ADMINISTRATION OF THE PENSION LAWS.
R. E. P. O. R. T.
OE
ASSISTANT SECRETARY JOHN M. REYNOLDS
TO THE
SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR.
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ADMINISTRATION OF THE PENSION LAWS.
R E E O F. T.
OF
ASSISTANT SECRETARY JOHN M. REYNOLDS
TO THE
SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR.
AIPEIIL 15, 1893–NOVEMEEER 15, 1896.
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR,
e - Washington, D. C., November 20, 1896.
SIR: In submitting my final report upon the execution and construc-
tion of the pension laws, it has seemed proper to present a general
review of the policy and scope of the work in this important branch
of the public service, covering the period in which I have discharged
the duties of Assistant Secretary. - - - * *
Polroy of THE ADMINISTRATION.
On assuming charge of this office, the decisions of the Department
in some of the most material and vital particulars were found to be
wholly inconsistent with a true construction of the law in its letter and
spirit, as well as irreconcilable and conflicting with each other. A
diligent effort was, in consequence, inaugurated and continued to
present a line of rulings as consistent as the fragmentary structure of
the pension laws would permit. -
With this purpose in view it has been the rule of this office, since
the first day of my incumbency, to direct that the laws should be con-
strued in the liberal and generous spirit which prompted their enact-
ment, and when reasonable doubts could not be resolved by evidence
presumptions should incline toward the claimant. On this principle,
thus declared, the claim of the widow of George Niedheimer (8 P. D., -)
and others of like character were allowed. And so, also, the claim of
Lydia Young, widow (8 P. D., 98), wherein I announced that where the
Soldier was sound at enlistment and died in regimental hospital, the
exact nature of his disease not being shown and the testimony relative
thereto being conflicting, it will be presumed, in the absence of evidence
to the contrary, that he died of disease contracted in the service and
line of duty. -
RESPECT FOR ESTABLISHED RULINGS AND PRACTICE.
At no time has a long-established practice in the adjudication of
claims been changed except where it was found that flagrant abuses
had arisen thereunder or that such practice was in plain contraven-
tion of the express terms of the law; and so also in respect to the
departmental decisions has due regard been shown for their sanctity;
but when it became apparent that such rulings had been ill considered,
or had inadvertently or designedly reversed a just interpretation of
4.
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the law, or had announced propositions which led to injustice and to
absurd results never contemplated by the lawmaking power, the
Department hesitated not in promptly declaring the law as its framers
intended. Hence early in this administration, in the case of Jackson
Martin (7 P. D., 265), I announced the rule that—
Cases long since adjudicated by previous administrations should not be reopened,
reconsidered, nor readjudicated, except (1) upon discovery that the pension was
procured through fraud; (2) when under the statutes the pensioner is required to be
increased or reduced in accordance with the degree of pensionable disability; (3)
when indisputable or manifest error in law or fact is apparent in the record; or
(4) when, on the presentation of new and material evidence, it is indubitedly shown
This pensioner, who was totally blind, was rerated at $72 per month
under the terms of this decision, an erroneous rating having been fixed
to his pensionable disability, which was shown by the records to be of
service origin. On the same line, in the case of James S. Lewis (8 P.
D., 128), I held that—
Where in the adjudication of an invalid claim the Bureau makes a patent mistake
in regard to the soldier's rank in the allowance of his claim, it is the duty of the
Commissioner of Pensions to correct it, even after the soldier's death, and pay his
widow the accrued pension due him.
Following these general principles, I have the honor to submit the
policy of this office in pension affairs as shown by the leading decisions,
in which important changes in the law and practice have been made,
under this administration, wherein leading principles heretofore an-
nounced have been followed; new propositions and methods inaugu-
rated; new legislation recommended and in consequence enacted. The
cases referred to will be found in volumes 7 and 8 of the Pension Deci-
sions of this Department.
In discharging this duty in the spirit indicated under the solemn
obligation that every official owes to the public service, exceptional
cases of hardship have arisen, and doubtless many apparently merito-
rious cases may have been rejected, but in every such instance it must
be remembered that the remedy is with the lawmaking power, and not
with the executive, except to recommend needed legislation, which
from time to time has been done in this branch of departmental work
as the necessity therefor arose. -
I submit the following, therefore, in harmony with the foregoing con-
siderations: -
HONORABLE AND DISHONORAIBLE DISCHARGE AND DESERTION.
The act of June 27, 1890, by its express terms, confers a pensionable
status upon condition of an honorable discharge. My predecessor hav-
ing ruled that the discharge must cover the soldier's entire service under
each enlistment during the war of the rebellion, such decisions have
been adhered to, as well as decisions involving the claims of widows
under said act where the soldier had served ninety days or more
and died during his first enlistment while not in line of duty—the act
requiring under these decisions that a formal honorable discharge
must precede death. It may well be doubted whether the latter
view is a reasonablé construction of the law, but having due regard
for former decisions, the Department has felt constrained to follow
it, leaving its correction, if erroneous, to the lawmaking power. I
did, however, in the case of Mary E. Walker (7 P. D., 197), reverse the
previous action of the Department denying her pension where it was
shown that her husband completed a service of ninety days with an
honorable discharge and reenlisted and died in his second enlistment
from a cause not the result of his army service, holding that where
death is not the result of a violation of any law, rule, or regulation of
the military service it should be construed as equivalent to an honor-
able discharge, and prior decisions were modified accordingly in the
interest of justice to this class of claimants. -
Willful desertion in time of war having always been considered a
heinous offense, it has been the purpose of this administration to exclude:
all persons with a record of such desertion from the pension “roll of
honor,” unless by the terms of some special enabling act, or the pro-
visions of the general law indicating the cases wherein the charge of
desertion might be removed or the record corrected, they had been
accorded the status of honorably discharged soldiers. Therefore it was,
held in the case of George Lessor (8 P. D., 114) that— -
A claimant against whom there stands a charge of desertion under an enlistment.
for service in the war of the rebellion, which charge the War Department declines to
remove, has no title to pension under any existing law on account of disability incurred
in said war or service performed therein.
Because it is the manifest intention of Congress to grant pensions to
persons who occupy the status of soldiers and deny them to those who
occupy the status of deserters, as appears from a review of the acts
granting pensions, and because Congress has, with full knowledge of
the uniform adverse action of the Department in claims generally for
pensions by deserters, indicated certain special cases only in which the
charges may be removed. - -
This action of the Department has been uniform, except only in those
decisions under the previous administration, in direct opposition to
the decision of the War Department, in which it was held that “a
formal discharge from a subsequent enlistment terminated the status
of desertion,” which holding has in terms been reversed in the case of
Joseph C. Williams (7 P. D., 218), wherein the principle was announced
that—
The War Department has exclusive jurisdiction over issues as to such desertion, the -
correction of its own records, and legality of the soldier's service, and until said
charge is removed by the War Department the claimant has no pensionable status.
This was followed by the Lessor case, Supra, holding that an unre.
moved charge of desertion in the late war was a bar to pension on
ageount of service therein, * >
6
But desertion, to defeat a right to pension, must not be carried
beyond the plain intent of Congress, and hence I held in the case of
James W. Miller (8 P. D., -) that “a desertion from the Regular Army
under an enlistment subsequent to a service and honorable discharge
from the war of the rebellion was no bar to pension under the act of
June 27, 1890,” and the original holdings under my predecessor in first
construing this act and all subsequent decisions, including those made
in pursuance thereof under this administration, have been overruled,
because the honorable discharge contemplated in said act is from a
service in the war of the rebellion only.
As to dishonorable discharge, it is held, in harmony with the plain
terms of the act of June 27, 1890, and all previous decisions, that it
operates as a bar to pension to the soldier or his widow and children
under said act, but as to pensions under the general law for disabilities
contracted in the service, or for death from causes originating therein,
I held in the case of Annie E. Basset (8 P. D., -), in harmony with
long-established practice and the best considered rulings, that a dis-
honorable discharge is no bar to such pension.
EFFECT OF ENLISTMENT AND SERVICE IN THE CONFEDERATE ARMY.
One of the most difficult and delicate duties devolving on the Depart-
ment has been the determination of the pensionable status of those
who voluntarily aided or abetted the rebellion, and who, prior or sub-
sequent thereto, rendered a service in the Union Army, and who, on
account of such service except for aiding the rebellion might, under
the act of June 27, 1890, known as the dependent law, or under the
terms of the general law prior to June 27, 1890, have a pensionable
Status. -
By the terms of section 4716 of the Revised Statutes “no money on
account of pensions shall be paid to any person, or to the widow, chil-
dren, or heirs of any deceased person, who in any manner voluntarily
engaged in or aided or abetted the late rebellion against the authority
of the United States;” and by the act of March 3, 1877, the said pro-
visions were modified so as not to apply to such persons as, after a
service in the Confederate Army, voluntarily enlisted in the Army of
the United States and incurred disability from a wound or injury
received or disease contracted in the line of duty.
These provisions of law left such “person” his widow and children
without title to pension under the “dependent act” of June 27, 1890,
when it appeared that the soldier had at any time voluntarily aided
or abetted the rebellion. But it was held under the previous adminis-
tration that the act of June 27, 1890, was special and independent legis- .
lation and not controlled by section 4716 of the general laws, before
recited; and, in consequence, the soldier was pensioned (provided he
had served at least ninety days in the Union Army and been honorably
discharged) regardless of his service in the Confederate army, although
7
it appeared in many cases that the disability producing the incapacity
to perform manual labor to the extent of giving title under the act of
June 27, 1890, was incurred in the Confederate service, notably the
cases of George W. Coffee (4 P. D., 285) and Louis Pereles, No. 571677.
The principles applicable to this line of cases were fully set forth in the
case of Job White (7 P. D., 312), wherein it was announced that—
Inability to earn a support by manual labor due to a disability incurred while serv-
ing in the Confederate army confers no title to pension under the act of June 27, 1890.
Section 4716, Revised Statutes, prohibits the payment of any money on account of
pension to any person, or to the widow or children or heirs of any deceased person,
who in any manner voluntarily engaged in or aided or abetted the late rebellion
against the authority of the United States, except in cases where pension is granted
on account of disability due to a wound or injury received or disease contracted in
the service of the United States, under a contract of enlistment entered into subse-
quent to the time such person was engaged in aiding or abetting the late rebellion,
and in certain classes of pensions granted on account of service in wars prior to the
war of the rebellion, which are expressly excepted from the operation of said section:
It will be observed, as before stated, that while a disability incurred
in an enlistment in the Union Army after a prior service in the Confed-
erate army entitled the soldier, his widow and children, to pension
under the general laws passed prior to the act of June 27, 1890, yet the
Question of what was a voluntary service in aiding and abetting the
rebellion was one to be determined from all the evidence in the case, and
the following principles, believed to be just and reasonable, were laid
down for the guidance of the Department, viz: f
An enlistment in the Confederate army will be presumed to be voluntary, and the
burden of proof is on the soldier to show that such service was not voluntary. If
the soldier was conscripted and it appears from the evidence in the case that the
services rendered the Confederacy were wholly compulsory, he is excepted from the
operation of section 4716. (Augustus H. Longee, 7 P. D., 586.) - -
But a class of cases arose wherein a service was sought to be excused
on the ground that the soldier enlisted in the Confederate army for the
purpose of escaping the hardships of prison life, and it was held, in
the case of Russell S. Cole (4 P. D., 141), on his unsworn statement
alone, that his enlistment in the Confederate service was for the pur-
pose of making his escape and to avoid starvation, that he was excepted
from the operation of section 4716; and, under this ruling, many who
had a record of voluntarily aiding the rebellion were pensioned upon
such naked statements, even when contradicted by the record and their
OWn conduct as to the bona fide character of their enlistment. To
meet this condition I announced the rule, in the case of Milo Ousterhout
(7 P. D., 270), that— s
The fact that a soldier of the United States Army was confined as a prisoner of war
in a Confederate military prison is no excuse for entering or serving in the Confed-
erate army, and that when such enlistment is sought to be excused on the ground
that it was for the purpose of escape, the presumption of voluntarily aiding and
abetting the rebellion can only be overcome by the most positive, direct, and satis-
factory evidence, and the uncorroborated testimony of a claimant will not be accepted
to outweigh such presumption. - -
8
ACCRUED PENSION Towſpows AND CHILDREN, AND REIMBURSEMENT,
UNDER ACT of JUNE 27, 1890, -
The holding of the previous administration that the act of June 27,
1890, was independent legislation and not controlled by the provisions
of prior general laws (thus rendering section 4716, which excludes.
from pension persons who voluntarily aided or abetted the rebellion
ineffective to deprive such persons of pension under said act of 1890),
resulted in the conclusion that section 4718, providing for the payment
of accrued pensions to the widows and children of the dead soldier and
for reimbursement to the persons who bore the expenses of his last
sickness and burial, was also not applicable to said act, and such persons.
were excluded from the benefits conferred by the plain terms of the law.
This injustice was corrected by my decision in the case of Adolph
Bernstein (7 P. D., 229), in which it was held that “the act of June
27, 1890, was a part of the general pension system and should be con-
strued whenever possible in pari materia, with existing laws.”
This ruling authorized the widow of the soldier who had died while
his application was pending to prosecute his claim to completion and
to receive the accrued pension to the date of his death.
The effect of the decision in the Bernstein case, was also to allow,
claims for reimbursement, to the person who bore the expenses of the
last sickness and burial of the soldier, which under prior rulings, had
been denied. * - -
In a word, the decision in the Bernstein case, while laying down a
rule that, in effect, excluded from the benefits of the act of June 27,
1890, those who voluntarily aided or abetted the rebellion, conferred
the benefits of accrued pension and reimbursement provided by section
4718, Revised Statutes, upon the same classes under the act of June 27,
1890, and of the act of July 27, 1892, pensioning certain survivors of
Indian wars, as had been the recognized beneficiaries under prior gen-
eral laws. Under this ruling several thousand accrued pension and
reimbursement claims have been allowed, involving a large expenditure
ARMY INURSES.
The act of August 5, 1892, having authorized pensions to a class of
persons theretofore unknown to the pension laws, viz, those who per-
formed services as nurses in attendance upon the sick or wounded in
any regimental, post, camp, or general hospital under certain conditions
named in the act, it became my duty early in this administration to
give due effect to the provisions, thereof, and I held that its terms
included those nurses who prepared the diet for the sick and wounded,
as well as those who cared for them directly at the bedside. (7 P.D.,8.)
That this decision responded to the intent of its framers is evident
from the letter of Mrs. Annie Wittenmyer, chairman National Woman's
9
Relief Corps, under date of October 10, 1893, to the Assistant Secretary,
in which she says: .
I desire, in the name of the Woman's Relief Corps of the Grand Army of the
Republic, to thank you most heartily for your wise and generous rulings in regard
to the army nurse pension law. * * * You have by your clear and generous ren-
dering of the Haw greatly helped me in my difficult duties. -
Those nurses who served in a regimental, post, or camp hospital,
whose claims, it seems, were intended to be embraced in the provisions
of said law, are not recognized by the War Department as having been
employed by authority; and, as the act in terms limits the right to
pension to those who were employed by authority recognized by the
War Department, this Department has been compelled to exclude
such nurses in granting pensions under said act. In doing so it
appears that many claims for service in regimental, post, or camp hos-
pital, as meritorious as those for service rendered in general hospitals,
have been denied allowanee, and it is recommended that this apparent
injustice be remedied by proper legislation.
RULES GOVERNING RATINGS IN AMPUTATION CASES.
The rate of $36 being allowed for an amputation at or above the knee,
it became necessary to define what was meant by the word “knee,” and
in the case of Lawrence Gates (7 P. D., 200) I laid down the rule for the
first time that— *
the point indicated by a line drawn around the limlj immediately below the liga-
mentum patellae at, the base of what is known as the tubercle of the tibia marks
thé lower limit of the knee, and an amputation at or above that limit is an amputa-
tion at the knee, as contemplated by the act of August 4, 1886.
By this decision, a just rule founded on the best surgical authority,
was established and this much-vexed question set at rest, and the pen-
sions of many who were drawing but $30 increased to the rate of $36,
the rule having previously been asserted that an amputation lower than
the knee joint was not an amputation at the knee entitling to the $36
rate, though some cases had been previously allowed on the authority
of the case of Wellington Glenn (5 P. D., 284), an uncertain and unten-
able ruling that “when the remaining bone below the joint was flexed
backward and anchylosed it was totally useless, and for all practical
purposes in such cases the amputation would be considered at the
knee.” l -
Resorting again, to the best authority on surgery, an amputation “at
the elbow” was clearly defined for the first time in the case of William
W. Scott (7 P. D., 417), and the lower limit of the elbow was marked
by a line drawn around the arm at the base of the head of the radius,
and many such pensions under the act of August 4, 1886, were increased
from $30 to $36, with arrears. :
The same act having provided a pension of $45 for those who shall
have lost an arm at the shoulder joint, or a leg at the hip joint, or so
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near the shoulder or hip joint as to prevent the use of an artificial limb,
it was held in the case of Daniel F. Hammell (7 P. D., 224), in harmony
with the rule laid down under the previous administration in the case of
John W. Curran (5 P. D., 1), that such amputation “shall be considered
as being so near the joint as to prevent the use of an artificial limb,” and
to give title to the $45 rate when the amputation was above the middle
of the arm or thigh bone." This ruling of extended liberality was
adhered to because it was not deemed wise to disturb former adjudica-
tions thereunder, and return to the uncertainties and perplexities that
previously surrounded the determination of the question.
In the interest of justice and the plain terms of the law, in order
to save to worthy claimants arrears of pension, the rule has been
announced in amputation cases that they are such specific disabilities
as are excepted from the terms of the act fixing the date of a medical
examination for the commencement thereof, and in original or increase
claims the pension shall commence from the date of amputation regard-
less of the date of the medical examination. (Cases of George W.
Keith, 7 P. D., 552, and John E. Lamb, 8 P. D., 191.)
MINORS–INSANE, IDIOTIC, AND HELPLESS CHILDREN.
In the construction of the law applicable to this class of claimants
it can be confidently said that their rights have been most diligently
guarded and the laws construed in the widest liberality consistent with
ample justice. In the case of the minor of Jacob Loeb (7 P. D., 163)
I held, in overruling decisions of the previous administration to the
contrary, that— n
Under the proviso to section 3 of the act of June 27, 1890, the pension of an
insane, idiotic, or permanently helpless minor which has ceased by reason of the
minor attaining the age of sixteen years before the passage of the act is renewable
from the date of the application therefor upon proof of the continued and uninter-
rupted insanity, idiocy, or helplessness of the claimant. -
And thus many helpless ones have been benefited. The rule was
also established, for the first time in the same class of cases, in constru-
ing the act of June 27, 1890, in connection with the existing general
laws (Instructions to the Commissioner of Pensions, 7 P. D., 167), that
the $2 increase allowed to minor children under the general laws will
also be continued to the mother of the helpless children, under the act
of 1890, after attaining their sixteenth year, and so long as such insanity
or helplessness continues. This was still further extended so as to
embrace those cases in which a mother survived the helpless child
till after it attained the age of 16 years and then died or remarried
without payment to her of any part of the pension, thus permitting the
pension to be revived for the benefit of such helpless persons. (Minors
of Joseph Disbrow, 8 P. D., 142.) - 2 * ~.
On appeal to the Department, I held, on April 17, 1895, in “the
minors of Thomas W. Baugher” (7 P. D.,433), that—
Claims in behalf of children under 16 years of age were excepted from the limita- .
tion in the act of March 3, 1879, and are not forfeited by neglect to apply during the
period of #nsiºnable rflinority.
11
This was followed by the case of Eli Phipps (8 P. D., 111), in which
I held that, under section 4702 of the Revised Statutes, where the
mother died after the children had attained their sixteenth year with-
out payment to her of any part of the pension, they may apply in their
own right thereafter, and receive the pension provided by the general
law from the date of the death of the father. In so holding, the rule
laid down under the previous administration in Minors of Patrick Fitz-
patrick (5 P. D., 248) was reversed, and, under the decisions in the
Baugher and Phipps cases, a large number of pensions were allowed.
To give further effect to the law in behalf of this class I announced
for the first time and in the case of Simon P. Showalter's minors
(7 P. D., 478) that under the act of June 27, 1890, a minor may file a
declaration and prosecute his claim in person, by guardian, or next
friend; and the former technical rule, requiring pension to date from
the filing of a declaration by the guardian, was overruled, in the interest
of allowing arrears in cases where the declaration was filed by the minor
in person, or the mother as next friend. Before payment, however, a
guardian must be appointed. -
In the same spirit of justice it was held in minors of Alfred S. Ham-
ilton (7 P. D., 437) that “where a widow's pension ceases by reason of
her immoral conduct the children under 16 years of age may be pen-
sioned as though her right had terminated by death or remarriage,”
and in the case of Caroline McElhaney (8 P. D., 42), where the widow.
has abandoned the care and custody of her children, or is an unsuitable
person to have the care and custody of them, such children may be
pensioned as if no widow had survived, regardless of a certificate of a.
probate court as to the facts.
WIDOWS' PENSIONS.
Probably no question in the whole range of the pension laws is sur-
rounded with greater difficulty than the adjudication of claims of widows.
and minor children on account of the service and death of the husband
and father, involving, as it does, so many main propositions, as the
legality of the marriage, a prior separation by death or divorce, the
presumption of the death of the husband, the forfeiture of pension by
immoral conduct, and many incidental questions necessarily arising in
the process of adjudication. -
At the foundation of the right to pension rests, first of all, the
legality of the marriage, which, except in cases of negroes and Indians,
is regulated by the law of the State wherein it is celebrated. It was
held under the previous administration, in the case of Mary A. Gar-
man (3 P. D., 179), that her voluntary separation and that of the soldier
was equivalent to and constituted a divorce; and in the case of Mar-
garet J. Anderson (4 P. D., 67), that a husband or wife who willfully
abandons the other for seven years is barred by statutory limitation, in
the State of Pennsylvania, from returning after that time and assert-
ing any marital rights, and the other party is fully, and: 'cèipletely
3. * * = ? a 2
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released from all obligations and duties growing out of the marriage.
When carried to their legitimate results, these rulings were bound to
produce alarming consequences, and in the case of LaVanchia L. Salis.
bury (7 P. D., 247) I overruled the Garman case and all other like adju.
dications, and, in harmony with settled law, declared that—
While abandonment or desertion of one party by the other is quite commonly a
cause for divorce, it does riot dissolve the marriage relation, but such relation remains
in full force until the death of one of the parties or until it is annulled by the decree
of a court of competent jurisdiction.
Cases of extreme difficulty have frequently arisen where a valid mar-
riage was sought to be established from and after the removal of an
impediment existing at the date when the matrimonial relation was
first assumed—as where one of the parties had a husband or wife liv-
ing and between whom the marriage had not been dissolved by death
or divorce. Under these conditions it, has been held in some of the
decisions of my predecessor that upon the removal of the impediment
a valid marriage arose by operation of law (Nancy J. Dorlas, 5 P. D.,
230; Amy P. Sheets, 3 P. D., 293), independent of the consent of the
parties. But the true rule, as announced by Bishop on Marriage,
Divorce, and Separation (2d edition, sec. 495), and set forth in the case
of Ann Eliza Server (7 P. D., 468), has been adopted instead, and the
distinction drawn between marriage in cases where the parties erro-
neously supposed the impediment was removed and those in which
they knew it was not, is set forth in the following language:
“Though cohabitation was introduced by a formal ceremony of marriage, and the
parties erroneously supposed the impediment of a former marriage to have been
taken away, and never had their mistake corrected, still in localities where formal
solemnization is not essential, valid marriage Inay be presumed to have occurred
after the impediment was removed.” But the rule is different where, as in this case,
the cohabitation is illicit at its inception; then the presumption is that such illicit
relation continues after the removal of the impediment until it is shown affirma-
tively that the relation is changed to one lawfully matrimonial.
Where pension is claimed by one alleging herself to be the widow of
the soldier under the act of June 27, 1890, and the rule of law as to
the presumption of death is invoked, the provisions of the act of
March 13, 1896, must govern, and it is held in the case of Marie Sharp
(8 P. D., 175) that— - -
Said act is but a legislative restatement of the rule laid down in the Supreme
Court of the United States in Davie v. Briggs (97 U. S., 628), viz., that the person
shown not to have been heard of for seven years by those, if any, who, if he had
been alive, would naturally have heard of him, is presumed to be dead, unless the
circumstances of the case are such as to account for his not. being heard of without
assuming his death. -
As the title of the widow under the act of June 27, 1890, must be
determined by her condition at the time she seeks to establish her right
and is in no way dependent upon or connected with her previous con-
dition (Frances Kendall, 8 P. D., 197), the rule has been established,
13
in terms as liberal as the law will permit, that when a widow's income
from other sources, added to the proceeds of reasonable effort on her
part, affords her a comfortable support she is not entitled to pension
under said act, affirming the same rule under the previous administra-
tion in the Lewis case (6 P. D., 294). As no unbending rule could be
laid down to indicate for each individual case when a certain income
could or could not be designated “means of support,” and to afford the
Department some latitude in a liberal construction of the laws, I held
in the case of Susan Landgraf (7 P. D., 380) that “In general, where a
widow is shown to have, from sources independent of her labor, an
income considerably in excess of the amount which the act of June 27,
1890, provides for widows who have no income or means of support
outside of their earnings, such widow does not come within the class
for whose benefit said act was intended;” and, in the case of Eveline
Holtzworth (7 P. D., 48) “means of support” was “held to include all
resources, such as lands, goods, or other sources of income from which
the wants of life may be supplied.” -
Nor have we hesitated to declare the law against the unworthy, for
in the case of Elizabeth Van Huff (7 P. D., 474) the rule was anneunced
that in a claim for pension under the general law by a mother, the fact
being shbwn that she was living as a mistress at the time of the soldier's
death is sufficient for rebutting an assumption of dependence, based
upon proof of absence of means of support and the conditions con-
tained in section 4707, thus affirming ruling No. 105 of the Bureau of
Pensions, made May 20, 1885.
In the same spirit of excluding the unworthy, and purging the rolls
of widows' claims barred by the terms of the act of August 7, 1882, on
account of open, notorious, adulterous cohabitation, I laid down the fol-
lowing rule in the case of Sarah J. Grooms (7 P. D., 207):
The open, notorious, and adulterous collabitation of a widow who is a pensioner, or
an applicant for a pension, on account of the service and death of her husband, will
work a forfeiture of her pension or her right to a pension; and such cohabitation
may be proved by her conduct, in habitually, openly, and notoriously consorting
with one or more persons of the opposite sex, under circumstances which would lead
the guarded discretion of a reasonable and just man to infer from such relation, as a
necessary conclusion, that it was illicit.
In so doing, the decisions made under the previous administration that
the act of August 7, 1882, was in the nature of a penal statute and must
be strictly construed, and that it applied only to a widow who was
actually in receipt of a pension, and who was living with one man and
supported by him as his mistress, were overruled. See cases of Sarah
E. West (3 P. D., 115); Caroline Knappenberger (3 P. D., 263); Sophia
Lingers (4 P. D.,287); Cynthia Evans (5 P. D., 188). The result of
these holdings was to encumber the pension rolls with the names of
some of the most immoral and unworthy claimants. It is also held, in
furtherance of justice under the statute, that it is not retroactive, and
the immoral conduct specified in the law, which had ceased before the
:
14
passage thereof, does not operate to terminate or to deprive a widow
of her pension. (Harriet M. Fellows, 7 P.D., 387.)
- In cases involving the legality of a divorce it is held, as a matter of
plain justice, that a decree of divorce obtained by the fraud of either
of the parties, or the collusion of both, may be impeached, even in a
collateral proceeding, by the Government, if prejudiced thereby in
regard to some preexisting right were the decree given full force and
effect. (Frances A. Monholland, 7 P. D., 494.) * . tº -
In the interest of the largest liberality to the claims of widows, the
following new rulings may be mentioned, in harmony with the principle
of construing the act of June 27, 1890, as a part of the general pension
system. -
Section 4703 of the Revised Statutes has been applied to cases under
the act of June 27, 1890, and a widow pensioner under said act may
be paid $2 per month additional pension on account of a child of her
deceased husband by a former wife during such period as she may be
charged with its maintenance; and, where not so charged, the pension
will be allowed the child from the date of application, and be paid to
the legal guardian. (Josie Ann Myers, 8 P. D., 32.) , - .
So, also, in applying said section, the rule has been established that
said $2 rate will be paid such widow where the stepchildren are being
maintained in whole or in part at the expense of a State, or the pub-
lic, in any educational institution, or in any institution organized for
the care of soldiers' orphans. (Belle Gilbert, 7 P. D., 239.) The hus-
band’s desertion from a service in the war of the rebellion is no bar
to the widow's right to pension on account of said soldier for a serv-
ice and honorable discharge in the Mexican War. (Bridget Kelley,
7 P. D., 128.) - -
Additional paymasters are held to be officers in the United States
Army within the meaning of the act of June 27, 1890, and their widows
are pensionable under said act. (Marcia M. Rhodes, 8 P. D., 99.)
Where soldier enlists in Regular Army subsequent to close of war
of the rebellion and deserts therefrom, such desertion does not bar
widow's right to pension under act of June 27, 1890. (Catharine
Tubah, 8 P. D., 82.) -
While it has been held in the case of Caroline Colby (7 P. D., 24)
that the widow of a deceased pensioner has no right, under the law, to
make and prosecute an original claim for a rerating of her husband's
invalid pension, thus returning to the decision in the case of Roland M.
Jones (3 P. D., 42), I announced the rule in the case of Henry Groppe
(8 P. D., -) that, when a soldier's claim is rejected during his life,
but he dies so soon thereafter as to exclude opportunity to appeal or
ask for reconsideration, such claim may be reopened by his widow or
III IILOI’. e
Where the Government has twice conceded thirty days' service in
the Creek war, by a grant to the soldier in 1851 of bounty land war.
rant, ang by allowance of his claim for pension under the act of July
tº * º "... • %, ’,
:
15
27, 1892, and no question thereto having been raised in his lifetime,
the burden of proof is on the Government when it sets up the plea of
insufficient service against the widow's claim. (Margaret M. Swan,
8 P. D., 149.) - 3.
Where the pensioner is imprisoned, payment to his wife or minor.
children is not such payment as requires the possession or production
of pension certificate by the beneficiary, but may be made to the wife
or guardian of minors upon their own properly executed vouchers
showing the pensioner alive and in confinement and that the benefici-
ary is dependent upon him. (Wilson, 8 P. D., 87.) :
COMMENCEMENT OF PENSIONS.
As the act of June 27, 1890, provides that the soldier's pension shall
commence from the date of application therefor, it became a vexed
question early in the execution of said act to determine the essential
elements of a declaration necessary to fix the period of commence-
ment. At the incoming of this administration various rulings existed
that appeared to be wholly untenable under this law. These led to
the decision in the case of Timothy L. Carley (7 P. D., 12) and Charles
J. Bryant (7 P. D., 299). While these rulings were strictly in harmony
with the law, Congress, seeing the hardship in certain cases through
neglect to set forth in the declaration the necessary averments to give
title, passed the act of March 6, 1896, providing that where a first
application under the act of June 27, 1890, has been rejected or sus-
pended and a new application is filed and pension allowed, it shall
commence from filing of the first application, provided a pensionable
disability is shown to have existed, which has since been construed in
the case of James J. Durkee (8 P. D., 152), wherein full effect is given
to the law as intended by Congress, thus vastly aiding the Bureau and
this office in doing ample justice to worthy claimants. The act is in
every sense a just one, and relieves the Department of many embar-
rassing conditions which necessarily arose under the old law.
The essential elements of title necessary to be shown in a valid
declaration are: *
(1) That the claim is made under said act, (2) ninety days' service during the war
of the rebellion, (3) honorable discharge, (4) the existence of a permanent physical
or mental incapacity for earning a support by manual labor, not due to vicious habits.
To further aid in a proper adjudication of claims under this act, and
to save arrears of pension, the rule laid down in the Showalter case,
before referred to, has been extended to the case of applications by
insane persons, wherein I announced the rule in the case of Joseph
Crawford (7 P. D., 582) that— -
Under the act of June 27, 1890, a person non compos mentis, without a committee
or guardian, may file a valid declaration for pension by a competent person as next
friend, but before payment a guardian or committee must be appointed, and when
qualified to act the pension should be paid to him in accordance with the practice
under the general law. -
16
This case has been followed by that of Joel Ames (8 P. D., 171),
wherein the rules governing the adjudication of pension claims filed by
insane persons and the rights of attorneys under powers executed by
the claimants are fully indicated in a spirit of equity to all concerned.
In the case of Clement B. Guchess (8 P. D., 118) a new and just con-
struction of the law was announced, overruling the previous practice
of the Pension Bureau, that where one who is an invalid pensioner
under former laws shall apply for the benefits of the act of June 27,
1890, or vice versa, and his condition is such as to entitle him to a
higher rating on said new application than he has been receiving, he is
at liberty to shift his title at will as long as any benefit survives to him
under the general law or the act of June 27, 1890, and he is not liable to
suffer defeat by application of the doctrine of election under section 4715,
Revised Statutes. Also, the case of Randall Montgomery (8 P. D., -):
Where the notice sent to the soldier of his privilege to elect to take pension
under the general law in lieu of the pension he was receiving under the act of June
27, 1890, did not inform him from what date the old-law pension would begin, or that
if he accepted it he would have to relinquish all the pension he had received under
the act of June 27, 1890, for the same period, and he thereupon made a choice which
resulted in depriving him of pension entirely for nine months and gave him a
smaller rate for the future and he died about a month after receiving the certificate,
Held, That such action is not binding or final, and because he did not have time
to set aside such action and opportunity to take steps therefor the action may now
be set aside.
I) EPENDENCE.
The following rules illustrate the application of the statutes relating
to dependence, and will be found to conform to the spirit of the laws:
Where the father and the nother of the children are without property,
and the father is unable to support the family, the mother is dependent
within the meaning of the law. (Sally Wood, 7 P. D., 336.)
Where a claimant for pension as dependent father under the act of
June 27, 1890, is shown not to be in need of any support, but, on the
Contrary, is enabled by his own manual labor to earn more than is nec-
essary to an adequate support, it is held that he is not pensionable.
(James A. Haynes, 7 P. D., 90.)
Dependence upon the soldier at date of his death relates to the needs,
Wants, and necessities of the father, mother, or minor brothers or sisters
of soldier and not to the ability of the son to furnish support. (Stephen
F. Williams, 7 P. D., 507.) The rule laid down by my predecessor in
the case of George W. Porter (4 P. D., 415), that the incapacity of the
soldier, for two years preceding his death, to aid in the support of his
father, did not entitle such father to dependent pension, was overruled;
and so, in the case of Mary Ann Riley (7 P. D., 459), the rejection of
claims solely upon the ground that the soldier did not contribute to her
maintenance, because physically unable, was disapproved.
Where a soldier, at the date of his death, leaves a divorced wife, and
children over sixteen years of age, his mother has pensionable status,
other statutory requirements being shown. (Sarah A. Morris, 7
P. D., 29.) - , -
17
TERMINATION OF THE WAR OF THE REBELLION.
It became necessary to fix the date of the termination of the war of
the rebellion in order to determine whether enlistments at certain
periods were for a service during the rebellion or for a service in the
Regular Army. In the former cases pensions were allowed under the act
of June 27, 1890, and in the latter they were not. Hence it was held
in the case of John Barleyoung (7 P. D., 453) that the technical legal
termination of the war of the rebellion was August 20, 1866, in accord-
ance with the opinion of the Supreme Court of the United States (12
Wallace, 700); but, as the service contemplated in the act of June 27,
1890, must have been rendered both during and in some connection
with the war of the rebellion, as a part of its belligerent operations,
and the question whether an enlistment was for that war is one of fact,
such enlistment and service must be determined in accordance with
well-known historical facts as to the actual termination of hostilities,
and of the orders from the proper authorities suspending enlistments,
and for mustering out and discharging the volunteer soldiers. Hence
it was held in the case of Edward Farrell, 7 P. D., 532– r
Enlistments in the loyal States after April 13, 1865, will not be deemed enlistments
in or for the war of the rebellion, and any service rendered under such enlistments
will be presumed not to have been rendered in the war of the rebellion, and to estab-
lish the contrary the claimant will be required to show affirmatively that his said
subsequent service was rendered in direct connection with active military duty in
aid of suppressing the rebellion. - -
Any enlistment in any other of the States, Territories, or District of Columbia
made after June 1, 1865, is presumptively not a service in the war of the rebellion,
and to overcome such presumption active war service in aiding the suppression of
the armed force of the Confederate States should be shown subsequent to such
enlistment. e
That enlistments in the United States Navy after July 1, 1865, were not enlistments
in or for the war of the rebellion, and that any service in the United States Navy
Tendered after that date, under any enlistment prior to July 1, is presumptively not
service in the war of the rebellion, and the burden of proof to overcome the pre-
sumption is upon the claimant to show, by satisfactory evidence, that such service
was active war or naval service, in aiding the suppression of the rebellion.
The result of this holding is that while those who did not enlist for
the war of the rebellion, and who rendered no service in connection
with its suppression, are excluded from pension under the act of June
27, 1890, it has saved the pensions of all such soldiers (their widows and
children) who enlisted between April 13, 1865, and August 20, 1866, and
were either dishonorably discharged or deserted from a service in the
Regular Army, and whose pensions were denied under the previous
rulings of the Department. (Case of Jeremiah Butler, 7 P. D., 214.)
ALLOWANCE OF $50 AND $72 RATES ON ACCOUNT OF PERIODICAL OR
- REGULAR AID AND ATTENDANCE.
In the claim of Edmund O. Beers (7 P. D., 113), the pension was
ordered to be increased from $50 to $72 per month on the lay and
medical testimony filed, upon the principle that the question as to
7121—2
18
whether the pensioner was so totally and permanently helpless as to
require the regular aid and attendance of another person is not wholly
a medical one, and that the regular attendance required must be such
as is continuous, in the sense of being at the command and service of
the person whose total and permanent helplessness necessitates the
aid and attendance of another in performing the ordinary and neces-
sary functions of daily life. This ruling has been the authority for the
allowance of many claims of this character, and has found expression
in different form in the case of John I. Hill (7 P. D., 142), where the
rate of $50 for frequent and periodical aid and attendance was allowed;
and, in the case of Thomas L. Hurst (7 P. D., 583), who was confined in
an asylum for the insane, the rule was, for the first time under the facts
of that case, applied so as to give the $50 rate. #
LINE OF DUTY.
It became my duty in the interest of public justice, as I regarded it,
to overrule some of the decisions of my predecessor involving the
Question whether the disability for which the pension was claimed
was incurred in line of duty. In the case of James E. Harrison
(7 P. D., 97) the prior rulings and cases were reviewed at length, and
the allowances made in accordance with the former practice of the
office were set aside—cases, in my judgment, wholly indefensible in
justifying the conclusion that the soldiers were in line of duty,
notably the said Harrison case, where the claim had been admitted on
proof that claimant had received permission to hunt, for his own
recreation, and while hunting was shot in the hand by the accidental
discharge of his gun, and that at the time of the injury he was not on
duty or acting in pursuance of orders from his superior officers.
Many other cases as indefensible might be mentioned. In this case the
Department returned to the rule which had long been followed by the
decisions, that soldier is considered in line of duty when in the per-
formance of those things which the law requires of him as a military
duty; and the vital question is, was the cause of the disability apper-
taining to, dependent upon, or otherwise essentially connected with
the claimant's duty as a soldier, or was the disability incurred while
the Soldier was acting in a personal matter, independent of or adverse
to his military duty? -
PERSONS HELD NOT ENTITLED UNDER ACT OF JUNE 27, 1890, AND
OTHER LAWS.
I have held that the act of June 27, 1890, does not warrant the pen-
Sioning of contract surgeons (Annie E. Few, 8 P. D., 95), nor provost-
marshals (Andrew J. Shannon, 7 P. D., 64), nor enrolling officers
(Barnes's appeal, 8 P. D., 94), overruling the case of Richard Mace
(5 P. D., 16), upon the plain ground that such persons are regarded as
/ 19
having been in the civil branch of the service, and not persons who
were regularly enlisted and mustered into the service, and who required
an honorable discharge as contemplated by said act. - -
The first case of importance decided under this administration was
that of Charles T. Bennett (7 P. D., 1), in which the legal basis for pen-
sion under section 2 of said act was defined, and the ruling under the
previous administration; in the case of Henry H. Weike (6 P. D., 193),
that the basis for pension under section 2 of said act is inability to
earn a support by reason of incapacity for manual labor, due to disa-
bility not the result of vicious habits, was affirmed, and Order No. 164
of the Commissioner of Pensions illegally construing said act was
abrogated.
Under the act of January 29, 1887, Mexican war, a soldier whose serv-
ice was confined to a recruiting station in the State of New York is
not entitled to a pension, because the law requires sixty days' service .
“in Mexico or on the coasts or frontier thereof, or en route thereto,” or
actual engagement in battle, or personal mention in Congressional res-
olution for specific service in said war, to give title to pension there-
under. (Joseph Shattuck, 7 P. D., 54.) -
A State militiaman is not pensionable under the first subdivision of
section 4693, Revised Statutes, unless his disability was incurred in the
line of duty while actually in service of the United States by direction
and under authority of the President; nor is he pensionable under the
third subdivision of section 4693, Revised Statutes, unless wounded or
injured in battle with rebels or Indians and his claim prosecuted to a
successful issue prior to September 4, 1874 (Alvin West, 7 P. D., 74),
overruling decision in case of Louisa S. Norris (5 P. D.,42), under which
certain State militiamen had been unlawfully pensioned.
Section 4700, Revised Statutes, relating to soldiers “upon veteran
furlough with the organization to which they belong,” is held to mean
such soldiers, while with their commands, when leaving for and return-
ing from veteran furlough, and not when separated and absent from
such command while at their homes (Mathew M. Curtis, 7 P. D., 398),
and the decision in the case of William R. Osborn (3 P. D., 396), hold-
ing them pensionable when absent from such command, overruled.
ATTORNEYS' FEES AND RECOGNITION.
No single question was surrounded with greater confusion, on taking
charge of this office, than that relating to the recognition and fees of
attorneys in pension claims. A line of rulings, as consistent as the
nature of the controversies would admit of, has been announced. The
number and varying phases of said rulings are so great as to forbid an
extended reference thereto. It is sufficient to say that attorneys have
been held to a strict performance of their contract to entitle them to
fees from claimants, and that every vigilance has been employed to
guard against unreasonable or illegal demands on their part.
20
PRACTICE IN MEDICAL ExAMINATIONS. . . .
It having been brought to the attention of the Department that gross
abuses existed under the practice in examinations before medical boards,
it was announced in the appeal of Byron A. Predmore (8 P. D., 165)
that a claimant ordered before a board of surgeons for examination
can not be deprived, save by his consent in writing, of the benefit of
such examination by a full board, and new rules were promulgated to
carry this decision into effect. By this ruling the claimant Iñáy hère-
after have the benefit of the judgment of a full board, and fees will not
be paid to surgeons who absent themselves from such examinations. .
IN GENERAL.
In general it may be confidently asserted that no mere technicality
has been permitted to defeat the demands of worthy claimants, and
that, while the Department has been diligent in guarding every ave-
nue to the final adjudication of claims against fraud and imposition, it
has been no less concerned in laying down just and equitable princi-
ples, as the necessity arose, for the admission of claims on their merits.
• t It seems not inappropriate to close the review of departmental deci-
sións by referring to the following new rulings in harmony with this
spirit: - -
Declarations under act of June 27, 1890.-A declaration which contains
no allegation as to disabling cause, except that applicant is 75 years of
age or over, held a sufficientallegation of disability. (Jacob Rinkel, 8 P.
D., 30.) The essential allegations in a declaration for widow's pensióñ
are, (1) that her husband served at least ninety days in the Army or
Navy of the United States during the late war of the rebellion; (2) was
honorably discharged, and (3) has died; (4) that she is without other
means of support than her daily labor, (5) and was married to said soldier
prior to the passage of the said act. (Susan M. Minor, 8 P. D., -.)
An application which states the dates of the applicant's enlistment and
discharge, but omits to state that he served ninety days during the
war of the rebellion, is not thereby made fatally defective. (Israel
Snyder, 8 P. D., -.) Upon restoration to the pension roll of a name
unlawfully dropped reduction of the rate for period during which
pension was withheld is error, unless it be clearly shown that the
disability during said period did not entitle pensioner to rate formerly
allowed. (William B. Walton, 8 P. D., 19.) -
Fraud and mistake.—Pension granted under the act of June 27, 1890,
can not be withheld to reimburse the Government for moneys erroneously
paid under the general law when such pension was not procured through
fraud or mistake, but was allowed as the result of an erroneousjudgment
on the evidence. (Christian May, 8 P. D., 71.) But where, while prose:
éutiñg claim for pension under the general law for injury of the left
hip, claimant concealed the fact that he had dislocated said hip whén
a boy, and was afflicted with rheumatism of hips before enlistment,
&
21
such concealment held to be actual fraud on his part, warranting the
withholding of the pension granted him under the act of June 27 , 1890;
to reimburse the Government for moneys paid him under general law.
(Herman G. Pike, 8 P. D., -) Where claimant's name has been dropped.
from the roll on failure to supply testimony called for on a thirty days
notice; testimony subsequently filed should be considered and the case
reopened upon a showing, by the pensioner, of reasonable cause för
the delay. (Francis S. Flint, 8 P. D., 63.) f
Act of March 2, 1895.-A certificate of medical examination executed
subsequent to act of March 2, 1895, which fails to specifically state the
rating to which the applicant is entitled is fatally defective. (Alonzo
Roberts, 8 P. D., 83.) -
Divorce, decree.—A decree of divorce which states that such decree is
to take effect upon the payment, by the plaintiff, of all costs of proceed-
ing is good, though costs are never paid; said condition, injected into
the decree, being regarded as mere surplusage. (Mary J. Poorbaugh;
8 P. D., 189.) - & '.
ſº Commencement.—When avalid declaration for invalid pension has been
filed alleging a certain cause or causes of disability, and it is subse:
quently lost, and another is filed to supply the loss, alleging the same
cause or causes of disability, and it is shown that a pensionable disability
therefrom existed at the date of filing the original declaration, pension
should be made to commence from date of filing first application. (Alex-
ander Beanstick, 8 P. D., -.) - - -
Identifying witnesses.—The absence of identifying witnesses to a decla-
ration for pension does not invalidate such declaration (Adolphus A.
Graves, 8 P. D., 108), overruling former practice. • * *
Reimbursement.—Municipal corporation is not entitled to reimburse.
ment for expenses incurred during last sickness, and on account of
burial of soldier who has been treated by it as a pauper. (Edwin Has-
kins, 8 P. D., 40.) gy • *
Requisite service.—Where claimant entered service in place of his .
brother, assuming brother's name, serving more than thirty days, records
showing acceptance into service and regarded as separate and distinct
from the principal (his brother), service would be regarded as having
been entered upon under an implied contract equivalent to enlistment
and mustering into service of United States, and meets requirements
of the act of July 27, 1892, Indian wars, and he is entitled to pension
thereunder. (James M. Griffin, 8 P. D., 57.) -
No rejection without medical ea amination.—Rejection of pension, under
act of June 27, 1890, should not be made without a medical examination,
where it appears that such examination has been requested by the
claimant before final adjudication and the pensioner has not been
accorded a medical examination for more than three years. (William
Í. Hulse, 8 P. D., -.) & * -
Vicious habits—In claims under act of June 27, 1890, where there
is no apparent ground for suspecting vicious habits and claimant has
22
always been a man of good habits and repute, presumption should be
in favor of claimant. (John Martin, 7 P. D., 578.) - . . . . . .
Commencement and end of service under act of July 27, 1892.-Under
act of July 27, 1892 (service pension, Indian wars), period of service
held to commence from date when claimant appeared at place of
battalion, regimental, or brigade rendezvous, and ends when he
reached said rendezvous on his return, or date of individual discharge,
or when organization to which he belonged was disbanded. (David J.
Bailey, 7 P. D., 173.)
Presumption.—In claims for pension under general law where appli-
cant, after long and unexplained silence, alleges new disability, of which
there is neither record nor medical evidence, the adverse presumption
arising from absence of such evidence may be rebutted by evidence
of officers, comrades, and neighbors. (Thomas H. Strange, 7 P. D., 36.)
Res gesta.--Where claimant's husband was pensioned for gunshot
wound of leg, and, while sitting on a porch at his home, fell in his
attempt to rise from his chair, receiving injuries from which he soon
thereafter died, his declaration, made immediately after the accident,
in response to inquiries, that his leg gave way, causing him to fall, is
admissible as part of the res gesta, and he was held not guilty of con-
tributory negligence, and death was conceded to be due to his wounded
leg. (Rebecca Maness, 7 P. D., 110.) -
This last decision called forth the following commendation from the
|United States Maimed Soldiers' League:
The board of officers of this association have read with pleasure your decision in
the Rebecca Maness Case. No former Secretary would so rule. It is the correct,
equitable way to look at such cases. Your various decisions on pension-appeal
cases have done justice to the soldier and his widow and orphan.
AMU) UNT OF WORK PERFORMED.
The number of pending appeals on the docket April 15, 1893, when
I took charge of this work, was 4,965. Since that date 17,755 new cases
have been filed, making a total of 22,720 to be acted upon by the
Department. Of this last number, 22,191 have been disposed of, leav-
ing 529 now pending, with the work of the office during the past year
devoted to the consideration of current appeals, this condition existing
for the first time in the past eight years. -
The action of the Pension Bureau was reversed in 2,069 of the cases
ruled upon by the Department since April 15, 1893. -
The amount of work has been unprecedented in the history of this
branch of departmental business, showing that about 9,000 more cases
were disposed of since April 15, 1893, than had been in any like period
prior to that time. -
LEGISLATION RECOMMENDED.
Minors under act of June 27, 1890.-I again urgently suggest that Con-
gress, by proper legislation, amend section 3 of the act of June 27, 1890,
so as to clearly define the pensionable rights of minor children where
23
they are within the age of pensionable minority at soldier's death with
no widow surviving. A fixed date of commencement under this section
should be established. f - . . . .
Marriage.—Also that justice demands the universal application of
the common-law rule in proof of marriage. State laws govern and lead
to denial of title in cases which are equally meritorious. There should
be no delay in enacting such a law, when it is known that in at least
three states of the Union the widow of a white soldier can not receive
pension, while, by reason of a liberal statute (sec. 4705, R. S.), the
widows of colored or Indian soldiers can. -
Pwnishment for embezzlement.—The statutes provide for the punish-
ment of guardiaus guilty of embezzlement. Yet the criminal precedents
of the Pension Bureau reveal no class of cases wherein greater abuses
of the rights of incompetents have been practiced. I therefore reassert
my conviction that greater protection should be assured, through the
intervention of the Federal courts, in order to secure speedier process
for recovery or protection of this fund, it having been made apparent
that in this class of cases the most distressing abuses of the rights of
helpless pensioners exist, and that redress is not always found in the
courts of local jurisdiction.
Aºmy nurses.—The act of August 5, 1892, relates to pensionable title of
those women who served as nurses during the war of therebellion. Title
is confined to those who served in regimental, post, camp, or general hos-
pitals. Therefusal of the War Department to recognize those as properly
employed who served in the first three classes mentioned tends to
defeat their title and render this portion of the act nugatory. Atten-
tion is invited to this in order that proper legislation may be enacted .
to relieve any deserving claimants of an unjust and unintentional
discrimination. -
. . . . RECENT LEGISLATION.
Accrued pension.—By the act of March 2, 1895, the provisions of
section 4718, Revised Statutes, relating to the payment of accrued
pension due any pensioner or applicant therefor, were so amended as
to be applicable not only to the pensions of soldiers, but to those of
widows, minors, and dependent relatives. I had the honor to recom-
mend in my report for the year 1894 the passage of this law to meet
the decision of September 28, 1892, denying the accrued pensions to
persons other than the soldier, and I am pleased to report that grati-
fying results have followed the above recommendation.
By act of March 23, 1896, section 6 of the act of July 8, 1870, pro-
viding that the check for pension when due and payable shall be given
direct to the hand of the party entitled thereto, if desired, and not be
mailed to his address as required by section 4765, was repealed, and
such check is now made payable to his order, being transmitted by mail
to the address of the pensioner. I had the honor to recommend legis-
lation looking toward the enactment of this law, after collecting the
needed data through reports from the various pension agencies, and it
24
affords me further gratification to state that this change in the manner
of making payments has been met with approval, and numerous expres-
sions of commendation. - g
Commencement.—The act of March 6, 1896, provides that where pen-
sion has been allowed under act of June 27, 1890, and has been rejected,
suspended, or dismissed under a former application, the pension shall
commence from the time of filing the first application, provided pen-
sionable disability is shown to exist at that date.
Death, presumption of.-By act of March 13, 1896, death of a soldier
is held to have been sufficiently proved on evidence showing continued
and unexplained absence from home and family for seven years, during
which period no intelligence of soldier's existence has been received.
Pension ceases upon proof that soldier still lives.
Limitation removed.—The act of March 2, 1895, removed the limita-
tion of time within which applications for relief from the amendment
of a military record might be received. -
The act of March 2, 1889, barred all applications not made within
three years from July 1, 1889.
Militia.-By act approved February 15, 1895, the provisions of the
act of June 27, 1890, were extended so as to embrace service rendered
in the Missouri State Militia and the Provisional Missouri Militia. The
same conditions to title were imposed as under the act of June 27, 1890.
Payment.—The act of March 2, 1895, provided that the mailing of a
pension check, voucher being executed and pensioner dying subsequent
thereto, shall constitute payment.
Payment to nonresidents.-By act approved March 2, 1895, the fourth
proviso to the act of March 1, 1893, was repealed in so far as it prohib-
ited payment to nonresidents, not citizens of the United States, except
for actual disabilities incurred in the service.
Rates.—The acts of March 2, 1895, and March 6, 1896, require exam-
ining surgeons to specifically state what rating applicant is entitled to
receive. This law also provides for the increase of all pensioners on the
rolls receiving less than $6 to $6, and that thereafter all applicants
entitled to less than $6 shall receive $6.
It is believed that the foregoing review will show not only a vigilant
regard for the public interest, but a patient and diligent effort to
execute the law in justice and equity.
Respectfully submitted.
. . JNO. M. REYNoLDs,
Assistant Secretary.
Hon. DAVID R. FRANCIS,
Secretary.
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NoTE.—Pages of Vol. 8 P. D. after 197 omitted, as not yet received from the printer.