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- UUSS'
HEARINGS Cº. 7S
(4.
BEFORE TEIE
COMMITTEE ON MILITARY AFFAIRS
UNITED STATES SENATE
SIXTY-FOURTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
ON
BILLS FOR THE REORGANIZATION OF THE ARMY AND
FOR THE CREATION OF A RESERVE ARMY
Printed for the use of the Committee on Military Affairs
lº.
{
WASEIINGTON
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
1916
COMMITTEE ON MILITARY AFFAIRS.
GEO. E. CHAMBERLAIN, Oregon, Chairman.
GILBERT M. HITCIICOCK, Nebraska. ROBERT F. BIROUSSARD, Louisiana.
LUKE LE.A, Tennessee HENRY A. DU PONT, Delaware.
DUNCAN U. FLETCIIFR, Florida. FRANCIS E. WARREN, Wyoming.
HENRY L. MYICRS, Montana. THOMAS IX. CATIRON, New Mexico.
CHARLES S. THOMAS, Colorado. JAMES II. BRAIDY, Idaho.
JAMES P. CLARKIC, Arkansas. NATHAN GOFF, West Virginia.
MORRIS SII EPIP.ARD, Texas. LE BARON B. COLT, Rhode Island.
J. C. W. BECKHAM, Kentucky. - JOHN W. WEEIKS, Massachusetts.
CARALYN B. SEIELTON, Clerk. º
H. GRANT, Assistant Clerk.
EDWARD J. HICE EY, Assistant Clerk.
- . c.
A *, . :* ** { . **
* * ***

PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE
*
HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON MILITARY AFFAIRs
UNITED STATES SENATE
SIXTY-FOURTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
ON
BILLS FOR THE REORGANIZATION OF THE ARMY AND
FOR THE CREATION OF A RESERVE ARMY
Printed for the use of the Committee on Military Affairs
à
{}
WASHINGTON
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
1916
(. . . "LoG bºwlsº
C O N T E N T S .
Page.
Aleshire, Maj. Gen. James B., Quartermaster General United States Army,
statement of. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 623
Bliss, Maj. Gen. Tasker H., Assistant Chief of Staff, United States Army, state-
ment of . . . . . . . - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 176
Boardman, Miss Mabel T., representing the American Red Cross, statement of... 1047
Brown, Dr. Homer C., chairman legislative committee National Dental ASSO-
ciation, statement of.-------------------------------.- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 849
Carter, Maj. Gen. William H., United States Army (retired), statement of . . . . 105
Christen, Dr. Theodore, Cincinnati, Ohio, statement of. --- . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 543
Critchfield, A. B., lieutenant colonel, National Guard of Ohio, statement of... 818
Crowder, Brig. Gen. E. H., Judge Advocate General United States Army, state-
ment of.--------------------- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 721
Crozier, Brig. Gen. William, Chief of Ordnance United States Army, statement
of-------------------------------------------------------- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 508
Jummins, Hon. Albert B., Senator from the State of Iowa, statement of. . . . . . 767
Donnblazer, Frank, statement of. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1042
Edwards, Brig. Gen. Clarence R., United States Army, statement of . . . . . . . . . 885
Field, Miss Sara Bard, statement of. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1044
Foreman, Martin, colonel commanding the First Illinois Cavalry, statement of... 831
Foster, Maj. Gen. J. Clifford R., chairman executive committee National Guard
ASSociation of the United States, statement of . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 779
Frease, Harry, Canton, Ohio, statement of. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 931
Garrison, Hon. Lindley M., Secretary of War, statement of . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Gifford, Dr. C. B., secretary legislative committee National Dental Association,
statement of.----------------------------------------------------------- 855
Glenn, Col. Edwin F., General Staff, United States Army, statement of . . . . . . . 565
Gorgas, Maj. Gen. William C., Surgeon General United States Army, statement
* §
of--------------------------------------------------------------------- G87
Haan, Lieut. Col. William G., Coast Artillery Corps, United States Army,
statement of. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 658
Howell, Capt. Willey, United States Army, lecture by, on the Swiss Army. . . . 995
Huidekoper, Frederic L., Washington, D.C., statement of . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 967
Hunt, Henry T., Cincinnati, Ohio, statement of... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 559
Kelley, Mrs. Florence, statement of... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1039
Kingman, Brig. Gen. Dan C., Chief of Engineers United States Army, state-
ment of.---------------------------------------------------------------- 447
Kuenzli, Frederick A., article by, on the Swiss military system. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1007
Lennon, John B., treasurer American Federation of Labor, statement of... . . . . 1026
McCain, Brig. Gen. Henry P., The Adjutant General United States Army,
Statement of. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 460
Macomb, Brig. Gen. M. M., president of the Army War College, statement of... 239
Mason, Guy, statement of.... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1023
Maurer, James H., president Pennsylvania Federation of Labor, statement of... 1034
Miles, Lieut. Gen. Nelson A., United States Army (retired), statement of...... 750
Mills, Brig. Gen. Albert L., Chief of the Division of Militia Affairs, War Depart-
ment, statement of.---------. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 187
Moseley, Capt. George W. H., General Staff United States Army, statement of. 485
Murray, Maj. Gen. Arthur, United States Army (retired), statement of... . . . . . . 415
Nelson, Hon. Knute, Senator from the State of Minnesota, statement of........ 763
O'Ryan, Maj. Gen. John F., commanding the New York division of the Na-
tional Guard, statement of. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 793, 805
Parsons, William Barclay, New York City, representing engineering societies,
Statement of.----------------------------------------------------------- 677
Sadler, Wilbur F., jr., adjutant general National Guard of New Jersey, state-
ment of . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .* * * * * * * * * * * * * * - * * * * * * * * - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 827
Saulsbury, Hon. Willard, Senator from the State of Delaware, statement of . . . . 945
Schindel, Capt. S. J. Bayard, General Staff, United States Army, statement of. 497
3
29399 |
4 CONTENTS.
Scott, Maj. Gen. Hugh L., Chief of Staff, United States Army, statement of..
Scriven, Fig. Gen. George P., Chief Signal Officer United States Army, state-
ment of: - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Stewart, Thomas J., adjutant general National Guard of Pennsylvania, state-
ment of: - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Treat, Col. Charles G., General Staff, United States Army, statement of. . . . . .
Villard, Oswald Garrison, New York City, statement of. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Wald, Miss Lillian D., chairman antipreparedness committee, statement of. . .
Weaver, Brig. Gen. Erasmus M., Chief of Coast Artillery, United States Army,
Statement of.-----------------------------------------------------------
Wood, L. Hollingsworth, New York City, statement of . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Wood, Maj. Gen. Leonard, United States Army, statement of . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Works, Hon. John D., Senator from the State of California, statement of . . . . . .
Young, Lawrence W., adjutant general National Guard of North Carolina,
Statement of.-----------------------------------. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Young, William B., Jacksonville, Fla., letter of . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Page.
14l
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
TUESDAY, JANUARY 18, 1916.
UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE. ON MILITARY AFFAIRS,
Washington, D. C.
The committee met at 2 o’clock p. m. pursuant to the call of the
chairman.
Present, Senators Chamberlain (chairman), Fletcher, Myers,
Thomas, Sheppard, Beckham, du Pont, Warren, Catron, Colt, and
Weeks.
Present also: The Secretary of War, Lindley M. Garrison; Assist-
ant Secretary of War, Henry Breckinridge; Maj. Gen. Hugh L.
Scott, Chief of Staff; Maj. Gen. Tasker H. Bliss, General Staff Corps,
Col. Richmond P. Davis, Coast Artillery Division; Brig. Gen. Albert
L. Mills, Chief Division of Militia Affairs, War Department; Maj.
William D. Connor, General Staff Corps. -
The CHAIRMAN. Gentlemen, the committee has met for the pur-
pose of taking up for consideration the several plans that have been
proposed for the reorganization of the Army and for the creation of
a reserve army. So far there have been several bills proposed for
the reorganization of the Army, but none of them has been intro-
duced in the Senate. There is a tentative plan submitted by the
War Department through the Secretary of War. That bill has been
printed, but not introduced in the Senate. There was one prepared
by me and submitted to the committee and printed, but not intro-
duced. There is also what is known as the Hay bill in the House,
which has not been introduced, but has also been printed, and all of
those bills are accessible to this committee. Those are the only bills,
I believe, that have been submitted for the proposed reorganization
and for the creation of a reserve.
In addition to those bills, there have been a number of bills intro-
duced in the Senate and referred to this committee having reference
to the National Guard of the several States, and I presume that in the
consideration of the whole subject the committee will have in mind
all of these bills; and out of them all I hope that some plan may be
evolved that will be satisfactory to the country and to us all.
The Secretary of War is here and we will be pleased to have the
Secretary make such statement as he desires to make in reference to
the whole subject, or any part of the subject that he desires to address
himself to.
5
6 PREPARED NIESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
STATEMENT OF HON. LINDLEY M. GARRISON, SECRETARY OF
WAR.
Secretary GARRISON. I thank you, Mr. Chairman. I shall avail
myself of the opportunity. After I have made the statement, I, of
course, will be ś. to place myself at the disposal of the Com-
mittee for any examination they may desire to make of me, and to
place at the disposal of the committee all of the general officers who
are available here, and any of the records or other documentary
matters that might help the committee.
For more than a year past the attention of the people of this coun-
try has been concentrated upon the question of national defense.
The fact that this country entirely lacked any adequate policy in that
respect is recognized and deplored. The determination that it shall
adopt and put in operation such a policy has been reached. The
opportunity to do this great, imperative duty to the Nation is offered
this Congress. The subject has received extended and comprehen-
sive consideration, so far as the land forces are concerned, by the War
Department. The War College Division of the General Staff Corps
has made a special report thereon. The War Department has made
specific recommendations with respect thereto, and the President
of the United States has advocated the adoption of a wise, sensible
policy of national defense based upon national forces.
With your permission I shall lay before you those considerations
which, in my judgment, indicate the imperative necessity of adopting
a national policy of national defense based on national forces, and give
the reasons for the adoption of the specific policy recommended by the
War Department and the President.
Before coming to specific recommendations it is necessary to deal
with those general considerations which must be in mind before
any proper determination can be reached.
Besides continental United States, including Alaska, our military
responsibilities embrace Porto Rico, the Panama Canal, Hawaii, the
Philippine Islands, and the Small force making part of the inter-
national guard of the railroad from Tientsin to Peking, in China.
We have determined and announced that the sovereignty, of the
other Republics on this hemisphere shall remain inviolable, , and
must, therefore, at all times stand ready to make good our position
in this connection.
It will of necessity be conceded by anyone who admits that
military force is requisite at all that our present military force is
totally inadequate to meet our responsibilities.
The only other provision with respect to military force is the
volunteer law. Under it, after Congress has specified the number
of men to be raised, the Executive may issue calls, make allotments,
and set about recruiting, examining, enlisting, clothing, arming,
organizing, officering, sheltering, training, and disciplining volunteers.
The chaos which a crisis always produces where preparations in
advance have not been made makes it certain that several months
would of necessity intervene after the outbreak of war before any
considerable number of volunteers would be ready to take their
training, and months of training must then ensué before they would
be ready to be sent into battle. In addition to the personnel,
PREPAREDINESS FOR, NATIONAL DEFENSE. 7
accumulated matériel must also have been prepared, for the great
lengths of time must be considered which are necessary to produce it.
Before the question can be taken up of the wise solution of the
problem we must, first, determine exactly what the problem is that
we are seeking to solve. There is a disposition upon the º of some
to assume that we are facing a crisis and must immediately set about
meeting it. Their disposition is to ask that all those measures should
be taken which would tend to the immediate preparation of this
country for immediate warfare. If their assumption is correct, then,
of course, their conclusion is correct also. The only way to meet any
emergency is by adopting emergency measures. The personnel and
matériel needed for military purposes should be immediately mobi-
lized. Every nerve should be strained, and every resource drawn
upon, and nothing overlooked necessary to preserve and defend us.
Nothing would be proper in this view short of immediate measures
vesting the fullest authority in the executive departments to proceed
regardless of cost and of other considerations. -
This, however, in my judgment, is not the proper view to take
nor the proper procedure to ºbe followed.
In my view #. occasion calls for the adoption of a wise, sensible,
adequate military policy on permanent lines and for definite ends.
Not considering for the present the situation outside of continental
United States and confining ourselves thereto, and not considering
the harbor defenses at the present time, there is common agreement
among those who have studied the subject intelligently that we
should have a force of 500,000 men subject to instant call. The rea-
sons which induce this conclusion will be found set forth in the re-
port made to me by the War College Division of the General Staff,
printed as an appendix to my own report.
Modern warfare, while it has demonstrated the increased use of
mechanical instruments of war, has also demonstrated the increased
use of numbers. In addition, therefore, to those with the colors sub-
ject to instant call there should be at all times in the country large
numbers of men available; by reason of previous service, for mili-
tary purposes. . .
ur immediate problem, therefore, seems to be, How shall we meet
these requirements' -
There can be no question that, from the standpoint solely of effec-
tiveness, nothing would so completely meet the situation as a regular
standing army of professional soldiers enlisted for a long period of
time and tº drilled, trained, and disciplined. Leaving aside
for the present all consideration of any other matter entering into
this question than that of raising such an army and maintaining it,
We must give attention to the following facts: We have at this time
in this country accommodation for only about 50,000 of such an
army. We should, therefore, have to provide accommodation for
450,000 more... We should either have to build upon existing Govern-
ment reservations or upon sites to be selected and bought all of those
things necessary for the housing, training, etc., of troops, at a cost
which can not even be approximated until it is determined where
Such new sites are to be. We should have to use everything we have
in reserve and to obtain all that which we have not already neces-
Sary fully to equip this vast number. We should have to find thou-
Sands of officers competent to train these new recruits. We should
8 | PREPAREDNIESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
have to enlarge to a very great extent all of the administrative
departments to handle such an army, and should in each one of .
such departments have to train competent officers for their very com-
plex and difficult tasks.
The expense attendant upon these matters which have just been
briefly adverted to would amount to hundreds of millions, and the
upkeep of the force, after it was fully equipped, sheltered, officered,
and trained, would mean an outlay approximating half a billion dol-
lars a year. And this without regard to keeping up fortifications and
laying by the necessary reserves of matériel which it is imperative
should be done. The Adjutant General of the Army, after a most
careful consideration of the whole subject matter and personal atten-
tion thereto, reaches the conclusion that he can not expect under pres–
ent conditions to recruit more than 50,000 men per year for the Army.
Compulsory service would therefore be the only method of securing
men for the service. I shall speak later concerning compulsion. It
would therefore seem impracticable in the last degree to consider that
the problem can be solved by providing for a standing army of the
size necessary for this solution.
In addition to those practicable considerations, there are all those
reasons which make against the maintenance of a large standing
army in such a Nation as ours. I do not in any way share the fear
of those who think that proper military preparations involve any
interference whatever with the supremacy of the civil authorities.
I do, however, firmly believe that in a democracy the defense of the
Nation should rest upon the citizens, and not upon a professional,
paid military force, constantly under arms and devoted solely to
military pursuits. I think it is clear that from every standpoint we
can dismiss the suggestion that the situation should be properly met
by a standing army of 500,000 men constantly under arms.
The next matter for consideration, therefore, is what other military
force shall be provided for outside of and in addition to whatever
standing army is finally determined upon. Since the size of the
standing army which shall finally be determined P. must to a large
extent depend upon what other force is provided for, that question
must be left for the present and we must take up the matter of the
provision for such jº force first.
The mind naturally turns when it begins consideration of this
question toward the existing Organized Militia or National Guard
in the various States. The question that instantly comes to the mind
is whether it is possible and practicable to utilize this force for the
requisite national purposes.
At the present time this force consists of approximately 129,000
men and officers, and it would therefore be necessary if it is to be
expanded to 400,000 to add 271,000 men and officers.
f this policy should be attempted to be adopted, Congress would
first have to require the States to raise and maintain all of these
troops. Even if we assume that Congress has such power under the
Constitution, it is difficult to see how it could make it effective. If
this point is successfully passed, the States would then have to prag-
tically treble their existing equipment in the way of military facili-
ties to take care of a force thus raised to about three times its present
number. I do not know whether Congress would have any power to
impose this burden upon the States, and assuming that it has the
PREPAREDINESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 9
power I do not see how it could make it effective. In any event there
would have to be not only acts of Congress attempting to make this
policy a success, but identical contemporaneous legislation in the 48
States to make effective such acts of Congress. It seems to me that a
mere statement of this situation indicates how utterly futile it is to
attempt this solution.
It is essential, if we are to view this matter in any adequate way,
to get down to the very truth of things, and to deal only therewith.
Each State, prior to the Constitution, maintained forces of its own.
It is well known to all of us that, at the time of the formation of the
Constitution, there was great distrust on the part of the individual
colonies of the use which might be made of the powers to be vested
in the Federal Government. It is difficult for us to realize that the
creation of a Federal Government such as the Constitution creates
was the result of pure reason by applied intelligence, since there was
no model or precedent of any value upon which to proceed. It is
little short of marvelous that so wonderful a product resulted in
view of the circumstances. It was realized by the framers of the
Constitution that the Nation must be empowered in the most ample
manner to protect itself and the interests confided to its charge. It
therefore, wested in the Congress of the Nation the most ample and
comprehensive power possible to this end. It gave it free and un-
qualified authority to raise and support an Army and Navy. The
States, however, desired to have within their own borders military
forces for their own purposes, and that right was reserved to them.
It was further provided that those forces within the States might be
utilized by the Nation to suppress domestic insurrection, to aid in
enforcing the law, and to aid in repelling invasions. The Federal
Government was granted the power of furnishing arms to those
forces, to prescribe the type of organization to which they must con-
form, and to prescribe the discipline to be followed. The Federal
authorities were given no power of government, excepting when
these forces were called out }. any one of the three purposes above
named. The Constitution absolutely vests in the State the right to
govern these troops, excepting when called out by the Federal au-
thorities, to officer them and train them.
It has very often happened in the history of the country that the
States have prevented their troops from responding to the call of
the National Government; they have even ordered their disbandment
to thwart the Federal Government. At all times, therefore, except-
ing when these forces are actually in the service of the Federal Gov-
ernment, under a call for one of the three purposes specified, they
are under the exclusive control, government, and command of the
State authorities, who raise, recruit, officer, and train them. In my
view, it is utterly impossible, so long as the Constitution remains as
it is, for the Federal Government to obtain the right to do anything
else than the Constitution specifies, or for the State authorities to
Surrender legally any of the powers and rights vested therein. It is,
of course, true that the Federal Government can make appropria-
tions of money for and on behalf of the National Guard, and can
annex conditions thereto so that the National Guard or the States in
which such guard exists can only obtain the money by fulfilling such
Conditions, but this does not and can not alter the legal situation
existing under the Constitution. It may result, as long as it is
10 PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
acquiesced in by all parties, in a much greater participation by the
Federal Government in the control, command, officering, and training
of these troops than the Constitution warrants, but it would not
stand the slightest legal test or strain, and there is, in my view, not
the slightest doubt that no enforceable obligation can arise out of any
such legislation—that is to say, any legislation which seeks to give
greater right or power to the Federal Government over these forces
than the Constitution warrants. It is absolutely axiomatic that juris–
diction can not be acquired by consent, and can not, of course, be
any more successfully acquired by purchase. Wherever a constitu-
tion fixes the limits of jurisdiction, there they must stand until the
constitution is changed.
This situation has been recognized by every attentive student of
the matter almost from the very beginning of the practical operation
of the Government under the Constitution. Innumerable attempts
have been made to obviate the difficulties. They have usually taken
the form of what is termed federalizing the militia or federalizing
the National Guard. All such attempts have failed for the reason
which, in my judgment, makes it certain that all such attempts will
fail. So long as these troops are those raised by the States, under
the Constitution they can not be governed, officered, or trained by any
other authority than the State—that is, no other situation can be
constitutionally produced. If by federalizing the militia, it is meant
to take them out from under State authority and west jurisdiction
and control under the National Government, then, of course, the
matter can readily be accomplished constitutionally, and they becom
organized Federal troops, frequently referred to by military students
as Federal Volunteers, a phase of the subject to be later dealt with.
There is no one thing so free from dispute as that the basis of any
proper military system must be unity of responsibility, authority,
and control. It is absolutely impossible to have this essential unity
under the constitutional provisions with respect to the Organized
Militia or National Guard. This has been recognized, as I have
just said, almost from the beginning of the Government; certainly
from the time that experience served to demonstrate the utter ineffec-
tiveness of attempting to count upon a national military system com-
posed of those factors. .
The suggestion that the situation can properly be met by some sort
of provision making these troops subject to call of the Nation for
all purposes, in case of war, instead of only for the three purposes
specified in the Constitution, overlooks and disregards the funda-
mental basic trouble which this remedy does not even touch, much
less cure. The fundamental difficulty, as has just been pointed out,
is not the inability of the Federal Government to utilize these troops
for all purposes in time of war. It arises from the inability of the
Federal Government, under the Constitution, to have that unity of
authority, responsibility, and control in time of peace which it must
have as the basis of any military system of any value whatever.
Without amplifying these views, I think I have sufficiently indi-
cated the reasons why I feel that we are utterly unwarranted in
attempting to erect a military system on so unstable a foundation, a
foundation which, after 125 years of attempt, has been shown to be
utterly insecure and without value as a basis upon which to build.
Even, therefore, if there were no question about the States agreeing
PREPAIRED NESS IFOR NATION AI, DEFENSTE. 11
to raise the 271,000 additional men and officers necessary, to provide
everything which it is their duty to provide for them, and to do all
those things which they can constitutionally do, and to permit the
Federal Government to do not only that which it constitutionally
may do but things far in excess thereof, it would, in my judgment,
present a foundation utterly without warrant for us to accept and
build upon. No one can possibly have any higher appreciation than
I have for the spirit which has animated the personnel of the National
Guard, jº during recent years. They have striven under
adverse conditions and with a bad system to do the very best that
they could do, and in many cases they have done excellently. If it
were possible for me conscientiously to reach a conclusion which
permitted the use of the militia system or the National Guard as the
only other force outside of the Regular Army, I should have wel-
comed that conclusion. I do not see, however, how it is possible for
anyone who studies the situation to come conscientiously to any such
conclusion.
The National Guard, however, as it exists is a Federal asset. It is
not only usable for the three purposes specified in the Constitution
but it is so circumstanced that it can volunteer for service in time of
war and be taken in as it exists; that is, each unit may come in as a
unit, up to and including regimental organizations. I therefore
propose a large addition to the Federal aid extended to the National
Guard, Só that the system may be operated to its maximum capacity
and be available for the Federal purposes specified in its most effec-
tive condition. As will be seen, when we come to treat of the other
Federal force outside of the Regular Army which I recommend
should be raised, I offer the most ample opportunity for Organiza-
tions or individuals of the National Guard to come into the Federal
Service under the most desirable conditions.
We have now reached a point where, in my judgment, it has been
demonstrated that we may not solve our problem by meeting the
requirements in the way of men by either a regular standing army
of the requisite number or by attempting to use the Organized Militia
as the other Federal force outside of the Regular Army. We must
therefore next take up the question of what such other force should be.
Many people who think that this situation has been successfully
met in other places urge the adoption of the system in use in Switzer-
land, or that in use in Australia. There is, unfortunately, very little
accurate knowledge among many who discuss this matter concerning
the details and what is involved in the adoption thereof. -
Very briefly, the two systems are as follows:
Every male Swiss is liable to military service from the age of 20
until the age of 50, and officers until the age of 55. Between the
ages of 10 and 60, the Swiss boy receives courses of gymnastics or
calisthenics in the public schools, and after the last-named age the
law requires him to go on with his gymnastics and to make a begin-
ning at musketry. Rifle shooting is a national sport, and practi-
cally every boy belongs to rifle clubs that are under national auspices.
The first line, called the “elite,” consists of those from 20 to 32,
inclusive; the second or “landwehr’’ of those from 33 to 44, in-
clusive; the third consists of all others from 17 to 50 years of age.
When a recruit reports, he is fitted with his uniform and equipment,
and given a rifle, all of which must be taken care of by him and
12 PREPARED NESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
remain in his custody until the end of his military service. Recruits
receive instructions from 60 to 90 days, depending upon their arm of
the service. For the “elite” a repetition course of from 7 to 14
days is held every year. Sergeants and higher noncommissioned
officers serve 10 repetition courses. In the “landwehr’’ a repetition
course of 11 days takes place every four years for all the different
arms. All work is in the field and on the target range. Universal
military service and the beginning of the work in the public schools
are the most prominent elements of the Swiss system.
The Australian system likewise requires all male inhabitants to
render military service. They are divided into junior cadets, of those
between the ages of 12 and 14, inclusive, who serve for 2 years for 90
hours each year;” senior cadets, 14 to 18 years, serve 4 years, 4 whole
days, 12 half days, and 24 night drills. Variations are permissible,
rovided the total remains the same. Citizen forces from 18 to 26,
or 8 years, in first 7 years equivalent to 16 whole days, of which at
least 8 must be in camp. There are particular requirements for par-
ticular branches of the service which need not be here gone into.
Musketry is carried out on Saturday afternoons throughout the year,
and nearly every training locality has rifle ranges within a few miles.
As in the Swiss system, the attention given in the schools to gym-
nastics and preliminary education along military lines, together with
universal military service, are the striking features of this system.
In this country it is not believed practicable at this time to found
a military policy upon either of the two essential bases of the systems
just described. The National Government has no jurisdiction over
the public school systems of the various States. A constitutional
amendment would be required to give it any such jurisdiction. If it
attempted to acquire any participation in the School work by the
consent of the States, it would require contemporaneous, identical
legislation in the 48 States of the Union, and this, as we all know,
would consume lºng years of time to accomplish. In addition to this
it would require an enormous number of Federal officials to supervise
the innumerable public schools scattered throughout our enormous
area. Furthermore, it is not believed that the people of this country
have reached the conclusion that compulsory military service is a
necessity. However rational such conclusion may be, and however
inevitable it may be thought that the people will eventually reach
such a conclusion, it is futile to found a policy upon any such requi-
site at this time, if there is not reasonable hope to expect that it will
receive the approval of the people at this time. If you found your
system upon any such essential basis, and there is no good ground to
expect that you can secure such a basis by legislative enactment, the
result would be that no step whatever would be taken, and that would
be a lamentable result. If, on the other hand, you adopt a practical
system, based upon the voluntary action of the people, and that fails,
then policies based upon universal service or some form of compul-
sory service will be enacted as the only remaining remedy. Pro-
ceeding along these lines, we reach the conclusion that the supplement
to the Regular Army should be a Federal force raised under the
authority vested in Congress by the Constitution to raise armies, and
subject solely to its legislative authority, jurisdiction, and control.
It is therefore proposed to raise 400,000 men, embracing the vari-
ous arms of the service, in annual increments of 133,000 each. The
PREPAIRED NESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 13
country would be divided up into districts, and each district would
be called upon for its proportionate quota. If the 400 congressional
districts are taken as a basis, 333 men would be required annually
from each such district. The men would enlist for three years wit
the colors and three years on furlough. During the time of their
service with the colors they would be subjected to military training.
They would be armed, equipped, and officered. Their training would
be 㺠by the officers º men of the Regular Army Organizations,
units of which similar to those to be trained being sent to work
with each such unit. They would be paid during the time of their
service on the same basis as the Regular Army is paid. At first
officers would be secured from those who have served in the Regular
Army or the National Guard, from the officers on the reserve list of
the Army, from graduates of military schools and colleges who
qualify, and from the ranks of the force itself. Lator it is hoped
that we can obtain large numbers of proper material from the .#
schools and colleges throughout the country that either have or wi
include proper military courses, standardized under regulations of
the War Department, and over which courses and training the War
Department will have sufficient supervision and participation to
keep informed of the results and to be able to select the best mate-
rial. Thousands of young men will be graduated from these institu-
tions each year after we have got the system in complete operation.
They will furnish as fine material as any foreign army ever had for
this purpose. They will not, of course, have received the highly
specialized training of those in the national academy at West Ploint,
and it is not essential that all our officers should have. We should, of
course, expect, as experience demonstrated the best ways of accom-
plishing the end, to have service instruction and various other
methods of im arting information and training so as to develop the
officers to the highest practicable extent.
With respect to matters of this character, as to the officers as well
as to the period of training, and other details thereof for the men,
much has purposely been left without specification. The very best
results can only be obtained by experience, and it would be folly
to attempt now to crystallize these matters into definite provisions.
If the Congress will fix the maximum to be required and then leave
the President free to control the matter by proper regulations, the
very best results can be obtained. It may very well be that different
branches of the service will require different conditions of training,
instruction, etc.; that in different parts of the country different seasons
of the year and different periods of training will bring the best re-
Sults. Where indoor training and outdoor training can both be
availed of to the best advantage, that course should there properly
be followed. Where the men can be secured for outdoor training
for an intensive period, longer than is possible at those places where
there must be a combination, we should be free to meet that situation.
The period of two months mentioned in the War Department recom-
mendation was put in so as to have $9mething upon which to figure,
but it has always been realized by me that the eventual requirements
could only be worked out properly by experiment. And I earnestly
urge upon the Congress the necessity of leaving the President and the
department a free š. in these respects. Incidentally it should be
14 PREPARED NESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
observed that in the Australian and Swiss systems constant changes
are being made as experience demonstrates their wisdom.
The great majority of the present personnel of the National Guard
are in the Guard primarily with a view to training for national service.
They have an equitable right to especial consideration in the forma-
tion of any body of national citizen soldiers. Therefore it is recom-
mended that the officers and men of the National Guard be given the
right to enter the Continental Army, grade for grade and rank for
rank, individually or by organizations, so far as they may desire to
enter the Continental Army. Such action is required if justice is to
be done. Thus free discretion and choice would be afforded this per-
sonnel either to stay in the National Guard, which will be conserved
and built up on an even more liberal scale than at present, or enter the
8. Army without any loss of rank in the transfer. -
For convenience of designation, this force has been called the
Continental Army, but, in fact, it is a system of Federal Volunteers
raised, organized, equipped, and trained in time of peace. There is
absolutely nothing new in this suggestion, as it has been a result
reached and expressed by the very best military authorities this coun-
try has produced. The greatest of such authorities is undoubtedly
Gen. Emory Upton. On the recommendation of Gen. Sherman he
was sent around the world to study the armies of Europe and Asia.
This he did with great intelligence, and his report was caused to
be printed by Secretary Root in 1904. Most of the great reforms
in the Army of this country since that he wrote in 1880 followed his
urgent recommendations. It not only met with the approval of
Secretary Root and his successors, but also of Gen. Sherman and
other great soldiers, who realized its value. The One great recom-
mendation made by him, that of Federal Volunteers, to be organized,
officered, and trained in time of peace, yet remains to be put into
practical operation. The conclusions reached by the War Depart-
ment, after a most careful study of the whole subject, resulted in
concurring in the judgment of these great students, and in urging
the adoption of the recommendations for this force. Writing as
late as the present year, Maj. Gen. Carter, just retired, after a care-
ful survey of the whole field concerning our military policy, reaches
a similar conclusion and recommendation. The present War College
Division of the General Staff likewise reaches the same conclusion
and makes the same recommendation.
In fact, from the earliest times all those who gave intelligent con-
sideration to the question reached practically similar conclusions.
The first Secretary of War, Gen. Knox, with the approval of Gen.
Washington, submitted a plan of universal military training of a
citizen army, providing that those between 18 and 19 should be
trained for 30 days successively in each year, and those of 20 should
be trained for 10 days in each year, which should be the last 10 days
of the annual encampments. At the age of 21 every individual hav-
ing served as above received a certificate of honorable service and
became enrolled in the main corps and was only required to serve in
case such main corps was ordered out.
In 1805 President Jefferson, in collaboration with his Secretary of
War, Gen. Dearborn, proposed a practically identical plan. He re-
quired universal military service and classified the population into
the minor class, 18 to 21; junior, 21 to 26; middle, 26 to 35; and
PREPAREDNIESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 15
senior, 35 to 45. He required their enrollment by districts and their
being officered and trained for specified periods in each year. His
proposals failed in Congress because, as he wrote on the 27th of April,
1806, “A diversity of ideas, however, among the members, arising
from partiality to local systems, defeated that.” -
After the humilitating and disastrous experiences of our land
forces in the War of 1812, Jefferson, on the 9th of September, 1814,
speaking with respect to the inefficiency displayed in that war and
the lack of the exercise of proper power by the Federal Government,
Wrote:
But I expect all will go off with impunity. If our Government ever fails, it will
be from this weakness. No government can be maintained without the principle
of fear as well as of duty. Good men will obey the last, but bad ones the former
only. * * * I think the truth must now be obvious—that our people are too
happy at home to enter into regular service, and that we can not be defended but
by making every citizen a soldier, as the Greeks and Romans who had no standing
armies, and that in doing this all must be marshaled, classed by their ages, and every
service ascribed to its competent class.
Numerous other similar proposals have proceeded from former
Secretaries of War, some based upon universal military service
and others upon the appeal to patriotism involved in the volunteer
service, and they have all failed because of the same reason to which
Jefferson alludes, namely, a diversity of ideas among the Members
of the Congress, arising from partiality to local systems.
The lesson is perfectly clear, that until we entirely abandon the
idea of relying upon the impossible system of State troops for national
defense we can never build a system upon any foundation that will
endure or that will stand the strain of war.
It makes little difference how carefully you plan and build your
º if your foundation is upon quicksand.
e have the power and the authority and the duty to build
upon the firm foundation furnished by the Constitution. Until
that power is availed of and that foundation is established, con-
sideration of the subsidiary details is a waste of time.
The apprehension is well grounded that in the multiplicity of
counsel there will be failure. It is so easy to bring forward alluring
solutions based upon attractive theories. It is very difficult, however,
to weld together a complete system, well adjusted as to all its parts.
Independent proposals may of themselves be extremely attractive,
but unless they offer a solution of the problem they must be discarded
in favor of a complete system which does offer such a solution. We
can not successfully hope to determine this important issued by
adopting disconnected and unrelated ideas, however desirable and
attractive each one standing by itself may be.
It will not have escaped your notice that this proposed system is
practically the same thing as the Swiss and Australian systems,
leaving out the supervision of the public schools and work therein
of a military character, and compulsory military service. If com-
pulsory military service is now desired for the country, and legisla-
tion concerning it can be expected by the Congress, then a short
provision in the act will accomplish it. Such a clause would provide
that wherever the quota required of any district by a certain date is
short of the proper number a selective process to obtain that number
shall be put into effect. This would give the volunteer principle its
16 PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
fullest possibility of producing results, and would also assure the
needed ji. case the volunteer principle failed in producing it.
Before leaving this portion of the subject it is desirable to empha-
size one important feature. Even if it is not found practicable to
secure the men for the continental army for so long a period of
time as to produce marked military results in the way of training,
etc., the mere fact that in time of peace a force of 400,000 men is
gathered, armed, equipped, officered, and ready for instant response
to the call of the Nation would be of incalculable benefit. At the
present time all of these things, as has been pointed out above, must
take place after the outbreak of war and the call for volunteers. They
take place in the midst of chaos and confusion, and many months
must elapse before the volunteers thus called out are circumstanced
as this other force would be before the call is made. Certainly, it is
not necessary to elaborate upon the incalculable benefit of this situa-
tion. If, in addition thereto, we can impart sufficient training and
instruction to the units and the officers so that a very short period in
the field after the outbreak of war would perfect them, we have at-
tained much and the system would come as near meeting the situa-
tion as any system could short of a professional, highly trained,
Regular Army constantly under arms.
We now come to the question of how large a standing army should,
under the circumstances, be maintained. -
The recommendations made by me were based upon these con-
siderations. That the essential duty of the standing army, outside
of its availability to the Executive for enforcing the law, suppress-
ing domestic insurrections, garrisoning the foreign possessions and
coast fortifications, and border and expeditionary duty, was the
training of the citizen forces. It was worked out for me that the
units of the Regular Army, aggregating about 50,000 of mobile
troops and about 20,000 of Coast Artillery troops in continental
United States, would be sufficient for this purpose under normal
conditions. In addition it would not be necessary to shelter such
a force to engage at this time in any further construction of bar-
racks and quarters. The Adjutant General believes that he could
recruit such a force but could not recruit a larger one. The expense
is within proper figures for such a force. I therefore recommended
the creation in two equal annual increments of 10 regiments of
Infantry, 4 regiments of Field Artillery, 52 companies of Coast
Artillery, 15 companies of Engineers, and 4 aero Squadrons, which
added to our present force and increased by the auxiliary and
attendant Quartermaster Corps, Hospital Corps, Ordnance troops,
etc., would make our total enlisted force 134,707 men, together with
7,086 officers; and 50 veterinarians included in the latter being the
extra officers needed for the purpose of training, instruction, etc.
It has been suggested that as large or a larger number of enlisted
men would result #. filling up existing units to their full strength.
This is so, but, in my judgment, this is not the wise and proper
thing to do, and would not result in advantage. It would not give
us the organizations and officers needed if our plan is to have any
chance .# successful operation. It would also result in a large
unnecessary increase of expense. Our regimental posts would only
be able to accommodate one-half of the enlisted strength of a war-
strength regiment and one-half of the officers, leaving at each such
PREPAIRED NESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 17.
post one-half of the officers' quarters unoccupied, and dividing the
regiment between two posts would result in there being at each one
one-half of the enlisted men, one-half of the officers, and one-half
of the officers' quarters vacant. It would be undesirable, from a
military standpoint, thus to separate the commands. It would
be undesirable from an economical standpoint for many reasons,
not only those mentioned, but in the matter of transportation,
administration, etc. The officers and men of the new organizations
are absolutely essential if the War Department plan is to be fairly
tried out. Without them it can not hope for successful results.
With them we have every hope of being able to produce results if
any system of voluntary military service can be successfully worked
in this country.
Suggestions are likewise made that we should have a much larger
standing army than that recommended by the War Department.
But if we can secure the essential features of the plan recommended
by the department, I am unable to perceive the wisdom of incurrin
the expense and taking so large a number of men into a professiona
army as these suggestions would require.
It is suggested that we should have an Army of 250,000 men. In
the first place, it does not seem possible, in view of all our experi-
ence, to recruit and maintain in time of peace any such Regular
Army. In the next place, we have no shelter or available military
accessories for any such force. We have no officers trained to take
charge of and properly instruct and make proficient any such force.
The cost would be very large to recruit, organize, and equip this
force, leaving aside the very large expenditures necessary to house
them and supply them with the necessary accessories, not to mention
the large amount of reserve matériel needed therefor. In the plan
of the War College Division of the General Staff, an Army of about
this size is so distributed that in continental United States there
would be left 121,000 mobile army troops. These are divided into
four divisions. The War Department plan, as recommended by
me, calls for three divisions. In the War Department plan these
divisions are at peace strength, so that they are capable of expansion.
The War College Division plan proposes a two-year enlistment, with
six years in reserve, and, eventually, at the end of eight years, makes
up a line of 500,000 men of the Regular Army, of whom 121,000
would be with the colors and 379,000 in reserve.
This brings up an important subject, and one that is full of com-
plexities. I do not, for one, believe that you can safely count on
a force that is made of those presently in the service with the colors,
plus those who are through with their active service and are back in
civil life, scattered all over the country, if the force is to be your
first line. It is of undoubted value to have such men under the
reserve obligation, so that you can avail yourself of such of them as
will undoubtedly come forward. But I have never seen any scheme
Worked out, which gave any promise of successful results, that con-
sidered these men as available, either as members of their original
organizations or as available in mass to form new organizations.
The best that I think you can expect is to have them come forward
to supply wastage or be incorporated in new organizations then to be
raised. If you expect anything else, you must work out some scheme
23380—PT 1–16—2
18 PREPARED NESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
by which the War Department can not only keep track of every such
man but be able to convey notice to him, to get transportation orders
to each one, and directions as to where he is to report. If it is be-
lieved that you can so arrange matters as to have each one report
where his old organization was, so that he can assume membership
therein, you are, in my judgment, imagining a vain thing. Even
to assume that you can gather in different localities all over this
country these reservists, and can have available at such places their
equipment, and can then organize them into the respective branches
in which they formerly served is to conceive a fine theory, but one
which never yet has been reduced to practical form in any plan that
I have seen. I therefore do not believe that it is wise or sound to
base a military policy upon a first line, of whom only 121,000 are
with the colors and the balance are scattered all over the vast area
of this country. In the plan proposed by the War Department the
first line would consist of those who are actually with the colors;
that is, those in the Regular Army who are actually serving and
those in the Continental Army who are actually serving. The
reserves of these organizations would be available just as they would
be in the War College division plan, but they are not counted upon
as part of the first line.
ther suggestions are made that we should have in continental
United States alone 250,000 of the Regular Army. All of what has
just been said is here applicable, and, in addition thereto, the con-
sideration that this number, added to those necessary for over-Sea
service, would make our annual budget for the Regular Army alone
$200,000,000 to $250,000,000 greater than it now is, and would be
unjustified, in my estimation.
With respect to this matter of the size of the Regular Army, of
the use of the National Guard, of the way to raise Federal volunteers,
of the way to obtain officers, of what to do concerning reserves of
men and material, and numerous other questions, many suggestions
have been made and will continue to be made. This leads to what
I believe is the imperative necessity, if anything whatever of value
is to be accomplished at this session of the Congress. Certain general
principles must be recognized as underlying the whole subject, and
procedure must be had along those principles if any result worthy
of the subject and of the Congress is to be reached. I sincerely be-
lieve that an attentive study of the whole subject will lead to the
conclusion previously stated, that a small highly trained, highly
effective Regular Army, expansible in character, Federal volunteers,
raised, officered, and trained in time of peace, and the National
Guard for State uses, is the best solution. It has been determined
to be such by many of the greatest statesmen, Soldiers, and reasoning
men who have studied the matter with concentrated attention and
high intelligence. None of the other suggestions. So far made will
stand the necessary tests. We must realize, I think, that it is our
imperative duty to satisfy the expectations of the people of this
country on this great subject. e can not do this unless, with
wisdom, patriotism, and disinterested Service, we lay the foundation
for a wise, permanent military policy that is practicable, economical,
and adequate. f - g
I shall take the liberty of attaching to this statement various docu-
ments from different sources, setting forth in greater detail matter
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 19.
which I think you will find useful in your consideration of this
subject matter.
I wish to place at your disposal every facility at my command to
aid you. Upon some subjects there is, of course, only one source of
information, and that is the technical experts who are informed
thereon. On the general subject, however, the conclusion must of
necessity be one ji. for many considerations.
With respect to the coast fortifications and accumulations of re-
serve material, it does not seem useful to add anything to what is
stated in my annual report. These two matters require an aggregate
of $46,000,000 a year for a period of four years, and this of necessity
must be kept in mind in dealing with any proposed policy.
A very great responsibility rests upon you gentlemen that have the
duty of formulating and enacting the policy for national defense. The
integrity of the country and its very existence as a powerful, valuable
member of the family of nations may depend upon the wisdom with
which you do your part.
I can not too earnestly urge upon you to rid yourselves of all pre-
conceptions, of all illusions, and of the necessity of facing sternly and
uncompromisingly the facts and the necessities of the case. If you
do this, I have no doubt that your conclusions will be similar to those
reached by all other intelligent, unprejudiced students of military
affairs, and that there will emerge from your council a policy broadly
based upon a firm foundation and adequate for the protection and
maintenance of the nation's vital interests. -
Now, Mr. Chairman, in addition to that statement I desire to place
before the committee a series of communications emanating from the
National Guard Association of the United States, the purpose of
which is obvious and the character of which bears its own condemna-
tion. *
The CHAIRMAN. If there is no objection, those will be printed fol-
lowing the statement of the Secretary.
(The communications referred to are printed in the record in full,
as follows:) -
CIRCULAR LETTER TO THE ADJ UTANTS G F NERAL OF THE SEVERAL STATES,
[Copies to other officers.]
THE NATIONAL GUARD Association of THE UNITED STATEs,
OFFICE OF CHAIRMAN EXECUTIVE CoMMITTEE,
St. Augustine, Fla., January 10, 1916.
1. The following information relative to the campaign being conducted in support
of the Federal military legislation proposed by the National Guard Association of
the United States is furnished you: -
2. This committee met at Washington December 16 and 17, and held informal
Conference with the chairman of the military committees of the Senate and House.
It was found that both of these gentlemen were favorable to the idea of Federal com-
pensation for militia service. Senator Chamberlain has reintroduced the “Chamber-
lain bill,” which was before the last Congress. Mr. Hay has incorporated in his
general military bill now under consideration provision for pay. Your committee
Conferred with Mr. Hay at length upon the details of his bill and made certain recom-
mendations to him suggesting amendments, which he took under consideration.
3. Hearings upon this bill by the House Committee on Military Affairs were com-
menced last Thursday, when the Secretary of War was heard, and is being continued
to-day. After the various representatives of the War Department have appeared
and been heard, the members of this committee will be afforded opportunity to pre-
Sent argument in favor of the proposals of the National Guard. It is expected that
20 PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
the representatives of our service will be invited to appear before the committee the
latter part of next week or early during the following week. -
4. Until legislation has been prepared and introduced to carry out the recommen-
dations of this association it will not be advisable to urge upon individual members
of Congress that they support a “pay bill.” It will be inconsistent and ill advised to
urge the question of pay until we have brought forward the remedies we propose for
those defects in the militia system complained of by the War Department. What
can be done at this time is to endeavor to acquaint the Members of Congress and the
public generally with what these remedies are. To this purpose we should address
ourselves. Certain recommendations as to action which should be taken now are
covered in a separate communication of this date, and it is urged that this program be
energetically and consistently carried out.
5. By this time it will have been made clear to you from the report of the general
staff and other information now obtainable that the attitude of the Army toward the
National Guard is hardly more favorable than that of the Secretary of War himself,
although the latter sought to take full responsibility for the Continental Army plan.
It will be well to accept the fact at the outstart that we will have strong opposition
to the National Guard program from both quarters and shape our course accordingly.
It is gratifying to find, however, that the sentiment in Congress is very favorable to us.
Numbers of letters have been received from Members of Congress expressing disap-
proval of the Continental Army Scheme and intention to support legislation favorable
to the militia. This is very encouraging, but we must exert ourselves to create senti-
ment at home which will back up our friends in Congress, and this sentiment must
be based upon an intelligent understanding of what we propose and the reasons for it.
6. Your attention is invited to the fact that the “Army League” has recently
adopted and given wide distribution to resolutions advocating universal military
training, and the development of the Continental Army or some force of Federal
citizen soldiery, other than the National Guard, as the medium for giving such
training.
7. Since the wide public agitation commenced in favor of better military prepared-
ness a number of associations have been formed (chiefly in eastern cities) having for
their purpose the carrying on of educational campaigns as to our military needs.
Most of these organizations are officered and controlled by influential men, many of
whom are contributing considerable sums of money toward the expense of these
campaigns. At least one of these associations owes its existence to direct suggestion
from Army sources, and strong influence is being exerted to fix the policy of the
others either in favor of large Army expansion or for the establishment of some new
Federal force which shall take the place of the National Guard. With this knowledge
it would seem to be in the interest of our service that National Guardsmen individu-
ally identify themselves with these organizations and take an active part in what they
are doing. By this means we may avail ourselves of these powerful agencies for
developing Sentiment favorable to our service. As a rule the affairs of these various
leagues are being conducted by Small directorates centered where they are directly
subjected to influences inimical to National Guard interests. Influential citizens in
all sections of the country should be solicited to write letters to the civilians who are
connected with the management of these several associations urging upon them the
desirability of making the National Guard the basis of any force of citizen soldiery
which the Nation shall undertake to maintain. I regard this as very important.
J. CLIFFORD R. FostER,
Chairman.
CIRCULAR LETTER TO THE ADJUTANTS GENERAL OF THE SEVERAL STATES.
[Copies to other officers.]
THE NATIONAL GUARD Association of THE UNITED STATES,
OFFICE OF CHAIRMAN EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE,
St. Augustine, Fla., January 10, 1916.
I beg to remind you of the action taken by this association at its recent convention
by which officers of the National Guard were invited to send in to the executive com-
mittee written argument in support of the National Guard program for Federal mili-
tary legislation, and to request that this matter be taken up at once with the officers
of your State and that they (or such of them as may be selected for the purpose), be
urged to mail to the undersigned any data prepared along such lines. *
It would be well to invite the preparation of argument bearing upon each of the
special features of the report of the legislative committee which was adopted at San
Francisco. As you know, this was the method so successfully employed by the
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 21
general staff with regard to matters under consideration for the Army, and if the
officers of our Service will zealously apply themselves to the task it will provide a
valuable symposium of information in support of the National Guard proposals.
If this matter is available before January 14, it should be mailed to me in care of the
New Willard Hotel, Washington; after that date to St. Augustine.
J. CLIFFORD R. FostER, -
Chairmam.
Fº: º T. Burns, major and inspector general, Illinois National Guard, Kan-
kakee, Ill.
To: The commanding general, National Guard, Washington, D. C.
Subject: Organized Militia statistics.
1. The undersigned is desirous of obtaining certain information concerning the
'Organized Militia of the various States, and is submitting a list of questions with the
respectful request that same be answered and returned as soon as possible. .
2. (a) What is the present strength of the Organized Militia of your State?
(b) What was the amount of the last annual appropriation (for all purposes) received
from your State? º .
(c) What year or period does this appropriation cover? -
(d) What part of this Sum, approximately, was used for extraordinary purposes,
such as riot or strike duty? *
(e) Does your State follow the policy of building armories?
(ſ) If any armories have been built, please give number and approximate value.
(g) What was the amount of the last appropriation or allowance (of all kinds) received
from the Federal Government? - -
(h) Among how many cities is your Organized Militia distributed?
§ Do the members of your Organized Militia receive pay for drills? If so, how
much?
(j) Are you in favor of the proposed Continental Army?
(k) What effect, if any, will the organization of the proposed Continental Army have
on the Organized Militia of your State?
(l) Do you favor the abolition of strike and riot duty?
(m). Do you favor the so-called federalization of the Organized Militia?
(n) Are you in favor of the passage of a “pay bill” by Congress?
(o) What do you think should be paid per drill to enlisted men?
(p) What do you think should be paid to company commissioned officers?
(q) What sum do you think should be paid to regimental staff officers?
(r) What sum should be paid to other officers?
(s) Can you suggest a plan whereby the Organized Militia will be immediately
available for national defense, without undergoing the delay required to transform
it from a State to a National force?
(t) Do you consider that the members of the Organized Militia of your State under
your State law and under the United States laws are legally obliged to perform any
military service out of your State?
(w) Do you believe that strike and riot duty should be performed by a State police
or constabulary, rather than by the National Guard?
(v) Please state the number of rifle ranges owned by your State. Number of per-
manent camps. The approximate value of both.
I am very desirous of securing information from the best authority on these ques-
tions, and I will most sincerely appreciate your answers to the foregoing questions.
You may rest assured that the information you furnish will not be published, if so
desired.
JAMES I). BURNs,
Major, Inspector General, Illinois Nalional Guard.
TO THE ADJUTANTS GENERAL OF THE SEVERAL STATES.
[Copies to other officers.]
THE NATIONAL GUARD Association of THE UNITED STATEs,
OFFICE OF CHAIRMAN EXECUTIVE Committe E,
St. Augustine, Fla., January 10, 1910.
1. Your committee believes it to be desirable that effort be made to secure the
adoption by boards of trade and other commercial organizations throughout the country
of resolutions indorsing the Nationál Guard program for Federal military legislation.
22 PREPAREDNIESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
This action can be initiated by officers in every city and town where there are organi-
zations of the National Guard, and perhaps in other cities.
2. Two things should be brought out specially in such resolutions, viz:
(a) Indorsement of the full program for Federal military legislation proposed by the
National Guard Association at San Francisco, and -
(b) Strong expression of the belief that the National Guard should form the basis of
.# force of citizen Soldiery which the Nation may undertake to maintain for national
€162D Se. -
3. The adoption of such resolutions may be argued for upon the following grounds,
which will appeal particularly to business men:
(a) That the members of the National Guard have for many years devoted them-
Selves seriously and with good result to the building up of a force of citizen soldiery for
national defense, for which patriotic work their branch of the service is entitled to con-
sideration. -
(b) That the National Guard, maintained by the States, trained and officered under
a uniform system, but available to the Nation in time of war, would be a force consist-
ent with our national ideals.
(c) That the members of the National Guard, being the only ones who have had
practical experience in the organization and management of citizen soldiers may be
Said to have expert knowledge of the conditions under which such service must be
performed, and, speaking from this experience and expert knowledge, they are
unanimous in the opinion that the continental army plan is impracticable and
foredoomed to failure.
(d) That effort to establish any new military force to be drawn from the citizenry
of the country must either result in failure or in the abolishment of the National
Guard, and that Sound principles of economy contend for the maintenance and devel-
opment of the force already in existence, and which has an invested capital of more
than a hundred million dollars.
Other arguments will suggest themselves.
4. There is submitted herewith draft of resolutions which have been used in some
cases. It is recommended, however, that the verbiage be changed in each instance.
5. Copies of all resolutions of this character which may be adopted should be mailed
to the President, the Secretary of War, the Senators and Representatives in Congress
º #: State, and to the chairmen of the Senate and House Committees on Military
2,11’S.
If this suggestion is vigorously carried out your committee feels that it will result
in a snow storm of resolutions at Washington which will be convincing evidence of
the sentiment of the country favorable to the National Guard.
J. CLIFFORD R. FostER,
Chairman.
RESOLUTION RECOMMENDING BETTER MILITARY PREPAREDNESS.
Whereas in this time of stress throughout the world the question as to whether or
not this Nation is adequately prepared for defense is one which occurs with force
to the American people; therefore, be it
Resolved by the Chamber of Commerce of the City of , State of , That it
does hereby place itself on record as strongly favoring action by the Congress of the
|United States which will insure the following:
First. A Navy second to none in the world.
Second. An increase in the strength of the Regular Army which will be adequate
but consistent with our national ideals. --
Third. The adoption of the legislative measures which have been recommended
by the National Guard Association of the United States in order to improve the effi-
ciency of the Organized Militia and make it available with the Regular Army for
first-line service in time of war.
Fourth. Provision for a proper and practicable reserve system for the Regular
Army, the Navy, and the National Guard. -
Fifth. Provision for universal military training under some such system as that
employed by the Swiss. -
Sixth. That the formation of any force of citizen soldiery which may be undertaken
shall have as its basis the Organized Militia of the country as at present constituted.
This out of consideration for the thousands of men who have voluntarily given their
time and effort for more than a quarter of a century to the development of this branch
of the national military service as a force for national defense; because of the Sound
economic reason that both the Nation and the States have an enormous invested
PREPAREDNESS For NATIONAL DEFENSE. 23
capital in this institution; because it is recognized under the Constitution as a funda-
mental part of our military system; and because the limitations and safeguards placed
upon the organization and control of our military forces are vital to the welfare of the
Government to-day and should be adhered to.
Be it further resolved, That copies of these resolutions be sent the President of the
United States, the Secretary of War, the chairmen of the Committees on Military
Affairs of the Senate and House, and to the Senators and Representatives in Congress
from this State, and that the latter be specially urged to use their best endeavors to
accomplish these results. º
The CHAIRMAN. I suppose the members of the committee desire to
ask the Secretary some questions, and I suggest that instead of having
a cross-firing of questions, interruptions of one Senator by another,
that one Senator finish what he has to ask, and then some other
Senator, if he desires to take up the subject, do so.
Senator THOMAs. We will have to violate our own precedents.
The CHAIRMAN. I know we will, but it is the only sensible way,
because if a Senator has a line of thought that he wishes to have
elucidated, he will not be interrupted. Senator Thomas, do you
desire to ask the Secretary any questions?
Senator THOMAS. Merely one question. It has been stated a num-
ber of times to me, and I think in this committee once or twice, that
our present maximum force has never been maintained; in other words
that we can not get men enough to fill the maximum efficiency of the
Army as it is at present provided for. I would like to know if that
is true? y
Secretary GARRISON. No, sir. The Adjutant General of the Army
says he can enlist, by spurring up to his limit, 50,000 men.
Senator THOMAS. Has it ever been done?
Secretary GARRISON. We are now enlisted as far as we have
appropriations to support the Army.
Senator THOMAS. Was there any time since the enactment of the
present law that you had the full force, somewhere about 102,000?
Secretary GARRISON. We have it now. -
Senator THOMAs. How long have you had it 3
Secretary GARRISON. I would have to ask the Adjutant General.
It is a fluctuating thing.
Senator THOMAs. It has been very recent, has it not ?
Secretary GARRISON. Yes; it has been during my term.
The CHAIRMAN. Senator Fletcher, do you desire to ask the Secre-
tary anything? *
Senator FLETCHER.. I have been obliged to attend another com-
mittee this afternoon, and therefore have not had the privilege of
hearing the Secretary's full statement. I therefore will not venture
to ask questions which he has perhaps already answered in his state-
ment. I would like to inquire of the Secretary if he could recommend
to us any economies in the present expenditure of public moneys for
the benefit of the Army. } will say this, Mr. Secretary, that at a
recent meeting of this committee it was advocated that a commission
ought to be appointed to inquire into details, both with reference to
the Army and the Navy, the suggestion being that there could be
saved a good deal of money that is now being spent without any
really good effects. If there is anything in that direction that has
not been covered, I should be glad to have some information about it.
Secretary GARRISON. In general response to your question, I have,
ever since I have been in the department, done everything that lay
24 PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
within my power in the way of investigation and consideration to
determine whether there were any economies which I could effect by
administrative orders. I constituted a board some time ago composed
of the Assistant Secretary, the Quartermaster General, under whose
department most of the money is expended, and the Inspector Gen-
eral—the latter, as his name implies, having duties that have entirely
to do with inspecting the material and the personnel of the Army—
that is, the posts and the men. Without now going into the matter in
the detail in which it will be presented to you by the report of that
committee and by the statement prepared by the Quartermaster
General, I may say that the main items of expenditure of the Army
appropriation are fixed by law and can not be changed unless the
law is changed. For the purpose of your immediate illustration,
with your permission, I will read the statement that I have prepared
upon that very subject [reading]: -
For the support of the Army the current appropriation is $101,959,195.87. In gen-
eral, this is divided as follows:
Pay, etc.--------------------------------------------------------- $48,974, 442. 52
Subsistence.... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . "- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 9,943, 384. 64
Transportation--------------------------------------------------- 10,626, 518.00
Clothing and equipage--------------. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6, 693,000.00
Regular supplies.---------. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7, 661,360.00
Barracks and quarters. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2,467, 558.00
Incidental expenses--- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1,872, 163.00
Water and sewers----------------. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,656, 254.00
Roads and Walks... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 600,000.00
Miscellaneous appropriations Quartermaster Corps not included in
above.-------------------------------------------------------- 1,653,075. 71
Ordnance Department. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7, 675,000.00
Medical Department. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 810,000.00
Office Chief Signal Officer. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 659, 500.00
Engineer Department---------. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142,000.00
Contingencies of the Army. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25,000.00
Office Chief of Staff. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72,600.00
The Adjutant General’s Department. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.6, 940.00
Under Chief of Coast Artillery. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28,000.00
Bureau of Insular Affairs. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,800.00
Miscellaneous. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 70,600.00
It will be perceived that the item of pay, including the different compensations paid
to the Army personnel, nearly equals the amount expended for all other purposes; that
subsistence requires almost 10 per cent of the total appropriation; transportation a
fraction more than 10 per cent; equipage, including clothing, nearly 7 per cent;
regular supplies, 7.52 per cent. And the remaining principal items are Ordnance,
7.53 per cent; medical, 0.79 per cent; barracks and quarters, 2.42 per cent; incidental
expenses, 1.84 per cent; water and sewers at military posts, 1.62 per cent; roads, walks,
wharves, and drainage, 0.59 per cent. These items taken together aggregate at least
97 per cent of the total expenditures for the Support of the Army. -
The amounts paid for upkeep of buildings are extremely small; for light, water, fuel,
etc., they contrast favorably with any private establishment of any considerable size.
Supplies are purchased as cheaply as possible, and each post buys in its own locality
unless we can furnish them as cheaply or cheaper from a center of distribution. Pay,
allowances, clothing, etc., are fixed and regulated by law. The item of transportation
seems large, but the reasons therefor are convincing when the facts are realized.
Apart from our water transportation, in connection with our outlying garrisons, the
vast spaces in this country explain the large amount paid for this item. Since this
matter of area in continental United States enters into many other phases of the prob-
lem besides transportation, it is useful to state the following facts in connection therein.
If you consider the area of the United States, including Alaska, as 100 per cent, the
combined areas of all the following countries are but 97 per cent thereof. The area of
each, expressed as a percentage, is also included:
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. - 25
Per cent.
Austria-Hungary. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6. 66
Belgium------------------------------------------------------------------ . 31.
British Isles. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3. 34
Bulgaria.------------------------------------. . . . . . . . - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1. 05
Denmark----------------------------------------------------------------- 43
France------------------------------------------------------------------- 5. 64
Germany . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5. 76
Greece. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
Italy------------------------------------------ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3. 06
Japan-------------------------------------------------------------------- 4. 46
Portugal.----------------------------------------------------------------- 99
Russia (in Europe). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57. 95
Spain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * - - - - - - - - - - - 5. 41
Turkey (in Europe). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1. 73
The CHAIRMAN. From what were you reading';
Secretary GARRISON. From a statement I had prepared myself in
anticipation of just this question.
Senator FLETCHER. What I had in mind was not so much economies
in administration. I assume that those were practiced as far as
ossible. But I wanted to know what the recommendation might
e with regard to the change of law—whether economies could be
effected.
Secretary GARRISON. The only laws you could change, Senator,
that would effect any large economies, would be to reduce the pay,
to reduce the character or class of clothing, to reduce the character
or nutriment of the food, things of that character.
Senator FLETCHER. Anything in a reduction of posts?
Secretary GARRISON. Yes; you could reduce posts, but if you are
contemplating doing that for economy, it has never been demon-
strated to me that you secure any offset, in changing your posts, for
the very large sums of money that would have to be invested in new
posts, because the idea, of course, would be if you are going to build
new posts and put them adjacent to large communities where the
facilities of large communities could be availed of, my long experience
of several years in active law practice is that adjacent to any bi
city in this country the land which would have to be purchase
would be at such a figure that the interest thereon, carried on that
side of the ledger, would more than balance, I think, any conceivable
economy that the erection of barracks and quarters there would
produce. se
There has been a very great deal of talk about that which is not
very well founded. Of course, from a military standpoint, it un-
doubtedly would be valuable to have posts that would contain larger
numbers of men than any posts that we now have, because you
would have them present for training, you would have them present
for maneuvering and training of the officers, and training of the
men in larger units. But on the bald standard of economy, I never
have had worked out for me any satisfactory balance sheet that
showed that if you abandoned our present posts and concentrated
your Army into 8 or 10 large posts adjacent to big cities, by the
time you had bought the land and built the buildings and done
all the things you would have to do to make it a usable Army post,
you would not have to charge yourself with a fair amount of interest
On that sum, and thus produce a total that would be quite as great
as any conceivable economy that you would thereby effect.
26 PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
Senator SHEPPARD. To what extent have the developments of the
European war affected the necessity in this country for increased
strength of the Army'
Secretary GARRISON. I do not know that I catch just the meaning
of your question Senator. All that we have learned from the
European war has been considered by the various committees or
bodies or individuals who have studied the subject, and whose
advice was laid before me before I made any recommendations to
Congress. Is that what you meant?
Senator SHEPPARD. If there had been no European war, would
these suggestions which you have just gone through with have been
made at all 7
Secretary GARRISON. Oh, my; yes. They have been made from
General Washington on down. There never has been any student
of military affairs in this country who has not tried to get a national
military system based upon national force. They have all realized
that we are absolutely building and continuing a situation founded
upon quicksand.
Senator SHEPPARD. Has not the European war created a public
sentiment in this country'.
Secretary GARRISON. Oh, yes; that is the valuable thing that has
hººd to this country, if anything valuable has come out of that
tragedy. -
Senator SHEPPARD. That is what I want to get at. What is the
relation of the European war to the question of military preparedness %
Secretary GARRISON. The relation is that it has concentrated public
opinion, for the first time almost in the lifetime of those who are now
living, so that the public will accept and will listen and will be gratified
by any wise, sensible settlement of the subject, because they are
thinking about it. - * -
Senator SHEPPARD. Has not the fact that nothing has been done
in that direction up to date been due to the fact that public opinion
had not becn sufficiently awakened?
Secretary GARRISON. I think there is no doubt of that. I do not
think you will find, Senator Sheppard, enough disagreement to make
it worth while considering between the treatment of this subject from
the military standpoint at any time in our history, by the people who
have studied it, mutatis mutandis, the changed situation of the
country as to population and things of that sort, which are necessary
changes; but, excepting for that, the conclusions are singularly
identical. Of course the state of the public mind has had everything
to do with what was accomplished, and the opportunity that this
Congress has to accomplish something is just because of what you
were speaking of, namely, that public attention is absolutely con-
centrated upon this and that the President of the United States,
voicing the sentiment of the Nation, has laid it before this Congress
as the one primary, exclusive subject for their immediate considera-
tion. -
Senator SHEPPARD. Has not the European war shown that certain
i. of fortifications and defense are less reliable than was thought
before ? .
Secretary GARRISON. I rather think that is true respecting forti-
fied cities, fortified places. It has demonstrated what military men,
I think, are pretty nearly agreed upon, and that is that a land fort,
PREPAREDINESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. - 27
a harbor defense, is still as valuable, as it ever was thought to be
against sea power. In other words, it has demonstrated that well-
directed land defenses can almost always overcome an attack from
the sea, and if you are going to attack them at all, you have to attack
them from the land side. The engagement at Gallipoli was an abso-
lute failure, so far as the fleet action was concerned, and when they
tried their land action, they did not send Sufficient men there to
accomplish the purpose, and that became an absolute failure.
Senator SHEPPARD. A number of fraternal Orders in the country
have uniform rank departments in which there are twenty, thirty,
forty, or fifty thousand men, many of them well drilled, officered,
equipped. They have annual encampments at which your officers
are present at times to look them over, and those officers have made
complimentary reports regarding them. Do you not think there is
some way in which their services could be utilized'
Secretary GARRISON. Oh, certainly. Let them come right in the
Federal volunteers and take the obligation and become diciplined
and trained and officered and under the jurisdiction of the Govern-
ment. I do not think anything should be considered for One moment
that is not under the absolute, exclusive control of the National Gov-
ernment for any proper use at all times.
Senator SHEPPARD. Is there any way in which these uniform-rank
companies of fraternal orders could be admitted by units’;
Secretary GARRISON. I see no objection, if they are within the
proper ages and are proper physically.
Senator SHEPPARD. And also their officers, if they pass the proper
examination ? -
Secretary GARRISON. Certainly. Any officer who was qualified; it
would make no difference in what he previously served.
Senator SHEPPARD. I heard your statement that the units of the
National Guard ought to be admitted unit for unit.
Secretary GARRISON. Yes. -
Senator SHEPPARD. You would require some form of examination ?
Secretary GARRISON. Oh, yes; certainly. If the National Guard
came over in the first instance, I imagine that they would be received
as they were; but of course as soon as there was the slightest necessity
for promotion they would then have to pass qualifying examinations
or not be able to be promoted.
Senator SHEPPARD. You said a while ago that you thought land
defenses were shown to be as efficient as they were before this war.
Secretary GARRISON. Yes.
Senator SHEPPARD. Is it not a fact that stone forts and ramparts
may be demolished by these long-distance guns that have been
º: by the war, and can be rendered useless in a few minutes,
forts that were supposed to be impregnable? Have they not been
shown to be like so much paper. -
Secretary GARRISON. You are speaking of land forts, not harbor
defenses as against a fleet. •
Senator SHEPPARD. Are not some of the land defenses forts?
Secretary GARRISON. Yes, as I say; but you are speaking of the
land forts, not harbor defenses.
Senator SHEPPARD. I am speaking of land forts.
Secretary GARRISON. Yes; still, holding back by the forces at
Liege of the German Army, or of the central powers army, I think
28 PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
would be stated by military students to have almost saved the
situation for the allies, and that was entirely because of a fortified
place which remained impregnable for so long that they furnished the
necessary time for the allies to mobilize and to form a line, which
eventually saved them from further invasion.
Senator SHEPPARD. Has it not been demonstrated that if our
heavy guns, for instance, could be moyed from one point to another,
behind ramparts, that they would be in a better position than if they
are fixed as at present—be less subject to destruction?
Secretary GARRISON. No; I do not think that has been demon-
strated. It has been demonstrated that in land operations, that is
to say, two land forces fighting against each other, these heavy pieces,
which are mobile, are very efficient, not only as against fortifications,
but to hurl high explosives in large quantities into the enemy, and
that subject has received very careful consideration in the depart-
ment, and we are asking provisions from the proper committee for
money to build some of those large mobile guns of large caliber.
Senator SHEPPARD. Do you think the land forts are in about as
good shape as ever ? . -
Secretary GARRISON. Yes. But we are not concerned with that
matter in this country, because we have no land forts. The only
things we have are harbor defenses. We have no forts inland.
Senator SHEPPARD. I am speaking of a fort like Fort Crockett, at
Galveston, where there are soldiers in connection with the big guns.
Secretary GARRISON. That is a harbor defense.
Senator SHEPPARD. If a big gun on a ship gets a line on a gun in the
fort, its stone protection would not be sufficient to save it'.
Secretary GARRISON. The people who make a study of that say
that the percentage is very vast in favor of the land fort being able
to put the ship out of action much quicker than the ship can put it out
of action, and all history proves that that is true.
Senator SHEPPARD. That is what I wanted to bring out.
Secretary GARRISON. And Gallipoli proves that. They had some of
the very best ships of the fleet. They had the Queen Elizabeth, which
carries the biggest gun they have, and they were unable to make an
permanent impression at Gallipoli. I think military students º
agree that if they had realized the job they were up against and sent
a sufficient number of men they could have taken it from the land
side. But they did not. They sent too few men and got them in an
inextricable position, and brought them away.
Senator THOMAs. Brought some of them away. *
Secretary GARRISON. They brought them all away. They left
some, but those were not alive.
Senator SHEPPARD. Has trench fighting changed your policy in
any way? -
Secretary GARRISON. We taught them trench fighting. We were
the first people to build trenches, in this country, probably on a
; scale. Our Civil War, I think, advanced the art of trench
uilding and of trench fighting further than any other war of which
I have any knowledge.
Senator WEEKs. Mr. Secretary, have you any reason to think that
the number of men that you propose in the continental army, or any-
thing like it, could be enlisted within a reasonable time?
PREPAIRED NESS FOR IN ATIONAL DEFENSE. 29
Secretary GARRISON. If you ask me to express my hope, yes. If
you ask me to express my belief, I have no more ground for belief
than anybody else. Anything I should state would be a mere
prophecy, and I do not take very much stock in prophecies.
Senator WEEKs. What reason is there for the hope that you could
do it . * -
Secretary GARRISON. Because whenever we have recently en-
deavored to get any line of sentiment, or any line of action, we find
that for the first time within the memory of those who are now active
in the Army there is a response. These various camps that were
started demonstrated that there were men who were not only willing
to serve, but were willing to pay their own expenses, and while the
numbers of those, perhaps 3,000, whatever they were, are small,
the mere fact that they came forward, the fact that we received a
great many suggestions from various sources, that men in certain
localities vastly in excess of what those localities would be expected to
furnish stand ready to come, give encouragement. My view of all that,
Senator, is simply this, that if we are going to attempt to provide
any military system whatever, we have to have numbers. Arbitrarily,
now, we say 500,000 men. I say arbitrarily, because you have to
take some number to figure upon. If you start out by saying “I do
not believe you can get 500,000 men in any way, and I do not purpose
trying to get them because of my belief that you can not get them,”
of course, we are all functioning in a vacuum. We might just as
well stop and devote our attention to something else. Whereas,
if we do not feel that the country wants its representatives at this
time to provide for compulsory or universal service, which, of course,
would solve your problem immediately, then the only thing I can
see that you can do immediately is to provide a system to be operated
under the volunteer idea, under the very best conditions that you
can conceive, and if that does not produce results, then you have to
go to some form of required service, or compulsory service, or uni-
versal service, whatever you choose to call it. For that reason
I have not been very much interested in trying to prophesy con-
cerning it, because of the essential necessity of offering some solu-
tion, something that, if it produces the men, will produce the results,
and if it does not produce the men, will then demonstrate to the
Congress that it must make some other provision to produce the
Tºlé1).
Senator WEEKs. Of course, my question was not intended to lead
to the suggestion that I did not want to do something, but it is folly
to put something on the statute books which can not be done. Has
it not been the experience of those who have been associated with
the militia organizations that in ordinary times there is a great diffi-
culty in getting militia organizations filled'.
Secretary GARRISON. Yes, certainly.
Senator WEEKs. Just now there is a kind of hysteria relating to this
whole subject, and these men who have been to camps like the one
at Plattsburg, generally speaking, want to be officers, and ordinarily
they would not go out. They are not the men at all who would
probably go into a continental army. What I am solicitous about
is, even if it is decided to adopt this plan, whether it would be possible
to get the men. I served 10 years in a militia organization, and I
had great difficulty in getting men for a week for a tour of duty.
30 PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
You talk about taking a man from his civil employment for two
months in a year, which would pretty nearly destroy the effectiveness
of that man as a civil employee, and would make a marked difference,
in my judgment, in his capacity to earn a living. That is the reason
that I make the suggestion that it seems to me there would be great
difficulty in getting suitable men for that service.
Secretary GARRISON. First, Senator, I do not want to repeat what
I just said a moment ago; and that is, that the conclusion that you
must necessarily come to is that the only way that you can be sure
that what you write on the books will produce the men is to compel
service. If you are not willing—I mean you generically—if the
country is not willing, if Congress is not willing or does not think it
wise, to provide for compulsory service, then the only other thing
you can possibly do is to work out a system which in theory produces
what you determine the country needs in the way of numbers, or—
ganizations, equipment, etc., and then make the opportunity for the
citizen to furnish that service as acceptable as it is possible to make,
consistent with what you are after. I have said to the point of tire-
some iteration that the two months was merely put in to figure by.
You have to figure on something; that is to say, to find out how
much it would cost. We had to find out how much equipment
would be needed, and things of that character, and we put in two
months because we had to have something to figure upon. I have
always realized from the beginning that we probably would not,
initially, at least, obtain any such length of service for the Federal
volunteers. -
I do think, however, that the experience of the State troops is a
very slight criterion in this respect, in the first place, because the
conditions are so entirely different; in the next place, because the
labor Organizations of this country have always had an-intense preju-
dice against the National Guard and have not only abstained from
encouraging it but have discouraged the going into the National
Guard. Furthermore, there is no such feeling on the part of a young
man entering the National Guard as there would be in entering the
Federal service. And, last of all, that appeals to a class of men that
I think would probably not come in great numbers into the conti-
nental army or the Federal volunteers, whereas the Federal volunteer
system would appeal to a class of men who never would go into the
National Guard—that is, the young men from 18 to 20 who in great
numbers are attending schools and colleges and who would have
ample opportunity to take intensive training, certainly for 30 days
or 45 days, or any period within their vacation period, and they are
the ideal men to enter into this service, in the first place, because of
their aptitude, their physical condition, their youth, the fact that
they have not settled into their occupations yet, the fact that they
are young and available for a much longer period of time, the fact
that they are not married and settled down and have children—and
all kinds of reasons which would make it very difficult for them to
go to war.
So that it seems to me that, from whatever angle you approach the
thing, the very minute you determine you can not now properly
recommend compulsory service, the only other thing for you to do,
if you are not going to throw up your hands and stop right there, is to
work out some form of this Federal force that offers the greatest
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 31.
portunity for the citizen to render that duty, and I have said, in
the considerations that I have given to this matter, that I realize
that experience is the only teacher that is worth anything in this
matter, and in the statement that I have just read to the committee
I have asked them, in dealing with this matter, to leave the largest
possible discretion with the President and with the department in
that respect. . *
Incidentally, and having nothing whatever to do with the Federal
volunteer matter, the brigadier general of Texas, speaking to me
about some matters in that State, and with reference to his State
troops, said this to me: “It is very difficult to get some of these
companies to attend their drills, because, of course, they have to.
attend them at stated periods throughout the entire year, and it is
extremely difficult to get them to come. If we could arrange it
between crops”—I presume there is a cotton crop or a tobacco crop
in the different seasons—“I could get them for a month or two
months, because they are idle, and would be probably delighted if :
they could come out intensively for that period. But to manage it
a night a week for two years is almost impossible.”
I mention that merely to show you that I want the opportunity
to avail myself of those situations, and if you consider the vast num-
ber of young men between the ages of 18 and 20 who are attending
schools and colleges, and who are foot free, and who in the summer
have a long period of time, I do not know why we should despair in
feeling that we can get a large number of such men. -
Now, with respect to the men who are employed, I have never
suggested that eventually we would not provide for a combination
of indoor and outdoor training. The outdoor period, or intensive
º when they would be taken away from their civil work, would
e very much shorter than for those who had an intensive training
for a much longer period. Initially it would be folly for me to point
out how I hope to do that or when I hope to. All that would come
with experience. . *
Senator WEEKS. I think, Mr. Secretary, some of the points you.
make about going into the militia which might be overcome by this
Service are somewhat debatable, and you very wisely ask the com-
mittee to throw away all preconceived notions about this subject
if we want to reach any conclusion. But in this connection I want to
ask you why we should not get the best service if we are going to get .
any, and why we should not enlist men for eight years, to serve with
the colors for two years, or about that proportion, and turn them ovel
into a reserve after they have served and gradually build up a real
reserve of real trained men who are soldiers because they want to be,
natural soldiers, and in that way reach the conclusion—after several
years I will admit—but have a correct one when we reach it?
Secretary GARRISON. That, of course, is the proposal of the War
College division of the general staff. To do that you would have to
have a standing army, a regular standing army, of more than 250,000
men. Your expense for that, according to their own figuring, would
with other things that have to be figured in, certainly be $325,000,000
to $350,000,000 a year.
Senator WEEKS. I appreciate that. -
Secretary GARRISON. I just want to say a further word about the
reserve question. That would only result in having in this country
121,000 mobile army troops. They would produce on the basis of
O -
8,
32 PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
two years' service with the colors and six years in reserve 369,000
reserves in eight years. Now, I have never seen any plan whereby
you could keep track of these reserves in this enormous country.
Senator DU Pont. Not if you pay them ż
Secretary GARRISON. I do not see, unless you keep them organ-
ized, how on earth you are going to avail yourselves of those reserves
in any organization. What happens in this country is that a man
starts out from your State, Senator Weeks, to get a job in Kansas,
gets as far as Chicago, learns that the crop has failed, or what not,
and enlists there. He perhaps is sent to the Philippine Islands and
serves two or three years, and when he returns to the United States
he finds a job in Omaha. I do not see how on earth we are going to
keep track of him, and if we do, what we are going to do with him in
case of war. Are we to hunt that man up individually and, if he
belongs to the Third Cavalry, which is stationed, we will say. at
Brownsville, Tex., furnish transportation for him to go from Omaha,
Nebr., to Brownsville, Tex. . It is inconceivable that we can do that.
You must remember that in these small countries like Germany and
France, the geographical dimensions of which I have contrasted with
our own, where they have all sorts of systems for the registration of
the citizens, and where their Federal control is such that the mayors
of the cities are as responsive to the central government as are the
officers of the Army to the Central Government here, all kinds of
things are possible that are absolutely impossible in this country
here under our form of government, with the respective State govern-
ments and the respective National Governments absolutely inde-
pendent in their spheres.
Of course, ideally the best army would be the regular standing
army, either with the colors or those that have been trained therein
and subject to come to the colors; but unless you keep those men
organized, unless you have them out for drill, and unless you have
the officers with them, then, I say, I would infinitely prefer the fresh
levy of a continental army or Federal volunteer that actually is with
the colors, with the officers, and trained and absolutely not only
subject to call but ready for call, than I would to gather up out of
this enormous area. 369,000 men and expect to have them in my
first line and organized and officered. have never seen a plan
worked out.
Senator WEEKS. I do not know that a plan has been worked out,
and possibly there may be some difficulties in connection with it,
but they do not seem to me to be insurmountable. We keep track
of all other classes of men in this country without any great difficulty.
Secretary GARRISON. I did not hear that last remark. -
Senator WEEKs. I say, we keep track of other classes of men, even
criminals, if we attempt to do it.
Secretary GARRISON. I simply say, that until some plan is worked
out that seems to be feasible * -
Senator WEEKs. I assume that you could not build up to the pro-
posed army which you mention, and which seems to me to be about
reasonably right—that you could not build up to the point of giving
us 500,000 men immediately and probably not entirely from these
men who will serve two years with the colors, but that we would have
to supplement that from some other source. But why should we
not get the best there is ? - -
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 33
Secretary GARRISON. Every plan contemplates having reserves.
The only difference is that I can not myself reach the conclusion that
you can have a first line that is safe to rely upon when you have
only got what is actually under arms that is organized and officered,
In the plan you have in mind there are only 121,000 of such, and all
your other first line is scattered over this enormous country abso-
lutely unorganized, unofficered, and to a great extent unreachable.
How are you going to find these men and get their notices to them 3
Senator CATRON. Would not that apply equally well to your plan
of getting 140,000 continental troops? -
Secretary GARRISON. No ; because they are in their localities.
Senator CATRON. Would not they travel around just the same as
other people? -
Secretary GARRISON. Not to any such extent. You See, that would
all be done locally. In the State of Massachusetts, for instance, you
would raise them say by congressional districts. Of course, that is
a detail. Out of each congressional district each year you would
take 333 young men. They are not the floating population. They
are not the men going about the country seeking employment.
They are the people that live in that congressional district. They
are going to schools and colleges, or, if they are young men in em-
loyment, they are in employment there. They will take an abso-
ute obligation then and there to serve the Government in these
ranks three years and to come into their organizations upon call.
This is a radically different system from one which discharges the
man, as I have said, whenever his time runs out; and then you have
to keep some kind of track of him wherever he may go. You see,
many of our men are enlisted miles and miles, possibly thousands
of miles, from where they live. This system would be local recruit-
ing, local organizations, local discharge, and it would present prac-
tically a minimum of difficulty in keeping track of those men, because
the people who would have charge of each unit would only have to
watch 333 young men within the circumscribed area of their unit,
which would be a simpler matter than having the War Department
keep track of 369,000 men with no ascertainable area in which to
locate them. -
Senator WEEKS: Do you not think you have greatly exaggerated
the floating character of our population ?
Secretary GARRISON. I have not exaggerated the situation with
respect to the Army.
Senator WEEKs. My impression is that if you should take the
voting list you would find that of the number of men who went to
some other section of the country within a limited time the percentage
would be very small.
Secretary GARRISON. Well, Senator, even assuming that every-
thing would be as favorable as you would hope to find it, how are
you going to keep these men in any organization ? - Are you going
to call them out once in so often and put them in organizations?
Senator WEEKs. Exactly.
Secretary GARRISON. Are you going to have their officers con-
stantly available? >
Senator WEEKs. Absolutely in that neighborhood.
23380—PT 1–16—3
34 PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
Secretary GARRISON. If you work all that out you will find that
you will have a great deal of work and you are going to create an
enormously expensive plant to do that. I have never seen it worked
out in any military organization. I would like to see it done. I
believe you will find that the utmost value that you will get out of
the reserves that come from an army raised as yours would be, would
be to have a certain percentage of them come forward to be held in
an unorganized depot unit to supply wastage. I firmly believe that
that is the best you will get. Furthermore, to produce a first line of
500,000 men in 8 years I do not know how you are going to recruit
it without compulsory service *
Senator WEEKs. I think you would have to supplement them from
other sources in order to get a sufficient reserve.
Secretary GARRISON. But you are going to produce your reserve
out of your Regular Army, are you not %
Senator WEEKs. What I have in mind, and what I want to have
definitely cleared up, is the possibility of having an army of the size
that you have suggested maintained as a skeleton regiment in time
of peace, perhaps one-half or two-fifths of the war strength serving
without a sufficient number of officers in reserve and reserves to fill
those ranks immediately in case of need.
Secretary GARRISON. That is exactly my proposal, except that
when I come to forming the first line I do not count upon such
number of reserves coming back, because I say that is undependable.
If we get them, we are just that much better off, but if we do not get
them we will still have our line of first reserves of 500,000 men without
them.
Senator WEEKs. I am afraid you will not get the 500,000 men.
You will not get the enlistments in the Continental Army. If my
experience has been worth anything, you will not get them. Possibly
some of the reasons you have assigned for going into that service and
not going into the militia may be strong and valid:
Secretary GARRISON. The answer to that seems to me to be per-
fectly obvious, and that is if you are not going to be able to get a man
for a very short period of national service—and we are told by the
officers of the Army that you can not get them for regular service—
you just stop before you start, and I refuse to do that. I want to
start and see if I can get them. If I can not, I havé demonstrated
that you have to have some form of required service.
Senator WEEKs. Let us suppose that a man is going into the
service. Do you think he wº on the whole prefer to enlist for two
years with a reserve provision for six years, than to enlist for four
€8),TS
y Secretary GARRISON. No; I do not think it would make much
difference to him.
Senator WEEKs. My impression is that it would not make any
difference to some men, but it would be far preferable to the average
IOla,I).
Secretary GARRISON. I think if a man wants to become a regular
soldier in the United States to-day he is not very greatly concerned
with the length of his contract. So I am told by the Adjutant General.
fhave asked him that question, and he has traveled all around among
his recruiting stations and tried himself to ascertain the facts.
PREPAREDINESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 35
Senator WEEKs. I should not think it would make any difference
in reenlistments.
Secretary GARRISON. I said initial enlistments.
Senator WEEKs. In the case of initial enlistments, I should think
it would make a material difference. -
Secretary GARRISON. I thought so too until I found from people
who had experience that it did not.
I particularly asked the Adjutant General, who had just returned
from a tour of the country, what he found the facts to be, and he
said that in asking questions of the very best recruiting officers he
had he found it was a rare case where a recruit asked anything at all
about that side of the matter. He asked about other things that
concerned him and then he took the paper that they gave him and
was about to sign it when they would say to him, “But, understand
that this means so and so.” They are required by regulation to
explain all these things to the recruit. Having a man who thinks
he understands these things, he is rather impatient at their explaining
them to him. -
I think, Senator Weeks, it would be very desirable to have in-
serted in whatever provision is made concerning enlistments a pro-
vision that the President, acting through the War Department, may
discharge a man who has reached efficiency in a stated time, say
12 months or 18 months, or whatever period you think wise, with
obligation throughout the rest of the complete period of his enlist-
ment to come to the colors in case of need. That might bring in a
few men who would feel that they could get through their service in
a shorter period than the total legal period, but after such investiga-
tion as I have made, I do not remain of the opinion that I once had
that it would make very much difference. I am inclined to think
that in this country the men who go into the Regular Army go in,
and they are not very much concerned with respect to the length of
their enlistment. I do not mean to say that if you made it 10 years
a would not affect them, or if you made it six months it would not
affect them, but when you come to talk about the difference between
three and four years or two and three years, I do not think it would
make any difference.
Senator WEEKs. Generally speaking, can you turn out a finished
product in the way of a soldier in less than two years 7
Secretary GARRISON. Yes, sir.
Senator WEEKs. In how much less time :
Secretary GARRISON. I had men taken as they came, not selected
men, formed into an infantry company and a troop of cavalry and a
battery of field artillery, and I placed selected officers over them and
told them to subject them to intensive training. By all the reports,
not only of their own officers but from the commanding officers above
them and from the inspectors, those troops, some of them well within
a year and all of them at the end of a year, contrasted favorably with
any organization in the Regular Army of their respective arm.
Now, of course, it is only fair to say that they were given intensive
training. They were kept right at the job. The company of infantry
that I saw at Rouses Point, when I went up to attend a three or four
day maneuver, I was told by the officers of other companies was the
best company in the regiment, but, of course, they all said the fact.
36 PREPARED NESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
that it had been subjected to intensive training was taken into
account. - -
sºnator DU PONT, Were the noncommissioned officers new men,
too ! - -
Secretary GARRISON. I can not tell you surely about that. I can
find that out for you.
The CHAIRMAN. Gentlemen, let me beg you again to observe the
rule. From my experience in serving on other committees I would
say that where we had a cross fire you could not get the sense of what
the witness was trying to convey. I would much prefer, unless you
overrule me, that we confine ourselves to having one Senator com-
plete the questions he desires to ask before others start questioning
the witness.
Senator WEEKS. Evidently my colleagues will want to ask the Sec-
retary some questions along the same line, and I will change for the
* to another subject. How many cadets are there at West
oint %
Secretary GARRISON. The number is stated in my annual report;
624, I believe. •
Senator WEEKS. How many can be accommodated there?
Secretary GARRISON. I think we can accommodate only 666, or
something like that, with our present physical facilities, but by the
expenditure of a very Small sum of money in supplementing those
accommodations—not building new buildings and things of that
sort—we can accommodate up to 770.
Senator WEEKS. How many cadets are there in a room?
Secretary GARRISON. Two.
Senator WEEKS. Are the rooms so arranged that three could not
live in a room':
Secretary GARRISON. You had better ask Gen. Scott that question.
He was the superintendent at West Point.
sº WEEKS. Perhaps I had better ask these questions of some-
OILG, GIS62.
Secretary GARRISON. I wish you would ask them of Gen. Scott.
Senator WEEKS. Let me ask you this question on that subject.
There have been several suggestions and more or less newspaper talk
about establishing other West Points. Do you think there is any
good reason for more than one military academy?
Secretary GARRISON. No, sir; I think there are very good reasons
why we should not contemplate any such thing.
Senator WEEKs. You think that if we are going to extend the num-
ber of cadets to be admitted that we had better do it at the estab-
lished academy than elsewhere? -
Secretary GARRISON. I think we ought to make available all the
institutions we have in this country, that stand ready now to give us
supervision and participation and sufficient control to see that we
can get the very best material that is needed; and when you realize
that in no other country in the world do they attempt to educate any
great number of officers in any such preliminary way as we do at
West Point, it does seem to me that it is a way to solve our problem.
Besides that, I think if you consider that, you must contemplate
getting your officers 10 years from to-day. You first would have to
select the site and build the buildings and train your corps of officers
and your boys and graduate them. By the time you have done that
PREPAIRED NESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 37
you would get your first officer 10 years from to–day. When you
take into consideration the University of California, Harvard, Prince-
ton, and hundreds of other schools and colleges that are anxious to
cooperate with the Government in turning out available matter,
which would be better preliminary work than any foreign government
has to-day, you can see that it is a very effective way to solve that
part of our problem. - -
Senator WEEKs. Senator Fletcher was asking you about some
means of reducing expenditures. It occurred to me when he was doing
it that some of the original expenditures which we go to in building
new buildings, and so forth, have always been very extravagant.
Secretary GARRISON. Absolutely so.
Senator WEEKs. Do you not think that the buildings at West Point
and the Naval Academy are tremendously extravagant }
Secretary GARRISON. I can not speak of the Naval Academy, be-
cause my visits there have all been hurried ones and I never have
inspected the buildings, there. I think the class of building which
has been furnished to the Army in the recent constructions has been
absolutely without warrant. They have been unduly expensive.
They have been very often unduly large. When you realize that
these men who are to occupy them are in receipt of modest fixed
salaries, it has not been fair to the men of the Army or to the Nation.
I do not believe in it.
Senator WEEKs. That is all, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. Senator Catron, do you wish to ask any questions?
Senator CATRON. Did I understand you to say that the Army now
has its full complement of men; that is, is up to the full number of
men authorized for it in times of peace? -
Secretary GARRISON. No; we have as many men as we have money
to support. -
Senator CATRON. What number of men have you in the Army now 3
Secretary GARRISON. We have enlisted to-day something like
103,000. - -
Senator CATRON. Does that include commissioned officers ?
Secretary GARRISON. No, sir; that includes the enlisted personnel.
Senator CATRON. Then you propose to add about 33,000 more to
that number? -
Secretary GARRISON. Yes, sir; about 35,000.
Senator CATRON. Did I understand you to state that you could
enlist 50,000 more men?
Secretary GARRISON. The Adjutant General says that his normal
enlistment runs about 35,000. Under extraordinary conditions, and
by spurring his force up to its limit, he has gone above 45,000; I
think at times 48,000. -
Senator CATRON. In a year? -
Secretary GARRISON. Yes, sir; in a year. He believes that he can
enlist 50,000 in a year. Those are not all fresh enlistments; some are
reenlistments.
Senator CATRON. Do men enlist for three years?
Secretary GARRISON. They enlist for four years, with three years in
TeSeTVe.
Senator BECKHAM. That is in the continental army'
Secretary GARRISON. No; in the Regular Army.
38 PREPAREDINESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
Senator CATRON. What is the main difficulty you would have in
regard to getting more enlistments if you should want them?
Secretary GARRISON. Men just simply will not go into the Regular
Army in any greater numbers. When you have Gen. McCain, The
Adjutant General of the Army, on the stand, if you take occasion to
ask him with respect to that subject he will tell you how effective
and how constant his force is in endeavoring to get all the available
material there is in this country for Regular Army service.
Senator CATRON. How much of a force have you doing that ?
Secretary GARRISON. I prefer to have you ask Gen. McCain with
regard to that, because he can give you the exact number of officers
and men. He can also describe the system to you and show you how
these men go out from centers and radiate throughout the entire area
of country in their neighborhood, almost putting a request back of
every available man, to see if he will enlist. y
Senator CATRON. That is all, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. Senator du Pont, do you wish to ask the Secretary
any questions?
enator DU PONT. Mr. Secretary, I have heard that in your recom-
mendation to increase the Regular Army about 35,000 men you con-
template 10 new regiments of Infantry and 10 of Artillery.
Secretary GARRISON. Four of Artillery.
Senator DU Pont. What, in your opinion, is the number of guns
that should be proportioned to a thousand muskets?
Secretary GARRISON. You do not really mean my opinion. You
mean the opinion I have derived from those who have an expert
knowledge of the subject.
Senator DU Pont. Exactly.
Secretary GARRISON. That subject was studied before the European
war by the so-called Greble Board, which was appointed by the Sec-
retary of War to consider that matter. It resulted in a recommenda-
tion of about 3.9, and that was the plan on which the department
was cooperating with Congress to achieve. After the outbreak of
the European war the reports which we got from our observers and
military deductions therefrom by the military students caused me to
form another board, which takes its name from the colonel who was
the senior member. It was called the Treat Board. Their recom-
mendations were laid upon my desk on Thursday of last week. They
now go to about 5.95, a very material increase, and they also recom-
mend, I think, at least doubling the number of rounds per piece. . So
it is difficult to say what I recommend now, because I have not had
an opportunity to look at their report. I just know in a general
way what the most striking conclusions were.
Senator DU Pont. As it now stands, the recommendations of the
War Department for a well-balanced force, it seems to me, are abso-
lutely wrong. You now have 6 regiments of Field Artillery of six
4-gun batteries each. One of these regiments is equipped with
mountain howitzers, and another is organized as Horse Artillery
for service with the Cavalry, leaving 4 regiments of 24 guns each, or
96 guns in all, for service with the Infantry. The proportion of these
96 guns to the war strength of the 30 regiments of Infantry (exclusive
of the Porto Rican regiment) is a little less than 2 guns to each
1,000 muskets. If you increase the 6 regiments of Artillery to 10
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 39
regiments, you would bring the proportion up (assuming that your
4 additional regiments are to be devoted to Artillery to serve with
the Infantry) to 3 guns to each 1,000 muskets, which is entirely
insufficient. One of the proposed new regiments of Artillery, how-
ever, might even be wanted as Horse Artillery, which would bring
the proportion somewhat below 3. It seems to me, therefore, that
the recommendations of the War Department for only 10 regiments
of Artillery are absolutely inadequate.
Secretary GARRISON. You do not mean 10 regiments of Artillery'
Senator DU Pont. I mean four additional regiments of Artillery
with our present 6 regiments of Artillery are absolutely inadequate,
Pºiº so when you consider that the militia troops have prac-
tically no Artillery. They are all Infantry.
Secretary GARRISON. Very largely.
Senator DU PONT. And the same thing would apply to your
Federal Volunteers. It would be very difficult for them to have
horses and stables, etc. . They must, in the main, be Infantry troops.
Secretary GARRISON. Our purpose was to establish Field Artillery
camps such as we have at Tobyhanna, Pa., and send there units of
the Federal volunteers to be trained. We propose to establish those
camps at º places throughout the country, not attempting to
have the Field Artillery in units go to the particular places where
the Federal volunteers would be trained, but to send the Federal
volunteers to use the equipment and the horses and the facilities
of the regular Artillery such as we have at Tobyhanna.
But let me say this in answer to your question: My recommenda-
tions are based upon a perfected tactical organization in continental
United States of three Infantry divisions and a Cavalry division,
and they were based upon what the tables of organization require
for them, and they have the amount of Artillery for such divisions.
Now, of course, if we determine that there should be this increase of
Artillery per rifle and Saber, as recommended by this new board,
that would then call for more Field Artillery than I have at the
present time asked for.
Senator DU PONT. I will read a note which I have made in antici-
pation of this hearing. It is proposed by the War Department to
raise 4 new regiments of Field Artillery and 10 new regiments of
Infantry. Assuming that none of these new regiments is to be
organized as Horse Artillery for service with the Cavalry, we would
then have 8 regiments of Field Artillery, or 192 guns in all, for service
with 40 regiments of Infantry (not including the Porto Rican regi-
ment of. Infantry). As the war strength of the 40 regiments would
be 75,480 officers and men, the proportion of these 192 guns to each
1,000 muskets would be 2.63, whereas it should be at least 5, or about
365 guns in all. This is a very serious matter, I think.
Secretary GARRISON, I would prefer, rather than to attempt to
do these figures in my head, to furnish you with the exact proportion
of field guns to rifles and sabers, which would result from the organ-
ization that is proposed, and then you can have the matter definitely
and accurately before you. I will send that up and have it put into
the hearing for you.
Senator DU PoNT. I wish you would.
Secretary GARRISON. I will, sir.
40 PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
(The statement referred to is as follows:)
Number of field guns in certain foreign armies and thore proposed for the United States
Army.
º §§ Cavalry divi-
infantry sion per 1,000
strength. 'sabers.
Nations.
Before Before
present . present º
War. e War. º
Germany * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 6. I 6. 1 3.3 3.3
Austria----------------------------- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 3.0 6.0 3.3 3.3
France----------------------------------------------------------------- 4. 66 4. 78 3.3 3.3
Russia----------------------------------------------------------------- 3.3 3.3 3. 3 3.3
Italy------------------------------------------------------------------- 4.0 1 4.0 2.7 2.7
Pngland--------------------------------------------------------------- 4. 2 1 4.2 1.33 1.33
United States---------------------------------------------------------- 2 3.02 || 3 5.2 2 3. 1S 33. 18

1 Approximate. - g
2 According to Present Tables of Organization and also the proportion provided for in force provided for
in War Department draft when at full strength. When at present reduced strength these figures are about
7.2 per 1,000 for Infantry and 4.24 for Cavalry divisions. "
8 Recommended by General Staff.
Without knowing the forces intended for foreign garrisons, it is
impossible to give similar figures for the forces prescribed in the
drafts prepared by Senator Chamberlain or by Representative Hay.
Senator DU PoNT. Recurring now to West Point for a moment, is
it your opinion that we should have some legislation which would
fill the academy with the maximum that it would accommodate?
Secretary GARRISON. Yes, absolutely; I think that there should
be legislation which would enable the President, after the Members
of Congress had had the fullest opportunity to exercise their preroga-
tive and having failed to exercise it, to see that available material
that is very anxious to go there should be permitted to go there, so
we could always keep the academy full.
Senator DU PONT. There was a scheme proposed some years ago
by Senator Briggs, a member of this committee, which was simply
this, that, taking Tennessee for example, where there was a shortage
then, " should be filled by the alternates of other districts who had
3.SSGC1. -
p Secretary GARRISON. I really do not care what the system is that
is worked out, Senator, provided it is one which results in every
vacancy being filled. -
Senator DU Pont. The President has the appointment of 10
cadets.
Secretary GARRISON. Ten a year? he can keep 40 there, and I
think last year he had 14 vacancies.
Senator DU Pont. Of course, that is the idea, but that is the
same number that he had when the Army was one-tenth of its present
size, or one-fifth of its present size, certainly. It seems to me that
that ought to be materially increased, that he ought to have the
appointment of 25 a year, at least.
Secretary GARRISON. Of course, it is immaterial to me who has
the right to fill them, just so you do not give it to me. I do not
want to have to do it. I am bothered enough now with people who
want to be put on the list, and I would be bothered five times as
much. I would a great deal rather that somebody else should have
PREPARED NESS FOR, NATIONAL DEFENSE. 41
the right to do it. We ought to keep West Point full; there is no
question about that. -
Senator CATRON. A large number of appointees fail to pass, and
that creates vacancies. A great number drop out at the end of the
first year, and a great many more at the end of the next year, creat-
ing vacancies. What would you do to fill those vacancies during
the current year when they occur :
Secretary GARRISON. I think that has been worked out. We will
put that in this hearing. The matter has been worked out.
The statement referred to is as follows:
Data with regard to the United States Military Academy.
Present enrollment (Jan. 20, 1916). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 589
Maximum capacity at present--------------------. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 770
At an immediate expense of $41,662, provided for in estimates.
Plant can be increased to capacity of.......... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1, 200
At an expense of $3,000,000.
Proposed legislation to fill Academy to its present maximum capacity: .
“Provided, That whenever any cadet shall have finished two years of his course at
the United States Military Academy, his successor may be admitted.”
Senator DU PONT. Yes; so we will have something to go on in
this committee. -
Secretary GARRISON. I know that has been worked out. I do not
carry the details in my head. The War Department is very anxious
to keep West Point i all the time, and it is a very wrong thing not
to be able to do so. Personally, as I said, I should prefer to have the
matter in the hands of Congress, because the less that I have to do
with that sort of thing the more time I have for something else; but
the essential thing is to get it done.
Senator DU Pont. I have in mind the fact that the President
could appoint sons of Army officers and naval officers.
Secretary GARRISON. He restricts himself to them.
Senator DU PONT. I think that ought to be fixed by law, that he
shall confine himself to those.
Secretary GARRISON. He does, practically.
Senator DU PONT. It has always struck me as a great hardship.
For instance, take South Carolina or any other place you please: An
officer of the Army goes away in the service of his country; he lives
outside of his State his whole life, and, of course, loses touch with
his local people. He has a boy whom he wants to have appointed
to West Point, but as he is not in touch with his Congressman that
boy does not have a fair chance with other boys of the district.
That was the idea in making presidential appointments, -
. If the Army is increased those boys are entitled to some recognition,
and there has been no change in the presidential possibilities.
Senator CATRON. He is doing it now. -
Senator DU Pont. He is doing it now, but he is limited to 40. He
ought to have a hundred. -
Secretary GARRISON. As I recall the legislation, I think, under the
law, the President has the unrestricted right to appoint them all,
but he turns his prerogative over to the Senators and Representatives
and retains only 40, and those he restricts to the sons of Army and
Navy officers. -
Senator WARREN. That has been done by several of the Presidents
without any special law. wº
42 PREPARED NESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
Senator DU PoWT. Do you think it would be well to make some
provision of law with respect to that %
Secretary GARRISON. I know that has been worked out so as to keep
West Point full, Personally, I am not concerned with whether the
exact number of appointments that should be allowed here, there, or
the other place is worked out or not, provided you have a scheme that
if one appointing power neglects to hi a vacancy, the next in rotation
shall have the privilege, so we can always keep the vacancies filled.
Senator CATRON. I think you went over it partially, but have you
any complete scheme as to appointing officers in case we should be
engaged in war and have to get together a large army—a million or
two of men ; -
Secretary GARRISON. My notion is that we have at hand to-day in
this country a great many educational institutions, many of which
already have, and practically all of them will have, a standardized
military course under the regulations of the War Department. That
will give us supervision and participation, and we have then gained
a great deal of material, a very large supply of entirely available
material to educate into officers.
There is also a proposal attached to the bill which Senator Chamber-
lain had printed for cadet companies, putting in a company of pros-
ective officers with each unit or regiment of the Regular Army, and
aving them serve one year in that capacity, and then at the end of
that year they would obtain a probational or provisional appoint-
ment in the Army, and, if they made good, would then be given a
commission in the Army.
The CHAIRMAN. Senator Beckham, do you want to ask the Secre-
tary anything? -
Senator BECKHAM. No questions, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. Senator Myers? -
Senator MYERs. No. .
The CHAIRMAN. I had some questions that I wanted to ask the
Secretary, but I will yield to any other member of the committee
who desires to ask him any at this time.
Senator WARREN. I desire to ask one question, which is as to a mat-
ter of expediency, and I do not know but what it is entirely im-
practicable. I want to ask the Secretary whether the subject could
be properly divided, the One covering the enlargement of the standing
Army and the other relating to the so-called continental army. Of
course, I understand the difficulties of enlistment, and I presume
some thought has been given it. The reason I ask the question is that
I find about as many different ideas as there are people who are
interested in the subject, on the reserve or continental army, while
I have never found one, unless he was an absolute pacifist of the
kind who believed in no army, but who thought that we ought to
have as large an addition, at least, to the Regular Army as that
proposed by the War Department.
We sometimes get along better in legislation to start a subject
and get something in as a committee report or partial report and
when consideration of it has proceeded that far, it is easier to go
further. I do not know whether it is at all practicable, but I would
like to ask the Secretary if he thinks it is practicable.
Secretary GARRISON. If all that you are going to do is to make
some addition to the Regular Army of which you speak, and not
PREPARED NESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 43
going to provide for the great backbone of any military policy, the
great backbone of any national defense, the other is not of any tre-
mendous consequence.
Senator WARREN. I do not wish it to be understood as my judg-
ment that we ought not to do it all, and perhaps more, than the War
Department has asked for but it is more a matter of whether some
portion of it could be got under way and finished—of course, the
other would dovetail in very nicely and follow.
Secretary GARRISON. If you mean for its consideration here, of
course I would have nothing to say about that; but from my stand-
point, if this Congress fails to grasp the unparalleled opportunity that
they have to work out a sensible, adequate military policy, I think
it would be a lamentable result, and I would not want them to feel
that they had functioned sufficiently if they merely did one of the
º that was asked without doing the essential things that are
8,SJKOCl.
Senator WARREN. I grant that, and it is only a matter of expe-
diency, as I said. ''.
Secretary GARRISON. For legislative purposes, of course, they are
distinct. I mean by that that legislation for a regular standing Army
is absolute independent, legislatively, of all other proposals, but they
supplement each other in any proper policy, in my judgment.
Senator WARREN. I was much interested in your statement of the
case as to college students and schoolboys. Would it not be worth
considering to reduce the age at which you can take in your recruits
for your continental army? I find that whenever we have been
engaged in actual war the most enthusiastic soldiers are those 16 or
17 or 18 to 20 years of age—usually those who have the most time to
devote to drill. I do not know why 17 would not be as good as 18,
or perhaps 16, keeping in view all the time that you are preparing for
war later. In the Civil War there were men on the side in which I
was interested who were 15 years old, and even younger than that,
who did valiant service. On the other side they were still younger.
I think you will find the same thing true to-day among the Mexicans,
and I think you would get five recruits of 16 or 17 or 18 years of age
where you get one to-day who is above 18, and from there to 20.
They have the time to drill and would be in the formative period in
which they could be molded.
Secretary GARRISON. When you have reached the period that it
seems proper to have a man render this service I would begin there.
I am not prepared to go as low as 16 years. I do not know whether
there is any particular reason, if you go to 18, why you should not go
to 17. I would not go to 16. - -
Senator WARREN. I think it would be very safe to go to 17 or even
16.
Senator DU PONT. I would like to ask one more question, Mr. Sec-
retary, if the chairman has no objection.
You were speaking, Mr. Secretary, of the expense in increasing the
accommodations for housing and providing for the soldiers of the
Regular Army in the event of its being increased. It occurred to me
that if a number of the small posts were disposed of, done away with,
the actual money that they would bring in would add to the accom-
modations. If they were sold or transferred and the value were estab-
lished, it would be an offset to a considerable extent to the new accom-
modations you would have to build. -
44 PREPARED NIESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
Secretary GARRISON. Yes, sir; undoubtedly; but I find, Senator
du Pont, what with respect to the Congress, the most dangerous
thing, almost, that you can propose is that you can give up some-
thing provided you get something else. They are always very glad
to hear that you can give up something; they take that away from
you, and they very rarely give you the other thing that you say you
wº like to have, and we have become a little wary in the départ.
IſleIlly.
& sºor WARREN. I take it that you have profited by your expe-
T16D.Ce
Secretary GARRISON. Yes, sir.
Senator DU PoNT. The Appropriations Committee is unwilling to
embody those in one bill. -
Secretary GARRISON. That is the difficulty. We can hardly give
up this or that or the other, because we are asking this committee
for something to take its place. The committee to which you say
you can give something up immediately takes you at your word and
makes you give it up, and if the other committee does not see the
light in a similar way you are just about as bad off.
Senator WARREN. I have known such things to happen in the one
Committee.
Secretary GARRISON. But that whole question of housing and loca-
tion of posts, it seems to me, would bring on a series of debates or
disputes that ought not to be complicated with the serious question
of military preparation, because, after all, to a large extent, it is im-
material, if you have got the men, where you have got them. In
this country the essential thing is to get the men and material, and
if we have to house them in places we would not have initially selected,
that really is of very small consequence. º
Senator CATRON. You could not get anywhere near the value of
them, or the amount out of them that you would have to pay to put
in the improvements at the other places, anyhow % w
Secretary GARRISON. I think that is true. . .
Senator CATRON. So you practically gain but little from that
process. # -
Secretary GARRISON. I am not at all enthusiastic myself—not, of
course, wishing to deter this committee from entering upon any of
those proposals at this time because of my assessment of their value.
I do not think, in other words, that those questions are of any mate-
rial value compared with the question of getting an efficient policy
adopted.
The CHAIRMAN. If there are no other questions by other members
of the committee I desire to ask the Secretary Some questions.
Mr. Secretary, did you compare these three several bills that
have been proposed? Have you analyzed the bill proposed by Mr.
Hay, as well as the one proposed by myself? Of course, you are
familiar with the terms of your own 3
Secretary GARRISON. Yes, sir, I have; yes, sir. I have had tables
and analyses made of the first bill that you introduced, of the bill
that Mr. Hay placed before his committee, of the War Department
proposal, and of the War College Division proposal. " .
* The CHAIRMAN. Some time ago, as chairman of the committee, I
referred them to you, with the request that each of these bills be

* ‘. e iv. 2
. Present establishment. "" ºnent Mr. Hay's plan. Senator ºbtain * | War College plan.
Officers. Men. Officers. Men. Officers. Men. Officers. Men Officers. Men.
General oſſicers---------------------------------------- 21 ------------ * * 24 l------------ * 24 |------------ * 3 |------------ (*) ------------
General Staff Corps. ---------------------------------- (*) ------------ (*) ------------ (*) ------------ 94 |------------ (*) ------------
Adjutant General’s Department........... --- - - - - - - - - - 23 ------------ 23 ------------ 23 l------------ 60 l------------ (*) ------------
Inspector General’s Department. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 17 ------------ 17 ------------ 17 ------------ (*) ------------ (*) ------------
Judge Advocate General’s Department......... ------. 13 l------------ 13 ------------ 13 ------------ 31 ------------ (*) ------------
Quartermaster Corps---------------------------------- 187 5,203 283 8,803 211 6,407 259 12,000 (*) ------------
Medical Department---------------------------------- 619 4,012 820 6, 500 629 4,436 1,133 10,697 (*) ------------
Corps of Engineers------------------------------------ 249 1,942 358 4, 248 249 2,661 469 8,041 230 0 7,575
Ordnance Department-------------------------------- 85 745 85 1,065 85 1,065 109 1,065 (*) ------------
Signal Corps. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 106 1,472 184 1,968 179 2,698 382 4,755 252 7 2,907
Bureau of Insular Affairs.----------------------------- 3 |------------ 3 ------------ 3 ------------ 3 |------------ 3 ------------
Cavalry....::------------------------------------------- 765 14, 184 765 16,414 S25 8 20,670 1,032 29,279 1,250 9 30,900
Field Artillery---------------------------------------- 252 5,513 423 9,767 576 14,952 810 23,330 861 10 23,688
Coast Artillery Corps...... ---------------------------- 715 18,973 S86 25,063 715 25, 203 1,264 30, 576 1,200 Il 30,056.
Infantry - - - - - - - : - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1,530 34,128 2,040 50,796 1,530 57,900 3,349 101,632 3,250 12 117,504
Division and brigade headquarters--------------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------
Porto Rico Tegiment of Infantry. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ----- 32 591 32 599 50 1,930 ------------|------------ 50 1,836.
Chaplains---------------------------------------------------------|------------|------------|------------|------------------------|------------|------------ 131 ------------
Military Academy------------------------------------ 8 632 8 632 8 632 632 8 632:
Detached officers.------------------------------------- 200 ------------ 950 -----------. 986 ------------ 1,200 ------------ 200 l. -----------
Cadet companies--------------------------------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------ 3,000 ------------|------------|------------|------------
Additional officers------------------------------------ 27 l------------ 24 ------------ 28 ------------------------------------ 28 ------------
Veterinarians----------------------------------- .- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 50 ------------|------------|------------|------------|------------ 61 ------------
Recruiting parties, recruit depots, and unassigned -
recruits---------------------------------------------|------------ 6,354 |------------ 1,334 ||-----------. 5,751 |------------ 6, 125 |------------|------------
Service School detachments. . . . . :- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 587 ------------ 746 ------------|------------|------------ 746 ------------|------------
Noncommissioned officers for training purposes-------i------------|-----------------------. 792 i------------ 2,580 i------------|------------------------|------------
United States Disciplinary Barracks Guards.----------|-------..... 320 ------------ 350 ------------|------------|------------ 350 ------------|------------
Added to regular companies to Which cadets are at-
tached.----------------------------------------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------ 210 ------------|------------|------------|------------
With disciplinary organizations-----------------------|------------ 65 |------------ 110 !------------|------------------------ 110 !------------|------------
Mounted orderlies-------------------------------------|------------|------------|------------ 24 ------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------
Sanitary, Quartermaster, Ordnance, etc., appropriate
to force----------------------------------------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|-- - - - - - - - - - - 1,959 28,041
Indian Scouts. ----------------------------------------|------------ 56 |------------ 56 |------------ 56 ------------ 56 ------------ 56
Total, Regular Army--------------------------- 4,852 94,777 6,988 129,267 6,151 150, 151 10,206 229,394 9,483 || 8, 18250,517
Additional force, Philippine Scouts. -----------------, 182 18 5,733 182 18 5,733 182 18 5,733 182 18 5,733 94 20,055
Grand total, Regular Establishment ............ 5,034 100,510 7, 170 135,000 6,333 155,884 10,388 235,127 10,428 8 270,572
Total strength, Organized Militia-------------...------ 148,705 || 14 120,693 148,705 || 14 120,693 14 8,705 || 14 120,693 148,705 || 14 120,693 148,705 || 14 120,693
Total strength, continental army----------------------|------------|------------ 18,000 382,000 18,000 382,000 ------------|------------ 22,500 477,500
Total strength of all forces under each plan. ----. 13,737 221,203 33,875 637,673 33,038 658,577 19,093 355,820 41,633 868,765
First year. Second year. Third year. Fourth year. Fifth year. Sixth year. Seventh year. Eighth year.
Senator Chamberlain's plan:
Regular Army - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - $125, 186,723.27 $144,029,014. 10 || $163,721, 196.42 $183,330,847. 73 $202,265,521.98 |------------------|------------------|----------------
Reserve material-------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|----------------
Seacoast defenses-------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|--- = • - - - - - - - - - - - - - I - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - I - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - I • - - - - - - - - - - - - - - s
Continental army ------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|----------------
Organized Militia 1%. --------- 16,450,000.00 16,450,000.00 16,450,000.00 16,450,000.00 16, 450,000.00 !------------------|----------------------------------
To be appropriated... . . . . . . 141,636,723. 27 160,479,014. 10 180, 171, 196.42 199,780,847.73 218,715,521.98 |------------------|------------------|----------------
Mr. Hay's plan: tº-
Regular Army - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 127, 152,564. 52 | 146,846,278. 29 || 133, 152,919.90 |... ---------------|------------------|--............ ----|------------------|-----------...--
Reserve material-------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|----------------
Seacoast defenses-------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|----------------
Continental army "... . . . . . . . * 25,879, 160.00 || 17 42,201,486.00 | " 57,310,300.00 |... ---------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------...-
Organized Militia. . . .-------- 16,450,000.00 16,450,000.00 16, 450,000.00 ------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|----------------
To be appropriated...... --- 169,481,724.52 205,497,764. 29 206,913,219.90 ------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|----------------
War Department plan:
Regular Army.-- - - - - - - - - - - - - - 111,635,716.08 127,234,559.70 127,234,559.70 127,234,559.70 127,234,559.70 ------------------|------------------|----------------
Reserve material------------- 26,081, 565. 27 26,081, 565. 27 26,081,565.27 26,081, 565. 27 ------------------|------------------|------------------|----------------
Seacoast defenses... -- - - - - - - - - - 20,000,000.00 20,000,000.00 20,000,000.00 20,000,000.00 ------------------|------------------|------------------|----------------
Continental army. ----------- 15,000,000.00 29,000,000.00 45,000,000.00 45,000,000.00 45,000,000.00 ------------------|------------------|----------------
Organized Militia. . . . . . . . . . . . 10,000,000.00 10,000,000.00 10,000,000.00 10,000,000.00 10,000,000.00 ------------------|------------------|----------------
To be appropriated.-------- 182,717,281.35 | 212,316,124.97 228,316,124.97 228,316,124.97 | 182,234,559.70 |. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . [- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
War College plan:
Regular Army - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 192,519,008. 13 239,522,532.73 244,855,236.73 247,949,700. 73 250, 754,100. 73 $253,268,388.73 || $255,492, 516,73 || $257, 523,300. 73
Reserve material. . . . . . . . . . . . . 53, 167,622.64 90,807,554.39 89,961,581. 24 12,971,807. 74 12,971,807. 74 8,513,297.85 8,513,297.85 9,149,647.18
Seacoast defenses-------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|----------------
Citizen army----------------- 32,348,950.00 52,751,857.50 71,637,875.00 75, 190,375.00 75,577,250.00 75,577,250.00 75,577,250.00 75,577,250.00
Organized Militia - - - - - - - - - - - - 7,000,000.00 7,000,000.00 7,000,000.00 7,000,000.00 7,000,000.00 7,000,000.00 7,000,000.00 7,000,000.00
To be appropriated.... . . . . . 285,035,580. 77 390,081,944.62 413,454,692.97 343, 111,883.47 346,303,158.47 344,358,936.58 346,583,064.58 || 349,250,197.91
1 This includes 3 additional members, Maj. Gens. Goethals, Hodges, Sibert.
2 Other generals included in officers of the various arms and Corps.
$ Included in 30,000, estimated for sanitary Quartermaster, Ordnance, etc.
4 On detached service.
5 With General Staff.
6 15% battalions.
7 11% battalions, 8 aero battalions.
8 The cooks, horseshoers, Saddlers, trumpeters,
9 25 regiments.
10 21 regiments.
il 289 companies.
12 65 regiments.
13 Figures show peace strength. Authorized strength, 12,000.
14 Present strength.
15 Under separate bill, S. 1158.
16 Fully eqüipped for field training..., - ->
17 If this continental army is to be equipped as is proposed in the War Department plan for the continental army, the items on this line would be the same as the corresponding
items in the War Department plan. - - - - -- - e. - e *
18 Total officers and men, 260,000, and 21,000 Philippine Scouts. If Philippine garrison is not to be increased the total officers and men is 248,000, and 182 officers and 5,733 enlisted
Philippine Scouts. The cost of the War College plan is figured on assumption that Philippine garrison is to remain as at present.
23380—PT 1–16.
(To face page 45.)
and wagoners have evidently been left out through omission in Mr. Hay’s bill.
Iſ Organized Militia were up to prescribed minimum strength total would be 9,128 officers and 151,574 enlisted men.
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATION AI. DEFENSE. 45
submitted to the heads of the different departments. Has that been
done?
Secretary GARRISON. Yes, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. Have the analyses been forwarded to the com-
mittee yet? . . .
Secretary GARRISON. Of that particular bill?
The CHAIRMAN. Of these three bills'
Secretary GARRISON. No, sir; they have not been furnished yet.
The CHAIRMAN. Have you them in course of preparation?
Secretary GARRISON. Yes, sir; we have. -
The CHAIRMAN. What I wanted to get at, Mr. Secretary, was what
each of these departments thought of these three several bills. They
might wholly diaspprove of one, they might approve of another, and
they might suggest combinations of all?
Secretary GARRISON. That is not the way in which I have had the
matter treated so far. That, I suppose, to some extent, is still being
done. What I have already had furnished me has been an analysies
of each of the four bills—yours, Mr Hay's, the War Department's,
and the War College Division's—and the statement made of the results
of each as to the main organization and cost. I have not had placed
before me any comparison of judgments upon the four proposals from
the respective departments.
The CHAIRMAN. I suppose, if we get those analyses before our com-
mittee, we can ask the staff and the War College officers as they come
on the stand 3 .
Secretary GARRISON. I think that would be much more useful, Mr.
Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. When may we expect those analyses, or the re-
ports from these different bureaus'
Secretary GARRISON. Gen. Bliss, are those analyses that we were
having worked over completed now %
Gon. BLISs. So far as I know, sir, they have all been turned in.
Secretary GARRISON, I will say this, Senator, that I think I can
furnish you very promptly with the analyses of each of those four
measures showing what §º will produce in the way of men and
organizations and cost.
The CHAIRMAN. That is what we want.
Secretary GARRISON. And then, if the committee desires to have
a specific study of any character made, I will furnish that as soon as
it can be made, and then I can furnish, as they come in, the reports
of each one of the departments with respect to each one of those
measures; but that will still leave for personal examination before
the committee the comparative merits of the different measures,
and that I think you had better not try to get in advance.
The CHAIRMAN. That is what we want; we want the analyses that
you speak of now.
Secretary GARRISON. That I will send you.
(The analysis referred to faces this page.)
The CHAIRMAN. The essential difference between all of the bills
and the One proposed by Mr. Hay, as I understand it in a general
way, is that Mr. Hay's bill keeps the standing Army organized prac-
tically as it is, except with an increase to 140,000.?
Secretary GARRISON. Mr. Hay's proposal adds six new artillery regi-
ments to the Regular Army. Then he proposes to enlist the existing
organizations up to their full war strength, and, as I have pointed out
*
46 PREPARED NIESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
in the statement. I have already made to the committee, it is thor-
oughly inaccepatable to the War Department if you are going to
contemplate the training of any other kind of force whatever, and is
inacceptable also, because, if you are going to spend the money
which that would cost, we feel it would be much better to spend it
for the new organization proposed by us, which would fill up three
infantry divisions and the cavalry division instead of leaving us with
the infantry tactical organization of the present Army
The CHAIRMAN. Was the bill.that you suggested prepared by the
War College, and the General Staff, and did you have them extend
the report of 1912 to the present time?
Secretary GARRISON. No; I did not ask them to prepare any bill.
What I asked them to do was to start with whatever had been deter-
mined, if anything had been, by the report of 1912, and give me their
present views. That was the only reference to the report of 1912.
The CHAIRMAN. There was no request that went with that, that
they prepare a bill embodying suggestions of the War College and
the General Staff
jºretary GARRISON. I do not think they were ever asked to do
that.
Gen. BLISs. They have not done that.
The CHAIRMAN. Have they done it up to this time' .
Secretary GARRISON. No, sir; they have prepared a very full re-
port which will be found attached to my annual report,
The CHAIRMAN. What I want to get at is this, Mr. Secretary:
They suggest an Army of 500,000 men
Secretary GARRISON. They suggest a standing army, constantly
with the colors, of about 250,000 men, of whom 121,000 of mobile
army troops will be in Continental United States which, under an
enlistment of two years with the colors and six years in reserve,
would at the end of eight years produce a first line of 121,000 with
the colors and 369,000 in reserve.
The CHAIRMAN. Your proposal—that is, the proposal of the War
T)epartment—suggests about 145,000 men
Secretary GARRISON. Yes, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. Did you ever submit to the War College and the
General Staff the proposition of raising an army of from 145,000 to
150,000 men, organized along the lines of which they, as military
experts, might suggest ?
ecretary GARRISON. I would say on that that as to the specific
number there is no dispute in the War Department, if that is what
you are trying to get at, as I understand it, over the kind, character
. form of organization of any kind of an army of whatever size we
18, W.G.
The CHAIRMAN. That is what I am trying to get at. Am I to
understand now that you have a tentative plan suggested by the War
College and the General Staff, or has it been prepared, each particular
section of it, by the particular division covered by its provisions?
Secretary GARRISON. I can not answer that. You have so many
uestions in one. I can tell you just what the facts are; I can answer
that question. The War College Division of the General Staff pre-
sented their report. The analysis of that report will show exactly
what will be produced in the way of military organization. The
writing of the law to carry that into effect is a mere matter of manual
PREPAIRED NESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 47
labor. That will all be left for you. The proposal of the War
Department, as distinguished from the War College Division of the
General Staff, is carried in the report which I have submitted to the
President, and in my annual report and in my testimony here, and
before the House Committee. That was then formulated into a
legislative measure for the purpose of demonstrating the manner
in which it would be carried out legislatively, and that is the bill
which you most recently introduced, and which is now before the
committee.
Sénator WARREN. I got the impression from the chairman's ques-
tion that he wanted to know whether it had been submitted to the
Artillery branch and to the Infantry branch, etc.
Secretary GARRISON. Oh, yes; it has been, of course.
Senator WARREN. The Hay bill, with which I am not familiar ex-
cept as I have seen it in the newspaper reports, is that susceptible, in
your judgment, to extension, taking in additional forces into the
organization, as could be done under either one of the other bills.
Secretary GARRISON. To the existing units. -
Senator WARREN. Up to the war limit?
Secretary GARRISON. Yes, sir. The only expansion would be by
additional organization.
Senator WARREN. And you have to have additional Organizations
instead of filling in the framework as laid out in the other bills'
Secretary GARRISON. Yes, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, if the suggestions of the War Col-
lege had been carried out as to the number of men, would any bill
F. to carry them out have been the same as the bill that you
have suggested
Secretary GARRISON. Of course it would have to be similar. I do
not know whether they recommended anything with respect to the
Regular Army that I did not recommend, excepting that they recom-
lººd more than I recommended. Am I right about that, Gen.
iss? - -
Gen. BLIss. I do not know all the details of their organization, Mr.
Secretary. The main difference was in size and strength.
Secretary GARRISON. That is what I thought. I can not blankly
say yes to your question, Mr. Chairman, but, in the main, it would be
so. I do not think they made any suggestions, Senator Chamberlain,
with respect to organization that I did not adopt. They suggested the
addition to the existing regiments of infantry and artillery and
cavalry of a headquarters company, a Supply company, and a machine
gun Company, . I have adopted that, and that appears in my draft.
The CHAIRMAN. The suggestions as to organization in your bill,
then, are the combined judgment of the General Staff'.
Secretary GARRISON. I think I am safe in saying yes as to that,
because I do not know of any suggestion emanating from the War
College Division of the General Staff that was not adopted and carried
into effect in the smaller recommendation that I made. If I discover
that there is any such, I will inform you, but as at present advised I do
not think there is.
The CHAIRMAN. I suppose as these gentlemen come on the stand
they will be in a position to state the facts with respect to it from their
viewpoint? -
Secretary GARRISON. Yes, sir.
48
PREPARED NESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
Statement of differences between
[Except as shown hereinafter the
* the organization recommended by the War Department
and by the General Staff. .
organizations recommended by the War Department (at full strength)
and the General Staff are identical.]
INIFANTRY REGIMENT.
War
General
º Staff Differences.
draſt. draft.
Officers........... * * * * * * * * 51 52 | +1 First lieutenant.
Headquarters company: -
Privates, first class...|... . . . . . 4 +4\General Staff plan makes 25 per cent of former privates
Privates.------------. 16 12 +} into privates, first class. -
Total.-------------- 57 57 "::"
Machine gun company:
Mechanics. . . . . . . . . . . . 1 2 | +1.
Trumpeters-----------|-------- 2 | +2.
Total.-------------- 70 74 || +4.
Company:
ergeants............. 5 8 || +3.
Corporals............. 10 17 | +7.
Mechanics-----------. l 2 | +1.
#: first class...}... i26 ; t;}see above as to privates, first class.
Total.-------------. 150 150 -
& & º - © tº º & º
* * * * * * * *
The supply companies in all regiments of Infantry, Cavalry,
and Field Artillery under the two plans differ in that the
War Department plan provides that all the enlisted men
except 3 regimental Supply sergeants shall come from the
Quartermaster Corps.
While the General Staff plan makes these men part of the
regiment proper, personnel intended to be identical.
CAVALRY ORGANIZATION.
Machine gun troop:
Mechanics
Privates, first class - - -
Privates--------------
Troop:
Stable sergeant........
Corporals-------------
Privates, first class...
Privates...... -------.
f
* * * * * * * *
+1 Captain. Training officer.
+7 UGeneral Staff plan makes 25 per cent of former privates
—7ſ into privates, first class.
+1.
–2\General Staff plan makes 25
per cent of former privates
# into privates, first class. *
+-l.
+1.
—l.
+20\General Staff plan makes 25 per cent of former privates
+15ſ into privates, first class. .
s º ºs º gº º ºs & de & e º 'º ºr º
+5. g
See general remark under Infantry organization.
FIELD ARTILLERY ORGANIZATION.
IHeadquarters company:
Color SUrgeants. . . . . . .
SGrgeants..... --------
Corporals. . . . . . . . . . . . .
IBattery: -
Sergeants. . . . . . . . . . . . .
Corporals. . . . . . . . . . . . .
Sadd Crs. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
HorseshocrS
Mechanics. . . . . . . . . . . .
Privates, first class. . .
Privates. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Total.--------------
Supply company. . . . . . . . .
A mmunition battalions
and battories.
* * * * * * * *
e sº sº se e º ºs ºr
* * * * * * * *
* * * * * * * *
—l
+2
+3
+6\General Staſſ plan makes 25 per cent of former privates
—5ſ into privates, first class.
+5 -
+2
-H 4
+1
+3}Merely different names.
t;}sco above as to privatos, first class.
See general remark under Inſantry organization.
These organizations are provided for in detail in the War
J)opartment draſt according to previous recommondations
of the General Staſi. On ſurther consideration the General
Staſt decided not to specify the personnel of those organiza-
tions, but to leaye them to be prescribed by the President
when they should be raised.
NotE.—The figures in the second and third columns are for regiments of Light Artillory of two battalions
of three companies.
Artillery are compared.
The diſſerences in column (4) are identical whon the regiments of Heavy or Horse
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 49.
Statement of differences between the organization recommended by the War Department
and by the General Staff—Continued.
ENGINEER OR GANIZATIONS,
\r
pºt General * g
Staff . Differences.
ºf draft
draft. &l 1 ly a -
Engineer regiment, head-
quarters: -
Regimental supply 2 1 –1
Sergeants.
Sergeant trumpeters. . 1. 0 | –1
Company:
Sergeants, first class. . . . . . . . . . 3 +3
Stable Sergeant. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 + 1
Sergeant.S. . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 S —3
Horseshoers. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 | +1
Saddler. . . . . . . . i.S.S & 1 + 1
> *- : *r ºn i. * *scs tº #Tº lºs tº * g
Fº mºs ... § § Iš Change in proportion of privates, first class.
Total. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | 165 164 — 1 .
Mou in e d b a t t a lion, ;
mounted company:
Buglers. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - - - - - - - - 2 +2
Privates, first class . . . . 21 20 –1
Privates. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60 61 -i-1
In addition to the differences shown in the foregoing tables the War Department
draft provides for reduced strengths for the various companies, troops, and batteries
in time of peace, or when the maximum number in the Army is limited by law to a
number less than that necessary to provide for full strength.
The CHAIRMAN. You speak of the inefficiency, generally, of the
National Guard in time of emergency and suggest the reasons for
that view.
Secretary GARRISON. Inefficiency of the system is what I have
been talking about, Mr. Chairman, not the inefficiency of the indi-
vidual men.
The CHAIRMAN. I did not mean to misrepresent what you said.
Secretary GARRISON. Oh, I know you did not.
The CHAIRMAN. The inefficiency of the system in case of an emer-
gency. Yet you recommend an increase of appropriations for the
National Guard. Why?
Secretary GARRISON. Because I believe that they are a Federal
asset. I believe that we would get from them in time of war a suffi-
cient number of organizations by volunteering to repay the Govern-
ment; that is to say, to compensate the Government for what it
would have spent. In other words, I think that usually we have
gotten from 30 to 45, perhaps 50 per cent—I doubt if you have
gotten as much as that, but 30 to 45 per cent of the National Guard
in time of war. If you are going to get 60,000 men from that source,
they are worth the ten millions of dollars a year that I recommend.
The CHAIRMAN. When the National Guard went into the Spanish-
American War in 1898 they went in as volunteer infantry?
Secretary GARRISON. Yes, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. So that those who were transferred became nation-
alized. -
Secretary GARRISON. Oh, yes; just like all volunteers. *
The CHAIRMAN. Were they generally officered by officers appointed
by the States, or by officers of the National Government?
23380—PT 1–16—4
50 PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
Secretary GARRISON. They were officered when they came in by
officers appointed by the States, but in very many instances they did
not remain under those officers, because of obvious reasons why they
should not. . -
The CHAIRMAN. Have you looked over any of the plans for organ-
ization of the militia? I introduced a bill covering that subject.
Secretary GARRISON. Yes, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. Senator Cummins has recently introduced a bill
On the same subject. Have you examined either of those ?
Secretary GARRISON. I have not seen Senator Cummins’ proposal
excepting in the newspapers. I know in a general way of the proposal
of the bill which you introduced.
The CHAIRMAN. What do you think about that ?
Secretary GARRISON. I think this, Senator, that if the States are
going to maintain State troops and the Federal Government is going
to spend money upon them, unquestionably everything that is pro-
vided in the way of supervision of their work by the National
Government as contained in that bill should be enacted, but I think,
and have always thought, and have always felt that that bill could
not and did not and never could be made to make a dependable first
line organization of the National Guard, because I believe that under
constitutional provisions you can not make a national force out of
these State troops, because you lack absolutely in time of peace the
essential unity of responsibility and authority and control that you
have to have if you are going to prepare any kind of a national force
for national service. -
The CHAIRMAN. I can obtain that from Upton's Military Policy as
well as from Washington's correspondence; but the militia now—that
is, the National Guard, is more efficient than the militia system that
prevailed during the colonial days and afterwards, is it not ?
Secretary GARRISON. Oh, I think undoubtedly the organizations
in some of the States at least are very much better organizations
than were in existence at the time you speak of; but my objection is
not based upon the quality or character of a particular organization;
it is based upon my legal conception of the utter ineffectiveness of the
system, and also upon this consideration, that here we are now, as I
think everyone admits, with the amplest, fullest opportunity that ever
was presented to Congress to produce a really effective military
system. You have the most ample power, you can lay down the
broadest and surest and safest foundation which unquestionably is a
national force raised, recruited, officered, and controlled by the
National Government under the jurisdiction and authority and control
of Congress. To my mind, even if there were no legal obstacles
whatever in the way, even if the Constitution were silent on the
subject, to neglect operating under that ample and full authority
vested in the National Government, to parcel out this jurisdiction to
48separate States and then buy back authority and control from those
48 organizations, is simply an inexcusable way to treat the situation.
It is useful to depart entirely for a moment from considering this
proposed idea from the military standpoint, and view it from a purely
business standpoint. It is comparable to this in the business world:
Here is a corporation or an individual, with, of course, all the power
that is possessed by any authority, owning a plant intended and
devised for a department store. Instead of organizing that with
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 51
unity of authority and responsibility and control in itself, it estab-
lishes 48 separate departments under 48 separate heads and permits
each one to raise its force and pay its force and to do with its force as
it pleases, and then, by premiums and bonuses, buys back into its own
hands whatever authority and control it needs. I say that just as a
business proposition that thing is so abhorrent to common sense that
you have only to state it to demonstrate it.
The CHAIRMAN. You suggest an increased appropriation for the
National Guard on the ground that the money will be well spent in
training these young men under quasi Federal control. You say that
60 per cent of the National Guard, at least enlisted •
Secterary GARRISON. I said we never get over something between
40 and 50. .
Mr. BRECKENRIDGE. Thirty-three. -
The CHAIRMAN. So you get 33 per cent. You still think that the
increase you suggest would be well spent because you have these
young men trained. Do you not think that the bill which has been
proposed here, known as the militia pay bill, bringing the National
Guard a little closer to the Government, will make them still more
efficient, and do you not think that if by that expenditure, and by the
enactment of that bill into law, you could get 60 per cent of the
National Guard it would still be money well spent
Secretary GARRISON. If I could consider that situation entirely
alone, uncomplicated with its effect upon the general question of
military policy, I should state my conclusion in this wise: That I
think it is a great mistake for the Federal Government to put State
troops on the Federal pay roll. I have always said so. I have
Said that if it be true that they can not maintain the proper control
of their men without the ability to do so by withholding the pay from
them—and that is what they say is the reason they want the militia
pay bill—then I would infinitely prefer to see that result accom-
º by the States themselves paying their own troops, and the
federal Government increasing its appropriation to the States for
sums of money which the States now spend on their National Guards.
However, as I have said on other occasions, if the Congress does not
entertain my objections with respect to putting the State troops
on the Federal pay roll, I should not continue to urge any personal
objection to accomplish that end.
From the earliest history of this country in its military aspect,
the one thing that has prevented any military progress has been
just as Thomas Jefferson said, the partiality of the Members of
Congress to local systems; in other words, these State troops have
always had sufficient influence to say: “We want to be the only
other force outside of the Regular Army, and we stand in the way of
Congress providing a system that does not continue us as the only
other force outside of the Regular Army.”
If you grant Federal pay and put these State troops on the Federal
pay roll, particularly if anyone contemplates that they are then going
to expand from 129,000 men to 400,000 men, you will not have a
sensible, adequate military policy adopted in this country, because
you are building up in the country an organization of men the main
object of which Wii be to see that nobody comes between them and
this opportunity to remain the only recipient of Federal funds for
military purposes outside of the Regular Army. -
52 PREPARED NIESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
The CHAIRMAN. You must admit, Mr. Secretary, that since the
enactment of the Dick bill the National Guards have become more
efficient 7
Secretary GARRISON. In spots; yes, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. Well, generally
Secretary GARRISON. No; I can not say generally.
The CHAIRMAN. What proportion have become more efficient?
Secretary GARRISON. I can not state it in proportions; it has
rather gone by localities. In some localities the matter has been
taken up much more seriously, and the people who have had it in
charge Haº. labored much more intelligently and constantly and
they have produced better results. But if you will take occasion and
time to read the report of Gen. Mills, the Chief of the Division of
Militia Affairs, I think you will find that there is very much to be
desired.
The CHAIRMAN. I realize the imperfections of the system, Mr.
Secretary. I have studied the thing a good deal, but what I am
trying to get at is, if it is to be a part of our military system, and it
looks’ as though it was to be, will not some measure that will place
them on the pay roll, giving them a small salary to be paid by the
General Government, have the effect of making them more nearly
efficient than any other system :
Secretary GARRISON. What I say is this, Senator Chamberlain—and
in this, as in other matters, I have to form my judgment upon the
nearest approximation to truth that I can get. . The militia officers,
who seem to me to speak with the greatest truth and who have had
the greatest experience, say this: The effect of our having pay for the
men will be that we can have control over the men, which we now
almost entirely lack. They do not take their duties seriously; that
is, men in the National Guard, in the State troops. The enlisted men
stay away from a drill if they feel like it. . They neglect military dis-
cipline if they feel like it. They allow their clothing to be thrown
around and very often lost. They do not keep their equipment in
#. shape, and when they are reprimanded and attempted to be
dealt with militarily they know perfectly well that they are not going
to be really punished; no one is going to treat them as if they were
actually soldiers and subject to the necessary restraint and discipline,
and the consequence is that the officers have very little real control
over their men. If those men, at the end of an ascertained period,
would have $10 coming to them, and we can say, “We will withhold
it because you did not conduct yourself properly, you did not do your
duty; we will withhold eight of those ten dollars, or all of the $10,”
we would have some hold on those men and some control over those
men which we utterly lack now.
That is what they tell me, from sources that I believe are the best
sources of advice and information concerning those things.
The CHAIRMAN. Do you think it would have that effect 7
Secretary GARRISON. Why, I suppose it would; I suppose, of
course, money is always a great incentive to anybody, and if those
fellows realized that they would have to pay some more attention
§ their duties or lose five or ten dollars, I suppose it would have some
effect. -
Senator DU Pont. Do you not think the fact that the officers are
elected by their men cuts a figure there?
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 53
Secretary GARRISON. Why, certainly. They are always going to
elect the man that enforces discipline the most laxly. They are not
going to elect a man who is going to make them behave—just the
way it is with schoolboys electing their school-teacher. They will
elect the school-teacher they like.
The CHAIRMAN. I do not know but what that has been the policy.
Secretary GARRISON. I think that has been the general policy, Mr.
Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. I feel an interest in the National Guard system,
because I somehow or other have some doubts as to the effectiveness
of your continental army scheme. That is only my personal view;
but in speaking of the continental army, could not a general section
be framed for your tentative law providing for the creation of a
volunteer Army, a continental army, and leave all the matter of
detail to the War Department without going into any detail?
Secretary GARRISON. I think the more generally that is done the
better results you will achieve.
The CHAIRMAN. You have gone into detail pretty generally in
your bill. You will note that in the law governing the Forestry
Bureau, for instance, the general policy is stated in a very few words
and it vests in certain departments of the Government the power.
to make rules and regulations which will have the force and effect of
statutes, and men have been indicted for perjury under those rules
and regulations and the conviction has been sustained. What
I am getting at is that if you were to eliminate the details from the
bill and simply provide for the organization of a volunteer army,
a continental army, if you please—
Secretary GARRISON. You can complete the army and bring it into
being in time of peace.
The CHAIRMAN. Yes; and leave to the President and his subordi-
nates the power of organization and regulation entirely. Do you not
º that that could be done better than by undertaking to go into
etails?
Secretary GARRISON. I am absolutely of that opinion, Senator.
The CHAIRMAN. But your bill goes further than that.
Secretary GARRISON. I do not doubt that. I am subject to the
same rule which I think is universal, and that is that you learn by
experience, and the more I have thought about this matter the more
I have realized that the inability to wisely crystalize and determine
a policy renders it unwise to do that any further than you have to.
Of course, what I was up against at the time that I formulated the
policy I felt that unless I produced something that seemed to have
definite form and substance I would be accused of not having fur-
nished the Congress and the country with any definite suggestion
whatever.
The CHAIRMAN. If you had such general policy it would be up to
the Secretary of War and the Army, to organize an army along efficient
lines, adapting the organization to conditions as they exist in different
parts of the country'.
Secretary GARRISON. Yes, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. Could you formulate a brief suggestion for a
statute'. -
Secretary GARRISON. Of that character?
54 PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
The CHAIRMAN. Yes, sir.
Secretary GARRISON. I will do so with great pleasure, Mr. Chairman.
(The suggested form of statute is as follows:)
Substitute for sections 14–27, and 29–30, inclusive.
SEC. 14. That in addition to the other forces authorized in this or any other act the
President is authorized to raise, organize, train, and maintain a force of not to exceed
four hundred thousand men, to be known as the Continental Army, and to consist of
such units of the various branches of the service, line and staff, as the President may
from time to time direct, the organization of each, as to both officers and enlisted men,
to be the same as that prescribed for the Regular Army. All officers of the Continental
Army shall be appointed by the President alone and shall be assigned, promoted and
discharged in accordance with such regulations as the President may establish. The
term of enlistment shall be for three years with the colors and three years with the
reserve, and eligibility for enlistment shall be as fixed from time to time by the Presi-
dent. At any time within three years after the passage of this act, officers and enlisted
men of the Organized Militia, including those attached to units higher than a regiment,
may be received into the Continental Army in the manner and under the terms,
except as otherwise herein provided, prescribed by section 3 of the act approved April
25, 1914, for their admission into the Volunteer Army; and officers now serving in the
Organized Militia whose organizations are not received into the Continental Army may
nevertheless be so received individually, and may thereupon be commissioned in said
army in the grades held by them in the Organized Militia. Officers and enlisted men
of the Organized Militia so received into the Continental Army shall stand discharged
from the Organized Militia. The reserve of the Continental Army shall consist of men
furloughed to it after the completion of their service with the colors and of such other
men having had military training as may be enlisted in said reserve under such condi-
tions and for such periods as the President may prescribe.
SEC. 15. That so far as permitted by appropriations made by Congress for that pur-
pose, the President may call out all or any part of the Continental Army for purposes
of training. The aggregate length of such training periods required for any one man
shall not without his consent exceed three months in any one calendar year nor six
months in any three successive years. Except for such periods of training the Conti-
mental Army shall not be called out for service except in time of actual or imminent
war. No part of the reserve of the Continental Army shall be called out except in
time of actual or imminent war, in which case all enlistments which would otherwise
expire within one year shall continue in force for the period of one year from the
beginning of the war unless sooner terminated by the President. 3.
SEc. 16. That when called into active service or when called out for purposes of
instruction the members of the Continental Army shall, from the time they are
required by the terms of the call to respond thereto, be subject to the laws and regula-
tions governing the Regular Army, so far as such laws and regulations are applicable
to persons whose permanent retention in the military service, on either the active or
the retired list, is not contemplated by law; and during such periods no distinction
as to pay, privileges, or eligibility to duty of all classes shall be made between members
of the Continental Army and those of the Regular Army.
The CHAIRMAN. In connection with this continental army, have you
in mind the absorption by it of the National Guard?
Secretary GARRISON. If you mean have I determined that I would
absorb the National Guard or that I would not, no. I have no such
thing in mind, but I have always said from the beginning, and have
said to the National Guard people who have come to me and conferred
with me, that to the extent that they wished to become what they
have often said they were in the service to become—actual Federal
forces—I would allow them to become in the most absolute spirit of
fairness and generosity, realizing, as I have said in my statement, that
it would be equitable to do so. I have said to them that if they can
arrange to come over in units that all this matter of character of
training and length of training and things of that kind can unques-
tionably be worked out between us.
PREPAIRED NESS FOR, NATIONAL DEFENSE. 55
The CHAIRMAN. Eventually you would absorb the National Guard
in the continental army' - - -
Secretary GARRISON. They have just got to come over or stay
where they are. Curiously enough, last night in New York a
National Guard officer was talking to me, and he said, “Why,
a great number of our men do not want to go in the Federal
service.” I had always understood that they did, in great num-
bers, want to go into it. What I want is to say to them, “If
you want to come into the Federal service, here is your oppor-
tunity. If you want to remain in State service, available as a
Federal asset in this opportunity to volunteer in time of war, then I
want to treat you with absolute fairness on that basis.” -
The CHAIRMAN. And that contemplates the elimination of a Fed-
eral appropriation for the system to the National Guard'.
Secretary GARRISON. No; I have suggested giving them almost
double their present appropriation, and thereby enable the States to
pay the men they have what is needed to enforce discipline.
The CHAIRMAN. One other thing, Mr. Secretary. Senator Fletcher
was asking you something about the reduction of expenses. It costs
about $1,000 per enlisted man in the Army, does it not ?
Secretary GARRISON. $1,000 is near enough to figure on, Senator.
Of course, what is meant by that is this: When you talk of expenses
attendant upon maintaining the military establishment and reduce
that to the number of men in the establishment, using that merely
as a norm to figure with, it amounts to about $1,000; and that, of
course, is Ordnance and all kinds and sorts and conditions of things.
The CHAIRMAN. That is the overhead charges? -
Secretary GARRISON. Yes, sir; everything added in; just for rough
figuring that is near enough to it. No one can determine exactly
what it does cost; you can not determine exactly what to figure in
on that basis, but I think, as a rough figure, that is sufficient.
The CHAIRMAN. A good deal has been said in the papers recently
about the great extravagance in the conduct of our Navy and our
Army, in comparison with the cost of other nations. If I am not
mistaken, it costs about four times as much per annum in the United
States as it does in Japan.
Secretary GARRISON. I have had a study made of that, so far as I
understand the figures are available. In these other countries the scale
of living, the payment of money to the Army, the way in which they are
clothed, and the way in which they are fed, the way in which they are
housed, and all that, are all entirely different and lower in cost than
in this country, so you do not get any fair basis of comparison at all.
The thing that you must always consider in this country is this, that
unless you are going to pay your soldiers less than we pay them, or
give them less good clothing, or give them less good food, or house
them in less complete dwellings, or give them less of the things which
the American citizen in any walk of life insists upon having, you
simply can not reduce those fixed charges; they will not admit of
reduction.
Senator CATRON. If you did, you could not get the recruits?
Secretary GARRISON. You could not get the recruits.
The CHAIRMAN. This comparison was made for the purpose of dis-
crediting not only this administration but other administrations, and
for the purpose of showing gross extravagance. I am calling your
56 PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
attention to it for the reason that I want to have your views on the
difference in the cost per man per annum in this country and other
COuntries.
Secretary GARRISON. You must remember this, Senator Chamber-
lain, that our lack of system has resulted in this, that we provide for
higher pay, better clothing, better food, better shelter, and better
general facilities of living for the Army that we have than in any other
country in the world, and we maintain such a small Army that the
aggregate of those costs divided among that Small number of men
makes the great common denominator extremely high. If we had
a real military policy in which by expending $127,000,000 upon your
regular standing army and $45,000,000 upon your 400,000 Federal
Volunteers, so that together you maintain 550,000 men, and then
take your norm, you would come down within a relative distance,
if not on a par with these other armies with which we are compared.
There is one of our very great difficulties that is never taken into
account. It is just as though you took the organization of the
Pennsylvania Railroad, with all its overhead charges, with all its
clerks and manifold activities to carry on a great business, and
applied it to a little railroad 50 miles long, and yet it has got all
º overhead charges and all the facilities of a ºdºo miles long.
The CHAIRMAN. In other words, it costs relatively more per man
per annum with a small army than with a large army?
Secretary GARRISON. We have only this highly polished costly
diamond, so to speak, and we have not, as these other countries have,
supplementary forces which would vastly increase our personnel and
vastly decrease the cost per man.
The CHAIRMAN. That is all I care to ask the Secretary now.
Secretary GARRISON. One other thing, Mr. Chairman, on this
question of economy. I do not mean for one instant to say that there
is not in this vast organization, spread all over the world as it is,
some amount of careless spending here, or of inattention to the proper
care and expenditure there, but I do mean to say that so far as
three years' close and constant attention can qualify a man to speak,
I can absolutely state that there is no corruption, there is no waste
in purchasing, there is no inefficiency in administration, there is
nothing that can be corrected excepting by the daily attention to
our duties, and unless you are going to radically change the whole
basis of your expenditure, and pay men less and house them less
well and treat them less well
Senator DU PONT. And then you can not get your men.
Secretary GARRISON. No; of course, it is very easy to state to
those who have only a very superficial knowledge and who are in-
fluenced by headlines, that our Army costs as much as the German
Army, or some other great army. In the first place, it is not true.
Our method of appropriation is such that you can definitely ascertain
exactly what is spent upon our military establishment. I defy any-
body to find out what is spent upon the military establishment of
any other country with any accuracy. It is carried in all kinds of
ways under all kinds of titles.
Senator BECKHAM. Could you before the war, Mr. Secretary'
Secretary GARRISON. I have had my men for two years trying to
find out, and they come to me and they say, “This is all I can find
out about it,” and, instead of being able to go, as anybody with any
PREPAIRED NESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 57
intelligence can go here to published reports and pick out definitely
the aggregate that we spend, you can get Some items there, but there
are always many items that you can not get at all. And then, as I
have said, they pay their men almost nothing. Their officers are
paid on an entirely different basis.
Senator BECKHAM. Has it not been the policy of a Government,
where they have an immense military º as Germany or
France or Austria or Russia, to keep from the knowledge of the people,
as much as possible, really how much was expended in the military
establishment 3 -
Secretary GARRISON. I do not know whether they have done it by
design or whether it has grown up as such things do grow up in
governments. I can not tell you that. Not that this is so, but you
will find similar things to this, that there will be a sum of money
under such a head as king or kaiser, or whatever he is, called “Privy
Purse.” Bound up in that may be a little army maintained by him
that is entirely separate from any of these other provisions. Unless
Somebody told you that by custom or tradition or by habit of that
country 100,000 men or 200,000 men were always maintained out
of the king s own private purse, you have no way of tracing that
appropriation at all.
Senator WARREN. Does it not come down to this, that as a com-
parison between Army and civil life, it is about the same in those
countries and in this
Secretary GARRISON. Yes; I think, practically stated, Senator War-
ren, it is the difference between the American plan of living and the
plan of living in almost all the other countries, at least in all those
countries requiring compulsory service, and therefore they do not
pay them anything. I think that many of those men get something
like 5 or 10 cents a day.
Senator CATRON. You spoke of housing—
Secretary GARRISON. I meant the shelter furnished by the Gov-
ernment.
Senator CATRON. What is the shelter that the foreign soldiers
get'. º
Secretary GARRISON. They have cantonments built in big cities,
which are just bare places to sleep in, and they are nothing similar
to what our men are living in.
Senator WARREN. Sometimes they are just in a stockade.
Secretary GARRISON. We build officers' quarters; we give our offi-
cers quarters. In these foreign armies the officer gets a very small
amount of money and he lives around in the city, what we would caii
commutation of quarters, and in most of those countries the pay,
being for compulsory service, is very much less than it is in this coun-
try, and if it was not as much as it was in this country you would
not begin to get anything like the high type of men that you
get in our professional army service. Most of our officers could
make about three times or five or six times what they make, in private
life. What keeps them in the service, after you get them in, is the
love of it. Take the Engineer Service. A man like Goethals could
go into private life and command a salary of $50,000 a year; and
there are many other men I could mention.
The CHAIRMAN. If there is nothing further, we will take a recess
until to-morrow afternoon at 2 o'clock. g
58 PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
Secretary GARRISON. Do you want me here to-morrow for exam-
ination ?
The CHAIRMAN. No, I think not. Could we have Gen. Bliss and
Gen. Scott and Gen. Mills'
Secretary GARRISON, Yes. Will you gentiemen report here to-
morrow at 2 o’clock, please? -
The CHAIRMAN. We asked you for Gen. Wood, too.
Secretary GARRISON. Yes, he has been summoned.
(Whereupon, at 5 o'clock and 5 minutes the committee took a
recess until to-morrow, Wednesday, January 19, 1916, at 2 o'clock
p. m.) -
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 19, 1916.
UNITED STATES SENATE,
CoMMITTEE ON MILITARY AFFAIRs,
Washington, D. C.
The committee resumed its session at the expiration of the recess
at 2 o’clock p. m., Senator Geo. E. Chamberlain (chairman), pre-
siding.
The CHAIRMAN. The committee will please come to order. Gen.
Wood, in command of the Eastern Department, is here from Governors
Island, and we will hear him. General, I will state to you generally
that a number of bills are pending before this committee and the
Military Affairs Committee of the House having for their purpose the
reorganization of the Army. There are three or four of them. One
of them is known as the Hay bill, one as the Chamberlain bill, one
as the tentative bill of the Secretary of War, and in addition to those
there is the militia-pay bill, so called. There is a universal military
training bill and a number of them that the committee may want to
ask you Something about, each as they may come up. But, first,
General, you may, if you will, make any general statement you desire
in reference to the whole subject of the reorganization of the Army.
STATEMENT OF MAJ. GEN. LEONARD WOOD, UNITED STATES
ARMY, COMMANDING THE DEPARTMENT OF THE EAST.
Gen. WoOD. The only bills that have been referred to me officially
are an unnumbered Senate bill, which I presume, sir, is the Chamber-
lain bill, and a bill from the House, also without number, which I
understand is the Hay bill, which carries a provision for the conti-
nental army. I also received a copy of a bill providing for general
military training, which I think was introduced by you.
I have made a report upon the Chamberlain bill, which seemed to
me to be a sound bill. My report recommended a few more regiments
of Infantry than that bill called for. It recommended a stronger
Infantry company, a company of 150 men rather than 112, and it
dissented from the policy of either promoting or retiring colonels as
they came to the head of the list, and added a little more Field
Artillery and a few more companies of Engineers. But, generally
. Speaking, I concur very strongly in the general provisions of that
bill. So far as the strength of the Army goes, my report made it a
little bit stronger. I believe the bill for general military training
is absolutely fundamental. - - ...
23380—PT 2–16—1* & 59
60 PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
Senator CATRON. Mr. Chairman, have we Gen. Wood’s report here?
Gen. WoOD. I brought an extra copy of it, I sent the original to
the War Department. - .
Senator WARREN. Mr. Chairman, would it not be well to have the
general state the number of regiments which he wants to reach in
his report?
Senator DU PONT. H. Was going to ask you, General, that you ex-
plain also—you spoke of the strength of a company of Infantry—
whether you referred to the peace establishment or to a war footing?
Gen. WOOD. I think, sir, it should be full war strength at all times
until We have an adequate reserve, and then we can reduce it to, say,
85 per cent of the War strength. With the companies as organized to-
day, roughly speaking, with 64 or 65 men, when the men are detached
for ordinary duties of the day, the company commander frequently
has only three or four Squads, and an effort to instruct a company
of that strength is pretty discouraging to officers and men, because
it is only a small skeleton organization, and no really good Work can
be done with it, and we have to combine them to make war-strength
companies in order to give officers instruction in handling a full
company. '. º
The CHAIRMAN. General, you say you have made a report on one
of these bills only'
Gen. Wood. On the Chamberlain bill, which provided for certain
specified numbers of regiments of Infantry, certain increases in the
Cavalry and Artillery. &
The CHAIRMAN. Did you make any report on the so-called Hay
bill?
Gen. WooD. That report is ready to be mailed to-morrow, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. Would you mind having both of those reports sub-
mitted as a part of your testimony and have them included in the
record?
Gen. Wood. I will do that. I brought the report on your bill to-
day merely as a reference. -
The CHAIRMAN. We would like to have both.
Gen. Wood. I will send them to you.
Senator WARREN. Mr. Chairman, the reason why I asked to have
the number of regiments stated at this time is that the chairman of
the committee introduces bills—usually they are all introduced by
him for the department—and we might like to distinguish in the
beginning what the differences are in the several bills as to the num-
ber of regiments and companies. We had yesterday, for instance,
testimony giving the strength of the Army as proposed in the War
Department bill, and as it would take but a few words I would like
to have it read into the record.
The CHAIRMAN. I would like to have the general state it.
Gen. WooD. Shall I make a statement from my general report?
The CHAIRMAN. Yes.
Gen. Wood. I recommended that we maintain in the Philippine
Islands four war-strength regiments of Infantry, the present Cavalry
force of two regiments; that we increase the Artillery so that there
would be a regiment and a half of Field Artillery in the Philippines;
that we maintain in the Hawaiian Islands six war-strength regi-
ments of Infantry, two regiments of Field Artillery, one regiment
PREPAIRED NIESS IFOR, NATIONAL DEFENSE. 61
of Cavalry, and the necessary auxiliary troops; that is, Engineers,
Signal troops, etc. I recommended four regiments of Infantry of
war strength in Panama, one full regiment of Field Artillery, and a
squadron of Cavalry; and at each of these stations two companies of
Engineers, an aerial squadron, and the necessary Sanitary and other
auxiliary troops. I recommended, also, a war-strength battalion and
necessary auxiliary troops for Alaska, as it is there only for police
duty, and that we add a battalion to the present Infantry regiment
in Porto Rico, making it a full-strength regiment, and that we
station in the island a battalion of Field Artillery. So much for the
foreign over-sea possessions, with the exception of Coast Artillery.
Our Coast Artillery is a force whose strength will depend entirely
upon the number of batteries that we may find it necessary to con-
struct in those possessions, and consequently my recommendation
with reference to Coast Artillery as a whole was that we should
increase the present Coast Artillery by the number of companies
which have gone abroad or are to go abroad, and that we should
have enough Coast Artillery in the United States to provide one
full manning detail for the mine companies and one full detail for
half the batteries, the idea being that the militia would supply the
remaining half. Up to date we have not been able to accomplish this,
which would require 97 more companies of regular Coast Artillery
and about 10,000 more militia than are now available.
I also recommended that in future whenever a battery of Coast
Artillery is authorized that the authorization should carry with it a
provision for the necessary men. Instead of building a battery and
then asking for troops, that we should do the whole thing in one act.
This would also apply to heavy mobile artillery for coast defense.
For the continental United States I recommend six complete In-
fantry divisions, complete in every detail, two Cavalry divisions of
six regiments each, and six regiments of Army Artillery of a late
heavy type—mobile, but of heavy type—and a sufficient increase in
the Corps of Engineers to give us a pioneer battalion of three com-
panies with each Infantry division and each Cavalry division and a
pontoon battalion of three companies with each group of three
divisions, or each field army, and a pontoon battalion of three com-
panies for the Cavalry divisions. This would really form a reserve
pontoon division.
Two war-strength Federal reserve regiments composed as much as
possible of men who have passed through the Porto Rican regiment
should be organized and maintained in Porto Rico. Federal reserve
artillery should also be developed, so there will be a full war-strength
regiment of artillery and a war-strength brigade of infantry in case
of need. Necessary auxiliary troops should also be developed. The
population will furnish ample personnel. Some of it will have to
be trained. -
With reference to the Philippines, steps should be taken to develop
in the Philippines a Federal reserve force of not less than 30,000 men,
made up as far as possible from the American inhabitants of the
islands and the remainder from men who have had service in the
Scouts or Constabulary, or other military training. Arms sufficient
for such a force should be maintained there. I believe that this
action would tend to improve conditions as to löyalty, and would
62 PREPAREDINESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. te
prove of tremendous value in case of military operations involving an
attack on our sovereignty in the Philippines by a foreign power.
Steps should be taken in Hawaii to organize a reserve force com-
posed of the American inhabitants of the islands. It is believed that
a force of approximately 5,000 could be organized and this should
be done. Such a force would relieve the regular force of many minor
duties in case of military operations, such as guarding foreign popu-
lation, policing city, etc. In other words, in all our foreign posses-
sions intelligent steps should be taken to organize a dependable per-
sonnel into a reserve force. Conditions for instruction are favorable
at all these places. The same can be done at Panama, so that the
guard for locks and interior lines would not have to be drawn from
Regular troops in case of an attack.
Senator WEERs. How many fieldpieces would that give per thou-
sand men? - -
Gen. WooD. That would require a total of 25 regiments of Field
Artillery, or an increase of 19 regiments over what we now have,
and it would give us a war-strength regiment when these Field
Artillery regiments are expanded, for I propose that there shall be
a two-battalion regimont in time of peace, for the extra officers
who are on detail with the militia, at the colleges, etc., would be
available to officer a third battalion in time of war. -
To do this would require a total of 25 regiment of Field Artillery
or an increase of 19 regiments over what we now have. These regi-
ments should be so organized as to permit their expansion from a
two to a three battalion regiment. The additional officers needed for
this would be available in part from those on detail in time of peace
with the militia, at colleges, etc. The number of Field Artillery
officers should be at all time sufficient to permit of this expansion.
The heavy artillery referred to would limited to pieces of 4.7-
inch to 6-inch caliber. In addition to artillery of this class there
should be available for duty with the Army in operations requiring
artillery of an especially heavy type mobile pieces of a type now
being considered with a view to furnishing protection for unde-
fended harbors, harbors which, while furnishing suitable landing
places for troops, are not of sufficient importance to Warrant their
being protected by permanent fortifications. This type of heavy
artillery should include guns up to the maximum caliber, both of
the howitzer or mortar type, and the direct-fire gun. They would
be available not only for the sea-coast defenses referred to but for
service with the Army in operations requiring the use of an
especially heavy armament. They would be designed and mounted
for ready movement by rail and would be available for service on
either coast. In case of an attack on the United States by a great
power there is no doubt but that guns of this class would form part
of the artillery of the attacking force, and we must be prepared to
meet it.
The principal use of guns of this type would probably be inci-
dent to coast defense, and as it would be in all probability the
same gun used by the Coast Artillery, I believe that all artillery of
this type should be in the hands of the Coast Artillery and that
this arm should have organized mobile units for handling this
type of artillery, both for coast defense and for work with the
- PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 63
mobile army in event of the coast line being pierced. The skilled
artillerists and machinists which it would be necessary to maintain
with batteries of this description would not in time of peace be more
than 60 per cent of the full authorized strength of the company on
a war footing. The balance of the personnel will be incident to the
transportation and the preparation of the sites and could be drawn
from the civil population who have had training which would adapt
them readily for this work. Guns of this type should be provided
and provided promptly. The Army artillery guns of approxi-
mately 5-inch to 6-inch caliber should have a range of at least
15,000 yards, if they are to be effective against guns of correspond-
ing caliber, which would probably be brought against them.
Senator DU Pont. Of an Artillery regiment?
Gen. WOOD. Yes; of an Artillery regiment at war strength; that
is to say, we should have two regiments of three battalions each, with
12 guns, or a total of 72 guns with each division, which has, all told,
about 17,000 rifles, including approximately 1,600 with the Cavalry
and Engineers, or about 15,500 Infantry rifles. Allowing for usual
unavoidable detachments, there would be about five guns per thousand
rifles on the line.
Senator DU PONT. General, you have spoken of Porto Rico being
given another battalion. Is there any trouble getting troops in
Porto Rico?
Gen. WooD. I thought if we put a regular battalion of Field Ar-
tillery in Porto Rico it would serve as a nucleus for quick expansion
into a regiment in time of war. We have there one regiment of
Infantry, two battalions. The proposition was to make that three
battalions and create two regiments of insular militia, or Federal
militia, and keep the arms in Porto Rico so that we could expand
immediately into a brigade of Infantry with a regiment of Field
Artillery. -
Senator DU PoWT. There was a proposition last winter to transfer
the Porto Rican officers into the Infantry line. Do you favor that?
Gen. WooD. Yes, sir; for this reason: It is not practicable to keep
American officers in Porto Rico continuously, and under the present
system—you are probably thoroughly familiar with the conditions
that exist there—we have had to retire a number of officers after
10 or 12 years of continuous tropical service. They are not available
for detail elsewhere, and they ought to be just as in any other regi-
ment.
Senator DU Pont. I wanted to know whether you do not think we
could raise two regiments in Porto Rico and keep one at the Isthmus,
in a tropical climate. *
Gen. Wood. You undoubtedly could, sir; there are something over
1,200,000 people in the island. -
Senator DU PoWT. Would you favor that, having two regiments
raised in Porto Rico? -
Gen. WooD. I think it would be a very good idea; yes, sir; but I
think they should be available for duty anywhere.
Senator DU Pont. I think so.
Gen. Wood. It paralyzes the ambition of the officers who are sta-
tioned there to feel that they can not get out of that regiment and
can not go anywhere else, and that their promotion is limited.
64 PREPARED NESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
Senator DU PoWT. I agree with you fully.
The CHAIRMAN. In your proposed plan increasing the Army, as
you suggested a while ago, what would be the strength of the Army
if that plan were adopted?
Gen. Wood. About 220,000 men at home and abroad.
The CHAIRMAN. That is, officers and men?
Gen. Wood. No, sir; I think not. I think that would be the men.
That includes, of course, the noncombatant troops, the auxiliary
troops of all sorts, the quartermasters, medical troops, etc. That
would give us six divisions in the United States, which, if main-
tained at War strength, would be, roughly, 138,000 in the Infantry
divisions, including auxiliary troops, with 15,000 Cavalry in the two
Cavalry divisions, plus the auxiliary troops, or a total of 20,306 in
the Cavalry divisions. &
The CHAIRMAN. Your plan suggests maintaining outside conti-
mental United States these different garrisons and posts at their full
war strength'
Gen. WooD. And not only at their full war strength, but I would
add 10 per cent to those regiments, because if War does come we never
can make good the losses; they will have to fight through the war
with what they have unless we have or secure sea control.
The CIIAIRMAN. Both as to men and munitions?
Gen WooD. Both as to illen and munitions, unless we control the
Sea. . g"
Senator DU PoWT. General, did I understand you to recommend
that the regiments in the United States be kept temporarily at War
strength also? +
Gen. WOOD. I would, sir, until we get a reserve. There is one other
thing I have urged in this report as strongly as possible—that we
have a new enlistment act, one that will make an adequate reserve pos-
sible. The present enlistment act is absolutely antagonistic to the re-
serve idea. It gives us a few men. We shall begin to get more now,
beginning with last November; but I think—and it does not make
much difference how long the term is—that the enlistment act in the
bill as reported upon by the War College, say an eight-year enlist-
ment, two with the colors and six with the reserve, is all right. The
maxiumm period does not matter so much if you will have this pro-
viso, abolish discharge by purchase altogether, and make it possible
for a man to transfer into the reserve on his own request in time of
peace whenever, in the opinion of his company commander, he is an
efficient and well-trained soldier. What we are after is the well-
trained soldier in the reserve.
Senator DU PONT. Do you favor making any distinction between
the mounted service and Infantry as to the minimum time they serve
with the colors? -
Gen. WOOD. None. I would insist upon the man remaining with
the colors until he is thoroughly efficient; but if he wants to get out
he has an opportunity of doing SO by becoming efficient.
Senator DU Pont. What I meant was two years with the colors
has been proposed in the bill.
Gen. Wood. Yes, sir. - -
Senator DU PONT. And then passing into the reserves. Now, do
you think two years with the colors is long enough for a mounted
soldier? -
*.
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 65
Gen. WOOD. Yes, sir; but I will try to make myself clear in another
way. I would keep him longer if necessary—if he is not efficient.
I would not let him go into the reserve until his company or battery
or troop commander says he is a trained soldier. Supposing he is a
graduate of the Virginia Military Institute or Norwich University,
he may be held efficient in five or six months, and then we could put
him in the reserve and get another man in his place. The decision
whether he is to go into the reserve or not depends upon a regular
officer or a board of regular officers; and when they say he is a well-
trained soldier they can let him go. Instead of having discharge by
purchase—there were over 3,000 purchased discharges last year, or
approximately 3,000; that is regulated by the condition of the de-
mand outside—instead of letting those men purchase their discharge,
if we had the system of letting them be furloughed to the reserve
as soon as they were efficient, we should have 3,000 more reserves
to-day from last year alone, not counting those of previous years.
Senator DU PONT. Of course, you mean the reserve must be paid to
be efficient; the Government has got to pay them? -
Gen. WooD. My own idea is you should pay $30 a year—about
$2.50 a month. *
Senator DU PONT. That is just what I think, too. If you are
going to get them you must keep tab on them ; there must be Some
means to have them come forward and get their pay, and then you
will know where they are. -
Gen. WoOD. Yes, sir. They are really soldiers on furlough ; and
I believe our people can be depended upon to play the game.
Senator DU PONT. It seems to me the country would stand for that
now ; they would not do so a few years ago, but there has been a great
change in public opinion about preparation for War.
Gen. WoOD. There is a great change. At all seaport towns their
docks are crowded with men who are beyond reach of their own
country’s law—trying to get back to fulfill their own military obliga-
tions. If our people are not going to do that, of course, we are
finished.
The CHAIRMAN. General, your plan contemplates an army of about
220,000 men until a reserve of Some kind is created, when you would
gradually reduce it?
Gen. WooD. That would shrink, then, to the proposed 185,000 or
190,000 men. The reduction would be only in the home force.
The CHAIRMAN. You say to 190,000 men?
Gen. WooD. To 185,000 or 190,000 men. When you got your big
reserve, of course, you might shrink it at home as far as you deemed
safe, provided the organizations are kept at sufficient strength for
instruction and service.
The CHAIRMAN. How many men would that plan contemplate hav-
ing in continental United States?
Gen. WOOD. The total troops of all kinds in the United States
would be 188,000 in round numbers until reserves are formed. If the
mobile troops should be reduced by 15 per cent on the formation of a
reserve, as they could safely be, the total number of troops would then
be 163,000. This number does not include the additional officers on
detached service of various kinds, which would be approximately
1,200 more under the present plans. This number, 163,000, plus the
66 - FREPAREDNIESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
foreign garrisons of approximately 55,000, including Alaska and
Porto Rico, brings the total strength of the Army up to 218,000 in
1 ound numbers. This, I believe, to be the minimum regular force
which can be depended upon to perform properly the functions which
the Regular Army is expected to perform.
The CHAIRMAN. Speaking of these bills again. I do not think this
committee has ever discussed any particular bill—that is, they are
not wedded to any plan. We want to get at the different proposi-
tions that have been made. With reference to a bill that is pending
before the House committee, have you examined that carefully, and
what criticism, if any, have you to make of that ?
Gen. WooD. You refer to the bill that carries a continental-army
proviso: - : -
The CHAIRMAN. That is the Hay bill, so called. -
Gen. WooD. I think the bill is entirely inadequate in its pro-
vision for the regular establishment. *
The CHAIRMAN. Why? -
Gen. WoOD. It does not give us men enough. It provides prac-
tically for a Regular Army of 141,000 at home and abroad.
The CHAIRMAN. Without increasing materially the organizations
of any branch? -
Gen. Wood. The recommendations as to Field Artillery indicate a
failure to appreciate the lessons of the war, as I See them. The
increase in Field Artillery is absurdly inadequate. That arm has
come to the front over and above all others, and it is simply in-
sanity not to take some steps to provide ourselves adequately, be-
cause it takes much time and money to do it, and money will not do it
Without time. -
Senator WEEKs. Is there any European nation that has not as
large a proportion of field artillery as the One you have instanced
in the bill which you were originally discussing? *
Gen. WoOD. I think, sir, they all have larger than that.
Senator WEEKs. That was my impression.
Gen. Wood. It is rather difficult to learn just what they are using
in the way of field artillery.
Senator WEEKs. Had they before the war? -
Gen. WooD. Before the war they ran about 5 and a fraction to 6
per thousand, and we were 3.18. -
Senator DU PoWT. Not that much even.
Gen. WooD. That is what we dreamed of at some remote, future
day. r
Senator DU Pont. We were about 2%
Gen. WooD. Yes, sir. The other feature of the bill is the conti-
nental-army proviso.
The CHAIRMAN. That is substantially along the line suggested by
the Secretary of War, is it not?
Gen. WOOD. I understand so; I have never seen his recommenda-
tions on the subject. The only paper I have seen is the bill which
you describe as the Hay bill.
The CHAIRMAN. Have you studied this continental-army plan of
creating a reserve? -
Gen. WoOD. Yes, sir; I have been over it and am writing a report
on it. I have finished it, in fact.
PREPAIRED NIESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 67
The CHAIRMAN. What is your idea about that, General?
Gen. WOOD. My idea is that any plan which fails to recognize the
fact that with the suffrage goes obligation for service will be only a
makeshift and a failure; that we can not afford to go on the volun-
teer system any longer; and if we are going to have an effective
Army there has to be some general system adopted, such as was out-
lined in your bill which you put in for general military training.
The volunteer system as a system has been a dismal failure in every
war we have engaged in and always will be. The good men will
go first, then volunteering will stop, as it did in the Revolution and
in 1812, and in the Civil War when we went to the draft; at the end
of a year in the South, a little later in the North, armed draft at that.
The good men went and went through, but the great bulk of the men
did not respond. We never filled our call for the Spanish War even.
It is a rotten system. The spirit is fine, but the system is unsound
and spells disaster if we ever go into a real war with it.
The CHAIRMAN. You recognize the difficulties in the way of uni-
versal military training? He
Gen. WoOD. I do not believe they are as great as people think.
It is the only suggestion, in speaking to the groups of university
men, and the more intelligent class of men, that receives the strongest
approval. Do you want a general statement on this?
The CHAIRMAN. Yes.
Gen. WooD. If the proposition of universal military training is
presented to a body of men, as it was a few nights ago to a thousand
bankers in New York, and the statement is made that with manhood
suffrage goes hand in hand with manhood obligation for Service,
that this is the very foundation on which a democracy, rests, the
soundness of the proposition is generally recognized, as is the fact.
that there is no logical method of ducking, side-stepping, or dodging
it. Whether they like it or not, men realize that the principle is
sound. They realize that a man can not exercise the suffrage as a
right and assume that he has the privilege of deciding as to whether
or not he is to render service in case of necessity. This general prin-
ciple has never been fully recognized in this country, and we have
with great cost and at times humiliation to ourselves (but always
with great and unnecessary cost in life and treasure), adhered to
the volunteer system, with its evils in the form of a bounty and the
purchase of substitutes. There has been no equality of service. The
rich when drafted have been able to buy the poor to take their
places. The result has been a debauchery of public morals on the
subject of each and every man’s obligation to service in time of war.
It may not be service with arms in hand; it may be service on the
lines of communications, in the Supply department, as a medical
officer Serving with the Red Cross; but it means service somewhere
for every able-bodied man who is within the period of obligation—
that is to say, every man who is within the age limits during which
Service must be rendered and who is physically fit. We have never in
our entire Service waged single-handed a war with a first class
country, and we have not the slightest conception of what war would
mean with an organized and prepared nation, and it is principally
with possible war with such a nation that we are concerned. No
greater folly could be committed than to follow the course which
68 PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
is occasionally recommended, of leaving the burden of War to the
time of war. Quite the contrary is true. The burden of war must
be spread over a very much longer time than the period of War.
This burden must be in the form of preparation, organization, provi-
sion of supplies, training of men, etc., all with the object of making
the war short, successful, and its burden as light as possible. To
leave the burden of war to the time of war would be an act of inde-
scribable folly and indicates on the part of those advocating it a
failure to gather anything from the lessons of the past and present.
Senator DU PONT. Gen. Wood, do you not think the volunteer sys-
tem, faulty as it may be, is superior to the militia system?
Gen. WoOD. Oh, yes. Now, with reference to the proviso in the
continental army proposition, concerning the militia.
The CHAIRMAN. What provision do you refer to; that authorizing
the National Guards to go into the continental army?
Gen. WoOD. I refer to the whole proposition of continuing them
and giving them an option to enter the continental army.
The CHAIRMAN. Yes.
Gen. WoOD. It seems to me that we all recognize the good work
which has been done by the officers and men of the militia. They
are cursed by a vicious system; it is not their fault. I think we
should put the militia, body and soul, into the Federal service. We
do not want any fifth wheel to our coach. Give them an opportunity
to come in the Federal Service just as they stand, by organizations,
without losing rank or prestige. If they do not come, then leave
them to the States, withdraw Federal support, and build up your
Federal force. To keep the militia, at the same time establishing
another force, whose very establishment is because the militia is
inefficient or unavailable, and to pay it, is like saying to your butler,
“James, you are unsatisfactory, but I am going to keep you and raise
your salary and get another man.” You are creating two forces that
are going to fight each other. Let us put the militia into the Federal
service, absolutely and unconditionally, or else leave it with the
States, absolutely and unconditionally, and have our own Federal
militia, call it what you like, continental army or anything else.
Senator WEEKs. You mean fighting each other in attempting to
get recruits? -
Gen. WOOD. Recruits and money. The activity would be greater
on behalf of money than for recruits. The local political influence
would probably back the militia, and the Federal force be left to shift
for itself. -
The CHAIRMAN. Would you take them in, officered as they are, with
officers appointed by the State authority?
Gen. WOOD. I would terminate an intolerable situation.
The CHAIRMAN. That would contemplate having them volunteer
into the Regular Army'
Gen. WooD. Yes, sir. We could not force them to come in, but we
would give them a warm welcome, and Say we will take you with your
present grade and give you every consideration possible.
Senator DU Pos T. General, does that remark of yours apply to the
general officers of the militia Ž
Gen. WoOD. I would take everybody who is physically fit in order
to terminate this situation. There are a very few who would not
want to come in, I think. All the good ones would want to come—
PREPAIRED NIESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 69.
men like O'Ryan, who is a graduate of the War College. I find
in going about the country that the best militia officers, the Soldier
element in the militia, all want federalization of the militia, and
that the real difficulty in filling the militia up is due not to fear of
service but to the uncertainty of the militia status. They do not
know where they stand or what is going to happen in time of War.
They know that if war comes the chances are they will be turned
into Volunteers, or they will be disintegrated and absorbed into
different organizations, and the natural inclination of the man who
wants to be in a good organization is to Say, “I will wait and go into
the Volunteers when they are formed. I know where they stand.”
The CHAIRMAN. The statement was made here yesterday that in
the Spanish-American War only 33% per cent of the National Guard
was available for service as Volunteers.
Gen. WOOD. I could not give you those figures, but it is not the
fault of the officers or men; they are working under the greatest
handicap ; it is an impossible system. The men and officers have done
what men could under an impossible system. The Regular Army
itself would go to pieces under it. They know they can not be
used for foreign service, and consequently no man wants to belong to
an organization which can not go to war in the fullest sense of the
word.
The CHAIRMAN. The constitutional limitation as to the militia
makes them distinctively a State force?
Gen. WooD. Yes, sir; within the continental limits of the United
States. We tried, as you know, to prepare a bill, which involved,
among other things, a dual oath of allegiance, and a proviso for
drafting the militia into the Federal service as Volunteers, but its
constitutionality, as I remember it—you were present at some of
those meetings—was questioned, and the thing was dropped.
The CHAIRMAN. The Secretary of War, while admitting the in-
efficiency of the system—the National Guard system—nevertheless
proposes an increased appropriation on the theory that the men
trained in it would be available for service in case of trouble.
Gen. Wood. No man who refuses to go into the continental army
under the terms which are laid down can be depended upon for
service in war. If he wants service he will go into the continental
army.
The CHAIRMAN. You do not think the continental-army scheme
would result in the creation of a reserve?
Gen. Wood. I think it would, sir, if we followed the policy I have
suggested. Either take the militia in or absolutely drop the militia
and leave it as distinct as is the constabulary force of the State of
Pennsylvania. It would be fatal, I believe, to continue to pay the
militia and maintain it as a separate force and at the same time try
to build up the continental army. You are building up two groups
to struggle with each other.
The CHAIRMAN. You were speaking of remodeling the enlistment
laws so as to have two years with the colors and from two to four
years with the reserves?
Gen. Wood. Yes, sir. -
The CHAIRMAN. Have you ever figured how you would keep track
of the men who would go into the reserve after two years of service
with the colors?
*>.
70 PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
Gen. Wood. I think various schemes have been worked out, but
that is really a matter of detail. They are soldiers on furlough; you
might group them in United States marshals' districts, or you might
have them registered in congressional districts if you like. I do not
think there would be any difficulty in keeping track of them. The
Federal Government keeps track of us as individuals and pretty much
everything we own, and it certainly would be a very simple proposi-.
tion to keep track of these men. Of course, they would be under the
liability to punishment if they did not report and respond; they
would be soldiers on furlough. I believe we would have no trouble
in that, sir.
Senator DU Pont. General, do you not think that if there was no
pay, there might be trouble? .
Gen. WoOD. I think the pay will aid until we build up a sense of
general obligation for service to the Nation.
The CHAIRMAN. The country is so extensive in area that if a man
is discharged from the colors, say, at San Francisco he may go to
some distant part of the United States and be there when his services
were needed. How would you mobilize those men?
Gen. WooD. Each man would be assigned to his own organization.
Suppose he should become a reservist in San Francisco and is at-
tached to a battery at Monterey or San Francisco. That battery com-
mander should know who he is, what his qualifications are, his size,
and he should have his clothing with that battery, his military equip-
ment, and everything that is needed to put that man on a war foot-
ing, Supposing that man changes his residence and goes to New
York. He has to be assigned then to a battery in New York, and
certain of his equipment should follow him, unless an exchange
could be made with some one in New York. There would be some
cletails to work out. I do not think it is a difficult problem. All
nations do it, and we can.
The CHAIRMAN. It would certainly be easier to keep track of him
if he were paid a small annual salary?
Gen. WooD. Yes, sir; because he should report there every quar-
ter for pay, or every six months.
Senator DU PoWT. He would report to get his pay; then you would
know where he is. .
Gen. Wood. I think we would have no serious trouble. It is like the
laws affecting taxation; you would have a pretty hard time to escape
the vigilance of the tax collector by going to some remote place.
They would locate you pretty quickly; and to follow up your reserves
would not be a difficult thing to do.
Senator DU PoWT. Is it not a fact that a great many soldiers—it
used to be in my time, I do not know how it is now—enlist under
assumed names in the Army? -
Gen. WooD. Yes, sir; they do that, but not so much as they did, I
think. x
Senator DU Pont. You see, there is a difficulty. A man enlists as
John Smith, and his real name is something entirely different, and
he goes home, and it would be almost impossible to establish his
identity at a great distance unless he comes forward.
Gen. Wood. Of course, if there is no patriotic impulse—if these
fellows are simply skulkers—when they leave we shall be in trouble,
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 71
but I do not believe that will be the case. I think they will respond
and will come to the colors. One sees so much of that now. At New
York men were standing by thousands trying to get back, men
who were away beyond the reach of their country.
The CHAIRMAN. Those are reservists of other countries?
Gen. WooD. The reservists of other countries.
Mr. BECKHAM. Are they paid anything, General, as reservists?
Gen. WOOD. No; it is recognized over there that every man owes
a man's duty to his country, and he does not have to be especially
paid to discharge it. s
Senator WEEKs. What has been the experience of those countries
in getting back reservists?
Gen. WOOD. I could not give the figures, but a noncommissioned
officer in the Greek Army said that some 45,000 Greeks went back to
the Balkan War—that there was practically a complete return of their
reservists from this country.
Senator WEEKs. How were they notified ?
Gen. WOOD. They are notified simply by postal card from the con-
Sul general, who keeps the address. They are all registered in the
different consulates and the home government is kept informed.
Senator DU PONT. The same is true of the Italian Government?
Gen. WOOD. Yes, sir; they have gone home, ships packed with
them. 4%
Senator DU Pont. When the different classes are called to fight
they go home?
Senator CATRON. How do they get them registered over here?
Gen. Wood. They are all registered. I do not know just the details
of that. I imagine that is a proviso, one of the conditions, under
which they leave their own country, if they are reservists, because
they do not allow them to leave except with special permission of the
Government, and that would naturally carry with it some details as
to their residence and occupation and registration.
Senator THOMAs. I suppose it is a consular duty, too.
Gen. WooD. Yes, sir; they are all registered. We have had one
or two rather interesting instances under this dual-citizenship
proposition. A number of men have asked for their discharges on
the ground that they were reservists in other armies, and that if they
did not respond they forfeited all rights of inheritance to property.
This suggests the advisability of enrolling in our Army no one who
has not fully completed his citizenship.
The CHAIRMAN. Have you made any estimate as to the number of
those in the Army'
Gen. WoOD. It would be hard to tell, because we enlist anyone who
has taken out his first papers, made his declaration. There were
4,056 foreign-born white enlistments in 1915 (fiscal year).
The CHAIRMAN. Have you any idea how many reservists there were
of other countries in the United States?
Gen. WoOD. It would be only a guess. I think at the beginning of
the war, probably half a million. --
The CHAIRMAN. That is the continental armies?
Gen. WoOD. The German, French, and Italians; I think half a
million would be a very moderate estimate, because the Balkan States
collectively estimated that they sent back about 170,000 from this
72 PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
country in the first Balkan war. I think 500,000 would be a very
conservative statement for the collective group of reservists of the
great powers mentioned. - t
The CHAIRMAN. It would make a pretty good army to meet our
standing Army, would it not?
Gen. WOOD. It would certainly make a good one to meet our 19
reservists.
Mr. FLETCHER. Have most of them gone back, do you think,
General? .
Gen. WooD. I think so.
The CHAIRMAN. All that could get back? -
Gen. Wood. I think so. I think the Germans had a great deal of
trouble to get back as soon as sea control was lost.
The CHAIRMAN. Have you ever undertaken to figure out a plan and
put it in systematic form for the creation of a reserve? -
Gen. WOOD. Yes, sir; we have drawn up a number of those at the
War College. There were a number prepared when I was Chief of
Staff, and I think they have been improved upon and added to since.
The CHAIRMAN. Was this continental army scheme a part of any
of the general plans formulated by the War College?
Gen. WooD. No, sir; not to my knowledge. The War College plan
was for an adequate Army and an adequate reserve.
The CHAIRMAN. Composed of soldiers? .
Gen. WooD. Practically all our soldiers and marines.
The CHAIRMAN. How many go out of the Army by termination of
their enlistment each year?
Gen. WooD. Regular Army, 27,020 for the year 1915, ending June
30, or nearly 20 per cent. This number varies from year to year.
Then, again, there are discharges by purchase. In 1915 there were
3.149; in 1914, 2,396; and in 1913, 3,320.
Senator DU Pont. General, I notice from The Adjutant General’s
report that there were a number of recruits rejected on account of
illiteracy. I suppose by that they could not read and write?
Gen. WooD. Yes, sir; a good many do not understand English
unless you use the simplest phraseology and speak very slowly.
Senator DU Pont. Do you favor excluding a man from the Regular
Army because he can not read and write?
Gen. Wood. Yes, sir. They are excluded now, because there is so
much individual work it is necessary for a man to be able to read
and write. I think we might get some very good men who could
not, but I think generally we should keep out men who can not read
and write. -
The CHAIRMAN. What proportion of the enlisted men do you
estimate to be foreigners?
Gen. Wood. Theoretically, sir, they are all Americans. Those
who have taken out their first papers; but at a rough guess I should
say 14 per cent were men who had not fully completed their citizen-
ship. That is only a guess; you would have to check that up from
The Adjutant General’s statement. We do not know. They come
to us as American citizens if they have completed their first declara-
tion. - -
The CHAIRMAN. I do not suppose you have figured on the cost of
a continental army to the Government?
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 73
Gen. WooD. I have not had a chance to do that; no, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. Have you ever made any estimate as to what it
would cost to relieve men of their enlistment, or, rather, after men
had been discharged from the colors, then go into the reserves and
pay them what you suggest, $30 a year?
Gen. WooD. It depends, of course, wholly on the size of your
reserves. Say our home Army is going to be 160,000 men in the
home country, I think our reserves ought to be twice as strong as the
Regular Establishment to fill it up to war strength and keep up the
wastage for the first six months, 60 or 70 per cent, according to the
nature of the campaign. It is just a matter of multiplying your totals
by the cost per man. There is another charge; there is the cost of
bringing them every other year to the maneuvers to keep them in
touch with changes that have taken place, also cost of equipment
and arms. -
The CHAIRMAN. That would be a part of the system
Gen. WooD. Yes, sir; that ought to be part of the system.
The CHAIRMAN. It has been claimed by some that it is pretty hard
to recruit the Army up to even its present strength. -
Gen. WOOD. I think it is due to the present system of enlistment
under which a man is now serving. It is four years with the colors
and three with the reserves. You will remember that the drop in
enlistment was over 40 per cent in the first six weeks after this law
went into effect. The law was enacted against the strong advice of
the War Department and General Staff.
The CHAIRMAN. The men do not like a four-year enlistment?
Gen. WooD. No, sir; men want to serve under conditions under
which intelligence and aptitude and devotion to duty receive some
adequate recognition. That is, if you provide an enlistment act
under which a man can be furloughed into the reserve when he is
efficient I think you are going to See a tremendous drop in desertions,
you are going to see keener interest in the Service; men do not care
to go in for four years. You can say, I think, that the number of men
who come in of the desirable type is in an inverse ratio to the length
of the enlistment. Four years is a pretty long time for a man to
tie himself up. If there was a proviso that he could go into the
reserves as soon as he was efficient, if he was a decent sort of a man,
instead of deserting or buying out he would brace up and be rated as
an efficient soldier and get a transfer into the reserves and be through
with it. I think you would find a great many men of a desirable
type coming in. After this summer camp up at Plattsburg I think
it is conservative to say that 100 different men came to me and asked
if there was any way they could enlist in the regular service and be
discharged when they were efficient. These are men of the best type.
A man does not want to tie himself up too many years.
The CHAIRMAN. What length of time does it take to make an effi-
cient soldier with intensive training? 4.
Gen. Wood. It depends entirely on the intelligence of the man
and the number of hours you can give him; Working men as we did
last summer an average of nine hours a day of actual work—pretty
hard work—you can do it in six months. There are two kinds
of discipline. There is a discipline which is based on intelligence,
which is the best of all. That is where the man surrenders himself
233S()—PT 2—16 2
74 PREPARED NESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
Voluntarily and he is absolutely a willing soldier. And the other is
the discipline of habit. The discipline of intelligence is illustrated on
a ship when the first-class passengers go one by one into the boat; the
other kind of discipline, or the lack of it, is indicated by the mate
and the boatswain standing in the gangway with a belaying pin to
keep the steerage from herding in like sheep. You take intelligent
men, such men as came to camp last year—of course they were an
extraordinary lot—but the discipline of those men, and the order of .
the camp and the police and attention to duty, although they were
under no obligation excepting a gentleman’s agreement to play the
game, were perfect. They went ahead and did in 30 days as much
as we could hope to do in four or five months with our recruits under
favorable conditions. So that if you take six months with nine
hours a day, or say eight hours a day, under conditions that do not
involve gardening and many kinds of nonmilitary work, etc., as most
of our big posts do, it is simply a matter of mathematics. At the
average post a man does not get over two hours a day at the very
outside of pure military training of an intensive type throughout
the year. *
Senator DU Pont. That is on account of the tremendous number of
details of all kinds at the post? -
Gen. Wood. Yes, sir; absolutely tied up by hundreds of details.
The CHAIRMAN. Your plan for the creation of a reserve out of
men who go out of the Army contemplates the assembling of the men
once a year?
Gen. WooD. No, sir; I should say once every other year.
The CHAIRMAN. In camp &
Gen. WooD. In camps attached to regular troops; bring them in
for instruction. -
Senator DU Pont. For how long?
Gen. Wood. Ten days to two weeks.
Senator WEEKs. Take a man who has graduated from the colors
to the reserves; how much do you think would be the total cost of
maintaining that man as a reserve man if you paid him $30 a year,
provided his transportation to the place of rendezvous, to and from,
paid him the soldier's pay while he is at that place, and provided
him with arms and equipment?
Gen. WooD. Probably about $55 to $60 a year.
Senator WEEKs. Has that been carefully estimated?
Gen. Wood. No, sir; it depends. If he is living in a thickly settled
district, say, like Brooklyn or New York, where his rendezvous is
within an hour or an hour and a half, it would cost very little to as-
semble him. Living in a sparsely settled southern or western State
his transportation would be the principal item.
Senator WEEKs. I am trying to get at the average to see what a
reserve army of 300,000 men would cost.
Senator DU Pont. How would you make up that $55 or $60 a
Vea.I.' '
Gen. Wood. You would include the pay.
Senator WEEKs. That would be rather high, even including the
pay, would it not?
Gen. WooD. I think it is a liberal estimate. -
Senator CATRON. What would be the items that would go into i
$30 for pay?
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 75
Gen. WoOD. Thirty dollars for pay. We should bring the reservists
into camp every other year for two weeks. Duding this period he
would have his full pay. It would mean that the average yearly
pay would be one week's pay. This pay would depend upon his
grade. Probably it would be the base pay; that is to say, the lowest
pay for the grade. Assuming the average of this pay to be $20 per
month we should have to assume $10 for his two weeks' service every
other year at an average of $5 a year. To this would be added a
certain allowance for clothing, Wear and tear on equipment, and
transportation. I think it would be safe to assume that the total
cost would not be over $60 per man per year. Every effort should
be made to have the training camps so placed as to reduce trans-
portation to the lowest cost.
Some of the following figures are necessarily inaccurate, as we
have not the details necessary to Work them out:
800,000 reservists, at $30 per year------------------------------- $9,000, 000
150,000 having one-half month's training on full pay (averages $12
fol: Officers and men) ____ ___ 1, 800, 000
Rations 15 days, at 23 cents for 15,000--------------------------- * 517, 500
Medical Supplies (10 Cents per man per Clay, maintenance Of equip-
ment included) * 15,000
Wear and tear on equipment (personal) — - * 150, 000
Hire of animals and motor Vehicles— - - * 100,000
Forage, gasoline, etc.-------------- ~ * 20,000
Clothing------------------------ –––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 1, 500,000
Wear and tear On Camp equipage-------------------------------- * 100, 000
Small arms and Subcaliber ammunition, including blanks for
I'lláll] Cll VCTS - 300,000
Transportation, average 200 miles, at 2% cents, with 2 meals, at
50 cents for 150,000 --> -- - - *S25,000
Add 10 per cent for clerical work and contingencies - 1, 442, 750
Total estimte----------- - 15, 870, 250
The CHAIRMAN. Even if it costs $100 a year, it would be the cheap-
est form of reserve system that could be adopted, would it not ?
Gen. Wood. Yes, sir. It would be from 1 to 10 to keep a man with
the colors, at the very highest.
The CHAIRMAN. It would be cheaper than the proposed continental
plan, would it not?
Gen. WooD. I could not tell you about that, it is so vague; I have
not gotten the figures on it. We shall require reservists whether we
have the continental army or not.
Senator WEERs. Would it not be very much more than 1 to 6%
Would not the ratio be very much higher? For instance, we appro-
priated last year $100,000,000 for an army of 85,000 men, including
officers. That would seem to indicate that we spent something like
eleven or twelve hundred dollars per man.
Gen. Wood. While we had about 85,000 combatant troops, we had
about 102,000 men of all sorts who drew it. The Army averages up,
roughly speaking, a thousand dollars a man. Of course, that includes
barracks and quarters and certain other charges. But it is a thou-
Sand dollars a man, roughly. So, when I Say 1 to 10 we are con-
servative.
* This varies from tinue to time ; 23 cents is an average.
* These are estimates only ; exact figures can be known only after experiment.
76 PREPAREDNIESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
Senator WEERs. Do you think if we increase the Army the addi-
tional cost for barracks and other things would be any less"
Gen. Wood. I think it would be, if we assemble the troops in larger
posts or in cantonments, less per capita. f . * *
The CHAIRMAN. Secretary Garrison said yesterday the larger the
Army the less the per capita cost, because you do not increase the over-
head charges a great deal, and the cost of the Army is proportionately
reduced. -
Gen. WooD. That is right. -
Senator DU PoWT. Have you examined the continental Scheme as
proposed with the old Federal volunteer plan that was recommended
when Mr. Root was Secretary of War, some years ago?
Gen. Wood. And back of that by Henry Upton.
Senator DU PoWT. Yes.
Gen. Wood. Yes, sir.
Senator DU PoWT. It is analogous, is it not?
Gen. WooD. Yes, sir; only you know Upton’s strong ideas about
not depending in any Way upon the militia. tº
Senator DU Pont'. Yes. - -
The CHAIRMAN. General, in speaking of the militia of colonial
days, and the militia of 1812, and later, are we not apt to get that
confused with the present National Guard system' It is certainly
more efficient now than it was in those days?
Gen. WooD. Yes, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. Even under State control?
Gen. Wood. It is more efficient.
The CHAIRMAN. Yes.
Gen. WooD. But the difficulty is that you have got 48 little armies,
each under its own chief, who appoints the officers, and he has the
power of mustering them out when he likes.
Senator WEEKs. The officers are elected.
Gen. Wood. The governor eventually appoints them.
Senator WEEKs. Now they are elected.
Gen. WoOD. It is hard to imagine anything worse than the system
with regard to officers. The only fundamentally sound project
prior to your bill, Mr. Chairman, for general military service that I
know anything about—that is, that has any comprehensiveness and
would furnish a basis for real defense—was the plan recommended
by George Washington, on the recommendation of Knox, who rec-
ommended the classification and grouping of all men between 18
and 60 into three corps—the advance corps, as he called them, from
18 to 21, men in their eighteenth or nineteenth years to get 30 days'
training a year in camp, the men in the twentieth year to have 10;
the men between 21 and 45 to have 4 days a year in camp; and men
beyond 45 and below 60 would be a reserve for service behind the
line. Washington strongly indorsed the plan and Knox's letter of
transmittal emphasizing what everyone should recognize—that every
man who is fit and of proper age must render service. The bill
went to Congress with that strong recommendation of the President,
and there has, so far as I know, never been a bill of that scope since
until this bill under which you provide for general training has
COme tip.
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 77
The CHAIRMAN. General, great objection is made to universal mili-
tary training, but is it not a fact that we had compulsory military
training under the act of 1792?
Gen. WooD. We had it, but never really applied it.
The CHAIRMAN. Never enforced it?
Gen. WooD. We live under it to-day to the extent that all from
18 to 45 are liable for military duty. -
The CHAIRMAN. Wasn’t it repealed by the Dick bill?
Gen. Wood. No, sir. Not wholly; we are still liable to military
Service.
The CHAIRMAN. So that theoretically it has been in force since
1792 & -
Gen. Wood. What I wish to say, sir, is this, that we are all still
liable to military service. There seems to be no general appreciation
of this fact; certainly none as indicated by preparedness to discharge
such service effectively and efficiently. The various plans which have
been presented of late years are but makeshifts. The Regular Army
must be strong enough for the peace needs of the Nation; that is,
furnish the garrisons for our oversea possessions, a proper force
for coast-defense works at home, and what is most important an
adequate mobile force to protect these works in case of sudden emer-
gency and furnish a training nucleus for reserves and nuclei of
instruction for such Federal Militia or other force as we may have.
But the Regular Army and its reserves are only a small proportion
of the force which would be required. The question with which we
are particularly concerned is the raising, training, equipping, and
organizing of this great force of citizen soldiers. This can only be
done on the foundation of universal military training and an appre-
ciation of the fact that every man owes service to the country in some
capacity or other. e
Do you realize that we had a million and a quarter men, speaking
in round numbers, under arms North and South at the end of the
Civil War and that we had something over four million under arms
on both sides? We had no oversea enemies and were not menaced
by naval attack. Our population has practically trebled since the
Civil War and our seacoast population has fully kept pace with the
interior population. Our wealth along the Seacoast is probably ten
times greater than it was during the Civil War. Our possessions
reach almost to the coast of China in the Pacific and we have others
in the Caribbean.
In other words our military situation has entirely changed as have
our responsibilities and liabilities. We have become one of the group
of world powers. The troops necessary for support of our seacoast
fortifications and to prevent attacks by raiding parties such as could
be landed from fleets, say 10,000 or 15,000 men for a quick dash,
amounts to something over 28 divisions for our entire coast. Two-
thirds of these are on the Atlantic coast.
We have been engaged in the last year in a careful study of the
land defense of Seacoast cities. The problem is a tremendous one,
not only from the standpoint of magnitude of work to be done
in the way of building land defenses when the emergency arises, but
also the still more grave problem of finding men to man them, for
if we are threatened from the sea our whole coast has got to be under
78 PREPARED NESS FOR, NATIONAL DEFENSE.
the immediate observation and protection of reasonably adequate
forces. Back of these must stand field armies ready to strike in case
an attack develops in force. With a view to better studying these
conditions and giving those who will be charged in part with the
work of defense an idea of their responsibility, conferences have been
held with the various adjutants general and senior officers of the
National Guard. The result of these conferences has served to con-
vince even the most skeptical of the magnitude of the problem and
the absolute impossibility of meeting it with a force in any Way
adequate in case of sudden emergency. No nation could afford to
maintain a standing army or a subsidized body of troops equal to
the calls of emergency such as would confront this country in case of
war with a first-class organized power. The demands of the situation
can only be met by the adoption of the policy of general military
training.
Senator DU PONT. General, what is the minimum age at which a
man can be enlisted in the Regular Army' -
Gen. WooD. Thirty-five is the maximum age now. The minimum
age, I think, if he gets his parents’ consent, is 18.
Senator DU Pont. Is it not a fact that two-thirds of the men who
fought in the Civil War were under 21 years of age?
Gen. WOOD. A very large proportion, perhaps half of them.
The CHAIRMAN. Gen. Carter in his book states the number. I
think it was something over 2,000,000 between 16 and 21.
Senator DU PoWT. Would you favor taking in men, if they were
physically fit, under 18? $ *
Gen. Wood. No, sir. The Confederacy did, in their last draft.
They dropped to 17 years, but that was due to the dire necessity of
the situation. If we went to general military training on the Aus-
tralian or the Swiss system—I think the Australian is the better of the
two for us—we should be able to build up a large reserve of trained
men in a comparatively short time, for we have in round numbers
about a million of men reaching the age of 18 each year. Assuming
that 50.per cent of these men would be fit for national service, we
should have in round numbers 500,000 men a year. Under this plan
we should be able to establish a policy fixing the age of military obli-
gation from the eighteenth birthday to the twenty-fifth–seven years.
Men between these years would be liable to military service in case war
came. They would not be constantly in uniform, but would belong
to the group who would have to respond in case of war. This is the
age of physical best, of maximum resiliency, and of minimum de-
pendent and business responsibility. It is from men of this age that
armies are built up. These men would not be in uniform all the time,
but they would simply represent the group from which men would
be drawn in numbers needed in case of war. We could organize our
Federal militia or continental army, or whatever we call it, and
from which we would draw men as we might need them. This coun-
try has to call at least 2,000,000 men if it has a war, and it is perfect
folly to dicker with systems which give us anything else. A small
army is no deterrent to war and relatively costs much ; a trained
and organized citizenry will cost little and may prevent attack.
The CHAIRMAN. What would be the consequence of a large body
of volunteers with less than six months’ training going up against
a small army of well-trained troops?
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 79
Gen. WooD. It would mean sundry well-filled cemeteries and a
very disastrous defeat, probably. It would be murder of the men,
that is all, that you sent out.
The CHAIRMAN. That is what Washington said.
Gen. WooD. Yes; and Light Horse Harry Lee, in express terms.
Gen. Wood. Yes, General. Light Horse Harry Lee, of the Revolu-
tion, said, in effect, that a nation, which sent its men undiciplined
and untrained to meet equally good men trained and disciplined was
#.” murder. These words are as true to-day as they were when
uttered.
Senator THOMAs. Is not that the case in modern Warfare, no mat-
ter how well drilled the men are? Take, for instance, the charges
on the fronts in France of those two great armies. Is there any
difference between drilled and undrilled men when confronted with
a long row of machine guns? r
Gen. WoOD. The instructed men will be better under control and
know how to make use of cover better. They are all going to be hit
equally with the bullets in an open attack. But the trained men can
be controlled and maneuvered into positions giving them the advan-
tage, while untrained men can be controlled neither for attack nor
retreat. -
The CHAIRMAN. But an untrained army could not have resisted
Germany, probably?
Gen. Wood. They would never have known what hit them.
The CHAIRMAN. Nor could an untrained army have confronted
France?
Gen. Wood. No, sir. There is one other very important feature
of this subject of general training, which, even if we can not go at
once, as we should, to some plan of universal military training, I
think ought to be considered, and that is the provision of a corps of
reserve officers for our troops, whether they be Volunteers or whether
they be men coming to us as a result of national training. In the Civil
War the North had 127,000 officers. The southern records are incom-
plete, but it is safe to say they had 60,000 or 65,000, or, roughly,
187,000 commissioned officers during the war. We have, in round
numbers, 5,000 officers in the Regular Army and 8,000 in the militia.
We may draw a few of those, of course, for service with Volunteers, but
for every man we draw we have to fill in his place, so we have the con-
stant number of 45,000 officers for a million and a half men, and that
is a moderate estimate. These we ought to provide without any delay
whatever; go at it, and make a business of it. We have got the mate-
rial in part, under the Morrill Act, which was passed to meet a situa-
tion just such as would confront this country in case of war—absolute
shortage of officers. We established the land-grant agricultural col-
leges, with compulsory military training. At those colleges there are,
in round numbers, 30,000 students, under officers of the Regular
Army, active or retired. At the so-called military colleges, like
V. M.I., Pennsylvania State Military College, and many others, there
are about 10,000 students. We ought to coordinate instruction at
these institutions. I believe an interpretation of that act would
take into consideration the purpose for which it was written, and we
could insist on reasonable military instruction. At the nonmilitary
colleges, like Harvard, Yale, and Princeton—I cite those simply as

•
80 PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
types—there is an interest, such as this country has never known, in
military training. They are all establishing officers’ training units.
Harvard has a thousand men in training. Yale has just formed three
field batteries, and Wesleyan has just voted to establish an officers’
training-corps unit there; Bowdoin Wants to start it; Williams is
considering it a course. We could get from those colleges an unlim-
ited lot of material, and it is very fine material. .
As an illustration of what is being done at Harvard, they have
agreed to give credit toward a degree—full-course credit toward a
degree—to men who take a certain military course. They provide a
two-year course. There are 30 lectures a year by officers of the
Army and six days spent in the field on tactical walks. With that
course of lectures go field engineering and Surveying, topography,
chemistry as applied to explosives, economics as applied to war.
military history and policy, and one modern language.
In addition to this work in the regular courses in each of the two
years, and in addition to the 30 lectures and 6 tactical walks, each
man must take 2 instructions camps to be held under the direction of
the Regular Army and in conjunction with regular troops. The
result will be that each man will have had two years’ theoretical work
along lines closely allied to the military profession, plus 60 lectures,
12 days of tactical walks, and 2 periods of 5 weeks each in camp
under Regular officers and alongside Regular troops. This should
give us very good foundation training and fit these young men who
have done good work in the course for first and second lieutenants.
Senator WEERs. Explain what that credit would amount to in ob-
taining a degree.
Gen. WooD. Harvard has 15 or 16 courses,
Senator WEERs. Sixteen, I think.
Gen. WoOD. You can see how very conservative the university
has been, because these men are required to take two years of
very hard work and to give five weeks each summer for field train-
ing. In this five weeks’ field training, the way we handle these men,
there is no time lost. They are in uniform one hour after they get to
camp and they are at work in two hours. I mean that literally. We
give them more hours in that 30 days than they get in the National
Guard, as an average, in a 3-years’ enlistment. This is what that
intensive training means, and when you apply that to a college boy,
who comes there full of enthusiasm, you come pretty near getting
a fairly efficient reserve lieutenant. I have recommended that from
this group each year We select not less than a thousand and attach
them to the Regular Army as second lieutenants for a period of one
year in the various arms and staff corps. I would go even into the
Medical Corps—attach them to the Medical Corps—for instruction.
Senator DU PoWT. Would you pay them? -
Gen. Wood. I would pay them as second lieutenants, When a
man has had two years in college, two camps of intensive training,
and one year in the Regular Army he will be the best reserve officer
We have ever had, and he will be fit to be a captain or major of citi-
Zen troops. We are doing nothing with this material, but we have
a very good plan drawn up, which I hope will be adopted this
winter, which will provide for the use of these men. I expect to
have a minimum of 10,000 men who will pay their own expenses
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 81
in the military training camps we are to establish this summer.
They realize something ought to be done. `.
The CHAIRMAN. You can not rely on that permanently. That
would only last while the intense interest exists.
Gen. Wood.' That is true, but it shows how intense the interest is
IlOW.
The CHAIRMAN. Speaking of these land-grant colleges, in some of
the States they have very efficient regiments among the students.
Gen. Wood. Very good. -
The CHAIRMAN. But has the War Department ever taken any
steps to ascertain whether these land-grant colleges were performing
their military duty!
Gen. WooD. Yes, sir. They are inspected each year wherever there
are officers of the Army on duty. The main thing now—and the
land-grant colleges are Willing to do it—is to standardize the course.
Senator CATRON. Do you not have an officer of the Army with
them?
Gen. WooD. Yes, sir. But they vary just as they do in the teaching
profession. Some are better than others. There is an inspection
each year by a special board from the War College.
The CHAIRMAN. I wish you could tell the committee the necessities
for training in case of hostilities. I understand Upton says, for in-
stance, that we had the great spectacle of two great armies training
in the field and not being fit for service until two years of the war
had gone by. I would like to know what the effect of nontraining is.
Gen. Wood. In the Revolutionary War we started, of course, un-
der a pretty big handicap. But our force, strangely enough, was
strongest in 1776. Our force in 1776 was eighty-nine thousand and
some odd men—47,000 continentals and 42,000 militia or short-term
troops. Even the continentals were for pretty short terms. That
force dwindled every year. We did everything to keep it up. We
raised our bounties from $4 to $1,200. We offered freedom to negroes.
We did pretty much everything people could do to buy men to serve.
We ended the war in 1781 with a little over 29,000 troops of all
classes. The British forces in the meantime had doubled. So much
for the volunteer system in that war. Washington never had an
effective 20,000 men in the field at any one time, and, as he said in
his letters, if he had a small, effective force we would not have had
the humiliating spectacle of four or five thousand of the enemy's
troops holding impotent several million people. Or, as Washington,
stated : -
We should not have found Ourselves so weak as to be insulted by 5,000 men ;
* * * We should not have been the greater part of the War inferior to the
enemy, enduring frequently the mortification of seeing opportunities fo ruin
them pass unimproved for want of a force which the country was completely
able to afford, and of seeing the country ravaged, our towns burned, our inliabit-
ants plundered and murdered with impunity for the same cause.
Senator WEEKs. Is it not true that the efficiency of the individuals
was as good then as any time? Many men had been in the Indian
wars and could shoot.
Gen. WooD. Far better than now. To-day hardly one man in a
thousand knows how to use effectively the high-power rifle. In the
war of 1812–14 we depended principally upon volunteers. We put
527,000 men in the field. The largest British force was 16,800. We
82 PREPAREDIN ESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
were defeated in the great majority of actions. The small nucleus
of regulars gave us a draw at Lundy’s Lane. We had minor suc-
cesses on the Thames and elsewhere, and two weeks after the termi-
nation of the war won the battle of New Orleans. The Navy covered
itself with credit because the Federal Government had never in-
trusted to the States the power of raising a navy. Consequently they
had a disciplined and well-organized force. In 1812 we went to the
bounty again. That was the evil child of the Revolution. It has
done more to debauch American patriotism than anything else. We
went into the Mexican War, where, of course, we met an inferior
enemy, and won hands down, due partly to the fact that we had our
troops far enough away from home to keep them away from political
influences. They were too far away to keep in touch with local
influence.
Senator DU Pont. No telegrams?
Gen. WooD. No telegrams. In the Civil War, as Col. du Pont
knows a great deal better than I, we went at once to the volunteer
system. The Confederacy fought the war as a nation; we fought it
as a confederacy. The Confederacy appointed its own officers and
allowed the States no special privileges in that direction; but they
went to the draft in April, 1862, and drafted those between 18 and 35.
A little time afterwards they raised the age to 45, and later from
17 to 50. We went to the draft in August, 1862, and the general draft
in 1863. We had to bring troops from the front to repossess our-
Selves of New York, and there were riots in many places. I do
not think you need to more than point out that condition to under-
stand what would have happened if 150,000 good troops had landed
anywhere on our shores. They would have gone through our forces
of that day at will. There is a great deal of nonsense in the press,
and a great deal of ignorance on the part of writers, to the effect
that troops can not be moved overseas. It would be very interesting
to get the statement of Lieut. Commander Jessop, of the Navy, who
was at Alexandria when the British allied army of 120,000 men came
in in 98 ships. They landed quickly and easily, rested their men for
two weeks, went off so quietly that no one noticed it; and here is the
point, ignorant people always tell you that no one could land on our
shores; that a million patriots would lock arms and push them into
the sea, and so on. But they landed at Gallipoli, where the beaches
are few and far between, where there was barbed wire under the
Water and a most intense resistance. They landed and stayed there
for five or six months. So much for that proposition. There is no
better way of moving troops than by sea. Our Navy is about fourth
now. There is no reason to suppose we will hold the sea, and troops
can be moved here very quickly, and you could not improvise troops
to meet disciplined troops. It is impossible to do it. If you can not
do anything else, increase our Regular Army to the extent requested,
get an adequate reserve, a proper enlistment act, and the reserves
supplies and munitions of War, and build up our officers’ corps. If
you do this, We shall have increased our efficiency two to three hun-
dred per cent, and this requires no constitutional change. But you
can, I believe, bring all that is worth keeping of the militia into this
continental army if you say, “Gentlemen, the doors are open for you
to come. If you do not come, there is no money or further help.” I
do not see how any man who is a soldier can object to those terms.
PREPAREDNIESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 83
The CHAIRMAN. If they had had a military policy during the
Revolution and these subsequent wars, is it not your opinion and
pretty generally the opinion of experts that all of those wars would
have been concluded in half the time?
Gen. WooD. Yes, sir. If the policy of Knox and Gen. Washington
had been approved, the chances are we would have had no War of
1812; and if we had had it, we would have held Canada after a short
campaign. If we had had that policy the Civil War would have been
impossible. The uprising would have been crushed in the bud.
There is only one time in all military history when we have been
prepared for War, and that was at the end of the Civil War, and the
diplomatic correspondence with the Emperor Napoleon was very
brief. He was told to withdraw his troops, and he did so, and that
was because We had force behind our Words.
The CHAIRMAN. But they claim that the armies would be so ex-
hausted now that there would not be any possibility of their waging
war anywhere else.
Gen. Wood. There is no greater mistake ever made than that.
Take the case of Holland after her 40 years' War for independence,
terminating in 1692. A great French minister writing a few years
later said, “Holland’s ships of commerce exceed ours 6 to 1. She
only lost her control when she turned to commerce’ and neglected her
army and navy. Take the case of Spain after 800 years constant
fighting with the Moors. The next 165 years she was conquering
and Christianizing the whole world. Whoever comes out as a winner
in this war is going to be so much stronger than when they went in
that there is going to be no comparison. There is going to be no
diminution in the total population of Europe. There will be an in-
crease. We are going to have nearly all the gold, but it is not going
to be worth much for defense unless we stiffen it with a little iron.
The CHAIRMAN. The Bulgarian Army is an example of resistance
after several years. - -
Gen. WooD. War is a great misfortune, but it doesn’t always de-
stroy a country or make it weaker. Take the history of certain
European countries—Prussia, for instance, in the days of Frederick.
Long periods of war, and out of each he came stronger. It’s a
strange thing, but nations are swept away not by War alone but more
frequently by the degeneration, moral and physical, which follows
long periods of peace, with attendant money-getting and gradual
neglect of national rights and needs, accompanied by an indisposition
to service. It is frequently stated that a certain great power (whose
name and whereabouts I will not refer to) is bankrupt and unable
to wage war. Such a statement is unwarranted. She may be bank-
rupt in a certain sense, but the munitions of war have been bought
and both her army and navy are ready with great reserves. This is
the condition in many instances. Nations pay a considerable portion
of the cost of war in preparation, and where service is obligatory
war can be initiated and carried on at comparatively little cost.
There is nothing in the present situation anywhere which justifies
the belief that we can look for safety because of the Weakness of
other people. - &
Senator FLETCHER. Have you any idea of the numbér of lives al-
ready lost and men crippled and maimed? .
84 PR.EPARED NIESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
Gen. Wood. That has been very dreadful, but you will probably
find that more male children have been born during this period than
men have been killed, and you will also find that the munitions of
War are being piled up in enormous quantities. We have until very
recently been of little importance in the matter of supplying fighting
tools such as rifles, time fuzes, cannon, etc. We have supplied enor-
mous quantities of general supplies, such as foodstuffs, leather,
cotton, etc. We are able to put out any amount of powder, thanks
to Well organized private enterprise, but until very recently our total
output of rifles for the whole country was about 3,200 a day. Our
capacity to make time fuzes for high explosive shell and shrapnel has
been very limited, but it will soon be greatly increased. Practically
speaking, prices have had no top limit. We have had one and a half
years of peace, we are receiving $30 and upward for a gun that did
not cost over $12; in other words, we have had every stimulus to put
out large quantities of material, but owing to lack of systematic
organization of our industries we have not up to date been able to
meet, except to a small extent, the demands upon us. This failure
should be one of the great lessons of the War and should lead us to
reverse our policy and not attempt to spend 90 per cent of our money
in our arsenals for certain important supplies, but to establish and
maintain through reasonable orders nuclei plants in as many large
establishments as practicable. The present policy is folly and means
that we shall be unable to meet the demands of expansion in case of
emergency, for you can not have trained Workmen unless you have
plants running. .
The CHAIRMAN. In other Words, you do not believe in the doctrine
of the Government manufacturing its own supplies?
Gen. WooD. I think that means absolute deterioration in quality
and capacity of machinery. It takes away all competition. We will
not have the men to do the work when the great expansion has to be
made in a hurry. We ought to keep the nuclei plants at Work in all
these establishments in order to justify them in keeping them up
and keeping a few skilled Workmen.
Senator FLETCHER. The suggestion, then, is that the private plants
could be completed. ---
Gen. Wood. If you keep a little nucleus plant and a few skilled
workmen, you can do that. Take the making of time fuses as an
illustration. The men who took those contracts found that there were
very few in the country who knew how to do the work. A number of
ordnance officers have resigned from the Army. Those men simply
had to have them, that is all. They had to pay whatever the men
wanted. They are developing men now. You must keep your
nuclei plants if you are going to be prepared for trouble. I think
the wise thing would be to build those plants, some of them at least,
in the far West, beyond the Mississippi. I remember years ago a
foreign officer speaking of what he called our vital area. He said,
“Start a line at Boston, run around Watertown and Springfield, and
then come down in Schwab's place and out at Baltimore, and you
have 90 per cent of all our arms-making, cannon-making, and powder
establishments, and most of them are right on the Water—a dan-
gerous situation.” There is another thing. Practically all your
nitrates come from Chile. There is only one plant in this country
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 85
for the manufacture of nitrogen from the air. All your nitrogen
comes from South America.
Senator BECKHAM. Where is that one nitrate factory in this
country?
Gen. WOOD. Up somewhere near Niagara.
The CHAIRMAN. It is in Canada, I believe.
Gen. WooD. I think it is on our side.
Senator FLETCHER. It is just the other side, I think.
Gen. WOOD. That may be, but it is a subject we ought to look into.
Senator WEEKs. That is being looked into; the manufacture of
nitrogen. -
Gen. WOOD. That may be, but I mean it is a question the Govern-
ment ought to take a pretty active interest in, because without sea
control we would be out of business right away, so far as nitrates go.
The CHAIRMAN. Nitrates that come from South America come in
foreign bottoms, do they not? -
Gen. WooD. They do.
Senator FLETCHER. What would you regard as a proper peace
footing for the Army &
Gen. WooD. About 220,000 men home and abroad. That means ap-
proximately 18,000 in Hawaii, the same in the Philippines, and about
15,000 in Panama. The reasons for those figures are that the hold-
ing of those places is really in the last analysis a matter of sea power,
and all We can expect to keep there in the Way of a garrison is a
force big enough to resist a landing from a fleet of perhaps 10,000
or 12,000 men on a raiding expedition. Of course, if the enemy gets
full possession of those Waters, he can move as many men as he
wants. We do not think it is worth while putting a huge garrison
in those places. I should say Hawaii should have 18,000 to 20,000
equipped troops, with ample reserve supplies for a year. With that
force we can hold it for a year against anything they can bring. If
they do not get relief in a year, it means we have lost sea control and
the game is up.
Senator BECKHAM. In your report recommending an increase to
something like 210,000 men you think that would be a sufficient
military increase without the continental army? -
Gen. WooD. No; that is the Regular Army. When you get your
reserves established behind that force and your general-service plan
in force, then you can begin to prepare your Regular Army, because
you have something to fall back on. You will have to keep your big
corps of officers as instructors. But until you get some system of
general training you must have that force in order to do anything,
and that force ought to be assembled in cantonments, in part at least.
Senator BECKHAM. What would be the approximate cost of this
increase you recommend?
Gen. WooD. I shall have to put that information in the record
later; it would carry so many things with it, like artillery and other
things. It would run up pretty heavily. We have been running very
close to the bottom on everything. When you move forward and
equip, say, 110,000 additional men with artillery and supplies, it runs
into the many millions.
In 1912 I caused to be prepared an exhaustive study of the cost of
maintenance of the Army for five years, based on the approximate
86 PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
cost of enlistment, equipment, support, and maintenance of the per-
Sonnel of the Army in every character, including muster, pay, sub-
Sistence, transportation by land and water, the purchase and repair
of ships, boats, and other vessels required for the transportation of
troops and Supplies, and for official, military, and garrison purposes,
for expenses of Sailing public transports and other vessels, clothing
and quartermaster supplies, ordnance stores and ordnance equipment,
the manufacture of small arms and ammunition, rifle practice, medi.
cal and hospital supplies and treatment, signal service and aero-
lautics, every contingent expenditure connected with the military
establishment, the maintenance of the War College, Army Medical
School and Library, Service and garrison schools, pay of cadets and
current and miscellaneous expenses of the Military Academy, and the
upkeep of the grounds and buildings of the military establishment
and Military Academy.
The average cost per man for the year 1912 was $1,018.81. Of the
items entering into the cost there are some, such as rations, pay,
clothing, etc., which are fixed; there are some which would not
increase at all with the increased force proposed, and others which
would not increase proportionately. A calculation based on these
considerations makes it reasonable to believe that the per capita cost
for the increase of 110,000 men proposed would not exceed $900 per
annum, or, in round numbers, $100,000,000 additional appropriation
per year. I believe it will be less; if the troops are stationed in can-
tonments by divisions, as they should be, it will certainly be consid-
erably less, but data for an accurate estimate as to how much less is
not at hand.
The CHAIRMAN. You know, General, the Sentiment in this country
generally is against the maintenance of a large standing army. In
a democracy the people have to regulate this thing,
Gen. WooD. Absolutely.
The CHAIRMAN. In my opinion, what we want to do is to get what
will do the work and at the same time meet the approval of the people.
Otherwise, the whole thing falls. -
Gen. WooD. I think you have to drive home that principle of gen-
eral military obligation and general military training. I think that
is the basis of the whole thing. Once you get that basis you can
bring your Regular Army down to a pretty small limit. We want
an Army sufficient for the everyday police work of the Nation. We
should establish a condition under which the greatest possible number
of men are trained, and once trained, return to their normal occupa-
tions, and only enough men maintained with the colors for the every-
day needs of the Nation, no more. There is nothing which savors of
militarism, but only a condition of normal, rational preparedness.
Then you will be able to keep the smallest practical number with
the colors. You will have a reserve behind you of trained people,
like the Swiss. As an illustration of the value of a reserve, our In-
fantry regiments on the border are now each about 1,000 short, or
less than half strength. If we had a reserve, this condition would not
be so alarming, as the regiments could be promptly filled with traine
men, which can not be done to-day. -
Senator FLETCHER. I have seen it stated that the peace footing of
the French Army was 768,300. Does that mean the regular army?
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 87
Gen. WoOD. Yes, sir; they have to keep on a rather different foot-
ing than we do. They virtually have ready always a force strong
enough to meet a quick rush, such as they met a year ago. *
Senator FLETCHER. It was also stated that the peace footing of
the German Army was 751,000 officers and men. That means their
regular army' -
Gen. Wood. Their regular establishment; yes, sir. They have a
small force separate from that in both countries, which is known
as their colonial force, but that is comparatively only a handful of
men. Their standing, of course, is really always under the cloud of
possible War, and they complete practically the training of their men
in about eight months. That is, a man is supposed to be ready for
the large maneuvers.
Senator FLETCHER. They have a three-year enlistment in France.
Gen. WOOD. They saw this war coming; they were getting ready
for the inevitable; and they passed the three-year act to give them
one increment more with the colors, but they considered it a misfor-
tune and only went to it reluctantly. Two years is their basic period.
The CHAIRMAN. General, with the present military establishment,
what would you do if you in an emergency had to organize an army
of 500,000 men? -
Gen. WoOD. It would be a good deal like putting a man on the edge
of a forest and telling him to assemble materials, make tools, in part
at least, and build a house. He would have to start at the bottom of
things. To build up a force of 500,000 men which would be effective,
we would have to increase the Infantry, Field Artillery, Coast Artil-
lery, Engineers, and certain other troops of the Regular Army, and
at the same time start in under a system of intensive training to train
additional numbers needed to bring us up to the 500,000; while we
are doing this, we should have to start a special training course for
officers. Our arsenals would have to begin to produce supplies, re-
serves of ammunition, and our supply department to provide for the
clothing and various other articles, and it would be an extremely
difficult thing to accomplish, because we should be confronted by
shortages on practically all sides. If the people respond in this mat-
ter, it would take at least six months to get the men together and the
officers in such condition that they would be militarily efficient. This
is assuming that we secured all the available trained material in the
country, and that it comes to us filled with enthusiasm and devotes
not less than eight or nine hours a day to work. But it also assumes
that we are not molested during this period by an attack from without.
The CHAIRMAN. Not sooner than that?
Gen. WOOD. Not sooner than that to be efficient. We should have
to call, just as we did in the Civil War, a great number of men to
the colors, pick out the most likely men as officers, and carry on while
conducting the War the training of an army, just as Upton described
conditions in the Civil War. It would be almost impossible to do it. ,
Senator MYERS. Is there any more reason for this increase now
than there was a year ago? r -
Gen. WOOD. Yes; I should say there is. I think the developments
of the last year, both South of us and abroad, have indicated the de-
sirability of a little better peace insurance. There is nothing con-
Crete, of course. But we are a good deal like a ship that is on an
88 PREPARED NESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
ocean and wireless alarms of typhoons are coming in from all direc-
tions. We do not know when one is going to hit us. We know this,
that if one does hit us we have not in any single particular—I make
no exception whatever—adequate reserve materials for the first force
we should have to call. We have about 700,000 Springfield rifles.
We also have some three hundred and odd thousand IKrags. That
is all we have. We ought to have behind us to-day at least one addi-
tional rifle for each man. That is the minimum. The French esti-
niate two. The capacity of this country for the manufacture of arms
if war came on now would be vastly increased over what it was a year
ago. This capacity will increase incident to the orders for arms from
abroad and probably the end of April we shall be up to 7,000 or 8,000
a day. We are very short of field artillery and field artillery ammu-
nition, alarmingly short of both, and if we should suddenly become in-
volved in war we should be absolutely without a reasonable supply of
either artillery guns or ammunition. Soldiers to-day without adequate
artillery are as helpless as a lot of men armed with butcher knives.
As for the new heavy mobile guns, we have not a single one in the
|United States. The condition with reference to field artillery and
of all types of field-artillery ammunition is a cause for grave alarm.
This has been repeatedly reported during the last few years.
Senator MYERs. You were speaking of the facility with which for-
eign troops could be brought across the ocean and landed in this
country. What do you think of mines and submarines?
Gen. Wood. The Gallipoli Peninsula was surrounded by subma-
rines, the sea was mined, and the ocean for some distance out was
full of barbed wire, but they landed, nevertheless. There is nothing
that has ever been done that has done other than to make War more
difficult. There has never anything been done to stop it, and never
will be until man changes.
The CHAIRMAN. Of course, you take our Navy into consideration?
Gen. WooD. You have a good Navy, as far as it goes. It stands
about fourth.
Senator MYERs. What others are ahead of it?
Gen. WooD. The navies of Germany and England, and probably
France and Japan. In ships fully manned to take the sea both of
these last are. .
Senator THOMAs. How long has that status existed?
Gen. WoOD. I think the Japanese status is just about being estab-
lished. The German status has been existing for some time, and they
have been building ships rapidly during the war.
Senator THOMAs. I saw an account yesterday to the effect that
since the outbreak of the War, which is less than two years ago,
Great Britain has built 12 dreadnaughts. I have been told and have
listened to statements made in my presence that it required three
or four or five years to build a modern dreadnaught, and I am unable
to understand how that jibes with the other statement on the subject.
Gen. WOOD. Great Britain turns out a completed ship, absolutely
equipped, in eight or nine months after she lays the keel plate. From
the time the War broke out until the 31st of last December Great
Britain put overboard new ships to more than the entire equivalent
of our Navy. We do not know what she has built in the way of sub-
marines. She has built an enormous fleet of destroyers.
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 89.
Senator THOMAs. There seems to be some error about the assump-
tion that it requires so long to build a battleship. -
Gen. WooD. I do not know why we do not build more rapidly, but
I think we have never done it much under three years. I think our
time is 32 or 33 months for one ship, but Great Britain builds well
within a year a completed ship.
Senator THOMAs. One of the assertions used for no preparedness
is that if we lay the keels for battleships at the present time it would
take from three to four or five years to complete them.
Gen. WooD. That means industrial inefficiency, if that is the case.
Senator THOMAs. You made a statement, General, a few minutes
ago that I was interested in. I do not know that I got the figures
correctly. The statement had reference to the number of ships and
the number of troops, with their equipment, that landed at a certain
point.
Gen. WooD. Ninety-eight ships with 120,000 men were the figures
given to me by Lieut. Commander Jessop, of the Navy.
Senator THOMAs. Was that one convoy or a number of them?
Gen. WooD. They came in practically as one big convoy.
Senator THOMAs. That included equipment and tents and horses,
etc.?
Gen. WooD. It included everything they had. It was a complete
expedition. But you know they have some enormous ships. Take
the Aguitamia. She can take 10,000 or 12,000 men. I remember that
because of a series of articles that appeared in the New York Evening
Post recently.
Senator THOMAS. I read those articles very carefully, and your
statement is in keeping with the statements contained therein.
The CHAIRMAN. Very careful estimates have been made by expert
Army men as to the ability to land troops in this country. Those
estimates are based on the tonnage of vessels?
Gen. WooD. Yes, sir.
Senator FLETCHER. Gen. Wood, have you spoken of coast defense?
Gen. WoOD. I think in coast defense we are probably ahead of any-
one else, but coast defense without mobile troops is fatally weak.
It is a fort that is open behind. You have heard a good deal lately
about the inefficiency of our coast defenses, as though the guns were
poor. The guns are all right. The real thing is the carriage. The
carriage we have had for a long time. Take the 12-inch gun with
the disappearing carriage, which was admirable when it was designed.
It is not satisfactory now, because it does not permit of sufficient
elevation to give the gun all its effective range. That carriage gave a
depression of 5°, an elevation of 10, and a range with a 1,076 pound
projectile of 14,600 yards. That gun with an elevation of 45° with
the same projectile got a range of 34,000 yards, and it would pierce
Over 6 inches of steel over 20,000 yards. So it is not the gun. What
We have to do is to remodel our carriages. All this talk about the
Queen Elizabeth coming in at Rockaway Beach and reaching Sev-
enteenth Street is true. We can not reach her. We used to think
that a ship's gun could not be given more than 14° elevation. We
know now that the German and English are carrying 26° of elevation
On their battleships, and they are sinking ships at over 17,000 yards.
233S0—PT 2—16 8
90 PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
So it is just a jump from one thing to another. I suppose it will go
on as long as man invents and thinks.
The CHAIRMAN. Are there any other Senators on the committee
who want to ask Gen. Wood any questions? Senator Warren, do you
wish to ask any questions?
Senator WARREN. Nothing now, sir.
Senator CATRON. What proportion of the men in the Army reenlist
when their terms expire?
Gen. WooD. I should say about 20 per cent. I have the figures
right here. I will put them in my answer. It depends, Senator, al-
most altogether on the conditions outside. High wages have a big
effect on reenlistments. The only men who really come back to us
right along are the noncommissioned officers and highly paid special-
ists like the electricians and the men who get specially high pay.
Senator CATRON. The President recommends a continental army of
400,000 men. How would you go about getting those men, taking
into consideration that 20 per cent of your men reenlist in the Regu-
lar Army and the others are discharged and they go into the reserves?
Gen. WOOD. My own idea would be to go right frankly to the sys-
tem of general training and make us all take our period of service.
The CHAIRMAN. Rich and poor alike?
Gen. WooD. Yes.
Senator CATRON. You would make the entire people of the United
‘States between certain ages subject to military duty 2
Gen. WooD. Yes; but I do not mean by this that all who are under
an obligation for military service would necessarily be in the firing
line. Some would be on the line of communications, others might
be engaged in railway transport, others in munitions plants, certain
expert classes of men should be doing what they can best do. It
might not be advisable to take experts in the manufacture of muni-
tions and put them into the ranks, or experts in transportation, but
somewhere in the military establishment they will have their proper
place. If we have not that system, then all we can do is to ask for
volunteers and assemble our mean in large training camps and start
an intensive system of training and complete that 400,000 men just
as quickly as possible. That would be the natural thing to do.
Senator CATRON. When peace occurs in Europe you will not be
able to get those men? k
Gen. WooD. There will be a certain amount of reaction and
diminution of interest naturally. With reference to training our
men, I believe we should make our training period for six months
straight rather than break it into three yearly periods of two months
each. An officer might be able to come for a period of two months
for several years, or a man who purposed to be an officer, but the
Haboring men, the mechanic, and the farmer, it would be difficult
for them to get away for two months each year, retaining their posi-
tion. We can give them much more effective training by holding
them for six months and laying out a rather progressive course
covering that period. If the work is conducted as are our camps
for intensive training under officers of the Army and alongside
Regular troops we can train a man of ordinary intelligence reason-
ably well in six months.
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 91
Senator CATRON. Your men are constantly being discharged and
others brought into the regiments. How long does it take you to
put one of those new recruits into condition along with other men?
Gen. WoOD. That man is, under the best instructions, fairly effi-
cient in four or five months. It depends entirely on the man’s
intelligence. We will assume that he is an average man. Then
it depends to a certain extent on his condition of service. If
he is serving at a post where the officer is a pure military type
and, where there is no gardening or agricultural work to be done,
he will get a good many hours of work into that fellow per day. If
he is at one of our big posts, where there are enormous grounds to
be kept up, it would take longer. We started three years ago an
experiment. We took a company of Infantry, a troop of Cavalry,
and a battery of Field Artillery, and we transferred all the men in
them to other organizations excepting the officers and the noncom-
missioned officers. Then the Secretary of War directed that that
company be filled up with men who had had no previous military
training of any kind, men not selected, the only condition being
that they never should have had any previous military training
of any kind. At the end of the year that company of Infantry led
its regiment in shooting.
Senator CATRON. That was the company in which all the members
were raw Ż
Gen. Wood. Yes; and it was the best company at the end of the
year in every particular. It had more desertions, of course, because
all of the recruits of that regiment that year went to that company.
I had the company out in the field for a month. It was a most ex-
traordinarily good company. The officer who commanded it said, “I
never want to go to an old company again. This is work.” Then
we took the Cavalry troop. That troop was ordered out to Colorado
in connection with the strike troubles about six months after it was
gotten together. The field inspector said such and such troops of
this regiment incident to detached service, etc., do not show the de-
gree of efficiency in field training, etc., that they should, with the
exception of new troops. I went down to Fort Sill. I am not an
expert artillerist, but I know something about the organization of
the Field Battery and its work. There was a regiment of Field
Artillery there. We turned out the new battery and started in
with the morning’s work at the stables and went right through.
The battery was taken through various classes of work. It was
a well-instructed battery, ready for the field, and its appearance was
highly creditable. These three experiments show what can be ac-
complished when the men are assigned so that systematic Work can
be done. They also show very conclusively that effective organiza-
tions could be made in a year. While intensive training is not em-
ployed in these organizations to the extent it could have been and
the standards of efficiency to which they have attained could prob-
ably have been attained in six months of intensive work in camp.
Senator WARREN. I suppose these men were put on their metal
and knew that they were not to receive extra pay, etc.? -
Gen. Wood. They were, sir. They were simply ordinary troops.
It is just as though you and I start out to do a thing and every day
92 PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
there is a little new feature added. It was progressive Work and
kept them keen. Under the old system you turn out a company of
60 men. Forty-five of them are reenlisted men, men who are drilled.
They go through practically the same work the new men are doing.
It is as though you were teaching a class of men in mathematics,
where vacancies were appearing only through death. If you took a
new class every three months and put them through that course there
would be some zest to it, Some go. -
Senator CATRON. Do you think, General, that if you were to make
double the number of regiments that you have with your 210,000
men and have them half the normal size and fill them up when the
emergency came, that the other half you put in could be made
efficient in four months?
Gen. Wood. They would be reasonably proficient, but they would
not be very good troops. The trouble with trusting that sort of troop
is that under modern Warfare the blow comes so suddenly. In think-
ing of troops you have to think in units of divisions and of time in
elements of days to get ready. That is the thing that is worrying us
soldier people. We know that you expect us to do the impossible
when the time comes, and We can not do it.
Senator BECKHAM. General, you, of course, as a general Scheme
of preparation favor universal training?
Gen. WooD. Yes, sir.
Senator BECKHAM. Leaving that aside, assuming that can not be
taken up in this Congress, what is the next best thing to do? Do
you think this continental army plan is a feasible thing? .
Gen. WOOD. Give us all you can give us in the Regular Army.
Give us an enlistment act which makes the reserve possible instead of
one which discourages.
Senator BECKHAM. You would have a reserve system in the Regu-
lar Army and also in the continental army?
Gen. WoOD. I would say that the first thing we want is a proper
enlistment act, which your bill carries. It is a good one. Give us
all the increase in the Regular Army you can give us, especially in
Field Artillery and Infantry, and replace the Coast Artillery re-
quired for foreign Service with enough to man the mine fields and
one-half the guns at home. Give us authority and money to develop
our reserve officer corps to 45,000 officers—that is vital—and a good
reserve of material. Heavy mobile Artillery is of especially im-
portance; air craft, as well. When you have done those things,
which do not require anything in the way of constitutional amend-
ments, we shall have trebled our present efficiency Let us go ahead
simultaneously with the above and take the militia into the conti-
mental army under conditions which place it absolutely and com-
pletely under Federal control, cutting off money and supplies and
that portion of the militia which does not come into the Federal
Service. Give the militia not only a chance to come into the conti-
nental army but urge them to do it. If they do not come, the failure
to do so rests with them. We should take all of them we can get, and
With this force as a nucleus, proceed to develop as rapidly as possible
our Federal force. But this force should be in every way absolutely
distinct from the State militia.
Senator BECKHAM. Then, in addition to these increases in the
Regular Army Establishment, you believe the suggestion made in the
PREPAREDNIESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 93
recommendation of the Secretary of War for a continental army is
the next best thing?
Gen. WooD. ‘Provided you can divorce it from the militia.
Senator BECRHAM. Does not his scheme do that?
Gen. WooD. No; it leaves the militia and gives the militia more
money, but it opens the door to the militia to come in.
Senator BECKHAM. If it “will not take too long will you kindly
explain how England has raised her army without conscriptions?
Gen. WooD. She has, of course, gone to every known expedient for
volunteers, and her volunteer spirit has been stimulated by oc-
casional raids and attacks on the coast which have interested people
and made them a little more alive to the situation, but England has
had a perfectly pathetic time with her troops. She has now prob-
ably a million and a half men waiting for equipment who are trained.
She has had to develop her officers right out of the boys’ schools and
colleges. An Englishman wrote to me not long since—his son had
been killed in Flanders—and said, “It was bad enough to have lost
the boy, but neither he nor his mates had a sporting chance; they
were not trained.” They had to send their men hastily trained be-
cause no preparations had been made in advance. Especially was
the shortage of officers felt and especially did this cripple efficiency.
Fortunately their navy was able to keep the attack off their coast
while they were preparing. If our Navy should be unable to hold the
sea securely and hold it for at least a year while We trained men
and manufactured supplies, we would have to develop our Army .
with an enemy's force on our shores and in all probability a highly
organized force knowing exactly what they had come to accomplish
and equipped to accomplish it. Our chance of successfully meeting
such a situation would be very small.
The CHAIRMAN. Some who oppose universal military training claim
that that would seriously cripple our industrial life. That is, take a
young man from the factory or the industrial life generally and re-
quire him to contribute a year of his time to the military Service, and
to that extent you cripple his capacity, his efficiency. Is that a correct
view to take of it? -
Gen. WooD. In my opinion, and I think it is the opinion of all
students of economics throughout the world, the efficiency of military
training in the great European armies is never put at less than 15
per cent, and it runs from 15 to 30.
The CHAIRMAN. In Germany it is claimed that it increases the
efficiency. -
Gen. WOOD. It is an absolute increase in efficiency, and there is also
a great increase in morality. The murder rate in this country, which
is the heaviest of any Christian country in the world, is 124 per
million, as against about 12 in Switzerland and 14 in Germany and
France in normal times. In Australia, a labor government and labor-
run commonwealth, the indications are that juvenile disorders and
crimes have been falling tremendously since the compulsary training
law was enacted. This discipline results not only in the physical
betterment that Senator Chamberlain refers to but also increases the
individual responsibility.
. The CHAIRMAN. The gymnastic exercise in the training of children
in the Schools or out of the schools is beneficial, is it not? -
94. PREPARED NIESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSIE.
Gen. WooD. Yes, sir; the Australian system includes calisthenic
training from 12 to 14. The procedure is simple and the apparatus
required practically nothing. From 14 to 18 the boys receive train-
ing in the elements of military drill, rifle shooting, map work, and
the general type of instruction which the older boy scouts receive.
They learn how to take care of themselves in the field, find their way
about. All of this is valuable training for the future soldier. You
take a youngster with this training and give him a few months of
intensive training under efficient officers, and you have a reasonably
Well-trained soldier. The Army of to-day is not the small, pro-
fessional Army of former years; it is practically the Nation in arms.
If the grand army of Napoleon, 480,000 to 500,000 men, were called
upon to hold the trenches now held by 2,500,000 men, it would fall
far short of meeting the demands which would be made upon it. The
training to-day embraces practically all men who are physically fit.
As a result of this training, we will have soon a people who are, as
our early Presidents recommended we should be, skilled and trained
in the use of arms. Our people have not such training or skill.
They are practically ignorant of the use of arms. What is needed
above everything else is a frank exposition of our situation and
needs. Once the people know what is needed and appreciate the
requirements and what it is necessary to do to meet the national
requirements, I am confident they will respond; but unless they are
made to understand the situation it will be difficult to secure the
ſcind of response which comes from understanding and appreciation
of the Nation’s needs. Only in this Way can we have a people
skilled and trained in the use of arms; we lack that now.
The CHAIRMAN. I suppose We have fewer now than We ever had.
Gen. Wood. I think so, sir. ©
The CHAIRMAN. Are there any other questions the members of the
committee desire to ask Gen. Wood? If not, we might excuse him.
Gen. WooD. I think I have traveled from morals to history.
The CHAIRMAN. We are very much obliged to you, General. We
would like to get the report that you made on any of these bills.
Gen. WooD. I will send you one.
The CHAIRMAN. Then, you will have a report on both bills that you
will let go in with your testimony?
Gen. Wood. Yes, sir; I will send it to you right away.
Senator FLETCHER. That report will be printed with the other
proceedings. -
The CHAIRMAN. Yes, sir; we want, it printed.
(The report submitted to The Adjutant General on the Chamber-
lain bill is as follows:)
HEADQUARTERS EASTERN DEPARTMENT,
Governors Island, New York City, January 10, 1916.
From : Department commander.
To : Adjutant General of the Army.
. Subject: Report on proposed Senate bill. -
1. I submit herewith a report On a proposed bill for making further and more
... effectual provision for the national defense, and for other purposes, which is
marked “Committee print, confidential, Senate, 64th Congress, 1st Session.”
Section 1 : NO remarkS. -
Section 2: Recommend the number of regiments of Infantry be 69, including
the Porto Rico regiment of Infantry. The number of regiments of Cavalry
should be 21. The number of regiments of Field Artillery should be 25.
PREPAREDINESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 95
Section 3: The typical Field Artillery brigade should consist of two TegimentS,
three battalions of three batteries each, regiments to be maintained as two bat-
talion regiments in time of peace, but provided with the necessary commissioned
bel'SOnnel to expand to three-battalion regiments in time of War. One battalion
Of Engineers is Sufficient for a division. A Cavalry division should consist of
tWO brigades. Adequate pontoon trains should be provided.
Section 4: Division commanders should be lieutenant generals, Commanders
Of brigades should be major generals.
Section 5: The assistant to the chief of staff should be a major general-
The inspector general should be a major general, or, if the inspector general’s
COrps is Imerged With the General Staff, as it should be, an additional major
general on the General Staff. There should be but one Coast Artillery district
in the Canal Zone. The language of the bill may imply there are two. The
halance of this section commencing with the words “general officers,” line 22,
Should be stricken out as it would be to the great detriment of the service in
time Of peace and worse in time of war. The selection exercised by the Presi-
dent in the appointment of general officers is about all we have of promotion
by Selection, and this I deem of vital importance to maintain untrammeled the
present procedure of appointing general officers. Moreover, it would interfere
With the Constitutional prerogatives Of the President to an unwarranted extent.
Section 6: The merging of the inspector general’s corps with the General Staff
has already been referred to. This should be done. The officers of the corps
should be transferred to the line and be eligible for detail on the General Staff.
They should not under any circumstances be made permanent officers of the
General Staff, as such procedure would tend to establish a continuance of the
present unfortunate condition of permanency of bureau Officers in Washington.
Section 7 : It would not be advisable to give the chief of Staff the grade of
general. This should be reserved for recognition of extraordinary Services
Or Special Command during war. It is not necessary that the Chief of staff take
precedence Over Other officers. He exercises authority by virtue of his posi-
tion and not his rank. The chief of staff should be a lieutenant general and
his assistant should be a major general,
Séctions 8 and 9: The Officers of these corps should be officers of the line
detailed to these departments, the detail to be subject to renewal Only after
two years service with troops. The present situation which makes it imprac-
ticable to relieve these officers and return them to duty with troops should be
be terminated. -
Section 10: That Section appears to be thoroughly unsound in that it provides
three general officers for the Quartermaster Corps. There should be one general
officer, who should have the rank of major general. All officers in this Corps
should be detailed Officers. The general Officer at the headl Of it should be sub-
ject to redetail after a perior of two years’ duty with troops, if desired (in:
case of War redetail without a period of Service with troops should be author-
ized to meet possible emergencies). All officers in this corps should be line.
officers detailed as they are in all other Corps (except the Medical Corps and
Engineers). There is no reason whatever for three general officers in this Corps.
The present arrangement was a compromise at the time of consolidation of the
three corps, and the abnormal situation created should not be continued.
Section 11: The Veterinarian Corps should be under the Surgeon General
and a division of the Medical Corps, as are dental Surgeons.
Section 12: I believe the number of regiments of Engineers is excessive, but
there should be a decided increase in the present number of Engineer Or-
ganizations. A minimum of six companies are required for Our foreign posses—
sions, and if we adopt the policy of maintaining six Infantry divisions and two
Cavalry divisions within the continental limits of the United States, as in my
opinion we should do, each division should have one battalion of three Com-
panies of Engineers organized as pioneers, and in the case of Engineers serv-
ing with the Cavalry they should be mounted. We also should have two pon-
toon trains of six divisions each with each field army (three divisions) and
a pontoon battalion of three companies for service with the Cavalry. This
would make a total of 39 companies of Engineers. The strength and organiza-
tion of the Engineer companies should be as now provided for in the Tables of
Organization. The Engineer organization can be assembled in provisional regi-
ments if OCCaSiOn Should require. -
Section 13: All officers of the Ordnance Corps should be detailed Officers,
the general officer to be subject to the general conditions as to redetail referred
to in connection with the Other staff Corps (two years with troops).
96 PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
Section 14: The same general provisions would apply as to Officers. They
should all be detailed OfficerS.
Section 15: The Bureau of Insular Affairs should not be a charge upon the
War Department. This is virtually a colonial office and should be under the
State Department. If this is to be continued under the War Department, the
chief should have the temporary grade of brigadier while holding office. The
duties are not in any way military in character.
Section 16 : NO remarks.
Section 17 : Veterinarians should be organized. On the Salme general lines as
our dental surgeons and should be under the direct control of the Medical
Department. -
Section 18: All Officers in the Staff Corps should be detailed officers. I know
of no single change which would add more to the efficiency of the Army. A
continuation of the present policy is prejudical to the best interests of the
service. I approve the provisions for the detail of Officers as embodied in
this paragraph of the bill.
Section 19 : Infantry organizations should be as at present provided for
in the tables of Organization with the exception Of machine-gun Companies,
which should have an enlisted personnel of 150 men and be equipped With 24
machine guns. There should be some recognition of the fact that machine guns
will not be carried on mules Or horses in modern War to any extent. I believe
the plan providing one mess sergeant and one supply Sergeant for the Infantry
headquarters company is a good one. The recommendations in the bill for an
Infantry company of practically 100 men indicates an entire failure to appre-
Ciate the necessity Of Strong COImpanies. An Organization. On these lineS WOuld
be most detrimental to the efficiency of the Infantry. With detachments for
various causes it would, after a few Weeks service, be practically a peace-
strength company as at present maintained.
Section 20: The troop provided under Cavalry does not give sufficient strength
to furnish a suitable unit for the instruction of the Captain or Officers. If we
are to maintain our present 12-troop regiment We should go to a troop of 150
men. Cavalry machine-gun companies should be equipped with not less than
18 machine guns. Cavalry dismounted work will require especially strong
machine-gun equipment. Aside from the strength of troops, I recommend fol-
lowing the present table Of Organizations. I believe it would be advisable to
add a Supply Sergeant and a mess Sergeant to the headquarters troop. I be-
lieve that the Cavalry should have a headquarters troop and a supply troop as
on the general lines provided for the Infantry, and that the headquarters troop
should have a meSS Sergeant and Supply Sergeant.
Section 21 : The Field Artillery slıould be Organized as at present and consist
of 25 regiments, of which six should be of the heavy siege type (Army Artil-
lery). Regiments should be organized as provided in the present table of
Organizations. A headquarters company or battery and supply company or
battery, Organized on the same general lines as for the Cavalry, should be
provided. What is Wanted is more Organizations, and not necessarily an entire
reorganization of the present establishment. The general policy should be to
Organize Our regiments in two battalion regiments in time of peace, but with
a Sufficient number of officers to expand each regiment to a three-battalion
regiment in time of War. General authority should be given the President
to Organize regiments as the needs of the service imay demand. With reference
to the almmunition battalions, it will be difficult to organize these battalions
in time Of War unless the personnel is provided in time of peace, and it is
believed that the additional personnel for Field Artillery should contemplate
the proVision Of Officers and a certain number of noncommissioned officers for
these Organizations, as ‘Well as for the expansion of the regiments on a three-
battalion basis. The material for the organizations should be accumulated in
time of peace and at least a skeleton of the personnel assembled with the
regiment.
Section 22: The Coast Artillery Corps should be increased now by the number
of Organizations, including those which have gone abroad and which it is
Contemplated to Send abroad in connection with existing approved plans for
fortifications. These companies should be organized as are the present com-
panies, and field and company officers should be supplied in the same proportion.
It Will probably be necessary later to further augment the Coast Artillery.
To carry out the accepted policy with reference to coast defense, which I under-
Stand to be one complete relief for mines and batteries in foreign possessions,
one relief for mines in the United States, and one relief for half the batteries
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 97
of the United States (the other half of the batteries of home forts to be manned
by militia) will require 267 companies of Regular Coast Artillery troops, or
an ultimate increase of 97 companies. As new fortifications are provided the
necessary troops should be authorized to man them in Case: Where the new
batteries do not replace those already existing and provided with a manning
personnel. The personnel of the Coast Artillery Corps should include also the
necessary Warrant officers and seamen and the Specialists required for the
Service of mine planters. These vessels are a part of the submarine defense
and should be under complete military control. At present the presence of
civilian Officers and Seamen on these planters, With privileges which may be
given precedence Over military needs, leads at times to friction and inefficiency,
in so far as the special work for which these planters are supplied is concerned.
With reference to the assignment of heavy mobile artillery for coast defense
or for land operations requiring calibers greater than 6 inch, this type will in
all probability be of the mortal: Or howitzer type and may include Calibers as
high as 12 inch, or even 14 incl. Most Of this type of Ordnance to be trans-
ported by rail, and it is believed that the same troops which handle it in coast-
defense operations should handle it in siege or field operations requiring guns
of this type.
Section 23 : NO remarks.
Section 24: There is no reason why captains and lieutenants of the Philip-
pine Scouts who are not natives Of the Philippine Islands should not be ell-
titled to retirement with pay, as are officers of the Army, provided they serve
a sufficiently long time or are disabled in service. The provision concerning
former Officers of the scouts I think is unwise. These cases should be dealt
with individually on their merits.
Section 25: Porto Rico Regiment of Infantry. This regiment should be Or-
ganized exactly as Our other regiments of Infantry and both men and Officers
should be available for service anywhere. We can not maintain an efficient
regiment So far as the commissioned personnel (other than those natives of
the island) is concerned under the present procedure. There isn’t a reasonable
Opportunity for promotion.
Section 26: I think this is unwise and should not be enacted. I believe the
results aimed at will be secured by fixing a definite period of service in each
grade at the end of which, unless Sooner promoted, officers will be advanced
in rank. This procedure, taking the present status of the Army as a basis,
WOuld not unduly increase the Inumber of additional Officers. See attached
statement. This statement illustrates what would have been the effect had the
general plan Outlined been applied to the existing Corps Of Officers. I believe,
however, that a general policy should be adopted which would require the
assignment of officers for a brief period of service with arms other than their
OWn. -
Section 27 : No remarks.
Section 28 : NO remarks.
Section 29 : No remarks, in view of the last proviso, which enables the in-
crease to be made rapidly in Case of necessity. -
Section 30 : It should specify that the Officers' reserve corps should consist
Of a minimum of 45,000 officers. This section should embody the provisions of
the university training Corps units On the general lines suggested by the War
College section of the General Staff, and provide for recognition of the men who
have undergone instruction and training at the military-training camps, pro-
Vided they are able to pass the required examinations
Section 31: No remarks.
Section 32: No remarks.
Section 33: No remarks.
Section 34: This section should provide for an enlistment with no minimum
period. Men should be eligible for transfer to the reserve as soon as, in the
Opinion of their organization commanders (company, troop, or battery), they
are well-trained soldiers. The act as at present drawn will defeat a reserve
and fails to appreciate the fact that the period in the reserve should be at least
twice as long as the period with the colors. What is wanted is efficient men.
AS Soon as they are found to be well trained and efficient they should be eligible
for, transfer. -
Section 35, fourth provision: Eliminate the declaration of intent to become
a citizen. No one should be enlisted in the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, or re-
Serye who is not a full citizen of the United States.
Section 36: No remarks.
* * : * * * *
&
98 PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
Section 37 : No remarks, except that under the final proviso in this section
the period should be extended to two years.
Section 38 : I believe that some definite monthly pay should be provided for
all men in the reserve. Two dollars and fifty cents per month I believe to be
Sufficient pay. Payments should be made semiannually, and the voucher system
now in use for the payment Of pension claims should be adopted, in Order to
avoid paper work. Reservists should receive the full pay and allowances of
their grade when on duty.
Section 39 : NO remarks.
Section 40 : No remarks. -
Section 41 : Substitute for the provisions of the officers’ training corps the
recommendations as recently prepared by the War College with modifications
Suggested here ; copy attached.
Section 42 : The principle embodied in the foregoing modification of the War
College draft should apply rather than those embodied in this section.
Section 43 : This section should be modified. There is no reason why Officers
in field grades, especially in the grade of major, should not be detailed. I be-
lieve it is inadvisable to limit the nulmber to 300. The numbel. Of Officers Of
the Regular Establishment below the grade of general Officer should be increased
by at least one-third in all grades and still further increased if they are re-
Quired for the immediate duty Of instructing Officers and men Of the reserve
forces. A large force of well-trained officers is about the best military invest-
ment the Country can make. It is a false policy to attempt economy in the
direction Of limiting the number of Officers.
LEONARD WOOD,
Major General, Commanding.
The report submitted to The Adjutant General on the Hay bill is
as follows:
A BITT, T() INCREASE THE EFFICIENCY OF TIIR MILITARY ESTABLIS FIMIENT OF THE
TJNITED STATES.
That portion of the bill which relates to the Regular Army does not contem-
plate a regular force of sufficient strength to furnish an adequate garrison for
our foreign possessions and an adequate mobile force and force of Coast Artil-
lery within the Continental limits Of the United States. In brief the provisions
of this portion of the bill are wholly inadequate and there is little or no recog-
nition in the Organization Contemplated Of the lessons Of the present War.
It is noted that no reference is made to the number of Officers On the General
Staff. It is recommended that the reductions made in the total number of Offi-
cers on the General Staff through recent legislation be replaced and that eight
additional officers (captains) be added—four from the Infantry, one from the
Engineers, one from the Field Artillery, one from the Cavalry, and one from
the Coast Artillery. These officers are urgently needed.
With reference to general officers it is recommended that the grade of briga-
dier general be abolishedſ, as it has been in most foreign Countries, and that it
be held as a grade for the purpose of furnishing local rank under Special Con-
ditions, such as a condition where a senior colonel is placed in Command Of a
brigade, and that, the President be authorized to appoint officers temporarily to
this grade to meet special conditions. It is recommended that all bureau Chiefs
be given the grade of major general and that generals of brigades be major
generals, generals of divisions be lieutenant generals, and the grade of general
be held in reserve as a reward for special service, as in the past; that the pay
of the major generals be that of the present brigadiers and that of the lieutenant
generals that of the present major generals. Also, whoever is detailed as Chief
of Staff shall have for the time so serving the grade of lieutenant general. It
is not advisable to give a special higher grade for this office, as the Chief of Staff
does not exercise command through virtue of his rank but simply as a repre-
sentative of his superiors. It is advisable, however, he have a grade Which is as
high as any in the service at the time.
It is also recommended that the number of general officers of the grade of
lieutenant general be sufficient to provide one officer of this grade for Command
in the Philippines, one for Hawaii, one for Panama, and one for each of the
four departments of the United States, and one as Chief of Staff. It is further
recommended that an adequate number of generals of brigades (major generals)
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 99
be provided for the command of all brigades, and in addition a sufficient num-
ber to provide a Chief of Coast Artillery, Chief of the War College Division
Of the General Staff, Chief of the Mobile Army Division of the General Staff,
Chief of the Militia Division of the General Staff, a chief for each of the
existing Staff Corps Or departments, and commanding generals of the Coast
Artillery districts. Under present conditions all brigadiers are junior to all
Officers in the grade of rear admiral and to the major general cofmmanding
Marine Corps. All Our major generals are junior to the new vice admirals.
In brief, the Army under present circumstances is not receiving equal recogni-
tion in the matter of rank with the Navy. We are continuing the grade of
brigadier general, a grade which has no corresponding grade in the Navy, and
One Which no longer exists in the Marine Corps, and which has gone out of
general use in most of the great armies. The discrimination against the Army
is an unjust One, and Operates to the disadvantage of the Army. This grade
Should be reserved for local rank, where one colonel is picked in command of
Others, Or in a position. Where added temporary rank is desirable.
I further recommend that the bill as enacted provide that all permanent
staff officers other than the officers of the Engineers and Medical Department
be transferred to the line Of the Army and assigned as far as possible to arms
in which they originally served. They will be available for detail as the interests
Of the Service may indicate. This will not increase the total number of Officers
in any grade, and it will, in my opinion, add very greatly to the efficiency of
the Army and to the military efficiency of each corps. There may be some
diminution of clerical efficiency and efficiency in paper work, but the gain in
knowledge of service needs and conditions incident to active service with troops
will far more than Offset this. The present system is, in my opinion, highly
prejudicial to the best interests of the service, and leads to the establishment
through long residence of conditions which are opposed to progress and effi-
Ciency of the Army as a whole.
Under Cavalry, I believe the regiments, if the present obsolete type of organi-
zation is to be continued, should be organized in accordance with the present
table of Organizations except as follows: The lieutenants for the supply troops
should be additional lieutenants and all Officers for machine-gun troops should
be additional Officers. The enlisted Strength of the machine-gun troops must
be very materially increased, as in all probability there will be not less than
12 and possibly 18 machine guns per regiment of Cavalry. Under present
plans there will be one regiment of Cavalry in the Philippines, one in Hawaii,
and a squadron in Panama. This would leave 12 regiments and 2 squadrons
Within the continental limits of the United States. One regiment will be re-
quired with each Infantry division, leaving a total of six regiments and two
squadrons, or, say, seven regiments available for Cavalry divisions. This should
be increased by a sufficient number of regiments to give two Complete divisions
of six regiments each. In other words, there will have to be an increase of five
regiments of Cavalry. This if the present organization is continued; if the
larger troop (150 men) is adopted there would be less increase required. The
present Cavalry organizations is extremely defective, and the Small troops do
not give suitable command for instruction of men or officers unless doubled up.
There should be no men pertaining to the Supply departments as a part of any
regimental organization. It is, in my opinion, very undesirable to have enlisted
men belonging to the staff corps actually serving as a portion of a regiment. A
regiment should be a fighting unit complete in all parts. -
The Coast Artillery Corps should be increased now by the number of Organiza-
tions, including those which have gone abroad and which it is contemplated
to send abroad in connection with existing approved plans for fortifications.
These companies should be organized as are the present companies, and field
and company officers should be supplied in the same proportion. It will prob-
ably be necessary later to further augment the Coast Artillery. To Carry Out
the accepted policy with reference to coast defense, which I understand to be
one complete relief for mines and batteries in foreign possessions, one relief
for mines in the United States, and one relief for half the batteries of the
United States (the other half of the batteries of home forts to be manned by
militia) will require 267 companies of regular Coast Artillery troops, or an ulti-
mate increase of 97 companies instead of 52 companies. As new fortifications
are provided the necessary troops should be authorized to man them in Cases
where the new batteries do not replace those already existing and provided With
a manning perSonnel. ; :
100 PREPAREDINESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
The personnel of the Coast Artillery Corps should include also the necessary
Warrant officers and seamen and the specialists required for the service of
mine planters. These vessels are a part of the submarine defense and should be
under COImplete military Control. At present the presence Of Civilian Officers and
Seamen On these planters, with privileges which may be given precedence Over
military needs, leads at times to friction and inefficiency in so far as the special
work for Which these planters are supplied is concerned.
The proposed increase of the Corps of Engineers is entirely inadequate. We
should have 2 companies of Engineers in the Philippines, 2 in Hawaii, 2
in Panama, a detachment at Porto Rico, and sufficient Engineer troops for the
organization at home. This is the minimum. This means if we have 6
Infantry division and 2 Cavalry divisions, which I believe we should have, that
we should have 33 companies of Engineers within the limits of the United
States, or 25 companies in addition to those already existing. Each of the 8
divisions should have 1 battalion of 3 companies of Engineers Organized as
pioneers. In addition, there should be with each field army a pontoon battalion
of 3 Companies of Engineer troops with 6 pontoon divisions. It is believed that
1 pontoon battalion of 3 Companies would be sufficient for the Cavalry.
The Infantry regiments should be increased by a sufficient number to create 6
complete Infantry divisions within the continental limits of the United States.
This means, on the assumption we continue 4 regiments in the Philippines,
place 6 in Hawaii, and 4 in Panama, 1 battalion in Alaska, and 1 regiment in
Porto Rico, that we shall have 15 regiments and 1 battalion Outside the Continental
limits of the United States and within the continental limits 15 regiments and
2 battalions, Or, say, 16 regiments, the Alaska battalion being Considered as
detached from the continental United States. This would necessitate 38 new
regiments of Infantry. I believe this number should be organized with the least
practicable delay. The Officers of the supply and machine-gun companies should
be additional officers and a machine-gun company should-be a company of 150
men provided with an equipment of 24 machine guns.
There should be a Sufficient number Of noncommissioned Officers to provide
a corporal with each Squad, and the organization in all which relates to the
enlisted men, whether privates or noncommissioned Officers, should be as now
prescribed in the table of Organizations.
With reference to the Field Artillery, I recommend the regiments be organized
as at present, and that the lieutenants for the supply company shall be addi-
tional lieutenants and not taken from the lieutenants of the regiment at large.
I believe the same amount of expansion can be made from two battalions as
three with less liability to increase unnecessarily the present proportion Of
field Officers in the Field Artillery. -
With reference to the Organization of an ammunition battalion and an
artillery park for each regiment, these should be organized in time of peace,
at least to the extent of providing the personnel and material, but not neces-
sarily the animals. The chances are that transport will be in any case
principally motor transport. The same is true of the ammunition battery.
The Field Artillery should be increased by a number of regiments sufficient
to give two regiments of two battalions each in time of peace (three in time
of war) with each Infantry division and one regiment of horse Artillery with
each Cavalry division. They should also be three-battalion regiments in time
of war. This means if we maintain the amount of Artillery, which I have
recommended in the foreign possessions, five regiments On foreign Service,
namely, a regiment and a half in the Philippines, two regiments in Hawaii,
one regiment in Panama, and one battalion in Porto Rico, it will leave to be
supplied 11 regiments for the Infantry and 2 for the Cavalry, or 13 new
regiments. In addition to this we should have at least 6 regiments Of Army
Artillery of the heaviest type, making a total of 19 new regiments of Artillery
to be supplied if we are to have an adequate amount of Artillery for Our
Regular Establishment. In view of the tremendous development of Artillery
and its use during the present war the provision of adequate Artillery is of
absolutely primary importance. -
With reference to the increase in the Signal Corps, this is concurred in, pro-
vided the 73 additional officers are all of them actual skilled flyers. It is be-
lieved that a large proportion of the Aviation Corps in time Of War Will be
drawn from Volunteers and that Officers Will be used perhaps more as ObserverS
rather than pilots. There should, however, be a most thoroughly trained corps
in the Army at all times. The increase in aviation officers should not increase
t
* - I
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 101
the number of field officers in the Signal Corps. What is wanted is young,
Officers for flying. These should all be detailed Officers. : . . .
|Under section 8, “Additional officers available for detached service,” I infer
an attempt is to be made to equalize promotion. It is difficult to comment on
this, other than to state in general terms that the total number of officers avail-
able for detached service should be at least 1,200. We have not anything like
enough Officers with the militia, nor should we if we had been able to detail.
all those intended under the Original plan. There are also a large number of
Colleges and Schools where Officers should be detailed. It does not appear that
the extension of this list applies to the Field Artillery, nor does it appear that,
sufficient Field Artillery officers will be available for duty with the continental
army. . . .
With reference to section 9, I believe this regiment should be placed upon the
Same Status as any other regiment Of Infantry and its Officers be made avail-
able for duty and for detached Service as those Of Other regiments. e
These increases herein recommended should be made in four yearly incre-
ments and the detached service law so modified that officers entering the Army
from civil life may be detached for instruction without reference to length of
Service to troops. -
Section 13. The Veterinary Corps should be organized as a division of the
Medical Department and maintained under the general control of the Surgeon,
General as are dental surgeons. These men are now highly educated men. They
should be assigned as needed. No man should be appointed to the Veterinary
Corps who is not a graduate of a recognized School. *
With reference to enlistments in the IRegular Army. The present enlistment
is highly prejudicial to the best interests of the service in that it effectively
prevents the establishment of an adequate reserve. There should be no mini-
mum period of Service fixed, but men should be eligible to transfer to the
reserve whenever in the Opinion of the Organization commander they are thor-
oughly well trained and disciplined soldiers. What we want is a reserve of
disciplined and trained men. A man may have had previous training or instruc-
tion or have special aptitude which will enable him to attain the desired stand-
ard in a brief period. Of time. If SO, he should be allowed to go into the reserve
when trained, if he desires it. The Officers of the Regular Army can be trusted .
to exercise due precautions in this matter. This is the most economical method.
of securing any given number of men as reservists. The cost per rifle is far
leSS in the end. The present law is lot in any Way Satisfactory and has caused
entirely false ideas concerning the difficulties of enlistment.
It will be remembered that enlistments dropped over 40 per cent after the
present law was put into effect, and Only Came up as the result Of hard times
and most strenuous efforts. The period. Of Service with the colors should never
be more than one-half the period with the reserve. A system such as above out-
lined Will make it possible to enlist men of a class who are not now available
but who are perfectly willing to take training if it can be gotten under condi-
tions under which intelligence, aptitude, and application are in any Way ade-
quately recognized as regulating the time needed to attain a standard of profi-
Ciency. Anything which looks to an inducement for reenlistment of men other
than noncommissioned officers should be discouraged. We do not want to re-
enlist men who have not the Capacity to become noncommissioned Officers. -
Section 14, continental army : Any plan which fails to recognize the basic
principle of universal military training and military service and fails to provide
for proper training of all who are within the age limit and physically fit can only
be regarded as a makeshift and as a temporary expedient. Such makeshifts
and expedients will never result in adequate preparation even in a Conservative
use of the term. The continental army as proposed adds a third force to the
all-eady existing land forces of the United States, and I can not escape the con-
Viction that its establishment will tend to further demoralize the militia and
render it less efficient than at present, once this new force is created, for it is
clearly apparent that its creation is because of the unavailabilities and defi-
ciencies of the militia, and that the probable use of the militia, if continued, will
be local, thereby accentuating one of the present great objections to enlistment
in the militia, namely, the uncertainty of the organizations going to the front.
in Case of actual service. Evidently, one of the purposes of the bill as drawn is
to induce the militia to come into the continental army. If so, why continue
to pay and aid it as a separate organization? -
It seems to me one of two things should be done if the continental army idea
is to be enacted into law. First, a serious effort should be made to bring all
102 PREPAREDINESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
the militia into the continental army, taking it in by Organizations, including
the Officers of all grades as now commissioned. If this is not feasible the
alternate Step should be the withdrawal of all Federal aid to the militia and
the concentration of the efforts of the General Government on the development
of the Continental army. I feel that the establishment of the continental army
and a Continuance of Support of the militia will be simply to add to the present
Condition of uncertainty and confusion. Ilet us do either one thing or the
Other, either take the militia into the continental army or drop it entirely as
a Federal instrument, and withdraw all support in money and material. Per-
Sonally, I think the latter move would be a great mistake until the first has.
been Seriously attempted. I think it would be wiser to make every effort to
transfer the militia to the continental army status, reimbursing the States for
armories, etc., under Such plan as may be most feasible. It may take some time
to make the arrangements for the transfer of the militia. The creation of the
proposed new force is of itself a declaration that the militia is unsatisfactory
and to continue paying it at the same time creating a new force because it (the
militia) is ineffective, is, from every standpoint, inconsistent.
In Case the continental idea is adopted the men should be assembled in large
Concentration camps and given six months of intensive training. This, if the
plan is adopted which was followed at the military training camps last year,
WOuld give more actual instruction than the average soldier receives in an
enlistment. Nothing could be more unwise or prejudicial to the success of the
idea than the dispersion Of these men at Small posts where the training will
be interfered with by post administrative work, upkeep of grounds, etc., on the
part of officers in charge of the instruction.
The training of men who have had previous military training and Service
should not be extended beyond the moment when they become efficient. This
period may be less than six months if the men have had any Considerable pre-
vious training.
I do not think that the two-month period of enlistment and training would be
feasible, either from the point of view of the employee or employer. It might
Work in the Case of the class of men who are going to be Officers and Who Can
dictate the time of absence from business, but for the laboring man, mechanic,
and farmer especially it will be difficult to work in this two-month period.
Moreover, it will be of relatively little value compared with six months of Con-
SeCultive WOl'k.
With reference to the provision of officers, I do not believe the Cadet companies
Will give us satisfactory officers. In the first place, the method of training
which will be given in a Cadet Company Will not tend to make a good Officer.
The men. We want as officers from civil life, especially in the grade of Captain
and junior field officer (major), are men who have actually exercised command
and are familiar With Army administration. This WOuld be obtained, as I See
it, much more thoroughly and in a much more satisfactory manner through
these men Serving for a year under a temporary Commission as Second lieuten-
ants in the Various arms of the Service. The pay can be the same as proposed
in the act. What we want is to give these men actual experience in Command
of men. I believe the plan prepared by the General Staff for the establishment
Of Officers training Corps at the various universities and high Schools will, with
some modifications, combined with the utilization through camps of instruction
of the graduates of the land-grant colleges who have had military training and
those of the private or semiprivate military Colleges and Schools, such a Norwich
University, Virginia Military Institute, Pennsylvania State Military College, the
Citadel (mentioning these only as types), give us a much better officer and
will enable us to Secure him with much less interruption to his educational life
for the reason he will come to our camps of instruction at the vacation period
and can receive from One to three months Of practical and intensive training
under the direction of regular officers and alongside regular troops each sum-
Imer for such number of months as may be required. From the men who attend
these camps should be selected not less than 1,000 each year for one year's
Service With the Regular Army in the gradle Of Second lieutenant in the various
arms and in the Quartermaster, Engineer, and Signal Corps.
Immediate steps should be taken to coordinate military instruction at the
land-grant military Colleges; to establish the Officers’ training units, as recom-
mended by the General Staff, in the various types of colleges, including the
nonmilitary Colleges; the continuation of the military training-camp idea for
men who are out of college, combined with correspondence and special courses;
and the Commissioning of Selected men for one year in the Regular Army, all
PREPAREDINESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 103
tº
with a view to building up with the least possible delay a reserve Corps Of not
less than 45,000 officers. This latter is of vital importance, whatever else is
ClOne.
The length of time which reserve officers should hold commissions should be
fixed at five years, subject to reappointment if service is satisfactory.
Medical officers are provided through the Medical Reserve. They might,
however, be attached for a year’s service at Our Various military hospitals,
just as officers would be attached to the Quartermaster's Department, Signal
Corps, etc., and at the same rate of pay as provided in the bill. This pro-
cedure, i. e., the provision of reserve officers through the methods above indi-
cated, should be pushed forward vigorously until a minimum of 45,000 have
been Secured. *
On page 51 attention is invited to the phraseology “all funds shall be dis-
bursed and accounted for by officers and agents of the Pay Department of the
Army.” There is no such department at present.
In conclusion I desire to state that in View of the failure Of the Volunteer
system in our own country in all our wars and by its evident failure in the
present European war, it seems to me highly inadvisable to in any Way yield
to popular prejudice and ignorance through the further continuance of a system
Which invites disaster and insures and makes Certain a great and unnecessary
loss of life and treasure in Case of a real War. I believe that every effort Should
be made to Secure frank recognition of the fact that with Suffrage goes the Obliga-
tion for military service. We should strive to adopt something on the general
lines of the Australian or Swiss Systems maintaining, because of Our large coast
line and Our Sea possessions, a regular establishment of approximately 220,000
men for the regular, every-day military needs of the Nation in time of peace, and
for training the great reserve force which would be built up through the adop-
tion of a System such as the Australian Or Swiss. Of this citizen Soldiery, at
least 24 divisions must be Organized and equipped as a Federal force. In the
meantime an adequate reserve for the Regular Army and Federal militia Or
Continental army must be furnished. If a Sound System Of general training is
adopted, it will be possible to quickly produce a large available trained reserve
as we have enough men coming of age each year to enable us to limit the period
of liability for military service to the period from 18 to 24, inclusive, or seven
years, the period of physical best and minimum business and dependent responsi-
bility. I believe that Once it is appreciated that adequate military protection
Can most effectively and economically be guaranteed through the adoption of a
system of this sort with its attendant comparatively brief service that it will be
accepted.
If nothing else can be accomplished, an effort should be made to secure a suit-
able enlistment act, One which will facilitate rather than hinder the Creation. Of
a reserve, the greatest possible increase of the Regular Army On lines indicated
above, an adequate reserve of materiel, and a corps of reserve officers. These are
Vital aS is the COmplete transfer Of the militia to Federal control.
AD]).ENDA.
R&Serve officers.-There may be some misunderstanding created by the
remarks under this leading in the foregoing. A minimum of 45,000 officers is
needed. We have at military schools and colleges under officers of the Army
about 38,000 young men who are receiving or have received during the course
Imjlitary instruction, These institutions include the land-grant colleges and
the private or semiprivate military colleges and schools. The instruction at all
these institutions should be standardized. At the large nonmilitary collegos
Of the type of Harvard, Yale, and Princeton (mentioning these as types only),
military courses are being established or military organizations built up. The
COurse which has been adopted at Harvard will count toward a degree and
Calls for a course running through two years accompanied by a series of lec-
tures On military subjects and the study of subjects closely related to the
military course, such as surveying, engineering, chemistry, military history,
and policy, modern languages, and economics, these in addition to the strictly
Imilitary courses. In addition to the course of the university young men taking
the course will be required to attend two military training camps under super-
Vision. Of officers of the Army and in conjunction with regular troops. These
COurSeS at the nonmilitary universities should be standardized and the Standard-
ization of the work in the land-grant military and nonmilitary colleges is now
104 PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
being worked out by the General Staff with a view to establishing officers'
training-Corps units at all these institutions.
The young men from all classes of institutions should be required to attend
at least two camps of intensive training not less than five Weeks each under
officers of the Army and in conjunction with regular troops. From the men
attending them there should each year be selected not less than 1,000, who
should be commissioned as temporary second lieutenants for a period of one
year and attached to the various arms and Staff Corps. The men selected for
this latter class of training should be those men whom it is believed have the
Qualifications to make possible captains and majors of Volunteers. From the
men who have had the courses in the universities plus two camps of intensive
training we should get our first and second lieutenants, with perhaps a few cap-
tains, if their training had been at an institution like the Virginia Military
Institute, Norwich University, or SOme Other good institution. From the men
who have had a years’ service with the Regular Army, in addition to the
university and Camp training, we should be able to Secure the bulk Of Our
Captains and all Of Our majors. -
The reserve Officers should be brought to the Colors every Other year for a
period of at least 10 days of intensive training either as attached to the arms
to which they belong Or at Officers’ training Camps. Their Commissions as
reserve Officers should run for a period of five years. They should be available
for duty with their Own Consent in time of peace in Case their services are
needed, as is the case with Officers of the Medical Reserve Corps at present.
We have, in other words, ample material for quickly building up an excellent
corps of reserve officers, and with very little effort Such a corps can be created.
It is of vital importance that the matter be no longer delayed, as upon the
existence of such a Corps will depend the possibility of training promptly the
vast number of men who must be trained in Case of war, at least until Some
System of general military training is adopted. -
Militia. To reiterate, an Oppportunity should be given the militia to imme-
diately enter the proposed Federal forces. Aid should be withdrawn from all
that portion which does not immediately avail itself of this privilege. It is
inconsistent and unwise to Create an additional force, retaining and paying the
old in whole or in part.
The difficulties of recruitment at present can be cured by the enactment of a
proper enlistment act. What is accomplished in the way of enlistment bears no
relation to what could be done under an intelligent workable act. The period
of training for the recruits of the enlisted personnel of the continental force
should be six months Of COntinuous, intensive training, and provision for its
establishment must Contemplate its being pushed forward With the utmost rapid-
ity and its concentration in large camps for instruction. To scatter it among
the small posts is to still further extend our present unsound administrative
principles with reference to stationing the Army, and can only result in unneces-
sary expense combined with a far less degree of efficiency than would be ob-
tained under the System Of concentration.
J_EONARD WOOD,
Major General, United States Army.
(The committee thereupon, at 4.20 o'clock p. m., took a recess until
to-morrow at 2 o’clock p. m.)
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
THURSDAY, JANUARY 20, 1916.
UNITED STATES SENATE,
CoMMITTEE ON MILITARY AFFAIRs,
- Washington, D. C.
The committee met at the expiration of the recess at 2 o’clock p. m.,
Senator Geo. E. Chamberlain (chairman) presiding.
The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order. Gen. Carter,
you were here yesterday when we stated the purpose of these meet-
ings, and it is unnecessary for me to state them to you. We will be
very glad to have you discuss the several measures that are under
consideration, and to have your opinion about them or any sugges-
tion you may care to make.
STATEMENT OF MAJ. GEN. WILLIAM H. CARTER, UNITED STATES
ARMY, RETIRED,
Gen. CARTER. Mr. Chairman and gentlemen, if I may be per-
mitted to read two or three pages, and then some extracts from a
book on the Army which I have published during the last year as a
result of some 25 years' serious study of this question, and then part
of the report which I made to the Secretary of War from Honolulu
recently, on which the continental army appears to be based, in part,
I will be able, then, to give you a connected hearing, and answer
any questions thereafter that you may see fit to ask.
In preparing myself to write this book I went into the subject
of military policy because of the interminable statements about mili-
tarism and pacificism we hear and See Written on the subject now.
Mr. John Hay, late Secretary of State, has stated very tersely the
relation of the State to War in these words:
War and politics, campaign and statecraft, are Siamese twins, inseparable
and interdependent; to talk of military Operations Without the direction and in-
terference of an administration is as absurd as to plan a Campaign. Without re-
cruits, pay, or rations. Historical judgment of War is subject to an inflexible
law, either very imperfectly understood or very constantly lost sight of. Every
war is begun, dominated, and ended by political considerations; without a
nation, without a government, without money Or Credit, Without popular en-
thusiasm which furnishes volunteers, Ol' public Support Which endures Con-
scription there could be no army and no war-—no beginning nor end of methodi-
Cal hostilities.
War is the recognized instrumentality for enforcing the decrees
of diplomacy. All our wars have been fought, so far as military
organizations are concerned, on the principle that our States con-
stitute a confederacy of independent governments and not one nation
233S0—PT 3—16—1% 105
106 Pl? EPARED NIESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
for war purposes. All Our Wars have been followed by investigations
by Congress or by commissions, but no action has ever been taken to
avoid similar unsatisfactory conditions in the future. Our Army is
always kept below the actual requirements of peace, and we have
never Seriously considered the need for a military policy looking to
the eventualities of War, a condition which may be forced upon the
Nation any day through diplomatic notes without previous con-
sideration of Congress. -
Congress did not declare war with Spain in the sense of initiating
it, but simply declared that war between the two nations had existed
since a particular day. England’s recent declaration of war with
Germany took a similar form. Japan's announcement to Russia
in their War of 10 years ago was by an attack on the fleet at Port
Arthur. The trend of modern practice indicates an abbreviation of
the period formerly available for preparation.
The question of national defense has been forced upon our Gov-
ernment since its inception. All through the Civil War a com-
mittee of Congress on the conduct of the war was in session, and for
many years thereafter the question of a military policy was under
discussion. At a time when practically every Member of Congress
was a veteran of the Civil War, and during the progress of our great-
'est Indian war, the subject of a military policy was under considera-
#: by the House of Representatives, and a conclusion was reached
that:
Our Army is viewed as in nucleus Wherein is to be acquired and preserved
military knowledge, and from Which should radiate the elements of instruction
and discipline, thus to form in time of War a competent force endowed with
talent to direct it as a Whole, and provided with agencies capable of grasping
the responsibility, Organization, all (l listribution of numerous Sup].)lies necessary
to the Conduct Of Successful military Operations.
When this policy had reduced the Army to a frontier police in
size, events in South America demanded action on the part of Presi-
ident Cleveland, who wrote:
There is no calamity which a great nation (an invite which equals that which
follows a Supine Submission to Wrong and injustice, and the Consequent loss of
national Self-respect and honor, beneath. Which are shielded and defended a
people's Safety and greatness.
European nations rely upon their regular armies and trained re-
serves to prosecute war. In the past we have relied upon organizing
armies after war is declared, expecting them to get their training
in the expensive school of actual War, and making only spasmodic and
ineffective provision for replacing the losses of campaign.
That the great and small problems of the Army have been studied
by as intelligent and devoted officers as are possessed by any nation
there is no doubt. Whether the solutions produced from time to
time accord with our civil polices is for those in authority to deter-
mine. In any event, the late Gen. Upton very clearly pointed the
path of duty when he wrote:
Jnless We frame and bequeath to the Succeeding generations a military
System Suggested by Our past experience and COmnaendled by the example Of
Other inlightened nations, Our rulers and legislators in the next War Will fall
into the same errors and involve the country in the same sacrifices as in the
past.
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 107
Gentlemen, you have heard in these committees, and will hear
many times again, the name of Gen. Upton. Forty-three years ago
I had the pleasure of serving immediately under Gen. Upton, when
Col. du Pont, at present a member of your committee, appeared at
the post, and together they worked for a long time on the upbuild-
ing of a new system of regulations for drill for the several arms,
particularly trying to assimilate what we then called the tactics of
the various arms, in order that the volunteers who would come into
the Service in the hereafter might have a better show for their
instruction, and a simpler system than had been given to their
forbears in the Civil War. I made a deep study of Gen. Upton’s
career subsequent to that time, and after he had been sent around
the World to observe the armies of Europe and Asia, I wrote a
magazine article, in 1889, urging that his work be not pigeonholed in
the War Department, because it contained the very best results of
the most trained man that we had in the Army, he having served
in command of Infantry divisions and Cavalry divisions and later as
an officer of Artillery, and having visited practically every army in
the world.
When I was on duty in the War Department I called the attention
of the Secretary of War to the wonderful career of Gen. Upton,
and in the address which he, Secretary Root, delivered at the laying
of the cornerstone of the War College, he commented upon that
wonderful experience and the fact that Gen. Upton’s voice had been
as one crying in the wilderness for military preparation. As a re-
sult of that address Gen. Upton’s family sent nearly all of the manu-
script written in longhand of what is now known as Upton’s Military
Policy of the United States. Some chapters were missing but were
found by Col. du Pont at his home, he having had the manuscript
of the book in his possession. The manuscript was turned over to
me, and after reading it I urged upon the Secretary of War to
print the book. This is the book that is always referred to in these
committees as Gen. Upton’s wonderful work. The things that we
have builded upon that Gen. Upton urged are not found in that
volume, but in another book of Gen. Upton's entitled “The Armies
of Asia and Europe,” in which he made his most important recom-
mendations for improving the Service.
Senator DU PoWT. I should like to interrupt Gen. Carter to Say, as
he referred to me, that Gen. Upton's manuscript was left to me by
Gen. Upton himself, and that I had it for many years. It was I who
sent it to the War Department, on request, and there was one chapter
that was overlooked when I sent the others, which afterwards was
forwarded to the department. This, in brief, is my personal connec-
tion with this matter.
Gen. CARTER. Nearly 40 years have elapsed since Gen. Emory
Upton analyzed the military system which had prevailed in this
country since the Revolution, and cited the causes of our weakness
to be— -
First. The employment of militia and undisciplined troops com-
manded by generals and officers utterly ignorant of the military art.
Second. Short enlistments, from three months to three years,
instead of for or during the War.
Third. Reliance upon voluntary enlistments instead of Voluntary
enlistments coupled with conscription.
108 PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
Fourth. The intrusion of the States in military affairs and the
consequent waging of all our wars on the theory that we are a con-
federacy instead of a nation.
Fifth. Confusing volunteers with militia, and surrendering to the
States the right to commission officers of volunteers the same as
officers of militia.
Sixth. The bounty, a natural consequence of voluntary enlist-
ments.
Seventh. The failure to appreciate military education, and to dis-
tribute trained officers as battalion, regimental, and higher com-
manders in our volunteer armies.
Eighth. The want of territorial recruitment and regimental depots.
On this subject of national troops or continentals, Gen. Washing-
ton said: *
Certain I am that it would be cheaper to keep fifty Or a hundred thousand in
constant pay than to depend upon half the number and Supply the other half
Occasionally by militia. The time the latter are in pay, before and after they
are in camp, assembling and marching, the Waste of ammunition, the Consump-
tion of stores, which, in spite of every resolution or requisition of Congress,
they must be furnished with, or sent home, added to other incidental expenses
consequent upon coming and conduct in camp, surpass all idea and destroy
every kind of regularity and economy which you could establish among fixed
and settled troops, and will, in my opinion, prove, if the scheme is adhered to,
the l’Ulin Of Our CallSe.
I find so many new members on the committee who were not here
when I was detailed to duty with it 15 years ago that I will state
that the preparation of bills on the floor of the Senate and the
House by amendment involved the States and the General Govern-
ment in more confusion concerning expenses of volunteers in the
various wars than from almost any other cause. When the War
with Spain was on a bill was put through hurriedly that the gov-
ernors of the State should be reimbursed for any expenditures for
bringing their volunteers into the service. When the war was de-
clared to have terminated no provision had been made by the Gov-
ernment, by appropriation, for reimbursing the States. They made
their applications to the Treasury Department, when it was discov-
ered that the banks throughout the country had refused to loan any
State money, the law specifically stating that the governors would
be reimbursed. It was then discovered that some of these governors
were about to go out of office within a short time, and I was sent
for hurriedly and given the task by the Military Committee to draw
a bill to take the place of five bills presented by gentlemen who
wanted their own States paid before anything happened.
The bill went through and accounts were settled within a few
weeks. It took 35 years to settle the accounts after the Civil War
because of the tangled state of legislation at that time. I only state
that, gentlemen, to try to give you an idea that to undertake to pre-
pare the details of a bill through these hearings in full committee
is very apt to lead to little errors that will come back to tease us.
Senator FLETCHER. I notice one of those recommendations was in
favor of long-term enlistments, or during the War. I understand that
a later recommendation is for a shorter term.
Gen. CARTER. Three years or during the war. If the war does not
last three years the man is entitled to discharge upon the termination
of the war. *
PREPAIRED NESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 109
Senator FLETCHER. Yet you read an authority that seemed to
recommend a long, continuous term. - -
The CHAIRMAN. That is during the war.
Gen. CARTER. Three years or during the war.
Senator FLETCHER. I am speaking of what he read from the book.
Gen. CARTER. I was reading Gen. Upton's recommendation.
Senator FLETCHER. Yes. I say we have changed our minds a little
about that. - .
Gen. CARTER. A great deal has been written and said recently con-
cerning the possibility of making a national force out of the militia.
When I was Assistant Chief of Staff this matter was thoroughly can-
vassed by a conference called in the office of Secretary Stimson, and
I found myself antagonistic to the views presented by the legal de-
partment, and rather than take my own views, I sought what I con-
sidered the best legal advice to be had in the country, and satisfied
myself that it is not within the power of Congress to pass a bill to
make a national force out of the militia without amending the Con-
stitution.
The legal status of the militia, the only other force we have besides
the Regular Army at this time, is now embraced in the act of May
27, 1908, which contains a limitation upon military efficiency pecu-
liarly embarassing when the distribution among the 48 States is
considered. That restriction reads as follows:
When the military needs of the Federal Government arising from the neces-
sity to execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrection, or repel invasion,
can not be met by the regular force, the Organized Militia shall be called into
the service of the United States in advance of any volunteer forces which it
may be determined to raise. -
I considered that the most embarrassing legislation that has ever
been placed upon the statute books, so far as military efficiency is con-
cerned, and one that should be removed without delay.
Senator DU PoWT. May I interrupt you by inquiring whether that
has not been modified ? I had that done. -
Gen. CARTER. I give that modification in another part; but it is
very slight. Some of our problems may become international in
character at a moment unforeseen and unpropitious. In an age when
ruptures of diplomatic relations come so suddenly as to preclude the
possibility of remedying grave defects, there should be no reliance
upon any system concerning which there is a shadow of doubt. To
avoid the waste inseparable from going to War without proper prepa-
ration there must be devised and ready a complete system for passing
from a peace to a war establishment. There should be no necessity
for congressional action at such a time beyond the exercise of its
functions of declaring war. The responsibility for proper prepara-
tion for war is, in the final analysis, placed by the people in the
War Department and it should be known there at all times just what
forces and supplies are available. -
Our people are somewhat misled by the very vastness of our
military resources which, to be of any potential value, must be
organized and directed by a central authority. It is only through
coordination of available men and material in peace that organiza-
tion and administration may be so perfected that the Nation can
pass to a war establishment without undue friction. While the
L10 PREPAIRED NIESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
millions now being spent upon the State militia are not a loss, the
return in the shape of an immediately available army bears no rela-
tion to the asset we would have in a force of Federal volunteers
available for any national purposes.
The whole matter revolves about the probable value of any body
of troops, for national purposes, which is maintained by and solely
under control of a State during peace, even though appropriations
for their support are made by the General Government. The history
of our country since colonial days, a period of a century and a half,
renders a steady series of verdicts against the probability of success
of any combination of national and State forces where the latter
remain during peace under the the actual command and control of
the several governors, who appoint the officers and direct, as pro-
vided by the Constitution, the training according to the discipline
provided by Congress.
I listened with great interest to Gen. Wood here yesterday, and
when asked the question whether he would transfer the National
Guard with all their officers into this force, he not only stated yes
but mentioned particularly a major general of the New York
National Guard. That is a feature which I never have found my-
self able to approve. All the generals of the National Guard are
appointed without any process of establishing their qualifications
for commanding troops in the field, and while Gen. O'Ryan, men-
tioned by Gen. Wood, may be just exactly the man we want, he has
jumped from the grade of captain in the National Guard over all
the generals, colonels, lieutenant colonels, and majors to major gen-
eral, and has had no field training that I know of outside of the
National Guard. If none of his seniors were qualified for promo-
tion within the State troops, it would seem Wrong to transfer them
bodily with command rank in the Federal forces. It would seem
quite a throwing away of good material from West Point and other
military institutions, whose graduates are trained for years in actual
contact with soldiers, being required, if detached, to go back to duty
with troops at frequent intervals so that they may not lose that
knowledge that comes only from experience. It seems to me quite
an unbusinesslike military policy to go out and seek influential men
of the militia for the higher commands in war. I think in every
instance generals should be appointetd by the President from the
most capable, whether they come from the Army or from anywhere
else; but it would be seriously wrong to legislate militia generals into
the war Army.
Various methods have been devised for overcoming the obstacle
raised by the decision of the Attorney General that the Constitution
forbids the use of militia for any purpose not stated therein be-
cause of its careful definition of the occasions upon which the State
forces may be called forth. One method which seems to have found
most favor is embraced in a proposition to draft the militia organi-
zations into the Army whenever war is imminent or declared. Con-
gress has wide discretion in its constitutional authority to raise and
support armies, and may properly declare that all men between 21
and 45 years of age, or all men between 5 feet and 6 feet in height,
or with any other defined qualifications, may be drafted into the
service, except that plenary powers cease when they conflict with
IPREPAIREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 111
the Constitution wherein the use of the militia is formally limited as
set forth by the Attorney General.
There has been some disposition to claim that the National Guard
is not the militia contemplated in the Constitution, but if it is not,
then it must be declared to fall under the ban of the provision which
forbids any State to keep troops or ships of war without the consent
of Congress. - -
It is humiliating to think of so much effort having resulted in such
complications. There are occasions when it is wiser and, in the end,
more profitable to admit defeat and begin anew upon a more stable
foundation. Makeshifts in law will be unsatisfactory because of
their liability to be overturned upon the first appeal. The Nation
needs a dependable War Army and the time seems propitious to begin
its upbuilding by adopting a system against which there can be no
legal assault.
The strength required to meet any probable emergency having
been agreed upon, the force should then be apportioned in the several
arms between the Regular Army and Federal volunteers, the officers
of the volunteers or continentals being appointed by the President,
in whom authority should be vested to provide for their training in
peace and calling forth for war. Such a body of Federal volunteers
would not be subject to call from a governor of a State directly, but
will be available under the orders of the President, in conjunction .
with the Regular Army, when disorder in any State has become too
great for suppression by the local authorities.
I will say here that in 1903 I assisted in the preparation of a bill
known as the Dick bill, When a paragraph was inserted known as
section 23, providing the officers for 100,000 Federal volunteers, and
section 24 for 100,000 enlisted men. I regret to say that after that
bill had passed the House it was thrown out in the Senate on the
continued, objection of a Senator that, in his opinion, it would be
improper and not in harmony with the Constitution to have any
force of volunteers in a State, organized as troops, upon whom the
governor could not call. That was not the view held by the then
Secretary of War and others, but it was sufficient at that time, with
the aid of a very influential body of gentlemen here to help the
National Guard, to kill that part of the bill, and it was thrown out.
The effect of the creation of a body of Federal volunteers upon
the States would be to restore the Organized Militia to its true func-
tions. The question has been asked many times what would become
of the militia. I say it would be restored to its true functions, leav-
ing the war army of Regulars and United States or Federal volun-
teers to prosecute campaigns without regard to State or National
frontiers or borders.
Our people have never up to this date been put under such pres-
sure as to be willing to stand for compulsory military service such as
prevailed in the Southern Confederacy during the war, and enabled
them, with a very much less force, to stand against the North for
many years. I do not think any military man watching the course
of events in Europe, or with the knowledge possessed by our mili-
tary people before, has any doubt that the best and wisest course
would be to distribute the burdens to the whole Nation. Every young
man arriving at the age of 21 years is given the same liberty to pur-
112 PREPAIRED NESS IFOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
Sue his calling, given the same protection, and every other man, re-
gardless of his wealth or poverty, and owes the same allegiance and
liability to service. Until this militia law of 1903 was passed every.
man, as provided by the act of 1792, was under obligation to serve
in the militia. *
The CHAIRMAN. That was in the nature of a compulsory system,
was it not?
Gen. CARTER. Yes, sir; absolutely. *
The CHAIRMAN. That was the act of 1792. -
Gen. CARTER. Not only was it compulsory, but there was a cap-
tain or muster master provided for in every district of the United
States, who was required to keep a roll of all young men in his dis-
trict arrived at the age of 21, born there, or who moved into that
district from any other place. The only reason why it was not car-
ried out, in my opinion, Was that the country grew so fast that no-
body could keep up with it. The proposition is very plain that
if the country is not ready to take compulsory Service—I have seen
nothing whatever, and I have traveled a great deal in recent years,
to convince me that our people are impressed with that necessity as
yet—the next best thing is to distribute by congressional districts a
force of Federal volunteers available for any war without further
volunteering.
The CHAIRMAN. You think a compulsory system would be the
best ? - - *.
Gen. CARTER. Unquestionably. If we can not have compulsory
military service, then I say the next best thing is to distribute the
Federal volunteer force, not as has been recommended, according
to the centers of population, but put them in every congressional
district, so that every Member of Congress will know exactly what
his young men are being required to do in peace, and what is going
to be required of them in War; and what their needs are. They
would all get exactly the same treatment, and the gentlemen in
Congress will not only be interested in it, but in my opinion they
will watch it with a careful eye to see that such a system is run
economically and efficiently. -
Since the War with Spain we have been striving to transform the
militia into a Federal force to provide a system of reserves, but as
yet nothing has occurred to discredit Gen. Upton's conclusion that:
The impossibility of forming a trained reserve as in Europe and the certainty
that the States can not be relied upon ) Support a numerous and Well Orgal]ized
militia even with the aid & * * appropriated annually by the Government
should impress us with the importance of devising some method whereby in
peace and in war we may have a national force ready to increase and support
Our troops in the field.
The organization of national volunteers would give us in time of peace a
Regular Army, a reserve (national volunteers), and the militia, and would
enable us in time of war to prosecute our Campaigns With Vigor and economy
and with that regard for numan life which becomes a free people.
This policy conforms to the Constitution without evasion or sub-
terfuge and is in line with the best military judgment of the past
century. It contemplates a minimum establishment of Regulars with
a dependable reserve of trained Federal volunteers, and a constitu;
tional employment of the Organized Militia and should commend
itself to patriotic Americans who desire a military establishment
proportioned to possible contingencies.
PREPAIRED NIESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 113
When methods for raising an army were under consideration in
1861 by the Secretary of the Treasury, to whom the matter was
entrusted by the President, he had as advisers two Army officers,
Maj. McDowell, assistant adjutant general, and Capt. Franklin,
topographical engineer. Both officers recommended regimental or-
ganizations of three battalions, one of which was to remain in depot
for the purpose of recruiting and drilling. Both officers recom-
mended enlistments for three years or the war. Capt. Franklin
recommended that volunteer regiments should be considered a part
of the Regular Army, regularly numbered, with officers appointed
by the President, the troops to be apportioned to the States on the
basis of congressional representation, each organization to be kept
full by recruitment from the district within which it was raised.
The views contained in these recommendations were concurred in by
the ablest officers of the Civil War. -
The 35,000 volunteers authorized for service in the Philippines in
1899 were organized as Federal troops, with officers appointed by the
President, and the regiments numbered consecutively after the regu-
lar regiments of Infantry and Cavalry. The results were the most
satisfactory of their kind under our Government since Washington
organized the Continentals.
Senator Fletcher spoke about the long and short enlistment. The
reason for asking for a three-year enlistment for the war army
comes from the fact that during the Civil War a great many men were
brought in on 60 and 90 days’ enlistment, on 6 months’ enlistment,
and on 9 months’ enlistment. It is perfectly easy to see why the pen-
sion roll should be so abnormally large. Its size has been amazing
to people in the South who served in the Confederate Army for many
years. They wonder where all these people came from. Now, if a
man is enlisted for three years he constitutes one possible pensioner;
if for one year, three pensioners; if for six months, six pensioners,
and if for three months, 12 pensioners in the same time. You can
see what is the matter with these short enlistments.
I am definitely of the opinion that for an economical and efficient
system of carrying on war the organizations of Regulars, Federal
volunteers, and Organized Militia should be maintained, as nearly
as possible, at War strength at all times and that dependence should
be placed in regimental depots to recruit, train, and deliver at the
front the increments necessary to maintain organizations at maxi-
mum strength. 4.
I am not at all in accord, nor are any officers that I know, with
the plan of keeping up Small organizations and filling them when
the war breaks out. We must have them before we go in, because
the first few weeks you lose from 15 to 20 per cent and after the first
fight you are short from 30 to 40 per cent.
After prolonged study of Army archives and much personal con-
tact with American soldiers for half a century, it is my belief that
none of the schemes for carrying men on the rolls as reservists has
the slightest chance of material success. There is no civil or military
hierarchy of local officials in our country upon whom the burden
Of looking after reserves may be placed. None of the advocates of
Such a system has ever produced a completed study to prove its
effectiveness in an American community. Our best students and
114 PREPAIRED NESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
generals of the Civil War reached the conclusion that keeping up
the strength of regiments in the field by means of depots at home
stations is the only solution of the problem of maintaining volunteer
armies in an economical and efficient manner. Whenever we are
ready to stop chasing false gods and build our War establishment on
a basis acceptable to the people, the depot system will so far outstrip
any of the proposed reservist schemes in practical efficiency that we
will begin to reckon our defense in available men and material
instead of in visionary theories. -
Long experience as department commander has taught me that
there is no sympathy with the Government in holding men to
service whenever their families want them. When discharged, men
usually marry and have families of their own. There will be open
resentment at any attempt to force them back into service. Our
people are dispersed over a large area with an infinite variety of
standards. With a small army, the number of men possible as
reservists under the existing law may never be counted upon in time
of war to exercise a material influence in the first forward movement.
If we abandon. the reserve feature of the present enlistment law,
maintain all organizations at War strength, and preserve in the
statutes the provision, slightly modified, for a payment to men of
former service who keep themselves fit, to reenter in War, we should
soon be on a basis for prompt and efficient service. A reserve system
which compels former noncommissioned staff officers, Sergeants, and
corporals to rejoin as privates is hateful to Soldiers of spirit and a
waste of trained talent which may be better utilized as officers and
noncommissioned officers of volunteers. Through listing of non-
commissioned officers discharged with excellent character and rec-
ommended for volunteer commissions, we should provide appropriate
émployment for most of them in event of war. To all other men of
former service with good discharges, who keep themselves fit and
reenlist for war, a straight bounty of $300 should be paid upon
reenlistment, so they may make temporary provision for dependents
before going to the front. This would require no payment in peace,
nor would any duty be expected of those men, except upon reenlist-
ment for war. Discharged men usually find employment upon quit-
ting the service and should not be expected to mobilize every time we
anticipate trouble on the Mexican border, or elsewhere, but only
in event of a declaration of war. -
Senator CATRON. May I interrupt you just there, Gen. Carter?
You spoke of reserve depots. They have them in Europe, do they
not, for the reserve battalions?
Gen. CARTER. Every regiment has a depot in Europe. Even the
English Army has them.
Senator DU PoWT. Gen. Carter, referring to that bounty law, you
say they have to come back as privates. There is nothing, however,
to prevent the military authorities the moment they rejoin from rein-
stating them in the grades they had? -
Gen. CARTER. A captain of a company or a troop or battery ap-
points his own noncommissioned officers, and he always keeps all
the vacancies filled. In order to reinstate a man in his former grade
the captain would have to wait until somebody got killed or was
discharged. -
PREPAIREDINESS FOR, NATIONAL DEFENSE. 115
Senator DU PONT. Take the ordnance sergeants and all those peo-
ple; they could be reinstated instantly. There are a number of places
where they have noncommissioned officers in those depot troops.
Gen. CARTER. Yes; but the idea of this reserve was to make them
available for an immediate move forward. We could utilize them in
raising volunteers; but that is not the intent of the law. -
If the Regular Army is to be utilized at all as training Schools for
short-Service men as reservists, the extent of such utilization should
be determined before other elements of the problem, for the reason
that organizations employed for that purpose would not be available
for duty on the roster for foreign service or for the emergency of
Wall". -
Under the assumption that our Military Establishment will com-
prise the Regular Army, a reserve of Federal volunteers organized
in peace, and the militia, all to be employed as contemplated under
the Constitution and enactments in conformity thereto, the detailed
organization and strength may then be determined. Once the de-
tailed organization of units is decided upon any given strength for
the Army results by the simple process of multiplication.
The strength of the Coast Artillery should be determined by the
need for providing one relief to each battery in peace and a reserve
of volunteers for the additional reliefs required for war. Sufficient
additional officers should be added to maintain depots in the several
districts to secure and give preliminary training to recruits and to
organize during peace the reliefs of volunteers for each battery com-
prising the defenses.
The Coast Artillery Corps as now organized should be adminis-
tered by a major general, with the addition of such brigadier gen-
erals as may be necessary to command the larger coast districts.
The number of brigadier generals having been determined, they
should be obtained by transfer of brigadier generals appointed to
the list of general officers from the Coast Artillery and by selections
from colonels of that corps. Vacancies created by transfer from the
list of general officers back to the Coast Artillery Corps should be
filled by promotion of colonels of the mobile army, and appoint-
ments as general officers to exercise command in the mobile army
should thereafter be restricted to selections from the colonels of
the line, exclusive of the Coast Artillery, if we are to give that en-
couragement necessary for the highest development of character
and efficiency. - -
The mobile army should have a sufficient number of organizations
to furnish garrisons for the Philippines, Hawaii, Panama, Alaska,
and Porto Rico. Guantanamo, Guam, or other naval bases requiring
defense by the Army must, in addition to Coast Artillery, be pro-
vided with mobile organizations for land defense. There should
be a sufficient number of organizations to furnish at least three
reliefs for all over-sea garrisons. •
Now, under the peculiar system which is used for obtaining laws
governing the organization and appropriation for the support of
the Army, the ordinary appropriation for the Support of the Army
passes through the Committee on Military Affairs of the House.
Appropriations for other purposes, fortifications, barracks, quarters,
buildings, and things of that sort come through the Appropriations
II6 PREPAIREDINESS EOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
Committee. The result is cross purposes. We had a report on the
Organization of Land Forces of the United States presented to
Congress three years ago, specifying the proposed garrisons for
various places. Under that the Quartermaster General makes the
necessary estimates to build quarters, storehouses, etc., for those
garrisons. Congress has never added enough organizations to the
Army yet to furnish the required garrisons, but construction work
has been going right along.
We must have three times as many organizations in all as the
minimum we have at over-sea stations, for the reason that if you
have only twice the number, or one relief, you have not enough
available officers to run the recruiting stations, West Point and other
details, and the military schools.
We must have at least three reliefs as the minimum number of
organizations and regiments, unless you revoke the policy as to over-
Seas garrisons as provided in the report referred to.
The problem then resolves itself into fixing the number of Organi-
Zations required to maintain the Regular Army within the conti-
nental limits of the United States at such strength as to furnish the
three reliefs previously mentioned; to furnish the organizations to
be utilized as schools of instruction, if any, for short-service men; to
maintain an expeditionary force of not less than a war-strength
division in cantonment; and, in addition, such units of special arms
as will be necessary to complete the divisional organizations of both
the Regulars and the Federal volunteers when called into active
service in war. Field Artillery, Cavalry, Signal companies and
other special arms required immediately upon the emergency of war
must be maintained in sufficient numbers by the Federal Govern-
ment without regard to balancing the Regular Army. It is entirely
too expensive for the States to keep up such organizations in the
National Guard.
It behooves us to adopt such organization in each branch as will
procure the delivery of the maximum possible of controlled fire at
the proper place and time by average volunteers. The organization,
therefore, should be such as to admit of simple drill regulations easily
acquired by volunteers, and make it applicable to the Regulars.
Well-trained and disciplined Regulars will fight under any organ-
ization. - -
I have struggled for Several years to impress on the Army the
advantages of the three-unit system. I feel perfectly certain that if
the Army will adopt what I call the three-unit system of organizing
volunteers, their training would be immensely simplified.
The CHAIRMAN: You Say if the Army would adopt it. You mean
if Congress would adopt it? . -
Gen. CARTER. Yes, sir.
In Our Service the unit of threes has long been accepted as appli-
cable to all organizations above the battalion. We have three bat-
talions to the regiment, three regiments to the brigade, three brigades
to the division, and three divisions to the corps, a term we have dis-
carded without justification as a result of the Japanese-Russian war
and Substituted for it the term “field army,” which constitutes one
of the Subordinate parts of an “army' in the field. Other nations
have not followed Japan, but we Snapped at the new phrase just as
PREPAIRED NIESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSIE. 117
we adopted the German helmet after the Franco-German war of
1870–71, only to abandon it at considerable cost later.
If we may now carry the unit of threes further down in the scale
and apply it to the battalion and company we make possible the
organization of volunteers in groups of Small towns, for where a
town may not develop a company outlying villages may organize
squads and platoons or sections. The drill of a company of three
platoons or sections may be prescribed practically the same as that
of the battalion and above, and if we then organize each platoon or
section in three squads we may simplify the whole military system
of drill and maneuvers in the minds of volunteers and fit them for
duty in the higher units without undue anxiety on their part.
When we modify the battalion organization by substituting three
companies for four we have a regiment of nine companies. By the
addition of one more company we may provide properly for the ma-
chine guns, instead of as in the present makeshift organization.
Infantry officers who have been abroad and have seen the great
German regiments of that arm with 250 men to the company have
become very much impressed with them. I took the matter up very
seriously and submitted it to all the general officers in the Army, and
I found an almost unanimous opinion existing among the officers who
had been in the Civil War and who had served with Volunteers that
it was entirely wrong to adopt a system which would give these very
large companies of volunteers, and that with our organization of
3 officers to the company it was far better that the number of men
in each company should be limited to 100 or 150, so that the officers
could know the personal equation of their men.
The three-unit organization gives us an opportunity to take ad-
vantage of the monderful advance in the use of machine guns.
What I want to do is to have this three-company organization of
battalions and multiply materially the number of machine guns with
each regiment, because I do not think they should be made separate
organizations, as is the Artillery. They should be a part of the
regiment of Infantry or Cavalry and utilized under the commanding
officers of those organizations.
A depot establishment for each regiment during war is an eco-
nomic necessity. Provision should therefore be made for them in
peace, so that no change of system shall be necessary when war
comes. No other system may be expected to keep the ranks of
volunteer armies filled and thus avoid the deplorable and expensive
conditions which have characterized all our wars.
I will explain to gentlemen who are not familiar with military
terms what we mean by “depot system.” Suppose we raise a regi-
ment of Infantry, as I propose, in every congressional district and
Congress declares war. That regiment moves right out. They have
a home depot with the necessary officers and noncommissioned offi-
cers. The reserves or recruits of that regiment that has gone to the
front join the depot. The reserves and recruits are equipped and
prepared for the field right at their home station.
There is another and very important reason for recommending
the unit of threes, for when we come to apply it to the higher units
we may correct what, in my opinion, is a serious error of the present
organization of a division, our principal tactical and administrative
118 PREP.A.R.E.D.NESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
unit. The present division is too large and unwieldy to move out
promptly on the march, upon a single road, or to form for battle, or
to go into camp prepared for the contingency of attack. I have had
opportunities to command two divisions of Regulars and two of
Regulars and militia combined in recent years. In marches and
maneuvers simulating as nearly as practicable actual events of cam-
paign my opinion has been definitely formed that our fighting effi-
ciency will be increased if we cut out one regiment of Field Artillery
and Field Artillery brigade headquarters, leaving one regiment of
Light Artillery of three battalions; cut out one field company and
battalion headquarters, Signal Corps, increasing the remaining com-
pany by such personnel and reel carts and matériel as may be neces-
sary for division communication, having in mind its reduced size.
A division as now prescribed at war strength is double the size of
the Army corps which fought at Gettysburg. The crux of the matter
is that any war we may have will probably be on this continent. We
will rarely have the numerous parallel macadamized roads necessary
for such divisions as we now have. If, therefore, we return to the
corps organization, we may count upon one good road from the rail
head for corps headquarters, one division and auxiliary troops, in-
cluding heavy Field Artillery, or Mountain Artillery, whatever may
be needed for the character of operations; aero Squadrons; reserve
ammunition of all kinds; motor trucks, and all the needful equip-
ment deemed necessary in the probable theater of war.
The division should be capable of rapid movement on ordinary
country roads and be ready to fight unencumbered anywhere at any
time. We are not apt to repeat on this continent the character of
war now in progress in Europe, where several armed nations are in
a state of siege in an area not much exceeding in size the State of
Texas. We should be careful not to draw many general conclusions
from a conflict inapplicable to our large country with its widely
dispersed population.
It got to be quite a fad at one time to decry the lessons of the
Civil War. The more I have studied them the more I think we will
err if we do not give the experiences of that war earnest considera-
tion. -
The great number of calibers of field artillery now are such that
we do not want to assign them to divisions, but we do want them with
the Army, and we want them to be assigned by some central authority
who can tell us the nature and character of the campaign. A great
many authorities may agree with the gentlemen who want five guns
per thousand. I think you all know by reading the morning papers
that the one trouble had in Europe is to provide ammunition for
the guns they have. You multiply the guns unduly and you can not
get factories enough in the country to furnish ammunition, much of
which is wasted. I suppose if we could really get down to the Waste
of very expensive ammunition by field artillery in Europe it would
be so enormous that we would be amazed. I favor going back to
the corps organization we had in the Civil War and not put so much
with the division.
Senator DU PoWT. You do not advocate diminishing the total
number of guns per thousand muskets? You would have them at-
tached to the corps.
PREPAIRED NESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 119
Gen. CARTER. Yes; I just want to distribute them a little differ-
ently so as to make the division a very mobile force.
Senator CATRON. What is your idea as to the number of guns
there should be per thousand muskets?
Gen. CARTER. We have about 2.6 now.
Senator CATRON. How many would probably be required in the
event of war?
Gen. CARTER. I think if we can furnish ammunition enough for
three guns per thousand we are getting about as much as we can
carry in any transportation available beyond the rail head. Of
course, War is not going to modify all your roads in a minute. With
all the automobile traffic and all the influence exerted by automobil-
ists in this country during the last 5 or 10 years they have not been
able to get roads good enough for heavy artillery, to go over, and
When you come to put these heavy pieces of ordnance on the average
American road at this time of year or in bad weather they become
almost useless. Our armies during the War could not move always
with the light pieces they had then, and the tendency is to get heav-
ier guns. I have not the slightest idea that we would want to use
anything like the large pieces the Germans have. Our present
ordnance guns and those they contemplate getting will be good
enough for any service we may have in this country. There is noth-
ing here to batter down which might require a 17-inch gun and I do
not anticipate that we are going to send any army abroad.
Any general reorganization should include consideration of the
Philippine Scouts. When I was directed to present to the military
committees of Congress measures intended to meet the emergency in
the Philippines in 1899, the provision for enlistment of Scouts was
prepared with the understanding that it was a temporary measure,
and for that reason appointments of officers were limited to four
years. Recent conversations with many officers of Scouts passing
through Honolulu have made it known that there is a widespread
discontent among the captains, who have borne the heat and burden
of Service for many years, because majors are now being appointed
over them from young captains of Regulars of shorter service and
less experience. While the wishes and prejudices of interested parties
may not be allowed to dictate public policy, experience teaches that
the best service is always derived from a contented and ambitious
personnel.
My opinion now is that the scouts should be consolidated with the
constabulary and be supported by the Philippine treasury. If that
is not practicable, then we should organize the Scouts into regiments
to be officered from the lists of corresponding grades of the line of
the Army, the numbers in each grade being increased for that pur-
pose and details for duty with scouts made from the several lists as
now made for Regular organizations on foreign Service.
The strength of the Regular Army, exclusive of any use of regi-
ments as training schools for reservists, should be sufficient first to
provide three reliefs for organizations on foreign Service and in
Alaska, counting the two battalions of Infantry in China and the
battalion of Infantry in Alaska as one regiment. Allowing four
regiments for the Philippines and one for Porto Rico, the approved
120 PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
over-seas garrisons call for 15 regiments of Infantry. For three
reliefs, 45 regiments are therefore required.
Senator CATRON. What you call “foreign service ’’ is service in the
Philippines, Hawaii, and Panama?
Gen. CARTER. Overseas service we generally call it. It is service
in Panama and the Philippines and Hawaii.
It is most important that a complete War strength division be kept
at a central point in the United States, where it may be economically
maintained. The division should be kept intact, but the troops com-
prising it should be changed periodically. If one regiment in each
Infantry brigade is relieved each year, there would always be six
trained regiments with the division. Other units could be changed
at convenient periods. General officers and staff officers should be
relieved similarly, one-third each year. I have heretofore recom-
mended the Fort Benjamin Harrison reservation, near Indianapolis,
Ind., for a cantonment for such a division, utilizing the present per-
manent post buildings for base hospital, storehouses, etc., or for 12
regimental depots, each to have one barracks and corresponding
quarters,
I have recommended that for many years, gentlemen, for the
benefit of our higher officers and administrative and Supply depart-
ments. In 40 years I am the only general officer who has had the
opportunity to mobilize and command as much as a division of our
troops. Our generals ought to have opportunity to command
brigades and divisions, mobilized at war strength, in Order that they
may see how the work is going on every day. Our people do not
have enough chance to get acquainted with each other’s work. Our
Infantry never has had sufficient opportunity to get acquainted with
Field Artillery employment. The Cavalry has a little better oppor-
tunity because stationed with Field Artillery at Fort Riley and other
places. , -
The English have had an expeditionary corps at Aldershot for 20
or 25 years, and that was all they had in large units to send immedi-
ately to the front. We can not do better than put a division at some
place in the center of the country where it would be equally available
to go to any frontier and where it would be maintained in the dis-
trict where meat and corn and forage and everything of that SOrt
are available. I regard it as one of the most essential things to bring .
together an organization in that way, where our generals can have
experience in actual command.
The CHAIRMAN. That is, to abolish all these posts?
Gen. CARTER. I have not come to that.
The CHAIRMAN. I asked you if that is what you meant.
Gen. CARTER. No, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. Then, go on with your own view until you reach it.
Gen. CARTER. I brought with me a pamphlet which I would just
as soon take up at this time. There has been a great deal of talk
about abolishing small posts. The pamphlet which I have brought
with me is a confidential report which I assisted in preparing in
1902 with a committee of the War College Board, to whom the sub-
ject had been referred as to what disposition of the Army should
take place in order that the Quartermaster General might properly
and with some reasonable degree of economy proceed with the con-
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 121
struction of quarters. At that time this board recommended the
abolition of the posts that were deemed no longer necessary. It also
decided just how many troops were to garrison the other posts and
what barracks were to be constructed. That has been going on
during the entire period since then, and construction has followed
those lines generally. The difficulty which the Quartermaster Gen-
eral has always found is changing the number of men in organiza-
tions after plans have been made. The quarters are nearly all built
for 65 men. Provisional organizations have been added and some
particular organizations have been increased. If we can fix once
for all that every organization shall have full war strength, the
matter would be settled as to the future.
It was decided at one time as quite proper and desirable to have a
regimental post in each State, not for political reasons, but because
if we are going to have militia and volunteer regiments we ought
to have some organization of the Regular Army in the near vicinity
as a model and to assist in instruction. The regiment is the place to
develop commanders, because the brigade is not our administrative
and supply unit, the division filling those functions, and the regula-
tions contemplate that the brigade shall work together only a few
days every two or three months. So it is the company commander
and the regimental commander who get the experience that is val-
uable in war.
Senator DU PONT, I thought the argument in favor of the brigade
post, was economy, the overhead charges being the same practically
as for two or three small posts.
Gen. CARTER. I can speak of our present transportation facilities
with some knowledge, because I have just had a brigade post under
my immediate observation, and I have given it a good deal of study,
with a view to seeing how economically we could run it. We no
longer build isolated posts with large storehouses. We simply pro-
vide enough supplies by rail of the nonperishable things for 30 days
and the others every 10 days. There might be some additional stor-
age room required, but with a small army the great thing ought to
be to develop officers with self-reliance and control, officers who are
fit to command men, and this dictates the policy of giving regimental
commanders authority. There is no system on earth that is going
to develop every officer into fitness for high command any more than
every man in the ranks into a high-grade sergeant. Any intelligent
man who does not lose his head and has good common sense, good
judgment, and forcefulness should, when given the technical train-
ing, make a good commander. If he has not common sense and good
judgment, he is not going to make a good commander. Nothing
but the actual test of command will determine fitness.
As was foreseen several years ago by the general officers assembled
in Washington to consider the matter, the organization of brigades
and divisions on paper, announced in General Orders, No. 9, War
Department, 1913, has resulted in very little practical benefit as
training Schools for generals. The Second Division comprises the
only full Infantry division in the United States, while the Army
remains at its present strength. Division organizations should be
complete and the units sufficiently close together to be concentrated
Without delay or excessive expense.
23380—PT 3—16
Ø
122 PREPAIRED NESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
I recommend that the Regular Infantry shall comprise 60 regi-
ments, distributed as follows:
Fifteen regiments for over seas, Alaska and Panama garrisons.
Nine regiments to comprise the First Division, Eastern Depart-
ment, with stations north of an east and west prolongation of the
border line of ICentucky and Tennessee.
Nine regiments to comprise the Second Division, Central Depart-
ment.
Nine regiments to comprise the Third Division, Western Depart-
ment.
Nine regiments to comprise the Fourth Division, to be located in
the States south of the east and west line prolonging the border line
of Kentucky and Tennessee.
Nine regiments to comprise the Fifth or Expeditionary Division,
to be maintained in cantonment on the Fort Benjamin Harrison
Reservation near Indianapolis. There are 12 trunk-line railroads
there, and the great meat and forage markets of the world are near
and easily accessible. -
The ultimate needs of the Nation for Cavalry, Field Artillery,
Engineers, Signal and communication units, and other special arms
can be determined only after the proposed strength of the Regular
Army and the number of Federal volunteer regiments and other
organizations shall be ascertained. For the over-seas and special
garrisons and to complete the proposed concentrated division of
Regulars, 21 regiments of Cavalry will be required:
Three and one-third regiments for over-seas garrisons; one-third
regiment special service Fort Myer; one-third regiment special serve
ice Army School of the Line, Fort Leavenworth, Kans,
Five regiments to complete the proposed divisions.
Six regiments reduced Cavalry division, Southern Department.
Three regiments, Cavalry brigade, Kentucky, Tennessee, and
Northern Georgia. *
Three regiments, Cavalry brigade, Missouri, Kanses, and Colo-
rado.
All recent experiences in War indicate that we need a material
increase of Field Artillery for the existing Military Establishment.
Any increase of the Regular Army will increase that need, and the
organization of the Federal volunteers should be accompanied by
additions of regular and volunteer Field Artillery in sufficient num-
bers to provide for the first call in war. The immediate and urgent
needs of Field Artillery comprise 14 regiments of Field Artillery:
Three regiments, two light and one mountain artillery, for overseas
and Panama.
Five regiments of light artillery, to complete the proposed divi-
Sions. $$. -
Two regiments horse artillery for duty with regular Cavalry divi-
Sions.
Three regiments heavy field artillery for duty with Army corps
and expeditionary forces. -
One regiment mountain artillery for expeditionary forces.
Senator CATRON. Would you limit your Field Artillery in the
Regular Army to just what would be the necessary complement for
that many men, or would it be better to have that branch of the
PREl?ARED NESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 123
Army increased to a larger proportion than any other branch in the
Army' *
Gen. CARTER. I said we should have enough to meet the wants of
whatever additional volunteers are provided for the first line.
Senator CATRON. It strikes me we have ridiculously less artillery
than is necessary.
Gen. CARTER. The regiments of cavalry I have put in comprise a
less number of “troops” in each than now—9 troops instead of 12.
The artillery regiment at present is organized in two battalions, and
the report of the board of three years ago on proposed organization
recommends three battalions to each regiment.
Senator CATRON. If I understood you correctly, you said something
about the impossibility of instructing the Cavalry and the Artillery
in the organizations which you might form; that is, to get adequate
instruction for enough of them. Would it not be better for the Regu-
lar Army to have a larger proportion of them, both Cavalry and
Artillery, because they would be more useful in time of war?
Gen. CARTER. I have always urged that, sir; and when the organ-
ization act of February 2, 1901, was drawn up I submitted to the
Secretary of War, Mr. Root, the large number of National Guard
infantry regiments that came in as compared with the number of
Cavalry and Field Artillery organizations. The proportion of
cavalry and field artillery and special arms was so very small that
the Secretary decided to increase the artillery and cavalry at that
time.' We had not had any experience with regimental field artil-
lery then, so it was decided to recommend a single corps of artillery,
and later when a proper regimental organization of a field artillery
regiment might be determined, to divide the corps of artillery into
regiments of field and a corps of coast artillery. Since then we
have been Working along practically experimental lines. We are
getting ahead, but we have so few regiments of field artillery that
we have never been able to fill the needs of the Army. We will have
to have more field artillery in any scheme of increase, &
Senator DU PONT. I was just going to say that you stated just a
moment ago that you recommended in regiments of Field Artillery.
Gen. CARTER. That is what is required to go with these regular
divisions.
Senator DU PONT. That would be 336 guns. -
Gen. CARTER. Yes; under the present organization of an Artillery
regiment.
Senator DU PONT. How many guns would that be to a thousand
muskets? v.
Gen. CARTER. There are now 24 guns in a regiment of Field Ar-
tillery.
Senator DU PoWT. And 14 regiments would give 336 guns?
Gen. CARTER. Yes, sir.
Senator DU PoWT. Then, how many Infantry troops are those to
go with, according to your plan? zº
Gen. CARTER. I added a battalion of 12-inch guns to each regiment
in this plan for a smaller division than our present division. I do
not want to read all of the details of organization to you, because
that will have to be considered later when you come to work over the
details of your bill.
sº
124 PRE PARED N ESS FOR NATION A L DEFENSE.
Any general reorganization of the Army will be more satisfactorily
accomplished if the reorganization and strength of the line of the
Army may be first accomplished and then reorganize the Several
staff corps and departments to fulfill their functions with the in-
creased and reorganized Army. Should the proposed system of Fed-
eral volunteers be adopted, it will be necessary to take cognizance
of that fact in the reorganization of the staff, for the Federal vol-
unteers would be equipped and supplied through direct issues by the
General Government and not through the State authorities. -
The line of the Army is clearly divided into the Coast Artillery
and the mobile army. In the contemplated reorganization the
strength of the Coast Artillery should be determined by the number
of men necessary to furnish one relief to every gun which is regarded
as part of the serviceable armament intended to be manned in peace.
There should be added the number of officers necessary to maintain
depots for recruits and reservists and to organize the two reliefs of
Federal volunteers needed to reenforce the Seacoast forts. The offi-
cers and men of the Federal volunteers comprising these reliefs
should be organized when practicable at points contiguous to the
forts where they are to serve and their training provided for under
local commanders, subject to Such general instructions and supervi-
sion as the Chief of Coast Artillery may deem necessary to insure
uniformity of training. When determined, the total strength will
comprise a definite factor of the Army to be provided.
The mobile army, comprising the Infantry, Field Artillery and
Cavalry, Engineer battalions, Signal companies, sanitary and other
units, should be considered as an entirely separate problem, but,
should the total strength of the Army deemed necessary be refused
by Congress, the mobile troops necessary to fulfill the duties now
pressing upon the Nation should not be sacrificed in favor of Coast
Artillery, for the service of the harbor-defense guns can not be
relied upon without land defense by mobile troops, and Coast Artil-
lery can be made efficient quite as rapidly as the mobile troops may
be prepared for War.
I have given my views as to the organization of the Regular Army
in units of threes with reference to its application to Federal volun-
teers. The General Government has no control over the organization
of the Organized Militia beyond withholding financial assistance
from those States whose existing units do not conform to correspond-
ing units of the Regular Army. - -
None of the schemes which contemplate using the Army generally
as a training school for reserves, while burdened with its foreig.
service, border duty, and frequent uses to prevent or suppress dis-
orders beyond the power of States to accomplish, has the slightest
chance of material success. The only way to use it for training
Schools is to set aside certain regiments with a complement of officers
and noncommissioned officers and use them for training short-term
men. Those regiments required for this duty must be kept on a
separate roster. Otherwise, you break up your school every few
weeks, for enlistments for brief periods of training would not sub-
ject the men to active service of the Regular Army in its many
periods of activity in peace without any declaration of war.
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 125
Senator CATRON. Possibly your statements show the sizes and
organizations of the companies. What size would you make an
Infantry company? -
Gen. CARTER. One hundred and fifty men.
Senator CATRON. That is, 150 noncommissioned officers and
privates? -
Gen. CARTER. Yes, sir; I have specified it all in detail here, and I
will leave the information with you.
Senator DU PoWT. What is the aggregate number?
Gen. CARTER. One hundred and fifty-three men. -
Senator CATRON. And a Cavalry regiment, what would you make
that ?
Gen. CARTER. I recommend 108 men to a troop. The words “com-
pany ” and “ troops” mean the organizations constituting the com-
mand of a captain. -
The listing of noncommissioned officers discharged with excellent
characters for appointments as officers of Federal volunteers and the
payment to other men of former Service of $300 upon reenlistment
for war should bring in all who desire active service, are fit, and not
embarrassed with dependents; this without cost to the Government
during the long intervals of peace. The depot system previously
mentioned may be depended upon to fill vacancies as they occur in
the organizations if the war is a popular one. If not, then a con-
scription act which admits of no purchased substitutes will alone
enable the Nation to carry on war. In this event all the laws excusing
certain religious denominations should be repealed. Such persons,
otherwise fit, may at least render service in the Sanitary units. I
have urged for many years compulsory service in the Organized
Militia for one year prior to exercising the right of suffrage, but no
State seems interested enough to embrace such a course in its organic
laws.
The organization of Federal volunteers or continentals in every
congressional district is, in my opinion, the only solution of the
question of a reserve ready to go with the Regulars at the first call.
Such volunteers should be a strictly Federal force and each regiment
should be provided with field and staff officers and noncommissioned
staff officers from extra numbers of Regulars maintained in excess
of requirements of Regular regiments for that purpose.
The Federal volunteers in each congressional district, under the
direct control of the Government in matters of training in peace and
subject to immediate summons for war by the call of the President,
will be less expensive and much more reliable than new levies of State
volunteers. Enlistments of Federal volunteers should be for two
years, with Specific contract for automatic extension to three years
or the war, and when the present enlistment contract of the Regulars
may be modified it should specify straight enlistment for three years
with automatic extension for three years or the war in the event of
a declaration of War before expiration of enlistment. The relation of
such volunteers to the Regular Army will be so intimate as to consti-
tute them the “continentals” of future wars, a purely Federal force.
Their relation to the Organized Militia will be the same as that of the
Regular Army to the Organized Militia. The Organized Militia are
sº-
126 PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
and will remain, without an amendment to the Constitution, an un-
satisfactory element of any war force because of its restricted action
and the control of the governors over its training and appointments
of officers.
In general, there should be a reserve of supplies, embracing all the
articles necessary to put a million Regulars and Federal volunteers in
the field at once and to insure replacements and prompt arming and
equipment of a second million as rapidly as they can be drilled and
prepared for service. By the time this shall be accomplished matters
will have adjusted themselves industrially to an orderly procedure
regarding production of arms, ammunition, equipments, and supplies
for the further contingencies of any probable war.
The strength of the reserve of the Federal volunteers should be
based upon one regiment of Infantry in each congressional district
and which should be designated in a manner to appeal to local and
State pride. The regiments might properly take the numbers of the
congressional districts and the name of the States, as First Tennessee
Federal Volunteers, or Continentals, and in the cases of units smaller
than a regiment enlistments would be stimulated if an appeal to
local pride may be permitted, as, for instance, the Davidson County
Bays, the Watauga Rifles, or other local names of significance. Regi-
ments obtained in this way would show a maximum of men in ranks
and a minimum of desertions, a very serious factor in all our past
wars. The Cavalry, Coast Artillery, Field Artillery, Engineer, Sig-
nal, and sanitary and other units should be distributed to appropriate
localities. The General Government should provide the field and
staff officers and noncommissioned staff officers from the Regular
Army, the various lists being increased for that purpose. This may
be combatted from the point of view of expense and also as depriving
volunteer aspirants for commands from appointments to the grade
of colonel, lieutenant colonel, and major. It will cost more than the
present system, but will prevent inexperienced aspirants to command
from reaching responsible positions without previous military train-
ing. The justification lies in getting such value from appropriations
as may never be expected from expenditures for the Organized
Militia. The danger arising from improper appointments as officers
of volunteers has been recognized from time to time by Congress in
legislation establishing boards for the elimination of unfit officers of
State troops mustered into the service of the United States.
During the period following the Civil War the duties of the Regu-
lar Army and its limited strength did not lend encouragement to any
scheme of allotting the units to specific localities for recruiting or
territorialization. The problem has changed completely, and if we
are to render the service popular and not a thing apart from our
people the present system of general recruiting should be gradually
abolished and all organizations of Regulars territorialized. I have
never known anyone to study this subject from the line point of
view who did not reach the conclusion that territorializing or local-
izing recruiting for each organization would tend to reduce deser-
tion.
This contemplates localized recruiting through regimental depots.
Of course, it would be hopeless to attempt to concentrate the recruit-
ing of one or two million men in general recruit depots as conducted
for the existing establishment.
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 127
The CHAIRMAN. Gen. Carter, I just want to ask one question in
that connection that has to do with the continental army. Take a
State like Nevada, for instance, I think it has only one Congressman.
Senator WARREN. There are three States in the Union that have
Only One Congressman each.
Senator DU Pont. My State—Delaware—has only one. -
The CHAIRMAN. But that is a small State. In a State like Nevada,
General, taking a congressional district as a basis for this organized
force, what would you do in a State like that? *
Gen. CARTER. My memory is that when we figured out the total
population of the United States in 1898 and made the apportion-
ment for the War with Spain the call for the number from Nevada
was about 250, and so they raised a Nevada battery instead of a regi-
ment of Infantry, and it did good service in the Philippines.
The CHAIRMAN. You would assume that that service would be
rendered in a very contracted area, like the larger towns?
Gen. CARTER. No ; it would work in average communities. Nevada.
is an exception in every way, yet I think the State would make good
under the Federal volunteer system. You strike the same thing if
you have compulsory military service. There is no use having a law
for compulsory training if you can not have somebody to instruct
the men who report. If you have compulsory training it is proposed
to give it to every man when he arrives at a certain age, and you
have to hunt him out on the back farms, cattle ranges, and every-
where else. In the scheme for Federal volunteers you can provide
for a force of 600,000 or 800,000, or 2,000,000, if you want to. I
assume that no one contemplates compulsory service in the Regular
Army, but only compulsory training of young men to make them
available in War. $
The CHAIRMAN. And yet you feel that that is really the system?
Gen. CARTER. I have seen nothing to justify the belief that our
people as yet appreciate the value of either compulsory service or
compulsory training, and I say that what we need now is some
prompt action which will give us a Federal volunteer system upon
which to build. In War if the districts do not supply enough then
a draft act could compel service to fill the organizations short of
men. If you decide we do not want any more preparedness than
we have now we shall have to go on and do the best we can. But
I think that the Federal volunteers enlisted in each congressional
district is the most practical system on which to base compulsory
service in event of necessity in war.
The bills for the reorganization of the Infantry, Cavalry, and
Field Artillery recommended by me as a minimum contemplates the
following strength of the mobile Army, exclusive of engineers, signal,
sanitary, and other minor units:
60 regiments of Infantry, 1,474 enlisted men each____________________ 88, 440
21 regiments of Cavalry, 1,163 enlisted men each______________________ 24, 423
14 regiments of Field Artillery, 1,330 enlisted men each_______________ 1S, 620
Total - --------------------------------- --- 131,483
Senator WARREN. That is the fighting strength without maintain-
ing a full corps?
Gen. CARTER. That is full-strength organizations under the three-
unit system previously explained by me, not including sanitary,
supply, and other staff units.
198 PREPAIRED NIESS FOR N AT I () N A L DEFENSE.
Senator WARREN. Have you figured what would be the total pay
roll of the Army' - *
Gen. CARTER. No, sir; I have an analysis with me of the several
proposed bills. -
Senator WARREN. Approximately, it would be 30,000 added to
that?
Gen. CARTER. Yes; it would probably require that many Coast
Artillery
Senator WARREN. I was speaking of everything except the Coast
Artillery.
Gen. CARTER. It would be a total of about 150,000. But I do not
recommend that we attempt to reorganize the staff corps and depart-
ments at the same time we do the line. I think we ought to reorgan-
ize the line and determine just what we are going to have, including
continentals, and then build a staff on that.
Senator WARREN. You would make it proportionate?
Gen. CARTER. Yes, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. You formulated a bill yourself, General, did
you not?
Gen. CARTER. I formulated a bill for each arm; yes, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. Did you put them in separate bills?
Gen. CARTER. I have plans for the organization of each branch
under the unit-of-threes system which I claim simplifies both organi-
zation and drill, and all can go as parts of one bill.
Senator WARREN. I think you gave also your estimate as to what
would be required for Coast Artillery' -
Gen. CARTER. Yes, sir; officers and men for every battery of guns
installed for harbor defense, and intended and included as part of
latest scheme of defense. &
In event of an increase of the Army each branch of the service
usually expects to profit by its own increases, and any advantage over
other branches is accepted as a matter of good fortune. Marked
differences in promotion in the several arms is not for the best inter-
ests of the service as a whole, and provision should be made to enable
the Secretary of War to regulate the matter by advancement of
officers to original vacancies in other branches to equalize promo-
tions. The detached list will be large enough to provide duty for
officers without actually assigning them to other branches. \
It should be borne in mind, when the reorganization of Staff Corps
and departments shall take place, that the General Staff Corps has
never been embraced under the provisions of the act of February 2,
1901, which authorizes the filling of vacancies in the line created by
details to the Staff Corps and departments. I prepared a bill for
this purpose under the direction of the Secretary of War in 1910
and was given a hearing to explain the measure to the Senate Mili-
tary Committee, I think, during the month of May, which hearing
was printed, and the bill was duly passed by the Senate, fixing the
status of the General Staff Corps as indicated above, but the House
Military Committee declined to consider the matter at that time.
The General Staff was subsequently reduced in numbers, due to the
peculiar conditions existing at the War Department at that time.
The original organization should be restored and the number of
officers in the General Staff Corps increased to meet any increase of
PREPAIRED NESS FOR NATION A.J., DEFENSE. 129
the Army, provided the latter shall be decided upon. I mention
the matter at this time in order that it may be of record when the
iºnization of the Staff Corps and departments shall be under-
taken.
I would like to read what the President said on this subject of
preparedness in his address to Congress,
The CHAIRMAN. That is the President’s last message that you
refer to ?
Gen. CARTER. The President's last message; yes, sir. -
Great democracies are not belligerent. They do not seek or desire War.
Their thought is of individual liberty and of the free labor that suppórts life
and the uncensored thought that quickens it. Conquest and dominion are
not in Our reckoning Or agreeable to Our principles. But just because We
demand unmolested development and the undisturbed government of our own
lives upon our own principles of right and liberty, we resent, from whatever
Quarter it may come, the aggression We Ourselves will not practice. We
insist upon Security in prosecuting our self-chosen lines of national develop-
ment. We do more than that. We demand it also for Others. We do not
confine our enthusiasm for individual liberty and free national development
to the incidents and movements of affairs which affect Only Ourselves. We
feel it wherever there is a people that tries to walk in these difficult paths of
independence and right. From the first we have made common cause with
all partisans of liberty on this side of the sea, and have deemed it as impor-
tant that Our neighbors should be free from all Outside domination as that
We Ourselves should be ; have set America aside as a whole for the uses of
independent nations and political freemen. *
Out of such thoughts grow all Our policies. We regard War merely as a
means of asserting the rights of a people against aggression. And We are as
fiercely jealous of coercive or dictatorial power within our own Nation as of
aggression from without. We will not miaintain a standing army except for
uses which are as necessary in times of peace as in times Of War, and We shall
always see to it that our military peace establishment is no larger than is
actually and continuously needed for the uses of days in Which no enemies
move against us. But we do believe in a body of free citizens ready and
Sufficient to take care of themselves and of the governments which they have
set up to serve them. In our constitutions themselves we have commanded
that “the right of the people to kéep and bear arms shall not be infringed,”
and Our confidence has been that Our Safety in times Of danger WOuld lie in
the rising of the Nation to take care of itself, as the farmers rose at Lexington.
But war has never been a mere matter Of men and guns. It is a thing Of
disciplined might. If our citizens are ever to fight effectively upon a sudden
summons, they must know how modern fighting is done, and what to do when
the Summons comes to render themselves immediately available and innmedi-
ately effective. And the Government must be their servant in this matter,
must supply them with the training they need to take care of themselves and
of it. The military arm of their Government, which they will not allow to
direct them, they may properly use to serve them and make their independ-
ence secure, and not their own independence merely, but the rights also of
those with whom they have made common cause, should they also be put in
jeopardy. They must be fitted to play the great rôle in the world, and particu-
larly in this hemisphere, for which they are qualified by principle and by
chastened ambition to play.
I have tried to base my studies on practicable things that can
be worked out. I believe that the proposed continental army has
been very much misunderstood. My recommendation to the Secre-
tary of War was to organize a body of Federal volunteers or con-
tinentals in each congressional district. If that plan is adhered to—
having a regularly organized regiment in each district—instead of
trying to provide two or three months of intensive training each
year, it will give us a more dependable force for immediate service,
because under my plan the regiments will be organized with all
130 PREPAIRED NIESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
the officers and men near their homes and holding the personal in-
terest of their own neighbors. A fine lot of young fellows have
gone into the National Guard, but there is always difficulty to keep
up the minimum numbers set by the War Department for each
organization. The militia deserve a great deal of credit and better
recognition for devoting their time and strength in holding organi-
zations together, but they can not get them up to full strength,
except in a few special instances, unless there is a War. If there is
a war the untrained boys will then come in to fill the ranks. In an
industrial district, gentlemen, you know very well that young men
who are getting from $2 to $6 a day are not able to give up two or
three months for consecutive intensive training. Who is going to
pay them, and who is going to hold their jobs for them? It is
claimed that it is not patriotic to discharge a man absent from his
job for such a purpose. Why should a man who has a lot of his
employees go off for three months pay them : It is not the business
of individual employers to take care of that sort of thing.
The camp at Plattsburg Barracks opened a great many people's
eyes, but the gentlemen who went there are not the men who are
going into the ranks to do the fighting unless we have compulsory
Service. My proposition for a Federal force is to provide each
regiment with a regular commander and the proper staff and non-
commissioned staff and train them at home. If a regiment goes to
War the people of the district know that the men are to be com-
manded by an experienced officer of the Regular Army. The junior
officers are going to be selected in time of peace and tried out.
Your young men will have been trained to shoot and care for them-
Selves in the field by selected Regulars qualified to prepare men for
War. The instruction would be given having regard to local con-
ditions and convenience in each district.
Senator WARREN. I did not understand you very clearly, General,
but I thought you referred to the matter of horses and armory for
the militia and stated that the United States should pay for them
wholly instead of the States being called upon to bear that expense.
Gen. CARTER. Efforts of States to keep Field Artillery and Cavalry
will always fail of success. These branches are too expensive and
those for the first line should all be Regulars and Federal Volun-
teers maintained by the United States.
Senator WARREN. Is it not proper to differentiate between Infantry
and Cavalry and Artillery when it comes to the State militia? It
is very distressingly expensive for the sparsely settled smaller States
to undertake to keep up an organization of either Artillery or Cav-
alry. It seems to me they ought to have more help from the United
States than they have now.
Gen. CARTER. I think that there are many localities where if the
Government provides for organization of Federal volunteers you
can get field batteries organized. You can have standing gun drill
enough to qualify them to join regular batteries in camps of instruc-
tion, and in case of war assign them to the regiments. I would not
undertake to create Cavalry and Field Artillery regiments for any
short campaign. A year would be too soon to expect them to become
fit, but they might be drilled under regular officers and qualified
enough to take their places by increasing the number of batteries to
PREPAIRED NIESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 131.
the battalion and troops to the squadron. You can readily get up a
Cavalry troop in many localities, but you can not get a Cavalry regi-
ment ready for the first move forward.
Senator FLETCHER. What becomes of the National Guard under
your plan'
Gen. CARTER. It stays just where it is. You can call it the National
Guard or anything else you wish, but it is the active armed militia
of the State, under the governor of the State, available for State
purposes, and in event of invasion, insurrection, or disorder for
Federal purposes.
Senator BECKHAM. What does the Government expend now an-
nually for the National Guard?
Gen. CARTER. The regular annual appropriation is about $4,000,000,
The District of Columbia Militia is allowed to draw out of the
Regular Army supplies anything that the Secretary of War aps
I’OVCS.
p Senator BECKHAM. Your idea would be to keep that up!
Gen. CARTER. I would furnish the National Guard with their arms
and equipment and whatever is necessary to maintain them. We do
not want the continentals or Federal volunteers to have to turn out
and put down strikes and disorders of that kind in the States, unless
of so serious a nature that the President orders out Regulars. The
necessity for frequent use of the militia to put down strikes is one of
the causes of inability to keep their ranks filled.
The CHAIRMAN. The members of the labor unions will not join.
Gen. CARTER. Labor unions not only object to service by members,
but employers are afraid of being boycotted if their employees serve,
But I feel sure men will go in for war purposes as United States
volunteers. Should labor organizations antagonize the system of
Federal Volunteers then we may know that their leaders are not
guided by patriotism.
The CHAIRMAN. You think the National Guard is very much more
efficient than the men were in colonial days?
Gen. CARTER. They could shoot mighty well in colonial days, but
the improvement in the National Guard as a military asset in the last
20 years has been very great.
The CHAIRMAN. Has not that been due to the assistance it gets
from the National Government?
Gen. CARTER. To a great extent but not wholly. Subsequent to
the War with Spain there was a great deal of enthusiasm all over
the country about improving the militia.
The CHAIRMAN. I belonged to the National Guard four years,
General, before they received any aid from the Federal Government,
and I know they are much more efficient now because they have
some equipment that they did not have then.
Gen. CARTER. Yes, sir; but I want to say to you—and you probably
know it better than I do—that there is no State in the Union that
provides for its National Guard such armories as your State does,
All over Oregon they have beautiful armories provided by the com-
munities.
Senator DU PONT. General, I do not quite understand about your
Federal Volunteers. These men are to come forward and volun-
teer for that service and are to be enlisted then?
132 PREPARED NIESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
Gen. CARTER. Yes, sir.
Senator DU PoNT. How are the officers appointed, the noncommis-
sioned officers? - -
Gen. CARTER. The officers are all appointed by the War Depart-
ment. I would not have the President sign all these commissions,
because it is difficult for him to sigh even those in the Regular Army.
Senator DU Pont. They are subject to an examination, of course, as
to qualifications?
Gen. CARTER. Yes, sir; my idea is to appoint a regular officer as
colonel of every one of the regiments and to send him to the con-
gressional district with a proper staff to organize and train his
regiment. All aspirants for commissions should be tested and tried
out by him. .
Senator DU Pont. I refer to the captains and lieutenants—the com-
pany officers.
Gen. CARTER. They are to be selected under any proper restrictions
which the War Department may prescribe from qualified candidates
in the district where the organization is raised.
Senator DU PONT. There would be no election by the men.
Gen. CARTER. No, indeed. - -
The CHAIRMAN. Do you approve the scheme of the Secretary of
War in its entirety with reference to the constitution of this conti-
nental army?
(¥en. CARTER. I think the chairman was out at the time I made a
statement in reference to that. I said I did not think it was possible
to make a success of the intensive training scheme for continentals
for two or three months each year. In the agricultural districts the
young men can not quit their farms at that time, and in the indus-
trial districts the men would lose from $2 to $6 a day, and there is
tiobody to pay them for that loss or in event of loss of their em-
ployment. #
The CHAIRMAN. The Secretary of War said that he had just
simply fixed a specified time in his bill in order to have a basis upon
which to work.
Gen. CARTER. I think the elements are all here, but my view is
that men should be enlisted for two years for continuous service,
just as a National Guard man is. In the country you can train him
when he is not at harvest and planting. In the towns you would
have to drill him generally at night when through with his work.
Senator FLETCHER. How much drilling would that contemplate if
he were enlisted for two years? -
Gen. CARTER. In two years, if he is enthusiastic, a man would get
about as much drill as he would in six months intensive drilling.
Senator FLETCHER. But you would have to provide armories and
equipment, and all that Sort of thing.
Gen. CARTER. I think that for the Federal volunteers we would
not have so much club feature and not such fine buildings as city
armories usually are. We could hire State armories in the cities or
other buildings as they were needed. There would not be so much
indoor work with volunteers. As much as possible would be done
in camp. There would have to be buildings for each regimental
depot where guns and property may be cared for. Many city armo-
ries are built to withstand attack of rioters, which makes them ex-
pensive.
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. - 133
The CHAIRMAN. If the Secretary had power to prescribe the times,
they could live in tents most of the time. -
Gen. CARTER. I would leave it to the colonel of the regiment to
train them whenever he could. If you put a good, active officer as
colonel of Federal volunteers, and give him a staff that would be on
their mettle in getting the recruits and training them, I believe you
would soon have a dependable military asset out of it. On the other
hand, if you just call men out and drill them for two or three months
and turn them loose without permanent officers and a regular or-
ganization I do not know how you are going to keep track of them
or how long they would require to be ready to go to War in an
emergency.
The CHAIRMAN. What do you think of the proposition that was
made yesterday that men should serve so many years with the colors
and so many years in the reserve, and that during the reserve period
they be placed on a small salary of, say, $30 a year, and a record to
be kept of them, and they to constitute the reserve?
Gen. CARTER. I studied that reserve proposition when I was Assist-
ant Chief of Staff, at the time the law was passed to establish the
reserve, and I accumulated some rather informing and unsatisfactory
data. We have not now any practicable way whereby we can keep
track of them. We have endeavored to connect them with the post-
masters. We tried to run it with marshals during the Civil War,
so far as drafted men were concerned. There was much violence
and resistance and little benefit to the troops in the field. I do not
believe they can be run by the marshals or postmasters in time of
peace or war. That is one reason why I have always felt that Col.
du Pont's idea was the safest, so far as the Regular Army is con-
cerned. Do not pay them anything until they come back, and then
give it to them in bulk, if they have kept fit.
The CHAIRMAN. That is the old bounty system that Washington
bemoaned, and so have all the officers in the Army since then.
Gen. CARTER. No ; there is this marked difference: You train a
man first and then pay him, if needed in war, for keeping himself fit.
Under the bounty system a man is paid to come in and get trained
afterwards. New York paid as a State $75,000,000 on that account
in the Civil War. - *
Senator DU Pont. You do not pay a cent of bounty unless you
have a trained and efficient soldier.
Gen. CARTER. He is trained and goes away, and then if he keeps
himself fit and comes back and passes your examination you give
him the money. A great many of these men get married and have
to give up their positions to come back in service. There is a feeling
among soldiers of, why doesn’t the other fellow come in, too, if they
take me back.
The CHAIRMAN. That always was the power of compulsory train-
ing. It makes them all act alike. -
Gen. CARTER. I have had much correspondence from mothers and
sisters and families of the men. They want to get them out, and
the men often want to get out. The minute you abolish discharge
by purchase or order you increase your desertions. We have a great
many theories suggested, but those who have to go and work them out
with the men find that soldiers are the same old human element all
the time. - -
134 - PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
Senator FLETCHER. I have a weakness for the National Guard. I
do not like to see them discouraged. Do I understand you to Say
that you would not have any of the men in this continental force out
of the National Guard? . -
Gen. CARTER. I said I would not have them try to serve two masters
at the same time. I would try and get every young lieutenant and
captain and man, in the National Guard that wanted to come, and
assume that the National Guard will eventually be composed of the
men who have been in the continentals and passed on out, and who
are willing to give the benefit of their training to the State when they
do not want to leave it on foreign Service on account of their families
and business. I hope eventually to see the National Guard with
nothing but trained continentals gone into the State forces and get
the young men in the Federal forces. -
The CHAIRMAN. Do you not think that the National Guard is worth
all it costs if it only provides 33% per cent of its enrollment?
Gen. CARTER. I think in any popular war the organizations of the
National Guard would eventually be filled up if they volunteered for
Federal service. In my recent book, ' The American Army, and
many magazine articles, I have set forth the defects of the constitu-
tional militia system. The militia deserves credit for what it accom-
plishes, but it is a professional folly to continue the present situation.
It required some courage to take the stand I did, but a great many
converts have come into camp of late.
The CHAIRMAN. What percentage of the National Guard went
into the Volunteer forces in the Spanish-American War?
Gen. CARTER. I doubt whether there were over 55; certainly not
Over 60.
The CHAIRMAN. It was stated here the other day that there were
only 33% per cent. I thought that was very Small.
Gen. CARTER. I think it was more than that.
Senator THOMAs. It is different in different States? -
Gen. CARTER. Yes. Many came along with very nearly full or-
ganizations; but they were not all old National Guard men. Many
were recruited up quickly.
The CHAIRMAN. Assuming that 55 per cent went in, were they
men who were fairly well trained?
Gen. CARTER. No; but they were better than the new volunteers.
Those now in the service are infinitely better trained and equipped
than those that were in the service in 1898. The National Guard has
improved immensely. .
The CHAIRMAN. That is what I thought. What I am getting at
is to ascertain if it is not true that the money that the Federal Gov-
ernment pays to the National Guard is not money well spent, as you
regard it, or money wasted in any degree?
Gen. CARTER. The results, while not a satisfactory national mini-
tary asset, suggest that nothing be done to stop helping the militia.
I commanded the camps of instruction on the big Indianapolis res-
ervation for two years. I used to watch those men come in and get
off the trains and go into camp and draw their rations. There was
an immense advance in efficiency over former years. They are waste-
ful; they throw away their bread and destroy things, but no more
so than any other young men would be if you took them into camp.
They would settle down in actual service.
PREPARED NIESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 135
The CHAIRMAN. Gen. Wood stated that no money ought to be con-
tributed to the National Guard unless they were put absolutely under
Federal control. - -
Gen. CARTER. I do not agree with him. We need every mili-
tary organization in this country. I want to build up, not destroy.
The CHAIRMAN. Gen. Carter, have you analyzed these three sev-
eral bills? Are you in a position where you can advise us whether
any of them are properly drawn? -
Gen. CARTER. I have a copy of an analysis showing the present
status and the changes each one of these bills effects. I do not think
any one of them as yet covers the ground. The essentials are there,
but need working into shape.
The CHAIRMAN. Pardon me. Have you analyzed any of them?
Gen. CARTER. I have studied them all. I do not think that any
of them are yet drawn with the detail that is necessary for proper
legislation.
The CHAIRMAN. That is what we want to get at. After we have
these general hearings we Want to get you gentlemen who are ex-
perts on the subject to try to assist in writing out a bill with the
proper details.
Gen. CARTER. I will be very glad to help you. -
The CHAIRMAN. That is what we want and we want it very badly.
We may have our own opinion as to the number of men -
Gen. CARTER, Yes; you fix the policy and the numbers you want,
and we can prepare the technical details so that they will work and
pass the Treasury Department. The most mortal enemy to military
efficiency is fear of the Comptroller of the Treasury. That is why
we have to draw all our bills so carefully.
The CHAIRMAN. I find that they change their minds every time
the administration changes. -
Senator WARREN. Sometimes several times during an adminis-
tration. -
Gen. CARTER. I considered it a patriotic duty to write my last
book on the Army and took leave of absence to write. The Treasury
took away my usual allowances when I got through—probably more
than I will get out of the book from royalties.
Senator WARREN. I want to ask you the same question that I pro-
pounded a couple of days ago. If we are to have a continental army
in which will be enlisted young men and men that have not yet taken
regular vocations, those that have time to go to training, and so
forth, What do you think about having a minimum age of, say, 16
or, possibly, 17 instead of 18 years? It has been my observation that
the young fighters are fully as valiant as the older ones and 'fully
&S Patriotic. . ~
Gen. CARTER, I think that a man, to stand the rigors of war, ought
to be 21 years old before he takes the field; but I think it would be
very good to train him at the ages suggested and let those of suffi-
cient physical strength go to the front at once. I do not presume
that if there is a war we will be a nation in arms besieging another
in trenches as in Europe to-day. We will have more open fighting,
more opportunity for flank movements—attacks are all frontal in
Furope to-day.
136 PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
Senator WARREN. I am rather assuming that this is for the pur-
pose of preparedness rather than for fighting and actual field serv-
ice, and such young men would take to instruction of any kind better
under 21 than if they were above 21, and we would have more en-
listments and they would come more rapidly.
Senator DU Pont. As Senator Warren has just said, would not
that apply very well to your proposed Federal volunteers, allowing
them to come in at the age of 17, if they are physically qualified, of
course, and then you would be instructing the youth in the art.
Gen. CARTER. I think lots of boys of 16 are eminently qualified
for enlistment in a force of Federal volunteers under regular officers
to look after them.
Senator WARREN. I hope you do not understand that I refer to
the Regular Army. I refer entirely to volunteers.
Gen. CARTER. I have had the Ohio, West Virginia, ICentucky,
Illinois, Wisconsin, Iowa, and Michigan Militia in camps of instruc-
tion, and there were many young boys who were apparently under
18 years old. They claimed to be old enough to enlist in the Na-
tional Guard. They were all enthusiastic youngsters and went
through everything.
Senator WARREN. In the Civil War those boys under 20 fought
like fiends. -
Gen. CARTER. I did not have a chance to see much fighting, but I
was 12 years and 6 months old when I went in.
Senator FLETCHER. What is your judgment about disarmament
when this trouble is all over ? .
Gen. CARTER. It is like other desirable ideals. We cherish the
hope, but are not assured of the reality. All that is worth living for
is possessed by the virile fighting nations that have armies and
navies. It is foolish to talk disarmament to those people, for they
control the sea and the land and all trade routes. Trade is the goal,
and unless we are prepared we will fall out in the race.
Senator THOMAS. In other words, General, as long as men trade
men will fight?
Gen. CARTER. Every nation wants to take those steps that will
benefit its own people; and the way it benefits its people is to give
them the necessary opportunities for trade; to make money. With
money we buy things that increase comfort and take care of the
growing population.
Senator THOMAS. In benefiting its own people it necessarily in-
jures others. - -
Gen. CARTER. Any nation that thinks it can grow up and get all
the good things of the earth without having to fight to get them and
later defend them is like an ostrich with its head in the sand.
Senator DU PoWT. That is absolutely right.
Senator THOMAs. Is any system of preparedness for defense or
for offense efficient unless the Government controls the avenues of
communication? #
Gen. CARTER. I do not exactly catch your meaning, Senator
Senator THOMAS. We have systems of telegraph and telephone.
The Government does control many of them. Is not modern pre-
paredness a movement and an institution which requires, among
other things, Government control of the lines of communication and
of intelligence?
PREPAIREDINESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 137
Gen. CARTER. You have absolutely got to control those things.
Senator THOMAS. I am concerned with preparation for defense. I
am unable to see really wherein we are going to make that effective
preparation which is thought to be necessary to meet some unknown
and possible enemy unless we act upon the best experience of the past
and to have an army, Small or large, which we can not concentrate
here, there, or yonder, as may be necessary, and at the same time have
our lines of communication and intelligence in the hands of private
parties, so that the enemy may use them just as well as anyone else,
seems to me to be an incomplete system.
Gen. CARTER. Senator, I proposed officially something in that line
several years ago. I took it up with a Senator that I thought might
wish to advance it. He told me that the feeling at that time toward
the railroads would render useless any effort of the sort I proposed.
You know the Government practically controls the telegraph lines
by having the Postmaster General fix a rate for all Government mes-
sages, and all telegraph lines that do not accept that, of course do not
get any Government business. They all accept it. All that you have
got to do is just say Government messages shall take precedence over
everything else.
I proposed that we follow that up and say to all railroads in the
United States that are land grant, or bond aided, or free railways,
“We are going to get together and make an adjustment of this mat-
ter on some terms, and not keep a corps of tariff experts working out
your affairs all the time, a very complicated business. We are going
to fix a rate of 2 or 24 cents a mile for all Government passenger
business, and fix a freight tariff, so that the railroad that runs across
a great desert will not be embarrassed against the railroad that has
a very large traffic in a well-populated district.” -
And then the Secretary of War, or any department it may be
turned over to, may fix a rate each year to take in the new railroads
that are built, and all Government freight and troops and passengers
will be sent by the most convenient route instead of having to ad-
vertise and ship around crooked routes to get a cheap rate. The rail-
roads will all come under the Government passenger and freight
tariff and simplify both traffic and accounts.
Senator THOMAS. That may be; but to my mind the best way is
for the Government to take over the railroads, if we are going into
the policy of preparedness in such Wise as to make it effective.
Senator DU PoWT. You mean the Government to take over all the
transportation systems of the country? -
Senator THOMAS. Certainly; if we are going to prepare, let us
prepare. *
Senator WARREN. You would not put that in the bill providing for
the Army, would you?
Senator THOMAs. I do not know that I would.
Gen. CARTER. I understand that that was one of the many objects
of the investigation going on now to get the physical valuation of
the railroads. Of course, protection from stock-watering operations
is involved.
Senator THOMAs. The object of that I do not think ever took into
contemplation the military side of the question.
Gen. CARTER. I have run across all the little intricate things that
tease a man when he is in command. I was ordered to assemble a
23380—PT 3—16—3*
138 PREPAIRED NESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
division at or near Galveston, ready to go to Vera Cruz. I arrived
there, and as the troops were getting off the trains I tabulated up
and found I was short most of my mounted troops. When I came to
locate them I found that they had to pass through several western
States that require the Government to stop its trains and take off the
animals. Your State does, Senator. It requires that they water them
and feed them every 24 hours. We can not run a military expedition
in peace without running into State laws. The railroads would not
run trains through in violation of law. -
Senator THOMAs. In the Sunday Supplement of the New Yor
Times last Sunday there was a very intelligent article upon this
subject, and there it appeared that when the troops were being moved
from Tampa to Montauk the officer in charge at Tampa made his
arrangements locally to move two regiments a day from Tampa to
Montauk. At the end of the second day, or about that time, he was
wired by the officers of the Pennsylvania Co., probably the most effi-
cient railroad company on this continent, to cut down his mobility
to 500 a day, otherwise he would swamp the business of the road.
Senator BECKHAM. You recommend a certain increase in the Reg-
ular Army. To what extent are those increased over the present
establishment in number?
Gen. CARTER. In the matter of regimental organizations, I recom-
mend doubling the Infantry, for instance, but I reduce the number
of companies in each regiment.
Senator BECKHAM. I mean in the aggregate of men.
Senator DU PoWT. The number of men, he means.
Gen. CARTER. About 45,000 more than present strength.
Senator BECKHAM. That is an increase over the present establish-
ment. And then you favor this continental army plan as the depart-
ment recommends? -
Gen. CARTER. Absolutely, so far as federalization is concerned. I
do not think it is practicable to have this intensive training of two
months and then let men disappear for a year. I want the men
enlisted just as in the National Guard; to be a Federal force in each
congressional district. -
Senator BECKHAM. Then you favor a continuance of the State
militia?
Gen. CARTER. Oh, yes; the Organized Militia of the States. The
States would determine the strength desired in each.
Senator BECKHAM. You think that with this increase We will be
reasonably prepared for emergencies? - -
Gen. CARTER. I think that if after a fair trial we can not do it,
Senator, we will then have to take up the subject of compulsory
service or conscription. I do not think we are prepared at this time
to give the instruction that you would need under a compulsory
system. I think we ought to give our young men a chance to come
into this Federal volunteer service and try it out. I would not urge
it solely on my own experience. Gen. Grant recommended sending
all the Regulars back to their own districts to raise volunteers as
soon as the war broke out. Instead of doing that, I want to raise
them in time of peace. Gen. Sherman and everybody who has ever
studied the question reached that conclusion. The idea did not
originate with me; I simply expanded and developed it.
PREPAIRED NESS FOR, NATIONAL DEFENSE. 139
Senator CATRON. Are there 30 or 31 regiments now?
Gen. CARTER. Thirty of Infantry and one more in Porto Rico of
natives.
Senator DU Pont. What is your opinion of the efficiency of the
; Rican soldiers, judging by the two battalions that have been
I’3,1S6C *
Gen. CARTER. I was down there once and saw that regiment. I
think they are about like the Filipinos. They make pretty good
soldiers for tropical service; they are all right.
Senator CATRON. You mean the Porto Ricans?
Gen. CARTER. Yes, sir.
Senator DU PONT. You favor their being made into a whole regi-
ment, do you not?
Gen. CARTER. Yes, sir.
Senator DU Pont. I would like to ask you what you think of in-
cluding two regiments of Porto Ricans, one to be stationed on the
island, if necessary, and one to be sent to the Canal Zone, both
tropical service, so they could relieve each other?
Gen. CARTER. Our experience in dealing with native troops is that
they are usually all married, and in taking any of these people away
from their homes you have got to take all the families with them.
They get married very young.
Senator DU PoWT. The Porto Ricans the same way?
Gen. CARTER. I think so. All the Filipino boys and girls get mar-
ried very young, and if you move them to another place those that
do not take wives with them seem very soon to get married.
(Whereupon, at 4 o’clock and 25 minutes, the committee took a
recess until to-morrow, Friday, January 21, 1916, at 2 o’clock p. m.)
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
FRIDAY, JANUARY 21, 1916.
UNITED STATES SENATE,
CoMMITTEE ON MILITARY AFFAIRs,
Washington, D. C.
The committee met, at the expiration of the recess, at 2 o’clock
p. m., Senator Geo. E. Chamberlain (chairman) presiding.
The CHAIRMAN. Gentlemen of the committee, Gen. Scott, Gen.
Bliss, and some other officers are present, and the committee is ready
to hear Gen. Scott. -
STATEMENT OF MAJ. GEN. HUGH L. SCOTT, CHIEF, GENERAL
s STAFF CORPS,
The CHAIRMAN. General, you were present the other day when
Secretary Garrison testified and when the purposes of these meet-
ings were stated. The committee would be very much pleased to
have you discuss the subject of Army reorganization or anything
connected with it, as you may see fit.
Gen. SCOTT. I have a statement I would like to make to you.
The CHAIRMAN. You may proceed in your own way, General.
Gen. SCOTT. Mr. Chairman and gentlemen of the committee, in the
absence of specific instructions as to the order in which subjects will
be taken up by your committee for discussion, I have assumed that
the subject of military policy will be taken up first and that details
as regards the subject of organization will be taken up later and
submitted as a supplement to this statement.
I believe that our military needs should be met by two classes of
soldiers—a well-trained Regular Army and a force of citizen soldiery
partially trained in time of peace for service in war.
I do not believe that the citizens of the Republic should count upon
the use of professional soldiers as the sole or even as their main re-
liance for defense, unless by compulsory Service throughout the Re-
public, which is by far the best method, as every soldier will agree
and to which every important country except England and the
United States long ago Saw the importance of and England is com-
ing to now too late. The right of a citizen, to the freedom of a
republic and to the privileges and benefits arising therefrom involve
a responsibility for certain military Service in defense of that gov-
ernment. •– “ - - *
23380—PT, 4–16—1 * 141
142 PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
The functions of the Regular Army have been well stated by the
General Staff in its “statement of a proper military policy,” wherein
they are enumerated as follows: .
(a) To furnish the entire strength of our garrisons outside of the United
States proper both in peace and War. . . *
f (b) To garrison our harbor defenses within the United States proper in time
Oi OéâlC62. -
§ To furnish detachments of mobile forces in time of peace sufficient for
the protection of these harbor defenses and naval bases against naval raids
Which, under modern Conditions, may precede a declaration of War.
(d) To furnish Sufficient mobile forces to protect our principal cities by pre-
Venting the landing Of hostile expeditions for their capture in the intervals be-
tWeen Our fortified harbors Or near Such Cities.
(e) To supply a mobile reserve to reinforce our garrisons outside of the
United States proper during periods of insurrection and disorder.
(f) To furnish expeditionary forces for minor Wars resulting from the OCCu-
pation of foreign territory where treaty rights or fundamental national policies
may have been theatened. -
(g) To prepare in advance its existing administrative and supply departments
§4. equipment, transportation, and Supply Of the great War Army Of the
a TLOIl.
(h) To assist in the training Of Organizations Of Citizen SOldiers.
Briefly then, the Regular Army forms the first line and the func-
tion of the citizen Soldiers is to back up the Regular Army in case
of emergency and to form the great war army of the Nation upon
which the Safety of our institutions and the maintenance of our
freedom depends. 4.
The draft of the bill under consideration by your committee makes
provision for a Regular Army, but even though the provisions
thereof are greater than those in the recommendations of the Secre-
tary of War, I desire to emphasize the fact that without a broad,
comprehensive policy which includes a force of citizen soldiers, even
the provisions of this bill must be considered inadequate. .*
The CHAIRMAN. Are you speaking of the bill I prepared, or the
, War College bill?
Gen. SCOTT. The one you prepared.
The force provided for in the bill is, as I said before, greater than
the Secretary of War felt justified in recommending to Congress,
although it is practically the same as the force recommended by the
General Staff. I recommend the force the Secretary of War pro-
poses, but whatever force is decided upon I would strongly urge
it be made so as to leave the Regular Army contemplated for
the continental United States such that it can be organized into
complete divisions. The necessity for complete tactical divi-
sions does not exist in our outlying possessions, inasmuch as the
forces at such places can be considered essentially as garrisons
of fortresses and not as field forces. It is more important to
my mind that the force within the United States should make up
into complete divisions than it is to have an undue increase in any
single branch, such as the Field or Coast Artillery, however im-
portant such arms of the service may be.
The main argument for completing the divisional organizations is
not that they may be maneuvered and trained as such in time of
peace, however important or desirable such a possibility may be. The
controlling reason is that when called upon for active service the
Army must be composed of complete divisions and not of a hetero-
geneous lot of regiments, battalions, and companies.
PREPAREDNESS FOR, NATIONAL DEFENSE. 143
Of course, in that statement I do not refer to the Coast Artillery
troops, which form a special class. The functions of that branch are
for harbor defense, and it forms only one element of our coast de-
fense. The efficacy of our harbor forts can not extend beyond the
range of their guns, and the intervals between such defended areas
must be cared for in case of invasion by the mobile Army. This does
not detract at all from the importance of the Coast Artillery troops,
but the Somewhat general idea that a large increase in that corps
will properly defend our coasts is so erroneous that I desire to em-
phasize their exact function at this time. .
The Coast Artillery Corps is deficient in numbers for the proper
performance of its duties, but to increase it out of proportion to any
increase in the mobile Army with the expectation of thereby properly
providing for our coast defense would be an error. The two branches
of the coast defense—that is, the mobile Army and the Coast Artil-
lery—should be simultaneously increased in accordance with a har-
monious plan for defense, as neither one can perform the functions
of the other.
The Regular Army, should be made up of two parts, as provided
for in the bill under consideration—that is, the part actively with the
colors and the part in the reserve. Personally, I can not agree with
those who advocate an extremely short period of enlistment with
apparently the sole idea of building up a large reserve, for I believe
that the functions of the Regular Army, as heretofore stated, can
only be performed by a force of well-trained soldiers, which training
I do not believe can be acquired in the short period of enlistment
advocated by some. I believe in the idea of a reserve, but I would
make the formation of that reserve secondary to the main considera-
tion, which is to have a well-disciplined and well-trained Regular
Army of professional Soldiers.
Senator WEEKs. Let me interrupt you to ask you what you con-
sider a short term, or what you would consider a term that would
be too short? We have heard all kinds of opinions, from six months
to two years, called short terms.
Gen. Scott. I think the Regular Army should be ready for any-
thing that it is called upon to do, and it should be composed of what
we call professional soldiers.
Senator WEEKs. Then, you mean that the term of enlistment
should be at least two years?
Gen. Scott. Four years.
Senator WEEKs. You are not what might be called a short-term
man? -
Gen. SCOTT. No; that is, for our small Regular Army. In case you
get compulsory service, that would be a different matter; you would
have enough then for any purpose. But if you had men of short
Service only you might get caught Sometime with your whole Army
short service. For instance, if you had a two years’ Service and just
discharged half of your Army and replaced it by half recruits, you
would have men of one year's service and the other half with no
year's service.
Senator WEEKs. You would not discharge half your men at one
time; they would be going out every day and coming in every day.
144 PREPAIRED NIESS FOR, NATIONAL DEFENSE.
Gen. Scott. The idea is, if possible, to get recruits to a regiment
only once a year, if it is possible to be done. That is what we are
striving for. -
Senator DU Pont. Does not the general mean if for any reason
there was a stoppage of recruiting in the Regular Army for a time,
a temporary stoppage, and then a large number of recruits were
enlisted in a short time, they would all be discharged at one time?
That would produce, to a certain extent, the condition to which you
refer? -
Gen. SCOTT. An inefficient army if you were called upon to use it
suddenly. 2.
As regards the policy of maintaining organizations at full strength
or at reduced strength, there is no doubt whatsoever but that a regi-
ment composed of companies at full strength can be better trained
and will be more efficient than a regiment of which the companies
are at reduced strength; but, on the other hand, in view of the great
need in time of war of regular officers and of the great number of
officers that are always detached in time of peace, I believe that, as
a whole, any army that will probably ever be maintained in this
country would be more efficient with a certain number of complete
divisions, the companies of which are at reduced strength, than would
be a smaller number of complete divisions the companies of which
are at War strength, and far more efficient than an unbalanced force
which could not be organized into complete divisions, whatever the
strength of the companies of such force.
That has reference to the proposition of the House to make no sub-
stantial increase in the Regular Army, except to fill up the organi-
zations to full strength and leave it unbalanced.
The CHAIRMAN. That is, they make no increase in the different
branches of the organizations?
Gen. SCOTT. Yes, sir; they propose a small increase in the Artillery,
but leave it impossible to organize it into large forces, large units.
As to the size of the company or battery organizations the bill under
consideration provides for an Infantry company of 112 men. I
believe that this number is too small even for the untrained soldiers
that will make up our armies. The resultant overhead cost of officers
is very materially increased by decreasing the size of the company,
and I think that this company should be increased to approximately
150 men. - • -
Senator DU PONT. Do you mean in time of war or in time of
peace - • *
Gen. SCOTT. In time of war, war strength. There are other slight
changes in strength and composition of organizations which I think
Ought to be made and which are set forth in the revised drafts of
those sections presented here with and which I would request be made
a part of this hearing. - - -
The bill provides for the usual organization of divisions and bri-
gades and prescribes the staff thereof. This provision is useful in
that, while not rigidly prescribing an Organization that can not be
changed except by law, it does prescribe a type of organization which
can only be changed by the President, and such changes will only be
made after long consideration and for cogent reasons. .
PREPAREDINESS FOR, NATIONAL DEFENSE. 145
Although not going into details at this time, I desire to touch upon
the organization of the various branches of the mobile army, which,
I believe, will produce the best results.
There have been many suggestions as to the proper organization
of these various branches submitted from time to time, and the or-
anizations which I submit herewith have been proposed by the
eneral Staff after a consideration of all the various proposals.
In each case the organization recommended is the result of a great
deal of thought and study by committees or boards of the various
arms. These boards or committees Submitted the results of their
work to the General Staff, and after deliberation and discussion
thereon agreement was reached resulting in the organizations as sub-
mitted herewith. To the greatest extent possible, therefore, the pro-
posed organization meets the views of the arms concerned and of
the General Staff studying the case from the point of view of all
arms combined.
The principal changes from the existing law embodied in this bill
in the organization of Infantry, Cavalry, and Field Artillery are the
introduction of a headquarters and supply company into each of
these regiments and the introduction of a machine-gun company
into regiments of Infantry and Cavalry. The necessity for these.
new organizations has been felt for a long time and have been met
by Organizing provisional companies out of the personnel otherwise
provided for in existing regiments. This has resulted in two evils,
the first of which was the depletion of companies by the personnel
so detailed, and the Second was that the provisional organizations
could neither be properly Organized nor given the proper number.
It is hoped that these provisional organizations will be made legal
during the present Congress and that sufficient personnel will be
provided therefor to carry on the duties assigned to them.
The headquarters company. The object of the headquarters com-
pany is to furnish an organization in which will be collected, under
the command of the adjutant, all the personnel necessary to perform
the regimental duties of administration, and is made to include the
band, the regimental orderlies, headquarters clerks, etc. It has
charge of the records and of the preparation of all reports and
returns required of the regiment. - -
The supply company. For reasons of administration and for
properly caring for the pay and supply of the regiment and of all
papers, funds, and property pertaining thereto, it is proposed to
combine all the regimental personnel pertaining to these functions
into one company, under the command of the quartermaster. It will
include the drivers of vehicles, the clerks and noncommissioned per-
sonnel necessary for the supply of the regiment. It is practically
the unanimous opinion of the General Staff that the personnel of
this company should belong to the regiment which they serve and
should not belong to any Staff Corps. -
Senator DU Pont. Do I understand that you recommend two head-
quarters companies, one including bands, clerks, and so on, and the
other the quartermaster’s people, one commanded by the adjutant,
the other by the regimental quartermaster? -
Gen. SCOTT. Yes; drivers, and so on.
.*
146 PREPAIRED NIESS FOR, NATIONAL DEFENSE.
Senator DU PoWT. They are two different units?
Gen. Scott. Yes, sir.
Senator DU PoWT. In addition to the machine-gun company?
Gen. SCOTT. Yes, sir; three all together.
Senator WEEKs. Is it necessary to have those companies as large
as the line companies? -
Gen. SCOTT. No; they differ according to their necessities.
Senator DU Post. They are all right, unless they detail a lot of
people out of the companies. -
Gen. Scott. What we want to avoid is the detailing from any
organization of men. We Want to leave that fighting organization
intact.
Senator DU Pont. Intact. That is very important. -
Gen. Scott. It is not believed that any detailed argument is re-
quired to show the necessity for a separate organization to operate
and care for the machine guns pertaining to a regiment. The in-
struction of the personnel charged with this weapon is so essentially
different from that of the other companies of the regiment that such
companies should be permanent and self-contained, as are the other
companies of the regiment. The proposed company will be armed
with six machine guns.
We will have another gun in case of breakage.
Senator THOMAs. How many machine guns do you recommend for
a regiment?
Gen. SCOTT. We recommend in this machine-gun company three
platoons of two guns each, and One extra gun to replace breakage.
Senator THOMAs. Seven to a regiment?
Gen. SCOTT. Yes; but there are practically six to a regiment; this
extra one is held in reserve. This is, of course, for the ordinary field
service. -
Senator DU Pont. In time of war?
Gen. SCOTT. But in case of any of this trench warfare we would
require very many, but would not require all the animals that are
necessary for the field organization. We would carry them, for in-
stance, in a wagon and distribute them right along the trench. That
would not require the full organization. The men of the companies
would have to utilize these extra guns themselves.
Senator FLETCHER. How many men to each gun?
Gen. SCOTT. Twelve to each gun.
Senator DU Pont. As I understand it, then, these six machine guns
are for a regiment on War footing?
Gen. Scott. Yes, sir. -
Senator DU Pont. In time of peace would you still have six?
Gen. SCOTT. We want them in peace and war; both.
The proposed company will be armed with six machine guns and
the personnel provided therefor is the least than can efficiently per-
form the duties required of this arm.
Infantry Organization. The proposed Infantry regiment will
consist of a headquarters company, a Supply company, a machine-gun
company, and 12 companies of Infantry organized into three bat-
talions of four companies each. -
Cavalry organization. The proposed Cavalry regiment will con-
sist of a headquarters troop, a Supply troop, a machine-gun troop,
PREPAIRED NESS FOR, NATIONAL DEFENSE. 147
and 12 troops of Cavalry organized into three squadrons of four
troops each.
Field Artillery organization. The proposed organization for Field
Artillery is more complicated than that for Infantry or for Cav-
alry. There are two classes of organizations—those that should exist
in time of peace and those the necessity for which arises only in time
of war. The first class consist of regiments of Artillery, and the
Second are known as ammunition companies and battalions and Ar-
tillery parks. It is proposed that the Organization of the regiments
shall be prescribed by Congress, but that the organization of the am-
munition battalions and batteries and of Artillery parks shall be such
as the President may prescribe and be organized only in time of war.
The proposed regiments of Artillery are of two classes, two-
battalion regiments and three-battalion regiments. The reason for
the difference in organization exists either in the method in which it
is proposed to use them or is inherent in the amount of the particular
arm that can be handled by a single battalion commander. The Field
Artillery, commonly known as light artillery, which accompanies an
Infantry division, consists of guns and howitzers, the personnel and
equipment of which can easily be handled in groups of three batter-
ies each by a single battalion commander. The Artillery that ac-
companies a Cavalry division, commonly known as horse artillery,
and the heavy artillery, which is only called up for use with the divi-
sions when required and commonly known as heavy artillery—it
used to be called siege artillery—consists of guns and howitzers, of
- which two batteries make up as large a command as can be handled
by a single battalion commander. It is therefor proposed to organize
the Field Artillery of Infantry divisions into regiments of two bat-
talions of three batteries each, and to organize the horse and heavy
artillery into regiments of three battalions of two batteries each.
Engineer organization. Under existing law the Engineer troops
are organized into battalions of four companies each, and these or-
ganizations are suitable for use with Infantry divisions only. In
the proposed organization the Engineer troops for an Infantry divi-
sion are organized into a regiment of two battalions of three com-
panies each, and provision is made for the organization of mounted
battalions for use with Cavalry divisions. The number of men pro-
posed for an Engineer regiment is such as to give approximately 6
per cent of the total number of Infantry of the #. to which it is
attached. This increase is necessitated to bring the number of troops
of this arm up to about the average percentage found in foreign
3.TIOlléS.
The regimental organization will give greater flexibility for the
same number of men than would be possible in the smaller number
of companies of greater size. The regimental commander will per-
form the duties formerly assigned to the chief engineer of the divi-
Sion, and will also command the Engineer troops, a combination of
duties which will greatly promote efficiency in that arm. -
The mounted battalions of Engineers proposed for Cavalry divi-
sions perform practically the same functions for the Cavalry arm
that the Engineer regiment does for the Infantry division, the per-
centage of mounted Engineers to Cavalry being about 3% per cent.
The organization of the Engineer troops provided for in the bill
before the committee will greatly increase the efficiency of that arm.
148 IPREPAREDNIESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
Coast Artillery organization. The bill under consideration differs
from the existing laws regarding the organization of this corps by
doing away with the company organization. This change is ap-
proved of, since in reality a company of fixed size was an anomaly
in a corps whose duties pertained to batteries requiring manning
details of a certain size, and not companies in the usual sense of the
word. - * -
Under the proposed law the officers and enlisted men can be made
up into companies to suit the batteries that they will man, and the
efficiency of the arm will be considerably increased.
The details of organization proposed for the various arms in the
revised drafts submitted here with differ somewhat from those shown
in the draft of the bill before this committee
Senator DU PoWT. Do you think that will mean that heavy artil-
lery companies will be constantly shifting—their commanders will
be continually changing, as the officers will be changing?
Gen. SCOTT. It is not that so much, but if you have a small bat-
tery, say, half a company could serve.
Senator DU PONT. Yes. -
Gen. SCOTT. You do not want a full company there.
Senator DU Pont. No. Is not that rather an exceptional case?
Gen. SCOTT. Well, I believe that is the way the Coast Artillery
want it. I think Col. Davis is here.
Col. DAVIS. Yes, sir.
Gen. SCOTT. Col. R. P. Davis is of the Coast Artillery.
Senator DU PoWT. They have worked that out? - - -
Col. DAVIS. Yes. That has been worked out, and that gives flexi-
bility to an organization that you can not get if you have the com-
panies as we have them now. For instance, take the half battery .
to which Gen. Scott referred. We would assign a certain number of
officers and men to that battery. That would have nothing to do
whatever with the company, which would be used as an administra-
tive unit. You would have the same officers and the same men to that
battery all the time. -
Senator DU PoWT. You would have the company as an administra-
tive unit? .
Col. DAVIS. Have a provisional company as an adminstrative unit,
but when it comes to service at the guns they will be broken up just
exactly as on a battleship. ge
Senator DU Pont. That would be analogous to the organization of
the Marine Corps now %
Col. DAVIS. Just exactly, and analogous to a battleship organiza-
tion.
Gen. SCOTT. The details of organization proposed for the various
drafts submitted herewith differ somewhat from those shown in the
draft of the bill before this committee, but on the whole such changes
are slight and are made in the light of all the recommendations re-
ceived from many sources during the past six months.
I would like to repeat the fact that the organization of the various
arms, as proposed in the following, was prepared by boards or com-
mittees of the arm concerned and have been passed upon and approved
by the General Staff, composed of all arms. -
PREPAREDNIESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 149
Statement of the superintendent on the cost of increasing the capacity
of the academy to 1,300 cadets, in accordance with the present style
of architecture, and a statement of Maj. Gen. Scott as to what can
be done at the present time without ea pense for construction of new
buildings. -
ESTIMATE OF COST BY TEEE SUPERINTENDENT.
A. Cadet mess hall . $770, 843
B. Cadet barrackS 859, 236
C. Cadet hospital 270,000
D. Cadet laundry. - 118,000
E. Camp grounds enlarged, additional toilets, baths, drainage, etc.--__ 41, 000
F. Alterations academic buildingS 42, 000
G. Officers' quarters ** 288,000
H. New roads, paving, grading, etc 150,000
I. Quarry work for walls, foundations, etc 140, 000
J. Heating, lighting, Water, and Sewers 80, 000
K. Stables for Cavalry and Artillery 85,000
L. Enlisted men's barracks - 80, 000
M. Fees of architect and consulting engineers 100,000
N. Miscellaneous expenses, advertising, printing Specifications, office
expenses, ClerkS, etC 50, 000
TOtal 3,074, 0.79
In connection with the above estimate, I believe that, temporarily
at least, the corps can be increased to 1,150 or 1,200 cadets without
new building construction by the following expedients:
1. By putting 3 men in each room, 1,038 cadets can be accommo-
dated in the present barracks.
By building a temporary barracks of cantonment type, at a cost
of about $25,000, this number can be increased to 1,200.
2. By sending the Corps of Cadets to their meals in two reliefs the
present mess hall will answer the needs of the corps at a strength of
1,200.
3. By making use of temporary buildings of the cantonment type
for the slightly sick, the present cadet hospital can be made to accom-
modate the sick if the corps is increased to 1,200. -
4. By increasing the number of instructors to the limit of the ca-
pacity of the present quarters and by increasing the amount of work
done by each instructor it is believed that items for officers’ quarters,
new roads, retaining Walls, heating, lighting, etc., can be, for the pres-
ent, dispensed with.
5. By increasing the number of hours work of the enlisted detach-
ment at the academy it is believed that the full amount of instruction
can be given without the amounts asked for for stables, barracks, etc.
6. To make the necessary changes in the interior of the academic
buildings to accommodate this increased number in the classrooms, to
provide for temporary structures that may possibly be found neces-
Sary, to enlarge the camp ground, to provide arms and equipment
for the new cadets, etc., it is probable that the sum of $260,000 will
be necessary.
If the corps be increased to approximately 1,200, and the things
done as I have suggested above, it will mean that the cadets and offi-
cers will not be so comfortably housed and cared for as at present,
and that the work of the instructors will be very materially increased,
but I believe that the work of the institution can still be conducted
150 PREPAREDNIESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
without lowering the present standards and that the spirit which ani-
mated officers and men at the academy in former days, when the
conveniences and plant were far inferior to what they are to-day, will
not be found wanting and that the results produced will be as good
as they have ever been.
To provide for this number of cadets, I recommend that the present
law regarding the appointment of cadets be amended so as to allow
2 cadets to each congressional district, 2 from each Territory, 4 from
the District of Columbia, 2 from Porto Rico, 6 from each State at
large, and 80 from the United States at large to be appointed by the
President. .
This change in the number of appointments will make 1,248 cadet-
ships, out of which it is believed that there will be not less than 140
to 200 vacancies, due to failure to pass the entrance examinations, etc.
In order that the new vacancies may not all be filled at one time, thus
making a single class of approximately 500 to 600 men, it is recom-
mended that the appointments be distributed over four years, in order
that all classes may be of nearly equal size. To accomplish this end
it is recommended that the increase be divided into four parts and
these increments be assigned to the Congressmen, Senators, etc., in
order of length of service in their respective branches of Congress.
The annual cost of this increase in the Corps of Cadets, when in full
operation, will be approximately $425,000 per year for pay and
rations. -
Senator DU PoWT. Is it not a fact that the heavy artillery of
foreign service is still organized into regiments? They have never
abandoned the regimental organization, as I understand it. Not
only have they retained the company organization, but they have the
regimental organization. - -
Gen. SCOTT. Col. Davis can tell you more about that than I can.
Col. DAVIS. The English service simply has so many companies and
they are carried as so many companies.
Senator DU Pont. I was referring more particularly to the conti-
nental Services. f
Col. DAVIS. No ; they are exactly the same as we propose here.
Take Germany; they are exactly on the same basis as the navy. The
fact is, they are part of the naval establishment, and the tendency
now in the coast artillery is to have an organization with so many
officers and so many men, and then assign them as the guns call for.
Gen. SCOTT. I understand they are all organized into regiments, .
except in England.
Senator WEEKS. Is the statement you have been reading your own
conclusions, or the conclusions of the General Staff'.
Gen. SCOTT. Both. -
The CHAIRMAN. To which you agree?
º SCOTT. I do not tell you anything that I do not agree to
myself.
Senator THOMAS. The statement that the general made was that
these matters had been worked out in detail by boards or committees
of the arm concerned, then submitted to the General Staff, and
received its approval.
Senator WEEKS. I did not understand that last.
Gen. SCOTT. I believe in what I tell you myself.
PREPAREDNESS FOR, NATIONAL DEFENSE. 151
THE DETAIL SYSTEM.
The subject of the detail system and its application to the various
staff corps and departments came up again for discussion in prepar-
ing the recommendations of the War Department. This system was
adopted in the law of February 2, 1901, and is believed to be the
best system of organization for the staff departments when the in-
terests of the whole Army and of Government are considered. Of
course, this may not be equally true in its application to each sepa-
rate department considered from the single viewpoint of its own
efficiency in time of peace, from which point of view doubtless a
more permanent detail system or one conferring increased rank
might be better, and a commendable pride in the efficiency of his
department makes each head of department want the system that
will work best when most people observe it, i. e., in time of peace. I
can not admit this point of view to be the one that should govern.
The Army exists for use in time of war and the staff departments
exist to serve the Army, and therefore the system of appointment to
the staff departments that will serve the Army best in war and will
prepare as many officers as possible in a knowledge of the staff duties,
is the one that should be adopted, and I think we have it in the
present detail system. I do not stand alone in my opinion on the
subject. I believe most officers of the Army agree with me in sub-
stance. Gen. Sherman’s ideas on the subject are well known, and
every Secretary of War for many years, and certainly since Secre-
tary Root's time, have concurred in the idea. Secretary Root said
in a hearing before your committee on December 14, 1900:
It is highly important for the Army that there should be interchangeable
Service between the line and the Staff; that these gentlemen Who are in the
staff departments should periodically go back to the line and serve ; and that
officers of the line should have reasonable rotation in Service in the Staff.
The CHAIRMAN. Do you not think, General, that that should be
still further extended, and men at the head of these different corps
required to serve with the line? -
Gen. SCOTT. Yes, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. I think one of the men in the Staff Corps has been
there over 33 years.
Gen. SCOTT. I think it would be advantageous to the Army.
The CHAIRMAN. If changes were made?
Gen. SCOTT. Yes, sir. •
At the same hearing he expressed the belief that such alternate
details on staff duty and with troops should be extended to include
the grade of lieutenant colonel and should be the same for the Quar-
termaster Corps, the Inspector General’s and The Adjutant General’s
Departments, and in connection therewith said:
It does not satisfy me; whether I am unreasonable I can not tell. They are
reasonable about The Adjutant General and Inspector General's DepartmentS.
There they provide that the lieutenant colonels and majors, everything below
a colonel, shall be by detail upon the plan which you propose. It is a detail
for four years and a requirement of service of two years before redetail.
. As to the Quartermaster's and Commissary’s Departments, they apply that
provision only to captains. I think that they ought to make that rule just as
high with quartermasters and commissaries as they make it with The Adju-
tant General's and Inspector General's DepartmentS.
152 PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
The detail system itself needs no defense. A detail system, or
something closely approximating thereto, exists in the armies of
practically all the great powers. In view of our small Regular
Army, and great demands that would be made upon its commissioned
personnel in case of war, I believe that the detail system and the
interval of duty with troops as it exists to-day is, with but slight
change, the one best suited to our conditions.
Senator WEEKS. Let me ask a question there, please. Do you
think an officer can become familiar with every branch of the service
during his career?
Gen. SCOTT. I do not believe that would be advisable; no.
Senator WEEKs. Where is the limitation? How would you limit
the different branches of the service with which he should serve?
Gen. Scott. I think an officer who is detailed in his own branch
has a pretty large contract to become very proficient in it; and, in
addition to that, if he is made cognizant with the staff details, he has
no time for anything else. If you put him into every other arm, you
have not made a really efficient man for any.
Senator WEEKs. That is exactly the point I want to get at, that
there must be some limitation in detail; otherwise you are going di-
rectly contrary to what is done in civil life—specializing.
Gen. SCOTT. Yes.
Senator WEEKs. But every man should at some time serve with
troops, should he not?
Gen. SCOTT. Yes.
The CHAIRMAN. In his particular branch?
Gen. SCOTT. Yes. I know of few to-day who would openly advo-
cate the abolition of the detail system and a return to the former
permanent staff; but several of the chiefs of bureaus desire to have
its provisions considerably changed, and advance almost convincing
arguments to uphold their claim. I say “almost,” because they will
convince anyone that does not keep continually in mind what I said
before—that efficiency in war and a dissemination of the knowledge
of staff duties among many officers of the Army far outweigh any
slight increase in efficiency that might result in time of peace from
a change in our present system.
The changes that are most advocated are those that have been made
since the passage of the original act in its application to the Ord-
nance Department, which, in brief, are: The detail of an officer to
the next higher grade when he goes to the staff department; a short-
ening of the interval of time between details when he is supposed to
be serving with troops; and a practically permanent detail, if his
services are satisfactory, when he reaches the grade of captain in the
line from which he comes.
I will discuss these points in detail. I admit that there is no
added expense in detailing an officer from the next lower grade over
that involved in the system whereby the detail is made from the
same grade; but the trouble is that by giving an increase in grade
for detail in the staff departments you exalt staff duty as compared
with straight duty with troops, for the efficiency of which both the
Army and its staff departments exist. This I think bad policy and
not to be encouraged.
The second point is the period of time that an officer should serve
with troops between details in the staff departments. I repeat that
PREPAIRED NESS FOR, NATIONAL DEFENSE. 153
the staff departments exist solely to serve the line of the Army, and
the main object of the detail system was to make sure that every
officer Serving in the staff departments should, at all times, have
recently served with troops, and thereby be personally familiar with
their needs and the best way of providing for them. The present
period of duty with troops, between details, is two years—except for
the Ordnance Department, which is one year in the lower grades.
This means two years’ duty with the line to four years’ duty in a
staff department, and I can not admit that less than one-third of an
officer's time spent with troops makes him conversant with the re-
quirements of such troops.
The third point is the redetail in a staff department without any
interval of duty with troops when an officer reaches the grade of
captain in the line. All that I just said as to the necessity of duty
with troops for junior officers applies with even greater force-to field
officers in the staff departments which come in close and continual
contact with line troops. They are the senior officers of the depart-
ments and shape the departmental policies. Their age and rank
make their recommendations carry far more weight than those of
junior officers, and therefore it is even more imperative in their cases
that they should periodically go back to duty with the line troops.
I have made my remarks general as to all the staff departments,
but have endeavored to emphasize them as applied to departments
whose personnel come in constant touch with the line, such as The
Adjutant General’s and Inspector General’s Departments and the
Quartermaster and Signal Corps. To those departments all that I
have Said applies in full.
With regard to the Ordnance Department, whose duties are highly
technical, and the Judge Advocate General's Department, wherein
the requirements are mainly legal, my statements are not meant to
apply with equal force. These departments come but little in direct
contact with troops and it is not so essential that they should be in
close touch with the line of the Army in order to perform their
functions properly as it is for the other departments mentioned.
For this reason I think that the present provision of law as to rede-
tail in the Ordnance Department should be retained for that depart-
ment and could be extended to the Judge Advocate General's De-
partment without evil effect upon the Army if that department is
put on the detail system, as I believe its chief desires,
The CHAIRMAN. Then, you favor the present requirement that an
officer should serve two years out of six with troops?
Gen. Scott. Yes, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. Except as applying to the Ordnance Department
and the Judge Advocate General's Department?
Gen. Scott. Yes, sir. The Judge Advocate General’s Department
has a great deal of very complicated legal business that requires a
trained lawyer to transact. Sometimes they practice before the
Supreme Court of the United States, and the Government has inter-
ests which are very valuable to it and highly important. If the
present system of dealing with legal matters is continued, and if the
whole business of the Judge Advocate General’s Department were
placed in the hands of the civil department, except the military busi-
ness—in the hands of the Solicitor General of the United States, for
154 PREPAIRED NESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
instance—then, I think, we should continue the detail system with
them. -
The CHAIRMAN. Do you not think it could be handled better in
connection with the War Department?
Gen. SCOTT. That is a subject, of course, for consideration, which
I am not prepared just now to answer. §
Senator DU Pont. Mr. Chairman, I did not quite understand the
intent of your question of a few minutes ago. You asked if he did
not think it would be advantageous to have the detail system ex-
tended to the heads of bureaus, did you not?
The CHAIRMAN. Yes.
Senator DU Pont. What heads of bureaus do you refer to?
The CHAIRMAN. I am referring to all of them. I have referred to
the Chief of Ordnance.
Senator DU PONT. And the Judge Advocate General?
The CHAIRMAN. All of them. I asked if it would not be well to
have the same rule apply to all, and the general says it ought to
apply, as it now exists, except those two departments—the Ordnance
Department, which is technical, and the Judge Advocate General’s
Department, which is the law department.
Senator-DU Pont. Then you would have it apply to the Quar-
termaster's Department?
The CHAIRMAN. All of them. I was asking the general if he did
not think it ought to apply to all of them and that all of these chiefs
should serve at least two years out of six with the troops
Senator BROUSSARD. General, it seems to me that in the statement
which you have just made, with regard to the Judge Advocate Gen-
eral's Department, there is something with regard to the legal busi-
ness of that department that does not pertain to the military, and
I think you entertain some opinion which I should be very glad to
hear.
Gen. SCOTT. When I said military I meant such matters as court-
martials. But there is a vast amount of legal business there con-
nected with the War Department; for instance, the discussion of con-
tracts, the sufficiency of contracts, the question of the ownership of
reservations, and things of that Sort. There is a vast mass of that
material that is passed upon by the Judge Advocate General and
requires a trained lawyer. . If that were put in the hands of the
Solicitor General of the United States, for instance, or some civilian
agency connected with the War Department, I think it might be
done. That is my present view of the case. I have never really
made a study of it, but so it has always appeared to me, and in that
case the Judge Advocate General would have the investigation of
trials of military men, which the Judge Advocate General’s Depart-
ment was originally intended for. -
Senator BROUSSARD. You think it would lend to the efficiency of
that department if the work that does not really pertain to the
military were placed with some legal branch of the Government?
Gen. SCOTT. I think that the Judge Advocate General’s Depart-
ment is able to do both in time of peace. I do not know what would
happen in time of war.
Senator BROUSSARD. We are at peace now. You think it could do
both }
PREPARED NESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 155
Gen. SCOTT. In time of peace. It is doing both. But, as I said, it
requires trained civil lawyers unless you contemplated taking it out
and taking the important legal business away from it.
Senator WEEKs. General, were there not a great many Engineer
officers who served with the line during the Civil War who had never
served with troops, who performed distinguished service?
Gen. SCOTT. Yes, I imagine so; there was Gen. H. G. Wright.
Senator WEERs. And Gen. McPherson and Gen. Meade?
Gen. SCOTT. Yes.
Senator DU PoWT. Gen. Meade had served with Artillery several
years in his youth, though. r
Senator WEEKs. What I wanted to ask you was whether those
were exceptions to the general rule, in your opinion ?
Gen. SCOTT. I can not think of many.
Senator WEERs. Those three occurred to me at once, Gen. Wright,
Gen. Meade, and Gen. McPherson. -
Senator THOMAs. Gen. Miles was another, was he not?
Gen. SCOTT. No, sir. -
Senator THOMAS. Had he had previous training?
Gen. SCOTT. No, sir. As I remember his history, he was a clerk
in a crockery store and came into the volunteers at the age of 18,
That is my remembrance of his history.
In the same way detail to these two departments requires an
immense, amount of extra effort and outside knowledge not incident
to the proper performance of a line officer's duties, and to encourage
this extra effort and outside study I think that the present provisions
regarding detail to the Ordnance Department with increased rank
should be continued for that department and extended to the Judge
Advocate General's Department if put on the detail system. This
does not refer to the heads of bureaus, all of whom should serve two
years out of six at least with the line.
None of the reasons for this deviation from the straight detail
System, as it now applies to the other departments, exists for any of
the other corps or departments, and with a single change I recom-
mend that the present detail system be continued in force for those
departments in spite of any expositions that may be made to the
contrary.
The change I recommend is that a provision should be made so
that when an officer serving in any of the staff departments is pro-
moted, such promotion, of itself, shall not operate to relieve him
from his detail of four years, but that authority should be granted
permitting such an officer to serve out his full period, and that the
number of officers in the grade from which he was promoted and
that to which he is promoted should be changed temporarily, the
former members in each grade to be restored when the detail to re-
place him is made. With this single exception I think that the
present detail system should remain unchanged and that if the Judge
Advocate General's Department is put upon the detail system it
should be so placed with the same provisions that now apply to the
Ordnance Department. I recommend that provisions to effect these
changes be made in the amended draft submitted herewith.
At the present time an officer having served possibly a year in the
Quartermaster’s Department receives his promotion, and it operates
233S0—PT 4—16 2
156 EPREPARED NESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
to relieve him from the Quartermaster’s Department, sends him back
to his regiment, and brings another officer there before this officer’s
four years detail has expired, which makes it very hard on the
mileage.
The CHAIRMAN. It adds to the expense?
Gen. Scott. Yes; and causes the officer to move, at very great ex-
pense. I see no reason for it.
Senator WARREN. General, when an officer is selected for the staff,
is not his liability to promotion during the time of his detail con-
sidered?
Gen. SCOTT. As far as we can.
Senator WARREN. It should be.
Gen. SCOTT. As far as we can.
Senator WARREN. Of Čourse, I realize that you can not always
predict beforehand.
Gen. Scott. We have rules of that kind.
Senator WARREN. But I should think that practically you would
know.
Gen. SCOTT. We do know. But possibly what we call the “Manchu ’’
law will throw out a whole grade of officers and restrict our choice
very greatly.
Senator BECKHAM. What is the “Manchu ’’ law, General?
Gen. SCOTT. That is, that an officer shall serve with an organiza-
tion four years out of every six. -
Senator BECKHAM. Should serve with an organization? With
troops in the line? -
Gen. SCOTT. Yes, sir. It is an organization to which his rank en-
titles him. For instance, if he is a captain, he should serve with a
company of some organized regiment. If he is a major, he should
have two troops at least under him. *
I now come to the question of equalization of promotion. In case
of the passage of a bill authorizing an increase of the number of offi-
eers of the Army, I think it is most important that these officers
should be divided up in Such a way as not to give one corps an
advantage in promotion over another.
Senator DU PONT. I would like to ask the general a question there.
In increasing the number of officers, do you not think they ought to
be increased pari passu with the existing numbers of each corps in
the Army? -
Gen. SCOTT. Yes, I do. -
Senator DU PoWT. I observed a proposition here about a year ago
in which there was a much larger increase in field officers than in
captains and lieutenants, and it seemed to me that that was not right.
Gen. SCOTT. I have a proposition here.
Senator DU PoWT. You are coming to that?
Gen. SCOTT. Yes, sir.
The 1912 Report on the Organization of the Land Forces of the
United States, chapter 7, page 46, included the following statements
with regard to equalization of promotion:
The Organization of the Army should be determined by strategical, political,
and economic considerations, with the sole view of Serving the public interest.
In the past, however, questions of relative promotion have largely influenced
the result. Proper promotion of the officers is essential in any military System,
and parity of promotion under similar conditions is necessary if We are to have
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 157
an effective force. Human nature is such that all officers desire their share
Of promotion. The result has been, however, that all these questions of relative
promotion have affected the proper consideration of all questions of organiza-
tion. If an effort is made to Secure an increase deemed necessary in any one
arm, officers of the other arms are liable to oppose it unless by other increases,
perhaps necessary and perhaps not, a parity of promotion is received. While,
therefore, the question of promotion and rank is one that all officers are rightly
interested in, it has interfered, and will continue to interfere, with any Scien-
tific and economical reorganization plans. It is therefore considered as abso-
lutely necessary preliminary to any reorganization of the mobile army to place
prolmOtion. On an equitable basis independent Of Organization.
However varying may be the opinions of officers of the various
arms of the line as to the remedy which may be applied with most
equity and least detriment to efficiency, the fact that opportunity
for promotion in the different arms is at present not equal, can not
be disputed. If such inequality were due to casualties sustained in
action no discontent would result. Nor would it excite criticism, if
such unequal opportunity were due to retirements, resignations, or
deaths through Service at oversea stations or in the field in the States.
For the past 10 years the Infantry has been represented at oversea
stations by a greater ratio of its commissioned strength than either
of the two Artillery arms. Yet in the Infantry promotion has been
slower than in either of those arms. Since 1911 the Cavalry has been
represented in field service on the Mexican border by a larger ratio
of its commissioned strength than any of the three other arms. Yet
its promtion during such period has been slower than in any other
al’II).
No one denies that discontent now exists. An officer's arrival at
the grade of colonel at an early date will mean his right to command
Some day and may influence his opportunity for appointment as
general officer. Relative equality in promotion between captains or
lieutenants is advantageous, but between colonels it is vital. Remove
the jealousy now existing between officers of the four arms, and there
will be increased mutual consideration of the equities of all arms
and thereby of the efficiency and contentment of all officers. No one
can now foresee at what period in turn the officers of each arm may
need the assistance of this policy to lift up officers of grades below
that of colonel to the positions on the relative list which are equitably
theirs. Let this policy be adopted and its application be continued
for the benefit of any arm which, because of legislation for other
arms or stagnation among its grades, may require such assistance,
and the general efficiency of all officers will be enhanced.
The proper tactical organization of the Army should not be
affected by considerations of promotion. The country requires a
force for adequate defense, and conditions may demand an increase
of one arm out of all proportion to others. If so, unequal as are the
existing opportunities for promotion, they will become more un-
equal if all four arms are not proportionately increased. Such in-
crease should not be denied because it will result in disproportionate
advantage in promotion of officers now of that area, but the residue
of detached officers not required for peculiarly technical duties should
be utilized to offset, as far as may be practicable, the relative disad-
Vantage resulting to officers of other arms. This is not an ideal
method.
Senator WEEKs. Have you ever known a time when there was not
discontent about promotions in the Army'
158 PREPAIRED NESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
Gen. Scott. I have never known a time when promotions were
equitably distributed.
Senator WEEKs. Do you think it could be done so that there would
be no discontent?
Gen. SCOTT. That would be an ideal condition.
Senator WEERs. As long as you are speaking about officers, I want
to ask you if you are familiar with the capacity of West Point?
Gen. SCOTT. Yes, sir.
Senator WEERs. Something has been said about increasing the
possible capacity by about 150. As I recall it, there are 625, there
now, and the proposition is to increase the number to 775. How
much will it cost to do that, and what has to be done?
Gen. SCOTT. On the 20th of January the enrollment was 589. The
maximum capacity at present is 770.
Senator WARREN. You are speaking of January of this year?
Gen. SCOTT. Yes. At an immediate expense of $41,662, provided
for in the estimates, we could take in 770.
Senator WEEKs. At an expenditure of $41,000?
Gen. SCOTT. Yes, sir. The plant can be increased to a capacity of
1,200 at an expense of $3,000,000.
Senator WEEKS. Could it not be done at a great deal less expense
than that?
Gen. SCOTT. It could be; yes; but not to keep up with the present
style of buildings. You would have to make a great change in the
appearance of the place.
Senator WEERs. Everybody admits that those buildings are enor-
mously extravagant, do they not?
Gen. SCOTT. I do not know that they do.
Senator WEEKs. How many cadets are there in a room?
Gen. SCOTT. Two. -
Senator WEEKS. Are the rooms so arranged that you could put
three in a room? *
Gen. SCOTT. I have lived three in a room.
Senator WEERs. So have I. Do you think it made any great
difference to the cadet in his capacity to study and opportunities to
study ?
Gen. SCOTT. If I were superintendent there I would put three in a
room rather than to allow the corps to remain of the size that would
require only two in a room.
Senator WEERs. If we should put three in a room, we could in-
crease the capacity about 400 without any additional expense, could
we not?
Gen. SCOTT. I do not remember whether this calculation was with
three in a room or two in a room. There has been a board of offi-
cers of which I was a member, the Superintendent of the Military
Academy was another member, and I think Gen. Bliss was a member.
Gen. BLTss. Senator Weeks, it would be an additional expense,
if you increased the number there to 770, due to the fact that addi-
tional instruction facilities would have to be provided. You could
accommodate a considerable number more by putting three in a room
without any additional expense at all.
Senator WEEKs. There would be some little expense, but no ma-
terial expense, I mean, to increase the number nearly 50 per cent?
PR.EPAREDINESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 159
Gen. BLISS. This $41,000 estimated to increase the corps to 770 is
necessitated partly by a modification of the mess hall in order to pro-
vide facilities for messing that number. Only about $500 of it goes
for that purpose; the greater part is for modification of existing in-
struction rooms made necessary.
Senator WEEKs. Gen. Scott, are you in favor of providing for
more appointments to West Point?
Gen. SCOTT. Yes, sir.
Senator WEEKs. To what extent?
Gen. SCOTT. Twelve hundred.
Senator CATRON. Practically doubling the amount we have?
Gen. SCOTT. Yes, sir.
Senator WEEKs. Is it not possible for you to figure out that that
can be done without the construction of new buildings, by putting
three cadets in a room, and without any material changes in the
other capacities there?
Gen. SCOTT. I believe that the Superintendent of the Military
Academy is very much against putting three in a room.
Senator WEEKs. It is somewhat inconvenient, but I lived three in
a room one year, and it did not make any great difference, and I
think it can be done under the present stress now.
The CHAIRMAN. It would not impair the sanitary conditions,
would it? -
Gen. Scott. I believe they have air space enough for them.
The CHAIRMAN. It is more a question of getting the men than it
is of making it entirely comfortable for the boys.
Senator WARREN. General, when you speak of the $3,000,000 extra
cost, that contemplates carrying out the plan that has been before
the committee heretofore, of bringing West Point up to a capacity,
say, of ten or twelve hundred, with buildings that will correspond
one with another?
Gen. SCOTT. Yes, sir. It would be unfortunate to inject another
type of architecture there.
Senator WEEKs. Mr. Chairman, I would like to have submitted to
the committee an estimate of what would have to be done and what
the expense would be to provide for doubling the number of cadets
at West Point without the construction of new buildings.
The CHAIRMAN. General, will you have that prepared and have
it put in your testimony ?
Gen. Scott. Yes, sir.
(The statement referred to is as follows:)
ORGANIZATION OF INFANTRY U NIT.
Each regiment of infantry, including the Porto Rico Itegiment of Infantry,
shall consist Of One colonel, One lieutenant Colonel, three battalions, One head-
quarters company, one machine-gun company, one supply company.
Each battalion shall consist Of One major, one first lieutenant, mounted ; bat-
talion adjutant, four Companies. Each company in battalion shall COnsist Of
one captain, one first lieutenant, one second lieutenant, One first Sergeant, One
mess Sergeant, One supply Sergeant, eight Sergeants, seventeel Corporals, three
cooks, two buglers, two mechanics, twenty-eight privates (first class), and
eighty-seven privates. -
The headquarters company shall consist of one captain, mounted ; regimental
adjutant; one regimental Sergeant major, mounted ; three battalion Sergeants
lmajor, mounted ; one first Sergeant, drum major ; two color sergeants; One mess
160 PREPAIRED NIESS FOR NATION ATL DEFENSE.
sergeant ; one supply sergeant ; two cooks; one horseshoer; one band leader ;
One assistant band leader ; one Sergeant bugler ; tWO band Sergeants ; four
band corporals; two musicians, first class ; four musicians, second class ; thir-
teen musicians, third class ; One Sergeant Orderly, mounted ; four privates,
first class, and twelve privates, orderlies, mounted. The machine-gun company
shall consist of One Captain, mounted ; one first lieutenant, mounted ; tWO Sec-
Ond lieutenants, mounted ; one first sergeant, mounted ; one mess Sergeant ; one
supply sergeant ; one stable sergeant ; one horseshoer ; Seven Sergeants, One
mounted ; eight corporals, two mounted ; two cooks; two buglers ; two me-
chanics; twelve privates, first class; and thirty-six privates. The Supply Com-
pany shall consist of one captain, mounted ; one second lieutenant, mounted ;
three regimental supply sergeants, mounted ; one first Sergeant, mounted ; one
mess sergeant; two corporals, mounted ; two Cooks; two Saddlers; two horse-
shoers; and one Wagoner for each authorized Wagon of the field-and-combat
train.
ORGANIZATION CH' CAVAILRY UNITS.
Each regiment of Cavalry shall consist of one colonel, one lieutenant Colonel,
one captain, training officer, three squadrons, one headquarters troop, one
machine-gun troop, and One supply troop ; each Squadron Shall consist Of One
major, one first lieutenant (squadron adjutant) and four troops. Iºach troop
in squadron shall consist of one captain ; one first lieutenant ; one second lieu-
tenant; one first sergeant ; one mess sergeant ; one supply Sergeant : One Stable
Sergeant ; five sergeants; eight corporals; two cooks; two horseshoers; One
Saddler; two buglers; and twenty privates, first class; and sixty-One privates.
The headquarters troops shall consist of one captain (regimental adjutant);
one regimental sergeant major ; three squadron sergeants major ; One first
sergeant (drum major) ; two color sergeants; one mess sergeant ; one supply
Sergeant ; one stable Sergeant ; two sergeants; five corporals; two cooks; two
horseshoers; one saddler ; and five privates, first class; and eighteen privates;
One band leader ; One assistant band leader ; One Sergeant bugler ; tWO band
Sergeants; four band corporals; two musicians, first class ; four musicians,
Second class ; thirteen Imusicians, third class ; One Sergeant Orderly and two
privates, first Class ; and nine privates, Orderlies. The Imachine-gun troop shall
consist of one captain ; one first lieutenant ; two second lieutenants; one first
Sergeant, one mess Sergeant ; One supply Sergeant : One stable Sergeant ; two
horseshoers ; One Saddler; eight Sergeants; eight Corporals ; two Cooks; two
mechanics ; two buglers; and thirteen privates, first class ; and forty-nine
privates. The supply troop shall consist of one captain, two second lieutenants,
three regimental Supply Sergeants, One first Sergeant, One meSS Sergeant, One
stable Sergeant, two corporals, two cooks, two horseshoers, two saddlers, and
one Wagoner for each authorized wagon of the field and combat train.
ORGANIZATION OF FTELD ARTILLERY UNITS.
The Field Artillery, including mountain artillery, light artillery, horse artil-
lery, heavy artillery (field and siege types), shall consist of one hundred and
twenty-six gun or howitzer batteries organized into twenty-one regiments. In
time Of War, threatened invasion, or when War is imminent, the President is
authorized to Organize Such number of ammunition batteries and battalions,
depot batteries and battalions, and such artillery parks, with such numbers and
grades Of personnel and such Organization as he may deem necessary. The
Officers necessary for such organizations shall be supplied from the officers'
reserve Corps provided by this act and by temporary appointments as authorized
by Section eight of the act of Congress approved April twenty-fifth, nineteen
hundred and fourteen. The enlisted men necessary for such organizations shall
be supplied from the Regular Army reserve provided by this act, or from
the Regular Army.
Bach regiment shall consist of one colonel, one lieutenant colonel, one cap-
tain, One headquarters Company, one supply company, and such number of gun
and howitzer battalions as the President may direct. Nothing shall prevent the
assembling, in the same regiment, of gun and howitzer battalions of different
Calibel'S and Classes.
Each gun Or howitzer battery shall consist of one captain, two first lieu-
tenants, tWO Second lieutenants, One first Sergeant, one supply sergeant, one
stable sergeant, one mess sergeant, nine sergeants, twenty corporals, one chief
PREPARED NIESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 161
mechanic, One Saddler, three horseshoers, three mechanics, three buglers, three
cooks, and thirty-five privates first class, and one hundred and seven privates,
When no enlisted men of the Quartermaster Corps are attached for such posi-
tions there shall be added to each battery of mountain artillery one packmaster
(Sergeant, first Class), one assistant packmaster (Sergeant), and one cargador
(COrporal).
Each headquarters company of a regiment of two battalions shali consist of
One Captain, One second lieutenant, One regimental sergeant major, two bat-
talion Sergeants major, one first Sergeant, two color sergeants, one mess ser-
geant, One Supply Sergeant, one stable Sergeant, four sergeants, fourteen cor-
porals, two horseshoers, one saddler, two mechanics, three buglers, two cooks,
four privates (first class), and fourteen privates, two privates (first class), and
Seven privates, Orderlies, One band leader, one assistant band leader, One Ser-
geant bugler, two band sergeants, four band corporals, two musicians (first class),
four musicians (second class), and thirteen musicians (third class). When a
regiment Consists of three battalions there shall be added one battalion Ser-
geant major, five Corporals, two orderlies, privates (first class), one bugler, two
Cooks, and six privates. When no enlisted man of the Quartermaster Corps is
attached for such positions there shall be added to each mountain artillery
headquarters COImpany One pack master (Sergeant, first class), one assistant
Däck master (Sergeant), and One Cargador (Corporal). -
Each Supply COmpany Of a regiment Of two battalions shall consist of One
Captain, one first lieutenant, two regimental Supply Sergeants, one first sergeant,
one mess Sergeant, two corporals, two cooks, two horseshoers, two saddlers, two
Orderlies, and One Wagoner for each authorized wagon Of the field train. When
a regiment consists of three battalions there shall be added one Second lieuten-
ant, One regimental Supply Sergeant, One Orderly, and One Wagoner for each
additional authorized Wagon Of the field train.
Each gun or howitzer battalion shall consist of one major, one captain, and
batteries as follows: Mountain artillery battalions and light artillery gun or
howitzer battalions and heavy field artillery howitzer battalions, serving with
the Field Artillery Of Infantry divisions, shall contain three batteries ; horse-
artillery battalions and heavy field artillery gun or howitzer battalions, other
than those specified above, shall contain two batteries.
ORGANIZATION OT ENGINEER UNITS.
The enlisted personnel of each regiment of Engineers shall consist of four
master engineers, Senior grade ; One regimental Sergeant major ; One regimental
Supply sergeant ; two Color Sergeants ; tWO Sergeants; One Cook ; One Wagoner
for each authorized Wagon of the field and Combat trains ; and two battalions.
The enlisted personnel of each battalion Of a regiment Of Engineers shall Con-
sist Of One battalion Sergeant major ; Six master engineers, junior grade ; and
three companies. The enlisted personnel of each Company (regimental) of
Engineers shall consist of One first Sergeant ; three sergeants, first class; One
mess sergeant ; One supply sergeant ; One stable Sergeant ; eight Sergeants ; eight-
een corporals ; One horseshoer ; one Saúldler ; three Cooks; two buglers ; thirty-
one privates, first class; and ninety-three privates. The enlisted personnel. Of
each mounted battalion of engineers shall COnsist Of tWO master engineers, Senior
grade; one battalion sergeant major ; two Color Sergeants; one battalion Supply
sergeant ; six master engineers, junior grade; One corporal ; one wagoner for each
authorized Wagon of the field train ; and three mounted Companies. The en-
listed personnel of each mounted company of engineers shall consist of One first
sergeant; two sergeants, first class; one mess sergeant; One Supply Sergeant;
one stable sergeant ; six sergeants; eleven Corporals; two horseshoers; One
saddler ; two cooks; two buglers; twenty privates, first class; and Sixty-One
privates: Provided, That appropriate officers to command the regiments, bat-
talions, and companies herein authorized and for duty with and as staff officers
of such organizations shall be detailed from the Corps of Engineers and shall
not be in excess of the numbers in each grade enumerated in this Section.
The enlisted force of the Corps of Engineers and the officers serving thereWith
shall constitute a part of the line Of the Army.
Senator THOMAs. General, you have given the number of Cadets
at West Point now. What is the number of instructors there—
teachers? *
162 PREPARED NESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
Gen. SCOTT. I think there are 112 or thereabouts.
Senator THOMAs. That is a ratio of one instructor to about five
cadets. Is not that a relatively large proportion?
Gen. SCOTT. That counts, of course, all the officers in charge of the
organizations. We have organizations there of Cavalry, Infantry,
and Artillery.
Senator THOMAs. What I am leading up to is obvious. Could we
not increase the number of cadets there without materially increas-
ing the number of instructors?
Gen. Scott. I think we could very materially.
Senator DU Pont. Do you advocate a larger number of unassigned
officers? *
Gen. Scott. Yes, sir.
Senator DUI PoWT. How many do you recommend?
Gen. SCOTT. I think we need approximately a thousand officers.
Senator DU PoWT. Is it not a fact that there are a great many
regiments to-day to which two colonels are assigned :
(Hen. SCOTT. No. -
Senator DU PONT. There are some, I know.
Gen. SCOTT. Not a great many.
Senator DU Pont. There are some.
Gen. SCOTT. There are some; yes. :
Senator DU PoWT. How many do you suppose, about?
Gen. SCOTT. In the Cavalry I do not think there are more than
two. Gen. Pliss has charge of the mobile army, and he could tell
you the exact number.
Senator DU Pont. I will ask him when he comes on. -
Gen. SCOTT. This matter of legislation to increase the number of
cadets could be very easily provided for by three lines:
Pror ided, That whenever any cadet shall have finished two years of his
course at the United States Military Academy, his successor imay be admitted.
That would bring up the number, it is thought, to the limit de-
sired. -
Senator CATRON. That would not provide for those who would
drop out. -
Senator THOMAS. I think that is already provided for. You can
reappoint.
Gen. SCOTT. You can reappoint, but when a man has been there
three years now his successor could be appointed; that is, two from
the same district. g
Senator THOMAS. Suppose a man is there for one year and drops
out because he does not pass his examinations, does not come up to
the standard; under the present law can not his successor be ap-
pointed ?
Gen. Scott. Yes; but not in the middle of the year. We appoint
only one man from a district, but the present plan is for two from a
(listrict.
Senator THOMAS. I am not dissenting from your suggestion; I am
simply trying to emphasize conditions. e
Senator DU Pont. The difficulty is this; that if a man fails in his
preliminary examination and his alternate fails, then there is no pro-
vision by which the vacancy can be filled for a year. t
Gen. SCOTT. It may present difficulties, but they will not prove
insuperable obstacles to its operation. It does contain elements of
PREPAIRED NIESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 163
equity and justice and should not be discarded for fanciful objec-
tions that may be offered or imagined.
It is my purpose to suggest a method of correcting the present
inequality in grade and rank of officers of equal commissioned
service. This method will not advance lieutenant colonels of cer-
tain arms of the line to the positions in the relative list which they
should equitably hold, but officers of lower grades should, under a
continuing policy of correction, reach the higher grades approxi-
mately with their contemporaries in other arms of the line.
To accomplish this result I propose that the so-called detached
officers’ list should be made use of to equalize promotion among
the various arms. There are certain duties for which officers are
detached which require special qualifications and special knowledge.
For such details, of course, I would propose to use the officers of
the arms specially qualified, but for the great majority of details
to which it will be necessary to detail officers, it is my opinion that
it is immaterial what branch of the service the officer so detailed
shall come from, and I propose that Congress shall authorize the
use of the detached list to equalize promotion, limiting it by a pro-
viso that it should be done only to the extent to which the President
deems that it can be effected without detriment to the interests of
the Government.
In view of the foregoing statement, I submit here with a tentative
draft of three sections which I recommend be included in any legis-
lation that may be recommended by this committee.
(The draft referred to is as follows:)
SECTIONS Pirov. 11) 1N (; lºor EQUALIZATION OF PROMOTION. .
[Recommended by the Chief of Staff. I
SEC. —. That Whenever any part of the Cavalry, Field Artillery, Coast
Artillery, and Infantry is increased or the number of officers in any of these
branches is increased the Original. Vacancies above the gradle of second lieuten-
ant due to the increase shall be filled from the liext lower grade in the four
branches, the number of officers promoted from each branch to be proportional
to the number of officers of that grade in the four branches as nearly as may
be practicable : Provided, That the order of promotion in any branch shall
be in the order of the lineal list of that branch : Provided further, That, so far
as practicable, officers shall be promoted in their own branch : Provided further,
That When ally Officer is nominated for promotion into any branch other than
his own he may waive such promotion, and in this case the vacancy shall pass
Consecutively to the Officer next below him in the lineal list of his own branch :
And provided also, That whenever any officer is promoted to another branch
under the provisions of this rule his position on the lineal list of that branch
shall be fixed by his position on the relative list of the Army.
SEC. — That so much of the act of Congress approved March third, nineteen
hundred and eleven, as relates to officers detached from their proper colm-
mands for duty with the Organized Militia, or for other duty, the usual period
of which exceeds one year, is hereby extended so as to apply equally in all
respects to the detachment and the filling of the vacancies caused by the de-
tachment of Officers in addition to those provided for by said act. The addi-
tional Officers provided by the act approved March third, nineteen hundred
and eleven, shall constitute what is known as the detached officers’ list, and
shall consist of Officers in the grades Of first lieutenant to colonel “in the
proportion of thirty-seven first lieutenants to forty-one captains to thirteen and
five-tenths majors to four and five-tenths lieutenant colonels to four colonels."
1 Tho sºme proportion in grades as adopted in the 200 extra officers allowed under the
flot Of 1911.
164 T2REPAIRED NESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
All details to fill both original and subsequent vacancies in the detached officers’
list as these occur from time to time after the Army shall have been orgain-
ized under the provisions Of this act shall be made from the Infantry, Cavalry,
Field Artillery, and Coast Artillery Corps in each grade from that branch
wherein the senior officer of the next lower grade has the longest continuous
commissioned service on the date of the occurrence of such vacancy: Provided,
That should there be two or more branches with Senior Officers Of the same
Commissioned Service the Officer so designated shall be from that branch
having the senior officer on the relative list of the next lower grade: Provided
further, That the President may, in his discretion, fill any vacancy on the
detached officers’ list from any branch of the line whenever in his opinion
the duties to be performed by the officer detailed thereto pertain exclusively
to that branch or require special technical knowledge pertaining thereto :
Provided further, That no officer shall be promoted under the provisions of
this Section before another Of the Salme branch Of the Service who shall be
senior to him in his grade: Provided further, That nothing in this section
shall change the present arrangement of Officers on the lineal list Of their
respective arms : Provided further, That these promotions shall be subject to
such examinations as are now Or may hereafter be provided by law.
SEC. —. That in each grade below that of brigadier general in the land forces
in the Service of the United States an Officer’s rank and precedence, and in
Case of a line Officer his eligibility to Command, shall be determined by the
length Of his continuous service as a Commissioned Officer in the military Serv-
ice of the United States: Provided, That in the case of any officer who now
Occupies Or Who naay hereafter occupy an anomalous position in lineal rank
which does not correspond to the length of his continuous commissioned service
a date of precedence shall be assigned by the President of the Iſnited States
from which shall be Calculated the length Of his Constructive Continuous colm-
missioned service. The (late so assigned shall be as nearly coincident with
the actual (late of Commencement Of his COntinuous COImmissioned Service as
may be consistent with his anomalous position in lineal rank in his own arm,
Corps, or department.
Regardless of the size of the force that may be authorized by Con-
gress, and whether it be made up of the Organized Militia or the con-
tinental army and the Regular Army, there will be need, in time of
war, of a large force of citizen soldiers in addition to the forces
maintained in time of peace. * -
To raise, equip, and train this force will require many months, and
any measures that can be taken in time of peace that will decrease
the length of time necessary to raise such a volunteer force will be a
very material measure of preparedness.
One of the greatest causes of delay in training such a force is
usually the lack of training that exists in its commissioned personnel.
The officers must learn their functions at the same time that they are
endeavoring to teach the enlisted men the part that they have to
play. -
It is therefore proposed to form a body of men who have been
partially educated and trained along military lines for use in Such
an emergency. They have few or no functions to perform in time of
peace, but the idea is to have them examined mentally, morally, and
physically in time of peace to determine their fitness for command in
time of war. This allows the examinations to be carefully con-
ducted when there is no emergency and insures a far better personnel
than could possibly be raised in the confusion incident to a state of
W2.T.
It is proposed to commission these men in time of peace as reserve
officers in the various arms, corps, or departments, and their commis-
sion renders them liable for service when called upon by the Presi-
dent, but his authority so to call them is limited in the draft pro-
posed to the time of war or the imminence thereof, except for short
PREPAIRED NESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 165
periods of training and for other purposes when authorized by Con-
gréss and with the consent of the reserve officers concerned, as, for
instance, the use of certain of them in place of the medical reserve
officers now authorized by law.
This reserve of officers is intended to supply wastage amongst the
forces in active operation, to officer the depot battalions and com-
panies which train the recruits, and to officer new organizations of
volunteers. ve
There now exists in the War Department what is known as the
eligible list, authorized by the act of Congress approved January 21,
1903, which contains the names of men who have passed certain
examinations for commission in the volunteer forces. This list will
be superseded by the officers’ reserve corps, the weakness in the pres-
ent plan being that the candidate, even when his name is on the
eligible list, has no assurance that he will be given a commission in
the volunteers, nor has the Government any assurance that the indi-
vidual will respond when his services are needed. The provisions of
sections 30 to 33 of the bill under consideration have all the good
points of the present plan and obviate all its weaknesses. There are
certain changes in the wording which I think could be made with
advantage, and I submit a new draft of these sections, which, I think,
improves both the sections mentioned.
(The draft referred to is as follows:)
SECTIONS PROVIDING FOR AN OFFICERS’ RESERVE CORPS.
[Recommended by the Chief of Staff.]
SEC. — That for the purpose of securing a reserve Of Officers available for
service as temporary officers in the ſtegular Army, as provided for in this act
and in section eight of the act approved April twenty-fifth, nineteen hundred
and fourteen, as officers in the continental army provided for in this act, as
officers for recruit rendezvous and depots, and - as officers of volunteers, there
shall be organized, under such rules and regulations as the President may pre-
scribe not inconsistent with the provisions of this act, an officers’ reserve
corps of the Army of the United States. Except as otherwise herein provided,
a member of the Officers' reserve corps shall not be subject to call for service
in time of peace, and whenever called upon for service shall not Without his
consent be so called in a lower grade than that held by him in said reserve
COrpS. *.
The President is authorized to appoint and commission as reserve officers of
the various arms, corps, and departments, in all grades up to and including that
of major, such citizens of the United States as may have Completed One year’s
satisfactory Service in the Cadet Companies provided for in this act, and Such
other citizens as, upon examination prescribed by the President, are found
physically, mentally, and morally qualified to hold such commissions : Provided,
That the proportion of officers in any arm, Corps, or department of the officers'
reserve Corps shall not exceed the proportion for the same grade in the Same
arm, corps, or department of the Regular Army, except that the number Com-
missioned in the lowest authorized grade in any arm, corps, or (lepartment of
the Officers’ reserve Corps shall not be limited.
All persons now carried as duly qualified and registered pursuant to section
twenty-three of the act of Congress approved January twenty-first, nineteen
hundred and three, shall, for a period of three years after the passage of this
act, be eligible for appointment in the Officers’ reserve Corps in the arm, COrps,
or department for which they have been found qualified, without further exami-
nation, except a physical examination, subject to the limitations as to rank
herein prescribed. After an officer of the reserve corps has served for five or
more years therein and has been honorably discharged from the Service Of the
United States, he shall be entitled to retain his official title and on occasions of
ceremony to wear the uniform of the highest grade he held in the officers'
reserve Corps.
166 PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
To the extent provided for from time to time by appropriations, the Secretary
of War is authorized to order reserve officers to duty with troops or at field
exercises, for periods not to exceed two weeks in any one calendar year, and
while so serving such officers shall receive the pay and allowances of their
grade: Provided, That, with the consent of such officers, the Secretary of War
is authorized to prolong this period or to order them to duty On boards, or for
Consultation or advice, to the extent justified by the funds appropriated and the
public needs.
One year after the passage of this act the Medical Reserve Corps, as now
constituted by law, shall cease to exist. Members thereof, may be Commissioned
in the officers' reserve Corps, subject to the provisions of this act, or may be
honorably discharged from the service. In emergencies, the Secretary of War
Innay, in time of peace, Order first lieutenants of the Officers’ reserve Corps of the
Medical Department, with their consent, to active duty in the service of the
United States in such numbers as the public interests may require and the
funds appropriated may permit, and may relieve them from such duty when
their Services are no longer necessary.
The President alone is authorized to appoint and commission all officers of
the Officers’ reserve Corps, such commissions to be in force for a period of five
years unless sooner terminated, in the (liscretion of the President. Such officers
lmay be recommissioned, either in the same or higher grades, for Successive
periods of five years, subject to such examinations and qualifications as the
President may prescribe : Provided, That officers of the officers’ reserve corps
shall have rank therein in the various arms, Corps, and departments of said
reserve Corps according to grades and to length of service in their gradles.
SEC. —. When a volunteer force is authorized, or the continental army is
called into active service, the Secretary of War may order officers of the re-
serve Corps, subject to such subsequent playsical examinations as he may pre-
scribe, to temporary duty with the Regular Army in grades thereof which can
hot, for the time being, be filled by promotion, as Officers in volunteer organiza-
tions, as Officers in the continental army, or as officers of recruit rendezvous and
(lepots, in such numbers as may be authorized by law. While such reserve
officers are on such service they shall, by Virtue of their commissions as re-
serve officers, exercise command appropriate to their grade and rank in the
organizations to which they are assigned, and be entitled to the pay and allow-
ances of the corresponding grades in the Regular Army with increase of pay
for length of active service as now allowed by law for officers of the Regular
Army, from the (late upon which they are required by the terms of their Order
to obey the same : I’rovided, That officers so ordered to active service shall take
temporary rank among themselves and in their grade in the Organizations to
which assigned according to the (lates of orders placing them. On active Service ;
and may be promoted, in accordance with such rank, to vacancies in continental
or volunteer Organizations or to temporary vacancies in the Regular Army,
thereafter OCCuring in the Organizations in which they are serving : Aiud pro-
a;ided further, That officers of the reserve Corps shall inot be entitled to retire-
lment Or retired pay and shall be elatitled to belision only for disability incurred
in the line of duty and While in active service.
Any officer of the reserve corps ordered to active service by the Secretary of
War while holding a reserve commission shall, from the time he is required
by the terms of his order to obey the same, be subject to the laws and regu-
lations for the government of the Army of the United States, in so far as they
are applicable to Officers Whose permanent retention in the military service is
not contemplated.
The CHAIRMAN. You are still discussing the bill that I presented?
Gen. SCOTT. Yes, sir. -
The CHAIRMAN. I just wanted to know, because there are three of
them. zº
Gen. SCOTT. The reason that these changes are now recommended
is because, in view of the large number of officers that will be re-
quired, it is not believed wise to limit the number by too much legis-
lation. If ultimately it be found that we have more applicants for
commissions in this corps than are thought to be needed, then the
IPresident can, by the power given him to prescribe the examination
PREPAIRED NESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. I67
for entrance thereto, make such restrictions as to age, etc., as may
seem to him wise at the time.
It is proposed to limit the life of the commissions given to members
of this corps to a length of five years, in order that continued mem-
bership therein will necessitate continued preparation on the part
of the individual and make sure that the personnel of the corps will
at all times be able and available to perform the functions for which
they are commissioned. Of all the provisions for preparedness pro-
posed, there are few of more importance than this one, and I believe
none from which the Government will receive so great a return for
the very small expenditure that may be necessary to provide the
members of the officers' reserve corps with the Small amount of
training that will be necessary.
In connection with the proposed legislation on military matters,
I desire to invite the attention of the committee to one feature which
is very important and provision for which is included in section 35 of
the bill now before the committee.
The provision that I refer to is one which will permit the War
Department to enlist a reserve of men who, by the nature of their
civil occupation or profession, are peculiarly fitted for the special
technical work of the Quartermaster, Engineer, or Signal Corps, or
the Ordnance or Medical Departments of the Army. The number of
this class of men that would be needed in time of war is far in excess
of the numbers now in the Regular Army.
This class of men do not require drilling and training in field
exercises as do infantrymen or cavalrymen, but they must be techni-
cally skilled in their own particular occupation, whether it be that
of chauffeur, automobile engineer, railroad man, bridge builder, Sur-
veyer, gas-engine man, telegraphist or telephone engineer, wireless
Operator, machine-shop expert, powder expert, doctor, nurse, or
|pharmacist. The daily occupation of these men in civil life is the
best training for the functions that they would perform in time of
War and, therefore, all that is required of them is that they should
enlist in Some reserve so that the Government may be sure of their
Services when it needs them. It is not expected that these men will
be called out in time of peace for any drill or training, but it is
expected that they will be arranged in organizations and that officers
of the officers’ reserve corps will be assigned to such organizations,
thereby creating units which will be immediately available for active
Service upon the very shortest notice. - -
A gentleman of the American Legion was in my office yesterday.
I believe he is the secretary of the legion. He says that they have
15,000 men already listed who want to take those positions.
I now come to the discussion of what in a republic must be consid-
ered the main dependence for the maintenance of our liberties and
the continuation of our form of government; that is, the great army
of citizens which must be organized to form the war army of the
Nation. This should be composed of two parts, one of which is
Organized in time of peace and the other part of which will only be
organized in time of war. The first class now consists of the Organ-
ized Militia and the second class is to be provided by volunteers.
raised in time of war or the imminence thereof. ſ
168 PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
There is a consensus of opinion that the organized citizen force
should not be less than 500,000 men. While many estimates are con-
siderably higher than this figure there is no reliable estimate that
places the figure below 500,000. - .
There are two methods suggested for raising this force. One is to
utilize the existing Organized Militia as a nucleus and endeavor to
expand it to the desired proportions, and by legislation to remove
the impediments that now stand in the way of making it into more
of a Federal force. -
The CHAIRMAN. You are speaking now of the National Guard?
Gen. Scott. Yes, sir. The other method is to encourage the
Organized Militia along its present lines by increased appropriations
and to provide in addition thereto a strictly Federal force of 400,000
men, which for convenience has been called the continental army.
The CHAIRMAN. That is the unorganized militia? I want to dis-
criminate between the militia under the Constitution and an unor-
ganized force of citizens, but you are distinguishing there between
the National Guard and the unorganized militia, are you not?
Gen. SCOTT. I am distinguishing between a Federal force and a
State force. -
Time will not permit an exhaustive statement of the legal obstacles
that block the federalization of the Organized Militia. These have
been explained already most carefully by the Secretary of War.
Many who at first strongly favored this method have, after long
study, finally decided that the obstacles were practically insurmount-
able. Briefly, the points that can not be altered are:
(a) The amount and character of the training.
(b) The appointment of the officers, and
(c) The time and places where the Organized Militia can be used.
(d) The fact that the Federal Government has no real control over
them at all times. -
So far as national defense is concerned, the first two of these points
together with the paramount authority of each governor over the
militia of his own State, extending even to its disbandment, are the
main stumbling blocks.
The rule that a man can not serve two masters applies here with
great force, and although Congress can provide for the discipline
of the militia, the reservation to the States of “the appointment of
the officers and the authority of training of the militia, according to
the discipline prescribed by Congress,” does not invest Congress with
two of the powers most essential to the creation of a dependable force.
Owing to these obstacles to the federalization of the Organized
Militia, the War Department decided to leave them as they now exist,
|performing a very important function in the body politic and form-
ing an asset to the Federal power in time of War. It was decided to
encourage their improvement along present lines by increased appro-
priations, but that in addition thereto a truly and solely Federal
force of 400,000 men was necessary and should be recommended to
Congress.
I believed that the Organized Militia will continue to embody a
class of citizens who are not prepared to render the amount and kind
of Service contemplated in the continental army. For that part which
exists mainly in the expectation of rendering Federal service and
PREPARTED NESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 169
can render the required service, generous provision has been made for
taking them into the continental army, to which they can transfer as
units or as individuals, with the consent of the State authorities, with
exactly the same rank and character that they now have in the Organ-
ized Militia.
The ample provision made for those who do not care so to transfer
is an earnest of the continued interest of the War Department in the
Welfare and improvement of that class of the citizen forces. The
War Department does not expect to create a force of veteran soldiers
in the six months’ training proposed for the continental army;
nothing but long training or actual War Service can make such a
force. We do, however, know that the continental army will have
certain points about it that will make it a force far superior to any-
thing except the Regular Army that this Government has ever had
at its disposition as a peace-time force.
These points are embodied in the existence of an equipped and par-
tially trained organization subject to instant call by the President
when they are needed.
Even to get a volunteer force of this size organized and equipped
would require possibly two months, while to give them the same aver-
age of training would require nearly three months more.
All this the continental army would have the day it was called out,
thus saving five months at a time when days and weeks, much less
months, are invaluable.
In addition to that the officers of this force will have been carefully
selected when time was available, and to a certain extent they will
have been tried out and the unsuitable eliminated.
From every point of view the advantages of such a force are ap-
parent, and I strongly urge that the plan for the continental army
be adopted by this committee and made an essential part of its plans
for preparedness.
THE GENERAL STAFF.
Profiting by the experience of other great nations and particu-
larly by our own experience during the War with Spain, this coun-
try, in 1903, established a General Staff and fixed its status and
prescribed its duties by law in accordance with the most efficient
military methods so far as they are applicable to our form of gov-
ernment. The duties of the General Staff as prescribed in sections
2 and 4 of the act of February 14, 1903, are as follows:
That the duties of the General Staff Corps shall be to prepare plans for the
national defense and for the mobilization of the military forces in time Of
war; to investigate and report upon all questions affecting the efficiency of
the Army and its state of preparation for military Operations; to render pro-
fessional aid and assistance to the Secretary of War and to general Officers
and other Superior commanders, and to act as their agents in informing and
coordinating the actions of all the different officers who are subject under the
terms of this act to the supervision of the Chief of Staff; and to perform Such
other military duties not otherwise assigned by law as may be from time to
time prescribed by the President. -
That the Chief of Staff, under the direction of the President or of the
Secretary of War under the direction of the President, shall have Super-
vision of all troops of the line and of The Adjutant General’s, Inspector
General’s, Judge Advocate's, Quartermaster's, Subsistence, Medical, Pay, and
Ordnance Departments, the Corps of Engineers, and the Signal Corps, and
170 - PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
shall perform such other military duties not otherwise assigned by law as
may be assigned to him by the President. Duties now prescribed by statute
for the Commanding General of the Army as a member of the Board Of
()rdnance and Fortification and of the Board of Commissioners of the Soldiers’
Home shall be performed by the Chief of Staff or other officer designated by
the President. * * * - -
The personnel for the General Staff was prescribed in section 3 as
follows: -
It shall consist of one Chief of Staff and two general officers, all to be de-
tailed by the President from officers of the Army at large not below the grade
of brigadier general ; four colonels, six lieutenant Colonels, and twelve majors,
to be detailed from the corresponding grades in the Army at large, under Such
rules for selection as the President may prescribe; twenty captains, to be
detailed from officers of the Army at large of the grades of Captain or first
lieutenant, who while so serving shall have the rank, pay, and allowances of
captain mounted. All officers detailed in the General Staff Corps shall be
detailed therein for periods of four years, unless Sooner relieved. * * *
No officer shall be eligible to a further detail in the General Staff Corps until
he shall have served two years with the branch Of the Army in Which Com-
missioned except in case of emergency or ill time of War.
Our law quoted above as to the status and duties of the General
Staff is excellent. Actual experience, however, extending over a
period of 12 years has shown conclusively that the personnel origi-
nally provided for our General Staff was too limited for the com-
prehensive duties required of it even for our small Army. This
original personnel was further reduced on August 24, 1912, by one
general officer and eight captains, thus impeding greatly the work
of the already meager personnel provided in the original act.
The work of a General Staff consists of two parts: (a) That per-
formed under the direction of commanders of armies, divisions, sepa-
rate brigades, and territorial departments; (b) that performed under
the direction of the Chief of Staff. General Staff duties are now so
divided in our Army. The General Staff officers performing the du-
ties referred to under (a) are denominated the General Staff serving
with troops; those performing the duties referred to under (b) con-
stitute the War Department General Staff. The number of General
Staff officers needed for serving with troops depends mainly on the
strength of the Army. The number needed for the work of the War
Department General Staff—preparing plans for national defense,
collecting information regarding foreign countries, etc.—depends
much less on the strength of the Army, being about as great for a
small army as for a large one. - -
Under the present law it consists of 2 general officers, 1 of whom
is Chief of Staff, 4 colonels, 6 lieutenant colonels, 12 majors, and 12
captains (or first lieutenants)—total, 36. In addition, the Chief of
Coast Artillery and the Chief of the Division of Militia Affairs are
also members of the General Staff, ex officio. The permanent station
of these latter officers is in Washington, but the specific duties for
which their officers were created to perform occupy their full atten-
tion and, properly Speaking, are not duties pertaining to the General
Staff any more than are those of the Chief of Engineers, Chief
Signal Officer, or other bureau chiefs. As a matter of fact they only
do General Staff work when temporaily acting for the Chief of Staff
and his senior assistant during the absence of those officers, and this
duty is in addition to their normal functions.
PREPAIREDINESS FOR, NATIONAL DEFENSE. - 171
Because of insufficient personnel the General Staff has been unable
to undertake some of its most important functions. For example,
no historical section can be established, and until this is done the
scientific military history of our various wars can not be written.
We can not now utilize to its full extent the important information
gathered by our military attachés and observers abroad, because we
can not assign officers to the exclusive duty of reading and digest-
ing these reports, due to the requirements of the daily routine Gen-
eral Staff work pertaining to the Army, which must be first at-
tended to. -
For the same reasons we can not properly attend to the work of
preparing monographs and maps pertaining to foreign countries,
matters which should be always kept up to date. -
The study of the important strategical areas of our own country,
including the relation of our railway systems thereto and the military
resources of the country, has not been satisfactorily accomplished,
due to the insufficient personnel.
One thing which prevents even our meager General Staff from
rendering such efficient service as it might is the continual change
of status of General Staff officers before the full detail of four years
has expired. This is partly due to the fact that the present law does
not provide for the retention of officers who are promoted. This
defect could be remedied by providing that an officer promoted should
serve out the balance of his detail in the next higher grade, the
vacancy in the grade from which he was promoted not being filled
until the completion of his term. This would not change the total
number of officers on the General Staff detail and would greatly
benefit the service by permitting continuity of work by men thor-
oughly trained to it.
As shown by the commendations given in official reports by suc-
ceeding Secretaries of War and Chiefs of Staff since the creation
of the General Staff it has rendered extremely valuable service in
spite of its limited personnel.
With only 29 General Staff officers on duty on the War Department
General Staff including the Chief of Staff and his assistant and 7
General Staff officers on duty with the troops, it is manifest that the
General Staff work of the country can not be properly accomplished
unless we conclude that the general staffs of all foreign armies are
unduly excessive in strength. Some of these staffs in number as they
existed previous to the outbreak of the war in Europe are given below.
It is my understanding that they have been considerably increased
in strength since the outbreak of war.
Austria-Hungary has a total of 508 general staff officers, while by
law this number is supplemented by 249 officers assigned to duty with
the general staff; 71 attached for duty and 101 line officers detailed
on general-staff work giving a total of 929 officers performing general-
staff duties. -
France has 132 general staff officers on its war department general
staff and 480 of its general staff on duty with the troops. There are
attached to the war department general staff 47 officers and for duty
with troops 216, giving a total of 179 general staff officers doing
general-staff work in the war department and 696 on duty with the
troops.
- 23380—PT. 4.—16—3 *
172 PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
Germany had 113 regular general staff officers in its war depart-
ment general staff and 196 on duty with troops. This number was
assisted by the addition of 228 officers performing general-staff duties,
giving a total of 537.
Great Britain had in its war department general staff 57, and on
duty with the troops 114, giving a total of 171.
Japan has a total of 79 general staff officers on duty at the war
department with 72 other officers attached for duty, giving a total
of 151 doing general-staff work in the war department. The num-
ber on duty with troops is not accurately known, but it is probable
Japan uses the same number on duty with the troops as any good
modern army.
The question of the proper number for our General Staff, in the
light of our experience, I caused to be studied at the War College,
and the conclusion arrived at by the War College Division was that
for our present Army, the General Staff should consist of 121 officers,
93 for duty on the War Department General Staff and 28 for duty
with the troops. This recommendation of the War College Division
was concurred in by the Mobile Army Division of the General Staff.
This is the number required for the Regular Army. For the con-
tinental army, 57 additional officers were recommended by the War
College Division.
The immediate increase in the Regular Army recommended by the
War Department corresponds to an approximate increase of 1 In-
fantry Division. The proportionate increase in the General Staff
for such an increase in the line would be 17 officers. To this number
should be added 1 general officer and 8 other officers, the reduction
made by section 5 of the act of August 24, 1912, giving a total in-
crease at this time of 26 officers to be added to the General Staff. It
is believed that this is the minimum addition that should be pro-
vided with the increase recommended, and the remainder should be
provided in four annual increments until the total of 121 is com-
pleted. -
I believe also that the General Staff should be put on the same
basis as the other details from the line of the Army which are
replaced by other officers in the organization from which they come.
The General Staff is not on such a basis now, and it is my belief that
it should be put on such a basis, and it is also the belief of all the
officers with whom I have talked about the matter.
The CHAIRMAN. Is not that a subject of regulation?
Gen. Scott. No, sir. -
The CHAIRMAN. It is a matter of law §
Gen. SCOTT. Yes, sir. .
Senator CATRON. You have been speaking about a War College
bill. Which bill do you call the War College bill?
Gen. SCOTT. As I understand it, the War College Division of the
General Staff did not make any bill, but it formulated a recommenda-
tion to the Secretary of War.
The CHAIRMAN. General, you have confined your discussion to the
bill that was prepared by me? - &
Gen. SCOTT. Yes, sir. - .
The CHAIRMAN. I want you to understand, and I Want the com-
mittee to understand, that I have no pride in authorship; I simply
I’REPAIRED NESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 173
prepared that as a tentative plan, but in order to bring the whole
matter to the attention of the committee there was printed for its
use the tentative plan of the Secretary of War, and also what is known
as the Hay bill, and all of those bills are under discussion by this
committee. You have only discussed one, Gen. Scott.
Gen. SCOTT. I have discussed that in the light of what I think
is proper. -
The CHAIRMAN. May I ask you if you have considered each of
the other bills—that is, the tentative plan of the Secretary of War
and the so-called Hay bill?
Gen. SCOTT. Yes, sir. . &
The CHAIRMAN. Has the Secretary of War had you refer each one
of these bills to the different bureaus of your department?
Gen. SCOTT. Yes, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. Has the chief of each bureau made a report on
each of these bills?
Gen. SCOTT. He has on some of them. I would not be able to say
whether or not reports were made on all of them.
The CHAIRMAN. Were they not all submitted?
Gen. SCOTT. They have all been submitted, but whether they have
been reported here or not, I do not know. -
The CHAIRMAN. Well, none of them has been sent here yet.
Gen. SCOTT. The Secretary signed a paper yesterday which would
forward to you quite a bunch of them. .
The CHAIRMAN. This committee is anxious not only to have hear-
ings from the officers themselves like you, but we would like to have
before us the reports of the chiefs of each of the bureaus under the
department on each one of these bills. Could you see to it that we
ge them here? -
Gen. SCOTT. You have written a letter to the Secretary of War and
that is being carried out.
The CHAIRMAN. I hope so, because we have not heard from him
yet.
Gen. SCOTT. He signed yesterday a paper that will forward to
you quite a mass of them. It should be in the mails now.
The CHAIRMAN. With reference to the Hay bill, you say that the
proposition involved in that bill is to increase the Army to some-
thing like 140,000 men without materially increasing the number of
organizations?
Gen. SCOTT. Yes, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. Does that bill meet with your approval?
Gen. SCOTT. No, sir. - - -
The CHAIRMAN. What is the particular objection to it, General?
Gen. SCOTT. We do not get the organizations to make our divisions.
We do not get from that bill the complete divisions.
The CHAIRMAN. It will not have the effect of giving you the num-
ber of divisions necessary to make an efficient army?
Gen. SCOTT. No, sir; they left out the Infantry increase altogether
and made a small increase in the Artillery.
The CHAIRMAN. That is practically the only increase. Then, in
order to increase the Army to the proposed strength—
Gen. Scott (interposing). They increased the Coast Artillery and
left out of that the officers for the Coast Artillery.
174 PREPAREDINESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
The CHAIRMAN. Then it simply provides for filling up the skele-
ton companies and regiments.
Gen. Scott. Mainly. -
The CHAIRMAN. But as between these three bills, as an expert
which of them do you think comes nearer filling the requirement of
the Army at this time?
Gen. SCOTT. The bill that the Secretary has prepared.
The CHAIRMAN. In its entirety?
Gen. SCOTT. Yes, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. That provides for the raising of how many men?
Gen. SCOTT. Five hundred thousand men. -
The CHAIRMAN. But the Secretary’s bill actually raises how many?
Gen. SCOTT. It provides for raising 500,000; that is, about 131,000
in the Regular Army and 133,000 per year for three years of the con-
tinental army.
The CHAIRMAN. Yes; but the bill recommended by the War
College provided for raising an army of how many ?
Gen. SCOTT. About 250,000.
The CHAIRMAN. But the proposed plan of the Secretary provides
for only about 131,000.
Gen. SCOTT. Regular Army; yes.
- The CHAIRMAN. The recommendation of the War College was that
there be an Army of 250,000 of Regular troops. In the bill that has
been submitted by the Secretary of War, has he taken as a basis for
his bill the recommendation of the War College, reduced to 131,000
IſleI] .
Gen. SCOTT. No.
The CHAIRMAN. Then his bill is not predicated on any particular
recommendation of the War College?
Gen. SCOTT. No, sir. -
The CHAIRMAN. Now, General, did you examine this universal-
training bill, or was it referred to you?
Gen. SCOTT. I have not seen that.
The CHAIRMAN. Was the militia-pay bill submitted to the consid-
eration of the War College?
Gen. SCOTT. Yes.
The CHAIRMAN. Was there a report on that?
Gen. SCOTT. There has been. *
The CHAIRMAN. You feel, I think, as indicated by your statement
here, that the ideal system of creating a reserve would be by uni-
versal military service?
Gen. SCOTT. Yes.
The CHAIRMAN. But you do not think it is wise to attempt it now %
Gen. SCOTT. I think it is Wise to attempt it as soon as it is prac-
ticable.
The CHAIRMAN. You did not examine the bill that had that pur-
pose in view -
Gen. SCOTT. No, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. What do you think will be the result of the effort
to create a continental army for reserve; will it have the effect of
raising the number of men desired?
Gen. SCOTT. I think it is a matter for trial.
The CHAIRMAN. You are not very sanguine about it, though, are
you?
PREPAIRED NESS FOR NATIONAL DIEEE NSE. 175
Gen. SCOTT. I hope for it; yes. I think there are probably more
than 400,000 young men in our country who would gladly give two
months a year to the service of their country.
The CHAIRMAN. You agree with the Secretary of War that it
would not be wise’ to withdraw appropriations for the National
Guardº -
Gen. SCOTT. I do. I believe that the National Guard is an asset,
and that in time of war we will get something out of it.
The CHAIRMAN. You think it is worth what the Government pays
for it? * . -
Gen. SCOTT. Yes.
Senator BECKHAM. General, in time of war, what was said of the
Organized Militia—the men enrolled that could be counted on to go
into the Volunteer Service? +
Gen. SCOTT. Comparatively a small percentage in the past; but I
believe that it will be better now. I had lunch about two weeks ago
with Col. Robert Leonard, who took the Twelfth New York Volun-
teer Regiment to the Spanish War. He told me that Col. Daniel
Butterfield took the same regiment to Washington in 1861; that they
had 900 men in the Twelfth New York in 1861 and they had 97 men
out of the 900 to take, and he filled up the balance of it with men he
found on the streets. Col. Robert Leonard himself, when he started
for the Spanish War, had a regiment of about the same size, and he
saved about 250 of the old men.
Senator BECRHAM. Out of 900?
Gen. SCOTT. Yes; and he filled up the balance with green men—
anybody he could get his hands on. That is better now, since the
passage of the Dick bill.
Senator THOMAs. What proportion of the Regular Army is com-
posed of native-born Americans? -
Gen. SCOTT. I do not know accurately, but I believe it to be a very
large percentage. Just in figures I can not give it.
Senator THOMAs. More than 50 per cent?
Gen. SCOTT. The Adjutant General could give you the exact
figures. If you would like them I can have them sent to you.
Senator THOMAs. No. I just wanted your approximation. My
question was prompted by an exhibit, which was presented here of
the last two transports of troops to Honolulu. There was not only
not a single English name, but not a single pronounceable name, and
I was curious to know whether that was the prevalent situation.
Gen. SCOTT. The law requires that the men enlisted be American
citizens or have taken out their first papers.
Senator THOMAs. These troops had all declared their intentions
to become citizens, but, of course, that is a different line of men
from those who are born in America, whether of native-born parents
or naturalized parents, and that list struck me as a remarkable one.
Gen. Scott. This report of the Adjutant General for 1915 says:
It may be observed that practically 86 per cent of the original enlistments
Of White Soldiers Were enlistments Of natives Of the United States.
Senator THOMAS. I am very glad to know that.
Gen. SCOTT (reading:)
Within each of the three years last preceding that percentage Was 84, 87,
and 88, respectively.
176 PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
The CHAIRMAN. General, what, in your opinion, would be the
effect of sending practically an untrained army, say partially regu-
lars but the majority volunteers, against a well-trained army, such
as the armies engaged in the European conflict?
Gen. SCOTT. They could not do very much on the offensive unless
there were overwhelming numbers.
The CHAIRMAN. Numbers do not cut so much figure in an actual
engagement as the training, do they? -
Gen. SCOTT. They should have to be in overwhelming numbers
and well led by skillful officers, and be well supplied with every
kind of munition and proper armament, then utilized to fight on the
defensive, as Jackson utilized his command at New Orleans. He did
not dare take them out from behind those cotton bales. -
The CHAIRMAN. Wherever the untrained men in the Revolution-
ary War or the War of 1812 met the trained regulars they got the
worst of it, did they not? se
Gen. SCOTT. Usually.
The CHAIRMAN. We are much obliged to you, General.
STATEMENT OF MAJ. GEN. TASKER. H. BLISS, GENERAL STAFF
CORPS, UNITED STATES ARMY.
The CHAIRMAN. Gen. Bliss, the committee will be glad to hear
from you in a general discussion of this subject.
Senator CATRON. What position does Gen. Bliss occupy now Ż
Gen. BLISs. I am Assistant Chief of Staff of the War Department.
Senator CATRON. And Gen. Scott is Chief of Staff Ż
Gen. BLTss. Yes.
Mr. Chairman, I have only a very brief preliminary statement to
make, and then any enlightenment I can give the committee in the
way of answering questions, I shall be very glad to do.
The only bills relating to the general subject of the organization
of the Army that I know of are these three, one of which I know
is before this committee, another before the corresponding com-
mittee of the House, and the third is the tentative draft of a bill
never intended to be a complete one in all its details, prepared under
the direction of the Secretary of War. All three of these bills I have
considered in the light of a brief pencil memorandum that I have
attached to the draft of the bill before this committee, which is to
this effect: x *
At the present time of universal interest in the question, “How is
the Government going to provide for the definite minimum number
of trained men that all military and civilian students are agreed upon
as necessary for national Safety,” any measure affecting the Regular
Army alone must be analyzed from one or the other of two points
of view. We must either drift as we have done heretofore, without
any military policy—that is to Say, without an orderly plan auto-
matically working year after year in time of peace so that when
it is in full operation military men whom you will hold responsible
for the protection of the country will know that they will have a
definite minimum number of trained men on which to base their
plans; or we must have such a policy which will accomplish that re-
Sult. There is no study made by the General Staff which does not first
PREPAIRED NESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 177
assume and then demonstrate that there is a definite minimum number
of trained soldiers in properly balanced organizations, which must be
instantly available at the outbreak of war in order that the country
may have an ordinary, reasonable degree of Safety. And any proper
military policy must provide that number or it is a delusion and a
snare. Personally, I am unable to understand why any measure
affecting the Military Establishment should now be drafted at all
unless it bases itself on three clearly expressed assumptions:
First, that a definite minimum total number of trained soldiers is
to be provided. tº
Second, that the measure relating to the Regular Army provides
a definite and proper part of that definite total. '
Third, that this or some other measure provides the remaining
definite part. - ©
In other Words, gentlemen, a military policy, as I conceive it, is
certainly like any other business policy. If this committee were the
managing board of directors of a railroad and the question were
before you, and you had formed a committee for the purpose of
studying out the question and formulating a policy for the extension
of that railroad from one point to another, for the provision of the
proper men, the rolling stock, cars and engines, the number of men
to operate it, and then a provision as to the means to be made ready
by which all this could be supplied, and such committee reported to
you setting forth the absolute necessity of extending that railroad
from A to C, but only vaguely showing a provision for extending
it from A to somewhere about B, perhaps about half the distance,
that you need 15,000 to 20,000 or 25,000 cars and only vaguely pro-
vided 12,000 or 15,000 of them, you would say that the policy was not
satisfactory. And so with the military policy.
The only reason I conceive why anybody is interested in this ques-
tion now is because everyone is convinced that some number of trained
men is necessary to be provided. Each individual may have figured
that out for himself. They may not like the figures that the Secre-
tary of War adopts or the figures that the War College Division of
the General Staff adopts, or the figures that are set forth in any
other plan, but if anyone is contemplating the formation of a policy
he has got to substitute some other definite number for that number.
Now, all of the plans that I know of that have been studied at the
War College from the time when I was first president of that institu-
tion have agreed upon an absolutely irreducible minimum of 500,000
men that this country should have instantly available, as well trained
as possible, at the outbreak of war. Anyone who accepts that number
and proposes to formulate a military policy has got to show how those
500,000 men can be obtained.
With those general remarks I call your attention to the follow-
ing: In the plan that has been proposed by the Secretary of War,
so far as it relates to the Regular Establishment, there is provision
made for 135,000 enlisted men, and a number of officers which will
bring it up in the vicinity of 141,000. • .
In the plan that is proposed in the printed draft of the bill before
the committee of the other House, there is a call for 154,884 enlisted
men plus about 6,000 officers.
In the printed draft before this committee there is called for
235,127 enlisted men and a little over 10,000 officers.
178 PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
In the plan proposed by the Secretary of War—I qualify what I
said a moment ago when I said that a policy must show definitely
the minimum that is aimed at, and how it is to be provided. It
must show, in good faith, what the people who draft it and who
stand sponsors for it believe will be provided by it; and in that good
faith the War Department plan calls for 400,000 men in the form
of a Federal volunteer army, continental army, or call it what you
will, as distinguished from the Organized Militia or National Guard.
The same number is called for in the bill before the other com-
mittee. None is called for in the bill before this committee. In
both of the bills, then, in which the continental army is provided
for, all of the elements, all of the features of those bills revolve
around that as the center. They accept that a regular army can not
be asked for and expected to be maintained in this country that will
give us the total number of men that we have need for.
The question comes up, then, in connection with that, and in con-
nection with all of the other drafts, “Why is the number fixed for
the Regular Army that is fixed in each one of those drafts?” In
the draft of the War Department, having in mind that constant
factor of 500,000, as one factor decreased the other had to increase,
and in the shifting of those two factors when the War Department
plan reached the point of about 140,000 for the Regular Army it
found that under its provision for organization it would be able, in
its belief, to train the 400,000 continental army if that force could
be raised. And that is the justification of the general figure of
141,000 officers and men fixed in the Secretary of War's bill. It so
happened that coincidentally with that we received the report of
The Adjutant General of the Army in which he said that that was
practically the outside limit of recruitment; without change of pay
and without change of inducements to men to enter the service, that
that was the limit of recruitment of a Regular Army in the United
States. -
The further advantage of the draft prepared by direction of the
Secretary of War lies in this, as the Chief of Staff has already
pointed out, that after providing for the force that must be sent
abroad for our oversea garrisons, that part of the Regular Army
that would be left at home would be formed of perfectly balanced
units, not of war strength. We prefer to have them of war strength
if the Congress is willing to appropriate the money, but having in
mind all of the many things for which money has to be asked, the
War Department considers it wiser to ask for the organizations
beyond the sea at war strength and at home peace strength, but at
home it gave us a balanced force, or what you might call a model
Army of three Infantry divisions and the Cavalry division.
The objection to the bill which is before another committee is
...twofold, but both objections centering in one fact: that bill takes the
Army as it stands and increases all of its organizations to statutory
strength. The force which is left at home after the oversea garri-
sons are provided for is a very unbalanced, indefensible kind of
organization.
Senator CATRON. That is the House bill? --
Gen. BLISs. That is the House bill. It is the so-called Hay bill.
Secondly, and to my mind a greater objection to any bill which
centers about a Federal volunteer force as its essential part which
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 179
must be trained by the Regular Army, the Second and more vital
objection is that by not giving us any increased number of organiza-
tions which, being scattered about the country, can greatly assist.
in this training of the continental army, it practically nullifies that
provision.
With that statement, and with the further statement that if the
wisdom of the Congress should absolutely reject the attempt to obtain
this Federal volunteer force, and there is no further question under
consideration than what should be the strength of the Regular Army,
I can only say that if there be nothing else in contemplation the
strength of the Regular Army, as provided in the bill before this
committee is still entirely insufficient, and it is about as though you
were at the bottom of a well 350 feet deep and you had a ladder 250
feet long to get out, and someone asks whether it is not wise to add
20 or 30 feet to the ladder.
I would say if you have the material ready and propose to add all
of the remainder of that 350 feet, well and good; but otherwise it
Seems to me it is a useless expense of material, for you are left just
where you were before. And then, finally, in saying that if that
objection be left out and it should be proposed to increase the Regu-
lar Army without any reference to any other force which, added to
it, will make the 500,000 that we want, I should say that I would
prefer the draft of the bill before this committee, in a general way,
to that of any other, with this distinct understanding, because I do
rºot think you should deceive yourselves, that if you should pass a
measure making the Regular Army 250,000 or 235,000 or 200,000
men, you have got to add conscription to it, or you will never get it.
That is all, Mr. Chairman, that I have to say before your ques-
tions.
The CHAIRMAN. Well, of course conscription would not go in
time of peace; there would be no use to figure on that at all ?
Gen. BLISs. That is what I have always assumed.
The CHAIRMAN. Under your system, then, it is impossible to raise
a volunteer regular army in time of peace beyond 140,000?
Gen. BLISs. I think, Mr. Chairman, that subject may be illumi-
nated if you will allow me to read a few words from a report made
by The Adjutant General on this same subject as to the increase in
the Regular Army. May I read it? - -
The CHAIRMAN. Yes, if you will.
Senator THOMAs. What is the date of it? Is it recent?
Gen. BLISs. It is recent, yes; it was made when we began the
study of this whole question of military policy, and it led to several
reports from him, all in the same general terms, on the limit to
which we could count on recruitment of the Regular Army of the
United States, and on that subject he says:
This subject may be treated from a theoretical—the ideal—military point
of view ; or it may be treated practically. From the former standpoint a rela-
tively large standing army might be recommended, and could be defended,
practically, a standing army of 500,000 or 200,00 men is out of the question
in this country without conscription. This office has handled recruiting for
the Army for many years, and is thoroughly familiar with the difficulty of
keeping up to its authorized strength the present Small force of 86,000 men.
With the recruiting service covering the entire territory of the United States
proper, which is divided into 54 districts. in which a large city is the center,
and With 170 auxiliary stations in other near-by towns occupied by recruiting
180 PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
\
tº
parties from which the surrounding territory is canvassed, it has been with
the utmost difficulty and great expense that the present Small Army has been
kept up. It is Only recently, under very favorable Conditions as to men Out
of employment and the natural military Spirit induced by the press accounts
of the European War that the Army has been filled up.
During the fiscal year ended June 30, 1914, the number of men obtained by
the general recruiting service—excluding those enlisted at posts other than
depot posts and in the field—was 32,172. The expense of obtaining these re-
cruits, including every form of expense from their enlistment until delivered
to the organization, was $3,030,833.87. Roughly, it costs $100 to deliver each
recruit to his regiment. During the fiscal year ended June 30, 1913, the
number so obtained was only 18,980, and there was a large shortage in the
enlisted strength of the Army , the facts in the case being so well known as to
cause Congressional comment. If a largely increased number of Officers and
men were put on recruiting duty so as to increase time territory actually COV-
ered, the maximum figures given might be increased somewhat—as would the
Overhead charges. But it is not possible to raise a large standing army in this
country in time of peace with the present rates of pay, and at the same time
replace loss by Ólischarge and other causes of more than 30,000 men annually.
It should be noted that the reenlistments and enlistments at posts other than
depot posts and in the field (lo not COver the losses due to all causes Other than
expiration of term of service. In the year ended June 30, 1914, for example,
the figures were 9,254 enlisted as opposed to 12,487 lost.
Under favorable circumstances, making special efforts, under the four-year
Gnlistinent, the maximulm army that can be recruited in the United States is
140,000 men. The average yearly enlistments in past years would not maintain
such an army. The average maximum would be nearer 120,000 men. *
With that general idea he suggests an organization for the Regular
Army amounting to about 122,000 men, exclusive of the Philippine
Scouts, and then he adds: -
However, with any of the various schemes to change the length of the enlist-
ment period to very short periods, even this strength is impracticable. A six
months' period of enlistment, for example, would mean obtaining 244,000 re-
cruits a year, which can not be (lone; and it is a simple matter to show that
the present enlistment period with the strength proposed above represents
Closely the limit in time of peace.
The CHAIRMAN. General, you favor the present four-year period of
enlistment?
Gen. BLISS. I should say anywhere from two to four years, Mr.
Chairman. I agree with Gen. Scott in believing that So long as We
have a small Regular Army it should be as nearly perfect in the
quality and training of its men and in its balanced organizations as
it is possible to make it. It should be a model.
The CHAIRMAN. You heard Gen. Wood's suggestion that there
ought to be a short-termn enlistment and create those men into a re-
serve of trained soldiers. Do you think that plan is feasible?
Gen. BLISs. For the reason that The Adjutant General gives, as I
have read here, I doubt very much whether it would be feasible.
The CHAIRMAN. It could not be done? -
Gen. BLIss. I was not present at the hearing, and I do not know
what he holds as a short enlistment.
The CHAIRMAN. He had a two-year period of enlistment.
Gen. BLISs. And you discharge a man, if he is qualified, at the end
of one year?
The CHAIRMAN. Yes. -
Gen. SCOTT. The Secretary of War would like a provision to be put
in the bill that permits a man, when he has arrived at a state of train-
ing such that his officers agree that he is a trained soldier, that he have
an opportunity to discharge him. *
PREPARED NIESS FOR NATIONAL DEFEN;S.S. 181
The CHAIRMAN. I rather think, myself, it would encourage efficiency
and prevent desertion. - -
Gen. SCOTT. Yes, sir. -
The CHAIRMAN. The four-year period, it is pretty generally be-
lieved, has much to do with the desertions in the Army.
Gen. BLISS. During my term in the Southern Department, when
I had the larger part of the mobile army in the United States, vary-
ing from 15,000 to 20,000 men, I made it a point to find out what
men came into the Army for, and have asked pointedly the question
to ascertain whether they came in for this purpose, and I never
learned of a man who entered the Army for the purpose of getting
trained for a future war and with the idea that as soon as he was
trained he was going out. You should keep in mind, what I believe
is the absolute fact, that in the Regular Establishment the men who
enlist in the Army come in because they believe, whether mistaken
or not, when they come, that they will like it, and they want to make
that their business; but after they get into the service they are divided
into two classes: Those that find that they do like it, and you could
not drive, them out willingly, and they reenlist as long as you will
allow them to reenlist; the class that find they do not like it, which
may be subdivided into two classes, one an honorable, self-respecting
class of men, who say, “I made a mistake, but I am in and I am going
to serve my time, and when I am through I am going to take my dis-
charge and leave,” and he leaves because he does not like it, and he
does not enter into a reserve because he wants to get in the reserve
and serve four years and be ready to promptly respond to the service.
If he liked the service he would stay in it. The other subdivision of
that class are the men who are not influenced by that high motive,
and who say, “I made a mistake; I do not like it, and I am not going
º stand it, and I am going to get out,” and that is your desertion
Cla.SS.
Senator THOMAs. That is a considerable percentage, is it not?
Gen. BLISS. No, sir; it is not to-day, but I think it has been in
the past. In round numbers, it is about 3 per cent. You will find
that in The Adjutant General’s report. .
Senator THOMAs. From what you say—and I ask the question
because I want to be correct about it if I am mistaken—you are not
sure at all about our being able to keep a Regular Army of 141,000
from purely volunteer soldiers?
Gen. BLTss. We can keep it approximately at that. It would be
just like the present Army; it would be influenced a great deal by
conditions from year to year.
The CHAIRMAN. General, the number of desertions shown by The
Adjutant General’s report is 3.23 per cent. -
Gen. BLISS. Senator, I think we get a remarkably fine class of men
in the Army now.
Senator BECKHAM. What is the term of service now 2 Is it four
ea I’S 4
y Gen. BLISs. The term of enlistment is seven years. The soldier can
take his discharge at the end of four years, or reenlist at the end of
four years, or he is permitted to pass into the reserve at the end of
three years, if he wants to, or he serves four years and passes into
the reserve for the remaining three years.
182 PREPAREDINESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
Senator BECKHAM. What information does the department keep
of that man in the last three years when he is in the reserve? Does
he make a report? - -
Gen. BLTss. There is no provision made whatever for that under
the existing law. -
Senator THOMAs. Some one made the statement yesterday that it
was 19.
Gen. BLISs. The law did not go into operation until the month
of November. Before that the only men we had in the reserve under
the law of 1912 were men who chose to enlist in the reserve, and
that came to 16 or 19 in that way. But beginning with the month
of November, every man who does not reenlist goes into the reserve,
and we will get them at a maximum rate of about 8,000 a year. . .
Senator BECRHAMI. Are there many officers who are detached from
the regular organizations? -
Gen. BLISs. The total number of officers of all grades, and includ-
ing staff and line, at this moment is 813.
Senator BECRHAMI. That are detached ?
Gen. BLISs. Excluding staff officers, it is 719, I think.
Senator DU Pont. That is, you mean detached; that are detached
from their commands?
Gen. BLIss. That is the number of officers detached from their
commands, doing duty other than that which is appropriate $
Senator BECKHAM (interposing). What sort of duties are they
performing? -
Gen. SCOTT. We have a table that will give you the whole thing.
Gen. BLISS. We have quite a large number in civil educational
institutions. We have a large number attached to the militia, in-
structors and inspectors. We have a large number on recruiting
duty, military attachés, etc. It is quite a varied list. I can introduce
a statement, Senator, if you would like that.
The CHAIRMAN. I think it is in The Adjutant General’s report.
Senator BECRHAMI. There was something came up while Gen. Scott
was testifying in regard to promotions in the event of increases in
the various branches of the service. Do I understand it is proposed
to make these promotions from this detached Service, or how %
Gen. BLISS. I do not quite understand you.
Senator BECKHAM. Gen. Scott spoke of a parity of promotions,
an equalization of promotions among the various branches of the
service. -
Gen. BLISs. Yes.
Senator BECKHAM. How would that be brought about; by assign-
ing these men, promoting these men in detached service, or how %
Gen. BLISS. Well, these men do not affect the question of promo-
tion, because they are temporarily out of their place. After they
have served out the detail in this detached duty they go back. A
colonel detached from his regiment goes back to his regiment, a lieu-
tenant colonel, major. Or captain.
Senator BECKHAM. They are still in line?
Gen. BLISs. Yes. 4
Senator WARREN. My understanding was it was an equalization
between the different arms, Artillery, Cavalry, and Infantry.
Gen. Scott. Yes; but this detached service list which this bill
proposes to add to equalize the different arms, wherever they may be.
PREPAIREDINESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 183
Senator WARREN. I understood that this bill was to equalize it
among the differnt arms. -
Senator CATRON. You mean by that, for instance, take three officers
in the service, one in Artillery, one in Infantry, and one in Cavalry,
that they should be so equalized that their promotions will run along
about the same?
Gen. SCOTT. As near as possible. If we had, for instance, a large
complement of Infantry, we would have a large number of promo-
tions in that arm which no other arm participates in.
Senator CATRON. Is it not true that in the last few years there have
been many promotions in the Coast Artillery?
Gen. SCOTT. I believe that the Coast Artillery has been first in the
entire Army—field army—next comes the Infantry, and then the
Cavalry.
Senator WARREN. That is because you increased that branchº
Gen. SCOTT. Yes. -
Senator DU PONT. When you speak of detached officers, do you
mean supernumerary officers or extra officers?
Gen. BLISS. No. The law of 1911, I think is the date, provides
that 200 extra officers shall take the place of 200 detached officers.
Senator DU PoWT. Then there were many more, you know, advanced
equalize promotions, who were in another class.
Senator WARREN. They have been pretty much worked into the
regular line?
Gen. BLISS. I think so.
& Senator WARREN. Temporary officers, but they have been worked
II] .
Gen. SCOTT. Yes, sir.
Senator DU PoWT. Gen. Scott, I think, testified, and the Secretary
of War, that in their opinion a larger body of supernumerary officers
would be needed.
Gen. BLISS. They would be needed for the training of the Conti-
nental Army.
Senator DU PoNT. How many do you think will be needed?
Gen. BLISS. The tentative draft of the bill proposed by the War
Department calls for 786.
enator DU Pont. Now, General, is it not a fact that there are a
number of regiments to which two colonels are assigned?
Gen. BLISs. There are five regiments of Cavalry shown in the re-
port of The Adjutant General of November 20–five regiments of
Cavalry, besides the regular commanding colonel, have a colonel at-
tached, and two regiments of Infantry. That same report shows one
regiment of Infantry minus a colonel, to which regiment one of these
was assigned, so that it would be one regiment of Infantry.
Senator DU PoWT. It is evident that two colonels are unnecessary
to a regiment, and if there are 700 additional division officers re-
quired, why is it that they attach two colonels to a regiment at all?
Gen. BLISS. I suppose, Senator, it is found that the particular man
who was so attached was not suitable for a detached duty for which
an officer is required. We have few colonels that are detached, any-
Wa.V.
Senator DU Pont. It seems to me that two colonels to a regiment
are not necessary, and that the extra colonels could be assigned to
other duties. If they are only fit to be assigned to duty as Super-
§
184 PREPARED NESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
numerary colonels of regiments, they are not fit to be in the Army at
all, it seems to me. .J.
Gen. BLISS. That evil is very quickly solving itself.
Senator DU PoWT. I think it results in abuse. -
Gen. BLISS. It all results, as Senator Warren has stated, from th
operation of that law which was passed at a time I was out of the
country, and I do not know how it operated.
Senator WARREN. Our information was inaccurate about the num-
ber that would be affected. -
Senator DU PoWT. That makes no difference. If these officers are
good officers, as I believe them to be—some of them. I know per-
Sonally—it seems to me that it is all wrong to assign two colonels
to a regiment, with no appropriate duty for the junior colonel to
perform unless the regiment is divided into two parts with a colonel
to each part. The Secretary of War has stated to the committee in
the past that the Regular Army needs at least a thousand more
officers, many of them of high rank, on the ground that in assigning
to details with the militia in the larger States it is necessary to have
officers of a certain grade. That was the reason assigned when an
excessive amount of colonels, lieutenant colonels, and majors were
asked for in the past.
Senator WARREN. Gen. Bliss, I understood you to say that in the
bill that was recommended by the War Department, a total of some
130,000, the proportions were such that we ought to maintain, if
that bill be passed, the Regular Army in the same proportion of
units, brigades and divisions. -
Is that what you intended us to understand?
Gen. BLISs. Yes, sir
Senator WARREN. In other words, preserve the same balance as
between the different arms?
Gen. BLISs. It gives us the arms with the complete units, the
model for that arm consisting of three Infantry divisions to one
Cavalry division.
Senator CATRON. Would you retain the same ratio of Cavalry
divisions to Infantry divisions if you increased the Army to 500,000?
Gen. BLISs. No, sir.
Senator CATRON. That, I think, was in Senator Warren’s question.
Gen. BLISS. The acceptable military organization would call for
a Cavalry division with what is called a field army, and the field
army is made up of three or four Infantry, probably all Infantry
divisions, so that if we could maintain three Infantry divisions in
the United States we would have one Cavalry division, and it does
not call for any increase in the present force of Cavalry. -
Senator CATRON. Do you think we have enough Cavalry if the
Army is increased up to 500,000?
Gen. BLISs. Not if we were going to raise an army of 500,000.
Senator CATRON. How much Cavalry would we need if the Army
was increased to 500,000? -
Gen. BLISS. The average proportion of the armies of the world
would be about one-ninth of cavalry as compared with the infantry
and field artillery. -
Senator CATRON. How many pieces of artillery in the field would
you think would be proper for each 1,000 men?
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 185
Gen. BLISS. If I had my way I would provide about six. That is
the Organization that is now proposed, increasing the Field Artillery
of a division from two regiments to three, with three battalions to
the regiment, would give a proportion of about, in round numbers,
six guns to a thousand of Cavalry and Infantry. -
Senator CATRON. Now, in organizing this continental army, say
400,000 men in the continental army, what would you do about in-
structing the Artillery'
Gen. BLISS. The general idea would be to train the artillery of the
continental army, if it should be raised, about the same way that we
train the batteries of the Organized Militia. We establish a camp
where we have plenty of ground for firing practice for the Organized .
Militia of the nearby States at times which are agreeable to them, and
they are sent there for their annual practice with the expenditure
of ammunition under the Supervision of one or more regular batteries
which are sent. t
Senator CATRON. How about horses?
Gen. BLISS. That depends upon circumstances. If they have not
the funds to hire animals they will use the animals of the regular
batteries that are there. If they have not sufficient they hire ani-
mals for the purpose temporarily. But, Senator, I think very little
stress should be laid on that question of the provision of animals
and everything that goes with them in this very important question
of training organizations, because the maneuvering of a battery of
artillery, since the time when Senator du Pont commanded one, has
become a very minor matter in the efficiency of a battery in time of
Wal'.
Senator DU PoWT. It is purely a secondary matter.
Gen. BLISS. They hitch a team to a battery and pull it to a point
we know in advance and get the horses away as quickly as possible,
the guns being in position ninety-nine times out of a hundred where
they can not be seen, nor can they see their enemy, and there they
remain in the battle until they either win the battle or these bat-
teries are probably lost. So that that is the reason why the dispo-
sition now is to substitute motor transportation for Field Artillery
wherever the country has sufficiently good roads to warrant taking
a chance with that sort of transportation. So that if we had this
400,000 continental army organized as theoretically we would require
it to be done, I think it would call for 246 batteries of Field Artil-
lery. Those 246 batteries can be trained very cheaply, because all
we have to do is to get the personnel, get them to go to an agreed
camp, and of course there would have to be an allowance of ammuni-
tion made to them, and these men would get 90 per cent of the train-
ing that would make them efficient in time of War, without anything
else, and I think it would be an exceedingly popular arm among
young men who I hope will find some encouragement to go into that
continental army. I think it would be an exceedingly attractive
service, just the target practice.
Senator DU PoWT. I think so also.
Gen. BLISS. If we never got anything out of the continental army
but those 246 batteries of Artillery, I should say we had made a great
step. If you never get anything more than 2,000 companies of In-
fantry, thoroughly trained, knowing everything that an Infantry
soldier has got to do in a company, and officers knowing exactly what
186 PREPAIRED NESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
to do with him as a company officer, if we never went any further,
never had a major nor colonel, I would say that the country had
made an enormous stride in advance in the Way of preparation.
The CHAIRMAN. Do you not think the ideal system would be a
system of universal military training?
Gen. BLISS. I think that is the ideal system, and the ideal demo-
cratic system. - * -
The CHAIRMAN. That makes the rich man’s son and the poor man’s
son work shoulder to shoulder. -
Gen. BLISS. Yes, sir. I look at it in this way: If it is right that
the United States in time of war, as it might, should force a man to
come into the Service, I think that it is right in time of peace to force
him to learn some of the things that he has got to do in time of War.
The CHAIRMAN. Necessary for his protection? -
Gen. BLISS. Necessary for his protection.
The CHAIRMAN. You think it would not be advisable to have it
adopted at this time in view of the sentiment of the country?
Gen. BLISS. Mr. Chairman, I do not understand that there is any
Sentiment of the country that would tolerate it, and I have never, in
fact, recommended or suggested it. I have heard more use of the
words “compulsory Service’ and “universal service ’’ since I have
been before the two congressional committees in the last two days
than I have heard in the last 12 months discussing it among Army
officers, because we all regard it as an academic question in the present
state of mind of the public. But in answer to your question, I say
it is the ideal thing. I think it is unquestionably the ideal.
The CHAIRMAN. We will take a recess until 2 o’clock p. m. to-
II].OTTOW.
(Whereupon, at 4.45 o'clock p. m., the committee took a recess to
2 o'clock p.m., Saturday, January 22, 1916.)
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
saturday, JANUARY 22, 1916.
2’ UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON MILITARY AFFAIRs,
Washington, D. C.
The committee met, at the expiration of the recess, at 2 o'clock
p.m., Senator Geo. E. Chamberlain (chairman) presiding.
The CHAIRMAN. The committee will please come to order. This
is the hour for the convening of the committee after recess, and I
have asked Gen. Mills to appear before us at this hour. General,
you were here at some of the former hearings and know the purpose
of these meetings. It is to discuss the question of Army reorganiza-
tion and bills that have been introduced for that purpose. We
would like to have a statement from you in reference to the whole
subject, in such a way as you may see fit to give it.
Gen. MILLS. Yes, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. And after you have made your statement we may
desire to ask you some questions.
STATEMENT OF BRIG, GEN, ALBERT L, MILLS, CHIEF OF THE
DIVISION OF MILITIA AFFAIRS.
Gen. MILLS. I have here, Senators, a prepared statement bearing
upon militia conditions, the Organized Militia, which I think may be
helpful to this committee in the inquiry under way, and with your
permission I would like to read it. -
Senator CATRON. Will you first state what position you are holding?
Gen. MILLS. I am Chief of the Division of Militia Affairs in the War
Department. I have been on duty in that office since September 1,
1912, three years and six months. -
The CHAIRMAN. Now, you may proceed, General.
Gen. MILLS. The Spanish-American War revealed the defects of
our military system so plainly that thoughtful men throughout the
country, considering what the results might have been had Spain
been a power of the first class, demanded some action looking to the
development of an adequate force of citizen soldiers on which the
Nation could rely. For this purpose the militia provisions of the
Constitution were resorted to for the means whereby this military
weakness might be cured. The National Guards of the several States .
were in existence. As then constituted, these forces were organized
without reference to national requirements, and due to this fact were
incapable of being assembled in a reasonable time as a national army.
23380—PT 5–16 1% 187
188 PRIEPARED NIESS FOR NATION ATL DJ.E. F. NSE.
At the close of the Spanish-American War their aggregate strength
was approximately 100,000 men. - -
It was to these organizations that Congress turned with a view to
Securing a basis for an efficient militia suitable for Federal purposes,
and a new militia law was enacted by Congress and approved January
21, 1903. This law was afterwards amended by the act of May 27,
1908. . -
In general terms, the amended law prescribes that the militia shall,
with certain exceptions, consist of every able-bodied male citizen of
the respective States and Territories and the District of Columbia,
and every able-bodied male of foreign birth who has declared his
intention of becoming a citizen, who is more than 18 and less than
45 years of age; and it divided the militia into two classes: The Or–
ganized Militia and the reserve militia. -
The principal requirements of the militia law as amended were
that on and after January 21, 1910, the organization, armament, and
discipline of the Organized Militia should be the same as that pre-
scribed for the Regular Army. This provision was made in pursu-
ance of the power vested in Congress by the Constitution. The
other requirements looked to securing field efficiency by means of
drills, camps, and other forms of training, which may be stated to
be requirements in equity, compliance with which entitles the State
to participate in the appropriations made under the provisions of the
law. The President is authorized to fix a peace strength for com-
panies, and the enlisted strength established is as follows:
Infantry------------------------------- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 65
Cavalry------------------------------------------------------------- - - - - - - - 65
Field Artillery. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 133
Coast Artillery. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
Engineers. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ---------------------------- 65
Signal:
Type A----------------------------------------------------------------- 75
Type B------------ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . --------------------------------- 75
Type C----------------------------------------------------------------- 40
Type D. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ---------------------- 67
Type E----------------------------------------------------------------- 75
Field hospital. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
Ambulance company------------------------------------------- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 43
Of the signal companies there are five types.
Senator HITCHCOCK. That means in each company'
Gen. MILLs. No, sir. For example, a signal company in type A
is made up of four wire sections and two radio sections; that is the
full type A signal company. Type D is made up of two wire sec-
tions and two radio sections.
Two Federal appropriations are made pursuant to the amended
militia law and enactments of Congress prior to 1903. Under the
provisions of section 1661, Revised Statutes, $2,000,000 are annually
appropriated for certain specified purposes, and participation therein
by a State is contingent upon the requirement that the number of
regularly enlisted, organized, and uniformed active militia main-
tained by the State shall be at least 100 men for each Senator and Rep-
resentative to which such State is entitled in the Congress of the
United States. This fixes the minimum strength of the Organized
Militia at about 53,100 men. Another $2,000,000 is appropriated
under the act of May 27, 1908 (section 13 of the amended militia law)
PREPAIRED NESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 189
for the purchase or manufacture of United States Service arms, accou-
terments, equipments, uniforms, clothing, equipage, and military
stores of all kinds necessary to arm, uniform, and equip the Organized
Militia for active service in the field. The basis of the apportionment
of this appropriation as fixed by regulations established by the Sec-
retary of War is the enlisted strength present at the annual inspection.
Under recent regulations which were drawn with a view of assisting
the States to develop the necessary auxiliary arms, the apportion-
ment is made by assigning various factors to the different arms of the
service as follows: Infantry, Coast Artillery, Hospital Corps de-
tachments, Quartermaster Corps, and Ordnance Department, one;
field hospitals and ambulance companies, two; Field Artillery, Cavalry,
Signal Corps, Engineer Corps, three. -
I might say in explanation that that is on account of the higher
cost of maintaining the auxiliary arms than the Infantry.
In addition to these two continuing appropriations, made pursuant
to the militia law, special appropriations for encampments and maneu-
vers, Field and Coast Artillery matériel, transportation of supplies,
and other purposes, have been made from year to year, bringing
the total annual appropriations made by the Federal Government
for the support of the Organized Militia to a sum which since the
passage of the militia law in 1903 has averaged slightly more than
$5,000,000. In this total, appropriations for reserve equipment for
the Field Artillery of the Organized Militia, which during the past
three years has amounted to more than $6,000,000, are not included.
The total State expenditures for the support of the Organized
Militia for the last State fiscal year was $8,463,044.89.
In 18 States the Federal allotments made during the past year have
exceeded the State appropriations in amounts ranging from equality
to thirteen times the State appropriation. In the case of one State
assistance has been extended for a period of two years, during which
the legislature adjourned without making any appropriation for its
Organized Militia. *:
The provisions of the act of 1903 and amendments thereto which
obliged uniformity in organization, armament, and training, and made
it possible to make the requirements in respect to training effective
by conditioning participation in Federal appropriations contingent
upon compliance there with, constitute a considerable advance in
efficiency in a part of the militia. The law intended that by 1910 the
Organized Militia should conform in organization, armament, and
discipline, to the standard prescribed for the Regular Army, subject
in time of peace to such general exceptions as may be authorized by
the Secretary of War. In a cºi. measure these require-
ments had been met by that date. Certain important details of
Organization, armament, and equipment have, however, since been
completed, and in addition a system of instruction has been devel-
oped through a provision made by Congress in 1911 for the detail,
from the Army, of officers and noncommissioned officers as instructors
of the Organized Militia. There are at present on this duty 118
officers of the active list, 24 retired officers, and 199 noncommis-
Sioned officers of the Regular Army. *
Senator DU PONT. How many active officers, did you say .
190 PREPAREDNIESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
Gen. MILLs. One hundred and eighteen, who are known as inspec-
tor-instructors, and there is the Division of Militiã Affairs which
numbers, including myself, 11 officers. -
Senator HITCHCOCK. And these retired officers are actively engaged 3
Gen. MILLS. No, sir; they are not engaged in the active tactical
instruction of the troops, but they are engaged more in the admin-
istrative work. - -
Senator HITCIICOCK. I wanted to know whether they were really
retired and not doing anything, or whether they were employed in
Some capacity.
Gen. MILLs. They are employed, and well employed. No retired
officer is detailed unless there is every assurance that he will give full
value to the State, for the additional expense entailed by detailing
him. *
Senator HITCHCOCK. He gets full pay while he is detailed'
Gen. MILLS. Not necessarily; the highest pay that can be given a
retired officer on this duty is that of major. - -
Senator CATRON. How is that % - -
Gen. MILLs. The highest pay that can be given to a retired officer
who is detailed to active service with the organization is that of
major. That is, if a colonel was detailed on duty with the militia,
his maximum pay would be that of a major.
Senator DU PONT. It would be more than that of a major, would
it not :
Gen. MILLs. No, sir. The greatest innovation, however, is found
in that part of the law which authorizes the President to require
the militia to serve beyond the limits of the United States. This
provision is at variance with the idea held in this country both
before and since the adoption of the Constitution that militia is for
local and home defense only. Though excellent in its intent, this
provision has been held unconstitutional in an opinion of the At-
torney General of the United States, and as the matter now stands,
it would be unwise to count upon using these troops in their status
as Organized Militia beyond the territorial limits of the country.
It was doubtless in view of this consideration that the volunteer
act of 1914 made provision for admitting organizations of the Organ-
ized Militia into the volunteer service under the proviso that to be
accepted for such service three-fourths of the prescribed minimum
enlisted strength of an Organization must volunteer.
‘The strength of the Organized Militia at the annual inspection held
during the winter of 1915 in accordance with section 14 of the militia
law was 8,705 officers and 120,693 enlisted men, of whom 564 officers
and 19,382 men were absent from the inspection. Seventy-two per
cent of the total strength is furnished by the States east of the Missis-
sippi; 7 per cent by the Pacific Coast States, and 6 per cent by the
States contiguous to the Mexican border. * -
It is under the provision of the above laws that the War Department
has been and is seeking to make effective the intention of Congress
by assisting the several States in so organizing, arming, equipping,
and training their active militia that these independent forces can
pass without reorganization into the Federal service and be at that
time as efficient, as a force of citizen soldiers can be that receive only
a limited training in time of peace. This work is accomplished
through the Division of Militia Affairs, which is one of the four
PRIEPARED NIESS FOR NATION AL DEFENSE. 191
coordinate branches of the Office of the Chief of Staff. The duties of
the division divide themselves into two general classes; administra-
tive and instructional. In the conduct of the division, those charged
with its responsibilities must not only constantly bear in mind that
the Government's chief interest in the Organized Militia lies in secur-
ing a partially trained field force, but must also, to attain a practical
result, acquire a complete understanding of the many difficulties
each State encounters in maintaining its troops, in order to be in
harmony with the military authorities thereof. †
The general policy of the War Department, adopted after con-
Sultation with the governors of the several States, contemplates the
Organization of the State troops into 12 tactical divisions, which are
at the present time incomplete. The logical completion of these
divisions, including the provision for them of the several special
arms in the proper proportion, will provide a force at the present
prescribed peace strength of 8,916 officers and 141,372 enlisted men,
capable of expansion with a proper system to a war strength of 8,916
. and 257,988 enlisted men. Although all of the divisions
except two (New York and Pennsylvania) are incomplete in respect
to certain essential auxiliary arms, the step taken is a practical one
and looks to the ultimate expansion of the whole into a properly
balanced force. The following units are necessary to complete
the organization of the 12 divisions: Cavalry, 51 troops; Engineer
companies, 29; Field Artillery, 64 batteries; Signal Corps, 3 com-
panies; field hospitals, 7; ambulance companies, 29; 84 machine-
gun companies. There also exists a shortage of 261 officers and
9,689 enlisted men of coast artillery, necessary to complete the
contingent of that arm which the Organized Militia is expected to
furnish.
Senator DUPONT. I did not hear the number of enlisted men in the
Coast Artillery.
Gen. MILLs. In the Coast Artillery, 9,689.
Senator CATRON. That is what you say are missing %
Gen. MILLS. Missing.
Senator DU PoWT. About 10,000 in round numbers ?
Gen. MILLs. Yes, sir. The States of New Jersey, Delaware, Penn-
sylvania, Maryland, Virginia, Florida, Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana,
and Texas do not furnish any Coast Artillery. -
The progress of the Organized Militia in field efficiency during the
past year has been variable, ranging from actual retrogression to
distinct improvement, but on the whole inclining upward and show-
ing a progressive increase of efficiency. In all but two of the States
the armament and personal equipment of the minimum strength of
all organizations is now complete.
In the foregoing statement, endeavor has been made to trace in a
general way the development of the Organized Militia since the
enactment of the militia law of 1903. As the question of the legal
obstacles encountered in making the Organized Militia a dependable
Federal force has been covered in the statement to your committee
|by the Secretary of War, that phase of the question will not be men-
tioned in this statement but attention is devoted to the present con-
dition of the Organized Militia and the practical difficulties encoun-
tered by the War Department in its efforts to carry out the intention
of Congress as expressed in existing legislation. -
j92 PREPAIRED NIESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
As a State force, the Organized Militia may be said to be in general
dependable and efficient for State purposes. This is shown by its
record of Service in many States in connection with conflagrations,
floods, riots, and similar duties.
As a national force, the difficulties referred to seem inherent in our
system of dual control. In a few States, there is found a sentiment
which regards the active militia as a State force beyond the control
of the Federal Government, and which arrays itself against such
control. One of the principal impediments attendant upon the
system of dual control arises from the constitutional provision which
reserves the authority of training to the States. The War Depart-
ment, of course, recognizes this divided control and concedes without
question that there are peculiar conditions which will influence each
tate in regard to its system of military instruction and the necessity
that each State shall finally determine its own system; but it insists
that in order to obtain the assistance of the Federal Government, the
State system must be such that it will afford proper instruction for
its officers and men, correct organization of its troops, and such a
condition in regard to arms, clothing, and equipment as will enable
its Organized Militia to take the field in an efficient condition.
The practical difficulties encountered in the effort to make the
Organized Militia an efficient force for Federal purposes, may be
Summed up as follows:
(1) Lack of reserves. The vital character of this deficiency will
be recognized when it is stated that the prescribed minimum peace
strength of companies, except Field Artillery, is less than one-half
the strength that they will require for war, and when we bear in
mind the fact that in actual campaign, the loss of men begins the
very day of muster into service. Consequently, if regiments are to
be at all times immediately effective, a reserve of similarly trained
men must be available to fill them to the determined war strength,
and provision must also be made for forwarding recruits to maintain
organizations at their fighting strength. Experience shows that we
must reckon on a loss of at least 50 per cent from all causes during
the first six months of campaign. The absence of such a reserve
during the Civil War by which regiments at the front could be
maintained at an effective strength resulted in the frittering away
of regiments in the field into mere skeleton organizations.
(2) Deficiency of the Organized Militia in its present make-up in
auxiliary arms. Many organizations of all arms are greatly below
the prescribed minimum strength.
(3) A certain degree of inefficiency in methods of administration
and training. This is largely due to the temporary tenure of office
of State adjutants gºi and to the election of officers or their
appointment from political or personal considerations. With con-
stant changes of administration due to the temporary tenure of
office by the State adjutants general, any continuing policy within
the several States is impossible. Moreover, this condition often
causes official actions to be influenced by considerations other than
military efficiency.
A reasonable system of examination for appointment and for pro-
motion would go far toward eliminating unfit officers; the examina-
tion requirements which prevail in some States counteract to some
extent the evils of the selection of officers by election. Since uniform-
IPREPAIRED NESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 193
ity of training throughout the United States is necessary, the exam-
ination should be essentially the same in all the States. This can be
effected only through Federal direction. The Nation should be
given every assurance that losses in campaign due to incompetent
leadership will be reduced to a minimum.
(4) Lack of uniform and efficient standard of physical examina-
tion. In some States, recruits are accepted without physical exami-
nation. Reports for the year 1914 show that in 301 companies or
equivalent units, the physical examination was not conducted in
accordance with Regular Army standards.
(5) Frequent changes in enlisted personnel due to excessive num-
ber of iº for reasons other than expiration of term of service.
(6) Low attendance at assemblies for drill and instruction. The
average attendance at assemblies for armory drill and instruction
was 56.6 per cent of the total strength of the Organized Militia,
Less than 50 per cent fired the prescribed course of rifle practice in
1914. -
In connection with this item I should state that the returns for
1915, which are not yet in, as they are not required to be furnished
until the 31st of December, will show better results in reference to
target practice, because conditions have been attached to the attend-
ance upon the national rifle matches and at interstate rifle com-
petitions that will necessitate a larger attendance at target practice,
Senator HITCHCOCK. How were those conditions attached, General?
Gen. MILLs. They were attached through the authority contained
in a special Federal appropriation made for the national matches,
and by regulations prescribed by the Secretary of War. An appro-
priation of $50,000 was made by Congress for the national matches,
which matches are conducted under such regulations as the Secre-
tary of War, after consultation with the §. Board for the
Promotion of Rifle Practice, shall make. With reference to inter-
state rifle competitions, the Secretary of War has prescribed that
in the case of each State planning to participate, at least 75 per cent
of the Organized Militia of that State armed with the rifle will have
fired the prescribed course in small arms firing during that season.
Senator HITCHCOCK. It was a legislative condition in the appro-
priation ?
Gen. MILLS. Yes, sir. It was brought about in that way.
(7) Lack of cooperation between the States. Only 11 States have
taken action looking to the completion of their divisional comple-
ments. The Federal Government has no power to prescribe .
organizations a State shall maintain.
The CHAIRMAN. General, could it be done under the power that the
Secretary of War has to establish rules and regulations, or would
it require additional legislation ? º -
Gen. MILLs. I think it would require additional legislation, Sen-
at Or.
Senator DU PONT. General, under those powers that have been
conferred upon the Secretary of War would he have any authority
to require that all promotions of officers be made after a system of
examinations, and prescribe the system .
Gen. MILLS. That is a mooted question, Senator.
Senator DU Pox T. And it is a matter of constitutional law Ż
194 PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
Gen. MILLs. Yes; Congress has the right to provide for the organ-
ization, armament, and discipline.
Senator DU PONT. To say they should not have the benefit of the
appropriation unless the officers are promoted under such a system 7
Gen. MILLs. Some of the States allow an election of officers to
take place, but then after the officer is elected he has to stand an
examination to show his proficiency to exercise the office to which
he has been elected, and that results in those States frequently
eliminating officers whose sole qualification for election is their popu-
larity with those who elected them.
(8) Lack of uniformity in the military codes of the several States,
no two of which are alike, and which, in many essentials, are different
from the Federal code; as an example, great differences exist in the
important particular of terms of enlistment and reenlistment.
In the States these terms vary from two to five years.
(9) Lack of care of Federal property. During the period from Jan-
uary 1, 1912, to June 30, 1915, property to the value of $1,352,761.14,
the loss or shortage of which can not be satisfactorily accounted for,
W. been acted on or is awaiting the final action of the Secretary of
8, I’. -
Senator HITCHCOCK. For what period of time is it'.
Gen. MILLs. From January 1, 1912, to June 30, 1915. Many of
the losses occurred before January 1, 1912, Senator; but during the
period stated the War Department has required that all losses of
property shall be covered by survey proceedings.
Senator HITCHCOCK. Such property as equipment and uniforms 7
Gen. MILLs. Yes; rifles and all the personal equipment and field
equipment of the Organized Militia, blankets, clothing, and every-
thing of that kind. There are no legal means by which a State can be
required to reimburse with its own funds the Federal Government for
property lost or destroyed through neglect or misappropriation,
And until legal means are given, based upon my experience in the
division, those losses will continue, I believe.
The CHAIRMAN. Where a State is short after the inspection is
made, do you attempt to withhold from the Federal appropriation
the value of the property lost 3
Gen. MILLs. No, sir; when a shortage in property is discovered,
that fact is reported to the governor of the State, who appoints an
officer of the Organized Militia, who must be a disinterested officer,
to investigate the shortage. The surveying officer forwards a report
of his investigation to the governor, who in turn forwards it to the
Secretary of War for consideration. If it is determined that the
property has been lost or has become unserviceable through fair wear
and tear in the service, the governor is authorized to drop same from
his return of accountability. -
Senator DU Pont. Or through unavoidable accident? -
Gen. MILLs. Yes; but if it is lost through negligence on the part
of the State, then the law prescribes that the §. of it shall be
charged against the allotment of the Federal appropriation made to
the State.
The CHAIRMAN. That is what I understand. So the Government
is reimbursed, in the final analysis?
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 195
Gen. MILLS. The final analysis is that it pays for it twice. It fur-
nishes the property in the first place. Then the Government replaces
it with new property.
Senator DU Pont. Do I understand that this money is deducted
from the amount the National Government pays the State?
Gen. MILLS. Yes, sir; and then covered into the Treasury.
Senator HITCHCOCK. I do not quite understand that yet. That is,
that loss is deducted from the amount to be paid to the State?
Gen. MILLS. Yes, sir.
Senator HITCHCOCK. What does the State do, subtract it from
what it would pay the militia?
Gen. MILLs. The State has so much less Federal funds to devote
to the militia for whom the funds were appropriated.
The CHAIRMAN. But it is really a governmental loss rather than a
State loss? - -
Gen. MILLs. Yes; and that is the basis of my belief that until the
State is held responsible the loss will continue to be considerable.
This does not apply to all States, but to States where great negligence
has existed and where there is every indication it is going to exist.
They get this property and then do not hold the officers to whom it
is issued accountable. . &
Senator HITCHCOCK. Is there any great difference in the percent-
age of loss in the various States ?
Gen. MILLs. A great deal, Senator, -
This question is fully presented in the report of the Division of
Militia Affairs for 1915, from page 59 to page 66, inclusive, and it
gives it in complete detail. -
The CHAIRMAN. It shows all the States?
Gen. Mrſ. Ls. It shows all the States and shows the losses and what
steps have been taken to correct the matter. --
Senator HITCHCOCK. I have been told, Gen. Mills, that the States
would have much less difficulty in compelling an accounting for mate-
rials that have become lost, supplies that have become lost, uniforms,
rifles, and so on, if there was a system of militia pay, and each mem-
ber of the militia realized that any loss would be deducted from his
forthcoming pay.
Gen. MILLs. Yes, sir; I think that is entirely true, and I believe
that Federal pay will increase the disciplinary hold both upon officers
and men. In some of the States, the officers to whom Federai prop-
erty is issued are required to give suitable bond, but they do not
always enforce these bonds. They are reluctant to do it, out of sym-
pathy largely, because the State authorities know that captains of
companies have great difficulty in recruiting their companies, and
they dislike adding to their difficulties, as would result by the enforce-
ment of a bond to cover property that had been lost through negli-
É. or had been abstracted and taken away. It may not have been
irect negligence of the commander but negligence to which he con-
tributed. -
(10) Inadequate Federal appropriations. More liberal appropria-
tions would permit of the organization of the necessary auxiliary
arms whose cost of upkeep would otherwise be a heavy burden on the
States. In many States appropriations are inadequate, and in some,
uncertain, to accomplish their part in the support of the troops they
maintain. &
IQ6 PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
(11) Service in the Organized Militia seems to offer little attraction
to the best material that is available and suitable for such service
and which exists in every community in the country.
In general, the most serious difficulties encountered in developing
the Organized Militia are traceable to the fact that it constitutes to-
day not a single armed body functioning in all its parts in obedience
to a common control, but an aggregation of 48 little State armies,
the majority organized without reference to national needs and each
jealously clinging to certain State rights. Such a system necessarily
carries with it a certain amount of friction, misunderstanding, and
confusion. This difficulty is inherent in the system of dual control.
In military affairs, more, probably, than in any other of the activities
of life, control of the essentials that go to make up field efficiency
must be centralized, and in our situation must be in the hands of the
Federal Government. -
The CHAIRMAN. General, have you ever tried to figure out a way,
within the limits of the Constitution, to federalize the National Guard,
to bring it into close touch with the Federal Government, so that there
would be unity of control or single control?
Gen. MILLs. Yes, Senator; but in the attempt we invariably come
up against constitutional questions; upon such questions I am not
an authority. That is a part of your functions. But as a practical
question I think it could be done. -
The CHAIRMAN. It has always seemed to me, although I have never
been able to figure it out, that limitations can be placed upon these
Nº. by the Federal Government that would compel the
ational Guard to yield to Federal control.
Senator THOMAs. That could be done as a condition to the appropri-
ation and the method of its use. *
The CHAIRMAN. That is what I am getting at. *
Senator THOMAs. But would such a statute be in harmony with
the provisions of the Constitution upon that subject 3
The CHAIRMAN. Suppose in making an appropriation for the Na-
tional Guard, for instance, it is optional with Congress to make that
or not. Suppose you make an appropriation conditioned upon the
National Guard of all the States obeying the regulations adopted by
the Secretary of War : -
Senator THOMAs. The regulation would not be effective unless the
States agreed to it.
Senator CATRON. Would not that do away with the National Guard?
Senator THOMAs. It would have that effect, ultimately, and I am
hººd to think that if it should have that effect it would be a good
thing. -
§. MILLs. That is what I referred to in the beginning of this
paper. Congress has power to provide for the organization, arma-
ment, and discipline. That is unquestioned. Now, it is under that
authority that we seek to bring about organization, armament, and
discipline to conform to that prescribed for the Regular Army. In
the statement that I read here, the other requirements looked to se-
curing field efficiency by means of drills, camps, and other forms of
training, which may be stated to be requirements in equity, compli-
ance with which entitles the State to participate in the appropria-
tions made under the provisions of the law.
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 197
The CHAIRMAN. The same difficulty has existed ever since colonial
days. Washington encountered that conflict of jurisdiction between
the Continental Congress and the State legislatures. But the
tendency of legislation has been to bring the National Guard into
closer touch with the Federal Government, has it not
Gen. MILLs. Yes, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. As this has progressed toward central control
has not the National Guard constantly become more efficient'
Gen. MILLS. Oh, there is no question about that.
The CHAIRMAN. It seems to me the Congress might, by attaching
conditions to these various appropriations—let the courts test it
if they want to—conditions to the appropriations to the States.
Officials always want the money; they would be disposed to come in
and obey. Have you ever worked out a bill along those lines?
Gen. MILLS. I should judge the bill you have introduced, known as
the militia pay bill, is based upon the use of money for that purpose.
The CHAIRMAN. Do not you think that bill will help increase the
efficiency of the National Guard? * -
Gen. MILLs. There is no question about it, Senator. -
The CHAIRMAN. That bill was practically agreed upon by the
adjutants general of the various States, and by the War Department,
was it not
Gen. MILLS. Yes, sir; it was agreed upon by the representatives
of the National Guard Association, the National Militia Board, the
Adjutants General Association, representatives of the Judge Advocate
General’s Office, a representative of the Division of Militia Affairs,
and of the War College.
Senator BECKHAM. How much additional appropriation would
that call for 7
Gen. MILLs. That bill calls for, as it stands, $16,500,000. This
is the bill introduced by Senator Chamberlain in the Senate. That is
at the minimum strength. If the militia are increased to the maxi-
mum strength it would cost some $32,000,000 or $33,000,000, and
probably more.
Senator HITCHCOCK. That would be over $100 per man, would it
not .
Gen. MILLS. Yes.
Senator BECKHAM. The militia costs about $6,000,000?
Gen. MILLS. Yes, sir; that is, the Government appropriates that
much for that purpose. The amount mentioned does not include
State appropriations.
The CHAIRMAN. The bill I introduced appropriates $16,500,000,
but it apportions it between the States, so that over a certain amount
can not be expended in a State. ſºme
Gen. MILLs. No; it is apportioned along the lines of the present
appropriation.
The CHAIRMAN. The bill would not automatically increase the
appropriation ?
en. MILLS. Oh, no. Congress would have to appropriate every.
year; but if the bill resulted in a considerable increase in the enlisted
strength of the Organized Militia, then Congress would have to
appropriate more money to meet that additional strength. . The
number of officers would be the same.
(Schedule of proposed militia pay submitted by Gen. Mills:)
198
PREPAREDINESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
Below is a close approximation of the actual cost of the Organized Militia under the
proposed militia law at the present required minimum strength (approximately
130,000 officers and men), also its cost under the same bill at its possible extended
strength (approximately 265,000 officers and men):
| Home-service pay.
(a) Based on required miximum strength of present organization:
Generals and certain staff officers. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $100,000
Line officers and staff officers on duty with Organiza-
tions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3,400,000
Total pay (approximately) for officers. . . . . . . . . . . . . 3, 500,000
Total pay (approximately) for enlisted men. . . . . . . . . . 6, 500,000
Total home-Service pay-------------. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $10,000,000
For acquirement of arms, equipment, etc. . . . . . . . . . 2, 500,000 f -
For State encampments, target practice, etc. . . . . . . . 2,500,000
For joint maneuvers with Regular Army. . . . . . . . . . . . . S50, 000
For special arms. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 600,000
sº sº º sº * * * * sº sº s º ºs º sº º sº sº.
Total appropriations for proposed bill
(b) Based upon maximum strength (500 per congressional representa-
6,450,000
16, 450,000
tion), (265,000):
Estimated pay for officers and men. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20,000,000
FCr acquirement of arms, equipment, etc. . . . . . . . . . $5,000,000 -
For State encampunents, target practice, etc. . . . . . . 5,000,000
For joint maneuvers with Regular Army . . . . . . . . . . . . 1, 500,000
For special arms. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . * * * * * * l,000,000
- e — 12, 500,000
Total estimated cost-------------. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32, 500,000
Base pay of officers of the Organized Militia.
ve Pay per
Rank. Per Cent. amºuſ.
Major general--------------------------------------------------------------------- 5 $400
Brigadier general. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . a s = • * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 5 300
Colonel (staff)--------------------------------------------------------------------- 5 200
Colonel (line).-------------------------------------------------------------------- 15 600
Lieutenant colonel (staff)--------------------------------------------------------- 5 175
Lieutenant colonel (line).............................................------------. 15 525
Major (staff). --------------------------------------------------------------------- 5 150
Major (line).----------------------------------------------------------------------- 15 450
Qaptain (brigade and division staff and chaplains): ................................ 5 120
Captain (company commanders and regimental adjutants and quartermasters). . . . 20 480
Captains (other than foregoing)-------------------------------.................... 15 360
First lieutenants (on staff of general officer and chaplains). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 100
First lieutenants (line).-------------------------------------------------.* - - - - - - - - - 15 300
First lieutenants (company commander or adjutant of independent battalion or
Squadron).--------------------------------------------------------------------- - 20 400
Second lieutenants (on staff of general officer). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 85
Second lieutenants (line).---------------...--------------------------------------- 15 255
Second lieutenants (company commander or quartermasters of independent battal-
ion or Squadron).---------------------------------------------- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 20 340
Base pay of enlisted men of the Organized Militia.
Regular |Militi
Grade. Army pay It la pay
per annum. Pº an IlliſDi.
Regimental sergeant major, quartermaster sergeant, commissary sergeant, and
first Sergeant------------------------------------------------------------------ $540 $135
Color Sergeants----------------------------------------.......................... 432 108
Battalion and Squadron Sergeant majors. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 480 120
Company quartermaster Sergeants, company and troop sergeants, and cooks . . . . 360 90
Corporals and artificers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ............ '- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 252 63
Musicians and privates --------------------------------------------------------. 180 45
PREPAIRED NESS FOR, NATIONAL DEFENSE. 199
The CHAIRMAN. Under your statement here awhile ago the National
Government is appropriating about $5,000,000 for the support of the
National Guard and the States are appropriating about $8,000,000.
Gen. MILLs. Approximately $7,730,000.
The CHAIRMAN. That is $13,000,000 annually. Do you feel, as the
head of that division, that the money is well spent
Gen. MILLs. Oh, I think it is. We could get, of course, with a
removal of some of the existing difficulties, better results; but we
have as a result of that expenditure a more or less partially trained
force of civilian soldiers, and it is the only force we have outside of
the Regular Army.
Senator THOMAs. What care do the militiamen take of the equip-
ment which is furnished by the Government'
Gen. MILLS. Well, it varies, Senator, in different States.
Senator THOMAs. In some States it is very bad, is it not ?
Gen. MILLS. In some States it is very bad, indeed. In other States
it is excellent. -
Senator THOMAs. Is there any way, in case of waste—I suppose this
waste does result from lack of care;-that the Government can reim-
burse itself from the States which exhibit such negligence or lack of
attention to the property that is furnished by the people.
Gen. MILLs. As I said a minute ago, I believe the only way—and
this is based upon my experience in the Division of Militia Affairs—
is, when property is lost or destroyed through neglect, to make, the
State pay for it out of its own funds and not out of funds accruing to
the State by reason of Federal allotments.
Senator THOMAs. What way have you of enforcing that % -
Gen. MILLS. If the State does not pay it, I recommend the stop-
page of all Federal funds going to that State until it does pay it.
The CHAIRMAN. Do you exact bonds?
Gen. MILLs. No, sir; we have no authority, although it has been
suggested to the States that they should exact bonds from responsible
officers, and in a good many States bonds are exacted, which are lived
up to ; in those States there is very little loss of property.
The CHAIRMAN. Ought not the Government to require bonds from
the legal custodian of the property representing the State 7 You
deliver the property to what representative of the State'
Gen. MILLs. The adjutant general.
The CHAIRMAN. Now, do you not think a bond ought to be required
by the Government from the adjutant general'.
Gen. MILLS. Yes, sir. For several years, Senator, the Division of
Militia Affairs has recommended the appointment of a property and
disbursing officer in each State from among the Officers of }. Organ-
ized Militia, to be selected by the governor and approved by the Sec-
retary of War, this officer to be paid a salary in accordance with
the strength of the troops in the State, who shall disburse all Federal
funds, and be accountable to the Federal Government for Federal
property issued to the State; and I believe that would be a good step
in advance, and it would certainly save the Federal Government a
great deal of money. -
The CHAIRMAN. That would require legislation ?
Gen. MILLS. Yes; a provision for the appointment of such an
officer is included in the present estimates.
200 PREPARED NESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
The CHAIRMAN. Do you make any recommendations as to any
radical changes in the National Guard system 7 -
Gen. MILLs. Yes, sir; you will find in the Book of Estimates that
the most radical recommended change is that the Federal appropria-
tions, instead of being allotted to States in accordance with con-
gressional representation, be based primarily and fundamentally
on what the State itself appropriates, with a provision that
would enable the War Department to increase the appropriations to
certain States, maybe poorer States, which were called upon to
maintain the more expensive arms, the auxiliary arms.
The CHAIRMAN. Do you embody the specific recommendation in the
Book of Estimates as to what the form of legislation should be .
Gen. MILLs. Yes, sir. It is a recommended revision of section
1661, Revised Statutes, and is included in the Book of Estimates.
Senator HITCHCOCK. What are the more expensive arms you
speak of . -
Gen. MILLs. The Field Artillery is the most expensive, and then
comes the Cavalry, and then the #º
Senator BECKHAM. General, in your statement you said that the
º, appropriation was inadequate. How much more do you
8,SJK IOI
Gen. MILLS. We have asked, in the Book of Estimates, that the
$2,000,000 appropriation under Revised Statutes, 1661 be increased
$500,000. We have also asked that the $2,000,000 appropriation
under section 13 of the amended militia law be increased $500,000.
This last appropriation, as stated in the statement I have read, is
used for providing stores and equipment and ammunition. ... With
the increase in the auxiliary arms in the militia an additional
appropriation to the $2,000,000 would be essential to get those arms
in a proper state of efficiency—in proper condition.
Senator BECKHAM. In the aggregate, how much increase do you
ask over the present -
Gen. MILLs. $1,000,000 in these two appropriations. Then, in .
addition, there are items to cover the care of horses, a certain num-
ber of horses for the use of the mounted auxiliary arms, Field Artil-
lery, the Cavalry, the Engineers, the Ambulance, the Sanitary com-
panies, and the Signal Corps; that is, sufficient horses to enable
them to have enough to become acquainted with their particular
duties as mounted troops. That appropriation also would provide
the forage, and in the Artillery it would provide a mechanic for each
battery and a caretaker or a stable man for each five horses.
That will entail an increase. The Book of Estimates carries
$398,000 for that, but that is not quite sufficient. Those estimates
were made in a great hurry, that is, that part of the estimates, and
after the determination of the Secretary of War to recommend a
large increase in the militia appropriation, and the items had to be
prepared by a certain date, so that in consequence an error was made
in the particular item which calls for $398,000. It will probably
have to be nearer $500,000.
The CHAIRMAN. That would be a million and a half
Gen. MILLs. A million and a half.
The CHAIRMAN. Are those the additional appropriations suggested
in the plan of the Secretary of War 7
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 201:
Gen. MILLS. In addition to that there is a large appropriation of
over $4,000,000 to cover the joint maneuvers every year, encampment
maneuvers, instead of an appropriation made every other year of
$1,500,000 and the next year anywhere from $250,000 to $500,000,
with the view of relieving the States of all the expenses that they now
go to in connection with the State camps, and joint camps, coverin
the pay and transportation of Officers, the pay, transportation, and
subsistence of enlisted men, and the incidental expenses connected
with those encampments.
Senator HITCHCOCK. Gen. Mills, you have recommended that the
º be divided among the various States in proportion to
the amount appropriated by each State 3
Gen. MILLs. By each State, yes; sir.
Senator HITCHCOCK. Would not that result in giving to well-organ-
ized States which make large appropriations an excessive amount,
and less to the poorer States, so that the disproportion would increase ?
Gen. MILLs. No, sir; you will find, as I have worked it out, and
with the conditions named in the estimates, that the States that
make the most appropriations now would get very little more than
they get now, but it would be a stimulus, I believe, to those States
that are very backward and do not appropriate enough to do their
part in maintaining the troops that they try to maintain.
Senator DU PONT. General, I understood you said there was a little
under $6,000,000 for the expenses of the States, and then there was an
additional sum, about $2,000,000 a year, was there not
Gen. MILLS. No, sir; that includes all, Senator. I can give you
the Federal appropriations since 1903 if the committee asks for
that, divided into two periods, from 1903 to 1908, when there was
$2,000,000 added by section 13 of the militia law to provide equip-
ment, and from 1908 to the present time.
Senator BECKHAM. As I understand, there is one place where you
ask for $500,000, and two others for $500,000, making three of
$500,000 each .
Gen. MILLs. Yes, sir. . -
Senator BECKHAM. And then an additional appropriation of about
$4,000,000 for maneuvers, making altogether about $5,500,000?
Gen. MILLS. It is a total appropriation of about $10,000,000.
The CHAIRMAN. For the j. of the National Guardº
Gen. MILLS. Yes, sir; the idea was for the Federal Government to
take over all the expenses that it legitimately could.
The CHAIRMAN. You have heard the recommendations of Gen.
Wood. He thought the system ought to be abolished.
Gen. MILLS. I believe that we ought to continue to build it up
until we get something better. I i. it would be a great mistake
to do anything that would impair the force that we have
got until we can do something better, that we ought to continue to
Build it up until we can do something better.
The CHAIRMAN. Now, General, turning from that a moment, there
are three measures affecting the National Guard. One is the tenta-
tive plan of the Secretary of War in which the National Guard is
provided for; the second is the provision made for the National
Guard in the so-called Hay bill, and the third is the militia pay bill
23380—PT 5—16—2
202 PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
that was introduced by me in the Senate. Have you carefully gone
over the plans involved in these several bills'
d Gen. MILLs. Yes, sir; very fully, and as carefully as it could be
OTO 0. -
The CHAIRMAN. Does the plan of the Secretary of War with refer-
•ence to the National Guard meet the difficulties which you have en-
countered 3 -
Gen. MILLs. Well, it meets only some of them, Senator; it will
meet the difficulty about the property and equipment. -
The CHAIRMAN. Yes. - * -
Qen. MILLs. It will tend to build up the auxiliary arms, which are
so important and without which the Organized Militia can not be-
come an efficient Federal field force.
The CHAIRMAN. Would the provisions of the bill as affecting the
National Guard increase its efficiency Ż
Gen. MILLs. Yes; it will increase its field efficiency considerably,
but it does not cure the vital defects of the system.
The CHAIRMAN. How does it compare with the system proposed
in the Hay bill? &
Gen. MILLs. There is simply embraced in the Hay bill the provision
increasing the appropriation made under section 1661 of the Revised
Statutes, $500,000.
The CHAIRMAN. But does not undertake to cure any of the present
deficiencies in the system - -
Gen. MILLs. Excepting as regards the care of property and pro-
visions for additional funds to secure better instruction, the bill as
it is printed º”. an amendment to Revised Statutes, 1661,
basing the Federal allotment to the State upon the principle that
the primary disposition would be made on what the State itself appro-
priates.
p The CHAIRMAN. Does it add to the efficiency of the National
Guard 7
Gen. MILLS. Does that particular bill?
The CHAIRMAN. Yes.
Gen. MILLS. Well, then it carries the pay feature, that is, it
carries the compensation feature. The percentages of pay are less
than those embraced in the bill introduced by yourself into the
Senate. The pay in your bill is the pay proposed by the National
Guard Association itself. The rates have never been passed upon
by the War Department—I mean the merits of the rates. The Hay
measure cuts the percentage of pay provided in your bill from 20
to 15, from 15 to 10, and from 10 to 5. The essential difference
hetween Mr. Hay's bill and your bill is that the latter superimposes
the status of Federal soldier upon that of the Organized-militiaman,
Mr. Hay's measure proposes to draft militiamen who receive Federal
pay into the Federal service in time of emergency.
enator HITCHCOCK. Those percentages are the percentages of
the pay that the regular enlisted man gets in the Regular Army.
Gen. MILLs. And the officers.
The CHAIRMAN. Does the bill I have introduced, known as the mili-
tia pay bill, cure some of the defects in the present system
Gen. MILLs. There is no question about it. That bill has the great
advantage, too, Senator, that it codifies all the militia laws. That is
a great advantage.
PREPAREDNIESS FOR, NATIONAL DEFENSE. 203
The CHAIRMAN. We are trying to get at the best results possible
in this whole situation. Taking the #. proposals, the militia pay
bill, the provisions in the Hay § and the provisions in the Secre-
tary of War's tentative bill, which do you think would be the best to
adopt, if we conclude to adopt any ?
Gen. MILLS. Leaving out the question of pay, which I think the
Secretary of War has covered in his statement to the committee, the
bill that you have introduced is the best bill of the three militia bills.
It will be greatly improved if you embrace in it the new legislation
proposed by the Secretary of War in the Book of Estimates.
The CHAIRMAN. That is, if the pay in that bill were reduced to the
proposition made by the Secreatry of War, you think it would more
nearly fill the requirements?
Gen. MILLs. The Secretary of War has not recommended armory
pay for the militia. *
he CHAIRMAN. Have you carefully looked at them all?
Gen. MILLS. I have. I want to add, however, Senator, that in
those sections in your bill which are equivalent to the present sec-
tion 1661, Revised Statutes, and section 13 of the militia law, those
$2,000,000 appropriations should be amended in accordance with the
recommendations made in the Book of Estimates so as to secure better
care of property, better training, etc.
The CHAIRMAN. Would it be possible for you to take each one of
those three bills and prepare such amendments to them as you think
would be necessary to make them efficient 2 -
Gen. MILLS. Well, I have already, Senator, in the back of the report
of the Division of Militia Affairs, taken up item by item your bill and
suggested changes that should be made in them. That bill was a
compromise in some particulars between the people interested, and
there were some sections that should be changed because they con-
flict with each other.
The CHAIRMAN. Have you done the same thing with respect to the
Hay measure ?
Gen.” MILLS. Yes, sir; I made a report upon the Hay measure to
the War Department.
The CHAIRMAN. What we would like to get at would be to have the
ºit of your suggestions as to proposed amendments in regard to
€8, Cºl.
Gen. MILLs. Both those reports have been made to the War
Department; and are accessible there, Senator, and I could have
them furnished if they have not been furnished.
The CHAIRMAN. I wish you would have them furnished and let us
have them to go in with your testimony. -
Gen. MILLS. Yes, sir. My report of the Organized Militia part of
the Hay bill, which begins with section 34, page 43, of the revision
draft of the bill, is as follows:
SUGGESTED CHANGES IN THAT PART OF RIEVISED HAY BILL RELATING TO THE ORGANIZED
MILITIA.
SEC. 34. That Section sixteen hundred and sixty-one of the Revised Statutes, as
amended by the acts of February twelfth, eighteen hundred and eighty-seven; June
sixth, nineteen hundred; and June twenty-second, nineteen hundred and six, is
hereby amended and reenacted So as to read as follows: -
“SEC. 1. The Sum of two million five hundred thousand dollars is hereby annually
appropriated, to be paid out of any money in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated,
204 PREPAIRED NIESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
for the purpose of providing arms, Ordnance stores, quartermaster Stores, and camp
. for issue to the militia, such appropriation to remain available until
expended. -
“SEC. 2. The appropriation provided in the preceding paragraph shall be appor-
tioned among the several States and Territories under just and equitable procedure
to be prescribed by the Secretary of War and in direct ratio, So far as not in conflict
with such procedure, to the annual State and Territorial appropriations existing at
the date of apportionment for the support of the Organized Militia of Such States and
Territories, respectively, and to the District of Columbia, such proportion and under
such regulations as the President may prescribe: Provided, however, That no State or
Territory shall be entitled to the benefits of the appropriation apportioned to it unless
the number of regularly enlisted, organized, and uniformed active militia in Such
State shall be at least one hundred men for each Senator and Representative that
such State is entitled to have in the Congress of the United States, and in each Terri-
tory and the District of Columbia shall be at least equal to the number fixed by the
President for such Territory and District. And the amount of Said appropriation
which is thus determined not to be available shall be covered back into the Treasury:
Provided further, That the sum so apportioned among the several States, the Territory
of Hawaii, and the District of Columbia, shall be available under Such rules as may
be prescribed by the Secretary of War for the actual and necessary expenses incurred
by officers and enlisted men of the Regular Army when traveling on duty in con-
nection with the Organized Militia; for the transportation of Supplies furnished to
the militia for the permanent equipment thereof; for office rent and necessary
office expenses of officers on duty with the Organized Militia; for expenses of
sergeant-instructors on duty with the Organized Militia, including quarters,
fuel, light, medicines and medical attendance; and such expenses shall, consti-
tute a charge against the whole sum annually appropriated under Section six-
teen hundred and sixty-one, Revised Statutes, as amended, and shall be paid there-
from and not from the allotment duly apportioned to any particular State, Territory,
or the District of Columbia; for the promotion of rifle practice, including the acqui-
sition, construction, maintenance, and equipment of shooting galleries and suitable
target ranges; for the hiring of horses and draft animals for the use of mounted troops,
bałeries; and wagons; for forage for the same; and for Such other incidental expenses
in connection with encampments, maneuvers, and field instruction provided for in
sections fourteen and fifteen of the said act of January twenty-first, nineteen hundred
and three, as the Secretary of War may deem necessary: Provided further, That the
governor of each State and Territory and the commanding general of the Organized
Militia of the District of Columbia, shall appoint, designate, or detail, Subject to the
approval of the Secretary of War, an officer of the Organized Militia of the State,
Territory, or District, who shall be regarded as property and disbursing officer of the
United States. He shall receipt and annually account for all property belonging to
the United States in possession of the Organized Militia of his State, Territory, or
District, and shall make such returns and reports concerning the same as may be
required by the Secretary of War. The Secretary of War is authorized, on the requi;
sition of a governor of a State or Territory or the commanding general of the Organized
Militia of the District of Columbia, to pay to the property and disbursing officer thereof
as much of its allotment out of the annual appropriation under Section sixteen hundred
and sixty-one of the Revised Statutes, as amended, as shall be necessary for the pur-
poses enumerated therein. He shall render his accounts through the War Depart-
ment to the proper accounting officers of the Treasury for settlement. Before entering
upon the performance of his duties as property and disbursing officer, he shall be
required to give good and sufficient bond to the United States, in such sums as the
Secretary of War may direct, for the faithful performance of his duties and for the
safe-keeping and proper disposition of the Federal property and funds intrusted to his
care. He shall, after having qualified as property and disbursing officer, receive pay
for his services, and such compensation shall be a charge against the whole sum
annually appropriated under section sixteen hundred and sixty-one, Revised Statutes,
as amended, and shall not be paid from the allotment duly apportioned to the State,
Territory, or District of Columbia. When traveling in the performance of his official
“duties under orders issued by the proper authorities he shall be reimbursed for his actual
necessary traveling expenses, the sum to be made a charge against the allotment to
the State, Territory, or District of Columbia, under section sixteen hundred and
sixty-one, Revised Statutes, as amended. The Secretary of War shall cause an
inspection of the accounts and records of the property and disbursing officer to be
made by an officer of the Army at least once each year. The Secretary of War is
empowered to make all rules and regulations necessary to carry into effect the pro-
visions of this section: Provided further, That whenever any property issued to the
PREPAREDINESS FOR, NATIONAL DEFENSE. 205
Organized Militia of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia as hereinbefore
provided has been lost, damaged, or destroyed, or has become unserviceable or un-
Suitable by use in Service or from any other cause, it shall be examined by a dis-
interested surveying officer of the Regular Army detailed by the Secretary of War,
or of the Organized Militia to be appointed by the governor of the State or Territory,
or by the commanding general of the Organized Militia of the District of Columbia,
and the report of such surveying officer shall be forwarded to the Secretary of War,
and if it shall appear to the Secretary of War from the records of survey that the prop-
erty has been lost, damaged, or destroyed through unavoidable causes, he is hereby
authorized to relieve the State, or Territory, or the District of Columbia from further
accountability therefor; if it shall appear that the loss, damage, or destruction of
property was due to carelessness or neglect, or that its loss, damage, or destruction
could have been avoided by the exercise of reasonable care, the money value thereof
shall be charged to the State, or Territory, or the District of Columbia, to be paid for
from State funds, or any funds other than Federal: Provided further, That if any State,
Territory, or the Di trict of Columbia, neglects or refuses to pay, or to cause to be paid,
the momey equivalent of any loss, damage, or destruction of property charged against such
State, Territory, or the Di trict of Columbia, by the Secretary of War, after survey by a
di intere, led officer appointed as hereinbefore provided, the Secretary of War is hereby
authorized to debar tºuch State, Territory, or the District of Columbia from further partici-
pation in any amd all appropriations for the Organized Militia until such payment is
'made: Provided further, That if the articles so surveyed are found to be unserviceable
or unsuitable, from either avoidable or unavoidable causes, the Secretary of War shall
direct what disposition, by sale or otherwise, shall be made of such articles, except
unserviceable clothing, which shall be destroyed; and if sold, the proceeds of such
Sale, as well as stoppages against officers and enlisted men, and the net proceeds of
collections made from any person or from any State, Territory, or the District of
Columbia, to reimburse the Government for the loss, damage, or destruction of any
property, shall be deposited in the Treasury of the United States as a credit to the
State, Territory, or the District of Columbia accountable for said property, and as a
#. of and in addition to that portion of the allotment of such State, Territory, or the
hº of Columbia, Set aside for the purchase of similar supplies, stores, or material
Of War.’’ -
SEC. 35. Section thirteen of the Act of January twenty-first, nineteen hundred and three,
as amended by the Act of May twenty-seventh, nineteen humdred and eight, is hereby amended
and reenacted so as to read as follows: (Act of May twenty-seventh, nineteen hundred and
eight, Volume thirty-five, page four hundred and two, Section eight).
“SEC. 13. That the Secretary of War is hereby authorized to procure by purchase or manu-
facture, and issue from time to time to the Organized Militia, whder Such regulations as
he may prescribe, such number of the United States service arms together with all acces-
sories and Such other accouterments, equipments, wriforms, clothing, equipage, and mili-
tary stores of all kinds required for the army of the United States, as are necessary to arm,
wniform and equip all of the Organized Militia in the several States, Territories, and the
District of Columbia, in accordance with the requirements of this Act, without charging
the cost or value thereof, or any expense connected therewith, against the allotmemt of the
State, Territory, or the District of Columbia owl of the annual appropriation provided
by Section one thousand six hundred and sixty-one, of the Revised Statutes, as amended,
or requiring payment therefor, and lo eſcChange, without receiving any money credit there-
for, ammunition, or parts thereof suitable to the new arms, round for round, for corre-
sponding ammunition suitable to the old arms heretofore issued to said State, Territory,
or the District of Columbia by the United States: Provided, That said property shall
remain the property of the United States except as hereinafter provided, and be annually
accounted for by the Governors of the States, and Territories as required by law, and that
each State, Territory, or the District of Columbia shall, on receipt of new arms or equipments,
turn in to the War Department, or otherwise dispose of in accordance with the directions
of the Secretary of War, without receiving any money credit therefor, and without eacpense
or transportation, all United States property so replaced or condemned. When the
Organized Militia is uniformed as above required the Secretary of War is authorized to
fia, an annual clothing allowance to each State, Territory, and the District of Columbia
for each enlisted man of the Organized Militia thereof, and thereafter issues of clothing to
such State, Territory, and the District of Columbia shall be in accordance with Such allow-
ance and the Governors of the Stales and Territories, and the Commanding General of
the Militia of the District of Columbia shall be authorized to drop from their returns each
gear as expended, clothing corresponding in value to such allowance. . The Secretary of
War is hereby further authorized to issue from time to time to the Organized Militia under
such regulations as he may prescribe, small arms and artillery ammunition wipon the
requisition of the Governor, in the proportion of fifty per centum of the corresponding
206 PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
Regular Army allowance without charge to the State’s allotment from the appropriation.
wnder Section one thousand Sia, hwndred and sixty-one of the Revised Statutes, as amended.
To provide means to carry into effect the provisions of the section the necessary money to
cover the cost of procuring, exchanging, or issuing of arms, accouterments, equipments,
wniforms, clothing, equipage, ammunition and military stores to be eacchanged or issued
hereunder is hereby appropriated out of any money in the Treawsry not otherwise appro-
priated: , Provided, That the sum expended in the execution of the purchases and issues
provided for in this section shall not eacceed the Swm of $2,500,000 in any fiscal year: Pro-
vided, also, That the Secretary of War shall annually submit to Congress a report of
expenditures made by him in the execution of the requirements of this section.” -
SEC. 36. That certain commissioned officers on the active list belonging to organiza-
tions of the Organized Militia of each State, Territory, and the District of Columbia
participating in the apportionment of the annual appropriation provided by section
sixteen hundred and sixty-one, Revised Statutes, as amended, shall receive compen-
Sation for their Services, except during periods of Service for which they may become
lawfully entitled to the same pay as officers of corresponding grades of the Regular
Army, at the rate of certain percentages of the pay of officers of like grade in the
Regular Army, not including longevity pay, as now provided by law, namely: Not
to exceed five per centum to all colonels, lieutenant colonels, majors, chaplains, aids.
de camp, and officers of staff corps and staff departments; not to exceed fifteen per
centum to commanding officers of companies, troops, batteries, aād-a-Habłłłańee-eefa-
pańies; and to adjutants and quartermasters of regiments, independent battalions
or Squadrons, or Coast Artillery-distriets; Defense commands; not to exceed ten per
centum to all other officers belonging to regiments, Smaller tactical units, or Coast
:A+tiłłery-distriets; Defense commands, including medical officers not above the rank
of captain, detailed or assigned to and doing duty with regiments or smaller tactical
units or Coast A++#ery—disłłłets; Defense commands, medical officers serving with
field hospitals, and veterinarians. Regulations to be prescribed by the Secretary
of War shall determine the amount and character of service that must be rendered
by officers to entitle them to the whole or specific parts of the maximum pay here-
inafter authorized.
That each enlisted man on the activelist belonging to organizations of the Organized
Militia of each State, Territory, and the District of Columbia, participating in the
apportionment of the annual appropriation provided by section sixteen hundred
and sixty-one, Revised Statutes, as amended, shall receive compensation for his
services, except during periods of service for which he may become lawfully entitled
to the same pay as an enlisted man of corresponding grade in the Regular Army,
at a rate equal to twenty-five per centum of the initial pay now provided by law for
enlisted men of corresponding grades of the Regular Army: Provided, That such en-
listed man shall receive the compensation herein provided if he shall have attended
not less than forty-five regular drills during any one year, and a proportionate amount
for attendance upon a lesser number of such drills, not less than twenty; and no such
enlisted man shall receive any part of said compensation except as authorized by
this proviso and the three provisos next following: Provided further, That the compen-
sation provided herein shall be computed for semiannual periods, beginning the first
day of January and the first day of July of each year, in proportion to the number of
drills attended; and no compensation shall be paid to any enlisted man for the first
semiannual period of any year unless he shall have attended during said period
at least twenty drills, but any lesser number of drills attended during Said
period shall be reckoned with the drills attended during the second semiannual
period in computing the compensation, if any, due him for that year: And provided
further, That when any man enters into an enlistment other than an immediate reenlist-
ment he shall be entitled to proportional compensation for that year if during the
remainder of the year he shall attend a number of drills whose ratio to twenty is not
less than the ratio of the part of the year so served to the whole year; and when any
man's enlistment shall expire the compensation, if any, to which he may be entitled
shall be determined in like manner: And provided further, That periods of any actual
military duty equivalent to the drills herein prescribed (except those periods of
service for which members of the Organized Militia may become lawfully entitled
to the same pay as officers and enlisted men of the corresponding grades in the Regular
Army) may be accepted as service in lieu of such drills when so provided by the
Secretary of War. -
That all amounts appropriated for the purpose of this act shall be disbursed and
accounted for by the officers and agents of the Quartermaster Corps of the Army,
and all disbursements under the foregoing provisions of this section shall be made
as soon as practicable after the thirty-first day of December and the thirtieth day of
June of each year upon pay rolls prepared and authenticated in the manner to be
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 207
prescribed by the Secretary of War: Provided, That stoppages may be made against
the compensation payable to any officer or enlisted man hereunder to cover the cost
of public property lost or destroyed by and chargeable to such officer or enlisted man-
That no money approrpiated under the provisions of this act shall be paid to afiy
person not on the active list, nor to any person over sixty-four years of age, nor to any
person who fails to quality as to fitness for military service, under such regulations
a.S #: Secretary of War, after conference with the National Militia Board, shall pre-
SCI 100.
That when Congress shall have authorized the use of the armed land forces of the
United States in the emergency of actual or imminent war, requiring the use of troops.
in excess of those of the Regular Army, the President may, under such regulations
as he shall prescribe, draft into the military service of the United States, to serve
therein fee-eae-year during the continuance of the emergenčy unless sooner discharged,
any members of the Organized Militia. All persons so drafted shall, from the date.
of their draft, stand discharged from the Organized Militia, shall from said date be
subject to such laws and regulations for the government of the Army of the United.
States as are applicable to members of the Volunteer Army, and shall be embodied
in organizations corresponding as far as practicable to those of the Regular Army or
shall be otherwise assigned as the President may direct. 4}re-ee:Haſſaissiełłed-effieers
#–Said–ergañāzāţieńs—sha}}-be-appeiated—#era—afaeag-the–HaeHabers—thereef-effieers,
with—Faak-aet—albeive—that—ei–eekefiel-to-be-appeiated—by-the-President—alehe-ahé–a4+
ether-effieets—te—be—appeiated—by-the-President-by-ahé—with—the-adžiee-and-eehsehā.
eſſ-the-Seitate. The commissioned officers of organizations drafted into the service of the
United States shall be appointed from among the members of such organizations. The
commissioned officers of organizations formed by consolidating lesser organizations drafted
into the service of the United States, shall be appointed from among the commissioned
personnel of such drafted organizations or of the Regular Army. Officers with rank not
above that of colonel shall be appointed by the President alone and all other officers shall
be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. Officers.
and enlisted men in the service of the United States under the terms of this section:
shall have the same pay and allowances as officers and enlisted men of the Regular
Army of the same grades and the same prior service.
That the President may detail one officer of the Regular Army or Organized Militia to
perform the duties appertaining to a Chief of Staff, and one officer of the Regular Army
or Organized Militia to perform the duties apperlaining to an Assistant Chief of Staff,
within a division or separate brigade of the Organized Militia called into the service of the
United States, or formed of lesser separate writs of the Organized Militia called into the
service of the United States: Provided, That in order to insure the prompt mobilization of
the Organized Militia in time of war or other emergency, the President may, in time of peace,
with the consent of the governors of the States or Territories, or the Commanding General
of the District of Columbia Militia concerned, detail a field officer of the Regular Army
to perform the duties appertaining to a Chief of Staff for such tactical division of the Organ-
ized Militia as exist, or it is proposed to create from the lesser wmits of the Organized Militia,
when called into the service of the United States. ---
SEC. 36 37. That in time of war or public darger, when two or more officers of the
Same grade are on duty in the same field, department, or command, or of organiza-
tions thereof, the President may assign the command of the forces of such field, depart-
ment, or commarid, or of any organization thereof, without regard to seniority of rank
in the same grade: Provided, That in the absence of such assignment by the President,
officers of the same grade shall rank and have precedence in the following order,
without regard to dates of rank of commissions, as between officers of different classes,
namely: First, officers of the Regular Army and officers of the Marine Corps detached
for service with the Army by order of the President; second, officers of the Organized
Militia called into the service of the United States; third, all other officers in the
military service of the United States, who shall take rank among themselves in their
respective grades according to the dates of their entry into the service of the United
States in those grades: Provided further, That officers of the Regular Army holding
commissions in the Organized Militia in the service of the United States, in the Con-
tinental Army, or in the Volunteer forces, shall have rank and take precedence under
said commissions as if they were commissions in the Regular Army; but the rank of
officers of the Regular Army under their commissions in the Organized Militia shall
not, for the purpose of this section, be held to antedate their formal entry into the
service of the United States under said commissions. : Provided further, That when the
Organized Militia of any State or Territory, or the District of Columbia, participates in
the encampment, maneuvers, and field instruction of any part of the Regular Army at or
near any military post or camp of the United States, the command of such military post
or camp, and the officers and troops of the United States there stationed, shall remain with

208 PREPAIRED NESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
the-regular commander of the post or camp without regard to the rank of the commanding
or other officers of the Militia temporarily so encamped within its limits or in its vicinity.
That all expenses necessary to the enforcement of this act, including the actual
and necessary expense of travel of the officers and enlisted men of the Army when
traveling on duty parsuant—te—erders—issued—by-the-gewełHers—ef-the-several-States
ańd–Perriteries-et-the-ee:Baraahdiag-geheral-ef-the–ergahážed–Mälätää-ef-the-Pisłriet-ef
Gelääbia in connection with the Organized Militia, shall be payable out of any appro-
priation made to carry out the provisions of this act.
That the Secretary of War shall cause to be annually estimated the amount necessary
for carrying out the provisions of this section, and no money shall be expended here-
under except as shall from time to time be appropriated.
SEC. 37 38. That all acts and parts of acts in conflict with this act are hereby
repealed to the extent of such conflict.

COMMENTS.
Section 34, page 44, line 19: After the word “Columbia” and before the word
‘‘under” insert the words “such proportion and.” - *
These words are contained in the estimates prepared by this office and it is believed
that their omission is due to a clerical or typographical error, because this provision
Was to definitely establish the fact that the Organized Militia of the District of Colum-
bia was to receive a proportional part of the appropriation under such regulations as
the President should prescribe, and that its allotment otherwise, if this provision is
not incorporated in the law, leaves the amount to be apportioned to the District to
be determined under such regulations as may be prescribed without reference to the
proportional part due the Organized Militia of the District.
Section 34, page 46, line 2: Omit the word “Batteries.”
The Original wording “mounted troops, batteries and wagons” tends to convey the
idea that the expression “mounted troops” refers to cavalry alone, since “batteries”
are also specifically enumerated. As the appropriation is also designed to aid the
mounted elements of the engineer organization, it is believed that the term “mounted
troops” will more accurately convey its intended general meaning if the word “bat-
feries” be omitted.
Section 34, page 48, line 23: After the word “Federal” and before the words “Pro-
vided, further,” insert the following proviso: “Provided further, That if any State,
Territory, or the District of Columbia, neglects or refuses to pay, or to cause to be
paid, the money equivalent of any loss, damage, or destruction of property charged
against Such State, Territory, or the District of Columbia, by the Secretary of War,
after Survey by a disinterested officer appointed as hereinbefore provided, the Secre-
tary of War is hereby authorized to debar such State, Territory, or the District of
Columbia from further participation in any and all appropriations for the Organized
Militia until such payment is made.”
This proviso is believed to be a very important one and absolutely essential in
order that the Secretary of War may enforce the provisions of the law, and further-
more, to put an end to avoidable losses of Federal property supplied to the States.
If this proviso is not incorporated it is believed the law will not accomplish the pur-
pose desired, in that it would require the payment for losses from State funds or funds
other than Federal, but would contain no provision for the enforcement of its
provisions. &
Section 35, page 49, line 14: Section 13, as shown on pape 392, “Estimates of ap-
propriations, 1917,” should appear.
Section 36, page 50, line 5: Omit the words “and ambulance companies.”
- Ambulance companies and field hospitals are held, by the interpretation of proper
:authority, to be included within the general meaning of the word “companies.” If
the wording of the bill is adhered to, specifically indicating “commanding officers
of companies, troops, batteries, and ambulance companies,” the improper construc-
tion might be placed upon it that commanding officers of field hospitals were excluded
from pav.
§ 36, page 50, line 7: Change the words “coast artillery districts” to
-defense commands” throughout the sentence.
This change is in accordance with new designations recently prescribed by the War
Department.
Section 36, page 53, line 10: Change the words “for one year” to “during the
continuance of the emergency.” The danger to the Nation involved in trusting to
short enlistments was exemplified in many costly and humiliating incidents of our
past wars, beginning with our first war for independence. To note only one such
illustration—on the morning of the 21st of July, 1861, the date of the first battle of
{
‘coast
PREPAIRED NIESS FOR, NATION AL DEFENSE. 209
Bull Run, although the Secretary of War and the commanding general had besought
them to remain, a regiment of Infantry and a battery of Artillery whose term of service
had expired (three months' volunteers), began their homeward march “to the sound
of the enemy's cannon.” (General McDowell’s official report). Experience shows
that the average thoroughly dependable Soldier can not be made in less than a year.
To discharge him at the expiration of one year's Service, exchanging a trained soldier
for a raw recruit, and this possibly in time of great national peril, is to disregard the
costly lessons of our past. It can not be too strongly urged that our legislators endeavor
to prevent a recurrence of these old evils of short enlistment.
Section 36, page 53, line 19: Change sentence beginning “The ” to read “The com-
missioned officers of organizations drafted into the service of the United States shall
be appointed from among the members of such organizations. The commissioned
officers of organizations formed by consolidating lesser organizations drafted into the
service of the United States, shall be appointed from among the commissioned person-
nel of such drafted organizations or of the Regular Army. Officers with rank not
above that of colonel shall be appointed by the President alone, and all other officers
shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.”
l Page 54, line 3: Insert as unnumbered paragraph, between lines 3 and 4, the fol-
OWIIl Q . - - - - ** ---
*śt the President may detail one officer of the Pegular Army or Organized
Militia to perform the duties appertaining to a Chief of Staff, and one officer of the
Regular Army or Organized Militia to perform the duties appertaining to an Assistant
Chief of Staff, within a division or separate brigade of the Organized Militia called
into the service of the United States, or formed of lesser separate units of the Organized
Militia called into the service of the United States: Provided, That in order to insure
the prompt mobilization of the Organized Militia in time of war or other emergency,
the President may in time of peace, with the consent of the governors of the States
or Territories, or the commanding general of the District of Columbia Militia con-
cerned, detail a field officer of the Z egular Army to perform the duties appertaining
to a Chief of Staff for such tactical division of the Organized Militia as exist, or it is
proposed to create from the lesser units of the Organized Militia, when called into
the service of the United States.”
It is believed that the important positions of Chief of Staff and Assistant Chief of
Staff should be filled by the detail of carefully selected field officers of the Regular
Army who have been specially trained and qualified for such duty in the schools
provided by the educational system of the Army.
Section 37, page 55, line 5: Insert between lines 5 and 6 the following proviso: .
“Provided further, That when the Organized Militia of any State or Territory, or the
District of Columbia, participates in the encampment, maneuvers, and field instruction
of any part of the Regular Army at or near any military post or camp of the United
States, the command of such military post or camp and the Officers and troops of the
United States there stationed, shall remain with the regular commander of the post or
camp without regard to the rank of the commanding or other officers of the militia
temporarily so encamped within its limits or in its vicinity.” *
This proviso constitutes a repetition of the existing law upon the subject. It was
not believed to be the intention of the framers of this bill to repeal this important
provision. *.
Section 37, page 55, line 8: After the word “Officers” and before the word “of”
insert the words “and enlisted men;” after the word “duty” omit the words “pur-
suant to orders issued by the governors of the several States, and Territories, or of the
commanding general of the Organized Militia of the District of Columbia,” substi-
tuting therefor the words “in connection with the Organized Militia.”
The suggested change expresses more accurately, it is believed, the general intent
of the bill as indicated in the proviso shown on page 45, lime, 5, to include line 11.
Gen. MILLs. I have here a complete discussion of your bill, with
the changes suggested by experience.
The CHAIRMAN. If the committee desires, we might have that dis-
cussion go right into the record. Suppose you furnish that to the
stenographer. -
Gen. MILLs. All right, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. That is the bill itself, is it not : -
Gen. MILLs. That is the bill you introduced last year.
The CHAIRMAN. It is the same this year. And you have interlined
the suggestions that you think necessary 7 *
210 - PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
Gen. MILLS. Yes, sir. And here I give you this discussion that
takes it up section by section.
The CHAIRMAN. How would it do to put the bill in and interline
your suggestions with respect to each section ?
Gen. MILLS. That would accomplish the purpose.
The CHAIRMAN. I think it . be more convenient.
(The bill, with suggested amendments, is as follows:)
64TH CONGRESS, -
1st SESSION. O - 58.
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES.
Mr. CHAMBERLAIN introduced the following bill; which was read twice and
referred to the Committee on Military Affairs.
A BILL
To increase the efficiency of the Organized Militia, and for other
purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled, That the militia
of each of the several States, Territories, and the District of Co-
lumbia shall consist of the following-described persons resident
therein, namely: All able-bodied male citizens of the United
States and all other able-bodied males who have declared their
intention to become citizens of the United States.
SEC. 2. That the militia shall be divided into two classes,
the Organized Militia and the Unorganized Militia. The Organ-
ized Militia shall consist of the regularly commissioned and
enlisted militia, between the ages of eighteen and sixty-four
years, in the several States, Territories, and the District of
Columbia, organized as hereinafter prescribed, whether known
as the National Guard of said State, Territory, or the District
of Columbia or by such other designation as may be given
them by the laws of the respective States and Territories.
The Organized Militia shall be divided into two classes, active,
and reserve. All other militia shall be known as the Unor-
ganized Militia.
SEC. 3. That the Vice President of the United States; the
officers, judicial and executive, of the Government of the
United States; the members and officers of each House of
Congress; persons in the military or naval service of the
United States; customhouse clerks; persons employed by the
PREPARED NIESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 211
United States in the transmission of the mail; artificers and
workmen employed in the armories, arsenals, and navy yards
of the United States; pilots; mariners actually employed in
the sea service of any citizen or merchant within the United
States shall be exempt from militia duty without regard to
8,962.
*šec, 4. That the organization, armament, equipment, and
discipline (which includes training) of the active Organized
Militia, except for such part as may be duly prescribed in
each State, Territory, or the District of Columbia as constitut-
ing its Naval Militia, shall be the same as that which is or may
be prescribed for the Regular Army, subject in time of peace to
such general exceptions as may be authorized by the
Secretary of War: Provided, That in time of peace there
shall be no general staff corps in the Organized Militia,
and there shii be no position of chief of staff or assistant
chief of staff in any division of the Organized Militia: Pro-
vided, That the authorized aides of general officers com-
manding brigades and divisions may be additional officers:
Provided further, That in peace and war each division, brigade,
regiment, and separate É.i. of infantry, engineers and
cavalry may have one inspector of small-arms practice with
rank as follows: For a division, lieutenant colonel; for a
brigade, major; for a regiment, captain; and for a separate
battalion, first lieutenant: And provided further, That no
commissioned officer shall be continued in active service in
the Organized Militia in time of peace after he shall have
attained the age of sixty-four years: And provided further,
That the President may, by order, fix the minimum number
of enlisted men in each company, troop, battery, or other
organization of the Organized Militia in time of peace+4+é!
9?evided–fººther HPhat—airy—Cerps—ef-A+++Heryº-Cavalry; ef
been—ia—eehāhūets—existerree—siaee—the-passage—ef—sai

212 PREPAIRED NESS FOR, NATIONAL DEFENSE.

aethal—wars—aird—been—he Herably—diseharged—#e3+a—serviee
#—their-respeetive—a Haies—Stieh—reserve—sha}}–in–time—ef
eeed–Ha—ałłłąbers—the
peaee—Het—es —differenee—between—the
###ber—eſ—ehlisted—Haeh-ef-the-aetive-Organized—Militia—and
the-a+Haber—Peettired—te—bri e–erga Hizatieńs—thereeſ—th?
te—the-a+the++% gth—eſ—eereespeading—thaits—ia—the

Regular—A++ay-with—an—additień—ef-ten-per-eentara-te-be
Sec. 5. That the organization, armament, equipment, and
discipline (which includes training) of the reserve Organized
Militia, eacept for such part as may be duly prescribed in each
State, Territory, or the fº of Columbia as constituting its
Naval Militia, shall be as from time to time prescribed by the
President of the United States: Provided, That, in time of peace,
the enlisted personnel of the reserve Organized Militia shall not
exceed the number necessary to bring the organizations of the
active Organized Militia *% to the authorized war strength of
corresponding units in the Regular Army, with an addition of
ten per centum of such authorized war strength to be used for
recruit depot troops and such other purposes as the interests of
the service may require: Provided further, That the reserve
Organized Militia shall be subject in time of war or other grave
emergency, to being called into the service of the United States or
being ordered into active service as a part of the Army of the
United States, the officers for the purpose of filling vacancies in
the commissioned personnel of the Organized Militia in Such
service, except as provided in section forty-four of this Act, and
the enlisted men for incorporation into the active Organized
Militia in such service; and the reserve personnel while in Such
service shall be subject to the laws, orders, and regulations that
govern the active Organized Militia: Provided further, That when
engaged, under such regulations as the Secretary of War shall pre-
scribe, in field or coast-defense training, the members of the
reserve Organized Militia shall receive the same pay and allow-
ances as members of the active Organized Militia of like grade:
Provided further, That in time of peace, when the active Organ-
ized Militia engages under proper authority in encampments,
maneuvers, or other exercises for field or coast-defense instruction,
officers of the reserve Organized Militia may, at the discretion of
the governor, be assigned to duty with organizations to fill the
places of officers of like grades of the active Organized Militia
absent therefrom, and when so assigned they shall be entitled to
the same pay and allowances as j. of the active Organized
Militia of like grades: Provided further, That the reserve Organ-
ized Militia shall receive no allowance under, paragraph (b),
section twenty-four, of this Act.
SEe—6–4}+a+–the–Haethed—eſ—ergaałżałień–ef—-the-Fe-
server—whether—a-general—reserve–e4–a–Feserve—fer—separate
#3–regulatiełłs—by-the–severa!—States—aład—Territeries;-with
the-appre-a!—ef–the–President—eſ—the-United—States;–ahé.

PREPAIRED N ESS FOR, NATIONAL DEFENSE. 213
fleabieńs-eſ-Hrehabers-eſ-the-reserve–eerpsi-the-H+++++a+y-dtities
ahd—ebHigatiens-Feefttired—eſ—reservists;-aird–steh-ether
*...*.*.*.*.*.*.*.
#eas—be-be-preseribed—fer—training–the–wishes–e4–eaeh–State
ałłé–Territery-as-determitted—after– ień-Wł *
epher—thereef-and-the-Pistºiet-eſ-Geithabia;-after-eenstää-
#ea—with—the-ee:Haimandžāg—general—eſ -1- #
sha}}-Het—exceeed—that—Peettired-fer-the-reservists—ef-the-Regular
º & e } | } *é º | } * : } | 8-> -y- €6S- } e | :
Haeh-ef-like-grade—ea-the-a.e.tive—Hists—ef-the-9rganized–MäH£ia;
war-er-ether—ge #erated—###e—the
aetive–Organized—Miłłłia—and—be—stabjeet–te—the-safae—laws;
.##def-paragraph-(b)+-seetień-twenty-fetº-eſ—this—Aet-
SEe-7- -eńher—ef—a.
8->
Hae—ef-peaee—whea-the-aetive+a+}}{i •+3 −.
#éhts; +aa Hettre+s;–e4–ether—exerei —field—er—eeast-
+a+k—Bray–at–the–diseretień-ef–the–geverher—be—assigned—te
étity—with–erganizatieńs—te—#H–the–pkaees—ef-effleers—whe
Haay—be-absent—therefreha;-&#d—wh ig {º
be—ehtitled—Ée—the-sahae—pay–and–a4!ewałrees—as-arehabers—ef
#he-aetize–HaiHää-ef-siſſa++a+—grades—Previćled-fºrtherº-That
the-effleers’ –Feserve—eerps—sha}}-eenstättite—a-part—eſ—the
9rgañized—M+H:#ar—and–the–HaeHabers—thereef-shałHbe—stib-
the-UHited—States—£er–the–pthºpese–e4–#H#Hg—waea Heies—ia—the
eera Haissierred—persehire!—thereih-exeept—as—previćied—ia—see-
#eh-ferty—£eth–ef—this—Aet-
SEC. 8. That under such regulations as the President
may prescribe the Secretary of War is hereby authorized to
procure, by purchase or manufacture, and to issue from time
to time to the Organized Militia, upon requisition of the
governors of the several States and Territories or the com-
manding general of the Organized Militia of the District of
Columbia, such number of United States service arms, with

214 PR.EPARED NESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
all accessories, field-artillery matériel, dūmaray coast-artillery
ałłaałaełłł matériel, engineer, signal, and sanitary º
accouterments, field-uniform clothing, equipage, publications,
and military stores of all kinds, including public animals, pro-
vided for the Army of the United States as are necessary to
arm, uniform, and equip for field service all of the Organized
Militia in the several States, Territories, and the District of
Columbia, in accordance with the requirements of this, Act:
::iº sº. -
#speeter—that—the-9*ganized—Militia—ef-a-hy-State; *::::#5
er–the–Pistºiet—eſ—Ce4++abia—is—affaed—and–eeftipped-fer-fié
servieer-the-a-Hethreat—theler—the-previsieńs—ef--paragraph
{a}r—see #eh-twenty-fetº-eſ-this—Aet;-Haay—be-Hsed--fer--the
ef-the-Army: Provided further, That as a condition prece-
dent to the issue of any property as provided for by this Act
to a State, Territory, or the District of Columbia, said State,
Territory, or the District of Columbia shall make adequate
provision for the protection and personal care of such
property.
Haay—preseribe;—it-sha}}-be-the-duty—ef-the-See *etary–e4—A-a++
SEC. 10. That each State, Territory, and the District
of Columbia shall, on the receipt of new property issued to
replace obsolete or condemned prior issues, turn in to the
War Department without receiving any money credit therefor,
or otherwise dispose of in accordance with the directions of
the Secretary of War all property so replaced or condemned,
SEC. 11. That any State, Territory, or the District of
Columbia may, with the approval of the Secretary of War,
purchase for cash from the War Department for the use of
the Organized Militia such stores, supplies, and matériel of
war other than that suitable for use in campaign, and also
Such military publications as are furnished to the Army in
addition to those issued under the provisions of this Act, at
the price at which they are lººd to the Army, with cost
of transportation added. The funds received from such sale
shall be credited to the appropriation to which they belong,
and shall not be covered into the Treasury, and shall be
available until expended to replace therewith the supplies
sold to the States in the manner herein authorized: Pro-
vided, That serviceable stores, supplies, and matériel of war so

PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 215
purchased by a State, Territory, or the District of Columbia
may, in time of war, or when war is imminent, be requi-
sitioned by the United States for use in the military service
thereof, and when so requisitioned by the United States and
delivered, credit * ; vira”
therefor shall be allowed to such State, Territory, or the Dis-
trict of Columbia, and when the war is ended or is no longer
imminent, the United States shall issue to such State, Territory,
or the District of Columbia serviceable properly in kind, in equal
quantity article for article to the property so requisitioned and
delivered, and such issue shall constitute full compensation for
the property so requisitioned and delivered.
SEC. 12. That all military property issued to the
Organized Militia as herein provided for shall remain the
property of the United States. Whenever any property
issued to the Organized Militia of any State or Territory or
the District of Columbia as hereinbefore provided has been
lost, damaged, or destroyed, or has become unserviceable or
unsuitable by use in service or from any other cause, it shall
be examined by a disinterested surveying officer of the
Regular Army detailed by the Secretary of War, or of the
Organized Militia, to be appointed by the governor of the
State or Territory or by the commanding general of the
Organized Militia of the District of Columbia, and the report
of such surveying officer shall be forwarded to the Secretary
of War, and if it shall appear to the Secretary of War from
the record of survey that the property has been lost, damaged,
or destroyed through ... causes, he is hereby author-
ized to relieve the State or Territory or the District of Co-
lumbia from further accountability therefor; if it shall appear
that the loss, damage, or destruction of property was due to
carelessness or neglect, or that its loss, damage, or destruction
could have been avoided by the exercise of reasonable care, the
money value thereof shall be charged against—that—perti -
#—#ade to the State or Territory or the District
of Columbia £er-the-pHrehase-ef-similar-supplies; steres; er-Haa-
#e3–ef-war-—H to be paid for from State funds or any funds
other than Federal: Provided, That if the articles so surveyed are
found to be unserviceable or unsuitable, from either avoidable
or unavoidable causes, the Secretary of War shall direct what
disposition, by sale or otherwise, shall be made of them such
articles, except unserviceable clothing, which shall be de-
stroyed; and if sold, the proceeds of such sale, as well as stop-
pages against officers and enlisted men, and the net proceeds
of collections made from any person or from any State, Territory,
or the District of Columbia, to reimburse the Government for
the loss, damage, or destruction of any property shall be
deposited in the Treasury of the United States as a credit to
said the State, er Territory, or the District of Columbia, ac-
countable for said property, and as a part of and in addition to that
portion of its the allotment of such State, Territory, or the Dis-
trict of Columbia, set aside for the purchase of similar supplies,
stores, or matériel of war: Provided further, That if any State,

216 IPREPAIRED NIESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
Territory, or the District of Columbia neglects or refuses to pay,
or to cause to be paid, the money equivalent of any loss, damage,
or destruction of property charged against Such State, Territory,
or the District of Columbia by the Secretary of War after survey
by a disinterested officer appointed as hereinbefore provided, the
Secretary of War is hereby authorized to debar such State, Terri-
tory, or the District of Columbia from further participation in
any and all appropriations for the Organized Militia until Such
payment is made: Provided further, That the Secretary of
War shall authorize an annual dropping allowance for each
enlisted man of the Organized Militia, and clothing to this
amount, or so much thereof as is necessary, may be dropped
as expended from the returns of the property of the disbursing
officer and other accountable officers of the State or Territory
or the District of Columbia, but no clothing in the possession
of the Organized Militia which is in a serviceable condition,
shall be dropped as expended—4}re : Provided further, That
the Secretary of War is hereby authorized to prescribe the rules
and regulations necessary to carry into effect the £eregeing
provisions of this section.
SEe—43–4 hat—the-het—preeeeds—ef-the-sale—eſ—eer-
detaired-steres—issued—te-the-9+gańized—Militia-aad-aet-eharged
#e—State—a Het HaeH+-sha}}-be-ee-ered—###e–the–TF **-r -
SEC. 14. That each State, Territory, and the District of
Columbia shall require all the members of each company,
troop, battery, and detachment in its Organized Militia to
assemble for drill and instructions at company, battalion, or
regimental armories or rendezvous or for indoor target
practice not less than twenty-four times each year, and shall
require each such company, troop, battery, and detachment
to lººp. in encampments, maneuvers, or other exercises,
including outdoor target practice, for field or coast-defense
instruction, under the provisions of section seventeen of this
Act, at least five consecutive days each year, in addition to
the assemblies for drill and indoor target practice herein-
before prescribed, unless such company, troop, battery, or
detachment shall have been in active service for at least five
consecutive days during such year or unless excused from
participation in such encampments, maneuvers, or other
exercises, including outdoor practice, for field or coast-defense
‘instruction, by the governor for reasons satisfactory to the
Secretary of War: Provided, That credit for an assembly for
drill or for indoor target practice shall not be given unless the
number of officers and enlisted men present for duty at such
assembly shall equal or exceed a minimum to be prescribed
by the President, nor unless the period of actual military duty
and instruction participated in by each officer and enlisted

PREPAREDINESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 217
man at each such assembly at which he is credited as having
been present shall be at least one and one-half hours.
SEC. , 15. That the Secretary of War shall cause an
inspection to be made at least once each year by officers of
the Regular Army detailed by him for that purpose to deter-
mine the condition and amount of the property in the hands
of the Organized Militia; whether the Organized Militia of each
of the several States, Territories, and the District of Columbia
is Organized as hereinbefore prescribed; whether the organiza-
tion and the officers and enlisted men thereof are sufficiently
armed, uniformed, equipped, and being trained and instructed
for active duty in the field or coast defenses, and its records
are being kept in accordance with the requirements of this
Act; and whether the requirements of section fourteen have
been complied with. The reports of such inspections shall
serve as the basis for the issue to and retention by the Organ-
º Mºis of the military property and funds provided for by
this Act. .
SEC. 17. That under such regulations as the President
may prescribe the Secretary of War is authorized to pro-
vide for the participation of any part of the Organized Militia
of any State, Territory, or the District of Columbia in en-
campments, maneuvers, or other exercises, including outdoor
target practice, for field or coast-defense instruction, either
independently or in conjunction with any part of the Regular
Army, and may set aside from the funds allotted to any
State, Territory, or the District of Columbia, under the pro-
visions of paragraph (c), section twenty-four of this Act,
such portion of said funds as may be necessary for the pay-
ment, subsistence, transportation, and other expenses of that
portion of the Organized Militia of the State, Territory,
or the District of Columbia which may participate in such
encampments, maneuvers, or other exercises, including out-
door target practice, for field and coast-defense instruction;
and the officers and enlisted men of such militia while so en-
gaged shall be entitled to the same pay, subsistence, and trans-
portation as officers and enlisted men of corresponding grades
of the Regular Army are or hereafter may be entitled by
law, but in the computation of pay longevity pay will not
be allowed: Provided, That encampments, maneuvers, or
other exercises, including outdoor target practice, for field or
coast-defense instruction shall be held to include the State
and national rifle competitions. &
SEC. 18. That under such regulations as the President
may prescribe the Secretary of War may, upon the recom-
mendation of the governor of any State or Territory, or
upon the recommendation of the commanding general of the
Organized Militia of the District of Columbia, provide for
officers' camps of instruction for the instruction of officers
and enlisted men of the Organized Militia. Such camps
shall be conducted by officers of the Regular Army detailed
by the Secretary of War for that purpose, and may be located
either within or without the State, Territory, or District of
23380—PT 5—16—3
218 PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
Columbia to which the officers of the Organized Militia so
designated to attend belong. Officers and enlisted men attend-
ing such camps shall be entitled to payment and transporta-
tion, and enlisted men in addition to subsistence, at the same
rates as for encampments or maneuvers for field or coast-
defense instruction. *
SEC. 19. That when any portion of the Organized Militia
participates in encampments, maneuvers, or other exercises,
including outdoor target practice, for field or coast-defense
instruction under the provisions of this Act they may, after
being duly mustered by an officer of the Regular Army, be
paid at any time after such muster for the period from the
date of leaving the home rendezvous to date of return thereto
as determined in advance, both dates inclusive; and such
#. if otherwise correct, shall pass to the credit of the
isbursing officer making the same.
SEC. 20. That when any part of the Organized Militia
participates in encampments, maneuvers, or other exercises,
including outdoor target practice, for field or coast-defense
instruction at a United States military post or reservation,
the command of the military post or reservation where such
encampments or maneuvers are held, and of the officers and
troops of the United States there on duty, shall remain with
the commander of the United States troops, without regard
to the rank of the commanding or other officer of the Organ-
ized Militia temporarily engaged in the encampments or
maneuvers for field or coast-defense instruction.
SEC. 21. That upon the application of the governor of any
State or Territory, or the commanding general of the Organ-
ized Militia of the District of Columbia, the Secretary of
War may detail one or more officers and enlisted men of the
Army to attend any encampment, maneuver, or other exer-
cise for field or coast-defense instruction of the Organized
Militia and give such instruction and information to the
officers and men assembled for such encampment, maneuver,
or other exercise as may be requested by the governor or by
the commanding officer of the Organized Militia there on
dutv.
§o. 22. That, under such regulations as the President
may prescribe, the Secretary of War may, upon the recom-
mendation of the governor of any State or Territory or the
commanding general of the Organized Militia of the District
of Columbia, authorize any officer or enlisted man of the
Organized Militia to attend and pursue a regular course of
study at any military school or college of the United States,
except the Military Academy at West Point, New York, and
(unless a graduate of the staff college at Fort Leavenworth,
Ransas, or the advance course for officers, Coast Artillery
School), the War College at Washington, District of
Columbia; or to be attached to an organization of the same
arm, corps, or department to which the officer or enlisted man
belongs for routine practical instruction at-er-Hear-ah-Army
fest during its period of field training or Outdoor season;
PREPAIRED NESS FOR, NATIONAL DEFENSE. 219
and such officer or enlisted man shall receive the same travel
allowances and quarters or commutation of quarters, and
the same allowance for heat and light to which an officer
or enlisted man of the Regular Army would be entitled
for attending such school, college, or practical course of
instruction under orders from proper military authority; and
each such officer shall also receive commutation of sub-
sistence at the rate of $1 per day, and each enlisted man
such subsistence as is furnished to enlisted men of the Regular
Army, while in actual attendance at such school, college, or
practical course of instruction.
SEC. 23. That, upon the request of the governor of any State
or Territory, the President may detach one or more officers of
the active list of the Army from their proper commands and
detail them to duty with the Organized Militia of such State
or Territory as-fe!!ews;-Hååtely;-Het-Ée—exeeed—eae—effleep
- * - - * The Secretary of War may
upon like application detail one or more enlisted men of the
Regular Army with such State or Territory for duty in
connection with the Organized Militia. All such assign-
ments may be revoked at the request of the governor of such
State or Territory concerned, or at the pleasure of the
Secretary of War. Like details may be made for duty in
connection with the Organized Militia of the District of
Columbia upon the request of the commanding general
thereof: Provided, That nothing in this section shall be so
construed as to prevent the detail of retired officers as now
provided by law. - g
SEC. 24. That the sum of $16,450,000, or so much thereof
as may be necessary, is hereby annually appropriated, to be
paid out of any money in the Treasury not otherwise appro-
priated, for the purposes hereinafter specified, namely:
(a) For the purposes specified in section eight of this act, .
$2,500,000 annually, or so much thereof as may be necessary
(armament and equipment). -
(b) For the purpose of enabling the States, Territories,
and the District of Columbia more effectually to provide for
the peace training of members of Organized Militia in such
States, Territories, and the District of Columbia, by reim-
bursing said members for expenses incurred in and compen-
sating them for time devoted to training during times of
peace, except during periods of service for which, under the
provisions of law, they become entitled to the same pay as
officers and enlisted men of corresponding grades in the
Regular Army, $10,000,000 annually, or so much thereof as
may be necessary (home-station expenses and service,
indoor target practice, and so forth): Provided, That this
appropriation shall be apportioned among the States, Terri-
tories, and the District of Columbia as prescribed in section
twenty-five of this act, and shall be disbursed, for the pur-
poses specified in this paragraph, in accordance with the pro-
visions of State—ań. & a T * ſº ień;-&#4–3 isłł
ef-Celtääbia—ia—aeeerdańee—with-regulatiens–te-be-preseribed


220 PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
ident paragraph (b), section twenty-five of this Act:
Provided further, That no part of this appropriation shall be
paid to any person who has not subscribed to the agreement
and oath prescribed in section thirty-eight of this Act.
(c) For the purposes specified in sections seventeen
and eighteen, twenty-two and thirty-two of this Act; for
the acquisition, construction, equipment, maintenance, and
repair of suitable target ranges and shooting galleries, for
small-arms and artillery ammunition for target practice;
for the actual and necessary expenses incurred by Army
officers in making the inspections provided for in section
fifteen of this Act; for purchase of forage for horses author-
ized by the Secretary of War; and for the following-described
expenses in connection with encampments, maneuvers, or
other exercises for field or coast-defense instruction, namely:
The hire of mounts for the use of mounted troops and of
officers required to be mounted; the hire of the prescribed
draft animals and wagons for organizations; the purchase of
forage for mounts and draft animals; and such incidental
expenses as the Secretary of War may deem necessary; all
such expenditures, purchases, and contracts for hire to be
made under such regulations and subject to such conditions
as the Secretary of War may prescribe, $3,950,000 annually,
or so much thereof as may be necessary (campaign and
combat training, schools, supervision, and so forth): Pro-
'wided, That the appropriation carried by paragraph (c) of
this section shall remain available until expended, and shall
not be covered into the Treasury of the United States.
SEC. 25. That the appropriations provided for in sec-
tion twenty-four of this Act shall be annually apportioned,
on or before the first day of July each year, in the following
IOla,D.I] eI’.
(a) The appropriations carried by paragraph (a) shall be
apportioned by the Secretary of War among the several
States, Territories, and the District of Columbia under just
and equitable rules to be prescribed by the President.
(b) The appropriation carried by paragraph (b) shall
be apportioned by the Secretary of War among the sev-
eral States, Territories, and the District of Columbia pro
rata, based upon the average actual commissioned and
enlisted strength of the Organized Militia of such State, Ter-
ritory, and the District of Columbia during the previous
calendar year, whenever—#—sha}}-be—satisfaeteråky—Haade—te
-Seeretary-ef-War—that Hader-the-laws-er-regu-
ieńs—pertaining—te—######y—affairs—having—the-feree—ef
4a. #te; ##eryº-e?—the-Pisłłiet—ef-Celtirabiar
the-effleeps-and-enlisted-meh-eſ-the-erganized—Militia—ef-stieh.

state-ferritory-en-Bistrieſ-of-Gelumbia, enlisted-and-eer
#issieńed—te—serve–the–United—States—as-previèed–by–the
H{-fer–expense j ień–£er;
#me-deveted-te-military-training-during-times—ef-peaee;—the
Hig-speeified—stras;-te-wiłł and the sums so apportioned
shall be disbursed under such regulations as the Secretary of
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 221
War, after conference with the National Militia Board, shall
prescribe as an allowance to commissioned officers and enlisted
ºnen of the active Organized Militia for their services in training;
as provided in paragraph (b), section twenty-four of this Act as
follows: To commanding officers of companies, troops, batter-
ies, ambulance companies, to adjutants and quartermasters
of regiments, independent battalions, or squadrons, or coast-
defense commands, and to Artillery engineers of coast-defense
commands an amount equal to twenty per centum of the base
pay of officers of corresponding grades in the Regular Army; to
general officers commanding a division or brigade, the author-
ized officers consisting of the division staff or brigade staff, in-
cluding officers detailed for duty there with, division and bri-
gade inspectors of Small-arms practice, if any, the authorized
aids and chaplains, an amount equal to five per centum of the
base pay of officers of corresponding grades in the Regular
Army; to all other officers belonging to regiments or tactical
units or coast-defense commands, including medical officers
detailed or assigned to and doing duty with regiments or
tactical units or coast-defense commands, officers serving
with field hospitals and veterinarians, an amount equal to
fifteen per centum of the base pay of officers of correspond-
ing grades in the Regular Army to all enlisted men of the
active Organized Militia an amount equal to twenty-five
per centum of the initial pay provided by law for enlisted
men of corresponding grades in the Regular Army: Pro-
wided, That such enlisted man shall receive such allowance if
he shall have attended not less than forty-five drills during
any one year and a proportionate amount for attendance
upon a lesser number of such drills, not less than twenty:
Provided further, That the allowance provided herein shall
be computed for semiannual periods, beginning the first day
of January and the first day of July of each year, in propor-
tion to the number of drills attended, and no allowance shall
be paid to any enlisted man for the first semiannual period
of any year unless he shall have attended during said period
at least twenty drills, but any lesser number of drills attended
during said period shall be reckoned with the drills attended
during the second semiannual period in computing the allow-
ance, if any, due him for that year: And provided further,
That when any man enters into an enlistment other than
an immediate reenlistment he shall be entitled to proportional
allowance for that year if during the remainder of the year
he shall attend a number of drills whose ratio to twenty
is not less than the ratio of the part of the year so served
to the whole year; and when any man's enlistment shall
expire the allowance, if any, to which he may be entitled
shall be determined in like manner: And provided further,
That periods of actual military duty equivalent to the drills
herein prescribed (except those periods of service for which
under the provisions of law members of the Organized Militia
may become entitled to the same pay as officers and enlisted
men of the corresponding grades in the Regular Army)
may be accepted as service in lieu of such drills when so
3.222 |PREPAIRED NESS FOR, NATIONAL DEFENSE.
provided by the Secretary of War: And provided further, That
the allowances authorized in this section shall be paid by the
State out of its allotment of the appropriation authorized in
º (b), section twenty-four of this Act, and shall be
isbursed and accounted for by the property and disbursing
officer of the State authorized by the Secretary of War to make dis-
bursements of appropriations under this Act, and that all pay-
'ments authorized under the provisions of this Act shall be made as
soon as practicable after the thirty-first day of December and
the thirtieth day of June of each year upon pay rolls prepared and
authenticated in the mammer prescribed by the Secretary of War:
And provided further, That stoppages may be made against the
allowance payable to any officer or enlisted man under the pro-
visions of this Act, to cover the cost of public property lost,
damaged, or destroyed and chargeable to such officer or
enlisted man. The-Éaet—# —Pega}ati Hag—the
£eree-ef-law's-eehtaihing-a+1-the-previsiełas-ef-this-seetień-are-iñ.
£eree—a Hé!—effeet—#-streh—Stateſ—Territery; er–the–Pistºiet-ef
Ge]+Habia-sha}}-be-Haade-a-Ha atter-eſ-Feeeed–Ha-the-effiee—ef-the
Treastre+-ef–the–United-States; and—thereafter-the-Treastºrer-ef
#he-UHited—States—sha}}-pay—te—stieh—State-Pełłłłeryº-e?—the
Pisłęiet—ef–Ce]+Habia;-thretigh-the-ÉFeastfeefs—ef-streh-State;
Territery-aird–the–disbärsäg-effieer-ef-the-Pistºiet-ef-Celtifa–
j * gº 3–(b)+-see tiełł
y } •r
e : | j ſº } {-y j tº - #5 * * & | É C | } g } 44;
at-a-H+++aes—prier-te—#s—disbürseraeałº-as-hereinafter-previeled;
be-held-by-streh-States; Pełłłłeryº-aird-the-Pisłłiet-ef-Celtàbia.
Ha!—#H#d—disti É 4–ether—#Had
dispesifień-by-the-la- sing-pewer
#y; słęiet—ef-Celtirabia—Éer—ałły—ptirpese—whatever
ether—that—that—hereiabefere-set-ferth . e—held—sub-
jeet-te-disbärsement-by-the-Hilitary-gatherities-eſ-Sheh-State;
& * - º . - e e
& * * * * - id-and-under-sueh-regulations made by the -
###ary—at therities—ef-streh-Stateſ-Teºtery; and—the-PisłFieł
94–Ce4++abia—as—Haaw-be-deehaed—maest—effeetive—Ée—Breñaete
aład–Haerease—the-effieżeńey—ef-the–9Fgańized—Militia—thereef
and-preserve–the–Hailitary-preperty—ef-the–United-States:
(c) 04–the–apprepriatiens–earried—by-paragraph—(e).
$27599;999–sha}}-be—appertierred—by-the–Seef *—G+ 7
Hirder–Stieh-regulatiens-as-the-President—Haay—preser+ber-te—the
States-aeeerding-te-the–HüHaber-eſ-Sea#ers—and—Representa-
#ves—Ée—whieh-eaeh–State-respeetively; is—entitled—#3—the
Gengress–ef-the-Hited—States—and—#6–the–Territeries—and
the-Pisáriet-eſ-Gelumbia-in-streh-prepertień—and—thaei-sheh
regulatieńs—as-the-President—may—preseribe. Of the appro-
priation provided for in paragraph (c), $2,500,000 shall be ap-
portioned among the several States and Territories under just



PREPARED NESS FOR, NATIONAL DEFENSE. 223
and equitable procedure, to be prescribed by the Secretary of War,
and in direct ratio, so far as not in conflict with such procedure,
to the annual State and Territorial appropriations existing at
the date of apportionment, for the support of the Organized
Militia of Such States and Territories, respectively, and to the
District of Columbia, such proportion and under such regula-
tions as the President may prescribe; $850,000 shall be set
aside for the participation of the Organized Militia in encamp-
ments, maneuvers, and field or coast-defense instruction
with any part of the Regular Army, and shall be appor-
tioned to the States, Territories, and the District of Colum-
bia under just and equitable rules to be prescribed by the
President, and $600,000 shall be set aside and shall be ap-
portioned under such rules and regulations and subject to
such conditions as the Secretary of War may prescribe, with
a view to encouraging the States, Territories, and the Dis-
trict of Columbia to maintain and train such forces other
than infantry as the Secretary of War may deem necessary
to make the whole body of the Organized Militia a well-
balanced military force: Provided, That no State, Territory,
or the District of Columbia shall be entitled to the benefits
of the appropriations carried by paragraphs (b) and (c),
section twenty-four of this Act, unless it shall appear from
the reports of the inspection required by section fifteen of
this Act that the number of regularly enlisted, organized,
armed, uniformed, and equipped active militia maintained
by the State is at least one hundred men for each Senator
and Representative to which said State is entitled in the
Congress of the United States, and by the Territory and the
District of Columbia such number as the President may pre-
scribe; nor shall any detachment, company, or similar unit,
battalion, regiment, brigade, division, or other unit of the
Organized Militia participate as such in the appropriations
carried by said paragraphs (b) and (c), which, at the last
formal inspection made by direction of the Secretary of
War, was not found to be organized, armed, uniformed,
equipped, and , being disciplined (which includes being
trained) for active duty in the field or in coast defences in
accordance with the requirements of this Act, and which
has not held the drills and other exercises prescribed in sec-
tion fourteen of this Act; and the amount of the appropria-
tion provided for in paragraph (b) which is thus determined
not to be available ji be covered back into the Treasury
of the United States: Provided further, That nothing in this
section shall be so construed as to deprive any individual of
the allowance due him under the provisions of this Act prior
to such inspection: And provided further, That no money
appropriated under the provisions of paragraphs (b) and (c),
section twenty-four of this Act, shall be paid to any person
under eighteen or over sixty-four years of age, nor to any
person who fails to qualify as to fitness for military service
under such rules ini regulations as the Secretary of War,
after conference with the National Militia Board, may pre-
scribe; nor shall any part of the appropriation carried by
224 PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
paragraph (b), section twenty-four, of this Act be paid to
any person not on the active list of the Organized Militia:
And provided further, That no part of the appropriation
provided herein shall be expended upon any person not
º º . Pº of this Act for like organiza-
tions of the Regular Army exeept—as—previćied—#—seetiełł
£etH-ef—this—Aet.
SEC. 26. That no part of the appropriations made and
rovided for herein shall be expended upon any Organized
ilitia which the State may maintain in excess of five
hundred active militia for each Senator and Representative:
Provided, That in the Territories and the District of Colum-
bia the numbers of the active Organized Militia shall be as
prescribed by the President: Provided further, That this
section shall not be so construed as to prevent organizations
called into the service of the United States from being raised
to and maintained at War strength.
SEC. 27. That the governor of each State and Territory
and the commanding general of the Organized Militia of the
District of Columbia may appoint, designate, or detail,
subject to the approval of the Secretary of War, an officer
of the Organized Militia of the State, Territory, or District
who shall be regarded as property and disbursing officer for
the United States. He shall receipt and annually account
for all property belonging to the United States in possession
of the Organized Militia of his State, Territory, or District,
and shall make such returns and reports concerning the same
as may be required by the Secretary of War. He shall disburse
all appropriations provided for by paragraph paragraphs (b) and
(c), section twenty-four, of this Act, except for supplies fur-
nished by one of the Supply departments of the Army which
are required by a State, Territory, or the District of Colum-
bia, in which case the cost of such supplies shall be made a
charge against the allotment of such State, Territory, or
the District of Columbia under the provisions of paragraph
(c) of said section. He shall render through the War Depart-
ment such accounts of Federal funds intrusted to him for
disbursement as may be required by the Treasury, Depart-
ment. Before entering upon the performance of his duties
as property and disbursing officer he shall be required to
give good and sufficient bonds to the United States, the
amount thereof to be determined by the Secretary of War,
for the faithful performance of his duties, and for the safe-
keeping and proper disposition of the Federal property and
funds intrusted to his care. He shall, after having qualified
as property and disbursing officer, receive pay for his
services from funds allotted to the State, Territory, and the
District of Columbia under the provisions of paragraph (c), Sec-
tion twenty-four of this Act, in accordance with the average num-
ber of officers and men of the Organized Militia of said State,
Territory, or the District of Columbia who are actually
enrolled and regularly receiving military instruction and
training, as follows: $500 for not less than five hundred
officers and men and not more than one thousand five hun-
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 225
dred officers and men; $700 for more than one thousand
five hundred officers and men and not more than two thou-
sand five hundred officers and men; $1,000 for more
than two thousand five hundred officers and men and not
more than three thousand five hundred officers and men;
$1,250 for more than three thousand five hundred officers
and men and not more than four thousand five hundred
officers and men; $1,500 for more than four thousand five
hundred officers and men and not more than five thousand
five hundred officers and men; $1,750 for more than five
thousand five hundred officers and men and not more than
seven thousand five hundred officers and men; $2,000 for
more than seven thousand five hundred officers and men
and not more than eight thousand five hundred officers and
men; $2,500 for more than eight thousand five hundred
officers and men: Provided, That when traveling in the
performance of his official duties under orders issued by the
proper authorities he shall be reimbursed for the actual
necessary traveling expenses, the sum to be made a charge
against the allotment of the State, Territory, or District of
Columbia under the provisions of paragraph (c), Section
twenty-four of this Act: Provided, That the Secretary of
War shall cause an inspection of the accounts and records
of the property and disbursing officer to be made by an
officer of the Army at least once each year: And provided
further, That the Secretary of War is empowered to make
all rules and regulations necessary to carry into effect the
provisions of this section.
SEC. 28. That in each State and Territory and in the
District of Columbia the adjutant general or other officer
designated to perform the duties of that office, in addition to
his duties as prescribed by the laws of such State, Territory,
and District, respectively, shall make such returns and
reports to the Secretary of War at such times and in such
form as he shall from time to time prescribe.
SEC. 29. That the Secretary of War shall annually
transmit to Congress an abstract of the returns and reports
of the adjutants general of the several States, Territories, and
the District of Columbia, with such observations as he may
deem necessary for the information of Congress, especially
as regards the state of efficiency and preparedness of the
Organized Militia for active field or coast-defense service, as
revealed by the reports of inspection required by section
fifteen, and shall annually make a report to Congress show-
ing the total expenditures from the annual appropriations
carried by this Act for the preceding fiscal year, as well as
the various purposes for which such expenditures were made,
and the amount of money disbursed and the value of the
property issued on account of the Organized Militia of each
of the several States and Territories and the District of
Columbia.
SEC. 30. That there shall be in the War Department, in
the office of the Chief of Staff, a Division of Militia Affairs,
the commissioned personnel of which shall consist of officers
226 PREPARED NESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
of the Regular Army, and there shall be a Chief of the Divi-
Sion of Militia Affairs, who shall be detailed from the gen-
eral officers of the line of the Army, and who shall, while
§ Serving, be an additional member of the General Staff
Orps.
SEC. 31. The Secretary of War shall appoint a board of
five officers on the active list of the Organized Militia, with
four years' service in the Organized Militia, at least
two of whom shall be officers of the line, said board to be
known as the National Militia Board. Such officers shall
be appointed as follows: One for a term of one year, one for
a term of two years, one for a term of three years, one for a
term of four years, and one for a term of five years; and
thereafter each member of the board shall be appointed for a
term of five years. In the event of a vacancy in the board
the appointment shall be for the unexpired term. The
members of the National Militia Board shall be so selected
as to Secure as far as practicable equitable representation
to all sections of the United States. No officer shall be
º to reappointment as a member of the National
Militia Board within two years after the cessation of his
membership under a prior appointment.
The National Militia Board shall assemble in Washing-
ton at-least—t #res—eaeh-year;-te--witH-ea—the-seeead
, º +y=May;-&#é–9eteber;-ahé at such times
as the Secretary of War may direct, for consultation with the
Secretary of War respecting the condition, status, and needs
of the whole body of the Organized Militia.
ia; * iariº r It
shall be the duty of the said board to recommend to the
Secretary of War policies for the benefit and improvement
of the Organized Militia and to confer with him and make
recommendations upon ałł such regulations proposed by him
for the government of the Organized Militia as he may submit
to the board for consideration.
SEC. 32. That the necessary clerical and office expenses of
the Division of Militia Affairs and the actual and necessary
traveling expenses, together with a per diem allowance to be
determined by the President, for the members of the National
Militia Board when assembled as hereinbefore provided, shall
constitute a charge against the whole sum annually appro-
priated under subdivision (c) of section twenty-four of this Act.
SEC. 33. That whenever the United States is invaded or in
danger of invasion from any foreign nation, or of rebellion
against the authority of the Government of the United States,
or the President is unable with the regular forces at his com-
mand to execute the laws of the Union, it shall be lawful for
the President to call forth such number of the militia of the
State, or of the States or Territories, or of the District of
Columbia, as he may deem necessary to repel such invasion,
suppress such rebellion, or to enable him to execute such laws,
and to issue his orders for that purpose, through the governor


PREPAIREDNESS FOR, NATIONAL DEFENSE. 227
of the respective State or Territory, or through the command-
ing general of the Militia of the District of Columbia, from
which State, Territory, or District such troops may be called,
to such officers of the militia as he may think proper: Pro-
wided, That he every commissioned officer et and enlisted man
of the Organized Militia shall be liable to be held to serve for
a lenger period than of two years from date of call and no
longer: Provided further, That divisions, brigades, regiments,
and battalions or squadrons may be organized by the Presi-
dent out of lesser separate units called into the service of the
United States as prescribed in this section, and the President
may then assign or, when provision is made therefor, by and
with the advice and consent of the Senate, appoint and com-
mission, with appropriate rank, commanders of such organi-
zations and the necessary staff officers from officers of the
Regular Army or the Organized Militia, the number and
grade of such officers not to exceed the number and grade of
like officers for like forces of the Regular Army: And provided
further, That when the military needs of the Federal Govern-
ment arising from the necessity to execute the laws of the
Union, suppress insurrection, or repel invasion can not be met
by i. º forces, the active Organized Militia of º, 8.TIOOl
or branch, exeept—the-effieers -eeserve–eerps—previ jer—#
ſº –this—Aeër shall be called into the service of the
United States in advance of any volunteer force of the same
arm or branch which it may be determined to raise.
SEC. 34. That every officer and enlisted man of the
Organized Militia who shall be called forth in the manner
hereinbefore prescribed shall be mustered for service under
such regulations as the President may prescribe without fur-
ther commission or enlistment and without making a physical
examination previous to such muster a condition precedent
thereto: Provided, That as soon as practicable after such
muster there shall be a physical examination of the Officers
and men so mustered: Provided further, That immediately
preceding the muster out of an officer or enlisted man called
into service of the United States as hereinbefore provided
he shall be physically examined under rules prescribed by
the President of the United States, and the record thereof
shall be filed and kept in the War Department.
SEC. 35. That the militia called into the service of the
United States shall from the date of the call be entitled to
the same pay and allowances as are or may be provided b
law for the Regular Army: Provided, That this provision sha
not be construed so as to authorize any species of expenditure
previous to arriving at the places of rendezvous which is not
provided by existing law to be paid after their arrival at such
laces of rendezvous. -
SEC. 36. That when any officer or enlisted man of the
militia is disabled by reason of wounds or disability received
or incurred in the service of the United States, he shall be
entitled to all the benefits of the pension laws existing at
the time of his service; and in case such officer or enlisted
man dies in the service of the United States or in returning

228 PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
to his place of residence after being mustered out of such
service, or at any other time in consequence of wounds or
disabilities received in such service, his widow and children,
i. any, shall be entitled to all the benefits of such pension
8, WS.
SEC. 37. That the militia when called into the service of the
United States shall, from the date of such call, be subject to
the Rules and Articles of War, and in addition thereto to the
other laws, orders, and regulations governing the Regular
Army, in so far as such laws, Orders, and regulations may
be applicable to officers and enlisted men whose permanent
retention in the military service, either on the active list or on
the retired list, is not contemplated, and no distinction shall be
made between the Regular Army, the Organized Militia while
in the military service of the United States, and the Volunteer
forces, in respect to the eligibility of any officer of said Army,
Militia, or Volunteer forces for service upon any court-martial,
court of inquiry, or military commission.
SEC. 38. That no money appropriated under the pro-
visions of this Act shall be paid to any person who has not,
in addition to his obligation as a member of the Organized
Militia of a State, Territory, or the District of Columbia,
voluntarily subscribed an agreement to serve the United
States in the manner provided in this Act and in connec-
tion with Such agreement taken an oath as a commissioned
officer or enlisted man in the Army of the United States:
Provided, That the obligation to serve in the Army of the
United States shall be effective from the date of the agree-
ment and oath herein prescribed to create the status of
officer and enlisted man in the Army of the United States;
but officers and enlisted men subscribing such agreement
and oath shall not, without the consent of Congress, be
ordered into the active military service of the United States
as a part of the Army thereof, nor shall they be entitled to
the pay and emoluments of officers and enlisted men in the
Army of the United States except as otherwise provided
in this Act.
SEC. 38a. That the President, with the consent of Con-
gress, in time of war, or when war is imminent, or in grave
international emergency requiring the use of troops in excess
of the Regular Army of the United States, may order into
the active military service of the United States as a part of
the Army thereof any portion of the Organized Militia hav-
ing subscribed the agreement and oath prescribed in section
thirty-eight of this Act, to continue in such active service for
two years, unless sooner released by order of the President;
and any Organized Militia, so ordered into active service
as a part of the Army of the United States shall be avail-
able for any duty for which the Regular Army may be
employed, and shall, from the date of the order to report for
active service until released from further liability to render
service thereunder, be subject not only to the Articles of War
but also to the laws, orders, and regulations governing the
Regular Army in so far as such laws, orders, and regulations
PREPAREDINESS FOR, NATIONAL DEFENSE. 229
are applicable to officers and enlisted men whose permanent
retention in the military service of the United States, either
on the active list or on the retired list, is not contemplated:
Provided, That when, in the discretion of the President, the
necessity for their further use no longer exists, he shall
release said organizations and the members thereof from
liability to render further active service under said order,
and said organizations and the members thereof, when so
released, shii cease for the time being to be in the active
military service of the United States: Provided further,
That when troops in excess of the Regular Army are needed
under the provisions of this section the active Organized Militia
of any armor branch;-exeept-the-effieers’reserve-eeeps—previeled
£er—#-seetień-seven-eſ-Éhis-A-et; shall be called into the service
of the United States in advance of any volunteer force of the
same arm or branch which it may be determined to raise.
SEC. 39. That whenever organizations are called into
the service of the United States or are ordered into active
service as a part of the Army of the United States those
organizations only must be so called or ordered into active
service which are entitled to the benefits of this act.
Organizations which at the date when called into the service
of the United States or ordered into active service as a part
of the Army of the United States are, in the judgment of
the Secretary of War, organized, so far as practicable, as
prescribed by law and regulations for like organizations
of the Regular Army, and are entitled to the benefits of
this act, shall be taken by divisions, brigades, regiments, or
independent and separate organizations as the quota or
major fraction thereof of each State, Territory, or the
District of Columbia may require, including all officers
authorized by law and regulations for corresponding units
of the Regular Army: Provided, That if in filling such
quota fractional parts of organizations are taken at different
times, when the complete organization from the State,
Territory, or the District of Columbia has been taken all
of its authorized officers shall be included.
SEC. 40. That every officer and enlisted man of the
Organized Militia who shall be ordered, into active service
as a part of the Army of the United States, as hereinbefore
prescribed, shall be mustered for such active service under
such regulations as the President may prescribe without
further commission or enlistment and without making a
physical examination previous to such muster condition prec-
edent thereto: Provided, That as soon as practicable after
such muster there shall be a physical examination of the
officers and men so mustered: Provided further, That im-
mediately preceding the release of an officer or enlisted
man ordered into active service as a part of the Army of
the United States from further liability to render active
service under said order he shall be physically examined,
under rules prescribed by the President of the United States
and a report thereof kept in the War Department.
230 g PREPAIRED NIESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
SEC. 41. That officers and enlisted men ordered into
active service as a part of the Army of the United States,
as hereinbefore prescribed, shall, during their term of such
active service, be entitled to the same fº and allowances as
are or may be provided for by law for officers or enlisted
men of the Regular Army of the same grade and with the
same prior service; and their pay , and allowances shall
commence from the date of notice of the order: Provided,
That this provision shall not be construed so as to authorize
any species of expenditure previous to arriving at places of
rendezvous which is not provided by existing law to be paid
after arrival at such place of rendezvous.
SEC. 42. That when any officer or enlisted man of the
Organized Militia ordered into active service as a part of the
Army of the United States is disabled by reason of wounds
or disability received or incurred in the active military
service of the United States he shall be entitled to all the
benefits of the pension laws existing at the time of his service;
and in case such officer or enlisted man dies in the active
service of the United States or in returning to his place of
residence after being released from further liability to render
active military service under the Order, or at any time in
consequence of wounds or disabilities received in such active
military service, his widow and children, if any, shall be
entitled to all the benefits of such pension laws.
SEC. 43. That divisions, brigades, regiments, and bat-
talions or squadrons may be Organized by the President out
of lesser separate units which are ordered into active service
as a part of the Army of the United States, and the President
may then assign, or when provision is made therefor, by
and with the advice and consent of the Senate, appoint and
commission with appropriate rank commanders of such
organizations and the necessary staff officers from officers of
the Regular Army or Organized Militia, the number and
grade of such officers not to exceed the number and grade for
like forces of the Regular Army.
SEC. 44. That all vacancies which exist or occur in the
grade of second lieutenant of the commissioned personnel of
any portion of the Organized Militia ordered into active
service as a part of the Army of the United States shall be
filled by the President, by and with the advice and consent
of the Senate, from the enlisted men of the ergañížatien—ef the
Organized Militia of the State, Territory, or the District of
Columbia in which the vacancy occurs: Provided, That all
promotions to include the grade of colonel shall be made by
the President, by and with the advice and consent of the
Senate, from within the arm of service in which the vacancy
occurs, and shall be confined to the commissioned personnel
of such arm of service pertaining to that State: Provided
further, That the President shall, by and with the advice and
consent of the Senate, appoint all general officers, except
as provided in section thirty-nine of this act.
SEC. 45. That the President may detail one officer of
the Regular Army or the Organized Militia to perform the
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 231
duties appertaining to a chief of staff and one officer of the
Regular Army or the Organized Militia to perform the duties
appertaining to an assistant chief of staff with any division
of the Organized Militia called into the service of the United
States, or ordered into active service as a part of the Army
of the United States, or formed of lesser separate units of
the Organized Militia called into the service of the United
States or ordered into active service as a part of the Army
of the United States: Provided, That in order to insure the
prompt mobilization of the Organized Militia in time of war
or other emergency the President may, in time of peace,
with the consent of the governors of the States or Territories
or the commanding general of the District of Columbia
Militia concerned, detail a field officer of the Regular Army
to perform the duties appertaining to a chief of staff for such
tactical divisions of the Organized Militia as exist or it is
proposed to create from the lesser units of the Organized
Militia when called into the service of the United States or
ordered into active service as a part of the Army of the
|United States.
SEC. 46. That the forces ordered into active service as
a part of the Army of the United States as hereinbefore
prescribed shall be regarded as a separate branch of the
Army of the United States. * -
SEC. 47. That the commander of a separate brigade,
division, or higher military unit is authorized to appoint
from time to time military boards of not less than three nor
more than five officers ordered into active service as a part
of the Army of the United States, or appointed under the
provisions of this act, to examine into the capacity, qualifica-
tions, conduct, and efficiency of any officer so ordered into
active service as a part of the Army of the United States,
or appointed therein, within his command: Provided, That
each member of the board shall be superior in rank to the
officer whose qualifications are to be inquired into: Provided
further, That if the report of such board be adverse to the
continuance of any officer in service, and if the report be
approved by the President, such officer shall be discharged
from service in the Army of the United States at the dis-
Cretion of the President.
SEC. 48. That all the organizations of the Organized
Militia called into the service of the United States or ordered
into active service as a part of the Army of the United
States shall be recruited and maintained as near the maxi-
mum authorized war strength as practicable; and the Presi-
dent is authorized to recruit all such organizations to such
maximum war strength from time to time, either by vol-
untary enlistment or by draft. For this purpose the neces-
sary rendezvous and depots shall be established for the
enlistment and training of all recruits, and in order that
officers may be available for recruiting duty the President
is authorized, by and with the advice and consent of the
Senate, to appoint from the Organized Militia of the several
States, Territories, and the District of Columbia officers
232 PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
of the proper arm of the service additional to those elsewhere
herein authorized in numbers not to exceed the proportion of
one major, four captains, five first lieutenants, and five second
lieutenants for each twelve companies; te

£—#####y;-eavalry; field—artillery; J 85
Heers;-aad of infantry, or coast artillery, each three battalions
of engineers, or each Sia, batteries of field artillery, and for the
purpose of instruction and discipline the troops at the recruit
depots herein authorized may be organized into provisional
companies and battalions or squadrons with noncommissioned
officers and privates of such grades and numbers as may be
prescribed by the President.
SEC. 49. That the provisions of this Act in respect to
the militia shall be applicable only to the militia organized
as a land force.
SEC. 50. That officers of the same grade shall rank and
have precedence in the folk)wing order, without regard to
date of rank or commission as between officers of different
classes, namely: First, officers of the Regular Army and
officers of the Marine Corps detached for service with the
Army by order of the President; second, officers of the
Organized Militia in the service of the United States; and,
third, officers of the volunteer forces: Provided, That officers
of the Regular Army holding commissions in the Organized
Militia in the service of the United States or of the Organized
Militia ordered into active military service as part of the
Army of the United States or in the volunteer forces shall
rank and have precedence under said commissions as if they
were commissions in the Regular Army; but the rank of
officers of the Regular Army under their commissions in
the Organized Militia shall not, for the purposes of this sec-
tion, be held to antedate muster into the service of the
United States: Provided further, That in time of war or
public danger, when two or more officers of the same grade
are on duty in the same field, department, or command, or
of any organization thereof, the President may assign the
command of such field, department, or command, or of any
organization thereof, without regard to seniority of rank in
the same grade.
SEC. 51. That the temporary vacancies created in any
grade not above that of colonel among the commissioned person-
nel of any arm, staff corps, or department of the Regular Army
through appointments of officers thereof to higher rank under
the provisions of this Act shall be filled by temporary promo-
tions according to seniority in rank from officers holding com—
missions in the next lower grade in said arm, staff corps, or
department, and all vacancies created in any grade by tem-
porary promotions shall be in like manner filled from and
thus create temporary vacancies in the next lower grade,
and the vacancies that remain thereafter in said arm, staff
corps, or department that can not be filled by temporary pro-
motions as prescribed in this section may be filled by the
temporary appointment of officers of such number and grade
or grades as shall maintain said arm, corps, or department
PREPAREDINESS FOR, NATIONAL DEFENSE. 233
at the full commissioned strength authorized by law: Pro-
wided, That in the staff corps and departments subject to the
provisions of sections twenty-six and twenty-seven of the
Act of February second, nineteen hundred and one, and
Acts amendatory thereof, temporary vacancies that can not
be filled by temporary promotions as hereinbefore pre-
scribed shall be filled by temporary details in the manner
prescribed in said sections twenty-six and twenty-seven and
Acts amendatory thereof, and the resulting temporary vacan-
cies in the branches of the Army from which the details are
so made shall be filled as hereinbefore in this section pre-
scribed: Provided further, That officers temporarily pro-
moted or appointed under the terms of this section shall be pro-
moted or appointed by the President, by and with the advice
and consent of the Senate, for terms that shall not extend
beyond the war or the passing of the emergency for which
additional forces were ordered into active service as a part
of the Army of the United States, and at the termination
of the war or the passing of the emergency said officers shall
be discharged from the positions held by them under their
temporary commissions or appointments, and officers de-
tailed as herein authorized shall be relieved from their tem-
porary details: And provided further, That officers tem-
porarily promoted under the provisions of this section shall
not vacate their permanent commissions nor be prejudiced
in their relative or lineal standing in the Regular Army.
SEC. 52. That officers of the Regular Army appointed
and commissioned in other forces under the provisions of
this Act shall not thereby vacate their Regular Army com-
missions or be prejudiced in their relative or lineal standing
therein. sº
SEC. 53. That all laws and parts of laws inconsistent
with this Act are, to the extent of such inconsistency, re-
pealed: Provided, That this shall not be construed to repeal
the Act entitled “An Act for the organization of the Militia
of the District of Columbia,” approved February eighteenth,
nineteen hundred and nine, or any other Act relating ex-
clusively to the Militia of the said District of Columbia.
SEC. 54. That this Act shall take effect on July first,
nineteen hundred and sixteen.
The CHAIRMAN. Now, General, with reference to this proposed con-
tinental army, have you given that any particular consideration ?
Gen. MILLs. Oh, yes.
The CHAIRMAN. If you feel disposed, we would like to hear your
views on that.
Gen. MILLS. I feel that the principles on which the policies proposed
in that bill are based are those that we will have finally to come to
if we are #. to properly prepare for national defense. While the
number of troops it calls for, 400,000, is certainly a reasonable num-
ber, it is susceptible of being increased, and increased to take in the
manhood of the country, if the occasion ever arose for it. 'If Congress
makes the bill effective there will be put upon the statute books the
really first sufficient military policy the country has ever had.
23380—PT 5–16—4
234 PR.EPARED NESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
Senator THOMAs. Do you feel sanguine that volunteers could be
induced to go into the continental army?
Gen. MILLs. That is a question, Senator, that experience only will
demonstrate, and I feel that it ought to be tried out. It can only be
tried out by Congress furnishing the means to try it out, and then, if
it is not successful, recourse must be had to other ways by which we
may get results. -
Senator THOMAs. That would be the universal system :
Gen. MILLs. The universal training, or first a combination of vol-
untary and compulsory service.
Senator HITCHCOCK. What is the real inducement to the average
man to enlist for two months a year, under the terms of such a bill?
What does he receive? -
Gen. MILLs. The monetary inducement is very little, Senator.
Senator HITCHCOCK. What is there in a financial way?
Gen. MILLs. He gets the same pay as that prescribed for the
Regular Army. . * -
Senator HITCHCOCK. For two months?
Gen. MILLs. The bill does not contemplate that two months is
the term of service. That two months was taken in order to have a
basis upon which cost could be approximately determined.
The CHAIRMAN. Any other time would do as well? .
Gen. MILLs. Yes. As I understand it, the duration of time of
service is a question that Congress must determine.
Senator HITCHCOOK. You said one-sixth of the pay of a regular
enlisted man.
Gen. MILLs. Oh, no; full pay during that time.
Senator HITCHCOCK. I understood you to say it was taken as a
basis for pay—that is, one-sixth of the year.
Gen. MILLs. No. That period of two months of service in the
continental army was taken by the Secretary of War as a basis for
determining what the bill, if passed, would cost, as a basis of cost to
the country. *
Senator HITCHOOCK. Does it not follow, then, that if the basis of
cost were formed in that way, it was intended to take two months’
service 7 -
Gen. MILLS. I see what you mean. -
Senator HITCHCOCK. And those two months’ service would be
one-sixth of the annual pay 3 -
Gen. MILLs. The annual pay for two months' service. But, then,
the Secretary of War did not, in that bill, say that two months’ service
was the amount of service that would be sufficient, in his policy under
the bill, to make a trained soldier. That is the point.
* The CHAIRMAN. He just simply used that as a basis for computa-
tion : -
Gen. MILLS. Computation; that is it.
Senator HITCHCOO.K. Do you think it would be sufficient 7
Gen. MILLs. No.
Senator HITCHCOCK. Do you think it would have to be more than
two months in a year?
Gen. MILLS. That brings up the entire question, Senator, of how
much training is necessary to make a dependable soldier.
PREPAREDINESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 235
Senator HITCHCOCK. Do you know anything about how soon after
men have been enlisted the British Empire has put them in the field 7
Gen. MILLS. Yes, sir; I know approximately.
Senator HITCHCOCK. What length of time? s
Gen. MILLS. I understood the Canadian contingent that went
Over from here was kept here three months, and then it was six months
more before the best of them were allowed to go in.
Senator HITCHCOCK. Were they militiamen who had had some
experience?
Gen. MILLS. Yes. They were partly militiamen. The first of
the territorials of England, which correspond to our militia very
closely, went in, the best of them, as I understand it, three months
after the outbreak of the war, and then the others followed along as
they were considered sufficiently efficient.
Senator HITCHCOCK. Therefore, so far as you know, six months
was the minimum service after which England permitted the men
to go in 7
en. MILLS. The untrained recruits. -
The CHAIRMAN. They would be useless up to that time .
Gen. MILLs. Yes.
The CHAIRMAN. Washington said they were a hindrance.
Gen. MILLS. I believe the War College has worked out, and their's
is expert advice, expert opinion, that should be considered, that an
equivalent of 900 hours of hard work is necessary to make a soldier
proficient in the technical part of his training. That is a difficult
proposition, because the essential element of a trained soldier is his
acquirement of discipline. It is discipline, that is, what we know as
discipline, which makes the dependable soldier, and it is discipline
which carries him up against the most difficult conditions. It is
discipline that enables the soldiers now fighting in Europe to go up
against what they have to do. And it is the acquirement of this
discipline which takes much time in addition to the 900 hours I have
mentioned. *
Senator HITCHCOCK. In selecting two months as the estimated time
for the citizen soldiery each year to be drilled, was that considered
the maximum length of time that a man could be taken away from his
vocation 7 *
Gen. MILLs. No, sir. As I think I said, Senator, it was entirely
as a basis to compute the cost. -
Senator HITCHCOCK. Was there any investigation as to what length
of time a man might be drawn away from his ordinary profession or
vocation ?
Gen. MILLs. No, sir; I do not think there has been –none that I
know of. -
Senator HITCHCOCK. What was the age at which these men were
to be taken 3 . -
Gen. MILLs. Into the continental army'.
Senator HITCHCOCK. Yes. -
Gen. MILLs. From 18 to 35. I would like to finish what I
mean by discipline in the soldier. It is a quality that is acquired
through the habit of obedience. There is a different discipline
demanded of officers, that is, the discipline that comes more through
higher intelligence, intelligence which teaches them and impresses
236 PREPAREDNESS, FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
º them the necessity of obeying, and obeying strictly, the orders
or superiors.
Senator HITCHCOCK. If obedience is so large a factor, why would
it not be better to begin with these men younger, begin when they are
14 years old &
Gen. MILLS. It would. That is where we ought to begin, Senator.
We ought to begin, I think, in the schools. *
The CHAIRMAN. That is the plan that was proposed in this univer-
sal measure that I introduced. -
Gen. MILLS. First, with a view of obtaining respect for authority
and proper physical development, not putting guns in the hands of
the boys until they are able phyiscally to carry a gun.
Senator HITCHCOCK. What is the minimum age at which soldiers
are now being taken in this European war?
Gen. MILLs. That I do not know. I have not seen it stated.
France has called on a very young class, I think 17 years old.
Senator HITCHCOCK. Seventeen years is the minimum, so far as
you know Ż
Gen. MILLS. I have seen it stated; I do not know whether it is true
Or not.
Senator HITCHCOCK. And they, of course, have had previous
military discipline? -
Gen. MILLs. Oh, yes, -
Senator HITCHCOCK. Of what length of time?
Gen. MILLs. That I can not tell, Senator, *
The CHAIRMAN. In Australia they commence to teach them at
12; that is, gymnastics and calisthenics, for children from 12 to 14.
Gen. MILLs. Yes. ge
Senator HITCHCOCK. Would it not be much easier to get men to
enlist at the lower ages?
Gen. MILLS. It would be advisable to enlist young men. Their.
individual efficiency in whatever vocation they adopted would be in-
creased, and the total result would increase the general efficiency of
the Nation.
Senator HITCHCOCK. Would the compensation that might be paid
them by the Government be acceptable to their parents as a part of
the family support? You say it is proposed to give them soldiers'
av Ž
&n. MILLs. Yes, sir; the pay proper of a soldier, which does not
include his subsistence or his clothing or actual other necessaries of
life—about $15 a month. . ->
Senator HITCHCOCK. It is not proposed to give these enlisted men
anything in the way of clothing? * g
Gen. MILLS. Oh, yes; give them the same allowances as a soldier,
which includes clothing and subsistence, as well as pay.
Senator HITCHCOCK. Then that clothing would only be used during
two months in the year?
Gen. MILLs. The time it would be used would be during the train-
ing period, being brought out each successive year.
The CHAIRMAN. It is not only one year's training, Senator.
Senator HITCHCOCK. No; it is four, I believe. I notice in this
tabulated statement that you have with you, for the period from 1903
to 1908, the average appropriation for militia was $3,373,000 a year.
Gen. MILLs. Yes, sir. - 2^

PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 287
Senator HITCHCOCK. And then for the next six years, from 1909 to
1915, it was $6,614,000% -
Gen. MILLs. Yes, sir. In 1908 section 13 of the militia law appro-
priated $2,000,000.
Senator HITCHCOCK. That was the reason 7
Gen. MILLs. That is the act of May 27, 1908, Senator. It is section
13 of the amended militia law. . .
Senator HITCHCOCK. So that we now are spending about twice as
much on the militia as we were prior to 1909'?
Gen. MILLS. Yes; Senator.
Senator HITCHCOCK. What was it prior to 1903? What were we
expending
Gen. MILLs. In 1808 we commenced and appropriated $200,000
annually, which we continued yearly until 1887. Then it became
$400,000. In 1900 it became $1,000,000, in 1906 it was increased to
$2,000,000, and by the act of May 27, 1908, to $4,000,000.
Senator HITCHCOOK. That was simply for one item?
Gen. MILLS. Those embraced all the items up to that time. The
other large items were when we commenced the appropriations for en-
campments and maneuvers. - g
Senator HITCHCOCK. These appropriations here include the pur-
chase of some equipment'
Gen. MILLS. Yes, sir.
h sºlor HITCHCOCK. What is the amount of equipment now on
and 7
Gen. MILLs. The total amount of equipment now on hand 7
Senator HITCHCOCK. Yes. -
Gen. MILLS. I could have that figured out, Senator; this would,
however, entail much clerical labor. We know that every State
except two has the minimum equipment, and we have the governors'
returns down to a basis where they show the amount of property for
which they are accountable.
Senator HITCHCOCK. I notice quite a large increase in the appro-
priation for field artillery. - -
Gen. MILLs. Yes, sir.
Senator HITCHCOCK. There must be considerable of that in good
condition now.
Gen MILLS. Oh, yes. We have out in the Organized Militia seventy
Some batteries. *
The CHAIRMAN. General, those States that have armories do not
lose much property, do they
Gen. MILLs. No, sir. In States that have armories that are pro-
tected from the elements and from fire and theft, as a rule property
is fairly safe. -
Senator HITCHCOCK. What would you think of the plan to have
the Government build armories for States under certain conditions?
Gen. MILLS. I think something of that kind will probably have to
be done, Senator, especially if there is no way of coercing or influencing
the States that do not have proper armories to build them—that is,
. we try to build up the Organized Militia into a dependable field
OTCG. -
Senator HITCHCOCK. What number of States have armories that
are satisfactory : ſº
238 PREPAREDINESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
Gen. MILLS. Table 11 of the report of the Division of Militia. Af-
fairs for 1915 shows the conditions as regards State armories. A good
many States are deficient in proper armories.
The CHAIRMAN. Oregon has some very fine armories.
Gen. MILLs. Yes, sir; very fine. I can send you that information,
Senator Hitchcock.
Senator HITCHCOCK. Has anybody ever considered the wisdom of
making service in the militia of some advantage to a man in securing
civil-service appointment under the Government afterwards?
Gen. MILLs. I do not know, Senator Hitchcock, whether that has
been considered. In a general way it has been proposed that they
should have preference under some iº. I think there are some laws
that bear on it in a general way. Discharged soldiers of the Regular
Army have a certain preference, as you probably know.
Senator HITCHCOO.K. But the militiaman has none"
Gen. MILLs. I do not know that he has. •
Senator HITCHCOCK. It has occurred to me that there is very little
inducement for a man to join the militia, and each one who does it,
does it usually at a great deal of sacrifice.
Gen. MILLs. They certainly do. I mean those who attend to their
military duties.
Senator HITCHCook. And with the thousands of people there are
who are trying to obtain admission to the civil service, the thought
occurred to me that if it were made of considerable advantage to a
man seeking a position in the civil service to have two or three years
militia service, it might be worth considering.
Senator THOMAs. You do not think the ordinary impulse of pa-
triotism is sufficiently strong in this country'
Senator HITCHCOCK. I know personally men who belong to the
militia and go to drills really at a sacrifice that I am surprised at.
Senator THOMAs. So do I. But the percentage is very low com-
pared with the total population capable of bearing arms.
Senator HITCHCOCK. If you sº show an ambitious lot of young
men that that would be a gateway to employment in the Govern-
ment service, it might be of advantage. I do not know that it is
feasible at all. -
Senator CATRON. Is there much inducement after he gets into the
civil service 3 -
Senator THOMAs. Oh, yes. They can organize and demand more
pay. That is what the civil-service employees are doing mostly
nowadays.
Senator HITCHCOOK. A good many young people have a mistaken
idea that the civil service is attractive.
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 239
STATEMENT OF BRIG. GEN. M. M. MACOMB, PRESIDENT OF
• * . THE ARMY WAR COLLEGE.
The CHAIRMAN. Gen. Macomb, you might state to the committee
the position which you hold. . . .
Gen. MACOMB. I am at present brigadier general of the line, in
charge of the War College Division of the General Staff, and presi-
dent of the Army War College. - -
The CHAIRMAN. I presume that you prefer to make your statement
in your own way as a beginning, in discussing this subject.
Gen. MACOMB. Yes, in an informalway. I want to state first to the
committee that we were directed last March at the War College Divi-
sion to prepare a statement of a proper military policy for the United
States, and that statement was prepared and presented to the Secretary
of War on the 11th of September, was considered by him, and was
included in his annual report as Appendix C. I suppose every mem-
ber of this committee has been given a copy, but I do not know.
The CHAIRMAN. Yes, we have it.
Gen. MACOMB. There are some points with reference to the state-
. that I want to explain to the committee in order to make it
Cl628),T. -
In the first place, we were told to do two things. One was to make
a complete and comprehensive study of everything pertaining to the
proper military policy, and then to make a succinct statement of that
policy within certain definite lines. This is the statement that we
made, but it does not by any means give a correct idea of the work
§: in by the division. We were told not to include too many details
ut to leave the main points prominent and to give the details later
in additional papers; and we did so, preparing some 31 documents,
which would naturally go with this policy, and of which I have pre-
pared a list which you may perhaps wish to put in the record. If
you desire to do so, I will submit that.
The CHAIRMAN. Submit the list of documents. - -
Gen. MACOMB. The documents we prepared in connection with and
in enlargement of this policy are set forth in this paper.
(The paper referred to is copied in the record in full, as follows:)
TITLES OF BROCHURES PREPARED BY THE WAR COLLEGE DIVISION, GENERAL STAIFF
CORPS, As A SUPPLEMENT TO THE STATEMENT OF A PROPER MILITARY Policy FoR
• TEIE UNITED STATES. -
1. Changes in organization found necessary during progress of the European war,
2. Comparison of cost of our military establishment with those of other countries. .
d ; Coordination of the mobile and Coast Artillery units of the Army in the national
€1CIOSG. -
4. Development of large caliber mobile artillery and machine guns in the present
European war. -
5. Educational institutions giving military training as a Source for a Supply of
reserve officers for a national army.
6. Elimination of unnecessary expense from Army administration.
7. Finances and costs of the present European war. .
8. Fortifications.
9. General staffs of certain belligerent powers.
10. Military aviation.- -
ll. Militia as organized under the Constitution and its value to the Nation as a
military asset. ...?
12. Mobilization of industries and utilization of the commercial and industrial
resources of the country for war purposes in emergency. e -
240 PREPAREDINESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
13. Modern organization for the Regular Army and its use as a model in organizing
other forces. - l
14. Motor transportin campaign.
15. Organization and administration of the War Department adapted to a change
from peace conditions to a state of war.
16. (1). Organization, training, and mobilization of a force of citizen Soldiery.
(2) Method of training a citizen army on the outbreak of war to insure its pre-
paredness for field Service.
17. Organization, training, and mobilization of a reserve for the Regular Army. .
18. Organization, training, and mobilization of volunteers under the act of April
25, 1914. -
19. Outline of Fº for military training in Fº schools of the United States.
20. Pension roll as affected by the War with Spain in 1898.
21. Personnel versus matériel in plans for national defense. & tº
22. Places of origin and ability to procure supplies needed in vast quantities in
time of war. & -
23. Proper relationship between the Army and the Press in war.
24. Recruitment of officers in time of peace in the principal armies of Europe. .
25. Standardization of methods of military instruction at Schools and colleges in
the United States, with draft of a bill to establish a reserve Officers’ training corps.
26. Statistical comparison of universal and voluntary service. .
27. Strategic location of military depots, arsenals, and manufacturing plants in the
United States. -
28. Sanitary troops in foreign armies. .
29. Training and uses of the proposed officers' reserve corps.
30. Training of forces of belligerent nations of Europe.
31. Utilization of our resources in various means of transportation and of the services
of trained specialists. »”
Gen. MACOMB. In preparing this statement of a military policy we
had to keep various points in view; that is, the connection of the
various departments of the Government with the military forces. .
We considered the question of the part played by diplomacy in
the functioning of our Government, and we find that, as a country,
we are confronted with certain fixed policies and primary interests
that seem simple enough to us, but are regarded by other nations
with disfavor and even distrust and may involve us in difficulties.
These are such policies as the avoidance of all entangling alliances;
that means that as we have no alliances we must fight our own bat-
tles unaided. & ºt e tº tº e e
The Monroe doctrine is another policy that is viewed in very differ-
ent ways by ourselves and other nations. Just now it seems to be
developing into a Pan American entente. The open door in the
Orient, Asiatic exclusion, the protection of the Panama Canal, and
the Supremacy of the Pacific are all questions we have had to con-
sider. These questions are all likely, diplomacy failing, to embroilus
with some of the great world powers, and then we will have to back
up our policies with force. We must always have adequate force
back of them. Every diplomat must feel that he can not dictate a
policy or carry out his instructions without feeling that back of him
there is power to enforce an ultimatum. Unless we are prepared to
back up these policies they are purely academic and will not play any
great part in the history of the world. .
To do this requires us to have, then, in the first place, an adequate
Navy, because, if we are attacked at all, we are going to be attacked
by some strong sea power. We must have an adequate º I
say, to resist that power, because the value of the Navy is the ability
to cut loose from our coast entirely and to seek out the enemy's
fleet on the high seas and either destroy it or drive it back.
PREPARED NIESS FOR, NATIONAL DEFENSE. 241
That might seem, to some people, to make it unnecessary to have
any Army, because, they will say, “The Navy can defend us.” On
the contrary, the Navy would never be allowed to go away from our
coasts unless we had an adequate mobile force and adequate coast
defenses—that is, an organization which handles the guns that cover
our main seaports, and Our main bases, forming points of support
for the Navy. In other words, the one great function of our land
forces is to give the Navy a free foot to carry out its part. Therefore
the contention of a great many people that the War Department in
recommending an adequate i. force is trying to solve the whole
problem itself, is not tenable. We are merely trying to play the
part an Army ought to play in the national defense. *,
In this statement we H. figured about what we ought to have in
order to enable us to play that part, and we have found it to be a
fully trained mobile force of about 500,000 men, which would be com-
posed of the Regular Army and its reserve. Then back of that we
would have to have a citizen force, not first-line troops but troops
which had received certain training, some 500,000 strong.
Senator DU Pont. General, what strength have you fixed for the
Regular Army'.
Gen. MACOMB. The Regular Army should be fixed so as to give
us enough of a garrison to defend our over-sea possessions properly,
and, in the next place, to give us the proper protection along our coasts.
You will find it stated exactly how many units we need for that pur-
pose on page 20 of the statement. -
Senator DU PONT. What is the total 2
Gen. MACOMB. The total number would figure up about 121,000
at home, which would be supplemented by this reserve of 379,000,
which would have to be bj from the regular force gradually.
We can not produce it at once, but in eight years, say, we would
reach this reserve. No country can at once furnish itself with an ade-
quate force. It is a question of many years' work. The Germans
have been working for 100 years to get the efficient force they have,
and so it goes. -
Senator DU Pont. Under the plan of the War College what would
be the total number of the Regular Army at home and abroad'.
Gen. MACOMB. The total number at home and abroad, with its
reserves, would be 500,000, as I say.
Senator DU Pont. I mean without the reserves.
Gen. MACOMB. Without the reserves it would be, say, 82,000
abroad in over-sea possessions, and about 148,000 at home, giving
us, in round numbers, about 230,000, of which 195,500 would be
mobile combatant and 34,500 Coast Artillery.
Senator DU Pont. The Adjutant General says it would be impos-
sible to recruit an army of that size with voluntary enlistments. Is
that your opinion? - -
Gen. MACOMB. He states it is impossible to recruit it, but it is
merely his opinion. He does not know what he can do, because he
has not tried anything but the present system. He knows that with
the present system he can not get that many. He knows he can prob-
ably recruit a force which I think he limits to about one hundred
and some odd thousand.
Senator DU PONT. One hundred and forty-one thousand.
242 PREPAREDINESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
Gen. MACOMB. One hundred and forty-one thousand, he claims. But
we do not know. He might do better by introducing other means
of getting these men to enlist. -
Senator THOMAS. Have you not had great difficulties in your at-
tempt to fill the present complement? -
Gen. MACOMB. f have not had that in charge.
Senator THOMAs. When I say “you” I speak collectively, of
COULTSé. - -
Gen. MACOMB. I think The Adjutant General has. He has had
difficulty in doing it under the present method of recruiting. But the
question is, Have they studied out and adopted the best methods of
recruiting? We do not know that they have. -
Senator HITCHCOCK. Explain what you mean. What change
could be made that would make it easier to get the men 3
Gen. MACOMB. We have suggested certain methods. I am not
certain whether this proposition would accomplish the result or not.
Perhaps I had better state them. &
Senator HITCHCOCK. I do not want to interrupt you in the state-
ment as you care to present it, but I wondered if there was any
question about our method of recruiting being satisfactory? .
Gen. MACOMB. It seems to be satisfactory as far as it goes, but
there might be improved methods of recruiting that could be adopted.
The CHAIRMAN. Some big business man here suggested to me
yesterday that the requirements for recruiting in the Army were
severer than those for employment in any ; the establishments
that employ five or six thousand men. Is that true, as to educational
qualifications?
Gen. MACOMB. I think they are severer for service in the Army.
Senator DU PONT. What is the number of rejections as stated in the
Adjutant General's report'; -
Gen. MACOMB. That must be given in his report, but I would
not venture to state the exact per cent. I have not noted how many
he reported. - - -
Senator HITCHCOCK. It seems to me more men are rejected than
accepted.
Gen. MACOMB. I do not know just how many. If there is an officer
here who has been on recruiting service here he would know. But
over 50 per cent of them are rejected. There are some general
propositions here that we favor in the War College Division that
might be taken down. One was listing all our people who might
be fit for military service. That has not been done yet. Then,
conscription to raise recruits when enough do not voluntarily enlist-
and repeal of laws authorizing payment of bounty and bonus for reen-
listment. This bonus does not refer to reenlistment pay, which is
favored for noncommissioned officers and specialists who should be
kept in the Service as long as possible. -
Other points suggested by officers of the War College Division
who have been studying this matter are as follows:
Recruiting of units of the Regular Army in the United States
should be localized in districts, based upon fit population. Each
such regiment or unit should have a depot detachment in its district
to obtain, equip, train, and forward men as required to keep the
organization at war strength.
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 243
General recruiting should be done for over-sea garrisons and tech-
nical branches of the service, and to assist generally in keeping
organizations at war strength. -
Motion pictures should be employed. These pictures should show
all the activities of the Army, the various stations in foreign posses-
sions, etc. They should be carefully prepared under the direction of
the War Department, and new films should be made from time to
time. The films should be distributed to the various points where
recruiting stations are located. Regimental commanders should be
given much latitude in the selection of ways and means of securing
recruits. -
Senator HITCHCOCK. I find in this report of The Adjutant General
that the total number of enlistments for the entire Army within the
fiscal year was 48,813. -
Gen. MACOMB. Yes; that is a fact.
Senator HITCHCOCK. And that the total number of rejections was
130,206. - -
Gen. MACOMB. That shows very severe, and perhaps some may
think unnecessarily severe, requirements. But it must be remem-
bered that many of these rejections were due to inability to establish
moral character, or to obtain the consent of parent or guardian.
Senator HITCHCOCK. It is amazing to me.
The CHAIRMAN. One reason for so many rejections was that they
only needed to keep the Army up to about 100,000, and there were a
great many applications made when the Army did not need the men,
so they just let them go and selected the very best in the lot.
Senator THOMAs. That hardly comports with what was said here
yesterday, that it was only recently that they have been able to get
enough recruits to keep the standard up to the present maximum.
The CHAIRMAN. Maybe that is true, but it did not seem possible
to me. I think maybe they are more strict than they ought to be.
Senator HITCHCOcK. Then you figure that if a larger army were
provided, it would be easier to secure the men by easing off somewhat
on the requirements at the enlistment'
Gen. MACOMB. I would not say it would be easy to do so. I would
say it would give us a bigger percentage than we are getting now, and ,
we do not know yet until we try it if we could actually get enough.
But I want to go on with my statement.
Make ex-reservists a favored class for civil-service appointments.
Increase the number of recruiting parties to reach rural communi-
ties and Small towns, in addition to the recruiting work done in larger
places. Advertise extensively by means of newspapers, posters, and
handbills. Appeal to patriotism, using posters and handbills, such
as are now used in England. To this should be added a publicity
campaign through newspapers and magazines designed to keep up
popular interest and to impress upon the people the necessity for
constant readiness for defense.
Popularize the service through military lectures, military drills,
and exercises throughout the country. .
Abolish the taking of photographs for identification now made at
enlistment. - -
Those were merely some of the methods which they thought might
be introduced to help. But nobody can say positively that this will
244 PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
ive us the number of men that we actually require to recruit the
orce we need. e -
Senator DU Pont. There is a population of a million in Porto Rico º
Gen. MACOMB. Yes, over a million. -
Senator DU PoWT. And we have eight companies recruited there.
In your opinion could a larger number of soldiers be taken from that
population? gº &
º MACOMB. Yes; I am sure they could recruit a whole regi-
ment there. .
Senator DU Pont. They could recruit two regiments, could they
not -
Gen. MACOMB. Probably two regiments. Others who have been
down there recently claim that they could get two. .
Bearing on that question is the condition in Hawaii which has a
mixed population of about 200,000. They have shown an immense
interest in developing the necessary force over there, and I am sure
they can get a brigade of militia in that Territory, although that
would be a large proportion, perhaps a larger proportion of the
population than any other Territory has ever attempted to raise, or
any State. Do you not think so, Gen. Mills?
Gen. MILLs. Yes.
Senator DU Pont. You mean locally enlisted there?
Gen. MACOMB. They can locally enlist enough militia to form the
equivalent of a brigade.
The CHAIRMAN. White men?
Gen. MACOMB. No, sir; not all white men. They have now a regi-
ment in Honolulu which is a mixed regiment, and has companies of
Hawaiians, who are American citizens; Chinese, who are American
citizens, and white men. .
The CHAIRMAN. Do they make pretty good soldiers?
Gen. MACOMB. They make very good soldiers.
Senator DU Pont. What regiment is that?
Gen. MACOMB. That is the First Regiment, National Guard of the
Territory of Hawaii.
Senator THOMAS. You say Japanese naturalized citizens?
Gen. MACOMB. No, sir. Isaid native-born Chinese. It is a strange
thing that the native-born Japanese do not seem to go into this,
and they do not take the same advantage, so far as I can see, of their
opportunities of becoming citizens, as do the others. There are a
number of native-born Chinese who are now growing up to the right
age for military service. Those are the ones who are enlisting in
this regiment. -
hº CHAIRMAN. Do the whites show any objection to serving with
them .
Gen. MACOMB. None whatever. There is no color line drawn there,
because the Hawaiians, as you know, are quite dark, and they were
declared under the Organic act American citizens. Under white
officers they make excellent soldiers. $
There is one thing I wanted to say here with reference to the neces-
sity for keeping up the proper relation between our Coast Artillery
and mobile troops. We speak of the Navy acting as our first line in
case of invasion. Then, of course, the coast defense must cover all
important harbors, but besides that we must have mobile troops
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 245
to cover the vacant spaces along the coast which might be liable
to attack, and for that reason, if we are going to enlarge our Army,
We must endeavor to increase these two forces together so as to
build them up about the same time.
Senator DUPONT. Do you not think in the defense of our coasts we
ought to consider communication between the different bays and
internal harbors, so that the Government could move promptly and
Swiftly munitions of war and troops?
Gen. MACOMB. Yes, sir. We have done that in many cases, and
I remember that Senator Saulsbury was interested in the Delaware &
Chesapeake Canal, which is an instance in view. That is one case
that I think is a very important one, and I think the Secretary of War
has approved the idea of deepening that to 20 feet and making it an
Open sea-level canal about 150 feet wide at the bottom. &
Senator DU PoNT. We are all interested in that in my State. Do
you remember about what would be the expense of that %
Gen. MACOMB. I have not figured on the expense myself. It was
given over to the Engineers. to do the figuring, and I have never seen
their results.
Senator DU PONT. Do you think the existing canal, deepened so
as to transport lighter men-of-war and transports, would be a con-
tributing element to the defense, not only of Washington and the
Chesapeake Bay, but of Philadelphia?
Gen. MACOMB. Absolutely. And another point that you need to
bring out is that it would be a very important obstruction in the case
of a successful landing at Lewes, Del, because an advance to the
northward would be met by this very strong obstruction, which could
be very readily defended, and in that way it could be very valuable
also; we could hold the enemy right at that point. -
There are some points I would like to bring out now, especially
with regard to Infantry. -
Senator CATRON. Before you go from this harbor matter and coast
defenses I want to say that I noticed a statement in some paper a few
days ago that there was no defense on the interior of those forts, and
it would be easy for an enemy landing a force to get in the rear of
them and easily capture them.
Gen. MACOMB. That is exactly the point we were trying to cover
by developing the mobile force at the same time as we did the
Coast Artillery. If we build these forts, man them, and give them
their personnel and guns, we must have at the same time another
force growing up which will cover them to the rear, and that must
be a mobile force. We can protect them against small raids by
means of a small force, which sees to their immediate defense. But
if we are going to resist operations on a large scale, which would
certainly be attempted, then we must have these large mobile forces
ready to act. *
Senator CATRON. We have not any forts where we do not have rail-
roads going into them " -
Gen. MACOMB. They are all close to rail communication.
Senator CATRON. Have you built a fort at any place on the coast
where the railroad does not go in and deliver freight on board ships,
where there is a harbor of any considerable consequence?
Gen. MACOMB. Yes; I think we have.
Senator DU PONT. Fort Monroe .
246 PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
Senator CATRON. Then, we have a fort at every one of those places?
Gen. MACOMB. Of course, but they are not adequate by themselves.
For instance, Senator du Pont was speaking of Fort Monroe. The
entrance to the Chesapeake opposite that place is not adequately
defended, but that is being arranged for. A certain appropriation is
asked for to cover the defenses necessary to close that bay. That is
very important, because if you close that you are closing this whole
interior waterway to the enemy. * .
Senator HITCHCOCK. If an enemy has once landed, of what use
is a coast fortification, if they have landed in another place 3
Gen. MACOMB. One use of the harbor fortification is to make him
land where he can be got at by the mobile force. If he landed at the
harbor he would gain what he was trying to do—gain his base, his
'supplies, and all the money he needed. So the object is to prevent
him from landing in an easy place like that—which would be of great
advantage to him—and make it difficult to effect his purpose by
having a large mobile force ready to meet him.
Senator HITCHCOCK. Such a mobile force must be equipped with
very heavy artillery in order to prevent a landing?
Gen. MACOMB. What force; the mobile force? *
Senator HITCHCOOK. Yes. How could the mobile force prevent
a landing from vessels that are equipped with these high-power, long-
range guns unless it is equipped with tremendous artillery 3
Gen. MACOMB. It would i. equipped with tremendous artillery,
but not of that kind. Those guns would not be of any advantage to
them for landing, because they have nothing to shoot at. They
have to see what they are doing, and they would not waste valuable
armor-piercing, fort-reducing shells in firing them around the country.
The method of landing would be like that adopted by the British at
the Dardanelles. They landed a force of over 100,000 men in a very
short time, and they did that because the Turks did not have guns
to keep the fleet off at a distance. So they came in, and in some
places were able to beach ships and use lighters, and they did all
that under the secondary guns of the ships, the Smaller guns. But
we propose and have arranged to supply our mobile force with suffi-
cient guns to hold a fleet off at a good distance. -
Senator HITCHCOCK. It is a matter more of artillery than of men,
is it not .
Gen. MACOMB. No, sir; the trouble is, that they can still land if
we fail to provide mobile troops to meet them. The powerful guns
ashore will merely keep the ships off and they will begin the landing
operations from a great distance. What we could do in that case
would be to use our Smaller caliber guns against the landing force
because the ships will have been kept off at such a distance that
they can not use their, Secondary guns, whereas we can use against
the landing parties that are coming in our guns that we have been
able to bring down for that purpose.
Senator CATRON. How long . it take the English to land 100,000
at Gallipoliº
Gen. MACOMB. It took about 15 days to land the 74,000 compos-
ing the first expedition. I am having that campaign accurately
studied at the War College, and I can give you the full details when
that paper is prepared. - -
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 24'ſ
Senator CATRON. How close could those ships from which the
º were landed get to the shore before they took the men off the
SIlliſDS 9 - -
ğ. MACOMB. Some of them got so close to the shore that they
were able to take them right off in lighters from the ships.
Senator CATRON. If our harbors are all protected by forts with
long-range guns, if they were to make a landing they would have to
make it where there was no harbor.
Gen. MACOMB. That is exactly it.
Senator CATRON. How far out would they have to stand, as a rule 3
Of course, the coast is different in different places.
Gen. MACOMB. If we had a mobile force with heavy guns, they
would have to stand off at about 10,000 yards. We are proposing to
furnish the mobile forces now with the heavier type of artillery—
heavier than anything we have had—and that wº suffice to keep
the ships off at 10,000 yards.
Senator CATRON. How large a type of artillery would that be?
Gen. MACOMB. That would require about an 8-inch or 11-inch how-
itzer, a mobile howitzer, which can be readily arranged to be brought
rapidly to the front on cars; that is, ordinary railway cars, or with
motors.
Senator HITCHCOCK. How would such a howitzer stand against
guns that were carrying twelve or fifteen thousand yards?
Gen. MACOMB. The trouble is the ship's gunners do not know where
the howitzer is. The battery on shore is so easily concealed that the
ships can not get at it. A ship makes a big target and can be readily
Seen, whereas the batteries on shore have the great advantage of them,
since they can see the ships when they are many miles away, but the
ships can not see the batteries. -
sºor HITCHCOCK. Is that true, even in these days of aeroplane
SCOuts'
Gen. MACOMB. The aeroplane scouts would possibly help them; but
still they would find great difficulty from the ship in directing their
fire at such objects on shore as troops, because they do not make good
targets. The guns can be readily concealed even from aeroplane
Scouts. The ships make a target the land forces are able to fire into.
Senator CATRON. General, have we any place along our sea shore,
outside of the harbors, where a ship could get up close so that there
would be a short distance between the shore and the ship where they
undertook a landing 3 I am asking that question in connection with
the fact that if the ships could not get very close they would have,
of course, to land them in small boats. • .
Gen. MACOMB. That is right. -
Senator CATRON. And as those smaller boats got close to the land
they might be reached by our land artillery -
Gen. MACOMB. Exactly. -
hº CATRON. Which would not have the range of the guns on
the ships? . .
Gen. MACOMB. No; they would not have the range of their great
guns.
Senator CATRON. Is there any place where they could get up so
close that they could do away with that difference?
248 PREPAREDINESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
Senator THOMAs. In other words, is there any place where the water
is deep enough for the large boats to come close enough to shore,
where there is not a harborº -
Gen. MACOMB. Yes, there is. I think you would find several along
the Pacific coast, say in the vicinity of Grays Harbor and Willapa
Bay, neither being fortified. There, I think, they could make land-
ings unless they were held off by mobile heavy Artillery, because
there is a long stretch of beach perfectly feasible for landing. They
could get in pretty close. The same applies to Salem Beach on the
east COast º many other places. But ships are not going to risk
themselves if we bring our mobile Artillery there, and we have recom-
mended that such Artillery be furnished for those places. The guns
have not been built, but are in process of planning by the Chief of
Ordnance. * w - \
Senator THOMAs. I would like to ask you if the scheme which you
have devised there also makes provision for attack on the Smaller
boats that must be used for such an expedition landing troops?
Gen. MACOMB. The mobile troops I speak of would be there also
with light guns. We would have Infantry as well as Artillery of vari-
ous calibers. The Artillery is not the only thing by a great deal.
I was just conning back to the Infantry, because everybody has been
talking about the Artillery and failing to comprehend the value of
the Infantry. •,
Senator CATRON. What is the range of one of these 8-inch how-
itzers ?
Gen. MACOMB. About ten to twelve thousand yards can be attained
with those and with the 11-inch.
Senator DU Pont. Is it not a fact that there are quite a number of
harbors entirely undefended along our coast, where a landing could
be made by a hostile force?
Gen. MACOMB. Yes, sir. The mouth of Delaware Bay is unde- .
fended. But we must do something to correct this. We can do it
by ºuling there certain long-range guns, and that has been pro-
OS62Cl.
p Senator DU Pont. There is a large breakwater there, and they
could take advantage of that breakwater and effect their landing.
Gen. MACOMB. Absolutely. It would be a great advantage to them.
That was one of the places where it was proposed to install a certain
number of long-range guns. That has already been referred to in
another way; it has already been reported on to another body; I
think the Committee on Fortifications.
Senator DU Pont. Are there not in the New England States
several harbors entirely undefended ?
Gen. MACOMB. Yes; we can find various undefended harbors alon
the New England coast also, but they are unimportant, and it woul
be possible for a mobile force to work there against an enemy trying
to land. In other words, he could not get at an important point with-
out being met by somebody and held. That is the idea. But again
coming back to the Infantry, in order to hold these troops of the
enemy, if they succeed in getting ashore, we have got to have a good
Infantry. In our Army the importance of good Infantry has never
been fully realized, and many people are of the opinion that the Infan-
try soldier requires less training than those who belong to what are
called the technical arms. As a matter of fact, to enable the infantry-
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 249
man to do what is required of him he requires fully as much, if not
more, thorough training than is required for any of the other arms.
While the Infantry soldier may be able to acquire the elementary
drill of his own arm in a shorter period of time than can a soldier
in the Field Artillery or Cavalry, nevertheless he needs a longer and
more rigid course of tactical instruction, so that when the way has
been prepared for this Infantry soldier to get forward to occupy a
position he must be able to do so intelligently. He must be able not
only to advance in the face of the enemy, but he must do so without
hesitation, and he must know exactly what to do when he reaches
that position from which the enemy has retired. To do this requires
the very highest discipline and the most perfect team work and
quickness of wit. .
You can hardly imagine a place where a man would have to
think more quickly than often occurs in trench warfare. We have
already heard of the English and French succeeding, by an enormous
artillery fire, in crushing the Germans and destroying them and their
trenches. The English infantry was able to advance to those posi-
tions with comparatively few losses, but when they got there they
had reached the end of their rope and did not know what to do.
That was because they did not have the training to make the infantry
soldier what he should be. -
Then, another point that has been brought out by this war, and
which we have not fully appreciated, is that the infantry and the
field artillery are most intimately connected and they must hang
together, and the officers of each arm should be instructed in the
work of the other. I can say this with great confidence, because I
watched, while I was a military observer in the Russo-Japanese War
with the Russians, exactly what was going on. There was not the
F. connection between the two arms that there should have
een, especially at the outset, but they gradually overcame that and,
while at first the infantry was inclined to growl at the artillery and
say it was always in the way and was not helping, they finally became
so fond of it that they would even help them haul their guns into
difficult positions. . .
Senator CATRON. Which side were you on ?
Gen. MACOMB. I was with the Russians. Although the Russians
had a Superior artillery to that of the Japanese, their infantry had not
been trained to the same degree as the Japanese infantry, nor was it
So skillful, and consequently they were not able, even with equal num-
bers, to stand against the Japanese, although to look at the men you
would say they should have done so without trouble. It was due to
the fact that the infantry was not trained along modern lines, as it
should have been, and the fact that the Japanese had been so trained
under German masters. In that way they were able to cope with
the force that was quite the equal of theirs in numbers in most of
the big battles and drive them back. I ascribe that entirely to
the training of the officers of the different arms and especially to
the soldiers of the infantry. The infantry, even on the Japanese
side, although better supported by the artillery than the Russians,
also complained that they were not supported well enough. The
idea now is to let the artillery go up as closely as it can with the
infantry and help them out, but that requires the training of the
two arms together. The point I wanted especially to bring out is
250 PREPARED NIESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
that it is a great mistake to assume that we are going to be able to
rely upon hastily trained citizen Infantry if we want to accomplish
results. We can not do it. We have to train Infantry as well as
any other arm if we expect to oppose modern armies.
The CHAIRMAN. What is your opinion, General, as to the amount
of time required to make an efficient soldier?
Gen. MACOMB. To make a soldier that is fit to send to the front
against good troops we have to give him a year's training, which
should be, I would say, a year's training consisting of 150 hours a
month, or 1,800 hours for that year. When he has that training the
man is fit to go to the front, but he would be still much better if he
had a year more to serve, which would give him the necessary dis-
cipline to use the training to the best advantage. He still needs the
discipline. He can get that, of course, during war, but it is better, if
possible, to give it to him before. Consequently, in proposing this
force we spoke of we stated it should be backed up by a reserve of
trained men, and this permanent force of say 121,000 men at home
was to be supplemented by a reserve 379,000 strong made up from
the men who }. been trained for two years.
. Senator HITCHCOCK. You mean to say, then, that as a minimum
a man should be trained 1,800 hours before he is perfected?
Gen. MACOMB. Yes, sir; before he is fit to send to the front against
trained troops; that is, before we would put him in the first line.
Senator CATRON. What do you mean by 1,800 hours? -
Gen. MACOMB. Five hours a day for a year. A man has to be kept
at work right along for a year. I was brought up in the Artillery
myself, but I would not think of training an infantryman less than
that for serious work. - -
Senator HITCHCOCK. What would he lack, supposing that he had
less than that amount of training 7
Gen. MACOMB. He would lack the power to understand exactly
what to do when he got into a difficult position. He would not
..understand fully how to take advantage of the terrain. Of course,
..he would have been trained in the elementary portion of his work,
but he would not have been trained in the way of protecting himself
as he goes to the front in respect to quickly intrenching himself and
all that. He would lack confidence and steadiness. *
Senator THOMAs. He must be trained to keep his presence of mind
and know what to do when he receives instructions from his officers.
Gen. MACOMB. Exactly; and that requires the time that we have
been speaking about. The experiences of the present war fully con-
firm our estimate.
Senator CATRON. I noticed that in the Japanese War there were
many night attacks. - . .
Gen. MACOMB. Yes, sir; that is true. - -
Senator CATRON. How much training would it take to make a
soldier efficient for a forward movement in one of those night attacks?
We generally understood that he got confused in the nighttime.
Gen. MACOMB. We could take them forward in the nighttime with
this year's intensive training. It is very important that the soldiers
should be fully trained so they will obey their orders and not lose their
heads during this night, work. I remember well when the Russians
made their only successful attack on the Japanese. It was at Lone
sº-
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 251
Yee Hill during the battle of Shaho that the Russians made that
ttack, beginning it in the afternoon and continuing into the night
ind finally driving the Japanese brigade off the hill and capturing
bout 14 guns of various kinds; but they had made no successfu
ttack of that kind before. This time it was carefully planned and
greatly superior force used. º
Senator CATRON. In this war that is going on now there does not
eem to have been much night fighting.
Gen. MACOMB. There has been a great deal of night fighting.
Senator CATRON. I thought they were using searchlights.
Gen. MACOMB. They do, and they have other means also of lighting
up the grounds, but there has been night fighting. They also did it
it Port Arthur during the Russo-Japanese War.
Senator HITCHCOCK. Suppose a man has had 1,800 hours of train-
ng and he then retires to civil life and five years elapse, will he still
»e a good soldier? -
Gen. MACOMB. He would never forget that training. Although I
would not say he would be a good soldier, he would have had that
raluable training and we could develop him very much faster than
man who had not had any training. To make a good soldier re-
Tuires two years with the colors in time of peace, anyway. In time
5f war the men have worked harder and learned faster. I agree
with Gen. McCain in that view. - -
Senator DU PONT. General, I infer from what you say that the
mportant thing required of an Infantry soldier, after all, is the per-
onal initiative and individuality. That is only to be acquired by
having confidence in himself from length of service? -
Gen. MACOMB. Yes, sir; and the officers are trying to instruct the
men in that very thing. They are making a great point of it.
Senator DU Pont. If he has once acquired that confidence in his
initiative and individual judgment, it seems to me that after a
xertain length of time in the reserve he would still retain that.
Gen, MACOMB. He does retain it. I have noticed that the old
soldiers of the Civil War maintain their common sense and individ-
ual judgment in emergencies better than the national militiamen
now. They still maintain that degree of discipline they got in the
Civil War. I believe it is like learning to dance or swim; they do
not forget it. - . . . . .
Now, another thing we tried to bring out in this statement of the
military jº. was that these troops we desire to organize should be
Organized in larger units than regiments, and we must now try to have
complete divisions. Of course, it may be impossible to give all the
troops that we have asked for, but if we can not get all and we have to
have these troops given to us in Smaller quantity, we would like to be
given the number of divisions asked for, even if we can not have them
at full war strength. It would be better to have the full divisions com-
pletely organized of units at reduced strength than to have incom-
plete divisions composed of units at war strength. The reason for
that is that there are certain areas in this country that need divisions
in them all the time. If completely organized we can build them up
for War more readily than if incomplete. Those areas are spoken of
as certain strategic areas. One is the Puget Sound area. Then there
is the Atlantic coast area, where we know we must be on the lookout.
There are also the great central area and the California area, making
252 PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
four grand divisions that ought to be completely organized. We have
never had this yet, but we have made complete plans and proper or-
ganizations for this in our study, and they are available at any time
for the use of this committee if they wish to take up that question of
Organization. &
The areas in which we are going to put them are illustrated per-
haps more clearly in this chart I have here. It is a very simple
chart. Here is one area up here that we speak of as the Puget
Sound area. This is the California area and here is the Atlantic
Coast area. This portion here is the great central area where the
troops could be thrown to the south or north. Then, along the
southern border we would need Cavalry troops, and there would be
two Cavalry brigades, one west and the other east of El Paso. That
is practically what we have asked for in this plan.
The CHAIRMAN. How many men are there in a division ?
Gen. MACOMB. There are about 23,000 of all arms.
Senator CATRON. Does a Cavalry division have the same number 3
Gen. MACOMB. No; that would be smaller. It would aggregate
about 10,000, with three brigades. -
Senator HITCHCOOK. You estimate 82,000 men for the over-seas
service - * -
Gen. MACOMB. Yes; 82,000 men were estimated as being necessary,
but there were about 7,500 Coast Artillery included in that number.
Senator DU PoNT. What is the value of the local troops in the
Philippines? * -
Gen. MACOMB. They are very good. f .
Senator DU Pont. The law authorizes the enlistment of 10,000 of
them, but the War Department has never raised more than 5,000.
Gen. MACOMB. No, they have not; that is true.
Senator DU PONT. It seems to me that in connection with the de-
fense of the Philippines that is a quiestion that ought to be taken up.
Gen. MACOMB. º, have taken that into account and proposed that
they do raise them. We think that if they could make a division of
Philippine troops out there it would be of great value.
Senator DU PONT. In your opinion, would it be wise to establish a
local army for the defense of the Philippines, a provincial army, and
then if we gave up the islands at any time that army would go with it?
Gen. MACOMB. It would be established with the idea of holding on.
Senator DU PONT. A local army composed mainly of Philippine
troops. - i
ë. MACOMB. Yes; that would be, as supposed by a good many
officers, a wise way of arranging it—to have a force in the Philip-
P. which belongs to the Philippines and is going to try to hold
them.
Senator HITCHCOCK. What is the pay of this Philippine Con-
stabulary?
Gen. MACOMB. It is about half that of our American troops. In
other words, they would get in pesos what we would get in gold.
Senator HITCHCOCK. What proportion of the officers are Americans?
Gen. MACOMB. So far as I know, the officers of the Philippine Scouts
now are all Americans. I have not been out there recently. Perhaps
Capt. Schindel may know. .
Capt. SCHINDEL. They are practically all Americans.
Senator HITCHCOCK. That is above what rank?
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 253
Capt. SCHINDEL. They are all Americans above captains, because
they are detailed from the Regular Army.
Senator CATRON. In talking about the Philippines and Porto Ricans
being good soldiers, is there any material difference between the
value of a man as a soldier, taking the officers as Englishmen or
Americans—that is, continental Americans—or Germans or French-
men or people of other nations, and considering them all in connection
with getting modern discipline and a modern way of conducting and
handling them Is there any difference between the value of men of
the different races :
Gen. MACOMB. I think there is very little difference with good
officers. I was rather surprised to see how the Japanese worked
against the Russians. It really seemed astonishing to me.
Senator CATRON. Do you really think that these Filipinos could be
; just as good soldiers as the continental Americans and as reli-
able %
Gen. MACOMB. They could be, possibly, in their own country, but
I doubt if they have the degree of intelligence and initiative. They
lack in those qualities and need white officers to lead them.
Senator DUPONT. In addition to the Philippine Scouts there is
also the Philippine Constabulary, which is under the control of the
provincial government' -
Gen. MACOMB. Yes, sir.
Senator DU PONT. Are they officered by white men also :
Gen. MACOMB. Yes, sir.
Senator DU PONT. What would be the objection to consolidating
the Scouts and the Constabulary and making one large local force for
the defense of the islands º e
Gen. MACOMB. That has been proposed, and some people favor it;
but, of course, there are things to be said pro and con, and we would
have to have a discussion on that that would take some time.
Senator DU Pont. What are a few of the objections :
Gen. MACOMB. As for myself, I am in favor of it. I do not see any
deep-rooted objections to it. If there were some officers here who
had served with the Philippine Scouts—we have them at the War
College—they could tell us what the objections are from their point
of view. I would like to see them consolidated into one force.
lºor CATRON. How many of the Philippine Constabulary are
there 3
Gen. MACOMB. I do not know. º
Senator CATRON. What kind of an organization do they have 7
Gen. MACOMB. They are organized into companies.
Senator HITCHCOCK. How many Scouts have they'.
Gen. MACOMB. Five thousand and odd. The number is stated in
The Adjutant General’s report. I think there are about 5,200.
Senator CATRON. The Constabulary has no further organization
than that of companies? .
Gen. MACOMB. Not so far as I know. The others are in battalions.
Senator DU PONT. They ought to be all assembled into one force
and put under one head.
Gen. MACOMB. If we did that, we could make a dependable force.
Senator HITCHCOCK. What is the difference between the duties
they perform 2 Can you give the committee that information?
23380—PT 6–16 2%
254 PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
Gen. MACOMB. The constabulary are under the civil government
and are used largely as a police force around the different towns and
villages. The little towns and villages there have their constabulary
who look after the people and are always there with them very much
as the constabulary are in Pennsylvania. They keep down local
troubles. The scouts are used in rooting out ladrones. They would
be used directly in suppressing insurrections. The constabulary
would not be able to get off because they are kept in different towns,
* the scouts are kept in battalions and can be used for bigger
things.
Senator CATRon. Are those scouts made up entirely of the natives
of the island?
Gen. MACOMB. Yes, the rank and file. -
Senator CATRON. Are the different regiments composed of different
tribes that do not speak the same language 3
Gen. MACOMB. Yes, sir. For instance, they have the Maccabebes
in Luzon. They are excellent little men. They try to keep those
together as nearly as they can. They work better that way and are
more efficient. -
I was last talking about the necessity for Organizing our divisions,
and you will notice in this military policy we also speak of it being
necessary to organize the divisions in the Philippines in order to hold
them properly. All that has been laid down, in a special study that
has been made and which it is hardly worth while to go into here.
There are certain other points that possibly might need explanation.
For instance, the War College Division never expressed itself with
reference to the detail system as enforced in the Ordnance Depart-
ment. This system permits the redetail of an officer after an interval
of only one year with troops. The practical result has been that
officers have been redetailed and no reserve generated by the Ord-
nance Department by which it could expand in time of war.
The CHAIRMAN. I think Gen. Scott, who testified yesterday,
thought that the Manchu law ought not to apply to the Ordnance
Department or to the Judge Advocate gº Department, but
that officers there should be permitted to be redetailed without
service with the line two years in six. Do you feel that that is
correct 7
Gen. MACOMB. No; I believe it is safer to get the men back with
the troops.
The CHAIRMAN. But the Ordnance Department is composed of men
; ºal skill and knowledge. Would you have them serve with
the line 7 -
Gen. MACOMB. Unless you do it would result in going back to the
old system and simply doing away with the detailed system as
regards the Ordnance Department.
The CHAIRMAN. Do you think that the Ordnance Department ought
to be permitted to have the same men detailed there for duty all the
time without any service with the line'.
Gen. MACOMB. No; I do not. I think they had better go on with
the detail system like everybody else. *.
The CHAIRMAN. You seem to be in conflict with Gen. Scott.
Gen. MACOMB. Possibly I am. I do not know what Gen. Scott
testified to here. The men in the Ordnance Department of the Navy
PREPAREDINESS FOR, NATIONAL DEFENSE. 255
go out, and back to the fleet and after sea service are again available
for ordnance work.
The CHAIRMAN. It seems to me there is force in your suggestion.
If you are going to detail the same men in the Ordnance Department
all the time where is your reserve :
Gen. MACOMB. There is no reserve; that is the great point. The
experience is not being spread around through the service sufficiently,
and I think that is a fatal defect.
With reference to the detail system, the act of February 2, 1901,
should be amended so as to permit an officer serving in a staff depart-
ment to continue to serve therein after promotion to the next higher
grade. Also, provisions of this act should be extended to apply to
the heads of ai corps and departments. I believe that this plan of
continually putting back a man who is detailed as the head of a
department into that department again is not right. Positions have
been provided for them in the line and they should go back to those
positions when they have served their time.
The CHAIRMAN. Do they not go back to their own positions?
Gen. MACOMB. They do not. They are usually redetailed for four
{22,I’S. *
y Senator DU Pont. None of them has gone back. The Quarter-
master General, the Inspector General, and The Adjutant General
stay indefinitely. *
The CHAfrMAN. Why should not the Manchu law apply to them
as well as to others?
Gen. MACOMB. The Manchu law applies to the other part of the
Army. It does not apply to those particular staff corps. However,
it would be common sense to have those officers go back to the line
and it would produce better results. We would have new blood
coming in all the time. . Those generals themselves would probably
* it, but I think it would accomplish better results in the
end. It works perfectly well in the Navy. -
The CHAIRMAN. Gen. Crozier is a very distinguished and capable
officer, but he has been there for a very long time.
Gen. MACOMB. He has been there a very long time.
The CHAIRMAN. Gen. Crowder has been in how long?
Gen. MACOMB. Not so long.
The CHAIRMAN. It is his second detail, is it not ?
Gen. MACOMB. Yes, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. He is also a very capable man.
Gen. MACOMB. Yes, sir; he is a very capable man.
The CHAIRMAN. Is the Quartermaster General serving under a
second detail? - .
Gen. MACOMB. Yes; he has been put back for a second detail, and
so has Gen. Weaver. They are all splendid men. . We could not get
better men. But we would like to have them out in the service, too;
they are first rate there. *
Now, as regards the Manchu law, we notice that now and then
there are certain colonels who are attached to regiments. They
are spoken of as being attached. That is because this Manchu law
compels it. The colonels are in excess of the number of regiments,
and they are required by law to serve with troops. In order to
carry out the law, it makes it necessary at times to attach a colonel
256 IPREPAIRED NESS EOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
to a regiment which already has one present, but if we did not have
to carry out that law we would like to use those colonels for some-
thing else. There are other posts we would like to give them, but
we can not do so because under the law we must put them back there
to serve with troops.
b Thºmas Have you a Suggestion as to how that change can
e made 3 *
Gen. MACOMB. Yes, sir; we could make it by amending the Manchu
law slightly so as to cover such a case as that. It has been amended
from time to time. It would require legislation to do that, however.
Senator DU PONT. General, the question has been brought up sev-
eral times, and as I understand it, an adjutant of a regiment is not
considered as serving with troops? - -
Gen. MACOMB. He is considered as being on detail. That is an
absurdity, because the man is serving with troops and performing a
very important service in an office provided by law.
Senator DU Pont. It might be provided that no man was to serve
twice as adjutant.
Gen. MACOMB. Yes, sir.
Senator DU Pont. Or until he has commanded troops for a certain
length of time.
Gen. MACOMB. Yes, sir; that is very easily arranged. In fact, it
ought to be made a matter of departmental action rather than law.
I think it should be a matter of regulation rather than law.
Senator DU Pont. Could it be reached by legislation?
Gen. MACOMB. Certainly it could be reached, but the only trouble
is we do not always follow our regulations. This law makes it abso-
lutely necessary to follow it exactly or else the man's pay is stopped
for violating it. Some very ridiculous things happen. . For instance,
you might say that a second lieutenant would be usefully employed
if he were sent out in command of a detachment on a reconnaissance
with directions to prepare a map, etc. We can not do that, because
to do it the man would be detailed away from his organization and
he would be acting contrary to the law. Then, again, say a colonel
of a regiment wants to take his officers out, not take them with
troops, but take them out to study a certain position. He can not
take them out if they are “Manchus” to study that position and
keep them out over 24 hours. Instead of being able to keep them
there all the time studying, if they are under the ban of the Manchu
law, they have to go back to their original command every night.
It causes all those peculiar things to happen, so that in some ways it
does not work as well as it might.
Senator DU PONT. I think it would be of great assistance if some
of you people would suggest in detail the amendment that would be
I’GC ULII’OCl.
ºn Macow. That would be valuable. As we are having ex-
perience with the law we find out where the failing points are, and I
do not think anybody would object to our showing the failing points
and ask to have them corrected, because the law has some good
features and has accomplished some good results.
We have made a study down at the War College also as to the
most efficient and economical way to secure an adequate number of
trained reserve officers. The result of that study has been embodied
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 257
in a special paper, and drawn up in the form of a bill, because in
trying to draw up anything concisely if you put it in the form of a
bill you will find out where the errors are. -
The CHAIRMAN. You have prepared a bill?
Gen. MACOMB. We have prepared something in the form of a
draft that will show how we could get our reserve officers; not only
that, but we have also shown how we could form a reserve officers
training corps, as we call it. w
the CHAIRMAN. Is that embodied in Secretary Garrison's tentative
bill &
Gen. MACOMB. No, sir; I think not. He mentions it, though.
Mr. Garrison has mentioned that very thing in his statement before
the Committee on Military Affairs because I heard him make that
statement in connection with the cadet companies. He spoke of
cadet companies and then of a possible other way that we might
work it. We have studied the thing pretty carefully, and have
studied both on their merits, and we think the officers training corps
is something we can get up without very much trouble and with little
COSt. .
Senator DU PONT. General, as I understand it, no retired officer
can be ordered to duty without his consent
Gen. MACOMB. That is the law now. -
Senator DU Pont. Do you not think that in time of war the Presi-
dent ought to have authority to order every retired officer to perform
any duty he may be capable of performing?
Gen. MACOMB. Yes, sir; I think so, because he would not neces-
sarily be ordered to the front. There are important duties in the
rear that have to be performed by somebody. That is one thing we
ought to provide for. For instance, on Our general staff, which is
already entirely too small, we find in time of war a great many of
our most efficient officers there are naturally eager to get to the
front. It would do no harm if we filled their places for the time
being with other officers. Those who have had experience in staff
work would be valuable there. •
Senator DU Pont. As I understand it, the War.College has not
made any formal recommendations to that effect 7
Gen. MACOMB. No; we did not go into those things.
Senator DU PONT. If we attempt to put through any legislation
here the first question that is asked is, Has it the approval of the
War Department 7 -
Gen. MACOMB. Yes, sir; that is a fact. I notice that a great many
bills that are being introduced here are being sent down to the War
College to be studied, and we have studied them all as fast as they
are coming in there. Of course, it has kept us pretty busy.
Senator DU Pont. It seems to me that this question of retired
officers is as important in connection with military preparation as
anything else. -
Gen. MACOMB. The retired officers can apply now to be taken into
the service, and Secretary Garrison is making a special study as to
how best to get them back.
Senator DUPONT. That is good as far as it goes; but, for instance,
a man who has lost his leg might be fully capable of doing duty in an
office and very good duty. -
258 PREPAIREDINESS FOR, NATIONAL DEFENSE.
Gen. MACOMB. Yes, sir; if he does not lose his head he would be
all right. The mere fact of his having lost a foot or a leg would not
interfere with his brain power. ---
Senator DU PONT. But as it stands now the President can not
order him to such duty. There he is unless he applies for it, and if
he applies to be relieved at any time he has to be relieved.
Gen. MACOMB. That is the law as I understand it. -
Senator DU Pont. That is the law as I understand it, and I think
that is all wrong. - - -
Gen. MACOMB. That should be corrected. I think that is wrong,
too. No other country would do a thing of that sort. They put
their officers off from active service but into a reserve where they can
get them if they want them. Von Hindenburg was put on the re-
º list for a while, but was taken back again because they knew his
abilitv.
wºhave recommended an increase in the general staff from its
present strength to a total of 121 officers, 93 of whom would consti-
tute the War Department personnel and 28 perform the functions of
the general staff with troops.
Senator HITCHCOCK. How much of an increase is that ?
Gen. MACOMB. That is an increase over the 38 we have now, tak-
ing everything into account, of course. That is too small to do the
work. * -
Senator THOMAs. It is too small compared to the forces of other
nations. -
Gen. MACOMB. It is very small compared to that of other nations,
and it is too small to do the work required. The General Staff
has to do an enormous amount of work. It consists partly of obtain-
ing information from abroad, codifying that information, and placing
it in shape for use. We get quantities of information that we have not
time to digest now, because we have not officers enough to attend to
it. They are busily engaged in the routine work that comes in every
day which must be dispatched as it comes. We have not been able
to write the scientific history of our wars as yet. We can not do it
until we get more officers.
Senator HITCHCOCK. Have you heard the statement made that
the breakdown of the English military operations was due in part to
the demoralization of their general staff'.
Gen. MACOMB. Yes, sir; I have; and that was due largely to this
very point I am making. They send their general staff officers to the
front and do not make any provision for replacing them. They had
excellent men on their general staff, but these men, who naturally
wanted to get to the front, were sent there and there was nobody to
replace them. As I understand it, Lord Kitchener was practically
without expert help, but no matter how you put it an army must
have its thinking machine and it must be made up of diverse ele-
ments. The General Staff has not been a very popular organization
in many ways, but I believe it is one of the best friends that the Mili-
tary Committee of Congress has, because they will take and work
out anything they can for them. As I say, the General Staff has also
outside duties to perform with troops, which means that a general
officer who is commanding there must have somebody to help him in
-**
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 259
his plans, and when he takes command of his whole force this officer
must be there to help him with his orders for movement of troops.
Senator HITCHCOCK. The French had an excellent general staff at
the outbreak of the war.
Gen. MACOMB. They had an excellent staff.
Senator HITCHCOCK. And that continued after the war broke out.
Gen. MACOMB. That continued after that, but they had some
trouble also, I believe. It was not organized as the German general
staff. The German general staff was organized perfectly to fill these
various positions both in peace and war. They understand the
whole military idea better than anybody else. *
There is another point. We realize that the volunteer system of
enlistment will not furnish the necessary personnel for the forces
proposed. The War College Division believes that only by resort to
a system whereby every physically fit, active male citizen, or pros-
pective male citizen of the United States shall be liable to military
training and service will the desired result be effected.
Now, we do not like to speak of compulsory service, because that
is one of the features which the Anglo-Saxons and those descendant
from them have always insisted on as their right, to say whether
they should go or should not go into military service, but in a country
of our size if we will go so far as to adopt a system of registration of our
people, we can find out exactly who is fit and who can be taken for
military service. Then we can take from that registry by lot such
as ought to go to make up the number required.
That requires a very careful study, and such a study has been
made. Without going into it here in detail it can be said that the
study is connected with a bill which was drafted, I think, by this
committee, or by Senator Chamberlain. We have studied that bill
and have carefully considered it, and when called for will submit
comments on it. Those things need to be studied. We do not any
of us want to go to compulsory service, but this is not exactly like
the compulsory service that is spoken of in Europe. It is the regis-
tration of the citizens and an acknowledgment of a liability to
universal service. That means, then, universal registration, which
must go hand in hand with any system of universal training.
Senator HITCHCOCK. That would simply be done once. The man
would register and it would be very much like taking a military
CG]].SUIS. -
Gen. MACOMB. It would be like taking a military census, and we
would get them all registered in certain districts and no harm would
be done at all.
Senator HITCHCOCK. A man would be under some requirement to
notify the department of a change of address'.
Gen. MACOMB. Yes, sir; that would all be arranged, and it would
also be arranged to have the necessary penalties imposed for failure
to comply with the law. That can be arranged, and we have done
so. That ought to come up, though, as a special discussion on this
bill that the Senator has submitted for comment.
Senator DU PONT. General, there has been great skepticism ex-
pressed here by several people who appeared before us as to the
possibility of getting a reserve out. I think the difficulty is because
no arrangement is made to pay them. It seems to me if they have
260 PREPAREDINESS FOR, NATIONAL DEFENSE.
º right kind of pay it would be much easier to keep in touch with
them. -
Gen. MACOMB. It depends on the sort of reserve we mean. The
Regular Army reserve, if we carry out the plan we propose, is made
up of men who have served two years with the colors or have reached
a certain standard before that time and have been allowed to go
into the reserve. But they are not allowed to go into the country
unrecorded; they are kept track of. Of course, we probably would
have to ask for an appropriation to pay those men and give them
Something to hold them. It would pay us to do it, because those
men would be. Organized on paper into various units. That would
enable us to start our first force out composed of trained men and
we would have left the basis for making up other units. That could
be well done by the system that we have proposed, which also
requires legislation as regards an officers' reserve corps and an
officers' reserve training corps.
Senator DU Pont. Suppose such legislation were attempted. Take
a first Sergeant who passes into the reserve, will he still retain his rank
as a Sergeant or a Sergeant major
Gen. MACOMB. No; he would not.
Senator DU PONT. Is not their status an important thing to
consider'
Gen. MACOMB. I think those men would be enlisted in those posi-
tions when we come to make up our units. We would keep track of
them as such.
Senator DU Pont. Gen. Carter was before the committee and said
that they could not, because when they came back they could not
be appointed first Sergeant except on the recommendation of the
captain of the company.
Gen. MACOMB. #. is really true. The captain has the authority,
but what I mean is they would not necessarily be appointed to that
position as first Sergeant, but they would be made sergeant and kept
on that Sergeant's list.
Senator DU Pont. That is what Gen. Carter said. Suppose the
companies are all full and there are no vacancies for the sergeants.
Gen. MACOMB. I am talking about the reserve companies. The
reserve companies are made up on paper and are complete, and the
Organization of the regiments and the different units are complete,
and these men would be assigned to those regiments. So there are
places for them. -
Senator DU PONT. There is a provision of law which goes beyond
the reserve. After a man has finished his time in the reserve if he
comes back in 30 days and is accepted he is paid a small bounty if he
comes in.
Gen. MACOMB. That is true. .
Senator DU PONT. Do you not think that would give us about
20,000 experienced men very promptly 7
Gen. MACOMB. I am not certain they would necessarily come back
on account of the bountv.
Senator DU PONT. Wài bounty and patriotism and necessity of
war. Three hundred dollars would enable a man to come back. He
would have $300 at once with which he could come in and also pro-
vide for his family. -
PREPAIREDINBSS EOR, NATIONAL DEFENSE. 261
Gen. MACOMB. That would seem quite favorable in many respects,
but it would be pretty expensive. It would be favorable to the man;
I do not know whether it would be the best system to adopt or not.
In regard to those reserves for officers I have been talking about, the
universities and colleges are the best available sources of Supply for
these reserve officers. Military instruction if given in all institutions
will not only fit the students for reserve officers, but also have a civic
value which can not be underestimated. It permanently fits the
young men for their duties as citizens. A military training is a means
to the end, not the ultimate object of this training. - -
Now, as regards the figures; the number under instruction in 1915
in colleges and schools amounted to 32,123. The graduates from all
classes of institutions was 5,200.
Senator HITCHCOCK. Do you mean each year }
Gen. MACOMB. Yes. Of these about 4,600 were from colleges
and universities. - -
Instruction given to-day is sufficiently along the properlines in land-
† and military colleges (V. M. I., Norwich University, The Cita-
el, and St. John's College, Annapolis) to be expanded without trouble
and thus insure ample training for students on the lines proposed for
the reserve officers’ training corps.
Senator HITCHCOCK. Do you mean it would be without any mili-
tary training in the colleges }
Gen. MACOMB. No. A certain amount of military training is nec-
essary and must be given as a part of the course in the colleges in
order that they may have an officer detailed there.
Senator HITCHCOCK. They are all receiving military training, the
32,123 that are there and the 5,200 that graduate each year }
Gen. MACOMB. Yes; they receive the military training both theo-
retical and practical, and the ones who have graduated can readily fit
themselves for the reserve or go on with the reserve officers’ training
corps if they need more training.
Senator HITCHCOCK. How many hours of drill do they get each
year
Gen. MACOMB. I can only ask Capt. Schindel to give us that,
because he belongs on the committee that inspects these colleges.
º yºu remember, Capt. Schindel, how many hours we can give
them . -
Capt. SCHINDEL. The minimum was 84 hours a year for at least
two years, in regard to colleges of instruction covering three and
many of them four years.
Senator HITCHCOCK (acting chairman). General, Senator Chamber-
lain, who had to leave, suggested that possibly we had better take a
recess until Monday, if you have very much more.
Gen. MACOMB. There is not very much more.
The ACTING CHAIRMAN. The Chairman desired me to present these
questions to you: First, please give your opinion of the Hay bill, and
your opinion of the Garrison or War Department bill.
Gen. MACOMB. The Garrison or War Department bill has not been
submitted to the War College Division. I do not know that bill at all.
The ACTING CHAIRMAN. You have not examined that bill?
Gen. MACOMB. No; I have not examined it.
Senator THOMAs. I am not sure that it has been introduced yet.
262 PREPAREDINESS IFOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
Gen. MACOMB. But the Hay bill has been submitted and a report
has been made on it. i.
The ACTING CHAIRMAN. Suppose you take a print of the Garrison
bill and we will take that matter up Monday. We will ask you on
Monday to give your views in a comparative statement of the Hay
bill, the Garrison bill, and Senator Chamberlain's bill.
The ACTING CHAIRMAN. In view of the fact that it is now about
5 o'clock the committee will now take a recess until 10.30 o'clock
next Monday morning, and we will ask you to come back at that time,
General, if you can conveniently do so.
(Thereupon the committee at 5 o'clock p. m. took a recess until
Monday morning, January 24, 1915, at 10.30 o'clock a. m.)
MONDAY, JANUARY 24, 1916.
# ****
UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON MILITARY AFFAIRs,
g |Washington, D. C.
The committee met, at the expiration of the recess, at 10.30 o'clock
a. m., Senator Geo. E. Chamberlain (chairman) presiding.
STATEMENT OF BRIG, GEN. M. M. MACOMB-Continued,
The CHAIRMAN. Gen. Macomb, at the conclusion of the hearing
Saturday you were being asked in reference to the three several bills
that are pending for army reorganization, that is, the tentative plan
of the Secretary of War, the so-called Hay bill, and the so-called
Chamberlain bill, and with these the plan of the War College. The
committee would like to have a discussion from you with reference
to these several bills in such way as you care to discuss them.
Gen. MACOMB. I will make it as brief and informal as I can. In
the first place, I will take up the bill presented by this committee.
The CHAIRMAN. The so-called Chamberlain bill.
Gen. MACOMB. Yes, the so-called Chamberlain bill, of which I
have a copy here. That was handed to me by Senator Hitchcock.
It is desired that I give my personal opinion on this?
The CHAIRMAN. That is what we want.
Gen. MACOMB. Examining this bill, I find that it corresponds very
closely to the plan laid down in this statement of the proper military
policy for the United States, which is before the committee.
The CHAIRMAN. That is, the War College plan' -
Gen. MACOMB. The plan of the War College Division, General Staff.
The great point about this bill is that it shows in an accurate way
how to organize the force called for and how to legislate for procur-
ing such a force.
Senator DU Pont. You are now talking of the Chamberlain bill?
Gen. MACOMB. Yes. So that we may say, then, that this bill as
now worded, with certain additions and amendments which has been
Suggested, will be the most thorough scheme yet presented for pre-
paredness, so far as regards the Regular Army, its reserve, and a re-
serve corps of officers. The only other feature that was omitted from
it was what we would call the reserve officers' training corps, and of
that we have made a very careful study, and can add to this bill that
study complete. That, then, will make this, as I say, the most scien-
tific and best designed measure for preparedness covering those points
yet presented.
The CHAIRMAN. It conforms more nearly to the plan that the War
College submitted ?
263
264 PREPAIRED NIESS FOR, NATIONAL DEFENSE.
Gen. MACOMB. It conforms closely to that plan, in which we stated
that we considered that that would give us an adequate force, as
far as the Regular Army was concerned, and its reserve and the
reserve officers needed, but also we want to add to it the reserve
officers' training corps.
Taking up the question of the reserve officers, it is evidently ex-
ceedingly important that provision should be made for procuring a
large corps of reserve officers. We can do this in time of peace by
utilizing the educational facilities of the country, and can do so with-
out too great an expense. We will, have a splendid asset for defense
if we can arrange that.
Senator BECKHAM. Does that bill give the increase in the Regular
Army that the War College asks for 7
Gen. MACOMB. Practically, with a few minor exceptions, which are
recorded in a very careful study made at the War College. This is
the printed draft, and this represents the draft of the War College,
showing the corrections.
The CHAIRMAN. That is, you have taken the so-called Chamber-
lain bill and had prepared a new bill with the amendments that you
Suggest ? -
Gen. MACOMB. And explaining fully in another memorandum wh
they are made. But the memorandum which was to have come with
the draft is not here. This printed bill was sent by the War Depart-
ment at your request for the War College Division to study, and to
make such comments as they desired to make, and then to make a
clean draft of a bill embodying those comments. That has been done.
The CHAIRMAN. Would you mind having that embodied in your
hearings at this place? -
Gen. MACOMB. No. I think it would be well to embody that in the
hearings. . -
The CHAIRMAN. And with it the paper which you say has not yet
come. I will hand the stenographer the draft of the so-called Cham-
berlain bill, revised, along the lines advocated by the War College,
and with it the comments on the original printed bill.
Gen. MACOMB. Exactly.
. (The comments on the original Chamberlain bill and the revised
draft of the bill are as follows:) -
MEMORANDUM. -
JANUARY 15, 1916.
Subject: Tentative draft of a bill “For making further and more
effectual provision for the national defense, and for other purposes.”
1. A careful study of the provisions of this draft indicates that
certain amendments should be made, in order that the Organization
and strength of the Regular Army and the Regular Army Reserve
may, after full effect shall have been given to the legislation, be
approximately that recommended by the War College, Division of
the General Staff Corps in a Statement of a Proper Military Policy,
September 11, 1915 (WCD9053–90) and concurred in by the Mobile
Army Division of the General Staff Corps.
2. If the amendments recommended herein are incorporated in
the draft, it is believed a bill expressed as in resulting revised draft will
provide that portion of the force recommended in paragraph 33
PREPAREDNIESS FOR, NATIONAL DEFENSE. 265
(“Total Strength of Regular Troops”), paragraph 41 (“The Regular
Reserve”) and paragraph 43 (“Reserve Officers”) in the memorandum
of September 11, 1915, and a revision of the estimate for Coast
Artillery Corps submitted by the Chief, Coast Artillery Corps,
September 15, 1915, certain batteries having been declared obsolete
by the War Department Board of Review since preparation of the
Statement of a Proper Military Policy. * *
3. It should be noted that the commissioned and enlisted strength
of various staff corps and departments, where prescribed, is based
upon the force of combatant troops shown in the draft. If the total
combatant force be changed from that included in the revised draft,
the commissioned and enlisted strength of each staff corps and de-
partment, where prescribed, should be changed correspondingly and
in the same ratio by which the combatant force is changed in any
draft or any legislation based upon the revised draft of this bill.
4. Revised draft herewith shows the original draft with words or
sections not approved lined out and the recommended substitutions
or corrections added and underscored.
The following notes indicate the changes proposed:
Section 1. “Officers” inserted, line 4, page 1, before “Reserve
Corps,” to distinguish that organization from the Regular Army
Reserve (at present called “Army Reserve” by act of August 24,
1912), which is included in the Regular Army.
“Iland” inserted before “Militia,” line 4, page 1, to exclude Naval
Militia. See act of April 25, 1914. :
“Employed” change to “while.” See act of April 25, 1914.
“The Volunteer Army’’ omitted, line 5, page 1, as none is organized;
it is better to include “and volunteer” in last phrase after “citizen”
forces that may be organized, when aulº by Congress.
Section 2. In line 3, page 2, change “sixty-four” to “sixty-five,”
and in line 5, page 2, change “nineteen” to “twenty-five” and
“twenty” to “twenty-one.” See (WCD9053–90) paragraph 33, State-
ment of a Proper Military Policy. Garrison of Philippines, two in-
stead of three regiments of Cavalry, one instead of three regiments
of Field Artillery, four instead of nine regiments of Infantry, per de-
cision of Secretary of War, July 15, 1915.
Change “one,” line 6, page 2, to “a.”
In line 7, page 2, change “companies” to “troops.”
In line 12, page 2, insert “the Rºi, Army Reserve.”
In line 15, page 2, insert “and detachments of Cavalry, Field Artil-
lery, and Engineers.”
In line 16, page 2, insert “the post noncommissioned staff officers.”
Omit “Regular Army Reserve” from line 19, page 2.
Section 3. Insert “Infantry” before “brigade,” line 2, page 3.
Insert “Infantry” before “division,” line 7, page 3.
Insert “Infantry” before “brigades,” line 8, page 3.
Insert “Infantry” before “divisions,” line 19, page 3.
Transpose “brigade of Field Artillery” to “Field Artillery bri-
gade,” line 9, page 3.
Change “troops” to “Corps,” line 16, page 3.
Insert “and” and “Signal Corps,” line 21, page 3.
Section 4. Change “a” to “an,” line 7, page 4.
Change “brigades” to “Infantry,” line 8, page 4.
Change “major general” to “brigadier general,” line 9, page 4.
266 IPREPAREDINESS FOR, NATIONAL DEFENSE.
Change “an” to “one,” line 9, page 4.
Change “two” to “One,” line 10, page 4.
Change “division” to “Infantry,” line 13, page 4.
Change “majors” to “lieutenants,” line 19, page 4.
Change “fifty-seven” to “fourteen privates, first class, and forty-
three,” fine 24, page 4. -
Substitute for sentence, lines 1 to 3, page 5, the following: “Officers
for the headquarters troops shall be detailed from the Cavalry arm,
and, when detailed, such details shall be subject to the provisions of
section twenty-seven, Act of Congress approved February second,
nineteen hundred and One.”
Change “dated” to “approved,” line 10, page 5.
Section 5. This section has been rewritten to conform to opinion
of the War College Division that the grade of a general officer should
be the same as his pay and allowances and that appropriate grades
of commanders of brigades and divisions are brigadier generals and
major generals, respectively. Temporary grade, pay, and allow-
ances of lieutenant general are provided for Chief of Staff and com-
manders of an army or corps. The temporary grade, pay, and allow-
ances of brigadier general for chief of each staff corps or department
are provided in later sections, to be held only “while so serving.”
Promotion by seniority to grade of general officer of the line should
not be prescribed by law.
Section 6. Omit the word “permanent” from lines 5 and 15,
page 7. Detailed officers do not hold any kind of commissions in a
staff department.
Insert after “occurring” in line 16, page 7, “among officers holding
commissions.” - -
Add to section: “Officers detailed for service in the Inspector
General's Department under the act of Congress approved February
second, nineteen hundred and one, shall be relieved from such details,
and unless detailed as members of the General Staff Corps under
section seven of this act, shall be assigned to other duties proper for
officers of the grades and arms of the line of the Army in which they
hold commissions.”
Section 7. Change “rank” to “grade,” line 22, page 7.
. Omit “ of general with the,” line 22, page 7.
Change “one” to “two,” and insert “to the ” after “assistants.”
Change “lieutenant general with the pay and allowances now
prescribed for a major general” to “major generals,” line 25, page 7,
and line 1, page 8.
Change “major generals with the pay and allowances now pre-
scribed by law for brigadier generals” to “brigadier generals,”
lines 2 to 3, page 8.
Change “three” to “two,” and add “to the ” after “assistants,”
line 2, page 8.
Change “sixteen” to “ten” and “thirty” to “forty-one,” line 4,
and “twenty-six” to “forty-eight,” line 5, page 8.
Section 8. Insert “while so serving” after “shall,” line 18, page 9.
Change “rank” to “grade,” line 18, page 9.
Omit “of major general with’’ from line 18, page 9.
Section 9. Insert “who shall, while so serving” after “General,”
line 24, page 9. - . . . . . .
PREPAIRED NIESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 267 -
Change “with the rank of major general with’’ to “have the grade.”
- Change “two” to “three,” “six” to “seven,” and “twelve” to
“twenty,” line 2, page 10.
Omit “and ten captains,” line 3, page 10.
Grade of captain not appropriate for legal adviser of a department
or tactical division commander. Grades are arranged to agree with
proportions of section 8, Adjutant General S Department. Judge
Advocate General concurs in the changes in numbers and grades of
officers below grade of brigadier general.
Section 10. Change “with the rank” to read “who shall, while so
Serving, have the grade,” line 8, page 10.
Change “major generals with’’ to read “assistants to the Quarter-
master General, who shall, while so serving, have,” line 9, page 10.
Insert “grade’’ after “the,” line 9, page 10. *
Add the following: “Provided, That when vacancies occur in the
office of Quartermaster General and in the office of either of the
assistants to the Quartermaster General, by retirement of the present
incumbents or otherwise, such vacancies shall not be filled, but the
offices in which the vacancies occur shall cease and determine; and
the Quartermaster General shall thereafter, while so serving, have
the gº pay, and allowances now prescribed by law for a brigadier
eneral.” -
g Section 11. Change “with the rank” to “who shall, while so
serving, have the grade,” in line 5, page 11.
Change “twenty-nine” to “twenty-eight,” line 6, page 11.
Omit “the Medical Reserve Corps as now provided by law” from
lines 9 and 10, page 11. (See sec. 30, “Officers' Reserve Corps.’)
Change “should’ to “shall,” line 16, page 11.
Insert “each” after “one,” lines 3 and 4, page 12.
Omit sentence lines 5 and 6, page 12. -
Change “seven” to “ten” and “seventeen” to “twenty,” lines
23 and 24, page 12. -
Change “seventeen” to “twenty,” line 2, page 13.
Add to section: “Provided, That when a vacancy occurs in the
office of Surgeon General, by retirement of present incumbent or
otherwise, such vacancy shall not be filled, but such office shall cease
and determine; and the Surgeon General shall thereafter, while so
serving, have the grade, pay, and allowances now prescribed by law
for a brigadier general.”
Add, also, the following: “And provided further, That the total
number of dental surgeons with pay and allowances of major shall
shall not at any time exceed fifteen.”
..Section 12. Change “with the rank” to “who shall, while so serve
ing, have the grade” and “major general” to “brigadier general,”
lines 6 and 7, page 13.
Change “twenty-eight” to “twenty-six,” line 7, page 13.
Change “seven” to “two,” line 13, page 13.
Insert “The enlisted personnel of ’’ just before the third, fourth,
and fifth sentences of section. . .
Insert “and combat.” after “field,” line 18, page 13. -
Change “a” to “one” (last word of line 19, page 13); “thirteen.”
to “eighteen,” line 24, page 13. de
Insert “two buglers” after “cooks,” line 1, page 14.
Change “thirty” to “thirty-One,” line 1, page 14.
Change “eighty-one” to “ninety-three,” line 2, page 14.
268 | PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
Add to the section: “The enlisted personnel of each mounted
battalion of engineers shall consist of two master engineers, senior
grade, one battalion sergeant major, two color sergeants, one battalion
supply sergeant, six master engineers, junior grade, one corporal, one
wagoner for each authorized wagon of the field train, and three
mounted companies.”
The enlisted personnel of each mounted company of Engineers shall
consist of one }. sergeant, two sergeants (first class), one mess ser–
geant, one supply sergeant, one stable Sergeant, six sergeants, eleven
corporals, two horseshoers, one saddler, two cooks, two buglers,
twenty privates (first class), and sixty-one privates.” (See proviso
in revised draft.)
Section 13. Change “with the rank of major general and with
the” to “who shall, while so serving, have the grade,” line 5, page 14.
Section 14. Insert “while so serving” after “shall,” line 11,
page 14. * > * > e
Change “rank of major general and with the ” to “grade,” line 12,
page 14.
Section 15. Omit the proviso shown in original draft. -
Section 16. Omit “rank” from line 5, page 16. No chaplain
should have any rank. e
Change “seven” to “ten,” line 6, page 16.
Change “may” to “shall,” line 7, page 16.
Omit “rank” from line 8, page 16.
Change “seventeen” to “twenty,” line 9, page 16.
Change “may” to “shall,” line 10, page 16.
Omit “rank” from line 11, page 16.
Omit “rank” from line 13, page 16.
Change “at present receive” to “be now receiving,” line 14, page
16. This change is to protect present pay and allowances, but not
to continue for all the expectation of higher rank or grade which is
now authorized.
And add, also: “And provided further, That the total number of
chaplains with pay and allowances of majors, including those now
entitled to such pay and allowances under existing law, shall not at
any time exceed fifteen.”
Section 17. Omit “and” from line 18, page 16.
Insert after “Field Artillery” “and mounted engineers and twenty-
four for the Quartermaster Corps,” line 18, page 16.
Change “five” to “seven,” line 21, page 16. Change
‘‘shall.”
( º “ten” to “fifteen,” line 24, page 16. Change “may” to
“Shall.” -
Add to section the following: ‘‘Veterinarians who have serve
more than twenty-two years as such shall, subject to such examina-
tions as the President may prescribe, have the pay and allowances
of majors: Provided, That the total number of veterinarians with pay
and allowances of majors shall not at any time exceed fifteen.”
Section 18. Change “now” to “how,” line 4, page 17. . . . f
Insert after “of,” “Infantry, Chief of Cavalry, Chief of Field
Artillery, and Chief of,” line 13, page 17.
Similar insertion, line 23, page 17. ...’
Insert “or from general officers appointed from the arm,” line 19,
page 17.
“may” to
FO -
R. NATIONAL D
d S.E.
- 269
Cha
à,]] O'G ( (
tºr section º to ‘‘
Y, line 14 & Insert º numb j
insert ºbs Jä,9. includi er,” li
ert, ‘‘b page 18 uding ine 7
Châ attali e 8-> the , pag
ange ‘‘ lior e POr ge 18
18. lge six” º adjutant. rto Rico R. &
Insert eight,' } { { after ‘‘mo egiment Of
and cha. after “I twelve” t unted,” li Infan-
Omi ange ( ( ~ : mechani - O ‘‘se j Ine 18
mit. “ eight nics,’’ ‘‘ event ; p &g
page 1S I. Ot º to { { twenty & een,” line #: 18.
Stateme To f xceed >k :: eight º -eight pri 1, page
inent urnisl eignty seve priyat
Insert . . Of 8, Pro Si). Infant * private 13, In li eS, first
Omi regi per Milita ry of es, first ne 22 class,”
mit, ‘‘ gime Milit * st cl , Of
wh ntal a ris ary P g proper C18 SS } ) l ; | age 18 j
8, UGS j ) i : 1Xteel ~ y in after { { . OVG O 8,0' 4
Chan lines 9 º ... "... . to º with
page * “two fi 10, page º privates ,” line 2 equired
C J - irst lieu 8-> 9. S, first , page 19 o
e hange Sutella, clas e
lin ge ‘O Yants j j ( S, à,]]. | -
e 12, pag ]] (2 SOCO to ‘‘ on d twelv
, Omit º' ge 19. nd lieut e first li e pri-
St. IYl O enant.” eutenant,’
able se unted” t to ‘‘t ant, ’ li
8. º º 13 º Sergeant,’’ ‘ Ond lieutena
(two mo eightee page 19. j and inse 9. j and
8-> € j .
Change “t ree’’ to 3.15. page 1 and i geants,” “
Change “ rumpet two.” i 9. insert aft (one
class and OIO.G hu ers” łº 15, D €I’ “COT
ð...". º dred and . º i. 19. - porals,”
º ºn tº #º -
º: iº." ãº
serº one - ** ... e priv.
ection 2 geant” af , first class,” , first
Cha 0. In à, ter { { - SS, li
O ange ( ( ~ : Sert. “ first nes 17
ne,” line 8 eighty-on ºne Capt. e Sergeant —18,
Omit ( { } page 20 € to “t all), traini j mounted j j i :
page 20 not to o wenty ning Offic j line
4–1 V-J e exceed * private er,” lir
li hange ( ( >k :: *k S, first l he 1 pa *
ine is." twent priv Class, and ge 20.
º. • privates, first sixty-
line 20 ge eleven” five privat class,” lin
ğ.” 20 to “ tWO e - eS, first Cl eS 9–10
page º “two fir e privates fir aSS, and eigh y
Čh e st lie j st cl 9. teen,”
li ange “ utenants” ass, and ni }
ine 21 8-> OIlé SG S’’ to “O J Ill Il G pri
fº.” cond lieut ne first lie vates,”
C OIl enant.” utenant,’
hange ( ( e saddler’’ to “t nt, j lin
Change nine.” to . after “h WO SOCO e 21,
In eigh eight.” li OTSG nd lie
sert. “ c teen.” ght sho eut
C tºw n” toºeſ line 2 ers,” li enants,”
hange ( & O bugle j j eight } } 23, pag j 1I].62 23 S,
class, and f OIlê . aftº “three #. 20. , page 20
23 orty-nin red andf mediºs.” “two,” li wº
**** º page 20.
g én oriva
r
270 | PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
Omit, “not to exceed º * *
page 20.
Omit “regimental supply officer” line 2, page 21.
Change “one second lieutenant” to “two second lieutenants,”
line 3, page 21.
Change “wagon” to “combat,” line 7, page 21.
Section 21. Omit “ammunition batteries and battalions, depot
batteries and battalions and artillery parks” from lines 11–12, page 21.
Change “eleven” to “twenty-six,” line 13, page 21. Change “forty-
one gun or howitzer battalions” to “twenty-one regiments,” lines
13–14, page 21. -
Substitute for remainder of lines 14 to 23, inclusive, the following:
“In time of war, threatened invasion, or when war is imminent, the
President is authorized to organize such number of ammunition
batteries and battalions, depot batteries and battalions and such
artillery parks, with such numbers and grades of personnel and such
organization as he may deem necessary. The officers necessary for
such organizations shall be supplied from the Officers' Reserve Corps
Fº by this act and by temporary appointments as authorized
by section 8 of the act of Congress approved April 25, 1914. The
enlisted men necessary for such organizations shall be supplied from
the Regular Army Reserve provided by this act, or from the Regular
Army.”
Change “two” to “three” before “buglers,” line 9, page 22.
Change “fourteen” to “twenty,” line 8, page 22.
Change “one hundred and two” to “thirty-five privates, first class,
and one hundred and seven,” line 10, page 22. -
Change “two” to “three” before “mechanics,” line 9, page 22.
Omit “not to exceed * * * privates, first class,” lines 10–12,
age 22. -
p hange “should’ to “shall,” line 13, page 22.
Omit sentence, lines 16–19, page 22.
Insert “one second lieutenant” after “captain,” line 21, page 22.
Change “two” to “four” before “sergeants,” line 24, page 22.
Change “eleven” to “fourteen” before “corporals,” line 24, page
22. -
Change “four” to “two” before “cooks,” line 25, page 22.
Change “eighteen” to “four privates, first class, and fourteen,”
line 1, page 23. -
Change “eighteen” to “two privates, first class, and seven pri-
vates” just before “orderlies,” line 1, page 23.
Change “should” to “shall,” line 6, page 23.
Insert “privates, first class” after “orderlies,” line 7, page 23.
Change “should” to “shall” and “position” to “positions,” line 9,
age 23.
p † to line 11, page 23: “One assistant packmaster (Sergeant) and
one cargador (corporal).”
Insert “first” before “lieutenant,” line 13, page 23.
Change “should” to “shall,” line 18, page 23.
Insert “second” before “lieutenant,” line 18, page 23.
Change “should” to “shall,” line 21, page 23.
Insert “or howitzer” after “gun,” line 23, page 23.
Change “battalion” to “battalions,” lines 23–24, page 23.
Change “organizations” to “divisions,” line 25, page 23.
rivates, first class,” line 25
p j j j
{{
| PREPAIREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 271
Omit lines 4–25, page 24, and lines 1–7, page 25.
Section 22. Omit “who while so serving * * * prescribed by
law,” lines 11 to 15, page 25.
Change “twenty-six” to “twenty-four,” line 16, page 25.
Change “twenty-five” to “twenty-four,” lines 16–17, page 25.
Change “eighty-five” to “seventy-two,” line 17, page 25.
Change “eighty-one” to “sixty,” line 18, page 25. -
Change “sixty-two” to “sixty,” lines 18 and 19, page 25.
Change “sixty-two” to “sixty-four,” line 20, page 25.
Change “forty-two” to “forty-one,” line 21, page 25.
Change “two” to “three,” and “one hundred” to “ninety-nine,”
line 22, page 25. * -
Change “seventy-four” to “five,” line 23, page 25.
Change “one hundred” to “ninety-nine,” line 24, page 25.
Change “nine” to “six,” before “firemen,” line 1, page 26.
Change “ninety-six” to “ninety-three,” line 1, page 26.
Change “sixty-four” to “sixty-two,” line 1, page 26.
Change “sixty-seven” to “sixty-three,” line 2, page 26.
Change “sixty-seven” to “sixty-three,” line 3, page 26.
Change “sixty-seven” to “sixty-three,” line 4, page 26.
Change ‘‘thirty-six” to “four,” line 5, page 26.
Change “two” to “one,” and “four” to “fifty-six,” line 5, page 26.
Change “thirty-four” to “twenty-six,” line 6, page 26.
Change “thirty-four” to “twenty-six,” line 7, page 26, before
‘‘mechanics and buglers.”
Change “two thousand three hundred and sixty-two” to “five
thousand two hundred and twenty-five privates, first class, and fifteen
thousand six hundred and seventy-five,” line 8, page 26. «
Omit “not to exceed * * * privates, first class,” from lines
9–10, page 26. - -
Change “thirty thousand and fifty-four” to “twenty-nine thou-
sand three hundred and ninety-nine,” line 13, page 26. -
Change “two hundred and forty” to “one hundred and four,”
line 19, page 26. -
Section 23. No change.
Section 24. Change “rank” to “grade,” line 23, page 27.
Insert “of” after “allowances,” line 1, page 28, -
Change “scouts” to “Philippine Scouts,” line 3, page 28.
Section 25. Omit from “consist of,” line 21, page 28, to include
“This regiment shall,” line 3, page 29.
Its organization is provided by section 19 as amended by these
notes. -
Some just and equitable provision for the status of two captains
romoted since the act of March 4, 1915, and for first and second
ieutenants should be made.
Section 26. The members of the War College Division are equally
divided as to the propriety of including this section in this legislation.
Some officers believe a single list for promotion of all Second lieu-
tenants of, and those hereafter appointed such in, the arms named
would remove discontent and thus promote efficiency. Others be-
lieve the operation of such provision would be difficult in war and
prejudicial to efficiency in peace as well as war. - -
Section 27. Insert “detached and” before “additional,” line 9,
page 30.
272 PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. '
Change “military prison” to “Disciplinary Barracks,” line 13,
page 30. .
Add the following: “Provided, That not to exceed twenty-five
per centum of the privates authorized for any organization of any
arm, corps, or department, by this act or by existing laws shall be
rated as privates, first class.” -
Section 28. Change “thirty-two" to “thirty-five” and “fifty-five”
to “forty-four,” line 25, page 30. - - -
Change “one hundred and thirty-six” to “three hundred and six,”
line 1, page 31. e
Change “five hundred and seventy-seven” to “seven hundred and
twenty-one,” line 1, page 31.
Change “three hundred and sixty-eight” to
eleven,” line 2, page 31.
Omit “and thirty-two second lieutenants,” line 3, page 31.
Add to section: “including two hundred detached officers author-
ized by the act approved March third, nineteen hundred and eleven:
Provided, That the number of officers of each grade to be detached
at the time each of the five increments provided by section twenty-
nine of this act is made, shall be detached from the Infantry, Cavalry,
Field Artillery, and Coast Artillery Corps, respectively, in the pro-
portion in which the authorized commissioned strength of each of the
above arms bears to the total authorized commissioned strength of
the Infantry, Cavalry, Field Artillery, and Coast Artillery Corps on
the day before each increment is made.”
Section 29. Change “equal” to “one-fifth of the total increase
authorized for each arm, corps, and department and of the detached
officers,” line 8, page 31.
Section 30. Change “civil” to “several,” line 2, page 33.
Omit “Provided # * * forty-five years” from lines 20–24,
page 33, and line 1, page 34. -
Change “grade” to “respective grades,” line 5, page 34.
Add “and when employed in active service shall rank next after
all officers of the same grades in the Regular Army and above officers
of the same grades in the Organized Militia and Volunteers,” line 5,
page 34. * -
Section 31. Insert “and” after “organizations,” line 11, page 34.
Omit “by virtue of * : * *” and “shall,” lines 14–16, page 34.
Insert “their active service alone being considered,” line 20, page 34.
Omit “Provided, That * * * are serving” from lines 21–25,
page 34, and lines 1–4, page 35.
Omit “further,” line 4, page 35.
Section 32. Omit this section. Members of the Officers' Reserve
Corps should be subject to military law at all times, since they are
commissioned officers.
Section 33. Insert “of the Regular Army or Regular Army Re-
serve,” line 16, page 35. . -
Add to section (line 23, page 35): “Provided further, That after all
officers of the Officers' Reserve Corps of any arm, corps, or depart-
ment have been ordered into active service, officers of Volunteers in
Such arm, Corps, or department may be appointed in such numbers
and grades as may be necessary: And provided further, That nothing
herein shall operate to prevent the appointment of any officer of the
Regular Army as an officer of Volunteers before all the officers of the
Officers' Reserve Corps have been ordered into active service.”
(
‘eight hundred and
(
PREPARED NIESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 273
Section 34. Change “six” to “eight” and “three” to “two,”
line 1, page 36. -
Change “three” to “six,” line 4, page 36.
Change “three” to “two,” line 5, page 36.
Change “six” to “eight,” line 9, page 36.
Change “six” to “eight,” line 17, page 36.
Add to line 21, page 36, “And provided further, That no bounty nor
bonus shall be paid to any man for enlisting or reenlisting.”
Section 35. Omit “Regular,” line 23, page 36.
Change “four” to “six,” line 7, page 37.
Insert “and” after “age,” line 13, page 37.
Change “four” to “six,” line 14, page 37.
Section 36. Change “six” to “eight,” line 17, page 37.
Section 37. Change “Infantry, Cavalry + 4 + staff depart-
ments” to “any arm, corps, or department,” lines 9–11, page 38.
Omit “in the event of war or the imminence thereof.” from line
14, page 38.
Section 38. No change other than typographical.
Section 39. Change “condition” to “rendition,” line 21, page 39.
Section 40. Omit “That all members * * * War, andſº lines
1–3, page 40.
Change “the '’ to “The,” line 3, page 40.
Sections 41, 42, and 43. Omit these sections. A separate draft
of bill for “Reserve officers’ training corps” is forwarded in lieu of
these sections. Such subject is not necessarily included in a reor-
ganization of the Army.
Add a section authorizing and fixing the pay of certain grades of
enlisted men named in this bill, and not heretofore authorized and
fixed by law.
Add a section repealing all laws and parts of laws in conflict with
the provisions of this bill.
6. A section should be added to the draft authorizing sergeants
detailed from the Infantry, Cavalry, Field Artillery, Engineers, and
Coast Artillery Corps for duty with the Organized Militia, in addition
to the sergeants authorized by this act for companies, troops, bat-
teries, and detachments of the arms named. At present such
sergeant-instructors are included in the strength of Infantry and
Cavalry regiments in the United States, since such regiments are not
maintained at maximum strength. With regular units all at maxi-
mum strength no sergeants can be spared from their proper units for
detached service.
One hundred sergeants, for duty with disciplinary organizations,
should be authorized for similar reasons.
7. It is noted that this draft does not provide for the “citizen
soldiers” referred to in paragraph 42, Statement of a Proper Military
Policy, September 11, 1915.
Such force of 500,000 mobile troops, in addition to the Regular
Army and Regular Army Reserve, being necessary for the solution of the
military j. confronting the United States, should be authorized
by some legislation, though it is not necessarily included in a bill
prescribing the organization and strength of the Regular Army.
M. M. MACOMB,
Brigadier General,
Chief of War College Division.
274 PREPAIRED NIESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
Revised draft of the Chamberlain bill,
[Omit the part struck through and insert the part printed in italic.]
A BILL For making further and more effectual provision for the
national defense, and for other purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress º That the Army
of the United States shall consist of the Regular Army, the
Officers' Reserve Corps, the organized land militia empleyed
while in the service of the United States, # -4-
and such other citizen and volunteer forces as Congress may from
time to time authorize. -
SEC. 2. That the Regular Army of the United States, including
the existing Organizations, shall be organized as hereinafter
Fº and shall consist of sixty-fear sixty-five regiments of
nfantry, including the Porto Rico Regiment of Infantry,
Hiheteen twenty-five regiments of Cavalry, twenty twenty-one
regiments of Field Artillery, eite a Coast Artillery Corps, the
brigade, division, and corps headquarters, with their detach-
ments and eerapahies troops, a General Staff Corps, an Adjutant
General's Department, a Judge Advocate General's Department,
a Quartermaster Corps, a Medical Department, a Corps of
Engineers, an Ordnance Department, a Signal Corps, the detached
officers, chaplains, the Bureau of Insular Affairs, the Regular
Army Reserve, and the following as now authorized by law: The
officers and enlisted men on the retired list; the professors, the
corps of cadets, the general Army service detachment and
detachments of Cavalry, Field Artillery and Engineers, and the
band of the United States Military Academy; the post noncom—
missioned Staff officers; the recruiting parties, the recruit depot
detachments; and unassigned recruits; the service school detach-
ments; the disciplinary guards; the disciplinary organizations;
Indian Scouts, Regular-A+Hay–Reserves Philippine Scouts, and
such other officers and enlisted men as may be hereinafter pro-
vided for.
SEC. 3. That the mobile troops of the Regular Army of the
United States shall be organized, as far as practicable, into
brigades and divisions. The President is authorized, in time
of war or threatened invasion or when war is imminent, to organ-
ize the brigades and divisions into such corps or armies as may
be necessary. The typical Infantry brigade shall consist of a
headquarters and three regiments of infantry. The typical
Cavalry brigade shall consist of a headquarters and three
regiments of Cavalry. The typical Field Artillery brigade shall
consist of a headquarters and three regiments of Field Artillery.
The typical Infantry division shall consist of a headquarters,
three Infantry brigades, one regiment of Cavalry, one Field
Artillery brigade ef-Piełd–A+#44ery, one regiment of Engineers,
one field batallion of Signal Corps, one aero squadron, one ammu-
nition train, one supply train, one engineer train, and one sani-
tary train. The typical Cavalry division shall consist of a head-
uarters, three Cavalry brigades, one regiment of Field Artillery
%. one battalion of Engineers (mounted), one field battalion
*
PREPAREDNIESS FOR, NATIONAL DEFENSE. 275
of Signal treeps Corps (mounted), one aero Squadron, one ammu-
nition train, one supply train, one engineer train, and one sani-
tary train. The typical corps shall consist of a headquarters,
two or more Infantry divisions, one or more Cavalry brigades or
a Cavalry division, one Field Artillery brigade, one telegraph
batallion, and one field battalion Signal Corps, and such ammu-
nition, supply, engineer, and sanitary trains as the President
may deem necessary. Nothing herein contained, however, shall
prevent the President from increasing or decreasing the number
of organizations prescribed for the typical brigades, divisions,
and corps, or from prescribing new and different organizations
and personnel as the efficiency of the service may require. -
SEo. 4. HEADQUARTERS PERSONNEL OF HIGHER
TACTICAL UNITS AND TRAINS.—The brigade headquarters
shall consist of such officers, enlisted men, and civilians as the
President may prescribe. The typical headquarters of a an
brigade;—a Infantry, Cavalry, or Field Artillery brigade shall
consist of one Haaier-generał brigadier general, &# one adjutant,
two aids (lieutenants or captains), one sergeant, twe-eeeks; one
cook six privates, and one wagoner. A division headquarters shall
consist of such officers, enlisted men, and civilians as the Presi-
dent may prescribe. The typical divisień Infantry and Cavalry
division headquarters shall consist of one major general, one
chief of staff, one adjutant, one inspector, one judge advocate,
one quartermaster, one surgeon, one ordnance officer, one signal
officer, one sanitary inspector, two assistants to the chief of
staff, four assistants to the quartermaster, one assistant to the
surgeon, three aids (captains or Haajeńs lieutenants), one head-
quarters troop, consisting of one captain, one first lieutenant,
one second lieutenant, one first Sergeant, one mess Sergeant, One
supply sergeant, one stable Sergeant, five Sergeants, eight cor-
porals, two horseshoers, one saddler, two cooks, two buglers, one
mechanic, #y-seven fourteen privates, first class, and forty-three
privates, and a quartermaster detachment of five sergeants, first
class, five sergeants, and five wagoners. Attºheſized-aids—ſet
general-effieers—shall-be-detailed-Håder—seetieńs-twenty-six-à
£wenty-seven;-A-et-eſ-Geºgress-et-Pebettæº-seeead;-Hineteen-hth-
dred-and-ere: Officers for the headquarters troops shall be detailed
from the Cavalry arm, and, when detailed, such details shall be
subject to the provisions of section twenty-sevem, Act of Congress
approved February second, nineteen hundred and one. A corps
headquarters shall consist of such officers, enlisted men, and
civilians as the President may prescribe.
Each supply train, ammunition train, Sanitary train, and
engineer train shall consist of such officers and enlisted men and
shall be organized as the President may prescribe, the line officers
necessary to be detailed under the provisions of sections twenty-
six and twenty-seven, Act of Congress dated approved February
second, nineteen hundred and one.
SEer—57–69;NERAL–9FF4CERS–9Pi—THE–HPAH3+—Majeń
generals-(general-effieers-ef-the-Hae)-et-the-Regükää-A+Häy-eſ—the
J###ed-States—#–#Hae-ef-peaee-sha}}-be-as-fe!!ews:–9ae–Assistant
Chief—ef-Staff—ańd—ehief—eſ—Haspeeters;-eńe–Assistairè—Chief-ef
Staff—ahd—president—ef–the–A++ay—War—Ge1}ege;—eire–Assistant

276 PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
Chief—ef—Staff—ałłd–Chief—eſ—P++isień–e4–A434 itia–Affairs;-eae—fer
eaeh-brigade—ef–Hafałłłłyº-Cax-alry-airé-Piełd–A+tiłłery;-eńe—Éer
HHaits—ef-the–UHited—States;-and-eńe—eaeh-fer–the–twe–Ceast
:A+tillery—disłłiets—in-the-Philippines—aład–the–CahaH-Zehet-The
geheral-effleers—at thełłżed–fer–brigades—ef-the-Haebiže—ferees—and
ałła—ef-the-serviee-in-whieh-the-vae&#e3es—exist—#Feha-the-Hāfah–
by-preſſietień-ef-the-sehief-eekerel-ef-said–a4+a+–4 he-prefaetiełł
ef—eaeh-ahé—every—eekere!; Ha-time—eſ—peaee;—te—the-grade—ef
Haaier-generał–(general-effieer-ef-the-Hire)—sha H-be-Haade-enly
* heada:#eas—ef-a-beard—eeh-e Hed—te—deter HaiHe
His—Hae+a+-physiea H-ańd—prefessiełłal-fitness—ſer-preſſaetień-te
the-said–grade-ef-Haajer-general—thader-stre++++++es-and-regulatiens
as—the-President—Haay—preseribe;-the-said—beard–te—eensist—ef
three—general-effieers—whe-ha-e-belenged–te—afte–served—ia—the
ałHa-ef-the-serviee-ef-the-eeleńe!—reperted-tipen-and-twe-effieers
Hreth Fed—#—Hae—ef-duty-he-sha}}-be-retired—with—the-Fähk–te
whieh-his-sehjerity—ehtitles—Hira–te—be—prefaeted—44–het—£ethad
thréfèalified-by-Pease as-ef-said-elisability-irrettered-in-H+re-eſ-duty;
but—£ethel—thefthalified—fer—ahy—ether—Fease#P-he-sha}}-be-retired
withetit-preme #* ień-
SEC. 5. GENERAL OFFICERS OF THE LINE.-The Chief
of Staff and each general officer regularly assigned by the President
to the command of a corps or army, duly organized under section
two of this Act, shall be selected from general officers of the line and,
while so serving, have the grade, pay, and allowances of a lieutenant
general. Major generals (general officers of the line) of the Regular
Army shall be as follows: Two assistants to the Chief of Staff, one
Chif of Infantry, one Chief of Cavalry, one Chief of Ficlä Artillcry,
one Chief of Coast Artillery, and one for each and every division
legally authorized and duly organized as part of the regular mobile
forces of the United States Army. Major generals shall be ap-
pointed from the brigadier generals of the line. Brigadier generals
(general officers of the line) of the Regular Army shall be as follows:
Two assistants to the Chief of Staff, one Chief of the Division of
Militia Affairs, one for each brigade of Infantry, Cavalry, and
Field Artillery, and one for each five Coast Artillery districts.
General officers authorized for brigades of the mobile forces and for
Coast Artillery districts shall be appointed from the arm of the
service in which a vacancy exists, to wit, from the Infantry, Cavalry,
Field Artillery, and Coast Artillery Corps.
SEC. 6. CONSOLIDATION OF THE INSPECTOR GEN-
ERAL'S DEPARTMENT WITH THE GENERAL STAFF
CORPS.—The Inspector General's Department of the United
States Army shall be consolidated with and form part of the
General Staff Corps of the United States Army ahd-sha}}-be
knew H-as-the-Generał-Staff-Cerps; United-States-Affay, and of
which the Chief of Staff will be the head. The duties now pre-




PREPAIREDN ESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 277
scribed by law for the Inspector General's Department and the
officers thereof shall be performed by the General Staff Corps.
Officers now holding perhaaheat commissions in the Inspector
General's Department shall be detailed as members of the
General Staff Corps, shall be included in the list of officers
provided for said General Staff Corps, and shall not be in addition
to the number prescribed for the General Staff Corps. So much
of the provisions of section three of the Act of Congress approved
February fourteen, nineteen hundred and three, as limits the
period of detail of officers for service in the General Staff Corps
to four years shall not apply to officers now holding permanent
commissions in the Inspector General's Department. Any
vacancy hereafter occurring among officers holding commissions
in the Inspector General's Department shall not be filled as a
vacancy in the Inspector General's Department but shall be
filled as a vacancy in the General Staff Corps. Officers detailed
for Service in the Inspector General's Department under the Act of
Congress approved February second, nineteen hundred and ome,
shall be relieved from such details, and, unless detailed as members
of the General Staff Corps under section seven of this Act, shall be
assigned to other duties proper for officers of the grades and arms
of the line of the Army in which they hold commissions.
SEC. 7. THE GENERAL STAFF CORPS.—The General
Staff Corps shall consist of one Chief of Staff, who shall while so
serving have the Pahk grade, ef-general—with—the pay and allow-
ances now prescribed for a lieutenant general, and shall take
rank and precedence over all other officers of the Army; eite
two Assistants to the Chief of Staff, Hettterraht—generał–with—the
fay–and–a4!ewahees-Hew—preseribed—#e3–a–Haajer-generał major
generals; three two Assistants to the Chief of Staff, Haaier-generals;
with-the-pay-aird-a-Hewahees-Hew-preseribed-by-law-fee-brigadier
generałs brigadier generals; seventeen colonels; sixteen tem
lieutenant colonels; thirty forty-one majors; and twełłły—six
forty-eight captains, to be detailed from corresponding grades
in the Army under such rules of selection as the President may
prescribe. If any officer so detailed shall be promoted to the
next higher grade while so serving, the number of officers of
the General Staff Corps in the grade to which he is promoted
shall be increased by one for such time as the officer so promoted
is an additional member of the advanced grade. The total
number of officers detailed to the General Staff Corps shall at
no time exceed the aggregate of the numbers herein specified
for the several grades. All officers detailed in the General Staff
Corps will be detailed therein for periods of four years, unless
sooner relieved. While serving in the General Staff Corps it
shall be permitted to temporarily assign them to duty with any
branch of the Army. Upon being relieved from duty in the
General Staff Corps officers shall return to the branch of the
Army in which they hold permanent commissions, and no
officer shall be eligible to a further detail in the General Staff
Corps until he has served two years with the branch of the
Army in which commissioned, except in cases of national emer-
gency or in time of war. The Chief of Staff, in time of peace,
shall be detailed from the general officers of the line of the Army.

278 |PR.EPARED NIESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
Each position vacated by officers below the grade of general
officer detailed in the General Staff Corps for tours of service
shall be filled by promotion in the corresponding branch of the
Army in which they hold permanent commissions, until the total
number detailed equals the number authorized for duty in the
General Staff Corps. Thereafter any vacancies caused by detail
to the General Staff Corps shall be filled by officers returned
from tours of duty with the General Staff Corps. If the number
of officers returned to any particular arm or branch of the
service at any time exceeds the number authorized by law in
any grade, promotions to that grade shall cease until the number
has been reduced to that authorized.
SEC. S. THE ADJUTANT GENERAL'S DEPARTMENT.-
The Adjutant General's Department shall consist of one Adju-
tant General, who shall, while so serving, have the rank grade, ef
; , , , , +a+–with pay and allowances now prescribed by law
for a brigadier general; seven colonels; thirteen lieutenant colo-
nels; and thirty-nine majors. *
SEC. 9. THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL’S l) EPART-
MENT.-The Judge Advocate General's Department shall con-
sist of one Judge Advocate General, who shall, while so serving,
with–the–Farak-eſ-Hrajer-generał–with have the grade, pay, and
allowances now prescribed for a brigadier general; twe three
colonels; six seven lieuttnant colonels; twelve twenty majors; arté.
tea-eaptains: Provided, That the duties of the Judge Advocate
General's Department may include investigations necessary in
the administration of military justice.
SEC. 10. THE QUARTERMASTER CORPS.—The Quarter-
master Corps shall consist of one Quartermaster General, with
the-rank who shall, while so serving, have the grade, pay, and
allowances of a major general; two Haajer-generals—with assist-
ants to the Quartermaster General, who shall, while so serving, have
the grade, pay, and allowances now prescribed by law for a
brigadier general; seventeen colonels; º: lieutenant colonels;
fifty-four majors; one hundred and fifty-five captains. The
total enlisted strength of the Quartermaster Corps and the num-
ber in each grade shall be limited and fixed from time to time
by the President in accordance with the needs of the Army,
and shall consist of quartermaster sergeants, senior grade; quar-
termaster Sergeants; sergeants, first class; Sergeants; corporals;
cooks; privates, first class; and privates. The Lumber in the
various grades shall not exceed the following percentages of the
total authorized enlisted strength of the Quartermaster Corps,
namely: Quartermaster sergeants, senior grade, three-tenths of
One per centum; quartermaster Sergeants, seven per centum; Ser-
geants, first class, ten per centum; Sergeants, fifteen per centum;
corporals, ten per centum: Provided, That the master electrician
now authorized by law shall hereafter be known as quartermaster
sergeant, senior grade, and shall be included in the number of
quartermaster sergeants, Senior grade, herein authorized: Pro-
vided further, That when vacancies occur in the office of Quarter-
master General and in the office of either of the assistants to the
Quartermaster General, by retirement of the present incumbents or
otherwise, such vacancies shall not be filled, but the offices in which
PREPAIR.E.D.NESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 279
the vacancies occur shall cease amd determine; and the Quarter-
master General shall thereafter, while so serving, have the grade,
pay, and allowances now prescribed by law for a brigadier general.
SEC. 11. THE MEDICAL CORPS.—The Medical Corps shall
consist of one Surgeon General, witH-the-Fahk who shall, while
So Serving, have the grade, pay, and allowances of a major general;
twenty-nine twenty-eight colonels, forty-eight lieutenant colonels,
two hundred and ten majors, six hundred and ten captains or
first lieutenants, the A4ediea HReserve–Gerps—as-Hew—previele
ław the Nurse Corps as now provided by law, and the Dental
Corps. The Hospital Corps of the Army as authorized and
constituted by existing law shall be designated and known as
part of the Medical ºrps of the Army. The total enlisted
strength of the Medical Corps shall be limited and fixed from
time to time by the President in accordance with the needs of
the Army, and she tild shall consist of master hospital Sergeants;
hospital sergeants; sergeants, first class; Sergeants; corporals;
cooks; horseshoers; saddlers; mechanics; privates, first class;
and privates. The numbers in the various grades shall not ex-
ceed the following percentages of the total authorized enlisted
strength of the Medical Corps, namely: Master hospital ser-
geants, one-half of one per centum; hospital Sergeants, one-half
of one per centum; Sergeants, first class, seven per centum;
sergeants, eleven per centum; corporals, six per centum. The
number of Cooks shi be limited and fixed from time to time by
the Secretary of War. The number of horseshoers, saddlers,
and mechanics shall be limited to one each for each regularly
authorized field hospital company and one each for each regularly
authorized ambulance company. The-HäHaber—eſ—privates;-first
elass-sha}}+ret—exeeed—the-HüHaber–e4-p+3*ates: Privates, first
class, and privates shall be eligible for ratings with additional
pay as follows: Nurse, $2 per month; dispensary assistant, $3
per month; surgical assistant, $5 per month. The number of
surgical assistants shall not exceed twenty per centum of the
total number of privates, first class; the total number of nurses,
dispensary assistants, and Surgical assistants shall not exceed
the total number of privates, first class. No enlisted man shall,
at the same time, receive additional pay under more than one
rating, nor shall he receive any additional pay unless he actually
performs the duties under the rating prescribed.
The President is hereby authorized to appoint and commission,
by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, dental Sur-
geons at the rate of one for each one thousand enlisted men
of the line of the Army. Dental surgeons shall have the pay
and allowances of first lieutenants until they have completed
seven ten years' service. Dental surgeons of more than sever,
tem, but less than seventeen twenty years' service shall, subject to
such examination as the President may prescribe, have the pay
and allowances of captains. Dental surgeons of more than
seventeen twenty years' Service shall, subject to such examina-
tion as the President may prescribe, have the pay and allow-
ances of major: Provided, That when a vacancy occurs in the office
of Surgeon General, by retirement of present incumbent or otherwise,
such vacancy shall not be filled, but such office shall cease and de-


280 PREPARED NIESS FOR NATION AT, DEFENSE.
termine; and the Surgeon General shall thereafter, while so serving,
have the grade, pay, and allowances now prescribed by law for a
brigadier general: Provided further, That º total mumber of dental
Surgeons with pay and allowances of major shall not at any time
exceed fifteem.
SEC. 12. CORPS OF ENGINEERS.—The Corps of Engineers
shall consist of one Chief of Engineers, with—the-rank who shall,
while so serving, have the grade, pay and allowances of a majer
generał brigadier general; twenty-eight twenty-sia, colonels; forty-
One lieutenant colonels; ninety-five majors; one hundred and
twelve captains; one hundred and five first lieutenants; eighty
Second lieutenants; and the enlisted men hereinafter enumerated.
The enlisted personnel of the Corps of Engineers shall consist of
one band organized as are bands of Infantry regiments; seven
regiments and seven two mounted battalions. The enlisted per-
Sommel of each regiment of Engineers shall consist of four master
engineers, senior grade; one regimental Sergeant major; one regi-
mental supply Sergeant; two color Sergeants; two Sergeants; one
cook; one wagoner for each authorized wagon of the field and
combat train, and two battalions. The enlisted personnel of each
battalion of a regiment of Engineers shall consist of a one bat-
talion sergeant major; six master engineers, junior grade; and
three companies. The enlisted personnel of each company (regi-
mental) of Engineers shall consist of one first sergeant; three ser-
geants, first clºss; one mess Sergeant; One supply Sergeant; one
stable sergeant; eight sergeants; thirteen eighteen corporals; one
horseshoer; one saddler; three cooks; two buglers; thirty thirty-
one privates, first class; and eighty-eire ninety-three privates.
The enlisted personnel of each mounted battalion of Engineers shall
consist of two master engineers, senior grade; one battalion Sergeant
najor; two color Sergeants; one battalion supply Sergeant; six master
engineers, junior grade; one corporal; one wagomer for each author-
ized wagon of the field train; and three mounted companies. The
enlisted personnel of each mounted company of Engineers shall
consist of one first sergeant; two sergeants, first class; one mess
Sergeant; one Supply sergeant; one stable sergeant; six Sergeants;
eleven corporals; two horseshoers; one Saddler; two cooks; two
buglers; twenty privates, first class; and sirty-one privates: Pro-
ºvided, That appropriate officers to command the regiments, battal-
ions, and companies herein authorized and for duty with and as
staff officers of such organizations shall be detailed from the Corps
of Engineers, and shall not be in excess of the numbers in each grade
enumerated in this section. The enlisted force of the Corps of
Engineers and the officers serving therewith shall constitute a part
of the line of the Army.
SEC. 13. THE ORDNANCE DEPARTMENT.—The Ordnance
Department shall consist of one Chief of Ordnance, with—the-rank
eſ-Haajer-general-ahé—with—the who shall, while so serving, have the
grade, pay, and allowances now prescribed for a brigadier gen-
eral; six colonels; twelve lieutenant colonels; twenty-four
majors; thirty-three captains; thirty-three first lieutenants; and
the enlisted men, including ordnance sergeants, as now author-
ized by law.
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 281
SEC. 14. THE SIGNAL CORPS.—The Signal Corps shall con-
sist of one Chief Signal Officer, who shall, while so serving, have
the Fałak-eſ-Haajer-generał–aird–with—the grade, pay, and allow-
ances now prescribed for a brigadier general; four colonels;
twelve lieutenant colonels; twenty-three majors; one hundred
and six captains; two hundred and thirty-six first lieutenants.
The total enlisted strength of the Signal Corps shall be limited
and fixed from time to time by the President in accordance with
the needs of the Army, and shall consist of master signal elec-
tricians; sergeants, first class; sergeants; corporals; cooks; horse-
shoers; privates, first class; and privates; the number in each
grade being fixed from time to time by the President. The num-
bers in the various grades shall not exceed the following per-
centages of the total authorized enlisted strength of the Singal
Corps, namely: Master signal electricians, two per centum; ser–
geants, first class, seven per centum; Sergeants, ten per centum;
corporals, twenty per centum. Authority is hereby given the
President to organize, in his discretion, such part of the com-
missioned and enlisted personnel of the Signal Corps into such
number of companies, battalions, and aero squadrons as the
necessities of the service may demand: Prºvided, That nothing
in this Act shall be construed to limit in any way the provisions
of the Act of July eighteenth, nineteen hundred and fourteen,
affecting the aviation section of the Signal Corps: Provided
further, That the enlisted men of the Signal Corps below the
grade of signal electrician who qualify, under regulations to be
prescribed by the Secretary of War, shall be entitled to receive,
in addition to their pay, the following amounts, namely: Mili-
tary telegraphers, first class, $5 per month; military telegraphers,
second class, $3 per month; military telegraphers, third class,
$2 per month; an enlisted man shall not receive at the same time
additional pay under more than one rating.
SEC. 15. BUREAU OF INSUILAR AFFAIRS.—The Bureau
of Insular Affairs shall consist of the personnel as now provided
by law:—Provided;—4-hºt-the-elief-eſ-the-bureat-sh ave—the
Fähk—ef–Haaier-generał–with—the-pay–aird–a4!ewäfrees—Hew—pre-
seribed—by-law—£er-a-brigadier-generał.
SEC. 16. CHAPLAINS.—The President is authorized to ap-
oint, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, chap-
ains at the rate of one for each regiment of Infantry, Cavalry,
Field Artillery, and Engineers, and one for every fifteen com-
panies of the Coast Artillery Corps, with the º and
subject to the examinations, now prescribed by law, and who
shall have the Fääk pay and allowances of first lieutenants.
Chaplains who have served seven ten years as such may shall,
subject to such examinations as the President may prescribe,
have the rank pay and allowances of captains. Chaplains who
have served more than seventeen twenty years as such Hray shall,
subject to such examinations as the President may prescribe,
have the Fałłk pay and allowances of majors: Provided, That
nothing herein contained shall operate to reduce the Fääk pay
and allowances which any chaplain may at-present-Feeeive be
now receiving: Provided further, That the total number of chaplains
with pay and allowances of majors, including those now entitled to


282 PREPAIRED NIESS FOR, NATIONAL DEFENSE.
such pay and allowances under existing law, shall not at any time
exceed fifteen. \,
SEC. 17. WETERINARIANS.—The President is authorized to
appoint by and with the advice and consent of the Senate,
veterinarians at the rate of two for each regiment of Cavalry, and
one for each battalion of Field Artillery and mounted Engineers,
and twenty-four for the Quartermaster Corps. Veterinarians thus
appointed shall have the pay and allowances of second lieuten-
ants. Veterinarians who have served five seven years as such
#aay shall, subject to such examinations as the President may
brescribe, have the pay and allowances of first lieutenants.
eterinarians who have served more than teh fifteen years as
such Haay shall, subject to such examinations as the President
may prescribe, have the pay and allowances of captains. Veteri-
marians who have served more than twenty-two years as such shall,
subject to such examinations as the President may prescribe, have
the pay and allowances of majors: Provided, That the total number
of veterinarians with pay and allowances of majors shall not at any
time exceed fifteen. -
SEC. 18. VACANCIES IN COMMISSIONED PERSONNEL
DUE TO DETAILS. N.O.W. HO W FILLED.—Vacancies which
may occur in the commissioned personnel of the Adjutant Gen-
eral's Department, the Judge Advocate General's Department,
the Quartermaster Corps, the Ordnance Department, the Signal
Corps, and the Bureau of Insular Affairs shall be subject to the
provisions of sections twenty-six and twenty-seven of the Act of
Congress approved February second, nineteen hundred and one,
and section three of the Act of Congress approved August twenty-
fourth, nineteen hundred and twelve. When a vacancy occurs in
the office of Chief of Infantry, Chief of Cavalry, Chief of Field
Artillery, amd Chief of Coast Artillery, Adjutant General, Judge
Advocate General, Quartermaster General, Surgeon General,
Chief of Engineers, Chief of Ordnance, Chief Signal Officer, the
President is authorized to appoint to such vacancy, by and with
the advice and consent of the Senate, an officer not below the
grade of colonel, selected from the arm or from general officers
appointed from the arm or from officers who have served a detail
of at least three years in the corps or department in which the
vacancy exists. Officers so appointed shall serve for a period of
four years unless sooner relieved. The position vacated by an
officer appointed Chief of Infantry, Chief of Cavalry, Chief of Field
Artillery, and Chief of Coast Artillery, Adjutant General, Judge
Advocate General, Quartermaster General, Surgeon General,
Chief of Engineers, Chief of Ordnance, Chief Signal Officer shall
be filled by promotion in that arm, corps, or department, but the
officer who has been or who may be hereafter thus appointed shall
continue in the same lineal position in his arm, corps, or depart-
ment which he would have held if he had not been so appointed,
and shall be an additional Hrehaber number in the grade from
which he was appointed or to which he may be appointed: Pro-
vided, That no officer shall be eligible to a further detail as chief
of an arm, corps, department, or bureau until he has served two
years with the branch of the Army with which commissioned,
except in an emergency, or in time of war. -
PIREPAIRED NIESS FOR, NATIONAL DEFENSE. 283
SEC. 19. INFANTRY UNIT.-That each regiment of In-
fantry, including the Porto Rico Regiment of Infantry, shall
consist of one colonel, one lieutenant colonel, three battalions,
one headquarters company, one machine-gun company, one
Supply company. t -
Each battalion shall consist of One major, one first lieutenant,
mounted, battalion adjutant, four companies. Each company in
battalion shall consist of One captain, One first lieutenant, one
Second lieutenant, one first Sergeant, one mess Sergeant, one
Supply sergeant, six: eight Sergeants, twelve seventeen corporals,
three cooks, two buglers, two mechanics, twenty-eight privates,
first class, and eighty-fetºp eighty-seven privates;-het—te—exeeed
twenty-five-per-eehtara-eſ-the-privates-sha}}-be-rated-as-privates;
first-elass.
The headquarters company shall consist of one captain,
mounted, regimental adjutant; one regimental Sergeant major,
mounted; three battalion Sergeants major, mounted; one first
sergeant (whe-sha}}-be-the drum major); two color sergeants;
One mess Sergeant; one supply Sergeant; two cooks; one horse-
shoer; one band leader; one assistant band leader; one sergeant
bugler; two band Sergeants; four band corporals; two musicians,
first class; four musicians, second class; thirteen musicians, third
class; one sergeant orderly, mounted; sixteen four privates,
jirst class, and twelve privates, orderlies, mounted. The machine-
guri company shall consist of one captain, mounted; #we-first
Hetitehåts one first lieutenant, mounted; eite-seeehd—Heatenant
two Second lieutenants, mounted; one first Sergeant, mounted; one
mess Sergeant, Haetºrted; one supply Sergeant, Haettated; one
stable sergeant, Hrethted; £we ome horseshoer; hire seven
sergeants, one mounted; eighteen eight corporals, two mounted;
three two cooks; two #####peters buglers; two mechanics; eae .
Hühdred–aird—thirty-five twelve privates, first class, and thirty-sia,
privates; het-te—exeeed—twenty- * ef—t #vates
#e-be-rated—as—privates;-first-elass. The supply company shall
consist of One captain, mounted; one second lieutenant, mounted;
three regimental supply Sergeants, mounted; one first sergeant,
mounted; one mess sergeant; two corporals, mounted; two cooks;
two saddlers; two horseshoers; and one wagoner for each author-
ized wagon of the field and combat train. -
SEC. 20. ORGANIZATION OF CAVALRY UNITS.–Each
regiment of Cavalry shall consist of one colonel, one lieutenant
colonel, one captain, training officer, three squadrons, one headquar-
ters troop, one machine-gun troop, and one supply troop; each
squadron shall consist of one major, one first lieutenant (Squad-
ron adjutant), and four troops. Each troop in Squadron shallcon-
sist of one captain, one first lieutenant, one second lieutenant, one
first sergeant, one mess Sergeant, one supply Sergeant, one stable
sergeant, five sergeants, eight corporals, two cooks, two horse-
shoers, one saddler, two buglers, and eighty-eire twenty privates,
first class, and Sixty-one privates º
eehttha-ef-the-privates-Ée-be-rated—as—privates; first-elass: The
headquarters troop shall consist of one captain (regimental adju-
tant); one regimental Sergeant major; three Squadron Sergeants
major; one first sergeant (drum major); two color Sergeants;



*
284 PREPAIRED NIESS FOR, NATIONAL DEFENSE.
One mess Sergeant; one supply sergeant; one stable sergeant;
two sergeants; five corporals; two cooks; two horseshoers; one
saddler; and twenty-three five privates, first class, and eighteen
privates; one band leader; one assistant band leader; one ser–
geant bugler; two band Sergeants; four band corporals; two
musicians, first class; four musicians, second class; thirteen
musicians, third class; one sergeant orderly and eleven two pri-
vates, first class, and mine privates, orderlies; the machine-gun troop
shall consist of one captain, twe-first-Heatenants one first lieuten-
ant, eHe-seeehd—Hetitehāht two second lieutenants, one first Ser–
geant, one mess sergeant, one supply Sergeant, one stable Ser-
geant, two horseshoers, one saddler, aire eight Sergeants, eighteen
eight corporals, three two cooks, two mechanics, two buglers, and
+the+ed-and-ferty—fette thirteen privates, first class, and forty-
nine privates; Het–te—exeeed—twenty-five-per-eehttim-ef-the-pºi-
+ates–te-be-rated—as—privates; #st–e4ass; the supply troop shall
consist of one captain (Pegi Haeatal–stºpply—effieep), eite-seeehé.
Hetttetrah% two second lieutenants, three regimental supply ser–
geants, one first Sergeant, one mess Sergeant, One stable sergeant,
two corporals, two cooks, two horseshoers, two saddlers, and one
wagoner for each authorized wagon of the field and wagen com—
bat train. -
SEC. 21. ORGANIZATION OF FIELD ARTILLERY
UNITS: The Field Artillery, including Mountain Artillery, Light
Artillery, Horse Artillery, Heavy Artillery (field and siege types),
ałłłłłłłłłłłień-batteries—aird—battaliens;-depet-batteries—aład—bat-
takiełas-a-Hé–8+++Hery—parks; shall consist of one hundred and
e!evea twenty-sia, gun or howitzer batteries organized into ferty-
eae-gūh-et-Hewitzer-batta Heas twenty-one regiments, twenty-twe
&#######e3+–batteries–erganized—iate—seven—afałłłłłąitień—bat-
£akiełłs;–seventeen—depet—batteries–ergałłłżed—i ight—depet
bałłakiełłs;–ahé—erre—artillery—park;-the–battalieńs—te—be—ergâh-
#zed—###e—seventeen—ahé—eae—ha}{-regihaeats;-the-details—ef
ałłłłłłłłłłitień-battaliens; stipp!y-effleeps-ahéHiełłłeñºrts-ef-supply
eerapahies—sha H-be—eeftā14y-divided—between—first—ahd—seeehd
#}}ety-paH-k-sha}}-be–ergañized-eńky-in-time-ef-war;-threaterred
#vasień-ef-etherwise—######ełłł. In time of war, threatened inva-
Sion, or when war is imminent, the President is authorized to
organize such number of ammunition batteries and battalions, depot
batteries and battalions, and such Artillery parks, with such num-
bers and grades of personnel and such organization as he may deem
necessary. The officers necessary for such organizations shall be
supplied from the Officers' Reserve Corps provided by this Act and
by temporary appointments as authorized by section eight of the Act
of Congress approved April twenty-fifth, nineteen hundred and four-
teen. The enlisted men necessary for such organizations shall be
supplied from the Regular Army Reserve provided by this Act, or
from the Regular Army.
Each regiment shall consist of one colonel, one lieutenant
colonel, one captain, one headquarters company, one supply
ºmpany, and such number of gun and howitzer battalions as
the President may direct. Nothing shall prevent the assembling,



PREPAIREDINESS FOR, NATIONAL DEFENSE. 285
in the same regiment, of gun and howitzer battalions of different
calibers and classes.
Each gun or howitzer battery shall consist of one captain, two
first lieutenants, two second lieutenants, one first sergeant, one
Supply Sergeant, one stable sergeant, one mess sergeant, mine
Sergeants, £etHºteen twenty corporals, chief mechanic, one saddler,
three horseshoers, Éwe three mechanics, twe three buglers, three
cooks, and eae—htädred–aird—twe thirty-five privates, first class,
and one hundred and seven privates;-het–te—exeeed—twenty-five
per-eehätta—ef-the-privates-Ée-be—Fated--as--privates; first–e4ass-
When no enlisted men of the Quartermaster Corps are attached
for such positions there sheuké shall be added to each battery
of mountain artillery one packmaster (Sergeant, first class),
One assistant packmaster (Sergeant), and one cargador (corporal).
The-President-sbettle-be-ałłłłterized;—ia-His-diseretień;-te-Haerease
the-Büäber-eſ-eełperałs—£e—Éwełłłyº-e?--hersesheers—Ée—fear;-ef
buglers—te—three;-ef-privates–te-eh-e-H+hdred-airé-Éerty-five-
Each headquarters company of a regiment of two battalions
shall consist of one captain, one second lieutenant, one regimental
Sergeant major, two battalion Sergeants major, one first Sergeant,
two color Sergeants, one mess sergeant, one supply Sergeant, one
stable sergeant, Éwe four sergeants, eleven fourteen corporals,
two horseshoers, one saddler, two mechanics, three buglers, fetir
two cooks, eighteen four privates, first class, and fourteen privates,
eighteen two privates, first class, and seven privates, orderlies,
one band leader, one assistant band leader, one sergeant bugler,
two band sergeants, four band corporals, two musicians, first
class, four musicians, second class, and thirteen musicians third
class. That when a regiment consists of three battalions there
sheald shall be added one battalion sergeant major, five corporals,
two orderlies, privates, first class, one bugler, two cooks, and
six privates. When no enlisted Haen men of the Quartermaster
Corps is are attached for such pesłłżeń positions, there shełłłd
shall be added to each mountain artillery headquarters company
one packmaster (Sergeant, first class), one assistant packmaster
(sergeant) and one cargador (corporal).
Each supply company of a regiment of two battalions shall
consist of one captain, one first lieutenant, two regimental
supply sergeants, one first sergeant, one mess Sergeant, two
corporals, two cooks, two horseshoers, two saddlers, two order-
lies, and one wagoner for each authorized wagon of the field
train. When a regiment consists of three battalions there.
sheta}d shall be j one second lieutenant, one regimental
supply sergeant, one orderly, and one wagoner for each addi-
tional authorized wagon of the field train.
Each gun or howitzer battalion she tºd shall consist of one
major, one captain, and batteries as follows: Mountain artil-
lery battalions and light artillery gun or howitzer battalions and
heavy field artillery howitzer battalions serving with the field
artillery of Infantry erganizatiens divisions shall contain three
batteries; horse artillery battalions and heavy field artillery
gun or howitzer battalions other than those specified above
shall contain two batteries.

23380—PT 6—16—4*
286 PREPAREDINESS FOR, NATIONAL DEFENSE.
£aeh-a+a+a+hitień-battalien-sha}}–eensist-ef-ene-Haajerj-eae
eaptain;-eńe—first-er-seeehd—Hetitehaat-(supply—effleet)+&H -
ałańatthit{eft-battalien—headefüarters—detaehāreh {−te—eehsist—ef
erre—battalien—sergeant—Haajerº-eńe—battalień-Słłppy—sergea:#;
£ette—eerperałs; gree; eeeks;–three—eféeries;–three
privates=&#d—erre-wage:Her—fer—eaeh-a+the+ized—wagen—ef—the
£aeh-ałańatthätień-battery-sha}}-eehsist-ef—erre-eaptain;-Éwe
first—Heutenants; -twe–seeehé—Hetitehants; +ere—first–sergeant;
effe—supply—sergeanti-eńe—stable–sergeanti-ene—mess—sergeant;
seven-sergeants;-twelve–eerperals;-eire—ehief—Haeehahier—eae
saddler;-Éethe–Hersesheers; eite—HaeehāHier—three-eeeks;–three
büglers; and—Het—Haere—than—erre-Händred–and–eighty-seven
privates; het–te—exeeed—twenty-five-per-eent. +e—privates
#e-be-rated—as—privates; -first-elass—When—#e-eńkisted—Haan–ef
#he-Quarter Haaster—Gerps—is—attaehed—fer—stieh—pesitień-there
shełłłd—be—added—te—eaeh–Haetihāīā–a4-##!ery—Białattàitiełł
battery—eae—paekHaaster—(sergeant;-first-elass)H-eńe—assistant
Fºlº
esident—is—atitherized;—ia—his—diseretień-te—Herease—the-attra-
bºrrºr-tº-nº-mountain ºther munition
&#e3+ - tº
Hºne-ºf-war ºr whe =a+–is— sº j-the-President-shº!
be—ałłłłłerized—Ée–erganize–the–depet—batteries—and—bāţţă. He as
Herein–presided-and-sueh-artillery- arks—with—streh—ałłłąbers
º:
eehsider—Heeessary; the -Heeessary–additierra!—persehire!—te—be
supplied—feeha-reserve-effieeps-and-the-Regular—Army–Reserve-
SEC. 22. COAST ARTILLERY CORPS.—The Coast Artillery
shall constitute a corps manning the fixed and mobile sea-
coast armament, and shall consist of one Chief of Coast Artillery;
whe-while—se—serving—sha:PHBe—ań-84éiti * * * *
General–Staff—Cerpsi-with—the-rank;-pay; and—ałłewahees—ef-a.
#aaier-general—as-new-preseribed—by-law;-five—majer-generals;
with—the-pay—Bird–a4!ewańees—eſ—a-brigadier—general-as—hew,
fºreseribed-by-law (as hereinbefore provided in section five of
this Act); #wenty-six twenty-four colonels; twenty-five twenty-
four lieutenant colonels; eighty-five seventy-two majors; three
hundred and eighty-eire sixty captains; three hundred and sixty-
#we sixty first lieutenants; three hundred and sixty-twe Sixty
second lieutenants; thirty-one sergeants major, senior grade;
s###y—Éwe sixty-four sergeants major, junior grade; ferty-twe
forty-one master electricians; seventy-three two engineers; eite
H+Hadred ninety-nine electrician sergeants, first class; two hun-
dred and seventy-fetºp five assistant engineers; eae—htādred
ninety-nine electrician sergeants, second class; one hundred and
hiłłe six firemen; Hinety-six ninety-three radio sergeants; sixty-
fear sixty-two master gunners; two hundred and sixty-sever,
sixty-three first sergeants; two hundred, and sixty-sever, Sixty-
three supply sergeants; two hundred and sixty-sever, sixty-three
mess sergeants; two thousand one hundred and thirty-six four
sergeants; three thousand #we one hundred and fetir fifty-six
corporals; five hundred and thirty-fetºp twenty-sia, cooks; five
hundred and thirty-fetºp twenty-six mechanics; five hundred and





*
PREPAIRED NIESS FOR, NATIONAL DEFENSE. 287
thirty-fetºp twenty-sia, buglers; twe—thetisand-three-hitädeed—ahé.
###y—Éwe five thousand two hundred and twenty-five privates, first
class, and fifteen thousand Sia, hundred and seventy-five privates;
Het–te—exceeed—twenty-five-per-eeñttifa-eſ-the-privates-be-be-rated
as-privates; first-elass; and eighteen bands, organized as herein-
before provided for Infantry bands. The total enlisted strength
of the Coast Artillery Corps shall not exceed thirty-thetisand-a-hé.
#y-fetºp twenty-nine thousand three hundred and ninety-nine,
exclusive of the enlisted strength of the bands. The rated men
of the Coast Artillery Corps shall consist of casemate electricians;
observers, first class; plotters; chief planters; coxswains; chief
loaders; observers, second class; gun commanders and gun
pointers. The total number of rated men shall not exceed two
thousand #we–HürréFed-and-ferty one hundred and four. Cox-
Swains shall receive $9 per month in addition to their pay.
SEC. 23. ORIGINAL APPOINTMENTS TO BE PROVI-
SIONAL.—Original appointments in the Regular Army shall be
provisional for a period of two years, at the close of which period
such appointment shall be made permanent, provided the pro-
visional appointee shall have demonstrated under such regu-
lations as the President may prescribe his physical, moral, and
professional fitness for such permanent appointment. Should
any officer holding a provisional appointment become eligible
for promotion, and qualify therefor, before expiration of the
period of two years from the date of his original appointment,
he shall receive only a provisional appointment in such higher
grade until he has qualified for permanent appointment, as pre-
scribed above. Should any officer holding a provisional appoint-
ment fail to establish his physical, moral, and professional fit-
ness for permanent appointment, as prescribed above, he shall
be honoraby discharged at or before the expiration of two years
from date of his original appointment, with six months' pay of
his grade at date of discharge.
SEC. 24. ENLISTMENT OF FILIPINOS.—The President is
hereby authorized to enlist natives of the Philippine Islands for
service in the Regular Army: Provided, That the Organizations
and the commissioned and enlisted strength of the Philippine
Scouts shall be as now authorized by law.
Captains and lieutenants of Philippine Scouts, other than
natives of the Philippine Islands, shall hereafter be entitled to
retirement under the laws governing the retirement of officers of
the Army of similar Pääk grade as permanently established,
except that they shall receive, as retired pay, the amounts now
or hereinafter allowed by law, as retired pay and allowances of
retired master signal electricians of the United States Army,
and no more: Provided, That former officers of the seetit Phil-
ippine Scouts who because of disability occasioned by wounds
received in action have resigned or been discharged such service,
or who have heretofore served as such for a period of more than
five years and have been retired as enlisted men, shall be placed
upon the retired list as officers of Philippine Scouts and there-
after receive the retired pay and allowances provided by this
section for other officers of Philippine Scouts: Provided further,
That any former officer of Philippine Scouts who vacated his
288 PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
office in the Philippine Scouts by discharge or resignation on
account of disability contracted in the line of duty and who
was subsequently retired as an enlisted man, and any former
officer of Philippine Scouts who has been retired as an enlisted
man by special act of Congress, shall be transferred to the retired
list created by this section and shall thereafter receive the
retired pay and allowances authorized by this section and no
IOOTG. S -
SEC. 25. PORTO RICO REGIMENT OF INFANTRY.—The
Porto Rico Regiment of Infantry shall eehsist-ef-ene-eeleńe}; eae
Heatenant—eekeaeli–three—Baajeńs;-fifteen—eaptaśās;-sixteeh—first
*...*.*.*.*.*.*.*.
a Byr-ene-stºpply—eerapahy-eae—haaehine—gań—eerapahay-ahé.
i...º.º.º.º.º.º.º.
parties—eaeh-and-the–erganizatien—ef-eaeh-ańit-sha}}-be-as-pre-
*ided–Ha—this—Aet-er-like-thaits—in-regihaeats—ef-Jafałatry---4 his
regihaeat-shałł be subject to the same laws and regulations as
are other regiments of Infantry of the United States Army. The
officers who are first lieutenants and second lieutenants of the
Porto Rico Regiment of Infantry shall be recommissioned as
first lieutenants and second lieutenants of Infantry of the United
States Army in their respective grades, including their commis–
sioned service; commissioned service in the Regular Army in
the Volunteers in the Porto Rico Provisional Regiment of
Infantry, and in the Porto Rico Regiment of Infantry shall be
counted, and the commissioned service of those officers of the
Porto Rico Regiment of Infantry who were officers of the Porto
Rico Provisional Regiment of Infantry shall be counted as
continuous and uninterrupted between the twenty-ninth day
of June, nineteen hundred and eight, and the thirtieth day of
June, nineteen hundred and fourteen.
SEC. 26. That—hereafter–a4!—appeii#Haehts—ef-seeehd—Hetiteh-
ałłłs—£er-serviee–H–the–Hafałłłły-Cavalry; Field—Artillery=ahé.
Geast–A+#44ery–Cerps-sha}}-be-ee:Haſſissieńed-as-seeehd–Heiteh-
ałłłs—#H–the–Häe ef-the–A+Bay;-&ad–a44–e4#eers—Hew—helding-eefa-
Haissieńs—as—seeehé—Hetitehabits—# £ałłłły-Cavalry-Field
Artillery=&Hél–Geast—A+##!ery—Cerps—sha}}-be-reeehałłissieńed
as—seeeh!d–Heliterrants—#3–the–Häe–e4–the–A++a; ;-aład–a4!—effleers
afteeted—by-this—seetień-sha}}-be-Hääted—ea—a-single—Hist—fer—pre-
H+3 bièa-by-seaterity—areeeeding-be-date-ef-preeedebee—an !
be—stabjeet—te—assigahaeat—and–transfer-te–the–Haſantry; Cavalry;
Field–A+##!ery—and–Geast–A+##!ery–Cerps:
SEC. 27. That all existing laws pertaining to or affecting the
United States Military Academy and civilian or military per-
sonnel on duty thereat in any capacity whatever; the officers
and enlisted men on the retired list; the detached and additional
officers under the Act of Congress approved March third, nine-
teen hundred and eleven; recruiting parties; recruit depots and
unassigned recruits; service-school detachments; United States
###y-priseh Disciplinary Barracks guards; disciplinary organi-
zations; and Indian scouts shall continue and remain in force
except as herein specifically provided otherwise: Provided,
That not to exceed twenty-five per centum of the privates authorized




PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 289
for any organization of any arm, corps, or department, by this Act
or by existing laws, shall be rated as privates, first class.
SEC. 28. That line officers detached for duty with the Organized
Militia, by whatever name it is designated, together with those
detached from their proper commands, under the provisions of
law, for other duty the usual period of which exceeds one year,
shall be subject to the provisions of section twenty-seven of the
Act approved February second, nineteen hundred and one,
with reference to details to the staff corps, but the total number
of detached officers hereby made subject to these provisions shall
not exceed thirty—Éwe thirty-five colonels, #y-five forty-four
lieutenant colonels, eite—hthādred-aird—thirty-six; three hundred
and six majors, five—htädred–and–seventy-seven seven hundred
and twenty-one captains, three—hthirdred–aird–sixty-eight and
eight hundred and eleven first lieutenants, aād-thirty-tº-e—seeehé
& ałats; including two hundred detached officers authorized by
the Act approved March third, nineteen humdred and eleven:
Provided, That the number of officers of each grade to be detached
at the time each of the five increments provided by Section twenty-
nine of this Act is made, shall be detached from the Infantry, Cavalry,
Field Artillery and Coast Artillery Corps, respectively, in the
proportion in which the authorized commissioned strength of each
of the above arms bears to the total authorized commissioned
strength of the Infantry, Cavalry, Field Artillery, and Coast
Artillery Corps on the day before each increment is made.
SEC. 29. That the increase in the commissioned and enlisted
personnel of the Regular Army provided by this Act shall be
made in five annual increments, which shall be, for each arm,
corps, department, and the detached officers, as nearly eitãº
one-fifth of the total increase authorized for each arm, corps, and
department, and of the detached officers as practicable. Officers
promoted to vacancies created or caused by the addition of the
first increment shall be promoted to rank from July first, nine-
teen hundred and sixteen, and those promoted to vacancies
created or caused by the second increment shall be promoted
to rank from July first, nineteen hundred and seventeen; those
promoted to vacancies created or caused by the addition of the
third increment shall be promoted to rank from July first,
nineteen hundred and eighteen; those promoted to vacancies
created or caused by the addition of the fourth increment shall
be promoted to rank from July first, nineteen hundred and
nineteen; and those promoted to vacancies created or caused
by the addition of the fifth increment shall be promoted to rank
from July first, nineteen hundred and twenty: Provided, That
in the event of war or similar emergency in which the public
safety demands it the President is authorized to immediately
organize the entire increase authorized by this Act. -
Vacancies in the grade of second lieutenant created or caused
by this Act shall be filled in the following order: First, from
cadets graduated from the United States Military Academy;
second, from enlisted men whose fitness for promotion shall have
been determined by competitive examination; third, from mem-
bers of the Officers' Reserve Corps; fourth, from candidates from
civil life between the ages of twenty-one and twenty-seven years
290 PREPAREDINESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
The President is authorized to make the necessary rules and
regulations to carry these provisions into effect.
SEC. 30. That for the purpose of securing a reserve of officers
available for service as temporary officers in the Regular Army as
provided for in this Act and in section eight of the Act #.
April twenty-fifth, nineteen hundred and fourteen, as officers for
recruit rendezvous and depots, and as officers of Volunteers,
there shall be organized, under such rules and regulations as the
President may prescribe, not inconsistent with the provisions of
this Act, an Officers' Reserve Corps of the Army of the United
States. **.
The President of the United States is authorized to appoint
and commission, by and with the advice and consent of the Sen-
ate, reserve officers in all grades up to and including the grade of
major, such citizens of the United States as upon examination
prescribed by the Secretary of War are found physically, mentally
and morally qualified to hold such commission, the persons so
commissioned to constitute and be known as the reserve corps of
the eivil several arms, corps, or departments in which they may be
found qualified and commissioned by the President.
All persons now carried as duly qualified and registered, pur-
suant to section twenty-three of the Act of Congress approved
January twenty-first, nineteen hundred and three, shall, for a
period of three years after the passage of this Act, be eligible
for appointment in the Officers' Reserve Corps in the arm, corps,
or department for which they shall have been found qualified
without further examination, except the physical examination,
subject to the limitations as to age and rank herein prescribed.
Commissions duly issued by the President to officers of the
Officers' Reserve Corps shall be in force for a period of five years
unless terminated in the discretion of the President; such officers
may be recommissioned either in the same or higher grade for a
consecutive period of five years, subject to such examinations
and qualifications as the President may prescribe: Provided;
That-tre+eserve—effieer—shall—be—appeiated—er—reappeiated—a.
seeehé—Hettéehāhā-ā–the–9ffleers’ Reserve—Cerps—after—he-has
Feaehed—the-age—eſ—thirty-years;-a—first—Hetatehaat-after—he-has
Feaehed-the-age-ef-thirty-five-years;-a-eaptain-after-he-has-Feaehee!
the-age-eſ-ferty-years;-aład-a-Haajer-after-he-has-reaeheel-the-age
£-ferty-five-years: Provided further, That officers of the Officers'
Reserve Corps shall have rank therein in the various arms, corps,
and departments of said reserve corps according to grades and to
length of service in their grades respective grades, and when
employed in active service shall rank meat after all officers of the
same grades in the Regular Army and above officers of the same
grades in the Organized Militia and Volunteers.
SEC. 31. That when a volunteer force is authorized the Sec-
retary of War may order officers of the Reserve Corps, subject to
such subsequent physical examinations as he may prescribe, to
temporary duty with the Regular Army in grades thereof which
can not, for the time being, be filled by promotion, as officers in
volunteer organizations and as officers of recruit rendezvous and
depots, in such numbers as may be authorized by law. While

PREPAREDINESS FOR, NATIONAL DEFENSE. 291
such reserve officers are on such service they shall by-wirétie—ef
their–eehabaissieh-as-reserve—effieers;–exereise-ee:Hainaahé—appre-
priate-te-their-grade-and-Fałak-in-the-ergaaizatień-te-whieh-they
are-assigned;—Bad-sha}} be entitled to the pay and allowances of
the corresponding grades in the Regular Army, with increase of
pay for length of service as now allowed by law for officers in
the Regular Army, their active service alone being considered from
the date upon which they are required by the terms of their
order to obey the same: (Preºided;—That—effleers—se-eféered-te
aetive-serviee-shak]—take—Éeñaperary–Fałak-aſſaeng—thełase]ves—aład
#-their-grades-in-the–erganizatieńs-te-whieh-assigned-aeeeféing
te—the-dates—eſ—eféers—pkaeing—theła-eń-aetive–serviee;-añé-Haay.
be-prehaeted;—ia-àeeeedańee-with—streh—Fałaki-te-vaeaneies-in-weł–
thirteer–ergartížatiełas-er-te-temperary—waeałreies—in-the-Regüläf
A+Hay—thereafter-eeetirring—Ha-the-erganizatien-in-whieh-the-are
serving: Provided, That officers of the Reserve Corps shall not
be entitled to retirement or retired pay and shall be entitled to
pension only for disability incurred in the line of duty and while
in active service.
SEer–32–4}+a+–āHy—effieer—ef–the–956ers–Reserve–Cerps—ef-
dered—te—aetive–serviee–by–the–Seeretary-ef-W-af-while—helding
a—reserve–eełańissie H-shałHreha-the-time—He-is-Feetired-by-the
#e3+as—ef-his-ereker-te—ebey-the-sahae;-be-subjeet–te–the–Haws—a Hé.
regulatieńs-fer-the-gevera#ent-ef-the-A+Hay-ef-the-United-States:
SEC. 33. That to the extent provided for from time to time
by appropriations the Secretary of War is authorized to order
reserve officers to duty with troops of the Regular Army or Regu-
lar Army Reserve or at field exercises for periods not to exceed
two weeks in any one calendar year, and while so serving such
officers shall receive the pay and allowances of their grade:
Provided, That with the consent of such officers the Secretary of
War is authorized to prolong this period or to order them for
duty on boards, or for consultation or advice, to the extent justi-
fied by the amount appropriated and the public needs: Provided
further, That after all officers of the Officers' Reserve Corps of any
arm, corps, or department have been ordered into active service,
officers of Volunteers in such arm, corps, or department may be
appointed in such mumbers and grades as may be necessary: And
provided further, That nothing herein shall operate to prevent the
appointment of any officer of the Regular Army as an officer of Vol-
wnteers before all the officers of the Officers' Reserve Corps have been
ordered into active service.
SEC. 34. That on and after the first day of July, nineteen hun-
dred and sixteen, all enlistments in the Regular Army shall be
for a term of six: eight years, the first three two years to be in the
active service with a branch of which those enlistments form a
part, and, except as otherwise provided herein, the last three Sia.
years in the Regular Army Reserve hereinafter provided for. At
the expiration of three two years' service in a first or subsequent
enlistment enlisted men may be furloughed to the Regular 3.
Reserve in the grade in which then serving, or may, in the dis-
cretion of the Secretary of War, be reenlisted for a period of six:
eight years: Provided, That after the expiration of one year's
honorable service any enlisted man of the Regular Army whose



292 PREPAIREDINESS FOR, NATIONAL DEFENSE.
company, troop, battery, or detachment commander shall report
him as proficient and sufficiently trained may, in the discretion
of the Secretary of War, be furloughed to the Regular Army
Reserve under such regulations as the Secretary of War may
prescribe, in which event he shall not be eligible to reenlist in the
service until the expiration of his term of six: eight years: Pro-
wided further, That in all enlistments hereafter accomplished under
the provisions of this Act four years shall be counted as an enlist-
ment period in computing continuous-service pay: And provided
further, That no bounty nor bonus shall be paid to any man for
enlisting or reenlisting.
SEC. 35. That the Regular Army Reserve shall consist of first,
alſ enlisted men now in the Regular Army Reserve or who shall
hereafter become members of the Regular Army Reserve under
the provisions of existing law; second, all enlisted men fur-
loughed to or enlisted in the Regular Army Reserve under the
provisions of this Act; third, any person holding an honorable
discharge from the Regular Army with character reported at
least good, who is physically qualified for the duties of a soldier
and not over forty-five years of age, who enlists in the Regular
Army Reserve for a period of £ethe six years; and fourth, any
erson who is a citizen of the United States or who has declared
his intention of becoming a citizen thereof, who by the nature of
his civil occupation or profession is qualified for duty in the
Quartermaster, Engineer, or Signal Corps, or in the Medical or
Ordnance Department, and who is physically qualified for the
duties of a soldier and not over thirty-five years of age and who
enlists for one of said corps or departments for a period of £ette
sia years.
SEC. 36. That no enlisted man in the Regular Army shall
receive his final discharge until the termination of his six: eight-
year term of enlistment except upon reenlistment as provided for
in this Act or as now provided by law for discharge prior to
expiration of term of enlistment, but when an enlisted man is
furloughed to the Regular Army Reserve his accounts shall be
closed and he shall be paid in full to the date such furlough
becomes effective, including transportation in kind and subsist-
ence as now provided by law for discharged soldiers: Provided,
That when by reason of death or disability of a member of the
family of an enlisted man occurring after his enlistment members
of his family become dependent upon him for Support, he may, in
the discretion of the Secretary of War, be discharged from the
service of the United States or be furloughed to the Regular
Army Reserve, upon due proof being made of such condition.
SEC. 37. That the President is authorized to assign members
of the Regular Army Reserve as reserves to organizations of the
Regular Army, or to organize the Regular Army Reserve, or any
part thereof, into units or detachments of Pałłłły;-Gavakry;-Piełd
Artillery;-Ceast—A+#44éry –Pagineers;-er-the-staff—departments
any arm, corps or department in such manner as he may prescribe,
and to assign to such units and detachments officers of the Regu-
lar Army or of the Officers' Reserve Corps herein provided for;
and in-the-event-ef-war-er-the-iña###eaee-thereef he may mobilize
the Regular Army Reserve in such manner as he may determine,
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 293
and thereafter retain it, or any part thereof, in active service for
Such period as he may determine the conditions demand: Pro-
vided, That all enlistments in the Regular Army, including those
in the Regular Army Reserve, which are in force on the date of
the outbreak of war shall continue in force for one year, unless
Sooner terminated by order of the Secretary of War, but nothing
herein shall be construed to shorten the time of enlistment pre-
scribed. *
SEC. 38. That when mobilized by order of the President, the
members of the Regular Army Reserves shall, so long as they may
remain in active service, receive the pay and allowances of
enlisted men of the Regular Army of like grades: Provided, That
any enlisted man who shall have reenlisted in the Regular Army
Reserves shall receive during such active service the additional
pay now provided by law for soldiers in his arm of the service
in the second enlistment period: Provided further, That upon
reporting for duty and being found physically fit for service
members of the Regular Army Reserves shall receive the actual
cost of transportation and subsistence from their homes to the
places at which they may be ordered to report for duty under
such order: And provided further, That service in the Regular
Army Reserves except when on active service, shall confer no
right to retirement or retired pay, and members of the Regular
Army Reserves shall become entitled to pensions only through
disability incurred while on active duty in the service of the
United States.
SEC. 39. That any enlisted man of the Regular Army who may
have served not less than fifteen years shall, if prevented by the
provisions of this Act from reenlisting at any time prior to the
eehéâtień rendition of service necessary for retirement under
existing laws, be retired and shall receive such proportion of the
retired pay and allowances of his grade authorized by law for
thirty years as his service, including double time as authorized
by law, bears to thirty years.
SEC. 40. That-a!-Haehabers-ef-the-Regular-A++ay-Reserves-sł844;
that H-day—diseharged-frera-the-sahae;-be-subjeet-te-the-Rules-8+d
A+tiekes—eſ—Wał;-and- The President may formulate such rules
and regulations as in his judgment may be necessary for utilizing
the services of members and employees of all departments of the
Government of the United States for mobilizing the Regular
Army Reserves.
SEC. 41. Thà:#—the-President—is—hereby-a+the++Zed—Ée—efeate;
establish;-ałłd—HaałłłłąłH-a-Reserve—9ſheers'—Training—Cerps:
Per—this—ptºpese—there—sha}}-be-Hälized–Stieh-eivil-editeatieńa!
#Hstitutions-ef-the-United-States;-at-whieh-ah-effieer-ef-the-Aiſſay
is—detailed—as—prefesser—eſ—HaiH+a+y—seiehee—a Hé-taeties—aład—at
which—tre++ess—than-Éwe-handred-students—are-daelergeing-ee:Ha-
pulsery—H+++++a+y—#aining—£er—Het—less—thała—twe-years—and—at
whieh-streh–Hailitary-training-sha}}-be-a-prerequisite-fer-gradua-
#e3+,-whe-agree-to-establish-ahé-Haağataia-Staeh-Hüäber-eſ-ÉHits
ef-the-Reserve–9ſheets”—Training-Cerps-as-Haay-be-preserá beel-by
the-See**#ary—ef—W-8++-Preºided HPhät-Häełąbers—thereef-sha}}-be
feetúired—be—tthélerge—streh–#&###g-as-Haay-be-preseribed-by-the
Seeretary—ef—Wał–Provided–fººther;-4-Hat—ae—student—sha}}-be

*N
294 PREPAIRED NESS FOR, NATIONAL DEFENSE.

eligible-fer-membership-Ha-the-Reserve–956ersº-Training—Cerps
Nº.i. hº :::::::::::::::::::::
Hettheed-physie&#y– Bełżeńa–HaiH #y—after—exałałłła-
..º.º.º.º.º.º.
vided—fºrther; Phat—the-Seeretary—eſ—Wał—is—autheråed—te—pre-
seribe-Éegłłłatiens-fer-the-Reserve 9{#eefs—Trainiag-Cerps-
SEe–42–4 hat-the-President—is–hereby—a titherized—te-appeiał
as-reserve-effieeps-Hader-streh—rega}atiens-as-He-Haay-preser+be-any
graduate-ef-the-Reserve–956ers—Training–Gerps-whe-sha}}-have
passed—the-preseribed—HaeH+a+–and–physiea!—exałaihatien-aird
whe-sha}}-agree—tthéler—eath—er—affirraatien-in-writiagº-with—the
eenseat—eſ—his—parent—er-guardian-iſ-à-H+Haerº-te—serve—the
|UHited—States—#–the–eapaeity—ef-a-Feserve–ef#eer-ef-the-Array
during-the-perieel-ef-six-years—#era—the-date—ef-his-graduatień.
#eH++he-#########eh-Ha-whieh-he-is-a-staedeat;-ałałess-seeiae+-elis–
eharged—by-preper-attherity- -
SEe–43–4}+at-the-President—is—hereby-attherized—te—detail—as
prefessers—eſ-HaiHitary—seiertee—and—Éaeties—a Hé–-as-HaiHitary—ia-
streeters—with-Haits—ef-the-Reserve–95;eers —Training–GeFps-stre+
HłłHaber-ef-effleers-ef-the-Array-aet—a beve-the-grade-ef-eaptain-as
Haay-be-Heeessary—fee—this—purpese-Provided;—That—het—Haere
#Bah—three-hººd Fed-effleeps-shak!-be-se—detailed-
SEC. —. That hereafter the monthly pay of enlisted men of the
grades of the Army named in this Act, during first enlistment, shall
be as follows, namely: Quartermaster sergeant, senior grade, Quarter-
master Corps, master hospital Sergeant, Medical Corps, master engi-
neer, senior grade, Corps of Engineers, and band leader, Infantry
Cavalry, Artillery, and Corps of Engineers, $75; hospital sergeant,
Medical Corps, and master engineer, junior grade, %. of Engi-
neers, $65; sergeant, first class, Corps of Engineers, regimental
Supply Sergeant, Infantry, Cavalry, Field Artillery, and Corps of
Engineers, and assistant engineer, Coast Artillery Corps, $45;
assistant band leader, Infantry, Cavalry, Artillery, and Corps of
Engineers, and sergeant bugler, Infantry, Cavalry, Artillery, and
Corps of Engineers, 840; musician, first class, Infantry, Cavalry,
Artillery, and Corps of Engineers, 886; sergeant orderly, Infantry,
and Cavalry, supply sergeant, Infantry and Cavalry, Artillery, and
Corps of Engineers, mess sergeant, Infantry, Cavalry, Artillery,
and Corps of Engineers, cook, Medical Corps, horseshoer, Infantry,
Cavalry, Artillery, Corps of Engineers, Signal Corps, and Medical
Corps, stable sergeant, Infantry, Cavalry, and Corps of Engineers,
radio Sergeant, Coast Artillery Corps, and musician, second class,
Infantry, Cavalry, Artillery, and Corps of Engineers, $30; musi-
cian, third class, Infantry, Cavalry, Artillery, and Corps of Engi-
neers, $24; Saddler, Infantry, Cavalry, Field Artillery, Corps of
Engineers, and Medical Corps, mechanic, Infantry, Cavalry, and
Field Artillery, and Medical Corps, and wagoner, Infantry, Field
Artillery, and Corps of Engineers, $21; private, first class, Infan-
try, Cavalry, and Artillery, $18; bugler, $15. Nothing herein con-
tained shall operate to reduce the pay or allowances now authorized
by law for any grade of enlisted men of the Army.





Sec. —. That all laws and parts of laws in conflict with the
provisions of this Act be, and the same are hereby, repealed.
Sec. —. That for the purpose of assisting in the instruction of
the personnel and care of property in the hands of the Organized
IPREPAREDNIESS FOR, NATIONAL DEFENSE. 295
Militia the Secretary of War is authorized to detail, from the Infan-
try, Cavalry, Field Artillery, Corps of Engineers, Coast Artillery
Corps, Medical Corps, and Signal Corps of the Regular Army,
Sergeants for duty with corresponding organizations of the Organized
Militia, not to exceed one thousand of Such Sergeants for such duty,
and not to exceed one hundred sergeants for duty with the discip-
linary organizations at the United States Disciplinary Barracks,
shall be additional to the sergeants authorized by this Act for the
corps, companies, troops, batteries, and detachments from which
they may be detailed.
The CHAIRMAN. Have you taken up each of those bills, General;
that is, the Hay bill and the tentative plan of the War Department'.
Gen. MACOMB. Yes, sir. They were handed to me at the end of
the session on Saturday, and I have studied them as well as I could
over Sunday. This is the first time I have seen the War Department
draft entitled ‘‘A bill for making further and more effectual pro-
vision for the national defense, and for other purposes.”
(The so-called War Department bill is as follows:)
A BILL For making further and more effectual provision
for the national defense, and for other purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-
tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
That the Army of the United States shall consist of the
Regular Army, the Continental Army, the Officers' Reserve
Corps, the Organized Militia employed in the service of the
United States, and the Volunteer Army.
SEC. 2. That the Regular Army of the United States,
including the existing organizations, shall consist of fifteen
regiments of Cavalry; a Coast Artillery Corps; ten regiments
of Field Artillery; forty regiments of Infantry; the cadet
companies; six major generals; fifteen brigadier generals;
a General Staff Corps; an Adjutant General's Department;
an Inspector General's Department; a Judge Advocate
General's Department; a Quartermaster Corps; a Medical
Department; a Corps of Engineers; an Ordnance Department;
a Signal Corps; the chaplains; the detached officers; the
officers of the Bureau of Insular Affairs; the officers and
enlisted men of the Army on the retired list; the professors
at the United States Military Academy; the Corps of Cadets,
the Army detachments, and band at the United States Mili-
tary Academy; the service school detachments; the recruiting
arties; recruit and disciplinary barracks companies; the
egular Army Reserve; Indian Scouts as now authorized by
law; and such other officers and enlisted men as may herein-
after be provided for. *
SEC. 3. That each regiment of Cavalry shall consist of
one colonel, one lieutenant colonel, three majors, fifteen
captains, sixteen first lieutenants, sixteen second lieutenants,
two veterinarians; one headquarters troop, one supply troop,
one machine-gun troop, and twelve troops of Cavalry, organ-
ized into three squadrons of four troops each. Of the officers
296 PREPAIRED NIESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
herein provided, the first lieutenants not required for duty
with the troops of Cavalry or with headquarters, supply, or
machine-gun troops shall be available for detail as squadron
adjutants or such other details as may be authorized by law or
regulations. -
Each Cavalry headquarters troop , shall consist of one
captain (who shall be the regimental adjutant), one regi-
mental sergeant major, three squadron Sergeants major, One
first sergeant (who shall be the drum major), two color ser–
geants, one mess sergeant, one supply sergeant, one stable
sergeant, two sergeants, five corporals, two cooks, two horse-
shoers, one saddler, twenty-three privates, one band leader,
one assistant band leader, one sergeant trumpeter, two band
sergeants, four band corporals, two musicians (first class),
four musicians (second class), thirteen musicians (third class),
one sergeant orderly, and eleven orderlies. *
Each Cavalry supply troop shall consist of one captain
(who shall be the regimental supply officer), two second
lieutenants, three regimental supply sergeants, and such
noncommissioned officers and other enlisted men as the
Secretary of War may authorize to be supplied from the
staff corps or departments.
Each Cavalry machine-gun troop shall consist of one
captain, one first lieutenant, two second lieutenants, one
first sergeant, one mess sergeant, one supply sergeant, one
stable sergeant, eight sergeants, eight corporals, two cooks,
two horseshoers, one saddler, one mechanic, two trumpeters,
and sixty-two privates, not to exceed twenty-five per centum
of the privates to be rated as privates, first class.
Each troop of Cavalry shall consist of One captain,
one first lieutenant, one second lieutenant, One first
sergeant, one mess sergeant, one supply sergeant, five
sergeants, six corporals, two cooks, two horseshoers, one
saddler, two trumpeters, and forty-three privates: Provided,
That the President in his discretion may increase the number
of corporals in any troop of Cavalry to nine and the number
of privates to seventy-six.
The commissioned officers required for the Cavalry
headquarters, supply, and machine-gun troops and for the
troops of Cavalry organized into squadron shall be assigned
from those hereinbefore authorized.
SEC. 4. That the Coast Artillery includes troops for
fixed and movable armament for coast defense. The Coast
Artillery Corps shall consist of the Chief of Coast Artillery
with the rank of major general; nineteen colonels; nineteen
lieutenant colonels; fifty-six majors; two hundred and
seventy-eight captains; two hundred and seventy-eight first
lieutenants; and two hundred and seventy-eight second
lieutenants; twenty-five sergeants major with the rank, pay,
and allowances of regimental sergeants major of Infantry;
thirty-four master electricians; seventy-six engineers; eighty-
nine electrician sergeants, first class; eighty-nine electrician
sergeants, second class; fifty-four sergeants major with the
rank, pay, and allowances of battalion sergeants major of
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFEN SE. 297
Infantry; fifty master gunners; sixty-six firemen; two hun-
dred and twenty-two first sergeants; two hundred and
twenty-two supply sergeants; one thousand seven hundred
and seventy-six sergeants; two thousand six hundred and
sixty-four corporals; four hundred and forty-four cooks; four
hundred and forty-four mechanics; four hundred and forty-
four trumpeters; seventeen thousand nine hundred and
eighty-two privates; and eighteen bands, organized as pro-
vided by this Act of the Engineer Band: Provided, That the
number of officers, noncommissioned officers, and privates
assigned to the manning body of any particular tactical unit
may be fixed by the President in accordance with the require-
ments of the service of that unit: Provided further, That
the number of rated men in the Coast Artillery Corps shall
not exceed one thousand seven hundred and seventy-six:
And provided further, That when Coast Artillery troops are
trained in the duties of any other arm of the service, they will
be organized in accordance with the law pertaining to that
à l'Iſl. -
SEC. 5. That the Field Artillery includes light artillery,
horse artillery, heavy artillery (field and siege types), and
mountain artillery. Of the ten regiments of Field Artillery
provided for by this Act, eight regiments shall be two-bat-
talion regiments and two regiments shall be three-battalion
regiments as hereinafter provided. It shall be in the discre-
tion of the Secretary of War to vary the equipment of units
authorized by this section, and nothing contained in this
section shall be construed to prevent the assembling in the
same regiment of light and heavy battalions of different
calibers and classes. *
Each regiment of Light Artillery and each regiment of
Mountain Artillery shall consist of , one colonel, one lieu-
tenant colonel, two majors, eleven captains, thirteen first
lieutenants, thirteen second lieutenants, two veterinarians,
One headquarters company, One Supply company, and six bat-
teries organized into two battalions of three batteries each.
Each headquarters company of a regiment of Light or
Mountain Artillery shall consist of one captain (who shall be
the regimental adjutant), one regimental Sergeant major,
two battalion sergeants major, one first sergeant (who shall
be the drum major), two color sergeants, one mess sergeant,
one supply sergeant, one stable sergeant, two sergeants,
eleven corporals, two horseshoers, one saddler, two mechanics,
three trumpeters, two cooks, eighteen privates, eight Order-
lies, one band leader, one assistant band leader, one sergeant
trumpeter, two band sergeants, four band corporals, two musi-
cians (first class), four musicians (second class), and thirteen
musicians (third class): Provided, That when no enlisted
men of the Quartermaster Corps are detached for such duty,
there shall be added to each Mountain Artillery headquarters
company one packmaster (sergeant, first class), one assistant
packmaster (Sergeant), and one cargador (corporal).
Each battery of Field Artillery shall consist of one cap-
tain, one first lieutenant, two second lieutenants, one first
298 PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
Sergeant, one mess sergeant, one supply sergeant, one stable
Sergeant, one chief mechanic, five sergeants, twelve cor-
porals, four mechanics, three cooks, two trumpeters, and
one hundred and two privates: Provided, That the Presi-
dent in his discretion may increase the number of sergeants
in any battery Field Artillery to seven, the number of
corporals to sixteen, the number of mechanics to seven, the
number of trumpeters to three, and the number of privates
to one hundred and forty-nine. .
The commissioned officers for the headquarters and sup-
ply companies and for the batteries shall be assigned from
among those hereinbefore mentioned, and the captains and
lieutenants hereinbefore provided for and not required for
duty with headquarter or supply companies or with batteries
shall be available for detail as regimental and battalion staff
officers and such other details as may be authorized by law
or regulations. -
In time of war or when war is imminent the President
is authorized to organize one ammunition battalion for each
regiment of Field Artillery and one artillery park. Each
ammunition battalion shall consist of one major, one captain,
one first lieutenant (who shall be the supply officer), one
ammunition battalion headquarter detachment, and three
ammunition batteries. - -
Each ammunition battalion headquarter detachment
shall consist of one battalion Sergeant major, one battalion
supply sergeant, four corporals, one trumpeter, two cooks,
three orderlies, three privates, and one wagoner for each
authorized wagon of the field train.
Each supply company of a regiment of Light or Moun-
tain Artillery shall consist of one captain (who shall be the
regimental supply offiger), one first lieutenant, two regi-
mental supply sergeants, and such noncommissioned officers
and other enlisted men as the Secretary of War may authorize
to be supplied from the staff corps or departments.
Each regiment of Horse Artillery and each regiment of
Heavy Artillery (field or siege type) shall consist of one
colonel, one lieutenant colonel, three majors, twelve cap-
tains, thirteen first lieutenants, fourteen second lieutenants,
three veterinarians, one headquarters company, one supply
company, and six batteries organized into three battalions of
two batteries each.
The headquarters companies and the supply companies of
Horse Artillery and Heavy Artillery regiments (field or siege
type) shall be organized as hereinbefore provided for the
headquarters companies and supply companies of regiments of
Light and Mountain Artillery, except that in regiments of
Horse Artillery and Heavy Artillery the enlisted strength
hereinbefore provided for headquarters companies shall be
increased by one battalion sergeant major, five corporals, two
orderlies, one trumpeter, two cooks, and six privates, and the
commissioned and enlisted strength hereinbefore provided for
supply companies shall be increased by one second lieutenant
and one regimental supply Sergeant.
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 299
Each ammunition battery shall consist of one captain,
two first lieutenants, two second lieutenants, one first
Sergeant, one supply Sergeant, one stable sergeant, one mess
sergeant, seven sergeants, twelve corporals, one chief me-
chanic, one saddler, four horseshoers, three cooks, three
trumpeters, and not more than one hundred and eighty-
seven privates: Provided, That not to exceed twenty-five
per centum of the privates shall be rated as privates, first
class: Provided further, That when no enlisted men of the
Quartermaster Department are detached for such positions,
there shall be added to each ammunition battery serving
with mountain artillery one packmaster (Sergeant, first
class); one assistant packmaster (Sergeant); and one cargador
(corporal): And provided further, That the President may in
his discretion increase the number of horseshoers in each
ammunition battery serving with Mountain Artillery to six.
The organization of an artillery park shall be as the
President may prescribe.
The organization of ammunition battalions, the artillery
park, and ammunition batteries shall be temporary and may
be discontinued by the President in his discretion. The
officers necessary therefor shall be supplied by the assign-
ment of officers from the Officers' Reserve Corps hereinafter
provided for, or by temporary promotions and appointments
in the manner authorized by section eight of an Act to
provide for raising the volunteer forces of the United States
in time of actual or threatened war, approved April twenty-
fifth, nineteen hundred and fourteen, for filling temporary
vacancies - created in the commissioned personnel of the
Regular Army through appointments of officers thereof to
i. volunteer rank.
SEC. 6. That each regiment of Infantry shall consist
of one colonel, one lieutenant colonel, three majors, fifteen
captains, fifteen first lieutenants, fifteen second lieutenants,
One headquarter company, one supply company, one machine
gun company, and twelve Infantry companies organized into
three battalions of four companies each. Of the officers
herein provided, the lieutenants not required for duty with
Infantry companies or with headquarter, supply, or ma-
chine gun companies shall be available for detail as battalion
adjutants and such other details as may be authorized by law
or regulations.
Each Infantry headquarter company shall consist of one
captain (who shall be the regimental adjutant); one sergeant
major; three battalion sergeants major; one first sergeant
(who shall be the drum major); two color sergeants; one mess
Sergeant; one supply Sergeant; two cooks; one horseshoer;
One band leader; one assistant band leader; one sergeant
trumpeter; two band sergeants; four band corporals; two
musicians (first class); four musicians (second class); thirteen
musicians (third class); one sergeant Orderly; and sixteen
orderlies.
Each Infantry supply company shall consist of one cap-
tain (who shall be the regimental supply officer); one second
300 PREPAREDINESS FOR, NATIONAL DEFENSE.
lieutenant; three regimental supply sergeants; and such non-
commissioned officers and other enlisted men as the Secretary
of War may authorize to be supplied from the staff corps or
departments.
Each Infantry machine-gun company shall consist of one
captain, one first lieutenant, one second lieutenant, one
first Sergeant, one mess Sergeant, one supply sergeant, one
stable Sergeant, seven Sergeants, eight corporals, two cooks,
one mechanic, and forty-eight privates, not to exceed twenty-
five per centum of the privates to be rated as privates, first
class.
Each Infantry company shall consist of one captain,
One first lieutenant, one second lieutenant, one first sergeant,
one mess Sergeant, one supply Sergeant, three sergeants, six
corporals, two cooks, two trumpeters, one mechanic, and
eighty-four privates: Provided, That the President in his
discretion may increase the number of Sergeants, in any com-
pany of Infantry to five, the number of corporals to ten, the
number of cooks to three, and the number of privates to one
hundred and twenty-six.
The commissioned officers required for the Infantry head-
quarters, supply, and machine-gun companies, and for the
Infantry companies organized into battalions shall be assigned
from those hereinbefore authorized.
SEC. , 7. That the General Staff Corps shall consist of
one Chief of Staff and general officers, all to be de-
tailed by the President from officers of the Army at large
not below the grade of brigadier general; colonels;
lieutenant colonels; and majors, to be de-
tailed from the corresponding grades in the Army at large,
under such rules for selection as the President may prescribe;
captains, to be detailed from officers of the Army at
large of the grades of captain or first lieutenant, who, while
so serving, shall have the rank, pay, and allowances of captain.
All officers detailed in the General Staff Corps, shall be de-
tailed therein for periods of four years, unless sooner re-
lieved: Provided, That if any officer so detailed shall be
promoted to the next higher grade while so serving, the
number of officers of the General Staff Corps in the grade to
which he is promoted shall be increased by one for such
time as the officer so promoted is an additional number of
the advanced grade, but the total number of officers detailed
to the General Staff Corps shall at no time exceed the aggre-
gate of the numbers herein specified for the several grades:
And provided further, That each position vacated by officers
below the grade of general officer detailed in the General
Staff Corps for tours of service shall be filled by promotions
in the corresponding branch of the Army in which they
hold permanent commissions, until the total number detailed
equals the number authorized for duty in the General Staff
Corps. Thereafter any vacancies caused by detail in the
General Staff Corps shall be filled by officers returned from
tours of duty with the General Staff Corps. If, in the opera-
tion of this section the number of officers in any particular
PREPAIREDINESS FOR, NATIONAL DEFENSE. 301
arm or branch of the service at any time exceeds the number
authorized by law in any grade, promotions to that grade
shall cease until the number has been reduced to that author-
ized.
While serving in the General Staff Corps, officers, may
be temporarily assigned to duty with any branch of the Army.
Upon being relieved from duty in the General Staff Corps,
officers shall return to the branch of the Army in which
they hold a permanent commission, and no officer shall be
eligible to a further detail in the General Staff Corps until he
shall have served two years with the branch of the Army in
which commissioned, except in case of emergency or in time
of war. .
. The Chief of Coast Artillery and the Chief of the Con-
tinental Army and Militia Division shall, while so serv-
ing, be additional members of the General Staff Corps.
SEC, 8. That. The Adjutant General's Department shall
consist of The Adjutant General, who shall be chief of said
department with the rank of brigadier general, five (5)
colonels, eight (7) lieutenant colonels, and thirteen (10)
majors.
NOTE:-The changes in designations of offices and titles here introduced
are for the purpose of conforming such designations to those employed in the
act of Congress approved April 23, 1903, for the reorganization of the Medical
Department, the latest enactment in which Congress may be said to have con-
sidered the matter, and to the designations that have generally been employed
in prescribing the composition of the Engineer and Signal Corps and the
Ordnance Department, and for the further reason that the terminology which
this enactment employs is the only one that has been suggested which is
applicable to all the staff corps and departments.
The figures in parenthesis show in this, as in succeeding Sections relating
to staff departments, the present strength, so that the increases proposed are at
Once apparent.
SEO. 9. That the Inspector General's Department shall
consist of one Inspector General, who shall be chief of said
department with the rank of brigadier general; three (3)
colonels; six (4) lieutenant colonels; and twelve (9) majors.
SEC. 10. That the Judge Advocate General's Depart-
ment shall consist of one Judge Advocate General, who shall
be chief of said department with the rank of brigadier general;
three (2) colonels; six (3) lieutenant colonels; eleven (7)
majors: Provided, That the duties of the Judge Advocate
General's Department may include investigations necessary
in the administration of military justice.
SEC. 11. That the Quartermaster Corps shall consist
of one Quartermaster General, who shall be chief of said
corps with the rank of major general; two brigadier generals;
twenty-one (14) colonels; thirty (20) lieutenant colonels;
seventy-two (48) majors; one hundred , and fifty-five (102)
captains; and not to exceed one hundred (15) quartermaster
sergeants, senior grade; five hundred and four quartermaster
sergeants; five hundred (380) sergeants, first class; seventeen
hundred (1,240) sergeants; eight hundred and fifty (600)
corporals; four thousand (2,920) privates, first class; one
thousand (750) privates; and one hundred and fifty (95)
23380—Pt 6—16—5
302 PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
cooks: Provided, That the master electricians now authorized
by law shall hereafter be known as quartermaster sergeants,
senior grade, and shall be included in the number of quarter-
master sergeants, senior grade, herein authorized: Provided
further, That vacancies in the grade of captain in the Quar-
termaster Corps may be filled by detail of either captains or
first lieutenants of the line of the Army (those detailed from
the latter grade to receive, while so serving, the pay and
allowances of a captain. * ~
SEC. 12. That the Medical Department shall consist of
the Medical Corps; the Dental Corps; the Nurse Corps; and
the Hospital Corps; and, for a period of months after
this Act shall become effective, the Medical Reserve Corps as
now authorized by law,
The Medical Corps shall consist of one surgeon general,
who shall be chief of said department with the rank of major
general (and when a vacancy shall occur in the office of
Surgeon General on the expiration of the service of the present
incumbent, by retirement or otherwise, the Surgeon General
shall thereafter have the rank of brigadier general); twenty-
two (14) colonels; thirty-eight (24) lieutenant-colonels; one
hundred and sixty-five (105) majors; and four hundred and
sixty-nine (300) captains and first lieutenants.
The Dental Corps, the Nurse Corps, and the Hospital
Corps shall be as now authorized by law.
SEC. 13. That the Corps of Engineers shall consist of
one Chief of Engineers, who shall be the chief of said corps
with the rank of brigadier general; twenty-three (15) col-
onels; thirty-two (22) lieutenant colonels; seventy-four (51)
majors; one hundred and four (60) captains; one hundred
(56) first lieutenants; and fifty-nine (43) second lieutenants.
The enlisted force of the Corps of Engineers shall con-
sist of four regiments of Engineers; one mounted battalion
of Engineers; and one Engineer band. . .
Each regiment of Engineers shall consist of one colonel;
one lieutenant colonel; two majors; eleven captains; twelve
first lieutenants; six second lieutenants; four master engi-
neers, Senior grade; one regimental sergeant major; two
battalion sergeants major; twelve master engineers, junior
grade; two regimental supply sergeants; two color Sergeants;
one sergeant trumpeter; two sergeants; one cook; one wagoner
for each authorized wagon of the field and combat train; and
six companies of Engineers, organized into two battalions of
three companies each.
Each company of Engineers shall consist of one captain;
two first lieutenants; one second lieutenant; one first ser–
geant; one mess sergeant; one supply sergeant; eleven
sergeants; eighteen corporals; two trumpeters; three cooks;
sixty-four privates, first class; and sixty-four privates.
The mounted battalion of Engineers shall consist of one
major; five captains; seven first lieutenants; three second
lieutenants; one veterinarian; two master engineers, senior
grade; one battalion Sergeant major; two color sergeants;
One battalion supply sergeant; six master engineers, junior
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 303
grade; one corporal; one wagoner for each authorized wagon
of the field and combat train; and three mounted companies.
Each mounted company of Engineers shall consist of one
captain; two first lieutenants; One second lieutenant; one
first sergeant; two sergeants, first class; one mess sergeant;
One supply sergeant; One stable Sergeant; six sergeants;
eleven corporals; two horseshoers; one saddler; two cooks;
twenty-one privates, first class; and sixty privates.
The Engineer Band shall consist of one first sergeant
(who shall be the drum major); one band leader; one assistant
band leader; two band sergeants; four band corporals; two
musicians, first class; four musicians, second class; and thir-
teen musicians, third class.
Regimental and battalion adjutants and supply officers
and appropriate officers to command the companies, battalions,
and regiments of Engineers shall be detailed from the Corps
of Engineers. The enlisted force of the Corps of Engineers
and the officers serving therewith shall constitute a part of
the line of the Army.
SEC. 14. That the Ordnance Department shall consist of
one Chief of Ordnance with the rank of brigadier general,
nine (6) colonels, fourteen (9) lieutenant colonels, thirty (19)
majors, forty (25) captains, and thirty-nine (25) first lieu-
tenants, and the enlisted men, including Ordnance Sergeants
as now authorized by law: Provided, That the Secretary of
War is authorized to detail not to exceed thirty lieutenants
from the Army at large for duty as student officers in the
establishments of the Ordnance Department for a period of
two years; and the completion of the prescribed course of
instruction shall constitute the examination for detail in the
Ordnance Department hereinafter provided for. -
* SEC. 15. That the Signal Corps shall consist of one
Chief Signal Officer with the rank of brigadier general; four
(1) colonels; six (2) lieutenant-colonels; thirteen (6) majors;
twenty-six (18) captains; forty-seven (18) first lieutenants;
forty-seven (16) master signal electricians; one hundred and
fifty-five (132) first class sergeants; two hundred and four
(144) sergeants; two hundred and seventy-three (156) cor-
orals; thirty-two (24) cooks; seven hundred and seventy-
our (552) first class privates; two hundred and thirty-three
(163) privates; and the aviation section now authorized by
law: Provided, That the number of aviation officers in said
aviation section shall be increased by seventy-three and the
number of aviation enlisted men shall be increased by twenty-
six master signal electricians; fifty first class sergeants;
ninety-three sergeants; one hundred and seventy-one cor-
porals; thirty-six cooks; two hundred and fifty first class
privates; ninety-four privates, organized into an aviation
school detachment, and such number of aero Squadrons as the
Secretary of War may direct, not to exceed seven, and each
aero Squadron shall normally consist of nineteen aviation
officers and one hundred and twenty-nine enlisted men:
And provided further, That the increase of pay and allow-
ances now authorized by the act approved March second,
304 - PREPAIREDINESS FOR, NATIONAL DEFENSE.
nineteen hundred and thirteen, to such officers as are actual
flyers of heavier than air craft shall be allowed to officers
while under detail as actual flyers of heavier than air craft
for purposes of sketching, reconnaissances, or operating radio
telegraph instruments from such craft.
SEC. 16. That the President is authorized to appoint,
by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, chaplains
at the rate of one for each regiment of Infantry, Cavalry,
Field Artillery, and Engineers, and one for every fifteen
companies of the Coast Artillery Corps, with the qualifica-
tions and subject to the examinations now prescribed by
law, and who shall have the rank, pay, and allowances of
first lieutenant. Chaplains who have served seven years as
such may be promoted to the grade of captain, and chaplains
who have served more than seventeen years as such may be
promoted to the grade of major, with the rank, pay, and
allowances of those grades, subject, however, to such exami-
nation as the President may prescribe: Provided, That nothing
herein contained shall operate to reduce the rank, pay, and
allowances which any chaplain may at present receive.
SEC. 17. That, except as otherwise provided in section
eleven of this Act, details to the several staff corps and de-
partments, the return of such officers at the expiration of
their details to the branches of the service in which com-
missioned, the promotion of officers holding permanent
appointments therein, and the retirement of Officers who have
served or shall hereafter serve as chief of such staff corps or de-
#. shall be as now provided by law: Provided, That
ereafter the provisions of section twenty-six of the Act ap-
proved. February second, nineteen hundred and One, as modi-
fied for the Ordnance Department by section two of the Act
approved June twenty-fifth, nineteen hundred and six, and
by the Act approved March third, nineteen hundred and
nine, shall be held to include the Judge Advocate General's
Department and the Signal Corps: Provided further, That
the board of officers which is to recommend officers for detail
in each of these departments shall be composed of officers of
the department in which the detail is to be made: And pro-
wided further, That one acting judge advocate for each
tactical division and separate brigade not provided with a
judge advocate from the list of judge advocates authorized
by section ten of this Act, may be detailed from officers of
the grades of captain and first lieutenant of the line of the
Army, who while so serving shall have the rank, pay, and
allowances of captain, and shall continue to hold their com—
- missions in the arm of the service to which they permanently
belong, and upon completion of a tour of duty not exceeding
four years shall be returned to the arm in which commissioned
and shall not be again detailed until they shall have com-
pleted two years’ duty in the arm of the service in which
commissioned.
SEC. 18. That the list of detached officers authorized
by Section two of this Act, exclusive of those authorized for
the Corps of Engineers, shall be limited to nine hundred and
PREPAIREDINESS FOR, NATIONAL DEFENSE. 305
eighty-six officers, inclusive of the two hundred detached
officers authorized by the Act approved March third, nineteen
hundred and eleven, and shall consist of officers in the grades
of first lieutenant to colonel, inclusive. The officers pro-
moted to fill original vacancies authorized by this section
shall be commissioned as provided in section twenty-one of
this Act, and details to fill vacancies in the list of detached
officers, as they occur from time to time after the Army shall
have been organized under the provisions of this Act, shall be
made from the Cavalry, Field Artillery, Coast Artillery
Corps, and Infantry, in each grade and in each arm in the
proportion which the 'number of officers in that grade and
arm shall bear to the total number of officers of ihai grade
in the four arms combined. Should the number of officers
on the list of detached officers in any grade and from any
arm at any time exceed the number apportioned to that grade
and arm under the provisions of this section, the number of
officers of that grade and arm in excess of the number so appor-
tioned shall be returned to the arm of the service in which
they shall hold commissions or to which they shall have been
assigned under section twenty-One of this Act, and the
vacancies on the list of detached officers thus created shall be
filled by details from the other arms until all the officers on
the list of detached officers in any grade shall be, as nearly
as practicable, in proportion to the number of officers of that
; *horized by this Act for the several arms hereinbefore
SOCCITIGCl. -
Pg. 19. That the Porto Rico Regiment of Infantry
shall consist of one colonel, one lieutenant colonel, three
majors, fifteen captains, fifteen first lieutenants, fifteen
second lieutenants, one headquarter company, one supply
company, one machine-gun company, and twelve companies
organized under three battalions of four companies each, and
the organization of each unit shall be as provided in this Act
for like units in regiments of Infantry.
The colonel and the lieutenant colonel of said regiment
shall be detailed for four years by the President from officers of
the Army not below the rank of major, and the majors for
like periods and from officers of the Army not below the rank
of captain, and, while so serving, officers so detailed shall have
the rank, pay, and allowances of the grades to which they are
detailed. The captains, first lieutenants, and second lieu-
tenants shall be appointed and promoted, up to and including
the rank of captain, as now provided by law, and nothing in
this Act shall be held or construed so as to deprive any officer
of the Porto Rico Regiment of the commission which he now
holds therein, or of any right thereunder: Provided, That
officers of the Porto Rico Regiment of Infantry, promoted to
the grade of captain since ‘March fourth, nineteen hundred
and fifteen, or hereafter so promoted, shall take rank on the
relative list after all captains of said regiment who have been
recommissioned as captains of Infantry: Provided further,
That any officer now holding a commission in the Infantry
who vacated a commission as an officer of the Porto Rico Pro-
306 PREPARED NESS FOR, NATIONAL DEFENSE.
visional Regiment of Infantry by accepting an appointment
as second lieutenant of Infantry to fill a vacancy other than
one created by the Act approved February second, nineteen
hundred and one, and who has not received credit for his
service as a commissioned officer of the Porto Rico Provisional
Regiment of Infantry, for the purpose of determining his
lineal and relative rank as an officer of infantry, may be recom-
missioned as an officer of Infantry in such grade and with
rank from such date as will place him in the lineal and relative
position which he would have been entitled to hold had he
been commissioned in the first instance in the Infantry of
the United States Army. & -
All men enlisted in said regiment shall be citizens of
Porto Rico, and hereafter all enlistments therein shall be as
provided by this Act for the Regular Army.
The pay and allowances of officers and enlisted men
shall be the same as provided by law for officers and en-
listed men of like grades in the Regular Army.
The Porto Rico Regiment of Infantry, or organizations
thereof, may be ordered for service outside of the Island of
Porto Rico, and the captains and lieutenants thereof shall
be available for such detached service as the Secretary of
War may direct; but vacancies created by officers so detached
shall not be filled by promotions or appointments.
SEC. 20. That on and after the first day of July, nine-
teen hundred and sixteen, all enlistments in the Regular
Army shall be for a term of six years, the first two years in
active service with the branch of which those enlisting form
a part, and except as otherwise provided herein, the last four
years in the Regular Army Reserve hereinafter provided for.
At the expiration of two years' service in a first or subsequent
enlistment enlisted men may be furloughed to the Regular
Army Reserve in the grade in which then serving, or may, in
the discretion of the Secretary of War, be reenlisted for a
period of six years: Provided, That after the expiration of one
year's service any enlisted man of the Regular Army whose
company, troop, battery, or detachment commander shall
report him as proficient and sufficiently trained may, in the
discretion of the Secretary of War, be furloughed to the
Regular Army Reserve under such regulations as the Secretary
of War may prescribe, in which event he shall not be eligible
to reenlist in the service until the expiration of his term of
six years.
For all enlistments hereafter accomplished under the
provisions of this Act, four years shall be counted as an enlist-
ment period in computing continuous service pay.
The Regular Army Reserve shall consist of:
First. All enlisted men now in the Army Reserve or
who shall hereafter become members of the Army Reserve
under the provisions of existing law;
Second. All enlisted men furloughed to or enlisted in
the Regular Army Reserve under the provisions of this Act;
Third. Any person holding an honorable discharge
from the Regular Army with character reported as at least
good, who is physically qualified for the duties of a soldier and
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 307
not over forty-five years of age, who enlists in the Regular
Army Reserve for a period of four years; and
Fourth. Any person who is a citizen of the United
States or who has declared his intention of becoming a citi-
Zen thereof, who by the nature of his civil occupation or pro-
fession is thereby qualified for duty in the tºº.
Engineer, or Signal Corps, or in the Medical or Ordnance
Departments, and who is physically qualified for the duties
of a soldier and not over thirty-five years of age, who enlists
for one of said corps or departments for a period of four years.
No enlisted man shall receive a final discharge until the
termination of his six-year term of enlistment except upon reen-
listment as provided for in this section or as now provided for
by law for discharges prior to expiration of term of enlistment,
but when an enlisted man is furloughed to the Regular Army
Reserve his accounts shall be closed and he shall be paid in
full to the date such furlough becomes effective, including
transportation in kind and subsistence as now provided by
law for discharged soldiers: Provided, That when by reason
of death or disability of a member of the family of an enlisted
man occurring after his enlistment, members of his family
become dependent on him for support, he may, in the dis-
cretion of the Secretary of War, be discharged from the service
of the United States or be furloughed to the Regular Army
Reserve, upon due proof being made of such condition.
The President is authorized to assign members of the
Regular Army Reserve as reserves to organizations of the
Regular Army, or to organize the Regular Army Reserve, or
any part thereof, into units or detachments of Cavalry, Coast
Artillery, Field Artillery, Infantry, Engineers, or of the
staff departments, in such numbers as he may prescribe, and
to assign to such units and detachments officers of the Regular
Army or of the Officers' Reserve Corps hereinafter provided
for; and, in the event of war or the imminence thereof, he
may mobilize the Regular Army Reserve in such manner as
he may determine and thereafter retain it, or any part thereof,
in active service for such period as he may determine the
conditions to justify: Provided, That all enlistments in the
Regular Army, including those in the Regular Army Reserve,
which are in force on the date of the outbreak of war shall
continue in force for one year unless sooner terminated by
order of the Secretary of War, but nothing herein shall be
construed to shorten the term of enlistment prescribed.
When mobilized by order of the President, the members
of the Regular Army Reserve shall, so long as they may
remain in active service, receive the pay and allowances of
enlisted men of the Regular Army of like grade: Provided,
That any enlisted man who shall have reenlisted in the
Regular Army Reserve shall receive during such active
service the additional pay now provided by law for soldiers
in his arm of the service in the second enlistment period:
Provided, further, That upon reporting for duty and being
found physically fit for service, members of the Regular Army
Reserve shall receive a sum equal to five dollars per month for
each month during which they shall have bº to the
308 PREPAREDNESS FOR, NATIONAL DEFENSE.
Regular Army Reserve, as well as the actual cost of transpor-
tation and subsistence from their homes to the places at which
they may be ordered to report for duty under such order: And
provided further, That service in the Regular Army Reserve
except when on active service, shall confer no right to retire-
ment or retired pay, and members of the Regular Army
Reserve shall become entitled to pensions only through dis-
ability incurred while on active duty in the service of the
United States.
In order to assist in mobilizing the Regular Army
Reserve, the services of postmasters and other employees of
the Post Office Department may be utilized to such an extent
and under such regulations as the President may prescribe.
Any enlisted man of the Regular Army who may have
served not less than fifteen years shall, if prevented by the
provisions of this Act from reenlisting at any time prior to the
completion of the period of service necessary for retirement
under the provisions of existing law, be retired and shall
receive such proportion of the retired pay and allowances of
his grade authorized by law for thirty years' service as his
service, including double time as authorized by law, shall
bear to thirty years. &
SEC. 21. That the vacancies in grades above that of
second lieutenant created by this Act in the Cavalry, Field
Artillery, Coast Artillery Corps, and Infantry, shall be
apportioned in each grade in each arm, as nearly as practicable,
according to the number of officers in that grade and arm now
authorized by law, exclusive of the additional officers author-
ized by law, exclusive of the additional officers authorized by
the Act of Congress approved March third, nineteen hundred
and eleven, and vacancies created by this Act for the purpose
of providing for detached officers in those arms shall be
apportioned, in the manner provided in section eighteen of
this Act, to the Cavalry, #. Artillery, Coast Artillery
Corps, and Infantry, and promotions to fill all such vacancies,
and to fill the vacancies caused by such promotions, shall be
made in each arm according to seniority and subject to exami-
nation as now provided by law. The officers promoted to fill
original vacancies shall be commissioned in the Army and not
in the arm to which they now belong, and, after promotion,
shall be assigned to the arms of the service in which the
original vacancies are created by this Act, as the interests of
the service may require; and after such assignment they
shall take rank and precedence in the arm to which assigned
among themselves and among the other officers in that arm of
the same grade and date of promotion, according to their relative
standing in the grade from which promoted, and they shall
be entitled to further promotion in the arm to which asigned
the same as if commissioned therein.
As far as practicable, officers promoted under the pro-
visions of this Act shall be assigned to the several arms in
which they now hold commissions: Provided, That when an
officer can not be assigned to the Cavalry, Field Artillery,
Coast Artillery Corps, or Infantry because there is no vacancy
in his grade in any of those arms, he shall be detached for
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 309
such duty as the Secretary of War may direct, and while so
detached he shall not be subject to the provisions of the
Acts of Congress approved August twenty-fourth, nineteen
hundred and twelve, and April twenty-seventh, nineteen
hundred and fourteen, relating to the detachment of officers
from their proper Organizations. -
SEC. 22. That the increases in the commissioned and
enlisted personnel of the Regular Army provided for by this
Act ji be made in two increments which shall be, for
each arm, corps, department, and the detached officers, as
nearly equal as pººl. Officers promoted to vacancies
created or caused by the addition of the first increment shall
be promoted to rank July first, nineteen hundred and six-
teen, and those promoted to vacancies created or caused by
the addition of the second increment to rank from July first,
nineteen hundred and seventeen.
Vacancies in the grade of second lieutenant created or
caused by this Act shall be filled by appointment in the
following order: (First) of cadets graduated from the United
States Military Academy, (second) of enlisted men whose
fitness for promotion shall have been determined by com-
petitive examination, (third) of members of the Officers'
Reserve Corps who have been commissioned therein from
the cadet companies hereinafter provided for, and (fourth)
of candidates from civil life between the ages of twenty-one
and twenty-seven years. The President is authorized to
make the necessary rules and regulations to carry these pro-
visions into effect: Provided, That hereafter all appoint-
ments to the grade of second lieutenant in the Regular Army
shall be provisional for a period of two years, at the close of
which period such appointments shall be made permanent
if the appointee has demonstrated, under such regulations
as the President may prescribe, his suitability and moral,
professional, and physical fitness for such permanent appoint-
ment, Or, should the appointee fail so to demonstrate his
suitability and fitness, shall terminate; and should any
officer become eligible for promotion and qualify therefor
before the expiration of two years from the date of his original
appointment, he shall receive a provisional appointment in
such higher grade, which shall be made permanent when he
shall have qualified for permanent appointment upon the
expiration of two years from the date of his original appoint-
ment, or shall terminate if he shall fail so to qualify: Pro-
vided further, That appointments to the grade of second
lieutenant in the Corps of Engineers shall continue to be
made as now provided by law: And provided further, That
the laws applicable to officers of the Regular Army which
relate to examinations for promotion and to retirement on
account of being incapacitated for active service shall be
applicable to officers serving under temporary appointments
as herein provided.
Officers appointed to Original vacancies in the grade of
second lieutenant created or caused by this Act shall take
lineal and relative rank according to dates of appointment:
Provided, That the lineal and relative rank of second lieuten-
310 PREPAIRED NESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
ants appointed on the same date shall be determined under
such regulations as the Secretary of War may prescribe.
SEC. 23. That the monthly pay of enlisted men of the
Army in the grades created by this Act shall be as follows
during their first enlistment: Band leader, quartermaster
Sergeant, Senior grade, and master engineer, senior grade,
$75; master engineer, junior grade, $65; regimental supply
Sergeant, quartermaster sergeant, Quartermaster Corps, and
Sergeant, first class (mountain battery), $45; assistant band
leader and sergeant trumpeter, $40; mess sergeant, musician,
first class, and supply sergeant (engineers), $36; horseshoer,
mechanic (machine-gun company), musician, second class,
Sergeant Orderly, stable sergeant and supply sergeant, $30;
musician, third class, $24; mechanic (Infantry . Cavalry),
$21; wagoner (Infantry, Cavalry, Field Artillery, and
Engineers), $18; private, first class (Infantry, Cavalry, and
Field Artillery), $16; trupmeter, orderly and saddler, $15.
NoTE.—This section fixing the pay of certain grades of enlisted men was
made necessary by changes in designations adopted in this proposed act and
the creation of new grades in the headquarter, supply, and machine-gun com-
panies in the Infantry, Cavalry, Field Artillery, and in the organizations of the
Engineer Department. Where there has been merely a change of designa-
tion, no change of pay occurs. Wagoners have been prescribed for Infantry,
Cavalry, Field Artillery, and Engineers, and their pay fixed at $18, instead of
$21, as now provided for wagoners allowed for Cavalry. The following is an
analysis of the section:
Present | Proposed
pay. pay.
1. Band leader (now chief musician). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $75. 00 $75. 00
2. Quartermaster Sergeant, Senior grade... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75. 00 75. 00
3. Master engineer (Senior grade), new. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75.00
4. Master engineer (junior grade), new. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .------------- 65. 00
5. Quartermaster Sergeant, Quartermaster Corps. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45.00 45.00
6. Regimental supply sergeant (now regimental quartermaster Sergeant). 45.00 45.00
7. Sergeant (first class), mountain battery (takes place of Sergeant, first *
class, Quartermaster Corps, ordinarily attached to such battery as
pack master). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 45.00 45.00
8. Assistant band leader (now principal musician). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40.00 40.00
9. Sergeant trumpeter (formerly chief trumpeter in Cavalry and Field | .
Artillery)--------. . . . . . . . . . .`-- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - --------------- 40.00 40.00
10. Mess sergeant (now a sergeant detailed as mess sergeant by company
Commander--------------------------------------------------------- 36.00 36.00
11. Musician (first class), (now Sergeant). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36.00 36.00
12. Supply sergeant, Engineers (corresponds to mess Sergeant in a head-
- º; company, troop or battery of Infantry, Cavalry, and Field
rtillery, there being no headquarters company of Engineers and a
mess sergeant being needed for the band and headquarters detach-
ment)-------------------------------------------------------------- 36. 00 36.00
13. Horseshoer (now authorized for Cavalry and Field Artillery only, but
by this act ſor Infantry and Engineers also). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30.00 30.00
14. Mechanic, machine-gun company (takes the place of one horseshoer
in prescribing the strength of machine-gun units). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30.00 30.00.
15. Musician, Second class (now corporals). -- . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ------ 30.00 30.00
16. Stable sergeant (now authorized for Field Artillery only, and in this
act takes the place of a sergeant in Cavalry troops, and is provided
for in machine-gun companies and troops) - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 30.00 30.00
17. Sergeant, orderly (new in the sense that he is a sergeant among the
orderlies provided for in beadquarters companies, troops, and bat-
teries, and receiving the same pay as a sergeant now receives) - - - - - - 30.00 30.00
18. Supply sergeants (corresponds to present company quartermaster
Sergeants)----------------------------------------------------------- 30.00 30.00
19. Mechanic, Infantry companies and Cavalry troops (corresponds to
present artificer). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ------------------------------ 21.00 21.00
20. Musician, third class (now private in bands). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .- - - - - - 24.00 24.00
21. Wagoner (now authorized for Cavalry only, but provided by this act
for Supply companies, troops, and batteries). ----------------------- 21.00 18.00
22. Privates, first class (now authorized for Engineers, Ordnance, Signal,
and Quartermaster Corps, at a monthly pay of $18; authorized by
this act for machine-gun units)--------------------------------------|---------- 16.00
23. § (now musicians)----------------------------------------- 15.00 15.00
24. Orderlies (now privates detailed as Such) - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 15.00 15.00
25
. Saddler (now authorized in Cavalry only).---------------------------- 21.00 15, 00
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 311
SEC. 24. That the organization and the commissioned
and enlisted strength of the Philippine Scouts shall be as
now authorized by law.
Captains and lieutenants of Philippine Scouts, other
than natives of the Philippine Islands, shall hereafter be
entitled to retirement under the laws governing the retire-
ment of officers of the Army of similar rank in the permanent
establishment, except that they shall receive, as retired pay,
the amounts now or hereafter allowed by law, as retired pay
and allowances, to retired master signal electricians of the
United States Army and no more.
Former officers of the scouts who, because of disability
occasioned by wounds received in action, have resigned or
been discharged that service, or who have heretofore served
as such for a period of more than five years and have been
retired as enlisted men, shall be placed upon the retired list
as officers of Philippine Scouts and hereafter receive the
retired pay and allowances provided by this section for other
officers of Philippine Scouts: Provided, That any former offi-
cer of Philippine Scouts who vacated his office in the Philip-
ine Scouts by discharge or resignation on account of disabil-
ity contracted in the line of duty and who was subsequently
retired as an enlisted man, and any former officer of Philip-
pine Scouts who has been retired as an enlisted man by
special act of Congress, shall be transferred to the retired list
created by this section, and shall hereafter receive the retired
pay and allowances authorized by this section and no more.
Officers of Philippine Scouts retired under the provisions
of this section shall not form part of the limited retired list
now authorized by law.
SEC. 25. That nothing in this Act shall be held or con-
strued so as to discharge any officer from the Regular Army
or to deprive him of the commission which he now holds
therein, except as provided in respect of provisional second
lieutenants in section twenty-two hereof.. -
SEC. 26. That whenever in the opinion of the Presi-
dent it is deemed advisable to organize the Regular Army in
brigades and divisions, the composition of such units, includ-
ing their respective headquarters, may be as hereinafter
provided. -
Three regiments of Infantry, of Cavalry, or of Field
Artillery may constitute, respectively, an Infantry, Cavalry,
and Field Artillery brigade. - -
Three Infantry brigades, one regiment of Cavalry, one
brigade of Field Aºi. one regiment of Engineers, one
field battalion of signal troops, one aero Squadron, one
ammunition train, one supply train, one Engineer train, and
one sanitary train may constitute an Infantry division, and
three Cavalry brigades, one regiment of Field Artillery
(horse), one mounted battalion of Engineers, one aero Squad-
ron, one mounted battalion of signal troops, one supply train,
one Engineer train, and one sanitary train may constitute a
Cavalry division.
312 PREPAIREDINESS FOR, NATIONAL DEFENSE.
When officers of the required grades are available for
such duty, the headquarters of an Infantry, Cavalry, or Field
Artillery brigade may consist of the brigade commander, his
authorized aids, one major who shall be the adjutant, one'
sergeant, two cooks, six orderlies, and one wagoner.
When officers of the required grades are available for
such duty, the headquarters of an Infantry or Cavalry divi-
sion may consist of the division commander; his authorized
aids; one colonel, who shall be the chief of staff; two
majors or captains, who shall be assistants to the chief of
staff; one lieutenant colonel or major, who shall be the ad-
jutant; one lieutenant colonel or major, who shall be the
inspector; one lieutenant colonel or major, who shall be
the judge advocate; one lieutenant colonel or major, who
shall be the quartermaster; four majors or captains, who
shall be assistants to the quartermaster; one lieutenant
colonel or major, who shall be the surgeon; three majors
or captains, who shall be assistants to the surgeon; One
lieutenant colonel or major, who shall be the Ordnance
officer; one lieutenant colonel or major, who shall be the
signal officer; one headquarter troop, consisting of one cap-
tain, one second lieutenant, one first Sergeant, one mess
sergeant, one supply sergeant, one stable sergeant, five
sergeants, eight corporals, two horseshoers, one saddler,
two cooks, two trumpeters, one mechanic, fifty-seven pri-
vates; a quartermaster detachment consisting of five ser–
geants (first class), five sergeants, and five wagoners, and
such civilian clerks as the necessities of the service may
demand.
The staff officers above authorized for brigade and
division headquarters shall be detailed from the Army at
large, and, if officers of the prescribed grades are not available,
the President is authorized to detail officers of other grades
for such duty.
It shall be in the discretion of the President to vary
the composition of brigades and divisions whenever he may
deem it proper to do so.
In time of war or when war is imminent the President
is authorized to organize the brigades and divisions into
such number of corps of three or more divisions each as he
may deem necessary, to organize corps into higher units,
and to prescribe the composition of the headquarters of such
corps and higher units. *
SEC. 27. That officers of the same grade shall rank and
have precedence in the following order, without regard to
the date of rank of commission, as between officers of different
classes, namely: First, officers of the Regular Army and
officers of the Marine Corps detached for service with the
Army by order of the President; second, all other officers
in the military service of the United States, who shall take
rank among themselves in their grades according to the
date of their entry into the service of the United States in
that grade: Provided, That officers of the Regular Army
holding commissions in the Continental Army, in the volun-
PREPAIREDINESS FOR, NATIONAL DEFENSE. 313
teer forces, or in the Organized Militia in the service of the
United States shall have rank and take precedence under
said commission as if they were commissioned in the Regular
Army; but the rank of officers of the Regular Army under
their commissions in the Organized Militia shall not, for
the purpose of this section, be held to antedate the employ–
ment of the Organized Militia in which they hold commis–
sion in the service of the United States: Provided further,
That in time of war or public danger, when two or more
officers of the same grade are on duty in the same field, de-
}.} or command, or any organization thereof, the
resident may assign the command of such field, depart-
ment, or command, or of any organization thereof, without
regard to seniority of rank in the same grade.
When different commands of the military forces of the
United States happen to join or do duty together, the officer
highest in rank in the line of such forces there on duty shall,
. to the provisions of this section, command the whole
and give orders for what is needful in the service, unless
otherwise directed by the President.
SEC. 28. That the President is authorized to raise,
organize, train, and maintain a citizen army of not to exceed
four hundred thousand men, to be known as the “Continental
Army,” to be raised in three annual contingents, and there-
after maintained by annual contingents sufficient to keep
the number up to the authorized strength of four hundred
thousand men. For this purpose he may from time to time
divide the United States into such number of divisional dis-
tricts as he may prescribe. The Continental Army shall con-
sist of such number of regiments of infantry, cavalry, field ar-
tillery, and engineers, and of such auxiliary troops as the
President may deem proper, within the limits of the force
herein authorized; but the President may vary the propor-
tion of the several arms, corps, and departments as he may
deem necessary for purposes of training.
SEC. 29. That except for periods of training as herein-
after provided for, the Continental Army shall not be called
out for service except in the event of war or when war is
imminent.
SEC. 30. That the organization of all units of the Con-
tinental Army, staff and line, including headquarters, shall
be the same as that prescribed by law and regulations for
corresponding units and headquarters of the Regular Army:
Provided, That to each regiment of Infantry, Cavalry, Artil-
lery, and Engineers, and to each battalion of signal troops
and' mounted battalion of Engineers organized under this
Act, there shall be attached the same medical personnel as are
attached to like organizations of the Regular Army: Pro-
vided further, That the organization of establishments of the
Medical Department, remount depots, military trains, secret-
service agencies, lines of communication, including their
supply depots, and all other adjuncts that may be necessary
in the prosecution of war and the organization of which is
314 PREPARED NESS FOR, NATIONAL DEFENSE.
not otherwise provided for by law, shall be as the President
may from time to time direct.
SEC. 31. That when at any time within three years
from and after the date when this Act becomes effective, any
company, troop, or battery, or such company, troop, or battery
comprised in any battalion, squadron, regiment, or higher
unit of the Organized Militia of any State, Territory, or the
District of Columbia, organized as prescribed by law and War
Department regulations, shall present themselves with three-
fourths of the prescribed minimum enlisted strength, and with
the consent of the proper State authorities, if from a State, for
entry into the Continental Army, the enlisted men thereof
may, Subject to physical examination and under Such regula-
tions as the President may prescribe, be received into the
Continental Army, and the officers of such companies, troops,
batteries, battalions, squadrons, regiments. Or higher units,
including the field, staff, and general officers, if any, may be
appointed as officers of like grade in the Continenfal Army.
SEC. 32. That the term of enlistment in the Continental
Army shall be for six years, unless sooner discharged; the first
three years of the enlistment to be served in the active organ-
izations with the colors, upon the completion of which the
soldier shall be furloughed, in the grade in which then
serving, to a reserve to be known as the Continental Army
Reserve, in which he shall serve the second three years of
his enlistment, unless sooner discharged, except that non-
commissioned officers, after the expiration of three years'
service in a first or subsequent enlistment may, in the dis-
cretion of the Secretary of War, be reenlisted for a period of
six years.
Enlisted men of the reserve may likewise be reenlisted
therein for successive periods of three years; and persons who
have been honorably discharged from the Regular Army,
Continental Army, Navy, Marine Corps, or Organized
Militia may be enlisted in the Continental Army Reserve for
like periods.
In the event of war all enlistments which would other-
wise expire within one year shall continue in force for the
period of one year from the beginning of war, unless sooner
terminated by the President. -
All enlisted men raised under the provisions of this Act
shall be taken from citizens of the United States, or those
who have declared their intention to become citizens, and
shall be, at the time of their first enlistment, between the
ages of eighteen and thirty-five years.
SEC. 33. That in the event of war only, the President
is authorized to call out the Continental Army Reserves and
to employ them as he may deem best. -
SEC. 34. That the offices of the Continental Army
created by this Act may be filled by appointments from the
following classes: (First) from officers of the Regular Army
on the active list, to serve in the Continental Army for a
period of not to exceed four years, subject to the limitations
as to number and compensation hereinafter provided; (sec-
PREPARED NESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 315
ond) from members of the Officers' Reserve Corps hereinafter
provided for; (third) from officers of the Organized Militia
and retired officers of the Regular Army; and (fourth) sub-
ject to such examinations as the President may prescribe,
from graduates or undergraduates of educational institutions
having military courses and other citizens who have quali-
fied themselves for such appointments by experience or
study, or both.
Vacancies thereafter occurring in the body of officers of
the Continental Army above the grade of second lieutenant,
except those filled by the appointment of active officers of
the Regiº Army, may be filled by promotion within the
Continental Army or appointments from the Officers' Re-
serve Corps, subject to such examinations as the President
may prescribe: Provided, That after a period of three years
from the passage of this Act all vacancies in the grade of
second lieutenant shall, as far as practicable, be filled from
officers of the Officers' Reserve Corps of the particular arm
or department in which the vacancy shall occur; and when
no such officers of that corps are available for that grade,
any remaining vacancies may be filled by the appointment
of other citizens of the United States, subject to such rules
and regulations as the President may prescribe not incon-
sistent with the provisions of this Act: Provided further,
That enlisted men of the Regular Army serving under com-
missions in the Continental Army or in the Volunteers shall,
On reenlistment in the Regular Army, resume their former
status under laws conferring benefits for continuous service.
SEC. 35. That the President alone is authorized to ap-
point all officers of the Continental Army below the º
of lieutenant colonel. All officers of the grade of lieutenant
colonel and of higher grades in that army shall be appointed
by the President by and with the advice and consent of the
Senate. All appointments below the grade of brigadier gen-
eral in the Continental Army shall be by commission in an
arm, corps, or department of the service, and line officers in
each arm of the service shall be assigned to organizations of
that arm and transferred from one organization to another in
that arm, as the interests of the service may require, by orders
from the Secretary of War: Provided, That when an officer
of the Continental Army changes his residence so as to make
Service with the organization to which he is assigned imprac-
ticable or inconvenient to the Government, the President
may, in lieu of transferring him to another organization of
the Continental Army at or near the locality to which he
has changed his residence, transfer him, if below the grade
of lieutenant colonel, to the Officers' Reserve Corps in the
grade held by him in the Continental Army, or if above the
É. of major, he may honorably discharge him from the
ontinental Army: Provided further, That under such régu-
lations as may be prescribed by the President, military boards
may be jº of not less than three nor more than five
officers of the Continental Army to examine into the capacity,
qualifications, conduct and º of any commissioned
316 PREPAREDINESS FOR, NATIONAL DEFENSE.
officer of said Army, each member of such board to be as far as
practicable superior in rank to the officer whose qualifications
are to be inquired into; and if the report of such board is ad-
verse to the continuance of such officer, and the report be
approved by the President, such officer may, in the discretion
of the President, be discharged from service in the Continental
Army: And provided further, That the appointment and re-
appointment of officers of the Continental Army below the
grade of lieutenant colonel shall be subject to the same limi-
tations as to age as provided in section forty-eight of this
Act for officers of the Officers' Reserve Corps; and no officer
shall be appointed or reappointed a lieutenant colonel in the
Continental Army after he has reached the age of fifty (?)
years, a colonel after he has reached the age of fifty-five (?)
years, or a general officer after he has reached the age of sixty
(?) years. When an officer of the Continental Army reaches the
age limit fixed for appointment or reappointment in the grade
in which he is commissioned he shall, with the approval of
the Secretary of War, be honorably discharged from the
service of the United States and be entitled to retain his
official title and, on occasions of ceremony, to wear the uni-
º of the highest grade held by him in the Continental
my. '.
SEC. 36. That not to exceed one Regular Army officer of
the active list shall hold a commission in any one battalion
of Engineers, Signal Troops, or Field Artillery, or the equiv-
alent thereof of other troops; and not to exceed four such
officers shall, at the same time, hold commissions in any one
regiment of Cavalry, Field Artillery, Engineers, or Infantry
of the Continental Army, including their field and staff:
Provided, That the appointments of Regular Army officers as
officers of the Continental Army shall not revoke their Regu-
lar Army commissions nor prejudice their relative or lineal
standing in the Regular Army: Provided further, That Regu-
lar Army officers so appointed shall exercise command therein
Only when the Continental Army is employed in active
service and during periods of training, but shall not, during
periods of training, receive any pay or allowances in excess
of that authorized by law for the grade held by them under
their permanent commissions in the Regular Army: And
provided further, That when the Continental Army is em-
ployed in active service, Regular Army officers holding com-
missions in that Army shall be entitled to the pay and allow-
ances of their grade in that Army, and in time of war their
places in the Regular Army may be filled by temporary pro-
motions or appointments under the same limitations as are
prescribed by law relative to appointments of Regular Army
officers in the Volunteer Army.
SEC. 37. That the President is authorized to appoint
such number of staff officers in the Continental Army as he
may find necessary to provide the staff officers corresponding
to those prescribed by law and regulations for like units of
* These and other figures similarly indicated in this act are tentative only.
PREPARED NIESS FOR, NATIONAL DEFENSE. 317
the Regular Army: Provided, That the Chief of Staff and the
assistant Chief of Staff of any tactical unit shall be detailed
from the General Staff Corps of the Army: And provided
further, That the President may appoint chaplains at the
rate of one for each regiment of Infantry, Cavalry, Field
Artillery, and Engineers, with rank corresponding to that
established by law for chaplains of the Regular Army.
SEC. 38. That when any enlisted man of the Continental
Army so changes his residence as to make his service with the
organization to which he is assigned impractical or incon-
venient to the Government, he shall be transferred to an
organization of the Continental Army at or near the locality
to which he has changed his residence, and his descriptive
list, with a statement of his accounts, shall be transmitted
to the commanding officer of that organization under such
regulations as the Secretary of War may prescribe.
SEC. 39. That the President may call the constituent
parts of the Continental Army, exclusive of the Continental
Army Reserve, together at such times and places and in such
numbers as he shall deem best for purposes of drill, instruction,
or training. The aggregate length of such training periods
for any soldier of the Continental Army, other than R.
Army officers or enlisted men assigned thereto, shall not
exceed three months in any one calendar year nor an aggre-
gate of six months in the first three years of the enlistment.
In the instruction and training of such troops the President
is authorized to use such parts of the Regular Army, the
military stores, and other property as he may deem necessary
for the purpose: Provided, That when organizations and
iºuſ officers and noncommissioned officers of the Regular
Army are on duty with the Continental Army during the
periods of training, the officers and noncommissioned officers
of the Regular Army shall have authority to command all
officers and noncommissioned officers of the Continental Army
of equal or lower grade and all enlisted men of the Continental
Army whom it is their duty to instruct; and when enlisted
men of the Regular Army below the grade of corporal are
used for the purpose of instruction, they may be appointed
lance corporals.
SEC. 40. That when called out for purposes of drill,
instruction, or training, in time of peace or when in active
service, the pay and allowances of the officers and enlisted
men of the Continental Army shall, while so employed, be
as prescribed by law and regulations for corresponding grades
in the Regular Army: Provided, That in computing ſength
of service for longevity pay or continuous service, pay-credit
shall be given for active service in the Army, Navy, or
Marine Corps, in militia employed in the service of the
United States, in volunteers, or in the Continental Army
while in active service: Provided further, That officers and
enlisted men of the Continental Army shall not be entitled
to retirement or retired pay and shall be entitled to pension
only for disability incurred in the line of duty during a period
\ 23380—PT 6–16—6*
318 PREPARED NESS FOR, NATIONAL DEFENSE.
of instruction while en route thereto or therefrom, or while
in active service: Provided further, That each member of .
the Continental Army shall be subjected to a physical exami-
nation at the beginning and end of each period of training,
and if no disability incident to the period of training is
shown by such examinations, it shall be taken as conclusive
evidence that none was incurred during the period of instruc-
tion: Provided further, That in lieu of any money allowance
for clothing, each enlisted man shall, in time of peace, be
issued such articles of clothing as the President may direct:
And provided further, That any clothing or other equipment
issued to members of the Continental Army shall remain the
property of the United States, and in case of loss or destruc-
tion of any article thereof, the articles so lost or destroyed
shall be replaced by issues to the soldier or officer and the
value thereof deducted from any pay due or to become due,
unless it is made to appear that such loss or destruction was
not due to neglect or other fault on his part. When the
enlistment of any enlisted man in the Continental Army
or Continental Army Reserve expires, or such enlisted man
is ordered discharged, all arms, equipments, clothing, and
other property issued to him during his enlistment shall be
accounted for, under such regulations as the Secretary of
War may prescribe, prior to the issuance of discharge. -
SEC. 41. That when called into active service or wiyen
called out for purposes of drill, instruction, or training, the
forces of the Continental Army shall, from the time they are
required by the terms of the call to respond thereto, be subject
to the laws and regulations governing the Regular Army, so
far as such laws and regulations are applicable to officers or
enlisted men whose permanent retention in the military
service, either on the active list or the retired list, is not con-
templated by existing law; and when in active service, or
during periods of training, no distinction shall be made
between the Regular Army, the Continental Army, the
Officers' Reserve Corps, the Organized Militia while in the
military service of . United States, and the Volunteer
forces, in respect to the conferring upon officers or enlisted
men of brevet rank, medals of honor, certificates of merit, or
other rewards for distinguished service, nor in respect to the
eligibility of any officer of said forces for service upon any
court-martial, court of inquiry, or military commission.
Persons in the Continental. Army, or honorably dis-
charged therefrom, shall receive the same preference with
respect to appointments in the civil service and retention
therein as are provided by existing law with respect to persons
who have been honorably discharged from the military or
naval service. < .
NoTE.—Under section 1754, Revised Statutes:
“Personally HONORABLY DISCHARGED from the military or naval service By
REASON OF DISABILITY resulting from wounds or sickness incurred in line of
duty SHALL BE PREFERRED FOR APPOINTMENTS, in civil service offices provided
they are found to possess the business capacity necessary for the proper dis-
charge of the duties of such offices.” - * *
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 319
Under section 3, act of August 15, 1876 (19 Stat., 169), the head of a
department is required to give a preference, “IF EQUALLY QUALIFIED’’ to those—
“who have been honorably discharged from the military or naval service of
the United States, and the widows and orphans of deceased soldiers and
Sailors.” - *
Section 4, act of August 23, 1912 (37 Stat., 413), provides that in the
event of reductions— -
“in the force of any of the executive departments, NO HONORABLY DISCHARGED
Soldier or Sailor wFIOSE RECORD IN SAID DEPARTMENT IS RATED GOOD shall be
discharged or dropped or reduced in rank or salary.”
SEC. 42. That in the event of war, or while war is
imminent, all organizations of the Army of the United
States shall be recruited and maintained as near their pre-
scribed strength as practicable. To this end the President is
authorized to establish the necessary recruit rendezvous and
depots, to be under the direct control of the Secretary of War,
for the enlistment of recruits and the training of unassigned
reservists and recruits; to provide for the organization, for
instruction and discipline, of the troops of recruit depots into
companies and battalions at the discretion of the Secretary of
War, with noncommissioned officers and privates of such
grades and numbers as may be prescribed by the President;
to appoint officers of the Continental Army of the proper arm
of the service additional to those elsewhere authorized in
such numbers and of such grades as he may deem necessary
for the proper instruction and discipline of such troops; to
employ retired officers, noncommissioned officers, and privates
of the Regular Army either with their rank on the retired list
or with increased rank: Provided, That retired officers and
enlisted men while thus employed shall not be eligible for
transfer to field units but shall receive the full pay and allow-
ances of the respective grades in which they are serving in the
Continental Army in lieu of their retired pay and allowances:
Provided further, That upon the termination of the duties,
Or, in case of those given increased rank in the Continental
Army on their discharge therefrom, said retired officers and
enlisted men shall revert to their former retired status.
SEC. 43. That in order to provide animals and vehicles
for the Continental Army the Secretary of War is authorized
to contract with owners of such animals or vehicles as may
in his opinion be suitable for military service, to furnish the
same if and when called upon to do so: Provided, That the
options so secured for the purchase or hire of the animals Qr
vehicles shall be clear and specific as to the price at which
such animals or vehicles are to be furnished, and as to time
within which the option shall be exercised, and that any
consideration paid or agreed to be paid for such options shall,
in the event of the purchase of the animals or vehicles, form
a part of the purchase price of the same. --
SEC. 44. That the central administration of the Con-
tinental Army shall be vested in the Secretary of War and
the agencies of the War Department under him; and for this
urpose there shall be created in the office of the Chief of
taff and from the personnel thereof a Continental Army
320 PREPAIREDINESS IFOR, NATIONAL DEFENSE.
and Militia Division, whose duty it shall be to advise the
Chief of Staff on all subjects relating to the Continental
Army and the Organized Militia in accordance with such
rules and regulations as the President may from time to
time prescribe. The commanders of the territorial depart-
ments of the Regular Army shall have subordinate adminis-
trative control and command of all organizations of the
Continental Army within their respective departmental
limits, including the general supervision of their training
and discipline.
SEC. 45. That all returns and muster rolls of organiza-
tions of the Continental Army, while in the service of the
|United States, shall be rendered to The Adjutant General of
the Army, and upon being relieved from active service or
upon the completion of periods of training the records per-
taining to them shall be transmitted to and filed in The Adju-
tant General's office or preserved in such other manner as
the Secretary of War may prescribe. And regimental and
all other medical officers serving with the Continental Army
in the field or elsewhere shall keep a daily record of all sol-
diers reported sick or wounded, as shown by the morning
calls or reports, and shall deposit such reports as provided
herein for other reports and returns.
SEC. 46. That for the purpose of instruction of the
Continental Army, and for taking care of the Government
property issued thereto, the President is authorized to detail
not to exceed two sergeants from the Regular Army to each
company, troop, or battery of the Continental Army from
corresponding organizations of each arm, corps, or depart-
ment of the Regular Army, who shall serve as first sergeant
and company supply sergeant, respectively, of the com—
pany, troop, or battery to which assigned: Provided, That
such sergeants shall be in addition to the sergeants author-
ized by law for companies, troops, and batteries of the Regu-
lar Army, and shall not be counted as part of the authorized
strength of the Regular Army. *
SEC. 47. That the President is authorized to organize
not to exceed thirty cadet companies of Cavalry, Field
Artillery, Infantry, Engineers, Coast Artillery, and Signal
troops, to be attached to and serve with regiments or other
units of their own corps or department of the Regular Army
within the continental limits of the United States.
-Each company shall consist of not to exceed one hundred
cadets who shall be between the ages of twenty and twenty-
four years on the date of engagement and shall be recruited
from officers of the National Guard, students and graduates of
educational institutions having military courses, and students
and graduates of other colleges and universities. Each cadet
shall be engaged for a period of six years unless sooner dis-
charged by competent authority, the first year of which
period shall be in a cadet company and the remaining five
years in the Officers' Reserve Corps provided for in this Act.
Each cadet shall receive, during his service in a cadet
company, the pay and allowances of a master signal electrician,


PREPARED NESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. . . 321
and shall, during such service, be subject to the laws and regu-
lations for the government of the Army of the United States.
Each cadet company shall be organized as the President
shall prescribe, and all duties in the various grades and posi-
tions therein, except as otherwise herein provided for, shall
be performed by cadets of the company, but no cadet shall
receive any extra pay or allowances for performing such
duties. For the purpose of assignment to cadet companies
for the conduct of their interior administration, the President
is authorized to increase the number of noncommissioned
officers of any organization of the Regular Army to which a
Cadet company is attached by one first sergeant, one mess
º and one supply sergeant, and the number of cooks
T IOUII’.
*E. cadet company shall be subjected to intensive
training, which shall include instruction in the duties of
privates, noncommissioned officers and company officers of
the arm, corps, or department of the service to which the
company is attached, and shall be conducted under such rules
and regulations as the President may prescribe.
Upon completion of one year's service with a company
as herein prescribed, each cadet shall, if found proficient, be
commissioned in such grade in the Officers’ Reserve Corps as
may be warranted by the degree of proficiency he may have
attained, under such rules and regulations as the President
may prescribe. Any cadet who, upon the completion of one
year's service, is not found proficient shall be discharged the
service of the United States with such character of discharge
as his services may have warranted. - -
SEC. 48. That for the purpose of securing a reserve of
officers available for service as temporary officers in the Regular
Army, as provided for in this Act and in section eight of the
Act approved April twenty-fifth, nineteen hundred and
fourteen, as officers in the Continental Army provided for in
this Act, as officers for recruit rendezvous and depots, and as
officers of Volunteers, there shall be organized, under such
rules and regulations as the President may prescribe not
inconsistent with the provisions of this Act, an Officers'
Reserve Corps of the Army of the United States. Except as
otherwise herein provided, a member of the Officers' Reserve
Corps shall not be subject to call for service in time of peace,
and whenever called upon for service shall not without his
consent be so called in a lower grade than that held by him
in said reserve Corps.
The President is authorized to appoint and commission
as reserve officers of the various arms, corps, and departments,
in all grades up to and including that of major, such citizens.
of the United States as may have completed one year's
satisfactory service in the cadet companies provided for in
this Act, and such other citizens as, upon examination pre-
scribed by the President, are found physically, mentally,
and normally qualified to hold such commissions: Provided,
That after three years from the passage of this act º
appointments as reserve officers of Cavalry, Field Artillery,
322 * PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
Coast Artillery, and Infantry shall be made only from such
citizens as shall have satisfactorily completed one year's
service in cadet companies of the respective arms: Provided
further, That the proportion of officers in any arm, corps, or
department of the Officers' Reserve Corps shall not exceed
the proportion for the same grade in the same arm, corps,
or department of the Regular Army, except that the number
commissioned in the lowest authorized grade in any arm,
corps, or department of the Officers' Reserve Corps shall not
be limited.
All persons now carried as duly qualified and registered
pursuant to section twenty-three of the Act of Congress
approved January twenty-first, nineteen hundred and three,
shall, for a period of three years after the passage of this Act,
be eligible for appointment in the Officers' Reserve Corps in
the arm, corps, or department for which they have been found
qualified, without further examination, except a physical
examination, subject to the limitations as to age and rank
herein prescribed.
No person shall be appointed or reappointed a second
lieutenant in the Officers’ Reserve Corps after he has reached
the age of thirty-two (?) years, a first lieutenant after he has
reached the age of thirty-six (?) years, a captain after he has
reached the age of forty (?) years, or a major after he has
reached the age of forty-five (?) years. When an officer of
the Reserve Corps reaches the age limit fixed for appointment
or reappointment in the grade in which he is commissioned
he shall, with the approval of the Secretary of War, be hon-
orably discharged from the service of the United States, and
be entitled to retain his official title and, on occasions of cere-
mony, to wear the uniform of the highest grade he held in the
Officers’ Reserve Corps. -
To the extent provided for from time to time by appro-
priations, the Secretary of War is authorized to order reserve
officers to duty with troops or at field exercises, for periods
not to exceed two weeks in any one calendar year, and while
so serving such officers shall receive the pay and allowances
of their grade: Provided, That, with the consent of such
officers, the Secretary of War is authorized to prolong this
period or to order them to duty on boards, or for consultation
or advice, to the extent justified by the funds appropriated
and the public needs.
One year after the passage of this Act the Medical Re-
serve Corps, as now constituted by law, shall cease to exist.
Members thereof may be commissioned in the Officers' Re-
serve Corps, subject to the provisions of this Act, or may
• be honorably discharged from the service. In emergencies
the Secretary of War may, in time of peace, order first lieu-
tenants of the Officers' Reserve Corps of the Medical De-
partment, with their consent, to active duty in the service
of the United States in such numbers as the public interests
may require and the funds appropriated may permit, and
may relieve them from such duty when their services are no
longer necessary. - -
PREPAIRED NESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 323
The President alone is authorized to appoint and com-
mission all officers of the Officers' Reserve Corps, such com-
missions to be in force for a period of five years unless sooner
terminated in the discretion of the President. Such officers
may be recommissioned, either in the same or higher grades,
for successive periods of five years, subject to such examina-
tions and qualifications as the President may prescribe and to
the age limits prescribed therein: Provided, That officers of
the Officers' Reserve Corps shall have rank therein in the
Various arms, corps, and departments of said reserve corps
according to grades and to length of service in their grades.
Sºc. º. when a volunteer force is authorized, or the
Continental Army is called into active service, the Secretary
of War may order officers of the Reserve Corps, subject to such
Subsequent physical examinations as he may prescribe, to
temporary duty with the Regular Army in grades thereof
which can not, for the time being, be filled by promotion, as
officers in volunteer organizations, as officers in the Conti-
nental Army, or as officers of recruit rendezvous and depots,
in such numbers as may be authorized by law. While such
reserve officers are on such service they shall, by virtue of
their commissions as reserve officers, exercise command
appropriate to their grade and rank in the organizations to
which they are assigned, and be entitled to the pay and allow-
ances of the corresponding grades in the Regular Army with
increase of pay for length of active service as now allowed by
law for officers of the Regular Army, from the date upon
which they are required by the terms of their order to obey
the same: Provided, That officers so ordered to active service
shall take temporary rank among themselves and in their
grade in the organizations to which assigned according to the
dates of orders placing them on active service; and may be
promoted, in accordance with such rank, to vacancies in
continental or volunteer organizations or to temporary vacan-
cies in the Regular Army thereafter occurring in the organi-
zations in which they are serving: And provided further,
That officers of the Reserve Corps shall not be entitled to
retirement or retired pay and shall be entitled to pension
only for disability incurred in the line of duty and while in
active service. *
Any officer of the Reserve Corps ordered to active service
by the Secretary of War while holding a reserve commission
shall, from the time he is required by the terms of his order
to obey the same, be subject to the laws and regulations for
the government of the Army of the United States, in so far
as they are applicable to officers whose permanent retention
in the military service is not contemplated.
APPENDIX.
The Chief of the Division of Militia Affairs has recommended, in submit-
ting estimates for that division for the fiscal year 1917, amendments of Section
1661 of the Revised Statutes, as amended by the acts of February 12, 1887,
June 6, 1900, and June 26, 1906, and of section 8 of the act of May 27, 1903 (35
324 PREPAIRED NESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
Stat., 401). The following are the amendments suggested, together with
statements of the purposes to which the increased appropriations are to be
devoted. The matter in Small capitals is new and the matter in brackets is
to be omitted from the existing law. -
Section sixteen hundred and sixty-one of the Revised Statutes, as amended
by the acts of February twelfth, eighteen hundred and eighty-seven, June
sixth, nineteen hundred, and June twenty-second, nineteen hundred and six,
is hereby amended and reenacted so as to read as follows:
SECTION 1. That the sum of two million FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND dollars
is hereby annually appropriated to be paid out of any money in the Treasury
not otherwise appropriated, for the purpose of providing arms, ordnance
stores, quartermaster stores, and camp equipage for issue to the militia, such
appropriation to remain available until expended.
SEC. 2. That the appropriation provided in the preceding paragraph shall
be apportioned among the several States and Territories, under [the direction
of the Secretary of War, according to the number of Senators and Representa-
tives to which each State, respectively, is entitled in the Congress of the
|United States, JUST AND EQUITABLE PROCEDURE TO BE PRESCRIBED BY THE
SECRETARY OF WAR AND IN DIRECT RATIO, SO FAR AS NOT IN CONFLICT WITH
SUCH PROCEDURE, TO THE ANNUAL STATE AND TERRITORIAL APPROPRIATIONS
ExISTING AT THE DATE of APPoRTIONMENT, FOR THE SUPPORT of THE ORGAN-
IZED MILITIA OF SUCH STATES AND TERRITORIES, RESPECTIVELY, AND TO THE
ITerritories and I District of Columbia, Isuch proportion and I under such
regulations as the President may prescribe: Provided, however, That no State
or Territory shall be entitled to the benefits of the appropriation apportioned
to it unless the number of regularly enlisted, organized, and uniformed active
militia IN SUCH STATE shall be at least one hundred men for each Senator and
Representative to which such State is entitled in the Congress of the United
States, AND IN EACH TERRITORY AND THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA SHALL BE
AT LEAST EQUAL TO THE NUMBER FIXED BY THE PRESIDENT FOR SUCH TERRI-
ToRY AND DISTRICT. And the amount of said appropriation which is thus
determined not to be available shall be covered back into the Treasury: Pro-
vided also, That the sum so apportioned among the several States Tand Terri-
tories], THE TERRITORY OF HAwarſ, and the District of Columbia shall be
available UNDER SUCH RULES As MAY BE PRESCRIBED BY THE SECRETARY OF
WAR Ifor the purposes named in section fourteen of the act of January twenty-
first, nineteen hundred and three, I for the actual [excess of expenses of
travel] AND NECESSARY EXPENSES INCURRED ſin making the inspections
therein provided for over the allowances made for same by law, I BY OFFICERS
AND ENLISTED MEN OF THE REGULAR ARMY WHEN TRAVELING ON DUTY IN
connecTION witH THE ORGANIZED MILITLA; For THE TRANSPORTATION OF
suPPLIES FURNISHED TO THE MILITIA For THE PERMANENT EQUIPMENT THEREOF;
FOR OFFICE RENT AND NECESSARY OFFICE EXPENSES OF OFFICERS ON DUTY
witH THE ORGANIZED MILITIA; For ExPENSEs of SERGEANT INSTRUCTORS ON
DUTY witH THE ORGANIZED MILITIA, INCLUDING QUARTERs, FUEL, LIGHT,
MEDICINES, AND MEDICAL ATTENDANCE; AND SUCH EXPENSES SHALI, CONSTI-
TUTE A CHARGE AGAINST THE WHOLE SUM ANNUALLY APPROPRIATED UNDER
SECTION SIXTEEN HUNDRED AND SIXTY-ONE, REVISED STATUTES, As AMENDED,
AND SHALL BE PAID THEREFROM, AND NOT FROM THE ALLOTMENT DULY APPOR-
TIONED TO ANY PARTICULAR STATE, TERRITORY, OR THE DISTRICT OF COLUM-
BIA; for the promotion of rifle practice, including the acquisition, construc-
tion, maintenance, and equipment of shooting galleries, and suitable target
ranges; for the hiring of horses and draft animals for the use of mounted troops,
batteries, and wagons; for forage for the same; and for such other incidental
expenses in connection with encampments, maneuvers, and field instruction
provided for in sections fourteen and fifteen of the said act of January twenty-
first, nineteen hundred and three, as the Secretary of War may deen necessary:
Provided, THAT THE Governor of EACH STATE, TERRITORY, AND THE COM-
MANDING GENERAL of THE ORGANIZED MILITIA OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
SHALL APPOINT, DESIGNATE, OR DETAIL, SUBJECT TO THE APPROVAL OF THE
SECRETARY OF WAR, AN of FICER OF THE ORGANIZED MILITIA OF THE STATE,
TERRITORY, OR DISTRICT, who shALL BE REGARDED AS PROPERTY AND DIS-
BURSING OFFICER OF THE UNITED STATES. HE SHALL RECEIPT AND ANNUALLY
Account FOR ALL PROPERTY BELONGING TO THE UNITED STATES IN POSSES-
SION OF THE ORGANIZED MILITIA OF HIS STATE, TERRITORY, OR DISTRICT, AND
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 32.5
SHALL MAKE SUCH RETURNS AND REPORTS CONCERNING THE SAME AS MAY BE
REQUIRED BY THE SECRETARY OF WAR. THE SECRETARY OF WAR Is AUTHOR-
IZED, ON THE REQUISITION OF A GOVERNOR OF A STATE OR TERRITORY OR THE -
COMMANDING GENERAL OF THE ORGANIZED MILITIA OF THE DISTRICT OF Co-
LUMBIA, TO PAY TO THE PROPERTY AND DISBURSING OFFICER THEREOF SO MUCH
OF ITS ALLOTMENT OUT OF THE ANNUAL APPROPRIATION UNDER SECTION SIX-
TEEN HUNDRED AND SIXTY-ONE OF THE REVISED STATUTEs, As AMENDED, As
SHALL BE NECESSARY FOR THE PURPOSES ENUMERATED THEREIN. HE SHALL
RENDER HIS ACCOUNTS THROUGH THE WAR DEPARTMENT TO THE PROPER AC-
COUNTING OFFICERS OF THE TREASURY FOR SETTLEMENT. BEFORE ENTERING
UPON THE PERFORMANCE OF HIS DUTIES AS PROPERTY AND DISBURSING OFFI-
CER HE SHALL BE REQUIRED TO GIVE GOOD AND SUFFICIENT BOND TO THE
UNITED STATES, IN SUCH suMs As THE SECRETARY OF WAR MAY DIRECT, FOR
THE FAITH FUL PERFORMANCE OF ELIS DUTIES AND FOR THE SAFEREEPING AND
PROPER DISPOSITION OF THE FEDERAL PROPERTY AND FUNDS INTRUSTED TO HIS
CARE. HE SHALL, AFTER HAVING QUALIFIED AS PROPERTY AND DISBURSING
OFFICER, RECEIVE PAY FOR HIS SERVICEs, AND such COMPENSATION SHALL BE
A CHARGE AGAINST THE WHOLE SUM ANNUALLY APPROPRIATED UNDER SECTION
SIXTEEN HUNDRED AND SIXTY-ONE, REVISED STATUTEs, As AMENDED, AND
NOT PAID FROM THE ALLOTMENT DULY APPORTIONED TO THE STATE, TERRI-
TORY, OR DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA. WHEN TRAVELING IN THE PERFORMANCE OF
HIS OFFICIAL DUTIES UNIDER, ORDERS ISSUED BY THE PROPER AUTEIORITIES BIE
SHALL BE REIMBURSED FOR THE ACTUAL NECESSARY TRAVELING EXPENSES,
THE SUM TO BE MADE A CHARGE AGAINST THE ALLOTMENT TO THE STATE, TER-
RITORY, OR DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, UNDER SECTION SIXTEEN HUNDRED AND
SIXTY-on E, REVISED STATUTEs, As AMENDED. THE SECRETARY OF WAR
SEIALL CAUSE AN INSPECTION OF THE ACCOUNTS AND RECORDS OF THE PROP-
ERTY AND DISBURSING OFFICER TO BE MADE BY AN OFFICER OF THE ARMY AT
LEAST ONCE EACH YEAR. THE SECRETARY OF WAR Is EMPOWERED TO MAKE
ALL RULES AND REGULATIONS NIECESSARY TO CARRY INTO EFFECT THE PROVI-
'SIONS OF THIS SECTION: PROVIDED ALSO, THAT WHENEVER ANY PROPERTY
ISSUED TO THE ORGANIZED MILITIA OF ANY STATE OR TERRITORY OR THE
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA. As HEREINBEFORE PROVIDED HAS BEEN LOST, DAM-
AGED, OR DESTROYED, OR HAS BECOME UNSERVICEABLE OR UNSUITABLE BY
USE IN SERVICE OR FROM ANY OTHER CAUSE, IT SHALL BE EXAMINED BY A
DISINTERESTED SURVEYING OFFICER OF THE REGULAR ARMY DETAILED BY
THE SECRETARY OF WAR, OR OF THE ORGANIZED MILITIA To BE APPOINTED
BY THE GOVERNOR OF THE STATE OR TERRITORY OR BY THE COMMANDING
GENERAL OF THE ORGANIZED MILITIA OF THE DISTRCIT OF COLUMBIA, AND
THE REPORT OF SUCH survey ING OFFICER SHALL BE FORw ARDED TO THE SEC-
RETARY OF WAR, AND IF IT SHALL APPEAR TO THE SECRETARY OF WAR FROM
THE RECORDS OF SURVEY THAT THE PROPERTY HAS BEEN LOST, DAMAGED, OR
DESTROYED THROUGH UNAVOIDABLE CAUSEs, HE IS HEREBY AUTHORIZED TO
RELIEVE THE STATE or TERRITORY OR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA FROM
FURTHER ACCOUNTABILITY THEREFOR; IF IT SHALL APPEAR THAT THE LOSS,
DAMAGE, OR DESTRUCTION OF PROPERTY WAS DUE TO CARELESSNESS OR
NEGLECT, OR THAT ITS Loss, DAMAGE, OR DESTRUCTION COULD HAVE BEEN
AVOIDED BY THE EXERCISE OF REASONABLE CARE, THE MONEY VALUE THEREOF
SHALL BE CHARGED TO THE STATE OR TERRITORY OR THE DISTRICT OF COLUM-
BIA, TO BE PAID FOR FROM STATE FUNDS OR ANY FUNDS OTHER THAN FEDERAL:
PROVIDED, THAT IF THE ARTICLES, SO SURVEYED ARE FOUND TO BE UNSERVICE-
ABLE OR UNSUITABLE, FROM EITHER AVOIDABLE OR UNAVOIDABLE CAUSES,
THE SECRETARY OF WAR SHALL DIREST what DISPosLTION, BY SALE or OTHER-
WISE, SHALL BE MADE OF SUCH ARTICLES, ExCEPT UNSERVICEABLE CLOTHING,
WHICH SHALL BE DESTROYED; AND IF SOLD, THE PROCEEDS OF SUCH SALE, AS.
WELL AS STOPPAGES AGAINST OFFICERS AND ENLISTED MEN, AND THE NET
PROCEEDS OF COLLECTIONS MADE FROM ANY PERSON OR FROM ANY STATE,
TERRITORY, OR THE DISTRICT OF Colum BIA, To REIMBURSE THE Gover N-
MENT FOR THE LOSs, DAMAGE, OR DESTRUCTION OF ANY PROPERTY, SHALL BE
DEPoSITED IN THE TREASURY OF THE UNITED STATES As A CREDIT TO THE
STATE, TERRITORY, OR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA ACCOUNTABLE FOR SAID
PROPERTY AND As A PART OF AND IN ADDITION TO THAT PORTION OF THE AL-
LOTMENT OF SUCH STATE, TERRITORY, OR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, SET
ASIDE FOR THE PURCHASE OF SIMILAR SUPPLIES, STORES, OR MATÉRIEL OF
WAR.
326 PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
The increase of $500,000 made by the foregoing amendment of section 1661,
Revised Statutes, as amended, is accounted for in the following estimates
submitted by the Division of Militia Affairs:
Travel of Federal officers in carrying out the provisions of section 14
of the militia law---------------------------------------------- $35,000
Travel of inspector-instructors and Sergeant-instructors, joining at
State stations for duty and returning to duty with regiments. . . . 15,000
Travel of inspector-instructors in making visits of instruction to . *
armories--------------------------------------------- - - - - - - - - - - 80,000
Travel of Federal officers in connection with State camps of instruc- -
tion and joint camps. . . . . . . . . . . . - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 80,000
Inspection of target ranges and mobilization camps for use of the
militia. ------------------------------------------------------ 1,000
Inspection of matériel pertaining to field artillery and Signal Corps
in the hands of the militia-------------. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4,000
Transportation of supplies (including transportation of animals
bought for the use of Cavalry and Field Artillery and machine-gun
units.-------------------------------------------------------- 85,000
Expenses of sergeant-instructors on duty with the Organized Militia,
- including quarters, fuel, light, medicines, and medical attendance. 150,000
Office rent of inspector-instructors. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50,000
500,000
The acts authorizing or providing for expenditures under the appropria-
tion made in section 1661, Revised Statutes, as amended, are cited as follows:
Act of February 12, 1887, volume 24, page 401, sections 1–3.
Act of August 18, 1894, volume 28, page 406, section 1.
Act of June 6, 1900, volume 31, page 662, section 1.
Act of January 21, 1903, volume 32, pages 775–780, Sections 3, 13–18.
Act of June 22, 1906, volume 34, page 449, sections 1–4.
Act of May 27, 1908, volume 35, pages 399–403, sections 1–11.
Act of April 21, 1910, volume 36, page 329.
Act of March 5, 1915, volume 38, page 1023, section 1.
The continuing appropriation of $2,000,000 provided for by section 8 of
the act of May 27, 1908 (35 Stat., 401), has been increased by the estimate of
the Division of Militia Affairs to $2,500,000, no other change in that section
being recommended. The purposes of the increase are stated as follows:
“For the necessary equipment for field service of the new organizations of the
auxiliary troops required to complete the twelve divisions of the Organized
Militia (seventy-four batteries of Field Artillery; three companies of Signal
Corps; seventeen companies of Engineers; thirty ambulance companies; eight
field hospitals; eleven machine gun troops; seventy-three machine gun com-
panies), and upon the completion of the organizations of the twelve divisions,
to meet the expenses necessary to keep all the troops thereof supplied with
serviceable field equipment, $500,000.”
The CHAIRMAN. That is the tentative plan of the War Department 7
Gen. MACOMB. Yes, sir. - - +.
The CHAIRMAN. What have you to say with reference to that ?
Gen. MACOMB. I will say that that provides in a general way for a
Regular Army consisting of the following combatant troops: Fifteen
regiments of Cavalry; Coast Artillery Corps, approximating 222 com-
panies; 10 regiments of Field Artillery; 40 regiments of Infantry; 1
Porto Rican Regiment Infantry; 30 cadet companies; 9 Battalions of
Engineers; 1 Engineer Band; 7 aero squadrons. This draft also pro-
vides for an increase in the enlisted personnel of the Signal º
I have prepared a little table here showing where, based on the
above strength of the combatant forces of the Regular Army. The
various units would go, as follows: - -
PREPAREDMESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 327

- Field Coast tº
Infantry | Cavalry * & Engineer | Aero
regi- regi- Aºry A.Y| 5at- squad-
mentS. mentS. mºs panies talions. rons.
Philippines-----------------------------.. 4 2 1 I 1
Oahu ------------------------------------- 6 1 1 52 2 1
Canal Zone.------------------------------- 3 # 1 2 1
Porto Rico.-------------------------------- 1 ----------|----------|----------|----------|----------
United States----------------------------- 27 113 7 170 4 4
Total.------------------------------- 41 15 10 222 9 7
Senator DU PONT. You have made no provision for the possibility
of having to put troops in Guantanamo 2.
Gen. MACOMB. No, sir.
Senator DU PONT. It has been talked of that in case of war we
would have to do that to assist the Marines. -
f Gen. MACOMB. That can be attended to with a special expeditionary
OTC0.
The deficiencies of this draft with respect to combatant troops are,
in the light of present day developments, that it fails to provide garri-
sons of sufficient strength for our over-sea possessions or to provide
the necessary number of regular troops for first line defense at
home. The organizations serving at home are to be maintained at
peace strength. We had recommended in our statement of policy
that, they be maintained at war strength.
The bill also provides a Regular Army reserve, and a continental
army of 400,000 men, to be raised in three approximately equal
annual increments, the individual members of which are to receive
not to exceed six months’ training, extending over a period of three
years. It provides for an officers’ reserve corps and for 30 cadet
companies in which approximately 3,000 cadets are to be trained
annually as reserve officers. The details of the organization and
personnel of the various arms, corps, and departments are shown in
full in the comparative statement here submitted.
The CHAIRMAN. I want that statement to go in the record.
(The statement referred to follows.) -
§
Comparative statement showing differences in the organization of the line of the Army: (1) As now authorized; (2) War Department draft of an act for
making further and more effectual provision for the national defense, etc.; (3) proposed House bill; (4) proposed Senate bill; (5) War College policy,
Sept. ii, 1915, with details of organization according to War College report on proposed Senate bill.
CAVALRY REGIMENT.
Band.
Squadron.
Squadron.
(1) As now authorized.
(2) War Department bill.
* (3) Proposed House bill.
(4) Proposed. Senate bill.
(5) As recommended by General
. Staff.
15 regiments Cavalry.
6 regiments Field Artillery.
Coast Artillery Corps, 170 com-
panies.
30 regiments Infantry.
1 Porto Rican Regiment Infan-
3 battalions Engineers.
1 engineer band.
15 regiments Cavalry.
10 regiments Field Artillery.
Coast Artillery Corps, equivalent
of 222 companies.
40 regiments Infantry.
1 Porto Rican Regiment Infantry.
4 regiments Engineers. -
1 mounted battalion Engineers.
1 engineer band.
15 regiments Cavalry.
sisting of 108 batteries.
Coast. Artillery Corps, 170 com-
panues.
52 *ditional companies author-
IZeC1.
30 regiments Infantry.
1 Porto Rican Regiment Infantry.
4 battalions Engineers.
1 engineer band.
NOTE.-Engineer band, , given
same organization as provided for
band of Coast Artillery Corps.
Enlisted personnel for
- | 64 regiments Infantry (including
12 regiments Field Artillery con-
Porto Rican regiment).
19 regiments Cavalry.
20 regiments Field Artillery.
Coast Artillery Corps consisting of
267 companies.
7 regiments Engineers.
| 7 mounted battalions Engineers.
1 engineer band (organized as are
bands of Infantry regiments).
1 Thought to be a typographical
error as unquestionably 2 mounted
battalions were intended.
65 regiments Infantry (including
Porto Rican Regiment).
25 regiments Cavalry.
21 regiments Field Artillery. .
Coast. Artillery Corps, 263 com-
panies.
7 regiments of Engineers.
2 mounted battalions Engineers.
1 colonel.
1 lieutenant colonel.
3 majors. ,
15 captains.
15 first lieutenants.
15 second lieutenants.
2 veterinarians.
1 Sergeant major.
1 quartermaster Sergeant.
1 commissary Sergeant.
3 . Sergeants major.
2 color SergeantS.
1 band.
12 troops (organized into 3 Squad-
rons of 4 troops each).
1 chief musician.
1 chief trumpeter.
1 drum major.
4 Sergeants.
12 troops (Organized into 3 Squad-
sº
1 colonel.
1 lieutenant colonel.
3 majors.
15 captains.
16 first lieutenants.
16 Second lieutenants.
2 veterinarians.
1 headquarter troop.
l ;
1 machine gun troop.
rons of 4 troops each).
Same as in column 2. Veterina-
rians provided in sec. 13 at the
rate of 2 for each regiment.
1 colonel.
1 lieutenant colonel.
3 Squadrons.
1 headquarter troop.
1 machine-gun troop.
1 Supply troop.
1 major. *
l º lººtenant (Squadron adju-
U8, ©
4 troops.
1 colonel. .
1 lieutenant colonel. t
1 captain (training officer).
2 veterinarians.
3 Squadrons.
1 headquarter troop.
1 machine gun troop.
1 Supply troop.
The Same as column 4

§
8 Corporals,
cook .
12 privates,
2s total enlisted.
Troop (in squadron).
1 captain.
1 first lieutenant.
1 Second lieutenant.
1 first Sergeant.
1 quartermaster Sergeant.
5 Sergeants.
7 corporals.
2 CookS.
1 farrier.
1 borSeShoer.
1 Saddler.
1 wagoner.
2 trumpeters.
66 privates.
88 total enlisted.
Headquarters troop.1
1 captain.
2 first lieutenants.
1 regimental sergeant major.
1 regimental quartermaster ser-
geant.
1 regimental commissary
sergeant.
2 color sergeants.
1 chief musician.
1 chief trumpeter.
1 principal musician.
1 drum major.
5 sergeants.
8 corporals.
1 Cook.
33 privates.
56 total enlisted.
1 Provisional organization pre- ||
Executive Order.
scribed by
The Commissioned and enlisted
strength taken from the Cavalry
regiment as by law authorized.
1 stab
Troop in the squadron.
1 captain.
1 first lieutenant.
1 Second lieutenant.
1 first Sergeant.
1 meSS Sergeant.
1 Supply Sergeant.
5 Sergeants.
6 corporals.
2 CookS.
2 horseshoers.
1 saddler.
2 trumpeters.
43 privates.
64 total enlisted. Provided that
the President in his discretion
may increase the number of
corporals in any troop to 9 and
the number of privates to 76.
Headquarters troop.
1 captain (regimental adjutant).
1 regimental Sergeant major.
3 squadron Sergeants major.
1 first sergeant (drum major).
2 color sergeants.
1 meSS Sergeant.
1 #. Sergeant.
e Sergeant.
2 Sergeants.
5 corporals.
2 CookS.
2 horseshoers.
1. Saddler.
23 privates.
1 band leader.
1 assistant band leader.
1 sergeant trümpeter.
2 band Sergeants.
Troop in the squadron.
1 captain.
1 first lieutenant.
1 Second lieutenant.
1 first Sergeant.
1 meSS Sergeant.
1 Supply Sergeant.
5 SergeantS.
9 corporals.
2 cooks.
2 horseshoers.
1 Saddler.
2 trumpeters.
76 privates.
100 total enlisted.
Headquarters troop.
The same as in column 2.
Troop in the squadron.
1 captain. *
1 first lieutenant.
1 Second lieutenant.
1 first Sergeant.
1 meSS Sergeant.
1 Supply Sergeant.
1 Stable Sergeant.
5 Sergeants.
8 corporals.
2 cookS.
2 horseshoerS.
1 Saddler.
2 buglers.
81 privates.
105 total enlisted.
Note.—Not to exceed 25 per cent
of the privates to be rated as pri-
vates, first class.
Headquarters troop.
The same as in column 2, ex-
cepting that the term “sergeant
bugler” is used instead of “ser-
geant trumpeter.”
Troop in the squadron.
The Same as in column 4 except-
ing that 20 privates first class and
61 privates are provided for and
the Fº providing that 25 per cent
of the privates shall be rated as
privates first class is omitted.
Headquarters troop,
The same as in column 2, except-
ing that 5 privates 1st class and 18
privates are provided for and that
1 sergeant trumpeter is replaced by
1 sergeant bugler, and instead of the
11 orderlies, 2 privates 1st class and
9 privates are provided for.
§
Comparative statement showing differences in the organization of the line of the Army, etc.—Continued.
CAVALRY REGIMENT—Continued.
(1) As now authorized.
(2) War Department bill.
(3) Proposed House bill.
(4) Proposed Senate bill.
(5) As recommended by General
Staff.
Machine-gun troop."
1 captain.
1 first lieutenant.
8 Sergeants.
6 corporals.
56 privates.
70 total enlisted.
1 Provisional organization pre-
scribed by Executive order.
The commissioned and enlisted
strength taken ſrom the Cavalry
regiment as by law authorized.
4 band corporals.
2 musicians (1st class).
4 musicians § class).
13 musicians (3d class
1 Sergeant orderly.
11 orderlies.
85 total enlisted.
Machine-gun troop.
1 captain.
1 first lieutenant.
2 Second lieutenants.
1 first sergeant.
1 meSS Sergeant.
1 Supply Sergeant.
1 stable Sergeant.
8 Sergeants.
8 Corporals.
2 CookS.
2 horseshoers
l Saddler.
1 mechanic.
2 trumpeters.
15 privates, first class.
47 privates.
90 total enlisted.
Supply troop.
1. ºn (regimental supply offi-
COI).
2 second lieutenants.
3 regimental supply sergeants.
And such noncommissioned offi-
CerS and other enlisted men as the
Secretary of War may authorize
to be supplied from staff corps or
departments.
Supply troop.
The same as in column 2.
Machine-gun troop.
The same as in column 2.
Machine-gun troop.
1 captain.
2 first lieutenants.
1 second lieutenant.
1 first Sergeant.
1 meSS Sergeant.
1 supply Sergeant.
1 stable sergeant.
2 horseshoers.
9 SergeantS.
18 corporals.
3 COOkS.
2 mechanics.
144 privates.
182 total enlisted.
NOTE.-Not to exceed 25 per
cent of privates to berated as pri-
vates, 1st class.
Supply troop.
1 ºn (regimental Supply offi-
Cer). -
1 second lieutenant..
3 regimental supply sergeants.
1 first Sergeant.
1 meSS Sergeant.
1 stable sergeant.
2 Corporals.
2 COOkS.
Machine-gun troop.
1 captain.
1 first lieutenant.
2 Second lieutenants.
1 first sergeant.
1 mess sergeant.
1 Su §. Sergeant.
1 stable sergeant.
8 Sergeants.
8 Corporals.
2 COOkS.
2 horseshoers.
1 Saddler.
2 mechanics.
2 buglers. r
62 (1st class privates, 13; privates,
9i total enlisted.
Supply troop.
The same as column 4, excepting
that 2 second lieutenants are pro-
vided for.
".
§
2 horseshoers.
2 Saddlers.
1 wagoner for each authorized
Yºn of the field and combat
Tall l.
INFANTRY REGIMIENT.
1 colonel.
1 lieutenant colonel.
3 majors.
15 captains.
15 first lieutenants.
15 second lieutenants.
1 Sergeant major.
1 quartermaster sergeant.
1 commissary sergeant.
3 battalion Sergeants major.
2 color Sergeants.
1 band. -
12 companies, organized into 3
battalions of 4 companies each.
Company in battalion.
1 Captain.
1 first lieutenant.
1 Second lieutenant.
1 first sergeant.
1 quartermaster Sergeant.
5 Sergeants.
9 or 10 corporals.
2 COOkS.
2 musicians.
1 artificer.
122 or 123 privates.
sº-º-º-º-º:*
143 or 144 total enlisted.
1 colonel.
1 lieutenant colonel.
3 majors.
15 captains.
15 first lieutenants.
15 second lieutenants.
1 headquarter company.
1 Supply company.
1 machine-gun company.
12 companies, organized into 3
ºlions of 4 companies
03 CIl.
Company in battalion.
1 Captain.
1 first lieutenant.
1 Second lieutenant.
1 first sergeant.
1 meSS Sergeant. l
1 Supply Sergeant.
3 Sergeants.
6 corporals.
2 CookS.
2 trumpeters.
1 mechanic.
48 privates. *
65 total enlisted. Provided the
President in his discretion
Imay increase the number of
sergeants in any company of
The same as in column 2.
Company in battalion.
1 captain.
1 first lieutenant.
1 second lieutenant.
1 first sergeant.
1 meSS Sergeant.
1 Supply sergeant.
5 Sergeants.
10 corporals.
3 Cooks.
2 trumpeters.
1 mechanic.
126 privates.
ºmºsºms.
150 total enlisted.
1 colonel.
1 lieutenant colonel.
3 battalions.
1 headquarter company.
1 machine-gun company.
1 Supply company.
Battalion.
1 major.
1 first lieutenant mounted.
4 companies.
Company in battalion,
1 captain.
1 first lieutenant.
1 second lieutenant.
1 first sergeant.
1 mess sergeant.
1 supply sergeant.
6 Sergeants.
12 corporals.
3 cooks.
2 buglers.
2 mechanics.
84 privates.
112 total enlisted.
NoTE.—Not to exceed 25 percent
of the privates to be rated as pri-
wates, 1st class.
1 colonel.
1 lieutenant colonel.
3 battalions.
1 headquarter company.
1 machine-gun company.
1 supply company.
Battalion.
The same as in column 4.
Company in battaliom.
1 captain.
1 first lieutenant.
1 second lieutenant.
1 first sergeant.
1 meSS Sergeant.
1 Supply Sergeant.
8 Sergeants.
17 corporals.
3 COOks.
2 buglers.
2 mechanics.
115 (28 privates, 1st class; 87 pri-
vates).
150 total enlisted.

§
Comparative statement showing differences in the organization of the line of the Army, etc.—Continued.
(5) As recommended by Genera
Staff.
Headquarters company.
The same as in column 2, except-
ing that the term sergeant bugler is
used instead of sergeant trumpeter
and that the 16 orderlies are re-
placed by 4 privates, 1st class, and
12 privates, mounted; and 1 regi-
mental sergeant major, 3 battalion
sergeants major, and 1 Sergeant
orderly are mounted.
INFANTRY REGIMENT—Continued.
(1) As now authorize
(2) War Department bill.
(3) Proposed House bill.
(4) Proposed Senate bill.
1 Headquarters company.
1 Captain.
3 first lieutenants.
1 regimental sergeant major.
2 color Sergeants
3 battalion sergeant majors.
1 Sergeant, orderly.
19 privates.
1 chief musician.
1 chief trumpeter.
1 drum major.
4 sergeants.
8 Corporals.
1 COOk.
13 privates.
55 total enlisted.
! Supply company.
1 captain.
2 second lieutenants.
1 regimental quartermaster ser-
Gant.
1 regimental commissary sergeant.
3 sergeants.
5 total enlisted.
1 Provisional organization pre-
scribed by Executive order, com-
missioned and enlisted strength
taken from Infantry regiment as
anthorized by law,
infantry to 5, the number of
corporals to 10, the number
of cooks to 3, and the number
of privates to 126.
Headquarters company.
1 captain (regimental adjutant).
1 regimental sergeant major.
3 battalion sergeants major.
1 first sergeant (drum major).
2 color sergeants.
1 mess sergeant.
1 Supply sergeant.
2 COOkS.
1 horseshoer.
1 band leader.
1 assistant leader.
1 sergeant trumpeter.
2 band sergeants.
4 band corporals.
2 musicians (1st class).
4 musicians (2d class).
13 musicians (3d class).
1 sergeant orderly.
16 orderlies.
57 total enlisted.
Supply company.
1 ºn (regimental supply offi-
Cél’).
1 second lieutenant.
3 regimental supply sergeants.
And such noncommissioned of-
ficers and other enlisted men as the
Secretary of War may authorize to
be supplied from the Staff Corps or
departments.
Headquarters company.
The same as in column 2.
Supply company.
The same as in column 2.
Headquarters company.
The same as in column 2, except-
ing the term sergeant bugler is
Swpply company.
1 captain, mounted.
1 Second fieutenant, mounted.
3 regimental supply sergeants,
mounted.
1 first sergeant, mounted.
2 corporals, mounted.
2 COOkS.
2 Saddlers. *
2 horseshoers and 1 wagoner for
each authorized wagon of the
field and combat train.
used instead of Sergeant trumpeter.
Supply company.
1 captain, mounted.
1 Second fieutenant, mounted.
3 regimental supply Sergeants,
mounted.
1 first Sergeant, mounted.
1 mess Sergeant.
2 corporals, mounted.
2 COOkS. *
2 Saddlers.
2 horseshoers.
1 wagoner for each authorized
wagon of the field and combat
train,
§
*:
*Machine-gun company.
1 captain.
1 Second lieutenant.
8 Sergeants.
8 corporals.
35 privates.
51 total enlisted.
* Provisional organization pre-
scribed by executive order, com-
missioned and enlisted strength
taken from Infantry regiment as
authorized by law.
Machine-gun company.
1 captain.
1 first lieutenant.
1 Second lieutenant.
1 first sergeant.
1 mess sergeant.
1 supply sergeant.
1 stable sergeant.
7 Sergeants.
8 corporals.
2 COOkS.
1 mechanic.
48 privates.
70 total enlisted.
NOTE.-Not to exceed 25 per
cent of the privates to be rated as
privates, 1st class.
Machine-gun company.
Same as in column 2. .
Machine-gun company.
1 Captain, mounted.
2 first lieutenants, mounted.
1 second lieutenant, mounted.
1 first sergeant, mounted.
1 meSS Sergeant, mounted.
1 Supply Sergeant, mounted.
1 stable sergeant, mounted.
2 horseshoers.
9 Sergeants.
18 corporals.
3 COOks.
2trumpeters.
2 mechanics.
135 privates.
175 total enlisted.
NOTE.-Not to exceed 25 per
cent of the privates to be rated as
privates, 1st class.
Machine-gun company.
1 captain, mounted.
1 first lieutenant, mounted.
2 second lieutenants, mounted.
1 first sergeant, mounted.
1 mess sergeant.
1 supply sergeant.
1 stable sergeant.
1 horseshoer.
7 sergeants (1 mounted).
corporals (2 mounted).
CookS.
2 buglers.
2 mechanics. e
48 (12 privates, first class; 36 pri-
Vates).
74 total enlisted.
PORTO RICO REGIMENT OF INFANTRY.
8 Companies (organized into 2
battalions of 4 companies each).
Field officers detailed from offi-
cers not below the rank of cap-
tain in the Regular Army.
11 captains.
10 first lieutenants.
10 Second lieutenants.
1 chaplain.
32 total commissioned.
599 total enlisted.
The organization of theregiment
and of each unit to be as provided
for like units in regiments of In-
fantry. The colonel and lieuten-
ant colonel to be detailed for 4
years by the President from offi-
cers of the Army not below the
rank of major, and the majors for
like periods from officers of the
Army not below the rank of cap-
tain, and while so serving officers
so detailed to have the rank, pay,
and allowances of the grade to
which detailed. Captains and
first lieutenants to be appointed
and promoted to include rank of
captain as now provided by law,
With provisos relating to rank, etc.
The same as in column 2, except
that vacancies created by act or
occurring hereafter in commis-
Sioned Offices of Said regiment
above the grade of second lieuten-
ant and below the grade of colonel
to be filled by promotion accord-
ing to seniority in the several
grades within the regiment sub-
ject to examination, etc.
The Porto Rican Regiment in-
cluded as one of the regiments of
Regular Infantry.
The same as in Column 4.
:
Comparative statement showing differences in the organization of the line of the Army, etc.—Continued,
(4) Proposed Senate bill.
(5) As recommended by General
Staff.
20 regiments. Units: Field Ar-
tillery to include Mountain Ar-
tillery, Light Artillery, Heavy
Artillery (field and siege types),
Horse Artillery, ammunition bat-
teries and battalions, depot bat-
teries and battalions; and Artillery
#. shall consist of 111 gun or
owitzer batteries organized into
41 gun or howitzer battalions, 22
ammunition batteries organized
into 7 ammunition battalions, 17
depot batteries organized into 8
depot battalions and 1 Artillery
park; the battalions to be organ-
ized into 173, regiments; the am-
mu ...ition batteries and battalions
and the Artillery park to be organ-
ized only in time of war or threat-
ened invasion, etc.
Regiment.
1 lieutenant colonel.
1 headquarters company.
l ;P. .
And such number of gun and
howitzer battalions as the Presi-
dent may direct... Nothing to pre-
went the assembling in same regi-
ment of gun and howitzer battal-
ions of different calibers and
FIELD AIRTILLERY.
(1) As now authorized.
(2) War Department bill.
(3) Proposed House bill.
Field Artillery Regiment.
(6 regiments).
1 Colonel.
1 lieutenant colonel.
2 majors.
11 captains.
13 first lieutenants.
13 Second lieutenants.
2 veterinarians.
1 Sergeant major.
1 quartermaster sergeant.
1 commissary sergeant.
2 battalion sergeants major.
2 battalion quartermaster ser-
;
2 color Sergeants.
1 band
6 batteries (organized into 2 bat-
talions of 3 batteries each).
Provided that the President
in his discretion may in-
CreaSO the regimental
strength herein authorized
by 9 mounted orderlies.
Pand.
Same as authorized for Cavalry
regiment.
Battery.
1 captain.
2 first lieutenants.
2 second lieutenants.
1 first scrgeant.
1 quartermaster Sergeant.
1 stable sergeant. *
1 Chief mechanic.
6 Sergeants.
The Field Artillery includes
Light Artillery, Horse Artillery,
Heavy Artillery, and Mountain
Artillery. ... Of the 10 regiments of
Field Artillery, 8 regiments shall
be 2-battalion regiments, and 2
shall be 3-battalion regiments.
The Secretary of War to have au-
ºrity to vary the equipme:1t,
€15C.
Field Artillery Regiment.
(Mountain or Light, 10 regiments).
1 colonel.
1 lieutenant colonel.
2 majors.
11 captains.
13 first lieutenants.
13 Second lieutenants.
2 vetorinarians.
1 headquarters company.
1 Supply company. -
6 batteries (organized into 2 bat-
talions of 3 batteries each).
Headquarters company.
1 captain (regimental adjutant).
1 regimental Sergeant major.
2 battalion Sergeants major.
1 first Sergeant (drum major).
2 color Sergeants.
1 meSS Sergeant.
1 supply Sergeant.
1 stable sergeant.
2 Sergeants.
11 corporals.
2 horseshoers.
1 Saddler.
2 mechanics.
Field Artillery (108 batteries):
12 colonels.
12 lieutenant colonels.
36 majors.
168 captains.
192 first lieutenants.
228 second lieutenants.
12 regimental Sergeants major.
36 regimental
geantS.
36 battalion Sergeants major.
24 color Sergeants.
12 Supply Sergeants.
12 meSS Sergeants.
12 stable sergeants.
24 Sergeants.
192 corporals.
24 horseshoers.
12 Saddlers.
24 mechanics.
48 trumpeters.
36 COOkS.
288 privates.
120 orderlies.
12 bands.
108 batteries.
Bands:
1 band leader.
Supply Ser-
1 first Sergeant (drum major).
1 assistant band leader.
1 sergeant trumpeter.
2 band SergeantS.
4 band corporals.
1 COOk.
2 musicians, first class.
4 musicians, Second class.
13 musicians, third class.
Battery:
1 captain.
1 first lieutenant.
2 Second lieutenants.
1 first sergeant.
1 colonel. -
1 captain.
| classes.
Gum or howitzer battery.
1 Captain.
2 first lieutenants.
2 Second lieutenants.
1 first Sergeant.
1 Supply Sergeant.
21 regiments. The Field Ar-
tillery, including Mountain Ar-
tillery, Light Artillery, Horse
Artillery, Heavy Artillery (field
and siege types), shall consist of
126 gun or howitzer batteries or-
ganized into 21 regiments.
In time of war, threatened inva-
Sion, etc., the President is author-
ized to organize such number of am-
munition batteries and battalions
depot batteries and battalions, and
Such artillery parks with such num-
bers and grades of personnel and
Such organization as he may deem
necessary.
Regiment.
1 colonel.
1 lieutenant colonel.
1 captain.
1 headquarter company.
1 Supply company.
And Such number of gun and
howitzer battalions as the Presi-
dent may direct.
Nothing shall prevent the assem-
bly in the same regiment of gun
and howitzer battalions of different
calibers and classes.
Gwn or howitzer battery.
1 captain.
2 first lieutenants.
2 second lieutenants.
1 first Sergeant.
1 Supply Sergeant.
1 stable Sergeant.
1 mess Sergeant.
9 Sergeants.
20 corporals,
1 Chief mechanic.
:
12 corporals.
4 mechanics.
3 Cooks.
2 musicians.
102 privates.
133 total enlisted.
Provided that the President
in his discretion may increase the
number of sergeantsto 8, the num-
ber of Corporals to 16, the number
of mechanics to 7, the number of
musicians to 3, and thenumber of
privates to 149.
3 trumpeters.
2 CookS.
18 privates.
8 orderlies.
1 band leader.
1 assistant band leader.
1 Sergeant trumpeter.
2 band sergeants.
4 band Corporals.
2 musicians, 1st class.
4 musicians, 2d class.
13 musicians, 3d class.
86 total enlisted.
Provided that when no enlisted
men of the Quartermaster Corps
are detached for such duty there
shall be added to each Mountain
Artillery Company:
1 packmaster (sergeant, 1st class).
1 assistant packmaster (Sergeant).
1 Cargador (Corporal).
Supply company.
l ºn (regimental supply offi-
Cer
1 first lieutenant.
2 regimental supply sergeants.
And such noncommissioned offi-
cers and enlisted men as the Sec-
retary of War may authorize to be
supplied from the staff, corps, or
departments.
Regiment of Field Artillery.
(EIorse or heavy.)
1 colonel.
1 lieutenant Colonel.
3 majors.
12 Captains.
13 first lieutenants.
14 second lieutenants.
3 veterinarians.
1 headquarters Company.
1 ; Company.
6 batteries (organized into 3 bat-
talions of 2 batteries each).
The headquarters and supply
companies of horse and heavy Ar-
1 Supply Sergeant.
1 mess sergenat.
1 stable sergeant.
1 chief mechanic.
7 Sergeants.
16 corporals.
7 mechanics.
3 COOkS.
3 trumpeters.
149 privates.
Each battery of Field Artillery
shall be armed and equipped and
any 2 or more such batteries
may be combined into or detached
from higher tactical units as the
President may direct.
Provided that when a Mountain
Artillery organization comprising
not less than 6 batteries is formed
and When no men of the Quarter-
master Corps are available for at-
tachment there shall be added:
1 packmaster (Sergeant, first
class).
1 assistant packmaster (Ser-
geant).
1 cargador (corporal).
Further provided that 1 chap-
lain is authorized for every 9 bat-
teries. &
Provided that for the purpose
of lessening as much as possible
increase of promotion due to in-
crease in number of officers of
Field Artillery under provisions of
this act, any vacancies created or
caused in commissioned grades be-
low that of captain may, in the dis-
cretion of the President and under
º prescribed by him, be
illed by promotion or transfer
from other branches, etc.
1 stable Sergeant.
1 mess Sergeant.
9 sergeants.
14 Corporals.
1 chief mechanic.
1 saddler.
3 horseshoers.
2 mechanics.
2 buglers.
3 CookS.
102 privates.
141 total enlisted.
Not to exceed 25 per cent of the
privates to be rated as privates, 1st
Class. When no enlisted men of
the Quartermaster Corps are at-
tached for such position thereshall
be added to each battery of Moun-
tain Artillery.
I packmaster (sergeant, 1st Class).
1 assistant packmaster (Sergeant).
1 cargador (corporal).
The President to be authorized
in his discretion to increase the
number of corporals to 20, the num-
ber of horseshoers to 4, the number
of buglers to 3, and the number of
privates to 145.
Headquarters company of regiment
of 2 battalions.
1 captain.
1 regiment Sergeant major.
2 battalion sergeants major.
1 first sergeant.
2 color Sergeants.
1 mess sergeant.
1 supply sergeant.
1 stable sergeant.
2 Sergeants.
11 corporals.
2 horseshoers.
1 Saddler.
2 mechanics.
3 buglers.
4 COOkS.
18 privates.
18 orderlies.
1 band leader.
1 saddler.
3 horseshoers.
3 mechanics.
3 buglers.
3 Cooks.
35 privates, 1st class.
107 privates.
189 total enlisted.
When no enlisted men of the
Quartermaster Corps are attached
for such positions there shall be
added to each battery of Mountain
Artillery:
1 packmaster (Sergeant, 1st class).
1 assistant packmaster (sergeant).
1 Cargador (Corporal).
Headquarters company of a regiment
of 2 battalions.
1 Captain.
1 second lieutenant.
1 regimental Sergeant major.
2 battalion sergeants major.
1 first sergeant.
2 color sergeants.
1 meSS Sergeant.
1 Supply sergeant.
1 Stable sergeant.
4 Sergeants.
14 Corporals.
2 horseshoers.
1 Saddler.
2 mechanics.
3 buglers.
. 2 Cooks.
4 privates, 1st class.
14 privates.
2 privates, 1st class (orderlies).
7 É. (orderlies).
1 band leader.
1 assistant band leader.
1 Sergeant bugler.
2 band sergeants.
4 band corporals.
2 musicians, 1st class.
4 musicians, 2d class.
13 musicians, 3d class.
32 total enlisted.
§
*.
FIELD ARTILLERY-Continued.
Comparative statement showing differences in the organization of the line of the Army, etc.—Continued.
(2) War Department bill.
(3) Proposed House bill.
(4) Proposed Senate bill.
(5) As recommended by General
Staff.
tillery shall be organized as herein
provided for the headquarters and
;. Companies of regiments of
light and mountain Artillery ex-
Cept that in the regiments of horse
and heavy Artillery, the enlisted
strength provided therein for
headquarters companies is in-
1 battalion sergeant major.
103 total enlisted.
And the commissioned and en-
listed strength provided therein
for Supply companies is increased
(1) As now authorized.
creased by—
5 corporals.
2 orderlies.
1 trumpeter.
2 COOkS.
6 privates.
y— e
1 second lieutenant.
1 regimental supply sergeant.
Battery of Field Artillery.
1 captain.
2 first lieutenant.
2 second lieutenants.
1 first sergeant.
1 meSS Sergeant.
1 supply sergeant.
1 stable sergeant.
1 chief mechanic.
5 Sergeants.
12 corporals.
4 mechanics.
3 Cooks.
2 trumpeters.
102 privates.
133 total enlisted.
1 assistant band leader.
1 sergeant bugler.
2 band Sergeants.
4 band Corporals.
2 musicians, 1st class.
4 musicians, 2d class.
13 musicians, 3d class.
98 total enlisted.
When regiment consists of 3
battalions, there are added—
1 battalion sergeant major.
5 corporals.
2 orderlies.
1 bugler.
2 COOkS.
6 privates.
115 total enlisted.
When no enlisted man of the
Quartermaster Corps is attached
for such position there is added
to each mountain artillery head-
quarter Company.
1 packmaster (Sergeant, 1st class).
Supply º of a regiment of
2 battalions.
1 captain.
1 lieutenant.
2 regimental supply sergeants.
1 first sergeant.
When a regiment consists of 3
battalions there shall be added—
1 battalion sergeant major.
5 corporals.
2 privates, 1st class orderlies.
1 bugler.
2 COOkS.
6 privates.
109 total enlisted (3-battalion regi-
ment)
When no enlisted men of the
Quartermaster Corps are attached
there shall be added to each moun-
tain artillery, headquarters com-
pany—
1 pack master (Sergeant, 1st class).
1 assistant packmaster (sergeant).
1 cargador (corporal).
Supply º of a regiment of
2 battalions.
1 Captain.
1 first lieutenant.
2 regimental supply sergeants.
1 first sergeant.
§
Provided that the President in
his discretion may increase the
of privates to 149.
tillery park.
talion for each regiment of Field
Artillery and 1 Artillery park.
A mºmwnition battalion.
i
1 major.
1 captain.
1 first lieutenant (supply officer).
munition batteries.
detachment.
1 battalion Sergeant major.
1 battalion Supply Sergeant.
4 corporals.
1 trumpeter.
2 Cooks.
3 orderlies.
3 privates.
wagon of the field train.
A mmunition battery.
1 captain.
2 first lieutenants.
2 second lieutenants.
1 first sergeant.
number of sergeants in the battery |
of Field Artillery to 7, the number ||
of corporals to 16, the number of |
mechanics to 7, the number of |
trumpeters to 3, and the number ||
mmunition battalion and Ar- |
In time of war or when war is |
imminent the President is author- |
ized to organize l ammunition bat- |
1 ammunition battalion head- |
quarter detachment and 3 am- |
A mmunition battalion headquarter ||
1 wagoner for each authorized
Ammunition battalion and Ar-
tillery park.
In emergencies of actual or im-
minent war, the President is au-
‘ thorized to organize 1 ammunition
battalion for each regiment of
. Artillery and 1 Artillery
park.
These organizations are the same
º column 2 (proposed draft,
€tC.). -
1 mess Sergeant.
2 corporals.
2 COOkS.
2 horseshoers.
2 Saddlers.
2 Orderlies.
1 wagoner for each authorized
wagon of the field train,
When a regiment consists of 3
battalions, there shall be added:
1 lieutenant.
1 regiment supply Sergeant.
1 orderly.
1 wagoner for each additional au-
thorized wagon of the field train.
Gun or howitzer battalion.
1 major.
1 captain.
And batteries as follows: Moun-
tain Artillery Battalion, Light
Artillery gun Battalion and Heavy
Field Artillery. Howitzer Bat-
talion serving with the Field Ar-
tillery of Infantry organizations
shall contain 3 batteries, horse
Artillery battalions, and heavy
Tield Artillery gun or howitzer
battalions other than those Speci-
fied above to contain 2 batteries.
Ammunition battalion.
1 major.
1 Captain.
1 first or second lieutenant (suppl
officer).
1 ammunition battalion head-
quarter detachment to be organ-
ized as provided in column 2
except that the term bugler
is used instead of trumpeter, and
1 mechanic is added to the en-
listed personnel of each ammuni-
tion battery.
Ammunition battery.
Same as column 2 except that 1
mechanic is added to the enlisted
pººl of each ammunition
attery. - .
1 meSS Sergeant.
2 corporals.
2 COOkS.
2 horseshoers.
2 Saddlers.
2 orderlies.
1 wagoner for each authorized
wagon of the field train. When
a regiment consists of 3 battal-
ions, there shall be added—
1 second lieutenant.
1 regimental supply Sergeant.
1 orderly.
1 wagoner for each additional
authorized wagon of the field
train.
Gun or howitzer battalion.
1 major.
1 captain.
Mountain Artillery, light Artil-
lery, gun or howitzer battalion and
heavy Field Artillery serving with
the Field Artillery of Inſantry divi-
Sions shall contain 3 batteries; horse
Artillery battalions and heavy field
Artillery, gun or howitzer bat-
talions other than those specified
above shall contain 2 batteries.
§
FIELD AIRTILLERY-Continued.
Comparative statement showing differences in the organization of the line of the Army, etc.—Continued.
(1) As now authorized.
(2) War Department bill.
(3) Proposed House bill.
(4) Proposed Senate bill.
(5) As recommended by General
Staff.
1 Supply Sergeant.
1 stable Sergeant.
1 meSS sergeant.
7 Sergeants.
12 corporals.
1 chief mechanic.
1 Saddler.
4 horseshoers.
3 COOkS.
3 trumpeters.
And not more than 187 privates.
Provided that not to exceed 25
per cent of the privates shall be
rated as privates, 1st class.
Provided further that when no
enlisted men of the Quartermaster
Department are detached for such
positions, there shall be added to
each ammunition battery serving
with Mountain Artillery—
1 packmaster (sergeant 1st class).
1 assistant packmaster (Sergeant).
1 cargador (corporal).
And provided further, that the
Presidentin his discretion may in-
crease the number of horseshoers
in the ammunition battery serving
with Mountain Artillery to 6.
Artillery Park.
To be organized as the President
may prescribe.
The organization of ammunition
battalions, artillery, parks, and
ammunition batteries shall be
temporary and may be discon-
tinued by the President in his dis-
cretion. The officers necessary,
therefor, shall be supplied by the
In time of war the President is
authorized to organize the depot
batteries and battalions herein
provided, and such Artillery park
with such numbers and grades of
personnel and with such organiza-
tion as he may consider necessary;
the necessary additional personnel
to be supplied from reserve officers
and the Regular Army reserve.
§
assignment of officers from the
officers’ Reserve Corps or by tem-
porary promotion and appoint-
ments in the manner authorized
by section 8 of the Volunteer act
approved Apr. 25, 1914, for filling
temporary vacancies created in
the commissioned personnel of the
Regular Army, etc.
COAST ARTILLERY.
1 Chief of Coast Artillery with
rank of brigadier general.
14 Colonels.
14 lieutenant Colonels.
42 majors.
210 captains.
210 first lieutenants.
210 second lieutenants.
21 sergeants major (with rank,
pay, and allowances of regi-
mental sergeant major of
Infantry).
26 master electricians.
60 engineers.
74 electrician sergeants,
Class.
74 electrician sergeants, second
Class.
42 sergeants major (rank, pay,
and allowances of battalion
sergeant major of Infantry).
42 master gunners.
first
60 firemen.
170 companies. ;
14 bands organized as now pro-
vided for Artillery Corps
bands. -
Company.
1 captain.
1 first lieutenant.
1 second lieutenant, i
1 first Sergeant, - |
Coast Artillery defined to in-
clude troops for fixed and mobile
armament for Coast defense.
1 Chief of Coast Artillery With
rank of major general.
19 colonels.
19 lieutenant colonels.
56 majors.
278 captains.
278 first lieutenants.
278 second lieutenants.
25 sergeants major (With rank,
pay, and allowances of reg-
imental sergeant major of
Infantry).
34 master electricians.
76 engineers.
89 electrician sergeants, first
Class.
89 electrician sergeants, sec-
ond Class. e
54 sergeantsmajor (With rank,
ay, and allowances of
§aii; sergeant major
of Infantry).
50 master gunners.
66 firemen.
222 first sergeants.
222 supply sergeants. "
1, 776 sergeants.
2,664 corporals.
444 Cooks.
444 mechanics.
444 trumpeters,
The Commissioned strength is
the same as now authorized by
law. The enlisted strength is
identical with that prescribed in
column 2. In the final proviso the
Wording is slightly di'erent, the
word “employed” is used instead
of the word “trained,” being as
follows:
‘‘ Provided further that when
Coast Artillery troops are em-
ployed in the duties of any other
arm of the service they shall be or-
ganized temporarily in accordance
With the law pertaining to that
arm.”
Band:
Same as column 2, except that
1 cook is added.
Definition: The Coast Artillery
shall constitute a Corps manning
the fixed and mobile seacoast arm-
ament, and shall consist of:
1 Chief of Coast Artillery,
who, while so serving,
shall be an additional
member of the General
Sta: I Corps with the rank,
pay, and allowances of a
major general, as now
prescribed by law:
5 major generals with the
rank, pay, and allowances
of a brigadier general, as
now prescribed by law.
26 Colonels.
25 lieutenant Colonels.
85 majors.
381 captains.
362 first lieutenants.
362 second lieutenants.
31 sergeants major, senior
grade. * * *
62 sergeants major, junior
42 master electricians.
73 engineers.
100 electrician sergeants, first
class.
274 assistant engineers.
100 electriciansergeants, second
class.
109 firemen,
Definition: The Coast Artillery
shall constitute a Corps manning
the fixed and mobile seacoast arma-
ment and shall consist of:
1 Chief of Coast Artillery
with rank of major general.
24 Colonels.
24 lieutenant Colonels.
72 majors.
360 captains.
360 first lieutenants.
360 second lieutenants.
31 sergeants major, senior
grade. * * *
64 sergeants major, junior
T3010
41 master electricians.
72 engineers.
99 electrician sergeants,
Class.
205 assistant engineers.
99 electrician sergeants, second
class.
106 firemen.
93 radio sergeants.
62 master gunners.
263 first sergeants,
263 supply sergeants.
263 mess sergeants.
2, 104 sergeants.
3, 156 corporals.
526 Cooks.
526 mechanics,
526 buglers,
first
£
Comparative statement showing differences in the organization of the line of the Army, etc.—Continued.
(5) As recommended by General
- Staff.
COAST ARTILLERY-Continued.
(1) As now authorized.
(2) War Department bill.
(3) Proposed House bill.
(4) Proposed Senate bill.
1 quartermaster sergeant.
2 CookS. -
2 mechanics.
2 musicians.
And such number of Sergeants,
corporals, and privates as may be
fixed by the President in accord-
ance with the requirements of the
Service to which assigned; pro-
vided that the total number of
Sergeants and Corporals in the
Coast Artillery so fixed shall not
exceed 1,360 and 2,040, respec-
tively, and that the total enlisted
strength of the Coast Artillery, as
provided under this act, shall not
exceed 19,147, exclusive of master
electricians, electrician sergeants,
first class, and electrician ser-
geants, Second class.
Provided that the number of
Casemate electricians shall not ex-
ceed 44; number of observers,
first class, 170; number of plot-
ters, 170; number of chief plant-
ers, 44; number of chief loaders,
44; number of observers, second
class, 170; number of gun com-
manders, 378; number of gun
pointers, 378.
and:
1 chief musician.
1 chief trumpeter.
1 principal musician.
1 drum major.
4 Sergeants.
8 Corporals.
1 COOk.
11 privates.
28 total enlisted.
17,982 privates.
18 bands organized as provided
under this act for engineer band.
Provided that the number of
officers, noncommissioned officers,
and privates assigend to the man-
ning body of any particular tacti-
tical unit may be fixed by the
President in accordance With the
requirements of the service of that
unit; provided further that the
number of rated men in the Coast
Artillery shall not exceed 1,776,
and pº. further that When
Coast Artillery troops are trained
in the duties of any other arm of
the service they will be organized
in accordance with the law per-
taining to that arm.
Band:
1 first sergeant (drum major).
1 band leader.
1 assistant band leader.
2 band sergeants.
4 band corporals.
2 musicians, first class.
4 musicians, Second class.
13 musicians, third class,
28 total enlisted.
96 radio sergeants.
64 master gunners.
267 first Sergeants.
267 Supply Sergeants.
267 mess sergeants.
2,136 Sergeants.
3,204 corporals.
534 COOkS.
534 mechanics.
534 buglers.
20,362 privates.
§ot to exceed 25 per cent of the
privates to be rated as privates,
first class.
18 bands organized as provided
for º band.
The total enlisted strength of the
Coast Artillery Corps shall not ex-
ceed 30,054, exclusive of the en-
listed strength of the bands. The
rated men of the Coast Artillery to
consist of Casemate electricians; ob-
servers, first class; plotters; chief
planters; coxswains; chief loaders;
observers, Second class; gun com-
manders; and gun pointers.
The total number of rated men
not to exceed 2,240.
5,225 privates, first class.
15,675 privates.
18 bands, organized as pro-
vided for in Column 4.
The total enlisted strength of the
Coast Artillery Corps, exclusive of
the enlisted Strength ou bands, shall
not exceed 29,399 men. The rated
men of the Coast Artillery Corps to
consist of Casemate electricians;
observers, first class; plotters; chieſ
planters; coxswains; chief loaders;
observers, Second class; gun com-
manders; gun pointers.
That the total number of rated
men shall not exceed 2,104.
IBand:
1 drum major (first sergeant).
1 band leader.
1 assistant band leader.
1 sergeant trumpeter.
2 band Sergeants.
4 band corporals.
2 musicians, first class.
4 musicians, second class.
13 musicians, third class.
2 COOkS.
31 total enlisted.
£

STAFF CORPS.
GENERAL STAIFF.
1 chief of Staff.
3 general officers, including Chief
of Coast Artillery and Chief
Of Militia Division.
4 Colonels.
6 lieutenant colonels.
12 majors.
12 Captains.
38 total commissioned.
igures not given in proposed
No change from present.
1 general.
1 lieutenant general.
3 major generals.
17 colonels.
16 lieutenant colonels.
30 majors.
26 captains.
94 total commissioned.
1 lieutenant general.
2 major generals.
2 brigadier generals.
17 colonels.
10 lieutenant colonels.
41 majors.
48 captains.
*
121 total commissioned.
AIDJUTANT GENERAL'S DEPARTMENT.
1 brigadier general.
5 Colonels.
7 lieutenant colonels.
10 majors.
23 total commissioned.
1 brigadier general.
5 colonels.
8 lieutenant colonels.
13 majors.
27 total commissioned.
NO change from present,
Same as column 5, except chief
of bureau has rank but not pay of
major general.
1 brigadier general.
7 Colonels.
13 lieutenant colonels.
39 majors.
60 total Commissioned.
INSPECTOR GENERAL's DEPARTMENT.
1 brigadier general.
3 colonels.
4 lieutenant colonels.
9 majors.
17 total commissioned.
1 brigadier general.
3 Colonels.
6 lieutenant colonels.
12 majors,
22 total commissioned.
No change from present.
|
As recommended by General
Staff.
To be consolidated with General
Staff.
JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL's DEPARTMENT.
1 brigadier general.
2 Colonels.
3 lieutenant colonels.
7 majors.
13 total commissioned.
1 brigadier general.
3 Colonels.
6 lieutenant colonels.
11 majors.
21 total commissioned.
No change from present.
1 major general (pay of brigadier
general).
2 Colonels.
6 lieutenant colonels.
12 majors.
10 captains.
sº-sº
31 total commissioned.
1 brigadier general.
3 Colonels.
7 lieutenant colonels.
20 majors.
31 total commissioned.
s
\:
-1
Comparative statement showing differences in the organization of the line of the Army, etc.—Continued.
(5) As recommended py General
Staff
1 major general.”
2 brigadier generals.”
17 colonels.
30 lieutenant colonels.
54 majors.
155 captains.
259 total commissioned.
Enlisted strength to be deter-
mined by President. Same as
column 4.
*General officers to be reduced
ultimately to 1 Quartermaster Gen-
º: with grade of brigadier gen-
0I’al.
STAFF CORPS–Continued.
QUARTERMASTER CORPS.
(1) As now authorized.
(2) War Department bill.
(3) Proposed EIouse bill.
(4) Proposed Senate bill.
1 major general.
2 brigadier generals.
14 colonels.
20 lieutenant colonels.
48 majors.
102 captains.
187 total commissioned.
15 master electricians.
404 quartermaster sergeants,
quartermaster corps.
380 sergeants, first class.
1,240 Sergeants.
600 corporals.
2,920 privates, first class.
750 privates.
95 CookS.
6,404 total enlisted.
1 major general.
2 brigadier generals.
21 colonels. .
30 lieutenant colonels.
72 majors.
155 captains.
281 total commissioned.
100 quartermaster Sergeants,
Senior grade.
504 quartermaster sergeants.
500 sergeants, first class.
1,700 sergeants.
850 corporals.
4,000 privates, first class.
1,000 privates.
150 COOkS.
No change from present.
1 major general.
2 major generals (pay of brig-
adier general).
17 colonels.
30 lieutenant colonels. . .
54 majors.
155 captains.
259 total commissioned.
The enlisted Strength of the
Quartermaster Corps shall be lim-
ited and fixed from time to time
by the President in accordance
with the needs of the Army, and
shall consist of: Quartermasterser-
geants, senior grade; quartermas-
ter sergeants; Sergeants, first class;
Sergeants; corporals; cooks; pri-
vates, first class; privates.
The numbers in the various
grades shall not exceed the follow-
ing percentages of the total author-
ized enlisted strength of the Quar-
termaster Corps: Quartermaster
Sergeants, senior grade, 0.3 per
cent; quartermaster sergeants, 7
per cent; sergeants, first class, 10
per cent; Sergeants, 15 per cent;
corporals, 10 per cent.
MEDICAL DEPARTMENT.
*1 major general.
14 colonels.
24 lieutent colonels.
105 majors.
300 captains or first lieutenants.
444 total commissioned.
*1 major generals
22 colonels. -
38 lieutenant colonels.
165 majors.
469 captains or first lieutenants.
*
695 total Commissioned.
No change from present.
1 major general.
29 colonels.
48 lieutenant colonels.
210 majors.
610 captains or first lieutenants.
*mºms.
898 total commissioned.
1 major general.
28 colonels. .
48 lieutenant colonels.
210 majors.
610 captains or first lieutenants.
*ºms
897 total commissioned.
É
*Upon retirement or separa-
tion of present incumbent the
Surgeon General shall thereafter
º the rank of brigadier gen-
©Tal.
*Upon retirement or separa-
tion of present incumbent the
Surgeon General shall thereafter
º the rank of brigadier gen-
0I '81.
The Medical Reserve Corps as
now provided by law, the Dental
Corps and the Hospital Corps to
be hereaſter designated and known
as part of the Medical Corps of the
Army. The enlisted strength to
be fixed by the President and to
consist of master hospital ser-
geants, hospital sergeants, ser-
geants, first class, Sergeants, cor-
porals, cooks, horseshoers, sad-
dlers, mechanics, privates, first
class, and privates. The numbers
in the various grades not to exceed
the following percentages of the
total authorized enlisted strength:
Master hospital sergeants, one-half
of 1 per cent; hospital sergeants,
one-half of 1 per cent; sergeants,
first class, 7 per cent; sergeants, 11
per cent; corporals, 6 per cent.
The number of cooks to be limited
and fixed by the Secretary of War.
The number of horseshoers, sad-
dlers, and mechanics to be limited
to one for each regularly author-
ized field hospital and ambulance
Company.
Dental Surgeons to be appointed
at the rate of one for each 1,000 en- |
listed men of the line of the Army;
to have the pay and allowances of
first lieutenant until they have
Completed 7 years’ service; den-
tal Surgeons of more than 7 but
less, than 17 years' service may,
Subject to examination, receive
the pay and allowances of Captain;
dental surgeons of more than 17
years’ service shall, subject to
examination, receive the pay and
allowances of major.
Surgeon General to have grade of
brigadier general when present in-
Cumbent retires.
The enlisted strength to be the
same as provided in column 4.
The number of dental surgeons
the same as in Column 4.
Dental surgeons, of less than 10
years’ service to receive pay and
allowances of first lieutenant; of
more than 10 but less than 20°
years’ service, Subject to exami-
nation, pay and , allowances of
captain; of more than 20 years’
Service, subject to examination,
pay and allowances of major.
§

º
Comparative statement showing differences in the organization of the line of the Army, etc.—Continued.
STAFF CORPS–Continued.
CORPS OF ENGINEERS.
(1) As now authorized.
(2) War Department bill.
(3) Proposed House bill.
(4) Proposed Senate bill.
(5) As recommended by General
Staff.
1 brigadier general.
15 colonels.
22 lieutenant colonels.
51 majors.
60 captains.
56 first lieutenants.
43 Second lieutenants.
-
248 total commissioned.
1 brigadier general.
23 colonels.
32 lieutenant colonels.
74 majors.
104 captains.
100 first lieutenants.
59 Second lieutenants.
-
393 total commissioned.
No change from present.
1 major general.
28 colonels.
41 lieutenant colonels.
95 majors.
112 captains.
105 first lieutenants.
80 Second lieutenants.
462 total commissioned.
1 brigadier general.
26 colonels. -
41 lieutenant colonels.
95 majors.
112 captains.
105 first lieutenantS.
80 second lieutenants.
460 total commissioned.
ENGINEER TROOPS.
3 battalions.
Enlisted strength of battalion of
Engineers:
1 sergeant major.
1 quartermaster Sergeant.
4 companies.
Company:
1 first Sergeant.
1 quartermaster Sergeant.
8 Sergeants.
10 corporals.
2 musicians.
2 Cooks.
38 privates, first class.
38 privates, second class.
100 total enlisted.
Provided, That the President
may, in his discretion, increase
the number of sergeants in any
company to 12; the corporals to
18; privates, first class, to 64;
privates to 64. -
1 chief musician.
4 regiments of 2 battalions each.
1 mounted battalion.
Regiment:
1 Golonel.
1 lieutenant colonel.
2 majors.
11 captains.
12 first lieutenants.
6 Second lieutenants.
33 total commissioned.
4 master engineers, senior
grade.
1 regimental sergeant major.
2 battalion sergeants major.
12 master Engineers, junior
grade.
2 regimental supply Ser-
geantS.
2 color sergeants.
1 chief trumpeter.
2 Sergeants.
1 Cook.
1 Wagoner for each author-
4 battalions.
7 regiments. -
7 mounted battalions. -
Enlisted strength of regiment:
4 master engineers, senior
grade.
1 regimental Sergeant major.
1 regimental Supply Sergeant.
2 color Sergeants.
2 sergeants.
1 COOk.
1 wagoner for each authorized
wagon of the field and com-
bat train.
2 battalions.
11 total enlisted.
Battalion: t
1 battálion sergeant majór.
6 master engineers, junior
grade.
3 companies.
7 total enlisted.
Regiment: Same as column 4.
Battalion: Same as column 4.
Company: Same as column 4, ex-
cept that the number of corporals
is increased to 18; number of bu-
glers to 2; number of privates, first
class, to 31; number of privates to
93; total, 164.
Enlisted strength of mounted bat-
talion of Engineers:
2 master engineers,
grade. -
1 battalion Sergeant major.
2 color Sergeants.
1 battalion supply Sergeant.
6 master engineers, junior
grade.
1 corporal. -
1 wagoner for each authorized
wagon of the field and com-
bat train.
3 mounted companies.
13 total enlisted.
Senior
#
1 principal musician.
1 drum major.
4 Sergeants.
8 Corporals.
1 Cook.
12 privates.
28 total enlisted.
ized Wagon of the field
and combat train.
6 companies of Engineers,
organized into 2 battal-
ions of 3 companies each.
27 total enlisted.
Company: .
1 captain.
2 first lieutenants.
1 second lieutenant.
1 first Sergeant.
1 meSS Sergeant.
1 Supply sergeant.
11 sergeants.
18 corporals.
2 trumpeters.
3 COOkS.
64 privates, first class.
64 privates.
165 total enlisted.
Mounted battalion:
1 major.
5 captains.
7 first lieutenants.
3 second lieutenants.
1 veterinarian.
2 master Engineers, senior
ade. -
1 battalion Sergeant major.
2 color Sergeants.
1 battalion Supply sergeant.
6 master Engineers, junior
grade.
1 Corporal.
1 wagoner for each author-
ized Wagon of the field
and combat train.
3 companies.
13 total enlisted.
Mounted company:
1 Captain.
2 first lieutenants.
1 second lieutenant.
1 first lieutenant.
2 Sergeants, first class.
Company:
1 first sergeant.
3 sergeants, first class.
1 meSS Sergeant.
1 supply sergeant.
1 stable Sergeant.
8 sergeants.
13 corporals.
1 horseshoer.
1 Saddler.
3 CookS.
30 privates, first class.
81 privates.
mºs
144 total enlisted.
! Band:
Same as Infantry bands.
Mounted company:
1 first sergeant.
2 Sergeants, first class.
1 meSS Sergeant.
1 supply Sergeant.
1 stable sergeant.
6 Sergeants.
11 corporals.
2 horseshoerS.
1 Saddler.
2 COOkS.
2 buglers.
20 privates, first class.
61 privates.
ºtal enlisted.
ØI1C1.
Same as column 4.
s

Comparative statement showing differences in the organization of the line of the Army, etc.—Continued.
STAFF CORPS–Continued.
ENGINEER TROOPS.–Continued.
(5) As recommended by General
Staff.
(1) As now authorized.
(2) War Department bill.
(3) Proposed House bill.
(4) Proposed Senate bill.
Mounted company—Continued.
1 meSS Sergeant.
1 Supply Sergeant.
1 stable Sergeant.
6 Sergeants.
11 corporals.
2 horseshoers.
1 Saddler.
2 COOkS.
21 privates, first class.
60 privates.
109 total enlisted.
Band:
1 first Sergeant (drum major).
1 bandleader.
1 assistant band leader.
2 band Sergeants.
4 band corporals.
2 musicians, first class.
4 musicians, Second class.
13 musicians, third class.
28 total enlisted.
ORDNANCE DEPARTMENT.
1 brigadier general.
6 colonels. -
9 lieutenant colonels.
19 majors.
25 captains.
25 first lieutenants.
85 total Commissioned.
1 brigadier general.
9 colonels.
14 lieutenant colonels.
30 majors.
40 captains.
39 first lieutenants.
133 total commissioned.
No change.
As recommended by General
Staff, except brigadier general has
rank but not pay of major general.
1 brigadier general.
6 colonels.
12 lieutenant colonels.
24 majors.
33 Captains.
33 first lieutenants.
*-ºsmºs
109 total commissioned.
š
Enlisted strength:
175 post ordnance sergeants.
69 sergeants.”
86 corporals.”
236 privates, first class.”
199 privates.*
590 total enlisted, excluding post
Ordnance Sergeants.
*Enlisted strength fixed by or-
der of the Secrotary of War.
30 lieutenants of the line of the
Army to be detailed as student
officers in the establishments of
the Ordnance Department for a
period of 2 years. Completion of
the prescribed course of instruc-
tion shall constitute examination
for gºal in the Ordnance Depart-
IIlêIli.
Enlisted men same as column 1.
SIGNAL CORPS.
1 brigadier general.
1 Colonel.
2 lieutenant colonels.
6 majors.
18 captains.
18 first lieutenants.
36 master signal electricians.
132 sergeants, first class.
144 sergeants.
156 Corporals.
24 cooks.
552 privates, first class.
168 privates.
1, 212 total enlisted.
And an Aviation Section, as
follows:
60 officers.
48 master electricians.
144 Sergeants, first class.
168 Sergeants.
234 corporals.
32 Cooks.
634 privates, first class.
212 privates.
1,472 total enlisted.
* x
1 brigadier general.
4 colonels.
6 lieutenant Colonels.
13 majors.
26 captains.
47 first lieutenants.
97 total commissioned.
47 master signal electricians.
155 Sergeants, first class.
204 sergeants.
273 corporals.
32 COOkS.
774 privates, first class.
233 privates.
1, 718 total enlisted.
And an Aviation Section con-
sisting of:
133 aviation officers.
38 mastersignal electricians.
62 sergeants, first class.
117 sergeants.
249 corporals.
44 Cooks.
332 privates, first class.
138 privates.
ammº-
980 total enlisted.
Commissioned strength same as
Column 1. º
Enlisted strength same as col-
UDOn 2.
Aviation Section:
Commissioned strength same as
column 1, except that 73 officers
are added.
Enlisted strength same as col-
UlDOn 2.
;
{
Commissioned strength:
1 º general (with pay and
allowances of present brig-
adier general).
4 colonels.
12 lieutenant colonels.
23 majors.
106 captains.
236 first lieutenants.
382 total Commissioned.
The enlisted strength shall con-
sist of master signal electricians,
sergeants, first class, Sergeants, cor-
porals, cooks, horseshoers, pri-
vates, first class, and privates, the
numbers being fixed from time to
time by the President. The num-
bers in the various grades shall
not exceed the following percent-
ages of the total authorized en-
listed strength:
Per cent.
Master electricians..... ------ 2
Sergeants, first class. - - - - - - - - - 7
Sergeants-------------------- 10
Corporals-------------------- 20
The President may organize the
commissioned and enlisted per-
sonnel of the SignalCorps intosuch
number of Companies, battalions,
and aero Squadrons as the neces-
sity of the service may demand.
1 brigadier general.
4 colonels.
12 lieutenant Colonels.
23 majors.
64 captains.
215 first lieutenants.
319 total Commissioned.
Enlisted strength same as co -
umn 4.
General provisions, etc., Same as
column 4.
§

Nothing in this act shall be con-
strued to limit in any way the pro-
visions of the act of July 18, 1914.
Enlisted men of the signal
Corps below the grade of signal
electrician who qualify under reg-
ulations to be prescribed by the
Secretary of War shall be entitled
to additional pay as follows:
- Per month.
To 15 years, first lieutenant;
More than 15 years, Captain.
Comparative statement showing differences in the organization of the line of the Army, etc.—Continued.
STAFF CORPS–Continued.
SIGNAL CORPS–Continued.
(1) As mow authorized.
(2) War Department bill.
(3) Proposed House bill.
(4) Proposed Senate bill.
(5) As recommended by General
Staff.
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * s = ºr * * * * * $5
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
VETERINAIRLANS,
2 for each regiment of Cavalry
or Field Artillery and such
number as the Secretary of
War may authorize to attend
animals pertaining to the
Quartermaster Corps or other
departments not directly con-
nected with the Cavalry or
Field Artillery.
2 veterinarians for each regiment
of Cavalry or Field Artillery and
1 for each mounted battalion of
Engineers.
Hay bill.
1 for every 3 batteries of Field Ar-
tiller
17 inspectors of horses and mules,
Quartermaster Corps.
7 inspectors of meats, Quarter-
master Corps.
Pay and allowances in accord-
ance with length of service as fol-
Iows:
first five years, second lieuten-
Chamberlain bill.
2 for each regiment of Cavalry.
1 for each battalion of Field Ar-
tillery. -
Pay and allowances in accord-
ance with length of service.
Less than 5 years’ service, pay
and allowance of second lieuten-
ants; more than 5 years’ service
but less than 10 years, first lieuten-
ants; more than 10 years, Captains.
2 for each regiment of Cavalry.
1 for each battalion Field Artillery'
and Mounted Engineers.
24 for the Quartermaster Corps.
Pay and allowances in accord-
ance with length of service.
Less than 7 years, second lieu-
tenant; more than 7 years but less
than 15 years, first lieutenant;
more than 15 years, captains.
§

%
DENTAL SURGEONS.
See Medical Department.
GENERAL OFFICERS OF THE LINE.
6 majors generals.
15 brigadier generals.
*1 major general.
*2 brigadier generals.
No change from present.
No change from present.
1 general (Chief of Staff).
1 lieutenant general (Assistant
Chief of Staff).
3 major generals (Assistant Chiefs
of Staff).
1 major general for each brigade of
Infantry, Cavalry, and Field Ar-
tillery and 1 for each of the 3
Coast Artillery districts within
continental United States, and
1 each for 2 Coast Artillery dis-
tricts in Philippines and Canal
Zone. Promotion of major gen-
erals by seniority and dependent
upon examination.
1 lieutenant general (Chief of Staff).
1 lieutenant general for each corps
organized as part of mobile forces
of U. S. Army. * g
2 major generals (Assistant Chief
of staff).
1 chief of Infantry.
łºść
CD 101 Of H'le €TV.
1 chief of Coast Aièry. (Also
included under Coast Artillery
Corps.) tº e &
1 major general for each division
organized as part of mobile
forces. *
2 brigadier generals (Assistant
Chiefs of Staff).
1 chief of the Division of Militia
Affairs. .
1 brigadier general for each brigade
of Infantry, Cavalry, and Field
Artillery, and 1 for each 5 Coast
Artillery districts.

*In excess; authorized as reward for Panama service.
3.
|
gomparative statement showing differences ºn the organization of the continental army and Organized Militia in (1) the Army as now organized; (2) the
act for making further and more effectual provision for the national defense and for other purposes; (3) theº; House bill to increase the effi-
ciency of the Military Establishment of the United States; (4) the proposed Senate bill for making further an
defense and for other purposes; and (5) the policy report of the War College Division of the General Staff.
7more effectual provision for the national
(1) The Army as now authorized.
(2) War Department draft.
(3) Proposed EHouse bill.
(4) Proposed Senate bill.
(5) Policy report, General Staff.
Continental army.
None,
Continental army.
Section 28 authorizes the Presi-
dent to raise, organize, train and
maintain a citizen army of not to
exceed 400,000 men, to be known
as the continental army, etc.
Section 29 provides that except
for periods of training, the conti-
mental army shall not be called out
for service except in the event of war
or when war is im/minent. * * *
Section 30 provides that to each
tº: of Infantry, Cavalry, Ar-
tillery and Engineers and to each
battalion of Signal troops and
mounted battalion of Engineers
organized under this act there
Continental army.
Section 14 is identical with Sec-
tion 28 of War Department draft.
Section 15 provides that it shall
not be called out for Service ercept
when authorized by Congress in the
emergency of actual or imminent
2007”.
Section 16 differs from section 30,
as follows: Provided, That to organ-
izations created in the comtimental
army under this act there shall be
attached the same medical person-
nel as are attached to like organ-
Continental army.
None provided for in bill.
Continental army.
Gives the following under the
head of Citizen Soldiers:
“In addition to the 500,000 fully
trained mobile troops mentioned
above at least 500,000 more—a total
of 1,000,000 men—should be pre-
pared to take the field immediately
on the outbreak of war and Should
have nad sufficient previous mili-
tary training to enable them to
meet a trained enemy within 3
months.
“Twelve months’ intensive train-
ing is the minimum that will pre-
Fº troops for war service. There-
ore 'the 500,000 partly trained
troops above referred to require 9
months’ military training before
war begins. Military efficiency of
of reserves requires that Regular
Army officers beassigned theretofor
training purposes—at least one to
every 400 men—and that organiza-
tions and Specially designated non-
commissioned officers of the Army
be utilized in instructing reserves
as far as practicable.”
§
| shall be attached the same medical
personnel as are attached to like
organizations of the Regular Army,
and provides further that the or-
ganization of establishments of the
Medical Department, etc.
Section 31 makes provision for
the entrance of organizations of
the Organized Militia in the con-
tinental army.
Section 32 provides for the term
of enlistment in the continental
army, the time spent in the re-
serve, and the qualifications of the
members of the force as to citizen-
Ship and age.
Section 33 reads as follows:
“That, in the event of war only
the Président is authorized to cali
out the continental army reserves
and to employ them as he may
deem best.”
Section 34 makes provision for
the appointment of officers of the
Continental army.
izatiioouſof the Regular Army.
Sectns 16 provides further that
the organization in the continental
army of establishments of the Med-
ical Department, etc.
Section 17 Covers the same Sub-
ject as section 31. It differs in the
second line by changing “when”
of section 31 second line, to “on
which” of section 17, and the
word “received” in line 11, section
31, to “enlisted” in section 17.
Section 17 contains the following
additional clause: “And there-
upon the officers and enlisted men
So received in the Service of the
United States in the Continental
army shall stand discharged from
the Organized Militia of which
they were members.”
Section 18 covers the same sub-
ject as section 32 and differs only
in prescribing that the enlisted
men raised under the provisions of
this act shall be taken from among
the citizens of the United States,
omitting “those who have de-
clared their intention to become
Citizens.”
Section 19 provides “that, in the
event of war only, the President,
after having been authorized by Com-
gress to use the armed land forces of
the United States for purposes of
the war, is empowered to call out
“the continental army reserves, or
any part of them, and to employ
them as he may deem best.”
Section 20 corresponds to section
34 and is identical except for the
addition of two minor Words in
line 5 of the second paragraph—the
addition of the word “by” before
appointments, so as to read “or by
appointments from the officers’
reserve corps,” and in line 10 of
Second paragraph by interpolating
the word “among” just before
“officers,” so that it now reads,
“be filled from among officers of
the officers’ reserve corps.”
§
Comparative statement showing differences in the organization of the continental army and Organized Militia, etc.—Continued.
(1) The Army as now authorized.
(2) War Department draſt.
!
g
(3) Proposed EIouse bill.
(4) Proposed Senate bill.
(5) Policy report, General Staff.
Section 35
;President is authorized to º;
all officers of the continental army
below, the grade of lieutenant colo-
nel, covers the change of residence
of officers, the appointment of mili-
itary boards to examine into the
capacity, qualifications, etc., and
prescribes age limits after which
officers cannot be appointed to the
various grades. The last sentence
of section 35 reads as follows:
“When an officer of the continen-
talarmy reaches the age limit fixed
for appointment or reappointment
in the gradein which he is commis-
|sioned he shall, with the approval of
the Secretary of War, be honorably
discharged from the service of the
United States,” etc.
Section 36 prescribes the number
of Regular Army officers of the
active list that shall hold commis-
isions in the continental army:
“That not to exceed one Regular
Army officer of the activelist shall
hold a commission in any one bat-
talion of Engineers, §º. troops,
or Field Artillery, or the equival-
ent thereof of other troops; and
not to exceed four such officers
shall, at the same time, hold com:
missions in any One regiment of
Cavalry, Field Artillery, Engin-
eers or Infantry of the continental
*º: including their field and
Staff;
ection 37 covers the appoint-
ment of staff officers and chaplains,
and contains this proviso: “Pro-
vided, That the Chief of Staff and
the assistant chief of staff of any
tactical unit shall be detailed from
the General Staff Corps of the
Army.”
rovides that the l
Section 21 is identical with sec-
tion 35, except the proviso under-
Scored in section 35 quoted in op-
posite column, that is, “with the
approval of the Secretary of War,” is
omitted.
The corresponding part of sec-
tion 22 reads as follows: “That |.
not to exceed one Regular Army
Officer on the active list shall hold
a commission in the continental
army in any one battalion of |
lºngineers, Signal troops, or Field
Artillery, or the equivalent thereof
of other troops; and not to exceed
four such officers shall, at the
same time, hold commissions in
any one regiment of . Cavalry,
Field Artillery or Infantry of the
said army.”
Section 23 covers the same sub-
ject as section, 37, but omits the
provision º that the chief
of Staff and the assistant chief of
staff of any tactical unit shall be
detailed from the General Staff
Corps of the Army.
§
Section 38 covers the change of
residence of enlisted men of the
continental army.
Section 39 covers the period of
| training of the continental army.
Section 40 covers the pay and
allowances of officers and enlisted
men of the continental army.
Section 41 provides that the gon-
timental army when called into
active service or when called out
for purposes of drill, instruction, or
training, shall be subject to the
jaws and regulations governing the
Regular Army so far as such laws
and regulations areapplicable, etc.
Section 42 reads as follows:
“That in the event of War or while
war is imminent all organizations
of the Army of the United States
shall be recruited and maintained
as near their prescribedstrength as
practicable. To this end the Pres-
ident is authorized to establish the
necessary recruit rendezvous and
depots, to be under the direct con-
trol of the Secretary of War, for the
enlistment of recruits and the
training of unassigned reservists
and recruits; to provide for the or-
ganization, for instruction, and dis-
cipline, of the troops of recruit de-
pots into companies and battalions
at the discretion of the Secretary
of War, with noncommissioned
officers and privates of such grades
and numbers as may be prescribed
by the President; to appoint offi-
cers of the continental army of the
Section 24 covers the subject of
section 38—the change of residence
of enlisted men of the continental
army, and is identical in language.
Section 25 covers the *. of
training of the continental army,
and is identical in language with
section 39.
Section 26 covers the pay and
allowances of officers and enlisted
men of the continental army, and
is identical in language, with sec-
tion 40, º: the proviso regard-
ing money allowance for clothing,
in which there is a slight change in
the phraseology—“There shall be
issued to each enlisted man,” in-
stead of “Each enlisted manshall,
in time of peace, be issued such
articles of clothing.”
Section 27 covers the same sub-
ject as section 41, and is identical
in language.
There is no section that corre-
sponds to section 42, quoted in op-
posite column. The subject mat-
ter, as far as directing that all or-
ganizations of the Army of the
United States shall be recruited
and maintained as near their pre-
scribed strength as practicable in
the event of war, or while war is
imminent, is covered by placing
the organizations of the Regular
Army, covering the first part of the
bill, on a war footing.
§
Comparative statement showing differences in the organization of the continental army and Organized Militia, etc.—Continued.
(1) The Army as now authorized.
(2) War Department draft.
(3) Proposed EIouse bill.
(4) Proposed Senate bill.
(5) Policy report, General Staff.
proper arm of the service addi-
tional to those elsewhere author-
ized, in such numbers and of such
º: as he may deem necessary
or the proper instruction and dis-
cipline of such troops; to employ
retired officers, noncommis-
sioned officers, and privates of
the Regular Army either with
their rank on the retired list or
with increased rank: Provided
that retired officers and enlisted
men while thus employed shall
not be eligible for transfer to field
units but shall receive the full
É. and allowances of the respec-
ive grades in which they are
Serving in the Continental army
inlieu of their retired pay and al-
lowances: Provided further, That
upon the termination of the du-
ties, or, in case of those given in-
Creased rank in the continental
army, on their discharge there-
from, said retired officers and en-
listed men shall revert to their
former retired Status.
Section 43 makes provision for
animals and vehicles for use of the
Continental army.
Section 44. That the central ad-
ministration of the continental
army shall be wested in the Secre-
tary of War and the agencies of
the War Department under him;
and for this purpose there shall be
created in the Office of the Chief of
Staff and from the personnel
thereof a continental army and
militia division, whose duty it
shall be to advise the Chief of Staff
on all subjects relating to the con-
tinental army and the Organized
Militia in accordance with such
Section 28 covers the subject of
section 43 and is identical in lan-
guage.
There is no section correspond-
ing to section 44, quoted in oppo-
site Column.
§
rules and regulations as the Presi-
dent may from time to time pre-
SCribe. The commanders of the
territorial departments of the Reg-
ular Army shall have subordinate
administrative control and com-
mand of all organizations of the
continental army within their re-
| spective departmental limits, in-
cluding the general Supervision of
their training and discipline.
Section 45 provides that all re-
turns and muster rolls of organi-
zations of the continental army
shall be rendered to The Adjutant
| General of the Army. . It also pro-
| wides that “upon being relieved
| from active service or upon the
completion of periods of training
the records pertaining to them
shall be transmitted to and filed in
The Adjutant General’s office or
preserved in such other manner
as the Secretary of War may pre-
Scribe.”
“SEC. 46. That for the purpose
of instruction of the Continental
army and for taking care of the
Government property issued
thereto the Presidentis authorized
to detail not to exceed two ser–
geants from the Regular Army to
each company, troop, or battery
of the continental army, from cor-
responding organizations of each
arm, corps, or department of the
Regular Army, who shall serve as
first Sergeant and company supply
sergeant, respectively, of the com-
pany, troop, or battery to which
assigned: Provided, That such ser-
geant shall be in addition to the
sergeants authorized by law for
companies, troops, and batteries
of the Regular Army, and shall not
be counted as part of the author-
ized strength of the Regular
Army.”
Section 30 is identical in lan-
guage with section 45 quoted in op-
posite column with the exception
that the clause “ or preserved in
such manner as the Secretary of War
may prescribe” is omitted.
“SEC. 29. That for the purpose
of instruction of the continental
army and for taking care of Gow-
ernment property issued thereto
the Secretary of War may detailto
the said army, from the corre-'
sponding organizations of the Reg-
ar Army, one sergeant to each
organized troop, battery, or com-
pany that is subject to be caiſed
out annually from the continental
army for training. Sergeants so
detailed shall perform the duties of
first Sergeant and supply Sergeant
in the organizations to which they
shall be detailed; they shall be ad-
ditional to the Sergeants author-
ized by law for the troops, bat-
teries, and companies from which
they shall be detailed, and they
shall not be counted as a part of the
authorized strength of the Regular
Army: Provided, That no such de-
tail shall be made to or shall be
continued for more than six
months with any continental
army troop, battery, or company
§
Comparative statement showing differences in the organization of the continental army and Organized Militia, etc.—Continued.
(1) The Army as now authorized.
(2) War Department draft.
(3) Proposed EIouse bill.
(4) Proposed Senate bill.
(5) Policy report, General Staff.
Section 47 authorizes the organi-
zation of not to exceed 30 cadet
companies, prescribes the age lim-
it, pay, and allowances, etc.
having a membership of less than
fifty enlisted men available for
active service at any time; and
Whenever any such organization,
after having attained a member-
ship of at least fifty enlisted men,
shall thereafter have had for six
months an average membershi
of less than fifty enlisted men avail-
able for active service at any time,
Said organization shall be dis-
banded immediately and its com-
missioned and enlisted members
shall be assigned to other organi-
zations of the continental army or
shall be discharged from said
army, as the Secretary of War may
i. further, That no
roop, pattery, or Company organl-
zation shall be formed in the ;:
nental army, and no public prop-
erty shall be issued to or for any
prospective members of such an
; until at least fifty
enlisted men, available ſor active
service at any time, shall have be-
come available for Said organiza-
tion, whereupon the organization
may beinitiated by the incorpora-
tion of said enlisted men into it,
and not otherwise.”
Section 31 covers the same
ground as section 47 and is iden-
tical in language, except in fifth
line of first paragraph, wherein is
used the expression “their respec-
tive branches” instead of “own
corps or departments,” which is
the language used in section 47,
and substitutes the word “thor-
ough” for the words “intensive
training” in the fifth paragraph of
section 47.
§
Section 48 establishes the Offi-
cers’ reserve corps and covers the
qualifications for membership
therein.
Section 49 makes provision for
the use of the officers of the reserve
Corps when the Volunteer force is
authorized. This section con-
cludes the bill as far as it relates to
the continental army.
Section 32 covers the same sub-
ject as section 48. It omits the
§. “with the approval of the
ecretary of War” in paragraph 5,
regarding the honorable dischargé
from the service of the United
States of an officer of the reserve
corps when he reaches the age
limit fixed for appointment or re-
appointment in the grade in which
he is commissioned. It also omits
the following proviso in paragraph
6 of section 48: “Provided, That
with the consent of such officers,
the Secretary of War is authorized
to prolong this period or to order
them to duty on boards, or for con-
Sultation or advice, to the extent
justified by the funds appropriated
and the public needs.” Line 1 of
paragraph 5 is changed by the in-
sertion after the word “appropria-
tions” the clause “for this specific
OS6.
Section 33. This section con-
cludes the bill as far as it relates to
the continental army.
Organizes an officers’ reserve
Corps along similar lines as pro-
posed House bill.
Recommends creation of a reserve
of Officers.
Militia.
12. The sum of two million dol-
lars is hereby annually appropri-
ated, to be paid out of any money
in the Treasury not otherwise ap-
propriated, for the purpose of pro-
Viding arms, ordnance stores,
Quartermaster stores, and camp
equipage for issue to the militia,
Such appropriation to remain
available until expended. (Sec.
1661, R. S., amended by act of
June 22, 1906, sec. 1,34 Stats., 449.)
13. The appropriation provid-
ed in the precedin B.º.
Shall be apportioned among the
several States and Territories,
under the direction of the Secre-
tary of War, according to the
Militia.
The appendix to the War De-
artment bill contains recommen-
ation from the Chief of the Divi-
sion of Militia Affairs for amend-
ments to section 1661, Revised
Statutes as amended by the acts of
Feb. 12, 1887, June 6, 1900, and
June 22, 1906; and of section 8 of
the act of May 27, 1908, as quoted
in column 1.
Militia.
NOTE.-The matter in italics is
new and the matter in parentheses
is omitted from the proposed
Eſouse bill.
Section sixteen hundred and
sixty-one of the Revised Statutes,
as amended by the acts of Febru-
ary twelfth, eighteen hundred
and eighty-seven, June sixth,
nineteen hundred, and June
twenty-second, nineteen hundred
and six, is hereby amended and
reenacted SO as to read as follows:
SECTION 1. The sum of two mil-
lion five humdred thousand dollars is
hereby annually appropriated to
be paid out of any money in the
Treasury not otherwise appro-
Militia.
No militia legislation.
Militia.
Recommendations:
In the preparation of plans for
the national defense and for the pre-
servation of the honor and dignity
of the United States, the number of
troops that are deemed necessary
are largely in excess of the total
regular and militia forces available
in the United States.
It is only during the existence of
war, or when war is imminent, that
any other forces may be raised un-
der existing law. When Congress
so authorizes the President, he may
call forth Volunteers.
Section 3 of the volunteer law pro-
vides that under certain conditions
organizations of the Organized Mili-
§
Comparative statement showing differences in the organization of the continental army and Organized Militia,
etc.—Continued.
(5) Policy report, General Staff.
(1) The Army as now authorized.
(2), War Department draft.
(3) Proposed House bill.
(4) Proposed Senate bill.
number of Senators and Repre-
sentatives to which each State,
respectively, is entitled in the
Congress of the United States,
and to the Territories and District
of Columbia such proportion and
under such regulations as the
President may prescribe: Pro-
vided, however, That no State shall
be entitled to the benefits of the
appropriation apportioned to it
ess the number of regularly
enlisted, organized, and uni-
formed active militia shall be at
least one hundred men for each
Senator and Representative to
which such State is entitled in the
Congress of the United States.
And the amount of Said appro-
priation which is thus determined
not to be available shall be cow-
ered back into the Treasury: Pro-
vided, also, That the sums so ap-
gº; among the several
tates and Territories and the
District of Columbia, Shall be
available for the purposes named
in section fourteen of the act of
January twenty-first, nineteen.
hundred and three, for the ac-
tual excess of expenses of travel
in making the inspections there-
in provided for over the allow-
ances made for same by law;
for the promotion of rifle practice,
including the acquisition, con-
struction, maintenance, and
equipment of shooting galleries
and suitable target ranges; for the
hiring of horses and draſt animals
for the use of mounted troops,
batteries, and Wagons; for forage
for the same, and for such other
incidental expenses in connection
with encampments, maneuvers,
priated, for the purpose of provid-
ing arms, ordnancestores, quarter-
master stores, and camp equipage
for issue to the militia, such appro-
priation to remain available until
expended.
SEC. 2. The appropriation pro-
vided in the preceding paragraph
shall be apportioned among the
several States and Territories, un-
der (the direction of the Secretary
of War, according to the number of
Senators and Representatives to
which each State, respectively, is
entitled in the Congress of the
United States), just and equitable
procedure to be prescribed by the Sec-
Tetary of Waramdim direct ratio, sofar
as motin conflict with such procedure
to the ammual State and Territoria
appropriations existing at the date
of apportionment, for the support
of the Organized Militia of such
States and Territories, respectively
and to the (Territories and) District
of Columbia (such proportion and)
under such regulations as the
President may prescribe: Provid-
ed, however, That no State or Terri-
tory shall be entitled to the bene-
fits of the appropriation appor-
tioned to it unless the number of
regularly enlisted, organized, and
uniformed active militia in such
State shall be at least one hundred
men for each Senator and Repre-
sentative to which such State is
entitled in the Congress of the
TJnited States, and im, each Terri-
tory and the District of Columbia
shall be at least equal to the mumber
fired by the President for such Terri-
tory and District. And the amount
of said appropriation which is
thus determined not to be avail-
* §
tia may be received into the Volun-
teer Service in advance of any other
organization of the same arm or
class from the same State, Terri-
tory, or District; and section 4 of
the act of May 27, 1908, amending
the militia law, provides that the
militia shall be called into the ser-
vice in advance of any volunteer
force that may be raised.
It is evident that it can not be
known prior to the existence of the
imminence of war what organiza-
tions, if any, of the Organized Mili-
tia will enter the volunteer service,
and that no definite plans can be
prepared providing for the use of
such organizations, either as militia
or as volunteers, until the war is
actually upon us.
No legislation affecting the Or-
ganized Militia is recommended be-
yond the repeal of all provisions of
laws now in effect whereby militia
or militia organizations may or
must be received into the Federal
service in advance of any other
forces.
This recommendation is not to be
Construed as advocating express re-
E. of certain sections of existing
ws relating to the Organized Mili-
tia, but as suggesting that any leg-
islation hereafter proposed for the
organization of a Federal reserve
force shall contain the usual con-
cluding section repealing all laws
and parts of laws inconsistent there-
with, and that such legislation be
so framed as to render inconsistent
with it the provisions of law just
Teferred to.
à
and field instruction provided for
in sections fourteen and fifteen of
the said act of January twenty-
first, nineteen hundred and three,
asthe Secretary of War may deem
necessary. (Sec. 2, idem.)
able shall be covered back into the
Treasury: Provided also, That the
sum so apportioned among the
several States (and Territories),
the Territory of Hawaii, and the
| District of Columbia, shall be
available under such rules as may
be prescribed by the Secretary of War
(for the purposes named in section
fourteen of the act of January
twenty-first, nineteen hundred
and three), for the actual (excess
of expenses of travel) and meces-
sary expenses incurred (in makin
the inspections therein provide
for Over the allowances made for
same by law), by officers and en-
listed men of the Regular Army
when traveling on duty in commec-
tion with the Organized Militia; for
the transportation of supplies fur-
mishedto the militia forthe permanent
equipment thereof; of office rent and
necessary office expenses of officers
on duty with the Organized Militia;
for expenses of sergeant-instructors
on duty with the Organized Militia,
âncluding quarters, fuel, light, medi-
cines and medical attendance; and
Such expenses shall constitute a
charge against the whole Sum ammu-
ally appropriated under section six-
teen hundred and sixty-One, Revised
Statutes, as amended, and shall be
paid therefrom, and not from the
the allotment duly apportioned to
any particular State, Territory, or
the District of Columbia; for the
romotion of rifle practice, includ-
ing the acquisition, construction,
maintenance, and equipment of
shooting galleries, and suitable
target ranges; for the hiring of
horses and draft animals for the
use of mounted troops, batteries,
and wagons; for forage for the
Same; and for Such otherincidental
expenses in connection with en-
campments, maneuvers, and field
instruction provided for in sec-
#
i
Comparative statement showing differences in the organization of the continental army and Organized Militia, etc.—Continued.
(1) The Army as now authorized.
(2) War Department draft.
(3) Proposed House bill.
(4) Proposed Senate bill.
(5) Policy report, General Staff.
tions fourteen and fifteen of the
said act of January twenty-first,
nineteen hundred and three, as
the Secretary of War may deem
necessary; Provided, That the gov-
ernor of each State, Territory, and
the commandi general of the
Organized Militia of the District of
Columbia, Shall appoint, designate,
or detail, subject to the dºpproval of
the Secrétary of War, an officer of
the Organized Militia of the State,
Territory, or District, who shall be
Tegarded as property and disbursing
§ of the United States. He
shall receipt and ammually account
for all property belonging to the
United States in possession of the
Organized Militia of his State
Territory, or District, and shai;
imake such returns and reports con-
cerning the same as may be required
by the Secretary of War.
The Secretary of War is author-
ized, on the requisition of a governor
of a State or Territory, or the com-
7manding general of the Organized
Militia of the District of Columbia,
to pay to the property and disbursing
§ thereof so much of its allot-
7ment out of the ammual ###;
tion under Section, Sirteem, humdred
and sixty-one of the Revised Statutes,
as a memded, as shall be necessary
for the § emºuſmerated therein.
He shall render his accounts through
the War Department to the proper
accounting officers of the Treasury
for settlement. Before entering upon
the performance of his duties as
##". and disbursing officer, he
shall be required to give good and
sufficient bond to the United States,
im. Such sums, as the Secretary of
à
War may direct, for the faithful per-
| formance of his duties and for the
safekeeping and proper disposition
of the Federal property and funds
intrusted to his care. He shall,
after having, qualified as property
and disbursing officer, receive pay
for his services, and such compensa-
tion shall be a charge against the
whole sum ammually appropriated
'under section sixteem hundred and
Sirty-one, Revised Statutes, as
amended, and not paid from the
allotment duly apportioned to the
State, Territory, or District of Co-
lumbia. When § in the per-
formance of his official duties wºnder
orders issued by the proper authori-
ties he shall be reimbursed for the
actual mecessary traveling expenses,
the sum to be made charge against
the allotment to the State, Territory,
or District of Columbia, under secº
tion sixteen hundred and sixty-one,
Fevised Statutes, as a memded. The
Secretary of War shall cause an in-
spection of the accounts and records
of the §§ and disbursing officer
to be made by an officer of the Army
at least once each year. The Secre-
tary of War is empowered to make
all rules and regulations necessary
to carry into effect the provisions of
this section: Provided, also, That
whenever any property issued to the
Organized Militia of any State or
Territory or the District of Columbia
as hereinbefore provided has been
lost, damaged, or destroyed, or has
become ºnserviceable or unsuitable
by use in service or from any other
cause, it shall be examined by a dis-
interested Surveying officer of the
Regular Army detailed by the Secre-
tary of War, or of the Organized
Militia, to be appointed by the gov-
ermor of the State or Territory or by
the Commanding General of the
Organized Militia of the District of
Columbia, and the report of such
surveying officer shall be forwarded
to the Secretary of War, and if it
w
§
Comparative statement showing differences in the organization of the continental army and Organized Militia, etc.—Continued.
(1) The Army as now authorized.
(2) War Department draft.
(3) Proposed EIouse bill.
(4) Proposed Senate bill.
(5) Policy report, General Staff.
w
shall ºpº. to the Secretary of War
from the records of survey that the
roperty has been lost, damaged, or
estroyed through unavoidable
causes, he is hereby authorized to
relieve the State or Territory or the
District of Columbia from further
accountability therefor; if it shall
appear that the loss, damage, or
destruction of property was due to
carelessness or neglect, or that its
loss, damage, or destruction could
have been avoided by the exercise of
reasonable care, the money value
thereof shall be charged to the State
or Territory or the District of Co-
lumbia, to be paid for from State
Columbia, to reimburse the Govern-
funds or any funds other than Fed-
eral: Provided, That if the articles so
Surveyed are jound to be unservice-
able or wmsuitable, from either avoid-
able or unavoidable causes, the Sec-
retary of War shall direct what dis-
osition, by sale or otherwise, shall
e made of Such articles, except un-
serviceable clothing, which shall be
destroyed; and if sold, the proceeds of
such sale, as well as stoppages
against officers and enlisted men,
and the met proceeds of collections
made from any person or from any
State, Territory, or the District of
ment for iñe loss, damage, or destruc-
tion of | property, shall be de-
posited in the Treasury of the United
States as a credit to the State, Terri-
tory, or the District of Columbia ac-
countable for said property, and as a
part of and in addition to that por-
tion of the allotment of such State,
Territory, or the District of Colum-
bia, set aside for the purchase of
similar supplies, stores, or matériel
of war.
v
#.
Sec. 35. That under such regula-
tions as the Secretary of War, after
conference with the National Militia
Board, shall prescribe, commis-
sioned officers on the active list be-
longing to organizations of the
Organized Militia , of each State,
Territory, and the District of Colum-
bia, participating in the apportion-
nent of the annual appropriation.
provided by section sixteen hundred
and sixty-one, Revised Statutes, as
amended, shall receive compensa-
tion for their services, eccept during
periods of service for which wºnder
existing law or the provisions of
section five of this act they may
become entitled to the same pay as
º of corresponding grades of
the Regular Army, at the rate of
certain percentages of the pay of
officers of like grade in the Regular
Army, not including longevity pay,
as now provided by law, mamely:
Five per centum to all colonels,
lieutenant colonels, majors, chap-
laims, aids-de-camp, and officers
of the General Staff; fifteen per
centum to commanding officers of
companies, troops, batteries, and
ambulance companies, and to adju-
tants and quartermasters of regi-
ments, independent battalions or
squadrons, or Coast Artillery dis-
tricts; ten per centum to all other
officers belonging to regiments,
Smaller tactical units, or Coast
Artillery districts, including medical
officers not above the rank of cap-
tain, detailed or assigned to and
doing duty with regiments or smaller
tactical units or Coast Artillery dis-
tricts, medical officers serving with
field hospitals, and veterimarians.
That under Buch regulations as
the Secretary of War, after conſer-
ence with the National Militia
Board, shall prescribe, each enlisted
Tmam on the active list belonging to
organizations of the Organized
Militia of each State, Territory, and
District of Columbia, participating
à
e
º
Comparative statement showing differences in the organization of the continental army and Organized Militia, etc.—Continued.
(1) The Army as now authorized.
(2) War Department draft.
(3) Proposed EHouse bill.
(4) Proposed Senate bill.
(5) Policy report, General Staff.
in the apportionment of the ammual
appropriation provided by section
sixteem hundred and sixty-one, Re-
vised Statutes, as amended, shall
receive compensation for his services,
except during periods of service for
which wºnder existing law he may
become entitled to the same pay as
an enlisted man of corresponding
grade in the Regular Army, at a
Tate equal to twenty-five per centum
of the initial pay now ;
law for enlisted men of correspond-
ing grades of the Regular Army:
Provided, That Such enlisted mam,
shall receive the compensation
herein provided if he shall have
attended not less than forty-five
Tegular drills during any one year,
and a proportionate amount of
attendance upon a lesser number of
such drills, not less than twenty:
Provided furtier, That the com-
Tensation provided herein shall be
computed for semiammual periods,
beginning the first day of January
and the first day of Jaily of each
gear, in proportion to the number
of drills attended; and no com-
pensation shall be paid to any em-
listed man for the first semiammual
£º of any year wmless he shall
have attended during said period at
least twenty drills, but any lesser
number of drills attended durin
said period shall be reckoned wit
the drills attended during the second
semiannual period im computing
the compensation: if any, due him
for that year; And provided further,
That when any man enters into am
emlistmemt other than am, immediate
Teenlistment he shall be entitled to
proportional compensation for that
\
É
year if during the remainder of the
gear he shall attend a number of
drills whose ratio to twenty is not
less than the ratio of the part of the
!year so served to the whole year; and
when any mam's emlistment shall
expire the compensation, if any, to
which he may be entitled shall be
determined im, like mammer: And
provided further, That periods of
any actual military duty equivalent
to the drills herein prescribed (ex-
cept those periods of service for which
wnder existing law members of the
Organized Militia may become
entitled to the same pay as officers
and enlisted men of the correspond-
ing grades in the Regular Army)
may be accepted as service in lieu of
such drills when so provided by the
Secretary of War.
That all amounts appropriated
for the purpose of this act shall be dis-
bursed and accounted for by the offi-
cers and agents j the Pay Depart-
| ment of the Army, and all disburse-
Tments under the provisiºns of the two
preceding sections shall be made as
soon as practicable ifter the thirty-
first day of December and the thir-
tieth day of June of each year upon
payrolls prepared and luthenticated
in the manner prescribed by the Sec-
retary of War: Provided, That stop-
pages may be made against the com-
pensation payable to any officer or
emlisted man hereunder to cover the
cost of º'. properly lost or de-
stroyed by and chargeable to such
officer or enlisted man.
That no money appropriated un-
der the provisions of this act shall be
paid to any person not on the active
list, nor to any person over sixty-four
gears of age, nor to any person who
fails to qualify as to fitness for mili-
tary service, under such regulations
as the Secretary of War, after con-
ference with the National Militia
Board, shall prescribe, and who has
not voluntarily, in addition to his
#
Comparative statement showing differences in the organization of the continental army and Organized Militia, etc.—Continued.
(1) The Army as now authorized.
(2) War I)epartment draft.
(3) Proposed House bill.
(4) Proposed Senate bill.
(5) Policy report, General Staſſ.
oath as a member of the Organized
Militia, also agreed to render mili-
tary Service to the United States as
hereinafter provided.
That whem. Congress shall have
authorized the use of the armed land
forces of the United States in the
emergency of actual or imminent
war, requiring the use of troops in
excess of those of the Regular Army,
the President may, under such regu-
lations as he shall prescribe, draft
into the military service of the United
States, to serve therein for one year
wnless sooner discharged, any mem-
bers of the Organized Militia. All
persons so drafted shall, from the
date of their draft, stand discharged
from the Organized Militia, shall
from said date be subject to such laws
and regulations for the government
of the Army of the United States as
are applicable to members of the Vol-
wnleer Army, and shall be embodied
in organizations corresponding as far
as practicable to those of the Regular
Army or shall be otherwise assigned
as the President may direct. The
commissioned officers of said organi-
zations shall be appointed from
among the members thereof, officers
with rank mot above that of colonel
to be appointed by the President
alone and all other officers to be ap-
pointed by the President by and with
the advice and consent of the Senate.
Officers and enlisted men in the
service of the United States under
the terms of this section shall have the
Same pay and allowances as officers
and enlisted men of the Regular
Army of the same grades and the
same prior service.
That whenever organizations are
called into the service of the United
3.
States under existing law those or-
ganizations only shall be taken into
such service or transferred to such
Army which have already received
compensation under the provisions
of this act; in addition thereto, such
other organizations as have become
entitled to receive compensation
hereunder between the time of the last
semiammual disbursement and the
time when such call or transfer is
made. Organizations which, at the
date when called into the service of
the United States, are, in the judg-
| ment of the Secretary of War, organ-
| ized so far as practicable by law and
regulations for like organizations of
the Regular Army and are entitled
to pay under this act shall be taken
by regiments, brigades, divisions, or
independent and separate organiza-
tions, as the quota of each State, Ter-
ritory, or the District of Columbia or
Tmajor fraction thereof may require,
including all regimental, brigade
and division staff officers authorized
by law and regulations for the corre-
sponding units of the Regular Army
or specially authorized by laws for ||

the Organized Militia.
That when the Organized Militia
is called into the service of the United
States, and is employed in conjunc-
tion with the Regular or Volunteer
forces of the United States, and mili-
tary operations require the presence
of two or more officers of the same
grade in the same field, department,
or command, or of organizations
thereof, the President may assign the
command of the forces of such field,
department, or command, or of or-
gamizations thereof, without regard
to seniority of rank in the same grade:
Provided, That in the absence of
such assignment by the President,
officers of the same grade shall rank
and have precedence in the follow-
ing order, without regard to date or
rank or commission as between offi-
cers of different classes, namely:
First, officers of the Regular Army
and officers of the Marine Corps de-
#.
Comparative statement showing differences in the organization of the continental army and Organized Militia, etc.—Continued.
(1) The Army as now authorized.
(2) War Department draft.
(3) Proposed House bill.
(4) Proposed Senate bill.
(5) Policy report, General Staff.
.."
tached for service with the Army by |
order of the President; second, officers
of the Organized Militia called into the
service of the United States; third,
officers of the Volunteer forces: Pro-
vided further, That officers of the
Regular Army holding commissions
in the Organized Militia in the
service of the United States, or in the
Volunteer forces, shall rank and
have precedence under said commis-
sion as if they were commissions in
the Regular Army, but the rank of
officers of the Regular Army under
their commissioms in the Organized
Militia shall mot, for the purpose of
this section, be held to antedate their
formal entry into the service of the
United States under said commis-
Sions.
That all expenses necessary to the
enforcement of this act, including the
actual and mecessary expense of
travel of the officers of the Army when |
traveling on duty pursuant to orders
issued by the governors of the several
States and Territories or the com-
manding general of the Organized
Militia of the District of Columbia,
shall be payable out of any appro-
priation made to carry out the pro-
sions of this act,
That the Secretary of War shall
cause to be ammually estimated the
amount mecessary for carrying out
the provisions of this section, and no
money shall be expended hereunder
except as shall from time to time be
appropriated.
ec. 36. That all acts and parts
of acts in conflict with this act are
hereby repealed. &
i
{
:
|
h
PREPAREDINESS FOR, NATIONAL DEFENSE.
369
Gen. MACOMB. Attention is invited also to the following comparison
in parallel colums of the proposed cadet companies and a suggested
method for establishing a reserve officers' training corps in the civil
educational institutions of the country.
COMPARISON OF THE CADET COMPANY SYSTEM WITH THE SYSTEM FOR A RESERVE
OFFICERs’ TRAINING Corps, PREPARED BY THE WAR College DIVISION OF THE
GENERAL STAFF.
CADET COMPANY.
Only 3,000 cadets under training at
one time.
Cadets upon joining a cadet company
do so with no standard education. They
may, in fact, have just entered college.
A member of a cadet company will
receive one (1) year's training, principally
as a private or noncommissioned officer
of a company. He will then become a
reSeTVe OTTICGI’. -
s
To become a reserve officer by the
cadet company method a young man
must devote one complete year of his life
to nothing but military training.
Every cadet enrolled must be accepted
to secure the number desired, 3,000 per
year.
Probable support of educational in-
stitutions questionable.
Whole system must be initiated and
makes no use of existing agencies.
*~
Government, not getting services of
these men until after they pass out of the
cadet companies. -
Uniforms, etc., will be source of ex-
pense to these men or to the Government
when they are passed into Reserve Corps
of officers.
Thirty captains and 60 lieutenants, 30
first sergeants, 30 meSS Sergeants, 30 Sup-
ply Sergeants, and 120 cooks are addi-
tional.
Barrack facilities will be needed.
The use of retired officers is not contem
plated. -
RESERVE OFFICERS’ TRAINING CORPS.
27,000 will be under training in the
senior division the first year. This num-
ber will probably increase every year, as
it depends largely upon the number of
students attending college.
All accepted reserve officers will be
graduates of an educational institution.
They will be young men of education and
will be vouched for by reputable author-
ity. In other words, they are the pick
of the country.
A cadet in the Reserve Officers’ Train-
ing Corps must first complete at least two
years’ military training before he becomes
eligible for the additional training. He,
then, is further trained during the re-
mainder of his time at college, which, as
a rule, will be two years. After this he
must serve six months with a unit of the
Regular Army as an officer.
A member of the Reserve Officers’
Training Corps pursues his education
while training to be a reserve officer until
he reports for the six months’ service with
the Army. That is, he only approxi-
materly loses six months’ time as com-
pared with one year in a cadet company.
The Reserve Officers' Training Corps
secures its reserve officers by a system of
selection and elimination. Only a small
percentage of those who start training will
finally be accepted.
Assured of support, as this has been dis-
cussed for past three years.
Already in partial operation, utilizing
existing agencies to fullest extent, con-
templates and permits of extension
through agencies of same kind.
While these men are completing their
training as officers, the Regular Army is
obtaining their services as officers. This
will to some extent replace many regi-
mental officers who will be detached for
necessary duties.
These men also leave Service equipped
with uniforms, etc., for active Service.
Additional officers above the 100, now
authorized are only needed as new insti-
tutions are qualified.
No barrack facilities will be needed.
Retired officers may be employed on
this duty.
370 PREPAREDNESS FOR
NATIONAL DEFENSE.
It is not believed that the condition of
affairs in the cadet company So far as dis-
cipline is concerned would be found en-
tirely satisfactory, for the following rea-
sons: (a) The pay of the cadet would be
much greater than that of the sergeants
and other noncommissioned officers who
were placed over these young men; (b)
the social conditions at a post or camp
would undoubtedly be found too binding
upon these young men, who will eventu-
ally become reserve officers, and who, ac-
cording to the provisions of section 10 of
the same bill, as members of the Officers’
Reserve Corps who have passed their
service in cadet companies, might be
commissioned second lieutenants later on.
The total cost of educating 3,000 annu-
ally will be $4,628,152, or at an average
cost of $1,542 per graduate. The total
number possible under this system is
18,000; 15,000 on the reserve list and 3,000
undergoing training.
This condition can not exist in the case
of the graduate of the Senior Division of
the Reserve Officers' Training Corps as he
is commissioned and is trained as a com-
missioned officer. In this respect this
system conforms to the best practice
abroad, namely, the ensign in the German
service, Sublieutenant in French, Italian,
Austrian, and Russian Armies, the train-
ing required being that of a commissioned
officer, and not of a cadet.
The total cost for the first year will be
$5,172,400. The total number of gradu-
ates, based on the last year’s report, is
5,200. This means a cost of $995 per grad-
uate and 2,200 more reserve officers annu-
ally than can be produced by the cadet
company. -
Senator DU Pont. What do you think of that name “Cadet com-
panies?” Is that a fortunate name? Will it not be confused with
the cadets from the West Point Military Academy'
Gen. MACOMB. I would not suggest that. I would suggest, in lieu
of it, “reserve officers' training corps,” as to which, as I say, we are
giving you for the record a comparative statement in two parallel
columns. You will find that the expense of the system is rather less
per officer for the reserve officers' training corps, and I think it will
give better results. For that reason I had previously suggested that
this plan for the reserve officers’ training corps as finally adopted
be incorporated as a part of the Chamberlain bill.
Attention is also invited to the fact, which is shown in detail on the
comparative statement of the three bills, that the increases in the
various staff departments, excepting the General Staff, are not in
proportion to the increase which the bill provides for the combatant
troops. In other words, in providing a staff for any force we ought
to have that staff in proportion to the strength of the force, and I did
not consider that that had been fully looked after in that bill, but that
the staff provided was in excess of what was required.
The CHAIRMAN. The plan of the Secretary of War embodies the
creation of a reserve from the so-called continental army. Is that
the system the War College suggested ? -
Gen. MACOMB. No; that is not the system. We have suggested
that there be a citizen force of partially trained troops supplied,
amounting to 500,000; but the details of supplying that force were
not given in the report, only the general principle governing that,
and we insisted upon it that that force should have a training of,
say, nine months, so that at the outbreak of war we could have it in
such shape that we could, during the assembling of the other forces,
give them 90 days more training to bring it up to a year's training.
The CHAIRMAN. Nine months in how long a time'.
Gen. MACOMB. They would have nine months in whatever time is
provided for in the system, which we have not yet devised in full.
PREPAIRED NIESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 3.71
What we mean is that we should aim to get that result in whatever
system we do provide; we should aim to give them nine months’
good training before mobilization.
The CHAIRMAN. That might be either done in time of peace or
after they had volunteered in time of war'.
Gen. MACOMB. I say, in time of peace they should have had the
nine months' training, and after war had become imminent and
these troops were being called out we should give them 90 days more,
and then they would be fit to be sent forth.
The CHAIRMAN. Have you considered the difficulties of taking men
out of industrial life for a period of nine months during peace times?
Gen. MACOMB. We have thought of that, but I will speak of that a
little later. I wanted to say that it should be noted that it was the
evident purpose of the draft of the War Department bill to use the
400,000 men of the continental army who will have received not
more than six months' training as first-line troops. That is abso-
lutely at variance with the system that we think is necessary. We
do not think you could use such a force as first-line troops at all,
and therefore we do not recommend such a continental army as is
recommended in the draft. We all know that the name continental
army is merely used as a convenience and is probably not the final
term that is going to be used when we devise this force. That is
practically all I would care to say on that bill, and I am giving it
merely as my personal opinion. That is not the opinion of the War
College Division, so far as I know, because the bill has never been
referred to the War College Division for discussion.
The CHAIRMAN. That is your individual opinion ?
Gen. MACOMB. That is just simply my individual opinion.
The CHAIRMAN. You realize the necessity of creating a reserve
force of some kind among the citizens?
Gen. MACOMB. I fully realize that. Perhaps we had better take
up the Hay bill next.
º CHAIRMAN. Yes; you had better do that, and have them in
OTC GT. .
Gen. MACOMB. This bill is one which had been already sent to the
War College Division for study, and had been studied down there
in tentative form. Certain corrections that were necessary, evidently
errors in the tentative draft, were communicated to Mr. Hay in
Some way, and he has placed them in this draft, which is marked
“Revision.” This is not the draft, which we studied, but is very
closely approximating to it.
(The revised so-called Hay bill is as follows:)
A BILL To increase the efficiency of the Military Establish-
ment of the United States.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-
tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
That hereafter the enlisted personnel of all organizations of
Cavalry, Field Artillery, Coast Artillery, Corps, and Infantry
shall at all times be maintained as nearly as possible at the
maximum strength fixed by law: Provided, That the total
enlisted strength of all of said arms of the service, including
recruits therefor at depots or elsewhere, shall at no time
372 PREPARED NIESS FOR, NATIONAL DEFENSE.
exceed by more than five per centum the total enlisted
strength prescribed for all of said arms by this section; and
the enlisted men now or hereafter authorized by law for
other branches of the military service shall be provided and
maintained without any impairment of the enlisted strength
prescribed for any of said arms by this section.
SEC. 2. That each regiment of Cavalry shall consist of
one colonel, one lieutenant colonel, three majors,
fifteen captains, sixteen first lieutenants, sixteen sec-
ond lieutenants, the veterinary officers hereinafter au-
thorized, one headquarter troop, one supply troop, one
machine-gun troop, and twelve troops of Cavalry organized
into three squadrons of four troops each. Of the officers
herein provided, the first lieutenants not required for duty
with the troops of Cavalry or with headquarter, supply, or
machine-gun troops shall be available for detail as squadron
adjutants or such other details as may be lawful. -
Each Cavalry headquarter troop shall consist of one
captain who shall be the regimental adjutant, one regimental
Sergeant major, three squadron Sergeants major, one first
sergeant who shall be the drum major, two color sergeants,
one mess sergeant, one supply Sergeant, one stable sergeant,
two sergeants, five corporals, two cooks, two horseshoers,
one saddler, twenty-three privates, one band leader, one
assistant band leader, one sergeant trumpeter, two band
Sergeants, four band corporals, two musicians, first class; four
musicians, second class; thirteen musicians, third class; one
sergeant orderly, and eleven orderlies.
Each Cavalry supply troop shall consist of one captain
who shall be the regimental supply officer, two second lieu-
tenants, three regimental Supply sergeants, and such non-
commissioned officers and other enlisted men as the Secretary
of War may authorize to be supplied from the staff corps or
departments. sº
Each Cavalry machine gun troop shall consist of one
captain, one first lieutenant, two second lieutenants, one first
Sergeant, one mess Sergeant, one supply Sergeant, one stable
sergeant, eight Sergeants, eight corporals, two cooks, two
horseshoers, one saddler, one mechanic, two trumpeters, and
sixty-two privates of whom not to exceed twenty-five per
centum shall be rated as privates, first class.
Each troop of Cavalry shall consist of one captain, one
first lieutenant, one second lieutenant, one first Sergeant, one
mess sergeant, one supply Sergeant, five Sergeants, nine cor-
porals, two cooks, two horseshoers, one saddler, two
trumpeters, and seventy-six privates.
The commissioned officers required in each regiment of
Cavalry for headquarter, supply and machine gun troops,
and for the troops organized into squadrons shall be assigned
from among the officers hereinbefore authorized for the regi-
ment.
SEC. 3. That the Field Artillery shall consist of twelve
colonels, twelve lieutenant colonels, thirty-six majors, one
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE, 373
hundred and sixty-eight captains, one hundred and ninety-
two first lieutenants, two hundred and twenty-eight sec-
ond lieutenants, the veterinary officers hereinafter author-
ized; twelve regimental Sergeants major, thirty-six regi-
mental supply sergeants, thirty-six battalion sergeants major,
twenty-four color Sergeants, twelve mess sergeants, twelve
supply sergeants, twelve stable sergeants, twenty-four ser–
eants, one hundred and ninety-two corporals, twenty-
four horseshoers, twelve saddlers, tºniº mechanics,
forty-eight trumpeters, thirty-six cooks, two hundred and
eighty-eight privates, one hundred and twenty orderlies;
twelve bands, each of which shall consist of one band
leader, one first sergeant, who shall be the drum major,
One assistant band leader, one sergeant trumpeter, two band
Sergeants, four band corporals, one cook, two musicians,
first class, four musicians, second class, thirteen musicians,
third class; and one hundred and eight batteries, each of
which shall consist of one captain, one first lieutenant, two
Second lieutenants, one first sergeant, one supply sergeant,
One mess sergeant, one stable sergeant, one chief mechanic,
Seven sergeants, sixteen corporals, seven mechanics, three
cooks, three trumpeters, and one hundred and forty-nine
º: The commissioned officers required for said
atteries shall be assigned thereto from among the officers
authorized by this section for the Field Artillery at Large.
The remaining officers and all the enlisted men so au-
thorized shall be assigned to duties or organized, within the
Field Artillery, as the President shall from time to time
direct.
Each battery of Field Artillery shall be armed and
equipped, and any two or more of such batteries may be
combined into or detached from higher tactical units, as the
President shall from time to time direct: Provided, That
when no enlisted men of the Quartermaster Corps are avail-
able for attachment, for the performance of the duties indi-
cated in this proviso, to a mountain artillery organization
comprising not less than six batteries, there shall be added
to such organization one pack master who shall be a ser-
geant, first class, one assistant pack master who shall be a
sergeant, and one cargador who shall be a corporal: Pro-
vided further, That in construing existing law relative to
the appointment of chaplains in the Army, nine batteries of
Field Artillery shall be regarded as a regiment thereof:
Provided further, That for the purpose of lessening as much
as possible inequalities of promotion due to the increase
in the number of officers of Field Artillery under the pro-
visions of this Act, any vacancies created or caused by
this Act in commissioned grades below that of captain in
the Field Artillery may, in the discretion of the President
and under such regulations as he may prescribe in further-
ance of the purpose stated in this proviso, be filled by the
romotion or transfer without promotion of officers of other
ranches of the line of the Army; but no such promotion
or transfer shall be made in the case of any officer un-
374 PREPAIRED NESS FOR, NATIONAL DEFENSE.
less it shall have been recommended by an examining
board composed of five officers of Field Artillery, not below
the rank of captain, who, after having made a personal ex-
amination of such officer and of his official record, shall have
reported him qualified for service in the Field Artillery in the
grade to which his promotion or transfer shall have been
proposed. ". .
In the emergency of actual or imminent war the Presi-
dent is authorized to organize one ammunition battalion for
each organization of Field Artillery consisting of not less
than six batteries, and one Artillery park. Each ammuni-
tion battalion shall consist of one major, One captain, one
first lieutenant, who shall be the supply officer, one ammuni-
tion battalion headquarter detachment, and three ammu-
nition batteries. -
Each ammunition battalion headquarter detachment
shall consist of one battalion sergeant major, one battalion
supply sergeant, four corporals, one trumpeter, two cooks,
three orderlies, three privates, and one wagoner for each
authorized wagon of the field train. -
Each ammunition battery shall consist of one captain,
two first lieutenants, two second lieutenants, one first Ser-
geant, one supply sergeant, one stable Sergeant, One mess
sergeant, seven sergeants, twelve corporals, one chief
mechanic, one saddler, four horseshoers, three cooks, three
trumpeters, and not more than one hundred and eighty-seven
privates: Provided, That not to exceed , twenty-five per
centum of said privates shall be rated as privates, first class:
Provided further, That when no enlisted men of the Quar-
termaster Corps are attached to an ammunition battery serv-
ing with mountain artillery for the duties indicated in this
proviso there shall be added to such battery one packmaster,
who shall be a sergeant, first class; one assistant packmaster,
who shall be a sergeant; and one cargador, who shall be a
corporal: Provided, further, That the President may, in his
discretion, increase to six the number of horseshoers in each
ammunition battery serving with mountain artillery.
The organization of an artillery park shall be as the
President may prescribe.
The organization of ammunition battalions, ammunition
batteries, and the artillery park shall be temporary, and upon
the passing of the emergency requiring their creation they shall
be disbanded. The officers necessary for said organiza-
tions shall be supplied by the assignment of officers from
the officers' reserve corps hereinafter provided for, or by
temporary promotions and appointments in the manner
authorized, by section eight of an Act to provide for raising
the volunteer forces of the United States in time of actua
or threatened war, approved April twenty-fifth, nineteen
hundred and fourteen, for filling temporary vacancies created
in the commissioned personnel of the Regular Army through
appointments of officers thereof to higher volunteer rank.
SEC. 4. That the Coast Artillery Corps shall, in addi-
tion to the commissioned officers now allowed by law, con-
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 375
sist of twenty-five sergeants major with the rank, pay, and
allowances of regimental sergeants major of Infantry, thirty-
four master electricians, seventy-six engineers, eighty-nine
electrician sergeants, first class, eighty-nine electrician Ser-
geants, second class, fifty-four sergeants major with the rank,
pay, and allowances of battalion sergeants major of Infantry,
fifty master gunners, sixty-six firemen, two hundred and
twenty-two first sergeants, two hundred and twenty-two
supply sergeants, one thousand seven hundred and seventy-
six sergeants, two thousand six hundred and sixty-four cor-
porals, four hundred and forty-four cooks, four hundred and
forty-four mechanics, four hundred and forty-four trumpeters,
seventeen thousand nine hundred and eighty-two privates,
and eighteen bands, each of which shall consist of one first
sergeant who shall be the drum major, one band leader, one
assistant band leader, two band sergeants, four band cor-
porals, one cook, two musicians, first class, four musicians,
second class, and thirteen musicians, third class: Provided,
That, within the limits fixed by law, the number of officers,
noncommissioned officers, and privates assigned to the man-
ning body of any particular tactical unit of the Coast
Artillery Corps may be fixed by the President in
accordance with the requirements of the Service of
that unit: Provided further, That the number of lated men
in the Coast Artillery Corps shall not exceed one thousand
seven hundred and seventy-six: Provided further, That when
Coast Artillery troops are employed in the duties of any other
arm of the service they may be organized temporarily in
accordance with the law pertaining to that arm, but nothing
in this proviso shall be held or construed to authorize any
increase in the numbers, rank, pay or allowances of officers
or enlisted men of the Coast Artillery Corps. g
SEC. 5. That the enlisted force of the Corps of Engi-
neers shall be increased by one battalion, to be constituted
as now provided by law; and the Engineer band shall here-
after have the same organization as that hereinbefore pro-
vided for bands of the Coast Artillery Corps.
SEC. 6. That each regiment of Infantry shall consist of
One colonel, one lieutenant colonel, three majors, fifteen
captains, fifteen first lieutenants, fifteen second lieutenants;
One headquarter company, One supply company, One ma-
chine-gun company, and twelve Infantry companies organ-
ized into three battalions of four companies each. Of the
officers herein provided for, the lieutenants not required for
duty with Infantry companies or with headquarter, Supply,
or machine-gun companies shall be available for detail as
battalion adjutants and such other details as may be lawful.
Each Infantry headquarter company shall consist of one
captain, who shall be the regimental adjutant, one Sergeant
major, three battalion Sergeants major, one first Sergeant,
who shall be the drum major, two color Sergeants, one mess
Sergeant, one supply 'sergeant, two cooks, one horseshoer,
One band leader, one assistant band leader, one sergeant
trumpeter, two band Sergeants, four band corporals, two
376 PREPAIRED NIESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
musicians first class, four musicians second class, thirteen
musicians third class, one sergeant orderly, and sixteen
orderlies.
Each Infantry supply company shall consist of one cap-
tain who shall be the regimental supply officer, one second
lieutenant, three regimental supply sergeants, and such non-
commissioned officers and other enlisted men as the Secretary
of War may authorize to be supplied from the staff corps or
departments. - -
JEach Infantry machine-gun company shall consist of
one captain, one first lieutenant, one second lieutenant, one
first Sergeant, one mess Sergeant, one supply sergeant, one
stable sergeant, seven sergeants, eight corporals, two cooks,
One mechanic, and forty-eight privates of whom not to exceed
twenty-five per centum shall be rated as priyates, first class.
Each Infantry company shall consist of Öne captain, one
first lieutenant, one second lieutenant, one first sergeant, one
mess Sergeant, one supply Sergeant, five sergeants, ten cor-
porals, three cooks, two trumpeters, one mechanic, and one
hundred and twenty-six privates.
The commissioned officers required in each regiment
of Infantry for headquarter, supply, and machine-gun com-
panies and for the Infantry companies organized into bat-
talions shall be assigned from among the officers hereinbefore
authorized for the regiment.
SEC. 7. That the Signal Corps, exclusive of the avia-
tion section thereof, shall consist of the commissioned offi-
cers now allowed by law, forty-seven master signal elec-
tricians, one hundred and fifty-five first-class sergeants, two
hundred and four sergeants, two hundred and seventy-three
corporals, thirty-two cooks, seven hundred and seventy-
four first-class privates, two hundred and thirty-three pri-
vates; and the aviation section now authorized by law:
Provided, That the number of aviation officers in said avia-
tion, section shall be increased by seventy-three, and the
number of aviation enlisted men shall be increased by twenty-
six master signal electricians, fifty first-class Sergeants,
ninety-three sergeants, one hundred and seventy-one cor-
porals, thirty-six cooks, two hundred and fifty first-class pri-
vates, ninety-four privates organized into an aviation school
detachment, and such number of aero Squadrons as the Sec-
retary of War may direct, not to exceed seven; and each
aero squadron shall consist of such numbers of officers and
sº men of the aviation section as the Secretary of
War shall prescribe.
SEC. 8. That so much of the Act of Congress approved
March third, nineteen hundred and eleven, as relates to offi-
cers detached from their proper commands for duty with the
Organized Militia, or for other duty the usual period of
which exceeds one year, is hereby extended so as to apply
equally in all respects to the detachment, and the filling of
the vacancies caused by the detachment, of seven hundred
and eighty-six such officers in addition to those provided for
by said Act. Of the additional officers thus provided for,
PREPAIREDINESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 377
there shall be commissioned in the Cavalry arm not to ex-
ceed thirty-two colonels, thirty-three lieutenant colonels,
twenty-seven majors, eighty-nine captains, and twelve first
lieutenants; in the Infantry arm not to exceed forty-two
colonels, sixty-two lieutenant colonels, sixty-one majors, one
hundred and seventy-four captains, and fifty-two first lieu-
tenants; in the Coast Artillery Corps not to exceed two hun-
dred and two first lieutenants; and, subject to the restric-
tions hereinafter imposed, detachments of officers from
said arms and corps shall be made so as to provide for
the commissioning of officers therein in accordance with the
foregoing requirement: Provided, That of said additional
officers twelve colonels, ten lieutenant colonels, thirty
majors, one hundred and fifty captains, and one hundred and
twenty first lieutenants, all to 5. reserved from the arms
and in the ratios last hereinbefore indicated, shall be re-
served for duty with the Continental Army, but not to
exceed one-tenth of their number in each grade of each
arm may be detached immediately for service in organizing
said Army, and thereupon the vacancies caused by their
detachment may be filled, and thereafter not to exceed a like
one-tenth additional in each grade of each arm may, within
the limit hereinbefore fixed, be detached for each increment
of forty thousand men actually inducted into the service of
the United States in said Army, and the vacancies caused by
such detachments may be filled as they occur; and, except
as authorized by this proviso, no officers of the line of i.
Army shall be detached therefrom for duty with or on
account of the Continental Army or any part thereof: Pro-
vided further, That hereafter details to fill vacancies in the
list of detached officers shall be made and maintained from
each grade in the Cavalry, Field Artillery, Coast Artillery
Corps, and Infantry in the ratio that the number of officers
in each grade of each of said arms shall bear to the total
number of officers in said grade in the four arms combined,
and such changes among detached officers as may be nec-
essary to preserve said ratio shall be made from time to time.
SEC. 9. That the Porto Rico Regiment of Infantry of
the United States Army shall hereafter have the same or-
ganization, and the same grades and numbers of commis-
sioned officers and enlisted men, as are by this Act or shall
hereafter be prescribed by law for other regiments of infantry
of the Army. All vacancies created by this Act or occurring
hereafter in commissioned offices of said regiment above the
grade of second lieutenant and below the grade of colonel
shall be filled by promotion according to seniority in the sev-
eral grades and within the regiment, subject to the examina-
tion prescribed by section three of the Act of Congress ap-
proved October first, eighteen hundred and ninety, and said
section is hereby extended so as to apply in the cases of all
officers below the grade of lieutenant colonel, who shall
hereafter be examined for promotion in the Porto Rico Regi-
ment of Infantry, except that the President may prescribe
such a system of examination for the promotion of officers of
378 PREPAIRED NESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
said regiment as he may deem advisable. The colonel of
said regiment shall be detailed by the President, from amon
officers of Infantry of the Army not below the grade o
lieutenant colonel, for a period of four years unless sooner re-
lieved. Vacancies created by this act or occurring hereafter
in the grade of second lieutenant in said regiment shall be
filled during any calendar year by the appointment by the
President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate,
of any native of Porto Rico graduated from the United
States Military Academy during that year, and, after such
appointment shall have been made or provided for, by like
appointment of native citizens of Porto Rico between
twenty-one and twenty-seven years of age.
SEC. 10. That, except as otherwise specifically pro-
vided by this Act, the increases in the commissioned and
enlisted personnel of the Regular Army provided for by said
Act jº be made in two increments which shall be, for
each branch of the service concerned, as nearly equal as
practicable. Officers promoted to vacancies created or
caused by the addition of the first increment shall be pro-
moted to rank from July first, nineteen hundred and six-
teen, and those promoted to vacancies created or caused by
the addition of the second increment to rank from July first,
nineteen hundred and seventeen.
Vacancies in the grade of second lieutenant created
or caused by this Act shall be filled by appointment in the
following order: (1) of cadets graduated from the United
States Military Academy; (2) of enlisted men whose fit-
ness for promotion shall have been determined by competi-
tive examination; (3) of members of the officers' reserve
corps who shall have been commissioned therein from the
cadet companies hereinafter provided for; and (4) of can-
didates from civil life between the ages of twenty-
one and twenty-seven years; and the President is
authorized to make the necessary rules and regula-
tions to carry these provisions into effect: Provided,
That hereafter all appointments of persons other than
graduates of the United States Military Academy to
the grade of second lieutenant in the Regular Army shall be
provisional for a period of two years, at the close of which
period such appointments shall be made permanent if the
appointees shall have demonstrated, under such regulations
as the President may prescribe, their suitability and moral,
professional, and physical fitness for such permanent appoint-
ment, but jºid" any appointee fail so to demonstrate his
suitability and fitness, his appointment shall terminate; and
should any officer become eligible for promotion to a vacancy
in a higher grade and qualify therefor before the expiration
of two years from the date of his Orginal appointment, he
shall receive a provisional appointment in such higher grade,
which shall be made permanent when he shall have qualified
for permanent appointment upon the expiration of two years
from the date of his original appointment, or shall terminate
if he shall fail so to qualify: Provided further, That appoint-
PREPAIRED NIESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 379
ments to the grade of second lieutenant in the Corps of Engi-
neers shall continue to be made as now provided by law:
And provided further, That the laws applicable to officers
of the Regular Army and relating to examinations for pro-
motion and to retirement on account of incapacity for active
service shall be applicable to officers serving under temporary
appointments as herein provided.
Officers appointed to original vacancies in the grade of
second lieutenant created or caused by this Act shall take
lineal and relative rank according to dates of appointment:
Provided, That the lineal and relative rank of second lieu-
tenants appointed on the same date shall be determined under
such regulations as the Secretary of War may prescribe:
Provided further, That The Adjutant General of the Army
shall, under the direction and supervision of the Secretary
of War, obtain, compile, and keep continually up to date all
obtainable information as to the names, ages, addresses, occu-
pations, and qualifications for appointment as commissioned
officers of the Army, in time of war or other emergency, of
men of suitable ages, who, by reason of having received
military training in civilian educational institutions or else-
where, or for other sufficient reasons, may be regarded as
qualified and available for appointment as such commis-
sioned officers.
SEC. 11. The monthly pay of enlisted men of the Army
in the grades created by this Act shall be as follows during
their first enlistment: Band leader, quartermaster Sergeant,
Senior grade, and master engineer, senior grade, $75; mas-
ter engineer, junior grade, $65; regimental supply Sergeant,
quartermaster Sergeant, Quartermaster Corps, and Sergeant,
first class, mountain battery, $45; assistant band leader and
Sergeant trumpeter, $40; mess sergeant and musician, first
class, $36; horseshoer, mechanic of machine gun company,
musician, second class, Sergeant orderly, stable Sergeant and
Supply Sergeant, $30; musician, third class, $24; mechanic
of Infantry or Cavalry, $21; wagoner of Infantry, Cavalry,
or Field Artillery, $18; private, first class, of Infantry,
Cavalry, or Field Artillery, $16; trumpeter, orderly, and
saddler, $15. -
SEC. 12. That nothing in this Act shall be held or con-
strued so as to discharge any officer from the Regular Army
or to deprive him of the commission which he now holds
therein. -
SEC. 13. That the President is hereby authorized, by
and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to appoint
veterinarians and assistant veterinarians in the Army, not
to exceed, including veterinary officers in service, two such
officers for each regiment of Cavalry, one for every three
batteries of Field Artillery, seventeen as inspectors of horses
and mules and as veterinarians in the Quartermaster Corps,
and seven as inspectors of meats for the Quartermaster Corps.
That hereafter a candidate for appointment as assistant
veterinarian must be a citizen of the United States, between
the ages of twenty-one and twenty-seven years, a graduate
380 PREPARED NIESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
of a recognized veterinary college or university, and shall
not be appointed until he shall have passed a satisfactory
examination as to character, physical condition, general edu-
cation, and professional º
That an assistant veterinarian appointed under this
Act shall, for the first five years of service as such, have
the rank, pay, and allowances of second lieutenant; that
after five years of service he shall have the rank, pay, and
allowances of first lieutenant; that after fifteen years of
service he shall be promoted to be a veterinarian with the
rank, pay, and allowances of captain: Provided, That any
assistant veterinarian, in order to be promoted as hereinafter
provided, must first pass a satisfactory examination, under
such rules as the President may prescribe, as to professional
qualifications and adaptability for the mounted service; and
if such assistant veterinarian shall be found deficient at such
examination he shall be discharged from the Army with
One year's pay.
That the veterinarians of Cavalry and Field Artillery
now in the Army, together with such veterinarians of the
Quartermaster Corps as are provided for in this Act and
are now employed in said corps, who at the date of the
approval of this Act shall have had less than five years'
governmental service, may be reappointed as assistant
veterinarians with the rank, pay, and allowances of sec-
ond lieutenant; those who shall have had over five years
of service may be reappointed as assistant veterinarians
with the rank, pay, and allowances of first lieutenant;
those who shall have had over fifteen years of service may
be reappointed as veterinarians with the rank, pay, and
allowances of captain: Provided, That no such reappoint-
ment of any veterinarian shall be made unless he shall
first pass satisfactorily a practical professional and physical
examination as to his fitness for the military service: Pro-
wided further, That veterinarians now in the Army or in the
employ of the Quartermaster Corps who shall fail to pass
the prescribed physical examination because of disability
incident to the service shall be placed upon the retired list
of the Army with seventy-five per centum of the pay to
which they would have been entitled if reappointed as here-
inbefore prescribed.
That the Secretary of War, upon recommendation
of the Surgeon General of the Army, may appoint, for such
time as their services may be required, such number of
reserve veterinarians as may be necessary to attend public
animals pertaining to the Quartermaster Corps. Reserve
veterinarians so employed shall have the pay and allow-
ances of second lieutenant during such employment and
no longer: Provided, That such reserve veterinarians shall
be graduates of a recognized veterinary college or university
and shall pass a satsifactory examination as to character,
physical condition, general education, and professional
qualifications in like manner as hereinbefore required of
assistant veterinarians; such reserve veterinarians shall con-
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 381
stitute a list of eligibles for appointment as assistant veter-
inarians subject to all the conditions hereinbefore pre-
scribed for the appointment of assistant veterinarians. -
That candidates for appointment as assistant veter-
inarians who shall have passed satisfactorily the examina-
tions prescribed for that grade by this Act shall be appointed,
in the order or merit in which they shall have passed such ex-
amination, to vacancies as they occur, such appointments
to be for a probationary period of one year, after which
time, if the services of the probationers shall have been
satisfactory, they shall be permanently appointed with rank
to date from the dates of rank of their probationary appoint-
ments. Probationary veterinarians whose services are
found unsatisfactory shall be discharged at any time during
the probationary period, or at the end thereof, and shall
have no further claims against the Government on account
of their probationary service.
That the Secretary of War shall from time to time
appoint boards of examiners to conduct the veterinary exami-
nations hereinbefore prescribed, each of said boards to con-
sist of a field officer of the line, two medical officers, and
two veterinarians. .
SEC. 14. That the President is authorized to raise, or- .
anize, train, and maintain a citizen army of not to exceed
our hundred thousand men, to be known as the “Continental
Army,” to be raised in three annual contingents, and there-
after maintained by annual contingents sufficient to keep the
number up to the authorized strength of four hundred thou-
Sand men. For this purpose he may from time to time divide
the United States into such number of divisional districts as
he may prescribe. The Continental Army shall consist of
such number of regiments of Infantry, Cavalry, and Field
Artillery, and of such Engineer and auxiliary troops, as the
President may deem proper, within the limits of the force
herein authorized; but the President may vary the proportion
of the several arms, corps, and departments as he may deem
necessary for purposes of training. -
SEC. 15. That, except for periods of training as herein-
after provided for, the Continental Army shall not be called
out for service except when authorized by Congress in the
emergency of actual or imminent war. * *
SEC. , 16. That the organization of all units of the Con-
tinental Army, staff and line, including headquarters, shall
be the same as that prescribed by law and regulations for
corresponding units and headquarters of the Regular Army:
Provided, That to organizations created in the Continental
Army under this Act, there shall be attached the same
medical personnel as are attached to like organizations of
the Regular Army: Provided further, That the organiza-
tion, in the Continental Army, of establishments of the
Medical Department, remount depots, military trains, secret
service agencies, lines of communication, including their
supply depots, and all other adjuncts that may be necessary
23380—PT 6—16—10
382 PREPAREDNIESS FOR, NATIONAL DEFENSE.
in the prosecution of war, and the organization of which is
not otherwise provided for by law, ji be as the President
may from time to time direct.
SEC. 17. That when, at any time within three years
from and after the date on which this Act becomes effective,
any company, troop, or battery, or each company, troop,
or battery comprised in any battalion, Squadron, regiment,
or higher unit of the Organized Militia of any State, Ter-
ritory, or the District of Columbia, organized as prescribed
by law and , War Department regulations, shall present
themselves with three-fourths of the prescribed minimum
enlisted strength, and with the consent of the proper State
authorities, if from a State, for entry into the Continental
Army, the enlisted men thereof may, subject to physical
examination and under such regulations as the President
may prescribe, be enlisted into the Continental Army, and
the officers of such companies, troops, batteries, battalions,
squadrons, regiments or higher units, including the field,
staff, and general officers, if any, may be appointed as offi-
cers of like grade in the Continental Army; and thereupon
the officers and enlisted men so received into the service of
the United States in the Continental Army shall stand
discharged from the Organized Militia of which they were
members. -
SEC. 18. That the term of enlistment in the Continental
Army shall be for six years, unless sooner discharged; the
first three years of the enlistment to be served in active
organizations with the colors, upon the completion of which
service the soldier shall be furloughed in the grade in which
.then serving to a reserve to be known as the Continental
Army reserve, in which he shall serve the second three years
of his enlistment, unless sooner discharged, except that
noncommissioned officers, after the expiration of three years'
service in a first or subsequent enlistment may, in the dis-
cretion of the Secretary of War, be reenlisted for a period of
six years. .
Finlisted men of the reserve may likewise be reenlisted
therein for successive periods of three years; and persons who
have been honorably discharged from the Regular Army,
Continental Army, Navy, Marine Corps, or Organized Militia
may be enlisted in the Continental Army reserve for like
periods.
In the event of war all enlistments which would other-
wise expire within one year shall continue in force for the
period of one year from the beginning of the war, unless
sooner terminated by the President.
All enlisted men raised under the provisions of this Act
shall be taken from among citizens of the United States, and
shall be, at the time of their first enlistment, between the ages
of eighteen and thirty-five years. -
SEC. 9. That, in the event of war only, the President,
after having been authorized by Congress to use the armcd
land forces of the United States, for purposes of the war, is
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 883 .
empowered to call out the Continental Army reserves, or
any part of them, and to employ them as he may deem best.
SEC. 20. That the offices of the Continental Army cre-
ated by this Act may be filled by appointments from the
following classes: First, from officers of the Regular Army
available, under the laws relating to detached serv-
ice, for detail from the active list, to serve in
the Continental Army for a period of not to exceed four
years and subject to the limitations as to eligibility, num-
ber, and compensation prescribed by this Act; second, from
members of the Officers' Reserve Corps hereinafter provided
for; third, from officers of the Organized Militia and retired
officers of the Regular Army; and, fourth, subject to such
examinations as the President may prescribe, from graduates
or undergraduates of educational institutions having military
courses, and other citizens who have qualified themselves for
such appointments by experience or study, or both.
Vacancies thereafter occurring in the body of officers of
the Continental Army above the grade of second lieutenant,
except those filled by the appointment of active officers of
the Regular Army, may be filled by promotion within the
Continental Army, or by appointments from the officers'
reserve corps, subject to such examinations as the President
may prescribe: Provided, That after a period of three years
from the passage of this Act, all vacancies in the grade of
second lieutenant shall, as far as practicable, be filled from
among officers of the officers' reserve corps of the particular
arm or department in which the vacancy shall occur, and
when no such officers of that corps are available for that
grade, any remaining vacancies may be filled by the appoint-
ment of other citizens of the United States, subject to such
rules and regulations as the President may prescribe not in-
consistent with the provisions of this Act: Provided further,
That enlisted men of the Regular Army serving under com-
missions in the Continental Army or in the Volunteers shall,
on reenlistment in the Regular Army, resume their former
status under laws conferring benefits for continuous service.
SEC. 21. That the President alone is authorized to ap-
point all officers of the Continental Army below the grade of
lieutenant colonel. All officers of the grade of lieutenant
colonel and of higher grades in that army shall be appointed
by the President by and with the advice and consent of the
Senate. All appointments below the grade of brigadier gen-
eral in the Continental Army shall be by commission in an
arm, corps, or department of the service, and line officers in
each arm of the service shall be assigned to organizations
of that arm and transferred from one organization to another
in that arm, as the interests of the service may require, by
orders from the Secretary of War: Provided, That when an
officer of the Continental Army changes his residence so as
to make service with the organization to which he is assigned
impracticable or inconvenient to the Government, the Presi-
dent may, in lieu of transferring him to another organization
of the Continental Army at or near the locality to which he
884 PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
has changed his residence, transfer him, if below the grade
of lieutenant colonel, to the officers' reserve corps in the
grade held by him in the Continental Army, or if above
the grade of major, he may honorably discharge him from
the Continental Army: Provided further, That under such
regulations as may be prescribed by the #President
military boards may be appointed of not less than three
nor more than five officers of the Continental Army to
examine into the capacity, qualifications, conduct, and effi-
ciency of any commissioned officer of said army, each mem-
ber of such a board to be as far as practicable superior in
rank to the officer whose qualifications are to be inquired
into; and if the report of such board is adverse to the con-
tinuance of such officer, and the report be approved by the
President, such officer may, in the discretion of the President,
be discharged from service in the Continental Army: And
provided further, That the º and reappointment
of officers of the Continental Army below the grade of lieu-
tenant colonel shall be subject to the same limitations as to
age as provided in section thirty-two of this Act for officers
of the officers' reserve corps; and no officers shall be appointed
or reappointed a lieutenant colonel in the Continental Arm
after he has reached the age of fifty years, a colonel after he
has reached the age of fifty-five years, or a general officer
after he has reached the age of sixty years. When an officer
of the Continental Army reaches the age limit fixed for ap-
pointment or reappointment in the grade in which he is com-
missioned he shall be honorably discharged from the service
of the United States and be entitled to retain his official title
and, on occasions of ceremony, to wear the uniform of the
highest grade held by him in the Continental Army.
SEC. 22. That not to exceed one Regular Army officer
on the active list shall hold a commission in the Continental
Army in any one battalion of engineers, signal troops, or
field artillery, or the equivalent thereof of other troops; and
not to exceed four such officers shall, at the same time, hold
commissions in any one regiment of cavalry, field artillory,
or infantry of the said army: Provided, That the appoint-
ments of Regular Army officers as officers of the Continental
Army shall not revoke their Regular Army commissions nor
prejudice their relative or lineal standing in the Regular
Army: Provided further, That Regular Army officers so
§. shall exercise command therein only when the
ontinental Army is employed in active Service and during
periods of training, but shall not, except in time of war,
receive any pay or allowances in excess of that authorized
by law for the grade held by them under their permanent
commissions in the Regular Army: And provided further,
That when the Continental Army is employed in active
Service in time of war, Regular Army officers holding com-
missions in the Continental Army shall be entitled to the pay
and allowances of their grade in that army, and their places
in the Regular Army may be filled by temporary promotions
or appointments under the same limitations as are prescribed
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 385
by law relative to appointments of Regular Army officers
in the volunteer army. - .
• SEC. 23. That the President is authorized to appoint
such number of staff officers in the Continental Army as he
may find necessary to provide the staff officers corresponding
to those prescribed by law and regulations for like units of
the Regular Army, and the President may appoint chaplains.
in the Continental Army at the rate of one for each regiment
or the equivalent thereof of Infantry, Cavalry, and Field Ar-
tillery, with rank corresponding to that established by law
for chaplains of the Regular Army. -
SEC. 24. That when any enlisted man of the Conti-
nental Army so changes his residence as to make his service
with the organization to which he is assigned impracticable
or inconvenient to the Government, he shall be transferred to
an organization of the Continental Army at or near the lo-
cality to which he has changed his residence, and his descrip-
tive list, with a statement of his accounts, shall be transmitted
to the commanding officer of that organization under such
regulations as the Secretary of War may prescribe.
SEC. 25. That, within the limits of appropriations spe-
cifically made by Congress for the purpose, the President
may call the constituent parties of the Continental Army,
exclusive of the Continental Army reserve, together at
such times and places and in such numbers as he shall
deem best for purposes of drill, instruction, or training.
The aggregate length of such training periods for any Sol-
dier of the Continental Army, other than Regular Army
officers or enlisted men assigned thereto, shall not exceed
three months in any one calendar year, nor an aggre-
gate of six months in the first three years of the enlist-
ment. In the instruction and training of such troops the
President is authorized to use such parts of the Regular
Army, the military stores, and other property as he may
deem necessary for the purpose: }.}}| That when or-
ganizations and individual officers and noncommissioned of-
ficers of the Regular Army are on duty with the Continental
Army during the periods of training, the officers and non-
commissioned officers of the Regular Army shall have author-
ity to command all officers and noncommissioned officers of
the Continental Army of equal or lower grade and all en-
listed men of the Continental Army whom it is their duty
to instruct; and when enlisted men of the Regular Army be-
low the grade of corporal are used for the purpose of instruc-
tion, they may be appointed lance corporals. - -
SEC. 26. That, except as otherwise specifically pro-
vided in this Act, when called out for purposes of di.
instruction, or training, in time of peace, or when in active
service, the pay and allowances of the officers and enlisted
men of the Continental Army shall, while so employed, be
as prescribed by law and regulations for corresponding grades
in the Regular Army: Provided, That in computing length
of service for longevity or continuous-service pay credit shall.
be given for active service in the Army, Navy, or Marine
\
386 PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
Corps, in militia employed in the service of the United States,
in volunteers, or in the Continental Army while in active
service: Provided further, That officers and enlisted men of
the Continental Army shall not be entitled to retirement or
retired pay and shall be entitled to pension only for dis-
ability incurred in the line of duty during a period of in-
struction, while en route thereto or therefrom, or while in
active service: Provided further, That each member of
the Continental Army shall be subjected to a physical exam-
ination at the beginning and end of each period of train-
ing, and if no disability incident to the period of training
is shown by such examinations, it shall be taken as con-
clusive evidence that none was incurred during the period
of instruction: Provided further, That in lieu of any money
allowance for clothing there shall be issued to each enlisted
man in time of peace such articles of clothing as the Presi-
dent may direct: And provided further, That any clothin
or other equipment issued to members of the Continenta
Army shall remain the property of the United States, and
in case of loss or destruction of any article thereof, the
articles so lost or destroyed shall be replaced by issues to
the soldier or officer and the value thereof deducted from
any pay due or to become due, unless it is made to appear
that such loss or destruction was not due to neglect or other
fault on his part. When the enlistment of any enlisted man
in the Continental Army or Continental Army reserve
expires, or such enlisted man is ordered discharged, all arms,
equipments, clothing, and other property issued to him
during his enlistment shall be accounted for, under such
regulations as the Secretary of War may prescribe, prior to
the issuance of discharge.
SEC. 27. That when called into active service or when
called out for purposes of drill, instruction, or training the
forces of the Continental Army shall, from the time they
are required by the terms of the call to respond thereto, be
subject to the laws and regulations governing the Regular
Army, so far as such laws and regulations are applicable to
officers or enlisted men whose permanent retention in the
military service, either on the active list or the retired list,
is not contemplated by existing law; and when in active
service, or during periods of training, no distinction shall be
made between the Regular Army, the Continental Army,
the officers' reserve corps, the Organized Militia while
in the military service of the United States, and the Volun-
teer forces, in respect to the conferring upon officers or
enlisted men of brevet rank, medals of honor, certificates
of merit, or other rewards for distinguished service, nor in
respect to the eligibility of any officer of said forces for Serv-
ice upon any court-martial, court of inquiry, or military com-
DOlíSS1C)]]. -
Persons in the Continental Army, or honorably dis-
charged therefrom, shall receive the same preference with
respect to appointments in the civil service and retention
therein as are provided by existing law with respect to per-
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 387
sons who have been honorably discharged from the military
or naval service. .
SEC. 28. That in order to provide animals and vehicles
for the Continental Army, the Secretary of War is author-
ized, within the limits of such appropriations as may
be made by Congress specifically for the purposes of this sec-
tion, to contract with owners of such animals or vehicles as
may in his opinion be suitable for military service, to furnish
the same if and when called upon to do so: Provided, That
the options so secured for the purchase or hire of the ani-
mals or vehicles shall be clear and specific as to the price
at which such animals or vehicles are to be furnished, and
as to time within which the option shall be exercised, and
that any consideration paid or agreed to be paid for such
options shall, in the event of the purchase of the animals
or vehicles, form a part of the purchase price of the same.
SEC. 29. That for the purpose of instruction of the
Continental Army and for taking care of Government prop-
sº
erty issued thereto, the Secretary of War may detail to the
said Army, from the corresponding Organizations of the
Regular Army, one sergeant to each organized troop, bat-
tery, or company that is subject to be called out annually
from the Continental Army for training. Sergeants so de-
tailed shall perform the duties of first sergeant and º
Sergeant in the organization to which they shall be detaile
they shall be additional to the sergeants authorized by law
for the troops, batteries, and companies from which they
shall be detailed, and they shall not be counted as a part of
the authorized strength of the Regular Army: Provided,
That no such detail shall be made to, or shall be continued for
more than six months with any Continental Army troop,
battery, or company having a membership of less than fifty
enlisted men available for active service at any time; and
whenever any such organization, after having attained a
membership of at least fifty enlisted men, shall thereafter
have had for six months an average membership of less than
fifty enlisted men available for active service at any time said
organization shall be disbanded immediately and its com-
missioned and enlisted members shall be assigned to other
organizations of the Continental Army or shall be discharged
from said Army, as the Secretary of War may direct: Pro-
wided further, That no troop, battery, or company organi-
zation shall be formed in the Continental Army, and no
public property shall be issued to or for any prospective
members of such an organization, until at least fifty enlisted
men, available for active service at any time, shall have
become available for said organization, whereupon the organi;
zation may be initiated by the incorporation of said enlisted
men into it, and not otherwise.
SEC. 30. That all returns and muster rolls of organi-
zations of the Continental Army, while in the service of
the United States, shall be rendered to The Adjutant General
of the Army, and upon being relieved from active service
or upon the completion of periods of training the records
388 PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
pertaining to them shall be transmitted to and filed in The
Adjutant General's Office. And regimental and all other
medical officers serving with the Continental Army in the
field or elsewhere ji keep a daily record of all soldiers
reported sick or wounded, as shown by the morning calls or
reports, and shall deposit such reports as provided herein for
other reports and returns. -
SEC. 31. That the President is authorized to organize
not to exceed thirty cadet companies of Cavalry, Field Artil-
lery, Infantry, Engineers, Coast Artillery and Signal troops,
to be attached to and serve with regiments or other units of
their respective branches of the Regular Army within the
continental limits of the United States. -
Each company shall consist of not to exceed one hun-
dred cadets, who shall be between the ages of twenty and
twenty-four years on the date of engagement and shall be
recruited from among officers of the National Guard, stu-
dents and graduates of educational institutions having mili-
tary courses, and students and graduates of other colleges and
universities. Each cadet shall be engaged for a period of
six years unless sooner discharged by competent authority,
the first year of which period shall be in a cadet company
and the remaining five years in the officers' reserve corps
provided for in this Act. - -
Each cadet shall receive, during his service in a cadet
company, the pay and allowances of a master signal elec-
trician, and shall during such service be subject to the laws
and regulations for the government of the Army of the
United States. *.*,
Each cadet company shall be organized as the President
shall prescribe, and all duties in the various grades, and posi-
tions therein, except as otherwise herein provided for, shall
be performed by cadets of the company, but no cadet shall
receive any extra pay or allowances for performing such
duties. For the purpose of assignment to cadet companies
for the conduct of their interior administration, the President
is authorized to increase the number of noncommissioned
officers of any organization of the Regular Army, to which
a fully organized cadet company of not less than fifty men
is attached, by one first sergeant, one mess sergeant, and one
supply sergeant, and the number of cooks by two.
Each cadet company shall be subjected to thorough
training, which shall include instruction in the duties of
privates, noncommissioned officers, and company officers of
the arm, corps, or department of the service to which the
company is attached, and shall be conducted under such rules
and regulations as the President may prescribe. .
Upon completion of one year's service with a company
as herein prescribed, each cadet shall, if found proficient, be
commissioned in such grade in the Officers’ reserve corps
as may be warranted by the degree of proficiency he may
have attained, under such rules and regulations as the Presi-
dent may prescribe. Any cadet who, upon the completion
of one year's service, is not found proficient shall be dis-
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 389
charged the service of the United States with such char-
acter of discharge as his services may have warranted. ..
SEC. 32. That for the purpose of securing a reserve of
officers available for service as temporary officers in the Regu-
lar Army, as provided for in this Act and in section eight of
the Act approved April twenty-fifth, nineteen hundred and
fourteen, as officers in the Continental Army provided for in
this Act, as officers for recruit rendezvous and depots, and
as officers of volunteers, there shall be organized, under such
rules and regulations as the President may prescribe not
inconsistent with the provisions of this Act, an officers’
reserve corps of the Army of the United States. Except as
otherwise herein provided, a member of the officers’ reserve
corps shall not be subject to call for service in time of peace,
and whenever called upon for service shall not, without his
consent, be so called in a lower grade than that held by him
in said reserve corps. - - - - º
The President is authorized to appoint and commission
as reserve officers of the various arms, corps, and depart-
ments, in all grades up to and including that of major, such
citizens of the United States as may have completed one
year's satisfactory service in the cadet companies provided
for in this Act, and such other citizens as, upon examination
prescribed by the President, are found physically, mentally,
and morally qualified to hold such commissions: Provided,
That after three years from the passage of this Act original
tºº. as reserve officers of Cavalry, Field Artillery,
Joast Artillery, and Infantry shall, if the President
So direct, be made only from such citizens as shall
have satisfactorily completed one year's service in
cadet companies of the respective arms: Provided
further, That the proportion of officers in any arm corps, or
department of the officers' reserve corps shall not exceed
the proportion for the same grade in the same arm, corps, or
department of the Regular Army, except that the number
commissioned in the ſowest authorized grade in any arm,
corps, or department of the officers' reserve corps shall not
be limited. -
All persons now carried as duly qualified and regis-
tered pursuant to section twenty-three of the Act of Congress
approved January twenty-first, nineteen hundred and three,
shall, for a period of three years after the passage of this
Act, be eligible for appointment in the officers' reserve
corps in the arm, corps, or department for which they have
been found qualified, without further examination, except a
physical examination, subject to the limitations as to age
and rank herein prescribed. - -
No person shall be appointed or reappointed a second
lieutenant in the officers' reserve corps after he has reached
the age of thirty-two years, a first lieutenant after he has
reached the age of thirty-six years, a captain after he has
reached the age of forty years, or a major after he has
reached the age of forty-five years. When an officer of the
reserve corps reaches the age limit fixed for appointment
390 PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
or reappointment in the grade in which he is commissioned
he . be honorably discharged from the service of the
United States, and be entitled to retain his official title and,
On occasions of ceremony, to wear the uniform of the highest
grade he held in the officers' reserve corps: Provided, That
nothing in the foregoing provisions as to the ages of officers
shall apply to the appointment or reappointment of medical
officers of said reserve corps. -
To the extent j for from time to time by appro-
priations for this specific purpose, the Secretary of War is
authorized to order reserve officers to duty with troops or at
field exercise, for periods not to exceed two weeks in any
One calendar year, and while so serving such officers shall
receive the pay and allowances of their grade.
One year after the passage of this Act the Medical Re-
serve Corps, as now constituted by law, shall cease to exist.
Members thereof may be commissioned in the officers' re-
serve corps, subject to the provisions of this Act, or may be
honorably discharged from the service. In emergencies, the
Secretary of War may, in time of peace, order first lieuten-
ants of the officers' reserve corps of the Medical Depart-
ment, with their consent, to active duty in the service of the
United States in such numbers as the public interests may
require and the funds appropriated may permit, and may
relieve them from such duty when their services are no longer
necessary.
The President alone is authorized to appoint and com-
mission all officers of the officers' reserve corps, such com-
missions to be in force for a period of five years unless sooner
terminated in the discretion of the President. Such officers
may be recommissioned, either in the same or higher grades,
for successive periods of five years, subject to such examina-
tions and qualifications as the President may prescribe and
to the age limits prescribed herein: Provided, That officers of
the officers' reserve corps shall have rank therein in the
various arms, corps, and departments of said reserve corps
according to grades and to length of service in their grades.
SEC. 33. When a volunteer force is authorized, or the
Continental Army is called into active service, the Secretary
of War, may order officers of the reserve corps, subject to
such subsequent physical examinations as he may prescribe,
to temporary duty with the Regular Army in grades thereof
which can not, for the time being, be filled by promotion,
as officers in volunteer organizations, as offiecrs in the Con-
tinental Army, or as officers of recruit rendezvous and
depots, in such numbers as may be authorized by law.
ile such reserve officers are on such service they shall,
by virtue of their commissioners as reserve officers, exercise
command appropriate to their grade and rank in the organi-
zations to §. they are assigned, and be entitled to the
pay and allowances of the corresponding grades in the
Regular Army with increase of pay for length of active
service as now allowed by law for officers of the Regular
Army, from the date upon which they are required by the
PREPAREDINESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 391
terms of their order to obey the same: Provided, That
officers so ordered to active service shall take temporary
rank among themselves and in their grade in the organiza-
tions to which assigned according to the dates of orders
placing them on active service; and may be promoted, in
accordance with such rank, to vacancies in continental or
volunteer organizations or to temporary vacancies in the
Regular Army, thereafter occurring in the organizations
in which they are serving: . And provided further, That
officers of the reserve corps shall not be entitled to retire-
ment or retired pay, and shall be entitled to pension only
for disability incurred in the line of duty and ºft. in active
Se]^VICG.
Any officer of the reserve corps ordered to active
service by the Secretary of War while holding a reserve
commission shall, from the time he is required by the terms
of his order to obey the same, be subject to the laws and
regulations for the government of the Army of the United
States, in so far as they are applicable to officers whose
permanent retention in the military service is not
contemplated. -
SEC. 34. That section sixteen hundred and sixty-one
of the Revised Statutes, as amended by the Acts of Feb-
ruary twelfth, eighteen hundred and eighty-seven; June
sixth, nineteen hundred; and June twenty-second, nineteen
hundred and six, is hereby amended and reenacted so as to
read as follows:
“SEC. 1. The sum of two million five hundred thou-
sand dollars is hereby annually appropriated, to be paid
out of any money in the Treasury not otherwise appropria-
priated, for the purpose of providing arms, ordnance stores,
quartermaster stores, and camp equipage for issue to the
militia, such appropriation to remain available until
expended.
“SEC. 2. The appropriation provided in the preced-
ing paragraph shall be apportioned among the several States
and Territories under just and equitable procedure to be pre-
scribed by the Secretary of War and in direct ratio, so far
as not in conflict with such procedure, to the annual State
and Territorial appropriations existing at the date of ap-
portionment for the support of the Organized Militia of such
§. and Territories, respectively, and to the District of
Columbia, under such regulations as the President may pre-
scribe: Provided, however, That no State or Territory shall
be entitled to the benefits of the appropriation apportioned
to it unless the number of regularly enlisted, organized, and
uniformed active militia in such State shall be at least one hun-
dred men for each Senator and Representative that such State
is entitled to have in the Congress of the United States, and
in each Territory and the District of Columbia shall be at
least equal to the number fixed by the President for such
Territory and District. And the amount of said appro-
priation which is thus determined, not to be available shall
e covered back into the Treasury: Provided further, That
392 PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
the sum so apportioned among the several States, the Terri-
tory of Hawaii, and the District of Columbia, shall be avail-
able under such rules as may be prescribed by the Secretary
of War for the actual and necessary expenses incurred by
officers and enlisted men of the Regular Army when trav-
eling on duty in connection with the Organized Militia; for
the transportation of supplies furnished to the militia for
the permanent equipment thereof; for office rent and nec–
essary offices expenses of officers on duty with the Organ-
ized Militia; for expenses of sergeant-instructors on duty
with the Organized Militia, including quarters, fuel,
light, medicines and medical attendance; and such ex-
penses shall constitute a charge against the whole
Sum annually appropriated under section sixteen hun-
dred and sixty-one, Revised Statutes, as amended, and
shall be paid therefrom and not from the allotment duly
apportioned to any particular State, Territory, or the Dis-
trict of Columbia; for the promotion of rifle practice, includ-
ing the acquisition, construction, maintenance, and equip-
ment of shooting galleries and suitable target ranges; for the
hiring of horses and draft animals for the use of mounted
troops, batteries, and wagons; for forage for the same; and
for such other incidental expenses in connection with en-
campments, maneuvers, and field instruction provided for in
Sections, fourteen and fifteen of the said Act of January.
twenty-first, nineteen hundred and three, as the Secretary of
War may deem necessary: Provided further, That the gov-
ernor of each State and Territory and the commanding gen-
eral of the Organized Militia of the District of Columbia,
shall appoint, designate, or detail, subject to the ap-
proval of the Secretary of War, an officer of the
Organized Militia of the State, Territory, or District, who
shall be regarded as property and disbursing officer of
the United States. He shall receipt and annually
account for all property belonging to the United States
in º of the Organized Militia of his State, Territory,
or District, and shall make such returns and reports concern-
ing the same as may be required by the Secretary of War.
The Secretary of War is authorized, on the requisition of a
governor of a State or Territory or the commanding general
of the Organized Militia of the District of Columbia, to pay
to the property and disbursing officer thereof as much of its
allotment out of the annual appropriation under section
sixteen hundred and sixty-one of the Revised Statutes, as
amended, as shall be necessary for the purposes enumerated
therein. He shall render his accounts through the War De-
partment to the proper accounting officers of the Treasury for
settlement. Before entering upon the performance of his
duties as property and disbursing officer, he shall be required
to give good and sufficient bond to the United States, in
such sums as the Secretary of War may direct, for the faith-
ful performance of his duties and for the safe-keeping and
proper disposition of the Federal property and funds
intrusted to his care. He shall, after having qualified
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 393
as property and disbursing officer, receive pay for his serv-
ices, and such compensation shall be a charge against the
whole sum annually appropriated under section sixteen hun-
dred and sixty-one, Revised Statutes, as amended, and shall
not be paid from the allotment duly apportioned to the State,
Territory, or District of Columbia. When traveling in the
performance of his official duties under orders issued by the
proper authorities he shall be reimbursed for his actual neces-
sary traveling expenses, the sum to be made a charge against
the allotment to the State, Territory or District of Columbia,
under section sixteen hundred and sixty-one, Revised Stat-
utes, as amended. The Secretary of War shall cause an in-
spection of the accounts and records of the property and dis-
bursing officer to be made by an officer of the Army at least
once each year. The Secretary of War is empowered to make
all rules and regulations necessary to carry into effect the pro-
visions of this section: Provided further, That whenever any
#. issued to the Organized Militia of any State or
Territory or the District of Columbia as hereinbefore pro-
vided has been lost, damaged, or destroyed, or has become
unserviceable or unsuitable by use in service or from any
other cause, it shall be examined by a disinterested Surveying
officer of the Regular Army detailed by the Secretary of War,
or of the Organized Militia to be appointed by the governor
of the State or Territory or by the commanding general of
the Organized Militia of the District of Columbia, and the
report of such surveying officer shall be forwarded to the
Secretary of War, and if it shall appear to the Secretary of
War from the records of survey that the property has been
lost, damaged, or destroyed through unavoidable causes, he is
hereby authorized to relieve the State, or Territory, or the
District of Columbia from further accountability therefor; if it
shall appear that the loss, damage, or destruction of prop-
erty was due to carelessness or neglect, or that its loss,
damage, or destruction could have been avoided by
the exercise of reasonable care, the money value thereof shall be
charged to the State or Territory or the District of Columbia,
to be paid for from State funds, or any funds other than
Federal: Provided further, That if the articles so surveyed
are found to be unserviceable or unsuitable, from either
avoidable or unavoidable causes, the Secretary of War shall
direct what disposition, by sale or otherwise, shall be made
of such articles, except unserviceable clothing, which shall
be destroyed; and if sold, the proceeds of such sale, as well
as stoppages against officers and enlisted men, and the net
roceeds of collections made from any person or from any
State, Territory, or the District of Columbia, to reimburse
the Government for the loss, damage, or destruction of any
property, shall be deposited in the Treasury of the United
States as a credit to the State, Territory, or the District of
Columbia accountable for said property, and as a part of and
in addition to that portion of the allotment of such State,
Territory, or the District of Columbia, set aside for the pur-
chase of similar supplies, stores, or material of war.”
394 PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
SEC. 35. That certain commissioned officers on the
active list belonging to organizations of the Organized Militia
of each State, Territory; and the District of Columbia partici-
pating in the apportionment of the annual appropriation
provided by section sixteen hundred and sixty-one, Revised
Statutes, as amended, shall receive compensation for their
services, except during periods of service for which they
may become lawfully entitled to the same pay as officers of
corresponding grades of the Regular Army, at the rate
of certain percentages of the pay of officers of like grade
in the Regular Army, not including longevity pay, as now
provided by law, namely: Not to exceed five per centum to
all colonels, lieutenant colonels, majors, chaplains, aide de .
camp, and officers of staff corps and staff departments; not
to exceed fifteen per centum to commanding officers of com-
panies, troops, batteries, and ambulance companies, and to
adjutants and quartermasters of regiments, independent
battalions or squadrons, or Coast Artillery districts; not to
exceed ten per centum to all other officers belonging to
regiments, smaller tactical units, or Coast Artillery districts,
including medical officers not above the rank of captain,
detailed or assigned to and doing duty with regiments or
smaller tactical units of Coast Artillery districts, medical
officers serving with field hospitals, and veterinarians.
Regulations to be prescribed by the Secretary of War shall
determine the amount and character of service that must be
rendered by officers to entitle them to the whole or specific
parts of the maximum pay hereinafter authorized.
That each enlisted man on the active list belonging to
organizations of the Organized Militia of each State, Terri-
tory, and the District of Columbia, participating in the ap-
portionment of the annual appropriation provided by section
sixteen hundred and sixty-one, Revised Statutes, as amended,
shall receive compensation for his services, except during
periods of service for which he may become lawfully
entitled to the same pay as an enlisted man of corre-
sponding grade in the Regular Army, at a rate equal to
twenty-five per centum of the initial pay now provided by
law for enlisted men of corresponding grades of the Regular
Army: Provided, That such enlisted man shall receive the
compensation herein provided if he shall have attended
not less than forty-five regular drills during any one
ear, and a proportionate amount for attendance upon a
esser number of such drills, not less than twenty; and
no such enlisted man shall receive any part of said com-
pensation except as authorized by this proviso and the
three provisos next following: Provided further, That
the compensation provided herein shall be computed for
semiannual periods, beginning the first day of January and
the first day of July of each year, in proportion to the num-
ber of drills attended; and no compensation shall be paid
to any enlisted man for the first semiannual period of any
PREPAREDINESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 395
ear unless he shall have attended during said period at
east twenty drills, but any lesser number of drills attended
during said period shall be reckoned with the drills attended
during the second semiannual period in computing the som-
pensation, if any, due him for that year: And provided
further, That when any man enters into an enlistment other
than an immediate reenlistment he shall be entitled to pro-
portional compensation for that year if during the remainder
of the year he shall attend a number of drills whose ratio
to twenty is not less than the ratio of the part of the year
so served to the whole year; and when any man's enlistment
shall expire the compensation, if any, to which he may be
entitled shall be determined in like manner: And provided
further, That periods of any actual military duty equivalent
to the drills herein prescribed (except those periods of
service for which members of the Organized Militia may
become lawfully entitled to the same pay as officers and
enlisted men of the corresponding grades in the Regular
Army) may be accepted as service in lieu of such drills
when so provided by the Secretary of War.
That all amounts appropriated for the purpose of this
Act shall be disbursed and accounted for by the officers and
agents of the Quartermasters Corps of the Army, and all dis-
bursements under the foregoing provisions of this section
shall be made as soon as practicable after the thirty-first day
of December and the thirtieth day of June of each year upon
pay rolls prepared and authenticated in the manner to be pre-
scribed by the Secretary of War: Provided, That stoppages
may be made against the compensation payable to any officer
or enlisted man hereunder to cover the cost of public property
lost or destroyed by and chargeable to such officer or enlisted
DOla, Il. .
That no money appropriated under the provisions of this Act
shall be paid to any person not on the active list, nor to any
person over sixty-four years of age, nor to any person who
fails to qualify as to fitness for military service, under such
regulations as the Secretary of War, after conference with
the National Militia Board, shall prescribe.
That when Congress shall have authorized the use of
the armed land forces of the United States in the emergency
of actual or imminent war, requiring the use of troops in
excess of those of the Regular Army, the President may,
under such regulations as he shall prescribe, draft into the
military service of the United States, to serve therein for one
ear unless sooner discharged, any members of the Organized
Yi. All persons so drafted shall, from the date of their
draft, stand discharged from the Organized Militia, shall from
said date be subject to such laws and regulations for the gov-
ernment of the Army of the United States as are applicable
to members of the Volunteer Army, and shall be embodied
in organizations tºº as far as practicable to those
of the Regular Army or shall be otherwise assigned as the
396, PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
President may direct. The commissioned officers of said
organizations shall be appointed from among the members
thereof, officers with rank not above that of colonel to be
appointed by the President alone and all other officers to be
appointed by the President by and with the advice and con-
sent of the Senate. Officers and enlisted men in the service
of the United States under the terms of this section shall have
the same pay and allowances as officers and enlisted men of
the Regular Army of the same grades and the same prio
Service. . & -
SEC. 36. That in time of war or public danger, when
two or more officers of the same grade are on duty in the
same field, department, or command, or of Organizations
thereof, the President may assign the command of the
forces of such field, department, or command, or of any
organization thereof, without regard to seniority of rank
in the same grade: Provided, That in the absence of such
assignment by the President, officers of the same
grade shall rank and have precedence in the following
order, without regard to dates of rank of commissions, as
between officers of different classes, namely: First, officers
of the Regular Army and officers of the Marine Corps
detached for service with the Army by order of the Presi-
dent; second, officers of the Organized Militia called into the
service of the United States; third, all other officers in the
military service of the United States, who shall take rank
among themselves in their respective grades according to the
dates of their entry into the service of the United States in
those grades: Provided further, That officers of the Regular
Army holding commissions in the Organized Militia in the
service of the United States, in the Continental Army, or in the
Volunteer forces, shall have rank and take precedence under
said commissions as if they were commissions in the Regular
Army; but the rank of officers of the Regular Army under
their commissions in the Organized Militia shall not, for the
purpose of this section, be held to antedate their formal entry
into the service of the United States under said commissions.
That all expenses necessary to the enforcement of this
Act, including the actual and necessary expense of travel
of the officers of the Army when traveling on duty pursuant
to orders issued by the governors of the several States and
Territories or the commanding general of the Organized
Militia of the District of Columbia, shall be payable out of
. appropriation made to carry out the provisions of this
Ct. , -
That the Secretary of War shall cause to be annually
estimated the amount necessary for carrying out the provi-
'sions of this section, and no money shall be expended
hereunder except as shall from time to time be appropriated.
SEC. 37. That all Acts and parts of Acts in conflict
with this Act are hereby repealed to the extent of such
conflict. . -
IPREPAIREDINESS FOR, NATIONAL DEFENSE. 397
The CHAIRMAN. That is the revised draft of his original bill?
Gen MACOMB. That is Mr. Hay's revised draft which was handed
to me by Senator Hitchcock, and we can comment on it perfectly
well.
Senator BECKHAM. In his revision did he adopt the suggestions
that the War College had recommended ? . .
Gen. MACOMB. He adopted certain revisions and corrections, but
I do not know who recommended them, and that will be apparent by
comparing our statement, which I have already laid before you in
tabular form, of the three bills. If the committee wishes to study
these bills I would advise them at their leisure to take that comparative
draft and use it. In their individual studies of these bills it will hel
them a great deal. The best way to proceed with the Hay bill is t
give some general comments upon it which I will read so that we can
incorporate them in the hearings. -
The main features of this bill are that it increases the Cavalry, Infantry, Coast
Artillery, and Field Artillery orhanizations to war strength; adds 6 regiments of Field
Artillery, 1 Engineer battalion, 11 Signal Corps battalions, 7 aero Squadrons, and 52
companies of Coast Artillery to the strength of the Army. It fails to provide any
officers for the Engineer, Signal Corps, or Coast Artillery organizations added to the
Army. It adds 786 officers to the 200 detached officers now authorized by law, and
attempts to equalize promotion by prescribing how these officers shall be divided
between the different arms of the service. -
It provides for a continental army of 400,000 men to be raised in three annual con-
tingents and thereafter maintained by annual contingents. •
It provides for 30 cadet companies for the purpose of training reserve officers, at the
rate of 3,000 per year.
It amends section 1661 of the Revised Statutes So as to provide pay for officers and
enlisted men of the Organized Militia except during periods for which under existing
law they become entitled to the Sme pay as officers and enlisted men of the Regular
Army.
Senator BROUSSARD. May I inquire if that is a recital of the pro-
visions of the Hay bill? º -
Gen. MACQMB. Of the tentative draft of the Hay bill which was
given to us for study. Here is another draft which contains certain
revisions, but is practically the same.
Senator BROUSSARD. There is no change, so far as that print is
concerned, in the new draft of the Hay bill from the original draft'.
Gen. MACOMB. There may be a few, but I have not had time to
compare them. © - - te
Senator BROUSSARD. Minor changes. tº
Gen. MACOMB. We need not take time to state just what they all
are, because it requires a very careful study of the bill to show where
the little corrections are required. This has been done in the com-
parative statement and in making that the revised draft was used.
. Senator DU PoNT. How do you propose to provide for those addi-
tional officers in the War College bill? Is provision made there for
them : -
Gen. MACOMB. Oh, yes; that is complete.
Senator DU Pont. Where did you propose to get them from ?
Gen. MACOMB. The War College draft of the bill provided for the
increase proposed in five annual increments, and the officers are pro-
yided in these increments according to the same system we use now.
It is merely using the same system, enlarging the system. We can
23380—PT. 6—16—11 *
398 PR.EPAREDIN ESS FOR, NATIONAL DEFENSE.
provide the officers for the Regular Army by utilizing West Point,
and, of course, to a certain extent we could get them by utilizing
the civilian examinations we now have for officers, and by utilizing
the enlisted personnel for giving us the additional Ones.
Senator DU PONT. Do you provide for transfer to the Engineer
Corps of Artillery officers who could pass the necessary examinations?
en. MACOMB. No, sir; we have not provided for them, so far as
I know, but there are not any applications of that kind; at least, I
have not heard of any. My understanding is that such transfers can
be made in the future as in the past.
The CHAIRMAN. So that your comparative statement will show
clearly the purposes of each of these bills?
* Gen. MACOMB. I think it shows them very clearly.
The CHAIRMAN. Is there any preference amongst the experts in the
Army as to these several bills? -
Gen. MACOMB. Yes, sir; there is. I think the Army desires to
see the cry for preparedness answered as far as may be, and for that
purpose the ; which we now call the Chamberlain bill is more
complete than any other as far as the Regular Army goes, and its
reserve and the training of officers for the reserve, provided you put
that feature into it. $.
The CHAIRMAN. You have put those in the draft which you have
submitted'.
Gen. MACOMB. I have given you a draft to add that latter feature.
The CHAIRMAN. That draft submits your views, not the views of
the War College? “, -
Gen. MACOMB. No, sir; it submits the views of the War College
Division because that came up here from the War College through
the Secretary of War's office.
The CHAIRMAN. What is the difference in the enlisted strength
provided by each of these bills?
Gen. MACOMB. That would have to be figured out very carefully
from the fact that we provide organizations which are somewhat dif-
ferent from the old organizations, and that is just what I want to
do. It would be well to take time to have that done accurately and
submit the figures later.
The CHAIRMAN. Was there anything else you had in mind that you
would like to submit to the committee, General, in reference to this
whole subject 3 -
Gen. MACOMB. I would like to speak about one other bill now that
bears upon all of them, and that is a bill marked “S. 1695.”
(The bill is as follows.)
PREP.A.R.E.D.NESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. & 399
64TE gºs)
1ST SESSION. (9 1 695 Q
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES.
DECEMBER 13, 1915. -
Mr. CHAMBERLAIN introduced the following bill; which was read twice and
referred to the Committee on Military Affairs.
• * : * ~ * * 5R ºr -º-º:
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To provide for the military and naval training of the citizen
forces of the United States.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-
tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
That all able-bodied male inhabitants of the United States
who have resided within the continental limits thereof for the
period of twelve months who are citizens of the United
States or who have declared their intentions to become citi-
zens of the United States shall be liable to be trained be-
tween the ages of twelve and twenty-three years, inclusive,
as prescribed: Provided, That the iº. persons shall
be exempt from the training prescribed in this Act so long
as the condition or status on which exemption is based
continues: (a) Those who may be º by the pre-
scribed medical authorities as being physically unfit for any
naval or military service whatever; (b) members of the
permanent military or naval forces of the United States;
(c) school-teachers who have duly qualified and are em-
ployed at a school of military or naval instruction or other
prescribed course, as instructors or officers of the Citizen
Cadet Corps; (d) persons employed in the police or prison
service of the United States, or of the several States, and of
the several cities thereof; (e) those morally unfit; (f)
members of any well-recognized religious sect or organiza-
tion, at present organized and existing, whose Creed forbids
its members to participate in war in any form—whose
religious convictions are against war or participation therein,
in accordance with the creed of said religious organization
(the exemption of this class, however, to include only such
portion of the prescribed training as requires the bearing

400 IPREPAREDINESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSIE.
or use of arms); (h) mariners actually employed in the
sea service of the United States, or of any of the States, or of
any citizen or merchant within the United States; (i)
those excused by the President in the interests of the public
service by reason of employment therein; (j) temporary
exemption for periods not exceeding one year, and renewable
from time to time, will be granted to persons whose com-
pulsory attendance at the prescribed training would impose
great hardships, either by reason of excessive distance or
other cause: Provided, That the district commandant of
each training district shall have the power to issue perma-
nent and temporary certificates of exemption for the above-
mentioned causes: Provided further, That in cases where a
permanent or temporary certificate of exemption is denied by
the district commandant, an appeal may be taken to the
United States district court or judge thereof nearest the
permanent office of the district commandant: Provided
further, That in all cases where an exemption is applied for
the burden of proof of the existence of cause for exemption
shall be on the applicant, and in all cases of appeal from a
denial of such permanent or temporary exemption the burden
of proving the exemption shall rest on the person claiming
the same. -
SEC. 2. That all persons trained under the provisions
of this Act shall be known and designated as follows:
(a) Between the ages of twelve and seventeen years, in-
clusive, as the Citizen Cadet Corps; (b) between the ages
of eighteen and twenty-three years, inclusive, as the Citi-
Zen Army. t
, SEC. 3. That the training of the members of the Citizen
Cadet Corps shall be divided into three periods, as follows:
(a) The first period shall commence on the first day of
July in the year in which the persons, liable reach the age
of twelve years and shall continue for two years. This
training shall consist of not less than ninety hours in
each year, terminating on the thirtieth day of June, and shall
be devoted during this period to calisthenics and such other
physical and military instruction, without arms, as may be
prescribed: Provided, That in the case of persons who
reach the age of thirteen years in the year in which this
Act becomes effective, the training for this class of persons
shall commence on the first day of July of that year and
continue for One year; (b) the training in the second
period shall begin on the first day of July in which the
persons liable reach the age of fourteen years, and shall
continue for two years. . The training during this period
shall be not less than ninety hours in each year, ending
the thirtieth day of June, and shall include military training
with the rifle, including gallery practice: Provided, That for
persons who reach the age of fifteen in the year in which
this Act becomes effective the training shall begin on the
PREPAIRED NESS FOR, NATIONAL DEFENSE. & 401
first day of July of that year and continue for one year;
(c) the training in the third period shall begin on the
first day of juſy in the year in which the persons liable
reach the age of sixteen years, and shall continue for two
years. The training during this period shall be not less
than ninety hours, and in addition thereto ten whole days
in camp in each year, ending the thirtieth day of June. The
training during this period shall include field ‘exercises and
target practice, in addition to other training that may be
prescribed: Provided, That in the case of persons who
reach the age of seventeen years in the year in which
this Act becomes effective the training shall begin on
the first day of July in that year and continue for one
year. -
SEC. 4. That the training for members of the Citizen
Army shall be not less than one hundred and twenty hours,
or twenty whole days, in each year, commencing on the first
day of July and ending on the following thirtieth day of
June, and shall continue for six years, and not less than
ten whole days in each year shall be in camp of con-
tinuous training.
SEC. 5. That the training hereinabove provided for the
third period of the Citizen Cadet Corps and for the Citizen
Army may be given in daily periods or it may be given in
whole-day drills of not less than six hours, in half-day
drills of not less than three hours, or in night drills of
not less than one hour and a half: Provided, That this
shall affect in no manner the prescribed days of con-
secutive training in camps of continuous training.
SEC. 6. That the members of the Citizen Army shall
be allotted to the various arms, corps, and departments
in such numbers as may be necessary for tactical Organ-
ization. *
SEC. 7. That those liable to military training who,
on arrival at eighteen years of age, elect to enter the Citizen
Navy shall undergo training for not less than the number
of hours prescribed for training of members of the Citizen
Army, and that this training shall include instruction aboard
ship for a period not less than that prescribed for training
of members of the Citizen Army in camps of continuous
instruction. -
SEC. 8. That the training prescribed by this act for
the Citizen Cadet Corps and for the Citizen Army and Citi-
Zen Navy may be given in public and private schools, acade-
mies, colleges, and universities, in the Organized Militia or
Naval Militia of the several States, in organization of Boy
Scouts or similar organizations, provided that it conforms
to the prescribed training for the corresponding years, is
Of * annual duration, and is so certified by the district
commandant of the district in which such instruction is
imparted.
402 - PREPAIR.E.D.NESS FOR, NATIONAL DEFENSE.
SEC. 9. That all persons liable to training for the Citizen
Army under this Act shall, upon reaching the age of twenty-
four years and having satisfactorily completed the prescribed
training, become members of the Citizen Army Reserve
without further training: Provided, That all persons liable
to this training who have reached the age of twenty-one
years in or before the year in which this act becomes effect-
ive shall, without training, become members of the Citizen
Army Reserve, unless they elect to undergo such training:
Provided further, That at the termination of each annual
training period in the Citizen Cadet Corps and in the Citizen
Army or Navy each member shall be classified by the officers
charged with that duty as efficient or nonefficient. Those
classified as nonefficient either by reason of failure to attend
during the prescribed period or because they have not at-
tained a sufficient standard of efficiency shall be required to
attend an equivalent additional period of training for each
year in which they are rated as nonefficient.
SEC. 10. That every person who, without lawful ex-
cuse, fails to register or who evades or fails to render the
personal service required by this Act shall, unless and until
he has performed equivalent personal service as prescribed,
be and remain ineligible for employment in any position of
trust and profit created and authorized by the Congress of
the United States. .
SEC. 11. That every person who in any year, without
lawful excuse, fails to register or who evades or fails to
render the personal service required by this Act shall be
deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and shall, in addition to the
liability under section nine of this act, be liable to a fine of
not to exceed five hundred dollars or to be confined for
twenty days or both: Provided, That in fixing the amount
of the fine due regard shall be had to the means of the per-
son offending and those of his parents: Provided further,
That any person committed to the custody of a prescribed
authority in pursuance of this section may be detained by
that authority at any prescribed institution or place, and
while so detained shall be subject to the regulations govern-
ing that institution or place and to training and discipline as
prescribed. - g -
SEC. 12. That no employer shall prevent, or attempt to
prevent, any employee who is serving or liable to serve in
the Citizen Cadet Corps, or in the Citizen Army or Navy,
from registering or rendering the personal service required
of him, or from attending any camp of instruction appointed
to be held by proper authority, and no employer shall in
any way penalize or prejudice in his employment, or attempt
to penalize or prejudice in his employment, any employee
for rendering, or being liable to render, such personal serv-
ice, or for attending such camp either by reducing his wages
or dismissing him from employment, or in any other man-
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 403
ner: Provided, That this section shall not be construed to
require an employer to pay an employee for any time when
he is absent from employment for the purpose of training.
SEC, 13. That any person or corporation found guilty
of violating any of the provisions of section twelve .# this
Act shall be punished by a fine of not less than $50 nor
more than $500: Provided, That in any proceedings for
any violation of section twelve of this Act the burden of
proof shall be upon the employer to show that any employee
proved to have been dismissed or to have been penalized
or prejudiced in his employment or to have suffered a reduc-
tion of wages was so ... penalized, or prejudiced in
his employment or reduced for some reason other than hav-
ing rendered or being liable to render the personal service
required of him or attending the camp of instruction.
EC. 14. That every person liable to training in the
Citizen Cadet Corps or the Citizen Army or Navy who (a)
fails without lawful excuse to attend a compulsory drill or in-
struction or (b) commits a breach of discipline while attend-
ing the same shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and shall be
liable to a penalty not exceeding $25: Provided, That any
penalty under this section may be recovered summarily on
the information or complaint of a prescribed officer: Pro-
vided further, That in fixing the amount of the penalty
the court shall have due regard to the means of the person
offending and those of his parents: And provided further,
That in addition to any penalty imposed or (where in the
opinion of the court or the judge the imposition of a penalty
would involve undue hardship) in lieu of imposing any
penalty the court or judge may, if he deems it proper,
commit the offender to the custody of any prescribed
authority for such time, not exceeding twenty days, or for
a time corresponding in duration to the time which, in the
opinion of the court or judge, would be taken up in ren-
dering the personal service required: And provided further,
That it shall not be necessary for this confinement to be
continuous, but the person having the custody of the offender
may, subject to prescribed regulations, release him for such
periods and call upon him to return to custody at such times
as he sees fit, in order that the offender may follow his
occupation: And provided further, That any person de-
tained in any prescribed institution or place in pursuance
of this section who escapes therefrom, or who being released
from custody fails to return thereto, may be arrested with-
out warrant by any prescribed person and taken back to
the institution or place, and may, on the application of any
rescribed officer, be ordered by any court of summary
jurisdiction to be detained for such additional period, not
exceeding twenty days, as the court deems fit to order:
Provided, That the averment of the prosecutor of any
offender of the Citizen Cadet Corps that he is duly au-
404 PREPAIRED NESS FOR, NATIONAL DEFENSE.
thorized by the constituted authority to bring the prosecu-
tion shall be sufficient and shall not be controverted by the
court or by the defendant. -
SEC. 15. That a person liable to be trained for the
Citizen Cadet Corps shall not be committed to jail in default
of a pecuniary penalty imposed in this Act or of any costs
awarded in the proceedings for any such offense, but, in
lieu thereof, a court may order that “he be committed to
the custody of a prescribed authority for such time, not
exceeding the time for which the court could but for this
section have committed him to jail in default of payment
of the pecuniary penalty imposed or costs ºld. as the
court deems fit: Provided, That the total duration of con-
finement of a person in respect of offenses committed in
any One }. or of costs awarded in proceedings for such
offenses shall not exceed sixty days: Provided further, That
in places where children's courts exist offenses against this
Act committed by citizen members of the Citizen Cadet
sº of the first and second periods shall be prosecuted in
such courts as far as may be practicable.
SEg. 16. That no person shall be permitted to serve in
the Citizen Cadet Corps or in the Citizen Army or Navy
who is found by any court duly appointed for that purpose
to have been convicted of any disgraceful or infamous crime
or to be of notoriously bad character: Provided, That any
member of the Citizen Cadet Corps or of the Citizen Army
or Navy who shall have been convicted of any disgraceful
or infamous crime shall be dishonorably discharged from
the service therein and shall not be eligible thereafter to
hold any position of trust or profit created or authorized by
the Congress of the United States.
SEC. 17. That each congressional district and the
District of Columbia shall constitute a registration and train-
ing district, and in each such district units of the Citizen
Cadet Corps and of the Citizen Army shall be organized and
trained, and for the purpose of registration, Organization, and
training each of said districts shall be under the charge of an
officer of the Regular Army, designated for the purpose, who
shall have an office permanently located in the district and
who shall be assisted by the necessary commissioned and
enlisted personnel and by such other assistants as are duly
authorized herein as instructors for imparting the prescribed
training. -
SEC. 18. That every male citizen, and those whose par-
ents have declared their intention to become citizens, of each
training district shall, upon arriving at the age of twelve
years, be registered in the office of the district commandant
of the district in which he resides. Such registration shall
be made in the form and in the manner prescribed by the
Secretary of War. Changes of address, removals from a dis-
trict, and entrances into another district shall, within thirty
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 405
days after such change, be recorded in the office of the dis-
trict commandant of the districts concerned in the form and
manner prescribed by the Secretary of War. The first regis-
tration under this Act shall begin on the first day of January
following the passage of the Act, and thereafter all males
arriving at the age of twelve years during the year preceding
the first day of January shall be registered during the months
of January and February.
SEC. 19. That there shall be established in or contigu-
ous to each training district one or more training centers,
under such regulations as the Secretary of War may pre-
scribe. And there shall be established such training centers
for naval training as the Secretary of the Navy may
prescribe.
SEC. 20. That all persons liable to training in the Citi-
Zen Army or Navy shall, before entering upon such training,
be examined for physical fitness, and shall take the oath of
allegiance to the United States as prescribed for enlisted men
of the Regular Army and Navy.
SEC. 21. That the President is authorized to mobilize
the Citizen Army and Navy in time of war or threatened
war, insurrection, or rebellion, or when the public safety
demands it.
SEC. 22. That officers and noncommissioned officers in
the Citizen Cadet Corps shall be appointed by the district
commandants, under such regulations as the Secretary of
War Imay prescribe. They shall not bear commissions or
Warrants. *
SEC. 23. That the President shall appoint and commis-
sion officers in the Citizen Army, in the Citizen Navy, and
in their reserves as hereinafter provided:
Beginning from the first day of January after the pas-
Sage of this Act all appointments and commissions of officers
in the Citizen Army and Navy shall be provisional, and
shall continue in force, unless vacated by promotion or other-
wise terminated by law, for a period of three years.
- For One year, beginning with the first day of January
after the passage of this Act, provisional appointments and
commissions shall be to the grades of captain, first lieutenant,
and second lieutenant in the organizations herein authorized.
Two years from the first day of January after the pas-
Sage of this Act provisional appointments and commissions
shall be to the grades of major, captain, first lieutenant, and
Second lieutenant in the organization herein authorized.
Three years from the first day of January after the
passage of this Act provisional appointments shall be to the
grades of colonel, lieutenant ... major, captain, first
lieutenant, and second lieutenant in the organizations herein
authorized; and thereafter shall be to all the grades enumer-
ated in this section: Provided, That in time of war or immi–
nent danger appointments and commissions to all grades
406 PREPARED NIESS FOR, NATIONAL DEFENSE.
may be made as authorized by law for the armies of the
United States.
Four years from the first day of January after the
passage of this Act the President is authorized to make
original permanent appointments and commission officers
to vacancies in organizations of the Citizen Army and Navy
and in their reserves then existing, under such regulations
as he may prescribe as to physical and mental requirements,
grade for grade, from the officers then holding provisional
appointments in these forces: Provided, That in case of
failure of any officer to meet the prescribed requirements
he shall, (a) upon the recommendation of the examinin
board, pass immediately to the reserve with the rank ;
by him at the time of the examination; (b) upon the recom-
mendation of the board, be honorably discharged from the
service: Provided, That for cause the President may revoke
the appointment of any commissioned officer of the Citizen
Army or Navy and of their reserves.
Original provisional appointments to the grades enumer-
ated in this section shall, under such regulations as the Presi-
dent may prescribe as to age, mental and physical require-
ments, and previous military service, be from (a) those who
have had previous service as officers of the Regular Army
or Navy; (b) graduates of institutions having satisfactory
military or naval training; (c) those who have had service
as officers in the Organized Militia or Naval Militia of the
United States; (d) enlisted men of the Regular Army or
Navy and those who have served therein; (e) those who
8. satisfactorily completed training in the Citizen Cadet
OTOS. *
Hºmotion of officers holding provisional appointments
º be under such regulations as the President may pre-
SCTIOG. -
SEC. 24. That all vacancies existing in the organizations
of the Citizen Army and Navy and their reserves four years
from the first day of January after the passage of this Act,
not filled as hereinbefore prescribed, all vacancies occurring
thereafter, and all vacancies caused by the organization of
new units, except in the grade of second lieutenant, shall be
filled from officers of the next lower grade of the arm of
the service in the district in which the vacancies occur, under
such regulations as to examination as the President may
prescribe: Provided, That seniority to be given to an officer
on promotion shall be determined by his order of merit in
the examination for promotion to that rank.
SEC. 25. That the President is authorized, under such
regulations as he may prescribe, to appoint and commission
officers to the grade of second lieutenant of the Citizen Army
and Navy from— -
(a) Graduates of institutions having military or naval
training.
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 407
(b) Those who have had commissioned or enlisted
service in the Regular Army or Navy and suitable enlisted
men serving therein. -
(c) Those who have had commissioned or enlisted
service in the Militia or Naval Militia and those who are
serving therein.
(d) Those who have completed the Citizen Cadet
Corps training and the first year of training in the Citizen
Army or Navy. -
(e) Those who have served in military organizations
not mentioned herein who demonstrate their fitness for such
commissions. -
SEC. 26. That the President is hereby authorized to
call into the service of the United States such members of the
Medical Reserve Corps, and for such periods of time, as
may be necessary to exercise proper sanitary supervision
of training centers and training camps, and to make the
necessary physical examinations of persons liable to be
trained in the Citizen Cadet Corps, in the Citizen Army and
Navy, and in their reserves. -
SEC. 27. That nothing contained in this act shall pre-
vent any member of the Citizen Army or Navy from enlist-
ing or accepting a commission in the Regular Army or
Navy, or in the Militia or Volunteer forces when called into
the service of the United States.
SEC. 28. That under such regulations as the Secretary
of War may prescribe, noncommissioned officers in the
Citizen Army and its reserves shall be appointed: (a) By
district commandants for companies, troops, batteries, and
detachments of the Several staff corps under their command
which are not a part of any permanently organized battalion,
Squadron, or regiment; (b) by battalion and squadron
commanders for companies, troops, or batteries which are
not a part of any permanently organized regiment; (c) by
regimental or cº commanders.
SEC. 29. That under such regulations as the Secretary
of the Navy shall prescribe, warrant officers and petty
officers of the Citizen Navy and its reserves shall be ap-
pointed by the commanding officers of vessels on which such
members of the Citizen Navy may be serving, or by the
commandant of navy yards or naval reservations to which
such members of the Citizen Navy may be assigned.
SEC. 30. That persons trained in the Citizen Cadet
Corps or the Citizen Army and the reserves thereof may,
when called into the service of the United States by the
President, be assigned to active service with the Marine
Corps of the Navy when the public interests demand such
assignment.
SEC. 31. That persons undergoing training as members
of the Citizen Cadet Corps, of the ăţ. Army and Navy,
shall not be entitled to pay. While undergoing training in
408 PREPAIRED NIESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
camps of instruction and on board of training ships as herein
provided they shall be entitled to the actual cost of trans-
portation going to or returning from said camps and training
ships, and to their subsistence and necessary medical attend-
ance while actually serving therein.
SEC. 32. That members of the Citizen Cadet Corps
undergoing training in the first period shall not be provided
with nor wear a uniform. Members of the Citizen Cadet
Corps undergoing training in the second and third periods
shall be entitled to wear the prescribed uniforms, and those
of the third period shall be provided by the United States
with the absolutely necessary uniforms for use during the
periods of actual training in camps of instruction. Members
undergoing training in the Citizen Army and Navy shall
be entitled to and be provided with the necessary service
uniform, the type of which shall be that of the Regular Army
or Navy, and the amounts shall be prescribed by the Secre-
tary of War or Navy, with such distinctive insignia as may
be prescribed. The uniforms so provided and issued by the
Government shall be worn only while present at established
camps of instruction, maneuvers, or aboard ship: Provided,
That nothing herein stated shall be construed to prohibit
the use at any time of uniforms purchased by those entitled
to wear them or the wearing of uniforms prescribed by uni-
Versities, colleges, academies, and schools, or military or
naval organizations.
SEC. 33. That any person , who, not being a member
of the Citizen Cadet Corps, of the Citizen Army or Navy,
and their reserves, wears any uniform or any tº:
imitation thereof, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor
and shall be punished by a fine not exceeding $50: Provided,
That this section shall not prevent any person from wearing
Such uniform in any staged play, musical performance, or a
bona fide military and ..f representation. -
SEC. 34. That no intoxicating or spirituous liquors shall
be sold or supplied, and no person jail have any such intoxi-
cating or spirituous liquors in his possession, at any military
or naval station, camp, fort, post, or aboard ship during
such time as the training of persons as prescribed in this act
is proceeding in such military or naval camp, fort, post, or
aboard ship, except as prescribed for purely medical purposes.
SEC. 35. That no intoxicating or spirituous liquors shall
be sold to any member of the Citizen Cadet Corps while in
uniform, nor shall, any intoxicating or spirituous liquors,
except as prescribed by a duly qualified medical practitioner,
be supplied to any such cadet while in uniform. Any person
violating this or the preceding section shall, on conviction
thereof, be subject to a fine of $100.
SEC 36. That the arms, ammunition, equipment, and
other military and naval supplies necessary for the training
provided for by this Act shall be issued in such quantities as
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 409
may be prescribed by the Secretary of War or the Secretary
of the Navy, respectively, and as Congress may duly author-
ize by appropriations therefor. * -
SEC. 37. That persons undergoing training in the Citizen
Army or the Citizen Navy and their reserves, when mobil-
ized and called into the service of the United States, as pro-
vided in section twenty-one of this Act, shall receive the same
pay and allowances as may be authorized by law for cor-
responding grades in the Regular Army or Navy, and shall
be subject to the Rules and Articles of War, if called to serv-
ice with the Army, and to the laws and regulations for the
government of the Navy if called to service with the Navy.
SEC. 38. That members of the Citizen Army or Navy and
their reserves who incur disabilities in line of duty while in
active service or while actually undergoing training, and
while proceeding from their homes to training centers and
camps of instruction, and returning therefrom to their homes,
shall be entitled to pensions as provided under existing laws.
SEC. 39. That for the purposes of carrying out the provi-
sions of this Act, in so far as they relate to the Citizen Cadet
Corps, the Citizen Army and its reserves, there shall be es-
tablished in the War Department a division of the General
Staff Corps which shall be known as The Citizen Army
Division of the General Staff Corps. The personnel of this
division shall consist of seven officers, who shall be additional
members of the General Staff Corps, and one of whom shall
have the rank of major or captain, and be detailed from the
Medical Department. The remaining personnel shall have
one representative detailed, respectively, from the Infantry,
Cavalry, Field Artillery, Coast Artillery Corps, and Engi-
neer Corps. The chief of this division shall have the rank
of colonel, the assistant chief shall have the rank of lieutenant
colonel, and the remaining members from the line of the
Army shall have the rank of major or captain, and it shall be
the duty of this division to supervise the training, Supply,
and administration of the Citizen Cadet Corps, Citizen Army,
and its reserves: Provided, That the continental limits of the
United States shall be divided into fifty inspection districts,
and there shall be an officer of the line of the Army, with the
rank of captain, designated and appointed as inspector of said
inspection district, whose duties jºi be to inspect and Super-
vise the training in the several training districts included
within the limits of his inspection district: Provided further,
That there shall be detailed from the Regular Army to each
congressional district and the District of Columbia, herein-
before designated as training districts, a district commandant,
one half of those so detailed shall have the rank of first lieu-
tenant and the other half shall have the rank of Second lieu-
tenant. .
SEC. 40. That the officers hereinbefore designated as
district inspectors and district commandants shall be addi-
410 PREPAIRED NIESS FOR, NATIONAL DEFENSE.
tional officers in their respective grades, and the vacancies
caused by their detail shall be filled by promotion or appoint-
ment in the Regular Army: Provided, That officers so de-
tailed as district commandants and district inspectors may be
relieved by officers of the corresponding grades of the Regu-
lar Army, and officers so relieved shilºhe assigned to the
duties of their grade with the Regular Army: Provided
further, That officers thus detailed shall be subject to the
requirements of the Act of Congress approved March third,
nineteen hundred and eleven.
SEC. 41. That for the purpose of carrying out the pro-
visions of this Act, in so far as they relate to the Citizen
Navy and its reserves, there shall be established in the Navy
Department a division of the office of the aid for Naval Op-
erations. The personnel of this division shall consist of two
officers, one of whom shall have the rank of captain, who will
be the chief of this division, and the other shall have the rank
of commander and be the assistant chief of this division, and
it shall be the duty of this division to supervise the training,
supply, and administration of the Citizen Navy and its re-
serves: Provided, That there shall be detailed from the Navy
to each training district, as herein designated, a district com-
mandant, who shall have the rank of junior lieutenant. The
officers hereinabove designated as district commandant shall
be additional officers in their respective grades, and the va-
cancies caused by their details shall be filled by promotion in
the Navy: Provided further, That officers so detailed as dis-
trict commandant may be relieved by other officers of the
corresponding grades of the Navy, and officers so relieved
shall be assigned to the duties of his grade with the Navy:
And provided further, That officers on the retired list of the
Navy may be detailed for duty as direct commandants.
SEC. 42. That the President is authorized to make such
regulations, not inconsistent with this Act, which by this
Act are required or permitted to be prescribed, or which are
necessary or convenient to be prescribed, for the securing of
the discipline and good government of the members of the
Citizen Cadet Corps, of the Citizen Army and Navy, and of
their reserves, or for carrying out or giving effect to this Act.
biº CHAIRMAN. That is known as the universal military training
Gen. MACOMB. Yes, sir. I believe there is a certain feeling abroad
in the country that we have got to realize that there is a liability to
universal military training on the part of our able bodied male citizens.
That practically has been acknowledged before in our history, but
if we recognize the necessity in time and make provision for carrying
it into effect without making a heavy drain upon the country, amount-
ing to militarism, we can form the framework for giving us what we
need with certainty and can do so in time of peace. The point is
that if we try to introduce any such system as this in time of war
PREPAIRED NIESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 411
we will be too late, because the results expected from it can not be
reached in the duration of the war. In other words, we can not give
the men the training they ought to get from this system in time to use
during the war. The English to-day have come to some such system,
but too late. It will give them more men, but it does not give them
trained men. You have got to adopt the system beforehand.
People are saying we should adopt the Swiss system. We can not
adopt the Swiss system in our country at all. The value of that system
is to show that a nation can, without interfering with its civil per-
suits, develop a force which is efficient for its purpose. But such a
force as they are developing would not be efficient for Our purposes,
in my opinion. It has not sufficient training, and they will probably
find that out themselves during this trouble. They are trying to
preserve their neutrality and they have organized this force so that in
that small country the proper troops can be moved swiftly to strate-
gical points along the border and perhaps hold them. But if there
should be a failure at any one of those points what would become of
the whole force I do not know. An army has to be organized so that
it has real military cohesion, and must have the mobility and the Sup-
plies and the necessary reserves to throw from one point to another.
How far the Swiss have gone with that I do not know.
The CHAIRMAN. This bill is modeled rather after the Australian
system of 1895.
Senator DU Pont. Do you not think the mountainous character of
the country of Switzerland lends itself to making their scheme a
practicable one?
Gen. MACOMB. Yes, sir. -
Senator DU PONT. It would not be practicable in an open country.
Gen. MACOMB. We will have to go further. The pºi am getting
at is, we can devise a scheme just as good as that for our own country
without imposing too heavy a burden on the people. I am sure we
can do it by careful study, and this very bill that has been referred
through the Secretary of War to the War College Division is now
being studied there, and a report will be made as soon as practicable.
The CHAIRMAN. The general principle involved in it you favor?
Gen. MACOMB. Yes, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. In other words, you feel that universal military
training is the most ideal form of creating a reserve?
Gen. MACOMB. Yes, sir; but I would modify that in saying that
the principle we want to enforce is liability to universal military
training rather than requiring universal service. If we say the lia-
bility is recognized at all times we merely have to divide the coun-
try into districts in a sensible way and then draw from those dis-
tricts the number we need to fill up our contingent.
The CHAIRMAN. The selection process. -
Gen. MACOMB. The selection process, because the number we will
need is very much smaller in proportion to population than the
Swiss require:
The CHAIRMAN. You know the objection that is made to anything
like universal military service, that it tends to create a military
spirit
412 IPREPAREDINESS FOR, NATIONAL DEFENSE.
Gen. MACOMB. Yes, sir; but after all it is merely a spirit of self-
preservation. Any nation that expects to live as a nation must
realize that it must prepare for its defense. As soon as any
nation reaches such a state that it thinks it can not provide
for its own defense it had better cease to exist. We have not
reached any such condition. The people can perfectly well provide
for defense, and as soon as they realize what it means will provide
for it. It does not mean militarism and it does not mean a military
spirit throughout the country subversive of proper regard to the
superiority of the civil power over the military.
§. BECKHAM. There is a wide distinction, then, between
universal training and universal service, is there not ? -
Gen. MACOM.B. Yes, sir; and there is a wide distinction between
that and liability to service. We must realize we are liable to that
and must prepare for it, but do not say we must have universal train-
ing or universal service. We will have enough of it to provide us the
defense we ought to have if we acknowledge that we are liable to it.
Then it is a mere question of registration. -
The CHAIRMAN. That was recognized in this Government from
1792 down, was it not ?
Gen. MACOMB. Yes, sir. We are not introducing anything new at
all. It has been recognized in the Constitution. It was also recog-
nized in a very bad form in our draft acts which we had to get up
during the Civil War. If we can prepare some milder system in time
of peace it will give us all we want. We will not have to resort to
method of hiring soldiers to go to the front by enormous bounties and
all that sort of thing. We can get the proper men at the proper time.
That will be brought out in the discussion of this bill when it is sub-
mitted to the committee. . -
The CHAIRMAN. Has the War College considered the provisions in
these several bills having reference to the National Guardº
Gen. MACOMB. I have not done so, but I would like to say some-
thing for the National Guard. I happen to know various members
of the National Guard, and I have a very great respect for their spirit.
I do not think the National Guard can be used as a first-line
force by the Federal Government under the present restrictions
which rest upon it, but there is one thing I do think we can utilize,
and that is the spirit that exists in the National Guard. You will
find we can utilize that when we come to study more thoroughly
this liability to universal service. There are certain old organizations
in the guard that have traditions which ought to be preserved, and
there are a number of men going into the National Guard solely
under the impression that their units are going to be used in time of
war, and they are there because they think they are going to be
taken over by the General Government and used in time of war. We
ought to utilize that spirit.
The CHAIRMAN. You do not think the money expended on the
National Guard is wasted'. -
Gen. MACOMB. No, because we are still keeping up that spirit, and
we are not letting go of one rope before we have hold of another.
PREPAIRED NIESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 413.
We can utilize the National Guard and its desire to see service.
It will still remain in the States and can be used by the Federal
Government. That is what we want to get. It can be localized,
but it will be completely Federalized. That is all there is to it.
Senator DU PONT. I note that Mr. Root the other day in a letter
which he wrote suggested that the National Guard might be very
useful in Coast Årålery Companies. -
Gen. MACOMB. Those things have all been taken into consideration
and are fully worked out now, and they are now being utilized for
that purpose as far as they can be.
Senator DU Pont. They would be very useful when they had
IOla,IlêUIVCTS. -
Gen. MACOMB. They can be utilized. We realize that and have
made every provision for it.
The CHAIRMAN. General, I understand you to say that while the
War College favors some system of reserve creation aside from the
Organized Army, yet the tentative plan of the War Department
does not meet the suggestions of the War College.
Gen. MACOMB. No, it does not. It proposes to put a certain set
of men into the first line without sufficient training to go into the
first line. ... The General Staff does not propose anything of that
kind at all. . -
Senator DU Pont. What is your opinion, General, as to the
desirability of making larger appropriations for the National Guard,
So as to pay them . -
Gen. MACOMB. I do not think that would help the situation at all.
This is not the time to discuss pay for the National Guard. We have
É. bigger things to discuss now. I believe in leaving the National
uard alone for the present. The National Guard is serving a good
purpose as it is and it will not help the National Guard as an
efficient force by trying to introduce a system of pay for it at this
time.
. Senator DU PONT. It would add very much to the large expense
that we are bound to incur for this purpose. .
Gen. MACOMB. It will add to it without increasing the efficiency
sufficiently to make it worth while. That is, in my opinion the money
would not be well spent. - -
º is one other question, the question of extra officers that we
8,SJK IOI’.
: The CHAIRMAN. For the Regular Army'. . . . - -
Gen. MACOMB. Yes, sir. There have been a number of extra officers
asked for and oftentimes the committee desires to know why we want
these officers and wants to know their rank, and by tabulating what
we have to say about that you can get at an accurate view of it.
The CHAIRMAN. Have you tabulated it . -
Gen. MACOMB. I have such a tabulation here that covers a larger
number, perhaps, than is provided in your bill. It is of interest only
as showing the general system. -
Senator DU Pont. Is there any principle under which the number
-of-officers of the different grades was selected?
23380—PT 6—16—12
414 PREPAREDINESS FOR, NATIONAL DEFENSIE.
Gen. MACOMB. Yes, sir. The principle was to select the officers of
the different grades for the duties they are required to perform and,
strange to say, in checking them up it seemed to give practically the
proportion we now have. That was a mere accident. It gives these
officers the proper proportion between the higher grades and the
lower grades, with the exception of second lieutenants, who are not
wanted for detached service. Until an officer has been 10 years in
the service he is not efficiently experienced. Nowadays the military
profession is a learned one and it takes just as much time to make
a good officer as it does to make a good lawyer.
Senator DU Pont. Do you not think that in time of actual or
threatened hostilities the President should have the right to order
any retired officers to perform such duties as they may physically be
able to do?
Gen. MACOMB. Certainly. My idea is this: We ought to utilize
the services of every man who has got the brains to be of service. He
may not be physically fit to go to the front, but the Government
should at least have the power to utilize his services for what they
are worth and in the position where they can be used to the best
advantage. There are going to be lots of positions at the rear of
the army where they can work to great advantage.
Senator DU PONT. I believe a good man should go to the front.
Gen. MACOMB. The good men should go to the #. Field Mar-
shal von Hindenburg, who had been placed temporarily on the retired
list, is a man over 64 years of age, I believe, and he is doing splendid
Se]"W1Cé. -
The CHAIRMAN. General, do you not think the age of 64 is too young
for retirement in nine cases out of ten ?
Gen. MACOMB. Well, I would not try to make a proportion like that,
}. in many cases it is. It has been º during the war in
l].TOTO €.
#. CHAIRMAN. In this country are not a good many of the retired
Army officers past 70 detailed for duty with the National Guardº -
Gen. MACOMB. I do not know of any, but there is no reason why
they should not be if capable and satisfactory.
The CHAIRMAN. If there are no more questions, we will take a recess
until 2 o'clock. - -
General, we are very much obliged to you.
(Thereupon, at 11.30 o'clock a.m. the committee took a recess until
2 o'clock p. m.)
PREPAREDNIESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 415
AFTER RECESS.
The committee resumed its session, at the expiration of the recess,
at 2 o'clock p. m., Senator Geo. E. Chamberlain (chairman) presiding.
STATEMENT OF MAJ. GEN, ARTHUR MURRAY, UNITED
STATES ARMY, RETIRED,
The CHAIRMAN. General, we have had under consideration different
º for the reorganization of the Army, and we would like to hear
rom you in such a way as you desire to submit your observations on
the whole subject.
Gen. MURRAY. I thank you for the privilege of coming up and ex-
pressing my views on what I consider so important a subject at this
time. &
Before being questioned by the committee I would be glad to be
given permission to read a memorandum on the subject of prepared-
ness for defense that I wrote last fall at the request of Mr. Clark,
Speaker of the House, made when visiting me in San Francisco. At
that time Speaker Clark stated that he fully believed in preparedness
as a national question which should have no connection with politics, -
but that after reading all hearings of military and naval committees
and listening to numberless discussions on the subject in the House
he still did not know what would constitute an adequate defense or
an adequate Army and Navy, and that he would be glad to have me
give him my views on the subject.
The memorandum I have here was carefully written to give him
those views, and, though it is long, as it covers a big subject, I believe
it will be interesting and possibly of some service to the committee
in deciding this important question, and therefore ask permission to
read it before being questioned.
The CHAIRMAN. Just proceed, then, General.
Gen. MURRAY. I º say, as a preliminary, further, that the
memorandum as prepared gives my views regarding the relations
among the Navy, the Regular Army, and the Volunteers, in connec-
tion with this general subject of defense.
Gen. MURRAY. Reading]:
MEMORANDUM ON PREPAIREDNESS FOR DEFENSE.
The meaning of the phrase:
In its broader sense “preparedness for defense” means prepared-
ness on the part of the United States to defend the persons, property,
and rights of its citizens wherever they may be found on land or sea,
and also to uphold the principles of the ‘‘Monroe Doctrine” against
hostile or armed attack by any nation of the world. In this sense
“preparedness” would be for offensive as well as for defensive action.
In a restricted sense it means: Preparedness to defend United
States territory wherever located against attack, by an armed foe.
In this sense “preparedness” would be for defensive action only.
To fulfill the requirements of the broadest meaning of “prepared-
ness for defense” would necessitate a navy at least equal in strength
to that of any nation of Europe or Asia, and possibly equal in strength
to that of any two nations that might combine to dispute by force
23380—PT. 7—16 1 *
416 PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
the principles of the Monroe Doctrine; and also an army capable, if
necessary, of invading a foreign country and, together with the navy,
of compelling any and every nation on earth to respect the persons,
property, and rights of American citizens within its or their terri-
tory. The Venezuela incident of 1894 during the Cleveland admin-
istration carried us perilously near to a clash with England, and
thereby with the greatest navy on earth. The Boxer incident of
1900 and the Vera Cruz incident of 1914 are recent examples of where
the Army has been called upon to invade a foreign country for the
urpose stated. The concentration of troops on the Mexican border
or the primary purpose of protecting the persons and property of
citizens F. in United States territory near the border and for the
secondary purpose of invading Mexico, if necessary, to compel respect
by the Government of that country not only for the persons and prop-
erty of American citizens, but also, in accordance with the Monroe
Doctrine, for those citizens of nations of the Old World found therein,
is a concrete illustration of where the Army may at any moment be
called upon to invade a foreign country for the defense of both Amer-
ican and foreign citizens. -
To fulfill the requirements of “Preparedness” in its restricted
meaning, would simply necessitate a navy and a regular army of
sufficient strenght to defend such of our outlying territorial posses-
sions as it may be deemed advisable to attempt to hold, against cap-
ture, by an enemy, in the event of war; and to defend the United
States, proper, against such attack until the Organized Militia can be
mustered into the United States service under existing laws, mobilized,
equipped, and trained; and until volunteers can be called out, armed,
equipped, and trained for field service under modern war conditions.
Any proposition which contemplates beginning at the present time
to provide a navy and an army of sufficient strength to fulfill the
requirements of the broadest meaning of “preparedness for defense”
is not believed to be worthy of consideration owing to the time and
the money that would be required to provide such a navy and army.
Any proposition, however, which contemplates the providing of an
adequate navy and regular army to fulfill the requirements of the
restricted meaning of “preparedness for defense,” would, it is
believed, be in accord with the precepts regarding preparation for war
enunciated by Washington, Jefferson, Adams, and every other
patriotic statesman from their day to this. It is worthy of most
earnest and careful consideration at this time, when practically every
powerful nation of the old world is engaged in war and when the rela-
tions of our country, both with Mexico and with Germany have
lately been more than once strained to near their breaking point, and
only the most careful diplomatic handling of the situation in each
instance has prevented our country from becoming involved in war.
Assuming that measures contemplating the P. of a navy
and a regular army of sufficient strength to fulfill the requirements of
the restricted meaning of “Preparedness for defense” will be con-
sidered by Congress at its next session, I will now, in accordance with
your request made when visiting me here in San Francisco, state as
briefly as I can my views regarding: -
A. What would be an adequate navy for this restricted purpose?
B. What would be an adequate regular army for this restricted
purpose?
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 417
C. How any necessary increase in the authorized regular army had
best be made 7 .
D. What general provisions should now be made by Congress
looking to the mustering of the Organized Militia into the United
States service and for equipping and training it for field service'
E. And with a view to the calling out, organizing, arming, equip-
ping, officering, and training of United States Volunteers, what general
provisions should be made with a view to providing for a reserve for
the Regular Army and the militia when mustered into Federal service'?
A. PROVISIONS FOR AN ADEQUATE NAVY FOR THE RESTRICTED
PURPOSE OF DEFENSE.
In this discussion it is thought that the navy except in the matter
of submarines for use as adjuncts to the harbor defense installed on
the various possessions, may be considered by itself. This for the
well known axiomatic reasons, that the true rôle of naval war vessels—
battleships and cruisers—is to be Organized in fleets and as such to
seek and destroy those of the enemy upon the high seas; and that any
scattering of such fleets for the purpose of assisting in the defense of
different harbors, prevents the use of the fleets in their true rôle and
practically insures their destruction by piecemeal. The submarines
are considered to be permanently attached to the coast defenses
for similar reasons.
For the naval defense of the Pacific coast it is thought that we
would require a single fleet of not less than four or more than eight
dreadnaughts or battle cruisers of the most powerful and Swiftest
type that has as yet been designed, together with such torpedo-
boat destroyers and other vessels of equal or greater speed as are
necessary adjuncts of such a fleet. The fleet would be based on
Pearl Harbor. The question of submarines may be considered as
adjuncts to the harbor defenses of the Pacific coast proper, and is
elsewhere discussed. -
Senator DU PONT. Did you say four or eight battleships?
Gen. MURRAY. Four to eight; that is, to have a fleet of not less
than four nor more than eight.
Senator DU Pont. Do you think that would be able to cope with
the fleets of the Asiatic powers ?
Gen. MURRAY. I do not believe that fleet alone would, but I
believe that fleet would be sufficient to do what I have proposed
here in the memorandum, as we will see later. That, I might state
now, would be to prevent the fleet of an enemy from bringing over
troops in transports. If we can do that, we ought to be able to
handle the matter on the coast. I might go further and state for
that reason you will note that I stated the swiftest and most powerful
ships built. In other words, if we had a single fleet of battleships of
from four to eight, any fleet, no matter how large, that was under-
taking to convoy transports could be held, and our fleet would itself
be able to get out of the way due to its speed or to retire if attacked
by superior numbers.
For the naval defense of the Atlantic coast it is thought that we
would need two fleets each consisting of six dreadnaughts or battle
cruisers such as above described with their necessary adjuncts.
4.18 PREPAIREDINESS FOR, NATIONAL DEFENSE.
Senator DU PONT. Is it not a fact that the naval people favor
grouping four battelships together in a division? -
Gen. MURRAY. I am not certain as to what they give as the proper
number for a division or fleet.
Senator DU PONT. I think that is their program.
Gen. MURRAY. On the Atlantic coast I would give them two bat-
tleship fleets of such size as they would want. . If I remember, cor-
rectly, the flying squadron at the battle of Tushima Straits consisted
of six swift cruisers. As to exactly what naval tactics requires, I
am not prepared to say, but it is believed that it would be advisable
to give them a fleet of that character on the Pacific coast and on the
Atlantic coast two such fleets to cover the tremendously long Atlantic
coast line. - . .
Gen. MURRAY (continuing reading): The number of Submarines nec-
essary both for the harbor defenses of the Atlantic coast and for or-
ganization in submarine fleets for general defense of the coast is given
elsewhere. One of the fleets should be based on Brooklyn and the
other on Guantanamo.
Total number of naval vessels believed to be necessary for the
efficient defense of United States territory, from 16 to 20 battle
cruisers or dreadnaughts of latest and most powerful and Swiftest
type, with necessary torpedo-boat destroyers, etc., and 51 submarines
for use as adjuncts to harbor defenses.
B. PROVISIONS FOR AN ADEQUATE ARMY FOR TEIE DEFENSE OF UNITED
. STATES TERRITORY. -
This question may be subdivided into two parts: (a) Which of our
outlying possessions is it advisable to defend, to what extent should
they be defended, and what is necessary for such defense. , (b) What
is necessary for the defense of the United States proper. (c) A sum-
mary of the whole.
(a) As to which of our outlying possessions it is advisable to defend,
and to what extent they should be defended: Of the Philippines,
only the small chain of islands at the entrance to Manila Bay, which
have been fortified, viz: Corregidor, Caballo, El Fraile and Carabao
Islands, and Grande Island in Subig Bay should be defended and
these in their entirety; if Guam is to be retained as a coaling station
for naval vessels and Army transports, its harbor should be defended;
of the Hawaiian Island, only Oahu should be defended, and this in
its entirety; there can be no question but that the Canal Zone should,
in its entirety, be defended; it is questionable if any defense of
Alaska should be attempted, but if such is to be made, it is believed
that the harbor of Kiska Island, as recommended by the “National
Coast Defense Board” in its report to Congress in February, 1906,
should be defended; if the harbor of Guantanamo is to be retained as
a naval coaling and tranning station, it should of course be defended;
of the island of Porto Rico it is thought that the harbor of San Juan
should be defended.
For the defense of the fortified islands at the entrance of Manila
and Subig Bays, it is believed that the Coast Artillery troops re-
quired to man the fortifications, already installed or being installed—
about 2,700 coast artillerymen—the mobile Army garrison of the
Philippines—about 2 regiments Infantry, 1 of Cavalry, and 1 of Field
PREPAIRED NIESS FOR, NATIONAL DEFENSE. 419
Artillery, or approximately 5,700 line troops of the mobile Army, and
3 submarines—2 for use as adjuncts to the defenses of Manila Bay
and 1 for those of Subig, Bay—would be sufficient. Regarding the
defense of these fortified islands, it may be here stated that the
jº. plans contemplate, in the event of war, the concentration of
all troops in the Philippines on these islands and the withdrawal of
all noncombatants therefrom, and that no defense of any portions of
the Philippines, except Manila and Subig Bays, shall be attempted.
With this in view storehouses have been erected and reservoirs are
being constructed on Corregidor Island, for at least two years supply
of food and water for the troops engaged in the defense of the islands.
As Congress made appropriations for these purposes, it would be
well for it to inquire as to how far these preparatory steps for defense
of the islands in question have been carried out.
For the defense of Guam, if it is to be retained as a coaling station,
fortifications should be erected thereon to cover the entrance to its
harbor and provisions made for storing food and water for the garri-
son. For manning the defenses proposed for Guarn by the National
Coast Defense Board in its report to Congress in February, 1906,
about 420 coast artillery men are necessary. In addition to this, it
is believed that at least 2 battalions of Infantry and 1 battalion of
Field Artillery, or approximately 1,725 line troops of the mobile Army,
and 2 submarines would be required. One submarine might be suffi-
cient, but in accordance with the old adage about putting all your eggs
in one basket, it is thought it would be better to have two.
For the defense of Oahu, about 1,100 coast artillerymen are re-
quired for manning the defenses already installed on the island, and
it is believed that at least 300 more are needed to man batteries of
long-range (30,000 yards) howitzers for keeping the enemy's battle-
ships from approaching near to the three now unfortified sides of the
island, on either of which a landing from such ships could readily be
made. Owing to the size and importance of the island and the ease
with which an enemy could make a landing on one of the unfortified
sides of the island, it is believed that, in addition to the Coast Artillery,
not less than 9 Infantry regiments, 2 Cavalry regiments, 2 horse
Artillery regiments, or approximately 24,450 mobile Army troops, and
4 submarines are necessary for a proper defense of the island. 8.
and horse Artillery are sºil. needed to enable troops to be sent
quickly from the mobile Army post near the center of the island to
ºy landing attempted on the north, which is its most vulner-
8,016 S1Clé. - gº .
For manning the fortifications of Kiska Island, Alaska, as projected
by the national coast defense board, about 415 Coast Artillery troops
are required, and in addition to these coast artillerymen it is believed
that at least one battalion of Infantry and one battalion of Field
Artillery or approximately 1,100 line troops of the mobile army and
two submarines are necessary for the defense of the island. Two
Submarines for the same reason as in case of Guam.
For manning the fortifications of the Canal Zone as projected by
the national land defense board, about 1,600 coast artillerymen are
required, and it is believed that at least this number will be found
necessary to man the fortifications as now being constructed. In
addition to these coast artillerymen, it is believed that, owing to the
importance of the canal in connection with our naval defense, not less
420 PREPAREDNESS FOR, NATIONAL DEFENSE.
than nine regiments of Infantry, one regiment of Cavalry, and two
regiments of Field Artillery or approximately 23,350 mobile army
troops and four submarines are necessary for an adequate defense.
For manning the fortifications of Guantanamo Bay as projected
by the national coast defense board about 900 coast artillerymen are
required, and it is believed that at least one regiment of Infantry
j one of Field Artillery or approximately 2,900 mobile army troops
and two submarines are necessary, in addition to the marines that
can be provided for the defense of the naval coaling and supply sta-
tion there located. -
For manning the fortifications of San Juan, Porto Rico, as projected
by the national coast defense board, about 430 coast artillerymen
are required. Such additional defense as is required it is believed
can be given by the Porto Rican regiment as organized and the two
submarines based on and operating from Guantanamo.
Senator DU Pont. Would you approve the increasing of that Porto
Rican regiment to two full regiments' - -
Gen. MURRAY. Yes, sir; I would.
Senator DU PONT. It has been suggested here at some of the hear-
ings, particularly in view of the fact that The Adjutant General as-
serts that he can not recruit an army larger than 139,000 or 140,000
men, that it might be well to have two Porto Rican regiments, one
to serve on the Isthmus and one in Porto Rico, and that enough
recruits could be gotten from the million of people there to obtain
those regiments. -
Gen. MURRAY. If you can get the two regiments, I would say with-
out any question it would be advisable to get them.
Senator DU Pont. In that event, you would favor having two
Porto Rican regiments?
Gen. MURRAY. Yes; only subject to whether or not you can get
under your present enlistment laws any more than the 140,000
regular troops, which I believe the plan of the War Department
contemplates asking for. Of course, the Adjutant General is the
man who is best prepared to speak on that subject, and if he states
that under the present enlistment laws we can not get more than the
70,000 enlistments each year, under an enlistment period of two
years that would be required to give you your 140,000 troops, then I
would say that if we have to get more troops, as I believe we should
have, there is one of three things to do. One is to change the enlist-
ment period, and, as I state in this memorandum later, from my own
experience that one year would be sufficient time to train infantry-
men, under ordinary garrison training, efficiently. I believe that in
a year and a half you could train field artillerymen, cavalrymen, and
coast artillerymen efficiently. In other words, I would reduce the
term of enlistment; and I believe that all will agree that if you reduce
the term of enlistment you will succeed in getting more men. The
only question as to the limit of the reduction in the term of enlist-
ment is where the Government will get its corresponding quid pro quo
of efficiently trained men.
Senator CATRON. To what period would you reduce that %
Gen. MURRAY. I would reduce the period for Infantry, as I recom-
mend in the memorandum, to one year, and for Cavalry, Field Artil-
lery and Coast Artillèry to a year and a half. I recognize that this
would make the Army cost more money.
PREPAREDNESS. FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. • 421
Senator DU PONT. You think just now that if there were 140,000
men on a two years enlistment basis that would necessitate an annual
enlistment of some 70,000 men? -
Gen. MURRAY. I took that from Gen. McCain's statement. -
Senator DU PONT. That seems not to recognize the question of
reenlistment. I would like to ask you one or two questions about
that. My Own experience was, in the Regular Army, in which I
served many years, that there was a certain percentage of the men
who were soldiers by profession and choice. They would not be
satisfied to pass into the reserve. They would want the privilege
of reenlisting in their regiments and companies. Therefore that
might diminish the number of recruits you would have to get annu-
ally. I would like to have you state to the committee your opinion
about that.
Gen. MURRAY. Unquestionably in the old days, when we had a
straight three years enlistment period, as you will remember, we had
a great many reenlistments, and we found soldiers with three, four,
five, or six enlistments.
Senator DU PONT. Yes; that is right.
Gen. MURRAY. Under the present enlistment term, four years, and
I believe three in the Reserves, very few men, so far as I have been
able to learn from inquiry, want to reenlist. As to exactly how many
reenlist, I would rather have you ask Gen. McCain, who can give you
exact data.
Senator DU PONT. If the enlistment period were reduced from four
years to two, there might be more who would want to reenlist. That
is the point. It is a mere guess on the part of The Adjutant General.
Gen. MURRAY. You would not only have more men who would
reenlist, but if you reduced the enlistment period from four to two
years and have, we may say, no addition to it, such as serving in the
reserve for a certain number of years, or have just a straight enlist-
ment period, you would unquestionably, in my opinion, get more
men; and if you reduced the period still further, you would, I believe,
be able to get still more men to enlist.
Senator CATRON. What do you mean by that, an enlistment to
serve two years, with no time for service in the reserve :
Gen. MURRAY. My Own idea in suggesting the reduction of the
period of enlistment to one year for the Infantry and one and a half
years for the Cavalry, the Field Artillery, and the Coast Artill ry
would be to get trained soldiers in the country and not simply to k p
old soldiers in service and thereby reduce the number of enlistme ts
We would have to make each year. I would reenlist only nonco m-
missioned officers and men who are experts of various kinds, such as
electricians, engineers, mechanics, and others. If that could be do"e,
and we had an army, we will say, of 250,000 regular troops, of which
50,000 were the noncommissioned officers and the experts, there
Would be about 200,000 men turned out every year and a half into the
great body of our citizens, who had been trained as soldiers, and who,
in case of war, would be available as trained men at comparatively
Short notice.
Senator DU PoWT. My question was not quite that. I inquired
Whether you did not think that this number of men in the Régular
Army—not noncommissioned officers or specialists, but men who
Were there because they liked the life of a professional soldier—if you
422 PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
prevented them reenlisting and turned them loose in the country,
would go off and enlist in the Marines or the Navy. Is not that
correct 7
Gen. MURRAY. You may be absolutely correct on that, but my
idea was that we would simply turn out so many trained men every
€8,I * .*
y Senator DU PONT. It is a small percentage, I have no doubt.
Gen. MURRAY. Yes. -- -
Senator CATRON. In discharging your men at the end of a year
or a year and a half, would you have them kept in the shape of a
reserve 7 -
Gen. MURRAY. No; I had not thought of doing that; made no
suggestion of that kind; just simply thought of turning them loose
as so many trained men into the big body of our people.
Gen. MURRAY (continuing reading); (b). In the defense of the ter-
ritory of the United States proper, it is believed that the rôle of the
Navy, as previously explained, is to seek and defeat the enemy's
fleets, with its battleship fleet, and if not powerful enough to do this,
at least to prevent their convoying an invading force in transports
until the Army is prepared for defense against such a force; that the
rôle of the Coast Artillery is to prevent a hostile fleet from occupying
any fortified harbor or from destructively bombarding any city cov-
ered by harbor defenses, and that the rôle of mobile troops of the
Regular Army is to repel any attempt that may be made by an
enemy's fleet to land such sailors and marines as may be spared from
the fleet while the latter is engaging the harbor defenses of a city
in front to attack these defenses in rear and compel the surrender of
the defenses and the city. All this is before the Organized Militia,
Volunteers, and regular reserves can be mustered into Federal service.
Considering the length and vulnerability of our tremendous coast
line, the number of rich cities located thereon, the facts that the term
coast defenses as ordinarily understood is a misnomer, that they are
in reality only harbor defenses, and that however strong they protect
the coast line and the cities in their rear from only such of an enemy's
vessels, as may come within effective range of their most powerful
guns, it will readily be seen that if either the Navy, the Coast
Artillery, or the mobile Regular Army fails in its rôle as above out-
lined, the financial, not to mention any other loss to our country,
would be incalculable. Such money as may be expended upon the
Navy, the Coast Artillery, and the mobile Regular Army to prepare
them to fulfill the above-described rôles, is, therefore, in the nature of
an insurance premium against the risk of such loss, and as the pre-
mium on any insurance risk increases as the risk increases, so may it
be expected that the cost of preparedness of the Navy and the
Regular Army to fulfill their rôles will be correspondingly great. If
the country is unwilling to pay such premium it, of course, assumes
the responsibility for all loss in the event of war.
In considering what it is believed would be an adequate Navy
and Coast Artillery and mobile troops of the Regular Army, to
enable them to fulfill the above described rôles in the event of war,
the strength of each required for the defense of the Pacific and then
of the Atlantic coast will first be considered and later a summary
will be made of the total required for the two coasts and also for our
outlying possessions. ~ *
PREPAREDINESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 423
For the defense of the fortified harbors of the Pacific coast the
matériel of the coast defenses already installed in those harbors, would
be sufficient if slightly strengthened by the addition of long range
mortars or howitzers and provided with ample reserve ammunition,
together with at least 12 submarines, 4 to be based on San Francisco,
2 on Puget Sound, 2 on Columbia River, 2 on Los Angeles, and 2 on
San Diego. • -
The Coast Artillery personnel necessary to man the defenses
already installed on the Pacific coast and such additions as are con-
sidered ample for strengthening them, is about 12,000 for those
already installed and about 1,000 for the additional defenses, a total
of about 13,000 coast artillerymen.
For the efficient defense of the Pacific coast, by mobile troops
of the Regular Army against landing parties of from 10,000 to
possibly 15,000 sailors and marines that might be made from hostile
fleets before the Organized Militia and Volunteers could be mustered
into service, armed, equipped, and trained, it is believed that there
would be required not less than four Infantry divisions of about
12,700 officers and men each, or 50,800 peace strength, and one
Cavalry division, 7,980 officers and men peace strength, or approxi-
mately 58,800 mobile Regular Army troops. An Infantry division,
so-called, consists at peace strength of approximately 8,250 officers
and men, and approximately 4,450 auxiliary troops composed of 1
Cavalry regiment, 1 pioneer battalion of Engineers, 1 Signal Corps
battalion, and a number of Sanitary and Quartermaster Corps troops,
a total of about 12,700 officers and men. A Cavalry division at
peace strength consists of approximately 5,920 cavalrymen, 1 regi-
ment of Field (horse) Artillery, approximately 1,020 men, 1 bat-
talion of Engineers, 1 Signal Corps battalion, and a complement of
Sanitary and Quartermaster Corps troops. - r
For making such a defense of the Pacific coast it is thought that at
least one Infantry division will be required to guard the coast from
Puget Sound to the mouth of the 8. River; one from the
Columbia River to San Francisco; one from San Francisco to Los
Angeles, one from Los Angeles to San Diego, and one Cavalry division
to assist the two Infantry divisions south of San Francisco in guarding
the long stretch of coast line between San Francisco and San Diego,
at practically any point of which a landing from a hostile fleet could
easily be made. To oppose a landing it is imperatively necessary
that troops be rushed quickly to the point where it is being made;
for this purpose it is believed that Cavalry, considering the open
character of the country and its suitability for the use of that arm,
is far better adapted than any other arm of the service, and therefore
an imperatively necessary element in the efficient defense of this
portion of the Pacific coast.
The necessity for having five divisions distributed along the Pacific
Coast as above recommended to defend it against the landing of about
One division will be understood when it is stated that this coast is
about 1,500 miles long; that there are seven rich cities, two naval
stations, and numerous important towns located on or near the coast;
that a landing from a hostile fleet may be made at practically any
point along the coast; that to transport Infantry troops from one
point to another along the coast to oppose a landing there is only one

424 PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
continuous line of railroad, and that a landing having been effected,
the landing party if intrenched and protected by the fire of their
ships, could not be dislodged with less than three or four times the
number of troops in the landing party, aided by heavy Field Artillery
fire. *
Senator CATRON. How many Cavalry regiments and what amount
of Cavalry did you suggest for the Pacific coast 3, .
Gen. MURRAY. One Cavalry division in addition to the Cavalry
which is in each of the Infantry divisions. You will understand, of
course, that this paper expresses my views as given to Mr. Clark upon
what I considered would be a proper and adequate defense for the
country, and also what I *ś to be the minimum Army and
Navy necessary for an adequate defense. -
Gen. MURRAY (reading): For the adequate defense of the fortified
harbors of the Atlantic, the material already installed should be
strengthened as in case of that of the Pacific coast provided with
ample reserve ammunition, should be further strengthened at least
22 submarines as adjuncts to the defenses; 2 submarines to be based
on Portland Harbor; 2 on Boston; 2 on Newport; 4 on New York; 2
on the Delaware River; 4 on Chesapeake Bay; 2 on Savannah; 2 on
Mobile Bay, and 2 on Galveston.
The Coast Artillery personnel necessary to man the defenses already
installed on the Atlantic coast and such additional defenses as are
considered ample for strengthening those already installed is about
37,500 for those already installed and about 1,500 for the additional
defenses, a total of about 39,000 coast artillerymen.
Senator DU Pont. Gen. Murray, do you think that if the Govern-
ment were to acquire and deepen the Delaware & Chesapeake Canal,
it would lend itself to a more efficient defense of our coast and
harbors :
Gen. MURRAY. Very much so, as it would enable submarines,
assigned for harbor defense, as I have herein indicated, to pass from
one harbor to the other. - - {-,
Senator DU Pont. From Delaware Bay to Chesapeake Bay ?
Gen. MURRAY. Yes.
Senator DU PONT. Then you think that in a scheme of national
defense that project ought to be considered 3
Gen. MURRAY. I should say without any question it should be,
and while on that subject I would call attention to another canal
which I consider of great importance in such a scheme of defense.
That is the canal, already built, known as the Cape Cod Canal, lead-
ing from New Bedford into Cape Cod Bay. A short canal, which
would enable submarines in Boston Harbor to be passed through it
to join with those in New York Harbor or vice versa. For this
reason I consider this canal of such importance that, in my judgment,
it should be fortified as soon as j.
Senator DU Pont. How about the fortifying of the Delaware &
Chesapeake Canal, if it were acquired?.
Gen. MURRAY. I do not think that is so necessary, for the simple
reason that you have the fortifications at the mouth of the Chesa-
peake and on the other side of the Delaware.
Senator DU PONT. You have not got them in the Delaware.
There is no fortification south of the canal. The Delaware break-
water at Lewes, which is a good harbor, is entirely unfortified.
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 425
Gen. MURRAY. Then there should be fortifications on that side.
Senator BROUSSARD. General, you speak of submarines passing
through these canals along the coast. What is the draft of these
submarines that would be permitted to pass through the canals' *
Gen. MURRAY. I do not think that the draft of a submarine when
it is running unsubmerged is more than 10 or 15 feet at the outside.
Of course, they could not run through a canal when submerged.
Senafor BROUSSARD. No, I understand; but is the canal deep
enough to take that draft now %
Gen. MURRAY. The Cape Cod Canal, to the best of my recollection,
has a depth of about 25 feet. -
Senator DU PONT. They are deepening it still more. --
Gen. MURRAY. I do not know about that. I am giving the depth
from memory.
Senator CATRON. What is the depth of the canal between the
Delaware and the Chesapeake? %
Gen. MURRAY. As I remember it, that is a very narrow and shal-
low canal, not more than 12 or 15 feet deep. It is proposed, I under-
stand, to widen and deepen that canal so as to enable larger and
deeper draft vessels to pass through it. ºr -
Senator DU PONT. It could be done at a relatively unimportant
expense.
Gen. MURRAY. Yes. -
Senator DU Pont. You see, we have the League Island Navy Yard
on one, without counting the cities, and the Capital of the Nation on
the other, on Chesapeake Bay, a very important point.
Gen. MURRAY. Yes. (Reading:) . . -
For the efficient defense of the Atlantic coast by mobile troops of
the Regular Army against like landing parties from hostile fleets
before the militia and volunteers can be mobilized, it is believed that
there would be required not less than 8 Infantry divisions of about
12,700 officers and men each, peace strength, or 101,600 mobile Rég-
ular Army troops; these divisions to be assigned in a similar way to
those on the Pacific coast, for the purpose of guarding the entire
Atlantic and Gulf coasts beginning north of Portland, Me., and
ending south of Galveston, Tex. The general reasons above given
regarding the necessity of distributing a number of divisions along
the Pacific coast to guard against a landing that may be made at
any point, apply equally in case of the defense of the Atlantic and
Gulf coasts. • #
T Senator CATRON. What do you mean by south of Galveston,
GNC. §
Gen. MURRAY. The coast line to the south of Galveston.
Senator CATRON. Toward the mouth of the Rio Grande'.
Gen. MURRAY. Yes. The coast line to be defended would really
begin above Portland, Me., and extend southward to where our
territory joins Mexico, and should include whatever is necessary to
be protected below Galveston. -
Senator CATRON. Yes, that is the mouth of the Rio Grande.
Senator DU Pont. That is the San Antonio region.
Senator CATRON. Practically, we understand that as going west.
Senator DU PONT. It is southwest. -
Senator CATRON. It is southwest, I know.
426 PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
Gen. MURRAY (reading): In making this defense of the Pacific, At-
lantic, and Gulf coasts, it is believed that the troops necessary for the
defense of the immediate rear of the forts against small raiding parties,
of from 1,000 to 5,000, should be assigned from the divisions nearest to
the forts, and that the remainder of the divisions should be assigned
to the general task of guarding the coast against larger landing
parties of from 5,000 to 15,000 men.
It will be understood that these five to fifteen thousand men that
I refer to are the “bluejackets” and marines which a hostile
fleet attacking the coast and not convoying transports might possi-
bly be able to put on shore to make a quick raid on any city on the
º We should have troops to guard cities against any such
attack. -
Considering the existing conditions in Mexico and the probable
continuation of similar conditions in that country for many years to
come, at least as many Cavalry troops—about 9 regiments (approxi-
mately 8,900 cavalrymen)—as are now on duty on or near the bor-
der, and have been on such duty for nearly four years past, will be
required in future. g
For the defense of the Canadian border it is not believed that any
special preparation need be made, and for that of the Mexican bor-
der no special preparation against invasion in force is thought
necessary.
For the defense of the Atlantic, Gulf, and Pacific coasts and the
Mexican border by mobile troops of the Regular Army until the
militia and volunteers can be mobilized, there will be required at
least 108 regiments of Infantry, about 99,150 men; 27 of Cavalry,
about 26,650 men; 25 of Field Artillery, about 23,000 men; and
about 21,500 Engineer, Signal Corps, Sanitary, and Quartermaster
Corps troops—a total of approximately 170,000 mobile army troops.
The CHAIRMAN. That is for Continental United States ?
Gen. MURRAY. That is for the Continental United States, and pro-
vides for four Infantry divisions and one Cavalry division on the
Pacific coast, and for eight Infantry divisions to be scattered along
the Atlantic coast from Portland, Me., to Galveston, Tex.
Senator FLETCHER. What would that cost 7
Gen. MURRAY. I have not undertaken to discuss in any way the
subject of the cost.
Senator DU Pont. I think that the cost, whatever it may be,
would not be one-hundredth part of the exactions that would be put
on our great cities if they were ever in the possession of an enemy.
Senator CATRON. A thousandth part. Before you go on, General,
you stated, if I understand you correctly, that there would be 108
regiments of Infantry, probably 99,000 men?
Gen. MURRAY. Yes. *-
Senator CATRON. How many companies would you have?
Gen. MURRAY. That is peace footing. I have assumed all organi-
zations to be on peace footing. We would then have full complement
of officers with each regiment.
sºtor CATRON. How many companies would you have to a regi-
ment
Gen. MURRAY. Twelve companies.
Senator CATRON. Some proposition was submitted about other
companies of some kind to go along with those regiments.
PREPAREDINESS FOR, NATIONAL DEFENSE. 427
Senator DU PONT. A machine-gun company, headquarters com-
pany, and supply company. Do you favor that ?
Senator CATRON. Does your estimate embrace that %
Gen. MURRAY. No. I simply considered the ordinary Infantry
division, as given by our field regulations, and took from these regu-
lations the number of troops that would constitute an Infantry or a
Cavalry division, without considering what might be added to those
hereafter. .
Senator CATRON. Would this 99,000 men that you mention include
commissioned officers as well as noncommissioned officers and men ;
Gen. MURRAY. It includes all.
Senator CATRON. Enlisted men, noncommissioned and commis.
sioned officers ?
Gen. MURRAY. All. *
Senator DU PONT. You are speaking of aggregates, not of totals?
Gen. MURRAY. The aggregates; yes.
Senator CATRON. What size would you make a regiment on a war
footing' g *
Gen. MURRAY. I would recommend that the recommendation of the
War College be taken as to that. I believe that increases the Infantry
company to 150 men.
Senator CATRON. That is, men and noncommissioned officers ?
Gen. MURRAY. That is the enlisted strength. It leaves the com-
missioned strength the same as in time of peace, and I believe non-
commissioned strength also the same, and simply increases the
number of privates in the companies. It may, however, increase the
noncommissioned strength; of this I am not certain. I would have to
consult the field regulations to make certain. .
Gen. MURRAY, (reading): That this is a conservative estimate will
be seen when it is stated that the National Land Defense Board (a board
appointed by the Secretary of War upon my recommendation in 1906
for the purpose of determining the number of troops necessary for the
defense of the immediate rear of all forts in the United States against
attack by small landing parties and also for guarding the coast line
between fortified harbors from landings from hostile fleets), after about
six years' work, during which time every fortified harbor in the United
States was visited and carefully examined as to its defenses by the
board, recommended for the Pacific coast 6 regiments for the defense
of the immediate rear of the forts and 6 infantry divisions for coast
guard, and for the Atlantic coast 16 regiments for defense of rear
of forts and 11 infantry divisions for coast guard, which would make
a total of 175 regiments of infantry, 17 of cavalry, 34 of field artillery,
or 226 regiments of infantry, cavalry, and field artillery as against
108 regiments of infantry, 18 of cavalry, and 25 of field artillery, or
151 regiments of the arms recommended by me. The estimate of
the board is therefore about 50 per cent greater than that made by me
for the defense of the Atlantic and Pacific coasts.
That is, this board recommends 226 regiments as against 151
recommended by myself, after considering the question of the
defense of our coasts in the same general way; so I think that my
estimate is at least conservative. - -
Senator CATRON. When you say the recommendation of the others,
do you mean by the War College?
428 PREPAIRED NESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
Gen. MURRAY. No. This question of the defense of our coast was
considered by a board called the National Land Defense Board, which
consisted of one infantryman, Gen. Wotherspoon; one coast artillery-
man, Col. Haar; and the district engineer officer of each district on
both the Atlantic and Pacific coasts. The board visited each fortified
harbor on the Pacific, Atlantic, and Gulf coasts and decided on the
ground as to what forces they considered was necessary for the
i. of the different harbors and of the coast line between these
arbors.
Senator DU Pont. Has there been a report of that board printed?
Gen. MURRAY. So far as I know, no; I do not think there has.
Their work and recommendations were simply submitted to the War
Department from time to time as they made their reports. They
were nearly six years on the work. I obtained from Col. Haan when
writing this memorandum a statement as to exactly what his board
had recommended—he was the recorder of the board—and I made
my comparison after getting data from him. Unquestionably they
have gone into many details connected with the land defense of our
coasts, and have decided upon the exact necessary defense for each
piace, and for that reason their reports would be considered confi-
dential. But the total number of troops they have considered neces-
sary to guard our coasts they could give you, just as I have. Their
recommendations, after .* on the subject for about six years,
are nearly 50 per cent greater than those I have given in my memo-
randum to Mr. Clark as the minimum number of troops required to
give anything like an adequate defense for the coast line of the At-
lantic, Pacific, and Gulf coasts. - -
Senator FLETCHER. Do you remember when that report was fin-
ished—how long ago they completed their report? -
Gen. MURRAY. The board, as I remember it, began its work in the
fall of 1906, and completed it in 1912. When writing my memo-
randum it occurred to me that the report of this board would be a
good basis for comparison, with my own estimate of the troops
necessary for the work in question, and I obtained data from Col.
Haan accordingly.
Senator DU Pont. Gen. Wotherspoon was president of that board,
was he not -
Gen. MURRAY. Yes; Gen. Wotherspoon was president of it [reading]:
(c) Summary required for outlying possessions: A Summary of
the above details, regarding what is believed would be an effective
defense of our outlying possessions and the United States proper by
the Navy and the Regular Army until the militia and volunteers can
be mobilized, gives— º
The committee will understand what I am trying to show is simply
what regular troops are necessary to hold a first line until the militia,
Volunteers, continental army, or whatever else they may be called,
are organized, trained, and ready to take their parts in the field.
For the Coast Artillery: The number of coast artillerymen required
to man the harbor defenses of our outlying possessions, including
those proposed for Guam, Kiska Island, Guantanamo, and Porto Rico,
about 8,000; to man those of the Pacific coast about 13,000; those of
the Atlantic and Gulf coasts about 39,000, a total of approximately
60,000 coast artillerymen for all purposes; 40,000 regular Coast
Artillery men are required if 50 per cent of manning details in United
States are furnished by militia.
PREPAIRED NESS FOR, NATIONAL DEFENSE. 429
With regard to this latter statement, of furnishing 50 per cent by
the militia, I might state that during the time I was chief of Coast,
* Artillery the question arose as to whether or not militia could be used
as coast artillerymen. I decided, after thinking over the matter, to
give it a trial, and upon a scheme that I devised for training the
militia was satisfied that we could make good use of them as coast
artillerymen in handling the gun defenses of the United States proper.
I found that with a comparatively few days' training, under the
system that I devised, militia could handle our guns and handle them.
efficiently, the efficiency being told by what they were able to do at
target practice.
Senator CATRON. In doing that, would you let the militia have one
gun or an entire detachment, or would you mix them with your Regu-
lar troops who had been handling the gun ?
Gen. MURRAY. I assigned the guns entirely to the militia. My
system, which might be interesting to you, was to assign, for instance,
a company of coast artillerymen to their guns, to place in rear of
each regular coast artilleryman, as you might say, an understudy
of a militiaman to learn the duties of that particular coast artillery-
man, thus making each regular coast artilleryman the instructor for
his understudy. In a very few days, not more than four or five,
with this method of exchanging the regular coast artilleryman with
the corresponding understudy behind him, I was able to exchange.
the whole militia company for the regular Coast Artillery company,
not only for everything connected with the guns directly, but for
everything connected with the fire-control and searchlight stations
that belonged to that particular battery. Thus I found the militia.
was able to take up the work of the Coast Artillery at gun batteries,
each militiaman knowing only the duties of his particular regular
Coast artilleryman who had been in front of him, and in four or
five days they were able to work independently at gun batteries.
As soon as I learned this, I decided that it would be a good thing
if we had coast artillery militia, and from time to time undertake
to train it at the guns. With that in view, I asked the War Depart-
ment to authorize the organizing of coast artillery militia throughout
the country, hoping to thus get at least 50 per cent of the number
of men required to man the gun defenses of the United States, so as to
reduce the cost of Coast Artillery by the amount required to provide
a manning detail of regular coast artillerymen for 50 percent of the guns
mounted in the United States proper. It was in about 1909, I think,
that I began organizing coast artillery militia. Since that time we
have been able to enlist only about 7,000 such militia. Instead of
this, we ought to have, if we consider the number required to man
50 per cent of the guns of the United States proper, about 20,000,
So that we are about 16,000 short. Assuming that we could get that
20,000 coast artillery militia, we would still require 40,000 regular
Coast artillerymen to man the defenses of the United States and of
Our foreign possessions.
Senator CATRON. Do you know what the objection of the people to
enlisting as coast artillery militia is . What is the particular objec-
tion to that as contradistinguished from entering the other militia &
Gen. MURRAY. I do not know what, if any, particular objection has
ever been raised against it. It is simply that we have not been able
to get more than that number of coast artillery militia in addition
23380—PT 7—16—2
430 PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
to the regular Coast Artillery that we had already in service in 1909.
I never have heard of any particular objection being raised by militia-
men to serving in the Coast Artillery. - {}
Gen. MURRAY (reading): For ...i. Regular Army, for the defense
of our outlying possessions: 22 regiments of Infantry, 4 regiments of
Cavalry, 7 regiments of Field Artillery, and other troops of the Engi-
neers, Signal Corps, Sanitary and Quartermaster Corps; or at war
strength approximately 60,000 officers and men. -
For adjuncts from the Navy: Number of vessels required for the
defense of our outlying possessions, 17 submarines for use as adjuncts
for harbor defenses; 3 for Manila and Subig Bays; 2 for Guam, if it
is to be defended; 4 for Hawaii; 2 for Kiska Island, if it is to be forti-
fied; 4 for Canal Zone; and 2 for Guantanamo. - -
Required for the mainland of the United States: For the defense
of the Pacific coast, 36 regiments of Infantry, 10 regiments of
Cavalry, 9 regiments of Field Artillery, and other troops; or at peace
strength approximately 59,000 officers and men of the mobile army,
and for harbor defense approximately 13,000 Coast Artillery, or
about 72,000 in all. -
For the defense of the Atlantic coast: 72 regiments of Infantry, 8.
regiments of Cavalry, 16 regiments of Field Artillery and other troops;
or at peace strength approximately 102,000 officers and men of the
mobile army, and for harbor defense approximately 39,000 Coast
Artillery, or about 141,000 in all. -
For the protection of the Mexican border: 9 regiments of Cavalry,
approximately 9,000 officers and men. -
The Regular Army would then consist of 130 regiments of Infantry,
31 regiments of Cavalry, 32 regiments of Field Artillery, and about
40,000 other troops (Signal Corps, Engineers, Sanitary and Quarter-
master Corps), making in all approximately 230,000 officers and men
in regular mobile army.
This total mobile army troops added to the total of 40,000 Coast
Artillery troops before stated gives a grand total of about 270,000
Regular Army troops believed to be necessary for an efficient defense
of United States territory until the militia and volunteers can be
mobilized. - -
Submarines for Pacific coast: 12 submarines for use as adjudcts to
the harbor defenses on the coast; 2 for Puget Sound; 2 for Columbia
|River; 4 for San Francisco; 4 for Los Angeles, and 2 for San Diego.
Submarines for Atlantic coast: 22 submarines for use as adjuncts
to the harbor defenses on the two coasts; 2 for Portland, Me...; 2 for
Boston; 2 for Newport; 2 for eastern entrance Long Island Sound; 2
for southern entrance New York; 2 for Delaware River; 4 for Chesa-
peake Bay; 2 for Savannah; 2 for Mobile Bay, and 2 for Galveston.
A total of 51 submarines are thus required for harbor defenses.
(c) The necessary increase in the present authorized strength of
the Navy and the Regular Army. -
To fulfill the plan as above outlined, for the efficient defense of the
United States territory it is believed: (a) That the five-year naval
program as recently published in daily papers is an excellent one:
(b) that the Army program as recently published will be proven
unsatisfactory both to Congress and the Army, for the reason that,
like practically all other programs for Army legislation ever sub-
mitted to Congress, it is not based upon any fixed military policy and
provides for no continuous and progressive increase.
PREPAREDINESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 431.
While this is my belief in regard to the published Army program,
1 still think it would be best, in case you find that my belief may be
wrong, for you to give that program your support, just as you would
support a party platform although it might not in all respects pe
perfectly satisfactory. This being understood, I will proceed to
outline for your consideration what I believe would be found to be
a satisfactory program for Regular Army increase. -
The summary, above made, of what I consider to be the minimum
number of Regular Army troops required for the efficient defense of
United States territory shows that 270,000 officers and men are
necessary. Of this number 40,000 are Coast Artillery, and 230,000
mobile army troops. -
This number of mobile army troops it will be clearly understood is
an estimate, made in detail above, of what is considered by me to be
necessary for the efficient defense, and, as stated above, so much of
this estimate as relates to the defense of the United States proper is
about one-third less than that made by the National Land Defense
Board after about six years study of the subject. Of course my esti-
mate might possibly be reduced to some extent by careful pruning
by military experts, but I do not believe that any body of such
experts would, after a careful study of the subject, reduce the number
of 230,000 as given by me to less than 200,000, which would give for
the Regular Army required, including Coast Artillery, 240,000.
With regard to the 40,000 Regular Army Coast Artillery required,
this number is obtained as follows: -
The summary, above given, shows that about 60,000 Coast Artillery
men are necessary to furnish one manning detail for all harbor de-
fenses installed and projected in both the United States and its out-
lying possessions. The approved policy of the War Department
regarding Coast Artillery—as recommended by myself when Chief of
Coast Artillery and approved in 1907—contemplates a full manning
detail of Regular Coast Artillery men for all gun and mine defenses
in our outlying possessions and also for all mine defenses of the United
States proper, and 50 per cent of one manning detail for all gun
defenses of the United States proper, the remaining 50 per cent to
be composed of Coast Artillery Militia men.
As stated above, about 8,000 coast artillerymen are required for
our outlying possessions and about 52,000 for the United States
proper. Of the latter number, about 6,000 are required for mine
defense and about 46,000 for gun defense; 50 per cent of the latter
number, 23,000, is the number of regular coast artillerymen and also
of militia coast artillerymen required for the gun defenses of the
United States proper. A summation of these numbers (8,000, 6,000,
23,000) gives 37,000 for the number of regular_coast artillerymen
necessary under the approved policy of the War Department for our
Coast defenses iºniº and projected, which number is approxi-
mately double the present authorized strength, 19,734, of the Coast
Artillery Corps.
Regarding the 23,000 militia coast artillerymen required for man-
ning 50 per cent of the gun defenses of the United States U.P.
only 7,122, as shown by the Report of the Chief of Coast Artillery for
1914, have been organized in the six years that have passed since my
recommendation regarding militia coast artillerymen was approved.
If it is found impossible to organize the remaining 16,000 militia
432 PREPAREDNIESS FOR, NATIONAL DEFENSE.
coast artillerymen required, then this number of additional regular
coast artillerymen will eventually have to be authorized by Congress
if one manning detail is to be provided for all our coast defenses.
With regard to the 230,000 mobile Regular Army troops considered
to be necessary for an efficient defense, this number embraces 130
regiments of Infantry, 31 of Cavalry, 32 of Field Artillery and En-
gineer Signal Corps, sanitary, and Quartermaster Corps troops. The
present authorized strength of mobile Regular Army troops is near
72,000, which number embraces 30 regiments of Infantry, 15 of
Cavalry, 6 of Field Artillery, 1 of Porto Rican Infantry, and Engineer
Signal Corps, sanitary, and Quartermaster Corps troops. From this
it will be seen that if my estimate of the number of mobile Regular
Army troops required for efficient defense is even approximately
correct, more than three times the present authorized number of
Infantry regiments, about double that of Cavalry, and about five
times that of Field Artillery, are required. This, taken in connection
with what has already been shown regarding the Coast Artillery,
clearly shows that, according to my estimate, a Regular Army of
more than double the present authorized strength is required for an
efficient defense. &
In making the required increase in the line of the Regular Army
from its present authorized strength, about 72,000 to 270,000, we
should remember the well-known fact that one of the greatest diffi-
culties connected with the passage of piecemeal Army legislation is
due to jealousies of branches of the service not included in the legisla-
tion and consequent opposition to its passage. This being so, and it
being of paramount importance that all such opposition be reduced to
a minimum, and it having been shown that to make the required
increase every branch of the mobile Regular Army as well as the
Coast Artillery will have to be at least doubled, I would propose as a
program of increase: . -
(1) That every branch of the line of the Army, except the Field
Artillery, and the auxiliary troops connected therewith be doubled in
the next five years, the Field Artillery to be increased from 6 to 16
regiments, an increase of one-fifth to be added annually in each case,
except the Field Artillery, and of two regiments in this. -
(2) That at the end of five years another program covering the addi-
tional increase required for the Infantry, Field Artillery, Coast Artil-
lery, and auxiliary arms be made out and considered by Congress.
Senator DU PONT. General, how many new regiments of light Field
Artillery do you recommend?
Gen. MURRAY. I recommend increasing the Field Artillery from 6
to 16 regiments.
Senator DU Pont. Increasing it by 10%
Gen. MURRAY. Yes. -
Senator DU Pont. The present organization of the Field Artillery
regiment consists of 2 divisions of 3 batteries each. What would
be the objection to giving 3 divisions to each regiment # It would
lessen the number of colonel and lieutenant colonels to be appointed,
and it seems to me it would be just as efficient. The only reason I
can see for Our regiments being Organized in that way is because
that is the way in the German Army, but in the French Army they
have 4 divisions of 12 batteries each, and, as we are working for
efficiency combined with economy, it seems to me a regiment of Field
PREPAREDINESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 433
Artillery ought to include at least three divisions. What is your
opinion about that ?
Gen. MURRAY. I would rather have you ask a field artilleryman,
who has been making a special study of that subject, that question.
Senator CATRON. Who has been doing that %
Gen. MURRAY. The Chief of Staff should be able to answer it.
Such work is under his charge. Up until the time I left the War
Department Col. Greble was in charge of all affairs in the Office of the
Chief of Staff relating to Field Artifiery. I do not know now what
field artilleryman has charge of that work, so therefore I am unable
to answer.
The CHAIRMAN. Col. Treat is the one you have in mind.
Gen. MURRAY. I am given to understand he has charge of Field
Artillery work now, and should therefore be better able to answer any
question relating to Field Artillery than I. -
Gen. MURRAY (reading): (d) General provisions to be made by Con-
gress. Whatever may be the increase authorized by law for the Navy
and the Regular Army, one of the greatest difficulties connected with
the increase will undoubtedly be that of procuring additional enlisted
men and qualified officers. .
With regard to procuring officers: Under existing law all vacancies
in both the Navy and Army are filled annually as far as practicable
by graduates of the United States Naval Academy and the United
States Military Academy, respectively, and at the present time the
annual number of graduates from each of these academies is just
about sufficient to fill the vacancies due to casualties that occur annu-
ally in the service. If the present strength of the Navy and Army
should be doubled, as is proposed by me for the Army, it would
require that the capacity of both academies be doubled to provide
sufficient graduates to fill annually the vacancies that would be due
to casualties in the increased force. If a five-year program of in-
crease should be adopted by Congress at the coming session I would
strongly recommend that it at the same time authorize that the
capacity of the Naval and Military Academies be doubled as soon as
practicable. This for the reason that if the capacity were doubled
next year, no graduates would be available under the increase for
four years. To make this increase in the academies, I would recom-
mend that the present cadet appointing power of all Congressmen
and the President be doubled, and that the President, or the Secre-
tary of the Navy, in case of the Naval Academy, or the Secretary of
War in case of the Military Academy, be authorized to fill annually
all vacancies at the academies unfilled by Congressmen.
The Military Academy, even when the Corps of Cadets is doubled,
will be unable to graduate a sufficient number of cadets to fill the
yacancies in the grade of second lieutenant due to any authorized
increase in the Army. Such vacancies existing after the appoint-
ment of the graduates of the Military Academy, will not be less than
600 annually for the next five years if the Army were increased as I
suggest, and if part 2 of my program is adopted this time will be
increased to 10 years. -
That is, assuming this suggestion of doubling the Military Academy
were adopted, it would only be able to provide for the annual casu-
alties that would occur after the Army had been doubled, and all
434 PREPAIRED NIESS FOR, NATIONAL DEFENSE.
vacancies due to the Army increase would have to be filled by ap-
pointment from civil life. -
These vacancies will, of necessity, be filled by the promotion of
qualified enlisted men and by appointments from civil life.
The present regulations on the subject of civilian appointments to
the Army are excellent and can not well be improved upon. They
serve to encourage service in the Organized Militia and foster military
instruction in our universities and colleges by giving militia officers
and graduates of institutions whose curriculum includes military
science the preference in the question of appointments as well as
higher relative rank when appointed.
Tegarding the procuring of enlisted men for any increase in the
Navy and Army, I do not believe any great additional number,
certainly for the Army, can be obtained unless the period of enlistment
is shortened.
The matter of transportation—wagon, motor, and railroad—is of
such primary, paramount importance that it is believed the necessary
authority should be granted by Congress before war comes for com-
mandeering all such transportation as may be needed for immediate
war purposes, as delay at that time might be of almost vital impor-
tance to the Nation. -
Assuming that some increase in the Regular Army will be made at
the coming session of Congress, the question of training of this increase
as well as of the rest of the Army will unquestionably arise.
With regard to training, it should be clearly understood that the
main difference between an armed mob and an army is due to the
training and recruiting discipline of the latter, and that just as we
find this difference between an armed mob and an army, so will we
find that the difference in the efficiency of armies is largely due to
their difference in training.
In years gone by it was considered that if troops received good
company and regimental training but little more was necessary to
form an efficient army than to bring such troops together. At the
present day the armament and equipment of the two armies being
equal, an army so trained would have little chance of success against
an army that had received higher training, embracing not only
brigade, division, and army corps training, but also field army
training. In Germany and Japan their armies have had this higher
training in time of peace for years past. Besides this peace training
the armies of Japan lately had, and the armies of Germany are now
having, the best of all training, that of actual war. In this country
the Regular Army has had practically no training other than by
company, and by regiment for many years, until about four years
ago a division of about 10,000 men was organized in Texas and given
Some field training. -
The necessity for higher training for an army being understood,
it goes, almost without saying, that if we are ever to have an effi-
cient Army—an Army that will not be found wanting in the advent
of Sudden war—provision must be made for its higher training in
time of peace.
In direct connection with this matter of training is that of the
quartering of the Army in time of peace, or its garrisoning. In con-
sidering this matter of garrisoning, the question of the duties of our
Army in time of peace naturally arises. These duties, briefly stated,
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 435
are: (1) To preserve and maintain order along our Mexican border,
in our outlying possessions, and in the different States of the Union
under the constitutional guaranty against domestic violence; (2) to
properly train itself for war; (3) to assist in the training of the Or-
ganized Militia and other citizen soldiers. To properly perform the
duties defined in (1) the necessary troops required therefor should
be stationed in time of peace along the Mexican border, in our out-
lying possessions, and in those States where such domestic violence
as would necessitate the calling out of Federal troops is known to be
liable to occur; to properly perform those defined in (2) strategic
points along the Atlantic, Gulf, and Pacific coasts in as large units,
brigade and divisional, as is consistent with the performance of the
duties defined in (1) and (3); to perform those defined in (3), so much
of the Army as is not necessary to fulfill the requirements of (1), and
for the higher training required by (2), should be apportioned among
the different States in accordance with the strength of its Organized
Militia and other citizen soldiery.
The above being believed to be the ideal way our Regular Army
should be quartered in time of peace, there remains to be seen what
should and could be done, practically, in quartering the Army in case
any considerable increase therein is authorized by Congress. First of
all, it is believed that our outlying possessions should be at all times
garrisoned with whatever may be decided to be the number of troops
necessary for their defense.
Gen. MURRAY. The reason for this is that you would not be able,
in case of war, to transport any reinforcements to these outlying
possessions.
Gen. MURRAY (reading): Second, it is thought that provisions
should be made by Congress for establishing at least one Infantry
division post on the Pacific coast, a Cavalry division post on the
Mexican border, and two Infantry divisions on the Atlantic coast.
Third, that all regimental and other posts now garrisoned or occu-
ied throughout the United States be, for the present, continued to
e garrisoned, but under no circumstances, either from motives of
economy or otherwise, should any abandoned post be regarrisoned.
In other words, if there is any increase made sº what is required
for garrisoning the posts that are now occupied, I would put that
* in the places where it could be properly and efficiently
trained. -
Senator CATRON. What would you say would be the least number
of soldiers that you would put in a garrison 7
Gen. MURRAY. I believe that if the questions of efficiently training
the soldiers of the Army itself, and also of giving aid and instruction
to the militia, or continental army are considered, the minimum
garrison should be a regiment. In the first place, I would therefore
take from such increase as may be made in the Regular Army enough
troops to form at least three division posts for proper training of
those divisions and then divide the remaining troops of the Regular
Army among regimental and brigade posts, and select for such posts
those where their garrisons would be of most service to the Govern-
ment; that is, in training themselves, and in training the militia.
Senator DU Pont. There are one or two brigade posts actually
existing. What would you do with those ?
436 PREPAIRED NIESS FOR, NATIONAL DEFENSE,
Gen. MURRAY. As I said, I would leave all of those. . The minimum.
post should, I think, be a regimental post.
Senator CATRON. Outside of putting your troops along the Mexican
border and the Canadian bº, the balance would be scattered
through the United States and along the coast. What would be
your maximum force in time of peace for instruction and things of
that kind in one of these posts?
Gen. MURRAY. As I stated in my memorandum, I would recom-
mend that at least one Infantry division post be made on the Pacific
coast, one Cavalry division post on the Mexican border, and two
division posts on the Atlantic.
Senator DU PONT. Gen. Murray, there was an officer here who
recommended very strongly the establishment of a division post
at Fort Benjamin Harrison, in Indiana, to be equipped and used for
an expeditionary force, if we had to send out any. What would
you think of that plan Ž -
Gen. MURRAY. I would prefer to have division posts closer to the
coast, to be used in connection with the defense of the coast in accord-
ance with the general lines for defense that I have recommended in
this memorandum.
As this “memorandum,” in spite of my efforts to curtail it, has
strung out to great length, I will only say regarding the Organized
Militia, that all necessary arms, munitions, and equipment for such
number of the militia as may possibly be called into Federal service
in time of war, be provided in time of peace and stored in such places
as will insure the prompt mobilization of the militia in time of war.
Senator DU Pont, May I inquire whether you think it would be
expedient or advisable to increase the appropriation for the militia
so as to enable them to be paid by the National Government'.
Gen. MURRAY. Individually, I do not believe it would be.
Senator CATRON. What amount of rifles should be manufactured
and turned out and kept on hand for the use of the Army which
might be called into existence in case we were forced into war, as a
preparatory proposition, to be kept in stock?
en. MURRAY. As far as I am able to judge from what has been
done during the present war in Europe, I should say that we should
have a reserve of, or at least be able to call out, not less than one
million men, and if we were to call that many men out we should
unquestionably have the requisite arms and other equipment to
supply them at the shortest possible notice.
enator CATRON. My question was based upon the idea that
probably you would want as many arms as you had men.
Gen. MURRAY. It is simply a question of how many volunteers you
would want to call out. Of course, when we speak of an adequate
defense, we should name the enemy, and consider what troops he
can probably bring against us. The question thus becomes prob-
lematical. Judging, however, by what is now going on in Europe,
I should say that certainly not iº than half a million men would
have to be called out in case we got into war with any of the great
powers, and probably many more than that. t
Senator DU PONT. sº we not have a supply of field guns in
reserve :
Gen. MURRAY. Unquestionably.
y
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 437
Senator DU PONT. How many do you think we should have,
because it takes a long time to make those 7 -
Gen. MURRAY. That question can best be answered by the Field
Artillery officers in charge of Field Artillery matters in the office of
the Chief of Staff. That is, I would prefer to have them state how
many guns per thousand men we should have. The French, I believe,
now have increased the number to something over six per thousand.
We have been trying hard to get about two per thousand, and I under-
stand have not yet succeeded. I think, however, we ought, without
any question, not only to make the strongest possible effort to increase
the number per thousand, but also to increase the caliber of our Field
Artillery guns, this owing to what has been done by heavy artillery
fire during the present war in Europe.
Senator DU B. What, in your judgment, would be the result
if we had 50,000 or 100,000 of our regular troops pitted against an
equal number of good troops of any foreign nation, our 50,000 men
having only two guns to the thousand, and they having six? What
would be the result -
Gen. MURRAY. I do not think it would take long to decide the
result, and in their favor.
Regarding the calling out and the mobilization of volunteers,
two of the greatest difficulties with doing both these promptly are the
procuring of efficient officers for training any great number of vol-
unteers and supplying any great number with modern arms, ammuni-
tion, and equipment.
As to officers, the existing volunteer laws allow four Regular Army
officers to each regiment of volunteeers. If 500,000 volunteers are
called out, it would require approximately 1,500 Regular Army
officers to give each º: regiment its complement of four
such officers. -
Senator DU Pont. I think the text of the volunteer law reads
“not exceeding four officers.” It does not assign four regular
officers to each regiment, but it authorizes not exceeding that number.
Gen. MURRAY. Yes; it simply authorizes not to exceed four
regular officers to each regiment. I believe, from my own experi-
ence with a volunteer regiment, that such a regiment ought to have
at least that number of regular officers. I told this committee of
which you were chairman when the volunteer bill was being con-
sidered, in the most emphatic terms, that every such regiment should
have at least five Regular Army officers assigned to it, and that five
per regiment should therefore be authorized.
That at least such number of trained officers per regiment would
be found necessary in war is rendered more than evident by the ter-
rible losses England has sustained during the present war, due largely
to lack of trained officers with her newly organized regiments. To
meet this difficulty in case volunteers are called out, I see no other
way than for Congress to authorize extra Regular Army officers in
time of peace, and for the War Department to keep these extra
officers on militia and college duty until they are needed for volunteer
SGI’VICG.
Regarding this matter of trained officers, a distinguished American
military writer, in describing the Battle of Tanneburg, August 26 to
31, 1915, in which about 60,000 Russians were left killed or wounded
4.38 PREPAREDNIESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
on the field, recently said, “Foremost among Tanneburg's many
lessons to the Army student, there is one salient fact that ought to
be dinned into the ears of every American citizen—it is a crime to
send even the bravest and most patriotic soldiers in the world upon
a modern battlefield under any but the most highly trained profes-
sional officers.”
Gen. MURRAY (reading): Arms, munitions, clothing, equipment, and
transportation must be provided in time of peace. They must be
stored where they will be most needed and whence they can be issued
promptly in the event of war.
F. PROVISIONS TO BE MADE FOR A RESERVIE.
With a view, therefore, not only of procuring enough enlisted men
to fill any increase that may be authorized, but also of rendering
more trained men available in the country for filling a reserve, I
would recommend that the period of enlistment for any arm of the
service be made the minimum required for efficient training in that
arm of the service under ordinary service conditions, and that no
reenlistments except of noncommissioned officers, enlisted specialists,
and mechanics, cooks, bakers, etc., be allowed. For Infantry I
would place the minimum at one year and for all other branches of
the service at One and a half years.
Provision should be made for periodical mobilization and training
of reserves and for a liberal pay allowance when they are so employed.
All men who pass into the reserve from the Regular Army should
be required to keep the uniforms which they had at time of discharge.
The unauthorized wearing of the uniform of the United States Army
should be made a punishable offense by law.
Senator CATRON. How would you create that reserve 7
Gen. MURRAY. I have made no suggestion as to forming the men
into a reserve, but simply that after this one year or year and a half
of service we should turn them out in the country at large. As I
figured it out, there would thus be 150,000 to 200,000 trained men
annually turned out into the country. The paper that I have here
presented had gotten so large when I reached this subject that I did
not want to go any further into the subject of reserves or their organ-
ization. I concluded I had written enough to give a general idea on
the subject of preparedness, and to have considered fully the subject
of forming this great number of men into a reserve, would have re-
quired a great deal of study and much more writing. My own idea
is that if these men should be simply turned out into the country at
large and no attempt is made to organize them to keep track of them
as reservists, or to give them a small amount of pay annually, that
if they are simply turned loose with no pay, we would have in the
country in a very short time a large body of men that had been trained
as soldiers. If war broke out, I believe these men would promptly
respond to a call for volunteers.
The CHAIRMAN. Would they not be likely to respond, General,
even if we kept no record of them . For instance, it was stated here
a while ago that some 46,000 reservists of Greece were ready to
respond to the call of their country.
Gen. MURRAY. That is my own belief, and that is why I did not
consider the subject of reserves.
PREPAIRED NESS FOR, NATIONAL DEFENSE. 439
Senator DU PONT. There would be volunteers if we were attacked,
in a patriotic war? - -
Gen. MURRAY. Yes. I would say further with regard to that,
Senator, that it is my own belief that it would be better if we turned
out this big body of trained men into the country each year; and with
the prospect of war only in the indefinite future, it would be better
not to pay them so much a year as has been proposed, but to give
them extra pay when they volunteer—call this “extra pay,”
“bounty,” or what you please—but let it only be so much pay as is
necessary to get the men to volunteer in case war should actually
come. Men receiving this extra pay or bounty should, I believe, be
graded so that those with best records and most recent discharges
should receive most pay. If this should be done the bounty paid
would correspond to the efficiency of the soldier. The reverse of this
would be the case if these men are paid annually as proposed.
Senator DU PONT. If they pass their inspection alright, then you
would pay them .
Gen. MURRAY. If they met the enlistment requirements.
Senator DU Pont. I think so, too.
The CHAIRMAN. Why is there such a difference of opinion among
experts in the Army as to the terms of enlistment 2 The other day
One of the officers opposed short-term enlistments. -
Gen. MURRAY. Yes; and I also saw, in looking over published
reports of the hearings before this committee, that the Chief of Staff
stated that he did not believe in a short-term enlistment, and that he
did not believe in getting these trained men out into the country.
Why he believed that, I do not know. I have simply stated to you
that I do believe in it, and that I think this is the best method of
getting trained men in the country for volunteer service in case of
Wa.I’.
Senator DUPONT. You have just stated that in your judgment the
only people who would be allowed to reenlist would be noncom-
missioned officers and special artisans and mechanics, and so on,
who would be useful. If the term of enlistment were one year for
the Infantry, would you allow any of these people after they had been
out a year, to come back and enlist again? Do you mean to say that
you would bar from all future enlistments in the Army, except in
time of war, any old soldiers who had served a year' .
Gen. MURRAY. I had not thought of it in that way, and I do not
believe that I would bar them for more than a given period. I
would try, however, to get a large number of trained men out into
the country.
The CHAIRMAN. You would discourage reenlistments'
Gen. MURRAY. Yes; I would try do do so.
Senator DUPONT. I think the best way to discourage reenlistments
would be to provide that only the special men that you suggested,
noncommissioned men and officers and others, should be entitled to
extra pay upon reenlisting, but any other men would get no extra
pay on reenlistment. That would be one way.
Gen. MURRAY. My idea is to get a great number of trained men out
in the country that would be available if called out for war who could
quickly be organized, armed, and equipped, and, with their training,
could quickly be gotten into proper shape for field service.
440 PREPAIRED NESS FOR, NATIONAL DEFENSE.
The CHAIRMAN. You would have a short-term enlistment with the
colors and so many years in the reserve?
Gen. MURRAY. I had no idea of having anything connected with
the reserve, but just to simply let them go at the end of a year or a
year and a half, and then, when war came, to call them out.
Senator CATRON. Your theory is that these men would reenlist if
they were called on in case of war. In doing that, would you limit
those who originally enlisted to any certain age? Take this fact, for
instance, that a young man has reenlisted, and he goes out so as to
be available for enlistment in case of war; he is more likely to enlist
when he is young than when he is older. If you enlist him at any
age, and he once got out and stayed out some time, there would be
less probability of his coming in. Would you recommend any change
in limitation as to the age of those persons who should actually enlist
in the first place, so as to meet that difficulty
Gen. MURRAY. I think that would be better. That is, in accord-
ance with your suggestion, to reenlist only the older men, those above
a certain age. - -
Senator CATRON. It seems to me those are the ones who would be
more enthusiastic and who would enlist when we called upon them.
Gen. MURRAY. For that reason I would want these men turned
out into the country so as to have that great body of trained men
to form quickly into proper organizations for war service. -
Senator CATRON. A young man under 25 would be much more
likely to go than one who was about 30.
Gen. MURRAY. That is undoubtedly correct; and then, besides
that, if you get only young men for service, they would probably be
in better shape physically than older men and this would keep down
the pension list. - -
Senator CATRON. But without reference to reenlistments would
you say that you would limit the age of the men who enlisted in the
Army to any certain number of years or to any certain age?
Senator DU Pont. They now begin at 18, I believe, as the minimum.
Gen. MURRAY. Yes; 18 to, I think, 35.
Senator CATRON. Would you cut that down to, say, 25 or some-
thing like that, in order to get a lot of these men who would go out
and upon whom you could rely as your real reserve and upon whom
you could call to come in and fill your army when you needed it 3
Gen. MURRAY. If you could get all the men you want for regular
service, regardless of the age—Gen. McCain says we can not—I would
say, as you suggest, take only younger men, from 18 to 25. If,
however, it should be found that we can not get all the men that we
want for an increased regular army under present enlistment regu-
lations, I would say change the enlistment requirements sufficiently
to enable a great number of men that are now rejected to be enlisted.
The CHAIRMAN. The standard is too high .
Gen. MURRAY. It is a question of a standard and of undertaking to
be absolutely certain that we enlist only men that are physically sound.
For instance, the standard as to height, giving it from memory, is 5
feet 4. I would suggest lowering this standard down to 5 feet 2 or
even less and enlisting recruits at this height if they are physically
Sound. In the same way I would suggest increasing the height.
There is also, I believe, a certain standard as to weight, a certain
standard as to the relative height and weight. By varying or chang-
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 441.
ing the standard we might thus get a number of men that are just
as sound physically as those we now get, and I would say that so far
as I can see they would make just about as good soldiers as we now
get under our present enlistment requirements.
If I should then find it impossible to get the number of men wanted
for an increased Regular Army under present enlistment regulations
and the present enlistment period, then I would change the enlist-
ment period and the standard of enlistment, and if it should still be
found that the necessary men for the increased Army could not be
obtained, I do not see any other way than to increase the pay of
enlisted men to that necessary to get the men required, just as you
have to increase labor pay to get workmen in civil life.
Senator DU PONT. What do you think of lowering the age limit,
say, 17 as a minimum, provided they are physically efficientº
d Gen. MURRAY. I would say, without any question, that I would
O SO.
Senator DU PONT. In the Civil War, or the War between the
States, there were 2,000,000 men engaged under 21, some of them
* the age of 12 and even at 10—the drummer boys that used to
enlist.
Senator CATRON. Do you know what is the average height of the
Japanese soldier'. -
Gen. MURRAY. No, I do not; but it must be pretty low, as against
ours—and they apparently make fairly good soldiers.
Senator CATRON. You were talking about 5 feet 2. Do they come
up to that % -
Gen. MURRAY. I do not know what their average height is.
Senator DU Pont. I do not know that they come up to 5 feet,
many of them. -
Gen. MURRAY. It seems to be simply a question of the build of
the man and of his physical condition and capacity, whether or not
* is physically sound and has the physical strength to make a
soldier.
Senator CATRON. A man 5 feet 2 will do just as good shooting and
just as good fighting and just as good trench digging as any other ?
Gen. MURRAY. Yes. * ~
The CHAIRMAN. You provide for no other system of reserve than
discharging the enlisted men into the community ?
Gen. MURRAY. No, sir; I did not consider that question, nor did I
ever give much thought or consideration to this question of reserves.
I never have been satisfied, however, or never have believed that the
proposed reserve system of keeping track of a man after he has left
the service and of paying him a small amount annually to insure his
prompt enlistment in case of war is a good One. It seems to me that
it would be better, as I have stated, to let them all go out into the
country at large on expiration of their terms of enlistment and then
undertake to get them to volunteer in case of war by means of
bounty or extra pay for reenlistment. In other words, to let these
trained men be scattered all over the country and not undertake to
keep track of them. That is my idea. -
Senator DU PONT. In other words, you would pay them in a lump
Sum what they would probably receive .# , except that the
man to whom you pay a lump sum must be sound and fit for imme-
diate service?
: 442 PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
Gen. MURRAY. That is exactly it.
Senator DU PONT. And the people you pay annually may be
maimed -
Gen. MURRAY. And at the time they are wanted they may not be
fit for service. And more than that, you could so arrange, as before
stated, to pay them an amount in accordance with the length of time
they have been out of the service and in accordance with the char-
acter of service they rendered when in service. -
Senator DU Pont. That is the law now—the length of time they
have been out of the service. It goes from $50 on up to $300, so
much a month.
The CHAIRMAN. What is your opinion with reference to the ques-
tion of universal military training? •
Gen. MURRAY. The only recommendation that I made to the War
Department this year on that subject, when called on by the Secre-
tary of War for my views on the subject of the Army, was that a
study be made of both the Swiss and the Australian systems, to see if
we could not find something in them that we could well adapt to
our own country.
The CHAIRMAN. Do you not think that that would be an ideal
system, if it could be done? p
Gen. MURRAY. That was my recommendation.
The CHAIRMAN. If you would take the Australian system, for
instance, and apply it to boys between 12 and 17 years of age, at the
end of one year after the bill took effect you would have over
2,000,000 young men between the ages of 12 and 17, and some over
that, probably between 17 and 23, who had some training. That is
too many. Could there not be superadded to that a selective system, a
gradual sifting process, so that we would have a body of men large
enough and so trained that they would make a splendid reserve
army
Gen. MURRAY. I thought that could be done, and in my recom-
mendation I simply wanted the War College to make a study of the
two systems and make its recommendations after having made a
thorough study of both systems.
The CHAIRMAN. Gen. Macomb stated this morning that the War
College was preparing such a bill and would have it ready to report
this week.
Gen. MURRAY. Yes. I did not know that and I am glad to hear it.
The CHAIRMAN. You do think that would be an ideal system if
the American people could be educated up to the point of believing
in it .
Gen. MURRAY. I believe so. I do not believe—if you want my
opinion on the general subject—that the militia system, as we have
it now, will ever be satisfactory. That has been told to you over
and over again, and many reasons have been given why it never will
be. Nor do I believe that the continental army will prove to be a
Success. I do not believe that it will be possible to get the 133,000
men annually that its advocates hope to get.
Senator CATRON: You think you would not get over 10,000 a year
On that continental-army idea º
Gen. MURRAY. I would not like to say how many, but I certainly
do not believe they will be able to get 133,000; and I believe we
will eventually have to adopt some system similar to the Swiss or
Australian.
PREPAREDIN ESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 443
Senator CATRON. General, there is one question that you referred
to indirectly a while ago. You said it took a year or about a year
within which to fully educate an infantry soldier; that is, you could
fully discipline him and drill him. You said that you took a year
for that, or a year and a half. Take the Infantry: You spoke about
the effect of bringing the raw recruits or the undisciplined recruits
into the Army. How was it with reference to the Japanese Army
.in the Russo-Japanese War 2 I understood that when the war
broke out they had about 230,000 men in their regular army. They
went into the field with a million and a half or two million, and they
put them into the field very rapidly. Were those men educated and
trained, or were they drilled or disciplined ?
Gen. MURRAY. They unquestionably had received a certain amount
of training, exactly how much I do not know. You did not catch
exactly what I said with regard to the one year's training.
Senator CATRON. Probably not.
Gen. MURRAY. I said one year under ordinary garrison training. I
believe that if you could get your men enlisted and brought together
in bodies for training under efficient officers, and give them what
might be called intensive training, as in case of intensive farming,
that it would then take nothing like a year to get these men properly
trained for war service.
To tell you of my personal experience in training volunteers, I
raised a volunteer regiment in the fall of 1899, and in three months
from the time I began to enlist men for the regiment I left New York
for the Philippines with what I thought was as well trained a regiment
of infantry as I had ever seen. To show what others thought of that
regiment—my own opinion of it being as stated—there was a discus-
sion in the office of the Chief of Staff some years after my regiment
was discharged, with regard to the question of the transfer of officers
from one branch of the service to another, and as to what would be
the effect on the efficiency of the service of putting all lieutenants of
the line of the Army on one lineal list, so as to equalize promotion
throughout the service. In that discussion a very able infantry
officer, later the Chief of Staff, arose and said, in line with what I
have just said with regard to my regiment: “I would say with regard
to this subject of interchange of officers that the best infantry regi-
ment I ever saw, and I make no exceptions, Regular or Volunteer,
was commanded by a coast artillery officer in the Philippines.” I
looked over toward him and said, calling him by name, “I was one
of three coast artillery officers that commanded a regiment in the
Philippines. If that compliment is intended for me, my hat is off.”
He replied: “You can take the compliment.” That was a volunteer
regiment, and I relate this incident merely to show you what an able
infantry officer thought of a volunteer infantry regiment that I had
raised and trained in three months.
Senator CATRON. Were these soldiers Filipinos?
Gen. MURRAY. Oh, no; they were men who had enlisted in this
country from Maine to Louisiana. *
Senator DU PONT. United States volunteers. General, we all
know of your efficiency; but taking the average officer, I do not
believe that he could bring up a regiment of volunteers in the highly
efficient condition that you were able to do in three months.
444 PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
Another question I wanted to ask you was this: When you referred
to one year's instruction, did you mean one year's instruction with
regiments? Because a great many of our recruits do not get to
their regiments for six months. They enlist in New York and are
sent out to the Philippines, and so on. Do you count that in in that
ear? - sº
y Gen. MURRAY. I would undertake to make my recruiting system
such as to keep them as short a time as possible at the recruiting sta-,
tions and as long as possible with the regiment.
Senator DU PONT. As a matter of fact, they do not, you know.
Gen. MURRAY. In that way I think you could get efficient training
ID 8, Wea,T.
sº CATRON. Where did you train that regiment? Where
did you get your officers? From what class of men were they–
military men or civilians or what?
Gen. MURRAY. Two regular officers, and the rest were officers
appointed by the President from all Atlantic and Gulf coast States;
that is, from Maine to Louisiana. What I did in order to hasten the
recruiting of the regiment was to leave each officer as he was ap-
pointed in the district from which he had been appointed to recruit
and then had each officer report to me by telegraph each day what he
had succeeded in doing. If an officer was doing well with his re-
cruiting, I left him at work. If he was not doing well, I ordered him
to report to me at regimental headquarters for other duties, to drill
and instruct the recruits who had arrived at headquarters. In that
way I succeeded in getting my regiment recruited in a very short time
and trained, as I have stated, in three months. So well trained that
I was satisfied that I had a well-trained regiment when I embarked
with it for the Philippines.
Senator DU PONT. Do you know anything from personal knowledge
about the efficiency of the Philippine Scouts?
Gen. MURRAY. I do not. I never have had any opportunity to
serve with them. At the time I was in the Philippines I formed four
companies of Filipinos—you might call them scouts—and I found
them to be remarkably good soldiers. I was very much surprised
to find what excellent service I received from those companies. .
Senator DU PONT. Congress, a number of years ago, authorized
the enlistment of 10,000 Philippine Scouts. For some reason they
have never enlisted more than five or six thousand. -
Gen. MURRAY. I do not know. I have never kept in touch with
what they were doing in that line in the Philippines. I can simply
º from experience with regard to the four companies of Filipinos
that I had under me a year while there. I thought they were excel-
lent soldiers. .
Senator CATRON. There has been something said here by Some of
the other officers who appeared before us in regard to discharging
men who had enlisted when they had gone through a system of strict
or intensive training, and a certificate was to be given them by their
commanding officer or by a board as to their proficiency as soldiers.
If a soldier accompanied that training within four or five or six months
he could be discharged if he wished to be. What would you say in
reference to enlistments for a year and a half
Gen. MURRAY. I would say that it would be an excellent thing
to discharge a soldier in that way. First, you would get more men
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 445
into the Regular Army by thus reducing the period of service, and,
Second, you would get better men to enlist and more trained men
back into the country.
Senator CATRON. I would say that a man who did that would be
a good soldier. Would it contribute toward getting men to enlist
more readily if they could do that %
Gen. MURRAY. Not only to enlist more readily but a better class
of men would enlist.
Senator CATRON. That is what I meant. I wanted to include both
those questions.
The CHAIRMAN. And it would diminish desertions, too !
Gen. MURRAY. Yes. A certificate could be issued to him letting
him out of service as soon as he was qualified. I think that would be
an excellent idea.
º CHAIRMAN. Is there any other statement that you wish to
make 3
Gen. MURRAY. No, sir.
(Whereupon, at 4 o'clock and 20 minutes, p. m., the committee
took a recess until Tuesday, January 25, 1916, at 10.30 a. m.)
23380—PT 7—16—3
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
TUESDAY, JANUARY 25, 1916.
UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON MILITARY AFFAIRs,
Washington, D. C.
The committee met, at the expiration of the recess, at 10.30 o'clock
a. m., Senator Geo. E. Chamberlain (chairman) presiding. -
STATEMENT OF BRIG, GEN, DAN C. KING MAN, CHIEF OF
ENGINEERS, UNITED STATES ARMY.
The CHAIRMAN. General, will you state your full name, rank, and
present position? - -
Gen. KINGMAN. Dan C. Kingman, Chief of Engineers, Brigadier
General, United States Army, I am at present as Chief of Engineers
in ºrge of the civil work of the corps and of certain of the military
WOPR.
The CHAIRMAN. General, we have had under consideration here
for some days a number of questions involving the reorganization
of the Army as a whole, and we wanted to hear from your corps.
I assume you have given the matter more or less consideration, and
any statement that you desire to make with reference to the whole
subject we would be pleased to hear from you.
Gen. KINGMAN. I arranged a statement when they called me
before the House Committee, but the bill under consideration there
was so different from the other bills that it would be hard to make
my statement fit any other bill.
The CHAIRMAN. Did your statement apply only to the so-called
Hay bill? - . -
Gen. KING MAN. More particularly to that. The great defect in
that bill as I saw it was the failure to make a good organization for the
Army. Taking the Regular Army as a start, it failed to organize it
into proper units, taking the division as a proper unit with its proper
proportion to different arms of the service, and, as far as the Engineer
troops were concerned in the division, it was a battalion of four com-
panies. That seems to me very deficient in number of men and of
officers, and what I urged particularly there was the regimental
Organization, one regiment of Engineer troops to the division, and
each regiment to consist of two battalions of three companies each,
with a full complement of field officers, so that it would make it
possible in the division to have the colonel of the troops act also as
division engineer on the staff of the division commander, and the
lieutenant colonel could command the troops directly or, if it was
necessary, to separate it into Smaller units, one of the majors could
23380—PT. 8–16 1 % 447
448 PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
command a battalion, or they could finally come down to the com-
}. I also endeavored to point out the shortage relatively of
ngineer troops which we would have. . We would not have enough
to correspond to the European proportion or what is now conceded
#: the proper number of Engineer troops as compared with the
Infantry.
sºor THOMAs. When you say engineer troops do you mean a
body of troops composed of engineers? e -
Gen. KING MAN. Of engineer soldiers; yes.
Senator THOMAS. Engineer soldiers; does that mean the educated
engineer or a troop under the command of an engineering force for the
work of the Engineer Division of the Army'
Gen. KING MAN. The proper name, probably, for the engineer sol-
dier would be the sapper; we call them sappers and miners and pon-
toniers. They call . that in many of the foreign services. They
call them pioneers also. In the European armies a little more than
6 per cent of the infantry strength is considered a proper assignment
to the engineers, or to sappers and miners and pontoniers. That is a
little less than the proportion in the German Army, the French Army,
the English Army, and the Japanese Army, and in our country hereto-
fore it has been very much less than that ; so what we recommend
now is to put ourselves on the same proportion of strength that they
have been finding stands the test of war. In some of the fronts, like
the western front in Europe, they have increased considerably, prob-
ably temporarily, the proportion of engineer troops, going to as high
as 12 and 14 per cent engineer troops as compared with infantry.
The CHAIRMAN. So that out of an army of 150,000 your proportion
would be about 9,000 engineer troops?
Gen. KINGMAN. About 9,000; yes, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. About 6 per cent of whatever the Army organiza-
tion may be 3
Gen. KINGMAN. Six per cent of the Infantry only. There would be
other kinds of troops in an army of 150,000, so that a complete army
of 150,000 would not have as many as 9,000 engineer troops.
The CHAIRMAN. Your estimate is based on the Infantry?
Gen. KINGMAN. On the Infantry strength. •
The CHAIRMAN. Did you point out the lack of cohesion in the
THay bill between the proposed plan and the Engineer Corps?
Gen. KINGMAN. Very briefly I pointed that out.
The CHAIRMAN. Or did you state amendments that ought to be
made to that bill?
Gen. KINGMAN. I suggested an amendment.
Capt. ALVIN B. BARBER. That amendment was based on three
Infantry divisions and one Cavalry division, besides foreign service
garrisons, so that the features of the draft the General submitted
are based on that organization. It would have to be changed for
our bill.
y The CHAIRMAN. Why not embody that suggested amendment to
the Hay bill in the record here?
Gen. KING MAN. I will be very glad to do it.
The CHAIRMAN. It might as well go in, because we are discussing
all of these measures.
Gen. KINGMAN. Yes, sir.

PREPAIRED NESS FOR, NATIONAL DEFENSE. 449
(The suggested amendment is as follows:)
SEC. 5. That the Corps of Engineers shall consist of one Chief of Engineers, who
shall be a major general; two brigadier generals; twenty-three colonels; thirty-two
lieutenant colonels; seventy-four majors; one hundred and four captains; one hun-
dred first lieutenants; and fifty-nine second lieutenants. Provided, That appoint-
ments to the grade of second lieutenant in the Corps of Engineers shall continue to
be made as now provided by law, but officers of the Army or Navy of the United
States may become candidates for said appointments under the provisions of section
five of the act approved February twenty-seventh, nineteen hundred and eleven,
without previously vacating their commissions as officers and without previously
establishing eligibility for appointment as junior engineer under the Engineer Bureau
of the War Department.
The enlisted force of the Corps of Engineers shall consist of four regiments of engi-
neers; one mounted battalion of engineers; and one engineer band.
Each regiment of engineers shall consist of one colonel; one lieutenant colonel;
two majors; eleven captains; twelve first lieutenants; six second lieutenants; four
master engineers, senior grade; one regimental sergeant major; two battalion ser-
geants major; twelve master engineers, junior grade; two regimental supply sergeants;
two color sergeants; one sergeant trumpeter; two sergeants; one cook; one wagoner
for each authorized wagon of the field and combat train; and six companies of engi-
neers, Organized into two battalions of three companies each.
Each company of Engineers shall consist of one captain; two first lieutenants; one
Second lieutenant; One first Sergeant; three sergeants, first class; one mess Sergeant;
One Supply Sergeant; One Stable Sergeant; eight Sergeants; eighteen corporals; one
horseshoer; one saddler; two trumpeters; three cooks; sixty-four privates, first class;
and sixty-four privates. -
The mounted battalion of Engineers shall consist of one major; five captains; seven
first lieutenants; three second lieutenants; one veterinarian; two master engineers,
Senior grade; one battalion Sergeant major; six master engineers, junior grade; one
battalion supply Sergeant; two color Sergeants; one corporal; one wagoner for each
authorized wagon of the field and combat train; and three mounted companies.
Each mounted company of Engineers shall consist of one captain; two first lieu-
tenants; one second lieutenant; one first sergeant; two sergeants, first class; one mess
Sergeant; one supply Sergeant; one stable Sergeant; six sergeants; eleven corporals;
two horseshoers; one saddler; two trumpeters; two cooks; twenty-one privates, first
class; and sixty privates. -
The Engineer band shall consist of one first sergeant (who shall be the drum major);
One band leader; one assistant band leader; two band sergeants; four band corporals;
One cook; two musicians, first class; four musicians, second class; and thirteen musi-
cians, third class. -
Regimental and battalion adjutants and supply officers and appropriate officers to
Command the companies, battalions, and regiments of Engineers shall be detailed
from the Corps of Engineers. The enlisted force of the Corps of Engineers and the
Officers serving therewith shall constitute a part of the line of the Army.
The CHAIRMAN. Now, have you discussed at any time the tenta-
tive measure of the Secretary of War 2
Gen. KING MAN. I have not discussed it before any committee; no,
sir. I have discussed it with the Secretary of War and with the
board of officers.
The CHAIRMAN. How does that bill impress you, in so far as your
department of the service is concerned 3
Gen. KING MAN. That was satisfactory in the kind of organization,
and, with minor exceptions, satisfactory in its entirety.
The CHAIRMAN. How about the other reorganization plan, the
So-called Chamberlain bill?
Gen. KING MAN. That bill was a very satisfactory bill to me.
The CHAIRMAN. Either of those two measures conformed very
nearly to the needs of the Engineer Corps ? -
Gen. KINGMAN. Yes, sir; and the service, in my judgment.
The CHAIRMAN. You have had them all under consideration?
Gen. KING MAN. Yes, sir.
450 PREPAIREDINESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
The CHAIRMAN. Did you discuss any of the other bills before the
House committee ?
Gen. KINGMAN. No, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. Have you prepared any statement with reference
to these other measures?
Gen. KINGMAN. Yes, sir; we had one statement that was prepared
with reference to the Chamberlain bill. We have a copy .# that.
The CHAIRMAN. Can you furnish us that copy? -
Gen. KINGMAN. Yes, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. I think that Ought to go in the record, too, to
show the committee in detail the suggestions you have to make with
reference to each of these measures. -
Gen. KINGMAN. It is not very long. It is addressed to The Adju-
tant General.
As a provision for the national defense I consider this bill, with some exceptions,
a very effective measure. It can, I believe, be so amended and Supplemented as to
accomplish its purpose.
The CHAIRMAN. Which one is that? tº sº tº º
Gen. KING MAN. This is the Chamberlain bill as it was referred
to me.
The defects noted, which it is assumed may be remedied by Supplemental legisla-
tion, are: .
(a) No provision is made for a citizen force, and (b) no extra officers of the Regular
Army are provided for duty with the cadet companies and reserve officers' training
corps, or for other citizen forces.
Among the defects noted in the bill, which should be remedied by amendment
thereto, are the following:
(a) The force provided for the Regular Army does not appear to be in exactly the
proportions required to secure completely rounded-out tactical units, Infantry and
Cavalry divisions, after the special needs of the OverSeas garrisons have been pro-
vided for. *
(b) Under section 12, line 13, “seven mounted battalions” should apparently read
“two mounted battalions.” It is believed this is a clerical error. The organization
of the Engineer regiment as prescribed in Section 12 appears to be satisfactory; but
the strength of Engineer companies should be 164 men, as in the War Department draft.
It takes a long time to make an effective Sapper, miner and ponto-
niers. Now, we have nearly all our engineer troops out making
surveys for military maps, etc. If you take the ordinary enlisted
man, to make him a good surveyor and draftsmen requires a con-
siderable time. We can not teach him that in the same time wou
can teach him to march and face and right-hand salute, etc. And
then we might call them off from that and put them to laying out
trenches, not digging them, but laying them out on the ground for
other troops to dig; and teach them to build bridges and build
Fº bridges. You can not teach them that in a short time.
f you take them out in rough water they may get drowned. It is
my opinion you ought to have at least three years to make a reason-
ably effective engineer soldier, and therefore we ought to have them
brought well up to full war strength so that we can have time to teach
them and so we can get good men and have them ready for the work
that is required of them, because there is so much of this surveying
and map making, etc. For that reason I think 164 men should be
provided.
(c) I consider Section 5 not only as unduly expensive in providing for the retirement
of so many officers as general officers, but also as discriminating against the Corps of
Engineers in failing to allow appointment to the grade of general officer of Engineer
officers in the ratio of Engineer troops to other troops of the line.
PREPAREDINESS FOR, NATIONAL DEFENSE. 451
I do not remember just how that section reads now.
Capt. BARBER. It provides for the examination of the senior
colonel in each arm, for the appointment of general officers in com-
mand of brigades of that arm. -
Gen. KINGMAN (reading):
It is not thought that this ratio should be mandatory, but that it should be allowed
both as a matter of fairness to the officers who may specialize in engineer line service
and for the efficiency of the Army. With an increased Army working by tactical
divisions there will be much duty for general officers of the rank of brigade commanders
with the experience of engineer officers. This is in accordance with the practice in
foreign armies. For example, in the German army, there are 10 major generals of
engineers (corresponding to our brigadier generals), in addition to the chief of the
corps. Four of the major generals are on fortification duty and six with the mobile
army. There are 44 battalions of German engineers. The Sāme proportion, based on
the War Department draft, would give two brigadier generals of engineers, in addition
to the Chief of Engineers. This is in accordance with my previous recommendations
and I deem it very necessary for the efficiency of the engineer service of our reorganized
Army that there should be one brigadier general (or major general with pay of brigadier
general, as in Chamberlain draft), in particular charge of the instruction of engineer
troops, and one general officer of the same rank for duty in connection with fortifica-
tions. These in addition to the Chief of Engineers, who, in accordance with the
Chamberlain bill, and my previous recommendations, should be a general officer of
the next higher grade. I consider it best for the efficiency of the service that the
restrictions as to appointment of general officers, section 5 of the Chamberlain draft,
be removed both as to the examination of the senior colonel and as to appointment
in the same arm of the service. Removal of the latter restriction is particularly im-
portant in our country with regard to appointments in event of war or threatened war,
when volunteers must be raised, and this restriction should certainly be removed.
With regard to appointments in time of peace, I consider it essential to have pro-
vided at least the general officers of engineers which I have mentioned above.
(d) I do not believe that the appointing power of the President should be limited
as in Section 18 by prescribing that the Chief of Engineers should be selected from the
colonels only. The four-year detail system removes the principal reason in favor of
the provision.
(e) It is believed that after West Point the best material available for engineer
officers is from the graduates of approved technical schools. It is, therefore, suggested
that the present system of appointing lieutenants of engineers be continued, omitting
only the requirement that candidates shall be eligible for appointment as junior engi-
neer in the Engineer Department.
Capt. BARBER. There is a little amendment in the last paragraph.
It was brought up by Mr. Nichols in the House.
Gen. KING MAN. It was brought up in the House. It was asked
why officers in other branches of the service should not be allowed
to apply for examination for appointment in the Engineer Corps if
they wanted to, and in reply to that I said and I believe that there
should be no restriction on account of an officer or an enlisted man
applying for and taking an examination that a man in civil life
could take. It seems to me to be absurd to bar from a branch of the
military service a man already in it simply because he is in the
service. Therefore, I would recommend, no matter what rank they
may hold in the military service, if they fulfill the necessary condi-
* and request the examination that they should be allowed to
take it.
The CHAIRMAN. You are submitting the proposed draft of an
amendment along the lines suggested by you?
Gen. KING MAN. Yes, sir.
Senator DU PONT. It would be just as reasonable as to say that no
officer of the Engineer Corps should accept a promotion in the line.
Gen. KING MAN. If he could get it.
452 PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
Provided, That appointments to the grade of second lieutenant in the Corps of
Engineers shall continue to be made as now provided by law, but officers of the Army
or Navy of the United States may become candidates for said appointments under
the provisions of section 5 of the act approved February 27, 1911, without previously
vacating their commissions as officers and without previously establishing eligibility
for appointment as junior engineer under the Engineer Bureau of the War Department.
That is a civil-engineer position, and the eligibility is determined
by a civil-service examination. We are glad to have them in the
case of graduates from technical Schools, because it gives them a good
practical examination; but in the case of a man already in the
military service I think it might be omitted. *
The CHAIRMAN. General, have you given any consideration to the
Creation of reserves in case of emergency? .
Gen. KINGMAN. In my opinion the only reserve that is of any great
value is a reserve that is immediately available. I think the first
reserve ought to be available in 48 hours. The men ought to be
standing up in the ranks with their guns in their hands 48 hours after
they are called for. I do not believe much in a reserve scattered over
the country—scattered around, you hardly know where, a man in
One place, his kit in another, and his gun in another, and his accouter-
ments in another, and his shoes in another, and they have all got to
be gathered together. I think it is most too late. It is like organ-
izing an army É. the start.
The CHAIRMAN. Have any plans been proposed for that which meet
with your approval? -
Gen. KING MAN. The best, I think, is a good, big, Regular Army.
Of course, that is not a reserve at all. But the next thing to supple-
ment the fighting line is the so-called continental army, provided in
the War Department plan.
The CHAIRMAN. Have you read that over carefully'.
Gen. KINGMAN. Yes, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. Do you think that is workable %
Gen. KINGMAN. I think it is sufficiently promising to try.
The CHAIRMAN. And if it does not work it would give the Congress
the basis to work on in future?
Gen. KINGMAN. Yes, sir; it might be a justification for compulsory
service; but I look with apprehension on the idea of compulsory serv-
ice. Our people do not #. it. . They resent even compulsory jury
duty, and one of the most fruitful causes for men to go into the militia
is to get rid of compulsory jury duty. -
Senator DU Pont. Do you think the dependence on the militia
would afford any promising outlook for preparation? -
Gen. KING MAN. No, sir; I am sorry to say that I do not; I think
it is a broken reed. I think that it will disappoint us in the future
just as it has in the past. I think it is composed of some of the best
people in the country; there are splendid men in it, and I think
many of them are patriotic, and many of them are doing the very
best they can. In my 40 years of service in the Army it has always
been a source of wonder to me why in the world anyone is willing to
go into it at all. It is a rope of sand; it is not composed of the right
material. The men that are in it are not the men that ought to go
or that can afford to go to war, and therefore since it is composed of
the wrong material, it is bound to break down under proof.
The CHAIRMAN. Do you speak of the National Guard or the unor-
ganized militia? *
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 453
Gen. KING MAN. I do not think it makes much difference. I was
referring to the National Guard.
Senator BECKHAM. Do you not think the fault lies more with the
system than with the material?
Gen. KING MAN. Yes; the material is good, and I think it is probably
worth what it costs at present because it furnishes a certain amount
of military training. - -
Senator DU PONT. Then you do not favor any additional appro-
priations to pay them 7.
Gen. KING MAN. I do not think at present we should try additional
payment.
The CHAIRMAN. Do you think it is better to try such a plan as the
volunteer continental army?
Gen. KINGMAN. Undoubtedly; I think that is better. My father
commanded a regiment in the Civil War, and I have the list of the
names of everybody in it, and the average age was under 21; they
were from 15 years old up to 20; boys they were; they called them
boys in those days.
Senator DU PONT. You know the enlistment age is between 18 and
; years. Would you recommend that it be lowered to 17 or a little
Ower'. - -
Gen. KINGMAN. Yes, sir, if I could have it lowered for troops
already Organized.
Senator DU Pont. I mean the Regular Army. Of course they
would have to pass a physical examination.
Gen. KING MAN. I think we ought to have our men in the reserve
first. To use a homely illustration, it is easier to lead a reserve into
the ranks by the nose than to drag it back by the tail. After a man
3ets out he does not want to come back, but before he is in he would
ike to come in. .
If I were a good deal younger and commanding a company of
troops in Washington or New York, or near any town of size, I could
get 50 or 100 boys who are a little bit older than the Boy Scouts that
would like to enlist in my company, and I could give them a button
showing they belonged to B Company of such a regiment—which, by
the way, should be territorialized—and those boys would be required
to go once or twice a month for an hour's drill; possibly in the evening
if they worked or in the afternoon, and they should be provided with
a uniform, thorough equipment, and be paid 50 cents or something
like that for coming to the drill, and every summer they should go
out for two or three weeks in camp, where they should have thorough
drill, and they should be taught to believe that their first sergeant
was the finest soldier that ever lived and that their captain was the
embodiment of all that was courteous and brave and kind, and the
men should treat them kindly—they always will because men are
always good to boys; and I think they should be allowed to take
part in their athletics, and if they were able to get to base ball games
anywhere they be allowed to go and see them, that the moving pic-
tures and entertainments should be given to attract them, and when
they were called they could come in answer to a telephone, come
º to the company, and their kit should be there; they would take
off their citizen's clothes and put on a uniform and step in the ranks.
They would make pretty good soldiers in the start. That, of course,
454 PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
would require a system of stationing regiments or parts of regiments
in places convenient to the cities and territorializing them.
he people will go and shout themselves hoarse i. the Washing-
ton base ball team is playing New York, and there may not be a
man on the Washington team that came from Washington or a man
on the New York team that came from New York, and the New
York team does not represent the style of play in New York and the
Washington team has no special stunts of its own, but simply the
name and the rivalry arouse an enthusiasm and induce people to
take an interest in it. - *
The CHAIRMAN. General, you find this whole subject not at all
free from difficulty ?
Gen. KING MAN. Oh, there is great difficulty in it. There is one
thing about it: After studying it and thinking it over carefully, I
have come to the conclusion that the man that expects to get Some-
thing for nothing is apt to be a fool or a knave; if we want anythin
we have to buy it at the market price; that is the only sure way o
fº it. It is pretty easy to tell how much a man will cost to hire
im to be a soldier or a policeman, or any other thing he is capable of
doing. My judgment is that it costs about $1,000 to get a good
soldier or to get a good policeman, and I think that is what our police
cost us on an average in Washington; the average is about $1,000
8, Iſlall.
The CHAIRMAN. They serve longer, and therefore it reduces the
COst. -
Gen. KING MAN. And it is about the same way with a soldier. All
of the countries, I think, pay about the equivalent of that; it may
be that the actual money value is less, but it is equivalent to that
number of dollars in that country.
The CHAIRMAN. I have seen estimates that the Japanese Army
costs about one-fourth less than our own.
Gen. KINGMAN. We and the English have been in the habit of
paying right straight out in money for what we get. The Conti-
mentals, the Europeans, have covered up theirs by a concealed tax-
ation. If we should take a million young men in our country and
keep them under arms continuously, changing them from year to
year, one year's service or two year's service, whatever it was, we
would take the productive labor of a million men, simply giving them
board and clothing and a few pennies for pocket money, we would
be taxing those individuals men just as much as their earnings
would amount to above what was necessary to purchase those
things, and it is fair to assume in this country that the average
young man, if he is honest and industrious and renders faithful
Service, ought to earn about a dollar a day in excess of those things—
his keep, his board, and clothes.
The CHAIRMAN. Some economic writers insist that the system you
speak of in Vogue in Germany, for instance, although it takes a man
Out of industrial life, nevertheless improves him as a factor in indus-
trial life because of his military service, although for the two years
he is in he has lost all that time.
Gen. KINGMAN. I agree to that fully. . But if we had a million
men at a dollar a day we would have $365,000,000 that do not show
on the tax collectors' returns. -
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 455
The CHAIRMAN. That is, you are getting the services of a million
men without pay practically' -
Gen. KINGMAN. Yes, simply for their board and clothes. Then
in their system of billeting the people are required to lodge the
soldiers and feed them.
Senator BECKHAM. Do they do that in time of peace?
Gen. KINGMAN. Oh, yes. That is another source of expense.
The CHAIRMAN. In the European countries their selection of
officers is very different from that in our Army, is it not ? The
officers rather come from a favored class or caste; they are not
Selected as they are in our country'
Gen. KINGMAN. Not exactly the same. Still, they take them
- .." young and put them through the schools and educate them,
and we only do that through the West Point system; we take them
there and educate them on a more liberal scale, because we pay them
while they are there.
Senator DU PoWT. With reference to the question of putting our-
Selves in condition for sufficient defense in time of war, what, in
your opinion, is the importance of the water connection between the
Chesapeake and Delaware Bays not only for the passage of Smaller
* vessels but for the transportation of troops and supplies of all
indsº
Gen. KINGMAN. I think that is a very desirable thing to have.
I am unquestionably in favor of intercoastal canals from the eastern
part of our country down to the Rio Grande. -
Senator DU PONT. Undoubtedly; but is not the connection be-
tween those two bays the most important thing in sight for the
moment, considering our National Capital is on one and the great
naval establishment at League Island on the other ?
Gen. KING MAN. It would seem to be very important, inasmuch as
every possible route between important centers is desirable and im-
portant, and as a water route is a thing that can not be destroyed
very well and can be used by means that are not very expensive. I
think it is very important.
Senator THOMAs. General, is not the control of the railroads even
more important, not only along the seashore but everywhere?
Gen. KINGMAN. Of course, we could not get along without them.
Senator DU PONT. But the railroads are there, but to open this
water connection requires the expenditure of a certain amount of
funds and it is an engineering question pure and simple. There
would be no practical difficulties if the Government took the Chesa-
peake and Delaware Canal, deepened it, and made it a sufficient and
adequate water way. Is not that so º
Gen. KINGMAN. I understand that that is so.
The CHAIRMAN. General, it has been suggested by a great many
people in the United States that in case of war we could rally to the
Standard at the first call and within 48 hours have a million or
more men. What would be the effect of putting a million or more
men called in that way in competition with a trained army?
Gen. KINGMAN. It would be just about as effective as to expose
them to some contagious disease—they would simply be gathered
together for the slaughter.
The CHAIRMAN. There is not any question about that ?
Gen. KINGMAN. There is not any question about it.
!
456 PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
The CHAIRMAN. Is not that illustrated where there is a riot, for
instance, and a few trained men are called out to quell it against
thousands who are untrained The trained men are able to quell it
because of their training and experience, are they not %
Gen. KING MAN. Certainly; it is because of the experience and
confidence and the submission of the will to one control. There is a
great deal of misunderstanding about discipline. A great many
people think discipline is some kind of a drill, but it is not at all. It
is the change in a man when he comes to that frame of mind in which
he submits himself to another man and he does willingly what another
man tells him to do under all circumstances. We have in a factory
a whole lot of men working under the control of one man making
some product, but if a fire breaks out they run mad; they would not
stand as they did on the deck of the Royal George and go down.
Their discipline does not go far enough for that. Discipline is educa-
tion; it is character. I do not believe very much in the idea of
intensive drill to get discipline. It takes a certain amount of time;
it takes time to shape a man's mind and change his character. You
could not do anything to a man suddenly that would change his
character in a few weeks. w
Senator BECKHAM. If we got into a war now with a first-class power
with such an Army as we now have and the militiamen were called
into service, how long would it take to prepare them for active service
to make them fit to go into battle?
Gen. KINGMAN. Well, I should not want to take them in for about
a year, and that would depend upon how many trained officers and non-
commissioned officers I had to shape them up with. I do not think
they could be started like putting in yeast, putting in some dough,
and foaming it up.
Senator THOMAs. Did the Canadian troops which have made such
a record for themselves have a year's training?
Gen. KING MAN. I expect a good many of them did.
Senator THOMAs. But taken as a mass, they did not have more
than six months' training, did they'
Gen. KING MAN. I do not believe they did. - .
Senator DU PONT. Except the first sprinkling, trained at home for
militia service, I think they kept them about a year in England at
the training camps. -
Senator THOMAs. The Canadian contingent last spring was deci-
mated. They had been drilled and disciplined at camp, but I do not
think they had had a year's training.
Gen. KINGMAN. I was giving a fair average.
Senator THOMAs. In these days of modern engines of destruction
a manis annihilated whether trained or not unless he is in the trenches.
Gen. KINGMAN. I started to speak about getting men and reserves
and I did not finish what I said, so it left it in the air. I said you
could get men for hire, you could employ men as you do policemen,
train soldiers and make them as good as drill and discipline and
thorough equipment could make soldiers, and that that could be done
with money. But the question was how you could get those men
for something that they regard as equivalent, for something that is
not equally as hard for us to get, and that is the way we try to get
reserves; we try to get men to do these things without being paid.
I started in by saying that it was easier to bring men in by the head
PREPAIREDINESS FOR, NATIONAL DEFENSE. 457
than it was to pull them in by the tail, and I then went on telling
about interesting the young boys and their parents, so that a man
would say of his son, “Well, if my boy wants to go to war and be a
soldier I would rather he would go with Captain So-and-so and Sergeant
So-and-so, because I know them.” That would be a great hel
toward getting men, that they knew who they were going with an
the troops they were going to belong to, and I think we could procure
a valuable reserve of partially trained men and that they would be
trained so that their minds would be willing, their minds would be
readily subordinated, and they would stand behind private so and
so who had been in for several years and feel that they would be
taken care of all right.
The CHAIRMAN. The great trouble with our present system is that
many of those who ought to serve their country stand back and let
Some fellow that has not got very much of his own do all the work.
During the Civil War lots of men who ought to have been on the firing
line stayed at home. -
Gen. KINGMAN. Yes; and they went after they tried to make them
go in by compulsory service. *
The CHAIRMAN. I think Washington found an appeal to patriotism
did not do much good in the Revolution. $
Gen. KINGMAN. I do not think it does. The only time I believe
the American people will stand for compulsory service will be in time
of actual war or threatened war.
The CHAIRMAN. They have got to see it.
Gen. KINGMAN. They have got to see it; but I do not believe they
would consent to it. In our system of self-government, the Congress
that passed a law that people should be required to serve would be
Sent back again with instructions to change it.
Senator BECKHAM. They would not be sent back; they would send
Some other men back.
Senator DU PONT. The law as it now stands prohibits any retired
officer being ordered to duty except on his own application?
Gen. KING MAN. Yes, sir. -
Senator DU PONT. Do you not think in time of actual or certain
hostilities the President should have the right to order any retired
Officer to perform any duty he is physically able to do?
Gen. KING MAN. Yes, sir; I think he should. Still, he has done
more for military service than a good many other men, and that is a
kind of compulsory service for us. - -
Senator DU PONT. But he is getting pay.
Gen. KINGMAN. That was part of his consideration when he went
in. I went in 45 years ago; part of the consideration was if I stayed
in until I was 64 years old they would give me a pension the rest of
the time that I lived.
. Senator BECKHAM. No President would likely, I imagine, send back
into service a retired officer who would not want to go.
Gen. KING MAN. No, sir; I think that would be a condition that
Would hardly arise. I think that every man that was able to put
One foot in front of the other would want to go, and there would be
no trouble about that. I think the trouble would be a good many
men would try to do what they were not able to do and break down,
and perhaps keep a younger man out of the place for a while—to
their subsequent disappointment and mortification. •.
458 PREPAREDINESS FOR, NATIONAL DEFENSE.
The CHAIRMAN. Are there any other remarks you care to make on
this whole subject, General?
Gen. KINGMAN. I have not said anything about the method of
getting officers from civil life for the Corps of Engineers. We used to
be regarded as very exclusive. We did not have anybody but the
honor graduates of West Point, and we got ourselves disliked in that
way by some of the officers in other branches of the service. But
when Congress gave us an increase some five or six years ago of about
60 officers, rendered necessary by the fact that the duties of the corps
were increased, without any increase in men, we got that increase
authorized at once, and we were allowed to have 12 officers a year
until we got up to the 60.
The CHAIRMAN. From civil life?
Gen. KINGMAN. They were limited to West Point graduates before
that, and we were, of course, glad to get West Point graduates. Very
few men offered themselves from civil life. In three years I think we
had only 11 candidates who offered themselves, and out of that we
got only three who passed their examinations.
But last year I sent out letters to the presidents of all the prin-
cipal technical schools and colleges whose graduates we were pre-
pared to accept on account of their having a sufficiently high standard,
and teaching the things that we thought necessary to be taught.
I sent out, I suppose, to 50 institutions of that kind, asking them to
bring the matter to the attention of their undergraduates, and I
directed at the same time different officers stationed around the
different parts of the country to bring the matter to the attention
of the young civil engineers who were working for the Government,
and anybody they knew, and to give advice, assistance, and sugges-
tion to any students who wanted to know about it. I was rather
surprised to find that, though some applicants came in response to
that, but when they found they were required to go into the Army,
they did not want to go. They said, “What, have to be soldiers?
We want to be civil engineers. We did not know we had to drill
and be soldiers.” . We did succeed in getting about 25 to make appli-
cation and take the examination. Of those a few failed to come up
when the examination time came around, and a few were found not
physically suitable. Seventeen actually took the examination,
and out of that we got six who passed the requisite examination,
and they have just been commissioned. While, of course, they are
not as handy for us as West Point graduates would be, they will
undoubtedly make good engineer officers. We have to teach them
a great many things we do not have to teach West Point graduates.
or instance, I doubt if any of them know how to ride a horse, so
we have to teach them to ride horseback. They do not know how
to drill, and we have to teach them infantry drill, the various drills
of the sapper and miner, and the light artillery drill, because an
engineer officer should know the duties of all the arms of the service.
It was a question in my mind at one time whether I would rather
make a soldier out of a civil engineer or a civil engineer out of a
soldier. I hardly knew which to choose. But I came to the con-
clusion that the best thing to do was to get a good civil engineer and
make a soldier out of him.
The CHAIRMAN. He is ordinarily a man of intelligence, and it is
easier to train such a man?
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 459
Gen. KINGMAN. Yes, sir. There are many young men of that char-
acter who have been through splendid technical Schools. There is no
doubt that the advantages they offer at the Massachusetts Institute
of Technology in teaching engineering are better than those afforded
at West Point. Although we have to waste a couple of years in
teaching these men the duties of the soldier, the Government will
be saved the expense of their education, and I think they will be
very satisfactory in the end. f
I have not said anything about the various duties of the Corps of
Engineers, which are imposed upon us by law, and which are just as
much a part of our duty as the duty of drilling, Sapping and mining,
and so on. We are required to handle a great many civil works. I
do not suppose one would ordinarily realize how much of that work
we have. In making up our list of officers we are allowing
nothing in addition for that kind of work. We are planning to
keep our organization for that work just as now provided. We
have at present something over 700 different works of river and
harbor improvement. We have over 1,200 contracts in force for
carrying out work of that kind. We have over 25,000 civil employees
who are working under the department. I have only about 70 officers
who are available for handling those 25,000 men. If they were
in the Army, I would have a thousand officers to train them and drill
them. We removed last year one hundred and seventy-odd wrecks
obstructing navigation, for which we drew the money directly from
the Treasury. We took care of forty-odd different completed works,
canals, and the like, for which we drew two and three-quarter million
dollars directly from the Treasury.
We have 2,500 vessels of all kinds—dredges, scows, Snag boats, tug-
boats, and things of that sort—that we use in connection with works
of improvement. All those things are works required by Congress.
We have, on an average, about 6 to 12 bridges a year, the plans of
which we have to examine before they can be authorized, and we
have over 1,600 different permits for building wharves and various
structures in navigable waters that we have to examine and authorize.
At present there is some important legislation pending in regard to
dams on navigable waterways, the plans of which will have to be ex-
amined by the Chief of Engineers. Of course, he can not do it really
himself, but he will have to see that it is done. It is competent for
Congress to give it to somebody else, but it has not been given to
Somebody else, and for a hundred years that has been done by the
Corps of Engineers. tº
The CHAIRMAN. So practically your corps is doing work 90 per
cent or more of which would not be required of them in time of war?
Gen. KINGMAN. No. So that in that way we can furnish some
extra officers in time of war. Ninety per cent is too great.
The CHAIRMAN. A large proportion are doing work that they would
not have to do in time of war?
Gen. KINGMAN. About one-third of the officers are strictly on that
Sort of work. I was not speaking of that as a burden. ** not
Speaking of it as a thing we wanted to get rid of, because it is our
most valuable training. Where an officer has been given something
to do, something to fight, whether it be a flood or a freshet or a
Token dam, or some obstacle of nature that he has to overcome,
and he goes and does it, he does it by means of men and material,
460 PREPAREDINESS FOR, NATIONAL DEFENSE.
and it is splendid training for him. It is an exceedingly valuable
training, and we would not have it taken away, because there is
nothing by which to replace it as a training for our officers.
Senator WEEKs. General, do you know how many engineer officers
served with troops during the Civil War? - -
Gen. KINGMAN. I think about all we had, on one side or the other.
I did know at one time, and I think that almost every one that we
had, except those who had just been out of military academy a
year or two, were general officers on one side or the other before the
Wà,I Wa,S OWGI’. $
Senator WEEKS. Then you consider it especially necessary that
those connected with the Engineer Corps, should have the general
º which would enable them to perform that service, or any
Other ?
Gen. KINGMAN. Oh, yes, sir; most necessary.
Senator WEEKs. And that would be an element against the civilian
being appointed in the Engineer Corps ?
Gen. KINGMAN. You must catch him young enough to make a
soldier of him and give him a training so that he would not lose that.
You could not specialize them; you could not divide them up and
have some civilian and some military ones; that would ruin the corps.
Senator THOMAs. Whenever I hear a statement from a gentleman
like Gen. Kingman I am more and more impressed with the fact that
we ought to make provision for a certain number of men, make our
appropriation, and then delegate to these experts the work of organ-
izing the Army, the number of regiments, for instance, the proportion
of guns, of Field Artillery, and all that sort of thing.
The CHAIRMAN. It could be done more 'ºïy if done in that
way, but you can not get Congress to do it.
Senator THOMAs. It takes a great part of the time of Congress and
of men who know nothing about the subject except as they are in-
formed from the lips of witnesses, and it would be much more efficient
and much more satisfactory. -
The CHAIRMAN. If there is nothing further, then, General, we are
very much obliged to you for having come up.
(Thereupon, at 11.40 o’clock a. m. the committee took a recess
until 2 ..i. p.m.)
- AFTER RECESS.
The committee reassembled at the expiration of the recess at 2
o'clock p. m., Senator Geo. E. Chamberlain (chairman) presiding.
STATEMENT OF BRIG, GEN. HENRY P. McCAIN, UNITED
STATES ARMY, THE ADJUTANT GENERAL.
The CHAIRMAN. General, kindly give your full name and station
for the record. }
Gen. McCAIN. Henry P. McCain, brigadier general, United States
Army, The Adjutant General, ºf at Washington, D. C.
The CHAIRMAN. General, we have under discussion these various
plans for the reorganization of the Army, and I assume, of course,
that you have seen the several bills.
PR.EPAREDINESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 461
Gen. McCAIN. Yes, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. The committee would like to hear from you, and I
presume you have a statement that you might desire to submit before
... the committee -
Gen. McCAIN, I have no statement, Mr. Chairman; I prepared no
statement on any of the bills, for myself. I hope that the com-
mittee will question me instead of asking me for any statement.
I have gone into the matter more particularly with reference of the
recruiting and how it affects the enlisted men.
The CHAIRMAN. That is your particular branch?
Gen. McCAIN. Yes, sir. -
The CHAIRMAN. We would like to hear from you in reference to that
subject, General. How many men does the War Department plan
contemplate raising 3 ---
Gen. MCCAIN. The number of men that I have thought we can raise
or enlist in one year is 50,000. That is the maximum—50,000 men a
year.
The CHAIRMAN. You misunderstood my question. How many
does the War Department's tentative plan of Army reorganization
contemplate raising 7 --
Gen. McCAIN. About 141,000.
The CHAIRMAN. That is, enlisted men .
Gen. McCAIN. Yes, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. And not the Officers ?
Gen. MCCAIN. No, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. The present enlisted strength of the Army is
how much -
Gen. McCAIN. It is about 101,000, but that includes everything—
the Philippine Scouts, the Hospital Corps, Quartermaster Corps——
Senator CATRON. Does that include commissioned officers ?
Gen. McCAIN. No, sir. -
Senator DU PONT. It includes all of the employees of the Quarter-
master Department and the Medical Department 7
Gen. McCAIN. It includes the enlisted men in those departments.
Senator DU PoWT. I understood it was the total, not the aggregate.
The CHAIRMAN. Have you had difficulty in keeping the Army up
to its present enlisted strength ;
Gen. McCAIN. No; we had no difficulty last year. We enlisted
last year, including the Philippine Scouts, something over 48,000 men,
Sonator DU Pont. You could have gotten more if you had needed
thena º
Gen. McCAIN. We might have gotten some more, Senator. We
let down on recruiting toward the end of the year because we did not
need any more. We withdrew some or discontinued some of our
substations; we withdrew some of the enlisted men and some of the
officers from recruiting and stopped the travel of officers looking for
recruits. Unquestionably we could have gotten a good many more
if we had tried. º
Senator FLETCHER. General, you stated that there is now 101,000
enlisted men. That does not include officers. What would the
officers bring it up to ? -
Gen. McCAIN. The officers would bring it up to 105,000 or 106,000.
The CITAIRMAN. I believe your report states that it would not be
possible to recruit an Army larger than 140,000 or 150,000 men
233S0—PT. S.–16 2 +
–462 * PR.EPARED NIESS FOR, NATIONAL DEFENSE.
Gen. MCCAIN. That is the report that I made to the Secretary of
War in a memorandum some time ago.
The CHAIRMAN. What was the difficulty about recruiting 2
Gen. McCAIN. They do not enlist, Senator. We covered most of
the territory of the United States. We had men stationed in the
principal cities and at substations, and we then -threw out canvass-
ing parties and covered the whole country with posters and cards,
advertisements of different kinds. We kept out in front of all sta-
tions an enlisted man to get information and to give information.
If we knew of any congregation of men anywhere we sent parties to
look for recruits.
The CHAIRMAN. I note that your report to the Secretary of War
for 1915 shows the total number of applicants up to June, 1915, of
168,842, and you rejected of that number 123,731, accepting only
about 45,111, What is the reason for so many rejections? Is it
not because the standard of enlistment is too high .
Gen. McCAIN. No; I do not think it is too high. We rejected, for
instance, 19,000 applicants because of minority last year; because
they were too young. We rejected some 5,000 because -
Senator DU PoNT. What do you mean by “too young” .
Gen. McCAIN. We can not enlist a man under 18 years of age.
Senator DU Pont. On account of the law §
Gen. McCAIN. Yes. Between the ages of 18 and 21 we can enlist
them, provided we gain the consent of the parents or guardians in
writing.
Senator DU Pont. Do you not think that if the bars were let down
a little so that you could take a man, say, from 17 years up, with the
consent of the parents, you could get a great many more men'
Gen. MCCAIN. I do not think you could get a great many more,
‘Senator. -
Senator DU PONT. In the Civil War there were over 2,000,000 men
under 21 engaged in that war. They were nearly all boys.
Gen. MCCAIN. I have heard that statement made, but we have
never been able to verify it.
The CHAIRMAN. Gen. Carter makes that statement in his book.
Gen. McCAIN. I have never been able to verify that statement.
Senator DU PONT. I remember perfectly well the men in my com-
mand. They were very youthful. There was a sprinkling of, say,
:about a dozen men who were 40 years of age.
Gen. MCCAIN. The standard we require of enlisted men is neces-
sary. We require them to be about 5 feet 4 inches, and they must
weigh at a minimum 120 pounds. If we accept anybody under that
weight we receive complaints from the inspectors that they do not
stand the strain. Reports have been made from the border that
they do not stand the hardships; they weigh too little. I think 120
pounds is about as low as you can go. Five feet four inches is low.
f you let down the bars you are going to get men in who are going
to be discharged for disability and the pension rolls will go up and
you will get no service out of the men. The Government will lose
the amount it puts into it. That 168,000 includes all sorts of people,
people that you would reject on sight. They are over age and have
various physical defects, some of them hidden and some apparent.
The CHAIRMAN. The proportion of those rejected seemed large as
compared with the number accepted, and I did not know what the
{}^{28,SOI)S WOI’é.
PREPARTED NIESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 463
Gen. MCCAIN. We try to be careful about it, and I think it is
proper to do so. Otherwise you would get a lot of material in the
Army that would be of little or no value, and the Government would
incur an expense and get nothing in return. -
The CHAIRMAN. Even after they had been accepted, 13 per cent
of those accepted were discharged at the depots?
Gen. McCAIN. You know what that acceptance is ? It is an
acceptance by a line officer at a general recruiting station in a
city. They go from there to the depots and are examined there
by medical experts. That gives us an opportunity to eliminate many
men that have troubles that are latent and hidden and can not be
discovered except by a medical expert. Formerly we used to keep
medical officers and Hospital Corps men at all the stations. That
was an expensive arrangement and did not give the best results;
but we send them to these recruit depots and eliminate many
of them who otherwise would be discharged at an early date for
disabilities and who would become a charge on the Government.
The CHAIRMAN. What seems to be the principal obstacle in the way
of securing enlistments' *
Gen. McCAIN. I do not know what you would call it. They simply
do not enlist. If men have plenty of work we have to go out and
compete with employment agencies everywhere. It is a ease of com-
petition. - .
The CHAIRMAN. Do you not think the long-term enlistment is
largely responsible for the hesitation of men to enlist Ž
Gen. MCCAIN. I can not find that that has had any material effect.
We got more men last year than we ever did in the history of the
Army, as far as I have been able to learn. -
The CHAIRMAN. The enlistment is four years with the colors and
three years with the reserves 7
Gen. McCAIN. Yes, sir.
Senator CATRON. Is there any particular reason why that was,
sº that you got more last year than ever before in the history of
the Armv. - 4.
Gen. Moºn. No; I have no doubt that this agitation for pre-
paredness has made them think about it; and it may be that there
were some men out of employment and that helped. We went at it,
; º more vigorously in the early part of last year than ever
D€IOI’G.
Senator CATRON. There are not any more men out of employment
than usual, so that would not have anything to do with it. .
Senator DU Pont. Do you not think they ought to increase the
number of recruits from year to year as the population of the country
increases : -
Gen. McCAIN. I think unquestionably that would help some, General,
Senator FLETCHER. Do you not think it might help if we would
shorten the term of enlistment
Gen. McCAIN. I do not think that that would make any material
difference. When a man goes up to enlist he does not inquire very
far ahead what is going to happen to him. But we have systematized
the recruiting, and all of §. parties were very active and very
Successful.
The CHAIRMAN. Do you get a pretty good class of men?
464 PREPAIRED NESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
Gen. McCAIN. I think we get an excellent class of men.
The CHAIRMAN. What do you think would be the limit of enlist-
ments in a year?
Gen. McCAIN. 50,000.
The CHAIRMAN. How many go out in a year?
Gen. McCAIN. 41,000 went out last year, from all causes.
The CHAIRMAN. By reason of what? •
Gen. McCAIN. Expiration of service and all other causes; and of the
41,000 about 16,000 reenlisted. There were 27,000 or a little over,
discharged by reason of expiration of service.
The CHAIRMAN. You would lose all trace of those 3
Gen. McCAIN. Except those that reenlisted. + 4.
The CHAIRMAN. So that the provision of the law that provides for
three years in the reserve amounts to nothing?
Gen. McCAIN. We do not lose trace of those that go into the reserve.
The reserve law did not go into effect until the 1st of last November.
Now we get trace of all those people and have their locations.
The CHAIRMAN. There was not much ground for the ridicule
about the 16 reservists, was there? Because as a matter of fact, the
law was not in effect. - -
Gen. McCAIN. None whatever. Those 16 men were simply
people outside who were authorized to enlist for the reserve.
he CHAIRMAN. The statement gained currency very generally that
this provision for the reserve of three years with the colors resulted
in creating 16 reservists, but they were not those that had been dis-
charged from the colors?
Gen. McCAIN. No, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. When did that law take effect, that put those men
into the reserve after four years of service & -
Gen. MCCAIN. The first of last November.
The CHAIRMAN. How many have been discharged since then }
Gen. MCCAIN. That went into the reserves 7 -
The CHAIRMAN. Yes?
Gen. McCAIN. Our returns are not complete; they are coming
II]. I.) OW. . -
hº CHAIRMAN. They will all go into the reserve by operation of
the law & i
Gen. McCAIN. We had in November about 400 and in December about
800, and this month up to the present some 150 or 200, but they are
coming in every day. We have no reliable data on which to base an
estimate of what we will get.
The CHAIRMAN. Do they keep in touch with the War Department'
Gen. McCAIN. Yes. There is no way we can force them to do it.
They are not tied to us in any way; but we get their addresses, and
they know what they are assigned to, and they report to us.
Senator CATRON. So far as you know, are you keeping in touch
with them pretty well? That is, they are moving about, are they
not, and they are all unmarried men, are they not ?
Gen. MCCAIN. Yes. Well, it depends, I think, Senator
Sentor CATRON. That is the class of people who move about the
most -
Gen. McCAIN. Yes. We have to rely on them to be good enough
to furnish us with their addresses.
Senator CATRON. There is no other way to do that ?
\ PREPAREDINESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 465
Gen. McCAIN. We have no way to make them do it.
Senator DU PONT. Do you think that if Congress were to provide
for a small pay, an annual pay for those in the reserve, it would assist
you to keep track of them :
Gen. McCAIN. I think that would be a good thing. -
Senator DU PoWT. I think so too. Would you suggest, if that
were done, that the pay be made quarterly or annually or every six
months - &
Gen. McCAIN. I would make it quarterly.
Senator CATRON. You would not make it monthly 3
Gen. McCAIN. If we do not get the addresses of them at the end
of the quarter, of course we will stop the pay. If they do not report
to us we would stop the pay, and that usually induces them to tell
us where they are.
Senator DUPONT. It seems to me that is the only method by which
you can hope to have any reserve worth anything.
The CHAIRMAN. Men enlist now for seven years, do they not ?
Gen. McCAIN. Yes, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. Four years with the colors and three years in the
reserve . .
Gen. McCAIN. Yes, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. Is their going into the reserve optional with them
On the expiration of the four years' enlistment, or are they com-
pelled to go into the reserve :
Gen. McCAIN. They must go into the reserve, or else reenlist.
The CHAIRMAN. And yet you have no means of keeping in touch
with those who have finished the four years' enlistment and have
gone with the reserve?
Gen. McCAIN. Except through their voluntary act.
The CHAIRMAN. Is there any provision that subjects those men to
the Articles of War? Are they subject to court-martial?
Gen. McCAIN. No, sir; they are not, as I understand it.
Senator DU PONT. If they belong to the reserve army and are
called out and do not come, are they not subject to the penalties of
the Articles of War :
Senator GATRON. Or for desertion ?
Gen. McCAIN. I do not know that any case has ever been tested.
The CHAIRMAN. Suppose these men have served a four-year
enlistment and are discharged into the reserve. Would it be possi-
ble to so amend the law as to subject those three-year reservists to
the Articles of War, and to include that in their discharge, and also
direct them where to assemble in case they are needed?
Gen. McCAIN. Yes. You know men can go off just as they do now,
and if you were to call for volunteers I have no doubt that every one
of those men would go into the volunteers somewhere and would
report somewhere. They probably might not report where we
wanted them, but they wºuld report somewhere.
The CHAIRMAN. Just as the German reservists and others did Ž
Gen. McCAIN. Yes, sir. I do not think there is any doubt about
the fact that they would go to the colors, but I doubt very much that
they would all go where we expected them to go. If they went in,
it probably would not make any difference, and we would probably
not do anything to them. *.
466 PREPARED NIESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
Senator DU PoWT. There is a provision that men who have passed
beyond the reserves, and who come forward after a presidential proc-
lamation, get small pay to join the Regular Army. In your opinion,
how many men of that kind could we hope to get under that pro-
vision of the law Ż
Gen. McCAIN. We tried to make some kind of figures on that, Senator,
but they have never been satisfactory, Those people that leave the
Army go off and get married and settle down into business, and the
chances are not very good for a very large proportion of those men
to return.
Senator DU Pont. I think so, too, unless there was a national war
and great enthusiasm. -
Gen. McCAIN. Yes; where everybody was going. -
Senator DU Pont. If you could get a substantial number of those
men, that would help the Regular Army very much in the first line'
Gen. McCAIN. Oh, yes. -
Senator DU Pont. If you did not get them, they would all go into
the volunteers and be lost in the large volunteer regiments.
Gen. McCAIN. They would be lost, but they would help out.
Senator DU Pont. Oh, yes; but I think it would do more good if .
the Regular Army was filled up with efficient men.
Gen. McCAIN. You asked me about the number of men that were
going into the reserve. We have figured that probably the number of
men who will constitute the reserve will be those men who have here-
tofore, after finishing their enlistment, not reenlisted, but have gone
out into the country. In taking the average for a number of years
we find that about 10 per cent of the authorized strength of the Army
will go into the reserve every year. During the fourth year after the
first enlistments took place under existing law three-fourths of 10
per cent of the strength would go into the reserve and 10 per cent
would go in each year thereafter. For instance, you take an army
of 140,000, under these figures, and 14,000 will go into the reserve at
the end of four years. . Seventy-five per cent of 14,000 would go into
the reserve at the end of three years, so that at the end of seven years
you would have a reserve of three times 14,000plus 75 per cent of 14,000,
making between fifty and sixty thousand men. After that the losses
i. the reserve would just about equal the gains, and it would not get
£UTO'GI’.
he CHAIRMAN. Have you ever thought of the idea of making
this army an extra continental army out of the material in your
possession?
Gen. MCCAIN. Yes.
The CHAIRMAN. You have the Philippine Scouts, and they make
pretty good soldiers, do they not ?
Gen. McCAIN. They have done very excellent service.
The CHAIRMAN. Could you recruit men from the natives in the
Philippines sufficient to garrison the Philippines?
Gen. MCCAIN. Oh, you could; yes, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. Would it be safe to do that '.
Gen. McCAIN. I do not think so.
nº CHAIRMAN. The Hawaiians make pretty good soldiers, do
they not ? -
Gen. McCAIN. We have not tried any of those.
The CHAIRMAN. The Porto Ricans make pretty good soldiers?
PR.EPARED NIESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 46'ſ
Gen. MCCAIN. Yes; they are doing all right there, although I
have had no personal experience with them.
Senator DU PONT. Would you have any difficulty in getting two.
regiments of Infantry out of Porto Rico if you wanted toº
Gen. McCAIN. I do not believe you would, though I can not
speak with any personal knowledge of the subject.
The CHAIRMAN. If the plan of the War College were carried out,
in which, I think, they suggested something like 250,000 enlisted
Hºyo" think it would not be possible to recruit up to the full
imit .
Gen. McCAIN. Yes. -
The CHAIRMAN. You do not think they could keep up an enlistment,
in excess of 145,000?
Gen. McCAIN. I do not think so.
Senator CATRON. Suppose the plan of the War College were carried
out to the extent of getting 250,000 men. Would you have full regi-
ments or would they be skeleton or half full, or how about that ?
Gen. McCAIN. I would have them filled up. -
Senator CATRON. Do you not think there would be a great deal of
advantage in having them smaller, so that a greater number of
organized units would be filled up from people at large, or from new
recruits, or something of that sort'; R. would have a greater
number of officers'
Gen. McCAIN. We would have a greater number of officers; of
course we would need those. We need the officers and we need the
organization. . -
Senator CATRON. You will need officers very badly if you are going
to have a big army. -
Gen. McCAIN. You can instruct an organization that is up to full
strength very much better than you can a skeleton Organization.
You can give them better training if you have them filled up.
Senator CATRON. Is it better training for the men or simply for the
officers ?
Gen. McCAIN. Better training for both, principally the officers.
It is better training for the officers to have full units. -
Senator CATRON. I understood that that was a fact, but I could
not see how it was better training for the men.
Senator DU PONT. How many men are there in a company of
Infantry on a peace footing now
Gen. McCAIN. Sixty-five. -
Senator DU PONT. If we had a middle course, say 100 men on a
peace footing and 150 on a war footing, would that not be better?
Gen. McCAIN. I think so; yes. -
Senator DU PONT. General, in the composition of an Infantry
regiment there is a proposition, you know, to have three companies,
So-called, one machine-gun company, one º Company,
and another a supply company, added to the Infantry regiment-
Do you approve of that?
Gen. McCAIN. Yes, sir.
Senator CATRON. Have you got those now %
Gen. McCAIN. We have not got them authorized by law.
Senator DU PoWT. They are there in the regiments?
Gen. MCCAIN. Yes, sir.
468 |PREPAIRED NESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
Senator CATRON. Are they attached to the regiment 7
Gen. McCAIN. Yes.
Senator CATRON. Of these 101,000 men that you claim to have,
how many of them would be actually fighting men if they were to
be put into the field into actual fighting?
en. McCAIN. In the line?
Senator CATRON. Yes; I am asking you that in view of the fact
that these other three companies are attached to the regiments.
How many, as you have them to-day, would be actually fighting
in case of war?
Gen. McCAIN. There would be about 80,000 in the line .
Senator CATRON. And the others would be where?
Gen. McCAIN. At the hospitals
Senator DU Pont. And the Quartermaster Corps ?
Gen. McCAIN. Yes; and the Philippine Scouts are in that, too.
Senator CATRON. I suppose the Philippine Scouts are organized
just the same as the others. There is no promotion into the Regular
Army for the Philippine Scouts, is there?
Gen. McCAIN. No, sir; that is a separate organization. .
Senator CATRON. And you are counting them a part of the 101,000
men ;
Gen. McCAIN. Yes. *.
The CHAIRMAN. You disapprove, then, of the War College plan 2
Gen. McCAIN. I would not say I disapproved of the plan; I do not
think we could get 250,000 men; but to that extent I approve of
fixing the strength of the Army that we can enlist.
º CHAIRMAN. There is no use to put it beyond what you can
enlist Ž
Gen. McCAIN. I do not think so; no.
Senator CATRON. In getting that 50,000 that you say you could
recruit a year, would that cover those who reenlisted, or would it be
independent? - -
Gen. McCAIN. It would cover those that reenlisted, everything,
enlistments and reenlistments.
Senator CATRON. You have said that about 16,000 reenlisted last
€8.I’.
y Gen. MCCAIN. That is about right; yes, sir.
Senator CATRON. That is about 40 per cent of the total that were
recruited, then. You say 40,000 in all? -
Gen. MCCAIN. We enlisted 48,000 in all.
Senator CATRON. That would be one-third, or 33% per cent.
Gen. McCAIN. Enlisted and reenlisted.
Senator CATRON. Is that greater than usual; is that a greater per-
centage than usual?
Gen. MCCAIN. The reenlistments last year were a little larger than
the average. -
Senator CATRON. Is there any reason for that that you could give 3
Gen. McCAIN. No; we can not give any reason for it. We tried
to find it, but we could not get any.
Senator DU PONT. There have been several propositions made
about this reserve, and one of them is that reenlistments should be
prohibited or discouraged except in the case of noncommissioned
officers and a few extra useful men in the company. How would
that affect your recruiting?
PREPAREDINESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 469
Gen. MCCAIN. You could not fill up what we have got,
Senator DU PONT. Exactly; that is just what I think. You are
experienced in serving with troops. I will ask you whether or not
there is not a certain percentage of the men in every company who
may be termed professional soldiers?
They are bound to reenlist; they do not like civil life; they want
to be surrounded with the duties and protection of the military pro-
fession. It would be a source of weakness, would it not, to arbitrarily
refuse to let that class of men reenlist, if they wanted to ? What is
your opinion about that ?
Gen. McCAIN. I think they ought to be allowed to reenlist. As
you say, they are professional soldiers, and they would be lost amy-
where else.
Senator DU Pont. The argument in favor of their not being allowed
to reenlist is that they go out into the country and constitute a
reserve, but I do not, think that amounts to a great deal, because
they would simply go off and enlist in the Marine Corps or some-
where else.
Gen. McCAIN. Yes; they would go somewhere.
Senator DU Pont. And the Army would lose them for good.
Gen. McCAIN. Yes, sir.
Senator DU Pont. That was my impression, and I wanted to know
what you thought of it. 4.
Gen. McCAIN. I think that is correct. *
Senator FLETCHER. If you have enlistments to the amount of
50,000 a year, that is about the limit, and you do not think that
lowering the term or reducing the term of service would enable you
to increase that. How would you hope to raise this continental
reserve :
Gen. McCAIN. You mean the proposed continental army?
Senator FLETCHER. Yes.
Gen. McCAIN. We would undoubtedly get that from a different
class of people than those who go into the Regular Army. There
is no way to get a line on them that would be of particular value.
The CHAIRMAN. From your experience in recruiting in the Army,
do you think that you could organize a continental army of 400,000
men in the annual increment that it is proposed to raise them :
Gen. McCAIN. It is such an entirely different kind of people that
you are going to appeal to, Senator, that it is a difficult question to
àI)SWOI’.
The CHAIRMAN. It would be experimental, largely .
Gen. MCCAIN. It would be an experiment; yes, sir. Undoubtedly
there are a great many people in the country who do not want to
enlist in the Regular Army and who do not want to go into an organ-
ized militia, but who would go into a continental army.
Senator FLETCHER. They would do it largely from a sense of duty,
rather than for the pay that is in it .
Gen. McCAIN. I think so. They would not go into it for the pay.
Senator FLETCHER. Have you any basis upon which you can form
an opinion as to whether that army will be raised ? - *
Gen. McCAIN. No, sir; I can not. I have nothing to go on.
Senator DU PONT. General, as the law now stands with reference
to retired officers, they can not be assigned to duty except on their
own application ?
470 - PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
Gen. McCAIN. That is right, sir.
Senator DU Pont. I should like to know whether you think that
in time of actual war or anticipated hostilities there should not be
some legislation giving the President authority to order every officer
OI). d; retired list to perform any duties that he is specifically able
to do . -
Gen. McCAIN. I think that would be a very proper law and a very
good law.
Senator DU PONT. That is what I think.
Senator CATRON. Why would you not make it apply at all times?
Senator DU Pont. Well, you might.
Gen. McCAIN. As it stands now, many of the retired officers who are
able to do active duty are on active duty of some kind. Some are
out in business; but that might hit these people who retired under
the statute after 40 years' service. A man of that kind ought to be
leniently treated. I would not come down too hard on a man that
had been in the service for 40 years and had been retired under the
statute. I do not know but that a law that would force him back
into the service would be unjust. -
Senator BECKHAM. If a man had been in the service that long, and
war should break out and he were physically able, he would want
to go back?
Gen. McCAIN. I think a good many of them would; yes, sir.
Senator DU PONT. There is an immense number of posts in the field
where you must have officers, you know, to do this recruiting and
office work generally, and it seems to me they would be very useful.
Gen. McCAIN. We are prepared to utilize every retired officer who
is able to do service on recruiting duty and other services like that.
Senator CATRON. Have you been using any of the retired officers on
recruiting service'?
Gen. McCAIN. Yes, sir; we have more from the retired list doing
recruiting than we have from the active list; that is, out on gen-
eral recruiting service. º -
The CHAIRMAN. You have them detailed with National Guards,
too : .
Gen. McCAIN. Yes, sir. &
Senator CATRON. Have you assigned them to military institutions
or some other places where they could serve?
Gen. McCAIN. There are a good many on that duty. You can not
assign them to any duty with troops. The law provides that even
with their consent they can not be assigned to duty with troops.
Senator BROUSSARD. Do they receive extra compensation for that
work?
Gen. McCAIN. They get the full pay of their grade, but in no case
can it exceed the pay and allowances of a major on active duty. If
you were to put a lieutenant colonel or colonel on active duty he
would get only the pay and allowance of a major.
l Senator DUPONT. It would be greater than his pay on the retired
istº
Gen. McCAIN. I think it would be.
Senator DU Pont. Under the provisions of the last Army appro-
priation bill with reference to restoring retired officers who are
physically able to the active list, have any been restored under that
provision ? -
*
PREPAIREDINESS FOR, NATIONAL DEFENSE. 471
Gen. McCAIN. That last law that was passed ?
Senator DU PONT. Yes. 3
Gen. McCAIN. No, sir. Two have passed the examination so far—
that is my recollection—but the Secretary has taken that all up
again. It took some time to draw up proper regulations under
which they could get back, and the matter has . completed
yet. They are still at work on it. -
Senator DU Pont. Do you handle applications for appointment to
the Military Academy in your office?
Gen. MCCAIN. Yes, sir.
Senator DU Pont. There has been a good deal of discussion about
the best way to prevent this long list of vacant districts at the acad-
emy. The principals and alternates both fail and the Congressmen
do not fill their places. Have you any views or opinions on that
subject that you would like to give the committee ?
Gen. McCAIN. There are very few districts where the Congressman
fails to designate candidates. I do not know of one now. They all
make their nominations, and the nominee does not always get in.
There are always vacancies.
Senator CATRON. What would you do with reference to that, so
that there might not be any for the whole year?
Gen. McCAIN. It has been suggested that we take all of the men
who go up for examination, and if some district fails to get a candi-
date to qualify then the place will be filled by a successful alternate
from somewhere else. Every Congressman that I know of has
nominated three. He is taking reasonable precautions to get his
Iſla,Il 111.
Senator CATRON. Do you think they always name three?
Gen. McCAIN. Yes, sir.
Senator CATRON. I do not think quite all.
Gen. McCAIN. I say all, but that is an estimate. If you take
them from other places, from different States, and put them in from
the congressional districts to which they do not belong, I am inclined
to believe that the Congressmen would cease to take a great deal of
interest in the matter.
Senator DU Pont. Are there any vacancies as a rule among the
presidential appointments? Are they kept full all the time?
Gen. McCAIN. They are kept full all the time.
Senator CATRON. Does he appoint three applicants for each one
he sends there?
Gen. McCAIN. He limits his designations to sons of Army and
Navy officers or enlisted men. He designates them if they apply
and lets them go up and take the examination, a competitive exami-
nation. For instance, at the present time there are 13 vacancies at
large. The President has nominated 55 candidates for the places.
He nominates them if they are eligible and belong to that class, and
he lets them take their chances.
Senator DU PONT. The best man wins'
Gen. McCAIN. Yes, sir; the best man wins.
Senator DU PoWT. Do you not think it would be a wise thing, in
order to keep up the supply of officers, to increase somewhat the
number of presidential appointments? It is the same thing to-day
as when the Army was ten times smaller than it is now.
472 PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSF.
Gen. McCAIN. It is 40 now. -
Senator CATRON. He is entitled to keep 40 there?
Gen. McCAIN. He is entitled to keep 40 there. I think it would
be a good thing to increase not only the number that the President
could appoint, inſt the number that every Senator and Representa-
tive could appoint.
Senator CATRON. How much would you increase the number that
the Representatives or Senators have—double it? -
Gen. McCAIN. The Secretary has recommended that it be in-
creased 770; that is, to have 770 there; and in order to do that he
has recommended that a provision of law be passed authorizing every
Senator and Representative to appoint a new cadet when the cadet
who is at the Academy has completed two years of the course there.
Senator CATRON. That would double it.
Senator DU PONT. Not necessarily, because after three years he
would appoint another One. -
General MCCAIN. You have got it that way now. You nominate
him a year ahead, but they go in at the time the present cadet finishes
three years. You nominate him when he has two years.
Senator CATRON. In nominating him at the end of two years he
would then go in at the end of three years?
Gen. McCAIN. No; at the end of two years. We would increase it.
Senator CATRON. If there were not any vacancies, that would
make it double. -
Senator DU PONT. We have now the congressional appointments
as fixed by law, and a 25 per cent numerical increase in addition.
This proposition would simply give another 25 per cent.
Senator CATRON. How did you get that 25 per cent 7
Gen. McCAIN. He enters at the end of three years instead of at the
end of four years. - *
Senator FLETCHER. Would you advise increasing the military in-
stitutions?
Gen. McCAIN. You mean the number of them ż
Senator FLETCHER. Yes.
Gen. McCAIN. No; I would not advise that ; I would advise in-
creasing the capacity of the present plant.
Senator FLETCHER. But not in other parts of the country?
Gen. MCCAIN. No.
Senator FLETCHER. What would you recommend with reference to
the National Guard, General?
Gen. McCAIN. I have never taken that up, Senator. I do not know
that I have information enough about that to give you any views that
would be of any value. I do not believe I can help the committee
out on that.
Senator SHEPPARD. You said a while ago that you could not well
enlist more than 50,000 a year. - *
Senator DU Pont. That is, in the Regular Army.
Gen. McCAIN. That is, in the Regular Army.
Senator SHEPPARD. In what way will the enlistments for the con-
tinental army be less difficult than enlistments for the Regular Army'.
Gen. McCAIN. The continental army will only have about two
months' training a year, and they can attend to all of their business
and keep up their affairs and serve in the continental army, too.
PREPARED N ESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 473
Senator SHEPPARD. You think it will be easier to enlist for the
continental army'. - !,
Gen. McCAIN. Oh, I think so; yes. - *
Senator. SHEPPARD. This enlisting in the continental army will
obligate them to serve for three years on a furlough, and obligate
them to return to the cotors in case of war or the imminence thereof,
Does that mean in the event that war takes place during the three
years of furlough, or any time? g *
Gen. McCAIN. Any time during their enlistment. They enlist for
six years—three years with the colors and three years with the
reserve. They are under obligation during all of those six years.
Senator SHEPPARD. How long is this 133,000 a year to enlist'.
Gen. McCAIN. Six years. s
Senator SHEPPARD. After the six years is over, nobody will be
subject to call to the colors?,
Gen. MCCAIN. That would be 133,000 every year.
Senator SHEPPARD. It is supposed to be perpetual?
Gen. McCAIN. I did not lº that. -
Senator DU PONT. One hundred and thirty-three thousand go out
i. fourth year, and then you get a new enlistment to take their
8,00S.
p Senator SHEPPARD. Their period of obligation is only four years?
Senator CATRON. I do not catch that, myself. - -
Gen. McCAIN. They would have 400,000 under actual training,
133,000 a year. -
senator CATRON. Then, the first 133,000 goes out after the end of
the - -
Gen. McCAIN. And then the 133,000 would go out, and then they
would still have 400,000 under instruction. -
Senator CATRON. It would still be a reserve'.
Gen. McCAIN. Yes, sir. º
Senator CATRON. What would be the status of that 133,000 at the
end of three years when they were out of actual training? They were
in for six years. For the remaining three years, what would be their
status'
Gen. McCAIN. They would form a continental army reserve.
Senator SHEPPARD. You do not insist upon the two months as an
indispensible thing? +,
Gen. McCAIN. Oh, no; the Secretary named that period, as I un-
derstand it, more as a suggestion.
Senator DU Pont. I would like to ask you what you would do in
this instance: Suppose a man had º his four years and passed
into the reserve in the Regular Army, and after he had been in the
reserve one year he came back to a recruiting officer and wanted to
enlist de novo. Would you take him 7
Gen. McCAIN. No. ...
Senator DU Pont. You would not allow him to reenlist in the
Regular Army'.
Gen. McCAIN. He would have to get his discharge first. He
might serve out his time with the reserve.
Senator DU Pont. My proposition was that he had passed into the
reserve, and after he had been in there about a year he got tired and
wanted to go back to soldiering. He comes to the recruiting office
and wants to reenlist. The question is, Would you take him 3
474 PBEPARED NESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
Gen. McCAIN. I do not think we could, Senator; but I am not
clear on that; the law is not specific and has not been construed.
Senator DU Pont. There ought to be some policy about that,
anyhow. º
Gen. McCAIN. I am sorry I can not answer that question very
definitely. - - *
Senator CATRON. I think that will depend upon what we put in
the law if we create a reserve. -
Gen. McCAIN. He can not do it at the end of three years. He
bas got to serve out his time. After he goes into the reserve he has
to stay there until the end of his time.
Senator DU Pont. At the end of five years it seems to me he
would be more valuable in the Army in active service than he would
be with two years more of service in the reserve.
Gen. McCAIN. The idea was to create a reserve.
Senator DU Pont. I know what the idea was. I understand that
perfectly; but I was thinking the matter over the other day and it
occurred to me that old soldiers always say they are not going to
reenlist, and they go out into civil life, and many of them lose their
money and they come back to reenlist. . -
Gen. McCAIN. We have had a great many who, after being fur-
loughed to the reserve, have applied for reenlistment, and we have
had to turn them all down. -
STATEMENT OF COL. CHARLES G. TREAT, GENERAL STAFF
• |UNITED STATES ARMY.
ºne's Will you give your full name to the stenographer,
ease ?
º TREAT. Charles G. Treat, colonel, General Staff, United States
A.I’Iſl W.
i. CHAIRMAN. Detailed for what duty 2
Col. TREAT. On duty at the War College.
The CHAIRMAN. What branch of the service 3
Col. TREAT. Field Artillery.
The CHAIRMAN. Colonel, we have been discussing these bills for
the reorganization of the Army, and we would like to have a state-
ment from you as to your branch of the service with respect to this
proposed legislation relating to the needs of your branch of the
SCTV1C0. -
Senator CATRON. You mean by that the Field Artillery :
The CHAIRMAN. Yes.
Col. TREAT. Everybody who has given the subject careful study
has been of the opinion, irrespective of the branch of the service to
which they belong, that we of necessity need an increased amount
of Field Artillery. The different bills which have been proposed
have all been unanimous in increasing the amount of Field Artillery
provided for, and the question to be determined is how much we are
able to organize properly and equip properly.
Senator CATRON. Before you go any further, Colonel: You are a
graduate of West Point?
Col. TREAT. Yes, sir.
Senator CATRON. How long graduated 3
Col. TREAT. In 1882.
W
e
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 475
Senator CATRON. You have been in the Field Artillery ever since
that time? .
Col. TREAT. Most of the time, sir. When I first came into the
service I went into the Artillery. They had then with each regiment.
two batteries, which were mounted batteries. Officers were trans-
ferred to those batteries and back to the Coast Artillery according
to certain rules which were generally regulated by the regimental
commander. That went on until the Artillery was made into a
corps and the Field Artillery was separated from the other branch of
the service. During the time when it was optional with the officer,
with the permission of his regimental commander, I served most of
my time with the i.ield Artillery, but since the division I have been
in the Field Artillery. -
Senator CATRON. There is no separation in the Field Artillery
beyond that of a regiment'. There is no brigade or division of it?
Col. TREAT. No, sir; the reason we were separated was because it
was a business proposition, really. Since we have been separated
both branches have rapidly developed and improved.
The CHAIRMAN. What is the difference between Field Artillery
and Coast Artillery
Col. TREAT. Field Artillery includes Mountain Artillery, Light.
Artillery, Horse Artillery, Heavy Artillery (field and siege type),
ammunition batteries, depots, and parks.
Senator DU PoNT. And the Coast Artillery
Col. TREAT. And the Coast Artillery. The Coast Artillery includes
the fixed and movable elements of land and coast fortifications and
mine and torpedo defense.
The CHAIRMAN. You have six regiments of Field Artillery as at
present constituted .
Col. TREAT. Yes, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. How much increase is recommended in these bills'
Col. TREAT. It waries all the way from the lesser amount in the
House bill, which I think was sent to the War College as the Hay bill,
to the one from the Senate, the Chamberlain bill, of larger amount.
The War College has made a recommendation that very nearly
corresponded to that of the Senate bill. ---
The CHAIRMAN. Do they differ essentially from the tentative plan
of the War Department'
Col. TREAT. Very slightly; almost none.
Senator CATRON. Assuming that we have an army of 142,000 men,
how many regiments of field artillery, or light artillery, you might
call it, would you provide out of that % -
Col. TREAT. As a result of study of conditions in the increased
use of field artillery we have all been impressed with the necessity
of increasing the number of guns available for a thousand muskets,
infantry and cavalry.
Senator CATRON. How much 3
Col. TREAT. We have always heretofore had about 3 per thousand
and less, and yet from the study of these conditions and the advanced
use of artillery, we have come to the conclusion that a conservative
number of 5 per thousand should be provided. Our recommendation
has been based upon about that proportion.
Senator DU PONT. Colonel, is not the fact that you have placed
your figure at that point based on lessons of the European war?
476 PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
Col. TREAT. If you took the lesson from the European war you
would find it would go higher than that. Germany had more than
six to begin with. ... I was president of a board to report on the type
of gun which we should adopt, and also to lay out some tentative
scheme or plan to which the chief of ordnance could work in building
guns and providing ammunition, and we figured it out at 4.9 guns
per thousand; in round numbers, 5. We thought that was a conser-
Vative estimate.
Senator DU PONT. Did that board finish its labors before the
present European war?
Col. TREAT. No, sir; the board was convened on April 17.
Senator DU Pont. This last year?
Col. TREAT. Yes, sir.
Senator DU Pont. A very recent board, then
Col. TREAT. Yes, sir. We studied a year from all of our observa-
tions on the other side, and we had access to data in the War College,
and we also took into consideration reports of senior officers who had
seen service in the Field Artillery and also the report of the Field
Artillery board. -
Senator CATRON. What caliber or sized guns would you have, for
instance, in a regiment'. Would you have them all the same or of
different caliber 7
Col. TREAT. No, sir; we found that the most efficient service re-
uires probably two different kinds of guns, or more. In establishing
the type of gun, the first consideration was to make the number
calibers as Small as possible in order to prevent confusion in supply-
ing ammunition, and that consideration must be consistent with get-
ting the best possible effect with field artillery. With these objects
in view we finally decided on and reported the advisability of a small
type of gun, a light gun, like our present 3-inch gun. Then, as a
Sister gun to that—we wanted a high angle-fire gun—we designated
a howitzer which would have a corresponding range and that would
give the vertical fire which is necessary for the present type of warfare
in trenches.
Senator CATRON. How many degrees?
Col. TREAT. About 45 degrees to reach the maximum range.
With the development and improvement in the 3-inch guns we hope
to arrive at a percussion range of 10,000 yards.
Senator DU PONT. Is it a fact that they have discontinued the use
of canister for field artillery'
Col. TREAT. Before this war took place our proportion was 10 per
cent of shell to 90 per cent of shrapnel. Our reports from the other
side indicate that they have reversed this proportion and use 90 per
cent of shell to 10 per cent of shrapnel.
Senator DU PONT. I did not refer to shrapnel or shells; I referred
to the old-fashioned canister.
Col. TREAT. We substitute a shrapnel with a zero fuse. º
Senator CATRON. Have you any other heavy field gun besides the
howitzer 7 . -
Col. TREAT. Yes, sir. The next type was the 4.7-inch gun to
correspond with the type of gun which it is found we need for a little
longer range and which will place a projectile about four times the
weight of the lighter gun.
Senator DU Pont. The other gun was what ?
PREPAREDINESS FOR, NATIONAL DEFENSE. 477
Col. TREAT. Three-inch. The 4.7-inch gun is the next type of field
gun, which, under present conditions, is hauled by eight horses. The
sister piece for that is a 6-inch howitzer.
Senator CATRON. What would be the range of that gun?
Col. TREAT. About 14,000 yards.
Senator CATRON. And the howitzer would be how much 3
Col. TREAT. About ten or twelve thousand. Those are the two
principal types. The largest type which the board recommended was
a 16-inch howitzer as a result of the experience and observation on the
other side. Between the 6-inch howitzer and the 16-inch howitzer,
7.6-inch, 9.5-inch, and 11-inch calibers were recommended. The
Ordnance Department has made a pilot howitzer of 7.6 inches caliber
which can be separated into two loads of about 8,000 pounds each,
so that each load can be hauled by horses or by tractors. No pilot
gun has been made larger than the 7.6-inch field howitzer.
Senator CATRON. You spoke of a 16-inch howitzer. --
Col. TREAT. The board recommended that one be designed and
made. -
Senator CATRON. That is probably of the same type as these
52 centimeter guns : *
Col. TREAT. Porty-two centimeters. That is about 17 inches.
Our military observers on the other side state that the guns of this
type that you have mentioned have not only been used, but they are
actually transported by motor tractors over the roads.
Senator CATRON. What report did you get about their durability,
the lasting of them? I notice when the war commenced that the
English claimed they would not be able to fire them more than
30 rounds apiece
Col. TREAT. Our guns of that caliber we figure can fire from
200 to 300 rounds.
Senator CATRON. Have we a howitzer of that caliber 7
Col. TREAT. No, sir; but we have guns of that caliber
Senator CATRON. But that has much more material in it.
Col. TREAT. Where the gun exhausts itself is in the bore.
Senator CATRON. In the rifling';
Col. TREAT. Yes, sir.
Senator CATRON. I gather from what these Englishmen said, as
I saw it in the paper, that probably the gun would burst, or would
be strained in some way. The barrel itself, outside of the bore, is of
thin material, and that might get out of repair.
Senator FLETCHER. It is claimed also that they became defective as
to accuracy.
Col. TREAT. That is caused by the deterioration of the rifling.
Senator CATRON. Have they got so they can make a thin-shelled
gun that will not burst. -
Col. TREAT. The thinness of the shell is only to try to limit its
weight, sir, for mobility. It is easy to make them heavy enough to
last, if that were the only consideration; but the main consideration is
the rifling and the interior of the gun.
Senator CATRON. You think they could be fired two or three
hundred rounds'. &
Col. TREAT. Yes, sir. -
Senator CATRON. What would be the weight of a 16-inch howitzer?
23380—PT-8—16—3
478 . PREPAREDINESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSF.
Col. TREAT. I have the weight here with me, if you will allow me to
refer to some of these papers that I have here.
Senator CATRON. Never mind. -- *:
Col. TREAT. We propose to haul guns of this type on a railway car.
ºf Chamas They have to be made stationary when they are
ed'.
Col. TREAT. They have a platform.
The CHAIRMAN. How do the Germans use them :
Col. TREAT. They divide them into three loads; one is the gun
itself, another is the carriage, and the third the large steel plane,
about twice as big as this table, which is a platform. Then they go
on a motor tractor, and they are hauled over the roads of that
country to the point where they are to place them, and the platform
is dropped first, and the next car comes along and drops the carriage,
and the next one comes up and the gun is pulled on the carriage,
and it can be assembled in an hour and a half and fired.
The CHAIRMAN. I thought, from reading some of the accounts of
the war over there, that these large 16-inch guns had to be built in
a stationary place, and that some of those countries have a concrete
that dried quickly and they had to put the guns in the concrete
foundation. -
Col. TREAT. That was the report, Senator, the first report we got.
I think that was the first manner in which they were used. One of
our attachés visited, or saw, where an excavation was made and a
concrete base was put in. A railroad track was made over this and
the gun was placed on this concrete base and fired from there. -
But our present observer has reported that these larger guns he has
actually seen fired and that they are fired from a platform that is
carried on a tractor. -
The CHAIRMAN. Does it provide for a rebound?
Col. TREAT. No, sir; it has a long recoil carriage, but no more re-
bound than any other howitzer.
Senator CATRON. Colonel, what proportion of the guns that you
have will be of the 3-inch type }
Col. TREAT. About 50 per cent, sir.
Senator CATRON. How does our 3-inch gun compare with the Small
guns, say, the Krupps ?
Col. TREAT. I think the only gun which anybody has stated is
superior to ours is the French, but I doubt that. I think that our
gun is as efficient a 3-inch gun as any that has been manufactured,
and the only advantage that has heretofore been claimed by the
French is the method of taking up the recoil. They have had a de-
sign for taking up recoil which utilizes, in connection with the pres–
sure of the oil, a pneumatic cylinder. We have not been able to
duplicate that at the present time, but I have no doubt that it will
be duplicated. sº &
Senator CATRON. Is not our gun heavier than theirs; that is, the
metal that is in it
Col. TREAT. Very slightly heavier. Our gun is about 4,200 pounds;
that is about 700 pounds per horse.
Senator CATRON. That is for the entire carriage, and all?
Col. TREAT. The carriage and all, yes, sir; the gun weighs about
800 pounds. - -
Senator CATRON. Those guns have a shield on each one of them 3
PREPAIRE])]NESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 479
Col. TREAT. Our shields are tested for point-blank distance for our
rifles, which is about 100 yards. Every shield and every piece of
shield is fired at by a service rifle and the dent is in the shield. "
Senator CATRON. They are strong enough to resist penetration by
a steel bullet 2 -
Col. TREAT. Yes, sir.
Senator CATRON. Of course, if a solid shot struck them; but if a
bursting shell struck in front of them filled with case shot, or shrapnel,
; or 75 yards to the front, do you think it would be able to do any
arm
Col. TREAT. Yes, sir; the harm that would be done there would
not be the fragments going through, but the tearing off of the shield
itself and upsetting the carriage. .
Senator CATRON. That is what I mean. -
Col. TREAT. Yes, sir. The French have about three times as much
high explosive in their high-explosive shell as we have.
Senator CATRON. That is in the shell, not the shrapnel?
Col. TREAT. In the shell; yes, sir. As a result of this high explo-
sive naturally the walls of the shell are weaker, in order to get a cavity
large enough to carry this, and our reports, which appear to be au-
thentic, show that they have lost about 400 of their guns by explosion
within the barrel, which invariably destroyed the gun and killed the
gun crew. That is the disadvantage of the heavy charge in the
high-explosive shell, but we are experimenting with that and hope to
overcome that difficulty.
Senator CATRON, What is your idea as to requiring horses, or using
horses, with a Field Artillery battery of 3-inch guns, in battery, in case
of battle? An officer the other day said anything to get them up
front would be sufficient. -
Col. TREAT. We are experimenting with that.
Senator CATRON. He said they did not cut as much figure as they
used to. -
Col. TREAT. That, I think, is true.
Senator CATRON. He did not use the words, but I read between the
lines that you might hitch oxen to them and take them up.
Col. TREAT. The idea of having the mobility of the 3-inch gun is to
have it so horsed, or have the power such, that you can go where the
average cavalryman or infantryman goes, and go as quickly, and that,
as far as we know, necessitates the horse. With our heavier guns—
the 6-inch howitzer and the 4.7-inch gun—we are experimenting at
present at Fort Sill, where we have them in service, with the use of
motor tractors; and we find when we figure out the cost, figuring
the horse's service at 10 years, and his upkeep, and compare it with
the upkeep of a tractor, taking into consideration that less men will
be used, having one chauffeur replacing three drivers, we find it is an
economic proposition for this heavier type to use a motor tractor
rather than horses.
The CHAIRMAN. We have not as good roads as they have over
there on the Continent. - *.
Col. TREAT. No, sir; but we have tractors that go where the
horses will not go, the caterpillar tractor.
Senator CATRON. Do you have the same number of horses to each
of your caissons? For instance, you have reduced to two ammuni-
5. chests to a caisson. Do you use the same number of horses for
those :
480 IPREPAIRED NESS FOR, NATIONAL DEFENSE.
Col. TREAT. The same number. A caisson is a slightly heavier
load, than the gun when it is loaded with ammunition.
Senator DU PoWT. It always was.
Senator CATRON. But when they took off one of the chests, I did
not know but what that changed it.
Col. TREAT. We made one to replace two, but made it very much
larger. *
The CHAIRMAN. Colonel, were you on a commission or a board
some years ago to investigate the question of harbor defenses and
coast defenses with Col. Haan 3
Col. TREAT. No, sir; I was not.
The CHAIRMAN. Gen. Murray mentioned somebody who was on
that board. You did not serve on that board 7
Col. TREAT. I did not; no, sir.
Senator CATRON. Do you know who did?
Col. TREAT. Gen. Wotherspoon was at the head of it.
Senator CATRON. But there was some artillery officer on it. I got
the impression you were the one.
Col. TREAT. No, sir; I was not. I was in Texas at that time.
The CHAIRMAN. They visited all of these coast fortifications :
Col. TREAT. They did, and with the idea of formulating some plan
for the land defense ~
The CHAIRMAN. Does your branch of the service report as to the
equipment necessary for the field artillery or does the Ordnance officer
know about that ? -
Col. TREAT. No, sir. We make the recommendations as to what is
needed, and the Ordnance Department is called upon to supply them.
This board that I mentioned, on the type of guns, made a study of
this matter and made its report showing what we thought in a tenta-
tive way ought to be aimed at to properly supply an army based on
the necessity of having an army of a million men, so that we would
not have to begin to supply additional ammunition or ordnance mate-
rial for at least six months. -
The CHAIRMAN. You are providing for a reserve stock?
Col. TREAT. Yes, sir. This is in the nature of the Endicott Board,
so far as field artillery is concerned, giving some tentative plans to
work toward, not necessarily to be supplied in a year or two years,
but to be eventually supplied, and be made available. ge
Senator CATRON. You have five commissioned officers to a battery,
have you not, under the present organization ? -
Col. TREAT. Yes, sir. -
Senator CATRON. How many caissons do you propose to have, or
have you now, for each gun, two or three ?
Col. TREAT. We have eight altogether, two with each gun.
Senator DU PONT. Two caissons?
Col. TREAT. Yes, sir.
Senator CATRON. Has there not been some suggestion in some of
these bills to increase that to three with each gun?
Col. TREAT. No, sir; they made a recommendation to have an
ammunition battery which would be all caissons, that would haul
the ammunition from the artillery depot, which would be at the rail-
head, to the troops in the field. -
Senator CATRON. What is to be the organization of an ammunition
battery—how many officers and how many men? -
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 481
Col. TREAT. There has been proposed almost the same organiza-
tion as for a regular gun battery, and the reason for these additional
men is to supply men in case of casualties, and keep the batter
at working strength, both in horses and men. Ammunition battal-
ions and batteries are to be organized in time of war only. -
Senator CATRON. You would have one of those for each regiment 3
Col. TREAT. Yes, sir. One ammunition battalion for each regi-
ment (three ammunition batteries).
Senator CATRON. And the regiment is composed of how many
companies—six
Col. TREAT. We proposed in the 3-inch gun to have three batteries
in each battalion, and two battalions in a regiment. In the horse
artillery we have found that two batteries is about the most efficient
command for a major, so we proposed in a horse artillery regiment to
have three battalions of two batteries.
Senator CATRON. Is there any reason for having only three bat-
teries to a battalion instead of four .
Col. TREAT. We have found that that is about the limit that a
major, in controlling fire, can properly attend to. That is the reason
it was fixed on. - .
Senator DU PONT. Colonel, the French battery has four battalions
to-day to a regiment. - - -
Col. TREAT. In our recommendation, Senator, we want to make it
elastic. A regimental organizaton is only for matters of organization,
Supply, instruction, and discipline, and I have no doubt that there are
cases where we would have five or six battalions to a regiment. There
are such cases, depending on circumstances. Whenever a number of
battalions get together, no matter what their type is, they are as-
signed to that regiment for administrative and instruction purposes.
In the heavy type of gun, the 6-inch howitzer, and those proposed
types larger than that, we have found that two would be the greatest
number of batteries that should be used in the normal battalion.
Senator DU PONT. I think that is true, but for the field pieces
Col. TREAT. Three.
Senator DU PONT. I should think three could be easily commanded
by one major.
Senator THOMAs. What is the weight of a 6-inch howitzer ?
Col. TREAT. About 8,500 pounds, with the carriage.
Senator DU PONT. You think two battalions, about eight pieces,
are all a major could successfully superintend in battle
Col. TREAT. Of the heavy type. -
Senator DU PONT. I mean of the field type.
Col. TREAT. Three. I thought three batteries of the 3-inch type
Was sufficient for a major. - gº
Senator DU PONT. I commanded myself in the Civil War 22
pieces in the Battle of Piedmont and 30 in the Battle of Lynchburg.
had no trouble in directing their fire. It kept me pretty busy, but
I could do it. I had everything at hand.
Col. TREAT. But under our present conditions we have our batteries
Sometimes a mile apart. -
Senator DU PONT. Yes; that is true.
Col. TREAT. And the conditions make it a little more difficult.
Senator THOMAS. I was unable to get in here, Colonel, at the
beginning of your hearing, and you may have made a statement in
482 PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
answer to a question I would like to ask, which is this: Have we any-
thing to correspond with the famous French 75%
Col. TREAT. Our 3-inch gun is a duplicate of it. You multiply
that by approximately 4 to reduce it to inches, and it is the 3-inch
gun. The projectiles weigh practically the same. Their projectile
is slightly heavier than ours.
Senator CATRON. How many rounds can be fired from one of those
3-inch guns';
Col. TREAT. Our records show that the French guns have up to
the present time averaged 8,000 rounds per gun since the beginning of
the war. Some of the guns have been fired 600 times in one day.
Senator DU PONT. That goes to show we ought to have a very
much larger amount of artillery ammunition in reserve.
Col. TREAT. The board recommended that we should supply at
least 5,000 rounds per gun; that is, to give us a working margin.
Senator CATRON. You mean when you are going into action ?
º TREAT. No. We should have a reserve supply manufac-
tured. - -
Senator THOMAS. Colonel, does the powder deteriorate in storage 7
Col. TREAT. Not our smokeless powder. We have not so found,
for the length of time we have had it. We have a very high grade
of Smokeless powder, and it has been very successful. It has been
very even in its action. I think one mistake some of us are likely
to make in drawing conclusions from this present war is that con-
ditions which suit over there will not always suit over here, because
there they are entirely dug into the ground, and it is almost entirely
º warfare, and they rely so much on the shell for the destructive
effect.
Senator THOMAS. We will have to dig here, too, if we have a war,
will we not :
Col. TREAT. We will have to dig to a certain extent, but I do not
think we look forward to a war here having one flank on Lake Michigan
and the other on Chesapeake Bay.
Senator THOMAS. Judging by some of these preparedness plans,
I think it is contemplated, from Lake Michigan clear down to the
Gulf, and on the Pacific slope, from Portland down.
The CHAIRMAN. We have not made any radical claims.
Senator THOMAS. I did not say anything about you, but I am
speaking about some of the speeches and 㺠I have seen
on the subject from the outside.
Senator CATRON. In the digging in over there have they any way
of doing the mining except actually going in with a shovel and
digging it out, or have they a way of boring in 3 -
Col. TREAT. They have developed a machine for boring, a motor,
with which they can bore in a trench.
Senator THOMAS. War is machinery in action.
Col. TREAT. All of our observers are unanimous in the statement
that a shell exploded in front of a column, although it kills less men,
is more demoralizing in its effect than a shrapnel bursting and killing
more men. The shock to the nerves is greater in effect in the high
explosive detonation.
Senator CATRON. In that case you would explode the shell closer
to the men than the shrapnel. How far in front of the men do you
explode shrapnel; about 70 or 80 yards'.
PREPAIRED NESS FOR, NATIONAL DEFENSE. 483
Col. TREAT. From 40 up. It depends on the height.
Senator CATRON. But the shell you undertake to explode right
over them, as near as you can'
Col. TREAT. Right in front of them. The shell is exploded by
percussion, and if you fire with a very flat trajectory, they use a
delayed-action fuse, so that it will explode just as it leaves the earth
from rebound. When they use the longer range, they have tried to
develop a very much quicker action fuse so that the shell will explode
before it covers itself, and the explosion is lost in the earth, called a
fougasse. But men will not face the detonation of a shell so steadily
as they will face the explosion of shrapnel, although more people are
killed by the latter.
Senator CATRON. How many balls are in a 3-inch shell? &
Col. TREAT. Two hundred and fifty-two, I believe, is about the
number. wº -
Senator CATRON. And in bursting it 40 yards in front of a line,
how wide will that spread out by the time it gets to the line 3
Col. TREAT. About 35 yards. It goes out like the water from a
sprinkling pot.
The CHAIRMAN. It is pretty near a war of machinery now, is it
not, Colonel? - -
Col. TREAT. Very much so.
Senator BECKHAM. Are they still using the poisonous gases over
there, Colonel? -
Col. TREAT. The papers say so, but we have not any actual reports
from our observers that they are using them.
The CHAIRMAN. Colonel, are there any further observations you
care to submit : -
Col. TREAT. No, sir; except I hope all the members of the com-
mittee are impressed with the necessity of getting more field artillery,
as I am, not because I am in the Field Artillery, but because I know
that if we expect to have a well balanced Army we have to have
more field ºft,
The CHAIRMAN. You have stated that two of these bills provide
what you want }
Col. TREAT. Yes, sir.
Senator CATRON. You have the machine gun. Is that classed as
artillery .
Col. TREAT. No, sir. That goes with the Infantry and Cavalry.
Senator CATRON. Do you have any idea about the relative number
of machine guns that shall be put into a regiment or a given number
of troops, as compared with the number of field guns'; Do they have
any relative value toward each other ?
Col. TREAT. None at all. It is only a matter of having a place to
put them, and we started in with a machine-gun platoon as our
Organization, two guns, and that has developed. Our reports have
shown that the machine gun has come into such general use, especially
in this trench warfare—although I hardly think it is fair to draw a
final conclusion in all cases—they have gotten so high as to put 16 of
these machine guns in an organization, and the War College Division
of the General Staff in their last recommendation for an organization
of machine-gun companies have gone as high as 6. So that is a
matter which is tentative. It is a matter of opinion.
484 PREPAIREDINESS FOR, NATIONAL DEFENSE.
Senator WARREN. Is the War College estimate of 6 all that is
necessary for trench work? -
Col. TREAT. From our standpoint. We thought that was all the
personnel assigned to a machine-gun company could operate.
Senator CATRON. How many men would you have to operate
them ż ###
Col. TREAT. It takes about three to each gun, actually. sº
Senator CATRON. That is, three to actually operate the gun ? You
have others?
Col. TREAT. Besides that we have to have the mules to carry the
gun and carry the ammunition and the equipment, and it makes
quite a large organization. - -
Senator CATRON. For a complete company, how many men would
you have 3 Do you not have some regular standard for a company?
Col. TREAT. Yes, sir. It is almost the same size as a regular
infantry company, 91 in the Cavalry and 74 in the Infantry.
Senator CATRON. How many men have you for a complete light
artillery company, or a field battery company ?
Col. TREAT. One hundred and thirty-three, with authority to in-
Crease to 190.
Senator CATRON. Four guns ?
Col. TREAT. Yes, sir.
Senator CATRON. And your idea was to have 35 to a gun?
Col. TREAT. We have so much more paraphernalia in this new de-
velopment of artillery fire by the indirect method that we have to
have scouts and observers, and the proposition is entirely changed.
Senator CATRON. In action, before you have anybody hurt or
killed at the gun, how many men would it take to operate a gun in
action ?
Col. TREAT. One man could operate it.
Senator CATRON. He could do it, but to operate it efficiently :
Col. TREAT. Five men right at the gun.
Senator WARREN. It takes more men to serve than to be right at
the gun? -
Col. TREAT. Yes, sir. -
The CHAIRMAN. If there is nothing further, the committee will take
a recess until to-morrow morning, at 10.30.
(Thereupon, at 3.55, the committee took a recess until to-morrow,
Wednesday, January 26, 1916, at 10.30 o'clock a. m.)

PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 26, 1916.
UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON MILITARY AFFAIRs,
Washington, D. C.
The committee met, at the expiration of the recess, at 10.30 o'clock
a. m., Senator Geo. E. Chamberlain (chairman) presiding.
STATEMENT OF CAPT. GEORGE W. H. MOSELEY, GENERAL
STAFF CORPS, UNITED STATES ARMY.
The CHAIRMAN. Are you connected with the War College
Capt. Moseley. I am permanently at the War College, but now
on temporary duty in the Chief of Staff's office. *
The CHAIRMAN. What we wanted to have you discuss before the
committee was this subject of universal military training. You
...have given the matter more or less consideration, have you not
Capt. Moseley. Yes, sir; I have.
The CHAIRMAN. Have you prepared any statements in reference
to it 7
Capt. MosBLEY. Yes, sir. I have a statement that I am ready to
IVC.
g The CHAIRMAN. We would like to have you submit it to the com-
mittee, and then the committee will ask you any questions which
they want to in regard to it.
Capt. MoselEY. I am to have the opportunity of saying a word on
the subject of who shall serve, or, where are the men, coming from.
No professional military man is so wise as to be able to devise a
System of preparedness which does not include, primarily, a trained
personnel. The soldier has always needed his equipment and rations.
There is nothing new about the importance of munitions. The
enormity of present day armies and the development of automatic
firearms and #. guns has simply multiplied the amounts of men and
munitions required beyond all previous conception. But success
in the field still depends on training of the personnel and this includes
not only the training of the individual but also the maneuver train-
ing and leadership of all units beginning with the company and pro-
ºng successively throughout all organizations to include the
rmy.
There seems to be a very general impression that when the profes-
Sional officer considers preparedness he has in mind thoughts of only
large increases in the Regular Army. This is not true. No one
knows so well as our Regular Army officers that the regular estab-
lishment is only a small part of what the great program of prepared-
ness should be; a program which demands self-sacrifice and renewed
485
486 PREPAREDNESS FOR, NATIONAL DEFENSF.
discipline on the part of our whole people; the regeneration of our
partiotic impulses; the cure of our human frames of disease and,
finally, the development of strong, righteous men ready for any
emergency arising either in their civic pursuits or when, serving as
soldiers in the defense of the Nation. Our people can avoid the
issue by focusing all attention and effort upon the Regular Army as
if preparedness could be found, practically, in that relatively small
force alone. We can have just that preparedness we are willing to
pay for in trained men and munitions. But the principal element
required is a willingness to render loyal service. Even if it were
desirable to maintain a large standing army, the cost of its upkeep
under our present, sytem would be prohibitive.
Canada is now paying $1.50 a day per man. Australia and New
Zealand are paying $1.10, gold, per man, and down on the border.
Gen. Cantu, who controls lower California, is paying $1.10 gold to his
Mexican soldiers. . . . . . . . . - - • * . .
If the country were willing to stand the expense of such an army
we could not keep it recruited up in prosperous times. Hard times
and hunger would have to be present with us to assist our recruiting
officers. During the period of 1901–1907 there was great difficulty
in recruiting even our small Army. On June 30, 1901, the actual,
enlisted strength was 74,310. This strength steadily ran down until
on October 15, 1906, it was 54,659, and on October 15, 1907, it was
50,190 enlisted men. During this same period (1901–1907) the
authorized strength of the Army had been reduced from 77,287 to
69,861 enlisted men. The difficulties of obtaining recruits had
become greater and greater. It became necessary to resort to special
advertising. The number of recruiting officers was increased from
58 on June 30, 1904, to 117 on June 30, 1907, and the standard of
acceptance, was reduced as shown by the reduced percentage of
rejection of applicants. . . . . .
To show how far this failure to get recruits went in some cases,
it is officially reported that at a grand review at American Lake,
before distinguished visitors from many nations, one whole battalion
marched past with 80 men in ranks while one company totaled only
13 men. Finally, the pay of the Army was increased and it soon
became possible to filſ the ranks to full strength. The Adjutant
General stated in his hearing:
... I put the maximum number of men we can get in a year, by putting forth extraor-
dinary efforts, at 50,000. If you should make the enlistment two years, with an
army of 140,000 men, Say, you would have to get at least 70,000 men a year, bona
fide enlistments every year, and I do not believe you can do that. s
The Organized Militia has always experienced great difficulty in
obtaining recruits. From year to year it has been able to § its
past strength but no more, notwithstanding the fact that the Federal
appropriations for the Organized Militia have been materially
increased. And when I say it has only been able to hold its strength
I wish to remind you that that strength is approximately 400 officers
and 30,000 men below the minimum strength prescribed by the Presi-
dent...I wish to point out particularly that these difficulties in
recruiting the militia, as well as in securing their attendance at drills,
are engountered just the same in those States which pay their Organ-
ized Militia for peace service as in those States that do not.
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 487
I have made the foregoing reference to recruiting to bring you face
to face with the practical difficulties which are encountered at once
when we speak of increasing our forces at all. You are confronted
with the problem of securing preparedness, either by means of a
highly paid army or of adopting some form of universal training,
coupled with the compulsory service of a certain number each year.
The first is prohibitive in cost and detrimental to our public sense of
duty; the second is democratic and will, if properly applied, so regen-
erate the moral standing of the Nation and the physical fitness of our
citizens that it will finally redound in the highest degree to the credit
of those who accomplish it. .
In 1908 England reorganized its forces. The militia forces at home
were recast and molded into the territorial army for home defense.
Service was voluntary for four years. The minimum strength of the
territorial army was estimated beforehand by Lord Haldane at 316,000
men, but these numbers were never reached. The approximate
strength reached 260,000, of whom about one-half were qualified.
The inablility to keep the territorial units recruited up was realized
long before that force was called for the final test. A group of dis-
tinguished civilians and officers—men who were themselves striving
to better the territorial army system—plead to the Crown to initiate
some form of compulsory service. They concluded their petition,
Saying: - * " .
It has not been found safe to rely upon individual voluntary effort for the carrying
out of Such matters of public concern as taxation, Sanitation, and education. Why
then should the fundamental purposes of the Government, the protection and security
of the State, be regarded as outside the province of compulsory obligation? Only in
this way can an efficient home defense force be obtained and only in this way can the
burden be distributed. The principle advocated is essentially democratic, the com-
mon duty of all citizens being borne equally by all, and it is one which our great self-
governing and democratic dependencies oversea have of their own motion undertaken.
Once the problem is thoroughly understood, we believe that the common Sense and
public spirit of our fellow citizens are sufficient to induce them to recognize the neces-
sity of accepting the duty of home defense as an obligatory principle, and, irrespective
of party considerations, which are completely foreign to the issue, to persuade what-
eyer government may be in power to face the realities of the situation. -
It is particularly interesting to note that it was the labor party in
both New Zealand and Australia that put through the systems of
universal training which now exist in those countries. r
Senator CATRON. Have Australia and New Zealand practically the
same system 7 - . . . . . . . . . .
Capt. Moseſ. EY. Very much the same; yes, sir. But right here
you may say that the English volunteer system may not have worked
in peace, but that it has turned out the necessary millions for the war.
The numbers that the Government was demanding were never forth-
coming in full or on time. Those which were secured always arrived
too late, and the results show that their reinforcements arrived gen-
erally after the decision on the field had been reached. The system
was called voluntary, but the evidence shows it was “conscription
by blackmail.” . . . . . . . . . .
Senator CATRON. What do you mean by that % . . . .
Capt. MOSELEY. They blackmail a man and force him out of the
body politic. Instead of having the authority in their own hands to
go and take him, they blackmail him into the Army. . . . .
The CHAIRMAN. They ridicule him, in other words?
488 PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
Capt. MosBLEY. Yes, sir. . - -
The CHAIRMAN. The men who serve at the front, I understand,
come back and ridicule the man who has not enlisted'. -
Capt. MosłLEY. Not only the men from the front, but the girls
at home. -
Senator. BECKHAM. Where was that %
Capt. MosłLEY. In England.
. The CHAIRMAN. You mean that the force of public opinion com-
pelled them to enlist . .
Capt. MosRLÉY. Yes, sir; a man would come out of the theater and
8, º would step up to him and put the white feather in his button-
hole—methods of that kind. But they were carried a great deal fur-
ther than that. º - -
Gentlemen, this question of training is a very practical problem
with me, because I have two boys; and if you want those boys, I
want them trained before you push them up against the enemy.
Of the hundreds of plans which have been proposed by civilians—
many of these letters coming, indeed, to the War Department—very
few of them would, if adopted, give us a single additional soldier.
The authors generally content themselves with suggesting means for
producing officers, even going so far as to offer their own services if
the same could be employed in some commissioned capacity. . Where
plans have been proposed which would give us soldiers—the men
who are going to do the real work for us—it is generally found that
these soldiers are to be gathered from the unemployed, the n'er-do-
wells, the undesirables, or even the criminal classes. An army made
up of such men could not give us victory on any field any more than
they could bring us success in the commercial world. The attitude
of the American people must be entirely reversed in this respect
before there can be any real preparedness. We must have a system
which will find our best blood in the ranks. The general's son, the
professor's son, the millionaire's son and the farmer's boy must be
found all serving in the same set of fours. Under such a system it
will not be difficult to supply the officers by competition from among
those who have had training in the ranks with the colors and who,
after completing such service, go to college or military Schools or
remain to perfect themselves in the Army itself.
Such universal service in our Republic would be voluntary service,
for the power to abolish or to continue the system would rest with the
citizens undergoing training or who had been so trained. These
volunteers do in time of peace what they say they would do in the
event of war. -
We hope to remain on friendly terms with all the world, but if we
are ever put to the test the troops that will be sent against us will be
the very best. We must meet the invader with the same kind.
This, then, sets the standard of our citizenry trained and accustomed
to armS. -
I would like to say right there that I see in the paper that Gen.
Murray is quoted as saying that his regiment was trained in three
months. I believe he is in error, or has been misquoted, or pehaps
he went on to explain to you gentlemen what his regiment was trained
for. It was trained to fight Eilipinos, men armed with assorted rifles
and bows and arrows, and supported with no artillery. We have
no officer in the Army to-day who has led an Organization against
a modern enemy. sº
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 489
Senator DU PONT. Besides that, a great many of those men in his
regiment must have had some military training in the Spanish War.
Senator CATRON. I expect nearly every one of them had been
down in the Cuban part of that war, because the Filipino war came
on later. -
Senator DU Pont. Precisely. . . -
Capt. MOSELEY. It has been said that the Swiss or Australian sys-
tems are not applicable to our country. The principle of universal
service is certainly applicable to our country, but the actual system
employing that principle as a basis in a small country, where by
taking every able-bodied man there are none too many, would cer–
tainly be very different from the system built upon the same principle
but adjusted to our country with its enormous distances, its widely-
distributed population producing more able-bodied men than we
need as soldiers. y
Right here we must bear in mind the distinction between universal
training and universal service. Universal training of our boys in the
Schools. will assure them of arriving at manhood sound in body and
mind and realizing their proper responsibilities and duties to the
Nation. This training would be largely nonmilitary, but the aim
would be to develop a scund, well-disciplined boy. If the Govern-
ment lacks the power to enforce this training in the schools it cer-
tainly has the power to enforce the training on the boy. Having
trained and developed our boys in the school to the proper moral and
physical standards then they would be ready to begin service with
the colors. - - *
In order not to interfere with industrial activities of the country
or the adjustment of our young man in his place in the world, it is
better to require him to take his service in one dose. At the outset
we would find that we would have more available able-bodied young
men to draw on than could be trained. All should be listed for serv-
ice and the number required drawn for that service. The remainder
should not be excused, but they would form the reserve of that year's
class. If the trained part of the class was mobilized for war, the able-
bodied men of the same class, who had not been trained, would be
sent to the depots at once to train and make themselves fit to make
good losses. These able-bodied men, as well as those who had been
exempted, should also be required to pay a military income tax at
the end of the year in which they were listed and did not serve.
Under such a system our military forces might be as follows:
A national army localized in districts at home engaged from year
to year in training with the colors—that number of citizen soldiers that
Congress might authorize and appropriate for.
Senator CATRON. That last you speak of would be what you call
the Regular Army'
Capt. MosLLEY. Yes, sir. I would like to qualify that. I mean
that there would be a permanent training, personnel, training the
citizens that Congress might authorize. The army you speak of now
as the Regular Army would be used for that purpose.
Senator CATRON. I thought as you made that last statement, that
that was the soldier who would be continuously in the service from
the time he enlisted until he was entitled to go out.
Capt. MoselBY. My idea would be to have this trained personnel
practically the Regular Army as it stands to-day, its officers and its
490 PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
principal noncommissioned officers, engaged in training these men
who were serving their period with the colors, such a period as Con-
gress might authorize, at least one year.
Senator CATRON. What you would call training the reserve army?
Capt. MOSELEY. Yes, sir. That would be a correct interpretation.
Senator WARREN. You would expect those men to be trained in
approximately the localities in which they were enlisted?
Capt. Mosºl EY. That is the best idea. We can not get to that at
Once on account of the location of the present available posts.
Senator CATRON. That saves a great deal of expense and time.
Capt. MosłI.E.Y. Yes, sir. . . .
Senator DU PONT. It would be approximating it, as far as pos-
“sible, but whether you could solve the problem entirely is another
question. - - - - . . .
Senator WARREN. The Regular Army should be so distributed that
it could be drawn from without great movements.
Capt. MOSELEY. A well-paid colonial army, made up of volunteers
from the country at large, for our over-seas garrison. -
Our whole military establishment would then consist of a national
army at home, based upon universal service; our over-sea colonial
garrisons made up of volunteers from the country at large. . .
But if we are not going to adopt such a system and if we are goin
to continue to rely on a small regular army, then that army .#
be concentrated strategically so as to be immediately available when
needed and so as to enable us to train it at least to include the tactical
division. . - -
Senator CATRON. What is that last you said : - w
Capt. MosFLEY. A well-paid colonial army, made up of volunteers
from the country at large, }. our over-seas garrisons. That would be
purely a voluntary army. Every nation in establishing its foreign
garrisons does so practically by volunteers, irrespective of whether
they have compulsory training at home or not. . . . . . .
Senator CATRON. In that case would you increase their pay?
Capt. MosBLEY. I would give them increased pay and the officers
increased advantages, so that they would volunteer for that par-
ticular service. . . . ; . .
Senator WARREN. They are paid extra now under the law.
Capt. MosRLEY. Yes, sir. - . . . .
The CHAIRMAN. That covers your views of the universal service
and the necessity for it? - . - . . . . .
Capt. MosłIEY. Yes, sir. • - , -
Senator CATRON. Captain, as the requirements for them exist
in the United States, how many of these volunteer troops, or the
colonial army which we would send abroad, would be required? .
Capt. MoseLEY. The total strength of our foreign garrisons
amounts, at present, to about 31,000 officers and men. The plans
call for twice that number, but the troops are not available for the
purpose. - . . . . .
Senator DU Pont. Captain, do you call service at Hawaii foreign
service'? . * * *
Capt. Mosely. Under this plan that I mention here I believe all
service outside the continental limits of the United States should be
foreign service. Otherwise, you are constantly disturbing the Army
and your system of training at home. . . . . . . . .
* PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 491
Senator CATRON. You would embrace Alaska in that, too, would
you not ? . . . . . . . . . .
Capt. MosBLEY. Yes, sir. . . . . . . -
Senator CATRON. According to the distribution that they have
now, how many would be in the Philippines if a full contingent were
there; how many at Hawaii, at Porto Rico, at Panama, and in Alaska,
respectively, if you had the contingent that is provided for or in-
tended to be provided for 7 - . .
Capt. Mosfile:Y. The idea is to have in the Philippine Islands a
dº equal approximately to a division of Infantry, which
totals about 20,000 men. . .
Senator CATRON. Is that independent of the Philippine Scouts?
Capt. MoselBY. That includes the Philippine Scouts. . In the
Hawaiian Islands there is practically a division of Infantry intended
for that station. In addition to this, there is the Coast Artillery
garrison necessary to man the guns emplaced there.
Senator DU Pont. Do you mean to say that there is actually there
to-day a division of Infantry?
Capt. MosFLEY. No, sir.
Senator DU PoWT. There ought to be. -
Capt. MosłLEY. Yes, sir. . This is what there ought to be. It is
also planned to station in the Canal Zone a division of Infantry—
approximately 20,000—and, in addition, the necessary Coast Artillery
troops to man the batteries emplaced there. . -
- #. CHAIRMAN. Captain, there was a bill introduced by me on
this subject of universal service. It was testified yesterday by one
of the officers that this bill had been revised and would be returned
with such suggestions as the War College thought proper. Have you
had anything to do with its preparation ?
Capt. Moseley. Only in a general way. . They met on it yesterday,
and a very complete report will be submitted by the General Staff.
It should be in certainly this week. -
Senator WARREN. Capt. Moseley, what about a national law regard-
ing an advanced position in the schools of the country being taken
with the boys as they grow up 3. Should we inaugurate in aif public
schools a system of training tending to make a soldier? -
Captain MosFLEY. Yes, sir; physical training, so that after the
boy has gone through that system there is presented to the Federal
Government for service a sound, well disciplined boy. But I do not
believe that you can give much practical military instruction to
boys of that age, say from 14 to 16. -
sº WARREN. We have in a small way been able to see some
very intensive training, I might say, and it seems to be productive
of good results, under the system that Lieut. Steever has inaugurated.
Sapt. MosFLEY. Almost excellent system.
Senator WARREN. I have seen the boys out in drill, and I never
saw a more enthusiastic body of humanity. It struck me that it
was at an age when they were most impressionable, and when they
were really forming a foundation not only physical but in their
general education along military lines, as far as they could. -
Senator DU PONT. Where was that % -
Senator WARREN. Out in the western country. Lieut. Steever
is the officer who is detailed in my State, and under a second detail
now. He has these boys, for instance, during vacation time. He
492 PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
has them go out and make their encampments and scale walls and go
through all the maneuvers that soldiers do in any ordinary training.
I want to get your idea as to whether that is along the correct lines
Or not. - - - -
Capt. MosBLEY. It is along the correct lines.
Senator CATRON. What system do you call that ? • '
Senator WARREN. It has not reached a point where it is called a
system, except that we call it the Steever system, because Steever
has inaugurated it. -
Capt. MosFLEY. It is a most excellent system, but I believe the
great advantages of it are that it will produce the physically fit boy,
the boy with the right idea of discipline and respect to the Nation.
The Cºmmºn. You understand, Captain, that the Federal
Government has no jurisdiction over the public-school system. It
would require laws to be enacted by each of the several States of the
Union. -
Capt. MosBLEY. Yes, sir. .
The CHAIRMAN. But Congress has jurisdiction over the boy.
Capt. MoselBY. Yes, sir.
Senator WARREN. These boys under the system I speak of are
taken into camp regularly, for a couple of weeks, go through all the
maneuvers that it is felt are good for them, and they take about all
that would be prescribed for a full grown militia organization.
Capt. MoseLEY. But we want to be very careful not to lean too
heavily upon any of these systems. England made every effort to
train in that way. It had a military system which included a regular
army, a territorial army, militia, reserves, and special reserves,
finally reaching down to the Knights of Pythias, and when it was
tested it did not amount to much. Our men must have intensive
training, and this training must not only perfect the individual in
such matters as target practice, sanitation, and field training, but it
must include the progressive training of the officers and noncommis–
sioned officers, not limited to the regiment but progressing right up
to and including the field training of the largest unit we have.
Senator WARREN. We all understand that, but the point is whether
we should commence early to turn the mind of the growing boy
along military lines. «
Senator DU PONT. The difficulty is, the primary schools are divided
into two classes, the city schools and the country schools, and they
would have to be treated a little differently. In the country schools
nearly all the boys are hearty, healthy, country boys. They do not
need so much physical development. But most of the country
schools are controlled and taught by women, and they could not very
well give military calesthenics. -
Capt. MOSELEY. That is one of the great disadvantages, the school
“marm” instead of the schoolmaster.
Senator WARREN: They have men teachers after they reach the
age when they go into the high school. -
Senator DU PONT. But nearly all the primary schools are taught
by women. . -
Senator WARREN. We will soon have woman's suffrage and women
soldiers. I have seen as fine a company of militia women as I have
seen for a long time of men, drilled by the daughter of an old soldier.
Senator DUPONT. Captain, you referred to the difficulties of obtain-
ing sufficient men for the militia, and also for the Regular Army 7

PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 493
Capt. MosFLEY. Yes, sir.
Senator DU Pont. What, in your judgment, is the principal diffi-
culty that the militia people have in getting the men they want?
Capt. MosBLEY. The greatest difficulty is the conflict with the
labor unions. i - * -
Senator DU Pont. That is what I thought. Passing to the Regular
Army, what is the great difficulty there? Why do we not get more
recruits than we do? Is it the length of enlistment, or what?
Capt. Mosſ. LEY. If a man is looking for a vocation, he can go on the
outside and get more pay. That is i there is to it. It is a question
of dollars and cents. -
Senator DU PoWT. Do you think that the social distinction which
prevails more or less all over this country, which means that the man
in the uniform of the Government is not allowed to go to public
places in uniform, discriminated against, and is denied admission very
often, simply because he wears the uniform of the United States, has
anything to do with it? - - -
Capt. MosłLEY. It has a great deal. . We talk about educating the
people, when we have men right here in the Government service who
suggest putting in criminals for enlistment. If those educated gen-
tlemen make propositions of that kind, what can you expect of the
people at large W. -
Senator DU Pont. How could we obviate in any way the dis–
crimination in reference to the uniform, and so on 3
Capt. MosLLEY. You are going to obviate it just as soon as you
et your son and my son and the millionaire's son all in that set of
fours. Then we are going to look to it that the discrimination is
not made. I thought, when I attended a Security League meeting
the other day, as I looked over that audience, I would have liked to
ask the question, Is there a single person present here who knows a
soldier in the Regular Army, or who even knows the name of a soldier
in the Regular Army'. I will guarantee that, outside of the regular
officers who were there, there was not one who knew a soldier, or
who knew the name of a soldier. Is it any wonder that such an Army
has not ammunition, or has not artillery, or is not looked out for 7
If every family of that class were represented in the ranks of the
Army, that Army would have proper munitions and it would be
looked out for. It would also be a fine army.
The CHAIRMAN. Captain, there are a number of bills introduced
in this Congress affecting the National Guard. I think one was
introduced recently by Senator Cummins, I introduced one, and there
may be some others. I would like to have a discussion from you on
the subject of these measures and the National Guard.
Capt. MosBLEY. In reference to the Organized Militia, the War
Department is now in a position to make a definite decision as to
what the attitude of the Government should be in handling this most
important question. There is now available not only the conclusive
evidence of our military history but more particularly the evidence
of the period since the Spanish-American War, during which time
the Federal Government has labored most earnestly to make the
Organized Militia a dependable force. The evidence shows that we
have failed to accomplish this, notwithstanding the fact that the
militia officers and the Regular Army officers detailed on this dut
have labored most patiently, earnestly, and skillfully. -
494 PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
In writing the “Report on the organization of the land forces of
the United States, 1912,” the matter of the policy which should gov-
ern in reference to the Organized Militia was held in abeyance in the
hope that some means might be devised for bringing the Organized
Wii. into the Federal fold. But this has been found impossible of
accomplishment and further detailed study of the matter has fully
demonstrated that we have progressed as far as we can on our present
course as far as the Organized Militia is concerned. -
Senator DU Pont. You do not favor paying them, then }
Capt. Moseley. Not at all. The evidence shows, as I said before,
that in those States which are paying their men right now the per-
centage of attendance is no better than in those States that do not.
From the time of the very birth of this Nation the most fundamental
defect of our military policy has been the weakness of the control
possessed by the General Government over the forces it has employed
to prosecute its wars. This was not due to the fact that the General
Government lacked the power to control fully and directly all the
resources of the Nation for employment in national defense, but to
the fact that our origin dates from the period during which we were
fighting as a loose league of colonies, and we accepted of necessity
these policies or expedients that have remained with us and from whic
we seem unable or unwilling to extricate ourselves, notwithstanding
the fact that the Constitution when adopted gave the General Gov-
ernment full and unrestricted war powers. t tº
Our people have taken little interest in military policy, and the
result has been that our wars have found us woefully unprepared.
In these emergencies we have as a rule turned to our militia, employ-
ing it either as militia or as State volunteers, which has amounted
really to the same thing. Thus, instead of prosecuting our wars
directly, we have employed troops subject to the dual control of the
Federal and State Governments. The failures which have resulted
and the abuses which have crept into the system are familiar to us all.
In attempting to adopt a military policy, no great difficulty is en-
countered until we have completed our considerations of the Regular
Army. With the Regular Army the question is largely limited to the
considerations of the funds available. But just as soon as we reach
that point we are estopped from proceeding further by being com-
pelled to consider an existing force which we can not fully control
either for peace training or for war employment. The Spanish-
American War again demonstrated the utter weakness of our military
policy, and an effort was made to secure the passage of a Federal
volunteer law under which an army could be directly organized and
employed when Congress so authorized. The wisdom of this measure
needed no argument. Statesmen and military men had recommended
it time and time again. Notwithstanding the merits of the measure,
it remained pending for a number of years and finally, when it passed,
there was injected into it a provision that organizations of the militia
“may be received into the volunteer forces in advance of other organiza-
tions of the same arm or class.” There is now a provision in the militia
law which reads: - w
That when the military needs of the Federal Government arising from the necessity
to execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrection or repel invasion can not be
met by the regular forces, the Organized Militia shall be called into the service of the
United States in advance of any volunteer force it may be determined to raise.
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 495
The apparent intent and purpose of these provisions is to require
the Federal Government to employ an uncertain force of militia
before proceeding directly to organize a national army of volunteers.
Thus confusion is injected into the situation at a most critical moment.
There is this block between the Regular Army and the resources of the
Nation. Under such a system, including, as it still does, dual con-
trol, mobilization for war must still be attended with confusion,
delay, and embarrassment. We can not know in advance what
organizations will volunteer. No definite plans can be made on this
uncertain force, for the Federal Government can not control the
number and kinds of troops maintained or their distribution. The
troops upon which we have spent our time and our money may not
even exist at all when we need them, or at this most critical time a
governor may reorganize his militia, discharging and appointing for
political reasons with the idea of forcing the balance into the Federal
Se]"W1C0. e • * * -
Whatever force of trained citizen soldiery is going to stand behind.
the Regular Army must be constructed on a national basis. The
serious-thinking line officer of the Organized Militia realizes this right
now. The actual construction of such a national force of citizen,
soldiery is going to be attended with many difficulties, but with such
a system the defects and deficiencies could be made good by direct
action on the part of the Federal Government. If preparedness is
built upon any other basis it will be a sham and the opportunity for
adopting a sound military policy for the Nation .# have passed
beyond recall. t • * t --
A bill is under consideration which provides for a force of some.
400,000 Organized Militia—this at a time when the States have fully
demonstrated their inability as a whole to maintain even the present
Organized Militia to full minimum strength. The States that pay
for service have the same difficulties as those which do not. Pre-
paredness is not going to come in any such easy way. With the
º already before us we can not accept responsibility for such
a pollcy. .* - - -
º. CHAIRMAN. Did you examine the Cummins bill?
Capt. MosBLEY. Yes, sir. It has some very good points, if such a
bill is going to pass at all, in that it requires some additional training.
Those points will all be commented upon in detail by reports which
have been submitted by the bureau chiefs on that bi. . .
The CHAIRMAN. That will reach us this week?
Capt. MosFLEY. I think so; yes, sir.
Senator WARREN. Capt. Moseley, what, in your estimation, have
we got in the way of trained men? . w
Capt. MosFLEY. In this counry?
Senator WARREN. In this country. How many hundred thou-
sand men do you suppose have had training, either in militia or in
the Regular Army, or in the Spanish War? - -
Capt. MosłI.E.Y. We have not got them at all, unless you have a
legal hold on them. - * . "- " '
Senator WARREN. That is true; but what I am getting at is
what have we in the way of educated men, if we did get them? -
Capt. MosBLEY. If they have had two years' training, and they
have not been out more than, say, five years, they are A No. 1 men.
*
496. PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
Senator CATRON. Here is what Senator Warren wants to know—
how many of them will be available for service? .
Senator WARREN. I want your estimate. Of course, we know.
how many enlistments there are a year, but the discharges, of course,
are for disability, and in some degree for age. But I want to get
your idea of how many really trained, fit soldiers, if we had control
of them, there are, who have been educated in that way?
Capt. MosFLEY. You mean only in the Regular Army 2:
Senator WARREN. We might as well include the militia. . Of
course, we could include the schools that have military training,
but I judge that that would be quite a different thing from actual
'Selºw 100. - • .
Capt. MosłLEY. I could only give you a guess as an answer to
that, and it would be of no value.
Senator WARREN. Approximately. I want to get your idea.
Capt. MoselBY. I can not do that. That is such an uncertain
matter that I could not even make an attempt on it. You speak of
the men who have been trained in the National Guard. The National
Guard is not able to hold its personnel through the three years. You
speak of a man who has been in the National Guard. That often
means a man grabbed a few minutes before the summer camp, who
º his vacation in the annual summer camp and then leaves the
U18, I’Cl.
Senator WARREN. I think you are taking my question too seriously.
I only asked your approximation. I think a few moments' thought
on your part would cover just those things. We know that those
men get in the Militia. We know in the Regular Army there are some
“coffee coolers” who go in and are discharged, and their education
amounts to nothing. But with the intensive thought you have
evidently given to some branches, I presume you might give us an
idea of how many would be available, and when I say available I
mean if we could reach them. -
Capt. MoselBY. There might be 20,000. -
lººr WARREN. That would only be a part of one year's dis-
charge 3
Capt. MOSELEY. Yes, sir.
Senator DU PONT. Captain, what is the maximum limit of age in
the European armies? }. it not 55% -
Capt. MOSELEY. Approximately that; that is pretty high. Fifty
is nearer it, I think. In the Swiss system it is 55 for officers and 50
for men.
Senator DU PONT. Assuming it to be 50, how many honorably dis-
charged regular soldiers do you suppose there are in the country under
50 years of age, approximately, who, in case of a national war, would
come forward 2
Capt. MOSELEY. I would not place them at over 20,000, of those
who would come forward. You must remember that these men have
generally married. They can not volunteer, in many cases.
Senator WARREN. I do not assume that any course of education or
compulsory movement on the part of the Government is going to keep
men subject to military duty from marrying and having families.
Capt. MOSELEY. No, sir; {. In Ot. . .
Senator WARREN. That is something we have to consider always.
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 497.
Capt. MosłLEY. Yes, sir. But I think generally the men who will
come to the colors will be the younger men. We will uses them first
and only call on the older men in case of absolute necessity.
Senator WARREN. I think history shows that in the Civil War,
while there were a great many single men there, families deterred
very few from going to the front in defense of their country.
Capt. MosFLEY. it has been so in England to–day.
Senator WARREN. What I am figuring on is that in case of great
distress what asset, if any, we have in the education, incidental, if
you may call it that, that these men got who went into the Army
from 21 to 25, maybe married and maybe settled in business. But
it is a very poor soldier who would have forgotten in 5 years or 10
years or 20 years, for that matter, what education he received. It
is not important. I just wanted for a moment to get your attention
to that, because it is a consideration.
Capt. MosłLEY. I would be very glad to study that and make an
argº estimate.
enator DU PONT. Captain, as the law now stands a boy or
young man of 18 can be enlisted in the service with the consent of
his parents or guardian.
Capt. MosłLEY. Yes, sir.
Senator DU Pont. Would you favor reducing that to 17, with such
consent 3 Do you think that would be a good thing?
Capt. MOSELEY. No, sir; I do not see any advantage in it.
Senator DU Pont. You would get more recruits, that is all.
Capt. MosFLEY. Yes; you would.
Senator DU PONT. That is the only advantage. I recollect over
2,000,000 of men in the Civil War were under 21.
STATEMENT OF CAPT. S. J. BAYARD SCHINDEL, UNITED
STATES ARMY, GENERAL STAFF, ON DUTY IN THE WAR
COLLEGE DIVISION.
The CHAIRMAN. Captain, you had a tour of duty in Switzerland, did
you not :
Capt. SCHINDEL. Yes, sir. I was with the Swiss Army for four
months in 1907. -
The CHAIRMAN. The committee would like to have you discuss the
system from your own viewpoint, and in such a way as you care to
discuss it.
Capt. SCHINDEL. I assume that everybody knows the general
Fº on which the Swiss system is based, and I shall only refer
riefly in this part of the discussion to a few salient points which are,
I think, indicative of the methods by which Switzerland attempts to
protect her neutrality.
In 1815, when the neutrality of Switzerland was first guaranteed by
the great powers, Swiss national defense depended upon a small
permanent force raised by the cantons and that system continued
until 1848, when the growing strength of the armies of the nations
which surrounded Switzerland forced the Confederation to take some
definite steps toward providing the forces which would be adequate
to defend the country and assist in guaranteeing the neutrality.
In 1848 the first organic law was passed. That was followed in
1874 by a second, and the last law followed in April, 1907. I was
498. | PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
over in Switzerland just after the law of 1907 was passed, after it had
been submitted to the Swiss people for their consideration as to length
of training, which was the main change in the last act. This act
increased the recruit service of the Swiss soldier, and increased the
period of training during his period in the active army from 8 days
every other year to 11 days annually. *
The problem which the Federal Council found itself confronted
with in 1848 was to develop a force whose strength would be 500,000
men. The population of Switzerland is at the present time about.
4,000,000. At that time the population was a trifle over 3,000,000.
If we apply the 10 per cent rule, which is generally used in making
a rough estimate of the number of trained men possible to º
in any organized system, we would see that only about 400,000 woul
be available in Switzerland. This force has been provided. With
the increase in population which the council had to figure on, as well
as develop an economic system of administration and organization,
they built what is known as the present Swiss militia system. . It is
founded on universal liability to service, a fact to which we should
particularly direct our attention.
Senator WARREN. What about the age?
Capt. SCHINDEL. When a man becomes 19 years of age he is called,
in each commune or recruiting region, before the recruiting officer.
At 20 he is drawn for service, and he remains in what is known as
the “elite” until he is 32. Between the ages of 32 and 40 he is in
the first reserve, known as the “landwehr,” and from 40 to 48 he re-
mains in the “landsturm.” * ,
The organized portion of the Swiss Army is made up of the men
who are between 20 and 32, and 32 and 40. e
Senator WARREN. He is not finally excused until he is 48%
Capt. SCHINDEL. No, sir. The system has to-day developed a
force which is approximately 150,000 men with the colors, about
120,000 with the first reserve, and about 250,000 with the second.
About 70,000 of the third class alone are armed. This developed
the force of 500,000 which the Federal Council had been working for
since 1874. -
Everybody refers to the Swiss Army as a militia army, on account
of the fact that it has a short-term service; the training is in Small .
doses. A man, when he becomes 20, takes a course in the infantry
of 65 days; in the cavalry he takes a course of 79 days, and it is less
in the field artillery and in the train.
Senator BECKHAM. Does he take all those days at the same time?
Capt. SCHINDEL. Yes, sir. I was going on to explain that during
this recruit period he takes the whole 65 days before he returns home.
The next year he finds himself assigned to an organization, and
he is called for a training of 11 days. The system of training em-
ployed depends upon local conditions, and, no great distances having
to be covered, it is perfectly possible to begin with a man in his home
town with the company training. The company is trained for two
or three days, and marches to a little village where the headquarters
of the battalion are located.
h Senator WARREN. Are their arms and accouterments kept at their
omes? .' -
Capt. SCHINDEL. At their homes. I neglected to state that when
a man is called, at 20, he is given his uniform, a certain number of
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 499
rounds of ammunition, a rifle, knapsack, and necessary equipment
for messing, etc. - - .
Senator WARREN. I understand that the first reserves are also
armed 3
Capt. SCHINDEL. They are; yes, sir.
Senator WARREN. And some portion of the second 7
Capt. SCHINDEL. Seventy thousand of the second.
Senator WARREN. And these drills are, of course, with full accou-
trements : -
Capt. SCHINDEL. Yes, sir. -
Senator DU PONT. And they have ammunition, too, at , their
homes? -
Capt. SCHINDEL. Yes, sir. You probably remember that each
man is required to undergo an obligatory course in firing at his home,
and he is required to do that annually. This ammunition is issued
to him with his first set of equipment for that purpose. -
Senator WARREN. Are Scores kept and records made of the scores?
Capt. SOHINDEL. No, sir. That is kept in the shooting association
to which he belongs. They do not keep any scores.
Senator WARREN. But there is enough to encourage competition,
is there? - -
Capt. SCHINDEL. Oh, yes, sir. The interest in shooting is kept up
by the competitions which exists in every commune.
Senator WARREN. Do they do any firing with blank cartridges in
their drills 3 -
Capt. SCHINDEL. A certain number of blank cartridges are issued
to a man when he joins a recruit School, and a certain number of ball
cartridges, and those issued at that time are used in the tactical ex-
ercises carried on at the recruit school. .
Senator WARREN. Of course, he becomes conversant with the man-
ual of arms almost from the very first 7
Capt. SCHINDEL. Yes, sir. I might supplement that information by
stating that, although the Swiss have compulsory education up to the
age of 15, there is no compulsory military training given in the schools.
Senator WARREN. The schools have all the régime of instruction
for the boys as they grow up until they are 15%
Capt. SCHINDEL. Yes, sir; it consists principally of physical exer-
cises, in order to develop the boy to conform to certain physical
requirements.
Senator WARREN. All of which is useful, if not called upon to be
put in practice, as a Soldier?
Capt. SoHINDEL. Yes, sir; it is good for him in after life. . I under-
stood from a number of officers that after this period of training had
become effective, insurance actuaries in Switzerland have figured that
it added at least five years to a man's life.
Going back to the training required, when a man's company reaches
his battalion station the four companies of the battalion are combined,
and they go through two or three days’ exercises as a battalion. The
battalion then marches to regimental headquarters, which is perhaps
only a short distance away, and the exercises for the regiment are
carried on. - - . . . - -
Senator CATRON. How long will those regimental and the battalion
exercises be carried on ? - - -
23380—PT 9—16—2
500 PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
Capt. SoHINDEL. Two or three days; that is all. , You remember,
they haye only 11 days' time to devote to a man's training for the year.
Senator CATRON. They do all this in the 11 days? -
Capt. SCHINDEL. Yes, sir; they do all this in the 11 days, with this
exception, that where the organization is called for the big maneuver
of the year this training is outside of the 11 days required of the man.
The preliminary training given to the Swiss soldier is in the recruit
school, which I mentioned a moment ago, is given under the eyes
of a certain number of permanent instructors, who are furnished by
the Federal Government. These men are trained officers. They
have in almost every case been trained in the military schools of other
nations, and many of them have served certain periods of training
with foreign armies. The gentlemen with whom I was thrown very
intimately in contact in Switzerland had each of them served a term
in the German Army—one in the Field Artillery, another in the Infan-
try, and another in the Cavalry. *
Senator WARREN. And they are detailed to visit other nations
where they are not in service'.
Capt. ScHINDEL. Yes, sir. Unfortunately, those men have very
little vacation. Their time of duty takes up practically the whole
year. The recruiting commences in April, men are drawn for the
recruits schools, and the instructors then proceed to the recruit schools,
where training is carried on continually until fall. In the fall they get
about three or four weeks vacation, and in the latter part of October
the schools commence for noncommissioned officers. The Schools are
arranged so that every Swiss officer is obliged to pass through the
noncommissioned officers' grade, and through the junior grades in the
commissioned ranks. Promotion is by seniority after having passed
a very rigid examination.
The Cantons are permitted by the Federal Government to appoint
the company officers of the infantry, the cavalry, and engineers, but
the brigade and division commanders, and the Supreme commander
in time of war are appointed by the Federal Council. -
Senator DU PONT. }. making their appointment the Cantons do
not do so by the process of election, do they :
Capt. SCHINDEL. No, sir. That is done under-certain definite laws.
Senator WARREN. The rank and file have no vote in choosing the
officers' -
Capt. SCHINDEL. No. This appointment is made according to certain
well-defined regulations which are issued by the Federal Council and
which the Cantons must follow before appointing the officers.
Senator CATRON. What authority in the Canton does that ? What
is the authority in the Canton that makes the appointments?
Capt. SCHINDEL. The organic act gives the Cantom that authority.
Senator CATRON. But who has the authority in the Canton?
Capt. SCHINDEL. The government of the Canton is very much like
the government of a State in this country. -
* Senator CATRON. Do they have a governor, or some chief execu-
tive . .
Capt. SCHINDEL. I do not know what his name is, but there is a
chief administrative officer in the Canton. The authorities charged
with recruiting are all Canton authorities, but all questions of organ-
ization are settled by the Federal Council.
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 50L
The CHAIRMAN. The whole system there, schools and all, is under
the Federal Council'? -
Capt. SCHINDEL. No, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. That is, they have jurisdiction over them :
º SCHINDEL. I do not think the central government has any
jurisdiction over the cantonal schools, but the organic act provides
that they can get hold of the boy when he comes out of the school.
Senator WARREN. We had some testimony by the witnesses pre-
ceding you about the cost per soldier in different times in different
countries. Do you happen to know what the average cost per man
to the Government in Switzerland is under this régime of instruction,
per annum per man, or per day?
Capt. SCHINDEL. I am not sure of the figures, but I remember
having asked the same question of a Swiss officer and that it is
approximately $120 annually. This includes everything.
Senator WARREN. Per annum. " -
Capt. SCHINDEL. Yes, sir. This figure includes all expenses of
billeting and his subsistence when he is called for the 11 days. He
gets no pay except during those 11 days he is called out. -
Senator WARREN. Does he get travel pay in addition to subsist-
ence
Capt. SCHINDEL. The Swiss railroad gives any man in uniform,
carrying a rifle, who states to the conductor of the train that he is
joining his company, the right to travel free, and all officers joining
their commands and instructors going from one recuit school to an–
other have a special travel rate of one-third the regular fare.
Senator WARREN. Are the railroads there owned by the Govern-
ment ‘. . .
Capt. SCHINDEL. Yes, sir.
Senator DU PONT. Captain, you spoke of billeting just now. Is
there a 'cqeral law that requires the inhabitants to take charge of
the soldiers in uniform and give them food and shelter?
Capt. SCHINDEL. Yes, sir. This is done in a very economical way,
however. All public school buildings, all municipal buildings, all
barns of a certain specified size are usually turned over to the soldiers
when they arrived at a village. They are billeted in those buildings.
Straw is furnished for bedding.
Senator WARREN. How about blankets and bedding?
Capt. SCHINDEL. They carry those with them.
Senator WARREN. They are furnished by the Government 7
Capt. SCHINDEL. They are furnished by the Government. That is
part of a man's equipment.
Senator CATRON. Does he keep that when he goes out 7
Capt. SCHINDEL. Yes, sir; but he docs not keep that at his house.
His blankets are given him when he joins at the company rendez-
vous upon mobilization orders. .
Senator WARREN. The Government sees to it that he gets shelter
and bedding'.
Capt. SoHINDEL. Yes, sir; the Government arranges with the
authorities of the Canton in which these maneuvers are carried on,
or with the communal authorities of the commune in which the troops
are undergoing their annual course of training, and that is all fixed
according to law. I will resume at this point the discussion.
502 PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
The Swiss Army is designed primarily for defensive purposes. The
size of the country, and the fact that it has mountainous boundaries,
have up to date deterred any nation from violating its neutrality.
The Swiss Army, so far as is known, has never been tried in war.
It is a short-term army, and the defects which are found in every
short-term army are most apparent to the observer serving with
that army. The principal defects are lack of noncommissioned offi-
cers, the lack of sufficient time to instill the proper habits of dis-
cipline and obedience in this short time which is employed to make
the soldier; the fact that these higher organizations, such as brigades
and divisions, are together only temporarily, about once in every
four years, when they are required to maneuver in any particular
district. For that reason I do not believe we can say that the Swiss
Army is absolutely a dependable force. -
Senator WARREN. You would say that it had the organization
there for commencing intensive training for an army in case of war?
Capt. SCHINDEL. It has. It has this advantage—and the army
has received the full effect given it by the organic act—every man
being liable for service. Its organization and basic units are modern.
The training of the officers in the command of the higher units is also
up to date. The machinery exists to give this training if they could
only find the time. I understand that since the mobilization in Au-
gust, 1914, there has been a decided improvement in the general train-
ing of the Swiss Army and that if any nation to-day were to decide
to fight the Swiss Army it would be a matter of considerable diffi-
culty. One hundred thousand of the members of the active army
have been continuously on duty since the outbreak of the war along
the threatened points of the frontier, so the force to-day is a much
more dependable force than was the force developed by the peace-
time system in August, 1914.
Senator DU Pont. Practically that means that this great war has
forced them into a period of intensive training' -
Capt. SCHINDEL. It has. - -
Senator WARREN. The machinery being there, it starts off with the
proper application of power; that is, it is all there ready to go ahead
with intensive training. - , -
Capt. SCHINDEL. It could, without any trouble at all. The whole
system is a most effective one, and is modern.
Senator WARREN. And of course that is far better than our system
of militia, located as we are in the different States, with the Govern-
ment having little control.
Capt. SCHINDEL. It is for the simple reason that it has been under
Federal control since 1848, while our militia is not an effective force
on account of the lack of central control. * *
º BECKHAM. Captain, is the system popular with the Swiss
people' - -
- apt. ScHINDEL. Very much so, indeed; so much so that among a
number of noncommissioned officers and enlisted men who came up
and spoke to me at different times during the maneuvers I found at
least 20 or 25 who had come back to Switzerland from this country
to finish their period of military training. Great crowds which or—
dinarily followed the maneuvers, something which you do not see
in other foreign countries, is most noticeable. I remember during a
brigade maneuver, the attack of a fortified field position, something
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 503
like 10,000 people from that section of the country witnessed the
maneuvers, showing intense interest in everything that was going on,
and asking all kinds of questions.
Senator WARREN. It is popular both with the soldiers and with
the people?
Capt. SCHINDEL. Oh, yes, sir; very.
Senator BECKHAM. Do you find a spirit of militarism there, such
as we hear spoken of . • -
º SCHINDEL. Not a bit. There is no such feeling among the
people, nor is there that feeling among the officers. Of course, the
ermanent corps of instructors, 230 in number, are professional sol-
º But I did not hear any statements of that kind even from
them. -
Senator BECKHAM. Is there much occasion of offensive action of
the officers toward the people, such as we hear of in other military
Countries, where they have large military establishments'
Capt. SCHINDEL. No, sir; I did not hear of any during the time I
was over there, and I have not heard of any since. I have kept
F. well in touch with the Swiss Army through my friends over
there.
The CHAIRMAN. It is really a defensive, patriotic proposition?
Capt. SCHINDEL. Exactly so. The training and education start
with the little boys, as well as the little girls—when they are still tod-
dling around. It is carried on through the primary schools up into
the high schools. Here the duty of a citizen to his country is dis-
cussed and talked about.
Senator WARREN. The women are of course as patriotic as the men?
Capt. SCHINDEL. Just as patriotic.
Senator BECKHAM. In the political life of the country is there any
such thing as a military party or military feeling?
Capt. SCHINDEL. No, sir; I do not think that there could be.
You see, the Cantoms have certain rights as well as certain obliga-
tions, and at the same time they have also a representation in the
Federal Assembly. I don’t think it would be possible for such a
feeling to develop.
Senator BECKHAM. Approximately what is the cost annually to the
Swiss Government of maintaining this system 7
Capt. SCHINDEL. I am not sure of these figures. My impression
is that in 1910 they spent something like 142,000,000 francs. That
is approximately thirty million dollars. That included pay, training
expenses, the purchase of war material, and the erection of the neces-
sary storehouses.
Senator BECKHAM. Are the men paid anything for their services
while they are in training?
Capt. SCHINDEL. Yes, sir; during those 11 days.
Senator CATRON. What are they paid 7
Capt. SCHINDEL. It is not very much. I do not remember the
figures, but it is very small.
Senator CATRON. During these 65 days, when they first go in, are
they paid 7 &
Capt. SCHINDEL. Yes, sir; during the time they are recruits.
Senator CATRON. You said only 11 days.
Capt. SCHINDEL, I intended to include the 65 that they spend in
their recruit school. &
504 PREPAREDNIESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
Senator BECKHAM. In the first year of their service º
Capt. SCHINDEL. In the first year of their service. &
Senator DU Pont. In trying to supply a similar system for this
country, is it not a fact that we must consider that there are two con-
ditions which are totally different from those that you meet here?
The first is that they are operating in an essentially mountainous
country, where a small army, and even an untrained army, could do
better than if it had to go out in the open field 3
Capt. SCHINDEL. That is perfectly true. -
Senator CATRON. And, in the next place, that the political condi-
tions of the country are not such as to bring them into antagonism
with their neighbors. What they have to look out for is simply the
violation of their neutrality ?
Capt. Sch.INDEL. That is perfectly right. -
The CHAIRMAN. Captain, they must have a selective process for
men who are to serve 7
Capt. SCHINDEL. They have one, and it is a very rigid one.
The CHAIRMAN. That is, they only call out a certain percentage
of the male population? -
Capt. SCHINDEL. I think you can figure that in order to produce
between four hundred and five hundred thousand men under arms
they must take every man who arrives at the age of 20 and examine
him. You only have, I believe, about 45,000 men who come of age
for military service. Of that number they take about 20,000. The
last figures I saw, which were for 1913, were 22,180. The 40,000 who
come up every year are first subjected to a very rigid physical exam-
ination. They are then given an examination in ordinary common-
school branches, and all must pass this educational test. They are
then taken out and given some physical exercises which will indicate
their endurance; a sort of an endurance test. It results therefore
that about 50 per cent are rejected, and the other 22,000 are drawn
for service. - -
The CHAIRMAN. In this country, if universal service were the
vogue, it would create too many men, even for an emergency.
Capt. SoHINDEL. It would, and it would not be economical to
attempt to put it in force.
The CHAIRMAN. Ten per cent of our population would be about
10,000,000 men. What sort of a selective process could you apply
here to make either the Swiss or the Australian system applicable?
Capt. SCHINDEL. That could be done by calling a certain proportion
of the men when they come to the age of 18 or 19. The country ought
to be divided into districts, each district having a certain proportion
of the total male population, based on the number of males between
18 and 32, say. In each one of those districts every man who comes
of the age should be listed. From that number a process of selec-
tion—first physical and then possibly by lot—could be gone through
so as to produce in each one of those districts a certain number
of men annually. These men after this process should be assigned
to the units located in that district.
The CHAIRMAN. With our immense population and vast area, it
would practically furnish a reserve army standardized along almost
any line as to the physically fit. For instance, you could almost
provide, under such a selective process that only men who were 6 feet
tall should serve,
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 505
Capt. SCHINDEL. You could. .
The CHAIRMAN. Or of a certain weight, because of the immensity
of our population and the smallness of our needs. -
Capt. SCHINDEL. Yes, sir. .
Senator WARREN. Mr. Chairman, may I suggest there that along
pretty well toward the close of the Civil War the State of Massachu-
setts adopted a system with its miſitia that districted it off with so
many men in each district, from 18 to 21 or 22 years of age. In other
words, they restricted it by the age, and the active militia were
between those ages and the reserve-militia enlisted, and so on, taking
them up to 45. As I have understood, the Swiss figure in somewhat
that same way, that is, if they wanted to reduce the number they
would reduce the maximum age and take them all between certain
ages. How would that system work?
The CHAIRMAN. Under this bill that, I introduced for universal
military training there would be over 2,000,000 between the ages of
18 and 23 per annum, and there would he over 2,000,000 between
12 and 17, so that the bill I suggested would create too large a reserve.
The only proposition is to find some selective process by which you
can reduce it to the amount you want. I wanted to bring that out,
because many people feel it is the conscription of the people of the
whole United States into an army, which is not true. We would
need how much for a reserve :
Capt. SCHINDEL. Of course, that would depend upon the military
problem to be solved. The figures which were proposed by the War
College division consisted in first line of 500,000 and a second line of
500,000. The second line of 500,000 might very well be produced by
the system that you had laid out in your bill, and the first line, of
course, must be men with two years’ training.
The CHAIRMAN. What effect does the Swiss system have on the
industrial life of Switzerland 3
Capt. SCHINDEL. I was talking, just before I left Switzerland, with
a gentleman who was the proprietor of a big steel establishment near
Zurich. He believes that the improvement in the Swiss railroads
which have been so successful, as well as the feats of engineering con-
nected with their mountain railroads, and the speeding up of the indus-
trial life in the factories, have all been due to j. fact that every man
in the country has had military training. This has helped him in
matters of orderliness and obedience, and that, so far as the younger
generation goes, fewer children have to be brought before the juvenile
courts over there than was the case before this system was in full
working order. -
The CHAIRMAN. You did not observe that it interfered with the
industrial life or the agricultural life?
Capt. SCHINDEL. Not a bit. In fact, from the crowds which at-
tended the maneuvers, I did not think it did, because I suppose
during the week there must have been 100,000 people who attended
the maneuvers. They followed the forces from place to place.
The CHAIRMAN. How large an army did Switzerland mobilize in
August, 1914% •
Capt. SCHINDEL. This is only an estimate. She called about
100,000 men. - -
The CHAIRMAN. The report was that she mobilized in 48 hours
upward of 340,000 men. - *
506 PREPARED NESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
Capt. SCHINDEL. I do not think they needed that many men for
the defense of their frontier.
The CHAIRMAN. How are the guns, the uniforms, and so forth,
taken care of by those who take them to their homes'
Capt. SCHINDEL. They are looked out for by the men, and are
inspected annually, in the month of March, by certain military
officials from the cantons. -
The CHAIRMAN. The men are called together for inspection ?
Capt. SoHINDEL. No, sir; a house-to-house inspection is made.
Senator CATRON. Did you get amongst the inhabitants generally
over there and ascertain the sentiment or feeling that they had so as .
to determine whether any of them had any feeling against that
system of military training and education, and liability to be called,
such as they have there 2 Did you find any resentment at all against
it amongst the people at large
Capt. SCHINDEL. No, sir; I did not. I stayed with families of four
or five officers, a professor at Zurich, and quite a time with my class-
mate, Col. Le Comte. Of course, the officers would not be apt to
say anything, but the men who came from the United States to
complete their-military service were emphatic in saying that every
Swiss citizen was most keen to render the military service required.
Senator CATRON. In what capacity were you there -
Capt. SCHINDEL. I was there by 㺠of the War Department
to attend the annual maneuvers and to study the new system as
developed under the organic act of April, 1907. -
Senator CATRON. How long did you remain }
Capt. SCHINDEL. Four months.
The CHAIRMAN. What do they do with the artillery horses and the
cavalry horses? •
Capt. SoHINDEL. They usually belong to the men who used them
in the Army. -
The CHAIRMAN. So that it is practically no expense to the Gov-
ernment 7 -
Capt. SCHINDEL. No, sir. They have rather a peculiar system
with respect to the owning of the horses there. The law requires
every mounted officer to have a horse. Every man assigned to the
cavalry and upon coming to the recruit school can either be furnished
a horse by the Government, or he can bring a horse with him. If he
brings a horse with him the Government will pay half the price to
the man, which is given in annual installments of one-tenth that half
º until it is ai paid. If the Government furnishes the man a
horse, the man pays the Government half of the price of the horse.
Senator CATRON. You say “half price.” Do you mean half the
value of the horse : -
Capt. SCHINDEL. Half the value of the horse. I do not remember
now who determines that. The war department values its stock.
They have a department in the war office known as the veterinary
department, which has charge of all the remount stations and mat-
ters of that kind.
The CHAIRMAN. Ilave you studied the Australian and New Zealand
systems at all?
Capt. SCHINDEL. Yes, I have, in connection with the Swiss.
The CHAIRMAN. But there will be a report sent to us on all of
those 7
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 507
Capt. SCHINDEL. Yes, sir. If you remember, we have furnished a
report, which was printed in Senate Document 796 last year, which
describes in detail the Australian and Swiss systems. - •
The CHAIRMAN. Yes, I had that printed. Is there any essential
difference between the systems in Australia, New Zealand, and
Switzerland 7
Capt. SCHINDEL. There is this difference, that the training is
required at an earlier age in Australia and New Zealand than
in the Swiss system. The general obligations as to training are the
same. Of course, there are d ferences in the form of government
which make some differences in the organic acts for military service.
Otherwise, the principles are very much the same.
Senator BROUSSARD. Captain, you said a while ago that there was
considerable improvement in the proficiency of the army of Switzer-
land since the outbreak of the European war. That is, you said there
was from the reports coming to you.
Capt. SCHINDEL. Yes, sir; that is true.
Senator BROUSSARD. Will you kindly tell us how that was accom-
plished ? I do not mean the method of it, but the authority for
taking in a larger scope of operations toward making a more efficient
army'.
Capt. SCHINDEL. The Federal Council decided that they would
mobilize a force of a certain strength to protect the frontier, and
as a result there were called out a number of units belonging to the
“elite,” together with a number of reserves from the first class, and
they have been kept mobilized continuously since that period. The
men are working in their own organizations. Their efficiency has
really increased along the line of teamwork. Those organizations
are really now fitted for war. The short period of training they
ordinarily have to go through in peace time is not sufficient to give
OI’ gº the cohesion to the units which exists to-day.
enator BROUSSARD. Then the law gives the power to a board
having charge of this matter to call any quantity of men who are
On the reserve force into active service whenever danger threatens
the country, or they imagine that it does 3
Capt. SCHINDEL. Yes, sir. That is delegated to the Federal Coun-
cil, the council of defense.
Senator BROUSSARD. Is there a limitation upon the power of that
Council as to the calling of men, or the period of time which these
men are to serve : -
Capt. SCHINDEL. Two things are considered: First, the problem
that is before the country; second, the funds which are ºft.
Senator BROUSSARD. They are only limited by those two things?
Capt. SCHINDEL. That is all.
Senator BROUSSARD. They could call the entire reserve force, if
they judged it necessary, and there were funds sufficient to perform
the task?
Capt. SCHINDEL. Yes, sir.
Senator BROUSSARD. Are the men who are on the retired list under
the law available for service throughout the period that may, in the
judgment of that board, be necessary for the proper safeguarding
of the country' *
508 PREPAREDINESS FOR NATIONAI, DEFENSE.
Capt. SCHINDEL. I do not understand what you mean by the word
‘‘retired.” A man is obliged to serve if called between the ages of
20 and 48. If he is past 48 I do not suppose they would call him
unless forced to by circumstances. I saw men over 50 who had
volunteered to act as guards on the line of communication during the
maneuvers. This fact was pointed out to me as a good illustration
of the patriotic feeling in Switzerland. Here were a body of men
Over 50, who did not necessarily have to be called, who were volun-
tarily undertaking military service. - -
The CHAIRMAN. The committee is very much obliged to you, Cap-
tain, for coming and making this statement to us. We will now tº
a recess until 2 o'clock.
(Thereupon, at 12.30 o'clock p. m., the committee took a recess
until 2 . p. m.)
AFTER RECESS.
The committee met at the expiration of the recess at 2 o'clock
p.m., Senator Geo. E. Chamberlain (chairman) presiding.
STATEMENT OF BRIG. GEN, WILLIAM CROZIER, UNITED
STATES ARMY, CHIEF OF ORDNANCE. -
The CHAIRMAN. Give to the stenographer your full name and your
rank and the position that you hold.
Gen. CROZIER. Brig. Gen. William Crozier, Chief of Ordnance,
United States Army. - -
The CHAIRMAN. How long have you held that place, General'
Gen. CROZIER. Something over 14 years.
The CHAIRMAN. You have been with the Ordnance Department a
great many years'
Gen. CROZIER. Yes, sir; I have been in the Ordnance Department
nearly 35 years. -
The CHAIRMAN. Gen. Crozier, you testified at considerable length
before the House Committee on Military Affairs, did you not ?
Gen. CROZIER. Yes; I gave quite a good deal ot testimony before
that committee. . - -
The CHAIRMAN. That, of course, will be accessible to this committee,
and it is with the view of saving you a duplication of work that I
suggest, if it meets with the approval of the Committee, that this
committee do not go into all that matter. You were on the stand
for five hours, were you not, General'
Gen. CROZIER. Yes, sir. -
The CHAIRMAN. Were you asked anything, General, in reference
to the reorganization of the Army'. -
Gen. CROZIER. Not otherwise than as it applied to the Ordnance
Department. . ‘. . . . - -
The CHAIRMAN. Have you any suggestions to make in reference
to that % -
Gen. CROZIER. In common with a number of other officers, I was
called upon by the Secretary of War last spring, sometime, to sub-
mit suggestions governing the general organization of the Army as it
related both to the regular force and to a force of citizen soldiery
and to reserves. I made a statement of some length, but I have
not any reason to believe that any views that I might advance would
PREPAIRED NESS FOR, NATIONAL DEFENSE. 509
do any more than confirm those which I suppose have already been
presented to you. -
The CHAIRMAN. Were those along the line of the approval of any
one of these bills that have been proposed for the reorganization of
the Army'.
Gen. CROZIER. I do not think that they were fully covered by any
of the bills that have been thus far introduced, but my ideas were in
general accord with those that were expressed in the presentation of
the general scheme of the War Department; that is to say, covering
the three most important points as to the character of the personnel
on which the main reliance of the Government could be placed for
numbers of troops in time of war, I agreed that the reliance should be
placed first on a Regular Army which should be somewhat larger
than the present Regular Army; second, upon the National Guard,
mainly because we have a considerable force of organized National
Guard which, however, I thought was not sufficiently in accord with
what I considered good military practice to deserve increase; and,
thirdly, the main reliance as far as numbers are concerned should be
upon a Federal force of citizen soldiery.
The CHAIRMAN. That was along the line of the proposed continental
army'. -
Gen. CROZIER. Yes, sir. You could call it that. There should
be some force of citizen soldiery which would consist of young men
who receive a prescribed amount of training during the early part.
of their enrollment as a citizen soldiery, j should be held for a
certain number of years thereafter to service in case of emergency,
and they should be under Federal control and subject to Federal
training.
And then I approve of a reserve for all of these bodies, of men who
had been through the course of training that this would involve, and
would, for a certain length of time thereafter, be held for service in
case of emergency.
The CHAIRMAN. Did you have in mind anything like a universal
military service, or compulsory service, or simply the Organization
of volunteer civilian soldiers.
Gen. CROZIER. Although my belief would be speculative only, I
think that the force of Federal citizen soldiery that is contemplated
in the War Department scheme could be obtained voluntarily; it
would call for only about 20 per cent of the number of young men
who reach a given useful age every year, and I think that the taste
of a sufficient number of young men would induce them to enroll for
that purpose. - +.
However, I am aware that a point would be reached, if the numbers
were to be expanded, where you probably would not secure enough
men to even undergo this training, irrespective of any immediate
service in time of peace following the training. In common, I fancy,
with most Army officers, I believe that it would be advantageous to
give all of the young men who are physically fit in the country a
military training; the military training being, as I am speaking now,
irrespective of military service in time of peace. I believe that the
statistics of European countries show that on an average there are
about 60 per cent of the young men who are what might be called.
first class fit, and that there are between 75 and 80 per cent who
are sufficiently fit not to be rejected on account of physical reasons.
510 PREPAIRED NIESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
The CHAIRMAN. You feel that a universal service would be the
ideal system for training young men : --
Gen. CROZIER. I think there is no question but that that is the
most efficient system, from a military point of view. I do not think
that it would be necessary, in order to attain a force of the size that
is contemplated in the War. Department project, but that is only an
opinion. Nobody could tell until after that were tried.
Senator BECKHAM. Do you not think that a great deal of the popu-
lar sentiment against universal training is due to the fact that so many
people confuse it with compulsory service .
Gen. CROZIER. I think there is a great deal of that kind of con-
fusion, Senator, and I think that another objection that many
people have to it is what they conceive to be the great economic loss
in their having these young men devote a portion of their time, at
the beginning of their manhood, to military training. My own
belief is, based upon the reports and opinions of some eminent men
in whom I have confidence, that the military training, instead of being
an economic loss is an economic gain; that the efficiency of these
young men is so much increased by the training that, notwithstanding
the less time which remains to them thereafter, their manhood an
efficiency is greater than it would have been if they had not had the
training and had commenced their economic life a little earlier.
Senator CATRON. That being the case, you would think that the
people ought to be educated up to that idea º
en. CROZIER. Educate the people up to that idea .
Senator CATRON. Yes, sir.
Gen. CROZIER. I fancy that is true. - -
Senator DU Pont. You spoke of advocating the retention of the
militia system as having a certain value, as I understood you ?
Gen. CROZIER. Yes, sir. - --
Senator DU PONT. I suppose you are aware that it is proposed to
increase the appropriations to about $30,000,000 per annum for the
militia, so as to pay them by the Government. Do you favor that %
Gen. CROZIER. No, sir; I do not; although I recognize that it would
probably be necessary if the numbers of the militia were to be in-
creased beyond their present number to give the militia men some
additional inducements to those which are now offered them to serve
in the National Guard. I base that belief very largely upon the ex-
perience of England in recent years with what they call the territorial
force. They have a territorial force, or did have it until the begin-
ning of this present war, which very closely resembles our National
Guard except that it is a force of the General Government and not a
force of subordinate political organizations in the State. These
men get their arms and equipment and uniforms furnished to them,
and they receive pay during a certain period when they are in camp,
receiving their training, just as our National Guardsmen have been
doing for several years past, and in addition they receive one thing
which we have never paid our National Guardsmen, and that is a
separation allowance during that period, which is a small sum paid
to the married men for the maintenance of their families, or to help
maintain their families while they are engaged in training, in the
summer time. Notwithstanding that, on two different occasions
bodies of distinguished British officials and civilians have represented
to the ministry that unless the country could be definitely informed
PREPAIRED NIESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 511.
that there was need for the services of large bodies of troops they
could not even keep their territorial force up to the figure in regard
to numbers
Senator BECKHAM. General, in comparing the territorial force with
our militia, is it not a fact that the territorial force of Great Britain
was under the control of the Government 7
Gen. CROZIER. Yes, sir. : .
Senator BECKHAM. Our militia is not under the control if th
Government, but is under the control of the States. -
Gen. CROZIER, That is a very great difference, so far as the utility
of the force to the General Government is concerned, in my opinion;
but I was speaking solely of what would be necessary to increase the
numbers of this force if it were desired to increase the numbers.
Senator BECKHAM. The question seems to be whether the increase
of a certain number of millions a year would be advantageous to the
militia or indirectly advantageous to the country, and whether it
would be wise to spend the money that way or to spend it in some
other way that would make more efficient results? * <
Gen. CROZIER. In my opinion it could be more advantageousl
expended in some other way. -
enator SHEPPARD. What is the age limit for the continental army?
Gen. CROZIER. The expectation has been that they would be en-
listed in the continental army at the age of 19 or 20, and that their
total term of enlistment would be six years.
Senator SHEPPARD. Is that specified in any bill that has been intro-
duced on that subject'. Mr. Chairman, has any bill been introduced
enbodying the continental army'.
The CHAIRMAN. Oh, yes. That is the tentative plan of the War
Department.
Senator SHEPPARD. Does the bill specify the ages?
The CHAIRMAN. Yes, sir.
Gen. CROZIER. I know it has been contemplated that the age
should be somewhat along near what I stated, although I can not say
that the War Department has fixed a definite limit of 20 years.
Senator SHEPPARD. Could you not well give a wider latitude there?
There are a great many men of higher age who would like to come
into this continental army. -
Gen. CROZIER. We think that that might be possible, but in think-
ing of it. I have been considering the question as to the possibility of
securing these men voluntarily, and in doing that I have taken one
certain age because we have the number of men that come to that
age every year in the country on an average, that being about 900,000.
To secure the number that would be required to keep up the force
at the size which the War Department has presented it at, namely,
400,000, of those who are in the first three years, you would have to
have about 145,000 a year, perhaps 147,000. That would give a
certain percentage of men just becoming 19. So I have rather
fastened my mind on that age of 19, but I do not think that the War
Department has stated any limit by which it would fix the age,
although I am not positive. . . .
Senator SHEPPARD. The proposed plan states that all enlisted men
raised under the provisions of this act shall be taken from citizens of
the United States, or those who have declared their intention to be
512 PREPAIRED NIESS FOR, NATIONAL DEFENSE.
citizens, and shall be at the time of their first enlistment between the
ages of 18 and 35 years. I think that is a very good provision.
Gen. CROZIER. That is much more liberal than the figures that I
mentioned, which I was stating with reference to another idea, Senator.
Senator SHIEPPARD. Of course, in practice, you would get more
around 19 or 20 than around the other ages, I presume? -
Gen. CROZIER. Yes; and, of course, in the long run if as many
men could be taken in as were willing to come at the age of 19, after
a while the only class we would have to turn to is the class just becom-
ing 19, and the others would be considered beforehand.
Senator DU Pont. General, all the bills under consideration involve
an increase in the Artillery force by a certain number of regiments.
I would like to ask you if you have in the arsenals at this moment
enough cannon to supply these new Artillery regiments which are
talked of 3 -
Gen. CROZIER. I have enough now in the hands of troops and in the
arsenals to supply all of the existing organizations of the Regular
Army and all the existing organizations of the National Guard, and I
have a considerable number left over—more than enough.
Senator THOMAs. Modern weapons? -
Gen. CROZIER. Modern weapons; more than enough to supply the
regiments which have been proposed in any one of these i.
Señator DU Pont. They propose 10 regiments, some of them.
Gen. CROZIER. As far as the additions to the Regular Army are
concerned; but I would remind you, Senator, that with fererence to
the continental army
Senator DU Pont. I am talking about the Regular Army.
Gen. CROZIER. So far as the Regular Army is concerned, there is
more than enough.
Senator DU Pont. There are not more than 240 guns now in the
arsenals—-
Gen. CROZIER. We have either built or under construction 225
batteries of four guns each. That is 1,000 guns.
Senator DU Pont. What is your heaviest gun?
Gen. CROZIER. Six-inch howitzer.
Senator DU Pont. What is its range? * *
Gen. CROZIER. It fires a projectile of 120 pounds weight, and its
range, as I remember it, is about 7,500 yards.
Senator DU Pont. How does that compare with the 30 or 40
centimeter gun of the German Army'.
Gen. CROZIER. Of course, the power of the piece as measured by
the weight of the projectile is very much less. The 42-centimeter
gun, which is the one which has been spoken of generally, fires a pro-
jectile from 1,600 to 1,800 pounds weight. As far as its range is con-
cerned, I doubt if it is very much greater than the range I have just
specified. I may add that we are contemplating a new model of this
6-inch howitzer, which is a newer model than that in any of the
European armies to-day, except perhaps in the Italian Army, which
would, by reason of the greater velocity that we would expect to give
to the projectile, have a greater range than the 42-centimeter howitzer
of which we have had definite information.
Senator DU Pont. How would you describe the 6-inch howitzer in
terms of centimeters? - - . . .
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 513
Gen. CROZIER. It is a little over 15 centimeters. That is the
largest one we have now, but it is not the largest one we have in con-
templation. - .
Senator DU Pont. You have guns in contemplation that you con-
sider superior to those in the European armies?
Gen. CROZIER. That will lead me into a little very recent history
which I am very glad to give you.
Senator DU Post. We shall be very glad to hear it.
Gen. CROZIER. The project as it now exists with reference to that
artillery is one which was settled upon or at least suggested by a board
of officers which was appointed for the purpose in 1911, which, from
the name of the senior officer of the board, has been known as the
Greble Board. That board proposed ascheme for Field Artillery for the
insular possessions and for six field armies, as we call it, and in addition
a reserve Artillery for a seventh field army. The Artillery was di-
vided into pieces of calibers ranging from 3 inches to 6 inches, 6 inches
being the largest, and the total number of batteries which was ex-
pected to be provided for all those purposes which I have mentioned
was 323. -
Senator CATRON. Batteries or guns' -
Gen. CROZIER. Batteries, of four guns each. The estimates which
are before Congress now with reference to that subject contemplate
these standards of that board, as far as the proportion of field guns
to troops is concerned, and as far as the calibers of the pieces is con-
cerned. The application of those standards is made in the estimate
to the larger Army now before you which would be 11 field armies
with two cavalry divisions. However, since the outbreak of the
European War the artillery has received what might be called a
very considerable impetus, and the value of it and the necessity of it
has been demonstrated to be greater than would accord with the
scheme of the Greble Board. As soon as sufficient information was
supposed to be on hand from that war to enable the lessons to be at
least partially utilized, the War Department appointed another board
to overhaul this subject and review the project of the Greble Board.
This board, from its senior officer, has been called the Treat Board.
It reported last summer. The report made a very large increase in
the amount of artillery called for, the increase being along three
lines. The proportion of guns to other troops, that is, to Infantry
and Cavalry, was increased from about 3.16 guns per thousand of
º ºple Board to about 4.9 guns per thousand of Infantry and
avalry.
Senator DU PONT. Do you think that is sufficient' º
Gen. CROZIER. I have no reason for saying that it should be larger.
That approaches much more nearly the proportions as we knew of
them before the war—
Senator DU Pont. I understand the Germans had six guns to
1,000 muskets before the war began.
Gen. CROZIER. I believe that they certainly had between five and
six. There is another point of difference. This board increased the
size of the largest piece from the 6-inch howitzer to an 11-inch
howitzer, firing a projectile of anywhere from 500 to 700 pounds,
and suggested that even larger calibers should be experimented with.
The third point advanced was in the amount of ammunition per
piece, which it thought desirable to supply. It increased the amount
514 - PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
for the piece which formed the most numerous caliber in the Field
Artillery, which is the 3-inch piece, from about 1,800 rounds per
gun to 5,000 rounds per gun, and a proportionate increase for the
pieces of larger caliber. - T •
These three changes very largely increased the estimate of the
total cost. That board's report was referred to me for comment,
and I suggested changes along two principal lines. ..
I made no suggestion of a change in the proportion of guns to
troops, leaving that at 4.9 guns per thousand of Infantry and Cavalry.
I suggested that for the present, and until we could get further
information as to the use and the value of these very heavy pieces
for general field operations, as distinct from operations against
land forts strongly protected, we should limit ourselves to a piece
of 9% inches caliber, firing a projectile of something like 400 pounds
weight, and we should experiment with pieces of larger caliber and
learn for ourselves something about their destructive powers, and
should secure information, which we would hope to get later, before
making a program involving a definite supply of those other large
pleces.
Senator DU PONT. I would like to ask you if this 4.9 piece is the
same gun that you referred to a short time ago that you had in
contemplation—a 6-inch howitzer, was it not
Gen. CROZIER. I did not speak of a 4.9-inch caliber, Senator; I was
speaking of the proportion of guns to troops being 4.9 guns per thou-
sand of troops. *
Senator DU Pont. But earlier in your remarks you said that you
had in contemplation a larger gun. That is this gun ? -
Gen. CROZIER. Yes, sir; that is this gun, the 9.5-inch gun.
Senator DU Pont. I would like to ask you if any gun has been con-
structed as yet of that kind 3
General CROZIER. In this country &
Senator DU PONT. Yes.
Gen. CROZIER. It has not; no, sir. -
Senator DU Pont. How long will it take to provide guns of that
caliber 3
Gen. CROZIER. It will take a considerable time by the conservative
methods which we usually follow, which involve making a design of
one of these guns, with its carriage, and producing a type gun, and,
from our experience in the test of that gun, to construct a perfected
tWpe. - - ;
*śnator DU PONT. Has the design been made as yet 7 -
Gen. CROzIER. The design has not been finished as yet. Before the
outbreak of this European war we were engaged upon the design and
construction of a piece of about 7.6 inches caliber which would fire a
projectile of double the weight of our present heaviest P. 240 pounds
instead of 120. That piece was just about completed and ready to go
on the proving grounds, but, owing to the lessons of the European
war, the consensus of opinion is that the caliber should be skipped
altogether. - . . . - -
Senator DU Pont. You say it would take a considerable time.
What do you mean, by “considerable time”! Do you mean six
months? . . . . • . . - . . . . . . .
Gen. CROZIER. More than that, sir. I think it would take, from
where we stand now, the better part of six months to finish the design,
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 515
and then, after that, it will take the better part of a year to build the
first gun. After we get these designs it may be that we will consider
that the subject has been sufficiently well worked out and the neces-
sity may be sufficiently pressing to justify our embarking on the con-
struction of these guns in numbers sufficient to constitute something
of a supply, rather than to make a type gun and try that before
seeking to build the guns for a supply. -
Senator Du Pont. Then it will be practically two years before the
country could expect, under the most favorable circumstances, to have
a supply of these guns
Gen. CROZIER. Yes, sir; at least that.
Senator SHEPPARD. Do you not think that we ought to have guns
equal to the 42-centimeter guns '
Gen. CROZIER. Senator, there is a good deal of opinion to that
effect among officers, but we know that those 42-centimeter guns
were produced for a particular purpose. They were to demolish cer-
tain land fortifications built of steel and concrete which were along
the French and Belgian frontiers, and for that purpose they were
very successful. We have reports which we know are true to the
effect that they have in addition to that been used in ordinary field
operations, such, for instance, as the advance of the German and
Austrian armies through Galicia and Poland. Their 30-centimeter
and 42-centimeter guns were both used, and they were reported to
have been used against entrenchments which could be quickly con-
structed by armies in the field. They were primarily intended to
demolish these concrete and steel forts that were permanent works.
That leaves still open the question as to whether they were not
used in ordinary field operations simply because they had them.
Of course, in a hard fight, a man will use anything he has got. It
leaves undecided the question as to whether or not they would still
be constructed for just such purposes as that. Their power is far
greater than is necessary to go to the bottom of any kind of an
entrenchment that any of these troops have built in the field. The
º of this 9.5-inch howitzer would penetrate far enough, if it
id not explode by action of its own fuse, to reach the bottom of
every one of these field entrenchments, and the projectile would
carry a high explosive charge.
Senator THOMAS. I think you made a statement a few minutes ago
that the carrying capacity or range of the guns we have, this 6-inch
howitzer, is about the same 3
Gen. CROZIER. I think the 42-centimeter has a somewhat greater
I’8,I) O'G. -
Senator THOMAs. My impression has been, from reading newspaper
and other accounts of that weapon, that it had a range of between 20
and 21 miles.
Gen. CRUZIER. That refers to a piece of different character.
Senator THOMAs. That is not the 42 centimeter?
Gen. CROZIER. No, sir; that is not the 42 centimeter. That is the
same kind of piece that we have in this country in our fortifications. ,
Senator THOMAs. Like the guns up at New York?
Gen. CROZIER. Yes, sir; and on our naval vessels. We have only
one 16-inch gun in existence in this country, but we have 12-inch
guns very nearly all over the coasts.
Senator THOMAs. It is up in New York?
233S0—PT 9—16—3
'516 PREPAREDNESS FOR, NATIONAL DEFENSE.
Gen. CROZIER. It happens to be at this moment at Sandy Hook
Proving Ground, undergoing tests, but it is intended that it shall go
down to the Panama Canal.
Senator DU PONT. What number of projectiles have you in stock
for the ordinary field artillery guns of the higher caliber, which is
3 inches, is it not
Gen. CROZIER. Up to 6 inches; 3 inches to 6 inches.
Senator DU PONT. How many projectiles have you in stock for
those guns'; -
Gen. CROZIER. In the neighborhood of three quarters of a million?
Senator DU PONT. How many for each gun; that is what I want to
et at .
g Gen. CROZIER. We have about 1,000 guns. That would average
about 700 per gun. .
Senator DU PONT. Do you think that is fully adequate %
Gen. CROZIER. No, indeed, I do not. That is less than half of the
supply that was recommended by the Greble Board, and a very small
percentage of that recommended by the Treat Board, and not more
than a quarter of the supply that I recommended myself in com-
menting on the Treat Board report. -
Senator DU PONT. Do you think Congress should authorize the
enlargement of this supply ---
Gen. CROZIER. Yes; } think so.
The CHAIRM.N. How large an Army could you supply guns to in
case of emergency' You say you have enough for the Army as it is
constituted, for the National Guard, or for the proposed continental
army; but how large an army could you supply guns to and ammu-
nition ? -
Gen. CROZIER. We have on hand or under construction, as I stated
a moment ago, about 1,000 field guns, and at the ratio of 4.9 or 5
guns per thousand troops, that would be sufficient to supply an
army of about 200,000 men.
The CHAIRMAN. And that is all?
Gen. CROZIER. That is all; yes, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. How would your supply compare with that of
these modern armies fighting in Europe?
Gen. CROZIER. It would be very much less, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. How long would it take you to equip an army, a
larger one than 200,000, or, say, 500,000%
Ben. CROZIER. I think I have some figures on a memorandum here
that I can give you with reference to that.
The CHAIRMAN. We would like to have it. There has been a great
deal of discussion about our situation with reference to guns and
ammunition, as well.
Gen. CROZIER. When I have been speaking of a thousand guns I
made a little mistake in multiplication. We have 225 batteries of
four guns each, and four times 225 is 900 and not a thousand. I
dare say everybody detected that when I mentioned it.
Senator THOMAs. I do not think anybody did.
Gen. CROZIER. As far as completed field batteries of ordinary size
are concerned, it would take about five months before complete bat-
teries could commence to be delivered after placing an order.
The CHAIRMAN. That is, from the Government arsenals?
Gen. CROZIER. From the Government arsenals and private fac-
tories.
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAI DEFENSE. 517
The CHAIRMAN. It would not make any difference %
Gen. CROZIER. It would not make any difference. The manu-
facture in Government arsenals would be limited by the rate at which
the gun carriages and other vehicles could be turned out. That is,
the limbers and caissons and so on. The only factory which the
Government has for making field artillery vehicles is at the Rock
Island Arsenal. That arsenal can do—the best way I can express
it—about $1,000,000 worth of work on field artillery vehicles a year;
and if we consider the field artillery material based on the Greble
Board's standards, and not on the Treat Board standards, for an
army of the size contemplated in the project of the War Department,
it would take the Rock Island arsenal alone about 35 years to turn
out those vehicles. But, of course, the Rock Island Arsenal is not
the only dependence that we have in the country, because these
vehicles are such that they could be made by almost any good machine
shop accustomed to making fairly large machine tools, such as lathes
and planers, shapers, and machines of that kind.
Senator DU PONT. Are any of those carriages being actually con-
structed now for the Government
Gen. CROZIER. Yes, sir; we have the Rock Island Arsenal loaded
up with Orders which will take them pretty nearly two years to fill.
Senator CATRON. General, can you tell me the cost of getting out
a 3-inch gun, with its carriage, and the two caissons to go with it
Gen. CROZIER. I have in my mind Senator, the cost of a com-
pleted battery of those guns—
Senator CATRON. Give me that; that will do just as well.
Gen. CROZIER. As the figures stand now it is in the neighborhood
of $90,000. *-
Senator CATRON. For a complete 4-gun battery'.
Gen. CROZIER. Yes, sir; including limbers and caissons and a forge
and battery wagon and certain tools and implements that go with
the battery. I will correct the figure in the hearings if that is not
COrrect.
Senator CATRON. Does that include horses and harness?
Gen. CROZIER. It does not include horses and harness, because, for
the regular service the harness is procured from another appropria-
tion, different from the one which covers the guns and carriages
themselves. That appropriation is known as “Ordnance stores and
supplies,” and it covers saddles and bridles for the Cavalry, and that
sort of thing, as well as harness for the Artillery.
Senator CATRON. You would say about $90,000 for the full
battery' -
Gen. CROZIER. About $90,000 for a full 3-inch battery, which is the
most numerous class.
Senator BECKHAM. How does that price compare with the price
paid by European Governments for similar outfits'
Gen. CROZIER. Those prices are kept very close, and we do not
really know what they are in Europe.
Senator CATRON. Does that iºde any ammunition that goes
with the battery'.
Gen. CROZIER. No, sir; that includes no ammunition. A year or
two ago that price was $78,000, but it has risen recently for reasons
º we know of; that apply to all that class of product made of steel
8.]]Cl, ITOI). -
518 PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
Senator CATRON. What is the weight of a field gun and its limber
set that goes with it, and the carriage, and all? . -
Gen. CROZIER. In our service, as it stands now, the weight behind
the team of horses, that the horses have to pull, amounts to about 750
pounds per horse for a six-horse team. --
Senator CATRON. You have an ammunition chest on the limber'.
Gen. CROZIER. Yes, sir. - -
Senator CATRON. General, what supply of ammunition have you
in reserve? - -
Gen. CROZIER. We have about one-third of the supply which was
ºplated by the Greble board; that is, we have about 750,000
I'Olli). CIS. - -
The CHAIRMAN. Then you would have still less, taking the Treat
board report as a basis. - -
Gen. CROZIER. Yes, sir. *
The CHAIRMAN. Is the manufacture of munitions a slow process?
Gen. CROZIER. No, sir; it is really a slow process to get ready to
manufacture it. Certain things, for instance, the fuse, particularly
what we call the combination fuse, which is a type of percussion fuse
which will go off either after a lapse of time or upon percussion, re-
quire a certain special tool equipment to prepare for turning them
out in considerable quantity, and require some little time. I can
tell you what I estimate the capacity of the country to be at the pres–
ent time.
The CHAIRMAN. That is what we would like.
Gen. CROZIER. I think that, considering both Government and
private manufacture—and in this the Government manufacture would
cut a very small figure—by the end of the summer the capacity will be
in excess of 50,000 rounds a day.
The CHAIRMAN. The whole country?
Gen. CROZIER. The whole country; yes, sir.
Senator CATRON. For a 3-inch gun?
Gen. CROZIER. For assorted sizes up to the 6-inch gun.
Senator DU Pont. If the European war should cease, would not
the capacity of the country to supply these projectiles be much
lessened because the factories will be abandoned, and so on 7
Gen. CROZIER. Unless some means could be devised to keep them
in existence, which is a matter of very serious consideration, to my
mind. Naturally, we would revert to the same condition that we were
in before the European demand stimulated the bringing into existence
of these factories. .
Senator CATRON. How long does it take to change one of these
factories into a munition or a gun manufacturing factory?
Gen. CROZIER. If the personnel of the establishment know how
to make the new product, there are certain kinds of establishments
that could be turned into that work in a comparatively short time,
to give a limited output.
Senator GATRON. What time would that be?
Gen. CROZIER. That would depend somewhat on the establish-
ment; but I should say that an establishment making things like,
we will say, cash registers, or something of that sort, could, Ifancy,
within two or three months, with the requisite knowledge, be con-
verted into an outfit to manufacture artillery ammunition. But
most of the factories that have been receiving orders from European
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 519
countries and making deliveries have put up new buildings and
equipped them with new machinery and materials and have started
from the ground up. The largest have done that. However, it is
uite possible to make the conversion of a good many factories in
the manner that you suggest -
Senator CATRON. I suggested that because the senator suggested
that at the close of the war these factories would change into some
other kind of business; that is, some other kind of a factory. They
would all be in that position excepting the Government factories.
Gen. CROZIER. That is undoubtedly the case. In any effort
that we would hope to make with the appropriations that would be
considered reasonable, these factories would either pass out of exist-
ence or go to the manufacture of something else; and the course
which it seems to me we ought to try to follow would be to give
some of them at least sufficient patronage from our limited appro-
priation to keep them with the knowledge of how to make the articles,
so that they would be prepared to expand. They would know how to
expand upon an emergency coming upon us.
Senator CATRON, Would you, in the meantime, keep a Government
factory of any considerable capacity to do that % -
Gen. CROZIER. I would; yes. I think, with reference to that,
that the Government should manufacture some part of all of the
different kinds of war material which are not also commercial arti-
cles, articles in commercial manufacture and commercial competition,
and should manufacture them in sufficient quantities to give an
economical output. That is, we should be enabled to know what the
things ought to cost, and in order to do that we would have to make
enough so that the cost would not be exaggerated.
The CHAIRMAN. You have always opposed the manufacture of
these arms and munitions by the Government itself
Gen. CROZIER. Exclusively; yes, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. On the theory that it was necessary, in order to
keep trained men, that we should patronize private institutions?
Gen. CROZIER. Yes, sir; and that we might have certain centers of
expansion, where the necessary knowledge would exist so that expan-
sion of production could be readily possible upon emergency.
Senator THOMAs. General, I saw about a week ago last Sunday,
in the Sunday supplement of the New York Times, a very graphic
description of the new ammunition plant of the Remington Arms
Co., at Bridgeport, said to have been built, with its present enormous
capacity, practically since last March, and which is now ready to
turn out many thousand arms a day. Does not that suggest that an
emergency such as you mentioned would tend to the supplying of
such necessities pretty rapidly in an enterprising country like this?
Gen. CROZIER. I think, Senator, that that was extremely rapid
work, but I call your attention to the fact that the orders for the
rifles which that factory was going to turn out were probably given
something like a year ago last November, and that the first rifle has
not yet been delivered. -
Senator THOMAs. But, be that as it may, the expenditure was
$11,000,000 in a few months, so they are certainly in possession of
the men and material -
Gen. CROZIER. Yes, sir; that can certainly be said to be very
rapid work.
520 PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
Senator THOMAs. Of course, I know that rapidity is a relative
term.
Gen. CROZIER. Yes, sir; and compared with the necessity that
might have been involved to the people who wanted these rifles it
is distressingly slow. *
Senator THOMAS. Is not a difficulty in the way of rapid production
of these articles as much a matter of the paucity of skilled labor as
it is facilities for manufacture ? -
Gen., CROZIER. If we are thinking of the same thing in saying
skilled labor, I should say yes. I should put it, however, in this way:
Skilled superintendents, skilled persons of the higher class. The
mechanics of the country I think have skill enough to go into any
munitions fäctory and, under proper superintendence, commence
immediately to maké: a useful output. - -
Senator THOMAs. Skill in direction is of course essential; but if
my recollection serves me aright, I think this article which I have re-
ferred to calls attention to the difficulty of getting skilled labor in
sufficient quantity to meet the demand; and that is what suggested
my question. -
Gen. CROZIER. That would be the case in this country, certainly,
Senator, when you consider that commercial activities are still going
on which demand this skilled labor. In a country at war, like Eng-
land, where the commercial activities would fall away, the demand
would fall also.
The CHAIRMAN. How long would it take to supply the number of
guns of all kinds contemplated for a force of 500,000 first-line troops
if a sufficient amount of money were appropriated ?
Gen. CROZIER. We were contemplating such a force as that up to
the time when the project which is now before you was submitted,
or approximately such a force as that, and we were going along at
the rate of the appropriations made last year in such a manner as to
complete that supply in about five years, I should say that if we were
to get appropriations as large as we could utilize, that could be
brought #. to something like not over 18 months.
The CHAIRMAN. An ordinary war nowadays would be over in 18
months, would it not : -
Gen. CROZIER. Many of these recent ones have been, but the present
one has been going on 18 months now. But that is an extraordinary
war, of course. I do not think we ought to be in a state which would
require 18 months before we would be ready to equip with artillery
as small a force as 500,000 men.
The CHAIRMAN. That is the shape we are in now, is it not %
Gen. CROZIER. Yes, sir. -
The CHAIRMAN. Is not that one of the reasons why we ought to be
prepared
en. CROZIER. Most decidedly.
The CHAIRMAN. The case we are in is almost a helpless situation ?
Gen. CROZIER. Yes, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. It has been stated that some of the belligerents that
are in the present war, have ordered large amounts of equipment
from us in the shape of artillery and ammunition. How long has
it taken from the time they made those orders, if you know, untſ they
were able to commence to deliver ?
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 521,
Gen. CROZIER. The most important item of armament which has
been ordered in this country, Senator, I think is the rifle, the infan-
tryman’s rifle. They have been ordered in large quantities.
Senator CATRON. You mean, the small arms
Gen. CROZIER. Yes, sir; they have been ordered in very large
quantities, and the establishments of this.country have been equipped
or are being equipped to turn them out in very large quantities.
With the exception of some few rifles—something like 100,000, which
is a small number in comparison with the number needed, all
old-model rifles modified to take the ammunition of one of the coun-
tries—with the exception of such a delivery as that I do not think,
8),S º as my information goes, that the first rifle has yet been deliv-
€TOCl. -
Senator CATRON. The first rifle of a new pattern has not been
delivered 7 - *
Gen. CROZIER. I do not think that a single modern rifle manu-
factured in this country on European orders has as yet been delivered.
Senator CATRON. In these European countries, in ordering small
arms, do they order according to their patterns or ours?
Gen. CROZIER. They order in accordance with their own. They
might just as well have done that in view of the fact that no private
factories in this country have been equipped to make the Govern-
ment's pattern or any other. The only factories capable of turning
out the Government rifle in this country are Government factories,
and have been for a number of years.
Senator CATRON. Have they been able to furnish any artillery or
artillery ammunition in this country'. -
Gen. CROZIER. Yes, sir.
Senator CATRON. How long does it take them to commence doing
that from the time they get their orders ?
Gen. CROZIER. They commence to furnish artillery—artillery of a
very small caliber—within a few months. I think they commenced
to furnish field batteries within five or six months, and they have
been furnishing them for some time.
mºtor CATRON. Have we manufactured their entire batteries for
them :
Gen. CROZIER. Yes, sir.
Senator CATRON. Do we use some other pattern besides our own 2
Gen. CROZIER. We have manufactured them in accordance with
their own design, and have manufactured complete batteries.
You spoke of ammunition. We have manufactured a considerable
amount of field artillery ammunition, but it has not yet commenced
to go over in what would be called large quantities. That is to say,
these factories have, some of them, barely gotten to the point of making
deliveries. The only exception to that statement, I think, would be
with reference to powder. We have really delivered very consid-
erable quantities of powder.
Senator WEEKs. You said a little while ago that before the end of
Summer we would have a capacity of 50,000 rounds of field artillery
ammunition, as I º it.
Gen. CROZIER. Per day. -
Senator WEEKs. Per day. What part of that would be manufac-
tured by the Government, or could be 2 -
Gen. CROZIER. For our Government. .
522 PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
Senator WEEKs. By our Government'. -
Gen. CROZIER. By our Government there could be manufactured
about 1,500 rounds a day.
Senator WEEKs. And that would mean 48,500 rounds by private
manufacturers? -
Gen. CROZIER. Yes, sir. -
Senator WEEKs. How large a factory would it require to manu-
facture 50,000 rounds of ammunition a day for field artillery'.
Gen. CROZIER. I can tell you something which would throw some
light on that, at least. Our own capacity is about 1,500 rounds a
day, and it would require something over $2,000,000 to double it.
To put it another way: To establish at an arsenal where we might
already have the land, say, so that that would not have to be taken
into consideration, a factory which would be intended only to assemble
ammunition; that is to say, the parts of it could be made by private
factories, and the Government would put it together and load it.
That is the part which would require the greatest skill and the most
training. A plant of the capacity of 10,000 rounds a day, working
on three shifts, could be established for about $2,500,000. That
would include the power, but would not include the land.
Senator WEEKs. Suppose the Government made all of the parts
and did all of the manufacturing. How much do you think it would
º to construct a factory which would manufacture 1,000 rounds
a day ?
Gen. CROZIER. I have the figure for 100,000 rounds a month.
That would be about 3,000 rounds a day—something over 3,000
rounds a day. It would be about $3,000,000. e
Senator WEEKs. How many men would be required to do that
work. What I am leading up to, General, is to find out how large a
factory, or what the factory capacity would have to be, if we as a
Government were going to manufacture all our ammunition. How
many men would be required for that purpose, and how much would
it cost to construct the factories? -
Gen. CROZIER. I can give you a general figure that will cover other
things besides ammunition. Unless one has a little time to work this
estimate out, it is a little difficult to give figures.
Senator WEEKs. You see what I want }
Gen. CROZIER. Yes, sir; I can give a general answer to your ques-
tion in this way; by something that I have already made a rough
estimate on. In order to supply with all the necessary kinds of
fighting materials as well as ammunition the Army contemplated by
the War Department project in four years, in addition to that which
we have now, it would be necessary to establish for that purpose
a plant that would cost about $50,000,000.
Senator WEEKs. Would that include the manufacturing of powder
as well?
Gen. CROZIER. Yes, sir.
Senator WEEKs. Suppose we were engaged in a war with a first-
class power. What proportional part of the artillery and small-arms
ammunition would that plant provide—the proportional part of our
requirements, I mean? -
en. CROZIER. It would not provide more than one quarter of the
amount which would be necessary to do this, we will säy, in the first
year of the war. The War Department contemplates, all told, about
PREPAIRED NESS FOR, NATIONAL DEFENSE. 523
a million men. To see that Army through a year of lively war, and
in addition, to add another million men to the Army and equip those
fully and supply what they could expend after they got into the
war—of course they would not go in in the beginning; they would
only come in in the progress of the first year—the plant would cost
something over $400,000,000.
Senator WEEKs. How many men would be required, do you think,
for a plant of that size 3 -
Gen. CROZIER. I should say that it would require not less than
three quarters of a million men, workmen of all kinds. Of course,
we could use women in some of the work.
Senator DU PONT. Seven hundred and fifty thousand men ;
Gen. CROZIER. Yes, sir. .
Senator DU Pont. Working people?
Gen. CROZIER. Yes, sir. -
Senator WEEKs. How many people do you suppose are employed
in manufacturing munitions and arms in this country to-day ? Have
you any basis for an estimate %
Gen. CROZIER. I might make an estimate, but I could not make
it offhand, Senator.
Senator WEEKs. My conception of a correct system for those
purposes has been that the Government should, for the purpose of
preventing monopoly and other substantial reasons, have a very
large reserve provided for through private manufacture. Is that
correct 7
Gen. CROZIER. That is in accordance with my views, Senator. I
have had some years' experience in it, and I think we should, if pos-
sible, have in the country private plants which are normally making
their living at commercial lines, and which would be available for the
Government to get war material from in time of war.
Senator WEEKs. Is there anyone connected with the military serv-
ice who has had any more experience in the manufacturing of military
supplies than you have 7 -
en. CROZIER. No, sir; not-at my advanced age. I can not think
of anyone now. -
Senator WEEKs. I expect you to throw away your own modesty in
answering that question. -
Gen. CROZIER. It is not a question of modesty, Senator. I have to
acknowledge a good many years.
Senator WEEKs. You are not estimating at all, when you figure on
the cost of a plan such as I suggested, on manufacturing for the Navy
their guns or ammunition, are you?
Gen. CROZIER. I have not been considering that, although we do
make certain things for the Navy. We supply the Navy with all of
their small arms and all of their small-arms ammunition.
Senator WEEKs. How many cartridges are being manufactured in
this country to-day ?
Gen. CROZIER. fiancy the output is not far from 5,000,000 a day.
Senator WEEKs. How many of those are manufactured at Govern-
ment plants' -
Gen. CROZIER. About 275,000.
Senator WEEKs. How many would be required if we were engaged
in a war where the number of men were engaged that you have
outlined 2 -
524 PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSI).
Gen. CROZIER. I can give you an estimate, but I would like at the
same time to state something in regard to the basis of the estimate.
In regard to the Small-arms ammunition we have not received from
Europe the same startling statements as to great expenditure that
we have had with reference to field-artillery ammunition. Notwith-
standing the fact that the machine guns use a great deal of Small-
arms ammunition, and notwithstanding the fact that they have come
into great prominence, there has been no great complaint of short-
age of Small-arms ammunition comparable to the shortage of field-
artillery ammunition.
Senator WEEKs. Is not that due to the trench fighting?
Gen. CROZIER. Yes, sir; that has probably a great deal to do with
it, Senator. Small-arms fire against intrenchments is not very
effective. Considering the information that we had with regard to
the expenditure of ammunition in the Russo-Japanese War in regard
to which I have endeavored to find reports as to the amount that was
expended by the Japanese troops who were in the theater of war
during the first six months of the war, and considering such reports
as have come over in regard to the expenditure of this kind of ammu-
nition from Europe, I should say that an allowance of one round per
day per man—that seems very Small—could not be definitely shown
to be far out of the way.
At that rate, an Army of a million men, under the War Department
project, which would include something over 900,000 men carrying
rifles, would expend in the first year some 336,000,000 rounds; and if,
during that first year, we should add a million men to the force, recruit
another million men, allowing for target practice, the grand total
would be 500,000,000 rounds. To produce that amount of ammuni-
tion would require the expansion of the present Government plant
about 500 per cent, at a cost of about $10,000,000, provided we would
expect to produce the ammunition on a one-shift basis, which, of
course, we would not, and if we went to work manufacturing day and
night, that figure would be divided by about two and a half.
Senator WEEKs. That is not a very serious problem, then 7
Gen. CROZIER. Not if the Army could be limited to that size, and
in consideration of the fact that we have these very large small-arms
ammunition factories going in the country now.
Senator WEEKs. How much powder is being manufactured in the
United States now % .
en. CROZIER. I will have to give you a very conservative state-
ment, Senator, and say there is capacity in the country now for over
150,000,000 pounds a year.
Senator WEEKs. What part of that is Government
Gen. CROZIER. The Government capacity at the Army factory is
Something less than 2,000,000 pounds a year, and at the Navy factory
it is a little larger; I should say that they might make perhaps
4,000,000 or 5,000,000 pounds.
Senator WEEKs. Would that be sufficient powder for this con-
ception of the War Department's army' -
Gen. CROZIER. No, sir; it would not. The War Department
project for an army would require for its supply in four years about
Seven and a half million pounds per year; and to add to the Army
powder factory sufficient capacity to meet that output would cost
about three-quarters of a million dollars, provided the factory should
be run on a three-shift basis, and about $2,000,000 on a one-shift basis.
PREPAREDNESS IFOR, NATIONAL DEFENSE. 525
The CHAIRMAN. General, can you state whether or not in Germany
the output of arms and munitions is under Government control, or
are they manufactured by private enterprise ? -
Gen. CROZIER. A great deal of the ammunition used by the Ger-
mans and Austrians is manufactured, Senator, in private establish-
ments; but the Government has for a number of years been in very
close relations with those private establishments, in accordance with
the best of our understanding, and has so systematized those rela-
tions that the German factories may be said to have been mobilized
for war at the beginning of this war.
The CHAIRMAN. Then they had a large supply before the war com-
menced, I suppose 3
Gen. CROZIER. Yes, sir; but not a sufficient supply. The con-
sumption in this war has outrun all anticipations, even the German
anticipations, and their armies ran very short in the first six months
of the war; but owing to this mobilized condition of their plants,
by which they were able to utilize the resources of the country very
promptly, they recovered from that condition very promptly.
The CHAIRMAN. You know, General, the great opposition there is
to the manufacture of these munitions in private plants and the insist-
ence that is being made that they ought to be manufactured entirely
by the Government. What have you to say as to that %
Gen. CROZIER. I think, sir, as I stated a moment ago, that the Gov-
ernment ought to manufacture a portion of all classes of material,
and to train officers in the full knowledge of the production of
the material which we have to use, and so that the Government
would understand about the price, and would be in a position to rec-
ognize an exorbitant price, and possibly to refuse to pay it. I should
think that the Government plants ought to have a somewhat greater
capacity than would be normally operated, so that in the case of a
given contract it would be in a position to refuse to make an award,
and could manufacture the material in its own establishments and
hope that the lesson would be effective when the next bid should be
submitted. Beyond that point I think that in order that we should
have a capacity for expansion our reliance should be upon private
manufacturers.
Senator WEEKs. As to the Krupp Works, or any similar works in
Europe, are they subsidized in any way, or is there an agreement to
take a certain amount of output; or what is the relation, General?
Gen. CROZIER. I am inclined to think, Senator, that such estab-
lishments as that, including their small-arms factories and their am-
munition factories, as well as these great artillery shops at Essen—
the Krupp works—receive various jº of governmental aid. I
have been told, for illustration, that this sort of thing has been done:
When some nonmanufacturing country has required war materials,
such as rifles or artillery, or anything else, the German establish-
ments have been encouraged by their country to take those orders
with something like an assurance that if the price made would have
to be too low to be profitable the Government would see that it
should not be unprofitable. That is for the purpose of maintaining
the plants in existence. That is believed by some persons who are
generally very well informed, and I can only give it to you as that
kind of a statement. - - - - .
526 PREPAREDINESS FOR, NATIONAL DEFENSE.
Senator WEEKs. Have you ever thought of any practicable way
which would enable us to aid private manufacturers so that they
could keep themselves º with competent superintendents and
with machinery, and in other ways, so that they would be promptly
ready to come to the Government's assistance in time of war'.
Gen. CROZIER. There are two ways, Senator, by which that kind
of effort could be made with some success. One, of course, is to give
them a certain amount of work; not sufficient, of course, to keep a
large plant employed, because our needs would not justify that unless
we concentrated on some one plant. Then we would not have ex-
pansibility. But enough to keep them equipped with a knowledge
of the art, as far as Our limited appropriation would allow us to go.
Another method would be to manufacture at Government expense
the special tools and fixtures and gauges and inspecting instruments
which would be required to turn out certain articles in large quantities
in time of war, and keep them on store for the purpose of equipping
an existing plant with these special articles, so as to enable them to
make a prompt output of things required by the Government when
they should be ordered. I can give an illustration of that which per-
haps would convey the idea better than the general statement.
#. for instance, small arms—the infantryman’s rifle. An estab-
lishment that makes the modern rifle with an output of, say, for illus-
tration, a thousand rifles a day, would require a set of these fixtures
in order to make a rifle of another model, and the time required to
make these special fixtures and tools, etc., would be something like
eight or nine months; so that to convert One of these large existing
factories for the manufacture of our rifles, which they are not manu-
facturing now, would probably require that length of time. If those
tools and fixtures could be manufactured in advance and kept in
store, either in the possession of some establishment or in the pos-
session of the Government, that would be a very good plan.
Senator WEEKs. How much would it cost to provide the tools,
and anything that would be necessary in the way of models for
manufacturing these rifles—a thousand rifles a day, to be kept with
some stated factory?
Gen. CROZIER. About $275,000.
Senator WEEKs. And then the only thing that it would be neces-
sary to change would be the possibility of changing the model, if we
changed our model?
Gen. CROZIER. Of course that would involve less expense than the
discarding of a large supply of rifles that had already been made.
so that there is, you see, a point at which it would be advisable to
cease adding to a store of rifles and to depend upon additional manu-
facture with the assistance of such facilities as I have been speaking
of—not a very well defined point, perhaps, but you can see that there
would be a point where that would be advisable.
The CHAIRMAN. I do not know that it is a fact, but assuming that
it is a fact that we are shipping munitions to belligerants in Europe,
do you know whether or not those who are buying munitions in this
country have their ordnance officers at the different factories?
Gen. CROZIER. Oh, yes sir; there is a large number of European
inspectors in this country now. . . . - -
The CHAIRMAN. At all of these private factories?
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 527
Gen. CROZIER. In all probability, at the greater number of them.
I am told that there are several hundreds of these factories engaged
in some kind of an output of war materials for the European coun-
tries. -
The CHAIRMAN. So that it is not a secret process in this country?
Gen. CROZIER. If I understand you rightly, Senator, I think that
there are probably no secrets now in any of this manufacture that
is going on in this country. I hardly think that any of these Euro-
pean countries have insisted, for instance, on secrecy with reference
to our own Government.
The CHAIRMAN. These things are being manufactured after their
own plans or under their directions? -
Gen. CROZIER. Yes, sir; and from their own drawings. -
The CHAIRMAN. Do you know how many representatives of other
Governments are here in these different munitions plants?
Gen. CROZIER. No, sir; I have never endeavored to count it up.
The CHAIRMAN. Our Government has no men there? -
Gen. CROZIER. Our Government has very few. It is our practice
to have inspectors at the private establishments where work is being
done for our Government, but especially in recent years the legisla-
tion against employing private manufacturers for work that can be
done in the Government arsenals has been such that we have been
doing very little of it.
The CHAIRMAN. We have none of our men, no ordnance officers,
at any of these plants that are manufacturing for shipment abroad 7
Gen. CROZIER. We have no officers stationed at any of them, but
I have a few civilian employees who are stationed at some of them,
which plants are visited by officers from time to time from the Ord-
nance Department.
The CHAIRMAN. Why?
Gen. CROZIER. Because some of them are doing a little work for
us, although not very much. .
The CHAIRMAN. Is it in connection with our own work or in con-
nection with work for shipment?
Gen. CROZIER. In connection with our own work.
The CHAIRMAN. We have nothing to do with any of these that
manufacture for shipment'. -
Gen. CROZIER. No, sir; we have nothing to do with that.
Senator WEEKs. One other question I wanted to ask you, General.
I think it is generally agreed that having so many of our establish-
ments for manufacturing arms and equipment on or near the coast
is ill advised. Is there any way to encourage the building of such
plants between the Alleghenies and the Rocky Mountains?
Gen. CROZIER. I asked the proprictor of a plant of some size the
other day, who was making a certain kind of equipment for soldiers
of European Governments, whether he would consider moving his
plant out west of the Allegheny Mountains, and he said he would,
under such terms as would insure him reasonable employment for
it, after he had got out there. It would be a difficult subject,
Senator. Of course, before inducing a plant of the size of this one
here at Bridgeport for the manufacture of rifles to move to another
part of the country, we would have to make promises that would be
very difficult of fulfillment afterwards. I think that something
might be gradually done in the way of giving preference in placing
528 PREPAREDINESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
orders to such plants as would possibly be well situated with refer-
ence to defense so that it would be seen that it was the policy
of the Government to take that into consideration; but in order to
do that release would have to be granted from the requirement of
accepting the lowest responsible bidder for the best and most suitable
article, which are the terms under which we have to make our pur-
chases now. Some legislation has been submitted in connection with
this bill, designed, to a certain extent, to relieve the War Department
from that necessity; that is, the necessity of making awards to the
lowest bidders, with regard to a portion of the materials which would
be purchased from appropriations made, with that idea in view.
Senator WEEKs. Would it be practicable, if we were going to furnish
models and machinery to factories to manufacture these things, to
limit these factories to a certain territory'. -
Gen. CROZIER. I should say that unless we would defeat our own
ends, the Government would be justified in giving the preference to
factories that were in that kind of territory and abandoning competi-
tion to that extent.
Senator WEEKs. I think that is important; don't you? .*
Gen. CROZIER. Yes, sir; I think it is of importance. Nearly all of
Our manufacturing arsenals, as well as the private manufacturing
plants, are situated where we would not place them. They were
placed there, of course, when pretty much al of the country was east
of the Allegheny Mountains and we never considered anything so
expensive as moving them. It is all we have been able to do to get
sufficient appropriations to keep them going and to enlarge them
slightly from time to time.
Senator WEEKs. I am not suggesting moving them so much as I am
encouraging the construction of additional plants where they will be
relatively safe. *
Gen. CROZIER. I should think that would be advisable as a matter
to take into consideration, and I can say that I have been concerned
and, to some extent, disappointed to see the way in which these large
new factories have grown up at places where no officer of the Govern-
ment would advise that they should be placed.
Senator WEEKs. Why has that been the case, do you think?
Gen. CROZIER. One reason is because of the restrictions that have
been placed on the War Department with relation to these people, in
time getting us very much out of relation. I have never been told as
to their plans before these factories were commenced. I have never
had an opportunity of making suggestions to them, but have usually
derived my first knowledge when the plants were partially erected. . .
Senator THOMAs. Is not that determined very largely by the ad-
vantages in the matter of transportation ?
Gen. CROZIER. That, of course, has something to do with it, sir;
but I think that most of these people who have erected these plants
have had an eye to the future and have had some solicitude with ref-
erence to the patronage which they might receive from our own Gov-
ernment afterwards. If there had been such relations between them
and the officers of the Government, or consultation had been promoted
before they undertook the erection of these plants, some influence
might have been had upon the location of some of them. Of course,
that is only speculation.
Senator THOMAs. Where are our plants now %
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. - 529
Gen. CROZIER. At five arsenals, two of which are in Massachusetts,
one of them just above Albany, one at Philadelphia, and one at Rock
Island Arsenal, in Illinois, on the Mississippi River. In addition to
these there is an Army powder factory in the northern part of New
Jersey, a naval powder factory 20 miles below Washington on the
ºmº River, and the Washington gun factory at the navy yard
GI’0.
The CHAIRMAN. And they have an arsenal at Benicia, Cal. '
Gen. CROZIER. Yes, sir; but that is not a manufacturing arsenal;
it is for storage and issue and repair. The private factories, the
largest ones, are at New Haven and at Bridgeport, Conn.; at Illion
and Utica, N. Y.; and there is one large one in the interior of Con-
necticut, one in New Jersey, one in northeastern Pennsylvania, two
close together on the Delaware River below Philadelphia, a large
powder factory on the Delaware River farther below, and a large con-
tributory powder factory near Richmond. There is a small-arms
ammunition factory in the eastern part of the State of Massachusetts,
one at Bridgeport, one at New Haven, and one, I am glad to say, out
in Cincinnati. Those are the principal ones. That does not include
them all. I may have omitted some others, but they are the largest
OIAGS. " -
The CHAIRMAN. Thay are all easy of access to the coast line 7
Gen. CROZIER. Most of them are; yes, sir.
Senator FLETCHER. The material can be found in places like
Birmingham, where they could have coal and iron and timber, too?
Gen. CROZIER. Yes; there is no factory for war material in that
vicinity, that I know of. That is, distinctly war material.
The CHAIRMAN. General, there was some testimony here the other
day with reference to machine guns. How is this Government
equipped in the way of machine guns';
Gen. CROZIER. We have about 1,000 machine guns.
The CHAIRMAN. How many do we need? º
Gen. CROZIER. In accordance with the project as it is now in exist-
ence, we would not need much more than double that; but it is my
opinion, and I fancy that most officers would agree with me, that the
existing projects need very radical overhauling. One of the things
that has been brought out in this war has been the efficacy of machine-
gun fire. Our present plans call for four machine guns per regiment
of Infantry or Cavalry. We have in addition to that added one,
making five per regiment. At the beginning of this war the Germans
are said to have had 16 per regiment, and that number has been said
to have been increased.
Senator CATRON. Their regiments are a great deal larger than ours?
Gen. CROZIER. Yes, sir; their regiments are larger than ours,
nearly twice as large as ours at the present time.
Senator CATRON. You mean 16 for their regiments?
Gen. CROZIER. Sixteen for their regiments. But I have been told
that it has probably been increased to 48. Of course all that kind
of information is more or less uncertain.
Senator CATRON. The German regiment when full is about 4,000
men, is it not
Gen. CROZIER. I do not think it is quite that. I do not remember
the figure exactly.
530 PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
The CHAIRMAN. You started to tell how many would be needed
under the contemplated plan.
Gen. CROZIER. Under the contemplated plan there is something
over 2,000 needed.
The CHAIRMAN. And you have 1,000?
Gen. CROZIER. We have a thousand; yes, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. How long does it take to manufacture them ż
Gen. CROZIER. There is in existence in this country now one plant
which in the comparatively near future, I think, will be capable of
turning them out at the rate of over 1,000 a month.
The CHAIRMAN. So that that is not a serious problem?
Gen. CROZIER. We could supply ourselves quite rapidly with them
as far as our present statement of our requirements goes; but I think
we should increase our estimates of the allowance necessary at least
four or five times.
The CHAIRMAN. You have to have them in reserve :
Gen. CROZIER. Yes, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. The Lewis gun has been mentioned, too !
Gen. CROZIER. Yes, sir; that is another gun, and there is another
factory engaged in the manufacture of that in addition to the one I
have spoken of, and that would be an additional source of supply.
The CHAIRMAN. Is that an approved gun ?
Gen. CROZIER. It is in use in certain European armies.
Senator CATRON. Is that the Lewis gun? .
Gen. CROZIER. That is the Lewis gun, yes; and is now under man-
ufacture in this country for the Canadian Government, I believe. I
am not certain what th. experience has been with it. There have
been some very good reports in regard to it.
Senator CATRON. It is represented to be much lighter than the
other gun.
Gen. CROZIER. I think there is not a great deal of difference as com-
pared with the most modern gun that we have, which is, however, not
the most modern one we have adopted, because the last one we
adopted we have no supply of. It has the advantage of not requir–
ing water for keeping the barrel cool.
The CHAIRMAN. Is not our reserve supply and our equipment,
generally, in very much better shape at this time than it has been for
a number of years?
Gen. CROZIER. Yes, sir; I think we are in better condition than we
have ever been before, excepting during or shortly after a war.
The CHAIRMAN. The Civil War : . -
Gen. CROZIER. The Civil War, for instance, and, for the standards
at that time, at the end of the Spanish War we had a considerable
supply of certain things. But we are better off during what might
be called a period of preparation, except that the lessons of this
European war have so increased our estimates of the number of
people who are likely to be engaged in War, and the expenditures,
that it tends to drop us back again. -
The CHAIRMAN. So that it is not so much our lack of progress as
the increased estimates based on this present war 3
Gen. CROZIER. It is very much that last feature; yes, sir.
Senator FLETCHER. Are improvements being made in these guns
all the while, changing them from time to time
PREPAREDINESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 531
Gen. CROZIER. Generally speaking; yes, sir. With reference to
the infantryman's rifle, which is an exceedingly important weapon,
there have been no very important improvements for 10 years or
more. The next improvement which is in sight, but which has not
et gotten to the point of adoption in any service, I believe, is mak-
ing that rifle, as we call it, Scniautomatic, so that the discharge of
the rifle will eject the old cartridge case and reload the rifle, so that
all that is necessary will be to pull the trigger between rounds. No
satisfactory gun of that type has yet been presented to us. -
Senator CATRON. You are speaking of the machine gun?
Gen. CROZIER. No, sir; of the rifle. The machine gun does
more than that. It not only does what I have mentioned, but it is not
necessary to pull the trigger between rounds; the gun will keep on
firing as long as the trigger is held back and the ammunition Supply
is kept up. •
Senator FLETCHER. That has bearing on the question of storing
molds and designs and plans and machinery that you make, whether
they will not get out of date before you have occasion to use those
molds again?
Gen. CROZIER. There is a certain risk, of course, Senator, but the
risk is not as great as the obsolescence of a large supply of the weapons
themselves j might be made and kept on hand. -
The CHAIRMAN. Is there anything further you desire to explain
or state to the committee - +
Senator CATRON. Can you give any idea of the amount of destruc-
tion or eruption created by one of those 40-centimeter guns when
it is fired and the shell goes into the ground?
What does it do; what is its execution ? I have seen a whole lot
of statements in the papers about it, but I do not take those
Gen. CROZIER. If the shell goes into the ground and could get
retty nearly to the depth that its force would permit it to go
{. it should explode, I should say that in ordinary earth it would
make a crater which would be in the neighborhood of 30 feet deep
and 50 feet or more in diameter at the top. That is in accordance
with the reports which we have received. &
Senator CATRON. I have seen that in the newspapers, but I was
doubtful about it.
Gen. CROZIER. I think that can be accepted, Senator. The writers
on the subject, not only the newspaper writers but the writers of the
military class that write in periodicals, and also our own people in
making reports, speak of very considerable numbers of men being
buried by the earth thrown over them by these explosions.
Senator CATRON. What becomes of the dirt that comes out of
that hole 7
Gen. CROZIER. It simply is thrown about as a sort of irregular pilo
around the crater.
Senator CATRON. That is one of the things I saw, that it disap-
peared like Smoke.
Gen. CROZIER. Senator, there is one thing I might speak to the
committee about, although I think I have spoken about the same
thing to the committee of the House, and that is the personnel Of
the Ordnance Department.
The CHAIRMAN. We would be glad to have you speak of it.
233S0—PT 9—16—4
532 PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
* Gen. CROZIER. The Ordnance Department consists of 85 officers,
and we have with that number to conduct about a dozen establish-
ments in the nature of arsenals and supply depots, six of which are
manufacturing establishments, and One of them is a proving ground
Where a great deal of work is done; and in addition we have to pro-
duce practically all of the designs for military matériel with which we
supply the Army. Eversincel have been connected with the Ordnance
IDepartment we have been behindhand in the matter of designs,
struggling to make the designs for the experimental construction of
types of guns and gun carriages and other mountings, in Order to
bring them up to the point to which progress had already shown a
'useful advance could be made. We have been always hoping to get
‘up-to-date with the designs and then be able to go along afterwards
|and keep up-to-date, but we have never been able to get up-to-date
in the time that I have been connected with the department; always
behindhand and always struggling. Comparatively recently there
have been a particularly large number of changes and improvements
forced upon our attention calling for new designs, and as a conse-
quence we are thrown further back than ever. ... I have submitted to
‘the War Department a statement in detail of the additional number
‘of officers that I think should be supplied to the Ordnance Department
and what I intend to do with all of them. I do not care to weary
you by going over this, but I should be very glad if you would find
yourselves able to consult that statement. I think it will be before
you.
! I call your attention, Mr. Chairman, to what has been found
necessary in England in Order to supply ordnance matériel to the
JBritish armies. They found that the work that was thrown upon
their ordnance department was such that they had to enlarge it into a
department of the Government, and give the head of it the powers of
'a cabinet minister in order to meet the situation. They at first took
over in that department simply the procurement of war material,
Teaving to the war office, the ordnance department branch of it, the
design and the distribution to the service; but comparatively recently
they have found it was impossible to divorce the design from the
procurement and they have taken over design also, so that as the
matter now stands the new munitions department of which Mr.
T.Ioyd George is the head is simply a very much enlarged Ordnance
department. I have had, as I stated at the beginning of my hearing,
a number of years' experience in the department now, and we have
never been in a satisfactory state with reference to the progress of
the work. There are a number of things that are pressing on us very
hard now. These field pieces of different sizes, clear up to the
42-centimeter howitzer need to be produced. We have to make the
‘designs for them; whether we afterwards procure them in quantity
or not we wish to know something about them and we ought to have
'one or two of an experimental type. The designs for the 9}-inch
howitzer, which we all agree should be attained, at least as far as
power is concerned in the Artillery which we ought to supply to the
Army, are not finished. They are not even well underway; they
will not be finished for a long time to come. We have had statements
of the success which has been had on the other side in mounting
heavy artillery in railway cars so as to make them movable.
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 533
That kind of design is pressing upon us and we want to produce
types of that kind, mounted in that way. We need equally to pro-
duce Seacoast mortars and howitzers of larger caliber than any we have
had before, and in addition to that we are called upon to produce
designs for mounting all classes of weapons on railroad cars so that
they can be loaded and sent to different places, weapons for harbor
defense, and be made available for resisting land forces, that may
be attempted to be landed. -
Senator CATRON. Does it come within your department to look
after the ordnance of the seacoast :
Gen. CROZIER. Yes, sir; we have to design and supply that for the
Coast Artillery.
The CHAIRMAN. You have only 79 men?
Gen. CROZIER. Eighty-five men.
Senator THOMAS. How many do you think you ought to have 7
Gen. CROZIER. I have made an estimate of 172.
Senator THOMAs. Does that force form a part of the General Staff,
or is it subordinate to it?
Gen. CROZIER. It is not a part of the General Staff, but the officers
of that force are subject to assignments to the General Staff, in the
same way as all officers are, which is temporarily.
Senator CATRON. Do you think you ought to have 172 officers?
Gen. CROZIER. I think I ought to have 172 officers. I have 85
officers now. My force of enlisted men is somewhat different and
somewhat differently taken care of.
Senator CATRON. You would have to have your enlisted men in- .
creased too, would you not * - -
Gen. CROZIER. Yes, sir; but the power lies in the War Depart-
ment to do that without special legislation. - -
The CHAIRMAN. Can you not get the officers for the Ordnance De-
partment without special legislation? -
Gen. CROZIER. No, sir; the Ordnance Department is a separate
department, as far as its organization is concerned. The Officers of
the Ordnance Department now, and will hereafter, serve in that de-
partment by detail for four years at a time. Afterwards junior offi-
cers are not eligible for redetail until after having served one year in
the branch of the service from which they were detailed, but the num-
ber that can be so detailed is limited. -
Senator CATRON. Is there an express statute limiting you to so many
men'. - - -
Gen. CROZIER. Yes, sir; just as the Engineer Corps or the Quarter
master's Corps, or the Medical Corps, or any other corps is limited
in their number of officers. Of course, as far as the general utiliza-
tion of officers is concerned, we might say that with very few excep-
tions it is within the power of the President to detail any officer to
any duty. The President can detail an Infantry officer to duty with
the Cavalry, or an Artillery officer to do engineering duty, but irres-
pective of the fact that that would take him away from the branch
of the service where he is supposed to be kept, there is special legisla-
tion that very strictly limits the amount of that sort of detailing that
may be done. •
The CHAIRMAN. Have you framed a provision that would carry out
your wishes in this regard?
Gen. CROZIER. No, sir; my provisions would form a part of the War
Department's project for the Army which has been submitted to you.
534 PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
The CHAIRMAN. Were you not a member of a board of review that
took up for consideration this tentative War Department plan?
Gen. CROZIER. Yes, sir; I am a member of the Board of Review,
whose duties relate particularly to Seacoast fortifications.
The CHAIRMAN. But I am speaking of this bill of the War Depart-
ment. Were you not on a board that took it up for discussion?
Gen. CROZIER. I was not a member of a board, sir. I do not think
any board was created. There were certain officers who were in
very frequent consultation with the Secretary of War, as a group, on
that subject, I believe. I was not one of that group. However, I
in common with a number of other officers, was consulted before the
Tylan of the War Department was finally adopted. That is to say, a
tentative plan was drawn up and then the Secretary of War got us all
together on one occasion and for several hours we discussed the pro-
ject and gave the Secretary of War our ideas.
The CHAIRMAN. Who was in the group that you speak of .
Gen. CROZIER. There was the Chief of Staff, Gen. Scott—this small
group in frequent consultation with the Secretary of War?
The CHAIRMAN. Yes, sir.
Gen. CROZIER. As I was not in the group, all I can tell is what I
have heard, casually. The Chief of Staff, and the Assistant Chief of
Staff, and the Chief of the War College Division of the General Staff,
and the Judge Advocate General. ' -
The CHAIRMAN. Was that all?
Gen. CROZIER. There was a young officer of the General Staff,
whose duty, I think, was to keep track of figures and that sort of
thing, principally.
. The CHAIRMAN. I am much obliged to you, General. We will have,
in addition to what you have stated here, your testimony before the
other committee.
STATEMENT OF BRIG. GEN. ERASMUS M, WEAVER, CHIEF OF
- COAST ARTILLERY. -
The CHAIRMAN. Give the stenographer your rank and present
assignment, General.
Gen. WEAVER. My rank is brigadier general with the title of Chief
of Coast Artillery, and that is my assignment—Chief of Coast Artillery.
The CHAIRMAN. I think you made a statement at considerable
length before the House Committee on Military Affairs?
Gen. WEAVER. I did; yes.
The CHAIRMAN. That, of course, is accessible to us, and will be
before the committee when it takes up this reorganization scheme,
but if there is anything that you would like to submit in addition to
that, or if you prefer to go ahead and review your statement there,
the committee would be pleased to hear from you.
Gen. WEAVER. I think the bill that is now before your com-
mittee fairly serves the needs of the Coast Artillery.
m". CHAIRMAN. Which one do you refer to ? We have taken them
8, 1 UID.
dº. WEAVER. I mean the so-called Chamberlain bill. Section 22,
I think it is, of that bill refers to the Coast Artillery, and it, in my
opinion, adequately supplies the personnel for all the Over-sea for-
tifications with Regulars and for one-half of the fortifications of the
United States proper. The policy of the department for some time
PREPARED NIESS FOR, NATIONAL DETENSE. 535
has contemplated that the other half of the personnel for the fortifica-
tions of the United States shall be manned by the militia of the sea-
board States. The War Department bill, however, it is only proper to
say, contemplates supplying immediately only a portion of that
number of personnel. Speaking in a general way, the Officers and
enlisted men required for the manning of the over-sea coast for-
tifications require about 291 officers and 6,800 men.
Senator THOMAs. You mean that is the full complement' -
Gen. WEAVER. For the over-seas fortifications, 291 officers; that
is supplying a complete manning body.
Of Course, for the over-sea fortifications it would be impracticable
to depend upon the militia to supply any portion of it, so the policy
contemplates the full manning body shall be made up of regulars for
all the over-sea forts, and 291 officers and 6,800 men will do that.
For all of the mines and one-half of the guns and mortars in the United
States proper it will require 940 officers and 23,047 enlisted men.
Senator THOMAs. It is 50 per cent of the required forces?
Gen. WEAVER. Yes; the enlisted men for one-half of the gun and
mortar batteries in the United States and all required for the mines.
Senator THOMAs. General, is the militia of the seaboard States
equipped for this work so as to be efficient as to the other 50 per
cent - *
Gen. WEAVER. What we have done along this line is this: We
have equipped their armories with dummy armament and accessories
thereto, which enables them to conduct drill in their armoriſs, includ-
ing all the features necessary for range finding and serving guns,
ammunition, etc. The system contemplates that they come to the forti-
fications for a period each year and put into actual practice at the
fortifications the armory instruction tº have had during the winter.
They are able to have in the armories practically all of the essential
instruction, except the firing of projectiles, and for that, in substitu-
tion of the firing of full-size projectiles, they have subcaliber practice
in firing at miniature targets. -
Senator THOMAS. Is it your experience that they take advantage of
this equipment'.
Gen. WEAVER. To the extent that the personnel has been supplied
by the States.
Senator THOMAs. That is what I had reference to.
Gen. WEAVER. The point that I was next going to take up is, that
the 50 per cent required of the States should include about 711
officers and 17,329 enlisted men.
The CHAIRMAN. That is the State proportion?
Gen. WEAVER. Yes, to man one-half of the guns and mortars in
the United States proper. -
Senator DU Pont. They have never come forward, have they'.
Gen. WEAVER. I am coming to that right now. Of the seven hun-
dred and odd officers and the 17,000 men, the latest reports we
have show that the States have at the present time supplied only
about 400 officers and about 7,000 men, so that they are three hun-
dred and odd officers and about 10,000 men short of their quota. As
perhaps bearing upon all of the personnel questions that are up for
discussion, I have a table here which gives what is required under
the 50 per cent plan which I have just enunciated and that recom-
º by the War College Division of the General Staff, that rec-
ommended by the Chamberlain bill, that recommended by the Hay bill,
536
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
wº
that recommended by the War Department draft, and that now au–
thorized by law. I think this would be of value, perhaps.
the personnel in tabulated form, side by side, and covers all the
features of it quite fully.
The CHAIRMAN. I would like to have that in the record.
(The statement referred to is as follows:).
It gives
Coast Artillery organization as required, as now authorized by law, and as proposed in
Chamberlain bill, Hay bill, War Department draft, and the War College Division,
General Staff.
Rºuted nº -
equired mended by • TYo- -
under 59 War.Solº | Chambºr- Hay bill * tiº,
per cent lege Divi- lain bill. y D111. p draſt iaº y
plan. Sion, Gen- 9 e
eral Staff.
Major general... -------------. 1 l 1 ------------ 1 ------------
Brigadier geaerals............. 5 5 5 1 ------------| 1
Colonels--------------------* * * * 25 24 26 14 19. 14
Lieutenant colonels........... 25 24 25 14 19 14
Majors.----------------------- 76 72 S5 42 56 42.
Captains. --------------------- 365 360 381 210 278 210
First lieuterants. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 367 360 362 210 278 210
Second lieutenants. . . . . . . . . . . . 367 360 362 210 278 210
Total officers............ 1,231 1,206 1,247 701 929 701
Sergeants major, S3nior grade.. 32 31 31 25 25 21.
Sergeants maj. r, junior grade. 65 64 62 54 54 42
Master electri ‘ians..... . . . . . . . 42 41 42 34 34 26
Master gunners. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64 62 64 50 50 42
Engine rS.-------------------. 73 72 73 76 76 60.
Assistant engin e S. . . . . . . . . . . . 207 205 274 |------------|------------|------------ .
El 3ctricians rºſeants, first class 100 99 100 S9 89 74
Ele3trician S-rguants, second
Class.----------------------- 100 99 100 89 S9 74
Firemen... ------------------- 109 106 109 66 66 60
Radio sergeants......--------- 96 93 96 l------------|------------|------------
First Sergeants. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 267 263 267 222 222 170
Supply Sergeants. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 267 263 267 222 222 170
Mess Sergeants..... -----------|-----------. 263 267 ------------|------------|------------
Sergeants. . . .----------------- 2, 136 2, 104 2, 136 1,776 1,776 1,360
Corporals. . . . . . . . . . . . . . ------- 3,204 3, 156 3,204 2,664 2, 664 2,040
Coo's.------------------ Te - - - - - 534 526 534 444 444 340
Mechanics. . . . . .-------------- 534 526 534 444 444 340
Musicians....... -------------. 534 526 534 444 444 340
Privates... ------------------- 21,483 20,900 21,360 17,982 17,982 13,468
Total enlisted, exclusive
of bands...... -------- 29,847 29,399 30,054 24,681 24,681 18,627.
DUTIES IPO.R. WEIICEI COAST ARTILLERY OFFICERS SHOULD BIE DETACHED.
g IFirst,
Field g e . .
Oſficers. Captains. *
Coast Artillery Militia (as recommended by the Chief, Division Militia -
Aff iss'---------------------------------------------------------------- 8 17 5
Coast .ºrtillery School faculty. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 5 4 3
Coast Ar illery School Students. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0 10 30
Colst Artillery Board. --------------------------------------------------. 2 3 0
Ordnance Boºrd--------------------------------------------------------- 1 0 0
Torpedo depot. ---------------------------------------------------------- 0 1 1.
Na al War Sollege (students). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 0 0.
Army War College (students). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 0 0
School of the line (Students)..... ----------------------------------------. 0 3 0.
General Stuff------------------------------------------------------------- 4 2 0.
District Stuff. ------------------------------------------------------------ 6 0 0
Office Chief of Coast Artillery............................................. 1 5 0
Total.----------------- - - - - - - - - - - - - - = • * * ~ * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * ~ * 33 45 39
Authorized in act of 1911—Coast Artillery proportion of 200 extra officers. . 10 18 16
- Shortage----------------------------------------------------------- 23. 27 23


PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 537,
Coast Artillery organization as reqvired, as now authorized by law, and as proposed i
Chamberlain bill, Hay bill, War Department draft, and the War College Division;
General Staff—Continued. - - - . . .
DUTIES FOR WHICH CoAST ARTILLERY SHOULD FURNISH PROPORTIONATE SHARE,
[The numbers in the table are as recommended by War College Division, General Staff.] ºf

First
Eield & g
--- Captains. lieuten-
Officers. • * ants.
Educational institutions... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 18 99 183
United States Mi itary Academy. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . l 9 33
Faculty Army War College. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 0 ()
Military Attachés. ----------------------------------------------......... 5 9 l
Studying languages abroad. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0 1. 3
Recruiſing--------------------------------------------------------------- 5 37 4
Acting Judge Advocates.-------------------------. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0 4
Aides to general officers. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . O 15 28
Total.-------------------------------------------------------------- 33 174 311
Coast Arºilery proportion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 8 42 74
Grand total for which Coast Artillery Corns officers should be authorized -
in addi.ion to those allówed in act of 1911. . . . . . . . . . ... • * - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 31 69 97
Gen. WEAVER. We are asking this year for two new grades in our
enlisted force. I have presented the request to the House and I would
like to refer to it here. We have developed the desirability of havi
ing these new grades. When we first took up the matter of provid-
ing for our power plants we overlooked the necessity for a grade
between the engineer and the fireman or stoker, such as is found in
the power plants of commercial plants and factories, and we are
asking to have a grade of assistant engineer or oiler, for such an in-
termediate place. We have found the necessity of this as the result
of our experience. We have now a difficulty in developing engineers;
there is no understudy grade leading up to the grade of engineer:
The jump from a fireman to an engineer is too great. With the in-
termediate grade we would be able to remedy the difficulties that we
have met with. . º
We also have had thrown upon us, in the evolution of work that
has come, the necessity of training men to handle radio signaling:
We introduced at the military school at Fort Monroe a course
of instruction for selected privates of the Coast Artillery and have
instructed quite a number of them. They have gone out to the
coast fortifications and are rendering excellent service. But their
qualifications are so valuable that we can not hold them as privates
and it is necessary, in order to get the benefit of the service of the
men we have instructed, that they be given some rating. We are
recommending that they be given the rating of a Coast Artillery fire-
man. This will give them pay varying, according to the different en-
listments they have from $30 to $42 a month. The men in the
TNavy who are doing the same work, the rated men of the Navy, are
paid from $40 to $70 a month. So that we feel our request is reas.
onable in that respect. - . . . . . . . . . . ;
There is one point I would like to refer to in connection with the
rule that should apply in assigning detached officers. In the act that
was passed in M.
, 1911, the 250-officer act, it was prescribed that
the officers should be assigned to this list and in the several arms of
the service according to the total commissioned strength of each arm,
and by the operation of a rule of the War Department that has been
538 PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
extended to the assignment of officers to the different staff depart-
ments under the law controlling the detailed staff. My view is that
if any extra officers are provided for detached service that that rule
should apply to whatever number of detached officers may be pro-
vided in the new legislation.
Senator DU PONT. You mean supernumerary officers?
Gen. WEAVER. Extra officers or supernumerary officers, yes, sir;
there are seven hundred and odd provided for in the House bill.
Whatever additional officers may be provided by pending legislation,
should, in my opinion, be apportioned according to the total com-
missioned strength of each arm.
A memorandum was submitted by my office in the War Department
bearing upon this subject, and in case you would like to consider
Sc)
that further I would be glad to submit it. • *
. The CHAIRMAN. That will be all right, General.
(The statement referred to is as follows:)
Subject: Use of detail system to provide for promotion in special branch of the line.
1. It is a well-recognized fact that one important consideration in the enactment
of section 26 of the statute approved February 2, 1901, providing for administrative
staff departments detailed from the line was a general opinion that these powerful
staff departments which controlled Army administraticn would be better administered
in the interest of the line if their members were of the line.
2. Upon the passage of this act the originators thereof adopted equalization tables
so that all branches of the line would have proportional representation in the various
staff departments—the natural and rational method of accomplishing the purpose for
which the act was passed.
; 3. The scheme was recognized so universally as the correct procedure that it was
incorporated into law when the so-called extra officers bill was passed in 1911. It
hardly seemed necessary to incorporate such an axiomatic proposition into law but the
wisdom of such action is seen when it is appreciated that a limited number of General
Staff officers are willing to recommend to the Secretary of War that the detail system
for staff officers be perverted into a promotion scheme. -
4. It is safe to say that no appreciable percentage of General Staff officers will sub-
scribe to the proposition.
5. It may be stated further that such a proposition not only defeats the fundamental
idea of the detail system but also perpetuates the inequity to other branches in the
matter of promotion, as the vacancies once filled from a particular arm must be filled
from that arm thereffter, if there is to be a continuity of service in the staff departments.
6. If this inequity is not perpetuated, the scheme would simply have the effect of
benefiting particular individuals at particular times at the expense of other indi-
viduals at some future time when the improper appointees return to their arm to be
absorbed. - -
7. It may be noted further that there is nothing so sure as the average promotion in
any arm when considered over a number of years. Ten years ago five junior colonels
of one branch of the service had the following service in the lower grades:
1----- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Captain, 10 years; lieutenant, 24 years; total, 34 years.
2.--------------------------- Captain, 10 years; lieutenant, 25 years; total, 35 years.
3---------------------------- Captian, 10 years; lieutenant, 25 years; total, 35 years.
4-------- • - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Captain, 10 years; lieutenant, 25 years; total, 35 years.
5---------------------------- Captain, 11 years; lieutenant, 23 years; total, 34 years.
f To-day, five junior colonels of another branch had service in the lower grades, as
follows:
1----------------------------- Captain, 8 years; lieutenant, 19 years; total, 27 years.
2----------------------------- Captain, 8 years; lieutenant, 15 years; total, 23 years.
3----------- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Captain, 8 years; lieutenant, 18 years, total, 26 years.
4----------------------------- Captain, 8 years; lieutenant, 19 years; total, 27 years.
8----------------------------. Captain, 8 years; lieutenant, 18 years; total, 26 years.
PREPAREDINESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 539
If data further back be considered, the comparison shows that the latter branch is
not suffering so much now as the former branch has suffered in the past.
* 8. It is submitted that application of rules in the special interest of a particular
arm of the service can result only in demoralization and animosity between different
2,I’IſlS. -
9. It is recommended that all staff details be made on the basis of the standard
equalization tables which have been in vogue in a satisfactory manner for 14 years,
and which embody a fundamental principle of the detail system.
Gen. WEAVER. I think the other questions I have covered quite
fully in my hearings before the House; and if you will refer to my
testimony in connection with the hearings there 1 think they will give
all the information that may be needed.
I should like to submit a table giving the duties for which Coast
Artillery officers should be detached, and the duties for which Coast
Artillery officers should furnish their proportionate share.
Senator THOMAs. I am not a preparedness man, but I am very
much interested in the matter of coast defenses.
Gen. WEAVER. That is very pleasing to me, sir.
Senator THOMAs. I would like to ask you before you leave us how
our coast defenses, as constructed at the present time, compare with
the coast defenses of other nations? -
Gen. WEAVER. I think there is no question, Senator, that our coast
defenses are superior to those of any other nation, so far as the maté-
riel is concerned. There is no question about it whatever. The
only element, in my opinion, that makes them inadequate now is the
shortage of personnel. -
lºor THOMAs. You have got the guns, but not the men behind
them : &
Gen. WEAVER. That is the point, exactly.
Senator THOMAs. Well, I think you ought to have them.
Gen. WEAVER. I will say this so that I may not be misunderstood.
The evolution of gun fire on board warships has developed a type of
ordnance that was not contemplated when our fortifications and our
guns were mounted, and therefore it is possible at the present time
or an enemy's ships to come up and take position beyond the range of
our guns and fire at us without our being able to reach them in reply.
Senator THOMAs. You mean changes in trajectory?
Gen. WEAVER. I am going to come to that so as to make it clear.
There are certain places, like the Rockaway Beach and at San Fran-
cisco, where it is necessary for us to provide additional fortifica-
tions to defend cities. In order to meet the attack of this new naval
ordnance against the forts themselves we have a number of surplus
12-inch guns which were intended to replace those guns which are
now mounted in our fortifications; but with the advance of ordnance
it is desirable now to substitute a larger caliber and a more powerful
gun. Since, however, these 12-inch guns are in existence, it is pro-
posed to take them and to mount them on carriages that will admit
of firing them under high angles of elevation, giving a range that is
Superior to that of any range that can be brought against us.
While the projectile is only 12 inches in diameter and therefore not
as large as that of the projectiles of the 15-inch guns mounted on
ships of the Queen Elizabeth type, still our range will be greater, and
with our superior range-finding equipment ashore our fire will be
more accurate, and we can contend with advantage against any
naval fire that may come against us. -
540 PREPAREDINESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
Senator THOMAs. Provided always you have got the men behin
the guns. .
Gen. WEAVER. Yes, precisely so.
Senator DU Pont. The statement has been made—I do not know
whether it is correct or not—that on account of the construction of the
carriages the guns in our fortifications can not be fired at their
maximum range. - -
Gen. WEAVER. That is true of our present carriages; the carriages
on which the guns are mounted admit of an elevation of only,
some of them, up to 10° and others up to 12°. But Gen. Crozier has
worked out a method by which we can increase the elevation of
these carriages up to 15°. With that we can extend the range out
to 19,000 yards. But even with this extension of range it would be
possible for a naval enemy with the most recent guns to reach us.
from a point a few thousand yards beyond the limit of range of our
guns. We propose to meet this by mounting the surplus 12-inch guns
on a new type of carriage which will admit of 30°. Also the Board
of Review recently recommended, and it has been approved by the
War Department and is now a policy of the department, that all
future constructions of coast-defense armament shall be of caliber
not less than 16 inches in diameter, shall have all-around fire
and a length that will make them guns of the first power.
Senator WARREN. Right there, I wanted to ask you, what are the
ºngº between the 12-inch and the 15-inch guns that you
speak of 3
Pº, WEAVER. The 15-inch gun of the Queen Elizabeth type, I
think, is limited to about a 45-caliber gun. We are proposing to
build our new 16-inch guns 50 calibers. That would be a first-power
gun and give us a full-muzzle velocity.
Senator WARREN. You are speaking of the 16-inch guns'.
Gen. WEAVER. Yes, sir. .4°
Senator WARREN. What I want to know is, what is the caliber of
these 12-inch guns : - -
Gen. WEAVER. They are 35-caliber guns, hardly anything more
than what are known as “howitzers,” which is a gun of short i.
Senator DU Pont. You speak of what it is proposed to do; it is
proposed to mount those guns on new carriages. How long will it
take to effect this? -
Gen. WEAVER. I think it can be done within a year, if the funds
are available. . -
Senator DU Pont. I would like to know whether estimates have
been made for them ż,
Gen. WEAVER. We have estimates in this year for 17 for the
United States. - .
Senator DU Pont. Is not that a very small number 7 -
Gen. WEAVER. That is a small number, but it was necessary to
fix this limit because of the financial limitations that were placed
upon the board. In making the recommendations we had to allow
for so many different items that that was the number we thought
could properly be estimated for, and I would say that with that we
can cover the necessities of the emergent situations. -
Senator THOMAS. What is your estimate for the change 2
Gen. WEAVER. The total estimate for the 17 guns
Senator THOMAs. You can approximate it'.
PREPAREDINESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 541
Gen. WEAVER. The cost of one carriage is $55,000 and the engi-
neering construction is about $200,000 to a battery of two guns.
Senator DU PONT. As I understand it, the Senate committee is
trying to get at what should be done in order“to put us in a reasonable
state of preparedness for war, and after that the cost may be ascer-
tained and then it is a question of finding the funds to do it. It
seems to me that any expenditure that comes within that condition
of reasonable preparedness ought to be estimated for. Otherwise the
responsibility falls on the War Department and not on Congress.
Gen. WEAvH.R. I would like to refer to the estimates which I have
here. - º %
Senator WARREN. Following along that line, what is the number
of such guns you have spoken of to be remounted at this large expense,
and the new ones which you contemplate are necessary for our present
fortifications? As I understand you, it is for such cities as New York
º San Francisco, at harbors where there is a city lying close be-
ind ; *
Gen. WEAVER. There are certain places where we need each type
of gun, the high-angle fire 12-inch guns and the new high-power
16-inch guns.
Senator WARREN. You are speaking of the 17 guns. If it were
not for the financial limit would you raise that number?
Gen. WEAVER. Yes; we contemplate emplacing 36 altogether, in
different localities.
Senator WARREN. That is what I wanted to get at.
Gen. WEAVER. The total estimates of the Ordnance Department
under this item are fifty-four 3-inch air-craft guns and mounts, six
16-inch guns and mounts, four 16-inch guns and mounts, six 16-inch
howitzers and mounts for railroad use, one 14-inch gun on railroad
car mounts, 17 long-range mounts for 12-inch rifles; and the total
amount is $1,764,500. The estimates submitted this year includes
also funds for the construction of twelve long-range mounts for 12-
inch rifles for the insular possessions and the canal, so that only
seven of these mounts are left to be covered in future estimates,
You only desired the estimates for this year?
Senator WARREN. Having the estimate of the number that you
have in mind, what would it cost
Gen. WEAVER. The whole 36 are included in the amount we con-
templated for ultimate expenditure over a four-year period; the total
amount is $5,580,000.
Senator WARREN. So the information is before us in that way?
Gen. WEAVER. Yes, sir.
(Thereupon, at 4.25 o'clock p. m., the committee took a recess
until to-morrow, Thursday, January 27, 1916, at 10.30 o'clock a. am.)
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
THURSDAY, JANUARY 27, 1916.
UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON MILITARY AFFAIRs.
The committee met, at the expiration of the recess, at 10.30
o'clock a. m., Senator Geo. E. Chamberlain (chairman) presiding.
The CHAIRMAN. We will now hear the statement of Dr. Christen.
STATEMENT OF DR. THEODORE CHRISTEN, OF CINCINNATI,
- - OHIO, - - - -
The CHAIRMAN. Please give the stenographer your name, address,
and occupation.
Dr. CHRISTEN. Theodore Christen; doctor of medicine; Cincin-
nati, Ohio. -
The CHAIRMAN. Dr. Christen, you understand there has been a
bill introduced here for universal military training, and I believe you
at one time served as an officer of the Swiss Army'.
Dr. CHRISTEN. I did, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. That system has been discussed, more or less, and
we would like to have a statement from you, in your own way, in
reference to the Swiss system. -
Dr. CHRISTEN. Very well; I will make a statement. Permit me
to speak of the recent mobilization, first, in August, 1914. That was
the test of the system, in a way, the Supreme test of the system so far.
While it was not the test of actual warfare, it was at least a test of
the Organization, and, if you will allow me to give you a description
of how the mobilization worked and how successful it was, then we
may # an idea whether perhaps after that test the system is justified
in itself.
Our Government decided upon mobilization on Saturday, the 1st
of August, 1914. The mobilization was decided upon and the bells
were rung in every village. The mobilization called for the men to
appear on the 3rd of August at 9 o'clock in the morning, at their
places of assembly. Every man always knows where he has to
assemble. If I were still in the Swiss Army, as I formerly was, I
would know now where I would have to assemble. Every year when
the Swiss army maneuvers the units that are assembled to maneuver
assemble at the same place where they will assemble in case of
mobilization. Therefore that is something extremely familiar to
them and has worked out well in this supreme test. They were
asked to assemble on Monday morning, August 3, at 9 o'clock. At
the same time the Government issued the proclamation of mobiliza-
tion and stated in it that the horses would have to be assembled
Monday morning at 9 o'clock, and that the wagons of the country
would have to be at the disposal of the mobilized army. No army
keeps enough horses for war time in its own stables, and the Swiss
Army less than any. It costs very much, and our army not being
a standing army they save in that way, but every horse owner of
• . . . . - "... . . . . . 543
544 PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE,
the country is registered, and his horse is registered, and he knows
where he has to bring his horse on the day of mobilization. In
addition, every village, township, and municipal community has to .
furnish wagons. These wagons are registered in time of peace, and
when mobilization comes, without much ado they can be furnished.
This took place successfully. The horses were brought on Mon-
day, August 3, before the committees of appraisal, which consist of
former cavalry officers and of army veterinary surgeons (every veter-
inary surgeon is naturally also an army veterinary Surgeon), and
they were at Once appraised. The men appeared on Monday morn-
ing, August 3. From Saturday night till Monday morning the trains.
of the railroads ran on schedule time for civilian purposes. After
that there was no more train service for civilian purposes, and after
the army had assembled on Monday they were carried to their places
of concentration within 24 hours—in fact, mostly on the same day;
the units which had assembled all over the country at distant places
from each other were assembled into larger units, and these larger
units on the next day, on Tuesday, August 4, were brought to the
exposed posts on the frontier to guard the country from invasion.
At the same time the railroads had to be guarded, and a sort of local
old-man organization, the local landstrum, took hold of railroad.
bridges and railroad rights of way, but the army itself was concen–
trated and transported in two days and a half. After that things
ran their historic course. .
Senator CATRON. You say the army was concentrated in two days
and a half; how many were concentrated ? -
Dr. CHRISTEN. To tell you the truth, there is no figure published;
the Government has not published any figure. The Government has
allowed the figure of 300,000 to be known. It is probable that there
were more, but they have not published the figures of the mobiliza-
tion. I have tried to get them from the Swiss legation here in
Washington but I have not been able to. They do not know; it is
not published. But at least 300,000 men were concentrated. Now,
300,000 men does not seem very much in this war, where millions of
soldiers are fighting, but is is very much in proportion to our popu-
lation. The Swiss population of native citizens, from which alone
recruits can be taken—the unnaturalized foreigners do not count—
is about 3,300,000. From this 3,300,000 let us assume there were
concentrated and mobilized in two days and a half only 300,000.
That would be about 9 per cent of the population. It would be 18
per cent of the male population. It would be in the United States of
America. 9,000,000 men. That is the same proportion. If the organi-
zation of the United States were the same as our Swiss Army we
would have had 9,000,000 men at their posts in two days and a half.
Now, this army of 300,000 men know their ground well. •
I remember, in 1894, when I attended maneuvers for the last time
in Battalion 28 of the Tenth Regiment of Infantry, we had our
maneuvers in the northwest of the country, in the region of the
French fortress of Belfort. At that time the supposition of the cam-
paign for maneuvers was that an enemy from Germany, I mean an
invader from the northeast, was trying to break through south of the
Alsatian frontier to the Swiss territory to go to the fortress of Belfort
The supposed Swiss army of defense were going over the Jura Moun.
tains to attack them right there. If the German army in this war.
had tried to invade France that way, they would have come through
PREPAREDNIESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 545
there, and the Swiss officers and the Swiss army would have known
that territory thoroughly and would have opposed them at positions
all prepared beforehand on maps. So that when the mobilization at
this time took place, the troops of defense were carried exactly to
places long before prepared and long before planned. I heard with
great Sorrow that near Basel a beautiful little forest, a parklike
forest, was completely cut down the first day, because it was in the
way of defense. It would have been to us strategically in the way.
All the plans were prepared. The railroad carried the troops accord-
ing to railroad time tables and schedules long before prepared, so
that there was, it seems from reports I received, no hitch whatever.
Senator HITCHCOCK. What number of men were in the mobilization ?
Dr. CHRISTEN. About 300,000. The exact figures are not published;
they will be published after it is all over. It is probably more than
300,000. The Government says 300,000, or allows it to be supposed
to be 300,000. In fact, the Swiss legation here in Washington has
no exact figures, and I have not seen any exact figures, but there
were probably not less than 350,000. .
Senator WARREN. A witness who testified previously stated that
the Government owns the railroads, and consequently troops were
transported whenever they appeared. In this mobilization of horses
and wagons, what is the plan of compensation to the owners, and,
furthermore, are they taken from foreign citizens? You said that
only citizens served; do they call upon the noncitizen property
holders to furnish horses and wagons, and, if so, under what rule of
compensation ? - &
Dr. CHRISTEN. I will reply to that in the following way: The prin-
ciple is that compensation must come; they are compensated. The
organic law of the Swiss Army compels the Government to compen-
sate; at what rate, of course, I do not know; at the uniform rate.
They have a certain standard schedule, probably for horses of such
an age, such quality; probably they call them A, B, C quality; I do
not know. They have, however, the principle of compensation. The
principle of compensation for wagons exists also.
The mobilization of horses is in the following way: I have a brother
in Switzerland, who is in business and owns 12 horses and 1 auto-
mobile truck. I asked him in 1912, when I went oyer, “How about
your horses?” He said, “At present, it is so that every man is
allowed to keep the fifth horse. If he has four horses, the four horses
go. If he has five, he keeps the fifth horse. Therefore, I, with my 12
horses and 1 automobile truck, would be able to keep 2 horses; the
rest, the 10 horses and the automobile truck, would go.” That, of
course, causes immense hardship. American travelers who were in
Switzerland when the war broke out told me the country was bare
of horses, that the country roads were absolutely deserted, because
the horses were concentrated. The army did not need the horses at
once. These supernumerary horses were put into so-called horse
depots, horse gathering places, and in the horse gathering places old
men, landsturm cavalry, were the stableboys. My own brother was
one of these stableboys. He is three years younger than I and has
passed the age of cavalry service, but he was, nevertheless, being still
enlisted, called upon to tend to some of these horses in the horse depot.
Now, as far as foreigners are concerned, who own horses, their citi-
zenship has nothing to do with furnishing the horses. They do not
have to furnish their own personal service, but the horse is an asset
546 PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
of the resources of the country and of the mobilization. In fact, 24
hours before actualmobilization the Government issues a proclamation
of warning. We call it the “Pickettstellung.” It is a term which is
probably not translatable. From that moment every horse deal is
over; no one has a right to buy a horse; no one has a right to sell a
horse. It is one of the first things, as far as men are concerned, not
to go out of the country, and, as far as the horses are concerned, all
sales are stopped. . - -
Senator WARREN. One more question. Do they purchase the
horses in all cases, or in some cases purchase and in others pay for the
use of them and then return them : - -
Dr. CHRISTEN. I do not think they purchase them.
Senator WARREN. They pay for the use of them :
Dr. CHRISTEN. They pay for the use of them.
Senator WARREN. The reason I am asking this question is that one
of the great elements that we approve of in the Swiss system is its
slight cost, comparatively, but in the matter of transportation of
horses there must be great cost, and I wanted to get at the system
of compensation, whether it is in full or whether it is a part of the
real value. Would the Government pay them $1 when you or I would
hº to pay $2 a day, or do they pay current values when they use
them 7 ** - -
Dr. CHRISTEN. They have a schedule, which is not in the organic
law of military cºnt. but it is subject to decree from the
administration, and they compensate, if I am not mistaken, well. I
was a mounted officer of the medical service and had to furnish my
own horse. I took a horse that I borrowed from a private horse
owner and gave him so much. The Government gave me the current
rate, the Government current rate. The Government current rate
was exactly what I paid for mine. - ** -
Senator WARREN. Do you remember what you paid : - • g
Dr. CHRISTEN. I think 5 francs. I would not swear to that, because
it is many years ago. -
Senator HITCHCOCK. That was when you went to the maneuvers?
Dr. CHRISTEN. Yes; when I went to the maneuvers.
Senator HITCHCOCK. How long do they last :
Dr. CHRISTEN. The maneuvers at that time lasted 17 days.
Senator HITCHCOCK. How often do they occur :
Dr. CHRISTEN. At that time they occurred every two years, and
then in between the two years there was each year a special trainin
of the medical arm, only amongst medical men and army nurses an
litter carriers with the medical organization.
Senator HITCHCOCK. Do the infantrymen or the cavalrymen re-
ceive any compensation ?
Dr. CHRISTEN. Yes, sir. I told you how it was in 1894. In the
meantime, in 1907, they accepted a new organization and, according
to the new organization, there would be now maneuvers and training
every year, not every other year, you know, as formerly. Now, you
are asking what the simple soldier receives as compensation ?
Senator HITCHCOCK. Yes.
Dr. CHRISTEN. The recruit received, and I think still receives, 80
centimes; 80 centimes in American money would correspond to 16
cents a day. As far as value of money is concerned, of course it
would amount to a little more, but it would amount to about 15 or
PREPAREDINESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 547
16 cents. Now, that does not seem much, but it is ample. The
man is fed—he has his breakfast, dinner, and Supper. -
Senator HITCHCOOK. And his cost of transportation ?
Dr. CHRISTEN. That is refunded to him. - -
Senator CATRON. Does he pay for his breakfast, dinner, and
º out of this 16 cents a day ?
Dr. CHRISTEN. No, sir; those are furnished him.
Senator WARREN. He is also furnished his clothing?
Dr. CHRISTEN. Everything. The 80 centimes are #. his beer——
Senator CATRON (interposing). And tobacco º -
Dr. CHRISTEN. And tobacco; for his pleasures. I remember when
I was a recruit of infantry in 1887 at Lucerne I saved money out of
the 80 centimes a day, and I have still in a drawer in Switzerland
some of that money. It was paid in brand-new money. In 1912,
when I went to Europe, I saw some of those francs still lying there.
as mementos from my recruit service, which I kept. Those 80
centimes are not little; they are fairly adequate. Of course, if a man
wants to buy wine in bottles it will not go very far.
. Senator HITCHCOO.K. Do you know how much Switzerland expends
every year in these maneuvers of 11 days? -
Senator CATRON. Seventeen days, he said.
Dr. CHRISTEN. They last 11 days, plus 2 days for assembly and
release. - - -
Senator WARREN. There is a period, in the first instance, of some
sixty-odd days, is there not—in one period 7 - .
, Dr. CHRISTEN. That is the recruit service. The recruit service is
65 days; I always add 2 days and say 67 days, because what I want
to chiefly emphasize is the cost of time to the simple soldier; that is,
to the man of the masses, to the laboring man. That interests us
the most, what do we have to ask from the laboring man?
Senator WARREN. That is the recruit service
Dr. CHRISTEN. The recruit service is 67 days.
Senator WARREN. For how many years?
Dr. CHRISTEN. Just one year.
Senator WARREN. And after that only 11 days?
Dr. CHRISTEN. After that only 11 days, yes; 13 days with the day
of entry and the day of release. -
Senator CATRON. How many years does he have these 11 days?
Dr. CHRISTEN. These 11 days he has to serve seven years; first is
the recruit service, and then about seven years, the repeat Service,
the maneuver service—we call it repeat service—of 11 days, plus 2,
until he is 27.
Senator CATRON. At what age does he go in as a recruit *
Dr. CHRISTEN. He goes in as a recruit at 20. He is examined for
physical fitness at the age of 19. This examination for physical fit-
ness is a great day for our Swiss young man, because he is not afraid
he might be accepted; he is afraid he might not be accepted. ... His
whole standing would be impaired if he were not accepted. All his
life he would have to make more or less apologies as to why he was
not accepted. -
The CHAIRMAN. They are proud to serve 7
Dr. CHRISTEN. They are proud to serve.
The CHAIRMAN. And they undertake to prepare themselves phys-
ically beforehand for that examination ?
Dr. CHRISTEN. Yes.
‘548 PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
“Senator WARREN. They are taught physical culture in the schools :
Dr. CHRISTEN. In the schools. While the schools do something, I
am under the impression, rather, that the part the schools are taking
is exaggerated in its importance in the present day discussion in
America. I follow every scrap I can see, and have been doing so in
this preparedness campaign, and it seems to me that the importance
of the schools and the schoolboy training is greatly, greatly exagger-
ated. The real test, the real service, only begins at the age of 19,
when he is examined for physical fitness, and of 20, when he has to
SGI’W.G.
Senator HITCHCOCK. Can you tell what per cent are rejected? .
Dr. CHRISTEN. The rejection varies according to the district.
There are goiter districts. p
Senator WARREN. Do they reject those affected with goitre’ -
Dr. CHRISTEN. They take them with very small goitres; where
the man is known—is otherwise physically fit—the little enlargement
of the thyroid gland does not matter. We all have it in Switzerland;
everyone has a little bit of an enlargement of that gland; but, on
the average, I think the proportion of accepted to rejected is 68 to
70 per cent. -
Senator HITCHCOCK. Accepted .
Dr. CHRISTEN. Yes; I would say 65 to 70 per cent.
Senator WARREN. Roughly speaking, it would be about two-thirds.
Dr. CHRISTEN. Two-thirds, roughly speaking, yes. First of all,
goitre, unfortunately, is the curse of mountain countries. -
The CHAIRMAN. Snow water is supposed to be the cause of it, is it
not - -
Dr. CHRISTEN. Yes; it is an infection from the water. -
The CHAIRMAN. What is the part the school plays in preparedness
in Switzerland'. You say it is exaggerated in this country. -
Dr. CHRISTEN. The schools of the country are, as they are in the
United States, State schools, Canton schools. Our Swiss Cantons
are sovereign States like the States in the United States, and they
control their school system supremely. They are supreme in it.
However, there is only one interference with it, or one exception to
it, because “interference” is too strong, on the part of the central
government, and that is gymnastics. The central government has
the right to demand certain gymnastics. First of all, there is a
place around the schoolhouse where gymnastics can take place.
Second, a few simple apparatus, horizontal bars. You see them
around every schoolhouse, what we would call our little red school-
house here in America; you would see that horizontal bar there.
And the central government sees that the school teachers are capable
of giving that gymnastic exercise adequately. In 1872, when I
served at Lucerne as a recruit of infantry in the third company in
that recruit school, the first company of that school, over 200 men,
were all school teachers. They were the school teachers of the year;
I think the year's crop of school teachers were taught the infantry-
man's duty and military gymnastics. I was very glad I was not in
the company with the school teachers, because they had too much
gymnastics to suit my personal tastes.
Senator CATRON. Do they use women for school teachers there?
Dr. CHRISTEN. In Switzerland we have some women for school-
teachers, but I think very few, and I think there is no school entirely
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 549
without men teachers. Now, that is one thing the school does.
The Government requires certain gymnastic exercises at the school.
... The CHAIRMAN. That is for the physical development of the
young'
... Dr. CHRISTEN. Yes. . -
Senator HITCHCOCK. At what age does the physical training begin?
Dr. CHRISTEN. I think at about the age of 10. *.
* Senator CATRON. And lasts how long . --
Dr. CHRISTEN. As long as school lasts. -
Senator CATRON. How many years do the children stay in school %
Dr. CHRISTEN. I think they have to go to the common school mine
years, from 7 to 15. - - - -
... The CHAIRMAN. So that there is really no military training in the
schools % º:
Dr. CHRISTEN. It is not military training at all. These boys at the
school never see a rifle. They take their gymnastic exercises with
wands, and have body-bending exercises, right and left turn, etc.,
but it is really not military, you know. . . - *
Senator WARREN. As I understand you, this instruction is pre-
paring them for their service as soldiers, physically, which is the
main foundation, of Course? . . . . . . . . -
. . Dr. CHRISTEN. Undoubtedly, it is a foundation for it. But they
lose it again. Between the ages of 16, let us say, when they quit
school, and 20, when they enter military service, they have no
physical training, unless they take it voluntarily.
... Senator Hitchcock. Do they not have the training they have in
German gymnastics, setting up exercises, and marching? -
Dr. CHRISTEN. Yes, it is that kind of exercise. Only most people
live in the country on their land, in the villages far away.
... Senator WARREN. Is their occupation such as to tend to physical
development 7
. . Dr. CHRISTEN. Yes, more or less, but agriculture does not make
them supple; it makes them rather stiff. The city boys as recruits
are more pliable and physically more likely than the country boys,
and it always takes sometime with the real farmer boys to make
them a little supple. - -
Senator HITCHCOCK. Is this physical training by a teacher who
teaches nothing else? -
Dr. CHRISTEN. Oh, no. In a country village which has only two
classes, two teachers, each school-teacher must teach gymnastics, be
able to teach gymnastics, also.
... Senator HITCHCOCK. Where does he learn that
Dr. CHRISTEN. He learns that first of all in his school-teacher
training, the so-called normal school, and he learns it in the army
in that company of school-teachers, such as that which was trained
at Lucerne. -
Senator HITCHCOCK. Under military management 2
Dr. CHRISTEN. Yes; that was military. I could not tell you,
Senator, whether they still do that, whether they take the school-
teachers of the country all in one company and emphasize for them
gymnastic military training, or not, but they did it at One time.
. . The CHAIRMAN. There is no bar to the employment of women school-
teachers ? - -
Dr. CHRISTEN. Oh, no; absolutely none; there are a great many,
but not as many in proportion as here, for instance.
550 PREPAREDINESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
Senator CATRON. Not as many as there are men? -
Dr. CHRISTEN. Not as many as men. There are many more men.
The CHAIRMAN. Even in this Country the women school-teachers
teach physical exercises.
Dr. CHRISTEN. The girls also have physical exercises in Switzer-
land, but that is taught by men.
Senator HITCHCook. Brust 'raus! Bauch im!
Dr. CHRISTEN. Yes, sir; exactly. Now, about military training
previous to actual drill, recruit service, I would like to say that in
certain places there are cadet corps, but these corps are, first of all,
not obligatory, and they are not universal. It is always the small
village that furnishes most of the men. The small villages have none
of these cadet corps. It is only in the larger cities—not so very
large—where such a thing is possible. .
The CHAIRMAN. That is ...i.
Dr. CHRISTEN. Voluntary, yes; I belonged to a cadet corps in m
little town. My little town was at that time of about 7,000 inhabi.
tants, and we had a cadet corps where the boys entered at their fifth
school year. The fifth school year would be the eleventh year.
Then we had simple infantry drills. We got an actual rifle, a little
rifle, a little shorter than the regular rifle, a cadet rifle, of the ordnance
of the day, the make of the day, of the regular army, and we had
actual shooting of actual bullets, sharpshooting; but that was not the
principal thing. The principal thing was discipline, marching on
their little parade ground, on their practice ground; and then the boys
would advance and some of them would become officers, etc. I was
a captain for two years. It helped some. . The purpose of these cadet
corps in the Swiss idea is not to train soldiers. We do not imagine
that the cadet is a soldier. But it has the purpose of making, creating
a certain amount of enthusiasm in some of them, so that afterwards
when the time comes they will be more likely to offer themselves as
officers; that is, to take longer service upon them as officers. It is
chiefly for that purpose. It is not considered part and parcel of the
military establishment. . . . . *
Senator HITCHCOCK. You have not told us yet how you get the
real officers for this citizen soldiery of the Swiss Army.
Dr. CHRISTEN. The real officers are drawn from the ranks, so to
speak. Every one, without exception, has to be a recruit if he is
physically fit, and has to go through the same training with whom-
soever is next to him in the ranks. He may be a man of wealth or
of poverty, clean or dirty, intelligent or less so, but he has to go
exactly through that same thing. During that recruit service they
size them up— -
Senator HITCHCOCK. Who does 7 -
Dr. CHRISTEN, The officers size them up, and afterwards they say
to So-and-so, “You have to become an officer.” We call that
aspiring. A candidate for a commission as officer is an aspirant;
that is, he has then, before he becomes an officer, to go through
special training. He has to become, first, a subofficer. He has to
go through an extra school, an éxtra course of training for subofficers.
That extra course in the infantry lasts 22 days, including coming
and going, 20 days actual training. During these 20 days he is
taught the elementary knowledge necessary for a corporal. . After he
has passed through that, he goes as a corporal to a recruit School,
and at once as a corporal becomes the instructor of these recruits.
PREPAREDNESS FOR, NATIONAL DEFENSE. 551.
Every recruit service has, of course, officers and subofficers. The
recruits are in battalion units, company units, on strictly military
lines, the administration of the company and battalion is on military
lines, with all the officers and subofficers, from the top to the bottom,
and these newly-made corporals are at once instructors of recruits,
responsible instructors of raw recruits. It is not a show training, a
parade training, of people who already know. These recruits are
raw, and have to be trained at once by the young Subofficer. I con-
sider this of extreme importance, and I will tell you afterwards why.
Then the officer has to go through a special school as a subofficer if
he aspires still higher, or is asked to go higher on account of his intel-
ligence and on account of his standing, to be able to do so. He must
not be a poor man, on whom a large family is dependent. That
would be a hardship. But somebody to whom it is not a hardship
is asked to become an officer, and he goes then through a special
officers course. The special officers course in the infantry is 80
days plus 2; in the infantry, cavalry, and fortress troops it is 82
days; in the artillery and engineering corps it is 107 days. .
Senator HITCHCOCK. In one year?
Dr. CHRISTEN. In one year, in succession.
Senator HITCHCOCK. First the man becomes a recruit
Dr. CHRISTEN. Yes, sir. -
Senator HITCHCOCK. He can not get any promotion that year'
Dr. CHRISTEN. No; he can not.
Senator HITCHCOCK. The next year he may become a corporal?
Dr. CHRISTEN. He may become a corporal the next year, or even
the same year. I will tell you how it is possible. Suppose a recruit
school of 67 days begins on the 15th of January at Lucerne, we will
say. Sixty-seven days from the 15th of January would bring it to
about the 22d of March. About the 22d of March he finishes. He
goes home, and then he is called a Subofficer aspirant. He then has
the opportunity to do his 22 days in a subofficers school in the same
year. Suppose there is such a school somewhere in June. If it is
not exactly in his district, to which, for instance, Lucerne belongs, if
he makes application to serve his 22 days in the corporals school
elsewhere, they will very likely accord him the privilege. If he wants
to get through as quickly as possible he can do it in the same year.
Then, afterwards, he goes again to a 67-day school for recruits.
That 67-day school for recruits may begin the 15th of September.
Practically he may devote the entire year, if he wants to, to that.
If he does not want to he can spread it considerably. If he is going
to be an officer and he has been a corporal, he does not have to, then.
I must say that he does not have to go as a corporal and train recruits
only those who stay corporals and subofficers go and train recruits.
Those who become officers afterwards can go at once to an 82-day
officers’ school and become lieutenants in the same year if they speed
Ull).
'senator HITCHCOCK. What do they study in these officers' schools?
Dr. CHRISTEN. First of all they are under military discipline, and
they have military units. They go through the routine of military
life every day. They practice with the rifle, they practice forma-
tions, and then they have the special study of, first, military organi-
zation—that is, the Organization of the military system of the Swiss
Army—how their units are formed, how all the units from the smallest
to the biggest are formed, how they are commanded, how the wheels
552 PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
of the system catch and work together as a machine. That is mili-
tary organization. Then there is the map reading. . The map reading
is extremely important. Then there is outpost duty. There is the
report system; that is, to make reports on the blanks. Every army
is full of blanks that have to be filled, so that the effective number
ready every day is checked up. An army is like a bank that checks
up every evening. An army checks up at a certain time of day every
day, whatever they have, in the sick room, sent away, discharged,
not present, and in the ranks. Everything is checked up. This
military system is very complicated. They learn that. Then they
learn reconnoitering in the open. Then fencing, horseback riding,
i. all that. Of course, they learn ballistics, the law of the flying
ullet. - -
Senator CATRON. Did you attend one of those officers’ schools?
Dr. CHRISTEN. Yes, sir; I attended the officer's school for medical
officers. In the medical officers’ school we had first of all, of course,
the routine of military duty. We had Infantry training of the
recruits, of the nursing and litter-carrying recruits, who were under
Our training. In that training we had, of course, simple Infantry
marching, and the other things that go with Infantry. Then we had
the special branches—litter carrying, the organization of the Medical
Corps—and we had to learn by heart where every ingredient could be
found, how much stuff was in such and such a standard wagon, filled
with Army supplies, how many empty mattress bags were to be filled
with straw, where we could find all of the ingredients, all the utensils,
all the instruments. We had to learn that. Then we had to learn
the principles of medical service, as far as a troop is concerned, the
first line, the second line, and the third line. The first line means the
establishment of bandage places behind the fighting units. The
second line means the first assembly places for the wounded, and
temporary field hospitals; and the third line means a civilian estab-
lishment behind the army, in the interior. All this is very compli-
cated. An army is a very complicated thing, and to learn its organi-
Zation takes time. -
Senator THOMAs. How many years did it take to develop the sys-
tem to its present standard?
Dr. CHRISTEN. To develop the whole system of the Swiss Army'
Senator THOMAs. Yes. When did you begin it 7
Dr. CHRISTEN. The system of the Swiss Army has had many
periods. - -
Senator THOMAs. I have reference, of course, to this system of
* that you have so well described here. When were its rudi-
ments begun ? You did not produce it in a day ? -
Dr. CHRISTEN. No; it was not produced in a day. For instance,
the training I went through was the product of the new army organi-
zation in 1874. The training they are going through now is the
product of the army organization of 1907. Both are now alike, and
they had a similar training—perhaps less time, perhaps a little differ-
ent—before 1874. It is the product of evolution, of necessity.
Experience has taught what an officer ought to know in order to be a
leader of his men, and they have gradually developed that.
But, as far as the Swiss Army is concerned, they have recently
celebrated the six hundredth anniversary of the Battle of Morgarten.
The Battle of Morgarten took place in 1315, against the house of

PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 553.
Hapsburg, of Austria. The house of Hapsburg is a Swiss house.
Their castle is still standing in Switzerland. But they had been
Emperors of Germany. Rudolph II had been Emperor of Germany,
and his son, Albert, wanted to reconquer the Swiss Republic, and
he sent his men to the Swiss Republic in 1315, and the Swiss met them,
and it was recently brought out, something I had not known, that
Uri, for instance, sent their men, and had obligatory military service
at that time. They were not volunteers, those men from Uri. They
have the names of those men who served at that time, the same
family names are still in existence. Some have died out, but very,
very few. That was in 1315. I do not know how it was in Schwyz
and Unterwalden, the two other parts that took part in that fight,
but it is a historic fact as far as Uri is concerned that they had obliga-
tory military service at that time. And I will say to you that the
men of Uri are the most stubborn men on earth. Nowhere can you
find such hard-headed people. It has not made them slaves; it has
not broken their backbone. They are still standing on their own feet,
in spite of the long time which this obligation has been put upon them.
This obligation does not destroy the democratic spirit, and does not
ºy manhood, or the power to say “No” when they want to say
( ( O.” -
Senator HITCHCOCK. What wars has Switzerland had since 1300%
Dr. CHRISTEN. From that time on there was an uninterrupted
series of wars, more than I can tell you. In 1337, I think, or 1338,
there was a great and important war against a combination of noble-
men in the surrounding country, the feudal nobles. They were beaten
back. They had a war against Austria, I think for the last time, in
1499; that is, from 1315 to 1499 they had wars against Austria. One
of their greatest and most difficult wars, and one of the wars that
determined the shape of Europe, practically, was in 1474, 1476, and
1477, against Charles the Bold, Duke of Burgundy, one of the most
daring, a genius in political Outlook, who was going to found a central
European empire, and in order to do that he had to have the key to.
central Europe, and the key to central Europe, Napoleon said, is
Switzerland, and Charles could not get it. He died on the field of
battle at Nancy, in January, 1477. -
Senator CATRON. Who, Charles the Bold'. w
Dr. CHRISTEN. Charles the Bold. He was found dead, frozen, at the
edge of a puddle of water that had frozen—a man who had at one
time excited the fear of Europe. -
Senator HITCHCOCK. Let us go rapidly over the others so as to:
come down to the present conditions.
Dr. CHRISTEN. They had many wars. In 1499 there was the
Suebian War. Austria for the last time tried to conquer Switzer-
land, and Austria did not succeed, and afterwards they gave it up.
Austria formed a combination of the South German States Union,
the Städteverband, to conquer Switzerland, and they did not succeed.
Then afterwards Switzerland had tried to defend itself against France
and Italy, and near Milan they were beaten badly in 1516, in the Bat-
tle of Marignano. That ended the Swiss dream of expansion. -
I must say this, as it is important, that the Swiss at one time had.
the best infantry. At one time in military history the chief arm was:
cavalry, the armored knight. Switzerland had never many horses,
and out of necessity, i r, they developed their infantry, and the
554 PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
development of the Swiss infantry tactics was the breakdown of the
cavalry tactics of the knights. The Swiss infantry in those days was
famous, and in military history forms an epoch in this period.
Senator HITCHCOCK. That was what date?
Dr. CHRISTEN. In was 1516 that the Battle of Marignano took
place. Then they began to enlist in foreign service as professional
soldiers. A great many then, from 1516 until the time of the French
Revolution, served the various kings of France, and they have com-
uted the number of Swiss who have served the kings of France and
É. bied on the battlefields of France to be 95 modern army Corps,
in the course of 270 years.
Senator HITCHCOCK. When was the Swiss Republic as now exist-
ing really established? -
r. CHRISTEN. Of course, there has been a constant development
and addition to it, but the principle was enunciated in August, 1291.
Senator HITCHCOCK. Is the independence of the Swiss Republic
guaranteed by any other nations of Europe?
Dr. CHRISTEN. Their neutrality; yes, sir.
Senator HITCHCOCK. When was that?
Dr. CHRISTEN. The Swiss neutrality was guaranteed through the
treaty of Vienna in 1815. It came about in this way: As I said,
Napoleon had called Switzerland the key to Europe, because Switzer-
land has the passes; Switzerland is a country of passes, and direct
routes from one country to another—from France to Germany, from
Germany to France, from Germany to Italy, from Austria to France,
from Italy to France. Napoleon, for instance, annexed Italy to
France for the sole purpose of building the Simplon route; he annexed
that part of the country and kept it 16 years.
Senator HITCHCOCK. That was the treaty of Vienna of 1815%
Dr. CHRISTEN. Yes.
Senator HITCHCOCK. What nations participated in that ?
Dr. CHRISTEN. In that treaty of Vienna all the European nations—
France, England, Prussia, Austria, and Russia. -
Senator HITCHCOCK. That is still in force 3 -
Dr. CHRISTEN. That is still in force. Italy did not exist at that
time, and we Swiss had of recent years felt somewhat apprehensive
of Italian expansion at our cost, and, as Italy had never been a part
of that pact, we were afraid they might not recognize it. When the
present European war broke out and Switzerland at once sent out a
proclamation of neutrality to all the civilized nations through. diplo-
matic channels, Italy acknowledged the receipt with the guarantee
of their adherence. They did that voluntarily. It is really very
valuable to them. The Swiss neutrality is valuable to all of them.
When I was a young man I remember very well at school our
school-teachers told us about it, and we were somewhat proud that
the great nations were guaranteeing something like that, and we were
told that if one of them attacked us the others would defend us.
When I was a young man after school, about 18 or 19 years old, I
think it was about 1890, a reversal of feeling came over the Swiss; at
least that was the time when I remember very well the first accounts
in the papers appeared which spoke of that guarantee as really not
worth more than the paper it was written upon. Of course, I must
add this, that guarantee of neutrality put upon the Swiss the obliga-
tion to protect it. It is not a negative duty, it is a positive duty.
It is not a negative right. It is not a right only, it is a duty. We
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 555
have to do it. We must be able to protect ourselves. Bismarck
once said that he only respected the neutrality of the strong, and that
obligation we have, and for that reason, on that account, since 1815
we have been training for that. -
The CHAIRMAN. To carry out your part of the obligation? ... .
Dr. CHRISTEN. To carry out our part of the obligation. The effect
has been such that the foreign Governments have recognized the
ability of the Swiss to defend their neutrality efficiently. There is
told in the preliminary chapters of the French Orange Book—if that
was the book which the French got out at the beginning of the war—
that the French embassy in Berlin had seen a memorial of the Ger-
man general staff that the Germans considered their left flank suffi-
ciently protected by the Swiss army. That was official. The
French ambassador, Cambon, sent this report home on the 3d of
August, 1913. That was a year before the war. He got hold of it.
The French likewise were fully aware that the Swiss would not let
anybody through, and that they were capable of guarding that flank
long enough and efficiently enough to prevent an invasion of France
from that side.
Senator HITCHCOCK. What is the length of the boundary between
Switzerland and Germany ? - . . --
Dr. CHRISTEN. The length of the boundary between Switzerland
and Germany is, from Alsace to the Lake of Constance, I would say,
perhaps, 150 miles.
Senator HITCHCOOK. And about the same on the French boun-
dary, or is it more?
Dr. CHRISTEN. On the French boundary, yes; about the same.
Senator HITCHCOCK. Do part of the Swiss speak German and part
French 3
Dr. CHRISTEN. Yes, sir. -
Senator HITCHCOCK. Do they keep the German-speaking Swiss on
the French boundary and the French-speaking Swiss on the German
boundary 7 -
Dr. CHRISTEN. In mobilization and defense?
Senator HITCHCOOK. Yes.
Dr. CHRISTEN. No. -
Senator CATRON. Is it not true that nearly all the Swiss speak both
French and German'.
Dr. CHRISTEN. Yes; a great many. It is the desire of everyone
to learn the other language, but not everyone has the opportunity.
They teach it at school, but that school French in the German part
or the school German in the French part is not adequate.
Senator HITCHCOCK. There is a third language you speak?
Dr. CHRISTEN. The third language is Italian. -
Senator BECKHAM. There is some Latin spoken there, is there not ?
, Dr. CHRISTEN. Yes; some Romance and Latin.
Senator BECKHAM. Very nearly the Latin of the Romans?
. . Dr. CHRISTEN. Very near the lingua rusticana—the rustic Latin
of Roman times. . . . . . . . . .
Senator HITCHCOCK. What is the language of the courts? -
Dr. CHRISTEN. The language of the courts is the language of the
district in which they are. ,' " " . .
... Senator HITCHCOCK. What is the language of the Congress? . . .
Dr. CHRISTEN. The language of the Congress is all three languages.
556 PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
Senator THOMAs. That is the official language of the Republic' -
Dr. CHRISTEN. All three. Every law, every decree, everything, is
published in three languages. - --
Senator HITCHCOO.K. May a man make a speech in any one lan-
guage in the country' -
Dr. CHRISTEN. A man may get up in what corresponds to our
Senate or what corresponds to our American House of Representa-
tives and make a speech in any one of the three languages. They
are translated then. I will say this, that the Swiss Italians have
enerously and most nobly asked that they give them no translator.
hey do not want it translated. They acknowledge that they know
both German and French. That was a sort of a noble gest. -
Senator BECKHAM. What effect has this system of universal.
training for service had upon the civil affairs of the country, upon
the industries and the business of the country & .
Dr. CHRISTEN. I think, Senator, it has had a good effect. A man
in the army gets his rating. An army, if it amounts to anything, is
a training school at least for the man, at least for the individual. He
ets his rating there. If he makes good, it is acknowledged; if he
i. not make good, he shows it. : If he does not make good in the
army, his rating in civilian life is inferior considerably.
Senator BECKHAM. What if any effect does that have upon the
efficiency of the man in industrial and commercial life -
Dr. CHRISTEN. For instance, anybody who is a corporal or an
officer or has any degree, whether it be a high degree or only a cor-
poral, has to have a little executive ability. He has to order men
around, he has to make them do their task, he has to make this one
and that one do this and that thing, and he has to instruct them to
do it. It gives them a certain amount of efficiency and an opportu-
nity to exercise it, which they otherwise would not get. There is no
doubt about it, when employing a man who is a corporal as a foreman,
you know that he can handle his men; he has to; he learns it there.
The CHAIRMAN. Does this system interfere much with industrial
life injuriously . That is, does it take men out of the business and
industrial life and interfere with business? -
Dr. CHRISTEN. No, Senator; it does not. The fact that the original
training service of 67 days is in one year—that is, the twentieth year—
and that hereafter the man has for about seven years only 13 days,
lessens what might be an interference. .
. The CHAIRMAN. It takes him out of industrial life really at a time.
before he begins' -- - - -
Dr. CHRISTEN. Yes; before he begins; that is, he knows years
before that he has to put aside 67 days in that year, and all the
arrangements are made. He is not very far advanced at 20 in any
pursuit. If the man is an employee, many employers pay them part
of their wages. All employers keep their places open. They keep
their places open for them even if they do not pay them their wages
in the meantime. Some do, but it is not * I think. But they
all keep their places open for them, and then hereafter it is only 13
days a year. These 13 days he has a certain latitude of choosing. If
it is extremely inconvenient certain days in one year, they j take
some other days in the same year. There is a certain amount of lat-
itude. There is really no hardship, and it does not disturb in any
way the industrial fabric of the country at all. . . . . . . .
PREPAREDINESS FOR, NATIONAL DEFENSE. 557
The CHAIRMAN. Does this Swiss system have the effect of cultivat-
ing an aggressive or offensive military spirit, a desire for aggression,
or º," policy which creates a patriotic spirit and one of defense
Simply
Dr. CHRISTEN. It does not create that spirit of aggression. I think
it curbs it to a certain extent. A man who has been an actual soldier;
that is, has had training and seen the effect of weapons and seen the
difficulties and the dangers to which a soldier is exposed, loses the
desire to expose himself, if he does not have to, to any such danger.
º has a sobering effect, if it has any effect, according to my knowl-
edge. - - -
The CHAIRMAN. Switzerland has not waged any offensive war since
this system was put in vogue; or rather for the last 100 years?
Dr. CHRISTEN. No. The Swiss people have an ideal, and aggres-
sion is against that ideal. I think if this present war were to end and
Some of the belligerents would, for instance, as has been proposed,
give Alsace to Switzerland, which is a bone of contention between
France and Germany—I don't believe they would want it. It was
proposed in 1871, but nothing came of it afterwards, and before it
could be even considered the Swiss Government has, in the name of
the Swiss people, pronounced its unwillingness to accept territory
from anyone. We do not want it. The Swiss nation has been
formed in the centuries on traditional lines of mutual interest and of
mutual culture, and we do not want any outsiders for the simple
reason that the outsiders may not want to come in. One has to come
in to become a Swiss.
It is a little complicated, but I will try to relate this. In 1859 the
war between France and Austria took place on the Italian plains.
Magenta and Solferino were the principal battles. Italy got Lom-
bardy from Austria. France got Savoy from the then Kingdom of
Piedmont. The Swiss had a foreclosure right, more or less, on parts
of Savoy, the northern parts, in case they changed hands. By the
treaty of 1815 at Vienna, if Switzerland had demanded it could have
had the northern counties of Savoy, bordering on Lake Geneva.
Switzerland refused it at that time; did not want it. We do not
want it. We do not want anything now. Our ideal is one of broth-
erhood amongst men as much as it is possible, with defense for our-,
selves. We want to defend ourselves. We trust no one to do that
for us. But our political ideal excludes completely any desire for
acquisition of territory. We do not want it. And I hope the Swiss
nation will not come into the temptation to accept such a gift. If we
are left alone, that is all that we ask from the world.
The CHAIRMAN. But in the meantime you are going to be in a posi-
tion where you can defend yourselves?
Dr. CHRISTEN. In the meantime we shall stand on our own feet,
and we shall defend our country.
Senator, may I now say something of how I imagine this system
could be applied to the United States ?
The CHAIRMAN. Yes; we will be glad to hear you.
Dr. CHRISTEN. My idea is the following: It should embody, first
of all, certain principles, and I will mention first Federal control of
the military establishment of the Nation. Federal control in Switzer-
land has become necessary in the evolution of the centuries. First
23380—PT 10—16—2
558 PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSI:
there was divided control of the military system. That has been
abolished almost completely, because it was found that modern con-
ditions demanded i. control.
As a second principle I would say adult manhood service for all
in the United States, and would suggest that any high-school boy or
college-boy training is inadequate. It will be inadequate in the
United States, as it has in Switzerland, because the training of the
young man under military conditions must be nothing short of actual
warfare, except the shooting of the actual bullets against the enemy.
Everything else—the long marches, the exposure in the open, the
digging of trenches—must be given. Our Swiss maneuvers at pres-
ent are so elaborate that they dig trenches man deep in Small maneu-
vers, and this should be embodied also.
The Australian system, of which much has been said, is inade-
quate, according to the Swiss idea, because it does not supply its
own officers sufficiently, and it does not create large organizations
of army corps. " -
I would say another principle would have to be that promotion
to any grade should only be on the principle of having promotion
through service in the lower grade, with suitable qualifications for
the higher, which would mean no appointment from civil life. §
As another principle I would say that the Swiss system be adopted
as much as possible, with as few modifications as possible. It is
elaborate and it is simple. It has been worked out elaborately, but
the principle is extremely simple.
As a Swiss I have been also in an American military organization.
I have an honorable discharge from the Ohio State Militia, and I
entered that some years ago in Order principally to see what it
amounts to. I have seen what it amounts to, after having been a
Swiss officer. While the spirit is very good—I want to speak highly
of it—it is inadequate. -
It provides for inadequate training, for absolutely no reserve.
These units are practically in the air; they are not attached to any
division; they are not attached to any army corps; they never see the
man who would eventually lead the whole body of them. They have
a great many other intrinsic weaknesses which can not be eliminated
by the volunteer system. The volunteer system, unfortunately, has
inherent weaknesses, to which I will not refer. -
I would have this country divided into 25 territorial districts about
equal in population; that is, in 25 districts of a population of
4,000,000 each, and from these 4,000,000 we could recruit every year
on the Swiss system, when they are 19 years old, a sufficient number,
and the Regular Army officers the first years would furnish the train-
ing. Then from these recruits of the National Army, of the universal
army, the officers and subofficers could be chosen, and in a very few
years we would have 25 Army corps districts; we would have 25
Army corps, which would be probably ample for the defense of the
United States at all times. The Army corps could be made large or
small according to needs, recruiting could be severe or less severe. and
we could have plenty of it under the Swiss system -
PREP.A.R.E.D.NESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 559
STATEMENT OF MR. HENRY T. HUNT, ATTORNEY AT LAW,
CINCINNATI, OHIO. -
Mr. HUNT. Mr. Chairman and gentlemen, my particular interest
here arose from my connection with Troop C of the Ohio National
Guard, where I served with Dr. Christen. I have also been mayor of
the city of Cincinnati, prosecuting attorney of the county, and have
served in the Ohio Legislature. I graduated from Yale College, where
I had some experience in a military way, and have acted as harvester
in western harvest fields, and in political and social life I have been
in contact with a great number of all classes of people.
Since being mayor, and going back to the practice of the law, I have
had time to reflect somewhat and to make some study of political
matters, and my conclusion, based on all this experience and what
study I have been able to make, aided by what I have learned from
Dr. Christen in regard to the Swiss system, is that we must have in
this country a universal service military system. That system, it
seems to me, would be adequate, democratic, economical, and bene-
ficial as preparation for peace as well as for war.
Dr. Christen has said enough in his remarks to show why it would
be adequate. It would furnish annually some six or seven hundred
thousand of able-bodied men from all walks and ranks of life to serve
the country. According to the War College estimate, which I have
had the pleasure of reading, some foreign powers could land on our
shores about 700,000 men in something like 45 days, assuming, of
course, that they could secure control of the seas. All our experience
with untrained volunteer forces in our various wars has demonstrated
the fact that they are absolutely inadequate, expensive, and undeserv-
ing of confidence. I am supported in this statement by the high author-
ity of Gen. Upton, who, in his work on Military History of the United
States, shows clearly what our volunteer system has cost. He says
that if we had had 20,000 veteran regular troops at the battle of
Bull Run the Confederacy would have been crushed at the very out-
set and four years of war saved to us. But I will refer the committee
to his work. It seems to me one of the most valuable, one of the
most thoughtful, and one of the most timely works to read at this
period of our existence. -
The second element to consider in relation to this Swiss system—
which I strongly urge on the committee—is the expense. Of course,
we will always need a Regular Army of considerable size, but we
must have as a reserve, available to be called into service in the time
of any emergency, an immense citizen reserve, and the great diffi-
culty is to determine some method of securing such a reserve at
reasonable expense. Under the Swiss system it costs about $2 per
capita for 300,000 men. -
The CHAIRMAN. You mean per year?
Mr. HUNT. Per year. If we could equal that record, our expense
would be comparatively slight in view of the immense value of such
insurance this system would afford. -
Furthermore, this system is democratic. The unfairness of the
volunteer system must be obvious to any man. Why should I
expect another man to volunteer and risk his life and expose his
family to want, while I remain at home and amass perhaps a for-
tune, leaving my children well off, while his children perhaps are
&
560 PREPAREDNIESS FOR, NATIONAL DEFENSE.
reduced to poverty? Pensions or any bounties of that kind from
the Government are inadequate from the standpoint of comparison
between the two situations. It strikes me that every man who is
an American citizen, every man who has the right to vote and to
control or affect the policies of his Government, should bear his
part of its responsibilities; he should be willing, and he should be
trained to meet whatever may offer. A part of what is sure to offer
is the aggression of some foreign power. The volunteer system is
really most unfair. It takes the most patriotic, the most intelligent
classes in the community, the most unselfish, the most enthusiastic,
the very blood we ought to try to retain in being, and sends them
forth, while the indifferent, the careless and the ignorant remain at
home to reduce the efficiency of succeeding generations.
The French author, Taine, in his History of Contemporary France,
says that universal service is the brother of universal suffrage, and
it would seem that the power and the duty ought to be concurrent.
The mingling of all classes in a citizen army based on universal service
is democratic. It would instruct the well to do in the advantages
of democratic association, and it would instruct the laboring and
mechanical classes in the value of education, and in the universal
brotherhood of mankind.
The equal opportunity of advancement which the Swiss system
offers ought to overcome any objection to such a system on the part
of labor. Mr. Gompers says in a published speech that he is not
opposed to a system of universal service, provided, of course, that it be
democratic, and that equal opportunities are offered to all for ad-
vancement in such a system. This the Swiss system does.
But with regard to universal service as preparation for peace
war by fleets and armies is not the only form of conflict for which
these United States of America should prepare and for which prepara-
tion is urgent. Europe may remain weary of slaughter for many
years from the close of the present war. European Governments
may be then occupied with domestic revolution. The mailed fist
which seems threatening now may not smite us. The danger of
attack and invasion we may escape, but there are other perils which
Overhang us and these are certain and not speculative, near not
remote. They appear, moreover, scarcely less destructive to our
welfare and prestige than a war in which we should be defeated and
humiliated. The potentialities of European genius when it shall
apply itself again to production and commerce constitute for us a peril
against which we should not delay to prepare. That genius has been
stimulated and exercised by war to an ardent efficiency. The instincts
of Self-preservation, patriotism, desire for glory are the strongest
impelling motives in human nature. These motives have energized
and driven European thought into producing marvels of organization,
production, and distribution. Every science has been ransacked for
available secrets; every art, every agency of civilization scrutinized
for possible improvement. The uscless has been pruned away, waste
stopped, misdirected energies corrected, the ship of state generally
cleared for action. Agriculture, manufactures, social and political
institutions all manifest the red-hot efforts of minds driven to their
utmost powers. The yield of the land has been increased, substitutes
found for expensive foreign raw materials, transportation extended
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 561
and improved, and the entire national force mobilized in every manner
valuable to attain victory.
More important than physical efficiency in practically all the
agencies of civilization which war has produced has been the stimulus
to thought and its application to the problems of life. When the
war ceases this thought will apply itself to the problems of peace and
it is the result of this application that we have to fear. The science
of war nowadays is not a science among other sciences. It includes
every Science, every art, every element of human industry, organiza-
tion, production. In such wars as the present every agency of civili-
zation is rendered more efficient and practically all this efficiency is
available for the ends of peace. Men have learned to know each
other better, to act in large masses, and the force and power of such
actions. Governments have learned how best to mobilize the forces
of the nation and move them for the accomplishment of national
ends. When peace comes governments will know that they can best
replenish the national resources by trade and all the forces of the
nation will be mobilized for that and men taught to maneuver in
heavy masses so as to overwhelm an enemy, will know the necessity
of cooperative action to capture the prizes of peace—trade and
commerce. With governments and population trained and saga-
cious, there will be little time lost in taking measures to recapture
trade from us and little difficulty in underselling us in the market of
the world and in our home market. The result will be an immense
reduction in our prosperity unless we take measures for a form of
preparedness which will prevent this.
The theory that the great belligerents will be too much prostrated
by exhaustion to seriously compete with us is not supported by the
evidence of history. The wealth of England grew with great rapidity
in the decades following the Napoleonic wars which lasted 23 years
and cost her billions. The devastation of 1870–71 which covered
almost every part of France, the expenditure of a billion in the
war and a billion in indemnity to Germany did not prostrate
French recuperative powers. From 1871 to 1881 France carried
through improvements costing billions more and amassed wealth with
astonishing rapidity. Our own experience after the Civil War is
similar. That war lasted four years and left one-half of the country
in a ruined condition. Billions of dollars were added to our debt and
2,500,000 citizens were removed from productive industry during
most of four years. Yet we built in the years succeeding that mighty
sº 125,000 miles of railroads, and wealth increased by leaps and
OUll] ClS.
It is true that the present war has been more destructive of human
life, property, and wealth than every previous struggle. On the other
hand human industry is more efficiently organized for production
now than at any time in history, the application of thought to the
science of production and distribution is keener and the world's stock
of ideas capable of application to the production of wealth greater
than ever before. Furthermore, the health and general welfare of
the individual has never been so well cared for. The result of it will
be to offset the greater devastation and loss of the present war and
make our future experience consistent with the past.
The effect of all this is that we must prepare not only for war
but for peace; that we have to fear not §§ the mailed fist but the
562 PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
efficient foreign hand; that we must prepare not only for self-defense
but for vigorous life among nations. We must not only prove our
right to exist as a nation by ability to defend ourselves against
foreign force but we must justify our democratic and individualistic
civilization by equipping ourselves to compete with the world in the
markets of the º It is only by improving our efficiency that
we can retain the prosperity we now enjoy, not by our own deserts
so much as by the misfortunes of others. It is not by such cow-
ardly methods as raising the tariff that we can save to ourselves the
foreign trade we now enjoy and which is the source of our great
prosperity. War has taught the lesson that that nation which retires
to and depends upon fortresses will suffer defeat; well-trained troops
in the field free to maneuver and take intelligent advantage of the
terra1n are the only safeguard. The nation which erects tariff walls
and cowers behind them will be forced to abandon trade and com-
merce, the prizes of peace, and will inevitably suffer the penalty of
relying upon artificial support. The rotting influences of isolation
from the commerce of the world, from competition among nations,
will weaken our national character, reduce our efficiency, and ruin
our prosperity, and we will tend to sink to an industrial condition
worse than anything we have emerged from in the past.
I want to quote a little testimony from well-known authors on the
subject of the military system as affecting industrial life and industrial
efficiency. In the first place, Carl Helferich, once director of the
Deutsche Bank, and now holding a position in Germany correspond-
ing to that of the chancellor of the exchecquer, after discussing the
influences of their schools on German industry, in his work on Ger-
many's Economic Progress and Natural Wealth, at page 36 says:
Not the Schoolmaster alone, but also the noncommissioned officer—for the training
of the School alone is not enough discipline—is just as necessary in every large organ-
ization. Whoever has had an opportunity to observe the various races at their eco-
nomic labor can not escape the impression that military service, to which the vast
majority of German workmen are subject, has a great influence upon cooperative
work in large economic groups by accustoming men to order, punctuality, and dis-
cipline.
To the same effect writes Hugo Schweitzer, a well-known German
ublicist of New York, to whose article in the Popular Science
W. for 1914, page 581, I call the committee's attention.
German militarism is the application of arts and Sciences as well as the more perfect
organization and administration to the defense of the hearth. -
Compulsory service has made the defense of home and family everybody’s business
and not the affair of a few hired men. .
The army has been pronounced by an American author the greatest democratic
university of the world. Here men of all types of education, the university man and
the artist, mix with the laborer and farmer. They learn order and discipline. They
are taught punctuality, exactness, cleanliness, obedience. The lessons learned are
not forgotten by the soldier after his return to civil life. Order, discipline, and the
necessity of physical exercise become indelibly impressed upon his mind.
Dr. Caro, one of the greatest chemists of all times, in his descrip-
tion of the German coal-tar industry, ascribes German superiority
to the character of the workingmen who had served in the army.
Compensation of all kinds in the way of insurance—accident, old-
age, sick, and death insurance—are the direct outgrowth of the mili-
tary system.
English, American, and German observers themselves have come
to the same conclusion, that a very large part of German efficiency,
PREPAREDINESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 563
which we must admire, has come from the installation of the military
SVSten).
To the same effect are Dawson in his work on Evolution of Modern
Germany, and Henry C. Emery, who was a member of the Tariff
Commission appointed by President Taft, in Some Economic Aspects
of War, in which work, at pages 20 and 21, he says:
The efficiency of factory labor in Germany has been greatly increased through the
military education, and the young men who have been through this military training
become much more efficient in later years than they would have been had they not
been obliged to take this training. .
The greatest effect of this war in its danger to us will be the increased
power of European thought. The struggle is intense. Every indi-
vidual, every philosopher, every scientist, every artisan, is urged on
by the most tremendous rewards, the desire for promotion, to devote
himself to his country. Each German, Frenchman, and Englishman
is attempting to discover something that will add to the chance of
victory. The result will be a power of concentration, a power of
applying thought and science which will immensely improve the
quality of foreign output. After the war the taxes will be heavy.
They will be compelled to replenish their resources through trade, and
they will be intense competitors of ours. We must put our house in
order to meet such competition. How can we best do that % It
seems to me, Mr. Chairman and Senators, that we can best do that by
introducing the system which has, according to the testimony, and
which testimony appears consistent with reason, produced that effect
in large part, to wit, universal military service.
The CHAIRMAN. Those who oppose preparedness express the very
great fear that anything like universal service would tend to create a
military spirit here that would induce our people to provoke war with
some other nation. What do you think about that aspect of the
question?
Mr. HUNT. That strikes me, with all deference to these le rned
persons, as simply absurd. My view, as must be every man's view
who has had any service, who knows anything about the dangers,
the efforts and expense to the individual of war, is that that
danger is remote. In addition to the effect on the individual
soldier available for war purposes, there is the effect on the demo-
cratic institutions of this country, on the law-making body, which
alone has power to declare war. No Member of Congress is going to
lunge the country into an aggressive and unnecessary war when he
nows that his constituency practically to a man will be injured and
will have to make terrific scarifices in such a conflict. He will be
extremely cautious before he embroils us in anything of that sort.
The CHAIRMAN. That feeling has gone so far since this war broke
out in Europe that some school-teachers in some sections of this
country will not even allow the children to march in or out of school
for fear it will cultivate a military spirit.
Mr. HUNT. There is a great deal of namby-pambyism in this
country unfortunately. How to get it out of the heads of some of
these people is a puzzle, worthy of engaging the attention of some
ºtſu men, and I want to do what I can to accomplish that
result. -
The CHAIRMAN. Your service with the National Guard did not
tend to create that spirit at all, did it
564 PRE PARED NESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
Mr. HUNT. Certainly not. The service with the National Guard
was a delightful service. Whether or not it was very valuable
for military purposes is doubtful. It is more valuable than
none. It produced a democratic feeling and social advantages.
One meets men of all kinds and learns to know them better.
You learn to act in large masses. You learn order and punctuality.
You are speeded up. I found myself doing things much more
quickly than I ever could before. I found routine matters, such as
we have to go through every day, which formerly would take 25 or
30 minutes, I could do after this training in four or five minutes,
thereby saving an enormous amount of time. The advantages in
every respect, it seems to me, are great. I want to see those
advantages carried to everyone.
As a politician and student of municipal affairs, I feel confident
that universal service will serve to improve the quality of our Govern-
ment, by improving the quality of the individual citizen. He would not
be content to live in slums, in filthy or Sordid or degrading surround-
ings. After returning from his service he would insist upon cleanliness,
order, and economy. The deficiencies of our local governments,
municipal and others, would be in large part corrected. This educa-
tion of the individual in healthy outdoor living would improve
the health of the people. There would be a reduction in tuberculosis,
which is due in i. part to bad housing and lack of ventilation.
We would thus become a far more efficient nation.
In addition to that, I should like to call the committee's attention
to the greater pleasure that such service offers in life. A large pro-
portion of our fellow countrymen really are unable to enjoy them-
selves very much. I have had enough experience in political life,
going to various entertainments, Sunday picnics, and those things,
ofaſciasses of citizens, to know that it is not everyone, by any maens,
who knows how to enjoy himself. The tendency is to sit around in
rather a dreary fashion, and to look bored. That is not so in the
foreign countries where they have military service. The men learn
to know each other. They learn something about music, something
about social arts, and they form clubs of various kinds. All the pleas-
ures of life are enhanced by such service.
For these reasons, Mr. Chairman, I would urge the committee,
although I know it is considered by a great many to be out of line
with our traditions, to make a report which would advocate universal
service for the people of this United States.
Our history has shown the tremendous expense and inefficiency
of the volunteer system, as well as its unfairness. I could quote a
great many American statesmen and leaders on this subject, but I
will refrain. Those matters are no doubt well known to the com-
mittee. Speaking for a very considerable part of the population
with whom I have conversed, I feel confident that the idea of uni-
versal military service would not be opposed by any considerable
number of thoughtful men. It strikes me that it is the duty of the
statesman to adopt adequate measures and not halfway measures.
Why not meet the present danger with something that is desirable,
that is really necessary, and which experience of the past has taught
is really the only system
The CHAIRMAN. We are much obliged to you, Mr. Hunt.
(Thereupon, at 12.30 o'clock p. m., the committee took a recess
until 2 o'clock p. m.)
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 565
AFTER RECESS.
The committee met, at the expiration of the recess, at 2 o'clock
p. m., Senator Geo. E. Chamberlain (chairman) presiding.
STATEMENT OF COL. EDWIN F. GLENN, UNITED STATES
ARMY, GENERAL STAFF, CHIEF OF STAFF, DEPARTMENT
OF THE EAST, AND FIRST DIVISION.
The CHAIRMAN. Colonel, this committee has had under considera-
tion the several bills for the reorganization of the Army and for other
purposes connected with this reorganization, for the creation of a
reserve, and for a national guard, and I presume that you have seen
all of these measures
Col. GLENN. I have seen all, and have had occasion to comment,
under instructions, on the reorganization bill that was presented b
you, as a committee bill, and on the bill presented by Mr. Hay, º
understand, as a committee bill, but have not been called on to com-
ment on any of the others.
The CHAIRMAN. Col. Glenn, we would like to have a discussion from
you of this whole subject, as you may see fit to discuss it, taking your
own method of doing so.
Col. GLENN. I would like, with your permission, to make a rather
short statement, which involves particularly the question of the
strength of the Army we must have in this country. -
STRENGTH OF ARMY REQUIRED.
As I understand the figures of the General Staff they call for a
trained and organized army, immediately available, of 500,000 sol-
diers. This force must be composed of regulars and trained reservists
of the regular Army. In addition they recommend 500,000 men par-
tially trained and organized. These combined figures of 1,000,000 men
they claim to be the irreducible minimum required to meet the con-
ditions of national defense in this country. I am forced to disagree
with their conclusions after a careful study of the subject, because I
believe their estimate is entirely inadaquate, as will readily appear
to anyone who makes a careful study of our situation from the
viewpoint of the man—the commander—who is charged with the
duty of preventing an invasion. It is only by assuming oneself in
the position of a commander, and as such responsible for the actual
defense of our country, that one can form a just and adequate con-
clusion as to requirements.
The first thing that a man in such position will consider is how
many soldiers of all arms, with their equipment, animals, vehicles,
etc., each foreign nation or aggregation of nations can transport to
our shores. This information is based upon a simple arithmetical
calculation of the published tonnage of the registered vessels of such
nations or aggregation of nations.
This calculation has been made and we know that in a single ex-
edition more than one European nation can readily transport across
the Atlantic Ocean as many as 400,000 men. We know that the
convoyed transports, with these troops on board, will probably follow
their fleet at a distance not to exceed 500 miles. e know that
566 PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
certain nations can gain sea control, certainly within two months
and probably within one month, after war begins. We know the
vulnerable points on both the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. On the
former coast this area lies between Portland, Me., and the mouth of
the Chesapeake Bay. We know that within this area all of the
principal harbors have suitable armament emplaced therein for pro-
tection not only of the cities located in such harbors, but furnish
a safe rendezvous for the remnants of the defeated fleet. We know
that in addition to these protected harbors there are in this vital
area at least 116 places excluding beaches and fortified harbors,
where an enemy can readily disembark a large expedition. If we
limit ourselves, therefore, to one nation operating on the Atlantic
coast, but who can send as its first expedition 400,000 men as above
stated, then we can assume that this expedition will be prepared to
land within six weeks or less after war begins, and we are prepared
to estimate the forces necessary to meet them and prevent such dis-
embarkation and subsequent invasion. With such an expedition the
commander can readily divide it up into four or even eight separate
armies, which can naturally be landed at four or eight separate places
of his own choosing, none of which, in all probability, will be known
to the officer in command of the troops charged with preventing this
invasion; this because the enemy commander will naturally use
every artifice known to war to prevent such information reaching the
defender in time to enable him to make his dispositions. The result
of this condition will be to require a large dispersion of the defendin
troops, with reserves centrally located to reinforce when the actua
point of landing is known. It requires no expert knowledge to
realize that at least one and probably several of these separate ex-
peditions will effect a landing, that immediately thereafter they will
secure one of our important seacoast cities as a base which can be
readily and safely used for subsequent expeditions from the home
country, fully as large as the first, if not larger; in short, it is safe to
assume that within two months after control of the sea is obtained
at least 1,500,000 of trained soldiers can be landed at the selected
point or points by the enemy. -
In my opinion, 500,000 trained regulars (assuming that we had
them) could not possibly prevent the landings as outlined above,
nor could they prevent the taking of one or more of our principal
harbor cities. In this connection it is but fair to state that the un-
trained or partially trained half million men called for can not be or—
ganized, armed, equipped, and mobilized short of three months, which
is the date set for the actual landing of 1,500,000 of the enemy. In
my opinion (and I have given this matter careful consideration),
the figures presented to you by the General Staff should be trebled,
which will give us 1,000,000 trained men and 2,000,000 partially
trained.
... In so far as our present condition is concerned it makes no great
difference whether we accept the General Staff figures or those given
by me, since the problem is an exceedingly difficult one to solve
under our system. We are informed by the adjutant general that
it is not possible, under our voluntary system, to enlist and maintain
a mobile Regular Army of more than 140,000 men, and in my opinion
it will not be possible to secure reserves with this strength of Army
sufficient to create a force of 500,000 trained men. We certainly
PREPAREDINESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 567
should not attempt to maintain a standing Army of 500,000 Regulars
with the colors. As a matter of fact, we could not afford to do this
even if we could enlist them under a voluntary system, since the
competition for labor in civil life precludes our ability to secure the
necessary men, except at figures that are prohibitive. The only other
source we have for securing these needed troops is from the militia
or National Guard, now consisting of about 120,000 men. They, too,
are recruited under our voluntary system of enlistment and we know
that this National Guard has been struggling for years, and are still
struggling, to secure Federal pay for their members, in the hope that
they can keep their companies recruited up to the present authorized
strength of 65 men or less to the company.
There is a proposal now that you legislate for what is known as a
continental army, which is to be, of course, under Federal control.
There is a proposal now that you legislate for what is known as a
continental army, which is to be, of course, under Federal control.
I invite your attention to the following comments on this subject:
I do not believe it is practicable to organize and maintain this
continental army, for the following reasons: -
First. Although we may be able to enlist the number of men re-
quired at this time, due to the special conditions incident to the
European war, it will not be possible under normal conditions to main-
tain them at the desired strength by voluntary enlistments. -
Second. This continental army will not secure for training the
class of young men or boys who have in the past and will in the future
do Our fighting, although, as a matter of fact, only those undergoing
instruction in our schools and colleges will be able to comply with the
requirements of the bills proposing this army. &
Business men, with rare exceptions, and all laboring men, on account
of the prescribed periods of training will be barred from joining this
8.TIY) V. -
#ia. Since the militia is a force recognized by the Constitution,
and can not for this reason be wiped out, certainly as a State force,
the Organization of this continental army will result in providing two
citizen forces to operate in the same terrain and for the same purposes.
The natural result of this will be to establish competition between
these two forces, the efforts of both being directed toward securing
appropriations for support, etc.
It is believed the ultimate result will be the establishment of two
opposing political forces and will certainly prevent the adoption of
any sensible or sane military policy in this country.
This continental army is also subject to the following serious or
basic objections: - -
First. It is undemocratic in that it does not place the burdens of
protecting the country equally on all classes.
Second. Since the militia has already provided in many States,
armories, maneuver sites, target ranges, and are provided with arms
and equipment at Federal expense, all of which must be provided for
the continental army, it follows that this army will start and remain
at a decided disadvantage in securing efficiency from the military
standpoint. . .
Unless this continental army is so equipped we will have to
depend upon established Army posts for places of rendezvous or
concenfration for instruction. This will necessarily involve a very
568 . PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
great expense in travel to and from these posts for instruction
purposes. .
The continental army will certainly be inferior, in one respect, to
the militia in that after two months’ training prescribed in these bills
it will disintegrate so that we will have no Army in being. - -
The militia is, in theory at least, constantly ready for service and
is working under the supervision of its officers. .
Third. Under the proposed system of training for the continental
army it will be exceedingly difficult to give advanco d instruction
since an annual influx of one-third of its strength is contemplated.
This means that the first increment after receiving 2 months’
instruction has 10 months without instruction, you then add an incre-
ment of the same size which makes the entire force a recruit organiza-
tion and limits your instruction practically to the rudiments of a
soldier's duty. This can not possibly produce first-line or even
Second-line troops. * * -
Fourth. Whether men of high intelligence and education can be
developed into dependable soldiers within the time allotted is cer-
tainly open to serious doubt. It is not believed possible to develop
any other class into dependable soldiers in the time prescribed for the
training of the continental army. - -
Fifth. Granting that with perfected plans and carefully selected
Army officers as instructors men of high intelligence, education, and
great earnestness of purpose may be advanced in the military art
quite rapidly, we find no provision for such number of officers nor
can we hope to obtain this class of enlisted men for this continental
army as a whole. * -
Sixth. For success this training of the continental army must be
placed in the hands of our best officers and enlisted men. This results
in depriving the Regular Army of its best material during the period
when it is receiving its necessary training to make it an efficient and
dependable force. The result of this will be to reduce the efficiency
of the Regular Army (our only dependable force). -
Seventh. If all the able-bodied youth of our country were trained
for three or more years during their high-school or college course we
might, by inducing them to join the continental army for two months
each summer, secure a dependable force. Without this assured
previous military instruction and without the assurance that they
will take, in addition, at least six months' intensive training, neither
of which can be counted as certain, the continental army is bound
to prove a failure. . . .
From the foregoing it must be clear that it is impossible under a
voluntary system of enlistment to secure the number of men re-
quired even for the estimate of the General Staff, which is, as stated,
considered an irreducible minimum.
In a word, whether you accept the General Staff's figures of 1,000,000
or the figures I have given of 3,000,000 men, which are deemed neces-
sary to protect our vulnerable Atlantic and Pacific shores, it must be
recognized at the outset that you can not, under any system thus far
proposed, secure this number of men; and you can not afford to pay for
them, granting that you could enlist them under this voluntary sys-
tem.”ft results, therefore, that to maintain with certainty the integrity
of our country, with its democratic institutions, we must abandon this
voluntary system (and the sooner the better) and adopt in its stead
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 569
Some universal compulsory system of military training, through
which we can secure the necessary trained men to meet the con-
ditions that confront us. The Swiss have introduced a system
that has proved efficient and satisfactory for many years. It
avoids all of the objections of so-called “militarism,” and is from
every viewpoint economical. The Australians have likewise adopted
a system of universal compulsory training, which has been in opera-
tion for four years, and which according to the best evidence that
we can obtain from the European war proved decidedly efficient.
Personally, I believe that the latter system, having been worked out
by the Anglo-Saxon race, will come nearer fitting in with our institu-
tions than the Swiss system. After careful comparison of this Aus-
tralian system with the bill introduced by the chairman of your com-
mittee, it seems to me that this bill comes nearer filling our wants
than anything that has come to my notice. I have prepared some
separate comments upon this bill. Unfortunately it will require
some time for any such system as this to produce adequate results,
at least five or six years, and in the meantime we must make such
provision as is possible and practicable for national defense. . . To this
end I think we should increase the Army to the extent that is practi.
cable under our system, but above all our Army should be organized
on correct principles. We should cease to recognize only companies,
battalions, and regiments, and commence to think only in the higher
units of brigades, divisions, and Army corps, and provision should be
made now that these will be organized to perform team work. This
implies that not only the enlisted personnel, but the necessary com-
missioned personnel as recognized by all well-organized armies shall
be provided. In addition to this we should provide all the necessary
transportation and reserve supplies of all kinds. This includes not
only arms, ammunition, Field Artillery equipment, and its ammuni-
tion, but clothing and everything that goes to make up a complete
army, including the sanitary troops. - º
In view of the fact that the militia is recognized as a constitutional
body, but possesses certain inherent defects that preclude its being
a dependable force for national purposes, it is believed that it shoul
be Federalized as far as it is possible to accomplish this end. It
should be encouraged, in every possible way after it has become
federalized, so as to convert it into a dependable force under the
control of the Federal Government. - -
The most important need of our country, in my opinion, is reserve
officers and noncommissioned officers. Of commissioned officers
we now have about 5,000 in the regular establishment and about
8,000 partially trained officers in the National Guard. We should
have not less than 50,000 reserve officers immediately available, and
as an illustration of this need, I invite your attention to the fact that
the Russian Army in one campaign of about 10 days lost between
nineteen and twenty thousand of its officers. The English lost the
great majority of the officers they sent over in their first expedition
into France, which included practically all of their trained commis-
sioned personnel, and are now struggling with the problem of training
several million of men with untrained officers and noncommissioned
officers. No system that we have yet evolved will produce the
number of commissioned and noncommissioned officers that we will
need, but it is believed that this result can be accomplished at rela-
57() PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
tively small expense through enlargement of West Point, the utiliza-
tion of the Regular Army in the proper way, and especially in the
encouragement and regulation of the military Schools, land grant
colleges and universities throughout the country. ... Without these
reserve officers and noncommissioned officers it will be impossible
to train within any reasonable time an effective Army of any sort.
This is illustrated in England to-day, where the necessity for troops
in France particularly is exceedingly pressing, where the training is
most intensive and yet they have not used any of these raw levies
in France until they have had at least 10 months of this intensive
training. -
May I digress for just a moment to call your attention to the fact
that England has just about completed legislation—I understand
from this morning's papers it is all complete, except the signature
of the Crown—for compulsory military service; the “draft,” in other
words, which is compulsory service.
I would like to introduce here a graphic illustration which is in the
Iondon Times recruiting supplement, dated November 3, 1915, show-
ing how this recruiting hasºaried from month to month. I do not
think it requires any special comment further than to call your
attention to it.
The CHAIRMAN. That is an English publication?
Col. GLENN. Yes, sir; it is in the Times supplement. The figures
on the left show what each square represents.
The duties of noncommissioned officers can be learned in a much
less period of time than those of officers. The function of the non-
commissioned officers is equally as important as that of the com-
missioned officers, and i. to properly instruct this class of
enlisted man will certainly result in as great disaster as the failure to
secure properly instructed commissioned officers. No system yet
devised or proposed lays proper stress upon the necessity for training
noncommissioned officers. These noncommissioned officers can be
trained in the same general manner and by the same methods as are
proposed for the training of commissioned officers, and this should
receive careful and earnest consideration.
We frequently say that the noncommissioned officer is the back-
bone of the Army, and I have never heard an officer controvert that
Statement. * \
In concluding this subject of the strength of the Army necessary,
I wish to call attention to the fact that the defense of our country
from the military standpoint is naturally divided into two essential
elements: First, the Navy, with its special functions; second, the
Army, with its special functions. The functions of these two bodies
must be thoroughly understood, they must be considered together,
and their generaſ relations for securing team work must be thoroughly
comprehended before we can determine the strength of either or of
any of their parts.
In general terms it may be said that the Navy constitutes our first
line of defense, and its primary function is to meet and destroy the
enemy fleet. This function is paramount to any other duty, which
must be regarded as subsidiary. In order to permit the Navy to
perform its essential functions the Army provides what is known as
harbor defenses. These harbor defenses consist of fixed armaments
manned by our Coast Artillery troops and these armaments are placed
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
57.1

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572 PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
in important harbors in which are located our principal cities. By
placing this almament in these harbors, we not only provide a safe
harbor of refuge for the Navy in case of defeat, but we also protect
the cities located therein against a Sea attack by the enemy navy.
These are the two essential functions of what is known as the Coast
Artillery or harbor defenses.
In this connection I wish to state that a navy, however powerful,
is not in itself a guaranty of victory in war. We are in the same
strategic position in relation to other nations of the world as is Eng-
land in that respect. A powerful navy must be supported by a power-
ful army in order to win a war. In illustration of this I call your
attention to the fact that the German Navy, to-day the second most
powerful navy in the world, owes its safety during the past 18 months
to the existence of the powerful German Army that protects it in
Northern France and Belgium.
In this connection it must be borne in mind that our harbor
defenses, while absolutely essential for the functions they are insti-
tuted to perform, are absolutely defenseless from land attack. Pro-
tection from land attack, including Small raiding parties from an
enemy fleet landed out of reach of the guns, must be furnished by the
other clements of the Army, known as the mobile army. In fact, the
only protection for a country against invasion after its navy has been
defeated is its mobile army, whose function is, as stated, not only to
protect the harbor defense armament from raids, but it must meet
the enemy at his landing places and drive him into the Sea.
In our legislation in this country we have never considered these
two elements—that is the Navy and the Army, with its subdivided
elements—together. For securing national defense this is absolutely
essential, and our failure to do so in the past has resulted in some
serious mistakes.
This fact was brought home to me very clearly in my recent visit
to Panama on a tour of inspection of the military forces there, and
incidentally of its defenses. I found there for the first time all of the
troops of the Army—that is, the mobile army and the Coast Artillery—
and the Navy jointly studying these terrains and the defenses. I
conversed with every field officer of the Army on the zone on this
subject, together with the Navy representative there. I visited all
of the defenses, including the trenches that have been proposed,
some of which have been constructed, and I also visited some of the
islands in the Pacific entrance, and I found that, by the combination
of all these elements in their study, more safe, Sane, and reliable
recommendations will be made than any which, in my opinion,
have preceded them.
The CHAIRMAN. These studies are being made jointly by the
Army and Navy for such defenses that have been established 7
Col. GLENN. Yes, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. Established under what jurisdiction ?
Col. GLENN. Under the jurisdiction of the Army.
The CHAIRMAN. They are revising the work on paper at least 3
Col. GLENN. They are preparing to make recommendations on
that subject, and as I stated, all of the Army that is down there now
is engaged on this work, making the necessary recognizances. They
have a naval officer assigned to them to study with them.
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 578
. Not being a Navy expert I do not attempt to say what the strength
of a navy 㺠be. I should not hesitate to assert, however, that
our country should establish some policy, which once established by
our statesmen, it then becomes the function of our Navy and military
experts, working together, to advise the legislative branches of our
Government what the strength of each should be, and these experts
should reach their determination not be considering either alone, but
the functions and relations of both. •.
In regard to the amount of the armament and strength of the per-
sonnel that we should provide for our harbors, will say that for
efficiency the following general rule should be observed: First, as to
armament—in all of our important harbors we should emplace guns
of sufficient caliber and with sufficient initial velocity, and have
them so mounted as to secure the maximum range, and thereby pre-
vent bombardment by an enemy fleet of the harbor, which they
rotect. -
p Second, there should be provided for this armament ample ammu-
nition for certainly securing this end. In addition to this every im-
portant harbor should be provided with the necessary mine defenses.
As for the personnel, for the mine defenses, we should have the full
quota of men to plant and operate the mines at all times. In Our
foreign possessions, due to the fact that they can not be readily rein-
forced, every gun battery and fire command should have a complete
personnel of one manning detail. In the United States we should
follow the present policy of having half of one complete manning
detail for these batteries, the other half to be supplied by the militia,
In our past legislation, as indicated above, in emplacing armaments
and providing other harbor defenses, we have never provided for the
back-door protection of this armament. By this I mean protection
against Small raiding parties landed from an enemy fleet. Such
raiding parties to-day are considered Small when they have as
many as 10,000 men, and I may add in this connection that they
contemplate sending with such raiding parties guns as high as
6-inch caliber with an effective range of not less than 15,000 yards,
This protection can only be furnished by the mobile army, which
must be provided in sufficient numbers for this purpose, otherwise
these harbor defenses are precluded from performing their proper
functions; that is, the protection of the cities which they guard, and
the Navy which may have taken refuge in the harbor where they are
located. In a word, without the mobile army protection this arma-
ment becomes a menace to the cities and to the Navy seeking refuge
there. It is hoped, of course, that before these forts containing the
harbor defense armament are captured, the personnel will blow up
their guns. It is not believed to be good policy to establish very
expensive armaments with the practical certainty that it will have to
be blown up to prevent its falling into the hands of the enemy because
we fail an º to provide the well recognized necessary mobile
defense. -
The CHAIRMAN. Then, according to that requirement, the larger
details will have to be made from the mobile army'.
Col. GLENN. Unquestionably so, sir. May I add that we have now
in this country about 32,000 mobile army, and if we take this entire
force, every available Regular we have got in this country, we would
not have enough troops to supply what we call the Coast Artillery
574 | PREPAREDNESS FOR, NATIONAL DEFENSE.
support; that is, those relatively small detachments that have to be
placed with the armament to protect against these raids. .
The CHAIRMAN. In the last analysis, then, it would seem from that
statement that the harbor defenses are rather a source of weakness
than otherwise, in case of an enemy landing here 7
Col. GLENN. They are certainly a source of weakness unless you
take the necessary steps to keep their guns from falling into an
enemy's hands. If protected from a sudden raid the batteries might
be destroyed before they could be captured by siege operations.
But if left open to sudden capture the enemy would have a ready-
made fortified base on our shores—he would use our own guns against
us when it came to an attempt to recover the city and jarbor in
other words, the proposition is this: If you protect these cities, and
I think politically you would be forced to do it, then you must con-
sider the proposition of furnishing protection from the rear. Failing
this, you would not only fail to permit this artillery to perform its
legitimate functions of protecting the cities in rear of them from
bombardment by a fleet, but you fail to furnish a harbor of refuge
for our Navy when it is dispersed; that is the proposition.
In this connection I desire to call attention to the fact that there
has been much discussion in this country about the establishment of
certain naval bases in various places, and I wish to call attention to
the fact that before any such bases are established our legislative
body should be thoroughly well convinced from both Army and
Navy sources that the money expended is going to produce adequate
results. By this I mean that naval bases should not be established
until it is absolutely certain that the necessary fixed or movable
heavy armament, together with the necessary protection of the
mobile army, is provided for rendering harbors absolutely safe at
all times. I refer to this matter particularly to emphasize the fact
that in all future legislation we should establish some board or
counsel that will consider all of the elements necessary for national
defense; and by this I mean the political, military, and naval aspects.
If there was no other reason for this than the perfectly apparent
necessity for knowing all the facts about a situation of that sort, I
wish to call your attention to a fact which is well known, that no large
legislative body can hope to go into all the details that are necessary
to make up the national defense of a country; it is not possible; and
the only safe, sane and reasonable way, in my opinion, to go about
that, is to get the necessary experts and have them establish a policy
and be prepared to carry it out.
The CHAIRMAN. I do not know whether you have ever examined it
or not, but I introduced a bill at the last session of Congress, and again
at this session of Congress, providing for a system of national defense.
Have you ever read it 3 *
Col. GLENN. Yos, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. Has it any force in connection with the suggestions
you make -
Col. GLENN. It has absolute force, sir. . I am not prepared to
state from recollection all the details of it and whether it is exactly
what we want. 4.
The CHAIRMAN. It coordinates the different arms, the Navy and
the Army and all of them?
PREPAIRED NIESS FOR, NATIONAL DEFENSE. 575
Col. GLENN. Yes; all should be present and consulted. To illus-
trate, let us assume that we are considering the question as to
whether a certain harbor should be defended and how, If I as a
..mobile army man were considering the question with a coast
artilleryman we would probably agree on º: necessities for this
harbor defense, and yet both of us would, quite likely, make some
fatal errors in our conclusions and recommendations unless we had
º: a naval expert to tell us the naval viewpoint, i. e., what the
Navy could do and why.
The CHAIRMAN. Not only would the Army and the Navy be con-
sidered in this, but ought not the State Department as well?
Col. GLENN. I think so.
The CHAIRMAN. And the executive departments?
Col. GLENN. I should say so, sir. -
Senator WARREN. Mr. Chairman, knowing that the colonel speaks
as others do of the reorganization of the Army, I take it that refers
more to the larger units. You do not refer to the ultimate formation
of it into brigades and divisions and corps ?
Col. GLENN. Yes, sir. -
Senator WARREN. But you are not attacking the general line of
commencing at the bottom and building up the companies?
Col. GLENN. No, sir; I did not have that in mind; but there is
another important thing that I want to call attention to before I quit.
That is the question of short-period training. I have been informed
that certain evidence has been given before your committee going to
show that reliable and trustworthy soldiers can be created in six
months.
Senator WEEKS. You suggested the possibility of a foreign nation
sending an army of 400,000 men ashore. How much tonnage would
it require to send 400,000 men and all the equipments—that is, food,
etc.—that would be necessary for such an expedition ?
Col. GLENN. They would not figure very largely on food, Senator,
especially if they were coming to this country; so that I think you
can eliminate that.
Senator WEEKs. You have got to have food
Col. GLENN. I can only give you that approximately, sir. The
English, when they went to the Dardanelles, found that their trans-
ports were not loaded to carry out the desires or the plans of the
commanding general. So they sent this expedition to Alexandria,
where they were disembarked and reloaded. I think they had
126,000 men on that expedition, whom they reembarked, and for
whom they used 98 ships, I think it was.
Senator DU Pont. Colonel, could I interrupt you here to ask you
to state the distances? What is the distance from England to
Alexandria, Egypt, as compared to the distance across the Atlanticº
Col. GLENN. I would have, Senator, to look that up. I am very
poor at remembering figures, but I think there is practically no
ifierence.
Senator WEEKS. I want to ask you a little more, in detail about
this expedition. How many horses would you send with 400,000
IOOC] )
Col. GLENN. I could not answer that. As a matter of fact, under
Our Organization now we have about 8,000 animals to a division.
Senator WEEKs. A division is how many men?
576 PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
Col. GLENN. Twenty to twenty-three thousand men.
Senator WEEKs. Then you would have nearly 200,000 horses or
animals with 400,000 men? .
Col. GLENN. I do not think, however, that an army organized to–.
day would attempt to carry So many animals. I think we would go
immediately to motor transportation, sir. .
Senator WEEKs. How many do you think would be carried ? -
Col. GLENN. That, of course, I am unable to more than estimate.
I think we will replace at least half of our animal-drawn transporta-
tion by motor-drawn transportation—probably more.
Senator WEEKs. On an expedition of that kind what would be the
weight of the ammunition which you would naturally carry'
Col. GLENN. I would have to figure that up. *
Senator WEEKs. What I am trying to find out is how much shipping
it is going to require to carry an army of 400,000 men 3,000 miles,
Supposing that they are landed without great opposition, and includ-
ing food, ammunition, arms, and animals, and everything pertaining
to such an expedition. If you have not the figures there, I would like
to have them carefully prepared. - -
‘. . The CHAIRMAN. I think it is all estimated in the War College report.
Col. GLENN. I will prepare them for you. Do you wish it figured on
so much space to each man and each animal? -
Senator WEEKs. Yes. - -
Col. GLENN. Very well, sir. - - - * .
I would like to call your attention to this table of the General Staff.
**

Preparedness of the great powers for over-sea expeditions.
- Fº expedi- sº expe- Timºrded -
g - * e g ion using ition using ,0—
º...sh Ips 50 per cent 75 per cent
of tonnage of tonnage
- given. given. Re-
turn
St. th - . - º i;
e rength . - 2.Il
Nation. of army. - ...] re.
- - . . with º:
3,000 2,000 1,000 Men Ani- Men Ani- | first SOC-
tons. tons. tons. * I mals. mals. expe- .
di- expe-
tion. ii.
tion.
Days Days.
Austria-Hungary..| 4,320,000|... . . . . . . . 762,756|.......... 72,000 14,000 108,000|21,600 20.7 40.4
France------...... 5,000,000|... . . . . . . . 1,705,931|... . . . . . . . 160,931. 32.186] 243,29548,279. 15.8 30.0
Germany. . . . . . . . . 5,000,000 3, 569,962 4,018, 185|... . . . . . . . * 387,000 81,270 4 440,000|94,600 15.8 30.8
Great låritain. . . . . | 695,000||13,000,000|... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 170,000 90,000|... . . . . . . . . . . . . 14.0| 27.0
Italy.------------. 2, 600,000|.......... 1,065, 321|... . . . . . . . 91,000 13,650 136,000|20, 475|| 18.3| 35.0
Japan------------. 2,212,000l..........]. . . . . . . . . . * 1,013,985| 95,745 24,416. 142, (2236,623 22.5 41.0
Russia............ 5,000,000|.......... 428,019.......... 37,630 7,940. 66,444|11,918, 20.5 40.0
. 1 240,500 territorials. . - -
* Japanese field regulations indicate the intention to use steamers of 1,000 tons; for this reason and be-
cause of the large amount of steamers between 10 and 12 knots speed, all Japanese steamers over 10 knots
Speed and a thousand tons gross have peen considered.
* Fiſty per cent has been assumed as the figure representing the amount of shipping in or within call of
home ports at outbreak of war... . . - - &
4 Using no ships less than 3,000 tons.
NOTE.-The allowance prescribed in our Field Service Regulations of 3 tons per man and 8 tons per animal
for ships over 5,000 tons and 4 tons per man and 10 tons per animal for vessels under 5,000 tons has been
used in estimating the capacity of ships, except where the regulations of any country prescribe a different
allowance. These allowances include rations, water, forage, etc., for the voyage and a margin for three
months' reserve supplies. The tonnage allowance covers með, animals, and all accessories and is sufficient
to provide for vehicles (including guns).
fighting power is the result of organization, training, and equipment backed by the resources of the
Country. Available shipping is a matter of commercial statistics.
PREPAREDINESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 57.7
* Senator? THOMAS. Does that include the equipment and ammuni-
tion for your artillery and your small guns? " ... •
* Col. GLENN. Includes everything; yes, sir. • *
Senator THOMAS. Does it include your general equipment, your
hospital stores, your airships, etc.? - -
Col. GLENN. Yes, sir. We do not figure that the German Army
or the English Army, even, coming over-here, would carry as much
tonnage as we do, because they would quarter their men around in
the various towns—I can not think of just the word I want to use at
this moment.
. The CHAIRMAN. Billet them :
Senator THOMAs. Assuming that the landing was difficult or
delayed, would they not as an ordinary precautionary measure carry
an abundance of provisions? -
, Col. GLENN. I do not think so, sir.
Senator THOMAs. They would take their chances?
Col. GLENN. Yes, sir. They would have enough, of course, for a
reasonable time. -
Senator WEEKs. Would they not take 30 days' provisions?
... Col. GLENN. I think they would, yes, sir. Coming across the
Atlantic, I should consider that a reasonable precaution, sir. .
Senator WEEKS. Colonel, if you were put in command of an
English army of 400,000 men to invade the United States, would you
Sail, assuming that you knew that the United States has its present
Navy, until the Navy of the United States had been crippled?
Col. GLENN. No, sir; I do not think I would sail. I certainly would
not approach my fleet closer than 500 miles. I would certainly have
a convoying fleet, which I could amply afford to have. *
Senator WEEKS. How would you feel about sailing at all if you
knew there were 500 submarines and ample mines in the harbors of
the United States ? -
Col. GLENN. I do not have the fear of submarines, myself, that a
good many people in this country have. As a matter of fact, our
information is that England several months ago had captured over
90 of these submarines, and a very recent report indicates that the
Submarines that were sent out to attack the British fleet in maneuvers
were all captured. I do not think that I would attempt to land, for
instance, at a harbor like New York or Boston, where these things
would be prepared, because, as I stated, we have 116 landing places
between Boston and Chesapeake Bay that are perfectly good natural
landing places. -- -
Senator WEEKS. How long would it take you, supposing there
were no opposition, to land 400,000 men and the animals and every-
thing that goes with such an expedition? *
Col. GLENN. It depends altogether on your facilities ashore. By
that I mean that you would not attempt to land—I do not th:
anyone would attempt to land—those 400,000 men in one expedition.
I think the expedition would be divided up somewhat. But I think,
or my recollection is, that the English expedition of 126,000 men was
landed in about 24 hours. * ,
Senator THOMAs. You mean the expedition from Alexandria to
Col. GLENN. That went from Alexandria to Gallipoli.
Senator THOMAs. You mean 24 hours?
r
578 PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
Col. GLENN. No; I am talking about the time when they got ready
to disembark. I refer to disembarkation. e - -
Senator WEEKs. Do you recall how long it took to send our expe-
dition from Tampa to Santiago Ż
Col. GLENN. No, sir; I do not. I was not in that expedition.
Senator WEEKs. Do you know how many men were sent 7
Col. GLENN. Nio, sir; I do not recall it. As I say, I was not in
that expedition, and I do not recall the figures.
Senator WEEKs. Were you with the Porto Rican expedition?
Col. GLENN. No, sir; I was in Alaska at that time, exploring. I
think we could disembark troops very much more rapidly to-day
than we did at that time, sir.
Senator WEEKs. Why? -
Col. GLENN. Because we have had more experience at it; just as
we can embark our troops on a train or on a º ship in a
great deal less time than we did before. From all I have heard of
that expedition, it was pretty badly bungled. They did not have
proper or adequate control of the transports or any of the other
things that they should have had in an expedition of that sort.
But i do not speak from personal experience.
Senator DU PONT. It was a poor point of embarkation to select?
Col. GLENN. Yes, sir.
Senator DU Pont. And did not have enough railroad facilities?
Col. GLENN. In other words, the point I was going to make in that
connection was that I do not think you can take anything that the
the United States has done in that line, except perhaps Gen. Scott's
landing in Mexico, as an example, or something to be followed. . .
, Senator THOMAs. Colonel, º my figures are correct on a basis of
98 transports to 128,000 men, it would take 311 transports for 400,000
men'.
Col. GLENN. Yes, sir.
Senator THOMAs. An armada of that size would encounter some
pretty severe and dangerous experiences, would it not ? It might
i. enveloped in fog or meet with storms ?
Col. GLENN. Yes, sir; it would have to take its chances on all
those things; yes.
Senator THOMAs. Probably resulting in disaster?
Col. GLENN. I do not think so, sir.
Senator THOMAs. With a number of ships like that ?
Col. GLENN. I do not think so, sir. •.
Senator THOMAs. And particularly if it had a large convoy with it?
Col. GLENN. It might, of course. You have to take your chances
on that sort of thing; but I do not believe that it would.
Senator THOMAs. Assuming that you had to make a landing with
your troops, after reaching the shore somewhere outside of a harbor
or along the shore, how far out would it be safe to anchor your trans-
ports from the shore in order to debark the troops ?
Col. GLENN. It depends entirely on the conditions. Yet, at the
harbor of Salem, Mass., I think they would run them right into the
docks. We certainly can not reach them with any guns we have.
h ºtor THOMAS. Landing at some other place where there is no
8,I’OOI’ - -
Col. GLENN. I do not catch the point, sir. They would not
hesitate to make a landing from several miles out, if it were necessary,
sir. They would use their launches.
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 579
Senator THOMAs. With small transports like those used by the
British Army it would be necessary, would it not, for them to stand
off quite a distance from shore, especially if the wind were blowing
shoreward 7 -
º GLENN. That all depends upon the local conditions of the
harbor.
Senator THOMAS. I am eliminating a harbor in these questions, sir.
Col. GLENN. You mean, sir, an open roadstead
Senator THOMAs. Yes; I am eliminating harbor conditions.
Col. GLENN. I do not quite catch your point. You mean, how far
out it would be necessary for them to go -
Senator THOMAS. I must assume that if a landing is attempted
where there is no harbor, that those large transports will not be able
to come right up to the shore, but that they ºhave to debark their
troops and ammunitions with lighters. About how far out would
these 311 ships have to stand in order to safely do that, and how far
away from each other ? - : - s
Col. GLENN. They, of course, would have to have swinging room
for their anchor chains when they did that; but I think that the
uestion of just where they would anchor would depend on the
}. th of water. * *
enator THOMAs. Precisely. .
Col. GLENN. And it would also depend upon what their facilities
were for discharging. With the Navy present and the facilities that
should be provided, it makes no serious difference whether it is a
mile or whether it is 5 miles; it takes just simply a little bit longer
to handle it. .
Senator THOMAs. It is a matter of safety, and it makes this differ-
ence, that the farther out they are the longer time it will take to
disembark.
Col. GLENN. Unquestionably the time factor comes in there.
Senator DU PONT. But the guns of the fleet would protect the
landing . - --
Col. GLENN. Undoubtedly. - -
Senator DU Pont. And at places like Delaware Breakwater, which
s entirely undefended, they could land, for instance, an armada in
perfect safety, and very close to shore? - -
Col. GLENN. It is very difficult, Senator, to answer that question,
unless you give me the particular locality. -
Senator THOMAs. Unfortunately, no locality has been selected in
the estimates and articles that I have seen upon the subject. I have
seen a good many statements to the effect that a large expedition
could be landed almost anywhere upon our coasts that are not fortified
or defended. I have been curious to know how 300,000 or 400,000
men could cross the ocean in a large armada of transports and encoun-
ter, storms and fog and strike some point upon the shore of America
that was not a harbor or roadstead with facilities to make a landing
of such men and munitions, with any great amount of easé or speed.
Col. GLENN. There are so many elements that come into the ques-
tion of landing, Senator. Of course, as Senator du Pont said, the
fleet would cover the landing; and then, of course, you would have
to know the charts. Of course every nation has charts of our shores.
Senator THOMAS. Three hundred and eleven transports would oc-
cupy a mighty long space on our shore.
23380—PT 11—16—2
580 PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
Col. GLENN. I do not doubt but that is true. Nobody questions
that proposition, but there are a great many shore places where you
can land them. - -
Senator THOMAS. I understand that, but I wanted to get some
information upon that point. - - -
Col. GLENN. I would be very glad to look it up for you, sir, if you
would like to know that, and take up any number of these places.
Senator DU Pont. With reference to storms, there are certain
seasons of the year when you are practically exempt from any dan-
gers of that kind; for instance, in July and August.
Senator THOMAs. You are never exempt from fogs. -
The CHAIRMAN. I may say to Senator Thomas that I went down
to the Department of Commerce and got some printed volumes by
which to show all of these places on both coasis. They are quite
voluminous. . - *
Senator THOMAS. Landings could be made, of course. -
The CHAIRMAN. They show soundings, and the whole condition of
the coasts. -
Col. GLENN. We have very complete charts of all our coast which
are kept up to date by the Geodetic Survey, and those are open to
purchase to every nation, and every nation in the world has to have
them and does have them. *
The CHAIRMAN. Is it your understanding that all of those nations
know those conditions? + -
Col. GLENN. Yes, sir; that is my understanding, sir. .
Senator WEEKs. Colonel, how long do you think it would take to
embark 400,000 men, supposing the ships were anchored 2 miles from
shore, containing 100,000 animals and all your arms and ammunition
that would go with an expedition of that kind?
Col. GLENN. Assuming that they have ample facilities for it?
Senator WEEKS. Open rot dstead I am speaking of now.
Col. GLENN. You mean to disembark?
Senator WEEKs. Yes.
Col. GLENN. If they were divided up, as they probably would be,
I think they could be landed in 24 hours; or if they are going to land,
say, 25,000 at a place, I would say that that 25,000 would be landed
within 24 hours, whether it is 2 miles or 4 miles from shore.
Senator WEEKs. As a practical proposition, with a fleet of that
kind, how would you transport your animals to get them ashore.
Col. GLENN. They can be carried ashore on lighters or they coul
be swam ashore. -
Senator WEEKs. Where are you going to get your lighters?
Col. GLENN. You can construct lighters with the ship's boats; carry
the necessary material with you. As a matter of fact these transports
would be provided with the necessary lighters. ~ *
Senator WARREN. The percentage of Toss is large where you swim
them ashore, is it not ? -
Col. GLENN. It depends altogether on whether they are handled
carefully or whether the handling is bungled, Senator. . Of course,
I think it fair to say this, that the most vulnerable time for an army
that is making an over-sea expedition is when they are actually dis-
embarking. They are the most helpless at that time of any time.
Senator DU Pont. Would not the season of the year make a great
difference % - - . . . . . . . . . .
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 581
Col. GLENN. A great deal of difference; yes sir.
Senator DU PONT. Of course the enemy could select their own
Season º -
Col. GLENN. They would probably do that, sir; within certain
limits, of course. --
SHORT PERIODS OF TRAINING.
I have been informed that certain evidence has been given before
your committee going to show that reliable and trustworthy soldiers'
can be created in six months, and in support of this statement that the
volunteer regiments we sent to the Philippine Islands were entirely
reliable. I caution you not to place too much reliance upon this class
of evidence, for the following reasons: First, these volunteers never
encountered a civilized trained enemy; on the contrary, the enemy
was inefficiently officered, very poorly trained, and actually dis-
appeared on the first indication of a charge on the part of United
States troops that appeared before them. Second, these Federal
Volunteers were raised under exceptional circumstances. As a matter
of fact, they were, as to the commissioned personnel, and largely as
to the enlisted personnel, the pick of some 250,000 volunteers (Spanish-
American) who had had about a year's training in the field in addition
to their previous militia experience. Reference is had in speaking of
the commissioned personnel to the company officers.
Of course I have reference, in speaking of the commissioned per-
Sonnel, to the company officers, as you all know. Those other officers
were regular officers. They were known as United States Volunteers.
MILITARY TRAINING.
Military training involves two essentials—one, perfection in the
mechanical or technical duties pertaining to a particular arm; and,
second, discipline. Too many people in our country, in which I
include some military men, º the mistake of disregarding the
second and decide that a body of men who have become mechanically
proficient in three to six months can be regarded as trained soldiers.
This is a great mistake and liable to lead to serious consequences.
Senator THOMAs. Can I interrupt you to ask you if you have any
information as to the length . time the Canadian troops were
trained before they went into actual service -
Col. GLENN. I can get that for you; yes, sir.
NOTES ON TRAINING OF CANADIAN TROOPS.
Generally speaking, the training of Canadian troops has been three
to four months in Canada, four to eight months in England, and about
two months in France.
The first expedition, which contained the bulk of the militia that
had received partial training, was two months in Canada, about four
and one-half months in England, and about two months in France,
or a total of about eight months before being put in the trenches.
Princess Patricia's regiment went to France about the last of
December and spent two months in camp in France before being put .
in the trenches. This regiment was composed largely of old soldiers,
and the best information we have is that they were drilled or trained
582 PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
about six months after being organized before being sent to the
trenches. + -
The training in Canada is from seven to eight hours daily except
Sunday. They are trained primarily for trench warfare, which
excludes practically minor tactics and combat work, except the phase
of charging from one trench to another. It is claimed that some
instruction in these subjects is given after they reach England.
According to the best information that can be secured, no troops
except a few of the very first expedition have been permitted to go
into the trenches with less than 10 months' intensive training of
about eight hours a day.
The average training of troops in the United States is about five
hours per day for six days of the week. This varies somewhat. The
Coast Artillery Drill Regulations prescribe four and one-half hours
er day. -
p pºpline, the second element in training, is the most difficult
thing to acquire. It requires long, continued training, the effect of
which is to convert the disciplined man into one who executes orders
issued to him mechanically and at the same time leaves his mind
free to meet any unexpected conditions.
The highest form of discipline is that which converts the soldier
into such a machine that he mechanically goes forward under orders
whatever the number of casualties that are occurring in the ranks
of which he is a part. This is the class of training that is sought in
all well-trained regular armies. It is absolutely essential in all
classes of troops who have to advance against an enemy in action.
In conclusion let us form no misconceptions and have no illusions
as to the time and amount of training required to create an efficient
and dependable soldier whatever may be the arm of the service in
which he is enlisted. & - *
Our General Staff has ascertained the concensus of opinion of the
rincipal nations of the world upon this subject and have decided,
in conformity with this opinion, that it requires a minimum period
of at least two years.
I have the tabulated statement of these results here with me, as
prepared from authentic sources by our General Staff.
With your permission, I would like to read this statement:
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 583

Y | ºv. Total -
ears per day, OLa Weeks | Aggre-
Belligerent nations of Europe. * sº, º, reservé |Tºte
| Sundays | active training. hours
army. and holi- army. e º
days.
Austria-Hungary:
Cavalry----------------------------------------------- - 3 8 || 7,200 11 7,728
Horse artillery----------------------------------------. 3 6} | 3,900 11 6,279
Other artillery-----. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . '- - - - - ------- 2 6} | 3,900 14 4,446
Infantry........................... -------------------- 2 8 4,800 14 5,472
Engineers. -------------------------------------------- 2 8 4,800 14 5,472
France: - -
Cavalry. ---------------------------------------------. 3 83 || 7,650 7 8,014
Field artillery. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 83 7,650 7 8,014
Other artillery----------------------------------------. 3 8} | 7,650 7 8,014
Infantry........... - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- 3 8% 7,650 7 8,014
Engineers--------------------------------------------- 3 8} | 7,650 7 8,014
Germany:
Cavalry----------------------------------------------- 3 9 8,100 8 8,532
Horse artillery. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... ---------------... 3 9 8, 100 8 8,532
Other artillery. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ., - - - - - - - - - - - - - 2 9 5,400 8 5,832
Infantry----------------------------------------------. 2 9 5,400 8 5,832
Engineers--------------------------------------------- 2 9 5,400 8 5,832
Great Britain. -------------------------------------------- 7 (1) (1) (1) (l)
Italy: - -
Cavalry. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .------------------------ 2 (1) (i) (1) (1)
Field artillery----------------------------------------. 2 (1) (1) (l) (1)
Other artillery----------------------------------------- 2 (1) (1) (1) §
Infantry----------------------------------------------- 2 (1) (1) (1) (l
Engineers--------------------------------------------- 2 | (1) (1) (1) (1)
Japan.----------------------------------------------------. 2 9 5,400 ----------|--------
Russia -
Cavalry and Cossacks.................................. 4 4 4,800 (1) (1)
Horse artillery----------------------------------------- 4 4 4,800 (1) (l)
Other artillery----------------------------------------- 3 4 3,600 (1) (1)
Infantry----------------------------------------------. 3 4 3,600 (1) (1)
Engineers. ------------------------------------------.. 4 4 3,600 (1)
1 No report.
The CHAIRMAN. That is only two years of service'
Col. GLENN. Only two years of service. I think that when you
come to consider a dependable soldier we ought to go very slowly in
attempting to get away from the experience of military nations who
have been making a practical study of this thing for many years. I
realize that I differ from a great many people in this. I do not want
to take a lot of men into action who have not been well disciplined,
and especially men who have to advance against the enemy. I want
them to be thoroughly disciplined and to have enough training so that
I can depend upon their going to the front all the time if I want
them to.
Now, sir, I am prepared to answer any questions on the separate
bills that you º like to put to me.
The CHAIRMAN. Your chief is Gen. Leonard Wood'.
Col. GLENN. Yes, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. He feels that one of the best ways to create a
reserve, as I recall his testimony, was to discharge men into the
reserve at the end of a year }
Col. GLENN. Yes, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. You disagree with him as to them :
Col. GLENN. No, sir. If a man is enlisted and is certified by a
board of competent officers who are familiar with him, that he has a
thorough training and is a dependable soldier, I would discharge him,
whatever the date might be.
The CHAIRMAN. What is your opinion as to the term of enlist-
ment, Colonel?
584 IPREPAREDNTESS FOR, NATIONAL DEFENSE.
Col. GLENN. I do not think it should be less than two years. I
should put it this way: If we are going to make dependable soldiers,
I think they should have fully two years' training. I believe this
might be cut down, if you take them as boys and train them every
day during the period from 12 to 18 years of age. - -
Senator DU Pont. By two years, do you mean two years with the
colors or two years’ enlistment' -
Col. GLENN. I mean two years with the colors, sir.
Senator DU PONT. After they have joined their regiment
Col. GLENN. Yes, sir. - -
Senator DU Pont. That practically means that it takes from three
to six months, does it not, on an average, to get a recruit to his
regiment 3 -
Col. GLENN. . Fully three months and sometimes longer than that.
I do not believe, Mr. Chairman, that any system we have yet devised
will produce the number of trained reserves we must have for our
Regular Army. I do not believe for instance, that you can secure
from a Regular Army of 140,000, which is the size of army proposed
in some of the bills now under consideration, by any process enough
trained reserves to constitute an army of 400,000 dependable troops.
The CHAIRMAN. What is the inherent weakness in our present
Army organization plan aside from the question of numbers?
Col. GLENN. We have no such thing as an organization in our
Army. Our people and our legislators, if you will pardon my saying
so, have always thought, in time of peace, that the regiment is the
highest unit we should have in any army, and, until the present
European War everyone thought of a national army in thousands
and hundreds of thousands instead of in millions of men. Heretofore
it has been possible for one man to direct and control national armies
numbered in thousands and hundreds of thousands, but this day has
passed, and for successful operation of the modern army composed
of millions we must have an efficient and competent General Staff
which, by constant study of military history and military problems,
work out complete plans for all commanders of armies in the field.
An army for efficiency must be prepared to do teamwork. This
implies that you must have not ºf: the enlisted personnel but you
must have officers to fill each position in all of the units of the regi-
ment, the brigade, the division, the army corps and separate armies,
and they must be trained in time of peace to perform these duties
in time of war. Without such training in peace these officers will be
utterly at sea in performance of their functions as commanders of these
higher units which in the past we have attempted to organize after
war begins. This is an impossible condition and one that is fraught
with great danger. -
The CHAIRMAN. You mean that they ought to have an under-
standing of the drill from the company up to the division ?
Col. GLENN. It is not a question of drill altogether. The question
of drill is a relatively small incident. Drill is essential for the pur-
pose of discipline, but what I mean is this: You take a football team
and you must have your captain, your quarter back, your half backs,
and your ends, and those men must all work together. If you take
away any one of those elements, you have a disjointed, disconnected
organization. That is, on a small scale. The smallest army unit that
any country has that is in itself self-sustaining and that can act as a
PREPAREDNESS For NATIONAL DEFENSE. 585
separate and independent unit is the division, made up of nine regi-
ments of infantry, a regiment of cavalry, and a regiment of field
artillery, your engineer troops, usually a battalion, your sanitary
troops, and your trains. That is a perfect fighting unit and the
smallest real fighting unit we have. Unless we have those, unless we
have more than one of them, so that we can combine them and get
what a good many people lately have been calling a field army, but
which, I think, ought to be called an army corps, then we have not
an opportunity to train men so as to handle a º body of troops
with efficiency. -
The CHAIRMAN. Is the Army as at present organized lacking in
these essentialsº - -
Col. GLENN. Yes, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. It is now divided into what units 7
Col. GLENN. The units are regiments, sir. We have a certain
number of brigadier generals, for instance, and yet we have no
brigade assembled for them. We do not appoint our brigadier gen-
erals to command these brigades because º any particular knowl-
edge they may have of the particular arm that constitutes a brigade,
but they take, for instance, a coast artilleryman and put him in
charge of an infantry brigade, although he has not served with
infantry for 20 or 30 years, and we have no division. The only time
we have ever had a division together was one at Texas City, which
you all know about, and, about two or three years ago, one at San
Antonio. I visited the first, and I happened to be in command of a
regiment of the second, and I believe that the first was no more com-
plete that the second, and it did not contain all the elements, by any
manner of means, that are necessary to get team work.
The CHAIRMAN. Is the weakness in our system due to the legisla-
tion that we have, or can not that weakness be cured by regulations
of the department'
Col. GLENN. In part by regulations of the department, but it
should be cured in great measure by legislation, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. Do any of these three bills correct those weak-
nesses' -
Col. GLENN. The bill introduced by yourself, sir, is the only one
that does, unless it be the General Staff bill, I make a mistake in
saying that. The General Staff, I understand, has prepared no bill,
but they have prepared a policy, and have commented on your bill,
indorsing it, as I understand it, showing the minor differences be-
tween what your bill calls for and what they recommended.
Col. GLENN. The tentative plan of the War Department does not
provide for anything like a satisfactory organization.
The CHAIRMAN. The General Staff has not presented any bill.
Col. GLENN. I say, I was mistaken; but they state in this paper
which I have here, and which has been introduced, the difference be-
tween what you call for in your bill and what they recommend in
their so-called policy of the General Staff.
The CHAIRMAN. Does the proposed bill of the War Department
correct these inherent weaknesses - -
Col. GLENN. It does not, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. Does the Hay bill ?
Col. GLENN. The Hay bill is still worse, sir.
586 PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
The CHAIRMAN. What I would like to have is an impartial state-
ment with reference to the merits of these several measures.
Col. GLENN. As I stated, the so-called Chamberlain bill, which you
presented, sir, is the only one that has presented for consideration an
organization which conforms to modern thought of all civilized
nations as to an organization for an army. It provides, if I may go
on a little bit in detail, for divisions, for brigades, and authorizes the
formation of army corps at the discretion of the President. It pro-
vides that every unit shall have every officer that belongs with that
unit. For instance, the brigade shall have its brigade commander;
the division shall have its division commander, and that all of the
staff departments shall have the necessary officers with the appro-
priate rank to their duties. It is the first time, I believe, in the
º of this country, when such a bill has been introduced in time
of peace. - - -
The CHAIRMAN. Wherein is the War Department measure lacking,
and the Hay bill, also : - º
Col. GLENN. The War Department measure is lacking in this
.#. principally in the fact that it does not provide enough general
officers for the functions that are required to i. performed in organ-
ized teamwork. It limits specifically the number of brigadier gen-
erals and other general officers which we are to have. It does not
provide—and I think that it should—for the necessary men to be
apportioned to each of these larger units. For instance, there is cer-
tain administrative work required of a brigade headquarters. There
is a certain number of men, such as cooks and messengers, and so
forth, that belong with them, and which, if not provided, will be taken
from the fighting forces. The same thing is true of the division.
None of these things are recognized in the War Department measure.
Mr. Hay's bill, as I read it through, impressed me that it was really
antagonistic to the officer. For instance, in the only draft of it. I have
seen he provides for practically an increase of 52 companies of Coast
Artillery, and he did not provide for a single company or field officer
to go with those, although we are short on Coast Artillery officers
already. But the main point about the whole thing is this, that an
army is provided for a specific work. Experts decide, after years of
experience, that certain officials, from the private up to the general
commanding, must be provided. If you did not do so, you would
simply break a link in the chain of command which is necessary for
teamwork. It is a very dangerous proposition. -
There is one other thing that I should like to state in connection
with the Chamberlain bill. We want to draw a comparison between
that and Mr. Hay's bill. The Chamberlain bill provides for 112
enlisted men to each infantry company. The present recognized war
strength of our infantry company is 150 men. I wish to go on record
as supporting the Chamberlain measure, and for the following reasons:
The real test, as I understand it, of efficiency is efficiency on
the field of battle, and the measure of that test is the number of
men that any officer can actually control on the field of battle and
carry forward with him in the fight. After a careful study of the
history of our own country I am of the opinion, and especially in
view of the fact that we have gotten to what we call extended-order
fighting, that no commissioned officer, and certainly no noncom-
missioned officer, can control in a fight to exceed 40 men; and I
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 587
would rather have him have not over 30. If we are going to have
only a captain and two lieutenants—that is, a first and second lieu-
tenant to a company—I think that with every man you put into
the company over 110 or 112—it should be in round numbers 100
men, because that is all you can get into a fight—you actually are
encountering danger. I think you will lose sºn;
I went into this question very carefully with men who were in
the Civil War. I have asked every man who actually tried to com-
mand a large body of men since, and the universal experience is
that 30 to 35 is all that an officer can carry forward with him.
. The CHAIRMAN. I think Gen. Wood favors even a larger company
organization ? - • * - .
. . Col. GLENN. Yes, sir; he favors a larger company organization, he
does not object to, but rather favors, the addition of a lieutenant.
I wish to say that if you are going to accept the organization of 150
men, then I think you would be safe to add at least one lieutenant.
Senator CATRON. How many officers, Colonel, has a French or
German company—250 men' - -
Col. GLENN. They have 250 men, but they have five officers, sir.
Senator CATRON. A captain and four lieutenants'
Col. GLENN. Yes, sir. I have no objection at all to the acceptance
of any number of men to the company they want, provided you have
the officers to lead them. My point is that if we shall attain battle-
field, efficiency we must not add to the number under the lieutenant
more than he can control and carry forward with him in a fight.
The greatest objection to having a company of the maximum
strength (150 men) arises when we contemplate the use of our militia
and volunteers. Both of these should have the same organization as
we provide for our Regular Army, and no one, I believe, will main-
tain that these partially trained and untrained officers can success-
fully carry forward with them in a fight more than 35 to 40 of their
partially trained and untrained enlisted personnel, certainly until
they have been seasoned by war, as occurred during our Civil War.
Another objection to these large companies is that we add very mate-
rially to the number of rifles in the regiment and this implies a pro-
portionately larger number of rifles in the division. This proposed
Organization of 150 men to the company will give us, in round num-
bers, 1,800 rifles to the regiment or between 16,000 and 17,000 rifles
to the division. Foreign armies have reduced their divisions to 12,000
rifles or less, and in our Civil War 10,000 was considered all or more
than a division commander could effectively handle. My firm con-
viction is that we should avoid increasing the number of rifles beyond
12,000 in our Infantry divisions, and I consider it safer not to exceed
10,000. • * .
Senator DU PONT. Would you prohibit reenlistment, as has been
suggested by several persons who have appeared before the com-
mittee, excepting always the enlistment of noncommissioned officers?
Col. GLENN. Senator, the proposition in a nut shell is simply this—
and the country had just as well recognize it now as at any other
time: You can not provide for the national defense of this country
without getting to compulsory training and service. That is the
proposition. Everything else, and everything you attempt to do
short of that is a makeshift, and no man can tell what it will produce.
To illustrate, our principal thought when we drew our last reserve
588 PREPAREDNESS FOR, NATIONAL DEFENSE.
act was that it would produce reserves, and on paper it looked
plausible. As a matter of fact, we have 19. Of course, we will get
more in time. . * -
With this preliminary remark I want to say that our enlistment
period with th. colors should be not less than two years, and we ought
to extend it with the reserve as long as we can. In other words, as
long as we can do this and have the men efficient. . . .
Senator DU Pont. I understand that. I do not think you quite
understood what I was driving at. There are a certain number of
military people who think that the defensive powers of the country
would $º increased by turning loose into the body politic as many
soldiers as possible who have served two years, and they would not
º them serve longer if they wanted to, excepting noncommissioned
OTTICGTS. - , -
My experience in the regular service is this, that there is a certain
percentage in each company, say from 5 to 10 per cent, of what we
may call professional soldiers, who will not return to civil life; they
are not suited by temperament or tastes to the avocations of peace;
and if you prohibit them especially from reenlisting you will lose
their services in the Regular Army, and they will go off and enlist
in the Marine Corps, .# thus you lose many men without any com-
parative gain. I want to know what you think about that ?
Col. GLENN. I am absolutely in accord with just what you say,
Senator. There is a certain percentage, just what number I am not
prepared to state, that should in all justice to the men and in all
justice to the service, be reenlisted. . . . . . .
Senator DU PONT. That is what I think. • *
Col. GLENN. I personally am. one of those who, when he gets into a
scrap, wants all the old soldiers around him that he can get. As I
told you, we are now figuring on a makeshift, and if Congress in its
wisdom decides that we have got to continue that, all we can do is to
figure out what will produce the best results under the conditions,
but we can not under any system yet proposed secure 500,000
reserves with the amount of men that we can enlist, and we can not
afford to keep a standing army of 500,000 men under our volunteer
SVStem. - -
'sºlor DU Pont. The Adjutant General states that we can not,
in his judgment, enlist more than 45,000 to 50,000 men a year. Do
you think that statement is absolutely correct?
Col. GLENN. No, sir; I do not; and especially it is incorrect in this
articular: If, for instance, we do not tie the men up too long—I
i. from personal conversation that there are a great many zealous
men who have patriotic feelings, who would like to be trained for
soldiering when they are called on. Under an enlistment contract
by which these men could go out just the minute they are certified
to be trained, unquestionably we could get quite a number more, just
how many nobody could determine, sir, -
You spoke of turning loose on the country certain military assets.
Ever since the Morrill law was passed for the dissemination of mili-
tary, knowledge we have had land-grant colleges, etc., which are
required to give training in the mechanic arts and military Science.
I do not believe that we have ever secured to exceed 5 per
cent of those men when the trouble came. They are no more of
an asset, practically, than an undeveloped gold mine in Alaska
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 589.
would be on Wall Street in a panic. In other words, to have a mili-
tary asset, in my opinion, you have to have organizations in being,
and the men who belong to those organizations, either in them at
the time or else so that you can put them under control at a moment's
notice, and keep them, and have them all trained to step right out,
as they do in the continental countries of Europe. -
Senator DU PONT. There is nothing proposed, Colonel, in all these
schemes for reserve that would hold a regular soldier beyond the
reserve period?
Col. GLENN. No, sir. . -
Senator DU PONT. That leaves, as they enlist very young, quite a
number of men, all the way from 28 to 45 years of age, who are trained
and efficient soldiers, and who are not provided for as they are in
the European services. -
Col. GLENN. Yes, sir. - -
Senator DU PONT. The only thing on the statute books intended
to utilize their services as far as possible was this provision that if they
come back and pass a physical inspection they would be paid a sum
of money equivalent to what their pay j have been had they
continued in a paid reserve 7 - . . . - -
Col. GLENN. Yes, sir. It is the old proposition you are referring to
now of paying a bonus'
Senator DUPONT. Yes. I suppose that would undoubtedly, in my
judgment, secure a certain number of those men.
Col. GLENN. I do not hesitate to say, Senator, that that is one of
the most practical schemes that we have had advanced for securing the
services of these reserves; and for this reason: The man who goes out
in all º will have acquired some business or social ties,
º arly if he has a family; but he has been bitten by the military
ug, so to speak, and if he could get a bonus sufficient so that he
could feel that his family would not suffer, or his business would not
suffer materially, he would come back. I think there is no question .
about that. But just how many, sir; we have never been able to
determine, because the system has never been applied.
But all of these things, Senator, are simply makeshifts, and allow
me to add that it does not get at the men that we want—the men who
are going to do the fighting. . The time is coming, in my opinion, when
we have got to begin to train our boys.
Senator CATRON. Would you make every young man in the
United States who is physically capable, subject to military duty 2
Col. GLENN. Every man who is physically capable, unless he is
ineligible on account of certain things, such as being located too far
from a training area, or on account of religious scruples, such as
have been recognized by our Constitution. I would make them all
be trained alike. -
Senator CATRON. At what age would you commence training the
boys before you actually make them subject to be called out 7
Col. GLENN. I would not have them called, out until they became
18 years of age, sir. •
Senator CATRON. You would call them out that young'.
Col. GLENN. That is the constitutional provision, sir; that is why
I fixed upon that. Rather, I should say that is the law, and has
been for a century. * * • -
* -
590 PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
Senator DU PONT. Right here, Colonel, I would like to ask you
this: Under the regulations by which men are enlisted into the Army
to-day the age of recruits is between 18 and 35%
Col. GLENN. Yes, sir.
Senator DU PONT. Of course, if they are minors between 18 and
21, they have to be enlisted with the consent of their parents or
guardians? . . . . .
Col. GLENN. Yes, sir. . . -
Senator DU PONT. Why should not that be changed and authority
given to enlist boys of 17 with the consent of their parents and
guardians? After the experience of the Civil War I should think we
would get a larger number of recruits, if they are physically able, at
: "...# a great many boys of 17 are just as physically able as those
of 18 or 19. • , , . 2.
Col. GLENN. Yes, sir; I see no reason except the law, sir. I have
personally seen a great many men who deceived as to their age who
made good soldiers at 16. .
Senator CATRON, I do not know that you exactly caught my idea
a moment ago. My idea was directed to this proposition, to make
every male person capable physically of being subject to duty and to
commence disciplining or drilling them in some way in connection
with the Army at the earliest age, but not to bring them in subject to
being called into the Army in case of absolute war until after they
reached a certain age, after they commenced drilling
Col. GLENN. I think they ought to commence drilling at 12 years
of age. I would not give them guns at that time, of course.
Senator CATRON: What time would you put guns in their hands
and commence drilling them with those
Col. GLENN. Say, 14. That would be my judgment. I would not
give them heavy guns at that time; I would treat them as Cadets,
you know. r
Senator CATRON. Senator Chamberlain's bill has something on
that, that they might put them in schools. That is the idea I had,
that we might send out and drill them in the schools. Schools are
subject to State control, entirely, and the Government has control
Over the boy and the man. Assuming that we could not get the
Schools to allow us to put officers in there and drill them at the
Schools—I think a great many of them would allow it and would be
glad to have it done—how would you gather together the youn
men within the proper age in a given district 3 I suppose you .#
send officers into the various districts to attend to that duty 2 *
Col. GLENN. I want, in answering that, to cite your attention to
the fact that both in Switzerland and in Australia, the school system
occupies exactly the same relation to the general government that it
does here. In Switzerland, I understand, it is controlled by the
Cantons, and in Australia by the States. The practical effect of the
bill as introduced by Senator Chamberlain, will unquestionably be
to force the schools to give this training. This training is based upon
20 minutes a day, at the outside, you understand, for every school
day of the school year; that is, up to 16 years of age. As a practical
proposition the schools will have to take this up, because every parent
will insist that this instruction be given at the school rather than
to send their children off to a Government-appointed rendezvous for
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 591
such drills, especially as it only takes 20 minutes a day. That will
meet that situation. They do it in Australia and in Switzerland.
Senator CATRON. That might create one difficulty that might be
gotten around. It is to require too many instructors to do the drill-
ing. In large schools in large towns you might work that, but
throughout the country I suppose you could make it an hour a day
for two or three days in the week, and then the officer could go from
point to point during the balance of the time? . -
• Col. GLENN. Or even a noncommissioned officer.
Senator CATRON. Yes; if you had a noncommissioned officer to do
these things it would be very well. I think you could get the officers
through these military schools. - -
Col. GLENN. I do not think there is any trouble about that, sir.
Senator CATRON: At military schools and the schools that have
military education we can get those.
Col. GLENN. A great many of our high schools have for several
ears applied for assistance to the Government in this training.
ou will recall, if you have read Senator Chamberlain's bill, it pro-
vides that this training can be given in the schools, public or private,
it can be given by the universities, and in fact, all educational insti-
tions, by the boy Scouts, or in the militia. - *
Senator CATRON. But we are liable to strike the difficulty that in
some places they will not want to adopt that in the Schools.
The CHAIRMAN. It is not compulsory.
Senator CATRON. You can not make it compulsory by the Gov-
ernment, but we can make it compulsory upon those boys and upon
the people. As soon as we teach them that we will make it com-
pulsory, they they will probably allow it in the schools, because it
will become easier and more convenient and require less time.
Col. GLENN. I inquired very carefully into that, Senator.
Senator CATRON. I was proposing to get up a bill myself, and am
proposing it now, I have not done it yet, but that was one of the
things I was troubled about. - - -
Col. GLENN. I inquired personally very carefully into the conditions
that confronted Australia in that regard, and also as to how they
worked it out, and I found that there was great opposition on the
part of mothers of the country to the introduction of this as a com-
pulsory measure. You understand that in Australia it commenced
about 1903, and their compulsory law was passed in 1909 to become
effective in 1911. After this had been in operation as a compulsory
measure for two years, and is so to-day, from every source that I
can get information from, you could not drive it out of Australia
on account of the objection of the mothers. They all actually insist
upon it, and they insist upon it not from the military point of view—
far from it; they insist upon it because of the civil benefits. -
Senator CATRON. The physical development'
Senator THOMAs. Like the boy Scout movement in this country 3
Col. GLENN. Yes, sir; but this is regulated and under the Govern-
lment. -
Senator Thomas. Yes; but that met with objections which have
since been overcome and have disap eared for the same reasons.
Senator DU Pont. There is no difficulty in the world in applying
that to the city and town schools; but in my part of the country
there are a great many rural schools with from 25 to 50 scholars, and
592 PREP.A.R.E.D.NESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
some of them have a school year of only five or six months; and the
problem is, instructing those boys. .
Senator CATRON. If they did it at the schools : -
Senator DU Pont. Yes; I mean at the schools. . . .
Col. GLENN. There are 12,000,000 boys of the school age in this
country, and 948,000 men coming of age every year. t
Senator CATRON. Of that many, how many do you think would be
fit for duty, physically?
Col. GLENN. For actual military duty a little less than 450,000;
out of the 948,000 a little less than 50 per cent. I base that on the
statistics of Australia and Switzerland. A great many who would
be pronounced unfit physically at the outset would become fit as a
result of the training, and a great many others who would not be
fit, perhaps, for the field, would be thoroughly competent to fit into
'our supply system. *
Senator CATRON. Some officer made a statement here yesterday
or the day before, that by adopting this preliminary training you
would get up to as much as 70 per cent. -
Senator DU PONT. Colonel, is the island of Porto Rico within the
'bounds of the Department of the East'.
Col. GLENN. Yes, sir.
Senator DU Pont. You have inspected the companies of Porto
Rican troops? *
Col. GLENN. I have not recently, sir. I have not made an inspec-
tion of them since I was chief of staff there.
Senator DU PoNT. You have seen these troops? -
Col. GLENN. I have seen those troops and I know them pretty
thoroughly.
Senator DU PONT. How do you regard them?
Col. GLENN, Excellent troops, sir.
Senator DU PONT. Do you favor increasing them so as to form a
regiment'.
Col. GLENN. I would not only increase them to a regiment, sir, but
I would make provision for training at least two other regiments. I
believe, personally, that you have splendid material there for making
a brigade, and I indorse Gen. Wood's idea of sending a battalion of
Field Artillery down there with a view of developing at least a regi-
ment of Field Artillery. -
Senator CATRON. How do they get the officers for those regiments?
Col. GLENN. The field officers are detailed from the Regular Army.
We still have nine captains with this regiment who are Americans.
The remainder of the officers are Porto Ricans who have been pro-
moted after examination by boards of officers. The principal trouble
with this regiment consists in the American captains, who have been
in that climate so long with no prospect of transfer to the Regular
Army occupying a healthy climate, that they have become prema-
turely unfit for further duty. Many of them have been in the
Tropics as much as 15 years.
Senator CATRON. But as a rule they are originally uninstructed in
military affairs?, • (2.
Col. GLENN. Yes, sir.
Senator DU PONT. Is there not a graduate from the West Point
Military Academy from Porto Rico?
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 593
Col. GLENN. I think so; at least one. I do not know how many,
sir. We have also graduate Filipinos from West Point, sir... I per-
sonally think we should use the Filipinos, certainly in the Philippines,
to the utmost extent that is safe.
The CHAIRMAN. Colonel, in that connection, is it not a fact that
a great proportion of the American soldiers that are called on for
service in the Philippines become mentally and physically wrecks
over there after a short tour of duty ? - -
Col. GLENN. Every white man, in my opinion, deteriorates very
rapidly after he has been there over 18 months.
The CHAIRMAN. You do not know what proportion of them are
sent to the asylums and hospitals? --
Col. GLENN. I know there has been a great number of them there.
The CHAIRMAN. Some officer was speaking to me outside of the
committee yesterday and he said that a very large number were
being sent back every year to the asylums.
Senator CATRON. Is there any reason given why that happens !
Col. GLENN. It is the effect of the climate, sir. I know when I
was serving out there in the early days we had a great many that
were sent home, and some of them were cured and some were not,
and it was in all cases attributed to the excessive heat, the direct
rays of the sun.
Senator DU PONT. Colonel, do you favor the consolidation of the
Philippine Scouts with the constabulary, making one body?
º GLENN. I favor any proposition that does away with two
forces of the same grade of people, operating on the same terrain for
the same purpose, and I would say the same thing in regard to your
continental army and your militia. I think it is fatal to efficiency.
Senator THOMAs. The constabulary over there, if I am correctly
informed, is a sort of a police Organization ?
Col. GLENN. Yes, sir; but it performs the functions also of larger
bodies, operating against insurgents or malcontents generally.
Senator CATRON. Taking the condition of things in the United
States, what number of men would you say the Regular Army ought
to be increased to ?
Col. GLENN. Are you going to supplement that with universal
service?
Senator CATRON. Yes, that is what I mean to say.
Col. GLENN. I think Senator Chamberlain's bill provides for about
210,000 men, and, if you will have universal service, I should say
that would be all we would need at the present time for an expedi-
tionary force. I am rather inclined to the opinion—I would not
assert it as a fact—that we will be able to reduce this after your
universal compulsory training system is in operation; some years
after it is in operation. . -
Senator CATRON. It has been stated that it is contemplated to
keep the companies up to a strength of 112. Would you keep the
companies filled, or would you have a lower number and have a
larger number of regiments? . . . . . . .”
-Col. GLENN. Without intending to criticize in any way the action
of the administration, or anyone else, I have noticed that in our
troops down on the border, where they are likely to be used, as you
know, at any time—and I know that the same applied to our troops
when they went to Vera Cruz—many of the companies were reduced.
594 PREPAREDNESS FOR - NATIONAL DEFENSE.
to as many as 40 and 45 men. In my opinion, it is not only an
absurdity to have any such organization, but it is the most uneco-
nomical thing that I can think of. It discourages the officers to
ive them that mere handful of men, and they do not feel that they
ave anything with them that is worth considering when they go
into action. Therefore, I think we ought to have those organiza-
tions maintained at the full strength that the number of officers you
give to the company can handle, whether you make it 112 or 150.
Senator CATRON. Then you would object to that one recommenda-
tion 7 - ... • . - . .
Col. GLENN. If you give us that number, yes, sir. I believe three
officers can handle 112 men. I do not believe three officers can
handle 150 men. But the Infantry arm of the service is opposed to
me on that. The great body of them believe they can. I do not.
Senator CATRON. I believe with you that four officers would be
better. -
Col. GLENN. The more you have the better. But, Senator, the
question must be resolved in this way: Of course, the more enlisted
men you can put in an Organization and the less number of officers,
the greater the economy. - -
Senator CATRON. That is not economy. - .
Col. GLENN. Economy must cease at some point, and the point is
where efficiency is lost. I believe if you go 5. 112 men with
three officers, you lose in efficiency to such an extent that it becomes
uneconomical. - - . -
Senator CATRON. If you go to 112 men with only three officers,
you get but two lieutenants? . . - .
Col. GLENN. Yes, sir. . . • -
Senator CATRON. A captain and two lieutenants can handle that ?
Col. GLENN. I believe they could. That has been the history of
the world. It dates clear back to the days of the centurions, when
they had 100 men to the captain.
Senator DU Pont. In the Civil War I commanded a battery, and it
was short of officers, but my first Sergeant commanded one of the
platoons, and did it very well and efficiently. I had only two
officers, and I ought to have had three. I do not know whether that
would be applicable in an Infantry company, whether the first ser-
geant could perform some of the duties of an officer.
* Col. GLENN. You must recollect, though, Senator, that at that
time you had a different class of men. You had volunteers. -
- Senator DU Pont. No, it was a regular battery I am talking about.
Col. GLENN. You had a regular battery 7 -
Senator DU PONT. Of course. -
Col. GLENN. Of course, you get exceptional men who can do that.
But there is this difference between a battery, you understand, and
an Infantry company: A battery is not right up on the firing line,
does not have to go up, especially modern artillery. I think you
did it on occasions in the Civil War.
Senator DU Pont. We did it then very often. ... 8
Col. GLENN. But you do not do it normally now, and I do not
think we should start out with an organization that required a
Sergeant to perform a commissioned officer's work. . . . .
. Senator DU PONT. I agree with you on that. You have said that.
you thought a company of Infantry with three officers should have
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 595
112 men, and, as I understand, that it should be kept up to that
number in time of peace?
Col. GLENN. Yes, sir.
Senator DU PONT. Where are your reserves to come in, in case of
War?
Col. GLENN. The prºpºl use for reserves is going to be to keep
your ranks filled up. Take England as an example. She lost more
than 70 per cent of the people she sent over. -
You have to have them to replace losses, and these occur in the
first few months. As a matter of fact, Senator, we have records of
a number of regiments, both French and English, which have replaced
their personnel three, four, and even more times since this war began.
They have absolutely replaced their personnel.
The CHAIRMAN. The men were killed .
Col. GLENN. Yes, sir.
Senator DU PONT. Then it would not be so absolutely necessary to
have the reserves ready instantly; any time within three weeks or a
month would do?
Col. GLENN. They ought to be ready to go within 30 days.
Senator DU PONT. I mean to say, in line of battle intº There
would be time to assemble them, and all that ?
Col. GLENN. For instance, to illustrate, suppose we went into Mexico.
I think the very next boat should carry down reserves. The losses
will be in the first very great. -
Senator DU Pont. Of course, sickness and casualties of all kinds,
outside of the casualties of battle.
Col. GLENN. That is the point I make, with 112 men to the com-
pany. If we had 112 men to the company, we would not go into any
fight with over 100 men, if that many.
Senator DU PONT. No; on account of the details, cooks, and all that
sort of thing. That is perfectly true.
Col. GLENN. Yes. -
The CHAIRMAN. Have you any information with reference to the
comparative cost of the enlisted man per annum in this country and
other countries? -
Col. GLENN. I have not any accurate data. I would be very glad
to get that and insert it in my hearing, if you would like to have it.
I think it has been computed." -
The CHAIRMAN. I wish you would do that. It has been insisted
that the cost per man per annum of the enlisted strength of our Army
is very much larger than the cost of the enlisted man in other armies.
Col. GLENN. I want to say something on that point, Senator. It
is absolutely wrong for a country like this to attempt to figure cost,
or relative cost, of our soldiers with any compulsory-service country,
for several reasons. But one of the most important reasons is the
fact of the great extent of this country, in connection with our volun-
teer system. To illustrate my point: If, as happened last fall, trouble
breaks out in Colorado, we are put to it to find troops to get there.
Regular troops, I mean, and the troops that were sent there were sent
at enormous expense. It is farther from the point where those troops
were sent than to ship them from one end of Germany to the other
1 Notes on the cost of the Army of the United States compared with foreign armies will be found on
page 597. º
23380—PT 11—16—3
596 PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
and back again, and the same would be true of any other European
country. Our expense of transportation in this country is large, not
only as just indicated, but as well in our enlistment and assignment
of recruits. -
The CHAIRMAN. The Secretary of War inserted in the record a
comparative statement of the areas of those different countries and
the amount of transportation necessary. -
Col. GLENN. Yes, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. I have seen the statement made that in Japan
the enlisted man costs about $250 per annum, as compared with from
$800 to $1,000 per annum for the enlisted man in this country.
Col. GLENN. Yes, sir. - *
The CHAIRMAN. Is not that due largely to the fact that there is
more or less of compulsory service there? - -
Col. GLENN. Unquestionably that cuts a great figure; and, in
addition to that, Senator, you must recollect that the American
soldier demands more in the way of food; demands more in the way
of equipment and clothing; and the American public demands it for
him. Our public demands that our soldiers shall be the best clothed,
the best paid, and the best equipped in the world.
Senator DU PoNT. They demand it for themselves, too.
Col. GLENN. Yes, sir. -
The CHAIRMAN. The statement is frequently made, and in many
instances made for the purpose of showing extravagance in the
administration of the Army, and I ask for your statement in order
to ascertain what the facts were.
Col. GLENN. I have heard this expense question preached, Senator,
ever since I came into the service, and I freely admit that we have
made mistakes that have been expensive. I said as much in the first
part of my hearing. I believe that the great bulk of the money that
is appropriated for all departments in this country is not only spent
honestly but judiciously, and in so far as the Army is concerned any
faults that may exist are due to too much centralization in adminis-
tration and lack of Organization. -
In regard to the question of organization will say that if we secure
our divisions as contemplated in the Chamberlain bill—the division
is the smallest unit that combines administration and combat—and
can induce the department at Washington to decentralize—that is,
to place upon the division commanders the burden of administration
º maintenance of these divisions in thoroughly efficient order for
service at all times—we will secure efficiency as well as true economy.
In a word, say to each division commander “You are allotted so much
money, with it you must administer the affairs of your command and
keep it in thoroughly efficient condition for the ensuing year.” The
resulting competition between these division commanders will Secure
both efficiency and economy. This is what we must do in time of
war. In illustration of the present system will say that a department
commander frequently has to request authority of the department in
Washington to make expenditures of as Small sums as $1, which is
not only expensive in correspondence and labor but is practically an
absurdity.
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 597
NoTES ON THE Cost of THE ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES COMPARED WITH FoREIGN
- ARMIES.
SYNOPSIS.
Paragraph 1. A uniform basis of comparison for all armies not possible.
Paragraph 2. Comparison between Great Britain and the United States possible.
Paragraph 3. Per capita cost of United States Army at home and overseas.
Pºph 4. Rates of pay for officers higher in United States Army than in English
3rmy. - *
Paragraph 5. Mileage in Great Britain and United States.
Paragraph:6. Pay of enlisted men in Great Britain and United States.
Paragraph 7. Comparison of four principal items of cost of the two armies.
Paragraph 8. Consideration of other factors increasing cost of United States Army.
(a) Relative strength of the several arms.
(b) Relative strength of commissioned and enlisted personnel.
Pººh 9. Comparative costs of American and British Army not unfavorable to
OTEOler. - *
Paragraph 10. Lack of data for accurately determining comparative costs of con-
scripted and volunteer armies.
Paragraph 11. The effect of universal service upon the cost of preparedness. Not
completed. *
|Abridged from War College Division study 9053–120.]
1. The only complete data on this subject compiled by the War College Division
refer to the Army of Great Britain, because that army, like our own, is raised by the
system of voluntary enlistments. All other countries employ the system of universal
military Service and it is, therefore, impossible to compare satisfactorily the cost of
these armies with our own. This is stated in the War College Division study, as follows:
“It is a matter of common knowledge that there are two systems in use by the world
powers for maintaining their armed forees. These are known, respectively, as ‘uni-
versal military Service,’ and ‘voluntary enlistment.’ In nations employing the first
system, the armed forces consist of all physically qualified male citizens between
certain ages. These citizens are required to submit themselves tor training in time of
peace as well as for Service in time of war. In the nations employing the Second
system, the armed forces are composed of citizens who voluntarily submit themselves
for training in peace, and for service in war. In the first case the obligation of mili-
tary service is paid by personal service, and the remuneration given the individual
soldier has no relation to the value of the service actually rendered by him; in the
second, the Soldier must be paid an amount sufficient to induce him to submit himself
for training and service.
“In the country employing the system of universal military Service, military train-
ing is looked upon as a part of the education of the individual citizen, just as is the
common-school course, and citizens of those countries would no more think of demand-
ing pay for their individual services during this education than they would while
attending the common schools.
“In those countries employing the system of ‘voluntary enlistments,’ however, the
citizen looks upon the profession of arms in time of peace as a trade or profession by
means of which he expects to earn his livelihood, and he will not offer himself unless he.
is assured a remuneration at least equal to that which he would receive in civil occu-
pations. -
“As the item of pay in those countries employing the system of voluntary enlist-
ments is by far the largest single item in the expense account, it is to be expected that.
nations employing the system will have to pay for their armed forces an amount
greatly in excess of those employing the system of universal military service and we
will find this to be the case. ->
“From what has been said, it is obviously unscientific to compare the cost of main-
taining an army by these two widely differing systems in terms of money actually paid
out of the treasury, since we would be comparing two absolutely dissimilar things.
If we wish, then, to compare the cost of our Army with the cost of those of other nations,
we must limit our comparison to those nations which employ the same general system
as ourselves. We will find that only one other nation in the world does so—Great
Britain.” (W. C. D., 9053–120.); -
• 2. The year selected for comparison was that of 1912–13 for great Britain in order to
avoid becoming involved in extraordinary expenses incident to the present war, and
1914–15 for the United States in order that we might have the latest figures available
598. PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
on costs. In order to arrive at a comparable basis for comparison of costs of the two
countries it was necessary to deduct certain items as follows:
The total expenditures for the fiscal year 1914–15 from appropriations for the sup-
port of the Army of the United States were $116,127,753.67. Of this amount,
$2,879,212.15 was for unusual expenses incident to the Mexican situation, and must .
be deducted, because the totals for Great Britain contain no similar item. Deduct-
ing this amount from the total expenditures we have $113,248,541.52. A further
deduction is now necessary of certain sums disbursed by the War Department pur-
Suant to appropriations which have but slight connection with the cost of the Army.
No such items appear in the totals for Great Britain. These sums, listed in detail
in Table 3, amount to $7,242,567.99. Deducting this amount we have, as the total
military expenditure for the United States, $106,005,973.53. This amount is logically
comparable with the total military expenditure for Great Britain, which was
$114,264,512.57. The actual enlisted strength of the Army of the United States
On July 1, 1915, was 101,195, including the 3,993 enlisted men of the Hospital Corps
and the 4,388 enlisted men of the Quartermaster Corps. 4.
She actual enlisted strength of the British Army on March 1, 1913, was 171,563.
This includes the “standing army at home,” and in the colonies (exclusive of India,
since India supports her entire military force). Based on the actual figures, there-
fore, the per capita costs per enlisted man are as follows:
Great Britain---------------------------------------------------------- $660.01
United States. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1,047. 54
On the same bases, all ranks being considered, the per capita costs are:
Great Britain. . . . . . - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - --------------- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - $630. 03
United States----------------------------------------------------------- 1,000. 13
The above figures, however, do not show the true comparative per capita costs,
as will be shown in what follows: First, the total for the United States includes
$1,138,322.68 for pay and allowances of officers on duty not connected with the Reg-
ular Army. As no equivalent item appears in the British accounts of effective strength
this sum should also be deducted from the total for the United States. Deducting
this sum we obtain $104,867,650.85. . .
Owing to the very limited extent of her coast line, Great Briain has depended
almost entirely upon the Navy for protection against serious invasion. Consequently,
only the navy yards, dock yards, and certain exposed arsenals have been fortified.
- The situation in the United States is vastly different, as can be seen from the per-
centage of coast artillery maintained in the two countries—8.2 per cent for Great Brit-
ain, and 18.59 per cent for the United States. Our strictly coast-defense expenditures
are shown in Table 7. However, the costs of these fortifications for Great Britain
are impracticable of separation from the total expenditures for permanent military
works of all kinds, which amounted to $5,884,847.37 in 1912–13. The corresponding
items in the United States expenditures for 1915 amounted to $10,188,667.58. After
deducting from the totals last above stated the amounts expended respectively for
permanent works, etc., the resulting totals are: -

t - - - -
º, Great Britain. United States.
Total cost, effective Army, less cost of permanent works.... . . . . . $108,379,665. 20 $94,678,983. 27
Per capita cost per enlisted man. ------------------------------. 631. 71 935. 60
Per capita cost, all ranks considered............................. - 597. 58 | 893. 26
3. One of the incidents of service in our Army which increases its cost is the necessity
of maintaining troops in Alaska, Hawaii, Porto Rico, the Canal Zone, the Philippine
Islands, and China. The additional cost for maintaining garrisons in the above-men-
tioned localities in excess of the amount necessary to maintain garrisons of the same
strength and composition in the United States, amounted in 1914–15, to $3,047,583.64,
or to an increased per capita cost per enlisted man serving in those localities of $84.62.
In other words, after making the deductions as set forth in the body of this study, the
per capita cost for the United States Army would be $905.51, if our entire Army were
stationed in the United States. These figures include only those pertaining to the
Quartermäster Corps. There is, of course, an increased cost of maintenance in all other
departments incident to foreign service, but figures for them are not available. Since,
from lack of data, it is impossible to obtain a similar figure of per capita cost for Great
Britain, this figure is not a comparable one. It is only given as showing one of the
causes of the high per capita cost of our Army.
PREPAIRED NESS FOR, NATIONAL DEFENSE. 599
* This is as far as we can carry our comparison as expressed in actual figures, but it
by no means gives a true comparison. .
4. We will find that the rates of pay for officers are higher in the United States than
in Great Britain. This is partly real and partly apparent. In the British service a
large part of an officer's pay consists of “allowances” while in the United States this
is not the case. The men who make up the officers of the British service come from
a different class than in the United States. The British officer is not expected to live
on his pay alone, while in the United States the pay is made sufficiently high to
enable him to do so. . *
5. The item of mileage in Great Britain is small, since the territory to be covered is
so limited. In the United States the country to be covered is extremely large. In
addition to this the provisions of law which makes it necessary to bring back to the
United States once in two years officers serving in the Philippines, Hawaii, and the
Canal Zone and replace them by officers from the United States makes up a heavy
item of expense. The same is true of the provision of law which requires officers to
serve two out of six years with a company, troop, or battery before becoming eligible
for detached service. -
6. When we come to consider the pay of enlisted men in the United States and
Great Britain, we will find that while the actual money pay is higher in the United
States than in Great Britain, there are several factors which must be taken into account
which will show that, as a matter of fact, the pay of the British soldier is little, if any
lower than that of the United States soldier. For, since both countries must go into
the labor market in their respective countries and bid for men, the rates of wages, the
cost of living and the standard of living in the two countries must be considered.
Stated briefly, we will find that the rate of wages in 16 trades and callings which can
be compared in the two countries is 159 per cent higher in the United States than in
Great Britain. The average expenditure for food in the laboring classes in the United
States is 66 per cent higher than in Great Britain, fuel is 21 per cent higher, and rents
91 per cent higher.
7. In considering the four items of cost which go to make up the bulk of the expense
of the military establishments of the two countries we find the following:

Items. Great Britain. United States.
Pay, mileage, etc.......................----------------................. $39,967,066.82 $49,722,369.91
Subsistence------------------------------------------------------------- 8, 260, 121.66 9,802,141.39
Transportation---------------------------------------------------------- 4,733,304.84 10,680, 546.69
Clothing---------------------------------------------------------------- 5,848,651.48 4,623,272.94
In terms of percentages to the total expenditures these items stand as follows:
Great |United
Items. Britain. States.
Per cent. Per cent.
Pay, mileage, etc.----------------.............................------------------ 34.10 43.90
Subsistence--------------------------------------------------------------------. 7. 22 8.65
Transportation... . . . . . . . |- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 4. 14 9.45
Clothing------------------------------------------------------------------------ 5. 11 4.08
For Great Britain the sum of the expenditures for these four items is 50.57 per cent
of the total expenditures for military purposes, and for the United States 66.08 per
Cent. -
In terms of per capita cost, considering enlisted strength only, they are as follows:
Great United
Items. Britain, States.
Pay, mileage, etc.--------------------------------------------------------------- $232.95 $491.35
Subsistence--------------------------------------------------------------------- 48. 14 96.86
Transportation... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .----------------.. 27. 58 105.54
Clothing------. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34.91 45.68
600 PREPAREDINESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
The factors affécting pay, mileage, etc., have already been considered.
In considering the second item, subsistence, we will find that the ration of the
United States is larger both in total quantity and in number of components than that
of Great Britain. This is explained, of course, by the higher standard of living.in
the United States.
. In considering the third item, transportation, Several factors must be taken into con-
sideration. This item includes not only the cost of transportation within the United
States but that for transportation between the United States and the Philippines,
Hawaii, Alaska, and the Canal Zone, as well as transportation within these localities.
Again, our garrisons within the continental limits of the United States are scattered
over an area of 2,973,890 square miles, while the territory of the United Kingdom
embraces an area of only 121,633 Square miles, or less than one twenty-fourth that of
the United States. Not only are the distanges over which troops and supplies must be
transported So vastly greater in the United States, but the cost per individual and per
pound per mile is greater than in the United Kingdom.
In respect to the fourth item, clothing, we find an increase of per capita cost of over
$10.77 for the United States. This is fully accounted for by the higher cost of clothing
in the United States.
8. There are now several other factors which make the cost of the United States Army
greater than that of Great Britain. . .
(a) The first is the relative strength of the various arms of the service maintained.
As is well known, the cost of maintenance of the various arms differs greatly. In a
study recently made in the office of the Quartermaster General, in which items of
quartermaster expenditures only were considered, we find the following, expended
on a per capita basis:
Annual
Organizations. First cost. ºf
tenance.
Regiments:
Infantry. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - $106, 67422 $557, 61
Provisional Coast Artillery (for Infantry duty). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119,93292 627. 63
Cavalry. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 318. 17225 772.47
Field Artillery (average) for light, horse, heavy, and mountain. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 333. 42676 747. 26
This table, of course, does not include the cost of the ordnance equipment which iè
vastly greater for Cavalry and Artillery than for Infantry. Nor does it include the
garrison equipment, either quartermaster or ordnance. It shows that the cost of
Coast Artillery (equipped as Infantry only) is 12 per cent, Field Artillery 34 per cent,
and Cavalry 38 per cent greater than Infantry. Now, if we look at the relative strength
of the various arms to total enlisted strength as maintained by Great Britain and by
the United States, we will find the following: -

Great United
Britain. States.
Per cent. | Per cent.
Inſantry.------------------------------------------------------------------------ 50. 51 41.06
§ Artillery------------------------------------------------------------------ 3. ; #. ;
º 'alſy. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - • .
Field Käärs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .------------------------------ 8;92 5.59
Combining these percentages we find that the United States maintained 14.53 per
cent more of the more expensive arms and 9.45 percent less of the less expensive arms
than does Great Britain.
PREPARED NESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 601
(b) The next factor is the comparative number of enlisted men and officers in the
V2, I’lC)llS ºr IYY.S.
Great TJ'nited
Britain. States.
Per cemt. Per comt.
29.84 24. 55
Infantry------------------------------------------------------------------------ e
Ǻluºry ge º e º ºs : - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - }}} §§
&Völſ W - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 27.4 º
Field Årålery sº tº e s tº sº e º is º e º a sº s º is is e e s e = * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * s & e º is e s = º e s º a ſº º ºs e g = & e s = s. 27.58 23.08.
This is due, of course, not so much to the fact that the organization of the various
arms differ in the two countries as to the fact that the majority of our organizations are
maintained at “peace strength,” while those of Great Britain are at “war” or nearly
“war” strength at all times. If all our organizations were maintained at “war.”
º the proportion of officers to enlisted men in the various arms would be as
OJIOWS:
Infantry, 1 officer to 36.72 enlisted men.
Coast Artillery, 1 officer to 27 enlisted men.
Cavalry, 1 officer to 24.72 enlisted men.
Field Artillery, 1 officer to 26.38 enlisted men.
9. From the preceding notes it is evident that it is hardly possible to reduce the
estimates of costs of the armies of Great Britain and of the United States to absolutely,
comparative figures in all instances. The reasons were given in each case. However,
it is believed that the cost of the United States Army does not compare unfavorably
with that of Great Britain if we take into consideration the various conditions obtain-
ing in the two countries.
10. The impossibility of comparing the cost of an army maintained by the system.
of “universal military service” with one maintained by the system of “voluntary
enlistments” has already been pointed out. To show how impossible it would be to
obtain recruits for our Army with the rates of pay for privates in their first enlistment
obtaining in the most important of the countries employing the system of “universal
military service” the following is quoted:
Monthly pay of a private in first year of enlistment.
Germany------------------------------------------------------------------ $3.21
France. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ------------------------- 1. 70
Russia-------------------------------------------------------------- - - - - - - ... 32.
Japan. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - . 60
Austria............ . . . . - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - .73
The data for the cost of the Army of Great Britain are very complete, but when we
come to look for like information for the other great powers, however, we fail to find it,
because it is not made public. It is not possible, theretore, to make a comparison
even of the lump cost of the military establishments of such countries as Germany,
France, Austria-Hungary, Russia, Italy, and Japan with our own because we do not
know what they have expended on their armies. So it is evident that any comparison
of the cost of our Army with those of the above-mentioned countries would be abso-
lutely worthless. And, as was pointed out in the first part of this communication,
even if we knew the exact sums expended and had the details of expenditure, a
comparison of the expense involved in maintaining an army by a system of “voluntary
enlistments” with that involved in maintaining one by a system of “universal military
service” would be impossible since we could have no common basis from which to
work.
602
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
TABLE I.—Universal service—Liability and enrollment. $
Liability. Actual enrollment for service.
Nati First period. Second period. | Third period.
ation. Ages, Service Total
fº. |Total begins years
tº." | years. ěj Years || Years Years | Months. Years | Months en-
o, ge). en- train- en- train- 0Il- train- rolled.
rolled. ing. rolled. ing. rolled. ing.
# Un i ve r s a 1- service
7ations.
Austria-Hungary...... 19–42 24 21 12 2} 9 0 0 0 21
'Tance- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 20–48 29 20 14 3# 7 * 7 0 28
*Germany. . . . . . . . . . . . . 17–45 29 20 7 2} 12 1 6 0 25
Htaly------------------ 20–38 19 20 8 2 4 0 7 0 19
Japan----------------- 17–40 24 20 7% 2% 10 4 23 0 20
Russia. --------------- 20–43 24 20 18 3} 5 0 0 0 23
JLimited compulsory-
service mations,
Australia............. 19–26 8 19 8 * 0 0 0 0 8
Switzerland. . . . . . . . . . . 17–48 32 20 12 * 8 * 8 0 28
Wol u mt a ry-service -
7ations. -
|United Kingdom...... 18–45 28 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
United States......... 18–45 28 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0



TABLE II.- Universal service—Population, finance, man power.

Finance.
x - - Yearly cost of training.
Nation. Population. -
Total yearly -
bººk Army Per cent | Unit cost
* budget of total | per in-
estimates. budget. habitant.
Austria-Hungary...................... ,000,000 || $1,216,000,000 $151,000,000 12 $2.80
‘France. ------------------------------- 40,000,000 | 1,012,000,000 | 200,000,000 20 5.00
‘Germany------------------------------ 67,000,000 852,000,000 212,000,000 25 3. 16
Italy---------------------------------- 36,000,000 557,000,000 91,000,000 16 2. 53
Japan.--------------------------------- ,000, 273,000,000 || 49,000,000 18 .91
'Russia-------------------------------- 174,000,000 | 1,843,000,000 || 381,000,000 21 2.19
Australia-----------------------------. 5,000,000 177,000,000 15,000,000 9 | 3.00
Switzerland--------------------------- 4,000,000 19,000,000 9,000,000 5 2.25
United Kingdom................. • * * * * 46,000,000 973,000,000 41,000,000 15 3.07
*United States....................... • - - - - 100,000,000 1720,000, 2 102,000,000 14 1.02
1 ordinary expenditures, and excluding postal-service expenditures paid from postal revenues.
2 Eliminating bounties and pensions. -
PREPAIRED NIESS FOR, NATIONAL DEFENSE.
603
TABLE II.-Universal service—Population, finance, man power–Continued.
Man power.
Theoretical. Actual.
Nation. º: tº
Males, malº. organized
- ex .ſ : actually ycº I. Feace Yearly
18, 9.4% availabie System of | establish- armed, unit
fit for and full training. ment equippºd, j
Service. ºutly and fit for e
fit for actual
fighting. - ... 3
c fighting.
Austria-Hungary... . . . . . . . . . 9,000,000 || 5,400,000 | Universal. . . . . 425,000 || 3,000,000 || $50.33.
France---------------------- 6,700,000 || 4,000,000 |- - - - - do-------- 845,000 || 4,000,000 50.00
Germany. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11,000,000 | 6, 700,000 |..... do-------- 805,000 | 6,700,000 31. 64
Italy------------------------ 6,000,000 || 3,600,000 |..... do-------- 305,000 | 1,600,000 56.87
Japan----------------------- 9,000,000 || 5,400,000 |. . . . . do-------- 400,000 || 2,000,000 24. 50
Russia---------------------- 29,000,000 || 17,400,000 ||-----do -- . . . . . . 1,300,000 || 7,000,000 54. 43
Australia. ------------------ 00,000 500,000 Liº. COIIl- 120,000 200,000 75.00
- pulsory.
SWitzerland. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 670,000 400,000 || - - - - - do-------- 150,000 400,000 22.50
United Kingdom. . . . . . . . . . . 8,000,000 || 4,600,000 | voluntary....] ió5,ööö 350,000 || 462.83
United States............... 17,000,000 | 10,000,000 |. . . . . do-------- 110,000 | 200,000 || 510.00

Approximate amounts expended annually on standing armies (exclusive of emergency war.

expenditures).
Peace à. &pen | War
Country. Ulre iOT 003 C0
y strength. [...] strength.
Argentina------------------------------------------------------ 24,000 $17,072,338 220,000
Austria-Hungary.---------------------------------------------- 424, 241 121,711,040 4,320,000
Belgium. ------------------------------------------------------ 48,603 20,219,291 170,000
Brazil---------------------------------------------------------- 23,500 23,445,047 |......... --.
Bulgaria------------------------------------------------------- 59,900 7,889,400 280,000
Chile-------------------.‘--------------------------------------- 19,360 8,882,880 |............
China---------------------------------------------------------- 440,000 50,000,000 |... . . . . . . . . .
Denmark------------------------------------------------------ 13,720 4,298,560 90,000
Ecuador------------------------------------------------------- 7,810 909,434 100,000
Prance--------------------------------------------------------- 703,000 208,472,666 || 3,878,000
Germany------------------------------------------------------- 790,985 210,482,580 4,000,000 .
Great Britain. ------------------------------------------------- 1406,278 140,475,150 804,710
dian army------------------------------------------------ 75,897 95,676,030 75,897
Greece--------------------------------------------------------- 65,000 20,309,825 80,000
Italy-----------------------------------------------------------| 304,672 69,261,140 | 1,102,320
Japan---------------------------------------------------------- 280,000 48,683,480 1,400,000
Mexico.--------------------------------------------------------- 29,543 2 11,106,860 84,000
Montenegro---------------------------------------------------. 8) .876,600 40,000 .
Netherlands---------------------------------------------------- 23,000 13,668,542 300,000
Worway-------------------------------------------------------. 6,200 4, 134,630 110,000
Portugal------------------------------------------------------- 32,800 10,800, 106 117,000
Roumania----------------------------------------------------- 101,348 16,288,700 580,000
Russia--------------------------------------------------------- 1,284,000 328,377,500 5,962,000
Servia---------------------------------------------------------. 42,000 10,000,000 361,747
Spain---------------------------------------------------------- 128,000 36,890,250 480,000
Sweden.-------------------------------------------------------. 21,413 15, 138,600 485,000
Switzerland. ...--------------------------------................ ) 9,629,640 260,000
urkey:------------------------------------------------------- 146,500 35,507,228 924,000
United States.................................................. 97,662 97,013,965 5 225,705
- Total. . . . . . * - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - I - - - - - - - - - - - - 1,637,221,482 - . . . . . . . . . . .
1 Includes 145,000 reserves and 78,278 special reserve.
2 1910–11.
8 Militia.
4 National militia.
5 Including 128,043 Organized Militia.
604 PREPARED NESS FOR, NATIONAL DEFENSE.
Senator FLETCHER. Where would you keep those divisions?
Col. GLENN. That involves a strategical answer. I personally,
speaking generally, would have at least one division in this threat-
ened area here on the Atlantic. I would have at least one division
in the Central States. I would have a division in the West Central
States, and one on the Pacific. As a matter of fact, for safety, I
think there should be at least two on the Pacific and two on the
Atlantic. - -
Senator CATRON. How about the Gulf of Mexico . Do you count
that part of the Atlanticº .
Col. GLENN. When I say the Middle States, Senator, I mean North
and South. I would rather put my Cavalry—large units of Cav-
alry—in the South, because I believe it is more economical to take
care of them down there—that is, large bodies; but with the divi-
sions there goes a certain amount of Cavalry. -
Senator FLETCHER. You want how many divisions'
Col. GLENN. I do not believe that the ‘p. coast can possibly
be defended against an attack from Japan, for instance, short of two
divisions, supplemented by strong reserves from the central part of
the country. - -
Senator FLETCHER. How many divisions do you think we ought
to require for a peace footing"
Col. GLENN. I think the minimum is four.
Senator FLETCHER. That would be how many men' -
Col. GLENN. That is, in round numbers, for the divisions them-
selves, with the auxiliary troops, about 20,000; about 80,000 in the
United States. That is exclusive of the Cavalry units. We would
have two Cavalry units in addition. - -
Senator CATRON. Of these 212,000 men that Senator Chamberlain
still proposes to put into the Regular Army, how many would be
Coast Artillery, practically stationary, and not to be handled in the
shape of a regiment, or a division, or a brigade? - -
Col. GLENN. I think he provides for 269 companies. I do not
remember the exact companies; but it is, in round numbers, with
100 men to the company of Coast Artillery about 29,000.
Senator DU Pont. T)o you not think that the Coast Artillery com-
pany units should be larger than an Infantry company unit'
Col. GLENN. Could be larger ? -
Senator DUPONT. Yes. In other words, three officers could super-
intend in battle much more readily a larger number of men than in
the field :
Col. GLENN. I do not think there is any question about that, unless it
be the mine companies. Approximately you will have for a company
not to exceed two guns. These are pretty close together and it is very
easy to control; that is, relatively. -
Senator DUPONT. Just as I thought; that the Coast Artillery com-
panies ought to be larger than the infantry companies. -
Col. GLENN. Why larger than the Infantry companies?
Senator DU PONT. Because I think that three officers could control
in battle a larger number of men. - -
Col. GLENN. Oh, yes, sir. As far as control is concerned condi-
tions of Coast Artillery in action make it possible for one officer to
control more men than can be done in Infantry, Cavalry, or Field
Artillery. In the Coast Artillery, however, the number of officers

PREPAIREDIN ESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 605
and men assigned to any given battery depends largely upon the
number and kind of guns in the battery as well as upon the location
of this battery. -
Senator THOMAs. Colonel, would it not make for economy in the
administration of the military forces if many of the details of our
legislation were left to the discretion of the General Staff'.
Col. GLENN. If you will pardon my saying so, I think this is the
most absurd proposition, for a great, big body of legislative men like
we have here bothering their heads with the details of what a company
shall consist of. It seems to me perfectly absurd. That is what the
General Staff is provided for. P think you should know what the
general policy should be.
Senator THOMAS. It would make both for efficiency and economy?
Col. GLENN. Yes, sir. -
The CHAIRMAN. Is it not a matter that rather ought to be a matter
of report from the Department to Congress than for Congress to
attempt to go into those details? -
Col. GLENN. Yes, sir. . .
Senator CATRON. Would not that lead to this difficulty, though,
that if we left the number of men to go in the companies, or the
number of companies, and so on, to administrative officers, each ad-
ministration that comes along might change it, and constantly alter
and amend your army without having anything stable like a statute?.
Col. GLENN. I do not believe that would be a real danger, Senator.
I think if it is once recognized that the General Staff of the Army
should attend to all of these details, any administration coming in
would naturally be absorbed with the larger things. .
Senator CATRON. If we passed a law providing for that, I think so,
but if we did not the Commander in Chief of the Army would be at
the head of it, and he would handle it in accordance with his ideas. ,
Senator THOMAs. A great many of the evolutions of the present
war would doubtless suggest imperative changes to a staff equipped
with discretion to take ſº of them : -
Col. GLENN. And you certainly should do this. If you appoint a
“council of national defense” as the term is suggested here, the first
thing that council would do would be to get the advice of the General
Staff of the Army and of the corresponding body in the Navy, which
should also have a general staff, in my opinion, and from that this
council would determine how many troops you should have and
make a report to you showing the appropriations and all details. It
would be a very simple matter then for the legislative body to take
it up. In other words, if you would adopt something like the budget
system I think you would find it very advantageous and save you
gentlemen a great deal of time now taken up with details and trifles.
This implies simply that you would accept the report of this council
of national defense and make the necessary appropriations. g
Senator FLETCHER. What ought we to do with regard to the
militia º - -
The CHAIRMAN. The National Guard, you mean?
Senator FLETCHER. Yes. .
Col. GLENN. The militia is a body of men recognized by the Con-
stitution. They are here, and to attempt to make another body per-
form the same functions would be an exceedingly dangerous propo-
sition. Therefore, unless you are going to adopt the only proposition
606 PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
that will give us defense; that is, universal compulsory training, then
I think you should develop your militia by federalizing it and mak-
ing it efficient. It can never be efficient as long as there are 48
States, or even 2 or 3 States, actually controlling it.
Senator FLETCHER. How would you federalize it'.
Col. GLENN. That I have not worked out. & º
The CHAIRMAN. There are constitutional limitations that have to
be considered in that connection.
Col. GLENN. Yes, sir. p -
I was talking to a very progressive militia officer, Maj. Gen. O'Ryan,
of New York. He was at lunch at my house for the purpose of having
a talk on this subject, and he said that the militia and he himself were
opposed to the continental army, and, to be frank with you, I said
Igthought it was a dead duck, and probably would never get into
legislation. But, I said, “It is not fair, as a representative militia-
man, to come out and say you oppose this without offering somethin
in exchange.” I said, “You propose to federalize your Nationa
Guard. Why do you not get some of your bright intellects to present
something to Congress for its consideration that will accomplish that
end ?” Incidentally, I offered to help him on it all that I could.
But I have not had time to devote myself to that subject. I believe
that it can be done. I know if you adopt this system of universal
training you will have an efficient National Guard, because after a
boy becomes 18 years of age, and º the boy who would not
go to college, he will naturally gravitate to the militia for the training,
which you compel him to take, and that in itself will make for .#
ciency, because this gives the General Government a supervision over
the militia and the power to say whether or not that training is in
accordance with what is prescribed by the proposed division of the
General Staff. That is also incorporated in this bill of Senator Cham-
berlain. Does that answer your question, Senator Fletcher?
Senator FLETCHER. Yes; I think so. Have we not now in the
statutes some provision for universal training and even compulsory
service 2
Col. GLENN. I do not know of any. We have this provision, which
I think has been on the statute books since 1792, that every man is
available and can be made to serve, between 18 and 45.
Senator DU PONT. All are liable %
Xol. GLENN. Yes, sir; they are all liable, and in every war where
we have accomplished anything we have gone to the draft, or, failing
in that, we have gone to what we did in the Civil War, to the draft
and to bounties, and all sorts of shameful things, as the result of which
the rich man bought the poor man to do his fighting and to stop the
bullets. I do not know of anything that will degrade a people worse
than that.
Senator DU Pont. I want to ask you one question about the
militia. We are now paying, as you know, several millions a year
to the militia establishments, and the proposition has been made to
increase that to about thirty millions a year so as to pay them.
Col. GLENN. Yes, sir. -
Senator DU PONT. Do you favor that ? Do you think that in-
creased appropriation would be wisely spent 3 -
Col. GLENN. I would like to answer that, without trying to dodge
the question, by saying that if you will spend $25,000,000 the first
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 607
year on your compulsory training proposition, and with that $25,000,-
000 make the purchase of what arms and equipment will be necessary,
based on an estimate of at least 2,000 stand of arms and equipment
for each congressional district and the District of Columbia, which will
cost about $14,000,000, I am satisfied that with the other $11,000,000
you can get all of the instruction that is necessary for the first year,
and I believe that the $25,000,000 a year will practically maintain
your universal training system. Once inaugurate that system and
the question of the expense of your army will not be a very serious
consideration. I have never believed that Federal pay to the militia
unless and until called into the Federal service is constitutional. If
we grant that for efficiency they should receive compensation then
the State authorities and not the Federal Government should be the
paymaster. It has been said that pay is necessary in order to secure
attendance at drills, etc., but I understand that a number of States
actually pay their militia and yet the increase in attendance is rela-
tively insignificant. The figures given me were about 56 per cent
of attendance without pay and about 57 per cent with pay.
Senator CATRON. They say we have about 700,000 stand of arms
now, outside of your Krag-Jørgensens, of which there are about
300,000. Would you recommend that the amount of those rifles
which we should keep on hand should be vastly increased ?
Col. GLENN. Senator, we ought to have at least two, and it would
not hurt if we had three, small arms for every man that we are liable
to have. At least we ought to have 2,000,000 men available within
six weeks if we are going to be safe on One coast alone. -
Senator CATRON. You think we should have 6,000,000 stand of
arms then 7
Col. GLENN. I think so. And let me say right in that connection
that one of our commissary generals, computed and found that for
every ration—that is, a day's food—that was issued to the troops of
the northern army in the Civil War the Government paid for 10.
In other words, they were lost, destroyed, and so on. We have
#. losses in these small arms, and we ought to have a reserve
SUl te
- ºlor CATRON. There is no doubt about that.
Col. GLENN. May I go on and amplify this a little? I limited
myself in my first talk here to the Atlantic coast. In other words,
I łº it to only one nation going to attack us. We know from
the present war that they have coalitions of nations, and we know
that there is in existence to-day a coalition or a treaty, offensive and
defensive, between Japan and England. We also know that Ger-
many and Japan are flirting with each other for a coalition. Taking
the first coalition, at the expiration of this war England will have
4,000,000 thoroughly trained men. Japan has 3,000,000; and they
have the navies. If they attacked us on both seas there is no question
but what a month would settle the proposition of sea control. There-
fore, both of our coasts are thrown open and you have to meet an attack
from 7,000,000 of people. I am mentioning this so that we do not
go and hide our heads under a sand pile and not realize conditions
that may confront us. Four millions of trained men will not begin
to meet that situation. We ought to have not only this reserve
supply of small arms, but we ought to have a good big reserve supply
of the ammunition. We ought to have a good reserve supply for
608 PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
the necessary Field Artillery, which should be enormously increased––
that is, these supplies of arms and ammunition—and we should have
ample ammunition for Our coast defense.
Senator CATRON. In connection with what you said just a while
ago about our using fourteen millions, so that we would have twenty-
five millions for the guns, including these troops, why could not those
guns be used in connection with this necessary supply that should be
kept on hand? -
8. GLENN. I consider those as immediately available.
Senator CATRON. So that it would not be practically necessary to
take fourteen millions out of the twenty-five millions to supply those
guns, anyhow? .
Col: GLENN. Certainly not. - * -
Senator CATRON. Twenty-five millions would make an ample sup-
ply for this army that you propose to raise by compulsion ?
Col. GLENN. Yes, sir.
Senator BECKHAM. Do you think any other power has any other
trained veteran soldiers in this country for any ulterior purpose?
Col GLENN. They have always had them.
Senator BECKHAM. For a purpose, you think? -
Col. GLENN. Of course for a purpose. Our Government ought to
do the same thing. We ought to have experts everywhere, and they
ought to be there secretly.
Senator BECKHAM. I am not referring to the spy system.
Col. GLENN. I am talking about experts. I do not care in what
form they go there, but we ought to have them scattered everywhere
to get information. You can not make a plan of campaign, you can
not plan a campaign of defense, without knowing what the other fel-
low has and what he is most likely to do. -
Senator BECKHAM. I mean, has any other country such a large
number of its reserves or trained soldiers in this country that they
would figure on using them in this country as such in the event of
War?
Col. GLENN. That, of course, would be mere speculative opinion
We know that there are a great many reservists in this country of all
nations. For instance, I understood the Greeks sent back 45,000 of
theirs from this country, and I have reason to believe there were as
many as 140,000 or more of German reservists. There, are a great
#. English reservists, and Japan has about 70,000 in the Hawaiian
Sla,Il ClS.
Senator DU Pont. And an enormous number of Italian reservists?
Col. GLENN. Yes; an immense number.
º CHAIRMAN. And all that could went back to the colors, as a
rule 3
Col. GLENN. Yes, sir. I think that can be stated safely, as a gem-
eral proposition.
Senator FLETCHER. Would you recommend strengthening the fort
at Key West ?
Col. GLENN. I would not say offhand just what Key West needs,
in so far as fixed armament is concerned, but I do say this, that Key
West is not protected with a mobile army, and without a mobile army
your defenses are of no permanent value. I simply hark back to my
original statement, that it is a menace to the country to go on pro-
viding coast defense armament without having something to protect
PREPAREDINESS FOR, NATIONAL DEFENSE. 609
it after you have it. We have for the first time in the past year and a
half, since I have been chief of staff of the Department of the East,
been making a very careful study of the coast defenses of our depart-
ment, so far as the coast defense was concerned. I mean by that the
harbor defenses. They extend from Portland, Me., to Galveston.
We have had every available man at work on this, including the
Engineers and the Coast Artillery, and such Cavalry as we could send
around, with the limited amount of money we had for the purpose,
and we recommended for Key West eight mortars, four 3-inch and
tº inch guns. I could not, of course, carry these details in my
€8,01.
Senator DU PONT. Colonel, do you consider the Delaware Break-
water, which is entirely undefended, as a very important point if in
possession of an enemy operating against † phia and Washing-
ton 3 - .-
Col. GLENN. We know that; yes, sir. This study I have before me
here relates to the mobile army troops that are required for the
close-in protection to which I referred a while ago, and I think it
might interest you to know that we call for 29% regiments of Infantry
alone in our department, and we call for 409 machine guns, 273 field
pieces, 22 siege pieces, 64 antiaircraft guns, 66 aeroplanes, and 44
portable searchlights. That gives you an idea of what we think is
necessary for that close-in defense. -
Senator DUPONT. Colonel, have you considered the question of the
deepening and enlarging of the Delaware & Chesapeake Canal, so that
troops and Smaller naval vessels could pass from one bay to the
other 7
Col. GLENN. That would not come before our board.
Senator DU PONT. It is a military proposition, though.
Col. GLENN. Yes; it is a military proposition. I am told by Capt.
Kilbourne that that came up while I was away, and I am not familiar
with it. But it should be considered, I can state that; and it should
be considered carefully. I want to emphasize the fact that this is
the first time, to my knowledge, when this matter—the most im-
portant matter we could consider has been taken up intelligently
outside of the General Staff.
Senator DU PONT. I think it is a very important thing, and I am
very glad to hear that the department is taking it up. *
ol. GLENN. I think you were shown the other day by Gen. Wood
the defense of Boston alone. The amount of work that has been put on
that is perfectly enormous, and it requires a good deal of expense,
and I can say, from the standpoint of the man who has had to look
after it—from that standpoint that has made me spend some sleepless
nights, as to how I could send a man to this place and that place,
when the Government had no money. We had to get a good many of
them to use their own machines at their own expense to carry on
this most important work that has ever been attended to.
The CHAIRMAN. Colonel, is there anything you desire to submit
further 3
Col. GLENN. I want to repeat, for the last time, that I am sure
that the only salvation for this country and our democratic institu-
tions is immediate compulsory training of our people. I think it has
the backing of the people; or to put it differently, the sentiment of
610 PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSF.
the people, certainly east of the Allegheny Mountains, is very strongly
in favor of it. -
Senator FLETCHER. Your opinion is that this conflict on the other
side is not going to end war? - -
Col. GLENN. Irrespective of that, Senator, I believe that we should
have a reasonable preparation for any contingency, just as a ship
going to sea should prepare for the safety of its passengers. It should
have the necessary lifeboats and other life-saving devices, not as
against any particular storm, because they do not know where it is
going to break loose. In the past 20 years there has not been a
ear that some one or more of tºº. civilized nations of the world
as not been at war; in other words, we are in a period of wars, and I
believe that our wealth has become a menace and will become a
greater menace as the demands of other people become greater.
Where the storm will break loose no one can tell.
Senator FLETCHER. A statement was made to-day on the floor of
the Senate by Senator La Follette, in substance that he recently ad-
dressed a meeting of over 7,000 people, who came without any direc-
tion or prearrangement or anything like that to attend the meeting,
made up from the Dakotas, Wisconsin, Iowa, and perhaps some from
Nebraska, and that there was practically unanimous condemnation
of the President's message on preparedness. -
Col. GLENN. Yes, sir; and let me say in that connection that, in my
opinion, this is based absolutely and totally on ignorance. And let
me go further and say to you that I believe you are confronted with
a duty that should raise you above the common clatter and clamor of
the ignorant and the pacifist, because I do not believe they know
what they talk about; I do not believe they realize the conditions
that confront us, or the dangers that lurk in our path. ... I believe that
certainly the legislative body of this country does have a pretty
accurate comprehension of it, and therefore, in my opinion, the duty,
So far as you are concerned, is plain and simple, and that is, secure for
us the simplest, best, and most economic system that fits in with our
institutions, and there is no system that has been presented, aside
from this compulsory training, that is not a violation of the funda–
mentals of a democracy. That is my position exactly, and I believe,
as I have told you, that the sentiment, certainly east of the Allegheny
Mountains, is in favor of it. I believe if you once adopt it that within
two years everybody—because the mothers will get behind it—will be
behind it. - -
Senator FLETCHER. Do I understand your view to be that there is
not only a question of insurance, in effect, involved, but really a
question of positive danger in failing to make proper preparation ?
Col. GIENN. There is no question about the danger; there is not a
particle of question about it. Itealizing somewhat the terrible condi-
tions that will confront our people if the country is once occupied by
a hostile army, and especially an army that has hard and fast rules,
such as the Germans have always applied in occupied territory,
which is published in numberless books, I urge you gentlemen to
take some positive steps to insure what we ought to have.
Senator LEE of Maryland. Mr. Chairman, I should like to ask the
colonel one or two questions.
The CHAIRMAN. You may do so, Senator.
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 611
Senator LEE of Maryland. Colonel, has not the experience in this
war raised quite a contest between what is known as guns of position
and guns of concealed position ? -
Col. GLENN. Yes, sir, and I am very glad you asked that question.
I think when we consider the question of armament our immediate
attention should be devoted to developing the heaviest armament
that we can possibly use on movable cars, both railroad cars and
auto-driven cars. - -
In this connection I invite your attention to the following memo-
randum prepared by the War College Division of the General Staff
on the following subjects: -
Influence of forts and fortified cities as distinguished from intrenched areas upon
Operations on land. - -
Influence of Seacoast fortifications with particular reference to attack by allied
fleet on Dardanelles fortifications.
Summary of attempt to take Dardanelles fortifications by mobile troops.
In this brochure will be found information not only upon the sub-
ject under consideration, but also upon the disembarkation of a
mobile expedition which has been previously discussed in this hear-
ing. You will note that this was prepared before the allied troops
had been withdrawn from the Gallipoli Peninsula.
FORTIFICATIONs.
I. INTRODUCTION.
In a memorandum from the Chief of Staff dated November 15, 1915, directions were
given for the preparation of a brochure upon the subject of “Fortifications,” with sole
reference to the present European War, given especial attention to the following
oints: - *
p (a) What influence forts and fortified cities, as distinguished from intrenched areas,
have exerted on the operations on land. º
(b) Influence of Seacoast fortifications with particular reference to the attack of the
allied fleet against the fortifications of the Dardanelles. Give in detail the total arm-
ament, with calibers of arms of the fleet as well as of the land forts, and the losses in
personnel and material suffered by both fleets and forts.
(c) A brief summary of the attempt to take these forts by the operation of the mobile
troops, the number of mobile troops as near as can be determined used to date, both
in the attack and in the defense, with total losses. - -
This has been done as far as practicable with the data now availing, and the results
are noted in the following paragraphs.
1. Influence of forts and ſortified cities, as distinguished from intrenched areas, upon
operations on land. -
Fortifications of Liege.—At the outbreak of the present European War, the Germans
in their march through Belgium were on the evening of August 4, 1914, closing in on
Liege, which lies astride the Meuse River near the eastern boundary of Belgium.
The fortifications of Liege had been constructed by Brialment, a Belgian officer, who
also designed the fortifications of Namur and Antwerp. They were completed in 1892,
and consisted of a circle of forts commanding the main approaches to the city and about
4 miles therefrom. There were six main forts of the pentagonal type and six Smaller,
triangular in shape; the greatest distance between forts was 7,000 yards and the aver-
age less than 4,000 yards. Each fort had a garrison of about 80 men and an armament
of two 6-inch guns, four 4.7-inch guns, two 8-inch mortars, and three or four quick-fire
guns, the total number of guns in the 12 forts being about 400. It was intended to
construct between the forts lines of trenches and redoubts for infantry and gun pits
for artillery, but this had not been done.
The fort itself consisted of a low mound of concrete or masonry, roofed with concrete,
and covered with earth; a deep ditch surrounded the mound, the top of the latter barely
showing above the margin of the ditch. The top was pierced with circular pits, in
233S0—PT 11—16—4
612 PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
which “cupolas” or gun turrets moved up and down. Within the mound there were
quarters, machinery, stores, etc. g .
When the Germans appeared, the Belgian mobilization was still in progress, and it
is probable that the garrison, instead of being 30,000 as was intended, was only
20,000. The Germans, numbering about 30,000, concentrated the attack on the four
forts at the southeast sector and opened up with field guns on the night of August 4–5.
One of the forts was silenced by this fire on the 5th, and on the 6th the Germans brought
up their 8.4-inch howitzers and probably some 11-inch mortars, outranging the Bel-
gian guns. Shells are said to have gone through 12 feet of concrete. The accurate
firing of the Germans showed that the forts could not long withstand, and in the after-
noon of the 6th the Belgian field force was withdrawn from the city and all the forts
abandoned except the northern ones. The Germans left the remaining forts in peace
until the 13th, when the 11-inch mortars opened on them and by the 15th all had been
captured. The cupolas had been Smashed and shells had penetrated the roofs and
exploded the magazines.
ortifications of Namur and along the French frontier.—Namur was defended by a ring
of nine forts, 2% miles from the city, with an armament similar to that in the Liege
forts. The garrison of 26,000 had prepared the defense of the intervals by intrench
ments and wire entanglements and a vigorous defense was intended, as French help
was expected. The Germans brought up 32 modern siege pieces, including the 42-
centimeter howitzer, its first appearance, and the Austrian 12-inch mortar, and placed
them three miles from the Belgian lines. The attack began August 20. On the
next day the Belgians had to withdraw from the advanced trenches owing to their
inability to reply to the German fire; two forts fell; three others were silenced after
an attack of two hours. On the 23d Namur was occupied and on the 25th the last
fort had fallen. One fort had fired only 10 times and was itself struck by 1,200 shells
fired at the rate of 20 per minute. The speedy fall of Namur came near playing havoc
with the allies' plans, as with the delay caused by its resistance they had intended to
complete the concentration along the Belgian frontier.
Other fortified places, such as Lille, Laon, La Fere, and Rheims, along the north-
eastern French boundary, fell before the advancing Germans without striking a blow.
The advance was on such a broad front that an attempt at defense would have endang-
ered the safety of the garrisons, and it was imperative that the garrisons join the field
army. By August 28 Mauberge of all the northern strongholds alone held out. The
defenses had been brought to a high state of efficiency, the intervals well prepared
with an armored train running on a track encircling the main line of defenses. The
German infantry invested the place August 27, but the siege guns did not go into
action until September 3, . The place fell September 8 with a loss of 40,000 men.
Antwerp.–Antwerp, said to be the second most strongly fortified city of Europe,
encircled by a girdle of 20 permanent forts and 12 earthen redoubts, was in similar
manner quickly reduced by the heavy siege guns. The garrison, beginning to profit
by the lessons learned at Liege and Namur, attempted to keep the enemy's big howit-
zers beyond range of the forts, but were driven back by the superior numbers of the
Germans, whose siege guns were then brought up and quickly demolished the masonry
forts. Thus the garrison was deprived of any further assistance from its larger guns
and, being but poorly entrenched and unable to withstand the overwhelming artillery
fire, was forced back to the inner line, thereby permitting the siege guns to come
within range of the city, which had therefore to be abandoned promptly in order to
prevent its destruction by bombardment.
Verdwm.—Verdun, however, on the eastern French frontier, with a ring of forts 5
miles from the city, is still in the hands of the French, because with a field army
employing earthworks the fortified zone has been largely extended, and the German
howitzers have been kept 6 miles from the forts. The unfortified city of Nancy has
withstood several heavy attacks, being protected by a field army on the hills forming
the “Grand Crown.”
Przemysl and the Russian fortifications.—The Russians invested the fortress of
Przemysl on September 22, 1914, but later the seige was raised and on November 12
it was invested a second time. As the Russians had no heavy siege guns, the siege
resulted in an attempt to starve out the garrison, which succeeded March 22, 1915.
With the return of the Teutonic allies in May, 20 days was sufficient to recapture the
place. The Russians stated that their ammunition supply was low, but it is safe to
assume that the presence of the heavy siege guns with the Germans had a great deal
to do with the recapture.
The fortresses guarding Warsaw and the Russian frontier on the west were quickly
taken during the advance of the Teutonic allies in the summer of 1915, either by
maneuvering the defenders out of them or by bringing up the heavy guns and shatter-
ing the fortifications, as at Novo Georgievsk. The fortress of Ossowetz on the line
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 613
Niemen-Bobr-Narew had a different history. In February, 1915, the Russians fell
back across the Bobr River to the protection of Ossowetz, which stood on the east
bank along a long ridge covered with woods, affording good artillery positions, and
commanding the opposite bank where artillery positions were poor. There were
extensive marshes along the river, but at this time of the year they were frozen.
The Germans at first tried to turn the position, but failing, brought up their heavy
mortars, even the 42-centimeter howitzer. The Russian batteries were so well con-
cealed that the Germans could not locate them and their big guns did no damage.
The Russians silenced several batteries without suffering from their fire. As the warm
weather advanced, the marshes made it difficult to emplace the heavy guns. Ossowetz
did not fall until August 22 in the general Russian retreat after the capture of Warsaw.
The fortified city of the future.—The failure of the forts in the present war is due to
several causes:
First. Being built some years before the war, their position was accurately known to
the enemy, thus losing the advantage of concealment; also, the details of their con-
struction leaked out and guns were especially designed to destroy them.
Second. Their armament had not been kept up to date and was entirely over-
powered by guns of recent construction and of a type unknown to the defense.
Third. The garrisons permitted the enemy to implace his guns within their effective
range, but beyond range of the fort's guns.
The favorable effect of concealment, as a defensive measure, is illustrated by the
operations against OSSowetz, and that of keeping the enemy at a distance by the
operations against Verdun.
The experiences of this war confirm the conclusion reached furing the siege of
Port Arthur in 1904 “that the mounting of large caliber guns in a fort for use against
the siege guns of the enemy is a fatal error.” It would therefore seem preferable to place
the fixed heavy guns in emplacements located in rear of the line of forts, depending
for protection upon concealment rather than masonry or other cover. The forts them-
selves, whether permanent or improvised after the outbreak of war, should be designed
for an infantry garrison only, and the main line of defense should consist of a con-
tinuous system of infantry entrenchments (including machine-gun emplacements),
located in advance of the line of forts. These latter would serve mainly as supporting
points for Organizing a counter attack in case the front were penetrated. -
To check the enemy's advance before his heaviest guns have reached points within
effective range of the city, naval base, or other vital object to be protected, a garrison
sufficiently strong to operate well in advance of the forts, is indispenasble and its
action should be assisted by a long-range fire from the fixed armament which should
be superior in caliber and range to the guns usually supplied to an army in the field.
The guns of the fortress, both fixed and mobile, should be distributed over a large
area and advantage taken of the terrain to Secure concealment, which must be had at
any price. It is important to bear in mind that the number of guns permanently
emplaced should be comparatively small compared with the total heavy armament
of the fortress, or in other words the main reliance will be placed on the mobile guns,
Some of which should be at least as powerful as any the enemy can bring against them.
The fortress of the future should consist of a large area, so organized as to insure ex-
treme mobility both to troops and guns. There will be no conspicuous forts of ma-
sonry and armor. Permanent gun emplacements should be constructed only at im-
portant points with the primary intention of compelling the enemy to lose time in
bringing up his heaviest siege guns. The mobile guns would be located in earthen
emplacements well concealed from the enemy’s observers who might endeavor to
direct fire on them. The point to be emphasized is that unless the garrison be strong
enough in both mobile troops and mobile guns to keep the enemy from breaking
through the line or coming within effective range of the city proper or other vital
point or object to be protected, then there is no hope of offering a prolonged resistance.
In view of the foregoing it is apparent that intrenched areas with mobile troops and
guns are a more dependable protection than a stereotyped system of permanent forts.
2. Influence of seacoast ſortifications with particular reference to the attack by allied fleet
on Dardanelles fortifications.
Description of the Dardanelles.—The western approach to the city of Constantinople
from the Aegean Sea is through the Dardanelles and the Sea of Marmora. The Darda-
nelles (ancient Hellespont) is a long winding channel, 47 miles in length, but the
really narrow portion, extending from the Aegean Sea to the town of Gallipoli, repre-
sents a sea passage of about 33 miles. The passage is at no point wider than 7,000
yards, and at one point, the Narrows, 14 miles from the entrance, it contracts to 1,400
yards. The surface current flows westward into the Aegean at an average speed of
614 PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
1} knots, which is sometimes trebled in the Narrows after strong northerly winds.
The depth in mid-channel varies from 25 to 55 fathoms, and there are shallows at Some
of the bays in the wider sections. Owing to the narrowness, the strong currant, and
the cross currents set up at some of the bays, maneuvering of large vessels is difficult.
The weather is treacherous and uncertain; the prevailing winds for nine months of
the year are northeasterly, but south winds spring up quickly, and blows last from
three to five days. Unfavorable weather and frequent haze and mist were encoun-
tered during the earlier stages of the naval operations. - - -
The long narrow tongue of land to the north is the Gallipoli Peninsula. It has its
greatest width, 12 miles, just above the Narrows or opposite Suvla Bay; it is narrowest
at Bulair, 3 miles; at the Narrows the width is 5 miles. Ships can therefore lie in the
Gulf of Saros and fire across the peninsula. The Asiatic shore of the Dardanelles is
lower than the European. The hills are low and wooded, while on the peninsula, they
are bare and rocky cliffs. On both shores there are heights which give advantage to
defensive artillery, and at the Narrows both shores tower above the ships. . *
Fortifications of the Dardanelles.—The original fortifications were the “Dardanelles
Castles;” the two inner, the “Old Castles,” at the Narrows, were built by the Sultan
Mohammed II, the conqueror of Constantinople in 1462; the two at the entrance, the
“New Castles,” were built in 1659. At the instigation of Great Britain new fortifi-
cations were built in the Narrows between 1864 and 1877. After the peace of San
Stefano in 1878 the Germans designed new fortifications, and all the new fortifications
were armed with Krupp guns.
From the best obtainable information, in the spring of 1915 the armament was as
follows: At the entrance between the towns of Seddel-Bahr near Cape Helles on the
European side and Kum Kale on the Asiatic side, there were four forts or batteries,
two on each side, with an armament of ten 10.2-inch guns, four 9.2-inch guns, and
two 6-inch guns.
Proceeding toward the Narrows, there were on the Asiatic side fortifications on
Dardanes Hill, 4 miles south of the Narrows, and two forts at the Narrows near the
town of Chanak—the whole mounting an armament of four 14-inch guns, six 10.2-inch
guns, one 8.3-inch howitzer, and nine 6-inch guns. On the European side there were
... three batteries South of the town Kilid Bahr at the Narrows, and a number of batteries
on the hills around Kilid Bahr, the total armament being four 14-inch guns, one
11-inch gun, eight 10.2-inch guns, fourteen 9.2-inch guns, fifteen 8.3-inch howitzers,
and twenty-four 6-inch guns. The armament between the entrance and the Narrows
thus amounted to eight 14-inch guns, one 11-inch gun, fourteen 10.2-inch guns, four-
teen 9.2-inch guns, fourteen 8.3-inch howitzers, and thirty-three 6-inch guns. *.
The fortifications extended 4 miles farther north to the line through Nagara, beyond
which the Dardanelles turns to the northeast and broadens out. The armament on
both sides amounted to two 14-inch guns, five 10.2-inch guns, five 9.2-inch guns,
eight 8.3-inch howitzers, and fifteen 6-inch guns, all except six 6-inch guns being on
the Asiatic side.
In addition to the above there were smaller guns to protect mine fields.
From an examination of the chart, it seems that a hostile fleet, after silencing the
guns at the entrance and proceeding toward the Narrows, would be subject to the fire
of the following guns when it had reached a point 4 miles from the Narrows: Ten
14-inch guns, eighteen 10.2-inch guns, eight 9.2-inch guns, twenty-one 8.3-inch
howitzers, and thirty-seven 6-inch guns. . - º
a. Power of the guns: The guns in the batteries vary greatly; alongside old guns
are guns of very great power. The heaviest gun, of which there were 10, the 14-inch
Krupp, with a projectile weighing 1,365 pounds, appears superior to our 14-inch sea-
coast gun with its 1,600-pound projectile, as it has a reported penetration in Krupp
hardened steel armor at 8,000 meters of 20 inches, while our gun has 16.3 inches. Its
life, however, is limited to 80 or 90 rounds, and hence it is probably not as accurate as
ours after firing a number of shots. - - - -
The next heaviest gun is the 11-inch, but there was only one of that caliber. Then
Comes the 10.2-inch, of which there were 29, a gun manufactured some years ago by
the Krupps. It is not as powerful as our 10-inch gun; its projectile weighs 450 pounds
as against Our 575 pounds, and its penetration at 3,000 meters is 6 inches, while our
gun penetrates 9.3 inches at 8,000 meters. The other heavy-caliber gun is 9.2 inches,
of which there were 25, with a projectile weighing 420 pounds, and still more inferior
to our 10-inch gun. - • , .
It is believed that Krupp guns of later pattern were mounted after the outbreak
of hostilities in 1914, and it seems to be certain that heavy mobile howitzers or mortars
were used against the allies. - - • *
b. Character of the batteries: The batteries were built with great care, but groups
were formed of different calibers and types, which rendered serving them difficult
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 615
and slow in action. The emplacements are of concrete and steel with earthen cover,
with guns in embrasures rather than in turrets. There was a modern system of search-
lights, telephones, and range finders, and good communication by roads. They were
generally invisible from the Sea, but their positions were detected by the stone bar-
racks, which were usually close behind them and in full view of passing ships.
One of the batteries was manned entirely by Germans, but the others had Turkish
crews that had been drilled by German officers. The movable howitzer batteries
appeared to have had German coast artillerymen, with German naval officers in
command. - -
Reduction of the forts at the entramce.—On November 3, 1914, the allied fleet bom-
barded the forts at the entrance, but the real, operations began February 19, 1915,
with a fleet of British battleships and cruisers, aided by a strong French squadron.
The attack was at first at long range, to which the forts could not reply, being out-
ranged. In the afternoon the ships closed in and opened fire with the secondary
batteries; the forts returned the fire. The forts on the furopean side were apparently
silenced; one on the Asiatic continued firing. The damage was subsequently found
to be comparatively Small and many of the guns were still intact. fight battleships
were engaged, with a total of 46 guns of major caliber, 30 being 12-inch, and 58 guns’
of minor caliber, from 7.5-inch to 4-inch. The shore guns were ten 10.2-inch, six 9.2-
inch, and two 6-inch. No ship was hit. In general the guns were mounted in open
works near the old masonry castles, with the sea faces protected by earth.
Action against these forts continued until February 25, when the reduction of all
four was completed. In the meantime the new battleship, the Queen Elizabeth, with
eight 15-inch guns and twelve 6-inch guns, had arrived, giving the allies 16 armored
ships of the line, 12 British and 4 I rench. The British casualties had been three
killed and five wounded. Landing parties had been sent ashore as quickly as possible
to complete the work of destruction, but were driven back by the Turks before com-
pleting the job. It was reported by the British that all-forts were completely de-
molished, with the exception of one at Kum Kale. - .
Operations against the forts at the Narrows.—Sweeping operations to clear the channel
of mines and obstructions began february 25, and on March 1 three ships entered the
strait and attacked fort Tardanes with its five 6-inch guns in rectangular turrets on
the military crest of a hill 350 feet high; these were said to be the only Turkish guns
with telescopic sights. Sweeping operations and the attack on Fort Dardanes, with
its outlying smaller batteries, continued until March 5, the French division and the
Queen Elizabeth using indirect fire from the Gulf of Saros on the forts at Kilid Bahr at
the Narrows. An aeroplane ship with seaplanes and aeroplanes accompanied the
fleet; but not a shot hit the forts during the indirect bombardment. According to
the Turks, the aeroplanes did not remain long enough in the air to direct the fire. On
March 8 the Queen Elizabeth entered the strait and fired on Kilid Bahr at 21,000 yards
range. This long-range bombardment of the forts at the Narrows and closer action
by the other ships against the batteries south of the Narrows, together with mine
sweeping, continued until March 18. The ships were hit several times, including
the Queen Elizabelh, which was struck by field guns, but no material damage was done
and the casualties were slight. i ort Dardanes and other concealed batteries near by
were almost daily under the fire of from four or five ships, sixteen 12-inch guns and
forty-eight 6-inch guns being used against five 6-inch guns. No battery on the Turk-
ish side was put permanently out of action. The Turkish casualties, omitting those
in the forts at the entrance, which were heavy, were 23 killed and 10 wounded.
Final attack of March 18.--On March 18 there was a general attack on the Narrows,
participated in by 12 British and 4 French ships, mounting a total of 82 major caliber
guns from 15-inch to 9.2-inch, and 178 minor caliber guns from 7.5-inch to 4-inch. As
stated in paragraph 2, subparagraph 2, “Fortifications of the Dardanclles,’’ pages 4
and 5, the number of guns that the Turks could bring into action against this fleet was
36 major caliber direct-fire guns and 21 howitzers, a total of 57, and 37 minor caliber
guns. In addition there were field pieces and movable heavy howitzers, the number
being indeterminate. In the forenoon the Queen Elizabeth, just inside the entrance,
10% miles from the Narrows, and three older British ships bombarded the forts at the
Narrows, while two other British ships at closer range attacked Dardanes and the
batteries south of the Narrows. Shortly after noon the French division of four ships
advanced to the support of these two ships, taking up a position near KepheZ Point,
3 miles south of the Narrows. A heavy firé was now returned by the forts, but as the
ships were maneuvering in circles, few hits were made. The 10 ships that were en-
gaged at this time mounted 58 major caliber guns. At 1.25 p.m. the forts coased
firing. A fresh British squadron of six ships now arrived to relieve a corresponding
number of ships well within the strait. As this squadron neared Kephez Point,
the other ships turned to withdraw when the French ship, Bowvel, was struck several
times and blew up, the cause of the explosion probably being a drifting mine. The
new squadron continued the advance, attacking in line; the ships just within the
616 - PREPARED NIESS FOR, NATIONAL DEFENSE.
entrance continued the bombardment, but it was manifest that the forts had not been
silenced. Mino-sweeping operations continued, but drifting mines sunk the British
ships Irresistible and Ocean, and a mine and gun fire so badly damaged the Inflexible that
it with difficulty reached the harbor of Mudors, 40 miles away. The French ship
Gawlois was also badly damaged by gun fire. The attack ceased when darkness fell.
The attack had been badly repulsed and was not again renewed. The British
casualties were slight, 61 all told, practically all the crew from the Irresistible and Ocean
being saved; but the French lost nearly the entire crew of the Bowvel. The Turks lost
23 killed and 60 wounded. The 6-inch guns in the turrets at Dardanes, which had
received such a heavy fire, were not damaged; the turrets were hit only three times.
On tho European side three 10-inch guns were put out of action, but three weeks later
all were ready again. The stone barracks in rear of the batteries were destroyed; 86
shells fell in a space 300 feat deep in rear of one battery, but the battery was untouched.
The shells easily penetrated earth, but not one passed through sand parapets. After
March 18 the Turks substituted sand for earth to a large degree in the parapets and
divided up the large interior rooms of the batteries into smaller ones by hollow walls
filled with sand.
Efficiency of seacoast ſortifications.—The operations in the Dardanelles have been the
only instance in this war of a naval attack on Seacoast fortifications, except the minor
attack of the Japanese Navy against the German fortifications at Tsingtau. Elsewhere
by virtue of their existence they have performed their functions of protecting harbors,
fleets, and naval bases. The German fle ºf under the protection of the shore guns has
maintained its existence in spite of the proximity of the superior British fleet.
These operations have emphasized the fact that has boen thoroughly demonstrated
by history that a purely naval attack can not succeed against Seacoast fortifications
adequately armed and manned, and that in such actions the proper function of the
navy is to convoy the army, which will make the attack by j. and to protect its
line of communications. .
Requisites for successful defense.—The forts at the entrance fell and those in the
Narrows were scarcely damaged, though in both cases there was an overwhelming
fire from the ships. The difference in the two cases is this: At the entrance the guns
were outranged and the ships had plenty of Sea room in which to maneuver and bring
the heavy guns to bear, free from danger of mines; in the narrow mined channel of
the Narrows, with both shores lined with guns, some of them equal or nearly so to the
heaviest ship gun, the ships had to come within range and could attack with only a
portion of the force. In such a position a fleet, exposed to fixed and floating mines,
shore torpedoes, and submarines, will fail. The slight damage sustained by the shore
batteries is illustrated by Fort Dardanes, which withstood the fire from the British
ships, admittedly inferior to none in marksmanship. An interior city with its approach
channel protected with well-placed and concealed guns, equal in range to the enemy's
and provided with the accessory means of defense, need not fear capture by bom-
bardment or a run by the forts. A fort on the Seacoast proper, exposed to the fire from
ships at Sea, must have guns of greater range than the ships' guns; otherwise the ships
could silence the guns on shore at their pleasure and under their fire could land troops
to complete the destruction of the forts.
Concealment and dispersion are also necessary. The aeroplane observation of fire
by the Allies does not seem to have neen very efficient, but this can not always be
relied on, and concealment from aerial observation should be obtained. Without
such observation, long range indirect bombardment is worthless. By taking advantage
of the terrain and resorting to dispersion, the amount of concrete might be reduced
and the money thus saved put into more guns.
Necessity for mobile troops.--The power of coast fortifications, to repel a direct attack
by an enemy fleet, is limited to the area within range of their guns, but their influence
is extended considerably farther whenever they cover a base from which submarines
operate. These fortifications must therefore be recognized as of Supreme importance
within the Scope of their proper functions, and this is especially true of a country
possessing an enormous frontage on two oceans. Their paramount value is that they
relieve the navy of the local defense of important harbors or other strategic points
and thus release our seagoing fleet for operations against the enemy on the high Seas
and furnish a refuge for it in the face of overpowering odds. But beyond the sphere
of influence of our Seacoast forts enemy ships may approach the shore with impunity,
and under the cover of their guns may land troops that can then proceed against the
important places defended by the forts or even against the forts themselves, since
they are vulnerable from the land side. With our long coast lines, the guarding of
every possible landing place by seacoast fortifications is out of the question, and
although the development and employment of heavy mobile Seacoast armament along
our coastal railroads will further restrict the landing places open to an enemy, there will
still remain many places affording facilities for landing operations which can only
PR.EPAREDINESS FOR, NATIONAL DEFENSE. 617
be opposed by mobile troops acting without the cooperation of coast artillery. For
these reasons it is evident that there must also be available a mobile force properly
trained, organized, and equipped to send against the enemy at the landing and
defeat him there or at least prevent his advance toward his objective should a landing
be effected. Until we have adequately provided for this dual defense of our coasts,
having full regard to both fixed defenses and mobile troops, our Navy will never be
free to perform its primary function, but will be frittered away in response to clamor
for protection from our coast population. - ,
An illustration of the value of mobile troops in coast defense is afforded by the
Operations at the Dardanelles, described in last subhead, under paragraph 3, page 12,
of this study.
3. Summary of attempt to take Dardanelles fortifications by mobile troops.
Initial delay.—Before the attack of March 18 it had been decided to undertake
operations by land at the Dardanelles. An official French note stated on the 12th
that a force was on its way to the Levant, and Gen. Ian Hamilton was appointed com-
mander of the British force and arrived in time to witness the action of the 18th.
Both the French and British forces had arrived in the harbor of Mudros, on the island
of Lemnos, West of the Dardanelles; but as the British transports had not been loaded
With a view to make a landing in force on a hostile shore and the lack of facilities in
Mudros made redistribution impossible there, they had to be sent back to Alexandria
#. ºading A month was lost, which, it is safe to say, was well employed by the
ll. TRS.
Terrain.—The Gallipoli Peninsula is covered by hills which rise to a height of 1,000
feet. On the Southern end Achi Baba, 600 feet high, dominates the end of the penin-
Sula; just west of the Narrows, Kilid Bahr, 700 feet high, covers the forts from an attack
from the Aegean; and northwest of the Narrows, Sari Bair Mountain reaches a height
of 970 feet. These hills must be taken before an advance can be made to the shores
of the Narrows. The hills do not runin a regular or well-defined direction, and between
the hills there are a confusing number of valleys. The area is practically roadless
and most of it covered with prickly scrub. The sides of the hills are almost vertical.
At the Water's edge there is generally a narrow beach with a steep bank 10 feet high,
and then the rolling hills with their crests 1,000 yards from the beach. Every trail
leading to the beach was covered with one or more machine guns in screened pits
and the roads were covered with field guns in groups of from three to six.
Strength of forces.—The British force consisted of the Twenty-ninth (Regular)
Division, the East Lancashire (Territorial) Division, a naval division of bluejackets
and marines, some Indian troops, and the Australian and New Zealand Corps with
20 battalions of infantry, together with artillery and engineers. The strength was
approximately 100,000. The territorials and colonial troops had been wintering in
Egypt. The French force was about 35,000. The Turks were in greater force and
better posted than was expected. The number on the European side has been given
as over 150,000. Besides they were supported by the Germans.
Allies' plan.—The coast being precipitous, landing places few, and trenches and
entanglements being visible on shipboard at most of them, Gen. Hamilton decided to
throw the whole of his troops very rapidly ashore at a number of places and selected
five beaches at the tip of the peninsula and two on the west coast, near Sari Bair
Mountain, as landing places. He could thus advance up the peninsula or cross it
where it was about 5 miles wide and, obtaining possession of the high hills, secure
observation points whereby the navy could assist in the reduction of the forts.
Landings at South end of Peninsula.—April 25 was the date of the landing. The
Twenty-ninth Division, 20,000 men, was to land at the end of the peninsula at the
five beaches, the three at the tip, near Sedd-el-Bahr, being the main ones. At the
two other places the landing was to take place at dawn, while at the main places the
landings were to be simultaneously at 5.30 a. m., after half an hour's bombardment
by the fleet. The landing parties, covering the advance of the division, were placed
on naval vessels the previous day and before dawn on the 25th were in the small boats
in which they were to be towed ashore. The accompanying Squadron of 4 battle-
ships and 4 cruisers began the preliminary bombardment. At S beach in Morto Bay,
the farthest to the east, three companies (750 men) made a successful landing with a
loss of 50 men and kept the position. On Y beach, the westernmost landing, two
battalions (2,000 men) landed on an undefended beach, but were subsequently
attacked and driven to the boats with heavy losses. On X beach, 3 miles South of
Y beach, one battalion (1,000 men) made a successful landing under cover of the fire
of the Implacable, which stood close inshore, firing with every possible gun, thus
preparing the way for a subsequent force of 2,000 men, which joined hands with the
force landing at W beach, the next to the south. On W beach one battalion (1,000
men) landed on a beach 350 yards long and 15 to 40 yards wide, well protected with
618 PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
intrenchments and entanglements, the latter extending under water. The Turks
reserved their fire until the first boatload of soldiers grounded, and under this fire the
assailants had to make their way through the entanglement. A foothold was gained
and more infantry following, connection was made with X beach. At V beach, west
of Sedd-el-Bahr, the site of the seacoast forts that had previously been reduced by
the navy, a force of about 3,000 attempted to land on a beach 350 yards long by 10
yards wide, overlooked by a natural amphitheater rising back from the beach with
concave slopes. On the very margin of the beach ran a wire entanglement and up
the slopes were two other lines, the whole covered with fire of rifles, machine guns
and pom-poms. Three companies (750 men), landing in Small boats, were almost
annihilated, the survivors obtaining shelter under the lee of a low Sandy bank 4 feet
high, at the inner edge of the beach; the boat crews were all killed. It was intended
to land 2,000 men from a collier, the Clyde, which was to be run ashore, and lighters
used to form a gangway between ship and shore. The attempt failed; of 1,000 men
who left the collier 50 per cent were killed or wounded. Nothing could be done
until night, when the remainder of the infantry from the Clyde went ashore. On the
26th, under cover of the fire from the ships, the troops established themselves on the
crests of the surrounding hills. During the night of the 25th the disembarkation of
the remainder of the Twenty-ninth Division was proceeding on W and X beaches.
Lamding by the Australian-New Zealand Corps.--This corps of 35,000 men landed
north of Gaba Tepe near the foot of Sari Bair Mountain. This rugged and difficult
part of the coast was chosen because it was believed it would be undefended. The
landing was to be a surprise and the preliminary bombardment was omitted. The
covering force of 4,000 men in ships' boats was towed by destroyers to within 500
yards from the beach, which was 1,000 yards long, when the destroyers dropped behind
and steam launches towed the boats in. In the darkness the boats were close to the
shore before they were discovered. About a battalion of Turks disputed the landing,
but they were driven back. The main body came up in the transports and by 2 p.m.
12,000 men and two batteries of mountain artillery were ashore. The Turks promptly
rallied and, reinforced to 20,000 by ll a. m., made Counter attacks. These counter
attacks continued for several days, but with the assistance of the ships' fire the British
maintained their position. On this first day—April 25–29,000 men were landed.
Diversion by the French.--As a diversion to draw the fire of the Asiatic guns from
Sedd-el-Bahr, a regiment of the French corps landed at Kum Kale on the Asiatic
shore on the 25th; but on the 26th they reembarked, after a loss of 754, one-fourth of
its effective strength, and the French corps began landing at W beach. .
Attempts to tdv ºnce.—On Aprll 23 the allies held a line across the peninsula 3 miles
north of Sedd-el-Bahr, and an attempt was made to capture the hill of Achi Baba,
which failed. The troops landing on the west coast also tried to advance, but were
held to a semicircle 1,100 years in diameter from the beach. J.Tere they were holding
open a door to the vital point of the Turkish position and were keeping 24,000 of the
best Turkish troops out of the main action around Sedd-el-Bahr. By May 5 the
landing of the allies was completed. The British official report gives the losses
among the British at this time as 602 officers and 13,377 men, which is about 13.5
per cent of the total estimated force of 100,000. It is estimated that the Turks lost
18,000 in the operations of April 25–27.
May 5 a general advance was attempted against the town of Krithia and the hill of
Achi Baba, but the attack was unsuccessful. May 18 the Turks, estimated at 30,000,
attacked the force at Anzac Cove (the name given to the landing place of the Aus-
tralian-New Zealand Corps, themselves termed “Anzacs”) and were repulsed with a
loss of 7,000, the Anzacs losing 500. To May 31 the British losses were 38,636 (1,722
being officers), the French about 5,000, and the Turkish estimated at 60,000. The
total battle losses of the British in the three years of the Boer war were 38,156. Ac.
cording to a Turkish report at this date, the number of British and French troops
amounted to 90,000. The Turks had received 60,000 reinforcements.
June 4 there was another general attack by the allies from Sedd-el-Bahr; on the
right there were two French divisions, the rest of the line, 4,000 yards, being held
by 24,000 British infantry. The net result was a gain of 200 to 400 yards along a
front of 3 miles. The line then held extended from south of Krithia southeast across
the peninsula, about 4 miles from Sedd-el-Bahr. The appearance of German sub-
marines caused the withdrawal to Mudros Harbor of the transports and the sending
of supplies in small boats. The Turks under Enver Pasha made a general attack in
the vicinity of Krithia June 30–July 2, but accomplished little with a loss of 5,150
. and 15,000 wounded. To July 18 the British losses were 49,283, 2,144 being
O{T, CGI’S.
Landing at Suvla Bay and subsequent operations.—August 7 another landing was
made at Suvla Bay, 4 miles north of Anzac Cove. The landing began at 2 a. m.
on three beaches and by day a force of two divisions was firmly established. The
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 619
Anzac force joined in the attack, the intention being to connect the two forces and cap-
ture the Sari Bair ridge. The attack from Anzac was carried to the Summit of the
ridge, but as the Turks had been heavily reenforced, the attack from Suvla Bay did
not make the expected progress and the line had to fall back. The two forces were
finally joined on a line 12 miles long. The number of men landing at Suvla Bay is
not known; the British speak of it as a fresh army and the Turks estimated it as
70,000. The British losses were heavy; according to the Turks, 30,000. *
According to a German estimate, on August 30 the Allies had from 20,000 to 25,000
troops at Sedd-el-Bahr, of whom 9,000 were French, all that was left of the original
35,000; 9,000 at Anzac Cove, and 70,000 at Suvla Bay. These numbers were not
materially increased after that date, though the losses in the trench warfare since
then had brought the casualties on November 9 to 106,610 among the British. The
Turkish losses are unknown. On December 20 it was announced that the troops
at Suvla Bay and Anzac Cove, about 100,000, had been withdrawn from the peninsula
for service elsewhere; the troops at Sedd-el-Bahr were left there until January 9, 1916,
when they, too, were withdrawn.
Necessity for heavy mobile guns.—Although the Turks had ample warning of the
impending attack with an abundance of men to draw upon and had guarded the
most probable landing places with intrenchments and entanglements, the allies
succeeded in getting ashore. With the limited number of beaches suitable for landing
the Turks apparently had sufficient force to guard everyone, but some were overlooked
and the success of the allies is due partly to that fact. The main reason for the suc-
cess, though, is due to the fire of the covering ships, which could come in close enough
to use all their guns and thus keep down the fire of the Turks. If the Turks had
employed guns heavy enough to stand the ships off the landing would not have taken
place, for experience has shown that even the most powerful naval guns at long range
are unable to put well-concealed shore guns out of action. Even chance hits have
little effect upon the sand or earthen parapets.
It may be accepted, then, as a fact that to prevent a hostile force from landing
there must be, in addition to the usual infantry defense at all the possible landings,
guns of sufficient power to keep the naval vessels at such a distance that their sec-
ondary batteries can not be used. Thus the landing of troops or supplies from ships
at so great a distance from the shore can readily be prevented by the infantry and field
guns. -
In the case of a landing on our coast, the stretch to be covered is so long that it is
impracticable to implace in prepared positions enough of these guns to cover all the
pººl. landing places. It will therefore be necessary to use mobile guns that can
e quickly transported to the point threatened. The quickest method ºf transpor-
tation appears to be a railroad paralleling the beach from which spurs could be run
to points near enough to the front to keep ships at about 8,000 yards from the shore.
The railroad, spur tracks, and gun locations should be prepared in time of peace.
The value of mobile troops in coast defense.—After the allies had succeeded in the
landing operations and had assembled on the peninsula the entire expeditionary
force, their further advance was small, and, after maintaining a position near the
water's edge for over nine months, the force was withdrawn. The reason for the fail-
ure appears to be threefold: First, the size of the Turkish force was underestimated
and an insufficient number of troops was sent at first, and these troops were not suffi-
ciently reenforced; second, the terrain was favorable to the Turks; third, most impor-
tant of all, the Turks had sufficient troops to prevent the allies from advancing.
Considering our own requirements, it should be noted that the terrain along our
Atlantic coast is not so favorable to the defense as that of the Gallipoli Peninsula,
as the landing beaches are numerous and extensive and the ground in rear is gen-
erally favorable for an advance. Moreover, our coast is too extended to permit the
preparation of defenses in advance at all possible landing places. There is conse-
quently the more necessity for mobile troops.
With a well trained and equipped force equal or superior to the force that had
Succeeded in landing, the operation on the Gallipoli Peninsula lead us to believe
that an advance from the beach away from the cover of the ships can be prevented,
but without such a force, once the outer line of defense at the beach has been pene-
trated, the forces must be withdrawn to some thoroughly prepared position covering
the objective of the enemy. . Unless such a position of suitable extent has been pre-
pared in advance further resistance is hopeless.
Senator IEE of Maryland. What is the present equipment of the
Army in guns capable of being made guns of concealed position :
Col. GLENN. We have not developed anything in that line yet;
but, as I understand it, the Germans have used up to the 42-centi-
meter gun, and I say that the guns that are movable ought to be used
620 PREPAREDNIESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
in preference to the fixed armament. I am opposed to the present
plan of building these tremendous concrete works for our present
coast defenses. I saw plans recently for one of these, and I am
opposed to it for this reason: If you have never been into one of our
coast defenses, or if you have, you will appreciate at once what I
say. We build a tremendous body of concrete, and in front of that
we put a certain amount of dirt and try to conceal it as much as possi-
ble. I believe with the long range and plunging fire if one of those
shells should strike one of these masses of concrète—and the history
of this war shows that the German guns penetrate 12 feet of this
concrete—the effect of this strike would be to practically kill all the
gunners who are manning this gun. Instead of that, I think we should
use sand or the natural earth, which would reduce the resistance
enormously. The plans I saw recently, and which I think should
not be carried out, called for an engineering project alone which cost
something like $1,800,000, and I do not #. to say—and the
coast artillerymen down there agree with me—that that ought to be
done for $300,000 at the outside, in other words, the balance of
that, in my opinion, is a waste of money. That is carried on every
time you put in these permanent defenses.
jºr DU Pont. That shows the necessity of a council of national
defense.
Col. GLENN. Absolutely. That is what I had in mind when I was
talking about it. It would save millions of money for us.
Senator CATRON. You think those heavy concrete bases are not
necessary? -
Col. GLENN. They are not necessary, in my opinion, and in many
cases constitute a menace. I know that the leaders of thought in the
Coast Artillery are very much opposed to this, and the experience
abroad is against it.
Senator CATRON. How would you fix or locate one of these 16-inch
guns'. We have one that is going to be sent down to Panama, but
there is a proposition to make others of them. What kind of a
foundation would you put them on ?
Col. GLENN. A concrete base; but I am talking about the protec-
tion from the front. I think we ought to have a concrete base, or
something else that is equally as good. In my opinion the great
trouble with our guns now is not the range of the guns, but the fact
that by our carriages we are limiting the range. We can not give
sufficient elevation.
There is one other thing I invite attention to. I disagree with the
methods we are pursuing with reference to the defense of our outly-
ing possessions. I think it is a dangerous policy. I refer to the
question of determining the number and character of our defenses
and to the fixing of the number of troops required. As to the first,
we do not get together the experts of the Army and Navy and do
not devote sufficient time and study to the determination of all the
details entering into the problem. As to the second, or the number
of troops necessary, we, including our General Staff, have been ultra
conservative and have recommended an irreducible minimum, which
is too many to sacrifice and too few to accomplish the purpose
assigned them.
I want to illustrate with the Panama Canal, with which I am very
familiar, because I have just come from there. We established a lot of
defenses down there and, as I say, constructed some trenches, and it

PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 621
was given out and generally believed in Army circles, I think, that
the jungle on either side of the canal was going to be the great safety
for us. I looked into that matter, and the place where the jungle was
considered worst or most impenetrable was on the west side of the
Pacific entrance, up toward what is called Chorera. I found that
every Army officer down there scouted the idea that it was an impene-
trable jungle, and I finally met Capt. Cone, of the Navy, who was down
there, and asked him about it. e Smiled and said, “I go out hunting
every Sunday—deer hunting—and the only precaution I take is to
take a bolo so that I can cut a vine occasionally that gets in my way.
But we chase these deer with dogs, and the natives get along through
there just as fast as the dogs. I can not quite keep up with them.”
But, he said, “I manage to get out at the proper time and get through
this jungle.” The day before I left down there he killed three. I
examined the country east of the Pacific entrance, and for fully 35
or 40 miles the country is a rolling prairie country. . I saw many
fººds of cattle and horses roaming over this and feeding, fat as
utter. -
To illustrate the danger, I noticed that Gen. Wood testified here
the other day that we should have 15,000 troops there; for my own
information, I asked every single field officer down there, and every-
body who has been making a special study under Gen. Edwards,
how many troops it would take to defend the canal. There was not
a man but . it would take at least a division, that is, 20,000.
Quite a sprinkling of them said it would take twice that number, and
I remarked that I had heard that the Kaiser said it would take 50,000.
Those are the conditions that we have to study, and they have not
been studied carefully, and they can not be resolved by you; it is
not your function to study those details. They all ought to be
worked out so that when the matter is presented here by your coun-
cil of defense it can all be explained, and if you want to go into the
details, if anybody wants to do it, they can be quickly explained.
Of course, Panama is an intensely valuable foreign possession.
Even if our Government does not use the canal, we want to hold it and
keep the other fellow from using it to go back and forth. The fact is
that we must do one of two things: We must either decide that we
are not going to hold those foreign possessions, and therefore put in
just the smallest force that we can, that we think we can afford to
lose, or else we have to make a careful study of it and put in a force
that will actually hold it for the time required. It has to be studied,
not only by Army men, but by Navy men and jointly.
Senator CATRON. Could landings be made north or south of the
mouth of the canal a sufficient distance away from our batteries
to be out of their range.
Col. GLENN. Yes, sir. . -
Senator CATRON. So as to get on land and march troops down at
different points. As far as the jungle is concerned, they could go
through that and go along?
Col. GLENN. Oh, yes. The trenches that were selected down there,
and some of which have been established, are less than 2 miles from
the vulnerable parts—the locks. An enemy, of course, could ap-
proach within 2 miles, or probably a mile, of these trenches and find
suitable ground on which to place his 6-inch guns, and that is the
smallest the navy would bring there. Those locks would not last
10 minutes after the 6-inch guns got into play, or even smaller guns
622 PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
Senator DU PONT. The canal would be ruined 3 . .
- Col. GLENN. Oh, yes; would be absolutely knocked out. Unless
we make some changes to protect the Gatun spillway, I think a
foreign navy could come in there and knock that into bits without
being in any danger from our coast defenses; and, in So far as this
latter is concerned, we ought to have a railroad running down to the
mouth of the Chagres on which we could use heavy mobile guns. .
I have not positively made up my mind to this effect, but I am
inclined to think that the best solution would be to induce American
citizens to go in there and cultivate the land, making their homes
in the Zone on either side of the canal.
Senator CATRON. Could they stand the climate there?
Col. GLENN. Yes, sir. . - - t;
Senator CATRON. We have 5 miles on either side, have we not
Col. GLENN. Yes. - . . . . . . . . . .
- Senator CATRON. Is the land on both sides susceptible of culti-
Vation ? . . . . . . . • * , . - . . . .
Col. GLENN. Yes, sir, the great bulk of it is.
Senator CATRON. If that is the case, an army could come down
there and land on the canal, and we would have to have a line of
trenches the full length on either side to make any substantial oppo-
sition, and the men to fill them. No fifteen or twenty or thirty
thousand men could do that.
Col. GLENN. We have to have men enough to go out and meet the
enemy at his landing places and, so far as the Pacific end is concerned,
I think we ought to establish some armament down in the Pearl
Islands. -
I want to call attention to a paper that was handed to me in
connection with this English enlistment which I neglected to men-
tion. I would like to have it inserted in the record, and to state
briefly in connection with it that our information is that in Jºngland
the principal men—Lord Asquith, Lord Kitchener, and Lord Derby—
have not been altogether frank about this matter of enlistment, and,
as history shows, they have already gone to compulsory training.
What happened was this: They have had a complete registration of
every male inhabitant of the country, and then they sent out their
recruiters to every single man who had not enlisted, who called on
him for his reasons for not enlisting, and were instructed to induce him
if possible to join the army, and they make special mention in this cir-
cular of getting them, if possible, to come into the infantry. I am not
introducing this for anything further than to show the dire stress. I
do not know myself why they call for infantry, except that I assume
that some conditions have prevented England from securing that
number of infantry that is necessary to keep her fighting force up to
the proper proportion. The paragraph to which I refer reads as
follows: •
Canvassers must endeavor to get all the men they possibly can for the infantry.
It is infantry that is required to maintain the armies in the field, and the issue
of the War largely depends on this arm. They should be told that their services are
equally useful whether they join the regular, new, special reserve, or territorial force.
The CHAIRMAN. Colonel, we are very much obliged to you.
(Thereupon, at 5 o'clock p. m., the committee took a recess until
tomorrow, Friday, January 28, 1916, at 10.30 o'clock a. m.)
X
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
FRIDAY, JANUARY 28, 1916.
UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON MILITARY AFFAIRs.
|Washington, D. C.
The committee met, at the expiration of the recess, at 10.30
o'clock a. m., Senator Geo. E. Chamberlain (chairman) presiding.
STATEMENT OF MAJ. GEN. JAMES B. ALESHIRE, QUARTER-
MASTER GENERAL, UNITED STATES ARMY.
The CHAIRMAN. Gen. Aleshire, you testified at considerable length
before the House committee this week, did you not
Gen. ALESHIRE. Last week, Senator. - -
The CHAIRMAN. Of course, the hearings before the House committee
will be accessible to this committee, but we would like to hear from
you along such lines as you care to make a presentation, either cover-
ing the #. hearings or adding to them, as you may see fit, with
reference to the needs of your department in this Army reorganiza-
tion scheme. - - .
Gen. ALESHIRE. I will address myself to the provision, Senate
print, of the bill as regalds the number of officers required in the
Quartermaster Corps.
The CHAIRMAN. To which particular bill do you refer? . .
Gen. ALESHIRE. I refer to the so-called Chamberlain bill. That
bill provides for 259 officers in the Quartermaster Corps. I have
recommended that the number be increased to 300. That is 41 offi-
cers in excess of the number carried by the bill and 113 officers in
excess of the number authorized by law at this time.
Of these 113 officers, 49 are required for the Army at the present
strength, and these additional officers are required for the reason
that new conditions have presented themselves and developed addi-
tional duties for the Quartermaster Corps during the last two or
three years.
Among those new conditions are the changes that have been made
in the Canal Zone. On June 30, 1911, there were 29 officers and 797
enlisted men in the Canal Zone. At this time there are 188 officers
and 6,110 men, and I understand that the ultimate strength of the
troops in the Canal Zone will be 243 officers and 8,149 enlisted men.
We require additional officers in the Canal Zone, and the present
number will not permit their assignment.
Senator WARREN. Are you predicating these numbers upon the
increase that is asked for in the bill to which you are referring?
623
624 PREPARTEDIN ESS FOR NATIONAL D]2PENSE.
Gen. ALESHIRE. No, Senator; I am predicating this request for 49
additional officers on existing conditions to-day, with the present
strength of the Army.
Senator WARREN. But the second addition you speak of ?
Gen. ALESHIRE. Oh, yes; the 64 on the proposed increase, such as
indicated in the Chamberlain bill.
Senator WARREN. Then, Mr. Chairman, may we understand that
in his figures he is covering the increase of the Regular Army 7
Gen. ALESHIRE. For the proposed increase.
Senator WARREN. And the reserve will be taken up separately, I
suppose? ... " . . . .
p en. ALESHIRE, Yes, sir. In other words, 113 officers in addition
to the present strength are asked for—41 in addition to the provision
made in the Chamberlain bill.
Senator DU Pont. Are these 113 officers for the Quartermaster
Department 7
Gen. ALESHIRE. Yes, sir. Of the 113 in excess of the present
authorized number, 49 of them are required for the Army at its
present strength, because of the general conditions, new conditions
that have developed, one of which I have stated.
In the Hawaiian department, similar conditions exist. There were
on June 30, 1911, 117 officers and 2,013 men. At present there are
308 officers and 9,310 men, and the ultimate strength is to be 479
officers and 15,362 men.
Instruction camps of Organized Militia require representatives of
the Quartermaster Corps, and we have not a sufficient number of
officers to send them. Last year the duties pertaining to the Quarter-
master Corps at those camps were performed by line officers. The
students’ camps and the business men's camp take the time of the
officers of the Quartermaster Corps. We can not furnish officers for
that purpose. That requires three or four months' time of the year
of three or four officers. .
The CHAIRMAN. The bill you are now discussing contemplates an
army of about 200,000 men.
Gen. ALESHIRE. Yes, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. But assume that a bill were reported out of this
committee providing for only 150,000 men; would you still need that
increase ?
Gen. ALESHIRE. I would want this 49, if you did not increase the
Army at all, and I would want an officer for each additional post that
was occupied in addition to the number we now occupy. I have
determined the number of officers approximately based on existing
conditions and number of posts now occupied, and I have assume
that new posts, if any be built, would not be for less than a regiment.
The CHAIRMAN. What have you to say with reference to the
Philippines? -
Gen. ALESHIRE. We have sufficient officers in the Philippines for
the present garrison. There is no material increase in the garrison
contemplated in the Philippine Islands.
Coast defense districts and coast defense commands. There are
30 commands. We should have an officer in each command, at the
headquarters of each command. We have only eight officers so
assigned. That leaves us 22 officers short there.
The CHAIRMAN. As at present constituted .
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 625
Gen. ALESHIRE. Yes, sir.
Senator DU PONT. Are these coast-defense districts of the same
size, with the same number of troops in each'
Gen. ALESHIRE. I do not know about that, Senator.
Senator DU PONT. Then why should you have an officer, irrespec-
tive of the size of the garrison?
Gen. ALESHIRE. Because the general policy of the War Depart-
ment is not to have a line officer or a coast artillery officer acting as
quartermaster and receipting for funds and property. We have to
have a representative of the corps there, a regular officer.
Senator DU PONT. Very well, if you carry that out. Suppose
you had only one company, or two companies, of Coast Artillery.
There is a limit, it seems to me. tº
Gen. ALESHIRE. There are more than that in a coast defense
Command.
Senator DU PONT. But it seems to me that the officers of the
Quartermaster Department ought to be members of the garrison.
The Coast Artillery districts are determined by military reasons.
They have nothing to do with staff reasons. Some must be larger
and some smaller. There is no reason why one officer of the Quarter-
master Department could not take in, possibly, two small Coast
Artillery districts. In other words, you are predicating that an officer
of your corps is necessary for a district which is constituted not with
reference to supplying the troops, but with reference to an entirely
different thing. It seems to me that is illogical.
Gen. ALESHIRE. I am only trying to carry out the policy of the War
Department in that regard. ...t
Senator DU PONT. # do not care whose policy it is; I am simply
saying that I think the policy is illogical.
Gen. ALESHIRE. There are 6 districts and there are 30 commands.
There are 170 companies of Coast Artillery. If you would divide the
170 companies of Coast Artillery among the 30 commands, you would
have between 5 and 6 companies in a command. It seems to me
that we should have an officer of the Quartermaster Corps to take
charge of the property and funds, and that is all that I am asking for.
Senator DU Pont. If they were divided numerically . *
Gen. ALESHIRE. We are asking a sufficient number of officers, so
that we may assign one to each Coast Artillery command, of which
there are 30. We now have 8 officers assigned, an officer each to 8
of these 30 commands, which leaves 22 more officers we would require
for the Coast Artillery commands.
Senator DU PONT. Do you know whether the Coast Artillery com-
mands constitute the same number of companies :
Gen. ALESHIRE. I do not. - -
Senator DU PONT. That is the whole point that I am making.
Gen. ALESHIRE. But there is more than one post in a command.
Senator DU PONT. That is perfectly true. -
Gen. ALESHIRE. And even on this basis, of an officer to each Coast
Artillery Command, that officer will have money responsibility and
property responsibility at places where he is not stationed, and it
seems to me we are putting a good deal on an officer to do even that.
I believe in an officer being present at the station at which he has
money accountability and property accountability.
Senator DU Pont. I do, too.
626 PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
The CHAIRMAN. As at present constituted, in 6 of the 30 commands
you say you have 6 officers ?
Gen. ALESHIRE. Eight officers assigned.
The CHAIRMAN. Does that necessitate some officer of the line acting
in the capacity of quartermaster 7 -
Gen. ALESHIRE. Yes, sir; Coast Artillery officers are acting in all
the other commands.
Senator WARREN. That costs as much, so far as service is con-
cerned, in the long run, as if you had the proper officers there 7
Gen. ALESHIRE. Yes, sir. - *
Senator WARREN. And it takes the time of the men of the line.
Senator DU Pont. It takes them away from their appropriate duties.
That is the great point.
Gen. ALESHIRE. In changing officers of the Quartermaster Corps
on duty at foreign stations, the number of officers is so limited, so small
that we have to relieve an officer from his station in the United States
and perhaps request that a line officer be assigned to that station
to relieve the officer under orders for foreign service and transfer the
property and the funds to him temporarily; or else take an officer out
of a Quartermaster's office, or some nearby depot, or where there are
two or more officers at a post, or station, and send him to the post or
station from which the officer who is to go to the foreign station is to
be withdrawn, and have the property and the funds transferred
temporarily until the officer from the Philippines or some other
foreign station returns to the post and takes that place. It keeps
from three to half a dozen officers constantly shifting property and
occupying temporary stations.
The other conditions that have developed include the question of
leave. We rarely ever grant a leave of absence to an officer except
in unusual circumstances, or else where an officer is changing his
station, he may be permitted to take leave pending the interval of
; from one station to another. We have only two officers on
sick leave now. Of course, we can never deny sick leave recom-
mended on a surgeon's certificate.
The CHAIRMAN. That is because of your shortage 7
Gen. ALESHIRE. Shortage of officers. All of this explanation is
with a view to informing you why we should have 49 more officers now,
without regard to any increase. r -
We have five retired officers on duty as quartermasters at posts
from which the troops have been withdrawn. They answer the
purpose fairly well at those posts, but we can not use them at posts
where there is a garrison, because under the law they can not com-
mand troops.
Senator DU PONT. Will you please explain that ? Does a quarter-
master have to command troops?
Gen. ALESHIRE. He would have to exercise some command. He
would have to exercise some command over the enlisted men of the
Quartermaster Corps. I should think he ought to be an officer who
could exercise command, give orders, to any enlisted man.
Senator DU PONT. Has there been a decision about that by the
Judge Advocate General'.
Gen. ALESHIRE. The law, I think, specifically states that a retired
officer may be assigned to duty where there is no command of enlisted
men exercised.
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 627
Senator DU PONT. I do not remember any such provision as that.
He can not command troops, but a quartermaster at a post, it seems
to me, incidentally has control over the employees of his department,
of course. I do not believe that the law was intended to cover that.
Has there ever been a decision of the Judge Advocate General'.
Gen. ALESHIRE. The opinion of the Judge Advocate General is to
the effect I have stated. - -
Senator DU PONT. Then the law ought to be changed.
Senator WARREN. At most of these posts are there not small
garrisons?
Gen. ALESHIRE. There are.
Senator WARREN. A dozen or 15 or 20%
Gen. ALESHIRE. Yes, sir.
Senator WARREN. I think at every one I know of there are troops
outside of those working in the Quartermaster's Department.
Gen. ALESHIRE. Yes; but he is very careful not to violate the law
as interpreted by the Judge Advocate General's opinion. He is
there in charge of the property and the money, that is all.
Senator DU PONT. Do you not think there may be a number of
officers from time to time who are retired—for instance, a man who
had some physical injury to his leg or arm—who would be perfectly
competent to perform duties in the Quartermaster's Department if
the law permitted it .
Gen. ALESHIRE. There are some. I do not believe there is any
great number.
Senator DU PONT. No; but there are someº
Gen. ALESHIRE. Some; yes. -
Senator DU Pont. Do you not believe it is to the interest of the
Government to utilize, as far as possible, all those retired officers?
Gen. ALESHIRE. I do.
Senator DU Pont. Do you not therefore think that if the law pre-
vents you from utilizing, say, the services of a few officers, it should
be changed so as to enable you to do it?
The CHAIRMAN. Here is the law in question:
Officers retired from active service shall be withdrawn from command and from
the line of promotion.
That is section 1255 of the Revised Statutes.
Gen. ALESHIRE. The law i had in mind is the one that provides
that they may be assigned to recruiting duties, and duties of that sort.
Senator WARREN. That regulates the salary, etc.?
Gen. ALESHIRE. Yes.
Senator DU Pont. I would like to see the text of that law. It has
always struck me that there was a disposition not to utilize the
services of retired officers. I do not mean in your department, but a
general disposition in the Army, and I do not believe that is to the
true interests of the Government. º
Gen. ALESHIRE. The law further provides that you can make use
of them when it is agreeable to them. -
Senator DU PONT. Yes; I know. That is a bad feature in the law,
certainly in time of war.
Senator WARREN (interposing). I do not understand that is
effective in war.
Senator DU PONT. What is not effective .
Senator WARREN. That is, that a retired officer can not be used.
628 PREPAREDINESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
Senator DU Pont. No; but this is a different line of thought.
Gen. Aleshire, do you not think that in time of actual or threatened
hostilities the law should be changed so as to give the President the
right of ordering any officer to perform any duty that he is com-
petent to perform and physically able to perform 7
Gen. ALESHIRE. Yes, sir; I do. I should think, though, in that
case there ought to be some consideration shown the retired officer.
If you should call him into active duty with his retired grade, he would
then be performing active duty junior to many officers to whom he
was senior, perhaps, when he was retired.
There are 37 mobile Army posts at which we have line officers on
duty as quartermasters.
The CHAIRMAN. In continental United States? -
Gen. ALESHIRE. Yes, sir. We would like to have officers sent to
certain business concerns, manufactories, packing houses, and other
similar establishments, for the purposes of instruction. We have a
few such officers now in the corps (those who have received such
instruction), but their terms will soon expire, and we will be without
any, and we can not spare others from the present number for
instruction.
The CHAIRMAN. Why?
Gen. ALESHIRE. We have not enough. -
The CHAIRMAN. Are not the places of those who are retiring filled
from the lower grade 3 -
Gen. ALESHIRE. Yes, sir. I do not mean there are six receiving
this instruction now; there are six who have had the instruction.
With the present number of officers we can not spare six officers to
take the desired instruction.
Senator DU PONT. To what instruction do you refer'.
Gen. ALESHIRE. Let them observe the method of slaughtering beef,
acking beef, canning fruits, vegetables, fish, and all such supplies.
e also have sent one or two officers to manufactories of automo-
biles, motor trucks, several places of that sort, of that general char-
acter, a knowledge of which we would like to have an officer have.
The CHAIRMAN. What is the use of that ? Can not your inspecting
officer, when the goods are offered for purchase, inspect the goods
just as well and results be determined as from an examination of the
packing?
Gen. ALESHIRE. I do not think he could, Senator, in the case of
perishable subsistence supplies, and I do not think that an inspector,
or an officer who had not had the opportunities of understanding the
manufacture of motor trucks could look after a motor-truck company
with the same degree of efficiency as one who had had those oppor-
tunities. -
The CHAIRMAN. Would it not be cheaper, so far as your department
is concerned, to employ an expert to assist your officers in the in-
spection ?
Gen. ALESHIRE. It would take a good many experts. I do not
think it would be cheaper. It does not cost us anything to have
officers instructed as indicated, except the time of the officer, and
I think he would be much better than any expert we could employ,
or experts.
PREPAREDINESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 629
We have now an officer at the Wär College. There was a while we
could not send an officer there. I think we ought to have one there.
We should have officers abroad observing the foreign armies.
Senator DU PONT. Will you please explain why you think an
officer of the Quartermaster Départment should be detailed to the
War College?
Gen. ALESHIRE. The War College course is very valuable and in-
structive. We ought to have an officer there all the time taking that
course and obtaining military information on various subjects.
Senator DU PONT. Your officers are detailed officers and do they
not get the advantages of the War College on entering the line?
Gen. ALESHIRE. The officers of the line up to the present time
taking the War College course are generally absorbed in the General
Staff or in The Adjutant General's office or the Inspector General's
office. But the course is a valuable one, and I had in mind more the
permanent officers of the corps, of which we have quite a few left.
Senator DU Pont. How many left?
Gen. ALESHIRE. We have all the colonels, 14; all the lieutenant
colonels, 20; perhaps half of the majors. I would say we have about
50 officers left.
Senator DU PONT. Those are diminishing, are they not
Gen. ALESHIRE. Yes, sir. -
Senator DU Pont. If they took a course at the War College,
would that enable them to enter the line at time of war?
Gen. ALESHIRE. No, sir. There are many problems they work
out at the War College that are purely staff problems. -
The CHAIRMAN. In reference to the duties of retired Army officers,
I call the committee's attention to the act of April 23, 1904 (33 Stat. L.,
264), which reads as follows: -
The Secretary of War may assign retired officers of the Army, with their consent,
to active duty in recruiting, for service in connection with the Organized Militia in
the several States and Territories upon the request of the governor thereof, as military
attachés, upon courts-martial, courts of inquiry and boards, and to Staff duties not
involving service with troops; and such officers while so assigned shall receive the
full pay and allowances of their respective grades.
So you see it is limited, Senator du Pont.
Senator DU PONT. I do not understand that staff duties not
involving service with troops would refer mainly to staff duties such
as those of the Adjutant General, and those who deal directly with
troops. Of course, if the Judge Advocate General has ruled on it,
it is another question, but I do not think the intent of the law was
to prevent them serving in the Quartermaster Corps.
Gen. ALESHIRE. So much, Senator, in explanation of the increase
in the number of officers of the Quartermaster Corps for the present
strength of the Regular Army. The 64 remaining officers that I ask
for are made necessary by the proposed increase as contemplated
in this bill. The number of regiments by which the Chamberlain
bill proposes to increase the Army is 33 regiments of Infantry, 4
regiments of Cavalry, 14 regiments of Field Artillery, 15 regiments
of Engineers, 97 companies of Coast Artillery, which is equivalent
to about 8 regiments; in all, something over 70 regiments. I have
fixed upon one officer for each regiment, assuming that there would
be many posts occupied in addition to the number we now have.
630 - IPRE PAR EDIN ESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
The CHAIRMAN. Of course, you understand that the bill which
you are now discussing is merely a tentative measure ?
Gen. ALESHIRE. I understand that.
The CHAIRMAN. Does either the Garrison plan or the Hay plan
provide you with any additional officers, or as many as you want?
Gen. ALESHIRE. In the War Department bill there were provided
94 officers in addition to the number we now have. That was on
the recommendation of the Quartermaster General and approved by
the Secretary of War. Forty-nine of that 94 were for service with
the Regular Army at present strength, for reasons I have just ex-
plained to you, and the remainder because of the increase in the Army
and the proposed continental army. The Hay bill had no provision
about the staff departments at all, but I explained to the House
committee that we would require these officers, 94, in the case of
that bill, along the same lines that I have explained to this committee.
The CHAIRMAN. So that section of these bills meets the require-
ments of your department'
Gen. ALESHIRE. No, sir. The War Department bill as drawn
would meet it, Senator. -
I have also asked for an increase in the enlisted men of the Quarter-
master Corps. Under the existing law we are allowed 6,000. The
increase as proposed in the Chamberlain bill will require 1,402 addi-
tional for º personnel of regimental field trains, according to the
tables of Organization, and 3,365 for garrison duty, making a total
of 4,767. Those are the additional ones required. In addition to
the 4,767, there are included 610 quartermaster sergeants. We now
have authority of law for 404, but they are not included in the 6,000
men. In addition to that we have included 623 to replace civilians
who are separated from the service, either by resignation or other-
wise, during the next five years. That makes a total of 12,000,
which is the number I have asked for in the Chamberlain bill.
Senator DU Pont. In other words, you about double your force?
Gen. ALESHIRE. We roughly double the force, and the bill doubles
the Army. tº
Senator DU Pont. Does the bill double the Army'.
The CHAIRMAN. Practically, yes.
Gen. ALESHIRE. It practically doubles the Army.
The CHAIRMAN. If the number suggested in that bill were reduced
to, say, 150,000, your number would be reduced proportionately?
Gen. ALESHIRE. Yes, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. Both in enlisted men and officers?
Gen. ALESHIRE. Yes, sir; except Senator, the 49 officers that I
first spoke of.
The CHAIRMAN. That you now need 3
Gen. ALESHIRE. Yes, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. All these bills are tentative.
Gen. ALESHIRE. I understand so.
The CHAIRMAN. Are there any further recommendations you care
to make, General
Gen. ALESHIRE. No, sir. I have statements here of the cost of the
several bills, so far as the Quartermaster Corps is concerned.
The CHAIRMAN. Have you them prepared so that they can go in
with your statement
Gen. ALESHIRE. I have them here.
PREPAIRED NIESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 631
The CHAIRMAN. Are they in the House hearing .
Gen. ALESHIRE. No, sir. But, Senator, in that regard, I understand
that the Secretary of War is forwarding a statement to you that in-
cludes these figures. -
The CHAIRMAN. So it will be unnecessary to put them in 7
Gen. ALESHIRE. I should think so. I have an estimate of the cost
of the bill providing for universal service, Senate bill 1695.
The CHAIRMAN. You have made an estimate of the cost under that ?
Gen. ALESHIRE. In so far as the Quartermaster Corps is concerned.
The CHAIRMAN. That is the bill as it is at present printed'.
Gen. ALESHIRE. At present printed.
The CHAIRMAN. You have not seen the proposed changes of the
War Department - -
Gen. ALESHIRE. No, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. Can you furnish that estimated cost under the
bill as it is now % -
Gen. ALESHIRE. Yes, sir. In so far as the Quartermaster Corps is
concerned only. *
The CHAIRMAN. We would like to have that go in the record, Gen-
eral, if you have it in such condition as to put it in the record.
Gen. ALESHIRE. I have it, sir. Would you care to have me ex-
plain it .
The CHAIRMAN. Yes.
Gen. ALESHIRE. I will not touch upon the provisions of the bill
because they are well understood, I think. We found on inquiry at
the Census Bureau that there were approximately 12,000,000 men
between the ages of 12 and 23. We dropped 10 per cent of them as
covering the authorized exemptions. Then we assumed that one-half
of that remainder would be in the citizens cadet corps, and one-half
in the citizens army. On that basis I have had prepared a detailed
estimate as follows:
ESTIMATE OF COST.
First period, citizen cadet corps.-If the training during this period is given in schools,
etc., as authorized by Section 8 of the bill, the cost is estimated as follows:
(a) Rent, heat, and light of 463 registration offices, at $750 each (sec. -
17), if not located in Federal buildings. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $327,000.00
The above estimate includes rent, heat, and light, and is ar-
rived at by taking the average cost for similar purposes at a num-
ber of recruiting stations. -
(b) Maintenance of 436 registration offices, at $650 each (sec. 17). . . . . . 283,400.00
The above cost covers all class A supplies and is based on the
average cost for similar purpose at a number of recruiting sta-
tions.
(c) Pay and allowance of 436 Medical Reserve Corps officers (sec. 26),
at $2,587.85 each. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1, 128, 302.60
It is not known for what period in each year the services of
these Medical Reserve Corps officers would be required. Their
per capita cost for one day, including pay, quarters, heat, and
light, is $7.09. The maximum cost would be one year's service,
which is the figure that has been used in this estimate.
(d) Pay and allowances of 436 district commandants (sec. 39). . . . . . . . I, 135,409. 40
The bill provides that these officers shall be lieutenants. For
the purpose of the estimate, one-half have been taken as first
lieutenants with 10 years’ service and one-half as second lieuten-
ants with 5 years' service, and the amount includes pay and com-
mutation of quarters, heat, and light.
(e) Pay and allowances of 436 commissioned and enlisted assistants to
district commandants (1 commissioned and 1 enlisted assistant -
to each district commandant). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1, 231; 592.92
632 PREPAREDIN ESS FOR, NATIONAL DEFENSE.
The bill provides for commissioned and enlisted assistants to
district commandants and such othér assistants as may be au-
thorized. It is not known what number of commissioned, en-
listed, or other assistants would be required; but for the purpose
of this estimate 1 commissioned and 1 enlisted assistant has been
assigned to each district. The commissioned assistant has been
taken as a lieutenant, at a cost of $2,604.15 (the average of the
cost of the 436 district commandants), and the enlisted assistants
as Sergeants in third-enlistment period ($679.32). No estimate is
made for civilian assistants.
(f) Pay and allowances of 50 officers (captains, 15 years' service) as
inspectors (Sec. 39)........... . . . . . . . . . . . . . - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - $191, 963. 50
If the training is not to be given in schools, etc., there should g
be added to the above:
(g) Rental of training centers (Sec. 19). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2, 180,000.00
It is estimated that 'at each of the training centers at least
1,000 acres of land will have to be rented, 400 acres of this being
required for establishment of camp sites, and the remainder, 600
acres, being required for drill purposes. The average price paid
for rental of drill grounds by the Quartermaster Corps has been
about $5 per acre per month, and the estimate herewith is based
On rental of 1,000 acres in each district for one month at an
average cost of $5 per acre per month.
(h) Water and sewer systems in connection with camps (training
centers): - -
For purchase of water and toilet paper, at an average of 40 cents t
per man (1,814,250 persons). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 725,700.00
For installation of water and sewer systems, at $5 per man
(1,814,250 persons). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9,071, 250.00
Total first period. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16, 274,618.42
Second period, citizen cadet corps— -
(a) For purchase of water and toilet paper for 1,814,250 persons at 40
cents each-------------------------------------------------- 725,700.00
Third period, citizen cadet corps—The expenditures required to care for those under-
going training in this period are estimated as follows: -
(a) Rental of camp (Sec. 3) if not rented for those being trained in
first period and second period. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $2, 180,000.00
(b) Rations for 1,814,250 persons (one-third of 5,442,750) (Sec. 31) for
. . 10 days, at 27 cents each per day. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4,898, 475.00
(c) Clothing and equipage for 1,814,250 persons (sec. 32), at $11 each. . 19,856, 750.00
(d) 12,095 field ranges No. 1 (1 to every 150 men), at $22 per range. . . 266,090.00
(e) Tableware and kitchen utensils, at $1 per man............ . . . . . . . . 1,814, 250.00
(f) Breakage and loss (20 per cent). . . . . . . . . . - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 362,850.00
g) Transportation to and from camp, at $3.25 per man------- - - - - - - - - 5, 896, 312.50
(h) Purchase of water and toilet paper for 1,814,250 persons, at 40 cents
each. ------------------------------------------ • - - - - - - - - - - - 725,700.00
Total third period... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36,000. 427. 50
Citizen army.—Section 4 provides the training of the citizen army shall not be less
than 20 days, and not less than 10 days in camp. For the basis of an estimate it is
assumed the whole 20 days will be spent in camp.
(a) Rations for 5,442,750 persons for 20 days, at 27 cents each per day
(Sec. 31)--------------------------------------------------- $29,390, 850, 00
(b) Clothing and equipage for 5,442,750 persons at $11 per man (Sec.
32)--------------------------------------------------------- 59,870,250.00
(c) 36,285 field ranges No. 1 (1 to every 150 men), at $22 per range--- 798, 270.00
If the citizen army is to use the camp at a different time than
the citizen cadet corps it is believed the ranges used by the lat-
ter would be available for the former, and the estimate could,
therefore, be reduced by the cost of the 12,095 field ranges esti-
mated for the citizen cadet corps.
(d) Breakage and loss of field ranges. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 399, 135.00
(e) Tableware and kitchen utensils, at $1 per man. ------------- - - - - - 5,442,750.00
(f) Breakage (20 per cent). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1,088, 550.00
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 633
(g) Transportation to and from camps, at $3.25 per man----. . . . . . . . . $17,688, 937. 50
(h) Hire of wagon transportation (to cover both citizen cadet corps and
citizen army----------------------------- ... • = • * * * * * * * = • * * * * * ~ * 806, 330.00
(i) Purchase of water and toilet paper for 5,442,750 persons, at 40 cents
each. ----------------------------------------------------- 2, 177, 100.00
(j) Installation of water and sewer systems for 3,628,500 persons (sys-
tem for 1,814,250 provided for under first period of citizen cadet
corps), at $5 per man. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18, 142, 500.00
Total citizen army---------------------------------------- 135,804, 672. 50
It seems to be the purpose of the bill that the training of all
those liable to such training, up to and including the third
period of the citizen cadet corps, is to be the same whether or
not the person trained is desirous of entering the citizen army
or the citizen navy. After completion of the course of train-
ing prescribed for the citizen cadet corps the person trained
may, if he so elects, enter the citizen navy. It would, there-
fore, seem that the cost to the appropriations of the Army and
to those of the Navy should bear the same relation to the whole
as does the strength of the Navy to that of the Army. Upon
this basis the cost to the appropriations of the Quartermaster
Corps would be as follows: •
Grand total cost. . . . . . . . . . . . ---------------------------- 188,805, 418.42
The comparison of the strength of the Navy and Marine Corps to that of the Army
would indicate that the Navy should bear two-fifths of the total cost. The division
of the cost would therefore be:
Army. - - - - ----------------------------------------------------- $113,283,251.05
Navy- - - - - - ---------------------------------------------------- 75,522,167.37
SUMMARY OF COST.
Citizen cadet corps:
First period. --------------------------------- $16, 274, 618.42
Second period. ------------------------------- 725,700. 00
Third period. . . . . . . ------------------------- 36,000, 427. 50
53,000, 745. 92
Citizen army. . . . . . --------------------------------------------- 135,804, 672. 50
Grand total.----------------------------------------------- 188,805, 418.42
FER CAPITA COST.
Citizen cadet corps:
First period. ------------------------------------------ $8.97
Second period. ---------------------------------------- . 40
Third period. - - - - - - ---------------------------------- 19.84
- 29. 21.
Citizen army. - - - - - - ----------------------------------- - - - - - - - - - 24. 95
Gen. ALESHIRE. Mr. Chairman, I have had figures made on this
basis, assuming that but 5,000,000 of these 12,000,000 men are
trained, half of them as cadets, half of them in the citizens' army. I
was in hopes I would have the per capita cost on that basis, but it has
not been telephoned from the office yet. I can put it in the hearing.
The CHAIRMAN. Is that the cost per annum ?
Gen. ALESHIRE. Yes, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. You have figured on the basis that all of the fit
boys and all of the fit men would be trained under this system'
Gen. ALESHIRE. I have assumed, Senator, that of the total number,
12,095,000 reported to our office by the Census Bureau, they would all
be fit, and that only 10 per cent of them would be exempted.
The CHAIRMAN. How many would you train per annum ? -
Gen. ALESHIRE. On the basis used there would be something over
10,000,000.
634 PREPAIRED NIESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
The CHAIRMAN. Do you not take into consideration the fact that
under a selective process not one-half of that whole number would
be trained 7 .
Gen. ALESHIRE. That is what I am having figured on now.
The CHAIRMAN. Possibly not a quarter of them.
Gen. ALESHIRE. No. -
Senator WARREN. On the other hand, you have not added anything
for unforeseen contingencies, have you?
Gen. ALESHIRE. No, sir; except in the loss or wearing out of certain
lines of property. I have given you the maximum possible.
The CHAIRMAN. For instance, you have taken into consideration
the renting of these grounds, the construction of sewers, and all of that
work, which in all human probability would not be required at all?
Gen. ALESHIRE. In a camp they will have to provide some means
to have perfect sanitation, Senator. - -
The CHAIRMAN. It seems to me you have those figures away out of
sight; in other words, that you have estimated things that would
- R. these men on a basis very much more extravagant than our
National Guard is maintained.
Senator WARREN. I expect, Mr. Chairman, to you and me those
seem outrageous, where the prairie is open to us, and the whole coun-
try. I assume, though, in some localities there would be pretty ex-
pensive rental and, of course, expensive ways of obtaining water and
sewerage, because the ordinary sinks we would use out in the open
country could not be used in the thickly settled portions.
The CHAIRMAN. You have not taken into consideration at all, in
the training of these young men, the use of the armories or the public
schools?
Gen. ALESHIRE. No, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. You have assumed that for the purpose of training
these young men it would be necessary to start out de novo and have
them fully equipped 3 -
Gen. ALESHIRE. Yes.
Senator BECKHAM. General, let me ask you one question just for
my information. You figure that the º cost to put in operation
this measure is something like one hundred and eighty-eight millions?
Gen. ALESHIRE. Yes, sir; on perhaps an unfair basis, perhaps an
impossible basis, namely, that only 10 per cent of these men from
12 to 23 are exempted for causes as stated in the bill, and assuming
that the remainder will all be fit.
The CHAIRMAN. And all be trained.
Gen. ALESHIRE. And all be trained. -
Senator WARREN. You intended to cover an extreme possible
maximum ? -
Gen. ALESHIRE. Yes, sir.
Senator WARREN. With no probability that the average would
reach that. -
Senator CATRON. General, you have estimated upon the cost of
about 10,800,000 men. Suppose that, upon an examination of those
men, it were found that only half of them, or about 5,000,000, were
fit, or capable to serve. Would your costs and expenses be cor-
respondingly reduced
Gen. ALESHIRE. Yes, sir; they would be correspondingly reduced.
I have here a rough estimate on the basis of but 5,00,000 being
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 635
trained. On that basis the per capita cost for the citizen cadet
corps for the first period would be $13.48, second period, 60 cents,
.# the third period, $29.76, making $43.84 as the total per capita
cost for the citizen cadet . The citizen army would be $37.42
per capita. The total expenditure would be $141,574,998.75.
The CHAIRMAN. To train 5,000,000 men ;
Gen. ALESHIRE. Yes, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. That is the total, extreme cost 7
Gen. ALESHIRE. Yes, sir. *
The CHAIRMAN. If you should reduce that still lower, to 2,500,000,
it would reduce the estimate in the same proportion ?
Gen. ALESHIRE. Yes, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. In other words, under this system you would
train an army of 5,000,000 men at a cost per capita of how much 3
Gen. ALESHIRE. Of $14.61 for the cadets and $37,42 for the citizen
army. That would be an average per capita of, in round numbers,
$26.02.
The CHAIRMAN. You would train 5,000,000 men at an expense to
the Government of about $26 per capita and at a cost of $141,000,000,
as compared with practically $100,000,000, or $1,000 per man, per
capita, for the Regular Army'. s
Gen. ALESHIRE. Yes, sir. Senator, remember, this is only the
Quartermaster Corps expenses. It does not take in expenses of the
Ordnance Department or any other department that might be
involved. - - -
The CHAIRMAN. But I am just comparing the expense of an army
raised on the universal service system with the Regular Army.
Gen. ALESHIRE. Yes, sir. g
The CHAIRMAN. It would cost practically $26, or a little more, per
man, as compared with $1,000 per man in the Regular Army.
Senator WARREN. That is hardly the right proportion, because
the thousand dollars covers everything—arms, transportation, and
everything—while this only covers the Quartermaster Department.
It would vary from that, although the amount is vastly different, as
you have stated, but not as wide a difference as that.
The CHAIRMAN. Have you made any estimate as to the cost of the
continental army proposed under one of these bills?
Gen. ALESHIRE. Yes, sir. I have the total cost, Senator.
The CHAIRMAN. For 500,000 men?
Gen. ALESHIRE. Four hundred thousand men.
The CHAIRMAN. Some of these officers that you speak of, and for
whose salaries you make estimates, are already in the Army?
Gen. ALESHIRE. Exactly. *
The CHAIRMAN. So you put it at an extra limit of expense?
Gen. ALESHIRE. Yes, sir. I have assumed that you would have
to have extra officers for this work. • -
The CHAIRMAN. And you have put at the head of these training
camps commissioned officers, where enlisted men could do the work?
Gen. ALESHIRE. Only where the bill provides that we have to put
commissioned officers.
The CHAIRMAN. It seems to me you have put an outside limit on
expense. -
Gen. ALESHIRE. I have. This is a statement of cost of the War
Department bill, Senator.
636 IPREPAREDINESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
The CHAIRMAN. Before you proceed with that, have you, in reach-
ing the estimated cost of the continental army of 400,000 men, used
the same extremes in the matter of their equipment and training?
Have you figured them both on the same basis?
Gen. ALESHIRE. I think so; yes, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. That is what I want to know.
Gen. ALESHIRE. The total estimated cost of the citizen army,
called the continental army, for the first year, is $13,641,923.08; the
second year, $22,004,280.61; for the third year, $31,366,636.94.
Senator WARREN. You have not figured any compensation in the
wº of pay ?
en. ALESHIRE. I was going to speak of that.
Senator WARREN. And you have not figured about the ordnance
or medical or other departments, but you have figured subsistence
and clothing? :
Gen. ALESHIRE. That is all, sir; just Quartermaster Corps appro-
priations, including pay. -
The CHAIRMAN. You say you have had the same element enter into
each computation?
Gen. ALESHIRE. I am quite sure I did, so far as it had application
to the two cases, Senator. “
The CHAIRMAN. Have you figured on this matter of the construc-
tion of sewers, and all of that class of work?
Gen. ALESHIRE. Yes, sir; in the continental army. -
The CHAIRMAN. Do you think that cost will be necessary in the
continental army? In all of the western country, for instance, there
are vast prairies, where there will not be any of that vast cost neces-
sary, either in the continental army or universal service system.
Gen. ALESHIRE. That may be so. They will have to have water,
in any case. .
The CHAIRMAN. In my State—and that is characteristic of many
others—we have vast armories that are used only one night a week
by the National Guard. All of them are completely equipped, and
º of them could be utilized for training, either in a continental army
or the other. You have not taken them into consideration at all?
Gen. ALESHIRE. No, sir. .
Senator DU PONT. Mr. Chairman, would you put in your bill a
requirement that the armories of the militia be at the disposal of
these forces? -
The CHAIRMAN. I do not see why they should not be.
Senator WARREN. They are built with State funds.
The CHAIRMAN. Yes; generally.
Senator WARREN. I think there would be no difficulty, but yet
it would have to be by the leave of the States and the militia who own
them. -
The CHAIRMAN. I was just getting at the general method of gettin
at this result. It seems to me extreme all the way down the line.
Gen. ALESHIRE. It is, Senator.
The CHAIRMAN. And yet, taking these extreme limits as a basis
of estimates, both as to the continental army and the universal service
system, it is more than one-twentieth less than the maintenance of a
regular soldier. The per capita cost of the continental army plan is
$80, in round numbers, as against $26, in round numbers, for the
universal training system plan as it appears in the bill.
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 637
Senator CATRON. Have you given your estimate about the con-
tinental army of 400,000 men? * : .
Gen. ALESHIRE. Yes, sir; I gave that.
Senator CATRON. I did not catch that.
Gen. ALESHIRE. The first year cost is $13,641,923.08. Of course,
there are only 133,000 men in that first year. In the second year,
$22,004,280.61. That is for about 266,000 or 267,000. The third
year we would have the entire 400,000, and it would be $31,366,636.94.
These figures represent the cost so far as Quartermaster Corps appro-
priations are concerned. - .
The CHAIRMAN. How much per capita is that ?
Gen. ALESHIRE. In round numbers, $80. (Note: The per capita
cost for third and succeeding years is $80.085371.) " .
. The CHAIRMAN. It is more than three times as much per capita as
tºniversal training system, using the same number of men as a
a SlS. * -
Gen. ALESHIRE. No, sir; the continental army is based on 400,000
officers and men, while the estimate under discussion for universal
service is based on 5,000,000 men. -
Senator WARREN. I suppose the per capita decreases as you
enlarge the number of troops, hº
Gen. ALESHIRE. It does. -
Senator WARREN. I agree with you, Mr. Chairman, that the differ-
ence is very vast, but not as we have it expressed here, one-twentieth,
because this only includes the simple portion that is furnished by the
Quartermaster Corps, and I wanted to ask the Quartermaster General
if he had at his disposal what it would cost for the wear and tear of
the arms that would have to be used in their drills, furnishing them
with arms, and so on; if he has calculated the medical attendance,
and things of that kind?
Gen. ALESHIRE. No, sir. -
Senator WARREN. Of course, you have not figured any compensa-
tion?
Gen. ALESHIRE. No, sir, except where the bill provides that they
shall receive pay during periods of training. have not figured
cost under any but Quartermaster Corps appropriations. I figured
on compensation for the continental army wherever that is provided
whenever they are called into active service.
Senator WARREN. I think, Mr. Chairman, it would be of value if
we had as close and as accurate a calculation—I grant you it is
extreme, as the Quartermaster General says it is—of the other
departments, so that we might assemble them and get the real cost
per man per annum. - -
Gen. ALESHIRE. In a report that was prepared by the Secretary of
War, it appeared that, considering the cost of the Army, the per
capita cost being taken at $1,020 a year, approximately 48.03 per
cent was for the pay; 9.75 per cent was for subsistence; 10.42 for
transportation; 7.52 per cent for regular supplies; 6.56 for clothing
and equipage; 2.42 for barracks and quarters; 1.84 for incidental
expenses; and 0.59 for roads and walks.
Senator WARREN. In the testimony of the Secretary of War all
those figures are given exactly, but I wish you would give them as
23380—PT 12–16—2
638 PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
far as you can now, because it is interesting, and it is a matter the
members of the committee ought to be familiar with.
Gen. ALESHIRE. I think I can give them from memory closely
enough. Clothing, 6.56 per cent. The item for the Ordnance De-
Yartment is something over 7 per cent, and 0.79 per cent for the
edical Department. I only mention that to show that perhaps 90.
per cent of the charges are for pay, subsistence, clothing, and allow-
ances like that that are fixed more or less by law. You can not
reduce it unless it is done by law. -
NOTE.-Based upon census, statistics of population (1910 census) the following
statement and estimate, pertaining to Quartermaster Corps appropriations only, are
submitted:
1. The bill provides for the training of all able-bodied males between the ages of
12 and 23, with certain exemptions. The estimate herewith is based upon 50 per
cent of the male population of the United States between the ages mentioned, in
accordance with the Census Report of 1910, as follows:
12 years old.--------------............................................. 969,032
13 years old. . . . . . . . . . . . . , º is tº gº tº tº gº is is is tº is ſº sº gº sº sº e s = ºs e is sº gº º ºs e º e º ſº sº º sº sº e º ſº tº gº dº º º is sº e 892, 602
14 years old-------------------. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 935, 974
15 years old----------------------------------------------------- . . . . . . . 862, 475
16 years old. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 925, 246 .
17 years old. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 900, 649
18 years old. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 949, 876
19 years old. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 889,036
20 years old. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . * * * * * * * * * * * 899, 372
21 years old. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 937,420
22 years old. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - . . . 925, 234
23 years old. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 906, 182
2. The first period of training commences July 1 of the year in which the person
liable reaches the age of 12 and continues for two years. This training consists of not
less than 90 hours each year, and is devoted to calisthenics and other military instruc-
tion without arms. -
3. The second period commences July 1 of the year in which the persons liable
reach the age of 14 and continues for two years. The training in this period consists
of not less than 90 hours each year, and embraces military training with the rifle,
including gallery practice.
4. The third period commences July 1 in the year in which the persons liable reach
the age of 16 and continues for a period of two years. The training in this period
consists of not less than 90 hours each year, and in addition thereto two whole days
in camp each year; and consists of field exercises and target practice in addition to
such other training as may be prescribed.
5. The training of the citizen army is to consist of not less than 120 hours, or 20
whole days in each year, and not less than 10 whole days in each year is to be spent
RD Caſſlº). -
6. §tion 17 provides that in each congressional district and the District of Colum-
bia there shall be a registration office where those liable to training shall register.
This office is to be under charge of an officer of the Regular Army who shall be assisted
by the necessary commissioned and enlisted personnel, and such other assistants as
are duly authorized. There are 435 congressional districts, which with the District
of Columbia makes 436 districts in which registration offices are to be located.
7. Section 19 provides for the establishment of one or more training centers in or
contiguous to ea h training district. It is presumed that by training centers is meant
campsites where the persons liable to such training in the particular district may be
assembled and trained.
8. Section 26 provides for the calling into the service of the United States of such
number of Medical Reserve Corps officers for such periods of time as may be necessary
to exercise proper sanitary supervision of training centers and training camps and to
make necessary physical examinations of persons liable to be trained. tº
9. Section 7 provides that those liable to military training who on arrival at the
age of 18 may, if they so elect, enter the citizen navy. Whatever number elect to
enter the citizen navy will reduce the number in the citizen army and make a corre-
sponding reduction in the expense to the appropriations of the Quartermaster Corps,
In this connection attention is invited to the fact that if the entire fund to carry out
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 639
the purposes of this bill are placed under control of the War Department the training
of all up to the age of 18 (at which age they may enter the Citizen navy if they so
elect) will be a charge against the Army whereas as a matter of fact the funds will have
been used to train eligibles for the Navy as well as the Army. -
10. Section 31 provides that persons undergoing training as members of the citizen
cadet corps or the citizen army and navy shall not be entitled to pay. While under-
going training in camps of instruction and on board training ships they shall be entitled
to the actual cost of transportation going to and returning from said camps and training
ships, and subsistence and the necessary medical attention while actually serving
therein. - - - -
11. Section 32 provides— . . . - *
(a) Members of the citizen cadet corps undergoing training in the first period should
not be provided with a uniform. . . -
(b) In the second and third periods of training members of the citizen cadet corps
shall be entitled to wear the prescribed uniform. -
(c) The uniform for those undergoing training in the third period should be provided
by the United States for use during periods of actual training in camps of instruction,
From the above it would seem that if those undergoing training in the second period
whom the bill states are entitled to wear the prescribed uniform desire to wear such
uniform, it must be procured at their own expense. - -
(d) Members undergoing training in the citizen army and navy are entitled to and
are to be provided with the necessary service uniform.
12. Section 39 provides for a new division of the General Staff Corps to consist of
Seven officers, one from the Medical Department, and one each from the Infantry,
Cavalry, Field Artillery, Coast Artillery Corps, and Engineer Corps, or a total of six.
No information is given as to where the seventh is to come from. They seem not to
be additional officers. This sention also provides for 50 captains as inspectors of the
50 districts into which the continental United States is divided.
ESTIMATE of cost (QUARTERMASTER coRPs APPROPRIATIONS ONLY).
First period, citizen cadet corps.—If the training during this period is given in schools, -
etc., as authorized by section 8 of the bill, the cost is estimated as follows:
(a) Rent, heat, and light of 463 registration cffices, at $750 each (Sec. 17),
if not located in Federal buildings. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $327,000.00
The above estimate includes rent, heat, and light, and is -
arrived at by taking the average cost for similar purposes at a
number of recruiting stations. . - - -
(b) Maintenance of 436 registration offices, at $650 each (Sec. 17). . . . . . 283,400.00
The above cost covers all Class “A” supplies and is based on
... the average cost for similar purpose at a number of recruiting
stations. - -
(c) Pay and allowances of 436 Medical Reserve Corps officers (Sec. 26), - -
at $2,587.85 each. . . . . . - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1, 128, 302.60
It is not known for what period in each year the Services of . . .
these Medical Reserve Corps officers would be required. Their
per capita cost for one day, including pay, quarters, heat, and
light, is $7.09. The maximum cost would be one year's service,
which is the figure that has been used in this estimate. - -
(d) Pay and allowances of 436 district commandants (Sec. 39). . . . . . . . . 1, 135,409. 40
The bill provides that these officers shall be lieutenants. For -
the purpose of the estimate one-half have been taken as first lieu-
tenants with 10 years' service and one-half as Second lieutenants
with 5 years' service, and the amount includes pay and commuta-
tion of quarters, heat, and light. -
(e) Pay and allowances of 436 commissioned and enlisted assistants to
district commandants (1 commissioned and 1 enlisted assistant -
to each district commandant). . . . . . - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1, 231, 592.92
The bill provides for commissioned and enlisted assistants to
district commandants, and such other assistants as may be author-
ized. It is not known what number of commissioned, enlisted, or
other assistants would be required, but for the purpose of this esti-
mate one commissioned and one enlisted assistant has been assigned
to each district. The commissioned assistant has been taken as a
lieutenant at a cost of $2,604.15 (the average of the cost of the 436
district commandants), and the enlisted assistants as Sergeants in
third enlistment period ($679.32). No estimate is made for civilian
assistants,
640 PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
(f) Pay and allowance of 50 officers (captains, 15 years' service) as in- -
- Spectors (Sec. 39) --------. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ----------------- $191,963. 50
Total (Quartermaster Corps appropriations) first period....... 4, 297,668.42
The above estimate is based upon the training during the first and second periods
of the citizen cadet corps being given in Schools, universities, colleges, armories, etc.
Therefore, no amounts have been provided for rental of training centers, or any
expense in connection with Such training centers, as a charge against the first and
second p3riods of the citizen cadet corps. - .
Second period, citizen cadet corps.--It is not believed any expenditures for those un-
dergoing training in this period, in addition to those given for the first period, will
be necessary.
Third period, citizen cadet corps.—The expenditures required to care for those under-
going training in this period are estimated as follows: -
(a) Rental of Camp (Sec. 3). -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $2, 180,000.00
It is estimated that at each of the training centers at least 1,000
acres of land will have to be rented, 400 acres of this being required
for establishment of camp sites, and the remainder, 600 acres, being
required for drill purposes. The average price paid for rental of
drill grounds by the Quartermaster Corps has been about $5 per
acre per month, and the estimate herewith is based on rental of
1,000 acres in each district for one month at an average cost of $5
- per month.
(b) Rations for 912,947 persons (sec. 31) for 10 days, at 27 cents each -
per day----------------------------------------------------- 2,464,956.00
(c) Clothing and equipage for 912,947 persons (Sec. 32), at $11 each. ... 10,042, 417.00
(d) 6,086 field ranges, No. 1 (1 to every 150 men), at $22 per range. . . 133,892. 00
(e) Tableware and kitchen utensils, at $1 per man. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 912, 947.00
(f) Breakage and loss (20 per cent). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - 182, 589.40
g) Transportation to and from camp, at $3.25 per man. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2,967,077.75
% For installation of water and sewer systems, at $5 per man (912,947
persons)----------------------------------------------------- 4, 564, 735.00
(i) Purchase of water and toilet paper for 912,947 persons, at 13 cents -
each. . . . . . . . . . . . . . ----------------------------------------- 118 683. 11
Total (Quartermaster Corps appropriations) third period. ... 23, 567,297. 26
Citizen army.—Section 4 provides the training of the citizen army shall not be less
than 20 days, and not less than 10 days in camp. For the basis of an estimate it is
assumed the whole 20 days will be spent in camp.
(a) Rations for 2,753,560 persons for 20 days, at 27 cents each per day
(Sec. 31)--------------------------------------------------- $14,859, 224.00
b) Clothing and equipage for 2,753,560 persons (Sec. 32) at $1.1 each. 30, 289, 160.00
§ 18,357 field ranges No. 1 (1 to every 150 men) are required, but if
the citizen army is to use the camp at a different time than the
citizen cadet corps, it is believed the ranges provided for the
latter would be available for use of the former. Therefore,
estimate is made only for the difference, or 12,271 ranges, at $22
each----------------------- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 269,962. 00
(d) Breakage and loss of field ranges. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134, 981. 00
(e) Tableware and kitchen utensils, at $1 per man. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2,753, 560 00
(f) Breakage (20 per cent). . . . .------------------ , sº º sm is s = * * * * * * * * * * * 550, 712. 00
(g) Transportation to and from camps, at $3.25 per man. . . . . . . . . . . . 8,949, 070. 00
(h) Hire of wagon transportation (to cover both citizen cadet corps -
and citizen army. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 244, 189. 36
(i) Purchase of water and toilet paper for 2,753,560 persons for 20 .
days, at 26 cents each. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 715, 925.60
(j) Installation of water and sewer systems for 1,840,613 persons
(system for 912,947 provided for under third period of citizen -
Cadet Corps), at $5 per man. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - - - - - - - - 9, 203,065. 00
Total (Quartermaster Corps appropriations) citizen army... 67,969,848.96
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 641
It seems to be the purpose of the bill that the training of all
those liable to such training, up to and including the third
period of the citizen cadet corps, is to be the same whether or not
the person trained is desirous of entering the citizen army or the
citizen navy. After completion of the course of training pre-
scribed for the citizen cadet corps, the person trained may, if
he so elects, enter the citizen navy. It would, therefore,
seem that the cost to the appropriations of the Army and to
those of the Navy should bear the same relation to the whole
as does the strength of the Navy to that of the Army. Upon
this basis, the cost to the appropriations of the Quartermaster
Corps would be as follows:
The comparison of the strength of the Navy and Marine Corps to that of the Army
would indicate that the Navy should bear two-fifths of the actual cost. The division
of the cost would therefore be:
Army------------------------------------ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - $57,500,888.78
Navy....... - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 38,333,925.86
Citizen cadet corps:
First period--------------------------- . . . . . . . . . . $4,297, 668.42
Second period. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Third period. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23, 567,297.26
. .. — 27, 864, 965. 68
Citizen army---------. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67,969,848.96
Grand total. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95,834, 814. 64
Citizen cadet corps:
First period.-------.... . . . . . . . . m sº * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * - - - - - - - - - - - - - - $4.61
Second period. . . . . . . . . - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Third period. . . . . . . . . . &s e sº gº ºs e s = e º º sº e s sº s = e º ºs sº e º ºs º ºs e = * * * * * * * * * * * 25.81
Total three periods. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - - - - - - - - - 3)$30.42
Average per capita cost, citizen cadet corps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - - - - - - 10. 14
Citizen army---------. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24.68
Total per capita cost citizen army, and average per capita cost citi-
Zen Cadet Corps-------. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2) 34.82
Average per capita cost for citizen army and citizen cadet corps. . . . . . . . . . . . 17.41
Senator WARREN. What is the condition now of the reserves?
What does your department, if at all, have to do with the reserves?
Gen. ALESHIRE. Under existing law the only part of the reservé
that the Quartermaster Corps would receive would be those men who
are furloughed to the reserve from the Quartermaster Corps. But
I have in mind a plan for a reserve that, it seems to me, would fit
our case very well, and that is to list men of occupations in civil
life, the same as those required in the Quartermaster Corps, and
when the reserves are called into the service assign them generally
to duties for which they are qualified by their training in civil life.
The CHAIRMAN. You mean in your corps ? - -
Gen. ALESHIRE. Yes, sir; only in our corps. I have a paper that
I prepared about it outlining the organization for a field army,
including the service of the interior and service of the theater of opera-
tions. It would involve about 13,000 officers and men.
Senator CATRON. What do you call a field army?
Gen. ALESHIRE. Eighty-four thousand men.
642 PREPARED NIESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
Senator DU PoNT. Has that term “field army” a legal definition?
Gen. ALESHIRE. It is fixed by the field service regulations, and it
is approximately 84,000 men and, I think, about 3,500 officers. -
Senator DU PONT. It is what is to be known as an army corps
under this bill of Senator Chamberlain's, then }
Gen. ALESHIRE. It may be. . . -
Senator CATRON. How many men do you say the Quartermaster's
Department require for that field army? - . . .
Gen. ALESHIRE. It would require 13,000. But this contemplates,
as I just stated, all the duties we would have to perform in what is
known as the service of the interior and all those in the service of
the theater of operations. The service of the interior starts with
the Quartermaster General's office and includes all the general sup-
ply depots, additional purchasing offices, remount depots, transport
service, and all of the offices we now have. It provides personnel
for mobilization camps, concentration camps, base depots, ports of
embarkation—every place we would have to furnish a man.
Senator CATRON. Would this 13,000 be included in the 84,000 of
the field army, or independent of that ? - -
Gen. ALESHIRE, Independent of that, and that organization of
13,000 men would serve the purpose for additional field armies, if
operated over the same lines of communication. But for every field
army, or every body of troops as large as a field army, or larger,
operating over a separate line of communication, we would need
about that number.
Senator WEEKs. Generally, speaking, you propose to take men
engaged in transportation and enlist them in the reserve for this
service? - - -
Gen. ALESHIRE. Yes, sir.
Senator WEEKs. And in time of need they would devote them-
selves to transportation service, and that alone 7
Gen. ALESHIRE. Exactly. - - -
Senator WEEKs. And other men would go into their own fields of
operation ? - -
Gen. ALESHIRE. Yes sir. I have here a list of occupations in civil
life that we considered in formulating this plan. It is as follows:
For officers.-Railroad officials, experts; steamship officials, experts; proficient in
the manufacture of clothing, wagons, etc.; experts in the manufacture and operation
of autotrucks and automobiles; experts, knowledge of the purchase, inspection, etc.,
of food supplies; expert knowledge of cotton and wool fabrics and materials; expert
mechanical and civil engineers; expert mechanics; electrical experts.
* For enlisted mem.—Bakers, cooks, butchers, truckmasters, trück mechanics, chauf-
feurs, blacksmiths, horseshoers, machinists, electricians, carpenters, brick and Stone
masons, wagon masters, train masters; plumbers, storekeepers, clerks, Stenographers
and typewriters, overseers, Saddlers. y - -
My belief is that the personnel of this organization, especially the
officers and those noncommissioned officers of the higher grade,
would need some training, perhaps a couple of weeks a year for
three years. I made a rough estimate as to the approximate cost.
I think we could give all the personnel that would need training in
this proposed organization that amount of training for about $75,000
to $100,000 a year, and it seems to me it would be money very well
spent. The only training that they would need really would be to
get them in touch with the methods that are used and required. I
think it would solve the problem of meeting an emergency.
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 643
Senator WARREN. Taking the Spanish-American War and other
movements of later times, has not our weakness, if we have any,
come through a lack of preparation along just the lines you have
described : ..
Gen. ALESHIRE. I think so, Senator. One other point I would
like to speak of. For instance, we would endeavor to assign officers
and enlisted men of this proposed reserve corps to duty in the locali-
ties where they reside. If a railroad j should choose to join
the reserve corps, we would endeavor to make use of him in connec-
tion with his own railroad, if possible, or in the vicinity of his home,
and so on. * *
Senator WARREN. Have you any thoughts, of her than what you
brought out this morning, with regard to any of these different bills
and these various forms of reorganization of the Army that you
want to bring before us? -
Gen. ALESHIRE. My thoughts have all been along the lines of the
Quartermaster Corps. I think the War Department plan is an
excellent plan, because it gives us a fixed policy which we have not
had during my service in the Army. :
* WARREN. You regard it as of the first importance to have
a plan - * -
- K. ALESHIRE. I do, sir; a definite policy.
Senator WARREN. Which means the balancing up of the different
arms and different departments one with another, as I understand it 7
Gen. ALESHIRE. Yes. *
Senator WEEKs. What is there in the War Department plan which
you do not approve, if anything?
Gen. ALESHIRE. Nothing, Senator. I would like to have this
understood; I do not want to be placed on record as expressing an
opinion as to whether the War Department plan goes far enough or
not, but the policy announced seems to me is excellent, because it
gives us a definite proposition. I have heard it stated that the
continental army idea would not work. I shall not believe that it
will not work until we try it.
Senator WARREN. I presume you do not wish to express yourself
as to whether we should have a larger or a smaller regular army than
the War Department proposes? -
Gen. ALESHIRE. No, sir. - -
Senator CATRON. Do you think we could make a fair trial of it
in a year?
Gen. ALESHIRE. No, Senator; I do not. I should not be dis-
couraged if you did not get a man the first year.
Senator WEEKs. If you do not get a man the first year, you never
will get any. -
Gen. ALESHIRE. Perhaps not.
Senator WARREN. Would not that depend somewhat on circum-
stances, as to conditions abroad and at home whether we got one or a
great many ? -
Gen. ALESHIRE. I think so.

644 PREPAREDNESS FoR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
STATEMENT OF BRIG. GEN. GEORGE P. SCRIVEN, CHIEF
SIGNAL OFFICER, UNITED STATES ARMY.
The CHAIRMAN. General, you appeared before the House com-
mittee'; -
Gen. SCRIVEN. Yes, sir. - - - -
l º glamºs. Did you go into your branch of the service at
ength'? : -
ë. SCRIVEN. No; I did not, Senator. We took up aviation
largely; in fact, almost entirely. But the Signal Corps at large and
the general questions regarding reorganization were hardly touched
upon at all. - -
The CHAIRMAN. The committee would like to hear from you and
have you discuss it in your own way, and then if the committee
want to ask any questions, they may.
Gen. SCRIVEN. In the first place, I would like to emphasize, as far
as I can, the growing importance of the service of information. I
have endeavored to do this in a little pamphlet before me, which I
think has come to the committee room. But the service of infor-
mation has become so obviously important and of such paramount
value in military operations, especially in the light of events abroad,
that I think it is well to emphasize it as strongly as possible. The
general officer or the commanding general of any force or any expe-
dition who has not a service of information, as compared with the
man who has, is like a blind man fighting one who can see, one who
has all the information of current happenings and changing events
before him upon which to base his actions.
The service of information is performed in these days, first, largely,
in broad scope, by the aeroplane, which gives the general Survey
of the field, but must be supported by the other means of trans-
mitting information now employed, such as, of courrse, the tele-
graph, telephone, what we call the buzzer, visual apparatus of vari-
ous kinds, and largely, as is now pretty well recognized, by wireless
telegraphy, or radio telegraphy, as it is now known. The value of
the ; with armies in field operations and for coastal observation
is enormous.
Now, in order to use these means effectively, they must be thor-
oughly organized for training and Service. A careful and exhaustive
study of this whole matter was made in the Signal Office, and a
memorandum based thereon was submitted to the Chief of Staff on
April 30, 1915. That memorandum was sent to the War College
Division of the General Staff, where a further study resulted in prac-
tically identical conclusions.
Here, Mr. Chairman, is the table of strength in officers and enlisted
men upon which the figures that appear in those two studies, and in
what we know as the Chamberlain biii are based. These figures are
not the result of guesswork. If you will examine the items one by
one, you will find that each and every figure represents a man or a
group of men that is simply indispensable if we are to be prepared
to render to the Army the service that is necessary to successful
operation.
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
645
Proposed organization of signal troops for an army consisting of
field armies.
seven divisions and two

Brig. - - Total
Cº. Cols. j, |Majors. Capts. |1st Its. .
* -- | Sioned.
Signal Corps, less aviation section. :
MOBILE ARMY. . -
Nine field battalions................----------|--------|---------------- 9. 27 81 117
Two telegraph battalions---------------------|--------|--------|-------- 2 4 16 22
Chief signal officers of divisions (proposed)....|... . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 1--------|--------|-------- 7
Chief signal officers of two field armies........|........ 2 --------|--------|--------|-------- 2
e ALASKA. -
W.A. Mil. Cable & Tgh. System...... - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1 * 1 3 5
- SERVICE of THE INTERIOR. ... i ! g
Office Chief Signal Officer..................... - 11...…. 2. 1. 21........ 6
Army Signal School:-------------------------|--------|--------|-------- 1 1 |-------- 2
Dept. signal officers, including Phil. & Haw’n. • * - ! :
- sº sº e º 'º º Fiwā& * * * * * * * : * * * * * * * * 2 |. 3 1 -------- T - - - - - - - '- 6
upply depots, cable boats, Ft. Wood & Asst., #
... at § sº ºl.........….l.........…. 5 1 . 6
Enlisted men for det, SVG---------------------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|---- * & ge. *
Army Signal School and recruit detachment.---------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|-------.
- - 1 4 12 15 40 | 101 173
) Aviation section. -
ovER-SEAs GARRISONs.
Philippines, 1 aero Squadron....... • * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * | * * * * * * * * ! • * * * * * * * 1 : 3. 16 20
Iławāii, 1 aero Squadron..........................----|--------|-------- 1 . 3 16 20
Canal Zone, 1 aero Squadron........................ --|--------|-...---- 1 3 || 16 20
IN THE UNITED STATES.
Mobile army; 4 divisions, 4 aero Squadrons............]........|........ 4 12 64 80
:Aviation administration......................l........ 1 1 --------|--------|-------- 2
Aviation School, detachment..................l.-------|--------|-------- 1 . 3 . 2 6
Total proposed aviation section................. 1 1 | 8 24 114 148
646
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
Proposed organization of signal troops for an arm
$/ consistin
field armies—Continued.
th
g of seven divisions and two

Total
M. S. E. isºlas Sergis. | Corpls. Cooks. 1st-class Pvts. CIl-
Sergts. pvts. listed.
Signal Corps, less aviation section.
- MOBILE ARMY. -
Nine field hattalions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 144 225 369 54 1,080 243 2, 142
Two telegraph battalions............. 12 42 66 92 8 260 86 566
Chief signal oſficers of divisions (pro- - -
POSect) - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Chief signal officers of two ſield armies-l--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|........
- ALASKA. - -
W.-A. Mil. Cable & Tgh. System. . . . . 8 28 30 33 5 112 34 250
SERVICE of TEE INTERIOR. … - - - *
Office Chief Signal Officer............l.---------------|--------|--------|--------|-----------.....l........
Army Signal School............. • - - - - || - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - || - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - || > → • - - - - - || - - - - - - - - || - - - - - - - - | * * * * * * * *
Dept. signal officers, including Phil.
& Haw’n Depts--------------------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------
Supplv depots, cable boats, Ft. Wood
& Asst... at N. Y. ------------------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|----------------|------- -
Enlisted men for det. Svc............. 9 33 36 30 6 135 42 300
Army Signal School and recruit, de- - -
tachment. ------------------------- 3 11 12 13 2 45 14 100
59 258 369 546 75 | 1,632 419 3,358
Aviation Scetion. -
OVERSEAS GARRISONS.
Philinninas, 1 aero squadron......... 5 8 15 33 6 44 18 129
Flawaii, 1 aero Squadron............. 5 8 15 33 6 44 18 120
Canal Zone, 1 acro Squadron.......... 5 8 15 33 6 44 18 129
IN TEIE UNITED STATES.
Mobile army: 4 divisions, 4 aero :
Squadrons-------------------------- 20 32 60 132 24 176 72 516
Aviation administration. . . . . . e = * * * * ~ I = • * * * * * * I e s = • , s = • , ~ * * * * * * * | * * * * * * * * | * * * * * * * * | * * * * * * * * | * * * * - - - - - - - - - - - -
Aviation School, detachment......... 3 6 12 18 2 24 12 77
Total proposed aviation section. 38 62 | 117 249 44 || 332 | 128 980
O. C. S. O., April 30, 1915.
Tovised Dec. 15, 1915,
TNoTE.—This table is a proportional one. The propor number of signal troops for an army of any size
may be found by simply adhering to these proportions and substituting the proper signal units to cor-
respond with the number of divisions and army corps taken.
Overseas garrisons, with strengths arbitrarily taken, would require additional telegraph companies in
numbers to fit the local situation in each case. -
This table shows in detail what is considered to be the proper organ-
ization of signal troops for an army consisting of seven divisions, com-
Osing two field armies, as well as the Signal Corps personnel required
or the service of the interior. The latter troops are necessary regard-
less of the size of the army or the number of its tactical divisions, but
should the number or divisions be increased or decreased, the propor-
tion of signal troops required for duty with these divisions should be
added to or taken from accordingly.
It is proposed that the organization of a field battalion shall be the
same during peace as in war, and that such a battalion shall consist of
three companies, as follows: A wire company, containing 1 captain, 2
first lieutenants, and 75 enlisted men; a radio company, containing 1
captain, 2 first lieutenants, and 75 enlisted men; and an outpost com-
pany, containing 1 captain, 4 first lieutenants, and 75 enlisted men,
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. . 647
The battalion would be commanded by a major, with a first lieutenant
a 3 battalion adjutant and quartermaster, and an enlisted headquar-
ters detachment of 13 men, making in all for the personnel of the bat-
talion 13 officers and 238 enlisted men.
The commissioned and enlisted personnel assigned to each of these
companies has been determined from considerations as follows: .
The wire company consists of four wire sections, to provide for the
four fundamental combat lines to the brigades. -
The radio company has four pack radio sections and one wheel radio
set, the former to provide constant communication with the divisional
cavalry, supply trains, and for other necessary communication where
the laying of wire is impracticable, the wheel set for communication
with other divisions, field-army headquarters, and base.
The outpost company should have four platoons, one plafoon to
i. ºrigade for the necessary interior communication within the
T108,016.
The lines of information of the field army are served with fele-
graph battalions for information to the rear and with field battalions
forward to the division.
The telegraph battalion should have the same Organization in peace
as in war and should, as now organized at war strength, consist of two
companies. ... It will provide all necessary camp telegraph and tele-
phone installation in the field army and supply it with lines of infor-
mation toward the base. For this purpose the companies are organ-
ized into telegraph and telephone sections.
Mr. Chairman, if you will allow me, I should like to say something
in regard to the bill which was submitted to me and the other chiefs
of bureau for consideration, and is known as the Chamberlain bill. It
has been very carefully gone over, and I would like with your per-
mission to speak of section 14, which provides for the Signal Corps of
the Army. - * -
The CHAIRMAN. Very well. Proceed and make such statement as
you care to, General. -- -
Gen. SCRIVEN. In the first place, the number of commissioned offi-
cers provided gives what is needed. It corresponds with our own
estimate and the study of the War College Division of the General
Staff. It is most desirable that the law provide for the enlisted per-
sonnel by actual numbers in each grade instead of relative percent-
ages. With changing administrations and policies, it seems to me.'
to be an extremely wise thing to fix these numbers definitely, just as
they are fixed for a company or a troop or a battery in the other
branches of the service. -
Organized companies and battalions and squadrons of the Signal
Corps serving with the line of the Army are combatant troops.
They are armed; they may fight; and their duties take them to the
very forefront of military operations. A larger percentage of Signal
Corps men were killed in the Philippine insurrection than in any
other branch of the Army. There seems to be every reason, there-
fore, to provide that officers and enlisted men of the Signal Corps
while serving in organized companies, battalions, and squadrons
shall be a part of the line of the Army. .
. The method by which officers are now selected for the Signal
Corps is most unsatisfactory. The law of 1901, creating the detail
system, as you know, provides that all vacancies in the Signal Corps
648 PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
shall be filled by detail from the line of the Army. This extends to
all grades, or will do so as soon as vacancies occur in the higher
grades, due to the passing out of the officers holding permanent
commissions. Selection of officers is further restricted and compli-
cated by the so-called Manchu law of 1912, so that as matters now
stand officers of the line who are known to possess predilection for
Signal Corps work can not be selected for detail, as it is purely acci-
dental if their eligibility and occurrence of a vacancy happen to
coincide. *J. - - e
Signal officers to be of value must be technically trained specialists.
The present system does not make it possible for detailed officers to
become such except in rare cases of independent effort. Officers who
have served a detail and have shown aptitude and desire to specialize
in Signal Corps work can not depend upon ever getting back. An
officer commissioned in a branch of the line of the Army has his life
work, his future prospects, and his preferment permanently fixed in
that branch. Signal work can be at best nothing more to him than
a side issue; even though detailed and serving in the Signal Corps,
his examination for promotion is solely in subjects pertaining to ;
permanent arm of the service, and his proficiency in or ignorance of
the technical work of the Signal Corps make no difference whatever.
A considerable number of officers secure details to the Signal
School and in the Signal Corps who have no predilection for the work
and who expect nothing more than a welcome change from the
monotony that is so often the lot of the first lieutenant who has
been in that grade for a long period of years. Other officers are
known to have sought details in the Signal Corps to escape disagree-
able or annoying conditions at the post in which they were serving.
Officers naturally serving details in the Signal Corps expect in the
event of war to get the command of regiments or battalions of volun-
teers of the arm in which they are commissioned, and have no inten-
tion of remaining on staff duty with the Signal Corps. Other officers,
too modest to admit their expectation of a higher command, prefer
to cast their fortunes with the troops of the line for the glory and
advancement that the fortunes of combat may offer to those branches.
The enlisted men of the Signal Corps are permanent, trained, tech-
nical specialists. A greater per cent of them reenlisted than in any
other branch of the service. For obvious reasons no attempt has
been made since 1878 to reintroduce the detail system in the enlisted
personnel. It has been proven, through bitter experience, that it
would not work. It is discouraging and unfair to these men and
organizations to officer them with commissioned officers who must
be changed every few months and who, in the majority of cases,
know so little about the work that they are detailed to supervise
that they are unable to properly direct it.
It seems very clear that unless some change is made in the method
of selecting officers, the high standard of efficiency of this auxiliary
branch of the Army must grow less and less; and as a rational and
reasonable remèdy a provision is offered which retains the detail
system in what might be termed “the probationary grade,” and then
provides tha officers in the higher grades shall take a permanent
place in the corps, enabling them to pursue this specialty as a life
work. . -
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 649
The provision for additional pay for expert qualification in military
telegraphy already appears in the bill. A slight change should be
made in the designation, as it is desirable to avoid giving men a classi-
fication of “second class” and “third class,” which has an element of
distaste.
In this suggested revision of section 14, which I desire to submit for
your consideration, in the part that relates to the aviation Section, the
aviation law has been entirely rewritten, following the language of the
original law exactly where it could be done, and making changes from
lace to place to accomplish the following objects: To remove the
ſº of age and conjugal condition that now govern the detail
of officers of the Army to the aviation section; to remove the increase
of rank that is now given to qualified aviation officers, but readjusting
the amount of pay received so that it would correspond to the
amounts now received. The giving of additional rank to very young
officers for the performance of a certain duty that carries with it no
responsibility of command or authority whatever is considered to be a
vicious principle and results in a vast amount of trouble. This pro-
vision provides for temporary additional rank of proper grade for
those officers who are actually assigned to and exercise the command
of squadrons and who actually direct the affairs of the aviation
section.
Another provision that is added is that provided by the act making
appropriations for the naval service for the fiscal year ending June
30, 1916, which provides for double pension resulting from aviation
accidents. This provision was added because it seemed eminently
fair to remove the discrimination that now exists between the services.
It is realized that the method we have taken to correct the existing
aviation law so as to make it workable seems rather lengthy, but from
our study it did not seem possible to make these changes by the
simple addition of a few short paragraphs in section 14.
It is hoped that it is clearly understood that in order to fill up the
aviation section with aviation officers, even as it exists to-day—to
say nothing of increasing its numbers—it is absolutely necessary to
remove the limitations and restrictions in the existing law.
The following is a draft of the proposed revision of section 14. Its
§º. are those which we believe to be the very best for the
ignal Corps and for the Army which it serves:
SUGGESTED REVISION OF SECTION 14 OF A BILL FOR MA.KING FURTHER AND MORE
EFFECTUAL PROVISION FOR THE NATIONAL DEFENSE, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSEs
(CHAMBERLAIN BILL).
SEC, 14. The Sigmal Corps.—The Signal Corps, exclusive of the aviation sections.
thereof, shall consist of one chief signal officer, who shall have the rank of major gen-
eral and with the pay and allowances now prescribed for a brigadier general; four
colonels; twelve lieuténant colonels; fifteen majors; forty captains; one hundred and
one first lieutenants; fifty-nine master signal electricians; two hundred and fifty-eight
first-class sergeants; three hundred and sixty-nine sergeants; five hundred and forty-
six corporals; seventy-five cooks; one thousand six hundred and thirty-two first-class
; four hundred and nineteen privates, and the aviation section hereinafter
provided: -
Provided, That the President may organize, in his discretion, such part of the com-
missioned and enlisted personnel of the Signal Corps into such number of companies,
battalions, and aero Squadrons as the necessities of the service may require, and that
while so serving they shall constitute a part of the line of the Army: -
650 PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
Provided, That the chief signal officer of the Army shall be selected as now pro-
vided by law; that vacancies in the grade of first lieutenant shall be filled by detail
from first lieutenants of the line of the Army as provided by the act of February second,
nineteen hundred and one, that vacancies in the grade of caſtain shall be filled by the
ermanent anpointment of officers who have served or may serve in the Signal Corps
y detail, under such system of examination as the Secretary of War may rrescribe;
and that vacancies in the other grades, including the original vacancies created by .
this act, shall be filled by promotion of officers holding permanent appointments in
the Signal Corps according to seniority: -
And provided, That enlisted men of the Signal Corps who qualify, under such regu-,
lations as the Secretary of War may prescribe, shall receive, in addition to their ray,
the following amounts: Expert military telegrapher, $5 per month; first-class military
telegrapher, $3 per month; military telegrapher, $2 per month; no enlisted man shall
receive at the same time additional pay under more than one such rating:
Aviation section.—Provided, further, That the aviation section of the Signal Corps
shall be, and is hereby, charged with the duty of operating or Supervising the operation .
of all military air craft, including balloons and aeroplanes, all appliances pertaining
to said craft, and signaling apparatus of any kind when installed on said craft; also
with the duty of training officers and enlisted men in matters pertaining to military
aviation. -
That in addition to such officers and enlisted men as shall be assigned from the Signal
Corps at large to executive, administrative, scientific, or other duty in or for the
aviation section, there shall be in Said Section aviation officers not to exceed one
hundred and forty-six in number and nine hundred and eighty enlisted men of all
grades; and said aviation officers and aviation enlisted men, all of whom shall be en-
gaged on duties pertaining to Said aviation Section, shall be additional to the officers
and enlisted men now allotted by law to the Signal Corps, the commissioned and
enlisted strength of which are hereby increased accordingly.
|The aviation officers provided for in this section shall, except as hereinafter pre-
scribed specifically to the contrary, be selected from among officers holding commis-
sions in the Army, and shall be detailed to serve as such aviation officers for periods
of four years unless Sooner relieved, and the provisions of Section twenty-seven of the
act of Congress approved February Second, nineteen hundred and one (Thirty-first
Statutes, page seven hundred and fifty-five) are hereby extended so as to apply to
said aviation officers and to vacancies created in the Army by the detail of said officers
therefrom, but nothing in said act or in any other law now in force shall be held to
prevent the detail or redetail at any time to fill a vacancy among the aviation officers
authorized by this act, or any officer holding a commission in the Army and who,
during prior service as an aviation officer in the aviation section, shall have become
especially proficient in military aviation. - -
There shall also be constantly attached to the aviation section a sufficient number
of aviation students to make, with the aviation officers actually detailed in said
section under the provisions of this act, a total number of one hundred and forty-
six aviation officers and aviation students constantly under assignment to, or detail
in, said section. Said aviation students, all of whom shall be selected from the Army
on the recommendation of the Chief Signal Officer, shall remain attached to the
aviation Section for a sufficient time, but in no case to exceed one year, to determine
their fitness or unfitness for detail as aviation officers in said section, and their detach-
ment from their respective arms of Service while under assignment to said section
shall not be held to create in said arms vacancies that may be filled by promotion
or original appointments: Provided, That no person, except in time of war, shall be
assigned or detailed against his will to duty as an aviation student, or an aviation
officer: Provided further, That whenever, under such regulations as the Secretary of
War shall prescribe and publish to the Army, an officer assigned or detailed to duty
of any kind in or with the aviation section shall have been found to be inattentive
to his duties, inefficient, incapacitated, or unfit from any cause whatever for the
full and efficient discharge of all duties that might properly be imposed upon him
if he should be continued on duty in or with said section, said officer shall be returned
forthwith to the branch of the service in which he shall hold a commission.
That the aviation officers hereinbefore provided for shall be rated as military
aviators. Within sixty days after this act shall take effect the Secretary of War
may, upon the recommendation of the Chief Signal Officer, rate as military aviators
any officers who are now on duty as junior military aviators and as aviation students
those now so detailed; and after said rating shall have been made the rating of mili-
tarv aviator shall not be conferred upon any person except as hereinafter provided.
Each aviation student authorized by this act shall, while on duty that requires
him to participate regularly and frequently in aerial flights, receive an increase of
twenty-five per centum in the pay of his grade and length of service under his commis-
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 651
sion. Each duly qualified military aviator shall, while so serving, receive an increase
of thirty-five per centum in the pay of his grade and length of service under his com-
mission, and while on duty requiring him to participate regularly and frequently
in aerial flights he shall receive an increase of seventy per centum in the pay of his
grade and length of Service under his commission.
* The aviation enlisted men hereinbefore provided for shall consist of twenty-eight
master signal electricians, sixty-two first-class sergeants, one hundred and seventeen
Sergeants, two hundred and forty-nine corporals, forty-four cooks, three hundred and
thirty-two first-class privates, and one hundred and thirty-eight privates, organized
into an aviation-school detachment and such number of 2.ero Squadrons as the Secretary
of War may direct, not to exceed seven; and each aero Squadron and the school detach-
ment shall consist of such officers and enlisted men of the aviation section as the
Secretary of War may prescribe. Such officers of the aviation section as may be
assigned as director and assistant director of the aviation section and in command of
aero Squadrons and in command of aero companies shall receive while so serving the
rank, pay, and allowances of colonel, lieutenant colonel, major, and captain, re-
spectively. - -
Not to exceed one hundred and forty-four of said enlisted men shall at any time
have the rating of aviation mechanician, which rating is hereby established, and
Said rating shall not be conferred upon any person except as hereinafter provided:
Provided, That sixty-five enlisted men at a time shall, in the discretion of the officer
in command of the aviation section, be instructed in the art of flying, and no enlisted
man shall be assigned to duty as an aerial flyer against his will except in time of war.
Each aviation enlisted man, while on duty that requires him to participate regularly
and frequently in aerial flights, or while holding the rating cf aviation mechanician,
shall receive an increase of fifty per centum in his pay: Provided further, That, except
as hereinafter provided in the cases of officers and aviation mechanicians now on
aviation duty, no person shall be detailed as an aviation officer, or rated as a military
aviator, or as an aviation mechanician, until there shall have been issued to him a
certificate to the effect that he is qualified for the detail or rating, or for both the .
detail and the rating sought or proposed in his case, and no such certificate shall be
issued to any person until an aviation examining board, which shall be composed
of three officers of experience in the aviation service and two medical officers, shall
have examined him under general regulations to be prescribed by the Secretary of
War and published to the Army by the War Department, and shall have reported
him to be qualified for the detail or rating, or for both the detail and the rating, sought
or proposed in his case: Provided further, That the Secretary of War shall cause appro-
priate certificates of qualification to be issued by the Adjutant General of the Army
to all officers and enlisted men who shall have been found and reported by aviation
examining boards in accordance with the terms of this act, to be qualified for the
details and ratings for which said officers and enlisted men shall have been examined:
Provided further, That, except as hereinbefore provided in the cases of officers who
are now on aviation duty and who shall have been rated as military aviators or avia-
tion students as hereinbefore authorized, no person shall be detailed for service as an
aviation officer in the aviation section until he shall have served creditably as an
aviation student for a period to be fixed by the Secretary of War: Provided further,
That there shall be paid to the widow of any officer or enlisted man who shall die as
the result of an aviation accident, not the result of his own misconduct, or to any
other person designated by him in writing, an amount equal to one year’s pay at
the rate to which such officer or enlisted man was entitled at the time of the accident
resulting in his death, but any payment made in accordance with the terms of this
proviso on account of the death of any officer or enlisted man shall be in lieu of and
a bar to any payment under the acts of Congress approved May eleventh, nineteen
hundred and eight, and March third, nineteen hundred and nine (Thirty-fifth Statutes,
pages one hundred and eight and seven hundred and fifty-five), on account of death
of Said officer or enlisted man.
In all cases where an officer or enlisted man of the Army dies, or where an enlisted
man of the Army is disabled by reason of any injury received or disease contracted
in line of duty the result of an aviation accident, received while employed in actual
flying in or in handling air craft, the amount of pension allowed shall be double that
authorized to be paid should death or disability have occurred by reason of an injury
received or disease contracted in line of duty, not the result of an aviation accident.
Gen. SCRIVEN. I should like to state another and very important
reason why the officers and men serving in the organized companies
and battalions of the Signal Corps should become a part of the line
of the Army. To-day we have mounted field companies of 100 men
652. PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
and 120 animals, and telegraph companies of 139 men. They are
commanded by captains. . . .
When these captains with their companies are serving in the same
camp or station with a small body of line troops, say 20, Infantry
soldiers commanded by a second lieutenant, the second lieutenant
is the commanding officer, issues the orders, etc., because he is “the
senior line officer present.” This is just one of those conditions that
have come down from the days before there were any organizations of
signal troops, and should be corrected. They should belong to the
line of the Army. - º
Senator CATRON. Have they not been so considered before? -
. . Gen. SCRIVEN. Not part of the line. They are a staff corps. The
Signal Corps troops are organized into companies, and all that, and
are armed and mounted, and they are sent out to the most exposed
and hazardous places, and on the most dangerous service at times,
yet they are staff troops.
Senator CATRON. You mean your entire organization, including
privates and everything, have been considered as a staff corps?
Gen. SCRIVEN. Yes, sir; we are staff troops.
The CHAIRMAN. How is it in Europe?
Gen. SCRIVEN, The men who do the work that our Signal Corps
does, in most of the foreign armies, belong to the engineer troops,
but I do not know of any case where their officers do not exercise
command according to their rank.
Senator DU PoWT. If there is an Army in the field, would your
corps undertake to keep communications open between the War
Department and the Army'
Gen. SCRIVEN. Oh, yes, Senator. In fact, in the Spanish War,
through the efforts of the Signal Corps, President McKinley was
within 6 minutes of Gen. Shafter at Santiago, actual time. Shafter's
communications were 6 minutes to the White House. Of course,
that was largely by cable. -- ,
The CHAIRMAN. How long does it take you to train men in this
Aviation Service and in the Signal Service, too? -
..Gen. SCRIVEN. I think in the Aviation Service it is a question of
the adaptability of the man. It is a good deal like asking how long
it takes to make a horseman. Some men learn to ride a horse
quickly, and some men learn to operate a machine quickly.
The CHAIRMAN. It is a question of adaptability?
Gen. SCRIVEN. I think so.
Senator CATRON. Do you find much timidity amongst those in the
aviation corps when they first start in 7
Gen. SCRIVEN. No, sir. ... I would like to have Col. Reber testify as
to the aviation. That is his particular branch. -
The CHAIRMAN. I think his testimony before the House committee
is pretty extensive, and we have access to that. We try not to dupli-
cate. If he wants to add anything to what he said there, we should
be glad to have it. Have you finished, general?
Ben. SCRIVEN. I was going on to say, Mr. Chairman, in regard to
the training of the Signal Corps men, that this is another question
that is very difficult to answer, in regard to the time and efficiency
of training, because instruction is carried on with men who are to
become Ordinary telephone men, and linemen, to telegraph operators,
cable operators, cable experts, radiomen, and then, in addition, to
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 653.
men who can handle gas engines, automobiles, balloons, can charge a
balloon, or fly an aeroplane. The field is so large and varied that it
is almost impossible to say how far you can carry the training of
any individual. But we do have a very intelligent, fine lot of en-
listed men in this corps which is filled pretty well up to its limit,
and contains mostly long-service men. But this suggests very much
the same question as that mentioned by the Quartermaster General
in regard to expansion for war purposes. The Chief Signal Officer
should certainly have a knowledge of all men available in the country
for use with the Army in case of war, for telegraph, radio, aeroplane,
automobile, and many other kinds of work. -
The needs of the aviation section were gone into quite fully in the
hearing before the House committee, and I understand that it will
not be necessary for me to repeat what appears in the report of that
hearing. I do, however, wish it to be fully understood that the
aviation organization which is called for in the preceding table—
that is, seven aero Squadrons and a school detachment, has been
reluctantly offered as absolute minimum in case the Army remains
at its present strength.
The CHAIRMAN. You went into that in the House committee 7
Gen. SCRIVEN. Yes, sir. I asked there for 18 aero Squadrons.
Senator CATRON. What constitutes a squadron º
Gen. SCRIVEN. A squadron as we had it consisted of two companies
of four aeroplanes each—that is, of eight aeroplanes, all of j. WCTO
intended for Scouting purposes.
Senator CATRON. How many men to a company ?
Gen. SCRIVEN. Under the old plan it was 90 to the squadron,
but now it has been proved by events abroad that to these two
companies of Scout machines for general outlook over the countr
must be added a third company of four aeroplanes, two of whic
shall be rapid-pursuit machines to counterattack any enemy's air
craft, and two heavy weight-carrying machines, armed with machine
or other types of guns and capable of carrying a considerable weight
of ammunition used for destructive purposes. So that a squadron
properly organized now consists of 12 aeroplanes in the first line, 129
men, and 20 officers.
Senator CATRON. You mean 129 men in a squadron, or in each
company ? .
Gen. SCRIVEN. In the whole squadron. There are 20 officers and
129 men to the squadron, 6 officers to each company, which make
18, one squadron commander, who should be a major, and One
adjutant and supply officer. But a squadron of 12 machines, in
my opinion, is not enough. The organization is good as a fighting
unit, but I think that for each machine you should count three—that
is, one machine that is actually in use, one replacement, so that when
the first is broken up or out of commission it can be at once replaced
and a third aeroplane be kept as a reserve, not necessarily assembled,
but ready to be used. As I see it, we should have one squadron in
the Philippines, one in Hawaii, one in the Canal Zone, seven for use
with the field armies—that is, one at the headquarters of each divi-
sion and three squadrons for the use of the Coast Artillery—that is,
one squadron for the North Atlantic, a squadron for the South Atlan-
tic, and a squadron for the Pacific. To these 13 squadrons there
23380—PT 12–16—3
654 PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
should be added one aeroplane, with its replacement, for each battery
of Field Artillery.
The CHAIRMAN. How many would that mean'
Gen. SCRIVEN. That means 18 squadrons.
The CHAIRMAN. Of 129 men each
Gen. SCRIVEN. Eighteen squadrons of 129 men.
The CHAIRMAN. And 20 officers?
Gen. SCRIVEN. Yes. Here is a table:


-: & % & lº •+.
# | # # # |} à | | |
pºl £3 173 tº * -
q) 3 |& 2 | #3 on CAE) -.' Q
* | # | # 5:3##| 4 || 3 || |##| | | #
35 | . . |& E; 3 || 3 |####| # | 3 || |##| 3 || 3
# | 3 |5"| 2 || 5 | E |##| | # 5 || 3 || 3 || 3 || 3 || 8
3 || 5 |33 || 5 || 3 || +s |3+*|†s | 3 || 2 || 3 |+s | 3 || 3
.59 | S |: .9, 5, £ 3 |É § | 8 || 3 |: P- §
: a .3 & | 3 || H -: 5 || 3 || 3 |..}} ‘F. C
ſº & 5 || 3 || 3 || ſ= |= |* | }. Č Č |- ſº | #
Mobile army:
18 aero Squadrons. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ....|....|....|18 |171 171 90 |144 (270 594 |108 |792 |324 2,322
Service of the interior:
Administration. -----. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ----| 1 || 1 |--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|------
Aviation School detachment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | 1 || 3 || 2 || 3 || 6 | 12 | 18 || 2 | 24 | 12 77
Total.----------------------------- ....| 1 || 1 | 19 |174 |173 || 93 .50 |282 (612 |110 816 |336 2,399
The total enlisted strength would be 2,399 for the 18 squadruns
and the aviation school detachment. The total number of officers
would be 368, 360 for the squadrons, 6 officers added for the school,
and 2 for administration at the administration center.
The CHAIRMAN. How many squadron have you now .
Gen. SCRIVEN. We have to-day, I think, 23 aeroplanes. Call it
two squadrons. . As a matter of fact, we have a squadron at San
Antonio and we have the aviation school at San Diego, and then we
have a company on its way to the Philippines.
The CHAIRMAN. That is three.
Gen. SCRIVEN. I could hardly call it three.
The CHAIRMAN. Not three squadrons'
Gen. SCRIVEN. No. Two squadrons by number; but better, one
Squadron and one company, and a school detachment.
The CHAIRMAN. You have not three, then 7
Gen. SCRIVEN. No, sir; not of the approved squadron organization.
We have 46 officers and 243 men. - .
The CHAIRMAN. How many machines have you now %
Gen. SCRIVEN. Twenty-three, and two awaiting acceptance tests.
The CHAIRMAN. How many do you need for 18 squadrons'
Gen. SCRIVEN. I think we need 36 machines to a squadron. But,
as a matter of fact, perhaps we will say, 24 machines to a squadron
would be well enough, though each unit in service should have a
support of two machines, rather than of one replacement.
The CHAIRMAN. You need 432, and you have 23%
Gen. SCRIVEN. Yes; reckoning 24 to the squadron; or if you
reckon 36 machines to the squadron, the total number of machines
we should have is 18 by 36, or 648. The machines should be con-
sidered as expendable, for they are easily placed out of commission.
The CHAIRMAN. There must be a great number in reserve with the
Furopean armies?
Gen. SCRIVEN. It is no doubt tremendous,
PREPAIRED NESS FOR, NATIONAL DEFENSE. 655
The CHAIRMAN. What does a machine cost 7
Gen. SCRIVEN. I think, roughly, $10,000, with the instruments,
and so on. . -
The CHAIRMAN. I should think it would be almost as perishable as
ammunition. - -
Gen. SCRIVEN. No doubt, and should be so reckoned. Abroad they
are getting tremendously powerful machines, and will undoubtedly
be able to carry guns and missiles in sufficient quantity to do a great
deal of destruction.
The CHAIRMAN. What do these Zeppelins carry'
Gen. SCRIVEN. They carry several tons. The new ones I do not
know about, but the old ones had a Capacity of something like 4 or 5
tons free weight. -
The CHAIRMAN. That is what the Germans are using for bombs'
Gen. SCRIVEN. Yes.
Senator CATRON. Can they drop their bombs with any accuracy 7
Gen. SCRIVEN. No, sir; they can not. They have small chance to
hit what they are aiming at. They simply drop the bombs when and
where they can.
Senator CATRON. And they have to get up about how high to be at
a safe distance?
Gen. SCRIVEN. Now, to be beyond the range of the powerful anti-
aircraft guns, they must rise to at least 13,000 feet. This is probably
beyond the ability of the dirigible.
Senator CATRON. If they drop them while they are moving and
their machine is not entirely steady, they ...' have all kinds of
trouble about where their shots would go? .
Gen. Sorry EN. They would. *
Senator CATRON. What are you doing in regard to improving your
machines, or whatever you call them : #. you adopted any
machine that is a standard machine, or are you open to getting better
ones 7 -
Lieut. Col. REBER. We are keeping abreast of the practice as
developed at home and abroad, and every time any improvement is
made we endeavor to put that in our machines. I want to add, Mr.
Chairman, that there is nothing special that I would care to add, in
compliance with your kind permission, unless the committee desires
to ask me any particular questions.
Senator CATRON. What machines are you using"
Lieut. Col. REBER. Aeroplanes.
Senator CATRON. What kind of aeroplanes are you using 3
Lieut. Col. REBER. We are using a biplane tractor, two-seated Scout
machine.
Senator CATRON. Any particular make, designated by the name of
any particular person 7
Lieut. Col. REBER. We have those machines made both by the
Curtiss Co. and the by Martin Co. - -
Senator CATRON. I suppose you have in them the advantage of
every machine there is in the country?
Lieut. Col. REBER. We try to get them.
Senator CATRON. What is the greatest speed you can get out of
one of those 7
Lieut. Col. REBER. Do you mean the ones we have 7
Senator CATRON. Yes. +.
656 PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
Lieut. Col. REBER. I think about 80 miles an hour.
Senator CATRON. It seems to me that over in Europe they have
gotten more speed than that out of them.
Lieut. Col. REBER. But not out of the same type of machine we
have. - -
Senator CATRON. Do we need another type of machine?
Lieut. Col. REBER. We do, and the only reason we haven’t it is
because we haven’t enough money to buy it.
Senator CATRON. That was what my first question was addressed
to, whether you were keeping abreast of the times, getting machines
as efficient as those now being used in Europe, that would be efficient
for and beneficial to the Army in its operations. You now say you
have not got as rapid a flying machine as they have 7 *
Lieut. Col. REBER. I might say this, that the average scout
machine abroad, of the same type we have, has approximately the
same speed as ours has. They have a faster type machine they have
developed that we have not as yet been able to buy, as it has not
been developed in this country, although American manufacturers
now are planning to build it, and they have offered to build some
types which we expect to have tried out in the next two or three
months. As a specific case, the Curtiss people are building and will
have for exhibition and trial within about a month a fast machine,
which will probably make 110 miles an hour.
Senator CATRON. The paper stated some machines over there are
making 110 miles an hour.
Lieut. Col. REBER. That is a fact. .
Senator CATRON. Is that the greatest speed any of them has
reached . ge *. -
Lieut. Col. REBER. No, sir. I think the fastest speed on record is
a little over 126 miles an hour; but that is not a military machine.
That was a racing machine. .
Senator CATRON. Where was that %
Lieut. Col. REBER. That was in France. In a Duperdussion mono-
plane, Prevost made a speed of 126.59 miles per hour.
Senator CATRON. As I understand, Gen. Scriven, you claim you
ought to have some additional machines, and particularly these very
fast machines? -
Gen. SCRIVEN. Yes, sir; I think it is pretty well developed that if
the aeroplane is actually used in war, there must be means of counter-
attack by aeroplane. An aero attack must be met by a counter-
attack, and a Zeppelin attack should be met probably by the fast
aeroplanes. x-
Senator CATRON. What is the speed of the Zeppelin'
Gen. SCRIVEN. I do not recall anything higher than about 65 miles,
whereas the aeroplanes have gotten up as high as about 125 miles an
hour.
Senator CATRON. What would be the particular benefit of the
exceedingly fast machine in connection with the others?
Gen. SCRIVEN. Like a blackbird attacking a crow. He can fly all
around his enemy, get above him, fire projectiles at him, and has the
advantage of always being able to manuever for position. Like a
fast ship, he can keep out of the way of the other's guns, and make
his own attack.
JPREP.A.R.E.D.N ESS E'OR, NATIONAL DEFENSE. 657
Senator CATRON. Have these machines proven a success as Scout
machines? -
Gen. SCRIVEN. Our machines are very successful as Scout machines.
Senator CATRON. How do these machines inform the Army where a
battery that may be firing against the troops is located 3
Gen. SCRIVEN. They do it by visual signaling, by dropping or dis-
playing objects of various shapes and colors, by directional flying, by
Smoke bombs, signals from a Very pistol, and by wireless apparatus.
Senator CATRON. You stated a while ago that they could wire out,
but they could not receive a message.
Gen. SCRIVEN. No; they can not hear. The aeroplane makes so
much noise.
The CHAIRMAN. How accurate is photography from those machines?
Gen. SCRIVEN. It has been very excellent. -
The CHAIRMAN. At what elevation ?
Lieut. Col. REBER. They have taken photographs from 12,000 and
13,000 feet.
Gen. SCRIVEN. It is very good work. In making signals they have
sometimes used little Scintillations of silver paper.
The CHAIRMAN. They have a code :
Gen. SCRIVEN. They have a conventional code.
The CHAIRMAN. Is there anything else you want to discuss, Gen-
eral 7 -
Gen. SCRIVEN. I have been thinking of the best means for obtain-
ing a reserve of men who would be required in war for signal work,
and also in regard to aviators regarding which I have made a Sug-
gestion, but that is in the House hearing. The question of a reserve
of men and officers is going to be the most serious matter that we
have to face.
The CHAIRMAN. It all looks serious to me, General.
Gen. SCRIVEN. I know. But I believe, Senator, that the plan
worked out by the Secretary of War is most admirable, and that if
we can stand together on those lines, with the reenforcement after-
wards, if necessary, of compulsory service, as indicated by the Cham-
berlain bill, we will get something that is of value. It seems to me
that the great element which has been omitted from most calculations
in regard to the continental army is the fact that this body of volun-
teers should be and can be brought together by making the service
sufficiently interesting and attractive to the young men of the coun-
try—the young men whom we need. It is not so much a question of
paying them enough to make the service a money consideration and
of intensive training and hurry as it is of interest in the service and
its work. The effort should be to make the volunteer service desirable
and worth while, and the rendezvous attractive to men who have
interest in military affairs, in the outdoor life, and in the life of a
Soldier, and indeed, in their country; happily, many such young
men exist in all communities. I think this interest in the volunteer
service can be created, and that the volunteer plan can be made
attractive and successful. -
(Thereupon, at 1 o'clock p. m., the committee took a recess until
2 o'clock p. m.)
658 PREPAIRED NESS FOR, NATIONAL DEFENSE.
AIFTER RECESS.
The committee met, at the expiration of the recess, at 2 o’clock
p. m., Senator Geo. E. Chamberlain (chairman) presiding.
STATEMENT OF LIEUT. COL. WILLIAM G. HAAN, COAST
ARTILLERY CORPS, UNITED STATES ARMY.
Hº CHAIRMAN. Will you state where you are stationed, Col.
8,8.Il 4 -
Lieut. Col. HAAN. I am stationed at Fort Totten, N. Y.
The CHAIRMAN. The committee has had under consideration these
various plans for Army reorganization, and in the course of the
examination information has been elicited with reference to the
Coast Artillery, and we wanted to hear you on the subject generally,
and in such Way as you care to discuss it. It further developed here
that you were on a board at one time to investigate the coast defenses
and that you were probably in a position to enlighten the committee
on that subject.
Lieut. Col. HAAN. That board that I was on was the National Land
Defense Board, and it prepared plans—projects—for the land defense
of fortifications and the cities on the fortified harbors. That has
been my principal work for the last seven years.
The CHAIRMAN. Is that board in existence now %
Lieut. Col. HAAN. No, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. When did you start in and when did you con.
plete the work?
Lieut. Col. HAAN. The board was organized in 1907, and the last
project was sent in in 1913, I think, excepting as to revisions. We
have just sent in another project for Boston Harbor, on which board
I was myself, but that was not the same board.
The CHAIRMAN. Who composed that original board?
Lieut. Col. HAAN. Gen. W. W. Wotherspoon, myself, and the
local district engineer and coast-defense commander for each place.
The CHAIRMAN. I don’t know how far the committee wanted tº
investigate this subject, but if you would enter into a discussion of
the land defenses generally we would be pleased to hear from you,
and as to our condition as to preparedness.
Senator CATRON. And as to what we need.
The CHAIRMAN. Yes.
Lieut. Col. HAAN: I think perhaps a brief history of the Nationa,
Land Defense Board and what it attempted to accomplish in the way
of preparing practical working plans for the defense of our large
cities and other important centers, as well as coast batteries, and then
give a summary of its conclusions, may give you the clearest idea as
to its final opinion on national defense, particularly coast defense in
its large sense, which for us means national defense against foreign
aggression. -
In 1903, when Congress created the General Staff, it also prescribed
one of its functions to be the “making of plans for the national
defense.” -
PREPAIR.E.D.NESS FOR, NATIONAL DEFENSE. 659
During the winter 1905–6 a committee of General Staff officers,
of which Maj. George W. Goethals was president, made a theoretical
map study of the general subject of our coast fortifications and im-
portant cities against attack by mobile troops from the land side.
The report of this committee was carefully considered by the War
Department, and on March 18, 1907, was appointed the National
Land Defense Board, consisting of Lieut. Col. William W. Wother-
spoon and Capt. William G. Haan as permanent members, and in
addition thereto local members for each project consisting of the
district engineer officer and the coast defense commander.
The board was instructed to prepare working plans and complete
estimates as to material, personnel, labor, and cost for each Section
determined by our fortified harbors, and also to state what would be
the minimum number of troops required at each place to prevent
such place from being taken by assault by any force that any prob-
able enemy who had temporary or permanent control of the sea
might be able to land shortly after the beginning of War.
The general method of procedure has been for the permanent
members of the board, after collecting the best obtainable maps, to
visit the locality under consideration, make a careful study of the
ground, determine the general strategic location for the field fortifi-
cations, prepare strategic plans, and then ask the War Department
to send Engineer officers in charge of Engineer troops to the locality
to make accurate maps and prepare complete working plans on the
general lines indicated in the strategic plans.
For the past six years from 3 to 8 Engineer officers and from 1 to
300 enlisted men of the Engineers have been engaged in the prepara-
tion of these working plans. Projects for all fortified harbors in
the United States have been submitted and approved by the War
Department, and copies have been filed with department commanders
and other proper local custodians with complete instructions as to
their duties in connection there with.
Due to the increased range of modern heavy mobile artillery, it
has become necessary to revise some of these plans in some respects,
and that work is now in progress. With this preliminary statement
showing how completely and carefully the work of the board was
done I think you may have a better appreciation as to what weight
to give to its conclusions.
The following table shows for the various localities the estimates
made by the board in 1908 and the estimates made by me on January
1, 1916, after assisting in revising the projects for Boston and New
York and after studying the methods and men used in the present
war in Europe:
PREDARED NESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
Number of divisions.

Estimates
Name of locality. Naina
Land
Defense
Board,
Estimates
Jan. 1,
1916, by
Lieut. Col.
Haan.
1908.
*—
Portland, Me., and Portsmouth, N. H.--------------------------------------------
Boston Section--------------------------------------------------------------- - * * ~ *
eWport and Buzzard Bay Section... ----------------- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - * * * * *
New London and eastern end Long Island Sound Section. . . . . . . . . . . . . . - - - - - - - - - - -
Northern New York and Long Island section. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Southern New York and New Jersey Section. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Delaware River and Philadelphia Section. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Washington and Baltimore . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • * * ~ * = - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -: - - - -
Norfolk, Fort Monroe, and Newport News section... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Reserve.-----------..............................---------------------------------
l 19
2
3
3
Puget Sound, including Seattle, Tacoma, and Olympia Section. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Greys Harbor Section. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Columbia River and Portland, Oreg., Section. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
San Francisco and vicinity
Los Angeles and San Diego Section. ... --------------------------------------------
Reserve---------------------------------------------------------------------------
*
-
-
º
-
*
-
-
-
-
* *
*
-
º
-
:
i
4 17
1 380,000 troops. 2 660,000 troops. 8 160,000 troops. 4 340,000 troops.
For the immediate defense of all the coast batteries against attacks
from the rear by small landing parties the board's estimates called
for 42 battalions war strength or about 25,200 men.
The board did not complete the projects for the South Atlantic
and Gulf coasts, except for the immediate defense of the forts, but
it concluded that if the enemy landed in any of those Sections some
of the reserve forces indicated in the table could be used for land
operations against him there. The total estimates of the board as to
troops required, made in 1908, were as follows:
For defense of cities and other vital points of North Atlantic coast____ 380, 000
Same for Pacific coast--------------------------------------------- 160,000
For defense of Coast batteries-----------------. -------------------- 25, 200
Total eXclusive of Coast Artillery troops______________________ 565, 200
My estimate, made January 1, 1916, after revising Boston and
New York projects, for same localities, is as follows:
North Atlantic coast-------------------------------------------- 660, 000
Pacific Coast ---------------------------------------------------- 340, 000
TXefense of Coast batteries---------------------------------------- 25, 200
Total, exclusive of Coast Artillery__________________________ 1,025, 260
Senator WARREN. Will you state what division in that sense
means? Of course a division in the mobile army means 20,000 men.
Lieut. Col. HAAN. We figured on mobile army divisions of 20,000
men each.
Senator WARREN. In these divisions you enumerated, you mean
20,000 in each 3 *
Lieut. Col. HAAN. Yes, sir.
Senator WARREN. And how many did it total?
Lieut. Col. HAAN. The total for the North Atlantic coast from
Maine to include Norfolk in the 1908 estimates was 18 divisions—
12 divisions for the localities and six divisions in reserve.
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 661
Senator WARREN. That would be something like 380,000 men?
Lieut. Col. HAAN. Yes; that would be 380,000 men.
I think perhaps it is well to say that in looking over our 1908
estimates I find that the force then estimated that could be landed
by the first transport fleet was about one division. Since that time
the carrying power of transports of various foreign nations has
very greatly increased, so that the force that could now be landed
would be considerably larger. * *
For the last nine months I have been on a board in Boston revising
a project for that place. We had to move the lines out further on
account of the longer range of the Field Artillery and the greater
destructive effect of high-explosive shells. We have increased the
force there to one field army of three divisions, and I am now in a
board working on the defense of New York.
Senator HITCHCOCK. Is this just to resist a raiding force?
Lieut. Col. HAAN. That is to resist any force that any probable
enemy may be able to land Soon after the beginning of War, and
might now be, perhaps, three or four divisions.
Senator HITCHCOCK. And when you say that you figured that the
division could be brought and landed in 1908, what number of ships
do you mean would be necessary to transport them?
Lieut. Col. HAAN. That would depend, of course, on the size of the
ships they had. Taking the tonnage, it would take about 3 tons per
man to cross the Atlantic, including all army accessories and im-
pedimenta. -
Senator HITCHCOCK. Those transports would have to be accom-
panied by a fleet able to command the Sea?
Lieut. Col. HAAN. Yes; or accompanied by a largely superior
fleet.
Senator HITCHCOCK. That would mean they would have to get
command of the Atlantic Ocean?
Lieut. Col. HAAN. Yes; or avoid our fleet.
The CHAIRMAN. Your estimates are based on time of practically
actual war? º
Lieut. Col. HAAN. Yes.
Senator HITCHCOCR. What would be the use of landing a division
of 20,000 men in the United States?
Lieut. Col. HAAN. That was the estimate in 1908, but if they should
succeed in landing a division very early in the operations even now
they could take almost any place. We could not now have sufficient
force in more than one or two places to resist a well-organized
and well-trained division. Any of the many other fortified harbors
could therefore be captured from the land side by a single division.
Senator HITCHCOCR. If they could land it they could not save it,
could they?
Lieut. Col. HAAN. Yes; they could take the place and then
with the fleet hold the harbor after our coast forts were destroyed.
The object would be to gain a base. That is the problem that was put
up to us to prevent the enemy from getting. Not So much to prevent
him from landing as to prevent him from getting a good base. If
he succeeded in landing a force near our fortifications, and we had
no force there to stop him, our fortifications would fall by attack
from the rear. Now, we must have forces at all our important har-
bors to prevent the enemy from doing this, and that was the object
662 IPREPAIRED NIESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
of the first study—local defense to prevent the enemy at the very
beginning from getting a comparatively small force in and getting
possession of the fortifications of one of our harbors, and then by its
fleet and land force holding that harbor as a base.
Senator HITCHCOCK. Holding it from land attack? *
Lieut. Col. HAAN. They would fortify and with their troops and
fleet hold it until their further reenforcements arrived as a base to
land large forces for further land Operations against other vital
centers.
Senator HITCHCOCK. They would have to follow it up then with
other divisions brought over? -
Lieut. Col. HAAN. Yes, sir; other forces would probably be Wait-
ing at Sea and would be quickly landed. -
Senator HITCHCOCK. Of course, 20,000 men would not last very
long. - tºº
Lieut. Col. HAAN. No; they would probably make a very much
larger first landing at the present time and then get prompt reen-
forcements. In the recent naval maneuvers in the vicinity of Bos-
ton I find that the enemy fleet had with it constructive transports
carrying 50,000 men. Just upon what that was based I don’t know.
The enemy fleet was called a Black fleet. I saw a copy of the prob-
lem, but it did not go so far as to say exactly how the calculations
were made. -
I have stated that for Boston our board in revision came to the
conclusion that for the local defense three divisions were necessary,
or a normal field army. For New York the old land-defense board
figured on two divisions. The present board’s estimate is three divi-
sions. If we take a general estimate on those lines to secure the
North Atlantic coast from Maine to include Norfolk, Va., and place
9 divisions in reserve—that is, 3 field armies in reserve instead
of 2, as before—the number of divisions called for would be 33
divisions, or a total of 660,000 men.
This distribution, according to my studies, would be as shown in
the table in the earlier part of this hearing.
Senator DU Pont. Did the board consider the breakwater of the
Delaware, the enemy taking possession of the breakwater, which is
unfortified ? -
Lieut. Col. HAAN. The National Land Defense Board did not.
Senator DU PONT. And would not that present a greater field for
an enemy's enterprise, the fact of it being unfortified and being an
excellent harborº .
Lieut. Col. HAAN. Our board did not consider that, Senator. We
were rather limited to fortified harbors, and the National Land De-
fense Board did not consider that.
At the present time there is a local board there, of which I am not
a member, revising that project, and I don’t know whether they are
considering that or not. I should think it might be considered in
the nature of providing heavy movable seacoast artillery to cover
that anchorage.
In Boston, for example, we have recommended definitely heavy
type of movable coast artillery for covering Plymouth Harbor, the
harbor at Salem, Marblehead, and Beverly; at Gloucester, Rockport,
and Newburyport, all of which come now very much more into the
PREPAIRED NESS IFOR, NATIONAL DEFENSE. 663
problem of the defense of the metropolitan district of Boston than
they did 10 years ago.
Senator CATRON. What kind of mobile artillery are you preparing
for that ?
Lieut. Col. HAAN. We could not get definite specifications of what
is called for, but we gave general specifications of what is required.
We took into consideration the waters in the vicinity, the depth of
water and the type of ships that could come into those waters, and
prescribed the weights of projectile and range we should have for
the various places. There are two types of guns that should be pro-
vided. One we estimated to have an armor deck piercing projectile
that weighed about 700 pounds, and a maximum high-angle fire
range of not less than 15,000 yards.
Senator CATRON. What caliber?
Lieut. Col. HAAN. About 12-inch caliber; and then another one of
about 100 pounds—it would be about 6-inch caliber—so mounted
on a movable or portable mount as to be capable of both direct and
high-angle fire. That type of artillery is the best for shallow waters,
where only the Smaller craft can come in, perhaps unarmored craft.
Senator DU PoWT. At the Delaware Breakwater, you know, vessels
of larger size could take shelter.
Lieut. Col. HAAN. There you would need the class of gun that I
first described, of about 12-inch caliber. I don’t know exactly the
distances there. I know where the breakwater is located, and I
understood the object of it was to make a harbor of refuge. I have
been there, but that was some time ago. It strikes me that with the
railroad and good roads there should be no great difficulty in pro-
viding a defense for that place, and I have no doubt that is taken
into consideration.
The instructions from the department commander and from the
War Department is revising the present projects cover all the points
of that kind. We were directed to take into consideration the minor
harbors, which are now not fortified, and report on those.
The CHAIRMAN. You are going to give us the requirements for each
of those coast defenses all along the line—you have gotten as far as
Newport News?
Lieut. Col. HAAN. Yes. Our board considered the most important
forts in the East to be what is generally spoken of as the north
Atlantic coast—that is, from the Chesapeake north. We made a
study of all the points south—that is, Charleston, the Cape Fear
River, Savannah, IQey West, Tampa, Pensacola, Mobile, New Or-
leans, and Galveston, for which, however, the full projects for resist-
ing a larger attack were not completed. We completed what we call
the Coast Artillery support projects there; that is, only such forces
as were necessary for the immediate defense of the fortifications.
We did not take into consideration the defense of the larger cities,
which, however, was a problem that we left open for further study.
The reason for this was that those of you who are familiar with
the topography in that southern country will recall that the cities
are located generally at considerable distances from the fortifications,
and some of them are of hardly sufficient importance to make them
main points of defense, and that the defense of that part of the
country would probably better be made by a mobile army without
specific location for defensive positions.
664 PREPAIRED N ESS FOR NATION AI, DEFENSE.
New Orleans is a little different, and that was the first subject
that we were to take up in further study. Perhaps there the con-
clusion would be reached that positions would be prepared, working
plans made, and everything made ready for their construction at the
beginning of war, as for the North Atlantic coast Charleston and
Savannah were also listed for further study.
Projects were prepared in the same way for the Pacific coast—they
are all completed—as for the Atlantic and Pacific coasts, the working
plans include detailed specifications and estimates of cost, and the
number of men and the classes of men, tools, and material, and time
required for their construction, much the same as an architect or
engineer makes a plan for the construction of a building. They are
working plans as known by the engineer. If you gentlemen would
like to see one of those working plans I have one here for Boston.
Senator WARREN. I think it was shown here the other day by some
officer. . e
The CHAIRMAN. Gen. Wood showed it. -
Lieut. Col. HAAN. Gen. Wood had the revised project sent in sev-
eral weeks ago by the board on revision, of which I was a member.
This has not yet been approved by the Secretary of War. It is per-
haps a little more simplified, due to our further experience, than the
present approved project which is the one I have here.
The CHAIRMAN. You spoke of the Pacific coast. What number
of men would be necessary to defend those -
Lieut. Col. HAAN. I have the figures here and the estimates of
our board, which were also made in 1908. We had for the Puget
Sound district, three divisions; for the Columbia River, one division;
for San Francisco, three divisions; for Los Angeles and San Diego,
one division. Our total was eight divisions, making 160,000.
Senator CATRON. One hundred and sixty thousand men on the
Pacific coast?
Lieut. Col. HAAN. Yes. These were our estimates made in 1908.
But, considering the changed conditions since that time in the carry-
ing power of foreign ships on the Pacific, my present estimate is 17
divisions, placing a reserve in the Puget Sound and Grays Harbor
and Portland district of one field army, and for the San Francisco
district another field army. This will make for the Pacific coast a
total of 340,000 men. -
The CHAIRMAN. All of those estimates are based on the assumption
that there might be landing parties on both coasts simultaneously?
Lieut. Col. HAAN. Yes; provided we consider them both. If we
consider them both, then we should have the combined force. If we
consider one, then, perhaps, at the beginning we would not need this
total force. This force on the Pacific coast, as my estimates now give
it, is 340,000.
Senator DU Pont. Is it a fact that the commanding officer of the
defensive forces could not possibly know where the attack was to be
made? -
Ilieut. Col. HAAN. He can only estimate the situation; no one can
tell positively.
Senator DU Pont. No one can tell. -
Lieut. Col. HAAN. Except the man who is trying to make it; and
he can not tell Sometimes.
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 665
Senator WARREN. I did not get your estimate for the southern
country—from Newport News down around, including the Gulf?
Lieut. Col. HAAN. We only made an estimate for the immediate
defense of the fortifications, and, as I recall it now, it amounted
to something like 12 regiments. There was nowhere considered a
force so large as a division. Mobile field armies must be located at
strategic points through the South if the general situation of the
War indicates that landings may be attempted on these southern
coasts. In addition to the force I have given for the North Atlantic
coast there is another defense force inside, close to the fortifications,
called coast artillery supports, for the immediate defense of the bat-
teries against Small parties that might be landed under cover near
the forts. This usually consists of a battalion or so for each fort.
For the fortifications to the south of Norfolk, on the South Atlantic
and Gulf coasts, our plans for the immediate defense are considerably
larger than for the same defense on the North Atlantic, due to the
fact, for example, that at Key West the whole defense must be made
on the island itself, and you should have a force large enough there to
prevent landings on that island. And in consequence of this the
force required for that station for coast artillery support defense is
larger than on the North Atlantic coast. As I recall it now, the addi-
tional force required for the whole United States for the immediate
defense of the batteries amounted, in 1908, to 42 battalions, or about,
at war strength, 25,200 men. That would be in addition to what
I have already given as to the larger or mobile army force for the
defense of the large cities and vital areas; and, of course, all of them
in addition to the personnel to man the coast fortifications.
The CHAIRMAN. How large an army, taking all of those divisions
into consideration, would your plans involve?
Ilieut. Col. HAAN. The North Atlantic coast calls for 660,000 men;
the Pacific coast, .340,000; and 25,200 for Coast Artillery supports
would be 1,025,200 men.
The CHAIRMAN. That is, in case of War?
Lieut. Col. HAAN. That would be war strength; yes.
The CHAIRMAN. Do you think those would be sufficient to protect
the coast defenses.
Lieut. Col. HAAN. They would be more than that, Senator. That
force is intended to protect not only the coast defenses but to protect
the critical areas, as we might say. In other words, the force for the
north Atlantic coast is intended to cover by its local divisions and
reserve field armies all the important territory between the mouth of
the Chesapeake Bay and Portland, Me. -
You all know, perhaps better than I do, the value of the factories
that are lying through Connecticut, and all along between Boston and
Philadelphia. It is quite as important to protect those valuable
plants as it is to protect our cities, and I think perhaps sometimes
more so. The reserve field armies, while no plan has been approved
so far as I know for their location, our board considered should be
located as follows: One between Boston and Narragansett, another
in the vicinity of northern New York—northern New York to cover
Connecticut, Springfield, and the water supply of New York City–
and another to the south of New York.
The CHAIRMAN. You know that some of our good friends claim that
within 24 hours after a call was issued we could assemble a million
666 PREPAREDIN ESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
men. Would that million men so assembled be sufficient to defend
thèse lines that you speak of?
Lieut. Col. HAAN. I hardly think that we need consider that. They
would not be worth anything, worse than nothing.
The CHAIRMAN. Washington said they would be in the way.
Lieut. Col. HAAN. When we considered the forces we did not con-
sider that these would be trained so completely as is our Regular
Army or as some of the armies of some military nations of Europe;
but we did consider that they should be organized and have some
training, so that they would be immediately in hand and directly
under the orders of the President, so that there would be no delay in
calling them to the colors. They should be organized, trained, and
ready to be called. We probably would have reduced this force con-
siderably could we have counted on a force so trained as are the
divisions of our Regular Army that have been trained together.
Senator WARREN. Now, are you assuming, in having in readiness
a force of that kind, that they are all to be in the neighborhood of .
the coasts, where they could be assembled in a few hours, or would
you draw them from the interior of the country?
Lieut. Col. HAAN. I would think it would be sufficient if they were
organized throughout the country. -
Senator WARREN. The main thing is to know where they are and
under organization. &
Lieut. Col. HAAN. Yes; they should be completely organized and
trained considerably and under the direct orders of the War Depart-
ment.
Senator WARREN. It struck me that it might be impossible to get
the number you wanted and have them in readiness quite near these
fortifications.
Lieut. Col. HAAN. The enemy can not in a minute get across the sea
with a large force. Of the force I have considered for our defense
a considerable percentage would be located in New England, for ex-
ample, where the transportation is very good; the railroad trans-
portation is good. Motor roads are very good, and there is a large
amount of motor transportation. This we learned in our study in
the vicinity of Boston. We had all the motor transportation listed
there to see what could be done in making more mobile the divisions
that might be assembled in that vicinity.
Senator WARREN. That is true all over the United States now, I
think. If you will send to the States and get the number of licenses
issued you will discover that.
Lieut. Col. HAAN. Yes, sir. That portion of the troops located in
New England could be assembled very quickly, provided they have
been organized into regiments, brigades, and divisions and given
Some training beforehand.
The CHAIRMAN. How much training ought men to have had to
meet the conditions of such a force?
Lieut. Col. HAAN. I do not like to say that; I belong to the Coast
Artillery, although I have served with the mobile Army, and I have
served two terms on the General Staff and have made studies. I
think perhaps it would be more enlightening if I would tell you my
own experience.
. A year ago I asked the department commander to give me 100
recruits, untrained, and let me try to see how long it would take by
PREPAIRED NIESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 667
intensive training to make those men efficient coast artillerymen, to
handle Seacoast mortars. He gave me enough for a company, and I
started them in last February. I assigned three selected officers and
12 noncommissioned officers to their instruction. They were in-
structed for 60 days six hours a day. I limited it to six hours a
day because by watching I saw that they could not stand more—they
could not absorb any more. After 60 days I assigned them to take
their share of the guard and their share of the necessary policing,
which perhaps amounted to one day a week altogether; so that after
that their training consisted of six hours a day four days a week
and a weekly inspection. My inspection at the end of six months
indicated that they were not sufficiently instructed to have target
practice with the mortars. After instructing them eight months
they showed very well-grounded information in the duties of a
soldier everywhere, and I was satisfied that they were sufficiently
instructed to have target practice with our mortars, which I consider
the most difficult work we have. In having target practice, however,
I found that they were not able to fire the guns at the prescribed
intervals without what we call “relaying ”—they could not fire as
rapidly as the regularly trained detachments. They were unable to
get the firing data from the fire-control stations to the guns in the
30-second interval allowed for that in our fire-control system. So it
came a little later, and each time we tried to fire at least once or twice
the mortar had to be “relayed.” So that I did not find them at the
end of eight months’ training what I call efficient detachments for
the mortar batteries.
Senator CATRON. Does each particular man have to have Some spe-
cial information or training?
Lieut. Col. HAAN. They are specialized; yes, sir. For example,
Some men are at the telescopes of observation instruments. Others
have to read the angles indicated on the instrument, usually by Some
form of vernier. This comes somewhat under the nature of Survey
work. Then in the fire-control stations on the plotting boards there
is special work required to accurately place on the map of the board
the location of the ship, just where it was at the instant of observa-
tion, predicting where it will be, say, 30 or 45 seconds later, and
getting that information to the gun. Then the gun must be laid
quickly on this data, so that it can be fired at the exact time to get
the projectile to the predicted point the instant called for by the
firing data. Exact and rapid teamwork is necessary, and usually a
well-trained regular detachment gets that information to the guns
in from 10 to 20 seconds. These detachments were able to get it to
the guns usually in from 20 to 30 seconds, showing still some defi-
ciency as compared with the four other detachments that I watched
all night at their work in night target practice.
Senator CATRON. So these men have to be somewhat more intelli-
gent or better educated than you will find in the general run of men
that you will pick up? *
Lieut. Col. HAAN. No; I think not necessarily. We get them from
the average recruits. But in, say, 100 men perhaps you can find, say,
10 or more who show aptitude for this kind of work, and they are
specialized. In the same way we find men for handling ammunition.
In some cases it is heavy work and it requires not only a strong man
to do it quickly but a man with the proper “ knack.” Then, again,
668 PREPAIRED N ESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
other men we find make good gun pointers. It is not a well-educated
man, necessarily, that can point a gun well. It takes a certain knack
for that, and our gun pointers, on the average, are better for that
particular work than our officers would be. It is the man's natural
aptitude, and that is one of the things that an officer training a com-
pany selects his men for—natural aptitude. -
Senator CATRON. Can you instruct the men in that sighting the
gun, or can you help them along, or do they just have to be men who
are naturally adapted to it and nothing else? -
Lieut. Col. HAAN. They are helped along. We have every day
now at the barracks instruction in that way. We have various in-
struments, such as telescopic sights, in the barracks, and preliminary
work in aiming and sighting is a part of the daily instruction even
during inclement weather. That instruction is going on daily in
the barracks during the winter, and there is an officer present who in-
structs these men and selects them for practical work, as soon as the
weather permits, for out-of-door training.
Then we have a large allowance of what is called subcaliber am-
munition. There is a little gun put inside the large gun which fires
a 1-pounder projectile. We tow the target, and that is where the real
practice training of the gun pointers comes in.
Senator CATRON. You put that gun inside of the other?
Lieut. Col. HAAN. It is put right inside of the other, yes; and the
breech of the big guin is opened and closed just the same as if we
were using a full charge, and it is fired by the same kind of a primer.
So everything is the same as firing a service charge except that
there is no recoil, and of course the range is shorter.
The CHAIRMAN. And there is economy in it in the expenditure for
ammunition?
Lieut. Col. HAAN. Yes, sir; they have four or five hundred rounds
for each company per year.
Senator CATRON. How are we prepared, Cononel,in Coast Artillery
guns to defend that strip of country from Maine to the mouth of the
Chesapeake Bay? -
Lieut. Col. HAAN. Well, our guns in some places are a little short
ranged at the present time. That is the principal defect. In Boston,
where I am perhaps more familiar with conditions than in other
places, I have made a special study of the matter. I was in command
there during the past year. I reported officially that there are points
in Boston Harbor where an enemy's ship can lie now and destroy the
Boston Navy Yard, the statehouse, the Fore River Ship Yards, and
the business part of Boston without our being able to reach him with
our short-range guns. .
The CHAIRMAN. That is because of the lack of improvement in our
guns and the improvement in naval guns?
Lieut. Col. HAAN. Yes, sir. The present project for Boston was
made when the British ship Bembonce was the type of battleship.
The CHAIRMAN. How long ago? -
Lieut. Col. HAAN. I think about 30 years ago. It was more than
25 years ago. The maximum range of the guns on board battleships
at that time was 3 miles. You can see it was quite a different propo-
sition.
The CHAIRMAN. What is the range now?
PREPAIRED NESS FOR, NATIONAL DEFENSE. -- 669
Lieut. Col. HAAN. I don’t know.
The CHAIRMAN. Take the Queen Elizabeth, for instance.
Lieut. Col. HAAN. I have seen nothing official, and yet I have seen
in the papers rather reliable reports that they have fired at over
21,000 yards. That would be approximately 14 miles.
The CHAIRMAN. Are there any guns in our coast defenses that
will carry that far now Ż
Lieut. Col. HAAN. No, sir; not as they are mounted. Our longest
range guns at present mounted are the mortars for Panama, which
were designed, I believe, to have a range of 21,000 yards. I was on
the Panama fortification board, and my recollection is that we asked
for mortars, if possible, of 21,000-yard range; actual range is, how-
ever, only 18,500 yards.
Senator CATRON. What is the size of that mortar'
Lieut. Col. HAAN. Twelve-inch caliber.
The CHAIRMAN. Is it not true that the accuracy of aim is better
on the land than on board ship In other words, you could reach
a ship at a point where it would be difficult for a warship to reach
a coast fortification?
Lieut. Col. HAAN. While our chances for hitting are better they
can reach just as far; that is, if the range of their guns is sufficient.
There is another thing to be taken into consideration as to naval
attack at the present time, and that is it is undoubtedly more effec-
tive to-day than it was some years ago, on account of the fact that
they no longer attempt to fire at a single battery; they no longer try
to do that, but at the present time the naval theory is to take a hill
that they can see at a long range, which they know to be fortified,
and then take a large number of ships and cover that entire hill,
without attempting to fire at a single battery, which would make a
target too small to even See at long range.
Senator CATRON. What is the size of our largest gun—not count-
ing that 16-inch gun—which we have in any of the fortresses?
Lieut. Col. HAAN. Fourteen inches.
Senator CATRON. Now, the trouble about them is that you can
not give them elevation enough 3
Lieut. Col. HAAN. That is correct.
Senator CATRON. To get the range, is that it?
Lieut. Col. HAAN. Yes, sir. The present carriage permits an
elevation to give us a range of about 14,500 yards with the 14-inch
gun. I have not, however, handled any of those 14-inch guns, and
do not, therefore, speak from experience.
Senator CATRON. By changing the carriage and giving them more
elevation do you believe they could reach 21,000 yards?
Lieut. Col. HAAN. I believe not; I believe the maximum range
they hope to get with the disappearing carriage is 18,000 yards. I
understand that a barbette carriage has been designed for our old
type of 12-inch gun, to use it in something of the nature of a mortar.
It would give it something over 30,000 yards range.
Senator CATRON. Has there been any particular change in the
character of the gun other than the caliber since that old plan you
spoke of?
Lieut. Col. HAAN. No, sir.
Senator CATRON. Or is it only in the carriage?
233S0—PT 12—16—4
670 PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
Lieut. Col. HAAN. It is only in the size of the gun and the length
of the gun and the character of the mount.
Senator CATRON. But nothing else as to the machinery or manu-
facture of the gun outside of the gun itself?
Lieut. Col. HAAN. I think not; no sir. -
Senator CATRON. They would be just as efficient as the others i
they were mounted like the others? -
Lieut. Col. HAAN. Yes. There is one thing with the old type of
gun. It is only a 35-caliber gun. The new guns are 50 caliber.
And with the same amount of powder pressure we get a difference in
velocity of prehaps 400 feet and an equal life of the gun.
Senator CATRON. You mean initial velocity?
Lieut. Col. HAAN. Yes, sir.
Senator CATRON. How much greater range would that give you?
Lieut. Col. HAAN. That should give us 3,000 or 4,000 yards more
range with the same elevation.
Senator CATRON. How much of a ship can you see at a distance of
14 miles if you are standing at the edge of the water on the Sea-
shore? -
Lieut. Col. HAAN. Standing at the edge of the water you could
only see the deck and upper works and the stacks; but, on the other
hand, from our average observation station you can see all of the
ship. There may be a few feet—but with our most accurate instru-
ments, most powerful telescopes, you can see the water line, and see
the white water at the bow very clearly at 14 miles. That is from
our observation stations, which are about 50 feet, or higher, in
elevation. -
Senator CATRON. Do you think that we ought to put in new imple-
ments or mountings for those guns So as to give them a larger range?
Lieut. Col. HAAN. As a rule I am not much in favor of renovating
old fortifications. It costs nearly as much to do that as to build
new ones. We have changed some of our mortar batteries from
the old type to the new type, and in So far as the engineering work
is concerned for changing an old type into a new type it costs exactly
as much as it would to build a new battery. -
Senator CATRON. Do you mean new battery; guns and all?
Lieut. Col. HAAN. No; they put new guns in, but to replace it it
costs as much, so far as the engineer part is concerned, which is a
large part of the total cost. -
The CHAIRMAN. Has not this war in Europe developed that no
fortifications will withstand a fire from this 42-centimeter gun?
Lieut. Col. HAAN. I think so. If you can get a high-angle fire in
sufficient volume on a fortification and get in the position where you
can hit it, no fixed fortification can stand it.
The CHAIRMAN. Has there been any fortification along the fron-
tier within the area of war that has withstood attack in Europe?
Lieut. Col. HAAN. The only place where there has been a persistent
attack on the fortifications is at the Dardanelles, and they seem to
have withstood it fairly well. - -
The CHAIRMAN. Well, there was in Belgium at Liege.
Lieut. Col. HAAN. Those were land fortifications.
The CHAIRMAN. Well, those were destroyed? . • .
Lieut. Col. HAAN. Yes; they were destroyed. They were destroyed
by the high angle fire of the land mortars as soon as they could get
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 67L
in range of them. That is the reason I said if the land mortars using
high-angle fire can get within range of our fortifications to attack
them from the rear our fortifications will be destroyed.
The CHAIRMAN. So in the last analysis the coast fortifications are
simply harbor defenses?
Lieut. Col. HAAN. They are; that is what they are designed for.
b sºtor CATRON. Can they use this 42-centimeter gun from ship-
O2, PCL 9.
Lieut. Col. HAAN. I believe not; I do not know that any ship has
ever been designed to use a vertical fire. It would be very inaccurate.
Senator CATRON. What is the maximum range, for instance, of
that 42-centimeter gun? - --
Lieut. Col. HAAN. I do not think it is very great. I think it is
probably 12,000 or 14,000 yards limit. It is a low-velocity gun.
Senator CATRON. It necessarily would be on account of the short-
ness of the barrel.
Lieut. Col. HAAN. Yes; on account of the shortness of the barrel.
l sºnator CATRON. I understand that they are about 15 or 18 feet
Ongº
Lieut. Col. HAAN. I think so; perhaps they are more than that.
Perhaps 20. All of our lines of protection around Boston had to be
moved out on account of the increased range of this heavy field artil-
lery. That is the principal reason we had to make revision of the
projects.
The CHAIRMAN. You call that the heavy field artillery'
Lieut. Col. HAAN. Yes, sir; there is also heavy movable seacoast
artillery, which, however, is much more powerful.
Senator CATRON. In doing that you are proposing to deal with an
enemy that would come up on the land, then, in rear of the fortifi-
cations?
Lieut. Col. HAAN. Yes.
The CHAIRMAN. It would be out of the question to undertake to
fortify the coast line so as to prevent a landing, would it not?
Lieut. Col. HAAN. I think that would be impossible. It would take
an enormous number of troops and fortifications to do that.
Senator CATRON. What is your information about the largest num-
ber of troops that could be landed on our shore by any one nation if
they were allowed to come on land at one time, one voyage?
Lieut. Col. HAAN. Well, Senator, I have not made any study of
that lately at all. I have read the report that the War College
Division of the General Staff made on that, but I don’t know what
it is based upon.
The CHAIRMAN. It is based on the registered tonnage of the dif-
ferent nations, I think. -
Lieut. Col. HAAN. Yes; a percentage of the registered tonnage,
but I personally have not made a study of this.
The CHAIRMAN. Yes. -
Senator CATRON. You stated a while ago that it took about 3 tons
to the man?
Lieut. Col. HAAN. Yes, sir.
Senator CATRON. In shipping troops?
Lieut. Col. HAAN. Yes; for crossing the Atlantic, it is considered
to require about 3 tons for a man and his equipment and supplies.
672 PREPARED NIESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
For the Pacific, where the trip is much longer, we have allowed
usually 5 tons to the man.
Senator CATRON. That includes all other service?
Lieut. Col. HAAN. Yes; it includes animals -
Senator CATRON. And gun carriage and everything else?
Lieut. Col. HAAN. Yes.
Senator CATRON. Well, what do you say as to the necessity for
improved fortifications and better guns, either by the way of re-
mounting them or better mountings, or new guns along the coast,
Say, from Maine down to the mouth of the Chesapeake?
Lieut. Col. HAAN. My recommendations have been to put at those
harbors where the vital points protected can be reached from the
Open Sea additional high-power long-range guns and long-range
mortars, and at other harbors mainly additional mortars, except
where a run by may be attempted, as at New London. Here rapid-
fire high-power guns, probably mounted on disappearing carriages,
should also be added. Where the enemy can attack from the open
Sea, he has ample room for maneuvering, and the navies have de-
veloped tactics to avoid our mortar fire at long range under such
circumstances rather effectively, I think, by frequent changes of
direction and speed. For this reason I recommend in such cases
very powerful direct-fire guns with the highest possible velocity, so
that the ships can not so maneuver as to get far from the predicted
point before the projectile gets there. -
Senator DU PONT. Sixteen inch 7
Lieut. Col. HAAN. At least 16 inch.
Senator CATRON. Now, if the fleet of the enemy should try to take
the harbor of Boston, how many guns would be required to keep a
fleet of 25 or 35 warships off so far that they could not come in close
enough or get in in some way close enough to destroy those batteries
and destroy that city; that is, practically keep off the fleet?
Lieut. Col. HAAN. We recommended that in addition to what is
there now we should have 16 long-range mortars and six 16-inch
guns. - -
Senator CATRON. Sixteen-inch long-range mortars would be what
range caliber, 12-inch!
Lieut. Col. HAAN. The mortar should have a range of 30,000 yards
and be not less than 12-inch caliber and the 16-inch guns should have
a range of 30,000 yards. -
Senator CATRON. What would be the length of mortar that would
have a range of 30,000 yards?
Lieut. Col. HAAN. I think perhaps it would be 25 caliber, that
would be from the powder chamber to the muzzle, about 25 or 26
feet. I believe that the Chief of Ordnance has reported that it is
practicable to make that kind of mortar.
Senator DU PoWT. None has been made, though, not even experi-
mentally? . -
Lieut. Col. HAAN. No.
Senator CATRON. Then you say they would be required at how
many other places between Boston and Old Point Comfort down
here?
Lieut. Col. HAAN. We have above Boston, Portland, Me. ; and then
we have. Portsmouth, N. H., and then Boston, and then comes Fort
PR.EPAREDINESS FOR, NATIONAL DEFENSE. 673
|Bodman and New Bedford, covering the entrance to Buzzards Bay,
and then comes Newport and New London, and then the eastern
entrance to New York at Fort Totten and southern New York,
and the Delaware and Fort Du Pont, and Fort Mott, down the river
below Philadelphia, and then the fortifications to the Chesapeake,
and Baltimore and Washington and Fort Monroe.
Senator DU PONT. Did your board have occasion to study the
problem of the proposed deepening of the Delaware and Chesapeake
Canals for defensive purposes as connecting the Delaware and
Chesapeake Bays?
Lieut. Col. HAAN. Yes; our board considered that; and we thought
it would be a very desirable thing to have. We did not make any
recommendations on that.
Senator CATRON. Between Portsmouth and the mouth of the
Chesapeak Bay how many of those large guns and mortars do you
estimate that you will need?
Lieut. Col. HAAN. We need them in four places, Senator, accord-
ing to my estimate. Of Boston I have already spoken. In New
London, that is the eastern entrance to Long Island Sound, I con-
sider those very important fortifications, and the distances are long
across the channel. The channel is difficult to mine, and there we
must have artillery that will stop the enemy from going through.
For that place I had not so much counted on the necessity of these
great range guns as quick-firing guns.
Senator CATRON. My question was directed to the proposition of
how many of these long-range 16-inch guns would you need from
Portland, Me., down to the Chesapeake, whether you would put
them in four places or half a dozen or a dozen more. How many
guns do you estimate that you would require?
Lieut. Col. HAAN. I did not make a study
Senator CATRQN. There has been no estimate put in for this ord-
Ila Il Ce
Lieut. Col. HAAN. Yes, sir; there has been. I understand that
the board of review has made complete estimates for the entire cost.
Senator CATRON. I have not seen it. Could you give us your
idea of what would be required?
Lieut. Col. HAAN. I could not. I have not made any special
studies except for Boston. For that place the estimates of the board
of review were smaller than those of the local officers.
Senator CATRON. They were smaller than those you suggested
to me?
Lieut. Col. HAAN. Yes, sir.
Senator DU Pont. There is Fort Totten ; what other forts command
the eastern entrance of Long Island Sound?
Lieut. Col. HAAN. Fort Wright, Fort Terry, Fort Michie, and Fort
Mansfield.
Senator DU Pont. Could those be taken by land?
Lieut. Col. HAAN. They are all on islands except Fort Mansfield,
which is near Watch Hill, in Connecticut.
Senator DU Pont. That could probably be taken by land, then?
Lieut. Col. HAAN. Yes. I think that Fort Wright as now located
could also be destroyed from the mainland by this heavy mobile ar-
tillery, and this project for the land defense must also take that into
consideration.
674 PRE PARED N ESS Jº OR NATIONAL Djº. FE NSE.
Senator CATRON. How long does it take to manufacture a 16-
inch gun such as you propose to make?
Lieut. Col. HAAN. I don’t know. I am not an expert in the man-
ufacture of guns.
Senator CATRON. Where are such guns made?
Lieut. Col. HAAN. At Watervliet Arsenal, Watervliet, N. Y.
The CHAIRMAN. As it is now the United States furnishes one-
half of the complement of the troops necessary for manning the gun
and mortar batteries of the Coast Artillery and the State is supposed
to furnish one-half. How does this dual system work? *
Lieut. Col. HAAN. Well, my experience is that the State troops so
far have furnished less than half of the complement that is assigned to
them. The total number I believe to be required to be furnished by
State troops is about 17,000, and they have furnished about 7,000.
The CHAIRMAN. How efficient are they?
Lieut. Col. HAAN. It is pretty hard to say. I had a regiment in
Boston Harbor this summer, and I had planned to have their attempts
at target practice very closely watched, but the weather conditions
were such that they could not fire.
The CHAIRMAN. Is your experience there about the same as it is
in other States, or do you know? .
Lieut. Col. HAAN. The Massachusetts Coast Artillery and New
York Coast Artillery Militia are about the same. I have had New
York Coast Artillery at my station at Fort Wadsworth.
The CHAIRMAN. How much time do they give in actual work at
the coast defenses? -
Lieut. Col. HAAN. Ten days each year.
The CHAIRMAN. And they are furnished appliances to practice in
their armories?
Lieut. Col. HAAN. They are furnished dummy guns for training
the men at loading and they are furnished fire-control stations and
plotting boards, to train men in those duties, described a while ago,
of the plotting room and at those various instruments, and at this
work they do surprisingly well, considering the lack of facilities and
lack of time they have put on it, and almost every report I have read
makes a statement something like this: Considering the short time
that these troops have had for actual training at the guns, and con-
sidering, further, the lack of complete facilities and time they have
in their armories, they are surprisingly proficient—which should not
be taken under any circumstances as proficient in the sense that the
regular companies are proficient. I do not know of anything that
would convince one more than that experience I have had during
the past year in trying to train men in handling heavy armaments,
where after eight months’ hard work under trained officers they
were only about 75 per cent proficient. -
The CHAIRMAN. Have there been any naval attacks on coast for-
tifications in the European War so far as you know, except at the
Dardanelles? *
Lieut. Col. HAAN. No ; I know of none. I read of some firings of
the British fleet on the German guns, on movable mounts in Bel-
gium, but I have not seen any official reports on that and I do not
really know anything about it. -
The CHAIRMAN. Colonel, is there any further statement you care
to make?
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 675
Lieut. Col. HAAN. Due to the fact that the National Land Defense
Board, in the beginning, directed its study mainly to the defense of
the coast batteries, an impression has gone abroad, particularly
among the mobile army troops, that the very considerable forces
recommended by the board for the defense of the various localities,
as I have indicated, were mainly for the defense of the coast bat-
teries. It will be seen by examining the table giving the number of
troops for the various sections, in the early part of the hearing, that
a very small force only is called for directly for the protection of the
rear of the fortifications, namely 42 battalions, or a force of 25,200
men. It is true that in the various places such as, for example,
New York and Boston, the protection of the city against capture
by a mobile force offers incidentally protection to the fortifications,
because if the enemy succeeded in getting either one of these cities
he could, with the present heavy movable artillery, from the very
heart of the city, destroy the coast fortifications, but it should be
kept clearly in mind that for our important harbors on which are
located large Seaport cities, the coast fortifications have two mis-
sions to fulfill. They must deny to the enemy ships the use of the
harbor as a base, and they must also protect the cities and impor-
tant public and private plants in the harbor from bombardment by
the enemy's fleet from the sea.
It is therefore seen that the large mobile forces recommended in
this report for the protection of such places are not primarily for
the protection of Seacoast batteries, but their principal mission is to
act in conjunction with the coast forts in protecting the vital areas
We have mentioned. The coast batteries protect against Sea attack
and the mobile forces against land attack and they afford mutual
protection to each other.
Another matter I should like to touch upon, and that is the
heavy movable artillery we read about in connection with the Euro-
pean War. Some types of this artillery have been used for coast
defense both in Belgium by the Germans and at the Dardanelles by
the Turks against the allied fleets. This kind of movable artillery
is very different from the kind used with an army in the field. It
must have a different system of fire control, because its target is a
moving target—Ships under Way—as are the targets for coast forti-
fications, whereas the targets for the movable artillery with a field
army are fixed and their fire control, therefore, very simple and
entirely similar to the fire-control system now used by the Field
Artillery in our Army. -
It must moreover be of the powerful seacoast type firing armor-
piercing projectiles capable of penetrating the 12 and 14 inch armor
carried by modern battleships. This type of movable artillery
should be provided not only for the harbors of less importance now
unfortified, but also to reinforce the fixed batteries now located at
the important harbors.
Troops that handle these guns must be instructed in a fire-control
system entirely similar to that now in use in the coast fortifications,
and the point from which these guns will be fired must be definitely
located and fully prepared beforehand in order that accurate tri-
angulations may determine points of observation from which the
fire can be controlled at long ranges against moving ships precisely
676 PREPARED NIESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
the same as is now controlled the fire of the fixed batteries in our
coast defenses. - -
This second observation I desire to state with emphasis, because
there has been created an impression that all that is necessary to
deny to the enemy the privilege of landing is to make a great
amount of heavy movable. artillery and to store same in some place.
I desire to Sound a Warning as emphatically as I can that such .
artillery will be of no use in preventing landings if personnel is
not provided and thoroughly instructed in time of peace for its
handling in time of war, because its handling will be even more
difficult than is the present efficient handling of the fixed coast
batteries on account of the complexities and difficulties that will
be met in providing at the various places fire-control systems and
preparing proper places to which the artillery may be quickly
moved and used against ships in motion, and on account of the fact
that the guns can not be kept at all times in these places for train-
ing the personnel. - -
he CHAIRMAN. If there is nothing further we will take a recess
until 3 o'clock to-morrow. - - --
(Thereupon, at 3.20 p. m., the committee took a recess until 3
p. m. Saturday, Jan. 29, 1916.)
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
SATURDAY, JANUARY 29, 1916.
UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON MILITARY AFFAIRs,
Washington, D. C.
The committee met at the expiration of the recess, at 3 o'clock
p.m., Senator Geo. E. Chamberlain (chairman) presiding.
STATEMENT OF MR. WILLIAM BARCLAY PARSONS, OF NEW
- YoFK CITY. -
The CHAIRMAN. Please state your name, address, and your present
business. . . 3.
Mr. PARSONs. William Barclay Parsons; address, 60 Wall Street,
New York; business, engineer. -
The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Parsons, we have had under consideration
bills for the reorganization of the Army, and we understand that you
desire to make some statements or suggestions to us with reference
to a reserve engineer corps, or something of that kind.
Mr. PARSONs. Yes, sir. - -
The CHAIRMAN. The committee would be very glad to hear you
make such statements as you desire to, in your own way, and what-
ever questions we want to ask you will be in the course of your state-
ment or afterwards. - - -
Mr. PARSONs. Last winter, Mr. Chairman, it was suggested to the
engineer societies that an engineer reserve could well be organized
as part of the Army on lines similar to the existing medical reserve.
The five national engineering societies, representing the civil engi-
neers, the mining engineers, the mechanical engineers, the electrical
engineers, and the consulting engineers, bodies which have a gross
membership of something over 26,000 members, appointed five com-
mittees to take up this question and study it. In order to simplify
the work, to unify it, there was appointed a joint committee con-
sisting of the chairmen of those five committees, and I was made
chairman of such joint committee, and represent that committee
here to-day. I regret very much that I could not get any of my
associates here. I got your telegram Only late last night, and the
others were all out of town. The other members of the committee
consist of Henry S. Drinker, president of Lehigh University, who
represents the mining engineers; Maj. William H. Wiley, publisher,
who represents the mechanical engineers; Mr. Bion J. Arnold, of
23380—PT 13–16 - 677
678 PREPAIRED NIESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
Chicago, who represents the electrical engineers; and Mr. Ralph D.
Mershon, an eminent electrical engineer, who represents the con-
sulting engineers, and I represent the civil engineers.
I came to Washington and took up the question last spring with
the Secretary of War, and, with his instructions, with the officers of
the General Staff and with the War College. We have had a number
of Conferences, which extended all through the summer, and as a
result of those conferences the Secretary suggested in his tentative
draft of legislation his provisions for an officers' reserve, which you
have substantially placed in your own bill, sir, the War Department
feeling that if it is a good thing to have a reserve for the engineers
and doctors, that it could well be broadened so as to include the
other arms and the Staff Corps.
The engineers are like the doctors; they are always mobilized for
service. They are doing in times of peace practically what they do
in times of war. They are building railroads and bridges and high-
ways and carrying on works of Sanitation, etc. They have around
them the forces of contractors with their extensive plants, so that in
case of an emergency it would be possible and readily feasible to
gather together a large engineering army to be placed in the field
at short notice, men who are accustomed to live in the open and
in camps, men that are accustomed to all the arduous duties of an
active army life. :
It is, of course, quite needless to assure you that no question is
raised as to the competence of the existing Corps of Engineers, for
whom all members of the profession entertain the highest respect
and admiration. The point is raised merely as to their numerical
strength. The corps is very much too small to meet the demands of
W8,I’. -
I had occasion recently to compare the size of our present Engi-
neer Corps with that of the British Army as it existed before the
war. I believe at the present time our Engineer Corps is the
largest the United States Army has ever had, with the possible
exception of during the Civil War. In the United States Army we
have 1 general officer, 14 colonels, and 195 officers of rank less
than that of colonel. In the British Army in 1912 they had in the
engineers 1 field marshal, 11 general officers, 14 colonels in chief,
60 colonels, and 1,007 officers of a rank less than that of colonel. Of
course, the results we know, that when the English Army got into
service the engineer corps was wholly inadequate to carry on the con-
struction work, and yet they had 86 officers of the rank of colonel or
higher as against 15 in the American Army.
n case this country should go to war, it is safe to predict that the
experience of 1861 and 1898 would be repeated, when the Corps of
Engineers were depleted of its best men by transferring them to the
line as brigade or division commanders, so that the force of engineers,
already too small, would be actually reduced at the moment when
an increase would be most urgently required. The object of estab-
lishing an officers' reserve of engineers is to provide a supply of trained
material to be on hand to fill the gaps thus caused, and to furnish
the required increase in number of engineers. While this country
contains many thousands of experienced engineers who would gladly
take service, it is not safe to wait until the last moment to get these
men together. In the stress of excitement at the outbreak of a
PREPAREDNIESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 6'79
war there is no time to make selection. The War Department
would be obliged to take whatever men were offered or were urged,
with the result, based on our previous experience, that the wrong
man would get into the wrong place, and it would take months
before the men would be readjusted according to their experience and
ability. By establishing now, when there is no excitement, proper
examination for men, they can be selected with due care according
to their individual fitness, their records can be tabulated and filed
with the War Department, so that when the emergency arises they
can be individually ordered to duty according to the lines of their
experience, without friction and without loss of time.
he scheme to accomplish this as devised, and as you have in-
corporated it in your bill, of course you are familiar with. It pro-
vides for the commissioning of men for the period of five years with
the rank up to and including that of major, the commissions to be
renewed with the consent of the Secretary of War. That was a
suggestion made by the War College, in order to eliminate from such
reserve the accumulation of human deadwood. If at the end of
five years, or during that period of five years, a man does not show
any interest, if he has not kept up with his duties, if he becomes in-
capacitated for physical or for other personal reasons so as not to be
ready to answer a call, his commission is not renewed. It is not
necessary to court-martial him; it is not necessary to take any steps
to put him out, he simply goes out, unless positive action is taken at
the end of five years by the War Department to keep him in.
Your bill provides that he should go on duty at least two weeks
a year and longer, with his consent, if the Secretary of War
should so desire. Now, in the case of engineers—and I am con-
fining my remarks to-day solely to the engineers in the reserve—
a comparatively short time each year would keep them sufficiently
familiar with the engineering details of the profession to make those
men readily serviceable in case of sudden emergency. They would
have to know the details of earthworks—for instance, the general
dimensions of gun emplacements, the weights of heavy artillery—so
as to estimate what bridges would have to carry, and the details of
cars to carry them; and two weeks a year, I should say, would be
amply sufficient to keep those men in touch with the progress and
development of military requirements. But beyond that, as I said
before, they would be doing in times of peace the very same things
they do in times of war. -
The cost of obtaining this reserve corps of engineers would be
nominal. The only expense to the Government would be the salaries
of the men during the small portion of each year when they would
be on duty under instruction, and for this comparatively small pay-
ment, the United States would have on hand, subject to immediate
call, a large selected body of trained men such as it has never pos-
sessed before.
The CHAIRMAN. Do any of the other bills embody this suggestion ?
... Mr. PARSONs. Mr. Hay's bill embodies this suggestion in slightly
different form. Gen. Scott appeared before you the other day, and
he gave you some suggestions as to certain amendments of your bill,
and I have those amendments here and I should like to say that these
amendments, as now drawn by Gen. Scott, as they apply to the offi-
cers' reserve, meet entirely with the approval of the committee that
680 PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
I have the honor to represent, with one single exception, and I spoke
about that in Gen. Scott's office this morning, and was told that the
wording was an improvement. The amendment states, “When a vol-
unteer force is authorized, or the continental army is called into service,
the Secretary of War may order officers of the reserve corps, subject to
such subsequent physical examinations as he may prescribe, to tempo-
rary duty with the Regular Army in grades thereof which can not, for
the time being, be filled by promotion, as officers in volunteer organiza-
tions.” I would like to suggest that it read “as officers of volunteers.”
S The CHAIRMAN. That is a suggested amendment proposed by Gen.
cott'.
Mr. PARSONs. By Gen. Scott. The reason for that being that
engineers would be largely ordered on staff duty, and it is a little
doubtful whether the original phraseology would cover a staff appoint-
ment. If you change it so as to make them officers of volunteers, it
certainly would. e -
The CHAIRMAN. You have dictated the change that you suggest ?
Mr. PARSONs. Yes, sir. I would like to leave this with you,
Senator. That differs from the provisions of your bill as you have
drawn it, in one or two trifling respects.
The CHAIRMAN. Do you suggest the amendment to the whole
section there 3 - .
Mr. PARSONS. I suggest the whole amendment as drawn there.
That differs from the bill that you have drawn, in one respect, and
there you copied Secretary Garrison's first draft, in that you have
an age limit, which Gen. Scott has struck out. The limit in your
bill was a certain age for a lieutenant, a certain age for a captain,
and a certain age for a major; and that Gen. Scott has struck out;
..I think very wisely, because I do not think those age limits, would
apply to engineers or to doctors. That draft also provides for the
merging of the existing medical reserves in to this officers' reserve,
which I think would be a good thing to do. * -
(The amendment suggested is as follows:) -
SECTIONS PROVIDING. FOR AN OFFICERS’ RESERVE CORPs.
SEC. —. That for the purpose of Securing a reserve of officers available for service as
temporary officers in the Regular Army, as provided for in this act and in section eight
of the act approved April twenty-fifth, nineteen hundred and fourteen, as officers in
the continental army provided for in this act, as officers for recruit rendezvous and
depyts, and as officers of Volunteers, there shall be organized, under such rules and
regulations as the President may prescribe not inconsistent with the provisions of this
act, an officers' reserve corps of the Army of the United States. Except as otherwise
herein provided, a member of the officers’ reserve corps shall not be subject to call for
service in time of peace, and whenever called upon for service shall not without his
consent be so called in a lower grade than that held by him in said reserve corps.
The President is authorized to appoint and commission as reserve officers of the
various arms, corps, and departments in all grades tºp to and including that of major,
such citizens of the United States as may have completed one year's Satisfactory Serv-
ice in the cadet companies provided for in this act, and Sºch other citizens as, upon
examination prescribed by the President, are found physically, mentally, and morally
qualified to hold such commissions: Provided, That the proportion of officers in any
arm, corps, or department of the officers' reserve corps shall not exceed the proportion
for the same grade in the same arm, corps, or department of the Regular Army, except
that the number commissioned in the lowest authorized grade in any arm, corps, or
department of the officers' reserve corps shall not be limited. • .
All persons now carried as duly qualified and registered pursuant to section twenty-
three of the act of Congress approved January twenty-first, nineteen hundred and
three, shall, for a period of three years after the passage of this act, be eligible for
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 681
appointment in the officers' reserve corps in the arm, corps, or department for which
they have been found qualified, without further examination, except a physical exam-
ination, subject to iºn. as to rank herein prescribed. After an officer of the
reserve Corps has served for five or more years therein and has been honorably dis-
charged from the Service of the United States, he shall be entitled to retain his official
title, and on occasions of ceremony, to wear the uniform of the highest grade he held
in the officers' reserve corps. . -
To the extent provided for from time to time by appropriations, the Secretary of
War is authorized to order reserve officers to duty with troops or at field exercises, for
periods not to exceed two weeks in any one calendar year, and while so serving such
officers shall receive the pay and allowances of their grade: Provided, That, with the
consent of such officers, the Secretary of War is authorized to prolong this period or to
order them to duty on boards, or for consultation or advice, to the extent justified by
the funds appropriated and the public needs. - -
One year after the passage of this act the Medical Reserve Corps, as now constituted
by law, shall cease to exist. Members thereof may be commissioned in the officers'
reserve corps, Subject to the provisions of this act, or may be honcrably discharged
from the Service. In emergencies the Secretary of War may, in time of peace, order
first lieutenants of the officers' reserve corps of the Medical Department, with their
consent, to active duty in the service of the United States in such numbers as the
public interests may require and the funds appropriated may permit, and may relieve
them from such duty when their services are no longer necessary.
The President alone is authorized to appoint and commission all officers of the
officers' reserve corps, such commissions to be in force for a period of five years unless
Sooner terminated in the discretion of the President. Such officers may be recommis-
Sioned, either in the same or higher grades, for successive periods of five years, subject
to such examinations and qualifications as the President may prescribe: Provided,
That officers of the officers' reserve corps shall have rank therein in the various arms,
corps, and departments of Said reserve corps according to grades and to length of
service in their grades.
SEC. —. When a volunteer force is authorized, or the continental army is called into
active service, the Secretary of War may order officers of the reserve corps, subject to
such subsequent physical examinations as he may prescribe, to temporary duty with
the Regular Army in grades thereof which can not for the time being be filled by
promotion, as officers of volunteers, as officers in the continental army, or as officers of
recruit rendezvous and depots, in such numbers as may be authorized by law. While
such reserve officers are on such service they shall, by virtue of their commissions as
reserve officers, exercise command appropriate to their grade and rank in the organiza-
tions to which they are assigned, and be entitled to the pay and allowances of the
corresponding grades in the Regular Army, with increase of pay for length of active
service, as now allowed by law for officers of the Regular Army, from the date upon
which they are required by the terms of their order to obey the same: Provided, That
officers so ordered to active service shall take temporary rank among themselves and
in their grade in the organizations to which assigned according to the dates of orders
placing them on active service; and may be promoted, in accordance with such
rank, to vacancies in continental or volunteer organizations or to temporary vacancies
in the Regular Army, thereafter occurring in the Organizations in which they are
serving: And provided further, That officers of the reserve corps shall not be entitled
to retirement or retired pay, and shall be entitled to pensions only for disability in-
curred in the line of duty and while in active service. -
Any officer of the resefve corps ordered to acrive service by the Secretary of War
while holding a reserve commission shall, from the time he is required by the terms
of his order to obey the same, be subject to the laws and regulations for the government
of the Army of the United States, in so far as they are applicable to officers whose
permanent retention in the military Service is not contemplated.
The CHAIRMAN. Under this system they would practically submit
themselves to the call of the President 7 -
Mr. PARSONs. They would submit themselves to the call of the
President. They would become, practically, officers of the Army,
with absolute obligation the same as any other officer of the Army, to
respond in times of war or other emergencies. gº
The CHAIRMAN. Practically a valuable addition to the Army
without expense?
Mr. PARSONs. Yes, practically a valuable addition to the Army
without expense. The actual expense would be. their pay during
682 PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
the two weeks a year they would be ordered on duty, which, of course,
would not pay for the cost of uniforms, so that anybody who
takes an appointment under the Officers' reserve would take it at a
personal Sacrifice.
Senator FLETCHER. How much expense would that be, Mr. Parsons;
have you figured that out 7 - -
Mr. PARSONs. For the two weeks? .
Senator FLETCHER. For the force you recommend.
Mr. PARSONs. The bill leaves the number unlimited so far as
numbers are concerned. It simply stipulates that the ranks above
that of second lieutenant, that of first lieutenant, captain, and
major, shall bear the same relation in point of numbers to similar
ranks in the permanent establishment; the lowest rank would be,
of course, unlimited, the expectation of the War Department
being that officers would be taken in from the lower rank and then
promoted as their commissions expired. ... --
The CHAIRMAN. It impresses me as a good idea because it makes
available for the service of the country a very distinguished body
of men, and, as you say, they are always mobilized and practically
always cngaged at their work. - -
Mr. PARSONs. I can say this, Senator, that from a personal canvass
I have made and from unsolicised letters I have received I know there
would be at once a response from a body of very able men, men who
are standing high, chief engineers of railroads, and men of that sort.
Senator THOMAs. It is bound to be voluntary, is it not ? — -
Mr. PARSONs. It is bound to be voluntary, yes; but you would
get first-class men. I had letters from men from all parts of the
country holding responsible positions, men in command of other men.
The CHAIRMAN. You say you have given some consideration to the
condition of the British Army before the war; that is, in 1912. Have
they embodied something along the lines of this same system affect-
ing their engineer corps ? 4. -
Mr. PARSONs. What they have there now I do not know. Those
were the conditions that existed in their permanent army before the
war. Since the war began they have been getting volunteers in
any possible way they could. Lately, as we all know, they had to
resort to conscription.
Senator THOMAs. Do you put any age limit at all?
Mr. PARSONs. Gen. Scott struck out the age limit entirely. , You
see, under this provision of the bill as your committee has drawn
it. -
Senator THOMAS (interposing). I think the amendment is a very
valuable one.
Mr. PARSONs. You have five years, and at the end of five years
you do not have to retain a man at all.
Senator THOMAs. One of the difficulties with the system of retiring
officers is that when a man is retired you can not keep him without
his consent. . .
Mr. PARSONs. Under this you can retire a man at any time at the
end of five years, or you can keep him. For instance, I can readily
see that in time of war an engineer—and, as I said before, I am speak-
ing solely of engineers to-day—an engineer over 64 would be an ex-
ceedingly valuable man at the base of supplies, to look after the
question of manufacture, etc. He is not only competent and able
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 683
to do that, but probably he is the best man to do it because of his
experience, and a man of that kind you want to keep in. -
Senator THOMAs. I agree with you. - .
Mr. PARSONs. In the first draft of the bill they limited the age to
45, and our committee contended that men in professional lines,
doctors and engineers, the men of experience, are those of over 45,
so that Gen. Scott has struck out that age limit. - . . .
Senator FLETCHER. What is the extent of training you propose?
Mr. PARSONs. The extent of training as proposed with the troops
is two weeks a year as a minimum. That would be compulsory.
Senator FLETCHER. For how many years? • -
Mr. PARSONs. For every year as long as a man holds his com-
mission; but, of course, so far as the engineers are concerned, they
are in practical training 12 months in the year. To answer your
question about expense, of course, you see it would be this one-half
month's salary of the rank held by any one of these officers, and that,
of course, varies from second lieutenant to major.
Senator THOMAs. I could figure that if I knew the number.
Mr. PARSONs. That, of course, you could tell. The number
would be fixed by the War Department from time to time.
Senator THOMAs. Do these associations for which you speak,
Mr. Parsons, include the several branches of engineers, mechanical,
mining, hydraulic, etc.?
Mr. PARSONs. They cover them all, Senator.
The CHAIRMAN. The services of men in all these branches would
be required. -
Mr. PARSONs. The services of them all would be required, and
they all stand ready to cooperate. You see, there is not a finer body
of men in existence than the Army engineers. -
The CHAIRMAN. I doubt if there is any engineer corps, connected
with any army, that has had as much work imposed upon them as our
Engineer Corps. - -
Mr. PARSONs. I think you are quite right; but, of course, they
are limited in numbers, and, to some extent, limited in general
experience. For instance, they are limited in experience so far as
railroad construction and railroad operations are concerned.
Senator DU PONT. There are certain branches they have nothing
to do with 3 y
Mr. PARSONs. There are certain branches that they have little
or nothing to do with. In other branches, for instance, river and
harbor work, they stand preeminent, but in actual war you have a lot
of railroads to be built and bridges to be rebuilt and heavy works to
be constructed, and things of that kind in which men of civil life
have had larger experience than the men in Army life. -
The CHAIRMAN. Do the Senators desire to ask Mr. Parsons any
questions? X- . -
Mr. PARSONs. If not, there is one other Imatter I would like to
touch upon. I believe the suggestion has been made to you to
incorporate in your final drafted bill some provision for the enlisting
of men, not officers, in an engineer reserve, including all kinds of
workmen, chauffeurs, hospital attendants—-
Senator DU PoNT. And railroad people. *
Mr. PARSONs. And railroad people—men of all kinds. I should
think that would be a most admirable thing to do. In 1898 I had
684 PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
some little experience in that line as to the need of just that kind of
a reserve. When the war with Spain broke out, several of us started
in New York to organize an engineer regiment, and we combined
our efforts under the lead of then Capt. Griffin, who was one of the
vice presidents of the General Electric Co., afterwards Gen. Griffin.
Congress had just passed a bill at the beginning of the war, as you
will recall, for three volunteer regiments, two of which became the
First and Second Cavalry, the famous Roughriders. The third
regiment had not been assigned. Capt. Griffin came to Washington
and secured the third regiment for an engineer regiment. There
was no time, therefore, lost in seeking legislation; that legislation
wº , as you will recall, at the very beginning of the war. . .
... We started in April with the legislation passed. It was not until
July that the first regiment was organized and drilled sufficiently as
a military unit—not as an engineer unit at all, but as a military
unit—for it to be able to march and to get away. By that time the
; : protocol had been signed. ... Congress subsequently passed a
ill for an engineer brigade; the Second and Third Engineers were
organized under that second bill. The Third Engineers, I think,
never became more than a paper organization. The second Engi-
neers were organized practically after the war was over. My part-
ner had a commission in that regiment, and they did service of im-
portance, going to Cuba and remaining there for something like a year
engaged in sanitation work in Habana; but so far as service in time
of war was concerned, not one of those two regiments was able to
take any part at all. -
Senator DU Pont. That illustrates how important is is to have
preparations made in time of peace. .
Mr. PARSONs. Precisely; and in regard to the Engineer Reserve
there is no dispute, fortunately, and I come here knowing the War
Department has supported it, and you gentlemen have drafted it in
your bill. Both of you are working in harmony, but unless you can
go ahead and get an organization in advance, when the time comes
you will be behind. If you know in advance where the men are, if
you have your officers in reserve, if those men have had some sort
of training, if the Chief of Engineers or the department commanders
know the men in their districts and have them classified, so many
men who know about sanitation and so many men who know about
this and so many know about that, then those men can be provided
at Once. - - -
The CHAIRMAN. You of the profession know all of those men.
Mr. PARSONs. We know all of them. -
I should like especially to urge upon the attention of your com-
mittee the drafting of some sort of a provision to provide for a reserve
of the rank and file. I believe that the suggestion has already been
made for such a reserve, in these words: - .
Any person who is a citizen of the United States, or who has declared his intention
of becoming a citizen thereof, who by the nature of his civil occupation or profession
is thereby qualified for duty in the Quartermaster's, Engineer, or Signal Corps, or
in the Medical or Ordnance Department, and who is physically qualified for the
duties of a soldier and not over 35 years of age, who enlists for one of said corps or
departments for a period of years. - - - , *
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 685
I think that describes it, and personally, from my own experience,
I think it would be a very valuable thing to do. I know we wanted
to get such men for that regiment in 1898. We had to advertise for
them and chase around and get them in every possible way, and
although we started in April it was not until in July, I think, we had
the first regiment ready. - - - -
The CHAIRMAN. We are very much obliged to you, Mr. Parsons,
for your suggestions here, and the substance of the proposals you
make with the amendment, you can embody in the record.
Mr. PARSONs. If I can be of any assistance, if you want to make
any further inquiries as to how to make it more attractive for men
to come forward and volunteer for such a corps, I am at your orders
at any time, or shall be glad to answer any inquiries by mail.
The CHAIRMAN. I am very much obliged to you, Mr. Parsons.
Senator FLETCHER. Mr. Chairman, I have here a letter from Judge
William B. Young, of Jacksonville, who was a major in the Con-
federate service and who has been an officer in the militia in Florida,
and was a circuit court judge there for some years. He is now
retired, but he is a gentleman whose opinion and judgment I value
very highly and, because of his experience and observation and
knowledge of this subject, I think it worth while to submit to the
committee his letter to me and have it go in our hearing. It is not
a very long letter. He says: -
- JACKSON VILLE, FLA., January 25, 1916.
EIon. D. U. FLETCHER. -
DEAR FLETCHER: I am glad to see that the country is waking up to the fact that we
are in a fearfully unprepared condition if a war should break out, as it may do at any
time. I realized our condition some 14 or 15 years ago, and in a conversation with
Maj. Durkee and Mr. D. G. Ambler I expressed the opinion that we should have at
least 500,000 men uniformed, drilled, armed, and equipped ready to take the field
on an hour's notice. When the Rivers and Harbors Committee of Congress came here
several years ago, in a conversation with Admiral Fletcher, I expressed the same
opinion. I was educated at a military School and served four years in the army of
orthern Virginia as an officer, and feel that I know something of military matters.
It is more important to have trained officers than trained men. Raw troops led by
well-trained officers, I refer to line and field officers, can be made to render good
service. Ignorant officers will do what they should not do, lose their heads and
demoralize their men. -
In two instances, in the first battles of the Civil War the colonels of regiments
marched their men into action in columns of fours, got a lot of men killed and wounded,
accomplished nothing, and nearly caused their regiments to run. We should have
more graduates turned out from West Point. The egular Army should be increased
to at least 200,000 men, with a preponderence of Artillery. We should have either a
National Guard or “continental army” of at least half a million men, and these with
the Regulars should have field maneuvers each year for several weeks. By this
method the higher officers can gain experience in handling bodies of troops. The
quartermasters and commissaries can get the necessary experience and the line officers
and enlisted men get much useful knowledge. All the interior Army posts should be
abandoned. We should accumulate an abundance of arms and ammunition. I have
thought much for years past on this subject, and in addition to my training as a cadet
and as an officer in the Confederate Army, for years I was an officer in the National
Guard, as you know. Some of the “peace-at-any-price” men Say, “Who are we to
repare against?” I have no hesitation in Saying against Germany and possibly
apan. Russia does not wish to bother us, as she sold us all the territory she had on
this continent. France will not molest us, England has all the territory she wishes,
but Germany has for years past chafed at the Monroe doctrine; tried to form a Euro-
ean concert against us at the time of the Spanish War, and just before the present war
impudently demanded a share in managing matters in Haiti.
In fact, in my opinion, formed from reading Bernhardi and other German writers,
and from her conduct on several occasions, I believe that we would have had war with
686 PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
her if she had not been afraid of the British Navy in case she became involved in war
with us. We should get out of the Philippines and leave them to take care of them-
selves. Having freed them from Spain, we owe them no further duty, and they are a
Source of weakness and expense. The conduct of the Germans in this country since
the outbreak of the present war and what I saw three years ago of the large number of
Italians in New Jersey, has convinced me that we should repeal all naturalization
laws and put a stop to immigration. Let us keep this country for ourselves and our
descendants. I have no earthly interest in this matter except a desire to see my coun-
try protected against invasion and preserved for my descendants. If we can not get
the men in any other way, let us have compulsory service. Pardon me for writing to
you at such length, but I feel deeply on this subject, and feel that we are in danger.
Yours, very truly, WM. B. Y
M. B. YOUNG.
(Thereupon, at 3.45 o'clock p. m., the committee took a recess
until Monday, January 31, 1916, at 10.30 o'clock a. m.)
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
\
MONDAY, JANUARY 31, 1916.
UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON MILITARY AFFAIRs,
Washington, D. C.
The committee met, at the expiration of the recess, at 10.30
o'clock a. m., Senator Geo. E. Chamberlain (chairman) presiding.
STATEMENT OF MAJ. GEN. WILLIAM CRAWFORD GORGAS,
SURGEON GENERAL, UNITED STATES ARMY.
The CHAIRMAN. General, will you state your full name, your rank,
and the duties to which you have been detailed .
Gen. GoRGAs. William Crawford Gorgas, major general, United
States Army; Surgeon General of the Army; head of the Medical
Corps of the Army. -
The CHAIRMAN. General, you testified before the House committee,
did you not ?
Gen. GORGAs. Yes, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. Did you go into your branch of the service at
length before that committee'
Gen. GORGAs. No; I simply answered questions. I did not go into
it at a great deal of length. &
The CHAIRMAN. The committee did not know whether there was
anything you wanted to suggest with reference to your branch of the
service or not. I thought I would like you to have an opportunity
you desired. -
Gen. GoRGAs. I think I would like to point out that the Medical
Corps of the Army is, in its essential functions, a training body for
whatever great army we have to raise from the citizens of the country,
and with that object in view our present organization and most of
the proposed bills are defective, I think, in not giving us a large
enough number of commissioned officers and a good organization in
our enlisted personnel.
The CHAIRMAN. How many commissioned officers are in your corps
now Ż -
Gen. GoRGAs. There are 444, authorized by law, including the
Surgeon General, and 12 vacancies.
The CHAIRMAN. Ranking how %
Gen. GORGAs. Ranking from first lieutenant to major general.
The CHAIRMAN. There is only one major general?
Gen. GoRGAs. Yes, sir. - -
687
688 PREPAIRED NIESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
The CHAIRMAN. How many do you need 3
Gen. GORGAs. For manning the Regular Army, if it went into the
field, we would need seven per thousand.
The CHAIRMAN. Officers?
Gen. GORGAs. Commissioned officers; of course that is a very small
part of our function. Our real function is that of training whatever
medical officers are required for whatever Army may be arranged
for. I think we would need as many more commissioned officers as
the country could afford to give us for that function.
The CHAIRMAN. In case of war'. - -
Gen. GORGAs. I presume we would adopt some policy of training re-
serves in time of peace. For instance, when we were preparing a year
ago and speaking of raising a larger number of men, we were looking
around for a body of 250,000 men. We are not now on a footing in
the Medical Corps with our reserve corps for officering that number
of men, and if it came to a million men we would be very far from
officering that number.
The CHAIRMAN. You have how many in the actual service now %
Gen. GORGAs. Four hundred and thirty-two in the Medical Corps,
ncluding the Surgeon General; 94 in the Medical Reserve Corps,
including 17 attending the Army Medical School as candidates to
fill the 12 vacancies in the Medical Corps; and 15 contract surgeons;
a total of 541.
The CHAIRMAN. And how many in the reserve corps ?
Gen. GORGAs. 1,460 (1,366 inactive, 94 active).
The CHAIRMAN: So that taking them both together you still would
not have enough for a war organization ?
Gen. GORGAs. Of course, it would depend a great deal on what
you mean by a war organization. For any such number as is con-
templated in any of these present bills, you would not have near
enough. Most of these bills look forward eventually to a million men.
The CHAIRMAN. In the reserve?
Gen. GORGAs. Yes; everything, -
The CHAIRMAN. Have you enough men now with the Army as at
present constituted ?
Gen. GORGAs. No ; I do not think we have. When the Civil War
commenced we had nine medical officers per thousand. Of course,
that war swamped us. When the Spanish War commenced we had
seven per thousand. -
The CHAIRMAN. To the enlisted strength'?
Gen. GORGAs. Yes. Seven commissioned medical officers to every
thousand men. As the Army was increased after that, the Medical
Corps, not being increased, our ratio went down, so that when the Army
was reorganized in 1901 we had probably about five medical officers
per thousand. . When our corps was reorganized in 1908 we were
again increased to seven per thousand, but the Army having been
increased since then, we are back to 4.9.
The CHAIRMAN. Per thousand 7
Gen. GORGAs. Per thousand.
The CHAIRMAN. Is not that enough'.
Gen. GORGAs. Five per thousand would not be enough to man
the present Army if it were placed in the field. The smallest num-
ber that could actually operate with the present Regular Army if it
were put into the field would be 10 per thousand; but that is a very

PREPAIREDINESS FOR, NATIONAL DEFENSE. 689
small part of our functions. Our purpose is not merely to take care
of the Regular Army; our great function is to train whatever medical
officers are required for whatever army we put into the field. No-
body maintains that we are going into the field with the Regular
Army alone. We have all sorts of organizations for complementing
that. I imagine that in the smallest war we could have, like the
Spanish-American War, we would not contemplate putting into the
field less than 250,000 men.
The CHAIRMAN. What is the enlisted strength of your corps at the
present time . -
Gen. GORGAs. Four thousand four hundred and thirty-six.
The CHAIRMAN. How many do you need?
. ...Gen. GORGAs. On a peace footing that is hardly enough. The law
allows the department to increase that or decrease it, in the discretion
of the Secretary of War, within the limits of the appropriation.
The CHAIRMAN. What are the functions of the enlisted men in the
Surgeon General's Department in time of peace?
Gen. GORGAs. Of course, their great function, I think, is to be a
nucleus for training whatever larger Army we have. I think their
great function would be helping to train the various organizations,
the National Guard, and any contemplated volunteers. The present
force of men is actually looking after the present Regular Army,
doing the nursing and all the functions that pertain to the care of
the 100,000 men we have at present.
The CHAIRMAN. The whole enlisted strength, then, finds occupa-
tion for itself in the present establishment' -
Gen. GoRGAs. Yes; but if it went into the field it would take
double that. We have 4,436 men now, and it would take at least
10,000 men if they actually went into field service.
The CHAIRMAN. I do not think people understand, generally, why
you need so many men in the enlisted strength. Take 4,500 men
with an army of practically 100,000; it would look like a large number.
Gen. GORGAs. Their great function is the nursing function. Most
of those men are actually nursing in the various wards and camps
and hospitals. -
The CHAIRMAN. Throughout the country?
Gen. GoRGAs. Yes, sir; on the border, now, in the field hospitals,
ambulance hospitals, etc. .
The CHAIRMAN. Do these bills provide for a sufficient increase in
the corps ?
Gen. GORGAs. Not in my opinion. They provide a Medical Corps
for the reorganized army having even a smaller proportion to its
strength than the present Medical Corps bears to the present Army,
That is the general effect of all these bills. The present personnel
of 443 subordinate officers in the Medical Corps was established in
1908 on the basis of an enlisted force of 65,000 men. ,
The CHAIRMAN. Then, as at present established, it would provide
for increasing the Medical Corps, in proportion as the Army increased,
which would be at about the rate of 7 per 1,000 %
Gen. GORGAs. No; our present Regular Army is a little less than
five per thousand. Under these bills the ratio would be still smaller.
At the beginning of the Spanish-American War the ratio was seven
per thousand. The question was gone into by the Dodge Commis-
sion after that war. They recommended (p. 189, vol. 1, of their
690 PR.EPARED NIESS FOR NATION AI, DEFENSE.
report) that there should be a larger force of commissioned medical
officers. The French have just published in their official journal an
investigation of their medical department. They have had much
the same breakdown that we had in the Spanish-American War, and
the recommendations are very similar.
The CHAIRMAN. Did they state how many per thousand there ought
to be of commissioned officers' -
Gen. GORGAs. No, sir; I did not see that in their report anywhere.
Senator CATRON. You mean seven medical officers to a thousand
men ;
Gen. GORGAs. Yes, sir.
Senator CATRON. Then you say that ought to be increased ?
Gen. GORGAs. The Dodge Commission reported that the number
of medical officers should be increased. The absolute number upon
which they based their recommendation was, in fact, in the propor-
tion of seven to the thousand men.
Senator CATRON. How much did they think it ought to be
Gen. GORGAs. They did not express any opinion.
Senator CATRON. Have you intimated how much you think it
ought to be . *
Gen. Gongas. I think, as far as our Regular Army is concerned,
that seven is what we should reasonably ask for, but I look upon the
great function of the Regular Army as for the training of whatever
army we are getting up with the reserves. Suppose we contemplate
an army of a million men and that army should actually go into the
field, meeting the enemy. They would use about 10,000 medical
officers. One of the principal functions of the Medical Corps of the
Regular Army is to train in time of peace those 10,000 medical officers
with the necessary enlisted men of the sanitary troops as much as is
feasible.
Senator CATRON. What do you refer to in this army that you are
speaking of Ż
Gen. GoRGAs. The present Regular Army, the Medical Corps. In
time of war this great army that is to be put into the field would
require about 10 per thousand. That would be 1 to 100 men.
Senator CATRON. About one to a company'
Gen. GoRGAs. Yes. Of course they would not actually be in the
field with them. That would be all the medical officers in the base
hospitals, etc. That is generally about the ratio. Their function
would be the training in time of peace of whatever army we have.
The more we have in time of peace the more thoroughly this thing
could be done.
The CHAIRMAN. The training of which you speak refers only to the
men in the Medical Corps ?
Gen. GORGAs. Yes, sir.
Senator CATRON. Of what would they consist :
Gen. GoRGAs. They would be doctors and the enlisted men of the
Hospital Corps.
Senator CATRON. Would they all be doctors'
Gen. GORGAs. Yes, sir; I was speaking entirely of doctors, except
the enlisted personnel. - ."
Senator CATRON. At what age would you take them to begin
training . Of course it is presumed that they would be graduated
from the best medical colleges.
F.R.EPAREDINESS. FOR, NATIONAL DEFENSE. 691
Gen. GORGAs. I should say from 25 to 45 if you refer to reserve
officers.
Senator CATRON. From the time they get out of the college, and
from then on ? - r
Gen. GoRGAs. I would not put a limit on age, because what we
would want in the base hospitals are the great operators the great
hysicians, the very best men—men of the greatest reputation.
}. Dr. Keen, a man of over 60, who was, when he came into
the reserve corps, the leading surgeon of Philadelphia. We would
want the leading surgeons of Baltimore and New York, etc. We
would want aii those men as operators and physicians in our general
hospitals. I am speaking of in time of war. So that I would not
like to have any age limit, because those men that we would put into
the field would be much more useful than the younger men in the
base hospitals.
Senator DU Pont. I saw in the press a protest from an officer of
the reserve corps against this new legislation, on the ground that it
would interfere with their record. Did you see that ?.
Gen. GORGAs. Yes; and I have had a great deal of correspondence
with the reserve corps.
Senator DU PoNT. Is there a just foundation for those protests?
Gen. GORGAs. I am very wd satisfied with the Medical Reserve
Corps. I think the reserve as proposed in most of those bills is
practically the same thing. I think one bill has the provision that
the present reserve corps would not go out of existence for a year.
The present reserve law is very good, and I recommend no substantial
change.
The CHAIRMAN. Have you any suggested amendment to any of
these bills regulating your corps ?
Gen. GORGAs. Yes. I think they ought all to be amended in a
great many respects. I think it ought to be provided that under all
circumstances the commissioned personnel should not fall below
7 per 1,000. I think it would be better than to fix the number, as
the law does now. I think we should have some such sliding scale
as that. If the Army were increased, automatically the commis-
Sioned medical corps would be increased. If it were decreased,
automatically it would be decreased. I think that in order to
encourage the men in coming in we ought to have much the same
ratio of general officers that the other corps have, and even the line
has. We have one general officer now to 443 other commissioned
officers. If we got 7 per 1,000, it would be one general officer to 700.
The CHAIRMAN. What ranks do those general officers have 7
Gen. GORGAs. Two brigadiers and one major general. I am the
only general officer in the corps at present with the rank of major
general.
The CHAIRMAN. That was by special act 7
Gen. GORGAs. That was by special act. There was one brigadier
general.
The CHAIRMAN. You have no brigadier general now Ż
Gen. GORGAs. No, sir; no brigadier general now. -
The CHAIRMAN. And the highest rank is that of colonel?
Gen. GORGAs. Yes, sir. -
The CHAIRMAN. Have you formulated your suggestions into a draft
of a section ?
692 PREPARED NIESS FOR, NATIONAL DEFENSE.
Gen. GORGAs. Yes, sir. -
The CHAIRMAN. Have you it with you ?
Gen. GORGAs. Yes, sir. - -
The CHAIRMAN. You might have it inserted in the record, General.
Gen. GORGAs. I shall be very glad to. I think the enlisted per-
sonnel of the Medical Corps, under all these bills which will be the
model on which the general Army is organized, needs change as much
as the commissioned personnel
The CHAIRMAN. Have you formulated a draft of that ?
Gen. GORGAs. Yes, sir. •
The CHAIRMAN. The committee would like to have both of those
inserted in the record, if you please. -
Gen. GORGAs. I think those bills formulated in that way would
express my ideas better than I could give them by answering ques-
tions or making an Oral statement.
The CHAIRMAN. The committee will then have them before it when
it comes to consider this whole subject. - -
The legislation referred to is as follows: &
1. An adequate Medical Corps is a corps sufficient in its personnel
to perform all routine duties with troops in garrison in time of peace
and to provide such additional officers as are necessary for adminis-
tration, general and base hospitals, supply depots, recruit depots,
laboratories, inspector-instructors with the Organized Militia and the
proposed continental army, or other auxiliary sanitary troops,
Army Medical School details, leaves and sickness.
2. The present authorized strength of the Medical Corps is 443
medical officers and 1 Surgeon General. In 1908, when the present
strength of the Medical Corps was established by law (act of Apr. 23,
1908), the authorized number of 443 medical officers was upon the
basis of an Army of 65,000 men. The ratio of medical officers to
authorized enlisted strength of the Army was approximately 7 per
1,000. Medical officers in number sufficient to equal this ratio was
recommended by the General Staff, two Secretaries of War, and two
Presidents (see Exhibit A), and Congress signified its approval thereof
by the passage of the act cited.
3. Since the passage of the above act the Army has been increased
about 50 per cent in enlisted strength, without any increase in the
Medical Corps. -
4. The plan proposed for the reorganization of the Army bases
the Medical Corps increase upon the ratio of regular medical officers
to the Army at this time, and authorizes an increase of medical
officers in the proportion of the increase of the Army over its present
strength—thus ignoring the fact that the Medical Corps is supple-
mented by officers of the Medical Reserve Corps and contract surgeons,
and operating to reduce the ratio of officers of the Medical Corps
from 7 per 1,000, the ratio upon which the act of 1908 was based,
to 4.9 per 1,000, a ratio entirely inadequate to the proper perform-
ance of the duties with which this department is charged by law and
regulations.
5. All studies or drafts of bills for the proposed increase of the
Army which have come to the notice of this office not only provide
sufficient officers of the line for all organizations, but provide also a
large number of extra line officers for instruction and other details.
At this time there are 200 extra line officers, with provisions in all
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 693
bills now before Congress for a material increase in the number of
additional officers available for duty other than with troops. These
same studies cut the Medical Corps to such an extent that in the
event of war failure is certain. To provide for an Army having a
sufficient number of officers in the combatant branch of the service
only is to jeopardize the success of the Army in campaigns or to pur-
chase success at an unnecessary amount of suffering and privation
as well as loss of life from disease and wounds. Proper training for
a staff corps is just as important as proper training for a line organ-
ization. An untrained personnel in the Quartermaster Corps, Ord-
nance Corps, and Medical Corps invites and assures a breakdown in
these branches under the strain of war. Transportation to the front,
food, clothing, arms and ammunition, evacuation of the sick and
wounded from the front, and protection of the Army from epidemic
diseases will not be properly provided. Disorganization will result,
followed by the demoralization that always occurs where one or
more branches of an army prove incapable because of lack of prepa-
ration in time of peace for service in war. If any of the plans pro-
posed should be enacted into law without change, the Medical De-
partment would inevitably in time of war suffer a lamentable break-
down similar to its breakdowns during the Spanish War and at the
beginning of the Civil War. A medical corps which in time of peace
has sufficient officers only for the actual administrative and garri-
son needs of the Regular Army can spare none to give even a sem-
blance of training to the sanitary troops of the Organized Militia,
the proposed continental army, or other auxiliary troops. The lat-
ter, then, when called to war, will come without that efficiency
derived from acquaintance with service conditions which only trained
officers can impart, and will be little or no better in that respect than
the raw volunteers, whose patriotic ardor in the future as in the
past will be found a feeble substitute for knowledge and skill. Thus
again, as in former wars, the scandal of medical inefficiency will
arise—a scandal due not to lack of ability on the part of the medical
personnel in the sphere of professional medicine, but to the want of
training in the art of military medicine of those drawn in from civil
life to augment the regular corps. The deplorable conditions due to
the inefficiency so produced were fully set forth in the reports of the
sanitary commission of the Civil War and of the Dodge Commission
of 1899. Attached hereto is an extract from the latter, marked “B,”
containing the commission's recommendations.
6. Requests for increase in the Medical Corps have been met with
the argument that such increase was unnecessary for the reason that
in our country there are thousands of medical men who in time of
emergency would tender their services and do their utmost to assist
such wounded as we might have. The duties of a military º
are vastly more complex than those of his civil brother, and no
matter how capable the latter may be in civil practice he can not
take the place of a trained medical officer. While it is true that the
purely professional work can be handled by the civilian practitioner,
and that the services of civil practitioners will be in a great measure
used, yet this fact does not controvert the necessity for trained
medical officers in numbers sufficient to fill all the supervisory posi-
tions which, in war even more than in peace, imperatively demand
a thorough familiarity with the processes of military administration.
694 PREPARED NESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
Unless medical officers sufficient in number for these positions in
time of war are provided and trained in time of peace, when war
comes men untrained in military administration must be called on
to fill them, thus placing the Medical Department upon, a volunteer
basis in a large measure at the very beginning of hostilities, with the
same demoralizing results that have always followed that procedure.
7. The available supply of medical men in the United States is
decreasing not only relatively to population but in absolute numbers,
as is shown by the statistics from the Journal of the American Medical
Association, Chicago, August 21, 1915. A study of the tables shows
an enormous decrease in the number of schools, students, and gradu-
ates. For example, in 1915 (population 100,399,318, estimated),
there were in the United States 95 medical schools, with 14,891 stu-
dents, against 160 schools with 28,142 students in 1904 (population
82,601,384, estimated). This shows a decrease in 11 years of 13,251
students, or 47-- per cent. The decrease in the number of graduates
of all classes of schools has been correspondingly great, thus: In 1915,
3,536, against 5,747 in 1904 (the largest number ever graduated in
one year), being 2,211, or 38+ per cent less in the later year. This
means that in 1915 there was 1 graduate in medicine to 28,000 per-
sons in the United States, against 1 graduate in medicine to 14,000
in 1904. With the increase in population and the decrease in the
number of medical men available, the returns from private practice
are increasing, and while it is recognized that there is no more self-
sacrificing body of men in the world than the medical men, neverthe-
less the greater the returns from a profession built up by years of
activity and studious attention to his profession, the less apt is he to
sacrifice all by volunteering for military service, with the prospect
of later starting life anew. In proportion to the returns from his
labors, just in that proportion will the average man weigh the sub-
ject of volunteering for the Army. This is not a reflection on any
man or body of men but is human nature the world over. England
is experiencing this difficulty to-day in the failure to obtain recruits
for war. The failure is in all branches. Recruiting has been a
failure. Parliament recently enacted a law providing for conscrip-
tion. The shortage is of medical officers as well as of enlisted men.
The shortage of medical men in England is so great that Sir James
Barr (extract from British Medical Journal, Oct. 2, 1915) stated:
The war office has got large numbers of medical men from Canada, Australia, and
New Zealand, and if the country can not now produce the men necessary, there will
be no course open but to apply to the United States to fill up the necessary comple-
ment. . - *
This request has recently been made. (See Exhibit C.) The
shortage of medical officers in the British Army is actual, as will
appear from statements, from British sources, appended hereto.
(See Exhibit D.) The British Medical Journal of September 18, 1915,
page 125, Scottish Connection of British Medical Association, reports
that according to the most recent returns 2,500 medical men were
wanted before Christmas, preferably men under 40, of which the
Scottish share would be 500. - - -
8. In so far as available medical men are concerned, considering
the decreasing number of graduates from the medical schools, the
United States is rapidly approaching the condition that England is
now in—not enough medical men for the civil population and the
PRFPARED N ESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 695, .
Army too. This shortage is for all schools of medicine, nonsec-
tarian, homeopathic, eclectic, etc. (See exhibit E.)
9. Doctors are not medical officers, and can not be made medical
officers with a knowledge of medico-military affairs simply by giving
them commissions. , Training is the one essential. An army only
partially trained is doomed to defeat when it comes in contact with
a trained army. An army trained in its combatant branches alone,
but not in its staff corps, is an army fighting under a handicap, and
will suffer unnecessary losses. An example of this is loss from
sickness. The losses in this respect deplete an army of its fighting
strength and increase the costs and burdens of war and pensions
after the war. Thus, the British Army from April 25 to October 20,
1915, removed from the Gallipoli Peninsula 78,000 sick (press dis-
patch Nov. 3, 1915, reporting statement in House of Commons by
the parliamentary under secretary for war). Later dispatches
(Nov. 15, 1915), stated that 90,000 sick had been taken from that
single area of operations. This is a high sick rate. How much
thereof may fairly be attributed to the shortage of medical officers,
and how much to the military inexperience of those drawn from
civil life, are questions, of course, entirely within the zone of con-
jecture. It is a fair conclusion, however, from the lamentable
history of our own wars, that such shortage and inexperience were
material factors in producing these calamitous figures.
10. All plans for an increase of the Regular Army provide for a
very substantial increase of line officers over the number actually
needed for the war strength of the Army. This actual increase is to
be officers over the additional 200 already authorized by Con-
gress. This is a very wise step, as trained officers will be needed to
instruct the large number of green man enlisted when war is immi-
nent and after hostilities have begun. By way of contrast, attention
is again invited to the fact that the relative number of medical officers
of the regular corps is to be reduced from 7 per 1,000, as upon the
reorganization of 1908, to 0.49 of 1 per cent in the proposed legisla-
tion. The questions then arise, why, if training is so important in the
line, is it not equally necessary in the Staff Corps ? Why, if it is
necessary to have extra officers of the line in time of peace, upon the
plea that training of the auxiliary troops of the line is essential, is it
unnecessary to have a sufficient number of medical officers, even for
peace duty . s
11. Force is given to this query by considering the functions which
devolve upon the Medical Department in peace and war, as follows:
(a) Professional care of the sick and wounded in garrison, on the
march, in camp, on the battle field, and after removal therefrom.
(b) Investigating the sanitary conditions of the Army and making
recommendations in reference thereto, including the location of
permanent camps and posts, the adoption of systems of water supply
and purifications, and the disposal of wastes.
(c) Making physical examinations of officers and enlisted men.
(d) The management and control of military hospitals.
(e) The recruitment, instruction, and control of the Hospital
Corps and the Army Nurse Corps. -
(f) Furnishing all medical and hospital supplies.
g) The direction and execution of all measures of public health
among the inhabitants of occupied territory.
, 696 PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
(h) The methodical disposition of the sick and wounded so as to
insure the retention of those effective and to relieve the fighting force
of the noneffective. -
(i) The transportation of the sick and wounded.
(j) The j of aid stations, dressing stations, hospitals,
and other formations for the care of the sick and wounded.
(k) The preparation and preservation of individual records of sick-
ness and injury in order that claims may be adjudicated with justice
to the Government and to the individual.
(l) The instruction of the troops in personal hygiene. -
(m) In addition to these duties, specifigally prescribed, medical
officers are required to act as members of retiring boards, examining
boards, and courts-martial, as instructors for the Organized Militia,
etc.
(a) The first of these duties may be quite successfully performed by
a physician having the professional education of a good general prac-
titioner, together with some special knowledge of military surgery,
although the Army Service is continually developing specialists in
bacteriology, protozoology, roentgenology, ophthalmology, Surgery,
and other strictly professional branches.
The other 12 groups of enumerated duties give rise, especially in
time of war, to problems of vast scope and great complexity. To
perform them efficiently, requires training not provided by the ordi-
nary medical curriculum. They will be briefly discussed in the Order
of their enumeration.
(b) Sanitation as applied in the military service by medical offi-
cers is a distinct specialty. It embraces the subjects taught in post
graduate courses in two or three of the most progressive º
colleges in this country, under the caption of “public health and pre-
ventive medicine.” It also includes those special measures which
have been developed entirely within the military service for the care
of troops in the field, where large bodies of men are brought together
for whom modern methods of waste disposal must be improvised,
corresponding to those permanently available in towns and cities.
A few years ago it was considered impossible for troops to continue
to camp on the same ground for a longer period than two weeks
without camp diseases becoming epidemic. At the present time in
the United States Army, even under unfavorable conditions of cli-
mate and terrain, troops remain on the same ground under canvas for
indefinite periods with a continuously low sick rate. The special
knowledge necessary to inaugurate and maintain such immunity is
of the highest importance to the health of the Army and to its battle
efficiency. -
(c) While the physical examination of men and the diagnosis of
disease should be as well performed by civilian practitioners as by
medical officers of the Army, experience has shown that special train-
ing along this line is necessary for a proper estimate of the effect of
various defects on the service of officers and men. Th Government
undoubtedly saves thousands of dollars annually by reason of having
trained officers to exlcude the unfit from its service. .
(d) It is found in civil life that good superintendents of hospitals
are difficult to obtain, and that good professional attainments are no
criterion of an individual’s capacity to properly manage and control
PREPAIRED NESS FOR NATION ATL DEFENSE. 697
a hospital. The management of hospitals has therefore attained the
rank of a distinct specialty.
(e) This duty needs no comment, as it is evident that it can only
be performed by men specially trained for the purpose.
(f) A considerable proportion of medical officers must be specially
trained in the Selection, purchase, standardization, storage, and issue
of hospital supplies. - -
(g) In time of war when troops are occupying territory outside the
limits of their own country it frequently becomes necessary, in order
to protect the health of the troops, that the diseases prevalent among
the people in the vicinity should be controlled and, if possible, eradi-
cated by the military authorities. The execution of the necessary
measures to accomplish this falls to the lot of the medical officers of
the invading force, and to be successful in this work they must have
the knowledge required of an officer of public health and, in addition,
be familiar with methods of military administration.
(h) and (i) These duties are undoubtedly the most important the
medical officer is called upon to assume in time of war. The disas-
trous results arising from the attempt to perform them with un-
trained medical personnel were well illustrated during the early stages
of the Civil War, when the encumbrance of the sick and wounded
frequently immobilized the fighting forces and destroyed their effi-
ciency. On the other hand, large numbers of men who should have
been retained comparatively near the front were sent so far to the
rear that their return was indefinitely delayed, resulting in very
serious depletion of the ranks. An organization for the proper dis-
posal of the sick and wounded, which has since become a model for
all the armies of the world, was later developed during that war.
Familiarity with these methods is absolutely essential, not only to the
proper care and comfort of the sick and wounded, but to the effi-
ciency of the fighting forces. Such familiarity can only be attained
by special training with troops.
(j) The medical officer must understand where aid stations, dress-
ing stations, and similar formations should be established, in order
to obtain the best results and at the same time not interfere with the
movement of ammunition trains, reserves, or other bodies of troops
necessary to battle success. To enable him to perform these duties
successfully, and to obtain a reasonable degree of protection from
fire for his wounded, he must have knowledge of the range and
trajectory of projectiles; he must be able to read a map and to esti-
mate therefrom the places most protected from rifle fire and from
artillery fire; the most direct lines of aid to the front and of the
evacuation of wounded to the rear; the slopes that are prohibitory
for wheeled vehicles; the places where watercourses may be forded,
etc. In short, to properly perform the duties enumerated in (h),
(i), and (j), he must be thoroughly drilled in that specialty which
in the military service is known as sanitary tactics.
(k) Paper work is regarded by the ordinary civilian practitioner
called into service in the Army as a rather unnecessary evil. The
preparation and preservation of individual records of sickness and
injury is, however, of the greatest importance to the individual as
well as to the Government. Their absence has in times past resulted
in injustice being done many worthy men, while others, less deserving,
have been granted pensions on manufactured evidence which might
698 PREPARED NIESS FOR, NATIONAL DEFENSE.
have been refuted if proper hospital records had been kept during their
service. The keeping of records can hardly be considered a specialty,
but nevertheless it is a branch of knowledge which can only be
learned by more or less study and considerable experience.
(l) The knowledge of personal hygiene taught the troops should
embrace not only the knowledge which any good physician should
be able to impart, but also the hygiene of the march, the care of the
feet, the disposal of excreta, etc.
(m) No special comment is necessary on the duties mentioned
under (m), as it is obvious that special experience is necessary to
their proper performance. -
12. Recruiting for the Army is of such importance that only
trained officers are capable of conducting it properly. It is by the
proper performance of this duty that the Government is protected
not only against unearned pensions, but against the enlistment of
defectives or degenerates who would eventually become inmates of
the disciplinary barracks or military prisons, or be discharged upon
certificates of disability. .
13. Medical officers properly trained in time of peace are able
from their training to protect the Army from disease, as shown by
the marked contrasts between the conditions existing in the recent
camp of the Second Division at Texas City in so far as health con-
ditions were concerned, and the camps of the Spanish-American War;
or by the difference between the camp of Regular Troops stationed
at San Antonio, 1911, and the camp at Jacksonville, 1898. (See
Exhibit F.) Trained men of the Medical Corps, Reed and his co-
workers, were able to discover the agent for the transmission of
ellow fever, and trained medical officers, by the application of this
nowledge, stamped out yellow fever in Cuba and Panama. This
discovery has been of inestimable value to the Nation, enabling the
authorities to crush several epidemics of yellow fever in the South
before the appearance of frost, something that had never before
been effected. And it has been also of untold benefit to the world
at large, since yellow fever is no longer the universal scourge of the
Tropics, but now exists in only a few places remote from navigation,
or in countries too poor to apply the necessary remedies for its
control. The sanitary work of trained medical officers in the Philip-
pine Islands, Porto Rico, and the Canal Zone has been so effective
that these regions have changed from pest holes to salubrious coun-
tries where the American and his family can live and thrive. These
trained men of the Medical Corps by one of its contributions to
Sanitary science, the control of yellow fever, have rendered to man-
kind, and particularly to the United States, a service that may be
tººd worth more than the entire cost of the Spanish-American
W 8,I’. - -
14. To produce an efficient Medical Department in time of war,
trained officers must be provided in time of peace in numbers suffi-
cient to form a nucleus for expansion to meet the needs of war.
Such expansion can not be accomplished if trained officers are author-
ized in time of peace sufficient only for ordinary duty.
Even if the Medical Corps is established on the basis of 7 per 1,000
of the authorized strength of the Army, the number of trained officers
therein will in time of war be so small, relatively, to the whole Army
Regulars, Milifia, and Volunteers—as to yield no more than enough
PREPAIRED NESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 699
to fill the positions demanding complete acquaintance with methods
of military administration. -
‘‘Success in war is the result of adequate military preparation
followed by effective military operation.” (Official Bulletin, vol. 1,
No. 2, p. 21.) To deny to the Medical Department sufficient medical
officers even for peace duty is to deny the axiom quoted. Failure
to acknowledge this principle is bound to bring reproach upon the
country by again producing the conditions that disgraced i. Civil
War—conditions which, it may be added, were corrected only after
two years of that conflict had brought the scandal home to the
country. The Spanish-American War, although a short war, was
another example of too few trained men to properly meet the de-
mands of war. In that war the Army was within a few weeks ex-
º to about ten times its peace strength. There is no reason to
elieve that, in the event of war with a first-class power, the present
Army would not be expanded in a similar ratio, with a result just as
disastrous from a sanitary point of view unless commissioned med-
ical personnel are provided for in numbers not only sufficient for the
peace strength of the Army, but in addition extra officers for detail
as inspector instructors with the Organized Militia and auxiliary
troops to be authorized by Congress.
The present war in Europe has taught the world nothing if not the
lesson of preparedness. ... An army to be efficient should be prepared
in all its branches, both line and staff, coordinating one with the other,
with sufficient commissioned personnel to meet the emergency of
expansion in the time of a national crisis. The peace strength of an
army should be the least number of men with which a country can
hope to enter upon a war with reasonable hope of success. This
minimum number for the peace strength of the Medical Corps should,
it is submitted, be recognized as on the basis of 7 per 1,000 of the au-
thorized strength of the Army. When war actually breaks out the
ratio of medical officers (Regular and Volunteer), will judging by in-
formation from the present conflict in Europe, necessarily rise above
1 per cent; and the trained officers of the Medical Corps must furnish
the nucleus to leaven the Volunteer medical personnel that may be
raised. -
These conclusions being accepted, it is submitted further that the
law establishing the Medical Corps (commissioned) should fix its
strength, not in absolute numbers, but on the definite ratio of 7 per
1,000 of the legal authorized strength of the Army, and provide auto-
matically for increase or decrease in the personnel of the Medical
Corps on the basis of that ratio according as the authorized strength
of the Army is increased or decreased by law, with proper provisions
for taking care of supernumerary officers in the event of decrease.
15. With the design of providing a reserve of medical officers to
augment the regular Medical Corps in times of emergency the act of
April 23, 1908, which established the Medical Corps on the basis of
7 per 1,000, as indicated above, also established the Medical Reserve
Corps by empowering the President to issue commissions therein sub-
stantially to all qualified practitioners of medicine who are citizens of
the United States. . . . -
16. It should be borne in mind, moreover, that the mere acceptance
of a commission in the Resreve Corps does not transform the civilian
practitioner into a trained medical officer. Even those members of
700 PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
that corps who are willing to assume full military duty would without
preliminary training bring to its performance only the professional
skill and knowledge of private practice. To become an effective
military asset this skill and knowledge must be supplemented by
theoretical and practical instruction in the medico-military duties of
the medical officer. In other words, officers of the Medical Reserve
Corps must be trained in time of peace for duty in war.
As a measure of theoretical instruction a correspondence course for
officers of this corps has recently been instituted and is now being
conducted at the Army Field Service and Correspondence School for
Medical Officers at Fort Leavenworth. - *
But theoretical instruction, whether by correspondence or class-
room courses, is at best but a half-way measure. Real proficiency
in the military art in any of its º can be acquired only by
actual contact with troops under the conditions of campaign. To that
end camps of instruction in time of peace, simulating the conditions
of campaign, are necessary. This is no less true of the sanitary
service than of any other branch of the Army, staff or line.
Such camps of instruction are periodically conducted at public
expense for the improvement of the Organized Militia and of all the
Regular Army except the inactive officers of the Medical Reserve
Corps. As to the latter, a difficulty arises because of the terms of
the act of 1908 which authorizes the Secretary of War to call these
officers into active service only “in emergencies”; and it is held
thereunder that there is no authority to call them into active service
merely to receive field instruction. The signal zeal and patriotism
of a small number of Reserve Corps officers who have offered them-
selves for short periods of field instruction at their own expense has
afforded a slight mitigation of this unfortunate situation. To give
instruction to officers of the Medical Reserve Corps who were willing
to pay the expenses incident thereto, camps were established during
July and August last at several places in the United States, which
were attended by 173 officers of this corps. The officers so attending
paid all their traveling expenses to . from the camps, º
themselves while in camp, and provided their own equipment, and
in addition sacrificed their practice while in attendance. No such
sacrifices are expected from the militia, who not only receive their
expenses but are paid for the time given by them to instruction duty.
The Medical Reserve Corps, as a part of the Regular Army, would
seem to have at least as strong a claim to the fostering care of the
Federal Government. Should such claim be recognized, and pro-
vision made at public expense for the establishment of instruction
camps for Reserve Corps officers, a substantial increase in the number
of trained reserves and a material advance in medical preparedness
could be confidently expected. - -
17. Assuming that all the Medical Reserve Corps officers, 1,460
now commissioned, were properly trained for field duty, that number
would nevertheless be misleading as a reliance for duty in time of
war. The law of 1908, establishing the corps, expressly provides
that Reserve Corps officers may at the same timé serve in the militia,
or serve the United States in some other capacity, and when so
serving shall not be subject to call for duty as Reserve Corps officers.
Of the 1,460 mentioned, about 90 are known to be now serving in
the militia or employed by the Government in some other capacity,
PREPAIRED NIESS FOR, NATIONAL DEFENSE. 701
and hence not available as reserves. To that extent the present
Reserve Corps, small as it is, is impaired as a ready resource in time
of war. A part of its purpose was to enable the department to apply
before the emergency of war arises proper tests of professional com-
etency, so as to avoid the danger of issuing, in the hurry and con-
usion of the first stages of war, commissions to incapable men.
As a partial remedy against this state of affairs it is believed that
the law should be changed to prohibit officers of the Medical Reserve
Corps from serving in the militia or serving the United States in any
other character.
18. Such remedy, however, would go only to the surface of the
trouble. What is needed is legislation that would really mobilize
the professional medical resources of the country for war service,
that is, that would develop the Medical Reserve Corps into the real
reserve of the medical forces of the Nation. As hereinbefore repre-
sented, the permanent military establishment should include Medical
Corps personnel in time of peace on the basis of 7 per 1,000 of the
authorized strength of the Army, so as to provide a proper medical
administration in peace and a leaven of thoroughly trained medical
officers for the supervisory and administrative duties of war. When
war actually supervenes an increased ratio will be found necessary,
at least 1 medical officer for every 100 enlisted men, in order to take
proper care of the huge number of sick and wounded that modern
warfare assures. That is to say, for every million men of volunteers,
there must be at least 10,000 medical officers. Two courses are
open: First, to get them in the old way by issuing volunteer commis–
sions, often under the pressure of private influence, to civilians whose
capacity has not been ascertained by deliberate test—a method
which the history of past wars utterly discredits; or, second, to get
them from an established Reserve Corps, adequate in number, com-
posed of physicians whose qualifications have been previously ascer-
tained by professional tests uninfluenced by private pressure.
Such a Réserve Corps, comprising thousands where we now have
hundreds, can not be developed without persistent effort and wise
encouragement. That the present law does not offer the required
encouragement the meager response of the profession to its invitation
sufficiently indicates. Nor upon consideration should this be deemed
surprising. Obviously, therefore, if the Reserve Corps is to do what
it was designed to do, it must in one way or another be made more
attractive. The best way to make it attractive is to make it by law
the sole channel or medium through which medical commissions in the
Volunteers proper may be reached by medical practitioners in private
life. This is, indeed, a negative attraction; but it is believed that,
if it should be incorporated in the law, it would be a potent influence
in drawing to the Reserve Corps in time of peace great numbers of
medical men who are now indifferent, but would at once see in the
reorganized corps the means and the only means through which they
could in time of war dedicate their professional skill and knowledge
to their country's need. Such reorganization being accomplished,
the Government would by seasonable and deliberate tests in time of
peace be able to sift out the capable from the incapable, and by listing
the former only in the reserve be ready, without delay and almost at
an instant's notice, to provide the necessary medical personnel for
the emergency army.
233S0—PT 14—16—2
702 PREPAIRED NESS FOR, NATIONAL DEFENSE.
19. The medical service also requires, it is submitted, some change
in the laws organizing the Hospital Corps. The present laws are
indefinite concerning the proportion of Hospital Corps personnel to
combatant troops. The problems of military sanitation, and the
huge number of sick and wounded in modern warfare, as demon-
strated by current experience abroad, indicate that the campaign
proportion should be no less than 10 sanitary soldiers to 100 of all
others. In time of peace the demands upon the sanitary service are
not so onerous, and 5 to 100 should suffice. It is recommended that
the law definitely establish the latter ratio as the peace strength of
the Medical Corps erlisted personnel, with a proviso that in time of
war or when war is imminent the strength thereof may be increased
by such number as the Secretary of War shall been necessary.
20. The Sanitary service requires in its higher enlisted grades
qualifications and attainments of no mean order, including knowledge
of pharmacy and minor surgery, and a high order of executive ability
for the management of men. Generally speaking, also, it may be
said, service with the sick and wounded and the drudgery of the rear
are not of a character which appeals to the average man whose mili-
tary instincts impel him to come forward to his country's aid. The
shouting and the tumult of the battle, the zest of conflict, which stir
the red blood of the fighting man, are denied the Hospital Corps sol-
dier. The latter must take his chance of death or injury without a
weapon of offense in his hands, and among environments of misery
and suffering. The call to such service, compared with that of the
combatant line, is feeble. Great and constant difficulty is therefore
met in keeping the Hospital Corps up to the proper contingent of
capable men. Formerly this #º, was recognized, and in a
measure overcome, by giving to the Hospital Corps man some slight
reference in pay as a set-off to the unattractiveness of his work.
ut this has been overlooked in recent legislation, which has operated,
speaking broadly, to increase the pay of the enlisted man of the line
and other branches of the staff, while leaving the Hospital Corps pay
more or less at a standstill, so that the ºfº, ents to sanitary
service are no longer offered. The difficulty in question thus becomes
once more acute. -
The view is accordingly urged that the Hospital Corps should be
made at least as attractive in its higher ranks as the line and other
staff branches, and to that end the establishment of two new grades
therein, master hospital sergeant and hospital sergeant (corresponding
in pay and allowances to master signal electrician and engineer,
Coast Artillery Corps), is recommended. For like reasons, the estab-
lishment of the grades of horseshoers, saddlers, farriers, mechanics,
and sergeant chauffeurs for service with field hospitals and ambulance
companies, the same to carry pay and allowances equal to that provided
for similar grades in other branches of the service, is also recommended:
Noncommissioned officers and enlisted men of other branches of
the service are by law permitted to earn extra pay for special assign-
ments. The Hospital Corps man does not enjoy this privilege,
except for assignments as mess sergeant. This seems to be a dis-
crimination against Hospital Corps service not founded in equity,
nor promotive of efficiency. Extra ratings are therefore recom-
ºndi of $2 a month for dispensary assistants, $3 per month for
nurses, and $5 a month for surgeon's assistants—no enlisted man to
PREPARED NIESS FOR, NATIONAL DEFENSE. 703
receive more than one rating or to draw the extra pay unless actually
performing the duties for which rated.
Finally, it is believed the law itself should definitely establish in
Some measure the proportions between the several grades of the Hos-
pital Corps, instead of leaving that matter wholly to chance or com-
promise as it now largely is, so as to give some assurance that merit
will in due season be rewarded and to hold out the expectation of a
constant flow of moderate promotion as an inducement to effort and
efficiency. The following percentages are regarded as a fair distri-
bution and in proportion to the needs of the service in the several
grades: Of the whole corps, master hospital sergeants, one-half of 1
per cent; hospital Sergeants, one-half of 1 per cent; sergeants, first
class, 7 per cent; Sergeants, 11 per cent; corporals, 5 per cent; and
cooks, 6 per cent.
Attached hereto are several exhibits and an outline of a bill which .
would carry these recommendations into effect.
Be it enacted, etc., That from and after the approval of this act the Medical Depart-
ment of the United States Army shall consist of one Surgeon General, with the rank,
pay, and allowance of a major general, who shall be its chief, and of a Medical Corps,
a Medical Reserve Corps, a Dental Corps, and a Veterinary Corps as hereinafter pro-
vided, and of the Nurse Corps and contract surgeons as now authorized by law.
SEC. 2. That when a vacancy shall hereafter occur in the office of Surgeon General
the President may appoint thereto, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate,
any officer of the Medical Corps not below the rank of lieutenant colonel, who shall
hold the office for a term of four years: Provided, That no officer so appointed who has
less than four years to serve from the date of his appointment to the date of his retire-
ment shall serve under such appointment, or be paid as if on the active list, beyond the
date of his retirement: Provided further, That when any officer shall, under the pro-
visions of this section, be appointed to the office of Surgeon General his appointment to
said office and his acceptance of the appointment shall create a vacancy among the
commissioned officers of the Medical Corps, which shall be filled in the manner pre-
scribed by law, but he shall retain in said corps the same relative position that he
would have held if he had not been appointed to said office, and he shall return to said
relative position upon the expiration of his appointment to said office unless he shall
be reappointed thereto; and if under the operation of this proviso the number of officers
of any particular grade in the said corps shall at any time exceed the number author-
ized by law no vacancy occurring in said grade shall be filled until after the total
number of officers therein shall have been reduced below the number authorized by
law: Provided further, That if upon the expiration of his appointment to the office of
Surgeon General the officer shall not be reappointed thereto he shall, if he makes
application therefor to the President, be retired from active service and placed upon
the retired list with the rank, pay, and allowances of a major general: Provided further,
That when any officer who shall have held the office of Surgeon General is subse-
quently placed upon the retired list he shall be retired with the rank, pay, and allow-
ances of a major general. 2.
SEC. 3. That the commissioned personnel of the Medical Corps shall comprise two
brigadier generals, and officers of the several inferior grades, proportionally distributed
among the same, as in the Medical Corps now established by law, the total number of
whom shall approximately be equal to, but not exceed, except as hereinafter pro-
vided, seven-tenths of one per centum of the total enlisted strength of the Army
authorized from time to time by law; Provided, That if by reason of a reduction by
law in the authorized enlisted strength of the Army aforesaid the total number of
officers in the Medical Corps commissioned previously to such reduction shall for the
time being.exceed the equivalent of seven-tenths of one percentum of such reduced
enlisted strength, no original appointment to commissioned rank in said corps shall
be made until the total number of commissioned officers thereof shall have been
reduced below the equivalent of seven-tenths of one per centum of the said reduced
enlisted strength, nor thereafter so as to make the total number of commissioned
officers thereof in excess of the equivalent of seven-tenths of one per centum of said
704 PREPAREDNESS FoR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
réduced enlisted strength; and no promotion shall be made above the grade of cap-
tain in said corps until the number of officers in the grade above that of captain, to
which the promotion is due, shall have been reduced below the proportional number
authorized for such grade on the basis of the reduced enlisted strength, nor thereafter
so as to make the number of officers in such grade in excess of the proportional num-
ber authorized on the basis of said reduced enlisted strength: Provided further, That the
commissioned officers of the Medical Corps shall have the rank, pay, and allowances
of officers of corresponding grades in the Cavalry arm of the service.
SEC. 4. That vacancies in the office of brigadier general in the Medical Corps
created by this act and hereafter occurring may be filled by the appointment thereto,
by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, of any officers of the Medical
Corps not below the grade of lieutenant colonel, who shall hold the said office for
terms of four years: Provided, That no officer so appointed who has less than four
years to serve from the date of his appointment to the date of his retirement shall
serve under such appointment, or be paid as if on the active list, beyond the date
of his retirement: Provided further, That when any officer shall under the provisions .
of this section be appointed to the office of brigadier general in the Medical Corps,
his appointment to said office and his acceptance of the appointment shall create a
vacancy in the grade of the Medical Corps from which he was appointed which shall
be filled in the manner prescribed by law, but he shall retain in the grades of the
said corps below the grade of brigadier general the same relative position that he
would have held if he had not been appointed to said office, and he shall return to
said relative position upon the expiration of his appointment to said office unless he
shall be reapp-inted thereto; and if under the operation of this proviso the number of
officers of any particular grade in the said corps shall at any time exceed the number
authorized by law, no vacancy occurring in said grade shall be filled until after the
total number of officers therein shall have been reduced below the number authorized
by law: Provided further, That if upon the expiration of his appointment to the office
of brigadier general the officer shall not be reappointed thereto he shall, if he makes
application therefor to the President, be retired from active service and placed upon
the retired list with the rank, pay, and allowances of a brigadier general: Provided
further, That when any officer who shall have held the office of brigadier general in
the Medical Corps is subsequently placed upon the retired list, he shall be retired
with the rank, pay, and allowances of a brigadier general.
SEC. 5. That vacancies in the several grades in the Medical Corps below that of
brigadier general and above that of first lieutenant, created or caused by this act or
hereafter occurring, shall be filled by promotion according to seniority from the
next lower grade: Provided, That all such promotions to grades below that of colonel
shall be subject to examination as hereinafter provided: Provided further, That first
lieutenants shall, subject to the prescribed examination, be promoted to the grade
of captain after three years’ service in the Medical Corps: Provided further, That no
person shall be promoted to the grade of captain in the Medical Corps until he shall
have served three years in the grade of first lieutenant: Provided further, That those
assistant surgeons who at the time of the approval of the act approved April twenty-
third, nineteen hundred, and eight (Thirty-fifth Statutes at Large, page sixty-six),
had attained their captaincy by reason of service in the volunteer forces under the
provisions of the act of February second, nineteen hundred and one, section eighteen
(Thirty-first Statutes at Large, page seven hundred and fifty-two), or who received
their captaincy upon the approval of the act of April twenty-third, nineteen hundred
and eight, aforesaid, by virtue of such service, shall take rank among the officers in or
subsequently promoted to that grade according to date of entrance into the Medical
Department of the Army as commissioned officers.
SEc. 6. That no commissioned officer of the Medical Corps below the grade of lieu-
tenant colonel shall be promoted therein until he shall have passed an examination
before an Army medical board consisting of not less than three commissioned officers
of the Medical Corps, to be designated by the Secretary of War, such examination to
be prescribed by the Secretary of War and to be held at such time anterior to the
accruing of the right of promotion as may be for the best interests of the service: Pro-
vided, That when the exigencies of the service of any commissioned officer who would
be entitled to promotion upon examination require him to remain absent from any place
where an examining board could be convened, the President is hereby authorized to
promote such officer, subject to examination, and the examination shall take place as
soon thereafter as practicable. If upon examination the officer be found disqualified
for promotion, he shall be treated in the same manner as if he had been examined
prior to promotion: Prºrºded further, That should any commissioned officer of the
Medical Corps fail in his physical examination, he shall if found incapacitated for
service by reason of physical disability contracted in the line of duty be retired with
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. - 705
the rank to which his seniority entitled him to be promoted; but if found incapacitated
for service by reason of physical disability not contracted in the line of duty, and the
finding is approved by the President, the officer shall be retired from active service
on the grade held by him, or be wholly retired from the service, as the President may
determine: Provided ſurth, r, That should a captain or first lieutenant be found dis-
qualified for promotion for any other reason, a second examination shall not be allowed,
but the Secretary of War shall appoint a board of review to consist of three officers of
the Medical Corps superior in rank to the oſſicer examined, none of whom shall have
served as a member of the board which examined him. If the unfavorable finding of
the examining board is concurred in by the board of review, the captain cr first lieu-
tenant reported disqualified for promotion shall be honorably discharged from the
service with one year's pay. If the action of the examining board is dissapproved by
the board of review, the captain or first lieutenant shall be considered qualified and
shall be promoted: Provided further, That any major of the Medical Corps who at his
first examination for promotion to the grade of lieutenant colonel in said corps shall be
found disqualified for such promotion for any reason other than physical disability
shall be suspended from promotion and his right thereto shall pass successively to such
officers next below him in rank in Said corps as are or may become eligible to promotion
under existing law during the period of his suspension; and any major so suspended
from promotion shall be reexamined as soon as practicable after the expiration of one
year from the date of the examination that resulted in his suspension. If on Such
reexamination he is found qualified for promotion, he shall again become eligible
thereto. If, however, he is found disqualified by reason of physical disability con-
tracted in the line of duty, he shall be retired with the rank to which his seniority
entitled him to be promoted; if found disqualified by reason of physical disability not
contracted in the line of duty, and the finding is approved by the President, he shall
be retired from active service on the grade held by him, or be wholly retired from the
service, as the President may determine; and if found disqualified for any other reason,
he shall be placed on the retired list without promotion.
SEC. 7. That no person shall receive an appointment as first lieutenant in the Medi-
cal Corps unless he shall be a citizen of the United States and a graduate of a reputable
school of medicine, and shall have been examined and approved as physically,
mentally, and morally qualified to hold a commission in said corps by an Army medi-
cal board consisting of not less than three commissioned officers of the Medical Corps
designated by the Secretary of War. -
SEC. 8. That hereafter sections twelve hundred and twenty-two and twelve hundred
and twenty-four, Revised Statutes of the United States, shall not apply to com-
missioned officers of the Medical Corps.
SEC. 9. That upon the detail of a commissioned officer of the Medical Corps for
duty as inspector-instructor with the Organized Militia, conformably to the provi-
sions of the act approved March third, nineteen hundred and eleven (Thirty-sixth
Statutes at Large, page one thousand and forty-five), or for other duty outside of the
Medical Department, a vacancy shall be regarded as thereby created in his grade in
the Medical Corps, which shall be filled by promotion in the regular way, and the
ensuing vacancies in the grades below shall be filled by promotion or appointment
as provided by law: Provided further, That medical officers on duty outside of the
Medical Department shall not by reason thereof lose their commissions, rank, pre-
cedence, or right to promotion at the proper time in the Medical Corps, but shall be
extra or supernumerary members thereof during the periods of such detail and shall
upon returning to duty with the Medical Department return to the positions in the
Medical Corps which they would have reached had they not been so detailed: Pro-
vided further, That if under the operation of this act the number of medical officers
in any grade, including those returned from duty outside of the Medical Department,
shall at any time exceed the number otherwise authorized by law in such grade,
promotions to that grade shall cease until the number has been reduced below that
So authorized.
SEC. 10. That nothing in this act shall be construed to legislate out of the Service
any officer now in the Medical Corps of the Army, nor to affect the relative rank for
promotion of any medical officer now in the service or who may hereafter be appointed
therein, as determined by the date of his appointment or commission, except as
herein otherwise provided in Section five.
SEC. 11. That the Medical Reserve Corps shall consist of first lieutenants, and the
President is authorized to issue commissions therein, by and with the advice and
consent of the Senate, to such number as he shall deem proper: Provided, That no
person shall be appointed in the said corps who shall not at the time of his appoint-
ment therein be a citizen of the United States and a graduate of a reputable medical
school, and who shall not, upon examination to be prescribed by the Secretary of
706 PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
War, have been found physically, mentally, and morally qualified to hold a com-
mission in Said corps. - -
SEC. 12. Commissions in the Medical Reserve Corps shall confer upon the holders
all the authority, rights, and privileges of commissioned officers of the like grade in
the Medical Corps, except promotions, but only when called into active duty, as
hereinafter provided, and during the periods of such active duty. Officers of the
Medical Reserve Corps shall have rank in said corps according to the dates of their
commissions therein, and when employed on active duty shall rank next below all
officers of like grade in the Medical Corps. - -
SEC. 13. That in emergencies, or for the purpose of instruction, the Secretary of
War may order officers of the Medical Reserve Corps to active duty in the service of
the United States in such numbers and subject to such examinations as the public
interests may require, and may relieve them from such diity on completion of the
service required: Provided, That he may in his discretion prescribe a physical exam-
ination of officers so relieved from active duty: Provided further, That nothing in this
or any other law shall be construed to prohibit an officer of the Medical Reserve Corps
not designated for active duty from service with the volunteer troops of the United
States or from employment in the service of the United States in any other capacity,
or from employment in the service of a State or Territory, except in the Organized
Militia thereof, but when so serving with the volunteer troops he shall not be subject
to call for duty under the terms of this section: Provided further, That any officer of
the Medical Reserve Corps who is subject to call and who shall be ordered upon
active duty as herein provided and who shall be unwilling and refuse to accept such
Service shall forfeit his commission, but shall suffer no other penalty for so refusing:
Provided further, That any officer of the Medical Reserve Corps who shall be at the
time of the approval of this act or shall thereafter become a member of the Organized
Militia of any State or Territory shall forfeit his commission in the said corps: Pro-
vided further, That the President is authorized to honorably discharge from the Med-
ical Reserve Corps any officer thereof whose services are no longer required.
SEC. 14. That officers of the Medical Reserve Corps when upon active duty in the
Service of the United States as provided in section thirteen of this act shall be subject
to the laws, regulations, and orders for the government of the Regular Army, and
during the period of such service shall be entitled to the pay and allowances of first
lieutenants of the Medical Corps, with increase for length of service as allowed by
law, said increase to be computed only for time of active duty: Provided, That any
officer of the Medical Reserve Corps or contract surgeons who at the time of the ap-
proval of this act shall be and have been on active duty for twelve years subsequent
to eighteen hundred and ninety-eight shall be eligible for appointment as first lieu-
tenant in the Medical Corps, subject to the examination prescribed in section seven
of this act: Provided further, That no officer of the Medical Reserye Corps shall be
entitled to retirement or retirement pay, nor shall he be entitled to pension exceut
for physical disability incurred in the line of duty while in active duty.
SEC. 15. Nothing in this act shall be construed to prevent the appointment in time
of war of commissioned medical officers of volunteers in such numbers and with Such
rank and pay as may be provided by law: Provided, That no persons shall be eligible
for appointment as commissioned medical officers of volunteers except, such as hold
commissions in the Medical Corps or the Medical Reserve Corps: Provided, however,
That the provisions of the preceding proviso shall not apply to commissioned medical
officers belonging to organizations of the militia which volunteer and are accepted for
service in the Volunteer Army as organizations.
SEC. 16. That the Dental Corps shall consist of senior dental surgeons, dental Sur-
geons, junior dental surgeons, and contract dental Surgeons, as hereinafter provided,
the total number of whom shall not exceed the proportion of one to each one thousand
of the authorized enlisted strength of the Army. Immediately following the approval
of this act the following procedure shall be had: All commissioned officers of the
Dental Corps established by the act of March third, nineteen hundred and eleven
Thirty-sixth Statutes at Large, page one thousand and fifty-four), then in active Service
shall be recommissioned in the grade of junior dental surgeon, and thereupon the
commissions heretofore issued to such officers as dental surgeons shall lapse and deter-
mine: all acting dental surgeons of the Dental Corps established by the act of March
third, nineteen hundred and eleven, then in active service, shall be reappointed by
contract as contract dental surgeons under this act, and the contracts heretofore
entered into with them as acting dental surgeons under the act of March third, nine-
teen hundred and eleven, shall lapse and determine.
SEC. 17. Hereafter all original appointments to the Dental Corps shall be as contract
dental surgeons, who shall have the same official status, pay, and allowances as the
- acting dental surgeons authorized by the act of March third, nineteen hundred and
PREPAREDINESS FOR, NATIONAL DEFENSE. 707
eleven: Provided, That no person shall be appointed a contract dental surgeon except
as authorized in Section sixteen of this act who shall not at the time of his appoint-
ment be at citizen of the United States between twenty-one and twenty-seven years
of age, and a graduate of a standard dental college, and who shall not, upon examina-
tion to be conducted by a dental examining board under regulations prescribed by
the Secretary of War, have been found physically, mentally, and morally qualified
for service as contract dental surgeon. .
SEC. 18. A contract dental Surgeon who shall have served two years continuously in
that grade, including Service in the grade of acting dental Surgeon established by the
act of March third, nineteen hundred and eleven, in a manner satisfactory to the
Secretary of War; shall be eligible for promotion to and commission in the grade of
junior dental Surgeon, Subject to the examination hereinafter prescribed. A junior
dental surgeon who shall have served seven years continuously in the Dental Corps,
including service in the grades of dental Surgeon and acting dental surgeon estab-
lished by the act of March third, nineteen hundred and eleven, and in the capacity
of contract dental Surgeon under the provisions of Section eighteen, act of February
‘second, nineteen hundred and one (Thirty-first Statutes at Large, page seven hundred
and fifty-two), shall be eligible for promotion to and commission in the grade of dental
surgeon, Subject to a like examination. A dental Surgeon who shall have served
nineteen years continuously in the Dental Corps, including service in the grades of
dental Surgeon and acting dental surgeon established by the act of March third,
nineteen hundred and eleven, and in the capacity of contract dental surgeon under
the provisions of Section eighteen, act of February second, nineteen hundred and one,
shall be eligible for promotion to and commission in the grade of senior dental surgeon,
subject to a like examination: Provided, however, That if at any time the number of
senior dental Surgeons shall become equal to twenty-five per centum of the whole
membership of the Dental Corps promotions to the grade of Senior dental surgeon shall
thereupon cease until the number of senior dental surgeons shall have become less
than twenty-five per centum of the whole membership of the corps.
SEC. 19. No contract dental surgeon or commissioned officer of the Dental Corps
shall be promoted therein until he shall have passed an examination to be conducted
by a dental examining board under regulations prescribed by the Secretary of War
and to be held at such time anterior to the accruing of the right to promotion as may
be for the best interests of the service: Provided, That when the exigencies of the
service of any contract dental Surgeon or commissioned officer of the Dental Corps
who would be entitled to promotion upon examination require him to remain absent
from any place where an examining board could be convened, the President is hereby
authorized to promote such contract dental surgeon or officer, Subject to examination,
and the examination shall take place as Soon thereafter as practicable. If upon ex-
amination the contract dental surgeon or officer be found disqualified for promotion,
he shall be treated in the same manner as if he had been examined prior to promotion:
Provided further, That should any contract dental surgeon be found disqualified for
promotion upon such examination he will be granted the leave of absence with pay
to which he shall have then become entitled under the laws and regulations ap-
plicable thereto, and at the expiration thereof his contract will be determined: Pro-
wided further, That should any commissioned officer of the Dental Corps fail in his
physical examination, he shall, if found incapacitated for service by reason of physical
disability contracted in the line of duty, be retired with the grade to which his service
entitled him to be promoted; but if found incapacitated for Service by reason of phys-
ical disability not contracted in the line of duty, and the finding is approved by the
President, the officer shall be retired from active Srevice on the grade held by him,
or be wholly retired from the service, as the President may determine. If he be found
disqualified for promotion for any other reason, a second examination shall not be
allowed, but the Secretary of War shall appoint a dental review board, none of the
members of which shall have served as a member of the board which examined the
officer, and if the unfavorable findings of the examining board are concurred in by
the review board, the officer reported disqualified for promotion shall be discharged
from the service with one year’s pay. If the action of the examining board is dis-
. by the review board, the officer shall be considered qualified and shall be
romoted.
p SEC. 20. The dental examining boards and dental review boards hereinabove pre-
scribed shall consist of three examiners each, to be designated by the Secretary of
War, of whom one shall be a commissioned officer of the Medical Corps, and two shall
be commissioned officers of the Dental Corps.
SEC. 21. Commissioned officers of the Dental Corps shall have precedence in Such
corps according to their grades and the dates of their commission therein. For Se-
lection of quarters and for service on courts-martial, courts of inquiry and other Army
708 IPREPAIRED NIESS FOR, NATIONAL DEFENSE.
boards, and so forth, they shall have precedence among officers of the line and staff of
the Army according to the assimilated rank of their grades and the dates of their com-
missions therein: Provided, That in the case of junior dental surgeons whose commis-
sions as such superseded, conformably to the provisions of sectiºn sixteen of this act,
commissions as dental surgeons previously held by them, their precedence among
first lieutenants shall be determined by the dates of their said commissions as dental
surgeons. For public ceremonies they shall have precedence in the Medical Depart-
ment next below officers of the Medical Reserve Corps. Their right to command
shall be limited to the Dental Corps.
SEC. 22. Senior dental surgeons, dental surgeons, and junior dental Surgeons shall
have the pay and allowances, respectively, of majors, captains, and first lieutenants
in the Medical Corps, including the right to retirement on account of age, Service, or
disability, as in the case of other commissioned officers: Provided, That the time
served by them as contract dental surgeons under this act as members of the Dental
Corps established by the act of March third, nineteen hundred and eleven, and as
contract dental surgeons under the provisions of the act of February second, nineteen
hundred and one, shall be reckoned in computing the increased service pay of such
as are commissioned under this act.
SEC. 23. That the Veterinary Corps shall consist of senior veterinarians, veterina-
rians, junior veterinarians, and contract veterinarians as hereinafter specified, in Such
total number as the Secretary of War may deem necessary to provide attendance for
all public animals pertaining to the military establishment, including two for each
regiment of Cavalry and one for each battalion of Field Artillery. Immediately fol-
lowing the approval of this act all the veterinarians of Cavalry and Artillery authorized
by existing laws who shall be then in active service shall be reappointed and com-
missioned in the grade of junior veterinarian, and thereupon the appointments here-
tofore issued to them shall lapse and determine; and all other veterinarians under
employment at the time of the approval of this act by virtue of the provisions of
section twenty of the act of February second, nineteen hundred and one (Thirty-first
Statutes at Large, page seven hundred and fifty-three), shall be appointed by contract
as contract veterinarians under this act, and the contracts of employment heretofore
entered into with them or the appointment heretofore issued to them shall lapse and
determine. -
SEC. 24. Hereafter all original appointments to the Veterinary Corps shall be as
contract veterinarians, whose pay shall be $100 a month and who shall be entitled
to the allowance of a second lieutenant of Cavalry: Provided, That no person shall be
appointed a contract veterinarian except as authorized in section twenty-three of
this act who shall not at the time of his appointment be a citizen of the United States,
between twenty-one and twenty-seven years of age, and a graduate of a standard
veterinary college, and who shall not, upon examination to be conducted by a veteri-
nary examining board under regulations to be prescribed by the Secretary of War,
have been found physically, mentally, and morally qualified for service as a contract
veterinarian. - .
SEC. 25. A contract veterinarian who shall have served two years continuously in
that grade, including employment under the provisions of section twenty of the act
of February second, nineteen hundred and one, in a manner satisfactory to the Sec-
retary of War, shall be eligible for promotion to and commission in the grade of junior
veterinarian, subject to the examination hereinafter prescribed. A junior veterinarian
who shall have served seven years continuously in the Veterinary Corps, including
service heretofore rendered as an appointed veterinarian of Cavalry or Artillery, and
as an employed veterinarian under section twenty of the act of February second,
nineteen hundred and one, shall be eligible for promotion to and commission in the
grade of veterinarian, subject to a like examination. A veterinarian who shall have
served seventeen years continuously in the Veterinary Corps, including service here-
tofore rendered as an appointed veterinarian of Cavalry or Artillery, and as an employed
veterinarian under section twenty of the act of February second, nineteen hundred
and one, shall be eligible for promotion to and commission in the grade of senior
veterinarian, subject to a like examination: Provided, however, That if at any time the
number of senior veterinarians shall become equal to twenty-five per centum of the
whole membership of the Veterinary Corps, promotions to the grade of senior veter-
inarians shall thereupon cease until the number of senior veterinarians shall have
become less than twenty-five per centum of the whole membership of the corps.
SEC. 26. No contract veterinarian or commissioned officer of the Veterinary Corps
shall be promoted therein until he shall have passed an examination to be conducted
by a veterinary examining board under regulations prescribed by the Secretary of
War, and to be held at such time anterior to the accruing of the right to promotion
as may be for the best interests of the service: Provided, That when the exigencies
|PREPAIRED NESS FOR, NATIONAL DEFENSE. 709
of the service of any contract veterinarian or commissioned officer of the Veterinary
Corps who would be entitled to promotion upon examination require him to remain
absent from any place where an examining board could be convened, the President
is hereby authorized to promote such contract veterinarian or officer, Subject to
examination, and the examination shall take place as Soon thereafter as practicable.
If upon examination the contract veterinarian or officer be found disqualified for
promotion, he shall be treated in the same manner as if he had been examined prior
to promotion: Provided further, That should any contract veterinarian be found
disqualified for promotion upon such examination he will be granted the leave of
absence with pay to which he shall have then become entitled under the law and
regulations applicable thereto, and at the expiration thereof his contract will be
determined: Provided further, That should any commissioned officer of the Veterinary
Corps fail in his physical examination, he shall, if found incapacitated for service
by reason of physical disability contracted in line of duty, be retired with the grade
to which his service entitled him to be promoted; but if found incapacitated for
service by reason of physical disability not contracted in the line of duty, and the
finding is approved by the President, the officer shall be retired from active service
on the grade held by him, or be wholly retired from the service, as the President
may determine. If he be found disqualified for promotion for any other reason, a
second examination shall not be allowed, but the Secretary of War shall appoint a
.veterinary review board, none of the members of which shall have served as a member
of the board which examined the officer, and if the unfavorable findings of the ex-
amining board are concurred in by the review board, the officer reported disquali-
fied for promotion shall be discharged from the service with one year's pay. If the
action of the examining board is disapproved by the review board, the officer shall
be considered qualified and shall be promoted.
SEC. 27. The veterinary examining boards and veterinary review boards herein-
above prescribed shall consist of three examiners each, to be designated by the Secre-
tary of War, of whom one shall be a commissioned officer of the Medical Corps and
two shall be commissioned officers of the Veterinary Corps.
SEC. 28. Commissioned officers of the Veterinary Corps shall have precedence in
Such corps according to their grades and the dates of their commissions therein. For
Selection of quarters and for service on courts-martial, courts of inquiry, and other
Army boards, and so forth, they shall. have precedence among officers of the line
and staff of the Army according to the assimilated rank of their grades and the dates
of their commissions therein: Provided, That in the case of junior veterinarians whose
commissions as such superseded, conformably to the provisions of section twenty-
three of this act, appointments as veterinarians of Cavalry or Artillery previously
held by them, their precedence among second lieutenants shall be determined by
the dates of their said appointments as veterinarians of Cavalry or Artillery. For
public ceremonies they shall have precedence in the Medical Department next
below members of the Dental Corps. Their right to command shall be limited to
the Veterinary Corps. -
SEC. 29. Senior veterinarians, veterinarians, and junior veterinarians shall have the
pay and allowances respectively of captains, first lieutenants, and second lieutenants
of Cavalry, including the right to retirement on account of age, service, or disability,
as in the case of other commissioned officers: Provided, That the time served by them
as contract veterinarians, and as appointed veterinarians for service with Cavalry and
Artillery, shall be reckoned in computing the increased service pay of such as are com-
missioned under this act. -
SEC. 30. That the enlisted force of the Medical Corps shall consist of the following
personnel, who shall not be included in the effective strength of the Army nor counted
as a part of the enlisted force provided by law: Master hospital sergeants, with the pay
and allowances of master signal electricians, hospital Sergeants, with the pay and
allowances of Engineers, Coast Artillery Corps; sergeants, first class, with the pay and
allowances now provided by law for sergeants, first class, Hospital Corps; Sergeants,
corporals and cooks, with the pay and allowances of like grades in the Signal Corps;
horseshoers, saddlers and farriers, with the pay and allowances of like grades in the
Cavalry; mechanics, with the pay and allowances of mechanics in the Field Artil-
lery; privates, first class, and privates, with the pay and allowances of like grades
in the Signal Corps: Provided, That master hospital sergeants shall be appointed by
the Secretary of War, but no person shall be appointed master hospital sergeant
until he shall have passed a satisfactory examination under such regulations as the
Secretary of War may prescribe before a board of one or more medical officers as to his
qualifications for the position, including knowledge of pharmacy, and demonstrated
his fitness therefor by service of not less than twelve months as hospital sergeant or
Sergeant, first class, Medical Corps, or as sergeant, first class, in the Hospital Corps now
710 PREPARED NESS FOR, NATIONAL DEFENSE.
established by law; and no person shall be designated for such examination except by
written authority of the Surgeon General: Provided further, That original enlistments for
the Medical Corps shall be made in the grade of private, and reenlistments and promo-
tions of enlisted men therein, except as hereinbefore prescribed, and transfers thereto
from the enlisted force of the line or other staff departments and corps of the Army
shall be governed by such regulations as the Secretary of War may prescribe: Provided
further, That the enlisted men of the Hospital Corps who are in active service at the
time of the approval of this act are hereby transferred to the corresponding grades of the
Medical Corps established by this act.
SEC. 31. The total number of enlisted men in the Medical Corps shall be approxi-
mately equal to, but not exceed, except as hereinafter provided, the equivalent of
five per centum of the total enlisted strength of the Army authorized from time to
time by law: Provided, That in time of war or when war is imminent, the Secretary of
War is hereby authorized to enlist or cause to be enlisted such additional number as
the Service may require: Provided further, That the number in each of the several
grades designated below shall not exceed except as hereinafter provided the following
ercentages of the total authorized enlisted strength of the Medical Corps, to wit:
Master hospital Sergeants, one-half of one per cent; hospital Sergeants, one-half of one
per cent; Sergeants, first class, seven per cent; sergeants, eleven per cent; corporals,
five per cent; and cooks, six per cent: Provided further, That the number of horse-
shoers, Saddlers, farriers, and mechanics shall not exceed one to each authorized
ambulance company or like organization: Provided further, That the number of pri-
vates, first class, shall not exceed twice the number of privates: Provided further, That
if by reason of a reduction by law in the authorized enlisted strength of the Army afore-
Said the number of noncommissioned officers of any grade in the Medical Corps whose
warrants were issued previously to such reduction shall for the time being exceed the
percentage hereinabove specified for such grade no promotion to such grade shall be
made until the percentage of noncommissioned officers therein shall have been reduced
below that authorized for such grade on the basis of the said reduced enlisted strength,
nor thereafter So as to make the percentage of noncommissioned officers therein in
excess of the percentage authorized on the basis of the said reduced enlisted strength,
but noncommissioned officers may be reenlisted in the grades held by them previously
to such reduction regardless of the percentages aforesaid; and when under this pro-
vision the number of noncommissioned officers of any grade exceeds the percentage
specified, any noncommissioned officer thereof who is not under charges may be dis-
charged on his own application.
SEC. 32. That privates, first class, of the Medical Corps, shall be eligible for ratings
as follows: As dispensary assistant, $2 per month; as nurse, $3 a month; as Surgical
assistant, $5 per month: Provided further, That no enlisted man shall receive more than
one rating for additional pay under the provisions of this section, nor shall any en-
listed man receive any additional pay under such rating unless he shall have actually
performed the duties for which he shall be rated. -
EXHIBIT A.
STATEMENTS OF THosł, who HAVE CAREFULLY STUDIED THE ORGANIZATION OF THE
MEDICAL CORPS AS RELATED TO THE ARMY AS A WHOLE.
WAR DEPARTMENT,
Washington, January 30, 1904.
I heartily approve this bill in principle. , I consider that it will be greatly to the
benefit of the service to abandon the employment of contract surgeons and substi-
tute in their place regular commissioned officers. ... I do not think the number to which
it is proposed to increase the Medical Corps is at all excessive. It seems to me that the
presentation of the case by the Surgeon General in regard to the necessities of skilled
administration of the medical service in time of war is conclusive. It will be easy
in time of war to secure an adequate number of physicians competent to treat the
sick and wounded, but it will be impossible to secure medical men competent to
conduct the administration of the great and complicated medical Service unless they
are specially trained in time of peace. The lack of a sufficient number of such trained
officers in the past has caused untold suffering and the Sacrifice of many thousands
of valuable lives. It is our present duty to see to it that such a condition shall never
exist again. I believe that that can be accomplished only by following the course
which has now been indicated by the Surgeon General and approved by the General
Staff.
PREPAREDINESS FOR, NATIONAL DEFENSE. 711
Upon the single question of the relative proportion of majors, lieutenant colonels,
and colonels which should properly be accorded to the Medical Corps, the Surgeon
General wishes to ask reconsideration by the General Staff. That single question,
with the assent of the Chief of Staff, will accordingly be relegated to the General Staff
for further consideration. Upon all other questions I approve the bill in detail.
ELIHU Root,
Secretary of War.
WAR DEPARTMENT,
Washington, February 18, 1904.
SIR: I have the honor to transmit herewith a bill to increase the efficiency of the
Medical Department of the United States Army, together with the approval by my
predecessor, Secretary Root, of the bill in every part except as to the relative pro-
portions of majors, lieutenant colonels, and colonels which should properly be accorded
to the Medical Corps.
The question was remitted to the General Staff for further consideration and has
been returned with the recommendation that the number of colonels be limited to 12,
the lieutenant colonels to 18, with 110 majors, and 300 captains and first lieutenants;
whereas the recommendation of the Surgeon General is that the colonels number 20,
the lieutenant colonels 20, majors 110, and captains and lieutenants 300.
It appears that the division of the General Staff to which the bill was referred ap-
proved the proportion of colonels and lieutenant colonels as recommended by the
Surgeon General, but that the War Department General Staff as a body, when the
exact point was submitted to them, made the recommendation as above. ... Gen.
Chaffee was not present, I am informed, at the meeting of the General Staff, and
possibly did not have the advantage of all the statements which were made with
reference to the proper number of medical officers for each tactical unit in the field.
Certainly the evidence introduced by the Surgeon General shows that the number
necessary for each tactical unit is considerably greater than that which must have
been assumed by Gen. Chaffee in the conclusion which he reached. Of course,
I must differ from the opinion of the General Staff and the distinguished chief of that
body with great diffidence, in view of the short time that I have been in the depart-
ment. I have, however, read the arguments carefully of the Surgeon General and
the statement of the third division of the General Staff and also of the Chief of Staff
and I am bound to say that it seems to me that the arguments of the Surgeon General
substantially outweigh those advanced by the Chief of Staff. The Surgeon General’s
report shows a complete workable system, which the amendment by the General
Staff truncates and destroys the symmetry of. Then, too, the prospect of promotion
which the increased number in the higher grades offers to those who enter the service
seems to be absolutely essential to procuring good material for the Medical Corps.
The increased expense in Securing a proper medical education in modern days, as
shown by lengthening of the term of preparation from two to four years, and the great
professional rewards in civil life make it highly important that there be offered a due
prospect of promotion to young men of ability to induce them to enter the corps.
In deference to the opinion of the General Staff, however, I have concluded to
recommend a reduction in the number of colonels and an increase in the number of
lieutenant colonels, so that the bill should provide for 16 colonels and 24 lieutenant
colonels, and this I do after a conference with the Surgeon General, who is willing to
accept the amendment.
I do not approve that amendment to the law which limits the examination Cf a
lieutenant colonel, necessary to his promotion to a colonel, to an examination of his
physical condition, his moral character, and his past record in the Service, and it
seems to me that the examinations ought to be continued to the highest rank, except
that of the Surgeon General, which grade is filled, of course, only by selection. Such
a requirement will have the effect of preventing the upper grades from being regarded
as places of leisure and as not entailing the hard, enthusiastic work which is found in
the lower ranks. -
I have the honor to recommend the passage of the bill amended as suggested. I be-
lieve it to be of the utmost importance in securing a proper and efficient Medical Corps.
I accompany this letter with the bill and with the communications received by me
rº, §: the Surgeon General, the third division of the General Staff, and the Chief of
taff. *
Very respectfull
y resp y; WM. H. TAFT,
Secretary of War.
The CHAIRMAN COMMITTEE ON MILITARY AFFAIRS,
House of Representatives.
712 PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
* * * It provides an organization which, when compared with that of other
nations, does not seem to err on the side of excessive liberality, but which is believed
to be sufficient. I earnestly recommend its passage by the present Congress. If the
Medical Department is left as it is, no amount of wisdom or efficiency in its adminis-
tration would prevent a complete breakdown in the event of a serious war. * * *
I think it should be passed.
THEODORE ROOSEVELT.
WHITE Hous E, January 9, 1905. -
JANUARY 14, 1904.
Approved. This report was considered and adopted by the third division in full
committee.
TASKER H. BLIss,
Brigadier General United States Army,
Assistant to Chief of Staff.
HEADQUARTERs PHILIPPINE DIVISION,
Manila, November 13, 1905.
SIR: As a result of observations made in Cuba during the Spanish-American War,
and Subsequently during the military occupation of the island, and also as a result of
experience in the Philippines, I have the honor to urgently recommend the passage
of a bill known as “A bill to increase the efficiency of the Medical Department of the
United States Army '' as originally presented. I deem the increase absolutely
essential to the efficient performance of the duties assigned to the Medical Department
of the Army and to the acquisition by and retention in the service of a suitable class
of medical officers. -
It is needless to refer to the importance of the work of the Medical Corps in time of
war. . The physical efficiency of the Army must depend largely upon their recom-
mendations and efforts. Our experience during the war with Spain should be suffi-
cient to render the recurrence of conditions then prevalent impossible. First-class
men in Sufficient numbers can not be procured under present conditions of pro-
motion. The class of men needed in the Medical Department of the Army must have
Some reasonable inducement to enter and to remain. Increase of rank, with its
attendant increase in emoluments, is as keenly sought after in the Medical Corps as
in the line of the Army.
The Medical Department should be large enough to enable the Army in case of
expansion to have regular medical officers in reasonable numbers throughout the
entire force. g
The plan for a medical reserve seems to be an excellent one, provided applicants
are admitted to it only after a thorough examination as to their qualifications.
Very respectfully,
LEONARD Wood,
- Major General, U. S. Army, Commanding.
The MILITARY SECRETARY, -
War Department, Washington, D. C.
EXHIBIT B.
NEEDS OF THE MEDICAL DEPARTMENT AS OTITLINED BY THE DODGE COMMISSION.
[Extract from report of Dodge commission, p. 189.]
What is needed by the Medical Department in the future is:
1. A larger force of commissioned medical officers.
2. Authority to establish in time of war a proper volunteer Hospital Corps.
3. A reserve corps of selected trained women nurses, ready to serve when necessity
shall arise, but, under ordinary circumstances, owing no duty to the War Department *
except to report residence at determined intervals.
4. A year's supply for an army of at least four times the actual strength, of all such
medicines, hospital furniture, and stores as are not materially damaged by keeping,
to be held constantly on hand in the medical supply depots.
PR.EPAREDINESS FOR, NATIONAL DEFENSE. 713
5. The charge of transportation to such extent as will secure prompt shipment and
ready delivery of all medical supplies.
6. The simplification of administrative “paper work,” so that medical officers may
be able to more thoroughtly discharge their sanitary and strictly medical duties.
7. The securing of such legislation as will authorize all surgeons in medical charge
of troops, hospital, transports, trains, and independent commands to draw from the
Subsistence Department funds for the purchase of such articles of diet as may be
necessary to the proper treatment of soldiers too sick to use the Army ration. This
is to take the place of all commutation of rations of the sick now authorized.
EXHIBIT C.
[British Medical Journal, Saturday, Oct. 2, 1915.]
HOSPITAL STAFFS AND THE WAR IEMETRGENCY.
Sir James Barr has written a pungent letter to the West Derby board of guardians,
Liverpool, in which, after admitting that the guardians must have difficulty in carry-
ing on their medical work, he says that “this is really not the question for the country
now. Everything should be viewed from a military point of view, and the medical
care of the civil population must be placed a long way behind that of our fighting
men. I hold that all the medical work in the country can be carried on by medical
men over military age and that the young medical men should be set free for foreign
service. We must get medical men for the armies that are going abroad; 2,500 are at
present required, and only young men can stand the fatigues of a long campaign.”
The guardians, he urges, ought to get men over military age, either for part-time or
whole-time service, to do the work of the younger men until the war is over, and thus
“give them an opportunity of rendering such service to their country as they will
never have the chance of doing again.” He concludes his letter in the following
words: “The war office has got a large number of medical men from Canada, Aus-
tralia, and New Zealand, and if this country can not now produce the men necessary
there will be no course open but to apply to the United States of America to fill up
the necessary complement.”
We have received several letters raising various other points, with which we hope
to deal in an early issue.
EXHIBIT D. O
Subject: The necessity for medical preparedness for war as exemplified by the
experience of the British Army.
EXCERPTS FROM THE BRITISEI MIEDICAL J O LJRNAL.
1. March 13, 1915, page 488:
Letter of the director general, March 10, 1915, army medical services, to the effect
that the need of medical men both for home and foreign service is acute. Suitable
men would be given immediate employment. Every man who can manage for his
work to be done at home should come forward as early as possible in order to keep up
an adequate Supply of medical attendance to the armies in the field is really a na-
tional emergency, etc.
2. April 10, 1915, page 645—Editorial on the urgent need of the army for more
medical men:
Need is large and urgent. Special committee of the British Medical Association
says the appeal “is justified up to the hilt” and the need is very real and very urgent.
It is convinced that every man under 40 who is physically fit and can be set free from
his existing engågements should offer his whole-time services and take a temporary
commission in the R. A. M. C. for the duration of the war. It realizes that the num-
ber of men free to make this offer at once would not nearly suffice and that arrange-
ments must be made to liberate others, such as those holding appointments under
public authorities and as residents in civil hospitals. l
3. June 19, 1915, page 1066: -
View of the medical situation stated that “The country is suffering from a very -
grave crisis and only the most strenous efforts will preserve us.”
714 PREPAIREDINESS FOR, NATIONAL DEFENSE.
4. Supplement of March 27, 1915, page 109: -
Shows how badly the civilian medical profession at home is undermanned owing to
the great number in the army and the ingenious contrivances necessary to take medical
care of the civilian population. -
5. Supplement of May 1, 1915, page 149:
Statement of Mr. Lloyd-George that there are at least 3,000 or 4,000 whole-time
medical officers serving with the British forces abroad and that “how many more are
under arms in this country and elsewhere we do not know, but the fact that the number
abroad is so large is sufficient to make evident that immense extent of the demand for
whole-time medical officers. The response to the demand has been very good, but
it is clear that still further efforts and sacrifices are necessary.”
6. Supplement of May 29, 1915, page 273:
The Scottish branch of the British Medical Association resolves to endeavor to
provide before July 7, 1915, at least 400 additional medical men for the army.
7. August 28, 1915, page 332:
Editorial note states that war emergency committee inquired of the director general
of the army medical department as to the needs of the same. He replied that to outfit
the new armies and to Supply reinforcements for six months it was estimated that at
least 2,500 more medical men of military age (that is, under 40) would be required.
During the last six months temporary commissions had been granted in every case
where the applicant was prepared to fulfill all the conditions of the contract for service.
It had been found necessary to bring medical men from Canada, Australia, and New
Zealand. It was specially incumbent on every young doctor who is physically fit
to offer himself for military service. All will be needed and practically all will have
an opportunity of Serving with the troops over-seas. The duty of the older men is
to Set free the, younger men by arranging to carry on their practices for them in their
absence, or by engaging in home Service, etc. - :
8. September 4, 1915, page 114;
States that wh)le-timed service medical men number 5,265. Also that there were at
that time approximately 6,555 medical men of military age in England and Wales and
º then engaged in war service and that of these one-third are at present
required.
9. Supplement for September 18, 1915, page 125:
Scottish committee of British Medical Association reports that according to the
most recent returns, 2,500 medical men were wanted before Christmas and preferably
men under 40 (Scottish share, 500).
EXCERPTS FROM THE LANCET.
1. July 3, 1915, page 48:
Mr. Tennant (in the House of Commons) on June 23, 1915, states that “in regard to
the shortage of medical men I do not think my honorable friend fully appreciated how
great is the difficulty. It is not so great at the present moment as the difficulty which
looms in the future, and is likely to become greater as time goes on and as we have more
men in the field.” -
2. August 28, 1915, page 526: -
Pointed out that the war office required “at the present moment” 2,000 of the 6,555
(medical) men of military age still available in England, Wales, and Ireland (this does
not deal with Scotland, which has a national committee of its own), resolved unani-
mously by the war emergency committee that the urgent need for enrollment should
be brought before the medical profession.
N. B.-The figures given above for the number of medical officers in the British
Army do not include the Indian medical Service of Several hundred members (which
does military service in India) nor the South Africa or other colonial médical con-
tingents.
EXHIBIT E.
NUMBER OF MEDICAL STUDENTS. *
The total number of medical students (matriculants) in the United States for the
year ending June 30, 1915, excluding premedical, special, and postgraduate students,
was 14,891, a decrease of 1,611 below last year, a decrease of 2,124 below 1913, a de-
crease of 3,321 below 1912, and a decrease of 13,251 (47.1 per cent) below 1904, when
28,142, the highest number of students, were enrolled. (See Tables 4 and 10.) . Of
the total number of students, 13,914 were in attendance at the nonsectarian (regular)
PREPAIRED NESS FOR, NATIONAL DEFENSE. 715
colleges, 736 at the homeopathic, and 241 at the eclectic colleges. The attendance
at the nonsectarian colleges shows a decrease of 1,524 below that of last year, a de-
crease of 2,005 below 1913, and a decrease of 11,016 (44.2 per cent) below 1903, when
24,930, the largest number of nonsectarian students, were enrolled. In the homeo-
pathic colleges there was a decrease of 58 below the attendance of last year, a decrease
of 113 below 1913, and a decrease of 1,173 (61.4 per cent) below 1900, when 1,909,
the largest number of homeopathic students, were enrolled. The eclectic colleges
show a decrease of 29 below the registration of last year, a decrease of 15 below 1913,
and a decrease of 773 (76.2 per cent) below 1904, when 1,014, the largest number of
eclectic students, were enrolled.
TABLE 4.—Medical college attendance.


TNonsec- Homeo- - Physio- Nonde-
Year. tarian. ji. Pelectic. inji. Script. Total.
1880--------------------------- 9,776 1,220 830 ------------|------------ - 11,826
1890. -------------------------- 13, 521 1, 164 719 ------------|------------ 15,404
1900--------------------------- 22,710 1,909 52? ------------|------------ 25, 171
1901--------------------------- 23,646 1,683 664 S0 144. 26,417
1902--------------------------- 24,878 1,617 765 91 150 27, 501
1903--------------------------- 24,930 1,498 848 149 190 27,615
1904--------------------------- 23,662 1,309 1,014 123 234 28, 142
1905--------------------------- 24, 119 1, 104 578 114 232 26, 147
1906--------------------------- 23, 116 1,065 644 110 249 25,204
1907--------------------------- 22,503 1,039 543 97 292 24,276
1908--------------------------- 20,936 891 479 90 206 22,602
1909--------------------------- 20, 554 899 413 52 227 22, 145
1910--------------------------- 20, 136 867 455 49 19 21,526
1911--------------------------- 18,414 890 433 49 ------------ 19,786
1912--------------------------- 17,277 S27 308 ------------------------ 18,412
1913--------------------------- 15,919 850 256 ------------|------------ 17,015
1914--------------------------- 15,438 794 270 ------------------------ 16,502
1915--------------------------- 13,914 736 241 ------------|------------ 14,691
NUMBER OF MEDICAL GRADUATES.
The total number of graduates for the year ending June 30, 1915, was 3,536, a decrease
of only 58 below 1914 and a decrease of 445 below 1913. The total this year is 2,211
(38.8 per cent) less than in 1904, when 5,747, the largest number, were graduated.
The number of graduates from the nonsectarian colleges was 3,286, or 84 less than
last year and 393 less than in 1915.
It is a decrease of 1,904 (36.6 per cent) below
1904, when 5,190, the largest number, were graduated from nonsectarian colleges.
(See Table 10.) From the homeopathic colleges there were 195 graduates, or 41 more
than in 1914 and 14 less than in 1913. It is a decrease of 225 (53.6 per cent) below
1903, when 420, the largest number of homeopathic physicians, were graduated.
eclectic colleges graduated 55, or 15 less than last year and 38 less than in 1913.
The
It
is a decrease of 166 (75.1 per cent) below 1890, when 221, the largest number of eclec-
tic physicians, were graduated.
ar
TABLE 5.—Medical college graduates.

Non- Eſomeo- - Physio- Nonde-
Year. sectºrian. pathi. *tie mediºl. jº. Total
1880--------------------------- 2,673 380 188 ------------|------------ 3, 241
1890--------------------------- 3,853 380 221 ------------|------------ 4,454
1900--------------------------- 4,715 413 80 ------------------------ 5,214
1901--------------------------- 4,879 387 148 18 12 5,444
1902--------------------------- 4,508 336 138 16 11 5,009
1903--------------------------- 5,088 420 149 24 17 5,698
1904--------------------------- 5, 190 371 146 20 20 5, 747
1905--------------------------- 5, 126 276 153 22 23 5,600
1906--------------------------- 4,841 286 186 22 29 5,364
1907--------------------------- 4,591 225 121 11 32 4,980
1908--------------------------- 4,370 215 116 12 |" 28 4,741
1909.-------------------------. 4, 163 209 84 15 44 4, 515
1910--------------------------- 4, 113 183 114 16 14 4,440
1914--------------------------- 4,006 152 110 5 ------------ 4,273
1912--------------------------- 4, 206 185 92 l------------|------------ 4,483
1913--------------------------- 3, 679 209 93 ------------|------------ 3,981
1914--------------------------- 3,370 154 70 ------------|------------ 3,594
1915--------------------------- 3,286 195 55 ------------|------------ 3,536
716 PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
NUMBER OF COLLEGES.
Until two years ago no exact data were available on which absolute statements could
be made regarding the number of medical schools existing in the various years prior to
1900. Through the work of the council on medical education, however, sufficient re-
liable data regarding all medical Schöols were collected and the chart prepared from
which the actual number of Schools existing in any one year could be positively stated."
Table 8 allows of comparison between the number of colleges existing in recent years.
Since June 30, 1914, one new college was organized and eight colleges (mentioned on
p. 698) have suspended or merged with others, leaving 95 medical colleges still ex-
isting. The number of colleges is the smallest since 1880, at which time began the
rapid movement toward creating medical colleges, many of which were conducted for
profit. The rapid increase in the number of colleges between 1880 and 1904 has been
paralled only by the rapid decrease since 1904. There has been a net decrease of 66
colleges since 1906, when there were 162, and when this country had about one-half of
the world’s supply of medical colleges. Ninety-two colleges have been closed by
merger or otherwise since 1904, but in the same time 25 new colleges were organized,
leaving 95 medical colleges which still exist. The net reduction has been 67 colleges,
or 41.4 per cent. -
TABLE 8.–Medical colleges.

7 or vs NonSec- FIomeo- e Physio- Nonde- -
Year. tarian. pathic. Eclectic. mººij. Script. Total.
1850. -------------------------- 44 3 4 1 |------------ 52
1860. -------------------------- 53 6 4 2 ------------ 65
1870. -------------------------- 60 8 5 2 ------------ 75.
1880. -------------------------- 76 14 8 2 ------------ 100
1890. -------------------------- 106 16 9 2 ------------ 133
1900--------------------------- 126 22 9 2 1 160
1901. -------------------------- 125 22 10 2 l 160
1902. -------------------------- 126 20 9 3 2 160
1903. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126 20 9 3 2 160
1904--------------------------- 127 19 9 3 2 160
1905. -------------------------- 125 19 9 3 2 158
1906--------------------------- 130 19 8 3 2 162
1907. -------------------------- 127 18 9 3 2 159
1908. -------------------------- 120 18 9 2 2 151
1909. -------------------------- 115 15 8 1 1 140
1910. -------------------------- 109 12 S 1 l 131
1911. -------------------------- 103 12 7 1------------|------------ 122.
1912. -------------------------- 101 11 6 ------------|------------ 118.
1913. -------------------------- 92 10 5 !------------|------------ 107
1914--------------------------- 87 10 5 !------------|------------ 102
1915--------------------------- S3 8 4 |------------|------------
The nonsectarian (regular) colleges number 83, a decrease of 4 since last year. The
homeopathic colleges number 8, or 2 less than last year, and the eclectic colleges
number 4, 1 less than last year. The nonsectarian colleges show a net reduction of
47, or 36.1 per cent, since 1906, when there were 130, the largest number of nonsec-
tarian medical colleges. The homeopathic colleges show a net decrease of 14, or 63.7
per cent, since 1901, when 22, the largest number of homeopathic colleges, were in
existence. The eclectic colleges show a net reduction of 6, or 60 per cent, since
1901, when there existed 10, the largest number of eclectic colleges.

TABLE 10—Reductions in numbers of medical colleges, students, and graduates.
Nonsectarian. Homeopathic. Eclectic. Total.
Numbers. º g % * º § § g 3 & . §
bſ) Gº) c bſ) d) E Öſ) Ö E. öſ) Q º
# # | 3 | # | # # # # | # | # | #
3 | # 5 || 3 | # | 5 || 3 || 5 || 5 || 3 || 5 || 5
Largest. . . . . . . . . . . . . 130 24,930 5, 190 22 | 1,909 || 420 | 10 1,014 || 221 | 162 | 28, 142 | 5,747
Present. . . . . . . . . . . . . 83 || 13,914 3,286 736 195 4 241 55 95 || 14,891 || 3, 536,
Decrease...... 47 | 11,016 | 1,904 4 | 1,173 225 6 773 | 166 67 | 12,251 | 2,211
Percentage. . . . . . . . . . 36. 1 44.2 36.6 | 63.7 | 61.4 53.6 || 60.0 | 76.2 75.1 || 41.4 47. 1 || 38.4
1 Life chart of the medical colleges in the United States: Journal A. M. A., Aug. 23, 1913, p. 576.
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 717
FEWER BUT BETTER COLLEGES,
Of the 92 medical colleges which have ceased to exist since 1904, 52 were closed by
merger and 40 became extinct. It is noteworthy that this rapid diminution in the
number of colleges began with the creation of the council on medical education in
1906. The largest number closing in single years were 10 in 1907, when the council’s
first classification of medical colleges was prepared; 15 in 1910, when the second
ºation was published, and 14 in 1915, when the third classification was made
pupilc. * - -


, Of the 92 medical colleges which have been closed, 48 were rated by the council on
medical education in classes A and B, and 44 in class C. Note also that 43, or 95.5
per cent, of the closures of the medical colleges in classes A and B were through merger
with other colleges, while of the 44 class C colleges which closed, only 9 (20 per cent)
were through merger with other colleges. In other words, all but 5 of the colleges
which became extinct had been rated in class C by the council on medical education.
While the total number of colleges is growing smaller, however, and approaching
more nearly the normal Supply for this country, the high-grade, stronger medical
colleges are constantly increasing. In 1904 only 4, or 2.5 per cent, of all medical
colleges were requiring any preliminary education in advance of the usual high-school
education; now 83 (88.4 per cent) are of advance college work. Of these 83 colleges,
there are 39 which are requiring two years or more of collegiate work for admission
and 7 others have adopted the higher requirement to go into effect in the next
One or two years. In 1904 very little was known about the practice of colleges in the
administration of entrance standards, as at that time no systematic check was kept
On the methods used; now, through the Students' Register, the standards actually
enforced by each college are known, faulty methods or “paper standards” are discov-
ered and corrected or exposed, and instead of being an unknown quantity preliminary
requirements are now known with fair accuracy.
EXHIBIT. T.
Difference in health conditions of the Second Division of the Seventh Army Corps at
Jacksonville, Fla., in 1898, and the Maneuver Division, at San Amtonio, Teac., Mar.
10 to July 10, 1911. gr
SECOND DIVISION.
Cases of typhoid ſever.
© ypno V T}eaths T)eaths
Regiment Mean *~. * from #. ań
* Strength. Certain. Cerºin, ºnd ºld diseases. .
probable. &
Second Illinois. . . . . . . . . . . . ~ 1,095 253 341 18 22
First North Carolina. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1, 164 147 227 16 20
Second New Jersey...... . . . . . . . . . --- - - - - - - - - - - 1,153 185 318 29 32
First Wisconsin. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,232 209 311 46 48
Fiftieth Iowa. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,097 . 164 203 33 33
Ninth Illinois. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - - - - - - - - - - - - 1, 288 153 248 18 28
Second Virginia. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .- - - - - - - - - 1,220 105 152 17 20
Fourth Virginia. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1, 274 135 * 231 21 28
Forty-ninth Iowa... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,236 378 612 50 50.
Total. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10,759 , 1,729 2,693 24S 281
23380—PT 14—16—3
718 PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
Difference in health conditions of the Second Division of the Seventh Army Corps ct
Jacksonville, Fla., in 1898, and the Maneuver Division, at San Amtonio, Tex., Mar.
10 to July 10, 1911—Continued,
MANEUVER, TXIVISION.
Cases of
Mean typhoid Deaths T}eaths
Organization. strength, * t #a from all
June. "and % .* | diseases.
* probable.
‘Eleventh Infantry------------------------------------------- 924 ----------|------------------- *
Fifteenth Infantry. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 969 |----------|---------. 2
Eighteenth Infantry. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,022 ----------|----------|---------- e
Thirteenth Infantry. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - - - - - - - - - - - - - 929 ----------|--------------------
Twenty-Second Infantry. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,033 |----------|------. . . e i - - - - - - - - - -
Tenth Infantry----------------------------------------------- 1,016 || ---------|---------- I
Seventeenth Infantry. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 954 ----------|----------|----------
Twenty-eighth Inſantry............................. --------- 951 ----------|--------------------
Third Field Artillery. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . as a s s a s = s. s. s = s. s is sº e º s sº sº s sº º is 847 ----------|---------- 2
Fourth Field Artillery. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - 741 ----------|---------- 1.
Engineer Battalion.... -------------------------------------- 536 ----------|---------- 1
Signal Corps.------------------------------------------------- 197 ----------|--------------------
Ninth Cavalry. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .------------- 744 ----------|----------|----------
Pleventh Cavalry----. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1, 143 |----------|---------- 3
:Sānitary troops. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . * 795 | 1 |- - - - - - - - - - 1
Total.-------------------------------------------------- 12,801 1 ---------- 11
1 This patient, a private of the Hospital Corps, had not completed his immunization, having taken only
two doSeS.
value in immunized persons, as all respond to it.
reported as occurring in the city of San Antonio during this period.
The case was very mild and would have been perhaps overlooked but for the rule that blood
cultures were made in all cases of fever of over 48 hours’ duration. The Widal reaction has no diagnostic
IForty-nine cases of typhoid fever, with 19 deaths, were
. The health of military commands is usually measured by the constantly noneffective
rate which represents the average number constantly sick in each thousand men.
This was for the Maneuver Division 22 per thousand, which can be better appreciated
when it is stated that the rate was 34 for all troops in the United States for the year
I910. -
EXELIBIT H.
THE RATIO of GENERAL officers AND FIELD OFFICERS IN THE MEDICAL CORPS TO THE
GENERAL OFFICERS AND FIELD OFFICERS OF OTHER STAFF CORPS.
. . The medical service of the Army is the great conserving force of a destructive organi-
Žation. Its primary purpose is to preserve the life and health of the troops.
It is not only the largest Staff Corps of the Army, but there is less chance for ad-
wancement for its officers than in any other Staff Corps of the Army. . For example:
. . In The Adjutant General's Department there is 1 brigadier general to 22 officers.
. . In the Inspector General's Department, 1 brigadier general to 16 officers. ...
. . In the Judge Advocate General's Department, I brigadier general to 12 officers.
. In the Quartermaster Corps, 1 major general and 2 brigadier generals to 184 officers.
In the Medical Corps, 1 brigadier general to 443 officers.
In the Engineer Corps, 1 brigadier general to 223 officers.
In the Ordnance Department, 1 brigadier general to 84 officers.
In the Signal Corps, 1 brigadier general to 45 officers.
Officers of field rank in the various corps:
- Per cent.
The Adjutant General. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100, 00
The Inspector General----------------. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100. 00
The Judge Advocate General---------- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 100.00
The Quartermaster Corps. --------. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44. 57
Medical Corps-------------------------------------------------------------- 32. 28
Engineer Corps. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34.08
Ordnance Department------- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 40.48
Signal Corps. -----------. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ----------------------- 20. 00
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 719
The Medical Corps has about three and a half times the number of officers of the
Quartermaster Corps and also twice the strength of the Corps of Engineers. In war
the Medical Department of the Army saves to the country the lives of its soldiers
and protects the Government from unjust claims for pensions; in other words, the
Medical Corps is the great conserving agency of the Army and should be treated as
generously as other Staff Corps. . -
The CHAIRMAN. Of course there is not that intensive training in the
Medical Corps that there is in the Regular Army'.
Gen. GORGAs. I think there is in the Medical Corps proper, and
that there should be in the Medical Reserve Corps. We could, if
we had the money, give intensive training to a ºrge part of the
1,460 reserve corps men we now have, and fit them measurably
for war service. We are doing a little. Last year, in our various
camps, we had 173 of our reserve corps men who were not under
orders for active duty; that is, they were men to whom we paid
no mileage and no salary. They paid all their own expenses and
gave up their practice. If we could have money enough to order
these men to camps for purposes of instruction we could give them
actual field work that would in time make them pretty good practical
medical officers in case of war. Of course that would not be the ideal,
but it would be a very great advance over putting men in in time of
war who had not seen any service. -
In this report—and it is a report of 200 or 300 pages by the parlia-
mentary committee of the French Government who investigated the
medical corps—there is constant reference to the want of training
of the corps in time of peace. I hope in years to come we can bring
the reserve medical officers, just like the regular medical officers,
actually in contact with such duties as they would have in time of war.
The CHAIRMAN. Does not the War Department look toward the
abolishment of the Medical Reserve Corps as at present organized ?
Gen. GORGAs. The plan is to abolish the reserve corps as at present
Organized. -
The CHAIRMAN. Is that a good plan &
Gen. GORGAs. I think the terms are vague, but the Judge Advo-
cate General thinks that they will cover in general terms. -
Senator DU PONT. Is it contemplated to have a reserve corps for
the continental army just as there is a Reserve Corps for the Regular
Army'.
Gen. GORGAs. One of the proposed bills contemplates an officers'
reserve corps, but I do not understand that it is to be a constituent
part of the Continental Army. - .
Senator DUPONT. Would that abolish your present Reserve Corps ?
Gen. GORGAs. Yes; the present Reserve Corps would be done away
with; but I do not desire this.
The CHAIRMAN. Let me call your attention to a letter that was
laced in my hands by Senator Sheppard. It is addressed to Senator
Šº by Dr. Harold Hays, who is secretary of the Association of
the Medical Reserve Corps. It is as follows:
Association of THE MEDICAL RESERVE CoRPs,
UNITED STATES ARMY, NEW YORK STATE DIVISION,
New York, January 26, 1916.
Hon. MoRRIs SHEPPARD,
United Stales Semale, Washington, D. C. -- *
MY DEAR SENATOR: From the perusal of the proposed act for the formation of a
continental army I note that there is a paragraph to the effect that the Medical Reserve
Corps, inactive list, be abolished.
720 PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
I desire to inform you that among the 1,500 officers belonging to this organization
are some of the most prominent physicians in the United States, many of whom were
taken in at a time when they considered it a duty to give the moral support to the
Army which their connection made possible. The Medical Reserve Corps has
advanced to the stage where for the pâst two seasons the men, in their enthusiasm,
have gone to camps of instruction at their own expense. These men were particularly
anxious to make good soldiers of themselves and have a jealous feeling for the reserve
corps as a concrete organization. . e * * * *
I am informed on the best authority that if the Medical Reserve Corps is abolished
the majority of these men will not join the continental army, which they feel will
be more or less of an experiment. The argument they set forth is that if their services
were needed in time of war they would be able to help out in the base hospitals—
hospitals in which they are now working. -
We all realize that the moral support of these men means a great deal, mainly in
the encouragement they give younger medical men to take positions in the reserve
corps with the possibility that they would be used for field service.
Hoping that this communication will have your attention, I am,
Respectfully yours, - -
HAROLD HAYs.
There is a feeling amongst the Medical Reserve Corps that it is
opposed to varying the list as at present organized.
Gen. GoRGAs. Yes; I get a great many letters of the same kind.
There is a pretty strong feeling against it.
The CHAIRMAN. Whose suggestion was it that it should be
abolished .
Gen. GORGAs. I do not know. -
The CHAIRMAN. It did not come from you, did it'.
Gen. GORGAs. No. gº ºf e
The CHAIRMAN. You do not think it ought to be abolished, do you ?
Gen. GORGAs. No, I would be very glad to º the present
Medical Reserve Corps. The members of that corps have a feeling
of loyalty toward it. They have belonged to it a number of years,
as a part of the Regular Army, and there is a feeling among them
that they do not want it abolished.
Senator CATRON. It is suggested in the letter the Chariman read
that if that change is made or that abolition is made, those parties
who are now in would never get into the reserve corps of the conti-
nental army, and you would lose them.
Gen. GORGAs. That would be optional with them, of course.
Senator CATRON. If that should be the result, it would not be a
very good one, would it . .
en. GoRGAs. We should very much dislike to lose those men.
The CHAIRMAN. You think in the present reserve corps as estab-
lished the inactive list could still be retained, and legislation for the
continental army could stand with that legislation ?
Gen. GoRGAs. Yes. It seems to me that it would be wise to
leave the Medical Reserve Corps as it now stands, in addition to the
proposed “officers’ reserve corps.”
Senator DU PONT. That is exactly what I think. If the con-
tinental reserve scheme should not work, these gentlemen would be
Out.
Gen. GORGAs. Yes. I think that would be so.
The CHAIRMAN. Is there anything else you want to submit, Gen.
Gorgas'.
Gen. GORGAs. Would there be any desire on the part of the com-
mittee to see the report of the French congressional committee
upon their investigation ?
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 721
The CHAIRMAN. It is quite voluminous, is it not %
Gen. GORGAs. I have made extracts of that part that pertains to
the medical department. I suppose it would be 50 or 60 pages of
typewritten matter.
The CHAIRMAN. That is experience obtained from actual war, is
it not * -
Gen. GoRGAs. Yes, sir; that is the French experience.
The CHAIRMAN. I think it would be a good i. if the committee
agrees with me, to have that submitted and placed on file in the
committee for consideration in connection with this subject and to
embody in the record the proposed amendments you have in mind.
Gen. GORGAs. It is interesting from the fact that it duplicates
our experience of the Spanish-American War, sir, and evidently
from much the same causes. -
Senator CATRON. Does this committee investigation of the French
that you speak of cover anything else besides the medical depart-
ment 7
Gen. GoRGAs. I do not know; I think it does, but I am not sure.
Senator THOMAs. General, I have received a number of letters, and
I have no doubt that the other members of the committee have also,
from certain dental organizations in the country urging the Organiza-
tion of a dental corps along the lines of the Medical Corps, and largely
for the same reasons. I would like to get your view of that subject
before you leave us.
Geri. GORGAs. I think it is a very good and desirable thing. Such
a scheme has been adopted in most of the European armies. We have
at present a very good Dental Corps, partly commissioned in the rank
of first lieutenant and partly civilian. The tentative draft of bill
which I have had made provides for some increases of rank up to
major, which I think is adequate, and should be satisfactory to the
dental associations. I understand that the dentists are asking for
a colonel as an assistant to the Surgeon General in his office. S00
no necessity for this.
The CHAIRMAN. We have given them an opportunity to be heard.
Senator CATRON. They have not been heard yet, have they
The CHAIRMAN. No. They are to be here Wednesday morning.
They will have a representative here.
Senator CATRON. Is there any hearing provided for the veterina-
rians?
The CHAIRMAN. They have not asked for one. There is a bill
pending with reference to veterinarians. -
That is all, General, and we are very much obliged to you.
STATEMENT OF BRIG. GEN. E. H. CROWDER, JUDGE ADVOCATE
GENERAL, UNITED STATES ARMY.
The CHAIRMAN. Give to the stenographer your full name and pres–
ent detail, if you please. -
Gen. CROWDER. E. H. Crowder, Judge Advocate General, United
States Army. -
The CIIAIRMAN. How long have you held your present position,
General'.
Gen. CROWDER. Since February, 1911:
The CHAIRMAN. This is your second detail?
722 PREPAREDINESS FOR, NATIONAL DEFENSE.
Gen. CROWDER. Yes, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. General, I would like to have you, and I think the
committee would be interested in hearing you, discuss the question
as to the possibility of federalizing the National Guard and, along
with it, the question of universal military service, in Such way as you
may care to discuss it. - - -
Gen. CROWDER. Of course, Mr. Chairman, the question opens up a
very vast field of inquiry, a field where there is a great deal of conflict
of judicial and congressional opinion. All of these federalization
schemes I have considered have presented constitutional ques-
tions. They involve the determination of the extent of the
national power over the Organized Militia. When that point
has been brought out, I think we have before us the most vital point
in the scheme of national defense which has been submitted by the
War Department for the consideration of Congress; perhaps the most
vital part of any scheme of national defense that could be submitted
to Congress for its consideration.
When the question has been asked, shall the reliance of the coun-
try be upon a Regular Army exclusively, or upon a Regular Army
and a citizen soldiery, and answered as I think it should be and as
the traditions of our country require it to be answered, that there
shall be reliance upon both classes of soldiers, we are immediately
confronted with the question, What form of citizen soldiery'.
There are some who reply that it should be a national force exclu-
sively under the direction of the National Government. There are
others who reply that it should be upon a federalized State force,
and that presents the question, How far can the Government go in
federalizing the militia'.
Heretofore in attempting to state my position on this question I have
been subject to some embarrassment because the views that I have
expressed upon a concrete matter have been misapplied, uninten-
tionally, of course, and I have had attributed to me views which I
did not entertain. For that reason I should like to have the com-
mittee indulge me in an initial statement of the point of view from
which I have approached the consideration of these questions.
I take it that no one desires to lose the cooperation of the 48 States
of the Union in the development of an efficient citizen soldiery. No
One likes to be put in an attitude toward the question where he would
appear lacking in appreciation of the splendid and patriotic effort
which the National Guard puts forth to develop itself into that class
of troops; but if they are laboring under constitutional handicaps
which will prevent them from developing into that class of troops,
that seems to me to be the end of the argument. -
... I understand the War Department's position before the country is
that whatever citizen soldiery is adopted should be exclusively under
national control. I hold no brief for the continental army and no
brief for the National Guard. My sole purpose is to try to refer
the committee to such judicial discussion as there has been on the
subject of the extent of the Federal power over the militia, and to
point out how impossible it is for anyone to advise you definitely as
to the scope and limits of this power. -
The question of federalization of the militia is not a new one. I
think the committee of the House of Representatives, which reported
in 1880 was right when it said that no subject, unless it be that of
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 723
finance, had ever engaged the attention of Congress so long and so
often, as had the subject of the militia, and on none have more
able and exhaustive reports been written. Nearly every Congress
since the First Congress has considered some scheme of militia feder-
alization. The first scheme submitted was prepared by Secretary of
War Knox and presented to Congress by Washington in 1790. It
was a highly federalized scheme in this sense, that it undertook to
federalize training. It laid the hand of compulsion upon every able-
bodied male white citizen between 18 and 60 and divided them into
three classes. The first class was to constitute an instruction corps
to consist of citizens between the ages of 18 and 20 exclusively.
It was a requirement of Secretary of War Knox's scheme that the
instruction corps should undergo intensive training for 30 days for
those of 18, 30 days for those of 19, and 10 days for those of 20 years
of age. His scheme organized all able-bodied male white citizens be-
tween 21 and 45 into what he called the main corps. They were like-
wise compelled to assemble each year for organizational training. All
able-bodied male white citizens between the ages of 46 and 60, inclusive,
were to constitute a reserve corps, and they had the duty under
this scheme of assembling once a year for inspection. -
That scheme fell under the weight of constitutional objection, and
the resulting legislation was the emasculated act of May 8, 1792. That
act carried the national power no further than to provide for compulsory
selfenrollment of able-bodied male white citizens between the ages of 18
and 45. It provided that they should be organized into divisions,
brigades, regiments, battalions, and companies, as the several State
legislatures might direct, but recommended to the State legislatures
a particular organization. It apportioned the officers to the men,
and it stopped there. A committee of Congress in 1803 expressed
the opinion that this act of May 8, 1792, carried the Federal power
to the extreme limits of the constitutional authority of Congress.
President Jefferson submitted a scheme somewhat similar to the
Knox scheme in 1803. That was referred to by the Secretary of War
when he appeared before you. It fell, as Jefferson said, under the
weight of local opposition. - .
The next highly federalized citizen soldiery scheme that engaged the
attention of Congress was presented by Mr. Monroe in 1813. He was
Acting Secretary of War when he submitted the scheme. A modifi-
cation of that scheme by the chairman of the Senate committee, and
subsequently known as the Giles scheme, was likewise considered,
but without any result.
The period following the War of 1812 was chacterized by intense
thought in congressional circles upon the subject of a national defense.
The outcome was the offer of a constitutional amendment by William
Henry Harrison, who was then chairman of the House Committee
on Military Aſtairs. That amendment looked to granting to the
General Government concurrent jurisdiction with the States over
the matter of the training of the militia, and concurrent jurisdiction
with the States over the public school system of the country to the
extent necessary to engraft upon that school system the principle of
compulsory military training. -
Senator DUPONT. Was that ever submitted . Did it pass Congress?
Gen. CROWDER. There was no action upon that. .
Senator DU PONT. No action was taken .
724 PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
Gen. CRow DER. No action at all, so far as I can inform myself.
Senator CATRON. What year was Harrison chairman of the com-
mittee 7 -
Gen. CROWDER. 1818.
But by far the most highly federalized scheme that has ever come
before the Congress was that presented by Secretary of War Poinsett
in 1840. *
Secretary. Poinsett's scheme carried the Federal power further than
it had ever been proposed to be carried. He provided for calling out
the militia for purposes of training. He was promptly reminded by
a committee of Congress that the power of the General Government
to call out the militia was limited to three purposes, and that training
was not one of them. He admitted the force of the constitutiona
objection to his scheme and did not insist upon it. He suggested in
lieu thereof a scheme of volunteering for instruction, which would be
about the scheme you would have if you set in motion in time of peace
the provisions of your 1914 volunteer bill, permitting the militia to
volunteer each year; to be mustered into service and mustered out
each year for the purpose of training.
But Secretary Poinsett's scheme was rejected, or rather was not
accepted by Congress, and so the matter slept until after the period of
the Civil War, when the agitation for a federalized militia was
renewed.
The agitation was carried on through the years until it culminated
in the enactment of the Dick bill, which was the most highly feder-
alized measure that we have ever had enacted into law. in that bill
I think it is admitted generally that the Congress transcended its
constitutional powers in legislating for the militia in two regards.
First, because it undertook to place officers of the Regular Army
in command relations to the National Guard, which, of course, can
not be done as long as the power to govern the militia is reserved
to the States. It undertook, further, to put officers of the National
Guard in command relations with the Regular Army. I take it that
no one will insist that that legislation is constitutional.
The second regard in which the Dick bill was declared to have an
unconstitutional provision was in the provision it made that the
militia could be used within or without the United States. That
matter came before my office for consideration in February, 1911.
At that time the General Staff was considering seriously the situation
to the South of us and engaging in some preliminary studies. The
question was asked if the National Guard was available for the
purpose of an Army of occupation. I went into that question as
thoroughly as I could and reached the conclusion that the militia were
not available for such a purpose; basing my conclusion on the con-
stitutional limitations respecting this force, that they could be called
out only for the purpose of executing the laws of the Union, suppres–
sing insurrection, and repelling invasion. Clearly there was no }. Of
the Union to be executed in Mexico; there was no such insurrection as
the Federal Constitution had in contemplation to be suppressed there;
and certainly there was no invasion to repel, the object being to
make one.
There was further agitation and the question went to the Attorney
General. He took that view, and the question is now a settled one,
so far as administrative lawyers can settle a question.
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 725
There then commenced the agitation for new schemes of federaliza-
tion of the militia to see if there was not some way of extending the
power of the National Government over them so that we could train
them to the point of developing them into dependable first-line troops.
The question of how far we can go depends upon the grant of power
to the Federal Government over the militia. The Constitution
answers that question in these terms:
Congress shall have power to provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the
militia and for governing such part of them as may be employed in the service of the
United States, reserving to the States, respectively, the appointment of the officers
: the authority of training the militia according to the discipline prescribed by
Jongress, •
In determining the extent of this grant we may have recourse,
initially, to the proceedings of the constitutional convention. I avail
myself of the condensation of the convention debate used by Justice
Bell of the Supreme Court of Texas in his dissenting opinion in Ex
parte Coupland (26 Tex. Rpts., 425-429). The State Supreme court
in that case affirmed the constitutionality of the Confederate con-
script laws. Justice Bell, in the course of his dissenting opinion, said:
When the subject of the militia was under discussion in the federal convention
which framed the Constitution of the United States, a long and interesting debate
transpired, with which the students of our political history are familiar and which
need not be quoted extensively. It was proposed by Mr. Sherman to strike out
the clause reserving to the State the right to train the militia. Mr. Ellsworth remarked
that the objection would apply as well to the reservation to the States of the appoint-
ment to offices, and doubted the propriety of striking out either. Mr. King said
that by organizing, the committee meant proportioning the officers and men; by
arming, Specifying the kind, size, and caliber of arms; and by disciplining, prescribing
the manual exercise, evolutions, etc. Mr. Gerry said the power in the United States
as explained by Mr. Kind, would make the States drill sergeants. He had as lief
let the citizens of Massachusetts be disarmed as to take the command from the State
and subject them to the general legislature. It would be regarded as a system of
despotism. In the progress of the debate Mr. Madison moved to amend the clause
relating to the appointment of officers, as follows: “reserving to the States respec-
tively the appointment of the officers under the rank of general officers.” Mr. Sher-
man considered this as absolutely inadmissible. He said that if the people should
be so far asleep as to allow the most influential officers of the militia to be appointed
by the General Government, every man of discernment would rouse them by sounding
the alarm to them. Mr. Gerry said let us at once destroy the State governments,
have an executive for life, or hereditary, and a proper senate, then there would be
some consistency in giving full powers to the General Government; but as the States
were not to be abolished he wondered at the attempts that were made to give powers
inconsistent with their existence. He warned the convention against pushing the
experiment too far. Mr. Madison said, “As the greatest danger is that of disunion
of the States, it it necessary to guard against it by giving sufficient powers to the
common government, and as the greatest danger to liberty is from large standing
armies, it is best to prevent them by an effectual provision for a good militia.” Mr.
Madison’s amendment was rejected by a vote of eight States to three, or of none to
two, it is not certain which. On the question to agree to “the reserving to the States
the appointment of the officers,” it was agreed to without à dissenting vote. I think
this statement of the debate (and all contemporaneous expositions) shows most con-
clusively that the framers of the constitution of the United States intended to reserve
to the States such a control over the militia as would make the States secure against
the encroachments of the General Government, and as would enable the people
to maintain their liberties.
The CHAIRMAN. You have read from a dissenting opinion of Judge
Bell, of the Texas Supreme Court? *
Gen. CROWDER. Yes, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. Was the majority of the court against his views?
726 PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
Gen. CROWDER. The majority of the court was against his views.
The majority upheld the constitutionality of the Confederate con-
script law. Justice Bell decided against the constitutionality of the
conscript law, and in the course of his dissenting opinion made this
reference to the proceedings of the constitutional convention.
I avail myself further of a condensation of the same debate, pre-
pared by Maj. Hunt, of the Army, from the Documentary History of
the Constitution of the United States, derived from the manuscripts
deposited in the Bureau of Rolls, State Department, volume 3, as
follows:
Mr. Mason moved that the legislature be given “the power to regulate the militia”
(p. 556), which was referred to the committee. Later, on the same day, after a discus-
sion of the power “to make rules and regulations of the land and naval forces, ’’ he
moved as an additional power “to make laws for the regulation and discipline of the
militia of the several States, reserving to the States the appointment of the officers”
(p. 561). He modified the motion again later so that the General Government should
not have control over more than one-tenth part of the militia in any one year. Both
propositions were referred to the committee (p. 564). When it was again reported
out on August 21 it read: “To make laws for organizing, arming, and disciplining the
militia and for governing such part of them as may be employed in the service of the
United States, reserving to the States respectively the appointment of the officers
and the authority of training the militia according to the discipline prescribed by
the United States” (p. 574). The clause was debated at various times on August 21,
22, and 23, particularly with reference to the construction to be given the terms
“organize,” “arm,” and “discipline.” . On the 23d, Mr. Madison proposed that they
limit the power of the State to the appointment of regimental officers only, as was the
case under the Confederation, but this proposition received the vote of only three
States, New Hampshire, South Carolina, and Georgia (p. 599). The clause was finally
agreed to on August 23 in the same form as introduced on August 21, but in the report
of the committee on style and arrangement on September 12 they substituted “to
provide for” in lieu of “to make laws for ” in the first line, and “Congress” for “the
United States” in the last line, and in this form it was finally adopted.
We get from these condensations a very narrow construction of the
powers of Congress over the militia. “Organizing” meant propor-
tioning the officers and men; “arming” meant specifying the kind,
size, and caliber of arms; and “disciplining” meant prescribing a drill
book. We get also from them the suggestion that it was prominently
writ in the minds of those framers of this particular provision of the
Constitution that the militia they were authorizing and regulating
was primarily a State force and only contingently and within quite
a restricted field could it be a Federal force.
Coming now to judicial construction, I think I can assure the com-
mittee that there is no authoritative construction of this clause of
the Constitution by any Federal court, though there has been one
construction by a State court. In construing related powers over
the militia, certain Federal judges have, by way of dictum, remarked
on the construction this clause should receive. I will now attempt
to call to the attention of the committee such judicial discussion
of this character as I have been able to find, first noting that which
affirms the broadest power in the Congress. -
Says Justice Washington, in Houston v. Moore, decided by the Su-
preme Court of the United States in 1820:
Congress has power to provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining them (militia);
and the power being unlimited except in the two particulars of officering and training
them according to the discipline to be prescribed by Congress, it may be exercised
to any extent that may be deemed necessary by Congress. (5 Wheaton, p. 16.)
PREPAIRED NIESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. - 727
Justice Johnson, in the same case, in a concurring opinion, stated
the power in this way:
The power of Congress over the militia is limited but by two reservations in favor of
the States, namely, the right of officering and that of training them. (Idem., p. 36.)
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, in 1859, answering
an inquiry by the governor and Council of Massachusetts, as to
whether the Legislature of Massachusetts could enroll in the militia
any persons other than those enumerated in the act of Congress ap-
proved May 8, 1792, replied:
“Organizing” obviously includes the power of determining who shall compose the
body known as the militia. The general principle is, that a militia shall consist of the
able-bodied male citizens. But this description is too vague and indefinite to be laid
down as a practical rule; it requires a provision of positive law to ascertain the exact
age which shall be deemed neither too young nor too old to come within the descrip-
tion. One body of legislators might think the suitable age would be from 18 to 45,
others from 16 to 30 or 40, others from 20 to 50. Here the power is given to the Gen-
eral Government to fix the age precisely, and thereby to put an end to doubt and un-
certainty; and the power to determine who shall compose the militia, when executed,
equally determines who shall not be embraced in it, because all not selected are neces-
Sarily excluded.
The question upon the construction of this provision of the Constitution is, whether
this power to determine who shall compose the militia is exclusive. And we are of
opinion that it is. * * * The General Government having authority to deter-
mine who shall and who may not compose the militia, and having so determined,
the State government has no legal authority to prescribe a different enrollment. * * *
We are therefore of opinion that the legislature of this Commonwealth can not con-
stitutionally provide for the enrollment in the militia of any persons other than those
º in the act of Congress of May, 1792, hereinbefore cited. (14 Gray (Mass.),
p. 618.
As favoring a narrower construction of the powers of the General
Government over the militia, we have to cite the opinion of Justice
Story in the case already cited of Houston v. Moore. In a dissenting
Opinion he vigorously combated the views of Justice Washington
and Justice Johnson in language as follows: -
It is almost too plain for argument that the power here given to Congress over the
militia is of a limited nature and confined to the objects specified in these clauses,
and that in all other respects and for all other purposes the militia are subject to the
control and government of the State authority, Nor can the reservation to the States.
of the appointment of the o ficers and the authority of training the militia according
to the discipline prescribed by Congress be justly considered weakening this conclu-
sion. That reservation constitutes an exception merely from the power given to
Congress “to provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the militia” and is a
limitation upon the authority which would otherwise have devolved upon it as to
the appointment of officers. But the exception from a given power can not upon
any proper reasoning be construed as an enumeration of all the powers which belong
to the States over the militia. What those powers are must depend upon their own
constitutions, and what is not taken away by the Constitution of the United States
must be considered as retained by the States or the people. (5 Wheat., p. 51.)
In the opinion of the Supreme Court of the State of Illinois in
Dunne v. The People (94 Ill. º 121), decided in 1879, the court
adopts the view of Justice Story, holding that, quoting from syllabus:
The Tederal Constitution does not confer on Congress unlimited power over the
militia of the several States, but it is restricted to specific objects enumerated, and
for all other purposes the militia of the States remains subject to State legislation.
The power of a State over its militia is not derived from the Constitution of the United
States. It is a power the States had before the adoption of that instrument, and its
exercise by the States not being prohibited by it, it still remains with the States,
Subject only to the paramount authority of acts of Congress enacted in pursuance of
the Constitution.
'728 PREPAIRED NESS FOR NATION AL DEFENSE.
The reservation to the States of the power of appointing the officers of the militia
and authority to train according to the discipline prescribed by Congress does not
place any restriction upon the States in respect of its power of concurrent legislation
concerning its militia. The exception from a given power can not be considered as
an enumeration of all the powers which belong to the States over the militia.
The Supreme Court of Florida, in the case of Acker v. Bell, decided
December 12, 1911, adopted substantially the views of Justice Story,
holding in that case that the power given to Congress to organize the
militia does not relate to or include the enlistment of a soldier, but
relates to the distribution of the personnel of the Army or militia
into units, remarking in this respect as follows: *
Organization relates to the distribution of the personnel of the Army or militia,
both commissioned and enlisted, into units. . It provides for the distribution of the
personnel into different arms and corps, such as Infantry, Cavalry, Artillery, Staff
Corps, Medical Corps, Signal Corps, etc., and the distribution of the personnel in each
arm of the service corps into different units, such as divisions, brigades, companies,
platoons, sections, squads, etc., and, further, into different ranks or grades, such as
generals, colonels, lieutenant colonels, majors, captains, lieutenants, Sergeants, cor-
porals, privates, etc. Enlistment is the contract of service that a soldier, as dis-
tinguished from the officer, enters into with the State or the United States. The
enlistment may be different in each State, some for seven years, some for five years,
some for three years, with varying provisions for enlistment, and yet the organization
of all may be the same, but it is essential to the effectiveness and efficiency of the
forces called into the national service that the organization thereof should be the
Same—one harmonious whole. (57 So. Rep. 356.)
These are all the cases that I have found in which judges have
remarked upon the interpretation which this militia clause of the
Constitution should receive.
CONGRESSIONAL OPINION AS TO THE EXTENT OF THIS POWER.
We have the authority of Maj. Gen. Fry for the statement that in
1803 the committee reported to the House that “after full investiga-
tion” they were of the opinion that the law of May 8, 1792, ‘‘em-
braceth all the objects of a militia institution delegated to Congress.”
(Fry's Military ºilº p. 261.) -
In a report from the Committee on the Militia, June 6, 1840
(Rept. No. 584, 26th Cong., 1st sess.), the provision of the Constitution
respecting Federal power over the militia received a narrow con-
struction. That committee said:
Thus, an enrollment seems the extent of organization, the distribution of arms in
quotas to the States, and a system of discipline adopted by Congress, in the enforce-
ment of which the training is specially reserved to the States, is the extent of the
authority indisputably conceded in the Constitution to the General Government.
In a report of the House Committee on the Militia, April 7, 1880
(Rept. No. 763, 46th Cong, 2d sess.), that committee favored abroader
construction, Saying:
The purposes and provisions of this clause are clearly and distinctly stated and
Scarcely admit of misinterpretation. The States are expressly limited to the ap-
pointment of the officers and to training the militia, and in training it according to
the discipline prescribed by Congress.
When the Dick bill was on its passage, Senator Foraker brought
forward the view that under the Constitution of the United States
the State determines to what extent it will have an organized militia.
Replying to this view, Senator Bacon remarked as follows:
I think the Senator is mistaken in that suggestion, and I was coming to that very
point. Under the provision in the Constitution which permits the General Govern-
ment to provide for organizing the militia (and that exact word is used), I think it is
PR.EPARED NIESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENS £. 729
competent for the General Government to prescribe that there shall be a certain number
of militia enrolled in each State, in proportion thereof, and I believe it is perfectly
competent to draft a bill which would be constitutional, which would prescribe the
number of militia to be organized in each State. (Vol. 36, Cong. Rec., p. 560.)
The judicial and congressional opinion which I have here recapitu-
lated presents these two extremes of view respecting the power of
Congress over the militia: One that the words “organizing,” “arm-
ing,” and “disciplining” are words of broad import, and pass to the
Congress the whole of the power over the militia except the powers
expressly reserved, namely, to officer and train, and, of course, with
the exception of the power impliedly reserved, namely, to govern the
militia when not under call; and the other, that the power of Congress
over the militia is limited to proportioning the officers and men, to
specifying the kind and character of arms, and to prescribing a drill
book. Congress must legislate in deference to one or the other of
these views, and the degree of federalization of militia will depend
upon the choice made. -
Adopting the view most favorable to Federal control, I would list
among the hitherto unused power of Congress over the militia, the
following:
(1) The power to prescribe lower age limits for service in the
Organized Militia and other conditions of the enlistment contract,
so as to insure the presence in the Organized Militia of any State of
men in a position to respond to the call of the General Government
without the severance of too many local ties; in other words, prescribe
the organization of the recruiting service of the Organized Militia.
(2) The power to prescribe the qualifications of officers, providing
in this regard that no person shall be appointed an officer in the
Organized Militia whose qualifications for the appointment are not
established by an examination approved by the Secretary of War.
(3) The power to provide the total strength, and the proportionate
strength of the several arms, branches, and corps, line and staff, of the
Organized Militia in each State, so that when assembled under call
of the General Government it will constitute well-balanced brigades,
divisions, and field armies.
(4) The power to prescribe who shall constitute the exempt classes.
to the exclusion of the exercise of State power on the same subject.
But the existence in the Congress of these four powers is negatived
by the reasoning of Justice Story and of the Supreme Courts of Illinois.
and Florida.
Conceding for the moment that Congress has these powers and has
legislated under each of them, I want to ask what coercive power
it has over States and the State forces to enforce what it has pre-
scribed . I know of none. It can only have recourse, as in the
matter of training, to purchasing control; that is, by conditioning
Federal appropriations upon compliance with Federal law. The
Dick bill as amended now says to the Organized Militia, submit
yourselves to Federal training and you shall be paid. With the same
legality and propriety, Congress can say to governors appoint as
officers only from among those certified to you by the War Depart-
ment, and all such officers will be placed on the Federal pay roll.
Exact the kind of enlistment contract prescribed by Congress and
all men subscribing to such an enlistment contract will be placed
on the Federal pay roll. And in this way one after another of the
730 PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
reserved powers of the States may be encroached upon and usurped
and the States become entirely divested of their control. I sub-
scribe to the view expressed by the Secretary of War to the House
Military Committee at a recent hearing that such legislation will not
stand the slightest judicial test. •
But independently of legal objections to such legislation, I think
the system is inherently weak. In its last analysis the control of
Congress depends upon the consent of the State and the State forces
to be controlled. have never been able to see how a military
system could be built upon this principle. As well you might send
an army into the field where the right of the general to command
depended upon the consent of the troops to be commanded.
. It may be urged against the view I have expressed that we have
been living under such a system as I condemn since the enactment
of the Dick bill in 1903 and can continue to live under it. But em-
barrassments have occurred; and one such embarrassment I will
bring to the attention of the committee. During the period of joint
encampment held in New England in 1910, in which organizations
of the Organized Militia of the State of New York participated, an
officer of the New York militia, becoming dissatisfied, left his organi-
zation and returned to the State of New York. The highest Tegal
authority of the Organized Militia of that State, an attorney who I
understand enjoys an enviable reputation at the bar of that State,
gave it as his opinion that it was very doubtful whether the governor
of the State had any authority to order the militia outside of the
State, and that it was likewise a matter of doubt whether the military
code of the State of New York would follow the militia of that State
into another State and be operative to denounce and punish offenses
there committed.
If this view be correct, it would not be possible for any National
Guard officer to enforce his authority outside of the State limits.
There is another objection to the present system to which I have
already referred. Congress has undertaken to provide, in section 15
of the Dick bill as amended, that the right of command at joint en-
campments of the Organized Militia and Regular Army shall devolve
upon the senior officer of the Regular Army or National Guard there
present. I take it that there will be no question that this provision of
the Dick bill is unconstitutional. As long as the power to govern
the militia remains with the States, as it does during periods of train-
ing, it would seem to me not competent for Congress to place an officer
of the Regular Army in command relations with the Organized Militia;
and, in the contrary case, I can not conceive that it would be compe-
tent for Congress to invest a National Guard officer with command
relations to the Regular Army.
The CHAIRMAN. I think in the Revolution Connecticut refused to
allow her troops to join the Federal forces :
Gen. CROWDER. Yes; but that case was disposed of by the
Supreme Court later. They decided that the decision of the Presi-
dent was final as to the necessity for calling out the militia. -
The CHAIRMAN. So that they had to come in .
Gen. CROWDER. Yes. -
We come now to the consideration of the scheme of federalization
now pending before the Senate. I refer to what is popularly known
as the militia pay bill. That bill provides for tºº, of the
militia in section 37, in these terms:
PRE PARED NIESS FOR IN ATION ATL DEFENSE. 731
That no money appropriated under the provisions of this act shall be paid to any
person who has not, in addition to his obligation as a member of the Organized Militia
of a State, Territory, or the District of Columbia, voluntarily subscribed an agree-
ment to serve the United States in the manner provided in this act and in connection
with such agreement taken an oath as a commissioned officer or enlisted man in the
Army of the United States: Provided, That the obligation to serve in the Army of
the United States shall be effective from the date of the agreement and oath herein
prescribed to create the status of officer and enlisted man in the Army of the United
States; but officers and enlisted men subscribing such agreement and oath shall not,
without the consent of Congress, be ordered into the active military service of the
United States as a part of the Army thereof, nor shall they be entitled to the pay
and emoluments of officers and enlisted men in the Army of the United States except
as otherwise provided in this act. * .
And then follows section 37a, providing that the President, with the
consent of Congress, in time of war, or when war is imminent, or in
grave international emergency requiring the use of troops in excess
of the Regular Army of the tº States, may order into the active
military service of the United States as a part of the Army thereof
any portion of the Organized Militia, etc.
The difficulty that I have with this section is twofold. I think
that I could write an chlistment contract under its authority which
would definitely fix the status of the enlisted man as a member of the
Federal Army, with all the obligations that would flow from a definite
contract of enlistment. I can not answer for what the effect would
be upon the State relations which the man is expected to carry along
with this national obligation. I do not think that anybody is in
a position to answer as to that. *
To hold that a man may contract himself into this dual relation re-
Juires you to say that it is possible for a man to have two military
iº, one to the governor of a State and the other to the Presi-
dent of the United States; that is, to have coexisting allegiances to
two commanders in chief who are not in such relations to each other
that one could command the other. I find great difficulty in that.
Senator DU PONT. That actually occurred in the War of 1812, did
it not ? Practically the relations of the governors of Connecticut
and Massachusetts were absolutely at variance with the General Gov-
ernment, were they not :
Gen. CROWDER. It presented itself in the War of 1812, in this
form: The men had been called out under the constitutional clauses
and were in the service of the United States. They received an
Order to cross the frontier. They declined to obey the order on the
ground that they were not liable for service outside of the country.
That took place at Detroit and was repeated at Niagara Falls. I
think there was one other case where they refused to recognize the
authority of the President of the United States or his officers to issue
an order of that character. --
The second difficulty I have with this section is that it undertakes
to vest Federal office by agreement. I do not know any way of con-
ferring Federal office except through the exercise of the appointing
power. I doubt very much whether you can do what this section
proposes in the face of the constitutional provision which vests the
power of appointment in the President and certain subordinate
officers. Therefore, I do not see how this can be made effective. It
is one of many forms of dual agreement. The House bill eliminates
this dual agreement, feature entirely and relies solely upon the effi-
cacy of a draft, but its draft is operative only in the event of actual
º
732 JPREPAIRED N ESS FOR N AT HON AI, DEFENSE.
or imminent war. It can not be resorted to to bring the militia into
the service of the United States for the purpose of training and thus
procure the Federal control of training that is so much needed if the
Organized Militia are to be developed into dependable first-line troops.
That power to train is expressly reserved by the Constitution to the
States. We have been invading that power by conditioning Federal
appropriations, and there is no reason why any power of the State can
not be invaded in the same way if the State is willing or complaisant.
As the Secretary said in his testimony before the House committee,
legislation of that kind, the purpose of which was to take away from
the State its reserve power, would not stand the slightest judicial test.
I do not know that you need to go particularly into the constitu-
tionality of the draft. I think we can say very positively that that
question is at rest.
Senator DU PONT. It is settled, you mean?
Gen. CROWDER. It is settled. The decisions both North and
South on the conscript acts of the Federal and Confederate Govern-
ments leave nothing to be said. They have silenced all contention
that the draft is not constitutional power. The constitutionality of
the Confederate conscript act was very generally assailed in four
courts of last resort in four different States of the Confederacy.
The CHAIRMAN. And sustained
Gen. CROWDER. Universally sustained. It was also assailed in one
supreme court in the North—the State of Pennsylvania. At first
the court stood three to two against the constitutionality of the law,
and upon a rehearing of the case the vote was reversed. The power
of the General Government to draft was sustained everywhere it was
judicially questioned.
The CHAIRMAN. In time of war? .
Gen. CROWDER. It is not limited to time of war. The power exists
at all times.
Senator THOMAs. Would not the decision limit it? -
Gen. CROWDER. No, the decisions did not limit the power to draf
except in one regard to which I will call the attention of the commit-
tee. All the decisions were broad enough to sustain the power to
raise armies by conscription, not alone in time of war but in time of
peace as well. That the committee may have a ready reference to
these cases and verify for themselves the construction I place upon
them, I will cite them: Kneedler v. Lane (45 Pa. (State), 238); Ex
parte Coupland (26 Tex. Rep., 388); Ex parte Tate (39 Ala. Rep.,
254); Fitzgerald v. Harris (33 (Sup.) Ga., 54); Jones v. Warren (34
Ga., 28); Jeffers v. Fair (33 Ga., 347); Burroughs v. Peyton (16 Grat-
tan (Va.), 470).
I do not think that I have misunderstood the opinions as Sustain-
ing the proposition that the power of Congress to raise and support
armies is plenary in all respects, and that its control over the entire
question is unqualified, absolute, and exclusive. That there is no
express limitation upon the power will be at once conceded. I do not
think that any limitation is to be implied. Hamilton brings this fact
out with great emphasis when he says with reference to this power that
the power ought to exist without limitation—
because it is not impossible to foresee or to define the extent and variety of national
exigencies, and the corresponding extent and variety of the means necessary to Satisfy
them. The circumstances which endanger the safety of nations are infinite. And
PR.EPARED NESS FOR, NATIONAL DEFENSE. 733
for this reason no constitutional shacklés can wisely be imposed on the power to
which the care of it is committed. . * * * It must be admitted, as a necessary con-
Sequence, that there can be no limitation of that authority which is to provide for the
defense and protection of the community in any matter essential to its efficacy—that
is, in any matter essential to the formation, protection, or support of the national
forces. (Whiting, War Powers of Congress, p. 35.) -
The southern courts which passed upon the question did, however,
recognize one limitation on the power to raise armies by conscription.
The Virginia Court of Appeals and the Supreme Courts of Georgia,
Alabama, and Texas took this general view, that whenever in the
operation of the Confederate conscript acts it was sought to lay hands
upon an agency of the State government, thus impairing the opera-
tions of #. government, constitutional limits had been tran-
scended; and I am compelled to invite attention to the fact that one
of these courts, the Virginia court, went further in its discussion and
raised the question whether, in the operation of the Confederate draft
act the Organized Militia of that State could be taken, but dismissed
the question with this remark:
It is sufficient for the purposes of this decision to see, as we do, that neither of the
acts of Congress, the validity of which has been called in question, does destroy or
impair the organization of the militia. It will be time enough when a case is brought
before us in which the organization of the militia is destroyed or impaired by Con-
gress to inquire what limits are fixed to their action in this respect. (16 Gratton's
Rep., 483, 484.)
The Virginia court thus reserved its opinion upon the question
whether a draft of the Organized Militia, such as is proposed in the
House bill, would be within the constitutional power of Congress. I
can not from my study of the subject as a whole entertain any doubt
on the question. Our Revolutionary history attests the fact that the
States not infrequently raised their quotas for the Continental Army
by drafts upon their Organized Militia. The framers of the Consti-
tution were, of course, familiar with this fact and I think they meant
to authorize any form of draft with which they were familiar. It
would be strange indeed if the power of the General Government to
raise armies by draft was not effective to reach the only body of our
arms bearing population that has some military training, and besides
this ºf instrumentality of our State governments is contin-
gently an instrumentality as well of the Federal Government.
Senator CATRON. Did the Confederate constitution have the same
provision that ours, has %
Gen. CROWDER. They were identical with the corresponding pro-
visions of the Federal Constitution.
The CHAIRMAN. Applying that doctrine that you say the courts
have universally sustained; that is, the power to exercise the draft,
either in time of war or in time of peace, would the system of uni-
versal training be sustained under those same decisions?
Gen. CROWDER. Yes; there is no doubt about that. It is within
the power of Congress to establish universal training. It is within
the power of Congress to conscript the whole of the arms bearing
population or to adopt selective conscription.
The CHAIRMAN. Then, Congress can reach out into the States and
touch the individual and compel him to perform a duty, while they
can not use the instrumentalities of the States? -
23380—PT 14–16–4
734 PREPARED NESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
Gen. CROWDER. Yes. Certain of the opinions are broad enough
to justify the conclusion that the courts announcing them contem-
plated a drafting power broad enough to take even the instrumen-
talities of the State government, and it is an interesting fact that the
Federal conscript act of March 3, 1863, exempted but one State
official, the governor; and so far as I know the execution that that
act received required of State officials, including the judiciary, to
pay commutation money or provide substitutes.
The CHAIRMAN. They all had to go º
Gen. CROWDER. That was the requirement of the act. I have not
examined the details of its execution to know whether they carried
it that far in actual practice, but there were no express exemptions
of these State officials. If they were drawn they would have to
make the same response as any other citizen.
The CHAIRMAN. Since this question of universal training has come
up, Gen. Crowder, it is insisted not only that it is unconstitutional,
but it is insisted that it is violative of the spirit of the Constitution.
According to your views, it is not violative of either the letter or
the spirit of the Constitution ?
Gen. CROWDER. No; when you consider that the first proposition
that the Congress of the United States considered laid hands on every
able-bodied citizen between 18 and 60 and required them to undergo
military training providing for a kind of cadet instruction, of those
between 18 and 20, inclusive, you see what the men of the constitu-
tional period thought about universal military training.
The CHAIRMAN. That was the act of 1792?
Gen. CROWDER. That was the the Knox plan, which led up to the
act of 1792.
The CHAIRMAN. How long did that act remain in force?
Gen. CROWDER. Until the passage of the Dick bill in 1903.
The CHAIRMAN. That was an implied repeal?
Gen. CROWDER. No, it was an express repeal of everything but
section 1661. f
The CHAIRMAN. But the purpose of the Dick bill was to go even
further than the act of 1792 to federalize the National Guard 2
Gen. CROWDER. Yes. .-
The CHAIRMAN. And the other purposes of the bill were subse-
quently voided by that decision of the Attorney General'
Gen. CROWDER. Yes, sir. -
-- . . CHAIRMAN. I would like to have those two decisions in the
I’éCOPCI. - -
Gen. CRowder. I can furnish copies of the decisions. I think they
are probably as exhaustive discussions of the development of the
militia as have been made.
(The decisions referred to are as follows:)
WAR DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL,
Washington, December 29, 1911.
The SECRETARY OF WAR - *
(Through the Chief of Staff). *
SIR: I am in receipt of your request for my opinion upon certain propositions sub-
mitted by the War College concerning the use of the Organized Militia or National
Guard when called into the service of the United States, stated as follows: --
“(1) Would it not be unconstitutional to authorize the mai tenance at war strength
of militia after having been called into the Service of the United States by recruits
from a United States reserve? -
&. -
PREPAREDNESS FOR, NATIONAL DEFENSE. 735
(2) How may the General Government keep recruited to proper strength the
militia called into the service of the United States and conform to the spirit of the
Constitution?
“(3) Would it be unconstitutional to organize part of the militia as a United States
Volunteer Reserve? (Debated during the 2d sess., 57th Cong.
“ (4) Is it constitutional to authorize the President to call out the militia and send
it into a foreign country as part of an army?”
By verbal instructions communi ated to me since your request for an opinion was
received, I am directed to limit my discussion to the fourth of the above inquiries,
restated in the following form:
“(4) Under existing laws may the President call out the National Guard and send
it into a foreign country with the Regular Army as a part of an army of occupation,
and especially in case the United States should intervene in the affairs of another
nation?”
In order to ansver this inquiry satisfactorily it will be necessary, first, to consider
generally the Military Establishment of the United States, and especially the char-
acter and purposes of the National Guard or the militia of the Several States constitu-
tionally organized as such.
The following are the provisions of the Constitution which constitute the authority
for raising the land Military Establishment:
“Congress shall have power * * *.
“To raise and support armies, but no appropriation of money to that use shall be for
a longer term than two years; . . .
“* * * To provide for calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the Union,
suppress insurrections, and repel invasions;
“To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the militia, and for governing
such part of them as may be employed in the service of the United States, reserving to
the States respectively the appointment of the officers, and the authority of training
the militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress.” (U. S. Constitution,
Art. I, sec. 8.)
No other provision of the Constitution has any material bearing upon the meaning
of those above quoted save perhaps the second amendment, which reads:
“A well-regulated militia, being necessary to a free State, the right of the people to
keep and bear arms shall not be infringed.” - -
The first attempt of Congress to exercise its constitutional powers over the militia
under the Constitution is found in a temporary act of September 29, 1789 (1 Stat., 95),
section 5 of which authorized the President to call into the service of the United States
from time to time parts of the militia for the protection of the frontiers. A similar
permanent provision was enacted, in section 16 of the act of April 30, 1790 (1 Stat.,
121). Neither act contained any provision looking to the Organization or discipline
of the militia.
The first act providing generally for calling forth the militia was that of May 2, 1791
(1 Stat., 264), which likewise omitted any provision for its organization or discipline.
Said act was to continue in force for two years and until the end of the next session of
Congress thereafter. It was followed by the act of May 8, 1792 (1 Stat., 271), which
provided for the organization and discipline of the militia. . The act of February 28,
1795 (1 Stat., 424), was next passed, which repealed and took the place of the old act
of May 2, 1792, providing for the calling forth of the militia, and which was about to
expire by limitation. The acts of May 8, 1792, and February 28, 1795, with slight
modifications and additions by subsequent acts of Congress, were incorporated into the
Revised Statutes as sections 1625 to 1661, inclusive. This legislation constituted the
main body of the law relating to the militia until the passage of the act of January 21,
1903 (32 Stat., 272), known as the Dick bill, which repealed all of the above-mentioned
sections of the Revised Statutes excepting section 1661, and substituted other pro-
visions covering the entire subject. In this act the Organized Militia was first desig-
nated as the National Guard. The act has been amended or added to every year since
its passage, but the principal alterations were accomplished by the act of May 27,
1908 (35 Stat., 399), and asso amended it constitutes the law in force at the present time.
The following provisions of the act of January 21, 1903, as amended by that of May
27, 1908 (35 Stat., 400), relate more particularly to the question under discussion:
“SEC. 4. That whenever the United States is invaded or in danger of invasion from
any foreign nation, or of rebellion against the authority of the Government of the
United States, Cr the President is unable with the regular forces at his command to
execute the laws of the Union, it shall be lawful for the President to call forth such
number of the militia. * * * as he may deem necessary to repel such invasion,
suppress such rebellion, or to enable him to execute such laws " * *.
736 PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
“SEC. 5. That whenever the President calls forth the organized militia of any
State * * * to be employed in the service of the United States, he may specify
in his call the period for which such service is required, and the militia. So called shall
continue to serve during the term so specified, either within or without the territory
of the United States, unless sooner relieved by order of the President: * * * Pro-
vided further, That when the military needs of the Federal Government arising from
the necessity to execute the laws of the Union, suppressinsurrection, or repel invasion,
can not be met by the regular forces, the organized militia shall be called into the
service of the United States in advance of any volunteer force which it may be deter-
mined to raise.” -
From a general discussion in military circles, which immediately preceded and fol-
lowed the enactment of the Dick bill, the impression has obtained in some quarters
that the purpose of that law was to create or to call into existence, under the name of
the National Guard, a distinct military organization with a status different from the
militia treated of in the Constitution, and that this law was enacted, not only under.
the authority of Congress over the militia, but also under its general authority to raise
and support armies. As a consequence of this view, it is maintained that the National
Guard has become practically a substitute for the volunteer army, and as such may
be used wherever the volunteer forces may be used. The provision of the law that
the National Guard should be called into service in advance of volunteers has con-
tributed, no doubt, to this impression. It becomes important, therefore, to inquire
into the meaning of the term “militia” as used in the Constitution, and to consider
whether or not the National Guard, as now organized in pursuance of the last legisla-
tion upon this subject, corresponds to the militia of the Constitution, and wherein it
differs from the Regular and Volunteer Army.
The powers of Congress over the land Military Establishment are, first, to raise and
support armies; and, second, to provide for the organization and discipline of the
militia of the several States and to call them into the service of the United States
under certain conditions. Under the first power it maintains its Regular Army and
raises its volunteer troops, which may be used for all purposes of a military force and
may be maintained and recruited as exigencies require, either by voluntary enlist-
ment or, as now conceded, by conscriptions, though this latter method of increasing
the Army has been strenuously contested as involving an unconstitutional exercise
of the power given for calling forth the militia of the States. (Kneedler v. Lane, 45
Pa., 238.) . - -
Besides the Regular Army or permanent Military Establishment maintained both
in peace and war according to law, Congress, under the power conferred upon it to raise
and support armies, provides for raising a volunteer army, which, according to section
4 of the act of April 22, 1898 (30 Stat., 361), “shall be maintained only during the ex-
istence of war or while war is imminent, and shall be raised and organized, as in
this act provided, only after Congress has or shall have authorized the President to
raise such a force or to call into the actual service of the United States the militia of the
Several States.” - -
An authority of Congress already existed under the act of February 28, 1795, for the
President to call the militia of the States into the actual service of the United States,
under the conditions enumerated in the Constitution, the reference to the calling of
such militia into the actual service of the United States as a condition under which
the volunteer army might be raised and organized” should properly be restricted to
cases where the President makes such a call during the existence of war or while war
is imminent, and there is a consequent danger of invasion. Any other view would
wipe out the limitation confining the maintenance of the Volunteer Army to a time of
war or while war is imminent.
There is, therefore, no authority for raising and organizing a volunteer force without
special legislation of Congress, except only when war actually exists or is imminent,
and where reasons exist, as a consequence thereof, for calling out the militia.
In addition to the power to raise and support armies, Congress may provide for or-
ganizing and disciplining the militia of the States, and may call them into the Service
of the United States under certain specified conditions. The Constitution did not un-
dertake to define what was intended by the militia, but section 1 of the act of May 8,
1792 (sec. 1627, R. S.), provided that—
“Every able-bodied male citizen of the respective States, resident therein, and who
is of the age of eighteen years and under the age of forty-five years, shall be enrolled
in the militia.”
The act further provided for such enrollment and for the organization, equipment,
and drilling of the militia all of which was left to the discretion of the States. The
sweeping and compulsory provisions of this act seem to have rested upon the idea that
the militia comprised all persons in the State capable of bearing arms, and this idea
PREPAREDNESS FoR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 737
found expression in the discussions which preceded and followed the adoption of the
Constitution, as well as in the decisions of courts. This broad use of the term “militia,”
as used in the Constitution was made the basis of attack upon the constitutionality.
of the draft act of March 3, 1863, by the minority of the court in the case of Kneedler v.
Lane (supra). It was argued that Congress by drafting citizens into the Volunteers
then authorized, was only drawing into that branch of the military service the con-
stitutional militia which could only be called into service as militiamen, and then only
for certain purposes. - -
While the act of May 8, 1782, did not directly apply the term “militia” to any body
of men, the act of January 21, 1903, reorganizing the militia and calling it the National
Guard, was more explicit, and stated definitely in section 1 that— -
“The militia shall consist of every able-bodied male citizen “ ” * who is more
than eighteen and less than forty-five years of age, and shall be divided into two classes:
The Organized Militia known as the National Guard * * * and the remainder to
be known as the Reserve Militia.” -
The militia as thus defined becomes coextensive with the citizenship of the country,
capable of bearing arms within the age limits specified. Was this the sense in which
it is used in the Constitution? The popular conception associates the term “militia”
with bodies of armed men, more or less organized. The American Encyclopædia
defines the term as— - *
“A body of armed citizens trained for military duty, who may be called out in cer-
tain cases, but may not be kept in Service like standing armies in time of peace. It
differs from the levee en masse in having regular organization at all times.”
It is evident, however, that the framers of the Constitution took a much more com-
prehensive view of the meaning of the word “militia.” They must have been familiar
with the militia system prevailing in England, from which most of them or their
ancestors had recently immigrated, which system had existed in some form from Saxon
times, surviving the military service of the feudal system introduced at the Norman
Conquest. (1 Blackstone Comm., 412; Am. Enc., “Militia.”) .
“During Saxon time in England there was a fyrd, or national militia, service in
whib was one of the three duties—trinoda necessitas—to which every allodial pro-
prietor was subject " * *. By the law known as the assize of arms, in 1181,
every freeman was required to provide himself with a doublet of mail, an iron skull-
cap, and lance.” (Steven, Sources of the Constitution of the United States, 223.)
The ancient militia of England seems then to have consisted of the body of freemen
capable of bearing arms who were expected to equip themselves for service, and the
duty of rendering military service on proper occasions was incumbent upon all capable
of doing so. As a military force it was regarded as something distinct from the Regular
Army, which was recruited by voluntary enlistments, and which was expected to serve
its sovereign in war or peace, at home or abroad. The militia, on the contrary, were
called to Service only for sperial occasions of a domestic nature, such as maintaining
the public peace and repelling hostile invasions, and provision is found in English
statutes to the effect that the militia should not be taken out of the Kingdom. r
The American colonists at the time the Constitution was formed had had but little
experience with regular armies and their military operations had consisted princi-
pally in repelling the predatory attacks of Indian Savages and in waging a desultory
war against them. This was accomplished by small military bodies hastily brought
together from the body of citizenship capable of bearing arms in a manner similar to
the assembling of the militia of England or the warlike clans of Scotland when inva-
Sion threatened. The peculiar condition of the frontier settlements required a mili-
tary force for their defense which could be quickly assembled in small bands ready
for action, without much regard to organization, and most of the States at the time of
the adoption of the Constitution had some sort of plan for organizing and using this
body of citizen soldiers. The situation naturally implied compulsory service, and
this idea was deeply impressed upon the minds of the early settlers. .
This was the military situation which the framers of the Constitution had before
them when they drafted the provisions for calling forth the militia and for organizing
and disciplining them. To their minds the militia was the principal military re-
Source of the country, involved compulsory service, and was to be availed of in enforc-
ing local order and resisting invasions; and was distinct from the regular or standing
army, service in which was voluntary, and which could be used for all purposes of a
military force, at home or abroad. It must therefore be considered that the con-
vention regarded the militia of the Constitution with all the limitations upon that
institution commonly understood at the time, and that it was their purpose to give
uniformity to the different local military organizations that existed throughout the
States, or should thereafter be formed, and to extend their service beyond the limits
of their respective States, but for purposes similar to those for which they had formerly
738 PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
been employed. By thus placing this mliitary resource within the reach of the Gen-
eral Government under the limitations named in the Constitution they hoped to
dispense with the necessity and expense of maintaining a large standing army in time
of peace and at the same time to avoid placing too great a military force within the
absolute control of the General Government. .
It is apparent that the militia can not be effectually called into service without
Some sort of organization, and the original act of May 8, 1792, made no provision for
compulsory organization by United States authority, but left that work to the several
States. By the act of July 2, 1862 (12 Stat., 597) Congress provided that when the
President should call forth the militia into the service of the United States, if from
defects in the laws of the several States, or from failure in the execution of such laws,
it should be found necessary to provide for enrolling the militia, he was authorized to
make all needful rules and regulations therefor. This is the only law I find for the
enrollment and forcible calling out of the militia by United States authority. Its
operation during the Civil War was not successful in the single instance in which it
was employed, and its subsequent use was abandoned.
The act of January 21, 1903, abandoned the old compulsory idea of utilizing the
reserve or unorganized militia, and made no provision for its enrollment. The organi-
zations formed under said act, and which are available for call by the President, are
voluntary so far as the laws of the United States are concerned, and the policy has been
inaugurated of maintaining militia Organizations by other means than by compulsory
enrollments. -
The militia or the National Guard may be called into the service of the United
States for three specific purposes only: (1) To execute the laws of the Union; (2) to
suppress insurrections; and (3) to repel invasions.
The purposes enumerated fall far short of those for which the Regular Army may be
employed, and hence a distinction is to be observed between the Army and the
militia when called into service, not in the manner of service, but in the field of
operation. The nature of the purposes enumerated indicate that the service of the
militia should be domestic in character, and it was early claimed that they could not
be taken beyond the limits of the United States. The Ohio militia in the beginning
of the War of 1812 with Great Britain refused to cross the river at Detroit into Canadian
territory, “alleging as a reason that they were not obliged to serve outside of the
United States”; and at the battle of Queenstown Heights fought on Canadian soil a
number of militiamen refused to cross the Niagara River to aid their comrades who
were actually engaged with the enemy, and who, as a consequence of such refusal,
were defeated and compelled to surrender. The engagement resulted as a part of a
movement or expedition for the invasion of Canada by the United States, and there
was little ground for apprehension of an invasion by the British at the time, and little
or no necessity existed for invading Canada to forestall such invasion. It may be
doubted, therefore, whether they were not strictly acting within their constitutional
rights in insisting that their operations be confined to United States territory. . Never-
theless a broader view, and one which seems to be in harmony with the spirit of the
Constitution, might have justified the crossing of the international boundary line in
order to attack and defeat the hostile force hovering near the border and thus threaten-
ing invasion, although immediate invasion might not have been imminent. The
objection of the militia in this case to crossing the boundary line most likely had a
deeper foundation in their opposition to the war.
The early understanding that the militia could not be called to serve outside the
limits of United States territory was adopted by constitutional writers. Ordronaux,
in his work on Constitutional Legislation, after enumerating the three purposes for
which the militia might be called into the service of the United States, says:
“These three occasions, representing necessities of a strictly domestic character,
plainly indicate that the services required of the militia can be rendered only upon
the soil of the United States or of its Territories. * * * In the history of this pro-
vision of the Constitution there is nothing indicating that it was even contemplated
that such troops should be employed for purposes of offensive warfare outside the
limits of the United States.”
Von Holtz's Constitutional Law contains the statement (p. 170) that “the militia
can not be taken out of the country.” -
This view was not based upon any decisions of competent tribunals, but was evi-
dently deduced from the language of the Constitution and from opinions expressed
by contemporaneous writers, and by the conduct of the people at the time that instru-
ment was adopted. The Constitution itself contains no such limitation upon the
services of the militia, and whatever limitation exists must flow from the language
employed in defining the purposes for which they may be called out. The Suppres-
sion of insurrection is of such a domestic character as necessarily to limit the opera-
PREPAIRED NESS FOR, NATIONAL DEFENSE. 739
tions for that purpose to United States territory, since the expression could have no
proper application to insurrections arising outside of such territory. If the militia
can be employed outside of the United States it must be by virtue of the authority
to use it for one of the two other purposes named, to wit, to execute the laws of the
Union and to repel invasions. - -
It has been suggested that the power to use the militia to execute the laws of the
Union might justify their use abroad to protect the rights of American citizens arising
under treaties or international law, as a part of the laws of the Union, since the Con-
stitution provides (art. 6):
“That all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United
States shall be the supreme law of the land.” -
It might thus be argued that the use of the militia to enforce the rights of American
citizens arising under treaties of the United States with foreign powers is but the execu-
tion of the laws of the land, for which purpose they may be constitutionally called out.
But this position is untenable. The President is bound to see that the laws are duly
executed, and in aid of this duty he may call forth the militia of the States. By the
execution of the laws is meant their execution within the jurisdiction of the United
States where they apply, and not outside thereof where they have no force as such.
Although rights of persons living outside of the Union may arise under the laws or
treaties thereof, the President has no authority by virtue of his office to undertake the
execution of such laws or treaties beyond United States territory in the sense of enforc-
ing them as laws of the land. Any attempt to do so would be a hostile invasion of the
jurisdiction of the nation concerned, and would naturally bring about a state of war.
This would amount to an invasion of the province of Congress, which alone has the
right to declare war and to forcibly maintain the rights of American citizens abroad,
as against a nation.
Ordronaux on constitutional legislation says upon this point (p. 506):
“Being the ministers of the law to enforce its commands they can only be sum-
moned by the lawmaking power to act within the extent of its jurisdiction and in the
manner prescribed by the Constitution. They can not, consequently, be used to
invade the territory of a neighboring country or to enforce any public rights abroad.”
In the case of Kneedler v. Lane (45 Pa., 238), Justice Stony, who delivered one of
the opinions on behalf of the majority of the court, holding that the draft act of March
3, 1863, was constitutional and refusing to enjoin its execution, in commenting upon
the lack of power to use the militia outside of the limits of the United States and the
consequent necessity of empowering Congress to raise and support armies, says (p. 276):
“Apart from the obligations assumed by treaty, it is well known that there are many
other cases where the rights of a nation and of its citizens can not be protected or vin-
dicated within its own houndaries; but the power conferréd by Congress over the
militia is insufficient to enable the fulfillment of the demands of such treaties or to
protect the rights of the Government or its citizens in those cases in which protection
must be sought beyond the territorial limits of the country.” -
It is interesting to note that this very question came before the convention in
framing the Constitution. The report of the committee on detail contained the
provision that—
“Congress shall have power to call forth the aid of the militia in order to execute
the laws of the Union, enforce treaties, suppress insurrection, and repel invasions.”
It was subsequently moved to strike out the clause relating to treaties and to accept
the provision as it now appears in the Constitution, which motion was agreed to with-
out objection. (Watson on the Constitution, 690; Journal of the Convention, 454.)
While it is contended on the one hand that this action indicated that the convention
considered that by making treaties the “law of the land,” it was unnecessary to specify
them in this connection, the more reasonable conclusion is that the words were stricken
out on account of the opposition which existed to Sending the militia. So far away from
their places of organization and because the convention considered it was quite enough
that the militia should be called to serve outside of their States but within the limits
of the United States. .
Can the authority to send the militia beyond the limits of United States territory
be derived from the power to use them for repelling invasions?
As stated, there has been no authoritative decision by the courts upon this point,
but in reason it would seem that service strictly within the United States is not the
only Service necessary or proper to be employed in repelling invasion. Something
more is contemplated than resisting the invader on the soil of the United States and
driving him to the border. In military operations to cease hostilities at this point
would be indefensible, and the Constitutional Convention must have viewed the
matter from a practical rather than from a theoretical standpoint. It would seem to
740 * PREPARED NESS FOR, NATIONAL DEFENSE.
be a reasonable deduction from the power given that the force called out might after
repelling the invader pursue him into his own territory, and defeat him there, or so
cripple his resources as to prevent a recurrence of the invasion. Neither is it reason-
able to hold that the Constitution forbids the use of the militia until the enemy has
actually crossed the border. It might and ought to be used to forestall a threatened
invasion by crossing an international boundary and attacking the invading force
before it had time to accomplish its object. This would be but a leasonable and
proper use of the militia in repelling an invasion. Judge Story, in his opinion in the
case of Martin v. Mott (12 Wheat., 19, 29), says: - -
“The power to provide for repelling invasions includes the power to provide against
the attempt and danger of invasion as the necessary and proper means to effectuate the
object.” • -
But, on the other hand, such a construction should not be so extended as to virtually
destroy the distinction between the Regular Army and the militia. The mere exist-
ence of a state of war would hardly be sufficient to justify the use of the militia for the
purpose of repelling invasion unless it should be threatening or imminent, and a mere
possibility of an invasion would hardly justify offensive operations. The contrary
view would eliminate the distinction between the scope of service of the Regular or
Volunteer Army and that of the militia, and would destroy the limitation which the
Constitution has placed upon the use of the latter.
I come now to consider specifically the question of an intervention by the United
States in the affairs of another nation and the use of the militia or National Guard as
a part of an occupying force therefor. If undertaken amicably, an intervention would
afford no apprehension of invasion, while if undertaken against the will of the nation
concerned it would be an act of war, and might or might not originate a condition
which would justify the use of the constitutional militia abroad. But the use of such
militia simply as an occupying force where no invasion is imminent and where no
just reason exists for employing them to forestall such invasion, would be unauthorized
and contrary to the Constitution. In this connection it may be observed that the
courts are unanimous in holding that the President is the sole judge of the necessity
for calling forth the militia under the constitutional authority, and that his judgment
is conclusive upon all others. (Story on the Constitution, sec. 1211; Martin v. Mott,
12. Wheat., 19, 29; Luther v. Brown, 7 How., 1.)
I am unable to conceive of any condition that might arise under an intervention
such as suggested by the question under discussion, which would authorize the use of
the militia in a foréign country, except as such intervention might produce a condition:
of war and a consequent danger of invasion, save perhaps in the case of Cuba, where
peculiar legislative conditions exist. When the question of intervention in the affairs
of that country was presented, this office, under date of September 15, 1906, rendered
an opinion to the effect that, in virtue of Article III of the treaty with said country
of May 22, 1903, a forcible uprising, after proclamation had been issued commanding
insurrectionary combinations to disperse, would become “forcible resistance to the
authority of the United States and brings the case within the operation of para-
graph 14, Section 8, Article I, of the Constitution, which authorizes Congress “to
provide for calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the Union, suppress
insurrections, and repel invasions.” - gº -
But conditions in that country are peculiar in that the Cuban constitution itself
contains the treaty provisions above referred to authorizing intervention by the
United States. - 4. -
In case of a friendly intervention, should Congress, in the exercise of its consti-
tional authority, enact laws requiring the presence of United States officials in the
foreign country to execute such laws therein, it would then, in my opinion, be lawful
for the President to call forth the National Guard for the execution of such laws, and
to send it into such foreign country should their enforcement be resisted by powers too
great t6 be overcome by the ordinary means of civil administration. The condition
supposed would amount to a partial extension of the jurisdiction of the United States
over the territory in question, so that the laws of the United States would become
operative therein, and would become such laws as the National Guard might be called
upon io assist in executing.
It is suggested that the act of January 21, 1903, by providing that the militia or
National Guard, when called into the service of the United States, shall serve “either
within or without the United States,’’ authorizes the use of the National Guard in
that manner as though it were a part of the Volunteer Army and that persons enlisting
herein after the passage of the law do so with this understanding, and thereby waive.
ºxemption from foreign service which they may have had as militiamen. -
PREPAIRED NIESS FOR, NATIONAL DEFENSE. 74.1
It is clear that Congress can not by legislation extend the limits of its constitutional
authority over the militia, but there is no reason, in considering the scope of the law,
for limiting the powers of Congress to one particular head. It might in a single legis-
lative act exercise both its power to call forth the militia and its power to raise and
support armies. Indeed, this is the rule commonly applied when the constitu-
tionality of an act of Congress is called in question, and every power which Congress
possesses under the Constitution will be invoked to sustain the law; but the question
arises, Did Congress intend to make out of the militia a quasi addition to the Regular
or Volunteer Army, under the name of the National Guard, and to invest it with a
character different from that of the State militia? -
In this case the meaning is controlled by the subject matter of the law, which in
its title purports to be an act “to promote the efficiency of the militia.” Section 24
of the bill as introduced in Congress, which provided for the formation of a reserve
from which the Regular Army might be recruited, was, after debate, stricken out as
not germane to the purposes of the law. Furthermore section 1 of the act has been
amended by the act of May 27, 1908 (35 Stat., 399), by adding a proviso:
“That the provisions of this act and of section 1881 of the Revised Statutes shall
apply only to the militia as an organized land force.”
The words “either within or without the United States” must, therefore, be limited
to such Service as the militia may constitutionally be called upon to render as such,
and can not operate to extend their field of service beyond the Jimits fixed by the
Constitution. Viewed in this light, men enlisting in the National Guard do not
thereby stipulate away any right they may have had as militiamen to be exempt
from military services outside of the United States. The words quoted were probably
inserted out of abundant caution to prevent misunderstanding in case it should be
proper for the militia to cross an international boundary as an incident to their service
in repelling invasions, and to prevent a recurrence of events similar to those which
happened in the early part of the War of 1812 with Great Britain. It is my conclusion,
therefore, that the National Guard is none other than the Organized Militia of the
Constitution, and is subject to the same limitations as to its use when called into
the service of the General Government. In case of war it is suited for use as an
emergency force, or first line of defense, and is to be called out before the Volumteer
Army. Under the act of April 22, 1898, providing for the Volunteer Army, the
members of the different organizations of the National Guard may enlist as such
organizations in the volunteer forces, and thus, in case of continued hostilities, they
would gradually be absorbed into such volunteer forces. It is noted, however, that
the bill now pending before Congress for raising a volunteer force in time of actual
or threatened war omits this provision.
As a conclusion from the foregoing observations, and as a more specific answer to
your question, it is my opinion that the fresident is not authorized to call out the
National Guard and send it into a foreign country as a part of an army of occupation,
either in case of war or in case of intervention, unless as an incident to its use in re-
pelling invasion or in executing laws which for the time may be extended over such
territory, as hereinbefore indicated.
Very respectfully,
. E. H. C.Row DER,
Judge Advocate General.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
. Washington, February 17, 1912.
The SECRETARY OF WAR.
SIR: I have the honor to respond to your note of the 8th instant, in which you ask
my opinion upon the following question:
“Whether or not, under existing laws, the President has authority to call forth
the Organized Militia of the States and send it into a foreign country with the Regular
Army as a part of an army of occupation, especially should the United States inter-
vene in the affairs of such country under conditions short of actual warfare.”
From very early times, in both England and this country, the militia has always
been considered and treated as a military body quite distinct and different from
the regular of standing Army; governed by different laws and rules, and equally
different as to the time, place, or occasion of its service. One of the most notable
points of difference is this: While the latter was in the continued service of the Gov-
ernment and might be called into active service at all times and in all places where
armed force is required for any purpose, the militia could be called into the actual
742 PREPAIRED NIESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
service of the Government only in the few special cases provided for by law. Their
service has always been considered as of a rather domestic character, for the pro-
tection and defense of their own country, and the enforcement of its laws.
This has always been the English doctrine; and in Some instances acts of Parlia-
ment have expressly forbidden the use of the militia outside of the Kingdom. -
Our ancestors, who framed and adopted our Constitution and early laws, got their
ideas of a militia, its nature, and purposes from this, and must be taken to have in-
tended substantially the same military body, with the same limitations of the occasion
and nature of their service. If they had intended to enlarge this, they would have
said so, just as they have when they intended to further limit or restrict the occasion
or nature of their service. -
When the Constitution gives to Congress the power “to raise and support armies”
and to provide “for calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the Union, suppress
insurrections, and repeal invasions” and makes the President “the Commander in
Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and the militia of the several States
when called into the actual service of the United States,” it is speaking of two different
bodies, the one Regular Army, in the continuous Service of the Government and liable
to be called into active service at any time, or in any place where armed force is re-
quired; and the other, a body for domestic Service, and liable to be called into the
service of the Government only upon the particular occasions named in the Consti-
tution. And acts of Congress relating to the Army and the militia must have the same
construction. -
It is certain that it is only upon one or more of these three occasions—when it is
necessary to suppress insurrections, repel invasions, or to execute the laws of the
United States—that even Congress can call this militia into the service of the United
States, or authorize it to be done.
As “insurrection ” is necessarily internal and domestic, within the territorial limits.
of the Nation, this portion of the sentence can afford no warrant for sending the militia
to suppress it elsewhere. And even if an insurrection of our own citizens were set
on foot and threateningly maintained in a foreign jurisdiction and upon our border,
to send an armed force there to suppress it would be an act of war which the President
can not rightfully do.
The term “to repel invasion * may be, in some respects, more elastic in its meaning.
Thus, if the militia were called into the service of the General Government to repel
an invasion, it would not be necessary to discontinue their use at the boundary line,
but they might (within certain limits at least) pursue and capture the invading force
even beyond that line, and just as the Regular Army might be used for that purpose.
This may well be held to be within the meaning of the term “to repel invasion.”
Then, too, if an armed force were assembled upon our border, so near and under
circumstances which plainly indicated hostility and an intended invasion, this Gov-
ernment might attack and capture or defeat such forces, using either the Regular
Army or the militia for that purpose. This, also, would be but one of the ways of
repelling an invasion. *
But this is quite different from and affords no warrant for sending the militia into a
foreign country in time of peace and when no invasion is made or threatened.
The only remaining occasion for calling out the militia is “to execute the laws of the
Union.” But this certainly means to execute such laws where, and only where they
are in force and can be executed or cnforced. The Constitution or laws of the United
States have no extraterritorial force, and can not be compulsorily executed beyond or
outside of the territorial limits of the United States. *
It is true that treatics made in pursuance of the Constitution are, equally with acts
of Congress, the supreme law of the land; but their observance, outside of our own
jurisdiction, can not be enforced in the same way. The observance and performance,
outside of our own jurisdiction, of treaty stipulations and obligations are left much to
the honor, good faith, and comity of the other contracting party, reenforced, at times,
by a regard for the consequences of a breach. We can not send either the Regular
Army or the militia into a foreign country to execute such treaties or our laws. Such an
invasion of a foreign country would be an act of war.
Outside of our own limits “the laws of the Union'' are not executed by armed force,
either regular or militia. *.
The Constitution had already given to Congress the unlimited power to declare
war at any time and for whatever cause it chose. It did not, in this provision, attempt
the useless thing of giving to Congress an additional power to declare war, or to afford
an additional ground for doing so. -
• * ,
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 7.43
What is certainly meant by this provision is that Congress shall have power to call
out the militia in aid of the civil power for the peaceful execution of the laws of the
Union, wherever such laws are in force and may be compulsorily executed: Much
. 2, º may call upon the posse comitatus to peacefully disperse a riot, or execute
the la WS. -
Under our Constitution, as it has been uniformly construed from the first, the
military is subordinate and subservient to the civil power, and it can be called upon
to execute the laws of the Union only in aid of the civil power and where the civil
power has jurisdiction of such enforcement. Even the Regular Army can be thus
called upon only on such occasions; and, certainly, the militia can not be thus called
upon at any other.
Then, as the civil power is without force in a foreign country, and as even the
Regular Army can not be sent into another country to there execute the laws of the
Union, it follows that the Constitution confers no power to send the militia into a
foreign country for the purpose stated in the question here considered. On the
contrary, by its specific enumeration of the only occasions for calling out the militia,
it clearly forbids this. * - r
In all this I am not unmindful that nations Sometimes do make hostile demonstra-
tions and use armed force to compel the observance by another nation of its treaty
obligations and Sometimes Send armed forces into another country to protect the lives
and rights of its own citizens there.
I shall briefly notice these in their application to our own country, its Constitution,
and laws. It will be observed, and as controlling and conclusive of the present
question, that, in case of a hostile demonstration against or a forcible attack upon
another nation to enforce its treaty obligations, or to punish their infraction, there is
no question involved of executing the laws of the invading nation, for such laws have
no force or existence there. While the Constitution makes itself and the laws and
treaties in pursuance thereof the Supreme law of the land, it is only in our own land
where such laws are Supreme or of any force. As to the other contracting party, a
treaty is a mere compact, depending for its observance upon the good faith, comity,
or other moral considerations. The Constitution can not make itself or the treaties
or laws made under it the Supreme law of any other nation, or give to either any force
or existence beyond our own borders. So that when an armed force is used to compel
the observance of treaty obligations or to punish or obtain compensation for their
Violation, there is no question of executing any law of the Union, for there is no such
law there. It is but the forcible compelling of the observance of an agreement or
compensation for its breach. The provision referred to does not warrant the use of
the militia for this purpose. -
Just So, it is, when in troublous times an army of occupation, large or Small, is sent
into a foreign country to ptotect the lives and the rights of our own citizens. Here,
too, no law of the Union is being executed by such invasion, for no law of the Union
exists, or can be enforced there. -
While it is the duty of every nation to afford proper protection to foreigners who are
lawfully within its borders, yet this is not because of any law of the nation of which
such foreigners are subjects, for no such law exists, or have any force there. No one
can say in such a case that we are executing or enforcing any law of the Union. We
are but aiding or compelling the foreign government to execute its own laws and to
perform its own duty. As no law of the Union is being executed by such invasion,
the militia can not be called out under this provision to take part in it. As no law
of the Union can exist or be in force in any foreign country the militia can not be
called out to enforce any such law there.
The plain and certain meaning and effect of this constitutional provision are to
confer upon Congress the power to call out the militia “to execute the laws of the
|Union” within our own borders, where, and where only, they exist, have any force,
or can be executed by anyone. This confers no power to send the militia into a
foreign country to execute our laws, which have no existence or force there, and can
not be there executed. - -
If authority is needed for the conclusion here reached the following may suffice:
In Ordronaux, Constitutional Legislation, page 501, it is said:
“The Constitution distinctly enumerates the three exclusive purposes for which
the militia may be called into the service of the United States. Those purposes are:
First, to execute the laws of the Union; second, to suppress insurrection; and third, to
repel invasions. e *
“These three occasions representing necessities of a strictly domestic character,
plainly indicate that the services required of the militia can be rendered only upon
the soil of the United States or of its Territories. * * * In the history of this
744 PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
provision of the Constitution there is nothing indicating that it was even contem-
plated that such troops should be employed for purposes of offensive warfare outside
the limits of the United States. And it is but just to infer that the enumeration of the
specific occasions on which alone the militia can be called into the service of the
eneral Government was intended as a distinct limitation upon their employment.
“Being the ministers of the law to enforce its commands, they can only be sum-
moned by the law-making power to act within the extent of its jurisdiction and in
the manner prescribed by the Constitution. They can not consequently be used to
invade, the territory of a neighboring country or to enforce any public rights abroad.
“The militia of the States restricted to domestic purposes alone are to be distin-
guished therefore from the Army proper of the United States, which, whether in the
form of regular troops or volunteers, may be used to invade a foreign country as well as
to repel the attack of foreign enemies.”
And Von Holtz, Constitutional Law, page 170, it is said, “the militia can not be taken
out of the country.” -
In Kneedler v. Lane (45 Pa. St., 238), Judge Strong, speaking for the court, said:
“Apart from the obligations assumed by treaty, it is well known that there are
many other cases where the rights of a nation and of its citizens can not be protected
or vindicated within its own boundaries. But the power conferred by Congress over
the militia is insufficient to enable the fulfillment of the demands of such treaties, or
to protect the rights of the Government or its citizens in those cases in which protec-
tion must be sought beyond the territorial limits of the country.” -
And see Houston v. Moore (5 Wheat., 1) and Martin v. Mott (12 Wheat., 19, 27).
. It is true that the act of January 21, 1903, as amended by the act of May 27, 1908
(35 Stat., pt. 1, 399), provides: -
... “That whenever the President calls forth the Organized Militia of any State, Ter-
ritory, or of the District of Columbia, to be employed in the service of the United
States, he may specify in his call the period for which such service is required, and
the militia, so called, shall continue to serve during the term so specified, either within
or without the territory of the United States, unless sooner relieved by order of the
President.” - . . - -
But this must be read in view of the constitutional power of Congress to call forth
the militia only to suppress insurrection, repel invasions, or to execute the laws of
the Union. Congress can not, by its own enactment, enlarge the power conferred
upon it by the Constitution; and if this provision were construed to authorize Con-
gress to use the Organized Militia for any other than the three purposes specified, it
would be unconstitutional. This provision applies only to cases where, under the
Constitution, said militia may be used outside of our own borders, and was doubtless
inserted as a matter of precaution, and to prevent the possible recurrence of what took
place in our last war with Great Britain, when portions of the militia refused to obey
orders to cross the Canadian frontier.
I think that the constitutional provision here considered not only affords no war-
rant for the use of the militia by the General Government, except to suppress insur-
rection, repel invasions, or to execute the laws of the Union, but, by its careful
enumeration of the three occasions or purposes for which the militia may be used, it
forbids such use for any other purpose; and your question is answered in the negative.
Respectfully, -
GEO. W. WICKERSHAM,
Attorney General.
The CHAIRMAN. Those decisions do not go to the extent of ques-
tioning the power of Congress to demand a service, but only the
power of Congress to utilize these forces out of the State?
Gen. CROWDER. Utilize these forces under existing law.
Senator DU Pont. Did you not state that in your judgment Con-
gress had the right of conscription at any time, either in peace or in
war : - - -
Gen. CROWDER. Yes, sir.
Senator DU Pont. Has it the right of conscription for any purpose,
as for instance purely for instruction, or is there any limitation as to
the purposes of conscription ? -
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 7 45
Gen. CROWDER. The Central Government is one of delegated pow-
ers, and if it has the power of conscription for purposes of instruction
it is because it has been delegated either expressly or by necessary
implication. I mean to say that I would have to defend the power
of conscription for the purposes of instruction under some delegated
%. I think it may be defended under the power to raise armies.
Whenever Congress is organizing the defense of the country and pro-
viding for a military force, it may be said to be acting under that
clause of the Constitution. As I have said, the power is unlimited
and may be exercised both in peace and in war. • -
Senator DU PONT. That would appear, then, to include the right
to organize for purposes of instruction, or what is commonly known
as training?
Gen. CROWDER. Yes; first declaring them a part of the military
forces, which they have the right to do, and nº them a part of
the general system of defense and a part of the Army of the United
States—
Senator DU PONT. Then you could give them any military instruc-
tion you desired 3
Gen. CROWDER. Yes. -
Senator WEEKs. General, what do you think is absolutely essential
in the matter of retaining the militia in its present form as far as en-
listment is concerned, and its relation to the States, and yet making
it absolutely available for national needs whenever the National
Government thinks the militia is required 7 .
Gen. CROWDER. I think a constitutional amendment would be
necessary. I have just explained to the committee, Senator, how
far we could go by legislation to accomplish that end. -
Senator CATRON. What do you understand to be the militia
Gen. CROWDER. I understand the militia of the Constitution to be
the arms-bearing population. I know that Congress has defined it to
consist of the able-bodied male citizens between 18 and 45, and I
presume that that operates as an exemption to excuse those under 18
and over 45. -
Senator CATRON. You understand it to be the militia in contempla–
tion of which Congress may provide for its training, etc., subject to
the appointment of the officers, or actual training by the State? Do
you mean that the word “militia” embraces everybody ?
Gen. CROWDER. I think it embraces everybody, but I am not
unmindful of the importance that attaches to the opinion of the
Supreme Court of Massachusetts, which I have just stated, namely,
that when the United States has declared who should compose the
militia, no other than those could be included.
Senator CATRON. But if the United States has not prescribed by
statute who shall compose it, do you claim that every able-bodied
person still is a member of the militia, not the Organized Militia º
Gen. CROWDER. Oh, yes. * -
Senator CATRON. Then, if you could execute the draft in time of
peace, would it not be taking the militia and making them subject
to the United States ? -
Gen. CROWDER. It would, and that precise question was con-
sidered by practically all the courts North and South that passed
upon the constitutionality of conscription.
746 PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
Senator CATRON. When we call them out for training as you say
we may do. - .
Gen. CROWDER. No; as I say you can not do. I say that the power
of the General Government does not extend to calling them out for
training as militia. - -
Senator CATRON. I am speaking about the people at large; not the
militia. I am speaking . the able-bodied men in the whole
country, such as you mentioned a while ago that were subject to
draft. Suppose we declared them all to be a portion of the United
States Army, the reserve part of the United States Army, would that
segregate them from the fact of being a part of the militia
Gen. CROWDER. Your question seems to assume, Senator, that the
United States will so exert its power as to include all of the arms-
bearing population. Am I right?
Senator CATRON. Yes.
Gen. CROWDER. In that sense there is a taking of the militia, the
arms-bearing population, for national purposes, and there will be no
force, no body of people, subject to be organized as Organized Militia.
Is that your question ?
Senator CATRON. Yes; but I put my question still further, leaving
out what is known as the Organized Militia in the different States
and assuming that the Government makes these persons a part of
the reserve Army of the United States, subject to the training, if
you want to state it that way. Who would appoint the officers or
hº the United States Government provide for the officers of an
organization formed in that way?
d º CHAIRMAN. Would the National Guard be exempt from that
raft, 7
Gen. CROWDER. Personally I think not; though, as I have said,
the Virginia Court of Appeals reserved that question.
The CHAIRMAN. Thev could still maintain their National Guard
ºrations and at the same time be compelled to submit to the
raft, 7 -
Miº CROWDER. Yes, I think they could be drafted as Organized
ilitia.
Senator CATRON. If that were the case, would the Government be
compelled to receive their organization with the draft'. -
Gen. CROWDER. I think not, but that is a personal view. That is
a question which the Court of Appeals of the State of Virginia re-
served. If the opinions of the court as to the constitutionality of
the draft law were sustained on any one point, it was the power of
the General Government to raise armies was not to be taken in any
sense as subordinate to the powers of the States over the militia.
Senator CATRON. You mean the Organized Militia, or those who
are subject to service'? . . - -
Gen. CROWDER. They were not considering specially the Organized
Militia, but the statement broad enough to include both organized
and unorganized militia. . - *
The CHAIRMAN. General, all of Washington's correspondence dur-
ing the Revolutionery War, and I think the correspondence of officers
of the Army in subsequent wars, disclosed the absolute and inherent
weakness of the State Organized Militia . -
PREPAREDNESS FOR, NATIONAL DEFENSE. 747
Gen. CROWDER. I read the military history of the country in that
Se][].SG.
The CHAIRMAN. So that for a proper defense and to establish a
proper reserve in time of peace, some system must be adopted to get
around that inherent weakness?
Gen. CROWDER. Yes, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. I think that is generally conceded.
Gen. CROWDER. Absolute national control seems to be the essen-
tial in the development of dependable troops of the first line.
The CHAIRMAN. Was there any other branch or phase of the
subject that you desired to discuss?
Gen. CROWDER. No, I think not. -
The CHAIRMAN. Have any other members of the committee any
questions to ask Gen. Crowder §
Gen. CROWDER. I have not answered one question of Senator
Weeks's. I have already pointed out, Senator, the extreme limit to
which Congress can go in the federalization of the militia under that
view of the Constitution which concedes the most ample powers to
the General Government. Of course, Congress can not properly in-
vade the expressly reserved powers of the States to train in time of
peace or when the militia is not under call, although Congress is now
invading them by Federal appropriations conditioned upon compli-
ance with what Congress prescribed in the matter of training. Con-
gress can go on in that way and invade the powers of the States by
making appropriations and conditioning them, and I have pointed
out to the committee how you can condition the appropriation in
such a way that no officer of the Organized Militia can receive Fed-
eral pay who has not been appointed by the governor as a result of
an examination approved by the Secretary of War, and that no en-
listed man can be paid any part of the congressional appropriation
unless he is under an enlistment contract prescribed by Congress; and
I stated how you could go on in that way and extinguish the power
of the State over the militia, provided the militia voluntarily com-
plied with what Congress prescribed, but that there was no coercive
authority in the General Government over the States to enforce what
it had prescribed, and that such a system was based upon consent.
Does that cover your question, Senator Weeks'
Senator WEEKs. Absolutely, yes.
The CHAIRMAN. General, it is rather immaterial whether the
Government can reach down in its capacity and train the Organized
Militia of the State, if it can nevertheless make them a part of the
reserve army of the United States, because the Government can
train them according to its own ideas as a national force, and the
States can proceed to train them as they please under the State law
Gen. CROWDER. There are only two ways in which you can make
them part of the Army of the United States, and that is by permitting
them to volunteer or by drafting.
The CHAIRMAN. In either event, then, they would be subject to
national control? -
Gen. CROWDER. Absolutely.
The CHAIRMAN. The constitutions of some of the States forbid
National Guard officers from holding any Federal positions.
748 PREPAIRED NIESS FOR, NATIONAL DEFENSE.
Gen. CROWDER. That is true. When I was discussing the provi-
Sion of the Senate bill respecting the Organized Militia, what is known
as the militia pay bill, I undertook to state what objections I found
to the phraseology of section 37. I pointed out that it provided for
a dual agreement; that it proposed to create a dual status, one
Federal and the other State, and that the section assumed that
the Federal and State status could coexist, that obligations could
arise out of each status, and two military allegiances be borne to
two commanders in chief, one the governor of a State, and the other
the President of the United States. I stated the difficulty I had in
entertaining that conception. .
There is one other point that I forgot to mention, and when I have
covered that I have answered your inquiry.
Assuming that the section can be executed in the form it appears
in the bill, the effect would be to have one individual at the same time
an officer of the National Guard of the State, and an officer of the
Army of the United States. I made a hasty search of the consti-
tutions of the States to see whether they would permit of such a
dual status as far as the officers were concerned, and I found that
eight of the States had constitutional provisions to the effect that no
person holding an office of honor or profit under the United States
could hold office of honor or profit under the State. Whatever may
be said by way of contending that the office is not one of profit,
because at times it may not carry rights of pay, I think we would
have to concede that it was an office of honor, and I think it would
be impossible until each of these States had amended its constitution
for this section to go into effect without men who accepted a Federal
office losing a State office.
I just point to that as one of the difficulties in the way of relying
upon the provision in the form in which it is. :
The CHAIRMAN. Have you suggested a substitute for that particular
provision ? -
Gen. CROWDER. I have been called upon for a report on this bill, and
I have it in an advanced state of preparation. It will probably reach
you in the course of two or three days. -
The CHAIRMAN. Can you embody in this record a substitute for that
provision which will meet your views?
Gen. CROWDER. Yes. -
The suggested amendments to section 37 and section 37a of Senate
bill 1158, Sixty-fourth Congress, are as follows: -
Omit the part stricken out and insert the part printed in italics.
SEC. 37. That no money appropriated under the pro-
visions of this Act shall be paid to any person who has not,
in addition to his obligation as a member of the Organized
Militia of a State, Territory, or the District of Columbia,
voluntarily subscribed an agreement to serve the United
States in the manner provided in this Act and in connec-
tion with such agreement taken an oath as–à–eeñāfāissi
effleer-er-eńkisted-H+a+ binding him to serve in the Army of the
United States: Provided, That the obligation to serve in the
Army of the United States shall be effective from the date of
the agreement and oath herein prescribed to epeat
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 749
ef-effieee-and-ealisted—Haah—ia—the-Array—ef-the-United-States
make such person a member of the Army of the United States;
but effieeps-and-enlisted—men such persons so subscribing such
agreement and oath shall not, without the consent of Congress,
be ordered into the active military service of the United States
as a part of the Army thereof, nor shall they be entitled to
the pay and emoluments of officers and enlisted men in the
Army of the United States except as otherwise provided
in this Act. * *
SEC. 37a. That the President, with the consent of Con-
gress, in time of war, or when war is imminent, or in grave
international emergency requiring the use of troops in excess
of the Regular Army of the United States, may order into
the active military service of the United States as a part of
the Army thereof any portion of the Organized Militia hav-
ing subscribed the agreement and oath prescribed in section
thirty-eight of this Act, to continue in such active service for
two years, unless sooner released by order of the President;
persons so ordered into the active military service as a part of the
Army of the United States shall be embodied in organizations corres-
onding, so far as practicable, to those of the Regular Army or shall
e otherwise assigned as the President may direct, and the com-
missioned officers of such organizations shall be appointed from
the members thereof, officers with rank not above that of colonel to
be appointed by the President alone, and all other officers to be
appointed by the President by and with the advice and consent
of the Senate; and any Organized Militia, so ordered into active
service as a part of the Army of the United States shall be
available for any duty for which the Regular Army may be
employed, and shall, from the date of notice of the order to
report for active service until released from further liability to
render service thereunder, be subject not only to the Articles of
War but also to the laws, orders, and regulations governing the
Regular Army in so far as such laws, orders, and regulations
are applicable to officers and enlisted men whose permanent
retention in the military service of the United States, either
on the active list or on the retired list, is not contemplated:
Provided, That when, in the discretion of the President, the
necessity for their further use no longer exists, he shall
release said organizations and the members thereof from
liability to render further active service under said order,
and said organizations and the members thereof, when so
released, shall cease for the time being to be in the active
military service of the United States: Provided further,
That when troops in excess of the Regular Army are needed
under the provisions of this section the Organized Militia of .
any arm or branch, except the officers' reserve corps provided
for in section seven of this Act, shall be called into the service
of the United States in advance of any volunteer force of the
same arm or branch which it may be determined to raise.
23380—PT 14–16—5 -
750 PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
Senator. WEEKs. Mr. Chairman, has there been an amendment to
the ºnstitution prepared that would cover the question which I
asked 3 -
The CHAIRMAN. The Federal Constitution ?
Senator WEEKS. Yes.
The CHAIRMAN. No; not that I know of.
º at 12.20 o'clock p. m., a recess was taken until 2
o'clock p. m.) gº
AFTER, IRECESS.
The committee reassembled, at the expiration of the recess, at 2
o'clock p. m.
STATEMENT OF LIEUT. GEN, NELSON A. MILES, UNITED
STATES ARMY, RETIRED,
The CHAIRMAN. General, this committee has had under consider-
ation a number of bills having for their purpose the reorganization of
the Army, and other purposes along kindred lines, and we would like
to hear from you on the whole subject in such way as you desire or may
be willing to present it.
Gen. MILEs. I am prepared to answer any questions, or I can give
you my views.
The CHAIRMAN. I think it probably would be better for the com-
mittee to have you present your views generally; then we will ask
such questions as we desire.
Gen. MILEs. My life has been devoted to the military service, and
I take as deep an interest in the Army as anyone. I have seen the
Army reorganized three times. After the Civil War many military men
thought we ought to have 100,000 men in the Army of this country.
Congress came together and said, “We will give you half of that.”
The Army was then reorganized in 1866 at 54,000 men. After a
serious panic, lasting five years, Congress came together and said,
“We must reduce the expenses of the Government,” and the Army
was cut down to 45,000, then 30,000, and finally approximately
25,000 men, where it remained for nearly a quarter of a century.
Many people thought that the proper size for an army—no more, no
less. }*. the hardest work, when I came into command of the
Army, to get it out of that shell.
In changing the fortifications of the coast from the old smooth-
bore guns mounted on wooden carriages to heavy, high-power guns
on steel carriages, we succeeded in getting an increase of the
Artillery. Then, when the shell was broken, I urged, and it was
adopted, practically, that the Government fix a standard of its
hysical forces commensurate with the necessities of the country
and that they should grow as the Nation grows. They authorized
one soldier per thousand of population, practically. With 65,000,000
people the Army was authorized to be 65,000 strong. . Then, addi-
tional authority was granted to make it 100,000, and that is the
authorized strength to-day, but it never has been recruited to that
strength.
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 751
I have a memorandum here I would like to present to the com-
mittee in regard to the physical strength of the Nation, and then
what I would suggest as a most economical and effective organization.
It is safe to say that our military strength includes 20,000,000 men
capable of bearing arms; that is, capable in case of a great emer-
gency, in case of invasion of our country, and the Government or
our liberties were being destroyed, who would go to the defense of
their country, but not, of course, capable of passing the rigid exam-
ination prescribed. There will be found 10,000,000 capable of doing
effective military service.
In the recent War with Spain there were over 300,000 men in the
Regular and Volunteer Armies. As commanding general of the
Army, I asked for only 160,000 men, but the pressure was so great
at the recruiting stations and on the administration, urging the
acceptance of regiments and batteries, that the Government did
accept 300,000 men. Only 52,000, however, left the country before
the indication of peace was apparent. That war was soon over.
Referring to it, I may say that it was somewhat remarkable,
from the fact that one side never lost a gun, a rifle, a prisoner, nor an
inch of ground, but they captured thousands of prisoners, guns,
colors, and vast territory that is now under the control of our Gov-
ernment.
Senator FLETCHER. General, may I inquire right there as to how
you found the working of the National Guard in connection with the
Army at that time 3 f
Gen. MILEs. The National Guard volunteered in many cases by
regiments, but in some cases they were not accepted, unfortunately.
For instance, the Seventh New York, which is one of the best regi-
ments on earth, volunteered as a regiment, and desired to go as
a regiment, because they had spent, many of them, a good part of
their lives in making it a perfect organization, and some of them did
not care to go as individuals, and i sympathized with that feeling;
at least, I think they were very reasonable about it. Speaking of the
number of men in the Spanish War, most of the men who volun-
teered are now within the military age.
Including the men in the Army and those who have enlisted since
(during the last 17 years), 400,000 men have passed through all
the drill, instruction, and discipline of the military service. Approxi-
mately the same number have received military training in the
National Guard. During that time about 136,000 young educated
men have received miliary instruction at our agricultural colleges,
under Regular Army officers. These figures make a total of near
1,000,000 men in our country who have received military instruction,
either in the Regular Army, the National Guard, or the agricultural
colleges, for which Congress appropriates money and furnishes officers
for drii and instruction. This does not include the men in other
military institutions, like the Virginia Military Institute, the institu-
tions in Vermont and Georgia, and different places where the young
men are drilled and disciplined; for instance, the corps of cadets here
in Washington. -
To say that these brave, patriotic men would not respond in case
their country was #ºf and their Government and liberties
752 PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
endangered would be a statement as unjust as it would be untrue.
Added to the above number there are between two and three millions
of men in our country who have passed through all the drill, disci-
pline, and instruction of European armies, and are now, in the main,
earnest, patriotic citizens of the Great Republic. -
One of your distinguished members, Senator du Pont, with a
brilliant military record, will remember that during the Civil War
many of the men of that class gave their lives as freely as any and
did as gallant service.
There are many officers on the retired list who have seen more
actual warfare than any body of men in any part of the world. In
case of emergency they are capable of organizing and commanding
large bodies of men, as is now being done by the generals in the
German Army, some of whom have been several years on the retired
list and are now called back and winning victories for that nation.
One of the most brilliant generals in Europe was six years on the
retired list. ... • -
During the last 30 years the Government has expended approxi-
mately $200,000,000 for our coast defenses. The result at Alexandria,
Port Arthur, and the Dardanelles is sufficient evidence that guns
aboard ship are no match for coast fortifications and submarine
mines. Within the control of the Federal Government and the
States there are now at least 1,000,000 serviceable rifles. Our gun
and ammunition factories are manufacturing at least 5,000,000 rifle
cartridges daily, and will soon be capable of manufacturing daily
50,000 artillery shells, if not more. In fact, there is now being
constructed in our country daily more war material than any two
armies now warring against each other in Europe are using in the
same time. Our railroads are blockaded with munitions of war, and
they find difficulty in getting ships enough to take the war material
to Europe. !
Having had much to do with the placing and construction of our
fortifications and inspecting every one along the Atlantic, Pacific,
and Gulf coasts, as well as having had an opportunity of seeing all
the great armies of the world and many of their strongest fortifica-
tions, including the Dardanelles, I am prepared to say that our coasts
are as well defended as the coasts of any country, with the same class
of high-power guns and heavy projectiles.
I think the fortifications at San Francisco harbor cost at least
$15,000,000, the defenses of New York cost more than that. Of
gourse, in changing from the old system of fortifications, of stone
forts, two tiers, we had to take new ground, build concrete walls 16 feet
thick, then put earth emplacements in front of those 30 feet thick,
then build concrete magazines under ground, then mount modern
guns with the modern appliances. That change took some 15 or 20
Vé8,I’S.
y Our Nation is composed of sovereign citizens who appreciate their
independence and realize the difference between their condition and
that of the millions of men now mere subjects of some despotism and
used as food for powder. -
What is required is a reasonable increase to the physical force as
the Nation grows. The Army is now authorized by Congress to be
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 758
100,000 men. I would recommend that authority be granted to in-
crease the strength to 140,000, or possibly 150,000 men, that num-
ber to be considered the minimum strength in time of peace; but
the organization should be perfected in such a way that it can be imme-
diately eſcpanded to 400,000 without adding a single officer or a single
negiment. This should be done by filling the ranks to the maximum
war strength, and I have therefore prepared a memorandum which
could be framed into a bill. This is no new theory, but is the result
of years of experience and observation, not only in our country, of
the requirements and condition of our people, but experience and ob-
servation in every other army of the world.
I am sure that it would be the most economical of any of the many
plans now suggested, and I am sure that it would be the most effective
organization that could possibly be adopted by our Government. It
would also be capable of expanding into a military force of 1,200,000
men. This need only be done as the revenues of the Government
would warrant. You can have the system, the organization, and in case
of emergency you can do as you did in the Spanish War, when one
day you appropriated fifty millions of dollars. If you have the
system and the organization, and fill it up from the bottom, you
have all the military experience and skill available to be used in the
most effective manner.
It would require no special or extraordinary increase of taxes upon
the people, or additional burdens. Of course, as you changed the
organization, there would be vacancies at the bottom of the list,
which would have to be filled either from West Point, from the
Army, or by civilian appointments. The additional number of secord
lieutenants that would be required by this change, I recommend be
appointed from the States and congressional districts in the course
of four years, the same as the appointments are now being made to
West Point and Annapolis. This system would be purely American,
and there is nothing to indicate that a larger military force would be
required in the near future, and I hope never in the distant future.
have drawn up a memorandum that seems to be in accordance
with the general impression that the Army must be increased as the
Nation has grown and new developments have appeared, and I have
therefore put this plan in brief form for your consideration.
The line of the Army should be composed, in time of peace, of
149,720 enlisted men, so organized that it can be immediately re-
. to approximately 400,000 men in time of threatened or actual
W8,I’I?,I’O. - -
The organization in time of peace to be as follows: Ninety-seven
regiments of Infantry, 1,000 men each, aggregating 97,000 men and
4,850 officers. In the German Army the war strength of a rºgiment
is 3,000, and in the Russian Army it is 4,000. If you have the mini-
mum of a regiment a thousand, which is enough, and then in time
of threatened warfare that recruited up to 3,000 men, it is none too
much to enter a campaign. The first four or five battles would prob-
ably reduce it down 25 or 50 per cent in strength. Then I would
recommend 20 regiments of Coast Artillery, 1,000 men each, aggre-
gating 20,000 men and 1,000 officers; 20 regiments of Field Artifiery,
790 men each, aggregating 15,800 men and 880 officers; 18 regiments
754 PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
of Cavalry, 940 men each, aggregating 16,920 men and 900 officers;
total, 155 regiments, 149,720 men, and 7,430 officers equipped with
motor cycles and machine guns to be distributed in the Almy where
they would be most useful.
Senator DU Pont. How many Field Artillery guns would that give?
Gen. MILEs. I would recommend 125 men to a battery of Field
Artillery in time of peace, with four guns, but the four additional guns
should be in the gun sheds, because in time of war you could not
readily manufacture field guns, and they should be manufactured
and availablé with a view of having enough for the war strength, so
that you would not have to wait for the manufacture of guns before
you were ready to go to war. Then that should be increased to 250
men to a battery, which would not be too much for a certain class of
un. It might be more than was needed for eight guns of 3.3 inches,
ut they have increased the caliber from 3.3 up to 6 inches, and even
as high as 9 inches, heavy guns that have to be drawn by 12 horses,
and of course it takes more men to handle the heavy ammunition and
to handle the guns than it would those of smaller caliber.
Senator DU Pont. I will put my question in another form. How
many guns to a thousand muskets does your plan propose 7
Gen. MILES. I am assuming that in time of peace they would have
only four guns with them, but they would have four others in the gun
sheds. That would be a much larger percentage in time of peace,
but in time of war the percentage would be approximately four to a
thousand. In the German Army it is six. That is why I recommend
an increase of the Ficló Artillery. -
Senator CATRON. Did you say 12 regiments of Field Artillery'.
Gen. MILEs. Twenty. There are not 12 batteries to a regiment;
there are only 6 to a regiment. But, with the Cavalry and Infantry,
there are 12 companies to each regiment. The war strength would
give the Infantry regiments 3,000 men; that is, I give them three
times as much in time of war as they have in time of peace. The
Coast Artillery need not increase so much, because you do not increase
the number of guns. But I double them, making 40,000 men for
the Coast Artillery and the same way with the Field Artillery. I
double that strength.
The Infantry r giment would be 3,000 men for war; Coast Artil-
lery, 2,000; Field Artillery, 1,540; and Cavalry, 1,840. Of course,
the Cavalry regiments are not as large, and they have their horses.
A small portion at least should have motor cycles. This is much
larger than the Cavalry regiments in Europe. That gives a total of
394,920 men and 7,430 officers.
I believe that will be all we will ever need, but in case a war
should continue, or should be more threatening and you wished
to increase it still more, utilizing the skill and experience of all
the officers and noncommissioned officers of your Army, this is also
suggested: Should the condition of the country require it, these
organizations can be increased to more than 1,000,000 men by con-
verting each regiment into a brigade, each battalion into a regiment
each company into a battalion, and each platoon into a company, and
assigning the officers temporary commissions according to the re-
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 755
uirements of the service, at the close of the war they returning to
their proper station in the Army as organized under this law. En-
listments in the service to be for three years. The National Guard
should be organized in the same way. -
That ... give you a peace force of nearly 300,000 men, and a war
strength of two millions of men. s
The enlistments years ago were for 5 years, then the time was re-
duced to 3 years, and that was found to be most advantageous. There
were fewer desertions with the enlistment of 3 years than at 5. We
did not reduce it below that, because men are recruited at the different
Stations sent to rendezvous, then to the recruiting depots, and when
enough are assembled they are sent to distant regiments. Most of
them are recruited in the densely populated portions of the country
and Sent to the Canadian border, or the Mexican border, or the western
frontier, or the Pacific coast, or the islands of the sea, and the trans-
portation back and forth and the time occupied and the time they
render service would be small if you reduced the term of enlistment.
Besides that, if a man is dissatisfied with the service after being in
6 months or a year, he will say to himself, “I have only a year or two
longer to serve,” but if he is tied up for 5 years, he might have an
incentive to desert. The desertions were formerly larger. Sometimes
they were 15 or 20 per cent of the Army.
Senator CATRON. Do you know what percentage they are now %
Gen. MILEs. Much smaller than they have ever been before. They
have been reduced from about 15 or 20 per cent down to 4 or 5 per
Cent. - -
Senator WEEKs. Has not the increase in pay something to do with
the desertions, General?
Gen. MILEs. Somewhat. It has not been extravagantly increased.
The pay is very small now.
The CHAIRMAN. General, have you considered the difficulties of
federalizing the National Guardº
Gen. MILEs. Not at all. Under your Constitution, if you want an
army for conquest, to carry on a war with some other country, it
would not be easily federalized; but for maintaining law and order
at home, maintaining the civil government of the States and Nation and
to repel invasion, it is available instantly, under the Constitution to
that extent it was wisely federalized 129 years ego.
Senator DU Pont. General, if we increased the National Guard,
what means would you devise to get the men? As it stands to-day,
they have from 110,000 to 120,000 men, and can not get more.
en. MILES. I am surprised, really, that they get so many, when
you think that the officers give their time and expense and atten-
tion and study to make their regiments effective and efficient,
and the men volunteer their time, which could be devoted to other
purposes—to employment, study, or reading—give their time to
make themselves efficient for the State or the Nation. I am surprised
that you get so many. My observation is they are a patriotic, i.
intelligent body of young men, and entitled to high consideration and
commendation, and the gratitude of the American people.
Senator FLETCHER. There seems to be difficulty about being able
to command them and order them around in case of trouble.
756 PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
Gen. MILEs. Not at all. -
Senator FLETCHER. That seemed to have been the objection.
Under State control they might not be available for national purposes.
Gen. MILEs. They can be called out in case of any serious trouble,
as they have been before, to maintain the authority of the States
and the United States within its jurisdiction, or to repel invasion.
Of course, this is not suggested for an army of conquest. That is
another subject. We have not reached that period yet, and I hope
we never will. -
Senator FLETCHER. What do you say about universal military
service 3 - -
Gen. MILES. You can not Germanize the American people. It
would be a step toward imperialism, and a very dangerous one. The
American people are a patriotic people. They appreciate their
system of government and their institutions, and will give their
lives as freely as any people in the world. But to compel them to
perform military service the same as some other countries, and be
absolute subjects of a despotism—we have not reached that period
and I hope we never will. -
Senator WEEKS. Based on your experience, General, you have not
any doubt about the desirability of an army of 140,000 or 150,000
men, and suitable reserves to bring it up to about 400,000, have you?
Gen. MILES. Certainly not. In case of imminent danger of in-
vasion, you could not keep the men back. The physical strength of
this Nation would be aroused in such a way as you have never seen
it before, and if you had an organization that was capable of expand=
ing, so as to give them a place where they could go, they would take
their places in line. Take your own case, Senator Weeks. You
have been educated at Annapolis, and there is another member of
this committee with a distinguished record, who was educated at
West Point. You could raise a regiment or a brigade or a division
overnight. Qe
Senator FLETCHER. The point has been made here that in those
circumstances we would have raw, untrained troops to meet trained
soldiers. It seems to me that has been magnified more or less. I
would like to have your opinion about it.
Gen. MILEs. As I have suggested, in every regiment of the United
States we would have a thousand men already. Fill up those places
to 3,000, and the chances are that you would bring back a great many
of the men who have served in the same regiment and have gone out
into civil life. As I explained to you, there are at least 1,000,000 men
who have passed through all the drill, discipline, and instruction of
the Regular Army, the National Guard, and your agricultural col-
leges authorized by Congress, to say nothing of the addition of other
military institutions and independent companies that are scattered
all over the country. - - -
Senator WEEKs. To my mind the difficulty is to keep hold of that
1,000,000 men, or a portion of them, who have been drilled and
thoroughly mechanized. How are you going to do that so that we
will be sure to get them 3 -
Gen. MILEs. You may be sure that in case of any crisis or danger
they would be only too glad. to volunteer; but if you make an im-
PREPAREDNESS FOR. NATIONAL DEFENSE. 757
perial army with a string tied to it, the chances are you would not
get them when you wanted them. They would go on the pay roll,
but in a great crisis I am not sure you would get them.
The talk about making this similar to the military force of Switz-
erland. Switzerland is a little community up in the snows of the
Alps. There is not a nation of Europe that would care to expend
the amount of life and treasure to conquer it; and there is no com-
parison with that community and a great nation covering a con-
tinent like ours, with a hundred millions of free people. It is abso-
lutely useless. They have no Regular Army, and I hope you will
certainly not destroy the organization that has been perfected and
is authorized by the Constitution and has been in existence for over
à hundred years—but improve that organization so as to make it
most effective. I would say the same as to the militia. Both are
recognized by the Constitution of the United States, but the Constitu-
tion does not recognize an unorganized mass or horde of men without
any control, without any commissioned or noncommissioned officers.
It would be a step toward centralization. -
Senator WEEKs. Personally, I am in agreement with you as to the
size of the Regular Army, relatively speaking, and with the size of
the reserve required. But I want to have that reserve made up of
men who are trained, and have a certainty that we are going to get
them when we need them. - - -
Gen. MILEs. You have them in the National Guard already. They
enlist and they give more time than is given or would be given by
any unorganized body. * -
enator WEEKs. I do not depreciate the National Guard. I
served in the National Guard 10 years and I think I know about
what it is. I want something a little more thoroughly mechanized
than the National Guard for the reserve for the Regular Army. ...
Gen. MILEs. I have a very high opinion of the National Guard.
The CHAIRMAN. General, how long does it take to make a raw
recruit a soldier'. - *
Gen. MILEs. It depends upon how efficient you make him. For
instance, take the Coast Artillery. It would take a man quite a long
time to understand all the duties of the profession in the coast forti-
fications. He needs to be a mathematician; he needs to be a man
to track ships, to use the range-finders to locate a ship, the elevating
and depressing of the guns in order to make his fire effective; that
requires a skilled artillerist. Yet in those batteries there is a great
deal of work to be done down in the concrete magazines, the lifting
and moving of heavy projectiles, for that work a man will learn in a
very few days. - -
The CHAIRMAN. Take an Infantry soldier.
Gen. MILEs. You could not make him an expert marksman,
but you could teach him the ordinary duties of a soldier in a
few months. The reason that the enlistment is for three years,
as I have explained, is the time needed in recruiting the men, to
get them to their regiments, the expense of getting them there, the
time required in getting them back to the places where they were
enlisted, and the expense of bringing them back. So that three
years has been found to be the most practicable.
"758 PREPAREDINESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
The CHAIRMAN. There seems to be a consensus of opinion amongst
military men here that it takes at least a year of pretty intensive
training to make a soldier out of a recruit.
Gen. MILEs. That is not extravagant or out of the way. :
Senator WEEKS. Take the case of the Heavy Artillery of which
you were speaking. Would it be practicable for us to make such an
organization as the First Heavy Artillery of Massachusetts a reserve
for the forces that are regularly stationed in those forts so that they
would be thoroughly manned in case of need?
Gen. MILEs. That is what it is now, practically. It is regarded as
a reserve. They go down in the summer and practice with the high-
power guns, make themselves familiar with them, and it is regarded
as a reserve for the Coast Artillery. Speaking of the men not coming
back, I believe our distinguished Senator was the author of the law
giving additional pay to men who have served in the Army—a very
fine and judicious measure. You could increase that as much as
you liked. You would be sure of getting men if you paid them, and
you would not pay money out of the Treasury until you wanted and
obtained them.
Senator DU PONT. Do you refer to that provision under which a
man who has received an honorable discharge and comes back gets
extra pay ?
Gen. MILEs. Yes; it is an excellent, wise provision.
The CHAIRMAN. That is, extra service pay on reenlistment'.
Senator DU PONT. Yes, provided he is physically fit and has a good
discharge. - e
Gen. MILES. Suppose you have a system of this kind, organize the
Regular Army of this country, which is very small, and an emergency
occurs or is threatened, in which Congress authorizes the employment
of a much larger force. They could do as they did in 1861, if neces-
sary, call for volunteers, especially men who had been in the service
before, for three months or six months. You would have no trouble
in filling the ranks. -
The CHAIRMAN. General, has it not been the opinion of military
men from Washington down, that they always have had trouble with
short enlistments?
Gen. MILEs. No; I do not think so. . .
The CHAIRMAN. Does, it not appear that Washington's men quit
the service at the end of their enlistments?
Gen. MILEs. Some did. - -
The CHAIRMAN. But the majority of the militia in the revolu-
tionary days were short-term enlistment men, and they would leave
as soon as their terms expired, even on the eve of battle.
Gen. MILEs. They had to go home and raise a crop to support their
families; then they would go back and fight again, and then they
would go back and raise another crop, or obtain additional food for
those dependent upon them, and this they did for seven long years.
The CHAIRMAN. They had trouble maintaining the Army; Wash-
ington said those men were more trouble than they were worth.
Gen. MILES. I am not so sure about that. They achieved their
independence.
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 7.59
The CHAIRMAN. Do you think they would have achieved it if it
had not been for the arrival of the French at the opportune time,
General'. -
Gen. MILEs. That is a question you can judge of as well as I,
I think they would. They might not have achieved it as speedily.
My grandfather walked home from Yorktown, and he would have
stayed seven years longer if it had been required.
Senator CATRON. General, you have suggested that we could
expand the 150,000 men which we would put in the Regular Army
to something over 400,000 from this lot of people who are disciplined
and drilled. How are you going to get them to join the Regular
Army'. There is a general disposition among volunteers not to go
into the Regular Army. How could you induce them to enlist, and
get that many men', - -
Gen. MILEs. It would depend altogether on the emergency.
“Thrice is he armed who hath his quarrel just.” If the emergency
were serious, you would have no trouble in getting twice that number.
Senator CATRON. To go into the Regular Army'
Gen. MILEs. Yes. They would be only too glad to serve, and
under that provision which you have already made they would get
extra pay. Either that, or else you have to keep your organizations
down in number to the minimum, and the war strength filled up to
the maximum. Then you have got to call for volunteers and take
just what officers you can get with volunteers, perhaps as inex-
perienced as the men, and if you would read Gen. Sherman's book
you would find he recommends the keeping up of the regiments,
filling them up to the full standard; that one Wisconsin Regiment
was worth any three regiments from the other States, where they
were allowed to go down and take in new organizations. That is
the object of this plan, to keep all the experienced officers and the non-
commissioned officers where they would be available and do the
most good.
Senator CATRON. It is true that Wisconsin soldiers, however, were
not regular soldiers; they were volunteer soldiers.
Gen. MILES. Yes; the same principle should apply to regiments .
of the Army.
Senator CATRON. And the disposition of people is not to go into
the Regular Army, but to go into some volunteer organization where
they would have an end to their service when the time for which
they enlisted ran out, or, rather, when the war closed.
Gen. MILEs. That depends entirely upon Congress. During the
Civil War, in order to strengthen the Regular Army, authority was
granted for men to be transferred from the Volunteers to the regular
regiments, and thousands applied and were so transferred. In the
war against Spain authority was given for men to enlist in the Regu-
lar Army for the war and were discharged at its close. Congress has
the absolute jurisdiction to authorize the organization of the Regular
Army in such a way that it can be expanded, and the National
Guard the same way, or, in case of war, to authorize a large Army
of volunteers, officers, and men. One would be enormously expen-
sive; the other would be efficient and economical.
760 PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
The CHAIRMAN. Have you read any one of these bills carefully,
General 7
Gen. MILEs. I confess that I have not, all of them.
The CHAIRMAN. Does any that you have read conform to your
idea of reorganization?
Gen. MILES. I do not know what bills have been introduced. I
know some I thought were very objectionable, but I am not here to
criticize. - -
The CHAIRMAN. That is what we want.
Gen. MILEs. I beg your pardon; I do not wish to comment on what
others may think. “
The CHAIRMAN. None of us are experts. We wanted to have the
benefit of men who have participated in war, and could give us
Sound advice on the subject. . .
Gen. MILEs. That which I have submitted is the result of careful
consideration. It will make the Army most effective and give you a
system that will be durable. As far as the expense is concerned, it
would not increase the expense more than $60,000,000, and certainly
that is not extravagant, provided you get 50,000 additional men and
nearly 4,000 officers. -
The CHAIRMAN. General, you served through the whole of the
Civil War. Speaking of volunteers to fill up these regiments as
depletions occurred through death and otherwise, at what period of
the war did the Government find it necessary to resort to the draft'
Gen. MILEs. It was 1863.
The CHAIRMAN. Do you know how many men were brought into
the Army under the system of the draft?
Gen. MILEs. I can not tell you positively. You can get those
figures from the War Department.
The CHAIRMAN. Do you think they could have kept the regiments
and the armies filled if it had not been for that system 7
Gen. MILEs. Possibly not. I know that thousands of troops had to
be taken from the field and sent back to surpress the riots occasioned
by the unpopular measure. -
The CHAIRMAN. Another thing that has been suggested here is
that the pension rolls have been very largely increased because of the
fact, first, of lack of preparation when the war commenced; and,
second, because of the short term enlistments. -
Gen. MILEs. The Army was contending against another army of
just the same character. There was no more preparation on the
other side than there was on ours. .
The CHAIRMAN. Both armies were trained in the field, practically 3
Gen. MILEs. By hard experience.
The CHAIRMAN. Would not much of that bloodshed have been
saved in the Union Army, for instance, if it had been fairly equipped
and prepared when the war broke out? -
Gén. MILEs. It probably would. If they had not had to contend
against an army prepared in the same way. That was a war of
Americans against Americans, and the armies were molded into
great strength and efficiency by the severe campaigns and battles
of the war of four years.
PREPAIREDINESS FOR, NATIONAL DEFENSE. 761
The CHAIRMAN. After it was over what was left of the two armies
would have made a powerful organization, would it not? -
Gen. MILEs. It was once suggested that two armies be formed,
one to move to the halls of Montezuma and the other to Montreal,
but that was not done. - - ^,
The CHAIRMAN. They did figure on it, though, did they not ?
Gen. MILEs. Very carefully. There was a French army in Mexico,
and the Alabama claims were then unsettled, and it was very strongly
urged that two armies be formed of the veterans of the two armies,
one sent to Montreal and the other to the City of Mexico. In fact,
an army of 50,000 was sent to the Rio Grande and the French
Emperor notified that the French army must be withdrawn from
Mexico. He replied that he would do that in his own good time,
and he was notified that the time had arrived.
As far as fortifications are concerned, I may say this, that every
war develops new engines of destruction. The American invention
of the airship, which was demonstrated over here at Fort Myer,
was a very important one. The Board of Ordnance, of which I was
president at the time, appropriated money to Prof. Langley to build
his first airship, and it has developed now into one of the most
effective engines of war. The submarine, another American inven-
tion, has also taken its place, and, as one British admiral said,
possibly it is the death knell of the dreadnaught. Anyway, those
two inventions are having very serious effect now, and will have more
in the wars of the future. Hence, I believe that one of our best meth-
ods of offense and defense, in addition to what we already have, would
be a very liberal appropriation for airships and submarines and the
Hammond radiodynamic torpedo-control system and Termit shell.
Senator FLETCHER. Speaking about fortifications, as I remember
the views of some experts who testified, they held that the concrete
walls and emplacements are rather a back number; that the way to
place a gun now is to place it behind a sand embankment.
Gen. MILEs. Ours are both, about 16 feet of solid concrete, and
about 30 feet of embankment in front of that. You can examine any
of these fortifications, and you will find that is the condition they are
in. Certainly the most powerful ships of the British Navy and the
French Navy have not been able to make any impression on the
fortifications of the Dardanelles, although they have lost 125,000
men and expended a billion six hundred million of treasure.
Senator FLETCHER. What do you think of the plans for moving
heavy guns on railroads and by motor transportation ?
Gen. MILEs. I do not know that we need to consider that at pres-
sent. The fortifications have been selected with great care by the
best engineers in the country, and constructed by the best engineers,
and are in good condition for the defense of the harbors. If we were
contending against a country that was fortified with permanent forti-
fications, then it might be necessary to construct those heavy 16-inch
mortars, that have to be transported by rail and put on a concrete
base, to be used to batter down fortifications. But an enemy that
would undertake to invade the United States would not bring that
kind of fortifications along with them, so that it has not been thought
762 PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
necessary to construct that kind of guns. The guns that will be placed
near the Panama Canal will be very heavy, high-power guns, as good.
as any in the world.
Senator FLETCHER. General, perhaps you would not want to ex-
ress any opinion about it, but, frankly, it seemed to me rather far
etched and absurd that it was a feasible thing for an army to be
transported across the ocean and landed on Rockaway Beach, or
Block Island, in such way that it could take that portion of the
country and then come on down and string a 400-mile line from
Chesapeake Bay to Lake Ontario. That is one of the important
dangers, apparently, in the minds of some people. I would like to
get your views about that, if you cared to express them.
Gen. MILEs. I dislike to give my views on that, as I consider it is
an unreasonable and impossible proposition. That is assuming, I
presume, that some enemy had transportation enough to embark
400,000 men, with 80,000 horses, with all the ammunition transporta-
tion and munitions of war required, and supplies enough to feed the
men and the animals for at least 90 days, because it would be easy to
burn anything within their reach, then supposing our own Navy at
the bottom of the sea, it might be possible to reach our shore. The
placing of an army on American soil is the last thing any European
É."; would attempt, it could never be reembarked. It would
issolve like the snow beneath the midday sun. Whenever it has
been attempted it has resulted in disaster. Many of the French
soldiers deserted in Mexico and are now citizens of the great republic.
Senator FLETCHER. It would be impossible for those ships to
carry coal enough to bring them over here and take them back,
would it not ? .
Gen. MILEs. If they could not be destroyed by the patriotism and
the valor of the American people before they could send their ships
back and get another load, then I would want to live in some other
country.
Senator FLETCHER. That is rather my view of that situation.
Gen. MILES. But as a safeguard, as I suggested a little while ago,
I think you could very wisely make a liberal appropriation for the
new engines of war—that is, the aeroplanes and the submarines.
If you can imagine a great fleet of transports moving slowly across the
Atlantic, or across the Pacific, you would not want a better target for
a fleet of submarines, which could go out among them.
The CHAIRMAN. If there is nothing more you desire to state,
Gen. Miles, we are very much obliged to you for having appeared and
for making this statement to the committee.
PREPAIRED NIESS FOR, NATIONAL DEFENSE. 763
(*
STATEMENT OF HON, KNUTE NELSON, A SENATOR FROM
THE STATE OF MINNESOTA.
The CHAIRMAN. Senator Nelson desires to address the committee in
regard to the subject we are now considering, and we shall take pleas-
ure in hearing him at this time.
Senator NELSON. Mr. Chairman and gentlemen, it may seem pre-
Sumptuous for me, a nonexpert, to appear before your committee on a
matter of this kind, and my excuse is that I am vitally interested in
an increase in the strength of our Army. I think we need a larger
Army and larger reserves.
There is some question as to the advisability of building up our
State militia. Constitutional objections exist to that, and you have
heard them ably discussed here. There is objection, too, among our
people to what we call universal training or universal service, not
exactly making them soldiers, but having them trained. I think
there is a simpler way, and to illustrate my meaning I will refer to a
piece of history a little old, but I think it conveys a useful lesson
to us.
In 1806 the Prussian Army, as you know, was defeated in the great
battles of Jena and Auerstadt, both fought on the same day, and
Napoleon entered Berlin and took possession of the country and a
treaty was made. Prussia was practically deprived of a good deal of
her possessions, her army was destroyed, but still Napoleon was not
satisfied. That first treaty of Berlin was in 1807. The next year he
insisted upon an enlargement of that treaty, which is known as the
Treaty of Paris. That treaty, among other things, provided, in addi-
tion to the payment of a money contribution of, I think, 300,000,000
thalers, that Prussia should not be allowed to maintain an army
larger than 42,000. That was the condition of the treaty, what was
left of the Prussian monarchy—and a large share of it was left—
should be allowed to keep a standing army of only 42,000 men.
The German patriots at that time were very anxious to shake off
the yoke of Napoleon, but they felt themselves much hampered. The
leading men were Stein, Scharnhorst, Hardenberg, and Gneisenau, who
was afterwards Blucher's chief of staff at the Battle of Waterloo.
These men hit upon this unique plan of increasing the Prussian Army
under that treaty: They would take men into the ranks, give them a
hard drilling for a short time, and then turn them out, then take in a
new lot, and keep on in this way, and in the course of a short time,
under that limitation in the treaty of Paris of 42,000 men, they had a
trained army of 150,000, and they did it just in that way. They would
keep the visible ranks fully up to that standard, give them a little
sharp training, turn them out, put in another lot, and keep on, until
it was an able military establishment for those times, of 150,000
IſlCIOl. * -
Applying what was done in that case to our present condition, this
thought has struck me, and that is why I want to make the suggestion
to you. Why not adopt this plan, enlist our men—and I refer par-
ticularly to the Infantry—for five years, but only require one year of
military service. After one year, put them in the reserves, make them
a permanent army of reserves. I think in one year you could fully
train infantrymen so as to make them good soldiers. In the course
23380—PT 15–16
764 PREPAREDINESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
of five years under this plan, starting with a standing Army of 200,000,
you would have 800,000 men in the reserve. In this way, by repeat-
ing that operation, by keeping our Regular Army up, say, to a stand-
ard of 200,000, enlisting them for five years, requiring only one year
with the colors, and putting them on a reserve where they could be
called on in case of war and emergency at any time, you would accom-
plish what you are after. In that way you could give us a fair stand-
ing Army, and I think we ought to have an Army of at least 200,000
men, and you would have a reserve in the course of four or five years
of 800,000, and, as you keep on with the operation, in the next five
years the men would not be obligated to join the colors after they
had been out five years, but still you would have that many trained
men among the community, among the people.
Another matter in connection with this, and to encourage enlist-
ments, I think, especially in the Infantry, you ought to make it a
little easier for enlisted men to become commissioned officers. It is
undoubtedly true that in the specialties of the Army, such as the
Engineering Department, the Ordnance Department, and the Artil-
lery, they require special technical knowledge, such a knowledge and
such an education as they would only get at Our Military Academy.
But they do not require that degree of technical knowledge in the
Infantry. It may be that these enlistments in the Artillery and in
the Engineering Corps—and by Artillery I refer to the Coast Artillery
also-they should be for five years, but two years with the colors.
Give them a year longer service. But I think if you enlisted our
young men—and I think they would enlist on that basis—for five
years, with the explicit understanding that they are to serve only
one year with the colors, after that they are a part of the reserve army
of the United States, and continue as such, j. to be called on in
an emergency, whenever we need them, I think we could procure an
ample supply of men, and in that way you would solve the question,
first, of a standing army, and, in the next place, a plan of reserves.
In other words, you group them into one system. You create in that
way, first, a moderate standing army, and, in addition to that, you
would have a large trained reserve. *
Senator DU Pont. Senator, would you pay the reserve 7
Senator NELSON. No; I would not pay them anything while they
were in the reserve, not until they they were called out into actual
service. I would enlist them for five years, with the express under-
standing that they were to serve one year with the colors at full pay,
and then, after that, to be released from further service except th
case of emergency, to answer a call in case of war or other urgency.
The CHAIRMAN. Senator, Adjt. Gen. McCain stated here that in his
opinion it would be impossible to enlist an army in excess of 140,000
men; that it is very difficult to get them to enlist at all.
Senator NELSON. What is the present term of enlistment'.
Senator DU Pont. Four years.
Senator NELSON. It used to be three. I think that when young
men are told that they would only have to serve one year in the
ranks, do actual soldiering, and after that they would be relieved
from service except in case of emergency, there would be no trouble
about enlistments. That is my idea.
PREPAREDNESS FOR, NATIONAL DEFENSE. 765
Furthermore, as I said, in order to encourage enlistments, you
ought to make a little broader opening for enlisted men to become
commissioned officers, especially in the Infantry.
The CHAIRMAN. Senator, you served through the Civil War, did
you not ? - *.
Senator NELSON. Yes, sir. All of us who are familiar with history
know that one of the great encouragements of the French soldier
was that he could become an officer and by and by even a marshal of
France. Here, with the exception of a very limited number who
come in by a sort of a rigid examination, a limited number every
year, you can put up a sign like the Dante sign over the infernal
; that whoever enlists in the ranks has little show to get any
arther. -
Another thing I want to call to your attention which has always
struck me. Take an enlisted man who has gradually, by his good
conduct and ability, risen to the high or highest grade of a noncom-
missioned officer, a first sergeant or a commissary sergeant, or any
other of the highest grades of a noncommissioned officer.
Under the Army Regulations, if that man reenlists he can not
reenlist in the rank that he had at his discharge. He must enlist
as a private, and he is subject to the contingency of the commander
of the regiment or the body he enlists in will put him back in his
old place. That is something that ought to be remedied. If a man
has attained a high position as a sergeant or sergeant major in the Army
and his enlistment expires, his record being good, that man should
be permitted to reenlist with the rank at which he was serving in
the Army when discharged. I never could see any good reason for
requiring him to enlist as a private when he had attained that high
raik Öf course, what I have stated simply applies to men who are
fit and competent and whose records are good.
The CHAIRMAN. Senator, what do you think of the proposition to
open the doors of West Point and the Naval Academy to every
young man in the United States who will enlist and serve a term of
One year and educate him at the expense of the Government 7
Senator NELSON. I think that is a very good plan.
The CHAIRMAN. Would it not put in the Army and Navy men who
by a year of effort had shown their proficiency? e
Senator NELSON. Yes, sir. We ought to do everything we can to
encourage young men to go into the Army and Navy, and I might
say here, while that subject is not before your committee, I am
heartily in favor of a large increase in our Navy. I believe our Navy
should rank next to that of England, and I am also anxious to see
Our Army increased, and while I am in favor of that, I am anxious
to see a little more consideration given to the enlisted men. It was
my fortune—or misfortune, whatever you call it—to serve through
the Civil War as an enlisted man. I have nothing to complain of,
and still I know some of the hardships that an enlisted man is sub-
ject to. *
Of recent years they have secured a lot of valuable young men in
the West for our Navy, farmers' boys, and, from what I can learn of
naval officers, they make first-class sailors, as a sailor is to-day; not
the old-style sailor who climbed the rigging, furled and unfurled
sails. But there is one thing that staggers the farm boys. In their
own neighborhood, when they are boys among boys, everybody treats
'766 IPREPAREDINESS FOR, NATIONAL DEFENSE.
them with civility and courtesy, and they are of good families. They
come here and enlist. They do not complain of hard work in the
Navy; they do not complain of the rations, but it is that spirit of
gruffness and aloofness that exists among the Officers that makes
these boys feel humiliated and homesick, and in many cases they
desert on that account. That is not so much true in the Army as in
the Navy. I think our Army has become more liberal.
I remember an incident some years ago, when I went down the
Potomac on a Government boat, and I stood upon the hurricane
deck with the commander of the ship, a naval officer, who was talking
to me in a pleasant manner. He talked to me in the most gentle-
manly, civil manner, as a naval officer would, but he had occasion
to give an order to a man down on the deck below us, and his voice
changed, and it seemed to me just as though he was talking to a dog.
I tell you, Senators, my heart blood boiled up. I was almost ready
to hit that officer because of the way he acted on that occasion. It
is that kind of conduct that makes it so discouraging for our boys,
who come from the farms, and from good neighborhoods. But I
am glad to say it is diminishing in the Navy.
Senator DU Pont. Under the present arrangements, can not en-
listed men, if they show sufficient merit, be promoted to commissioned
officers 3
Senator NELSON. It is a very limited number. There is a way,
but it is a pretty hard road to travel.
Senator DU Pont. I sympathize cordially with your suggestion
that due consideration . be given to the wants and welfare of
the enlisted man, and I think he should be treated with all proper
kindness so far as is consistent with discipline.
Senator NELSON. I can see that in the Navy, gentlemen, why a
great amount of technical knowledge is required, and why there
should be more rigidness in the requirements in the examinations.
I can also see the same in respect to the Ordnance and the Artillery
and the Engineer Corps, but certainly in the Infantry arm, which is
the great arm of the service—the fighting arm, when you come right
to it—I do not think there is any reason for making the door so
narrow for an enlisted man to get in. That part of it ought to be
liberalized.
But, gentlemen, you have enough to do, and I have taken up more
time than I intended. I only came here and made this statement
about the increase of our Army because it is a matter I am vitally
interested in, and I would rather say it to you here in the committee
than to go over on the floor and talk about it.
(Thereupon, at 3.20 o'clock p. m., the committee took a recess
until to-morrow, Tuesday, February 1, 1916, at 10.30 o'clock a. m.)
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 1, 1916.
UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON MILITARY AFFAIRs,
Washington, D. C.
The committee met, at the expiration of the recess, at 10.30 o'clock
a. m., Senator Geo. E. Chamberlain (chairman) presiding.
STATEMENT OF HON. ALBERT B. CUMMINS, A SENATOR FROM
THE STATE OF IOWA.
Senator CUMMINs. Mr. Chairman and gentlemen, I do not pretend
to qualify as a military expert, even though I was for seven years
commander in chief of the army and navy of my own State. I have
Some knowledge, however, of the National Guard, because during
the time that I was chief executive of Iowa. I gave it a great deal of
attention and was deeply interested in its welfare. I do not intend
to discuss the general military situation. In passing, however, I
may say that I believe in a fair, reasonable enlargement of our
Regular Army, to balance it up especially. I do not believe in the
proposed continental army, for it is my opinion that the militia or
the National Guard is a better instrumentality for training the body
of our citizens in military affairs than the continental army could
possibly be. I do not stop, however, to debate the proposal for the
continnental army, for that would more properly come on the floor
of the Senate.
I think everybody recognizes that the needs of the United States
in this respect are a reasonably large Organized force. I am speaking
now of the secondary line, not the Regular Army in active service.
It needs a fairly large force of men who are already under military
organization, and who could be quickly mobilized or applied to the
emergency, whatever that might be. Second, it needs a very large
number of men between 18 and 30—for they are the men who fight
the battles of any country—who have had military training.
Senator DU Pont. Two-thirds of the soldiers who fought in the
War of the Union were under 21 years of age.
Senator CUMMINs. I so understand; and in the very nature of
things they must be the body upon whom we must rely in times of
danger. Third, we need very much a number much greater than now
exists of competent officers who are not in the regular Service, officers
who in times of peace pursue civil avocations and live their lives in
767
768 PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
the ordinary way, but who are, in times of war, quickly competent
to command the troops of the United States. If we were to fall into
war at this time the necessary course would be that the Second lieu-
tenants, I fancy, of the Regular Army would be advanced to com-
pany commanders and the like in the Regular Army, and that the
higher officers would be assigned to commands in the militia, or the
secondary armed force, because it requires a little more skill and com-
petency to train and drill and command new troops than it does old
OneS. & -
Whatever may be the merits of compulsory military training—and
I express no opinion upon that point, although I am quite sympa-
thetic with the general idea—I am opposed unalterably to com-
pulsory military service, except as a last resort. We must depend in
the main, if we should engage in a great war with a power at all
equal to our own nation, upon a volunteer army.
Senator CATRON. Do you draw a distinction between compulsory
military service and compulsory military training? ..
Senator CUMMINs. Oh, yes. There is a very marked distinction be-
tween compulsory military training and compulsory military service
in time of war. I would like to see many of our schools give their
students military training as a part of their education. I would like
to see a very large part of our young men who have not had the
opportunity to attend the schools in which military training could
be given enter some organization in which they could receive mili-
tary instruction, training, and discipline. But when these men are
called upon to expose their lives in defense of their country, I think it
is the history of the world that we must depend upon patriotism in
volunteering for that service. That does not at all impinge upon the
idea that I formerly expressed that we ought to have a reasonably
large number of men who are actually organized and who could be
ordered in just exactly as the Regular Army is ordered in.
As I said before, I believe that the National Guard is the very
best instrumentality for supplying, first, the immediate force which
we need; and second, for the training of those who must volunteer.
The objection that is made oftenest and probably with most effect to
employment of the National Guard is the constitutional objection,
and I want to address myself just a minute to the constitutional
phases of this question. There is, I think, some misapprehension, I
am sure not in this committee, but in the minds of people generally,
with regard to the constitutional restriction upon the Federal em-
ployment of the militia. So I refer to Article I, Section 8, a moment
in order to get our minds clear upon that subject. That section pro-
vides that Congress shall have power to declare war, and so on. Then
it provides: - •
To raise and support armies, but no appropriation of money to that use shall
be for a longer term than two years. - -
That obviously refers to the Army that is in the constant employ-
ment or service of the Government, the organization which we know
as the Regular Army. t
To provide and maintain a Navy.
f To make rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval
IOI CCS. -- :
PREPAREDNESS FOR, NATIONAL DEFENSE. 769
I do not claim that any of these things to which I have just re-
ferred covers the authority of the Government over the militia in
times of peace. It is then provided:
To provide for calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the Union,
suppress insurrections, and repel invasions.
This is the authority of Congress over the militia. It has been
said, and I think said with a good deal of force and reason, that the
militia as such could not be ordered into an aggressive war; that is, if
we were to declare war on England, or Germany, or Japan I doubt
whether the Organized Militia could be ordered beyond the borders
Of our country as an original proposition.
Senator DU Pont. If we were to declare war on Mexico, could we
order the militia to cross the bridge at El Paso" -
Senator CUMMINs. I doubt it.
Senator DU Pont. The same thing occurred in regard to Canada
in the War of 1812.
Senator CUMMINs. I doubt whether it could be used beyond the
borders, although if the use of the troops in another country is re-
quired in order to repel an invasion or a threatened invasion, an
imminent invasion, then I have no doubt that the militia could be
sent anywhere, for this language bears no other construction. It
does not prescribe a locality in which the troops shall fight. It sim-
ply prescribes the conditions under which they shall be called into
service, the authority of Congress over them. -
So far from that being an objection to the use of the National
Guard as a recruiting force or training force of the United States,
I think it is a positive advantage. It must be remembered that the
United States is not a war-like Nation. It is not panting and eager
to declare war on any other power, and I do not believe that we ought
to organize an army for the purpose of invading another country.
It may be that there will come a time when we must take possession
of Mexico. -
I do not say whether that time will come or not, but if it does
come, even though the National Guard could not be used for that
service—which I do not admit, because there have been provocations
already which, in my judgment, go very far toward justifying an
intervention that would be the repelling of an invasion—however
that may be, if we come to a case of that kind, if the war is a just
one, if the War is one which the people commend, there will be no
difficulty, if you have trained men throughout the country who have
seen service in either the guard or the Regular Army, in securing all
the volunteers that the country could, by any possibility, need. If
the President of the United States were to call to-morrow for volun-
teers for an army to invade Mexico, you do not doubt that in 24 hours
we would have the service, not fully equipped, filled with volun-
teers that would be more than adequate for that work.
Senator HITCHCOCK. Where does Congress derive the right to de-
fine what the militia of the several States and Territories shall be?
Senator CUMMINs. I am about to read. The next clause in the
Constitution is: - -
To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the militia. .
770 PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
We have complete power over the organization, the arming, and
the disciplining of the militia. Those terms are so broad and com-
prehensive that if there were not a subsequent reservation to the
States they would cover the whole subject. It is not possible to
imagine anything that you want to do in the Way of the militia that
would not fall within the words “organizing, arming, and dis-
ciplining.” Then it provides—
and for governing such part of them as may be employed in the service of the
United States. -
That means this, that the very moment a war comes and the
militia are called into the service of the Government, the power
to govern the Organized Militia becomes absolute. There is no more
comprehensive word than is employed here. +
Senator DU PONT. Do you think that includes the power of pro-
moting officers?
Senator CUMMINs. Undoubtedly. I have no doubt about that sub-
iect.
J Senator HITCHCOCK. Then, if a State provides what citizens shall
coilstitute the militia of the State, and an act of Congress provides
a different specification -
Senator CUMMINs (interposing). The act of Congress would pre-
Vail.
Senator HITCHCOCK. Suppose a State should say that no man over
30 or under 25 years of age should be in the militia?
Senator CUMMINs. As against the act of Congress, it would have
no effect whatever. The law would be utterly void. It is one of
those cases in which the law of the State is valid until Congress acts
upon it. I do not anticipate a collision of that sort. But that
undoubtedly would be the construction of the Constitution.
Senator HITCHCOCK. The State provides the appropriations for
the support of the militia.
Senator CUMMINs. It does if it cares to do it.
Senator HITCHCOCK. They all do it. -
Senator CUMMINs. They all do it to some extent. In some of
them the compensation is very slight, in others it is more generous.
There is no uniformity at all in the provisions of the several States
with regard to compensation paid the enlisted men and officers of
the National Guard, while there is uniformity with regard to the
compensation provided by Congress. &
The clause of which I have read a part continues:
Reserving to the States, respectively, the appointment of the Officers and the
authority of training the militia.
There is a very clear reservation. There can not be any doubt
about it, or about its extent. So long as the period of training
continues the States have the authority to appoint the officers of the
National Guard, and Congress can not withdraw or take away that
power from the States. .
Senator CATRON. Where would you draw the line between train-
ing the militia and disciplining the militia?
jºr CUMMINs. That is perfectly explained in the next few
WOTCIS :
Reserving to the States, respectively, the appointment of the Officers and the
authority of training the militia according to the discipline prescribed by
PREPAIRED NESS FOR, NATIONAL DEFENSE. 771
That means this, that the States appoint the officers according to
some rule or regulation which they prescribe. These officers, of
course, are the training commanders, and they have the physical
duty of giving the commands to the men, but they must train them
according to the discipline prescribed by Congress.
Senator DU PoWT. By “disciplining” you mean teaching them the
tactics, the Army Regulations, and so forth Ž
Senator CUMMINs. Everything that pertains to the discipline of
the men, just as everything that pertains to the organization of the
guard, falls within the power of Congress.
Senator DU PoWT. Senator Cummins, returning to what I said
just now, it has been held, I understand, that when the militia have
been called into the service of the United States the governor still
has authority to regulate the promotions of officers.
Senator CUMMINs. There is a fugitive decision of that sort, I
believe. I have not provided myself with those cases, and I do
not know but what there is an opinion of an Attorney General to
that effect.
Senator DU PONT. That is a very important point.
Senator CUMMINs. It is important, yes; but practically speaking
there is no difficulty about it. I take it that this Constitution of
ours on any point of that sort, where it could admit of a double
interpretation, means what the necessities of the people require
that it shall mean, and we have grown a good deal since the Civil
War, and of course there they were all volunteers—however, in the
Federal service, or at least they came to be so very rapidly—and
at that time there was no law which authorized the organization
of the militia as We have it now, for now, under the law, every
national guardsman enlists in the service of the United States and
is as completely a guardsman of the United States as he is a guards-
man of the State in which he happens to live. -
I sum that all up, expressing this opinion, that there is no power
which the Federal Government can not exercise over the National
Guard that ought to be exercised over an Army except that in times
of peace the States must appoint the officers.
The CHAIRMAN. That, you think, is the only limitation on the
power of the General Government?
Senator CUMMINs. That, in my judgment, is the only limitation so
far as the authority over the National G is concerned. I am not in-
tending to deny that there may be some doubt about the right of the
General Government to order militiamen into a foreign service
where there has been no invasion or threatened invasion of the
country. .
With that general statement in regard to the subject, I desire very
briefly to mention the bill that I have introduced. -
The CHAIRMAN. Have you submitted your bill to any of those who
claim to represent the National Guard? -
Senator CUMMINs. I collaborated all summer with the adjutant
general of my State and with various other officers of the guard, and
I understood that their views simply reflected the opinion of other
officers of the guard, but not entirely, as I will presently point out.
The CHAIRMAN. They are to be heard here this afternoon, and I
just wanted to know whether you had conferred with them.
772 PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
Senator CUMMINs. I say in the outset that I think there are some
inconsistencies in the bill. I am not sufficiently familiar with mili-
tary adjustments to have succeeded in writing a bill that is not sub-
ject to some criticism. There are certain repugnances in it that I
will have to correct hereafter, but they are not material at all. They
are small matters of detail. -
In preparing the bill I took as the basis the bill which was intro-
duced last year and again this year by Senator Chamberlain, it being
the bill that was agreed upon through long conferences between the
representatives of the National Guard and the War Department more
than two years ago. That furnishes the basis of the bill. I have
offered. This year, as I have remarked, your chairman introduced
a bill early in the session. The essential change between the existing
system and the bill introduced by Senator Chamberlain is that the
Federal Government undertakes to pay the National Guard, or the
enlisted men in the National Guard, not only for the time spent in
camp and maneuvers, but for the time they spend in drill. Ordi-
narily the National Guard drills once a week, or 45 or 48 times a year,
and they drill at night generally. There was no compensation for
that service, and the bill introduced by Senator Chamberlain pro-
vides a compensation of practically one-fourth the base pay of an
enlisted man in the Regular Army. That means about $45 or $48
a year for that service. Of course, I preserve that change, because
that is one of the most essential things that can be thought of to
make the National Guard effective. -
But the changes I have made in comparison with the bill intro-
duced by the chairman are, in the first place, an increase of peace
strength of the National Guard to 400,000 enlisted men and officers.
It is now, under an order issued by the War Department under au-
thority of Congress, nominally 150,000. It is actually about 115,000.
But if it were possible to do it, I suppose there would be authority
now to increase the strength of the National Guard to 150,000.
Senator DU PoWT. Senator Cummins, where do you propose to get
these 400,000 men? The experience of 10 years past is that they can
not increase the National Guard.
Senator CUMMINs. I will show you how you can get them. You
have not been able to get them, first, because the men have not been
paid for their drill. - - -
Senator DU Pont. The testimony of the chief of the Bureau of
Militia Affairs and other people who are experts, or at least familiar
with the subject, shows that in States where they pay the militia the
attendance at drill was no greater than where they did not pay them.
That has been stated here several times.
Senator CUMMINs. Of course, I can not contradict that, because
I have not the information. But I gave a great deal of attention to
the National Guard for Seven years. I attended every encampment,
I attended a great many of the drills, and I became thoroughly con-
versant, not only with the views of the officers, but with the views
of the men, and I know how they felt then, and I know in my State
there would be no difficulty in enlarging the National Guard to our
proportion of 400,000 if the things were done that I have proposed
here. The pay is but one of them. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
PR.EPARED NESS FOR, NATIONAL DEFENSE. 773
Senator DU Pont. I do not say that it is not practicable, but I Say
it is like the so-called continental force, it is in the nature of an ex-
periment. You do not know whether you can get them or not.
Senator CUMMINs. Of course, I can only submit my opinion
against that of one who probably knows more about the Subject
technically than I do. But I do not believe he knows as much about
men as I do.
Senator DU Pont. I am not expressing an opinion at all. I am,
just stating that it is a question; these people have stated that it is
a question whether they could be gotten.
Senator CUMMINs. If they can not be gotten, your continental
army disappears in the midst.
Senator DU PoWT. I agree With you.
Senator HITCHCOCK. Have we statements here in evidence show-
ing what is paid by the different States to the militia?
The CHAIRMAN. I suppose that is included in the report of the
Chief of the Division of Militia Affairs.
Senator CUMMINs. In some it is very Small, and in Some it is very
ood.
g Senator HITCHCOCK. In some States is the payment as large as
you propose to have it in your bill? -
Senator CUMMINs. I do not think so. I do not know of any State.
But I may be wrong about that, because I have not examined the
subject.
Second, the war strength I have provided for here is 800,000. It
is simply doubled. In that respect it takes on an analogy to the
organization in the Regular Army. I eliminate in the bill the re-
serves in the National Guard. I do not believe in that system or
policy, nor do I think it would accomplish the purpose that is in-
tended for it. The bill introduced by your chairman provides that
the enlistment shall be four years, two years in active work in the
guard and two years in a reserve, during all of which time, if war
should ensue, the reserves could be called to the colors. I have elimi-
nated that, because I think it would be a very great obstacle in the
way of enlisting men, and that would be sufficient alone, I think, to
raise an objection to the plan that could not be overcome. But that
is not my principal reason. I think the great service that the guard
can render to the country is the training of men who are in civil
life, and if you make the enlistment four years, it is obvious that you
can not train as many young men as though the enlistment were a
shorter time, for you will have your full quota or strength. My
bill provides that the enlistment shall be three years. I was doubtful
myself whether it ought to be three years or two.
Senator DU PoWT. Would it not be best to prescribe that the term
of enlistment of the National Guard should be the same as that of
the active period of the Regular Army, and that will be undoubtedly
two years or less? - - e
Senator CUMMINs. I am not inclined to think so, although it
might be. While I have put three years in the bill, I was strongly
disposed to limit it to two, and I make them ineligible to reenlist-
ment. The reason for that is that what we are trying to do is to
accumulate a large body of young men who have had military train-
ing. If the guardsmen reenlist until they are 30 years of age you
'774 PREPAREDNIESS FOR, NATIONAL DEFENSE.
accomplish nothing, but if, after having given the guardsman suffi-
cient training, say in two years or three years, he is then ineligible
to reenlistment, and the guard is filled up again; in the course of nine
years you would have at peace strength 1,200,000 men who had had
military training. In 12 years you would have 1,600,000, and in 15
years you would have more than 2,000,000 men who had had the
training that is required in order to make a man quickly effective
as a soldier, and that is our need—much more, I think, that to have
the excess of training for the reserve, the obligation to come to the
colors during the two years that might elapse after the active train-
ing had ceased. At least that is my theory of it, and I believe that
upon reflection you will find that it is sound. -
Senator DU PONT. Senator Cummins, you do not provide for any
reserves for your militia organization? . --
Senator CUMMINs. No.
Senator DUPONT. The experience of all wars is that when you call
out a regiment of militia in the service of the Nation in less than
three months it is depleted by 40 to 50 per cent or greater.
Senator CUMMINs. Yes. -
Senator DU PONT. Then at the end of six months you would have
nothing but the skeleton of a regiment, as we did in the Civil War.
Senator CUMMINs. You will then have to depend, as I said a mo-
ment ago, on the volunteers, and what you need is a large body of
men who have had training from which these volunters can come.
Senator DU PONT. Then your idea is that the militia is called out
as a temporary expedient until the volunteer army could be raised?
Senator CUMMINs. Oh, of course. If we ever get into a war of
any magnitude We will have to depend very largely upon volunteers.
I have no doubt about that. The great thing is to have two, three,
or four millions of men between 20 and 30, or between 18 and 30,
who have actually had military training, and who, if they desire to
Volunteer, can be transformed into effective soldiers in a very short
while.
Senator HITCHCOCK. I think you are right there, and I think that
is one of the weaknesses of our present military system. We allow
Soldiers to reenlist—in fact, we give them a bonus for reenlisting—
and thereby reduce the number of experienced men in civil life.
Senator CUMMINs. I pass on hurriedly. The third change in my
bill, as compared with the bill introduced by the chairman, is that
the Government pay is made directly to the officers and men instead
of through the State governments. .
The CHAIRMAN. I think that is a good suggestion. -
Senator CUMMINs. It seems to me, if we are going to take charge
of the Organized Militia and subject them to our orders so far as
we can constitutionally, there ought to be no difference of opinion
about making our payments directly.
The CHAIRMAN. It makes them realize some obligation to the Fed-
eral Government.
Senator CUMMINs. Yes. The fourth change is this, that the pay
given by the Federal Government is conditioned upon the several
States changing their laws and regulations so that the officers of the
National Guard are to be selected from a list furnished by the Sec-
retary of War.
PREPAREDINESS FOR, NATIONAL DEFENSE. 775
Senator HITCHCOCK. Before you leave that, there is one difficulty
about your paying direct. As it is now, the adjutant general of the
State, if money is paid through the State, can hold a man responsible
for arms and equipment that he has and withhold pay.
Senator CUMMINs. There is no difficulty about that. I may not
have sufficiently provided for it, but the fact is that the Government
appoints the adjutant general in nearly all cases as its disbursing
officer, he gives a bond to the General Government, and he does pay
directly, as a matter of fact, to the officers and men.
Senator DU PONT. It ought to be provided, though, that if a man
forfeits his pay as a result of a court-martial, or for destroying pri-
vate property, that could be deducted.
Senator CUMMINs. Yes; certainly. That, I think, is in there. If
it is not, it ought to be. But I have now reached what I regard as
one of the important changes, namely, that the appointments made
by the States must be made from lists furnished by the Secretary of
War, if those lists are available.
The CHAIRMAN. That is really a crucial point in this whole propo-
sition, because the question is, if the State has the jurisdiction under
the Constitution to name the officers, can it relinquish that jurisdic-
tion?
Senator CUMMINs. No ; it does not delinquish the jurisdiction
at all.
The CHAIRMAN. Pretty near it.
Senator CUMIMINs. It appoints, but it appoints from a list. It
passes a law, which it can easily do. Any State can do that now.
Senator CATRON. Suppose they only provided one in the list for
an officer. That would make the governor practically appoint that
Iſlall. -
Senator CUMMINs. Of course. These lists are made up in this
way
The CHAIRMAN (interposing). If that can be done, Senator, I
think it would pretty nearly solve the question of this dual control.
Senator CUMMINs. There is no relinquishment of constitutional
power on the part of the State, but the Federal Government gives it
aid upon condition that these officers are selected from that list. That
is because the great need of the National Guard at this time is com-
petent officers.
There are some States in which the officers are very competent;
there are other States in which they are not competent at all, and what
we need, of course, is trained officers. We haven’t them now. They
are not to be had. The Regular Army has none to give to the Na-
tional Guard except for Supervision and inspection and the like.
This list is to be made up, first, of graduates of six Federal schools,
for which I have another bill that I will come to in a moment;
second, of graduates from any other military institution; third, per-
sons who have passed the examination which is now required to ad-
mit a civilian to a second lieutenancy in the Regular Army. These
are the three classes from which the officers must be selected. If none
of these are available, then, of course, there is no requirement.
The CHAIRMAN. Do these classes include all the commissioned
officers from lieutenant up? -
776 PR.EPAREDINESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
Senator CUMMINs. Yes; all the commissioned officers from second
lieutenant up. -*
The CHAIRMAN. The National Guard elects its lieutenants.
Senator CUMMINs. That is true in some States, not in all.
Senator DU Pont. All but two.
Senator CUMMINs. I did not know just how many.
The CHAIRMAN. That is not a good policy.
Senator CUMMINs. There is no constitutional requirement for
election. It is as bad as it can be, and that is what I Want to
change; and I have no doubt whatever about the constitutionality
of this nor have I any doubt that the States would at once accept it,
because they recognize, just as well as we do, the necessity of compe-
tence in the officer.
The CHAIRMAN. But you can not forget one thing, that in some of
the guards—and that is limited, of course—the offices of these com-
panies are largely political. -
Senator CUMMINs. It is my idea to get it out of politics if we can.
The CHAIRMAN. If it could be accomplished, it would be a great
step in the right direction. - &
Senator DU PONT. You are now discussing section 24 and the
qualifications for officers, but you have passed over section 6, which
provides for officers of the reserve corps. -
Senator CUMMINs. I did not change that at all.
Senator DU PONT. There are several changes there that I think
ought to be made.
Senator CUMMINs. That is in the bill introduced by Senator
Chamberlain.
Senator DU Pont. It says it should be composed of officers of the
Regular Army, Marine Corps, Organized Militia, former noncom-
missioned officers of the Regular Army, and cadets of military es-
tablishments. In the first place, it ought to be limited to former
officers who have been honorably discharged and former noncom-
missioned officers, provided they have sufficient education and good
discharges. If not, some who have been cashiered may get in.
Senator CUMMINs. Undoubtedly. I took that part just as it
was agreed upon between the War Department and the National
Guard two years ago.
The fifth change, and the most important one, is this—and that J.
impose directly because it is a part of the organization, a part of the
discipline—that the National Guard shall not be subject to police
duty; that is, that it shall not be called out to suppress the ordinary
insurrection or industrial riot or strike. -
The CHAIRMAN. I think that is a good plan. I think Pennsyl-
vania has adopted some such system.
Senator CUMMINs. I have made that apply some two years in
advance, because it is necessary that some other things shall be done
by the State in order to supply a sufficient constabulary. I am not
suggesting that I want riots, or that I think they ought not to be
suppressed; but you can not maintain a National Guard in full
strength, you can not recruit it, and the same thing would be true of
the continental army, unless you relieve it from police duty. That
is one subject upon which I have had a great deal of experience.
Senator DU PoWT. Would you specify by statute that they should
not have police duty?
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 777
Senator CUMMINs. Yes, sir; that is in here.
Senator, DU PONT. Then, in the smaller States—my State, for
instance—it would be impossible for them to provide and maintain
a constabulary.
Senator CUMMINs. Why not?
Senator DU PONT. You would simply put them at the mercy of
any riot.
Senator CUMMINs. Why?
Senator DU PONT. They have not the revenue. • .
Senator CUMMINs. Levy your taxes and get the revenue. It is
Worth something to have an Army.
Senator DU Pont. That would be a very unpopular provision in
a great many of the smaller States.
Senator CUMMINs. It might be.
Senator DU PoWT. In the large States, like Pennsylvania and New
York, it would do very well.
Senator CUMMINs. You are trying to get an Army to defend your
Nation, a reserve, and everything ought to be subordinate to it, and
I tell you from long experience that you can not enlist either an
effective continental army or an effective National Guard unless you
relieve them of that duty. It must be made up of poor people.
Rich men do not go into the National Guard, or rich boys do not go
into the National Guard, as a usual thing. Take the guard in my
State, where wealth is about as evenly distributed as it is anywhere
in the Union; the enlisted men in the National Guard are made up
of the men who work for a living, either in the stores, in the offices,
or in the shops, and there is not enough inducement to them, the
mere glory of it, or the sense of duty of providing this country with
an army will not overcome their reluctance and their unalterable
resolution not to go into a National Guard that may be called out
to fight their brothers in the same locality. They will not do it.
Senator BECRHAM. Are you proposing in this bill to relieve the
Organized Militia of police duty :
Senator CUMIMINs. I am.
Senator BECRHAM. Would that be constitutional?
Senator CUMMINs. I have no doubt of it. The State can provide
any constabulary that it likes, but, in my opinion, that is entirely
constitutional, so far as the Organized Militia is concerned.
Senator BECKHAM. Would it not be an intetrference with the con-
trol by the State over the Organized Militia if you would say it
should not do this or that particular duty :
Senator CUMMINs. No. 1 discussed the constitutional phase of it
before you came in. All the Constitution says is that Congress shall
have the power to provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining
the militia. The only thing that is reserved to the States is the
authority to appoint the officers and to do the training, according to
the discipline provided by Congress. That is absolutely the only
power reserved to the States. We have not exercised the power I
have just suggested, but we will have to exercise it if we get an
army which we intend to employ against a foreign enemy. I have
spent days and nights trying to get our National Guard up to the
point in numbers that it ought to be, and that is the constant objec-
tion. You have to appeal to a peculiar class of people in order to get
your recruits.
778 PREPAIRED NIESS FOR, NATIONAL DEFENSE.
That, gentlemen, is all I desire to say with regard to the National
Guard bill. In all other respects it is the bill that has been intro-
duced by your chairman, and is the bill that was agreed upon two
years ago between the National Guard and the War Department.
I have another bill which I think is a complement or supplement to
this one. As I remarked a few moments ago, what we need in this
country is officers. You can make an enlisted man a good soldier in a
very little time. All he needs is courage, intelligence, and some fair
acquaintance with the discipline. But you can not make an officer in
a short time. One who is competent to command must have other
qualifications, and he can only get them through long study. So
I have introduced a bill that provides that the Secretary of War
is authorized and directed to take six of the Army posts in the coun-
try—posts that are not needed. We have a great many that are not
needed, that is perfectly evident. The location of our Army posts
has been largely a political matter in the past, and it has grown up
here, there, and everywhere without much regard to the needs of the
Service. I am only echoing the reports and the opinions that have
emanated from time to time from the War Department in that re-
spect.
Senator DU Pont. They were originally located on account of
Indian hostilities, and then political influence enlarged them, often
unduly. -
Senator CUMMINs. This bill provides that the Secretary of War
shall take six of them and convert them into Federal reserve schools,
because they are intended to create a reserve body of officers.
Senator DU PONT. That is a very good name.
Senator CUMMINs. It is in his discretion.
Senator SHEPPARD. They are West Points, are they?
Senator CUMMINs. Not entirely. I will read you this bill. It pro-
vides:
That in making such election the Secretary of War shall, in so far as is prac-
ticable, distribute the schools so to be established throughout the country,
having due regard to convenience and accessibility. •
SEC. 3. That the course of instruction in such schools shall be four years
and the Studies pursued shall be so arranged as to fit students for civil avoca-
tions and for Command in military organizations.
It has the double purpose of giving the young men an education
that will equip them for the ordinary affairs of life, as well as for
command in the Army. When these young men graduate, they go
out into civil life. " They are given the rank of second lieutenant in
the Regular Army, but without pay and without duty, except when
called into the Service, and they do not interfere with promotions in
the regular service. -
Senator BECKHAM. How long are they in reserve?
Senator CUMMINs. They are in reserve until they are 40 years old,
and they are required to take an examination every five years in
order to see that they keep their competency.
It is sufficient to say that these are the men who, I hope, will
become officers of the National Guard. They are part of the list that
is to be furnished to the States and from which the officers of the
National Guard will be selected.
Senator SHEPPARD. Do you provide that these institutions shall
all practically be the same size?
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 779
Senator CUMMINs. I say no one shall have more than 400 students.
Senator SHEPPARD. With a trained faculty for each?
Senator CUMMINs. That is entirely in the hands of the Secretary
Of War. 2 ”
Senator SHEPPARD. I understand; but he must provide a faculty?
Senator CUMMINs. Oh, yes; so far as he can from retired or active
Army officers.
Senator CATRON. How about the expenses of the students?
Senator CUMMINs. We pay all their expenses, except their clothing.
They furnish their own clothing. - -
Senator BECKHAM. What do you say about the cost for the six
schools?
Senator CUMMINs. I have a sum in the bill, but I am not very
sure on that point. I would think that with the paraphernalia and
everything to train them in military science it would cost a thousand
dollars a year for each student.
(Thereupon, at 12 o'clock noon, a recess was taken until 2 o'clock
p.m.) &
AFTER, RECESS.
The committee met at the expiration of the recess at 2 o'clock
p. m., Senator Geo. E. Chamberlain (chairman) presiding.
The CHAIRMAN. I will say to the members of the committee that
representatives of the National Guard are here to be heard, and we
will proceed and call Gen. Foster first. -
STATEMENT OF MAJ, GEN. J. CLIFFORD R. FOSTER, CHAIR-
MAN OF THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE INATIONAL
GUARD ASSOCIATION OF THE UNITED STATES.
The CHAIRMAN. General, please state the position which you hold,
and what State you are from. ... •
Gen. Fost ER. I am from Florida, and I am here as chairman of the
executive committee of the National Guard Association of the United
States.
The CHAIRMAN. You know what is up for consideration before
this committee, the plans for the reorganization of the Army and, in
connection therewith, matters affecting the National Guard; and we
would like to hear from you in any way you desire to discuss the
situation.
Gen. Fost ER. I should like to present a statement which I have
prepared, which explains in a way the attitude of the National Guard
upon this question of preparedness.
The CHAIRMAN. Proceed.
Gen. Fost ER. We appear before you as officers of the Organized
Militia and in a representative capacity as members of the executive
committee of the National Guard Association of the United States.
In the latter capacity it is proper that we first present to your atten-
tion the declaration of principles and recommendations for Federal
military legislation which were adopted by our association at its
recent convention held in San Francisco, Cal. We submit the report
of the legislative committee which was adopted unanimously and
which we believe presents the consensus of National Guard opinion
upon the subjects discussed therein.
780 PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
It will be noted that we express the opinion that the training and
development of a larger force for national defense is imperatively
necessary, and we urge the importance of formulating and adopting
a definite military policy for the United States; but we maintain that
such a policy must have as its foundation not only the opinions of
the military experts of the Nation as to the forces which shall be
organized and maintained but should be formulated with due con-
sideration of those ideals and traditions which have a place in the
minds and hearts of the American people. -
It is proper to bring to your attention the fact that this report,
embracing the recommendations which we now present to you, was
drafted and adopted before anyone in high place had suggested that
Our situation is such as might make necessary the acceptance of a
policy of compulsory military service as the basis for the organiza-
tion of our national military forces. This report was written under
the inspiration of the hitherto accepted doctrine that the oºly thing
we could do or would do in every time of national peril, in the future
as in the past, would be to depord not upon a starding army, nor
yet upon a reserve army, but upon a citizenry trained and accus-
tomed to arms. These recommer dations were tuned to accord with
that conception of our national ideals, that estimate of the basic
principles of our national life which precludes the consideration of
plans for that form of “preparedness” which would enable us upon
brief notice to put the Nation in arms.
It is best that you may appreciate the state of mind of those who
prepared the proposals which we submit to you to-day. The fact
that Our program does not embrace recommendations for the estab-
lishment of a system of universal military training or of a policy for
Compulsory military service need not be accepted as expressing dis-
approval of either or both of those proposals, nor can it fairly be
made the basis for the claim that the National Guard of the United
States is opposed to adequate preparedness. The National Guard
does now, and always has, advocated better preparedness for national
defense. We have always supported every proposal for necessary
increases in the commissioned and enlisted personnel of the Regular
Establishment, and I may add that we have always been called upon
to do so. It will be noted that we now recommend any reasonable
increase in the Regular Army that may be proposed by the iPresident
of the United States as in his judgment necessary for better national
defense. We have consistently urged measures for improving the
efficiency of the organized citizen soldiery of the Nation, and it will
not be denied that the first legislation designed for improving the
efficiency of the Organized Militia written upon the Federal statute
books in more than a century was initiated by the National Guard
Association of the United States. I refer to the act of January 3,
1903. - -
These things I say that you may be reminded that during the
many years when no department of the Government was concerning
itself greatly with the training of the citizenry for defense the mem–
bers of the National Guard were actively at work seeking the oppor-
tunity and the means to fit themselves for Federal service in time
of war, and it will not be successfully disputed that until quite
recently it was the only agency composed of men in civil life which
PREPAREDNIESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 781
served to keep up the military spirit of the people and sought to
maintain an interest in military affairs. - -
In making this declaration with regard to the attitude of the
Organized Militia toward preparedness I have particularly in mind
the charge made before the Military Committee of the Senate a day
or two ago that “the one thing that has prevented the working out
heretofore of an adequate military policy has been the attitude of
the State troops” and that “the militia always.stands in the way.”
If the Congress shall decide that our national ambitions as well as
our national responsibilities have so evolved and expanded that “an
adequate military policy” must now mean complete departure from
old guideposts and that to insure the proper working out of our
national destiny a system of universal compulsory military service
must be adopted and entered upon, then the program which we have
proposed need not concern you, except, perhaps, as to that provision
in which we declare the belief that the National Guard should be
made the basis of any system of military training for the citizenry
of the country which may be provided for oy law.
A careful study of the Swiss and Australian systems, which are
now receiving such favorable mention by the advocates of universal
military service, will disclose a close relationship to our own militia
system. The Cantons of Switzerland correspond to our States, and
the functions of control as exercised under the Swiss system do not
essentially differ from our own except to the extent that the Swiss
system has been intelligently developed to a state of efficiency. . .
I will again remind you that the recommendations of the National
Guard which you have before you were formulated with a view to
their consideration in connection with the proposals of the Govern-
ment, which latter contemplate not the º of a large force
of professsional soldiery nor yet a system of universal military training
and service, but suggest that a force of not less than 500,000 troops are
needed for first-line service, and seek to provide this by a slight
increase in the Regular Army, and the substitution of a new element
of Federal citizen soldiery for the Organized Militia in the category
of first-line troops as now provided for by law. - w
The suggestion that the National Guard aspires to service in the
first line has been the feature of our program which has perhaps called
forth the most severe criticism. This recommendation, however, will
stand the light of full discussion, and we again submit that if a mobile
force of 500,000 troops is required for first line service within the
continental limits of the United States, and only one-fifth of that
number can be supplied by the Regular Army, then we contend and
we believe that by the measures we propose the National Guard can
be so developed that it will produce a greater state of military pre-
paredness than can be attained by citizens under any other system
now proposed. O
We admit the disingenuous state of mind that permitted us to con-
sider and to discuss the continental army scheme as a legitimate
attempt to provide for the Nation a trained volunteer citizen soldiery,
but the suggestion had not then been made that the real purpose of
this experiment was to demonstrate the weakness of the volunteer
system and pave the way for service by conscription.
23380—PT 16—16—2
782 PREPAREDINESS FOR, NATIONAL DEFENSE.
It could not be expected that men who for a quarter of a century
have been dealing with the problem of maintaining citizen soldiery,
and who had earnestly and zealously addressed themselves to that
purpose, would indorse without question a proposal which to their
minds and in the light of their experience appears impracticable from
every standpoint. Any disappointment which #. evidence of
National Guard sentiment with regard to the continental army plan
may now occasion would at least have been softened had the same
value been placed on the views and opinions of our nonprofessional
soldiery before the scheme was definitely projected as has been subse-
quently attached to them. So far as we have been able to ascertain,
no National Guardsman shares responsibility for the conception of
that plan, with one possible exception.
In considering a military policy for the United States we can not
bring ourselves to accept the belief that it is wise to discredit and to
abandon a force which actually exists, which is susceptible of develop-
ment, and which owes its being to the patriotic impulses of our
citizenry, for a mere plan, confessedly experimental, and presented
with implied doubt by its friends as to whether or not it will work.
It can not be expected that such a program will appeal to those
who sincerely desire the development ºan efficient national force of
citizen soldiery. •
And so it will happen that the continental army plan will find its
most earnest supporters among those who appreciate its weak-
nesses but accept it as a step toward that which they hope to bring
about, which is the establishment of a large force of highly trained
professional soldiery, or some system of universal compulsory
Se]"W1C0.
We of the National Guard meet this by recommending such
increase of the Regular Army as those in authority believe can be
, recruited and maintained without unreasonable expense, and we
submit definite proposals to cure the defects which are alleged to
exist in the militia system and which, if adopted, we believe will
provide in the National Guard a force of citizens trained and accus-
tomed to arms, or nonprofessional Soldiers, in number adequate to
meet our immediate requirements.
The suggestion of a constitutional amendment is advanced to
meet the criticism heretofore emphasized above all others that the
militia is without value for Federal uses because of the constitutional
inhibition against its employment beyond the continental limits of
the United States. National Guardsmen first sought to cure this
alleged defect by legislation, but question as to whether or not the
act of 1908 is effective in this respect remains in debate among our
best legal minds. To provide a sure cure, and as evidence of the
desire of National Guardsmen to do whatever may be necessary to
fit themselves for Federal service whenever and wherever required,
this constitutional amendment is suggested.
It will be noted, however, that the need for authority to send the
militia beyond the limits of the United States is no longer being
stressed, for suddenly it has been discovered that this is not an
unusual restriction, but that it applies to the military forces of
Switzerland and Australia, and to the forces, as well, of some of the
most militant and aggressive of the Old World nations. It may even
be considered now by some that that policy is sound which precludes
PREPAREDINESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 783
the use of our armed forces beyond the continental limits of the
country unless Sanctioned by a definite expression of public opinion
at the time. - -
There is much talk now of necessity for the absolute control of
the militia by the central authorities. The militia system is pro-
nounced “impossible,” because it is not completely and wholly
under the control of the Federal Government at all times, and we
are told that the militia must be “federalized.” That, however, is
a catch phrase, and it should be borne in mind that no measure for
its federalization is proposed save by the National Guard. What
you are asked to do, if I may quote the expression, is “to abandon
it to the States.”
We regard the militia as a Federal institution. What Federal
institution is there that antedates the Constitution ? Yet it is
argued to you that because, as a measure of safety, military forces
existed and were employed by the States prior to their confederation,
then the militia is a State force, which can only appropriately be
used for State purposes. -
It will be difficult to suggest any function relating to the armament,
equipment, organization, discipline or training of the Organized
Militia which can not be effectively subjected to Federal control under
the powers now delegated to Congress under the Constitution. Cer-
tainly there seems to be no feature of control not so related which
will weigh in iº against the desirability of adhering to that
basic principle of our Government which makes it a confederation of
States rather than an autocracy. Federal control will not compen-
sate in a force of volunteer soldiery for the stimulus of regional re-
cruitment, local pride, and for the consideration which our present
system gives to the sentiments and prejudices of the people of the
various States as to the elements within them which may be per-
mitted to bear arms. -
Those who advocate making the militia wholly subject to Federal
control at all times will find it difficult to establish the theory that
the absence of State interest and State support will contribute to
increased efficiency. The fate of the militia of the District of Colum-
bia will not bear them out, for there is scarcely a State in the Union
whose forces are so conspicuously ill-housed and ill-cared for, though
I would not have you construe this as questioning the efficiency of
the District Militia, which has succeeded in maintaining itself at a
creditable standard under most discouraging circumstances.
As has already been pointed out, the National Guard itself has
initiated the legislation which resulted in the Federal supervision
which it now receives. We believe that the Congress now has author-
ity to increase the powers of Federal control to the fullest extent
necessary to insure a uniform standard of reasonable efficiency. It
is only necessary that these powers be exercised. It will be time
enough to declare that the militia is inefficient and hopeless and to
recommend that it be abandoned as an institution for the defense of
the Nation when the full powers of the Government, both legislative
and administrative, have been exercised in the effort to develop it
to a better degree of efficiency. This has not been done.
We are told that the varying systems for selecting officers in the
several States, and the lack of uniformity in organization, are vital
784 PREPAIRED NIESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
defects, yet who can deny that the Congress under its constitutional
power to prescribe the Organization of the militia may provide—
1. The terms of commissioned officers and the periods of enlist–
ment. .
2. A standard qualification as a prerequisite to appointment to
commissioned office.
3. A definite and uniform system for the appointment of officers.
. . 4. A uniform plan of organization which will deny the right to
maintain any other. *
We feel also that a system of discipline may be prescribed which
will insure an adequate and uniform method of training. If the field
training of the militia is not long enough, it is only necessary for Con-
gress to provide the means for increasing it. If it is not sufficiently
intensive, you are reminded that the programs of instruction at all
encampments are subject to the approval of the Federal authorities
and for the most part are prepared by the representatives of the War
Department on duty in the several States. The greatest progress
which has been made in the theoretical instruction of militia officers
has been accomplished through the medium of correspondence
schools. These are conducted in some States and not in others.
It is perfectly practicable to standardize this work. A single insti-
tution in Pennsylvania is training thousands of young men each year
in professional callings by means of correspondence. Yet our Gov-
ernment has not availed itself of this economic and thoroughly
practicable means of supplying its greatest military need, which is
efficient officers. The importance of establishing a uniform standard
of training for the officers of the Organized Militia would suggest
itself to the mind of a layman, yet it was not until 11 years after the
adoption of the Federal statute which was designed to standardize
militia training, and establishing a bureau at the War Department
for the supervision of militia affairs, that a comprehensive, definite,
and uniform scheme for progressive training was even suggested to
the States.
If the militia is inefficient, and if the administrative systems em–
ployed in certain States are inadequate, the Federal. Government
and the central authorities in control of the militia are not without
responsibility in that connection, and it may be laid down as a con-
clusion born of experience that no law which may be placed upon
the statute books will increase the efficiency of the militia unless
provision is also made whereby the affairs of that arm of the military
service will be administered with sympathy and understanding.
The Marine Corps is admittedly the best disciplined and most
efficient body of mobile troops that we have. Fourteen per cent of
its officers are graduates of the Naval Academy; 8 per cent had pre-
vious service in the National Guard. None are graduates of West
Point. It is not administered by the War Department, and may I
ask if you would regard with favor a proposal to maintain it as a
separate corps but to assign officers of the Regular Army to control
and conduct its affairs? Could you hope for continued favorable
results if those conditions were imposed ? Yet this is the system we
now employ to develop the largest military force in the country.
Effort has been made to provide a means for making directly available
to the Secretary of War information from militia sources and recom-
mendations that convey the ideas of militiamen, but these have been
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 785
rendered ineffective and impotent, and, as a result, let us say, of the
lack of understanding of those conditions which are peculiar to our
branch of the service, rules are imposed which serve to discourage and
to render more difficult the task of maintaining the National Guard
at a proper standard. Let me cite, for example, one of the rules
governing the matter of Organization. Those of you who as officers
of the Organized Militia have had to deal with the problem of re-
cruiting can appreciate the effect of a rule which provides that if a
regiment becomes deficient by the mustering out of one company,
and remains so for a period of six months, the headquarters of that
regiment must be discontinued, with the line and staff officers attached
thereto. It is to be assumed that officers whose length of service,
experience, and qualifications have advanced them to the grade of
colonel would be of special value to the Government; but, apparently,
that is not presupposed under this rule. - Only a few years ago, during
a season of plenty, there was a great shortage of men in the Regular
Establishment, and recruiting was most difficult. The application
of a similar rule to the Army at that time would gave disrupted it.
Yet the militia survives, and is a force in being.
It is a cause for wonder that in a government which proclaims its
dependence for defense upon the citizenry of the country, and makes
a direct appeal to the patriotic impulses of the people to sustain it,
an institution such as is the National Guard, a force designed to
stimulate and to develop those qualities which are the highest attir-
butes of American citizenship, should have to fight, constantly to
fight, not only to maintain, but to justify its existence.
And this fight always commences with the happenings of 1812.
The present Organized Militia forces bear as much relation to the
enrolled militia of that time as do the electrically propelled cars of
Our modern railroads to the stage coaches of the long ago. But we are
arbitrarily constituted hereditary legatees to the inefficiency which
distinguished the minute men of the revolutionary period, and,
despite our earnest endeavors, are still held responsible for the burning
of Washington by the British.
Those who from their own knowledge can judge of the vast im-
provement which has marked the progress in training and efficiency
of the National Guard during the last decade, marvel at what has
been achieved under such discouraging conditions. For our service
can scarcely be said to offer the compensations which should balance
the exactions it imposes. The militiaman is prevailed upon to
voluntarily give his services under a contract which obligates him for
a period of years. He is required to perform certain duties, and if he
fails or is delinquent he may go to jail, but, if he makes good, then he
has only the satisfaction that comes from the consciousness of a duty
well performed.
Perhaps the greatest discouragement, however, with which our
branch of the service has had to contend is that for a period of years
past, there has been a persistent propaganda designed to lessen the
public estimation of the value of the Organized Militia as a part of our
national military forces. As you may have noticed, these attacks
have been particularly pronounced during the past few weeks.
Reports professedly emanating from official sources have quite
recently charged among other things a gross misapplication of an
786 PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
enormous amount of Government military property. The alleged
theft of arms and of military stores by some officer in Texas is made
the basis of a sweeping denunciation of the entire militia service.
There is, of course, no more justice and reason in this than were
National Guardsmen to point to the case of the Army officer who
some years ago was convicted at Savannah of the embezzlement of
more than $1,000,000, as establishing the moral plane of the commis-
sioned personnel of the Regular establishment.
In a recent issue of a New York paper a high official of the Govern-
ment is quoted as saying that “any scheme for national defense
founded upon the militia is a swindle, a gold brick, and a bogus check;”
that “National Guardsmen are urging Congress to enact legislation
which will divert millions of the Government's money into private
pockets without a dollal’s worth of real protection in return,” and
that “the National Guard Association of the United States is planning
and seeking to make a raid upon the Public Treasury.”
Senator WARREN. Have you given in your remarks the author of
that statement .
Gen. FOSTER. I have the newspaper article, which I can put in the
record if you desire. -
These are harsh expressions, and they are both untruthful and
unfair. The mention of this particular matter brings me to a dis-
cussion of the proposal for Federal compensation for militia service.
The National Guard does not ask a dollar from the Public Treasury for
which it can not give a full measure of service in return. In the first
place, it should be considered that under any system of volunteer
military service the Government must pay for such service, and that
whether this cost takes the form of expenditures to train and fit
soldiers for active duty, or is paid in bounty and pensions to com-
pensate for casualties attributable to the incompetency of unpre-
paredness, is a matter of choice—but with all argument for economy
favoring the first-named plan.
The War Department has all along favored Federal compensation
for militia service. I think that every officer who has served at the
head of the Division of Militia Affairs has definitely recommended it
as a necessary measure to insure proper efficiency of the militia. A bill
embodying that principle passed the House in the Sixty-first Congress,
and was favorably and unanimously reported out of the Senate com-
mittee of the same Congress, but too late to receive consideration. A
similar bill passed the House in the Sixty-second Congress, but
again failed to come up for final consideration in the Senate. An-
other bill was introduced in the Senate of the Sixty-third Congress by
Senator Chamberlain and was reported favorably by the Senate com-
mittee, but too late to receive consideration. The latter bill was
prepared in the War Department at the direction of the present Sec-
retary of War, although he did not at any time specifically recom-
mend its adoption. Its provisions were agreed upon, however, after
conference, by the representatives of the Organized Militia and the
heads of all of the divisions of the War Department having to do
with militia affairs.
Until quite recently the proposal to grant Federal compensation for
militia service has not been regarded at the War Department as in
the nature of an attempt to raid the National Treasury. The records
will show on the other hand that for a long time there was a division
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 787
of opinion among national guardsmen as to whether or not the effect
of putting the militia upon a basis of pay would promote the inter-
ests of that service. The chief of the Division of Militia Affairs in his
report for the year 1911 refers to this when he says: -
At the time of the rendition of the last report of the Chief Division of Militia.
Affairs the Organized Militia was, as stated in that report, divided into two definite
classes, one favoring Federal pay for Service in the militia and the other opposing it.
During the year that has elapsed since this report was made sentiment has crystallized
in favor of Securing Federal pay, but this division was, of course, at no time a party to
the controversy. Yet it realizes that the amount of time and money that have been
demanded by the Federal Government under the law in an attempt to secure efficiency
of the militia have now reached the point where they are almost burdensome. It is
believed that the limit of Sacrifice that can be asked of the militia under the present
laws and without compensation has been reached. This statement is based upon
almost universal reports as to the amount of sacrifice required and upon an examina-
tion of the figures showing the strength of the organization. Inquiries have devel-
oped the fact that it is at present very difficult to keep the organizations up to the
desired strength, and while there are a number of factors which affect the case, yet
not the least is the time and money that militiamen must give to belong to the serv-
ice. As the people of the United States are opposed to conscription, whereby each
man must of necessity give military service to the country in return for the protec-
tion and benefits afforded him, it would seem to be only just that those men who are
willingto sacrifice their time shall at least be partially compensated therefor.
There has been presented to Congress at the hearings upon the
various pay bills which I have referred to, strong arguments in favor
of the principle of Federal compensation for militia service. We are
prepared to renew those arguments or to furnish any additional infor-
mation which you may require. We have no bill to urge upon your
attention. We come here simply to present to you our recommenda-
tions for legislative action and the reasoning upon which they are
based. We believe that the sentiment of the country is favorable to
the maintenance and the development of the National Guard, and
naturally we shall by every proper means seek to satisfy you, as you
should be satisfied, upon that point.
If, as has been charged, the National Guard has no other purpose
in this issue than to obtain Federal pay, I think I can show you that
a very powerful influence could have been enlisted in support of
that undertaking; an influence now denied because of our adherence
to that policy which conviction dictated as best for the cause which
we seek to serve. I read you from the report of a conference of
National Guard officers held in this city with the Secretary of War
on October 29 last, the report of which conference is as dictated by
the Secretary himself: •
The final matter that remains in my memory that has not been alluded to I propose
to state in exactly the form in which it occurred, so that there may be no misunder-
standing. I was asked this question: “Supposing the National Guard convention
should approve of your recommendations concerning the Regular Army and should
engage to show its sympathy and desire that your recommendations should be adopted
in that respect; supposing that they should take a similar attitude with respect to
your plan for a continental army; supposing that they should approve of all of your
plans with respect to the National Guard excepting the addition of the pay bill, would
you then be in favor of the pay bill?” My answer was “Yes.” I was then asked
whether, if they took that attitude, I would exercise my influence in favor of the pay
bill, and I said “Yes.” But I added that I had never elicited from President Wilson
any expression of final judgment in this particular on the pay bill, and that I could not
tell, therefore, whether or not he would permit me, as Secretary of War, to favor that
bill; but my own personal position was just as I have above expressed it. To prevent
any misunderstanding I wish to say this, that I can not in any event initially propose
the pay bill as part of my scheme, and when I said that I would favor it and add my
788 PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
influence, I did not mean and do not mean that I can include it in the recommenda-
tions that I have already made and which have already been made to Congress.
What I do mean, and what I will do in the event of the things which were the basis
of the questions to me, if the pay bill is engrafted upon my plan, the other details
of the plan being left as they are, is that I will not only not object to it but I will
say that under the circumstances I will favor its passage.
... To the charge of undue activity upon the part of the adjutants
eneral of the several States in regard to National Guard recommen-
dations for Federal legislation, I need only invite your attention to
the fact that no bill under consideration now, or which has ever been
introduced in Congress, has proposed pay for the adjutants general
or for the officers of the staff departments serving under them who
are not attached to organizations of the line.
Perhaps I am not called upon to establish to you the fact that the
National Guard Association of the United States as an organization
is truly representative of the rank and file of the National Guard.
Were it required of me that I do so, I would cite the fact that it has
always been so regarded by the War Department. Many Secretaries
of War have appeared before our association at its conventions to
discuss means and measures for improving the military service. The
present Secretary of War expressed regret that he could not attend
our recent meeting at San Francisco, and the Assistant Secretary
journeyed across the continent to outline the proposed new militar
policy of the administration. I may add in that connection that if
eloquence and magnetic influence could overcome a sober judgment
born of experience and understanding of the particular problem
involved, the first annual increment of the proposed continental
army would have been provided for at that meeting.
In closing this statement which I have felt called upon to make in
explanation of the seeming opposition of the National Guard to the
full program of the administration for military preparedness, I would
remind you that the same Thomas Jefferson whose words are em-
ployed to support the plan for a force to take the place of the National
Guard in the Federal forces, is the one who said: -
For a people who are free and who mean to remain so, a well organized and armed
militia is their best security. - - e
Let us not disturb the shades of that distinguished patriot by Seek-
ing to make him responsible for any departure from the policies fixed
in the instrument to which his name is appended and which until this
day has served to guide this Nation to a position of greatness second
to none in the world. -
You may be assured, gentlemen of the committee, that whatever
the action of the Congress may be in determining the weighty prob-
lems which you are now called upon to solve, the members of the
National Guard will in the future, as in the past, give their first thought
to the service of the Nation, for whose defense they feel and believe
themselves to be already enrolled. - .
Mr. Chairman, that concludes the statement I have to make. I
would say that it is the position of the National Guard—and I think
we gentlemen who are before you to-day represent the opinion of
National Guardsmen generally throughout the States—that our insti-
tution is susceptible of being Federalized to the extent that all of the
influences of control, which are necessary to provide for uniform train-
ing, equipment, and armament can be effected by legislative action,
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 789
and we are earnestly and sincerely in favor of having that action
taken by Congress. ... Some of the things that have suggested them-
selves to us that might be done I will outline to you, as follows:
We believe the States should be required to maintain a bigger quota
of troops, and we believe that the Congress has the authority to pre-
scribe a definite plan of organization for the troops, and to prohibit
or to deny the right of a State to maintain any other force. I would
like to say, in this connection, that the effect of the present method
of administration in dealing with the provision of the Federal Militia
law which requires that the organizations of the militia shall conform
to that which shall be prescribed for the Army, defeats its purpose, in
that it seems to admit the authority of the States to maintain other
forces. In other words, when the organization in a State does not
conform to the system prescribed, the action of the War Department
is usually to notify the State that the department will not recognize
that portion of its forces which does not conform, which in itself
carries the suggestion that some other form of organization is per-
missible. We think Congress has power to definitely fix that.
. The CHAIRMAN. Has any other State undertaken to put any other
form of force in being'. - -
Gen. FOSTER. I do not know that they have undertaken, but there
have been many forces which were in existence that have not been
discontinued promptly. There have been surplus officers in some
States, and these men are continued on an assigned list or given some
active duty with the troops.
Senator CATRON. How do you propose to enforce the proposed
action of the Federal Government in requiring more troops to be
maintained by the militia in the State and to prevent the State from
interfering with the Federal Government in the management and
control and operation 3
Gen. FostER. We are recommending the principle of Federal com-
pensation for militia service, and I would deny the States which do
not comply with that requirement the Federal support.
Senator CATRON. How would you compel them to do it if you
want the militia . You do not want them to stay out . º
Gen. FostER. Do you mean to require them to organize where they
do not have militia .
Senator CATRON. Yes; to compel them.
Gen. Fost ER. I do not know that I can suggest such a provision,
but I can not conceive of such a situation, Senator.
The CHAIRMAN. It has been said here that in some States where
the National Guard is paid by the States it is still difficult, if not
impossible, to get the militiamen to attend drill. -
Senator CATRON. Where they are paid 3
Gen. FostER. There are gentlemen here representing those States
who can better answer that than I can. We do not pay them in
Florida. .
Senator CATRON. How do you expect to fill up the National Guard
to the amount of 500,000, as you suggested'
Gen. FostER. I do not think we have contemplated as large a force
as 500,000, though that might be achieved as a system is developed;
but we have now, in our State, more than two and one-half times the
strength of the militia which the Federal law requires as a prerequisite
to Federal support. *
'790 . PREPAREDINESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
Senator CATRON. In Florida. ?
Gen. FosTER. In all the States we have practically 129,000 militia
now, and, in round numbers, a hundred for each Congressman.
Fifty thousand is required as a minimum under the existing law.
Senator DU Pont. I do not understand that the proposed so-
called continental system of forces presupposes the elimination of
the National Guard, and if so is the National Guard opposed to the
organization of this continental force : -
Gen. FOSTER. I would not say that is the attitude of the National
Guard. They have given no expression of opinion. I do not think
it a practical plan. I am not opposed to it. To Senator Catron.:)
. I would answer your question a little more fully by saying we think
it is perfectly competent for the Congress to enact a law which would
preclude the disbandment of troops already organized that organized
under a system which might be prescribed by Congress without the
consent of the Federal authorities. - -
Senator CATRON. It is generally conceded to be an advantage to
have an Army of at least 500,000 men who can be called into the field
in case of any emergency, and you said in your proposition there that
the militia was the best way to get that. -
Gen. Foster. Yes, sir. - -
Senator CATRON. Then my question comes to the point, How
would you get it'. You have said the States have raised two and
one-half times as much as they are required to raise, but they will get
the 500,000? 4.
Gen. FOSTER. We believe that the present plans for the increase
in the Regular Army contemplate having at least 100,000 mobile
troops, and it has been suggested that there should be 500,000 men,
so it would leave 400,000 of the troops to be raised. The present
force of militia Organizations aggregate 129,000 at peace strength.
Of course, they are not now at war strength.
We are frank to say perhaps it would be most feasible to permit the
formation of new organizations. Possibly, in New York and Penn-
sylvania and some of the large centers, it would not be difficult to
build the present organizations up to war strength quickly.
The CHAIRMAN. Do you not think you would have less trouble in
building up the National Guard in some States if those States had a
º constabulary instead of calling the National Guard to do police
duty :
Gen. FostER. I think that it has had a beneficial effect on the
National Guard in States where they have tried that.
The CHAIRMAN. How many States have tried it?
Gen. FOSTER. I know of two, Pennsylvania—Gen. Stuart is here
and can tell you about that—where it has been most successfully
tried, and a similar organization in Texas, the Texas Rangers.
One of the objections, of course, to the militia service is the state-
ment that we do not get a uniform standard in the training of officers.
We conceive it to be within the power of Congress to prescribe a
standard which they shall meet, and we would invite that; we think
it is proper legislation. We believe it lies within the power of Con-
gress to prescribe what the tenure of commissioned office shall be
and what the terms of enlistment of enlisted men shall be. We think
that it will be very beneficial if Congress will take such action, and
also prescribe the standards for promotion, the age limit of those
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 791.
who can be commissioned in the National Guard, and enlisted, for
that matter. -
We believe it very important that the system of training should be
standardized. - -
Now, gentlemen, those are things that have occurred to me say,
as I have consulted notes made at the hearing this morning before
the committee of the House.
The CHAIRMAN. There are two bills pending before this committee
having particular reference to the National Guard. One is the bill
that was introduced by me a year ago and which has been reintro-
duced this session, and which was formulated by the War Depart-
ment and by representatives of the National Guard; the other was
introduced by Senator Cummins. Have you gentlemen examined
these bills, and have you a preference with reference to them?
Gen. Fost ER. I do not know that we would say that; we have not.
I think the essential difference is the question you had just raised
with regard to the establishment of a State constabulary to take the
place of the militia, which, as I say, would be of good effect. Of
course, there may be some question as to whether or not that can be
done. I do not see how, speaking my own views, the right could be
taken away from the States, or how the States can be refused the
right to use the troops to enforce the laws within the States.
The CHAIRMAN. I do not think Congress would have the power
to take that away; that would devolve upon the States themselves.
Gen. FOSTER. Yes; that would require State action.
The CHAIRMAN. But in some States, and pº it is true in your
State, a great many young men who would join the National Guard
will not join it because they may be called upon to do police duty.
Gen. FOSTER. I think, Senator, that the chief thought in the mind
of every young man who is recruited in the National Guard is that he
is entering the service for Federal service; none of them go in for
police duty. But I believe the thought that that kind of duty affects
the National Guard adversely and that labor unions are against our
service is very much exaggerated in the public mind. I do not think
that is as serious a consideration as it used to be and as people think
it is.
The CHAIRMAN. Would it be possible for you gentlemen, while you
are all here, to go through those bills and suggest any changes in either
of them, or combing the two, if you please, so that the committee can
have the crystalized judgment of the National Guardsmen with refer-
ence to legislation ? -
Gen. FostER. Do you mean to merely consider the features
expressed by the bills now, or anything that may be added ?
The CHAIRMAN. Yes; have a consultation and put in concrete form
a bill that you think would meet the conditions.
Gen. FostER. I think we would be glad to make suggestions; I do
not know whether we could make a biii.
The CHAIRMAN. It is pretty hard for members of this committee to
sit down and formulate a bill themselves and adopt the suggestions
that are made.
Gen. Foster. At the present time I know our committee would
greatly appreciate the privilege of taking these two bills and making
any suggestion as to changes we think necessary or combining the two.
792 PREPAIRED NESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
The CHAIRMAN. That is what I should be glad to have, and I think
the committee would. I do not understand from the Secretary of
War that he is opposed to the National Guard system. He did not
say that in his testimony here. It is possible that you might formu-
late a bill and agree with the Division of Militia Affairs of the War
Department. .
Gen. Fost ER. Senator. I will say this in explanation of our posi-
tion in that matter. The National Guard representatives come be-
fore you now for the first time in more than two years. Our attitude
and our feeling has been that in the development of any force for
Federal purposes the War Department—or the President through
his Secretary of War—should take the initiative in suggesting those
things to Congress which are required to improve such forces and
perfect them; and at our convention in Boston two years ago the
instructions to our committee were to cooperate with the War Depart-
ment to that end, and always when matters have come up in seeking
this legislation, which we think important and necessary, after getting
to a basis of final agreement, which was reached in your bill, then the
whole thing has in some way been upset. We have given that up, and
we now believe we should come directly to you gentlemen and make
these suggestions to you directly in order to get them before you.
The CHAIRMAN. We are glad to have them. So far as I am con-
cerned, we want you to put them in concrete shape.
Gen. FostER. We shall be very glad to.
Senator WARREN. Right along the line of your remarks, which are
splendid in themselves, the bills that are before us sometimes have
to be modified and other parts of the bills not alluded to have to be
included to make it one whole. I think you are wise in asking them,
Mr. Chairman, to take one or all of these bills and incorporate them
into a complete bill along the lines of their thought. I think it
would be useful to us. -
The CHAIRMAN. I think so, and at the same time meet the ob-
jections.
Senator WARREN. The idea is to make it complete so that the sug-
gestions dovetail into each other and get the complete idea of these
gentlemen who have given it great study, and who know the issues
of that arm of the service.
The CHAIRMAN. You gentlemen know the objections which are
being made to the National Guard, the imº of Federalizing
it because of constitutional limitations, and in such a draft of a
measure as you see fit to prepare why should you not bring it as near
under Federal control as you think it possible to bring it?
Gen. FOSTER. That is our object. It is the earnest desire of the
militiamen everywhere to make our force available for Federal use,
and in a majority of the States the National Guardsmen, since 1903,
in their oaths of enlistment, have taken an obligation to serve the
National Government in time of war.
The CHAIRMAN. The trouble does not seem to be in time of actual
War, in the minds of a good many. The trouble seems to be in
having a more central control in time of peace. - -
Gen. FOSTER. I think, as I outlined in the statment which I pre-
pared, that the means are open to Congress for prescribing by law
a scheme of Organization by which every necessary function of
control can be centrally exercised in time of peace.
PREPAIREDINESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 793
The CHAIRMAN. Gen. Crowder yesterday discussed the situation
from a constitutional viewpoint, and he feels that there are means
of bringing it under Federal control, and Senator Cummins, in a
discussion of the constitutional view of it expressed the same opinion
quite forcibly. So it would seem, taking the views of these gentle-
men, together, that some measure might be framed meeting the
requirements of them all.
en. FOSTER. We think so.
I do not want to take up your time further. Gen. O'Ryan, whom
I would suggest be j next, will discuss that very proposition
for you. \
STATEMENT OF MAJ. GEN, JOHN F. O'RYAN, COMMANDING
THE NEW YORK DIVISION OF THE NATIONAL GIJARIO.
Gen. O'RYAN. I would like to say first, on behalf of the officers and
enlisted men of the New York division, and I think that it applies to
officers and enlisted men throughout the United States, that they have
no particular anxiety about getting on the Government pay roll.
New York opposed the proposition of Federal pay of the militia
from the time the proposition was first suggested, until about two
years ago. The basis of that opposition, I think personally, was
-largely due to the fact that the officers realized that with Federal
pay—so-called Fºº." come very exacting Federal obligations,
and we had at that time in our divisions officers who, while they were
well-intentioned citizens and were efficient in the matter of drill,
lacked the necessary fundamental education, . They lacked habits
of study; they lacked the breadth of view which goes with educa–
tion and which is necessary and essential for an officer to efficiently
render his service in the command of the larger units. And so these
officers did not enthuse much over this proposition. The National
Guard of the country has changed very materially during the past
few years, and with that change has come a change of sentiment in .
respect to this pay proposition.
Our educational standards have vastly improved; our commis-
sioned personnel has been re-created and rejuvenated. These men
have made a thorough study of this proposition of efficiency, of disci-
pline, of property accountability, of professional education, of the
º of leadership that are necessary in the command of troops, and
they know that to bring about the necessary standards of efficiency
throughout the service as a whole there must be a substantial hold in
the form of compensation on the enlisted personnel. As well to try
to run the Regular Army without compensation for the officers and
IOleI).
Now, occasionally we hear some man who has superficial knowledge
of this matter say, “Why, it is obvious that you must have a form of
compensation for the enlisted man if you are to have your summary
courts exercise jurisdiction effectively over these men; have their
delinquencies in the matter of fines, which may be withheld from
pay. "We appreciate that in order to assure correct accountability for
military property lost or damaged there must be, in the nature of
things, coming from the Federal Government, from the central
source, some compensation to the individual soldier which may be
'794 - PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
withheld in the event of his neglect. But how about the officers ?
Why do you wish them on the pay roll''
As to that, it is most unfortunate that the name “pay” has been
given to this proposition. I, personally, do nor know the particular
amounts that have been recommended, but I know in a general way
that they are nominal; that in effect they do not constitute pay or
compensation, but constitute amounts sufficient to cover the out-of-
pocket expenses of the officers. I have referred briefly to the neces-
sity for our officers being selected from among the educated class of
young men of the country. That is absolutely essential. Now, what
do we find? We have a number of colleges in New York State; they
have them in all States; the young man who comes out of college is
essentially the right type of man; he has the time to go into things,
into this sort of thing. He is available, so far as time is concerned.
He has the education; a very large percentage of them have the
physical fitness, and as the result of their study of the history of their
country, as the result of their athletic prowess where it exists, as the
result of the fact that they have time, these men possess the martial
spirit in most cases to a degree, and when the suggestion is made to
come in and join the National Guard organization and that in the
natural course of events they can very promptly qualify for a com-
mission, these men approach this subject with enthusiasm.
But we do. not get them in sufficient numbers, and why not
Because, when that prospective officer is told that the holding of a
commission in the National Guard involves an expenditure by him
of funds to the extent of from $300 to $400 for his uniforms, for his
equipment, for his books, for everything else that has to do with this
quasi profession of his, he throws his hands up. He is a young man.
Remember that. And he has a false sense of modesty, so that he
does not frankly state, “I am too poor; I can not afford this.”
He says, “I will have to think this over,” but when you get under-
neath the skin you find that this man is in the same class with eight-
tenths of our young college men; he has been maintained through
college by the personal sacrifice of his parents or his family, and when
they get him through college they say, “Now, we have launched
you; go to it. We will not give you three or four hundred dollars
to take up a profession that is not going to pay anything”; and
although he is available in every other way, although he is just the
material we want, we can not get him. This so-called pay bi is the
solution for that proposition. It will make this class of young men
available, and you have got to render them available, no matter
what you call the force, whether it is a continental or Regular Army,
or any other kind of a national army. -
Now, one or two suggestions, in order that in this discussion we
may get on common ground. The most conservative of our military
people have stated that the minimum number of troops required for
the first line to be maintained, irrespective of reserves, is a force of
400,000 men, and perhaps 500,000. In speculating as to how the
troops will be maintained we naturally turn to the Regular Army.
Can we by expanding the Regular Army meet that minimum of
demand in respect to national defense ? The Regular Army cost
the last fiscal year $115,000,000 for, roughly speaking, 100,000 men.
It is almost obvious, and I will assume that it is obvious, that the
proposition to complete this first line by expanding the Regular
PREPAREDNIESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. '795
Army to the extent of 500,000 men is a fanciful one, by reason of the
cost; but there is another aspect of this question which has not been
discussed to any considerable extent, and that is that the method of
attempting to wage war by a professional Regular Army supplemented
by volunteers is a plan of waging war that has been abandoned by
every one of the great powers of this earth except two, Great Britain
and the United States; and they are the two admittedly least pre-
pared to engage in efficient modern warfare.
Now, let us see an example of that. When the war abroad broke
out Great Britain maintained in the southern part of England an
efficient regular, highly trained force, a professional army of 165,000.
Within a few days after the declaration of war that efficient profes-
sional army was moved with faultless precision to the Continent of
Europe and there, like a handgrenade, it was thrown on the conflagra-
tion against the trained citizenry of the Continent. And what
happened to that highly efficient regular professional army is a matter
of history, through no fault of its own, but, as the great German
author Clausewitz says, “One of the most important factors in
modern war is numbers.” What else happened after this hand
grenade went up in smoke º Great Britain has found herself greatly
handicapped in the organization and the training of the vast national
army with which she is now trying to wage this war.
There is every precedent for that. Gen. Grant, in his memoirs,
states that if he had known as much about the conduct of war on a
big scale at the beginning of his career in the Army as he did when he
completed his experience, his first act would have been to disband
the Regular Army of the United States and to use the personnel as
the leaders and instructors of the great national Army with which the
war was to be waged. Now, this does not mean that those who call
attention to these principles are against an increase of the present
personnel of the Regular Army. That is not the point. It is the
manner in which the force is to be used and is to be organized. We
need a big increase of the regular force, but not to be utilized except
when occasion demands it, as a national police, but to have it welded
into this vast national army is what we advocate. We need officers
of the Army for organization of this national militia army that we
advocate. Every such regiment should have, every battalion should
have, a regular officer with it. We should so organize this system
that the interests of the regular force will be identical with the inter-
ests of the national army. That System has been worked out in
Australia. You hear the Australian system advocated constantly as
a fine system. How often is attention called to the fact that that
system is based upon our system, not as it is, but as it should be and
as it is capable of becoming'. The interests of the provinces of Aus-
tralia in the national force in the early days were very similar to the
interests of the States here.
According to the organic law of Australia, the maintaining of a
regular professional standing army is prohibited; according to the
Organic law of Australia, the use of the troops outside the Dominion of
Australia is prohibited. It is based upon this thought, that when
any nation attempts to wage a foreign war, an aggressive offensive
campaign, that campaign is doomed to failure, no matter what the
form of government—absolute monarchy or republic—unless there
is back of the offensive warfare the sentiment of the people. Now,
796 PREPAREDINESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
if you have back of such an offensive campaign, which requires
troops outside of the continental limits of the country, that senti-
ment, the troops will volunteer; and that has been the case in Aus–
tralia in the present war, where the Australian troops were demanded,
or, rather, where their willingness to volunteer was requested, it was
manifested, and hence we find the troops of Australia serving most
gallantly and efficiently in the Gallipoli Peninsula and in Egypt. I
am told by Swiss officers that the cantons of Switzerland, which
correspond to our States, have certain rights in respect to the national
army of Switzerland, which is, of course, well known to be a militia
army based very much upon the plan that was contemplated by our
Constitution. If it is obvious that the attempt to create this first-
line force by an expansion of the Regular Army is impossible by rea—
son of the cost, and is wrong in principle by reason of the fact that
the plan to protect the interests of the country rest upon the man-
hood of the country and should not be imposed upon numbers of
the professionals who may be hired to do the duty of the others,
then we must indeed turn to some other force.
One suggestion has been made that this be provided by the national
continental army plan, and, being a soldier and it being the policy of
the War Department to advocate that plan, I have no comments to
make about it. The other plan is whether or not the militia of the
country may be developed into an efficient and effective national
army, to an extent sufficient to meet the military needs of the coun-
try. The first question that presents itself is as to the authority of
Congress to provide in any way under the Constitution that this force
shall be made available for extraterritorial use. I have been one
of those officers who for years have pointed out this great organic
defect in the militia system under the limitations imposed by the
Constitution; but I have found, after I gave more than superficial
consideration to this alleged defect, that as a matter of fact there is
very little in it. It seems to me a rather daring proposition for our
people to advocate that it is an organic defect in the organization of
the great national army because the Organic law prohibits the use of
that great body of troops that might be raised for offensive warfare
in other parts of the world, unless the troops volunteer. We can not
undertake to outmilitary the most militaristic powers of the world,
because we find that the same limitation exists in respect to the
national and imperial forces of the great countries.
. Several years ago a German officer returning from China visited me,
and he told me that under the organic law of the German Empire it
was unlawful, at the time of the China relief expedition, for the
German Emperor to order any of the troops to that theater of opera-
tions; that it was necessary for him to call upon them to volunteer.
Of course, there was no question but what that magnificent body
of men with their wonderful esprit and morale and knowledge of the
Fº of arms would all volunteer to a man, and of course he
ad no trouble; it was a mere matter of detail, and the officers and
soldiers were sent. But the point is that they could not be arbitrarily
sent there without calling upon them to volunteer. A short time
ago, about six months ago, I entertained a Japanese officer of the
Imperial Japanese Army, and I asked him half humorously when
the Japanese Army was going to show up in Europe, and he said
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 797
“Not in this war.” I said, “Why not ?” “Well,” he said, “because
the soldiers would not volunteer.” I said, “You do not mean to tell
me that your great military nation is limited in any such manner
in its jurisdiction over its troops?” “Oh, yes,” he said “unquestion-
ably. In the organic law, the extraterritorial use of troops for other
than defensive purposes is prohibited, unless the troops volunteer,
and from what I know of the sentiment of the Japanese troops
would not volunteer to go to Europe.” - -
So I think you gentlemen will find, when you investigate these
various systems, and I think one of the officers here has some very
interesting matter on the composition of the German troops as to the
rights of the separate kingdoms. You will find with the President
of the United States over this National Militia, not as it exists to-day,
but as it is capable of being rendered under the powers vested in
Congress by the Constitution, that it can be made just as effective,
So far as the field of its usefulness is concerned, as are the National
forces of the several military powers. g -
The CHAIRMAN. If that were the only question involved, General,
there would be no trouble about it, because we do not want any
army of invasion. We do not want the troops of this country to be
put to any such use, and it would be a very rare occasion when they
would be called upon for any purpose. A necessity might arise, as
when they went to Vera Cruz, but the great difficulty seems to be the
dual authority exercised by the Federal Government on the one side,
and the State authorities on the other, which sometimes are in
apparent conflict.
en. O'RYAN. Yes, sir; I am coming to that; but I mentioned this
because, when this proposition about Federalizing the Militia, de-
veloping this Militia into a great National Army, was first suggested,
those who opposed the plan urged what I have referred to as a great
reason, an economic reason, why the attempt to construct such a
National force would be building on a bank of sand.
Now we come to the next set of conditions that operate as alleged
defects that make impossible the development of the militia as a na–
tional army. These, briefly, may be summed up as the following: That
there are as many standards of professional qualification for officers
as there are States; that there are as many tenures of office as there
are States or groups of States; that there is no uniform period of en-
listment for the enlisted man; that the physical standards for enlist-
ment vary throughout the country; that in some States officers are
retired upon reaching the age of 64, as in the Regular Army, while
in other States they can go on and attempt to serve until they die of
old age; and all of these wide variations in conditions and require-
ments in qualifications have been, and very recently have been made
the subject of mirth, but the point is this, it is not within the power
of the State by any joint dº. to rectify these things from a prac-
tical point of view. It is almost impossible to conceive that the
States, by any joint action of their legislatures, could enact an act,
a code of laws, which they would all agree should be enforced in the
Several States.
The Constitution of the United States provides that Congress has
the power to provide for the organization, equipment, and armament
of the militia. Congress also has the power to prescribe the discipline
233S0—PT 16—16
3
798 P:REPARED NESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
for the militia. The Supreme Court of the United States has held
that where . Congress refuses to or has neglected to provide these
things—the power to do it is vested in Congress—then the States
have concurrent but subordinate jurisdiction, and hence the States
found it essential if any attempt was to be made to make these troops
efficient, that they could supply by legislative act what Congress has
failed to do. And thus we see the conditions that exist to-day.
Now, Congress, in 1903, did something in the way of organization;
it provided then that the organization of the militia should conform
to that of the Regular Army, but that, up to the present time, has
been limited to prescribing and enforcing that the number of men
who shall constitute a company shall not be below a prescribed
minimum, or more than a certain maximum, and that certain a num-
ber of companies shall constitute a battalion, and a certain number of
battalions a regiment, and so on; but under the power to organize
the militia, “organization” has a significance and a meaning well
understood in the military profession; under the power to organize is
included the power to prescribe the period of enlistment.
This is a most important thing in the make-up and the organization
of an army. And they have the power to prescribe the physical
qualifications. If you did not do that you might have no organized
army. It also includes the power to prescribe the tenure of office
of the officers—when they shall be retired, if ever. It includes the
ower to prescribe the professional, moral, and mental qualifications
or appointment in every grade. I think you will find it admitted
by the best military lawyers who have given this matter considera-
tion that there is nothing in dispute on this proposition. So limitless
are the powers of Congress in respect to organization, that it is
within the power of Congress to enact that none but redheaded men
shall be captains of cavalry in the militia, or none but blue-eyed
men shall be majors in the infantry. + .
The CHAIRMAN. In other words, you feel that Congress has the
power to act on practically everything except the naming of the
officers of the National Guard?
Gen. O'RYAN. Yes, sir. - *
The CHAIRMAN. And Senator Cummins goes still further than that,
taking the same position you do, and provides in his bill for a require-
ment as a condition to the giving of moneys, for instance, to the
State, or to the National Guard, that the National Government
reserve the right to have the officers selected from a list furnished
for that purpose.
Gen. O’RYAN. Yes, sir; I will cover that next. Congress reserves
to the State two things, the appointment of officers and the training
of the militia, but with this serious and important restriction,
according to the discipline prescribed by Congress. Let us see what
the power of the State to appoint the officers amounts to. Very much
has been made of that, that with 48 governors butting into this
national Army we will never get anywhere. This is not a criticism
that may be seriously made when you consider the power of Congress
in respect to the Organization, because if Congress will utilize its
powers the power reserving to the States the appointment becomes
in effect merely the power to nominate.
As to the constitutionality of that, I ask you to remember the
warfare that was waged in the matter of civil-service reform. When
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 799
the civil-service laws provided that the appointing power should be
limited in the selection to the man who stood at the top of the civil-
service list litigation resulted, and the courts held that it was such a
restriction on the power of selection as to take away the appointing
power from the officer in whom the Constitution had vested the
ower to appoint and to place it within another body, the Civil
ś, Commission, and so that law was held to be unconstitutional.
Whereupon the law was amended, and by its provisions there was
given to the appointing power the authority to select one of the three
names highest on the list, and that matter was litigated, and the
courts have quite unanimously held that it was a selection, a choice,
a field of selection, and that it did not unconstitutionally restrict the
powers of the appointing officer.
It is not necessary, in providing for legislation to govern this
matter of commissioned officers in the militia by the Federal Govern-
ment, to go even as far as that, but to narrow the field of selection.
The Federal Government does not care who the governors appoint,
whether he is on one list or another, provided the man whom he seeks
to appoint meets the requirements of the War Department as to his
mental, physical, moral, and professional education and fitness.
THE POWERS OF CONGRESS TO LIMIT THE APPOINTMENT BY THE GOVERNORS TO THOSE
WHO ARE QUALIFIED FOR COMMISSIONS.
See People v. Mosher (163 N. Y., 32), in which case the court cited 13 opinions.
Attorney General of the United States, page 516, to the effect that the word “appoint-
ment” implied an exercise of judgment, but the court held that there was power to
prescribe qualifications for office, and that this necessarily limited the power of ap-
pointment. g
The court also referred to the cases of People v. Roberts (148 N. Y., 360) and Chitten-
den v. Wurster (152 N. Y. 345). &
In the matter of the registration of Campbell (197 Pa., State, 581), the court, referring
to the power of appointment vested in the governor by the constitution, said, “but
neither section nor any other part of the constitution prohibits the legislature in
creating an office, from fixing the qualifications of the incumbent, and thereby limit.
ing the choice of the governor in the appointment to the class of persons so qualified.”
There is one matter about training, that training is reserved to the
States. Much has been made of that. Who trains the Regular
Army'. . * * e e t
The President does not train it. . He is the commander in chief. It
is largely a fiction. The officers of the Army train the Army. Who
trains the militia?' Another fiction. The governor is the commander
in chief, but we know he does not. We know the governors do not
train them. They know very little about it. They are trained by
the officers of the militia, aided by the officers of the Army detailed to
help them. If the War Department, the central government, can
control the selection and the qualifications of these officers, have you
not the matter of training in good hands? Have you not provided
to make the training of the militia effective? e
There remains, I think, but one constitutional question to refer to,
which has been urged as another organic objection, and that is that
it would be bad policy for the Federal Government to invest large
sums of money in the militia with the view that they were building
up a safe and sound investment for national defense-if it were
true that the national Army was so little its own army that it could
be compelled, under the law or the Constitution, to stand idly by
800 PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
and watch a governor disband the forces, perhaps at some time when
their presence was imperatively needed somewhere. If there is any-
thing in that objection, of course, it is a sound objection, and we are
wasting our time; but that objection will not stand, I think, serious
consideration. If the powers wested in the President to use the
militia for purposes mentioned in the Constitution are considered in
connection with the powers wested in Congress to provide for organi-
zation and disciplining of the militia, it must be evident that to
prevent the defeat of the primary object of this constitutional pro-
vision, namely, to provide for the national defense, it must be so
construed as to include the power to prohibit disbandment, and we
recommend that in your militia legislation you insert a provision
that no organization of the forces hereby organized, or covered by the
rovisions of this act, shall be disbanded without the consent of the
entral Government, or some proper officer whom you may designate
to represent it.
Congress has power to include in the laws organizing the militia a
provision that no organization shall be disbanded without the con-
sent of the War Department. It is a proper and essential detail of
organization to prescribe the life of the organization. A legislative
body vested with the right to charter or provide for the organization
of corporations possesses, as incidental to that power, the power to
prescribe the duration of the life of such corporations. To prescribe
the duration of an organization is a part, and a very important and
essential part, of the power to provide for organization, -
But it may be said that if Congress enacted a provision that no
militia organization shall hereafter be disbanded without the con-
sent of the Secretary of War, the governors might indirectly cause
the defeat of the primary object of the Constitution by preventing
enlistments in the organization they sought to disband. We hear
frequent references or comments in the answer to these apparently
unanswerable points, “Well, perhaps the governors might conspire
to defeat all these things, or the legislatures might meet and concoct
a conspiracy to defeat the ends of Congress.” These things are very
hard to answer. But Mr. Justice Story, of the United States Su-
preme Court, answering this point said, in the case of Martin v. Mott,
referring to the power of the States to legislate in respect to the
militia when Congress had failed adequately to do so:
But it is contended if the States can at all legislate or adjudicate on the Subject,
they may affect to aid, when their real object is nothing less than to embarrass the
progress of the General Government. I acknowledge myself at a loss to imagine how
this could ever be successfully attempted. .
Opposition, whether disguised or real, is the same thing. * * * . The absurdities
that might grow out of an affected cooperation in the States, with a real view to produce
embarrassment, furnish the best guaranty against the probability of its ever being
attempted and the surest means of detecting and defeating it. We may declare defects
in the Constitution, without being justly chargeable with creating them; but if they
exist, it is not for us to correct them.
The CHAIRMAN. Do you not think it is a fair assumption, general,
that when the Constitution was adopted, Congress had in mind the
difficulties which Gen. Washington encountered with the Continental
Army, and the principal purpose of that section of the Constitution
was to invest Congress with an enlarged power %
Gen. O'RYAN. Yes, sir; I think that is unquestionably so, and I
think we have, in support of your suggestion, the statement made by
*
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 801.
Washington in 1795 in a formal message to Congress, after all his ex-
perience with this militia, who were nothing more nor less than men
from the street and the farm. The citizens were told they were sol-
diers, told to provide their own arms, and told to elect their own officers.
That was the militia in those days. Washington, in spite of ail that
sad experience, after he had finished his functions as a general and be-
come President, made an exhaustive study of this subject with his
Secretary of War, Mr. Knox, a distinguished officer of the Revolution,
and as a result of that study he offered to Congress what has become
known as the Knox plan for building up a great national army under
the militia provisions of the Constitution, and Washington, who was
an acknowledged authority, entitled to respect here, gave it as his
formal opinion that it was within the power of Congress to so provide
for organization and discipline, equipment, and arming of the militia,
and for its development in such manner that it could be made to meet—
these are his own words—“every military exigency of the United
States.”
I referred to the constitutional aspect of this subject, and in clos-
ing I would like to refer to another aspect of it, because you can not
build an army if the officers and those who are concerned with its
development remain here in Washington and criticize it. That may
be essential and necessary, but then comes the matter of instruction,
the matter of training, the matter of leadership, and correct leader-
ship. We have to breathe into this force a iº martial spirit,
an esprit, and to do that we have to have assistance, and that assist-
tance must come from the Regular Army. We need all the officers
of the Regular Army in the way of an increase, and all the noncom-
missioned officers of the Army that Congress will give us. We can
use all that we have reason to believe you are willing to give. And
the field of operations, the opportunity to do good for his country,
that each and every one of those officers and noncommissioned officers
will find open to him, is a field vastly broader than he can ever hope
to find in the performance of his functions as an officer assigned to
some company, troop, or battery in the Regular Army.
We find there are two sentiments when we talk about the Regular
Army. We find there is the Washington sentiment, which you gen-
tlemen all know about; but we fear that perhaps you do not know
the sentiment of the great number of regular Officers who are working
with us, looking and hoping for the development of this great militia
of the country as a national force, and we want them a part of us,
with us. They are working with us now. I have 15 of them right
in my division, two of them holding two commissions, one in the
Regular Army on the active list, temporarily loaned to us and com-
missioned in our organization. Massachusetts has one. The State
of Washington has one. We all think alike on these questions.
They are a part of our family. We are part of them. We all think
alike, we are all working in the same cause. Those people believe
in the militia. They know the possibilities of its development.
They know why the militia of New York State is held up as a model.
They know and we know why the conditions in other States are bad.
It is not the fault of those men and those officers. It is the failure
of Congress to provide adequate money for the development and train-
ing of this force, as in some of the richef States it has been made up by
State appropriations, while in the poorer States they can not afford
802 PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
to do it. So we know that the regular soldier, while he is on duty,
or doing something else, costs the Federal Government $1,000 a year;
the money which Congress devotes to the 129,000 militia amounts to
$35 a year. Just imagine trying to make an army efficient with that
sum of money per capita.
So after we get our particular scheme of organization, and after
you convince the people in charge, with these larger means, to
sincerely aid in the development of this great national force, then you
must give us some professional help, some professional assistance, of
the kind of officers who are with us, who are going to aid in the
development of this great national army. -
Then we must have Federal appropriations besides this compensa-
tion, “out-of-pocket” expenses. We must have appropriations for
field training. That is the most valuable training. Our Regular
Army gets very little of it. What they get is mostly with us. We
get very little of it, and I can tell you gentlemen with positive au-
thority that the National Guard will take all the field training that
Congress is willing to pay for. There is very little conception of
the amount of training, schooling, development, examinatioſis, and
all that sort of thing, that goes on night in and might out in the
National Guard, and I am going to take just about three minutes
of your time more so as to tell you something about it, because if
you get your impression from what you hear in Washington, the
training of the militia in this country consists of elementary drills
three or four times a month, and then are ordered out for a short ma-
neuver period in the summer, after which they go home, aid you are
asked, Would you place the dependence and the liberties ard institu-
tions of this country upon such a force 3
What is the truth about it? Take the matter of the education of
the officers. It has been standardized throughout the United States,
so far as the Coast Artillery is concerned. First class gunners and
second class gunners in the Coast Artillery have to .#. under the
same examinations carried on pursuant to War Department regu-
lations for first and second class gunners in the Reft Army. The
enlisted specialists are subjected to the same tests conducted and
supervised by the War Department.
#. the mobile forces, for example, our officers, when they are com-
missioned, are sent to school, known as the garrison school. They
have first to take a year's course known as the basic course. If they
qualify in that course, they are then advanced to take the four years'
course, and for four years they follow that course, and, gentlemen,
that is all in addition to their administrative duties, to their supply
duties, if they have any, if they are staff officers; it is in addition to
recruiting and training their companies, all in addition to that.
Our law is relentless. It is not like it is in the Regular Army.
Just stop and think that over a minute. One of the great handicaps
that the regulars suffer from we do not suffer from. When a man
does not measure up to the requirements in the Army, everyone has
so much sympathy for him because it is his life profession, that unless
he is very, very far below par, he will manage to get along. That is
not true any longer in the militia. The law and the practice under
our law now are relentless and in the case of this basic course, a man
gets two strikes and he is out. He has to pass that examination or
out he goes. In the same way with the other, he gets a year there,

PREPARED NIESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 803
and then he gets another chance. It is two strikes and out with him.
Our physical examinations are most rigid. - All of this sort of thing
has been going on, but the militia are too busy to talk about it. They
have all they can do to make a living and follow this adopted pro-
fession of arms.
To give you some little conception of the amount of time that is
imposed upon our officers, which is well known to us, I will relate
what happened to one of our officers who commands a company of
Infantry at Syracuse, N. Y. I might say that in our large armories
we have stables and horses, we have all the things they have in the
regular service, we have a great number of soldiers throughout the
State who are stationed in these armories, enlist in the organizations,
and who groom the horses, glean the stalls, drill in the morning, and
all that sort of thing, and of course these men have to be disciplined
and proper order maintained and a proper performance of their
duties exacted. This officer in that armory has a time clock so that
when each State regular goes on duty there he punches the time clock,
and when he goes away for any time and comes back he does the same
thing, so that there is a record throughout the year of his time.
This officer thought it would be a good plan for his own information
to punch that time clock himself, so he began on January 1, 1915, to
punch that clock every day when he came in the armory, and he
punched it when he went out. At the end of the year he had his
sergeant in charge of the time of the men make up his time, and what
did he find? He found that the average time devoted by him every
day was 3 hours and 20 minutes for 305 days, and that this amounted
up to very near 80 days of service in the military profession, 80
8-hour days. -
I might also say that that service did not cover his work as a mem-
ber of an examining board, for which he was paid. This service only
included the service he was not paid for, and it did not include his
period of field training. Of course he was paid for his time in the
field. That is no exceptional case, because the post commander has
to be there nearly all the time. The colonel of the Seventh Infantry
gives all his time. He just stays right on the job there. That is the
reason he has such an efficient regiment.
The CHAIRMAN. Let me ask you, General, whether the company
officers are elected by the enlisted personnel?
Gen. O'RYAN. No, sir; fortunately they are not any longer.
The CHAIRMAN. How are they chosen 7
Gen. O’RYAN. We abolished that in New York State, but it still
exists in a few commands, which will shortly vote to change it.
The CHAIRMAN. Do you think that could be regulated by Congress %
Gen. O'RYAN. I think that is absolutely within the power of
Congress. -
The CHAIRMAN. Are the regimental officers elected .
Gen. O'RYAN. No, sir. We have abolished that system as wrong
fundamentally. -
The CHAIRMAN. How are they appointed ?
Gen. O'RYAN. The regimental officers are appointed on the nomi-
nation of the colonel of the regiment. -
The CHAIRMAN. What officers does the governor appoint %
Gen. O'RYAN. He appoints them, in the sense that he writes his
name on the commissions of those nominated who qualify.
804 PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
The CHAIRMAN. That is all?
Gen. O'RYAN. Yes, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. With any of them'
Gen. O’RYAN. YES, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. That is not true in all the States, though.
Gen. O'RYAN. I think it is becoming true very rapidly. I think
they are all ready for this rule now under the organization you have
the power to prescribe. .
The CHAIRMAN. I am finding out conditions now. Those are con-
ditions which you claim, and which Senator Cummins claims, can
be remedied by an act of Congress?
Gen. O'RYAN. Yes, sir.
Senator DU PONT. There is no question about it.
The CHAIRMAN. Enlisted men are paid in your State, are they not ?.
Gen. O'RYAN. No, sir. -
The CHAIRMAN. In what States are they paid :
Gen. O'RYAN. They are not paid anywhere in the proper sense.
I think that should be noted. There are some States where they
make a small payment of 25 cents a drill, and tried to provide in that
manner a fund at the end of the year which would be available to
assist the man in paying for property that he may have lost. That
was the real motive.
The CHAIRMAN. So that the statement that the enlisted men in the
National Guards were paid was hardly correct 7
Gen. O'RYAN. Only to that extent.
The CHAIRMAN. It was said here that even in those States where
the enlisted personnel is paid they did not get any better attendance
than in States where they received nothing.
º O'RYAN. I would like the officer from North Carolina to reply
to that.
STATEMENT OF MR, LAWRENCE W. YOUNG, ADJUTANT GEN-
ERAL, NATIONAL GlſARD OF NORTH CAROLINA.
Mr. YoUNG. I will state for the information of the committee that
we find the question of pay has helped us a great deal in the State of
North Carolina.
The CHAIRMAN. What do they pay enlisted men ;
Mr. YoUNG. We only pay 25 cents a drill for 24 drills a year.
The CHAIRMAN. That is hardly pay.
Mr. YoUNG. It is hardly pay. We use it to protect the captain in
taking care of his property. -
Senator CATRON. You say it has helped you ?
Mr. YOUNG. Yes, sir. Our attendance is very greatly increased
over the years when we did not pay.
Senator CATRON. You mean the number of enlistments and attend-
ance'.
Mr. YoUNG. We have no trouble with enlistments in our State.
We have now practically all the organizations that we have full;
that is, up to the minimum of required strength. We have on file
in the State of North Carolina now 27 applications for new organi-
zations that we can not accept because we have not the funds. The
amount of funds appropriated by the Federal Government under
section 1661 is insufficient to pay for more than five days’ field
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 805
training each year. All the other expenses in connection with the
administration of the guard must be paid by the State. In connec-
tion with our field maneuvers we held last year camps of eight days
duration for all organizations, and we had to pay for three days.
The allotment given our State paid for only five days' transportation
and subsistence.
STATEMENT OF GEN, JOHN F. O'RYAN–Continued.
Senator DU PONT. Gen. O'Ryan, have you had any practical
experience in regard to paying militia yourself?
Gen. O’RYAN. Yes, sir. We organized two years ago a company
which we called a pay bill company in order to try it out before we
committed ourselves to this thing in New York. I arranged with
the commanding officer of the Seventy-first Regiment to transfer the
men out of Company F and leave it blank. Then I got from the
War Department a young officer named Lieut. Rich and he was
commissioned in the National Guard. He was a regular officer, and
I got him to command that company, and I said, “It is a pay com-
pany. The State will pay one day's pay a week on the basis of State
pay, that is, $1.25 a day, but we will do more in the way of require-
ments than the War Department would ever require. We will require
three drills a week of two hours' duration in order to get this one 3.
pay. If a man is absent from one of those occasions he does not get
any pay for that week.”
So we advertised in the newspapers, setting forth briefly what this
ay was, and we found that we got results. The men flocked in there,
undreds of them. Sometimes there was a long line outside, and the
captain went through them. He could be very discriminating in
the matter of selecting his men. They were subjected to very rigid
examinations. We had higher standards than they have in the
Army. For example, we did not take any man under five feet six,
and we did not take any man over six feet one. We thought that we
had the material and we could get them uniform. This captain is a
very rigid disciplinarian. He handles those men just the same as he
would regular troops. He held no unmilitary intercourse with them,
he exacted the most rigid discipline, and we got as a first lieutenant an
officer who had had 11 years’ experience in the Philippines with the
constabulary there, a very sº man, and another young officer
for second lieutenant, who had had a couple of years at the military
academy at West Point. They went to it with these men, and they
kept piling on the requirements and the exactions to see what
National Guardsmen could put up with. Finally he got up to a
standard of 194 hours training a week, and a considerable part of this
training was in the field at the week end. That winter in February
we took them up for three days in the mountains, in the snow, when
the Snow was a couple of feet deep, and we walked the feet off of
them. I was up there, and we had night exercises, and we did every-
thing you could do with troops to try to kill their spirit, to see what
was possible to do with those men, and at the º of the year the
captain reported that in his opinion if given a very few months more,
in spite of the handicap that }. had no trained nucleus to begin with,
those troops would line up along with the average Infantry in the
Regular Army, and all his experience has been with the Regular
806 PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
Infantry. So we have no doubt about what can be done under proper
leadership and a system of compensating men to a reasonable extent,
because the military spirit is there if you give it a chance.
Senator DU PONT. i. the National Guard of New York maintain
its quota of men for the Coast Artillery'.
Gen. O'RYAN. Yes, sir; we have 32 companies.
Senator DU Pont. And its efficiency also :
Gen. O'RYAN. I believe that is certified to by the War Depart-
ment.
Senator FLETCHER...What amount of training do you think should
be required of the militia in the way of field service to qualify and
equip them ż * --
Gen. O'RYAN. I think they should have from two to three weeks
training in the field every summer, and I think that funds should be
available for these week-end exercises. That is to many officers a
new proposition, but the average National Guards man can get away
on Saturday and Sunday if you do not run in every Saturday and
Sunday on him. He is willing to go every third or fourth Saturday
and Sunday, and one thing that stops him is the lack of funds.
Senator FLETCHER. Two or three weeks a year for how many years ?
Gen. O'RYAN. Our period of enlistment in New York State is three
years, and we think that we get pretty good, effectively trained
soldiers if we will give them during that time every year two or three
weeks in the field, with occasional week-end tactical exercises to exem-
plify and carry out this indoor training. We have from one to two
rills a week throughout the year entirely in military operations.
- ºnator CATRON. How long did you drill that company you spoke
Of 2
Gen. O'RYAN. They began in the fall and ended up the followin
summer, late in the summer, a little short of a year. Then we ha
no more money to continue the experiment.
The CHAIRMAN. What did your records show as to the percentage
of attendance %
Gen. O'RYAN. I could not state that offhand, but the attendance
was excellent. It was paid for.
Senator THOMAS. What is the cost per capita per annum of the
Militia of New York State 3
Gen. O'RYAN. I would like to read that into the record after
looking it up, so as to be accurate. tº
Senator DU PONT. The company you speak of, as I understood you
to say, received $1.25 provided they attended all the drillsº
Gen. O’RYAN. They were paid by the month, and they got $5 a.
month, but for that they had to make 12 drills.
The CHAIRMAN. Complaint was made here about the loss of prop-
erty by the State organization that belongs to the Government. As
the appropriations are made now, the Government really pays for the
property that the State troops lose—that is, the Government appor-
tions so much to each State, the property is charged to the State, and
if the property is lost by the State troops, they deduct it out of the
money appropriated by Congress. Is there any way to avoid that ?
Gen. O’RYAN. In New York State the losses are very small, and
such losses as exist I think you will find from the record are paid for
out of State funds.
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 807
The CHAIRMAN. Could that be largely obviated if the State troops
were paid some small sum by the Government and the amount of each
man's property charged to him ; -
Gen. O'RYAN. Exactly the same system that you have in the Army.
The trouble has been there has been an effort to get something for
nothing right along with this militia proposition, to treat the militia
one way and the Army in an entirely different way. You would
have very bad results in the matter of property accountability in
the Regular Army if your officers and men were not paid. The
reason you have proper accountability there is that if a man does
not return what you charge him with, you take it out of his pay.
Put that into effect with the militia and you will have similar results.
The CHAIRMAN. The statement was made here, which very much
surprised me, that only about 33 per cent of the National Guard were
available to go to the Spanish-American War.
Gen. O'RYAN. The way we view that in our section is that it
makes little difference in this matter whether none of them were
available—although I have heard that percentage disputed—
because the force is just as different now during the last three years,
as compared with that force, so far as Our section of the country
is concerned, as the modern locomotive is from the stage coach.
In our section at the time of the Spanish-American War many of
our regiments were composed of well-fed, prosperous, dignified citizens,
business men. At the present time if you look those regiments
over you will find they are made up of lean-waisted, athletic young
men who are ready to go anywhere you want them to go. There is
not any other thought about their military service in their minds but
service to Uncle Sam. That is what is in their minds. The State
obligation in their minds is an entirely subordinate one. But that
was not the spirit in 1898. It came like a shock to these men and it
was very embarrassing to many of them who had business engage-
ments and large families. But that has undergone a vast change in
the last few years. .
The CHAIRMAN. Was the small percentage due to these facts that
you mention, or was it physical unfitness?
Gen. O'RYAN. I think that contributed, too, undoubtedly, and I
understand that that matter was brought up in the other committee,
and I think some officer from the National Guard gave some other
figures. & º -
The CHAIRMAN. Another question was raised here, too. It is
claimed that the Federal Government has no jurisdiction to punish a
man. I think an instance was given where a man in the National
Guard left one of the regular encampments and there was no way
to punish him. - -
Gen. O'RYAN. Yes, sir. 1 will be very glad to cover that.
The CHAIRMAN. I wish you would.
Gen. O'RYAN. We have very exacting codes of discipline in some
States, where we can imprison a man. In other States, I am informed,
they have no such laws, and if a man does not like it, perhaps they can
not do very much to him. But the Federal Government has no right
to complain about those conditions, because it is solely within the
power of the Federal Government to correct that. The federal
Government is charged with the responsibility for establishing a sys-
tem of discipline for the militia, and just so soon as this Congress
808 PREPARED NESS FOR NATION AI, DEFENSE.
enacts a code of discipline for uniform application to the militia of
the United States, just as soon as that act takes effect all the consti-
tutions of all the States to the contrary, all the State laws inconsistent
with the code of discipline, fall. It does not require any concurrent
action by the 48 States.
The CHAIRMAN. Are the militiamen subject to the Articles of War?
Gen. O'RYAN. They are in our State, by virtue of the State having
stepped into the breech and legislated. As far as Our State is con-
cerned, they are subject to the Articles of War whenever they are in
the field. -
The CHAIRMAN. Do you think Congress has power to subject the
National Guard to the Articles of War? x,
Gen. O'RYAN. I do; yes, sir.
Senator DU PONT. General, how large a proportion of the privates
of your organizations are married men?
Gen. O'RYAN. It varies in different organizations. I should say
that it varies—I will take one type of Organization—from perhaps
60 per cent to perhaps 18 or 20 per cent in other organizations.
Senator DU PONT. Which are the ones that have the largest pro-
portion?
Gen. O'RYAN. The organizations that are so-called “élite” organi-
zations, where the men are more apt to reenlist for successive periods.
Senator DU PONT. Of course, they are more apt to have married
men'.
Gen. O’RYAN. Yes, sir.
Senator CATRON. What is the limit of age?
Gen. O'RYAN. Men may be enlisted in New York State from 18
to 45.
Senator CATRON. How about the average age of your militia Ž
Gen. O'RYAN. Since we have weeded out all of the men who were
unfit for military service, the average age has gone away down. You
will see a lot of recruits going before the doctor for examination in
any one of these organizations who run from 19 to 22 or 23, along in
there. The men who come in who are older than that are nearly all
men who have had service in another State or in the Army or Navy.
Senator CATRON. Most all of these men from 19 to 23 are unmar-
ried, of course
Gen. O'RYAN. Yes, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. Do you allow them to reenlist as often as they
please ?
Gen. O'RYAN. Yes, sir. * ;
The CHAIRMAN. In the Cummins bill it is suggested that the term
of enlistment be two years and no reenlistment, on the theory that
when men are permitted to reenlist you do not get a man trained for
military service that you would get if you had only a two-year en-
listment.
Gen. O'RYAN. That is on the theory that the two years would pro-
vide adequate training.
The CHAIRMAN. Not necessarily adequate training, but of some
training. -
Gen. O'RYAN. I think that system of rotation and carrying them
to a reserve list can be made effective under a system of compulsory
training.
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 809
The CHAIRMAN. In other words, suppose all the National Guard,
120,000 we will say, were to serve out their enlistment in two years,
and they are reenlisted and you have your full quota. You have in
training only 120,000 men until they reach the age limit, so you have
not trained many men, and they all go out at once, and you take in
a new set of men. On the supposition of Senator Cummins’ bill, you
take 120,000 men, they enlist for two years, you let them go into the
community, and you have a reserve force there until they reach the
age limit. The next year you train the same number of men, and
you will have 240,000 at the end of four years. His theory is that by
that process you will have a large reserve trained—not adequately
trained, but trained. What do you think about it 7
Gen. O'RYAN. I do not think it would be practical to get the men
unless you had compulsory training. I do not think you would get
the next contingent. I do not think they would be there. We
know from experience that it is very hard to get men. You can not
get for the Regular Army above 50,000 men a year.
mº CHAIRMAN. You think you could not keep the National Guard
filled & -
Gen. O'RYAN. I feel quite certain of it.
Senator DU PONT. I think there is no doubt of it. Then the old
soldiers have the esprit, and they are essential. These things appear
fine on paper, but they would not amount to anything.
Gen. O'RYAN. We have good noncommissioned officers, and it takes
us some years to develop them. That is one of those things that
reads all right on paper, or on a desk, but when you get with the
living men—you have to have a machine and keep grinding them out.
Senator CATRON. In your State do you have more than one day a
week for training 7
Gen. O'RYAN. Throughout the State they average about two
nights a week. -
Senator CATRON. They use the night for drilling? **
Gen. O’RYAN. Yes, sir; except these week-end exercises. They
are voluntary. We can not enforce that, due to lack of funds. But
they get funds, many of them, to do that, and go without pay.
They are all keen for this ſield training. They all like it.
Senator CATRON. The training you give at night is principally in
the armories :
Gen. O'RYAN. Yes, sir, although we have one troop of Cavalry
that has not yet its armory, and they drilled all last winter out
doors, at night. I have another in Staten Island that drills the same
way, out doors, at night in all sorts of weather. If it is raining
they wear slickers. All of our cavalry troops and field batteries
have a substantial nucleus of horses. We have over a thousand
horses maintained in the State of New York.
The CHAIRMAN. How much does your State appropriate every
year for the National Guard'.
Gen. O'RYAN. Over two millions of dollars; that is to say, directly
and indirectly.
Senator CATRON. What is the number of the National Guard in
your State :
Gen. O’RYAN. There are a little short of 18,000—officers and men.
The CHAIRMAN. Does the State build the armories 7
810 PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
Gen. O’RYAN. The State builds the armories outside of New
York City, and in the counties within New York City the armories
are built at the expense of the county.
COST OF MILITARY PLANT IN THE STATE OF NEW YORK.
The estimated valuation of military property owned by the State is approximately
$8,562,288, which includes armories, arsenal, and rifle ranges. To this should be
added the valuation of armories owned by the city of New York, which, according
to the last report of the armory board of the city of New York, is as follows:
Valuation of land by department of taxes and assessments. . . . . . . . . . . . .. . $8,909, 300
Valuation of armories. . . . . . . . . - - - - - - - - s = • = • = - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 8,000, 800
16,910, 100
Hence in 1914 the total valuation of all the armories, rifle ranges, etc., in the State
was approximately $25,472,388. Since that year the building of an armory for the
Eighth Coast Defense Command has been authorized by the city of New York, and is
nearly completed, at an approximate cost of $1,200,000; a new armory for Troop B,
First Cavalry, at Albany, has been completed by the State at a cost of $150,000; and
a new armory for Troop I, First Cavalry, at Buffalo, is under construction at a cost of
$150,000. The cost of the land for the Albany and Buffalo armories is estimated at
$42,000, which is not included in the construction cost. Therefore the total estimated
valuation can safely be placed at approximately $26,814,388. In addition to this,
furnishings and equipment might be roughly estimated at $1,500,000.
Maintenance charges for the year 1914, according to report, for State armories
amounted to $617,343.07. In addition to this should be charged appropriations for
construction of armories at Rochester and Yonkers and for repairs, etc., made by the
legislature which amounted to $109,500, making total for maintenance, construction,
and repair of State armories $726,843.07. Adding to this the maintenance cost of
New York City armories, which amounted to $647,179.44 (exclusive of construction
charges for the Coast Defense Command armory noted above), the total maintenance
cost was $1,374,022.61. -
There are 45 armories owned by the State, their location being indicated in the
report. In addition there are 15 leased buildings. There are 2 State rifle ranges. . In
addition 30 rifle ranges are leased, the rentals being paid from Federal funds, their
location and rental cost being noted in report. The city of New York owns 19 armories
and rent other buildings for military purposes. There is an armory at Yonkers owned
by the county of Westchester. The total number of armories owned by the State
and its municipalities is 65, while the number of leased buildings used for military
purposes may be placed at 20. -
STATEMENT OF ADJT, GEN. THOMAS J. STEWART, NATIONAL
GUARD STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA, PRESIDENT OF THE
NATIONAL GUARD Association OF THE UNITED STATES.
The CHAIRMAN. You are a veteran of the Civil War, are you not ?
Gen. STEwART. Yes, sir. I have no paper prepared, Mr. Chair-
man, and I want to conserve the time of the committee and not
intrude upon your patience, so I will take but little time, because
there are a couple of other gentlemen present who want to say some-
thing. I shall be very glad indeed to answer any questions, and
give you any information you have not already. I want to say that
as far as what has been presented and the arguments made and the
statements made are concerned, they are made in full accordance
with our plans, desires, wishes, and aims, so that I can be entirely
free, as far as saving any time is concerned, and I will be very glad
to answer any question. -
If I may make a statement before being questioned
The CHAIRMAN (interposing). We would rather have a statement
from you.
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 811
Gen. STEwART. You said something about the effect of the Organ-
ized Militia being removed from the necessity for police duty in the
several States affecting enlistments. -
The CHAIRMAN. Yes, sir. - -
Gen. STEwART. And reference was made to Pennsylvania, and I
presume it will be of some interest to the gentlemen of the committee
to have me say something about the organization of the State con-
º in Pennsylvania, and how it is affected by the National
l] 8,I”(l. - .
In 1905 we organized what is known, not as a State constabulary,
but as a State police. It consists of four troops equivalent in strength
to a troop of cavalry. They average now from about 65 to 75 men,
running about 270 in the four troops of the police. They are sta-
tioned in different parts of the State. They have full police powers.
They are game wardens, fish wardens, .." so on. They report for
duty to the district attorney. If he wants any men to do plain-
clothes work, or wants to send a few men out in the community, they
are authorized to do it, and they do do it. In the event of industrial
disturbances, since 1902 no organization of the National Guard has
been called upon to do anything in connection with disorder of any
kind. We had the great strike in the anthracite coal regions at that
time, which cost the State $997,000, and kept troops on duty for
three months, and over 150,000 men were included in that strike.
jator WARREN. These men are mounted, but they serve on foot
also } --
Gen. STEwART. Yes, sir; either way.
The CHAIRMAN. They were really a State force, anyway, before they
were constituted a police, were they not %
• Gen. STEwART. No, sir. They were all organized anew. It was
a new venture entirely for the State, and I might say now that the
force is composed in proportion probably 60 per cent of men who have
been discharged from the United States Army, and probably the
Cavalry service, with discharges and records excellent, and there is
robably 30 per cent of the force that has previously served in the
avy, so that they are all high-grade men.
Senator FLETCHER. Not connected with the State militia?
Gen. STEwART. Not in any way. It is a separate force of the
State entirely, and has no connection with the National Guard or
Organized Militia in any way. . They have their separate powers.
Senator CATRON. What are they paid?
Gen. STEwART. The captains, $1,800; the lieutenants, $1,500; the
first Sergeant, $1,200; the sergeants, $1,000; the corporals, $975, and
the privates, $900. - -
Senator THOMAs. Are they furnished anything besides that ?
Gen. STEwART. No, sir.
Senator THOMAs. Do they have to furnish their own uniforms
and horses?
Gen. STEwART. The State furnishes the horses and all the equip-
ment. They furnish their own uniforms.
Senator WARREN. What about their subsistence?
Gen. STEwART. They arrange their own subsistence in the barracks,
except when they are on special detached duty. -
Senator WARREN. The State pays for their subsistence when they
are traveling?
812 PREPARED NIESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
Gen. STEWAR.T. When they are in the barracks they subsist them-
selves, but when a man is detached from the barracks for any special
duty, his subsistence is provided, because he is away from the general
I]16SS.
Senator DU Pont. In a money allowance?
Gen. STEWAR.T. No; they subsist themselves out of their pay.
Senator DU PONT. But suppose a man is detached from the bar-
racks for two or three days? 2.
Gen. STEwART. Then they commute his subsistence to him in money
and the cost of maintaining the force now is about $700,000, met in
appropriations every two years. Our general assembly meets bien-
nially. It costs about $360,000 a year to maintain them.
Senator WARREN. Who is the superior officer to whom they report?
Gen. STEwART. We have a superintendent. Of course, the gov-
ernor is really the superior officer of the troops, but it is under the
control of the Superintendent of the police, who has an assistant.
Senator WARREN. It reaches one head before it goes to the gov-
ernor 3
Gen. STEWART. Yes, sir; through the superintendent of state police.
That is his designation. He gets $3,000 a year, and his assistant
$2,000 a year, with the necessary office force to conduct the service
and keep their records. - -
Senator CATRON. What effect has that upon the regular militia?
Gen. STEwART. That relieves the militia from immediate contact
with the troubles, and has been of considerable benefit to us, and has
really helped enlistments.
Senator CATRON. In what regard? -
Gen. STEwART, Men who would have had a peculiar view of doing
police duty in the National Guard felt that it was removed, in a
degree, at least, from police duty, not so likely to be called upon, and
they have entered the service of the National Guard more readily, the
ounger men, and it has grown that the opposition on the part of
abor organizations and those who are opposed to the National Guard
has been greatly lessened. . - .
Senator THOMAS. Has it been transferred to the constabulary?
Gen. STEwART. Very largely.
Senator WARREN. Is there any legislation of the State which pre-
vents the use of the militia for the same purpose ?
Gen. STEwART. No, sir.
Senator WARREN. They would be used if you had no constabulary 7
Gen. STEwART. Oh, yes; that force would not be able to take care
of some of the industrial disturbances we have had, and if they
failed, then the Governor is in the position of not waiting for word
from the sheriff of the county—he reinforces his own State police
by the State troops.
Senator WARREN. Is there any inhibition placed upon the militia
of the State because you have that constabulary?
Gen. STEwART. No, sir.
Senator DU PONT. General, Senator Cummins has introduced a
bill which he explained before the committee this morning, which
proposes to absolutely prohibit the State militia from taking any
part in the suppression of insurrections or disturbances of any kind,
and compelling the States to put down those troubles by a system of
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 813
constabulary or State police. Do you think that is a practicable
measure ?
Gen. STEwART. I should say, Senator, that would not be popular
in several States to do it in that way. *
Senator DU Pont. It is not in the smaller States.
Gen. STEWART. It might do in some States, but it would not do in
a State like ours. -
Senator DU PONT. The small States would not be able to support
State police.
Gen. STEwART. I think the Governor should be authorized, in the
case of extraordinary disturbance that might occur at any time, to
use his troops to enforce the law, to save property.
Senator THOMAS. It might amount to an insurrection.
Gen. Stewart. We could not, in the disturbances we have had in
the past, have depended on the State police. We have this advant-
age, that the constabulary can go to the point or points where the
trouble is going to show, and they can curb it in the beginning,
whereas heretofore we had to wait until it became a matter of great
importance, and they had to order out the troops in large numbers.
Senator WARREN. In the latter case, you waited until the sheriff
would call for help ?
Gen. STEwART. Yes, sir.
Senator WARREN. How about it now %
Gen. STEwART. We do not pay any attention to the sheriff now.
We send the State police in, and if they can not do it, the Governor
can support the State police with the State troops. The whole
matter now is in the hands of the Governor. -
Senator FLETCHER. What training do you give your State troops ?
Gen. STEwART. The constabulary, you mean? -
Senator. FLETCHER. The National Guardº
Gen. STEwART. Virtually the same as Gen. O'Ryan stated for
New York, and we have in the neighborhood of 12,000.
The CHAIRMAN. General, do you find difficulty in securing the
attendance of the enlisted strength of your National Guardº
Gen. STEwART. We do; yes, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. What percentage of them do you suppose attend ?
Gen. STEwART. That depends, in a measure, Mr. Chairman, upon
the esprit of the company or the organization, the qualities of the
captain, and so on. If the captain is a good captain and can get the
men interested in his company, he gets them out in goodly numbers,
while there may be some instances where the captain is not a man of
that type, and he has a good bit of trouble to get them out. Then,
in a State like ours, a good many of the men are compelled to work
a good many nights a week, so that one of those companies on any
particular night will not get the strength.
Senator WARREN. Are your commissioned officers elected by the
privates ?
Gen. STEwART. No, sir. We allow them to elect the second lieu-
tenants, but all other officers are appointed by the Governor.
Senator CATRON. General, suppose the nation should decide that
there should be 400,000 militia and each State was required or asked
to provide its pro rata; do you think there would be any trouble in get-
ting them in your State } -
23380—PT 16—16—4
814 PREPAREDINESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
Gen. STEwART. No, sir; we would have no trouble if the bill pro-
viding for compensation were put in force, and the other expenses,
of course, were provided for. There is one thing I want to say in
connection with this, in raising the force from what we now have up
to 500,000 and apportioning the quota among the States, under our
present regulations we would have to provide considerable money
from State funds, because in the training of those men there is quite an
expense. If we put men into camps, we pay the privates $1.50 a
day, we pay the corporals $1.75, the duty sergeants $2, the other
sergeants $3, and the commissioned officers the pay of the same grade
in the regular service, so that if we want to double the force of Penn-
sylvania, we would have to double the amount of pay. *
Senator WARREN. What is your total appropriation for militia in
Pennsylvania?
Gen. STEwART. You mean everything?
Senator WARREN. Yes.
Gen. STEwART. About a million dollars a year, which includes the
support of the National Guard, the care of the rifle ranges, and every-
thing in connection with the Organized Militia.
Senator WARREN. And that is in addition to the expense of the
constabulary, which is, you say
Gen. STEwART (interposing). $700,000 every two years. -
Senator THOMAs. What is the total force in your National Guardº
Gen. STEwART. Nearly 12,000. -
The CHAIRMAN. How many men are there in the constabulary Ż
Gen. STEwART. Two hundred and seventy. They are on duty all
the time, under pay all the time. *
Senator CATRON. Gen. O'Ryan stated that under the provision
which the Government made it amounted to about $35 for each man
in the militia. What amount of appropriation per man do you think
would be required by the Government to secure the greater efficiency,
that is, to secure the men that the Government would want in the
militia up to four or five hundred thousand'. What proportion per
man would bring that %
Gen. STEwART. I should think they would have to proportionately
increase the appropriations made from Federal funds.
Senator CATRON. I know, but Gen. O'Ryan intimated that $35 was
insignificant, that it did not amount to anything, or cut much figure.
As I supposed from his statement, it would require a larger appro-
priation per capita for them; that is, for the men engaged. Have you
any idea? Did I understand you correctly, Gen. O'Ryan'
Gen. O'RYAN. Yes, sir; dividing the total average troops.
Senator CATRON. It gave $35? - º
Gen. O'RYAN. Thirty-five dollars; it was on that basis; of course,
the man did not get the money.
Senator CATRON. I am asking Gen. Stewart a question. How much
more than that does he think would be required to enable the States
to secure their pro rata of this necessary increase in the National
Guard to bring them up to 500,000?
Gen. STEwART. I should say it ought to be increased at least 50 per
cent; put it up to $50 a man.
Senator CATRON. What would be your idea about that, Gen. O'Ryan?
Gen. O'RYAN. My idea is this, that in New York State we spend
about two millions a year and have 18,000 troops, roughly speaking,
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 815.
and that runs up a little over $105 per man per year. That is exclu-
sive of the Government support. I think the figures are about $135
or $140 a year. . . . *
Senator WARREN. They do not draw that %
Gen. O RYAN. No; but that is the total support, including over-
head, rifle ranges, cost of maneuvers, and field training—all the
overhead charges and everything, every expenditure that is made for
military purposes by the State and Government because of soldiers
in New York State, costing about $105 to the State and $35 to the
Government, about $140 altogether. So that if you want to reach
the efficiency you have there, you must do the same for the troops
throughout the country. - -
Senator CATRON. I understand that, but to get the 500,000 men
would you have to make any greater appropriation proportionately
than that % - -
Gen. O RYAN. I think unquestionable; yes, sir.
Senator CATRON. Above the $135? -
Senator CATRON. No; above the $35. -
Gen. O'RYAN. I think it will run up to $150 or $160 a man.
Senator CATRON. That the Government should appropriate %
Gen. O RYAN. Yes, sir; the Government and the States together.
Gen. STEwART. That runs about what I said, about $50 per capita
from the Government. - Y
The CHAIRMAN. You are not taking into consideration in that esti-
mate, Gen. O Ryan, the pay, if the Government intends to pay these
militiamen.
Gen. O’RYAN. Yes, sir. That will run about $50 per man, on an
average, for that item alone. -
Senator DU Pont. Forty to fifty dollars, I should say.
Gen. O’RYAN. Fifty dollars a year, I believe the private soldier is
to get under this bill.
Gen. STEwART. But you see that goes to the soldier. That does
not help the State in maintenance in any way.
Senator WARREN. Gen. Stewart, do the men in the militia draw
pay while they are in camp 2 -
Gen. STEwART. No, sir; they draw no pay. Under the present
provision, under section 1661, we can use that for transportation,
use it for subsistence, and some of the States use it for pay at the
Army rate, which is 50 cents per day for the private. In Pennsyl-
vania we do not use any of that for pay. The State pays the troops
out of State funds absolutely. We have money enough to do it.
But in some of the other States they do not have sufficient money to
pay the State troops and they use part of the money under section
1661 for pay.
I want to say, in connection with section 1661, that has been bur-
dened from time to time until now it is not sufficient for the purposes
for which it was intended to be used. For instance, the appropriation
was $2,000,000, and that has been running for some years. At that
time we had no officers' camps for instruction. For instance, you
have an officers’ camp for infantry instruction. I would send four
or five hundred men there. That runs up into money. They are
entitled to pay while they are there, and we are told we can pay
them from section 1661. But such a thing was not in existence
816 PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
when the first appropriation was made. We send Cavalry officers to
Fort Myer, Artillery and Engineer officers to Tobyhanna, and we are
authorized to pay them out of section 1661, and all those burdens
have been added to that, and not a cent put in the appropriation,
and we are going along from time to time with additional burdens
placed upon us. They say “You can do this and pay for it out of
section 1661.” So that it is bearing all the burdens, and yet we are
not getting an additional cent of appropriation. So that it ought to
be increased.
Then we would have to arrange for supplies for all these new troops.
Another matter that would have to be taken into consideration, that
the States would have to provide for this additional force, would be
increased armory facilities. Another question was asked here to-day
as to whether we could raise all these companies to war strength. As
far as Pennsylvania is concerned—and I think that would apply very
largely to many States—we could not unless there was an induce-
ment, the enthusiasm of an immediate or an imminent call for war,
and then we could in every community, and we would have splendid
organizations. t
Senator CATRON. Then your men would not be ready ?
Gen. STEwART. No; but we can get new organizations in other
communities. I have a community now in which I have an enthu-
siastic company of 75 men under a splendid captain, and he has about
all the men who are willing to go in just now. We could not raise
that to 150 in the community without some special inducement or
incentive. But we can, from the men who go out, have the trained
force there, so that we might get them in if there were a difficulty.
But in time of peace, when there is not any inducement to bring them
in, they will not come. So that we ought to have the right to go into
other communities with one company now, but we can not afford to
put them there because we have not sufficient to go into that com-
munity to organize and have a splendid company there. So that I
have no doubt that we could raise in Pennsylvania. Our quota of the
four hundred or five hundred thousand without any trouble and get
the men. -
Senator FLETCHER. That is on condition that certain assistance was
rendered. What assistance would be needed to do that ?
Gen. STEwART. You would have to make your arrangements for the
transportation of these men to their encampment. You would have
to make arrangements for their pay. You would have to make the
necessary arrangements to furnish them with full equipment—uni-
forms and supplies necessary for field service—the same as you have
already done with the portion of the Organized Militia that is now in
existence. You could not increase the force beyond the present pro-
vision any more than a man could put a fifth story on his house with-
out its costing him anything. It is going to be a question of money.
Senator DU PoNT. You have to increase your appropriation in pro-
portion to the increased cost? . .
Gen. STEwART. Yes; and the State would have to make increases.
Senator DU Pont. The State would have to do the same?
Gen. STEwART. Yes.
Senator CATRON. I was under the impression that the militia was
insisting not only that it should be increased in proportion to the
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 817
other, but still have an additional increase; that the amount is not
sufficient for what they are furnishing to-day; that is, the amount
of pay is inadequate, and should be greater.
&. STEWART. It should be greater, because there are things we
can not do and Ought to do for which we have no funds.
Senator DU PONT. The Government is paying them nothing now?
Gen. STEwART. Take men who go to the Army schools. They sa
we can send a certain number of officers. The Government º
furnish the transportation, will commute the quarters to the man,
and give him a dollar a day. But a man who has the capability
and the qualifications to get a commission in the Army is a pretty
good man in the business community. That man can not go away
and lose his salary and leave his profession for that time. Yet he
is expected to do that, and if he is to be reimbursed that has to come
out of State funds. - g
Senator DU PONT. Have many of your officers of the Pennsyl-
º Militia gone on their own responsibility to the Army service
school?
Gen. STEwART. No, sir; very few. The doctor can not leave his
profession to go there, the lawyer can not leave his office to go there
and neglect his practice. -
Senator DU PONT. Those few who did go I suppose think it was of
great benefit to them "
Gen. STEwART. It was of great benefit, and they were what you
will call the men of leisure, and were very glad to go and get the
benefits they did get. They are very valuable men now.
The CHAIRMAN. General, do you think it would be possible to
keep up the enlisted personnel of the National Guard if you had a
short enlistment, say two or three years, and the men were not
permitted to reenlist'
Gen. STEwART. If the men are not to be permitted to reenlist, it
Ought not to be shorter than three years.
The CHAIRMAN. Could you then keep up the National Guard'.
Gen. STEwART. I do not think that you would be very well able
to do it unless under very extraordinary conditions, if you are going
to prevent any man from reenlisting. Up to this time we have en-
couraged men to reenlist. It is up to the captain if he will reenlist
him. If he is no good, does not attend his drills as he ought to, or
has not within him the necessary make-up of a good soldier, the
Captain does not need to reenlist him. But where he is a good
man, we bring him back, and for his second enlistment we give him
25 cents a day additional pay. -
The CHAIRMAN. There is much force in the suggestion that Senator
Cummins made this morning, that if the National Guard is to be
used as a nucleus for creating a citizen soldiery, you do not add much
to that soldiery by reenlisting the same men year after year.
Gen. STEWART. No; but if you are going to reenlist no man at all,
you are changing your noncommissioned officers, a very important
factor in an organization of that kind; you are getting them out of
the service and bringing in entirely new men. It ought to be so that
it would not apply to the noncommissioned officers.
Senator WARREN. What is the percentage of reenlistments as com-
pared with original enlistments? -
818 PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
Gen. STEwART. We calculate that we lose 33% per cent by expira–
tion of enlistments and probably from 5 to 7 per cent from other
causes—moving away from the community, or something of that kind.
Senator WARREN. As a mafter of fact, then, you are taking in 60
per cent or more even under the method of reenlistment &
Gen. STEwART. Not that much.
Senator WARREN. I am speaking of three years. .
Gen. STEwART. Some of these men who go out reenlist. I should
say we had probably 30 per cent new men.
Senator WARREN. For three years or one year 7
Gen. STEwART. For three years.
Senator DU PONT. What annual percentage of new men join the
militia . & -
Gen. STEwART. I would say we take to annual encampments—and
that is the best way to calculate it—between 27 and 30 per cent of
new men each year. -
Senator DU PONT. A little less than one-third 7
Gen. STEwART. Yes; because some of those wo go out reenlist.
The CHAIRMAN. Is there any disposition on the part of the employ–
ers generally to refuse to let a man go to these drills'
Gen. STEwART. Not to attend the drills, Senator, except where
they are working in industries that do night and day work, and then
the employer says, “I can not spare these men, because upon their
work depends the work of so many other men,” and that man can go
to the drills the next week. That is the ouly case in which I found
any trouble.
Senator FLETCHER. How about going off to the encampments :
Gen. STEwART. They have but little trouble about that. We have
an encampment of all the troops, take everything into camp for
eight days, and we manage to get them there very well. There may
be a case here and there of opposition. -
Senator FLETCHER. How would it be if you had an encampment
lasting two months a year.
Gen. STEwART. I do not think you could have that. It would be
a good thing for the Organized Militia, but the general class of en-
listed men could not get off for two months from their occupations.
They would come to the conclusion that if they could do without
them in the industry for two months they could do without them
altogether. - - - -
STATEMENT OF LIEUT. COL. A. B. CRITCHFIELD, NATIONAL
GUARD STATE OF OHIO. - -
The CHAIRMAN. Gen. Critchfield, are you connected with the
National Guard of Ohio now % -
Lieut. Col. CRITCHFIELD. Yes, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. In what capacity?
Lieut. Col. CRITCHFIELD. Lieutenant colonel.
The CHAIRMAN. You were at one time adjutant general?
Lieut. Col. CRITCHFIELD. Yes, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. We would like to have an expression of your views
on this general subject of the National Guard. -
Lieut. Col. CRITCHFIELD. Gentlemen, owing to the late hour, I do
not want to make any extended remarks. I want to answer a couple
PREPAREDNESS FOR, NATIONAL DEFENSE. 819
of questions that have been put here, a couple of propositions, and
what I have I want to submit to the committee.
First, in regard to the Volunteers in 1898, I want to say, for my
own State, that we volunteered 120 per cent of our quota. Out of
96 companies of Infantry, we had to discharge 18 men from each,
because we had too many men. That is what happened in regard to
furnishing 30 per cent from Ohio.
I have a telegram here from the adjutant general of Missouri,
which I received to-day, and I will read it into the record. It is as
follows:
Hope you will not fail to deny statement of Assistant Secretary of War before House
committee that only 30 per cent of the National Guard volunteered in Spanish-
American War. This is absolutely without foundation as to this State, and I pre-
sume of all the others in 1898 the entire National Guard of Missouri, 100 per cent
volunteered for service.
JoBIN B. O’MEARA,
Adjutant General.
. Senator FLETCHER. Gen. Foster, how was it in Florida. ?
Gen. Fost ER. Florida had 21 companies of Infantry and two bat-
teries of Field Artillery. The allotment to the State was one regi-
ment of Infantry, and those 12 companies were selécted. All the
companies volunteered. Twelve companies volunteered at , their
peace strength. They at that time numbered about 50 men, and they
recruited in various localities up to the required war strength, which
was 84, I think, and then, when they were mobilized, a hurry Order
was issued to recruit to 109, so that they brought in about 50 per cent
of men who were not in the National Guard at the time they volun-
teered. The policy of the State was to retain the other companies
and to endeavor to get them ready for any further call that might be
made, and men were not transferred from those companies into the
ones that were accepted. .
Senator WARREN. Mr. Chairman, along that line, I think there
must have been a misunderstanding, because I know in the State I
represent twice, as many men went into the Spanish War as we had
militia, probably nearer three times as many. But it is true that
members of the companies with families, or any business that they
could not leave, did not enlist, but more than 100 per cent in most of
the States, I think, went through new enlistments.
Gen. CRITCHFIELD. Senator, the idea that these men did not go
because of physical disqualifications, or for any other reason, is
fallacious, because they did go. There is no place where you can find
such figures, unless you take in my State, where more than 900,000
men are liable to military service, and you take the number that they
furnished compared with the number that were available, and you
might get 30 per cent. There is no such thing as 30 per cent, and it
can not be proved from any source whatever. -
The next question I want to call attention to is in regard to the
federalization of the militia, and I just want to make a short state-
ment on that. - - -
Much has been said about federalizing the militia and the weakness
of our militia or National Guard system because it is not a Federal
force. We have done all in our power to federalize the National
Guard and have made some progress. We used to be called “nine-
months troops,” because the law provided that we could only be called
820 PREPAREDINESS FOR NATIONAL IDEFENSE.
out by the President for nine months. We succeeded in eliminating
that designation by getting the law changed. As to the j
constitutional limitations for which the guard can be used and the
manner used, we have been shunted about like pawns on a chess board.
By the act of Congress in 1908 we thought this question was set-
tled. When we prepared that law we submitted to the Judge Advo-
cate General the draft of the law, and he assured us of its constitu-
tionality, and later appeared before our convention and reiterated
his assurance that there was no doubt of its constitutionality. This
gave us a sound rest for about four years. Then for some reason,
just when we were all working to carry out the provisions of the law
in good faith, the question of the Constitution was injected or raised
again, not on account of any act of Ours or on our initiative. But
the same authority held our law invalid that had validated it four
years before, but by a different officer. For some years we have
considered these constitutional questions serious and have made
every effort to find a solution, even asking Congress to enable us to
change the Constitution—not especially for our benefit, as nothing
could add to our purpose or intention to serve at any time or place
the President may direct, but it is our purpose and desire to allay
the fear of the man without faith in us that is unwilling to trust or
accept us whom we wish to disarm.
Senator DU Pont. I should like to know if you favor any pro-
vision or any legislation which Congress may adopt for the militia
looking to a militia reserve, so that the companies of the militia
could be kept full? -
Gen. CRITCHFIELD. We have provided for that by a State law in
our State, and had been getting ready to go into it long before this
matter came up before Congress. *
Senator DU PONT. Is that true in the other States ?
Gen. CRITCHFIELD. I do not know. I think some of them have
gone into it. -
Senator DU Pont. I would like to ask Gen. O'Ryan about the con-
dition in New York. -
Gen. O'RYAN. I believe that is true quite generally. We have
taken up the reserve proposition in New York, and are perfecting a
system now in respect to the officers, and then we expect to produce
reserve organizations for enlisted men. - &
Senator DU PoWT. It is a truism, you know, that for any organiza-
tion, militia or regular, that goes into an active campagin, in the
space of a very few months it is depleted by 40, 50, or greater per-
Centage. -
Gen. O'RYAN. Yes, sir; in about six months.
Senator DU PoWT. Therefore it is evident that to have such organi-
zations fully efficient there must be some method of feeding them,
keeping them up. Otherwise, you have skeleton regiments, just as
the volunteer régiments were in the Civil War, which were largely
inefficient for that reason. -
Gen. O'RYAN. It is part of the power of Congress, I think, under
this power to organize the militia, to provide as a part of the organi-
zation for reserves. . +
Gen. CRITCHFIELD. We have provided for that by a State law in
our State, and are putting it in operation now. -
PREPAREDNESS FoR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 821
If we should succeed in establishing ourselves, the next and impos-
sible thing for us would be to qualify, unless Congress establishes the
rules. Since the European war I do not take so seriously the objec-
tions urged against the National Guard either from constitutional
limitation of service as urged by some or lack of Federal control. For
instance, Germany has no standing or regular army, but she has
compulsory service. Article 66 of the Constitution of Germany
provides that the princes and senates of the several States shall
appoint the officers of their respective contingents, subject to the
restrictions of article 64. They have also the right to employ not
only their own troops in their respective States to maintain the laws
but to employ the troops of any other division stationed or located
in their State at the time; thus exceeding the authority of any of
our governors. Article 64 provides that all commanders of fortresses,
the commander in chief of a contingent and all officers commanding
troops of more than a contingent shall be appointed by the Emperor.
Generals, or officers performing the duties of generals in a contingent,
are subject to the approval of the Emperor. And that the Emperor
is the commander in chief. We find by examination of the con-
stitution that the Emperor of Germany has about the same power
as our President—a little less; that the States have about the same
control of the military as our States—only a little more. Has any
claim been made or likely to be that because the governors of the
several German States appoint the officers and have no West Point
to select from that her army is a failure? When called to the colors
or mobilized, has she 27 little armies? With a system so like ours
that the charge of plagarism would lie against the men who drafted
the German constitution as adopted in 1867 and amended in 1871,
differing only in requiring compulsory instead of volunteer service,
compulsion being provided for in both organic laws. . But in volun-
teer America the National Guard can be used only to suppress
insurrections, repel invasion, and enforce the laws of the Union.
For what other purpose do you want to use them : Has anyone
indicated another single purpose As far as I have observed, all else
is a matter of mental reservation, as only the term “national defense”
is popular. .*
That is all. I have a brief here sent me by a colonel in the Missouri
National Guard, which I would like to submit. -
The CHAIRMAN. If you would like to have it go in, we will be glad
to have it. Is there anything further, General?
Gen. CRITCHFIELD. That is the only statement I care to make.
The CHAIRMAN. We are very much obliged to you, General.
(The document referred to by Gen. Critchfield is as follows:)
St. Joseph, Mo., January 6, 1916.
Gen. A. B. CRITCHFIELD,
Washington, D. C.
DEAR SIR: I note the following statement in Ed Howe's Monthly, a publication
devoted, as he puts it, “to indignation and information”: -
“According to the war program agreed upon by the American war party we will be
compelled to raise this year $900,000,000, not counting the appropriation for the
Post Office Department, which is self-sustaining. More than two-thirds of this will
be for Army, Navy, pensions, and interest on the public debt—all war items. This
is more than twice as much as was expended on the German Army and Navy the
year before the war.”
822 PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
We will spend twice as much for war items as Germany spent for all her vast armies
and navy the year before the beginning of this great war and then we will have an
increase in the Regular Army of only about 50,000 men. ..
Believing as I do that the American people have been aroused to the necessity of
preparedness, I still do not believe that they are in favor of hysterical extravagance.
I believe that they are in favor of reasonable preparedness and reasonable economy.
In other words, I believe that they want to spend some money, but want to get their
money’s worth. . - - r
If I am correct in this it seems to me that, after just and proper support for the
Regular Army and such moderate increases therefor as may be necessary, our country
can get more security against invasion and an adequate land force with the minimum
expense by turning its attention to the creation of a properly drilled and equipped
citizen soldiery and that in so doing we shall satisfy both those who demand more
security and those who resent militarism and extravagance. -
Having proceeded thus far in our general estimate of the situation the question which
immediately arises is, what form of a citizen soldiery shall we have? *
Shall we make an expensive experiment with a new form of scattered Army com-
F. of ex-Regulars and call it a Reserve Army which may in the end prove a water-
haul? .
Or shall we spend large sums in a like experiment or an immense and entirely new
kind of an army with the high-sounding name of “Continental,” which is, at most, a
mere plan of other well-meaning theorists and thereby risk useless expenditure and
failure through the impracticability of the scheme. -
Or shall we use this money to increase and develop our present constitutional and
well-developed Organized Militia or National Guard and which is a force in being now,
and, thanks to the efficient and devoted work of the Division of Militia Affairs, consists
of approximately 129,000 troops of all arms already equipped, organized, and drilling
under the same uniform regulations prescribed by the Federal Government, to wit:
One hundred and twenty-four regiments, 20 separate battalions, and 26 Separate com-
panies of Infantry, 8 regiments of Cavalry, 70 batteries of Artillery, 123 companies of
Coast Artillery, 3 battalions of engineers of 4 companies each, and 7 Separate companies
of engineers, 21 companies of signal troops, 28 field hospitals, 18 ambulance companies,
and 160 regimental infirmary detachments. - -
Concerning the first plan that I have referred to, namely, the Scheme to acquire a
Scattered reserve to the Regular Army by enlisting men to serve in the Regular Army
eight years, two with the colors—a high-sounding European term—and six years in
reserve; that is to say, at the plow or elsewhere, I have only this to say concerning
the theory, it would be very nice if it worked, but who will come forward and stake
his job on a wager that it will work? Who will undertake to find 500,000 such Cincin-
natti in this country? That is the number proposed to be raised. Who will enlist
in the Regular Army for eight years, at $16 per month for the first two years and be
turned out on the cruel world to make a living with a rope tied to him for the remaining
six? How many young men do you think of in your own community would serve
two years in the Regular Army at $16 per month for the privilege of being released on
parole, as it were, for an additional six years without substantial Support to Sustain
them and the enthusiasm that comes from association to keep them steadfast? Accord-
ing to the author of such a scheme the highest degree of technical skill and the best
of motives, do you not at once perceive, as a practical man accustomed to dealing
with American citizenship at close range, that this plan is at best the dream of a well-
meaning theorist and in appplication would prove a veritable “waterhaul”? I
believe that some such elaborate plan for a reserve force was tried out a few years ago
in this country and resulted in raising a reserve army of 16 men. It is reported in the
West, though I can not vouch for its truth, that a certain Congressman who advocated
preparedness had the entire reserve Army of the United States to dinner with him
one night at the Willard. He was very impolite if he did not also invite the mili-
tary expert who got up the scheme for its organization—the father of the Army, so to
speak. I assure you that it is my firm belief that this proposed regular reserve will
never assemble in bivouac camp or barracks, and it is my humble opinion that it
would find ample and proper shelter in a waste basket. *
Concerning the second plan, and I use the word “plan” advisedly, for you will
admit that this is all it is for the present at least—the plan to create a new kind of
citizen army of 500,000 men and label it with the large and high-sounding name of
“continental army.” On this experiment it is proposed to spend for the first year
$15,000,000, for the second year $45,000,000, for the third year $45,000,000, a total of
$105,000,000 for the first three years during which it is being organized or attempted.
As a condition precedent to the success of this plan we must assume the half million
men who will constitute its personnel can be recruited from the farm, the work shops,
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 823
the stores and offices of the nation in time of peace—I might almost add in time of
world peace—for when this war ends all of the belligerents will shake hands and
Swear on Scraps of paper never to fight again and our professors, idealists, Chautauqua
lecturers, and pacificists will again assume charge and we shall get over our little
hysteria and go on our way rejoicing and making money until the hour when Some
40-centimeter Aleric or Attila shall come to gently inquire why we have stclen his
commerce, and what we are going to do with all that gold.
Therefore, we must assume that this immense paper army must come into being
and count noses in a time of profound peace and not under the hysterical conditions
which made it possible to gather a total of about 3,000 business men and others at
Plattsburg Barracks and Fort Sheridan to enjoy the novel experience of a period of
so-called “intensive training” with no strings tied to them after the close of patriotic
stunt (if you will excuse this last word—it best expresses what is in my mind). -
So much for the difficulties of recruiting. In the light of this fact there must already
be some little doubt in your mind about the counting of the 500,000 noses; but theré
are other difficulties to be added. It is proposed to give them six months in camp or
barracks out of the three years or two months a year (which is little enough if they are
to have no drill at all for 10 months of each year.) Assuming that the continental army
will bar tramps and will not be able to recruit more than one regiment of millionaires,
how many young men in your community do you think they could get to leave the
store, workbench, or farm for two months in camp or barracks during which time their
pay at home will cease and they will get $16 per month in lieuthereof; and if they were
willing to make this Sacrifice, how many merchants, manufacturers, and others of your
º: would be willing to let much-needed employees off two months out of
each year and insure their jobs while absent. We officers of the National Guard find
it difficult to get our men off for the one week of camp instruction provided by the
ºn, using, as we do, every local influence that we can bring to bear upon the
employer. ... " -
And again add to the difficulties of recruiting already enumerated the fact that you
are asking these young men to enlist for intensive training at the risk of their positions
each year or Federal court-martial as the other alternative, with absolutely no social
features and no entertainment whatever such as we generally offer in our organizations
to induce them to enlist in the National Guard.
One theory of the authors of this continental army plan is that they will partially
Solve the problem of recruiting by taking over the National Guard almost, if not quite,
en masse. Ilet them not deceive themselves. We are not only military enthusiasts
but we love the National Guard as they do their Army, and we would as soon abandon
it as they would their Army. Do they think that we are going to deliver over to them
aſid abandon regiments that are a part of our community and its traditions for years—
regiments in which fathers and sons have served in the wars of our country? And
receive what in return?—a number in a make shift experimental army, with no place
of nativity, no war paternity, and no certain war posterity; to receive in return
strangers for our officers and a six-year commission and a six-year enlistment. I shall
not prolong my remarks by enumerating more of the difficulties that will confront the
theorist who attempts to recruit this continental host. -
But the recruiting question is only the beginning of its difficulties. In the National
Guard we not only have our own State camps of instruction, but we find it necessary
to drill the men all the year around in order that our organizations may be coordinated
as efficient units, in order that men may not become rusty, that they may keep plce
with ever changing instruction drill and equipment. For this purpose the combined
National Guard has armories estimated to be worth in the aggregate about $100,000,000.
The proposed outlay of $105,000,000 includes no provision for sheltering the contin-
ental army, and the War Department recognizes that it will be impossible to provide
armories, stables, quarters, and class rooms for the continental army, and proposes to
substitute for such training and shelter the year round, some so-called extensive train-
ing in the field (employe and employer being willing). We get this intensive training
already (as much as we can get employer to let us have time for) and it is the least part
of our yearly work. Need I say more about this well-meant theory with a high-
sounding name? Need I say more about what these gentlemen propose to give the
country for and in consideration of the sum of $105,000,000? Have I not already said
enough to put the practical mind on inquiry? - º
We come now to the third form of citizen soldiery which I mentioned in the begin-
ning—the Organized Militia, or National Guard. As I stated, it is an actual force in
being (not a plan) and consists of about 129,000 organized, drilled, and equipped
troops of āll arms. . . . . . . * * --- - - --
In my humble opinion, we, with all our present-day love of new things, can not sub-
stitute a better first line of citizen soldiery for national defense than the one provided
for and alone contemplated by the founders of this Government—the militia.
824 PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
Through all the smoke and dust of this preparedness issue it seems to me that it is
well to hearken back to first principles and to again get our bearings by a glance at
that fixed and guiding star of our people, the Constitution of the United States.
Of course, you are familiar with that section of the Constitution pertaining to the
militia; but let me quote it again in order that it may be fresh in our minds, for I
want to meet some of the objections made to its terms and made to the militia because
of its terms. -
“The Congress shall have power to provide for calling forth the militia to execute
the laws of the Union, to suppress insurrections, and repel invasions; to provide for
organizing, arming, and disciplining the militia, and for governing such part of them
as may be employed in the service of the United States, reserving to the States, re-
spectively, the appointment of the officers and the authority of training the militia
according to the discipline prescribed by Congress.” -
From this you have of course noted that the Federal Government has the absolute
right to use the National Guard and absolute control of it in the following respects:
To order it into the service of the United States and while in such service to govern
it—(1) To execute the laws of the United States; (2) to suppress insurrections; (3) to
repel invasions. Any officer or enlisted man who fails to report for duty undersuch
circumstances is now by the present law of the United States known as the “Dick
bill” subject to the same punishment as a deserter from the Regular Army.
Under this section of the Constitution the Federal Government has the right—(1)
to prescribe the form of its organization and make.it conform to that of the Regular
Army; (2) to prescribe its armament and equipment and make them conform to that
of the Regular Army, and it has already done so in So far as the Federal appropriations
will permit, so that we now have the same uniform, the same arms, the same equip-
ment as that prescribed for the Regular Army, although, owing to the inadequate
Support a recruit often has to don a discharged soldier's breeches, which are too large
for him, and make him look more like a determined young Turk than an American
citizen soldier; (3) to prescribe the discipline of the National Guard. All arms of
the National Guard are now drilling under the identical regulations used by the
Regular Army. -
In view of all this power given the Federal Government by the Constitution, what
is the objection to this section? What does the extreme militarist claim that the
founders of this Government overlooked? In what did they errº
] rom the viewpoint of those who criticize this section and would abandon the
National Guard on account of it there are two glaring defects—two flies in the oint-
Iment— -
l irst. The National Guard can not be used to invade foreign countries unless it
revolunteers. -
Second. The States have the right to appoint the officers.
In answer to the first objection let me ask a few questions:
(1) What do you want to invade?
(2) Is this preparedness movement for conquest or for defense?
(3) In those instances in which the great mass of the American people thought
invasion of foreign territory right and justifiable was it not State regiments mustered
into the volunteer service that did the most of the invading?
(4) Who but State troops volunteering invaded the Philippines in 1898, the North
and South in 1861, Mexico in 1848, Porto Rico?
(5) Ninety-five per cent of the individual militiamen of my State and all militia
organizations volunteered in the Spanish War. It is said that only between 30 and
40 per cent of the militia of the whole country volunteered, but I challenge any man
to produce such figures. - - .
Now, as to the second fly in the ointment (if you will again pardon the expres-
sion). The officers are appointed by the States. -
Again, let me ask a few questions.
(1) Hasn’t the Federal Government the right to refuse to recognize and equip a
regiment that is not properly officered?
(2) Haven’t the sº. almost without exception, provided examining boards
before which all officers must pass satisfactory examinations on subjects touching
their qualifications?
(3) Haven’t the governors of States in the past discovered some pretty fair officers,
including Washington, of Virginia; Grant, of Illinois; the officer now commanding our
troops on the border, Funston, of Kansas; and others? . .
. (4) Why not satisfy yourself as to the competency or incompetency of the average
National Guard officers instead of accepting without inquiring disparaging statements
from persons wholly ignorant or, worse still, prejudiced?
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 825.
But returning to the consideration of this section as a whole and further answering
those who criticize it in various specious pretexts, I know it will be interesting to you
as a matter of history to recall the fierce debates over this very section by those who
participated in the drafting and adoption of our organic law—men who were not only
fearful of the wolf of militarism outside the door but mindful of the whelp within. I
shall therefore beg your indulgence while I quote some of their words uttered at the
birth of this all important constitutional provision. They at least remind us that it
was inserted after much deliberation; that it was opposed and defended; that with
certain assurances it was finally adopted and that we were cautioned against ever
changing it. Upon three quotations I shall then beg you to ponder, and leave you to.
arrive at a conclusion as to the advisability of permitting it to be undermined or ren-
dered nugatory at the instance of any man or men now living, even though you and I
may accord to them the best of intentions. - - -
Patrick Henry, he who said, “Give me liberty or give me”—the next best thing—
was fearful of the whole section and opposed it; but such men as James Madison and
Alexander Hamilton defended it, advocated its adoption and reassured the American
#: pointing out as its wisest features, the very parts that some men now seek to
abrogate. - -
Representing the extreme view and speaking in the Virginia convention and in
opposition to this section on June 14, 1788, Patrick Henry said in part:
“Your militia is given up to Congress; * * * all power will be in their own
possession. * * * . Of what service would militia be to you, when, most probably
you will not have a single musket in the State? For, as arms are to be provided by
Congress, they may or may not furnish them.”
Continuing he said: -
“Let me here call your attention to that part which gives the Congress the power
to provide for organizing, arming and disciplining the militia, and for governing such
part of them as may be employed in the service of the United States; reserving to the
States, respectively, the appºintment of the officers, and the authority of training
the militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress. By this, sir, you see
that their control over our last and best defense is unlimited. If they refuse or neglect
to discipline or arm our militia, they will be useless; the States can do neither, this.
power being exclusively given to Congress. The power of appointing officers over
men not disciplined or armed is ridiculous; so that this pretended little remains of
power left the States may, at the pleasure of Congress, be rendered nugatory.”
Such are the words of Patrick Henry, the radical patriot, the extreme Democrat;
but fortunately the opposition of Henry and other anti-Federalists did not prevail.
Had they prevailed this part of our organic law would have no being and the Federal
Government would have been divested of one of its most important constitutional
functions. -
The guiding hand of Providence was in the making of this section and ready with
Such great minds as Alexander Hamilton and James Madison to explain and defend it.
Listen to James Madison’s answer to the above attack of Patrick Henry in this Same
Virginia convention, 128 years ago. I quoté from his speech:
“But the honorable member sees great danger in the provision concerning the
militia. Now, sir, this I conceive to be an additional Security to our liberties, without
diminishing the power of the States in any considerable degree, it appears to me SO.
highly expedient that I should imagine that it would have found advocates even
in the warmest friends of the present system. The authority of training the militia
and appointing the officers is reserved to the States. But Congress ought to have
the power of establishing a uniform system of discipline throughout the States; and
to provide for the execution of the laws, suppress insurrections and repel invasions:
These are the only cases wherein they can interfere with the militia; and the obvious
necessity of their having power over them in these cases must flash conviction to any
reflecting mind. Without uniformity of discipline, military bcdies would be incap-
able of action; without a general controlling power to call forth the strength of the
Union, for the purpose of repelling invasions, the country might be overrun and
conquered by foreign enemies. Without such a power to suppress insurrections our
#º might be destroyed by intestine faction and domestic tyranny be estab-
lished.” . -
You will pardon me if I follow the manner of a lawyer who seeks to convince the
court of the merits of his point by quoting from authorities and precedents rather
than by relying upon the poor power of his own eloquence, and in this spirit I wish
to go further and read the words of Alexander Hamilton relative to this section pub-
lished in the Federalist January 10, 1788: - •
“It requires no skill in the science of war to discern that uniformity in the organiza-
tion and discipline of the militia would be attended with the most beneficial effects
826 PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
whenever they were called into service for the public defense. . It would enable them
to discharge the duties of the camp and the field with mutual intelligence and con:
cert—an advantage of peculiar moment in the operations of an army; and it would
fit them much sooner to acquire the degree of proficiency in military functions which
would be essential to their usefulness. This desirable uniformity can only be accom-
plished by confiding the regulation of the militia to the direction of the national
authority. It is, therefore, with the most evident propriety that the plan of the con-
vention proposes to empower the Union ‘to provide for organizing, arming, and dis-
ciplining the militia, and for governing such part of them as may be employed in the
service of the United States, reserving to the States, respectively, the appointment
of the officers and the authority of training the militia according to the discipline pre-
scribed by Congress.' * * * - tº ºn tº a £º
“If standing armies are dangerous to liberty, an efficacious power over the militia,
in the body to whose care the State is committed, ought as far as possible to take
away the inducement and the pretext to such unfriendly institutions. If the Federal
Government can command the aid of the militia in those emergencies which call .
for the military arm in support of the civil magistrate, it can better dispense with
the employment of a different kind of force. If it can not avail itself of the former it
will be obliged to recur to the latter. To render an army unnecessary will be a
more certain method of preventing its existence than a thousand prohibitions on
aper.” # * *
p ‘There is something so far-fetched and so extravagant in the idea of danger to liberty
from the militia that one is at a loss whether to treat it with gravity or with raillery;
whether to treat it as a mere trial of skill, like the paradoxes of retoricians; as a disin-
genuous artifice to instill prejudices at any price; or as the serious offspring of political
fanaticism. Where in the name of common sense are our fears to end if we may not
trust our sons, our brothers, our neighbors, our fellow citizens? What shadow of danger
can there be from men who are daily mingling with the rest of their countrymen and
who participate with them in the same feelings, sentiments, habits, and interests?
What reasonable cause of apprehension can be inferred from a power in the Union to
prescribe regulations for the militia and to command its services when necessary,
while the particular States are to have the sole and exclusive appointment of the offi-
cers? If it were possible seriously to indulge a jealousy of the militia upon any
conceivable establishment under the Federal Government, the circumstances of the
officers being in the appointment of the States ought at once to extinguish it.”
Much more was said by the great men of those times in support of this section which
our latter-day militarists seek to abrogate or render nugatory; but I shall not pre-
Sume to trespass further upon your time by quoting others. I have dwelt upon them
at this length because, in my humble opinion, they are not beside the question or
glittering generalities; for, as I see it, back of all these recommendations and bills in
the last analysis the great and final question which you will have to determine is,
Shall the Congress proceed to give full force and effect to this constitutional provision
or shall you abandon it as obsolete?
Permit me, therefore, to conclude my remarks by quoting a few words from the
Farewell Address of that Virginia militia officer who afterwards came to be called the
Father of His Country:
I quote from the Farewell Address of George Washington:
“Toward the preservation of your Government and the permanency of your present
happy state it is requisite, not only that you steadily discountenance irregular oppo-
sitions to its acknowledged authority, but also that you resist with care the spirit of
innovation upon its principles, however specious the pretexts.” . (There are many
pretexts before you.) “One method of assault may be to effect, in the forms of the
Constitution, alterations which will impair the energy of the system and thus under-
mine what can not be directly overthrown.
“In all the changes to which you may be invited remember that experience is the
Surest standard by which to test the real tendency of the existing Constitution of a
Country; that facility in changes, upon the credit of mere hypothesis and opinion,
exposes to perpetual change, from the endless variety of hypothesis and opinion.
“In offering to you, my countrymen, these counsels of an old and affectionate friend,
I dare not hope they will make the strong and lasting impression I could wish; that
they will control the usual current of the passions or prevent our Nation from running
the course which has hitherto marked the destiny of nations. But if I may even
flatter myself that they may be productive of some partial benefit, some occasional
good; that they may now and then recur to moderate the fury of party spirit, to warn
against the mischief of foreign intrigue, to guard against the impostures of pretended
patriotism, this hope will be a full recompense for the solicitude for your welfare by
which they have been dictated.” - . . . . . . . . . * -
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 827
Now, I have already written at greater length than I had intended; but in closing
I beg to assure you that my only motives in thus addressing you are the same patriotic
motives that have caused me to serve my country as an officer of Volunteers and militia
for many years at no little sacrifice.
Very respectfully,
•º
JoBIN D. McNEELY,
Colonel Fourth Missouri Infantry.
STATEMENT OF ADJUTANT GENERAL WILBUR F. SADLER,
JR., NATIONAL GUARD, STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Gen. SADLER. Mr. Chairman and gentlemen, I have no written
statement that I care to make, and, owing to the lateness of the hour,
I will take up just as little time as possible. -
Since I have been called, there are one or two things that I think
should be brought out. One of the first is what it will cost to pay the
officers and enlisted men of the National Guard at the present author-
ized minimum strength under the terms of the Chamberlain bill.
The division of militia affairs have taken that up and have figured
it very accurately, and after going over their figures very carefully
I find that we practically agree. To pay the men at the authorized
minimum strength under the terms of the Chamberlain bill would
cost $8,302,416 per year. - ~
Senator DU Pont. That is in addition to the present appropria-
tion º
Gen. SADLER. Yes, sir. . .
Senator CATRON. That is based on how many men ;
Gen. SADLER. That is based on 151,574, which is the authorized
minimum strength. But we have at the present time, according to
our reports, 123,105 men enlisted. To pay them would cost
$7,066,311.
The officers, the militia division figures, number 9,128, and I figure
that the officers for the authorized minimum strength would be
9,103. To pay them at the authorized minimum strength would cost
$2,103,920, or a total of $9,170,231.
I had hoped to be able to compare those figures with the conti-
nental-army proposition, but in looking over the figures that the
experts have furnished in regard to the continental army, I find that
the expert testimony is about the same as you find in almost every
court where they are heard or where we hear them daily in the bank
in regard to various propositions. I might say that I am president
of a national bank and come in contact with them quite frequently.
Mr. Breckenridge's statement is that when the system is in normal
working order, that is, the continental army, it will cost $40,000,000
a year. The cost for the first year will be about $15,000,000, the
second year $30,000,000, and the third year will be $45,000,000.
Col. Macomb, of the War College, says that the first year will be
$87,500,000, the second year will ić $70,000,000, the third year will
be $85,000,000, and thereafter $62,500,000.
Now, gentlemen, I feel, after six years' experience as the adjutant
general of the State of New Jersey, that if you will pay the officers
and the men of the National Guard the rates suggested in the Cham-
berlain bill and provide that we shall have 500 men per Congressman,
that we will have within less than two years' time 265,500 men, which
is what they would amount to if each State furnished its quota.
828 PREPAREDMESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
Leaving the companies at peace strength, in the infantry at 65, and
the other organizations at their peace strength, we could quickly raise
to 531,000 men in case of war, and that could be done very quickly.
The CHAIRMAN. And at a very much less cost than the continental
army system, do you think? -
Gen. SADLER. Oh, yes, sir. To pay the guard at the present time
at its authorized minimum strength would be $9,170,000, which would
increase in proportion to the number of men you take.
Senator DU PONT. The consensus of opinion from various experts
of the Regular Army who appeared before the committee in reference
to the terms of enlistment of the regular troops seems to be that it
should be a short one, say two years, with the colors, then passing
into a reserve. It seems to me it would be desirable to assimilate the
National Guard as far as is possible in the Regular Army for various
purposes, and I wanted to ask you whether, in you opinion, a pro-
vision by Congress fixing the term of enlistment in the National Guard
at two years, with full privilege to reenlist, would be satisfactory, or
would it be workable %
Gen. SADLER. It would be workable, but not, in my judgment, as
satisfactory as three-year enlistments,
Senator DU PONT. It would be workable, however ?
Gen. SADLER. Yes, sir. I made a couple of notes as the other
officers talked, and I would like to refer to them for just a minute.
The number of men enrolled in the National Gaurd, according to
the returns made by the various adjutants general, is 123,105. The
number of inspections up to March 31, 1915, was 120,693. The num-
ber of officers enrolled was 9,103, and the number at inspections,
8,705. It has been said at some time, at least by ready writers, that
the National Guard was not responding when they were ordered to
inspections and I wanted to correct that statement. --
In regard to the enlistments of the National Guard, I want to say
for the State of New Jersey that if the officers and men of that State
thought that they could not go to the front, and would not be given
an opportunity to go to the front in case of war, I would not have
30 per cent of the officers and men of my commands serving within
90 days. They enlist for that purpose, gentlemen; they want to go.
to the front. They want a certain amount of Federal control. -
Senator THOMAs. Do you not think, General, that is true with the
militia all over the United States?
Gen. SADLER. Yes, sir; I do. - -
Senator CATRON. How would they want to go to the front—in the
present Organizations? . - -
Gen. SADLER. Yes, sir; the present Organizations.
Senator CATRON. As they are organized now %
Gen. SADLER. Yes, sir.
Senator FLETCHER. Commanded by their own officers?
Gen. SADLER. Commanded by their own officers, who have given
years and years and years to this service.
The CHAIRMAN. Not as a federalized body? -
Gen. SADLER. It depends entirely on what you mean by a “feder-
alized body.” Federalization we want as far as it is consistent with
State uses, and I feel that we are to a very great extent federalized
to-day, but we are willing to go further and agree to anything that.
Congress provides.
PREPAIRED NESS FOR, NATIONAL DEFENSE. 829
The CHAIRMAN. The serious trouble about it all now is that there
does not seem to be any understanding as to just where the National
Guard stands with respect to the Federal Government. They are
continually raising questions about that proposition.
Gen. SADLER. Never a question has been raised by the National
Guard officers of the State of New Jersey, or any other State, that I
know of. Take my State, for instance. The Division of Militia
Affairs has never requested the State of New Jersey to do anything
that it has not at least tried to do. We have never had any conflict
with them, and we have had no complaints from them. We have
been organized to conform with the Regular Army and we are nearer
that organization as planned than the Regular Army is to-day. We
are armed, we are equipped, we are uniformed, we are taught by
Regular officers, three of whom are in our State at the present time,
who are given every opportunity to do everything that they want to
do, and we want to help them; we want them to guide us and direct
UIS.
The CHAIRMAN. How are your officers chosen now % .
Gen. SADLER. By election at the present time, but that is very
carefully guarded. That is a consitutional provision at the present
time in our State. The company officers are elected by the men
of their companies and the field officers elect their commanders.
Senator DUPONT. If an act of Congress were passed to regulate
the appointment of officers, would that suspend your constitutional
provision?
Gen. SADLER. Absolutely. Any provision you make will take care
of that without any question.
There is one other thing I want to bring to the attention of the
committee, that some ready writers have suggested that the National
Guard Association is not representative of the officers and men of
the guard. I want to say that there are about 500 officers who
attend those conventions; there are only 48 adjutants general, and I
think in nearly every State the officers who attend those conventions
are chosen by the local National Guard associations; or, in my
State, they are either chosen by them or selected by the colonels of
the regiments.
I think that the question of enlistments being kept down because
of the probable call to do labor duty is being greatly exaggerated.
Senator DU PONT. Have you in the State of New Jersey any pro-
vision for a reserve for the militia? -
Gen. SADLER. No, sir; we are working to that now.
Senator DU PONT. That is a very important feature, is it not, to
make provision so that the militia can be kept full.
Gen. SADLER. Yes, sir.
Senator DU Pont. If it is called out 7
Gen. SADLER. Yes, sir. Of course, we have the usual provisions
by which the recruiting officer goes to his armory and starts to fill
up his Organization right away, but the reserve I think you mean we
have not yet provided for, but I expect before the present session of
the legislature adjourns that will all be taken care of. -
º CHAIRMAN. What is the character of the young men who
enlist
Gen. SADLER. Fine young men.
23380—PT 16—1.6—5
830 PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
The CHAIRMAN. Are they laboring men?
Gen. SADLER. A great many of them are. Gen. O'Ryan very
accurately described the kind of officers in his guard, and ours are all
about the same kind.
The CHAIRMAN. I mean the enlisted men.
Gen. SADLER. I thought you meant the officers.
The CHAIRMAN. How about the enlisted men?
Gen. SADLER. They are young farmers, laborers, clerks, from all
kinds of establishments, banks, manufactories, and college boys.
The CHAIRMAN. So that you have a good class of young men?
Gen. SADLER. Yes, sir. - -
Senator FLETCHER. You spoke about the possibility of bringing up
this National Guard from 151,000 to something like double that.
What would the States have to do in order to accomplish that?
Gen. SADLER. The States would have to give some increase, but if
you increase the amount of money that you appropriate under
section 1661 and under section 13, and increase the pay, or give them
}. there will be no trouble about getting those men. Senator
Fletcher, it might be interesting to you to know how we look at the
pay from the standpoint of the officer. . At the present time our
officers give three nights a week to their work in the armory. I
think I am safe in saying that they average that, and when a man
is away from his family three nights a week, the family complains.
There are other reasons for complaining, but that is one of the
reasons that has not been suggested. If that man, who is away
from his family three nights in the week, could carry something home,
he would not have so much opposition from the gentler sex, and if
the gentler sex is with us, I have so much respect for their power I
know there would not be so much trouble with our officers.
I could go into the great amount of duty done by the guard, and so
on, but I suppose at this late hour it is not necessary to do that.
Senator LEE. I would like to ask Gen. O'Ryan, or some of these
other gentlemen, to clear up the question a little more as to the cost
per capita of the proposed militia. It did not appear exactly what
the man himself would get. It struck me they were dwelling on the
overhead charges most of the time. . .
Gen. O'RYAN. The question is to make an effort to clear up what
the militia will cost per capita, including this provision for pay for
their field training, and for all overhead charges?
Senator LEE. Yes. . --
Gen. O'RYAN. I could only do that as a result of rather hurried
computation, but I should think that if you expect to develop out of
the militia a trained fighting force, dependable as first-line troops,
those soldiers will cost you, for everything, about $200 a man.
The CHAIRMAN. The man does not get that ?
Gen. O'RYAN. No, sir; that is on the basis of the per capita.
Senator CATRON. Out of that how much will he get 2
Gen. O'RYAN. The private, according to this bill, gets $45 and
the others more. I really do not know what the provisions of that
bill are. I never concerned myself about the amount of compensa-
tion. I think the officers get two to four hundred dollars.
Senator DU PONT. Senator Cummins has introduced a bill, which
he advocated before the committee this morning, in relation to the
militia and its organization, and one of the provisions of the bill is
PREPAREDNIESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 881
to absolutely prohibit the reenlistment of any man in the militia
after his term of service has expired, on the ground that in this way
there will be disseminated more rapidly military instruction through-
out the country. I would like to ask Gen. Critchfield what his
opinion is in regard to that provision?
Gen. CRITCHFIELD. My opinion is that that would be a very unwise
provision if you want to maintain a National Guard force in this
country. .
The CHAIRMAN. We have had the staff officers generally here,
gentlemen, and I understand there are some line officers representing
Cavalry and other branches of the service. Does any member of
the committee want to ask any of these gentlemen anything, or has
any officer any particular thing that he wants to submit to the
committee' -
STATEMENT OF COL. MARTIN FOREMAN, COMMANDING THE
FIRST III,INOIS CAVALRY.
Col. For EMAN. Mr. Chairman and gentlemen, I merely want to
touch on one phase of this matter from my experience. I have
been in my regiment 21 years and have been colonel 9 years; that is,
I have two squadrons of Cavalry and a machine-gun troop. They are
enlisted to the minimum strength supplied by the Army of the
|United States. I know of no way by which the volunteer method
can be obtained excepting by the sympathetic shoulder touch of
man to man, whether you call it one thing or another. My Organ-
ization has been built up by men living with one another, eating
with one another, chumming with one another. Enlistments are
not obtained in times of peace by any other method. -
The American boy is the finest war soldier on earth, and is the
poorest peace soldier. The necessity of defense, prospective, if you
please, does not appeal to him in the least. He is more touched by
his companion who says “Come and join my troop. There are a
lot of good fellows,” than he is by any other appeal. We have a
field tour of duty every year of 10 days. We get 8 days’ pay. Still,
the men gladly go out for 10 days. They will be glad to go out this
year, if the authorities of our State will permit us, for two weeks for
one weeks' pay, and it is merly because of the esprit of the organ-
ization, because of that personal touch is put in, and that personal
touch can only be put in through the Officers and the noncommis-
sioned officers living together.
I agree with Gen. O'Ryan in his remark about efficient officers,
but the officers I have were raised from the ranks. They represent
every phase of American manhood. Some of them have been denied
college educations, some of them have been compelled, on account of
their responsibilities, to go to work very early. Still, they are highly
competent officers. We have had eight years of field work, eight
years under the tuition of Army officers at our elbows every day and
every night, with noncommissioned officers of the Regular Army in-
structing us. We have maneuvered and worked and camped and
drilled with Regular Army troops for eight years. These men have
become qualified, in my judgment, in spite of their lack of college or
higher education, to take men on the firing line, because they have
learned from the ground up. I think it is from the National Guard,
832 PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
guided, controlled, equipped, and managed as my regiment has been,
that you can look for a large volunteer army. I think any other
form, while it may be popular under stress of enthusuasm for a year.
or two, is bound to result in failure. Even the students' camp at
Fort Sheridan last summer required the united efforts of the large
mercantile institutions and several organizations to get barely 500
men to that camp, and then a very fair proportion of them were men
who would not be accepted in a well-organized militia regiment.
If we could have the support and maintenance and facilities that
the Army has, the encouragement that sporadic military movements
have, and such facilities as will give the President of the United States
and the War Department the absolute control over our education,
equipment, morale, and use in time of war, I assure you that from
my personal experience of 21 years you would have a volunteer army
you could well depend on. I know no other way you could get at it.
Senator FLETCHER. Have you read the Chamberlain bill?
Col. For EMAN. Yes, sir. I read that part of it published in the
papers, that is all. .
Senator FLETCHER. What have you to say about it?
The CHAIRMAN. Senator Fletcher is speaking of the militia pay bill.
Col. FoEEMAN. I favor a militia pay bill, by all means. I think
the burden on the men is one they should not bear. My men come
from all parts of Cook County. When a boy leaves his work it costs
him 10 cents to get to the armory. He is required to pay for his
supper. If he is a healthy young fellow, it costs him 25 or 30 cents
more. He drills at least three hours, an hour and a half mounted
and an hour and a half dismounted, and he is likely to be hungry,
and then he buys a little more food. We have never had a horse
issued to us. A number of us have bought the horses, about 90 horses,
and the horses are owned by this organization, which runs a livery
stable and a riding academy to support it. These men are drilled,
two troops drill at night, and we have the officers’ equitation school,
and I am sorry to say that is required to be held on Sunday after-
noon. We have four or five or six tactical rides of two days each
every year, and the three days following Thanksgiving 45 officers
took the test ride prescribed by the United States Army, 30 miles a
day, 64 hours. I want to assure the gentlemen of the committee
that we got on very intimate terms with zero during those two days.
So it is the personal touch, the esprit, that makes the volunteer
army. No legislation will do it. It is the touch of the elbow, the
touch of the shoulder, that makes the fighting man, and if we have
the encouragement to fill up a volunteer army of that kind, I will
assure you that all these problems will be solved. The men in my
regiment enlist as first-line troops. If they thought they were to be
Second-line troops, and would have to guard ditches and bridges,
they would go back to the peaceful pursuits of ther affairs—the pool
rooms and other forms of civilized amusement in times of peace.
The CHAIRMAN. Gentlemen, we will now take a recess until to-
morrow at half past ten. -
(Thereupon, at 5.15 o'clock p. m., the committee took a recess
* Wednesday, February 2, 1916, at 10.30 o'clock
8. DOl. - -
In line with the suggestions of the chairman of the committee
made during the hearing of representatives of the National Guard,
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 833
the executive committee of the National Guard Association of the
United States took the bills which have been introduced affecting
the National Guard and together formulated a bill and later pre-
sented the same for the consideration of the committee.
The following is the bill referred to:
A BILL To provide for the organization, armament, discipline, and government of the militia of the
United States and to further provide for the national defense.
Be it emacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America
in Congress assembled, That the militia of the United States shall consist of all able-
bodied male citizens of the United States and all other able-bodied males who have
declared their intention to become citizens of the United States who are more than
tWelve years of age and not more than sixty-four years of age, and shall be divided
§ three classes; The National Guard, the Junior Guard, and the Unorganized
itia. -
SEC. 2. That the National Guard shall consist of the regularly commissioned and
enlisted militia between the ages of eighteen and sixty-four years organized, armed,
and equipped as hereinafter provided. -
The Junior Guard shall consist of the militia between the ages of twelve and eighteen
years.
All other militia shall be known as the Unorganized Militia.
SEC. 3. That the Vice President of the United States; the officers, judicial and
executive, of the Government of the United States; the Members and officers of each
House of Congress; persons in the military or naval service of the United States;
customhouse clerks; persons employed by the United States in the transmission of
the mail; artificers and workmen employed in the armories, arsenals, and navy yards
of the United States; pilots; mariners actually employed in the sea service of any
citizen or merchant within the United States; and all persons who because of religious
beliefs are exempted by the laws of the respective States or Territories shall be exempt
from militia duty withouf regard to age.
SEC. 4. That to provide for the proper organization and training of the members
of the militia between the ages of twelve and eighteen years those of that class who
may be enrolled under this act shall be designated the Junior Guard and shall be
organized and disciplined as hereinafter prescribed: Provided however, That the Junior
Guard shall not be called into the active service of the United States until every other
class of militia has been ordered out or called forth.
SEC. 5. That the Junior Guard shall be divided into two classes, namely, cadets of
first class and cadets of the second classs. Cadets of the first class shall be those who
are students or graduates of high Schools or institutions of higher learning not under
fifteen years of age. All others enrolled in the Junior Guard shall be cadets of the
Second class. The unit of organization of cadets of the second class shall be the
company, but for purposes of Supervision and instruction, counties, cities, and School
districts may be divided into training areas in each State, Territory, or the District
of Columbia. Cadets of the first class within a county, city, or the student body of any
educational institution, when the enrollment exceeds the strength of one company,
may be organized into tactical units conforming to the plan of organization prescribed
for the National Guard.
SEC. 6. That the organization of the National Guard shall be the same as that which
is or may hereafter be prescribed for the Regular Army, subject in time of peace to
Such general exceptions as may be authorized by the Secretary of War.
SEC. 7. That no State shall maintain troops in time of peace other than as authorized
in accordance with the organization prescribed under this act: Provided, That nothing
contained in this act shall be construed as limiting the rights of the States and Ter-
ritories to the use of the National Guard within their respective borders in time of
peace: Provided further, That the authorized aids of general officers commanding
brigades and divisions may be additional officers: And provided further, That in peace
and war each division, brigade, regiment, and separate battalion of Infantry and
Cavalry may have one inspector of small-arms practice with rank as follows: For a
division, lieutenant colonel; for a brigade, major; for a regiment, captain; and for a
separate battalion, first lieutenant.
SEC. 8. That the minimum number of enlisted men in each company, troop, bat-
tery, or other unit of the National Guard in time of peace shall be the same as that
prescribed under the tables of organization of the Organized Militia of the United
States in effect at the passage of this act: Provided, That the maximum strength of the
units of the National Guard in time of war shall be fixed by the President.
834 PREPAIRED NIESS FOR, NATIONAL DEFENSE.
SEC. 9. That the number of the National Guard to be organized under this bill
within one year shall be for each State in the proportion of two hundred for each
Member of Congress in the House of Representatives from such State, and a number
to be determined by the President for Territories and the District of Columbia, and
shall be increased each year thereafter in the proportion of fifty per centum until a
total peace strength of five hundred for each Member of Congress in the House of
Representatives has been reached: Provided, That this shall not be construed to pre-
vent any State, Territory, or the District of Columbia from organizing the full number
of troops required under this section in less time.
SEC. 10. That whenever a State, Territory, or the District of Columbia shall fail to
organize and maintain its allotted quota as herein specified, by voluntary enlistment,
it shall be lawful for the President to cause a sufficient number of the unorganized
militia within said State, Territory, or District to be drafted into the National Guard
to serve therein as herein provided and to detail officers and noncommissioned officers
of the United States Army to train the same until such time as officers are duly com-
missioned by the governor and qualified as herein provided.
SEC. 11. That any corps of Artillery, Cavalry, or Infantry existing in any of the
States on the passage of the Act of May eighth, Seventeen hundred and ninety-two,
which by the laws, customs, or usages of Said States have been in continuous existence
Since the passage of Said Act, under its provisions and under the provisions of section
two hundred and thirty-two and sections sixteen hundred and twenty-five to sixteen
hundred and sixty, both inclusive, of title sixteen of the Revised Statutes of eighteen
hundred and seventy-three, and the Act of January twenty-first, nineteen hundred
and three, relating to the militia, shall be allowed to retain their ancient privileges,
Subject, nevertheless, to all duties required by law of militia, but shall not be a part
of the National Guard or be subject to any of the privileges or requirements of this
Act relating to the National Guard.
SEC. 12. That for the purpose of maintaining appropriate organization and to
assist in instruction and training, the President may assign the National Guard of
the several States and Territories and the District of Columbia to divisions, brigades,
and other tactical units, and with the concurrence of the governors of the States and
Territories concerned and the commanding general of the District of Columbia Militia
may detail officers of appropriate grade either from the National Guard or the Regular
Army to command such units: Provided, That where complete units are organized
within a State, Territory, or the District of Columbia the commanding officers thereof
shall not be displaced.
SEC. 13. That the President may detail one officer of the Regular Army or the
National Guard as chief of staff and one officer of the Regular Army or the National
Guard as an assistant chief of staff with any division of the National Guard called into
the service of the United States, or ordered into active service as a part of the Army
of the United States, or formed of lesser separate units of the National Guard called
into the service of the United States or ordered into active service as a part of the
Army of the United States: Provided, That in order to insure the prompt mobilization
of the National Guard in time of war or other emergency, the President may, in time
of peace, detail a field officer of the Regular Army to parform the duties appertaining
to a chief of staff for such tactical divisions of the National Guard as exist or as it is
proposed to create from the lesser units of the National Guard when called into the
service of the United States or ordered into active service as a part of the Army of the
|United States.
SEC. 14. That there shall be appointed in each State an adjutant general, who shall
be an officer of the National Guard with rank of brigadier general. The office of adju-
tant general shall be the office of record and administration for the militia of each such
State, except when such militia has been called into the service of the United States.
In addition to his duties, as prescribed by the laws of such State, such adjutant general
shall make such returns and reports to the Secretary of War at such times and in
such form as the latter shall from time to time prescribe. The adjutants general shall
be appointed from among officers on the active list of the National Guard of their
respective States who shall have had not less than five years' prior service as com-
missioned officers of the National Guard or Regular Army, or both combined: Pro-
vided, That the adjutants general of the Territories and of the District of Columbia
shall be appointed by the President with such rank and qualifications as he may deem
roper.
SEC. 15. That the governor of each State and Territory and the commanding general
of the Militia of the District of Columbia may appoint, designate, or detail, subject
to the approval of the Secretary of War, an officer of the National Guard of the State;
Territory, or District of Columbia who shall be regarded as property and disbursing
PREPAREDINESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 835
officer for the United States. He shall receipt and annually account for all property
belonging to the United States in possession of the National Guard of his State, Ter-
ritory, or District of Columbia, and shall make such returns and reports concerning
the same as may be required by the Secretary of War. He shall disburse all appro-
priations provided for by paragarphs (c), (d), (e), (f), (g), and (i), section ninety-
one of this act, except for supplies furnished by one of the supply departments of
the Army which are required by a State, Territory, or the District of Columbia, in
which case the cost of such supplies shall be made a charge against the allotment of
Such State, Territory, or the District of Columbia under the provisions of paragraphs
(a), (d), and (e), of Said section. He shall render through the War Department such
accounts of Federal funds intrusted to him for disbursement as may be required by
the Treasury Department. Before entering upon the performance of his duties as
property and disbursing officer he shall be required to give good and sufficient bond
to the United States, the amount thereof to be determined by the Secretary of War,
for the faithful performance of his duties and for the safe-keeping and proper dispo-
sition of the Federal property and funds intrusted to his care. He shall after having
qualified as property and disbursing officer receive pay for his services from funds
allotted to the State, Territory, and the District of Columbia under the provisions
of paragraph (g), Section ninety-one of this act in accordance with the numbers of
officers and men of the National Guard of said State, Territory, or the District of
Columbia, who are actually enrolled and regularly receiving military instruction
and training, as follows: $500 for not less than five hundred officers and men and
not more than one thousand five hundred officers and men; $700 for more than one
thousand five hundred officers and men and not more than two thousand five hundred
officers and men; $1,000 for more than two thousand five hundred officers and men and
not more than three thousand five hundred officers and men; $1,250 for more than three
thousand five hundred officers and men and not more than four thousand five hun-
dred officers and men; $1,500 for more than four thousand five hundred officers and
men and not more than five thousand five hundred officers and men; $1,750 for more
than five thousand five hundred officers and men and not more than seven thousand
five hundred officers and men; $2,000 for more than seven thousand five hundred
officers and men and not more than eight thousand five hundred officers and men ;
$2,500 for more than eight thousand five hundred officers and men: Provided, That
when traveling in the performance of his official duties under orders issued by the
proper authorities he shall he reimbursed for his actual necessary traveling expenses,
the sum to be made a charge against the allotment of the State, Territory, or District
of Columbia under the provisions of paragraph (g), section ninety-one of this act: Pro-
vided further, That the Secretary of War shall cause an inspection of the accounts
and records of the property and disbursing officer, to be made by an officer of the
Army at least once in each year: And provided further, That the Secretary of War
is empowered to make all rules and regulations necessary to carry into effect the
provisions of this section.
SEC. 16. That the States and Territories shall have the right to determine and fix
the location of the units and headquarters of the National Guard within their respec-
tive borders: Provided, however, That no part of the National Guard which is entitled
to compensation under the provisions of this act shall be disbanded without the
consent of the President.
SEC. 17. That hereafter the period of enlistment of enlisted men in the National
Guard shall be for three years, and they shall be subject to the same qualifications
as are now or may hereafter be prescribed for admission to the Regular Army.
SEC. 18. That enlisted men in the Organized Militia of the several States, Terri-
tories, and the District of Columbia now serving under enlistment contracts which
contain an obligation to defend the Constitution of the United States and to obey
the orders of the President of the United States shall be recognized as members of
the National Guard under the provisions of this act for the unexpired portion of
their present enlistment contract. When such enlistment contract does not contain
Such obligation the enlisted men shall not be recognized as members of the National
Guard until they have signed an enlistment contract as provided in the following
Section. -
SEC. 19. That hereafter enlisted men in the National Guard shall sign an enlist-
ment contract to serve in the National Guard for a period of three years unless sooner
discharged, which contract shall also include an obligation to bear true faith and
allegiance to the United States and support the Constitution thereof and obey the
orders of the President of the United States and the officers appointed over them, and
which shall also contain the following agreement: “In the event that the President
of the United States shall order the National Guard into active service because of
War or imminence thereof within three years from the date of my enlistment I agree
836 PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
to serve as a member of the National Guard in the service of the United States within
or without the continental limits of the United States for the period of two years
§: the daté of said order or until discharged by order of the President of the United
tates.’
SEC. 20. That an enlisted man discharged from service shall receive a discharge in
writing in such form and with such classification as is prescribed for the Regular
Army, and in time of peace discharges may be given prior to the expiration of terms
of enlistment upon the permanent removal of a soldier beyond the limits of the organi-
Zation to which he belongs; because of his engagement in business such as precludes
him from properly performing his military duties; upon certificate of a medical officer
or reputable physician that he has become permanently incapacitated for military
Service; and for such other reasons as may be provided for by the i. of the respective
States, Territories, and District of Columbia.
SEC. 21. That commissioned officers of the Organized Militia of the several States,
Territories, and the District of Columbia now serving under commissions regularly
issued shall continue in office as officers of the National Guard without the issuance
of new commissions: Provided, That they have taken, or may hereafter take, an oath
to bear true faith and allegiance to the United States, to support the Constitution of
the United States, and obey the lawful orders of the President of the United States.
SEC. 22. That hereafter commissioned officers of the National Guard shall be selected
from the following classes and none other: First, officers or enlisted men of the National
Guard recommended by the commanding officers of their several corps, independent
companies, independent battalions, regiments, and higher units; second, officers on
the reserve or unassigned list of the National Guard; third, officers, active or retired,
and ex-officers of the United States Army, Navy, and Marine Corps; and, fourth,
graduates of the United States Military and Naval Academies and graduates of schools,
colleges, and universities where military science is taught under the supervision of
an officer of the Regular Army.
SEC. 23. That no commission shall issue under the foregoing section until the
person selected shall have successfully passed such tests as to physical, mental,
moral, and military fitness as may be prescribed in regulations to be formulated by
the militia section of the General Staff and approved by the Secretary of War. The
examination to determine the qualifications for commission shall be conducted by a
board of commissioned officers appointed by the governor of the State or Territory,
or the commanding general of the State, Territory, or District of Columbia.
SEC. 24. That no person commissioned as an officer in the National Guard shall
assume such rank or enter upon the duties of the office to which he may be commis-
Sioned until he has accepted such commission and taken such oath or affirmation as
may be prescribed, which shall include an oath to bear true faith and allegiance to the
United States, to support the Constitution of the United States, and obey the orders
of the President of the United States.
SEC. 25. That all vacancies which exist or occur in the grade of second lieutenant
of the commissioned personnel of any portion of the National Guard ordered into
active service as a part of the Army of the United States shall be filled by the Presi-
dent, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, from the enlisted men of the
organization of the National Guard in which the vacancy occurs: Provided, That all
promotions to include the grade of colonel shall be made by the President, by and with
the advice and consent of the Senate, from within the arm of service in which the
vacancy occurs, and shall be confined to the commissioned personnel of such arm of
service pertaining to that State: Provided further, That the President shall, by and
with the advice and consent of the Senate, appoint all general officers, except as pro-
vided in section eighty-seven of this act.
SEC. 26. That officers of the same grade shall rank and have precedence in the fol-
lowing order, without regard to date of rank or commission as between officers of
different classes, namely: First, officers of the Regular Army and officers of the Marine
Corps detached for service with the Army by order of the President; second, officers
of the National Guard in the service of the United States; and third, officers of the
volunteer forces: Provided, That officers of the Regular Army holding commissions in
the National Guard in the service of the United States or of the National Guard ordered
into active military service as part of the Army of the United States or in the volunteer
forces shall rank and have precedence under said commissions as if they were commis-
sions in the Regular Army; but the rank of officers of the Regular Army under their
commissions in the National Guard shall not, for the purposes of this section, be held
to antedate muster into the service of the United States: Provided further, That in
time of war or public danger, when two or more officers of the same grade are on duty
in the same field, department, or command, or of any organization thereof, the Presi-
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 837
dent may assign the command of such field, department, or command, or of any Or-
ganization thereof, without regard to seniority of rank in the same grade.
SEC. 27. That commissions of officers may be vacated upon resignation, absence
without leave for three months, upon the recommendation of an efficiency board, or
pursuant to sentence of a court-martial. e
SEC. 28. That officers rendered surplus by the disbandment of their organizations
may be placed upon the reserve list or discharged. Officers may, upon their own
application, be placed upon the reserve list. Any officer on the active or reserve list
shall be retired upon reaching the age of sixty-four years or if determined by a board
of officers to be physically disqualified for the performance of military duty.
SEC. 29, That at any time the moral character, capacity, and general fitness for the
service of any officer may be determined by an efficiency board of commissioned offi-
cers, and if the findings of such board be unfavorable to such officer and be approved,
he shall be discharged.
SEC. 30. That the governor of a State or Territory or the commanding general of the
District of Columbia Militia may prescribe rule; and regulations which, when approved
by the President, will govern the organization of an officers' reserve corps for such
State, Territory, or the District of Columbia, which shall be composed of former officers
of the Regular Army, Marine Corps, Navy, National Guard, former noncommissioned
officers of the Regular Army, and graduates from military departments of institutions
where regular officers are detailed as instructors: Provided, That in time of peace, when
the active militia participates at encampments, maneuvers, or other exercises for field
or coast-defense instruction, officers of the reserve list of appropriate rank may, at the
discretion of the governor, be assigned to duty with organizations to fill the places of
officers who may be absent therefrom, and when so assigned they shall be entitled to
the same pay and allowances as members of the active militia of similar grades: Pro-
vided further, That the officers’ reserve corps shall constitute a part of the National
Guard, and the members thereof shall be subject to being called into the service of
the United States or being ordered into active service as a part of the Army of the
º States for the purpose of filling vacancies in the commissioned personnel
th Orein.
SEC. 31. That an enlisted reserve corps of the National Guard shall be organized
in each State, Territory, and the District of Columbia, to consist of honorably dis-
charged enlisted men of the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps of the United States
and honorably discharged enlisted men of the National Guard of the several States,
Territories, and the District of Columbia who have served with record “good” or
better for a period equal to one full enlistment, and civilians of foreign birth who have
had experience in actual wars and been honorably discharged from service in their
respective armies. Such reserve shall in time of peace not exceed in numbers the
difference between the number of enlisted men of the National Guard and the number
required to bring the organizations thereof up to the authorized war strength of cor-
responding units in the Regular Army, with an addition of ten per centum to be used
for Such purposes as needed. e
SEC. 32. That the method of organization of the reserve, whether a general reserve
or a reserve for separate units, or a combination of those methods, shall be prescribed
in regulations by the several States and Territories, with the approval of the President
of the United States; and the President of the United States is authorized to promul-
gate regulations prescribing the physical and other qualifications of members of the
reserve corps, the military duties and obligations required of reservists, and such other
regulations as may be necessary: Provided, That in the regulations to be prescribed for
training, the recommendations of the militia section of the General Staff shall be fol-
lowed as far as practicable: Provided further, That when acting under such regula-
tions as the President shall prescribe reservists when engaged in field or coast-defense
training with the active militia shall receive the same pay and allowances as enlisted
men of like grade on the active lists of the National Guard, and when called to the colors
for active service in time of war or other grave emergency shall be incorporated into
the National Guard and be subject to the same laws, orders, and regulations which gov-
ern the same.
SEC. 33. That no commissioned or enlisted reservists shall receive any allowance
under paragraph (b), Section ninety-nine, of this act.
SEC. 34. That all the organizations of the National Guard called into the service
of the United States or ordered into active service as a part of the Army of the United
States shall be recruited and maintained as near the maximum authorized war strength
as practicable; and the President is authorized to recruit all such organizations to
Such maximum war strength from time to time, either by voluntary enlistment or by
draft. For this purpose the necessary rendezvous and depots shall be established for
the enlistment and training of all recruits, and in order that officers may be available
838 PREPAIREDINESS FOR, NATIONAL DEFENSE.
for recruiting duty there shall be appointed in the several States, Territories, and the
District of Columbia officers of the proper arm of the service additional to those else-
where herein authorized in numbers not to exceed one major, four captains, five first
lieutenants, and five second lieutenants for each twelve companies, troops, and bat-
teries of Infantry, Cavalry, Field Artillery, Coast Artillery, and Engineers, and for
the purpose of instruction and discipline the troops at the recruit depots herein au-
thorized may be organized into provisional companies and battalions or squadrons with
noncommissioned officers and privates of such grades and numbers as may be prescribed
by the President.
SEC. 35. That there shall be in the War Department, in the Office of the Chief of
Staff, a Division of Militia Affairs, the commissioned personnel of which shall consist
of officers of the Regular Army and National Guard, and there shall be a Chief of the
Division of Militia Affairs, who shall be detailed from the officers of the line of the Army
and who shall, while so serving, be an additional member of the General Staff Corps
with the rank, pay, and allowances of a brigadier general: Provided, That the National
Militia Board created by section twenty of the act of May twenty-seventh, nineteen
hundred and eight, shall, from the date of taking effect of this act, be abolished.
SEC. 36. That the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate,
shall appoint an additional section of the General Staff, to be composed of five officers
on the active list of the National Guard with not less than fifteen years’ service, at
least two of whom shall be officers of the line, said section to be known as the Militia.
Section of the General Staff. Such officers shall be appointed as follows: One for a
term of one year, one for a term of two years, one for a term of three years, one for a
term of four years, and one for a term of five years; and thereafter each member of the
section shall be appointed for a term of five years. In the event of a vacancy in the
section the appointment shall be for the unexpired term. The members of the Militia
Section of the General Staff shall be so selected as to Secure, as far as practicable,
equitable representation to all sections of the United States. No officershall be eligible
to reappointment as a member of the Militia Section of the General Staff within two
years after the cessation of his membership under a prior appointment.
SEC. 37. That the Militia Section of the General Staff shall have a suitable office at
the War Department, and during their detail the members thereof shall receive the
pay and allowance of officers of similar grade in the Regular Army. The members
of the Militia Section of the General Staff shall be subject to the orders of the Secre-
tary of War and the Chief of Staff for consultation respecting the condition, status,
and needs of the whole body of the National Guard. It shall be the duty of said sec-
tion to recommend to the Secretary of War policies for the benefit and improvement
of the National Guard and to confer with him and make recommendations upon all
regulations proposed by him for the government of the National Guard.
SEC. 38. That the necessary clerical and office expenses of the Division of Militia
Affairs and the actual and necessary office expenses, expenses of travel, pay, and
allowances for the members of the Militia Section of the General Staff shall constitute
a charge against the whole sum annually appropriated under this act.
SEC. 39. That the Secretary of War shall annually transmit to Congress an abstract
of the returns and reports of the adjutants general of the several States, Territories,
and the District of Columbia, with such observations as he may deem necessary for
the information of Congress, especially as regards the state of efficiency and pre-
paredness of the National Guard for active field or coast-defense service, as revealed
by the reports of inspection required by section forty-two, and shall annually make
a report to Congress showing the total expenditures from the annual appropriations
carried by this act for the preceding fiscal year, as well as the various purposes for
which Such expenditures were made, and the amount of money disbursed and the
value of the property issued on account of the National Guard of each of the several
States, Territories, and the District of Columbia.
SEC. 40. That the provisions of this act in respect to the militia shall be applicable
only to the militia organized as a land force.
SEC. 41. That the National Guard of the United States shall be uniformed, armed,
and equipped with the same type of uniforms, arms, and equipments provided for
the United States Army.
SEC. 42. That under such regulations as the President may prescribe the Secretary
of War is hereby authorized to procure, by purchase or manufacture, and to issue
from time to time to the National Guard, upon requisition of the governors of the
Several States and Territories or the commanding general of the Militia of the District
of Columbia, such number of United States service arms, with all accessories, field-
artillery material, dummy coast-artillery armament, engineer, signal, and Sanitary
material, accouterments, field uniforms, clothing, equipage, publications, and mili-
tary stores of all kinds, including public animals, provided for the Army of the United
PREPAIRED NESS FOR, NATIONAL DEFENSE. - 889
States as are necessary to arm, uniform, and equip for field Service all of the National
Guard in the several States, Territories, and the District of Columbia, in accordance
with the requirements of this Act: Provided, That when it is shown by the reports
of the inspector that the National Guard in any State, Territory, or the District of
Columbia is armed and equipped for field service, the allotment under the provisions
of paragraph (a), section ninety-One, of this act, may be used for the purchase of
any article issued by the supply departments of the Army: Provided further, That as
a condition precedent to the issue of any property as provided for by this Act, the
State, Territory, or the District of Columbia shall make adequate provision for the
protection and care of such property.
SEC. 43. That under such regulations as the President may prescribe it shall be the
duty of the Secretary of War, whenever a new type of equipment, Small arm, or field
gun shall have been adopted for the use of the Regular Army, and when a sufficient
quantity of such equipment, arms, or field guns shall have been manufactured to
constitute, in his discretion, an adequate reserve for the armament of the Regular
Army in case of war, to cause the National Guard in the several States, Territories, and
the District of Columbia to be furnished with the equipment, small arms, and field
guns of the type so adopted, including all accessories, without charging the cost or
value thereof or any expense connected therewith against the appropriations provided
in this act. - -
SEC. 44. That each State, Territory, and the District of Columbia shall, on the
receipt of new property issued to replace obsolete or condemned prior issues, turn in to
the department or otherwise dispose of in accordance with the directions of the Secre-
tary of War all property so replaced or condemned without receiving any money credit
therefor.
SEC. 45. That any State, Territory, or the District of Columbia may, with the ap-
proval of the Secretary of War, purchase for cash from the War Department for the
use of the National Guard, including the officers thereof, such stores, supplies, material
of war, and military publications as are furnished to the Army in addition to those
issued under the provisions of this act, at the price at which they are listed to the Army,
with cost of transportation added. The funds received from such sale shall be credited
to the appropriation to which they belong, and shall not be covered into the Treasury,
and shall be available until expended to replace therewith the Supplies sold to the
States in the manner herein authorized: Provided, That stores, supplies, and material
of war so purchased by a State, Territory, or the District of Columbia may, in time of
war or when war is imminent, be requisitioned by the United States for use in the
military service thereof and when so requisitioned by the United States and delivered
º for the value thereof shall be allowed to such State, Territory, or the District of
'olumbia.
SEC. 46. That all military property issued to the National Guard as herein provided
for shall remain the property of the United States. Whenever any property issued to
the National Guard in any State or Territory or the District of Columbia as hereinbe-
fore provided has been lost, damaged, or destroyed, or has become unserviceable or
unsuitable by use in service or from any other cause, it shall be examined by a disin-
terested surveying officer of the National Guard, to be appointed by the governor of the
State or Territory or by the commanding general of the Militia of the District of Colum-
bia, or of the Regular Army detailed by the Secretary of War, and the report of such
surveying officer shall be forwarded to the Secretary of War, and if it shall appear to the
Secretary of War from the record of Survey that the property has been lost, damaged,
or destroyed through unavoidable causes, he is hereby authorized to relieve the State
or Territory or the District of Columbia from further accountability therefor, if it shall
appear that the loss, damage, or destruction of property was due to carelessness or neg-
lect, or that its loss, damage, or destruction could have been avoided by the exercise
of reasonable care, the money value thereof shall be charged against that portion of
the allotment made to the State, Territory, or the District of Columbia for the purchase
of similar supplies, stores, or material of war. If the articles So surveyed are found to
be unserviceable or unsuitable, the Secretary of War shall direct what disposition,
by Sale or otherwise, shall be made of them, except unserviceable clothing, which
Shall be destroyed; and if sold, the proceeds of such sale, as well as stoppages against
officers and enlisted men, and the net proceeds of collections made from any person to
reimburse the Government for the loss, damage, or destruction of any property shall
be deposited in the Treasury of the United States as a credit to said State, Territory,
or the District of Columbia, and as a part of and in addition to that portion of its allot-
ment Set aside for the purchase of similar supplies, stores, or material of war: Pro-
vided, That the Secretary of War shall authorize an annual dropping allowance for
each enlisted man of the National Guard, and clothing to this amount, or so much
thereof as is necessary, may be dropped as expended from the returns of the property
840 - PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
or disbursing officer and other accountable officers of the State, Territory, or the Dis-
trict of Columbia, but no clothing in the possession of the National Guard which is in
a serviceable condition shall be dropped as expended. The Secretary of War is au-
thorized to prescribe the rules and regulations necessary to carry into effect the fore-
golng. - $
SEC. 47. That the net proceeds of the sale of condemned stores issued to the National
Guard and not charged to State allotments shall be covered into the Treasury of the
United States, as shall also stoppages against officers and enlisted men, and the net
proceeds of collections made from any person to reimburse the Government for the
loss, damage, or destruction of said property not charged against the State allotment
issued for the use of the National Guard.
SEC. 48. That the appropriations provided under section ninety-one of this act shall
be available for the purchase, under such regulations as the Secretary of War may pre-
scribe, of horses conforming to the Regular Army standards for the use of Field Artil-
lery, Cavalry, Signal companies, Engineer companies, ambulance companies, and
other mounted units of the National Guard, said horses to remain the property of the
United States and to be used solely for military purposes.
SEC. 49. That horses purchased for the purposes set forth in the foregoing section
may be issued not to exceed thirty-two to any one battery, troop, or company, or four
to a battalion or regimental headquarters, under such regulations as the Secretary of
War may prescribe to the organizations mentioned; and the Secretary is further author-
ized to issue for the use of such organizations, without cost to the National Guard, con-
demned Army horses which are no longer fit for service, but which may be suitable
for the purposes of instruction, the same to be sold as now provided by law when the
latter purpose has been served. -
SEC. 50. That the appropriation provided under paragraph (e), section ninety-One,
of this act shall be available for the purchase and issue of forage, bedding, shoeing and
veterinary Services, and supplies for horses of the organizations mentioned in sections
forty-eight and forty-nine that may be owned or acquired by, or issued to, any of the
Said organizations, and for the compensation of competent help for the care of the
matériel, animals, and equipment thereof, under such regulations as the Secretary
of War may prescribe: Provided, That the men to be compensated, not to exceed five
for each battery, troop, or company, shall be duly enlisted therein and shall be de-
tailed by the battery, troop, or company commander, under such regulations as the
Secretary of War may prescribe, and shall be paid by the United States disbursing
officer in each State, Territory, and the District of Columbia.
SEC. 51. That for the purpose of securing uniformity of the training of the Junior
Guard, the Secretary of War may require the Militia Section of the General Staff to
formulate a comprehensive plan embracing such rules and regulations in conformity
herewith as may be necessary to secure efficient results; this plan, when approved by
the Secretary of War and promulgated, will be the system of organization and disci-
pline prescribed for this class of militia.
SEC. 52. That the training of second-class cadets of the Junior Guard shall be limited
to physical exercises of not less than fifteen minutes each day, which may include
evolutions in drill, calisthenic exercises, swimming, running, and the principles of
first aid and hygiene and will be designed to develop the physical standard of the
youth of the country and to inculcate in them at an early age habits of promptness
and obedience, an understanding and appreciation of the institutions of our Govern-
ment, and a patriotic sense of the obligations of citizenship.
SEC. 53. That members of the Junior Guard of the first class organized under this
act are authorized to wear a service uniform similar to that prescribed for the National
Guard with such variation of insignia as will be distinctive of the State, educational
institution, or special unit. - -
SEC. 54. That cadets of the Junior Guard above the age of fifteen years may be
trained in the use of the military rifle, and when organized into rifle clubs under
Competent Supervision issues of arms and ammunition may be made to them under
conditions similar to those under which such munitions are issued to rifle clubs affili-
ated with the National Rifle Association of America; Provided, That all Government
rifle ranges and all State rifle ranges built or maintained by the use of Federal funds
Shall under proper regulation be available for use by the members of the Junior Guard;
Provided further, That the use of rifles which have been issued to any branch of the
military Service of the United States may be granted members of the Junior Guard
for target practice by and with the consent of the accountable and responsible officer
When such practice is conducted under the supervision of a competent officer or non-
commissioned officer satisfactory to the authority responsible for the rifles so used.
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 841.
SEc. 55. That upon the request of the governor of any State or Territory the Presi-
dent may detail officers and noncommissioned officers of the active or retired list of
the Regular Army or officers and noncommissioned officers of the National Guard on
the active or retired list to duty with said States, Territories, and District of Colum-
bia to assist in organizing and disciplining the Junior Guard within the borders thereof
as follows, namely, not to exceed one officer above the grade of captain to each State,
Territory, and District of Columbia, and such other officers below the grade of major
as the President may determine. The Secretary of War may, upon like application,
detail one or more enlisted men of the Regular Army or National Guard with each
State, Territory, or District of Columbia for duty in connection with the Junior Guard
within the borders thereof. All such assignments may be revoked at the request of
the governor of such State or Territory or the commanding general of the Militia of
the District of Columbia or at the pleasure of the Secretary of War; Provided, That
any officer or noncommissioned officer of the National Guard detailed pursuant to.
the provisions of this section shall during such detail be entitled to the pay and
allowances allowed by law for like grades in the Tegular Army. **
SEC. 56. That the discipline (which includes training) of the National Guard shall
conform to the system which is now or may hereafter be prescribed for the Regular
Army, and the training shall be carried out by the several States, Territories, and
the District of Columbia, so as to conform to the provisions of this act.
SEC. 57. That each company, troop, battery, and detachment in the National.
Guard shall assemble for drill and instruction at company, battalion, or regimental
armories or rendezvous or for indoor target practice not less than forty-eight times
each year, and shall participate in encampments, maneuvers, or other exercises,
including outdoor target practice, for field or coast-defense instructions, under the
provisions of section fifty-nine of this act, at least fifteen days each year, five of which
shall be in rifle practice, in addition to the assemblies for drill and indoor target
practice hereinbefore prescribed, unless such company, troop, battery, or detachment
shall have been in active service for at least five consecutive days durirg such year.
or unless excused from participation in such encampments, maneuvers, or other
exercises, including outdoor practice, for field or coast-defense instruction, by the
governor for reasons satisfactory to the Secretary of War: Provided, That credit for an
assembly for drill or for indoor target practice shall not be given unless the number
of officers and enlisted men present for duty at Such assembly shall equal or exceed a
minimum to be prescribed by the President, nor unless the period of actual military
duty and instruction participated in by each officer and enlisted man at each Such
assembly at which he is credited as having been present shall be of at least one and
one-half hour's duration.
SEC. 58. That the Secretary of War shall cause an inspection to be made at least
once each year by officers of the Regular Army detailed by him for that purpose to.
determine the condition of the property in the hands of the National Guard; whether
the National Guard is organized as hereinbefore prescribed; whether the organization
and the officers and enlisted men thereof are sufficiently armed, uniformed, equipped,
and being trained and instructed for active duty in the field or coast defense, and its
records are being kept in accordance with the requirements of this act. The reports
of Suchinspections shall serve as the basis for the issue to and retention by the National
Guard of the military property provided for by this act.
SEC. 59. That under such regulations as the President may prescribe the Secretary
of War is authorized to provide for the participation of any part of the National Guard
in encampments, maneuvers, or other exercises, including outdoor target practice,
for field or coast-defense instruction, either independently or in conjunction with
any part of the Regular Army, and there may be set aside from the funds allotted to
any State, Territory, or the District of Columbia, under the provisions of paragraph
(c), Section ninety-one of this act, such portion of said funds as may be necessary for
the payment, Subsistence, transportation, and other expenses of that portion of the
National Guard in the State, Territory, or the District of Columbia which may par-
ticipatein such encampments, maneuvers, or other exercises, including outdoor target
practice, for field and coast-defense instruction; and the officers and enlisted men
of Such National Guard while so engaged shall be entitled to the same pay, subsist-
ence, and transportation as officers and enlisted men of corresponding grades of the
Regular Army are or hereafter may be entitled by law: Provided, That encampments,
maneuvers, or other exercises, including outdoor target practice, for field or coast-
defense instruction shall be held to include the State and National rifle competitions.
SEC. 60. That when any part of the National Guard participates in encampments,
maneuvers, or other exercises, including outdoor target practice, for field or coast-
defense instruction at a United States military post or reservation the command of
the military post or reservation where such encampments or maneuvers are held,
842 PREPAREDINESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
and of the officers and troops of the United States there on duty, shall remain with
the commander of the United States troops without regard to the rank of the com-
manding or other officer of the National Guard temporarily engaged in the encamp-
ments or maneuvers for field or coast-defense instruction. • ,
SEC. 61. That upon the application of the governor of any State or Territory or
the commanding general of the Militia of the District of Columbia the Secretary of
War may detail one or more officers and enlisted men of the Army to attend any
encampment, maneuver, or other exercise for field or coast-defense instruction of
the National Guard, who shall give such instruction and information to the officers
and men assembled for such encampment, maneuver, or other exercise as may be
ºd by the governor or by the commanding officer of the National Guard there
on duty. - -
SEC. 62. That under such regulations as the President may prescribe the Secretary
of War may, upon the recommendation of the governor of any State, Territory, or
the commanding general of the Militia of the District of Columbia, provide for officers'
camps of instruction for the instruction of officers and enlisted men of the National
Guard. Such camps shall be conducted by officers of the Regular Army detailed
by the Secretary of War for that purpose, and may be located either within or without
the State, Territory, or District of Columbia to which the officers of the National
Guard so designated to attend belong. Officers and enlisted men attending such
camps shall be entitled to pay and transportation, and enlisted men to subsistence in
addition, at the same rates as for encampments or maneuvers for field or coast-defense
instruction.
SEC. 63. That when any portion of the National Guard participates in encampments,
maneuvers, or other exercises, including outdoor target practice, for field or coast-
defense instruction under the provisions of this act they may, after being duly mus-
tered, be paid at any time after such muster for the period from the date of leaving
the home rendezvous to the date of return thereto as determined in advance, both
dates inclusive; and such payment, if otherwise correct, shall pass to the credit of
the disbursing officer making the same.
SEC. 64. That all officers and employees of the United States and of the District
of Columbia who are members of the National Guard shall be entitled to leave of
absence from their respective duties without loss of pay, time, or efficiency rating
on all days engaged in field training ordered or authorized under the provisions of
this act. º -
SEC. 65. That, under such regulations as the President may prescribe, the Secre-
tary of War may, upon the recommendation of the governor of any State or Territory
or the commanding general of the Militia of the District of Columbia, authorize any
officer or enlisted man of the National Guard to attend and pursue a regular course
of study at any military school or college of the United States, except the Military
Academy, at West Point, New York; or to be attached to an organization of the same
arm, corps, or department to which the officer or enlisted man belongs for routine
practical instruction at or near an Army post during its period of field training or
outdoor season; and such officer or enlisted man shall receive the same travel allow-
ances and quarters, or commutation of quarters, and the same pay, allowances, and
subsistence to which an officer or enlisted man of the Regular Army would be entitled
for attending such school, college, or practical course of instruction under orders from
proper military authority, while in actual attendance at such School, college, or prac-
tical course of instruction.
Sec. 66. That, upon the request of the governor of any State, Territory, or the
commanding general of the Militia of the District of Columbia, the President ma
detail officers of the active list of the Army to duty with the National Guard in suc
State, Territory, or District of Columbia, and officers so detailed may accept commis-
sions in the National Guard without vacating their commissions in the Regular Army,
or be prejudiced in their relative or lineal standing therein. The Secretary of War
may, upon like application, detail one or more enlisted men of the Regular Army
with such State, Territory, or District of Columbia for duty in connection with the
National Guard. All such assignments may be revoked at the request of the governor
of such State, Territory, or District of Columbia concerned, or at the pleasure of the
Secretary of War; that nothing in this section shall be so construed as to prevent the
detail of retired officers as now provided by law: Provided further, That the service
of an officer of the Regular Army as a commissioned officer of the National Guard or
as an inspector-instructor thereof shall be deemed Service actually performed with
troops within the meaning of any Act of Congress.
Sec. 67. That the militia when called into the service of the United States shall
from the date of notice of such call, be subject to the Rules and Articles of War, and,
in addition thereto, to the other laws, orders, and regulations governing the Regular
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 843
Army, in So far as such laws, orders, and regulations may be applicable to officers
and enlisted men whose permanent retention in the Military Service, either on the
active list or on the retired list, is not contemplated. In time of peace the National
Guard shall be subject to the Rules and Articles of War in so far as they are not incon-
sistent with the constitutions of the respective States, and the laws governing such
States, Territories, and the District of Columbia: Provided, That officers of other
military forces in the Service of the United States shall not, against the objection of
the accused, be competent to sit on a general or special court-martial for the trial of
officers or Soldiers of the militia when called into the service of the United States:
Provided further, That officers of the militia when called into the service of the United
States shall not, against the objection of the accused, be competent to sit on general
or Special courts-martial for the trial of officers or soldiers of other forces.
Sec. 68. That courts-martial in the National Guard of the United States shall be
of three kinds, namely: General courts-martial, special courts-martial, and summary
courts-martial. They shall be constituted and have cognizance of the same subjects,
and possess like powers, except as to punishments, as similar courts provided for by
the laws of the United States and organized under the Articles of War and the rules
and regulations for the United States Army. The proceedings of courts-martial shall
be assimilated to the forms and modes of procedure prescribed for like courts organized
under the Articles of War and the rules and regulations for the government of the
armies of the United States.
SEC. 69. That general courts-martial may be convened by order of the governors of
the respective States and Territories and by the commanding general of the Militia
of the District of Columbia, and such courts shall have the power to 1mpose fines not
exceeding $200; to sentence to forfeiture of pay and allowances; to a reprimand; to
dismissal or dishonorable discharge from the service; to reduce noncommissioned
officers to the ranks; or any two or more of such punishments may be combined in the
sentences imposed by such courts.
SEC. 70. That the commanding officer of a district, garrison, post, camp, or other
place where troops are on duty, and the commanding officer of a brigade, regiment,
detached battalion, or other detached command, may appoint special courts-martial
for his command; but such special courts-martial may in any case be appointed by
superior authority when by the latter deemed desirable. Special courts-martial
shall have power to try any person subject to military law except an officer, for any
crime or offense made punishable by the military laws of the United States, and
Such special courts-martial shall have the same powers of punishment as do general
courts-martial except that fines imposed by such courts shall not exceed $100.
SEC. 71. That the commanding officer of each garrison, fort, post, or other place,
regiment, or corps, detached battalion, company, or other detachment of the National
Guard shall have power to appoint for such place or command a summary court to
consist of one officer, who shall have power to administer oaths and to try the enlisted
men of such place or command for breaches of discipline and violations of laws gov-
erning such organizations; and said court, when satisfied of the guilt of such soldier,
may impose fines not exceeding $25 for any single offense; mav sentence noncommis-
sioned officers to reduction to the ranks; may sentence to forfeiture of pay and allow-
ances. The proceedings of such court shall be informal, and the minutes thereof
shall be the same as prescribed for summary courts of the Army of the United States.
SEC. 72. That all courts-martial of the National Guard, including summary courts,
shall have power to sentence to confinement in lieu of fines authorized to be imposed:
Provided, That such sentences of confinement shall not exceed one day for each dollar
of fine authorized.
SEC. 73. That no sentence of dismissal from the service or dishonorable discharge
shall be executed until approved by the governor of a State or Territory or the com-
manding general of the Militia of the District of Columbia.
SEC. 74. That presidents of courts-martial and summary court officers shall have
power to issue warrants to arrest accused persons and to bring them before the court
for trial whenever such persons have disobeyed an order in writing from the convening
authority to appear before such court, a copy of the charge or charges having been
delivered to the accused with such order, and to issue subpoenas and subpoenas duces
tecum and to enforce by attachment attendance of witnesses and the production of
books and papers, and to sentence for a refusal to be sworn or to answer as provided in
actions before civil courts.
SEC. 75. That all process and sentences of said courts shall be executed by such
civil officers as may be prescribed by the laws of the several States and Territories,
and in any State where no provision has been made for such action and in the Terri-
tories and the District of Columbia, the same shall be executed by a United States
marshal or his duly appointed deputy, and it shall be the duty of any United States
844 - PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
marshal to execute all such process and sentences and make return thereof to the
officer issuing or imposing the same. - -
SEC. 76. That commissioned officers on the active list belonging to organizations of
the National Guard shall annually receive as reimbursement for their expenses and
compensation for their services, except during periods of service for which under
existing law they may become entitled to the same pay as officers of corresponding
grades of the Regular Army, at the following rates, namely: To all major generals,
$800; to all brigadier generals, $700; to all colonels, $600; to all lieutenant colonels,
$550; to all majors, $525; to all captains, $500; to all first lieutenants, $300; to all
Second lieutenants and all veterinarians, $250.
SEC. 77. That each enlisted man on the active list belonging to organizations of
the National Guard shall receive as reimbursement for his expenses and compensa-
tion for his Services, except during periods of Service for which under existing law
he may become entitled to the same pay as an enlisted man of corresponding grade
in the Regular Army, at a rate equal to twenty-five per centum of the initial pay now
or that may be hereafter provided by law for enlisted men of corresponding grades of
the Regular Army: Provided, That such enlisted man shall receive the compensation
herein provided if he shall have attended not less than forty-eight regular drills of
not less than one and one-half hours each during any one year, and a proportionate
amount for attendance upon a lesser number of such drills, not less than twenty: Pro-
vided further, That the compensation provided herein shall be computed for semian-
nual periods, beginning the first day of January and the first day of July of each year,
in proportion to the number of drills attended; and no compensation shall be paid
to any enlisted man for the first Semiannual period of any year unless he shall have
attended during said period at least twenty drills, but any lesser number of drills
attended during said period shall be recokoned with the drills attended during the
second semiannual period in computing the compensation, if any, due him for that
year: And provided further, That when any man enters into an enlistment other than
an immediate reenlistment, he shall be entitled to proportional compensation for
that year if during the remainder of the year he shall attend a number of drills whose
ratio to twenty is not less than the ratio of the part of the year so served to the whole
year; and when any man’s enlistment shall expire, the compensation, if any, to
which he may be entitled shall be determined in like manner: And provided further,
That periods of any actual military duty equivalent to the drills herein prescribed,
except those periods of service for which under existing laws members of the National
Guard may become entitled to the same pay as officers and enlisted men of the cor-
responding grades in the Regular Army, may be accepted as Service in lieu of Such
drills when so provided by the Secretary of War.
SEC. 78. That all amounts appropriated for the purposes of the two preceding
sections shall be disbursed and accounted for by the officers and agents of the Pay
Department of the Army, and all disbursements made under the provisions of the
two preceding sections shall be made as soon as practicable after the thirty-first day
of December and the thirtieth day of June of each year upon pay rolls prepared and
authenticated in the manner prescribed by the Secretary of War: Provided, That
stoppages may be made against the compensation payable to any officer or enlisted
man to cover the cost of public property lost or destroyed by and chargeable to such
officer or enlisted man. -
SEC. 79. That no money appropriated under the provisions of this Act shall be paid
to any person not on the active list, not to any person over sixty-four years of age,
nor to any person who fails to qualify as to fitness for military service, under such
regulations as the militia section of the General Staff shall prescribe, approved by the
Secretary of War. .
SEC. 80. That when Congress shall have authorized the use of the armed land
forces of the United States in the emergency of actual or imminent war, requiring
the use of troops in excess of those of the Regular Army, the officers and enlisted
men of the National Guard, who have signed an enlistment or agreement to render
military service to the United States and have received and accepted compensation
for training for such service under the provisions of this Act, and who have passed
the required physical examination at the time of their enlistment, shall constitute
an army and may be ordered into the service of the United States by the President
to serve for a period of two years within or without the continental limits of the United
States, unless sooner discharged by the President. Officers and enlisted men in the
service of the United States, under the terms of this section, shall have the same
pay and allowances as officers and enlisted men of the Regular Army of the same prior
ServilGe.
SEC. 8]. That when any officer or enlisted man of the National Guard is disabled
by reason of wounds or disability received or incurred in the service of the United
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 845
States, he shall be entitled to all the benefits of the pension laws, and in case such
officer or enlisted man dies in the service of the United States or in returning to his
place of residence after being mustered out of such service, or at any other time in
consequence of wounds or disabilities received in such service, his widow and chil-
dren, if any, shall be entitled to all the benefits of such pension laws. .
SEC. 82. That when any officer or enlisted man of the National Guard ordered into
active service as a part of the Army of the United States is disabled by reason of wounds
or disability received or incurred in the active military service of the United States
he shall be entitled to all the benefits of the pension laws; and in case such officer or
enlisted man dies in the active service of the United States or in returning to his place
of residence after being released from further liability to render active military service
under the order, or at any time in consequence of wounds or disabilities received in
such active military service, his widow and children, if any, shall be entitled to all
the benefits of such pension laws.
SEc. 83. That the Secretary of War shall annually submit to Congress recommenda-
tions and estimates for the establishment and maintenance of indoor and outdoor rifle
ranges, under such a comprehensive plan as will ultimately result in providing ade-
quate facilities for rifle practice in all Sections of the country. And that all ranges so
established and all ranges which may have already been constructed, in whole or in
part, with Federal funds shall be open for use by those in all branches of the military
and naval Services of the United States and by all able-bodied males capable of bearing
arms, under reasonable regulations to be prescribed by the controlling authorities and
approved by the Secretary of War. That with the concurrence of the authorities of
the States and Territories and the District of Columbia, the President may detail
capable officers and noncommissioned officers of the Regular Army and National Guard
to duty at such ranges as instructors for the purpose of training the citizenry in the
use of the military arm. Where rifle ranges have been so established and instructors
assigned to duty thereat, the Secretary of War is authorized to provide for the issue of
a reasonable number of Standard military rifles and such quantities of ammunition as
may be available for use in conducting such rifle practice: Provided. That it shall be
the duty of the militia Section of the General Staff to formulate comprehensive plans
for the consideration of the Secretary of War designed to carry into effect the purpose
of this section, which is to provide for the effectual training in rifle practice of the
military and citizenry of the country: Provided further, That where officers and non-
commissioned officers of the National Guard are assigned to duty at rifle ranges as
instructors under the provisions of this section they shall be entitled to the same pay
and allowances as are officers and noncommissioned officers of like grades in the
Regular Army. .
SEC. 84. That whenever the United States is invaded or in danger of invasion
from any foreign nation, or of rebellion against the authority of the Government of the
United States, or the President is unable with the Regular forces at his command to
execute the laws of the Union, it shall be lawful for the President to order out such
number of the National Guard as he may deem necessary to repel such invasion,
suppress such rebellion, or to enable him to execute such laws, and to issue his orders
for that purpose, to such officers of the National Guard as he may think proper: Pro-
vided, That no commissioned officer or enlisted man of the National Guard shall be
held to serve for a longer period than two years from date of call: Provided further,
That when the military needs of the Federal Government arising from the necessity
to execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrection, or repel invasion can not be
met by the Regular forces, the National Guard of any arm or branch, except the
reserve corps provided for in this Act, shall be called into the service of the United
States in advance of any volunteer force of the same arm or branch which it may be
determined to raise.
SEC. 85. That the temporary vacancies created in any grade not above that of
colonel among the commissioned personnel of any arm, staff corps, or department of
the Regular Army, through appointments of officers thereof to higher rank in the
National Guard under the provisions of this Act shall be filled by temporary promotions
according to Seniority in rank from officers holding commissions in the next Tower grade
in Said arm, Staff Corps, or department, and all vacancies created in any grade by tem-
porary promotions shall be in like manner filled from and thus create temporary va-
cancies in the next lower grade, and the vacancies that remain thereafter in said arm,
Staff Corps, or department that can not be filled by temporary promotions as prescribed
in this section may be filled by the temporary appointment of officers of such number
and grade or grades as shall maintain Said arm, corps, or department at the full com-
missioned strength authorized by law; Provided, That in the staff corps and depart-
ments subject to the provisions of sections twenty-six and twenty-seven of the Act of
23380—PT 16—16—6
846 PREPAREDINESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
February Second, nineteen hundred and one, and Acts amendatory thereof, tempo-
rary vacancies that can not be filled by temporary promotions as hereinbefore pres-
cribed shall be filled by temporary details in the manner prescribed in said sections
twenty-six and twenty-Seven and Acts amendatory thereof, and the resulting tem-
porary vacancies in the branches of the Army from which the details are so made
shall be filled as hereinbefore in this section prescribed: Provided further, That officers
temporarily promoted or appointed under the terms of this section shall be promoted
or appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate,
for terms that shall not extend beyond the war or the passing of the emergency for
which additional forces were ordered into active service as a part of the Army of the
United States; and at the termination of the war or the passing of the emergency said
officers shall be discharged from the positions held by them under their temporary
commissions or appointments, and officers detailed as herein authorized shall be
relieved from theic temporary details: And provided further, That officers temporarily
promoted under the provisions of this section shall not vacate their permanent com-
missions nor be prejudiced in their relative or lineal standing in the Regular Army.
SEC. 86. That in time of war or the imminence thereof the National Guard forces
ordered into the active service of the United States as hereinbefore prescribed shall
constitute a separate branch of the Army of the United States.
SEC. 87. That organizations which, at the date when ordered into the Service of
the United States, are organized so far as practicable as prescribed by law and regula-
tions for like organizations of the Regular Army and are entitled to pay under this
Act shall be taken by regiments, brigades, divisions, or independent and separate
organizations, as the quota of each State, Territory, or the District of Columbia or
major fraction thereof may require, including all regimental, brigade, and division
staff officers authorized by law and regulations for the corresponding units of the
Regular Army or specially authorized by law for the National Guard. And that when
the organizations provided for in this section are ordered into the service of the United
States and employed in conjunction with the Regular or Volunteer forces of the United
States and military operations require the presence of two or more officers of the same
grade in the same field, department, or command, or of organizations thereof, the
President may assign the command of the forces of such field, department, or com-
mand, or of organizations thereof, without regard to seniority of rank in the same grade:
Provided, That in the absence of such assignment by the President, officers of the
same grade shall rank and have precedence in the following order, without regard to
date of rank or commission as between officers of different classes, namely, first,
officers of the Regular Army and officers of the Marine Corps detached for service
with the Army by order of the President; second, officers of the National Guard ordered
into the service of the United States; third, officers of the Volunteer forces.
SEC. 88. That every officer and enlisted man of the National Guard who shall be
ordered out in the manner hereinbefore prescribed shall be mustered for service under
such regulations as the President may prescribe without further commission or enlist-
ment and without making a physical examination previous to such muster a condition
pº thereto: Provided, That as soon as practicable after such muster there shall
e a physical examination of the officers and men so mustered: Provided further, That
immediately preceding the muster out of an officer or enlisted man called into the Serv-
ice of the United States as hereinbefore provided he shall be physically examined
under rules prescribed by the President of the United States, and the record thereof
shall be filed and kept in the War Department.
SEC. 89. That whenever the United States is invaded or in danger of invasion from
any foreign nation, or of rebellion against the authority of the Government of the
|United States, or the President is unable with the regular organized forces at his com-
mand to execute the laws of the Union, it shall be lawful for the President to call forth
such number of the unorganized militia as he may deem necessary to repel such inva-
sion, suppress such rebellion, or to enable him to execute such laws, and to issue his
orders for that purpose, through the governor of the respective State or Territory or
through the commanding general of the militia of the District of Columbia, from which
State, Territory, or District such troops may be called: Provided, That all members of
the unorganized militia between the ages of eighteen and forty-five shall be taken
before an older class is called: Provided further, That no commissioned officer or enlisted
man of the militia shall be held to serve for a longer period than two years from date
of call: And provided further, That divisions, brigades, regiments, and battalions or
squadrons may be organized by the President out of lesser separate units called into
the service of the United States as prescribed in this Section, and the President may
then assign or, when provision is made therefor, by and with the advice and consent
of the Senate, appoint and commission, with appropriate rank, commanders of Such
organizations and the necessary staff officers from officers of the Regular Army or the
PREPAIRED NESS FOR, NATIONAL DEFENSE. 847
National Guard, the number and grade of such officers not to exceed the number and
grade of like officers for like forces of the Regular Army: And provided further, That
before being mustered into the service the militia called forth under this section shall
be subject to such physical examination as the Secretary of War may prescribe.
SEc. 90. That any officer or enlisted man of the National Guard who shall refuse or
neglect to obey the orders of the President, and any member of the unorganized
militia who shall refuse or neglect to present himself when called forth by the Presi-
dent shall be subject to trial by court-martial and shall be punished as such court-
martial may direct.
SEC. 91. That the sum of $ , or as much thereof as may be necessary, is hereby
annually appropriated, to be paid out of any money in the Treasury not otherwise
appropriated, for the purposes hereinafter specified, namely:
(a) For the purposes mentioned in sections forty-two and forty-three of this Act,
annually, or as much thereof as may be necessary (armament and equipment).
(b) For the purposes mentioned in Sections seventy-six and seventy-seven of this
Act, $ annually, or as much thereof as may be necessary (reimbursement of
expenses and compensation).
(c) For the purposes mentioned in sections fifty-seven, fifty-nine, and sixty-two
of this Act, $ annually, or as much thereof as may be necessary (encampments,
maneuvers, and other field exercises). º
(d) F or the purposes mentioned in section eighty-three of this Act, $ &DIll]-
ally, or as much thereof as may be necessary (acquisition, construction, maintenance,
and repair of indoor and outdoor rifle ranges).
(e) r or the purposes mentioned in Sections forty-eight, forty-nine, and fifty of this
Act, $ , or so much thereof as may be necessary (purchase of horses, forage, bed-
ding, shoeing, veterinary services and supplies, and compensation of help).
(f) I or the pay, subsistence, allowances, and other expenses of officers and noncom-
missioned officers of the National Guard detailed to attend service schools of the
Army and attached to units of the Regular Army temporarily for instruction as pro-
vided for under section sixty-five of this Act $ annually, or as much thereof
as may be necessary. - *
(g) For the pay, subsistence, allowances, and other expenses of offices and noncom-
missioned officers of the National Guard detailed and placed on duty as contemplated
under sections fifteen, thirty-five, thirty-six, thirty-seven, fifty-five, and eighty-three
of this Act $ annually, or as much thereof as may be necessary.
(h) J or the purpose of encouraging the States, Territories, and the District of
Columbia to maintain and train such forces other than infantry as may be deemed
necessary to make the whole body of the National Guard a well-balanced military
force, the sum of $ annually, or so much thereof as may be necessary; to be
apportioned and used under such rules and regulations and subject to such conditions
as the Secretary of War may prescribe. .
(i) I or the actual traveling expenses incurred by officers and enlisted men of the
Regular Army when travelling on duty in connection with the instruction of the Na-
tional Guard, and quarters, fuel, light, medicine, and medical attendance of Sergeant
instructors on duty with the National Guard when the same is not furnished them in
kind, $ , annually, or as much thereof as may be necessary: Provided, That the
appropriation carried by paragraphs (a), (b), and (c) of this section shall be appor-
tioned by the Secretary of War among the several States, Territories, and the District
of Columbia prorata, based upon the average actual commissioned and enlisted strength
º the National Guard of such State, Territory, or District during the previous calen-
ar year.
SEC. 92. That all laws and parts of laws inconsistent with this Act are, to the extent
of Such inconsistency, repealed: Provided, That this shall not be construed to repeal
the Act entitled “An Act for the organization of the Militia of the District of Colum-
bia,” approved February eighteenth, nineteen hundred and nine, or any other Act
relating exclusively to the militia of the said District of Columbia.
SEC. 93. That this Act shall take effect on July first, nineteen hundred and sixteen.
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 2, 1916.
UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON MILITARY AFFAIRs,
- Washington, D. C.
The committee met, at the expiration of the recess, at 10.30 o'clock
a. m., Senator Geo. E. Chamberlain (chairman) presiding.
STATEMIENT OF DIR. HOMER C. BROWN, COLUMBUS, OHIO,
CHAIRMAN OF THE LEGISLATIVE COMMITTEE OF THE .
NATIONAL DENTAL ASSOCIATION,
Dr. BROWN. Mr. Chairman and members of the Senate Military
Affairs Committee, as chairman of the legislative committee of the
National Dental Association I appear before you, through the cour-
tesy of your chairman, in behalf of legislation which has for its pur-
pose the increasing of the efficiency and the raising of the status of
the Army Dental êº which will, at the same time, secure for our
profession recognition appropriate with the service rendered.
“Necessity is the mother of invention.” This statement is fre-
quently used and is especially applicable in this connection, since it
was during the War with Spain that the necessity for dental treatment
of soldiers was very emphatically demonstrated. In order to meet
the pressing needs at that critical period, some of the younger mem-
bers of our profession, imbued with patriotic impulses and anxious to
serve our country in any capacity, enlisted and were assigned to the
Hospital Corps in order to render such dental services as the exigencies
of the situation would permit. I very distinctly recall a young man
from the small town where I practiced and with whose parents
I boarded, enlisting under these conditions, the day following his
graduation and leaving immediately for the front. A few months
later I was called upon to officiate as one of his pallbearers. . This
personal reference is only made to indicate my familiarity with the
conditions existing at that time, and it has been my privilege to keep
in rather close touch with all the developments in this connection
since then.
In 1901 Congress passed a law creating a corps of 30 contract
dental surgeons attached to the medical corps, but without military
rank. The late Gen. Sternberg was Surgeon General of the Army
at that time, and accepted, as a compromise, the contract status
as only a temporary expediency, giving assurance of his support in
securing legislation which would commission these men during his
term of office. Some who entered the service at that time were
encouraged to do so with that definite understanding.
Congress passed a law March 3, 1911, granting one commissioned
grade, that of first lieutenant. This law also made possible a dental
corps on a basis of 1 to 1,000 of the actual strength of the Army, but
at present there are only 36 first lieutenants and 39 acting dental
surgeons in the Army Dental Corps. One reason which may be
responsible for the fact that this has not been filled to its possible
apportionment is that the opportunities are not sufficiently attractive
to many of the graduates to-day. 849
4
850 PREPAIREDINESS FOR, NATIONAL DEFENSE.
Further, it may be of some interest to have data relative to the
results of the examinations for the Army Dental Corps from Sep-
tember 1, 1911, to October 18, 1915. During this period 377 were
notified to appear for examination, 28 of this number declined the
invitation, and 85 failed to present themselves for the examination;
55 were disqualified by physical examination and 146 failed to pass
the required examination, leaving 63 that met all the requirements.
During the 15 years since Congress passed legislation granting the
first Dental Corps, the progress º achievements of the dental
profession have attracted most favorable attention from all sources,
until it is now recognized as assuming its full responsibilities in the
educational campaign of preventive medicine, which is generally
and generously considered both a humanitarian and an economic
question.
If organization will be accepted as an evidence of progress, I need
only say that four years ago the membership of our National Dental
Association was not in excess of 800, but since then it has been reor-
ganized and to-day has a membership of nearly 20,000 of the most
progressive and aggressive dentists of the world. Less than nine
months ago the research institute of this association was incor-
orated in Ohio to carry on research work along lines similar to the
ockefeller Institute and the Carnegie Foundation. Our own build-
ing, adequately equipped, is to be formally opened on Tuesday night,
February 7, with some of the most noted members of the medical,
dental and allied professions present. The funds for this work have
largely been provided by our members. The dentists of my State
(Ohio) have contributed nearly $20,000, and be it said to the credit
of the members of the Army Dental Corps that they have liberally
contributed to this research work.
These general remarks may seem unnecessary on this occasion, but
are made for the sole purpose of impressing you with the fact of the
changed attitude toward the dental profession in the past few years.
All of this has stimulated the hopes and aspirations of the dental
graduates of recent years, and when associated with the increased
educational requirements and the necessary additional expense in
completing a dental college course, as well as the fact of the limited
purchasing power of the dollar of to-day as compared with a few
years ago, makes it easily understood why it is necessary to provide
some positive changes for the betterment of the Army Bºf Corps.
Further, the present European war has demonstrated the close
relation of the work of the medical and dental professions, and the
work of the dental Surgeons in the present war has attracted favor-
able attention throughout the world. In this connection I quote
from Dr. A. M. Fauntleroy, surgeon of the United States Navy, in
his report of the medico-military aspects of the European war. He
says:
One of the surgical advances of the present war has been the recognition of the
dentist as a necessary unit in the organization of a military hospital. It has been
largely brought about by the present-day trench warfare. The latter leads to the
production of a large number of face and jaw wounds, involving a great loss of sub-
stance in the form of bone, teeth, and soft parts. So valuable has this work become
that every large military hospital now has its surgical dental department, which
works in conjunction with large surgical services and supplements certain proced-
ures which are indispensable as regards bringing about a favorable result. * * *
One of the most attractive features of the value of the dentist in the organization of a
PREPAREDINESS FOR, NATIONAL DEFENSE. 851
military hospital is shown in the results obtained by surgical cooperation with the
dentists of the American ambulance in connection with the mutilated wounds in the
face.
In this connection I am reminded of a conversation I had only
last Saturday with the Hon. Myron T. Herrick, one of Ohio's fore-
most citizens, who recently rendered most efficient and commenda-
tory service as ambassador to France. He informed me that he
very early recognized the need for dental services in connection with
the American ambulance, and did everything possible in establishing
this particular service. Coming from a layman and a man of Mr.
Herrick's standing, this observation is entitled to your most careful
consideration.
Further, Dr. George W. Crile, who needs no further introduction,
and Dr. W. E. Lower, president of the Ohio State Medical Asso-
ciation, both informed me soon after their return from service in
connection with the American ambulance in Paris, that the work of
the dental surgeons in connection there with was receiving the highest
possible commendation, and would result in bringing about a closer
relation of the two professions, and the raising, very materially, of the
standards of dentistry in the eyes of the world.
In the last copy of the Army and Navy Register we note, in con-
nection with Gen. Gorgas's appearance before the House Military
Affairs Committee, the following: -
Information was sought concerning the Dental Corps, and it was announced that the
new legislation, approved by the War Department, contemplated promotion for
dental Surgeons up to and including the grade of major; that there were increasingly
important functions for dentists in the military service; that the dentists were doing
splendid work in Europe; that there was an important function in dental surgery on
account of special wounds. Gen. Gorgas added that on a recent trip to Canada, he
had occasion to inspect a new command destined for Service in Europe and found it
equipped with an excellent dental department, and that men were now being accepted
for Service despite dental defects which hitherto would have resulted in their rejection.
In this connection I desire to call your attention to an article in
the Literary Digest of January 29. This is headed “Teeth and
military efficiency,” and quotes very liberally from an article by
Prof. William H. Potter, of Harvard, who calls attention to what
England, France, and Germany have found it necessary to do in a
dental relief work in order to develop the highest possible efficiency
in their armies.
You may be interested in knowing that our committee has not
taken a position of attempting to go headstrong and independent in
an effort to secure what appears to our profession as meritorious
legislation. On the contrary, we have respectfully and considerately
resented our views to the honorable Secretary of War, the Surgeon
eneral, and the chairmen of the Senate and House Military Affairs
Committees, and it is indeed very pleasing to note the published
comment to which I have just referred. ~ºms
Supplementing the reference that has been made to the dental
corps in the European war, I have recently seen it stated, upon
seemingly good authority, that Germany has 800 dental surgeons in
the active service. A very late press report indicates that France is
Fº to add 1,000 j dentists to her present equipment.
have no specific data relative to the numbers in service in the other
countries, but do know that they have met similar conditions and
are giving equal attention to the dental needs of their armies.
1852 PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
The National Dental Association is on record as unanimously in-
dorsing the following, which it was my pleasure to recommend in my
address as president of the association in 1914:
1. A Dental Reserve Corps, similar to the Medical Reserve Corps, to replace the
present “acting dental surgeons,” except that members of the Dental Reserve Corps
shall be obligated to serve when called upon for active duty.
F will say in connection with that that this reserve corps takes the
place of the acting dental surgeons as now provided, and it makes pos-
sible to bring into active affiliation members of the profession who
may not be really interested in entering active service. The fact of
bringing in a type of men who can reflect some credit and be of assist-
ance in time of emergency has many strong points. We do not, how-
ever, want our men to receive recognition such as membership of the
Dental Reserve Corps would mean and not render some service. There-
fore we are willing to have it made a part of their contract that they
shall be required to render service when called upon. In the Medical
Reserve Corps they are permitted to resign if called into active duty
and do not feel disposed to enter the service.
2. The Dental Corps to consist of:
(a) First lieutenants, to be appointed from the Dental Reserve
Corps after two years of active service, who shall not be less than 23
nor more than 30 years of age, and otherwise qualified as at present.
(b) Captains, who shall be promoted to this grade after seven years
of total service, including service in Dental Reserve Corps and as
contract dental Surgeon, dental surgeon, or acting dental surgeon.
(c) Majors, not to exceed 25 per cent of the Dental Corps, to be
promoted according to seniority, as in the Medical Corps.
(d) A colonel, who shall be chief of the Dental Corps, acting under
the direction of the Surgeon General, to be appointed by the President,
by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, for a period of four
years. The first colonel to be appointed from the 15 senior officers of
the Dental Corps, after which they shall be appointed from the majors
of this corps.
3. The strength of the Dental Corps to be as now provided–1 to
1,000 of the enlisted strength. .
4. The service heretofore rendered as dental surgeon, contract den-
tal surgeon, or acting dental surgeon shall be computed as commis-
sioned service.
5. The right to command shall be limited to the members of the
Dental Corps and the Dental Reserve Corps and to enlisted men serv-
ing as their assistants. *
f i. of the arguments in support of our recommendations are as
OILOWS . . - -
The same necessity exists for changing from the contract status—
acting dental surgeons—to a commissioned personnel as resulted in
abolishing the contract surgeons in the Medical Corps. Under con-
tract the dental surgeon occupies an anomalous position, being neither
an officer or an . man, and having no protection in case of
disability in line of duty. In the highly specialized condition of
modern warfare economy demands that the enlisted man be in a good
physical condition in order to render efficient service, which requires
the service of a dentist as well as a physician. Therefore, it is mani-
festly essential that the service be made equally attractive as with
Medical Reserve Corps. . . . .
IPREPARED NESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 853
The age limit has been raised from 27 to 30 on account of the in-
creased preliminary requirements before entering a dental college, and
an additional year being required in the study of dentistry.
In explanation of the increased preliminary requirements and the
additional time in dental college, I will say that in all dental colleges
of the first grade, beginning this next year, they require a stipulated
preliminary educational qualification, which is considerably higher
than it has been in the past, and, in addition to that, they require an
extra year of study and work in the college before the student can
complete his college course. That is the reason for raising the mini-
mum and the maximum age limits in the present law. A man can not
graduate and qualify to enter the service as early as he could two or
three years ago.
It is the conviction of our committee that an increase in the number
of grades as suggested will go far toward increasing the efficiency
of the Dental Corps. Under existing conditions there is not a suffi-
cient incentive, under present college requirements, to prompt our
best dental graduates to enter the service, or stimulate those in the
service, under present conditions, to keep pace with the progress of
the profession.
ith an increased Dental Corps, and in the interest of efficiency
and economy, there is every reason for having a representative of the
corps, with rank of colonel, stationed in the Surgeon General’s Office
to cooperate with him in the administrative affairs of the Dental Corps.
With referenge to having a head of the corps in the Surgeon Gen-
eral's office, you are, of course, aware that there are various heads now
stationed there. When the Dental Corps is increased in keeping
with present-day requirements, there is every reason to expect that a
head of the corps stationed in the Surgeon General's office can render
most efficient and economic service in connection with this special
service. A dentist naturally is especially equipped to look after the
various details in connection with the work of the Dental Corps.
The purchasing of supplies, the detailing of the members of the
corps, and things of that nature, could naturally be looked after to
better advantage by a man who had had long years of service in this
particular work. . .
Senator CATRON. Can you give us any idea with reference to how
these dentists are treated in the English, French, and German armies,
or any of them, as to holding office, and their different grades?
Dr. BROwn. They have up to the grade of colonel in the armies of
Europe. The right to command by virtue of a commissioned corps,
with actual rank, can not conflict with any other department, as this
right can be limited by Congress to the Dental Corps, and their en-
listed assistants. - -
Mr. Chairman and gentlemen, there never was a time when there
seems to be such a necessity for the suggested changes as at this par-
ticular time. Of course, we all are in hopes that there never will be any
occasion to call into active service our military forces, but should
anything like that happen, there is no question but we would be forced
to assume tactics in º with the present-day warfare. Espe-
cially in and about France, where trench fighting has predominated,
the wounds inflicted are, to a very perceptible per cent, located in
and about the head, face, and shoulders, due to the exposure of these
parts. Thus there has been a constant demand for dental service,
854 PREPAREDINESS FOR, NATIONAL DEFENSE.
It may be interesting to you to know that the dentists of this
country are just at this particular time contributing and supporting
an American special hospital in Paris for this particular work. The
very last thing I did yesterday was to send a check to New York for
$160, contributed largely by dentists, toward establishing this par-
ticular hospital.
The Red Cross Society is actively engaged in this particular work,
and they are collecting funds for that purpose, and if there was ever
a time when special legislation should be provided for the Army
Dental Corps, it is at this particular time, and especially so since
there is such a general understanding that the whole Army is to
undergo a generaſ reorganization.
The CHAIRMAN. What is the highest grade that dental surgeons
attain now, first lieutenant } *
}}r. BROWN. First lieutenant, without any opportunity of advance-
ment. There is no further incentive and there is no further oppor-
tunity for them.
Senator CATRON. Do you get the longevity increase ? -
Dr. BROWN. Probabiy so, but you understand, I am not in mili-
tary life. -
Senator CATRON. Are you in the Army'.
Dr. BROWN. No, sir. I am in private practice.
The CHAIRMAN. Are they allowed anything as officers generally are,
for house rent, and so on ?
Dr. BROWN. They are allowed quarters. In that connection I
would like to say this, that a dental surgeon who serves, say, 10
years, and who may be located in very satisfactory quarters to-day—
if a medical first lieutenant, that is, a man of equal grade, comes
along to-morrow who has just entered the service, he can come in
and oust the dental surgeon from his quarters, because it is clearly
stated in the law that they rank below the same grade of members of
any corps or department. -
The CHAIRMAN. The law provides that “Officers of the Dental
Corps shall be ranked in such corps according to the date of their
commissions therein, and shall rank next below officers of the Medical
Reserve Corps.”
Dr. BROWN. Next below: So that clearly puts it in such shape
that if a first lieutenant of the Medical Corps came into the Army
last month, he takes precedence.
Senator CATRON. Do they assign an operating room for the dentist
and give him his equipment 2
Dr. BROWN. Yes, sir.
Senator CATRON. And furnish him with an operating room where
he is to work upon these people?
Dr. BROWN. Certainly.
Senator CATRON. That he holds as against anybody? -
Dr. BROWN. That is in the hospital, and is provided in all the
Osts. s -
p Senator CATRON. Wherever he goes he has to have that place.
Dr. BROWN. If he is out on field duty, they have regular field
outfits.
Senator CATRON. The Government supplies everything in that
regard?
Dr. BROWN. Certainly.
PREPAREDNESS FOR, NATIONAL DEFENSE. 855
Senator CATRON. All of the apparatus he needs to carry on his
business?
Dr. BROWN. Yes, sir. That is the One reason why I emphasized
the point of the necessity for a member of the Corps being stationed
in tº: Surgeon General’s Office, to purchase and look after such
equipment or materials as are required from time to time by these
IOOlCIl.
The CHAIRMAN. Is there anything else, Doctor :
Dr. BROWN. No, sir. -
STATEMENT OF DR. C. B. GIFFORD, OF NORFOLK, VA., SEC-
RETARY OF THE LEGISLATIVE COMMITTEE OF THE NA-
TIONAL DENTAL ASSOCIATION.
Dr. GIFFORD. Mr. Chairman and gentlemen, I think Dr. Brown
has covered the subject pretty thoroughly. There is one point that
he did not bring out quite as fully as I thought possibly might have
been developed, and that is, with the one-grade corps, as we now have,
there is no incentive to study for promotion, which is the case in other
progressive corps, as all other corps of the service are. Of course, a
man progresses according to his ability, and this corps, instead of
eliminating as it should, is eliminating backwards, and that is why
the National Dental Association is so vitally interested in this
feature. A lot of the better men went in there with a view, accord-
ing to Gen. Sternberg's promise, that future accommodations would
be made for them to make that their life work, and they stayed in
there a period of years, still in the same niche, and, as I say, a lot of
these better men have gotten discouraged. It is disheartening, and
they have gotten out of the corps to take up practice in civil life,
which is hard to do after advanced years. You are eliminating in
the wrong direction constantly.
The CHAIRMAN. As Dr. Brown said, there is not the incentive to
either join or to make it a life work.
Dr. GIFFORD. Yes; that is the point I wanted to bring out a little
more fully.
Senator CATRON. Is the Dental Corps now in the Medical Depart-
ment and under the control of the Surgeon General?
Dr. BROWN. It is, sir, and should be. -
Senator CATRON. Yes; I think it should be. The fact that the law
stated that they took rank after the officers of the same rank in the
Medical Reserve Corps led me to be in doubt whether it was intended
that it should be a part of the Medical Corps or not.
Dr. BROWN. The work of the two professions is so related and
there has been such advancement and recognition to the importance
of a healthy mouth and the effect of a diseased mouth upon the sys-
tem generally, that the two professions should not only be cooperating,
but they are cooperating much more closely now than ever before.
Senator CATRON. When recruits are accepted, are the dentists ever
called upon to make an examination ?
Dr. BROWN. Yes, sir; they are required to have a certain amount
of mastication surface; that is, they have a minimum requirement in
the number of teeth that the recruit must have before he is eligible
to be accepted. It is part of the physical examination.
856 PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
Senator CATRON. And that has to be passed upon by a dental sur-
geon'?
Dr. BROWN. Yes, sir. That was the point Gen. Gorgas empha-
sized.
Senator CATRON. He did not state that they were required, how-
ever, to be examined by a dentist.
The CHAIRMAN. Doctor, we are very much obliged to you for mak-
ing your presentation. -
r. BROWN. We are very grateful to you for the opportunity.
(Thereupon, at 11.35 o'clock a. m., the committee took a recess
until 2 o’clock p. m.)
AIFTER RECESS.
The committee met at the expiration of the recess at 2 o’clock
p. m., Senator Geo. E. Chamberlain (chairman) presiding.
STATEMENT OF MIR. OSWALD GARRISON VILLARD, PRESIDENT
of THE NEW YORK EVENING Post, NEW YORK CITY.
The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Villard, we have been discussing here with
various persons the question of Army reorganization and prepared-
ness for national defense, and we would be glad to hear from you
along any lines you see fit to discuss this subject.
Mr. VILLARD. Mr. Chairman and gentlemen, I represent a group of
citizens who are opposed to any increase in the military establish-
ment at this time, believing that the war abroad will continue for
some time to come, and that as long as it continues we are not in
any danger, and that we should wait before arming further in order
that we may profit by the lessons of the European war, if it is designed
that we must arm further after that time.
I submit that the lessons of the war are by no means clear. There
have been a number of great surprises in the development of the war,
such as the effectiveness of the trench. Americans would have been
repared for that, because of the experience in the Wilderness and
i. Petersburg in 1864 and 1865, but it has come as an entire
surprise to the military experts abroad.
So has the development of the use of cannon, notably the machine
gun. There is a great difference of opinion at present as to what is
the proper equipment for an infantry regiment, for instance.
These are only samples of many questions that are pressing for an
answer that probably will not be definitely answered until the entire
war is at an end. Meanwhile there are pressing upon us a number
of important questions in regard to the reorganization of our own
service. I have been a student of the Regular Army for more than
twenty years, and I am convinced that the mobile army, outside of
our Coast Artillery, is comparatively inefficient, through defects in
organization, not because the material is not good. +
There are many admirable officers and efficient officers, and the
human material is as fine as can be found anywhere else, in my
judgment; and I have seen troops abroad a great deal. . But the
organization itself is wasteful. You have, for instance, regiments of
enlisted strength of 700 men, which means that on an average you will
not parade more than 400 men, that your companies of 72 men will
* "
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 857
aggregate 40 at drill, which is an inefficient and wasteful condition of
affairs. If there is to be any increase of Infantry, I submit that the
most effective and the least expensive method would be to increase
the regiments to the European peace strength. We have always
patterned our regiments after the English battalion, which is a mat-
ter of 800 men. We have called them regiments, but they really
corresponded to these battalions. They are not usually the strength
of a European battalion, of a three-battalion regiment. -
Then, I served enough myself to know the tremendous efficiency
that comes from having companies and regiments and battalions
thoroughly manned. You get an esprit de corps and a sense of
power that you do not get when your companies turn out with
ragged numbers. -
That has been clearly set forth recently in a letter by Capt. (now
Maj.) S. D. Rockenbach, of the Eleventh United States Cavalry, who
says in the journal of the United States Cavalry Association:
My testimony, after nearly 24 years of commissioned service, is that under the
Organization and system we have it is impossible to make a troop efficient for war.
If it is the overhead cost that counts, why can we not get the men to work with?
And he estimates that with an aggregate of 81 he would not have
present for drill 41 men, and that such a troop could not take the
field for a month under war conditions without needing reserves of
men and horses.
Senator CATRON. Does he state there why he could not have more
than 41 out of the 81 % -
Mr. WILLARD. He gives a summary as follows: That 13 would be
off training horses; 2 in charge of stables; 5 in quarters; 1 mess
Sergeant, 2 cooks, and 2 room Orderlies; 6 absent, sick, and on fur-
lough; 1 recruit; 3 sick in quarters; 2 veterinary, hospital, and
post exchange, . exchange; 2 with the machine-gun troop;
and 1 with the headquarters troop. -
That allowance for training remounts is very large, but it does not
seem to me, with my knowledge of the service, that there is enough
allowance, on the other hand, for detached service in post, such as
gardeners, officers' servants, for running busses, and things of that
kind. . ."
Senator WARREN. Under the law there can be no officers' servants
among the enlisted men. - -
Mr, VILLARD. Not exactly.
Senator WARREN. I know what you mean. I have seen it in
Civil War times, and I have seen it since, but it is pretty much done
away with now. There is no law under which an officer can take a
man for a servant.
Mr. VILLARD. I understand, but my belief was that there were
still some of that sort of services that can be performed; that, for
instance, men can be used for supplying milk to officers' families,
in a post like West Point, supplying ice to them, mowing their front
lawns, and that sort of service, and it is that that takes so many.
Senator WARREN. West Point is a trifle different from the usual
camps, of course. I presume it is subject to abuse. I do not want
to antagonize your testimony at all, only I thought you ought to
qualify it, not as if it was recognized as a lawful proceeding for
officers to have the enlisted men acting as their servants. . . * *
et
858 * PREPAIRED NESS FOR, NATIONAL DEFENSE.
Mr. VILLARD. Gentlemen, my argument is that this year we have
before the end of the war—for everybody seems to think it will last
at least a year longer—should be devoted to a very careful study of
the weaknesses of the present system, and remedying them. It
seems to be generally agreed, in and out of the service, that the
Army does cost a great deal. There are a good many cases of waste,
which I presume have been brought to your attention, and this one
that I have spoken of, of the small regiments and companies, is one
of the wastes. You have had testimony from one general after
another, many of whom have testified differently, according to the
reports; that is, one thinks that 141,000 regulars are needed, another
160,000, another 175,000, another 200,000, and so on.
The people are asked to agree to legislation in a time of hysteria,
of great uncertainty, of changing conditions, and I would very
strongly urge that no additions be made to the service until the ques-
tion can be thoroughly studied, unless it is decided to increase the
existing units, which is the simple way. As long as we have regi-
ments, it seems to me they sº be at war strength.
I Suppose you gentlemen are aware that one of the Canadian regi-
ments, the Princess Patricia Regiment, went over with 1,200 men, and
after a single action had only a handful remaining, 40 or 50. If that
is an accurate report of the facts, it is another reason why regiments
should be larger than ever before.
Senator WARREN. Mr. Villard, our law does not allow us to make
the regiments as large as the European regiments. You would have
them as large as the European regiments, two or three thousand in
a regiment -
Mr. WILLARD. Yes, sir. It is in the power of Congress. Of course,
we ought to have a law at this session.
I should also like to oppose the proposed continental army. In the
first#". it has only been two or three years since the Dick law came
finally into effect in regard to the militia, and I submit we have not
tried it long enough to know definitely how the militia is going to
progress on the new line. In some of the Eastern States the progress
has been something marvelous, Owing to the increased supervision by
the War Department, the detailing of many commissioned and non-
commissioned officers to the regiments, the growing interest in them,
and the development, in our New York State, through the very
capable commander that we now have, Gen. O'Ryan. It is too soon
to come to the conclusion, as some of the War Department authorities
seem to have, that we can not go any further with the development
of the militia. If this system had been tried for 10 or 15 years and
it had been found that nothing further could be obtained, then such
a criticism would be in order. But nothing of the kind has been
shown. Each year since the passage of the Dick law the efficiency
of the militia as a whole—however many exceptions there may be in
the weaker States—has steadily increased. -
I think the thing to do is to pay further attention to the militia, to
carry it on still further, to show to the people a greater interest by
the War Department, to encourage the States that are going along,
to recognize them with additional appropriations if they attain cer-
tain standards of efficiency, to stimulate them by prizes, and in other
ways. -
PREPAREDINESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 859
To turn to the continental army, simply because of the lack of
patience and this constitutional difficulty in the way of the use of
the militia, appears to many of us a great mistake. No one knows
whether the continental army could be recruited. In no scheme or
statement that I have seen has it been specified how they shall be
stationed, where the reserves of munitions shall be, or what shall
become of the Regular Army officers and noncommissioned officers
detailed to them after three months or two months service. During
the other nine or ten months of the year what are they to do? Are
they to sit idly there at their stations waiting for the year to roll
around until this continental army comes into being again? It
would seem so from any statement that has been made. No ade-
quate statement has been made as to whether these troops are to be
brigaded and put into divisions, and if so, where the brigade head-
º are to be, and the division headquarters, and who are to be
the brigadiers and division commanders. There is absolutely no
estimate that I have seen as to the enormous amount of traveling
expense that would be required to keep up this force, to draw it
together. If they are simply men scattered all through the hamlets
of a State, they have to be drawn together at a central point and be
sent back to their homes, and somebody has to keep in touch with
them pretty steadily. -
There is no estimate that I have seen as to the clerical headquarters .
force that would be required here in Washington, if it is all to be
done by correspondence from here, and, as the Secretary himself has
stated, he has no means of knowing whether this would appeal to the
American public, so that there would be recruits º But if
my figures are correct, there would be needed about 14,000 officers
for this force; 14,500, it seems to me, is a low estimate for 400,000
continental troops. But no statement is made as to what shall
become of those officers. We know that a great many of them would
become foci for militarist agitation, and, to my mind, a danger to the
Republic by the establishment of such a force.
We have seen here in Washington a persistent demand for more
men and more equipment coming from the Officers, many of them
who have direct interest in the result of their agitation, who will be
promoted and advanced if their propaganda is successful. The cre-
ation of a large military establishment here would certainly seem to
be absolutely uncalled for at the present time.
Perhaps I feel very strongly about this question. If so, it is
because I have watched the development of militarism in Germany
ever since my boyhood there, and have seen how insidiously a mili-
taristic spirit can affect a nation. ... It does not seem to me just that
we should take any step in that direction unless under the stress of
dire necessity, and with the clearest understanding of the risks that
we are running. To create a large number of additional officers is to
create new centers of military propaganda, and not necessarily a
propaganda for effective armament. It does not at all follow that
if the Congress should at this session vote a large number of men and
additional material to correspond, the country would thereby be pre-
pared. We know from the Russian experience that merely having
men and officers does not constitute adequate preparedness.
If there were to be a careful investigation of the United States
Army to-day it is quite likely that the following would be ascertained:
860 PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
That general Army appropriations lead to abuse and waste, and not
to efficiency; that the exercise of discretion in expenditures in Army
posts and elsewhere leads to wastefulness, in that the precedence of
the comfort of officers and their families is dºid ºf over purely
military expenditures; that the lack of any actual supervision of the
disposition of moneys appropriated, or results obtained, leads directly
to inefficiency; that reform from within the Army is almost hopeless
as long as there is no critical supervision from the outside, inspections
by officers having less and less value, degenerating steadily to the
point where they will become merely an inspection to see if Army
regulations are lived up to; that many of the Army's faults are due
to customs, like the building of homes for officers' families, which
were not faults under the conditions controlling when the Army
was on the frontier engaged in Indian campaigns; and, finally, there
is the influence of politics within the service. If all of these matters,
and many others, are to go uninvestigated and uncured, the elabora-
tion of the military system, the adding to it of more men, more
organizations, will not make for efficiency, but for inefficiency,
because you will be building a new military structure upon an in-
secure, if not a rotten, foundation.
Ours is the only Army which I know in which an officer may rise
to high rank without having shown that he can command the larger
number of troops to which he is assigned, or that he really has military
efficiency and ability. If he does not transgress against the moral
laws, he can rise to be a colonel as a matter of seniority. He does
not even have to take an examination after he reaches the grade of
major to show whether he is competent, all of which hardly consti-
stutes adequate preparedness for war times. g
It seems to me that Senator Newland's resolution, calling for a com-
plete study and survey of the entire problem, not only from the point
of view of the Army, but of the whole question of national defense, is
precisely what the situation calls for. The Government, so far as I
am aware, has never studied this question of defense from one stand-
point, from the union of the coast defenses, of the mobile army and
of the Navy. Every supposition that troops of an enemy can be
landed on our shores leads back to the theory that the American
Navy will be totally destroyed before that is done, even down to the
last submarine. If there is to be any comprehensive scheme worked
out for the defense of the United States, it ought surely to be the
result of a study of all three branches, the Navy, the coast defense,
and the mobile force. -
Finally, I base my protest against further large expenditures for
militarism on the ground that they make against true national
preparedness for the higher tasks of humanity, and for carrying on
the ideals of the great and unarmed and peaceful American democracy.
We are now spending a sum for wars, past and future, which has been
estimated at 70 cents on the dollar. If the preparedness program
urged by the present administration goes through, that sum will
doubtless approximate 80 cents. That will mean the retarding of
every development along the lines of the internal welfare and progress
of the Nation, such as has been suggested by the report of the Secre-
tary of the Interior, such as the conservation of the national resources,
the development of rivers and harbors, of waste lands, and the better-
ment of social conditions in every direction. . w
* >
PREPAREDNIESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 861.
Senator WARREN. Do you get that 70 cents on the dollar from your
Cogitations, or do you take it from the acknowledged statements?
Mr. VILLARD. The acknowledged statements.
Senator CATRON. What do you mean by that ? -
Senator WARREN. It means that 70 per cent of the total appropri-
ation goes for money spent on war, which includes pensions. But .
there is a great deal charged to that that does not belong to the
military establishment at all. - . .*
Senator CATRON. You do not take the position that we should not
increase the Army and Navy, but simply that we should not do it
now; that we should wait until we can get the benefit of the experi-
ence of the war which is going on in Europe?
Mr. VILLARD. No, sir. Personally I am opposed to any increase,
now or at any time, but I submit that if it is the policy of the Gov-.
ernment to increase, and I am in a minority on that, with a certain
number of my fellow Americans, and it is the desire of the country as
a whole to arm, then my point is that this is not the proper time.
Senator FLETCHER. Are you in favor of keeping up the present sit-
uation, supporting the Army and Navy as they stand now, with th
annual appropriations we have been accustomed to make? .."
Mr. WILLARD. Not the Navy; no, sir. I should decrease the Navy.
The CHAIRMAN. Decrease it 3
Mr. WILLARD. Decrease it. I think it makes for war, is a steady
temptation to war, and not a measure of safety.
Senator FLETCHER. Do you think we should go on down gradually.
to where we would have no Navy at all?
Mr. VILLARD. I believe so; yes, sir. My chief objection to the five-
year naval program urged by the President, and another objection to
the whole policy of arming at the present time, is that it may be the
One thing #. will prevent Europe from disarming at the close of this
war. You have heard what Lord Rosebury said, that this American
proposal was the most disheartening thing that had happened. Sim-
ilar statements have appeared in the English press, and a very con-
siderable section of it, and in the best part of the German press. I
received yesterday a quotation from The Labor Leader, which speaks
for the intelligent labor party, which discusses this whole American
proposal for an increased Army and increased Navy, and says that
that is the most pitiful feature of the war situation. *
The CHAIRMAN. Yet they took no steps themselves. They were
increasing all the time. -
Mr. VILLARD. Not the Army.
The CHAIRMAN. They were increasing the Navy.
Mr. WILLARD. Yes. -
Senator WARREN. Is it your hope, Mr. Villard, that at the close of .
this war the havoc will have been such, and the sorrow such, that all
of those nations now at war will assemble on the idea of disarmament'
Mr. VILLARD. I have the greatest hope.
Senator WARREN. Of course, that would be a most desirable accom-
ºnt. but do you entertain the hope of reason that that can take
ace'. -
p Mr. VILLARD. I think so. There are very strong minorities at least
in Germany and in England and in France that are working now for
that very thing, and they are the ones who are so disheartened and .
discouraged by the proposal to arm in this country. e
862 PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
Senator WARREN. Of course, there is no argument that can be
raised against the advisability of that if it can be accomplished. I
do not know whether you are taking chances or not in 5. to
that only as the solution of the tremendous war now raging.
Mr. VILLARD. That is another argument I make why we should
wait, and not plunge the country now into this tremendous expense
If the five-year naval program should be voted, it would make abso-
lutely impossible naval disarmament.
The CHAIRMAN. Congress could recede from that action at any time.
Mr. VILLARD. If you had a unanimous Congress and a President in
accord with you. *
The CHAIRMAN. There is not much question but that Congress
would abandon their program for increasing the Army and Navy if
steps were initiated by the other governments, or by us with the con-
sent of other governments, to disarm. We would not have to carry
out any five-year program. We could stop it in a year.
Senator WARREN. We could simply refuse to appropriate. Of
course, it might lead us into some embarrassment on some continu-
ing contracts. .
The CHAIRMAN. Those could be adjusted. º
Senator WARREN. But, after all, the appropriation itself governs.
The CHAIRMAN. I am frank to say that if such a movement were
inaugurated and a disposition shown by other Governments to unite
in such a movement, there is no man in the United States who would
oppose any increase in the Army and Navy quicker than I would.
Senator WARREN. There is nothing so desirable as that state of
affairs, if it can be brought about.
The CHAIRMAN. But at the time they were discussing that propo-
sition, the other fellows were quietly increasing their navies all the
time.
Mr. VILLARD. I remember that Winston Churchill made a start
at it once. -
The CHAIRMAN. He proposed it.
Mr. WILLARD. He proposed it. If this program is entered into, it
seems to me it should be the expressed opinion of Congress that the
Executive arm should devote as much labor and as much enthusiasm
to taking the lead in that direction at the close of the war as it will
in the development of these armaments, the building of these ships,
and the raising of these new regiments. But if the United States
holds back from that at the conclusion of the war, if we do not come
forward and say “We are ready to disarm, and we are all the more
ready because we have recently gone into it as a means, we believe,
of self-protection, we are ready to join you in this’ —if the United
States §. not take the lead along those lines, it will most certainly
put an almost fatal obstacle in the way.
The CHAIRMAN. It can not do it just now while the other nations
are engaged in a war for their very lives.
Mr. VILLARD. I call your attention to what the London Telegraph
said, which is not a peace-loving newspaper. .
The CHAIRMAN. That is the most American of any of those papers,
is it not ?
Mr. WILLARD. No, sir; I should say that the Daily News was
about the most American. -
PREPAREDNIESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 863
º
Senator WARREN. You are a most distinguished member of the
press, and your paper is a well-known and very influential publi-
cation. Of course, you associate with others, and you watch the
ress of the country. Do you believe that a propaganda of the
É. you speak of could be popularized by the press, and would they
follow that line, to try to start early enough to bring about, first,
an understanding on the part of all foreign countries that we are
ready to disarm and to remain disarmed if they would do the same?
What do you think could be done with the newspapers of the country
row %
Mr. VILLARD. I think a great deal could be done. I know there
are a very great many organizations, peace organizations, that are
for the moment yielding to the preparedness fight that would coop-
erate very strongly in that direction. Some of the peace Societies
that are not moving at all at the present time would jump at a
chance to help along that line, and I believe a great many of the
newspapers would. -
Senator WARREN. There are a great many peace people who
would help along the line of trying to bring that about ultimately,
but in the meantime they are strongly for our defense, and you have
different grades among the so-called peace people.
Mr. WILLARD. There are such. I would like to read just this
quotation from the Telegraph: -
We have the spectacle of the greatest democracy in the world, although separated
from Europe by more than 3,000 miles, in such a hurry for more men of war that it
has decided not even to wait for the lessons on construction and armament which
the war may teach. Moreover, this decision has been reached by a party which
came into power in opposition to the Rooseveltian policy of the “big stićk” and
pledged itself to economy in armaments.
The CHAIRMAN. Let me ask you a question or two. You do not
see any possible danger in the pending diplomatic negotiations with
Germany, for instance, with reference to the Lusitania, or with Great
Britain in reference to her alleged violation of international law as
it affects neutrals and commerce between neutral nations, do you?
Mr. VILLARD. No, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. You think those can all be adjusted .
Mr. VILLARD. Yes, sir; if the attempt on our side is carried on in
a pacific and just spirit, as it has been heretofore.
The CHAIRMAN. Of course, a great many people in this country
feel that Great Britain has gone farther now than she did in 1812 in
reference to neutral commerce. If we submit to it, there can not be
any danger. The question is: Do you think we ought to submit
much farther?
Mr. VILLARD. I think we should make very much stronger protests
than we have made heretofore, but I believe that in all these inter-
national matters there are many measures short of war that can be
resorted to before the final break.
The CHAIRMAN. Embargoes, for instance?
Mr. WILLARD. Embargoes and other means, friendly and earnest
representations, arousing a public opinion in a proper way, not through
belligerent features, not through speeches declaring that war may
come to-morrow, but that a way shall be found by mutual concilia-
tion, by arbitration, and other ways. -
23380—PT 17–16—2%
864 PREPAREDINESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
Of course, if I may point out, if there is danger of war, the pre-
Fº program that is urged after all is not far-reaching enough.
f war may come, to-morrow, and it is believed that the Government
should go into it, your naval program, which will not be complete
for 10 years, is certainly not an emergency program. It is a prepared-
heSS program, but not an emergency program.
The CHAIRMAN. Of course, it is being formulated, I assume, on
the theory that there will not be any war, and possibly on the theory
entertained by some, at least, that if disarmament can be agreed upon
between the powers, this program can be stopped at any time.
Mr. VILLARD. It is very unfortunate that that impression has not
gone abroad. From all these clippings that I get from the foreign
newspapers, the interpretation is that our act shows that we are defi-
nitely going into the ranks of the great militaristic nations, and that
hereafter we shall be a menace to the world. I would like to call
your attention to the fact that prior to the war, both in the British
Parliament and in the German Reichstag, the heavy increase of our
fleet was cited as a reason for additional naval armament in both
those countries. You remember it was proposed in England that
they go to a third power standard, namely, that their fleet should be
able to take care of the United States, Germany, and a third power—
France or Russia—and that was the cry of the extreme navy league
people there, just as our navy league to-day is making use of this
preparedness agitation to urge the same thing—that we should have
a navy large enough to overcome any possible combination that
might be brought against us—any “likely” combination, I think
they put it. -
Senator WARREN. Mr. Villard, I think the newspapers, and surely
the Secretary of War and those who have followed him here, have
been careful to explain that this preparedness is for defense and not
for offense. I do not know what influence that may have upon the
foreign mind. I should think, however, that they might give us
some credit for that—that we are preparing for defense and not for
offense.
Mr. VILLARD. Senator, I think it would if they were not so familiar
with that language over there; if they had not used it themselves so
often.
Senator WARREN. You are right, I guess, about that. While it
might mean that here, it does not always mean it in foreign countries.
Mr. VILLARD. You could be shown passages from Bismarck and
Von Moltke that their armament was only to be for defense and not
for offense. .
The CHAIRMAN. Do you not think the course of the United States
in submitting to all kinds of indignities in Mexico, practically sur-
rendering Cuba and the possessions in the West Indies, and now ne-
gotiating to surrender the Philippines, is pretty strong evidence that
we are not an aggressive nation—that we are not seeking any terri-
tory outside of continental United States? -
Mr. WILLARD. I do. I think it is excellent - evidence, but it is
because of that record that the sudden change in policy seems SO
startling and so uncalled for abroad. They do not understand it.
The CHAIRMAN. Would not the very fact that the very Congress
which is proposing better preparedness for defense is releasing, as
it will do, the Philippines, disclose that the real purpose of the Con-

PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 865
gress is the putting through of a defense program and not an offensive
program * - -
- Mr. WILLARD. I should think it might to thoughtful people, but
unfortunately the masses of the people and the jingo press in those
countries are not of that kind. Just as there are many people in
Japan who insist that our large naval armament, which the Japanese
authorities say is twice the size of theirs, twice the efficiency of
theirs, is aimed at them, and just as there are many Americans who,
despite the assurances given by the most prominent Japanese states-
men that their attitude toward us is a friendly one, insist that
Japan is arming against us. It is action and reaction all the time, ,
the play of these forces, first on one side of the water and then on
the other.
No sooner do we add two or three battleships, than some one rises
in the Reichstag or in the Chambre de Deputés or in the Parliament
and says “America is menacing us, and we have to keep just that
far ahead of her.” It all leads up to the fact that if the world is not
to react at the close of this war, if it is not to become merely a world
in which everything is subordinated to armaments, then the United
States above all other nations must take the lead in moving for dis-
armament. This arming of the United States will complete a vicious
military circle of the world. . Up to this time it has been incomplete.
You could leave London and travel back to England, and you would
get to a place where you could travel for miles and miles and not
See gay uniforms. If this stupendous naval program goes through,
which is probably the largest program ever urged at one time by
any Christian people, unless we except the German naval program
of 1901, then you will have the circle complete. You leave London
and go back to London, and you go through fortified nations all the
way, and if the menace is from England, then you must prepare to
fortify your Canadian boundary, and give up that historic peace
between the two countries.
Senator WEEKs. Are you in favor of any Army and Navy'
Mr. WILLARD. I am in favor of a very small Army and Navy.
Senator WEEIs. How small'. r
Mr. VILLARD. I should say the size of the forces in 1898.
Senator WEEKs. Before the war'.
Mr. VILLARD. Before the war; merely as a police force.
The CHAIRMAN. What would you do with your foreign possessions
and the Panama Canal?
Mr. WILLARD. You are giving up the Philippines. You can save
that garrison, and then there jº, Rico. The necessity of keeping
a regiment of Infantry there always struck me as extremely .
lous, precisely as the stationing of a Cavalry regiment in Hawaii,
where you certainly could never have use for it, and the stationing
of a regiment in Alaska. If the War Department really wished to
increase the mobile Army, there are three regiments that could very
Speedily be added to the mobile force at home. As for the Panama
Canal, I certainly think that the position originally taken by John
º was the correct one, and the canal should not be armed and forti-
GCl.
Senator WEEKs. But Congress has decided to arm and fortify it.
Mr. WILLARD. Congress can change its mind, Senator. It has on
Occasions.
866 PREPAIRED NIESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
Senator WEEKs. The defense of the canal is under way; the work
is being done. t
Mr. WILLARD. Is done, practically. You have the best fortifica-
tions anywhere on the Panama Canal. There are statements from
entirely reliable, authorities that, given a few submarines in connec-
tion with the present guns there, and you have an absolute protec-
tion for the canal. That does not call for anything additional.
Senator WEEKs. How much of a Navy are you in favor of .
Mr. WILLARD. Just sufficient to do what the Navy did prior to the
War with Spain.
Senator WEEKs. Prior to the Spanish War?
Mr. VILLARD. Prior to the Spanish War; police the oceans.
Senator WEEKs. To maintain that kind of a Navy would be an
absolute waste of money. * . . .
Mr. WILLARD. Not any more than the present waste.
Senator WEEKs. I think I appreciate Mr. Villard's position, but I
think it is rather unfair to very many earnest men to imply that
hysteria and yellow press and ammunition makers are the entire
motive behind a desire to put this country in a position of proper
defense. Mr. Villard, what kind of a Navy do you think we should
maintain, if any ?
Mr. WILLARD. I favor a Navy such as we had prior to 1898, merely
a force for patroling the seas, and for policing them; neither a defen-
sive nor an offensive Navy. *
Senator WEEKs. Any first class navy could destroy that kind of a
navy in an hour if they could get at it. -
Mr. WILLARD. Yes, sir.
Senator WEEKs. Would it not be practically a waste of money to
maintain such a Navy'. -
Mr. VILLARD. If you are maintaining it for war purposes, yes, sir.
If you are maintaining it for purposes of patrolling the seas, or
protecting American citizens, as they have been protected many times,
on the Isthmus of Panama, at the shelling of Alexandria in 1881,
when we put marines ashore, and in º in South America
innumerable, and in other ways, patrolling the seas in times of
disaster. They used to pick up derelicts. That work has now been
transferred to the Revenue-Cutter Service, but it used to be done
by the Atlantic Fleet. If you maintain a small force for those pur-
poses, I do not think it is a waste of money.
Senator WEEKS. Practically speaking, we put marines ashore if we
have them, and you can transport marines in a transport much
better than in a naval vessel, so that for the purpose of landing
forces in Central or South American countries, or in the West Indian
Islands, a transport would answer all the purposes, and we could
entirely eliminate our naval force, if that is the purpose for it.
Mr. WILLARD. Yes, sir. - +
Senator WEEKs. So that, as a matter of fact, your final judg-
ment would be that we might do without a Navy'.
Mr. WILLARD. Yes, sir. We practically had no Navy from 1870
until 1893, anyway, or 1894. We had no Navy when Mr. Cleveland
brought on the Venezuelan trouble.
Senator WEEKs. We did not have a very large Navy, but do you
not appreciate that a competing nation, if it is going to compete at
all, must have tools equivalent to and of the character of those
PREPAIRED NESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 867
controlled and used by other nations? Other nations did not have
navies at that time. At the end of the Civil War we had, relatively
speaking, as strong a Navy as anyone.
Mr. VILLARD. But that was soon dissipated. It did not exist
after 1870. **
Senator WEEKs. It did not last very long, because they were
largely wooden ships, and the iron ship had demonstrated its worth,
and European nations commenced to build up navies before we did.
Mr. WILLARD. We sold our best boats, our best steel monitors and
others, at the close of the Civil War.
Senator WEEKs. We sold two or three; that is all.
STATEMENT OF MR, L, HOLLINGSWORTH WOOD, SECRETARY
OF THE LEAGUE TO LIMIT ARMAMENTS, NEW YORK CITY.
Mr. WOOD. Mr. Chairman and gentlemen, I desire to speak for
just a moment on the reaction that I find existing in the minds of the
citizens of the United States, and also on the reaction which I find
coming from friends of mine in other countries in regard to this propo-
sition of preparedness. I am very much interested in what our
President has said in his speeches, that no one seriously fears the
invasion of the home territory of the United States. I only wish
that that could be brought home to the people of the United States,
for I feel confident that it is just such a fear as that which is causing
the hysterical situations which some of our Atlantic-coast cities
display. sº
Senator Warren said that nothing was so desirable as disarmament,
if by any means that could be brought about, and to a great group of
us—there are a number of people with whom I am in correspondence in
all parts of the United States—the opportunity for the United States
to lead in that direction is at present before us as it has never been,
it seems to us, in our history.
The taking of chances is something that is perhaps inherent with
life as a nation as it is with an individual, and the taking of the
chances at the present time of not increasing our armaments seems
to so many of us to be so much to be preferred to the assurance of
bringing to ourselves the suspicion of other nations, and not only the
suspicion of other nations, but the suspicion of great classes of our
own citizenry.
Senator Weeks spoke of competitive nations. I feel, just along the
line of the competitive nations of the world, that I want to read some
lemarks that Admiral Chadwick made at the Clark University con-
ference recently. They are of interest, because he is not exactly a
labor agitator, and yet he makes this, to me, startling statement, and
to so many of the labor element of our country I am sure it is a start-
ling statement:
“Imperialism has had its worst and most injurious development in recent years,
its essence being land grabbing and the establishing of spheres of influence. Navies
and armies are insurance for capital owned abroad by the leisure class of a nation.
It is for them that empires and spheres of influence exist. The great war now raging
is a combination of efforts to maintain and extend those spheres. The time has come
to call a halt.” -
It struck me as very interesting that that should come from Rear
Admiral French E. Chadwick. An increasing number of our own
868 PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
citizens feel that that is what armament means. It is to them a class
proposition. May I submit a letter from a militarist?
(The letter is as follows:)
In the Adverul of Bucharest for August 21 appears a letter addressed by a German
officer to his friend in Roumania. This letter is accompanied by a facsimile reproduc-
tion of passages in the letter. This letter translated into French and again into
English, reads as follows:
s “NAUEN, July 28, 1915.
“WERY DEAR WILHELM: Always in good health. Everything goes as we would
wish and we have the best hopes. * * * When one thinks how difficult it was for
H to convince Qur Emperor that the last moment had arrived for letting loose the
course of war; othérwise, pacifism, internationalism, antimilitarism, and so many
other noxious weeds of our country would have been propagated to such a point
that even our stupid people (‘der dumme Michel') would have come to be infected
by these maladies. That would have been the finish—the twilight of our dazzling
nobility. We can lose nothing by the war; on the contrary, we have everything to
92,111.
“We can never sufficiently thank our Emperor for having saved the German nobility
from certain ruin. Even in case the fate of the war were doubtful, we should have
nothing to lose, because the people would never rise against us. We are going to be
the absolute masters of the world. All the chimeras and stupidities like democracy
will be chased from the universe for an infinite time. We already have got rid of
Bebel. We shall soon be rid of that bullhead who calls himself Eſarden, and of all the
fools who have the boldness to impose their theories upon us. That we may at last
finish with all these charlatans, we must first become the all-powerful dictators of the
world. * * * I rejoice already that I am going to travel through the vassal
countries of Germany in the suite of our Emperor. What glory and what pride for us
as Germans. At the end of the count we have to purge our own country of all its revolu-
tionary ideas, in order that our nobility will recover its ancient splendor, its power, and
its authority.
s “KARL VON Eſ—.”
This, of course, is not characteristically German by any means, any more than
similar utterances which one can find in England are characteristic of Great Britain.
It is, however, typical of the attitude of a certain class represented in all nations, more
or less, but potent in matters of military activity. -
Senator WEEKs. Do you think that militarism results to any extent
where the military is not exalted above the civil classes :
Mr. WooD. I should think not, but it seems to me that that is a
very difficult position to maintain in any country. You have sug-
gested a condition which if does not seem to me the history of the
world shows as having obtained where the military is in any numbers.
Senator WEEKs. Let me suggest Japan, under the old conditions,
and to some degree under the present conditions. The Samurai in
the old days were a higher class socially than the artisans, or even
the professional men. Did that produce militarism'
M. WooD. Yes; they had a perfectly good feudal system.
Senator WEEKs. But in countries where the soldier is not in a
class considered as a higher caste than the civilian do you think
there is any such thing as militarism : -
Mr. WooD. I certainly do. I certainly think that as soon as you
get a class in a community which devotes itself exclusively to its
profession and sets up, as the officers of that class set themselves up,
as experts in demanding a policy for the country, you then put
yourself in danger of militarism, because your mouthpiece to your
eople speaks from the prejudice of a man's own profession. As a
awyer myself, I feel it very distinctly.
Senator WEEKs. Your mouthpiece is Congress. Congress is ad-
vised by military experts. Does that create militarism
PREPAREDINESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. . 869
Mr. WoOD. May I quote Justice Brewer as warning us, in practi-
cally his dying message, against listening to military and naval ex-
perts in regard to building up our armaments? It seems to me that
that is just exactly where the danger of militarism comes in. Since
I have been here in Washington, if I may be personal, it seems to me
I have heard and seen much more of the effect of the military on our
public life than I had supposed obtained. *
Senator WEEKs. In what way?
Mr. WOOD. Their statements that are so interesting to listen to
published by the press at the present time. It seems to me that
the officers of the Army and Navy are getting a tremendous amount
of the ear of the public.
Senator WEEKs. But, Mr. Wood, do you not recognize the fact
that the press is entirely commercial, and that the press feeds the
people what the people want to read'. I am looking at Mr. Villard.
[Laughter.]
Mr. WOOD. You do not expect me to assent to that proposition
with Mr. Villard so near me. e -
Senator WEEKs. They give the people what they think the people
want to read, and that is what gives the circulation to the newspapers.
The CHAIRMAN. To whom would we apply for advice as to the
needs of the Army if we did not go to the gentlemen who knew about it 3
Mr. WOOD. I do not object to the application made to the officers
for the needs of the Army, but I do object to having the needs of the
Nation dictated by Army and Navy officers. It seems to me the
question of policy for our Nation and the question of what it is we
actually need here are distinct, and that the Army and Navy officers
have no business meddling on the policy side.
The CHAIRMAN. I do not think you will find in the hearings of these
officers that they undertook to dictate what the policy of the Nation
should be. They are simply submitting, in answer to requests, what
the Army needs, not what the policy of the Nation should be.
Mr. WOOD. I submit that, outside of these particular hearings, we
have heard a great deal from them on what the policy of the Nation
should be.
Mr. Villard draws my attention to the Jack London case and Gen.
Wood's supressing of it. I do not know the details of it well enough
to bring it forward. -
Mr. WILLARD. He induced the Postmaster General to suppress a
criticism of the Army. It is a pretty good case of militaristic feeling.
The criticism of the Army was suppressed at the request of a military
officer and shut out of the mails. - -
The CHAIRMAN. Did not London deny being the author of that
diatribe on the soldier? -
Mr. WILLARD. I do not know whether he denied it or not, but the
request was made, and it was stated in the press that the request was
made by Gen. Wood and acted upon. -
Senator WEEKs. Was it not a scurrilous attack of some kind?
Mr. WILLARD. It was a very loose attack, not scurrilous. It was
not obscene. It did not come under the usual rules of the Post Office
Department. It was a foolish, self-defeating, ridiculous abuse of the
Army. But I merely suggested that as one of the many evidences of
the growth of militaristic feeling in America, the militaristic spirit,
870 | PREPAREDNIESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
with which I am perhaps more familiar than Mr. Wood is, because I
have been following it for 20 years. * - .
Senator WEEKs. I had no desire to interrupt you, Mr. Wood.
Mr. WOOD. I thank you very much for bringing out the point,
because I want to get the facts before the American people. That
is the thing I am particularly interested in, because it seems to me
that we have not §. shown by any of the authoritative speakers
for Our Government why our Republic does not need to fear the
militaristic spirit. -
In work in connection with the limitation of armaments prior to
the announcement of the administration's program I found so many
people who would reply, “But we are in absolutely no danger of
militarism.” You could not get them to take an interest in the
roblem. Since the announcement of the program, those people
ave changed their viewpoint, and they do feel that there is a fear,
because they find our country so excited about it. May I submit
letters bearing on this point %
(The letters referred to are as follows:)
THE BEE HIVE,
.* 211 North Lincoln Street, Northfield, Minn., February 2, 1916.
L. EſolDINGsworth WooD,
New York City. -
DEAR SIR: In a dual debate held at this place last Saturday evening on the ques-
tion “Resolved, That the United States should materially increase her national de-
fenses,” one negative team got three judges and one affirmative team got two judges.
The popular sentiment of the students of the colleges in this city, as well as of the
resident citizens, is opposed to further armament.
Again thanking you for the material Sent us, I remain,
Respectfully, yours, -
STEPHEN GARLAND.
* *mºmsºms” s
GREEN FIELD, IND., December 28, 1915.
Mr. L. EIoDDINGsworth WooD, -
New York, N. Y.
DEAR SIR: I inclose a clipping from the Indianapolis Star, a most vigorous cham-
pion of universal blood letting and the spending of a billion dollars to get ready for it.
I wish to say that outside of some few men in large cities who are either Secretly
financially interested in making death missiles or hope to be, there is practically no
one in the great western country who has any sympathy with the movement to use-
lessly plunge our Nation into a quicksand of debt out of which it will never rise... I
am a lecturer by profession and I find that among the men who must do any fighting
that comes along there is a constant dread of anything that might bring war. The
miners are particularly hard against it; the sturdy farmer boy whom they will draft
the first thing is a bitter foe to war, as he would much rather raise food to keep people
alive than to go to war and shoot them down; the man in the factory is becoming a
home owner and the farthest thing from his heart is a condition that will drag him
away from his home and shoot him down. g - tº º
The preparedness movement as it is planned now is the most unpopular thing in
the West, and woe be to the men who force it through Congress if they do. I admire
any movement that will hinder the reckless waste of the people's money to enrich
a few ammunition makers.
Very sincerely, yours,
C. A. Robinson.
Senator WEEKs. If you were a Senator and you wished information
relating to transportation you would quite likely ask railroad men
here to advise you, would you not ?
Mr. WooD. Yes, sir.
BREPAIRED NESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 871
Senator WEEKs. And if you wanted information relating to bank-
ing you would ask bankers?
Mr. WooD. Yes, sir.
Senator WEEKs. If you wanted information relating to what is a
suitable national defense you would naturally turn to military
experts, would you not ?
Mr. WooD. Certainly, as to what is a suitable national defense; but
distinguishment, in my mind, is between.what is a suitable national the
defense and what is the national policy which we desire to follow.
It seems to me those are distinguishable.
Senator WEEKs. It is for Congress to determine what the national
policy is, absolutely. .
Mr. WooD. Yes, sir. But it seems to me that the predominant
# at the hearings, as they are reported to us, is the voice of the
military. -
Senator WEEKs. It has been; but there is no disposition on the
part of this committee to refuse to listen to others.
Mr. WooD. No, sir; you are very kindly letting us come here and
take up your time.
The question of the reaction abroad is the next point that I want
to bring up. It has come to me through correspondence with indi-
viduals in practically all the belligerent countries, and it bears out
almost exactly what Mr. Villard said in his speech, and I wish to
bring to your recollection again the extremely interesting and illumi-
nating story that Miss Jane Addams told at one of the hearings granted
the Womans Peace Party the starting at Hull House of the Boy
Scouts, and their going through, without guns, but in uniform, simple
evolutions of the Boy Scout drill, and the immediate effect on the
Surrounding community, as a result of which the mothers, of mostly
European birth, came to Miss Addams and said, “Oh, Miss Addams,
that is what we came to America to avoid for ourselves and our
children.” And although for the boys of that neighborhood the
woodcraft and other useful parts of the Boy Scout training would
have been of great value, yet, in response to that plea, Hull House
had to give up the Boy Scouts. That just indicates the way that
class of our citizenship regards anything that savors of military training.
I was much interested last night in driving from the station to my
home—my man is a Swede who has been in this country about 15
years—I had not spoken to him about why I was planning to come
to Washington at all, but he said to me, “The President is making
many speeches, Mr. Wood.” I said “Yes.” He said “In a little
while, if they do not look out, it will be just as it was in Europe, with
guns in every place, and that is what my friends and I came to this
country to get away from.” I said, “Do you feel that there is any
number of your friends in the community who feel that way ?” He
said, “Yes; there are a good many of us, Mr. Wood, who feel that
way.” I submit that that simple man feels something in our atmos-
phere here that is about to change.
Senator WEEKs. Does it occur to you that that may be an isolated
instance?
Mr. WooD. Yes; of course it may be.
Senator WEEKs. There is perhaps a larger proportion of foreign
, born in Massachusetts than in any other State in the Union, and I
º
872 PREPAREDINESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
have not seen a single letter from Massachusetts which conveys any
such idea as that, and people write me pretty freely. .
Mr. WOOD. Of course, in our correspondence on the speeches made
here in Congress we have a good many letters expressing practically
what this man of mine expressed. -
... I think Mr. Villard quoted to you Lord Rosebury's statement that
the most disheartening thing that he saw was America taking up the
burden which was almost, if not entirely, breaking the backs of
Europe. Before Lord Rosebury made that statement it had come
to me through the channels of correspondence with my friends, both
in Germany and in Great Britain. Great numbers of my friends in
Great Britain had asked most concernedly about what the United
States meant by this change of front. - - -
Just another word or two in regard to the dangers which we face
and why some of us feel they should be faced in another way.
Granted that the problems of the Pacific slope with Japan are serious.
Granted that injustice has been done to some Japanese there and
that a highstrung nation feels that we are arming, as Mr. Villard
Said, against them. Why increase that feeling of suspicion, when we
might avoid a possible break by going to them and agreeing with Japan
to appoint a joint high commission of investigation on the situation
as it obtains around the Pacific basin, practically calling all the
nations which border on that great ocean into conference, to meet
before the questions arise which might cause the outbreak 2 Such
statesmanship as that would seem to have a forward look. It would
seem to avoid the lack of dignity of secret diplomacy about which
we have heard so much in all this great embroilment in Europe.
Senator WEEKs. Have you made that suggestion to the admin-
istration ? - .
Mr. WooD. Yes, sir. -
Senator WEEKs. Has the aoministration refused to accept it .
Mr. WooD. No, sir. It has not been replied to. -
Senator WEEKs. Have you any evidence that the Japanese would
accept a suggestion of that kind favorably
Mr. Wood. I personally have no evidence, except from the corre-
spondence with friends of mine who are in Japan who are closely in
touch with the Japanese people. -
Senator WEEKs. A missionary told me that he was in the interior
of Japan when the troops were assembled to take part in this war—
that is, to go to China—and the Japanese who were gathered around
the assembling points were almost all of the opinion that the troops
were being assembled to attack the United States. .
Mr. WooD. That does not indicate to me that they would not
accept an agreement to look into the differences between the United
States and Japan. If Great Britain and Russia, after the Dogger
Bank incident, could calmly consider a situation which was fraught
with the most intense electrical danger, it seems to me two nations
on such a friendly basis as Japan and the United States could look
into some such question as that. •
Senator WEEKs. I do not think it is impossible, but I did not
know but what you had some evidence that such a proposition would
be favorably received. - -
Mr. Wood. Let me refer again to the question of our internal
situation as affected by this increase in our Army, which is, of course,
PREPAIRED NIESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 878
I suppose, your special regard in this committee. What is the effect
upon a man of going through our Army at the present time? My Only
real information about that comes from a source which is rather
intimate in this way. My sister during the Spanish War was in
charge, as nurse, of the recruiting hospital at Fort Hamilton, and in
conversation with her in regard to the men that she saw, and who
came back from the war broken with disease, or whatever it might
be, and the men of the post there—she was made to feel that for thered-
blooded man in times of peace there was not enough to do to develop
his initiative, to develop his feeling of ability to go ahead on his own
account. If any army we had can have such a training as will make
them more efficient citizens when they come out, it seems to me there
might be some argument for training in an army. Whether that is
an absolute statement from the statistics I am not able to say, but
I have seen a number of plans proposed making for some industrial
efficiency in the Army toward which, it seems to me, there ought to
be at least some tendency in any increase which we make.
In closing I just have to present this one thought, as Judge Brewer
said, warning us against listening to the advice of the military and
naval leaders in building up our armaments: As these friends of mine
from abroad have brought to me this picture of the reaction at the
announcement of a policy, so my own experience abroad has made me
feel that the world looks at the United States not as a hated nation.
If, on account of the action in the war, we have obtained the enmity,
say, of the Germans because we have provided the allies with ammuni-
tion, if we have obtained the enmity of the British because we have
charged them two prices for the ammunition, shall we embark upon
a program calculated to intensify their dislike because it will place
upon them still greater burdens' Or shall we embark upon a program.
which will be definitely pointed toward alleviating any irritation
which may have grown up 7
May I insert a letter from Mr. Hamilton Holt on this subject 7
(The letter is as follows:) -
THE INDEPENDENT,
New York City, January 21, 1916.
TO THE EDITOR.
SIR: The American press has already discussed at length the President’s prepared-
ness program from the military and financial standpoint. Is there not an aspect of
the problem, however, more fundamental than either?
Here we are in the midst of the direst calamity known to history. Europe is bleed-
ing to death. Asia is straining every nerve to hold our friendship. We would seem
to be safer from invasion than at any time during our history. We are not only safe,
but we are prosperous. Our prosperity, however, is not the result of our own plan-
ning. It is coined out of Europe’s agony. And yet at the very time when our hearts
should open as never before to the piteous cries from across the water, when all our
thoughts and all our substance should be freely given to binding up the broken
wounds, when the hour calls for a supreme and glorious unselfishness, we are pro-
Fº to retire within our little world and proclaim as our national policy “Safety
rSt.’’ tº
Instead of considering how to embark on a course that would bring us the gratitude
and love of every nation—such, for instance, as taxing ourselves to lend them a billion
dollars to repair their losses after the war—we propose a plan that will inevitably
make each one of them hate us a little more."
Some years ago we returned to China $10,000,000, which was an overpayment on
the Boxer indemnity. That was not a present to China, but only a refusal to keep
what did not rightfully belong to us. Yet the return of that sum—half the cost of
a modern dreadnaught—has made the United States the most beloved nation on
earth in the hearts of that great Asiatic people now so sincerely groping for light and
liberty. Is there not a lesson here for a nation that would plan preparedness for peace?
874 PREPAIRED NIESS FOR NATIONAL DIEEENSE.
Let us then make haste slowly in increasing our armaments. By the time the war
is over we shall most likely find the nations ready to organize the world for peace
and some sort of disarmament. If that is the case, any great burden of taxation now
imposed on the American people for armament purposes will be wasted.
If the nations, however, instead of making a durable peace, only declare a truce
in order to continue the mad scramble for greater and ever greater armaments, then
the United States, having lost neither in treasure nor in men, will be in a better
position than any other nation to enter the inevitable and crushing race whose end
is death to all but the most powerful. .
Sincerely, yours,
HAMILTON HolT.
Propositions have been made that the United States should, of its
great surplus wealth, embark on constructive building-up schemes in
those countries which are broken down, marshal our assets to enable
those countries to rehabilitate themselves rather than marshal our
assets to start in a competition with people already on their backs
and struggling for life. All the eyes of all those nations, it seems to
us, are turned, gentlemen, to the United States, and that we should
miss this opportunity to lead the nations of the world because, for-
sooth, we fear that they will attack us—and our President says we
have no fear of invasion of the home country of the United States—is
gratuitously, as we see, it, to insult the peoples of the rest of the world.
If, in our national life, we are at the present time in no danger of
invasion, while the rest of the world is busy, certainly we can afford
to wait, as far as any program that has been announced by the ad-
ministration is concerned, for a year or for two years, in order to learn
the exact lessons of this war in Europe, and it is to delay in this pro-
gram, it is to offer in connection with any bill which is passed by our
Congress to the other nations of the world to disarm, if they will
disarm, the writing into our statutes of some provision that if within
the period for which any appropriation you recommend is intended
steps are taken by the other nations to disarm, then the unexpended
balance of this appropriation shall be returned to the Treasury—that
the group for which I speak appeals to this committee.
Senator CATRON. You favor the idea of disarmament. Do you
think the United States ought to disarm now and trust to that exam-
ple of disarmament to influence other nations to disarm 3
Mr. WooD. Personally, I feel that would be the strongest possible
position for us to take. The group for which I think would not go
with me that far, but merely think that we ought to have practically
at the present time not an increase.
Senator CATRON. Do you think any other nation would be in-
fluenced by our example of that kind'
Mr. WooD. I think so, as I know people in the other nations. May
I suggest this, each one of the nations of Furope has had to go to the
greatest lengths in statements that it was the other fellow's fault,
and that they were fighting on the defensive 7 Every one of the many
colored books which we have had to read has had that as its plea, in
order to make its people stand the tremendous burden of this contest.
A disarmed United States will be the strongest evidence for the social-
minded men in their Governments that there was no such opportunity
to come to them from the United States.
Senator CATRON. It would be the safest way for other nations to
fight us under those conditions, if they had any grievance against us,
would it not #
Mr. WooD. The safest way ?
PREPAIRED NIESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 87.5
Senator CATRON. Yes; for them, if they had the least bit of a griev-
ance. If we expected to accomplish anything against them in case
of any differences between us, if we had no means of showing that we
could make any resistance if they made an attack on us, do you sup-
pose we would get any concessions from them "
Mr. WOOD. Absolutely the most dangerous thing for their military
class in any government of the world would be to have some great
nation, as Herr Babel used to quote the United States in the Reichstag
“unarmed and unafraid.” The only way we will be able to get the
imperialism out of any country is to have the people of that country
spurn the military power. May I submit a letter on this point?
(The letter is as follows:)
A German writes (in German) to another friend in America:
|B writes from New York that there will be no more attempt at mediation.
The battle must be fought out to the complete extinction of militarism. That is
inconceivable. For militarism is in war time bound up in the closest manner with
the people. It is extinct only with the extinction of the people. Militarism can
not be suppressed from the outside. On the contrary, every attack from the out-
side awakens and strengthens it, for it makes it appear necessary. The struggle
against militarism is possible only from the inside. It is possible that after the war
this struggle will be less difficult.
Thé greatest probability is that the war, according to our prophecy, will remain
without result. Then may militarism be killed forever.
One must realize that Germany, before she declares herself exhausted, can fight a
very long time; and then when Germany is perhaps suppressed, Europe, too, can not
maintain herself. The fighting of this war to the last end is a most ghastly conception.
Senator CATRON. Do you think it would have any effect at all?
Mr. WOOD. I think it would have the greatest effect if the argu-
ment that they use is that they are being attacked by somebody.
That is the argument of the militarist, that they are in danger, and
if they can not prove it by showing that we have any guns at all they
can not use us as that argument. - -
Senator CATRON. But argument does not amount to much, does it,
whenever a nation decides to accomplish its purpose against a foreign
nation ? It is simply a matter of a grievance that they get up, and
if they are able to enforce it by the power that they have and the
force that they can exert against one that has no power or force they
are pretty apt to exercise it, are they not
Mr. WOOD. They will have to persuade their people to do it.
Senator CATRON. You would not think that would be the case in
nations like those in Europe, where people are not consulted very
much, like Germany or Austria Ž * -
Mr. WOOD. Certainly, for the coming years the danger from the
countries of Europe seems to me to be practically nil; and if we come
at the end of this war into anything like a serious consideration of dis-
armament the voice of the people, it seems to me, is going to be heard
as it has never been heard before. The riots we hear about occurring
already are most unusual occurrences there.
Senator CATRON. The fact that a riot comes up and is put down in
a few minutes shows nothing in the way of a demonstration that those
people would be consulted by their Government if the Government
desired to accomplish anything against us, without our having any
preparation whatever.
Mr. WooD. The history of the rise of the Social Democratic Party
in Germany, it seems to me, points to the fact that the people will be
consulted there.
876 - PREPAIRED NESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
Senator CATRON. They have not been.
Mr. WooD. They were at that time.
Senator CATRON. At the time of this war'. - .
Mr. WooD. Prior to the war; the history of the rise of the party, I
was talking about, during the times of Herr Babel. .
Senator CATRON. But not this war?
Mr. WooD. They convinced them that they were being attacked
by Russia; and Russia was mobilizing with a great army, so that they
succeeded in convincing them. One of the most illuminating dis-
patches about the red, yellow, or the other kind of books was one
which quoted the German ambassador in St. Petersburg as follows:
“Do not mobilize, for if you do our general staff will get out of hand.”
The military will completely subordinate the civil. -
And that is, to me, right along the line of our argument. They will
then have the opportunity to place their hand upon the civil govern-
ment. If Russia had not had that mobilization, perhaps but We
deal so much in ‘‘ifs.”
Senator WEEKs. What would have happened to Serbia .
Mr. Wood. It would have been much easier, according to Sir
Edward Grey, to have settled the whole Serbian proposition than it
was to settle the previous Balkan situation.
ADDITIONAL STATEMIENT OF OSWALD GARRISON WILLARD.
Senator WEEKs. I want to ask Mr. Villard what he would do with
the Monroe doctrine without a force to maintain it'.
Mr. WILLARD. I should do precisely with it what we did during a
century when we had no force to protect it, when it was not violated;
and I should think that the time has come when the Monroe doctrine
can be supported by the united powers of the various Republics. The
proposition, of course, in regard to the Monroe doctrine is entirely
different now from what it was a hundred years ago.
Senator WEEKs. Are you in favor of our making an alliance with
the South American Republics? -
Mr. WILLARD. Yes, sir.
Senator WEEKs. Offensive and defensive'.
Mr. VILLARD. Not offensive—defensive. +
Senator WEEKs. Would you put us in a position of being obliged
to take part in their quarrels or their troubles?
Mr. WILLARD. No, sir; not obliged. But on this One point, if you
are going to stand by the Monroe doctrine, I see no reason at all why
there should not be united action. The very fact you had united
action would prevent anyone from coming over here.
Senator WEEKs. I should be very much pleased, if I were a citizen
of one of the other American Republics, to have an alliance with the
United States. But how about the United States having an alliance
with them? How about George Washington's farewell address and
his warning to us not to in any way become entangled?
Mr. WILLARD. That was violated when we went into the Monroe
doctrine. Then you became sponsor for them, and you have been
practically in alliance with them all these years.
Senator WEEKS. Only an alliance for defensive purposes.
Mr. WILLARD. That is all we stand for now.
Senator WEEKs. From our standpoint, not from theirs.
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 877
Mr. WILLARD. That is what I stand for now.
The CHAIRMAN. But that was for our own protection.
Senator WEEKs. That was for our own protection entirely.
Mr. VILLARD. I think Mr. Wood overlooked one point in answering
your question, Senator Catron, as to what would happen to us if we
were threatened now by a large nation. The answer is what happened
to us when Mr. Cleveland made his ferocious onslaught on England.
The English Navy at that time could have sunk ours with one broad-
side, but that question was satisfactorily settled by arbitration.
Plenty of these problems that are going to confront us will be more
or less difficult, but, if properly handled, will not lead to serious
trouble; but if handled in a belligerent spirit, of course everyone
knows, no matter what army you have, you can plunge this country
into war if you go at your foreign relations recklessly and with the
determination to make enemies.
Senator CATRON. The difference between England and other
countries toward us is very great. England is very vulnerable to us.
If we had been drawn into a war, England was about as unprepared
as we were, and she had Canada on our borders, which could have
been taken by crossing the boundary. But we do not find Austria,
Germany, Italy, and Russia, or even Japan, in that situation.
Mr. VILLARD. No, but in 100 years we have never had a foreign
war except of our own seeking. -
Senator CATRON. That argument to me is a good deal like an old
fellow in Missouri once who was firing a Fourth of July cannon that
burst. He said, “What in the world is the matter with it '. I have
fired it ten thousand times, and that is the first time it has ever
done that way.”
Mr. WILLARD. That is perfectly possible. As Mr. Wood says, you
have to take some risk. The individual citizen takes some risk when
he goes unarmed. But, after all, you have gotten through a hundred
years and over of national life without serious foreign entanglement,
and now you are going into the very thing which makes for war.
The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Villard, I differ from that statement of yours
that we have had no wars in a hundred years that have not been of
our own seeking. Do you believe that the War of 1812 was of our
seeking? -
Mr. VILLARD. Practically, yes.
The CHAIRMAN. Do you think we ought to have submitted to the
outrages that were perpetrated against us then, without resistance 3
Mr. VILLARD. I am not for war, ever, Senator; so that I certainly
would not have advocated at that time going to war about it. But the .
point we are trying to make about it is this, that when you create
these great armaments, you do raise up a military caste in the
country, and you are doing it now. You have it right here in Wash-
ington, and we can illustrate it in many ways. In the second place,
you are creating weapons for use. You take the President's state-
ment that they are for defense and never for offense, and we are never
going to take another foot of foreign territory. I can show you that
President Polk, a year before we robbed Mexico of all those lands,
made exactly the same statement to Congress, that there would be
no thought of taking any Mexican territory. -
The CHAIRMAN. We practically had no Army then. We did not
have any Army in 1845 and did not have any in 1812, so that the
military spirit was not responsible for any of those wars.
§
878 PREPAIRED NESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
Mr. WILLARD. You had aggression right then and there. Perhaps
the military spirit was not responsible for it. . It was the slave power
that was behind that aggression, the desire for more land to plant
cotton on. If you are going to have these tremendous forces and
center them under an Executive who can make war, as the President
did at Vera Cruz, and as we know McKinley did in suppressing the dis-
patch of Woodford the night before he sent his message to Congress,
in which Woodford stated that the Queen had made every concession,
you are asking the country to take great risks. We are patriotic
and loyal Americans, and we have thought a good deal about these
things and the life and future of our Republic and the maintenance
of our liberties is just as dear to us as anybody else. But we believe
that if you are going to create this great machinery of war a day will
come when you will have a President who will use it, and, as President
Wilson himself said in his speech the other day, speaking about these
experts, said that we must not have a large Regular Army, because
then you will have all these experts, and when you get a class of ex-
perts, they want to be expert, and that would not do in this country,
so I am opposed to it. -
Senator WARREN. Did I understand you to say that McKinley
brought on the war with Spain?
Mr. WILLARD. I think he was responsible.
Senator WARREN. On both sides of the chamber it has been said
that Congress pushed us into it.
Mr. VILLARD. If you accept what Minister Woodford said many
times to me, that if President McKinley had produced the dispatch,
of which very few of the American people are aware to-day, which
was not known until five years after the war, but is now in the official
documents, that dispatch which Woodford sent the day before the
President sent his message to Congress, on which Congress acted,
in which Woodford stated that the Queen surrendered on every
point, then Mr. McKinley is responsible.
Senator WARREN. I was in Congress at the time, and I was one
of those who did not want war, one of those who thought I was quite
conversant with affairs in the executive offices at that time, and I
can say to you that Congress pushed that war, as Senator Newlands
from the Democratic side said the other day that the Democratic
Party pushed them into it.
Mr. WILLARD. But if that dispatch had been produced -
Senator WARREN. That is simply the judgment of Woodford.
Senator CATRON. You stated, I believe, in answer to Senator
Weeks, that you would have the Army the same as it was before the
Civil War. -
Mr. WILLARD. No, sir; before the Spanish War.
Senator CATRON. That was only 25,000 men. What would you do
with that Army'. What is the use of keeping it if it is not adequate
for defense 2
Mr. VILLARD. We have never had an Army that was adequate for
defense. I should have some of it employed in great industrial
undertakings, and I should have it used as Gen. Miles used it in
1894. . The fact that the Federal troops had to go to Chicago in 1894
was what sent a great many of us into the Massachusetts Militia and
other militia, because we felt that a national police force was neces-
sary. Pacifist as I am, I recognize that you must have a police
PREPAIREDINESS FOR, NATIONAL DEFENSE. 879
force in any country. I deny that the simile holds between a police
force in a city and a national Army.
Senator CATRON. Do you think the Army ought to be used as a
police force 7. - -
Mr. VILLARD. To uphold domestic order, precisely as required by
the Constitution. - -
ciº WARREN. You approve Cleveland's call of the Army to
IC3, O'O % • º
Mr.” VILLARD. I certainly do. The Constitution obligates the
Federal Government to maintain troops in order to keep domestic
peace, and as long as that is true the Federal Government has to
have an Army, which is a police force, and that is all that our Army
ever was, and that is all it is to-day.
Senator CATRON. It has been demonstrated that a thousand Fed-
eral Soldiers can put down any riot Or any trouble that has ever
come. Why would you keep 25,000? -
Mr. VILLARD. It is a convenient figure. You could use them for
industrial undertakings, as I have said. If that is too large, I should
be the first to be willing to reduce the figure to 10,000. -
Senator WEEKs. I think you make a mistake in assuming that
military service or training creates militarism. There are Senator
Warren and Senator Catron, both of whom served throughout the
Civil War. I was educated for the naval service and served a good
many years, first and last. I think you will fail to find three more
peace-loving men than we are, or more desirous to maintain peace.
Mr. WILLARD. My own father went all through the Civil War. He
was as ardent a peace man as you could find, and he was com-
mended for gallantry under fire, not once, but many times, during
the Civil War, although he was not a soldier. He was a corre-
spondent. With the elder generation who served in the Civil War,
you will find that true. But with the new group of men, the War
College, general-staff crowd, you do find men who are preaching doc-
trines that are utterly un-American and are extremely dangerous,
and, as a result, you have your Navy League, who voice that a good
deal, you have some of the officers who are going around the country
doing nothing else but preach militarism.
Senator WEEKs. They are not preaching militarism; they are
preaching what they conceive to be an adequate navy. -
Mr. VILLARD. It leads directly to it. They are preaching universal
service, for one thing, which leads directly to militarism. If you
have universal service, you have militarism.
Senator WARREN. How do you feel about the Swiss system º Do
you believe that that nation is more military because of their com-
pulsory education and training of all the people than otherwise ? -
Mr. VILLARD. No, I do not. But their situation is entirely dif-
ferent from ours. They are a little bit of a homogeneous people,
although they speak three different languages. They have a peculiar
territory, practically all mountainous, and we have an entirely
different state of affairs. We have a great continent. We have
great changes of climate, and different groups of population, and
I believe the adoption of the Swiss system in this country would
make us a militaristic nation.
23380—PT 17—16—3
880 PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
Senator WEEKs. I am pretty familiar with military men, and espe-
cially with naval men, personally, and I have never heard a man in
our military service who advocated war for the sake of war. They
have conceptions of what should be a proper means of defense, and
when they are asked they perform their duty by so stating.
Mr. WILLARD. I have never heard any who advocated war for war's
sake. I have heard men out of the Army advocate war, politicians,
on the ground that there would not remain any virile citizens if
we did not occasionally have bloodletting. I have never heard an
Army officer go to that extreme; but I say that the things they are
advocating, if adopted, would lead right up to the militaristic condi-
tion in this country, and my belief is due simply to the history of the
world, the history of every army, and my own observation in Europe.
You take the branch of my own family in Germany. The elder gen-
eration, my father's contemporaries, were all distinguished officers
who served through the Franco-Prussian war, and those men were
not any more militaristic than the veterans of our Civil War, than
Gen. Miles, or these distinguished Senators here. Their children,
south Germans, who have been educated at Berlin and educated by
the general staff and the war college believe in war for war's sake,
and in a lifetime this change has come about in Germany, and I think
I see many evidences of it here. For instance, you take the demand
in “The Seven Seas,” the organ of the Navy League, that Congress-
man Kitchin should not be allowed to speak on the floor of the House
because of his “unpatriotic and treasonable” attitude.
Senator WEEKs. Of course, that is silly.
Mr. VILLARD. That is silly. .
Senator WEEKs. That does not deserve an answer or consideration.
Mr. VILLARD. Those people who wrote that, backing the Navy
League, can put up thousands of dollars.
The CHAIRMAN. Will not that same spirit evince itself in any great
issue that comes up, whether it refers to the military organization
or not
Mr. WILLARD. I have not seen anything like it outside; I do not
know anything you can compare to it.
The CHAIRMAN. The abolitionists in slavery days took very rabid
views, and the slavery people took a very decided stand on the other
side, each trying to suppress the other.
Mr. VILLARD. If you are going to be historical, that is very true.
I thought you meant comparing it with some present sentiment.
The CHAIRMAN. No; on any question that comes up before the
people there are extremists on either side who would suppress the
freedom of the press. *
Mr. VILLARD. There is the New York Times, which came out the
other day and said that anybody who gets up and says that the
country should not have any preparedness must not be allowed to
utter such treasonable sentiments. Six months ago it was speaking
of the militarist agitation in the United States. You have the
entering wedge there. You have the spirit evinced by Gen. Wood
in getting the Postmaster General to suppress this alleged libel by
Jack London. - -
The chairman called my attention to the fact that London denies.
it, but whether he denies it or not, the fact is there that you have a
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 88.1
major general in the Regular Army asking the Postmaster General
to put that out of the mails, and the Postmaster General did so.
What civilian class would think of doing such a thing?
The CHAIRMAN. If a paper was gaining circulation through the
mails that reflected on any of our institutions, and vitally threatened
them, would you not at least want to have it suppressed, so far as
your name was concerned 2
Mr. VILLARD. No, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. You would allow a libel or a falsehood to be
circulated over your name 2
Mr. VILLARD. The courts are there to deal with libels. When an
outrageous slander like that goes around, it defeats itself, and that
was the folly of Gen. Wood's action. It was the usual dull military
mind at work. What was the immediate result 2 The immediate
result was that just as soon as the American newspapers, that had
never heard of this libel, immediately printed it as a matter of news,
it had the widest circulation, which it never would have had if Gen.
Wood had not said anything about it.
Senator WARREN. Your combativeness all comes out through your
articles in the newspaper, and I do not know but what they are as
much responsible for this war feeling as anything, and any class of
people. Has that ever occurred to you?
- Mr. VILLARD. My own combativeness?
Senator WARREN. I am just speaking generally. I think you
generally do your part, Of course, you have a vigorous newspaper,
and attack anything you wish to attack.
Mr. VILLARD. I hope so.
Senator WARREN. I think every newspaper man has a pride in
that, and each newspaper man thinks nothing should be suppressed.
Senator CATRON. Then your idea is, Mr. Villard, that we should
have practically no preparedness?
Mr. WILLARD. That is my idea. I consider the greatest prepared-
ness is the preparedness of unarmed righteousness.
Senator CATRON. You are on the other side—in favor of putting
the Army out of existence # - - -
Mr. VILLARD. I refer to the historic American condition, the condi-
tion under which we lived prior to 1898; yes, sir. I go further and
say that if you think preparedness should come, in your wisdom that
we should have preparedness, then I ask of you that you do not build
on a foundation which is not efficient, which one might almost say
is rotten, and my information on that comes to me from a number of
officers who feel very strongly. .
Senator CATRON. You refer to the continental army .
Mr. VILLARD. Not only that but the building up of the Regular
Army on the present basis. -
Senator WARREN. How about the Navy'.
Mr. WILLARD. I have always understood the Navy to be extremely
efficient. I am not one of those who runs down the American Navy.
I am not one of those who says the American Navy would be defeated,
as Gen. Wood said here the other day, no matter with whom we go to
war, inside of what did he say—six weeks 3
Senator CATRON. They say we are the fourth power in naval
strength. I do not know where they get that.
882 PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
Mr. VILLARD. I have no disposition to run down the Navy. Sena-
tor Weeks seemed to think I was attributing this demand for pre-
paredness entirely to yellow journals and hysteria. I have not done
so consciously. I have not intended to. I realize there are a great
many high-minded, well-intentioned persons who really and sincerely
believe in it—mistakenly, I think. But I say that a great part of it
is hysteria, due to these unprecedented conditions in the countries
beyond the seas. I maintain it is no more wise to go into a complete
reorganization of the national policy in such a period of hysteria than
it would have been to reconstruct our currency during the panic of
1893 or the panic of 1907. We waited 25 years. We took thousands
of pages of testimony. We had one monetary commission after
another, and finally we got a condition of financial preparedness
which stood the test when the shock came—the greatest shock the
world has ever seen—and we took it up and met it.
Senator WARREN. To what shock do you refer as the greatest shock?
Mr. VILLARD. At the outbreak of the world war. For 10 days or
2 weeks no one knew what was going to happen. I mean when the
general international collapse took place, with the outbreak of the
war, we met it in a remarkable way. That was a great piece of con-
structive statesmanship, according to my ideas. The feeling that I
have is that if you decide you must go into preparedness, that you go
about it slowly, and that you study it, and that you take the best
there is to be had, and that you put such checks upon it and upon the
propaganda of the officers as will prevent us from getting militaristic.
I think when you consider the different attitude of the service to-day
toward these things and what it was prior to 1898, you must admit
that we have some ground for uneasiness.
May I just remind you that Maj. Gen. Wotherspoon, when he retired
as Chief of Staff of the Army a year ago last December, was given a
great dinner here by the two or three hundred Army officers stationed
here, who wished to say farewell to him on his retirement to the
retired list, and what did he say to those officers who were assembled
there? He said, “I can give you ino more solemn warning than to
beg of you to keep away from the Halls of Congress and leave legis-
lation alone.” Those are my words, but that was in substance what
he said.
Senator WEEKs. You do not think that our financial preparedness
was due to the Federal reserve act, do you ?
Mr. WILLARD. It had not gone into effect at that time. But it led
up to a condition that had influenced public sentiment. I think that
came just in the nick of time. I think its going into effect immediately
afterwards was very helpful; do you not ?
Senator WEEKs. I think the Aldrich-Vreeland act had the entire
effect at that time. My own judgment is that the Federal reserve
act—which I am a supporter of, as perhaps you know—had very
little to do with that preparation. º
Mr. VILLARD. We had been working up to this thing for a period
of years, had we not ?
Senator WEEKs. Oh, yes; you are quite right about that.
Mr. VILLARD. You did it not in the excitement of a panic.
Senator WEEKs. We never would have done it if it had not been for
the panics, and they drove us to it finally.
Senator WARREN. The panics of the past; yes.
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 883
Mr. WILLARD. You are having a panic now on national prepared-
ness. If you are going to legislate on this matter, as I hope you are
not, we ask that you go at it in exactly the same way, deliberately
and carefully considering, and not building on a foundation which is
not sound. e
Senator WEEKs. You try to trust us for that.
Mr. VILLARD. Senator Newlands has proposed a joint commission
to study the whole thing from the point of view that I presume you
have not been able to study it from, namely, from the point of view
of the whole thing—the Navy, the Army, and the coast defense.
Senator WARREN. He has asked that at a time when the committees
of the House and Senate are in session, when our duties are about all
we can handle. -
Mr. VILLARD. Yes, sir; I appreciate that.
(Thereupon, at 4.35 o'clock p. m., the committee took a recess until
tomorrow, Thursday, February 3, 1916, at 2 o’clock p. m.)
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 3, 1916.
UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON MILITARY AFFAIRs,
Washington, D. C.
The committee met, at the expiration of the recess, at 2 o’clock
p.m., Senator Geo. E. Chamberlain (chairman) presiding.
STATEMENT OF BRIG, GEN. CLARENCE R. EDWARDS, UNITED
• , STATES ARMY.
The CHAIRMAN. Gen. Edwards, will you give to the stenographer
your name, rank, and present tour of duty :
Gen. EDWARDS. C. R. Edwards, brigadier general, United States
Army; at present in command of the United States troops in the
Canal Zone.
The CHAIRMAN. This committee has had under consideration for
some time the question of reorganization of the Army and kindred
subjects, and I assume that you have read the bills and know what
the committee is considering. We should be pleased to hear from
you in any way you may care to discuss the subject.
Gen. EDWARDS. Senator, I should be very glad to give my views.
I have only just arrived here, and unfortunately I have not been able
to read all of the various bills through, nor have I been able to read
the hearings; I have just glanced at one or two.
The CHAIRMAN. Were you ever called upon at any time by the
War Department to give a statement of your views on the subject 3
Gen. EDWARDS. I was, sir. -
h The CHAIRMAN. It might be well if you could give us that, if you
have it.
Gen. EDWARDS. All right, sir. I can submit it. I was called upon,
as were all the other general officers to present my views upon the
organization of the Army and the preparations for the defense of
the United States, and I have such report that fully comprehends
my views as to the proposed organization. I think the date of that
report was May 1.
Senator CATRON. May 1, last year?
Gen. EDWARDS. Of last year, sir. I shall be glad to submit it as
now comprehending my views, and I should like to emphasize por-
tions of it that I think are necessary, and to mention specially the
evolution that has taken place since I made that report.
I should like to state, like any other officer of equal service and
age—and I have served some 36 years as an officer—that I have always
885
886 PREPAIRED NIESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
felt that the most essential thing for the defense of our country and
its economic uplift was the universal citizenship training of the
youth. I felt that it was possibly a visionary ideal in that, when,
like other officers, I have trembled for the safety of this country,
knowing its absolute unpreparedness, I have felt that nothing but
a national disaster which was sure to come would ever make us fully
awake to the absolute necessity of this citizenship training. So,
being away for three years, I come back with a perfect delight to
see the attention and heed that is given to that proposition.
I believe that nothing in the world could contribute more to the
economic uplift and well-being of this country, irrespective of its
admitted military advantages, than such a system of training. I
believe it is the most democratic act that could be passed in the
interest of preparedness. I believe that the expense would be
justified by the lessening of crime and the bettering of morals and
the improvement of sanitation and sanitary conditions. I believe
the essential principle of it is that manhood suffrage means manhood
obligations, and if that principle obtains no man however wealthy
can hire a substitute to protect his life or be killed in his stead, and
that nothing would be better for the Government. .
Any amount of arguments might be mentioned in advocacy of this
measure, and I trust that the agitation will go on. I understand that
you, Senator, have introduced a bill embodying these principles,
and I think it is most important legislation, and I think it is the
only real solution, considering the menace that is before us.
In the meantime, something has got to be done. Were this uni-
versal citizenship training to obtain, all the fancied objections to its
inauguration would be wiped away in a year's time, and I am sure
it would be successful. But, however, as I say, something in the
meantime must be done, and the first thing to approach is the Organ-
ization of the Regular Army, putting it on a sound basis, and the
using of the plant for training and for turning out reserves. I know
enough about your bill, Senator, and your reorganization of the
Army, to indorse its provisions. .
The CHAIRMAN. That is, the one I proposed ? -
Gen. EDWARDS. The one which proposed organizing divisions of
the Regular Army. My plan that you direct me to submit, will
show that I am in accord with most of its provisions. My plan pro-
vides for seven divisions, four at home, three in the outlying pos-
sessions; a division reinforced with Coast Artillery in Panama,
giving about 25,000 men.
- Senator DU PONT. General, when you speak of divisions, of course,
that is exclusive of the Coast Artillery'
Gen. EDWARDs. Exclusive of the Coast Artillery and the Cavalry
divisions. *
Senator DU PONT. That is what I supposed.
Gen. EDWARDS. In Panama I would recommend at least 25,000
men as the irreducible minimum for safety.
Senator DU Pont. How many of those would be Coast Artillery'
Gen. EDWARDs. There would be 21 batteries. That would make
probably about 3,000 men. The division would be 22,000 strong,
plus an additional regiment of Field Artillery of heavier calibers,
with the primary arm, the excellent 4.7 field gun. I would put at
least a division in Hawaii, and then I would assign a division for the
PREPAREDNIESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE, 887
Philippines and Guam. That absorbs 27 regiments of Infantry and
the largest proportion of Field Artillery, Cavalry, Coast Artillery,
and the technical troops.
Senator DU PONT. General, speaking of the largest proportion of
Field Artillery, how many field guns, in your opinion, should there be
to a thousand muskets in a jºi military force :
Gen. EDWARDS. I would hope to get five per thousand.
Senator DU Pont. That is rather low, from the experience of the
European war, is it not ? -
Gen. EDWARDS. I would like more.
Senator DU PONT. At least five 3 -
Gen. EDWARDS. I would like to have at least five.
Senator CATRON. What do you think would be the most effective
number if you could get what you wanted 3
Gen. EDWARDS. From the lessons of the European war, I think six
or seven would not be an excessive number.
Senator DU PONT. General, do you not think that, in view of the
fact that the militia, if called on, must largely consist of Infantry,
that our regular Field Artillery should be in larger proportion to the
thousand muskets' Because, naturally, the militia have compara-
tively few field batteries, and there would be difficulty about their
horses, you know.
Gen. EDWARDS. Senator, I would like to answer that question as
I come along by giving my views of the disposition of the militia. I
think it will come in there better than in any other way.
This scheme that is comprehended in this report that you ask me
to submit will show that I advocate a system of reserves to equal in
six years the strength of my proposed Regular Army. The scheme
provided for their localization, their paper mobilization, the ease .
with which the reservists are kept track of, and their complete pro-
visional Organization.
G. ARRISON S OF OUR OUTTLYING POSSESSIONS.
The possessions here considered are Alaska, the Philippines, the
Canal Zone, the Hawaiian Islands, Guam, Porto Rico, and Guan-
tanamo. In some degree in all cases and in a great degree in some
cases our national defense (defense of the homeland) is dependent
upon the defense of these possessions. To each of them the general
rule is applicable that it should be adequately garrisoned at all times
for defense or else left wholly undefended. Any intermediate course
represents weakness and waste. The military reinforcement of any
of them involved in any given war after war has become a fact must
be accepted as so improbable as to be beyond consideration. It is
important then that the necessary garrisons be determined accurately
and thereafter maintained complete at all times. And in none of
them should fixed guns and defensive works be installed unless these
are to be accompanied or immediately followed by sufficient mobile
troops for their complete defense.
I have been stationed for considerable periods in the Philippines,
Oahu, and Panama under conditions that have made the study of
their defense a necessity. I have been connected with nearly all of
the possessions named in a way that made familiarity with them a
part of my duty. I have personally visited all of them except
888 PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
Alaska. My recommendations for their garrisons are based upon
direct knowledge and careful study, but they are supported as well by
the judgment of every qualified observer who has had opportunity to
study the matter directly and with whom I have been able to consult.
Considering the possessions separately in the order named, I recom-
mend permanent garrisons as follows:
Alaska: No garrison; for the present no land defense. This is not
because Alaska presents no military problem or is not seriously
important to our national defense and not a tempting prize in itself to
an enemy, but because under the general rule laid down anything less
than complete defense will be complete waste, and the maintenance
there in peacé of a sufficient army for complete defense must be con-
sidered out of the question. The railroad construction now in
progress and the development of its coal and copper resources will
eventually make the garrisoning of Alaska, at least to the extent of a
securely defended base there, a necessity, but with our more pressing
needs elsewhere this must be neglected for the present.
Senator DU PONT. General, could you tell us how large the Phil-
ippine Constabulary is . t
Gen. EDWARDS. I have not had anything to do with them for three
years. I think it is about 5,000 troops now.
Senator WARREN. It never exceeded 7,000%
Senator DU Pont. That is, the Philippine Scouts?
Gen. EDWARDs. The Philippine Scouts, 5,000; and the Philippine
Constabulary used to be 7,000. I recommended to Secretary Dick-
inson, when I last accompanied him there in 1910 or 1911—I strongly
urged the combination of those two forces. As I recall, I showed
that a million dollars would be saved by the United States. I showed
that the constabulary was a fine mobile force; they did not have im-
pedimenta, and their value as Scouts was enhanced. Combining them
with the scouts, you would have a concrete insular arm, which would
be a reserve to the Regular Army. At the same time I advocated
that the commanding general in the Philippine Islands be a member
of the Philippine Commission, having to do with the defense of the
islands. I think both forces would be better, and I think the ex-
pense would be much less. -
Senator WARREN. Do you happen to remember as to the Moros,
whether they are in the constabulary or the scouts, or both }
Gen. EDWARDS. Both.
Senator WARREN. They are known as Filipinos, although a distinct
people?
Gen. FIDWARDs. Yes, sir.
Senator DU Pont. There are 10,000 Philippine Scouts'
Gen. EDWARDS. Fifty-two companies, I think.
Senator DU PONT. Seven thousand authorized by law . -
Gen. EDWARDs. I think that we got a total force, which I thought
was adequate, of 8,000 men.
Senator DU PONT. Both combined'
Gen. EDWARDS. Both combined.
Senator DU PoWT. You would organize this force as a regiment 7
Gen. EDWARDs. Yes; I thinkso. I call it an insular army. I would
make it very elastic and I would leave it to the commanding general
there, who was responsible to the Government and the commission,
for the defense of the islands. It recognizes the same thing that the
|
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 889
English have found an excellent thing; that is, the comprehension
#. the governing body of all the various elements. It eliminates
riction.
Senator CATRON. How is this Philippine Constabulary?
Gen. EDWARDS. They are excellent troops, sir.
Senator CATRON. How are they organized?
Gen. EDWARDS. They are a great deal like the Marine Corps organ-
zation. It lies with the chief of constabulary, with the consent of
the Secretary, under whom he is serving, to determine the strength,
and they are a very mobile force in that they live on the country and
have a certain allowance for their rations. They are not loaded
down with impedimenta, and they fulfill their needs. They do have
posse comitatus status, and they do exercise police duties, and they
are especially valuable in putting into effect quarantine measures
and other civil measures. -
Senator CATRON. Are they in regiments, battalions, and divisions?
Gen. EDWARDS. Districts, as a rule, and they serve under a district
commander. e .
h Senator CATRON, What kind and grade or rank of officers do they
ave
Gen. EDWARDs. They have very few Filipinos. The way we
organized the force was that we took Army officers, four of them—
a brigadier general and three colonels—and then we took some excel-
lent volunteers, and one of them finally reached the rank of colonel.
There are only one or two now, I believe. Then the insular bureau
went to all these colleges at which there were officers and asked them
to nominate men that they would recommend, and we made them
at the time third lieutenants. They had the small salary of
$900 a year, and we put them into a finishing school when we got them
there. I say to you gentlemen that they were as fine a lot of young
men as I have seen anywhere.
It is of interest only in showing how we could get reserve officers
and officers of volunteers. The service of many of these men has been
so brilliant, and some of them on account of the lack of career in the
constabulary, that they have been transferred over, after exami-
nation, into lieutenants of the Regular Army, and they make as
fine officers as we have.
The CHAIRMAN. Are they natives' --
Gen. EDWARDs. No; they are Americans. Whenever a native is
efficient they cover him into it, and a great many natives are in there.
I have lost touch; I have been away so long. -
Senator DU Pont. A great many negroes were discharged who were
over there, were they not ?
Gen. EDWARDS. Yes, sir.
Senator DU Pont. It was the discharged soldiers of the colored
troops who stayed there 7
Gen. EDWARDS. No, sir; it was the white noncommissioned officers
who were promoted into the scouts.
Senator CATRON. They have a full complement of officers for a full
company, up to a captain?
Gen. EDWARDS. Yes, sir. I think they no longer have the third
lieutenants. They just have the first and second ieutenants.
. The Philippines: The military problem in the Philippines and their
place in our national defense are not dissimilar to Alaska. Their
890 . PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
complete defense, even so far as a sufficient and practical naval base
is concerned is impossible without the presence of a force greater
than we can now maintain there. In the event of war involving
them we must expect them to permit their occupation by the enemy,
if he so desires, and to leave their final status to be settled in the
treaty of peace. There is another phase, however, of the Philippine
situation. The presence of a reasonable force is desired for moral
effect. As a base of supply in peace the Philippines have proved
their worth both to the Kºy and the Navy. Having troops there,
it must be expected in the event of war that they will make such
resistance as possible. The existing plan contemplates their final
withdrawal to Corregidor, which is being prepared accordingly to
withstand siege operations. Held thus, moreover, Corregidor can
probably for the time being prevent the occupation of the Manila
roadstead by the enemy's fleet, and keep it open for our own in the
event of its arrival during the war. In view of all the conditions thus
presented I recommend the continuance there of a garrison practically
as now maintained. I suggest, however, that one squadron of Cav-
alry be withdrawn and the remaining squadrons mounted on native
ponies. Neither in the Philippines nor in any of the outlying pos-
sessions considered can Cavalry ever act or be required to act in its
historical rôle. As mounted Infantry it can serve an important
purpose... . e * &
In addition to the American garrison there are now 52 companies
of Philippine Scouts. I believe that these should be combined with
the #. Constabulary as an insular force for police as well as
military purposes. If this is done the commanding general of the
Philippine Department should be made by law an officer of the local
overnment in charge of the police and defense of the islands. This
force would then be available and certainly be necessary for the final
defense of Corregidor. - *.
Canal Zone: The importance of the Panama Canal in our system of
national defense can not be overestimated. Its protection should be
absolute. Heavy, fixed guns, no matter how many or large, can
never do this alone. Without sufficient mobile troops to defend the
canal here from land attack the guns already mounted are not merely
a weakness, they are a positive danger to us in the event of war.
In my judgment, the present mobile garrison, and the garrison con-
templated by all existing plans known to us, are deficient and in the
face of a determined attack can never serve the purpose expected of
them. The minimum garrison recommended is shown in the table
which follows this discussion.
There is a more or less prevalent belief that the jungle of the Canal
Zone will prove, in the event of war involving attack on the canal, a
military factor in our favor through the difficulties an enemy will
encounter in making his way through it. I am convinced, and all
officers here who have reconnoitered the surrounding country agree
with me, that the idea that the jungle will prove a greater handi-
cap to an advancing enemy than to our defending troops must be
discarded. I believe, indeed, in case of an enemy's advance on the
canal even through the country where the jungle is thickest, that
the cover thereby afforded him would far more than compensate him
for the difficulties of cutting his way through. Efficient mobile
defense of the canal must eventually demand throughout the zone
PREPAREDNIESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 89]
a road and trail system that will permit thorough reconnoissance and
prompt and free communication and movement by the defending
mobile troops. But this is far from all. At a distance of from 7 to
20 miles from the axis of the canal on the Pacific side the country
is not only free from jungle and the Ordinary tropical growths, but
it is as open as are ports of New Mexico and Lower California.
There an enemy is offered every facility for landing mobile forces
and reaching by easy marches the vitals of the canal—the Miraflores
and Pedro Miguel Locks. The most casual reflection by any military
student familiar with the facts should show that we must never let
an enemy approach within 10 miles of the locks if we are to save the
canal. The only way an enemy's attack in this region could be effec-
tively met would be through a well-devised system of information
that would permit opposition, first, at the point of landing and there-
after, if driven back, through the successive occupations of positions
selected in advance for the advantage they would offer to the defend-
ing troops. That is the most practicable line of attack for an enemy
on the Pacific side, and in the military problem it presents the
jungle is in mowise involved. .
Senator DU PONT. Is there any jungle on United States territory
Gen. EDWARDS. Yes; and beyond the zone limits, also, some of it.
In another way the Canal Zone presents a situation not found in the
same degree in any other of our overseas possessions. The canal is
the sole reason for the political existence of the zone itself. The
strip of territory which constitutes the zone has no other purpose
than to insure the efficient operation and defense of the canal. By
act of Congress its lands have been expropriated and the zone depop-
ulated. Outside of the hotel for tourists and visitors i t each terminal
of the canal no one can live in the zone except the troops and the
employees of the United States. The contemplated permanent
force of these civil employees is from 2,000 to 2,500 whites and 10,000,
blacks. They and their families may be counted as the permanent
population of the zone. Their occupation is dependel t upon the con-
tinued operation of the canal and their welfare and the welfare of
their families upon its successful defense in case of attack. In the
event of war likely to involve the canal, indeed, it is probable that
many of them would volunteer for and be mustered iſ to the military
service of the United States. If so, it would appear wise to insure
º for this emergency by training those physically fit as
ar as practicable in advance of the need for their services. I rec-
ommend legislation, therefore, that shall require all male civilian
employees of the canal of suitable age and physical condition to obli-
gate themselves, as a condition of their ..º. to volunteer for
military service in defense of the canal in the event of emergency de-
manding them; and in preparation for this to offer themselves for a
period of at least two months training during the first two years of
their employment and thereafter for 10 days each year. The volun-
teer force, if provided, would not take the place of the regular garrison
proposed, nor make any reduction in my estimate of the regular garrison
required for the defense of the canal. , Wholly or in part it would
merely supplement this force in time of serious emergency.
Senator BECKHAM. Why is it that they can not live in the zone
Gen. EDWARDS. Because of an act of Congress. -
892 PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
Senator CATRON. You suggest, I believe, that those people are all
employees on the canal, drawing some kind of pay or salary, are they
not - -
Gen. EDWARDS. Yes, sir; a salary which is at least 25 per cent
higher than they can get in this country.
Senator CATRON. If they should volunteer and should be drilled
two months of the year, would you have their pay go on all the same 3
Gen. EDWARDS. I never worked out the details of the plan, sir.
The canal is very generous with leaves of absence there. They find it
economically wise to keep up a man's health and vigor. My propo-
sition would be to extend that leave of absence along, I think, for a
couple of years, to use that part of their leave for the military train-
ing that is necessary. As I recall it, there are some 600 old soldiers,
excellent men, now serving as civilians on the canal. g
The CHAIRMAN. Civil War veterans? -
Gen. EDWARDs. No, sir; discharged soldiers from the Regular
Army and the Navy; and they occupy very important positions.
They show a good deal of patriotism and interest, and they rather
advocate this extra obligation. I go so far as to state that every
man on that canal, other than visitors, should owe that obligation to
the United States. Either he should be an officer or enlisted man in
the Regular Army or he should be an officer or enlisted man of the
Regular Army reserves, and that would be conditioned or contingent
upon his remaining there. The Army has to go there. These other
men do not have to go there, and it should be a condition of their con-
tract, because they are given 25 per cent more pay in their positions
than they could get in the United States; which is not true of the
Army. They get no foreign service pay whatever, and the condi-
tions there are quite as onerous as they are in the Philippines, where
that consideration is given them. - -
Hawaiian Islands: What I have said above in respect to the im-
portance of the Canal Zone in any system of national defense and the
necessity for providing complete protection applies with equal force
and almost word for word to Oahu. The existing and contemplated
garrison is seriously deficient in strength and the guns now emplaced
are a danger to us until supported by sufficient mobile troops. -
In a lesser degree Oahu presents a condition not unrelated to the
situation on the Canal Zone. Many civilians are living there in peace
and contentment due to the fact that the island is under the American
flag and that a considerable garrison of American troops is there
maintained. The right of the United States to the service of every
such qualified civilian in war is undoubted. I believe, therefore, that
every American citizen there who is physically sound and of military
age should be required to render military service in the islands in the
event of war, and that legislative authority should provide at the
same time for the enlistment of friendly aliens who may volunteer in
the time of emergency. In this event opportunity should be afforded
for training for periods no greater than those suggested above for the
Canal Zone. - - - . . .
Senator DU Pont. You mentioned danger. I ask this question,
so that it may be clearly understood by a nonmilitary º You
mean, I presume, that this danger consists in that you would lose
those guns and they would be used against you? . . . *
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 893
Gen. EDWARDS. Surely; and it would make it just so much harder
for ... to capture the place. It is just like the situation in Los Angeles
to-day. -
Existing official plans do not include Guam as a link in our
chain of defenses. I believe that it should be so included, and
that recent events in the Pacific have shown this beyond question.
Its defense I think would be comparatively easy. And with the
Panama Canal, Oahu (Hawaiian Islands), and Guam securely held,
our own western coast would have better defense from attack from a
Pacific power than any number of harbor defenses on our own coast
could ever hope to provide. -
C Senator DU Pont. Is Guam garrisoned by the Navy or the Marine
orps ?
Gen. EDWARDs. It is not garrisoned at all; it is under the Navy's
control. They used to have a few marines there, but they have been
taken away.
Senator DU PONT. So they do not have any garrison at all?
: General EDWARDS. The Navy, I find, is pretty near a unit in the
belief that Guam is the most important base on account of its
location. -
Senator CATRON. It has a good harbor, has it not
Gen. EDWARDS. Yes, sir; they say it is a very good harbor. I am
not very wise about that. I understand it is a very good harbor and
it is very easily defended. ** -
Senator DU Pont. Are there any fortifications there of any kind?
. . Gen. EDWARDs. No, sir. -
Senator DU PONT. It is entirely unfortified ? - .
Gen. EDWARDS. Yes, sir; it is the place, you know, in the Spanish-
American War, where that commanding officer came out when he was
º and said that he was sorry that he could not return the
Salute. - -
In regard to Porto Rico: Without a naval base and without fortifica-
tions Porto Rico raises no problem of moment; and with a base main-
tained elsewhere in the same vicinity—Guantanamo–it may for the
present at least be neglected. No mobile force can therefore be re-
arded as a military necessity. Thereis maintained there now the Porto
ico Regiment of two battalions of native troops. This regiment has
fulfilled such important functions in our development of the island
and is an institution in which the islanders take such just pride that
I should hesitate to recommend its disbandment, even were there no
military reasons for its existence. But I think such reason can be
found. If a proper reserve system be established and its principles
applied to the Porto Rico Regiment, it would be possible within a
few years, with the third active battalion added to the existing regi-
ment, to organize two reserve regiments with which the active regi-
ment could, in an emergency, be immediately mobilized as a brigade:
While not definitely to be counted upon, under certain conditions of
attack this brigade might be thrown promptly either into Guanta-
namo or the Canal Zone to supplement the garrison there. If this
F. be adopted in its entirety, I recommend therefore that the third
attalion be added to this regiment and that thereafter one battalion,
changed at proper intervals, be kept always on duty in the Canal Zone.
Senator DU PoWT. Have you any personal knowledge of those two
battalions of Porto Rican troops?
894 PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
Gen. EDWARDs. Yes, sir.
Senator DU PONT. What kind of troops are they
Gen. EDWARDs. Excellent.
Senator DU Pont. In your opinion would it be wise not only to
increase those two battalions to a regiment, but to have a Porto "
Porto Rican brigade, about three regiments? -
Gen. EDWARDs. I think it would be a good idea to do that. They
could be sent to the Panama Canal if we did not want them there.
Senator DU PONT. That is what I have contended. -
Gen. EDWARDS. It is a very good idea, Senator, also to put a bat-
tery of artillery down there.
Senator DU Pont. Yes; it ought to be there.
Senator CATRON. Have we any coast defenses around San Juan 3
Gen. EDWARDs. Yes, sir, right at San Juan; but they are not relied
upon in the problem of defense. . .
Senator CATRON. Do we need any soldiers there in Porto Rico in
charge of the heavy artillery'.
Gen. EDWARDS. Just in charge of the heavy artillery; there is
no coast artillery there.
Senator DU Pont. There would be no trouble, would there, General,
ºsing right in the islands, enough men to keep three regiments
ull? -
Gen. EDWARDS. I think not. It is the most overpopulated piece.
of ground under the American flag. I do not think there is any
doubt about that.
I might digress here. I think future study will pick out Samana
Bay, on the northeastern part of Santo Domingo, close to the Culebra
Island, as the most excellent advance base, having in view the defense
of Panama and of Key West, that there is anywhere. -
The CHAIRMAN. It has been asserted and denied that Great Britain
has a naval base and also has fortifications on some of these islands
of the West Indies. Do you know whether that is true :
Gen. EDWARDS. I do not know, sir. . I know that they have got
Bermuda and they have Jamaica, large bases right off our shores.
The CHAIRMAN. You do not know whether they are fortified ?
Gen. EDWARDS. Oh, they are fortified.
The CHAIRMAN. Do they keep garrisons there 7
Gen. EDWARDS. Yes, sir; big garrisons there:
The CHAIRMAN. That is what I wanted to know.
Gen. EDWARDS. Oh, yes; they are using it as a point of refuge and
supply for their cruisers now operating from the &. Zone up.
Referring to Samana Bay: If you take the trade map of the world.
it shows that if is on the line of any raiding force that would menace
the Atlantic end of the canal. It can take our entire fleet. It is
the easiest defended harbor in the West Indies. I have been there,
and all I am recommending is that consideration should be given it.
Guantanamo is a nice drill ground for a fleet, but it presents for
defense the same difficulty that Olongapo does over in the Philippine
Islands. It would take such a vast amount of mobile troops to de-
fend the heights in the rear of it which could be approached that I
do not believe anybody in the Army or the Navy will advocate its
fortification. We started to fortify it and that feature of the case
came up and our fortifications were taken away.
PREPAREDN ESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSF. - 895
If Samana Bay should be made our naval base, there is no reason,
under the present conditions, that the Santo Domingo Government
would not turn it over to us. Culebra Island, right near Porto Rico,
is an excellent base for destroyers. Then would come up the question
that you advance, Col. du Pont, in that a brigade of mobile troops,
with artillery, would be the solution of that point. That is what I
was trying to bring out. -
Senator CATRON. How far is it from Guantanamo to Panama ž
Gen. EDWARDS. It requires three days' steaming from Guantanamo
to Panama. - - -
Senator CATRON. How long from Porto Rico—the same distance,
or a little less?
Gen. EDWARDS. A little less; yes, sir.
Senator CATRON. Two and a half days, I suppose?
Gen. EDWARDS. Yes, sir.
As to Guantanamo: So far as known to me, present plans contem-
plate the defense of this base by naval means alone.
Our plans for harbor defense for the entire country and its outlying
bossessions should be given the most exacting revisions. Existing
Ortifications cover many places where no possible enemy would
attack; places liable to attack are covered by works improperly
located and improperly armed. All these useless fortifications
should be abandoned; obsolete armament should be scrapped; and
such important centers as are finally and properly selected for defense
should be fortified and armed against both sea and land attack,
Unless fortified and armed against both, they should be fortified
against neither. - -
There are only a few of the centers on the homeland. We can
not, under present conditions, hope to prevent an enemy Securing
some base on our shores provided he is strong enough to land his
forces in the face of such mobile troops as we can throw against him.
It is of present importance, then, only to assure ourselves that the
base secured by him will not be disastrous to us. The capture of
New York, Philadelphia, or Boston might very obviously force the
United States to immediate peace. The capture of Mobile or Gal-
yº even New Orleans or Los Angeles, would not have the same
effect.
Important harbors and cities like Boston, New York, and Wash-
ington on the east coast should then be put as far as possible beyond
the thought of capture. All others should be left undefended so
far as permanent works are concerned and left to other known means
of defense when the emergency shall arise. In my judgment, and in
the judgment of competent artillery officers themselves, there should
under present conditions be no permanent works on the Atlantic
coast south of the mouth of the Chesapeake. On the Pacific coast
only San Francisco and the Columbia River and Puget Sound region
should be defended; but these should be completely defended. San
Francisco affords perhaps one of the best illustratons we have of the
folly of harbor defenses unaccompanied by land defenses of the
same region. - -
It is conceivable of course that, left undefended, Los Angeles might
be occupied by the enemy. Speaking broadly, if an enemy must
land on our Pacific coast, he could not find probably a better place
for our purpose than this. Furthermore, with the Canal Zone, Oahu,
896 PREPAIRED NESS FOR, NATIONAL DEFENSE.
and Guam properly held by us, Los Angeles would have a better
defense than any number of guns mounted on the California coast
could possibly give her. And in any event mounting and manning
heavy guns will never alone save Los Angeles from capture. But
just so much does she offer a more tempting prize to a possible enemy
strong enough in mobile troops to take her, since by so much would
she be the more easily held by them against recapture by us.
The fact that with the Canal Zone, Oahu, and Guam securely held,
a point like Los Angeles on our Pacific coast is better defended than
by guns at her own harbor mouth, shows plainly the difference
between the defense of our outlying and distant bases and the
defense of those homeland. Readiness at all times for complete
defense of these places is essential to defense at home. Whatever
fixed defenses are necessary in them should be installed and fully
manned, but again only when the mobile troops equally essential
to their troops have been provided. .
My recommendation, therefore, is that a study may be made, and
that it be completed in the shortest time, as all the facts are available,
and the study should be made by the Army, which is composed of the
mobile army, and the Coast Artillery, and the Navy. any plans
evolved without the voice of these three factors can be attacked, and
I think that all arms of the service should participate. I therefore
recommend that just as many Coast Artillery companies in excess
of those we now have should be given on the report of the conclusion
of such a study. º
The canal coast artillery emplacement I think is one of the most
magnificent things I have ever seen. The generosity of Congress is
certainly appreciated in this defense. There will be 12 companies of
Coast ºil. shortly there, and it is the purpose of the War Depart-
ment to put 21 in toto, and with a few additions, it is going to be as
fine an emplacement, I think, as exists under the American flag.
Now comes up the important subject of the militia. I wrote this
report on May 1, and as that part relating to militia is just a page
and a half I might read it.
Strength: It is recommended that the strength of the various or—
*ions of the militia remain at the minimum at present prescribed
8, W.
- - 'f this minimum strength be increased, the present difficulty of
recruiting will be multiplied and will make it a burden too great for
the time that can be spared by the average officer of the militia.
With the time at his disposal, the present size of organizations is as
great as the average officer of militia can effectively command and
train. Armory accommodations throughout the country are based
on the present minimum strength of organizations, and their remod-
eling to meet the demands of larger units would entail great expense.
... Organization: It is recommended that the organization of the
militia remain as now prescribed by law, with the proviso that every
effort be made to maintain its various arms in the same proportions
as those of the regular, reserve and volunteer forces suggested in this
report. Under the plan outlined hereafter, the Organization of the
higher units would not affect Federal use of the militia, while this
organization would continue to be of importance in the matter of
State control and administration. . 4. . . . . .
Reserve: No reserve system for the militia is recommended.
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 897
Senator DU PONT. We have had a number of militia officers here
within the last few days, and they seemed to think—notably, the adju-
tants general of the different States—that they would be able to
inaugurate in their States a system of militia reserves consisting of
eople who had served their time, and that it was perfectly feasible.
t seems to me if the States can do it, it is a good plan.
Gen. EDWARDS. I do not believe go, Senator. If I may, I will just
finish this next page, and then I will speak to you about it and you
will see then why I say that.
In this connection, these stubborn facts must be recognized: (1)
The militia is first and always a State force; (2) under the Constitu-
tion, it can not be employed for Federal purposes beyond the bound-
aries of the United States except after a complete change of its iden-
tity from militia to volunteers; and (3) the requirements of service in
the militia and in the volunteers differ j -
Thousands of men are able to reconcile their physical condition,
their business and family relations with the demands of service in the
militia, and are thus enabled to gratify a laudable desire for military
service; whereas, any obligations to comply with the demands of
volunteer service which takes them away from touch with personal
and business interests proves not only a serious embarrassment, but
in many cases a real and tangible obstacle.
For these reasons the militia can not be reckoned upon with suffi-
cient certainty to permit of its organization in advance into units
capable of rapid and complete mobilization.
Organization in its minutest detail is the first essential to modern
civilization. Hence, as an element in the organization of mobilizable
forces, the militia must be disregarded.
However, there remains a large field in which the militia may be
of the greatest value in the matter of national defense. The militia
is a machine capable of imparting, under the most favorable condi-
tions, the elements of military training to a large number of men,
fostering patriotism, and spreading throughout the country a desirable
military spirit and of thus contributing materially to the building up
of an army of partially-trained citizenry. For this purpose, it should
be used both in time of peace and in war for the training of future
volunteers. It should be maintained at all times at its highest
possible standard of efficiency—not as an unorganized, tentative,
volunteer force, but as a highly organized feeder to a properly organ-
ized volunteer force.
Such an arrangement is easily effected without further legislative
change with regard to the militia. It requires no change in either
strength or organization. Under existing law it is possible to lend to
the militia all necessary financial and professional assistance. Noth-
ing further is required but to carry the law into full effect by the
detail of an officer of the Regular Army of suitable rank to each regi-
ment or its equivalent to take active charge of the instruction and
training of its units.
By means of this instruction and training, its officers and men should
be given every opportunity and assistance to qualify themselves for
commissioned and noncommissioned rank in the volunteer organiza-
tion hereafter proposed. As fast as they are able to qualify by passing
a standard, practical examination, they should be appointed and
assigned to the units of this volunteer organization. Such appoint-
898 PREPAIRED NIESS F(.) R. NATIONAL DEFENSE.
ment and assignment would have no effect upon their status as militia-
men until the actual mobilization of the volunteers in case of war.
On the issuance of orders for the mobilization of the volunteers the
militiamen assigned thereto would at Once join their organizations
and take up the work of organizing and training. The militia organ-
izations, with the remaining men who for good and sufficient reasons
are unable to volunteer, would remain intact in their respective
States and become the active recruiting and training force for the
State's quota of volunteers. . When this work has been completed,
these organizations could be further used as a recruiting and training
force for the Army at large or for the recruiting and training of a
second volunteer force.
By such an arrangement those who desire to volunteer in the event
of war are provided with the means of doing so under the most favor-
able circumstances, viz: They are enabled and assisted to prepare
themselves in time of peace for, and to receive appointment to the
highest volunteer rank they are capable of exercising, without resort
to politic 1 or other influence. On the other hand, those who for any
reason may find it inadvisable to volunteer may, without incon-
venience or embarrassment, remain at home and give excellent and
individual service in recruiting and training. 4.
In addition to providing a means whereby the militia may be
utilized for the greatest good of the country at large and with the
least interference with State control and the interests of the individual
militiaman, this plin creates a permanent machine for recruiting and
training in time of war—something for which no provision has ever
heretofore been made in this country. The advantage of this to us
will be shown better when the subject of organizing our volunteers is
reached. -
Now, gentlemen, I have not had a chance, being away so long, to
go into this matter, but I find a critical situation here, which is due
to the agitation of the so-called federalization of the militia. I
believe that there are excellent men in the militia. I believe many
of them desire to make it a life service. I think there is only one
solution of this thing, and that is taking them over—body, baggage,
armories, plants, and everything else—from the State, letting the
State retain so much of the plant or the armory as they need, and
so many members of the militia as desire to be discharged or to remain
in the constabulary or the old constitutional militia of the State, and
giving to us the rest of them, which might be covered into what I
understand has been advanced, a continental army, or whatever
Federal force Congress should org mize after the Regular Army and
the reserves were obtained. I think that would give an opportunity
to all these gentlemen who are serious to beeome national troops.
I assume that the number that the National Government would get
would be about 60,000, and then they could be put under the National
Government and thoroughly trained, organized, equipped, and made
a dependable force.
The CHAIRMAN. It has been argued here, and with a good deal of
force, by two distinguished gentlemen, the Judge Advocate General
and Senator Cummins, that if Congress will exercise its unused
power it can practically federalize the militia as it is.
Gen. EDWARDS. I am not enough of a lawyer to decide that, but I
consulted one or two men of your own body who were preeminent as
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 899
constitutional lawyers, and I believe that is generically impracticable.
I believe it depends on the use of the President's power to raise armies
in the exercise of the draft?
The CHAIRMAN. It is claimed by these gentlemen, and I think with
a good deal of force, that practically the only limitation upon the
absolute power of Congress over the National Guard is the power to
appoint officers, which power the State has.
Gen. EDWARDS. I might advance this argument: What is there to
keep a governor—and many of them have the power—from wiping
out between training periods the whole National Guard 7
The CHAIRMAN. They can not do it if Congress passes a law making
* for the training, the disciplining, and the organization
of them. g
Gen. EDWARDS. There appears to me no way to force a governor
to enforce such a law. At the same time, that goes to the future. It
does not give us any direct control over them for a continuous training
and making them into a dependable force. It allows the militia, while
it remains in the State service, to be charged with police duties, and
the putting down of riots, and nothing could be more unfortunate for a
national force than those functions. I consider it impracticable, and I
think this opportunity that I suggest should be given the militia, under
which conditions the Regular Army would welcome them, and if they
do not choose to take advantage of that opportunity, I believe the
National Government should withdraw all aid.
Senator DU PONT. General, you are aware, of course, that under
the existing law no troops of any description can be called out until
the militia has first been called out. -
Gen. EDWARDS. Yes.
Senator DU Pont. What do you think of that provision 7
Gen. EDWARDS. I think that was a fatal defect in an excellent law.
Senator DU Pont. You think that provision, then, should be
repealed'. -
Gen. EDWARDS. I do. I think it should be eliminated; yes, sir.
I think that the present system is unfortunate, illogical, and unwise,
and so proved. The average excellent militia officer, the kind that
we are anxious to get to help us command the volunteer armies in the
war, and to whom I have advanced this proposition, all seem to be
favorable to it; that is, the captain and the major and the man who
gives up all his time to better his force; and I believe if the National
Government would give them a chance to come into the Federal
force we would get some excellent material, and the men who wanted
to stay with the constabulary and do police duty could be differ-
entiated. I think it would solve this difference, because we must
regret, it seems to me, just arriving here, that this alleged opposition
to any national preparedness plan seems to be because this duality of
obligation to the Government prevails and is asserted by the militia-
men. I can not help believing that if a referendum vote were given
to the militia, you would see a large per cent of them anxious to accept
this proposition.
The CHAIRMAN. I think you are mistaken about that, General.
I do not think there would be 3 per cent of the National Guard that
would remain in the service if it were not for the fact that they feel
that they are in close touch with the Federal Government; in other
23380—PT 18—16—2 *
900 . PREPAIRED N ESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
words, that they would be called upon in time of trouble by the Fed-
eral Government. -
Gen. EDWARDS. But in my proposition, Senator, they would be
part of the Federal service. Their localization would be the same.
The CHAIRMAN. Under the continental army plan
Gen. EDWARDS. I do not know about that, but just what I hear of
it. Under a Federal force plan, or continental army plan, I do not
see why the localization should not be the same, and probably we
should let an officer know we were going to take him and work him
as we do in the Regular Army; there might be a condition in there
that for the first three years the training demands would be definitely
stated, so that he could choose definitely as between remaining in the
constabulary and going with the Federal force. I have talked to only
a few militiamen, but the fact that they would be right there, part
of the National Government, alongside of the Regular Army, seems
to appeal to them much more than this nebulous, dual obligation that
seems to exist. Naturally, I think it is one of the most important
things in the whole question of preparedness, and naturally, as I
stated first in my argument for universal military training, that would
be all solved.
On the subject of recruitment, I am told that evidence has been
introduced showing our probable inability to recruit even the small
Regular Army contemplated in the Chamberlain bill of 210,000.
he CHAIRMAN. Yes; Gen. McCain testified that it would be impos-
sible to recruit a larger army than forty or fifty thousand men.
Gen. EDWARDS. I do not share that belief. I know that Gen.
McCain and the other experts of the War Department under the
resent system and the present equipment get every man possible,
É. I believe that the problem of securing men to fill the ranks of
our Army and of the proposed reserve is merely one of making an
attractive enlistment contract, and of adopting modern businesslike
methods of recruiting. By shortening the term of service with the
colors and the minimum required for practical training the enlistment
contract would be rid of its most objectionable feature. By assigning
the recruits in this way they will be enabled to travel to one of Our
foreign possessions, with the elimination of unnecessary fatigue, and
even a part of the United States, and we will add a feature to the
military service that will prove a powerful attraction to thousands of
young men.
I venture to suggest, in addition, or by modification of the present
method and those contemplated by the scheme of reserves and local-
izing of reserves, in my report, that the existing Federal machinery
be invoked, and that every postmaster in the country should be made
a recruiting agent for the Army and Navy. In other countries
civilian officials act in this capacity, and I am sure that the poste
master is especially equipped for such work, selected, as he is, as On-
of the representative citizens of the community. Through them we
can secure the best class of recruits for the Regular Army or any
other force of Federal troops. Under such a system if a man wished
to enlist, it would be only necessary for him to apply to the post-
master. Should the postmaster approve such an applicant as worthy
to be a member of the Army and Navy, he would turn over the appli-
cant for a physical examination by a reputable physician of the
locality, selected by himself, with the approval of the Medical Depart-
ment of the United States Army. For this patriotic work, in addition
PREPAIRED NIESS FOR, NATIONAL DEFENSE. 901
to his routine duties, he could be given a small fee not less than $5
and the medical officer a fee to be determined by the Secretary of War,
not less than $2 for every accepted applicant, both fees to be contin-
gent upon the gaining of the man. The postmaster would then be
authorized, by the Ordinary quartermaster's request to send that man
to the nearest Army officer on recruiting duty. The cost would
probably be not as great as that which now obtains.
This suggestion would give to the recruiting branch of the services
56,000 additional agents at an expense not as great as exists to-day,
and the Army and Navy would 5. a Federal representative who
would be, as in other countries, the logical registrar for any system
of recruitment should the ideal of all of us obtain for a universal
citizen training.
I believe that this scheme would be practical, and now comes the
question of training and the relative time taken by the various arms
of the service. I am just from a command that has been raised in a
year from the so-called peace strength to what has been called war
strength, but which is really a serviceable unit, and the only kind
to be depended on for battle, and to train the officers that are with
it, that is, 150 men per company, 100 in the Cavalry, and a corre-
sponding increase in the other arms.
I approach this subject with a good deal of humility on the ques-
tion of the time it takes to make a soldier. I have a table here j,
I will insert, if it has not been already inserted. -
In order that there may be no misconception as to the quality of
the troops of the gréat powers, the actual training given these troops
in aſl branches of their army in time of peace will now be given:


.
With P9.93% | Total
ge - tº - & ccept .* Reserve | Aggre-
Belligerent nations of Europe. active excep y active --~ *~ *
army. sº S army. training. gate.
holidays.
Austria-Hungary: Years. Hours. Hours. JWecks. Hours.
Cavalry.----------------------------------------- 3 8 7, 200 11 7,728
Horse artillery----------------------------------- 3 6% 3,900 11 6,279
Other artillery----------------------------------- 2 6% 3,900 14 4,446
Infantry--------------------------- .* * * * * * * * * * * * * * 2 8 4,800 14 5,472
Engineers.--------------------------------------- 2 S 4,800 14 5,472
France: - •
Cavalry------------------------------------------ 3 8% 7,650 7 8,014
Field artillery----------------------------------. 3 8% 7,650 7 8,014
Other artillery----------------------------------- 3 8% 7,650 7 8,014
Infantry----------------------------------------- 3 8% 7,650 7 8,014
Engineers.--------------------------------------- 3 8% 7,650 7 8,014
Germany:
Cavalry------------------------------------------ 3 9 8, 100 S 8,532
Horse artillery----------------------------------- 3 9 8, 100 8 8,532
Other artillery---------------------------------.. 2 9 5,400 S 5,832
Infantry----------------------------------------- 2 9 5,400 S 5,832
Engineers.--------------------------------------- 2 9 5,400 8 5,832
Great Britain---------------------------------------. 7 --------------------|----------|----------
Italy:
Cavalry------------------------------------------ 2 ----------|------------------------------
Field artillery----------------------------------- 2 ----------|--------------------|----------
Other artillery----------------------------------. 2 ----------|--------------------|----------
Infantry----------------------------------------- 2 ----------|----------|----------|----------
Engineers---------------------------------------- 2 --------------------|----------|----------
Japan------------------------------------------------ 2 9 5,400 ----------|----------
IRussia:
Cavalry and Cossacks. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 4 4,800 ----------|----------
Horse artillery------------------------ - - - - - * * * ~ * * 4 4 4,800 ----------|----------
Other artillery----------------------------------- 3 4 3,600 . . . . . . . . . .]. ---------
Infantry----------------------------------------- 3. 4 3,600 ----------|----------
Engineers---------------------------------------- 4 4 3,600 ----------|----------
902 PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
The training given by each of the great powers enumerated above
to their army must be taken as embodying the concensus of military
opinion of the general staff of those countries as to the minimum
time necessary to make a thoroughly trained soldier. It will be
noted from the table above that the training given the German Sol-
diers—9 hours a day for 6 days a week for 2 years while in the active
army and for 8 weeks while in the first reserve—is of the intensest
character. It will also be noted that the French standard of 8%
hours a day for 6 days in the week for 3 years plus 7 weeks in the
first reserve, or 900 days, is now considerably higher than the Ger-
man standard. It will be further noted that in the French Army
this training for 3 years is given to all branches of the army. . Unless
we can establish the fact, which so far has never been established,
that there is something in the character of the American which ren-
ders less necessary for our soldiers the amount of training given in
foreign armies, we had better depart from their standard of training
with extreme caution, as the armies with such high standards of
training are our possible opponents. Whenever an officer of Our
Army departs from the standard agreed upon by our own General
Staff and takes direct issue with the consensus of the military opinion
of the world, he should be able to give reasons other than his own
opinions based on his own experience in peace and in war.
It has been said before your committee that Infantry is the arm
of the service most easily improvised—in fact, it has been strongly
intimated here that the training given the Infantry of the National
Guard, which receives in the best organizations about 100 hours'
training annually, will be sufficient for the needs of the United States.
It is sometimes asserted that the training given the European troops
is such as to cause them to become overtrained, and that anywa.
they need more training than our men, who are so much more intel-
ligent, etc. This is all part of the great American delusion that when
you hand a rifle to an American and put him in a uniform you have,
to begin with, the best soldier in the world. No greater harm can
be done to the cause of preparedness and no more unfortunate doc-
trine can be propagated at this time than that the bulk of your Army,
the Infantry, can be improvised. No part of an army, no branch of
the service, can be improvised without endangering the defeat of the
whole. It is astounding that in view of what is now being done in
Europe anyone in this country, military man or civilian, can still be
of the opinion that the great bulk of your Armies, the Infantry, can
be more or less improvised. If any part of an army could be impro-
vised, why does France train its infantry eight hours a day for three
long years and why does Germany and Japan train its infantry nine
hours a day for two years, particularly when it would be a great
davantage to each of these countries to avoid the economic loss that
ocmes from this period of service with the colors, if a lesser period
would do. The best military minds of these countries have long
considered this question, ...Y we may rest assured that if it were
possible to safely reduce the period of training by one month even
it would be done. Nothing in the experience of the European powers
involved in the present war can be quoted to justify the opinion that
any branch of an army can be improvised or given less training than
any other branch. . -
PREPAREDINESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 903
To show that infantry can be quickly trained and rendered effi-
cient, our experience with the United States volunteer regiments
that we sent to the Philippines in 1900 has been quoted before this
committee. These were excellent volunteer regiments and did excel-
lent work in the Philippine Islands, but it must be remembered that
they were operating against untrained, undisciplined, and badly
armed Filipinos usually split up into small guerrilla bands. It is
manifestly absurd to believe that these new troops would make an
equally good showing against trained and disciplined Europeans, and
equally absurd that any definite conclusions could be drawn from
our experience in the Philippine Islands in regard to a standard of
training for our Infantry. Very few of the officers who participated
in the battle of Santiago against the Spanish troops have any illu-
sions on the subject of the necessity of training and discipline in our
Infantry if we are to defeat the trained infantry of Europe or Asia.
Officers who have had the experience I have had in Panama and in
Honolulu, must speak advisedly, but at the same time not draw any
false deductions.
Nevertheless I believe that if we get rid of all the discouraging fatigue
work, like cutting grass, cutting jungle, and doing Jamaica negro work
by the soldier that we have in Panama, devoting nine hours a day
to the subject; if I had 25,000 troops in Panama I believe I could
turn out 10,000 men to the reserve, each year. My standard would
be high, and it would primarily be passed upon by the company and
the battle-unit commander, the captain, and the major. The major
now is the very important battle commander, and he, with the cap-
tain, with the aid of the first sergeant, would be the man whom I
would rely upon to find out whether a man came up to a certain fixed
standard. id he say at the end of a year, “This man is soundly
trained, is skilled in fire control, and I believe he is good enough to
go into the reserve,” I would pass him into the reserve.
Senator CATRON. For what length of time would you take in the
man 7
Gen. EDWARDS. As my report shows, it would be a term of six
years, two years with the colors and four years with the reserve, and
during the time I had him in the reserve I would not call him back
to the colors except I intended to really use him. -
I believe that should we go into the country and through the post-
masters and through the regimental recruiting officers—and my
report provides for that in the 64 reserve districts that I have—the
young men were told that they could enlist and be sent and see the
world, at Panama, at Oahu, and in the Philippines, and if they worked
earnestly and hard they could get out in a year, I have no doubt that
we could keep the outlying possessions filled all the while, and I think
we would turn out fine reserves.
What I wanted to emphasize was this, that the important thing
is to realize the wonderful training opportunity you have in your
expensive establishment of the Regular Army. I feel this so earnestly,
gentlemen, that I can confidently state that in a period of 20 years,
since I have been a subaltern, the captains of our service have im-
proved 80 per cent in efficiency. Their promotions have been out-
rageously delayed. They are a lot of men who have stood every
practical test, who have gone through these continuous Schools, the
postgraduate schools of application and staff, and I believe never in
904 PREPAIREDINESS FOR, NATIONAL DEFENSE.
the history of our Army have we had as fine an educated lot of men
as we have in the captains grade. You can pick out among them
any number of men for brigade commanders, or any number of men
who will take any Federal reserves or continental army contingent
and get as much out of them as any lot of officers in the world.
As to the relative time it takes in the various arms, I hold no brief
as a general officer for any arm in the service, but I say advisedly,
after the practical experience I have had, that you can make just as
good a private soldier in a definite time in any one of these arms.
I have come to this conclusion from this experience: While in
Texas City we conducted a system of fire-control and fire-discipline
problems, and higher training, followed up in Oahu, and I have kept
busily at it at Panama in all for three years, and I say this advisedly,
that you give me a battalion of Infantry thoroughly trained in fire
control and fire discipline, which means everything that is necessary
to keep fire superiority, which includes direction, distribution, the rate
of fire, and steadiness, and a battalion trained like that will whip the
best regiment in the Army of Regulars that has not been trained like
that. I have got everything I can from the foreign war now going
on, and that is demonstrated. So I should say give Cavalry, Artillery,
and Infantry the same amount of training. Certainly no good infan-
tryman can be prepared in any less time than any other man.
I notice that the loss in the infantry has been something like 80
per cent of its officers. I am told that the loss is so great that one
of the contestants, with infantry trained as I suggest, and starting
out of the trench, leave behind quite a complement of their officers
and noncommissioned officers because they have been so wiped out,
that they can not stand the loss, and one regiment I hear of has fur-
nished an entire new complement over ten times, completely wiped out.
When you put an army in such a position as that, the training that
is necessary puts them all on the same basis.
We might state that some of the technical arms, like the Signal
Corps, the aeroplane, and the Engineers, might require more, with
the technical man in the Coast Artillery. I do not know any arm
which, in case of trouble, could get recruits thoroughly trained in
their technical demands sooner than those technical corps, so I
put them all on the same basis as to training.
Senator DU Pont. General, do you not think that a cavalryman
or an artilleryman requires a certain additional amount of training
with respect to horses that an infantryman does not require 3
Gen. EDWARDS. I think that is true, but I think when you get the
higher degree of the effort with personnel that is demanded by the
Infantry over that of the material, that would be equalized. In other
words, I consider that the expert training of an infantryman, realizing
what he must go up against, and the fact that you have 150 rifles
and individuals to take care of and control, demands just as much
as any other arm. .
Senator DU PONT. You said a moment ago that you had just come
from a command that had been increased from peace strength to
war strength. That means that the companies have been more than
doubled, or practically doubled ?
Gen. EDWARDS. Yes; from 65 to 150.
Senator DU Pont. Were they increased by recruits from the
general service?
PREPAIRED NESS FOR, NATIONAL DEFENSE. 905
Gen. EDWARDS. Yes, sir.
Senator DU PONT. Was it found, in your opinion, that this was
too large a body of new men to assimilate?
Gen. EDWARDS. Not at all.
Senator DU PONT. There was no trouble about that ?
Gen. EDWARDs. No, sir. I have not had the chance to go thor-
oughly through Senator Chamberlain's bill, but I notice a strength of
112 men, and I can see the argument for that 112 men. It is, prob-
ably, that no officer in battle, under the experience in the war in
which you served, Senator du Pont, and other wars, ought to control
more than 30 or, at the outside, 40 men. My answer to that is, if
we have only three officers, a captain and a first and second lieutenant,
we never can hope to put on the firing line more than 120 men.
Senator CATRON, Out of a company of 150%
Gen. EDWARDS. Out of a company of 150. That is the preactical
effect. I think that other general officers will find the same obstacle.
I would like to have four or five lieutenants in each company, but I
know that these officers in peace times, and I know that these officers
in maneuvers, and I know that these officers in every critical hard
battle, ball-cartridge maneuvers, with the aid of their noncommis-
sioned officers, can control that number of men. In a regiment of
negroes who had been trained in Oahu–and the noncommissioned
officers were old soldiers of long service—I dropped out the officers
of a battalion and gave a problem to a black sergeant major, and it
was astonishing the fire control and discipline exercised by his
subordinates, the first sergeant being the captain.
Senator WARREN. Which regiment was that?
Gen. EDWARDs. That was the Twenty-fifth Infantry at Schofield
Barracks. In all these fire problems we have just had in Oahu a
sergeant has commanded one platoon. I would rather have a com-
missioned officer. At the same time, he has done it well and effec-
tively enough to lead me to state that we want those men. For 150
men the overhead charges are so much less that there is no com-
arison. In having 150 men, we get real training of officers. Really,
§. du Pont, since your time, the captain who has commanded a
peace company of 65 men very nearly has to learn his duties anew
when he gets to 150 men.
Senator WARREN. That is, of Infantry? -
Gen. EDWARDS. Yes. It is increased in all the arms. His pride
in his organization, the fact that he gets real training, and the fact
that he is giving his full worth to the Government, all indicate
that number. Until I served with these war-strength companies I
thought 108 was the proper amount. To-day I should urge that
nothing less than the war strength as now prevails should obtain.
Senator DU Pont. In the Civil War a battery of Light Artillery,
such as I commanded, was composed of 130 or 140 men, 6 guns.
Gen. EDWARDS. Did you not have a sergeant frequently command-
ing guns';
Senator DU PONT. I stated here the other day that in all the bat-
tles in which I commanded my battery my first sergeant always
commanded a platoon, and did it very well. But I ought to have
said that I had not my full complement of officers at that time.
Gen. EDWARDS. I have often talked it over with regimental
officers and officers of experience, and we came to the conclusion that
906 PREPAREDNIESS FOR, NATIONAL DEFENSE.
in about every regular regiment there were 16 or 17 sergeants who,
in case of war, we would be mighty glad to receive as brother com-
missioned officers with us on account of their training. Men are
discharged right along, in Oahu and in Panama, who would make
excellent captains of Volunteers, or make subordinate officers of
reserves. Anything we can do to keep these excellent noncommis-
sioned officers is a wise thing. But I indorse the scheme of the
General Staff to get extra reserve officers. I think the scheme is
quite logical.
Senator DU PONT. It has been proposed by a number of people who
have appeared before the committee, both in the Regular Army and
in the militia, that nobody should be allowed to reenlist, on the ground
that there would be a greater number of instructed men disseminated
throughout the country, and that would be an element of military
strength. What is your opinion of that 3 -
Gen. EDWARDS. My opinion of that is this: I would not put any bar
on that at all.
Senator DU PONT. That is my judgment, too. - -
Gen. EDWARDs. The leavening of old soldiers would be about 5 per
cent, always very desirable to have as a disciplinary factor, that you
could always make noncommissioned officers considering probable
losses, and a few old soldiers, like Mulvaney, in Kipling, teach disci-
pline to a troop quicker than a sergeant, and I should not discourage
the reenlistment. That will take care of itself. I think that going
in first, as I said, we ought to get a better lot of men than we have
In OW.
Senator DU PoWT. I think you are absolutely right.
Senator CATRON. Enlisting them for six years and having them two
years with the colors, how many of those men would reenlist'
Gen. EDWARDs. You mean in the reserves or in the Regulars?
Senator CATRON. In the Regulars I am talking about. , You made
a statement here, if I understood you correctly, that if you had
25,000 men at Panama you could turn out 10,000 annually for a
reserve. -
Gen. EDWARDS. Yes.
Senator CATRON. Did you mean by that that only the others might
reenlist Ž
Gen. EDWARDs. No, sir; the others would stay to complete the
minimum time of their enlistment, two years. ' Then I assume about
15 per cent of those men would reenlist somewhere under the Ameri-
can flag as soldiers. That can be pretty nearly definitely deter-
mined. I think there would be quite a few reenlistments under cer-
tain conditions, were it allowed, in the reserves in that way. Prob-
ably a man would get tired in Oahu, as they do, and they would get
tired in Panama, and they would come back here and enlist in New
York State, and I think you would have quite a percentage of them
who would reenlist.
Senator WARREN. You mean after they had served their eight
years, two with the colors and six without 3
Gen. EDWARDs. Oh, yes. I would allow a man who completed
his two years' service to reenlist right in the Regulars.
Senator CATRON. That is what I was asking about.
Senator WARREN. That is, of course, another matter.
PR.EPAREDINESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 907
- Gen. EDWARDS. The question comes up, at the end of the reserve,
ought not these men to go back, to pick up their military knowledge
again so as to be eligible to the reserve? -
Senator WARREN. Most men, though, would have family relations
or business relations? * -
Gen. EDWARDs. Yes. A young man who served a year in Oahu
and Panama and worked, as he ought to be worked, eight or nine
hours a day, and so many hours for recreation, and got out with an
excellent character, would go back and tell his friends, “Here, see
this. This is the finest school I ever went to,” and I think it not
unlikely that he will do so.
Naturally, I agree with every other officer of the service that the
capacity of West Point should be increased to its limit; in fact,
doubled. I am in accord with all other officers who recommend the
extra munitions and equipment. - -
Senator DU PoWT. How about using the military schools as a
nucleus for additional officers required 3 *
Gen. EDWARDS. I think they are splendid reservoirs. I think
they should be encouraged in every way, and I think they should be
even better supervised than they are now, in fact, that the supervi-
sion should be increased by the General Staff, and I think they
should be given every aid and encouragement. I have found what
an excellent lot of men we got for the Philippine Constabulary by,
#. method, and I think it is going to be a great reservoir for getting
them.
Senator DU PONT. I notice that the representatives of these mili-
tary schools testified to the House committee that they could fur-
nish the Government with a largely increased number of graduates who
would agree to belong to the reserve corps of officers if the Government
would give a certain number of scholarships at a cost of $400 a year
each, the scholarships to be dependent upon the appointees passing
into the service as second lieutenants for a certain number of years.
What do you think of that ? “...
Gen. EDWARDS. I think it is excellent. I think the General Staff
report takes that in, does it not ?
Senator DU PONT. I have not seen that.
Gen. EDWARDS. They have gone into that thing. I have not seen
it, but I have bec n told about it, and they get a large corps of extra
officers. -
Senator DU PONT. It seems to me that is very good.
Gen. EDWARDS. Yes. There was one other point I have been urg-
ing, and it has been granted—a few trial car equipments, the armored
car equipped with heavy artillery for railroad or truck transporta-
tion, and I think that such material should take that into considera–
tion. I believe that the range of the larger caliber guns should be
15,000 yards. & -
C Senator CATRON. Have you anything to say about the Aviation
Orps ?
en. EDWARDS. I think it is very, very important, and especially
important in the defense of the outlying possessions, and critically
important in Panama. -
enator CATRON. We have a very insignificant Aviation Corps.
What do you think about the increase of it .
908 PREPAIRED NESS FOR, NATIONAL DEFENSE.
Gen. EDWARDS. I believe in the most decided increase, according
to the proportion to be determined by the experience in the war
that is now raging. I think they are absolutely essential for any
general officer defending or fighting a battle. x
Senator CATRON. Will they not dispense also with a large amount
of the Cavalry that has heretofore been required, doing scout duty
and things of that kind? -
Gen. EDWARDS. Yes. I think they have been of great aid to any
large tactical unit, but I think it would be unwise to change the
relative proportion of the arms of the other divisions.
I think this gives me a good chance to state, Senator, that, like
every other Regular Army officer, I believe the country should be
taught to think in divisions. I believe that the tactical unit is the
most important thing in the world to have us pay attention to.
Organization is absolutely essential, and it would be well if we could
have these few, these seven, divisions of Infantry, and the two of
Cavalry, with their proper proportion of arms, giving a little total
of 210,000 regular troops for this country. ... I think it very, very
important, and I never would get up any scheme that did not com-
prehend that as the essential part. -
Senator DU PONT. As the basis for the whole thing 3
Gen. EDWARDs. Yes, sir; I think that is the basis, and then when-
ever possible I would have those divisions together. . I would pay
more attention to its integrity. I would keep the brigade commander
who had made good with his brigade, and the division commander
who had made good with his division, and I would keep them to-
gether just as much as possible.
Senator CATRON. Has not the experience of the present war shown
that artillery is much more efficient than heretofore and that cavalry
renders less service than it heretofore did :
Gen. EDWARDS. I think that is undoubtedly true; but, Senator,
that is in trench warfare, in siege operations, which has eliminated
the cavalry except to fight on foot, and they never can be dispensed
with, because they are used right along as mounted infantry. I
think if you consider the great expanse of this country, you can not
draw too serious an analogy to that condition. That is my general
idea of it. - -
Senator DU PONT. Do you not think, General, that the operations
of the war on the eastern front of the European conflict are more
analogous to the conditions that would obtain here?
Gen. EDWARDs. Yes; and the cavalry performs very valuable
functions there to-day. The rôle of cavalry is greatly advanced,
but the whole question of it is that it is an arm subordinate to
and depending upon infantry, and their §. is recognized
by every professional officer in the world, and therefore I would follow
those essential proportions in the organization of any arm, and I
would not, gentlemen, organize anything on a skeleton basis.
Senator CATRON. A new arm that has come into existence is cut-
ting considerable figure. How many machine guns would you have
to a thousand men'
Gen. EDWARDS. I have recommended in this report no less than 12,
and rather favor 18, per regiment. The strength of an Infantry regi-
ment at war strength is 1,836. By my special presentation I am
allowed and have just been shipped, 24 machine guns per regiment
PREPAREDINESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 909
in the Canal Zone. While you must have the mobility of the
machine gun, you must also realize that in possible fortress com-
mands, and on the defense, you need all you can get. In fact, I
asked for, I think, 200 for the Canal Zone, but they have given me
24 per regiment, and I think it very wise to have each regiment
equipped with at least 12, and there should be a machine-gun com-
pany of 150 men. The executive, the Secretary of War, or general
commanding should have quite a latitude in the organization of ma-
chine-gun companies, headquarter companies, and supply com-
ſº because their rôles are constantly changing, and as much
atitude as Congress will give the executive I think wise in that kind
of organization, because in different localities the problems of arms
and supplies and everything are quite different.
Senator DU PONT. Do you favor the supply companies and the
headquarters companies and the machine-gun companies being given
a legal basis by law'.
Gen. EDWARDS. I do, in that I believe the executive should have
the authority to organize them. I would make them very elastic.
Senator CATRON. You would make them a part of the regiment,
would you? --
Gen. EDWARDS. Yes, sir.
Senator DU PONT. That would make a regiment of 15 companies?
Gen. EDWARDS. Yes; virtually 13 fighting companies. I think all
those questions of logistics, of supply, should be left with the execu-
tive, as is done largely in the Navy, and I think it would make us
much more mobile should they be. The Navy has another excellent
authority that we are denied. I never knew it until I was travelin
on a Navy ship, when four or five excellent sailors came up and aske
to take on another year, as they said, and I found the º of the
ship had authority, instead of reenlisting them for the full term, to
just continue their enlistment one year longer. I think that it an
an opportunity we should have in the Army, because a man is per-
fectly ...; to wait a year longer before he gets married and takes
upon himself the cares of a family.
Senator DU Pont. Would it not result in none enlisting more than
a wear 7
%. EDWARDS. That is not a bad feature. It retains a good non-
commissioned officer to, and a good many of them go right through
their retirements that way. It is the option of the captain of the ship
or the commanding officer whether they are retained or not.
Senator CATRON. Does a soldier on reenlisting get additional pay $
Gen. EDWARDS. Yes.
Senator CATRON. Do these men who take on another year, as you
say, get additional pay ?
Gen. EDWARDS. I do not know exactly the Navy pay. The Secre-
tary of the Navy exercises the power of the President as to the rate of
8, V.
º WARREN. In other words, the President makes the pay in
the Navy. *
tºwamps. Congress has delegated that to the President.
Senator CATRON. What would you recommend about that ? If a
thing of that kind should be adopted by the Army, that the captain,
or whoever it was in command of the troop or company, were allowed
910 IPREPAIRED NESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
to take a man on for another year, would you recommend that he
should have additional pay? - - *
Gen. EDWARDS. Yes, I should think he should enjoy some relative
benefit; in the same proportion that now exists. * -
Senator FLETCHER. Would that be done indefinitely or done only
Once 3
Gen. EDWARDS. Indefinitely, I understand. One of these men was
some petty officer. They all liked him, he was an excellent man, and
he came in and said “I have changed my mind, Captain. I am going
to take on a year longer.” The captain said, “I am glad you are.
I need you,” and he enlisted him right there. They have much more
authority than we have. - -
There is one more point I should like to speak on. I only give here
the nominal pay of a dollar per month for the reservist, assuming
that, say, $6 on the 1st of June and $6 on the 1st of December is enough
of an inducement to make that chap who has been assigned to a cer-
tain district report to his district commander.
h Senator CATRON. How much discipline or drill would you give
imº
Gen. EDWARDS. I would not call him back to the colors at all in
four years. I would let him understand that unless we needed him
we would not call him back. Just glancing over some of these
hearings—I have seen very few of them, because I have not had the
opportunity—I notice that Senator du Pont suggested $30 a year.
I know that that would catch every reservist, even though he had
a wife and babies in the meantime. The bounty system that obtains
in your bill has its good points, but I think it is better to pay the
reservists some nominal sum.
As I recall it, Senator du Pont, your idea of bounty was that after
the man had passed out of the reserve period, when he became about
40 or 45 years of age-
Senator DU Pont (interposing). Not quite that. The existing law,
which was enacted before bounties were talked of, provides that if
the man who has been discharged comes forward and offers himself
for reenlistment, he receives a bounty provided he is physically able
to do his duty. Under present conditions this provision of law could
only apply to men who have finished their period in the reserve; but
as a great many men with six years' service who went in at 18 or
20 would come out under 30 years of age, there would be a large
class of old soldiers between 28 and 45 throughout the country who
could still take advantage of this provision if it were retained in the
law. What do you think of the expediency of retaining it
Gen. EDWARDs. I could see no objection. I could see that it would
probably give several thousand old soldiers to the Regulars At the
same time the other returning reservist might be displeased and
again the old bounty system was a blot on our military system.
Senator DU Pont. Right away ?
Gen. EDWARDS. Right away. I should guess that it would. . I
have never thought of it in that way at all, but it would be helpful
in addition to the scheme I suggest.
Senator DU Pont. It can not conflict with anything that has been
suggested, as far as I can see.
Gen. EDWARDS. No.
PREPAREDINESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 911
The CHAIRMAN. Your statement covers the whole subject pretty
fully, does it not, General Ž • -
Gen. EDWARDS. Yes, sir. It is a question of what policy should be
followed. It is here with submitted.
From: Brig. Gen. Clarence R. Edwards.
To: The Adjutant General of the Army -
(Through the Commanding General Eastern Department).
Subject: Study regarding strength and organization of armed land forces.
1. In compliance with instructions contained in letter (2268568) of March 22, 1915,
from The Adjutant General of the Army, the following study is submitted. It is based
upon the few general principles here enunciated.
GENERAL PRINCIPLES.
(a) No military policy worth the name can be disassociated from the State policy of
the nation concerned. While its military policy is nothing more than the develop-
ment of its military system, this development is shaped by the nation’s political sys-
tem, its people's industrial and commercial progress, and their habit of thought. Such
a military policy is a matter of growth. It can not be created by law, nor brought full
fledged into being by any human endeavor.
(b) But no military policy worth the name can be created in any way nor in any
time unless founded on a definite and prescribed military system. To define and
prescribe such a military system is as far as the law can go. But if the law does not go
as far as this the development of a military policy is impossible.
(c) In defining and prescribing a military system the law must follow the habit of
thought of the people for whom intended; but, this requirement met, political expedi-
ency, party and Sectional partisanship, and regard for local benefits must give way to
the demands of national security.
(d) Efficiency must be the goal sought in formulating any military system. Effi-
ciency in military systems dependent upon simplicity and economy. But economy
in this sense does not mean continued reduction in expenditures; it means continued
effort to secure proportionately greater protection for the expenditures necessarily
made. There is no economy—on the contrary there is total waste—in any expendi-
tures for military purposes that do not afford reasonable assurance of national security.
(e) Tactical organization is a fundamental requirement of any efficient military
system, but the secret of military efficiency is o be found, nevertheless, not in the
perfection of organization but in adequacy of system. Unless the present problem
be approached therefore with the determination to define and prescribe an adequate
military system for the United States and unswervingly to carry this system to com-
pletion in every detail, all efforts toward a satisfactory Solution are a waste of time.
(f) No organization, however perfect, can survive false economy, cumbersome admin-
istration, and unwise political influence.
(g) With a definite military system established, the problem of simple, economical,
and efficient organization of the forces provided thereunder is elementary.
2. With these principles in mind this study is intended to outline a definite mil-
itary system reasonably likely, if given time to carry it to completion, to meet the
military needs of the United States without running counter to national prejudices
or conditions.
TEIE PLAN OF 1912.
3. My work in the preparation of this study, as must be the case with anyone in
Fº any similar study, or in putting into form of law the details of organization,
as been simplified by the publication in 1912 of the War Department plan for the
organization of the land forces of the United States. This plan, I believe, will stand
always not merely as the first complete outline of national military System for the
United States but as the corner stone of all our military development hereafter. As
a matter of policy we can make no greater mistake than to neglect it or fail to give it
full credit in putting our proposed system into legal form. But there is better reason
for clinging to its precepts. The time and labor spent in its production and the wide
deliberation and debate preceding the adoption of its conclusions should force anyone
to hesitate to suggest changes without long study and Substantial grounds. For myself
I indorse nearly all of its general features and most of its details, and in the few in-
stances where my recommendations appear at variance with it they will be found, I
think, generally no more than a broader application of the principles upon which that
plan was laid.
912 PREPAREDINESS FOR, NATIONAL DEFENSE.
4. The plan of 1912 was completed two years ago. That some change in details
should now be desirable is only a sign of military progress. But the time that has
elapsed has been, in a military way, an eventual period. There is everywhere with
us better understanding of our military needs, and a completely changed national
attitude toward the upbuilding of our military system. Those who gave form to the
plan of 1912 faced different conditions and were obliged to procced out of such an
abundance of caution as undoubtedly to force their judgment always toward the
minimum of strength and cost. In some instances they were probably betrayed
through this into recommendations for garrisons insufficient for the purpose described.
This, I think, is notably true with the garrisons indicated by most of the outlying
possessions of the United States, though the principle laid down for the determination
of these garrisons was and remains Sound. But the time that has passed and the con-
ditions of service in these possessions has permitted more extended study of them
and their military needs, while actual service demonstrations of defense plans has
confirmed the resulting belief in the inadequacy of the garrisons heretofore proposed.
These are sufficient grounds, I think, for revision of the original estimates in this
respect. -
STRENGTH AND ORGANIZATION.
5. Strength.--To meet our military obligations and to secure reasonable national
security any efficient military system must provide—
(1) For the maintenance of the fixed garrisons of the outlying possessions at all times;
(2) For the regular maintenance of a sufficient force to meet military emergencies
not involving attempted invasion of our territory, but to which our State policies
may give rise; and
(3) For trained men, armed, equipped, and organized in sufficient strength to meet
any enemy that may attempt to invade the United States, and to hold him in check
until the Volunteer Armies necessary finally to defeat him may be raised, armed,
equipped, and trained. ... -
6. The first two provisions indicated in the preceding paragraph are to be met only
by a regular force constantly maintained under arms. For the third it is admittedly
economically possible with a volunteer system and our standards, and impracticable
with our traditions, to maintain a sufficient force under arms for this purpose. Nor
under present conditions is maintenance of such a force desirable. Our system should
assure the withdrawal from industrial life of no more than the minimum number of
men essential to security, and then only for the minimum period essential to proper
training. Nevertheless, it is equally true that when the emergency shall arise this
force must be capable not only of immediate mobilization but of concentration in
the threatened theater.
7. There are at least three nations that, if involved in war with the United States,
could threaten us with invasion by armies varying in strength from 200,000 to 500,000
men. Neglecting consideration of two or more of these acting in combination against
us, the minimum strength of our first resisting force is fixed. Certainly no one com-
petent by experience and study to form just conclusions in the matter has been able
to reduce this required minimum below approximately half a million men. I am
assuming this number as the strength the system must provide for immediate use.
8. Organization.—Any system that will provide, when needed, this number of trained
men, with the necessary officers, will leave organization a simple matter. I desire at
this point only to emphasize again the necessity of organizing them in advance of their
possible use which is quite as imperative as the necessity for their training in advance.
At whatever strength it is found practicable to maintain the Regular Army, there must
then remain several hundred thousand men to be trained, organized, armed, and
equipped and held in readiness for War. But this does not mean that they will be
held with the colors. For the most part, once their period of training is over, they will
return, with their economic efficiency increased, and thereafter continue undisturbed
in the industrial life of the nation, nothing more than a trained citizen Soldiery in
readiness to give their service intelligently to the defense of the Nation when the
demand comes. Without organization, however, they can never be in readiness, no
matter how highly trained, nor in what number. Nor is their organization in this way
unrepublican or opposed to our traditions. Rather it is an intelligent application of
our dependence upon the citizen for defense. Switzerland maintains no standing
army, but practically her whole male population of military age is trained and organ-
ized for immediate mobilization. What Switzerland can do with her whole manhood,
‘we can certainly do with a Small fraction of ours.
9. The immediate problem then is to devise a system that will insure the training
and organizing of this necessary force economically, efficiently, and with the least
interference with the civil life of our citizens.
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 913
10. The most efficient, economical, and rapid way of training men in the duties of the
soldier is through service in the Regular Army. We know now from experiment, and
in spite of all theories to the contrary, that under proper conditions and unhampered
by extraneous duties, some men can be given sufficient training as a private for the
purpose now considered in one year, and that any man worth retaining at all can be
given sufficient as a private in two years at most of intensive work. This, moreover,
is true not only for all of the mobile fighting arms and the Coast Artillery, but, I am
satisfied, for the corresponding grades of the so-called technical arms and staff depart-
ments. It goes without saying that the average man can be better trained in two years
than in one, and in three years than in two; but this does not alter the fact that he can be
trained sufficiently for the purpose in view, in one; and to attain this purpose it is
better to sacrifice the higher training of the individual than to fail in Securing sufficient
men trained in the fundamentals.
11. It will be the part of wisdom as well as economy, therefore, and the least dis-
turbing to social and industrial life, to use the machinery of the Regular Army to its
full capacity for the purpose of providing as many as possible of the trained men
essential to national security. Even, however, with the Regular Army maintained
at the highest practicable maximum and worked in this way to its full capacity it
will never be able to provide all the trained men necessary for war with a first-rate
power or for a prolonged war with even lesser powers, and we shall be dependent
for the rest upon utilization of the machinery of the Organized Militia and thereafter
upon other means still to be devised.
THE RIEG ULAR A RMY.
12. In addition, then, to preparation for sharing in defense against attack by a first-
rate power, the Regular ‘Army must fulfill always these three functions: (1) Of
providing the garrisons for our outlying possessions, (2) of forming in addition an
expeditionary force capable of immediate use for training in military emergency, and
(3) of serving as a means of training as many as possible of our citizens in the essential
duties of the soldier. -
13. It is through consideration of these three functions that the total strength of
the mobile Regular Army with the colors should be determined. The relative
strength of the several arms may be worked out thereafter by simple rules of military
proportion, and by the requirements of tactical organization. The Coast Artillery I
shall consider separately.
14. Garrisons of our outlying possessions.—The possessions here considered are
Alaska, the Philippines, the Canal Zone, the Hawaiian Islands, Guam, Porto Rico,
and Guantanamo. In some degree in all cases and in a great degree in some cases
our national defense (defense of the homeland) is dependent upon the defense of
these possessions. To each of them the general rule is applicable that it should be
adequately garrisoned at all times for defense or else left wholly undefended. Any
intermediate course represents weakness and waste. The military reinforcement of
any of them involved in any given war, after war has become a fact, must be accepted
as So impossible as to be beyond consideration. It is important, then, that the neces-
sary garrisons be determined accurately and thereafter maintained complete at all
times. And in none of them should fixed guns and defensive works be installed
unless these are to be accompanied or immediately followed by sufficient mobile
troops for their complete defense. -
15. I have been stationed for considerable periods in the Philippines, Oahu, and
Panama under conditions that have made the study of their defense a necessity.
have been connected with nearly all of the possessions named in a way that made
familiarity with them a part of my duty. I have personally visited all of them except
Alaska. My recommendations for their garrisons are based upon direct knowledge
and careful study, but they are supported as well by the judgment of every qualified
observer who has had opportunity to study the matter directly and with whom I
have been able to consult.
16. Considering the possessions separately, in the order named, I recommend
permanent garrisons as follows:
Alaska.-No garrison. For the present no land defense. This is not because
Alaska presents no military problem or is not seriously important to our national
defense and not a tempting prize in itself to an enemy, but because under the general
rule laid down anything less than complete defense will be complete waste and the
maintenance there in peace of a sufficient army for complete defense must be con-
sidered out of the question. The railroad construction now in progress and the
development of its coal and copper resources will eventually make the garrisoning of
914 PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
Alaska, at least to the extent of a securely defended base there, a necessity, but with
our more pressing needs elsewhere this must be neglected for the present.
The Philippines.—The military problem of the Philippines and their place in our
national defense are not dissimilar to Alaska. Their complete defense, even so far as
a sufficient and practical naval base is concerned, is impossible without the presence
of a force greater than we can now, maintain there. In the event of war involving
them we must expect them to permit their occupation by the enemy, if he so desires,
and to leave their final status to be settled in the treaty of peace. There is another
phase, however, of the Philippine situation. The presence of a reasonable force is
desired for moral effect. As a base of supply in peace the Philippines have proved
their worth both to the Army and the Navy. Having troops there it must be expected
in the event of war that they will make such resistance as possible. The existing
plan contemplates their final withdrawal to Corregidor, which is being prepared
accordingly to withstand siege operations. Held thus, moreover, Corregidor can
probably for the time being prevent the occupation of the Manila roadstead by the
enemy’s fleet and keep it open for our own in the event of its arrival during the war.
In view of all the conditions thus presented I recommend the continuance there of a
garrison practically as now maintained. I suggest, however, that oné Squadron of
Cavalry be withdrawn and the remaining squadrons mounted on native ponies.
Neither in the Philippines nor in any of the outlying possessions considered can
Cavalry ever act or be required to act in its historical rôle. As mounted Infantry it
can serve an important purpose. The complete garrison recommended (exclusive of
Coast Artillery and technical troops) will be shown later in tabular form.
In addition to the American garrison, there are now 52 companies of Philippine
Scouts. I believe that these should be combined with the Philippine Constabulary
as an insular force for police as well as military purposes. (See my report and Col.
Harboard’s Field Bureau of Insular Affairs.) If this is done, the commanding gen-
eral of the Philippines Department should be made by law an officer of the local
government in charge of the police and defense of the islands. This force would then
be available, and certainly necessary, for the final defense of Corregidor.
Camal Zone.—The importance of the Panama Canal in our system of national
defense can not be overestimated. Its protection should be absolute. Heavy, fixed
guns, no matter how many or large, can never do this alone. Without sufficient
mobile troops to defend the canal here from land attack the guns already mounted
are not merely a weakness, they are a positive danger to us in the event of war. In
my judgment the present mobile garrison and the garrison contemplated by all exist-
ing plans known to us are deficient, and in the face of a determined attack can never
serve the purpose expected of them. The minimum garrison recommended is shown
in the table which follows this discussion. s
There is more or less prevalent belief that the jungle of the Canal Zone will prove,
in the event of war involving attack on the canal, a military factor in our favor through
the difficulties an enemy will encounter in making his way through it. This is
founded, probably, on the views of men of long residence in the Canal Zone, but
whose attention has been confined to the great problem of canal construction and
who have not had the time or opportunity for the military study of the terrain beyond
the immediate field of their employment. I am convinced—and all officers there who
have reconnoitered the surrounding country agree with me—that the idea that the jun-
gle will prove a greater handicap to an advancing enemy than to our defending troops
must be discarded. I believe, indeed, in case of an enemy’s advance on the canal,
even through the country where the jungle is thickest, that the cover thereby afforded
him would far more than compensate him for the difficulties of cutting his way
through. Efficient mobile defenses of the canal must eventually demand through-
out the zone a road and trail system that will permit thorough reconnoissance and
rompt and free communication and movement by the defending mobile troops,
3ut this is far from all. At a distance of from 7 to 20 miles from the axis of the canal
on the Pacifie side the country is not only free from jungle and the ordinary tropical
growths, but it is as open as are parts of New Mexico and Lower California. There
an enemy is offered every facility for landing mobile troops and reaching by easy
marches the vitals of the canal—the Miraflores and Pedro Miguel Locks. The most
casual reºle 'tion by any military student familiar with the facts should show that we
must never let an enemy approach within 10 miles of the locks if we are to save the
canal. The only way an enemy's attack in this region could be effectively met
would be through a well-devised system of information that would permit opposition,
first, at the point of landing, and thereafter, if driven back, through the successive
occupation of positions selected in advance for the advantage they would offer to
the defending troops. That is the most practicable line of attack for an enemy on
PREPAIRED NIESS FOR, NATIONAL DEFENSE. 915
the Fº side, and in the military problem it presents the jungle is in no wise
l]) V Ol.V eCi. - -
In another way the Canal Zone presents a situation not found in the same degree
in any other of our over-seas possessions. The canal is the sole reason for the political
existence of the zone itself. The strip of territory which constitutes the zone has no
other purpose than to insure the efficient operation and defense of the canal. By act
of Congress its lands have been expropriated and the zone depopulated. Outside of
the hotel for tourists and visitors at each terminal of the canal no one can live in the
zone except the troops and the employees of the United States. The contemplated
permanent force of these civil employees is from 2,000 to 2,500 white and 10,000 black. '
They and their families may be counted as the permanent population of the zone.
Their occupation is dependent upon the continued operation of the canal and their
welfare and the welfare of their families upon its successful defense in case of attack.
In the event of war, likely to involve the canal, indeed it is probable that many of
them would volunteer for and be mustered into the military service of the United
States. If so, it would appear wise to insure preparation for this emergency by train-
ing those physically fit as far as practicable in advance of the need for their services.
I recommend legislation, therefore, that shall require all male civilian employees of
the canal of suitable age and physical condition to obligate themselves, as a condition
of their employment, to volunteer for military service in defense of the canal in the
event of emergency demanding them; and in preparation for this to offer themselves
for a period of at least two months training during the first two years of their employ-
ment and thereafter for 10 days each year. The volunteer forces, if provided, would
not take the place of the regular garrison proposed, nor make any reduction in my
estimate of the regular garrison required for the defense of the canal. Wholly or in
part it would merely supplement this force in time of serious emergency. -
Hawaiian Islands.--What I have said above in respect to the importance of the
Canal Zone in any system of national defense and the necessity for providing com-
plete protection applies with equal force and almost word for word to Oahu. The
existing and contemplated garrison is seriously deficient in strength and the guns now
emplaced are a danger to us until supported by sufficient mobile troops. (See my
report of Dec. 12, 1914, file A. G. O.) -
In a lesser degree Oahu presents a condition not unrelated to the situation on the
Canal Zone. Many civilians are living there in peace and contentment due to the
fact that the island is under the American flag and that a considerable garrison of
American troops is there maintained. The right of the United States to the service
of every such qualified civilian in war is undoubted. I believe, therefore, that
every American citizen there, who is physically sound and of military age, should be
required to render military service in the islands in the event of war, and that legis-
lative authority should provide at the same time for the enlistment of friendly aliens
who may volunteer in time of an emergency. In this event opportunity should be
gºed for training for periods no greater than those suggested above for the Canal
ODL6.
Guam.—Existing official plans do not include Guam as a link in our chain of de-
fenses. I believe that it should be so included, and that recent events in the Pacific
have shown this beyond question. Its defense, I think, would be comparatively easy.
And with the Panama Canal, Oahu (Hawaiian Islands), and Guam securely held,
our own western coast would have better defense from attack from a Pacific power than
any number of harbor defenses on our own coast could ever hope to provide. w
Porto Rico.—Without a naval base and without fortifications, Porto Rico raises no
problem of moment, and with a base maintained elsewhere in the same vicinity
(Guantanamo) it may, for the present at least, be neglected. No mobile force can
therefore be regarded as a military necessity. There is maintained there now the
Porto Rico Regiment of two battalions of native troops. This regiment has fulfilled
such important functions in our development of the island, and is an institution in
which the islanders take such just pride, that I should hesitate to recommned its
disbandment, even were there no military reasons for its existence. But I think
such reasons can be found. If a proper reserve system be established and its prin-
ciples applied to the Porto Rico Regiment, it would be possible within a few years,
with the third active battalion added to the existing regiment, to organize two reserve
regiments, with which the active regiment could in emergency be immediately
mobilized as a brigade. While not definitely to be counted upon, under certain
conditions of attack this brigade might be thrown promptly either into Guantanamo
or the Canal Zone to supplement the garrison there. . If this plan should be adopted
in its entirety, I recommend, therefore, that the third battalion be added to this regi-
ment, and that thereafter one battalion, changed at proper intervals, be kept always
on duty in the Canal Zone. -
23380—PT 18—16—3
916 PREPAIRED NIESS FOR, NATIONAL DEFENSE.
Guantamamo.—So far as known to me, present plans contemplate the defense of this
base by naval means alone, and, in the absence of any direct knowledge of conditions
there, I make no recommendation for change. In view of the importance of secure
possession to us of a naval base in this vicinity, I suggest that careful study be made of
the necessities for the land defense of Guantanamo; and if, to assure its retention by
us in war, mobile army troops and emplaced guns and their personnel be necessary,
they should be provided in addition to those hereinafter recommended.
17: The mobile garrisons, exclusive of detachments and technical troops, recom-
mended for the outlying possessions discussed above are shown in the following table:
TABLE I.—Over-seas garrisons.

{ 'A T- e i º & º
Infantry | Cavalry t; * §º. Porto Rico
regiments. regiments. ments panies regiments.
Alaska. -----------------------------------------------------------|------------|------------|------------
Philippine Islands. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ‘l 4 13 1} * 52 . . . . . . . . . . . .
Canal Zone.-------------------------------. 9 l 2 ------------ %
Hawaiian Islands... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 I * ------------------------
Guam. ------------------------------------ 3 * # ------------|------------
Porto Rico.--------------------------------|------------|------------|------------|------------ 3
Guantanamo. -----------------------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------
Total OverSeas. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 4 6 2 52 1
11 regiment (or 2 battalions) in China.
2 Philippine Scouts to be combined with Philippine Constabulary.
18. The foregoing estimate of the mobile forces required overseas is based on an
assumed strength of Infantry companies of 150 men, Cavalry troops of 100 men, and
of Field Artillery batteries of 171 men, and upon regimental organizations remaining,
with slight exceptions to be noted later, as now provided. The mobile enlisted
strength of the overseas garrisons would be 62,156 men, to which, for the total, must
be added the strength of the Coast Artillery and of the detachments and units of the
technical corps and staff departments in their proper proportions.
19. Examination of Table I shows that the estimated garrisons for the Canal Zone
and the EHawaiian Islands are practically one Infantry division for each. For the
Philippines and Guam it is a reinforced Infantry brigade for each, though the composi-
tion of these detachments is not the same. While the tactical problem presented in
each of the outlying possessions is different, as was pointed out in the report of 1912,
the troops required in each place correspond so closely to the normal (division) organiza-
tion that no exception in organization should be made on this account. This being so,
there is no argument, so far as organization alone is concerned, for retaining regiments
permanently abroad. On the otherhand, there are marked disadvantages in the present
system, while the economy, it is thought, is less than was expected, and whatever
difference in cost there may be would tend to disappear under the system I shall
suggest of a shorter period of service with the colors and of using the regiments abroad
as well as those at home at their maximum capacity for creating reserves. I believe
therefore that service in the over-seas garrisons should be performed by exchanging
organizations at proper intervals. Accordingly, I recommend the immediate abandon-
ment of the present so-called colonial system of permanently retaining regiments in
foreign service. The unfortunate effect of the present system on the noncommissioned
grade of the service is well known. The importance of efficiency in these grades is
equally plain; and this will be increased under the reserve system proposed, when
the noncommissioned officers must become practically the whole of the trained and
permanent personnel of an organization. To assure efficient results, as many non-
commissioned officers as possible must be encouraged to make the service a life occupa-
tion. The present system of foreign service altogether discourages this. It is injurious
also to regimental spirit, which has in no way lost its value because we have neglected
it of late in our service. Its renewed development under the reserve system proposed
is important. In cases where regimental pride is strong something of the spirit which
this inspires might be expected to find its way even into the complimentary reserve
regiment and thus give the organization, when mobilized, a service asset that ordinarily
only tradition and time can develop. Finally, with the increased foreign service
rendered necessary by the increased garrisons abroad there will never be through
this course serious disturbance of any º of localization of troops that may hereafter
be adopted for the home regiments; and I make this suggestion with the under-
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 917
standing that a proper distribution of the Army and localization must Some time
become a fact if we are ever to have an efficient and at the same time economical mili-
tary system. -
20. Regular forces at home.—The report of 1912 recommended the gradual creation
of a home mobile Army, or expeditionary force, of four Infantry divisions, and certain
extra-divisional troops. I believe that this is the minimum force that can give us any
confidence in our ability to meet our ordinary military obligations, or that can, with the
overseas forces, provide the necessary reserve strength to afford reasonable assurance
of our ability to defend ourselves in the event of attack by a first-rate power. I believe
also that recent world events have shown the desirability of the increase and organ-
ization indicated with the least possible delay. . -
21. When provided, these four divisions and the necessary extra-divisional troops
will permit the organization of two Army corps of two divisions each or of a field army
of from two to four divisions. I recommend that neither the name nor the organiza-
tion of the army corps be abandoned in our system.
22. As extra divisional troops I recommend, in order to preserve reasonably extra
accurate proportions of sabers and guns to rifles, to assure the development of reserve
forces of these arms in the same proportion, and to permit exchange of regiments servº
ing abroad without interference with the division organization, that there be provided
four additional Field Artillery regiments, two additional Infantry regiments, and
sufficient Cavalry to permit the organization of two Cavalry divisions of six regiments
each.
23. Our whole mobile active Army, if created according to this plan, would consist
of— & - * * -
6 Infantry divisions,
2 reenforced brigades,
2 Cavalry divisions,
4 additional Field Artillery regiments,
- 2 additional Infantry regiments, -
and such other extra-divisional auxiliary troops as this organization would require.
Two of the Field Artillery regiments should be horse artillery for assignment to the
Cavalry divisions. Our present strength, our requirements to meet these recom-
mendations, and the distribution proposed are shown (in terms of regiments) in the
following table: -
TABLE II.-Proposed and existing organizations.

Infantry | Cavalry | A.
regiments. regiments. | \ºy
g . reg regiments.
Overseas ---------------------------------------------------------- 2 26 4 6
2 Infantry divisions.
2 reenforced brigades.
In United States:
4 Infantry divisions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ---------. 36 4 8
2 Cavalry divisions.
Additional Field Artillery. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 2
Additional Inſantry. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 ------------|------------
Total required.----------------------------------------------- 64 20 1S
Existing regiments. -------------------. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ------ 31 15 6
To be supplied. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 33 5 12
1 See Table I. -
2 Including Porto Rico Regiment, 1 additional battalion of which remains to be supplied.
3 Plus 1 battalion Porto Rico Regiment. -
ORGANIZATION.
24. The details of organization, as well as the proportions of other auxiliary troops
to the Infantry, are not entered upon here, because I believe these should be worked
out by the General Staff, where the time and facilities for such work are greater than
are permitted to my office. I suggest, however, that with the Infantry and Cavalry
regiments there should be authorized not less than 12 machine guns. There should
also be authorized a reasonable number of mounted Scouts to each regiment of In-
fantry, in addition to orderlies. With companies 150 strong, the necessary personnel
for 12 machine guns, 15 mounted Scouts, and the remaining strength and organization
º as now provided, and Infantry regiments would run 2,000 strong in en-
isted men. I am taking this strength as a standard throughout this report.
918 PREPARED NESS FOR, NATIONAL DEFENSE.
*
25. Our experience with machine-gun organizations, headquarter companies, and
the like has well shown the need of a more elastic legal definition of the regiment.
The constant change in material and methods of war necessitate corresponding change
in organization. The law should go no further than to fix the limit of strength, com-
missioned and enlisted, and the proportion of officers and noncommissioned officers
to men of other grades. The rest should be left to Executive action. The same prin-
ciple holds true to every other unit or organization.
26. With companies 150 men strong there should be provision for three cooks.
There should also be authorized one clerk with the rank, or at least the pay, of cor-
poral. I believe one wagon essential for each company of this strength. If it is
authorized, a teamster should be one of the enlisted personnel of the company. He
should be as much a part of his organization as the company cooks.
27. Regular Infantry companies should not exceed 150 men strong unless provision
be made for an additional company officer. But they should not be reduced below
this on the ground that the militia and volunteer officers can not be expected to
handle companies so large. This is undoubtedly true, but the condition should be
met, not by reducing the efficiency and increasing the relative cost of the Regular
Army, but by limiting the strength of volunteer organizations when formed to the
number that we may probably expect volunteer, or partly trained officers, to com-
mand. There is an advantage, of course, in uniform strength of organizations, but
this can seldom be maintained in war under any circumstances while the advantage
of various strength is less an evil than the extravagance in overhead expenses in the
Regular Establishment. Moreover, under the plan now suggested, the fundamental
purpose of the Regular Army in peace is to create a dependable reserve force for use
in War. Only by working it to its maximum capacity can there be any hope of ac-
complishing this purpose within any reasonable period of years. For other reasons
as well, the organizations overseas must be maintained at their maximum strength
at all times; and until the limit of the Army’s capacity to supply reserves has been
reached under the plan adopted they should be maintained at the same strength as
at home. Without system, and the comparatively small establishment that we can
at best maintain under it, there should, in my judgment, be no difference between
peace and war strength of organizations with the colors. The use of the term in this
sense ought to be abandoned. As we use them their real significance is peace strength
and war weakness. And there is no economy in reducing the number of actual
fighting men in proportion to the remaining personnel of the Army.
22. The Cavalry regimental organization so far as concerns the number of troops
and Squadrons to the regiment and the strength of troops should remain as now pro-
vided. The Cavalary.arm needs rewritten drill regulations rather than reorganiza-
tion. What was good in the old regulations should be preserved, and only what has
been found practical and necessary, through the recent experimental cavalry camps,
should be added.
COAST ARTILLERY.
29. The importance of coast defense is not to be minimized. Along our coasts,
in the event of war with a first-class power having sufficient command of the sea to
attempt to reach us by this means, must come the decision whether or not the United
States can be invaded. But in such an emergency the Coast Artillery, so called,
will probably have no active part, and, under the most favorable circumstances to
them, can have but a minor part in influencing the decision. This is so because,
despite the name, our Coast Artillery are not coast defense troops, or are at best but
a part, and by no means the most important part, of the troops necessary for defense
of the coasts. The Coast Artillery and their fixed guns are the immobile part of the
defense of certain harbors where established—nothing more. They are not even
harbor defense troops in the sense of affording complete defense to the harbors they
in part protect. Their guns cover only the channels and the sea entrances to the
channels of these harbors. Against approach from any other direction or by any
other means they are helpless. Without the aid of mobile troops they can not even
defend themselves from small attacking parties that may succeed in landing in the
vicinity of the works themselves. - -
The terms “coast defenses” and “Coast Artillery” as used by us are misnomers.
Largely through these terms and the significance they carry to the ignorant or unthink-
ing, the arm of the Service they represent has been enabled during the last quarter of
a century to reach a degree of efficiency that places it, well to the forefront of our
Military Establishment. This in no wise denies the ability and earnestness and high
professional attainments of our Coast Artillery personnel. But these things them-
Selves constitute only another reason for checking, when necessary, the professional
enthusiasm that would further distort our unbalanced Military Establishment and
PREPAIRED NIESS FOR, NATIONAL DEFENSE. - 919
thereby add to the extravagance without adding any thing to our military strength.
, The original fault lies with the so-called Endicott Board, which started the modern
development of this arm cf a military system without any thought of the remaining
parts of the system. The harm innocently, but still ignorantly, done by this board
to our military development is incalculable and far outweighs its good intentions and
the real benefit conferred in directing attention to our undefended coasts. The
results of its activities have not only been extravagant in cost but they have weakened
uS militarily and have made our defense methods the laughingstock of every serious
foreign student who has studied them. Unpleasant as the task is, I feel it incumbent
upon me to take this opportunity to urge new study of this part of our defensive
System before we go to extremes that can do no more than make us ridiculous in the
military world.
30. The fact that the terms “Coast defenses” and “Coast Artillery” are misnomers
can not, in the light of these greater truths, be accepted with equanimity, since it is
through them that the country has heretofore been lulled into a false sense of security
and immeasurable harm done to all other parts of our Military Establishment and to
the whole cause of national defense. - -
31. The Coast Artillery does not, and can not, defend out coasts. Alone it does
not, and can not, protect our harbors and the cities whose gates these harbors are.
But more than this, wherever their guns have been installed and manned they have
made the active land defense of that city and harbor a necessity in War, and by so
much have added to our positive need of mobile troops for their defense. These
mobile troops have never been provided, and until they are provided every coast work
for which we lack mobile defending troops is not only a military weakness, but in the
event of war may become a positive danger to our defense through its liability to cap-
ture, and the certainty in this event of our own guns being used against us.
32. In war with a Sea power our coast defenses, in our present use of the term, will
not only tie their own garrisons hard ànd fast in place, but they will render useless for
general military purposes a much larger proportion of mobile troops by holding them
equally fast in the vicinity of the fixed defenses, since in no other way under attack
can these defenses be Saved or prove a strength instead of a weakness. The signifi-
cance of this fact should be grasped. The fundamental strength of mobile troops lies
in their mobility. Whatever are assigned to the land-side defenses of coast-fortified
places are for the time immobilized So far as their use for general military purposes is
concerned. And there are already more than enough coast works installed in the
TJnited States to immobilize in this way a force of mobile troops greater than our com-
bined Regular Army and Organized Militia. . Every additional coast work hereafter
will create at once the necessity for corresponding increase in the mobile army. This
fact, at least, should be recognized and counted as a part of the cost of our expensive
system of harbor defense, for I am convinced that never until it is recognized and the
cost counted will anything like a rational system of national defense be possible fer
the United States. -
33. I can not but believe that under our military development we have failed to
recognize the difference between the defense of our continental shores and the defense
of distant or insular possessions, and, even more the difference between the defenses
of a great continental country like the United States with its far-stretched coast line
and of island countries like Great Britain or continental countries of limited area
and restricted coast line like the German Empire. The defense problem in their case
and ours is totally different. Along our coast, cities are growing up on or near every
possible harbor. The demand for fixed defenses just so soon as any of these reaches
puberty is insistent. It is an ignorant demand or a selfish demand and should be
resisted. The fundamental principle for us in this respect should be not how many
of these harbors can we fortify but how many of them can We afford fortifying. Any
other principle logically followed must involve us in endless expense of money and
men and leave us militarily weaker than we are to-day. -
34. The present enlisted strength of the Coast Artillery is approximately 19,000
men. It is my understanding that Coast Artillery authorities estimate the number
of men required to man completely (with “one relief”) all the harbor works now in-
stalled and under construction at home and abroad as about 55,000. But the proper
fighting of coast-defense units, according to the same authorities, “demands and is
accepted as three reliefs.” Properly to serve all the defenses then would require
about 165,000 men, a force nearly twice as great as the entire Regular Army to-day;
and even this number counts none of the mobile troops which would necessarily Sup-
plement them in time of danger and which would no less necessarily exceed them in
number. That we can never, as far as we can see now, provide anything like this
number of artillerists, even with regulars and militia combined, is certain; yet if we
920 PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
are not to provide them we should assuredly decide upon some definite plan of harbor
defenses that there is a possibility of carrying into execution.
35. I have quoted above, of course, the minimum estimate known to me of men
required. Personally I do not agree with them. I have never been able, and am
unable now, to accept the theory of three “reliefs” or two “reliefs,” or indeed any
number of “reliefs” as any more essential in our Coast Artillery than in any other
part of our military establishment. The use of the term ought in common fairness,
if for no other reason, to be abandoned. They, as well, convey wrong impressions to
the ignorant or unthinking. The idea that manning details for our harbor defenses
will ever in the general case be required in war to remain continually at their posts
for longer periods than other forces will be required to remain at theirs is untenable.
For the exceptional case it is impossible to prepare. Certainly if our fixed harbor
defenses be ever seriously attacked, the ships attacking them are not likely to have
#: ºlies. and much less will the mobile troops supporting our artillerists be thus
VlCleCl.
36. In the last quarter of a century we have spent more proportionately on the Coast
Artillery on their works than on all of the rest of our military establishment combined.
In all our history this arm has done less fighting in its own sphere than any other arm
of the service. Our history is not different in this respect from the history of any
other nation. There is nothing whatever now to indicate that precedents are to be
overturned in the future. Rather the contrary. The only possible case where our
harbor works and their personnel can come into active use is in event of a direct
attack from the sea by the enemy’s ships. This is the rarest form of attack known in
war. Unaccompanied by land attack it is almost unknown; and with our extensive
coast line it is safe to say that with us it will never be known. Wherever we install
harbor defense works they should be efficient and effectively manned, but once this
is attained, their purpose is served. No navy will attempt seriously to confront them.
37. I have set forth these truths here at some length because I earnestly believe
their consideration essential to the proper development of our military System, which
must be regarded as superior in importance to the development of any one part. ... But
#. consideration is also important to the proper development of the Coast Artillery
itself.
38. Our plans for harbor defense for the entire country and its outlying possessions
should be given the most exacting revisions. Existing fortifications cover many
places where no possible enemy would attack; places liable to attack are covered by
works improperly located and improperly armed. All these useless fortifications
should be abandoned; obsolete armament should be scrapped, and Such important
centers as are finally and properly selected for defense should be fortified and armed
against both sea and land attack. Unless fortified and armed against both they should
be fortified against neither. -
39. There are only a few of these centers on the homeland. We can not, under
present conditions, hope to prevent an enemy securing Some base on Our Shores
provided he is strong enough to land his forces in the face of such mobile troops as we
can throw against them. It is of present importance then only to assure ourselves
that the base secured by him will not be disastrous to us. The capture of New York,
Philadelphia, or Boston might very obviously force the United States to immediate
peace. The capture of Mobile or Galveston, even New Orleans or Los Angeles, would
not have the same effect. -
40. Important harbors and cities like Boston, New York, and Washington on the
east coast should then be put as far as possible beyond the thought of capture. All
others should be left undefended so far as permanent works are concerned and left to
other known means of defense when the emergency shall arise. In my judgment and
in the judgment of competent Artillery officers themselves, there should be under
present conditions no permanent works on the Atlantic coast South of the mouth of
the Chesapeake. On the Pacific coast only San Francisco and the Columbia River
and Puget Sound region should be defended—but these should be completely de-
fended. San Francisco affords perhaps one of the best illustrations we have of the
folly of harbor defenses unaccompanied by land defenses of the same region.
41. It is conceivable, of course, that, left undefended, Los Angeles might be occu-
pied by the enemy. Speaking broadly, if an enemy must land on our Pacific coast,
he could probably not find a better place for our purpose than this. Furthermore,
with the Canal Zone, Oahu, and Guam properly held by us, Los Angeles would have
a better defense than any number of guns mounted on the California coast could
possibly give her. And in any event mounting and manning heavy guns will never
alone save Los Angeles from capture. But just so much does she offer a more tempting
prize to a possible enemy º enough in mobile troops to take her, since by So much
would she be the more easily held by them against recapture by us.
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 921
42. The fact that with the Canal Zone, Oahu, and Guam Securely held, a point like
Los Angeles on our Pacific coast is better defended than by guns at our own harbor
mouth, shows plainly the difference between the defense of our outlying and distant
bases and the defense of those homeland. Readiness at all times for complete defense
of these places is essential to defense at home. Whatever fixed defenses are necessary
in them should be installed and fully manned; but again only when the mobile troops
equally essential to their defense have been provided.
43. My recommendations in respect to the Coast Artillery are based upon the fore-
going conclusions and the study that has led to them. The recommendations are as
follows: & -- -
(1) That if provision be made for the defense of Guam, whatever fixed armaments
may be found necessary there be installed and manned at the same time the island
is occupied by its mobile garrison; and that the Coast Artillery Corps be increased in
strength sufficiently for this purpose.
(2) That no other or further increase in this corps be made; that no new harbor
defenses be installed at home; and that no other new installation be made abroad until
after competent and thorough study of our whole system of harbor defense be made,
not as a thing apart, but in connection with our military and naval system of defense,
and until our plans for harbor defense have been revised in accordance with the re-
sults of this study. This study should be completed immediately. I recommend
Such increase as it discloses is necessary.
44. Reserves.—The same principle of reserves, hereinafter suggested, for the mobile
army should be applied without change to the Coast Artillery. Once in complete
operation this would permit immediate mobilization of the Coast Artillery in double
its peace strength.
45. The training and use of Coast Artillery troops should be confined wholly to the
defenses pertaining to the branch they represent. They should not be trained in the
special duties of any other arm and their use as any other arm should not be anticipated.
To expect to use any force in war for two different purposes is to leave one purpose
unaccomplished.
ORGANIZED MILITIA.
46. Strength.—It is recommended that the strength of the various organizations of
the militia remain at the minimum at present prescribed by law. If this minimum
strength be increased, the present difficulty of recruiting will be multiplied and will
make it a burden too great for the time that can be spared by the average officer of the
militia. With the time at his disposal, the present size of Organizations is as great as the
average officer of militia can effectively command and train. Armory accommodations
throughout the country are based on the present minimum strength of Organizations
and their remodeling to meet the demands of larger units would entail greater ex-
CD SC.
p 47. Organization.—It is recommended that the organization of the militia remain
as now prescribed by law, with the proviso that every effort be made to maintain
its various arms in the same proportions as those of the regular, reserve, and volunteer
forces suggested in this report. Under the plan outlined hereinafter, the organiza-
tion of the higher units would not affect Federal use of the militia, while this Organiza-
tion would continue to be of importance in the matter of State control and adminis-
tration.
48. Reserves.—No reserve system for the militia is recommended.
49. In this connection these subbborn facts must be recognized: (1) The militia
is first and always a State force; (2) under the Constitution it can Inot be employed
for Federal purposes beyond the boundaries of the United States, except after a
complete change of its identity from militia to Volunteers; and (3) the requirements
of service in the militia and in the Volunteers differ radically.
50. Thousands of men are able to reconcile their physical condition, their business
and family relations with the demands of Service in the militia, and are thus enabled
to gratify a laudable desire for military service; whereas any obligation to comply
with the demands of volunteer service which takes them away from touch with
personal and business interests proves not only a serious embarrassment but in
many cases a real and tangible obstacle.
5l. For these reasons the militia can not be reckoned upon with sufficient certainty
to permit of its organization in advance into units capable of rapid and complete
mobilization. -
52. Organization in its minutest detail is the first essential to modern civilization.
Hence, as an element in the organization of mobilizable forces, the militia must be
disregarded.
53. However, there remains a large field in which the militia may be of the greatest
value in the matter of national defense. The militia is a machine capable of impart-
922 PREPAREDTNESS FOR, NATIONAL DEFENSE.
ing, under the most favorable conditions, the elements of military training to a large
number of men, fostering patriotism and spreading throughout the country a desirable
military spirit and of thus contributing materially to the building up of an army of
trained citizenry. For this purpose it should be used both in time of peace and in
war for the training of future volunteers. It should be maintained at all times at its
highest possible standard of efficiency—not as an unorganized, tentative volunteer force,
but as a highly organized feeder to a properly organized volumteer force.
54. Such an arrangement is easily effected without further legislation with regard
to the militia. It requires no change in either strength or organization. Under
existing law it is possible to lend to the militia all necessary financial and professional
assistance. Nothing further is required but to carry the law into full effect by the
detail of an officer of the Regular Army of suitable rank to each regiment or its equiv-
alént to take active charge of the instruction and training of its units.
55. By means of this instruction and training its officers and men should be given
every opportunity and assistance to qualify themselves for commissioned and non-
commissioned rank in the volunteer organization hereafter proposed. As fast as
they are able to qualify by passing a standard, practical examination, they should be
appointed and assigned to the units of this volunteer organization. Such appointment
and assignment would have no effect upon their status as militiamen until the actual
mobilization of the volunteers in case of war.
56. On the issuance of orders for the mobilization of the volunteers the militiamen
assigned thereto would at once join their organizations and take up the work of organ-
izing and training. The militia organizations, with the remaining men who, for good
and sufficient reasons, are unable to volunteer, would remain intact in their respective
States and become the active recruiting and training force for the State's quota of
volunteers. When this work has been completed, these organizations could be further
used as a recruiting and training force for the Army at large or for the recruiting and
training of a second volunteer force.
57. By such an arrangement those who desire to volunteer in the event of war are
provided with the means of doing so under the most favorable circumstances, viz:
They are enabled and assisted to prepare themselves in time of peace for and to
receive appointment to the highest volunteer rank they are capable of exercising,
without resort to political or other influence. On the other hand, those who for any
reason may find it inadvisable to volunteer may, without inconvenience or embarrass-
ment, remain at home and give excellent and individual service in recruiting and
training.
58. In addition to providing a means whereby the militia may be utilized for the
greatest good of the country at large and with the least interference with State control
and the interests of the individual militiaman, this plan creates a permanent machine
for recruiting and training in time of War—something for which no provision has ever
heretofore been made in this country. The advantage of this to us will be shown
better when the subject of organizing our volunteers is reached.
RESERVES.
59. The report of 1912 seems to contemplate limiting the use of reserves in our
system to maintaining existing active regiments in peace at full strength in war.
The principle of reserves is, of course, much broader than this, and if the creation
of an adequate military System is to be economically possible for us we must apply
the principle in its broadest aspects.
60. Generally speaking reserves fulfill three distinct purposes: (a) To fill existing
organizations of the active Army to a war footing; (b) to make good losses occurring
in organizations after they have taken the field; and (c) to fill up and complete reserve
units which, while fully organized in time of peace, do not actually function until
war has been declared, or until mobilization has been ordered, or, in special cases,
when such units can be assembled in whole or in part for a limited period of peace
time training.
61. All of these purposes are important. The first two are essential to the war
efficiency of whatever active organizations we may maintain in peace, but the third,
(c) is no less essential to us in its broadest sense if we are ever to develop a trained
citizen soldiery capable of efficient employment in war. -
62. Furthermore, it must be accepted at the outset that organized reserves will not
repay the cost of scattering them among our population, though while enjoying in
peace uninterrupted liberty as to residence, occupation, and manner of living, the
reservist must throughout belong to some definite organization if he is to be useful in
war. It must be recognized as a cardinal principle that no man who has once been
trained as a soldier should be lost track of until he has completed the period of service
in the reserve prescribed by law. In other words, we must so systematize and handle
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 928
our reserves that, when mobilization is ordered, every man on the reserve list, unless
physically disqualified, shall present himself at Some previously designated center,
there to be incorporated into an existing organization, receive his uniform, equip-
ment, arms, ammunition, and rations, and prepare to move without delay or lost
motion to whatever point of concentration may have been ordered.
63. In order, therefore, to bridge the gap between our present utter lack of prepara-
tion for War and reasonable preparedness, and to proceed at once to the organization
of reserve regiments and higher units for the active Army, every organization of the
Regular Army should be maintained at its maximum strength until the period of
transition—several years at best—has been passed, and the reserve regiments herein
proposed have been organized and filled. Once this has been accomplished and
sufficient additional reserves listed to assure keeping the active and reserve regi-
ments full for the first few months of war, the active regiments at home may, if then
desired, be reduced in strength to a point where equilibrium will be preserved. A
reasonable percentage of reservists must, however, always be allowed in calculation
Inot only to raise reduced-strength regiments to war footing, but to allow for losses on
the reserve list due to death, disability, and desertion and for men who for various
reasons may fail to respond to the call to the colors when war comes. But personally
as already stated, I believe there should be no reduced-strength status for any organi-
Zation in our Small Regular Establishment
64. To provide the necessary flow into the reserves, I recommend that the enlist
ment law provide for a six-year term with a maximum period of two years with the
colors and a corresponding four-year period in the reserve. Provision would have to
be made, of course, for longer retention on the active list and the reenlistment of non-
commissioned officers and desirable privates for selection to fill vacancies in the non-
Commissioned grades. As heretofore stated, the average man could be passed into
the reserve after one year's training. In special cases he could be furloughed to the
reserve in an even shorter period. No absolutely fixed period should be legally fixed
as a minimum. While in the average case one year's training would be necessary
and in many cases two years, special cases should be left for executive settlement as
they arise, and transfer to the reserve permitted as soon as it is assured that he is
Sufficiently trained. It should be an established rule, however, that once service
with the colors has commenced no man qualified for the service should be given com-
plete discharge therefrom until his full period has been completed either with the
colors, with the reserve, or with both. Discharges by purchase or by favor should not
be authorized, nor would they be necessary since practically the same result would
be attained by transfer from the active list to the reserves.
65. The necessity of retaining and encouraging the reenlistment of noncommissioned
officers and privates who are desirable for promotion must be emphasized. More than
ever, under the system proposed, will these become “the backbone” of the service.
The Navy enjoys the excellent privilege of retaining, in emergencies, the services of
any man, with his own consent, for an additional period of one year after the expiration
of his enlistment, and without formal reenlistment for the full term. The same rule
should apply to the Army. Many excellent men would remain in the service for
considerable periods under this condition who now hesitate to obligate chemselves
for the full enlistment period. The advantage to the service would hardly be less.
66. In time of threatened war, of course, the right of the soldier to transfer to the
reserve would have to be temporarily suspended. Provision would have to be made
in the law accordingly.
67. No experienced officer probably can accept the principle of so short a term of
Service as suggested here without regret. That something of the steadiness and
Spirit that come through mere service itself will be lost by this method goes without
Saying. The Sacrifice should not be made then without assurance of gain in other
ways sufficient to balance the loss. The gain is to be expected only through the
assured establishment of an adequate reserve system such as is suggested here. If
this plan or Some similar plan be not accepted in its entirety I can not bring myself to
recommend reduction of the period of service below three years in the general case
and two years in special cases. .
68. For the purpose of illustrating the system proposed I shall employ only the
Infantry in the active strength and organization herein suggested. The same prin-
ciple, however, will apply to all of the mobile arms, the Coast Artillery, and the
technical corps. Once established then in their proper proportion these various
services will develop reserves in the same proportion.
69. Provision having been made for the organization and recruitment of 64 active
regiments of Infantry suggested, there should be immediately organized a correspond-
ing reserve regiment for each of them, and regimental mobilization centers for these
reserve regiments designated and established. These reserve regiments should be
924 PREPAIRED NIESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
numbered from 101 to 164 and so designated. Thereafter whenever a soldier passes
from the active to the reserve list he should be assigned to the reserve regiment nearest
to his place of residence. Upon removal to some other part of the country he should
be transferred to the nearest regiment to his new residence. z -
70. The time required to fill these 64 regiments to their proper strength must depend
upon the following factors: (a) The rate at which the organization of the additional
33 regiments (required to complete the total of 64 regiments) is authorized by the
enabling act of Congress; (b) the time required to recruit these 64 regiments to maxi-
mum strength; (c) the rapidity and rate at which men can be trained and furloughed
to the reserve. For the purpose of this estimate we must neglect the first and second
factors, (a) and (b), and assume the organization and recruitment of the active regi-
ments complete. Based upon the best obtainable data we must deduct thereafter
9 per cent of the total for the annual loss from death, disability, and desertion. The
permanent personnel of noncommissioned officers is about 20 per cent. Allowing
for retention of a reasonable percentage of desirable privates for promotion and for
the men who will require two years’ training before transfer to the reserve, I estimate
that approximately 44 per cent of the forces could be furloughed annually to the
reserve. This estimate gives results as follows: -
64 regiments Infantry, active strength. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128,000
9 per cent annual loss due to casualties. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11, 520
Remainder-------------------------------------------------- 116,480
44 per cent annually furloughed to reserve . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51,251
Were there no other losses to be anticipated, and no loss among the reservists them-
selves, this rate would enable us to complete the enlisted personnel of the reserve
regiments, One hundred and first to One hundred and sixty-fourth, in about two and
one-half years. But there would, of course, be losses not easily estimated, and some
percentage would fail to respond to the call to the colors. So, even assuming that the
Regular Army could be immediately increased as suggested and promptly recruited
to full strength, at least from two to four years must elapse before we could hope to
have sufficient reserves to complete the organizations suggested. But certainly it is
not only when this has been accomplished that we could begin to think of storing up
a reserve of men for the purpose of expending reduced-strength organizations to their
minimum or of reducing our active Organizations to a so-called peace strength.
71. Under any system short of universal service there is, of course, a practical limit
to the numbgr of reservists that can be created and organized. The limit for the
Infantry under the plan proposed may be shown as follows:
Assuming that, as estimated above, 51,251 men are furloughed each year to the
reserve, to get our net reserve gain at the end of the year we must deduct 9 per cent
for casualties, since death, desertion and disability must be expected at about the
same rate in the reserve as in the active organizations. Our net reserve strength after
one year would therefore be 46,638 infantrymen. After four years at the same rate
we should have 178,952 reservists. But after four years the reservists begin to pass
off the reserve list by reason of final discharge from the service, and after five years
they would pass out of the reserve at practically the same proportion as new men
entered it. We may safely take 200,000 men, therefore, as the minimum limit to our
Infantry reserve unless reenlistment be permitted in the reserve. Certainly, however,
until the reserve organizations have reached their maximum strength, reenlistment
therein should be permitted. •
72. For our 64 reserve regiments we need 128,000 men. Considering the maximum
limit of the reserve, 200,000, this would leave us (provided every man responded to
the call to the colors) 72,000 men to replace casualties in 128 regiments (64 active and
64 reserve) in the case of war. The casualties for a regiment in a campaign are reck-
oned at 50 per cent for the first six months, and at this rate our number of available
reservists would be able to maintain their regiments at full strength in war for only
about four months. The maximum number of reservists possible under this plan is
therefore not excessive.
73. So far as the organization of the reservists is concerned only a general outline
can be given here. The details, of course, should be worked out by the General Staff.
I believe it wholly practicable, however, to formulate such a plan and gradually to
perfect the details. And I believe it should be formulated.
74. Adopting as a basis the 64 reserve regiments above proposed we have to con-
sider (a) organization, (b) localization, (c) plans for mobilization, and (d) a System for
keeping control of individual officers and enlisted men as fast as they are placed on
the reserve list and assigned to definite organizations.
75. Organization and localization should go hand in hand, i.e., as soon as the reserve
regiments are organized a definite point should be fixed upon as the mobilization
depot for each regiment. Taking into consideration the distribution of population
PREPAREDINESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 92.5
throughout the United States it will not be difficult to fix upon 64 centers to be desig-
nated as mobilization points for each of our 64 reserve regiments. Also when mobi-
lized there, and by this term it is intended to cover every operation connected with
placing the regiment in readiness to take the field, it should be ready then to be moved
promptly to brigade or division headquarters at whatever concentration point may
have been selected, or, if time permits, to receive needed training. Organization
should not, of course, stop with the regiment, but should be perfected in time of peace
to include the divisions, complete with its necessary auxiliary troops, staffs, clerks,
service corps, and trains. But it is desired to emphasize the necessity of fixing upon
the regiment as the basis of mobilization for the reason that it has, or should have, all
the necessary machinery required for putting the various operations connected with
mobilization into effect. In thickly populated localities it will probably be found
advisable to establish more than one mobilization center at the same point, and thus
an entire brigade, or even a division, may be mobilized at one point. But the mobili-
zation element should remain the regiment and each reserve regiment should have
its own storehouse, or separate part of the same storehouse, wherein should be stored
everything required in the way of uniform, armament, and equipment to put the
regiment on a war footing. If the plan suggested hereafter of adding to each regiment
of the Regular Army a definite number of extra officers be adopted, then at least one
of these should be permanently detailed to supervise all matters connected with the
administration of each of the reserve regiments in time of peace, to include the keeping
up to date the records of all reservists who may from time to time be assigned to the
regiment, and the maintenance of all property and stores in a state of readiness for
war. Furthermore, the field staff of each regiment should be selected and assigned
in time of peace from officers of the Regular Army under such regulations as may be
prescribed by the President, and as fast as reserve officers become available they
should be also assigned to companies and at once place themselves in touch with the
officer in administrative charge of the regiment as above described. Company com-
manders so assigned should be furnished with descriptive lists giving names and
records of all reservists assigned to their companies, including, of course, the com-
missioned personnel, and their services should be utilized in keeping track of the
reservists and in keeping the records up to date. It is assumed that the four infantry
divisions suggested for permanent maintenance within the continental limits of the
United States would correspond to the present Eastern, Central, Southern, and
Western Departments. It is suggested that each one of these departments, or division
districts, be subdivided into a certain number of reserve districts numbered to cor-
respond with the number of reserve regiments. In carrying out this arrangement
complete subdistricts should, where possible, fall within a State, with the result that
each State would have one or more subdistricts to serve as headquarters and mobili-
zation centers for all reservists within that particular State. In pursuance of this
plan, and to provide for the control and supervision of all matter connected with our
military preparedness in time of peace, division commanders should be held responsi-
b'e within their districts for the effective performance of all duties relating to the
organization, administration, control, and, whenever practicable, training of all
reserves and volunteer organizations within their districts. It is thought that the
authority and responsibility of division commanders might well be further extended
to include questions of recruitment and supply of their own divisions and of all United
States forces, reserves and volunteers, pertaining to the mobile Army within their
division districts. Real decentralization must accompany the institution of any
efficient military system.
76. The question of establishing a system for keeping track of men as fast as they
are trained and pass into the reserve is a purely administrative matter, the details
of which will have to be worked out and published as a part of our regulations. It
is offered here simply as a suggestion that each man be furnished with a card showing
his assignment to company and regiment and giving clear and brief directions con-
cerning the course to be pursued, including mobilization point at which he is to
report, in case of war or when assembled for any purpose. . This card should contain,
in addition, a form of transportation request to be accepted by railway and steamship
companies, under prescribed conditions, over the route he must necessarily travel
for rejoining.
77. Such number of copies of his descriptive list as may be necessary should be
prepared so that copies may be furnished to all concerned in the preparation and
maintenance of the record of his regiment. It is, of course, realized that it will not
always be possible to assign a man to his reserve regiment immediately upon discharge
from service with the colors, since in many cases he will have to look for work, sometime
must elapse before he becomes definitely located. Furthermore, men having been
located and assigned will move from one State to another or from the country, will
die, become disabled, imprisoned, fail to report their whereabouts, and in other ways
926 PREP.A.R.E.D.NESS FOR, NATIONAL DEFENSE.
will become separated from military control. No system can be designed to prevent
such cases, and it remains to devise methods to obviate, as far as is humanly possible,
defects that, from the nature of things, must exist in any system. But it needs no
argument to show that a fixed organization and definite plans for mobilization are
in every way superior to the haphazard methods, or utter lack of method, that have
always characterized our efforts to raise, equip and train a volunteer force. -
78. The formation of a definite plan for organization, administration, and control
of the reserve in time of peace is in no way impracticable for us. Compared with
similar problems abroad, it is complicated by the extent of our country, our hetero-
geneous population, and the fact that we have as yet no machinery to put our plans
into operation, and no force trained for this particular work. Whatever plan may
be finally adopted will require time and effort, to put into successful operation; but
as between, on the one hand, any plan for training so many thousand men to disperse
in all directions, with only the hope of getting them together after the outbreak of
war, and, on the other, a plan for their definite, orderly, and prompt mobilization,
there can be no comparison from the point of view of military efficiency. Instead
of a more or less indefinite obligation to report on the outbreak of war at an unknown
point, the reservist under the proposed system should find himself a unit in a definite
organization, distant at most but a short journey from his place of residence and to
which to Some extent he be required to forward his address at stated intervals to
regimental headquarters and to report changes of residence promptly. It will be
necessary to pay the reservists a nominal sum, say $1 per month, to insure compliance
with the regulations governing them.
79. The establishment of an adequate reserve system means the upbuilding of
a trained citizen soldiery. To establish it, every proper encouragement must be
offered men to seek the period of training that will enable them intelligently to serve
their country in time of need. Patriotism alone can not be counted upon in ordinary
times as sufficient. Every reservist will have made sacrifices, or will have promised
to make Sacrifices in case of need, before his enrollment on the reserve list. He will
be entitled to such preference as his Government can properly show him. I urge,
therefore, that by proper legislation the principle be established of the reservist's
right to preference in selection for any civil service position that his abilities, when
disclosed by examination, may fit him for.
ADDITIONAL AND RESERVE OFFICERS.
80. Any study of a reserve must include reserve officers, which can not be provided
by the organized regiments of the Regular Army unless, as in past wars, we propose
to strip our regular regiments of their commissioned personnel at the time when most
needed with the Organizations to which they belong.
81. Before entering upon the question of officers for the reserve and volunteer
regiments, it is desired to touch briefly on the need of additional officers for the regi-
ments of the active Army. . It is suggested that for each regiment of Infantry of the
active Army there be provided—
1 extra lieutenant colonel,
l extra major,
4 extra captains, and
8 extra lieutenants, -
and in similar proportions for the other arms. The number of officers suggested will
be no more than needed, and their provision will not only furnish officers for details
to Schools, colleges, militia, and the like, but assure the regiment of a reasonable
complement of officers always present for duty, . Furthermore, from each active
regiment should be selected certain officers who, in the event of war, will join at
once the reserve regiments to which assigned in time of peace and enter upon the
duty of organizing, equipping, and otherwise preparing that regiment for war. The
lieutenant colonel or senior major of each active regiment should be assigned as
colonel of the corresponding reserve regiment, the Senior captains to the grades of
majors, so that, in the event of war, these positions would be promptly filled by
experienced and competent officers selected and assigned in time of peace and to
Some extent identified with the organization they are to command in war.
82. Under this plan in time of war each regiment of the active Army would be
ready to take the field at once with organizations at their highest efficiency and with
a full complement of their own officers, while at the same time each reserve regiment
would, at least in the higher grades, be officered by experienced men.
83. To provide officers for the Regular Establishment, West Point, of course, should
be worked to its full capacity. With the institution of a reserve system, graduates
of the academy thereafter resigning from the service, and in good standing, should
PREPAIRED NESS FOR, NATIONAL DEFENSE. 927
as a condition of acceptance on the part of the Government, be assigned as officers of
reserves for a suitable term of years. Another important source of reserve officers
would be through the discharge from active service in the Regualr Army of high-
class noncommissioned officers. Provision should be made that upon the recom-
mendation of company, battalion, or regimental commanders, the Secretary of War
may, without examination, appoint and assign to the reserve any qualified noncom-
missioned officer, with the rank recommended by his regimental superior upon his
transfer to the reserve. The term of appointment should be for the reserve period
due under the soldier's original enlistment contract, and reappointment should be
authorized.
84. But the problem of reserve officers can be completely solved only if systematic
effort be made to Secure and utilize the excellent material that our country affords.
To some extent now we are training and in part listing some hundreds of young men
each year with a more or less definite idea that in time of war they would make good
officers of reserve or volunteers. With a definite reserve and volunteer system these
young men could be examined and, if successful, commissioned and assigned to
reserve or volunteer regiments with which they would thereafter be identified and
to which they would report on the outbreak of war.
85. We should go, however, a step further and require the aspirant for a com-
mission in the reserve to serve with a company, troop, or battery of the mobile force
for a minimum period of six months and preferably for one year. The work of regular
officers at educational institutions where military training is a part of the course is
growing in importance and no observer of the student's military instruction camps
has failed to note their possibilities for their developing reserve or volunteer officers.
The fine class of young men attending these schools, the intelligence and energy
they bring to their work, and the opportunity afforded to give them thorough and
practical instruction should result in these camps becoming a permanent part of
Our System. At the close of each camp all those students who have successfully com-
pleted the course should be afforded an opportunity to take an examination, which,
if passed, should entitle them to designation as “Aspirants,” and to later assignment
to a company, troop, or battery of the Regular Army for a period as indicated above.
Thereafter their records and another examination, if necessary, will determine their
fitness for assignment to the reserve and the grade in which they should be com-
missioned. A similar course should be followed in case of students of institutions
where military training under a regular officer is a part of the curriculum. The
64 regiments of Infantry proposed will give 788 companies, and if to each one of these
companies could be attached each year one student officer of reserves the result is
easy to calculate. The same course should be followed with other arms and with the
staff corps and departments. The number of officers that could be secured by this
nethod can not be estimated with accuracy, but there is no reason to doubt, that
many of our best yourng men who are yearly receiving more or less military training
throughout the United States, would gladly avail themselves of such an opportunity.
The training would benefit them physically and increase their business and economic
value, while enabling them at the same time to fit themselves for military Service
in the event of war. Young men so assigned to regular organizations should receive
the pay and allowance of a second lieutenant during the period of service with the
troops. Upon the completion of this instruction period all those commissioned
should be assigned to an Organized reserve regiment and company. The question
of promotion of such reserve officers and the limiting age at which they should be
dropped from the reserve lists, as well as others that will arise can all be solved as they
occur. That selected officers from the Organized Militia should also be taken into
the reserve, subject to examination by a board of regular officers, goes without Saying.
86. As already stated, the militia should prove a valuable source of Officers and non-
commissioned officers for the proposed volunteer force. In order to obtain a sufficient
number of officers for the volunteers it will be necessary to commission them therein
without the period of service with a regular organization proposed for the reserves.
But even so much excellent material can be obtained in the ways already noted, and
young men unwilling or unable to take the period of instruction, with regular troops
will be found ready and anxious to fit themselves for military service and for examina-
tion and commission in the volunteer forces. The hope of being able to mobilize,
in time of war, some hundreds of thousands of Organized and trained, or partly trained,
troops, officered by men known to be reasonably competent and selected under the
regulation and supervision of the War Department, justifies in itself consideration
of the methods herein suggested. -
87. The organization of the reserve and volunteer forces proposed herein would open
up a useful field for the employment of every retired officer and noncommissioned
officer whose services could be secured. In connection with problems of organiza-
tion, administration, supply, and maintenance their services would be invaluable
928 | PREPAIRED NIESS FOR, NATIONAL DEFENSE.
and should be fully utilized. The supply centers which must be organized and, in
part at least, maintained in time of peace must continue to function after the troops
have taken the field in time of war and the value of having a trained, competent
personnel in charge is apparent. -
VOLUNTEERS.
88. The organization of the volunteer force should accompany the organization of
the regular and reserve forces.
89. Strength.-The organized volunteer force should be made up as follows:
Infantry----------------------------------------------- 128 regiments
Cavalry----------------------------------------------- 40 regiments
Field Artillery---------------------------------------- 36 regiments
Coast Artillery----------------------------------------- 352 companies
and technical corps and staff departments in their proper proportion.
90. Organization.—The mobile arm of the volunteers should be organized into
brigades and divisions, and plans for corps Organization should be in readiness. The
Coast Artillery companies should be organized into districts and inspections to corre-
spond with the organization of the regular forces of the same arm.
91. Just as far as possible the known personnel that is to constitute this volunteer
force in war should be selected and assigned in "peace. Its officers and noncommis-
sioned officers should be drawn from the militia under the method already described
and from ex-regulars and ex-militiamen and military camps and student camps.
But enrollment of men in the lower grades should proceed at the same time, and
every effort be made to induce former reservists and militiamen, graduates of military
schools, uniformed Orders, and, in fact, every qualified man, with or without military
training, to enroll themselves as volunteers and be assigned to organization. There
would, of course, be no obligations or restrictions imposed upon them in time of
peace, but in the event of war we should be by so much the better prepared for the
emergency and know, within reasonable limits, upon what force we could count for
prompt mobilization.
92. The following tables show the present organization of our military establishment
and the proposed system and its organization and strength: -
TABLE III.—Army.

Regular. Reserve. Volunteer,
Regiments. # Regiments. * Regiments. #
É t; §
º, Š Fº 3. F, 3.
5 C = Q C = 35 O fº
F. to GD E. to dº E. to G2
s, g | f | # F. # |##| g | g | # #
5 | E 3 || 3 5 | E | 3 ă 5 Pº : º
º: cº rd º : º rº º g ": re; *—d
3 || 3 || 3 || 5 || 3 || 3 || 3 || 5 || 3 || 3 || 3 || 3
E | 5 | E | 3 || 5 || 5 | E 3 5 || 3 || 3 || 3
Authorized at present. . . . . . 31 15 6 || 170 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ()
First increment . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 1 2 1 37 16 8 171 74 32 , 16 342
Second increment . . . . . . . . . . 6 1 2 1 6 I 2 I 12 2 4 2
Third increment - - - - - - - - - - - 5 1. 2 1 5 1 2 1. 10 2 4 2
Fourth increment. . . . . . . . . . 6 1 2 1 6 1 2 1 12 2 4 2
Fifth increment. . . . . . . . . . . . 5 1 2 1. 5 1 2 1 10 2 4 2
Sixth increment..... . . . . . . . 5 0 2 1. 5 1 2 1 10 2 4 2
Total.--------------- 64 20 18 l 176 64 20 18 176 128 40 36 352
1 The sational Six companies of Coast Artillery (or as many as necessary) are intended for Guam iſ
garriSOned. -
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 929
TABLE IV.-Strength.
Regular forces: •
Infantry---------------------------------------------------- 128,000
Cavalry---------------------------------------------------- 26, 940
Field Artillery. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21, 104
Coast Artillery. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18, 931
Total regular forces. . . . . . . . . . . . ------------------ …~ 194, 975
Reserve forces:
Infantry-------------------------- ** = • * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * = • * = 128,000
Cavalry---------------------------------------------------- 26, 940
Field Artillery. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21, 104
Coast Artillery. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18, 931
Total reserve forces. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 194, 975
- Total regular and reserve forces. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 389, 950
Volunteer forces:
Infantry---------------------------------------------------- 256,000
Cavalry. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 53,880
Field Artillery . . . . . . . . . . . - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 42, 208
Coast Artillery---------------------------------------------- 37, 662
Total volunteer forces--------. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 389, 950
Aggregate fighting force. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 779, 900
93. The organization of the entire force should follow the procedure outlined in
Table III, the organization of the Regulars being actual and complete in strength with
the colors; of the reserves, skeleton until through the means suggested they have
attained their complement of officers and men in reserve; and of the Volunteers,
skeleton except for officers and noncommissioned officers and such lower grades as may
be enrolled through the means indicated above. -
94. To complete the enrollment of the volunteer force will probably be a matter of
years of endeavor. By the time, however, that the reserve regiments have been
organized and filled, sufficient volunteer organizations should have been completed
and their strength enrolled to permit reasonably prompt mobilization of a force of
approximately half a million men. -
95. If the increments indicated in Table III be added annually in the order named,
as they should be, it will require six years after the enabling act to complete the organi-
zation outlin 20 for the Regular Establishment. Even presuming that as they are added
the regular organizations are immediately recruited to their full strength their com-
bined maximum capacity to produce reserves can be reached only after the additional,
the last (sixth), increment. For the reasons already shown at least four year smore will
be required to fill the reserve organizations to maximum strength. At best, therefore,
the institution of the system outlined will require 10 years or more to complete, though
there will be constant and regular increase in our actual and potential military strength
throughout this period. The cost of the system will be similarly progressive until the
maximum is reached with the maximum strength. The development of the volunteer
force should proceed simultaneously, though it will probably proceed more slowly;
but as no direct expense results in peace from the development of this force its growth
will not affect the cost of the system.
96. Provision should be included in the law for the immediate organization of the
entire additional force authorized, in the event of threatened war at any time before
its gradual development is completed.
RESERVE MATERIAL AND SUPPLIES.
97. For a system including reserves and volunteers to prove efficient in war there
must be accumulated in peace sufficient reserve matelial and Supplies, not only for all
authorized existing (reserve and volunteer) organizations, but for the replanishment of
the entire armed force after war had become a fact. The war in Europe has shown that
our reserve supplies should be largely increased over former estimates, particularly in
respect to arms and ammunition. t
98. As a general rule every item of the necessary reserve stores that can be kept
without loss or deterioration should immediately be available for issue at the outbreak
of war. Food supplies, means of transportation, and other stores that can not well
be kept in the required quantities in peace should be covered, So far as practicable,
930 PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
by conditional contracts, kept alive by periodical renewal, made and filed at the
mobilization centers. *
99. Reserve material and supplies should be kept on hand as follows:
(a). For the reserve regiments, complete arms (with ammunition), equipment,
clothing, and equipage, stored at the mobilization points and arranged for immediate
issue as reservists’ report.
b) For reserve divisions, sufficient material, stored at the division concentration
points, to complete the equipment of the divisions outside of their component or-
ganizations. .
(c) For volunteer regiments, same as (a), except that readiness for immediate use
will be less important until the organization and enrollment of the regiments are
completed. & -
(d) For volunteer divisions, same as (b), except that certain elements, like means of
transportation, can not wisely be kept in Store, though provision should be made for
their prompt supply in emergency through conditional contracts.
(e) At division depots sufficient supplies in excess of the requirements noted above,
to equip reserves and recruits sent to regiments in the field to replace losses occurring
during the first few months of War.
100. No reserve supplies need be kept on hand for the organized militia, inasmuch
as under the proposed plan these are included so far as necessary in the supplies for
reserves and volunteers.
101. Division commanders in time of peace should be given executive control over
the supply of all parts of the Army, including the reserve and volunteer organizations
within their respective districts, and should in this respect be practically independent
except in a financial sense of the War Department. The supply offices of the War
Department should concern themselves generally only with the manufacture, and the
encouragement of manufacture, of material, leaving distribution and responsibility,
where it belongs in any efficient system, to the immediate commanders most con-
cerned with the problems of supply and most familiar with the needs of their command.
102. Reserve stores for over-seas garrisons.—The problem in this respect for the out-
lying possessions is essentially different from that at home. Under probable condi-
tions in Warno additional material and supplies can be furnished the over-Seas garrisons
after the outbreak of war. The reserve stores in the depots of these garrisons should,
therefore, be sufficient at all times to assure adequate supply for whatever period
they are expected to continue, unaided, resistance. For most of them certainly this
period can not be less than six months. The garrison of the Philippines should be
Supplied for at least a year. In most of the outlying possessions little reliance can be
placed on local means of food supply. In the Canal Zone the troops at present are
dependent upon a department outside of military control, which maintains in storage
not to exceed one month’s supply for the population of the zone. The Republic of
Panama, if cut off from outside sources of supply, can supplement this little except
in the items of sugar and beef. There are, however, large areas of the depopulated
Zone that could be placed under cultivation, and considerable areas cleared, for de-
fensive purposes, that could readily be made available for grazing purposes. In the
execution of any plan for developing local supplies, inducement might Well be offered
to reservists to live in these areas and take up their development and cultivation.
103. Troop transports.—With increased garrisons abroad, the economical Solution
of the problems of their supply and changes of station, and of sending out the annual
quota of recruits and returning reservists, will require a suitable fleet of properly con-
structed and equipped transports built for the purpose. They should not be of less
than brigade capacity, equipped with modern fuel-oil Diesel engines, to afford the
largest cargo and passenger space possible.
104. Promotion and organization.—It is impossible to eliminate the factor of promo-
tion from the problem of organization. The matter of promotion should not certainly
be allowed to influence organization, but efficiency under any organization is seriously
dependent upon it, and that an unsatisfactory system of promotion may retard devel-
opment of organization we all know. For these reasons I venture to include the sub-
ject here far enough to merely indorse the heretofore proposed single-list plan to
include all arms of the mobile army. It is a just and practicable method, and if put
into operation in connection with any increase or reorganization of the existing estab-
lishment it would materially aid in the development of the service under whatever
military system is finally adopted. With the reservoir of additional officers provided
for the necessary duties not connected with command of troops, the objection. Some-
times urged of probable promotion to a different arm from the one in which an officer
has been trained is removed. . •
PREPAIRED NIESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 931
however, and court the opportunity to do so.
CONCLUSION.
105. The time permitted me for the consideration of this important subject does not
permit entering here into the details of organization under the system proposed.
am prepared to present the details necessary to its successful institution if desired,
CLARENCE R. EDWARDS.
STATEMENT, LIEUT. COL. HARRY FREASE, CANTON, OHIO,
CHIEF ENGINEER OFFICER (RETIRED) OF THE OHIO
NATIONAL GIJARD.
The CHAIRMAN. You testified at length, Colonel, before the House
committee, did you not - -
Col. FREASE. I testified before the House committee until about
noon, and did not get quite through. I will not go over the same
ground here, because I understand you will have that hearing.
The CHAIRMAN. We will have that. But we will be glad to hear
whatever you desire to say.
Col. FREASE. I did not propose to say much of anything when I
came in here, but I have been most delightfully interested in the very
able presentation of the policy which has been given to you. . But,
as a citizen soldier who has been associated with the National Guard
and in independent military work for over 40 years, there is just one
comment I would like to make in a preliminary way.
The suggestion that the officers and men in the National Guard
should be segregated into those who desire to enter more closely into
Federal service and those who desire to become a constabulary force,
seems to be a most unusual and unfortunate suggestion. It seems to
show an utter lack of sympathy or appreciation of the motives which
have influenced the hundred of thousands of officers and men who
have sought to be prepared for actual service for their Nation during
these last 40 or 50 years when the Nation itself, you might say, has
ignored the question of preparedness. The National Guard has done
what it could during the 40 years that I have been familiar with it
to be as well prepared as the facilities which are offered by the State
and Nation would enable them to be. I can say that I do not
believe there is a single officer or man in the National Guard who has
accepted a commission, or who has enlisted in its service, to become
a State constabulary.
The CHAIRMAN. They would not stay in there if they could not be
called into the general service'
Col. FREASE. No, sir. They have accepted that as any patriot or
any citizen should, as one of the necessary things that should be
provided for in the Government. . But that is not what they join
the National Guard for. They join the National Guard to get an
education, and preparedness, if you please, for just the situation this
nation finds itself in to-day, and there is not an officer or a man in the
National Guard who entered it or would remain in it for one minute
for the purpose of being a part of a State constabulary. § --
The Regular Army must not forget that the very fact that the
National Guard has had an existence has been a buffer between the
Regular Army and a service the very unfortunate burden and the
onus of which has been sustained in the National Guard and which,
if the National Guard is crowded out of existence by any form or
23380—PT 18—16—4*
932 PREPAREDINESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
policy of preparedness which may be enacted by Congress, will devolve
upon the Regular Army, and they would be subject to the antipathy
from organized labor and other influences which are unfriendly to
the National Guard, from which the Regular Army has been pro-
tected heretofore. -
Having said that much, I want to express my appreciation of the
very careful and thoughtful discussion as to how the Regular Army
can be enlisted and maintained on a proper basis, which is suggested
as something over 200,000. I fear, from my knowledge of obtaining
recruits for military organizations, which has extended, as I say,
through a period of over 40 years, that any plan of obtaining recruits
for the Regular Army through post offices and postmasters would
hardly be successful. It takes something more active than a post-
master to obtain recruits for the Army. It takes something to excite
interest in the possible recruit. e
Briefly, I developed before the House committee a plan which had
been in my mind for over 20 years, as to how the National Guard and
the Regular Army could be coordinated as a unitary force, and I am
glad to see that such an able Army officer as Gen. Edwards has
suggested the very plan that I proposed before the House committee
this morning, namely, that if a man could be trained within a year
he might be passed on to the reserve.
I think if you make such a provision for enlisted men in the Regu-
lar Army, you can enlist to the strength you need for immediate
purposes, and I thing every year you can pass from fifty to a hundred
thousand of those men into the reserve. I think, further, that that
policy has an economic value, beyond the mere maintaining of the
Army. You keep on educating year after year a hundred thousand
or more soldiers, and they pass on into civil life, and I think in a very
few years you will eliminate a great many of the difficulties which
we have experienced by way of strikes and riots. Who ever heard of
a man who had had a year's training in the Army engaging in any
lawless transaction ? I think that is the way to wipe out that situa-
tion which we have in our country to-day, by educational work
along military lines. That is the kind of work the National Guard
is engaged in.
Having provided an enlistment of a year, or two years, if need be,
make it possible, within a year, if the man is educated, to pass him
into the reserve and find another. As you accumulate corporals and
sergeants, my plan proposes that they shall be utilized more directly
and more generally for education of the National Guard. My plan
»roposes—and I think Gen. Edwards suggested—that there should
É. a Regular Army officer assigned to every regiment of the National
Guard. I would go further. I would assign a sergeant of the Regu-
iar Army to every battalion of the National Guard. There is where
you get your breeding ground for recruits for the Regular, Army.
You would never have regimental recruiting stations, with the
Robinson Crusoe privates and sergeants, who stand in a recruiting
room in some city, with no interest, nobody to call upon, no organi-
zation to bring recruits in. Place a Regular Army sergeant with
every battalion, have him visit their company on its drill night and
keep up the papers and keep up the organization, and you will have
him in direct touch with those civilians who will be willing to devote
a year or two during their youth to the training, not only to get a
PREPARED NESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 933
sight of the world, as suggested, but the training, which will be
beneficial to them when they go back into civil life.
That sort of a coordination between the two services would be
incidentally beneficial to the Army officers who were thus drawn into
touch and work with larger units. It would be beneficial to the
Sergeant, and there you will have in each regiment an Army officer
and four sergeants, at least—more, if you please—who will be the
nucleus in case of need. Those men can be a preliminary organiza-
tion, and organize other volunteer forces.
Senator DU PONT. Senator Cummins appeared before the commit-
tee a few days ago in behalf of a bill he has introduced looking to the
reorganization of the militia of the country. One of the features of
that bill is that at the expiration of a militiaman's service he should
be compelled to leave the service, the idea being that the greater the
number of people who have been trained for two or three years and
turned loose into the great body of civilians the better for the
country. In your opinion, would it be conducive to the discipline and
instruction of the militia to have every man, as soon as he has com—
pleted his term, forced to leave it 2
Col. FREASE. I quite agree with the theory that every man you can
train is of great economic value to the country, but I think there is a
better way to train more men—have more organizations, organize
two companies where there is one, and you will find the officers and
men for them.
Senator DU PONT. But would not the company be deprived of all
its noncommissioned officers ? - -
Col. FREASE. I think you would deprive yourself of good timber,
noncommissioned officers and officers. I would not favor that idea.
I think a man ought to be permitted to continue his military training
as many years as he sees fit to. Some of us have done it, as I say,
for 40 years, and still have something to learn.
I would like to say something upon the alleged dual relations
which is feared would render the use of the National Guard as a
first-line reserve, if you please. It seems to me that that is almost
fanciful, to say the least, the idea that there is anything inconsistent
with the National Guardsmen not only enlisting as a National
Guardsman, but enlisting as a Federal soldier, whatever you call
him, continental soldier or Federal soldier, without leaving the
National Guard. I will say this, a National Guard soldier is
none the less a militiaman or a citizen of his State because he joins
the National Guard. If you want a soldier in the Federal service,
you have to enlist him from some source. If you do not enlist him
from the National Guard, which is the Organized Militia, you have
to enlist him from the unorganized militia, which is not the National
Guard. There is no real distinction between the two. The only
difference is that the National Guardsman has subjected himself
voluntarily to some special training. Why should he be disquali-
fied from enlisting to-day in the Federal force without leaving his
State relation?
But it is said he will have a dual master to serve, he has to serve
the President and the governor. That is not a real difficulty, because
in every State we have the same situation. Every organized militia-
man in every company is subject to the call of the governor, the sheriff
934 PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
of any county, the mayor of any municipality, and the judge of any
court, and in all the years I have been familiar with the National
Guard I have never known of a case where that dual responsibility
to respond to Orders has ever caused any confusion, and I predict
that if the National Guard shall enlist and become part of the Federal
force, without leaving the National Guard obligation, there will
never occur any confusion because of that dual relation.
Senator DU PONT. In case of war and the Federal forces were
ordered out by the President, would not that decrease the ranks of
the National Guardº -
Col. FREASE. Certainly. But here is the way it will operate : We
will say there is confusion in a city. The mayor calls out the troops.
If it spreads to the county, the sheriff takes command and calls out
more troops, and takes them away from the mayor. If it becomes
too much for the troops availble for the mayor and the sheriff, the
governor steps in and orders other troops. Each time the superior
authority takes precedence. In case of war it is true the National
Guard, having Federal obligation, would be called to the front. Then
what will happen? It can be arranged just as it was arranged
automatically once within my knowledge. There will at once be
formed a complementary organization to take the place of the guard.
That occurred in the Spanish-American War in my own community.
Our National Guard went to the front. I was not in the service for
a year or two at that time. I had another regiment formed to take
the place of the guard, for State purposes, if you please, or for
national purposes. We could not get in at the third call, but we
were ready. The National Guard will follow itself up in that way, fill
the vacuum, if you please. -
The same thing occurred in recent years. It was rumored, and
pretty definitely, that there would be need of service along the Mexi-
can border. The Regular Army found itself there. It was expected
that in case of trouble the National Guard would follow it. Auto-
matically in our community there were plans made and completely
formulated to fill the place of the troops who went to the front, and in
that way you will j through the National Guard and the influences
which cause men to enlist and take commissions in the National
Guard the soldiers automatically follow where they are needed. They
will come forth. If you destroy that organization, you will find your-
self without troops. -
Senator DU Pont. I see your ideas, and I think they are sound.
But the only difficulty in my mind is this. There is a law on the
statute books that compels the President before he calls out any other
troops to call out the National Guard. All the National Guard will
be called out, if they obey the law, and it would be impossible to
realize your plan unless that provision were repealed.
G º Farase. No. Why should not the President call the National
|U18.I’Clº
Senator DU Pont. Then they all would go.
Col. FREASE. Yes, sir; let them all go.
Senator DU PoNT. Then your idea is that after they have all
OI).0
s Col. FREASE (interposing). We would fill the vacancies at once.
Senator DU Pont. You would not fill the vacancies; you would
create a new organization.
*
~.
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 935 -
Col. FREASE. Yes; create a new organization, fill their places.
Just as many times as the troops were called to the front, there would
be other troops to fill their places in the armory. They have the
organization.
Senator DU PONT. Would they have the organization if the organi-
zation were ordered to the front ?
Col. FREASE. I mean they have the outline of the organization. In
every community in the United States there are always officers who
have been in the National Guard who can step in the shoes of those
who have left, over night.
The CHAIRMAN. In other words, would not that policy of yours
preclude the President from calling for volunteers at all, except as
they offered themselves through the National Guard?
ğı FREASE. It would not preclude him. He would never have
to do it.
The CHAIRMAN. I do not see that. Suppose war were declared
to-morrow, and the Plesident should conclude to call out the National
Guard, as the law seems to imply that he has to do. The National
Guard organizations all answer the call and all go into the Regular
Army. You say they will immediately fill up the National Guard.
Then the President wants more troops. Would he be bound to cali
again on the National Guard?
Col. FREASE. No. My idea is that those supplementary troops
can become Volunteers, if you please. Let the President call for
volunteers and they can be offered right out of the same territory,
and they will have a meeting place, an assembling place. The
National Government will not need to supply depots and places for
the Volunteers to assemble.
The CHAIRMAN. You do not mean the formation of a so-called
second National Guard'. --
Col. FREASE. Not a second National Guard; no. I mean after the
National Guard has gone, volunteers would be called.
Senator DU PONT. It has been the experience of the great war now
going on and the opinion of all the military men, both regular soldiers
and militia officers, as far as I have been able to learn, that any
organization which is ordered to the front in time of war to be effi-
cient must have an organization behind it which will keep it supplied
with troops.
Col. FREASE. Yes, sir.
Senator DU PONT. Otherwise it will become a mere skeleton after
six months. Is there any organization or machinery in the National
Guard looking to that, so that the ranks of the National Guard, if
called out by the President, can be kept full?
Col. FREASE. I will say this, I think there should be a reserve for
the National Guard, just the same as proposed for the Regular Army.
Senator DU PONT. It does not exist now, does it'.
Col. FREASE. No, it does not exist.
Senator DU PONT. You think it should exist Ž
Col. FREASE. Yes, it should. t
l Senator DU PONT. It would have to be created by the State legis-
ature.
Col. FREASE. It would have to be. Until it is created, it is there.
In the companies I have had connection with, I can call on the mem-
bers, they are all in the communities. Until it can be provided by
936 | PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
legislation, it is there. It is not like the Regular Army. When a
... dismissed, he goes anywhere. The National Guardsman is
a man who has a residence in the community, and he does not leave
the community because he withdraws from the guards, or because
he has served his term. He is there. But I would supplement it by
the same provision as to a reserve. Then you have your men coming
Oll. - - -
Senator DU PONT. In the Civil War the Volunteers were raised in
the different States, and there is a great deal of analogy between the
conditions under which they went into the service and the National
Guard, because they all came from the same town, or State, or com-
munity. -
Col. FREASE. Yes.
Senator DU PONT. They sent off these regiments a thousand strong,
and they went off to the war, but there was no provision in that com-
munity to keep them full. The result was that in six months they
were skeletons, of two or three hundred men, and comparatively
inefficient. They did not come forward then, though the circum-
stances were the same. Why? Because there was no organization
to bring them forward and to get them in. -
Col. #. That, I think, is a natural thing to be accomplished,
to provide for a reserve or a feeding of the waste.
Senator DU PONT. You think that is sufficiently important, do
you - -
Col. FREASE. Certainly. That is something that would follow
naturally from the proposition that you have your National Guard
as a part of the Federal force. I had not gone that far in the develop-
ment of the idea. At present we are concerned with how to get the
force immediately available, and of course there should be coupled
with it, I believe, a system of reserves, and also a system of feeding
the waste. -
You asked me a question about volunteers, Mr. Chairman. I
could never understand why, under our system of government and
laws, we could not provide for volunteers in advance of the need for
them; that is, why can not the National Guard organization to-day
Volunteer for a war that may come in one year or five, sign enlist-
ment papers, and be ready ? That is the only trouble we have had
in the past, the National Guard has not been enlisted and mustered
into the Federal service, and when they are called for they have to
become volunteers. Why can we not have them provided by law
in advance of a need, and under that condition, why can we not
form a volunteer army to-day out of the National Guard, call it the
volunteer army, call it the continental army, if you please, just so
you do not wipe out the National Guard organization in forming it?
Briefly, that is the plan of cooperation which I blocked out before
the House committee this morning, and I have made a few expres-
sions here which I did not have an opportunity to give before the
House committee. Unless there are some further questions, I think
that is all I care to say to you.
The CHAIRMAN. We are very much obliged to you, Colonel.
(Thereupon, at 4.45 o'clock p. m., a recess was taken until to-
morrow, Friday, February 4, 1916, at 10.30 o'clock a. m.) -
X
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 4, 1916.
* UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON MILITARY AFFAIRs,
- |Washington, D. C.
The committee met at the expiration of the recess at 10.30 o'clock
a. m., Senator Geo. E. Chamberlain (chairman) presiding.
STATEMENT OF HON, JOHN D. WORKS, A SENATOR FROM THE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA.
Senator WORKs. Mr. Chairman, I am afraid there is very little to be
accomplished by attempting to convince either the committee or
Congress of the advisability of enacting any peace legislation, or to
establish any peaceful reserve force, under the present excited con-
dition of the public mind. The President of the United States is
traveling over the country, increasing this condition of excitement
and fear by declarations and statements made by him. Nearly all
of the civic organizations in the country have been turned into vehi-
cles for carrying information that tends to increase this condition
of fear in the public mind and frighten people into measures for pre-
paredness that I am afraid are going to carry us beyond what is rea-
sonable under all the circumstances. & -
I have no fear, myself, of war with any other nation. I am unable
to see anything in conditions as they exist that should lead us to
believe that there is any danger of such complications as would
result in war. I have introduced a bill to which I am going to call
W. attention, not as a means of national defense in the #. instance
ut only incidentally.
The bill provides for the creation of what I may call a constructive
and industrial reserve force of 200,000 on the Pacific coast, not pri-
marily for the purpose of military defense but for defense against
the forces of nature that I think in the near future will destroy more
P. and more lives than any complication with foreign nations.
should like to have this bill, which is short, printed in the record
of the hearings, and I am not going to take up the time of the com-
mittee in discussing its features except in a very general way.
The bill referred to, S. 2684, is as follows:
A BILL To provide a constructive and military reserve force, and for other purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America
in Congress assembled, That there is hereby created and established as a part of the
public service a body of men to be known and designated as the Mobile Land Force
and Military Reserve for National Defense on the Pacific Coast, to be composed of
937
938 PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
two hundred thousand men to be chosen and enlisted as hereinafter provided, which
force may be increased from time to time as Congress may provide.
SEC. 2. That such force shall consist of men capable and efficient and fitted to take
lands furnished for their use as herein provided for, and to perform manual labor in
the Forestry and Reclamation or other public works, and military service when called
upon to do so. They shall be enlisted for the service for a term of five years under
rules and regulations to be prepared by the Secretary of the Interior, and may be
reenlisted, and while engaged in the civil service as hereinafter provided shall be a
branch of the Interior Department and under its supervision and control.
SEC. 3. That when such force is called upon, as hereinafter provided, to undergo
military training or service it shall be under the supervision and control of the War
Department, under rules and regulations to be provided by the Secretary of War.
SEC. 4. That each of the members of such force shall, by the Secretary of the Inte-
rior, be provided with a garden farm of not more than five acres of land in the States
of California, Oregon, Washington, Nevada, and Arizona, suitable for cultivation and
provided with water for domestic use and irrigation when needed, at a cost in each
case of not exceeding $2,000, upon which such member shall be required to make
a home for himself and family, and cultivate the same when not engaged for the
Government, and for which he shall be required to pay a reasonable monthly rental
not exceeding four per centum of the cost of the same, title thereto to be retained by
the Government. The Secretary of the Interior is authorized to devote any of the
lands owned by the Government suitable for the purpose to settlement by such mem-
bers, to acquire by condemnation or purchase such other lands in Said States as may
be necessary to carry out the purposes of this act, and to acquire or construct any
water rights and water systems necessary to supply such lands with water for domestic
use and irrigation: Provided, That such garden farms shall be so located as to establish
not less than an entire regiment of such force in one community on adjacent homes.
SEC. 5. That as a constructive force, the Secretary of the Interior shall, except for
such time as they are required to render military service as hereinafter provided for,
if they so desire, employ the members of such force wherever he may direct in the
forestry, reclamation and other public works, and shall construct storage and service
reservoirs for the protection of lands from overflow, for the drainage of submerged
lands, the irrigation of arid or semiarid lands, needing irrigation in order to be suc-
cessfully cultivated, and generally for the protection, reclamation, and cultivation of
lands and works necessary for the improvement of the rivers and harbors of the country.
and such other public works as the said Secretary shall elect for which Congress may,
make appropriations. . - . . .
SEC. 6. That members of said force while thus employed in the public service as
constructive workers, shall be paid a reasonable compensation to be fixed by the Sec-
retary of the Interior, and they shall be employed to the exclusion of all other per-
sons whenever practicable. - -
SEC. 7. That for one month of each year, or two months in any one year, if the
Secretary of the Interior and the Secretary of War shall mutually so determine, the
said force shall undergo such military training as may be provided for by the Secre-.
tary of War under rules and regulations prescribed by him at such place or places as
he may direct and he shall provide all necessary officers and equipment for such,
training. z - . . . . .
SEC. 8. That such force shall constitute a reserve military force and be subject to
military service whenever called upon by the Secretary of War.
SEC. 9. That whenever the members of such force shall be under military training,
preliminary or annual, or in actual military service in the event of war or anticipation
thereof, they shall constitute a part of the United States Army and shall be exclusively
under the direction and control of the War Department, in all respects the same as
any part of the Regular Standing Army of the United States. The officers of said
reserve shall be appointed and shall rank the same as officers in the Regular Standing
SEC. 10. That there is hereby appropriated out of any moneysin the Treasury not
ctherwise appropriated the sum of $50,000,000, annually, for ten years, or 'so much
thereof as may be necessary for the purpose of carrying out the terms and provisions
of this act. - -
Senator WoRKs. The conditions are such that we need some sort
of organized force of men to carry on the work that I think should be
done by the Government in the way of reforestation, the extension of
the Reclamation Service, the construction of reservoirs and dams for
the purpose of checking and holding back the storm waters in case of
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 939
the severe storms that we have in this country, in pretty much all
sections, and other needed public works. The people along the
lower stretches of the Mississippi River suffer more frequently and
more continuously from the storms and high waters than those of
any other section of the country, I suppose; but within the last few
weeks in my own State, particularly in the southern portion of it,
the storms have been exceedingly destructive. The high waters are
not only imperiling the property of the people themselves, individuals,
but they are threatening San Pedro Harbor. The storm waters that
are coming down from above are filling up the harbor with silt, and
something will have to be done in order to protect the harbor from
storms of that kind. - -
Efforts are being made now, through State legislation, to control
the waters and carry them in a different direction. That work is
going to cost millions of dollars. The people of California-are asking
e
the Government to share the expenses of that work—something that
I think should be done. But the purpose of this bill is to establish a
reserve army of men who can be called upon at any time for the purpose
of doing this work on the part of the Government, particularly in the
matters I have just stated. It also provides, however, that they
shall be subjected to military training for at least one month in the
year, which may be extended to two months by the combined action
of the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Interior. -
, I am not going to take up time in discussing the bill. There is
another little pamphlet here bearing upon that subject that I should
like to have printed in the record. It is entitled, “Invincible America—
A plan for constructive defense.” I was not aware, at the time I
presented this bill and made a speech in support of it, that there was
any such organization as the one mentioned in this pamphlet.
The CHAIRMAN. By whom is it .
Senator WoRKs. It is published by the provisional committee of
the Society of Constructive Defense, at Ridgewood, N. J. That
Society has in view practically the same objects that are covered by
the bill that I have introduced; and there are other organizations
throughout the country that are interested in the same way and are
* measures of this kind. - t
: The pamphlet above referred to is as follows:
INVINCIBLE AMERICA—A PLAN OF CONSTRUCTIVE DEFENSE.
[By Harry G. Traver.]
- FOREW ORD.
Some there are who would abandon our Army and Navy entirely and who advocate
peace at any price. - º
Others would arm our country to the teeth with a great standing Army of hundreds
of thousands costing hundreds of millions yearly.
This booklet outlinds a practical plan for a great industrial Army of trained men
always available which will afford the largest possible protection without the usual
waste of men and money. Every thinking American should read it. It has received
the indorsement of many prominent Army men and engineers.
HOW AMERICA CAN HAVE A LARGE ARMY OF TRAINED MEN witHouT wasTE OF MEN
# AND MONEY.
* There are two sides to the army question. Peace advocates ask why we should
maintain a hundred thousand men in practical idleness, waste their time on useless
effort, waste the money spent on their equipment and maintenance, and develop a
large class of men who have few ideals except to kill the enemies of their country.
940 PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
*
The advocates of a large army ask: How can we be prepared to defend our great
country with its thousands of miles of coast line, our cities, and our homes without
keeping up a large army and a proper reserve who are trained to fight? How can we,
they ask, ignore the fact that great nations call treaties “only scraps of paper”? How
can we defend the Monroe doctrine? How can we maintain our national dignity
when great disputes arise? How can we defend ourselves from a foreign foe who may
land on our shores with a great army when we have barely 50,000 men to-day who
could take the field? That number is scarcely larger than a single army corps of
the nations now engaged in the death struggle in Europe. As for the protection
offered us by the Atlantic Ocean, distances to-day are so short on water that two of
the chief naval battles of the present war were fought twice as far away from Europe
as the distance across the Atlantic.
All attempts to solve this problem have failed. Thousands of earnest and patriotic
men in the State militia and in the Regular Army have labored faithfully against
Serious difficulties to build up dependable organizations, and in many cases they have
succeeded. In the Civil War and in the Spanish-American War there were units
which performed wonderful services. But there has been a tremendous change in the
conditions of warfare since that time. To send a small army of militia who are unac-
customed to the hardships of war against the seasoned and well-trained troops of other
great nations would be nothing less than criminal slaughter. To send the Regular
Army is out of the question, as it contains at present only 86,000 men in all, most of .
whom are necessary to defend the insular possessions and to man the fortifications and
Army posts. - - - -
Now, the Regular Army already costs $100,000,000 per year, or $1,160 per year per
man, which is from two to four times the cost per man of the army of any other nation.
The militia, too, is very expensive, though it is not completely trained nor equipped
for active service. To increase the Regular Army and the militia to what is con-
sidered adequate size, and to place each in a proper condition for service, will cost
this country at least $400,000,000 per year, or more than any other country on earth.
To remedy the existing defects and to meet the needs of the United States for an
ºte army without wasting a dollar or a man is the object of the new system here
OIICTCCI. -- - - -
The new system consists simply in developing on a large scale the method found SO
Successful in building the great Panama Canal, namely, place the great reclamation
projects, the great road-building Schemes, the great Mississippi River Improvement,
and other great and much needed public works under the control of the United States
Army Engineers. Give these engineers an army of young men who can handle a pick
and shovel, live in the open, drive mules, load wagons, operate motor trucks, and do
such work and live such a life as that required of a soldier. That the Army Engi-
neers built and completed successfully and economically the greatest engineering
feat of modern times at Panama, after other agencies had failed, is sufficient proof that
they are equal to this new task. At Panama it was necessary to hire foreign labor on
account of the climate, but in this country the common soldier can do all of the work,
Soldiers will be enlisted with this end in view from the very start. They will con-
stitute a vast industrial army under the control of the War Department; there will
be important work for every man from the officer down to the rawest recruit; and all
the men being profitably employed, it will be possible to maintain an army of 500,000
or more with a mere fraction of the loss and waste that is common under our present
Svstem. -
These men will be enlisted for a period of several years. The pay and other con-
ditions will be made attractive enough to get sufficient good men and no more. The
work will be conducted under the regular discipline of the Army. The men will
live in portable houses or camps at the various places where the work is being done
throughout the country. The outdoor work and life will tend to harden the men to
the life of a soldier. Every day an hour or more will be devoted to drill and other
military training. On Saturdays extensive maneuvers will be practiced. Here,
then, in a nutshell is the scheme which will train a million men in a few years at
very little more expense than the cost of the great engineering works on which the men
are employed. - - -
That a limited amount of practical but thorough training is very effective in time
of war was proven by the experience of the Germans a century ago. In 1809 the
Germans were crushed by Napoleon, who forced them to agree to limit their army
thereafter to 42,000 men. Germany kept her word, but cleverly arranged her system
So that the men only served for a short time and then gave place to others. Thousands
upon thousands were put through the army quickly, and out again, till Germany
Soon had a vast array of trained men ready to help accomplish the downfall of
Napoleon in 1815. - - ... . +
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 941
The great public works herein contemplated are such as have been discussed and
advocated for many years. We Americans have a tremendous country, yet there is
not to-day a single highway extending from the Atlantic to the Pacific worthy of the
name. The roads of the West and of the South are abominable. Even in the East,
where millions have been spent on roads in recent years, only the main thorough-
fares are suitable for modern traffic. The annual losses due to bad roads in America
run into millions and millions of dollars. The days of the motor truck and the auto-
mobile are here. Farmers, truckmen, and business men all over this country are
crying out for better roads. So far there has been but feeble answer. To build these
roads will cost thousands of millions. There is no agency so capable for this great
task as the National Government. Road building by the various counties and
States has resulted to-day in a heterogeneous system of roads of all kinds and in all
conditions which are in most cases supervised by politicians who have little knowl-
edge of road engineering, and in consequence the work has been turned over in many,
cases to selfish contractors whose business it is to get enormous profits and put into
the roads as little as possible of material and labor. The idea of making a road that
would be durable for years to come is of no interest to them. There are engineers in
the United States Army who can build roads as fine as any of the world. They are
not handicapped by political affiliations. They are not burdened with a selfish
desire to squeeze out the profit of a fat contractor. They are governed by the iron-
clad rule of Army discipline. The simple, practical, and economical solution of the
highway problem is to turn it over to the United States Army. -
• The Mississippi and Ohio River systems call for effective and immediate improve-
ment. The direct annual loss from floods runs into millions, to say nothing of tre-
mendous indirect losses to trade and transportation. This great work will cost at
least $500,000,000. The present annual losses would more than pay the interest on
the entire cost of the work. The territory involved covers many States. No State
can, or should undertake it. It is outside the field of private enterprise. The
National Government, alone, has the necessary authority and the financial ability
to handle it. Much of the work which has been done up to date has been done as a
Fº Sop to the various sections through which these rivers pass. The work should
e taken out of politics and turned over to the United States Army Engineers. If
they do as well as they did at the Panama, the whole Nation will rejoice.
The great reclamation projects have proved the ability of the United States Govern-
ment to carry on great works of this character. During 10 years the area of irrigated
land in this country was doubled, largely through these Government irrigation
systems. Who knows what might be accomplished if the Army were put into this
field for 20 years? This work should be continued and enlarged by the industrial army.
There are other great works needing attention, though not quite so urgent. The
inland coastwise canal along the Atlantic seaboard, the draining of the vast swamp
areas, the improvement of the national forests, and the building of the new Govern-
ment railway in Alaska, can all be done by the new army.
Not only can the National Government do this work efficiently, but by purchasing
supplies in enormous quantities it can do the work more economically than the
Small contractors can in local districts. - - *
What kind of an army will this system produce? It must necessarily produce the
best army in the world. No army in history has been so effective as the army composed
of citizen soldiers when they were properly trained and physically able to endure the
hardships of war. Our new industrial army will be an efficient force, well trained,
always mobilized, always ready. It will be made up of hearty young fellows, accus:
tomed to the hard life in the open. They can stand the rain and snow, the cold and
heat. They will be accustomed to the use of the pick and shovel, to earthworks, to
concrete construction, to motor trucks, automobile tractors, and other machinery.
They will be used to discipline, to working in squads, both large and small units.
They will develop individual initiative. They will be accustomed to being shifted
about from place to place, to hard physical labor, to hard foot and leg work, and to
carrying necessary equipment. The officers will be men who can really command,
who as foremen, Superintendents, and managers of departments, have seen real field
service. They will be officers who can take responsibility, and who have been weighed
in the balance and not found wanting.
This army will be put through military drill an hour or more every day except Sun-
day. On Saturday it will practice field maneuvers and once each year it will take part
in large unitsin operations on a large scale. There will be an educational department,
wherein the men can study certain fundamental things necessary to the ideal life of
a Soldier. This will include hygiene, first aid to theinjured, geography, horsemanship,
motor-truck driving, track laying, bridge work, and military tactics.
A man who can successfully drive a motor truck in building a wagon road would
make an ideal man to drive the same truck in time of war. The ability to get there
942 P:REPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. .
promptly under adverse conditions, and keep his truck moving properly, are the re-
quirements in each case. The same may be said of handling teams, wagons, and Sup-
plies. A man who can dig ditches and drains for roads and culverts can dig trenches.
Battles are not always fought on macadamized roads. They are more likely to be
fought on rain-soaked fields, over ditches, hills, and valleys, through ice and Snow,
across streams and through difficulties in general more like those of the road builder
than anything else. Battles are never fought on the dance floor of a regimental arm-
ory nor on the well-kept lawns of an army post. It is said the life of a horse or a motor
truck in the present European War is often not more than a week, and that at the be-
#. of the war this was often due to carelessness in handling or to the inability of
inexperienced men to make slight adjustments. How foolish it is, then, to put trucks
in charge of any but men trained to handle them in actual service? .
The men of our industrial army would travel about the country more or less, and
would become familiar with the climate, topography, local customs, and other con-
ditions of the different sections of the country, so that in time of invasion there would
be officers and men in every regiment familiar with the physical difficulties to be met
with and they would avoid such disasters as those of history, which were caused by
ignorance of local conditions. Napoleon's disastrous retreat from Moscow and his
defeat at Waterloo would not have happened to our industrial army. . . .
The soldiers of this army will be paid better wages than the present Regular Army,
and they will earn the money. Their food and other supplies will be suitable for men
doing hard physical labor and living out of doors. Their houses will be portable
structures quickly moved from place to place. No more Army posts should be built
like #. present establishments, except to be used as places of storage for Army
SUl LGS. - 4 .
- "ß would be the mental and moral development of these men? Better than at
present. Men who are engaged in a great enterprise will have a higher sense of self-
‘esteem and a greater personal interestin their work than they have if they spend their
time in the ordinary monotonous routine of Army life. Unfortunately there has often
been a prejudice against the soldier in uniform in time of peace. Congress even passed
a law in 1911 forbidding discrimination against the uniformed soldier by theaters and
other places of entertainment. When these men are engaged on great public works
and paid reasonable wages they will be respected and esteemed as highly in time of
peace as in time of war. -
Under the old system men often find it difficult to get work after their dischargé
from the Army because their whole life in the service has made them unadapted;
either by experience or disposition, to work in civil life. Under the new system the
men will gain practical knowledge of many useful trades. Regular habits of industry
and the rigid discipline of their training will make them the best and most efficient
workers for civil life. Employers are always seeking men who have such habits and
training at good wages. -
A great national reserve will develop from this Army. Men should serve in the
Regular Army for the period of their enlistment and they may then reenlist at advanced
pay or be retired to the first reserve, which will meet yearly for the maneuvers. They
will have their expenses paid during this meeting and will be paid for their time:
The reserve is subject to call only in time of war. After serving for a period of years
in the first reserve they will then be retired to the second reserve, which is not called
out unless the first reserve is inadequate. •
This system need not be installed all at once. Like the rural free delivery, it can
be started on a small scale and increased gradually till it supersedes the present Army;
The individual States may keep their present system of militia till the National
Army is well established and work progressing on many projects. They will then
either abandon the State militia entirely or copy the National Army for State use.
| Some work will be done in every State, but only as part of a comprehensive plan
wherever and whenever most needed and according to plans worked out under the
efficient eyes of the Army engineers; not in the extravagant fashion of the annual
river and harbor appropriations. Thus will be found a solution of the old pork-barrel
system from which most of our Congressmen will be glad to get away if it can be done
gracefully. Here is their chance.
A balance wheel to national industry can be created out of this industrial army.
The time is now here when something more effective than the present methods must
be provided to cope with the problem of the unemployed during periods of business
depression. The new Army system offers a practical Solution, for the same reason
that it solves the probelms of great public improvements, namely, because only the
National Government is large enough to handle the proposition. - ..
. A watch needs a balance wheel to make its movements regular. Iikewise a clock
needs a pendulum. A waterworks needs a reservoir to conserve the supply over
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 943
periods of plenty and scarcity. A farmer provides barns and feed to carry his stock
over periods of nonproduction. A successful business house keeps on hand or in
bank a reserve supply of cash to protect, it during periods of reduced income. But
a great Nation with 90,000,000 of people has new.r taken the trouble to provide a prac-
tical method of absorbing its surplus labor during slack times, nor thought it worth
while to care for the idle human beings who must be fed and sheltered, no matter
whether employed or rot. . -
When the stocks or bonds of a reputable corporation are offered too freely on the stock
exchange or fall a few points in price there is started a buying movement which “Sup-
ports the market” and takes up the surplus stock. When the country produces more
wheat than can be consumed at home it is “absorbed ” by Europe. When an American
corporation produces more steel or harvesters, sewing machines, or watches than can
be sold in the home market they are “dumped abroad.” But when a financial crisis
arises which destroys the confidence of business men the country over nearly every-
body gets scared, people stop buying goods they can do without, trade falls off, em-
ployees are discharged by the hundreds, and wages fall in many industries. There
is then a surplus of labor.
Untortunately there is no support to the labor market, it can not be “absorbed”
by Europe, it can not be “dumped abroad.” It can not even be stored in ware-
houses like surplus cotton and corn. ... Surplus labor is a living, moving, breathing
reality different from all other commodities. It is composed of human beings who
must eat and sleep and be clothed, and, though we have devised systems for dispos-
*
ing of every other kind of surplus, all efforts to take care of the surplus labor have
proved fruitless. - - ... • - - ... '
As the new reserve banking system was devised to provide a balance wheel for
the money market by providing an elástic currency during varying business con-
ditions, so the industrial army can be made to balance the labor market. This opera-
tion is very simple. Congress or the President or the War Department should have
power during bad industrial periods of increasing the industrial army by new recruits
in a special class, who are enlisted for only a short period, perhaps one year. The
number of men taken in this way should be limited only by the extent of the business
depression and the consequent labor surplus. It might-rise as high as half a million
men, but would probably never do so. These men should always receive the regular
military training and should be put in the national reserve after their term of enlist-
ment expires. They may be released from Service in less than one year if the regular
industries of the country demand them sooner. .
Most of the unemployed are single men, which makes them especially adapted to
this system. Employers usually aim to keep their oldest, steadiest, and best men
even during dull times, and this includes men generally with families. Even married
men will be better off to join the army temporarily, than to starve or accept charity.
They will be fed, clothed, and housed in the Army and all of their wages can be sent
home to their families, whom they can visit often, as they will not be far from them.
... Only a small number of men will probably be taken into the Army during a de-
pression. The mere fact that the Army is ready to employ them is sufficient. When
the Government puts its stamp on a paper dollar few people ever take it to the Treas-
ury to have it redeemed. The mere fact that the Government is ready to redeem it
is sufficient. So with labor. When the Government stands ready to redeem or
employ every man who applies, few will apply. Why? Simply because employers
will know that the sale of their products will not decrease through bad business and,
therefore, they will keep their employees themselves.
The wages of this special army would not be so high as to keep them out of the
regular industries when, the period of depression is passed. It would be a simple
mätter to employ them all, as the Army engineers would always have projects Under
way scattered over the entire country on which many extra men could be used eco-
nomically. In case of a mere local disturbance, the work can be provided only in
that particular section. The money for this special operation would come from bond
issues. During industrial depressions much money is withdrawn by timid persons
from the various channels of trade and either hoarded or put into postal Savings banks
or similar places. This money could be at such times invested in Government bonds
and through the expenditures on the special industrial army, it would at once flow
back into the channels of business. - * r
Here then is the balance wheel for labor. All the men who want work and can
nct find it elsewhere, can find it in the Army. If these men do not stop earning,
thèy likewise will not stop consuming. Where there is no stoppage of consumption,
there can be little stoppage of production. Therefore, the hesitating wheels of in:
dustry will revolve and confidence will be quickly restored. If there is unlimited
demand for wheat, the price of wheat will not decline below a certain point. So if
944 PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
there is an unlimited demand ready to absorb the surplus labor, wages will not de-
cline below a certain level, neither will business men become frightened by a financial
crisis. They will know if all the men in the country are continually employed—
that the consuming public as ever and always practically unchanged. They will
know if the materials and supplies used in one industry are decreased, that there will
be a corresponding increase in other lines, for the total number of workers in the
whole country will not be allowed to decrease. -
How much self-respect and manliness will be saved to the workers themselves can
not be measured in dollars and cents. The Army may in this way absorb the men
who might otherwise become part of the floatsam and jetsam of city and town out of
a job and out of a home. It will keep them out of Soup houses and lodging houses.
It will keep them from becoming vagabonds or charity applicants. It will give
them self-respecting work, and pay them decent wages for it—better wages, in fact,
than are often paid in some industries. Their work will be efficient and effective
under the discipline of trained officers, and according to well-defined plans of the
Army engineers. There could be no better work found for men who have lost their
grip, or lost their jobs than a year under the discipline of the industrial army. -
Labor unions will receive practical help from this system, especially those com:
prising labor which is poorly paid and which is most affected by periods of depression
and by competition of cheap labor. The new system will tend to establish a mini-
mum wage, though not in the way usually intended and with none of the possible ill
effects of a minimum wage law. Employers will profit as well, for if there are no
unemployed the purchasing power of the public will be unimpaired and there can
be no long and serious depressions in business such as cripple and ruin many an
employer at present. . -
Suppose it does cost a few hundred millions to operate this system and thereby
avert the consequence of a financial panic. The money will all go into legitimate
public improvements which are worth all that they cost, national industries will be
saved from a long period of stagnation, and there will be a great saving to charity, but
the greatest benefit of all, which can not be measured in money, will be the self-respect
and habit of industry which will be saved or created for the thousands of men who
would otherwise become recipients of charity. -
To sum up the advantages of this new army system it will: -
Provide an adequate standing army.
Provide a suitable trained reserve.
. Improve the morale of the soldier.
Build up our great public works.
Fit the soldier Ior conditions of War.
. Provide for surplus labor in hard times.
Relieve one of the causes of depression.
. Retain the Self-respect of the unemployed. -
. Give the American people value received for every dollar spent on the Army.
This then is the new American Army. Their weapons are not weapons of death,
but picks and shovels, hammers and drills, the tools of thrift and industry, the instru-
ments of peace. They are conquerors, not of mºn, but of the great forces of nature.
Soldiers not of battle, but soldiers of the great common good. How every American
bosom will swell with pride at the sight of such an army. The pride of every Amer-
ican in the Panama Canal will be reflected and reechoed in every great highway and
river Trom coast to coast. And when the time comes, if it does come, to repel a foreign
foe, these men will be fitted by their training and experience to fight for their country
as well as any army that ever took the field. -
Senator WoRKs. I should like to have this project given the atten-
tion of the committee. I am not expecting very much from it in the
way of immediate legislation, on account of the conditions that
prevail at the present time; but I think it is a matter that is worthy
of attention and consideration by this committee and by Congress,
Some time I think we will come to legislation of this sort, if not now.
It is principally for that reason that I am appearing before the com-
mittee, in order to secure public attention, as far as can be done, for
a measure that I think ought to receive attention. -
The CHAIRMAN. The bill and pamphlet you have referred to will
be printed with your statement, Senator.
Senator WoRKs. I thank the committee very much for its time and
trouble. - - - -
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 945
STATEMENT OF HON, WILLARD SAULSBURY, A SENATOR
* . * , - FROM THE STATE OF DELAWARE. * º
Senator SAULSBURY. Mr. Chairman, there are two bills to which I
desire to call the attention of the committee. One is a rather simple
and noncontentious bill, being in a way my contribution to the idea
of enabling the Government to raise a sufficient number of men to
take military training; and there is an idea in that bill in regard to
exempting from active military service members of the Society of
Friends, which I hope, whatever bill may be reported by this com-
mittee, will be incorporated therein. - -
The CHAIRMAN. That is, on the assumption that some compulsory
service bill will be reported? - -
Senator SAULSBURY. Yes; or if some idea along the lines of the one
which I suggest in the bill I introduced yesterday, and which has been
referred to this committee, should be adopted as the basis of the bill
to be reported. - ->
The bill which I introduced yesterday, and which it will take me
only a moment to refer to, is Senate Bill 4229. Briefly, it provides
for the training of all persons who shall desire to enter the classified
Service and who may be within the ordinarily accepted military age,
The bill is a short one, and the idea incorporated in it is that any one
who desires either to take an examination for the classified service or
to remain in it shall voluntarily come forward to take the military
training, which we are all coming to think may be necessary for the
good of this republic.
. . Certainly if one desires to enter into the public service of the Gov- .
ernment he should be willing to prepare himself for the defense of the
Country; and the idea is that each person who goes into or who
desires or shows his willingness to go into the classified service of the
Government shall prepare himself for performing the highest duty
of a citizen in time of stress, which is the defense of his country.
It seemed to me that in that way, without any idea of compulsory
Service, without any attempt to force any one in America to take the
training which we believe to be necessary, you would have a sufficient
number of Volunteers for that service to prepare them, at least in a
measure, for the highest duty, or what may become the highest duty,
of citizens of any country. The bill also provides that those persons
in the service under military age shall not remain in the service after
the first day of January, 1919, unless they shall take training such as
is F. by regulations to be issued by the Secretary of War.
I commend that to the committee as an idea for obtaining volun-
teers. I also provide, which I think is a good idea, too, that any one
who desires to appear as an advocate in the courts of the United
States, and who is within the military age, shall take this training.
In that way I think the measure will bring forward a large number of
young lawyers, who as a rule, I think, like to take this training,
am acquainted with a number of them who, last year, at Plattsburg,
took this training. I can say that I am not asking them to do any-
thing that I have not done myself voluntarily, because when I was
younger, and better fitted for military service, I was connected with
a militia company myself. I do not know whether I was sergeant,
or second lieutenant, or some minor officer of the company, but I
946 PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
really enjoyed the service. I thought that statement might show the
propriety of my advancing this measure.
A provision is put in this bill that the Secretary of War may pre-
scribe, in these regulations, equivalent service to be performed by
those members of the Society of Friends, commonly called Quakers,
who are conscientiously opposed to the performance of military
service which may involve the taking of human life. I call the atten-
£ion of the committee to that for the reason that the locality from
which I come, among its best citizens are a very large number of
Quakers, and I know that the Quakers are not cowards. I know
that they want to do what they conceive to be their full duty as citi-
zens, and are always ready to do it; but I know that they have the
strongest scruples against the performance of military service involv-
ing the taking of life. I think, however, they will welcome the oppor-
tunity, in so far as this bill may affect them, to perform equivalent
service; and certainly they would volunteer for equivalent service for
the welfare of the country in case it became necessary.
. So far as that bill goes, I have concluded. ;
Now, Mr. Chairman, there is a matter in which I am very much
interested because of our special locality. I think the official reports
made on the subject by the most competent Government authorities
have disclosed the fact that we in Delaware have the most vulnerable
point on the Atlantic seaboard which promises any considerable bene-
fit to an invading force at war with us. We have at the Capes of
Delaware, near Cape Henlopen, the harbor of Lewes, Del.
The CHAIRMAN. Have you a map there showing the locality ?
Senator SAULSBURY. I have a small map, which I think will
answer. - - - *
The CHAIRMAN. I just want to look at it as you address yourself
to the subject.
Senator SAULSBURY. By an examination of the small map which I
hand you, which is published by the association before which I made
a speech some time in November, you will observe that the capes of
Telaware furnish the only fine undefended harbor which can be seized
|as a naval and military base by an attacking force. The harbor of
Tewes, Del., is absolutely undefended. It was attacked by the
haval forces of Great Britain in the War of 1812, which was the
gccasion of the last attack made upon our shores by a foreign naval
force. Delaware was invaded by the English in both the wars which
we had with England, the War of the Revolution and the War of 1812,
and history certainly usually repeats itself, because the configuration
of the earth's surface remains the same; and the conditions remaining
the same regarding defenses, men's minds determine practically the
same things if they are intelligent, and they select the most available
spots for offense.
That point is practically 150 miles from New York, and practically
the same distance from the capes of the Chesapeake. It is within
100 miles of some of the greatest, shipyard and munition plants,
within 100 miles of oil pipe lines, and within 100 miles of possibly the
very heart of the manufacturing business of this country, in the neigh-
borhood of Philadelphia. * *
'. The bill which I have introduced and to which I am now calling
your affention—Senate bill 2891—provides for the fortification of
ewes Harbor in such a way as to deny an enemy the use of that
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 947
harbor. The importance of this matter, I think, is recognized by all
the officials of the War Department. They have plans for the forti-
fication of that harbor, but they do not propose to put them into
force immediately, as I understand.
I leave for the moment the matter of the fortification of that har-
bor to come to the greater proposition of the acquisition by the
Government of the existing canal between Delaware and Chesapeake
Bays, which now permits boats of only 9 feet draft, 23 feet beam,:
. 220 feet length to pass through it from one bay to the other. :
I have discussed the commercial advantages of this matter a num-
ber of times, and if the committee cares to utilize it as one of the
explanations of a favorable report, or desires to consider it, I have
a copy of one of the more recent speeches which I made which is
not of public record—and the only one, I think, of any particular
importance which is not a public document—which I can furnish the
committee for publication, if it is desired. I may say that the one
which the chairman has in his hand is a public record. It is Senate
Document 249, Sixty-fourth Congress, first session.
The CHAIRMAN. Do you wish to have this speech go in the record
as a part of your remarks? - . ... .
Senator SAULSBURY. I should be glad to have the one which I now
furnish you incorporated in the hearings. Not that one, because it.
is already a public document. :
(The speech referred to is as follows:)
- CEIESAPEAKE & DELAWARE CANAL. -
BY Hon. WILLARD SAULSBURY, UNITED STATES SENATOR FROM Delaware.
[From the bulletin of the Atlantic Deeper Waterways Association.]
--f
. I am trying to get my colleagues in the Senate and House of Representatives to
invest for the Government about $7,500,000, so they will get a net annual return of
at least 18 per cent to 20 per cent for 10,000,000 to 15,000,000 of our people, and a
war-risk insurance on many billions of dollars worth of property as well as save the:
Government several millions of dollars each year in naval expenses.
The net profits per year may increase to 50 per cent. Ten human lives will be
saved each year which are now sacrificed; the defenses of our Capital City and two;
of the great cities and many of the Smaller cities of the country will be doubly pro-
tected; our chances of victory in any future war with a naval nation will be tre-
mendously increased, and in peace we will draw our dividends of at least 18 per cent,
regularly and reduce the cost of living, increase the means of livelihood, and generally
benefit millions of our people. - . .
That sort of a proposition would look pretty good to an ordinary business man;
but the initiation of this investment was possibly prevented at the last session of
Congress by the physical ability of one Senator to vocalize for a week or so, and to do:
this at a critical time for 24 hours on a stretch. The statement I have made is not an:
exaggeration. I have practiced law and advised clients in their business affairs,
sometimes of considerable importance, during a period of over 30 years. :
I have gone into this question of the acquisition by the Government of the Chesa-)
peake & Delaware Canal as I would examine the most important law case I ever
had, where clients of mine might become interested to the extent of millions of dollars.
I have acted, so far as I could volunteer my services in this examination, as the
counsel of the Government, and every word I have said I believe would be approved
by any open-minded man who will exhaustively examine the reports of Government:
engineers, of commissions and committees of Congress. They are many in number
and extend over a period of 42 years, beginning in 1872 and ending last April. º
Let me give you as briefly as I can some of the undisputed facts about the Chesa-
peake & Delaware Canal. It is a little less than 14 miles long from the entrance,
at Delaware City, to the outlet, at Chesapeake City. The distance from Philadelphia.
to Delaware City by water is 42 miles, from Chesapeake City to Baltimore 56 miles,
making a total distance between these two great cities by water 112 miles. The canal."
948 PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
wili pass vessels 220 feet long, having 9 feet draft and 24 feet beam. The distance by
water compared with rail between Baltimore and Philadelphia is 96 miles by rail
against 112 by water. Freight delivered in Philadelphia to the small boats plying
through the canal at 5 o'clock in the afternoon is landed at Baltimore at 7 o'clock the
next morning, while the average time for freight deliveries by rail is something like
two to three days. - . * *
The gross earnings of the canal from tolls on vessels passing through it for the past
four years have averaged about $175,000 annually, its cost of operation has averaged
$65,000, leaving a net annual income from operation of $110,000. The interest on
its bonded indebtedness of $2,602,950 at 4 per cent is $104,118, leaving a net annual
income above all charges of about $6,000. The interest on its bonds was some years
ago decreased from 5 per cent to 4 per cent and has been earned and paid.
Its average annual gross earnings between the years 1864 and 1874 approximated
$400,000, and during the same period its average annual operating cost was about
$130,000, leaving $270,000 for charges and dividends. &
' There are 10,000 boats engaged in the commerce of the two great bays and their
tributaries, which have a shore line of 2,500 miles, and the commerce of these waters
is over 100,000,000 tons annually.
On the Delaware Bay and tributaries and on Chesapeake Bay and its tributaries
we have a combined traffic, as shown by the report of the Chief of Engineers of the
United States Army, exceeding 50,000,000 tons annually; and if to this the undocu-
mented and unregistered tonnage is added, which includes the vast amount handled
daily by thousands of local trading boats, the tonnage is estimated to exceed 100,000,000
tons; and this tonnage is almost equally divided between the two bays, the tonnage of
Delaware Bay and River and tributaries for 1912, as I compile it from the engineer's
report, aggregating 26,267,335 short tons, while the tonnage on the Chesapeake Bay
and tributaries, which I am not sure is as accurate as the other figures, and in some
respects is possibly duplicated, amounts to 36,333,489 tons. -
In 1904 (H. Rept. No. 2725, 58th Cong., 2d sess.) the combined tonnage of the two
bays and tributaries was stated to be almost exactly 50,000,000 tons, and from a state-
ment of the Department of Commerce, Bureau of Navigation, the registered tonnage,
represented by 4,391 sailing vessels, steam vessels, and barges, was six hundred and
ninety-two thousand and some hundred tons. - . . .
The population of the States to be immediately benefited by the canal is about
...th of the total population of the United States and estimated at 14,092,627
people. -
Last year (1913) 5,778 boats passed through the canal, carrying 908,689 tons of freight,
an average of less than 200 tons to each vessel, boat or barge. This is not a small
traffic but the Government engineers have estimated, declaring their estimates to be
conservative, that this tonnage on a 12-foot canal such as now recommended would
be 2,537,000 tons, and the annual saving to commerce as estimated by the Board of
Engineers, if the Government shall take over the canal, widen it to 90 feet and deepen
it to 12 feet, will be $1,414,000. The cost, including the acquisition of the canal at
a reasonable figure, will be between seven and eight millions of dollars which provides
for a purchase price of the canal of $2,514,000. It is believed that the canal can be
condemned for this figure, although the various boards of engineers have estimated
that the Government, to duplicate the canal, would have to expend $3,700,000. This
estimate as to the cost of reproduction is itemized in Senate Document No. 215, Fifty-
ninth Congress, second session, page 18. (See appendix.) Government engineers
have consistently and uniformly recommended its purchase for $2,514,000. The
approaches to the canal at its Delaware end are defended by the forts on the Delaware.
and New Jersey shores as well as an old fortification in midstream, and the Chesapeake
end is above the important defenses of the whole of the Chesapeake Bay. There are
no difficulties in the deepening and enlargement of the canal, indeed no rockwork
even will be necessary.
Ten lives is the average death toll taken by the Sea on the rough outside passage
between the Delaware and Virginia Capes. One of my colleagues asked me when I
was urging this matter in the Senate, what the Atlantic Ocean was there for if not to
sail boats on, and I told him 10 lives could be saved annually and proved it by official
reports, and then I showed him that this canal shortened the water passage between
Baltimore and Philadelphia by 308 miles, and between Baltimore and New York, by
oing out the Delaware Capes instead of the Virginia Capes, by 180 miles. Indeed
it will materially shorten the distance from Baltimore to Europe.
The facts. I have given are all contained in official reports, printed as public docu-
ments. It may interest you to know some of the men who, as Government engineers,
have made these reports. The list is too long to give the names of all of them, but I
select from this list of distinguished engineers, the following: Gen. Thomas L. Casey,
Col. Craighill, Gen. Bixby, Col. Rossell, Maj. Raymond, Col. Black, Col. Flagler,
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 949
Capt. Turtle, Gen. Humphreys, Benj. H. Latrobe, Admiral Dewey. I can hardly
think a finer, abler lot of engineers could be found anywhere than those nor could
any business man hesitate to accept their conclusions or follow their advice.
On the Delaware Bay and its tributaries is carried annually 50,000,000 tons of freight.
On Chesapeake Bay and its tributaries that much and more. Only a narrow isthmus
of less than 14 miles stops the free exchange between millions of people of a hundred
million tons of freight. .
- We are almost a hundred years behind our time, for nearly 100 years ago, to be
exact, in 1829, the people of that day, only one-eighth as numerous as they are now,
built a canal sufficient for their commercial needs across this 14 miles and brought
together the two greatest commerce bearing estuaries of the Atlantic seaboard. They
had seen in the war of 1812 how their inability to concentrate the land and naval
forces of the United States in this region had led to the capture and destruction of
this capital city. They could understand what the exchange of the then relatively
Small commerce of these two great bays and their tributaries meant in the way of
increased business and comfort to the people of the whole section, and they dug a
canal 10 feet in depth which Satisfactorily carried the water traffic of the section for
many years. It proved of use to the Federal Government during the war between
the States. Indeed, that was the greatest time of its prosperity. Some have said
its use prevented this capital city from falling into the hands of the Confederacy.
The railroad bridges had all been burned and troops and supplies from the North
could only at one time be sent here by boats which were hastily brought through
this Small canal. It then proved its military value and if properly enlarged and
deepened, it can and may again. The great shipyards of the Delaware and Chesa-
peake, the oil refineries and pipe lines at Marcus Hook, the coal supplies and the great
cities of Philadelphia, Baltimore, Wilmington, Chester, Camden, and Trenton deserve
and should have the protection a modern canal here would afford. -
In 1866 Col. Craighill, of the United States Engineer Corps, reported:
... “No argument is necessary to show the great value in time of war with a maritime
power of such an interior line of communicatiºn between the great Chesapeake and
Delaware Bays and their tributary streams as this canal would be.”
. The committee of the FIouse in 1886 recommended the appropriation of $1,000,000 to
begin the work on this canal, and in its report quoted from the report of Capt. Turtle,
made to the Forty-second Congress, second session, as follows:
º “Without a canal a blockade at the Capes of the Delaware would close the port of
Philadelphia, or the blockade at the Capes of Virginia would close the outward com-
merce of Baltimore and the other ports of the Chesapeake. With the canal built
where communication would be secure, neither the ports of Philadelphia nor of
Baltimore would be closed, unless an effectual blockade were established both at the
Delaware and Virginia Capes. It may be assumed that if a war with one of the great
naval powers should arise, and the mere appropriation of the money could provide such
a channel of communication between the bays, the amount would be at once provided
without hesitation. That would, however, be too late.” -
Every board of engineers which has had this Chesapeake & Delaware Canal under
consideration has recommended its purchase, and there have been so many boards, so
many investigations, that it is an immense task to go through the reports made to
Congress from time to time concerning it, but every board which has reported on the
subject has declared its great usefulness for military purposes and as a means of defense,
should our country be attacked. I venture to predict that if our country should ever
be attacked and because of the failure of the Government to provide for the passage of
its vessels between these two great bays, we should suffer a naval disaster due to inabil-
ity to concentrate our fleet, our torpedo boats, and our submarines at the point of
danger, those who have actively endeavored to prevent the building of a proper-canal
between the Delaware and Chesapeake Bays by the Government would be as earnest in
disavowing their responsibility for such unpatriotic efforts as the European nations
are now endeavoring to escape responsibility for bringing on the present war. Not a
transport or supply ship or hospital ship or destroyer or monitor or third-class cruiser in
our Navy could get through this canal to assist in a naval battle in one bay or the other
when Norfolk, Baltimore, or Philadelphia were being being attacked. There is not
even a gunboat in the American Navy, if we except those on the Asiatic station, that
could use this canal. About one-half of the converted yachts could get through it and
not one-half of the Government tugs could pass, for the dimensions of the lock do not
ermit any vessel of over 24-foot beam, 9-foot draft, or 220-foot length to use the canal.
en I speak of beam and draft of vessels, I wonder if some of these critics of the water
transportation understand what I mean. . From the intelligence displayed in the
speeches they make and the articles they write, I sometimes doubt whether they could
tell, if they saw them, the difference between the capstan and the binnacle, a cook’s
galley and the mizzenmast.
950 PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
Somehow or other; those of us who have lived where we have the smell of the sea in
our nostrils love a ship and shipping. The sea to us promises romance and adventure,
tales of the sea have come down to us from grandfather and greaf grandfather. We .
have seen the ships come and go between our ports and the distant places of the earth,
our old sea captains and our naval men have told us tales, which charmed our boyhood
days, of different races of men and adventures throughout the world.
We believe our country is a great one, we believe our flag should again be seen on
every sea and in all ports and yet when we try to increase our commerce, when we try
to build up our water transportation, we feel the sordid combination of the selfish.
interests which are working against the cheaper transportation of our commodities and
the expansion of our commerce. '. -
We don’t like it, and from time to time, when after years of labor we bring matters to
a point where we think progress is possible and men instead of argument, instead of
convincing figures being offered to combat us, all else failing, resort to the filibustering
tactics when men are worn out beyond the possibility of further endurance. -
. It seems strange that this little canal has managed somehow or other to keep out of
the clutches of the railroads, yet there is a good explanation for it. The canal company
was never able to get from the State legislatures of either Delaware or Maryland the
right itself to transport freight and passengers and, for that reason, because it had to
allow everyone owning a boat to use the canal on equal terms, it could not, itself, fur-
nish active competition with the railroad lines which have so industrially acquired and
put out of use nearly all the canals on the Atlantic seaboard. The Chesapeake & Dela-
ware Canal has been preserved from railroad ownership only because it has no pºwers
as a transportation compuny. It is a toll proposition entirely, and if its owner must
allow everyone's boat to pass through on the same terms, the attractive moncpolistic
feature, so useful for capitalization purposes, is absent. In my humble judgment,
this canal may have been preserved that the pecple of this country may have an object
lesson in a square deal for water transportation as against railroad transportation. I do
not believe that our very useful interstate Commerce Commission could bring about
greater good, in the field of transportation than by letting us have a square deal on the
canal transportation problem, by Sep rating the old canals from the railroads. Let us
have the beginnings of a Square deal in water transportation by separating the canals,
the landings, the wharves and the boats that must use them, from railroad ownership.
If the Government can expend money in public work which will greatly assist in
the defense of our Atlantic Seaboard and at the same time Save to our commerce 18 per
cent on the cost of such work, it looks like a good publicinvestment. The Panama Canal
equipment will possibly be largely available for the actual work. I believe that the
old idea of commerce by canal will be magnificently approved or irretrievably con-
demned by the success or failure which will attend the Government's purchase, im-
provement, and operation as a free waterway of this comparatively little channel
between the Delaware and Cheaspeake Bays.
. The acquisition of this canal by the Government will be in accord with the last
two platforms of the now dominant party in this country. In its platform at Denver,
in 1908, the Democratic Party declared:
“Water furnishes the cheaper means of transportation, and the National Govern-
ment, having control of navigable waters, should improve them to their fullest ca-
pacity. * * * We favor, when practicable, the connection * * * of the
navigable rivers with each other by artificial canals with a view of perfecting a sys-
tem of inland waterways to be navigated by vessels of standard draft.”
At Baltimore in 1912 its declaration was as follows: -
‘‘We favor the adoption of a liberal and comprehensive plan for the development
and improvement of our inland waterways with economy and efficiency so as to per-
mit their navigation by vessels of standard draft.”
It goes without saying that I believe the proposal will be magnificently vindicated
in practice or I should not think for a moment of advocating its purchase and enlarge-
ment by the Government with public money. You gentlemen who are familiar with
conditions of water transportation elsewhere may get Small appropriations here and
there for Some little canal in a less thickly settled portion of the country and in a small
way you may demonstrate the wisdom of such expenditures, but if you wish to prove
the availability of canals for modern commerce there is no place in the whole country
like this narrow neck of land between the two great bays, separating the great com:
merce they carry, to get quick proof of this and demonstrate what a great benefit
water transportation can be to communities which can use it.
Believing as I do in the great utility this canal would be to the commerce of the
country with even the Small improvement its deepening to 12 feet would make, be-
lieving as I do that a demonstration of this canal at that depth will prove absolutely
to the Government the great desirability that is should be made a ship canal through
which our warships may be concentrated for the defense of our country in time of
PREPAIRED NIESS FOR, NATIONAL DEFENSE. 951
war, I deel that I would be unpatriotic if I did not urge that this work should be taken
up by the Government. I believe it is now in a position where we will soon have the
last word on this project So far as the able engineers of the Army and Navy can Say
that word. When after the most careful study and consideration of all the reports
which have been made on this project by skilled engineers of the Army engaged in
work on waterways made by committees of both Houses of Congress, made by commis-
sions, in which the membership of which civilians were included, one has become
convinced that there can not be two opinions on a proposition by men who have suffi-
cient intelligence and industry to learn the facts, one is inclined to be somewhat
impatient with the trifling and almost unintelligent criticism or questions raised
concerning it.
When it became impossible in the last Congress to start this great project by an
appropriation, feeling absolutely confident that no capable engineer could make
an unfavorable report on this project, I offered and secured the passage in the Senate
of a resolution directing the Secretary of War to Secure, prepare, and report to the
Senate summaries of the reports of the Government commissions, officers, and engi-
neers heretofore made, and such facts, information, and opinions of boards or officers
of the Army and Navy as he may deem proper or pertinent as to the advantages or
disadvantages, commercial, naval, or military, of the acquisition of the Cheaspeake
& Delaware Canal by the United States, with such information as he can secure as
to the price at which the property can be purchased.
In my judgment, gentlemen, when the Secretary responds to that resolution in a
report setting out the facts known to the Government regarding the canal, its great
possibilities for good to commerce and the national defense, there will be no popular
criticism or objection to the action of the Government in taking over this property
and making it available in the broadest sense and in the biggest way for commercial,
naval, and military puposes. i
I believe in this great work. I believe its greatness will be demonstrated and its
benefits certified to by the best engineers and the highest officials in this branch of the
Government service, and on the report which will be made pursuant to that resolu-
tion I pin my faith that there will be a start made by this Government in the devel-
opment of that waterway for commerce and defense. I believe this waterway will
come to be used by the great ships of the United States; I believe its usefulness will
be so proven that the Government will soon proceed, after its practical development
has shown the people of this country its great advantages, to extend northward a
canal which may be similarly used between deep water in the Delaware River and
New York Bay. I do not believe that anyone should advocate this latter work until
the Small and less expensive work is done and demonstrates its usefulness and suc-
cess, but when the two are completed then the enormous advantages to this country
will be self-evident. The whole fleet of the United States without knowledge of an
attacking force could be concentrated anywhere on our Atlantic Seaboard from Nar-
ragansett Bay to the Virginia capes. Should such concentration ever be needed for
defense the value of such a passageway would be incalculable. Can anyone to-day
compute the value to the German Empire, either in money or for defense, of the
great but less important military canal at Kiel?'
Our greatest warships last only a few years. At the end of 10 years they go into the
Second line of defense, I believe, because they have become partially obsolete and
outclassed. For less than the cost of one warship this great project may be demon-
strated. For the cost of a few warships the whole great project may be accomplished
with a saving to the commerce of the country of 20 per cent on this investment and
1,000 per cent advantage for the military and naval defense of this country over that
of Germany’s great military canal at Kiel. -
I shall try to be patient. I shall try to convince my colleagues of the desirability
of this great work, even if they hesitate at the expenditure and question the certainty
of its result. But if I can be in any way instrumental in forcing along the accom-
plishment of this project, of bringing the people of the country to see how, along
peaceful lines, we can double, quadruple, possibly quintuple, the effectiveness of
our naval forces for defense of the Atlantic seaboard, and at the same time Secure
almost inestimable facilities for the free interchange of products of the whole I ast,
I shall not feel that my time has been ill spent, no matter what labor or loss of energy
it may entail.
APPENDIX.
(By joint resolution of Congress public resolution No. 37, 1906) the President was
authorized to appoint a commission to examine and appraise the value and works and
franchises of the Chesapeake & Delaware Canal, and an appropriation made for that
purpose.
23380—PT 19—16—2
952 ... PREPARED NESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
This caused the appointment of the so-called Agnus commission, which consisted .
of Gen. Felix Agnus, of Baltimore, as chairman; Maj. C. A. F. Flagler, now Col.
Flagler. of the United States Army, who appeared before the Committee on Coast and
Insular Survey at its recent investigation; and Mr. F. T. Chambers, civil engineer, of
the United States Navy. The commission reported January 1, 1907. (S. Doc. No.
215, 59th Cong., 2d sess.) - -
This commission obtained and brought together a vast amount of information and
reported in favor “of acquiring the Chesapeake & Delaware Canal at an early date,
if practicable, and if it can be done at a cost not to exceed $2,514,289.70,” which sum
was reached by appraisement of the works and franchises of the canal, and the com-
mission considered the works and franchises of the canal in three ways:
The canal company valued its property at $5,348,071. The commission, basing its
estimate on cost of production, valued the property at $3,708,186. The itemized
estimate of values found at page 18, Senate Document No. 215, Fifty-ninth Congress,
second session, is as follows:
Dry excavation, 15,000,000 cubic yards, at 16 cents. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $2,400,000
Dredging, 1,435,760 cubic yards, at 14 cents. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 200, 996
Revetment, 80,000 linear feet. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 70,000
Masonry, 44,000 perches, at $3. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132,000
Lock at Delaware City. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120,000
Lock at St. Georges-------------------------------------------------. 118, 220
Lock at Chesapeake City. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147, 970
Land holdings, 8,000 acres, at $50. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 400,000
Summit level supply------------------------------------------------- 5,000
Bridges--------------------------------------------------------------- 31,000
Houses, offices, etc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 30,000
Tools, machinery, etc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,000
Telephone line-------------------------------------------------------- 2,000
Total “cost of reproduction,” 1907. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3,708, 186
Senator SAULSBURY. Mr. Chairman, this project has been before
the Commerce Committee of the Senate, and i. been twice favorably
reported on by them, but has been so tangled up with the howl of
“pork barrel” which has gone up that I have not been able to dis-
entangle it and present it as an independent proposition until this
moment before this committee. My hope was that by presenting it
to this committee it would become so separated from the mass of
projects which usually have been included in river and harbor bills
that it could have a fair consideration without meeting the tremen-
dous opposition—which, in my opinion, , is very largely mistaken
opposition—to the appropriations in the river and harbor bills.
This project of uniting the Delaware and Chesapeake Bays has
been recommended by the highest military engineers of the Govern-
ment for the past 30 years, and they have uniformly agreed upon it.
: It has been recommended by engineers who have been on commis-
sions appointed from civil life. So far as the Navy is concerned, I
fancy it could have no greater recommendation than that of the
Admiral of our Navy, Admiral Dewey, who, when he was a captain,
was on one of the boards which reported favorably on this project.
. The matter became so involved in the discussion of the river and
harbor bill at both the last session and the session before that seeing
that it was impossible to get anything done regarding it I introduced
a resolution which called upon the Secretary of War to send to the
Senate the opinions, and data which he could obtain regarding the
matter, and the opinions of his officers and boards regarding the
military, naval, and commercial value of the project. That resulted
: in a report which I desire to commend to the perusal of the members
of this committee, and particularly the few pages of it, pages 29 and
30, where the conclusions are drawn from the matter contained in
--- PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 95.3
the report, where Gen. Macomb, as Chief of the War College, Gen.
Bliss, as acting Chief of Staff, and the Secretary of War, say among
other things that
The fine undefended harbor of Lewes, Del., makes such a landing a probability.
The writer is referring to the landing of a hostile invading force
on the west bank of Delaware Bay. He says that the existing canal
would form something of an obstacle to the advance of a hostile
expedition; but he says that if the canal is made a tidewater canal
18 feet deep, which he recommends for this purpose, it will be
an almost impossible obstacle to the passage of troops advancing to attack Wilming-
ton or Philadelphia from the peninsula between Delaware and Chesapeake Bays.
He further says:
A canal along this line—
Speaking of the little 14-mile canal between Chesapeake and Dela-
ware Bays– -
and a canal from Delaware Bay to New York Harbor would make a landing of hostile
troops almost impossible between Narragansett Bay and Chesapeake Bay, and the
construction of this canal is an important step toward the accomplishment of this
result.
I refer next to the report of Gen. Macomb, which is approved by
the Acting Chief of Staff, that the construction of this canal between
the Chesapeake and Delaware Bays, defended by a few troops and a
few small gunboats, would be such an obstacle as would “hardly be
crossed, and it is not believed that it would be attempted.” .
I incorporate here pages 29 and 30, Senate Document No. 14, Sixty-
fourth Congress, first session, giving the findings of these officials:
APPENDIX C.
WAR DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OR STAFF,
Washington, February 27, 1915.
Memorandum for the Chief of Staff.
Subject: Military advantages of the Chesapeake and Delaware Canal.
1. There is returned herewith a memorandum with attached papers on the above
subject, dated February 24, 1915, from the Secretary of War to the Chief of Staff,
wherein three questions are submitted:
(a) The military advantage, if any, of the existence of this canal. .
(b) Whether a canal along this line would be of any military advantage, and if so,
What? -
(c) What character and size the canal would have to be in order to be of any
advantage? -
These questions apparently refer both to the present and contemplated canal along
this line.
2. In answer to 1 (a), it is believed that the existing canal has some value as it
exists to-day as an obstacle to the advance of a hostile expedition landing on the west
bank of Delaware Bay and advancing against Wilmington and Philadelphia. The
fine undefended harbor at Lewes, Del., makes such a landing a probability. The
canal, especially at the locks, is so narrow, only 24 feet at the locks, as to form an
obstacle not very formidable. The canal is too small for the passage of submarines
or other naval craft that would be used fol preventing the landing of troops from hos-
tile transports and too small and obstructed by locks for rapid transport of troops and
matériel from one bay to the other. - -
3. As to 1 (b), a sea-level canal along this same line would be of very great military
importance from the following points of view: - -
§ For the movement of submarines and other craft that must constitute an impor-
tant part of our coast-defense system. - -
954 PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
(b) As forming an almost impassable obstacle to the passage of troops advancing to
attack Wilmington or Philadelphia from the peninsula between Delaware and Ches-
apeake Bays.
(c) For the transport of men and matériel of the Coast Artillery and the Coast-Artil-
1ery supports from one bay to the other. t
4. The first of the points, enumerated in paragraph 3, is a military One, because
submarines and other:Small craft are believed to be at present an integral part of the sea-
coast defense for use not only against naval attack on the harbors, but in a still more
important sense against transports attempting to land a hostile force on our shores in
case of the defeat of our Navy. Seacoast defenses reach no farther than the range of
their guns, and it is impossible to distribute mobile army troops at all possible land-
ing places to prevent the landing of troops without so frittering away the Army in Small
detachments as to render it almost impossible to collect them for united action. A
canal Such as proposed would allow the whole force of Submarines, etc., to be held in
one of the two bays and used with equal efficiency in either. Without the canal the
force of submarines, etc., must be divided between the two bays, and to reinforce one
another they must attempt a passage by the outside, a distance of over 200 miſes, as
against about 15 miles by the canal.
A canal along this line and one from Delaware Bay to New York Harbor would
make a landing of hostile troops almost impossible between Narragansett Bay and
Chesapeake Bay, and the construction of this canal is an important step toward the
accomplishment of this result. -
5. As an obstacle and a part of the land defense of Wilmington and Philadelphia
a canal Suited for other commercial and naval purposes would be of great importance.
Defended by a few troops and Small gunboats, such an obstacle (of the size recom-
mended below) would hardly be crossed, and it is not believed that it would be
attempted.
6. As a means of transport it has a measure of value for the easy transportation of
men and matériel between the fortifications of Delaware Bay and of Baltimore.
7. As to 1 (c), the objects Set forth in paragraph 3 above can be obtained by a Sea-
level canal having a depth of 18 feet at mean low water and a bottom width of about
150 feet. While tides of 6 feet to 10 feet prevail in the waters at the ends of the canal,
investigation has shown that guard locks will not be necessary and that an open canal
will be entirely feasible.
* M. M. MACOMB,
Brigadier General, Chief of War College Division.
I concur.
TASKER H. BLIss,
Brigadier General, United States Army, Acting Chief of Staff.
I concur.
LINDLEY M. GARRISON,
Secretary of War.
You have had before your committee, as I have observed from
reports which I have seen, Mr. Chairman, some gentlemen of mili-
tary knowledge who have described how very important to the
welfare of the Government of this country is the protection of that
territory running from, we will say, about the vicinity of Boston up
toward Buffalo, and then down through Pittsburgh and Baltimore
to Norfolk, or maybe a little west of Baltimore. I want to submit
to you that the most important portion of that whole section, the
manufacturing activities in which are very essential to the defense
of this country in case of attack, lies within the territory which would
be subject to attack from the point at Lewes, Del., which I have
indicated; that the highest military officers of this Government have
said that the construction of this little canal, only 14 miles in length,
and costing, including the estimated purchase of the existing canal,
only $12,000,000 when 10 per cent has been added to the estimated
cost of construction, would so defend that section of the country
from attack in the only fine and undefended harbor within a reason-
able striking distance of New York that such an attack would not
be attempted, and that this would be an lº. obstacle to an
expedition advancing toward the great manufacturing centers which
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. g 955
are in the neighborhood of Wilmington and Philadelphia, and extend
up even as far as Bethlehem.
Senator CATRON. What did you say the cost would be 3
Senator SAULSBURY. Adding 10 per cent to the estimated cost,
a 25-foot canal—I was in error in my first statement, because they
have only recommended, for present military purposes, an 18-foot
canal—but the cost of a 25-foot sea-level canal, including 10 per cent
for profit if it should be done by contractors, and including the pur-
chase of the existing canal at an estimated price for which I think it
could be bought, is about $12,000,000 plus.
Personally, I can not see that there is comparable to this anywhere
any work of public importance so far as the defense of this country is
concerned. I may say that the speech which you have ordered in-
corporated as part of the record, made by me some time ago before
one of these associations, refers specifically to the reports of our
engineers, showing that the saving to the commerce of the country by
the construction of this little canal would be $1,400,000 a year.
That is just 12 per cent on the estimated cost of this canal.
Now, think of being able to get 12 per cent return for the people of
this country on the cost of providing an impassable obstacle to the
advance of troops against this important portion of our manufac-
turing, and what is now practically the munition center of this coun-
try, and rendering useless an attack on the only undefended harbor
of great importance within 150 miles of New York. I should be
charmed and delighted if somebody could tell me how we could better
expend for this country the sum of $12,000,000 than in doing some-
thing of that kind. We can not get at it too soon, and I should
certainly favor doing it at once myself. -
It seems to me that the proposition is absolutely self-demonstrable.
It will be a lasting benefit to this country in time of peace for all time.
Incidentally it will save on an average each year ten lives which are
lost on the passage between the capes of the Delaware and the Vir-
ginia Capes. It will unite 50,000,000 tons of commerce annually on
Chesapeake Bay with 50,000,000 tons of commerce annually on Dela-
ware Bay, which is the amount that they have. There are 10,000
registered boats on those two bays. They are the greatest commerce-
bearing estuaries on the Atlantic seaboard; and how anyone can
conceive of a greater public work than this, I am unable to imagine.
Senator CATRON. Senator, I am not very well acquainted with the
sºphy over there. Is this canal south of Wilmington, or north
Of it, 3
Senator SAULSBURY. This canal is about 12 miles south of Wil-
mington. It is defended on the east by a fort on the Delaware River
shore, by a little midstream fortification, old Fort Delaware, and by
a fort on the New Jersey shore. Practically those forts will prevent
runbys by hostile vessels, but they could all be taken in the rear
without very much difficulty.
Senator CATRON. Do you know what is the maximum draft of the
battleships of the United States? *
Senator SAULSBURY. I think about 30 feet on an average. I may
say to the committee that personally I am absolutely in favor of and
should be delighted to vote for a measure which would provide for a
sea-level canal from the Chesapeake Bay to the Delaware Bay, capable
956 PREPAREDNIESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
of passing all our superdreadnaughts, and one from the Delaware
River to New York Harbor capable of performing the same office.
Senator CATRON. I should think, if we were going into the project
of building a canal 25 feet deep, we ought to make it deep enough for
the Superdreadnaughts. e
Senator SAULSBURY. Thirty to 35 feet would be entirely ample.
I do not know that some of the members of the committee appre-
ciate what a comparatively small work this is. The ë. &
Delaware Canal is only 14 miles long, and the canal from the Dela-
ware River in the neighborhood of Trenton or Bordentown to New
York Bay is only 34 miles long. - .
Senator CATRON. Have you any estimate as to what it would cost
if you made it 33 or 35 feet deep?
Senator SAULSBURY. I can only say that in order to obtain such an
estimate as that I would have to add to the amount stated an addi-
tional estimate on account of excavations.
Senator CATRON. As you excavate deeper it costs more ?
Senator SAULSBURY. No; but of course, if you will pardon me for
making the suggestion, when a dredge is at work the material can be
moved very much more cheaply if it continues than otherwise.
Senator CATRON. Oh, yes; I understand that.
Senator SAULSBURY. I want to say, just there, that the excavation
on the canal from Delaware Bay to Chesapeake Bay is absolutely
without a single piece of rock work. There is no rock there. It is all
alluvial soil. It has all been examined time and time again. The
report of the Secretary of War shows these various reports from time
to time, and it is the easiest excavation that any people ever had for
canal purposes.
Senator CATRON. What would be the width of the canal?
Senator SAULSBURY. I can give you the approximate width.
Senator CATRON. If you made it 33 feet deep, you would have to
have it wide enough to accommodate vessels of that draft, of course.
Senator SAULSBURY. Oh, yes, indeed. The cost of purchasing the
canal and enlarging it is given on page 27 of the report of the Secre-
tary of War, which is Document No. 14, first session Sixty-fourth
Congress. By some error, Mr. Chairman, this report of the Sécretary
of War—which is very interesting, and would be a very good thing for
the members of the committee to read if I am able to interest them in
the matter—was referred to the Interstate Commerce Committee. I
was not well when the report was handed down, and was not in the
Senate, and it was referred to the Interstate Commerce Committee;
but I have brought a sufficient number of copies of it here, I think, to
supply the members of the committee.
Senator CATRON. On what subject is that report in the main }
Senator SAULSBURY. It was made, Senator, pursuant to a resolu-
tion which I offered in the Senate, calling on the Secretary of War to
give his opinion and the opinions of his boards and officers on the
military, naval, and commercial value of this canal. If I may direct
your attention to this report, the resolution which I introduced is
found on page 1 of it, and I hope you will read it.
I will leave these copies with the secretary of your committee, so
that the other members of the committee can have them if they like.
Senator CATRON. Senator, you have stated that this canal would
be an insuperable obstacle to any advance of troops on Philadelphia
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 957
and Wilmington. In what respect would it be an insuperable
ºle The crossing of a stream is ordinarily a very insignificant
thing. &
siator SAULSBURY. Yes; but the Secretary of War, the Chief of
the War College, and the Chief of Staff describe how it might be
defended by a few gunboats.
Senator CATRON. Is that in this report.' -
Senator SAULSBURY. You will find it on pages 29 and 30 of the
report.
} was quoting from official opinions when I made that statement,
Senator. -
Senator CATRON. I was a little curions to know how it would be an
obstacle, because ordinarily the crossing of a stream does not amount
to anything.
Senator sºulswºx. Oh, no; of course a stream could be crossed,
and particularly the present canal could be crossed, because there is an
upper level to it, and a stick of dynamite put under the locks at one
place would run the canal dry. I am speaking of it as it now exists.
That is only a 10-foot level. -
Senator CATRON. Where does the canal get its water from to go
into that level 7 - -
. Senator SAULSBURY. There are natural streams there. They also
do some pumping in the summer time.
I may say, Mr. Chairman, that I know practically every foot of
this ground. I was born within 20 miles of Lewes, and I have been
over this canal, I suppose, 500 times at different points. I know
the vicinity of the harbor and all the surroundings, so that you could
wake me up in the middle of the night and ask me a question about
any part of this territory and I could probably reply to you almost
automatically. I shall be very glad if any of the members of the
committee can think of any question which may be troubling them
to reply to it.
I was going on to say that, being connected with this general river
and harbor proposition every year, as it has been, there have been
Some most unfair, unjust, and improper criticisms, due entirely to
the ignorance of those making them, which I have been chasing
down, and it is rather hard chasing down ghosts. Every time some
one gets a letter from somebody who has been interested in an old
projected canal down there some Member of the House or Member
of the Senate, and he says they are quicksands in this canal, I have
to meet the ghost of the quicksand allegation. In order to avoid all
the troubles I can conceive of, I want to call the attention of the
committee to the report which has been made by the Government
engineers, which will be jound at pages 90 to 93 of Senate Document
215, Fifty-ninth Congress, second session, which absolutely disposes
of the quicksand question. - .
Senator CATRON. You insist that there is no quicksand there?
Senator SAULSBURY. I insist that there is no quicksand there that
is of any material consequence. I do not think there is any quick-
sand there at all; but the Army officers entirely disregard it after
examination, and explain why there is no quicksand. There is a
very fine sand there which runs readily with water; but when the
water gets out of it, it settles to the bottom and forms a very hard
and a very good surface. It would make a very good road, for ex-
958 PREPAREDINESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
ample; so that it is not quicksand. Yes; I am sure there is no
quicksand there, practically, as far as any untechnical person who
is not an engineer can be sure who has not examined it personally.
Various other objections have been made from time to time.
There seems to be a great desire that an “old, bankrupt canal”
shall not be purchased. Well, personally, I think that if you need a
thing it is better to buy it when it is in a bankrupt condition than
when it is in a prosperous condition. But I call the attention of the
committee to the fact that by thorough investigation, made by the
committee of which I am chairman—the Coast and Insular Survey
Committee—all the financial matters of that canal were thoroughly
brought out and exposed. e -
º, I myself thought that this canal was owned by the railroads, and
I was very much surprised to find that it was not. I thought that
they had been killing the canal by their ownership in favor of rail
transportation; but this canal, strangely enough, has been preserved
from railroad ownership by the fact that the canal company itself
is not a transportation company. It can not transport freight
through the canal, but is bound to allow anybody’s boat to go
through the canal on the same terms that anybody else's boat is
allowed to go through. So that it could not be used for capitalization
purposes, for general combination, in a way that was attractive,
and the railroads have never been able to make use of it. Therefore
this still exists as one of the few original canals which are not domi-
nated by the railroad interests.
. So far as concerns any special interest desiring the purchase of
this canal, if there is any such interest as that f do nºt know it.
The canal company has avowed to the Secretary of War the impos-
sibility of giving him any price on the canal, and says that the only
way in which the Government can obtain it is by condemnation
proceedings. I will explain the reason for that.
Senator CATRON. Is the canal being used now %
Senator SAULSBURY. The canal is being used now, and somewhere
between 900,000 and 1,000,000 tons of freight a year pass through it.
The net income of the canal each year has been about $108,000. :
Senator CATRON. What kind of craft go through it?
Senator SAULSBURY. Small steamers run through it regularly, for
One thing. - -
Senator CATRON. You may have stated that heretofore.
Senator SAULSBURY. No; I have not. -
Senator CATRON. What is the present depth of it? -
Senator SAULSBURY. It permits the passage of boats of 9 feet draft,
23 feet beam, and 220 feet long. There is a regular line of steamers
plying through it from Baltimore to Philadelphia. In the summer
time they pass through it twice a day. They have a day line and a
night line. There are regular lines of transportation from the south,
tugs which haul canal boats through there. --
Senator CATRON. Are these regular lines of steamers that go
through in the summer time freight or passenger lines of boats?
Senator SAULSBURY. Both. They are very ridiculous steamers in
appearance. They are a good deal like a knife blade, because other-
wise they can not be made narrow enough to go through the locks of
a canal which only accommodates craft 23 feet wide, 223 feet long,
and 9 feet in draft. *
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 959
§ Senator CATRON. Is the canal straight, so that there is no difficulty
on that account - -
Senator SAULSBURY. Oh, practically so. There are curves in it,
but they are long curves.
I hold in my hand the last annual statement of the company,
which I obtained on my request some time since. It shows that their
gross revenue was $183,000 plus, and the maintenance of the canal
cost them $75,000 plus, leaving a net revenue of $112,000 plus, out
of which they paid 4 per cent on their mortgage loan, amounting to
$104,000 plus, ºil. net $8,000. That has been about the character
of their operations for the past 10 years. Their mortgage bonds
amount to $2,602,000 plus, and they had to reduce the interest from
5 per cent to 4 per cent. They have been sort of struggling along,
and unless the canal is deepened and widened it wifrui, along
probably about in the same way.
Senator CATRON. What is the amount of the mortgage debt
Senator SAULSBURY. Two million six hundred and odd thousand
dollars. The cost of the canal to the Government, as estimated by
all these boards of engineers, will be about $2,514,000, I think, and
the United States engineers' estimate of the replacement value is
three million seven hundred and odd thousand dollars. In other
words, the stock of the canal company is absolutely worthless from
any indication of its operations, and the bonds would not bring par.
The committee of which I am chairman, which reported on this
measure, estimated the value of those bonds at about 80 cents on
the dollar; that is, taking them on a 5 per cent basis. They are
paying 4 per cent, and on a 5 per cent basis we estimated the bonds.
at about 80 cents on the dollar, which would make the canal worth
about two million one or two hundred thousand dollars, and the
engineers recommend its purchase for $2,514,000. -
*I do not know whether there is anything further that I can say,
Mr. Chairman, if you will read the report of the Secretary of War and .
some of these other reports wº have mentioned. May I call
your attention, however, if you will not consider it seeking to call
attention to myself, to Senate Document 249, Sixty-fourth Congress,
second session, which is a speech I made and which has been pub-
lished as a public document on the request of Mr. Oliver ? You will
find a tremendous amount of material in that, which, I think, will be
enlightening if you care to go through with it.
# Senator HITCHCOCK. The original proposition was not to acquire
this canal for military purposes, was it
; Senator SAULSBURY. Yes; all the time. Its commercial value was
obvious, its military demonstrated.
& Senator HITCHCOCK. Was it . . -
# Senator SAULSBURY. Yes, indeed; all reports of engineers and
speeches show that. As -
Senator CATRON. Senator, have you had that speech printed in
pamphlet form -
Senator SAULSBURY. Yes; it has been printed as a public document.
Senator CATRON. It is a speech you made elsewhere than in the
Senate } 4.
Senator SAULSBURY. Yes; I made it outside. I have made one or
two speeches in the Senate which have been printed, but that was the
w

960 PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
most recent one, and was particularly on the military and strategic
value of the canal. That was the subject of the speech.
Senator CATRON. I suggest that you might get copies of that for
each one of us. *
Senator SAULSBURY. Yes; I shall be very glad indeed to furnish
the members of the committee with copies of it. &
Senator CATRON. Our chairman can get it, if it is a public docu-
Iment. -
Senator SAULSBURY. Mr. Chairman, while you are making out
your program for preparedness, it seems to me there is one matter
which has to be considered, and that is, how can you most quickly
prepare for what may happen at the end of this European war? The
most critical time we are going to have is when this war in Europe is
finished, and the participants in that war are prepared to demand of
us explanations and apologies and restitution and accommodation of
all the difficulties they may have had with us.
Our shipyards are absolutely congested, and we can not have a
great shipbuilding program now, in my judgment, because every ship-
yard I know is full of work. Some of them in my town are full for
two years. The navy yards of the United States can not build ships
as fast as I should like to see them built. Now, here is a work sug-
gested which is only for defense. It can not be used for aggression.
It can be used only for the protection of this country, and the most
important manufacturing section of the whole country, both manu-
facturing for defense and ordinary manufacturing. It is a work
which may be carried on without any reference to the congested con-
diaion of the shipyards, which can be carried on independently of any
other part of a program of preparedness, but which will prepare us.
l].S.
Admiral Mahan, in one of his later books, has described how import-
ant it is that harbors, and particularly defensive harbors, shall have
two entrances or two exits. Think of our fleet being defeated by a
more formidable one, as it might be, at a point where they would
brobably meet in an engagement, somewhere off the Atlantic sea-
i. maybe 500 or 1,000 miles. Think of those ships limping home
and trying to get into harbors and into shipyards where they could be
repaired and where they could refit and rejoin.
f this canal is built and if, as I hope, a larger canal from the Dela-
ware River to New York Harbor is built, then the ships could enter all
the shipyards on the eastern seaboard, beginning with Norfolk, goin
through all those great shipyards on the Delaware and the navy yard
at New York and all along the Connecticut coast and the Rhode Island
coast, very largely, because it is so close to the eastern end of Long
Island Sound that practically the concentration of the fleet through
these canals would protect Rhode Island and Narragansett Bay as well
as any other portion of it. You would have at least four entrances,
and for offensive purposes against a hostile fleet trying to blockade
you would have four exits. -
I can refer you to the statements of Admiral Mahan regarding this
subject, if you think it is worth while to do that at this time. The
statements of Admiral Mahan will be found in his Naval Strategy,
at pages 158 and 159. As I hear one of the members of your com-
'mittee mention the Kiel Canal, I only want to say that in my opinion,
not as a military expert but from the standpoint of a person who
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 961.
knows the situation fairly well, the construction of these two canals,
14 miles long and 34 miles long, respectively, would make the Kiel
Canal look i. a child's toy in the matter of efficiency. I say that
because in this way, according to the opinions of the highest military
officers of this Government, you will render practically impossible the
landing of an invading force for about 450 miles of Our Atlantic Sea-
board in a region that it is absolutely essential and necessary to have
protected.
The New York and Delaware River Canal is a work of much greater
cost, chiefly because of the country through which it runs, the railroad
crossings, and the road crossings; but I can conceive no work in which
we could engage at this time which would be of greater protection to
our country than the construction of these two canals, and I am sat-
isfied that the members of the committee, if they will look at it, will
feel convinced of the same thing.
I have already taken up too much of your time. I am very grate-
ful, indeed, for the opportunity to bring this matter to your attention.
The CHAIRMAN. You might, if you desire, put in Admiral Mahan's
Statement.
Senator SAULSBURY. I shall be very glad to do so, sir.
(Admiral Mahan's statement is as follows:)
DOUBLE ENTRANCE HARE OR.S.
In his book on “Naval Strategy” (pp. 158–159), Admiral Mahan
says:
If a port have two outlets at a great distance from each other, the offensive power
will be increased thereby, the enemy being unable to be before both in adequate
force. New York is a conspicuous instance of such advantage. If the two outlets
by the sound and by the ocean, are suitably fortified, an enemy can not be near
both without dividing his fleet into two bodies out of mutual supporting distance.
A united hostile fleet can not command both channels until right before the city,
where the channels meet. The same advantage, to a much less degree, is found at
Port Orchard, Puget Sound, and had weight with the commission which chose this
point for the navy yard. The port of Brest has the same, which with sailing fleets
gave a distinct advantage. Wireless telegraphy, of course, facilitates the movement of
the enemy to one entrance from the other, or from a central position, but the gain
over former conditions is less than one would imagine, Nelson, 50 miles from Cadiz,
learned of the enemy's sailing in two and a half hours by a chain of signal vessels.
His chance of intercepting the enemy was as good, perhaps even better, than that of
a steam fleet similarly situated, dependent upon wireless. The speed of the escaping
fleet under Steam would fully counterbalance, probably more than counterbalance,
the gain of the outsider by speedier information. Over 24 hours were required for
the allied fleets to leave Cadiz before Trafalgar.
In order that two outlets should confer fully the offensive advantage claimed, it
is necessary that they should be so far apart that the enemy can not concentrate
before one, between the time that the fleet within indicates its intention of coming
out and the time when it has formed its order of battle outside. With steam, few
ports are so favorably situated. The depandence of sailing ships upon the direction
and force of the wind introduced a tactical and strategic element which can now be
disregarded. ‘‘Keep all fast,” once wrote Lort St. Vincent, “for we know that with
a wind to the Southward of Southeast by south no ship of the line can leave Brest.”
The analogy of this to the delay in coming out caused by an enemy's mine field is
easily seen. -
In duscussing the value of double lines of retreat, he says (ibid.,
p. 169):
It is difficult to imagine a more embarrassing position that that of a fleet after a
decisive defeat, hampered with crippled ships, having but a single port to which to
return. It may be laid down as an essential prinicpal that on every sea frontier
962 PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
there should be at least two secure ports, sufficiently fortified, and capable of making
any and all repairs. In such cases pursuit may be baffled, if the enemy can be dropped
out of sight; but with one port he knows to which you are bound. Togo, for instance,
knew that Rozhestvensky must be bound to Vladivostok, although he did not know
whether he would go through the Strait of Korea or that of Tsugaru. If the two ports
are tolerably near each other, so much the better, as the enemy can not then judge
the aim of the retreating fleet by slight indications.
Also (p. 272): *
* * * to a retreating United States fleet the second entrance to New York by
Hong Island Sound together with Narragansett Bay constitutes for a pursuing enemy
a further complication which favors escape. A single port with widely separated
entrances approaches the condition of two ports, in the embarrassment imposed upon
an enemy who has lost touch. Admiral Togo was confronted with just this perplexity.
Vladivostok could be reached by three different routes, wide apart. A position head-
ing off all three could be found close before Vladivostok itself; but, besides the possi-
bility that an unfavorable chance, such as a fog, might allow the Russians to slip by,
in which case they would not have far to go to get in, there was also the risk that, even
if defeated, those which escaped for the moment could enter, thus making a victory
less decisive. The pursuit of the day following the battle, picked up ships which had
got by, and in the supposed case might have reached port. .
Although approving the Russian choice of Port Arthur over Vladi-
vostok as a station for the fleet during the Japanese War on account
of the heavy ices during the winter at Vladivostok, he says (p. 396):
Actually, however, Vladivostok was available; and in its situation, in its two exits,
as well as in general navigational facilities, it possessed distinct advantages for a fleet
intended for its proper office of offense.
He repeats the same idea on page 439:
The question would not have been altered in principle, only in application, if the
Russian fleet had been concentrated at first in Vladivostok. There is something to be
said in favor of each port; but the balance inclines to Vladivostok, granting the effec-
tive icebreakers.
... In his book on “Naval Administration and Warfare,” discussing
the principles involved in the Russo-Japanese War, Admiral Mahan
quotes from a Times correspondent (p. 102): -
Kamimura's squadron is not powerful enough to blockade the two entrances to
Vladivostok. It has been compelled to adopt the minor role of Sealing the Tsu Shima
$traits, so as to cover the line of communication southward of that point. The naval
people pray daily for freedom to wipe out the score Vladivostok has run up against
them. -
In stating that Vladivostok was the proper rendezvous for cruisers
(ibid., 161), he says: -
From this center, itself possessing two exits, and leading equally to the Japan Sea
and to the east coast of the islands by way of Tsugaru Straits, the field to commerce
destroyers was as clear as conditions often allow.
Mr. Chairman, as supplementing and showing the importance of
this work, with the permission of the committee. I will have incor-
É. at the end of my remarks letters from Gen. Kingman, the
Chief of Engineers, regarding the reports on this project, and a letter
from Gen. Macomb, in which he gives unqualified endorsement to the
roject, and of which I think, with your permission, I will read a part.
He refers to this speech, which has been made a public document.
(Senator Saulsbury then read part of the letter of Gen. Macomb of
November 19, 1915, and part of the letter of Gen. Weaver of Decem-
ber 13, 1915, both of which are printed in full at the end of his
statement.)
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 963
Senator SAULSBURY. Gen. Macomb gives me permission to use his
letter in a subsequent letter, in response to a request from me for
such permission.
Senator CATRON. Will you tell me, if you have not already stated
it, what would be the saving in distance if you wanted to convey a
ship from one of those bays to the other by canal rather than going
around and coming up 3 -
Senator SAULSBURY. There is a saving in distance between Balti-
more and Philadelphia—this does not exactly answer your question—
but there is a saving in distance of, I think, 323 miles. Somewhere in
some of these reports the saving in distance is estimated at about
200 miles for naval operations.
Senator CATRON. My question was this: What would be the dis-
tance, commencing at one mouth of this canal and going down until
you came to the Atlantic Ocean and going out of the Chesapeake Bay
and up the coast until you got to the other mouth of it?
Senator SAULSBURY. About 400 miles; 423 miles, I think, to be
exact.
Senator CATRON. There would be about 400 miles saving in dis-
tance, would there; or is there any other way to get through?
Senator SAULSBURY. No ; it would not figure out exactly that
way, because you would have to go north, and lose a little in that
way. I can tell you the exact saving of distance between Baltimore,
for example, and New York by going through this way. That would
be 180 miles. The steaming time for all the boats, if you should be
attempting to concentrate them, if they desired to go from Baltimore
to New York, would be shortened by 180 miles.
Senator HITCHCOCK. How large craft could go through the canal
according to your proposal?
Senator SAULSBURY. The present suggestion is to have the canal
18 feet deep. I think every man who has examined the matter
wants this to be a deep sea-level canal, and not simply an 18-foot
canal. My idea is that the great importance of it will be so manifest
as soon as we are able to concentrate any of our naval vessels through
there and carry commerce through there generally that it will natu-
rally be deepened. The estimate for a 25-foot canal made by the
engineers—which is the best, so far as I know, that I have come
across—is $12,000,000, including the purchase of the existing canal,
and adding 10 per cent for profits on contracts. -
Mr. Chairman, I also have here a letter from the Acting Secretary
of War of December 27, 1915, regarding these defenses, and also a
letter from Mr. James S. Harlan, who was at one time the chairman
of the Interstate Commerce Commission, and is now a member of it,
in regard to this particular work, which I shall take the liberty of
having printed at the end of my remarks, with the permission of the
committee. -
Senator CATRON. What is the height of the country between the
two bays at the highest point above sea level?
Senator SAULSBURY. That information is contained in these reports
Senator. My recollection is that the highest point is 90 to 100 feet
above sea level. That is where they have the deep cut; but I am
not quite sure that that is accurate. You will find that it is about
90 feet, I think. *
The CHAIRMAN. How many locks has the present canal?
964 PREPAIRED NIESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
Senator SAULSBURY. It has three locks. One is a tide lock, at
Delaware City, on the Delaware River. Then, at a place called St.
Georges, there is a lock through which the boats reach what they call
the high level, which is only 10 feet above the lower one; and the
other lock, at Chesapeake City, Md., on the Chesapeake Bay, is both
a tidal lock and a lift lock. It lets you down from the 10-foot level
into Back Creek, which is an estuary of the Chesapeake Bay.
It is very interesting to me to try to answer any questions of any
members of the committee, and I should appreciate it as a favor to
have these questions asked directing my attention to such matters.
I thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and gentlemen.
The CHAIRMAN. We are much obliged to you, Senator.
(The letters referred to, to be placed at the end of this statement,
are as follows:) -
WAR DEPARTMENT,
Washington, December 27, 1915.
Hon. WILLARD SAULSBURY,
United States Senate.
MY DEAR SENATOR: In reply to your letter of the 20th instant, inquiring as to the
plans of the department for the provision of defenses for Delaware Bay, and more
particularly as to the defense of the harbor of Lewes, Del., I beg to inform you that
the projects of the department for additional Seacoast defenses include a project for
the installation of long-range guns upon the borders of Delaware Bay for the purpose
of denying the occupancy of that bay to the warships and transports of an enemy.
These proposed defenses will serve also to deny the harbor of Lewes to an enemy.
No funds are available for initiating the construction of these defenses, and no item
therefor was included in the estimates submitted this year, as the entire amount
included in these estimates for new seacoast defenses will be required for other locali-
ties at which the need for defenses is deemed to be of a more pressing character.
Very truly, yours,
EIENRY BRECKINRIDGE,
Acting Secretary of War.
ARMY WAR COLLEGE,
Washington, November 19, 1915.
Hon. WILLARD SAULSBURY,
United States Senate, Washington, D. C.
DEAR SENATOR: I have read your speech on the Chesapeake and Delaware Canal
and its proposed enlargement, with much interest and thank you for sending me a
copy. It seems to me you have covered the question very thoroughly and it is diffi-
cult for me to understand why the value of an enlarged sea level canal in war as a
military asset in our coast defense is not at Once acknowledged in COBgress, to Say
nothing of its peace value for commercial purposes.
If we imagine this waterway converted into an Open sea-level canal of not less than
18 to 20 feet depth at mean low water and with about 150 feet bottom width, we have
a formidable obstacle to the advance of an enemy force up the peninsula against Wil-
mington and Philadelphia. They could Surely be stopped here.
Again its value for readily transferring Submarines and other torpedo craft from One
bay to another can not be overestimated. These would work from a safe base, say
near Philadelphia, and could descend either bay against an enemy fleet on very
short notice.
I hope you will succeed in your efforts to get this project appropriated for and
pushed to completion.
Very sincerely, yours,
• . - M. M. MACOMB.
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 965
ARMY WAR COLLEGE,
Washington, December 15, 1915.
Hon. WILLARD SAULSBURY, -
United States Senate, Washington, D. C. .
DEAR SENATOR SAULSBURY: In reply to your note of the 14th instant, I have to
say that you are welcome to quote anything I stated in my letter to you of the 19th
ultimo, commenting on your Savannah speech concerning the proposed enlargement
of the Chesapeake & Delaware Canal.
Sincerely, yours,
M. M. MACOMB.
WAR DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF,
Washington, December 13, 1915.
*.
EIon. WILLARD SAULSBURY,
United States Senate.
MY DEAR SENATOR: I beg to thank you for your kind letter of November 18
inclosing a clipping from the Wilmington Morning News containing your speech
delivered at Savannah, Ga., on November 10, before the convention of the Atlantic
Deeper Waterways ('onvention. Absence from the city and accumulation of busi-
ness in connection therewith prevented me from reading your speech until last night.
I want to say to you that I have read it with the greatest interest and feel that I must
thank you for the valuable information which it contains and the masterly way in
which you have contended for the adequate defense of the country in connection
with the coast defenses of the Delaware, and the consideration of a sea-level canal
between the Delaware River and Chesapeake Bay.
In my opinion it is important that the waters inside the Delaware capes and adjacent
to the Delaware Breakwater be placed under such coast artillery fire as shall prevent
the occupancy of those waters as an anchorage and harbor of refuge by a naval enemy.
The enlargement of the Delaware & Chesapeake Canal from its present proportions to
those of sufficient size to admit of the passage of torpedo boats and submarines between
the Delaware River and Chesapeake Bay is a matter the greatest importance of which
it is difficult to estimate. It is easy to understand from the mathematical discussion
which you give in one portion of your address that the ability to shift naval craft and
troops from one point to another between these two bodies of water might, in itself,
determine favorably to the United States a naval attack or land operations in con-
nection therewith. I congratulate you on having been able to present the matter So
forcefully, and earnestly hope that you may be able to accomplish something during
this session of Congress toward the inauguration of this great work.
Sincerely, yours,
E. M. WEAVER.
INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMIssion,
Washington, January 27, 1916.
MY DEAR SENATOR SAULs BURY: Before the Christmas holidays you were kind
enough at my request to send me copies of your two speeches relating to the proposed
purchase by the United States of the canal now connecting the Delaware with Chesa-
peake Bay, but it was not until a few days ago that I found an opportunity carefully
to read them. I wish to thank you for an interesting hour with them. In a general
way I knew of the project, but I did not realize at what a relatively small expense
those two important waterways could be connected up for military as well as for
maritime purposes. The amazing thing to me in the situation is that a project of
such great importance should have gone so long unfulfilled, notwithstanding the many
authoritative reports that have been made on the question. It seems to me that this
is a peculiarly good time for agitating the matter.
With warmest personal regards, I am,
Faithfully, yours, -
JAMES S. HARLAN.
Eſon. WILLARD SAULSBURY,
United States Senate, Washington, D. C.
966 . PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
WAR DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF of ENGINEERs,
'. . Washington, October 21, 1915.
: Hon. WILLARD SAULSBURY, -
United States Semale.
SIR: 1. In reply to your request that you be furnished with a copy of report on
Senate resolution of October 8, 1914, concerning the Chesapeake & Delaware Canal,
by a board of officers convened to report on Said Senate resolution, I have the honor
to inform you that this report contains certain data on naval and military matters
which it is considered unwise to make public. . The report was never transmitted
to the Senate, and it is believed that the department should not permit copies of it
to leave its possession.
2. I shall be very glad, however, to show you a copy of the report in this office,
for your own information, should you desire to see it. *
g Very respectfully,
DAN G. KING MAN,
Chief of Engineers, United States Army.
- (Thereupon, at 12 o'clock m., the committee took a recess until
10.30 a. m., Monday, February 7, 1916.)
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
MONDAY, FEBRUARY 7, 1916.
UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON MILITARY AFFAIRs,
Washington, D. C.
The committee met at the expiration of the recess at 10.30 o'clock
a. m., Senator Geo. E. Chamberlain (chairman) presiding.
STATEMENT OF MR, FREDERIC LOUIS HUIDEKOPER, 1614
EIGHTEENTH STREET N.W., WASHINGTON, D. C.
The CHAIRMAN. You are an attorney'.
Mr. HUIDEKOPER. Yes, sir; by profession, and I am in business.
The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Huidekoper, you are the author of the book
entitled “Military Unpreparedness of the United States?”
Mr. HUIDEKOPER. Yes, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. Published by the Macmillan Co?
Mr. HUIDEKOPER. Yes, sir. ... •
The CHAIRMAN. I thought the committee would like to hear you
discuss the basis for the suggestion of your book and the condition of
the Army generally, from Colonial days until now.
Mr. HUIDEKOPER. Exactly 10 years ago, at the beginning of this
month—that is, February 1, 1906—the first of my articles on national
defense appeared. It was entitled “Is the United States prepared for
War?” was published in the North American Review for February
and March, 1906, and was subsequently republished in pamphlet form
in May, 1907, with an introduction by Hon. William H. Taft. Since
that time I have written a great many articles in the effort to bring
about what seemed to me a very necessary realization of the weakness
of our land forces, appreciating as I did that the time would surely
come when it would be imperative to strengthen them. Five years
ago—namely, on January 17, 1911—I was the subject of a very
animated debate in the House of Representatives on account of
certain truths which I told about the United States Army and to
which exception was taken by Hon. J. A. T. Hull, chairman of the
House Committee on Military Affairs, and Hon. James Tawney,
chairman of the House Committee on Appropriations, on the ground
that my article was virtually identical with Secretary of War Dickin-
son’s secret report. This report I had not then seen nor have I ever
seen it up to the present time.
My interest in military matters began as a boy. My first arti-
cle appeared before I graduated at Harvard. My first book, enti-
* 967
968 PREPAREDINESS FOR, NATIONAL DEFENSE.
tled “Military Studies,” was published in 1904, is used at West
Point and in the Army War College, and is a standard textbook
in the British Staff College. I founded the Army League of the
United States on April 3, 1912, and have been the vice president of
The National Remount Association, an organization interested in
developing the breeding of horses for military purposes. I have
also been at work for over 18 years on a history of the Campaign of
Austerlitz and have attended many of the European maneuvers.
Upon my return from abroad at the end of November, 1914, after
an absence of two and a half months spent in France, England,
Holland, and Germany, the awakening of American public interest
in national defense brought me to a realization of the need for a
military history which told the unvarnished truth, doubly so since
our histories have painted in glowing colors the successes of Our
ast wars but have suppressed with studied care the blunders which
have characterized our military methods in the past. Heretofore
the only approach to such a history is Gen. Emory Upton's great
work, The Military Policy of the United States, one of the most
masterful works of its sort in any language. Gen. Upton's book
only covers the period from 1775 to the end of 1862, is much too
technical for the average reader, and, moreover, is not available
to the general public, since the first edition, published by direction
of Secretary of War Root in 1904, was quickly exhausted and the
subsequent editions have been very limited. It was to supply this
need, to correct certain errors in Upton's work and to bring American
military history down to the present time that I wrote the book
referred to, which is entitled “The Military Unpreparedness” of the
United States, and was published by The Macmillan Co., New York,
in November, 1915.
The cause for the prevalent attitude of Americans in respect to
their land forces is readily explainable if our military history be
carefully examined. In colonial times we had no regular forces;
these were supplied by Great Britain. Each colony had a force of
militia of decidedly uncertain value as a military asset. On the
other hand, by reason of the frontier conditions of the time, the men
were hardy, resourceful, good shots, and fully able to take care of
themselves in an emergency. They possessed all the elements of a
first-class soldier of that day except the discipline which alone can
make a cohesive and well-trained military force. During the French
and Indian wars many of these troops had rendered excellent service,
notably at the siege of Louisbourg in 1745, in the struggle between
the French and English for the valley of the Ohio from 1749 to 1758,
and in the fighting along the Canadian border. Both at Louisbourg
and at Fort Duquesne they greatly distinguished themselves. No
historian that I know of has ever pointed out that the annihilation of
Gen. Braddock's regulars at this last battle was in reality a blessing
in disguise for the colonists, inasmuch as it shook the prevalent
belief in the invincibility of British troops, bred in the Americans a
contempt—which was by no means wholly warranted—for the
European method of fighting in close formation, and compelled the
colonists to rely solely upon their own fighting ability instead of
trusting Supinely to the protection of England as they would other-
wise unquestionably have done. Indeed, it is impossible to empha-
size too strongly the influence of these factors in strengthening the
PREPAIRED NIESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 969
morale of the Americans and in confirming in them the belief that
they could make a successful opposition to the regulars of Great
Britain. - -
Just prior to the outbreak of the Revolution, the Massachusetts
Bay Colony Organized one-third of its militia into “minute men,”
and it was with such troops that the opening actions of Concord and
Lexington were fought. - -
During the Revolution the States were loosely bound together in a
confederation, a political body which by virtue of its very character-
istics possessed none of the elements of strength or of national re-
sources properly mobilized and directed by a central head which are
absolutely necessary if war is to be conducted efficiently and with
the minimum of bloodshed and expense. In proof of this assertion
one has only to cite the example of Germany at the present time. In
the initial stages of the Revolution the States deferred in a greater of
lesser measure to the Continental Congress, but as the war went on the
States grew more and more independent, local interests, passions, and
- Fº became paramount, and as a result of the feeble and ex-
haustive military policy followed Congress was finally reduced to the
helplessness of an advisory body, bereft of all power to call out or
support a single soldier without the assistance and concurrence of all
the Colonies. . A worse state of affairs would be difficult to imagine,
but it arose from the fact that Congress was not clothed with sov-
ereign power to utilize the entire military resources of the country.
The National Legislature—which, if the truth be told, did not then
represent the Nation as a whole—allotted to the various States the
Quotas of troops to be furnished to the United States. Owing to the
increasing paucity of men suitable for military service and the de-
creasing response on the part of the men, the interests of the States
soon clashed with those of the Government, and in order to obtain
the quotas allotted to them the States soon outbid the Government
for troops. Indeed, matters reached such a point that in May, 1779,
Virginia paid a bounty of as much as $750, one suit a year, and 100
acres of land to each recruit, incidentally reserving to herself the
bounty and clothing offered by Congress—which was tantamount to
confiscating them.
The CHAIRMAN. For her militia Ž - -
Mr. HUIDEKOPER. For her quota of Continental troops to be sup-
plied to the United States. The Continentals were regulars as differ-
entiated from the militia or volunteers.
. In consequence of this ridiculous military policy—or, rather lack
of military policy—aggravated by the weakness of the central Gov-
ernment and by the States working in opposition to it at no time dur-
ing the Revolution was Washington able to assemble more than 17,000
for battle. At Trenton (Dec. 26, 1776) and at Princeton (Jan. 3,
1777) when the fate of the Colonies trembled in the balance the effec-
tive strength of his force was only 4,000 men.
These facts bring up a military question which is distinctly perti-
ment to-day—that is, the volunteer system as contradistinguished
from a system in which every able-bodied male is required to do mili-
tary service. During the Revolutionary War the voluntary system
resulted, as it invariably does, in the use of many more troops than
there was any justification for, in totally unnecessary cost, and in pen-
sions for services which a government has an undeniable right to exact
970 PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
of its citizens. Incidentally, I should like to call attention to the fact
that the day of the professional army as the sole military force in time
of war has passed; that the great nations all require universal service;
and that the United States is now the only great power which still
adheres to the obsolete system of voluntary enlistment.
The Revolution presents the first example of the folly of the system
of depending mainly upon untrained troops enlisted for too short
periods of service. As a result that war compelled us to use 231,771
regular or Continental troops and 164,087 militia or volunteers
against British forces numbering, from first to last, only about 150,605.
That war cost no less than $350,000,000, and $70,000,000 have been
paid out in pensions on account of it. Persistent adherence to this
system has made our subsequent wars similarly costly in men, treas-
ure, and pensions, as is shown by this table, which I ask permission
to have inserted in the record. - .

- Militia, Pensions
War. - Regulars. volunteers, Opponents. - CoSt. down to
etc. - June 30, 1915. .
Revolution. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 231,771 164,087 | About 150,605. . . $350,000,000.00 $70,000,000
1812. -------------------- 56,032 471,622 || About 67,000. . . . 86,627,009. 14 45,972,805
Cree's-------------------- 600 43,921 | About 2,000. . . . . Unestimated. -
Seminole. . . . . . . ., - - - - - - - - About 1,000 5,911 | About 1,000. . . . . 8,004, 236.53
Black IIawk. . . . . . . . . . . . 1, 341 4, 638 Bººn 800 and 5,446,034.88 13,315,227
. - 1 g
Florida. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12,539 48,152 | Between 1,200 69,751,611. 50
- - and 2,000. -
Mexican. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31,024 73,532 || About 46,000. . . . 88,500,208, 38 49,618,948
Of the Rebellion. . . . . . . . . 67,000 2,606,341 About 1,000,000..] 5,371,079,778. 28 || 4,614,643,267
; * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 58, 688 223, 235 | About 228,160. . .] 321,833,254. 76 } 49,944, 441
Philippine....... ** * * * * * * * 76,416 50,052 | Unestimated. . . . 170,326,586. 11 j u → •y
The authorities for the figures contained in the above table will
be found on page 275 of my book, the Military Unpreparedness of the
United States, and on the other pages there referred to. *
Unflattering though it be to our national pride, few Americans
realize that the United States has never been engaged in a war except
that with Spain in which it has ever employed less than two soldiers
to every one used by its adversary. Indeed, in one instance, the
Florida War, we had under arms 30 times as many men as did our
opponents. The reason is not far to seek. Our histories and school
books are almost invariably incorrectly written. There is scarcely
one—and I have carefully examined a great many—which tells the
truth of our military history. It is very natural, I suppose, and
certainly a much more agreeable task to depict victory and brilliant
success than it is to chronicle disaster and failure, but it is high time
that the American people knew the unvarnished truth about their
military history. That was one of the motives which induced me to.
write this last book—tell the truth plainly and accurately. - -
The CHAIRMAN. You have compiled the information given in your
book from official documents? -
Mr. HUIDEKOPER. Almost entirely. The authorities which are
given in an appendix in the back of the book amount to 162 pages of
closely printed type and embody something upward of 480,000 pages
of collateral reading. -
Except Gen. Upton, no-historian whom I know tells the funda-
mental truth about the Revolutionary War nor explains why it
PREPAREDINESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 971.
dragged on for eight years. The real reason was due to the faulty
military policy, coupled with the pernicious system of short enlist-
ments and bounties, with the result that only two military events
had a direct bearing upon the ultimate expulsion of the British.
The first was the Battle of Saratoga where Burgoyne surrendered on
October 17, 1777, with 5,763 officers and men; the second was York-
town where Cornwallis capitulated on October 17, 1781, with 7,973
troops, and it must be distinctly borne in mind that the latter success
could never have been achieved without the invaluable assistance
º * French Army under Rochambeau and the French fleet under
e, Uirasse. -
The evils entailed by short enlistments, which have been the bane
of our military system, were very much in evidence throughout the
Revolutionary War. The most conspicuous case is that of Benedict
Arnold at Quebec at the end of 1775. After trying in vain for six
weeks to capture the place, he was forced on December 31 of that year,
to make a desperate attack because the enlistment period of a large
portion of his troops would expire legally next day. Gen. Mont-
gomery was killed, Arnold himself wounded, and the major part of his
force was killed, wounded, or taken prisoners. In the War of the
Rebellion McDowell at the first battle of Bull Run and Hooker at
Chancellorsville were impelled to strike because of the approaching
expiration of the terms of service of their troops. The consequences
are well known. Indeed, our military history is replete with instances
when a detrimental influence over operations in the field is distinctly
traceable to legislation too hastily enacted and to an unfortunate
proclivity on the part of Congress to short enlistments.
The CHAIRMAN. Did the State troops and the short-term enlisted
men generally leave at the termination of their enlistments?
Mr. HUIDEKOPER. Almost invariably, Senator. In 1775 Washing-
ton had his patience sorely tried by the Connecticut contingent
which decamped the instant its service expired. Gen. Upton answers
your question by saying, Military Policy of the United States, page
7, that “Those who are familiar with our military history will not
be surprised at the conduct of these Connecticut troops. Each suc-
ceeding year of the Revolutionary struggle found American soldiers
behaving in like manner; and during the War of the Rebellion a simi-
lar course was followed by the regiments whose terms of service
º on the morning of the first battle of Bull Run.” .
uring the Revolution, as throughout our history, advantage was
not taken of the initial enthusiasm which marks the outbreak of
hostilities to secure enlistments for the war. The maximum term of
service was for three years, the minimum for one month only. With
the subsiding of popular enthusiasm and the prolongation of the war,
endless shifts had to be resorted to in order to induce men to enlist,
to reenlist, or not to desert. As Gen. Upton so pertinently declares
(p. 7):
Any system of voluntary enlistments necessarily places a government in the position
of a suppliant, and when patriotism and popular enthusiasm no longer suffice to fill
the ranks resort must be had to the vicious practice of giving bounties to recruits.
Reference to my own book will show how these evils increased and
how this pernicious system was aggravated to the last degree.
Briefly, the successive steps were as follows: -
972 PREPARED NESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
Rhode Island instituted bounties in the first year of the Revolu-
tion, but on December 6, 1775, Congress refused to allow its claim
against the United Colonies for money expended for this purpose.
In 1776 Congress awoke to the necessity of enlisting men “for the
war,” but, upon ascertaining that uncertainty as to its duration was
exercising a detrimental effect, it modified its terms in order to per-
mit enlistments to be “for three years” or “for the war,” at the dis-
cretion of the recruit. In the former case a bounty of $20 was given;
in the latter $20 and 100 acres of land—a procedure quite in keeping
with other legislative measures on that score enacted during 1776,
which resulted in the States bidding against Congress for men and
ended by creating an enormous and totally unnecessary debt. In the
case of the officers this rivalry wrought incalculable harm by depriving
Washington of anything except a nominal control over them.
In 1777 Congress again resorted to raw levies, found itself greatly
embarrassed by the bounty system which it had inaugurated, was
compelled to introduce territorial recruitment, and ended by granting
dictatorial powers to Washington for the second time. Before the
year was out so apparent had become the insufficiency of congressional
measures that Virginia and Massachusetts set the example of draft-
ing—a method which Washington recommended to the President of
Pennsylvania as the only sure way to obtain continental troops.
In 1778 Congress recommended on February 6 that the States
draft men for nine months, with the proviso that they could be
replaced as fast as others enlisting for three years were received. On
May 15 it passed a resolution granting half pay for seven years to
all officers serving until the end of the war and a gratuity of $80 to
noncommissioned officers and nen. So prevalent had become the
enlistment of deserters in order to fill the quotas required by the
resolution of February 6 that Congress was obliged to denounce this
nefarious practice. The desire to procure men so as to avoid the
draft led, however, to another expedient, and in Rhode Island the
proposal was made to enlist slaves. The tremenous depreciation
in the value of money proved another serious handicap. The
bounties first offered by Congress and the States were tantamount
to a confession of the truth that nations collectively are fully equal
to maintaining a protracted struggle, but that individuals often
shirk the privations and dangers of a long war. Each subsequent
campaign of the revolution confirmed this truth. Congress, unable
to check this evil, endeavored to conceal it by authorizing Wash-
ington on September 18 “to augment the continental bounty to
recruits enlisting for three years or during the war to a sum not
exceeding $10.” - - - -
In 1779 Congress empowered Washington on January 23 to give a
bounty not in excess of $200 to each able-bodied veteran who reen-
listed or each recruit who enlisted “for the war.” On March 9 it
reiterated its resolution and transferred the bounty to the State for
whose contingent the soldier enlisted. On March 29 it recommended
that Virginia and North Carolina raise as many battalions of regular
troops as they could for the defense of the Southern States, with the
proviso that they should not be obliged to serve north of Virginia.
On top of these concessions it granted a bounty of $200 to these one-
year troops. The States immediately outbid Congress, New Jersey
giving $250 to each recruit in addition to the $200 allowed by Con-
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. . 973
*
gress, while Virginia fixed the bounty at $750, one suit a year, and
100 acres of land, incidentally confiscating for her own use the
bounty and clothing given by Congress. These huge bounties to
new recruits produced such intense dissatisfaction among the soldiers
who had already seen considerable service that Washington was
impelled to suggest that they too be given à gratuity of $100, and
Congress complied with a suitable resolution ou June 22. The sequel
for that year is thus related in my own book, the Military Unpre-
paredness of the United States, page 25:
The continued depreciation of the continental currency wrought increasing distress
among the officers, and, as the half pay for seven years to those who served until the
end of the war was manifestly insufficient, a recommendation was made to the States
to grant half pay for life to officers remaining in service until the conclusion of hos-
tilities, as well as proper rewards to the soldiers. In other words, in order to have
sufficient officers to command the troops, Congress found itself forced to advocate
that they too be given a bounty in the shape of half pay for life. The claim of the
officers was ignored by the States; but in proportion as the bounties for the soldiers
was augmented the character of the recruits obtained became increasingly inferior,
until Washington declared in disgust that in any operation against the enemy’s force
in New York and Rhode Island “double the number is the least it could be under-
taken with, and this would be far from giving a certainty of success.”
To quote again from my book (pp. 27–28):
As in previous years, 1780 witnessed a diminution in the number of enlistments
and the increase in the size of the bounties offered, New Jersey paying $1,000 in
excess of the continental allowances. The depreciation in the currency caused the
utmost distress among the officers, but Congress confined itself to reiterating its pre-
vious resolution that they be offered half pay for life to remain in service until the
close of the war. Notwithstanding an almost uninterrupted succession of defeats
and the urgent need for more and better troops, Congress resolved on a reduction of
the Army, to take effect the 1st of January following. This was quite in keeping
with the unwise legislation which made no attempt to check the corruption among
Government agents that had arisen as a result of increasing prices and commissions,
which legalized violence and exposed unprotected persons to cruelty and outrage
until the summary execution of soldiers without trial—even by order of Washington—
the plundering of citizens and the seizure of their property without payment became
matters of frequent occurrence. The States likewise took a hand in legislation, and
toward the close of the war the seizure of supplies for the Army was made a penal
offense by more than one of them, quite regardless of national welfare and the detri-
ment to the land forces.
Is it to be wondered that, after a bitter experience of five years of
war, during, which he had abundant opportunity to test in full the
military policy pursued by Congress, Washington laid bare its follies
and inadequacy in a letter to the president of that body, dated
August 20, 1780, in which he declared that “it is the true policy of
America not to content herself with temporary expedients, but to
endeavor, if possible, to give consistency and solidity to her meas-
ures.” -
This same advice is just as applicable at the present time as it was
when it was penned, nearly 136 years ago. --
Apropos of the campaign of 1781, I quote once more from my book,
which says (pp. 33–34) that— - - * - .
The jealousy against standing armies manifested by Congress since the beginning
of the Revolution—a jealousy so studiously fostered as to wring from Washington the
reluctant acknowledgment that “it is our policy to be prejudiced against them in
time of war”—bore fruit in the reduction of the continental forces, which took place
on January 1, 1781. The failure to provide pay, clothing, and often food—largely
attributable to the unwillingness of Congress to comprehend military necessities,
owing to its fear of “militarism”—tookaform that the legislators had not contemplated.
The mutiny of the Connecticut regiments in the preceding May was caused by starva-
974 - PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
tion; equally well justified were the complaints which culminated in an open mutiny
of the Pennsylvania line at Morristown on January 1. In spite of the efforts to restore
order made by their officers—several of whom were killed or wounded in the attempt—
the mutineers, under the command of their noncommissioned officers, started for Prince-
ton next day, with the avowed determination of marching to Philadelphia to obtain a
redress of their grievances, their demands being for clothing, the residue of their bounty,
and the full arrears of their pay. Congress, in a panic lest the remainder of the Army
should become similarly disaffected, dispatched a committee to make terms with the
malcontents. The conditions proposed were accepted substantially in the form
offered and were tantamount to an absolute capitulation of the civil authority, not to
the Army, but to a band of mutineers. A similar uprising on the part of the New Jersey.
troops toward the end of the month was, however, suppressed with a strong hand.
These mutinies, regrettable as they were, owing to theimpairment of discipline and dis-
regard of authority, in no wise affected the loyalty of the troops. *
Their revolt was against unbearable conditions and contained many of the elements
of lawful revolution to justify it on the ground that the Government had failed in its
duty to its defenders.
Within a year after the termination of the Revolutionary War,
Congress, in the midst of the most critical period in our history, when
the national credit at home and abroad was exhausted and when the
country was rapidly drifting into a state of anarchy, gave an indicat-
tion of its future course in respect to the Army by disbanding all of
the continental—that is, the regular—forces except 80 soldiers des–
tined to guard the public stores. The act of September 29, 1789,
laid the foundations for our present Army by recognizing ‘‘the estab-
lishment for the troops in the service of the United States,” by requir–
ing all officers and men to take an oath of allegiance, and by vesting
the power of appointing officers in the President alone. The act of
April 30, 1790, effected the first general organization of the Regular
Army and also instituted the volunteer system of a purely Federal
force independent of all State control—a system which, with certain
modifications, we have followed ever since. The organic law of May
8, 1792, was formulated “to provide for the national defense by estab-
lishing an uniform militia throughout the United States.” That law
wisely prescribed in its opening section that all able-bodied white men
between the ages of 18 and 45 should be enrolled in the militia, should
provide themselves with certain specified arms and accoutrements,
and should appear therewith equipped when called out for duty or
drill. That law was subsequently repealed by the Dick bill.
The CHAIRMAN. It was a compulsory statute and remained in
existence until 1903, when the Dick bill went into effect 7 -
Mr. HUIDEKOPER. Until January 23, 1903. It was, of course,
stricken out also in the subsequent amending of the Dick bill, which
was approved on May 27, 1908, and April 21, 1910.
From 1792 until 1812 the Regular Army never exceeded 10,000
men, except in 1798 and 1799, when difficulties with France, Spain,
and England were imminent. The advent of Jefferson had much to
do with the principle of dependence upon a so-called “citizen Sol-
diery.” Jefferson was strongly opposed to anything which Smacked
of a dominant central government or the augmentation of its exist-
ing powers. In his first message to Congress he deprecated the Super-
fluous size of the Army—which then numbered only 4,051—declaring
that the only dependable force was “the body of neighboring citizens
as formed into a militia.” Throughout his utterances as President
is the underlying principle of dependence upon a citizen soldiery,
which he ºfteå should be raised to the number of 300,000 and
classified.
- PREPAIRED NIESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 975 .
I mention this fact because it is extremely important in the light of
to-day. At that time the population of the United States was be-
tween five and seven millions. If 300,000 men were deemed neces-
sary to be under arms at that time, the followers of Jefferson's opin-
ion might apply the same ratio to the population of the United States
at the present. -
The CHAIRMAN. That suggestion of Jefferson's was made while
there was a compulsory system of training on the statute books, too.
Mr. HUIDEKOPER. Yes, Senator. -
Senator WARREN. What do you make that ratio now * That is,
on the same proportion you have now % -
Mr. HUIDEKOPER. The population in 1800 was 5,308,483. The
ratio of 300,000 to that number is 3 to 53. On the basis of a present
population of over 100,000,000, the number of soldiers would be
about 6,000,000. --
The less we Americans have to say about the War of 1812 the better.
Lundys Lane was a drawn battle and, indeed, as Gen. Upton points
out, ‘‘the only decisive victory of the War of 1812, before the con-
clusion of the treaty of peace, was at the Battle of the Thames, where
the force of British regulars dispersed or captured numbered but little
more than 800.” It must be distinctly remembered that in conse-
quence of the faulty military system pursued more than 100,000
militia from Pennsylvania, Maryland, and Virginia were called out
to repel the incursions of 3,500 British along the shores of the Chesa-
peake. Washington was burned on August 24, 1813, by 1,500 British
after the Battle of Bladensburg, in which the American Army was
completely routed, although it lost only 8 killed and 11 wounded.
The most remarkable victory thus far recorded in American
military annals was the Battle of New Orleans, which was fought
after peace had been signed at Ghent. And here again is a fair ex-
ample of how our historians have failed to tell the whole truth.
Gen. Pakenham with the very flower of Wellington's Peninsular
Army stormed the fortifications which Jackson had hurriedly con-
structed on the left or east bank of the Mississippi, attacking in mass
formation over ground as Smooth as a glacis—quite as Smooth as this
table [indicating the committee table], only to be driven back with
frightful carnage. That much the historians relate. But they neglect
to tell that on the west bank of the river Gen. Morgan was stationed
with some 800 militia; that when he was attacked by a small force
of British under Col. Thornton, his troops broke and fled ignomini-
ously; that just when the Americans on the other bank were cheering
over a victory still unexampled in our history, just when an advance
by a skirmish line might have resulted in the capture of the British
Army, Jackson had the mortification of seeing the Kentuckians
“abandon their position and run in headlong flight toward the city.” .
Luckily, Thornton had been delayed in his advance and the debacle
of the main British Army across the river forced him to relinquish
his advantage. Had he been able to deliver his attack sooner, the
result of the battle might readily have been another story.
This is only one of many instances where our historians and the
writers of our school books have studiously ignored or suppressed
the truth.
976 PREPAREDINESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
The CHAIRMAN. You speak of the Battle of Lundys Lane having
been a drawn battle. The war was a drawn war, if I may use that
expression, was it not ? - -
Mr. HUIDEKOPER. Yes, sir. That war affords another example of
what a faulty military system entails, since the United States used
56,032 regulars and 471,622 militia or volunteers against a force of
British and Indians of only about 67,000. That war cost $86,627,009,
and the pensions, on which we are still paying, amounted on June 30,
1915, to $45,972,805.
No sooner was the War of 1812 ended than the Regular Army was
reduced by successive steps until in December, 1818, it numbered
only 7,676 officers and men. In 1820 a further reduction was con-
templated, and the House of Representatives, by a resolution dated
May 11, 1820, called upon the Secretary of War, Hon. John C. Cal-
houn, for a plan for the reorganization of the Army. In December
of that year Mr. Calhoun submitted his report, which is worthy of the
most careful study even at the present time. It is a very remarkable
document, in so much as he traced the general scheme for an expansive
organization such as almost every army in the world has now found
it necessary to adopt. - e
Senator DU PoNT. Was he not the first one to propose expansion?
Mr. HUIDEKOPER. The first person, Colonel, certainly, in America.
In his report Mr. Calhoun wrote: - -
If our liberty should ever be endangered by the military power gaining the ascend-
ency, it will be from the necessity of making those mighty and irregular efforts to
retrieve our affairs, after a series of disasters, caused by the want of adequate military
knowledge, just as in our physical system a state of the most dangerous excitement
and paroxysm follows that of the greatest debility and prostration. To avoid thesedan-
gerous consequences, and to prepare the country to meet a state of war, particularly
at its commencement, with honor and safety, much must depend on the organization
of our military peace establishment, and I have accordingly, in a plan about to be
proposed for the reduction of the Army, directed my attention mainly to that point,
believing it to be of the greatestimopriance. . & -
To give such an organization, the leading principles in its formation ought to be
that at the commengement of hostilities there should be nothing either to new model
or to create. The only difference, consequently, between the peace and war formations
of the Army ought to be in the increased magnitude of the latter, and the only change
in passing from the former to the latter should consist in giving to it the augmentation
which will then be necessary. º e .
It is thus, and thus only, the dangerous transition from peace to war may be made
without confusion or disorder, and the weakness and danger which otherwise would
be inevitable be avoided. Two consequences result from this principle: First, the
organization of the staff in a peace establishment ought to be such that every branch
of it should be completely formed, with such extension as the number of troops and
posts occupied may render necessary; and, secondly, that the organization of the line
ought, as far as practicable, to be such that in passing from the peace to the war forma-
tion the force may be sufficiently augmented without adding new regiments or
battalions, thus raising the war on the basis of the peace establishment, instead of
creating a new army to be added to the old, as at the commencement of the late war.
The keynote of military organization is sounded in the phrase that
“at the commencement of hostilities there should be nothing either
to new model or to create.” I desire to emphasize that because it
explains why the armies of France, Germany, Austria, and, to a lesser
degree, Russia passed from their peace to their war formation in 1914
with so little disturbance. Every detail of organization had been
planned beforehand. The reservists, all of whom had been previously
trained, were brought into the ranks, and the change from the peace
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 977
to the war footing was accomplished with the minimum amount of
friction. -
The various Indian wars which followed that of 1812 need not be
examined in detail here. In them the same faulty system of depend-
ing largely upon untrained troops was followed. The number of men
employed by the United States, the size of the Indian forces, and the
cost both in money and pensions are all set forth in the table already
alluded to. Incidentally, F venture to call your attention to the
Florida War, in which our preposterous military policy caused us to
have 30 men under arms for every Indian enemy opposed to them.
At the outbreak of the Mexican War occurred something which is
extremely important as demonstrating the detrimental effect which
can be exercised by hasty and carelessly worded military legislation.
By the act of May 13, 1846, Congress authorized President Polk to
call for 50,000 volunteers and appropriated $50,000,000, empowering
the President to require the Volunteers “to serve 12 months after they
shall have arrived at the place of rendezvous, or to the end of the war.”
The sequel demonstrated once again the necessity for wise and com-
prehensive legislation, for the President, instead of exercising his
prerogative, issued his call in the exact phraseology of the law and
thus left to it the discretion of each volunteer to decide at the expira–
tion of a year whether he should demand his discharge or continue in
service “to the end of the war.” -
What was the result 7 Gen. Zachary Taylor conquered the north-
ern Provinces, but in January, 1847, was stripped of nearly all his
Regulars and the best of his Volunteers, who were dispatched to join
Gen. Scott in an expedition against Vera Cruz and the City of Mexico.
Scott captured Vera Cruz in March and, pushing forward, won the
battle of Cerro Gordo—a victory so decisive that, as he wrote to Tay-
lor, “Mexico has no longer an army.” Jalapa and Perote were taken
in quick succession and the road to the enemy's capital lay open, but
upon reaching Puebla on May 15, Scott's progress came to a sudden
halt through no fault of his own. There he discovered that out of
his 11 Volunteer regiments, which had then received sufficient training
to make them excellent troops, the men composing 7 of them had
decided to exercise the alternative offered them upon enlistment and
to terminate their service at the conclusion of 12 months. In conse-
quence Scott was compelled to dispatch 4,000 troops to Vera Cruz,
whence they were shipped back to the United States, thus reducing
his own forces to 5,820 effective troops. In the midst of a hostile
country and only four days’ march from the Mexican capital, with
Virtually no enemy to oppose him, the American commander in chief
found himself unable to budge for more than three months. Had
Santa Anna possessed any formidable army and had he fallen in force
either upon Scott or Taylor, the American Government would have
had abundant reason to regret both its defective legislation and a
most faulty plan of campaign—blunders which could not have been
retrieved by many thousand new but raw troops. It was nothing
but incredible good luck that averted a calamity and spared the
American people the mortification of seeing their preparations collapse
like a house of cards—all because Congress and the President had
been oblivious to the lessons of past wars and had been too short-
sighted to take advantage of the enthusiasm which invariably marks
978 PREPAREDNIESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. .
the outbreak of hostilities, and under it stimulus to obtain enlist-
ments “For the war.”
Senator DU Pont. Mr. Huidekoper, I should like to know who was
the Secretary of War in Mr. Polk's Cabinet when that decision was
reached to enlist them for 12 months?
Mr. HUIDEKOPER. Hon. William L. Marcy, who was the Secretary
of War from March 6, 1845, until March 4, 1849.
Senator DU Pont. Thank you. -
Mr. HUIDEKOPER. As a result of this state of affairs, when Scott
actually did fight his way into Mexico City, it was only after losses
which were totally and absolutely unnecessary. Moreover, his oper-
ations had to be conducted with a force of 10,738 troops, “nearly
one-half of whom were new and untried soldiers, fresh from the pur-
suits of civil life, except for the discipline to which they had for a
few months been subjected at Pueblo,” and obviously not to be com-
pared with the seasoned troops who had left him.
I emphasize this fact because it might have had such a fatal effect
upon the issue of that war. The same thing occurred during the
War of the Rebellion, and might have occurred in the Spanish-
American War had it been prolonged more than the two years for
which the troops were enlisted.
At the close of the Mexican War the Regular Army was promptly
reduced from 30,890 to 10,317 officers and men, and at the outbreak
of the War of the Rebellion it numbered only 16,367.
The CHAIRMAN. And no provision had been made for its expansion
along the lines of the European armies?
Mr. HUIDEKOPER. Mr. Chairman, scarcely once in our military
history has a proper expansive organization been provided for the
Army. On several different occasions there has been a most com-
prehensive provision for reducing the Army, but almost never for
expanding it automatically at the outbreak of war or when hostilities
were recognized to be imminent.
Senator CATRON. What was the actual authorized strength of the
Army at the outbreak of the Civil War?
Mr. HUIDEKOPER. Eighteen thousand and ninety-three officers and
men, according to the Army Register for 1860. The actual strength
in December, 1860, was 16,367.
There existed no General Staff, there were no plans for war; no
expansive organization capable of meeting a great emergency had
been provided by Congress. On April 15, 1861, President Lincoln
called for 75,000 volunteers, and on May 3 he decreed by proclama-
tion that the Regular Army be increased by 22,714 officers and men,
the Navy by 18,000 sailors and additionally called for 42,034 vol-
unteers. The organization of the troops called out on May 3 was “tossed
over” to the Secretary of the Treasury, but luckily three experienced
officers were detailed to assist him. Their decision that the term of
service should be for three years was of utmost importance, since it
prevented the dissolution of the Union by retaining these troops in
service for three years, which was sufficient to give them ample train-
1I].9". -
Senator DU Pont. The Regular troops? -
Mr. HUIDEKOPER. The term of service for the Regulars and Volun-
teers comprised in the proclamation of May 3 was fixed at three
years; that of the volunteers called out on April 15 was only three
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 979
months. The vice of short enlistments became apparent when the
clamor arose in the North that these 75,000 men be led to battle
before their terms of service had actually expired. The result was
to force Gen. McDowell into fighting the first Battle of Bull Run, in
which the northern troops, except the Regulars, were thoroughly
routed and did not stop running until they reached the Potomac
and some of them Baltimore. Count von Moltke, the founder of the
great German general staff, very aptly described the opposing forces
as “two armed mobs” and there can be no question that he was
correct in his estimate of them. I mention this because the average
American is prone to consider the veterans of 1865 as the type of
troops who fought in 1861. There is no more analogy between the
two than there is between cheese and chalk. As a result of that
battle, so Gen. Joseph E. Johnston, declared, “the Confederate
Army was more disorganized by victory than the United States was
by defeat,” and no other military operations of major importance oc-
curred during the rest of that year.
In 1862 there was an occurrence which it is very important to bear
in mind, and which no historian that I know of, except Gen. Upton,
has sufficiently emphasized. During the second period of the cam-
paign of 1862, when the Union armies acted on the defensive, Upton
eclares (Military Policy of the United States, p. 275) that—
the Government and the Confederates conducted the war on contrary principles.
The Government sought to save the Union by fighting as a confederacy; the Confed-
erates sought to destroy it by fighting as a nation. The Government recognized the
States, appealed to them for troops, adhered to voluntary enlistments, gave the gov-
ernors power to appoint all commissioned officers, and encouraged them to organize
new regiments. The Confederates abandoned State sovereignty, appealed directly
to the people, took away from them the power to appoint commissioned officers, vested
their appointment in the Confederate President, refused to organize war regiments,
abandoned voluntary enlistments, and, adopting the republican principle that every
citizen owes his country military service, called into the army every white man
lbetween the ages of 18 and 35.
Senator CATRON. You are a little mistaken there about the Con-
federate Government authorizing the President to appoint all the
commissioned officers. The companies selected their officers, up to
the colonels.
Mr. HUIDEKOPER. Senator, I am quoting this directly from Gen.
Upton. -
Senator CATRON. I do not care what Gen. Upton said. I know
what was done. I was down there. I went through that mill.
Mr. HUIDEKOPER. I have ventured to lay stress upon this because
it is one of those extraordinary contradictions which sometimes occur
and which most Americans do not appreciate. It was a remarkable
thing that in a confederacy, which º its very nature is a loosely-
formed political entity, whenever State rights conflicted with mili-
tary wisdom State rights went by the board. On the other hand,
the North, supposedly a closely knit union, manifested in its military
policy all the weaknesses which are considered to be characteristic of
a confederacy. In consequence of the contradictory methods pur-
sued there was every indication at the end of two years of war that
the Confederacy would emerge victorious from the struggle. In the
North the voluntary system broke down completely—as it always
does under the stress of a really serious war—and it became abso-
lutely imperative to pass an enrollment act, which became a law on
980 PREPAIRED NESS IFOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
March 3, 1863. In other words, the North found itself compelled to
resort to the “draft” because men would not volunteer. As the
provost marshal general pointed out in his final report, this “was the
first law enacted by Congress by which the Government of the United
States appealed directly to the Nation to create large armies without
the intervention of the authorities of the several States.” This act
was subsequently amended on February 24, 1864, and March 3, 1865,
and at last became a comprehensive measure; but not until its en-
forcement had been characterized by endless abuses for which there
existed no justification and which might readily have been prevented
had the amended law been put into operation earlier. This serves to
demonstrate beyond all question the necessity for the enactment of a
similar measure at the present time in order to forestall any such
possible emergency, and the law of March 3, 1863, as finally amended
might well form the basis upon which such a measure could be formu-
lated. - *
It was not until the first week of July, 1863, that the tide definitely
turned toward the North, with the Union victories at Gettysburg in
the east and Vicksburg in the west.
In connection with the latter the sinister influence of defective
legislation upon military operations is admirably epitomized by
Gen. Grant, who relates in his Memoirs (Vol. I, pp. 574–575) that—
The campaign of Vicksburg was suggested and developed by circumstances. The
elections of 1862 had gone against the prosecution of the war. Voluntary enlistments
had nearly ceased and the draft had been resorted to; this was resisted, and a defeat or
backward movement would have made its execution impossible. A forward move-
ment to a decisive victory was necessary. Accordingly I resolved to get below Vicks-
burg, unite with Banks against Port Hudson, make New Orleans a base and, with
that base and Grand Gulf as a starting point, move our combined forces against Vicks-
burg. . Upon reaching Grand Gulf, after running its batteries and fighting a battle,
I received a letter from Banks informing me that he could not be at Port Hudson
under 10 days, and then with only 15,000 men. The time was worth more than the
reinforcements; I therefore determined to push into the interior of the enemy's
country.
With a large river behind us, held above and below by the enemy, rapid move-
ments were essential to success. Jackson was captured the day after a new com-
mander had arrived, and only a few days before large reenforcements were expected.
A rapid movement west was made; the garrison of Vicksburg was met in two engage-
ments and badly defeated, and driven back into its stronghold and there successfully
besieged. It looks now as though Providence had directed the course of the campaign
while the Army of the Tennessee executed the decree.
It was not until 1864 that the Federal Government concentrated
all its power in the hands of Gen. Grant, and thenceforth it was
merely a question of wearing out the Confederacy. In consequence
of the defective military legislation by Congress, coupled with the
blunders committed by various Union generals, the War of the Rebel-
lion was appallingly costly. The North used only about 67,000
Regulars, but had under arms no less than 2,606,341 volunteers or
militia pitted against the Confederate forces which have never been
estimated to exceed 1,500,000 and which were probably nearer
1,000,000 troops. I have gone into the records of The Adjutant
General's Office with utmost care, but the Confederate records and
regimental rosters in the possession of the War Department are not
sufficiently complete to enable one to make more than an approxi-
mate estimate.
Senator CATRON. They never had even a million. We had as many
men out in the swamps and bushes as we had any other place. When
PREPAIRED NESS FOR NATIONAL DIEFENSE. 981
I Surrendered at Meridian, Miss., we surrendered about 18,000 men
in Our Regular Army, and the balance all came out of the swamps,
the deserters. That was the way our Army was made up in the last
years of the war.
Mr. HUIDEKOPER. That struggle cost the United States no less
than $5,371,079,778, and on June 30, 1915, the pensions had already
amounted to $4,614,643,267. In other words, the pensions for that
war have thus far cost the United States virtually 86 per cent of
the expenditures actually made for the war itself, and, il they con-
tinue at the present rate of $156,668,771.43—as given by the Report
of the Commissioner of Pensions for 1915, page 13—in another
Seven years they will exceed the actual cost of the war. This aston-
ishing fact only goes to show in a striking manner how costly the
Voluntary system can be. Many of these pensions are unquestion-
ably undeserved, but every time the suggestion has been made by
the War Department that the Pension Bureau be put under its con-
trol, this recommendation has been stoutly resisted by Congress.
The cost of the War of the Rebellion both in military expenditures
º: * pensions is fully set forth in Table A to which I have already
alluded. -
When the Confederacy had at last been crushed and the great
armies of veteran volunteers disbanded, the disturbed condition
of the South and the violation of the Monroe doctrine by the allied
invasion of Mexico compelled Congress to increase the Regular
Army from 39,273 to 54,641, but in 1869 occurred the first of a series
of reductions which brought the enlisted strength of the Army down
to about 25,000 men.
In that connection I should like to point out that, while a nation
may be weakened internally by war, it is never enfeebled externally
or in its foreign relations. The promptness with which the French
evacuated Mexico in 1867 and the alacrity with which Great Britain
agreed to compromise the Alabama claims were due to One cause
and to one cause alone, namely, because there existed in the North
about one million and in the South about half a million veteran troops
ready to enforce the demands of the United States.
There is a prevalent fallacy, especially among Americans, that a
nation is weakened in its foreign relations as a result of war. His-
tory shows no such thing, and, moreover, it demonstrates to those
who study its teachings carefully that bankruptcy has never once
stopped a country from going to war when public opinion has deter-
mined to fight. If you will thoroughly examine the history of war
since 1806—the year when Prussia was so completely crushed by
Napoleon at Jena and Aurstadt—you will discover that this is a
fact. In 1866 Bismarck forced Austria, which was then virtually
bankrupt, to keep her forces mobilized so long that in the end she
was compelled by public º and circumstances to declare war
against Prussia—the very thing that Bismarck, knowing the odium
which always attaches to the aggressor, had sought to make her do.
These are only two of many instances which go to prove that the
belief, which is so prevalent, that bankruptcy prevents war is nothing
more or less than a fallacy and a delusion. .
The CHAIRMAN. Bulgaria is a pretty good example of that, is it
not -
23380—PT 20–16—2”
*
982 PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
Mr. HUIDEKOPER. It would not be possible to find a better example.
After the War of the Rebellion there occurred but little of interest
until the beginning of the Spanish-American War. From June, 1875,
until March 8, 1898, the actual strength of the Regular Army never
exceeded 28,000 officers and men. The only notable events during
that period were (1) the establishment of the Infantry and Cavalry
School at Fort Leavenworth in 1911; (2) the creation by act of Con-
gress of March 3, 1885, of the Board on Fortifications and Other
Defenses—better known as the Endicott Board—which inaugurated
a scheme of coast defense by its report made on January 3, 1886;
and (3) the foundation on February 9, 1987, of the present “Mounted
Service School,” which is located at Fort Riley, Kans.
Notwithstanding the lessons of the past, the Regular Army in the
spring of 1898 consisted of only 28,183 officers and men.
Senator CATRON. Actually in service' -
Mr. HUIDEKOPER. Yes, sir; in actual service, according to the offi-
cial returns. In other words, it numbered less than four one-hun-
dredths of 1 per cent of our estimated population.
Senator CATRON. Have you the authorized force at that time :
Mr. HUIDEKOPER. The act of March 8, 1898, added two regiments
of Artillery and fixed the authorized strength of the military estab-
lishment at 2,137 officers and 26,610 enlisted men, a total of 28,747,
apart from the Hospital Corps, which the act of March 1, 1887, spe-
cifically directs “shall not be included in the effective strength of
the Army nor counted as a part of the enlisted force provided by law.”
In this connection it is interesting to note that at the beginning of
no decade in our history save one—that is, 1810—have we possessed
as many as one trained soldier to each thousand of population, as
this table will show:
Strength Soldiers
Year, Population. of Regular per 1,000
Army. |population.
1790. --------------------------------------------------------------- 3,929, 214 1,273 0.324
1800---------------------------------------------------------------- 5,308,483 4,436 . 833
1810---------------------------------------------------------------- 7,239.881 9,921 1. 378
1820---------------------------------------------------------------- 9,633,822 8,942 . 927
1830. --------------------------------------------------------------- 12,866,020 5,951 . 462
1840------------------------------------------------- --------------- 17,069,453 10,570 . 602
1850---------------------------------------------------------------- 23, 191,876 10,763 . 421
1860---------------------------------------------------------------. 31,443, 321 16,367 . 520
1870---------------------------------------------------------------- 38,558,371 37,075 .963
1880---------------------------------------------------------------- 50, 155,783 26, 509 . 527
1890---------------------------------------------------------------. 62,947,714 27,095 . 430
1900---------------------------------------------------------------- 76,303,387 68, 155 , 895
1910. --------------------------------------------------------------. 93,402, 151 77,035 . 825
Notwithstanding the recommendations of the Endicott Board made
in 1886, there were only 151 guns in position out of the 2,362 con-
sidered necessary.
Senator DU PONT. There are now Ż
Mr. HUIDEKOPER: No, Colonel. I was referring to April, 1898,
when there were only 151 guns in position in our coast fortifications.
Everything military was in chaos and, most important of all, no
General Staff existed, no plans for war had been prepared nor could
any be prepared beforehand. The act of Congress of March 9, 1898,
appropriated $50,000,000, but specifically limited it to “National
PREPAREDINESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE, 983
defense,” so that nothing could be done to prepare for offensive war
or for such an operation as subsequently occurred in the invasion of
Cuba. War had actually begun ‘. Congress began to legislate.
for the necessary means to carry it on. Once again enlistments were
made for too short a period, since Congress fixed the term of service
of the troops at two years instead of for the war, or at least for a
minimum of three years.
To examine in detail the operations of the Spanish-American War
would be superfluous at this time; they are well known to this com-
mittee. Gen. Shafter's expedition was composed of 16,887 officers
and men—the very flower of the Regular Army—as well as the pick
of the volunteer regiments, of which there were three, the Rough
Riders, the Seventy-first New York, and the Second Massachusetts.
In Cuba at that time there were no less than 196,820 Spanish veterans,
of whom 36,582 were stationed in the Province of Santiago. I think
that any officer who participated in that campaign will acknowledge
that had the Spanish commanders, Blanco and Linares, been of the
type of the French and German generals of to-day, the story would
undoubtedly have been quite different. The destination of Shafter's
force was heralded all over the world for weeks before he actually
landed, but the Spanish showed the most extraordinary apathy and
incapacity, scarcely once handling their troops with any initiative
whatsoever. On July 4, after the city of Santiago had been invested,
yellow fever broke out among the American forces. Luckily for us,
this fact was apparently unknown to Gen. Toral, otherwise he would
undoubtedly have prolonged the negotiations for surrender and have
forced Shafter to assault the place. This would necessarily have
entailed the loss of more men than the American Army could afford
and, under such circumstances, there is every indication that Shafter
would have been compelled to relinquish his position, if not to have
abandoned Cuba, for the time being at least.
On the other hand, the campaigns in Porto Rico and in the Philip-
pines were ably handled. It must be distinctly borne in mind that
the Spanish-American War is the only one in which the United States
has not had to employ at least two, and often many times more,
men to every one man used by its adversaries. In this war the
United States had in service 58,688 Regulars and 223,235 Volunteers
opposed to Spanish forces numbering about 228,160. That war cost
our Government $321,833,254,76, and the pensions, taken in con-
junction with those paid for the Philippine insurrection, amounted,
on June 30, 1915, to no less than $49,944,441.
jºr WARREN. You are referring to the Spanish-American War
alone Ž -
Mr. HUIDEKOPER. Yes, sir. That is in all the above figures except
those for pensions, which also include the pensions paid for the
Philippine war.
Senator WARREN. That is, money already paid out? -
Mr. HUIDEKOPER. Yes, Senator. The pensions down to June 30,
1915, according to the report of the Commissioner of Pensions for
the fiscal year ending on that date.
The Philippine war shows once again the folly of not having a
proper force ready and sufficiently large to meet such emergencies as
may arise. The Volunteers sent to the Philippines under Gen.
Merritt were enlisted, like the others, under a conditional contract
984 PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
which stipulated that they should be discharged “when the purposes
for which they were called into service shall have been accomplished,
or on the conclusion of hostilities.” Owing to the failure of Congress
to give the Regular Army sufficient strength or to provide other
troops to replace the Volunteers of 1898, the troops sent to the
Philippines had to be retained in service not only after the protocol
of peace had been signed on August 12, 1898, but after their term of
enlistment had legally expired with the consummation of the treaty
of peace on December 12, 1898. The Government, being confronted
by two alternatives, namely, either to abandon the Philippines
entirely or to endeavor to hold them by retaining in service such
troops as were available, was thus compelled to break its contract
and to hold the men who had volunteered for the War with Spain
only, through a succession of active operations lasting for six months
after the period when their term of enlistment had legally expired.
All these facts are fully narrated in my book on pages 207–209, but
you will find that they have been suppressed with studied care by
almost every other historian or writer.
The Philippine insurrection broke out on February 4, 1899, and it
required just such a jolt to awaken Congress from its habitual
slumber when military needs are at stake. On March 2, 1899, the
National Legislature created the best volunteer force which the
United States has thus possessed, without any exception. The
standard, both of officers and men, was higher than in the case of
any similar force, and the law contained more elements of sound
military wisdom than any other measure hitherto enacted. Admi-
rable as it was, months elapsed before these troops could be procured
and shipped to the Philippines. st ---
Senator WARREN. What is your record as to the physical condition
of those troops. Would we have less pensions now if we then had a
properly organized force, gathered together, beforehand and sub-
mitted to various examinations by the Medical Corps, or is that
something we would have in the same proportion no matter what
kind of force we might have 7 *
Mr. HUIDEKOPER. I am convinced that, with a properly organized
force in which the men would be much less liable to sickness and
much better able to take care of themselves in the field, it would be
obvious that the pensions would necessarily be smaller. This is,
of course, in a properly disciplined and trained force. Did I under-
stand you correctly, Senator?
Senator WARREN. Yes; I want to know whether the pensions are
in larger proportion in your judgment because of the hasty way in
which our volunteers were enlisted, passed upon, and sent into
service, and perhaps somewhat improperly cared for afterwards.
What would be the comparison with a regularly, carefully organized
force submitted to perhaps more rigid organization and examination
and to better care in the field 7 I want to know what your idea is
of the percentage, looking to the future, as to pensions.
Mr. HUDEKOPER. I should think, Senator, that the pensions would
unquestionably be very much smaller with a properly organized force.
The CHAIRMAN. Either your book or Gen. Carter's book along the
same lines gives the exact number of Regulars on the pension rolls
and the number of Volunteers on the pension rolls, showing very
PREPAREDNIESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 985
conclusively that there are a greater proportion of Volunteers by far
than of Regulars. -
Senator WARREN. You mean, during the time they are in service or
during the entire time 2 -
The CHAIRMAN. Speaking of those that are now on the pension
rolls. He shows the exact number.
Mr. HUIDEKOPER. There is an absolute answer to your inquiry
which is readily obtainable from the Commissioner of Pensions in
case the information is not given by Gen. Carter.
The CHAIRMAN. Gen. Carter gives it in his book. I read it the
other day. •.
Senator WARREN. There is one thing, however, to mitigate that
somewhat. The pensions that are allowed to those in the Regular
Army from time to time now are not dealt with as liberally as were
those who served in the volunteers during the Civil War. You see,
a great proportion, now, of our payments are for Services, and that
does not appear in the Regular Army. It is only disability, and so
forth, except as to the officers.
Senator DU Pont. Mr. Huidekoper, I think two officers have
testified either before this committee or the House committee that
efficient troops could be made within six months, and that statement
is based on the record of this very volunteer force that was organ-
ized for the Philippines. Do you not think that the rapidity with
which they became efficient was due, to a certain extent, to the fact
that a great majority of them were men who had already received
similar instruction during the Spanish-American War and who
reenlisted? -
Mr. HUIDEKOPER. Undoubtedly, sir.
Apropos of these troops, Capt. Charles D. Rhodes, formerly of the
General Staff and one of the soundest and deepest thinkers in the
Army, in an admirable article which was given the gold medal prize
by the Military Service Institution, and which was published in the
Journal of that institution for March–April, 1905, declared that—
As volunteer regiments, it has been the almost unanimous verdict that they have
never been surpassed. Certainly never, in such a short space of time, have such
excellent troops been organized, trained and put in the field. -
If the cause of this efficiency be analyzed, it will be found to have resulted from
four factors: * -
1. In most cases the field officers of the regiments were selected from experienced
officers of the Regular Service.
2. The company officers were principally selected by the War Department, from
gº who had served creditably in the State organizations during the war with
2,111.
º The fact that from this method of selection the officers were in no way under
obligations to the men under them. *
4. From careful selection of the enlisted personnel, accepting only the physically
perfect, and after enlistment summarily discharging those deficient in the qualifica-
tions of a good soldier.
In so much as the law creating this force did not go into effect
until March 2, 1899—in other words, nearly one month after the
outbreak of the Philippine insurrection—the first troops comprising
this volunteer body did not reach the Philippines until October 11,
1899, while the last regiment did not arrive there until January 25,
1900, nearly one year after the insurrection began. Under such
conditions it is scarcely surprising that there was a time when the
situation was distinctly ominous. Two years had not elapsed before a
986 PREPAIRED NIESS FOR NATION AI, DEFENSE.
similar situation again arose, caused this time by the persistent adher-
ence of Congress to terms of enlistment almost invariably too short
to meet a state of war, and once more was demonstrated the advisa-
bility of securing troops for periods not less than for the war. The law
of March 2, 1899, specifically announced that the Philippine Vol-
unteers were to be mustered out on July 1, 1901. As early as De-
cember 11, 1900, the War Department ordeled Gen. MacArthur to
“start home Volunteer regiments,” but the military authorities
found themselves hard put to find a sufficiency of Regulars to replace
the Volunteers who were withdrawn from the Philippines as fast
as possible, lest there should be a repetition of the course which had
iºd to be pursued in respect to the Volunteer troops, sent to those
islands in 1898, to which I have already alluded. This fact is attested
by the cable sent by Adj. Gen. Corbin on January 29, 1901, to Gen.
Leonard Wood at Habana, which read as follows:
Secretary of War is desirous to know if you can give your consent to the immediate
withdrawal of the Tenth Infantry from Cuba. The long delay in passage of the
Army bill makes it imperative that we have immediate use of every available com-
pany we can lay our hands on for service in the Philippines. Secretary [of] War
very much desires, if possible, you can see your way clear to recommend the with-
drawal of this regiment at once.
Thus was afforded a fresh instance of congressional folly in limiting
the term of enlistment of troops instead of making it “for the war.”
Fortunately the insurrection collapsed completely during the spring
of 1901 as a result of the drastic measures inaugurated by Gen.
MacArthur on December 20, 1900, and nothing serious occurred to
interrupt the departure of the regiments of Philippine Volunteers, the
last of which sailed from Manila on May 5, 1901.
As a military asset, this force was in marked contrast to any other
volunteers ever created by Congress, being extraordinarily efficient
from the very start. The law which brought them into being might
well serve as a model for any future force of Federal volunteers. Our
military legislation prior to that time manifested no such wisdom,
In that connection I venture to call to your attention Chapter XX of
my book, entitled “The lessons of our past wars,” and Chapter XXI,
which treats of citizen-soldiery. The latter shows how dependence
upon untrained troops has caused such enormous expenditures on
account of our military forces, irrespective of the totally unnecessary
number of troops which the United States has been compelled to
maintain under arms and pay during hostilities—all of which are
attributable to the utter absence of a sound military policy. The
folly of unnecessary retrenchment in time of peace, to which our legis-
lators have persistently clung, is nothing more or less than the ‘‘penny
wise, pound foolish” policy which every sane business man heartily
condemns. The results entailed by this false economy furnish a
further corroboration of the fact that our military policy has always
been unsound from a financial as well as a numerical standpoint, as
will appear from the following table:
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 987
Cost of the War. Department, by periods.

Period. Condition. & - CoSt.
1791–1811. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Peace----------------------------------------------------- $5,669,930. 65
1812–1816. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Including the War of 1812. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . S2,627,009. 14
1817–1835. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Minº Indian Wars. Army averaging under 6,000 officers 90,411,068.59
3.11(1 Iſløſ] .
1836–1843. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Florida War. --------------------------------------------. 69, 751, 611. 11
1843–1845- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Peace. The Army reduced. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13,873, 146. 89
1846–1849. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Including the Mexican War. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88, 500,208.38
1850–1860. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Peace. The Army reduced------. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 168,079,707. 57
1861–1865. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Including the War of the ebellion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2,736,570,923.50
1866–1869. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Forces large on account of French occupation of Mexico. . . 583,749, 510.99
1870–1897. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Peace. The Army reduced. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,211,321,300.94
1898–1899. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Including the Spanish-American War. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 321,833,254, 76
1900–1902. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Including the Philippine War. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 391,662,681.06
1902–1915. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Peace. The Army reduced. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,866,893,601. 69
Total cost Since 1790.1--------------------------------------------------. . . . . . . . . . 7,630,943,955.27
Total cost of pen- |------------. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4,895,475,637.08
Sions since 1790.
It also explains why we have invariably used many more troops
than there was any justification for.
Senator DU Pont. During war times?
Mr. HUIDEKOPER. Yes, sir; during all our wars. The objections to
maintaining an unnecessarily large army in peace could have been
completely obviated had the Army, at any time in our national career,
been given an expansive organization and had the President been
empowered to expand that force automatically when war was immi-
nent or had broken out. May I be permitted to emphasize the fact
that it is of little use to expand an army unless the increase be made
by troops, preferably as well trained as those already in service, but
under any circumstances by those who have previously received some
training at least. For example, if any army numbers 100,000 men
and is expanded to 125,000 by means of totally raw recruits, it would
be weakened by about 20 per cent--about one-fifth. -
Senator CATRON. Your statement in that regard is based upon the
idea that those raw troops would be in sufficient organizations or regi-
ments? Supposing they filled up the old regiments with them 7
Mr. HUIDEKOPER. You would weaken them by putting in troops
not so well trained as those already under the colors—
Senator CATRON. That would depend upon whether you put more
of them in than you did of old troops. If there were more old troops
than new ones, you would not weaken it very much. -
Mr. HUIDEKOPER. You would be bound to weaken any force,
would you not, Senator, to a certain degree ?
Senator CATRON. Of course.
Mr. HUIDEKOPER. But obviously not nearly so much as if wholly
raw material were put into the ranks as occurred often during the
War of the Rebellion. Apropos of the difference between organizing
untrained men into separate regiments or of amalgamating them with
seasoned troops, Gen. Sherman very pertinently remarks in his
Memoirs (Vol. II, p. 388): *
I believe that five hundred new men added to an old and experienced regiment
were more valuable than a thousand men in the form of a new regiment, for the former
by association with good, exparienced captains, lieutenants, and noncommissioned
officers, soon became veterans, whereas the latter were generally unavailable for a year.
988 PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
That seems to me to demonstrate the value of having reserves for
any Regular force. When the Army is increased in time of war, if
this expansion be made by means of troops who have previously
been thoroughly trained, the organizations will be in readiness to take
the field at once. Heretofore, in almost every instance the existing
regiments have been filled up by many men insufficiently trained to
meet the requirements of a hard campaign.
I do not suppose that this committee desires me to go into the
details of military events and legislation since the Spanish-American
War, especially since they are all fully chronicled in Chapters XVIII,
XIX, and XXII of my book, The Military Unpreparedness of the
TJnited States. Of all these measures I think that the most important
was the act of April 25, 1914. Had this law been in effect in 1898 it
would undoubtedly have prevented most of the disorders which char-
acterized the Spanish-American War. -
The CHAIRMAN. That you consider a wholesome piece of legisla-
tion ?
Mr. HUIDEKOPER. In my humble opinion it is the best that has ever
been passed in our military history—by far the most comprehensive
and the most thorough.
Senator BECKHAM. What act was that %
Mr. HUIDEKOPER. The act of April 25, 1914, For raising the volun-
teer forces of the United States in time of actual or threatened war,”
which was originally introduced on May 25, 1911, by Senator du
Pont when he was the chairman of this committee. -
The CHAIRMAN. Is there anything else that you desire to say?
Mr. HUIDEKOPER. May I be permitted to point out, sir, that in
1806, when Napoleon had crushed Prussia and limited her army to
42,000 men, Prussia resorted to a method which might be of use at
the present day. She made the period of service in her army just as
short as was possible in order to train men to be soldiers.
The CHAIRMAN. That was because she was limited. She was
limited to a standing army of 42,000 men and that was insufficient
for her defense; therefore she resorted to the system of having men
go through a short training and let them out into the citizenship.
Mr. HUIDEROPER. Certainly. And it ought to be obvious that
the quicker men are passed out of service with the colors and into
the reserve and back to their civil pursuits, the more men can be
trained, the more soldiers there will be in the country, and the less
will be the disturbance made in productive and economic conditions.
Senator DU PONT. You do not mean by that, as has been suggested
here by one or two people, that every man, noncommissioned officers
and all, after they are trained, should be turned loose without any
opportunity of reenlisting if they desire to do so?
Mr. HUIDEKOPER. No, Senator, I do not. I certainly think that
the noncommissioned officers are most essential to be retained in
large proportion. A large number of them ought always to be with
the colors as nuclei to train the new men as they come in. On the
other hand, the average private should promptly be returned to his
civil vocation just as soon as he has become a proficient soldier,
unless he particularly wishes to select the Army as a career.
I should like to emphasize one fundamental fact shown by our
military history, namely, that rarely has our Government wielded
its military power despotically or utilized all the national resources
PREPAREDINESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 989
for war without hindrance on the part of the States. The history
of the world demonstrates that war can not be conducted with that
degree of efficiency which the people have a right to demand in return
for their sacrifices unless the Government exercises its power despot-
ically, and that any delegation of that power to any other authority
obviously weakens the national military strength and correspond-
ingly increases the national expenditures beyond all justification.
The best proof of that truth is afforded by the method employed by
Germany in the present European war. The extraordinary efficiency
shown by the German Army is attributable almost entirely to one
fact, namely, that there exists but one single directing head. The
unanimity of action on the part of the German and Austrian mili-
tary forces is due to their operating under one controlling power,
despotic in its operation and acting without the slightest interference
from any internal source. The political composition of the German
Empire bears a decided analogy to that of the United States. It is
comprised of separate kingdoms and States, many of which have
their own distinct form of Government—such as Bavaria, Saxony,
and Wurttemberg—but for military purposes and policy all of them
are completely subordinated to the central head.
The CHAIRMAN. We have been driven to that in two very impor-
tant wars. During the Revolution Congress in its desperation finally
threw the complete control of the Army over to Washington, and in
the Civil War they finally did the same thing with reference to Grant.
º those two desperate acts were passed there was a chance of
Clefeat. -
Mr. HUIDEKOPER. These crises might readily have been forestalled
had the military forces been properly organized beforehand instead
of too late, as Congress has almost invariably done. History estab-
lished one fact which there is no gainsaying—that is, that no nation
has ever plunged into war unprepared without unnecessary slaughter,
unjustifiable expense, and national peril. To place upon insuffi-
ciently trained men the main dependence of a country's defense is
nothing more or less than to invite disaster. That is what the United
States has consistently done from the very start, and the record of
our militia is not very flattering to American pride and conceit.
One reason for the American attitude of indifference to national
defense, so prevalent until latterly, is due to the fact that we have
never been pitted against the land forces of a first-class military power.
Our people as a whole have not the slightest conception of what such
8, º: entails; it is impossible for them to realize the effect of the
application of highly organized and thoroughly prepared military
force. The crux of the entire question lies in the efficiency of troops,
which can only be gauged by the extent and thoroughness of their
training. Our Organized Militia to-day receives a schooling confined
to one week in camp and about 80 hours of drill per annum. How
long does any reasonable man suppose that such troops would stand
against European or Japanese regulars? How much faith would the
officials place in an agent or employee whose training is limited to
one week and 80 hours of work a year? There are splendid, zealous,
and hard-working officers and men in the National Guard to-day, but
in Imy opinion they are laboring under an insuperable handicap in a
system which is fundamentally wrong from the standpoint of the
990 PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
Nation and which does not and can not afford them a fair chance to
demonstrate their worth. -
In speaking of the militia I wish distinctly to say that, as I under-
stand it, there is a decided difference between the militia of the Con-
stitution and the Organized Militia to-day. It would seem that the
Organized Militia exists because the militia of the Constitution failed
in its duty. Since it was necessary to have some force, especially
insomuch as the Regular Army was too small to afford adequate
protection to the country, the present National Guard was created
and organized to supply this need. .
Senator CATRON. What do you call the militia of the Constitution ?
Mr. HUIDEKOPER. The military force mentioned in paragraphs 15
and 16 of section 8 of the Constitution. By the organic act of May
8, 1792, every able-bodied man
Senator CATRON. That act is still in force?
Mr. HUIDEKOPER. No, Senator, that law was repealed by the Dick
bill on January 21, 1903. -
Senator CATRON. You speak of the constitutional militia. There
is no constitutional militia to-day ?
Mr. HUIDEKopBR. No, sir; the militia which is organized into a
military force is under control of the various States. -
Senator CATRON. You use the word “constitutional” or “con-
stituted” .
Mr. HUIDEKOPER. Constitutional. Of course, strictly speaking, I
should have said constituted.
& jºr CATRON. I did not know whether I caught that word
rightly. -
§: HUIDEKOPER. Literally, it should have been “constituted.”
The Constitution of the United States, in paragraphs 16 and 17 of
section 8, mentions “the militia,” but does not define its composition.
The act of May 8, 1792, however, prescribes in its opening section—
That each and every free, able-bodied, white male citizen of the respective States,
resident therein, who is or shall be of the age of 18 years and under the age of 45 years
(except as hereinafter excepted) shall, severally and respectively, be enrolled in the
militia. * * *
The Dick bill, which was approved on January 21, 1903, separated
the militia into two classes—namely, Organized Militia or National
Guard, and the Reserve Militia—and also announced that—
The militia shall consist of every able-bodied male citizen + 4 + and every
able-bodied male of foreign birth who has declared his intention to become a citizen,
who is more than 18 and less than 45 years of age.
The Organized Militia is, by the Constitution, a State force and as
such can not be controlled by the Federal Government.
May I be permitted to point out that the title “National Guard”
for the present Organized Militia is an egregious misnomer. It is not
a National Guard and is of no use to the Nation as a whole until its
status has been completely changed; in other words, until it ceases
to be a State force and becomes a purely Federal force.
The CHAIRMAN. In that regard there has been an argument here by
two distinguished men to show that by the exercise of its unused power
Congress can practically place the National Guard under the Federal
Government; that is, every function it performs except the naming of
º and a means has been suggested for the accomplishment of
that. -
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 991
Mr. HUIDEKOPER. If that could be done thoroughly and effectively,
so that no question could be raised as to its being absolutely under the
control of the Federal Government, in my opinion it would be an
immense step forward. The fact that it has not heretofore been done
or was thought impossible of effective accomplishment has been one
of the causes of the costliness of our wars and the inefficiency of the
troops employed.
The CHAIRMAN. Gen. Crowder showed it, and Senator Cummins,
who is quite a distinguished constitutional lawyer, claims that under
the Constitution the Federal Congress now has power to do everything
in respect to the National Guard except the appointment of officers,
which is vested in the governor of the State.
Senator CATRON. And the actual disciplining of the men—to provide
how it shall be done. It has got to be done by the State.
The CHAIRMAN. I think they eliminated every feature except the
officering of them.
Senator WARREN. And as to taking them outside the boundaries,
The CHAIRMAN. Of course, you could not do that.
Senator WARREN. In other words, there is a great deal left after
you have exercised your unused powers ?
The CHAIRMAN. Not much.
Mr. HUIDEKOPER. This is a very interesting suggestion, if it can
be made to operate effectively. I am thoroughly convinced, how-
ever, that you will never obtain really good troops under any system in
which the officers are appointed by the States or elected by the men.
The only dependable force is one under Federal control wholly and
absolutely—that is a fact which our own military history has proved
beyond any question. -
However, suppose that in the event of war such a measure as you
mention were put into operation, and suppose that its constitutional
validity were brought into question. Would not the matter have to
be settled in the courts, perhaps to the decided detriment of the
military service in the meantime'.
The CHAIRMAN. Possibly it would have to have a legal determina-
tion. *
Mr. HUIDEKOPER. I should like permission to put into the record
these three tables, giving certain facts about the militia in the past.
The Cºmmºn. Yes ; you may put them in.
TABLE D.—The militia ran away or deserted.
Battle. Date. Organization or expedition.
Long Island.--------------------------- Aug. 27, 1776. . . . . . . Parsons’s brigade.
Evacuation of New York.... . . . . . . . . . . . Sept. 15, 1776. . . . . . . Brigades of Parsons and Fellows.
Brandywine---------------------. . . . . . Sept. 11, 1777... . . . . . Sullivan's division.
Guilford Courthouse, N. C. . . . . . . . . . . . . Mar. 15, 1781. - . . . . . North Carolina Militia and Second Mary-
land Regiment. *
Burwells Ferry, Va. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Apr. 19, 1781. . . . . . . Virginia Militia.
Williamsburg, Va...................... Apr. 20, 1781. . . . . . . Do.
Indian village near Fort Wayne, Ind...] Oct. 22, 1790... . . . . . Gen. Harmar’s Miami expedition.
Darke County, Ohio. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Nov. 4, 1791. . . . . . . . Gen. St. Clair’s expedition.
Frenchtown and Raisin River, Mich. ... Jan. 18–22, 1813. . . . . Gen. Winchester’s column.
Sacketts Harbor, N. Y. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . May 29, 1813-... . . . . . Gen. Drown’s New York Militia.
French Creek, N. Y. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Nov. 1–2, 1813. . . . . . Gen. Hampton’s column.
Chrystlers Tields, Canada. . . . . . . . . . . ...] Nov. 11, 1813. . . . . . . Gen. Wilkinson’s column.
Burning of Buffalo, Lewiston, and | Dec. 30, 1813. . . . . . . Gen. McClure's New York Militia.
other townsin northern New York.
New Orleans, La. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Jan. 8, 1915. . . . . . . . . 800 militia under Gen. Morgan, posted on
the west bank of the Mississippi,
Lake Okeechobee, Fla. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Dec. 25, 1837. . . . . . . Missouri Volunteers and spies under Gen.
- Zachary Taylor.
Bull Run, Va.----------. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . July 21, 1861.... . . . . Th; º force of Militia under Gen. Mc-
OWell.
*~
992
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
TABLE E.—The militia mutinied.
Place Date. Mutineers.
Morristown, N. J... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Jan. 1, 1781. . . . . . . . . 6 regiments of the Pennsylvania Line,
1,300 men.
Pompton, N. J. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Jan. 24–28, 1781. . . . . New Jersey Line.
Lancaster, Pa.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - - - - - - - - June, 1783. . . . . . . . . . S0 recruits, joined by 200 other malcon-
contents, marched to Philadelphia, de-
manded their pay, and held Congress
- prisoner for several hours on June 21, 1783.
On the march from Urbana, Ohio, to June, 1812- . . . . . . . . . Part of the militia, under Gen. Hull.
Detroit, Mich. -
Detroit, Mich. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . July, 1812. . . . . . . . . . 180 Ohio Militia of Gen. Pſull's command.
On the march from Fort Harrison, Ind.,
to the Walbash and Illinois Rivers.
Iºn route to the rapids of the Maumee
River.
Battle of Queenstown, Ontario. . . . . . . .
En route from Plattsburg, N. Y., to
Canada.
Fort Strother, Fla.... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Retreat to Buffalo, N. Y., after the
evacuation of Fort George.
Withlacoochee River, Fla... . . . . . . . . . . . .
Charles Town, W. Va..................
Oct. 19, 1812........
October, 1812... . . . .
Oct. 13, 1812. . . . . . . .
November, 1812. . . .
November, 1813. .
December, 1813. .
Dec. 31, 1835. . . . . . .
July 16–18, 1861 ... .
4,000 Kentucky Mounted Militia, under
Gen. Hopkins.
Kentucky, Tennessee, and Virginia Militia,
under Gen. William H. Harrison.
New York Militia, under Gen. Van Rens-
Sela or and Wadsworth.
Nearly all tha 3,000 militia, under Gen.
Dearborn.
. Tennessee Militia and Volunteers, under
Gen. Andrew Jackson.
The New York Militia
McClure.
About 500 Florida Militia and Volunteers,
under Gen. Clinch.
Militia of the Army of the Shemandoah
under Gen. Patterson.
under, Gen.
TABLE F.—The States defy the
United States Government by refusing to furnish their
nilitia to its service.
State. Governor. Date. Cause and reason for refusal.
Massachusetts. . . . . . . . . . Strong . . . . . . . . . . . . Apr. 1812 Denied the right of the President or Congress
to determine when such exigencies arise as
to require the militia to be ca'led out, and
claimed that “tnis right is vested in the
commanders in chief of the militia of the
Several States.”
Connecticut. . . . . . . . . . . . Griswold. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . do. . . . . . . Sustantially the same contention as the
a tº OV0.
Vermont. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Chittenden. . . . . . . . Nov. 10, 1813 Declared that “the military strength and
resources of the State must he reserved
ſor § own defense and protection exclu-
sively.”
P0----------------|----- do-----------. Sept. 1814 | Refused to permit the militia to support
{ } Gen. Macomb in repelling 11,000 British
veterans, under Gen. Sir George Prevost,
- - who had then invaded northern New York.
Virginia. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Letcher. . . . . . . . . . . Apr. 16, 1861 -
N º Carolina. . . . . . . . . ; ºffin.......... April 15, 1861
Sentucky... . . . . . . . . . . . ašOTITD - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 0 - - - - - - - *
Tennessee.............. Harris. . . . . . . . . . . . Apr.º. iśći Rebellion.
Missouri. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Jaſkson. . . . . . . . . . . Apr. 22, 1861
Arkansas. . . . . . . . . . . . . . Reector...........l..... do-------
Mr. HUIDEKOPER. In connection with the organization of the
militia, I suppose that there are few men of my age in America who
have been more interested in the military service for years than I.
Purposely I have never joined any organization in the National
Guard, because I want to render such service as lies within my
ability to some force wholly under the jurisdiction and control of
the United States, and under no other authority whatsoever.
The
fact that the National Guard is essentially a State and not a national
force is, I am convinced, one of the reasons which deter many young
men from joining it.
Its work in putting down strikes and other
police duty—which ought properly to be performed by a State con-
PR.EPARED NESS FOR NATION A.J., DEFENSE. 993
stabulary—and its organization being of a dual character, defeat the
very purpose for which a strictly military force is intended.
The more I have seen of European troops, both in peace and war,
and the more I study, the greater the necessity appears to me that
any military force which is to be used by the United States Ought to
be wholly in the service of the Nation and not controlled by any part
of the Nation. In a word, the whole military power and resources
of the Nation ought to be concentrated in the Federal Government.
Under the present Organized Militia system, which is under the con-
trol of the various States, I do not think that the good officers and
men are given half a chance to demonstrate their worth. There is
no question that intensive training produces much better troops than
a half-baked schooling strung out over a period of several years, as
is the case in the Organized Militia. An excellent example was
afforded by the Business Men's Camp at Plattsburgh last summer.
More intensive training I have never seen, even in France, England,
and Germany in time of war, and the men learned more in one month
than the average Army recruit does in five months.
Senator DU Pont. You were one of the men who participated in
that training? -
Mr. HUIDEKOPER. Yes, sir; from the 10th of August to the 6th of
September. There were two things which the men who had had no
previous experience with troops learned, even if they learned nothing
else: First, that there was infinitely more to be learned in the mili-
tary profession than most of them ever dreamed of; and, secondly,
that the prevalent American opinion that a soldier can be made in
no time or an officer in a few months has no foundation in fact.
The men who attended these camps of instruction also came to
appreciate the maxim of law that “the origin of every right is in a
duty fulfilled,” and they were brought to a realization that no prin-
ciple is more in accord with a republican form of government, no doc-
trine is more truly democratic, than that which asserts that every
able-bodied male citizen owes military service to his country. They
also came to understand that the principle of universal service is no
more a violation of the policy and traditions of the American people
than is the payment of taxes under compulsion. *
The CHAIRMAN. We are very much obliged to you for coming down
here Mr. Huidekoper.
Mr. HUIDEKOPER. I have been studying the various bills pertaining
to our land forces which are now before Congress and, if agreeable, I
should like to submit a few suggestions to you, Senator, as I have
been working on them with one of the ablest retired officers of the
Army who, by his past experience, is eminently qualified to make
recommendations. - *
The CHAIRMAN. Please submit them in the form of a bill.
Mr. HUIDEKOPER. I shall be happy to do so, sir.
(Whereupon, at 12 o'clock m., the committee took a recess until
to-morrow, Tuesday, February 8, 1916, at 1.30 o'clock p. m.)
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 8, 1916.
UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON MILITARY AFFAIRs,
Washington, D. C.
The committee met at the expiration of the recess at 1.30 p.m.,
Senator Geo. E. Chamberlain (chairman) presiding.
The CHAIRMAN. Unless there is objection to it on the part of the
committee, I desire to insert as a part of the record a lecture delivered
to the field officers' class at Fort Leavenworth, Kans., January 7,
1916, on the Swiss Army, by Capt. Willey Howell, and also an
article entitled, “What does the military policy and strength of the
Swiss Republic suggest for our national defense,” by Frederick A.
Kuenzli, former lieutenant in the Swiss Army, teacher in the high
school at Zurich, Switzerland, and now assistant in the appraiser's
office at the port of New York.
The lecture by Capt. Willey Howell is as follows:
THE SWISS ARMY.
[Lecture delivered to the field officers’ class, at Fort Leavenworth, Kans., Jan. 7, 1916.]
The inception of what may be called the national system of forming armies took
place in 1808 in Prussia.
At that time Napoleon was master of Europe.
He formulated a demand, in a secret article of the Franco-Prussian convention of
September 8, 1808, that Prussia should limit her army to 42,000 men for at least 10
years and should not form a militia or civic guard. The military situation was such
that Prussia could not but comply, although it meant that for the time she must be
deprived of the ability to throw off the Napoleon régime.
The Prussians were not, however, without the means of devising a plan for pro-
viding trained men in case of need in spite of the convention.
Scharnhorst, the principal military reformer in Prussia, at that time, devised the
famous “shrinkage system,” so called because the cadras at stated intervals were
refilled with recruits and correspondingly depleted by the passage of the trained
men into a reserve.
The working of the system was kept as secret as possible. , Nominally the total of
the army was kept at 42,000; but by the year 1812, Prussia had as many as 150,000
men trained in this manner to the Service of arms.
As to just how well the scheme would meet the military needs of the nation re-
mained in doubt until the Austro-Prussian War of 1866. There was always one
thing that could be said in its favor—that whatever it lacked in organization or appar-
ent merit was more than made up by the fact that it planted the military power of
the nation in the hearts of the people and thereby developed its strength concom-
itantly with the fast-growing civic patriotism of the German nation.
The first real test came in 1866 in the war with Austria. The neatness and dispatch
with which that war was won by the Prussian arms led even the most conservative
to believe that Scharnhorst's ideas were the correct ones.
Four years later came the giant struggle with the France of Napoleon III, the prize
being final Teuton consolidation and paramount European influence.
995
996 PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
The French Army of 1870–71 was in process of reorganization at the time of the
breaking out of War. -
The code of the 1st of February, 1868, ordained that it should consist of active army,
reserve, garde nationale mobile and navy.
The object of the reserve was to reinforce the field army, to garrison fortresses, and
form depot troops, whilst the garde nationale mobile was only intended to complete
the garrisons of home fortresses and form a reserve to the army. -
The duration of the term of service was extended to nine years, of which five years
were reckoned with the colors and four with the reserve. -
The system. WSS almost identical with the one in vogue in the United States at
this day. - - -
Its keynote is the formation of a body of professional soldiers, intended to remain
in the service in both peace and War, called in this country the Regular Army and in
France at that time the active army, with a reserve of semiretired soldiery (our reserve
was lately said to consist of 16 men) and a more or less poorly trained body of civilians,
called the Organized Militia in this country and the garde nationale mobile in France.
There were many things that contributed to the downfall of France in the war of
1870–71, but the actual conflict at arms was as much probably as anything else a.
struggle between the German militäry system and the French. -
The important point is that the German system, with its fundamental idea of pre-
senting a nation of trained men in arms to an enemy in the least possible time, did
win in the war of 1870–71, as it bids fair to win to-day. w
With such vindication of the contention that no nation can be successfully defended
from outside aggression unless it has prepared in peace promptly to place every male
citizen within its limits in the line of battle, properly trained, equipped, armed, and
ready in every respect to bear the strain of modern War, let us proceed to examine
the application of this idea by the Swiss people to the special conditions as they exist
for them.
With a population of 3,750,00ſ, Switzerland is able to mobilize within 24 hours an
army of 240,000 trained solidºrs.
Forty-eight hours later a second line of defense can be placed in the field numbering
over a quarter of a million, a total of nearly half a million soldiers, fully armed and
equipped and Well trained, in three days.
And this wonderful defensive strength is obtained at a cost of less than $9,000,000
per annum. -
The system by which this is done is well worth close study, not merely as an example
of an efficiently conducted plan of national defense but as an illustration of the high
grade of patriotism which makes it possible.
In the first place, why must Switzerland maintain a military system which produces
a trained soldier for each eight inhabitants? We find the answer in the peculiar
geographical position and political situation in which this little nation is placed.
Surrounded by powerful States, she can not extend her territory nor increase her
political power. Defenseless, she would be the easy prey of any unscrupulous and
ambitious nation. Guarded by half a million patriotic men it is hardly worth the
price in money and lives which must be paid to get it. .
If, for protection, she allied herself with a first-class power, defeat in war would
mean the political death of Switzerland. Recognizing this grave danger, Switzerland
has kept out of entangling alliances, and for 100 years has steadfastly maintained an
attitude of strict neutrality toward warring nations.
A number of treaties guaranteeing the neutrality of Switzerland have been drawn
up and signed by the European powers, but with the wisdom acquired by experience
the Swiss authorities refused to rely upon these diplomatic promises. As one of their
historians has aptly expressed the situation: “The value of these written conventions
has never existed except in the brains of pedants; and history itself undertakes to
teach us that these written conventions have never prevented the military from
doing that which they believed to be most judicious. The respect for the inviola-
bility of neutral territory has always kept pace with the respect inspired by the forces
charged with its defense and by the spirit of resolution of those who controlled this
force.” (Strategic Importance of Switzerland, Col. Weber; translation by Maj.
Sorley, U. S. Army.)
“To examine the situation from a purely military standpoint, what are the chances
of Swiss territory being invaded during the next great war?. Let us quote from
, McCracken's The Rise of the Swiss Republic, published 1901. The advantages which
certain powers would find in pushing troops through Switzerland in order to attack
their rivals upon the flank are so great that the temptation could not be resisted iſ
only military considerations were allowed to have the upper hand. In case of a duel
between France and Germany the likelihood of such a violation is not great, for the
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 997
invading nation would immediately find Switzerland making common cause with the
enemy, and in the present state of affairs this slight advantage might decide the issue;
but since the formation of the triple alliance (Germany, Austria, Italy) the risk has
measurably increased. A glance at the map reveals Germany on the north, Austria
on the east, and Italy on the south leagued together against France on the west.
Switzerland is therefore completely surrounded by a cordon of armies eager to attack
each other across her territory. Austria, perhaps, would not need to make use of
Swiss soil, for, according to present indications, all her available troops would be
engaged in a struggle with Russia; nor would Germany apparently gain very much
by such a move, for after crossing Switzerland she would be confronted by a strong
line in France (Belfort-Besancon and Lyons), but the right of passage would be
undoubtedly of inestimable value to France and Italy. The former could in 24 hours
throw a large force upon Germany’s unprotected flank (the line of Basel-Schaffhausen-
Constance), while the latter could reach France by the undefended Swiss passes of
the Simplon and the Great St. Bernard and by the Lake of Geneva. The chances
are, consequently, that if Swiss neutrality were violated at all it would be by the
French and Italians, and there seems to be no doubt that whichever of these powers
made the first move the other would immediately follow suit by hastily throwing
forward an army to check the enemy's advance. Switzerland would then again be-
come the seat of war as in 1799.
“In view of the military situation, what resistance could the Swiss offer to the
invaders? Of course no one pretends that they could hold their own single handed,
even against an isolated European power, for any length of time; but the necessity
for such an action is hardly imaginable. If the Swiss were called upon to fight at all,
it would be only to hold certain positions until the friendly powers could come to
their aid, and not to carry on great offensive operations.” (Rise of the Swiss
Republic, McCracken, published 1901.) - -
In the war of 1914 the sides have not arrayed themselves exactly as it appeared
they would when the above was written.
Yet it is still remarkable that, in spite of the vast Sea of war that has been whirling
º the little nation for the past 17 months, not a hostile shot has yet been fired
on her soil.
Switzerland is a confederation of 19 Cantons and six half Cantons organized under the
constitution of May, 1874. The Republic is governed by a Federal Council of seven
members elected for three years by the Federal assembly, one of these Seven members
is designated by the assembly to exercise the functions of prosident of the confedera-
tion. The Federal assembly is composed of the National Council of 167 members and
the State council of 44 members, two of the latter for each Canton and one for each
half Canton. e
Each Canton is subdivided into districts, there being 187. These in turn are sub-
divided into communes which are the real political units, there being 3,164. The
government is most democratic. The political meetings in the communes are almost
identical with the town meeting form of government which still exists in New England.
The people have the right of referendum. Any legislative act passed by the assembly
can be subjected to recall by popular vote on the demand of eight Cantons or 30,000
active citizens.
The estimates for the military expenses—the budget, as they call it—are prepared
annually by the Federal Council and voted upon by the assembly. The total national
expenditure for 1911 was 98,300,000 francs of which the army took 44,700,000.
September 1, 1915, $1=6.05 francs; formerly, $1=5.12 francs: 98,300,000 francs=
$19,200,000:44,700,000 francs=$8,730,470. • ,
By the constitution, German, French, and Italian are officially recognized as
national languages. Debates in the assembly may be conducted in any one of these
three tongues, while laws, executive proclamations, and decrees, appear in all three.
Of the Cantons all but six have a German-speaking majority; of these six, five have
a French speaking majority; there is only one where Italian predominates. This
feature of Swiss life makes the local organization of military units necessary.
By percentages, 69 per cent speak German; 22 per cent, French; 7 per cent, Italian;
all others, 2 per cent. :*
The Swiss are very loyal to their country and its democratic institutions. Very
few emigrate to other countries. Those who do generally come to the United States,
90 per cent of the total annual emigration being credited to this country. The Argen-
tine Republic takes the largest part of the remainder, about 6 per cent of the total.
The entertainment of foreign visitors is the principal industry of Switzerland;
grazing next, with 83 per cent of productive lands devoted to that purpose. Manu-
factures come third.
998 PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
The training of the Swiss citizen for his duties in the army begins with a systematic
gymnastic course in the public Schools. Education is compulsory up to 15 years
which gives excellent opportunity to develop the physique of the growing boys.
All School children must undergo prescribed courses which are preparatory to their
future military. Service, since the law requires military service of every man (or a
liberal tax if disqualified either through mental or physical deficiency). This tax
varies from 6 to 3,000 francs yearly, depending upon income and property.
School children are divided into three classes: First, those under 9; second, those
from 9 to 12; third, those over 12 years. 2.
Instruction in the first class is conducted by cantonal associations and consists
only of gymnastics. The minimum amount of this instruction is two hours per week.
Instructors from the army inspect this gymnastic instruction from time to time.
In the Second class (9 to 12) there is a preparatory instruction in the use of arms
in every commune, directed by officers, noncommissioned officers, or soldiers. The
confederation furnishes the arms and equipment and prescribes the course. In 1910,
14,399 boys received instruction in this class.
In the third class (over 12) instruction in rifle firing is given by the organized firing
clubs under direct supervision of the officers and soldiers of the militia who belong to
the club. Each Society, receives a bounty from the government of 5 francs for each
boy So instructed. In 1909, 1,141 of these classes were organized; the number included .
is not given. -
There are, in addition, voluntary gymnastic Societies which stimulate interest in
physical training and have a large membership.
In the Cantons and communes there are many juvenile cadet corps, in which the
instruction is preparatory for the army. The boys from 11 to 19, inclusive, are eligible
for membership. Their principal instruction is in rifle firing, maneuvers, and artillery
drills, the matériel being furnished by the confederation. r
At the age of 20 the Swiss citizen is obliged by law to present himself to the levy of
troops in the Canton where he lives. Every citizen is subject to military service from
the time he is 20 until he reaches 48 years of age. The following are exempted during
the time they are in office or employed:
1. Members of the Federal assembly during the session of the assembly. -
2. Members of the Federal Council, the chancellor of the confederation, and clerks
of the Federal tribural.
3. Those employed in the administration of the post and telegraph; employees in
Government arsenals, workshops, and powder magazines; directors and wardens of
prisons; attendants in public hospitals; members of Cantonal and communal police
and frontier grards.
4. Ecclesiastics who do not act as army chaplains.
5. Those employed in public schools, only so far as it would interrupt their school
dutios. sº
6. Railroad officials and employees of the steamboat companies which have con-
cessions from the Government.
7. All those who have been deprived of their civil rights by sentence of court are
also excluded from the military service.
On presenting himself at the age of 20 each recruit undergoes an examination by
army surgeons, and if passed, is then required to take a scholastic examination, which
includes reading, arithmetic, Swiss geography and history, and an essay. If the re-
cruit fails to pass the physical examination he is exempted from military Service, but,
if the disqualification is slight, or temporary, he is turned out again within four years
for another examination. - .
Men disqualified physically or mentally in the final test must pay a sperial tax to
the Government, according to their individual means. Such is the pride taken in
the local contingents that some Cantons require the youngsters from 18 to 20 to attend
night school for 60 hours a winter two successive years to enable the youths to pass
the examination to qualify for service. The teachers for this special course are paid
by the confederation, and the lads for the time are under military law.
The examinations are not easy, for the standard maintained is high. During a recent
year, of the total examined, 52% per cent were enrolled at once, 13 per cent were
found disqualified, but remained subject to a second call, and 34% per cent were
wholly exempted. --
The standard of height is 5 feet 1% inches; chest not less than 31% inches. Men of
certain desirable trades may be accepted under the height standard.
The number of recruits examined annually is about 30,000.
When enrolled the recruits are sent to one of the recruit schools for which the con-
federation is divided into eight territorial departments; for infantry, for cavalry, and
for artillery, two each; for engineers, two. At these schools there is a permanent
PREPAIREDINESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 999
corps of instructors numbering 230 who are most carefully selected for this work.
These instructors are about the only permanently paid officers of the Swiss Army.
Qn reporting at the training school the recruit is fitted out with a complete uniform
and equipment and given a service rifle. After completion of the course of instruction
he takes the rifle and equipment to his home and keeps them until the end of his
military service. When he is summoned to report for active duty he must turn out
with a full equipment, and if anything is missing he is liable to fine or punishment.
The length of time devoted to the first year's training of the recruit is fixed as follows:
- Days.
Sanitary troops, supply trains, and commissary. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
Infantry and engineers-------------------------------------------------------- 65
Artillery and garrison troops....... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
Cavalry----------------------------------------------------------------------- 90
To an experienced soldier this time seems insufficient for the complete training of
the recruit but it must be taken into consideration that the boys of school age have their
cadet corps in different localities with an abundance of rivalry and esprit de corps.
Under these conditions the growing boy absorbs much military training which it is
unnecessary to teach him at the recruit schools. The rifle clubs, of which there are
many in Switzerland, admit boys over 12 years of age to membership and at 20 they
are all fair rifle shots. - *
Each day the recruit school, except Sunday, means eight hours of hard drill or
instruction. In addition to the daily schedule the recruits receive much night
instruction, such as night firing, intrenching, and maneuvers.
After the completion of the course the recruit is assigned to an organization in his
own Canton and becomes a regular member of the Elite, or first-line troops, with which
he remains until he reaches the age of 32 when he passes into the Landwehr. There he
remains until he is 40 years old when he is transferred to the Landstrum and remains a
member of the latter until he is 48 years old. The Landwehr are also the first-line
troops, but are given certain considerations on account of their age and skill in trades.
The Landsturm is composed of three distinct classes:
First. The members of the militia who have passed out of the Landwehr and are
not yet 48 years of age.
Second. All citizens between the ages of 17 and 50 who are not already members
of the Elite or the Landwehr.
Third. All males under 17 or over 50 who volunteer their Services in time of war.
The Landsturm is the second-line army and is not intended for Service outside
Switzerland. It has two distinct classes, the armed and unarmed. The armed class
is organized into companies, troops, batteries, and regiments, and is sometimes Ordered
out for maneuvers by the Federal Assembly for periods of from One to three days.
The unarmed Landsturm have special duties which can be performed in time of war,
some of a military nature, others more distinctly civilian. The unarmed wear a
cockade. >
After the first year soldiers in the Elite are called out six times—that is, every other
year—during their term of service for periods of 11 to 14 days each each time, while the
Landwehr is only called out once for 11 days. Cavalrymen serve 10 years in the
Elite (no service in the Landwehr) and are called out eight times for 11 days each
time for Service during that period.
Material for drills, maneuvers, and other military purposes are distributed among
the Cantons and stored in accessible places. Arsenals, powder magazines, and ammu-
nition factories are located with due regard to rapid mobilization and convenience of
supply.
§ method by which officers are developed is interesting. Should a recruit show
particular ability, it is noted on his record by the instructors of the recruit School,
and this report goes forward also to the commandant of the military forces of his Can-
ton. The following year, when the noncommissioned officers' Schools are formed,
the recruit is directed to attend. . He can not ask for this order and is bound to obey
it unless excused by proper authority. These especially chosen recruits assemble,
to the number of about a hundred, at the designated place, and there they are put
through a grilling course of instruction calculated not only to teach but to try out the
metal of the man.
At the end of the course if he has been found satisfactory he is appointed a *::::::::
All noncommissioned officers are eligible for appointment as commissioned officers
but can not be admitted to the school for commission candidates until they have
passed a certain amount of time as drill masters in the recruit Schools and have received
the recommendations of their Superior officers.
The candidates for the commissioned grade report under orders after the completion
of the recruit school course and undergo a course of instruction which is principally
*
1000 PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
theoretical and includes lectures, recitations, and examinations. At the end of the
course those who are found qualified are commissioned as Second lieutenants and pro-
ceed to their homes.
The instructor in the Swiss Army occupies a rather unique position. There are
about 230 of these divided into three classes. They are sometimes assigned to com-
mand regiments, brigades, and divisions, but the number So assigned must not exceed
one-fourth of the total. This is for the express purpose of preventing all the higher
commands from being occupied by the professional soldiers and to give the real militia
officers a chance at all grades and commands. The instructors accompany commands
and are really the advisers of the commanders more than anything else, in addition
to their duties as instructors during the training periods for recruits and noncom-
missioned officers. - *
To be given the position as an instructor the lieutenant who desires the detail must
be a college graduate and also must have taken a course at the Polytechnical School at
Zurich. Socially he must be from a family in good standing. Professionally he
must have a good record and the recommendations of his superiors. If possessed of
all these qualifications the lieutenant may make application for the detail. On receiv-
ing the approval of higher commanders he is assigned to the arm he desires and given
a station at Some training camp. At this station he teaches recruits, noncommissioned
officers, and candidates for commission. On the character of his work depends his
chances for promotion. If not a good instructor he may never rise above the third
and lowest class. -
Their principal work is at the various schools and instruction camps. During
maneuvers they are not assigned to duty unless as umpires. Once a year they meet
and make recommendations to the chief of their arm to whom they are responsible.
Instruction is made uniform throughout the Republic as a result of these conferences.
Promotion to the grade of first lieutenant comes by seniority after four to seven
years of service, provided the officer has certificates of proficiency from his command-
ing officers. After four years the first lieutenant may be made a captain but must
show actual capacity for this grade as a captain in the instruction of recruits in one
of the recruit courses. Captains are retained in the elite until 38. After passing into
the landwehr the officer either continues as a captain or hē may be promoted to the
rank of major. Promotions to the field grades are largely the result of recommenda-
tions from superiors. First lieutenants who do not get promoted to the grade of captain
pass into the landwehr as first lieutenants at 32. Captains serve in the landwehr
until the age of 44, field officers until the age of 48. In the landstrum all officers serve
until the age of 52; after that they may be retained with their own consent.
Recommendations for promotion to include the grade of lieutenant colonel go
through regular channels from the man's commanding officer to the division com-
mander and if the chief of that arm thinks the promotion merited the commission is
issued. A man must serve six years as a captain and two years as a major before he
can be promoted. For regimental and brigade commanders a board is convened,
consisting of the Secretary of war, the chief of the arm concerned, and the division
commander. This board Selects the names of two men and submits them to the
executive, who designates which of the two has his approval. Division commanders
are usually Selected from brigade commanders in the same way. General staff officers
are Selected by the Federal Council after competitive examination from officers of
the different arms proposed by Senior instructors. After a period of service they
return to the line.
When the Services of an officer are no longer required he is honorably discharged.
He receives no retired pay and no pension except for disability, and this only when
in actual need, an express restriction of the constitution. Pensions are paid to the
families of crippled or deceased soldiers according to their actual need and the number
of dependent children.
The grade of general exists only in time of war. In peace divisions and brigades
are commanded by colonels. The rates of pay are as follows:
PRiº PARISI) X tº SS FOR N A T | ( ; N Aſ D 2 FENSE. • 1001
Rate per day.
| United
TrancS. States
equivalent.
Colonel, Commanding a division. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 $6.00
Commander in chief, 50 francs ($10).
Colonel, commanding a brigade. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 5.00
Colonel, commanding a regiment. -- . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 4.00
Lieutenant Colonel-------------------------------------------------------------- 15 3.00
Major--------------------------------------------------------------------------. 12 2. 40
Captain------------------------------------------------------------------------- 10 2.00
First lieutenant----------------------------------------------------------------. 8 1. 60
Second lieutenant---------------------------------------------. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 1. 40
Personal allowance for equipment and uniforms:
Officers not mounted.------------------------------------------------. . . . . . . 200 40.00
Officers mounted.----------------------------------------------------------. 250 50.00
For equipment of horses.... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 250 50.00
The pay of the private soldier is 80 centimes a day, about 15 cents, from which a
small deduction is made for certain fixed contingent expense. (During the drill
periods and maneuvers the pay is 50 centimes a day.) Rations are furnished and con-
sist of 94 ounces of beef, 18 ounces of bread, and 22 centimes to purchase the other
articles to complete the ration. The emergency ration for the soldier consists of one
tin of meat, cost 1 franc; one box of crackers, cost half a franc; and one tin of Soup,
cost half a franc; but is divided by two men. -
Forage for animals consists of 10 pounds of oats, 12 pounds of hay, and 7 pounds of
straw. There is also a compressed forage ration, details of which are lacking.
Great attention is paid to the quality of the horses used as mounts. The Govern-
ment horse depot at Thoune provides in case of war the mounts for the higher officers
and officers other than those of the cavalry, who purchase their own horses. These
horses in time of peace are used by the staff, higher commanders, visiting officers at
maneuvers and at the school of equitation. To a limited extent some are sold to the
officers. These animals are bought mostly in Ireland, but also in Germany, and are
of better quality than the horses ordinarily purchased for cavalry. Their cost is from
$300 to $350. Horses for the artillery are usually obtained by hire. Our officers
who have observed the Swiss maneuvers found the artillery well equipped with good
horses and this system seems to work Satisfactorily.
EIorses for the cavalry are obtained by the Government buyers from different
countries; each year several hundred being bought. The animals are from 3 to 4
years old and unbroken. At the Government remount depot the horses are given a
very careful training by expert civilian trainers which takes about a year. The
animals are thoroughly broken and trained to three gaits as well as jumping. At the
end of the training period the horses are divided into three groups, viz, officers' mounts;
second, horses with curable faults usually sold to old soldiers who have lost their
mounts; third, those to be sold to the recruits who have just completed their course
of recruit instruction. Most of this class are sold at cost price, but the more desirable
ones are sometimes auctioned off to the highest bidder. The man who buys a horse
pays the Government half of the purchase price and takes the animal home. He may
use the saddle and bridle, but not the equipment. He may also use the horse as he
desires but can not lend or hire him to another person. He must keep the horse in
good condition and when called out for maneuvers or Service must appear with horse
and equipment in good condition.
At the end of each year the Government refunds to the cavalry Soldier one-tenth of
the price he has paid in. At the end of the 10 years when he leaves the Elite he has
been refunded all that he paid and the horse is his absolutely. So practically the
cavalryman has a horse for which he pays nothing and may use all the time provided
he keeps the horse in condition suitable for the military service. In case the horse
dies there must be a report made and an examination by the local veterinary. . If in
actual military service the Government pays the recruit half the value of the Soldier's
share, but the recruit pays a like amount if the death is the result of carelessness or
neglect on the part of the Soldier.
Horses are always inspected annually and reported upon so long as the Government
retains an interest in them.
1002 * PREPAREDNIESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
oRGANIZATION e
[French Year Book, 1913, last edition. Translated.]
On the 1st of April, 1912, the new organization went into effect.
follows: -
Infantry, Elite, 36 regiments; in which there are 76 battalions fusiliers; 8 battalions
carbineers; 21 battalions mountaineers.
The carbineers are combined with fusiliers by battalions to form regiments.
The 21 mountaineer battalions are organized into 8 regiments.
The battalion, 25 officers, 881 soldiers.
The company, 5 officers, 209 soldiers,
There are 15 per cent more names on the rolls than are required to fill the company.
This in order that the company will always be full when turned out.
Infantry, Landwehr, 16 regiments forming 8 brigades; 56 battalions or 212 companies
of 170 men each.
Infantry, Landstrum, 83 battalions. •
Cavalry, Elite, 8 regiments of 3 Squadrons each, forming 4 brigades; 12 companies of
guides, forming 6 groups. - -
The squadron, 4 officers, 17 noncommissioned officers, 107 troopers, 123 saddle horses,
8 draft horses.
Cavalry, Landwehr, 24 squadrons.
Cavalry, Landstrum, 13 companies(?).
Artillery, Elite, 12 regiments field artillery, 3 batteries to the battalion, 2 battal-
ions to the regiment, 2 regiments to the brigade. -
The battery, 4 or 5 officers, 1 veterinary, 8 Sergeants, 13 corporals, 118 men, 122
horses, 4 pieces.
Artillery, Landwehr, 43 companies. -
Mountain artiſlery, Elite, 4 battalions of 3 batteries each.
Mountain artillery, Landwehr, personnel for 8 batteries.
Foot and fortification artillery, Landstrum, 39 companies:
There are numerous special troops, such as engineers, Sapper battalions, railway
companies, guides, etc., but time is lacking to describe them. &
The Elite are organized into six divisions. The composition of these divisions
varies somewhat. The first, third, fifth, and sixth (mountain divisions) are organ-
ized as follows: t
Infantry, 2 brigades and 1 regiment mountain infantry, 1 battalion machine guns
(3 companies), 1 company cyclists.
Cavalry, 2 Squadrons of guides.
Artillery, 2 regiments field artillely (48 guns), 1 battalion howitzers (8 guns), 1 bat-
talion mountain artillery (8 guns).
Engineers, 1 battalion of Sappers (4 companies).
Signal corps, 1 section.
Bridge train, 1.
Telegraph company, 1.
Medical, 1 division hospital, 5 companies Sanitary troops; 1 mountain hospital, 2
Sanitary companies.
Ammunition trains, 2 companies artillery ammunition, 1 company infantry ammu-
nition, 2 pack trains. -
The mountain organizations have more men, So that the first, third, fifth, and sixth
divisions are stronger than the Second and fourth. The transportation is slightly
different. The second and fourth are organized as follows:
The strength is as

, ſº r, Avs Riding Draſt, * - Auto-
Officers. Men. borses. horses. Vehicles. Autos. trucks.
Division headquarters. . . . . . . . . . 3 63 22 22 11 5 |----------
3 infantry brigades. . . . . . . . . . . . . 482 15,061 223 676 338 ----------|----------
1 battalion M. G. guns (3 Com-
panies)----------------------- 17 209 40 92 25 ----------|----------
1 company cyclists....... - - - - - - - 6 173 ||---------- 4 2 ----------|----------
2 Squadrons guides......... . . . . . 20 298 308 16 6 ----------|----------
1 brigade artillery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108 2,095 357 1, 176 270 ----------|----------
1 division ammunition train. . . . 42 903 95 814 219.----------|----------
1 battalion Sappers-----. . . . . . . . . 24 703 22 108 35 ----------|----------
1 division bridge train. . . . . . . . . . 3 90 5 55 10 ----------|----------
1 telegraph company.... . . . . . . . . 7 143 9 32 10 ----------|----------
6 Sanitary Companies. . . . . . . . . . . 37 494 17 88 46 ----------|----------
1 division hospital. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 159 9 33 15 ----------|----------
2 subsistence companies. . . . . . . . 17 410 35 270 111 3 24
Total.-------------------- 823 20,801 1, 142 3,687 1,098 8 24
PREPAIRED NIESS FOR NATION AL DEFENSE.
1003
Strength of the principal writs and transportation units of each.
* * * * * ** Riding Pack | Draft * -
Officers. Men. horses. horses. | horses. Vehicles. | Autos.
INFANTRY.
Company----------------------- 5 209 |----------|---------- 8 4 - - - - - - - - - -
Battalion----------------------. 25 881 8 |---------- 38 19 |----------
Regiment.---------------------- 81 2,652 33 ---------- 118 59 |----------
Brigade.----------------. ------- 168 5,314 77 ---------- 238 119 |----------
CAVALRY.
Squadron.---------------------- 4. 124 123 |---------- 8 3 1. ---------
Regiment.----------. . . . . . . . . . . . 17 378 376 - - - - - - - - - - 24 9 |----------
Brigade------------------------. 45 895 893 24 66 26 5
ARTILLIERY.
Battery------------------------- 5 138 21 |---------- 106 18 l.---------
Battalion.---------------------- 20 420 70 ---------- 324 55 ----------
Regiment----------------------- 47 844 145 ||---------- 650 111 ||----------
Brigade------------------------. 108 2,095 357 ---------- 1,476 270 - - - - - - - - - -
ARMAMENT.
Infantry: & © 2 tº &
Rifle, cal. 7 mm., initial velocity 600 meters.
Ammunition— ---
On the man, 120 rounds.
On wagons, 86. (Am. Co. 100.) Res. 480.
Cavalry: *-
Carbine, cal. 7 mm., initial velocity 575 meters.
Ammunition— -
On the man, 60 rounds; in Saddle pocket, 30.
On the wagons, 25.
Saber.
• Light cannon.
Field artillery:
Model 1903 Krupp, cal. 75 mm.
With the battery, 280 rounds.
Ammunition Cos., 230 rounds.
Model 1903 Krupp, 75 mm.
Mountain artillery:
With the battery, 144 rounds.
With the “convoy,” 414 rounds.
Intrenching tools:
Carried by infantry, per company—
80 intrenching spades or shovels.
20 picks.
8 hatchets.
4 wire cutters.
Cavalry (carried in wagon)—
20 shovels, 10 picks, 21 wire cutters.
Engineers by battalion—
1,800 shovels.
1,080 picks.
378 hatchets and axes.
168 wire cutters.
36 Saws.
1,150 sandbags.
(Res. 290.)
Of the infantry pack, Col. Bell, one of the observers from our own army reports as
follows:
“The pack carried by the Swiss soldier is one of the heaviest in the world, as each
soldier in the infantry carries a load of about 66 pounds; but there was no complaint,
and for two days, a short time before maneuvers, I was in the mountains with a
recruit battalion, while they were undergoing training and firing at unknown dis-
tances, at from 500 to 1,200 meters, and the pack seemed to bother them very little.
No attention whatever was paid to ordinary rain or wet grass, and all maneuvers upon
the wet ground or in the rain were the same as if the sun were shining. I am told that
no bad results occurred from such practice which probably arises from the fact that very
1004 PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
little rest is given and the men are kept moving. On the day I left them they started
on a four-hour climb up the mountains, with pack and Alpine stocks, to do their shoot-
ing. ...I saw them through field glasses three hours after they started still climbing
steadily upward.” $º -
Maj. Mott, of our Army, who has spent much time in Switzerland and whose reports
are probably the most interesting and instructive of any rendered, gives the following
description of the Swiss rifle clubs: - ſº
“Upon the reorganization of her military system in 1874, creating a national instead
of a cantonal or state militia, Switzerland wisely took advantage of the old customs
and while proclaiming that every citizen must be trained as a soldier, added that his
arms, uniform, and equipment furnished by the state must be kept by him in his home.
Thus was confirmed if not created the means whereby the poorest peasant could
practically own a modern $20 rifle, receive some free ammunition, and get more on
easy terms.
“The enthusiasm and peculiarities of youth were moreover remembered, and the
Cadet Corps, ranging from 11 to 16, and the preparatory corps, ranging from 16 to 20
were encouraged by law. The small boys were supplied with a safe and serviceable
light gun, and the big ones with the regulation musket; army officers teach them
to drill and shoot and public ranges are given them to practice on.
“Any man who remembers how he felt at the idea of owning and shooting a rifle
when he was between 14 and 18 years of age has little difficulty in appreciating the
Sound military policy which dictates this encouragement of youthful spirit in the
direction of shooting by furnishing arms and ammunition, instructors, and ranges to
boys at the age when their tastes are being formed and when to possess a rifle is an
unspeakable joy. The influence is felt outside the active members of the boys’ corps,
which are, by the nature of things, mostly confined to towns and to boys whose parents
are a little easy, and there can be small doubt that the example of these proud young-
sters goes far to shape the ambitions and form the taste of those who for one reason or
another are not members of the corps.”
We all know the effect produced upon a town or a school by the possession of a
champion baseball or football team; every boy wants to play ball. Shooting clubs in
Switzerland take the place of our baseball teams.
In 1904 there were nearly 13,000 boys between 11 and 20 years belonging to these
corps; omitting about 3,000 of the youngest, all were reported to be fair shots. Reck-
oning according to population, if this system existed in the United States, there would
be nearly 300,000 boys instructed in drill and shooting, over 200,000 of whom would
be fair shots with the Army rifle. - - .
That target shooting is the great national sport in Switzerland is attested by the
eternal crack of the rifle which assails one's ears in every part of that country, no
less than by the evidence of statistics. -
In 1904 there were 3,656 shooting clubs under Federal control or encouragement,
with a membership of 218,815. In 1902, the membership was 213,567; in 1898,
210,524; in 1894, 133,486. Thus the clubs are not only fully alive but are increasing
in strength. The total population of Switzerland is only about three and a half
millions. If shooting clubs existed in similar proportions in the United States the
membership would attain approximately 5,898,000.
A shooting club voluntarily adopts such statutes as it chooses, has its matches
as it likes, and in general is a perfectly free and voluntary organization, just as such a
club would be in America. The influence of the Government is felt in three ways:
First, each commune in Switzerland, is obliged by Federal law to maintain at public
expense a safe and suitable target range of not less than 300 meters. On this range
all legally organized shooting clubs of the commune have a right to shoot. Thus the
club is at no expense for its range. Second, the Federal Government offers a substan-
tial subsidy (maximum of 4 francs per member) to each club whose members have done
certain prescribed shooting in the year. Third, any soldier who, during the year he
is not called out for service, presents his target book, proving that he has done the
prescribed military target practice for the year with the club of which he is a member,
is excused from summons to a military range that year. Thus, most Soldiers, if merely
for their own interest, join clubs, for if they do not they are required to present them-
selves during the year they are not called out, at the division target range and do
three days’ target practice. During these three days they are housed and fed, but
receive no pay and no indemnity for the time lost. This ruling applies to company
officers and to all noncommissioned officers and privates armed with the musket.
The state pays for cartridges used by soldiers shooting their prescribed scores, but
for no others. (They are also permitted to buy Government cartridges in excess
of their allowance at reduced rates.)
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 1005
‘‘ In 1904, the Swiss Army shot nearly 6,000,000 musket-ball cartridges; the shooting
clubs shot over 21,000,000 ball cartridges for the army musket.
“These clubs are self-supporting; the Canton gives them nothing; the commune
furnishes the range. The expenses are very small. The entrance fee to a club is
about 2 or 3 francs and the annual dues about 15 cents.”
Rapid mobilization is possible on account of the system by which the Swiss Army
is maintained. Col. Bell, another observer, gives the following description of the
mobilization of a battalion:
“As an example of the mobilization of a battalion of the Swiss Army, I would
state that on September 25, 1911, the Forty-first Battalion was ordered to mobilize
in a certain Square in Lucerne. In this square were several tables, and between
8 and 9 o'clock the men commenced to report, completely equipped. As soon as a
man reported he took his place in the section to which he belonged, and then com-
menced a general inspection of the man and his entire equipment by the lieutenants
in charge of these sections. The inspection was most thorough, every article being
held up and examined; socks being pulled apart to see that they had no holes in them;
trousers were examined to see that they wel e sound and in good condition, as were
all other articles of clothing. Every soldier had a good pair of extra shoes besides the
Serviceable pair he wore. The meat can and canteen were thoroughly inspected
and a short time was given to the men to clean rifles, each man being provided with
rags which he had brought for this purpose, at once cleaned his rifle, and then the
breechblock being removed and a mirror being put in the breech, each piece was
thoroughly scrutinized; the breechblock was examined, put in place, and tried
in the gun several times to see that it worked properly. -
“The dress coats in which the men reported were taken off, carefully tagged and
marked, and blouses were brought over to the company from storehouses in which
they had been kept, all having been washed and thoroughly repaired since the last
time they had been used. The dress coats were carefully folded and wrapped up in
the clothes in which the blouses had been packed. Each man Selected a blouse,
which, after he had adjusted the belt, was thoroughly inspected by the Section com-
mander, and in case it did not fit, the man was compelled to change with Some other
man or to obtain another blouse. At the end of the inspection the blouses looked
very well, and after everything had been thoroughly inspected the surgeon, accompan-
nied by the section commander, made a thorough inspection of the arms and hands
of each man.
“Three cooks had reported early, and by noon a good dinner, consisting of Soup,
sausage, and bread, was issued to the men. There was no loud talking, laughter, or
boisterous conduct of any kind, and there was no confusion. The entrenching tools
which the men did not keep were issued to them, and before noon each man had his
complete equipment in every way and the major had given what instructions he
desired to his captains, the captains giving them to the lieutenants, and the lieu-
tenants to their subordinates. At 8 o’clock in the morning there had been practically
nothing in the square. Before 2 o’clock there was a complete body of trained Soldiers
who had been organized; and the band, with a platoon, was sent down to escort the
colors to the battalion, which were received very much in the same way as our own
people do on such an occasion. After the colors were received and the guard had
taken its proper place, the band played the national anthem, and the entire battalion
sang it. After this was over the battalion marched to the station with its wagon train
and entrained, without any noise, confusion, or delay. Flyerything, had been pro-
vided for and arranged beforehand. I saw two other battalions entrain; there being
a few points of difference, but no confusion. * º
“To the unpracticed eye, accustomed only to see troops in parade and moving with
the precision of the parade ground, the maneuvers of the Swiss Army may be mis-
leading, but to the trained soldier, who can separate at a glanco the essentials from
the nonessentials, it is apparent that the Swiss is a man who has received an excellent
training in fieldwork, and while he may be far from perfect in many things, mostly
because of the shortness of the time at his disposal, there is nothing essential that has
been onlitted in the instruction required of him, so when the time arrives that his
services are needed, his country has reason to believe this training will be sufficient
to enable him to defend her intelligently and to the best of his ability. e - e.
“A professional soldier may, of course, find much to criticize about the niceties of
military training, but there is something about this army which impresses him. With
its potential power, and makes it more to be dreaded than some regular military
establishment which shows more skill and precision in exercises, but does not possess
the endurance, education, and wonderful patriotism which could endure anywhere.
One short campaign or good skirmish would correct the few faults or deficiencies .
observed, and would make the Swiss Army a magnificient fighting machine.” (Col.
Bell's report on the Swiss Maneuvers, 1911.)
1006 PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
The Swiss war department need not be described in detail. Briefly it is directed
by a secretary of war and divided into bureaus which direct the recruiting, the supply
and instruction of the troops. A limited number of instructors are on duty at the war
department and with a small staff of clerks and employees handle every necessary
detail of coordination. -
It has already occurred, no doubt, that the existence and common use of three
national languages would be a handicap to the satisfactory control of the troops, espe-
cially in campaign. There seems to be very little difficulty arising from this condi-
tion. The troops from German-speaking cantons are brigaded together so that each
complete unit uses but one language. The higher commanders and the instructors
and staff are fluent in all the languages used. . Many of the Swiss can speak both Frénch
and German and some Italian in addition, linguistic ability not being confined to the
instructors and higher commanders.
Such is the military system of Switzerland. Time and again it has been pointed
out to us by various writers of this country, principally military, as the proper system
for us to adopt. It undoubtedly has many excellent features, but, upon close analysis,
is it suitable for our needs? - -
In the first place, Switzerland is a small country, part of it very mountainous.
The very nature of it would seem to preclude much travel to and fro or much com-
plexity of life. This latter is most plainly indicated by the fact that the majority of
its business consists in the entertainment of tourists, its next great industry, the
business of grazing. In addition to this simplicity of existence there is in the Swiss
character a certain contentment and lack of ambition for material place and power
and that species of family discipline which is everywhere present on the Continent
of Europe and is So Sadly lacking in England and this country.
All these factors lend exactly to the success of just such a military system as the
Swiss have evolved. -
As an offset to this, we have a country that is very vast in comparison with tiny
Switzerland. Our citizens are possessed of a spirit of unrest that keeps a large propor-
tion of the population oscillating to and fro a greater part of the time, either on busi-
ness or pleasure, and making it difficult to subject them to any fixed set of rules that
would insure their presence at a time and place where needed for military duty or
instruction. Our national distaste for military duty, our intense spirit of selfishness
with its concomitant manifestations, love of luxury and waning patriotism, our lack
of discipline and our disinclination to subject ourselves to restriction of any kind
would militate most strongly against the success of a scheme like the Swiss, even
were it adopted. - *
We have only to look critically at our present militia system which is, after all, a
fair approximation of the Swiss system, and to remember how nearly it comes to being
worthless as a means of producing an efficient soldiery, to be convinced that even the
broad outlines of that system could have no effective application here.
The method of training school children for possible future use in war is good in
theory and finds its counterpart in this country in the numerous military colleges
and State universities having military departments. Can this be used in the United
States in the same manner as in Switzerland? To do so it would appear necessary to
have the entire school system of the United States, at least in so far as would be neces-
sary for the purpose of imparting military instruction, under the supervision of the
War Department. This would require probably a change in the Constitution in the
first place. Then it would be necessary to secure thousands of specially equipped
persons as teachers. There would have to be made arrangements for the pay of these
teachers and for enforcing on the school authorities throughout the country the em-
ployment of these teachers and the adoption of just such forms of instruction as might
be decided upon by the War Department. For without uniformity of instruction the
entire effort would be wasted. An undertaking so vast in scope and requiring the
interference of the General Government in so local a matter as the schools of the
country could scarcely be hoped for.
The organization of rifle clubs is excellent, but thousands of them would be required
to produce an appreciable effect on the shooting abilities of the American citizenry.
When we remember how difficult it is to get a reasonable rifle range near any military
post in the country to-day and keep it going without the annoyance of injunctions
gotten out by citizens living in the vicinity of the post, we realize at once that in this
alone exists an almost insurmountable obstacle. Then, again, arise questions con-
cerning who will instruct the members; can we afford the immense amount of ammu-
nition required; will it be possible without much individual hardship to require the
members to attend? - t
A successful system of rifle clubs could be inaugurated only if the individual citizens
of this country possessed the same desire individually to learn to shoot and to excel in
PREPAIRED NIESS FOR, NATIONAL DEFENSE. 1007
shooting that they do usually to succeed in business or sports or other form of private
enterprise. A moment's reflection will show that they do not and that the chances
are they never will.
If the Swiss System is inapplicable and if, as is obvious, it would be impossible to
provide Scientifically for the defense of this country by the simple process of expanding
the present Regular Army to Suitable proportions on account of the expense, the
inability to get recruits of the proper character, the impossibility of forming an ade-
quate Second line, etc., what then is the solution of this difficulty roblem for the
United States?
Whatever may be the details of that Solution, careful consideration indicates that
the following would seem to be its most essential elements:
First. A colonial army System for the protection of our foreign possessions.
Second. Division of the home territory into division districts.
Third. The division districts to be sufficient in number to provide for the first line
defense of the United States.
Fourth. The establishment of a modern division post with suitable maneuver
ground, target facilities, etc., at a strategic point in the division district.
Fifth. The maintenance at division headquarters of a complete and permanent
corps of officers and noncommissioned officers from division commander down, with
all the equipage, supplies, etc., that are required for the division to take the field at
a moment’s notice. -
Sixth. A system by which, if the division is not usually maintained at full war
strength it can be raised to full war strength in a few hours by the addition of fairly
well trained men.
Seventh. A system whereby the division can be kept up to full war strength,
regardless of the losses incident to campaigning, by the addition of fairly well-trained
men coming from the same division district.
d Eighth. Accurate records at division headquarters of the births and deaths in the
istrict.
Ninth. A system whereby the division can enforce military training for a period
not less than one year on the male population, or a percentage thereod, in its district.
Tenth. A system whereby the division will return to civilian pursuits each year a
certain percentage of men with not less than a year’s military training, with the
necessary arrangements for securing the services of these men in time of war.
Eleventh. A system by which new divisions properly equipped and filled with
fairly well-trained men, can be promptly organized in the division district for the
Second line of defense.
Twelfth. A system whereby these new divisions will be properly provided with
officers and noncommissioned officers having a reasonable amount of training as such,
without having to wait until that training is obtained before being fit for Service.
. The article by Mr. Frederick A. Kuenzli is as follows:
WHAT DOES THE MILITARY PoELCY AND STRENGTH OF THE SWISS REPUBLIC SUGGEST
FOR OUR NATIONAL DEFENSE?
“The national defense is one of the cardinal duties of a statesman.” (John Adams.)
“The United States and Switzerland have common principles of life, common
ideals and common aspirations.” (President Woodrow Wilson.)
&
INTRODUCTION.
Our eyes are turned toward Switzerland. Thousands of miles from the scene of
the bloody conflict now devastating Europe, America must confess concern over her
own nonpreparedness, while Switzerland, lying in the very midst of the slaughter, is
serene and secure, because she is prepared.
It is, therefore, only natural that we should ask ourselves if we can not attain that
Same degree of security by adopting a modified form of the Swiss military system.
Can we transplant the Swiss system to America? All of it? No; nor would it be
desirable if we could. Part of it, and the best part, we surely can transplant. To
demonstrate that to do so would be the most logical method of establishing a proper
military preparedness, and to show how this could be done so as to harmonize with
our social and political conditions are the purposes of this work.
Peace ends in war and war again ends in peace. A nation while at peace ought to
prepare for the time when war is to be her lot.
We are told of countries which for centuries are more or less war loving, ruled by
dynasties for whom war was the welcome means of expanding their territorial pOS-
I008 PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
sessions as well as their trade. They had armies of men that made warfare their
life's occupation. Those men did not care for the causes or the purpose of the fighting
they did. g & e *
It was the wars of liberation and defense of independence, history teaches us, that
the patriotic spirit as a new factor came to rank very highly in deciding the success
of battle. Up to that time skill and drill were looked upon as the qualities a soldier
had to possess while the “why” and “what for” of his fighting was none of his
business. . . . e e & e e a º & g’
The fighting spirit of the inhabitants of the territories which afterwards are known
to us as the “Swiss Republic” and the Thirteen States was not a spirit for mere lust
for war, but it was the impulsive love for their sacred possessions. ‘.
The poet's verses in “William Tell” illustrates this spirit in wonderful words:
When the oppressed can nowhere turn for justice,
When the burden grows intolerable,
Then with a good cheer his hand to heaven he liſts,
* And his eternal rights that hang above,
Inalienable and irrefragable
As are the stars themselves, them he takes down
The primal state of Nature comes again
When man his fellow man confrontings stands,
And in the last resort, where other means
Will naught avail, the sword is given him. .
The highest good we rightly may defend
Against the assaults of violence
We stand for country, for our wives we stand, our children.
It took the regular soldiers of those days a long time to understand how the peasants
with little or no training could be of much value in the game of war, but the wonder-
ful deeds of the citizen-soldiers convinced the whole world what a patriotic spirit
could do. . tº e - . * • tº
What surprise and satisfaction the wonderful qualities of the liberty loving Swiss
and Americans brought to the “noble” soldiers we are told by Attinghausen in Schil-
ler’s “William Tell” when Melchthal told him about the plan of the peasants to over-
throw the Austrian tyrants:
What, hath the yeoman from his own resources
Unaided of the nobles, dared such deed?
In his own strength had he such confidence,
Nay, then, where is no longer need of us,
Blithely we may go down into the grave.
All dies not with us. Nay, through other strengths
His glorious heritage shall man retain. -
Forth from this head, whereon the apple lay,
A new, a better liberty shall Spring. . . .
The ancient order topples, changes the time,
And from the wreck, new life is blossoming.
And the words of Washington, when he, on his way to take command of the Army,
heard how the minutemen fought in the Battle of Bunker Hill, exclaimed: “The
liberties of the country are safe.”
In the Alpine Republic, as well as in the Thirteen States, professional soldiery for the
love of war vanished, and whenever the sons of the aristocrats of the two Republics chose
the military career, it was to train their bodies and minds to be of utmost value to their
beloved country should the need of protecting the independence ever come, but the
necessity of having a separate class of citizens intrusted solely with the defense of the
nation was repugnant to the democratic ideas of the Republics, in which, liberty and
independence is first in the hearts of all. Again the poet pictures the dependence of
the citizen and soldier of a nation excellently, when he says:
Melchthal: -
Why then, here's my hand! e º gº º
The peasant’s handgrip, noble Sir, it is
A man’s word too. "What is the Knight without us?
And older our condition is than yours.
Rudenz:
I honor it, and with my sword will shield it.
Melchthal:
The selfsame arm, Sir Kane, that doth subdue the stubborn earth, and make her bosom fruitful,
Can Shield a man’s breast too.
Rudenz:
Aye, ye shall shield my breast,
And your breast I will shield,
And so either through other will be strong. . ..!
For America the years following the War of Independence until the sixties of the
nineteenth century peaceable occupation of the citizens were not interrupted to any
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 1009
great degree. The peasants and toilers, the manufacturers and merchants could go
after their trades and follow their walks in life. . During the long period of peace,
which the majority of the American people enjoyed, the soldier part of the citizen was
neglected; the rifles and the Swords which the forefathers were so handy with, now
dusty and rusty, were hanging untouched on the walls of their comfortable firesides.
The isolation of the United States from the firebrand of the European powers could
prevent any military action against the fast-growing Republic of the West, and there-
fore the absence of immediate danger of war made the people forget to be prepared.
One was not aware of the danger of civil war until a short time before the conflagra-
tion actually broke out. Had the United States Government at that time had a some-
what adequate force of loyal, trained troops the Battle of Bull Run would have been
the only battle of the Civil War. It would have resulted in the quelling of the rebel-
lion and the preventing of the terrible bloodshed for four years, and the ruinous
draining of the Nation’s finances.
Switzerland also enjoyed a comparatively quiet period from 1813 up to 1914, with
the exception of the Civil War, or the War of Secession in 1847, when, after 556 years
of partnership in the old Republic of Helvetia, 10 of the Cantons (States) thought that
religious and political differences would not allow them to live any longer under the
same governmental roof with the other 14 States seceded and formed, under the pro-
tection of the ancient common arch enemy, Austria, a separate Republic. But the
strong hand of the Government and the readiness of its loyal citizen soldiers put the
rebellion down inside of 20 days. Gen. Tufour, commissioned as the Federal general,
had in a few days 100,000 Soldiers mobilized. His brilliant strategy in moving with
seven columns, excellently officered, toward the rebellious States succeeded in the
capitulation of one State after another, and in the absolute rout of the confederate
force which numbered about 85,000 men. The losses on both sides were only a few
hundred killed and some thousand wounded. -
The sublime thought that forces itself upon the mind of the reader of history of
the two Tepublics is: - *
The training of the men, the perfection of the arms, numerical superiority, and the
directions of the brightest military minds are not so much responsil le for success in
war as is the spirit that lives in an army.
But here is where a mistaken conviction seizes our minds. Because America.
triumphed in the evolution, in the War of 1812, in the Mexican War, and in the
Great I’ebellion a great many of our people think that patriotism and the traditional
fighting spirit of the American are the sole qualifications for a defender's calling,
and neglect in the long periods of peace the training of the citizens or the establish-
ment of an adequate standing army.
Switzerland, on the other hand, hemmed in by the four great military powers,
Germany, France, Italy, and Austria, in constant danger of being brought in the
frequent war embroilment of the surrounding nations and being made the battle field
of the European nations, was forced to put her whole people in arms. Since 1848
the Alpine . .epublic prepared, not to side with any of the powers in a war of aggres-
sion or expansion, but to offer a powerful resistance should any attempt be made to
violate her neutrality in misusing her territory. Switzerland is neutral, not by the
orders of the lig powers of Europe, but by her own voluntary conclusions. To this
policy of neutrality the Alpine epul lic is going to adhere, but we should not forget
that in placing her powerful military forces to guard the borders the prote: tion of
her neutrality is not the ultimate duty, but the preservation of her liberty and inde-
pendence at all hazards and at any cost.
It is not generally known that the modern constitution of the Swiss erublic,
adorted in 1848, was principally molded after the Constitution of the United States.
The old Swiss constitution before 1848 looked like a sample card of States with
different constitutions.
There we found “pure democracies” like Uri, Schwyz, Unterwalden, Glarus, Zug,
and Appenzell; “aristocratic democracies” with constitutions like Zurich, Basel,
Schaffhausen; and the “pure aristocracies’ like Bern, Luzern, Fribourg, and Solo-
thurn.
The cause of these conditions we must seek in the foundation and development
of the Republic. The federation was not the product of one casting or of one seces-
Sion, as for instance the formation of the United States; neither the product of a unit,
well-thought-out plan, but the growth of the three first Cantons by gradual additions
through five centuries. Cantons, often single-handed, made treaties with other
nations. Bern and Zurich many times were states in the state, and often more pow-
erful than Helvetia herself.
23380—PT 21—16—2
1010 IPREPAIRED NESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
To the Congress in Vienna 1814, when the borders of the States of Europe were
reshaped, the federation had three plenipotentiaries, but Cantons like Bern, Vaud,
Aargau, Graubunden, and Geneva sent their special delegates to work for their Can-
ton’s interests.
The Federal spirit was lacking. But, when, in 1848, the new constitution was
adopted, the Republic, then 557 years old, was reborn, and has since worked herself
into the most free and progressive land on earth. -
The Republic of Switzerland consists of 22 states, called Cantons. Two of these,
Basel and Appenzell, are each divided in two politically independent parts, namely,
Basel city district and Basel county district, and Appenzell in Inner and Outer
Appenzell or Inner and Outer Rhoden. * - -
The Swiss form of government now is in one principal point even more representa-
tive and democratic than ours, as it does not invest one man with the executive power
in nation or states.
The President of the Swiss Republic is only the chairman for one year of an execu-
tive body of seven men called Bundesrat-Conseil Federal, which is intrusted with all
the power which the United States places in the hands of one man, the President.
The election of the members of the Bundesrat as well as the chairman, called the
president, takes place annually during the winter season by Congress, which consists .
of the House of Representatives, Nationalrat, Conseil National, and the Senate,
Ständerat-Conseil d’Etat. +.
The president can not succeed himself, in other words can not preside for two
consecutive years. --
The annual election of the members of the Bundesrat is in fact a mere reelection,
unless a member resigns or dies during the year of administration, which would neces-
sitate the election of a new member. - -
In the states, Cantons, the executive power is exercised by a body of five to seven
men instead of a governor—called the Kantonsrat-Conseil Cantonal.
The legislature of the Cantons is only a single chamber with no Senate, and is called
the Grosse Rat-grand conseil. -
Switzerland has three official languages, German, French, and Italian.
German is spoken by 2,500,000 inhabitants of the Cantons: Bern, Luzern, Zurich,
Basel, Solothurn, Zug, Aargau, Thurgau, St. Gallen, Appenzell, Uri, Schwyz, Unter-
walden, Glarus, Schaffhausen, and thé greater part of Graubündell.
F French by 800,000 inhabitants of the Cantons; Geneva, Vaud, Valais, Neuchatel,
Tribourg. - º
Italian by 300,000 inhabitants of the Canton Ticino and part of Graubunden and
Valais.
The official language in the German speaking Cantons is German, in the French
speaking, French; and in the Canton Ticino, Italian. -
In debates of the national goverrimental bodies anyone of the three languages can
be used as almost every representative masters them, and the minutes are translated
into the three.
The Federal constitution adopted in 1848 by a popular vote of 170,000 against
70,000 and with 15% Cantons in the affirmative, provided that: “Every Swiss is bound
to do military service,” making Switzerland the first nation to introduce compulsory
service in modern times. *
The Federal Government took over the business of instructing the engineer corps,
the artillery and the cavalry and the training of the instructors for the infantry and
§: higher officers, while the instruction itself of the infantry was left to the various
Santons.
By still another revision of the constitution in 1874, military administration was
further centralized. By these last provisions, the army of the Republic was made to
consist of the contingents from the Cantons. The enrollment of the contingents,
their care, and the appointment and promotion of the officers remained with the
Cantons, controlled by general rules laid down by the Federal Government.
The latter, however, took over all instruction, training, arming (free of charge), and
right to enact military legislation. The Cantons may appoint and promote officers
* # the grade of major, but only when made permissible by a Federal certificate of
ability. -
Until 1895 other changes in military administration took place, but there was still
room for improvement. The officers’ Societies (membership is compulsory for every
officer), especially the younger officers, worked hard to bring about another revision
of the military clause of the constitution, having a complete centralization in view.
But vast expenditures for the creation of the Landsturm in 1886, the fortifications
around the St. Gotthard and around St. Maurice (these two fortifications alone costing
over $7,000,000) and the rearming of the infantry (costing over $9,000,000) and demands
PREPAIRED NESS FOR, NATIONAL DEFENSE. 1011
of Some overzealous instructors, had provoked a widespread dissatisfaction through
Sober Switzerland. These days gave birth to “antimilitarism.” Several influential
newspapers nourished the discontent, and began to attack and seek to discredit the
officers, charging them with the desire to “Prussianize” the army.
A period of over 20 years of peace among the great European powers, the ever
growing propaganda of the dreamers of “world peace,” the successful agitation of
foreign-born citizens with socialistic tendencies, who pointed to the three years
military service of the neighboring States as a menace surely to materialize in Switzer-
land, as well as a tremendous national debt, should the Swiss people want to hold
pace in military efficiency with other nations, were great obstacles to an effective
preparedness of Switzerland in the nineties of the last century.
“We do not need any additional preparation,” the pacifists of Switzerland cried in
those days. “Think of the money, modern rifles, º guns, modern fortifications,
longer courses of training would cost? Why should we go to all these expenses when
there will never be another European war?” Such was the gospel preached and
cried out from the Alps to the Rhine, from the Jura Hills to the Tyrolean Mountains.
Small wonder that the Swiss peasants lent a more attentive ear to such arguments than
to the men who could not yet see the millenium on the threshold of Europe and who
urged people to prepare. Everything connected with the military institutions was .
decidedly unpopular—even the soldiers uniform was scorned. *
The Federal legislature was in a quandry, as the referendum to any appropriation
or military legislation would surely be taken and the proposition brought to a popular
vote, a negative result of which nobody could doubt. Thus an undermining of disci-
pline was brought about that Saddened every true Swiss Soldier. .
Some able officers sought to stem the tide of public opinion that seemed running
against them, but with little success. The popular chord was tuned for the time
being to “antimilitarism.” A captain of the general staff, a dashing and intelligent
fellow and officer, Fritz Gertsch by name, undertook to enlighten the people on the
necessity of good discipline for the efficiency of any army. He published a pamphlet
entitled: “Arm or Disarm,” which, in logical language, said:
“There is only one Swiss Soldier, only one Swiss Army possible, and that is a soldier
whose ºftence is unconditional and an army with the strictest discipline always
enforced.”
In pointed words he attacked the newspapers that had incited a disregard of dis-
cipline among the Soldiers.
“The first thing I would doin case of war between the Republic and another nation,”
he wrote, “would be to confiscate every newspaper and thereby prevent information
of our condition or movements from reaching the enemy.”
Gertsch's pamphlet was a sensation. Not only those newspapers which felt that
“the shoe would fit them, ” but nearly all newspapers took a fling at the fearless cap-
tain, and so to heart did he take this unjust criticism that he handed in his resignation.
Col. Ulrich Wille, then chief of cavalry, and a great disciplinarian, had supported
Gertsch whole-heartedly, and he too was forced into seclusion. The people had to
have their victims.
On November 3, 1895, the proposed revision of the military article was defeated
by a vote of 270,000 to 200,000. - -
But such a setback could not permanently discourage the real leaders of “the
people in arms.” In a short time a great change of sentiment took place, and Wille
and Gertsch “came back.” The former is at present, since the recent mobilization,
the general of the Swiss Army and Gertsch is the commander of a brigade.
The highest rank in the Swiss Army, when on a peace footing, is that of colonel.
In time of mobilization a joint session of the Senate and House of Representatives
elects a general as the chief of the entire army. But only three Swiss have ever car-
ried this honor. They were Henry Dufour in 1857, when Switzerland mobilized
against Prussia, Hans Herzog in 1879, at the of the Franco-Prussian War, and now
Ulrich Wille.
Within 12 years from the defeat of the proposed revision of the military article a
great change in sentiment took place. The certainty was brought home to the Swiss
people that only by a strong and efficient army could the independence of the army be
upheld. November 5, 1907, was a red-letter day for the Alpine citizenry. By an
immense majority the military article of the constitution was amonded as the officers
of the army had desired. Here are some of the Salient features of the organization as
it stands to-day:
It provides for three army corps, each corps consisting of two divisions. The organ-
ization of divisions takes cognition of the language spoken in the Cantons.
The first division is French speaking, and derives its contingements from the Cantons
of Geneve, Valais, and Vaud; the second division is French speaking from Neuchâtel,
1012 PREPAREDINESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
Fribourg, and Jura bernois. Divisions 3, 4, and 5 are recruiting their men from the
German-speaking Cantons of Barn, Luzern, Solothurn, Basel, Aargau, St. Gallen,
Zurich, and Schaffhausen. The sixth division, with the Italian language as tha prin-
cipal language of command, embraces the Cantons of Ticino, Graubunden, and parts
of St. Gallen and Appenzell. As each division contains three brigades, the federation
has 18 infantry brigades of the first line. In four of the divisions the third brigade is a
mountain brigade of infantry. Each regiment of infantry has attached to it one
company with 12 machine guns. & - -
The Swiss Army has 72 batteries of field artillery, assembled in 12 regiments, and
also six batteries of howitzers for each of the six divisions; also 12 companies (4 guns
each) of foot artillery and 24 batteries of mountain artillery.
About 5,000 cavalry are in the first line, attached to the division and at the dis-
position of the army commander.
Every male Swiss at his nineteenth year must undergo a mental and physical
examination. If he passes the test and is recruited as an infantry soldier, he enters
the service in his twentieth year. - - -
The first year he serves for 67 days in a recruiting school, and after that for 13 days
each year until he is 28. He belongs to the first line for four years longer, until he is
32, but is not bound to do any yearly Service during that period. -
From 32 to 42 he belongs to the second line or Landwehr. In this capacity he serves
for one week every second year. For six years, until he is 48, he serves in the
Landsturm, and is called to the colors twice for a period of one week. In addition,
every Landwehr and Landsturm soldier presents himself for annual inspection, when
he must account for the care of his uniform and arms. A private of infantry, there-
fore, serves from his twentieth year to his forty-second year, 67/7%l3/5X7=193 days'
service, which means an average of 9 days of active service per year for 22 years.
During the 67 days’ course for infantry recruits especial care and time is devoted
to making the recruit a good shot.
In civil life every Swiss soldier is compelled to be a member of a rifle club, under
the Supervision of which he must yearly undergo a rifle shooting test, consisting of
6×6, or 36 shots, with a minimum of 75 per cent hits and 60 per cent points for each
©XOTCISG. - -
The last day of each year for the return of this annual test to be filed is July 15.
To insure a good return one can practice on the shooting range whenever he chooses,
from early spring until such time as he feels himself fit to take the compulsory test.
The Federal Government refunds to all those who pass the cost of the ammunition
used and pays to each rifle club the sum of 2 francs (39 cents) for each man coming
up to the required mark.
Woe to the chap that fails in this rigid test. He is looked down upon by all of his
comparions, and in November or December he is again compelled to don his uniform,
shoulder his rifle, and go to the nearest recruiti, g place, where he practices shooting
under the eyes of special instructors until he passes the mark required for 36 shots.
We find in Switzerland at the present time 4,500 rifle clubs with a membership of
400,000 men. An expenditure of 2,000,000 francs is the cost to the Government of
the compulsory shootirg exercises. One hundred shots is the approximate number
a Swiss fires in target practice each year.
This consistent and persisteſt system of rifle practice makes every Swiss Soldier a
crack shot and is primarily responsible for the high state of efficiency of the army.
That the proficiency in shootiig grows immensely from year to year is visible from
the following facts: w
Federal “Scheutzenfests” are held every three years, and the highest awards in,
those events is the title of “MeisterSchuetze,” given to those who make 75 hits out of
\00 shots within an 8-inch circle, in kneeling position, at a distance of 330 yards.
In 1900 at Luzerne 4 Meisterschuetzen were proclaimed.
In 1904 at St. Gall 13 MeisterSchuetzen were proclaimed.
In 1907 at Zurich 27 Meisterschuetzen were proclaimed.
In 1910 at Berne 128 Meisterschuetzen were proclaimed.
Undoubtedly there are hundreds, if not thousands, of Swiss who could make this
* but every Swiss has not the money to spend to take part in a Federal Scheutzen-
est. - -
The extent of interest in these scheutzenfests can be imagined from the fact that at
Berne, in 1910, 300 gallery stands were erected and in use. At every stand there
were from 30 to 40 men waiting for their tuns, some of them waiting for 10 or 12 hours.
The same year the Rheinische Scheutzenfest took place in Germany, at Karlsruhe,
for a district five times the size of Switzerland, and there only 50 gallery stands were
in use, and rarely more than three men at a time waiting for their turns to shoot.
FREPAIRED NIESS FOR, NATIONAL DEFENSE. 1013
During the same year, 1910, there were a total of 44,000,000 shots fired in rifle prac-
tice in Switzerland, with its 4,000,000 population. t
In Germany (population 67,000,000) there were only 30,000,000 practice shots
fired, and in France (population 40,000,000) 20,000,000. It is still remembered that
at the international shoot in Camp Perry, Ohio, September, 1913, Switzerland came
out ahead of all competing nations. The official returns were:
Switzerland--------------------------------------------------------------- 4, 959
France------------------------------------------------------------------- 4,767
United States-------------------------------------------------------------- 4, 578
Sweden.------------------------------------------------------------------ 4, 577
Peru. -------------------------------------------------------------------- 3,892
Canada.------------------------------------------------------------------- 3,760
Up to this year Switzerland carried first honors in 17 out of 18 international shoots.
So much for rifle practice; now turn to the training of the army officers. Any Swiss
that has the ambition and the intelligence can become an officer in the army. After
completing the course of 67 days in the recruiting school, if his conduct during that time
warrants a recommendation from his superiors, he gets a call to attend a school for non-
commissioned officers, lasting three weeks, after which he receives the rank of cor-
poral. As such he attends another recruiting school a year later, and the corporal with
a good record and the ambition to become an officer enters the school for officers for a
period of 120 days. There he is taught all that a second lieutenant and first lieutenant
need to fill their positions. For practical and training purposes a school for noncom-
missioned officers is connected with the school for officers.
After serving this 120 days’ course the second lieutenant goes through a 13 days’
regular first-line course, and the following year spends 67 days at the School for recruits
as a second lieutenant. So that after serving 67 plus 21 plus 67 plus 120 plus 13 plus 67
equals 355 days, he is a full-fledged second lieutenant. -
For four years the second lieutenant must serve 13 days a year and then may become
a first lieutenant. To advance to the rank of captain a first lieutenant must take a 45
days’ course in Central School No. 1. -
Officers above the rank of captain have to devote a considerable part of their time to
special courses of tactics, information, etc. The higher the rank, the greater the duty
and preparation therefor. Commanders of division and army corps commanders are
taken from the corps of professional officers.
# Switzerland spends on her army Ilfrancs ($2.20) per head of the population, and 23
francs on public education.
Those Swiss who are physically unfit to serve in the army must pay an annual tax of
exemption. Every Swiss citizen living in other lands must pay this tax. -
It amounts to a ground tax of 1% per cent, and a personal property tax of 1% per
thousand. -
The equipment, other than fire or side arms—with the exception of underwear
shoes, and stockings—is furnished by the Cantons. The cost of this equipment is
from 185 francs ($37) for the infantry to 225 francs ($45) for the cavalry. Half of this
expense, however, is borne by the Federal Government, and is paid out of the mili-
tary taxes. - -
The yearly Federal military budget in peace time is 45,000,000 francs ($9,000,000)
out of which is paid: - .
1. Half of the cost of equipment to the Cantons. -
2. The whole of the armament of all military branches.
3. The maintenance of the army in instruction and training courses.
4. Fortification of strategically important points.
5. The rent of the military barracks of which the Cantons are the owners.
The cost of a soldier to federation and Canton is:

Infantry. Cavalry.
Iſramcs. Francs.
185 225
Equipment---------------------------------------------------------------------
; * * * e = * * * * * * * * is e e s tº e º ºs e s = e º is e e º sº sº e º ºs e º ºs e º sº º is tº e º ºs & e º sº tº sº as tº $ tº º e º ºs º ºs & e º s = * * * * * * 110 120
Total.--------------------------------------------------------------------- 295 | 345
Share of Cantons---------------------------------------------------------------- 95 115
Share of federation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ºr e º º ºs e º 'º e º e º sº º e º sº e s is sº tº * * 200 230
1014 PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
In the event of an emergency call, mobilization takes place through official procla-
mation transmitted by wire. The Landsturm (42–48 year men) near the border re-
pair at Once to their appointed stations, which are always nearest their homes, and
augment the force of the customs guards. -
At 9 o'clock in the morning of the second day following the proclamation all the
troops assemble, fully equipped, at their assigned military posts. As an illustration,
the call for mobilization last year was issued August 1. The Landsturm immedi-
ately joined the customs guards on the border, and at 9 a. m. on August 3 the Swiss
Army of 425,000 was ready for action.
There, then, you have the army of Switzerland—“a citizenry trained and accus-
3. to arms”—such as President Wilson says this country must depend upon for
€162 IASé. +
How is it possible that the short time of his obligatory military service brings the
Swiss Soldier to the same or a higher efficiency than the three years of continuous
training do the man of the surrounding great military powers? -
All who have sought to answer this question have found that the training of the
Swiss boys in School, cadet corps, and preparatory courses is responsible for it.
_At the age of 10 every Swiss Schoolboy begins his program of physical training.
This course is a methodical system of exercises, beginning with easy performances
for the boy of 10 to the difficult problems for the boy of 15 in setting-up exercises,
calisthenics, work on horizontal bars, parallel bars, rings and horse, jumping, vault-
ing, climbing, and all other applied gymnastics. This work gradually takes up more
and more of the boys' time. The boy of 10 begins with two hours a week, while the
boy of 15 devotes one hour every day to such practice. Physical training is the
only subject in Swiss schools under supervision of the Federal Government. The
whole System is uniform, and there is only one primer for all the instruction. The
most important factor in every lesson of physical training is the military training
without arms in absolute accordance with the army regulations. About one-fourth
of every period of instruction is taken up by exercises like: Position of attention,
the rests, facings, steps and marchings, School of Squad, alignments, taking distances
and intervals, oblique march, turning on moving and fixed pivots, open and closed
formation in Squads, platoons, and companies. -
All this Federal physical instruction is given by male teachers of the Swiss public
School. The school-teacher is the primary military instructor of every Swiss boy,
and to make him proficient to teach in this subject he takes, while at the teacher's
college, a very rigid course of four years' study in the branch of physical training
along with his other lines of study.
The examination as to his fitness to instruct after completing his course is held by
Government inspectors.
Every year a rigid inspection and examination of all boys' classes and grades is
undertaken by the Federal examiners. -
Hand in hand with the obligatory physical training of the Swiss boy at School goes
the voluntary work in the cadet corps, where the lad undergoes all of the exercises
from the “school of the soldier” to those of the “school of battalion,” and here he
receives his first training in rifle and target practice. The rifle used in the cadet
㺠is a miniature model of the army regulation rifle. The practice time for the
cadet corps amounts to about 120 hours per year. The instruction periods vary from
two hours to half a day to several consecutive for maneuvers with other cadet corps of
the whole Canton. -
º ºys out of school from their 16th to the 20th year, military preparatory courses
3.Te ſlel Cl.
The course consists of military exercises, light tactical problems, and extensive
rifle shooting practice on Summer week-day evenings and Sunday mornings.
So great is the benefit of the physical training, inclusive military training without
arms in schools, cadet corps and preparatory courses, that fully 70 per cent of the young
men entering recruiting schools are not only physically well drilled, but competent
marksmen as well.
It is a great fault that seizes the mind of a great many of our American people in
thinking that the short obligatory service the Swiss Soldier goes through is responsible
for the military strength of Switzerland, and it would therefore make our nation also
secure if we would adopt the same system; but the making of the Swiss Soldier and
his spirit is in the training in School, cadet corps, and preparatory courses rather than
the obligatory service part.
If we are convinced that a system similar to the Swiss system would be a great
addition to our national defense, then let us begin with the foundation of the building,
not the roof.
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 1015
Is there anything more logical, more valuable than a methodical system of physical
training for our school boys?
Unfortunately, most of our educational systems do not appreciate the value of
physical education in School as Switzerland does. We should not forget that a sound
mind can only be developed to its maturity in a sound body, and that therefore the
º of body and mind should be mutual and one not neglected at the cost of
the other. -
In making physical training and military training without arms an obligatory and
very important subject of a boy’s school education, we would pursue three objects:
First. The physical welfare of the boy. - -
Second. Implant obedience and discipline. -
Third. Prepare the boy to become an able defender of the Stars and Stripes.
A great many of our citizens are of the opinion that athletic sports and games have
the same Scope and accomplish it without bringing a militaristic spirit to the schools,
as the proposed military training would.
In advocating systematic physical training we do not underestimate the high value
of Qur athletic sports, because they all tend to harden and develop the body, so as
to make it a sound foundation on which a strong mind can be cultivated. Ilook at
base ball, for instance. There is not a better upbuilder of the body than baseball.
It develops legs and arms, lungs and heart, and stimulates the mental faculties of
Self-control and quick thinking. But while in baseball every player has an indi-
vidual position of which he tries to become a master, in military drills all participants
of a working section undergo the same movements the same way at the same time at
the command of a superior. This subordinating of the will of every soldier to a com-
mand which must be obeyed at any time and under any circumstances and condi-
º is dicipline, and discipline is the fundamental quality in the makeup of a
SOICIle]".
In a democracy, more So than in any other form of government, discipline is indis-
ensable. Discipline economizes strength, lightens work, and makes it less frictional.
Without discipline the lofty picture of simultaneous evolution and the clang of unison
would be impossible.
He who can obey himself will cheerfully obey someone else, because he knows
that nothing can be accomplished without discipline.
That the athletic games do not and can not implant the necessary discipline is
shown to us nearly every day.
A steady pitcher, a good batter, an ever alert first baseman, a fleet-footed base
runner, is generally the most independent individual you want to find, and because
he is the idol of fandom, petted and spoiled, he disregards orders of captains or umpire,
because he knows he only is right, and all others wrong. -
Rarely we see a team which adopts the military spirit of sinking individuality,
Fº what we term “teamwork,” which is merely another name for discipline.
f such a team, with every player subordinating his work to a competent manager,
succeeds, as did the Boston Nationals in 1914, every fan agrees that only the teamwork,
the discipline, brought the victory. .**
War does not recognize sport Superiority, but it surely adorns with victory men
who have an efficient, thorough, and uniform training best obtained in youth.
Military training with and without arms, in conjunction with physical training,
gives the boy gait and posture, straightens his spine, throws his shoulders back, and
makes him walk erect. In other words, it gives him the manly appearance that we
all admire. That the value of methodical physical training is not an imaginary or
exaggerated one, but scientifically and practically proved, the following facts show:
Of the young Swiss who reach their twentieth year and have to pass a physical and
mental examination for acceptance to the army, 73% per cent are accepted and 4 per
cent permanently rejected for defects. The remaining 22% per cent are rejected for
reexamination a year later, for such reasons as insufficient height or insufficient chest
measurement (the recruit must have half his height for chest measurement).
What do the military authorities do with these young men? They send them
through a special physical training course for the following year, and when the young-
Sters come for a physical test the next year they are tall enough or their chests have
expanded. That is what I call exploitation of the practical and scientific value of
pººl training, of which the much dreaded military training is the most important
9I'2,IlCO.
Physical training is a great boon to all boys and should not be a privilege only of
city boys who enjoy good physical training systems, or high-school students in up-to-
date gyms under direction of high-priced instructors. -
Physical training in as many cities and high Schools is taught in as many different
Ways, but they lack thoroughness in methods, system in exercises, and uniformity in
1016 PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
command. Every instructor has his own program, and is absolutely at liberty to do
as he pleases. - - - .
The first aim of a system of military training without arms for schoolboys at the
ages of 10 to 14 must be uniformity. We should pick out a system and make it the
standard. Such a system (standard) we find in the Drill Regulations of the United .
States Army. -
. . If the American is ever called to the colors to protect his country, he invariably is
drilled by only one system, which is the system of the Regular Army. Should it be
necessary to call the whole male population of the United States to the colors, each
and every man would have to undergo the exercises, which are the fundamentals of
military organization and mobility of groups or units of soldiers. -
Exercises like position of attention, the rests, facings, steps and marching, school
of the squad, alignments, taking distances and intervals, oblique march, turning,
and on moving and fixed pivots, open and closed formation in squads, platoons, com-
panies, etc., are described and executed by the instructors in an absolutely identical
way, with the same words, the same movements, whether the young man enters the
Army in the Philippine Islands, New York, or San Francisco, and the command for
such exercises is strictly the same in every corner of the country. So that a com-
pany commander of a New York regiment can take command of a company mustered .
in Arizona and lead that company from the first minute he meets it as if the boys had
never had another commander or the captain never any different soldiers.
When he commands “Squad right, march,” every man of the eight in every squad
knows what he should do and executes it accordingly, and to the satisfaction of the
commander, as “Squad right” is executed the same way all over the United States.
All these exercises must become so instilled in the mind, body, and hones of our
youngsters that they will perform them automatically, promptly, with snap and
vigor and strictly simultaneously. - *
Why do we send children to school for their mental education? Because they
learn easiest then, and remember what they learn. Their minds are gradually
trained from the simple to the difficult problems. They do not have to earn money
for their support, nor is their time valuable in an economic sense. Now, why is the
State so deeply interested in the intellectual education of its citizens, so much so as to
compel every child to go to School for seven years, when such mental preparation is
almost exclusively a benefit only to the private interest of the individual? Why does
the State not care for the physical education, the development and building up of a
healthy body of the future defender, which would be of immeasurable value should
ever the honor, integrity and independence of the Nation be in danger? Why should
the man give up his most valuable time for a training which the boy could acquire
in the days when such a training would be a healthy sport and a pleasure?
A system of physical training in our schools would not only be of great benefit to
the health of the boy, but would form an honest and efficient factor of preparedness
for the Stars and Stripes, for which he holds up his right hand every morning and
swears “I pledge allegiance to my flag and to the Republic for which it stands; one
nation indivisible, with liberty and justice for all.” .
Ask the “rookies” who go to the military camps to train themselves for officers in
the Reserve Army how they would have appreciated military training in their school
days. How much time could they have saved for other military instruction necessary
to make an officer if they were not forced to devote most of their time to the exercises
which they should have learned in the schools? *
Why are we so timid about having our boys taught how to stand at attention, how
to march, to run, to align, to form squads, to drill in closed and open formations?
Why are we so laughingly, childishly afraid to teach our boys how to handle a rifie,
if they volunteer to learn it? How many are there among us who, when a boy, did
not spend hours every week playing soldier? Then, why not utilize this spirit of
our youngsters to the good of our country? Why not lead the enthusiasm for charge
and self-defense, for shooting arrows, brandishing wooden swords, shooting off wooden
rifles, into channels of systematic training under expert supervision and with real
weapons? ..
There was a time when the American boy learned how to handle a rifle; it came
from father to son as an absolute necessity. In those times war with another powerful
nation was more remote than it will be in our future.
The next step to the obligatory physical training and military training without
arms for the schoolboys from their twelfth year on is the membership in cadet Corps.
For the cadet corps of public-schools, let us say the boys of the sixth, seventh, and
eighth grades, the training should not be obligatory.
If the support by the National Government to such corps would be a generous one,
so that the expenses for the boys would be nominal and the training at the same time
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 1017
attractive, we would get a great percentage of the eligible boys to join the corps
voluntarily. -
Figuring that one out of every four boys would join a cadet corps, we would add per
year 300,000 lads, equipped with the fundamentals of a soldier training for our national
defense. That thousands upon thousands of cadets, and especially students who are
members of high school and college corps would be fine material for officers of minor
º commands, should an emergency prompt the President to call for volunteers,
is evident. g
CADET CORPS ARE THE REAL TELINGS FOR MANY REASON S.
All the boys like a uniform because of its attractiveness and, to a certain extent,
its democracy. The cadet, like the Soldier, wants to be seen; therefore he does not
confine his activity to gallery ranges and gyms, but marches through the streets
behind the martial drum. He wants his exercise in the field, he wants his target
practice and to fight sham battles, and the cadet of the near future will want to dig
trenches. The cadet will attract the boy standing on the curb, watching others like
himself marching to the strains of patriotic music, garbed in natty uniforms and with
shouldered guns, and will be straightway filled with the desire to join a cadet corps.
The existing provisions of Congress as to the Government’s help for uniformed
cadet corps in schools, dated April 27, 1914, are in fact prohibitive to the establish-
ment of such corps, as the following newspaper clipping shows:
&s ‘‘MILITARY DRILLS IN HIGH SCHOOLs.
“A letter written by Secretary of War Garrison to a member of the school board of
East Orange indicates that the plan for holding military training classes in the high
schools of that town will have to be abandoned. It appears that only by turning
the school into an out-and-out military school could any aid from the Government
be received.
“One of the demands is that every able-bodied lad in the school join the classes;
another that uniforms be worn. The course which the Government regulations
prescribe covers two years' training. The instructor sent by the Government must
be placed on the same rating as other members of the faculty and his commutation
must be paid. Aside frcm this a Satisfactory storehouse for the equipment must be
guaranteed. In return, the Government is willing to send a retired Army officer
to conduct the classes and to send equipment. -
“As various cities throughout the country have been planning to embark upon a
program of preparedness by introducing military drills in high Schools, expecting to
receive governmental aid in meeting the cost of the enterprise, this communication
from Secretary Garrison is of general interest.”
Out national defense is primarily an educational problem. If our pacifists are right
and a large portion of our citizens make their slogan ‘‘We not only do not need addi-
tional preparation, but we are fortunate in not having it,” the first thing for us to do
would be to abolish the teaching of United States history in our schools.
By no means let any boy read the Declaration of Independence, in which the
great signers pledged to each other life, fortune, and honor in guarding and protect-
ing the inalienable rights of the United States citizens against all enemies. Pledg-
ing life means the risk of war, and as long as there are citizens on this continent who
believe in the Declaration of Independence just so long is there a possibility for the
Government to call on its citizens to redeem its pledges. -
What made our independence possible? All the men that history links with the
liberation of the tºº.” States were strong in mind and body. Their youth as well
as mature life had been a constant struggle, not only in an economic sense but also
a chain of ups and downs in their strife to attain their ideals of liberty and independ-
ence. The whole Nation derived its health, its vigor, its tenacity through the rugged
life of its citizens. Danger lurked from every side, and danger was met every time
by a courageous mind and a hardened, trained body.
History instills the root of patriotism. The description of the deeds of our fore-
fathers, their struggles in the molding of the Union, their sense of righteousness,
their spirit of independence and liberty, their determination to protect with the
Sword, if necessary, the integrity and progress of the Nation, their zeal to build up
legislation, agriculture, industry, and commerce produces an inspiring effect in the
heart of the boy. The conviction that by the deeds of the great men prominent in
the life of the Union and by the cheerful support given them, whereby we are enabled
to enjoy to-day the citizenship of the greatest nation on earth, awakes admiration,
thankfulness, and love for the land and its people—in other words, creates patriotism.
1018 PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
Immediately the boy desires to follow the example, form his walk in life according
to one of the Nation's great men or the masses of men, who by their deeds contributed
largely to the honor and success of the State.
An able-bodied, physically strong man with Sound and open mind is the ideal
citizen of our race. The man who is a useful servant to Uncle Sam in time of peace
and an effective defender in time of war, is a real American.
Everything possible is done by our educational system to prepare and help the
boys to become prospering members of the community, but the school does nothing
to jº the prospective citizen to protect the State, the grantor of life, liberty,
and pursuit of happiness, should ever the necessity arise.
To the Schoolboy who receives military training, United States history has a much
greater interest and stirs his patriotic impulses much more, than to the one without
a cadet's training for whom history is generally a mass of dates and a description of
military happenings which he does not understand.
The whole War of Independence from the Battle of Bunker Hill to the crowning
victory of Yorktown is one lesson after another for our boys as to the value of military
training. The initial contest between the British and out minutemen and millitia
at Bunker Hill in itself bears the foundation for a manual on tactics. -
The historian tells us that at the council of war which decided upon the occupa-
tion of Bunker Hill, Putnam said: “The Americans are never afraid of their heads,
they only think of their legs; shelter them and they will fight forever.” .
Putnam expressed thereby a military principle, the truthfulness of which every
One of our wars emphasized and which holds good to our present days.
When the Schoolboy reads what a magnificent spectacle it was for the Americans
to see the 3,000 picked British veterans marching up hill in solid columns, their
bayonets gleaming, and of Prescott's order: “Don’t fire until you see the whites of
their eyes,” as a cadet he assimilates and applies simple tactical problems and draws
the conclusions:
1. It was wrong for the English troops to march in closed formation when exposed
to the fire of an enemy.
2. The Americans, seeing the mistake of the enemy, kept cool and did not bang
away at the on marching Britishers, but waited for the command to fire, which proves
that they learned dicipline.
3. Prescott showed an officer's good judgment and tactical knowledge by giving
the famous order, manifesting thereby that the fire is to be used whenever it is most
effective and a surprise.
4. Prescott's order was short, clear, and to the point, as military orders have to be.
He did not confuse his men with figures as to the distance they should fire at the enemy,
neither did he distract the concentration of the mind of his men to that sublime
moment of firing and surprise, by giving long-winded advice.
When Stark was urged to quicken the step of his men, when they came under
artillery fire on the way to the breastworks, he replied: “One fresh man in action is
worth ten fatigued ones,’’ teaching his fellow officers that preventing a probable loss
of his own troops was not as important as to do the greatest possible damage to the
enemy.
Furthermore we are told that when the English with fine pluck made a third attack,
the Americans found their ammunition gone and were compelled to use their guns as
clubs, for they had no bayonets. What was the cause of their shortage in ammuni-
tion? More than probably because the Americans thought that they had enough for
the emergency. They were not prepared. And the lack of bayonets was also a sign
of unpreparedness. -
Whether it was ignorance as to the necessity for more powder and of having bayonets
or whether the lack of material caused the unfortunate condition is now immaterial,
but it bears the lesson that: The state of unpreparedness caused a battle conducted
by excellent officers and brave men to be a defeat for the Americans in so far as the
; succeeded in taking Breed's Hill, and thereby made possible their remaining
in Boston.
The lesson of the Battle of Runker Hill is only one example of the manifold benefits
the students of history and the schoolboy can derive if he is, by the medium of military
training, able to draw conclusions so valuable to him personally and to his beloved.
country in general. -
The first objection usually advanced to military training of boys is that it fosters an
aggressive and militaristic spirit. Some people think that the rudiments of military
training would make our boys, when grown up, anxious for War on the slightest
provocation. -
Does not the Alpine Republic furnish the whole world with the most convincing
proof that her very extensive military educational system does not foster militarism
nor martial spirit, but inculcates the nation with the moral self-will to withstand all
PREPAIRED NIESS FOR, NATIONAL DEFENSE. 1019.
the tempting offers of expansion, conquest, or economic betterment by siding with
one or the other of the belligerents and so participate in the present war? Is there
any doubt that a Switzerland possessed of the now common “war spirit” had grave
reasons to enter the war and that by doing so she could gain immensely? Had Switzer-
land at any stage of the game offered her military resources to the allies or the Teutons,
Would not that party have tremenduous if not absolutely decisive advantages? And
are the following reasons not very “vital” ones to urge the Swiss Republic to break
the tightening ring which all the neighboring nations have put around her by un-
sheathing her Sword in favor of the party that could give her the most advantages.
with the least risks?
1. The tremenduous cost of keeping her army mobilized for the protection of her
neutrality.
2. The daily growing difficulty to feed her people.
3. The steadily increasing embarassment from all powers as to her economic and
commercial course.
The Swiss is not only “too proud to fight,” but it is the sober, manly thought of the
conscientiousness Helvetian which will not let him throw to the winds his happiness,
his sacred fireside, and his love of wife and children.
No; not for all the gold and land in the world would he want to chance the lives of
thdusands of his brothers, and the destitution of millions of women and children.
The Swiss, as a rule, is not sensitive, as the rough country makes him tough, and the
fine ends of his nerves are generally covered by a thick skin. The thickness is greatest
with the German-Swiss, and gradually thins out in the French, while the Italian-
speaking brothers are responsive to the slightest touch. But they are all first, last,
and all the time citizens of the old and free Republic, Helvetia.
Switzerland does not want war. To the Swiss, war is a terrible horror. And who
are better aware of it, who are the better judges next to the sufferers themselves, of the
monstrous destruction of life and property going on under their very eyes? To plunge.
into this hell, into this infermal turmoil, he wants to have better reasons than the
arguments of hotheaded, irresponsible agitators, or the clamor of a shortsighted irre-
sponsible mob. Cartainly there is, seemingly, unneutral sympathy of the German-
º Swiss with the Teuton cause, and the French and Italian speaking with the
Ilies, but the biggest and seemingly irreparable breaks come out as harmless family
affairs, which vanish as soon as the respective newspapers are finished with their
unneutral abuse, calling one another names of the harmless variety to the cursing of a
stableman. -
To veil their participation in this world’s war, some nations say they must liberate
their brethren of the same race and language. How foolish to liberate people from
the yoke of a monarchy just to put another harness on them. And there is Switzerland,
embracing the Teuton, Gallic, and Roman races under her care for centuries.
If the S riss were to follow the example of others they v ould have to annex Ger-
many, Austria, France, and Italy because they are all of the same race and language
as the people comprising S itzerland.
And such a procedure we would call a liberation, because they would be given the
greatest gift on earth—the government of the people, by the people, and for the people.
- º is above all three shining truths or reminders that Switzerland teaches us
to-day: - -
1. S itzerland's policy of preparedness has always been to keep peace and prevent
W2, l’.
2. S. itzerland, by keeping ready her powerful military resources, prevents any
ambition of neighboring po ers to attack her.
3. Preparedness by training the youth does not foster militarism or military aggres-
Sion, but is a Onderful contribution to the vigor and vitality of a nation.
The best criterion by , hich to judge the policy of a nation is to see how she fared
when that policy came to a trial. Nobody ill deny that the Yorld's struggle, lasting
no ºf 17 months, is the most severe trial that will ever come to Sº..itzerland. Did
S ritzerland's policy of preparedness succeed?
As to policy 1: S itzerland is at peace and will stay so.
As to policy 2: Why did Germany not strike at France through S. itzerland?
What are the reasons that prevented France and Italy to strike by way of Switzer-
land at the most vital and unprotected parts of Germany?
Why is no y the , ay of Saloniki taken instead of Geneva, Bern, Basel, or Zurich
to invade Germany?
Because all the big powers are afraid of the well-trained and patriotically inspired
army and the well-laid fortifications of Helvetia.
Is it not logical that the Swiss system of preparedness should appeal to us, especially
as Switzerland has remained a Republic for 624 years and the Swiss people have

L020 PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
cherished and maintained the highest ideals of liberty, justice, and orderly govern-
ment for more than six centuries?
Is not the Swiss policy a good policy for the United States? No dynastical, des-
potical, or aristocratic interests can become a power in the United States, and there-
fore the greatest factor for militarism is eliminated beforeband. Our only aim, our
only cause, our only reason to fight would be to protect the honor and the institutions
of the United States. - - .
By whatever road or from whatever viewpoint, you search into the causes that lead
to the present devastating conflict the opinion can not escape you that war was the last
and only way out for the European rulers to divert their people's attention from inner
affairs of their territorial possessions. The fear of the ruling houses of the fast spread-
ing republican ideas throughout their monarchies, the inability of some dynasties to
maintain their thrones against imminent internal troubles, the daily growing indig-
nation of the people against the tremendous military burden mainly incurred to
sustain the tottering thrones, were the intrinsic causes of the world’s war.
Why are the green fields, the snowy mountains of Helvetia untouched by the
bloody fingers of Mars? -
Why is Switzerland not only symbolically the white cross in the red field, but to-day
in reality the only pure spot in blood-reddened Europe? . . .
Why are Columbia’s beautiful shores and fertile cornfields spared the devastation
of this hellish war? Why are our harbors busy and the hundreds of thousands of our
mills humming? Because the two nations enjoy God’s greatest gift to mankind, the
ºptiºnable government which derives its just powers from the consent of the gov-
€rIleCl. &
Of course, all this reasoning of keeping peace and preventing war should not effemi-
nate us and mislead our steps of preparation. Should our country become involved
in war we have to meet war with war, and there the soldier comes before the Red
Cross nurse, and the man to handle the rifle counts before the rifle. If we go to war
we are going to battles. Our Army Regulations say: -
“Success in battle is the ultimate object of all military training; success may be
looked for only when the training is intelligent and thorough.
“Thoroughness and uniformity in the training of the units of an organization are
indispensable to the efficiency of the whole; it is by such means alone that requisite
teamwork may be developed. -
p ºple movements and elastic formations are essential to correct training for
attle.’’ - - -
It is incomprehensible that so many of our men are of the opinion that to train our
youngsters for their future usefulness as defenders of their great country it would be
necessary to bring over instructors and their systems from England (Boy Scouts),
Germany, or Switzerland. That is all wrong. We have the best of systems, the best
of books, the best of officers for our Regular Army and National Guard.
All we have to do is to make use of our facilities in a methodical way. Our regula-
tions and manuals, compared with the Swiss and the German ones, are in many re-
spects simpler and clearer, absolutely to the point, and inculcated with an excellent
soldier spirit. The patriotic military spirit of officers of our Army that are observed
instructing parts of the Regular Army, National Guard, and rookies, is of the highest
Order, and if not superior certainly not secondary to that of the European officers.
Now, if we possess such first-class material to train our grown-up soldiers, should
not the very same men be able to bring the institutions of Federal corps and Federal
preparatory courses to an efficient asset of our defense? .
Of course, the introduction of “Obligatory physical training, including military
training without arms,” in all our schools would seemingly be a very difficult job,
but a solution could be found in the following way: -
Until such time that Federal physical training is made a part of the curriculum of
every teacher's seminary and a part of the examination the male teacher would have
to pass, it could be arranged that during school vacation there would be established
a “teacher's training camp” of about five weeks duration. Here male teachers who
are specially fit to specialize in that kind of teaching would get the instruction at
first hand of expert physical training teachers, to provide which we would have no
trouble, and officers of the Regular Army. A half a dozen such camps distributed
over the country with l,000 school teachers each, would give a fine start to Federal
physical training education. .
The benefit our nation would reap in adopting the policy of obligatory physical
training for boys, including military training without arms, voluntary training in
cadet corps and preparatory courses, would be immense.
If we look into the history of the military strength of modern Switzerland, we find
that since 1848 the endeavor of her statesmen was to reach the greatest possible cen-
tralization. -
PREPAIRED NESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 102I.
Napoleon found the old Swiss Republic a loose structure of Cantons, a chain of
which the different links varied in strength. Political, religious, and economical
differences tore the States apart, and it was, therefore, little wonder that an utter lack
of national Spirit made Switzerland, at the end of the eighteenth and the beginning of
the nineteenth century, the prey and battlefield of all European nations.
After the Congress of Vienna, 1815, patriotic men all through Helvetia worked for the
restoration of a united nation and the creation of a national spirit. The one great
lesson the events of the Napoleonic era taught the Swiss, was that only a strong and
efficient defense backed by a united people would prevent the repetition of the
shameful misuse of Swiss territory and the tremendous suffering of their people. A
patriotic upheaval of the spirit of the forefathers overtook old Helvetia. While cen-
tralization was the keynote of the constitution, the tendency of the careful statesmen
was not to obliterate at once the old rights of the 22 States, but to keep the spirit of
unity as the goal in all future legislation.
What makes the national defense of Switzerland so efficient, and at the same time
popular, is that all the legislation pertaining to the army and the defense has been
brought to popular vote by referendum. Time and again since 1848 the Swiss
#. voted for measures strengthening the means of protection of the Alpine
epublic.
There were dark days too for the Swiss patriots who made their slogan “One army,
one law.” As a rule the people do not see the necessity of stringent measures of the
country’s military policy as quickly as the men with a military education and they
will prefer to listen to the opponents of preparedness, to the pacifists and their visions.
The mood of the sovereign has a whole lot to do with the acceptance of a program for
increasing the efficiency of a nation’s military strength, and the history of Helvetia
since 1848 gives us many examples. We need cite only the one when a revision of the
military articles in 1896 was submitted to a popular vote. The antimilitarists and
pacifists had so strongly succeeded in poisoning the minds of the people against every-
thing relating to the army that, with an avalanche of votes, the proposed legislation
for future centralization and efficiency of the military system was buried, and termi-
nated with it, fortunately for the time being only, the military careers of Col. Wille,
Gertsch and others.
Put the common sense and patriotism of the Swiss finally prevailed, and then it
awakened with greater strength amd made more than good by adopting in 1907 the
present system of military policy which fills with admiration and fear the great military
powers surrounding the Alpine. Republic. With the realization of Wille's dream,
back came the soldier Wille and his popularity grew with leaps and bounds, and small
wonder he was elected general or commander in chief of all the Swiss military forces,
and is to-day the most popular man in Switzerland.
The secret of the popularity of the Swiss system is the fact that it is not the work
of one class or one political party but the product of assimilation and consent of the
whole people during 67 years of experiment. It is self-evident that a system, the
development of which is absolutely controlled by the people, must be free from ex-
travagance, in complete accord with the Civil life, and will never SuperSede as a mil-
itary power the civil government of the Republic.
Now, if the United States as the country which has, according to our President’s
“Common principles of life, common idea's, and common aspirations with Switzer-
land” is considering the adoption of the feasible points of the Swiss System of pe-
paredness, let us soberly discuss some Salient features that stand before our minds.
National defense as to the part of training men must be built up Systematically
and logically. A great majority of our citizens, especially in the States on both
coasts, are wrought into great excitement by the events of the world’s war. Seeing
whole nations going under, others suffering terribly through the tremendous sacri-
fices of life and property, fertile and industrious provinces overrun by the enemy,
makes one shudder and think of the prospects of our country and our firesides should
we be embroiled in war.
Men of opposite tendencies take advantage of our people's state of mind. Some
seek to discredit everything that makes up our present military strength; others tell
us the lesson of this war is that every male inhabitant of the United States should be
stuck into a uniform and do military duty as being the only way of repelling an inva-
sion of our country. It is the scarecrow of the militarist against the bogyman of the
pacifist, who tells us that we should thank God for not having any better defenses,
because if we had our fighting spirit would have us in constant trouble with other
nations. .
It is extremely difficult for the citizens to determine which road he can travel with
safety, as the sign posts as the roads to preparedness and disarmament both point,
seemingly, to his happiness and Security.

1022 PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
The extent and the system of our preparedness depends on the needs of our country,
the reasons and causes that eventually should move us to provide adequate protec-
tion. It is self-evident that up to now our condition did not necessitate a system
as far-reaching as the Swiss for the simple reason that north and south of us the neigh-
boring nations will not be of any danger to us, while east and west a strip of water
over 3,000 miles wide splendidly isolates our continent—even considering the enormous
progress of aerial and naval warfare the present war disclosed—from the military
powers of Europe. It is not necessary yet that each of us throw himself in an armor
and thereby make the whole nation “the people in arms.” At the present time it
looks as if for 10 years to come, it would be hardly possible that one of the European
nations will recuperate sufficiently to risk an attack on our shores. Therefore, our
preparation for Such a case can be made calmly and thoroughly in such a way as not
to interfere with or revolutionize our present social and political lives.
Outside of a strong, mobile, Regular Army, our land forces should be of a voluntary
nature, but in establishing a volunteer system let us build along such lines that if
the necessity of compulsion arises, we need only put one big girder to our military
structure to comply with the Nation's need. º
We should not build something in haste and excitement that would very probably:
result in an extravagant misfiting suit for Uncle Sam. Let us work according to the
old Roman Saying, Festina lente! By all means let us adopt that part of the Swiss
system that fits our condition as well as Switzerland's, and which will never be out
of date or a hardship to the citizens: The obligatory physical training with military
training without arms for school boys from their tenth year, cadet corps training pro-
vided free of charge by the Federal Government for boys who want to volunteer from
their thirteenth year on, and preparatory courses free of charge for boys volunteering
from their sixteenth to twentieth year. Such training will be of immense benefit to
the health of the body and mind of the future citizen even if he never should be
called on to give an account of the Soldier's part of his training.
We are not going to dwell on the question of officering the forces that an obligatory
System would bring us. Every man familiar with military affairs knows that an
absolute insufficient number of officers and noncommissioned officers is the one unsur-
mountable obstacle in the immediate establishment of compulsory service for a nation
of 100,000,000 inhabitants. w
But obligatory Service, besides burdening the Union with tremendous financial
Sacrifices and inflicting hardships on the time and economical conditions of the individ-
ual citizen, would bring in its wake a near revolution of the so celebrated independence
of our Social relations. It is very problematical whether the American can ever be
educated to a subjection of “keeping tab’’ on him all his life, and to have his civil
life interfered with by complicated military rules such as even the Swiss system
necessitates. The people of Switzerland are groundstanding, while the United States
has more of a migrating population.
In other words, a big majority of the Swiss live all their lives in a comparatively
Small district wherein they are born, and are easily reached by the military authori-
ties in any emergency. Not So in America. Outside of the farming population, the
average young American is a migrating bird. The ties that bind him to the place of
his rearing are becoming either very brittle or very elastic, and the first opportunity
takes him away to somewhere else in our big and beautiful country to follow his trade
or take up his business.
Now, let us see how our sons would be “booked” under an obligatory service system.
When the boy at 19 passes the mental and physical examination for adoption into the
United States Service, he is given a page in the “service ledger” of his recruiting dis-
trict. Each district has a Federal military bureau, managed by Federal employees.
The Service ledger contains a very correct and exact pedigree of the man, his rating
obtained in the physical and mental test, the branch of arms he is selected for, and the
unit he is a member of. All promotions, as well as his behavior, every time he is
doing Service, is entered therein. If he leaves his recruiting district to make his home
in another one, he would be compelled to inform, within three days, the district chief
of the old and the one of the new district and give his exact new address. A duplicate
of all this data in the form of a “service book” is given to each man. -
This book would be the “civil bible” or the “report card” for every American. It
would be kept strictly up to date, and is a passport not only for his military but also
his civil life, without which he would not dare to walk the street.
Another reason for postponement of obligatory service is the necessity of constructing
a great apparatus of Federal employees, which would be necessary to keep the military
mill of 10,000,000 soldiers going. Such competent Federal employees we could edu-
cate by voluntary training as to their task and duties. There are other reasons that
speak for the advisability of a volunteer rather than the obligatory system.
|PREPAIRED NIESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 1023
We would get: .
1. A larger, yet not dominating, sprinkling of uniforms among the civilians.
2. A democratizing and respecting influence of the national spirit toward the garb
of a United States soldier.
3. A prospective instructors corps for the volunteers of succeeding years.
4. A greater number of people who are interested and become familiar with the
nations defensive needs. -
I am afraid the tremendous army obligatory service would bring for our rich Nation
of 100,000,000 inhabitants, paired with our fighting spirit, would grow that aggressive
spirit which we now denounce rightly as an undemocratic, militaristic spirit. . The
hundreds of thousands of officers necessary to form the skeleton for the armies of
millions would become a new factor in our civil life. The boys of the rich would like
the life of soldiery and would, because economically independent, choose the officer's
career. Now it is only natural and especially American nature if officers, backed by
millions of soldiers, one time or another would like to show to the other citizens that
the time they spent and the instruction they received in the interest of the Stars and
Stripes, was well made use of. The smallest differences with other nations would fur-
nish a welcome pretext to let the mighty eagle scream, and hasten the dawn of “the
day” which anxious officers always look for. .
A system that considers our present conditions and builds upon and assimilates
existing military bodies, would be a promising program for our national defense.
Why do away with the National Guard, the only permanent military organization
besides the Regular Army?
Why establish new Army organizations if a strong Regular Army and a real National
Guard would answer for all purposes? -
The main reasons for an intended obliteration of the National Guard as a prime factor
for defense is its almost exclusive State relation and its unmilitary appendages. To
make the National Guard first-line troops, her history and complete organization, her
popularity and democratizing influence would be great assets, while her “side shows”
would have to be extinguished of her program.
STATEMENT OF GUY MASON, ESQ., OF THE INTERNATIONAL
* NEWS SERVICE, -
The CHAIRMAN. Please state your name and address.
Mr. MASON. Guy Mason, 34 Post Building.
The CHAIRMAN. In the discussion of this Army reorganization you
have some views in reference to the subject from the point of view of
the enlisted man?
Mr. MASON. Yes, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. Have you ever had any service as an enlisted man?
Mr. MASON. I served three years in the First United States Regu-
lar Cavalry, in the States and in the Philippine Islands; one year in
the militia in New Jersey, and with the New Jersey Volunteers during
the Spanish American War. I served in the District of Columbia
National Guard since the war. I am not now a member of any
Organization.
The CHAIRMAN. You never served as a commissioned officer .
Mr. MASON. No, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. Then the committee would be glad to hear from
you on this subject from the point of view of an enlisted man.
Mr. MASON. The question that struck me more forcibly than any
Other—and I spoke to you about it some time back at the White
House one day—was the three distinct and different atmospheres
that seem to prevail and that do prevail among the commissioned
personnel in the Army, and which, from the enlisted man's point of
view as I have observed, is due to the source of appointment and the
environment in the beginning, I mean by that the young officer,
the second lieutenant, coming into the organization from West Point
carries in the mind of the enlisted man some military traditions with
1024 PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
him and it has a psychological effect, at least, on the organization.
A man receiving his commission from the ranks, from the enlisted
men, has always to combat the fact that he has been an enlisted man
and he generally leans backward in his treatment of the men who in
the future might serve under him. - -
The civilian officers who receive appointment from civilian life—I
am speaking now of the Officers of the rank of first and second lieutenant
and including that of captain, men who have to do with the units of the
Organization, companies, troops, batteries, or detachments, or things
of that character—the officer coming in from civilian life has no mili-
tary training behind him, and he is regarded by the enlisted man as
not knowing quite as much as the enlisted men do about things, and
they have not the same confidence, in other words. It struck me
that in the efforts of the War Department in connection with the
big universities or colleges, they should have the West Point curric-
ulum adopted, at least in part, and under some supervision of the
War Department, in order to get the same standard of training as
to subjects, including the traditions, etc., of those schools, and let
them be a source of supply for Army schools as well as West Point,
and eliminate as much as possible the appointments from civil life
and reduce the appointments from the ranks or make it possible for
the enlisted man—I would really prefer the latter—who expresses
a desire to become a commissioned officer and is found to be fit
physically and mentally otherwise, to send him to West Point or
some school of like standing under the supervision of the War De-
partment. There you produce one atmosphere. The handicap has
been that the officer from West Point is regarded by the man ap-
pointed from the ranks and the man appointed from civil life as
going around with the idea that he is of a little better caste, although
the man from West Point does not so regard it. That is not true
at all. I fancy if you would talk to the enlisted men and ask them
the class of officers under whom they prefer to serve, ninety-nine Out
of every hundred would tell you the West Point man.
The CHAIRMAN. The enlisted man feels that way?
Mr. MASON. The enlisted man feels that way. Of course the officer
from the ranks goes into the commissioned personnel with the Squad
room or barracks gossip in the back of his head about this officer and
that officer, because, after all, the company or troop or battery is
nothing more than a little family. That has got to be the case; they
bunk together, they sleep together, they quarrel among themselves,
but they will resent interferences from outsiders, and they have their
family gossip; and this officer and that officer comes in for his share
of praise or censure, etc. A man coming through an appointment of
that kind into the commissioned personnel without any period of time
between his service as an enlisted man and his service as an officer has
that with which to contend. If he is assigned to duty with the
organization or with the regiment in which he served as an enlisted
man and he becomes officer of the guard or officer of the day or
post quartermaster, or holds some office, which has to do with the
service of the whole post, the administration of orders and discipline,
he is going to lean backwards. I have observed that he always does,
and he is either more severe or he is more lenient than the man from
West Point. -
FREPAIRED NIESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 1025
Senator THOMAs. He departs from the standard in One direction
or the other ? *
Mr. MASON. Yes, sir.
Senator THOMAs. You think, then, that officers promoted from
the ranks should never be assigned to the same regiment in which
they formerly served?
Mr. MASON. Not only that, but they ought to be sent to some school
under Government supervision for a year or two, to use a common
expression of the street, to put on the finishing touches.
The CHAIRMAN. Take him away from the provincialism.
Mr. MASON. Take him away from his former environment. .
The CHAIRMAN. Somebody has suggested—and I am going to
have inserted in the record a letter on the subject—that in order to
democratize the West Point Academy the young men ought to be
given an opportunity to enlist in the Army for a period of a year and
then, if they develop the characteristics of a soldier, selections be
made from them and they then be permitted to be educated at the
expense of the Government at West Point.
- . MASON. The enlisted man may take the examination under
the existing law for a commission after having been in the Army
8, WG8I’.
}. CHAIRMAN. But that does not give him the benefit of a West
Point examination.
Mr. MASON. No.
The CHAIRMAN. The writer of this letter had in mind rather the
doing away with the present system of appointment to West Point.
It was to give everybody an opportunity to go to West Point.
Mr. MASON. To my mind, although I am not a college graduate,
you can accomplish the same thing by having embodied in the
curriculum of the various universities and colleges that part of the
West Point course which has to do with the science of warfare. A
high-school or an equivalent education is necessary to pass the pres–
ent entrance examination at West Point, and a college education
or its equivalent is necessary to pass an examination for a commis-
sion as a second lieutenant. He does not necessarily have to get it at
school, but he has to have it in order to pass the examination for a
commission. He could get his finishing touches preferably at West
Point, but also at some school which had a military course of some
kind; I mean the sciences and arts of war and not the drill manual,
particularly. -
The CHAIRMAN. Particularly the engineering and medical courses.
Mr. MASON. Yes, and the strategy of warfare. The average en-
listed man after a year's service is a pretty fair soldier. He is not
quite as good as a man who has had two years' service, but I believe
a man with two years' service is as good as a man with 10 years'
service.
Senator CATRON. Have you ever been a soldier yourself?
Mr. MASON. Yes, sir.
Senator CATRON. Where have you served 3 -
Mr. MASON. In the First United States Regular Cavalry, in the
States and in the Philippines, and in the militia before and since the
Spanish-American War.
Senator CATRON. How long did you serve in the Cavalry 3
23380—PT 21—16—3 - - - ... --d
1026 PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
Mr. MASON. Three years.
Senator DU PONT. In the mounted service, for those who are not
previously accustomed to horses, there is a certain length of time
required for a man to learn to ride'.
Mr. MASON. A man who does not know how to ride is usually more
desirable, because the man that does ride has to learn all over again,
but that does not require a great length of time. The average en-
listed man in the Cavalry becomes a fair horseman in three months.
When I enlisted they usually gave considerably more of what we
called recruit drill than they do now.
Senator DU Pont. I am familiar with that, because I served for
a long time in the light artillery.
Mr. MASON. That is in some respects very similar. -
The CHAIRMAN. We are very much obliged to you. Was there
anything further ? -
Mr. MASON. Nothing, except that I hope something will be done
to nationalize the militia, if you are going to use them, but not to
use them if you can avoid it.
STATEMENT OF MR. JoHN B. LENNON, TREASURER
AMERICAN FEDERATION OF LABOR. y
Mr. LENNON. I would say, Mr. Chairman and gentlemen of the
committee, that I speak for myself and not officially for the organized
labor, movement of this country. No one at this time has authority,
no matter who he may be, from the organized labor movement of the
|United States to speak definitely as to which one, or none, of the
multitude of plans for what is called preparedness shall or shall not
be approved by the organized labor movement. I am not going to
take but a few minutes of your time, because I know that neither
I nor any living man or woman can say anything that has not been
said on this question already.
I am against what is generally termed preparedness, and I resent
the appellation of being a coward because I am against what is usually
termed preparedness. My ancestors fought in the wars previous to
the Revolution, in the Revolutionary War, and in the War of 1861
to 1865, and I do not believe that I am an offspring of those ancestors
that is afraid to take my part in the defense of the things which I
believe to be right. I say, therefore, that the appellation assigned
of coward to every man or woman in this country who sees fit to take
the stand they do against these multitudes of plans for prepared-
ness is evidence of this, as it is everywhere else; it is evidence of the
fact that those who make the charge know the argument of those
against these plans can not be refuted.
The CHAIRMAN. I do not think any witness that has appeared
before this committee has used that term.
Mr. LENNON. I apprehend, Mr. Chairman, that that is true, but
not so far as the sayings of the newspapers and the general discussion
are concerned.
Senator CATRON. Has any Member of Congress indulged in that
language, to your knowledge?
Mr. LENNON. I do not desire to become personal at all. I could
use scores of names of persons that have made use of that statement,
but I prefer not to do so. It seems to me, as a workingman, and with
PREPAIRED NESS FOR, NATIONAL DEFENSE. 102.7
only such advantages as a man can acquire by observation, that the
nations of the world and the people of the world have tried the sword
or force, and certainly, to a considerable degree, it has been a failure;
and I am one of those men who believe the time is here now that the
American people can afford to give a fair trial to brotherhood and
Christianity rather than to force. Why should we go into the same
extensive lines of preparation, either by building up an enormous
army or by building a great navy which is purely for naval purposes,
mind you? What nation is there across the waters with which any
of the members of this committee or those who are here to-day feel.
that we are in danger of entering into war. Is it likely that Great
Britain will again seek our shores to bring us under kings other than
George 2 Is it likely the Kaiser will want to cross the seas to have
war with the United States? Is it likely that any of the European
or Asiatic countries are going to seek war with this country'
If anyone believes they are likely to, then the next question is,
What for . What reason is there for their seeking war with the United
States? I would like to have some one study that out and try and
assign some reason why those countries should seek war with the
United States; and if you conclude there are reasons why war should
be sought by foreign countries with the United States, the next thing
to determine is where lies the fault. Are we to blame for a condition
of affairs that make war a dangerous proposition between our country
and some others, or are they to blame 2 If we are to blame, let us
clean house, as American citizens. If they are to blame, let us set
them the proper example.
For many years I have heard much about the United States
assuming a position as a world power. We can only judge nations
in the main by individuals. The greatest world power as an indi-
vidual was not a man who used a sword. It was Jesus Christ, and
he has been a world power because of his example and of his life.
This nation has been a world power since the Revolutionary War
ended, and it has been a world power because of its example of the
right of men and women to govern themselves. That is what has
made it a world power, and if we want it to grow as a world power
then let our example ever be moving toward higher ideals for men
and women and children, and as a world power we will grow greater
and greater. These are some of the things that I believe will solve
the question of war.
I find in my personal experience that men and women who are just
themselves and live justly in the communities in which they do live
are not in much danger of being attacked by those that surround
them. The man or woman that does justice is not usually dealt with
unjustly by others. There are, of course, some exceptions. I think
if this Nation will, as it has already done, continue to set the highest
example in the world of a high standard of living, build up on this
continent a race of people, even though they do come from all climes
and from all parts of the world, it will build up here a citizenship that
no nation on earth will want to attack. Let us have here for the
mothers that need it mothers' pensions. Let us set the example here
of giving to our women the right to be a part of our Government, as
well as having to perform the duties in most directions of citizenship.
Let us pay the highest wages in the world. That is already done, but
let us pay still higher wages in order that our men and women shall
1028 PRISPARED NIESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
have an opportunity to develop into that ideal condition, as near as .
we can imagine it, at any rate, where our example will be in every
lºon for the things which mean peace and permanency in the
WOTICL. # -
My friends say, “Mr. Lennon, we know you pretty well, and you
are a sentimentalist.” Thank God, I am. I am not ashamed of it.
I am a sentimentalist, but perhaps not without some practical com-
mon sense. The people who are urging all kinds of preparedness
upon this Nation seem to have overlooked the very war which is
now attracting the attention of the world. No man that knows
anything about the conditions across the seas will claim that Great
Britain was prepared at the opening of the war—I mean in the accep-
tation that is usually applied to that term—and neither was France.
And all will at the same time acknowledge that, so far as the German
Empire and Austria were concerned, they were prepared, and yet
they did not march into Paris. Now, I heard a young man in this
chair talking. If I refer to a matter that is personal perhaps it will
not be out of the way; personal, at least, to my family. My father
enlisted in the war of 1861 as a private. The first major of the
regiment and the lieutenant colonel were both West Point men. At
the end of six months my father was the second lieutenant of his
company; at the end of a year he was the first major of his regiment,
and he commanded the regiment until the close of the war; and
Gen. Steel and Gen. Carr, one of them a Cavalry general, the other
one an Infantry general, wrote on the back of his papers, and they
are on file in the War Department, that my father was the best
Cavalry officer in the western army, showing that it is possible for
men, if they are intelligent, if they love their country, if they know
what citizenship is and its duties and obligations, if it is required, to
take care of their country's interests. -
Now, after I have said this much, you men have a right to ask, and
you have a right to ask every man or woman that appears here, what
do you propose shall be done in this matter? What can we do that
would be fair and right to the American people 2 I suggest this, and I
am not the first to suggest it, either; that the thing to be done in this
matter is to consult the American people directly by a referendum of
the American people, to be taken next fall, when the proposition shall
be put before them square and fair so that there is no misunderstand-
ing and no chance for subterfuge of any kind. Let a vote be taken
on half a dozen different propositions, all dealing with this subject.
Shall we have an army of 150,000; shall we have an army of 500,000;
shall we train every citizen for military service & How shall the cost
of the maintenance of such an army and navy be maintained Shall
it come from taxing those things which the workingmen have to use,
or shall it come from taxes on incomes and intelligence 3 Submit the
question to the people. I am ready to go along with the majority,
even though the majority takes a position against my own convictions.
I want to say just a word about the Navy and then I am going to
cease. I know that perhaps I have talked longer than I had intended
to. We are in favor, gentlemen of the committee, of the Government
of the United States building just as many ships as the Congress of the
United States can appropriate money to build, without any restriction
whatever; building them, however, for a mercantile purpose, so that
they can be converted to military purposes should it ever be required.
PREPAIRED N ESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 1029
I think that is what the nation needs more than anything else, a good
merchant marine, and I am not here to talk for anybody who is inter-
ested in the merchant marine. I am not, and I have not a dollar in
that or any other kind of an investment, but I know it can be done.
Other countries have done it and are doing it in this very war, con-
verting their merchant vessels into war vessels, and successfully; and
so far as that phase of the matter is concerned, I think nothing better
can be done for the country than to build up a large merchant marine,
and then if the necessity should ever arise—which I believe it will
not—they would be at the command of the Government. I thank
you, gentlemen.
STATEMENT OF MISS LILLIAN D. WALD, CHAIRMAN OF
THE ‘‘ANTIPRE PAREDNIESS’’. COMINIITTEE.
The CHAIRMAN. Miss Wald, will you give your address'
Miss WALD. 265 Henry Street, New York City.
The CHAIRMAN. Miss Wald, we will be pleased to hear from you.
Miss WALD. I have the honor, Mr. Chairman, to have charge of
this meeting, and I am sorry that I was not here on time to introduce
Our committee and myself to you. It is very gracious of you to grant
us this opportunity, and may I speak for myself personally that you
may understand why some of us feel so very, very strongly about this,
as well as for the antipreparedness committee of which I am chairman.
I have for nearly a quarter of a century devoted all the energies, all
the resources I could command, all that I have and all that I am,
to measures that will build up the social welfare of this country, to
interpret to the great numbers of strangers who come here (for I
live in an immigrant neighborhood and have communication with
the working people and the immigrants in very many sections of
the city and of the country), and I have felt, and my colleagues
with me have felt, we could do no greater service than to interpret
to these incomers the national ideals of this country, to the end
that we might be making of them American citizens; and therefore
it was entirely logical that I should identify myself immediately
with the committee that had the courage and, perhaps, a good deal
of moral courage to stand out at this time against the stampeding
that we fear is attempted—the stampeding of this country into a
militaristic policy that we think, and that I personally think very
strongly, is at variance with the very highest ideals in our country,
the things that make this country, in theory and might so easily
be in fact, the greatest country in the world.
Our Secretary will lay before each member here a copy of the
program of our antipreparedness committee, and I beg you to read
them dispassionately and from our point of view if possible, and see
whether what we ask is not entirely reasonable. We are plain
Americans, and we think we are thinking Americalis, and we are not
representing any disarmament group. That is not what our com-
mittee is proposing or has said, but we do believe that we are
right in forming an organization to protest against the attempt to
stampede this nation, in the program I have mentioned. In respect
to the danger of invasion we believe there is no danger of invasion that
threatens this country; and we agree with the President when he said
that we are not confronted with that danger and therefore there is
1030 PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
no cause for hasty and ill-considered action. We believe that there
should be most thorough investigation of our military equipment
and our naval equipment. We believe we should get a hundred cents
for every dollar that has been invested and that we should not have the
scandal of hearing that the guns do not shoot and that the ships do not
function for the purposes for which valuable money was spent,
the money that we would so gladly see spent for measures of con–
servation, for the things that we call social progress, and which social
thinkers believe the country needs for that great, real preparedness;
because the money should not be withheld from these upbuilding
measures unless absolutely necessary and only after the most com-
plete and thorough investigation has been made of the methods and
means by which our money is spent, and that we enter into no entan-
glements until the people are convinced that every means has been
exhausted, for we believe in a democratic control of our foreign
relations. -
I have just come from a meeting in North Carolina, where we have
been considering child-labor measures, and a very interesting and
valuable contribution we think it was to the welfare of this country.
I went there to participate in this conference, as I have many times in
the years I have been identified with public work, to contribute such
knowledge and experience as I have that will lead to the proper pro-
tection of our people. I noticed in an editorial yesterday that they
used this phrase, referring to so-called preparedness and the fear that
is over the land, that a “national atmosphere has been created.”
That is what we deprecate. We deprecate that national atmosphere
that leads to the belief that we need such an enormous outlay that
seems to many of us a danger to the things that we hold most precious
and dear, and I need only remind you that we are asked first for
400,000 continentals, and then for a million and a half men, and then
our President says we want the biggest Navy in the world, and Mr.
Roosevelt says we want to have every American in the military
service. The bogey is everywhere, and they talk of drilling the little
children in school carrying guns, and so hysterical do the people be-
come that one man in New York asserts that he has seen a German
company drilling in a public park at 2 o'clock in the morning. So
everywhere the Nation is infiltrated with this fear, and we want to
have the most careful examination, the most efficient inquiry. We
want to have every aspect of this analyzed, and we want to know the
facts. We believe that an inevitable corollary of the militaristic
system is secret diplomacy, and we hear from our friends in England
that secret diplomacy at home is more to be feard than a foreign foe.
So, Mr. Chairman, you will understand why we do feel so strongly,
so deeply that any one of us would be willing to die, not in the
trenches like rats but standing up for policies that we believe deter-
mine and must determine the happiness of the community; and
to-day this committee is providing an occasion for people who think
as we do, and the committee, we hope, will examine their testimony
upon this. Representatives from labor, from the great agricul-
tural organizations, from women, though we are not making this
plea because of woman's point of view, though that phrase that
war is not waged against women and children is not true. War is
waged against women and children, and so women are organized
against it; we know war is waged cruelly against women and children.
PREPAREDINESS FOR, NATIONAL DEFENSE. 1031
But I do not want to take up more of your time, Mr. Chairman. I
am very sure you must be fatigued.
The CHAIRMAN. We are glad to hear from you, Miss Wald.
Miss WALD. Thank you, sir; and perhaps you will feel and believe
in your own heart, in your own household, that what I am saying is
no exaggeration. I think we belong to a large and growing group of
people who call themselves social workers, and we are not theorists
and do not present our views as academic people do. We present
them based upon actual knowledge, years upon years of knowledge
of what really affects the great mass of people, the working people
and the people who are not always as articulate as they should be.
I º to tell you something of this. We say, go slow on pre-
paredness. We do not say disarm; we do not say that this country is
prepared as yet to lay down their arms. We wish we might; we hope
we will live to see the day, but not now would it be a good time; but we
say go slow on preparedness, Our immediate purpose is to prevent
appropriations during this Congress. Perhaps some of the ardor,
perhaps some of the hysteria may have passed away by that time,
and we say stop the waste of preparedness. We want investigations,
the most thorough investigations, on the present budget; and, as I
said before, we want a hundred cents for every dollar that has been
invested. . We stand for taking the private profit out of so-called
( { Pºlº of the ammunition. We would like to have it
all taken out, if it were possible.
We would deplore the temptation to have an ammunition lobby
Created. And then we have some other things to say that I do not
want to take up your time for, as I mean to introduce the speakers of
the afternoon and want them to speak for themselves and not only
for themselves but for the large organizations they represent. Before
I introduce them, I should like to say that I did not bring telegrams
and letters, as I thought you would be grateful if I spared you that.
But here is one we wish to bring before you because it comes from
the governor of Kansas, and he says that he is “heartily in favor of a
protest which the anti-preparedness committee is to launch against
the proposed naval and military preparations, on the 8th and 9th,
and I regret other engagements prevent me being with you in Wash-
ington.” It is signed by Arthur Capper.
Senator HITCHCOOK. Your committee does not complain against
all preparedness?
Miss WALD. We do not stand for disarmament at the present time.
I think some of us fervently and ardently hope the day will come,
but we do not stand for disarmament now. We ask for thorough
investigations to-day of what we now have.
Senator HITCHCOCK. Has your committee decided what amount
of preparedness is desireble % -
iss WALD. We think we are perhaps in accord with a great many
experts because we really do not know. We have been reading the
testimony that has been presented and, as you know, there is a great
variance of judgments and advice. We would like to have unanimity,
if possible; certainly more agreement than seems to exist now, before
huge sums are spent.
Mr. HITCHCOCK. If you thought there was real danger would you
be in favor of preparedness?
1032 PREPAREDINESS FOR, NATIONAL DEFENSE.
Miss WALD. I should say to a degree, if you mean by that to what
extent should we appropriate money. -
Senator HITCHCOCK. I mean if your committee thought there was
real danger would you be in favor of preparedness and resistance 2
Miss WALD. Yes, Senator; I should say that when all other things
are exhausted, when we are sure that our money is not being wasted
or being misused, after careful inquiry, and we are certain that every
diplomatic device has been tried, we would say let our army and
our navy be not the largest but the best; the best for every dollar
that has been expended. Just how far they would go I am no more
prepared to say than the military experts º came before you.
Senator HITCHCOCK. You realize there are some preparations that
can not be made after the danger arises 3
Miss WALD. When is that danger, Senator, to-day or to-morrow,
or when war has ceased on the other side º &
Senator HITCHCOCK. We do not know thaf, but I am asking you
whether you would be in favor of such preparation as is necessary
before the danger arises?
Miss WALD. When you say when the danger arises, that might
lead us very, very far, would it not ? I think that after we have
spent as much money as we have we should be prepared, but I could
not say whether we are adequately prepared or not. I think none
of us could say until there has been a very thorough and honest and
patriotic investigation of the uses to which the money has been put
that has been appropriated for the Army and the Navy.
Senator HITCHCOCK. You realize that in these days a war comes
like a bolt of lightning out of a clear sky.
Miss WALD. I, of course, am not a military º but I say that
modern wars do not come that way, and that the unknown enemy
that it is intimated hangs over us like a dark cloud is probably at
Some distance. º
Senator HITCHCOCK. Take the war raging in Europe; it broke out
on the 1st of August or the last day of #. Nobody knew it was
coming a week before.
Miss WALD. Why did they not know when Germany had the big-
gest army taxing its people? Certainly they did not provide it for
nothing, and there was secret diplomacy, of course, and some treaties
that had been made between different countries that makes the matter
very obscure to common people; but when all the papers are read
I have no doubt that there will be proof that some people knew, not
the ordinary working people. That is what we would avoid in
America.
I am afraid that if I am led into the subject I will say things that will
be presented better by other people who are to appear here this after-
moon. I only know that out of the strong feeling on the part of
those with whom I am associated has come the conviction that we
are in great danger of reversing our American policy. . It is so easy to
change from day to day, and the increasing demands mountin º
in tremendous numbers are confusing the whole country. I think
that they see ghosts. I believe the man, who saw the German
company drill saw ghosts. When the Spanish-American War was on,
I saw with my own eyes hundreds move from the river front because
they said the Spanish guns had been heard around the corner in the
East River. I have known many people in the region where I live
*.
PREPAIRED NESS FOR NATIONAL, DEFENSE. 1033
that were indignant because war was not declared as promptly as one
of the newspapers demanded. - *
Senator HITCHCOCK. I am calling your attention to the fact that
this last war broke out in the twinkling of an eye, so that the whole
world was astounded. The war before that, between Japan and
Russia, was suddenly aflame when Japan attacked Russian vessels;
and the Spanish-American War was caused by the explosion on the
Maine, an event as dramatic and sudden as could be. That is the
case with modern wars. In view of that fact do you think any pre-
paration should be made by our country'. -
Miss WALD. Of course when we are appropriating large sums of
money we are preparing, and I beg to say, Mr. Chairman, that the
situation between the invasion of Belgium and the invasion of New
York Harbor can not be considered the same. Germany's army was
mobilized, ready to step overnight into Belgium.
Senator CATRON. You say of course they knew Germany was pre-
pared, and therefore they knew war was inevitable. That being the
case, should they not have prepared
Miss WALD. I do not want to be led into a discussion of European
policies, because I am not competent to discuss them.
Senator CATRON. These countries, however, are prepared now, and
when the war is over they will be better prepared than they are to-day.
Miss WALD. The situation is not parallel, is it?
Senator CATRON. Not entirely, but from it you can draw very good
ideas.
Miss WALD. But I would remind you that the foes that are hanging
over us, presumably on the other side of the water, are in the midst of
a devastating war. Their manhood is destroyed, their finances must
be in a very precarious Condition. I do not know when we could
expect them to escape from the obligation to protect their own land
and come over here with their armies, and I am trying to protest
against what may be an entirely unfounded fear that is reducing the
Nation to a state of hysteria.
Senator CATRON. I do not suppose that the war is going to last
forever, but when it does come to an end they will have their armies
in magnificent shape, they will have their men in fighting trim and
ready to carry on a vigorous war, and we are not making many
friends over there just now. •e -
Miss WALD. I think not, and if we create large armies and navies
we will lose the last scintilla of confidence in us that may exist in
Europe. e
The CHAIRMAN. Will you excuse us for a moment, to take a vote.
We will be back in five minutes.
(The committee then took a recess for five minutes. At the expi-
ration of the recess the committee resumed the hearing.)
Miss WALD. We want you to realize that there are many people
that look on the subject from the angle which we look upon it, and
to give some idea of the interests that are brought together by us
to-day I will mention the United Mine Workers of America when
at their meeting in Indianapolis very recently their president made
his report and it was indorsed in full–I am sorry he is not here
to-day—but the One sentence which is suitable to bring before you,
and which the entire organization indorsed in the convention, was
that men of labor are unalterably opposed to the whole scheme of
1034 BREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
preparedness which means war. And the trade unionists throughout
the country have many of them passed strong resolutions. One of
their representatives has already spoken.
- . The Farmers' Cooperative and Educational Union, representing
thousands of farmers of the South and Middle West, met in conven-
tion and passed similar resolutions, and some people will speak from
that union this afternoon; and the National Grange and Farmers'
Union, representing farmers from Minnesota, Iowa, North and South
Dakota, met in the city of St. Paul and passed the most emphatic
resolutions against so-called preparedness. As far as our little com-
mittee is concerned, may I say we have only been in existence a very
few weeks. We are very busy people, but we came together because
we thought it was patriotic to do so, and contributions have come in
amounts ranging from $2,000 to 10 cents through the mail, and
500 letters of approval and encouragement have come to us, and
3,000 requests for Our literature. I have not brought any letters to
ou, because I imagine gentlemen as experienced as you are would
ow how people would express their approval of such committees
as ours. To-day our committee is merely acting as an agency to
provide the Occasion for these other people to come before you, and
they will give you the inference they jº from this agitation.
I am going to ask Mr. James H. Maurer, the president of the
Pennsylvania Federation of Labor, to speak.
The CHAIRMAN. Please give your name and address.
STATEMENT OF MR. JAMES H. MAURER, PRESIDENT OF THE
PENNSYLVANIA FEDERATION OF LABOR.
Mr. MAURER. My office address is Pittsburgh, Pa.; home address,
Reading. Occupation, machinist, at the present time employed as
president of the Pennsylvania Federation of Labor and member of
the General Assembly of Pennsylvania.
Now, gentlemen, I can not voice the State federation's views of
this subject, because it has not had a chance to express itself on the
Subject of preparedness yet. I may, however, briefly speak to you
as to the feeling of the working class of Pennsylvania. The position
I hold keeps me at least two-thirds of my time on the road. You
will pardon this personal reference to myself, but you will understand
my authority for making whatever statements I may make. Last
year I covered over 25,000 miles and this year it will be more. I
have been through Pennsylvania, never any farther West than
Chicago nor East than Boston, doing this work. I mention this so
you will understand that I am in pretty close touch with the working
class, and I feel that I can briefly express their feelings on this sub-
ject. I have delivered a number of lectures on this subject, have
been in debates, and I feel I understand it fairly well, and I will try
to express to you the views as I see them, and as those I have met
along the road see them.
I feel satisfied that if we were to hold a convention now we would
pass resolutions as strong as the United Mines people did. -
Our reason for opposing this mania that seems to be stampeding
Tnhany of our citizens for preparedness is that we can not see the use
of it. We feel that instead of spending any more money for the
Army and Navy it would be more patriotic on the part of the United
PREPAIRED NIESS FOR, NATIONAL DEFENSE. 103.5
States Senate and Congress to investigate those forces to which the
money we have spent in the last 10 years for preparedness has been
going. People were led to believe that they were being prepared all
along. Ten months ago we were told that we should go to war with
Mexico. Intervention was demanded. Then the Lusitamia was
sunk. We were told at that time that we were the greatest power on
earth, and we were led to believe that we could thrash most anything
that came along. In fact, they contended that we could go to war
with Mexico and Germany at one and the same time if we saw fit.
Suddenly by these same sources we are told we are not prepared for
anything; that our boats are old tubs, and that our Army and Navy
2.I’O oorly equipped. It was too much to expect in so short a time.
N. we feel that we are not so poorly protected against invasion
as some people would have us believe. We feel that the war trust,
or those who make munitions for profit, are the most interested in
this preparedness program, although they are not the entire cause
for this agitation. There are other factors. Those who are responsi-
ble, or partly responsible at least, for the continuance of the Euro-
pean conflict are also eager that we prepare for what may come
after that conflict in Europe may cease.
We can not see any reason for forcign invasion unless we do some-
thing to provoke it. Two years ago there was a threat of invasion.
It might have been, perhaps, accepted by a greater number of people
than are now accepting it or are willing to accept it. Two years
ago when the European nations, especially Germany and Austria,
were prepared as they never were before in all their history, and the
same is practically true of the other countries, when they might have
made trouble for the United States if they had been so disposed, we
heard no remarks of preparedness or attacks from the outside. In
fact, I have never heard of any until about six months ago, when this
thing started here, and I do not think any of you ever have. We
feel perfectly secure. When there was danger in so far as preparation
on the other side was concerned, these nations were prepared then,
but they have had now going on two years' war among themselves.
They have expended, we are told, something like $40,000,000,000
worth of supplies. They have killed and wounded over 11,000,000
of the best people of Europe, and now when they are hopelessly in
debt, so hopelessly in debt that some people fear they can never pay
the interest on the debt, their population reduced to cripples, women,
and children, when they are bleeding to death, you say we have got
to be afraid of them. It does not look good to us. It does not fit.
There is something wrong.
I come from an old American stock. I can trace my ancestry back
in this country in Pennsylvania for over 200 years, and if I felt that
Germany or the allies could thrash us Americans I would be ashamed
to admit that I was an American. We blow about our American
manhood and honor, and yet we are preparing against nations that
are actually to be pitied. The question has been asked whether we
should be prepared for a spontaneous outbreak. Gentlemen, we of
the working class, who must fight these battles, want to know what
you know about this thing. If there is anything on the inside that
you have not told, why not ? What is the trouble herº President
Wilson said the other day, in his speech in my own State, that in a
1036 PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
moment there may be a conflagration, perhaps next week, perhaps a
month hence, he hoped never, but we can not tell.
Now, I know enough about governmental affairs to know that it
would not do to tell everything that you do know; the enemy might
find out what perhaps they should not know; but I do know this, that
we Americans should know what the danger is. I am astisfied
that if the Germans and the Austrians and the allies had known what
the trouble was before the conflagration started in Europe, there
would not be this mess that they are in now. -
We feel this way about preparedness, gentlemen: I have spoken
to many people about it, and none of us feel that we ought to disarm.
As long as there is any uncivilized nation on earth that is armed, we
have got to do the same thing or they will come in like barbarians
and clean us up. We admit that; but we are removed 3,000 miles
from the Europeans and many more thousand miles from the Asiatics.
We feel that we are prepared to meet any danger within at least
two generations to come.
If the Germans had won three months after the war started, there
would have been a war indemnity, and they could have gotten it;
but there is no war indemnity that can be paid to-day. The best
that they can hope for will be possessions—land—and if they get
that, what then . They will have to police it, to soldier it, and these
soldiers must be Germans. Do you think that Germany, after being
compelled to police that which she acquired through victory in war,
will R. able to come over and make war against the United States,
fresh, with all its resources at its commandº I do not think so. If
she could, what do you suppose, the allies will be doing while she is
over here . The same is true if the allies should make war on us.
Wºº do you think Germany will be doing while the allies are over
ere?
I have reasoned the matter of preparedness out with some of the
ablest men you have in the country on the subject and have com-
municated with them and read their speeches, and I have not really
found any yet that could convince me of the necessity for prepared-
ness. Gentlemen, I am going to tell you what I think about it. lt
is our private opinion the American capitalists are to-day financing
the European war in supplying munitions of war and the methods of
destruction, and they are not selling those things for cash. It is on
a credit basis that they are selling the munitions of war at the present
time. The American banking interests, which are to-day the most
powerful interests in the world, are financing these notes. They are
cashing them. Munitions are to-day bought with pieces of paper—
bonds and promissory notes and securities of different kinds—any-
thing with a fancy name and a crooked mark on it. The banking
interests are furnishing the money to the manufacturers so they can
pay wages and buy supplies, which it will require more than promis-
sory notes to do. These promises are piling up higher and higher,
and some day there will be an end of this European war. When that
day comes, they will be getting around a table just as we are here now.
It is a pity they could not do that before a war, but they always wait
until they kill a lot of people and do it. Then there will be a question.
of settlement. It may be, perhaps, that they will decide to hold the
munition manufacturers responsible for the robbery committed at
this present time by charging excessive prices, and they may agree to
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 1037
only pay what these notes are actually worth, or agree to repudiate
the whole thing, and a big army and navy would be a mighty handy
thing for the capitalist to have at that time to send us working men
abroad as collectors for them. We refuse to be used for anything like
that. - -
Again, if you fear the allies, why are you permitting American
capitalists to-day to equip them? Why not shut off their bases of
supplies'. To-day you are actually furnishing them the very things
you fear they may use against us, for no other purpose than profit;
and we absolutely refuse to be brought into this thing in order to
appease the appetites of a few Vultures of Society. This is harsh
language, but right here is the place to speak it. I want to be frank
with you. We are sick and tired of being turned into fodder for
cannon. Then you are going to raise the money by taxing us work-
ers, and you are then going into our homes and take our fathers and
º and sons out and make us do the fighting and also pay for
the fight. * -
We have a right to protest. If it is right to take a workingman's
life we say it is right to take a rich man's fortune. The day has come
when it is necessary for the workingmen to reason these things out
for themselves, gentlemen, and we are going to have some voice in
this matter before it is settled in Congress. We, after all, are the
bone and the sinew and the salt of the earth, and if you want a good
standing army, if you want a people that can resist any invasion, I
will tell you how you can obtain it.
I have got a program for protection, one that is worked out and
One with which every one of you will agree. Make the American
pºpº prosperous, make the American worker feel that this is the
est spot on earth, and make conditions so that he can live with
his wife and support her and not make her go out to work and sup-
port the family #. millions of us must. Make it so that a father
can raise his children and educate them and, during the course of
his lifetime, establish a little home unto himself with flowers around
that little home and a breathing space, and let that man bring
those children up in the sunshine of the playground or the school-
room so that they can develop to be big men and women, physical
and mental giants. Make that condition, and you will have a people
here that will resist any invasion, even though it be twenty times the
force in numbers that we are. They will have something to fight
for, gentlemen. What do you suppose we people in the Pennsyl-
vania coal fields, working four or five months in the year, have to
fight for 3 You want us to be patriotic. What about 2 You
sicken me with your patriotic talk. I want to be a patriot only to
the extent that I am fighting the battles of myself, my family, and
those that are dear to me. When you give me a country to fight
for, a country in which I can not make a decent living for myself
and my family, and you say I shall have to fight for that country,
I can not see it, gentlemen, and I am an American and come from
Old American stock, a Pennsylvanian all my life. ..
We are patriotic and will be, but give us something to be patriotic
about, and how are you going to do that ? The only way you can do
it is to take the drones off our backs. That is how you can do it.
You can not do it all, but you can go a great ways toward that.
That is preparedness, and for the present #. tell you what you
1038 PREPARED NIESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
can do without turning this country over to militarism. Mine your
coasts—our coasts. Furnish submarines. I do not admit that there
is any danger, but if you feel that there might be danger, and your
positions as Senators demand that you protect this continent and
that you would not be doing your full duty unless you do something,
then do that. Mine our coasts and furnish us as many submarines
as you think could take care of us. It has been figured out by men
who know that you can mine our coasts for the price that they talk
about spending on the Navy this year alone. You talk about battle-
ships. After all, what are they doing in Europe now . They come
out of a harbor, half a dozen of them, and a little submarine comes
out and they run for their lives. Battleships are good enough to
protect transports when you go to make war or to protect little island
possessions, but I do not see that they amount to much for protec-
tion of a great coast like we have in the United States. Keep what
you have, but I would not spend any more money on getting new
ones. If you do you are going to make war some day. That is the
most probable thing. --
As to the Army and Navy, I think it is large enough. I do not see
that you need any other protection than what you have. If you
insist on making the Army larger and you want something like an
army of the people such as has been talked about as a continental
army, while P. not favor a continental army, I say if you are going
to make your workingmen soldiers, the only way we will ever agree
to your program is that you will give us the right to elect our own
officers. Give us at least a thousand rounds .# ammunition and a
good rifle and rapid-fire high-pressure guns. If you will give us
those, together with the necessary amount of ammunition and also
let us keep them in our homes, we will take good care that the Arm
will never be used for aggression but only for protection. We will
give you our word for that. I think, also, in conclusion, you should,
gentlemen, do this: I think it would be a splendid idea if instead of
going into this preparedness program you would agree to pass an act
iving the President the right to start corraling the best brains we
#. in the United States, the experts, the engineers, and chemists,
and let us start getting ready to furnish ourselves with everything
we need, far removed from the seacoast, inland somewhere, and get
the brains of this country and start making these things. In a very
short time we can be in a position to make all we .# ever need in
our own arsenals and plants, and that will eliminate the profit in war.
I feel safe in saying ift when we once eliminate profit in war there
will be no more wars.
Miss WALD. Mr. Chairman, we thought this afternoon that we
would introduce to you a limited number of speakers, and I have
mentioned particularly the laboring men and the representatives of
agricultural and farmers' associations. There will be in addition to
them a voter from the far West, a woman whose name is known far
and wide, but there are a great many other organized bodies that are
very much with us. The church should have been represented to-day,
and will be well represented at the meeting in the other House to-
morrow morning. Washington Gladden, who is perhaps the most
revently loved minister in the whole. United States, and who was to
have been with us this afternoon, is addressing a meeting in New
York on this same subject, taking the point of view that we do.
PREPAIRED NIESS FOR, NATIONAL DEFENSE. 1039
Otherwise he would have been here. Others, too, would have been
here had there been sufficient time.
The next speaker is Mrs. Florence Kelley, the daughter of an
American statesmen who for 30 years sat in the House of Repre-
sentative. Mrs. Kelley is known throughout every State in the
|United States from Maine to California and I think in every country
in the world where people gather together to discuss measures for
human welfare. She is a statesman, too, Mr. Chairman and gentle-
men, and I would like you to hear her.
STATEMENT OF MIRS, FLORENCE KELLEY.
Mrs. KELLEY. Mr. Chairman and gentlemen, it has of late been so
much the fashion for a part of the press to sneer at all who object to
the sudden increase in expenditure }. war purposes, that I Crave your
patient hearing, not for my own sake, but in the memory of my father
who was in the House of Representatives from 1860 to 1890, and
at Gettysburg and at Antietam with the Pennsylvania Reserves;
also because of my old grandfather's father who was in the Revolution,
and my old granduncle who was in the Mexican War, and my uncles
who died frightful, lingering deaths of tuberculosis acquired in
the Civil War, and also my inj who were in the Cuban war.
We have not been a family of cowards, but no one thought in those
days of spending any such sums for defense as it has been pro-
posed to spend now. In those days at the close of the Civil War,
when we had an Army and a Navy developed during the fighting,
no one proposed any such equipment for conceivable future wars as
people are threatening us with now.
I beg to point out that this Congress can not possibly have any
mandate from the women of this country to turn at a * angle
from the traditional policy of preparing only at the moment of
danger, to introduce tremendous expenditures, because only 2,000,000
women had the opportunity of voting for this Congress. I hope
that future Congresses may be able to speak for both men and
women, but this one does not. It has only a mandate from a very
small proportion of the women of the country, and they have not
expressed themselves in favor of this change of policy. We hear
it sneeringly said by the papers that this is not a concern of women;
that a suspiciously large number of those who object to the policy
of sudden overpreparedness are women. But it is primarily the
concern of women. Women produce the armies. Whenever a
soldier is born it is at the risk of a woman’s life, and whenever a soldier
is killed her heart is broken. It is more the concern of women than .
it could possibly be of any other citizens. I speak as a mother, and
I know what it means to women, to threaten us with becoming one of
the military nations. I know what the barracks do to the soldiers of
regular armies.
i beg to call your attention to the singular disproportion between
what recent Congresses have done for the future soldiers and what
they have spent in preparation for war. There is nothing which is
treated with such º niggardliness as the children of the
º After, we worked seven years to get a bureau for the
children it was given $25,000 with which to begin; and after it had
shown its value with that pitiful little sum it was then lavishly given
1040 PREPAREDINESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
$167,000 with which to go on the second two years in the service of the
future soldiers. Now its allotment for printing is so pitiful that when
the chief of the bureau goes traveling about to speak to women about
the children, she can not send her publications from the bureau to
be distributed. We have to write for one and send an address to
which one shall be sent, and then we write for another and send
another address to which another little publication shall be sent.
And these are the future soldiers, and your spending millions of dol-
lars for cannon and $25,000 to keep the future soldiers alive seems to
us very singular and very undesirable. We would like to see more
money spent on the soldiers of the future at this stage when they are
in the beginning, than after they are crippled and maimed in a war
which we have reason, perhaps, for some future time—I do not know
when or where or why—to dread.
Another thing to which I wish to call attention is the very singular
artificial hysteria on the subject to which women are now being sub-
jected by wholesale. I own a barren, lonesome little farm on the
coast of Maine with a rebuilt frame house of an abandoned farm on it.
It is surrounded by roads so bad that nobody can come and see me in
the summer. It is 28 miles from a railway station. It is four hours
by boat from a town. It is 8 miles from a telephone center. In that
lonely spot last summer I received a letter from a Special War-Relief
committee, which the signers said they had written with the appro-
bation of Secretary Garrison. This letter said, “Will you give your
country house for use as a hospital during the period of the War'''
I thought to myself, God help the soldiers who are brought across a
sea and sent over these roads to this house. But then I read it again,
and I found that it was not this war for which they wanted my little
abandoned farm. It is for our war when it comes. Then the letter
said, “If you can not conveniently give your house”—I could give
it far more conveniently than any soldier could ever use it—“if you
can not conveniently give your country house, will you give your
motor car º' Now, no motor car could ever get to that house over
those roads without losing its tires. In closing, the letter said, “If
you can not give either, how much money will you subscribe every
week for the care of the soldiers ?” The answer was to go to 156
Fifth Avenue, and that letter was signed by many well-known names.
It was represented that it was written at the solicitation of Mr.
Garrison, the Secretary of War. -
Now, I am an old woman. I have lived through two wars, the
Civil War and the Spanish-American War, and I submit for your
consideration whether the women of this country were ever insulted
with such hysterical appeal as that before, asking us to give our
houses, our money, and our motor cars for our war with no specifica-
tion whatever as to whom we are to fight, or when, or where, or why,
but only to make us anxious and wretched.
Last summer I was in Montana and I saw there a fort or barracks
which was built in the days before the Indians were dead, while we
were exterminating our few enemies in this hemisphere. . The houses
were very substantial. They were well warmed for that climate.
They were built above the snow level. It was a comfortable, well-
planned village, up in the mountains, far from the Canadian border,
and far from everything but the dead Indians and a little university.
The people of that region have been begging Uncle Sam for a long
*
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 1041
time to give them those houses to use for feeble-minded girls, because
the people of Montana have not recently seen those barracks occupied
for any ascertainable purpose, the Indians being dead; but Uncle
Sam keeps on, the houses are warmed, the people in them are fed,
they seem to be occasionally drilled, but they do not serve any
ascertainable purpose.
I questioned why this expenditure was maintained, why the bar-
racks were there, and the people shrugged their shoulders or laughed
or evaded the question, and the few that I succeeded in getting to
answer me at all said, “Why, the only reason we have ever been
able to concoct for keeping these barracks here is that it costs, a
good deal to get the soldiers here when they are changed, and to take
them away when they are changed, and to send up the coal to keep
them warm and the food that they eat; the only thing we can conceive
of as a reason is that there must be some profit for somebody in bring-
ing things here and taking them away, because nobody ever does any-
thing here.” I do not know how many Missoula barracks there may
be scattered over the country, but I have often questioned, since
people have been discussing the enormous appropriations that are
asked for, whether we spend as much money on the Missoula bar-
racks as we spend on the children's bureau, and, if the money which
has been voted by Congress in times past is squandered in other
places as it is obviously squandered in Missoula, why should any
more money be given to men to use in such futile ways as that ? It
would seem to us that instead of launching out in new expenditures
this is the time to redistribute the oxpenditures we are already mak-
ing and to take care of the boys who will be soldiers and the women
who may be soldiers' wives and who certainly will be valuable citizens
if they are allowed to be alive and be educated. Is it not better to
spend money on them now than scatter it on more Missoulas %
Miss WALD. Mr. Chairman, I have here a letter from a distinguished
engineer employed in the steel works at Pittsburgh, Mr. Julian Ken-
nedy. The *. does not indicate that he is entirely in accord with
us, but it does indicate a difference of opinion among people qualified
to pass judgment upon measures of defense and preparedness, and,
with your permission, I will read it.
The letter from Mr. Kennedy is as follows:
PITTs BURGH, February 7, 1916.
Miss CRYSTAL EASTMAN, Secretary,
Munsey Building, Washington, D. C.
My DEAR MISS EASTMAN: Replying to your telegram and letter, I have wired you
as follows: - }
“Regret that very important engagement in Buffalo will prevent my being in
Washington to-morrow.” -
I have an engagement in Buffalo to-morrow which it will be impossible for me to
change, so that I can not go to Washington,
. I believe that it is unwise to go hastily into any very extravagant expenditure for
armament, and I feel also that a very vigorous effort should be made to spend the
money on the Army, especially, in a very much more efficient manner than at present.
I think Congress should take immediate steps to wipe out at least half of the pork-
barrel political posts now maintained in this country. If they would instruct the
President to discontinue a certain number of posts, leaving it to his discretion which
ones should be abolished, and also instruct him to dispose of the property at the
earliest practicable moment, a long stride would be made in the direction of real
“preparedness.”
23380—PT 21—16—4
1042 PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
Our system of navy yards also should be promptly and thoroughly investigated
to the end that the yards which can never be made really efficient should be either
abandoned or used as subsidiary yards to build small vessles. To equip Mare Island,
yard, for example, to build battleships of the largest size would seem to be a foolish
waste of money. The money required to dredge miles of channel away would be
better expended on a good yard Some place on deep water. In other words, we need
a little common sense business efficiency and a good deal less of what is popularly
known as “log-rolling for the pork barrel.” - *
. Trusting you may be able to at least suggest something in the line of business effi-
ciency to the Congress, I remain, -
Yours, truly, &
- JULIAN KENNEDY.
. Mr. Chairman, I wish now to call upon Mr. Frank Donnblazer, who
is a member of the general executive board of the National Farmers'
Union, and who is the official representative sent by the president of
that enormous organization.
STATEMENT OF MIR, FRANK DONNBLAZER.
Mr. DONNBLAZER. Mr. Chairman, gentlemen, and ladies, it is some -
thing new to me to appear before a committee of this kind. I am not
here from choice nor voluntarily. I was drafted into this service. I
had a resolution this morning before the other committee and, unfor-
tunately, I have not got it with me. I am a Pennsylvania Dutch-
man on my father's side, and Scotch-Irish on my mother's side. That
is considerable of a mixture, but it is pretty good stuff. I was born
in Pennsylvania in 1841. I am a farmer. I am the secretary of the
board of directors of the Farmers' Educational and Cooperative Union
of America, an organization that I believe is one of the greatest and
most useful organizations that the farmers have or ever did have. I
am a granger and a member of the grange. I have been married over
54 years. My wife is still living. We are the parents of 18 children,
9 boys and 9 girls, and I guessi have fulfilled the Scriptures. I was
turned loose when I was but 13 years old. My father gave me my
freedom. It is unusual for the Dutch people to do that.
I went to Texas with a drove of sheep when I was 14 years old lack-
ing a month. I was five years with the sheep. I laid out of doors all
that time. What I know I learned by experience outside of books.
I went to school one winter after I quit the sheep. I studied grammar -
30 minutes. When I came to that part where it said I love and he
loves and she loves, I laid it aside, because I knew that already. So
what I am going to tell you is in my simple homespun way. I am
not here to represent myself. I am here to represent over 2,000,000
farmers. I may have some ideas of my own, but they are my own.
I am not representing myself. My ancestors, my great grandfather
and his brother came from Germany before the Revolutionary War.
My grandfather fought seven years for the independence those folks
have got. My greatuncle lost his life in the Revolutionary, War.
My father's father, my grandfather on my father's side, was in the
ar of 1812. My own father was in the War with Mexico, and he
joined the Union Army, was wounded at the very last of the war and
died on the boat on his way home at St. Louis and now lies in a
soldier's grave. I am not much of a warrior. If it were left to me,
I would not let any ruler declare war. It is dangerous. But this is
my idea: -
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 1043
I would submit it to the people who have to do the fighting and if
the majority said that we should have war I would let those who
vote for war go and the others stay at home. But, anyhow, I believe
in peace; I believe in preparedness; but first and foremost I believe
in readiness, and that is why I am a member of the farmers' union.
I joined a farmers' club in 1866, the Grange in 1869, and I am still
a member of the Grange; the Farmers' Alliance in 1879, and I was
the eleventh man that joined this union 17 years ago last September
and was chairman of the committee that framed the constitution that
we have now. I know something about what the farmers are up
against. I am working in this business for readiness; I mean in the
farmers' union or in the Grange or in any of the farmers' organizations.
i believe that the masses of the people of this country are honest.
If I did not believe that I would be despondent. They will do what is
right if they know. But I am here to tell you that some of them do
not know. Hence we have this great organization of the Farmers'
Educational and Cooperative Union, educational for the purpose of
educating the people so they will know what is right and may better
their condition by having home rights, for I do honestly believe
before God that if more people had homes we would be ready to whip
any nation that came in here, whether we had any more preparedness
Or not.
That is the best thing in the world, to have something to fight for.
Should an enemy come here from any other country we are nearer
ready, from what I have heard, to-day than we were when the war
broke out over yonder, where if they keep on they will not have any-
one left but women and children and cripples. But I am not here
to talk of what I think. I am here for what the Farmers' Educa-
tional and Cooperative Union of America has declared. I am repre-
senting 22 States that are organized and 6 that are on the way, and
4 of them will be organized as State unions in March, which will
make 26. We organize a local. When we get enough locals in the
county, we Organize the county. When we get enough counties or-
ganized we organize the State, and when we got enough members in
the State we organized the national union. These questions come
up which agitate the public at the locals, and they are agitated and
discussed and resolutions are passed and sent with the delegates to
the county union and at the county unions they are discussed again,
because the delegates come from all the locals, and there may be 50
or 60 locals in the county, and even more. These resolutions are dis-
cussed and the best is taken. It then goes to the national union.
This resolution comes from the forks of the creek, and it has been
discussed by hundreds of thousands of farmers. Here is what it
says:
We demand economy in all operations made by Congress, and we are especially
opposed to any great increase in expenditure for the Army and Navy, but approve a
reasonable outlay for coast defense by submarine or other weapons, proved by recent
experience to be effective for that purpose. We are unalterably opposed to a large
Standing army and to any change in our military system tending to compulsory
military Service.
That is the resolution that came up from the forks of the creek.
You need not ask me anything about what I know about the big
É. and the big ships. I do not know anything about them. I
now this, I believe in preparedness, and I told them this morning,
1044 PREPAIRED NESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
to a certain extent. Yes, we have cyclones down in our country,
and I have a storm house, and when the storm begins to appear, or
it even looks like there is going to be one, my family and I get in it.
* would be a blamed fool # I would build another when I did not
need it.
Ladies and gentlemen and gentlemen of the committee, I am just
here to represent the farmers' union, as I have already told you.
They have their papers to read and are doing their thinking. They
are patriotic, and if a war should break out and they should be called
on, you would find them on hand. You need not be a bit uneasy.
But they see no necessity for this great preparedness. They believe
you are going to do what is right. I know we have some men in the
union that if it were left to them we would tear everything to pieces.
We have some that would not do anything. You have them, too,
in the Senate and in Congress. You do not have to go to the union
to find them. Hence we are glad to help you fellows who want to
do what is right and will do it. You want to represent your con-
stituents and I have told you how many there are of us and they
are increasing all the time. We organized the State of Nebraska two
years ago last December with 5,000 farmers, male farmers. Women
join the farmers' union free. It does not cost them a cent. Some
old fogy wanted to know what a woman could do, and I said: “Good
Lord, how much would they have to do to beat us men º’’ Some men
are always afraid the women can not do anything. If they think
they can not, let them alone and let them try. - -
Now, Nebraska has over 44,000 male members in the farmers'
union, and at their State meeting just a week or two ago they unani-
mously and without a single solitary objection opposed preparedness,
opposed going into this expensive preparedness and telling our boys
to drill and get ready to fight. A fight always looks best to me a
good ways off, and the further off the better it looks to me. ... If I
believed that was the only way to settle fusses when children fell out
at school I would tell them to scrap it out. I do not believe any
nation will come into America, because we will not let them. But
the farmers have their eyes open. I have spent the best of my
life. I am 75 years old—no, I am not; I have just lived that long—
and I have had some wonderful experiences. I have been among
the Comanche Indians and other tribes and the desperadoes that
came down into Texas before the war, and even after the Civil War.
It was the dumping ground for the desperadoes.
Mr. Chairman, I did not know I was using up so much time, and
there are others here who want to make a statement. I thank you,
gentlemen, for your attention. If you want to hear any more at
some time, if you get in a tight place, just call on us and we will help
Ou Out. -
y Miss WALD. Mr. Chairman, Pennsylvania seems to have been very
well represented, but our selections ran more to the interests than to
geographical lines. Our next speaker is a citizen from the State of
California, Miss Sarah Bard Field.
STATEMENT OF MISS SARA BARD FIELD.
Miss FIELD. Mr. Chairman and gentlemen, early in December 1
had the honor of addressing the Suffrage Committee of the Senate,
the Judiciary Committee of the House, and the national committees
PREPAREDINESS FOR, NATIONAL DEFENSE. 1045
of both parties with regard to the matter of suffrage. At that time
I was the official representative of the first woman's political con-
vention from San Francisco, and I spoke representing a large number of
the 4,000,000 women voters of the West. But to-day I do not come
in any official capacity. I am not representing any organization.
I am only representing what I believe after a long residence in the
west and an intimate contact with the women that iſ met in my
long automobile trip from San Francisco to the East to be the opinions
and the feeling among the millions of women who can now wield the
ballot and who will have a right to say something on this question
at the coming elections. -
When I arrived here in the east I said to Crystal Eastman that I
believed the stronghold of opposition to preparedness and to the
ſº campaign on this question was in the Middle West and the
ar West. Since then the administration that is now in power has
borne out that belief of mine by sending out its chief to try to over-
come an opposition which he and the party saw was centered in the
Middle West and the far West.
It is easy to see why that opposition is centered there. Things do
not happen just because a locality is a locality, and I submit very
humbly as a student of affairs that one of the reasons why the oppo-
sition has been so strong against preparedness in the Middle and far
West is because of the entrance of women into the field of politics.
I believe already that this antagonism toward this º Of
preparedness is a direct result of women's entrance into the political
field and her right to speak and her growing intelligence because she
has the right and has been assuming the duties of the franchise. Why
is that true? Why are the women who have studied this question
opposed to it? I have no use for that sickly sentimental and sob story
stuff of women being opposed to war because they go down to the
gates of death to bring life into the world, I do not believe woman
is opposed to a fight when the fight is for a good purpose. I do
not believe that women are opposed to preparedness when it is
preparedness for something that is vital and real. Women have
always been ready to give the life they brought into the world when
the giving of it meant a “life more abundant” for the Nation.
I think the women of the West and Middle West do not believe
this is a big fight before us. I would say to the Senator—I do not
know his name—who asked our chairman to-day whether she did
not know that wars were a result of a very sudden announcement—
and he cited three or four recent wars—that it is only the dear people
who did not know about the conditions that lead to wars. There are
documents in evidence, sir, that the men in high finance and the
militarists knew two years before that this war was inevitable and
the very day on which it was to be announced. It is only the people
who were fooled, and the women of the West and the far West, at
least a great many of them, know that and realize that if the people
of the United States are to be fooled about a condition of war which
is imminent, that it is because we are capable of being fooled, and it
is because our rulers let us be fooled and not because it is necessary
that war should be the result of a sudden windfall, as it were. I
think that is one reason why we women of the West are opposed to
preparedness, and I know a great many of them are. I think we are
opposed to it because we know that there is no real fight before us.
1046 | PREPAREDNIESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
We see no change since President Wilson announced that we had
no enemy to fear and that we were a Nation too proud to fight. We
see no change in that condition and we believe there are other things
to use our money for. ... I think we see this very clearly in the Middle
and far West, because, you know, it is there that the great projects
of irrigation and reclamation and reservation all center. Two years
ago I went down into Nevada to help in the suffrage fight there. I
went to Fallon, and there I found a country desolate, lying in the
midst of a great desert, unproductive, and not giving to the people
any return. This year I came through that very district. What
has happened? The Lahonitan dam has been constructed, and the
biblical prophecy has come true. Already in one year “the desert
has blossomed like a rose.” . It has everything in the way of food
and living. Thousands of people already have come into Nevada
because of it and others will come. It is because we are very close to
those projects of the country that I think we feel the waste it would
be to spend money on unnecessary preparedness when there are such
necessary things before us to be done in the development of the land.
You may say, too, that we are against this program because we
believe there is a bigger fight on than any jingoism can make us
believe is coming between our own power and any European power,
and that is the great industrial fight. I saw women in the labor ranks
put up the most magnificent fight against an effort to throttle labor
unions in Sacramento, Cal. The women stood picket duty. They
were willing to go to the full limit to protect the unions, which is,
of course, a protection in a most direct way of the life of their children
and their husbands and brothers, as well as their own lives. Women
are interested in a real fight, and I think it is because we are very
close to the many phases of the industrial fight out there. We have
had the ballot for some time now, and as we have used the ballot we
have found there is only one big fight before the world, and that is
labor's fight. Knowing that, we feel that all our energy and all the
money we can spare should go toward rectifying such conditions as
Florence Kelley can more eloquently speak of out of her experience
and out of her great knowledge than I can.
The Japanese question, involving the lower standard of living on
the part of the alien, the yellow man, can be settled in no other way
than by insisting on a fair wage for the yellow man, even though he
has not learned to spend as large sums of money as the white man.
So, altogether, we do not believe in spending our millions needlessly
when there are so many internal problems of peace. -
May I say right here, will not every one of you gentlemen get and
read H. G. Wells's book recently written along these lines, “The
war that will end war”'. It is from the pen of a brilliant and cul-
tured Englishman who understands the situation as it is, and the
book makes a most wonderful appeal to the United States. I think
the whole matter is summed up very well in a recent issue of the
London Punch, in the following four lines:
In silence you have looked on alien fields;
On butchers’ work with which the whole world reeks,
Now, in God’s name, from whom your likeness falls,
Sister, will you not speak.
So the western women are speaking. They have something to
say on this question of preparedness.
PREPAIREDINIESS IFOR, NATIONAL DEFENSE. 104.7
Now, Mr. Chairman, may I read this telegram, because it cost me
such a lot of money. I wired to the San Francisco Bulletin, which
has probably the biggest circulation of any paper on the coast and
is read more than any other paper by labor and women. I wired
them asking for a succinct statement of the policy of the Bulletin—
which I already knew, but which I wanted right from their own pen.
It is as follows:
. SAN FRANCISco, CAL., February 7, 1916.
SARA BARD FIELD, -
68 South Washington Square, New York:
Bulletin opinions requested follow. The fight is not now between preparedness
and unpreparedness, but between reasonable preparedness and unreasonable pre-
paredness. On the Sea, increased strength not manifestly directed solely to the
defense of our home coasts is unreasonable and unnecessary. On land, a moderate
increase in the Regular Army will do no harm, nor will a volunteer system under which
adults who want military training can get it; but any military system looking toward
any bid or degree of compulsory training will be an offense against reason and against
American ideals of freedom and self respect. No emergency confronts the United
States; no act or policy of any Government in any part of the world can be construed
as a menace to our safety. We are in less danger than we were in 1914. We are in
less danger than we were in 1840 or 1880. Our militarists have lost their heads chiefly
over their own remarks. If we intend to be a world power, if we are content to sub-
stitute for a genuine though imperfect democracy the empty shell of democracy which
comes from submission to a common, Self-imposed tyranny, by all means let us have
complete preparedness—a great Navy, a 10,000,000-man Army. If not, let us stand
where we are. -
BULLETIN.
The CHAIRMAN. We are very glad to have had you with us, Miss
Field, and I thank you. º
Miss Boardman is going to make a statement in reference to the
Red Cross.
STATEMENT OF MISS MABEL T. BOARDMAN, REPRESENTING
THE AMERICAN NATIONAL RED CROSS.
The CHAIRMAN. Miss Boardman, I promised you some time ago
that in the consideration of the question of the reorganization of the
Army the committee would be very glad to hear from you, and you
may make such statement as you desire with reference to the needs
of the Red Cross. •
Miss BOARDMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
It is very well recognized that in war, in a serious war, the medical
service of the Army can not be adequate to the demands that are
made upon it. This is not any reflection upon the service itself,
because anyone who has had a seriously sick or injured person to
take care of knows well how many it takes to take care of such a per-
son even in normal conditions. Under war conditions it is all the
more difficult, as they are not normal. In the transportation of a
wounded man from the trench to the base hospital he passes through
very many hands. We realize this, that in war the men who are in
the fittest condition are the men that are going to make a great addi-
tional demand upon the medical personnel of the country. The
women and children and old people who are left behind are the ones
upon whom the medical profession devotes most of its care in normal
tillmes.
At the time of the battle in the valley of the Marne the French
Army was losing at the rate of about 3 per cent of its force in a day.
1048 PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
That would have meant at the end of a month the entire army would
have been either killed or wounded. You can realize what an enor-
mous amount of medical attendance this required. The French
organization—I am only going to mention two foreign organizations—
the French Red Cross, upon which the j service depended
largely for its reserve lacked in one or two important qualifications
for this service. It was divided into three branches, working under
One central committee. That led to confusion. Secondly, it was not
as closely affiliated with the medical services of the army and navy
as it should have been, and that led to additional confusion. Men in
those earlier days of the war were left lying upon the platforms of
railway stations without medical attendance, without anesthetics,
without bandages, and without necessary supplies. -
On the other hand, the German Red Cross, which was well central-
ized and efficiently organized, with a close connection with the army.
medical service, mobilized as smoothly as the German Army at the
outbreak of the war. There has been a most remarkable result
because of the efficiency of the medical service of the German Army
and of the German Red Cross. I can give you the figures as given
me by the War College here. -
Out of the wounded men taken into the German hospitals—this
of course does not include men that have been killed in the threnches—
out of the 100 per cent that were taken into the hospitals 89.5 per cent
have sº recovered. Only 8.8 per cent have remained per-
manently crippled, and 1.7 per cent have died.
That is a record unprecedented in all warfare.
In the Russo-Japanese War, 6 per cent of the wounded died, but
thanks to the efficiency of the medical service in Germany and of
the German Red Cross, with its various departments, there has
resulted this remarkable showing. -
As to our own organization, I want to show you, if I may, Senator,
a little diagram of the organization. Perhaps it may make it clearer
to the committee what the organization is and what we are anxious
to have as an assistance in the work. You probably know that the
President of the United States is president of the Red Cross, not
ex officio, but by election. He appoints, as President of the United
States, the chairman of the central committee and representatives
of five departments of the Government. Among these are the
Surgeon General of the Army and the Surgeon General of the Navy.
What I want to say briefly is that the organization is divided
practically into three parts. There is the central or office organiza:
tion, and we have as chairman of the central committee º:
by President Wilson, Mr. Taft, who is giving a great deal of time to
the work. Gen. Murray is acting chairman in his absence. We
have segregated relief operations in two different departments. One
is the military relief and the other the civilian relief. &
It is most important and indeed vital that we have an efficient
organization, and it is necessary in order to obtain that result that
the director general of military relief should be a senior medical
officer in the Army. You can not create an efficient Army medical
reserve, which is what this department of the Red Cross is, unless
it is done on Army lines. The law at the present time provides
that the Secretary of War is authorized to detail in charge of the
first-aid department an Army medical officer. We have Maj.
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 1049
Patterson at the head of this bureau. . This military relief is a very
big work, and the only way you can coordinate it is to bring it all
under the charge of a senior medical officer of the Army.
In the new bill we have suggested that the Secretary of War be
authorized to detail one or more medical officers of the Army to duty
with the military relief department of the Red Cross. The reason
we have put in “one or more” is that in the Organization, particu-
larly of some of the hospital columns, it may be necessary for several
of the junior officers to go out in the mining districts or among the
railroad men and organize from among those who have had our'first-
aid courses the field or transportation columns. It would need only
a short amount of drill, Hospital Corps drill, to make these men well
fitted for this particular position, and that work should be done by
medical officers who know what the Hospital Corps drill really is.
We have a first-aid instruction department which is teaching thou-
sands of miners and thousands of railroad men and which last year
went into the lumber camps in the State of Washington and taught
7,000 lumber men first aid. -
We have the supply sales department, which sells supplies, its
profit going toward the salaries of our first-aid instructors. We
have the nurses’ bureau, with 6,000 of the best trained nurses enrolled
and on file at Washington. Under the women's personnel we have
also the women's classes. All our nurses returning from Europe
report, and we realize it is very essential to add to the regular trained
graduate nurses the assistance of the lay women who have been
prepared and trained, some in nursing, some in first aid, and some
in hospital administration, and various other matters of this kind.
We have regular orders from the War Department and the Navy
Department for the Red Cross.
fam very glad to say that we are securing wonderful cooperation
from the largest medical schools in connection with the largest
hospitals in the country. The Harvard Medical School, the Presby-
terian Medical School in New York, the New York City Hospital, and
Bellevue are arranging to form hospital columns, some of their very
best Surgeons acting as officers and becoming Army medical reserve
men. We are asking our chapters, when a column is organized, to
provide it with the equipment for 500 beds, each bed having its own
Outfit, so many sheets, garments, etc. You can take 500 of these
Outfits for a hospital, and if you want to add 100 more beds take
100 more outfits. We have the supply column which will be in charge,
as the Quartermaster's Department of the Army, of supplies. We
have an information section, members of which are put in the hos-
pitals, so that information may be sent as to the condition of the
sick and wounded to their families. During the occupation of Vera
Cruz we had our representatives stationed there, who went into the
hospitals to obtain information or letters that the wounded wanted
to send home to their families.
In any war we have a great deal of suffering, not only among the
Soldiers, but among their families. We take a man who has been
drawing good pay and put him into the Army, where he is paid much
less. This leaves a burden upon his family. We also have the
widows and Orphans. These will come under the civilian relief
department of the Red Cross. If we have such a misfortune as to have
refugees in this country, they would come under that department.
1050 PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
So would the permanently crippled men who would have to be taken
charge of and taught some vocational training, because even a blind
man can be made to feel he is of some use in the world if he is trained
for future work. All this would fall under the director general of
civilian relief, thus dividing the two great departments of relief.
Generally this is the department that takes care of disasters. We
are at work in some of the Mississippi flood districts. This depart-
ment [indicating on chart] would take care of the noncombatants
while this ſindicating] would take care of the sick and wounded.
In regard to the collection of supplies, I have here a little roughly
colored map that may give you an idea of the plan. These indicate
warehouses in the Quartermaster's Department. These should be
Imade collecting stations of the Red Cross. The idea is to have
these supplies for hospital columns at these various stations. If we
had the misfortune of war—and we can not tell, of course, where
that war will be until it has developed—we would have, perhaps,
two or more distributing stations. During the Civil War the dis-
tributing stations were at Washington and at Louisville, and I have
placed, simply for illustration purposes, one at Washington and the
other at St. Louis. Any hospital that needed supplies, instead of
not knowing where to apply for aid would simply telegraph to the
headquarters at Washington, “We want a thousand sheets; we want
so many thousand pounds of anaesthetics,” or whatever it might be
Washington headquarters finding the hospital in the St. Louis
district, a telegram is sent to the St. Louis distributing station to
send to that hospital such supplies as are needed. In the meanwhile
it notifies its feeders, the collecting stations, that it is short of sheets.
They immediately send down a supply. They have unpacked the
little boxes that come in from small towns with sheets, pajamas, two
or three jars of jam and a few rolls of bandages all mixed up together,
and have taken them and sorted them out. They take from their
shelves and forward only what is needed by the distributing station.
The Chicago collecting station, for instance, will then notify its feed-
ers in North Dakota, Minnesota, Wisconsin, Michigan, and Illinois,
what it is short of, and every little town in these States will know
what is needed. It is a question that is always asked, “What is
most needed?” If you simply keep the whole country constantly
feeding toward your distributing stations what particular supplies
are most needed, it develops an efficient supply system.
There are two matters that I wanted to bring up to-day for the
assistance of the Red Cross. First, that the Secretary of War be
authorized to detail - one or more medical officers of the Army to
the military relief department of the Red Cross, the number to be
left in the hands of the Secretary. The Secretary will not allow any
to go if he can not conveniently do so, and the Red Cross does not
wish them unless it has a service for them to perform, because, in
calling them out, it must defray the traveling expenses itself. ... We
are very anxious to have, instead of the detail of one medical officer
to take charge of the first aid, as the law now stands, that there shall
be one or more detailed to the military relief department of the Red
Cross. The other provision has to do with the question of ware-
houses. It is very important to have Red Cross supplies on the
Government reservations. We want also to provide that in case of
serious disaster those supplies shall be made available for the relief of
i PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. 1051
the civilian population. At such times the Army is frequently
called on for stores, and we want to make Red Cross stores available
in such serious disasters as the San Francisco fire or the Ohio floods.
The provision we desire is that the Secretary may grant permission—I
think you call it with revocable license—to the Red 8. to utilize
such warehouses as the Secretary would agree to where there is
available space or, if in case this was not in some cases feasible, that
the Red Cross may have permission to erect upon reservations ware-
houses of its own for the collection of such supplies. This would
enable us to have collecting stations located all over the country
ready for any mobilization for war or ready for the use of the civilian
population in case of disaster.
Those are the two particular points in which the Red Cross desires
the assistance of Congress. It is not a question of finances; it is a
question of expediency in making this service the efficient service
that it should be, to meet the demands that war brings upon it for
the conservation of human life and the mitigating of human suffering.
I thought, Mr. Chairman, that I had a copy of the provisions we
desire, but I do not seem to have it here. I can easily send it to the
Stenographer, however, to be incorporated in the record.
Senator HITCHCOCK. Does the Red Cross seek permission to use
any reservation or Government warehouse ?
Miss BOARDMAN. Only certain ones, Senator.
Senator HITCHCOCK. Have you a reservation of your own 3
Miss BOARDMAN. No, sir; we have none. We have had some for
temporary storage given to the Red Cross, but that has generally been
with the understanding that they are only temporary; if we had ware.
houses not on Government reservations, it would necessitate in every
case a special guard.
Senator HITCHCOCK. The Red Cross is supported by voluntary
contributions :
Miss BOARDMAN. Entirely; and, of course, what income comes
from its endowment fund—but that was originally a contribution.
sºtor HITCHCOCK. Have you your offices in the War Depart-
Iment
Miss BOARDMAN. We had, Senator, but we have taken an old house
to bring our different offices together. The one room that we had
in the War Department was not sufficient for our purposes. The
Memorial to the Women of the Civil War, which is being built by an
º. from Congress and by gifts from citizens, will provide
the Red Cross a permanent headquarters in the future. We are to
maintain this new building.
Senator HITCHCOCK. You spoke of the statistics you had from the
German Army concerning the hospital records. Have you the sta-
tistics concerning any other of the belligerent armies?
Miss BOARDMAN. I doubt if they have made up their statistics,
Senator. The Germans have kept up their statistics all along, and
the German Red Cross is the only one from whom we have had a
report as to its work. Dr. Kimmle, who is one of the medical officers
in the German Army with the German Red Cross, sent a brief, com-
plete, and excellent report, but the others have not yet reported.
C senator HITCHCOCK. Their hospitals are not all under the Red
TOSS 't
Miss BOARDMAN. No, sir.
1052 PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.
Our plan is, when we form one of these hospital columns and it is
completed, to report it immediately to the Surgeon General's Office,
with the whole personnel. In case of war we go right under the
surgeons general of the Army and Navy. They may order one of
these columns, which would probably be numbered, to a certain post
for duty. It is placed under the orders of the surgeons general of
the Army or Navy. *.
I might say that this system varies in different countries. During
the Russo-Japanese War the Japanese Red Cross, which has 1,800,000
members, worked under the medical service of the army. The Rus-
sians worked rather as an independent organization, which was unfor-
tunate, and led to a good deal of confusion.
The CHAIRMAN. What about this Japanese society º Is it main-
tained by private subscription, or is it a part of the Government?
Miss BOARDMAN. Entirely by private subscription. The members
pay $1.50 per year. The Emperor gives it a yearly donation of 25,000
yen, but it is supported entirely by private contribution.
The Russian Red Cross has certain subsidies. On passports a cer-
tain tax is paid, which goes to the Red Cross, and I am informed
that there has been a tax placed upon railroad tickets which goes to
the Russian Red Cross. *. Russian Red Cross, at the outbreak of
the war, had a permanent fund and a reserve fund of $19,000,000.
The Japanese Red Cross has at present an endowment of $13,000,000.
I think it is a mistake, myself, for these Red Cross organizations to
ask for financial support from the Government. I think the idea of
the organization is that it should be of assistance to the Government,
and not ask for Government support. The idea is that in war there
will be a great number desiring to be of assistance. The men who go
to the war are very few, but everyone has somebody back of him who
is interested in him, and they want to do all they can for the sake of
the men who have gone to the front. Certainly those men deserve
to have their assistance. But without organization such energy,
time, and money are wasted. I can tell you an amusing instance that
occurred in our short war with Spain, told by Gen. O'Reilly. Men
were lying ill with typhoid fever on the ground in their khaki uniforms,
and he was very anxious to get pajamas and towels for them, but he
did not know exactly where to go for them. He received a most in-
viting lot of boxes, one after another, and every one of them were
filled with abdominal bands. The country had gone mad over them,
because somebody had suggested them. There was no organization
to bring all that tremendous energy and interest into practical
channels.
Senator HITCHCOCK. Has the American Red Cross any endow-
ment 7
Miss BOARDMAN. We have a little over $850,000 in the permanent
endowment. - -
Senator HITCHCOCK. Do you derive any income from that ?
Miss BOARDMAN. The income only is used.
Senator HITCHCGCK. Then you receive membership dues
Miss BOARDMAN. Yes, sir.
Senator HITCHCOO.K. But they are not very important
Miss BoARDMAN. Not of much importance, because our member-
ship does not total 30,000. Wherever they are formed in chapters,
50 cents remains in the chapter for any local expense that they may
PREPAREDINIESS FOR, NATIONAL DEFENSE. 1053
have and 50 cents comes to headquarters at Washington. Of course,
the Red Cross has very generous contributors. One man, Mr. Cleve-
land Dodge, gives $5,000 a year, and Mr. Schiff gave a special endow-
ment of $100,000, and Mrs. Whitelaw Reid gives annually $2,500.
We have some very dependable people who, if we found ourselves in
a tight place, would be very glad to contribute whatever sums the
Red Cross would require for our administrative work.
Senator HITCHCOCK. In case of any disaster or calamity in this
country, you call for funds?
Miss BOARDMAN. Yes; and if any funds are left over from that spe-
cial relief work the money is used for some other relief work. It is
never used for administration work. The balance goes into the con-
tingent fund, and that enables us to meet such conditions as some of
these flood conditions in the West. w
The CHAIRMAN. Have you prepared an amendment that you would
like to have inserted in the record .
Miss BoARDMAN. Yes; I have, Senator; and I thought I had it
with me, but I do not seem to have it. -
The CHAIRMAN. When you correct your notes, will you insert your
amendment at the proper place º
Miss BOARDMAN. I shall be very glad to. I have here a little repro-
duction of the diagram that I ...i.a to the committee, and I will
be very glad to leave it here to be placed in the record.
The CHAIRMAN. I do not know whether we can get that in the rec-
ord or not. I do not think we can; but the committee will be very
glad to have it. We are much obliged to you, Miss Boardman.
(The following provisions embody the requests of the Red Cross
as mentioned in the hearings:)
Provided, That hereafter the Secretary of War is hereby authorized to detail one or
more officials of the Medical Corps for duty with the military relief division of the
American National Red Cross. - & 4
That authority is hereby given to the Secretary of War to grant permission by
revocable license to the American National Red Cross to erect and maintain in any
military reservations within the jurisdiction of the United States buildings suitable
for the storage of supplies, or to occupy for that purpose buildings erected by the
United States, under such regulations as the Secretary of War may prescribe.
The CHAIRMAN. Officers of some of the branches of the Army have
not been called by the committee. This is particularly true where
such officers have expressed their views before the Committee on
Military Affairs of the House, and these hearings are accessible to
this committee, and the attention of Members of Congress who are
interested in the subject is respectfully called to the hearings had
before the Committee on Military Affairs of both the Senate and
House.
(Whereupon, at 4.30 o'clock p. m., the committee adjourned subject
to the call of the chairman.) .
AUG 2 - 1916


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