ARTES
LIBRARY
1837
SCIENTIA
VERITAS
OF THE
UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN
E PLURIBUS UNUM
TUEBOR
SIQUAERIS PENINSULAM AMOENAM
CIRCUMSPICE
THIS BOOK
FORMS PART OF THE
ORIGINAL LIBRARY
OF THE
UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN
BOUGHT IN EUROPE
1838 TO 1839
BY
ASA GRAY
JC
51
·M758
1778
REFLECTIONS
ON THE
RISE AND FALL
OF THE
'ANCIENT REPUBLICKS.
1-149
2899
REFLECTIONS
ΟΝ ΤΗΕ
RISE AND FALL
J
OF THE
ANCIENT REPUBLICKS.
ADAPTED TO THE
PRESENT STATE
O F
GREAT BRITAIN.
Οὐ τί τῷδε, ἢ τῷδε δόξει, λογιζόμενα
᾿Αλλὰ τί πέπρακται λέγων.
Lucian. Hiftor. Scribend.
BY EDWARD WORTLEY MONTAGU, Efq.
THE FOURTH EDITIO N.
LONDON:
Printed for J. RIVINGTON and Sons, T. LONGMAN,
S. CROWDER, T. CADELL, T. BECKET, and W. Fox.
M DCC LXXVIII.
THE
CONTENTS.
REFACE
PR
Introduction
Page
I
9
CHAP.
I. Of the REPUBLICK of SPARTA
15
II.
Of ATHENS
74
III.
OF THEBES
157
IV.
Of CARTHAGE
176
V.
Of ROME
22I
VI. Of the real Cauſe of the rapid Declenſion
of the ROMAN REPUBLICK
293
VII. CARTHAGINIANS and ROMANS com-
pared
317
VIII. Of Revolutions in mixed Govern-
ments
364
IX. Of the BRITISH Conſtitution
377
蒸​茶
​PRE FА СЕ.
PLUTARCH
LUTARCH takes notice of a very
remarkable law of Solon's', "which
"declared every man infamous, who, in
is any fedition or civil diffention in the ſtate,
"fhould continue neuter, and refuſe to ſide
"with either party." Aulus Gellius, who
gives a more circumftantial detail of this un-
common law, affirms the penalty to be "nolefs
"than confifcation of all the effects, and ba-
"niſhment of the delinquent." Cicero men-
tions the fame law to his friend' Atticus, and
even makes the puniſhment capital, though
he refolves at the fame time not to conform
to it under his prefent circumſtances, un-
lefs his friend ſhould adviſe him to the con-
trary.
Which of theſe relators has given us the
real penalty annexed to this law by Solon,
¹
Plut. in Vit. Solon. TV.
ἄτιμον.
2 A. Gellii Noct. Attic. lib. 2. c. 12.
3 Epift. ad Attic. lib. 10. epift. 1.
B
is
1
2PREFACE.
N
.
is fcarce worth our enquiry. But I cannot
help obferving, that ſtrange as this law may
appear at first fight, yet if we reflect upon
the reaſons of it, as they are affigned by Plu-
tarch and A. Gellius, it will not appear un
worthy of that great legiſlator.
The opinion of Plutarch is, "That So-
lon intended no citizen, as foon as ever he
had provided for the fecurity of his own pri-
vate affairs, ſhould be fo unfeeling with re-
fpect to the public welfare as 'to affect a
brutal infenfibility, and not ſympathize with
the diftrefs and calamities of his country:
but that he ſhould immediately join the ho-
neſter and jufter party; and rather rifque his
all in defence of the fide he had efpoufed,
than keep aloof from danger till he faw which
party proved the ſtronger."
The reafon given by A. Gellius is more
ftriking, and leſs liable to objections than that
of Plutarch." If (fays that writer) all the
good men in any ftate, when they find
themſelves too weak to ftem the torrent of a
furious divided populace, and unable to fup-
prefs a fedition at its firft breaking out, ſhould
immediately divide, and throw themſelves
into the oppofite fides, the event in fuch a
I
* Μὴ συναλγεῖν, μηδὲ συννοσεῖν.
cafe
PRE
3
FACE:
cafe would be, that each party, which they
had differently efpoufed, would naturally be-
gin to cool, and put themſelves under their
direction, as perfons of the greateſt weight
and authority: thus it would be greatly in
the power of fuch men fo circumſtanced, to
reconcile all differences, and reftore peace
and union, while they mutually reſtrained
and moderated the fury of their own party,
and convinced the oppofite fide, that they
fincerely wifhed and laboured for their fafety,
not for their deftruction.
What effect this law had in the Athenian
ſtate is no where mentioned. However, as
it is plainly founded upon that relation which
every member bears to the body politick,
and that intereft which every individual is
ſuppoſed to have in the good of the whole
community; it is ftill, though not in exprefs
terms, yet virtually received in every free
country. For thofe who continue neuter in
civil diffention, under the denomination
of moderate men, who keep aloof and wait
quietly in order to follow the fortune of the
prevailing fide, are generally ftigmatized with
the opprobrious name of Time-fervers, and
confequently neither efteemed, nor truſted by
either party.
any
B 2
As
4 PRE FAC E.
1
As our own country is bleffed with the
greateſt ſhare of liberty, fo is it more ſubject
to civil diffentions than any other nation in
Europe. Every man is a politician, and
warmly attached to his reſpective party; and
this law of Solon's feems to take place as
ſtrongly in Britain, as ever it did in the moſt
factious times at Athens. Freedom of
thought, or the liberty of the mind, ariſes
naturally from the very effence of our con-
ſtitution; and the liberty of the preſs, that
peculiar privilege of the Britiſh ſubject, gives
every man a continual opportunity of laying
his fentiments before the Public. Would
our political writers purfue the falutary in-
tention of Solon, as delivered to us by A.
Gellius in his explication of that extraordi-
nary law, they might contribute greatly to
the eſtabliſhment of that harmony and union,
which can alone preferve and perpetuate the
duration of our conftitution. But the oppo-
fite views and interefts of parties make the
altercation endleſs; and the victory over an
antagoniſt is generally the aim, whilft the
inveſtigation of truth only, ought ever to
be the real end propofed in all controverfial
inquiries. The points which have lately
exerciſed fo many pens, turn upon the pre-
fent expediency, or abfolute infignificancy,
of a Militia; or, what principles conduce
moſt to the power, the happineſs, and the
duration
PREFACE.
5
duration of a free people. The diſpute has
been carried on, not only with warmth, but
even with virulence. The chicane of fo-
phiſtry has been employed, whilſt indecent
perfonal reflections, and the unfair charge
of difaffection, have been too often made
ufe of to fupply the defect of argument, and
to prejudice the reader, where they defpaired
of confuting the writer. Hiſtorical facts
have been either mifreprefented, or aſcribed
to wrong principles; the hiftory of ancient
nations has been quoted in general terms,
without marking the different periods dif-
tinguiſhed by fome memorable change in the
manners or conftitution of the fame people,
which will ever make a wide difference in
the application.
Anxious after truth, and unfatisfied with
fo many bold affertions deftitute of all proof
but the writer's word, which I daily met
with, I determined coolly and impartially
to examine the evidence arifing from an-
cient hiſtory, which both fides fo frequently
appealed to: for bare fpeculative reafoning
is no more conclufive in political inquiries
than in phyfical. Facts and experience
alone muſt decide: and political facts and ex-
perience muſt alone be learned from hiftory.
Determined therefore to judge for myſelf, I
carefully read over the hiftories of the moſt
celebrated
B 3.
6 P
PRE FAC E.
REFACE.
celebrated republics of antiquity in their ori-
ginal languages, unbiaffed either by com-
ments or tranflations; a part of hiſtory of
all others the most inftructive, and moft in-
tereſting to an Engliſhman.
As inftruction was the fole end of my
inquiries, I here venture to offer the refult
of them to the candor of the Public, fince
my only motive for writing was a moft ar-
dent concern for the welfare of my coun-
try. The deſign therefore of thefe papers
is, to warn my countrymen, by the example
of others, of the fatal confequences which
muft inevitably attend our inteftine divi-
fions at this critical juncture; and to in-
culcate the neceffity of that national union,
upon which the ftrength, the fecurity, and
the duration of a free ftate muft eternally
depend. Happy, if my weak endeavours
could in the leaft contribute to an end fo
falutary, fo truly defirable!
In the numerous quotations from the
Greek and Latin hiftorians, which are un-
avoidable in a treatife of this nature, I have
endeavoured to give the genuine fenfe and
meaning of the author, to the beſt of my
abilities. But as every reader has an equal
right of judging for himſelf, I have fubjoin-
ed in the margin, the original words of the
author,
f
PRE FAC E.
7
author, with the book, page, name, and
date of the reſpective edition I made ufe of,
for the eaſe as well as the fatisfaction of the
candid and judicious; for that vague and
careleſs manner, which fome writers affect,
of quoting an author by name only, with-
out ſpecifying the particular paffage referred
to in evidence, is neither ufeful, nor fatis-
factory to the generality of readers; whilft
the unfair method, too often practifed, of
quoting disjointed fcraps, or unconnected
fentences, is apt to raiſe ſtrong fufpicions,
that the real fentiments and intention of the
author are kept out of fight, and that the
writer is endeavouring to palm falſe evidence
upon his readers.
I muſt take the liberty of offering another
reaſon, which, I confefs, was of more weight
with me, becauſe more perfonally intereft-
ing. As the Britiſh ſtate and the ancient
free Republicks were founded upon the fame
principles, and their policy and conftitution
nearly fimilar, fo, as like cauſes will ever
produce like effects, it is impoffible not to
perceive an equal refemblance between their
and our manners, as they and we equally
deviated from thofe firft principles. Unhap-
pily, the refemblance between the manners
of our own times, and the manners of thofe
republicks in their moſt degenerate periods,
B 4
is
8
PREFACE,
is, in many refpects, ſo ſtriking, that unleſs
the words in the original were produced as
vouchers, any well-meaning reader, unac-
quainted with thofe hiftorians, would be apt
to treat the defcriptions of thoſe periods,
which he may frequently meet with, as li-
centious, undiſtinguiſhing fatire upon the
prefent age,
The behaviour of fome of our political
writers makes an apology of this nature in
fome meaſure neceffary; on the one hand,
that I may avoid the imputation of pedan-
try, or being thought fond of an idle of
tentatious parade of learning; on the other,
left a work calculated to promote domeftick peace
and union, fhould be trained, by the perverſe-
ness of party conftruction, into an inflammatory
libel.
INTRO-
2
INTRODUCTION.
I
Am not at all furpriſed at thoſe enco-
miums which the philofophers and poets
fo lavishly beſtow upon the pleaſures of a
country retirement. The profufion of va-
rying beauties, which attend the returning
ſeaſons, furniſhes out new and inexhauftible
fubjects for the entertainment of the ſtudious
and contemplative. Even winter carries
charms for the philofophic eye, and equally
ſpeaks the ftupendous power of the great
Author of nature. To fearch out and adore
the Creator through his works, is our pri
mary duty, and claims the first place in
every rational mind. To promote the public
good of the community of which we are
born members, in proportion to our fitu-
ation and abilities, is our fecondary duty as
men and citizens. I judged therefore a clofe
attention to the ftudy of Hiftory the moſt
uſeful way of employing that time which my
country-recefs afforded, as it would enable
me
ΙΟ
INTRODUCTION.
me to fulfil this obligation: and upon this
principle I take the liberty of offering thefe
papers as my mite towards the public
good.
In the courſe of theſe reſearches nothing
gave me fo much pleaſure as the ſtudy of
ancient hiſtory: becauſe it made me fo truly
fenfible of the ineftimable value of our own
conftitution, when I obferved the very dif-
ferent maxims and conduct, and the ſtrong
contraft between the founders of defpotick
monarchies, and the legiflators of the free
ſtates of antiquity. In the former, that ab-
furd and impious doctrine of millions created
for the fole uſe and pleafure of one indivi-
dual, feems to have been the firft pofition in
their politicks, and the general rule of their
conduct. The latter fixed the baſis of their
reſpective ſtates upon this juft and benevo-
lent plan, "That the fafety and happineſs
"of the whole community was the only end
"of all government." The former treated
mankind as brutes, and lorded it over them
by force. The latter received them as their
fellow-creatures, and governed them by rea-
fon; hence whilft we deteft the former as
the enemies and deftroyers, we cannot help
admiring and revering the latter, as the lo-
vers and benefactors of mankind.
The hiftories which I confidered with the
greateſt attention, gave me the higheſt en-
tertain-
+
INTRODUCTION.
I I
tertainment, and affected me moft, were
thofe of the free ftates of Greece, Carthage,
and Rome. I faw with admiration the
pro-
found wiſdom and fagacity, the unwearied
labour and difinterested fpirit of thoſe amia-
ble and generous men, who contributed
moft towards forming thoſe ſtates, and ſet-
tling them upon the fireft foundations. I
traced with pleafure their gradual progreſs
towards that height of power, to which in
procefs of time they arrived; and I marked
the various fteps and degrees by which they
again declined, and at laft funk gradually
into their final diffolution, not without a
juft mixture of forrow and indignation.
It would be a labour of more curiofity,
than of real uſe at this time, to give a long
detail of the original formation of thoſe
ftates, and the wife laws and inftitutions
by which they were raiſed to that envied
degree of perfection; yet a concife account
of the primitive conftitution of each ſtate
may be fo far neceffary, as it will render the
deviations from that conftitution more in-
telligible, and more fully illuftrate the cauſes
of their final fubverfion. But to point out
and expoſe the principal cauſes, which con-
tributed gradually to weaken, and at length
demoliſh and level with the ground, thoſe
beautiful fabricks raiſed by the public vir-
tue, and cemented by the blood of ſo many
illu-
12
INTRODUCTION.
illuftrious patriots, will, in my opinion, be
more intereſting, and more inftructive.
When I confider the conftitution of our
own country, I cannot but think it the beſt
calculated for promoting the happineſs, and
preferving the lives, liberty, and property of
mankind, of any yet recorded in prophane
hiftory. I am perfuaded too, that our wife
ancestors, who firft formed it, adopted what-
ever they judged moſt excellent and valuable
in thofe ftates when in their greateſt per-
fection; and did all that human wisdom
could do for rendering it durable, and tranf-
mitting it pure and entire to future gene-
rations. But as all things under the fun are
fubject to change, and children are too apt
to forget and degenerate from the virtues of
their fathers, there feems great reaſon to
fear, that what has happened to thoſe free
ſtates may at length prove the melancholy
fate of our own country; efpecially when
we reflect, that the fame caufes, which con-
tributed to their ruin, operate at this time
ſo very ſtrongly amongst us. As I thought
therefore that it might be of fome uſe to my
country at this dangerous crifis, I have fe-
lected the interefting examples of thofe once
free and powerful nations, who by totally
deviating from thofe principles upon which
they were originally founded, loft firft their
liberty, and at laft their very exiſtence, ſo far
as
1
!
13
INTRODUCTION.
as to leave no other veftiges remaining of
them as a people, but what are to be found
in the records of hiſtory.
It is an undoubted truth, that our own
conftitution has at different times fuffered
very fevere fhocks, and been reduced more
than once to the very point of ruin: but
becauſe it has hitherto providentially efcaped,
we are not to flatter ourſelves that opportu-
nities of recovery will always offer.
To
me therefore the method of proof drawn
from example, feemed more ftriking, as well
as more level to every capacity, than all ſpe-
culative reaſoning: for as the fame cauſes
will, by the ſtated laws of fublunary affairs,
fooner or later invariably produce the fame
effects, ſo whenever we ſee the fame maxims
of government prevail, the fame meaſures
purfued, and the fame coincidences of cir-
cumſtances happen in our own country,
which brought on, and attended the fubver-
fion of thoſe ſtates, we may plainly read our
own fate in their cataſtrophe, unleſs we ap-
ply ſpeedy and effectual remedies, before our
cafe is paſt recovery. It is the best way to
learn wiſdom in time from the fate of others;
and if examples will not inftruct and make
us wifer, I confefs myfelf utterly at a lofs to
know what will.
In my reflections, which naturally arofe
in the courſe of thefe refearches, truth and
im-
14
INTRODUCTION.
impartiality have been my only guides. I
have endeavoured to fhew the principal caufes
of that degeneracy of manners, which re-
duced thofe once brave and free people into
the moſt abject ſlavery. I have marked the
alarming progreſs which the fame evils have
already made, and ftill continue to make
amongſt us, with that honeft freedom which
is the birthright of every Engliſhman. My
fole aim is to excite thofe who have the wel-
fare of their country at heart, to unite their
endeavours in oppofing the fatal tendency
of thoſe evils, whilft they are within the
power of remedy. With this view, and this
only, I have marked out the remote as well
as immediate caufes of the ruin of thoſe
ftates, as ſo many beacons warning us to
avoid the fame rocks upon which they
ftruck, and at laft fuffered fhipwreck.
•
Truth will ever be unpalatable to thoſe
who are determined not to relinquish error,
but can never give offence to the honeft and
well-meaning amongſt my countrymen. For
the plain-dealing remonftrances of a friend
differ as widely from the rancour of an ene-
my, as the friendly probe of the phyſician
from the dagger of the affaffin.
REFLEC-
REFLECTIONS
ON THE
RISE and FALL
OF TH E
ANCIENT REPUBLICKS.
A
CHA P. I.
Of the REPUBLICK of SPARTA.
LL the free ftates of Greece were at
firft monarchial', and feem to owe
their liberty rather to the injudicious op-
preffions of their reſpective Kings, than to
any natural propenſity in the people to al-
ter their form of Government. But as they
had ſmarted fo feverely under an exceſs of
power lodged in the hands of one man,
they were too apt to run into the other ex-
treme, Democracy; a ftate of government
the moſt ſubject of all others to difunion
and faction.
Of all the Grecian states, that of Sparta
feems to have been the moſt unhappy, be-
fore their government was new-modelled by
Lycurgus. The authority of their Kings
and their laws (as Plutarch informs us) were
Dion. Halicarn. p. 248. edit. Rob. Steph. 1546.
alike
16 Of the RISE and FALL of the
ǎlike trampled upon and defpifed. Nothing
could reftrain the infolence of the headſtrong
encroaching populace; and the whole go-
vernment funk into Anarchy and confufion.
From this deplorable fituation the wifdom
and virtue of one great man raiſed his coun-
try to that height of power, which was the
envy and the terror of her neighbours. A
convincing proof how far the influence of one
great and good man will operate towards re-
forming the moſt bold licentious people, when
he has once thoroughly acquired their efteem
and confidence! Upon this principle Lycur-
gus founded his plan of totally altering and
new-moulding the conftitution of his coun-
try. A defign, all circumſtances confidered,
the moſt daring, and the moſt happily exe-
cuted, of any yet immortaliſed in hiſtory
Lycurgus fucceeded to the moiety of the
crown of Sparta at the death of his elder
brother; but his brother's widow declaring
herſelf with child, and that child proving to
be a fon, he immediately refigned the regal
dignity to the new-born infant, and govern-
ed as protector and guardian of the young
prince during his minority. The generous
and difintereſted behaviour of Lycurgus
upon this occafion endered him greatly to
the people; who had already experienced
• Plutarch relates this affair greatly to the honour of
Lycurgus in the beginning of his Life.
the
ANCIENT REPUBLÍCKS.
T
the happy effect of his wife and equitable
adminiftration. But to avoid the malice of
the Queen-mother and her faction, who
accuſed him of defigns upon the crown, he
prudently quitted both the government and
his country. In his travels during this vo-
luntary exile, he drew up and thoroughly
digefted his great fcheme of reformation:
He vifited all thoſe ſtates which at that time
were moft eminent for the wiſdom of their
laws, or the form of their conftitution.
He carefully obferved all the different infti-
tutions, and the good or bad effects which
they refpectively produced on the manners
of each people: He took care to avoid
what he judged to be defects; but felected
whatever he found calculated to promote
the happineſs of a people; and with theſe
materials he formed his fo much celebrated
plan of legiflation, which he very foon had
an opportunity of reducing to practice. For
the Spartans, thoroughly fenfible of the dif-
ference between the adminiſtration of Ly-
curgus and that of their Kings, not only
earneſtly wifhed for his prefence, but fent
repeated deputations to intreat him to return,
and free them from thoſe numerous diſorders
under which their country at that time la-
boured. As the requcft of the people was
unanimous, and the Kings no ways oppofed
his return, he judged it the critical time for
C
the
18 Of the RISE and F ALL of the
the execution of his ſcheme.
For he found
affairs at home in the diftracted fituation they
had been repreſented, and the whole body
of the people in a diſpoſition proper for his
purpoſe.
Lycurgus began his reform with a change
in the conftitution, which at that time con-
fifted of a confuſed medley of hereditary mo-
narchy divided between two families, and a
diforderly Democracy, utterly deftitute of the
balance of a third intermediate power, a
circumftance fo effential to the duration of
all mixed governments. To remedy this
evil, he eſtabliſhed a fenate with fuch a de-
gree of power, as might fix them the in-
expugnable barrier of the conftitution againſt
the encroachments either of Kings or peo-
ple. The Crown of Sparta had been long
divided between two families defcended ori-
ginally from the fame ancestor, who jointly
enjoyed the fucceffion. But though Ly-
curgus was fenfible that all the mifchiefs
which had happened to the ftate, aroſe from
this abfurd divifion of the regal power, yet
he made no alteration as to the fucceffion of
the two families. Any innovation in fo
nice a point might have proved an endleſs
fource of civil commotions, from the pre-
tenfions of that line which fhould happen
to be excluded. He therefore left them the
title
ANCIENT REPUBLICK S. 19
title and the infignia of royalty, but limited
their authority, which he confined to the
buſineſs of war and religion. To the people
he gave the privilege of electing the fena-
tors, and giving their fanction to thofe laws
which the Kings and fenate fhould ap-
prove.
When Lycurgus had regulated the go-
vernment, he undertook a talk more arduous
than any of the fabled labours of Hercules.
This was to new-mould his countrymen, by
extirpating all the deftructive paffions, and
raiſing them above every weakneſs and in-
firmity of human nature. A ſcheme which
all the great Philofophers had taught in
theory, but none except Lycurgus was ever
able to reduce to practice.
As he found the two extremes, of great
wealth and great indigence, were the fource
of infinite mifchiefs in a free ftate, he di--
vided the lands of the whole territory into
equal lots, proportioned to the number of the
inhabitants. He appointed publick tables, at
which he enjoined all the citizens to eat
together without diſtinction; and he fubject-
ed every man, even the Kings themfelves, to
a' fine, if they ſhould violate this law by
I H
*Αγιδος γεν το βασιλέως
ἐζημίωσαν αὐτόν.
Plut. vita Lycur. pag. 46. lit. c. Edit. Xiglandri.
C 2
eat-
20 Of the RISE and F ALL of the
eating at their own houſes. Their diet was
plain, fimple, and regulated by the law, and
diftributed amongſt the gueſts in equal por-
tions. Every member was obliged monthly
to contribute his quota for the provifion of
his refpective table. The converfation al-
lowed at theſe publick repafts turned wholly
upon fuch fubjects as tended moft to improve
the minds of the younger fort in the prin-
ciples of wiſdom and virtue. Hence, as
Xenophon obferves, they were ſchools not
only for temperance and fobriety, but alſo
for inftruction. Thus Lycurgus introduced
a perfect equality amongſt his countrymen.
The higheſt and the loweſt fared alike as to
diet, were all lodged and cloathed alike,
without the leaſt variation either in faſhion:
or materials.
When by theſe means he had extermi-
nated every ſpecies of luxury, he next re-
moved all temptation to the acquifition of
wealth, that fatal fource of the innumerable
evils which prevailed in every other country.
He effected this with his ufual policy, by
forbidding the currency of gold and filver
money, and fubftituting an iron coinage of
great weight and little value, which conti-
nued the only current coin through the whole
Spartan dominions for ſeveral ages.
Το
1
ANCIENT REPUBLICKS.
21
To bar
up the entrance of Wealth, and
guard his citizens againſt the contagion of
Corruption, he abfolutely prohibited navi-
gation and commerce, though his country
contained a large extent of fea-coaſt,furniſhed
with excellent harbours. He allowed as
little intercourſe as poffible with foreigners,
nor fuffered any of his countrymen to vifit
the neighbouring ftates, unlefs when the
publick bufinefs required it, left they ſhould
be infected with their vices. Agriculture,
and fuch mechanick trades as were abfolute-
ly neceffary for their fubfiftence, he confined
to their flaves the Ilotes; but he baniſhed
all thofe arts which tended either to debaſe
the mind, or enervate the body. Mufick
he encouraged, and poetry he admitted, but
both fubject to the infpection of the ma-
giftrates. Thus, by the equal partition of
the lands, and the abolition of gold and filver
money, he at once preferved his country
from luxury, avarice, and all thofe evils
which arife from an irregular indulgence of
the paffions, as well as all contentions about
property, with their confequence, vexatious
law-fuits.
To infure the obfervance of his laws to
the lateſt poſterity, he next formed proper
*
Lycurgus was the first who collected the entire
works of Homer; which he brought into Greece out of
Afta-Minor.
:
C3
C 3
1
regu-
22 Of the RISE and FALL of the
1
}
regulations for the education of their chil
dren, which he eſteemed one of the greateſt
duties of a legiſlator. His grand maxim was,
"That children were the property of the
ftate, to whom alone their education was
"to be intrufted." In their first infancy, the
nurſes were inftructed to indulge them nei-
ther in their diet, nor in thofe little froward
humours which are fo peculiar to that age
to inure them to bear cold and fafting; to
conquer their first fears by accuftoming them
to folitude and darkness; and to prepare
them for that ſtricter ftate of difcipline, to
which they were foon to be initiated.
When arrived at the age of feven years,
they were taken from the nurfes, and placed
in their proper claffes. The diet and cloath-
ing of all were the fame, juft fufficient to
fupport nature, and defend them from the
inclemency of the feafons; and they all
lodged alike in the fame dormitory on beds
of reeds, to which for the fake of warmth
they were allowed in winter to add the down
of thiftles. Their ſports and exerciſes were
fuch as contributed to render their limbs
fupple, and their bodies compact and firm.
They were accuftomed to run up the ſteep-
eft rocks barefoot; and fwimming, dancing,
hunting, boxing, and wreſtling, were their
conftant diverfions. Lycurgus was equally
folicitous in training up the youth to a habit
of
ANCIENT REPUBLIC K S. 23
of paffive courage as well as active. They
were taught to deſpiſe pain no leſs than dan-
ger, and to bear the fevereft fcourgings with
the moft invincible conftancy and refolution,
For to flinch under the ſtrokes, or to exhi-
bit the leaſt ſign of any fenſe of pain, was
deemed highly infamous,
Nor were the minds of the Spartan youth
cultivated with lefs care. Their learning, as
Plutarch informs us, was fufficient for their
occafions, for Lycurgus admitted nothing
but what was truly ufeful. They carefully
inftilled into their tender minds the great
duties of religion, and the facred indifpen-
fable obligation of an oath, and trained them
up in the beſt of ſciences, the principles of
wiſdom and virtue. The love of their
Country ſeemed to be almoſt innate; and this
leading maxim, "That every Spartan was
"the property of his country, and had no
right over himſelf," was by the force of
education incorporated into their very na-
ture.
When they arrived to manhood they were
inrolled in their militia, and allowed to be
preſent in their publick affemblies: Pri-
vileges which only fubjected them to a dif-
ferent difcipline. For the employments and
way of living of the citizens of Sparta were
fixed, and fettled by as ftrict regulations as
an army upon actual fervice. When
C 4
they
24
Of the RISE and F ALL of the
they took the field, indeed, the rigour of
their diſcipline with refpect to diet and the
ornament of their perfons was much foftened,
fo that the Spartans were the only people in
the univerfe, to whom the toils of war af-
forded eaſe and relaxation. In fact, Lycur
gus's plan of civil government was evident-
ly defigned to preferve his country free and
independent, and to form the minds of his
citizens for the enjoyment of that rational
and manly happiness which can find no
place in a breaft enflaved by the pleafures of
the fenfes, or ruffled by the paffions; and the
military regulations which he eſtabliſhed,
were as plainly calculated for the protection of
his country from the encroachments of her
ambitious neighbours. For he left no alterna
tive to his people but death or victory; and
he laid them under a neceflity of obferving
thofe regulations, by fubftituting the valour
of the inhabitants in the place of walls and
fortifications for the defence of their city.
If we reflect that human nature is at all
times and in all places the fame, it ſeems to
the laft degree aftonishing, how Lycurgus
could be able to introduce fuch a ſelf-deny-
ing plan of difcipline amongst a diforderly
licentious people: A fcheme, which not only
• Plutarch has taken no notice of them. But Xeno-
phon has fully explained them in his treatiſe on the Spar-
tan republick, p. 542, & feq.
levelled
ANCIENT REPUBLICK S. 25
*
levelled at once all diftinction, as to pro-
perty, between the richeſt and the pooreft
Individual, but compelled the greateſt per-
fons in the ftate to fubmit to a regimen
which allowed only the bare neceffaries of
life, excluding every thing which in the
opinion of mankind feems effential to its
comforts and enjoyments. I obferved be
fore, that he had fecured the esteem and con-
fidence of his countrymen; and there was,
befides, at that time a very lucky concur-
rence of circumftances in his favour. The
two Kings were men of little fpirit, and leſs
abilities, and the people were glad to ex-
change their diforderly ftate for any fettled
form of government. By his eſtabliſhment
of a Senate, confifting of thirty perfons who
held their feats for life, and to whom he
committed the fupreme power in civil af-
fairs, he brought the principal nobility into
his ſcheme, as they naturally expected a
ſhare in a government which they plainly
faw inclined fo much to an Ariftocracy. Even
the two Kings very readily accepted feats in
his fenate, to fecure fome degree of autho-
rity. He awed the people into obedience by
the fanction he procured for his fcheme
from the oracle at Delphos, whofe decifions
were, at that time, revered by all Greece as
divine and infallible. But the greateft dif-
ficulty he had to encounter, was, to procure
the
26 Of the RISE and F ALL of the
→
the equal partition of the lands. The very
firſt propofal met with fo violent an oppo-
fition from the men of fortune, that a fray
enfued, in which Lycurgus loft one of his
eyes. But the people, ftruck with the fight
of the blood of this admired legiſlator, feized
the offender, one Alcander, a young man of
a hot, but not difingenuous difpofition, and
gave him up to Lycurgus to be puniſhed, at
difcretion. But the humane and generous
behaviour of Lycurgus quickly made a con-
vert of Alcander, and wrought fuch a change,
that from an enemy he became his greateſt
admirer and advocate with the people.
I
Plutarch and the reſt of the Greek hifto-
rians leave us greatly in the dark as to the
means by which Lycurgus was able to make
fo bitter a pill, as the divifion of property,
go down with the wealthy part of his coun-
trymen. They tell us indeed, that he carri-
ed his point by the gentle method of reaſon-
ing and perfuafion, joined to that religious
awe which the divine fanction of the oracle
impreffed fo deeply on the minds of the citi-
zens. But the caufe, in my opinion, does not
ſeem equal to the effect. For the furious op-
poſition which the rich made to the very firft
motion for fuch a diſtribution of property,
evinces plainly, that they looked upon the re-
fponfes of the oracle as mere prieft-craft, and
treated it as the efprits-forts have done reli-
gion
ANCIENT REPUBLICKS.
27
gion in modern times; I mean, as a ſtate-
engine fit only to be played off upon the com-
mon people. It feems moft probable, in my
opinion, that as he effected the change in the
conftitution by the diftribution of the fu-
preme power amongst the principal perfons,
when he formed his fenate; fo the equal par-
tition of property was the bait thrown out to
bring over the body of the people intirely to
his intereft. I fhould rather think that he
compelled the rich to fubmit to fo grating a
meaſure, by the affiftance of the poorer citi-
zens, who were vaftly the majority.
As foon as Lycurgus had thoroughly fet-
tled his new policy, and by his care and affi-
duity imprinted his laws fo deeply in the
minds and manners of his countrymen, that
he judged the conſtitution able to fupport it-
ſelf, and ſtand upon its own bottom, his laft
ſcheme was, to fix and perpetuate its dura-
tion down to lateft pofterity, as far as human
prudence and human means could effect it.
To bring his ſcheme to bear, he had again
recourſe to the fame pious artifice which had
fucceeded fo well in the beginning. He told
the people in a general affembly, that he
could not poffibly put the finishing ftroke to
his new eſtabliſhment, which was the moft
effential point, till he had again confulted the
oracle. As they all expreffed the greateſt
eagerneſs for his undertaking the journey, he
laid
28 Of the RISE and FALL of the
laid hold of ſo fair an opportunity to bind the
Kings, fenate, and people, by the moſt folemn
oaths, to the ftrict obfervance of his new
form of government, and not to attempt the
leaſt alteration in any one particular till his
return from Delphos. He had now com-
pleted the great defign which he had long in
view, and bid an eternal adieu to his country.
The queftion he put to the oracle was,
"Whether the laws he had already efta-
blifhed, were rightly formed to make and pre-
ferve his countrymen virtuous and happy?'
The anſwer he received was juſt as favourable
as he defired. It was, "That his laws were
excellently well calculated for that purpofe;
and that Sparta fhould continue to be the
moſt renowned city in the world, as long as
her citizens perfifted in the obfervance of the
laws of Lycurgus." He tranfmitted both
the queftion and the anſwer home to Sparta
in writing, and devoted the remainder of his
life to voluntary banishment. The accounts
in hiſtory of the end of this great man are
very uncertain. Plutarch affirms, that as his
reſolution was never to releaſe his country-
men from the obligation of the oath he had
laid them under, he put a voluntary end to
his life at Delphos by fafting. Plutarch ex-
tols the death of Lycurgus in very pompous
terms, as a moſt unexampled inftance of he-
roic patriotiſm, fince he bequeathed, as he
terms
ANCIENT REPUBLIC Ks. 29
terms it, his death to his country, as the per-
petual guardian to that happineſs, which he
had procured for them during his life-time.
Yet the fame hiftorian acknowledges another
tradition, that Lycurgus ended his days in
the iſland of Crete, and defired, as his laſt re-
queft, that his body fhould be burnt, and his
aſhes thrown into the fea '; left, if his re-
mains fhould at any time be carried back to
Sparta, his countrymen might look upon
themſelves as releafed from their oath as
much as if he had returned alive, and be in-
duced to alter his form of government. I
own, I prefer this latter account, as more
agreeable to the genius and policy of that
wife and truly difinterefted legiflator,
The Spartans, as Plutarch afferts, held the
firſt rank in Greece for difcipline and reputa-
tion full five hundred years, by ſtrictly ad-
hering to the laws of Lycurgus; which not
one of their Kings ever infringed for fourteen
fucceffions quite down to the reign of the
firft Agis. For he will not allow the crea-
tion of thofe magiftrates called the Ephori to
be any innovation in the conſtitution, fince he
affirms it to have been, "not a relaxation,
but an extenfion, of the civil polity." But
notwithſtanding the glofs thrown over the in-
ftitution of the Ephori by this nice diftinction
* Plut. Vit. Lycurg. ad finem.
2 Plut. ibid. p. 58. Α. Η γὰρ τῶν φόρων κατάτασις, &c.
of
30 Of the RISE and FALL of the
1
of Plutarch's, it certainly induced as fatal a
change into the Spartan conftitution, as the
Tribunefhip of the people, which was formed
upon that model, did afterwards into the Ro-
man. For inftead of enlarging and ſtrength-
ening the aristocratical power, as Plutarch
afferts, they gradually ufurped the whole go-
vernment, and formed themſelves into a moſt
tyrannical Oligarchy.
The Ephori (a Greek word fignifying in-
fpectors or overfeers) were five in number,
and elected annually by the people out of
their own body. The exact time of the ori-
gin of this inftitution, and of the authority
annexed to their office, is quite uncertain.
Herodotus afcribes it to Lycurgus; Xenophon
to Lycurgus jointly with the principal citi-
zens of Sparta. Ariftotle and Plutarch fix it
under the reign of Theopompus and Poly-
dorus, and attribute the inftitution exprefly
to the former of thofe princes, about 130
years after the death of Lycurgus. I cannot
but fubfcribe to this opinion as the moſt pro-
bable, becauſe the firft political conteſt we
meet with at Sparta happened under the reign
of thoſe princes, when the people endea-
voured to extend their privileges beyond the
limits preſcribed by Lycurgus. But as the
joint oppofition of the Kings and ſenate was
eqally warm, the creation of this magiftra-
cy out of the body of the people, feems to
have
!
ANCIENT REPUBLICKS.
3 I
have been the ſtep taken at that time to com-
promiſe the affair, and reſtore the publick
tranquillity: A meaſure which the Roman
fenate copied afterwards, in the erection of
the Tribuneſhip, when their people mutinied,
and made that memorable feceffion to the
mons facer. I am confirmed in this opinion
by the relation which Ariftotle givos us' of
a remarkable difpute between Theopompus
and his wife upon that occafion. The Queen,
much diffatisfied with the inftitution of the
Ephori, reproached her huſband greatly for
fubmitting to fuch a diminution of the regal
authority, and aſked him if he was not
afhamed to tranfmit the crown to his poſteri-
ty ſo much weaker and worſe circumſtanced,
than he received it from his father. His an-
fwer, which is recorded amongſt the laconic
bons mots, was,
No, for I tranfmit it
"more lafting." But the event fhewed that
the lady was a better politician, as well as
truer prophet, than her huſband. Indeed the
nature of their office, the circumſtances of
their election, and the authority they affum-
ed, are convincing proofs that their office
was firft extorted, and their power afterwards
gradually extended, by the violence of the
people, irritated too probably by the oppref-
2
* De Rebufpubl. cap. 11. p. 154. vol. 2. Edit. Bafil.
$550.
* Οὐ δῆτα φάναι παραδίδωμι γὰρ π. εχρονιωτέραν.
Live
32 Of the RISE and F ALL of the
five behaviour of the Kings and fenate. For
whether their power extended no farther than
to decide, when the two Kings differed in
opinion, and to over-rule in favour of him
whoſe ſentiments fhould be moſt conducive
to the publick intereft, as we are told by Plu-
tarch in the life of Agis; or whether they
were at firſt only felect friends, whom the
Kings appointed as deputies in their abfence,
when they were both compelled to take the
field together in their long wars with the
Meffenians, as the fame author tells us by
the mouth of his hero Cleomenes, is a point,
which hiſtory does not afford us light enough
to determine. This however is certain, from
the concurrent voice of all the antient hifto-
rians, that at laft they not only feized upon
every branch of the adminiftration, but af-
fumed the power of imprifoning, depofing,
and even putting their Kings to death by their
own authority. The Kings too, in return,
fometimes bribed, fometimes depofed or mur-
dered the Ephori, and employed their whole
intereſt to procure fuch perfons to be elected,
as they judged would be moſt tractable. Í
look therefore upon the creation of the
Ephori as a breach in the Spartan conftitu-
tion, which proved the firft inlet to faction and
corruption. For that thefe evils took rife
from the inſtitution of the Ephori, is evident
I
from
ANCIENT REPUBLICK s. 33
from the teſtimony of Ariftotle, "who
thought it extremely impolitick to elect ma-
giſtrates, veſted with the fupreme power in
the ſtate, out of the body of the people;
becauſe it often happened, that men extreme-
ly indigent were raiſed in this manner to the
helm, whom their very poverty tempted to
become venal. For the Ephori, as he affirms,
had not only been frequently guilty of bri-
bery before his time, but, even at the very
time he wrote, fome of thoſe magiſtrates,
corrupted by money, uſed their utmoſt endea-
vours, at the publick repafts, to accompliſh
the deſtruction of the whole city. He adds
too, that as their power was fo great as to
amount to a perfect tyranny, the Kings them-
felves were neceffitated to court their favour
by fuch methods as greatly hurt the confti-
tution, which from an Ariftocracy, degene-
rated into an abfolute Democracy. For that
magiftracy alone had engroffed the whole
government.'
>>
From theſe remarks of the judicious Ari-
ftotle, it is evident that the Ephori had to-
tally deſtroyed the balance of power eſtabliſh-
ed by Lycurgus. From the tyranny therefore
of this magiftracy proceeded thofe convul-
fions which fo frequently fhook the ſtate of
Sparta, and at laſt gradually brought on its
I
* Arift. de Rebufpubl. lib. 2. c. 7. p. 122. lit. I.
vol. 2.
D
total
34 Of the RISE and F ALL of the
total fubverfion. But though this fatal alte-
ration in the Spartan conftitution muſt be im-
puted to the intrigues of the Ephori and
their faction, yet it could never, in my opi-
nion, have been effected, without a previous
degeneracy in their manners; which muſt
have been the confequence of fome deviation
from the maxims of Lycurgus.
It appears evidently from the teftimony of
Polybius and Plutarch, that the
great ſcheme
of the Spartan legiflator was, to provide for
the laſting ſecurity of his country againſt all
foreign invafions, and to perpetuate the blef-
fings of liberty and independency to the
people. By the generous plan of diſcipline.
which heeftabliſhed, he rendered his country-
men invincible at home. By baniſhing gold
and filver, and prohibiting commerce and
the uſe of ſhipping, he propofed to confine
the Spartans within the limits of their own
territories; and by taking away the means,
to reprefs all defires of making conqueſts
upon their neighbours. But the fame love
of glory and of their country which made
them fo terrible in the field, quickly pro-
duced ambition and a luft of domination }
and ambition as naturally opened the way for
avarice and corruption. For Polybius
•
I
truly obferves, that as long as they extended
I
Polyb. lib. 6. p. 685. vol. 1. edit. Ifaac. Gronov.
1670.
t
their
ANCIENT REPUBLIC ks.
35€*
their views no farther than the dominion over
their neighbouring ftates, the produce of
their own country was fufficient for what
fupplies they had occafion for in ſuch ſhort
excurfions. But when, in direct violation
of the laws of Lycurgus, they began to un-
dertake more diftant expeditions both by ſea
and land, they quickly felt the want of a
publick fund to defray their extraordinary
expences. For they found by experience, that
neither their iron money, nor their method
of trucking the annual produce of their own
lands for fuch commodities as they wanted
(which was the only traffick allowed by the
laws of Lycurgus) could poffibly anfwer their
demands upon thofe occafions. Hence their
ambition, as the fame hiftorian remarks, laid
them under the fcandalous neceffity of
pay-
ing fervile court to the Perfian monarchs for
pecuniary fupplies and fubfidies, to impofe
heavy tributes upon the conquered iflands,
and to exact money from the other Grecian
Rates, as occafions required.
Hiftorians unanimoufly agree, that wealth,
with its attendants luxury and corruption,
gained admiffion at Sparta in the reign of the
firſt Agis. Lyfander, like a Hero and a Po-
litician; a man of the greateſt abilities and
the greateſt diſhonefty that Sparta ever pro-
duced; rapacious after money, which at the
fame time he defpifed, and a flave only to
D 2
am-
36 of the RISE and F ALL of the
1
ambition, was the author of an innovation
fo fatal to the manners of his countrymen.
After he had enabled his country to give law
to all Greece by his conqueſt of Athens, he
fent home that immenfe mafs of wealth,
which the plunder of ſo many ſtates had put
into his poffeffion. The moft fenfible men
amongſt the Spartans, dreading the fatal con-
fequences of this capital breach of the infti-
tutions of their legiflator, protefted ftrongly
before the Ephori againſt the introduction of
gold and filver, as pefts deftructive to the
publick. The Ephori referred it to the de-
cifion of the fenate, who, dazzled with the
luftre of that money, to which 'till that time
they had been utter ftrangers, decreed, "That
gold and filver money might be admitted for
the fervice of the ftate; but made it death,
if any ſhould ever be found in the poffeffion
of a private perfon." This decifion Plutarch
cenfures as weak and fophiftical'. As if
Lycurgus was only afraid fimply of money,
and not of that dangerous love of money
which is generally its concomitant; a paffion
which is fo far from being rooted out by
the reſtraint laid upon private perfons, that
it was rather inflamed by the effeem and va-
lue which was fet upon money by the pub-
lick. Thus, as he justly remarks, whilft
Plut. in Vit. Lyfand. p. 442. lit. E.
they
ANCIENT REPUBLICKS.
37
1
they barred up the houſes of private citizens
againſt the entrance of Wealth by the terror
and fafeguard of the Law, they left their
minds more expoſed to the love of money
and the influence of corruption, by raiſing
an univerfal admiration and defire of it, as
fomething great and refpectable. The truth
of this remark appears by the inftance given
us by Plutarch, of one Thorax, a great friend
of Lyfander's, who was put to death by the
Ephori, upon proof that a quantity of ſilver
had been actually found in his poffeffion.
From that time Sparta became venal, and
grew extremely fond of fubfidies from fo-
reign powers. Agefilaus, who fucceeded
Agis, and was one of the greateſt of their
Kings, behaved in the latter part of his life
more like a captain of a band of mercena-
ries, than a King of Sparta. He received a
large fubfidy from Tachos, at that time King
of Egypt, and entered into his ſervice with a
body of troops which he had raiſed for that
purpoſe. But when Nectanabis, who had re-
belled againſt his uncle Tachos, offered him
more advantageous terms, he quitted the
unfortunate Monarch and went over to his
rebellious nephew, pleading the intereſt of
his country in excuſe for ſo treacherous and
infamous an action. So great a change had
* Plut, in Vit. Ageſi. p. 617. lit. C₂
D 3
the
38 Of the RISE and FALL of the
J
the introduction of money already made in
the manners of the leading Spartans !
Plutarch dates the firft origin of corrup-
tion, that diſeaſe of the body politick, and
confequently the decline of Sparta, from that
memorable period, when the Spartans having
fubverted the domination of Athens, glutted
themſelves (as he terms it) with gold and
filver. For when once the love of money
had crept into their city, and avarice and the
moft fordid meannefs grew up with the pof-
feffion, as luxury, effeminacy, and diffipa-:
tion did with the enjoyment of wealth,
Sparta was deprived of many of her ancient
glories and advantages, and funk greatly both
in power and reputation, till the reign of
Agis and Leonidas. But as the original al-
lotments of land were yet preferved (the
number of which Lycurgus had fixed and
decreed to be kept up by a particular law)
and were tranfmitted down from father to
fon by hereditary fucceffion, the fame con-
ftitutional order and equality ftill remain-
ing, raiſed up the ftate again, however, from
other political lapfes.
Under the reigns of thofe two Kings hap-
pened the mortal blow, which fubverted the
very foundation of their conftitution.. Epi-
In Vit. Agid. p. 796. lit. C.
* Ibid. p. 797. lit. C.
tadeus,
ANCIENT REPUBLICKS.
39
I
tadeus, one of the Ephori, upon a quarrel
with his fon, carried his refentment fo far
as to procure a law which permitted everyone
to alienate their hereditary lands, either by
gift or fale, during their life-time, or by will
at their deceaſe. This law produced a fatal
alteration in the landed property. For as
Leonidas, one of their Kings, who had lived
a long time at the court of Seleucus, and
married a lady of that country, had intro-
duced the pomp and luxury of the Eaft at
his return to Sparta, the old inftitutions of
Lycurgus, which had fallen into difufe, were
by his example foon treated with contempt.
Hence the neceffity of the luxurious, and
the extortion of the avaricious, threw the
whole property into fo few hands, that
out of feven hundred, the number to which
the ancient Spartan families were then re-
duced, about one hundred only were in pof-
feffion of their respective hereditary lands al-
lotted by Lycurgus. The reft, as Plutarch
obferves, lived an idle life in the city, an
indigent abject herd, alike deſtitute of fortune
and employment; in their wars abroad, in-
dolent difpirited daftards; at home ever ripe
for fedition and infurrections, and greedily
catching at every opportunity of embroiling
* In Vit. Agid. p. 797. lit. A.`
? Ibid. lit. E.
D 4
affairs,
a
40 Of the RISE and FALL of the
affairs, in hopes of fuch a change as might
enable them to retrieve their fortunes. Evils,
which the extremes of wealth and indi-
gence are ever productive of in free coun-
tries.
Young Agis, the third of that name, and
the moſt virtuous and accomplished King
that ever fat upon the throne of Sparta fince
the reign of the great Agefilaus, undertook
the reform of the ftate, and attempted to
re-eſtabliſh the old Lycurgic conftitution, as
the only means of extricating his country
out of her diſtreſſes, and raiſing her to her
former dignity and luftre. An enterprize at-
tended not only with the greateſt difficulties,
but, as the times were fo corrupt, with the
greateſt danger. He began with trying the
efficacy of example, and though he had been
bred in all the pleaſures and delicacy which
affluence could procure, or the fondneſs of
his mother and grandmother, who were the
wealthieſt people in Sparta, could indulge
him in, yet he at once changed his way of
life as well as his drefs, and conformed to
the ftricteft difcipline of Lycurgus in every
particular. This generous victory over his
paffions, the moft difficult and moft glori-
ous of all others, had fo great an effect
2
¹ Vita Agid. p. 797. lit. B.
Ibid. lit. C.
amongſt
ANCIENT REPUBLICKS.
41
1
amongst the younger Spartans, that they came
into his meaſures with more alacrity and
zeal than he could poffibly have hoped for.
Encouraged by this fuccefs, Agis brought
over fome of the principal Spartans, amongſt
whom was his uncle Agefilaus, whofe in-
fluence he made uſe of to perfuade his mo-
ther, who was fifter to Agefilaus, to join
his party. For her wealth, and the great
number of her friends, dependants, and debt-
ors, made her extremely powerful, and gave
her great weight in all public tranfactions.
His mother, terrified at firft at her fon's
raſhneſs, condemned the whole as the vifion-
ary ſcheme of a young man, who was at-
tempting a meafure not only prejudicial to
the ftate, but quite impracticable. But when
the reaſonings of Agefilaus had convinced her
that it would not only be of the greateſt
utility to the publick, but might be effected
with great eafe and fafety, and the King
himſelf intreated her to contribute her wealth
and intereſt to promote an enterprize which
would redound fo much to his glory and
reputation; 2 fhe and the reft of her fe-
* Ibid. p. 798. lit. B.
2
male
Something ſeems plainly to be wanting in this paſ-
fage, which is ftrangely obfcure and intricate. It is
evident that Agis employed his uncle Agefilaus to per-
fuade his mother, who was Agefilaus's fifter: THY μNTÉga
την μητέρα
πείθειν, ἀδελφὴν οὖσαν τὰ ᾿Αγησιλάς. The king himfelf
intreats
42
Of the RISE and F ALL of the
male friends at laſt changed their fentiments.
Fired then with the fameglorious emulation,
and ſtimulated to virtue, as it were by fome
divine impulfe, they not only voluntarily
fpurred on Agis, but fummoned and encou-
Faged all their friends, and incited the other
ladies to engage in fo generous an enter-
prize. For they were confcious (as Plutarch
obferves) of the great afcendency which the
Spartan women had always over their huf-
bands, who gave their wives a much greater
fhare in the publick adminiſtration, than
their wives allowed them in the management
I
↑
intreats his mother to affist him, auros de ů Baol-
λεὺς ἔδειτο τῆς μητρος,
And after he has enumer-
ated the advantages which would refult from his fcheme,
Plutarch abruptly adds, στο μετέπεσον ταις γνώμαις αἱ
ymates, &c. in the plural number, though he had juft
before mentioned Agis's mother only, as the woman ap-
plied to on this occafion. It is evident therefore, that
his grandmother and all their female friends and rela-
tions must have been prefent at that time, though not
mentioned, and that they were the only Spartan ladies
who came heartily into his ſcheme. For when Agis
afterwards offers his whole fortune to the publick, he
affures the people that his mother and grandmother,
Tas unrices,, and his friends and relations, who were
the richest families in Sparta, were ready to do the fame.
As Agis certainly includes the wives of his friends and
relations, and mentions no other women, I have taken
that ſpeech for my guide in giving the fenſe of this
whole paffage, in which I could get no afftance from
any
of the commentators.
In Vit. Agid, p. 798. lit. D.
of
ANCIENT REPUBLICKS,
43
of their domeftick affairs. A circumftance
which at that time had drawn almoſt all
the wealth of Sparta into the hands of the
women, and proved a terrible, and almoſt
unfurmountable obftacle to Agis. For the
Ladies had violently oppofed a ſcheme of
reformation, which not only tended to de-
prive them of thofe pleafures and trifling or-
naments, which, from their ignorance of
what was truly good and laudable, they ab-
furdly looked upon as their fupreme happi-
nefs, but to rob them of that reſpect and
authority which they derived from their fu-
perior wealth. Such of them therefore as
were unwilling to give up theſe advantages,
applied to Leonidas, and intreated him, as
he was the more refpectable man for his
age and experience, to check his young hot-
headed colleague, and quafh whatever at-
tempts he ſhould make to carry his deſigns
into execution. The older Spartans were
no leſs averſe to a reformation of that na-
ture. For as they were deeply immerfed in
corruption, they trembled at the very name
of Lycurgus, as much as runaway flaves,
when retaken, do at the fight of their
mafters.
Leonidas was extremely ready to fide with
and affift the rich, but durft not openly op-
pofe Agis, for fear of the people, who were
eager
for fuch a revolution. He attempted
there-
44 Of the RISE and F ALL of the
1
1
therefore to counteract all his attempts un-
derhand, and infinuated to the magiſtrates,
that Agis aimed at fetting up a tyranny, by
bribing the poor with the fortunes of the
rich; and propoſed the partition of lands and
the abolition of debts as the means of pur-
chafing guards for himſelf only, not citi-
zens, as he pretended, for Sparta.
Agis however purfued his defign, and hav-
ing procured his friend Lyfander to be elect-
ed one of the Ephori, immediately laid his
fcheme before the fenate. The chief heads
of his plan were: "That all debts fhould be
totally remitted; that the whole land
CC
2
fhould be divided into a certain number of
"lots; and that the ancient diſcipline and
"customs of Lycurgus fhould be revived."
Warm debates were occafioned in the fenate
by this propofal, which at laſt was * reject-
ed by a majority of one only. Lyfander
in the mean time convoked an affembly of
the people, where after he had harangued.
Mandroclidas and Agefilaus befeeched them
not to fuffer the majefty of Sparta to be any
longer trampled upon for the fake of a few
luxurious overgrown citizens, who impofed
upon them at pleaſure. They reminded
them not only of the refponfes of ancient
Vit. Agid. p. 800. lit. A.
* Ibid. 799. lit. A,
દ
oracles,
ANCIENT REPUBLICKS.
45
oracles, which enjoined them to beware of
avarice, as the peft of Sparta, but alſo of
thoſe ſo lately given by the oracle at Paſiphae,'
which, as they affured the people, command-
ed the Spartans to return to that perfect
equality of poffeffions, which was ſettled by
the law firft inftituted by Lycurgus. Agis
ſpoke laſt in this affembly; and, to enforce
the whole by example, told them in a very
few words, That he offered a moft ample
" contribution towards the eſtabliſhment of
"that polity, of which he himſelf was
"the author. That he now refigned his
"whole patrimony into the common ſtock,
"which confifted not only of rich arable
"and paſture land, but of 600 talents be-
"fides in coined money. He added, that
"his mother, grandmother, friends and re-
"lations, who were the most wealthy of all
"the citizens of Sparta, were ready to do
"the fame."
The people, ftruck with the magnanimity
and generofity of Agis, received his offer
with the loudest applaufe, and extolled him,
as the only King who for three hundred
years paſt had been worthy of the throne of
Sparta. This provoked Leonidas to fly out
This is an oracle mentioned by Plutarch, about
which the learned are not agreed: however, it ſeems to
have given its refponfes in dreams.
into
1
46 Of the RISE and F ALL of the
into the moſt open and violent oppofition,
from the double motive of avarice and envy
For he was fenfible, that if this ſcheme took
place, he fhould not only be compelled to
follow their example, but that the furrender
of his eſtate would then come from him
with fo ill a grace, that the honour of the
whole meaſure would be attributed folely to
his colleague. Lyfander, finding Leonidas and
his party too powerful in the fenate, deter-
mined to profecute and expel him for the
breach of a very old law, which forbid any
of the royal family to intermarry with fo-
reigners, or to bring up any children which
they might have by fuch marriage, and in-
flicted the penalty of death upon any one
who ſhould leave Sparta to refide in foreign
countries.
After Lyfander had taken care that Leo-
nidas fhould be informed of the crime laid
to his charge, he with the reft of the Epho-
ri, who were of his party, addreffed them-
ſelves to the ceremony of obferving a fign
from heaven. A piece of ſtate-craft moſt
probably introduced formerly by the Ephori
to
The reader may be glad perhaps to find here the
ceren ony made ufe of upon this occafion. Vit. Agid.
p. 8co. lit. B. δι' ἐτων ἐννέα λαβόντες οι Ἔφυροι, ὅτε.
Every ninth year the Ephori taking the opportunity of
a clear fill night, when the moon did not appear, fat
filently
ANCIENT REPUBLICKS.
47
to keep the Kings in awe, and perfectly well
adapted to the fuperftition of the people. Ly-
fander affirming that they had feen the ufual
fign, which declared that Leonidas had fin-
ned againſt the Gods, fummoned him to his
trial, and produced evidence fufficient to con-
vict him. At the fame time he ſpirited up
Cleombrotus, who had married the daughter
of Leonidas, and was of the royal blood, to
put in his claim to the fucceffion. Leonidas,
terrified at thefe daring meaſures, fled, and
took fanctuary in the temple of Minerva :
he was depofed therefore for non-appear-
ance, and his crown given to his fon-in-
law Cleombrotus.
But as foon as the term of Lyfander's
magiftracy expired, the new Ephori, who
were elected by the prevailing intereſt of the
oppofite party, immediately undertook the
protection of Leonidas. They fummoned
Lyfander and his friends to anſwer for their
decrees for cancelling debts, and dividing
the lands, as contrary to the laws, and trea-
fonable innovations; for fo they termed all
attempts to reſtore the ancient conftitution
filently and obferved the ſky with great attention; and,
if they faw a ftar fhoot, they judged the kings hd of-
fended the Gods; and removed them from the govern-
ment, till an oracle came from Delphos which was fa-
vourable to them.
of
48 of the RISE and F ALL of the
of Lycurgus. Alarmed at this, Lyfander
perfuaded the two Kings to join in oppofing
the Ephori; who, as he plainly proved,
affumed an authority which they had not the
leaſt right to, as long as the Kings acted
together in concert. The Kings, convinced
by his reaſons, armed a great number of the
youth, releaſed all who were priſoners for
debt, and thus attended went into the Fo-
rum, where they depofed the Ephori, and
procured their own friends to be elected into
that office, of whom Agefilaus the uncle of
Agis was one. By the care and humanity
of Agis, no blood was fpilt on this memo-
rable occafion. He even protected his an-
tagoniſt Leonidas againſt the deſigns which
Agefilaus had formed upon his life, and fent
him under a fafe convoy to Tegea.
After this bold ftroke, all oppofition funk
before them, and every thing fucceeded to
their wishes; when the fingle avarice of
Agefilaus, that moſt baneful peft, as Plu-
tarch terms it, which had fubverted a con-
ftitution the moſt excellent, and the moft
worthy of Sparta that had ever yet been
eſtabliſhed, overfet the whole enterpriſe.
By the character which Plutarch gives of
Agefilaus', he appears to have been artful
and eloquent, but at the fame time effemi-
• Plut. Vit. Agid. p. 798. lit. A.
nate,
ANCIENT REPUBLIC KS. 49
hate, corrupt in his manners, avaritious, and
ſo bad a man, that he engaged in this pro-
jected revolution with no other view but
that of extricating himſelf from an im-
menfe load of debt, which he had moſt
probably contracted to fupport his luxury.
As foon therefore as the two Kings, who
were both young men, agreed to proceed
upon the abolition of debts, and the parti-
tion of lands, Agefilaus artfully perfuaded
them not to attempt both at once, for fear
of exciting fome terrible commotion in the
city. He affured them farther, that if the
rich ſhould once be reconciled to the law for
cancelling the debts, the law for dividing
the lands would go down with them quietly
and without the leaft obftruction. The
Kings affented to his opinion, and Lyfander
himſelf was brought over to it, deceived
by the fame fpecious, though pernicious
reaſoning: calling in therefore all the bills,
bonds, and pecuniary obligations, they piled
them up, and burnt them all publickly in the
Forum, to the great mortification of the
moneyed men, and the ufurers. But Agefi
laus in the joy of his heart could not
re-
frain from joking upon the occafion, and told
them with a fneer, That whatever they
might think of the matter, it was the bright-
* Ibid. p. 801. lit. B.
E
eſt
50
Of the RISE and F ALL of the
1
eſt and moſt chearful flame, and the pureft
bonfire, he had ever beheld in his life-time.
Agefilaus had now carried his point, and his
conduct proves, that the Spartans had learnt
the art of turning publick meafures into
private jobs, as well as their politer neigh-
bours. For though the people call loudly
for the partition of the lands, and the Kings
gave orders for it to be done immediately,
Agefilaus contrived to throw new obftacles
in the way, and protracted the time by va-
rious pretences till Agis was obliged to march
with the Spartan auxiliaries to affift their
allies the Achæans. For he was in poffeffion
of a moft fertile and extenfive landed eftate
at the very time when he owed more than
he was worth; and as he had got rid of all
his incumbrances at once by the firft decree,
and never intended to part with a ſingle foot
of his land, it was by no means his intereſt
to promote the execution of the fecond.
The Spartan troops were moftly indigent
young men, who, elate with their freedom
from the bonds of ufury, and big with the
hopes of a fhare in the lands at their return,
followed Agis with the greateſt vigour and
alacrity, and behaved fo well in their march,
that they reminded the admiring Greeks of
the excellent difcipline and decorum for
which the Spartans were formerly fo fa-
mous under the most renowned of their
ancient
1
ANCIENT REPUBLICKS.
SI
e
ancient leaders. But whilft Agis was in th
field, affairs at home took a very unhappy
turn in his disfavour. The tyrannical beha“
viour of Agefilaus, who fleeced the people
with infupportable exactions, and ſtuck at
no meaſure, however infamous or criminals
which would bring in money, produced
another revolution in favour of Leonidas.
For the people, enraged at being tricked out
of the promiſed partition of the lands, which
they imputed to Agis and Cleombrotus, and
detefting the rapacioufnefs of Agefilaus,
readily joined that party which confpired to
reſtore Leonidas. Agis finding affairs in this
defperate fituation at his return, gave up all
for loſt, and took fanctuary in the temple of
Minerva, as Cleombrotus had done in the
temple of Neptune.
Though Cleombrotus was the chief ob-
ject of Leonidas's refentment, yet he ſpared
his life at the interceffion of his daughter
Chelonis, the wife of Cleombrotus; but
condemned him to perpetual exile. The ge-
nerous Chelonis gave a fignal inftance, upon
this occafion, of that heroic virtue, for
which the Spartan ladies were once fo re-
markably eminent. When her father was
expelled by the intrigues of Lyfander, the
followed him into exile, and refuſed to ſhare
his crown with Cleombrotus. In this ca-
lamitous reverfe of fortune, fhe was deaf to
E 2
all
52 Of the RISE and FALL of the
I
all intreaties, and rather chofe to partake of
the miſeries of banifhment with her huf-
band, than all the pleaſures and grandeur of
Sparta with her father. ' Plutarch
ladies a fine compliment upon this occa-
pays the
fion, when he fays, "That unleſs Cleom-
"brotus fhould have been wholly corrupted
""
by falfe ambition, he muſt have deemed
"himſelf more truly happy in a ſtate of
"baniſhment with fuch a wife, than he could
"have been upon à throne without her."
But though Cleombrotus efcaped death,
yet nothing but the blood of Agis could fa-
tisfy the vindictive rage of the ungrateful
Leonidas, who, in the former revolution,
owed his life to that unfortunate Prince's ge-
rofity. After many ineffectual attempts
to entice Agis from his afylum, three of
his intimate friends in whom he moſt con-
fided, who uſed to accompany and guard
him to the baths and back again to the tem-
ple, betrayed him to his enemies. Ampha-
res, the chief of theſe, and the contriver of
the plot, was one of the new Ephori created:
after the depofition of Agefilaus. This
wretch had lately borrowed a quantity of
valuable plate, and a number of magnificent
veſtments of Agis's mother Agefiſtrata, and
determined to make them his own by the
Vit. Agid. p. 803. lit. A
de
IM
ANCIENT REPUBLICKS.
53
deſtruction of Agis and his family; at their
return therefore in their uſual friendly man-
ner from the baths, he first attacked Agis
by virtue of his office, whilft Demochares
and Arcefilaus, the other two, feized and
dragged him to the publick prifon. Agis
ſupported all theſe indignities with the ut-
moſt magnanimity: and when the Ephori
queftioned him, whether Agefilaus and Ly-
fander did not conſtrain him to do what he
had done, and whether he did not repent of
the ſteps he had taken; he undauntedly took
the whole upon himſelf, and told them that
he gloried in his fcheme, which was the re-
fult of his emulation to follow the example
of the great Lycurgus. Stung with this an-
fwer, the Ephori condemned him to die by
their own authority, and ordered the officers
to carry him to the place in the priſon where
the malefactors were ftrangled. But when
the officers and even the mercenary foldiers
of Leonidas refuſed to be concerned in fo
infamous and unprecedented an action as
laying hands upon their King, Demochares
threatening and abufing them greatly for
their difobedience, feized Agis with his own
hands, and dragged him to the execution-
room, where he was ordered to be diſpatch-
ed immediately. Agis fubmitted to his fate
with equal intrepidity and refignation, re-
proving one of the executioners who deplor-
E 3
ed
54
Of the RISE and F ALL of the
!
ed his calamities, and declaring himſelf in-
finitely happier than his murderers. The
unfeeling and treacherous Amphares attend-
ed the execution, and as foon as Agis was
dead, he admitted his mother and grand-
mother into the prifon, who came to inter-
ceed that Agis might be allowed to make
his defence before the people. The wretch
aflured the mother, with an infulting fneer,
that her fon fhould fuffer no heavier puniſh-
ment than he had done already; and imme-
diately ordered her mother Archidamia, who
was extremely old, to execution. As foon
as fhe was dead, he bid Agefiftrata enter the
room, where, at the fight of the dead bodies,
fhe could not refrain from kiffing her fon,
and crying out, that his too great lenity and
good-nature had been their ruin. The fa-
vage Amphares, laying hold of thoſe words,
told her, that as fhe approved of her fon's
actions ſhe ſhould ſhare his fate. Agefiftrata
met death with the refolution of an old
Spartan Heroine, praying only that this
whole affair might not prove prejudicial to
her country.
Thus fell the gallant Agis in the cauſe of
liberty and publick virtue, by the perfidy of
his mercenary friends, and the violence of a
corrupt and moft profligate faction. I have
given a more particular detail of the cata-
ſtrophe of this unfortunate Prince as tranf-
mitted
1
ANCIENT REPUBLICKS,
55
mitted to us by Plutarch, becauſe it furniſhes
convincing proofs, how greatly the intro-
duction of wealth had corrupted and debafed
the once upright and generous ſpirit of the
Spartans,
a very
Archidamus, the brother of Agis, eluded
the ſearch made for him by Leonidas, and
eſcaped the maffacre by flying from Sparta,
But Leonidas compelled his wife Agiatis,
who was a young lady of the greateſt beau-
ty in all Greece, and fole heiress to a vaſt
eftate, to marry his own fon Cleomenes,
though Agiatis had but juſt lain-in of a ſon,
and the match was entirely contrary to her
inclinations. This event however produced
different effect from what Leonidas
intended, and after his death proved the
ruin of his party, and revenged the mur-
der of Agis. For Cleomenes, who was very
young, and extremely fond of his wife, would
fhed fympathifing tears whenever ſhe re-
lated the melancholy fate of Agis, and occa-
fionally defire her to explain his intentions,
and the nature of his fcheme, to which he
would liften with the greatest attention.
From that time he determined to follow fo
glorious an example, but kept the refolution
fecret in his own breaft till the means and
opportunity ſhould offer. He was fenfible
Plut. Vit. Cleom. p. 805. lit. B.
E 4
that
}
1
36 Of the RISE and FALL of the
that an attempt of that nature would be ut-
terly impracticable whilft his father lived;
who, like the reft of the leading citizens,
had wholly given himſelf up to a life of eaſe
and luxury. Warned too by the fate of
Agis, he knew how extremely dangerous it
was even once to mention the old frugality
and fimplicity of manners, which depended
upon the obfervance of the difcipline and in-
ftitutions of Lycurgus. But as foon as ever
he fucceeded to the Crown at the death of
his father, and found himſelf the fole reign-
ing King of Sparta without a colleague, he
immediately applied his whole care and
ſtudy to accompliſh that great change which
he had before projected. For he obferved
the manners of the Spartans in general were
grown extremely corrupt and diffolute; the
rich facrificing the publick intereft to their
own private avarice and luxury; the
the poor,
from their extreme indigence, averfe to the
toils of war, carelefs and negligent of edu-
cation and diſcipline; whilft the Ephori had
engroffed the whole royal power, and left
him in reality nothing but the empty title:
Circumſtances greatly mortifying to an
aſpiring young Monarch, who panted eager-
ly after glory, and impatiently wiſhed to re-
trieve the loft reputation of his country-
men.
2
He
ANCIENT REPUBLICKS.
57
He began by founding his most intimate
friend, one Xenares, at a diſtance only, en-
quiring what fort of man Agis was, and
which way, and by whofe advice, he was
drawn into thofe unfortunate meaſures, Xe-
nares, who attributed all his queſtions to the
curiofity natural to a young man, very rea-
dily told him the whole ftory, and explained
ingenuouſly every particular of the affair as
it really happened. But when he remarked
that Cleomenes often returned to the charge,
and every time with
time with greater eagerness, more
and more admiring and applauding the ſcheme
and character of Agis, he immediately faw
through his defign. After reproving him,
therefore, feverely for talking and behaving
thus like a madman, Xenares broke off all
friendſhip and intercourfe with him, though
he had too much honour to betray his friend's
fecret. Cleomenes, not in the leaft difcou-
raged at this repulfe, but concluding that
he ſhould meet with the fame reception from
the reft of the wealthy and powerful citi-
zens, determined to truft none of them, but
to take upon himſelf the whole care and
management of his fcheme'. However, as
he was fenfible that the execution of it
would be much more feafible, when his
country was involved in war, than in a ſtate
Plut. Vit. Cleom. p. 8c9. lit. A.
of
58 Of the RISE and FALL of the
1
of profound peace, he waited for a proper
opportunity; which the Achæans quickly
furniſhed him with. For Aratus, the great
projector of the famous Achæan league, into
which he had already brought many of the
Grecian ftates, holding Cleomenes extremely
cheap, as a raw unexperienced boy, thought
this a favourable opportunity of trying how
the Spartans ftood affected towards that
Union Without the leaſt previous notice,
therefore, he fuddenly invaded fuch of the
Arcadians as were in alliance with Sparta,
and committed great devaftations in that part
of the country which lay in the neighbour-
hood of Achaia.
The Ephori, alarmed at this unexpected
attack, fent Cleomenes at the head of the
Spartan forces to oppoſe the invaſion. The
young Hero behaved well, and frequently
baffled that old experienced commander.
But his countrymen growing weary of the.
war, and refufing to concur in the mea-
-fures he propofed for carrying it on, he re-
called Achidamus the brother of Agis from
baniſhment, who had a ftrict hereditary
right to the other moiety of the kingdom;
imagining that when the throne was pro-
perly filled according to law, and the regal
power preferved entire by the Union of the
two Kings, it would reffore the balance of
government, and weaken the authority of
the
1
1
1
ANCIENT REPUBLICKS.
59
the Ephori. But the faction which had
murdered Agis, juftly dreading the refent-
ment of Archidamus for ſo atrocious a crime,
took care privately to affaffinate him upon
his return.
4
Cleomenes now more than ever intent up-
on bringing his great project to bear, bribed
the Ephori with large fums to intruft him
with the management of the war'. His
mother Crateficlea not only fupplied him
with money upon this occafion, but married
one Megiftonus, a man of the greateſt weight
and authority in the city, purpoſely to bring
him over to her fon's intereft. Cleomenes
taking the field, totally defeated the army of
Aratus, and killed Lydiadas the Megalopoli-
tan General. This victory, which was en-
tirely owing to the conduct of Cleomenes,
not only raiſed the courage of his foldiers,
but gave them fo high an opinion of his
abilities, that he feems to have been recalled
by his enemies, jealous moft probably of his
growing intereft with the army. For 2 Plu-
tarch, who is not very methodical in his re-
lations, informs us, that after this affair,
Cleomenes convinced his father-in-law, Me-
giftonus, of the neceffity of taking off the
Ephori, and reducing the citizens to their
• Plut. Vit. Cleom. p. 807. lit. B.
2 Vit. Cleom. p. 808. lit. A.
ancient
60 Of the RISE and F ALL of the
ancient equality according to the inftitutions
of Lycurgus, as the only means of reſtor-
ing Sparta to her former fovereignty over
Greece. This fcheme therefore muſt have
been privately fettled at Sparta. For we are
next told, that Cleomenes again took the
field, carrying with him fuch of the citizens
as he ſuſpected were moſt likely to oppoſe
him. He took fome cities from the Achæans
that campaign, and made himſelf maſter
of fome important places, but harraffed
his troops fo much with many marches
and countermarches, that moſt of the Spar-
tans remained behind in Arcadia at their
own requeſt, whilft he marched back to
Sparta with his mercenary forces, and fuch
of his friends as he could moft confide in.
He timed his march fo well that he entered
Sparta whilſt the Ephori were at fupper,
and diſpatched Euryclidas before with three
or four of his most trufty friends and a few
foldiers to perform the execution. For Cleo-
menes well knew that Agis owed his ruin
to his too cautious timidity, and his too great
lenity and moderation. Whilft Euryclidas
therefore amufed the Ephori with a pretend-
ed meffage from Cleomenes, the reft fell
upon them fword in hand, and killed four
upon the fpot, with above ten perſons more
who came to their affiftance. Agefilaus the
furvivor of them fell, and counterfeiting him-
felf
3
ANCIENT REPUBLICK s.
6i
C
I
felf dead, gained an opportunity of eſcaping.
Next morning as foon as it was light, Cleo-
menes profcribed and baniſhed fourſcore of
the moſt dangerous citizens, and removed all
the chairs of the Ephori out of the Forum,
except one, which he reſerved for his own
feat of judicature. He then convoked am
affembly of the people, to whom he apolo-
gized for his late actions. He fhewed them,
in a very artful and elaborate fpeech,
"the
nature and juſt extent of the power of the
Ephori, the fatal confequences of the autho-
rity they had ufurped of governing the ſtate
by their own arbitrary will, and of depofing
and putting their Kings to death without al-
lowing them a legal hearing in their own de-
fence. He urged the example of Lycurgus
himſelf, who came armed into the Forum
when he firſt propoſed his laws, as a proof
that it was impoffible to root out thoſe peſts
of the commonwealth, which had been im-
ported from other countries, luxury, the
pa-
rent of that vain expence which runs fuch
numbers in debt, ufury, and thoſe more an-
cient evils, wealth and poverty, without vio-
lence and bloodſhed: That he fhould have
thought himſelf happy, if like an able phy-
fician, he could have radically cured the dif-
cafes of his country without pain: but that
* Vit. Cleom, p. 809. lit. A.
ne-
62 Of the RISE and FALL of the
1
neceffity had compelled him to do what he
had already done, in order to procure an
equal partition of the lands, and the aboli-
tion of their debts, as well as to enable him
to fill up the number of the citizens with a
felect number of the braveſt foreigners, that
Sparta might be no longer expoſed to the
depredations of her enemies for want of
hands to defend her."
To convince the people of the fincerity
of his intentions, he firft gave up his whole
fortune to the publick ftock; Megiftonus,
his father-in-law, with his other friends, and
all the reſt of the citizens, followed his ex-
ample. In the diviſion of the lands, he ge-
nerouſly ſet apart equal portions for all thoſe
citizens he had banished, and promiſed to re-
call them as ſoon as the publick tranquillity
was restored. He next revived the ancient
method of education, the gymnaſtick exer-
cifes, publick meals, and all other inſtituti→
ons of Lycurgus; and left the people, unac-
cuſtomed to the denomination of afingle King,
fhould fufpect that he aimed at eſtabliſhing a
tyranny, he aſſociated his brother Euclidas
with him in the kingdom. By training up
the youth in the old military difcipline, and
arming them in a new and better manner,
he once more recovered the reputation of the
Spartan militia, and raiſed his country to ſo
great
}
1
ANCIENT REPUBLICKS.
63
great a height of power,' that Greece in a
very fhort time faw Sparta giving law to all
Peloponnefus.
2
་
The Achæans, humbled by repeated de-
feats, and begging peace of Cleomenes upon
his own terms, the generous victor defired
only to be appointed general of their famous
league, and offered upon that condition to
reſtore all the cities and prifoners he had
taken. The Achæans gladly confenting to
fuch eaſy terms, Cleomenes releafed and
fent home all the perfons of rank amongſt
his prifoners, but was obliged by fickneſs to
defer the day appointed for the convention,
'till his return from Sparta. This unhap-
py delay was fatal to Greece. For Aratus,
who had enjoyed that honour thirty-three
years, could not bear the thought of having it
wrefted from him by fo young a Prince,
whofe glory he envied as much as he
dreaded his valour. Finding therefore all
other methods ineffectual, he had recourfe
to the deſperate remedy of calling in the
Macedonians to his affiſtance, and facrificed
the liberty of his own conntry, as well as
that of Greece, to his own private pique and
jealoufy. Thus the moft publick-fpirited
affertor of liberty, and the moſt implacable
I
Parallel. inter Agid. & Cleom. & T. & C. Gracch.
p. 844. lit. D.
Vit. Cleom. p. 811. lit. C,
enemy
64 of the RISE and F ALL of the
i
enemy to all tyrants in general, brought
back thofe very people into the heart of
Greece, whom he had driven out formerly
purely from his hatred to tyranny, and ful-
lied a glorious life with a blot never to be
erafed, from the deteftable motives of envy
and revenge. A melancholy proof, as Plu-
tarch moralizes upon the occafion, of the
weakneſs of human nature, which with an
affemblage of the moft excellent qualities is
unable to exhibit the model of a virtue com-
pletely perfect. A circumftance which
ought to excite our compaffion towards thoſe
blemiſhes, which we unavoidably meet with
in the moſt exalted characters.
Cleomenes fupported this unequal war
againſt the Achæans and the whole power of
Macedon with the greateſt vigour, and by
his fuccefs gave many convincing proofs of
his abilities; but venturing a decifive battle
at Sallafia, he was totally defeated by the fu-
perior number of his enemies, and the treach-
ery of Damoteles, an officer in whom he
greatly confided, who was bribed to betray
him by Antigonus. Out of fix thouſand
Spartans, two hundred only eſcaped, the reft
with their king Euclidas were left dead on
the field of battle. Cleomenes retired to
Sparta, and from thence paffed over to Ptole-
my Euergetes king of Egypt, with whom he
Was
ANCIENT REPUBLICKS.
65
}
was then in alliance, to claim the affiftance
he had formerly promiſed. But the death
of that Monarch, which followed foon after,
deprived him of all hopes of fuccour from
that quarter. The Spartan manners were as
odious to his fucceffor Ptolemy Philopater, a
weak and diffolute prince, as the Spartan vir-
tue was terrible to his debauched effeminate
courtiers. Whenever Cleomenes appeared at
court, the general whifper ran, that he came
as a lion in the midſt of ſheep; a light in
which a brave man muft neceffarily appear to
a herd of fuch fervile daftards. Confined at
laft by the jealoufy of Ptolemy, who was
kept in a perpetual alarm by the infinuations
of his iniquitous minifter Sofybius, he with
about twelve more of his generous Spartan
friends broke out of prifon, determined upon
death or liberty. In their progrefs through
the ſtreets, they firft flew one Ptolemy, a
great favourite of the King's, who had been
their fecret enemy; and meeting the gover-
nor of the city, who came at the firft noife of
the tumult, they routed his guards and at-
tendants, dragged him out of his chariot, and
killed him. After this they ranged uncon-
trouled through the whole city of Alexan-
dria, the inhabitants flying every where be-
fore them, and not a man daring either to
aflift or oppofe them. Such terror could
thirteen brave men only ftrike into one of the
F
moft
1
66
Of the RISE and F ALL of the
moſt populous cities in the univerſe, where
the citizens were bred up in luxury, and
ftrangers to the uſe of arms! Cleomenes, de-
fpairing of affiſtance from the citizens, whom
he had in vain fummoned to affert their li-
berty, declared fuch abject cowards fit only
to be governed by women. Scorning there-
fore to fall by the hands of the deſpicable
Egyptians, he with the reft of the Spartans
fell defperately by their own fwords, accord-
ing to the heroifm of thofe ages'.
The liberty and happinefs of Sparta ex-
pired with Cleomenes. For the remains of
the Spartan hiſtory furniſh us with
very little
after his death, befides the calamities and
miſeries of that unhappy ſtate, ariſing from
their inteftine divifions. Machanidas, by the
aid of one of the factions which at that
time rent that miſerable republick, ufurped
the throne, and eſtabliſhed an abfolute ty-
ranny. One Nabis, a tyrant, compared to
whom even Nero himſelf may be termed
merciful, fucceeded at the death of Macha-
nidas, who fell in battle by the hand of the
great Philopamen. The Etolians treacher-
oufly murdered Nabis, and endeavoured to
feize the dominion of Sparta; but they were
prevented by Philopamen, who partly by
Plut. Vit. Cleom. p. 822. lit. E.
2
Polyb. lib. 4. p. 479.
force,
ANCIENT REPUBLICKS.
67
force, partly by perfuafion, brought the Spar-
tans into the Achæan league, and afterwards
totally abolished the inftitutions of Lycur-
gus'. A moft inhuman and moft iniquit-
ous action, as Plutarch terms it, which muft
brand the character of that hero with eternal
infamy. As if he was fenfible that as long as
the difcipline of Lycurgus fubfifted, the
minds of the Spartan youth could never be
thoroughly tamed, or effectually broke to
the yoke of foreign government. Wearied
out at laft by repeated oppreffions, the Spar-
tans applied to the Romans for redreſs of all
their grievances; and their complaints pro-
duced that war which ended in the diffolu-
tion of the Achæan league, and the fubjec-
tion of Greece to the Roman domination.
I have entered into a more minute detail of
the Spartan conftitution, as fettled by Lycur-
gus, than I at firſt propoſed; becauſe the
maxims of that celebrated lawgiver are fo
directly oppofite to thoſe which our modern
politicians lay down as the baſis of the
ftrength and power of a nation.
Lycurgus found his country in the moſt
terrible of all fituations, a ftate of anarchy
and confufion. The rich, infolent and op-
preffive; the poor groaning under a load of
debt, mutinous from defpair, and ready to
Plut. Vit. Philopam. p. 365. lit. E.,
F 2
cut
68
Of the RISE and F ALL of the
cut the throats of their ufurious oppreffors.
To remedy theſe evils, did this wife politi-
cian encourage navigation, ſtrike out new
branches of commerce, and make the moſt
of thofe excellent harbours and other natural
advantages which the maritime fituation of
his country afforded? Did he introduce and
promote arts and ſciences, that by acquiring
and diffufing new wealth amongſt his coun-
trymen, he might make his nation, in the
language of our political writers, fecure,
powerful, and happy? Juft the reverſe. Af-
ter he had new-modelled the conftitution,
and fettled the juft balance between the powers
of government, he aboliſhed all debts, di-
vided the whole land amongst his country-
men by equal lots, and put an end to all dif-
fentions about property, by introducing a per-
fect equality. He extirpated luxury and a
luft of wealth, which he looked upon as the
pefts of every free country, by prohibiting
the ufe of gold and filver; and barred up the
entrance againſt their return by interdicting
navigation and commerce, and expelling all
arts, but what were immediately neceffary
to their fubfiftence. As he was fenfible that
juft and virtuous manners are the beſt ſupport
of the internal peace and happineſs of every
kingdom, he eſtabliſhed a moſt excellent
plan of education for training up his country-
men, from their very infancy, in the ſtrict-
eſt
ANCIENT REPUBLICKS.
69.
eft obfervance of their religion and laws,
and the habitual practice of thoſe virtues
which can alone fecure the bleffings of li-
berty, and perpetuate their duration. To
protect his country from external invafions,
he formed the whole body of the people,
without diſtinction, into one well armed,
well difciplined national militia, whoſe lead-
ing principle was the love of their country,
and who efteemed death in its defence, the
moſt exalted height of glory to which a
Spartan was capable of attaining. Nor were
thefe elevated fentiments confined folely to
the men; the colder breafts of the women
caught fire at the glorious flame, and glowed
even with ſuperior ardour. For when their
troops marched againſt an enemy,
" to
bring back their fhields, or to be brought
home upon them," was the laft command
which the Spartan mothers gave their fons
at parting.
Such was the method which Lycurgus
took to fecure the independency and happi-
nefs of his country; and the event fhewed,
that his inftitutions were founded upon
maxims of the trueft and jufteft policy. For I
To bring back their fhields impl'el victory; to be
brought home upon them, a glorious death in defence
of their country; becaufe the Spartans, if poffible,
brought back and buried all who fell in battle in their
native country.
F 3
can-
70 Of the RISE and F ALL of the
cannot help obferving upon the occafion, that
from the time of Lycurgus to the introduc-
tion of wealth by Lyfander in the reign of
the firft Agis, a ſpace of five hundred
years,
we meet with no mutiny amongst the people,
upon account of the feverity of his difcipline,
but on the contrary the moſt religious re-
verence for, and the moft willing and chear-
ful obedience to, the laws he eſtabliſhed. As
on the other hand, the wiſdom of his military
inſtitutions is evident from this confideration;
That the nationel militia alone of Sparta, a
fmall infignificant country as to extent, fitu-
ated in a nook only of the Morea, not only
gave laws to Greece, but made the Perfian
monarchs tremble at their very name, though
abfolute maſters of the richeft and moft ex-
tenfive empire the world then knew.
I obferve farther, that the introduction of
wealth by Lyfander, after the conqueft of
Athens, brought back all thoſe vices and dif-
fentions which the prohibition of the uſe of
money had formerly banifhed; and that all
hiftorians affign that open violation of the
laws of Lycurgus, as the period from which
the decadence of Sparta is to be properly
dated, I obferve too, with Plutarch, that
though the manners of the Spartans were
greatly corrupted by the introduction of
wealth, yet that the landed intereft (as I
may term it) which fubfifted as long as the
ori-
f
ANCIENT REPUBLICK S.
71
I
original allotments of land remained unalien-
able, ſtill preferved their ſtate; notwithſtand-
ing the many abufes which had crept into
their conftitution. But that as ſoon as ever
the landed eftates became alienable by law,
the moneyed intereft prevailed, and at laſt to-
tally íwallowed up the landed, which the
hiftorians remark as the death's-wound of
their conftitution. For the martial virtue of
the citizens not only funk with the lofs of
their eftates, but their number, and confe-
quently the ftrength of the ſtate, diminiſhed
in the fame proportion. Ariftotle, who
wrote about fixty years after the death of
Lyfander, in his examen of the Spartan Re-
publick, quite condemns that law which per-
mitted the alienation of their lands. For
he affirms, that the fame quantity of land,
which, whilft equally divided, fupplied a mi-
litia of fifteen hundred horfe, and thirty thou-
fand heavy armed foot, could not in his time
furniſh one thoufand; fo that the ſtate was
utterly ruined for want of men to defend it.
In the reign of Agis the third, about a hun-
dred years after the time of Ariftotle, the
number of the old Spartan families was
dwindled (as I remarked before) to feven hun-
dred; out of which about one hundred rich
2
'Ariftot. de Rebufpubl. lib. 2. cap. 7. fol. 122. lit..
* Ἡ πόλις ἀπόλετο διὰ τὴν ὀλιγανθρωπίαν. Ariftot. ibid.
F 4
over-
1
72 Of the RISE and F ALL of the
overgrown families had engroffed the whole
land of Sparta, which Lycurgus had for-
merly divided into thirty-nine thouſand
fhares, and affigned for the fupport of as
many families.
families. So true it is, that a landed
intereft diffuſed through a whole people is
not only the real ftrength, but the fureft bul-
wark of the liberty and independency, of a
free country.
From the tragical fate of the third Agis we
learn, that when abuſes introduced by cor-
ruption are fuffered by length of time to take
root in the conftitution, they will be termed
by thoſe whofe intereft it is to fupport them,
eſſential parts of the conftitution itſelf; and
all attempts to remove them will ever be cla-
moured againſt by fuch men as attempt to
fubvert it: As the example of Cleomenes
will teach us, that the publick virtue of one
great man may not only fave his falling coun-
try from ruin, but raife her to her former
dignity and luftre, by bringing her back to
thoſe principles on which her conftitution
was originally founded. Though the vio-
lent remedies made ufe of by Cleomenes ne-
ver ought to be applied, unleſs the diſeaſe is
grown too defperate to admit of a cure by
milder methods.
I fhall endeavour to fhew in its proper
place, that the conſtitution eſtabliſhed byLy-
curgus,
ANCIENT REPUBLICKS.
73
curgus, which feemed to Polybius to be
rather of divine than of human inſtitution,
and was ſo much celebrated by the moſt emi-
nent philofophers of antiquity, is much infe-
rior to the British conftitution as fettled at the
Revolution. But I cannot quit this fubject
without recommending that excellent infti-
tution of Lycurgus, which provided for the
education of the children of the whole com-
munity without diftinction. An example
which under proper regulations would be
highly worthy of our imitation, fince no-
thing could give a more effectual check to
the reigning vices and follies of the prefent
age, or contribute fo much to a reformation
of manners, as to form the minds of the
rifing generation by the principles of religion
and virtue. Where the manners of a people
are good, very few laws will be wanting;
but when their manners are depraved, all the
laws in the world will be infufficient to re-
ftrain the exceffes of the human paffions.
For as Horace juftly obferves --
Quid leges fine moribus
Vana proficiunt, Ode 24. lib. 3.
Η Ὥσε θειοτέραν την επίνοιαν ή κατ' ἄνθρωπον αὐτῶν
you. Polyb. lib. 6. p. 683.
νομίζειν.
CHA P.
74
Of the RISE and F ALL of the
CHA P. II.
Of ATHENS.
THE Republick of Athens, once the
feat of learning and eloquence, the
fchool of arts and fciences, and the center
of wit, gaiety, and politenefs, exhibits a
ftrong contrast to that of Sparta, as well in
her form of government, as in the genius.
and manners of her inhabitants.
The government of Athens, after the abo-
lition of Monarchy, was truly democratick,
and ſo much convulfed by thoſe civil diffen-
tions, which are the inevitable confequences
of that kind of government, that of all the
Grecian ſtates, the Athenian may be the moſt
ftrictly termed the feat of faction. I obferve
that the hiftory of this celebrated Republick
is neither very clear nor intereſting till the
time of Solon. The laws of Draco (the firſt
legiflator of the Athenians who gave his laws
in writing) affixed death as the common pu-
nifhment of the moſt capital crimes, or the
moft trivial offences; a circumftance which
implies either the moft cruel aufterity in the
temper of the lawgiver, or fuch an abandoned
profligacy in the manners of the people, as
laid him under a neceffity of applying ſuch
violent remedies. As the hiftorians have not
clearly
ANCIENT REPUBLICKS.
75
clearly decided which of theſe was the cafe,
I fhall only remark, that the humanity of
the people, fo natural to the human fpecies,
was intereſted upon the occafion, and the ex-
ceffive rigour of the laws obſtructed the very
means of their being carried into execution.
A plain proof that a multiplicity of rigorous
penal laws are not only incompatible with the
liberty of a free ſtate, but even repugnant to
human nature. For the natural equity of
mankind can eaſily diftinguish between the
nature and degree of crimes; and the fen-
timents of humanity will naturally be excit-
ed when the puniſhment feems to be too
rigorous in proportion to the demerits of the
offender. The chief reafon, in
my opinion,
why fo many offenders in our nation eſcape
with impunity for want of profecution, is be-
cauſe our laws make no diftinction, as to the
puniſhment, between the moft trifling rob-
bery on the highway, and the moſt atrocious
of all crimes, premeditated murder.
The remedy which Draco propofed by his
laws, proving worfe than the diſeaſe, the
whole body of the people applied to Solon,
as the only perfon equal to the difficult tafk
of regulating their government. The fu-
preme power of the ftate was at that time
vefted in nine magiftrates, termed Archons or
governors, elected annually by the people
out of the body of the nobility. But the
com-
1
i
!
76 Of the RISE and F ALL of the
community in general was ſplit into three
factions, each contending for fuch a form
of government as was moft agreeable to
their different interefts. The moft fenfible
among the Athenians, dreading the confe-
quence of thefe divifions, were willing, as
Plutarch 'informs us, toinveft Solon with ab-
folute power; but our difinterefted philofo-
pher was a ſtranger to that kind of ambi-
tion, and preferred the freedom and happi-
nefs of his countrymen to the fplendor of a
Crown. He continued the Archons in their
office as ufual, but limited their authority by
inftituting a fenate of four hundred perfons
elected by the people, by way of ballot, out
of the four tribes into which the community
was at that time divided. He revived and
improved the fenate and court of Areopa-
gus, the moft facred and
tribunal, not only of Greece,
we ever read of in hiftory.
L
24
moft refpectable
but of all which
The integrity
Vita Solon, p. 85. lit. D.
The time of the firft inftitution of this court (fo de-
nominated from "Apsos waves, i. e. Hill of Mars, an
eminence where they always affembled) is quite uncer-
tain; nor are the hiftorians at all agreed about the num-
ber of the members of which it was compofed. How-
ever, this was the fupreme court, which had cognizance
of wilful murders, and all matters which were of the
greateſt confequence to the Republick. Suidas.
Suidas. They
had alfo cognizance of all matters of religion, as we find
by the inftance of St. Paul.
and
ANCIENT REPUBLICKS.
gay
1
and equity of this celebrated court was fo
remarkable, that not only the Greeks, but
the Romans, fometimes fubmitted fuch cauſes
to their determination which they found too
intricate and difficult for their own decifion.
To prevent all fufpicion of partiality either
to plaintiff or defendant, this venerable court
heard all caufes and paffed their definitive
fentence in the dark, and the pleaders on ei-
ther fide were ſtrictly confined to a bare repre-
fentation of the plain truth of the fact, with-
out either aggravation or embelliſhment. For
all the ornament of fine language, and thoſe
powers of rhetorick which tended to bias.
the judgment by interefting the paffions of
the judges, were abfolutely prohibited. Hap-
py if the pleaders were reftricted to this righ-
teous method in our own courts of judica-
ture, where great eloquence and great abili-
ties are too often employed to confound
truth and ſupport injuftice!
It is evident from hiſtory that Solon at firſt
propoſed the inſtitutions of Lycurgus as the
model of his new eſtabliſhment. But the
difficulty which he met with in the abolition
of all debts, the firft part of his fcheme,
convinced him of the utter impracticability
of introducing the Laconic equality, and de-
terred him from all farther attempts of that
nature. The laws of Athens gave the credi-
tor fo abfolute a power over his infolvent
debtor,
78 Of the RISE and FALL of the
F
debtor, that he could not only oblige the un
happy wretch to do all his fervile drudgery,
but could fell him and his children for flaves
in default of payment. The creditors had
made fo oppreffive an ufe of their power,
that many of the citizens were actually
obliged to fell their children to make good
their payments; and fuch numbers had fled
their country to avoid the effects of their de-
teſtable inhumanity, that, as 'Plutarch ob-
ferves, the city was almoſt unpeopled by the
extortion of the ufurers. Solon, apprehen-
five of an infurrection amongſt the poorer ci-
tizens, who openly threatened to alter the
government, and make an equal partition of
the lands, thought no method fo effectual to
obviate this terrible evil, as to cancel ali debts,
as Lycurgus had done formerly at Sparta.
But fome of his friends, to whom he had
privately communicated his ſcheme, with an
affurance that he did not propoſe to meddle
with the lands, were too well verfed in the
art of jobbing to neglect ſo fair an opportu-
nity of making a fortune. Forthey ftretched
their credit to the utmoft in loans of large
fums from the moneyed men, which they
immediately laid out in the purchaſe of land-
ed eftates. A precedent which the treacher-
ous Agefilaus copied too fuccefsfully after-
Plut. 85. lit. A.
wards
ANCIENT REPUBLICKS.
79
wards at Sparta. The cheat appeared as foon
as the edict for abolishing all debts was
made publick: but the odium of fo flagitious
a piece of roguery was thrown wholly upon
Solon; as the cenfure of the publick for all
frauds and exactions committed by officers
in the inferior departments will naturally
fall upon the minifter at the helm, however
difintereſted and upright.
This edict was equally disagreeable to the
rich and to the poor. For the rich were vi-
olently deprived of all that part of their
pro-
perty which confifted in their loans, and the
poor were diſappointed of that ſhare of the
lands which they fo greedily expected. How
Solon drew himſelf out of this difficulty,
hiftorians have no where informed us. All
we can learn from them is, that the decree
was at laft received and fubmitted to, and
that Solon was ftill continued in his office
with the fame authority as before.
This experiment gave Solon a thorough
infight into the temper of his countrymen,
and moſt probably induced him to accommo-
date his fubfequent regulations to the hu-
mour and prejudices of the people. For as
he wanted the authority which naturally
arifes from royal birth, as well as that which
is founded on the unlimited confidence of
the people, advantages which Lycurgus pof-
feffed in fo eminent a degree, he was obliged
to
86 Of the RISE and FALL of the
<c
<<
to confult rather what was practicable, than
what was ftrictly right; and endeavour, as
far as he was able, to pleaſe all parties. That
he acknowledged this, feems evident from
his anfwer to one who afked him "" Whe-
ther the laws he had given the Athenians
"were
were the beſt he could poffibly have
"made ?" "They are the beft, replied So-
lon, which the Athenians are capable of
receiving." Thus whilſt he confined the
Magiftracies and the executive part of the
Government folely to the rich, he lodged
the fupreme power in the hands of the poor-
er citizens. For though every freeman whofe
fortune did not amount to a particular cen-
fus or estimate, was excluded from all ftate
offices by the laws of Solon; yet he had
a legal right of giving his opinion and fuf-
frage in the Eκκλησια or affembly of the
people, which was wholly compofed of
this inferior clafs of citizens. But as all
elections, and all caufes of appeal from the
fuperior courts, were determined by the
voices of this affembly; as no law could paſs
without their approbation, and the higheſt
officers in the Republick were fubject to
their cenfure, this affembly became the der-
nier reſort in all cauſes, and this mob go-
vernment, as it may be justly termed, was
Plut. in Vit. Solon, p. 86. lit. C.
the
ANCIENT
81
REPUBLICKS.
the great leading cauſe of the ruin of their
Republick. Anacharfis the Scythian Phi-
lofopher, who at that time refided with Solon,
juſtly ridiculed this excefs of power which
he had lodged in the people'. For when
he had heard fome points debated firſt in the
Senate, and afterwards decided in the affem-
bly of the people, he humourouſly told So-
lon, that at Athens "Wife men debated,
"but fools decided." Solon was as fenfible
of this capital defect as Anacharfis; but he
was too well acquainted with the licentiouf-
neſs and natural levity of the people, to di-
veft them of a power, which he knew they
would refume by violence at the firſt oppor-
tunity. The utmoſt therefore he could do was
to fix his two fenates as the moorings of the
conftitution: That of 'four hundred, to ſecure
the ſtate againſt the fluctuating temper and
tumultuous fury of the people; that of the
Areopagus, to reftrain the dangerous en-
croachments of the great and wealthy. He
repealed all the laws of Draco, thofe againſt
murder alone excepted; rightly judging,
as Plutarch remarks, that it was not only
moft iniquitous, but moft abfurd, to inflict
the fame puniſhment upon a man for being
Plut. in Vit. Solon, p. 81. lit. B.
4
5
•
2 Ibid. p. 88. lit. D.
2
3 The new Senate, which he had inftituted.
↑ Which he had revived. Vide Note p. 76.
5 Ibid. p. 87. lit, E.
Ꮐ
idle,
82 Of the RISE and FALL of the
1
L
idle, or ſtealing a cabbage or an apple out
of a garden, as for committing murder or fa-
crilege. But as the account handed down to
us of the laws which Solon eſtabliſhed is ex-
tremely lame and imperfect, I ſhall only men-
tion the ſarcaſm of Anacharfis upon that occa-
fion, as a proof of their infufficiency to an-
fwer that end for which Solon defigned them.
For that Philofopher comparing the corrupt
manners of the Athenians with the coer-
cive power of Solon's laws, refembled the
latter to cobwebs, which would entangle
only the poor and feeble, but were eafily
broke through by the rich and powerful.
Solon is faid to have replied, "That men
"would readily ftand to thofe mutual com-
pacts, which it was the intereft of neither
CC
.
GC
I
2
party to violate; and that he had fo rightly
adapted his laws to the reafon of his
"countrymen, as to convince them how
"much more advantageous it was to adhere
"to what was juft, than to be guilty of in-
<<
juftice." The event, as Plutarch truly
obferves, proved more correfpondent to the
opinion of Anacharfis, than to the hopes
of Solon. For Pififtratus, a near relation
of Solon's, having artfully formed a ſtrong
party among the poorer citizens, by diftribut-
ing bribes under the fpecious pretence of
Ibid. p. 81. lit. A.
2 Ibid. p. 81.
re-
ANCIENT REPUBLICKS.
83
1
relieving their neceffities, procured a guard
of ' fifty men armed with clubs only for the
fafety of his perfon, by the help of which
he ſeized the citadel, aboliſhed the Democra-
cy, and eſtabliſhed a ſingle tyranny in ſpite
of all the efforts of Solon.
This ufurpation proved the fource of end-
lefs faction, and brought innumerable cala-
mities upon the republick. Pififtratus was
expelled more than once by the oppofite
party, and as often brought back in triumph
either by the fraud or force of his prevailing
faction. At his death he left the kingdom to
his two fons Hipparchus and Hippias. The
former of theſe was affaffinated by Harmo-
dius and Ariftogiton for a perfonal injury
they had received"; Hippias was ſoon after
driven out of Athens by the Spartans, at the
inſtigation of ſome of his difcontented coun-
trymen. Deſpairing of recovering his for-
mer fovereignty by any other means, he
fled to Darius for affiftance, and was the
cauſe of the firft invafion of Greece by the
Perfians, in which he died fighting againſt
his country in the ever memorable battle of
Marathon. But the moft fatal evil which
refulted from the ufurpation of Pififtratus,
• Solon in his letter to Epimenides, fays 400, which
feems moft probable. Diog. Laert.
2 Thucyd.
G 24
was,
84 Of the RISE and FALL of the
I:
2
was, that perpetual fear of feeing the ' fu-
preme power again lodged in the hands of a
fingle perfon. For this fear kept the jealouſy
of the people in a conftant alarm, and threw
them at laſt into the hands of the factious
Demagogues. Hence fuperior merit was
frequently repreſented as an unpardonable
crime, and a kind of high treafon againſt
the Republick. And the real patriots were
rendered fufpected to the people, juft as the
Demagogues were influenced by envy or
private pique, or even bribed by ambitious
or defigning men, who afpired at the very:
thing of which the others were unjustly
accufed. The hiftory of Athens abounds
with inftances of the levity and inconftancy
of that unfteady people. For how fre-
quently do we find their beft and ableft
citizens imprifoned or fentenced to baniſh-
ment by the oftraciſm, in honour of whom
the fame people had juſt before erected fta-
tues: nay not unfrequently raifing ſtatues to
the memory of thofe illuftrious and inno-
cent men, whom they had illegally doomed
to death in the wantonnefs of their power;
I
2
3
4
Thucyd. lib. 6. p. 415. fect. 60.
Xenoph. de Republ. Athen. p. 55. Edit. Luvenel.
Baf. 1572.
3 Miltiades, Themiftocles, Ariftides, Cimon, Thucy-
dides the hiftorian, &c.
4
Socrates, Phocion, &c.
at
ANCIENT REPUBLICKS.
85
!
at once the monuments of their injuſtice and
too late repentance! This evil was the na-
tural confequence of that capital error in
Solon's polity, when he entrusted the fu-
preme power to the giddy and fluctuating
populace. A defect which (as I obferved
before) was the great leading cauſe of the
loſs of that liberty which they had ſo licen-
tiouſly abuſed. For as the removal of all
the honeſt citizens either by death or baniſh-
ment, paved an eafy way for ufurpation and
tyranny; fo it was a meaſure invariably pur-
fued, in the Democratick governments of
Greece, by all thoſe ambitious men who aim-
ed at fubverting the liberties of their coun-
try. This truth is fo clearly explained, and
fo inconteftibly proved, by the great Thu-
cydides, that whilst I perufe the annals of
that admirable hiftorian, I cannot help griev-
ing over the tragick pages ftained with the
blood of fo many patriot citizens, who fell
a facrifice to the dire ambition and avarice
of faction. What a ſtriking detail does
he give us of the moſt calamitous fituation
of all the Grecian Republicks during the
Peloponnefian war! How does he labour for
expreffion in his pathetick enumeration of
the horrible confequences of faction, after
his deſcription of the deſtructive ſedition at
Corcyra! A contempt of all religion, the
open violation of the moft facred ties and
G 3
com-
1
1
86 Of the RISE and F ALL of the
compacts; devaftations, maffacres, affaffina-
tions, and all the favage horrors of civil dif-
cord inflamed even to madneſs, are the per-
petual fubjects of his inftructive hiftory.
Calamities of which he himſelf was at once
an eye-witneſs and a moſt faithful recorder.
I
Thucydides truly afcribes this deſtruc-
tive war to the mutual jealoufy which then
fubfifted between the Spartans and Athe-
nians. The moſt ſtale frivolous preten-
ces were trumped up by the Spartans, and as
ftrongly retorted by the Athenians. Both
ſtates made the interefts or grievances of
their allies the conftant pretext for their
mutual altercations, whilft the real cauſe was
that ambitious fcheme which each ftate had
formed, of reducing all Greece under its ref-
pective dominion. But an event which both
ftates feemed to have waited for quickly
blew up the latent fparks of jealoufy into
the moſt violent flame ³. The Thebans
privately entered the city of Platea in the
night (a fmall ftate at that time allied to
Athens) which had been betrayed to them by
a treacherous faction, who were enemies to
the Athenians. But the honefter part of the
I
3
Thucyd. edit. Duker. lib. 1. p. 58. fect. 88.
2 Thucyd. lib. 1. p. 82. fect. 127, 128.
3 Thucyd, lib. 2. p. 98. fect. 2, 3, 4, et fequent. ·
Pla-
ANCIENT REPUBLICKS.
87
Platæans recovering from their furprize, and
taking notice of the fmall number of the
Thebans, quickly regained poffeffion of their
city by the flaughter of moſt of the invad-
ers. The Plateans immediately applied to
the Athenians for affiftance; the The-
bans to the Spartans. Both ftates entered
eagerly into the quarrel between their re-
fpective allies, and engaged as principals in
that deftructive war which at laft involved
all Greece in the common calamity. Where-
ever the fortune of the Spartan prevailed, an
oligarchical Ariftocracy was eſtabliſhed, and
the friends to a popular government deſtroy-
ed or baniſhed. Where the Athenians were.
victors, Democracy was fettled or reſtored,
and the people glutted their revenge with the
blood of the nobility. Alternate revolts,
truces violated as foon as made, maffacres,
profcriptions, and confifcations, were the
perpetual confequences, in all the petty re-
publicks, of the alternate good or bad fuccefs
of theſe two contending rivals. In a word,
all Greece feems to have been feized with an
epidemick madneſs; and the polite, the hu-
mane Grecians, treated one another, during
the whole courfe of this unnatural war, with
a ferocity unknown even to the moſt favage
barbarians. The real caufe, affigned by Thu-
• Thucid. lib. 2. p. 101, &c. fect. 6,
G 4
cydides,
88 Of the RISE and F ALL of the
cydides, of all theſe atrocious evils, was,
The luft of domination arifing from
"avarice and ambition:" for the leading men
in every ſtate, whether of the Democratick
or Ariftocratick party, affected outwardly the
greateſt concern for the welfare of the Re-
publick, which in reality was made the prize
for which they all contended. Thus, whilft
each endeavoured by every poffible method
to get the better of his antagoniſt, the moſt
audacious villanies, and the moft flagrant
acts of injuſtice, were equally perpetrated by
both fides: Whilft the moderate men
amongſt the citizens, who refuſed to join with
either fide, were alike the objects of their
reſentment or envy, and equally deſtroyed
without mercy by either faction.
2
Hiftorians unanimously agree, that the
Athenians were inftigated to this fatal war
by the celebrated Pericles. Thucydides, who
was not only cotemporary with Pericles, but
actually bore a command in that war, does
real honour to that great man's character
³ for he affigns his defire of humbling the
Spartans, and his zeal for the glory and
3
Ι
С
;
* Thucyd. Πάντων δ᾽ αὐτῶν αἴτιον ἡ ἀρχὴ διὰ πλεονεξίαν
tải protra. lib. 3. p. 218. fect. 82.
2
σε
اد
Τὰ δὲ μέσα τῶν πολιτῶν ὑπ᾽ ἁμφοτέρων, ἤ ὅτι οὐ
ξυνηγωνίζοντο, ή φθόνων περιεῖναι διεφθείροντο.
p. 219.
3
Thucyd. lib. 1. p. 91. fect. 140.
Thucyd.
;
intereft
f
1
1
ANCIENT REPUBLICK S. 89
intereft of his country, as the real motives of
his conduct upon that occafion. But, as a
detail of this tedious and ruinous war is
wholly foreign to my purpoſe, I fhall only
remark, that if ever union and harmony are
neceffary to the prefervation of a ſtate, they
are more effentially fo when that ſtate is en-
gaged in a dubious war with a powerful ene-
my. For not only the continuation, but the
event, of that long war, fo fatal to the Athe-
nians, muſt (humanly ſpeaking) be wholly
attributed to the difunion of their councils,
and the perpetual fluctuation in their mea-
fures, occafioned by the influence of the am-
bitious and factious Demagogues. Not the
calamities of war, nor the moft dreadful
plague, ever yet recorded in hiſtory, were
able to fix the volatile temper of that un-
fteady people. Elate beyond meaſure with
any good fuccefs, they were deaf to the moſt
reaſonable overtures of peace from their
enemies, and their views were unbounded.
Equally dejected with any defeat, they
thought the enemy juft at their doors, and
threw the whole blame upon their command-
ers, who were always treated as unpardon-
ably criminal when unfuccefsful. The De-
magogues, who watched every turn of tem-
per in that variable people, took care to adapt
I
1
I
Thucyd. lib. 2. p. 127. fect. 47. et feq.
every
90 Of the RISE and FALL of the
every circumſtance that offered to their own
ambitious views, either of gaining or fup-
porting an aſcendancy in the ftate, which
kept up a perpetual fpirit of faction in that
unhappy Republick. Thus, in the begin-
ning of the Peloponnefian war, Cleon, a
noiſy feditious Demagogue, ' declaimed vio-
lently againſt Pericles, and was the conftant
oppofer of all his meaſures: but the firmneſs
and fuperior abilities of that great man ena-
bled him to baffle all his antagoniſts. When
Pericles was carried off by that fatal pefti-
lence which almoft depopulated Athens, the
nobility, jealous of that fway which Cleon
had acquired over the people, fet up Nicias
in oppofition. Nicias was honeft, and a
real lover of his country, but a man of no
great abilities; and though an experienced
officer, yet cautious and diffident even to ti-
midity. In his temper he was mild, hu-
mane, and averfe to bloodshed, and laboured
to put an end to a war which ſpread fuch
general deftruction; but all his meaſures were
oppoſed by the turbulent Cleon; for when
the Spartans propofed an accommodation,
Cleon perfuaded the Athenians to infift
fuch high terms that the treaty broke off,
and war was again renewed with the fame in-
• Plut. in Vit. Pericl. p. 171. lit. E.
2 Plut. in Vit. Nic. p. 524. lit. B.
upon
veterate
ANCIENT REPUBLIC Ks. 914
veterate fury: but the incendiary Cleon, the
chief obſtacle of all pacifick meaſures, falling
in battle in the tenth year of that war, ne-
gociations were again fet on foot, and a
peace for fifty years concluded between the
Athenians and the Spartans by the unweari-
ed endeavours of Nicias '. But whilſt Ni-
cias was intent upon the enjoyment of that
repoſe which he had procured, a new and
infinitely more formidable rival ſtarted up,
and again involved his country and all Greece
in the fame calamities by his reſtleſs and in-
fatiable ambition.
2
Alcibiades now appeared upon the ſtage;
a man compofed of a motley mixture of
virtues and vices, of good and bad qualities;
one who could affume even the moſt oppo-
fite characters; and with more eaſe than a
chamæleon can change its colours, appear a
very contraſt to himſelf, juſt as his intereſt
or ambition required. This State-Proteus was
ftrongly piqued at the growing power and
reputation of Nicias. His luft' of power was
too great to bear either a fuperior or an
equal; and he determined at all events to
ſupplant him, alike regardleſs either of the
I
Hence, as Plutarch informs us, it was termed the
Nician peace, lib. 5.
2 Plut. in Vit. Alcib. p. 200. lit. B.
3 Plut. Vit. Alcib. p. 197. lit. C.
equity
92 Of the RISE and FALL of the
*
I
equity of the means, or of the confequences
of it to his country. The Athenians were.
not a little diſpleaſed with the Spartans, who
¹ had not been very punctual in fulfilling the
conditions of the treaty. Alcibiades finding
his countrymen in a humour very proper for
his purpoſe, inflamed them violently againſt
Nicias, whom he publickly accufed as a fe-
cret friend and well-wisher to that people.
Nicias endeavoured to ward off the blow,
and prevent his countrymen from coming to
an open rupture; but the intrigues of Alci-
biades prevailed, who 'procured himſelf to
be elected General, and freſh hoftilities to be
commenced againſt the allies of Sparta.
The 17th year of this memorable war is
remarkable for that fatal expedition againſt
Sicily, which gave a mortal blow to the
Athenian grandeur, and affords a fignal in-
ſtance of the terrible confequences of fac-
tion. The Egeftians, a ſmall ſtate in Sicily,
applied to the Athenians for affiſtance againſt
the oppreffions of the Syracufans. Alcibi-
ades, looking upon it as an object worthy of
his ambition, undertook the cauſe of thefe
fuppliants, and knew fo well how to flatter
the vanity of his countrymen, that a large ³
I
Thucyd. lib. 5. p. 339. fect. 35, 42.
$
2 Thucyd, lib. 5. p. 350. fect. 52.
6
Thucyd. lib. 6. p. 383. fect. &.
arma-
3
ANCIENT REPUBLICKS.
93
I
armament was decreed by the people for that
purpoſe, and Nicias, Alcibiades, and La-
machus, a daring but able officer, were
elected generals. Nicias was the only per-
fon who had the honeſty or courage to op-
pofe a meaſure which he judged not only
rafh, but to the laft degree impolitick; but
the Athenians were deaf to all his remon-
ftrances. The relief of the Egeftians was
only the pretext; for the entire dominion of
Sicily, as Thucydides ' affures us, was the real
object they had in view when they gave or-
ders for that powerful armament. Alcibi-
ades had promiſed them an eaſy conqueſt of
that iſland, which he looked upon only as a
prelude to much greater enterprizes; and the
befotted people had already fwallowed up
Italy, Carthage, and Africa, in their idle ima-
ginations. Both factions concurred in the
vigorous profecution of this meafure, though
from very different motives: the friends of
Alcibiades, from the view of aggrandizing
their chief by that vaft acceffion of wealth
and glory which they hoped for from this ex-
pedition: his enemies, from the hopes of
fupplanting him in his abfence, and gaining
I
3
Thucyd. lib. 6. p. 381. fect. 6.
2 Plut. in Vita Alcibid. Item Thucyd. in orat. Alcib.
ad Lacedæm. lib. 6. p. 436. fect. 90.
3 Thucyd. lib. 6. p. 395, 396. fect. 28, 29.
AT
the
94 Of the RISE and FALL of the
I
the lead in the adminiſtration. Thus the
true intereſt of the ſtate was equally facri-
ficed to the ſelfiſh and private views of each
party! But, in the midſt of theſe vaſt pre-
parations, an odd accident threw the whole
city into confufion, and at once alarmed the
fuperftition and jealoufy of the people. The
Terms, or ftatues of Mercury were all de-
faced in one and the fame night by fome un-
known perfons; nor could the Athenians ever
diſcover the real authors of this reputed fa-
crilege. Proclamations were iffued with a
free pardon, and reward for any of the ac-
complices who could make a difcovery, and
the information of ſtrangers and flaves was
allowed as legal evidence; but no informa-
tion could be procured as to the true authors
of that particular fact; a circumftance which
to me does not appear at all furprizing: for
it was evidently, in my opinion, a piece of
party-craft played off againſt Alcibiades by
the oppofite faction, who knew that to at-
tack the eſtabliſhed religion, was to touch the
mafter-ſpring of the paffions of their coun-
trymen. Some flaves indeed, and other low
I
2
Thucyd. The Terms were ftatues of Mercury,
placed at the doors of their houfes, made of fquare ftones
of a cubical form.
2 A fimilar meaſure was taken in the latter end of
Queen Anne's reign.
per-
1
ANCIENT REPUBLIC K S. 95
I
perfons (fuborned, as Plutarch afferts, by
Androcles, one of the Demagogues) depofed,
that long before that, fome ftatues had been
mutilated, and the moſt facred myfteries of
their religion ridiculed, in a drunken frolick
by fome young wild fellows, and that 2 Alci-
biades was of the party. This information,
which, according to Plutarch, was a palpa-
ble contrivance of his enemies, enabled them
to fix the odium of the laft action upon Al-
cibiades 3 The Demagogues of the oppo-
fite faction greatly exaggerated the whole
affair to the people. They accufed him of a
treaſonable defign againſt the popular go-
vernment, and produced his contemptuous
ridicule of the facred myfteries, and the mu-
tilation of Mercury's ftatues, in ſupport of
their charge; as they urged his well-known
libertiniſm, and licentious life as a proof that
he muſt be the author of thofe infults upon
their religion. Alcibiades not only denied
the charge, but infifted upon being brought
immediately to a legal trial; declaring him-
felf ready to undergo the puniſhment in-
flicted by the laws, if he fhould be found
guilty. He befeeched the people not to re-
2
4
Plut. in Vit. Alcib. p. 200. lit. D.
Thucyd. lib. 6. p. 395. fect. 28.
* Thucyd. ibid.
Thucyd. ibid. fect. 29. paffim,
3.
ceive
{
96 Of the RISE and F ALL of the
[
1
ceive any informations againſt him in his ab
fence, but rather to put him to death upon
the fpot if they judged him to be the offend-
er. He urged too, how impolitick it would
be to fend him with the command of ſo
great an army, whilſt he lay under the im-
putation of a crime of that nature, before
they had taken thorough cognizance of the
affair: but his accufers dreading the effect
which his intereft with the army, and his
well-known influence over the allied troops,
which had engaged in the expedition from
their perfonal attachment to him, might
have upon the people, if he fhould be brought
to immediate trial, procured other Dema-
gogues of their party to diffuade the people
from a meaſure which they judged would
difconcert their fcheme. Theſe men plead-
ed the dangerous delay which fuch a pro-
ceeding might occafion, and urged the ne-
ceffity of diſpatch in an enterprize of fuch
vaft importance. They 'propoſed therefore
that the fleet fhould fail immediately, but
that Alcibiades fhould return when a day was
appointed for his trial. For their intention
was, as Thucydides remarks, to recall and
bring him to his trial when the popular pre-
judice run ftrong againſt him, which they
knew they could eaſily ſpirit up in his ab-
3
1.
+
Thucyd, lib. 5. p. 395. fect, 23. ad finem.
fence,
ANCIENT
REPUBLIC K S.
97
?
fence. It was decreed therefore that Alcibi-
ades ſhould depart immediately upon
pedition.
2
I
the ex-
This mighty armament, which carried
the flower of the Athenian forces, was the
moft fplendid, the beſt fitted out, and the
moſt expenſive, that had ever failed from any
of the Grecian ports to that very time.
But the firſt thing we meet with in this ex-
pedition, was (what might naturally be ex-
pected) a diſagreement between the three
Generals as to the manner of beginning their
operations. Alcibiades indeed brought them
both over to his opinion; but whilſt he was
difputing with his colleagues in Sicily, his
enemies at Athens were by no means idle.
The affair of the ftatues, and the pollution of
the facred myſteries, were again brought up-
on the carpet. The people, naturally fuf-
picious, never enquired into the character of
the informers, or the validity of the evi-
dence, but admitted all that offered without
diſtinction; and, giving eafy credit to the
moſt abandoned wretches, apprehended ſe-
veral of the most eminent citizens, and com-
mitted them to priſon.
4
+ One of thefe
I
3
Thucyd. lib. 6. p. 396. fect. 31.
2 Thucyd, lib. 6. p. 408. fect. 47, 48, 49.
3 Thucyd. lib. 6. p. 411. fect. 53.
4 Ibid. p 415. fect. 60.
H
per-
fuaded
t
98 Of the RISE and FAL L of the
1
1
fuaded another of his fellow-priſoners, who
was moſt liable to fufpicion, to take the crime
upon himſelf, and to impeach fome others as
his accomplices: urging this as a reafon,
that whether what he confeffed fhould be true
or falfe, he would at leaſt fecure his own
pardon, and calm the prefent fufpicions of
the people. Audocides, for that was the
name of this perfon according to Plutarch,
though it is omitted by Thucydides, was pre-
vailed upon by this kind of reaſoning to ac-
knowledge himſelf guilty of defacing the
ſtatues, and to inform againſt fome others as
accomplices in the fame act of impiety. Up-
on this declaration the informer received
his pardon, and all thoſe who were not men-
tioned in his information, their liberty: but
proceffes were made out againſt as many as
he had named; and all who were apprehend-
ed were tried, condemned, and executed up-
on his fingle evidence. Thoſe who eſcaped
by flight were fentenced to die, and a price
fet upon their heads by a publick proclama-
tion. Whether the perfons condemned were
guilty or innocent was not at all clear, accord-
ing to Thucydides. 3 Plutarch tells us, that
the friends and acquaintance of Alcibiades,
2
Plut. in Vit. Alcib. p. 202.
2 Thucyd. p. 416. fect. 60,
3 Plut. in Vit. Alcib. p. 201. lit. C.
1
who
ANCIENT REPUBLICKS.
99
who fell into the hands of the people, were
feverely handled on this occafion. It is cer-
tain therefore that the information was chiefly
levelled at him by the artifice of the oppofite
faction for Thucydides informs us almoft
in the very next fentence, that the people re-
ceived the information againſt Alcibiades with
all the fury of prejudice, at the inſtigation of
fuch of his enemies as had accuſed him be-
fore he failed upon the expedition. And
fince they now had not the leaft doubt of his
being concerned in the affair of defacing the
ftatues, they were more than ever convinced
that he was equally guilty of the pollution
of the myſteries, and that both thoſe crimes
were committed by him and his affociates
with the fame deſign of fubverting the po-
pular government. For a body of Spartan
troops happened to make an excurfion, in
that very juncture, as far as the Ifthmus,
upon fome defign or other againſt the
Boeotians. * This unlucky incident con-
firmed the people in their fufpicions that
this was a fcheme concerted before-hand.
with Alcibiades, covered with the fpecious
pretext of attacking the Baotians; and that
if the plot had not been happily' difcovered
I
2
Thucyd. lib. 6. p. 416. fect. 61.
2 Ibid.
3 Ibid.
H 2
in
7
}
100
Of the RISE and FALL of the
I
in time, and the execution of it prevented
by the death of the confpirators, their city
would moſt inevitably have been betrayed
to the Spartans. Thus on every fide fufpi-
cions fell ftrongly upon Alcibiades, and the
people determining to put him to death,
fent a private exprefs to Sicily to recall
him and fuch of his friends as were named
in the information. The officers difpatched
in the Salaminian galley, which was
fent on that occafion, were ordered to ac-
quaint Alcibiades, that he was defired to
return with them to Athens to clear himſelf
of thoſe things which were objected to him
before the people; but they received a ſtrict
charge not to offer to take him or his friends
into cuftody; not only from the dread of
fome mutiny amongſt their own foldiers up-
on his account, but for fear the allied troops,
whom his influence had engaged, ſhould de-
fert and abandon the enterprize. Alcibi-
ades obeyed the fummons, and taking his
friends, who were included in the informa-
tion, into his own fhip, left Sicily in company
with the Salaminian galley, feemingly as if
returning to Athens; but, whether he only
fufpected, or, which is more probable, had
2
This veffel may properly be termed the Athenian.
State-pacquet boat, and was never fent out but upon
very extraordinary occafions. Plut.
2
Thucyd. lib. 6. p. 417. fect. 61.
3
received
ANCIENT REPUBLICKS.
ΙΟΙ
I
received intelligence of the meaſures taken
by his enemies in his abfence, he, with his
friends, went afhore at Thuria, and gave the
Athenian officers the flip, not caring to ſtand
the fentence of the credulous and prejudiced
people. The officers, finding all their fearch
after him quite fruitleſs, returned to Athens
without him, and the Athenians paffed fen-
tence of death upon him and all thoſe who
accompanied him, and confifcated their
eftates for non-appearance. Thus, inſtead
of uniting their joint efforts to promote the
fuccefs of an enterprize upon which they had
ftaked their All, the infatuated Athenians
were intent upon nothing but the cabals and
intrigues of faction; and the folly of the
people, managed by their ambitious and ſelf-
iſh Demagogues, deprived the ftate of the
only commander from whom they could ra-
tionally hope for fuccefs in that hazardous ex-
pedition. A meaſure which occafioned the
total ruin both of their fleet and army, and
gave a fatal fhock to their Republick; for
the foldiers were not only greatly difpirited at
the loſs of a chief, in whofe abilities they
placed the moſt entire confidence, but Alci-
biades, in revenge for his ufage, took refuge
amongſt the Spartans, and prevailed upon
I
Thucyd. ibid.
2 Plut. in Vit. Alcib. p. 202.
2
H 3
them
102 Of the RISE and F ALL of the
2
them to fend fuch fupplies to the Syracufans
as compleated the deftruction of the Athe-
nians in that country. Nicias was taken and
put to death by the enemy; not a ſingle ſhip
returned, and 'few of the men eſcaped either
flaughter or captivity. The news of this
terrible defeat threw the city into the utmoſt
confternation. They at firft gave up all
hopes, and imagined they fhould quickly fee
the enemies fleet in the Pyræum whilft they
were in this exhaufted and defenceless con-
dition. However, the dread of the impend-
ing danger had this good effect, that it made
the populace extremely tractable, and
ready to fupport their magiftrates in whatever
meaſures they judged moft conducive to the
common fafety. Nor could any thing but
union and harmony amongst themſelves
have poffibly ſaved them in the midſt of ſo
many enemies, with which they were fur-
rounded. For all the Greeks in general
were highly elated, as Thucydides tells * us,
with the ill fuccefs of the Athenians in Sici-
ly. Thoſe who had hitherto obferved a ſtrict
neutrality in this war wanted no folicitations
to join in cruſhing that unhappy people, but
rather thought it glorious to have a fhare in a
I
2
3
Thucyd. lib. 7. p. 505. ad finem.
Thucyd. lib. 8. p. 506, &c.
3 Thucyd. ibid. p. 507.
4 Thucyd. ibid. p. 508. ſect. 2.
4
war
ANCIENT REPUBLICKS.
103
1
war which they concluded would be but of
fhort duration. The Spartan allies were more
than ever defirous of delivering themſelves
from the calamities of war which they had fo
long fuffered; whilft thofe ftates, which till
that time had received laws from the Atheni-
ans, exerted themſelves above their ftrength to
fupport the revolt which they were then me-
ditating. They judged of the fituation of
affairs from the blind impulfe of paffion, re-
gardleſs of the dictates of reafon, and fancied
the next campaign would finifh the ruin of
the Athenians. The Spartans, promifing
themſelves the certain dominion over all
Greece, if the Athenians were once reduced,
made vaſt preparations for the war, to
which all their allies contributed their ut-
moft; all got ready for opening the cam-
paign the ſpring following.
2
I
The Athenians, now harmony was re-
ſtored to the ſtate, recovered their fpirits, and
begun to act with vigour. They applied
themſelves to the re-eſtabliſhment of their
marine, the repairs of their fortifications, and
the care of ſtoring their magazines with the
greateſt diligence and œconomy, retrenching
all fuch expences as they judged ufelefs or
fuperfluous. The good effects of this un-
I
2
Thucyd. ibid. fe&t. 2—3.
Thucyd. ibid. fect. 4.
H 4
animity
104
Of the RISE and F ALL of the
I
animity were vifible when the campaign
opened, for they found themſelves in a con-
dition to make head againſt their numerous
enemies, though ftrengthened by a new al-
liance with the Perfians, and affifted with
· Perfian money and they even gained fome
confiderable advantages. An event too hap-
pened, which greatly difconcerted the mea-
fures of their enemies, and raiſed their ftate
once more to its former power and luftre.
Alcibiades, a thorough libertine, who never
ftuck at the moſt infamous means of gratify-
ing his paffions, debauched Timea, the
wife of Agis, King of Sparta, his great
friend and protector. Dreading the refent-
ment of that prince for fo fhameful a breach
of friendſhip and hofpitality, as well as the
jealouſy of the Peloponnefians, who had
fent private orders to Aftyochus, the Lace-
demonian Admiral, to cut him off, he fled
to Tiffaphernes, at that time Governor of
the provinces in the Lower Afia under the
Perfian Monarch. ³ Alcibiades, who was a
confummate mafter in the art of addrefs,
quickly infinuated himſelf into his good
graces, and explained to him the true intereft
of the Perfians with refpect to the Grecian
A
3
2
¹ Plut. in Vit. Alcib. p. 203.
2
Thucyd. lib. 8. p. 531. fect, 45:
3 Thucyd. ibid. fect. 46.
Re-
ANCIENT REPUBLICKS.
105
+
Republicks. He fhewed him the bad policy
of raifing one ſtate to a fuperiority over all
the reft, which would deprive his maſter of
all his allies, and oblige him to contend
alone with the whole power of Greece. He
adviſed him to permit every ſtate to enjoy its
own ſeparate independent government; and
demonftrated, that by keeping them thus
divided, his mafter might fet them together
by the ears, and, by playing them one againſt
another, crufh them all at laft without the
leaft danger. He added too, that an alliance
with the Athenians would be more advan-
tageous to the Perfian intereft, and preferable
to that which he had made with the Lacede-
monians. The crafty Perfian was too able
a politician not to reliſh his advice; he paid
the Peloponnefians their fubfidy fo ill, and
put off a naval engagement fo long, under
pretence of waiting for the Phænician fleet,
that he wafted the ftrength of their navy,
which was far fuperior to the Athenian, and
ruined all their meafures.
2
Whilft Alcibiades refided with Tiffa-
phernes, and gave the Perfians the beft in-
ftructions he could for regulating their con-
duct, he at the fame time formed a ſcheme
for procuring the repeal of his fentence, and
I
2
Thucyd, ibid.
Thucyd. ibid. fect. 47.
liberty
1
1
106 Of the RISE and FALL of the
liberty to return once more to his native
country. He judged the beſt way to obtain
this favour would be to convince the Athe-
nians of his intimacy with Tiffaphernes.
To effect this, he wrote to the chief officers
of the Athenian forces, which then lay at
Samos, directing them to inform all thofe of
the greateſt weight and authority how defir-
ous he was of revifiting Athens, if the go-
vernment ſhould be once lodged in the hands
of a ſmall number of the principal citizens;
but that he could by no means think of re-
turning whilft the Democracy fubfifted, and
the State was governed by a parcel of aban-
doned wretches, who had fo fcandaloufly
driven him out of his country. Upon that.
condition he promiſed to procure the friend-
ſhip of Tiffaphernes, and declared himſelf
ready to accept a ſhare with them in the ad-
miniſtration. The event anſwered his expec-
tations; for the officers and the leading men,
both of the fea and land forces, which were
at Samos, were eagerly bent upon fubverting
the Democracy. Thus the treaty was ſet
on foot at Samos, and the ſcheme laid for al-
tering the government. The principal men
were in hopes of a fhare in the adminiftra-
tion, and the inferior people acquiefced from
the expectation of large fubfidies from the
I
Thucvd. ibid. fect. 48.
Per-
ANCIENT REPUBLICK S.
107
-+
Perfians. Phrynicus, one of the Generals,
alone oppofed it, ſenſible that Alcibiades cared
as little for an Ariftocratick government, as
for a Democracy, and had no other point in
view (which, as Thucydides acknowledges,
was the real truth) than to procure fuch a
change in the preſent adminiſtration as might
enable his friends to recall him.
• The
terms however, which Alcibiades offered,
were agreed to by the reſt, and Piſander, one
of the leading men, was fent to Athens to
manage the affair.
2
5
Pifander at firſt met with violent oppofi-
tion from the people; and the enemies of
Alcibiades in particular clamoured loudly
againſt the violation of the laws, when his
return was propofed, which they chiefly
dreaded. But Pifander applied fo artfully
to the fears of the people, and fhewed them fo
plainly that it was the only refource they had
left which could poffibly fave the ſtate, that
they at laft agreed to it, though with great
reluctance. He therefore, with ten others,
was appointed to ſettle the affair with Tiffa-
phernes and Alcibiades, as they fhould judge
moſt conducive to the intereſt of the Repub-
ì Thucyd. ibid. fect. 49.
Thucyd. ibid. fect. 53.
3 Thucyd. ibid. fect. 54.
lick;
}
108 Of the RISE and F ALL of the
I
lick; but Tiffaphernes, who dreaded the
power of the Peloponnefians, was not fo
ready to enter into a convention with the
Athenians, as they were taught to believe.
Alcibiades therefore, to fave his credit, and
conceal from the Athenians his inability to
make good what he had promiſed, infifted,
in the name of Tiffaphernes, upon fuch
high terms that the treaty broke off, and the
deputies returned to Samos, enraged at the
trick which they thought had been put upon
them by Alcibiades. Determined however,
at all events, to purſue their ſcheme, Piſan-
der, with ſome of the deputies, returned to
Athens, where their party had already
made a confiderable progrefs; for they had
privately affaffinated fuch of the leading men
as were averfe to an Ariftocracy; and though
they permitted the fenate and people to af-
ſemble and vote as ufual, yet they would
not allow any thing to be decreed but what
they thought proper: 3 befides, none but
thoſe of their own faction durft venture to
harangue the people; for if any one at-
tempted to ſpeak in oppofition, he was fure
to be diſpatched the first convenient opportų-
Ι
*
2
Thucyd. ibid. fect. 56.
Thucyd. ibid. 65.
3 Thucyd, ibid. 66.
i
nity;
ANCIENT REPUBLICKS.
Ic9
nity; nor was any enquiry made after the
affaffins, or any procefs iffued out againſt
thoſe who were ftrongly fufpected of the
murders. The people were fo terrified with
thefe bloody executions, that they acquiefced
to whatever was propofed, and every man
thought himſelf happy if no violence was
offered him, even though he continued quiet
and filent. They were deprived even of the
power of bewailing the common calamity to
each other, in order to concert meafures for
revenge for the faction had artfully ſpread
fo ftrong and fo univerfal a diffidence
amongst the popular party, that no one
durft venture to confide in his neighbour,
but each man fufpected every other as an
accomplice of the crimes which were daily
perpetrated.
I
In this fituation Pifander found the city
at his arrival, and immediately prepared to
finiſh what his friends had fo fuccefsfully be-
gun: convoking therefore an affembly of
the people, the Ariftocratick faction openly
declared their refolution to abolish the antient
form of government, and to lodge the fu-
preme power in the hands of four hundred
of the nobility, who fhould govern the State
in the manner they thought beft, with the
power of affembling five thousand of the citi-
I
Thucyd. ibid. p. 67.
zens
110
Of the RISE and FALL of the
1
ز
zens to confult with as oft as they thought
proper. 'Pifander was the man who acquaint-
ed the people with this definitive refolution
but Antiphon was the perfon who formed the
plan, and was chief manager of the whole
affair: a man, according to the teftimony,
of Thucydides, who knew him perfonally,
maſter of the greateſt abilities, and of by far
the moſt nervous eloquence of any of his
cotemporaries. Thus the Oligarchy was
eſtabliſhed, and the Athenians deprived of
that liberty which they had enjoyed near an
hundred years from theexpulfion of Hippias:
during which whole ſpace they had been ſub-
ject to none, but had been accuſtomed, above
half that time, to lord it over others; for
as ſoon as this decree had paffed in the affem-
bly without oppofition, the chiefs of the con-
fpiracy artfully permitted fuch citizens as
were opon duty, but had not been let into
the fecret, to go wherever they pleaſed; but
directed their own friends to continue under
arms, and difpofed them in fuch a manner
as might beſt favour their enterprize: for the
Athenians kept at that time a conftant guard
upon their walls, as the Spartan army was
encamped in their neighbourhood. When
they had made their difpofition, the four
2
1
I
Thucyd. ibid. 68.
2
Thucyd. ibid. 69.
?
hun-
ANCIENT REPUBLICKS.
III
hundred Nobles with poignards concealed un-
der their habits, and attended by an hundred
and twenty daring young fellows, whom they
employed in their affaffinations, furrounded
the 'Senators, and paying them what was due
upon their ſalaries, commanded them to de-
part the court. 2 The Senators tamely ſub-
mitted, and not the leaft ftir happening
amongſt the citizens, they proceeded to elect
magiftrates out of their own body, and per-
formed all the religious ceremonies uſually
practifed upon thofe occafions. When they
had thus got poffeffion of the government,
they did not think proper to recall thoſe
whom the people had formerly baniſhed, for
fear of being obliged to include Alcibiades in
the number, whofe enterprifing genius they
dreaded extremely; but they behaved moſt
tyrannically to the citizens, putting ſome to
death, throwing fome into prifon, and ba-
niſhing others.
3.
The ſpirit of liberty however is not fo ea-
fily extinguiſhed. Pifander had brought
mercenary troops with him out of fome of
the cities which he paffed through on his re-
turn to Athens, who were of great fervice to
the new Governors in their enterprize: but
the forces at Samos confifted of Athenian ci-
• Solon's new fenate of four hundred,
2 Thucyd. ibid. 70.
3
Thucyd. lib. 8. p. 543. fect. 65.
tizens,
1
事
​}
I
12 Of the RISE and F A L L of the
tizens, jealous even of the leaft attempt upor
the liberty of their country, and declared
enemies to every ſpecies of tyranny. The
firft news which theſe brave fellows received
of the ufurpation, brought fuch exaggerated
accounts of the cruelty and infolence of the
four hundred, that they were with great dif-
ficulty reſtrained from cutting every one to
pieces who was in the intereft of the Oli-
garchy. However, they took the com-
mand from their former Generals, and ca-
fhiered every officer they fufpected, fubftitut-
ing others in their places; the chief of whom
were Thrafybulus and Thrafyllus. Alcibi-
ades² was recalled, and unanimouſly declar-
ed their Captain General both by the fea and
land forces; which gave fuch a turn to af-
fairs at Athens, that the four hundred were
depofed, in ſpite of all their efforts to conti-
nue in power, and the publick tranquillity
once more eſtabliſhed.
3
4
The people confirmed Alcibiades in the
command, and committed the whole ma-
nagement of the war to his conduct.
+ But
his foul was too great to receive his recall
from baniſhment, and even his high poſt as
Thucyd. lib. 8. p. 551. fect. 76.
I
2
Thucyd. ibid. p. 553. fect. 81.
3
Thucyd. ibid. p. 567. fect. 97.
+ Plut. in Vit, Alcib, p. 206.
an
ANCIENT REPUBLICKS. 113
1
1
2.
an act of favour. He determined to merit
both by fome fignal ſervice, and not to revi-
fit Athens 'till he could return with glory.
• His ufual fuccefs attended him in this war,
and he ſeemed to bring victory with him
wherever he appeared; for he gained fo many
victories both by fea and land, and diſtreſſed
the Peloponnefians fo much by his addreſs
and conduct, that he once more retrieved the
dominion of the fea, and returned triumphant
to Athens. His entry was fplendidly mag-
nificent, adorned with the trophies of two
hundred ſhips of war, which he had de-
ſtroyed or taken, and a vaſt number of pri-
foners. His reception was attended with all
the honours and applauſe he had fo juftly
merited. The people, confcious of the late
happy change in their affairs under the ad-
miniſtration of Alcibiades, lamented with
tears their miſcarriage in Sicily, and other
ſubſequent calamities; all which they im-
puted to their own fatal error in not truſt-
ing the fole command to ſo able and fuccefs-
ful a commander.
The fortune however of this great man
was perpetually fluctuating, and feemed to
be ever on the extreme; and Plutarch re-
• Plut. ibid. p. 207, 208.
2 Plut. ibid. p. 209.
3 s Ibid. p. 211.
3
}
I
marks,
114 Of the RISE and FALL of the
marks, that if ever man owed his ruin to his
own glory, it must be Alcibiades; for the
people were fo prepoffeffed with the opinion
of his courage and conduct, that they looked
upon him as abfolutely invincible. Whenever
therefore he failed in any one point, they im-
puted it entirely to his neglect, or want of
will; for they could imagine nothing ſo dif-
ficult, but what they thought him able to fur-
mount, if he applied to it with earneſtneſs
and vigour. Thus, in the fame campaign,
he failed to the ifle of Andros with a power-
ful fleet, where he defeated the joint forces
of the inhabitants and Spartans; but, as he
did not take the city, he gave his enemies a
freſh handle for renewing their ufual accufa-
tions; for the people already fancied them-
felves mafters of Chios and the reft of Ionia,
and were extremely out of humour becauſe
his conquefts did not keep pace with their
heated imaginations. They made no allow-
ance for the wretched ftate of their finances,
which frequently obliged him to quit his
army to go in fearch of money to pay, and
provifions to fubfift, his forces, whilft their
enemies had a conftant refource for all their
wants in the treaſures of Perfia. To one of
theſe excurſions, which neceffity obliged him
to make in order to raife money, he proper-
ly owed his ruin: for leaving the command
of the fleet to one Antiochus, an able feaman
indeed,
ANCIENT REPUBLICKS. 115
indeed, but rafh, and in every other refpect
unequal to fuch a charge, he gave him the
moft pofitive orders not to fight the enemy
upon any account whatſoever during his ab-
fence; but the vain Antiochus treated his or-
ders with ſo much contempt, that he failed
out with a few fhips to brave the Spartan
admiral Lyſander, which brought on a gene-
ral engagement. The event was, the death
of Antiochus, the defeat of the Athenians,
who loft many of their ſhips, and a trophy
erected by the Spartans in honour of their
victory. Alcibiades, at the firſt news of this
misfortune, returned to Samos with precipi-
tation, and endeavoured to bring Lyfander
to a decifive action; but the wary Spartan
knew too well how different a man he had
now to deal with, and would by no means
hazard a fecond engagement.
In the mean time one 'Thrafybulus, who
bore a mortal enmity to Alcibiades, pofted to
Athens, and impeached him as the caufe of
the late defeat, affirming that he committed
the care of the fleet to his pot companions,
whilft he rambled at pleaſure amongſt the
provinces, raiſing money, and living in a ſtate
of riot and diffipation with wine and women.
¹ The ſon of Thrafon; the other of that name is call-
ed by Thucydides, the fon of Lycus. Thucyd. lib. 8,
P. 549. fec. 75.
I 2
A vio-
116 Of the RISE and F ALL of the
1
A violent charge, befides, was brought againft
him for fortifying a place near Bizanthe', as
a retreat upon occafion, which his enemies
urged as a proof that he either was not able,
or not willing, to refide in his native coun-
try.
Jealoufy and inconftancy were the charac-
terifticks of the Athenian people. They
gave implicit belief to the fuggeftions of his
enemies, and difcharged, as Plutarch tells
us, the fury of their gall upon the unfortu-
nate Alcibiades, whom they deprived imme-
diately of the command.
Thucydides, fpeaking of the behaviour
of his countrymen to Alcibiades upon the
impeachment brought againſt him for de-
facing the ftatues, imputes their ruin to that
jealoufy which they conftantly harboured
both of his ambition and abilities. For
though he had done the State many great
and fignal ſervices, yet his way of life made
him fo odious to every individual, that the
command was taken from him, and given to
others, which not long after drew on the
deſtruction of the Republick.
3
For Tydeus, Menander, and Adiman-
tus, the new Generals, who lay with the
Athenian fleet in the river Ægos, were fo
I
1
A city in Thrace.
Thucyd. lib. 6. p. 387. fect. 15.
3 Plut. in Vit. Alcib, p. 211, 212.
weak
ANCIENT REPUBLICKS. 117
weak as to fail out every morning at day-break
to defy Lyfander, who kept his ſtation at
Lampfacus; and, at their return from this
idle bravado, ſpent the reſt of the day with-
out order or difcipiine, or keeping any look-
out, from an affected contempt of the ene-
my. Alcibiades, who was at that time in
the neighbourhood, and thoroughly ſenſible
of their danger, came and informed them of
the inconveniences of the place where their
fleet then lay, and the abfurdity of fuffering
their men to go aſhore and ramble about the
country. He affured them too, that Lyfan-
der was an experienced and vigilant enemy,
who knew how to make the moſt of every
advantage: but they, vain of their new
power, deſpiſed his advice, and treated him
with the utmoft rudenefs. Tydeus, in
par-
ticular, ordered him to be gone; and told him
infolently, that not he, but they were now
commanders, and knew beft what to do.
The event happened as Alcibiades had fore-
feen. Lyfander attacked them unexpectedly
whilft they lay in their uſual diſorder, and
gained fo compleat a victory, that of all their
fleet eight veffels alone efcaped, which fled at
the firft onfet. The able Spartan, who knew
as well how to make ufe of, as to gain, a vic-
tory, foon after compelled Athens itſelf to
furrender at difcretion. As foon' as he was
I
* Plut. in Vit. Lyfand. p. 441.
I 3
maf
118 Of the RISE and F ALL of the
1
mafter of the city, he burnt all their fhip-
ping, placed a garrifon in their citadel, and
demolished the rest of their fortifications.
When he had thus reduced them to a ſtate
of abfolute fubjection, he aboliſhed their
conſtitution, and left them to the mercy of
thirty governors of his own chufing, well
known in hiſtory by the appellation of the
Thirty Tyrants.
This tyranny, though of very ſhort dura-
tion, was to the laft degree inhuman. The
tyrants facrificed all whom they fufpected to
their fear, and all who were rich to their ava-
rice. The carnage was fo great, that, ac-
cording to ' Xenophon, the Thirty put more
Athenians to death in eight months only,
than had fallen in battle, againſt the whole
force of the Peloponnefians, during ten
years of the war. But the publick virtue
of Thrafybulus could not bear to ſee his
country enflaved by fuch inhuman monſters:
collecting therefore about feventy determined
citizens, who, like him, had fled to Thebes
for refuge, he firſt ſeized upon ³ Phyle, a
5/
I
2.
3
• Τριά κοντα πλήες ἀπεκτόνασιν Αθηναίων εν οκτω μησίν,
πάντες Πελοπόννησιοι δέκα ἔτη πολεμέντες. Xenoph.
Hellenic. lib. 2. p. 370. Edit. Lewencl. Bafil.
n
2 Moft probably the fon of Lycus, mentioned by
Thucydides, who had fo great a fhare in depofing the
Four Hundred, and reftoring the ancient conftitution.
3 Xenoph. ibid. p. 367.
ftrong
ANCIENT REPUBLICKS.
119
2
ſtrong fort near Athens; and, ftrengthened
by the acceffion of fresh numbers, which
flocked in to him from every ſide, he got
poffeffion of the Pyræum. The Thirty
Tyrants endeavoured to retake it, but were
repulfed, and Critias and Hippomachus,
two of their number, flain in the attempt.
The people now, weary of the Tyrants,
drove them out of the city, and chofe ten
magiftrates, one out of each tribe, to ſupply
their places. The Tyrants applied to their
friend Lyfander, who failed and inveſted the
Pyræum, and reduced Thrafybulus, and his
party, to an extreme want of neceffaries;
for they were yet confined to the Pyræum, as
the people, though they had depofed the
Tyrants, yet refufed to receive them into the
city; but Paufanias, one of the Kings of
Sparta, who commanded the land forces in
this expedition, jealous of the reputation
which that great man had acquired, gained
over two of the Ephori, who accompanied
him, and granted peace to the Athenians,
notwithſtanding all the oppofition of Lyfan-
der. Paufanias returned to Sparta with his
army, and the ' Tyrants, defpairing of affift-
I
2
4.
Xenoph. ibid. p. 368.
? Xenoph. ibid. 370.
3 Xenoph. ibid. 371.
4
+ Xenoph. ibid. 372-373-
• Xenoph. ibid. p. 375•
I 4
ance,
120 Of the RISE and F ALL of the
ance, began to hire foreign troops, and were
determined to re-eſtabliſh themſelves by force
in that power of which they had been fo late-
ly deprived, But Thrafybulus, informed of
their defign, marched out with all his forces,
and, drawing them to a parley, puniſhed
them with that death their crimes fo juftly
merited. After the execution of the Ty-
rants, Thrafybulus proclaimed a general act
of indemnity and oblivion, and by that falu-
tary meaſure reſtored peace and liberty to
his country without farther bloodshed.
The conclufion of the Peloponnefian war
may properly be termed the period of the
Athenian grandeur; for though, by the affift-
ance of the Perfians, they made fome figure
after that time, yet it was but of ſhort dura-
tion. The manners of the people were great-
ly degenerated, and the extreme fcarcity of
virtuous characters, fo vifible in their fubfe-
quent hiftory, marks at once the progrefs
and the degree of their degeneracy. Conon,
who escaped with eight fhips only when
they were fo totally defeated by Lyfander,
had convinced the Perfian Monarch how
much his intereft was concerned in fupport-
ing the Athenians, and obtained the command
of a powerful armament in their favour:
whilft the artful Tithrauftes, general of
I
Xenoph, lib. 3. p. 392.
the
1
ANCIENT REPUBLICKS.
121
2
I
the Perfian forces in Afia, raiſed a ſtrong con-
federacy againſt the Spartans, by properly
diftributing large fums amongst the leading
men of the Grecian Republicks. ¹ Conon
totally defeated the Spartan fleet commanded
by Piſander, and, by the help of the Perfian
money, rebuilt the ftrong walls and other
fortifications of Athens, which Lyfander had
demolished. 3 The Spartans, jealous of the
rifing power of the Athenians, who ſeemed
to afpire at recovering their former grandeur,
made fuch advantageous offers to the Per-
fians by their Admiral Antalcidas, that they
once more drew them over to their party.
+ Conon was recalled and impriſoned upon
the fuggeftions of Antalcidas, that he had
embezzled the money allotted for the re-
eſtabliſhment of Athens, and was no friend
to the Perfian intereft. The Athenians now
fent Thrafybulus, their great deliverer, with
a fleet of forty fail to annoy the Spartans:
he reduced feveral cities which had revolted
to the enemy, but was flain by the Rhodians
in an unſucceſsful attempt upon their iſland,
* Conon, according to Juftin, was executed
at Sufa by the Perfians. Xenophon, who
4
5
I
Xenoph. lib. 4. P. 404.
2 Ibid. p. 420.
3 Ibid.
4 Ibid. 421.
5 Juftin. in Vit. Conon.
ל
lived
122
Of the RISE and FALL of the
lived at the fame time, is filent as to his death;
but, whatever might be his fate, it is certain
he is no more mentioned in hiſtory. After
the death of theſe two great men, we meet
with none but Chabrias, Iphicrates, and Ti-
motheus, the ſon of Conon, whoſe charac-
ters are worthy of our notice, 'till the time
of Demofthenes and Phocion. The martial
ſpirit of the Athenians fubfided in proportion
as luxury and corruption gained ground
amongſt them. The love of eafe, and a
moſt inſatiable fondneſs for diverfions, now
took place of thofe generous fentiments which
before knew no other object but the liberty
and glory of their country. If we trace the
rife of publick virtue up to its firſt fource,
and fhew the different effects arifing from the
prevailing influence of the different ruling
paffions, we may juftly account for the fatal
and amazing change in that once glorious
Republick. A fhort digreffion therefore,
on that fubject, may perhaps be neither un-
uſeful nor unentertaining.
Of all the human paffions ambition may
prove the moſt uſeful, or the moſt deſtruc-
tive to a people. The-
I
-Digito monftrari et dicier hic eft;
the fondneſs for admiration and applaufe
I
Perfius, fat. I.
feems
ANCIENT REPUBLICKS.
123
feems co-eval with man, and accompanies us
from the cradle to the grave) Every man
pants after diftinction, and even in this
world affects a kind of immortality. When
this love of admiration and applaufe is the
only end propoſed by ambition, it then be-
comes a primary paffion; all the other paf-
fions are compelled to be fubfervient, and
will be wholly employed on the means con-
ducive to that end. (But whether this paf-
fion for fame,(this eagerness after that ima-
ginary life, which exifts only in the breath
of other people) be laudable or criminal,
uſeful or frivolous, muft be determined by
the means employed, which will always be
directed to whatever happens to be the reign-
ing object of applaufe. Upon this princi-
ple, however the means may differ, the
end will be ftill the fame; from the hero
down to the boxer in the bear-garden;
from the legiflator who new-models a ftate,
down to the humbler genius who ftrikes out
the newest cut for a coat-fleeve. For it was
the fame principle directing to the fame end,
which impelled Eroftratus to fet fire to the
temple of Diana, and Alexander to fet the
world in a flame fo quickly after.
There is no mark which fo furely indi-
cates the reigning manners of a people at
different periods, as that quality or turn of
mind, which happens to be the reigning ob-
ject
124 Of the RISE and F ALL of the
ject of publick applaufe. For as the reign-
ing object of applaufe will neceffarily con-
ftitute the leading-fashion, and as the leading-
faſhion always takes rife among the great or
leading people; if the object of applauſe be
praife-worthy, the example of the Great will
have a due influence upon the inferior claf-
fes; if frivolous or vicious, the whole body
of the people will take the fame caſt, and
be quickly infected by the contagion. There
cannot therefore be a more certain criterion,
by which we may form our judgment of
the national virtue or national degeneracy
of any people, in any period of their exiſt-
ence, than from thofe characters, which
are the moſt diftinguiſhed in every period
of their reſpective hiftories. To analyze
theſe remarkable characters; to inveſtigate
the end propoſed by all their actions,
which opens to us all their fecret ſprings;
and to develope the means employed for the
acquifition of that end, is not only the moſt
entertaining, but, in my opinion, by much
the moſt uſeful, part of hiftory. For as the
reigning object of applaufe arifes from the
prevailing manners of a people, it will ne-
ceffarily be the reigning object of defire, and
continue to influence the manners of fuc-
ceeding generations, till it is oppofed, and
gradually gives way to fome new object,
Confequently the prevailing manners of any
people
ANCIENT REPUBLICKS.
125
people may be inveftigated without much
difficulty, in my opinion, if we attend to
the increaſe or decreaſe of good or bad cha-
racters, as recorded in any period of their
hiſtory; becauſe the greater number will
generally endeavour to diftinguiſh them-
felves by whatever happens at that time to be
the reigning object of applaufe. Hence too we
may obſerve the progreffive order, in which
the manners of any people prepared the way
for every remarkable mutation in their go-
vernment. For no effential mutation can
ever be effected in any government (unleís
by the violence of external force) till the
prevailing manners of the people are ripe for
fuch a change. Confequently, as like caufes
will ever produce like effects; when we ob-
ferve the fame fimilarity of manners pre-
vailing amongſt our own people, with that
which preceded the laft fatal mutation of
government in any other free nation; we
may, at fuch a time, give a fhrewd gueſs
at the approaching fate of our conſtitution
and country. Thus in the infancy and riſe
of the Grecian Republicks, when neceffity
of ſelf-defence had given a manly and war-
like turn to the temper of the people, and
the continuance of the fame neceffity had
fixed it into a habit, the love of their coun-
try ſoon became the reigning object of pub-
lick
126 Of the RISE and FALL of the
lick applauſe. As this reigning object confe-
quently became the chief object of deſire to
every one who was ambitious of publick
applaufe, it quickly grew to be the faſhion.
The whole people in thofe ftates glowed
with the generous principle of publick vir-
tue to the highest degree of enthuſiaſm.
Wealth had then no charms, and all the be-
witching pleaſures of luxury were unknown,
or defpifed. And thoſe brave people courted
and embraced toils, danger, and even death
itſelf, with the greateſt ardour, in purſuit of
this darling object of their univerfal wiſhes.
Every man planned, toiled, and bled, not for
himſelf, but for his country. Hence the
produce of thoſe ages was a race of pa-
triot Stateſmen and real Heroes. This
This ge-
nerous principle gave rife to thofe feminaries
of manly bravery and heroic emulation, the
Olympick, Ifthmian, and other publick games.
To obtain the victory at thoſe ſcenes of pub-
lick glory was eſteemed the utmoſt fummit
of human felicity. A wreath of wild olive,
laurel or parfley (the victor's prize), that
palma nobilis, as Horace terms it, which
Terrarum dominos evebit ad Deos,
was infinitely more the object of emulation
in thoſe generous times, than Coronets and
Garters are of modern ambition. Let me
add too, that as the former were invariably
the
ANCIENT REPUBLICKS.
127
the reward of merit only, they reflected a
very different luftre upon the wearer. The
honours acquired at thefe games quickly be-
came the darling themes of the poets, and
the charms of mufick were called in to give
additional graces to poetry. Panegyrick
fwelled with the most nervous ftrokes of elo-
quence, and decked up with all the flowers
of rhetorick, was joined to the fidelity and
dignity of Hiſtory; whilft the canvaſs
glowing with mimick life, and the animated
marble, contributed all the powers of art to
perpetuate the memory of the victors. Theſe
were the noble incentives which fired the
Grecian youth with the glorious emulation
of treading in the fteps of thofe publick-
fpirited Heroes, who were the firft inftitu-
tors of theſe celebrated games. Hence that
refined tafte for arts and fciences arofe in
Greece, and produced thofe mafter-pieces of
every kind, the inimitable remains of which
not only charm, but raife the juſted admira-
tion of the prefent times.
This tafte raiſed a new object of applaufe,
and at laſt fupplanted the parents which gave
it birth. Poetry, Eloquence, and Mufick be-
came equally the fubjects of emulation at
the publick games, were allotted their re-
fpective crowns, and opened a new road to
fame and immortality. Fame was the end
propoſed and hoped for by all; and thoſe
who
128 Of the RISE and F ALL of the
1
2
who defpaired of attaining it by the rugged
and dangerous paths of honour, ' ftruck into
the new and flowery road, which was quickly
crowded with the fervile herd of imitators.
Monarchs turned poets, and great men
fidlers; and money was employed to biafs
the judges at the publick games to crown
wretched verfes and bungling performers
with the wreaths appropriated only to fupe-
rior merit. This tafte prevailed more or lefs
in every ftate of Greece (Sparta alone ex-
cepted) according to the different turn of
genius of each people; but it obtained the
moft ready admiffion at Athens, which
quickly became the chief feat of the Muſes
and Graces.
Thus a new object of applauſe introdu-
cinganew tafte, produced that fatal alteration
in the manners of the Athenians, which be-
came a concurrent caufe of the ruin of their
Republick. For though the manners of
the Athenians grew more polite, yet they
grew more corrupt, and publick virtue ceafed
gradually to be the object of publick ap-
plauſe and publick emulation. As drama-
tick poetry affected moft the taſte of the
Athenians; the ambition of excelling in
that fpecies of poetry was fo violent, that
Lucian, p. 328. Edit. Bourdel. 1615.
I
2
Dionyfius the tyrant of Syracufe.
Diodor. Sicul, lib. 14. p. 318, 319.
Æfchy-
ANCIENT REPUBLICK S. 129
I
Æfchylus died with grief, becauſe in a pub-
lick contention with Sophocles the prize
was adjudged to his antagoniſt. But though
we owe the fineſt pieces of that kind now
extant to that prevailing taſte, yet it in-
troduced fuch a rage for theatrical entertain-
ments as fatally contributed to the ruin of
the Republick.
2
Juſtin informs us that the publick vir-
tue of Athens declined immediately after the
death of Epaminondas. No longer awed by
the virtue of that great man, which had
been a perpetual fpur to their ambition,
they funk into a lethargy of effeminate in-
dolence. The publick revenues appropriated
for the fervice of the fleet and army were
fquandered in publick feftivals and publick
entertainments. The ftage was the chief
object of the publick concern, and the
theatres were crowded whilft the camp was
a defart. Who trod the ſtage with the great-
eft dignity, or who excelled moſt in the
conduct of the Drama; not who was the
ableſt General, or moft experienced Admiral,
was the object of the publick reſearch and pub-
lick applauſe. Military virtue and the ſci-
ence of war were held cheap, and poets and
players engroffed thoſe honours due only to
2
¹ Plut. in Vit. Cim. p. 483.
Juftin. p. 67. Edit. Elziv.
K
the
1
↓
་
M
1
130 Of the RISE and F ALL of the
the patriot and the hero; whilſt the hard-
earned pay of the foldier and the failor was
employed in corrupting the indolent pleaſure-
taking citizen. The fatal confequence of
this degeneracy of manners, as Juftin af-
fures, was this: That the able Philip, tak-
ing advantage of the indolence and effemi-
nacy of the Athenians, who before took the
lead in defence of the liberty of Greece,
drew his beggarly kingdom of Macedon out
of its primitive obſcurity, and at laſt reduced
all Greece under the yoke of fervitude.
Plutarch, in his inquiry whether the Athe-
nians were more eminent in the arts of war
or in the arts of peace, feverely cenfures
their inſatiable fondneſs for diverfions. He
afferts, that the money idly thrown away
upon the repreſentation of the tragedies of
Sophocles and Euripides alone, amounted
to a much greater fum than had been ex-
pended in all their wars againſt the Perfians,
in defence of their liberty and common fafe-
ty. That judicious philofopher and hiſto-
rian, to the eternal infamy of the Athenians,
records a fevere but fenfible reflection of a
Lacedemonian who happened to be prefent
at theſe diverfions. The generous Spartan,
trained up in a ſtate where publick virtue
ſtill continued to be the object of publick
'Plut. de Glor. Athen. p. 349. Vol. 2.
ap-
ANCIENT REPUBLICKS.
131
applauſe, could not behold the ridiculous
affiduity of the Choragi, or magiftrates who
prefided at the publick fhews, and the im-
menfe fums which they laviſhed in the de-
corations of a new tragedy, without indig-
nation. " He
He therefore frankly told the
I
Athenians, that they were highly criminal
"in waſting ſo much time, and giving that
"ferious attention to trifles, which ought
"to be dedicated to the affairs of the pub-
"lick. That it was ftill more criminal to
"throw away upon fuch baubles as the de-
"corations of a theatre, that money which
<C
ought to be applied to the equipment of
"their fleet, or the fupport of their army.
"That diverfions ought to be treated merely
'
as diverfions, and might ferve to relax
"the mind at our idle 2 hours, or when over
"a bottle; if any kind of utility could
"arife from fuch trifling pleaſures. But
"to ſee the Athenians make the duty they
"owed to their country give way to their
C
paffion for the entertainments of the
theatre, and to wafte unprofitably that
"time and money upon fuch frivolous di-
"verfions, which ought to be appropriated
"to the affairs and the neceffities of the
!
Plut. Sympofiac. p. 710.
3. Ενπότω καὶ ἀνέσει.
K 2
st
"ſtate,
132
Of the RISE and F ALL of the
ſtate, appeared to him to be the height of
"infatuation."
CC
Could we raiſe the venerable Philofopher
from the grave to take a fhort furvey of the
preſent manners of our own countrymen,
would he not find them an amazingly exact
copy of thoſe of the Athenians, in the times
immediately preceding their fubjection to
Macedon? Would he not fee the fame fe-
ries of daily and nightly diverfions, adapted
to the taſte of every clafs of people, from the
publick breakfaſting (that bane to the time
and induſtry of the tradefman) up to our
modern Orgyes, the midnight-revels of the
Maſquerade? If he cenfured the Athe-
nians for throwing away ſo much time and
attention upon the chafte and manly ſcenes
of Sophocles and Euripides, what muſt he
have thought of that ftrange Shakespearo-
mania (as I may term it) which prevailed
fo lately, and fo univerfally amongst all
ranks and all ages? Had he enquired of
thoſe multitudes who fo long crowded both
theatres at the repreſentation of Romeo and
Juliet, what were the ftriking beauties which
fo ftrongly and fo repeatedly engaged their
attention, could a tenth part of the affected
admirers of that pathetick poet, have given
him a more fatisfactory anſwer than, “That
5 C
it was the faſhion?" Would he not be
convinced that fashion was the only motive,
when
ANCIENT REPUBLICKS.
133
when he ſaw the fame people thronging
with the fame eagerness, and ſwallowing the
ribaldry of modern farce, and the buffoon-
ery of pantomine with the fame fury of áp-
plauſe Muſt he not have pronounced, that
they as much exceeded the Athenians in
thoughtleſs levity and folly, as they funk
beneath them in taſte and judgment? For
Plutarch does not find fault with the fine
taſte of the Athenians for the noble compo-
fitions of thoſe incomparable poets; but for
that excefs of paffion for the theatre, which,
by ſetting up a new object of applauſe, had
almoſt extinguifhed that publick virtue, for
which they had been fo greatly eminent;
and made them more follicitous about
the fate of a new tragedy, or the decifion
of the pretenfions of two rival players,
than about the fate of their country. But
what idea muſt he have of the higher claſs
of our people, when he faw thoſe who
fhould be foremoſt in a time of diſtreſs
and danger, to animate the drooping ſpirit
of their countrymen by the luftre of their
example, attentive only to the unmanning
trills of an Opera; a degree of effeminacy
which would have difgraced even the
women of Greece, in times of greateſt
degeneracy. If he was informed that this
fpecies of diverfion was fo little natural
to the rougher genius, as well as climate of
Britain, that we were obliged to purchaſe.
K 3
and
134 Of the RISE and F ALL of the
and fetch over the worst performers of Italy
at the expence of vaft fums; what opinion
muft he form of our underſtanding? But if
he was to ſee the infolence of thefe hire-
lings, and the fervile proftration of their
pay-maſters to theſe idols of their own
making, how muſt ſuch egregious folly ex-
cite his contempt and indignation! In the
midſt of theſe fcenes of diffipation, this
varying round of unceafing diverſions, how
muſt he be aſtoniſhed at the complaint of
poverty, taxes, the decay of trade, and the
great difficulty of raifing the neceffary fup-
plies for the publick fervice, which would
ftrike his ear from every quarter! Would
not his cenfure upon our inconfiftent conduct
be juſt the fame which the honeft Spartan
paffed upon the infatuated Athenians?
When a national Militia of 60,000 men
only was aſked for, would he not have bluſh-
ed for thoſe who oppofed a meaſure (once
the ſupport and glory of every free ſtate in
Greece) and whittled it down to half the
number from a pretended principle of œco-
nomy? But could his philofophick gravity
refrain a ſmile, when he faw the fame people
laviſhing their thouſands in fubſcriptions to
balls, concerts, operas, and a long train of ex-
penſive et cætera's, yet fo wondrous frugal in
pounds, fhillings, and pence, in a meaſure
fo effential to the very fafety of the nation?
If
ANCIENT REPUBLICKS. K35
1
If therefore he faw a people bending under
an accumulating load of debt, almoſt to
bankruptcy, yet finking more and more into
a luxury, known in his time only to the
effeminate Perfians, and which required the
wealth of Perfia to ſupport it: Involved in
a war, unfuccefsful 'till meafures were
changed with miniſters; yet indulging in
all the pleaſures of pomp and triumph, in
the midſt of national loffes and national
diſhonour: -Contracting daily freſh debts
of millions, to carry on that war, yet idly
confuming more wealth in the uſeleſs pa-
geantry of equipage, dreſs, table, and the
almoſt innumerable articles of expenſive
luxury, than would ſupport their fleets and
armies; he could not help pronouncing fuch
a people mad paft the cure of Hellebore, and
felf-devoted to deftruction.
This ſtrange degeneracy of the Athenian
manners, which Plutarch fo feverely cen-
fures, was first introduced (as that great man
informs us) by Pericles. That ambitious
'
man determined to fupplant his rival Cimon,
who, by the éclât of his victories, and the
fervices he had done the publick, was con-
fidered as the firſt man in Athens, and fup-
ported his popularity by the diſtribution of
a large fortune. Pericles, greatly inferior in
Plut. in Vit. Pericl. p. 156.
K 4
point
136 Of the RISE and F ALL of the
1
1
point of fortune, and no way able to contend
with him in liberality and magnificence,
ftruck out a new method of gaining over
the people to his party. He procured a law,
by which every citizen was intitled to a gra-
- tuity out of the publick money, not only
for attending at the courts of judicature, and
affemblies of the ſtates; but even at the en-
tertainments of the theatre, and the pub-
lick games and facrifices on their numerous
days of feftivity. Thus Pericles bought the
people with their own money; a precedent
which has been fo fuccefsfully followed by
corrupt and ambitious ftatefmen in all fuc-
ceeding ages. To this piece of ſtate-craft,
not to fuperior abilities, late miniſters owed
their long reigns, which enabled them to
reduce corruption into fyftem.
The confequence of this corruption, as
we may gather from the writings of Demoft-
henes, was, that in a few years time the
Athenians were no more the fame people.
The annual fund appropriated to the pub-
lick fervice for the army and navy, was
wholly diverted to the ſupport of the theatre.
Their officers regarding nothing but their
rank and pay, inſtead of patriots, were dege-
nerated' into meer mercenaries. The emu-
Plut, in Vit, Phocion, p. 744. Item Demoft.
Olynth. 2. p. 25, Edit. Wolf. 1604.
lation,
ANCIENT REPUBLICKS.
137
·
lation, of who ſhould ferve their country beſt,
no longer fubfifted amongſt them; but of
who fhould obtain the moft lucrative com-
mand. The people taſting the ſweets of
corruption, and enervated by the luxury of
a city, which was one perpetual ſcene of
feſtivals and diverfions, grew averfe to the
toils and dangers of war, which now ſeem-
ed an infupportable flavery, and beneath the
dignity of free citizens. The defence of
the ſtate was committed to mercenary hire-
lings, who behaved fo ill that their affairs
were in the utmoſt diſorder. Of all their
leading men, Demofthenes and Phocion were
alone proof againſt the gold of Macedon;
the reſt were Philip's known and avowed
penfioners. Demofthenes, at this alarming
juncture, laid before the people the ambi-
tious views of Philip, and the diftreffed
fituation of their country, with the utmoſt
freedom. He employed all the energy
and Pathos of eloquence to roufe them out
of that lethargy of indolence and inatten-
tion to the publick fafety, into which their
own luxury, and the flatteries of their cor-
rupt Demagogues, had thrown them.
He demonftrated to them, that the glo-
rious principle, which had fo long preſerved
the liberty of Greece, and had enabled them
* Demoſt. Orat. in Philip. 3. p. 86, 92.
to
138 Of the RISE and FALL of the
to triumph over the whole force and opu-
lence of the mighty power of Perfia, was
that common hatred, that general deteſta-
tion of corruption, which prevailed fo uni-
verfally amongſt their generous fore-fathers.
That, in thoſe times of publick virtue, to
receive preſents from any foreign power
was deemed a capital crime. That if any
man fhould be found fo fhamefully profli-
gate, as to fell himſelf to any one who had
defigns upon the liberty of Greece; or fhould
endeavour to introduce corruption into his
own country; death without mercy would
have been his puniſhment here, and his
memory
branded with indelible and eternal
infamy hereafter. That the Stateſmen and
Generals of thofe happier times, were abfo-
lute ſtrangers to that moſt criminal and in-
famous kind of traffick; which was grown
fo common and fo univerfal, that honour,
fame, character, the liberty and welfare of
their country were all fet to fale, and fold
publickly by auction to the beft bidder.
He then made ufe of his utmoſt art, backed
with the greateft ftrength of reafoning, to
perfuade the people, to give up that fund to
the fupport of the army and navy (the fer-
vice to which it had been originally appro-
priated) which from the time of Pericles
I
'Demoft. ibid.
had
ANCIENT REPUBLICKS.
139
had been applied folely to defray the ex-
pences of the theatre. He fhewed next, the
folly and danger of confiding the defence of
the ftate to mercenary forces; who had al-
ready ferved them fo ill. He informed them,
that their allies the Olynthians earneſtly in-
fifted, that the troops fent to their affiftance
might no longer be compoſed of venal hire-
lings as before, but of native Athenians,
animated with a zeal for the glory of their
country, and warm in the intereft of the
common cauſe. Both theſe motions were
oppoſed by the corrupt party who adhere:1
to Philip. The people were unwilling to
give up that fund, even to the moft preffing
exigencies of the ftate, which enabled them
to gratify their favourite paffion; thus the
oppofition of the people quafhed the former
of theſe motions. But though the urgent,
and repeated remonftrances of Demofthenes
prevailed in favour of the latter, yet the De-
magogues, who omitted no opportunity of
convincing Philip, how well he employed
his money, took care to reduce the promiſed
fuccours to a very ſmall number, and to pro-
cure Chares, a creature of their own, to
be placed at the head of the expedition.
Small as thofe fuccours were, yet they did
the Olynthians effential fervice. But as all
J
• Plut. in Vit. Phocion. p. 747-
the
140. Of the RISE and FALL of the
the eloquence of Demofthenes could not pre-
vail upon his countrymen to make more
vigorous efforts, the city of Olynthus fell
the year following into the hands of Philip
by the treachery of Euthycrates and
Lafthenes, two of the leading citizens. Phi-
lip ftill continued his encroachments upon,
the allies of Athens; fometimes cajoling,
fometimes bullying the Athenians; juſt as
he found either method moft conducive to
his purpoſe, in which he was punctually fe-
conded by the corrupt Demagogues. But at
laft the joint attack which he made upon the
cities of Perynthus and Byzantium, from
whofe territories the Athenians drew their
chief fupplies of corn, at once opened their
eyes, and rouzed them from their indolence.
They equipped a very large armament with
great expedition; but the Philippick faction
had ſtill influence enough with the people,
to obtain the command of it for their friend
Chares. The conduct of this general was
exactly anſwerable to the opinion and hopes
of his friends, who had procured him that
employment. Chares, voluptuous, yet for-
didly avaritious; vain and affuming, yet
without either courage or capacity; rapa-
cious, and intent only upon enriching him-
ſelf at the expence either of friend or foe,
Diodor. Sicul. lib. 16. p. 450.
!
was
ANCIENT REPUBLICKS. 141
was refuſed admittance by the inhabitants of
Byzantium; who from experience were too
well acquainted with his character. Enraged
at fuch an unexpected affront, this doughty
general employed his time in parading along
the coafts, deteſted by his allies whom he
plundered, and deſpiſed by his enemies whom
he had not the courage to face. The Athe-
nians, fenfible of their folly, difplaced Chares,
and gave the command to Phocion. The
able and honeft Phocion was received with
open arms by the Byzantines, and quickly
convinced his countrymen, that he was more
than a match for Philip. He not only
drove that ambitious monarch out of the
territories of the allies; but compelled him
to retire with great lofs and precipitation in-
to his own dominions, where Phocion made
feveral glorious and fuccefsful incurfions.
Philip now throwing off the mafque, march-
ed his army towards Athens, with a refolu-
tion to humble that people, who were the
chief obſtacle to his ambitious views. De-
mofthenes alone took the lead
upon this oc-
cafion, and perfuaded his countrymen to join
the Thebans with all the force they could
raife, and make head againſt the invader.
Philip finding his meaſures quite difconcert-
ed by this confederacy, fent an embaſſy to
Athens to propofe terms of peace, and to
profeſs his defire of living in amity with the
Athenians.
142:
Of the RISE and FALL of the
A
I
peo-
Athenians. Phocion, anxious about the fuc-
cefs of a war, which he knew his country-
men had not virtue enough to ſupport, and
where the lofs of a ſingle battle muſt be
fatal to the ſtate, pleaded ftrongly for paci-
fick meaſures. But the flaming zeal of De-
mofthenes prevailed. Phocion was not only
infulted, but excluded from all ſhare in the
command of the army by the infatuated
ple. Chares, fo notorious for his coward-
ice and incapacity, who (as Diodorus Si-
culus informs us) knew no more the duty of
a general than the meaneft private foldier in
the army, and one Lyficles, a man of dar-
ing courage, but rafh and ignorant, were
appointed commanders in chief. As De-
mofthenes had puſhed on the people to this
war, and was at that time at the head of
affairs, this fatal ftep muſt be entirely attri-
buted to his private pique at Phocion for
oppofing his meafures. Phocion had more
than once beaten Philip with much inferior
forces, and was indifputably the ableſt ge-
neral of the age, and the only man whom
Philip was afraid of. The conduct there-
fore of Demofthenes was fo rafh and weak
in the management of this war, that Plu-
tarch refolves the whole into a certain di-
2
* Diodor. Sicul. lib. 16. p. 476.
2 Plut. in Vit. Demoft. p. 854.
vine
ANCIENT REPUBLICKS.
143
vine fatality; which, in the circumvolution
of mundane affairs, had limited the free-
dom of Greece to that particular point of
time. The battle of Charonea, which en-
fued quickly after, gave the Athenians a too
fatal proof of the fuperior forefight and fa-
gacity of Phocion, and their own ſuperlative
folly in the choice of their generals. The
battle was fought with equal bravery and
obftinacy on both fides, and the confederates
behaved as well as men could do upon the
occafion; but their defeat was owing en-
tirely to the incapacity of the Athenian
commanders. This was fo apparent, that
Philip obferving a capital blunder committed
by ² Lyficles in the heat of the action, turn-
ed about coolly, and remarked to his officers,
That the Athenians knew not how to con-
quer." This fault in point of generalfhip
quickly turned the fcale in favour of the
abler Philip, who knew his trade too well
to let flip fo material an advantage. The
Athenians were totally routed, and that fa-
tal day put a period to the liberty and in-
dependency of Greece.
"C
2
3
• Polyæn. Stratagem, lib. 4. c. 3. p. 311.
2
Polyænus calls this general Stratocles.
3 Hic dies univerfæ Grecia et
et vetuftiffimam libertatem finivit.
Edit, Elziv.
I
gloriam dominationis,
Juftin, lib. 9. P. 79.
Thus
144
Of the RISE and F ALL of the
•
Thus fell the Athenians, and their fall in-
volved the reft of Greece in one common
ruin. The decadence of this once glorious
and free State was begun by Pericles, who
firſt introduced venality amongſt the people
for the fupport of luxury! continued by the
venal orators who encouraged that corrup-
tion to maintain their influence over the
people; but finiſhed by that fatal difunion
between the only two men, whoſe publick
virtue and abilities could have faved their
country from deftruction.
-*
Athens however, by her fall, has left us
fome inſtructions highly ufeful for our preſent
conduct. Warned by her fate we may learn,
-that the moſt effectual method which a
bad miniſter can take, to tame the ſpirit of a
brave and free people, and to melt them
down to flavery, is to promote luxury, and
encourage and diffufe a tafte for publick di-
verfions-That luxury, and a prevailing
fondness for publick diverfions, are thenever-
failing fore-runners of univerſal idleneſs, ef-
feminacy, and corruption.-That there can-
not be a more certain fymptom of the ap-
proaching ruin of a State than when a firm
adherence to party is fixed upon as the only
teſt of merit, and all the qualifications requi-
fite to a right difcharge of every employ-
ment, are reduced to that fingle ftandard.-
That theſe evils take root, and ſpread by al-
moſt
3
A
ANCIENT
REPUBLICK S. 145
peace
moſt imperceptible degrees in time of
and national affluence; but, if left to their
full and natural effects without controul, they
will inevitably undermine and deſtroy the
moſt flouriſhing and beft founded conftitu-
tion. That in times of peace and affluence
luxury, and a fondneſs for diverfions, will
affume the ſpecious names of politenefs, tafte,
and magnificence. Corruption will put on
different maſks. In the corruptors it will
be termed able management, encouraging
the friends of the adminiſtration, and ce
menting a mutual harmony, and mutual de-
pendance between the three different eftates
of the government. In the corrupted it will
be denominated loyalty, attachment to the
government, and prudence in providing for
one's own family. That in fuch times theſe
evils will gain a freſh acceffion of ſtrength
from their very effects; becaufe corruption
will occafion a greater circulation of the pub-
lick money; and the diffipations of luxury,
by promoting trade, 2 will gild over private
vices with the plauſible appearance of pub-
lick benefits.-That when a State, fo circum-
ſtanced, is forced into a war with any formi-
I
Thus Demades termed the gratuities given to the
people out of the publick money, the glue or cement of
the different parts of the Republick. Plut. Queft. Pla-
ton, p. 1oII.
Fable of the bees.
L
dable
146 Of the RISE and FALL of the
+
dable power, then, and not 'till then, thefe
baleful evils will fhew themſelves in their
true colours, and produce their proper effects.
The counfels in fuch a State will be weak
and pufillanimous, becauſe the able and ho-
neft citizens, who aim folely at the publick
welfare, will be excluded from all ſhare in
the government from party motives.
Their meafures will terminate in poor fhifts,
and temporary expedients, calculated only to
amufe, or divert the attention of the people
from prying too cloſely into their iniquitous
conduct. Their fleets and armies will be e-
ther employed in uſeleſs parade, or will mif-
carry in action from the incapacity of their
commanders, becauſe, as all the chief pofts
will be filled up with the creatures of the
prevailing faction, fuch officers will be more
intent upon enriching themſelves than annoy-
ing the enemy; and will act as fhall be judg-
ed moft conducive to the private intereft of
their party, not to the publick fervice of
their country. For they will naturally ima-
gine, that the fame power, which placed
them in the command, will have weight
enough to fcreen them from the refentment
of an injured people.--Their fupplies for
the extraordinary expences of the war will
be raiſed with difficulty ;--becauſe, as fo
great a part of the publick money will be
abforbed by the number of penfions and lu-
crative
1
}
ANCIENT REPUBLICKS. 147
crative employments, and diverted to other
purpoſes of corruption, the funds deftined
for the publick ſervice will be found greatly
deficient. If the rich are applied to, in fuch
depraved times, to contribute their fuperflu-
ous wealth towards the publick expences,
their anſwer will be the fame which 'Scopas
the rich Theffalian made to a friend, who
aſked him for a piece of furniture, which he
judged wholly uſeleſs to the poffeffor, becauſe
it was quite fuperfluous. "You miſtake,
my friend; the fupreme happineſs of our
lives confifts in thoſe things which you call
fuperfluous, not in thoſe which you call ne-
ceffaries." The people, accuſtomed to fell
themſelves to the beft bidder, will look upon
the wages of corruption as their birth-right,
and will neceffarily rife in their demands, in
proportion as luxury, like other faſhions, de-
fcends from the higher to the lower claffes.
Heavy and unequal taxes muft confequently
be impofed to make up this deficiency; and
the operations of the war muft either be re-
tarded by the flownefs in collecting the pro-
duce, or the money must be borrowed at
high intereft and exceffive premiums, and
the publick given up a prey to the extortion
I
Ἀλλὰ μὴν τέτοις ἐσμέν ἡμεῖς εὐδαίμονες καὶ μακάριοι τοῖς
περιτλοῖς, ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ ἐκείνοις τοῖς ἀναγκαίοις. Plut. de Cupidit.
P. 527.
!
L 2
of
148 Of the RISE and F ALL of the
of ufurers.
2.
If a 'venal and luxurious De-
mades fhould be at the head of the ruling
party, fuch an adminiſtration would hardly
find credit fufficient to fupport their mea-
fures, as the moneyed men would be averſe
to trufting their property in fuch rapacious
hands; for the chain of felf-intereft, which
links fuch a fet of men together, will reach
from the higheft quite down to the loweſt
officer of the ftate; becauſe the higher offi-
cers, for the mutual fupport of the whole,
muſt connive at the frauds and rapines of
the inferior, or fcreen them if detected.
If therefore the united voice of a people,
exhauſted by the oppreffions of a weak and
iniquitous adminiſtration, ſhould call a truly
difintereſted patriot to the helm, fuch a man
muſt be expoſed to all the malice of detected
villany, backed by the whole weight of dif-
appointed faction. Plutarch has handed
down to us a ſtriking inftance of this truth
in the cafe of Ariftides, which is too re-
markable to be omitted.
3 When Ariftides was created Quæftor, or
high Treaſurer of Athens, he fairly laid be-
I
Demades, according to Plutarch, by the diffolute-
nefs of his life, and conduct in the adminiftration, ſhip-
wrecked the Athenian Republick. Plut, in Vit. Pho-
cion, p. 741.
2 Plut. Apotheg. p. 188.
3 Plut, in Vit. Ariftid. p. 320.
fore
ANCIENT REPUBLICKS.
149
fore the Athenians what immenfe fums the
publick had been robbed of by their former
Treaſurers, but eſpecially by Themistocles,
whom he proved to be more criminal than
any of the others. This warm and honeſt
remonftrance produced fuch a powerful coa-
lition between thefe publick plunderers, that
when Ariftides, at the expiration of his of-
fice, (which was annual, and elective) came
to give up his accompts to the people, The-
miftocles publickly impeached him of the
fame crime, and, by the artifice of his cor-
rupt party, procured him to be condemned
and fined; but the honefter, and more re-
ſpectable part of the citizens highly reſenting
fuch an infamous method of proceeding, not
only acquitted Ariſtides honourably, and re-
mitted his fine, but, to fhew their approba-
tion of his conduct, elected him Treafurer for
the following year. At his entrance upon
his office the fecond time, he affected to ap-
pear fenfible of his former error, and, by
winking at the frauds of the inferior officers,
and neglecting to fcrutinize into their ac-
compts, he fuffered them to plunder with
impunity. Thefe State-leeches, thus gorged
with the publick money, grew fo extremely
fond of Ariftides, that they employed all their
intereft to perfuade the people to elect him a
third time to that important office. On the
day of election, when the voices of the Athe-
nians
L 3
150 Of the RISE and F ALL of the
<<
nians were unanimous in his favour, this
real Patriot ſtood up with honeft indignation,
and gave the people this fevere, but just re-
primand. When, fays he, I difcharged
my duty in this office the first time, with that
zeal and fidelity which every honeft man
owes to his country, I was vilified, infulted,
and condemned. Now I have given full li-
berty to all theſe robbers of the publick here
prefent to pilfer, and prey upon your finan-
ces at pleaſure, I am, it feems, a moſt up-
right miniſter, and a moft worthy citizen.
Believe me, O Athenians! I am more aſham-
ed of the honour, which you have ſo unani-
mouſly conferred upon me this day, than of
that unjuſt ſentence which you paſſed upon
me with ſo much infamy the year before.
But it gives me the utmoſt concern, upon
your account, when I fee that it is eaſier to
merit your favour and applaufe by flattering,
and conniving at the rogueries of a pack of
villains, than by a frugal and uncorrupt ad-
miniftration of the publick revenues.' He
then difclofed all the frauds and thefts, which
had been committed that year in the treafury,
which he had privately minuted down for
that purpoſe. The confequence was, that
all thofe, who juſt before had been fo loud
in his praife, were ftruck dumb with fhame
and confufion; but he himſelf received thoſe
high encomiums, which he had ſo juſtly me-
}
>>
rited,
1
ANCIENT REPUBLICKS.
15I
It is evi-
rited, from every honeſt citizen.
honeft citizen.
dent from this whole paffage, as related by
Plutarch, that Ariftides might have made his
own fortune, at the expence of the publick,
with the fame eafe, and to as great a degree
as any of his predeceffors had done before,
or any minifters in modern States have done
fince. For the rest of the officers, who
ſeemed to think their chief duty confifted in
making the moſt of their places, fhewed
themſelves extremely ready to conceal the
peculation of their chief, becauſe it gave them
a right to claim the fame indulgence from
him in return. A remark not reftricted to
the Athenians alone, but equally applicable
to every corrupt adminiſtration under every
government. Hiſtory, both ancient and
modern, will furniſh us with numerous in-
ſtances of this truth, and pofterity will pro-
bably make the fame remark, when the ge-
nuine hiſtory of fome late adminiſtrations
ſhall ſee the light in a future age.
If the Athenians were fo corrupt in the
time when Ariftides lived, ought we to won-
der at that amazing height to which that cor-
ruption arrived in the time of Demofthenes,
when left to its full effects for fo long a term
of years? Could the State of Athens at that
time have been preferved by human means;
the indefatigable zeal of Demofthenes, joined
to the ſtrict œconomy, the inflexible integri-
L 4
ty,
152
Of the RISE and F ALL of the
D
1
ty, and fuperior abilities of Phocion, might
have raiſed her once more to her ancient luf-
tre. But the event fhewed, that luxury, cor-
ruption and faction, the cauſes of her ruin,
had taken too deep root in the very vitals of
the Republick. The Grecian hiftory indeed
affords us ever memorable inftances of Re-
publicks bending under the yoke of foreign
or domeſtick oppreffion, yet freed and reftor-
ed to their former liberty and dignity by the
courage and virtue of fome eminent Patriot
citizen. But if we reflect upon the means,
by which theſe great events were fo fuccefs-
fully conducted, we fhall always find, that
there yet remained in the people a fund of
publick virtuefufficient to fupport their chiefs
in thoſe arduous enterprizes. The fpirit of
liberty in a free people may be cramped and
preffed down by external violence; but can
fcarce ever be totally extinguifhed. Oppref-
fion will only encreaſe its elaftic force, and
when rouzed to action by ſome daring chief,
it will break out, like fired gun-powder, with
irrefiftable impetuofity. We have no occa-
fion to look back to antiquity for convincing
proofs of this moſt important truth. Our
own hiſtory is but one continued ſcene of al-
ternate ſtruggles between encroaching prin-
ces, aiming at abfolute power, and a brave
people refolutely determined to vindicate their
freedom. The genius of liberty has hither-
to
ANCIENT REPUBLICKS.
153
!
to rofe fuperior in all thoſe conflicts, and ac-
quired ftrength from oppofition. (May it
continue to prevail to the end of time! The
United Provinces are a ſtriking proof that the
ſpirit of liberty, when animated and con-
ducted by publick virtue, is invincible,
Whilft under the dominion of the houſe of
Auftria, they were little better than a poor
affemblage of fishing-towns and villages.
But the virtue of one great man not only en-
abled them to throw off that inhuman yoke,
but to make a refpectable figure amongſt the
firft powers in Europe. All the different
States in Europe, founded by our Gothick
anceſtors, were originally free. Liberty was
as truly their birth-right as it is ours; and
though they have been wormed out of it by
fraud, or robbed of it by violence, yet their
inherent right to it ftill fubfifts, though the
exerciſe of that right is fuperfeded, and re-
ſtrained by force. Hence no defpotick go-
vernment can ever fubfift without the ſupport
of that inſtrument of tyranny and oppref-
fion, a ſtanding army. For all illegal power
muft ever be fupported by the fame means
by which it was firft acquired. France was
not broke into the yoke of flavery till the
infamous adminiftrations of Richlieu and
Mazarin. But though loyalty and zeal for
the glory of their Prince feem to form the
characteriſtick of the French nation, yet the
late
154
Of the RISE and FALL of the
late glorious ſtand againſt the arbitrary im-
pofitions of the crown, which will immor-
talize the parliament of Paris, proves that
they ſubmit to their chains with reluctance.
Luxury is the real bane of publick virtue,
and confequently of liberty, which gradual-
ly finks in proportion as the manners of a
people are foftened and corrupted. When-
)
ever therefore this effential fpirit, as I may
term it, of a free nation is totally diffipated,
the people become a mere Caput Mortuum, a
dead inert maſs, incapable of reſuſcitation,
and ready to receive the deepeſt impreffions
of flavery. Thus the publick virtue of
Thrafybulus, Pelopidas and Epaminondas,
Philopamen, Aratus, Dion, &c. reftored their
reſpective States to freedom and power, be-
cauſe though liberty was fuppreffed, yet the
ſpirit of it ſtill remained, and acquired new
vigour from oppreffion. Phocion and De-
mofthenes failed, becaufe corruption had ex-
tinguiſhed publick virtue, and luxury had
changed the ſpirit of liberty into licentiouf-
nefs and fervility.
That luxury and corruption, encouraged
and propagated by a moft abandoned faction,
have made an alarming progreſs in our nation,
is a truth too evident to be denied. The
effects have been too fenfibly felt during the
courfe of the late and prefent wars, which
'till
1
1
ANCIENT REPUBLICKS. 155
#
till the laſt campaign, were the moſt expen-
five, and the leaft fuccefsful of any we ever
yet engaged in. But a late fignal change
muſt convince our enemies, that we have a
fund of publick virtue ftill remaining, capa-
ble of vindicating our juſt rights, and raiſing
us out of that calamitous fituation, into
which we were plunged under fome late ad-
miniſtrations. When the publick imagined
the helm in the hands of corruption, pufilla-
nimity and ignorance, they transferred it to a
virtuous Citizen, poffeffed, in their opinion,
of the zeal and eloquence of Demofthenes,
joined to the publick œconomy, incorrupt
honefty, and immoveable fortitude of Arif-
tides and Phocion. The numerous dif-
intereſted marks of approbation, fo lately
given from every part of this kingdom,
demonftrate the refolution and ability of
the publick to fupport that minifter, as
long as he purſues his upright plan of con-
duct with undeviating firmneſs.
From the time of Phocion, the Athe-
nian hiſtory affords little more than a de-
tail of fcandalous decrees, and defpica-
ble inſtances of the levity and fervile adu-
I
I
• Plut. in Vit. Demet. p. 893-94-900.
lation
156 Of the RISE and FALL of the
lation of that abject people. Reduced at
laſt to a province of the Romans, Athens
contributed her tafte for arts and ſciences
towards poliſhing, and her paffion for thea-
trical performances towards corrupting the
manners of that warlike people.
"
※涨
​CHA P.
ANCIENT REPUBLICKS. 157
:
T
2.
CHA P. III.
Of THEBES.
HE accounts of the earlier ages of
this ancient Republick are fo enve-
loped in fable; that we muſt rather apply for
them to the poets than the hiſtorians. `Pau-
fanias gives us a lift of fixteen Kings of this
country, down from Cadmus inclufive, who
evidently belong to the fabulous times of the
Heroes. He ſeems indeed to acknowledge
as much, fince he confeffes, that as he could
find no better account of their origin, he was
obliged to take up with fable. After the
death of Xanthus, the laft of thofe Kings,
the Thebans, as the fame author relates, dif-
gufted at Monarchy, changed the form of
their government into a Republick. But it
is in vain to fearch for the cauſe, or manner
how this revolution was effected, either in
Paufanias, or any other hiftorian. All we
can learn of the Thebans or + Boeotians from
hiſtory, is, that they were remarkable for
4
3
* Paufan. Grec. Defcrip. lib. 9. c. 5. p. 718. Edit.
Kechnii.
2. Ου γαρ τι ηδυνάμην, ες αυτές παρευρείν, επομαι τω μαθω.
Id. ibid.
3 Ibid. p. 723.
4 Thebes was the capital of Bœcotia.
their
158 Of the RISE and FALL of the
t
I
their dullneſs and ftupidity, even to a pro-
verb: that, 'till the time of Pelopidas and
Epaminondas, they made as poor a figure in
the art of war as in the fciences: that their
form of government was Democratick; and
that, as ufually happens in that kind of
go-
vernment, they were divided into factions.
After the famous peace of Antalcidas, by
which the honour and true intereft of Greece
was facrificed to the ambition of the Spar-
tans, whatever State refufed to come into
their meaſures, was condemned to feel the
effects of their refentment. They had com-
pelled the Thebans to accede to that treaty,
though it deprived them of the dominion over
Boeotia; and afterwards, by the perfidy of
the Ariftocratick faction, got poffeffion of
their citadel, and reduced them to a ſtate of
abfolute ſubjection. This was the wretched
ftate of the Thebans 'till they were deliver-
ed both from foreign and domeſtick flavery,
and raiſed to a height of power fuperior to
every other State of Greece by the virtue of
Pelopidas and Epaminondas. I have felect-
ed therefore this revolution as the moſt in-
tereſting, and moft worthy of our attention;
becauſe it exhibits a convincing proof, that²
• Bootûm in craffo jurares aëre natum. Hor. epif. 1.
lib. 2. lin. 244.
2 Plut. in Vit. Pelopid. p. 287.
a brave
$
M
ANCIENT REPUBLICKS. 159
a brave and warlike people are not the pro-
duce of any particular ſpot, but are the
growth of every place and country, where
the natives are trained up in a true fenfe of
ſhame at mean and baſe actions, and inſpired
with that manly courage which arifes from
the emulation after what is juft and honour-
able. And that thoſe who are taught to
dread infamy more than the greateſt dangers,
prove the moſt invincible, and moſt formi-
dable to an enemy. It inftructs us too, that
the moſt depreffed, and moſt abject State
may be extricated from the calamities of op-
preffion, and raiſed to fuperior dignity and
luftre by a very ſmall number of virtuous.
patriots, whilft the fpirit of liberty yet re-
mains, and the people fecond the efforts of
their leaders with unanimity and vigour.
The Thebans, by a fatal error in poli-
ticks, had chofen Ifmenias and Leontidas,
who were at that time heads of two oppofite
parties, their fupreme annual magiftrates.
Ifmenias was a fready affertor of the liberty
and juft rights of the people, and laboured to
preferve a due balance in the powers of the
conftitution. Leontidas wanted to engrofs
the whole power into his own hands, and
to govern by a ſmall, but felect number of
his own creatures. It was impoffible for uni-
on and harmony to fubfift between two men,
who had views fo diametrically oppofite.
Leon-
160 Of the R 1 SE and F ALL of the
Leontidas therefore, who found his party the
weakeft, bargained by a private convention
with Phæbidas, the Spartan General, to deli-
ver up his country to the Lacedemonians, up-
on condition that the government ſhould be
lodged in himſelf, and fuch as he fhould
think proper to intruft. The agreement was
made, and Leontidas conveyed Phæbidas
with a ſtrong body of troops into the citadel,
at a time when the poor Thebans, wholly
unapprehenfive of any danger from the Spar-
tans, with whom they had lately concluded
a peace, were celebrating a publick religious
feftival. Leontidas, now fole governor, gave
an immediate looſe to his paffions. He feiz-
ed his colleague Ifmenias, and, by the aſſiſt-
ance of the Spartans, procured him to be
tried, condemned, and executed, for caballing
againſt the State. A pretence however ſtale,
yet conftantly urged by every iniquitous ad-
miniſtration againſt all who have the refolu-
tion to oppofe their meaſures. The party of
Ifmenias, upon the firft news of the impri-
fonment of their chief, fled the city, and
were afterwards baniſhed by a publick decree.
A ftrong proof of the fatal lengths a faction
will run, which is compoſed of thoſe profli-
gate wretches whofe fole aim is their own
private emolument Yet fuch a faction, in
all free States, when once luxury and corrup-
tion are introduced, is generally the moft nu-
!
merous,
ANCIENT
161
REPUBLICKS.
Athens, not
merous, and moft prevalent.
long before, had been betrayed to the Spar-
tans in the fame manner, and on the fame
infamous terms by a deteſtable faction, com-
pofed of the moſt abandoned of her citizens,
and groaned under the fame fpecies of ty-
ranny, 'till ſhe was freed by the great Thra-
fybulus. And, I believe, we have not yet
forgot the ſtrong apprehenfions we were
lately under, that a certain free State, upon
the continent, was on the point of being
fold to a powerful neighbour by a fimilar
faction, and by a like iniquitous contract.
We must remember too, after what manner
that ſcheme was defeated by the glorious
efforts of patriotifm and publick fpirit.
I fhall make no apology for this digref-
fion, becauſe I thought the remark too
appofite to be omitted.
The honeft citizens, who had fled to A-
thens, enraged to fee their country thus trick-
ed out of her liberty, and groaning under the
moſt ignominious fervitude, determined to
fet her free, or periſh in fo glorious an at-
tempt.
The fcheme was well concerted,
and as boldly executed by Pelopidas, who
entering the city with a ſmall number of the
moft refolute of his party in difguife, deſtroy-
ed Leontidas, and his colleague Archias, with
the moſt dangerous of his faction; (and, by
M
the
162 Of the RISE and F ALL of the
1
the affiftance of Epaminondas and his
friends, with the additional aid of a large
body of Athenians, recovered the citadel.
2 The Spartans, at the firſt news of this fur-
prizing event, entered the Theban territories
with a powerful army to take vengeance of
the authors of this rebellion, as they termed
it, and to reduce Thebes to its former fub-
jection. The Athenians, confcious of their
own weakneſs, and the mighty power of
Sparta, which they were by no means able to
cope with, not only renounced all friendſhip
with the Thebans, but proceeded with the
utmoſt ſeverity againſt fuch of their citizens
as favoured that people. Thus the Thebans,
deferted by their allies, and deftitute of
friends, appeared to the reft of Greece as de-
voted to inevitable deftruction. In this def-
perate fituation of affairs, the virtue and abi-
lities of thoſe two great men fhone forth with
greater luftre. They begun by training their
countrymen to the ufe of arms as well as the
ſhortneſs of the time would permit, and in-
fpiring them with a hatred of fervitude, and
the generous refolution of dying in defence
of the liberty, and glory of their country.
As they judged it imprudent to hazard a de-
cifive battle againft the beft troops in the
• Diodor. Sicul. lib. 15. p. 470.
2 Plut. in Vit. Pelop. p. 284. et fequent.
world,
差
​ANCIENT REPUBLICKS.
163
1
world, with their new-raifed militia, they
haraffed the Spartans with daily ſkirmiſhes to
inftruct their men in military difcipline, and
the trade of war. By this method they ani-
mated the minds of their people with the
love of glory, and inured their bodies to the
fatigues of war by exerciſe and labour, whilſt
they acquired experience and courage by thoſe
frequent encounters. Thus, as Plutarch
remarks, when theſe able generals, by never
engaging rafhly, but watching every favour-
able opportunity, had fleſhed the Thebans,
like young ftag-hounds, upon their enemies,
and rendered them ftaunch by tafting the
fweets of victory, and bringing them off in
fafety, they made them fond of the ſport,
and eager after the moſt arduous enterprizes.
By this able management they defeated the
Spartans at Platea and Thefpia, where they
killed Phæbidas, who had before ſo treacher-
oufly furprized their citadel, and again routed
them at Tenagra, the Spartan general him-
felf falling by the hand of Pelopidas. Flufh-
ed with this fuccefs, the Thebans feared no
enemy, however fuperior in number; and the
battle of Tegyra foon after raiſed the repu-
tation of their arms to a degree unknown
before. In this action the brave Pelopidas,
2
Plut. in Vit. Pelop. p. 285.
Id. p. 286, 287.
M 2
with
164 Of the RISE and FALL of the
with a ſmall body of horfe, and no more
than three hundred foot, broke through, and
difperfed a body of Spartans, confifting of
above three times that number, made a ter-
rible flaughter of the enemy, killed both
their generals upon the fpot, took the ſpoils
of the dead, raiſed a trophy on the field of
battle, and brought his little army home in
triumph. Here the aftoniſhed Greeks firſt
faw the Spartans defeated by a much inferior
number, and by an enemy too whom they
had always held in the greateft contempt.
They had never, 'till that time, been beaten
by equal, and rarely by much fuperior num-
bers, and, 'till that fatal day, were juftly re-
puted invincible. But this action was only
the prelude to that deciſive ſtroke at Leuctra,
which gave a fatal turn to the Spartan affairs,
and ſtripped them of that dominion which
they had ſo long exerciſed over the reſt of
Greece. For this feries of fuccefs, though
it greatly elated the Thebans, yet rather en-
raged than difcouraged the Spartans. The
Athenians, jealous of the growing power of
Thebes, ftruck up a peace with their ancient
rivals, in which all the Grecian States were
included, except the Thebans, who were
given up a facrifice to the Spartan vengeance.
Cleombrotus, joint King with Agefilaus, en-
tered Boeotia with the largeſt and fineft army
the Spartans had ever fent into the field. The
I
great
ANCIENT REPUBLICKS.
165
1
great Epaminondas engaged them at Leuctra
with a body of fix thouſand Thebans, which
ſcarce equalled a third part of their enemies;
but the admirable difpofition he made, joined
to the ſkill and dexterity of Pelopidas, and
the bravery of their troops fupplied the de-
fect of numbers. Cleombrotus was flain on
the ſpot, his army totally routed, and the
greateſt flaughter made of the native Spar-
tans that had ever happened 'till that day,
with the lofs only of three hundred The-
bans. Diodorus Siculus gives a concife ac-
count of this action in theſe remarkable
words, "That Epaminondas, being reduced
.
to the neceffity of engaging the whole
"confederate force of the Lacedemonians,
"and their allies, with only a handful of
"his city militia, gained fo compleat a vic-
tory over thofe hitherto invincible war-
riors, that he flew their King Cleombro-
tus, and cut off the Spartan diviſion,
"which was oppofed to him, almoſt to a
'
<c
cc
<c
man."
This victory gave ſo happy a turn to the
affairs of the Thebans, that their alliancewas
now as much courted as before it had been
defpifed and fhunned. The Arcadians ap-
plied to them for fuccours against the Spar-
tans. Epaminondas and Pelopidas were fent
Διὸ καὶ συναναγκαθείς ὀλίγοις πολιτικοῖς, &c. Diodor. Si-
cul, lib. 15. p. 477. Edit. Henr. Stephani.
M 3
with
166 Of the RISE and F ALL of the
1
with a powerful army to their affiftance.
At the head of the joint forces theſe two
great men entered Laconia, and appeared with
a hoftile army at the gates of Sparta; the
firft fight of that kind ever ſeen by that
haughty people. The mafterly conduct of
Agefilaus, and the defperate valour of the
Spartans faved the city, but could not pre-
vent the ravage of their territories by the
two Theban generals, who reftored the Mef-
fenians to their kingdom, of which the Spar-
tans had deprived them near three hundred
years before, defeated the Athenians, who
came to the affiftance of the Spartans, and
returned home with glory.
The Theban arms were now fo terrible,
and their power grown fo formidable, that
whilſt ſome States applied to them for
pro-
tection, and others for afliftance, the Mace-
donians referred the difputes about the fuc-
ceffion to that crown to their decifion, and
gave hoftages as a fecurity that they would
abide by their determination. The chief of
theſe hoſtages was the famous Philip, father
of Alexander the Great, who employed his
time fo well, under thofe two able mafters in
the art of war, that from them he acquired
that military knowledge which proved after-
wards fo fatal to all Greece in general. Thus
the publick virtue of two private citizens
not only reftored Thebes to her former li-
berty,
ANCIENT REPUBLICKS. 167
berty, but raiſed her to a much more refpec-
table rank than fhe had ever held before
amongſt the Grecian Republicks.
But this eminent, and newly acquired de-
gree of power was but of fhort duration.
Pelopidas had freed the Theffalians from the
infults of Alexander the Pherean; but going
to him afterwards, accompanied only by If-
menias, to compofe fome differences, he was
not only unjustly made prifoner, but treated
with the moft fpiteful cruelty by that perfi-
dious tyrant. The Thebans, enraged at this
treacherous act, fent an army against the ty-
rant, under the command of two new ge-
nerals, who returned with lofs and difhonour.
The command was again committed to Epa-
minondas, who, by the terror of his name
alone, brought the tyrant to reafon, and pro-
cured the releaſe of his friend Pelopidas and
Ifmenias. But the tyrant foon after renew-
ing his ufual depredations upon the Theffa-
lians, Pelopidas was once more fent with
forces to their affiftance. The two armies
came foon to action, when Pelopidas, blinded
by refentment, and eager after revenge, ruſh-
ed into the right wing, where the tyrant
commanded in perfon, and fell, covered with
wounds, in the midft of his furrounding ene-'
mies. His death however was not unre-
venged; for his troops, quite furious at the
lofs of a general they fo much revered and
loved,
M 4
168 Of the RISE and FALL of the
loved, routed the enemy, and facrificed three
thousand of them to his manes.
Though the death of this truly great man
was an irretrievable lofs to Thebes, yet Epa-
minondas ftill furvived, and whilft he lived,
the good fortune and power of his country
remained unaltered. But new diſturbances
breaking out not long after, Epaminondas,
at the head of his Thebans, broke again in-
to Peloponnefus, eluded the vigilance of Age-
filaus, and advanced into the very fuburbs
of Sparta. But as they had juſt before re-
ceived intelligence of his approach by a mef-
fenger from Agefilaus, they were fo well pre-
pared for his reception, that he judged pro-
per to retire, and, in his return, fell unex-
pectedly upon the Spartans and their allies at
Mantinea. The difpofition of his forces up-
on this occafion is eſteemed a mafter-piece of
generalfhip; nor was his valour inferior to
his conduct. He routed and made a terrible
flaughter of the Spartans; but, puſhing on
too eagerly to compleat his victory, he re-
ceived a mortal wound in his breaft, and was
carried to his tent. As foon as he recovered
his fpeech, and was fatisfied that his fhield
was fafe, and the Thebans were victors, he
ordered the broken part of the weapon to be
drawn out of his wound, and died rejoicing
at the good fortune of his country.
Thus
fell the incomparable Epaminondas, who,
as
ANCIENT
169
REPUBLICKS.
2
2
as Polybius obferves, overcame his ene-
mies, but was overcome by fortune. The
fame judicious hiftorian, in his remarks on
the different conftitutions of the ancient Re-
publicks, obferves, "That the flouriſhing
"State of the Thebans was but of fhort du-
cc
<c
..
<c
SC
ration, nor was their decay gradual, be-
"cauſe their ſudden rife was not founded on
right principles. He affirms that the The-
"bans took the opportunity of attacking
"the Spartans when the imprudence and,
haughtiness of that people had made them
quite odious to their allies; and that they
acquired amongst the Greeks their high
reputation for valour by the virtue and
"abilities of one or two great men, who
"knew how to make the beft ufe of thofe
unexpected incidents, which fo fortunate-
ly offered. He adds, that the fudden
change in their affairs made it quickly ap-
pear to all, that their remarkable fuccefs
"was not owing to the fyftem of their
KC
<<
*
go-
vernment, but to the publick virtue of
"thofe who were at the head of the admi-
"niftration. For that the
For that the power and gran-
"deur of the Thebans arofe, flouriſhed,
" and fell with Epaminondas and Pelopi-
"das is too evident, he fays, to be denied.
1
Polyb. Comparat. Epaminond. et Hannib. lib. 9.
P. 762.
2 Id. lib. 6. p. 678-79.
" Whence
170
Of the RISE and FALL of the
<<
"Whence he concludes, that the fplendid
figure the Thebans at that time made in
"the world, muft not be afcribed to their
civil polity, but to thoſe two great men
only."
<<
<<
I have hitherto confidered them only in
the light of virtuous citizens, and able ge-
nerals; perhaps a ſhort ſketch of their cha-
racters as Patriot-Stateſmen may not be un-
acceptable nor uninftructing.
Pelopidas and Epaminondas were both de-
fcended from ancient and worthy families.
Pelopidas inherited a large fortune, which
he enjoyed with honour to himſelf and uti-
lity to his friends; and by avoiding the two
extremes of avarice and diffipation, fhewed
that he was the mafter of, not the flave to,
riches. The patrimony of Epaminondas on
the contrary was extremely fmall, yet equal
to his utmoſt wants or defires. Devoted
wholly to the ſciences and the ftudy of hif-
tory and philofophy, which mend the heart,
whilft they inftruct the head, he preferred
the fweets of retirement and ſtudy to a life
of pleaſure and oftentation. He avoided all
lucrative employments and ſtate honours
with as much affiduity as they were courted
and intrigued for by others: nor did he ac-
'cept of the higheft office in the ftate, 'till he
was called to it by the united cry of the peo-
ple, and the exigencies of the publick. When
dragged
1
ANCIENT REPUBLICKS.
171
dragged out of his retirement, and placed by
force, as it were, at the head of affairs, he
convinced his countrymen, as 'Juſtin informs
us, that he was fully equal to the taſk, and
feemed rather to give luftre to, than receive
any from the dignity of his employment.
He excelled in the art of fpeaking, and was
the most confummate orator of his time;
perfuafion hung upon his tongue, and he
was the maſter of the paffions of his audi-
tors by his eloquence, and of his own by
philofophy. With this truly great man Pe-
lopidas was joined as colleague, who, when
he could not prevail upon his friend Epami-
nondas to fhare the enjoyment of his own
fortune with him, copied him in the hum-
bler virtues of private life. Thus both be-
came the admiration of their countrymen for
their temperance and moderation, as well
as their plainnefs in drefs, and frugality at
their table. But the moſt ſtriking part of
their character, was that unexampled union
and perfect harmony which fubfifted be-
tween theſe two great men, and ended only
with their lives. They filled at one and the
fame time the two higheſt pofts in the ftate.
The whole management of publick affairs
was intrufted to their conduct, and all bufi-
Juftin. lib. 6. p. 74.
>."A
4
nefs
172 Of the RISE and F ALL of the
nefs paffed through their hands. Yet during
all that time, no latent fpark of envy, jea-
loufy or ambition, no private or ſelfiſh views
or difference of fentiments (the fatal, but
too general fources of difunion amongſt
ſtateſmen). could in the leaſt affect their
friendſhip, or ever make any impreffion upon
an union, which was founded upon the im-
moveable bafis of publick virtue. Animated,
as Plutarch obferves, and directing all their
actions by this principle only, they had no
other intereft in view but that of the pub-
lick; and inſtead of enriching or aggrandiz-
ing their own families, the only emulation
between them was, which fhould contribute
moſt to the advancement of the dignity and
happineſs of his country. To crown all,
they both died glorioufly in defence of that
independency which they had acquired and
preferved to the ſtate, and left the Thebans
free, great and flouriſhing.
It is natural to think, that men of fuch
fuperior merit, and fo eminently difintereſt-
ed, could never poffibly be the objects of
party-refentment. Yet we are affured in
hiftory, that they were frequently perfecuted
by a virulent faction compoſed of the ſelfiſh;
thofe leeches whom theſe two virtuous men
Plutarch, Juftin, Corn, Nepos.
pre-
ANCIENT REPUBLICKS.
173
prevented from fattening upon the blood of
the publick; and of the envious, from that
ftrong antipathy which bad men naturally
bear to the good. For envy, that paſſion of
low uncultivated minds, has a greater ſhare
in party oppofition than we are apt to ima-
gine. A truth of which we have ftrong
proof in that celebrated paffage, recorded by
Plutarch, between Ariftides and the Athe-
nian countryman. Though the virtue of
thefe great men triumphed over all the ma-
licious efforts of thefe domeftick enemies;
yet they had power enough at one time to
impeach and bring them both to a publick
trial for a breach of formality relative to
their office, though that very act had ena-
bled them to render the moſt ſignal fervices
to their country. They were tried however,
but honourably acquitted. At another time,
2
¹ When Ariftides had acquired the firname of Juſt,
he became the object of the Athenian envy, and the
Oftraciſm was demanded against him. Whilft the peo-
ple were preparing their fhells, a country voter, who
could neither read nor write, brought his fhell to Arifti-
des, and defired him to write the name of Ariftides upon
it. Ariftides, not a little furprized at his requeft, afked.
him what injury that Ariftides had done him.
"Me!
none, replied the fellow, for I don't fo much as know the
man by fight; but it galls me to the foul to hear him
every where called the Juft."--Plut. in Vit. Ariftid. p.
322, 323.
.2
They kept the field and attacked Sparta, when the
time of their office was near expired, by which means
they were in office more than the regular time.
>
whilft
174
Of the RISE and FALL of the
whilſt Pelopidas was detained prifoner by
Alexander the Pherean, this malignant fac-
tion had weight enough to exclude Epami-
nondas from the office of Polemarch or
General, and to procure for two of their
friends, the command of that army which
was fent to puniſh the tyrant for his treach-
ery.
But the new Generals made fuch
wretched work of it, when they came to
face the enemy, that the whole army was
quickly thrown into the utmoft confuſion,
and compelled for their own prefervation, to
put Epaminondas at their head, who was
preſent at the action only as a volunteer : for
the malice of his enemies had excluded him
from the leaft fhadow of truft or power:
This able man, by a manœuvre peculiar to
himſelf, extricated the Theban troops out
of thofe difficulties in which the ignorance
and incapacity of their generals had involv-
ed them, repulſed the enemy, and by a fine
retreat brought the army fafe to Thebes.
His countrymen, now fenfible of their error,
and how greatly they had been impofed up-
on by the faction, immediately recalled him
to the higheft offices in the ftate, which he
continued to execute 'till his death, with
the greatest honour to himſelf, and emolu-
ment as well as glory to his country. As
the management of publick affairs, after the
death of thefe two illuftrious patriots, fell
by
I
ANCIENT REPUBLIC K S. 175
!
by the intrigues of faction into the hands.
of men of a quite different character, we
need not wonder that the Thebans funk
alike in power and reputation, 'till Thebes
itſelf was totally deftroyed by Alexander the
Great; and their country, with the reft of
Greece, fwallowed up at laſt by the infatiable
ambition of the Romans.
淡菜
​CHA P.
176 Of the RISE and F ALL of the
เ
1
OF
CHA P. IV.
Of CARTHAGE.
F all the free ſtates whofe memory is
preferved to us in hiftory, Carthage
bears the neareſt reſemblance to Britain, both
in her commerce, opulence, fovereignty of
the ſea, and her method of carrying on her
land wars by foreign mercenaries. If to
theſe we add the vicinity of the Carthagini-
ans to the Romans, the moſt formidable and
moſt rapacious people at that time in Eu-
rope, and the fpecifick difference, as I may
term it, of the refpective military force of
each nation, the fituation of Carthage with
refpect to Rome, feems greatly analogous to
that of Britain with refpect to France, at
leaft for this laft century. Confequently,
the dreadful fate of that Republick, once the
moft flouriſhing ftate in the univerfe, and
the moſt formidable rival Rome ever had to
cope with, muft merit our higheſt attention
at this juncture: both as the greatnefs of
her power aroſe from, and was fupported by
commerce, and as fhe owed her ruin more
to her own inteftine divifions, than to the
arms of the Romans.
We
ANCIENT REPUBLICKS. 179
We know very little of this opulent and
powerful people 'till the time of the firft
Punick war. For as not one of their own
hiftorians has reached our times, we have
no accounts of them but what are tranſmit-
ted to us by their enemies. Such writers
confequently deſerve little credit, as well
from their ignorance of the Carthaginian
conftitution, as their inveterate prejudice
againſt that great people. Hence it is that
we know fo little of their laws, and have but
an imperfect idea of their conftitutional
form of government.
The government of Carthage, if we may
credit the judicious Ariftotle, feems to have
been founded on the wifeft maxims of po-
licy. For he affirms, 'the different branches
of their legiflature were fo exactly balanced,
that for the ſpace of five hundred years,
from the commencement of the Republick
down to his time, the repofe of Carthage
had never been difturbed by any confiderable
fedition, or her liberty invaded by any fin-
gle Tyrant: the two fatal evils to which
every Republican government is daily liable,
from the very nature of their conftitution.
An additional proof too may be drawn from
this confideration, that Carthage was able
to ſupport herſelf upwards of feven hun-
I
Arift. de Republ. lib. 2. cap. 9. lit. 4.
N
dred
1
178 Of the RISE and F ALL of the
1
dred years in opulence and fplendor in the
midft of fo many powerful enemies, and
during the greater part of that time, was the
center of commerce of the known world,
and enjoyed the uninterrupted fovereignty of
the fea without a rival.
The genius of the Carthaginians was
warlike as well as commercial, and affords
undeniable proof, that thofe qualities are by
no means incompatible to the fame people.
It is almoſt impoffible indeed to diſcover the
real character of this great people. The
Roman hiftorians, their implacable enemies,
conftantly paint them in the blackeſt colours,
to palliate the perfidious and mercileſs be-
haviour of their own countrymen towards
that unfortunate Republick. A fact fo no-
torious, that neither Livy nor any other of
their writers, with all their art, were able
to conceal it. The Greek hiftorians, whofe
countrymen had fuffered fo greatly by the
Carthaginian arms in Sicily and all the other
iflands in the Mediterranean, betray as
ſtrong a prejudice againſt them as the Ro-
man.
Even the refpectable Polybius, the.
only author amongst them who deferves any
degree of credit, is plainly partial,, when he
ſpeaks of the Carthaginian manners. The
Romans continually charge them with the
want of publick faith, and have handed
down the Punica Fides as a proverb. Iſhall
take
፣
ANCIENT REPUBLICKS.
179
take notice of this fcandalous charge in ano-
ther place, where I fhall fhew how much
more juftly it may be retorted upon the Ro-
mans.
As the defire of gain is the chief ſpur to
commerce, and as the greateſt men in Car-
thage never thought it beneath them to en-
gage in that lucrative employment, all the
hiſtorians have reprefented the whole body
of the people as fo infatiably fond of amaf-
fing wealth, that they efteemed even the low-
eft and dirtieft means lawful, that tended
to the acquifition of their darling object.
CC I
2
3
Amongst the Carthaginians," "fays Po-
lybius, when he compares the manners of
that people with thofe of the Romans, "no-
thing was infamous that was attended with
gain. Amongst the Romans nothing fo
infamous as bribery, and to enrich them-
felves by unwarrantable means.'
" ' He adds,
in proof of his affertion, that, " at Car-
thage all the dignities and higheft employ-
ments in the State were openly fold.
practice, he affirms, which at Rome was
a capital crime." Yet but a few
pages be-
fore, where he inveighs bitterly againſt the
fordid love of money, and rapacious ava-
A
1
I
Polyb. lib. 6. p. 692.
2 Id. ibid.
3 Ibid.
N 2
rice
180 Of the RISE and FALL of the
I
2
rice of the Cretans, he remarks, that " they
were the only people in the world to
whom no kind of gain appeared either in-
famous or unlawful." In another place
where he cenfures the Greeks for afperfing
Titus Flaminius the Roman General, as if
he had not been proof againſt the gold of
Macedon, he affirms, "that whilft the
Romans preferved the virtuous manners of
their fore-fathers, and had not yet carried
their arms into foreign countries, not a
fingle man of them would have been guilty
of a crime of that nature." But though
he can boldly affert, as he fays,
"that in
his time many of the Romans, if taken
man by man, were able to preferve the truſt
repoſed in them inviolable as to that point,
yet he owns he durft not venture to fay the
fame of all." Though he fpeaks as mo-
deftly as he can to avoid giving offence, yet
this hint is fufficient to convince us, that
corruption was neither new nor uncommon
at that time amongſt the Romans. But as
I fhall reſume this fubject in a more proper
place, I fhall only obferve from Polybius's
own detail of the hiftory of the Carthagi-
nians, That, unleſs when the intrigues of
faction prevailed, all their great pofts were
I
Polyb. lib. 6. p. 681.
Excerpt. ex Polyb. de virtutibus et vitiis, p. 1426.
ge..
ANCIENT REPUBLICKS.
181
3
1
generally filled by men of the moſt diſtin-
guiſhed merit.
The charge of cruelty is brought againſt
them with a very ill grace by the Romans,
who treated even Monarchs themfelves, if
they were fo unhappy as to become their
prifoners of war, with the utmoſt inhu-
manity, and threw them to perifh in dun-
geons, after they had expofed them in tri-
umph to' the infults of their own popu-
lace.
I
The ſtory indeed of Regulus has afforded
a noble fubject for Horace, which he has em-
bellished with fome of the most beautiful
ftrokes of poetry; and that fine ode has
pro-
pagated and confirmed the belief of it, more
perhaps than the writings of all their hif
torians. But as neither Polybius nor Dio-
dorus Siculus make the leaſt mention of fuch
an event (though the Greeks bore an equal
averfion to the Carthaginians), and as the
Roman writers from whom we received it,
differ greatly in their accounts of it, I can-
not help joining in opinion with many learn-
ed men, that it was a Roman forgery.
The Greek writers accufe them of bar-
bariſm and a total ignorance of the Belles
Lettres, the ſtudy of which was the reigning
taſte of Greece. Rollin contemptuously
3
Perfeus, &c.
N 3
affirms,
182 Of the RISE and F ALL of the
affirms, that their education in general
amounted to no more than writing and the
knowledge of merchants accounts; that a
Carthaginian Philofopher would have been
a prodigy amongst the learned; and then
afks, "What would they have thought of a
Geometrician or Aftronomer of that nation?"
Rollin feems to have put this queſtion too
haftily, fince it is unanimoufly confeffed,
that they were the beft fhip-builders, the
ableft navigators, and the moſt ſkilful me-
chanicks at that time in the world: that
they raiſed abundance of magnificent ftruc-
tures, and very well underſtood the art of
fortification; all which (eſpecially as the
ufe of the compaſs was then unknown) muft
of neceffity imply a more than common
knowledge of Aftronomy, Geometry, and
every other branch of mathematicks. Let
me add too, that their knowledge in Agri-
culture was fo eminent, that the works of
Mago the Carthaginian upon that ſubject
were ordered to be tranflated by a decree of
the Senate, for the uſe of the Romans and
their colonies.
1
That the education of their youth was
not confined to the mercantile part only, muft
be evident from that number of great men,
who make fuch a figure in their hiftory;
particularly Hannibal, perhaps the greateſt
I
Varro.
Cap-
ANCIENT REPUBLICKS.
183
Captain which any age has ever yet pro-
duced, and at the fame time the moſt con-
fummate Stateſman, and diſintereſted Patriot.
Painting, Sculpture, and Poetry, they feem
to have left to their more idle and more luxu-
rious neighbours the Greeks, and applied
their wealth to the infinitely nobler ufes of
ſupporting their marine, enlarging and pro-
tecting their commerce and colonies. What
opinion even the wifer part of the Romans,
had of theſe ſpecious arts, and how un-
worthy they judged them of the cloſe atten-
tion of a brave and free people, we may
learn from the advice which Virgil gives
his countrymen by the mouth of his Hero's
father Anchifes. I have endeavoured here
to clear the much injured character of this
great people from the afperfions and grofs
mifrepreſentations of hiftorians, by proofs
drawn from the conceffions and felf-contra-
dictions of the hiftorians themfelves.
The State of Carthage bears fo near a
reſemblance to that of our own nation, both
in their conftitution (as far as we are able
to judge of it) maritime power, commerce,
• Excudent alii fpirantia mollius æra :
Credo equidem, vivos ducent de marmore vultus.
Virg. Æneid. lib. 6.
Tu regere imperio populos, Romane, memento ·
(Hæ tibi erunt artes) pacique imponere morem
Parcere fubje&tis, &c. Ibid.
N 4
party
184
Of the RISE and FALL of the
party divifions, and long as well as bloody
war which they carried on with the moft
powerful nation in the univerſe, that their
hiſtory, I again repeat it, affords us, in my
judgment, more ufeful rules for our prefent
conduct than that of any other ancient Re-
publick. As we are engaged in a war (which
was till very lately unfuccefsful) with an
enemy, lefs powerful indeed, but equally
rapacious as the Romans, and acting upon
the fame principles, we ought moſt carefully
to beware of thofe falfe fteps both in war and
policy, which brought on the ruin of the
Carthaginians. For fhould we be fo unhap-
py as to be compelled to receive law from
that haughty nation, we muſt expect to be
reduced to the fame wretched fituation in
which the Romans left Carthage at the con-
clufion of the fecond Punick war. This
ifland has been hitherto the inexpugnable
barrier of the liberties of Europe, and is as
much the object of the jealoufy and hatred
of the French, as ever Carthage was of the
Romans. As they are fenfible that nothing
but the deftruction of this country can open
them a way to their grand project of uni-
verfal monarchy, we may be certain that
Delenda eft Britannia will be as much the
popular maxim at Paris, as Delenda eft Car-
thago was at Rome.--But I ſhall wave
thefe reflections at prefent, and point out the
real
ANCIENT REPUBLICK S.
185
real cauſes of the total ruin of that powerful
Republick.
Carthage took its rife from a handful of
diftreffed Tyrians who fettled in that coun-
try, by permiffion of the natives, like our
colonies in America, and actually paid a kind
of rent, under the name of tribute, for the
very ground on which their city was found-
ed. As they brought with them the com-
mercial genius of their mother-country, they
foon arrived at ſuch a ſtate of opulence by
their frugality and indefatigable induſtry,
as occafioned the envy of their poorer neigh-
bours. Thus jealoufy on the one hand,
and pride naturally arifing from great wealth
on the other, quickly involved them in a
The natives juftly feared the growing
power of the Carthaginians, and the latter
feeling their own ftrength, wanted to throw
off the yoke of tribute, which they looked
upon as diſhonourable, and even galling to a
free people. The conteft was by no means
equal. The neighbouring princes were
poor, and divided by feparate interefts; the
Carthaginians were rich, and united in one.
common caufe. Their commerce made
them mafters of the fea, and their wealth
enabled them to bribe one part of their
neighbours to fight againſt the other; and
thus by playing one againſt the other alter-
nately, they reduced all at laft to be their
war.
tri-
186
Of the RISE and FALL of the
tributaries, and extended their dominions
near two thouſand miles upon that conti-
nent. It may be objected that the conduct
of the Carthaginians in this cafe was highly
criminal. I grant it: but if we view all
thoſe maſter-ſtrokes of policy, and all thoſe
fplendid conquefts which ſhine ſo much in
hiſtory, in their true colours, they will ap-
pear to be nothing more than fraud and rob-
bery, gilded over with thoſe pompous ap-
pellations. Did not every nation that makes
a figure in hiſtory rife to Empire upon the
ruin of their neighbours? Did not France
acquire her prefent formidable power, and
is the not at this time endeavouring to worm
us out of our American fettlements by the
very fame means? But though the motives
are not to be juftified, yet the conduct of the
Carthaginians upon thefe occafions, will af-
ford us fome very uſeful and inftructive leſ-
fons in our preſent fituation.
It is evident that the mighty power of
theſe people was founded in and fupported
by commerce, and that they owed their vaft
acquifitions, which extended down both fides
of the Mediterranean quite into the main
ocean, to a right application of the publick
money, and a proper exertion of their na-
val force. Had they bounded their views to
this ſingle point, viz. the fupport of their
I
com-
·
ANCIENT REPUBLICKS.
187
commerce and colonies, they either would not
have given fuch terrible umbrage to the Ro-
mans, who, as Polybius obferves, could
brook no equal, or might fafely have bid de-
fiance to their utmoſt efforts. For the im-
menſe fums which they fquandered away in
fubfidies to ſo many foreign Princes, and to
fupport fuch numerous armies of foreign
mercenaries, which they conſtantly kept in
pay, to compleat the reduction of Spain and
Sicily, would have enabled them to cover
their coafts with fuch a fleet as would have
fecured them from any apprehenfion of fo-
reign invafions. Befides, the Roman genius
was fo little turned for maritime affairs, that
at the time of their firft breach with Carthage,
they were not mafters of one fingle fhip of
war, and were fuch abſolute ſtrangers to the
mechaniſm of a fhip, that a Carthaginian
galley driven by accident on their coafts
gave them the firſt notion of a model. But
the ambition of Carthage grew as her wealth
encreaſed; and how difficult a talk is it to
fet bounds to that reftiefs paffion! Thus
by grafping at too much, fhe loft all. It is
not probable therefore that the Romans
would ever have attempted to difturb any of
the Carthaginian fettlements, when the
whole coaft of Italy lay open to the infults
and depredations of fo formidable a maritime
power.
188 Of the RISE and F ALL of the
power. The Romans felt this fo fenfibly
in the beginning of the firft Punick war,
that they never refted till they had acquired
the fuperiority at fea. It is evident too,
that the Romans always maintained that
fuperiority: For if Hannibal could poffibly
have paffed by fea into Italy, ſo able a ge-
neral would never have harraffed his troops
by that long and feemingly impoffible
march over the Alps, which coft him above
half his army; an expedition which has
been, and ever will be the wonder of all fuc-
ceeding ages. Nor could Scipio have landed
without oppofition fo very near the city of
Carthage itſelf, if the maritime force of that
people had not been at the very loweſt
ebb.
The Carthaginians were certainly greatly
weakened by the long continuance of their
firſt war with the Romans, and that favage
and destructive war with their own merce-
naries, which followed immediately after.
They ought therefore in true policy, to have
turned their whole attention, during the in-
terval between the firſt and fecond Punick
wars, to the re-establishment of their ma-
rine; but the conqueft of Spain was their
favourite object, and their finances were too
much reduced to be fufficient for both. Thus
they expended that money in carrying on a
continental war, which would have put their
marine
ANCIENT REPUBLICKS.
189
marine on fo formidable a footing, as to have
enabled them to regain once more the do-
minion of the fea; and the fatal event of
the fecond Punick war convinced them of
the falſe ſtep they had taken, when it was
too late to retrieve it.
I have here pointed out one capital error
of the Carthaginians as a maritime power,
I mean their engaging in too frequent, and
too extenfive wars on the continent of Eu-
rope, and their neglect of their marine. I
fhall now mention another, which more
than once brought them to the very brink
of deftruction. This was-their conftantly
employing fuch a vaft number of foreign
mercenary troops, and not trufting the de-
fence of their country, nay not even Car-
thage itſelf wholly, to their own native fub-
jects.
The Carthaginians were fo entirely devot-
ed to commerce, that they feem to have
looked upon every native employed in their
armies as a member loft to the community;
and their wealth enabled them to buy what-
ever number of foldiers they pleaſed from
their neighbouring States in Greece and Afri-
ca, who traded (as I may term it) in war as
much as the Swifs and Germans do now, and
were equally ready to fell the blood and
lives of their fubjects to the beft bidder.
From hence they drew fuch inexhauſtible
fup-
190 Of the RISE and FALL of the
1
fupplies of men, both to form and recruit
their armies, whilft their own natives were
at leifure to follow the more lucrative occu-
pations of navigation, huſbandry, and me-
chanick trades. For the number of native
Carthaginians, which we read of, in any of
their armies, was fo extremely fmall, as to
bear no proportion to that of their foreign
mercenaries. This kind of policy, which
prevails fo generally in all mercantile States,
does, I confefs, at firft fight appear extreme-
ly plaufible. The Carthaginians, by this
method, fpared their own people, and pur-
chafed all their conquefts by the venal blood
of foreigners; and, in cafe of a defeat, they
could with great eaſe and expedition recruit
their broken armies with any number of good
troops, ready trained up to their hands in mi-
litary difcipline. But, alas! thefe advantages
were greatly over-balanced by very fatal in-
conveniences. The foreign troops were at-
tached to the Carthaginians by no tye but
that of their pay. Upon the leaft failure of
that, or if they were not humoured in all
their licentious demands, they were juft as
ready to turn their arms against the throats
of their mafters. Strangers to that heart-felt
affection, that enthufiaftick love of their
country, which warms the hearts of free citi-
zens, and fires them with the glorious emu-
lation of fighting to the laft drop of blood in
de-
1
Z
ANCIENT REPUBLICKS.
191
defence of their common mother; theſe for-
did hirelings were always ripe for mutiny
and fedition, and ever ready to revolt and
change fides upon the leaft profpect of great-
er advantages.
But a fhort detail of the calamities which
they drew upon themſelves by this miſtaken
policy, will better fhew the dangers which
attend the admiffion of foreign mercenaries
into any country, where the natives are un-
accuſtomed to the ufe of arms. A practice
which is too apt to prevail in commercial
nations.
At the conclufion of the firft Punick war
the Carthaginians were compelled, by their
treaty with the Romans, to evacuate Sicily.
Gefco, therefore, who then commanded in
that Ifland, to prevent the diſorders which
might be committed by fuch a multitude of
defperate fellows, compofed of fo many dif-
ferent nations, and fo long inured to blood
and rapine, fent them over gradually in ſmall
bodies, that his countrymen might have
time to pay off their arrears, and fend them
home to their reſpective countries. But ei-
ther the lownefs of their finances, or the ill-
timed parfimony of the Carthaginians totally
defeated this falutary meaſure, though the
wifeft that, as their affairs were at that time
I
Polyb. lib. 1. p. 92-3.
cir-
192
Of the RISE and F ALL of the
en.
circumſtanced, could poffibly have been tak
The Carthaginians deferred their pay-
ment till the arrival of the whole body, in
hopes of obtaining fome abatement in their
demands, by fairly laying before them the ne-
ceffities of the publick. But the mercena-
ries were deaf to every reprefentation and
propoſal of that nature. They felt their
own ſtrength, and faw too plainly the weak-
nefs of their mafters. As faft as one demand
was agreed to, a more unreaſonable one was
ftarted; and they threatened to do themſelves
juſtice by military execution, if their exorbi-
tant demands were not immediately complied
with. At last, when they were juft at the
point of an accommodation with their maf
ters, by the mediation and addreſs of Geſco,
two defperate ruffians, named ' Speudius and
Mathos, raiſed fuch a flame amongſt this un-
ruly multitude, as broke out inſtantly into the
moft bloody, and deftructive war ever yet re-
corded in hiſtory. The account we have of
it from the Greek hiftorians muft ftrike the
moft callous breaft with horror; and though
it was at laft happily terminated by the fu-
perior conduct of Hamilcar Barcas, the fa-
ther of the great Hannibal, yet it continued
near four years, and left the territories around
Carthage a moft fhocking ſcene of blood and
3
Polyb. p. 98-9.
I
de-
1
ANCIENT
193
REPUBLICKS.
>
devaftation. Such was, and ever will be the
confequence, when a large body of merce-
nary troops is admitted into the heart of a
rich and fertile country, where the bulk of
the people are denied the uſe of arms by the
miſtaken policy of their governors. For
this was actually the cafe with the Carthagi-
nians, where the total difufe of arms amongſt
the lower claſs of people, laid that opulent
country open, an eafy and tempting prey to
every invader. This was another capital er-
ror, and confequently another caufe which
contributed to their ruin.
How muſt any nation but our own, which
with respect to the bulk of the people, lies in
the fame defenceleſs fituation; how, I fay,
muſt they cenfure the mighty State of Car-
thage, fpreading terror, and giving law to
the moſt diſtant nations by her powerful
fleets, when they fee her at the fame time
trembling, and giving herſelf up for loft at
the landing of any invader in her own ter-
ritories?
The conduct of that petty prince Aga-
thocles, affords us a ftriking inftance of the
defenceleſs ſtate of the territories of Car-
thage. The Carthaginians were at that very
time maſters of all Sicily, except the fingle
city of Syracufe, in which they had cooped
that tyrant both by land and fea.
up
I
Diodor. Sicul. lib. 20. p. 735-36.
Σ
Aga-
thocles,
194 Of the RISE and F ALL of the
thocles, reduced to the laft extremity, ftruck
perhaps the boldeſt ſtroke ever yet met with
in hiftory. He was perfectly well acquaint-
ed with the weak fide of Carthage, and knew
that he could meet with little oppofition from
a people who were ftrangers to the ufe of
arms, and enervated by a life of eafe and
plenty. On this' defect of their policy he
founded his hopes; and the event proved
that he was not miſtaken in his judgment.
He embarked with only 13000 men on board
the few ſhips he had remaining, eluded the
vigilance of the Carthaginian fleet by ſtrata-
gem, landed fafely in Africa, plundered and
ravaged that rich country up to the very gates
of Carthage, which he cloſely blocked up,
and reduced nearly to the fituation in which
he had left his own Syracufe. Nothing could
equal the terror into which the city of Car-
thage was thrown at that time, but the pa-
nick which, in the late rebellion, ftruck the
much larger, and more populous city of Lon-
don, at the approach of a poor handful of
Highlanders, as much inferior even to the
fmall army of Agathocles in number, as they
were in arms and difcipline. The fuccefs of
that able leader compelled the Carthaginians
to recall part of their forces out of Sicily to
the immediate defence of Carthage itſelf; and
this occafioned the raifing the fiege of Syra-
cufe, and ended in the total defeat of their
army,
ANCIENT REPUBLICKS.
195
army, and death of their General in that
country. Thus Agathocles, by this daring
meaſure, faved his own petty State, and, af-
ter a variety of good and ill fortune, conclud-
ed a treaty with the Carthaginians, and died
at Syracufe at a time when, from a thorough
experience of their defenceleſs ſtate at home,
he was preparing for a freſh invafion.
I
Livy informs us, that this very meaſure
of Agathocles fet the precedent which Scipio
followed with fo much fuccefs in the fecond
Punick war, when that able General, by a
fimilar deſcent in Africa, compelled the Car-
thaginians to recall Hannibal out of Italy to
their immediate affiftance, and reduced them
to that impotent ſtate, from which they ne-
ver afterwards were able to recover. How
fuccefsfully the French played the fame game
upon us, when they obliged us to recall our
forces out of Flanders to crufh the Rebelli-
on, which they had fpirited up with that
very view, is a fact too recent to need any
mention of particulars. How lately did they
drive us to the expence, and I may ſay the
ignominy, of fetching over a large body of
foreign mercenaries for the immediate de-
fence of this nation, which plumes herſelf fo
much upon her power and bravery? How
I
Livy, lib. 28. p. 58-9.
02
greatly
196 Of the RISE and FALL of the
greatly did they cramp all our meaſures, how
much did they confine all our military opera-
tions to our own immediate felf-defence,
and prevent us from fending fufficient fuc-
cours to our colonies by the perpetual alarm
of an invaſion ?
Though we may in part truly aſcribe the
ruin of Carthage to the two above-mentioned
errors in their policy, yet the cauſe which
was productive of the greateft evils, and con-
fequently the more immediate object of our
attention at this dangerous juncture, was
party difunion; that bane of every free State,
from which our own country has equal rea-
fon to apprehend the fame direful effects, as
the Republicks of Greece, Rome, and Car-
thage experienced formerly.
By all the lights, which we receive from
hiſtory, the State of Carthage was divided in-
to two oppofite factions; the Hannonian and
the Barcan, fo denominated from their re-
ſpective leaders, who were heads of the two
moft powerful families in Carthage. The
Hannonian family feems to have made the
greateſt figure in the fenate; the Barcan in
the field. Both were ftrongly actuated by
ambition, but ambition of a different kind.
The Barcan family feems to have had no
other object in view but the glory of their
country, and were always ready to give up
their private animofities, and even their paf-
3
fion
ANCIENT REPUBLICKS.
197
}
$
fion for military glory to the publick good.
The Hannonian family acted from quite op-
pofite principles, conftantly aiming at one
point; the fupporting themſelves in power,
and that only. Ever jealous of the glory ac-
quired by the Barcan family, they perpetu-
ally thwarted every meaſure propofed from
that quarter, and were equally ready to fa-
crifice the honour and real intereft of their
country to that ſelfiſh view. In ſhort, the
one family ſeems to have produced a race of
Heroes, the other of ambitious Statefmen.
The chiefs of theſe two jarring families,
beſt known to us in hiftory, were Hanno
and Hamilcar Barcas, who was fucceeded by
his fon Hannibal, that terror of the Ro-
mans. The oppofition between theſe two
parties was fo flagrant, that Appian does not
fcruple to call the party of Hanno, the Ro-
man faction; and that of Barcas, the popu-
lar, or the Carthaginian, from the different
intereſts which each party efpoufed.
I
The firſt inſtance, which we meet with in
history, of the enmity fubfifting between the
heads of theſe factions, was in that deftruc-
tive war with the mercenaries, from which
I have made this explanatory digreffion.
Hanno was firſt fent with a powerful, and
well provided army againſt theſe mutinous
Appian, de Bell. Punic. p. 36.
0 3
def-
198 Of the RISE and F ALL of the
4
I
defperado's; but he knew little of his trade,
and made perpetual blunders. Polybius,
who treats his character, as a foldier, with
the utmoft contempt, informs us, that he
fuffered himſelf to be ſurprized, a great part
of his fine army to be cut to pieces, and his
camp taken, with all the military ſtores, en-
gines, and all the other apparatus of war.
The Carthaginians, terrified and diftreffed
by the bad conduct of their General, were
now compelled, by the neceffity of their af-
fairs, to reſtore Hamilcar to the chief com-
mand of their forces, from which he muſt
have been excluded before by the influence
of the Hannonian faction. That able com-
mander with his ſmall army (for his whole
force amounted to no more than ten thouſand
men) quickly changed the face of the war,
defeated Spendius in two pitched battles, and
puſhed every advantage to the utmoſt, which
the incapacity of the rebel Generals threw in
his way. Senfible that he was too weak
alone to cope with the united forces of the
Rebels (which amounted to 70,000 men)
he' ordered Hanno (who had ſtill influence
enough to procure himſelf to be continued
in the command of a ſeparate body) to join
him, that they might finiſh. this execrable
I
Polyb. lib. 1. p. 104—5.
2 Ibid. lib. 1. p. 115..
war
ANCIENT REPUBLICKS.
199
[
war by one decifive action. After they were
joined, the Carthaginians foon felt the fatal
effects of difunion between their Generals.
No plan could now be followed, 'no mea-
fure could be agreed on; and the diſagree-
ment between theſe two leading men aroſe
to ſuch a height at laſt, that they not only let
flip every opportunity of annoying the ene-
my, but gave them many advantages againſt
themſelves, which they could not otherwife
have hoped for. "The Carthaginians, fenfi-
ble of their error, and knowing the very dif-
ferent abilities of the two Generals, yet wil-
ling to avoid the imputation of partiality,
empowered the army to decide which of the
two they judged moft proper for their Gene-
ral, as they were determined to continue only
one of them in the command. 3 The deci-
fion of the army was, that Hamilcar fhould
take the fupreme command, and that Hanno
fhould depart the camp. A convincing proof
that they threw the whole blame of that dif
union, and the ill-fuccefs, which was the
confequence of it, entirely upon the envy
and jealouſy of Hanno. One Hannibal, a
man more tractable, and more agreeable to
Hamilcar, was fent in his room. Union was
1
Polyb. lib. 1. p. 115.
2 Id. ibid.
3 Idem ibid. 117.
0 4
re-
1
A
200 Of the RISE and F ALL of the
reftored, and the happy effects which at-
tended it were quickly vifible. Hamilcar
now puſhed on the war with his uſual vigi-
lance and activity, and foon convinced the
Generals of the Rebels how greatly he was
their mafter in the art of war. He harraf
fed them perpetually, and, like a ſkilful
gameſter, (as Polybius terms him) drew
them artfully every day into his ſnares, and
obliged them to raiſe the fiege of Carthage.
At laſt he cooped up Spendius with his army
in fo diſadvantageous a place, that he re-
duced them to fuch an extremity of famine
as to devour one another, and compelled
them to furrender at difcretion, though they
were upwards of 40,000 effective men.
The army of Hamilcar, which was much
inferior to that of Spendius in number, was
compofed partly of mercenaries and deferters,
partly of the city militia, both horſe and
foot (troops which the enemies to the mili-
tia bill would have called raw and undifci-
plined, and treated as ufelefs) of which the
major part of his army confifted. The re-
bel army was compofed chiefly of brave and
experienced veterans, trained up by Hamilcar
himſelf in Sicily during the late war with
the Romans, whofe courage was heightened
1
2
• Polyb. 'Ayados TETlEUTHS, ibid. p. 119.
Αγαθὸς πετλευτής,
2 Id. ibid. Πολιτικὲς ἱππεῖς καὶ πεζές. p. 120.
by
t
!
ANCIENT REPUBLICKS.
201
C
I
by defpair. It is worthy our obfervation
therefore, that theſe very men who, under
the conduct of Hamilcar, had been a terror
to the Romans, and given them fo many
blows in Sicily towards the latter end of the
firſt Punick war, fhould yet be ſo little able
to cope with an army fo much inferior in
number, and compofed in a great meaſure of
city militia only, when commanded by the
fame General. Polybius, who eſteems Ha-
milcar by far the greateſt Captain of that
age, obferves, that though the Rebels were
by no means inferior to the Carthaginian
troops in reſolution and bravery, yet they
were frequently beaten by Hamilcar by mere
dint of Generalfhip. Upon this occafion he
cannot help remarking the vaft fuperiority
which judicious ſkill and ability of General-
ſhip has over long military practice, where
this fo effentially neceffary ſkill and judgment
is wanting. It might have been thought un-
pardonable in me, if I had omitted this juft
remark of Polybius, fince it has been fo late-
ly verified by his Pruffian Majeſty in thoſe
maſterly ſtrokes of Generalfhip, which are
the prefent admiration of Europe. Hamil-
car, after the deftruction of Spendius and
his army, immediately blocked up Mathos,
with the remaining corps of the Rebels, in
Polyb. lib. 1. p. 119.
2 Id. ibid.
2
the
202
Of the RISE and FALL of the
the city of Tunes. Hannibal, with the
forces under his command, took poft on
that fide of the city which looked towards
Carthage. Hamilcar prepared to make his
attack on the fide which was directly oppo-
fite; but the conduct of Hannibal, when
left to himſelf, was the direct contraft to
that of Hamilcar, and proves undeniably,
that the whole merit of their former fuccefs
was entirely owing to that abler General.
Hannibal, who ſeems to have been little ac-
quainted with the true genius of thoſe dar-
ing veterans, lay fecure, and careleſs in his
camp, neglected his out-guards, and treated
the enemy with contempt, as a people al-
ready conquered. But Mathos obferving
the negligence and fecurity of Hannibal, and
well knowing that he had not Hamilcar to
deal with, made a fudden and refolute fally,
forced Hannibal's entrenchments, put great
numbers of his men to the fword, took Han-
nibal himſelf, with feveral other perfons of
diſtinction, priſoners, and pillaged his camp.
This daring meaſure was fo well concerted,
and executed with fo much rapidity, that
Mathos, who made good ufe of his time,
had done his bufinefs before Hamilcar, who
lay encamped at fome diftance, was in the
leaſt apprized of his colleague's misfortune:
I
Polyb. id. ibid. p. 121.
Ma-
ANCIENT REPUBLICKS.
203
Mathos faſtened Hannibal, whilft alive, on
the fame gibbet to which Hamilcar had
lately nailed the body of Spendius: A ter-
rible, but juft reward for the fhameful care-
leffneſs in a commanding officer, who had
facrificed the lives of fuch a number of his
fellow-citizens by his own indolence and pre-
fumptuous folly. Mathos alfo crucified
thirty of the firft nobility of Carthage, who
attended Hannibal in this expedition. A
commander who is furprized fn the night-
time, though guilty of an egregious fault,
may yet plead fomething in excufe; but, in
point of difcipline, for a General to be fur-
prized by an enemy juft under his noſe in
open day-light, and caught in a ſtate of wan-
ton fecurity, from an overweening prefump-
tion on his own ftrength, is a crime of fo
capital a nature as to admit neither of alle-
viation nor pardon. This dreadful and un-
expected blow threw Carthage into the ut-
moſt confternation, and obliged Hamilcar to
draw off his part of the army to a confider-
able diftance from Tunes. Hanno had again
influence enough to procure the command,
which he was compelled before by the army
to give up to Hamilcar. But the Carthagi-
nians, fenfible of the fatal confequences of
difunion between the two Generals, efpe-
cially at fuch a defperate criſis, fent' thirty
I
Polyb. lib. 1. p. 122.
of
204 Of the RISE and F ALL of the
I
of the moſt refpectable amongſt the Sena-
tors to procure a thorough reconcilation
between Hamilcar and Hanno before they
proceeded upon any operation; which they
effected at laſt, though not without difficulty.'
Pleafed with this happy event, the Carthagi-
nians (as their laft, and utmoſt effort) fent
every man in Carthage, who was able to
bear arms, to reinforce Hamilcar, on whoſe
fuperior abilities they placed their whole de-
pendance. Hamilcar now refumed his
ope-
rations, and, as he was no longer thwarted
by Hanno, foon reduced Mathos to the ne-
ceffity of putting the whole iffue of the war
upon one decifive action, in which the Car-
thaginians were most compleatly victors, by
the exquifite difpofition and conduct of Ha-
milcar.
I hope the enemies to a militia will at leaſt
allow theſe new levies, who compofed by far
the greateſt part of Hamilcar's army upon
this occafion, to be raw, undiſciplined, and
ignorant of the ufe of arms; epithets which
they beſtow ſo plentifully upon a militia.
Yet that able commander, with an army con-
fifting chiefly of this kind of men, totally de-
ftroyed an army of defperate veterans, took
their General, and all who escaped the flaugh-
ter, priſoners, and put an end to the moſt
I
· Τὲς ὑπολοίπες τῶν ἐν ταῖς ἡλικίαις καθοπλίσαντες οἷον
ἔσχάτην τρέχοντες ταύτην ἐξαπεστέλλον πρὸς τὸν Βάρκαν.
Polyb. lib. 1. p. 122.
ruinous,
ANCIENT REPUBLICKS.
205
ruinous, and moſt inhuman war ever yet
mentioned in hiſtory. Theſe new levies had
courage (a quality never yet, I believe, dif
puted to the Britiſh commonalty) and were
to fight pro aris et focis, for whatever was
dear and valuable to a people; and Hamilcar,
who well knew how to make the proper ufe
of theſe difpofitions of his countrymen, was
mafter of thofe abilities which Mathos want-
ed. Of ſuch infinite advantage is it to an
army to have a commander fuperior to the
enemy in the art of Generalfhip; an advan-
tage which frequently fupplies a deficiency
even in the goodneſs of troops, as well as in
numbers.
The enmity of Hanno did not expire with
Hamilcar, who fell gloriouſly in the ſervice
of his country, in Spain fome years after.
Hannibal, the eldeſt fon, and a fon worthy
of fo heroic a father, immediately became the
object of his jealoufy and hatred. For when
Afdrubal (fon-in-law to Hamilcar) had been
appointed to the command of the army in
Spain, after the death of that General, he de-
fired that Hannibal, at that time but twen-
two
years of
age, might be fent to Spain to
be trained up under him in the art of war.
Hanno oppoſed this with the utmoſt viru-
lence in a rancorous fpeech (made for him
by Livy) fraught with the most infamous
infinuations againſt Afdrubal, and a ſtrong
charge of ambition againſt the Barcan fami-
ly.
200 Of the RISE and FALL of the
ly. But his malice, and the true reafon of
his oppofition, varniſhed over with a fpecious
concern for the publick welfare, were fo ea-
fily feen through, that he was not able to
carry a point, which he fo much wiſhed for.
1
Afdrubal not long after being affaffinated
by a Gaul, in revenge for fome injury he had
received, the army immediately appointed
Hannibal to the command; and fending ad-
vice to Carthage of what they had done, the
Senate was aſſembled, who unanimouſly
confirmed the election then made by the fol-
diers. Hannibal in a ſhort time reduced all
that part of Spain which lay between New
Carthage, and the river Iberus, except the
city of Saguntum, which was in alliance
with the Romans. But as he inherited his
father's hatred to the Romans, for their in-
famous behaviour to his country at the con-
clufion of the war with the mercenaries, he
made great preparations for the fiege of Sa-
guntum. The Romans (according to Po-
lybius) receiving intelligence of his deſign,
fent ambaffadors to him at New Carthage,
who warned him of the conſequences of ei-
ther attacking the Saguntines, or croffing
the Iberus, which, by the treaty with Af-
drubal, had been made the boundary of the
I
Polyb. lib. 2. p. 172.
2 Mia yväjon. Polyb. lib. 3. p. 234.
3 This will be explained in another place.
4 Lib. 3. p. 236.
3
Car-
ANCIENT REPUBLIC KS.
207
Carthaginian and Roman dominions in that
country. Hannibal acknowledged his re-
folution to proceed againſt Saguntum ; but
the reaſons he affigned for his conduct were
fo unfatisfactory to the ambaffadors, that they
croffed over to Carthage to know the refolu-
tion of their Senate upon that fubject. Han-
nibal in the mean time, according to the
fame author, fent advice to Carthage of
this Embaſſy, and defired inſtructions how
to act, complaining heavily that the Sagun-
tines depending upon their alliance with the
Romans, committed frequent depredations
upon the Carthaginian fubjects.
I
We may conclude that the ambaſſadors
met with as diſagreeable a reception from
the Carthaginian Senate as they had done
from Hannibal, and that he received orders
from Carthage to proceed in his intended
expedition. For 'Polybius, reflecting upon
fome writers, who pretended to relate what
paffed in the Roman Senate when the news
arrived of the capture of Saguntum, and
even inferted the debates which aroſe when
the queſtion was put, whether, or no, war
fhould be declared againſt Carthage, treats
their whole accounts as abfurd and fictitious.
"For how, fays he, with indignation, could it
3
• Id. ibid. p. 237.
Polyb. lib. 3. p. 243–44.
poffibly
208 Of the RISE and F ALL of the
poffibly be, that the Romans, who had de-
nounced war the year before at Carthage,
if Hannibal ſhould invade the Saguntine ter-
ritories, ſhould now after that city was tak-
en by ſtorm, affemble to deliberate whether
war ſhould be commenced againſt the Car-
thaginians or not." Now as this declaration
of war was conditional, and not to take
place unleſs Hannibal ſhould attack the Sa-
guntines, it muſt have been made before
that event happened, and confequently muft
be referred to the Embaffy above mention-
ed. And as Hannibal undertook the fiege
of Saguntum notwithſtanding the Roman
menaces, he undoubtedly acted by orders
from the Carthaginian Senate.
I
When the Romans received the news of
the deſtruction of Saguntum, they diſpatched
another Embaſſy to Carthage (as Polybius
relates) with the utmoft expedition; their
orders were to infift that Hannibal and all.
who adviſed him to commit hoftilities againſt
the Saguntines ſhould be delivered up to the
Romans, and in cafe of a refufal, to declare
immediate war. The demand was
ceived by the Carthaginian Senate with the
utmoſt indignation, and one of the Sena-
tors, who was appointed to ſpeak in the
name of the reſt, begun in an artful ſpeech
I
Polyb. id. ibid.
re-
to
ANCIENT REPUBLICK S. 209
to recriminate upon the Romans, and offered
to prove, that the Saguntines were not allied
to the Romans when the peace was made
between the two nations, and confequently
could not be included in the treaty. But
the Romans cut the affair fhort, and told
them that they did not come there to difpute,
but only to infift upon a categorical anſwer
to this plain queſtion: Whether they would
give up the authors of the hoftilities, which
would convince the world that they had no
ſhare in the deftruction of Saguntum, but
that Hannibal had done it without their au-
thority; or, whether by protecting them,
they choſe to confirm the Romans in the
belief, that Hannibal had acted with their
approbation? As their demand of Hannibal
was refuſed, war was declared by the Ro-
mans, and accepted with equal alacrity and
fierceness by the majority of the Carthagi-
nian Senate.
2
I
Livy affirms that the firſt Embaffy was
decreed by the Roman Senate, but not fent
'till Hannibal had actually inveſted Sagun-
tum, and varies from Polybius in his relation
of the particulars. For according to ³ Livy,
to³
I
2
Polyb. lib. 3. p. 259.
Livy, lib. 2r. p. 132.
3 Ib. p. 135.
P
3
Han-
210 Of the RISE and F ALL of the
Hannibal received intelligence of the Ro-
man Embaffy, but he fent them word, that
he had other buſineſs upon his hands at that
time than to give audience to ambaſſadors;
and that he wrote at the fame time to his
friends of the Barcan faction to exert them-
felves, and prevent the other party from car-
rying any point in favour of the Romans.
The ambaffadors, thus denied admittance.
by Hannibal, repaired to Carthage, and laid
their demands before the Senate. Upon this
occafion Livy' introduces Hanno inveighing
bitterly in a formal harangue againſt the
fending Hannibal into Spain, a meaſure
which he foretels, muft terminate in the ut-
ter deftruction of Carthage. And after tef-
tifying his joy for the death of his father
Hamilcar, whom he acknowledges he moſt
cordially hated, as he did the whole Barcan
family, whom he terms the firebrands of the
State, he adviſes them to give up Hannibal,
and make full fatisfaction for the injury then
done to the Saguntines. 2 When Hanno
had done ſpeaking, there was no occafion,
as Livy obferves, for a reply. For almost all
the Senate were fo entirely in the intereft of
Hannibal, that they accuſed Hanno of de-
claiming against him with more bitterneſs
* Liv. lib. 21. p. 135, 36.
2
Id. ibid.
and
ANCIENT REPUBLICKS.
211
and rancour than even the Roman ambaf-
fadors, who were difmiffed with this fhort
anfwer, "That not Hannibal, but the Sa-
guntines, were the authors of the war, and
that the Romans treated them with great
injuftice, if they preferred the friendship of
the Saguntines before that of their moſt an-
cient allies the Carthaginians." Livy's 'ac-
count of the ſecond Embaffy, which follow-
ed the deftruction of Saguntum, differs fo
very little from that of Polybius, both as to
the queſtion put by the Romans, the anſwer
given by the Carthaginian Senate, and the
declaration of war which was the confe-
quence, that it is needleſs to repeat it.
any
24
If what Hanno faid in the ſpeech above-
mentioned, had been his real fentiments from
conſciouſneſs of the fuperior power of
the Romans, and the imprudence of engag-
ing in a war of that confequence before his
country had recovered her former ftrength,
he would have acted upon principles worthy
of an honeft and prudent Patriot. For
Polybius, after enumerating the fuperior ex-
cellencies of Hannibal as a General, is ftrong-
ly of opinion, that if he had begun with
other nations, and left the Romans for his
laft enterprize, he would certainly have fuc-
Liv. lib. 3. p. 142—43.
Polyb. lib. 11. p. 888--89.
P 2
ceeded
212 Of the RISE and F ALL of the
I
ceeded in whatever he had attempted againſt
them, but he miſcarried by attacking thoſe
firſt, whom he ought to have reſerved for his
laft enterprize. The fubfequent behaviour
of Hanno, during the whole time that Italy
was the feat of war, evidently proves, that
his oppofition to this war proceeded entirely
from party motives, and his perfonal hatred
to the Barcan family, confequently is by no
means to be aſcribed to any regard for the
true intereft of his country. Appian in-
forms us, that when Fabius had greatly
ftreightened Hannibal by his cautious con-
duct, the Carthaginian General ſent a pref-
fing meffage to Carthage for a large ſupply
both of men and money. But, according
to that author, he was flatly refuſed, and
could obtain neither, by the influence of his
enemies, who were averfe to that war,
and cavilled perpetually at every enterprize
which Hannibal undertook. Livy, in his
relation of the account which Hannibal fent
to the Carthaginian Senate of his glorious
victory at Cannæ by his brother Mago, with
the demand for a large reinforcement of
men as well as money, introduces Hanno
(in a fpeech of his own which he gives us
on that occafion) ftrongly oppofing that mo-
I
Appian. de Bell. Annib. 323. Edit. Hen. Steph.
2 Lib. 23. p. 265-66.
tion,
ANCIENT REPUBLICKS.
213
tion, and perfifting ftill in his former fen-
timents in refpect both to the war and to
Hannibal. But the Carthaginians, elate with
that victory, which was the greateſt blow
the Romans ever received in the field fince
the foundation of their Republick, and tho-
roughly fenfible (as Livy informs us) of the
enmity which Hanno and his faction bore
to the Barcan family, immediately decreed
a fupply of 40,000 Numidians, and 24,000
foot and horſe to be immediately levied in
Spain, befides Elephants, and avery large fum
of money. Though Hanno at that time had
not weight enough in the Senate to pre-
vent that decree, yet he had influence enough
by his intrigues to retard the ſupply then
voted, and not only to get it reduced to
12,000 foot and 2500 horfe, but even to
procure that ſmall number to be fent to Spain
upon a different fervice. That Hanno was
the true cauſe of this cruel difappointment,
and the fatal confequences which attended it,
is equally evident from the fame hiſtorian.
For Livy tells us, "that when orders were
fent to him by the Carthaginian Senate to
quit Italy, and haften to the immediate de-
fence of his own country, Hannibal inveigh-
ed bitterly againſt the malice of his enemies,
who now openly and avowedly recalled him
Liv. lib. 30. p. 135.
P 3
I
I
from
214 Of the RISE and F ALL of the
f
•
from Italy, out of which they had long be-
fore endeavoured to drag him, when they
tied up his hands by conftantly refufing
him any fupply either of men or money,
That Hannibal affirmed he was not con-
quered by the Romans, whom he had fo
often defeated, but by the calumny and envy
of the oppofite faction in the Senate. That
Scipio would not have fo much reaſon to
plume himſelf upon the ignominy of his re-
turn, as his enemy Hanno, who was fo im-
placably bent upon the deftruction of the
Barcan family, that fince he was not able to
cruſh it by any other means, he had at laſt
accompliſhed it, though by the ruin of Car-
thage itſelf."
Had that large fupply been fent to Han-
nibal with the fame unanimity and diſpatch
with which it was voted, it is more than
probable, that fo confummate a General
would have foon been mafter of Rome, and
transferred the Empire of the world to
Carthage. For the Romans were fo ex-
haufted after the terrible defeat at Cannæ,
that Livy is of opinion, that Hannibal
would have given the finiſhing blow to that
Republick, if he had marched directly to
Rome from the field of battle, as he was
adviſed to do by his General of horfe Ma-
herbal that many of the nobility, upon
X
I
Lib. 22. p. 240.
the
ANCIENT REPUBLICK S. 215
1
I
the first news of this fatal event, were in
actual confultation about the means of quit-
ting Italy, and looking out for a fettlement
in fome other part of the world; and he
affirms, that the ſafety both of the city and
empire of Rome muſt be attributed (as it
was then firmly believed at Rome) to the
delay of that fingle day only, on which Ma-
herbal
gave that advice to Hannibal.
• Ap-
pian confirms the diſtreſsful fituation of the
Roman affairs at that juncture, and informs
us, that including the flaughter at Cannæ,
in which the Romans had loft most of their
ableft officers, Hannibal had put to the
fword 250,000 of their beft troops in the
ſpace of two years only, from the beginning
of the fecond Punick war inclufive. It is
eaſy therefore to imagine how little able the
Roman armies, confifting chiefly of new le-
vies, would have been to face fuch a com-
mander as Hannibal, when fupported by the
promiſed reinforcement of 64,000 freſh men,
befides money and elephants in proportion.
For Hannibal, though deprived of all fupplies
from Carthage by the malice of the Hanno-
nian faction, maintained his ground above
fourteen years more after his victory at
Cannæ, in ſpite of the utmoft efforts of the
Romans. A truth which Livy himſelf ac-
i
I
Appian. de Bell. Hannib. p. 328.
P 4
knowledges
216 Of the RISE and F ALL of the
1
{
I
knowledges with admiration and aſtoniſh-
ment at his fuperior military capacity. From
that period therefore after the battle of Can-
næ, when Hannibal was firft difappointed
of the promiſed fupplies from Carthage, we
ought properly to date the fall of that Re-
publick, which must be wholly imputed
to the inveterate malice of the profligate
Hanno and his impious faction, who were
determined, as Hannibal obferved before, to
ruin the contrary party, though by means
which muſt be inevitably attended with the
deſtruction of their country. Appian in-
finuates, that Hannibal firft engaged in this
warmore from the importunity of his friends,
than even his own paffion for military glory
and hereditary hatred to the Romans. For
Hanno and his faction (as ² Appian tells us)
no longer dreading the power of Hamilcar
and Afdrubal his fon-in-law, and holding
Hannibal extremely cheap upon account of
his youth, began to perfecute and opprefs
the Barcan party with fo much rage and
hatred, that the latter were obliged by letter
to implore affiſtance from Hannibal, and to
affure him that his own intereft and fafety
was infeparable from theirs. Hannibal (as
Appian adds) was conſcious of the truth of
2
Iberic. p. 259.
Appian. id. ibid,
2
this
ANCIENT REPUBLICKS. 217
this remark, and well knew that the blows
which feemed directed at his friends, were
levelled in reality at his own head, and
judged that a war with the Romans, which
would be highly agreeable to the genera-
lity of his countrymen, might prove the
fureſt means of counter-working his ene-
mies, and preferving himſelf and his friends
from the fury of a pliant and fickle popu-
lace, already inflamed againſt his party by
the intrigues of Hanno. He concluded
therefore, according to Appian, that a war
with fo formidable and dangerous a power,
would divert the Carthaginians from all in-
quiries relative to his friends, and oblige
them to attend wholly to an affair, which
was of the laſt importance to their country.
Should Appian's account of the caufe of
this war be admitted as true, it would be
a yet ftronger proof of the calamitous.
effects of party difunion; though it would
by no means excufe Hannibal. For Hanno
and his party would be equally culpable for
driving a man of Hannibal's abilities to fuch
a defperate meaſure, purely to fcreen him-
felf and his party from their malice and
power. But the blame for not ſupporting
Hannibal after the battle of Canne, when
ſuch ſupport would have enabled him to
cruſh that power, which by their means
recovered ftrength fufficient to fubvert their
own
;
218
Of the RISE and FALL of the
own country, muſt be thrown entirely upon
Hanno and his party. It was a crime of
the blackeſt dye, and an act of the higheſt
treafon against their country, and another
terrible proof of the fatal effects of party
difunion. Nor was this evil peculiar to
Carthage only, but was equally common in
the Roman and Grecian Republicks. Nay,
could we trace all our publick meaſures up
to their firft fecret fprings of action, I don't
doubt (notwithſtanding the plaufible reafons
which might have been given to the pub-
lick to palliate ſuch meaſures) but we ſhould
find our own country rafhly engaged in wars
detrimental to her true interefts, or obliged
to ſubmit to a difadvantageous peace, juft
as either was conducive to the private in-
tereſt of the prevailing party. Will not our
own annals furnifh us with fome memor-
able inftances of the truth of this affertion
too recent to be denied? Was not the treat-
ment which the great Duke of Marlbo-
rough received from Bolingbroke, the Eng-
lifh Hanno, parallel to that which the vic-
torious Hannibal met with from the Cartha-
ginian, after the battle of Canne? Did not
Bolingbroke, from the worft of party mo-
tives, difplace that ever victorious General,
defert our allies, and facrifice the brave and
faithful Catalans, and the city of Bar-
celona, in at leaft as fhameful a manner
I
as
ANCIENT REPUBLICKS.
219
as the Romans did their unhappy friends at
Saguntum? Did not the fame miniſter by
the fatal treaty of Utrecht, rob the nation
of all thofe advantages, which fhe had reaſon
to hope for from a long and fuccefsful war?
Did he not by the fame treaty, give our mor-
tal enemy France time to retrieve her affairs,
and recover from that low ftate to which the
Duke of Marlborough had reduced her, and
even to arrive at that power, at preſent ſo
terrible to us and to all Europe?
To what can we attribute the late ill con-
ducted war with Spain, but to the ambi-
tion of party? How was the nation ſtunned
with the noiſe of Spanish depredations from
the prefs! how loudly did the fame outcry
refound in parliament! yet when the leaders
of that powerful oppofition had carried their
point by their popular clamours; when
they had puſhed the nation into that war;
when they had drove an overgrown minifter
from the helm, and neftled themſelves in
power, how quickly did they turn their
backs upon the honeft men of their party,
who refuſed to concur in their meaſures !
How foon did they convince the nation, by
fcreening that very minifter who had been
fo many years the object of their refentment,
and by carrying on their own war (as I may
* The firft Edition of this work appeared in 1759.
term
220 Of the RISE and FALL of the
term it with the fame or greater lukewarm-
neſs than what they had fo lately exclaimed
againſt in the fame minifter; they convinced,
I fay, the whole nation, that the welfare of
the publick, and the protection of our trade,
had not the leaft fhare in the real motives of
their conduct.
But as the Carthaginian hiftory during
this period, is intimately blended with the
Roman, to avoid repetition, I am obliged to
defer my
farther remarks upon the conduct
of this people, 'till I fpeak of the difference
between the civil and military polity, and
manners of both thoſe nations.
!
CHAP.
ANCIENT REPUBLICKS.
221
T
CHA P. V.
Of ROME.
HOUGH there is a concurrence of
ſeveral cauſes which bring on the ruin
of a ſtate, yet where luxury prevails, that
parent of all our fantaſtick imaginary wants,
ever craving and ever unfatisfied, we may
juſtly affign it as the leading cauſe: fince it
ever was and ever will be the moſt baneful
to publick virtue. For as luxury is conta-
gious from its very nature, it will gradually
defcend from the higheſt to the loweſt
ranks, 'till it has ultimately infected a whole
people. The evils arifing from luxury have
not been peculiar to this or that nation, but
equally fatal to all wherever it was admitted.
Political Philofophy lays this down as a
fnndamental and inconteftable maxim, that
all the moſt flouriſhing ſtates owed their ruin,
fooner or later, to the effects of luxury; and
all hiſtory, from the origin of mankind, con-
firms this truth by the evidence of facts to
the higheſt degree of demonftration. In
the great defpotick monarchies it produced
avarice, diffipation, rapaciouſneſs, oppref-
1
I
Dionyf. Halicarn. cap. 2. p. 137. Edit. Wechel.
fion,
222 Of the RISE and FALL of the
fion, perpetual factions amongſt the great,
whilft each endeavoured to engrofs the fa-
vour of the Prince wholly to himſelf; ve-
nality, and a contempt of all law and diſci-
pline both in the military and civil depart-
ments. Whilft the people, following the
pernicious example of their fuperiors, con-
tracted fuch a daftardly effeminacy, joined to
an utter inability to fupport the fatigues of
war, as quickly threw them into the hands
of the firſt refolute invader. Thus the Af-
fyrian empire funk under the arms of Cyrus
with his poor but hardy Perfians. The ex-
tenfive and opulent empire of Perfia fell an
eafy conqueft to Alexander and a handful of
Macedonians; and the Macedonian Empire,
when enervated by the luxury of Afia, was
compelled to receive the yoke of the vic-
torious Romans.
Luxury, when introduced into free ſtates,
and ſuffered to be diffuſed without controul
through the body of the people, was ever
productive of that degeneracy of manners,
which extinguiſhed publick virtue, and put
a final period to liberty. For as the incef-
fant demands of luxury quickly induced ne-
ceffity, that neceffity kept human invention
perpetually on the rack to find out ways and
means to fupply the demands of luxury.
Hence the lower claffes at firſt fold their
fuffrages in privacy and with caution; but
as
ANCIENT REPUBLICK S.
223
as luxury increaſed, and the manners of the
people grew daily more corrupt, they openly
fet them up to fale to the beft bidder. Hence
too the ambitious amongſt the higher centu-
ries, whofe fuperior wealth was frequently
their own qualification, firſt purchaſed the
moft lucrative pofts in the State by this infa-
mous kind of traffick, and then maintained
themſelves in power by that additional fund
for corruption, which their employments
fupplied, 'till they had undone thofe they
had firft corrupted.
But of all the ancient Republicks, Rome
in the laſt period of her freedom was the
ſcene where all the inordinate paffions of
mankind operated moft powerfully and with
the greateſt latitude. There we fee luxury,
ambition, faction, pride, revenge, ſelfiſh-
nefs, a total difregard to the publick good,
and an univerfal diffolutenefs of manners,
firſt make them ripe for, and then compleat
their deftruction. Confequently that pe-
riod, by fhewing us more ftriking examples,
will afford us more uſeful leffons than
other part of their hiſtory.
any
Rome, once the mighty miſtreſs of the
univerſe, owed her rife, according to Dio-
nyfius of Halicarnaffus, the moſt curious and
moſt exact inquirer into the Roman antiqui-
tìes, to a ſmall colony of the Albans under
the conduct of Romulus, the fuppofed grand-
fon
1
224
Of the RISE and FALL of the
fon of Numitor King of Alba. That the
Albans derived their origin from the Greeks
feems highly probable from the nature of
the Alban and Roman monarchical govern-
ment, which appears to be plainly copied
from Lycurgus.
The government firſt inſtituted by Romu-
lus, the founder of this extraordinary Em-
pire, was that perfect fort, as it is termed by
Dionyfius and Polybius, which confifted of
a due admixture of the regal, ariftocratick,
and democratick powers. As this great
man received the Crown as a reward for
his fuperior merit, and held it by the beſt
of all titles, the willing and unanimous
choice of a free people; and as he is univer-
fally allowed to be the fole inftitutor of their
firft form of government, I cannot help
ranking him amongst the moſt celebrated
law-givers and heroes of antiquity. Ro-
mulus's plan of government, though formed
upon the model of Lycurgus, was evidently,
in ſome reſpects, fuperior to the Spartan.
For the executive power in the Roman Go-
vernment was lodged in one man only; the
number of the Senators was much greater;
and though the whole body of the Romans
was formed into one regular militia, yet the
loweſt claſs of the people were directed to
apply themſelves to agriculture, grazing, and
other lucrative employments; a practice
wholly
1
ANCIENT REPUBLICKS. 225
wholly prohibited to the free Spartans. The
great employments of the State were folely
confined to the Patricians, or Ariftocratick
part; but the Plebeians, or commonalty, had
in return the power of chufing Magiftrates,
enacting laws, and determining about all
wars when propoſed by the King. But ftill
their decrees were not final, for the concur-
rence of the Senate was abfolutely neceffary
to give a fanction to whatever the people had
determined.
Whether the Romans would have conti-
nued the regal power in their founder's fa-
mily by hereditary fucceffion, cannot poffibly
be determined, becaufe, when Romulus was
put to death by the Patricians for aiming at
more power than was confiftent with their
limited monarchy, he left no children. This
however is certain, that their monarchy con-
tinued to be elective, and was attended with
thoſe diſorders which are the ufual effects of
that capital error in politicks, 'till the ufur-
pation of Tarquinius Superbus.
After the death of Romulus, Numa, a
man of a very different genius, was invited
to the throne by the unanimous confent of
the whole body of the Romans. This wor-
thy prince reclaimed his fubjects from their
favage fondneſs for war and plunder, and
taught them the arts of peace, and the hap-
pineſs of civil and focial life, by inftructing
them
!
226 Of the RISE and F ALL of the
them in the great duties of religion, or piety
towards their Gods, and the laws of juftice
and humanity, which contained their duty to-
wards their fellow-creatures. The long reign
of this wife and good prince was the moſt
remarkable and the moft happy period of
time Rome ever knew from her foundation
to her diffolution. For during the whole
term of forty-three years, which was the ex-
tent of his reign, the harmony of the Ro-
man State was neither interrupted by any ci-
vil diffention at home, nor the happineſs of
the people diſturbed by any foreign war or in-
vafion. After the death of Numa, who
died univerſally lamented as the father of the
people, Tullus Hoftilius, a man of real me-
rit, was legally elected King; but, after a
victorious reign of thirty-two years, was de-
ftroyed with his whole family by lightning,
according to fome authors, but, according to
others, was murdered by Ancus Marcius,
grandfon to Numa, by his only daughter, who
looked upon his own right to the crown as
prior to Tullus, or his family. Ancus Mar-
cius, however, received the crown by a free
election of the people, and died a natural
death after a reign of twenty-four years, in
which he reſtored fuch of the religious infti-
tutions of his grandfather Numa as had been
neglected during the reign of his predeceffor.
He greatly enlarged the city of Rome itſelf,
and
ANCIENT REPUBLICKS.
227
and made it a fea-port by fortifying the
haven at the mouth of the river Tiber.
Lucius Tarquinius, a man of Greek ex-
traction by his father's fide, and admitted to
the privilege of a Roman citizen under the
reign of Ancus Marcius, was raifed to the
throne for his uncommon merit, and fhewed
himſelf worthy of that high truft, which
was repofed in him by the Romans. He en-
creaſed the number of the Senators to three
hundred, greatly enlarged their territories,
and beautified the city; and, after an illuſ-
trious reign of thirty-eight years, was afſaf-
finated in his palace by the contrivance of
the two fons of Ancus Marcius, who hoped
after his death to recover the kingdom, which
their father had been poffeffed of. But their
ſcheme was far from fucceeding, for Tarqui-
nius was fo well beloved by his people, that
the perfons, who committed the murder, were
executed, and the fons of Ancus baniſhed, and
their eftates confifcated. Tullius Servius,
who had married the daughter of Tarquini-
us, fucceeded to the crown by the artful
management of his mother-in-law, and by
the favour of the people, though without the
concurrence either of the Senate or Patrici-
ans. Tullius was certainly a man of real me-
rit, and, as I think, fuperior in point of abi-
lities to all the Roman Kings, Romulus alone
excepted. But as he feemed to affect a De-
mocracy, and was chiefly fupported by the
Q 2
people,
228 Of the RISE and F ALL of the
people, he was always difagreeable to the Pa-
tricians, who looked upon his advancement
to the crown as an illegal intruſion. But as
he did moft fignal fervices to his country,
during a glorious reign of four and forty
years, I cannot help taking notice of fome
of his inftitutions, without the knowledge of
which it is hardly poffible to form a perfect
idea of the Roman conftitution.
Tullius ordered all the Romans to regiſter
their names and ages, with thoſe of their pa-
rents, wives and children, and the place of
their abode, either in the city or the country.
At the fame time he enjoined them to give in
upon oath a juft valuation of their effects,
on pain of being whipped and fold for ſlaves,
if they failed in regiſtering all theſe particu-
lars. From this regifter he formed his plan
for a regular and general militia, which was
invariably followed by the Romans, 'till the
time of Marius. To effect this he divided
the whole body of the citizens into fix claf-
fes. The firft clafs confifted of thoſe whoſe
poffeffions amounted to a hundred' Mina.
Theſe he armed in the compleateſt manner,
and divided into eighty centuries; forty of
which, compofed of the younger men, were
appointed to take the field in time of war;
the other forty were affigned for the defence
About three hundred pounds.
of
ANCIENT REPUBLICKS.
229
of the city. To thefe eighty centuries of
heavy armed foot he added eighteen centuries
of horſe, felected out of thoſe who had the
largeſt eſtates, and were of diſtinguiſhed
birth. Thus the firſt claſs contained ninety-
eight centuries.
The fecond, third, and
fourth claffes confifted each of twenty cen-
turies only, and were compofed of citizens,
whofe effects were eſtimated at ſeventy-five,
fifty, and five and twenty Mina; and their
arms were lighter according to their refpec-
tive claffes. To the fecond clafs he added
two claffes of armourers and axmen; to the
fourth clafs two centuries of trumpeters
and blowers on the horn, which contained
the martial mufick of the army. The fifth
clafs confifted of thoſe who were worth
twelve Mina and a half, which he divided
into thirty centuries, armed with darts and
flings only, and were properly irregulars.
The fixth clafs, which was by much the
moſt numerous, was comprehended in one
century only, and confifted of the pooreſt
citizens, who were exempted from all
kinds of taxes, as well as all fervice in the
army.
By this wife difpofition the burden of the
war fell chiefly upon thoſe who were beft able
to fupport it. Thus, for inftance, if he
wanted to raiſe twenty thousand men, he di-
vided that number amongſt the centuries of
& 3
the
230 Of the RISE and F ALL of the
the firft five claffes, and ordered each centu→
ry to furniſh its refpective quota. He then
calculated the fum neceffary for the fupport
of the war, which he divided in the fame
manner amongst the centuries, and ordered
every man to pay in proportion to his poffef-
fions. Hence the rich, who were fewer in
number, but divided into more centuries,
were not only obliged to ferve oftener, but to
pay greater taxes. For Tullius thought it
juft, that they who had the greateſt property
at ftake fhould bear the greateſt ſhare of the
burden, both in their perfons and fortunes:
as he judged it equitable, that the poor
fhould be exempted from taxes, becauſe they
were in want of the neceffaries of life; and
from the fervice, becauſe the Roman foldiers
ferved at that time at their own expence; a
cuſtom which continued long after. For the
Roman foldiers received no pay, as 'Livy
informs us, 'till the three hundred and forty-
eighth year from the foundation of the city.
As the rich, by this regulation, were fub-
jected to the greateft fhare of the expence
and danger, Tullius made them an ample re-
compence by throwing the chief
power of
the Government into their hands, which he
effected by the following ſcheme, too artful
for the penetration of the common people.
Liv. lib. 4. p. 276.
"
By
ANCIENT REPUBLICKS. 231
By the fundamental conftitution of the
Romans, the electing Magiftrates, both civil
and military, the enacting or repealing laws,
and the declaring war, or concluding peace,
were all determined by the fuffrages of the
people. But as the people voted by their
curiæ, into ten of which every tribe was di-
vided,
Romulus had divided the whole People into thirty
curiæ, ten of which compoſed a Tribe. At their comitia,
or general affemblies, the people divided into their re-
ſpective curiæ, and gave their votes man by man. The
majority of votes in each curia paffed for the voice of the
whole curia, and the majority of the curiæ for the gene-
ral determination of the whole people.
Tullius on the contrary took their votes only by
centuries, the whole number of which amounted to 193,
into which he had ſubdivided the fix claffes. But as the
firſt claſs alone, which was compofed wholly of the
rich, contained 98 of thefe centuries, if the centuries.
of the first clafs were unanimous, which, as Dionyfius
informs us, was generally the cafe, they carried every
point by a fure majority of 3.- If they difagreed,
Tullius called the centuries of the 2d clafs, and fo on
'till 97
centuries agreed in one opinion, which made a
majority of one. If the numbers continued equal, that
is, 96 on each fide of the queftion, after the five firſt
claffes had voted; Tullius called up the fixth clafs,
which was compofed wholly of the pooreſt people, and
contained but one century, and the vote of this cen-
tury determined the queftion.--But this cafe, as Diony-
fius obferves, happened fo very rarely, that even the
votes of the 4th claſs were feldom called for, and thus
the votes of the fifth and fixth were generally ufelefs.
Confequently, when the people voted by their curiæ,
where the vote of every individual was taken, the poor,
who were much the more numerous, might always be
Q4
fecure
232
Of the RISE and F ALL of the
vided, the meaneſt citizen had an equal vote
with the greateſt: confequently, as the poor
were much more numerous than the rich,
they carried every point by a fure majority.
Tullius altered this method, affembled the
people, and took their votes by centuries, not
by curiæ. This artful meaſure turned the
ſcale, and transferred the majority to the rich.
For as the votes of the firft clafs were firſt
taken, the votes of that clafs, which con-
tained ninety-eight centuries, if unanimous,
always conſtituted a majority of three votes,
which decided the queſtion without taking
the votes of the five fucceeding claffes, as
they were in that cafe wholly uſeleſs.
Tullius had married his two daughters to
Tarquinius and Aruns, the grandfons of his
predeceffor, whofe guardianſhip he had un-
dertaken during their minority. But what
tye is ſtrong enough to reſtrain ambition!
His younger daughter Tullia, the moſt am-
bitious and moft deteftable of her fex, un-
able to prevail upon her huſband Aruns to
join in depofing her father, applied to her
brother-in-law Tarquinius, whoſe temper
fecure of a great majority,-
But when the votes were
taken by centuries, according to the new method in-
ftituted by Tullius, that numerous body of the poor,
which compoſed the fingle century of the fixth claſs, and
confequently had but one vote, became wholly infigni-
cant.
was
ANCIENT REPUBLICKS. 233
}
was congenial with her own, and offered to
be his wife if he would affert his juſt right,
as ſhe termed it, and attempt to fupplant her
father. The offer was accepted, and the in-
ceftuous match agreed upon, which was ſoon
after compleated by the death of her huſ-
band and fifter, who were privately diſpatch-
ed, that there might be no obftacle remaining.
Tarquinius, now the worthy huſband of ſuch
a wife, attempted in the fenate to procure
the depofition of Tullius; but, failing in his
defign, at the inſtigation of his impious wife,
he procured the old King to be openly affaffi-
nated in the ftreet before his palace, and
the unnatural Tullia drove her chariot in
triumph over the body of her murdered fa-
ther. By this complicated ſcene of adultery,
murder, and parricide, Tarquin, furnamed the
Proud, forced his way to the throne, and to
ufurpation added the moſt execrable and
avowed tyranny. The ' Patricians, who had
favoured his ufurpation, either from their
hatred to Tullius and the Plebeians, or from
the hopes of fharing in the Government,
with which, according to Dionyfius, they
had been privately allured, were the firft
who felt the bloody effects of his arbitrary
temper. Not only the friends of Tullius,
I
Dionyf. Halicarn. lib. 4. p. 182. edit. 1546.
and
234 Of the RISE and FALL of the
and thoſe whom he ſuſpected as uneafy un-
der his ufurpation, but all who were diftin-
guifhed by their fuperior wealth, fell a fa-
crifice to his fufpicion or avarice. All fuch
were accuſed by his profligate emiffaries, of
many fictitious crimes, but particularly of a
confpiracy against his perfon; the common
pretence of all tyrants. As the
As the tyrant him-
felf fat as judge, all defence was uſeleſs.
Some received fentence of death, fome of
baniſhment, and the eſtates of both were
alike confifcated. The greater number of
thoſe that were accuſed, knowing the true
motives of the tyrant's conduct, and deſpair-
ing of fafety, voluntarily left the city; but
fome of the greateſt note were privately mur-
dered by his orders, whofe bodies could
never be found. When he had fufficiently
thinned the Senate by the death or baniſh-
ment of its moſt valuable members, he filled
up the vacant feats with his own creatures.
But as he allowed nothing to be propoſed or
done there, but in conformity to his or-
ders, he reduced it to an empty form, with-
out the leaſt ſhadow of power. 'The Ple-
beians, who beheld with pleaſure the ſuffer-
ings of the Patricians, which they eſteemed
a juft puniſhment for their behaviour under
the reign of Tullius, were quickly treated
with much greater feverity. For the Tyrant
I
Dionyf. Halicarn. id. ibid.
not
ANCIENT REPUBLICKS. 235
not only aboliſhed all the laws which Tullius
had eſtabliſhed to fecure them againſt the op-
preffions of the Patricians, but loaded them
with ruinous taxes, and prohibited all their
publick religious affemblies, that they might
have no opportunity of meeting to form ſe-
cret confpiracies. Proceeding then upon the
conftant maxim of all tyrants, that idlenefs
in the people is the parent of all fedition, he
exhauſted them ſo much by the flaviſh drudg-
ery in which he kept them conftantly em-
ployed at the publick works, that the Patri-
cians rejoiced in their turn at the heavier mi-
ſeries of the Plebeians, whilſt neither of them
endeavoured to put a period to their common
calamities. After the Romans had groaned
five and twenty years under this cruel and
ignominious bondage, the rape committed
by Sextus, the eldeft fon of Tarquin, upon
Lucretia, the wife of Collatinus, an eminent
Patrician, and near relation of the Tarquin
family, produced a coalition of both orders,
which ended in the expulfion of Tarquin
and his fons, and a folemn abjuration of
monarchical Government.
The tyranny of Tarquin had made the
very name of King fo odious to the Romans
in general, that the Patricians, who were
the chief conductors of this revolution,
found it no difficult matter to eſtabliſh an
Arif-
236 Of the RISE and FALL of the
1
F
1
I
Ariſtocracy upon the ruins of Monarchy.
Two Magiftrates were appointed, termed
Confuls, vefted with the regal power, whoſe
office was annual and elective. The Senate
was filled up out of the moſt eminent of the
Plebeians, after they had first been created
Patricians, and the people reſtored to their
right of holding affemblies, of giving their
votes, and doing whatever they were intitled
to by former cuftoms. But the power of the
people was rather nominal than real. For
though the Confuls were annually elected by
the fuffrages of the people, a privilege which
carried the appearance of a Democracy,
yet as the votes were taken by centuries,
not by tribes, the Patricians were generally
maſters of the election. It is remarkable
that, after the expulfion of Tarquin, Diony-
fius conftantly terms the new Government
an Ariftocracy. It evidently appears too
through the whole remaining part of his hif-
tory, that there was a ſelfiſh and haughty
faction amongst the Patricians, who affected
a tyrannical Oligarchy, and aimed at reducing
the Plebeians to a ftate of fervitude. Vale-
rius, furnamed Poplicola, the moſt humane
patriot of all thoſe who were concerned in
baniſhing the Tarquins, introduced fome be-
neficent laws, which, according to Dionyfi-
I
Dionyf. Halicarn. lib, 5. p. 205.
us,
ነ
ANCIENT REPUBLICKS.
237
pre-
us, gave great relief to the Plebeians. For
by one he made it capital for any perſon to
exerciſe any magiftracy over the Romans, un-
lefs that office fhould be received from the
people as he ordered by another, that no
Roman ſhould be puniſhed without a legal
trial; and that if any Roman ſhould be con-
demned by any magiſtrate to be fined, whip-
ped, or put to death, the condemned perfon
might appeal from the fentence of that Ma-
giftrate to the people, and ſhould be liable to
no puniſhment 'till his fate had been deter-
mined by their fuffrages. A plain proof that
the Plebeians 'till that time laboured under
grievances not very confiftent with their
tended liberty. Another proof may be drawn
from the wretched ftate of the Plebeians, un-
der the cruel oppreffions arifing from the ava-
rice and extortions of the Patricians, which
firft gave birth to thoſe perpetual feditions,
which fill the hiftory of that Republick.
For as the Roman foldiers, who were all free
citizens, not only paid their proportion of
the taxes, but were obliged to ferve in the
field at their own expence during the whole
campaign, this frequently obliged them to
borrow money at high intereft of the Patri-
cians, who had engroffed by far the greater
part of publick wealth. But as the Ro-
man territories were often ravaged by their
neighbours in thoſe wars, which Tarquin
per-
238
Of the RISE and FALL of the
perpetually incited to procure the recovery of
his crown, the lofs fell heaviest upon the Ple-
beians, who were frequently ftript of all
their effects, and reduced to the utmoſt po-
verty. Hence unable to pay the principal of
their debts, joined to an accumulated load of
ufury upon ufury, they were furrendered by
the judges to the diſcretion of their creditors.
Theſe unfeeling wretches confined their debt-
ors in chains, tortured their bodies with whips,
and treated them with fuch inhumanity, that
great numbers of the Romans were in as bad
a ſituation as the poor Athenians when Solon
firft undertook the adminiſtration. The ef-
fects of this deteſtable treatment of people,
who had been taught to call themfelves free,
appeared about twelve years after the erection
of their new Government. For when the
Tarquins had raiſed up a confederacy of thir-
ty cities of the Latines againſt them, the Ple-
beians peremptorily refuſed to enliſt 'till a
vote was paffed for the abolition of their
debts. As perfuafions had no effect, the
Senate met upon the occafion. Valerius, the
fon of the humane Poplicola, pleaded ſtrong-
ly in favour of the people, but was violently
oppofed by Appius Claudius, a haughty and
imperious man, who is termed by Dionyfius
an abettor of the Oligarchy, and head of that
faction, which were enemies to the people.
The moderate men amongſt the Senators
3
pro-
{.
ANCIENT REPUBLICKS.
239
propoſed that the debts ſhould be paid out
of the publick treaſury; a meaſure which
would preferve the poor for the ſervice of the
State, and prevent any injuftice to the credi-
tors. Salutary as this meafure muſt ſeem,
the oppofition was fo great that nothing was
agreed to, and the refult of the debates was,
"That no decree ſhould be made at preſent
relating to this affair, but that as ſoon as the
war fhould be concluded with fuccefs, the
Confuls fhould lay it before the Senate, and
take their vote upon the occafion. That in
the mean time no debt ſhould be fued fɔr,
and that the execution of all laws, except
thoſe relating to the war, ſhould be ſuſpend-
ed." This decree did not wholly quiet the
ferment amongſt the people. Several of the
poorer fort demanded an immediate abolition
of their debts, as the condition for their tak-
ing a ſhare in the dangers of the war, and
looked upon this delay rather as an impofi-
tion. The Senate, who, as the event fhewed,
were determined never to grant their requeſt,
and yet were afraid of new commotions, re-
folved to aboliſh the Confulſhip, and all other
Magiſtracies for the prefent, and to inveſt a
new Magiftrate with abfolute and unlimited
power, and ſubject to no account for his ac-
tions. This new officer was termed the Dic-
tator, and the duration of his office was li-
mited to fix months, at the end of which
term
240
Of the RISE and F ALL of the
term the Confuls were to refume their for-
mer authority. The chief reafon, as 'Dio-
nyfius informs us, which induced the Senate
to make uſe of this dangerous expedient, was
to evade that law which Poplicola had
pro-
cured in favour of the Plebeians, which made
it death for a Magiftrate to puniſh a Roman
without a legal trial, or before he was con-
demned by the people. The Senate then
made a decree for the election of a Dictator;
and the Plebeians ignorant, as Dionyfius ob-
ferves, of the importance of that decree, not
only confirmed the refolutions of the Senate,
but gave up to them the power of chufing
the perſon who ſhould be inveſted with that
dignity. Titus Lartius, one of the Confuls,
was nominated by his colleague, according to
the form at that time agreed upon in the Se-
nate. When the Dictator appeared in all
the pomp and grandeur of his new office,
he ftruck a terror into the most turbulent;
and the people, thus tricked out of that law
which was their only protection, immediate-
ly fubmitted. Lartius, who ſeems to have
been one of the greateft men of his time,
ordered in a general regiſter of all the Ro-
mans, and formed his army after that wife
method firſt inſtituted by Servius Tullius.
When he took the field he perfuaded the La-
tines, by his fingular addrefs, to difband their
forces and conclude a truce, and thus divert-
• Dionyf. Halicarn, lib. 5. p. 247.
1
ed
ANCIENT
241
REPUBLİCKS.
•
ed the impending ftorm without fighting.
He then returned home, and refigned his
office before the time was expired, without
having exerciſed any one act of feverity upon
a ſingle Roman. A noble inſtance of mo-
deration and publick virtue!
At the expiration of the truce, which was
made for one year only, the Latines took the
field with a powerful army. Aulus Poſt-
humius was created Dictator by the Romans,
and a decifive battle was fought near the
Lake Regillus, in which the Romans were
compleatly victors. Sextus Tarquin was
killed upon the fpot, and old Tarquin the
father died foon after. As foon as this war
was ended, the Senate, regardleſs of their
promiſe, ordered all thofe fuits for debt to
be determined according to law, which had
been fufpended during the war.
This faith-
lefs proceeding raifed fuch violent commo-
tions amongſt the people, that a foreign war
was judged the beſt expedient to divert the
ſtorm which threatened the Ariftocracy. The
haughty Appius Claudius, and Publius Ser-
vilius, a man of a very different character,
were nominated Confuls by Pofthumius and
his' colleague, which feems a manifeft inva-
fion of the rights of the people. A war was
reſolved upon againſt the Volfcians, but the
I
Dionyf, Halicarn. lib. 6. p. 255.
R
1
Ple-
242 Of the RISE and F ALL of the
I
Plebeians again refuſed to obey the fummons
for inlifting. Servilius adhered to the max-
ims of Valerius, and adviſed an immediate
decree for the abolition of the debts. But
he was furiouſly oppofed by the inexorable
Appius, who called him a flatterer of the
people, and declared that it would be giving
up the Government to the people, when they
had it in their power to live under an Ariſ-
tocracy. After much time was ſpent in
thefe debates, Servilius, who was a popular
man, prevailed upon the Plebeians by his in-
treaties, and raiſed an army of volunteers,
with which he marched againſt the enemy.
The Volfcians, who placed their chief depen-
dance upon the difunion which prevailed
amongſt the Romans, fubmitted to whatever
terms the Conful fhould think proper to im-
pofe, and delivered three hundred hoftages
chofen out of their principal families, as a
fecurity for their behaviour. But this fub-
miffion was far from real, and calculated
only to amuſe the Romans, and gain time for
their military preparations. War was once
more decreed againſt the Volfcians; butwhilſt
the Senate was deliberating about the number
of the forces proper to be employed, a man
advanced in years appeared in the Forum, and
1
Dionyf. Halicarn. lib. 6. p. 266.
im-
ANCIENT REPUBLIC K S. 243
implored the affiftance of the people. 'Fa-
mine fat pictured in his pale and meagre face,
and the fqualid hue of his dreſs indicated
the extremes of poverty and wretchedneſs.
This man, who was not unknown to the
people, and, according to report, had borne
a command in the army, firſt ſhewed ſeveral
honourable ſcars in his breaſt, remains of the
wounds he had received in the ſervice of his
country, and then informed them: "That
" he had been preſent in eight and twenty
"battles, and frequently received rewards
"beſtowed only upon fuperior bravery :
"that in the Sabine war his cattle were
"driven off by the enemy, his eftate plun-
dered, and his houfe reduced to afhes:
"that under thefe unhappy circumſtances
"he was compelled to borrow money to pay
"the publick taxes; that this debt, accu-
"mulated by ufury, reduced him to the fad
«Ε
66
neceffity of felling the eftate defcended
"to him from his anceſtors, with what
"little effects he had remaining: but that
"all this proving infufficient, his devouring
"debts, like a wafting confumption, had at-
"tacked his perfon, and he, with his two
I have chiefly followed Livy in his beautiful relation.
of this affair, as the defcription he gives of this unhappy
object, is not only much more ftriking than that of Dio-
nyfius, but one of the moſt pathetick I ever met with in
hiftory. Liv. lib. 2. p. 92.
R 2
"fons,
244
Of the RISE and FALL of the
}
fons, were delivered up as flaves, and led
away to the flaughter-houſe by his credi-
"tors." When he had ſaid this, he threw
off his rags, and fhewed his. back yet bleed-
ing from the ſcourge of his mercileſs maſter.
This fight inflamed the people greatly; but
the debtors breaking out of their creditors
houſes, moſt of whom were loaded with
chains and fetters, raiſed their fury even to
madneſs. If any one defired them to take
up arms in defence of their country, the
debtors fhewed' their chains, as the reward
they had met with for their paſt ſervices, and
afked with indignation, whether ſuch blef-
fings were worth fighting for? whilft num-
bers of them openly declared, that it was
much more eligible to be flaves to the
Volfcians than the Patricians. The Senate,
quite difconcerted by the violence of the
tumult, intreated Servilius to take the ma-
nagement of the people. For an expreſs was
just arrived from the Latines, with advice
that a numerous army of the enemy had
already entered their territories. Servilius
remonſtrated to the people the confequences
of diſunion at ſo critical a juncture, and pa-
cified them by the affurance that the Senate
would confirm whatever conceffions he
fhould make; he then ordered the crier to
Dionyf. Halicarn. lib. 6. p. 268.
pro-
རྗ
ANCIENT REPUBLICKS. 245
proclaim, that no citizen who voluntarily
inliſted ſhould be fubject to the demands or
infults of his creditors whilft the army con-
tinued in the field. The people now flock-
ed in with chearfulneſs, and the levies were
· foon compleated. Servilius took the field
and defeated the Volfcians, made himſelf
maſter of their camp, took feveral of their
cities, and divided the whole plunder amongſt
his foldiers. At the news of this fuccefs
the fanguinary 'Appius ordered all the Vol-
fcian hoſtages to be brought into the Forum,
there to be whipped and publickly beheaded.
And when at his return Servilius demanded
a triumph, he loudly oppofed it, called him
a factious man, and accufed him of defraud-
ing the treaſury of the booty, and prevailed
upon the Senate to deny him that honour.
Servilius, enraged at this ufage, entered the
city in triumph with his army, amidſt the
acclamations of the people, to the great mor-
tification of the Patricians.
Under the following confulfhip the Sa-
bines prepared to invade the Romans, and
the people again refufed to ferve unleſs the
debts were firſt abolished. Lartius, the firft
dictator, pleaded ſtrongly for the people; but
the inflexible Appius propofed the nomination
of a Dictator, as the only remedy againſt the
1
Dionyf. Halicarn. lib. 6. p. 270.
R 3
mutiny.
246 Of the RISE and F ALL of the
mutiny. His motion was carried in the Se-
nate by a majority of voices, and Manius Va-
lerius, a brother to the great Poplicola, was
created Dictator. Valerius, who was a man
of great honour, engaged his word to the
Plebeians, that if they would ferve chear-
fully upon this occafion, he would undertake
the Senate ſhould reward them by quieting
the conteſts relating to their debts, and
granting whatever they could reaſonably de-
fire; and commanded at the fame time that
no citizen fhould be fued for debt during his
adminiſtration. The people had ſo often
experienced the publick virtue of the Vale-
rian family, and no longer apprehenfive of
being again impofed upon, offered themſelves
in fuch crowds, that ten legions of four
thouſand men each were levied, the greateſt
army of natives the Romans had ever brought
into the field. The Dictator finifhed the
campaign with glory, was rewarded with a
triumph, and diſcharged the people from far-
ther fervice. This step was not at all
agreeable to the Senate, who feared the peo-
ple would now claim the performance of the
Dictator's promiſes. Their fears were juft;
for Valerius kept his word with the people,
and moved the Senate that the promiſe they
had made to him might be taken into con-
3
I
Dionyf. Halicarn. lib. 6. p. 276-77.
fideration.
1
f
1
ANCIENT REPUBLICK 8, 247
fideration. But the Appian faction oppofed
it with the utmoſt virulence, and exclaimed
againſt his family as flatterers of the people,
and introducers of pernicious laws. Vale-
rius, finding his motion over-ruled, reproach-
ed the Senate for their behaviour, and fore-
told the confequences which would attend it
and quitting the Senate abruptly, called an
affembly of the people. After he had thank-
ed them for their fidelity and bravery, he in-
formed them of the ufage he had met with
in the Senate, and declared how greatly both
he and they had been impofed upon; and
refigning his office, fubmitted himſelf to
whatever treatment the people ſhould think
proper. The people heard him with equal
veneration and compaffion, and attended him
home from the Forum with repeated accla-
mations. The Plebeians now kept no mea-
fures with the Senate, but affembled openly,
and confulted about feceding from the Pa-
tricians. To prevent this ftep, the Senate
ordered the Confuls not to difmifs their ar-
mies, but to lead them out into the field,
under pretence that the Sabines were again
preparing for an invafion. The Confuls left
the city, and incamped nearly together; but
the foldiers, inftigated by one Sicinnius Bel-
lutus, feized the arms and enfigns to avoid
violating their military oath, feceded from
the Confuls, and after they had appointed
Sicinnius
R 4
1
248
Of the RISE and F ALL of the'
リ
​Sicinnius commander in chief, incamped on
a certain eminence near the river Anio,
which from that event was always termed
the Mons Sacer, or the Holy Mountain.
/
When the news of the feceffion was
brought to Rome, the confufion was fo
great, that the city had the appearance of a
place taken by ftorm, and the Appian fac-
tion were feverely reproached as the cauſe of
this defertion. Their enemies at the fame
time making inroads up to the very gates of
Rome, increaſed the general confternation, as
the Patricians were terribly afraid they would
be joined by the feceders. But the foldiers
behaved with fo much decency and modera-
tion, that the Senate after long debates fent
deputies to invite them to return, with the
promife of a general amnefty. The offer
was received with fcorn, and the Patricians
were charged with diffimulation, in pretend-
ing ignorance of the juft demands of the
Plebeians, and the true caufe of their fecef-
fion. At the return of the deputies, the af-
fair was again debated in the Senate. Agrip-
pa Menenius, a man refpectable for his fu-
perior wiſdom and thorough knowledge of
the true principles of government, and who
was alike an enemy to tyranny in the arifto-
cracy, and licentioufnefs in the people, ad-
viſed healing meaſures, and propoſed to ſend
fuch perfons as the people could confide in
3
with
}
ANCIENT REPUBLICKS.
249
with full power to put an end to the fedition
in the manner they fhould judge moſt pro-
per, without farther application to the Se-
nate. Manius Valerius, the laft Dictator,
ſpoke next, and reminded the Senate,
"That
CC
<<
his predictions of the evils which would
"refult from their breach of promiſe were
now verified that he adviſed a ſpeedy ac-
"commodation with the people, left the
"fame evils, if fuffered to make a farther
«Ε
progrefs, fhould become incurable: that
in his opinion the demands of the people
"would riſe higher than the bare abolition
"of debts, and that they would infiſt upon
"fuch fecurity as might be the firm guar-
"dian of their rights and liberty for the
"future; becauſe the late inftitution of
"the Dictatorship had fuperfeded the Va-
"lerian law, which was before the only
<<
guardian of their liberty; and the late
"denial of a triumph to the Conful Servi-
"lius, who had deferved that honour more
"
than any man in Rome, evidently proved,
"that the people were deprived of almoſt
"all thofe privileges they had formerly en-
·
joyed, fince a Conful and a Dictator who
"fhewed the leaſt concern for the intereſts
"of the people, were treated with abuſe
and ignominy by the Senate: that he did
"not impute thefe arbitrary meaſures to the
moft confiderable and refpectable perfons
" amongſt
{
250 Of the RISE and FALL of the
amongſt the Patricians, but to a combi-
"nation of proud and avaritious men, wholly
"intent upon unwarrantable gain; who by
rr
advancing large fums at exceffive intereft,
"had enſlaved many of their fellow-citizens,
"and by their cruel and inſulting treatment
"of their unhappy debtors, had alienated
"the whole body of the Plebeians from the
"Ariftocracy: that theſe men, by forming
themſelves into a faction, and placing
<c
Appius, a known enemy to the people
"and abettor of the Oligarchy at their
"head, had under his patronage, reduced
"the commonwealth to its preſent defpe-
"rate fituation." He concluded by fecond-
ing the motion of Menenius for fending am-
baſſadors to put a ſpeedy end to the fedition
upon the beſt terms they fhould be able to
obtain.
Appius, finding himſelf thus perfonally
attacked, rofe up and replied to Valerius in
a hot inflammatory fpeech full of the moſt
virulent invectives. He denied that he was
ever guilty of inflaving his debtors: "He
"denied too, that thoſe who had acted in
"that manner could be charged with injuf-
tice, ſince they had done no more than
"the laws allowed. He affirmed that the
imputation of being an enemy to the
ple, and favouring Oligarchy, arofe from
his fteady adherence to the Ariftocracy,
<<
66
CC
'
peo-
"and
ANCIENT REPUBLICKS. 251
!
"and equally affected all thofe of ſuperior
"worth, who like him difdained to be go-
"verned by their inferiors, or to fuffer the
..
1
cracy.
form of government which they had in-
"herited from their anceſtors to deviate into
"the worst of all conftitutions, a Demo-
He recriminated upon Valerius,
"and charged him with aiming at Tyranny,
by courting the moſt profligate of the ci-
"tizens, as the most effectual and fhorteſt
way of inflaving his country. He termed
"the feceders, vile, mean wretches, a
thoughtleſs fenfelefs multitude, whofe pre-
"fent arrogance had been firft infpired by
"that old man, as he contemptuoufly called
"Valerius. He declared abfolutely againſt
××
CC
CC
fending ambaſſadors, or making the leaft
"conceffion, and adviſed rather to arm the
flaves, and fend for afliftance from their
allies the Latines, than fubmit to any
thing that might derogate from the power
"and dignity of the Patricians. He pro-
tr
'
pofed, if the feceders fhould appear in arms
againſt them, to put their wives and
"children to death before their faces by
the moſt ſevere and ignominious tor-
tures. But if they would ſubmit at diſ-
It is remarkable that Appius terms the Ariftocracy,
which, at that very time, was hardly of feventeen years
ftanding, the form of government which they had in-
herited from their ancestors.
"cretion
252
Of the RISE and FALL of the
"cretion to the Senate, he adviſed to treat
" them with moderation.' This ſpeech
produced a violent tumult in the Senate; and
the young Patricians who adhered to Appius
behaved with fo much infolence, that the
Confuls threatened to exclude them from the
publick councils, by a law which ſhould fix
the age for the qualification of every Sena-
tor. Nothing was determined at that time,
but in a few days, the moderate party, fup-
ported by the firmneſs of the Confuls, pre-
vailed againſt the ftill inflexible Appius; and
ten ambaſſadors, at the head of whom were
Menenius and Valerius, were fent with full
powers to treat with the feceders. After
many debates, Menenius in the name of
the Senate promiſed full redreſs of all their
grievances with refpect to the debts, and
offered to confirm this promiſe by the folemn
oaths of all the ambaffadors. His offer was
upon the point of being accepted, when Lu-
cius Junius, who affected the furname of
Brutus, a bold and able Plebeian, interpofed
and infifted upon fuch a fecurity from the
Senate as might protect the Plebeians for the
future from the power of their enemies, who
might find an opportunity of wreaking their
vengeance on the people for the ſtep they
had taken. When Menenius defired to
know what fecurity he required, Junius de-
manded leave for the people to chufe an-
nually
ANCIENT REPUBLICKS.
253
nually a certain number of magiſtrates out
of their own body, veſted with the power of
defending their rights and liberties, and pro-
tecting their perſons from injury and vio-
lence. As this new and unexpected demand
ſeemed of too great confequence to be grant-
ed by the ambaffadors. Valerius with fome
others were fent to take the opinion of the
Senate upon that fubject. Valerius laid this
demand before the Senate, and gave his opi-
nion that the favour fhould be granted, and
Appius, as ufual, oppofed it with outrageous
fury. But the majority, determined at all
events to put a period to the feceffion, rati-
fied all the promifes made by the ambaffa-
dors, and granted the defired fecurity. The
feceders held their affembly in the camp, and
taking the votes by curiæ, elected five per-
fons for their annual magiftrates, who were
termed Tribunes of the people. By a law
made immediately after the election, the per-
fons of the Tribunes were rendered facred;
and the people obliged themſelves to fwear
by whatever was held moſt facred, that they
and their poſterity would preſerve it invio-
lably.
The erection of the tribunitial-power,
which happened about ſeventeen years after
the expulfion of the Kings, is certainly the
æra from which the liberty of the Roman
people ought properly to be dated. All the
neigh-
254
Of the RISE and FALL of the
I
2
neighbouring States were at that time fub
ject to Ariftocracy, where the people had
little or no fhare in the government; and it
appears evidently from the Roman hiftori-
ans, that the Romans intended to eſtabliſh
the fame form of government at Rome after
the abolition of monarchy. For the Senate,
as Livy informs us, gave a looſe to that
unbounded joy which the death of Tarquin
infpired, and begun to opprefs and injure the
people, whom 'till that time they had court-
ed with the utmoſt affiduity. But Salluft
is more full and explicit. For he affirms,
"That after the expulfion of the Kings, as
long as the fear of Tarquin and the burthen-
fome war with the Etrurians kept the Ro-
mans in fufpence, the government was ad-
miniſtered with equity and moderation. But
as foon as ever the dread of thofe impending
dangers was removed, the Senate begun to
domineer over the people, and treat them as
flaves; inflicting death or fcourging after the
arbitrary manner of defpotick Tyrants; ex-
pelling them from their lands, and arrogat-
ing the whole power of government to them-
felves, without communicating the leaft
fhare of it to the Plebeians." Thus the
people, before the creation of this magif-
• Liv. lib. 2. p. 91.
2 Salluft. Fragment. apud Auguftin, de civitate Dei,
lib. 2. cap. 18. edit. Froben. 1569.
tracy,
ANCIENT REPUBLICKS.
255
|
tracy, were amufed with the name of Liber-
ty, whilſt in fact they had only changed the
Tyranny of one, for the more galling yoke
of three hundred. But the tribunitial-power
proved an invincible obftacle to the arbitrary
ſchemes of the Ariftocratick faction, and at
laft introduced that due admixture of Demo-
cracy, which is fo effentialty neceſſary to the
conſtitution of a well regulated Republick.
As a minute detail of a hiſtory ſo well
known as that of the Romans would be
quite fuperfluous, I fhall only obſerve, That
the Democratick power in that Republick
did not arrive at its juſt ſtate of indepen-
dance, 'till the Plebeians were not only en-
titled to the higheſt poſts and dignities, equal-
ly with the Patricians, but 'till the Plebifcita
or decrees made by the people in their aſ-
fembly by tribes, were confirmed to be
I
In the Comitia Tributa, or affemblies by tribes, the
people voted in the fame manner as in the Comitia Cu-
riata, or affemblies by curiæ. The majority of fingle
votes in every tribe conftituted the voice of that tribe, and
the majority of the tribes decided the queftion. But the
Patricians confcious of their fuperiority in the Comitia
Centuriata, or affemblies by centuries, conftantly refuſed
to obey the Plebifcita or Decrees made by the people in
their affemblies by tribes, which they infifted were bind-
ing to the Plebeians only. After the abolition of the De-
cemvirate the people obtained a Law :-" That all Laws
paffed in their affemblies by tribes fhould have equal force
with thoſe made in the affemblies by centuries, and fhould
be equally obligatory to all the Romans without diftinc-
tion."
equally
256. Of the RISE and F ALL of the
equally binding as thofe made in their af
fembly by centuries. This law was firft
made when the Tyranny of the Decemvirs
was aboliſhed by the ſecond feceffion of the
people to the Sacred Mountain, but was per-
petually violated by the overbearing power
of the Ariftocracy. But an event fimilar to
that which occafioned the firft feceffion of the
people, to which they properly owed the ori-
gin of their liberty, was the caufe of the third
and laft feceffion, which fully compleated
that liberty, and gave the fatal blow to the
arbitrary Ariftocratick faction. Veturius, the
fon of Titus Veturius, who had been Conful
and died infolvent, borrowed a fum of money
of one Plotius to defray the expences of his
father's funeral. As the father was greatly
indebted to the fame Plotius, he demanded
of young Veturius the payment of both debts
which his father and he himſelf had con-
tracted. As the unhappy young man was
utterly unable to fatisfy the demand, Plotius
feized his unfortunate debtor, and confined
him to the work of a flave, 'till he had dif
charged both principal and intereſt. Ve-
turius bore his fervitude with patience, and
did his utmoſt to pleafe his creditor. But
as he refuſed to gratify the deteftable paſſion
of the infamous Plotius, he treated him with
the utmoſt inhumanity to force him to a
compliance. One day he had the good for-
tune
譬
​}
ANCIENT REPUBLICKS.
257
tune to eſcape out of the houſe of his mer-
cileſs creditor, and fled to the Forum, where
he fhewed his back torn with ſtripes and his
body covered with blood, and explained the
reaſon of his ſhocking treatment. The peo-
ple, enraged at fo dreadful a fpectacle, de-
manded an abſolute ſecurity againſt that law,
which gave the creditors fuch a fhameful
power over their infolvent debtors. For
though that law had been aboliſhed near forty
years before upon a like occafion,
like occafion, yet the Pa-
tricians, by their fuperior power, had again
revived it. The Confuls reported the affair
to the Senate, who committed Plotius to
prifon, and ordered all thoſe who were in
cuftody for debt to be fet at liberty. The
Plebeians, not fatisfied with theſe trifling
conceffions, infifted upon the abfolute abo-
lition of that inhuman law; but they were
oppoſed with equal animofity by the Patri-
cians. Defpairing therefore of gaining their
point by intreaties and remonftrances, they
retired in a body to the Janiculum, refolutely
determined never to enter the city, 'till they
had received full fatisfaction. The Senate,
alarmed at this feceffion, had recourfe to their
laft refource in all defperate cafes, the crea-
tion of a Dictator. Q. Hortenfius was no-
minated Dictator upon this occafion, a man
of great temper and prudence, and a real
friend to liberty. As he was vefted with
S
abfolute
258 Of the RISE and F ALL of the
abfolute power by virtue of his office, he
totally aboliſhed that law which had given
fuch juſt cauſe of uneafineſs, and, notwith-
ſtanding all the oppofition of the Senate,
revived and confirmed two laws which had
been formerly made, though conſtantly vio-
lated by the Patricians. One was, "that
the decrees made by the Plebeians fhould be
equally obligatory to the Patricians;" the
other," that all laws paffed in the Senate
fhould be laid before the Comitia, or affem-
blies of the people, either to be confirmed or
rejected." Thus the liberty, which the Ple-
beians had acquired by the firft feceffion, was
confirmed in the plaineft and ſtrongeſt man-
ner by the laft, which happened about two
hundred and fix years after. For the Patri-
cians, from that memorable æra, had ſcarce
any other advantage over the Plebeians, ex-
cept what aroſe from their fuperior wealth,
and that refpect which is naturally paid by
inferiors to men of ſuperior birth.
It is evident, from that fudden change
which the Plebeians experienced in the beha-
viour of the Patricians at the death of Tar-
quin, that if the Senate could have fupported
themſelves in that arbitrary power, which
they ſo viſibly aimed at, the condition of the
people would have been juſt like that of the
Poliſh peaſants under their imperious Lords.
For in that deteftable Ariftocracy, the Patri-
3
}
cians,
ANCIENT REPUBLICKS.
259
cians, not content with the wealth of the
Republick, which centered chiefly in their
own body, uſed their utmoft efforts to en-
grofs the entire poffeffion of the lands. The
feceffion of the people, and the creation of
the Tribunes, defeated the ſchemes they had
formed for eſtabliſhing an Aristocratick ty-
ranny. But the frequent attempts to revive
the Agrarian law prove undeniably, that the
Patricians never loft fight of their ambitious
views of aggrandizing their families by an
illegal ufurpation of the conquered lands.
Spurius Caffius, a Patrician, was the firſt au-
thor of this law, about eight years after the
feceffion, with a view of raifing himſelf to
the regal power by conciliating the affection
and intereft of the people. The law itſelf
was certainly juft, and founded upon that
equality in the diftribution of the land,
which was a part of the conftitution, as fet-
tled by their founder Romulus. The plea
therefore of Caffius, "That the lands, which
"had been conquered by the blood and va-
"lour of the people, fhould be taken from
"the rich and applied to the fervice of the
<<
publick," was founded upon the ftricteft
equity, as well as the fundamental princi-
ples of their conftitution. Even Appius, the
moſt inveterate enemy to the people, ac-
knowledged the juftice of his propofal, fince
he moved that commiffioners fhould be ap-
S 2
pointed
260 Of the RISE and FALL of the
pointed by the Senate to fix the boundaries
of the land in queſtion, and fell or let it out
in farms for the benefit of the publick. This
advice was unanimously approved of, and
the Senate paffed a decree, that ten of the
moſt ancient confular Senators ſhould be ap-
pointed commiffioners to carry this ſcheme
into execution. This decree at once pacified
the people, and ruined Caffius. For as he
had propoſed to divide two-thirds of the
lands between the Latines and the Hernici,
whofe affiftance he at that time courted, the
people gave him up to the refentment of the
Senate, who condemned him for plotting to
introduce a ſingle tyranny, and ordered him
to be thrown down the Tarpeian precipice.
This was the firft rife of the famous A-
grarian law, which occafioned fuch frequent
contefts between the Senate and the people,
and ſtirred up the firft civil war in Rome,
which ended in the murder of both the
Gracchi, about three hundred and fifty years
after. For the Senate not only evaded the
nomination of the commiffioners, as they
had promiſed in their decree, but, whenever
that affair was brought upon the carpet, they
acted with an infincerity and artifice which
are highly inconfiftent with the ſo much
vaunted probity of the Roman Senate. Un-
lefs therefore we attend to the true reafons
upon which the Agrarian law was originally
founded,
ANCIENT REPUBLICKS.
261
founded, we can never form a right judg-
ment of the perpetual diffenfions between the
Senate and the Tribunes upon that fubject.
For though the chief blame, in all theſe con-
teſts, is moſt commonly thrown upon the
turbulent and feditious temper of the Tri-
bunes, yet, if the real cauſe of thoſe diffen-
fions is impartially examined, we ſhall find
that moſt of them took rife from the avarice
and injuſtice of the Patricians. But though
the tribunitial power was fometimes made
fubfervient to the intereſted views of fome
ambitious Tribunes, yet no argument can
justly be drawn from the abuſe of that
pow-
er againſt its real utility. For how much it
was dreaded as the bulwark of the liberty of
the people, is evident from this confidera-
tion: that it was reduced almoſt to nothing
by Sylla, and afterwards totally abforbed by
Auguftus and the fucceeding Emperors, who
never looked upon the people as thoroughly
inflaved 'till they had annexed the tribunitial
power to the imperatorial dignity.
I remarked before, that when the higheſt
dignities and employments in the Republick
were laid open to the Plebeians, and the de-
crees of the people had the fame force, and
affected the Patricians in the fame manner as
thoſe which were iffued by the Senate, the
Democratick power was raiſed to an equality
with the Ariftocratick. But as a third power,
S 3
or
262 Of the RISE and F ALL of the-
2
or eſtate (as we term it) was wanting, capable
of preſerving the requifite æquilibrium be-
tween the other two, it was impoffible, from
the very nature of the Republican conftitu-
tion, that the equality between the two pow-
ers could be long fupported. The concef-
fions made by Hortenfius quieted indeed the
civil diffenfions; and it is remarkable too,
that after peace was reſtored to the Repub-
lick, the progreſs of the Roman conquefts
was fo amazingly rapid, that in little more
than two hundred years from that period they
had fubjugated the moft opulent empires in
the univerfe. But the fame conquefts, which
raiſed the Republick to the fummit of her
grandeur, threw too much weight into the
Democratick ſcale, and, by totally corrupt-
ing the Roman manners, brought on the fi-
nal ruin of their liberty and conftitution.
For as every conquered Province created fuc-
ceffively a new Government, thefe new dig-
nities immediately became new objects of
avarice and ambition. But as the command.
of the armies, the government of Provinces,
and the higheft pofts in the ftate, were dif
pofed of by the fuffrages of the people; the
candidates for thofe lucrative employments
left no means unattempted to fecure a majo-
rity. Hence, as the poor Plebeians were ex-
tremely numerous, the man who was able to
diftribute the greateſt largeffes, or divert the
mob
ANCIENT REPUBLICKS. 263
mob with the fineſt fhews, was generally
the moſt fuccefsful. When the intereft of
the candidates was nearly equal, force was
frequently made ufe of to decide the con-
teft; and it was not uncommon to fee the
* Forum covered with the flaughtered bodies
of the electors. The Generals who were
elected fleeced the Provinces to enable them-
felves to keep up their intereſt at home with
the people, and connived at the rapines of
their foldiers to fecure their affections.
Hence at Rome liberty degenerated into the
moſt outrageous licentioufnefs, whilft the
foldiers gradually wore off that parental love
for their country, which was once the cha-
racteriſtick of the Romans, and attached
themſelves wholly to the fortunes of their
Generals. Hence the moſt fuccefsful leaders
began to look upon themſelves no longer as
fervants, but as mafters of the Republick,
and each endeavoured to fupport his preten-
fions by force of arms. The factions of Syl-
la and Marius filled the city alternately with
flaughter and rapine, as the fortune of their
refpective leaders prevailed in the courſe of
that deftructive conteft; and Rome frequent-
ly felt the calamitous effects of war in her
own bowels, at a time when her victorious
arms abroad were adding new Provinces to
.I
The place of election.
S 4
her
264 Of the RISE and F ALL of the
her dominions. Theſe factions were far
from expiring with their leaders, but broke
out again with the fame baleful fury under
the firſt and fecond Triumvirate. Each of
theſe, ſtrictly ſpeaking, were no more than
coalitions of the fame factions, where three
chiefs united their ſeveral parties to cruſh
every other. When they had accompliſhed
this, and fatiated their ambition, their ava-
rice, and their private refentments, by the
moſt bloody profcriptions, they quarrelled
about the divifion of power, like captains of
banditi about the divifion of booty, with
whom they agreed in principle, and differed
only in degree. Thefe quarrels occafioned
thoſe civil wars, which gave the finiſhing
blow to the Roman Republick. The ableft
and most dangerous man, in each Triumvi-
rate, proved at laft the conqueror; and Ju-
lius Cæfar first put thofe chains upon his
country, which Auguftus rivetted beyond a
poffibility of removal.
All the hiftorians, from whom we have
received any account of the Roman affairs,
agree unanimouſly in fixing their conqueft of
Antiochus the Great, as the æra from
whence we are to date the rife of luxury and
corruption amongst them. Livy affures us,
that luxury was first introduced into their city
by the army of Manlius at their return from
Afia. They, he informs us, were the firſt
who
1
ANCIENT REPUBLICKS.
265
c
who made Rome acquainted with the finely
ornamented couches, the rich carpets, the
embroidered hangings, and other expenſive
productions of the looms of Afia, with all
thoſe elegant tables of various forms and
workmanſhip, which were eſteemed ſo effen-
tial a part of that magnificence which they
affected in their furniture. They introduced
wenches, who fung and played upon differ-
ent inftruments, with dancers of anticks, to
heighten the mirth and indulgence of the
table. To fhew to what height they carried
the expence and luxury of the table, he adds,
with indignation, that a cook, who, by their
frugal and temperate anceſtors, was looked
upon, from his very office, as the vileft flave
in the houfhold, was now eſteemed an officer
of mighty confequence, and cookery was
erected into an art, which before was looked
upon as the moft fervile kind of drudgery.
Yet new and ſtrange as theſe firſt ſpecimens
might feem, Livy affures us, that they were
but trifles when compared to their fucceeding
luxury. Before that fatal æra the Romans
were poor, but they were contented and hap-
py, becauſe they knew no imaginary wants;
and whilft their manners were virtuous, po-
verty itſelf was honourable, and added a new
luftre to every other virtue. But when once.
they had contracted a reliſh for the luxury of
Aſia, they quickly found that the wealth of
Afia
266 Of the RISE and FALL of the
Afia was neceffary to fupport it; and this
diſcovery as quickly produced a total change
in their manners. Before that time the love
of glory, and a contempt of wealth, was
the ruling paffion of the Romans. Since
that time, money was the only object of their
applauſe and defire. Before, ambition im-
pelled them to war, from a thirſt of domi-
nion; now avarice, for the fake of plunder
to ſupport the expence of luxury. Before,
they feemed a race of Heroes; they were
now a gang of infatiable robbers. Formerly,
when they had reduced a people to obedi-
ence, they received them as their allies; they
now made the conquered Nations their flaves.
They fleeced the Provinces, and oppreffed
their friends. As the great offices, which
entitled the poffeffors to the command of
armies, and the government of Provinces,
were difpofed of by the votes of the people,
no method was left unattempted to fecure
a majority of fuffrages. The candidates
for theſe employments, not only exhauſted
their own fortunes, but ftrained their credit
to the utmoſt, to bribe the people with fhews
and donatives. To this infamous period we
muft fix the rife of that torrent of corrup-
tion, which fo quickly deluged the Roman
Republick. The fuccefsful candidates fet
out for their government, like hungry ema-
ciated wolves, to fatten upon the blood of the
miferable Provinces. Cicero makes heavy
com-
ANCIENT REPUBLICKS..
267
complaints of the rapine and extortion of
thefe rapacious oppreffors; and his orations
againſt Verres, when accufed by the Sicilians,
give us a compleat idea of the behaviour of
a Roman Governor in his province. The
complaints of the oppreffed Provincials were
inceffant; but every Governor had his friends-
amongſt the leading men, whom he fecured
by a fhare of the plunder, and the weight of
their whole intereft was applied to ſcreen the
criminal. Laws indeed were made againft
this crime of peculation, but they were eaſi-
ly eluded, becauſe the judges, who were
chofen out of the body of the people, were
as corrupt as the offenders, and were fre-
quently their affociates in villany. Thus
corruption made its way into the very vitals:
of the Republick. Every thing was venal,
and the venality had made fo rapid a progreſs,
even in the time of Jugurtha, which was
about eighty years after the defeat of Antio-
chus, as to occafion the fevere farcaſm of that
Prince, recorded by Salluft, which places the
corruption of the Romans in a ſtronger point
of view, than the moſt laboured and pathe-
tick deſcriptions of their hiſtorians. That
"Rome had carried her venality to fo great-
"a height, as to be ready to fell herfelf to
"deftruction, if fhe could but find a pur-
"chafer." When the Romans had beggared.
the Monarchs, whom they vouchſafed to ſtile
their
1
;
268 Of the RISE and FALL of the
!.
their friends, and drained the Provinces 'till
they had ſcarce any thing left to plunder;
the fame principle which had induced them
to pillage the univerfe, impelled them now to
prey upon one another. Marius and Sylla
were the firſt Romans who fet that fatal pre-
cedent, and were the firſt who bridled Rome
with a ſtanding army. The civil power was
compelled to give way to the military, and
from that period we may truly date the ruin
of the Roman liberty. The State continued
to fluctuate between Defpotifm and Anarchy,
'till it terminated irretrievably under the C-
fars, in the moſt abſolute and moſt infernal
tyranny that any people were ever yet curſed
with. Marius opened the bloody ſcene, and
glutted his followers with the blood and
wealth of the friends of Sylla. Sylla repaid
the Marian faction in the fame coin with ufu-
ry. Battles were fought in the very ſtreets;
and Rome more than once experienced all
the horrors of a city taken by ftorm from her
own citizens. Perfonal refentment and re-
venge for injuries received, were the
pre-
tence on both fides, but plunder and confif-
cation feem to have been the chief motives.
For the rich were equally looked upon as
-Profcriptiones innoxiorum ob divitias, cruciatus vi-
rorum illuftrium, vaftam urbem fuga et cædibus, bona ci-
vium miferorum quafi Cimbricam prædam, venum aut
dono datam. Sall. Frag. p. 142.
enemies,
!
ANCIENT REPUBLICKS.
269
enemies, and equally profcribed by both
factions, and they alone were fafe who had
nothing worth taking.
If we connect the various ftrokes inter-
fperfed through what we have remaining of
the writings of Salluft, which he levelled at
the vices of his countrymen, we ſhall be able
to form a juft idea of the manners of the Ro-
mans in the time of that hiftorian. From
the picture, thus faithfully exhibited, we muſt
be convinced, that not only thoſe fhocking
calamities, which the Republick fuffered dur-
ing the contest between Marius and Sylla,
but thoſe ſubſequent and more fatal evils,
which brought on the utter extinction of the
Roman liberty and conftitution, were the na-
tural effects of that foreign luxury, which
first introduced venality and corruption.
Though the introduction of luxury from
Afia preceded the ruin of Carthage in point
of time, yet, as Salluft informs us, the dread
of that dangerous rival reſtrained the Ro-
mans within the bounds of decency and or-
der. 2 But as foon as ever that obftacle was
I
'Ante Carthaginem deletam-metus hoftilis in bonis
artibus civitatem retinebat. Sall. Bell. Jug. p. 80.
2
Poftquam remoto metu Punico mores non paulatim
ut antea, fed torrentis modo præcipitati. Sall. Frag.
p. 139.
-Rapere, confumere, fua parvi pendere, aliena cu-
pere, pudorem, pudicitiam, divina humana promifcua,
nihil penfi, neque moderati habere. De Bell. Cat.
pag. 8.
removed,
·270 Of the RISE and FALL of the
酱
​+
#
I
removed, they gave a full ſcope to their un-
governed paffions. The change in their
manners was not gradual, and by little and
little, as before, but rapid and inſtantaneous.
Religion, juftice, modefty, decency, all re-
gard for divine or human laws, were fwept
away at once by the irreſiſtible torrent of
© corruption. The nobility ſtrained the pri-
vileges annexed to their dignity, and the
people their liberty, alike into the moſt un-
bounded licentioufnefs. Every one made
the dictates of his own lawleſs will his only
rule of action. Publick virtue, and the love
of their country, which had raiſed the Ro-
mans to the empire of the univerſe, were
extinct. Money, which alone could ena-
ble them to gratify their darling luxury,
was fubftituted in their place. Power, do-
minion, honours, and univerfal refpect,
were annexed to the poffeffion of money.
Contempt, and whatever was moft reproach-
ful, was the bitter portion of poverty; and
to be poor, grew to be the greateſt of all
crimes in the eſtimation of the Romans.
Thus wealth and poverty contributed alike
1
2
Cæpere nobilitas dignitatem, populus libertatem in
lubidinem vertere. Bell. Jug. p. 80.
Poftquam divitiæ honori effe cæperunt, & eas gloria,
imperium, potentia fequebatur hebefcere virtus, paupertas
probro haberi, innocentia pro malevolentia duci cæpit.
Bell. Cat. p. 8.
to
ANCIENT REPUBLIC´K S.
-271
<
3
2
I
to the ruin of the Republick. The rich
employed their wealth in the acquifition of
power; and their power in every kind of
oppreffion and rapine, for the acquifition of
more wealth. The poor, now diffolute and
deſperate, were ready to engage in every fe-
ditious infurrection, which promifed them
the plunder of the rich, and fet up both their
liberty and their country to fale to the beft
bidder. * The Republick, which was the
common prey to both, was thus rent to pieces
between the contending parties. As an uni-
verfal felfiſhneſs is the genuine effect of uni-
verfal luxury, fo the natural effect of ſelfiſh-
nefs is to break through every tye, both divine
and human, and to ftick at no kind of ex-
ceffes in the purfuit of wealth, its favourite
object. 4 Thus the effects of ſelfiſhnefs will
naturally appear in irreligion, breach of faith,
Ita cum potentia avaritia fine modo, modeftiaque
invadere, polluere, & vaftare omnia, nihil penfi neque
fancti habere. p. 81.
Sibi quifque ducere, trahere rapere. De Bell. Jug.
p. 81.
3
2 Eos paulatim expulfos agris, inertia atque inopia in-
certas domos habere fubegit: cæpere alienas opes petere,
libertatem fuam cum Republica, venalem habere. Sall.
Orat. 2. ad Cæfarem de Repub. Ordinand. p. 197.
3 Ita omnia in duas partes abftracta funt: Refpublica,
quæ media fuerat, dilacerata. De Bell, Jug. p. 8o.
+ Pecuniæ cupido fidem, probitatem cæteraſque bonas
artes fubvertit; pro his fuperbiam, crudelitatem Deos
negligere, omnia venalia 'habere edocuit. De Bell, Cat.
P. 7.
per-
272 Of the RISE and F ALL of the
perjury, a contempt of all the focial duties,
extortion, frauds in our dealings, pride,
cruelty, univerfal venality and corruption.
From ſelfiſhneſs arifes that vicious ambition
(if I may be allowed the term) which Sal-
luft rightly defines, "The luft of domina-
tion:" Ambition, as a paffion, precedes
avarice; for the feeds of ambition feem al-
moft to be innate. The defire of pre-emi-
nence, the fondness for being diftinguiſhed
above the reſt of our fellow-creatures, attends
us from the cradle to the grave. Though as
it takes its complection, fo it receives its de-
nomination from the different objects it pur-
fues, which in all are but the different means
of attaining the fame end. But the luft of
domination, here mentioned by Salluft, tho'
generally confounded with ambition, is in
reality a different paffion, and is, ftrictly
ſpeaking, only a different mode of ſelfiſhneſs.
For the chief end which we propofe, by the
luft of domination, is to draw every thing to
centre in ourſelves, which we think will en-
able us to gratify every other paffion. I con-
feſs it may be alledged, that felf-love and ſelf-
iſhneſs both arife from the general law of
felf-prefervation, and are but different modes
of the fame principle. I acknowledge, that
if we examine ftrictly all thofe heroick in-
ſtances of love, friendſhip, or patriotiſm,
I
Cupido Imperii, id. p. 7..
which
1
ANCIENT REPUBLICK S. 273
which feem to be carried to the moſt éxalt-
ed degree of difintereſtedneſs, we fhall pro-
bably find the principle of felf-love lurking
at the bottom of many of them. But, if
we rightly define theſe two principles, we
fhall find an effential difference between our
ideas of felf-love and felfifhnefs. Self-love,
within its due bounds, is the practice of the
great duty of felf-prefervation, regulated by
that law which the great Author of our being
has given for that very end. Self-love there-
fore is not only compatible with the moſt
rigid practice of the focial duties, but is in
fact a great motive and incentive to the
practice of all moral virtue. Whereas ſelf- -
iſhneſs, by reducing every thing to the fingle
point of private intereft, a point which it
never lofes fight of, banifhes all the focial
virtues, and is the firft fpring of action, which
impells to all thoſe diforders, which are fo
fatal to mixed Government in particular, and
to fociety in general. From this poiſonous
fource Salluft deduces all thofe evils, which
ſpread the peftilence of corruption over the
whole face of the Republick, and changed
the mildeſt and moſt upright Government in
I
I
Primo pecuniæ, dein imperii cupido crevit, ea quafi
materies omnium malorum fuere Poft ubi contagio,
quafi peftilentia, invafit, civitas immutata, imperium ex
juftiffimo atque optumo, crudele intolerandumque factum.
De Bell. Cat. p. 7.
T
the
274 Of the RISE and FALL of the
**
the univerſe into the most inhuman, and
moft infupportable tyranny. For as the luft
of domination can never poffibly attain its
end without the affiftance of others, the man,
who is actuated by that deftructive paffion,
muft, of neceffity, ftrive to attach to himſelf
a fet of men of fimilar principles, for the
fubordinate inftruments. This is the origin
of all thoſe iniquitous combinations, which
we call factions. To accompliſh this, he
must put on as many fhapes as Proteus; he
muft ever wear the mafk of diffimulation,
and live a perpetual lye. He will court the
friendſhip of every man, who is capable of
promoting, and endeavour to cruſh every
man, who is capable of defeating his ambi-
tious views. Thus his friendſhip and his en-
mity will be alike unreal, and eaſily converti-
ble, if the change will ferve his intereft.
As private intereft is the only tye which can
ever connect a faction, the luft of wealth,
which was the caufe of the luft of domina-
tion, will now become the effect, and muft
be proportional to the fum total of the de-
mands of the whole faction; and, as the
• Aliud claufum in pectore, aliud promptum in lingua
habere, amicitias, inimicitiafq; non ex re, fed ex com-
modo æftumare, magifq; vultum, quam ingenium bonum
habere. Ibid.
2
Malitia præmiis exercetur; ubi ea demferis, nemo
omnium gratuitò malus eft. P. 200.
latter
ANCIENT REPUBLICKS.
275
I
latter know no bounds, fo the former will
be alike infatiable. For when once a man
is inured to bribes in the fervice of faction,
he will expect to be paid as well for acting
for, as for acting againſt the dictates of his
confcience. A truth, which every minifter
muſt have experienced, who has been fup-
ported by a faction, and which a late great
minifter (as he frankly confeffed) found to
be the cafe with him during his long admi-
niftration. But how deeply foever a State
may be immerſed in luxury and corruption,
* yet the man who aims at being the head of
a faction for the end of domination, will at
firſt cloak his real defign under an affected
zeal for the fervice of the Government.
When he has eſtabliſhed himſelf in power,
and formed his party, all who fupport his
meaſures will be rewarded as the friends, all
who oppoſe him will be treated as enemies to
the Government. The honeft and uncorrupt
citizen will be hunted down as difaffected,
2
उ
Nam, ubi malos præmia fequuntur, haud facile quif-
quam gratuitò bonus eft. Sall. Orat. Philip. contra Le-
pid. p. 145.,
Pauci potentes, quorum in gratia plerique conceffe-
rant, fub honefto patrum, aut plebis nomine dominationes
affectabant, bonique & mali cives appellati, non ob merita
in Rempublicam (omnibus pariter corruptis) fed uti quif-
que locupletiffimus & injuria validior, quia præfentia de-
fendebat, pro bono ducebatur. Frag. p. 139.
T 2
and
I
276 Of the RISE and FALL of the
I
and all his remonftrances againſt mal-admi-
niftration, will be reprefented as proceeding
from that principle. The cant term, Dif
affection, will be the watch-word of the fac-
tion; and the charge of difaffection, that
conſtant reſource of iniquitous miniſters, that
infallible ſign that a cauſe will not ſtand the
teft of a fair enquiry, will be perpetually em-
ployed by the tools of power to filence thofe
objections which they want argument to an-
fwer. The faction will eſtimate the worth
of their leader, not by his fervices to his
country, for the good of the publick will
be looked upon as obfolete and chimerical
but his ability to gratify, or fcreen his friends,
and crush his opponents. The leader will
fix the implicit obedience to his will, as the
teſt of merit to his faction: Confequently, all
the dignities and lucrative poſts will be con-
ferred upon perfons of that ftamp only, whilſt
honeſty and publick virtue will be ſtanding
marks of political reprobation. Common
juftice will be denied to the latter in all
controverted elections, whilft the laws will
;
• Idem illi factiofi regunt, dant, adimunt quæ lubet;
innocentes circumveniunt: fuos ad honorem extollunt.
Non facinus, non probrum, aut flagitium obftat, quo
minus magiftratus expetant: quod commodum eft, tra-
hunt, rapiunt: poftremo tanquam urbe capta, lubidi-
ne ac licentia fua pro legibus utuntur. Sall. Or. 2. ad
Cæfar, p. 196.
be
ANCIENT REPUBLICKS.
277
2
be ſtrained, or over-ruled in favour of the
former. Luxury is the certain fore-runner
of corruption, becauſe it is the certain parent
of indigence: Confequently, a ftate fo cir-
cumſtanced will always furniſh an ample
fupply of proper inftruments for faction.
For as luxury confifts in an inordinate gra-
tification of the fenfual paffions, the more
the paffions are indulged they grow the more
importunately craving, 'till the greateſt for-
tune muft fink under their infatiable de-
mands. Thus luxury neceffarily produces
corruption. For as wealth is effentially ne-
ceffary to the ſupport of luxury, wealth will
be the univerſal object of defire in every State
where luxury prevails: Confequently, all thoſe
who have diffipated their private fortunes in
the purchaſe of pleaſure, will be ever ready
to inlift in the cauſe of faction for the wages
of corruption. (A taſte for pleaſure immo-
derately indulged, quickly ftrengthens into
habit, eradicates every principle of honour
I
Divitiis, quas honefte habere licebat, per turpitudi-
nem abuti properabant. Lubido ftrupri, ganeæ, cæteri-
que cultus non minor incefferat.-Vefcendi caufa, terra
mariq; omnia exquirere; dormire priufquam fomni cu-
pido effet: non famam, aut fitim, neq; frigus, neq; laffi-
tudinem operiri; fed ea omnia luxu antecapere. Hæc
juventutem, ubi familiares opes defecerant, ad facinora in-
cendebant. Animus imbutus malis artibus haud facile
lubidinibus carebat: eò profufius omnibus modis quæftui
atque fumptui deditus erat. Sall. de Bell. Cat. p. 9.
T 3
and
278 Of the RISE and F ALL of the
and virtue, and gets poffeffion of the whole
man. And the more expenfive fuch a man
is in his pleafures, the greater lengths he
will run for the acquifition of wealth for the
end of profufion. Thus the contagion will
become fo univerfal, that nothing but an un-
common fhare of virtue can preferve the pof-
feffor from infection. "For when once the
idea of refpect and homage is annexed to the
poffeffion of wealth alone, honour, probity,
every virtue, and every amiable quality will
be held cheap in compariſon, and looked upon
as aukward and quite unfafhionable. But as
the ſpirit of liberty will yet exift in fome
degree in a ſtate which retains the name of
Freedom, even though the manners of that
ftate fhould be generally depraved, an oppo-
fition will ariſe from thofe virtuous citizens,
who know the value of their birth-right, Li-
berty, and will never fubmit tamely to the
chains of faction. Force then will be call-
Ubi divitiæ claræ habentur, ibi omnia bona vilia
funt, fides, probitas, pudor, pudicitia.. Sall. Orat. 2. ad
Cæf. p. 199.
2 Itaque omnes conceffere jam in paucorum dominati-
onem, qui per militare nomen, ærarium, exercitum, reg-
num, provincias occupavere, et arcem habent ex fpoliis
veftris cum interim more pecudum vos multitudo fingu-
His habendos, fruendofque præbetis, exfuti omnibus, quæ.
majores reliquere: nifi quia vofmet ipfi per fuffragia, uti
præfides olim, nunc dominos deftinatis. Sall. Frag. Orat.
Lepid. ad Pleb. p. 160.
ed
ANCIENT REPUBLICKS.
279
ed in to the aid of corruption, and a ſtand-
ing-army will be introduced. A military
government will be eſtabliſhed upon the
ruins of the civil, and all commands and em-
ployments will be diſpoſed of at the arbitra-
ry will of lawlefs power. The people will
be fleeced to pay for their own fetters, and
doomed, like the cattle, to unremitting toil
and drudgery for the fupport of their tyran-
nical maſters. Or, if the outward form of
civil government fhould be permitted to re-
main, the people will be compelled to give a
fanction to Tyranny by their own fuffrages,
and to elect oppreffors inftead of protectors.
From this genuine portrait of the Ro-
man manners, it is evident to a demonftra-
tion, that the fatal catastrophe of that Re-
publick (of which Salluft himſelf was an eye-
witnefs) was the natural effect of the cor-
ruption of their manners. It is equally as
evident from our author, and the reft of the
Roman hiftorians, that the corruption of their
manners was the natural effect of foreign
luxury, introduced and fupported by foreign
wealth. The fatal tendency of thefe evils,
was too obvious to escape the notice of every
fenfible Roman, who had any regard for li-
berty, and their ancient conftitution. Many
fumptuary laws were made to reſtrain the
various exceffes of luxury; but thefe efforts
were too feeble to check the overbearing
violence
T 4
280
Of the RISE and F ALL of the
1
I
Ε
violence of the torrent. Cato propofed a
fevere law, inforced by the fanction of an
oath, againſt bribery and corruption at elec-
tions; where the fcandalous traffick of votes
was eſtabliſhed by cuftom as at a publick
market. But, as Plutarch obferves, he in-
curred the refentment of both parties by that
falutary meaſure, The rich were his ene-
mies, becauſe they found themſelves pre-
cluded from all pretenfions to the higheſt
dignities; as they had no other merit to
plead but what aroſe from their fuperior
wealth. 2 The electors abuſed, curfed, and
even pelted him as the author of a law which
deprived them of the wages of corruption,
and reduced them to the neceffity of ſubſiſt-
ing by labour. But this law, if it really
paffed, had as little effect as any of the for-
and like the fame laws in our own
country, upon the fame occafion, was either
evaded by chicane, or over-ruled by power,
Our own feptennial fcenes of drunkennefs,
mer;
I
nai
Διαφθειρόμενα δε το δήμε ταῖς δωροδοκίαις ὑπὸ των φιλαρ
χεντων, καὶ χρωμένων τῷ δέκας ισθαι καθάπερ ἐργασία συνήθει
τῶν πολλῶν, βελόμενΘ ἐκκόψαι παντάπασι τὸ νόσημα τέτο
τῆς πόλεως, επειδε δόγμα θέσθαι την σύγκλητον, ὅπως οἱ και
ταταθέντες ἄρχοντες, ει μηδένα κατήγορον, ἔχοιεν, αυτοὶ πα-
ριόντες ἐξ ἀνάγκης εις ένιορκον δικατήριον ευθύνας διδωσιν. Plut.
in Vit. Cat. p. 126.
2 Εωθεν ἦν ἐπὶ τὸ βῆμα τῆ Κάτων, προελθόντα, ἀθρόοι
πρεσπεσόντες ἐβόων, ἐβλασφήμων ἔβαλλον. Plut. ibid.
3
riot,
ANCIENT REPUBLICKS.
281
Z
riot, bribery, and abandoned perjury, may
ferve to give us an idea of the annual elec-
tions of the Romans in thoſe abominable
times. Corruption was arrived at its laſt
ſtage, and the depravity was univerfal. The
whole body of the unhappy Republick was
infected, and the diftemper was utterly in-
curable. For thoſe exceffes which formerly
were eſteemed the vices of the people, were
now, by the force of cuftom, fixed into ha-
bit, become the manners of the people. A
moſt infallible criterion, by which we may
aſcertain the very point of time, when the
ruin of any free ftate, which labours under
theſe evils, may be naturally expected.
2
The confpiracies of Cataline and Cæfar
against the liberty of their country, were
but genuine effects of that corruption, which
Salluft has marked out to us, as the imme-
diate caufe of the deftruction of the Repub-
lick. The end propofed by each of theſe
bad men, and the means employed for that
end, were the fame in both. The difference
in their ſucceſs aroſe only from the difference
Hinc rapti fafces prætio: fectorque favoris
Ipfe fui populus: lethalifque ambitus urbi
Annua venali referens certamina campo.
1
Lucan. Pharfal. lib. 1. Edit. 1506.
2 Mala fua, quod malorum ultimum eft, amant-&
definit effe remedio locus, ubi quæ fuerant vitia, mores
funt. Senec. Ep. 39. p. 100.
of
282
Of the RISE and FALL of the
I
2.
1
of addreſs and abilities in the reſpective lead-
ers. The followers of Cataline, as Salluft
informs us, were the moft diffolute, the
moft profligate, and the moſt abandoned
wretches, which could be culled out of the
moft poulous and moft corrupt city of the
univerfe. Cæfar, upon the fame plan,
formed his party, as we learn from Plutarch,
out of the moft infected, and moft corrupt
members of the very fame State. The vices
of the times cafily furniſhed a fupply of
proper inftruments. * To pilfer the publick
money, and to plunder the provinces by
violence, though State-crimes of the moſt
heinous nature, were grown fo familiar by
cuftom, that they were looked upon as no
more than mere office-perquifites.
4 The
3
younger people, who are ever moſt ripe for
fédition and infurrection, were fo corrupted
' In tanta tamque corrupta civitate, Catilina ominium
flagitioforum, atque facinoroforum circum fe, tamquam
ftipatorum catervas habebat. Sall. de Bell. Cat. p. 9.
2
Καισαρος-τα νοσόντα καὶ διεφθαρμένα τῆς πολιτειας
μέρη ταράτλοντος καὶ συνάγοντος πρὸς αὐτόν. Plut. in Vit. Cat.
nai æpès
Min. p. 241.
3 Peculatus ærarii, & per vim fociis ereptæ pecuniæ,
quæ quanquam gravia funt, tamen confuetudine jam pro
nihilo habentur. Sall. de Bell. Jug. p. 73.
4 Adeo juventus luxu atque avaritia corrupta eft, uti
merito dicatur, genitos effe, qui neque ipfi habere poffent
res familiares, neque alios pati. Sall. Frag. p. 139.
by
ANCIENT REPUBLICK S.
283
by luxury, that they might be defervedly
termed, an abandoned race, whofe diffipa-
tion made it impracticable for them to keep
their own private fortunes; and whofe ava-
rice would not ſuffer their fellow-citizens to
enjoy the quiet poffeffion of theirs."
It is not at all ftrange that Rome thus
circumftanced ſhould fall a victim to the cor-
ruption of her own citizens: nor that the
Empire of the univerfe, the toil and labour
of ages, to which the Romans had waded
through feas of blood, ſhould be deftined to
feed the deteftable vices of a few monfters,
who were a difgrace even to human nature.
The total change of the Roman conftitu-
tion, the unlimited Tyranny of the Empe-
rors, and the abject flavery of the people,
were all effects of the fame caufe, extended
in degree by a natural progreffion. The
Romans in fact were no more; the name
indeed fubfifted, but the idea affixed to that
name, was as totally changed as their ancient
conftitution. In the time of Pyrrhus the
Roman Senate appeared an affembly of Kings
to his ambaffador Cyneas. When the Eaft
had felt the force of the Roman arms, the
moft defpotick princes received the orders of
a Roman Senate, and executed them with
as prompt obedience, as a flave would do
the commands of his mafter. A deputy
from the Roman Senate made a haughty
1
Mo-
284 Of the RISE and FALL of the
}
X
Monarch tremble at the head of a victorious
army, compelled him to refign all his con-
quefts, and return ingloriouſly home, by a
fingle motion of his walking-flick.
What an elevated idea muft this give us
of the Roman manners, whilſt that haughty
people retained their freedom! Nothing is
more grand; nothing more ſtriking. Shift
but the ſcene, and view the manners of the
Romans when enflaved. Nothing is fo ab-
jectly fervile, nothing fo defpicable. We
fee the Roman Senate deifying the worſt of
mankind; wretches, who had funk even
below humanity, and offering the adoration
of incenfe to thefe idols of their own mak-
ing, who were more contemptible than the
very ſtone and wooden reprefentatives of their
deities. Inftead of giving laws to Monarchs,
and deciding the fate of nations, we fee the
auguft Roman Senate run trembling like
flaves at the fummons of their maſter Domi-
tian, to debate in form about the important
buſineſs of dreffing a turbot. The Majeſty
of the Roman people, which received the
tributary homage of the univerſe, expired
together with their liberty. That people,
who difpofed of the higheft offices in the go-
I
2
Popilius to Antiochus Epiph. Liv. lib. 45. p. 672.
2
Juv. Sat: 4.
vern-
ANCIENT REPUBLICKS.
285
2
vernment, the command of armies, provinces
and kingdoms, were funk into a herd of dif-
pirited flaves. Their total infignificancy
fcreened them from the fatal effects of the
caprices of their Tyrants. They dragged on
a wretched being in a ſtate of idlenefs and
poverty, in the midft of flavery; and the ut-
moft extent of their wifhes amounted to no
more, * than bread for their daily ſubſiſtence,
and diverfions for their amufement. The
Emperors fupplied the one by their frequent
largeffes of corn, and gratified the other by
their numerous publick fhews. Hence hif
torians obferve, that the most infamous of
their Tyrants were as fond of Raree-fhews,
as the mob themſelves; and as they were by
much the moſt profufe of all their Empe-
rors, their deaths were always moft regret-
ted by the people. So ftriking is the con-
traft between a ſtate when bleffed with li-
berty, and the fame ftate when reduced to
flavery by the corruption of its people!
As I have already made fome reflections
upon that paffion for theatrical entertain-
ments, which prevailed at Athens, I cannot
£
Ex quo fuffragia nulli
Vendimus, effugit Curas. Nam qui dabat olim
Imperium, fafces, legiones, omnia, nunc fe
Continet, atque duas tantum res anxius optat
Panem & Circenfes.
Juv. Sat. 10. lin. 77.
Otium cum fervitio.
Sall. Frag. p. 143.
help
286 Of the RISE and FALL of the
help obferving, that after the introduction
of luxury, the fondneſs for that kind of
diverſion amongst the Romans, was at leaft
equal to that of the Athenians. The Ro-
mans ſeem to have been ſtrangers to every
kind of ſtage-plays for the firſt four hundred
years. Their first attempts of that kind
were rude and fimple, and not unlike the an-
cient mummery at our country wakes, or
Chriſtmas gambols. The regular Drama
was imported together with the luxury of
Greece, but every ſpecies of this kind of en-
tertainment, whether tragedy, comedy, farce,
or pantomime, was comprehended under
the general denomination of ftage-plays, and
the different performers alike ranged under
the general term of players. The profef-
fion itſelf was reckoned fcandalous, and
proper only for flaves, and if once a Roman
citizen appeared upon the ftage, he imme-
diately forfeited his right of voting, and
every other privilege of a free man. Upon
I
2
this account Cicero feems to lament the fate
of his friend Rofcius, when he tells us,
"that he was fo fuperior to all as a player,
that he alone ſeemed worthy of appearing
upon.
I Ludi Scenici.
2
Hiftriones.
3 Etenim cum artifex ejufmodi fit; ut folus dignus
videatur effe, qui in ſcena spectetur: tum vir ejufmodi
cft,
ANCIENT REPUBLICKS.
287
præ-
upon the ſtage: but of fo exalted a charac-
ter, as a man, that of all men he deſerved
leaſt to be doomed to fo fcandalous a profef-
fion." Suetonius, fpeaking of the licentiouf-
neſs and infolence of the players, takes notice
of an ancient law, which impowered the
tors and ædiles to whip thofe players pub-
lickly, who gave the leaft offence, or did not
perform to the fatisfaction of the people.
Though Auguftus, as the fame hiftorian in-
forms us, exempted players from the igno-
miny of that law, yet he took care to re-
ftrain them within the bounds of decency,
and good manners. For he ordered Stepha-
nio, a celebrated comedian, to be whipped
publickly through all the three threatres, and
afterwards baniſhed him, for prefuming pri-
vately to keep a Roman matron diſguiſed un-
eft, ut folus dignus videatur, qui eò non accedat. Orat.
pro Rofc. Edit. Glafg. p. 43.
'Divus Auguftus immunes verberum hiftriones quon-
dam refponderat. Tacit. c. 14. p. 42. Edit. Glaſg..
Coercitionem in hiftriones magiftratibus in omni tem-
pore et loco lege vetere permiffam ademit. Suet. in Vit.
Aug. p. 163.
2 Hiftrionum licentiam adeo compefcuit, ut Stepha-
nionem Togatarium, cui in puerilem habitum circumton-
fam matronam miniftraffe compererat, per tria theatra
virgis cæfum relegaverit. Hylam pantomimum, querente
prætore, in atrio domus fuæ, nemine exclufo, flagellis
verberaverit; et Pyladem urbe atque Italia fubmoverit,
quod fpectatorem à quo exfibilabatur, demonftraffet digi-
to, confpicuumque feciffet. Ibid.
der
288
Of the RISE and F ALL of the
der the habit of his boy. Upon a complaint
from the Prætor he made Hylas the panto-
mime be laſhed openly in the court of his
own palace, to which place the offender
had fled for refuge; and baniſhed Pylades,
one of the moft eminent players, not only
from Rome but even from Italy, for affront-
ing one of the audience who had hiffed him
upon the ſtage.
the ſtage. But theſe reſtraints ſeem to
have expired with Auguftus. For we find
the pride and infolence of the players carried
to fo great a height in the reign of his fuc-
ceffor Tiberius, as to occafion their total
baniſhment. The fondnefs of the populace
for the entertainments of the theatre, and
the folly of the degenerate nobility, were the
cauſes of this alteration. For both Pliny
and Seneca affure us, that perfons of the
very firſt rank and faſhion were fo fcanda-
louſly mean, as to pay the moft obfequious
court to the players, to dangle at their levees,
to attend them openly in the ſtreets like their
flaves; and treat them like the maſters, in-
ftead of the fervants of the publick. Every
eminent player had his party, and theſe ridi-
culous factions intereſted themfelves fo warm-
ly in the cauſe of their reſpective favourites,
that the theatres became a perpetual ſcene of
I
▪ Oftendam nobiliffimos juvenes mancipia pantomimo-
rum. Senec. Epift. 47. p. 118.
riot
ANCIENT REPUBLICKS. 289
1
riot and diforder. The nobility mingled
with the mob in theſe abfurd conflicts ;
which always ended in bloodshed, and fre-
quently in murder. The remonftrances and
authority of the magiftrates had fo little ef-
fect, that they were obliged to have recourſe
to the Emperor. Bad as Tiberius was, yet
he was too wife to tolerate ſuch ſhameful‍li-
centiouſneſs. He laid the cafe before the
Senate, and informed them, that the player's
were the cauſe of thofe fcandalous riots
which diſturbed the repofe of the publick:
that they ſpread lewdnefs and debauchery
through all the chief families; that they
were arrived to fuch a height of profligacy
and infolence, through the protection of their
factions, that the authority of the Senate it-
felf was requifite to reftrain them within
proper bounds. Upon this remonftrance
they were driven out of Italy as a publick
nuifance; and Suetonius informs us, that all
the frequent and united petitions of the
peo-`
• Variis dehinc et fæpius irritis prætorum quæftibus,.
poftremò Cæfar de immodeftia hiftrionum retulit; multa
ab iis in publicum feditiofe, foeda per domos tentari-eo
flagitiorum & virium veniffe, ut auctoritate patrum coer-
cendum fit. Pulfi'tum hiftriones Italia. Tacit. Annal.
4. P. 134.
2 Cæde in theatro per difcordiam admiffa, capita fac-
tionum & hiftriones propter quos diffidebatur, relegavit :
nec ut revocaret unquam ullis populi precibus potuit
evinci. Suet. in Tib. c. 37.
U
ple
290 Of the RISE and F ALL of the
1
ple could never prevail upon Tiberius to re-
call them.
Auguftus affected an extreme fondnefs for
all kinds of diverfions; he invited the moſt
celebrated players of every denomination in-
to Italy, and treated the people, at an im-
menfe expence, with every kind of enter-
tainment, which the theatre or circus could
furnifh. This is remarked as an inſtance of
that refined policy of which he was fo tho-
rough a maſter. For that artful prince was
not yet firmly fettled in his newly ufurped
power. He well knew, that if he gave the
people time to cool and reflect, they might
poffibly thwart the execution of his ambitious
fchemes. He therefore judged that the beſt
expedient to prepare them for the yoke of
flavery would be, to keep them conftantly
intoxicated by one perpetual round of jollity
and diverfions. That this was the opinion
of thinking people, at that time, is evident
from that remarkably pertinent anſwer of
Pylades the player to Auguftus, tranfmitted
to us by Dion Caffius. Pylades, as I have
already obſerved, had been baniſhed by Au-
guftus for a miſdemeanor, but pardoned and
recalled to gratify the humour of the peo-
ple. At his return, when Auguftus reproved
him with quarrelling with one Bathyllus, a
perfon of the fame profeffion, but protected
by his favourite Mæcenas; Pylades is report-
ed
ANCIENT REPUBLICKS.
29f
t
ed to have made this bold and ſenſible an-
fwer: ".
" 'It is your true intereft, Cæfar, that
"the people fhould idle away that time up-
on us and our affairs, which they might
"otherwife employ in prying too narrowly
"into your government."
I am far from being an enemy to the
ſtage. On the contrary, I think the ftage
under proper regulations might be rendered
highly ufeful. For of all our publick di-
verfions, the ſtage, if purged from the ob-
ſcenity of farce, and the low buffoonery of
pantomime, is certainly capable of afford-
ing infinitely the moft rational, and the moſt
manly entertainment. But when I fee the
fame diforders in our own theatres, which
were fo loudly complained of in the time of
Tiberius; when the ridiculous contefts be-
tween contending players are judged to be of
fuch mighty importance, as to fplit the pub-
lick into the fame kind of factions ; when
theſe factions intereft themſelves fo warmly
in the ſupport of the fuppofed merit of their
refpective favourites, as to proceed to riots,
blows, and the moſt extravagant indecen-
cies; I cannot help wiſhing for the interpo-
fition of the reforming fpirit of Auguftus.
And when I fee the fame infatiable fond-
Συμφέρει σοι, Καισαρ, περὶ ἡμᾶς τὸν δῆμον αποδιατρία
Béabai. Dion. Caff. lib. 54. p. 533-
U 2
nefs
292
Of the RISE and F ALL of the
1
I
nefs for diverfions, the fame unmeaning taſte
(ſo juſtly ridiculed by ¹ Horace in his coun-
trymen) prevail in our own nation, which
mark the moſt degenerate times of Greece
and Rome, I cannot but look upon them as
a certain indication of the frivolous and ef¬
feminate manners of the prefent age.
• Verùm equitis quoque jam migravit ab aure voluptas
Omnis, ad incertos oculos, & gaudia vana.
Hor. Epift. 1. lib. 2. lin. 187.
Tanto cum ftrepitu ludi ſpectantur, et artes,
Divitiæque peregrinæ: quibus oblitus actor
Quum ftetit in fcena, occurrit dextera lævæ :
Dixit adhuc aliquid? nil fane. Quid placet ergo ?
Lana Tarentino violas imitata veneno.
Ibid. lin. 203.
#
СНАР.
ANCIENT REPUBLICKS. 293
CH A P. VI.
The real CAUSE of the rapid Declenfion of
the ROMAN REPUBLICK.
'D'
IONYSIUS of Halicarnaffus obſerves,
that Romulus formed his new go-
vernment in many reſpects after the model
of that of Sparta, which accounts for that
great reſemblance, we evidently meet with
between the Roman and Spartan conftitu-
tions. I may add too, that we cannot help
obferving as great a refemblance for fome
ages at leaſt between the manners of both
thoſe people. For we find the fame fim-
plicity in their houſes, diet and apparel;
the fame contempt for wealth, and quite to
the laſt period of their liberty, the fame war-
like genius. Publick ſpirit and the love of
their country was carried in both ftates to
the higheſt pitch of enthuſiaſm; it was deaf
to the voice of nature itſelf, and that amia-
ble virtue wore a kind of favage afpect at
Rome and Sparta. But the alteration of
their manners, which alike preceded the
lofs both of the Spartan and Roman liberty,
will admit of no kind of compariſon either
1
Dionyf. Halicarn. lib. 2. p. 65.
C
U 3
as
294 Of the RISE and F ALL of the
1
+
I
as to degree or progrefs. Luxury and cor-
ruption ſtole in by very flow degrees, and
were never carried to any remarkable height
amongſt the Spartans. But, as Salluft
beautifully expreffes it, the Roman manners
were precipitated at once to the depth of
corruption, after the manner of a refiftlefs
torrent. I obferve that the deftruction of
Carthage is fixed upon by that elegant hiſ-
torian, as the æra from which the rife of
this rapid degeneracy is to be dated. He
affigns too the removal of the dread occafion-
ed by that dangerous rival, as the cauſe of
this fudden and aftoniſhing change. Be-
cauſe, according to his reaſoning, they could
then give a full looſe to the impetuous fury
of their paffions, without reftraint or fear.
But the cauſe here affigned is by no means
equal to the effect. For though it might
contribute in fome meaſure to accelerate the
progrefs of luxury, and confequently the
corruption of their manners; yet the real
caufe of their fudden degeneracy was widely
different.
The Romans founded their fyftem of po→
licy, at the very origin of their ftate, upon
that beft and wifeft principle, "The fear
of the Gods, a firm belief of a divine
I
+
Mores majorum non paulatim ut antea, fed torrentis
modo precipitati. Salluft. Fragment. p. 139.
fuper-
ANCIENT REPUBLICKS. 295
I
fuperintending Providence, and a future
ſtate of rewards and puniſhments:" Their
children were trained up in this belief from
tender infancy, which took root and grew
up with them by the influence of an excel-
lent education, where they had the benefit
of example as well as precept. Hence we
read of no heathen nation in the world,
where both the publick and private duties
of religion were fo ftrictly adhered to, and
fo fcrupulouſly obferved as amongſt the Ro-
mans. They imputed their good or bad
fuccefs to their obfervance of thefe duties,
and they received publick profperities or pub-
lick calamities, as bleffings conferred, or
puniſhments inflicted by their Gods. Their
hiftorians hardly ever give us an account of
any defeat received by that people, which
they do not aſcribe to the omiffion, or con-
tempt of fome religious ceremony by their
Generals. For though the ceremonies there
mentioned, juſtly appear to us inſtances
of the moſt abfurd, and moft extravagant
fuperftition, yet as they were eſteemed ef-
fential acts of religion by the Romans, they
muft confequently carry all the force of reli-
gious principle. We neither exceeded, fays
I
Nulla unquam Refpublica fanctior, nec bonis exem-
plis ditior fuit. Liv. in Præfat.
2
Dionyf. Halicarn. lib. 2. p. 61, 62.
U 4
Cicero,
7
296 Of the RISE and F ALL of the
I
2
Cicero, fpeaking of his countrymen, the
Spaniards in number, nor did we excel the
Gauls in ftrength of body, nor the Cartha-
ginians in craft, nor the Greeks in arts or
fciences. But we have indifputably fur-
paſſed all the nations in the univerſe in piety
and attachment to religion, and in the only
point which can be called true wiſdom, a
thorough conviction, that all things here be-
low are directed, and governed by Divine
Providence. To this principle alone Cicero
wifely attributes the grandeur and good for-
tune of his country. For what man is there,
ſays he, who is convinced of the exiſtence
of the Gods, but muſt be convinced at the
fame time, that our mighty Empire owes
its origin, its increaſe, and its preſervation,
to the protecting care of their divine provi-
dence. A plain proof that theſe continued
to be the real fentiments of the wifer Ro-
mans, even in the corrupt times of Cicero.
From this principle proceeded that reſpect
for, and fubmiffion to their laws, and that
3
-Tamen nec numero Hifpanos, nec robore Gallos,
nec calliditate Pœnos, nec artibus Græcos.
2 Sed pietate ac religione, atque hac unâ fapientiâ, quod
deorum immortalium numine omnia regi gubernarique
perfpeximus, omnes gentes nationefque fuperavimus.
Cic. de Haruf. Refp. p. 189.
3 Quis eft quicum Deos effe intellexerit, non in-
telligat eorum numine hoc tantum imperium effe natum,
et auctum et retentum. Ibid. p. 188.
tem-
ANCIENT REPUBLICKS.
297
I
temperance, moderation, and contempt for
wealth, which are the beſt defence againſt
the encroachments of injuſtice and oppref-
fion. Hence too arofe that inextinguiſhable
love for their country, which, next to the
Gods, they looked upon as the chief object
of veneration. This they carried to fuch
a height of Enthufiafm, as to make every
human tye of focial love, natural affection,
and ſelf-preſervation, give way to this duty
to their dearer country. Becauſe they not
only loved their country as their common
mother, but revered it as a place which
was dear to their Gods 2 which they
had deſtined to give laws to the reft of the
univerfe, and confequently favoured with
their peculiar care and protection. Hence
proceeded that obftinate and undaunted cou-
rage, that infuperable contempt of danger,
and death itſelf in defence of their country,
which compleat the idea of the Roman
character, as it is drawn by hiftorians in the
virtuous ages of the Republick. As long
as the manners of the Romans were regu-
lated by this firſt great principle of religion,
;
Cari funt parentes, cari liberi, propinqui et familiares:
fed omnes omnium caritates patriæ una complexa eft.
Cic. de Offic.
2 Pro qua patria, mori, et cui nos totos dedere, et in
qua noftra omnia ponere, et quafi confecrare debemus.
Cic. de Leg.
they
}
1
298 Of the RISE and FALL of the
they were free and invincible. But the
Atheiſtical doctrine of Epicurus, which in-
I
• It has been remarked * "that if I had mentioned
"Stoicifm upon this occafion as the root of Atheiſm,
it might have been more proper; becauſe a true Stoic
was a profeffed Atheist.' That the fundamental
principles of the Stoics tended to Atheiſm, I readily
grant: but as the real philofophers of that fect inculcat-
ed a thorough contempt for what are called the good
things of this life, and were extremely auftere in their
morals; their Doctrines feem to have had a very different.
influence upon the manners of the people, wherever they
were received, from thofe of the Epicureans.-Brutus
and Cato, the inflexible Champions of liberty, and al-
moft the only virtuous characters in that corrupt period,
were rigid Stoics.-Julius Cæfar, who fubverted the Con-
ftitution of his Country, was a thorough Epicurean, both
in principle and practice. His principles we plainly fee
in Salluft, where he urges the total extinction of our being
at death, as an argument for fparing the lives of Cataline's
accomplices. For he audacioufly affirms to the Senate :
"that death as a puniſhment was fo far from being
"an evil, that it releaſed us from all our forrows, when
"labouring under diftrefs and mifery; that it put a final
"period to all the evils of this life, beyond which there
was no longer room either for grief or joy."
joy." Thus,
as the learned Dr. Warburton juftly remarks," he took
"occafion, with a licentioufnefs 'till then unknown to
"that auguft affembly, to explain and inforce the avowed
"principles of Epicurus (of whofe fect he was) concern-
"ing the Mortality of the Soul." Divine Legation, part
2d, pages 111, 112, laſt edition. . That his manners were
notoriouſly infamous, we may learn from the hiſtory of
his life in Suetonius, where he is termed the bufband of every
woman, and the wife of every man: Omnium Mulierum
virum, & omnium Virorum Mulierum. Sueton. in vit.
Jul. Cæf. c. 52. ad finem.
-
* Critical Review, March, 1759.
a
finuated
}
ANCIENT REPUBLICKS.
299
finuated itſelf at Rome, under the reſpect-
able name of Philofophy, after their ac-
quaintance with the Greeks, undermined
and deſtroyed this ruling principle. I allow
that luxury, by corrupting manners, had
weakened this principle, and prepared the
Romans for the reception of Atheiſm, which
is the never-failing attendant of luxury.
But as long as this principle remained, it
controuled manners, and checked the pro-
grefs of luxury, in proportion to its influ-
ence. But when the introduction of Atheiſm
had deftroyed this principle, the great bar to
corruption was removed, and the paffions at
once let looſe to run their full career with-
out check, or controul. The introduction
therefore of the Atheiſtical tenets 'attribut-
ed to Epicurus, was the real caufe of that
rapid depravity of the Roman manners,
which has never been fatisfactorily account-
ed for, either by Salluft, or any other hiſto-
rians.
The learned, I know, are not a little di-
vided in their opinions about Epicurus. But
I here men the tenets of the Epicurean Atheists, as
they are termed by the very learned Mr. Baxter in his
treatiſe on the Immortality of the Soul; where he has
confuted them at large in the firſt volume of that admira-
ble work.
Enquiry into the Nature of the Human Soul, Vol. 1.
P. 355.
a dif
هم
;
300 of the RISE and FALL of the
a difquifition into what were, or were not
the real tenets of that philofopher, would be
wholly foreign to my purpoſe. By the doc-
trine of the Epicureans, I mean that fyftem
which Lucretius has dreffed
up in his
poem
with all the beauties of poetry, and all the
elegance of diction. This, like the reft of
the Atheiſtick fyftems, which are attributed
to moſt of the Grecian philofophers, is preg-
nant with the wildeft abfurdities that ever
entered into the human imagination. Epicu-
rus, ¹if Lucretius has given us his genuine
tenets,
It has been remarked, that the Difciples of the an-
cient Greek philofophers have blended fo many of their
own opinions with the Doctrine of their masters, that
it is often difficult to diftinguiſh the genuine tenets of the
Jatter, from the fpurious ones which have been interpo-
lated by their followers.-Thus Epicurus taught that the
Summum Bonum or Supreme Good confifted in pleafure.
His defenders infift, that he placed it in that refined
pleaſure which is infeparable from the practice of virtue.
His enemies affirm, that he meant the groffer pleaſure
which arifes wholly from the fenfual paffions.-His friends
reply, that this Notion was firſt broached by the diffolute
part of his difciples, who moft injuriouſly fathered it
upon Epicurus, and then alledged his authority as a plea
for their debaucheries:--they add, that the true Epicu-
reans, who adhered rigidly to the genuine tenets of their
mafter, always treated thefe fpurious difciples as fophifts
and impoftors. But even allowing this to be a true ftate
of the cafe; yet that the materiality and diffolution of
the human foul at death was a genuine tenet of Epicurus,
is a truth which the moft fanguine of his admirers are
not able to deny. As this pernicious tenet therefore was
equally
i
1
ANCIENT REPUBLICKS.
301
}
1
tenets, aſcribes the formation of the univerſe
to the fortuitous concourfe of fenfelefs atoms
of matter. His mafter, Democritus, from
whom he borrowed his fyftem, afferts the
fame. But Epicurus has exceeded him in
abfurdity. For Democritus, if we may cre-
dit Plutarch, endowed his atoms with a cer-
tain living intelligence, which Epicurus
ſcorns to make uſe of. He boldly deduces life,
intelligence, and free-will itſelf, from the di-
rect, oblique, and other various motions of
his inanimate atoms. He admits a fort
of infignificant beings, whom he terms
Gods; but as he would not allow them to
have any hand in the formation of his uni-
verfe, fo neither will he fuffer them to have
the leaſt ſhare in the conduct of it. He
has fhewed them plainly, that he could
equally held, and publickly taught by both theſe kinds
of Epicureans, a very ſmall knowledge of human nature
will enable us to decide, which of the two oppofite noti-
ons of pleaſure was moft likely to prevail, and gain the
greatest number of profelytes amongst a luxurious and
corrupt people.
The diffolute manners of the Romans in the laſt pe-
riod of their Republick, prove evidently, in my opinion,
that the fenfual doctrines of the later Epicureans were al-
moſt univerſally received. And if the evidence of Horace
in his humourous deſcription of the manners of thoſe phi-
lofophers is to be depended upon, they feem to have in-
groffed the name of the fect wholly to themſelves.
Me pinguem et nitidum bene cura tacute viſes;
Cum ridere voles, Epicuri de Grege porcum.
Hor. Epift. 4. lib. 1.
do
302
Of the RISE and FALL of the
I
do without them; and, as he has made
them fo egregiouſly infignificant as to be
able to do neither good nor harm, he has
packed them off at a diftance, to live an
indolent, lazy life, and to divert them-
felves juft as they think proper. Thus he
has got rid of the troubleſome doctrine of
a divine fuperintending Providence. Some-
times he forgets himſelf, and feems to deny
their very exiſtence.
exiſtence. For he tells us in one
place, that the whole univerfe contains no-
thing but matter and empty fpace, or what
arifes from the cafual concurrence of theſe
two principles: Confequently, that no third
nature, different from theſe two, can poffibly
be proved to exift either by the cognizance of
our fenfes, or by the utmoſt efforts of our
reaſoning faculty. He teaches, that the ſoul
is compofed of the fineſt and moſt ſubtile
atoms, confequently difcerpable and mortal.
That the identity of man confifts in the uni-
on of theſe finer corpufcles with the groffer
ones, which compofe the body. That, at
their
2
* Omnis, ut eft igitur per fe natura duabus.
Confiftit rebus; nam corpora funt et inane.
Ergo præter inane et corpora tertia per fe.
Nalla poteft rerum in numero natura relinqui
Nec quæ fub cenfus cadat ullo tempore noftros
Nec ratione animi quam quifquam poffit apifci.
Et nebula ac fumus quoniam difcedit in auras;
Crede
है
ANCIENT REPUBLICKS.
303
their difunion by death, the foul evaporates,
and is diffipated in the upper regions, from
whence it firft diftilled, and the fame man ex-
ifts no more. Nay, he is fo amazingly abfurd
as to affert, that if the ſoul, after its ſepa-
ration, ſhould ſtill retain its confcioufnefs,
and, after a length of time, by ſome lucky
jumble of his atoms, fhould happen to ani-
mate another body, this new compound would
be quite a different man: Confequently, that
this new man would be no more intereſted
in the actions of the former, than the former
would be refponfible for the behaviour of
the latter, or for that of any future man,
who might happen hereafter to be produced
by another cafual affemblage of the atoms of
the fame foul, united to thofe of another bo-
dy. This doctrine is plainly ſtolen from the
Pythagorean ſyſtem of the tranfmigration of
fouls; but mutilated, and miferably perverted
to the purpoſes of Atheiſm. The abfurdities
in this wild philofophy are fo felf-evident,
that to attempt a refutation of them, would
be an affront to common ſenſe. Yet, from
Crede animam quoque diffundi, multoque perire
Ocius, et citius diffolvi corpora prima,
Cum femel omnibus è membris ablata receffit.
* Et fi jam noſtro fentit de corpore, poftquam
Diftracta eft animi natura, animæque poteftas:
Nil tamen hoc ad nos; qui cætu conjugioque
Corporis atque animæ confiftimus uniter apti.
this
304
Of the RISE and F ALL of the,
this fource, theſe philofophers draw their pre-
tended confolations againſt the fear of death:
"That at death the identity of the man ab-
folutely ceaſes, and we totally loſe our exift-
ence." Yet, from thefe excellent comforters,
our modern fceptics have revived their ſenſe-
lefs tenet of annihilation to ferve the cauſe of
libertinifm. The grand Defideratum, in li-
bertinifm, is, to be able to give an unbound-
ed looſe to the fenfual paffions to their very
utmoſt extent, without any impertinent hints
from a certain difagreeable monitor, called
Confcience, and the dread of an after-reckon-
ing. Now as both theſe terrors are removed
by this fyftem of annihilation, it is no won-
der that libertines, who abound in a corrupt
licentious age, fhould fly eagerly to fo com-
fortable a doctrine, which at once filences
thofe enemies to their pleafures. This is the
creed introduced by the fect of Epicurus
amongſt the Romans, which eafily accounts
for that fudden, and univerſal revolution in
their manners. For manners can never be
fo effectually, and fo fpeedily depraved, as by
2
2
* Nil igitur mors eft, ad nos neque pertinet hilum,
Quandoquidem natura animi mortalis habetur:
a to-
Ubi non erimus: cum corporis, atque animaï
Difcidium fuerit, quibus è fumus uniter apti,
Scilicet haud nobis quicquam, qui non erimus tum,
Accidere omnino poterit, fenfumque movere.
Epicurus vero ex animis hominum extraxit radicitus
reli-
}
J
ANCIENT REPUBLICK s.. 305
1
I
a total extinction of all religious principle,
and all religious principle muſt be neceffarily
fubverted wherever this doctrine of annihila-
tion is received. I allow that Lucretius gives
us fome excellent maxims from Epicurus,
and inveighs in many places againſt the vices
of his countrymen. But the cheat is too
grofs and palpable, and only proves, that he
has gilt over the pill of Atheiſm to make it
go down more fmoothly. For how can a
ſuperſtructure ſtand when the foundation is
taken away; and of what ſervice is the beſt
ſyſtem of morality when the fanction of fu-
ture rewards and puniſhments, the great
motive which ſhould enforce the practice, is
removed by the denial of a Providence, and
the doctrine of annihilation? Cicero informs
us, that all the fine things, which Epicurus
afferts of the exiftence of his Gods, and their
excellent nature, are mere grimace, and only
thrown out to ſcreen him from cenfure. For
he could not be ignorant, that the laws of his
country puniſhed every man with the utmoſt
feverity, who ftruck at that fundamental
principle of all religion, the exiſtence of a
religionem, quum Diis immortalibus et opem et gratiam
fuftulit. Cic. de Nat. Deor. p. 76 & 77.
* At etiam liber eft Epicuri de fanctitate. Ludimur
ab homine non tam faceto, quam ad fcribendi licentiam
ibero. Quæ enim poteft effe fanctitas, fi Dii humana
on curant? Cic. de Nat. Deor. p. 78.
X
Deity.
306 Of the RISE and F ALL of the
Deity. Cicero therefore, who had tho-
roughly examined his tenets, affirms him, by
his own principles, to have been a downright
Atheiſt. For in reality, a man who ſhould
affert the exiſtence of fuch idle Gods, as are
neither capable of doing good or hurt, muft,
if he expects to be believed, be a greater fool
than the man, "Who fays in his heart there
is no God at all." Yet this ſtrange ſyſtem,
though fraught with fuch abfurdities and
contradictions as could fcarce be palmed
upon the genius of an Hottentot, has been
implicitly fwallowed by too many of thoſe
gentlemen, who affect to call themſelves the
efprit forts of the prefent age. Theſe are
the Atheiſtical tenets of Epicurus, preſerved
by Lucretius in his beautiful poem, which,
like poiſon, conveyed in fweets, pleaſe and
murder at the fame time 2.
The
' Verius eft igitur nimirum illud quod familiaris om-
nium noftrûm Pofidonius differuit in libro quinto de natu-
râ Deorum, nullos effe Deos Epicuro videri: quæque is
de Diis immortalibus dixerit, invidiæ deteftandæ gratia
dixiffe, p. 78.
2 I am much obliged to the Gentlemen who write the
Critical Review for the compliments paid to my little
performance in their Review for March 1759. Their can-
did remarks upon thefe quotations from Cicero have been
truly ferviceable; as they have induced me to read over
his philofophical works with cloſe attention, as well as
the writings of fome of our ableft moderns upon that ſub-
ject.
The
ANCIENT REPUBLIC KŚ.
307
f
The Greeks were early infected with this
execrable doctrine, and fhew the effect it
X 2
had
The principles of the New Academy, that doubting
fect, which Cicero had eſpouſed, led fo directly to Scep-
ticifm, that he keeps us in a ftate of perpetual doubt and
uncertainty as to his opinions. Mr. Baxter in his En-
quiry into the Nature of the Human Soul, Vol. II. p. 70,
complaining of Cicero's inconfiftencies and felf-contra-
dictions, obferves, that--" as philofophers, he teaches
men to be Sceptics, or to maintain that truth is not to be
" perceived." And afterwards adds, "But it is long
fince it hath been obferved of this great man, that his
"academical writings are at variance with his other works;
"and that he may be confuted out of himſelf, and in his
66 own words."
..
Dr. Warburton expatiates largely upon the great dif-
ficulties there are in getting to Cicero's real fentiments.
I fhall mention only two of them, and in his own words:
"A fourth difficulty arifes from Tully's purpofe in writ-
❝ing his works of philofophy; which was, not to deliver
"his own opinion on any point of Ethics or Metaphy-
"fics; but to explain to his Countrymen in the moſt
"intelligible manner, whatſoever the Greeks had taught
"concerning them. In the execution of which defign,
"no fect could fo well ferve his turn as the New Academy,
"whofe principle it was, not to interfere with their own api-
"nions, &c. But the principal difficulty proceeds from the
feveral and various characters he ſuſtained in his life and
"writings; which habituated him to feign and diffem-
<<
ble his opinions. Here (though he acted neither a
"weak nor an unfair part) he becomes perfectly infcru-
"table. He may be confidered as an orator, a ſtateſ-
"man, and a philofopher; characters all equally per-
66
C
fonated, and no one more the real man than the other;
"but each of them taken up and laid down, for the oc-
cafion. This appears from the numerous inconfiften-
"cies we find in him throughout the courſe of his ſuſ-
66
taining
1
308 Of the RISE and FALL of the
'
1
had upon their manners by their violation of
publick faith, and contempt for the moſt ſa-
cred tyes of religion. Trüft, fays Polybius,
"taining them, &c." And afterwards, p. 171. the Dr.
adds,- "We meet with numbers of the like contra-
"dictions delivered in his own perfon, and under his
"philofophical character;" of which he gives us feveral
inftances. In the note upon the word Perfonated, p. 169,
the Dr. obferves; "that as a philofopher, his end
"and defign in writing was not to deliver his own opi-
"nion; but to explain the Grecian philofophy; on
"which account he blames thofe as too curious, who
"were for having his own fentiments. In purfuance of
"his defign, ha brings in Stoics, Epicureans, Platonifts,
"Academics, New and Old, in order to inftruct the
"Romans in their various opinions, and feveral ways of
"reaſoning. But whether it be himſelf or others that
"are brought upon the ftage, it is the Academic not Ci-
"cero; it is the Stoic, the Epicurean, not Balbus, nor
"Velleius, who deliver their opinions." See Warbur-
ton's Divine Legation, part 2. book 3. laft edition, where
the character of Cicero, as drawn by that very learned
and able writer, p. 165, &c. is the best clue I know of
to guide us through his philofophical works. See alfo,
Critical Inquiry into the Opinions and Practice of the an-
cient philofophers, paffim.
Οἱ τὰ κοινὰ χειρίζοντες παρὰ μὲν τοῖς Ἐλλήσιν, ἐαν τάλαντον
μόνον πιστευθῶσιν ἀντιγραφεῖς ἔχονλης δέκα, και (φραγίδας τοσαύτας,
καὶ μάρτυρας διπλασίες, ο δυνανται τηρεῖν τὴν πίστιν, παρὰ δὲ Ρω-
μαίοις, κατὰ τὲ τὰς ἀρχὰς καὶ πρεσβείας πολὺ τὶ πλῆθα χρημάτων
χειρίζοντες δὲ αὐτῆς τῆς κατὰ τὸν ὄρκον πίστεως, τηρᾶσι τὸ καθῆκον.
Polyb. lib. 6. p. 693.
I have called ärryfapis, Notary-publick, becauſe that
office anfwers the idea much better, in my opinion, than
Contrarotulator, from which may poffibly be derived our
Comptroller, which, I think, is by no means what is
here meant. ·
but
ANCIENT REPUBLICKS.
309
but a fingle talent to a Greek, who has been
uſed to finger the publick money, and though
you have the fecurity of ten counterparts,
drawn up by as many publick notaries, back-
ed by as many feals, and the teſtimony of
twice as many witneffes, yet, with all theſe
precautions, you cannot poffibly prevent him
from proving a rogue. Whilft the Romans,
who, by their various offices, are intrufted
with large fums of the publick money, pay
fo confcientious a regard to the religion of
their office-oath, that they were never known
to violate their faith, though reſtrained only
by that ſingle tye. How greatly they devi-
ated from this rectitude of manners, after
thefe infidel tenets had taken root amongſt
them, we may learn from Cicero, in his ora-
tions and epiftles. Salluft too will inform
us, how extremely common the crime of per-
jury was grown, in that fevere reproach, which
Lucius Philippus, a Patrician, makes to Le-
pidus, the Conful, before the whole Senate,
That he neither ftood in awe of men or
Gods, whom he had fo frequently injured,
and defied by his villanies and perjuries.
2 Polybius gives it as his real opinion, that
nothing
X 3
Te neque hominum neque Deorum pudet, quos per-
fidia & perjurio violàfti. Sall. Fragm. Orat. L. Phil.
Cont. Lep. p. 146.
* Μεγίστην δὲ μοι δοκεῖ διαφορὰν ἔχειν τὸ Ρωμαίων πολίτευμα
πρὸς τὸ βέλτιον ἐν τῇ περὶ θεῶν διαλήψει· καὶ μοὶ δοκεῖ τὸ παρα
τοῖς
C
310 of the RISE and F ALL of the
nothing fhews the fuperior excellence of the
civil Goverument of the Romans to that of
other people, fo much as thofe religious ſen-
timents with reſpect to their Gods, which
they conftantly inculcated and ſupported.
He affirms too his real fentiments to be, that
the chief fupport and preſervation of the
Roman Republick aroſe from that awful ſear
of the Gods, which was fo much ridiculed
and exploded by the Grecians. I have tak-
en the liberty to render τοῖς ἄλλοις ἄνθρώποις,
the Grecians, who are evidently pointed at
8
in
τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀνθρώποις ὀνειδίζομενον, πᾶτο συνέχειν τὰ Ρωμαίων πράγ
μαλα· λέγω δέ την δεισιδαιμονίαν. Polyb. lib. 6. p. 692.
• There is indeed little occafion for an apology for
this tranflation. The judicious critick will eafily fee,
that in this paffage there is a plain contraft drawn be-
tween the manners of the Grecians and the Romans in
the time of Polybius. The caufe of that difference this
able writer juftly afcribes to that devidaspora, or awful
fear of the Gods, fo ftrongly inculcated amongſt the Ro-
mans, and ſo much deſpiſed and ridiculed amongst the
Grecians, who were at that time greatly tinctured with
the Atheiſm of Epicurus. The inftance he felects in
proof, drawn from the very different effect of an oath up-
on the manners of thoſe two people, muft convince us
beyond a doubt, that by the words τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀνθρώποις ὄνει-
Coμevov, he plainly characteriſes his own country-
men. As by “ οἱ νῦν εἴκῃ καὶ ἀλόγως ἐκβάλλειν αὐτά,” they
who now (that is, in his time) inconfiderately and ab
furdly reject thofe great fanctions of religion, he evi-
dently points at fuch of the leading men amongst the
Romans, as in his time had embraced the pernicious te-
nets of Epicurus. For though he had ftigmatized the
Cartha-
}
ANCIENT REPUBLICKS. 311
in this paffage. For fo juft and accurate a
writer as Polybius could not be ignorant, that
the Grecians were the only people in the
world at that time, who had been debauched
into Atheiſm by the pernicious tenets of
Epicurus. Polybius firmly believed the exi-
ftence of a Deity, and the interpofition of a
divine fuperintending Providence, though he
was an enemy to fuperftition. Yet when
heobferved the good effects produced amongſt
the Romans by their religion, though carried
even to the higheſt poffible degree of fuper-
ftition, and the remarkable influence it had
upon their manners in private life, as well as
upon their publick councils, he concludes it
1
Carthaginians in mediately before for their avarice and
luft of gain, yet no man knew better than Polybius, that
the Carthaginians rather exceeded the Romans in fuper-
ftition. That they were fincere too in their belief, is
evident from that moſt horrible method, by which they
expreffed their ducida ponía, which was their frequent
facrifices of great numbers of their own children (thoſe
of the very firft families not excepted) to their God Mo-
loch, who, by the Greeks and Romans, was termed
Chronos and Saturn.
I thought this remark might not be unuſeful, becauſe
as none of the Commentators have taken any notice of
it, fo neither Cafaubon, nor any tranflator I have yet met
with, ſeems to have given me the true ſpirit and meaning
of this remarkable paffage.
* Ἐπὶ τοῦτοι γὰρ ἐκεῖραγώθηκαν καὶ παρεισῆκται τόσο τὸ μέρος
παρ' αὐτοῖς εἴς τε τῆς κατ' ἰδίαν βίος, καὶ τὰ κοινὰ τῆς πόλεως, ώσε
μὴ καταλιπεῖν ὑπερβόλην. Ibid.
J
X 4
to
312
Of the RISE and FALL of the
x
to be the refult of a wife and confummate
policy in the ancient Legiſlators. He there-
fore very juftly cenfures thofe as wrong-head-
ed, and wretchedly bungling politicians, who
at that time endeavoured to eradicate the fear
of an after-reckoning, and the terrors of a
hell, out of the minds of a people. Yet how
few years ago did we fee this miferably miſ-
taken policy prevail in our own country,
during the whole adminiſtration of ſome late
power-engroffing minifters. Compelled at
all events to fecure a majority in Parliament
to fupport themſelves againſt the efforts of
oppofition, they found the greateſt obſtacle
to their ſchemes arife from thoſe principles
of religion, which yet remained amongſt the
people. For though a great number of the
electors were not at all averfe to the bribe, yet
their confciences were too tender to digeft
perjury. To remove this troubleſome teſt at
elections, which is one of the bulwarks of
our conftitution, would be impracticable.
To weaken or deftroy thofe principles, upon
which the oath was founded, and from
which it derived its force and obligation,
would equally anfwer the purpoſe, and de-
Διόπερ οἱ παλαιοὶ δοκέσιμοι τὰς περὶ θεῶν ἐννοίας, καὶ τὰς περὶ
τῶν ἐν ἅδε διαλήψεις ἐκ εἰκῇ καὶ ὡς ἔτυχεν εἰς τὰ πλήθη παρεισαταγεῖν.
πολὺ δὲ μᾶλλον οἱ νῦν εἰκῇ καὶ αλόγως ἐκβάλλειν αὐτὰ. Lib. 6.
·P. 693.
ftroy
1
ANCIENT REPUBLICKS.
313.
}
ftroy all publick virtue at the fame time.
The bloody and deep-felt effects of that hy-
pocrify which prevailed in the time of
Cromwell, had driven great numbers of the
ſufferers into the contrary extreme. When
therefore fo great a part of the nation was
already prejudiced againſt whatever carried
the appearance of a ſtricter piety, it is no
wonder that fhallow fuperficial reaſoners,
who have not Logic enough to diſtinguiſh
between the uſe and abuſe of a thing, ſhould
readily embrace thofe Atheiſtical tenets,
which were imported, and took root in the
voluptuous and thoughtleſs reign of Charles
the Second. But that folid learning, which
revived after the Reftoration, eafily baffled
the efforts of open and avowed Atheiſm,
which from that time has taken fhelter un-
der the lefs obnoxious name of Deifm. For
the principles of modern Deifm, when ſtript
of that diſguiſe which has been artfully thrown
over them, to deceive thofe who hate the fa-
tigue of thinking, and are ever ready to ad-
mit any conclufion in argument, which is
agreeable to their paffions, without examin-
ing the premifes, are in reality the ſame with
thofe of Epicurus, as tranfmitted to us by
Lucretius. The influence therefore, which
they had upon the manners of the Greeks
and Romans, will readily account for thofe
-effects which we experience from them in
our
314
Of the RISE and FALL of the
our own country, where they fo fatally pre-
vail. To patronize and propagate theſe prin-
ciples, was the beft expedient which the
narrow felfiſh policy of thoſe miniſters could
fuggeft. For their greateft extent of genius
never reached higher, than a fertility in tem-
porary fhifts and expedients, to ſtave off the
evil day of national account, which they fo
much dreaded. They were fenfible that the
wealth and luxury, which are the general ef-
fects of an extenfive trade in a ſtate of pro-
found peace, had already greatly hurt the
morals of the people, and ſmoothed the way
for their grand fyftem of corruption. Far
from checking this licentious fpirit of luxury
and diffipation, they left it to its full and na-
tural effects upon the manners, whilft, in or-
der to corrupt the principles of the people,
they retained, at the publick expence, a ve-
nal fet of the moſt ſhameleſs mifcreants that
ever abuſed the liberty of the prefs, or infult-
ed the religion of their country. To the ad-
miniftration of fuch minifters, which may
justly be termed the grand æra of corruption,
we owe that fatal fyftem of bribery, which
has fo greatly affected the morals of the elec-
tors in almoſt every borough in the king-
dom. To that too we may juftly attribute
the prefent contempt and difregard of the fa-
cred obligation of an oath, which is the
ftrongest bond of fociety, and the beft fecu-
rity and fupport of civil
government.
I have
ANCIENT REPUBLICKS.
315
I
I have now, I hope, fatisfactorily account-
ed for that rapid and unexampled degene-
racy of the Romans, which brought on the
total fubverfion of that mighty Republick.
The cauſe of this fudden and violent change
of the Roman manners, has been juſt hinted
at by the fagacious Montefquieu, but, to my
great furprize, has not been duly attended to
by any one hiſtorian I have yet met with.
I have fhewed too, how the fame caufe has
been working the fame effects in our own
nation, as it invariably will in every country
where thofe fatally deftructive principles are
admitted. As the real end of all hiſtory is
inſtruction, I have held up a juft portrait of
the Roman manners, in the times immedi-
ately preceding the lofs of their liberty, to
the inſpection of my countrymen, that they
may guard in time againſt thofe calamities,
! I have been favoured with the following remark
upon this paffage.- "I have lately met with an obfcure
book, entitled, Chriftian Morals, and Chriftian Pru-
dence, by John Lawrence, M. A. rector of Yelvertofi,
"Northamptonshire, printed for Knapton, 1717, in which
cc
are theſe words:--But as ſoon as Epicurus and his
"followers began to weaken the foundation principles
❝of religion, by calling them in queſtion, all manner of
❝ immorality came rolling in like a mighty torrent, and
"threw down the banks of law and fobriety." The
book indeed I never heard of before, and as I have not the
honour to know the gentleman who fent me the remark,
I take this opportunity of returning him thanks for his
very obliging letter.
which
316 Of the RISE and FALL of the
which will be the inevitable confequence of
the like degeneracy. The unpromifing af-
pect of our affairs, at the time of the fudden
and unexpected alliance between the houſes
of Bourbon and Auftria, gave the firſt riſe
to theſe reflections. But as the interefts and
fituation of this kingdom, with refpect to
France, are ſo greatly analogous to thoſe of
Carthage with reſpect to Rome, I ſhall pro-
ceed to compare the different manners, po-
licy, and military conduct of thofe two ri-
val nations. By thus comparing the differ-
ent policy of thefe warlike people, whofe
views and interefts were as diametrically op-
pofite, and as irreconcileable as thofe of Great
Britain and France, we may learn the ſupe-
rior advantages which each enjoyed, and the
different difadvantages arifing from their dif-
ferent policy, which each people laboured
under, during their long and inveterate con-
tefts. The refult, which I moft fincerely wifh
from this inquiry, is, that we may avoid
thofe egregious blunders on the fide of the
Romans, which reduced them to the very
brink of ruin, and thofe more capital defects
on the part of the Carthaginians, which ter-
minated in the utter deſtruction of their very
being as a people.
CHA P..
ANCIENT REPUBLICKS.
317
CHA P. VII.
CARTHAGINIANS and ROMANS Compared.
HE origin of both theſe people ſeems
TH alike to have been extremely low.
Romulus, according to Dionyfius of Hali-
carnaffus, could form no more than three
thouſand foot and three hundred horfe out
of his whole people, where every individual
was obliged to be a foldier. The Tyrians,
who accompanied Dido in her flight from
her brother Pygmalion, could be but few in
number from the very circumſtances of their
eſcape from an avaritious and vigilant Ty-
rant.
Romulus, to fupply this defect, not only
opened an aſylum for all fugitives, whom he
admitted as fubjects, but in all his conqueſts
over the neighbouring States, annexed the
lands to his own ſmall territory, and incor-
porated the priſoners amongſt his own Ro-
man citizens. By this maſterly policy, not-
withſtanding the number of men he must
neceſſarily have loft during a warlike reign of
thirty-feven years, he left at his death, ac-
cording to Dionyfius, forty-five thoufand
foot and a thouíand horſe. As the fame
policy
1
3
318 Of the RISE and FALL of the
policy was purfued under the Republican as
under the regal government, the Romans,
though involved in continual wars, found
themſelves not inferior in number even to
thoſe nations, who were reputed the moſt
populous. Dionyfius, from whom I have
taken this account, extols the policy of the
Romans in this point as greatly fuperior to
that of the Grecians. The Spartans, ſays that
judicious hiftorian, were obliged to give up
their dominion over Greece by their ſingle
defeat at Leuctra; as the lofs of the battle
of Charonea reduced the Thebans and A-
thenians to the fad neceffity of yielding up
the government of Greece, as well as their
liberty, to the Macedonians. Theſe misfor-
tunes Dionyfius imputes to the miſtaken
policy of the Grecians, who were, in ge-
neral, unwilling to communicate the pri-
viléges of their refpective States to fo-
reigners. Whereas the Romans, who ad-
mitted even their enemies to the rights of
citizenſhip, derived additional ſtrength even
from their misfortunes. And he affirms, that
after the terrible defeat at Cannæ, where out
of eighty-fix thouſand little more than three
thouſand three hundred and feventy men ef-
caped, the Romans owed the preſervation of
their State, not to the benevolence of for-
tune, as fome, he fays, imagine, but to the
number of their difciplined Militia, which
enabled
1
:
ANCIENT REPUBLICKS.
319
enabled them to encounter every danger. I
am fenfible that the remarks of Dionyfius,
which have been adopted by many of our
modern writers, are extremely juſt in rela-
tion to the Thebans and Athenians. Be-
cauſe as the former of thefe people endea-
voured to extend their dominions by arms,
the latter both by arms and commerce, both
States ought, like the Romans, to have at-
tracted as many foreigners as poffibly they
could, to enable them to execute plans which
require an inexhauftible fupply of people.
But the exclufion of foreigners ought not,
in my opinion, to be cenfured as a defect in
the Spartan conftitution. Becauſe it is evi-
dent, from the teftimony of Polybius and
Plutarch, that the great end which Lycur-
gus propoſed by his laws, was not to increaſe
the wealth and power of his countrymen,
but to preſerve the purity of their manners:
as his military regulations, according to the
fame authors, were not calculated for mak-
ing conquefts and ferving the purpoſes of
ambition, but for the defence and fecurity
of his Republick. I obferve too, in proof of
my opinion, that the Spartans gradually loſt
their virtue, and afterwards their liberty,
only ſo far as they deviated from the infti-
tutions of their legiflator-But I return
from the digreffion into which this fubject
unavoidably led me.
In
*
320
Of the RISE and F ALL of the
1
In our reſearches back into the remote
times of antiquity, we muft lay hold of
whatever helps we are able to meet with. If
Juftin therefore is to be credited, Dido not
only received confiderable affiſtance from a
colony of Tyrians which ſhe found ſettled in
Utica, but admitted great numbers of the
natives who ſettled with her in the new city,
and confequently became Carthaginians. I
may add too, in proof of this account, that
unleſs the Carthaginians had long purſued
this wife policy, it is ſcarce poffible, by the
courſe of nature, that the Tyrians alone
could have multiplied by propagation to fo
prodigious a degree, as to be able to furniſh
men fufficient to raiſe and carry on that ex-
tenſive commerce, and plant thoſe nume-
rous colonies which we meet with in the
earlier ages of their hiſtory.
As to their conſtitution, Rome and Car-
thage were both Republicks, both free, and
their form of Government nearly fimilar, as
far as we can collect from hiftory. Two
Supreme Magiftrates, annually elected, the
Senate, and the people, formed the body po-
litick in each Republick. The annual elec-
tions of their chief magiftrates, were a per-
2
I
Juftin. lib. 18. c. 5.
Termed confuls by the Romans, Sufetes by the Car-
thaginians.
manent
1
ANCIENT REPUBLICKS.
321
manent fource of divifion and faction alike
in both; a defect which Lycurgus guarded
againſt in the Spartan government, where
the chief magiftracy was perpetual and he-
reditary. The Senate in both nations was
compofed out of the moſt refpectable and
greateſt men in each Republick. At Rome
the Confuls choſe the Senators with the ap-
probation of the people, but at laſt the Cen-
fors arrogated that power to themſelves. At
Carthage, as Ariftotle informs us, the Sena-
tors were elected; but as he has no where
told us who were the electors, it is moſt pro-
bable, that the right of election was the in-
herent privilege of the people, fince he cen-
fures that Republick as too much leaning
towards Democracy. At Rome, in the vir-
tuous times of that Republick, birth and
merit alone intitled the poffeffor to a place in
the Senate, as well as the chief offices in
the State. At Carthage, though birth and
merit ſeem to have been qualifications indif-
penfably neceffary, yet even theſe could
not fucceed, unleſs the candidate was at the
fame time mafter of fuch a fortune as would
enable him to ſupport his dignity with 'luf-
I
Οὐ γὰρ μόνον ἀρισίνδην, ἀλλὰ καὶ πλεῖίνδην οἴοντας δεῖν αἱμεῖσθαι
rès apxolas. Arift. de Repub. lib. 2. p. 334. c. 11.
τὲς ἄρχονίας.
2
Αἱρονται γὰς εἰς δύο ταῦτα βλέπονες (τὴν πλείον, fcil. καὶ τὴν
ἀρετήν) και μάλισα τὰς μεγίσας, τὰς τε Βασιλεῖς καὶ τὰς τρατηγές.
Ibid. p. 335.
Y
tre.
322 Of the RISE and FALL of the
1
tre. This Ariftotle cenfures as a defect. For
he looks upon all that merit, which was un-
fupported by the proper proportion of wealth,
as fo much loft to the Carthaginians; and he
lays down that maxim in their Government,
as the real caufe of that undue reſpect for
wealth, and that luft of gain, which pre-
vailed fo much in that Republick. But the
fentiments of this philofopher, like thofe of
his maſter Plato, are, I fear, too ideal to be
reduced to practice. For he does not feem
to attend to the different genius of different
nations, but aims at adjuſting the balance
of power in his Republick by the nice ſtand-
ard of philofophick theory. The genius of
nations differs perhaps as much as their cli-
mate and fituation, which feem (at leaſt in
fome degree) to be the natural cauſe of that
difference. The Republicks of Sparta and
Rome were both military, and military glory.
ſtamped the primary character of both thefe
people. The Republick of Carthage, like
that of their anceſtors, the Tyrians, was
commercial. Hence the luft of gain marked
their ruling character. Their military cha-
racter aroſe from the neceffity of defending
that wealth which their commerce had ac-
quired. Hence military glory was but a fe-
condary paffion, and generally fubfervient to
their luft of gain. Unlefs we attend to the
different ruling paffion, which forms the dif-
ferent
ANCIENT REPUBLICKS.
323
ferent character of each Republick, we ſhall
never be able to make fuch a compariſon as
will do equal juftice to each people. At
Sparta and Rome wealth was defpifed, when
put in competition with honour, and poverty
joined with merit formed the moſt eftimable
of all characters. Quite different maxims
prevailed at Carthage. Wealth with them
was the chief ſupport of merit, and nothing
was fo contemptible as poverty. Hence the
Carthaginians, who were well acquainted
with the power and influence of wealth, re-
quired the additional qualification of an am-
ple fortune in all candidates for the fenato-
rial dignity, and publick employments. For
they judged that fuch men would be leſs ex-
poſed to the temptations of corruption, and
at the fame time more anxious for the wel-
fare of a State in which they were fo deeply
intereſted by their private property. That
this was the real ftate of the cafe, at Car-
thage, notwithſtanding the fuggeftions of
Ariftotle and the Greek and Roman hiſto-
rians, may, I think, be fairly proved from
the behaviour of their Senate and the choice.
of their officers, which ought certainly to
be admitted as the beft evidence. For we
conftantly find all their publick employments
filled up with men of the greateft families,
and, unleſs when the intrigues of faction
fometimes prevailed, of the greateſt abilities.
Y 2
We
324
Of the RISE and FALL of the
We find in general the fame firm and ſteady
attachment to the fervice of their country,
and the fame indefatigable zeal for extend-
ing the territories and power of their Re-
publick. Nor does the moſt partial hiftorian
charge any one of them with facrificing the
honour and intereft of his country to any
foreign power for money: a practice which
was fhamefully common amongſt the Ro-
man Generals in the time of Jugurtha.
Hence we may, I think, affign the true rea-
fon, why the greateſt families in Carthage,
as we are informed by hiſtorians, thought it
no way derogatory to their honour to en-
gage in commerce. For as this is moſt pro-
bably to be underſtood of the younger fons
of their nobility, the true motive feems to
arife, not from avarice, as their enemies ob-
ject, but from a view of raiſing ſuch a for-
tune, as might qualify them for admiffion
into the Senate, or any of the great employ-
ments. Hence too it is evident, that a re-
gulation which might be highly uſeful and
falutary, in an opulent commercial Repub-
lick, would be greatly injurious to fuch mi-
litary Republicks as Rome and Sparta, by
corrupting their manners. We need no other
proof than the fate of thoſe two Republicks,
who both owed their ruin to the introduc-
tion of that wealth, which was unknown to
their virtuous anceſtors. The Carthagi-
nian Senate feems to have been much more
numerous
ANCIENT REPUBLICKS.
325
numerous than the Roman. 'For at Car-
thage there was a felect ftanding committee
eſtabliſhed, of one hundred and four of the
moſt reſpectable members, to keep a watch-
ful eye over the great families, and reprefs
any attempts which their ambition might
make to fubvert the conſtitution. To this
committee all their commanding officers by
fea and land, without exception, were ob-
liged to give a ſtrict account of their conduct
at the end of every campaign. We may
therefore properly term it the Carthaginian
court-martial. Out of this venerable body
another felect committee was formed of five
members only, who were moft confpicuous
for their probity, ability, and experience.
Thefe ferved without fee or falary; as
glory, and the love of their country, were
efteemed motives fufficient to engage men
of their fuperior rank, and character, to
ſerve the publick with zeal and fidelity. For
which reaſon they were not choſen by lot,
but elected by merit. Their power was very
2
:
I
Ἔχει δὲ πολιτεία τῶν Καρχηδονίων παραπλήσια τη Λακωνική
πολιτεία τὰ μὲν (υσσίτια τῶν ἐταιρῶν τοῖς φιδιτιοίς τὴν δὲ τῶν ἐκαλὸν
καὶ τετλάρων ἀρχὴν, τοῖς Εφόροις, πλὴν ἐν χεῖρον. Οἱ μὲν γὰρ, ἐκ τῶν
τυχόντων εἰσὶ. Ταύτην δ᾽ αἰρῦνται τὴν ἀρχὴν αριστίνδην. Ibid. P. 334.
2 Τὸ δ' αμίσθες καὶ μὴ κληρωτὰς άριςοκρατικὸν θετέον, καὶ εἴτε
τοιῦτον ἔτερον. Ibid.
Y 3
ex-
326 Of the RISE and F ALL of the
1
2
2
extenfive. Their office was for life, and
they filled up any vacancy in their own body,
out of the one hundred and four, and all
vacancies in that grand committee, out of
the reſt of the Senate, by their own autho-
rity, and at their own difcretion. They were
the fupreme judges, befides, in all caufes
whatſoever without appeal. The inftitution
of this grand committee, in my opinion, ex-
ceeded every thing in the Roman policy.
For it preferved their State from all thoſe
violent concuffions, which fo frequently
ſhook, and at laſt totally fubverted the Ro-
man Republick. But the power of the
committee of five was exorbitant, and dan-
gerous to the lives and fortunes of their fel-
low-citizens. The proof is from fact. For
at the conclufion of the ſecond Punick war,
they had made ſo arbitrary an uſe of their
power, and were grown fo odious to the
people, that the great Hannibal regulated
that amongſt other abuſes, and procured a
-Τὸ δὲ τὰς πελαρχίας κυρίας ἔσας πολλῶν καὶ μεγάλων, ὑφ᾽
αὐτῶν αἱρετὰς εἶναι, καὶ τὴν τῶν ἑκατὸν ταύτας αἱρεσθαι τὴν μεγίςην
ἀρχὴν. ἔτι δὲ ταύτας πλείονα ἄρχειν χρόνον τῶν ἄλλων (καὶ γὰρ
ἐξεληλυθότες ἄρχεσι, καὶ μέλλονες) ὀλιγαρχικόν. Ibid.
* Σημεῖον δὲ πολιτείας συντελαγμένης, τὸ τὸν δῆμον ἔχεσαν,
διαμένειν ἐν τῇ τάξει τῆς πολιτείας, καὶ μηλεςάσιν, ὅτι γὰρ ἄξιοῖν εἰπεῖν,
γε ενῆσθαι, μήτε Τύραννον. Ibid.
law,
ANCIENT REPUBLICKS. 327
law, which made that office annual and
elective, with a claufe forbidding any future
alteration. Whether the Carthaginian Se-
nators enjoyed their feats for life, or whether
they were liable to be expelled for any mif-
demeanour, and by whom, are points in
which hiſtory is quite filent. At Rome, as
the cenfors had the power of promoting to
that dignity, fo they had equally the power
of expelling any member for bad manners,
by the fingle ceremony of leaving out his
name when they called over the lift of the
Senate. I cannot help thinking this a great
defect in the Roman polity: fince it threw
the power of garbling and modelling the
Senate into the hands of two men, who
were liable to be corrupted to ferve the ends
of faction. A power which ought never to
be lodged in fo few hands in a country which
enjoys the bleffings of liberty. For how
ſerviceable foever it might have been, as a
curb to licentiouſneſs in the earlier ages of
that Republick; yet Cicero, in his Oration
for A. Cluentius, inveighs bitterly againſt the
abuſe of the cenforial power in his time, and
gives feveral inftances where it was made
fubfervient to the ends of faction in model-
ling the Senate. And he ſeems to fear that
the cenfors lift may bring as many calamities
upon the citizens as the late moſt inhuman
profcription; and that the point of the cen-
Y 4
fors
328 Of the RISE and F ALL of the
fors pen may prove as terrible as the fword
of their late Dictator. C. Nepos, in the life
of Hamilcar, takes notice of an officer of the
fame nature amongſt the Carthaginians, to
whofe inſpection the greateſt men in that
Republick ſeem to have been fubject. But
it does not appear from hiftory, whether his
power extended fo far as to expel a Senator.
Should a bad prince, or a wicked miniſter,
ever be inveſted with the power of weeding
the houſe, and modelling a parliament at
pleaſure, there would be an end of our con-
ftitution and liberty.
In the Roman Senate all queftions were
decided (as in our parliament) by a majority
of voices. At Carthage no law could pafs,
unlefs the Senate were unanimous, like the
Polish diet. One fingle Veto from any one
member, took the queftion out of the hands
of the Senate, and gave up the ultimate de-
cifion to the people, who were the dernier
reſſort
reffort of all power. This Ariſtotle cen-
fures as inclining more towards Democracy
I
* Τὸ μὲν, προσάγειν, τὸ δὲ μὴ προσάγειν πρὸς τὸν δῆμον, οἱ
Βασιλεῖς κύριοι μετὰ τῶν γερόντων, ἂν ὁμογνωμονῶσι πάντες. εἰ δὲ μὴ,
καὶ τέτων ὁ δῆμα. "Α δὲ ἂν εἰσφέρωσιν ὗτοι ἐ διακᾶσαι μόνο
ἀποδιδόασι τῷ δήμῳ τὰ δόξανα τοῖς ἄρχεσιν, ἀλλὰ κύριοι κρίνειν εἰσὶ
καὶ τῷ βελομένῳ τοῖς εἰσφερομένοις. άνειπεῖν ἔξεσιν. Ὅπερ ἐν ταῖς ἐτέραις
woniletais eu est. Ibid. pag. 334.
απολιτείαις ἐκ ἔσι
than
ANCIENT REPUBLICKS.
329
than was conſiſtent with the juſt rules of a
well regulated Republick. Becauſe the ma-
giftrates were not only obliged to open all
the different opinions and debates of the
Senators upon the queſtion, in the hearing
of the people, who were the abfolute and
decifive judges in all theſe cafes of appeal;
but any one, even the loweſt fellow in the
mob, might freely give his opinion in oppo-
fition just as he thought proper. A fource
of endleſs difcord, anarchy, and confufion!
A kind of polity, as Ariftotle obferves, un-
known in any other form of Republican go-
vernment.
In this point, I think the Roman polity
far preferable to the Carthaginian, except in
thofe abuſes of the tribunitial power, which
fo frequently happened towards the decline
of that Republick. But when any one tur-
bulent, feditious tribune, inftigated by am-
bition, or corrupted by a faction (which in
thofe times was generally the cafe) could by
his fingle Veto, ftop all proceedings of the
Senate, and haul the cafe before the people;
nay, when he could drag the fupreme magi-
ftrates, the Confuls themfelves, to prifon,
by his fole authority, and could commit the
moft outrageous, and moſt ſhameful acts of
licentiouſneſs with impunity, becauſe their
office rendered their perfons facred by law,
I eſteem the Carthaginian polity infinitely
more
330
Of the RISE and FALL of the
more eligible. For that fear and jealouſy
of ceding any part of their authority, which
is fo natural to men in power, would always
be a ſtrong motive to union in a Carthagi-
nian Senate; becauſe it would naturally in-
duce any member, rather to give up his pri-
vate opinion, than fuffer an effential part of
their power to devolve to the people. But
the Roman tribunitial power, which was in
conftant oppofition to the Senatorial, drew
at laft by much too great a weight into the
Democratick ſcale, and in the laſt period of
their liberty was a principal leading cauſe of
the ruin of that Republick. For as the Se-
nate was unfupported by a third power, fo
effentially requifite to preferve the balance of
government in its due æquipoife, the Tri-
bunes perpetually fomented and kept up
thofe terrible feuds, which brought on Anar-
chy, and terminated in abfolute infupport-
able Tyranny.
The condition of the Roman populace
before the erection of the tribunitial power,
feems, in my judgment, to have been little
better than that ftate of vaffalage, which
the peaſants groan under in Poland. The
relation between Patron and Client amongſt
the Romans, feems to be fomething analo-
gous to the relation between Lord and Vaf-
fal, with this difference, that the Client had
the free choice of his patron, which the
Vaffal
1
ANCIENT REPUBLICKS.
331
Vaffal has not with reſpect to the Lord. At
leaſt it is certain, if we may credit the Ro-
man hiftorians, that their people were fub-
ject to equal, if not greater exactions and
oppreffions from the Patricians. How heavy
theſe were, we may learn from the nume-
rous mutinies, infurrections, and that great
feceffion, which compelled the Patricians to
create the tribunitial office in their favour.
This new office occafioned a great revolution
in their new government, and produced thoſe
perpetual conflicts between the Ariftocratick
and Democratick powers, which fill the hif-
tory of that Republick. The Patricians had
recourfe frequently to their only refource,
a Dictator with abfolute power, to defend
them from the infolence of the Tribunes.
But this was only a temporary expedient.
The people renewed their attacks, 'till
they had abolished the diftinct prerogatives
arifing from birth and family, and laid
open all honours, even the Confulfhip, and
Dictatorship, the fupreme magiſtracy of all,
to the free admiffion of their own body.
The people were highly elated with theſe
repeated victories, as they imagined them,
over their old enemies the Patricians; but
they were quickly fenfible, that in fact,
they were only the dupes of their ambitious
leaders. The moſt opulent and powerful of
the Plebeians, by ferving the high offices of
the
332 Of the RISE and F ALL of the
the State, acquired the title of Nobles, in
contradiftinction to thofe, who were de-
fcended from the Patrician families, who ftill
retained their ancient appellation. Thefe
new Nobles, many of whom had crept into
the Senate, fided conftantly with the Patri-
cians in all diſputes and conteſts with their
former friends, the people, and were gene-
rally their greateſt enemies. The Patricians,
ftrengthened by this new acquifition of pow-
er, were frequently too hard for the Tri-
bunes. In thoſe memorable conteſts with
the two Gracchi, who endeavoured in their
Tribuneſhip to revive the Agrarian law (cal-
culated to divide the conquered lands among
the poor citizens) the difpute feems to have
lain wholly between the rich and the poor :
for the Nobles and rich Plebeians were as
unwilling to part with their land, as the
Patricians. This ftrengthened the Patricians
fo much, that they were able in each of thoſe
conteſts, to quell the efforts of the people
by force, and quaſh the whole affair by the
death of both the Gracchi.
It has been a general remark of moſt
writers, both ancient and modern, that the
Roman Republick owed its preſervation to
the firmneſs and wiſdom of the Senate, and
the fubordinate obedience of the people:
and that the Republick of Carthage muft
afcribe its ruin to that aſcendency, which the
people
ANCIENT REPUBLIC KS. 333
people had ufurped over the authority of the
Senate. The reverfe of this feems to be
the truth. We meet with but one inſtance
in hiſtory, where the power of the Cartha-
ginian people over-ruled the authority of
their Senate, ſo far as to compel them to act
contrary to their opinion. This was that
fhameful violation of the law of nations in
feizing the tranſports which were bringing
neceffaries to Scipio's camp, during the truce
he had granted that they might ſend ambaf-
fadors to Rome to negotiate a peace with the
Roman Senate. For though they threaten-
ed violence to the Senate, if they ſubmitted
to thoſe hard terms which were impoſed by
Scipio after the defeat at Zama; yet they
were eaſily reduced to obedience by Hanni-
bal, and refigned the whole affair to the de-
cifion of the Senate. The Roman hiſtory,
on the contrary, is one continued detail of
animofities, and frequently moft bloody con-
teſts, between the Senate and the people in
their perpetual ſtruggles for power. And
the frequent elections of that low Plebeian
Marius to the confular dignity, in oppofition
to the Patricians, the malignant effects of
the overbearing power of the people, opened
that ſcene of blood and anarchy, which
ended only in the utter fubverfion of their
liberty and conſtitution.
The
334 Of the RISE and FALL of the
1
The judicious Montefquieu obferves,
"that the Carthaginians grew rich much
"fooner than the Romans, and confequent-
ly funk much ſooner into corruption."
He adds too; "that whilft merit alone en-
"titled the poffeffor to the great employ-
ments at Rome, every thing which the
public at Carthage had the power of
beftowing, was venal."--The former
part of this affertion is too general to be ad-
mitted without proper reftrictions, the latter
is a plain tranfcript from Polybius. The
Carthaginians must have been rich feveral
ages before the Romans. For both Herodo-
tus and Thucydides, (who was but thirteen
years younger) take notice of them as a very
formidable maritime power, a circumſtance
which could only arife from their naval ge-
nius and extenfive commerce. Yet we find
no inftance of their being corrupt, 'till the
conclufion of the fecond Punick war, when
Hannibal reformed thofe fhameful abufes,
which had crept into the management of the
publick revenue, and reftrained that power
which the committee of five had ufurped over
the lives and fortunes of their fellow-citi-
zens. As for the quotation out of Polybius,
whofe country was at that time a province
to the Romans, with whom he refided only
as a ſtate priſoner; I efteem it as no more
than a compliment to the Roman vanity at
the
1
ANCIENT REPUBLICKS.
335
the expence of the Carthaginians, whofe
very name was odious to that people. Or
very probably he might bring that charge
againſt the Carthaginians, as a hint to fhew
the confequences of the fame fpecies of cor-
ruption, which even in his time, had found
entrance amongst the Romans.
As to religion, both nations were equally
fuperftitious. If many of the religious ce-
remonies amongst the Romans were abfurd
and childiſh, it muſt be owned that the Car-
thaginian worſhip, like that of their an-
ceſtors the Canaanites, from whom they re-
ceived it,' was truly diabolical. But it is
by no means candid to judge of the natural
bent and temper of a people, from effects
produced in their minds by fuperftition. For
the fame fuperftition which enjoins fuch
horrid rites, will naturally place the chief
efficacy of the facrifice in the zeal and fin-
cerity of the offerer. Confequently, the
higheſt degree of merit in fuch oblations,
will confiſt in ſtifling every human affection,
and over-ruling nature. Thus in the Car-
thaginian idolatry, the fofter fex, as more
fufceptible of tenderneſs for their offspring,
The idol to whom the Carthaginians facrificed their
children was the Moloch of the Canaanites, from whom
they were lineally defcended. This idol was the Chro-
nos of the Greeks, and Saturn of the Latines.
were
336 of the RISE and F ALL of the
:
1
2
were required to attend in perfon. They
were even compelled, upon this dreadful
occafion, to affect all the joy and chearful-
nefs of feſtivity, becauſe, as Plutarch informs
us, if a figh or a tear eſcaped them, the
merit of the offering would be abfolutely
loft, and themſelves liable to a fine. That
the Carthaginians were no more void of pa-
rental affection than other nations, is evident
from that pious fraud they had fo long
practifed, of fecretly buying up poor chil-
ren, whom they ſubſtituted as victims to
their bloody deity inſtead of their own. But
after a great defeat which they received from
Agathocles, they attributed their ill fortune
to the refentment of their God for their re-
peated facrilege. They' facrificed two hun-
dred children of the firft families in Carthage,
and three hundred other perfons offered
themſelves as voluntary victims to atone
for a crime, to which the higheſt degree of
guilt was affixed by their impious religion.
The Roman fuperftition muſt in general be
acquitted of the charge of inhumanity. The
only tendency towards it, was in the cuftom
of inhuming alive ſuch of the veſtal virgins,
• Plut. de Superftit. p. 171.
2 Diodor. Sicul. lib. 20. p. 739.
3 Id. ibid.
T
as
ANCIENT
337
REPUBLICKS.
2
as had violated their vow of chaſtity'. But
the bloody and frequent fhews of the gla-
diators, which were the delight of the Ro-
mans, fix an indelible blot on the charac-
ter of a brave people. Hiftorians in general
brand the Carthaginians with cruelty and in-
humanity. If the charge is juft, it must be
chiefly attributed to that execrable cuſtom
of human facrifices, which always prevailed
amongſt that people. Nor do I 'in the leaft
doubt, but that favage ferocity, which the
Romans were fo guilty of in war, was in a
great meaſure owing to thoſe barbarous
fpectacles, where wounds, and murder in
cold blood, made the moſt agreeable part of
the entertainment.
As to publick virtue or love of their coun-
try, the Carthaginians were no way inferior
to the Romans. The intrepid behaviour of 3
This inftitution has been adopted fince, by the
Greek and Latin churches. The only difference in the
puniſhment is, that the ancient veftals were buried alive,
the modern veftals are immured between four walls.
2
Polybius informs us, that when the Romans took
a city by ftorm, they not only put all the men to the
fword, but even quartered the dogs, and hewed off the
limbs of every other living creature they found in the
place.
Πολλάκις ἰδεῖν ἐσιν ἐν ταῖς τῶν Ρωμαίων καταλήψεσι τῶν πόλεων,
ἐ μόνες τις ανθρώπες πεφονευμένες, ἀλλὰ τὰς κύνας δεδιχοτομένες
και των άλλων ζώων μέλη παρακεκομμένα. Polyb. lib. io. p. 820.
³ Salluft, de Bell. Jugurth. p. 226-27.
Z
the
338 Of the RISE and F ALL of the
the Philæni, two Carthaginian brothers, who
confented to be buried alive to inlarge the
boundaries of their country, equals the moft
heroic inftance of that kind of enthuſiaſm,
which the Roman ftory can boaſt of. The
fate of Machæus, Bomilcar, Hanno, and
others, afford undeniable proof, that neither
birth, dignity, nor the greateft fervices,
could fcreen that man from the moſt ignomi-
nious death, who made the leaſt attempt to
fubvert the liberty of his country. I have
before taken notice of the Punica fides, or
that proverbial want of fincerity, which has
been fo often objected by the Roman hif-
torians but I cannot help obferving with
the more impartial Montefquieu', "That
"the Romans never made peace with fin-
r cerity and good faith, but always took
care to infert fuch conditions as, in the
"end, proved the ruin of the people with
"whom they treated: that the peace they
granted was no more than a politick fuf-
penfion of arms, 'till an opportunity of-
"fered of compleating their conquefts:
"that it was their invariable maxim to fo-
"ment divifions among the neighbouring
"powers, and by fiding alternately with
"either party, as they found it moſt con-
"ducive to their own intereft, play one
⚫ Grandeur des Romains, p. 68, &c.
againſt
ANCIENT REPUBLICKS.
339
<6
ત
I
2
"againſt the other, 'till they had reduced
"all equally into Provinces: that they fre-
quently employed the fubtilty and ambi-
guity of terms in their own language, to
"fineffe and chicane in their treaties." Thus
they cheated the Ætolians by the ambiguous
phraſe of yielding themſelves up to the
faith of the Roman people. The poor to-
lians imagined, that the term implied only
alliance. But the Romans foon convinced
them, that what they meant by it, was ab-
folute fubjection. They deftroyed Carthage
under fanction of the moſt vile equivocation,
pretending, "that though they promifed
that deluded people to preſerve their State,
they did not mean to grant them their city,
which word they had purpofely omitted.'
Maxims which the French have fteadily
and too fucceſsfully purfued, and are ftill
purſuing!--Montefquieu very judiciouſly
obferves, "That the Romans were ambi-
tious from the luft of domination: the Car-
thaginians from the luft of gain." This ac-
counts for the different reception which
commerce met with in the two nations. At
Carthage commerce was eſteemed the moft
honourable of all employments. At Rome
In fidem populi Romani fefe dedere. Vide Polyb.
Excerpt. Legat. p. 1114, 15.
2 Ibid. p. 1349, 50.
Z 2
com-
340
Of the RISE and FALL of the
L
་
commerce was held in contempt. It was
there looked upon as the proper occupation
of flaves only, and difgraceful to a free ci-
tizen. Thus the one loved war for the fake
of glory and acquiring dominion; the other
looked upon war as a means of acquiring
wealth, and extending commerce. The Ro-
mans plundered the vanquifhed enemy to
make a parade with their wealth in the tri-
umphal proceffion. The Carthaginians
fleeced not only their enemies, but their tri-
butary Provinces, and oppreffed their allies,
to feed their own private avarice, as well as
that of the publick. The oppreffions of the
Carthaginian Generals in Spain loft them all
their allies. The wifer policy of Scipio at-
tached thofe allies unalterably to the Romans.
The exactions of their rapacious Governors
in the African Provinces, was the fource of
perpetual revolts, upon the approach of any
invader, from a defire of changing mafters.
When Scipio landed, he was joined by all
thofe Provinces, who looked upon the Ro-
mans as their deliverers. As foon as lux-
ury had introduced avarice and corruption
amongſt the Romans, their Generals and Go-
vernors purfued the fame deftructive maxims,
which was one leading cauſe of the final ruin
of both the Weſtern and Eaſtern Empires.
There cannot be a ftronger proof of a
weak or a corrupt adminiſtration, than when
in-
}
ANCIENT REPUBLIC K S. 341
indigent and neceffitous men are appointed
to the government of diſtant Provinces, from
no other motive than party merit, and with
no other view than to raiſe a fortune at the
expence of the people. Whether the wretch-
ed and defencelefs condition in which the
French found our colonies at the beginning
of this war, ought not to be afcribed chiefly
to this cauſe, is a question I ſhall wave at
prefent. Becauſe the evils we have already
fuffered from former miſconduct, will, I
hope, be now removed, by a total alteration
of meaſures under an able and honeft admi-
niſtration.
It is remarkable, that not one of the hif
torians who reproach the Carthaginians with
corruption, were ever able to accuſe them of
luxury and effeminacy. The Carthaginians,
to their immortal honour, ftand fingle upon
the records of hiſtory, "the only people in
the univerſe, upon whom immenfe wealth
was never able to work its ufual effects."
The Romans, corrupted by wealth, quickly
loft all pretenfions both to publick and pri-
vate virtue, and from a race of heroes, de-
generated into a nation of the moſt abject
flaves. The Carthaginian virtue was fo far
from degenerating that it fhone brighter in
the laſt period of their hiſtory, than in any
of the former. Even the behaviour of their
women in that long and brave defence of
Z 3
their
342 Of the RISE and F ALL of the
I
their city againſt the whole Roman power,
equalled, or rather exceeded that of the Ro-
man matrons in thoſe times, when they were
moſt celebrated for publick virtue. When
the Romans were mafters of the city, one
fmall part only excepted, and that part ac-
tually in flames, the generous wife of Af-
drubal the chief commander, cloſed the ſcene
by as deſperate an act of heroick bravery,
as can be met with in hiſtory. After the
had upbraided her huſband as a coward and
a traitor for fubmitting to Scipio, fhe de-
clared her determined refolution of dying
free, and not furviving the fate of her coun-
try. She firſt ſtabbed both her children, and
threw them into the flames; then leaped in
after their bodies, and buried herſelf in the
ruins of Carthage.
2.
The fententious Montefquieu remarks,
"That when Carthage made war with her
opulence againſt the Roman poverty, her
great difadvantage arofe from what the ef
teemed her greateſt ftrength, and on which
fhe placed her chief dependence. The rea-
fon, as he judicioufly obferves, is evident.
Gold and filver may be eafily exhauſted, but
publick virtue, conftancy, and firmneſs of
mind, fortitude and poverty, are inexhauſti-
Appian. de Bell. Pun. p. 82.
* Grandeur des Romains, p. 34-
1
ble."
1
ANCIENT REPUBLICKS. 343
ble." The Carthaginians in their wars em-
ployed foreign mercenaries. The Roman
armies were compoſed of their own natives.
A defeat or two at ſea obftructed the Cartha-
ginian commerce, and ftopped the ſpring
which fupplied their publick exchequer.
The lofs of a battle in Africa, where their
country was quite open, and deſtitute of for-
treffes, and the natives as much ſtrangers to
the ufe of arms as our own country people,
reduced them to fubmit to whatever terms
the victors thought proper to impofe. Re-
gulus, in the firſt Punick war, cooped up the
Carthaginians in their capital, after he had
given them one defeat by fea, and one by
land. The Romans, after receiving four
fucceffive defeats from Hannibal, the laft of
which was the fatal battle of Canne, where
they loft moſt of their beſt officers, and all
their veteran troops, would hearken to no
terms of accommodation, and even fent
reinforcements to Spain and other places,
though Hannibal was at their gates. The
reafon is plain. The citizens of Carthage
confifted chiefly of unarmed, and undifci-
plined tradeſmen. The citizens of Rome,
without diſtinction, compoſed a regular body
of diſciplined militia.- -A fhort compari
fon between the Roman and Carthaginian
polity, with reſpect to the military of each
people, will eaſily point out to us the true
Z 4
caufe
344
Of the RISE and F ALL of the
cauſe which gave the Romans their manifeſt
fuperiority.
I have already taken notice of fome capi-
tal defects of the Carthaginians, both in their
marine and military departments. Montef-
quieu imputes feveral capital errors to the
Romans, but he attributes their preſervation
after the defeat at Cannæ, when they were
at the very brink of ruin, to the force of
their inſtitution. He feems to place this
force in the fuperior wiſdom and firmneſs of
the Roman Senate. A fhort inquiry into
their conduct, during the fecond Punick war,
will fhew that the caufe of their prefervation
at that time muſt be afcribed to a very dif-
ferent principle, and that Monteſquieu too
haftily adopted that opinion from the Greek
and Roman hiftorians,
If we examine the boafted behaviour of
the Roman Senate, from the firft attack of
Saguntum to the memorable battle of Cannæ,
we fhall find it to confift of one continued
ſeries of blunders, which carry all the marks
of weak, factious, and divided counfels.
The Romans had certain intelligence of Han-
nibal's defign of attacking them in Italy.
This was no fecret in Spain, where every
preparation, and every motion of Hannibal's
was directed to that point of view. The
Romans were certainly jealous of fuch a de-
fign, when they fent ambaffadors to Hanni-
bal,
ANCIENT REPUBLICKS. 345
bal, to inform him, that if he paffed the
Iberus, and attacked the Saguntines, they
ſhould look upon it as a declaration of war.
When they had received an evaſive anſwer
from Hannibal, they croffed over to Africa,
and made the fame declaration to the Car-
thaginian Senate. When Hannibal laid fiege
to Saguntum, did the Romans act up to their
formidable declaration, or did they ſend a
fingle man to the affiftance of thofe faithful
allies? Juft the reverſe: They wafted nine
months, the time the fiege lafted, in uſeleſs
debates, and fruitleſs embaffies. They facri-
ficed that faithful and heroick people, toge-
ther with their own intereft and character,
by their folly and irrefolution. For if they
had fent a powerful army at firft, they might
have faved Saguntum, or at leaſt confined the
war to Spain, and prevented it from penetrat-
ing into their own bowels. After Hannibal
had laid Saguntum in aſhes, did the boaſted
wifdom and firmnefs of the Roman Senate
2
When the Roman ambaffadors, foon after the lofs
of Saguntum, follicited an alliance with the Volficani, a
people of Spain, that people feemed aſtoniſhed at the ef-
frontery of the Romans, and bid them go and ſeek for
allies amongſt thoſe nations who had never heard of the
deftruction of Saguntum, which, as they affured them,
would be a melancholy, and ftriking warning to the Spa-
niards how they ever placed any confidence in the good
faith and friendſhip of the Romans. Liv. lib. 21. c. 19.
P. 144.
ap-
346 Of the RISE and FALL of the
appear in more vigorous or more politick
meaſures? They again employed a whole
winter in a wife embaffy to Carthage, to juſt
as little purpoſe as the former, and gave Han-
nibal all the time he could wish to prepare
for his expedition. When Hannibal was on
his march for Italy, inſtead of ſhutting up
the paffages of the Alps, which would eaſily
have defeated that daring enterprize, they
ordered the Conful Scipiò, with his army, to
oppoſe his paffage over the Rhone. The
Conful' came juft time enough to learn, that
fuch dilatory meaſures would never check
the progrefs of fo active and vigilant an ene-
my, who had already paffed that river, and
was on his march for the Alps. The Conful
immediately reimbarked his troops, and haf-
tened to meet him in his deſcent from thoſe
mountains. But Hannibal was already near
the banks of the Po, where the Conful at-
tacked him, but was defeated and dangerouſly
wounded. The Senate, alarmed at Hanni-
bal's paffage over the Alps, which they had
taken no precaution to prevent, ſent in a
great fright for the other Conful Sempronius,
with his army, out of Sicily. He arrived, and
joined his wounded colleague Scipio, who
was an able officer, and having learnt, by ex-
périence, how dangerous an enemy they had
1
Polyb. lib. 3. p. 270, et feq.
to
ANCIENT REPUBLICKS.
347
1
to cope with, adviſed caution and prudence
in all their operations. But Sempronius,
vain, rafh, and ignorant, was deaf to all falu-
tary advice, which he ridiculed as the effect
of fear. Hannibal, who never inquired into
the number of his enemies, but ſtudied only
the foibles of their commanders, directed all
his operations upon that principle. He
He ap-
plied therefore to the foible of Sempronius,
which he was foon mafter of, drew him into
a fnare, and cut off almoft his whole army.
The Senate was dreadfully frighted at this
fecond defeat; but to mend the matter, they
fuffered Flaminius, a man more vain, more
headſtrong, and more rafh than Sempronius,
to be choſen Conful, and fent againſt Han-
nibal. Flaminius fared much worſe than
Sempronius. As he acted upon the ſame
principles, he run headlong into the trap
laid for him by his artful enemy, and loft his
life together with his whole army. Though
this terrible blow threw the Romans into in-
expreffible confternation, yet it ſeems to have
brought them to their fenfes. For they at
laft created the celebrated Fabius Dictator,
who was the only Roman commander ca-
pable of oppofing Hannibal. Yet even here
they could not help giving another inſtance
of their folly, by forcing Minucius upon him
for his general of horſe, a man of the fame
character with Sempronius or Flaminius.
4
Fabius
348 Of the RISE and FALL of the
Fabius acted upon a quite different plan. He
knew the danger and folly of oppoſing new
raiſed troops to veterans, fluſhed with repeat-
ed victories, and commanded by fo confum-
mate a General. He therefore oppoſed art
to art, watched every motion of his enemy,
and cut off his foragers. Hannibal, whoſe
army was compofed chiefly of foldiers of for-
tune out of different nations, connected to
him by no other tye than the hopes of plun-
der, and their efteem for his perfonal abi-
lities, was fenfible, that fuch a conduct in
his enemy would quickly put an end to all
his hopes in Italy. He tried therefore every
art he was maſter of to bring Fabius to a
battle; but the wary Roman convinced him,
that he knew his trade too well to deviate
from that plan, which alone could fave his
country. Though Hannibal did juſtice to
thoſe fine ſtrokes of his antagoniſt, yet they
were too delicate for the eyes of the Ro-
mans. They were diſguſted at his conduct,
becauſe they wanted capacity to underſtand
it, and gave credit to the idle boaſts of Minu-
cius, though they had already ſuffered ſo ſe-
verely by truſting men of his genius. Yet,
by the moſt unaccountable folly, they raiſed
Minucius to an equality of power with Fa-
bius; and Rome, for the first time, faw two
Dictators veſted with unlimited authority.
The wifer Fabius, though amazed at the
ftu-
1
1
ANCIENT REPUBLICKS.
349
ftupidity of his countrymen, adhered fteadily
to his firſt plan. He gave up half the army
to the command of his new colleague, but
was determined to preferve the other moiety
at leaſt, upon which fo much depended.
Hannibal was fenfible, that the Romans could
not have done him a more effential piece of
ſervice, unleſs they had recalled Fabius. He
immediately threw out a bait for Minucius,
which that raſh, unthinking commander as
greedily bit at. He fell into the trap laid for
him by the crafty Hannibal; was enveloped
by the Carthaginians, and muft inevitably
have periſhed, with all the troops under his
command, if Fabius had not flown to his
affiſtance, repulfed the enemy, and reſcued
him from the moſt imminent danger of death
or captivity. Though Fabius had been fo
ill uſed by his countrymen in general, and by
his colleague Minucius in particular, yet he
fhewed, by this generous action, a greatneſs
of foul fuperior to private refentment, and
every ſelfiſh paffion, which he was always
ready to facrifice to the publick welfare. Mi-
nucius indeed felt the force of the obligation,
as well as of his own incapacity: he nobly
acknowledged it in the ſtrongeſt terms, and
returned to his former poſt and duty to his
abler Commander. But this heroick beha-
viour of Fabius feems to have made no more
impreffion upon his countrymen, than his
maf-
350 Of the RISE and FALL of the
maſterly conduct. Two new Confuls were
chofen, to whom he refigned his authority
and army, and retired to Rome neglected and
unemployed. The new Confuls followed the
advice of Fabius, and avoided coming to ac-
tion, which diftreffed Hannibal extremely.
But the following year exhibits fuch a maf-
terpiece of folly and ſtupidity in that Roman
Senate, whofe firmnefs and wifdom are fo
much boaſted of by hiſtorians, and fuch in-
fatuation in the body of the Roman people,
as would ſeem incredible, if the facts, as
handed down to us by their own hiſtorians
themſelves, did not prove it beyond a poffi-
bility of doubt or contradiction. Determin-
ed to drive Hannibal out of Italy, and put a
ſpeedy end to fo ruinous a war, they raiſed
one of the mightieft armies they had ever
yet brought into the field, and employed in
it every officer of note or diftinction at that
time in Rome, the great Fabius alone ex-
cepted. This was the laft ftake of the Ro-
mans, upon which their all was ventured.
But where does the boaſted wiſdom of the
Senate appear in the management of this af-
fair, which was of the laft importance? Of
the two Confuls, Paulus Æmilius, the one,
was a reſpectable man, and an experienced
officer: Terentius Varro, the other, was a
fellow of the loweft extraction, who, by
noiſe and impudence had raiſed himſelf to
the
ANCIENT REPUBLICKS.
35I
the Tribuneſhip, was afterwards made Præ-
tor, and, by the affiftance of one Bebius,
his relation, at that time a Tribune of the
people, had forced himſelf into the conſular
dignity. This wretch, who had but juſt ta-
lents fufficient for a captain of the mob,
who had never ſeen an action (nor perhaps
an army) in his life, had the impudence to
cenfure the conduct of Fabius, and to boaſt
in the Senate, that he would immediately
drive Hannibal out of Italy. The wife Se-
nate were not only fo weak as to believe,
but, in oppofition to all the remonftrances
of Fabius, even to truft fuch an empty cox-
comb with an equal ſhare in the command.
They even gave the Confuls orders to fight
the enemy without delay, fo great was their
confidence in the gafconading Varro. Han-
nibal at that time was fo greatly diſtreſſed for
want of provifions, that his Spaniſh troops
begun to mutiny, and talked openly of re-
volting to the Romans, and he himſelf had
thoughts of retiring into Gaul for his own
perfonal fafety. Æmilius, who endeavoured
in every point to follow the advice of Fa-
bius, declined fighting, and was convinced
by his intelligence, that Hannibal could not
fubfift his troops above ten days longer. But
Varro was alike deaf to reafon or perfuafion.
Debates at laſt run fo high between the Con-
fuls, that repeated expreffes were ſent to the
Se-
352 Of the RISE and F ALL of the
Senate by Æmilius for freſh orders. Had the
Senate acted with that prudence, which has
been fo loudly celebrated by hiftorians, they
would certainly have created Fabius Dictator
at that critical juncture, which would have
put an end to the differences and authority
of the Confuls. For how could they reaſon-
ably hope for fucceſs, whilſt the army was
commanded by two Generals, vefted with
equal power, who differed as widely in opi-
nion as in temper? But their chief view at
I
that
• It has been aſked for what reaſon? I anſwer,
Livy will inform us in the 22d book of his hiftory..
"The ſtudied delay of Fabius (who induſtriouſly avoid-
ed fighting) which, according to that hiftorian, gave
fuch juſt cauſe of uneafinefs to Hannibal, was treated.
at Rome with the utmoſt contempt by the citizens of
every rank both military and civil; particularly after
the General of the Horfe Minucius had gained fome
flight advantage over Hannibal during his abfence."--
He adds, "that two unlucky incidents concurred to aug-
ment the diſpleaſure of the citizens against the dictator.
One was, the artful behaviour of Hannibal; who
wafted all the country around with fire and fword, the
Eftate of Fabius alone excepted, which he carefully
preſerved, in hopes that fuch a different treatment might
be thought the effect of fome clandeftine correfpondence
between the two Commanders."-The other was,
his fettling an exchange of priſoners with Hannibal by
his own proper authority, and by the fame cartel which
had fubfifted between the Roman and Carthaginian
Generals in the firft Punick war. By that it was agreed:
that if any prisoners fhould remain on either fide, after
the exchange of man for man was finifhed, fuch pri-
foners
ANCIENT REPUBLICKS. 353
that time ſeems to have been to mortify Fa-
bius, and to that favourite point they wil-
A a
fully
foners ſhould be redeemed at the rate of two pounds
and a half of filver for each foldier. When the ex-
change was made, 247 Roman prifoners remained to
be ranfomed. But as the Senate hefitated greatly at
paffing a decree for the payment of the ftipulated fum,
becauſe the Dictator had not confulted them upon the
occafion; he fold thofe very lands which Hannibal had
left untouched, and difcharged the debt due from the
publick out of his own private fortune. Whether
theſe were the only reaſons or not, yet they had evi-
dently fuch an effect upon the Romans, that Fabius
feems to have been at that time the object of their
refentment, which they never failed to give proofs of
upon every occafion. Thus when Fabius opened
the campaign, his cautious conduct was fo difagree-
able to the officers as well as foldiers, who liftened
wholly to the idle boafts of Minucius, that if the choice
of their commander had depended upon the voices of
the military men, Minucius, as Livy affirms, would
undoubtedly have been preferred to Fabius. The fame
hiſtorian tells us; that when Fabius returned to Rome
to prefide as Dictator at their religious ceremonies, the
Tribunes of the people inveighed fo bitterly againſt
him in their publick harangues, that he refrained
from coming to their affemblies. Even what he
fpoke in the Senate met with a very indifferent recep-
tion, especially when he extolled the conduct and
abilities of Hannibal, and enumerated the repeated de-
feats they had received for the two laft years through
the rafhnefs and incapacity of their own command-
ers. --When Fabius returned to the camp, he re-
ceived a much more mortifying proof of their dif
pleaſure. For they raiſed Minucius to an equality
with him in the command, an act for which there
had been no precedent fince the first erection of the
dicta-
..
}
1
1
354 Of the RISE and F ALL of the
fully facrificed the publick honour and fafety.
Æmilius at laft returned to Rome, and laid
the whole affair before the Senate. But Var-
ro's party proved the majority, and orders
were renewed for fighting, but not imme-
diately. Æmilius ftill declined fighting, and
followed the advice of Fabius; but the alter-
nate command of the two Confuls, which
took place every day, defeated all his mea-
fures. Varro, on the day of his command,
marched the army fo cloſe to the enemy, that
it was impoffible to retire without fighting."
This imprudent ſtep brought on the famous
battle of Cannæ, where Hannibal, whofe
whole force fcarce equalled the moiety of the
i
dictatorial office.--Nor did their enmity to Fabius fub-
fide 'till after the fatal defeat at Cannæ. For the worth-
lefs Varro obtained not only the Confulfhip, but, what
is ftill more extraordinary, even the confidence of the
greater part of the Senate, and almoft the whole army by
railing at Fabius and Fabian meaſures, and out-boaſting
Minucius. I have fhewed above from Polybius what
truft the majority of the Senate repofed in Varro. But
I cannot omit a remarkable inftance, which Livy gives
us, of the abfurd and fatal partiality of the military men to
Varro, in oppofition to Æmilius, who avowedly followed
the advice of Fabius.--In a council of war, fays that
hiftorian, held a little before the battle of Canne, when
each Conful perfifted firmly in his former opinion; Æmi-
lius adhering to Fabius's plan for avoiding fighting,
Varro to his refolution of engaging the enemy imme-
diately; Servilius, one of the Confuls of the former year,
was the only one who joined Æmilius, the reft declared
for Varro.
Romans,
ANCIENT REPUBLICKS.
355
1
Romans, gave them the moſt remarkable
defeat we ever read of in their hiſtory. Po-
lybius, and after him the reft of the hifto-
rians, impute this defeat to the great fupe-
riority of the Carthaginian army in horſe,
and the ignorance of Varro in pitching upon
a plain open country for the field of battle,
where Hannibal could employ his cavalry to
the beſt advantage. That the Carthaginian
horſe was fuperior to the Roman in goodneſs,
is readily admitted. But if we compute the
number of the cavalry of the Romans, and
that of their allies, as given us by Polybius
himſelf, we fhall find the difference in each
army amounted but to four thoufand; fo
ſmall an advantage therefore, in point of
number, could never poffibly have turned
the fcale in favour of Hannibal when the
Romans had fuch prodigious odds in the
number of their infantry, who fhewed them-
ſelves no way inferior to Hannibal's foot, ei-
ther in bravery or intrepidity. The true
reaſon was, the infinite fuperiority of Han-
nibal in point of Generalihip. That con-
fummate leader, by a moft exquifite difpofi-
tion of his troops, a manœuvre much too
fine for the eyes of the Roman Generals,
caught their whole infantry fairly in a trap
(though in a plain level country) where they
were almoſt to a man cut to pieces, or taken.
Æmilius, and all the other general officers,
A a 2
with
356 of the RISE and FALL of the
2
with '70,000 Romans, lay dead upon the
field of battle after a brave and obftinate re-
fiftance. The infamous Varro, that baſe-
* minded fellow, as Polybius terms him, who
commanded the cavalry of the allies on the
left wing, behaved like a true bully in the
face of danger. He fled almoſt at the firſt
attack, and rather choſe to live with infamy
than die with honour. When the fatal news
reached the city of Rome, both Senate and
people gave up all hopes of fafety. Fabius
alone took the lead, and acted with his uſual
firmneſs and calmnefs upon this occafion.
He placed guards at the gates to prevent the
deſertion of the citizens, who were flying in
great numbers to escape the conquerors,
whom they expected every moment. He
confined the women to their houſes, who
had filled the city with lamentations. He
manned the walls and outworks, and took
every other precaution which the ſhortnefs
of the time would admit of. All refigned
themſelves implicitly to his conduct, and he
acted for the time as fole Governor. Many
of the Senators, and principal of the Roman
nobility, were in actual confultation about
leaving Italy, and retiring elſewhere for ſafe-
ty. But they were prevented, as Livy ³ in-
3
'Above 80,000, according to Dionyfius of Halicar-
naffus.
2
Polyb. lib. 3. p. 370. 3 Liv. lib. 22. p. 242..
forms
ANCIENT REPUBLICKS.
357
(
forms us, by the terrible threats of young
Scipio, and compelled to ſtay and ſhare the
fate of their country. Hannibal has been
greatly cenfured for not attacking Rome it-
felf immediately after the battle, and is ac-
cuſed of not knowing how to make the
pro-
per uſe of a victory, though he knew fo
well how to conquer. The candid Monteſ-
quieu acquits him of this charge. His rea-
fons are, that though Rome at that time was
in the higheſt degree of confternation, yet
the effects of fear upon a warlike people,
inured to arms like the Romans, and a low
undiſciplined rabble, who are ſtrangers to the
uſe of arms, are very different. In the for-
mer, who are confcious of their own ftrength,
it almoſt always changes into the moſt def-
perate courage. In the latter, who feel their
own weakneſs too fenfibly, it difpirits fo
much as to render them incapable of refift-
ance. Hence he gives it as his real opinion,
that Hannibal would have failed of fuccefs
if he had undertaken the fiege of that city.
His proof is, becauſe the Romans at that
very time were able to fend fufficient fuc-
cours, drawn from their own citizens, to
every part where they were then wanted.
Thus Rome was faved, not by the wifdom
or firmneſs of the Senate, but the prudence
and magnanimity of one old officer, whom
they deſpiſed and hated, and the intrepidity
of a boy of eighteen, joined, as I obferved
before
A a 3
}
f
358 Of the RISE and F ALL of the
before from Dionyfius, to the force of that
part of their inftitution, which formed the
whole body of their citizens into a militia,
ever ready, and capable of taking the field as
foldiers. All the Roman armies which were
oppoſed to Hannibal, were drawn out of this
militia. Nor do we meet with one inftance
of cowardice, or ill-behaviour amongſt the
men, but rather of intrepidity even to rafh-
nefs, which uſed to be the characteriſtick of
the Britiſh Nation. Polybius, who was at
leaft as able a judge of the military as any
man of that age, and who lived very near
the time of the Hannibalick war (as he terms
it) is loud in his praifes of the Roman
troops, whofe infantry he prefers greatly to
the Carthaginian mercenaries. Nor does he
once impute any of their defeats to the fault
of their men, but invariably to the folly and
incapacity of their commanders.
1
Upon the whole, the great defect in the
Carthaginian military inftitution confiſted in
the want of a national militia, which, as Po-
lybius obferves, was the reafon of their em-
ploying foreign mercenaries. The capital
defects in the Roman lay in that equality of
power with which each Conful was vefted in
the field, and the fhort duration of their
command, as their office was only annual.
Every battle which the Romans loft to Han-
Polyb. lib. 6. p. 688.
I
nibal,
ANCIENT REPUBLICKS. 359
nibal, except the firſt, may be fairly aſcrib-
ed to the former of thefe caufes. The de-
feats of Trebia and Thrafymene were plainly
occafioned by the jealoufy of one of the Con-
fuls, left the other fhould fhare with him in
the glory of beating Hannibal; as the want
of harmony, and difference of opinion be-
tween the two Confuls, was the primary
cauſe of the dreadful defeat at Cannæ. To
the latter cauſe we may juftly attribute the
long duration of the Hannibalick war;
when that great man, who entered Italy
with no more than 20,000 foot and 6000
horſe, maintained his ground above fixteen
years, without any affiftance from Carthage,
againſt the whole united force and efforts of
the Romans, by the mere ftrength of his own
extraordinary genius. For as every man,
who had intereft fufficient to obtain the Con-
fulfhip, was immediately vefted with the
command of an army, however qualified or
not, ſo he was obliged to refign his command
at the end of the year, before he had well
time to be thoroughly acquainted with the
true method of dealing with his enemy.
Thus every
new fucceffive commander
amongſt the Romans, had the fame taſk to
begin afreſh at the opening of every cam-
paign. I know that political writers afcribe
this miſtaken policy to that jealoufy, and
fear of lodging fo much power in fo few
hands
A a 4
360 Of the RISE and F ALL of the
hands for any length of time, which is fo
natural to all Republican Governments;
and that the office of Dictator was contrived
as a remedy againſt any abuſe, or inconve-
niency, which might at any time arife from
the confular power: but the event ſhewed,
that the remedy was much worſe than the
diſeaſe. Whilft publick virtue exiſted, the
office of Dictator was frequently uſeful;
but when luxury had introduced corruption,
the pro tempore Dictator foon came to be per-
petual, and the perpetual Dictator terminat-
ed in a perpetual and defpotick Emperor.
At Carthage their military inſtitution was
entirely different. The power of their Ge-
nerals in the field was abfolute and unlimit-
ed, and, if their conduct was approved of, ge-
nerally continued to the end of whatever
war they were engaged in. They had no
occaſion for the dangerous refource of a Dic-
tator. The watchful eye of their ſtanding
court-martial, the committee of 104 of their
ableft Senators, was a perpetual and never-
failing check upon the ambition, or ill be-
haviour of their Generals. The Sacred
I
Co-
! Our method of trying delinquents, either in the
land or fea-fervice, by a court-martial compofed of their
refpective officers, has been judged liable to many ob-
jections, and has occafioned no little diſcontent in the
Nation. For as their enquiry is reftricted to a particu-
lar fet of articles in each fervice, I don't fee how a
com-
1
ANCIENT REPUBLICKS.
361
Cohort, amongſt the Carthaginians, confifted
of a large body of volunteers of the richeſt
and
commanding officer, vefted with a difcretionary power
of acting, can ſtrictly or properly come under their cog-
hizance, or be ever liable to their cenfure, unless he is
proved guilty of a direct breach of any one of thofe arti-
cles. But as a commander in chief may eaſily avoid an
offence of that nature, and yet, upon the whole of his
conduct in any expedition, be highly culpable; a court-
martial, thus circumfcribed in their power of enquiry,
can never be competent judges in a caufe where they are
denied a proper power of examining into the real demerits
of the fuppofed offender. Much has been ſaid about
trying offences of this nature, like other criminal cafes,
by juries a ſcheme which, at the very firft fight, muſt
appear abfurd and impracticable to the rational and un-
prejudiced.
•
As therefore instruction is the true end and ufe of all
hiſtory, I fhall take the liberty of offering a fcheme,
drawn from that wife and falutary inftitution of the Car-
thaginians, which is, "That a felect ftanding com-
"mittee be appointed, to be compofed of an equal
"number of members of both houfes, chofen annually
by balloting, with a full power of enquiring into the
"conduct of all commanders in chief, without any re-
ftraint of articles of war; and that, after a proper
"examination, the committee fhall refer the cafe, with
"their opinion upon it, to the decifion of his Ma-
jesty."
This fcheme feems to me the leaft liable to objections
of any I have yet met with. For if the numbers are
chofen by balloting, they will be less liable to the influ-
ence of party. If they are chofen annually, and refer
the cafe to the decifion of the crown, which is the
fountain of juſtice as well as mercy, they will neither
encroach upon the royal prerogative, nor be liable to
1
that
362
Of the RISE and FALL of the
and greateſt families of the Nation. This
wife and noble inftitution was one of the
chief fupports of the Carthaginian State;
and as it was the conſtant ſeminary of their
officers and commanders, might very pro-
bably be one caufe why luxury and effemi-
nacy could never obtain footing in that war-
like Republick. For we always find this
generous body giving the moſt ſignal in-
ftances of bravery and conduct, and bearing
down all before them.- Nor did they
ever quit the field of battle, 'till they were
deferted by the rest of the army, and even
then generally retired in excellent order.
I
The Romans were gradually trained up,
from the very infancy of their Republick,
in long and obftinate wars with their Italian
neighbours, who were mafters of the fame
arms and difcipline, and were no way their
inferiors in bravery. Nor did they perfect
themſelves in the art of war, 'till they learn-
ed it by bloody experience from Pyrrhus, the
moſt confummate Captain of that age. The
Carthaginians were only exercifed in war
with the wild undifciplined Africans, or the
irregular Spaniards; nor were they able with
their numerous fleets and prodigious armies
that fignal defect in the Carthaginian committee, which
fat for life, and whofe fentence was final without ap-
peal.
• Diodor. Sicul. lib. 20. p. 739.
to
1
t
ANCIENT REPUBLICKS.
363
to compleat the reduction of that part of
Sicily, which was inhabited by Grecian co-
lonies, who retained their native arms and
difcipline. Hence aroſe the great fuperio-
rity of the Romans, both in foldiers and com-
manders; though the Barcan family pro-
duced fome great officers, who at leaft equal-
led the ableft Generals Rome could ever
boaſt of.
It is evident from the courfe of this en-
quiry, that the ruin of the Roman Repub-
lick arofe wholly from internal cauſes. The
ruin of Carthage was owing remotely to in-
ternal, but immediately to external. The
Plebeian faction reduced Rome to the verge
of ruin at the battle of Cannæ, and a com-
plication of factions compleated the fubver-
fion of that Republick under the two Tri-
umvirates. The envy and jealouſy of the
Hannonian faction deprived Carthage of all
the fruits of Hannibal's amazing victories.
and progreſs, and paved the way for the ut-
ter exciſion of their very name and nation by
the Roman arms. Such are the direful ef-
fects of faction, when fuffered to run its na-
tural lengths without controul, in the moſt
flourishing and beſt conſtituted Govern-
ment!-
CHA P.
!
364 Of the RISE and FALL of the
*
CHA P. IX.
Of Revolutions in mixed Governments.
POL
OLYBIUS remarks, that the beſt form
of Government is that which is com-
pofed of a due admixture of monarchy, arif--
tocracy and democracy. He affirms that
his affertion may not only be proved from
reafon, but from the evidence of fact, and
cites the Spartan conſtitution in proof, which
was modelled upon that very plan by Lycur-
gus. He adds too, 2 that to perpetuate the
duration of his Government, he united the
peculiar excellencies of all the beſt Govern-
ments in one form, that neither of the three
parts, by fwelling beyond its juſt bounds,
might ever be able to deviate into its ori-
ginal inborn defects: but that whilft each
power was mutually drawn back by the op-
pofite attraction of the other two, neither
power might ever preponderate, but the
balance of Government continue fufpended
in its true æquipoife.
From the obfervance of this nice adjuft-
ment of the balance of Government, he'
1
Polyb. Hift. lib. 6. p. 628.
2 Id. ibid. p. 638 −9.
foretels
ANCIENT REPUBLICKS. 365
4
foretels the duration or fall of all mixed Go-
vernments in general. He adds, that as all
Government arifes originally from the peo-
ple; fo all mutations in Government pro-
ceed primarily from the people alfo. For
when once a ftate has ftruggled through
many
and great difficulties, and emerged at
laft to freedom and wealth, men begin to fink
gradually into luxury, and to grow more dif-
folute in their morals. The feeds of ambi-
tion will ſpring up, and prompt them to be
more fond of contending for fuperiority in
the magiſtracy, and carrying their point, in
whatever they had fet their hearts upon,
than is confiftent with the welfare of the
community: when once theſe evils are got
to a head in a country fo circumftanced, the
change muſt neceffarily be for the worſe;
becauſe the principle of fuch change will
arife from the gratification, or diſappoint-
ment of the ambition of the chief citizens,
with reſpect to honours and preferments;
and from that infolence and luxury arifing
from wealth, by which the morals of the
private people will be totally corrupted.
Thus the change in Government will be pri-
marily effected by the people. For when
the people are galled by the rapine and op-
preffion of thofe in power, arifing from a
principle of avarice; and corrupted, and elated
with an undue opinion of their own weight,
by
366
Of the RISE and FALL of the
1
by the flatteries of the difappointed, which
proceed from a principle of ambition, they
raife thofe furious commotions in the State,
which unhinge all Government. Thefe
commotions firft reduce it to a State of
anarchy, which at laſt terminates in abfo-
lute monarchy and tyranny.
I have here given the fentiments of Poly-
bius (and almoſt in his own words) from that
excellent differtation in Government, pre-
ſerved to us in the fixth book of his hiſtory,
which I would recommend to the perufal of
my countrymen. He there traces Govern-
ment up to its firft origin. He explains the
principles, by which different Governments
arofe to the fummit of their power and gran-
deur, and proves, that they funk to ruin by
a more or lefs rapid progreſs, in proportion
as they receded more or lefs from the firſt
principles, on which they were originally
founded. He furvived the ruin of all the
Grecian Republicks, as well as Carthage,
and lived (as he more than once tells us) to
fee the Romans maſters of the known world.
Bleft with parts and learning fuperior to
moft men of his time, joined to the moſt
folid judgment, and the experience of eighty-
two years; no man better underſtood the
intrinfick nature of Government in general.
No man could with more certainty foretel
the various mutations, which fo frequently
hap-
ANCIENT REPUBLICKS. 367
1
happen in different forms of Government,
which muſt be ever in a fluctuating ſtate,
from the complicated variety of the human
paffions. Nor can any man give us better
hints, than he has done, for guarding againſt
the effects of thofe dangerous paffions, and
preſerving the conſtitution of a free people
in its full force and vigour. Of all the
legiſlators, which he knew of, he prefers Ly-
curgus, whom he looks upon rather as di-
vinely inspired, than as a mere man.
He
eſteems the plan of Government which he
eſtabliſhed at Sparta, the moſt perfect, and
propoſes it is a general model worthy the
imitation of every other community; and he
remarks, that the Spartans, by adhering to
that plan, preferved their liberty longer than
other nation of the known world.
any
I cannot help obferving upon this occafion,
that our own conftitution, as fettled at the
Revolution, ſo nearly coincides with Lycur-
gus's general plan of Government, as laid
down by Polybius, where the monarchy
was for life and hereditary, that it ſeems, at
firſt fight to have been formed by that very
model. For our plan of Government in-
tended to fix and preferve fo juſt a propor-
tion of the Monarchick, Ariftocratick, and
Democratick powers, by their Reprefenta-
tives, King, Lords, and Commons; that any
two of thoſe powers might be able joint-
ly
368 Of the RISE and F ALL of the
ly to give a check to the other, but not to
deſtroy it, as the deftruction of any one
power muſt neceffarily induce a different
form of Government. This is the true bafis
of the Britiſh conftitution, the duration of
which muft abfolutely depend upon the juft
equilibrium preferved between theſe three
powers. This confequently is the unerring
teft, by which every unbiaffed and attentive
confiderer may judge, whether we are in an
improving ſtate, or whether, and by what
degrees, we are verging towards ruin. But
as I aim at reformation, not fatire; as I
mean no invidious reflections, but only to
give my fentiments with that honeft freedom,
to which every Briton is intitled by birth-
right; I fhall juſt ſtate from Polybius, the
means by which all mixed Governments have
originally deviated from thoſe firſt principles,
which were the bafis of their rife and gran-
deur: how by this deviation they tended to-
wards their decline, and that thofe means ac-
quiring additional force from that very de-
cline, neceffarily produced thofe evils, which
accelerated the deſtruction of every free peo-
ple. As the remarks of this moft judicious
hiftorian, are founded upon long experience,
drawn from undeniable facts, to many
of
which he himſelf was eye witneſs, they will
>
• Polyb. lib. 3. p. 223.
P.
not
ANCIENT
REPUBLICK S. 369
not only carry greater weight, but will en-
able us to form a right judgment of our own
fituation, as it is at prefent circumftanced.
Polybius obferves, that of all the mixed
Governments ever known to him, that of
Lycurgus alone was the refult of cool reafon
and long ſtudy. The form of the Roman
Republick, on the contrary, was the produc-
tion of neceffity. For the Romans came at
the knowledge of the moft proper remedies
for all their political evils, not by dint of
reaſoning, but by the deep-felt experience of
the many and dangerous calamities, with
which they had fo long and ſo often ſtrug-
gled. I don't in the leaft doubt, but that
excellent form of Government eſtabliſhed
by our rude Gothick anceſtors, wherever their
arms prevailed, aroſe from the fame cauſe, ne-
ceffity founded upon experience. Every mix-
ed Government therefore, where the three
powers are duly balanced, has areſſource within
itſelf againſt all thoſe political evils to which
it is liable. By this reſſource, I mean, that
joint coercive force, which any two of theſe
powers are able to exerciſe over the other.
But as nothing but neceffity can authorize
the exerciſe of this power, fo it muſt be
ftrictly regulated by thofe principles, on
which the Government was founded. For
if by an undue exercife of this power, any
one of the three fhould be diminished, or
B b
anni-
370 Of the RISE and FALL of the
1
annihilated, the balance would be deſtroyed,
and the conſtitution alter proportionally for
the worſe. Thus in Denmark, where the
monarchy was limited and elective, the peo-
ple, exaſperated by the oppreifions of the no-
bility, who had affumed an almoſt deſpotick
power, out of a principle of revenge threw
their whole weight into the regal ſcale.
Frederick the IIId, the then reigning mo-
narch, ſtrengthened by this acceffion of power
and the affiſtance of the people, compelled
the nobility to furrender their power and pri-
vileges. In confequence of this fatal ftep
taken by the people, the monarchy, in the
year 1660, became abfolute and hereditary.
Lord Molefworth obferves upon this occa-
fion, in his Account of Denmark, that the
people of Denmark have fince felt by fad
experience, that the little finger of an abſo-
lute Prince is heavier than the loins of a
hundred Nobles.
The late revolution of Government in
Sweden, though arifing from the ſame prin-
ciples, took a very different turn. Charles the
XIIth, brave even to enthuſiaſm, and as in-
fatiably fond of glory as the ambitious Alex-
ander, had quite tired out and exhauſted his
people, by his deftructive expeditions. But
when that fortunate fhot from the town of
Frederickſhal gave repofe to his own coun-
try as well as to a great part of Europe, the
States
ANCIENT REPUBLICKS. 371
States of Sweden, no longer awed by a war-
like Monarch, who had ufurped a defpotick
power, and a veteran army, again refumed
the exerciſe of their own inherent powers.
Stimulated by a defire of vengeance for the
evils they had already fuffered, and the fear
of fmarting again under the fame evils, they
beheaded Gortz, the minifter of their late
Monarch's oppreffion, and left the crown
no more than the bare fhadow of authority.
For though they continued the Monarchy
for life and hereditary, yet they impoſed ſuch
rigid terms upon their fucceeding Kings, as
reduced them to a ſtate of dependance and
impotence nearly equal to a Doge of Genoa
or Venice. We fee, in both theſe inftances,
the revolution in Government effected by the
union. of two powers of the Government
against the third. The cataſtrophe indeed
in both nations was different, becauſe that
third power, which was obnoxious to the
other two, was different in each nation.
the former of theſe inftances, the people,
fired with refentment againſt the nobility, and
inftigated by fecret emiffaries of the crown,
blindly gave up their whole power to the
King, which enabled him to deprive the no-
bility (the fecond eftate) of their fhare of
power, and bring the whole to center in the
crown. Thus the Government in Denmark
was changed into abfolute Monarchy. In
B b 2
In
.the
:
372
Of the RISE and FALL of the
the latter, the Senate took the lead during
the interregnum, which followed the death
of Charles, and changed the Government
into Ariftocracy. For though the out-
ward form of Government indeed is pre-
ferved, yet the effence no longer remains.
The Monarchy is merely titular, but the whole
power is abforbed by the Senate, confequent-
ly the Government is ſtrictly Ariftocratick.
For the people were by no means gainers by
the change, but remain in the fame ſtate of
fervitude, which they fo much complained
of before. Thus in all revolutions in mixed
Governments, where the union of the two
injured powers is animated by the ſpirit of
Patriotifm, and directed by that falutary rule
before laid down, which forbids us to de-
ſtroy, and only enjoins us to reduce the third
offending power within its proper bounds,
the balance of Government will be reſtored
upon its firſt principles, and the change will
be for the better. Thus when the arbitrary
and infupportable encroachments of the
crown under James the IId, aimed fo viſibly
at the fubverfion of our conftitution, and the
introduction of abfolute Monarchy; neceffi-
ty authorized the Lords and Commons (the
other two powers) to have reccurfe to the
jointexercife of that reftraining power, which
is the inherent reſource of all mixed Govern-
ments. But as the exercife of this power
was
ANCIENT REPUBLICKS.
373
t
was conducted by Patriotiſm, and regulated
by the above-mentioned rule, the event was
the late happy Revolution; by which the
power of the crown was reftrained within
its proper limits, and the Government reſet-
tled upon its true bafis, as nearly as the ge-
nius of the times would admit of. But if
the paffions prevail, and ambition lurks be-
neath the mafque of Patriotifm, the change
will inevitably be for the worſe. Becauſe
the reftitution of the balance of Govern-
ment, which alone can authorize the exer-
cife of the two joint powers againſt the third,
will be only the pretext, whilft the whole
weight and fury of the incenfed people will
be directed folely to the ends of ambition..
Thus if the regal power ſhould be enabled
to take the lead by gaining over the whole
weight of the people, the change will ter-
minate in abfolute Monarchy; which fo
lately happened in Denmark, as it had hap-
pened before in almoft all the old Gothick
Governments. If the Ariftocratick power,
actuated by that ambition, which, an ex-
treme few inftances excepted, feems infepa-
rable from the regal, fhould be able to direct
the joint force of the people againſt the
Crown, the change will be to an Ariftocra-
tick Government, like the preſent State of
Sweden, or the Government of Holland, from
the death of William the IIId, to the late
B b 3
revo-
374 Of the RISE and FALL of the
revolution in favour of the Stadtholder. If
the power of the people impelled to action
by any caufe, either real or imaginary,
fhould be able to fubvert the other two, the
confequence will be, that Anarchy, which
Polybius terms, the ferine and favage do-
minion of the people. This will continue
'till fome able and daring ſpirit, whoſe low
birth or fortune precluded him from rifing
to the chief dignities of the ſtate by any
other means, puts himſelf at the head of
the populace enured to live by plunder and
rapine, and drawing the whole power to
himſelf, erects a Tyranny upon the ruins of
the former Government; or 'till the com-
munity, tired out and impatient under their
diftracted fituation, bring back the Govern-
ment into its own channel. This is what
Polybius terms the circumvolution of Go-
vernments; or the rotation of Governments
within themſelves 'till they return to the
fame point. The fate of the Grecian and
Roman Republicks terminated in the former
of theſe events. The diftracted ftate of Go-
vernment in this nation from 1648, to the
reſtoration of Charles the IId, ended hap-
pily in the latter, though the nation for
1
2
Η Δημοκρατία θηριώδης. Polyb. p. 638.
2 Πολιτειῶν ἀνακύκλωσης. p. 637.
fome
ANCIENT REPUBLICK S. 375
fome years experienced the former of theſe
cataſtrophes under the Government of Crom-
well.
I have here given a fhort, but plain ge-
neral analyſis of Government, founded up-
on experience drawn from hiſtorical truths,
and adapted to the general capacity of my
countrymen. But if any one defires to be
acquainted with the Philofophy of Govern-
ment, and to inveſtigate the ratio and feries
of all theſe mutations, or revolutions of Go-
vernments within themſelves, I muft, with
Polybius, refer him to Plato's Republick.
The plan of a good and happy Govern-
ment, which Plato lays down, by the mouth
of Socrates, in the former part of that work,
is wholly ideal, and impoffible to be execut-
ed, unleſs mankind could be new moulded.
But the various revolutions of government,
defcribed above, which he treats of in the
latter part, was founded upon facts, facts
which he himſelf had been eye-witnefs to
in the numerous Republicks of Greece and
Sicily, and had fatally experienced in his
own country Athens. The divine Philofo-
pher, in that part of his admirable treatiſe,
traces all thefe mutations up to their firft
fource, "The intemperance of the human
paffions," and accounts for their various
progrefs, effects and confequences, from the
various combinations of the fame perpetually
Bb 4
con-
376 Of the RISE and F ALL of the
conflicting paffions. His maxims are found-
ed folely upon the fublimeft truths, his allu-
fions beautiful and appofite, and his inftruc-
tions alike applicable to publick or private
life, equally capable of forming the ſtateſ-
man or the man,
淡淡
​+
CHA P.
ANCIENT REPUBLICKS. 377
1
CHAP. IX.
Of the BRITISH CONSTITUTION.
X
2
Enophon obſerves, that if the Athe-
nians, together with the fovereignty
of the feas, had enjoyed the advantageous
fituation of an ifland, they might with great
eaſe have given law to their neighbours.
For the fame fleets which enabled them to
ravage the fea-coafts of the continent at dif-
cretion, could equally have protected their
own country from the infults of their ene-
mies as long as they maintained their naval
fuperiority. One would imagine, fays the
great Montefquieu, that Xenophon in this
paffage was ſpeaking of the iſland of Britain.
The judicious and glorious exertion of our
naval force under the prefent miniſtry * ſo
ftrongly confirms Xenophon's remark, that
one would imagine their meaſures were
directed, as well as dictated by his confum-
mate genius. We are mafters both of thoſe
natural and acquired advantages, which Xe-
nophon required to make his countrymen
invincible. We daily feel their importance
more and more, and muſt be fenfible that
1
2
Xenophon. de Republ. Athen.
Efprit des Loix, vol. 2. p. 3.
*The first edition of this Work appeared in 1759.
our
378 Of the RISE and FALL of the
1
our liberty, our happineſs, and our very ex-
iſtence as a people, depend upon our naval
fuperiority, fupported by our military virtue
and publick fpirit. Nothing, humanly ſpeak-
ing, but luxury, effeminacy and corruption
can ever deprive us of this envied fuperiority.
What an accumulated load of guilt therefore
muft lye upon any future adminiſtration,
who, to ſerve the ends of faction, fhould
ever precipitate Britain from her preſent
height down to the abject ſtate of Athens,
by encouraging thefe evils to blaft all pub-
lick virtue in their unlimited progrefs.
As Britain is fo confeffedly fuperior to all
the maritime powers of the antients by the
advantages of fituation; fo the Britiſh con-
ftitution, as fettled at the Revolution, is de-
monftrably far preferable to, and better
formed for duration, than any of the moft
celebrated Republicks of antiquity. As the
executive power is vefted in a fingle perfon,
who is deemed the firft branch in the legif-
lature; and as that power is for life and
hereditary; our conftitution is neither liable
to thoſe frequent convulfions, which attend-
ed the annual elections of Confuls, nor to
that foleciſm in politicks, two fupreme heads
of one body for life, and hereditary, which
was the great defect in the Spartan inftitu-
tion. As the Houfe of Commons, elected
by, and out of the body of the people, is
veſted
}
ANCIENT REPUBLICKS.
379
veſted with all the power annexed to the Tri-
bunitial office amongst the Romans; the
people enjoy every advantage which ever ac-
crued to the Roman people by that inſtitu-
tion, whilft the nation is fecure from all
thofe calamitous feditions, in which every
factious Tribune could involve his country
at pleaſure. And as all our queſtions in par-
liament are decided by a majority of voices;
we can never be fubject to that capital defect
in the Carthaginian conftitution, where the
fingle Veto of one difcontented fenator re-
ferred the decifion of the most important
affair to a wrong-headed, ungovernable po-
pulace. The Houfe of Peers is placed in the
middle of the balance, to prevent the Regal
fcale from preponderating to Defpotifm or
Tyranny; or the Democratical to Anarchy
and its confequences. The equitable intent
of our laws is plainly calculated, like thofe
of Solon, to preferve the liberty and property
of every individual in the community; and
to reſtrain alike the richeft or the pooreft,
the greateſt or the meaneft, from doing or
fuffering wrong from each other. This is
the wife and falutary plan of power eſta-
bliſhed at the Revolution. Would we always
adhere ſteadily to this plan, and preſerve the
juft æquilibrium, as delivered down to us by
our great Anceſtors, our conftitution would
remain
380 Of the RISE and FALL of the
1
remain firm and unſhaken to the end of
time.
I have already fhewed in the courſe of
theſe papers, that, ſince that ever memorable
æra, we fuffered fome breaches to be made
in the moſt intereſting part of this conftitu-
tion, not by the hand of open violence, but.
by the infidious, and confequeutly more
dangerous arts of corruption. The great
increaſe of our commerce after the peace of
Utrecht, brought in a vaft acceffion of
wealth; and that wealth revived, and gra-
dually diffuſed that luxury through the whole
nation, which had lain dormant during the
dangerous reign of James the IId, and the
warlike reigns of William and Ann. To this
univerfal luxury, and this only, we muſt im-
pute that amazing progrefs of corruption,
which feized the very vitals of our conſtitu-
tion. If therefore we impartially compare
the preſent ſtate of our own country with
that of Rome and Carthage, we ſhall find,
that we refemble them moft when in their
declining period.
To the commercial maxims of the Car-
thaginians, we have added their infatiable
luft of gain, without their economy, and
contempt of luxury and effeminacy. To
the luxury and diffipation of the Romans,
we have joined their venality, without their
military
1
ANCIENT REPUBLICKS.
381
military fpirit: and we feel the pernicious
effects of the fame ſpecies of faction, which
was the great leading cauſe to ruin in both
thoſe Republicks. The Roman inſtitution
was formed to make and to preferve their con-
quefts. Abroad invincible, at home invul-
nerable, they poffeffed all the refources re-
quifite for a warlike nation within themſelves.
The military ſpirit of their people, where
every citizen was a foldier, furniſhed inex-
hauſtible ſupplies for their armies abroad,
and fecured them at home from all attempts
of invafion. The Carthaginian was better
calculated to acquire than to preferve. They
depended upon commerce for the acquifition
of wealth, and upon their wealth for the
protection of their commerce. They owed
their conqueſts to the venal blood and finews
of other people, and, like their anceſtors
the Phoenicians, exhibited their money bags
as fymbols of their power. They trusted
too much to the valour of foreigners, and
too little to that of their own natives. Thus
whilſt they were formidable abroad by their
fleets and mercenary armies, they were weak
and defencelefs at home. But the event
fhewed, how dangerous it is for the greateſt
commercial nation to rely on this kind of
mercantile policy; and that a nation of un-
armed undifciplined traders can never be a
match, whilft they are fo circumſtanced, for
a na-
1
382
Of the RISE and FALL of the
1
a nation of foldiers. About two centuries
ago a handful (comparatively ſpeaking) of
rude irregular Tartars fubdued, and ſtill en-
joy the dominion of China, the moſt popu-
lous, and the richeft commercial Empire in
the univerſe. And a neighbouring mercan-
tile Republick, by adhering too clofely to
theſe maxims, is at this time neither re-
fpected by her friends, nor feared by her
enemies.
The English conftitution was originally
military, like that of every kingdom founded
by our Gothick anceſtors. Henry the VIIth
gave the firft fpur to commerce, by diffufing
property more equally amongst the com-
mons at the expence of the nobility. From
that time, the ancient military fpirit of this
nation has gradually dwindled to the low ebb,
at which we now find it. But the great
epocha of our marine, as well as commerce,
ought properly to be fixed to the glorious
reign of Elizabeth. The colonies fettled
during the peaceful reign of James the Ift,
laid the foundation of our prefent exten-
five commerce. The civil wars between
Charles the Ift and the parliament revived
and diffuſed the ancient military ſpirit thro'
the whole body of the people; and the able
Cromwell made the English name more re-
fpectable in Europe, than it ever had been
under any of our Monarchs. Our naval
glory
ANCIENT REPUBLICKS.
383
glory ſeems to have reached its fummit un-
der that period; for though our marine is
greatly encreaſed both in the number and
ftrength of our fhipping, yet we have by no
means furpaffed the commanders and ſeamen
of that time either in bravery or ability. The
reafon is evident. Publick virtue then ex-
ifted in its full force, and zeal for the nati-
onal glory was the great fpur to action. The
commanders failed in queft of honour, not
lucre, and eſteemed the glory of the capture
as an adequate reward for the moſt hazard-
ous enterprizes. Luxury was as much un-
known to the higheſt claſs, as fpirituous li-
quors were to the loweft. Difcipline, fo-
briety, and an awful fenfe of religion, were
ftrictly kept up amongst the private feamen;
whilft the humane ufage of the officers
taught them to obey from love, and a juft
fenfe of their duty, not from the flaviſh prin-
ciple of fear only. The immortal Blake
eſteemed 500 l. for a ring, and the publick
thanks of parliament, a glorious recompence
for all thoſe illuftrious actions, which made
Africa and Europe tremble, and raiſed the
Engliſh flag to the fummit of glory. Infe-
rior merit, in later times, has been rewarded
with coronets and great lucrative employ-
ments.
Luxury with its fatal effects was imported
by Charles the IId at the Reſtoration. The
con-
384 Of the RISE and FALL of the
1
1
$
contagious influence of that bane to pub-
lick virtue and liberty, corrupted our man-
ners, enervated our bodies, and debaſed our
minds, whilſt our military fpirit fubfided, in
proportion as the love of pleafure increaſed.
Charles the IId, nurtured in the high prin-
ciples of prerogative, was diffident of a mi-
litia compofed of the whole body of the
people. He obtained a ſtanding force of
about 4 or 5000 men under the ſpecious de-
nomination of guards and garrifons; which
he increaſed afterwards to 8000, and fuffered
the Militia gradually to decay, 'till it be-
came almoſt uſeleſs. A policy fatal to liber-
ty, which has been too fuccefsfully copied,
fince that reign, byevery iniquitous minifter,
who fupported himſelf by faction. James
the IId, devoted to bigotry, and iufluenced by
the most weak, as well as the moft wicked
counfels, that ever prevailed in this kingdom,
at one ftroke difarmed the people, and efta-
bliſhed a large ſtanding army. As the mili-
tia were unwilling to act against Monmouth
and his followers, whom they looked upon
as the protector of their religion and liber-
ties, James, concealing the true reaſon, de-
clared to his Parliament, that he had found
the Militia ufelefs and unferviceable by
experience, and infifted upon fuch fupplies,
as would enable him to fupport thoſe addi-
tional troops, which he fhould find neceffary
for his fecurity. And he had actually in-
creaſed
1
ANCIENT REPUBLICKS. 385
creafed his army to 30,000 men at the time
of the Revolution. The whole reigns of
William the Third and Ann are diſtinguiſh-
ed by war abroad and factions at home. Yet
though we entered into both thoſe wars as
principals, the military fpirit of our people
was not much improved; our national troops
compoſed but a fmall part of the allied
armies, and we placed our chief dependance
upon foreign mercenaries.
Frequent attempts have been made fince
that time to revive a national difciplined Mi-
litia, which have been as conftantly defeated
by corruption and the malignity of faction.
Our late fears of an invafion, and the intro-
duction of fo large a body of foreign troops,
a meaſure highly unpopular and diſtaſteful,
procured at laſt the long wiſhed-for act for a
Militia. Mutilated as it was, and clogged
with almoſt infuperable difficulties by the
fame faction, who durft not openly oppoſe it
at that dangerous juncture, therealwell-with-
ers to their country were glad to accept it.
They looked upon it as a foundation laid for
a much more uſeful and extenſive Militia;
which time and opportunity might enable
them to perfect. Much has been ſaid, and
many affertions boldly thrown out of the
utter impracticability of a national Militia.
But this is either the language of corruption
or of effeminacy and cowardice. The Ro-
Сс
mans,
386 Of the RISE and FALL of the
mans, in the firſt Punick war, found them.
felves unable to contend with the Carthagi-
nians for want of a marine. Yet that mag-
nanimous people, without any other know-
ledge of the mechaniſm of a ſhip, than what
they acquired from a galley of their enemies,
thrown by accident upon their coafts, with-
out either ſhipwright or feaman, built, man-
ned, and fitted out a fleet under the Conful
Duilius in three months time, which en-
gaged and totally defeated the grand fleet of
Carthage, though that Republick had en-
joyed the fovereignty of the fea unrivalled for
time immemorial. This effort of the Ro-
man magnanimity gives a higher idea of the
Roman genius, than any other action re-
corded in their hiftory. And by this alone
we muſt be convinced, "That nothing is
" infurmountable to the unconquerable hand
" of liberty, when backed by publick virtue,
" and the generous refolution of a brave and
"willing people." The difficulties and ob-
ftacles in either cafe, I mean of making a fleet
or eſtabliſhing a good militia, will admit of
no compariſon. The Romans may almoſt
be faid to have created a fleet out of nothing.
We have nothing more to do than to rouže
and diffuſe that martial ſpirit through the na-
tion, which the arts of minifterial policy have
fo long endeavoured to keep dormant. Great
indeed has been the outcry of the danger of
truſting
1
1
ANCIENT REPUBLIC Ks.
387
་
1
1
1
truſting arms in the diffolute hands of the
fcum and refuſe of the nation in theſe licen-
tious times. Theſe I confign to the pro-
per ſeverity of the martial difcipline of an
army; for of this kind of people, the bulk
of every army in Europe is at this time
compofed. I fpeak to the nobility and
gen-
try, the traders and yeomanry of this king-
dom, to all thoſe who are poffefſed of pro-
perty, and have ſomething to lofe, and, from
the intereft of their reſpective ſhares, are
equally concerned in the preſervation of the
whole. Of fuch as theſe the Roman armies
were compofed who conquered Italy. Every
Roman foldier was a citizen poffeffed of pro-
perty, and equally intereſted in the ſafety of
the Republick. The wifdom of the Romans
in the choice of their foldiers never appeared
in fo confpicuous a light as after the defeat
at Cannæ. Every citizen preffed to take up
arms in defence of his country, and not only
refuſed his pay, but generoufly gave up what
gold and filver he was mafter of, even to
the moſt trifling ornaments, for the publick
fervice. The behaviour of the women too,
to their immortal honour, was equally great
and difintereſted. Such is the fpirit, which
a truly brave and free people will ever exert
in a time of diftrefs and danger. Marius
was the first man who broke through that
wife maxim, and raiſed his forces out of the
Cc 2
fixth
388 Of the RISE and F A L L of the
•
fixth claſs, which confifted only of the dregs
and refuſe of the people. Marius too gave
the firſt ftab to the conftitution of his coun-
try. People of property are not only the
chief fupport, but the beſt and ſafeſt defence
of a free and opulent country; and their ex-
ample will always have a proper influence
upon their inferiors.
Nothing but an extenfive Militia can re-
vive the once martial ſpirit of this nation,
and we had even better once more be a na-
tion of foldiers, like our renowned anceſ
tors, than a nation of abject crouching flaves
to the moſt rapacious, and moſt infolent
people in the univerſe. Let us not be too
much elated, and lulled into a fatal fecurity
from fome late fucceffes, in which our na-
tional forces had no fhare. Nothing is fo
common as unexpected viciffitudes in war.
Our enemies have many and great refources;
our heroick ally, in cafe of a reverſe of
fortune, few or none. Our haughty and
implacable enemy, unaccustomed to infults
in their own territories, will think the blot
in their honour indelible, 'till they have re-
turned the affront upon our coafts with re-
doubled vengeance. Whilft a pretender to
this crown exifts, France will never want a
plaufible pretext for invading this kingdom.
Their laft attempt anſwered the propoſed en
fo well, that we may be certain, fo politick
an
ANCIENT REPUBLICKS. 389
The
an enemy, inftigated by revenge, will omit
no opportunity of playing the fame fuccefs-
ful engine once more againſt us.
French are now perfectly well acquainted
with our weak fide. The violent fhock our
national credit received by the inroad of a
few Highlanders only, into the heart of this
country, has taught them the infallible me-
thod of diftreffing us in that effential point.
Should therefore our meafures for annoying
that nation be ever fo wifely planned, yet
we can never hope to execute them with
proportionate vigour, whilſt we remain de-
fenceleſs at home. If the bare alarm only
of an invafion frightened us fo lately into
the expence, as well as ignominy, of im-
porting foreign mercenaries for our own de-
fence, the French know by experience, that
an actual attempt would compel us to recall
our fleets and forces, and again expofe our
commerce, colonies, and our only ally to
their mercy. No man, I believe, is fo weak
as to imagine, that France will be deterred
from fuch an attempt by the danger which
may attend it. For if we reflect upon the
number of her troops, the riſque of 10 or
20,000 men, can hardly be deemed an ob-
ject worthy the attention of fo formidable
a power. For ſhould they all perish in the
attempt, yet France would be amply repaid
by the advantages fhe would draw from that
a
confu-
390 Of the RISE and F ALL of the
confufion, which they would neceffarily oc
cafion. The traitor who lately pointed out
the proper time, as well as place for an in-
vafion, and the fatal effects it would have
upon publick credit, whatever fuccefs might
attend it, furniſhes us with a convincing
proof, that France never lofes fight of fo
uſeful a meaſure. A confideration which
greatly inforces the neceffity of national uni-
on, and a national Militia. The unequalled
abilities of one man' (humanly ſpeaking) have
given a turn to the affairs of Germany, as
happy, as it was amazing; and hope begins
to dawn upon our late defpairing nation.
The wife and vigorous meaſures of our
prefent Patriot-miniftry have conciliated not
only the esteem, but the univerfal confidence
of the people. Under the prefent miniftry
we laid the foundation of this long wifhed-
for, though long defpaired of, Militia. If
we fupport their adminiftration with unani-
mity and vigour, we may fix this great na-
tional object, upon that extenſive and uſeful
plan, which was defigned and hoped for by
every lover of his country. The fate there-
fore of the Militia depends abfolutely upon
the prefent crifis. For if we fupinely neglect
this aufpicious opportunity, future efforts
will be juſt as inneffectual, as the point we
The King of Pruffia.
have
ANCIENT REPUBLICKS.
391
}
have already carried with ſo much labour and
affiduity. For the fame faction, which has
invariably oppofed every attempt for a na-
tional Militia, are avowed enemies to the
prefent miniſters, from that antipathy, which
private intereſt and the luft of power for fel-
fifh ends, will ever bear to Patriotifm and
publick virtue. Should therefore the evil
genius of this nation again prevail, and the
fame faction once more feize the helm of
Government, we must give up all hopes of
a Militia as well as every other national mea-
fure.
Let us throw but one glance upon the
prefent fituation of thefe once glorious Re-
publicks, and we cannot help reflecting upon
the final and direful cataſtrophe, which will
eternally refult from the prevalence of am-
bitious and ſelfiſh faction ſupported by cor-
ruption.
Greece, once the nurfe of arts and ſcien-
ces, the fruitful mother of Philofophers,
Lawgivers, and Heroes, now lies proftrate
under the iron yoke of ignorance and barba-
rifm-Carthage, once the mighty fove-
reign of the ocean, and the center of uni-
verfal commerce, which poured the riches of
the nations into her lap, now puzzles the in-
quifitive traveller, in his reſearches after even
the veftiges of her ruins.
And Rome,
the miſtreſs of the univerſe, which once
contained
392 Of the RISE and FALL of the
contained whatever was eſteemed great or
brilliant in human nature, is now funk into
the ignoble feat of whatever is eſteemed
mean and infamous.
Should faction again predominate and fuc-
ceed in its deftructive views, and the daf-
tardly maxims of luxury and effeminacy
univerfally prevail amongſt us--Such too
will foon be the fate of Britain.
Mifful
707
な
​FINI S.
i
1.