* * *
r' + 4 + i.
* + .
*...*.*
F 's
* *
DUPL
335,894
REPORT
- OF THE
SPECIAL COMMISSION
ON
MILITARY EDUCATION AND RESERWE.
DECEMBER, 1915.
• Exchange Duplicate
BOSTON: º
wrTGHT & POTTER PRINTING CO., STATE PRINTERs,
32 DERNE STREET.
1915.
;









#!/(
º
%. I
Egillſillºilº ||
É BJ sº sº * * * * * * * º º
** * * * * . . . * ARTE.5% W
-Šs
º
-
- so 2
- •
- - -
•- *
* *
ºt
. . "
i
H
º
º
º
º
...
- 5
sº º
Tºsº.º-
tººlſ ºf
$'; ºil..."
* ..." -
|3:
f
-—----— -º-º:
... ------ -- º
iłit!!!! illiºl||1}} ſº
, is
fºſſ
ñºſ | bºº º
Sº J/ tº:
* … *- % * *
LIBRARY
univElsmoºuſillºn
Pºvºlº.
§ſſ
... ; : Tºrry:-- 3. wºrrºw -º-Trº
… ſºlºſ. i. Tº...ºf
Y^–
㺠\;#
of the
*-*-------
%
#
i
f
º **
C Tº
º º sº dº º ºs º º ºs º dº º gº & º ºs º ºr * * * * * * * *º gº ºs º º
























* . . . . ; .*. r r * : , t * ... - * >
- . . . . . . . J/ * * * * & a , , , t w w tº 6 y º “ . .
* 8 .' f - * * * * * t . . . * ... º. - º: -. * - y,
- * * * * * . Af # ; : * - - e
} º -
sº-º 4. ſ . . . * , - 4 / J & is . . .
sº zz ( , {A : , , ºf f * * * * , , , a , . A 4 & J & “. . .
* - -
REPORT
OF THE
SPECIAL COMMISSION
ON
MILITARY EDUCATION AND RESERVE
DECEMBER, 1915.
EE-
t=S
*~~
*~~-
*-*-*-
º-
---
É
É
TE=
===
º:
º--->
-w"
sº
E
*.
º:
|
#
BOSTON:
WRIGHT & POTTER PRINTING CO., STATE PRINTERs,
32 DERNE STREET.
1915.


















By trarisſ tº 4
The White House.
º MEMBERS OF COMMISSION. 1
ROBERT L. RAYMOND, Chairman, Lawyer.
WALTON A. GREEN, Secretary, Editor and Publisher of “Boston
Journal.”
REv. CHARLES W. LYONS, S.J., President of Boston College.
ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, President of Amherst College.
J. FRANK O'HARE, Secretary, Boston Printing Pressmen’s Union.
WILLIAM. A. PEW, Major-General, M. V. M., Retired.
WILLIAM STOPFORD, Major-General, M. V. M., Retired.
JOHN J. SULLIVAN, Brigadier-General, M. W. M., Retired.
HAROLD E. SWEET, Manufacturer, Mayor of Attleboro.
1 Appointed June, 1915, by His Excellency Governor David I. Walsh.
PREFATORY NOTE.
The Commission desires to express its thanks for general
advice and assistance given by Adj.-Gen. Charles H. Cole,
David Snedden, Esq., Lieut.-Col. B. B. Buck, U. S. A., and many
other officials and officers.
The Commission also desires to express its hearty thanks to
Dallas D. L. McGrew for valuable assistance and co-operation;
to J. Wells Farley, Esq., Lieut.-Col. Willis W. Stover, W.
Rodman Peabody, Esq., John G. Palfrey, Esq., and Capt. M.
Sumner Holbrook for assistance in drafting legislation; and to
Otto Manthey-Zorn, Esq., George De-Butler, Esq., and Donald
Gordon, Esq., for assistance in preparing summaries of the mili-
tary systems of foreign countries.
REPORT OF SPECIAL COMMISSION ON MILITARY
EDUCATION AND RESERVE.
To the Honorable the Senate and House of Representatives.
In compliance with the provision of Chapter 81 of the Resolves
of 1915 the Special Commission on Military Education and
Reserve has the honor to submit the accompanying report.
The text of the Resolve is found in the appendix to this report,
but attention is here called to the following provision: —
The board is authorized, in its discretion, to consider any related
matter whether or not the same is particularly mentioned in this resolve.
A statement of the attitude of the Commission towards the
problems referred to it, and as to its course of dealing with
them, is necessary to explain, and perhaps to justify, the scope
of this report. -
Fully realizing the obvious fact that the present interest in
questions of military defense, and indeed the existence of the
Commission itself, are due to the proof furnished by the terrible
conflict in Europe that war is not yet obsolete and must still
be reckoned with, we have nevertheless endeavored to treat the
subjects assigned to us for enquiry from a broad point of view,
and to submit a report which shall stand the test of normal
times. We have kept in mind the inutility as well as the
danger of schemes so elaborate or radical as to be certain to
fall to pieces when the present intense interest in military
affairs passes. Our recommendations are offered, not as .
emergency measures but as representing a fair and prudent
policy in the march of ordinary and usual events. They are
directed not to preparation for participation in the present war,
but to preparation for reasonably possible future contingencies.
Obviously preparation for immediate war should be considered
and must be dealt with on an entirely different basis.
8
Another and quite different point requires a word of ex-
planation. We are not unmindful of the fact that we are a
State Commission. Our right to make suggestions for positive
action is limited to what may be done by the Commonwealth
of Massachusetts. It is our duty, in the words of the Resolve,
to report the result of our investigations to the General Court,
and to accompany our report with such recommendations for
legislation as we may deem advisable. Of course, the Great and
General Court of Massachusetts can legislate only, as to such
matters as come within the powers of a single state.
Nevertheless, early in our deliberations it became evident
that any adequate consideration of the topics assigned to us
required some consideration of the whole question of national
defense; that we could best arrive at conclusions as to appro-
priate state action only in connection with Federal action; that
the whole must be understood in order to determine the proper
function of a part.
It is, therefore, we believe within the strict limits of pro-
priety to discuss in this report questions clearly outside the
scope of state legislation, not with any intention of imposing
suggestions where they do not belong, but with a view to
clearing the way for intelligent action on the part of the
Commonwealth. Such discussion, while based on information
believed to be authoritative, does not pretend to be exhaustive
or complete as to mechanical and technical details.
We believe our duty under the Resolve to be two-fold. First,
to interpret the public opinion of this state as we have ascer-
tained it on this great subject and so reduce to definite ex-
pression the broad principles on which action must be based.
Second, to direct affirmative action into definite channels so
that the aroused sentiment of the citizens of this Common-
wealth may neither be left vibrating in the air nor expend itself
in disconnected efforts having no co-ordination.
The first duty is to be performed distinctly from a non-
technical point of view. The second, as distinctly, is a duty
which must be attempted on the basis of expert knowledge and
advice. The Commission has kept clearly in mind the vital
differences which characterize each of its two-fold functions.
This report, so far as it deals with specific matters of military
9
preparation, is founded on the expert advice and assistance
which the Commission, in one way or another, has received.
So far as it deals with general principles it is based on en-
lightened public opinion. In this latter aspect we have deemed
it proper to cover the subject at wide range.
There will be found in the appendix to this report a list of the
persons who have appeared and spoken before the Commission,
together with the dates and places of hearings, brief summaries
of the military systems of other countries, and, finally, drafts
of suggested legislation.
Basis of Discussion.
This report proceeds on the following basis of discussion: —
First, is preparation for war justified? Which course is to be
adopted, fighting or non-resistance?
Second, are additional measures for defense necessary?
Third, to what extent is additional preparation advisable?
Fourth, of what should such preparation consist?
Fifth, given an adequate preparation for actual defense, in
case of war, should military training be provided for beyond
this point on the ground of its beneficial effect on the standard
of citizenship? This involves consideration of: —
(a) Compulsory universal training.
(b) Military training in the schools.
Fighting or Non-resistance.
While this question to most people seems hardly debatable,
an honest attempt was made by the Commission to give a fair
hearing to the arguments on both sides, and to reach a con-
clusion which could be justified by reason as well as by instinct.
War among civilized nations is not an outgrown relic of the
past; it can occur; it is now actually going on. It is not
certain, therefore, that it may not come to us. If attacked
shall we fight? Are we willing in such a case to make it the
deliberate business of the nation to kill and mutilate fellow
human beings and to inflict all the suffering, horrors and agony
which such a process requires?
10
To the average man, facing this question with a full under-
standing of the seriousness and solemnity of its meaning, the
only possible answer is “Yes.”
The policy of non-resistance will not work. Whether or not
it can be justified in the field of abstract moral speculation, it is
to-day absolutely ineffective practically. It could not accom-
plish its purpose if tried; and the public mind is utterly un-
willing to try it. Whatever the future may bring forth, to-day
the only answer to attack, the only way to defend, is to fight.
We do not reach this conclusion on the basis of the belief
held by some persons, that war in itself is a good thing for a
nation; that without it or its constantly threatening possibility
nations lose virility, degenerate and decay. On the contrary,
with the vast majority of our citizens, we believe war to be a
process so debasing and awful that nothing short of the sheer
necessity of preserving its life or honor justifies a nation in
entering upon it.
Not from any desire nicely to balance conflicting opinions,
nor in the spirit of compromise, but from strong conviction
which in no way weakens our belief in the necessity of the
general position taken in this report, we urge upon the citizens
of this Commonwealth the duty of positive effort to discover
and make real some practical means whereby war among
civilized nations may be rendered less easily possible than it
now is. A firm determination to provide and maintain means
for self protection does not exclude co-operation in any sane
movement which strives for world peace.
Additional Measures for Defense are Necessary.
Are we prepared at the present moment, from a military
point of view, to resist successfully the sudden, swift and
trained attack of a first class power?
It has become common knowledge that we are not so pre-
pared. No one to-day makes even a pretense that we are.
The Commission feels that nothing would be gained by any
attempt on its part to enter here upon a discussion of such
technical subjects as our navy, our coast defenses, and our
supply of arms and munitions of war, requiring as they do an
exact and highly specialized knowledge. It is proper, however,
11.
to call attention to our pitiable lack of field guns, ammunition
and other munitions, while at the same time we point out that
the installed ordnance equipment of our coast defenses is prob-
ably inferior to none in the world.
For the purposes of this report, however, the point to be
emphasized is our wofully inadequate preparedness in the
matter of trained soldiers, both in respect to numbers and
organization.
The actual strength of the United States regular army,
according to the report of the Chief of Staff, dated November
15, 1914, is 4,582 officers and 88,444 enlisted men.
The total strength of the field or mobile army (consisting of
Engineers, Cavalry, Field Artillery and Infantry) is less than
52,000 enlisted men.
Of this mobile army 20,863 are distributed in the Philippines,
Hawaiian Islands, Panama Canal Zone, China, Alaska and
Porto Rico, leaving in the United States proper only 30,481
enlisted men.
The organized militia of the several states consists of 8,333
officers and 119,087 enlisted men. Of this number 106,911
enlisted men belong to the mobile force. Reports as to the
attendance at camps of instruction for the total organized
militia show a total absenteeism of 1,428 officers and 31,855
enlisted men.
The same report draws the following conclusion: —
The above figures, taken in conjunction with the fact that the number
of companies, troops, batteries, etc., is 2,000, and that of this number
1,120 organizations are below the prescribed minimum strength, would
indicate to some degree the dependence to be placed upon this force.
Even if all the militia of all the states was an effective
fighting force, which it most certainly is not, and even if all
the members of all the militia could be counted on for service
in case of war, the total of the trained and semi-trained soldiers
we can now call on is entirely insufficient to meet the military
problem of this country as it is discussed later in this report.
12
To what Extent is Additional Preparation Advisable? g
Additional preparation is not only justifiable but necessary,
and the question becomes what shall be the measure of that
preparation. -
The standard by which the degree of preparation is to be
determined depends upon the purpose of the preparation and is
a question belonging not to military experts but to the realms
of statesmanship and public opinion. In establishing a stand-
ard the opinion of the general public is a safer guide than the
opinion of military men.
On the other hand, the problem of what is necessary to meet
the standard of preparation adopted is a question for military
experts, and one in which they must be followed. The only
limitation is the practical one of what can, in fact, be done.
Both questions come properly under the heading now to be
discussed and we consider each in order.
PURPOSE OF PREPARATION.
First as to the purpose or standard of preparation. The
almost universal attitude, including that of those who most
strongly favor measures for preparedness, is to say that all we
need to consider is a defensive war. That is the off-hand
opinion of practically everyone; but, is it strictly true? Does
not that opinion represent a sincere and deep-rooted hope,
rather than a frank appreciation of facts? Is it not within the
bounds of reasonable probability that we may at some time be
involved in a war due to other causes than an actual attempt
to land hostile troops on our territory? That is the definition
of defensive war in the strict sense of the words.
The Spanish war was manifestly not a defensive war. If
we become involved in trouble with Mexico, that manifestly
would not be a defensive war. Within the last twelve months
we have seemed at times to be near entrance into the European
conflict. That manifestly would not have been a defensive
war. To maintain the Monroe doctrine by force of arms would
involve us in other than a defensive war. Is it not the true
statement of the case that we may some time be involved in a
war which it is a moral wrong to avoid, rather than in nothing
13
but a strictly defensive war? It does no harm to call things
by their right names, even when there may be a temptation to
dispose of a problem by loose thinking. We should face the
issue of what may happen in order that any decision arrived at
may be reached with open eyes.
It has been said that the measure of our preparation should
be consonant with the measure of our political intentions. We
feel that any such standard is not only too large but too
indefinite. If to maintain the Monroe doctrine is one of our
political intentions, as we assume it is, the measure of prepara-
tion immediately becomes that necessary for an offensive war.
There is no limit to what might be wise and advisable as
preparation for an offensive war. Compulsory universal train-
ing and service, and the promotion of military interests to
the place of first importance logically follow such a purpose of
preparation. If such standard were adopted, we should be
required to emulate the system of Germany, for example, and
to carry it, if possible, to higher effectiveness. :
We do not believe that public opinion desires or would
Sanction any such thing. We believe that preparation for an
offensive war has a tendency to lead to war. There is no
occasion and it would be absurd for this country to become
a great military nation with that sort of preparedness whose
only outlet is war.
The Commission does not believe that the plain possibility
that we may at some time engage in an offensive war should
either determine or influence the extent of the preparation
which we should now provide. Nor do we feel that the military
maxim — the best defense is an offense — sound though it is
from a military point of view, furnishes a proper basis on which
to determine the degree to which we should now prepare for
war. We believe the standard of preparation should be that
preparation which is actually required, in the opinion of experts,
to repel a hostile invasion by any single first class power and
that it should not go beyond this point. We believe it better
for the country to adhere to this standard in times of peace,
even though it recognizes the certainty of loss of immediate
effectiveness should it become involved in other than a de-
fensive war. Moreover, we are emphatically of the opinion that
14
the adoption of any standard beyond this should bear the test
of normal times, and not be fixed at a moment of overheated
public sentiment.
As promptly as possible we must have an adequate defense
against what is reasonably possible, not merely conceivable, in
the line of invasion. If we have that we have what is at once
the minimum of what we should have and at the same time a
very great deal – the security of our country on this continent.
As to anything beyond that, we believe the country should
deliberately choose to rely on emergency measures to meet
specific occasions rather than to undertake a program of
preparation for war having no logical limit, and tending
eventually to lead to war. -
Though satisfied with this measure of preparation, our citizens
are determined that such preparation as we have shall be
effective and of the best possible kind. There must be a
coherent, co-ordinated plan of defense and a truly scientific
method of organization, the lack of which has been and is our
greatest weakness.
There are certain things, above all others, which public
opinion to-day is decided upon, namely, that the money ex-
pended for purposes of national defense shall be expended
economically and wisely; that the country shall receive its
money's worth; that slip-shod or selfish methods shall no longer
be tolerated; that the crucial test to be applied to any plan
for national defense is, – Does it provide for national defense,
and in the most efficient and best possible way? Public
opinion is determined that the slackness which is natural and
to a certain extent inevitable in a country having our form of
government, a republic with the dual authority of state and
nation, shall be minimized to the last practical degree. More-
over, public opinion is sufficiently aroused so that it may be
expected to treat with a contempt second only to that visited
upon an active traitor to the country any, if there be any, who
shall attempt to deal with this vital question selfishly, or as a
matter of party politics. .
Inefficiency is the price which a democracy pays for the
blessings of individual freedom and personal liberty; and they
are well worth the price. It is, however, the primary duty of a
15
democracy, by the intelligent participation of its members in
important matters, to make this price as small as possible.
More than anywhere else, this is true when the question deals
with safeguarding the nation's life or the nation's honor.
PROBLEM OF DEFENSE.
How is this measure of preparation to be translated into
numbers of men, guns, munitions and allied defenses? That is
a question for experts. Clearly here we must follow their
guidance; clearly also this is a matter wholly within the
province of the Federal government, and not within that of the
states, or any of them.
What problem of defense have we to meet? In plain English,
how great a hostile force can be brought against us? Not even
experts can do more than form an estimate on such a question,
based on reasonable calculations. The expert opinion adopted
by the Federal Government is to the effect that the largest
attacking force would be slightly under 400,000 men. This does'
not mean, of course, that any such limit could be put on the
number of hostile troops which might be directed against us in
a war. Any great military power which could land a given
number of men here once, could repeat the operation in periods
of time dependent on its distance from our shores, and varying
from four to six weeks. The figure mentioned is merely the
limit as far as reasonable probability goes of a single expedition-
ary force. -
Quite plainly the navy is our first and best defense. What is
required as to naval preparation we have considered as outside
any possible scope of our deliberations. On this point we wish
only to record our opinion, which we believe to represent the
general opinion of Massachusetts citizens, that the navy should
be increased until, measured by present ratings, in number of
ships, kinds of ships and general efficiency, it is at least second
to any in the world.
Not before our navy is destroyed or rendered ineffective can
the landing of any considerable hostile force in this country
become a practical undertaking.
To meet an expeditionary force of 400,000 hostile troops,
16
expert opinion seems to be that we should have 500,000 first
line mobile troops and immediately available second line troops
of the same number. From a strictly military point of view,
that is the problem to be faced.
Our troops should be sufficient to defeat the first expedition-
ary force of the enemy before the second could arrive. This
appears to be a fair basis for preparation to be undertaken in
time of peace, as the possibility that the theory may not work
out in practice is offset by the time which would be allowed for
emergency measures during the period of resistance by our
navy. w
These figures, of course, deliberately exclude preparation for
an offensive war, and leave on one side consideration of the
benefits of military training apart from what is necessary for
use in war.
Of what should Such Defense Consist?
THE REGULAR ARMY.
The first line troops, so called, that is the officers and men
who will march at the briefest possible notice to confront the
enemy, would include all our available regular, or professional,
soldiers; men whose business for the time being is training for
W3.I’.
What should be the size of our mobile regular army stationed
within the limits of the United States proper? Here is a prob-
lem so clearly beyond the scope of the powers of a State Com-
mission that we hesitate to do more than point out its diffi-
culties.
It is certain of course that the regular soldier is and always
will be more efficient than the occasional or militia soldier.
Clearly, as far as efficiency goes our entire first line troops
should be regular soldiers. It is equally clear that an increase
of our regular army to the extent of producing 500,000 mobile
troops (even though that number be made up in large part of
the regular reserve) would not be tolerated, on the ground of
expense; and it is even more certain that such increase could
not now be recruited under the voluntary system and the
existing scale of pay.
In case of invasion by a power able to land 400,000 men,
17
which it should be noted is a number far in excess of the
potentiality of most foreign countries, we must, therefore, de-
pend to some extent on the militia or similar force.
Many military experts are of opinion that the militia can
never be first line troops. On the other hand some experts
including certain officers of the regular army believe that a
militia organized and trained in the manner described later in
this report and having efficient officers, would be effective as
part of a first line of defense. In any event a very practical
situation is here and must be met. It would seem to be the
part of wisdom to increase the regular army to as great extent
as the sentiment of the country will permit, and to provide,
if it is practically possible, for a real regular army reserve.
We ought to have an élite body of troops sufficient in number
to form the core of the first line of our defensive force.
Of course the determination of all these questions belongs
entirely to the Federal Government and must be left with it.
The State has and can have nothing to do with the regular
army, and the discussion of that here is for the purpose of a
clear understanding of the subject as pointed out in the open-
ing of this report.
THE CITIZEN FORCE.
Besides the regular army, then, obviously there must be other
immediately available troops for use either as first or second
line defense, consisting of what is now the militia of the several
States or a similar force. The numbers of these will depend
on the numbers of the regular army and the reserve provisions
for each force. *
Here at last we come upon ground where it is fitting that
the Commission make definite recommendations and where it is
not only proper but necessary for the State Legislature to act.
If there prove to be any practical value in this report we
believe it will consist in our recommendation that the organized
militia of the States be immediately federalized. Just what is
meant by “federalized” appears in the following discussion.
The existence of State Militia is a relic of the early days
before the Constitution. Probably the status of State Militia
after the adoption of the Constitution, so far as militia was
18
then thought important enough to be considered at all, was
one of the many compromises which were made in the conflict
between local feeling on one side and desire for adequate
centralized power on the other. It was, however, recognized
even at that time that the chief defensive-forces of the country
must be directly in the control of the national government.
This was responsible for the clauses in the Constitution giving
congress the power “to . . . provide for the common defense
. of the United States,” and “to raise and support armies.”
This latter clause met with some opposition on the ground that
the militia of the States was sufficient. In reply Hamilton in
No. XXV of The Federalist wrote: —
Here I expect we shall be told that the militia of the country is its
natural bulwark, and would be at all times equal to the national defence.
This doctrine, in substance, had like to have lost us our independence.
It cost millions to the United States that might have been saved. The
facts which, from our own experience, forbid a reliance of this kind, are
too recent to permit us to be the dupes of such a suggestion. The steady
operations of war against a regular and disciplined army can only be
successfully conducted by a force of the same kind. Considerations of
economy, not less than of stability and vigor, confirm this position.
And in the same paper he says: —
The truth is, that the existence of a federal government and military
establishments under State authority are not less at variance with each
other than a due supply of the federal treasury and the system of quotas
and requisitions.
It should be noted that when the above was written the
existing militia could in no sense of the word be considered a
“military establishment.”
Congress was also given power “to provide for calling forth
the militia to execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrec-
tion, and repel invasion, to provide for organizing, arming, and
disciplining the militia, and for governing such parts of them as
may be employed in the service of the United States, reserving
to the States respectively, the appointment of the officers, and
the authority of training the militia according to the discipline
prescribed by Congress.”
19
It is obvious that under these provisions the Federal Govern-
ment has no effective control over the militia in time of peace
and no authority in time of war save for those purposes dis-
tinctly specified. Attempts have been made to increase the
Federal control of the militia, and these attempts have been to
some extent successful. Moreover, the proposed militia pay
bill would, if it became a law, considerably increase the control
of the Federal Government in time of peace and would, by
the contract of individuals in the militia, submit the militia
directly to Federal authority in time of war. The Commission
feels that all such attempts to reach an end by indirection are
mere make-shifts and unworthy of either the country or the
states. Without amendments of the Federal and of the various
State Constitutions, there would always remain archaic pro-
visions such as appears in our own State Constitution, for
example, that officers of the militia “shall be elected by the
written votes of the train-band and alarm list of their respective
companies.”
Broad principles are involved and now is the proper time to
face the issue and deal with it frankly and resolutely. What
to-day is the reason for the existence of the State militia?
Why is money expended on it? Why do men enter its service?
The plain answer is as an arm of the national defense. That,
with one exception, is the only use to which it would or could
be put; that, with no exception, is the justification for its ex-
istence.
The exception just referred to is, of course, the use of the
State militia to put down riots accompanying strikes or other-
wise, and to quell other civil disorders.
There must always be a sufficient force to maintain peace at
all times, but the militia is not a body fitted to perform police
duty. The situation at time of civil riots, especially accompany-
ing strikes, is so tense that it can be handled only by highly
efficient and thoroughly disciplined men who are professionals
in their duties. The militia is not a body either armed or
trained to handle such situations well. Moreover, the fact that
the militia may be called upon to perform police duty is one of
the reasons for the difficulty it has in securing enlistments.
Police duty of this sort should be performed by a trained and
20
efficient state mounted police, and if such are not sufficient the .
regular army should be called upon before any militia or sim-
ilar force. It has been proved again and again that the former
bodies are able to perform strike and riot duty with a maximum
of efficiency and with a minimum of friction and cost. They
are far superior for this purpose to any body of occasional
soldiers. The Commission recommends the organization of a
State force of mounted police. It feels that it should be pro-
vided by law that the militia or other volunteer fighting force,
whatever it may be named, be called upon to perform strike
or riot duty only after the efforts of the State police and the
regular army have been exhausted. To serve in such capacity
as a last resort, a Federal militia could be summoned at the
request of the Governor of a state, just as the regular army
can be summoned.
If the real function of the militia is that of a prepared fight-
ing force it can act only for national defense. No other sort of
Service is possible. As its sole function is national, its organization
and control should be national. The absurdity of forty-eight
different armies in one country does not require emphasis.
The entire field equipment and even the service uniforms of
the militia are to-day the property of the Federal Government.
All who know the facts recognize that the militia has become
in its very life and fibre a thing wholly different from what it
was in the early days of the republic; not its functions alone
but its very spirit has become national. Even the word “mili-
tia” does not mean, still less does it connote, what it did at
that time. State Militia is to-day an anachronism.
What will be lost if the militia be Federalized? It is diffi-
cult to find anything. Local pride and sentiment can be
maintained by having local depots, armories and recruiting
stations. Moreover, all historical association could be retained
by keeping the names of the various militia organizations.
The possibility of having a militia which shall really be
effective is infinitely greater if the whole is under Federal
control. The militia of certain states, and we are proud to
include that of Massachusetts, has reached a considerable
degree of efficiency. The militia of certain other states is by
no means equally effective. The militia should be a homo-
21
geneous body throughout the country, maintained at a uniform
standard and subject to the same rules, duties and discipline.
Again, the Commission is clearly of the opinion that no exist-
ing system of training of any state militia, not even our own, is
adequate to accomplish its real purpose. The periods of train-
ing, consisting of one week in the field in summer and evening
drills throughout the winter at armories, are not adapted to
create an efficient fighting force. To-day the training of a
soldier consists, not in close order drill, but in the actual
work of a soldier which can be done only in the field. The
period of one week is altogether too short for a man either to
acquire fixed habits which will be useful or to become imbued
with a proper military spirit. Experts, both military officers
and psychologists, have united in telling us that one month is
the shortest period in which it is possible for the average man
to acquire the necessary set and habits of a soldier.
For these reasons we believe that the State is not securing the
value of its expenditures from the present system of military
training. We recommend in a special report certain changes
to be made in that system, if the State militia is to remain a
State force.
The essential one of these suggested changes is that providing
for a longer period of intensive training in the field for at least
the first year after enlistment. We consider as important also
the changing of the evening drills from two hours per week to
monthly sessions of twenty-four hours. - * -
All sorts of training are not only more effective but actually
more interesting and appealing to those receiving it when the
standard is hard and rigorous than when it is easy. That
military training in particular should be “kept going at high
speed” or abandoned altogether for an interval, is agreed by
experts. The benefit of these changes will be secured if the
State militia is immediately Federalized, because the system
adopted by the Federal Government certainly will require these
longer periods of intensive training and will be, generally speak-
ing, a system better qualified to produce really effective fighting
. Iſlen.
It cannot be too strongly emphasized that we are consider-
ing this matter not as it relates to Massachusetts alone but
22
as it embraces the forty-eight states of the Union. What has
or can be done with the militia of this Commonwealth as a
state force in the way of efficiency is a question which touches
only a small part of what can be done with the militia of all
the states if they continue to be treated as separate and inde-
pendent units, requiring appropriations and subject to the laws
of forty-eight different legislatures. The militia of each state is
a small part of a problem which must be treated as a whole.
The naval militia of the Commonwealth is already more
closely under Federal control than the land forces, but what
has been said as to complete federalization applies to it also.
To maintain state militia is an unwise and awkward duplica-
tion of effort; it is pursuing the shadow and not the substance
of national defense.
For these reasons the Commission wishes to state clearly that
its recommendation goes to the point of making the militia
actually a Federal force and nothing else. It should be con-
trolled and paid by the Federal Government and subject to the
orders of the Federal Government. To accomplish this result
three things must concur.
1. An act of congress under authority of its constitutional
power “To raise and support armies.”
2. Consent of the state legislature.
3. Consent by re-enlistment of members of the militia.
There would be very little opposition to what is funda-
mentally involved in this move on the part of officers or men
of the militia of this State. There is a remarkable unanimity
of opinion as to the wisdom and plain common sense of the
main proposition. There is, of course, and very properly, con-
siderable difference of opinion as to details, and doubt exists in
the minds of some as to whether at least some merely formal
allegiance to the state should not be retained, if that be possible.
From all the evidence we have obtained, however, it appears
to be certain that the average man in our militia would as
soon be a member of the Fifth Massachusetts Regiment of
Federal Militia, for example, as of the Fifth Massachusetts
Regiment of State Militia.
It is, of course, immaterial what such Federal militia is
called. The only necessity is that it should be a force required
23
to do sufficient training to become effective, while not taking so
much time as to incapacitate its members from performing
their duties of civil life.
Though at the time of submitting this report the proposed
plan of a continental army has not become law, yet it is
reasonably certain that some form of Federal militia will be pro-
vided for. It is reasonably certain also that any Federal plan
adopted will not be so burdensome on the individual as to invite
certain failure for its practical working. It will recognize
that for highest efficiency there is nothing but the regular
soldier who devotes his whole time to his profession. Short of
that, and short of compulsion, the Federal plan must be such
as to invite enlistment. We believe the Federal plan may
finally call for training periods of not over four weeks, three
weeks and two weeks, with monthly twenty-four hour sessions
during the winter.
Moreover any Federal plan, if it is to succeed, will be strictly
territorial in its scheme of organization. Not only because of
practical convenience but even more for the purpose of availing
itself of local sentiment and pride, such plan must, so far as
possible, localize organization and authority.
Although the Commission believes that Massachusetts would
gladly spend more money than it now does on its militia if that
course seemed advisable, it should be pointed out that if our
militia entered the Federal force the entire expense of its mainte-
nance and equipment would be saved to the state. The
Federal Government would assume the whole burden, including
care and maintenance of armories and other state plant, in
exchange for a revocable license from the state to use such
armories and plant. The only expense to which the Common-
wealth would be put as an offset to this saving would be that
of a new or increased body of State Mounted Police.
It is, therefore, the recommendation of this Commission that
the General Court pass such enabling legislation as will permit
the ready transfer of the present state militia and its voluntary
incorporation in such Federal body as may be formed.
The legislation suggested is permissive merely. Nothing in
any way compulsory should be attempted in the line of making
our militia a Federal force. Unless the change be made, not
24
only willingly but enthusiastically, it is better that the proposed
Federal militia make a wholly fresh beginning. Moreover, the
voluntary incorporation of the state militia in the Federal force
can not take place until such force is provided for by law and
its details are found to be satisfactory. Even then the transfer
should be made conditional upon the filling up of its first year's
quota, by the Federal body within a fixed time.
We believe the duty of Massachusetts to be plain. It is one
of the proud boasts of this Commonwealth that it has stood in
the past for whatever has made for the strength of the Union.
Its greatness as a state has been due in no small part to its
active recognition of the larger greatness of the nation. It
can now disregard selfish or timid considerations and take the
lead in standing for what the occasion requires, a national
defense which is truly national.
CoMPULSORY OR VolunTARY SYSTEM.
If the plan of a Federal militia or continental army be
adopted and the figures now suggested by the Federal Govern-
ment be taken as the proper standard, the quota of Massa-
chusetts would be in three years about 21,000 men. The
quota for the first year would correspond very closely with the
present numbers of our state militia, that is to say, it would be
about 7,000 men. Each subsequent year 7,000 men would be
required. If the militia of the states is assimilated by the
continental army, and the proposed numbers of the continental
army are increased in consequence, even more men will be
needed.
How are these men to be obtained? By the voluntary or
the compulsory system?
Obviously nothing like universal service is required. Uni-
versal service would produce numbers wholly disproportionate
to those suggested by any proposed plan. According to the
13th census of the United States there are in this country
male persons, as follows: —
15 to 19, . . . . . . . . . . . . 4,527,282
20 to 29, . . . . . . . . . . . . 8,824,638
30 to 39, . . . . . . . . . . . . 7,022,784
40 to 44, . . . . . . . . . . . . 2,786,350
25
There are in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts male
persons as follows: — *
15 to 19, . . . . . . . . . . . . 145,630
20 to 29, . . . . . . . . . . . . 311,311
30 to 39, . . . . . . . . . . . . 273,517
40 to 44, . . . . . . . . . . . . 114,454
If we adopted the much talked of Swiss system, and made
even the high allowance of 50% of exemptions for physical or
other disability, we should have in the country 9,316,886 and
in the Commonwealth 349,641 men trained to arms and liable
to service.
On the other hand, can these men be obtained by the
voluntary system? The difficulties which the militia of this
state has had in securing enlistments make the answer very
doubtful. It cannot be known until it is tried. It is to be
noted that there are several present causes which might add to
the volunteer spirit to-day.
First, the awakened public interest in military defense,
Second, the fact that men would prefer to volunteer as part
of a Federal force than a state force,
Third, the provision that the militia force shall be used for
police duty only in the very last resort,
Fourth, pay as provided in the Federal plan.
If the voluntary system is adhered to much would depend
upon the attitude of employers. It is here that public opinion
can play a considerable part. Employers who from selfish and
unworthy motives refuse to co-operate in permitting their men
to enter the militia should be made to feel the weight of public
disapproval. It is doubtful whether positive legislation can be
as effective in this matter as public opinion.
Many persons suggest that if sufficient volunteers be not
forthcoming, men between certain ages be drawn by lot from
all those available to make up the necessary quota, in some
way similar to the drawing of men for jury duty. This sug-
gestion has considerable plausibility and some merit. We feel,
however, that a provision of law for this form of limited com-
pulsion would arouse more opposition than a law requiring
universal training, and properly so. We do not, therefore, now
26
advocate its adoption. We feel that the only thing to do at the
present time is to try once more the voluntary system, and to
bespeak on its behalf the active co-operation of every mem-
ber of the Community. If the voluntary system fails other
more rigorous measures should be adopted. The country needs
a minimum defensive force. If it is unable to secure it in one
way it must in another.
Officers.
Private soldiers, according to expert opinion, can be trained
and made fit within a comparatively short time if they are
under thoroughly competent officers. Six months is said to be
long enough for this purpose.
The education and training of officers is a very different
matter. This is not a question of months but of years. It
must be approached on a basis as nearly like that for the edu-
cation of a lawyer, doctor or other professional man as is
possible.
Since the time of Frederick the Great the necessary quali-
fications for company officers have increased enormously. In
the days of the great Prussian king, the efficiency of his army
depended upon the drill sergeant. The less company officers
and men thought, the better soldiers they were. The army
was an automatic machine, operated under the supervision
and personal direction of its commander.
To-day war is fought upon such a large scale that a high
degree of intelligence and initiative is demanded from every
officer. Officers to-day must know how to feed their men,
guard them against sickness, and bring them in the best phys-
ical condition upon the firing line. They must have an expert
knowledge in the matters of directing and controlling fire, and
of leading men under service conditions. This involves a
scientific knowledge and a long training and preparation both
in company administration and troop leading.
Expert knowledge on the part of an officer to be available
must be organized. By this is meant such mental adjustment
in the memory of past experiences as will enable him to classify
new problems by comparison with past problems and bring
to their solution his accumulated skill. To be an efficient officer
27
a man's memory must be stored with a rich experience before
he can be trusted to make prompt, accurate and correct
decisions. -
Besides this expert skill, an officer must be equipped with the
professional attitude towards his work which inhibits other
forms of mental activity from interfering with the application
of his full powers. The professional attitude is one of concen-
trated attention in which all thoughts are centered upon adjust-
ing the means at hand to accomplish a definite purpose.
Besides concentrating his own powers, an officer must control
and dominate the men he leads. His value as an officer de-
pends upon his ability to nerve men to great efforts and
sacrifices. To accomplish this he must acquire in some manner
that prestige which makes one a leader of men. Prestige is
partly knowledge but mostly character. To these qualities
he must add another, — that of pleasure in his work. He must
find in it an opportunity for self-expression in a way which he
thinks worth while.
The problem of the education of officers in sufficient numbers
to meet the requirements of an increased regular army and
militia force is perhaps the most important single feature of
preparation for national defense. go
Here again the Federal Government must take the lead and
show the way, while the states fall into line in co-operation.
Nevertheless, it should be recognized by the States that to
turn out a large enough number of efficient officers will tax
heavily the higher educational resources of the country.
For the professional soldier of course a basic education such
as is received at West Point is desirable, although it may be
noted in passing that many of the efficient officers of our
regular army have not attended West Point. Because of time,
cost and similar practical considerations we do not believe that
the problem of officers can be solved in its entirety by army
schools duplicating West Point. Other less effective agencies
must to some considerable extent be relied upon.
Much can be done by the Morrill Land Grant colleges where
military training is required. We suggest to the other uni-
versities and colleges of this State the institution of standardized
courses in the history of military campaigns, especially in the
28
military history of this country, in tactics and in allied subjects
such as can properly be taught during their academic sessions.
The discussion of the problem of officers has so far related
to company officers alone. For the higher commands, and
especially for the highest ranks, the qualifications of officers
increase practically without limit. Their education must be
specialized and scientific to the last degree, with opportunities
for actual practice. We suggest that the universities and
colleges in this State again may find it possible to develop
instruction along these advanced lines and to open such courses
to officers who are not regularly enrolled as students.
As a splendid and inspiring example of what can be done on
a small scale for the education of officers we instance the Train-
ing School of the Massachusetts Militia at Charlestown. If the
State militia is to be maintained as such and not to become a
Federal force we recommend that graduates of this school may
be given commissions as second lieutenants and be placed on a
special list to be assigned to such duty by the Commander-in-
Chief as the Constitution permits.
Auxiliary Defenses.
There is a sort of preparedness which this country can under-
take and develop with the ingenuity and high degree of
effectiveness of which its accomplishments in the commercial
world have shown it to be peculiarly capable, without any
serious objection that it tends towards militarism. We mean
the organization of certain industries and workers so that they
may be readily mobilized in case of war.
The making of munitions, an efficient system of transporta-
tion and the means to carry it out, an auxiliary hospital and
medical service, have been shown to be nearly as important for
the successful conduct of war as the strictly military forces.
We believe the Federal government will adopt an adequate
plan.for the enrollment of mechanics and operators in munition,
motor, railroad and other industries and for a census of fac-
tories available for use in time of war.
If it does not, we recommend that such enrollment be made
and such census taken of workers and factories in this State by
the Adjutant General of the Commonwealth.
29
We suggest to the Medical Schools and Colleges of Massa-
chusetts the institution of courses in military hygiene.
Given an Adequate Preparation for Actual Defense in Case of
War, should Military Training be provided for beyond this
Point on the Ground of its Beneficial Effects on the Stand-
ards of Citizenship?
A. COMPULSORY UNIVERSAL TRAINING.
The present wide spread interest in war and national defense
has brought out into strong light a subject which, while con-
nected on broad lines with those questions, has been much dis-
cussed from other points of view. We mean the question of
military training considered from the point of view of its
effect on the individual and through the individual on the
community. There are many who feel that military training is
not only a good thing in itself but that it is the only thing
which will or can achieve certain results.
Military training inculcates a sense of responsibility, a feeling
in every man who receives it that he owes some duty to his
country. It teaches habits of promptness, obedience and
mental alertness. A man who has submitted to the discipline
of military training is, generally speaking, more effective than
one who has not. He is less selfish; better able to act with
others; becomes endowed with a community spirit; and, in a
word, knows and appreciates team play and is able to take part
in it. He has the capacity to co-operate with other men under
expert guidance. The Commission therefore has no hesitation
in expressing the opinion that it would be a benefit to the
individuals of the community, and therefore to the community,
if every physically fit man underwent some period of military
training.
The Commission makes a marked distinction between com-
pulsory training and compulsory service. The basis of volun-
tary service, namely that there should be moral conviction as
well as devotion to the state behind a war, does not apply to
military training as distinguished from military service. The
Commission believes, so far as benefit to the individual is con-
cerned, that compulsory training and voluntary service would
be the ideal state of affairs.
30
The Commission, however, does not recommend compulsory
universal military training, for the following reasons: —
First, because no such plan is necessary from the point of
view of national defense.
Second, because there are not now (and will not be for some
years) enough officers available to suggest any possibility of
success for the plan if now adopted.
Third, because of the expense involved.
Fourth, because any such radical proposition should be tested
by a longer lapse of time than has occurred since the present
agitation for preparedness arose. -
B. MILITARY TRAINING IN THE SCHOOLs.
“Military training” in the schools, as the words are used by
different persons, may mean one or more of several things.
First, military drill, in the sense of training with a musket,
manual of arms and close order formation. In a word, an
imitation of the sort of training which a young man receives at
the armory when he goes into the militia.
Second, physical exercises and physical training which will
develop not only the body but the attention and mind of the
boy receiving it.
Third, the teaching of true military history, personal hygiene,
and camp sanitation. -
Fourth, the teaching of love of country and willingness, to
serve it. .
The overwhelming weight of opinion from school teachers,
military experts, officers of both the regular army and the
militia, and the general public is against military drill as de-
fined in the first clause above. It is generally agreed that the
military drill which a boy receives in school is of little or no
advantage to him from the point of view of practical soldiering.
As far as available evidence goes, drill in the schools has had
no beneficial effect in promoting enlistments in the militia
except in a few isolated localities. For various reasons, it has
seemed to create a dislike for soldiering. Military drill in the
schools is objected to by many on the ground that boys of
school age have not attained sufficient mental maturity to
31
appreciate what war and fighting mean, and are therefore
unable to digest ideas which military drill presents to them in
concrete form. It is worth noting that military drill as such
is given in the schools of no countries of the world except
Australia and Japan.
The Commission does not recommend military drill in the
schools but is opposed to it.
Physical training which tends to make a boy strong, phys-
ically well set up and mentally alert is the proper preparation
for the real intensive training necessary to make a soldier, as
it is also the proper preparation for civil life. The overwhelm-
ing weight of public opinion favors the greater development of
physical training in the schools and the standardization and
inspection of such training by some central authority.
The Commission recommends the adoption of a systematic
plan of physical training in the schools and has drafted legis-
lation providing for that purpose. It believes that the basis of
such training should be the system of calisthenics used for many
years at West Point under the supervision of Captain Herman
J. Koehler, not because that system is particularly military,
but because, according to the consensus of expert opinion, it is
the best system which can now be adopted.
The Commission also recommends the teaching of personal
hygiene, camp sanitation, and the truth about our military
history, in the schools. -
The Commission also recommends the establishment of
training camps for school boys during one month of the
summers preceding or following their last year in high or
Latin Schools. Attendance at such camps should be voluntary
and they should be conducted under the joint supervision of
the State Board of Education and the Adjutant-General.
The teaching of patriotism or love of country in the schools
is something which can hardly be standardized or provided for
by legislation. Nevertheless, the Commission feels warranted
in expressing the hope that teachers throughout the Common-
wealth will feel that it is their duty to inculcate these ideals in
the minds of the boys under their charge as a real part of the
school life.
The most frequent criticism as to American boys is that they
32
seem to lack a sense of responsibility or of loyalty and duty
to something beyond themselves. A spirit of devotion to his
country is the finest spirit which a boy can acquire. That spirit
is not at all incompatible with the teaching that every endeavor
must be made to maintain peace. The militaristic spirit which
means blind faith in the doctrine of force is perhaps the most
vicious idea which could be instilled in a boy's mind. The
military spirit which means a willingness to serve and fight for
his country in time of need, which recognizes as abhorrent the
point of view which relies on others to perform the service and
do the fighting, is a fine and unselfish sentiment which can not
be too early instilled into the youthful mind.
There is no need to use the word military in this connection.
It is offensive to many, and unquestionably means very differ-
ent things to different people. What the boy should be taught
is that nothing can ever make other than glorious and holy the
death of one who dies for his country, and that no boy can shift
to the shoulders of others a duty to the nation any more than
he can a duty to his family or friends.
Recommendations Summarized.
The definite recommendations of the Commission for affirma-
tive action are as follows: —
1. The Federalization of the militia in the manner described in
this report.
An increase in numbers by means of a reserve, and change in
methods of training of the militia if it remains a State force.
2. Relieving the militia of police duty and the establishment
of a State mounted police.
3. Courses of military instruction in colleges located in
Massachusetts. -
4. Development of physical training in the public schools
according to a prescribed standard.
5. Teaching of military history, personal hygiene and camp
sanitation in the public schools.
6. Establishment for school-boys of summer training camps.
7. Enrollment of mechanics and census of factories of certain
industries if the same is not provided for by Federal legislation.
33
8. Institution of courses in military hygiene in medical
schools.
Conclusion.
If successful results are to be obtained under the voluntary
system, not only co-operation but concentration of activity is
necessary. The Commission feels that much of the present
interest and enthusiasm as to national defense is in danger of
being dissipated in efforts which are not really effective parts
of a co-ordinated whole.
In case this country became suddenly involved in war every
sort of military training would need to be availed of. At the
present moment the volunteer spirit should be concentrated on
filling up the State's quota of the Federal militia and in pro-
ducing officers. Young men, say those under thirty, who wish
to be really of service should go into the Federal militia or into
the State militia if that is maintained. Older men, physically
capable of being officers, should take steps to fit themselves for
commissions. Indiscriminate military training in isolated and
sporadic cases is not what the occasion requires.
Those who are unable to take an active part in one of the
two ways suggested immediately above can best help by giving
active support to those who do, and by themselves assisting
in the economic and industrial organization without which no
military system of defense can be adequate.
In the past our militia has received little support or en-
couragement from the general public. The patriotism and self-
sacrifice of its members, who for years have performed devoted
service in a period when there was little or no interest in
military affairs, have received scant recognition. Few persons
have even known the amount of time which many of our militia
officers have unselfishly given to their duties. In substituting
a healthy and co-operative interest for this indifference every
member of the public can be of real assistance. As represent-
ing a part of the public this Commission desires to express its
appreciation of the services of the men and officers of our
militia and to record its gratitude for the same.
In solving the problem of our national defense the co-
operation of every one is to be welcomed. The occasion
34
provides both a duty and an opportunity. Nothing is worth
striving for but an ideal; no ideal is of practical value unless
it is in some way represented by a fact. Behind this question
of national defense is our country—at once an ideal and a
fact—to which we can all offer the devotion of our hearts
and the energy of our minds.
ROBERT L. RAYMOND, Chairman.
WALTON A. GREEN, Secretary.
CHARLES W. LYONS, S.J.
J. FRANK O’HARE.
WILLIAM A. PEW.
WILLIAM STOPFORD.
JOHN J. SULLIVAN.
HAROLD E. SWEET.
DEc. 10, 1915.
35
I regret that I cannot give unqualified assent to the report
and recommendations which are presented to the General
Court by the majority of this Commission.
I am heartily in favor of most of the recommendations,
especially those which provide that the militia be made a
Federal force, that provision be made by the Commonwealth
for the development of physical training in the public schools,
and that military drill be not established in the public schools.
One of the recommendations does not seem to me wise, –
that which provides for the establishment of summer camps
under the direction of the Board of Education and the Adjutant-
General. With respect to this recommendation my objection
is rather to the method proposed than to the essential purpose
of the recommendation.
I cannot give complete approval to the formulated body of
information and opinion in which the recommendations are ex-
plained and justified. With much of it I am in sympathy, but
with respect to a number of points of varying degrees of im-
portance I find myself in disagreement with the other members
of the Commission.
ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN.
DEC. 13, 1915.
36
THE ADJUTANT GENERAL's OFFICE,
STATE House, Boston, 13 December, 1915.
RoBERT L. RAYMond, Esq., Chairman, State Military Commission,
: Boston, Mass.
DEAR SIR: — I have carefully read the general report of
your Commission to the Legislature, and desire to record my
indorsement of every one of the recommendations contained
therein. -
The recommendations as to the Massachusetts Volunteer
Militia, should they remain as at present, a State force, if
adopted by the Legislature, should make for a marked increase
in the efficiency of our State troops. .
Very respectfully,
CHAS. H. COLE,
The Adjutant General,-Chief of Staff.
SPECIAL REPORT ON MILITIA AS A STATE FORCE.
In the main body of its report the Commission has recom-
mended that the militia of Massachusetts be federalized,
therefore the sub-joined suggestions, as to improvement of the
present state militia are submitted as an alternative if the
militia is not federalized.
Officers, Selection and Education.
The education of officers is discussed in the main body of
the report.
A far-reaching weakness of our present militia system, a
weakness which permeates every branch of the service, is the
method by which officers receive commissions through popular
election. It is to this system that much of the undesirable
and unmilitary social aspect has been traceable in the past.
There are many reasons why the election of officers is inad-
visable, but it is perhaps enough to name one of these reasons,
namely, that the average young militiaman is incapable of
judging as to the amount of technical knowledge which is
requisite in a man who is to exercise command. The young
militiaman is prone to cast his vote for the man who is a
social good fellow and an agreeable and easy task-master.
Although the Commission is of the opinion that the elective
system should be abolished, yet it is uncertain as to what
method should be substituted. It feels that any method
which shall presently be inaugurated will prove at the outset
experimental in its nature, and must therefore be worked out
by experience. The Commission suggests that in any method
that is ultimately adopted, it will prove advisable to permit
the selecting power, whatever that may be, to exercise its
function only upon such candidates for promotion as have
passed standardized tests, or who have been certified by some
central examining board, or who are graduates of certain
approved training schools for officers.
38
Militia Reserve.
The idea of a military reserve implies a system by which a
personnel can be supplied and equipped within a short period
to raise and to maintain an organization at a required strength.
This involves maintaining a depot for equipments, and a body
of men, prepared by previous training and ready for immediate
mobilization with their organizations. A State Arsenal sup-
plied with necessary equipments fulfills the requirements of a
depot. Any scheme of increasing the enlistment period, and
excusing men serving in the last part of it from active training,
would create a paper reserve. The efficiency of such a reserve
depends upon its previous training. It is assumed that such a
reserve would receive its training in connection with the
organization to which it is attached. The problem of a reserve
cannot properly be considered apart from the training of the
organization for which the reserve exists.
As the infantry represents larger numbers and its cohesion
raises more difficult problems than the other arms, we shall
consider its organization and training. Other branches of the
service are more closely associated with and anchored to
materials which assist in maintaining cohesion; the gun is a
center for artillerymen, and the cavalryman and his horse are
inseparable. In the case of the infantrymen there is nothing
but discipline and training to hold men together. Excepting
the collection of matériel and the technical training it is easier
to create the other arms than good infantry.
There are at present sixty-four companies of infantry scat-
tered throughout the State. Each company is a social and
military unit. They are partially held together by a social
cement, the chief motive in which is the possibility of a good
time. This social phase has been encouraged as a means of
securing recruits. The State has supplied expensive armories,
and has encouraged their use as social centers. The military
work required of these soldiers is tempered not to exceed their
enthusiasm. A Regimental or Company Commander who can
work up a public spirit in his organization for military effi-
ciency, is allowed a free rein, but no one is required to do
more than to appear at Inspections with fairly full ranks,
39
clean equipments and some shooting ability. There is no-
where behind the system any means of control which compels
obedience. Efficiency is elective and left in a large measure
to individual initiative. Men attend drills or not as they
please. Nothing happens to them for non-attendance except
a discharge, which involves no evil consequence, and is often
welcome to a man who thinks the game too strenuous. The
men are protected against hard task-masters by the ballot and
a controlling voice in the selection of officers.
The public has a deep interest in the efficiency of the militia
and in making it a training school, where the results attained
shall be somewhat commensurate with the large sums spent in
its maintenance.
Our present loose system precludes uniform efficiency. At
best it produces in companies here and there a sporadic effi-
ciency depending upon casual leadership, which is not of much
value, except as it suggests that under trained leadership,
with proper means of control, the mass of citizen soldiers can
be played up to a higher plane of military efficiency.
Experience recognizes that in training youths to correct
conduct, behavior must at first be imposed from without and
practiced until finally the outward requirements become trans-
formed into personal volition. This principle applies in making
soldiers. Men must be made to conform in their actions to
standards in the expectation that proper behavior will induce
the correct emotional tones of which the imposed behavior is
the physiological expression. We begin by acting like soldiers
and end by being soldiers. This has always been a basic prin-
ciple in military instruction, and it has been found always neces-
sary to lodge somewhere behind this training, a power which
compels obedience. The absence of this power and the presence
of the social and elective elements are insurmountable obstacles
to military efficiency in the militia and should be eliminated.
An important principle in military training is standardization,
not only in ways of doing but in ways of thinking, and feeling.
The proper feeling and thinking tone is usually transmitted by
suggestion and imitation. The isolation of our companies
precludes the close association with standards necessary to
secure this kind of uniformity. There is a lack of uniformity
40
among officers, the remedy for which requires greater care in
their selection and fuller opportunities for instruction and
training.
There is a way by which the rank and file can be made
efficient in a few years, if all recruits at the beginning of their
enlistment are assembled in one camp of instruction for a
period sufficiently long and under a training sufficiently in-
tensive to create in them the proper set in the nervous system
which constitutes discipline.
The system of training in such a camp should involve —
1. The orderly habits necessary for the preservation of
health and the timely movement of troops.
2. Personal hygiene and care under service conditions.
3. The expert use and care of arms.
4. Tactical team play.
5. Discipline. .
The teaching of discipline is the hardest problem, as it in-
volves the building up of every kind of habit useful in military
life.
The process takes time, as it involves changes and re-group-
ings in the nervous system.
The process of acquiring discipline is (1) Knowledge. This
consists of setting before recruits standards, and gradually
developing in them, according to their power of absorption, an
idea of what a soldier should be, not only how he should look
and carry himself physically, but how he should think, feel
and act under all conditions. (2) Valuation of standards.
Developing the self respect of recruits in such a way that they
acquire a master sentiment to conform and mould their lives
to the accepted standards. (3) Efforts of will. Practice and
the struggles with other impulses, by which standards are
assimilated. The time limit of such training depends upon
the intelligence and willingness of recruits and the ability of
instructors.
It is an open question, whether there are enough young men
in the State, who will volunteer in times of peace to undergo
the necessary training to make real soldiers, but it is proposed
to try further the voluntary system.
The following is suggested as a proper scheme of recruiting:
41
determine the number of troops needed; divide the State into
districts for recruiting companies or equivalent units; open
lists for voluntary enrollments. Enlistments to be for a period
of six years, three of which are to be with the colors and
three with the reserve. Recruiting in all localities for any one
year to take place at the same time. All recruits, irrespective
of organizations, to be assembled for four weeks of instruction
in camp. This camp period to be one of intensive training.
Immediately thereafter recruits to be assigned to companies,
and required each year to participate with the organization to
which they are assigned, in their armory drills or other ex-
ercises, and to attend manoeuvres for a period of two weeks.
At the end of enlistments soldiers to be transferred to a reserve
for three years.
To meet the requirements of intensive training during the
first year of enlistment, it will be necessary to create a recruit
depot and attach to it a personnel of officers. Should the
militia be called into the service of the United States this
recruit depot would be utilized to receive and train the recruits
necessary to replace casualties in the organizations called out.
Attendance at Drills.
As organized, our infantry companies are skeletons. The
maximum number allowed to each company is about forty-
three per cent of war strength. In practice, this percentage
is somewhat reduced, as few companies maintain the maximum
allowance of men. For continuous and systematic training,
these skeletons are further reduced by a flux of privates, who
enroll, attend a few drills or a camp, and disappear. The
time of officers, instead of being devoted to instruction, is
dissipated in drumming up recruits.
Owing to this system of voluntary attendance, a progressive
program is impossible, and instruction rarely goes beyond a
rudimentary state, and is generally superficial. Of those who do
attend drills, many become tired, because no progress is made,
and drop out. The few who stick become officers and non-
commissioned officers, and acquire some practice in com-
manding and drilling recruits in the rudiments. Our companies
42
are mere shells. Privates learn very little of military values,
and serve mostly as pawns in the training of officers.
Attention is invited to the impossibility of proper training
because of non-attendance. The militia needs law to compel
attendance at all drills and tours of duty, during the whole
period for which recruits pledge themselves to serve. Such law
would not work any hardship upon the youngsters who make up
the rank and file of the militia, and would probably be a mere
background suggestion which would accomplish its purpose by
furnishing the necessary incentive to secure attendance.
Reference is made to a draft of legislation, which will be
found in Appendix W.
WALTON A. GREEN,
WILLIAM A. PEW,
WILLIAM STOPFORD,
JOHN J. SULLIVAN,
Sub-Committee on State Militia.
A PPIENT) ICES.
\
A P P E N D I x I.
REsolves, 1915, CHAP. 81.
Resolve authorizing the Appointment of a Special Board to report
upon the Practicability of Providing Military Education for
Boys and of Creating a Militia Reserve.
Resolved, That three officers of the militia of the rank of cap-
tain or higher rank, and six persons not members of the militia,
all to be appointed by the governor within two weeks after the
passage of this resolve, shall constitute a board to inquire into
and report upon the following matters: —
(1) The practicability of providing military education for boys
between the ages of fourteen and twenty-one for the purpose of
securing a proper military training and discipline for the youths
of this commonwealth and improving their physical, moral and
mental qualities and for providing for the commonwealth an ade-
quate basis for a citizen soldiery.
(2) The practicability of providing military training for youths
in the public high schools.
(3) The advisability of requiring enrolment in the Massachu-
setts volunteer militia for a period of three years of all male
citizens and of such as have declared their intention to become
citizens upon attaining the age of twenty-one years, or a suffi-
cient number thereof to maintain the several organizations of
the Massachusetts volunteer militia at the maximum strength
prescribed by law.
(4) The practicability of creating a militia reserve in the com-
monwealth, including: —
A. The keeping of records by state authorities of all retired
members of the militia, with names and addresses for a period
of seven years after the termination of their enlistment.
B. Provisions for limiting periods of training for such retired
members.
C. Organization of said militia reserve and methods by which
it might be mustered as active militia in case of need.
D. The cost to the state of any plan recommended by the
board. e
46
The board is authorized, in its discretion, to consider any re-
lated matter whether or not the same is particularly mentioned
in this resolve. The members of the board shall serve without
pay, but the board may employ a clerk and incur such expense in
the performance of its duty, not exceeding one thousand dollars,
as may be authorized by the governor and council. The board
shall report the result of its investigations to the general court on
or before the second Wednesday in January in the year nineteen
hundred and sixteen, and shall accompany its report with such
recommendations for legislation as the board may deem advisable.
[Approved May 6, 1915.
47
A P P E N D I X II.
List of Hearings and Speakers.
During the course of the public hearings held in Boston and in
the different cities of the State one hundred and twenty-five
persons appeared before the Commission and presented their
views.
Room 440, STATE House, BosTon.
Sept. 15. — Prof. R. M. Johnston,
Adj.-Gen. Charles H. Cole,
Lt.-Col. John H. Dunn,
M. H. Gulesian,
Marshall P. Thompson.
Sept. 22. — J. Randolph Coolidge,
Ex. Adj.-Gen. Pearson,
Mrs. Edwin D. Mead,
Lt.-Col. Willis W. Stover.
Sept. 29. — Gov. David I. Walsh,
Lt.-Col. Willis W. Stover,
Dr. George W. Nasmyth,
Capt. Harry G. Chase.
Oct. 6. — Maj. Henry L. Higginson,
Dr. Hugh Cabot,
Hon. Samuel J. Elder,
Ex-Rep. George T. Daley,
J. Wells Farley.
Oct. 15. — Hudson Maxim,
Henry H. Chamberlain,
Com. James P. Parker,
A. Gifford Alley.
Oct. 20. — A. Lawrence Lowell,
Charles W. Eliot,
J. H. McCurdy,
Hon. Charles T. Davis,
Hon. L. A. Frothingham,
Capt. Walter Bouvé.
Oct. 27. — William E. Hocking,
John P. Meade, A. F. of L.,
Hon. Herbert Parker,
Lt. Edgar Z. Steever, U. S. A.,
Capt. M. Sumner Holbrook.
48
Nov. 3. — Dr. Morton Prince,
Henry S. Haskins, Secretary, Mass. Peace Society,
Mrs. J. Malcolm Forbes,
Rev. Samuel C. Bushnell,
* Dr. Dudley A. Sargent,
Whitfield S. Tuck,
Col. Homer B. Sprague,
J. F. Higgins,
Maj. Charles H. Rollins, M. W. M.,
Denys P. Myers, World Peace Foundation.
Nov. 10. — Maj.-Gen. William H. Devine, M. W. M.,
Fred E. Foye, Department Commander, Spanish War
Weterans,
Capt. C. A. Ranlett,
Livy Richards,
Miss Annetta E. Esilman,
Mrs. Glendower Evans.
FALL RIVER HEARING, Nov. 5, 1915, ALDERMANIC CHAMBER.
Capt. William B. Edgar, Naval Brigade,
James Marshall,
Capt. D. Hartwell Dyer, G. A. R.,
Dr. John Gilbert,
Lawrence Hayden,
Thomas Clifford,
Frederic W. Plummer, Principal, B. M. C. D. High School,
Fred F. Bergeron (School Committee),
Citizen William Kershaw,
Benjamin F. King, Attleboro School Board Chairman,
Lewis A. Fales, Attleboro,
Ex-Rep. Jackson,
Hector L. Belisle (School Committee, Superintendent).
LAWRENCE HEARING, Nov. 8, 1915, CITY HALL.
Major Thorndike Howe,
James D. Horne (Principal, High School),
Rev. James T. O'Reilly (St. Mary's Church),
Joseph McCarthy (Editor, Telegram),
Edson Keith.
WoRCESTER HEARING, Nov. 9, 1915, CouncIL CHAMBER.
Dr. Howard Beal, Henry H. Chamberlain,
Frank F. Dresser, Charles P. Adams,
Alvin E. Whitehead, Arthur Stavely,
Arthur C. Commins, Eugene F. Burr,
49.
Thomas F. Maroney, William H. Thornton,
A. W. Calhoun, Edw. D. Cunningham,
John W. Odlin, Theo. Benda,
Capt. John F. J. Herbert, George J. Rockwell,
Abraham Capps, Lewis M. Nuss.
FITCHBURG HEARING, Nov. 9, 1915, THE ARMORY.
Dr. James Chalmers (Superintendent of Schools),
Joseph G. Edgerley (Ex-Superintendent of Schools),
Charles E. Akeley, Lt., Co. B Fusiliers,
John G. Faxon, Representative-elect,
Hon. Arthur H. Lowe, Ex-Mayor,
Charles T. Woodbury (Principal, High School),
John F. Bresnahan,
Major Dolan.
SPRINGFIELD HEARING, Nov. 11, 1915, ALDERMANIC CHAMBER.
Col. William C. Hays, Colonel Second Regiment, M. W. M.,
Hon. Frank E. Stacey, Mayor of Springfield,
Dr. Van Sickle,
C. E. Warner,
Capt. Herbert F. Hartwell,
Lieut. Clifford A. Tinker, O
Thomas Loorem,
A. E. Metzdorf,
Jacob Henin,
Messrs. Grady, Chapin, and Franklin,
F. H. Kent, -
Lieut. Henry C. Martin,
E. T. Broadhurst,
Ralph W. Ellis,
Dr. J. H. McCurdy,
Mrs. S. C. Roberts.
PITTSFIELD HEARING, Nov. 12, 1915, CouncIL CHAMBER.
Capt. Ambrose McClogher, Charles E. P. Turner,
M. D. Steever, George E. Haynes,
Stewart H. Clapp, K. B. Miller,
Charles McKernon, Mrs. Charles Croughwell,
J. H. Gamwell, Cummings C. Chesney,
A. C. Washburn, Charles P. MacGregor.
J. A. Barker,
50
A P P E N D IX III.
Brief Summaries of Principal Military Systems.
The Commission believes the following brief popular sum-
maries of the military systems of other leading countries may
be of interest. They are, of course, based on conditions existing
before the Great War.
Swiss SYSTEM.
Compulsory Universal Service. — The Swiss Constitution pro-
vides that every man is liable to perform military duty between
the ages of 20 to 48. (Legal liability begins at 17, but service
at 20.)
ExEMPTIONs. – (a) Federal officials; (b) employees postal and
telegraph service; (c) officials of hospitals and prisons; (d) police;
(e) clergymen; (f) teachers.
Divisions of Service. — The Army is divided into three
classes: — ©
Elite, . . . . . . . . . . Men from 20 to 32
Landwehr, . . . . . . . . . Men from 32 to 40
Landsturm, . . . . . . . . . . Men from 40 to 48
Elite. — At 20 the young Swiss reports for admittance to
service and is examined by local commissions. Examinations
are both physical and mental, the former being very severe.
About 50 per cent. of those reporting are rejected. If the candi-
date passes he is given his soldier's register in which there will
be recorded his entire military history. He is also issued uniform,
equipment and rifle. These he takes home and keeps during his
whole period of service, being responsible for them and their
condition under heavy penalties.
The first year's course of instruction is at designated training
places, and is called a recruit school. Eight hours work per
day, Sundays excepted, are required. Instruction is in school of
the soldier, company and battalion, target practice, care of arms,
cooking and hygiene. Recruits during their first year serve —
Infantry, Engineers and Foot Artillery, 65 days.
Artillery and Garrison, 75 days.
Cavalry, 90 days.
5i
After first year soldiers in Elite (other than Cavalry) are
called out seven times, for a service lasting from 11 to 14 days.
Cavalry serve only ten years, i.e., to age of 30 in the Élite; but
are called out eight times for service of 11 days each.
Training periods after the recruit course are devoted chiefly to
tactical manoeuvres in large bodies. Division operates against
division, starting at widely separated points.
At all times the training is very practical. Little attention is
paid to mathematical precision in marching. Field work, with
long marches in full kit, is the rule. Average march, 15 to 19
miles.
Landwehr. — Called out only once for service of 11 days.
Landsturm. — Called out only in case of war.
School Instruction. – Every boy must attend school until 15.
From 10 to 15 boy is given athletic and gymnastic exercises but
no distinctive military instruction. Object is to turn out vigorous
and agile men with minds impressed with ideas of duty and
honor. This instruction is controlled by the cantons.
Voluntary Organizations. – There are voluntary military or-
ganizations for boys known as “Cadet Corps.” Rifle-shooting
is a national sport as baseball is here. There are many rifle
clubs. Some are for boys from 11 to 20. In 1914 about 13,000
boys were members of these clubs. Rifle clubs for adults are
under federal control and encouragement and have a membership
of over 213,000.
Strength of Army. — Switzerland can mobilize a trained and
equipped army of 220,000 soldiers in twenty-four hours. Behind
this first line is a reserve of 270,000 men, of whom 70,000 are
armed.
Military Tax. – Every Swiss citizen at home or abroad be-
tween the ages of 20 and 44, who for any reason is not accepted
and enrolled in the active or reserve armies, is obliged to pay a
military tax. This tax is of three kinds: —
1. Military poll tax, $1.20.
2. Military property tax of .15 per cent. of assessed value of
property in excess of $200.
3. Military income tax of 1.5 per cent. on income.
This tax is in addition to all other taxes; the assessments are
rigorously made and every penny is exacted.
52
AUSTRALIAN SYSTEM.
Compulsory Universal Service. — The Australian “Defence
Act” makes military training and service compulsory upon all
male British subjects between the ages of 12 and 26.
Exemptions.— Temporary exemptions are granted to: (a)
School teachers qualified as instructors of junior cadets (see infra);
(b) members of regular army and navy; (c) residents of sparsely
settled districts; (d) residents 5 miles from training places; (e)
theological students; (f) those physically unfit.
Permanent disqualification exists against: (a) those convicted
of crime; (b) those of bad moral character. -
Divisions of Service. -
Junior Cadets, . . . . . . . . . . Age 12 to 14.
Senior Cadets, . . . . . . . . . . Age 14 to 18.
Citizen Forces, . . . . . . . . . . Age 18 to 26.
Junior Cadets. – Education is compulsory up to 14 years in
most of the Australian states and shortly will become so in all of
them. Three-fourths of those liable to Junior Cadet training are
in the State Schools and the rest in private schools. Consequently
the Schools supply this training with supervision from the military
authorities.
The course covers 120 hours per annum and consists of: (a)
at least fifteen minutes of general physical training; (b) infantry
squad drill; (c) any two of the following: (1) miniature rifle
shooting; (2) swimming; (3) running games; (4) first aid.
No uniform is required or allowed. The object of this train-
ing is simply to improve the physique of the boys, and medical
examination is intended only to exclude those who would be
injured by the work. In 1913, 55,850 junior cadets were in
training.
Senior Cadets. – All boys must be registered in January of
the year in which they become 14. In July of that year, after a
rigid medical examination at which about 10 per cent. are re-
jected, they receive uniforms, “record books” and arms (all of
which they use only when on duty), and are told off to com-
panies. They are now a part of the army and liable to any
service required. For the convenience of schools having 60
senior cadets or over and a qualified instructor, the organization
of special units at such schools is permitted.
53
The course covers 4 whole days, 12 half days and 24 night
drills annually. At the end of each year a military board
examines each cadet and passes him as “effective” or requires
an extra year's service if he is “non-effective.” In 1911 there
were 92 batallions of senior cadets, with 922 companies and
89,184 officers and cadets. (N.B. The “batallion,” as applied
to senior cadets, is a geographical and not a numerical division.)
Citizen Forces. – At 18 years all senior cadets receive a
severe medical examination for the citizen forces, at which over
30 per cent. are generally rejected. Each soldier is armed exactly
as in the British army.
The course covers 7 years, in each of which there must be 16
full days’ service (8 of which must be in camps of continuous
training) and 1 year wherein attendance is required only at regis-
tration or muster parade. (N.B. Artillerymen and engineers
must serve 25 days annually for the first 7 years, 17 of which
days must be spent in camp.)
All promotion is by competitive examination based on merit and
is from the ranks. In 1913 the citizen forces were 45,000 men
and ultimately will number 152,000. Discipline is carried out
by fines and no defaulter can ever obtain government employ-
ment.
Reserves. – There is no reserve force, but on completing the
twenty-sixth year, the men are expected to join the rifle clubs,
which receive government encouragement.
Regular Army Force. — The regular army force in 1911
consisted of 2,003 officers and men.
FRENCH SYSTEM.
Compulsory Universal Service. — All men are compelled to
serve 3 years in active military service. Although Frenchmen
need spend only 3 years in barracks, they are all subject to
service from the age of 20 to the age of 48, - thus remaining at
the disposal of the military authorities for twenty-eight years.
Only the infirm are excused. .
The Active Army. — The active army is composed of soldiers
accomplishing their three years of compulsory service. -
Every year, from the first to the fifteenth of January, census
tables are drawn up by the municipalities. On these tables are
inscribed the names of all those young men who have attained
the age of 20 during the year, and who are domiciled in the
commune. These young men are then summoned to appear,
54
in the simplest clothing, before a special council, which is known
as the council of revision, and which meets at the chief town in
the district; it is presided over by the prefect, and comprises a
general, a councillor-general, an arrondissement councillor, and a
councillor of the prefecture. A military surgeon examines the
young men, and the council decides whether they are fit for
service or whether they should be “adjourned.” All those
incorporated are afterwards inscribed on a special register, —
when they receive a military livret, or memorandum book, which
they must produce whenever required.
Distribution of Recruits. – Recruits may be drafted to any
garrison; in other words, recruiting is not local or territorial,
but national; a young man born at Marseilles may be sent, for
example, to Dunkirk. º
The recruiting of the reserves and the territorial army is
always regional, with a view to rapidity of mobilization.
Special Engagements. – Men more than 18 and less than 32
years of age, who are neither married nor widowers with children,
may, on condition that they have never been condemned by the
courts, engage to serve for four or five years. Re-engagements,
having the great advantage of strengthening the staff of under
officers, are encouraged by premiums and by higher pay. The
ex-under officers re-engaged have the right also to pensions in
proportion and to civil employments.
Special Enlistments, and Postponement of Service. — Young
men who contract to serve for more than three years may join
before the age of 20 under certain conditions, and those who are
students or engaged in some industrial, agricultural, or commer-
cial exploitation may obtain, upon the advice of the council of
revision, a postponement of service, renewable in some cases
until the age of 25.
National Colleges. – Young men admitted to the entrance
examinations in certain national schools — the Normal Superior
College, the Central College of Arts and Manufactures, the
School of Forestry, the School of Bridges and Highways, and the
School of Mines – may receive there a special military training,
and are prepared for the grade of sub-lieutenant of reserves. If
they pass the necessary examinations for this grade, they need
serve only one year as soldiers and may complete their time as
officers. Young men admitted to the Military School of Saint-Cyr
or the Polytechnique School of Engineers must themselves pass
a year in barracks. All young Frenchmen are subject to this
common rule.
55
In the barracks the soldiers receive a course of thorough physical
training, in addition to which is complete instruction in the whole
duty of the soldier, both theoretical and practical. .
Divisions of Service. — The term of service in the ranks of
the first line, or “active” army, is, as has been said, three years,
and the men join at the age of 20. The soldier completing this
time then belongs to the reserve for eleven years; after which he
passes to the “territorial” army for seven years; finally com-
pleting his service with seven years in the “territorial” reserve.
Men of the reserve of the active army are called up for training
and manoeuvres twice in their period of reserve service, for four
weeks on each occasion. The men of the “territorial” army
have only one training of two weeks, and those of the “terri-
torial” reserve no periodical training.
Mobilization. — Owing to the length of the reserve service
the number of reservists per battalion is very large (2,000 or
more). On mobilization, therefore, the reserve not only brings
its unit to war strength, but every battalion and regiment forms
a corresponding reserve unit, and there is still a certain surplus
left for the depôt. In peace time the troops on the eastern
frontier have a considerably higher establishment than the
remainder. The mobilized strength of a normal army corps
would be nearly 33,000 combatants. The strength of a cavalry
division of six regiments would be about 4,700 combatants.
Strength of the Metropolitan and Colonial Armies of France.
— The Metropolitan Army has 736,164 men in France, and
82,368 men in Algeria and Tunis, – making a total of 818,532
IQ6. Il.
The Colonial Army has 28,000 men in France, and 59,000
men in the French colonies, – making a total of 87,000 men.
The general total, therefore, on a normal footing is about 900,000.
GERMAN SYSTEM.
Compulsory Universal Service. — The whole of the German
military system is dominated by the principle of universal service
according to which every male subject is liable to military service
from his 17th to his 45th year. Service actually begins at 20.
Exemptions. – The number of exemptions depends upon the
budget granted to the army for the period concerned. The
budget has never allowed a full application of the principle in
times of peace. Those afflicted with physical defects, however
slight, are certain of exemption, also only sons indispensable to
their family, and usually theological students. All classes of
offenders against the law are excluded from service while under
court suspension of their civil honor. -
Types of Recruits. – From the standpoint of military train-
ing the men of the ranks are divided into two groups, those who
have completed an education equal roughly to our High School
course, i.e., through the seventh year of the Gymnasium or
Realschule, and those who have not.
Regular Recruits. – The latter must serve two years with
the colors if enlisted with the infantry, three years if with the
cavalry or horse artillery. These years are spent in severe mili-
tary drill. The men are housed in the government barracks, are
clothed and fed and allowed a small pay of about 6 cents a day.
Small manoeuvres are frequently held, but every fall a grand
manoeuvre of eight weeks under the most complete war condi-
tions possible is engaged in. Aside from the physical drill
schools are conducted for the men by the lieutenants to give
instruction in the most elementary military science, history and
geography.
Reserve. — After the two or three years with the colors the
men are assigned to the reserve for five or four years. During
this term they are called upon to take part in two grand fall
manoeuvres of eight weeks each.
Landwehr, First Ban. — For the next five years they are
attached to the first ban of the Landwehr, during which time
they undergo two trainings of from one to two weeks each. The
cavalry receives no additional training after leaving the reserve.
Second Ban. — After five years with the first ban the men
are enrolled with the second ban of the Landwehr up to the com-
pletion of the 39th year; but no training is demanded during
this time.
Landsturm. — After this up to 45 they compose the first ban
of the Landsturm. The second ban of the Landsturm is made
up of untrained men between the ages of 39 and 45. The
Landsturm receives no training and is the last to be called out
in time of war, and then only provided the war is a defensive
OIle.
The actual training of the ordinary private then consists of
two full years with the colors, twice eight weeks with the reserve,
and twice one to two weeks during the next five years with the
first ban of the Landwehr.
57
Noncommissioned Officers. — In times of peace promotions
from the ranks are made only to all ranks of noncommissioned
officers, ranging from the lance-corporal to the sergeant-major.
Rarely more than the first promotion is made during the first two
years with the colors. Those who have completed the two years
with an honorable record have the option of remaining with the
colors as corporals. Upon completion of twelve years of honor-
able service the state provides to retiring noncommissioned
officers employment in its civil service followed by old age
pensions.
One-year Volunteers. — Those who have completed the so-
called high school education mentioned above may enter the
army as one-year volunteers. This shortens the service with the
colors by one year and exempts from most barrack duty. In
return, volunteers must supply their own lodging, board, and
uniforms. Though the training in most respects is identical with
that of the ordinary private, due allowance is made for the higher
intellect of this class. Promotion to lance-corporal is made on the
basis of record at the end of the first half year and to corporal
after the fall manoeuvres. Such corporals then have the option of
serving in the very next grand manoeuvres, at the end of which, if
their record is still favorable, they are admitted to an examination
on the basis of which they are recommended to their local corps of
officers for promotion to lieutenants of the reserve. In time of
war this class furnishes the bulk of officers for the reserve and the
Landwehr. It is interesting to note that a very large percentage
of one-year volunteers choose to serve during their first year at
the university with a regiment stationed in a university town.
Thus they manage to satisfy not only the exacting military re-
quirements and the requirements of the first university year,
which may be made very light, but also the rather heavy duties
imposed upon the first year men by the fraternities at a German
university. The ratio of the one-year volunteer to the ordinary
private seems to be as high as 1 to 25.
Ersatz. — All able-bodied men who have not been accepted by
the recruiting officers are assigned to the “Ersatz Reserve,” a
substitute reserve, to which they belong up to the end of the
39th year. After that up to 45 they are enrolled in the second
ban of the Landsturm. These men are drafted and trained in
time of war. With an especially favorable army budget they
sometimes receive short training in times of peace. This body
is variously estimated, the lowest figure being about half a mil-
lion able-bodied men.
58
Officers. Types of Applications. – Those who seek regular
commissions in the army either enter a cadet school at a very
early age, usually at 10 or 12, or join the ranks as “avantageurs.”
after having passed the one-year volunteer examination or the
university matriculation examination, or, in many cases, as late
as after one or two years at the university. -
Cadet Schools. – The training at the cadet schools, of whic
there are eleven, is severe and under an excellent staff of instruc-
tors, but is not very broad. It is strictly a professional school-
ing. Military drill and the rudiments of military science are
carefully ground into the pupils, and mathematics, drawing,
history and geography are taught from a military standpoint.
Much emphasis is also put upon Latin and the principal modern
languages. At these schools the sons of deceased or needy army
officers or other servants of the State are maintained wholly at
the expense of the government. Others pay a sum of less than
$300 a year. Upon graduation after a seven-year course the
cadet is appointed to serve as ensign with the colors.
War Schools. – After a year of such service the brighter men
are sent to the Kriegsschule, war school, while the rest are made
to spend an extra year with the colors. To this school are also
sent the “avantageurs” after having served one, rarely two,
years with the colors as volunteers. Here the higher branches
of military science are taught and the command of modern
languages strengthened. The course is for thirty-five weeks only
and all the expenses are defrayed by the State. After graduation
and upon examination candidates are appointed lieutenants and
assigned to some regiment.
Selected Cadets. – Cadets who have especially distinguished
themselves at the cadet schools are exempted from service with
the colors. Instead they remain at the school an extra year
(“Selecta”), during which they receive instruction similar to
that at the war school and are then admitted to an examination
entitling them to a lieutenant's commission. “Avantageurs.”
who have spent at least one year at the university also need not
attend the war school. A six-months course of study for the
second half of their year with the colors is outlined for them to
prepare them for the lieutenant’s examination.
Promotion. — Promotion is extremely slow if made simply
upon completion of the term of service in each rank prescribed
by the code. Each fall manoeuvre, however, gives the ambitious
young officer a chance to distinguish himself before his superiors.
59
At regular intervals special problems as tests of intellectual
efficiency are assigned to all officers up to the rank of captain,
the solutions of which are sent to the officers of the General Staff
and often made the bases of promotion.
War Academy. — In addition to this, young officers have the
option of applying for admission to the war academy at Berlin.
The examination required for admission is very severe. The
school is conducted by the General Staff, the Kaiser himself tak-
ing a very active part in its management. The instruction
centers about the theory and practice of military strategy and
tactics, the principal purpose of the school seemingly being the
discovery of those most highly gifted along these lines. The
average man is generally dismissed after a year or two and only
the most promising candidate retained for the full three-years
course. The graduates are considered likely candidates for posi-
tions on the General Staff, in the war ministry of the State, or
for all the higher commands in the army.
General Staff. — For a time at least the successful graduate
of the war academy is appointed to the General Staff. This
body, which has complete control over the army and is respon-
sible to the Kaiser alone (for there is no imperial war ministry in
Germany), differs from similar organizations in other countries in
that it continually changes its constituency. Wholly at the dis-
cretion of the Chief of Staff officers are chosen and retained for
shorter or longer periods, ranging from one to fifteen years or
longer.
Functions. – The duties of the General Staff are assigned to
different departments, and consist principally in —
(1) “Procuring the fullest obtainable information about the
organization and the changes occurring in all the armies of the
world; -
(2) “Preparations of every kind to keep the army in a
permanent state of readiness for war;
(3) “Perfecting the means of transportation for the army in
the event of war, especially the railroad lines of strategical
importance.”
There are also departments for topographical surveys of the
empire, for military history, geography and the like.
60
ITALIAN SYSTEM.
Compulsory Universal Service. — Service in the army (or
navy) is compulsory and universal. The total period is nineteen
years, beginning at the age of 20.
Divisions of Service. — The young men of the year are divided
into three categories: the first being posted to the permanent
army; the second also to the permanent army but with “un-
limited leave;” the third, that is those exempted from active
service, to the territorial militia. The second category men form
what is called the “complementary force.”
Term of Service in the Permanent Army, or First Category.
— The term of service in the ranks of the permanent army is
two years for all arms. After passing through the ranks, the men
are placed on “unlimited leave,” i.e., they are transferred to the
reserve, in which they remain for six years. From the reserve
the soldier passes to the mobile militia, the term of service in
which is four years. After completing his time in the mobile
militia he is transferred to the territorial militia, in which he
remains seven years; thus finishing his military service at the
age of 39.
Term of Service in the Second and Third Category. — The
second category recruits are regarded as belonging to the per-
manent army for the first eight years of their service. During
this period they receive from two to six months training, which
may be spread over several years. Then they pass to the mobile
militia and afterwards to the territorial militia, the periods of
service in each being the same as in the case of the first category
soldiers. The men allotted to the third category, who are posted
at once to the territorial militia, receive thirty days’ training.
Distribution of Recruits. – In Italy the regiment receives re-
cruits from all parts of the country, and the troops change their
stations by brigades every four years. On mobilization regiments
would be filled up by reservists from the districts in which they
are quartered at the time. Reliefs are so arranged that at least
one-half the reservists shall have previously served in the unit
which they would join on mobilization.
Carabinieri Force. — This is a force of military police. They
are recruited by selection from the army, and they remain in the
ranks of the force until they have completed three years’ service.
Then they serve in the reserve of the Carabinieri for four years,
after which they are transferred to the territorial militia for the
61
remainder of their service, and are reckoned as a part of the
army. -
Strength of Army. — The strength of the field army (12 army
corps and independent cavalry) is about 400,000 combatants.
The nominal strength of the mobile militia is 326,000, but the
numbers put into the field would not perhaps exceed 200,000.
The “complementary” troops should be sufficient to maintain
the strength of the first line and mobile militia in the field. The
territorial militia is strong numerically, but only about one-half
the number, viz.: the first category men who have passed
through the army and mobile militia, could be made use of
should their service ever be required.
RUSSIAN SYSTEM.
Compulsory Universal Service. — Military service is universal
and compulsory, extending from the age of 20 through the 43rd
year. &
Divisions of Service. — The first line or active army service
is for three years in infantry, field or foot artillery, and for four
years in all other arms. The soldier then passes into the reserve
(Zapas) for fifteen or fourteen years, during which he has two
training periods of six weeks each. At the end of these eighteen
years — active and reserve — the soldier becomes a part of the
territorial army (Opolchénié) for the remaining five years of his
total of twenty-three years’ service.
There is a modified system of one-year volunteers, which
furnishes the majority of the officers required for the reserves on
mobilization. -
Cossacks. – A purely military section of the population of
southeastern European Russia, holding land by military tenure,
is liable to military service for life. These Cossacks are almost
entirely mounted troops, and the men furnish their own horses
and equipment. Beginning at the age of 19 the Cossacks are
trained at home for two years. They then enter the “first cate-
gory” regiment in their home districts for four years, following
with a period of four years in the “second category” regiment,
and then a similar period in the “third category” regiment. The
men of the “second category” live at home but retain their
horses and equipment, but those of the “third category” retain
only their equipment, and are called out for three weeks’ annual
training. Then follows the final period of five years in the re-
62
serve, after which there remains the life liability to emergency
service in the national defense.
Territorial Army. — The Opolchénié, or territorial army, is
divided into two classes or bans. The first includes not only the
trained men who have passed through the first line and reserve,
but the young men surplus to the required annual contingent;
all are liable to embodiment in the active army in time of war.
Exemptions are made in the cases of only sons, students, the
physically unfit, etc.
Regional Organization of the Army. — The organization of the
army is regional, there being three geographical divisions namely
those of European Russia, the Caucasus, and Asia. Recruit-
ing as well as distribution is by districts, but owing to the sta-
tioning of a greater part of the European Russian army in the
western part of its territory, both recruits and reservists have
long distances to travel in joining their commands. This arrange-
ment is held to be an obstacle to quick mobilization. .
Strength of Army. — The peace strength of the armies — all
told — is about 1,850,000 men.
JAPANESE SYSTEM.
Compulsory Universal Service. — Service in the army or
navy is universal and compulsory. Liability commences at the
age of 17 and extends to the age of 40, but actual service begins
at 20. -
Divisions of Service. — All physically capable of bearing arms
are divided into two classes, the “fit” and the “absolutely fit.”
Geneki. — The number necessary for the first line or active
army, called the Geneki, are taken solely from the absolutely fit.
Service in the ranks, is two years for the infantry, three in all
other arms and either four (or five) years and four months in the
reserve. Reservists are called out twice for training during their
reserve service, for sixty days on each occasion.
Kobi. — After completing seven years and four months in the
first line, including its reserve, men are transferred to the second
line, called Kobi. Service in the Kobi is for ten years, with two
trainings of sixty days each in the whole period.
Kokumin. — At the end of their Kobi service the men are in
their 38th year and then pass into the Kokumim, which is the ter-
ritorial or home defense army. In this they serve two years and
eight months, to complete their total service of twenty years.
63
Hoju. — The reserve for making good the waste of war is
called Hoju. It is composed of the balance of the absolutely fit
recruits not required for the first line, and of as many of those
classed as fit as may be required to make up a certain fixed
number. They all serve in the Hoju for seven years and four
months, during which they have a first training of 90 days and
two subsequent trainings of 60 days each. After completion of
this period they are passed to the Kobi in which they serve for
ten years. -
Regional Organization of Army. — The Japanese Islands are
divided into military districts corresponding to the divisions of
the army and the district is the unit of administration as well as
of territorial command. Each division is supplied with recruits
from its own district, except the Guards, whose infantry recruits
are selected from the whole country.
Strength of Army. — No returns of the peace strength of the
active Japanese army are published. - *
ENGLISH SYSTEM.
Voluntary Enlistment. — Service in both the Regular and the
Territorial Army is by voluntary enlistment.
Regular Army. — On a peace footing the Regular Army is
composed of the permanently embodied troops, the Army. Re-
serve, and the Special Reserve. Service in the permanently
embodied portion of the Regular Army and the Army Reserve is
for twelve years, with permission to extend to twenty-one years
in certain circumstances. Of the original twelve years, from
three to nine are spent “with the colours,” and the remainder of
the time in the Army Reserve. Enlistment is possible between
the ages of 18 and 25. The average service of infantry is seven
years “with the colours” and five in the Reserve.
Expansion for War. — On mobilization for war the com-
mands are raised to war strength from the Army Reserve, and,
to a small extent, from the Special Reserve.
A large part of the Regular Army serves in the overseas
dominions of the Empire, in addition to local forces known as
the “Indian Army” and the forces of other dominions.
Special Reserves. – The Special Reserve was created in 1907
out of the militia, and is available for service abroad in time of
war. Its officers are for the most part non-professional. The
units are attached to permanent depots, and the enlistment term
64
is six years. Recruits undergo, generally, five months' prelim-
inary training, and the trained men are called annually for three
weeks, with six days of rifle practice in addition for infantry.
Territorial Army. — The Territorial Army is primarily for
home defense, with enlistment age-limits of 17 to 35 years. The
enlistment term is four years. The requirements for training are
two weeks in camp and a number of drills varied for the different
arms. Unless exempted, the soldier absenting himself from camp
is liable to a penalty of 5 pounds. With the exception of certain
of the generals and staff all officers are non-professional.
Administration. — The land forces are administered by an
Army Council, composed of the Secretary of State for War and
the heads of the six departments in the War Office. The Terri-
torial Army is under County direction, the War Office maintain-
ing general control of expenditures.
Regular Officers. — Officers are commissioned by Royal ap-
pointment after education prescribed: for the artillery and en-
gineers in the Royal Military Academy; for the cavalry and
infantry in the Royal Military College, and for the Staff in the
Staff College. The Officers’ Training Corps, in two divisions
representing the universities and the public schools, provides
officers for the Special Reserve and the Territorial Army.
Size. – Effectives, reported as of January 1, 1914, were as
follows: Regular Army, 156,000; Reserve Army, 147,000; Spe-
cial Reserve, 63,000; Territorial Army, 252,000; British Army
in India, 78,500. -
CANADIAN SYSTEM.
Voluntary Enlistment. — Military service in Canada is by
voluntary enlistment, except as noted below. -
Classes of Service. — The Canadian Land Forces are divided
into the “active” and the “reserve militia.” The country is
divided into six divisional areas and three military districts. The
“active militia” is formed by voluntary three-year enlistments;
but it can also be compulsorily recruited, should the necessity
arise, by ballot. It consists of a “permanent force,” and of a
non-permanent force composed of various corps which are classi-
fied either as “city” or as “rural.” The “permanent force”
provides personnel for the various schools of military instruc-
tions, for the fortress garrisons, for the maintenance of works,
and for the care of armament. -
In the non-permanent part of the “active militia” the period
65
for annual training varies, according to arms, from twelve to
sixteen days. Rural corps perform the whole of their training in
camp; City corps, partly in camp and part at their own head-
quarters; a proportion of the officers are trained at the Royal
Military College at Kingston.
Administration. – The Canadian Land Forces are under the
control of a Militia Council, with the Minister of Militia and
Defense as President. There is also an Inspector-General whose
duty it is to inspect the forces, and to report to the Minister of
Militia and Defense in Council of their readiness for war.
Personnel. – The personnel of the Permanent Force in 1914
amounted to 3,447 men of all arms, approximately one-third being
infantry and one-fifth non-combatant corps. Of the total, 78,350,
in the “active militia,” 52,290 were infantry, 12,622 cavalry and
mounted rifles, 4,629 horse and field artillery, 2,251 heavy and
garrison artillery, 1,902 engineers, and 4,656 non-combatant
corps.
Reserve Militia. — The “reserve militia” is unorganized. It
comprises all male British subjects between 18 and 60 years of
age who are not exempt or disqualified by law. It is divided into
four classes which are subject to successive calls for service:
unmarried men and widowers (without children) between 18 and
30 years of age; unmarried men and widowers (without children)
between 30 and 45; married men and widowers (with children)
between 18 and 45; all men between 45 and 60.
66
A P P E N D I X IV.
Drafts of Suggested Legislation.
The Commission has not drafted legislation to cover all of
its recommendations for legislation. It does, however, submit
drafts as to three matters: —
1. An enabling act.
2. Provision for development of physical training in high
schools. -
3. Amendments to the militia law.
In regard to the last of these, it should be understood that
it does not purport to cover all the details necessary for a com-
plete militia law, but merely relates to certain general principles
which the Commission feels that it is essential to provide for.
The draft submitted does not take into consideration the naval
militia and its provisions relate wholly to the land forces. There
is a large volume of military legislation now in force which covers
many matters not dealt with in the draft submitted, and most
of this it is not necessary to change. This legislation is now
being codified and from that codification and these suggestions
it will be entirely possible to produce a complete militia law.
The recommendation of the Commission that the militia should
not be used for strike or riot duty until after the efforts of the
State Police and the regular army are exhausted is not explicitly
provided for in the draft of legislation submitted, for this reason:
The Commission feels that it should become law at the same
time when a law creating a body of state mounted police, or
increasing the present state police, is enacted. The drafting of
legislation as to the state police involves many questions which
need to be considered further than this Commission has had time
to do. The Commission wishes to be clear, however, that it
regards its recommendation that the militia should not be re-
quired to perform police duty as essential.
67
AN ACT TO PROVIDE FOR CO-OPERATION BY THE COMMONWEALTH witH
THE FEDERAL MILITARY FORCEs.
Be it enacted, etc., as follows:
SECTION 1. The governor may, without expense to the common-
wealth and upon such terms to secure the commonwealth against expense
or damage as he may approve, lend to or permit to be used by any federal
military force organized under the laws of the United States any military
property provided for the use of the organized militia of the common-
wealth, including camp equipage, camp grounds, parade grounds, drill
grounds, ranges for target practice, armories of any class, uniforms, arms
and equipment, except that in case of any such military property which
has been provided for the particular use of any particular military unit
of the organized militia it shall first appear to the satisfaction of the
governor that, by vote of the enlisted men composing such unit, they
shall have manifested their intention to join such federal military force.
SECTION 2. Any military unit of the organized militia is hereby au-
thorized to join in a body any federal military force organized under
the laws of the United States by vote of the enlisted men composing such
unit. Service as prescribed by the laws of the United States in any such
federal military force, on the part of any enlisted man in any company or
corresponding military unit of the organized militia, which shall have
voted to join such federal military force, shall be accepted by the com-
monwealth as full discharge of all claims by the commonwealth for active
militia service. -
AN ACT TO PROVIDE FOR COURSES IN PHYSICAL TRAINING IN CERTAIN
HIGH SCHOOLS of THE COMMONWEALTH.
Be it enacted, etc., as follows:
SECTION 1. Every town containing ten thousand inhabitants or more,
and every city, shall maintain the teaching of physical training as part
of its high school system.
SECTION 2. The board of education is hereby authorized and directed
to investigate and to aid in the introduction of physical training in the
high Schools in towns containing ten thousand inhabitants or more, and
in cities; to initiate, regulate, Supervise and approve the teaching of
such physical training; and to report annually to the general court,
describing the nature of and the progress in physical training in such
high schools, with such recommendations as the board may deem ad-
visable. ; ; ,
SECTION 3. High schools which maintain courses of physical training,
and which are approved by the board of education in respect to, qualifi-
cations of teachers, courses of training, and the equipment provided for
pupils, shall constitute approved physical training high schools...; Aſº cr;
68
SECTION 4. The commonwealth, in order to encourage proper phys-
ical training in the schools and to aid in the maintenance of approved
physical training high schools, shall pay annually from the treasury, to
cities and towns maintaining approved physical training high Schools,
an amount equal to the salaries of such instructor or instructors as are
employed by such city or town to teach physical training in such schools:
provided, that such instructor or instructors and their respective salaries
shall be approved by the board of education; and provided, further, that
if any instructor also teaches other courses or studies, the city or town
shall be reimbursed by the commonwealth for that portion of his salary
only which may be properly applicable to the teaching of physical training.
SECTION 5. On or before the first Wednesday of January of each year
the board of education shall present to the general court a statement of
the amount which cities or towns maintaining approved physical training
high schools should receive as reimbursement on account of salaries paid
to instructors in physical training prior to the first day of the previous
December. On the basis of such a statement, the general court may
make an appropriation for the reimbursement of such cities or towns up
to such first day of December.
AN ACT TO AMEND THE MILITIA LAWS OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF
MASSACHUSETTS.
Be it enacted, etc.; as follows:
SECTION 1. The militia shall consist of two classes: first, the active
militia, which shall be divided into the first and second lines, with the
respective duties hereinafter set forth, and shall be composed and or—
ganized as hereinafter provided; secondly, the reserve militia, which
shall be composed of all the members of the militia not enlisted in the
active militia.
SECTION 2. The militia shall be ordered out for active duty in case of
war or the imminence thereof, invasion or the imminence thereof, insur-
rection, rebellion or revolution, or the imminence thereof, or in time of
public danger. A proclamation of the commander-in-chief, to the effect
that one or more of these conditions exist, shall be conclusive thereof.
SECTION 3. The active militia shall consist of the forces and of such
military units of the several branches of the service as are provided for
under the statutes of the Commonwealth now in force, of such additional
commissioned officers, noncommissioned officers and enlisted men as
shall be necessary so that said military.units shall be the same in number
of men and organization as the corresponding military units of the army
of the United States of the corresponding arm at full war strength, and of
such other organizations, auxiliary forces and arms, staff corps, depart-
ments and units as the commander-in-chief may direct. The commander-
in-chief may also authorize such additional forces as in his judgment may
be advisable; so as to ensure that the active militia, if ordered out for active
69
duty, shall be at the full strength above provided, and to fill all vacancies,
casualties or absences occurring for any reason.
SECTION 4. The commander-in-chief may prescribe the organization
and change the minimum or maximum requirements for the numbers in
any military unit or organization of the militia, so that such requirements
shall conform with the corresponding requirements of the corresponding
military units or organizations of the army of the United States, as the
same may from time to time be established. Any military unit of the
active militia falling below the minimum requirements, in numbers or
organization, or below the standard of efficiency established by the com-
mander-in-chief, may be disbanded by him, or may be ordered by him
to take such steps as may be necessary to fulfill the provisions of law
and of his orders.
SECTION 5. Every person enlisting in the active militia shall be mus-
tered into the service of the Commonwealth for a term comprising three
years in the first line and three years in the second line thereof: provided,
however, that any person now in the organized militia may enlist in the
first line of the active militia for the residue of the term for which he
enlisted in the organized militia, and at the end of such time his term of
enlistment shall expire; and provided, further, that a person who has
received an honorable discharge from the Massachusetts organized militia,
or who has served in the army of the United States, or who has had in
the judgment of such persons as the commander-in-chief may authorize
so to determine, sufficient previous military experience or training, may
enlist and be mustered in for terms of one or more years in either or both
lines of the active militia at his election.
SECTION 6. The active militia shall perform the following service,
namely: for the first year of enlistment in the first line, four weeks of
continuous service and eight monthly tours of duty of not less than eight
nor more than twenty-four consecutive hours; for the second and third
year and any subsequent year of enlistment in the first line, two weeks of
continuous service and eight monthly tours of duty of not less than eight
nor more than twenty-four consecutive hours. Thereafter, such persons as
do not elect to continue in the first line of the active militia, as provided
in the following section, shall pass to the second line, and shall perform
such duty, not in excess of five days of continuous Service, or its equivalent
in hours, as they may be ordered by the commander-in-chief.
If ordered out for active duty, the militia shall be subject to such serv-
ice, not in violation of the constitution of the Commonwealth or the
United States, as the commander-in-chief may determine.
SECTION 7. Any person, who at the end of his period of service in the
first line of the active militia, shall elect to continue therein, instead of
passing to the second line, shall be entitled to count such years as he may
remain in the first line towards his full term of service.
SECTION 8. The commander-in-chief shall establish camps, at which,
between June first and October first in each year all men in the first year
70
of their enlistment in the first line of the active militia (except as provided
in section ten of this act) shall receive four weeks' continuous instruction
and training under such persons as the commander-in-chief may appoint.
The commander-in-chief may give to such persons as he shall appoint
to act as instructors at such camps such rank, for the period during which
they shall so act, as he may determine, and such rank shall carry with it,
during such period, the authority thereof and the pay and allowances
thereof.
SECTION 9. The commander-in-chief shall, by executive order, divide
the commonwealth into territorial districts, and establish the military
units of the active militia and the numbers for such units which shall
respectively be recruited from said districts.
SECTION 10. All persons recruited for the active militia, except those
who have previously served in the army of the United States or in the
organized militia, or have had, in the judgment of the commander-in-
chief, or such person as he may authorize so to determine, a sufficient
previous military experience, or are re-enlisting, shall be enlisted to
begin their service on the day fixed by the commander-in-chief for the
opening of the period of four weeks’ continuous training above provided.
The persons above excepted may be enlisted to begin their service at any
time, and shall perform in their first year the same service as provided for
other persons in the second year in the first line of the active militia.
SECTION 11. The commander-in-chief shall fix the time and method
by which recruiting shall be conducted, the recruits examined, accepted,
mustered in and assigned to their respective commands.
SECTION 12. The remuneration of the men performing their four weeks
of continuous service at the training camp above provided for in their
first year of enlistment shall be at the rate of that allowed from time to
time for enlisted men in the army of the United States, and their allowances
shall, during said period, not exceed those now established by the statutes
of the commonwealth for subsistence of members of the organized militia.
Except as above provided, the remuneration and allowances of all
persons serving in the active militia shall be the same as would be receiv-
able by them for the same military service, rank or position as members of
the organized militia under the statutes now in force.
SECTION 13. While upon duty or performing service, all persons in
the active militia shall be subject to military authority, and officers in
authority may enforce all proper and authorized commands by the same
methods, orders, punishments and fines as are from time to time au-
thorized by the articles of war and the statutes of the United States
for forces under the command of the officers of the United States.
A soldier who wilfully absents himself from duty, without excuse in
accordance with such regulations as may be established by the commander-
in-chief, and whose absence shall not have been excused, shall, on com-
plaint of the officer commanding the organization of which he is a member,
be punished by fine as follows: —
71
For each day's absence from camp, annual drill, or from an inspection,
not more than five dollars; for each day's absence from special duty when
ordered by the commander-in-chief, or from any parade ordered by the
commanding officer of a regiment, separate battalion, squadron, corps of
cadets, staff corps or department, not more than three dollars; for each
absence from company or battalion drill or meeting of noncommissioned
officers ordered for the purpose of instruction, or from an election, not
more than one dollar.
Upon the filing of a sworn complaint by the officer commanding the
organization of which the delinquent is a member, any court of competent
jurisdiction shall issue a summons to the defendant to appear but no
warrant shall issue unless the defendant fails to appear upon the summons.
SECTION 14. The commander-in-chief shall establish a school or schools
to train enlisted men or noncommissioned officers in the qualifications of
officers. He shall establish the necessary regulations for such school or
Schools and shall assign such officers and appoint such persons as he may
determine to act as instructors at such school or schools.
The commander-in-chief may give to such persons as he shall appoint
to act as instructors at Such School or schools such rank, for the periods
during which they shall so act, as he may determine, and such rank shall
carry with it, during such periods, the authority thereof and the pay and
allowances thereof.
SECTION 15. The commander-in-chief shall cause to be provided such
accommodations as may be necessary for such school or schools.
SECTION 16. Every company or corresponding military unit of the
active militia shall in each year provide not less than two enlisted men or
noncommissioned officers to take the course or courses provided at the
school or Schools provided for in section fourteen.
SECTION 17. Each person who has graduated from the school or
Schools provided for in section fourteen, and received from the authorities
thereof a certificate that he is qualified to perform the duties of an
officer, shall, if he shall so request, be commissioned by the commander-
in-chief as ā Second lieutenant, and from time to time assigned for such
duty, not in conflict with the constitution of the commonwealth, as the
commander-in-chief may determine.
SECTION 18. No person, except those now serving or who have form-
erly served as officers of the organized militia or of the army of the United
States, shall be hereafter elected or appointed an officer in the active
militia, unless he shall have received the training provided for at the
school established under the provisions of section fourteen, or shall have
had previous military experience sufficient, in the judgment of the com-
mander-in-chief, to constitute an equivalent of such training: provided,
however, that the commander-in-chief may appoint staff officers, de-
partmental officers or officers for special duty, who are in his opinion
qualified by training and experience for the duties which they are ap-
pointed to perform.
72
SECTION 19. The commander-in-chief may establish such regulations
for the organization of the reserve militia as he may determine, and he
may appoint such persons, qualified by previous training and experience,
as he may determine, to act as reserve officers or officers of the reserve
militia in case it is ordered out for active duty.
SECTION 20. The members of any college, university or educational
institution may establish a company or companies for the purposes of
receiving military training, and such companies, subject to any regu-
lations that the commander-in-chief may establish, shall be entitled to
bear and drill with arms. Such companies, if they shall volunteer to do
so, may be received and trained at any camps established for the active
militia, subject to such regulations and authority as may be established
by the commander-in-chief.
SECTION 21. Companies or military organizations, including any organ-
izations for auxiliary purposes, such as aeroplane service, motor Service,
motor transported troops of any arm, or any other organizations which
the commander-in-chief may deem helpful to the military forces, may be
established, in addition to the active militia, under such terms, regula-
tions and authority as may be determined by the commander-in-chief,
and such organizations may be authorized to bear arms and possess
military equipment: provided, that such companies or organizations shall
not, without the authority of the commander-in-chief or the general court,
cause any expense to the commonwealth.
SECTION 22. All laws or statutes in conflict or inconsistent herewith
are hereby repealed. All laws not in conflict or inconsistent herewith are
hereby expressly re-enacted, and all provisions in the existing statutes
relating to the organized militia or the volunteer militia, not in conflict
or inconsistent herewith, shall apply to the active militia, as herein de-
fined.
SECTION 23. The word “person” as used in the foregoing act shall
include all men, noncommissioned officers, commissioned officers and
other persons enlisted or commissioned in the active militia or appointed
to act in connection therewith. .’
The word “men” shall include men, noncommissioned officers and all
other persons, except commissioned officers, enlisted in the active militia.
The words “organized militia” shall be interpreted to mean the or-
ganized militia or volunteer militia and all the branches thereof, as or-
ganized under the constitution and laws of the commonwealth now in
force.
73
A P P E N D IX W .
The West Point System of Calisthenics.
In all active team play, like football, where the activities of
units must be subordinated to central control, success depends
not alone upon the ability of the individual players but also upon
their capacity to subordinate their individual playing to the pur-
pose of the group as determined by the group commander.
In military life this is called tactical cohesion. The psycho-
logical processes involved are steady attention and prompt obedi-
ence. At West Point the curriculum is arranged to develop
these habits by many practices. The physical development of
the cadets is largely in the hands of Captain Herman J. Koehler,
Master of Fence.
When the cadets join they are placed under his tutelage. In a
large measure he is responsible for the fine physical set-up of the
cadets. His activities, however, are not limited to muscular
development. He attempts, by means of his physical exercises,
not only to give the cadets a military carriage, and to teach
them to stand and walk correctly, but also to develop habits
of mental alertness. ” For this purpose he makes use of the
so-called setting-up exercises in a way which is peculiarly his
OWIl.
This phase of his drill consists of defining with great accuracy
numerous positions of the limbs and muscles and passing with
great rapidity from one position to another.
A military command is divided into two parts. The first part
is called the “preparatory command” and indicates the move-
ment to be executed. The remaining part of the order is the
“command of execution” and is the signal for action. Captain
Keohler in his preparatory command indicates the position to be
taken, or movement to be made. He rarely uses the same
phraseology twice to indicate this, but so arranges the words of
his preparatory command that the meaning is developed only at
the last word. No cadet can obey correctly the command unless
he gives close attention to the spoken words.
74
He must grasp the idea which Captain Koehler conveys in the
preparatory command and be prepared to execute promptly and
exactly the movement ordered. -
The period devoted to this kind of drill rarely exceeds forty-
five minutes. It requires an absolute concentration of attention
upon the instructor. A whole class is required to respond by
going through the ordered motions in the shortest period in
which the response can be made after the command of execution
is given.
In this way the so-called setting-up exercises are made the
means, not only of physical development but of mental develop-
ment of the most desirable habits. This system of instruction is
not generally understood even by the officers of the United States
Army. Many of them think there is nothing more involved in
it than co-ordination and strengthening of muscles. They are
satisfied with going through the exercises in any way, provided
the method adopted tends to strengthen the body and co-ordinate
nerves and muscles.
A practice has arisen of going through these exercises to music,
and a manual has even been prepared for this kind of drill. Such
musical practices have a tendency to please the actors and spec-
tators. The movements are rhythmic, and satisfy a sense of
uniformity. In these musical practices, however, the elements
developing the mind are absent. It is a lazy and slip-shod
adaptation of Captain Koehler's method. It minimizes the
amount of attention required and deprives the exercises of
the two elements, which are the essentral features of Captain
Koehler's instruction, viz.: steady attention and prompt obedi-
€IlC6,
W. A. P.
A P P E N D Ix VI.
Table of Costs.
1. Annual saving to the State if the militia should become
a part of the Federal establishment: –
(a) Whole cost to the State of present militia establish-
ment, including maintenance of armories and
payment of interest on bonded armory debt, sav-
ing annually, . . . . . . .
(b) If Federal government should assume all except pay-
ment of interest on bonded armory debt, saving
annually, . . . . . . . . .
(c) If Federal government should assume all except
maintenance of armories and payment of interest
on bonded armory dº saving annually,
2. Cost to the State of the establishment and maintenance
of a body of mounted State police. Conditions,
both social and industrial, indicate that a com-
paratively small but highly mobile and efficient
force of State police would be sufficient in this
State. By comparison with the Pennsylvania
costs, two troops of State police would cost ap-
proximately, per year, . . . . . .
Note. — The present cost in Pennsylvania for a State
police force of 228 officers and men, with adminis-
tration headquarters, barracks, and equipment,
is approximately, per year, $310,000.
3. Cost of recommended additions to the militia in case it
remains a State force: — -
30 day tour of instruction (recruit camp): — -
(a) 2,500 men, State pay and subsistence, . . .
(b) 2,500 men, United States pay and State subsist-
€1106, . . . . . . . .
(c) 2,500 men, United States pay and subsistence, .
100 officers, State pay and subsistence, . . .
100 non-commissioned officer instructors, State
pay and subsistence,
$743,897 83
586,655 33
474,563 13
160,000 00
150,000 00
70,000 00
56,000 00
26,000 00
76
Additional 14-day tour of field duty,
Note. — (b) $96,000, with officers' and instructors' al-
lowance plus the cost of the fortnight of extra
field duty, brings the total per annum to $196,000.
The scheme (b) is the one recommended by the
State military authorities.
. (a) The cost of the proposed system of physical train-
ing in high schools of towns of more than 10,000
inhabitants, at the rate of 1 instructor to 500
pupils: —
150 instructors at $1,500 per year, . . $225,000
12 directors, at $3,000 per year, tº a 36,000
1 deputy commissioner, . . . . 4,500
Clerical service, . . . . . . 7,500
Total, amm-mºmsºmºmºs
(b) Cost of one month's Summer camp for graduates of
high schools following or preceding graduation.
This course cannot be determined accurately in
total because of the absence of any definite figures
of the numbers of boys who would take advan-
tage of this privilege, but the cost per capita
would be approximately $7 per week, including
food, wear and tear of equipment, but not in-
cluding interest on investment in new equip-
ment.
$100,000 00
273,000 00
UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN
O
3 9015 076644924
|