&Martyrs or Criminals? Theodore Schroeder | | | “Price Ten Cents - 2 2. / a a. 2. C-Cacººns A-tº- lºs - 4, 244, tº lº 4A-T-84-4-3: º, a * , MARTYRS 0/- CRIMINALS An unmoral analysis of a celebrated case BY THEODORE SCHROEDER PRINTED AT HILL ACRE RIVERSIDE, connectICUT MCMXV Reprinted from the Forum September, 1915 MARTYRS or CRIMINALSP It is now six years since the Mc- Namara brothers dynamited the Los Angeles Times building and the Lewéllyn Iron Works. Already they have been about four years in San Quentin penitentiary. In dis- cussions of labor problems, their offences cause more irritation and debate than most of the current crimes, even among newspaper de- VOtees. No theory can explain this ex- traordinary vitality without taking into account the relation of their acts to the great industrial struggle, between the blind sympathizers of even the more thoughtless or heart- less exploiters, and the more intel- ligent or desperate ones among the exploited. It is, of course, infantile to think that this or any other dispute can be finally settled by violence, either legalized or lawless. The great vio- 3 lent dramatizations of industrial is— sues are but the cry of extreme pain, which may guide the social physicians to a more efficient effort toward understanding the remote causes of our social ills. At the late hearings of the United States Commission on In- dustrial Relations, there appeared from California a witness named Anton Johannsen, who is himself under indictment for some dyna- miting plot of the workers on the Pacific coast. This witness under- took to furnish what he called the “social background” of the deeds of the McNamaras. This was partly published in The Masses, for July, 1915. The moralists might call it an attempted justification, though Mr. Johannsen seems not to have thought of his facts in terms of moral judgment. He only sought to induce us to see the “crimes” of the McNamaras in more correct perspective and in relation to the “crimes” against humanity charge- able to exploiters like the Steel Trust. Strange to say, this witness did not appear to have any adverse moral judgment even against the 4. Steel Trust or the Erectors’ As- sociation. One of the Commissioners asked him, and several other witnesses, whether the McNamaras were re- garded by them as martyrs or crim- inals. Johannsen promptly said they had never committed any crime against the laboring class. Al- though he seemed not to regard them as ſhartyrs, yet manifestly he had no bitterness in his heart either for them, their dynamiting conspir- acies, or even against the Steel Trust or the Erectors’ Association. He seemed to have the attitude of the professional soldier who ac- cepts war and its penalties with stoical fortitude. Numerous other witnesses, of course, condemned the McNamaras as extremely mal- ignant types of criminals. It is this issue as between mar- tyrdom and criminality that I wish to discuss. It appears to me that when put to witnesses of radical sympathies, this question was not asked from any sincere purpose to promote a larger understanding of the behavior of the social forces in- volved in our industrial conflict, 5 but was prompted by a desire to embarrass and discredit the wit- nesses, and the cause of those whom they were endeavoring to help. It also appears to me that it was an unfair method of intensifying the public prejudice. If the labor witness called the McNamaras “criminals,” he seemed by the same token to be condemning also all that part of the labor movement which is attempting to intensify and ra– tionalize the laborers’ discontent with the condition of their exploit- ation, because every such intensi- fication and formulation of griev- ances tends to promote a violent resistance to the forcible imposi- tion of the condemned conditions. If a radical witness called the McNamaras “martyrs,” that an- swer categorically or dogmatically put before the public without any explanation or justification, would stimulate the hatred of all the sen- timental worshippers of legal forms and judgment. Again this would in- tensify existing prejudices against the open-minded consideration of the charges of economic injustice 6 and tend to preclude all agitators from securing a fair hearing for the understanding of their com- plaints or remedies. I believe these questions were al- ways asked with a conscious desire that this unfair result should fol- low, though the commissioner re- sponsible for this conduct, and most of the public, probably lack that particular kind of intelligence which is necessary for seeing in what the unfairness consists. In my view the unfairness of the question consists in the assumption of an alternative not involved in the facts viewed as a whole. In other words, the question is as un- intelligent asthough the witness had been handed a pig's ear and then had been asked whether he regard- ed this as a Government bond or a Government mule. Of course, sen- sible persons would say it is nei- ther. I will indicate why intelligent persons do also refrain from apply- ing to the McNamaras such ques- tion-begging, moralistic epithets as “criminal” or “martyr.” When you characterize the Mc- Namaras as “martyrs” or “crimin- 7 als,” you are not describing either their conduct or the behavior of the forces which under their particular circumstances created the psychol- ogic imperative of which dynamit- ing was the inevitable manifesta- tion. In other words, these epi- thets furnish no enlightenment up- on the subject which is being in- vestigated. Again, it must be admitted, I think, that by these epithets we are only characterizing the feeling which their conduct has stimulated in us. In so far as these epithets intensify a like feeling in others, so far do they preclude a calm con- sideration, or clearer understand- ing, of the many social factors and forces which contributed toward the final, unfortunate, indictable result. In other words, all the feel- ings which these epithets tend to arouse are but means for prevent- ing you and me from inquiring in- to our share in producing or main- taining the conditions of which these dynamiting affairs are the in- evitable consequence. I have already said that when a man calls the McNamaras “mar- 8 tyrs,” he is not telling us anything about the McNamaras, or their con- duct. Let us then inquire what, if anything, he is telling us about him- self, or about his feelings, when he applies the word “martyr.” Let us first try to understand as minutely as possible the mental processes involved in designating the McNamaras as “martyrs.” Manifestly this is a feeling-judg- ment, based upon some kind of sympathetic emotion. Psycholog- ically this implies some degree of emotional identification of the speaker with the McNamaras. Per- haps he has a sympathetic interest in those whom the McNamaras were trying to help. Such an at- titude lends charity even to the use of disapproved means. Such a per- son, at the time of using the epi- thet, is expressing a feeling atti- tude, as though the workers, whom he believes to be accepting injustice under the force of economic neces- sity, were occupying a large, pos- sibly an unduly large, place in the focus of his attention. Perhaps a specially sympathetic or vivid view of their unfortunate wives and 9 children is in his mind, because of some similar tragic situation in his own family history. If neither of these influences affects him, then it may be that his feelings at the mo- ment are determined by a great emotional aversion to some partic- ular employer or generally the ben- eficiaries of unjust and oppressive exploitation; that is, for those whose greed so often makes the ex- ploiter blindly indifferent to the suffering and wrong by which he profits and to which he contributes. It is now well known among gen- etic psychologists that the real source of this sympathetic feeling may be obscured in the remote emotional tones and associations which came into existence during infancy or childhood, and are trans- ferred to present situations by pro- cesses of which the individual is wholly unconscious. Whatever the cause, his characterization of the McNamaras as “martyrs” is merely the expression of a feeling-state in the speaker and it imparts no information whatever about the causes, the motives, the character or the “morality” of their conduct. 10 If we imply any of these things, as necessarily contained in the word “martyrdom,” we are again expres- sing only our own equally blind feeling attitude toward something in the situation, and exhibiting our own inefficient psychologic under- standing. If those who judge the McNa- maras as martyrs had not been blinded by their feelings, they might have seen that penalized con- duct in its broader relation; not only in relation to its causes in the related acts of the Steel Trust, but also in its relation to the causal or sustaining public opinion, which ig- nores or excuses, and at least im- pliedly justifies, the provoking con- duct of the Steel Trust. If not blinded by sympathetic feeling, such a person might also have seen the dynamiting in relation to the letter of the law and the evolution- ary forces which, at least now, still seem to make some penal law in- evitable even though un-ideal and deplorably infantile. Let us now try similarly to un- derstand also the man who calls the McNamaras “criminals.” Of course 11 the penal statutes were violated, and in this sense there can be no doubt of their status as criminals. The very asking of the question, therefore, implies that it was not a legal but a moral judgment that was desired. Of course, a convic- tion under our present system of criminal procedure does not at all involve an issue of moral turpitude, because the rules of evidence pre- clude all inquiry into the inducing causes of that condition which we call the criminal mind or criminal intent. In the absence of such in- quiry and evidence as to the causes of the psychologic imperative in- volved, there can be no adequate understanding, and no excuse for a moral judgment. Even the moral- ist should not indulge in any judg- ment as to relative degrees of mor- al turpitude, as for example be- tween the McNamaras and those who contributed to the motive for dynamiting, without a full inquiry and understanding of both. I re- peat that this is impossible under present modes of court procedure. What, then, is it that we express, if we characterize the McNamaras 12 as moral criminals? Clearly, this also expresses only a feeling atti- tude in ourselves and gives no il- lumination to anyone's understand- ing of the act or of the persons so characterized. The person who designates the McNamaras as mor- al criminals has the same blurred and incomplete vision which we have seen to be possessed by those who characterize them as martyrs. In both cases the mental mechan- ism is the same. In the warfare between the ex- ploited and the exploiter, many be- long economically to the exploited, yet emotionally identify themselves with the exploiters. Not having achieved an economic-class-con- sciousness, such persons of course act in accordance with their feelings and not in harmony with any conception of their class inter- ests. All persons who thus feel themselves personally outraged by the McNamaras will be possessed by strong aversions, such as tend to preclude them from even trying to understand the forces which made the McNamaras what they are. Likewise, and quite as un- 13 consciously, these sentimentalists become compelling factors which contribute to the psychologic im- perative impelling someone to the next inevitable dynamiting plot. Persons possessed by such feel- ings necessarily tend to make two justifications for their moral judg- ments. One of these is the senti- mental relative overvaluation of the lives unintentionally destroyed in the Times Building explosion, and the other is the sentimental correl- ative overvaluation of the sacred- ness of the violated statutes. That there is a sentimental over- valuation of the particular lost lives will be apparent when we see the moral judgment passed upon the McNamaras, made by ignoring the fact that this loss of life was un- intentional. It will be further man- ifested if the person ignores the larger social and relatively imper- Sonal motive which prompted the use of dynamite. Another confir– mation of this prejudice may per- haps be found in the persistent ig- noring of the many lives which are annually more or less directly sac- rificed, by the Steel Trust and other 14, large exploiters, from the sole mo- tive of increasing dividends. In such matters, relative judgments are the most important, and surely if the steel-mill and mine owners may incidentally take many lives merely to save the expense of saf- ety devices, then the McNamaras should be equally allowed a few killings, as an incident to the war- fare in the wage-interests of the producing class. When our material or emotional interests are promoted by the law, we always acquire an exaggerated estimation of its value and sacred- ness. Now we glorify it and insist that there is a sort of eternal fit- ness, if not divine right, that the hangman shall have his prey. As one hears the emphasis put upon legality by the adherents of the exploiters, a psychologist's sus- picions are naturally aroused by the knowledge that in such matters we are prone to announce enthusiasti- cally a general dogma when we are only concealing or intellectualizing a particular desire. Thus the meas- ure of our zeal exhibits the meas- ure of our craving to be the bene- 15 ficiary of legality. This suspicion is encouraged when upon further observation we see an indifference, conspicuous by contrast, when the law is violated by those with whom we identify ourselves, at least in phantasy or emotional attitude, be- cause we feel, though we may not be fully conscious of it nor even formulate it, that their crimes are committed in the furtherance of impulses which we share, or of which we have a sympathetic un- derstanding and of which we have not yet been made ashamed. When a law is violated by a class or in the interests of a class with some aspects of which we even un- consciously crave to be identified, then the letter of the law can be quite ignored without producing any great moral upheavals. The reason is that now we have sym- pathetic understanding and desire impels us to find extenuating or ex- cusing circumstances. It would speak well for our understanding if we could find them in all cases. Anyway, you have not been fair enough to try to acquire a sympa- thetic understanding of all con- 16 cerned, if you are still impelled to utter moral judgments, especially of the absolute sort instead of the relative sort. My desire thus far has been to induce the checking of a general habitual tendency to express our more intense feeling in terms of moral praise or blame, because such feeling-judgments are always void of understanding, just in the degree that the inducing feelings are in- tense. The other aspect of my desire is to divert the energy usually ex- pended in an effort to justify feel- ing attitudes which are derived from unknown sources, and to in- duce its expenditure in the enlarge- ment of our understanding of the forces that produce McNamaras. Thus I hope to promote a more adequate and just understanding of these men themselves. If you really have such funda- mental craving for a sense of jus- tice so refined as to require that you shall seek understanding, rather than proofs of your own relative self-righteousness, then you will show this superiority by your fu- 17 ture hospitable attitude for men like the McNamaras. Even more is now required. You must listen, and insist that all oth- ers shall also listen, while the Mc- Namaras tell you their story—tell you what they think impelled them to act as they did. And then you must not be angered or even impa- tient if it shall appear that suffer- ing has made them bitter and that they exhibit intensity of feeling by harshness of language. If your de- sire really to understand is stronger than your vanity of respectable su- periority, you must be absolutely calm under the most vigorous de- nunciation of things as they are and of those for whom they seem to exist in unfair abundance. Also you must be really anxious to listen to their most “outrageous” alleged remedies for social evils and to es- timate their possible value accord- ing to objectively derived stand- ards. But now I come to the most dif- ficult task of all. You must really crave to listen to all this, not merely to find out whether they are crim- inals or martyrs—whether among 18 the damned or the saints. Leave all moral judgments as to the Mc- Namaras to those infantile minds that have not yet outgrown the child’s impulse to pose as a Daniel. But listen—listen to discover as much as possible of your own un- conscious contribution to the state of things that makes such relative- ly intelligent workers as the Mc- Namaras desperate and that creates violent revolutions when enough of the workers come to feel as the Mc- Namaras felt. "When we see our contribution to the final tragedy, then and then only do we have sufficient under- standing to entitle us to pass moral judgments—on ourselves of course. If we have even approximated to the state of development which I have tried to portray and promote, we never would think of passing a moral judgment upon anyone but ourselves. I have asked you to help to see to it that everybody—that is, the greatest possible number of per- sons—shall hear and understand the inner meaning of the “crime” of the McNamaras. So long as you 19 are unwilling or unable to do all this, you cannot claim to be super- ior to, and probably not even the equal of, the McNamaras. So long • as you cannot act according to this ideal which I have portrayed, you, too, are among those infantile ones who solve social problems through the methods inspired by prejudice and passions, that is, by violence of the intellectually blind. That places one either into or below the evolu- tionary class to which the McNa- maras belong. 20