9. 77 P AL .. .. .. . . . 17 . . !! : ..-*:! - . . . F F LLON * , * ! 1 .TYLE 11* 1. T L The 1.4.1 ' * UNCLASSIFIED ORNL IMMALT. Tue, 4 STEFTITIT . WA 9. W AIT 4.1. . Art . . . . A . .. *::-.- TI 11: 22 LUET OP R2 4 . . * * . . 1093 . S I', : ORNI - AEC - OFFI! ORNU -D-1093 - ATIE-SP Corp - 650211-18 ORNI - AEC - OFFICIAL MAR 23 1963 wy CIVIL DEFENSE RESEARCH AT OAK RIDGE NATIONAL LABORATORY An address before the New York State Radiological Officers Conference at Albany, New York February 25, 1965 privately owned rigua; or will be Conmission, or wie omploys mot Mus doh contractor, diomonate, or pondo acca to, wy Information partant to be employmest or contract soch employs or contractor of the Commission, or employee or much costructor preparu, ploys or contractar of the Coonusloo, or employ As wood to the abova, "per co ucting on behall of the Communion" includes way to un of Lay Laformation, appurata, martbod, or process dacloved in this report. B. Augumai nay liabilities with respect to the uroi, or for damgou rosuluing from the of say lalormation, appunto, method, or proco.. declared in the report may not lotringe Tky, complelonch, or wnetworuof the talormation contaiond in this report, or what the use A. Makes wy wraty or roprenotation, expressed or implied, with roupect to the actu- Sula, dor the Commission, nor naj porno acung on bedalf of the Commission: The report mi propered us an account of Government spoamored work. Neither the Vallad of much contractor, to the ment that -LEGAL NOTICE J. C. Bresee Oak Ridge National Laboratory Oak Ridge, Tennessee .. Introduction .. My purpose today is to discuss a civil defense research program . . .. . . ecently established at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL), Oak Ridge, Tennessee, and to describe one area of research in some detail to illustrate our general approach. In September 1964, Nobel prize winner Eugene P. Wigner, Professor of Physics at Princeton, came to Oak Ridge to establish a civil defense study group at ORNL. The group he directs consists of 12 scientists and engineers, including three social scientists. The work is jointly . . . . . . . . . .. . sponsored by the Department of Defense and the Atomic Energy Commission. We are interested in looking as broadly as possible at the entire subject of civil defense: the present and future military threat, the technical feasibility of shelter systems, the problems of warning and communication, the interrelation of action and passive defense, the post- attack economic and ecologic problems, and the effect of civil defense on * . Operated by the Union Carbide Corporation for the U. S. Atomic Energy Commission. Y ORNL - AEC - OFFICIAL. PATENT CLEARANCE OBTAINED. RELEASE TO THE PUBLIC IS APPROVED. PROCEDURES ARE ON EILE IN THE RECEIVING SECTION ORNI - AEC - OFFICIAL 'VE ORNI - AC - Oricine society. Careful research requires, among other things, careful review of the literature, which you know is extensive. One must take seriously many anticivil defense arguments, since they often suggest areas reguiring more research. Often too, they have little basis in fact. Samples of these arguments are given on the first slide (Table 1). Table 1. Samples of Anticivil Defense Arguments: 1. 3. There is no defense. Any war in which civil defense night be used would mean the end of the world. Didn't you see the movie "Dr. Strangelove" ("On the Beach," "Fail Safe," etc.)? Civil defense might appear to be feasible to our military leaders, making them much more susceptible to unauthorized behavior. Didn't you see the movie "Dr. Strangelove" ("Seven Days in May," etc.)? Civil defense might appear to be feasible to our potential enemies, making them much more likely to attack us as a large program grows. A national shelter program either will or will not be accompanied by drills. If there are drills, the population will not respond to a real threat. Imagine yourself in bed with snow outside and an alarm sounds.) If there are no drills, the population will not know how to respond. Civil defense would be an ever-present reminder of the dangers of a nuclear war, leading to widespread neurotic behavior among the young. 5. 6. Civil defense would require civil regimentation beyond anything ever experienced in this country and would ultimately destroy our democratic form of government. All arguments but the first involve the behavioral scientists, and I do not intend to discuss them today. Let me just say that social science research is possible which can lead to definitive statements about the kind of civil defense programs which minimize possible harmful effects on American society. I will discuss the "there is no defense" argument by describing one ORNL research effort on the problem of urban shelters. ORNI - AEC - OFFICIAL The Technical Feasibility of Urban Shelters . One of the most difficult civil defense prowlems is the sheltering of urban populations from the direct effects of missile-delivered nuclear weapons, particularly in the megaton range. Even if isolated blast shelters of adequate strength are accessible to city dwellers, a very serious prob- lem remains of postattack evacuation in the presence of rubble and radio- activity. Interconnected blast shelters have been proposed in the past; our contribution has been to look in some detail at the sheltering capa- bilities of the tunnel connections themselves. Incidentally, after a month of study, we found a reference to a previous report which investi- gated the same concept for Tucson, Arizona. Before I begin this part of my talk, I want to stress that our findings are guite preliminary, and we do not know enough about the shelter system I will describe to claim that it or another like it solves all or even most of the difficult problems of urban sheltering. The Tunnel-Grid Shelter Concept The basic shelter concept can best be illustrated by reference to a particular city. For this purpose, I have invented the city, Protec- topolis, in which one million people live. A plan view of an interconnected tunnel grid which nan house all the inhabitants is shown in the next slide (Fig. 1). -"Local Civil Defense Systems, " Engineering Research Laboratory, University of Arizona, Tucson, Arizona, June 4, 1964. NVIDIJO-DIY - INNO 1V131110-IV- INYO ORNL DWG 64-11365 " . . - ī 4 mi. R 6.75 mi. Î OUTLINE OF ORIGINAL DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA Fig. 1 PROTECTOPOLIS THE "LIVING TUNNEL" GRID ORNI - AC - OFFICIAL ORNI - AC - OPTICIAL You will notice that Protectopolis has roughly the dimensions of the original District of Columbia, which was a diamond ten miles on a side. (The present District plus Arlington contains 1,000,000 people.) The "living tunnels" are on one-mile centers which means that for a person on the surface, the maximum walk to an entrance would be about one-half mile or about ten minutes. The square grid was selected so that the tunnels might be laid under streets on city property. A tunnel cross section is shown in the next slide (see Fig. 2). The preliminary design from which this slide was taken was based on the use of standard 8-ft-diameter reinforced concrete pipe. The standard pipe has an 8-in. wall and is very strong. Its crushing strength is in excess of several hundred pounds per square inch, but the nominal design strength of the entire grid, based on the strength of the entrance doors, is 100 psi. Other features of the tunnel include bunk space for four adults every six feet, or 3500 per mile. With all bunks folded back, the walking V space is five feet wide. With one bunk folded down, there is a. three foot aisle plus seating space for four in six feet or, again, 3500 per mile. Under the floor is a forced air duct, with distributors about every 20 feet. Cooling water and electric power complete the services. The next slide shows a typical entrance design (Fig. 3). Note that the shelter support facilities are in rectangular-shaped rooms alongside DOM the main tunnel. Access to the tunnel is through four revolving blast- resistant steel doors. Through the two stairways (or lower-angle ramps) approximately 120 people per minute could be admitted. In low population density areas, entrances would be every 1000 feet (or every two normal blocks). In crowded areas, the entrances would be every 500 feet. ORNL DWG. 65.180A SOURCE: "ENGINEERING AND COST CONSIDERATION FOR TUNNEL GRID BLAST SHELTER CONCEPT," HOLMES AND NARVER, INC. LOS ANGELES, CALIF. JANUARY 1965 OINI - AEC -OSPICIAL 'S ANGELES NARVER. NO COST co. SWEB OLUMINESCENT TAPE FLUORESCENT REFLECTOR LAM SHOCK MOUNT VENTILATION COOL AIR DUCT) 118 TO 20°CENTERS) 4160V. ELECT CABLES . . . . COOLEO AIR SUPPLY DUCT . A Wiesen WATER SUPPLY Eué SCALE (FT.) Fig. 2 8 FT. 1.0. TUNNEL CROSS SECTION ENTERING CONDITION ORNI - LEC - OFFICIAL TVIJIJ10- 3V - INYO TV101510 - ); V - 1880 ORNL DWG. 65.181A SOURCE: "ENGINEERING AND COST CONSIDERATION FOR TUNNEL GRID BLAST SHELTER CONCEPT," HOLMES AND NARVER, INC. LOS ANGELES, CALIF. JANUARY 1965 -,FAN ROOM EXPANSION S24 INTE סן ס ה I REST ROOM STORAGE ROOD PREPARATION WATER STORDUE ICS DECONTAMINATION ROOM AN EXNAUST I REST ROOM AGE ROOM Leod po IN ROOM COOLING COIL Oral CXNAUST COOLING COIL IR EXHAUSTM EMOVABLA N SCALE AT PLAN VIEW pop-up com OT OLAST VALVE NIR INTAKES егот ree TORAGE MON ROON - ELEVATION SECTIONALA Fig. 3. TYPICAL SHELTER ENTRANCE ORNI - AEC - OFFICIAL ORNI - AIC - OFFICIAL The main tunnel is interrupted by a removable metal bulkhead at each entrance. Although the actual value of this feature has not been determined analytically or experimentally, its purpose is to re- flect shock waves propogated through the tunnel if it is breached by a ground burst and to attenuate the shock by turning it through four right-angles. The bulkhead could be removed for rapid tunnel travel, perhaps by vehicles. The preliminary design included a refrigeration plant every mile discharging heat to ground water. The cooling was effected by circu- lation of cold water under the tunnel floor. To provide both excess cooling for overcrowding and temporary emergency refrigeration, space is shown for ice storage beside a fan room. Air would normally be ob- tained from the outside, cooled and passed through 250 to 500 feet of tunnel, and exhausted. If the outside air were contaminated with, for example, carbon monoxide in excess of 100 parts per million, the tunnel air would be recirculated, treated with lithium hydroxide to remove Co., and enriched with oxygen from chlorate candles or bottled storage. A "OSS COV "button-up" period of eight hours was provided. The cross section in the slide (Fig. 3) suggests perhaps five feet of earth cover. A radiation protection factor (P.F.) of more than 100,000 would be provided by this earth cover (standard identified fallout Shelters begin at a P.F. of 40), but ten to twenty feet was finally selected to évoid interference with normal city services under most streets. was Advantages of the Tunnel Grid One advantage of the cylindrical shape of the tunnel is indicated by the slide (Fig. 3). To resist a 100-psi blast wave, the rectangular- shaped entrance structure has an 18-in. reinforced concrete roof and floor and a 12-in. wall. Only about a three-in. wall of the pipe would have the same strength; the standard eight-in. wall is greatly overde- signed for blast strength. This and other advantages of the tunnel.-grid are shown in the next slide (Table 2). Table 2. Some Possible Advanjages of a Tunnel- Grid Shelter Concept 1. Cylindrical structure very resistant to blast damage. 2. Entire urban shelter system interconnected a. Members of family in various parts of city, enter b. Critical personnel and facilities (e.g., medical) accessible to entire population. Supporting facilities can be easily duplicated a. For example, auxiliary power at each intersection can serve tunnel length to next intersection. External air supply point can be shifted, depending on external fire or rubble problems. 4. Protected city evacuation theoretically possible a. Multiple exit routes insensitive to local damage. b. Evacuation possible up- or cross-wind. . 5. Interconnected tunnels have great potential for dual use (use during peacetime). The second advantage, illustrated by three examples, is particularly important. Many people have expressed serious doubt that even the threat of an immediate attack would cause husbands in the center of a city or wives at home near the edge of town to enter isolated blast shelters, separated from each other and from children at school. The tunnel grid or a system like it offers a protected passage to loved ones. The picture of streets clogged with automobiles trying to flee the center of a city before an attack is one of the most graphic features of horror stories of nuclear war. Critical personnel and facilities include not only medical (such as tunnel connections to hardened emergency treatment rooms) kat also radi- ation protection (radiation survey and monitoring), communication, police, fire, and rescue, engineering and public works, and others which even large isolated shelters could easily not contain. - In an emergency, the assembly of a large, balanced population is a most improbable event. One is more likely to have a shelter full of insurance adjustors or radiological officers! The significance of the reduction in localized overcrowding is sufficient to expand on further. But first I want to touch briefly on the remainder of the possible advantages shown on the slide (Table 2). The third advantage has been suggested by a previous reference to refrigeration plants at each tunnel intersection. By designing excess capacity into each auxiliary service generator and by interconnecting services in the same way tunnels are interconnected, every point in the grid can be supported from at least two directions or generators and consequently is safer" from failure or damage than an isolated system would be. 11 The fourth advantage can be best illustrated by a later slide, but redundancy in exit routes exactly parallels the redundancy in supporting facilities. The fifth advantage will be the subject of my closing remarks. Population Movement and Protection To illustrate the special significance of the relief of overcrowding, let us again consider the city Protectopolis. Let me have the second slide as a reminder (see Fig. 1). The characteristics of the city and the sig- nificance of the two-mile radius are shown in the next slide (Table 3). Table 3. Characteristics of Protectopolis Population Outer Radius Area Average Population Density 1,000,000 6.75 miles 143 square miles 7,000 per square mile Central City Maximum population Radius Area Maximum population density 440,000 2 miles 12.6 square miles 35,000/square mile Outer City Minimum population Area Minimum population density 560,000 130 sguare miles 4300/square mile Tunnel Dimensions Living tunnels Pedestrian subway tunnels Central city tunnels 290 miles on one-mile centers 100 miles on one-mile centers 44 miles on half-mile centers You will recall that the city contained 1,000,000 people. For con- venience in analysis, it is roughly circular and 13.5 miles across. The 143-square-mi le area means an average population density of 7000 persons 12 per square mile. However, during a weekday, almost half the population (440,000) is in the center of the city (a rather pessimistic case, you will see). This 12.6-square-mi.le area would contain 35,000 persons per square mile. The remainder of the city contains only 4300 people per square mile. You have seen the "living tunnel" grid. I remind you that 3500 persons per mile, the average for the entire city, could be housed as in a pullman car (uppers and lowers on both sides). Such accommodation should not be particularly uncomfortable even if intense external radiation and inadeguate evacuation facilities reguired that several weeks or even several months were spent living in the tunnels. The pedestrian subway tunnels and central city tunnels are necessi- tated by the factor of ten variation in population density shown above. I have compared Protectopolis with some similar-sized U.S. cities in the next slide (Table 4). You can see that 7000 persons per square mile is a density more like that of eastern rather than western cities. In fact, the Buffalo metropolitan area is quite a bit like Protectopolis, although it, of course, is not circular. Let us look in more detail at the problem of protecting those in the center of the city. May have the next slide please (Fig. 4). This slide shows the extra tunnel length on half-mile centers required to protect the central city inhabitants at 10,000 persons per mile of . tunnel. If these inhabitants were moved to regular "living tunnel" locations (3500 people per mile of tunnel on one-mile centers), they would occupy the heavier-lined area out to a four-mile radius from the center of town. . 13 Table 4. Comparison of Protectopolis with U.S. Cities . and SMSA* Urbanized Areas In population range: 800,000 to 1,200,000 City Area (sg. mi.) 143 Population 1,000,000 939,000 876,000 938,000 Protectopolis Baltimore Cleveland Houston Density (persons/sg. mi.) 7,000 11,900 10,800 2,860 79 81 328 SMSA Buffalo Miami 1,054,000 853,000 864,000 921,000 845,000 836,000 1,150,000 (1,140,000 (1,419,000) 160 183 238 282 267 Seattle Kansas City New Orleans San Diego Milwaukee (Houston) (Baltimore) 6,580 4,660 3,630 3,270 3,170 3,040 2.930 (2,650) (6,450) 276 392 (431) (220) Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area: A U.S. government designation based on geographic, economic, and social relation- ships, crossing state lines. 14 ORNL - AEC - OFFICIAL ORNI - AEC assicu ORNL OWG 65-855 10. - Outline of original District of Columbia Central city grid "Living tunnel" space for central city evacucos Fig. 4. PROTECTOPOLIS (showing central. city grid) . . . ORNI - AEC - OFFICIAL 15 Prst of all, how crowded are 10,000 people per mile of tunnel? That can best be answered by the next slide (see Fig. 5). I seriously question whether any central city inhabitants would be playing checkers after first entering the shelter. The slide does indicate that the extra occupants would have sitting space, even if 18 inches would be a little snug for some. Of course, a more serious question is the number who could crowd into a section of the tunnel if they were packed in subway- or elevator-style. I will dodge the question by observing that such packing could be re- . . . . . . lieved by movement around the next tunnel bulkhead and that the local air conditioning could be supplemented by ice storage. The question is: to a considerable extent less serious than the normal question for isolated shelters, namely, who locks the door after the prescribed number have entered in the face of the next arrival? The movement of these crowded people to a much less crowded condition and ultimately to their assigned family location might require a next lower level of tunnels similar to those shown in the next slide (Fig. 6). Here you see a "pedestrian subway" grid through which most or all of the occupants of the central city could walk to intermediate locations in the region between the two- and four-mile radii. While this movement occurred, the occupants of the intermediate region would need to walk toward the outer region to make room for the central city evacuees. The distance involved in both casea : 1a on the order of two miles. It would not be reasonable to expect such a movement to be completed in less than two hours. The longer term movement to final family location might take several days. 1712110 - 33V - INNO IVIDILJO- 33 V - INTO ORNL DWG 64-9989.R! ... :.:. ..: ..... :.. :: ::::: .. .. IXO :, : . 2.2 16 3'-8" .. COOLED-AIR SUPPLY DUCT Trip.,::01...2. Fig. 5. 8 Ft. 1.D. TUNNEL CROSS SECTION (showing occupancy of 10,000 people per mile) ONNI - AEC - OFFICIAL ORNI - AEC - OFFICIAL IVIJIJ10-DIN- INYO TVIJIJIO - 13V - INDO ORNL DWG 65-856 27 CI --- Pedestrian subway grid - City evacuation tunnels Fig. 6. PROTECTOPOLIS (showing pedestrian subway grid) ONNI - AEC - OFFICIAL OANI - AEC - OFFICIAL 18 I want to call your attention to the city evacuation tunnels shown around the perimeter. Earlier I mentioned protected city evacuation. Let me just say that in some rather unpredictable direction from a damaged city, radioactivity may decrease to the extent that gradual city evacuation by surface transportation may begin to be possible even a few days after a major attack, provided that protected walkways lead to those less radio- artive areas. The city evacuation tunnels might stretch ten or more miles in all directions into the surrounding rural areas. Let us take a final look at the concept of pedestrian evacuation in the tunnel grid. The next slide (Fig. 7) shows that three adults abreast can walk through the eight-foot tunnels. To illustrate the consequence of decreasing high population densities, let us imagine that a single 10-megaton weapon is used to attack Protectopolis Such a weapon, exploded at the optimum height to maximize the area covered by a blast wave larger than 100 psi, can produce a 100-psi circle at approximately 1.5 miles from ground zero. The maximum number of people within such a circle is shown on the next slide (see Table 5) for several U.S. cities and for Protectopolis. The data for the U.S. cities are taken from 1960 resident population census data. The Protectopolis value is for the day population in the central city. The effect of shelter plus movement is shown on the next slide (Table 6). If a 10-megaton weapon were directed at an unsheltered population in a city like Protectopolis, most inhabitants would be killed (the blast wave at 6.75 miles from ground zero could be as large as 8 psi, accompanied by winds of 240 miles per hour). If tunnel-grid shelters were used, as ܘܐܛܕ ܙܕܕ-rioiagoܪ ܘܘܐܐ - ܟܕܕ. ܘܕܢܙܕܙv ORNI Dws 64-9990-ii . ܕܐܙܨܘܝ 9,-ܙܨ Minimum Headroom for a Mon Standing on Floor ܂2.. .ܢ 19 • > rw • • • • • • ܀ • ..- ...-.. .- ܝ. -. ܓܓ ܚܝ ܀ ܀ COOL.ED - AIR SUPPLY DUCT ܘ. ، ، ܆ . . ܂ . ܝ.܂ Fig. 7. 8 Ft. I.D. TUNNEL CROSS SECTION (showing walk area for 3 adults) OANL -- AEC - OFFICIAL ORNI - AEC - OFFICIAL many as 75% of the population could be protected at the peak population density and up to 95% after several hours of movement. These figures for a sheltered population are based on an overly simplified model: complete protection at 99 psi on the ground surface and no protection at 101 psi. The actual system needs a more complete analysis before realistic pre- dictions could be made. Obviously, one problem completely ignored is the total warning time plus the evacuation of tall buildings. However, the · Preliminary values are sufficiently encouraging to warrant further analysis. Table 5. Peak Resident Population Within 1.54-Mile Radius (100 psi at 1.54 miles from 10 MT, airburst) Philadelphia Chicago (Protectopolis)* Cleveland Boston Baltimore Los Angeles 425,000 257,000 (245,000) 228,000 185,000 175,000 144,000 *Peak daytime population. Table 6. Protectopolis Population at Risk (one 10-MT weapon, airburst) Unsheltered Sheltered, at peak population density Sheltered, after several hours ~1,000,000 ~250,000 ~50,000 Tunnel-Grid Shelter Costs At such an early date, cost figures are likely to be very misleading. A preliminary report by Holmes and Narver, Inc., shows that costs per person sheltered could lie in the region of $400 to $500 for rather elab- 2 orate systems involving refrigeration and power plants at each entrance. More austere and more crowded tunnel-grid shelters probably could reduce the costs to the $300-400 range. It is probable that no city would undertake to provide its citizens a protection system like the tunnel-grid shelter if it had only one use. The Tucson report points out that an underground tunnel grid could be very valuable for installation of new utilities such as power and tele- phone cables. Another possible dual use would be to tap the tunnel grid as a source for citywide air conditioning. I would like to conclude my remarks today by a special reference to future urban underground trans- portation systems and to leave you with the thought that design of such systems with civil defense in mind could be the most important route to urban shelter from the direct effects of nuclear weapons. Future Urban Underground Transportation A RAND report on work sponsored by the Ford Foundation was published about 18 months ago.' One of the most striking conclusions of the report is illustrated in the next slide (Fig. 8). The cost of tunnels per lane 'Engineering and Cost Considerations for Tunnel-Grid Blast Shelter Con- cept," Holmes and Narver, Inc., Los Angeles, California, January 1965. "Urban Underground Highways and Parking Facilities," G. A. Hoffman, RAND Report RM-3680-RC, August 1963. ORNL DWG 65-852 ORNL - AEC - OFFICIAL HOLLAND TUNNEL ORNI - AEC - OFFICIAL SOURCE: "URBAN UNDERGROUND HIGHWAYS AND PARKING FACILITIES," RAND REPORT RM- 3680-RC AUGUST, 1963. 16. COST OF U.S. TUNNELS TOTAL HXY. COST PER LANE-MILE (millions of dollars), COST OF U.S. URBAN HIGHWAYS QUEENS, MIDTOWN• 4 HOLLAND TUNNEL APPROACHES SANTA MONICA 7 FREEWAY - 1920 1940 1960 1980 COMPLETION DATE COST OF ABOVEGROUND AND UNDERGROUND U.S. HIGHWAYS OANI - AEC - OFFICIAL mile has been falling for 40 years, while the cost of urban highways has been rising. In the 1970's, the costs may be about the same. The scatter of data around the tunnel cost band is shown by the Holland and Queens Midtown tunnel figures which lie well above and below the general trend. The highway data are somewhat better behaved, although scatter of twenty to thirty percent above and below the cost band is fairly common. The reason for the reduced tunneling costs up to the present is principally increased mechanizition. The increase in urban surface high- ways comes from increased lahor and right-of-way costs. Labor costs may increase tunneling costs in the future. On the assumption that new urban highway construction may be as cheap in the near future underground as on the surface, Hoffman illustrates ways that mechanical moles can be used to build three- and four-lane highways into the center of a city. May I have the next slide (Fig. 9). These tunnels would require counterrotating rock-boring machines 21 to 27 feet in diameter, which Hoffman predicts could be available during the present decade. A clever feature of both tunnels is the over- head patrol car. Its use is shown in the next slide (Fig. 10). Hoffman points out that the key to successful underground auto trans- port to the center of cities is the construction of inexpensive underground parking facilities. One design is shown in the next slide (Fig. 11). This design is based on machine-tunneled space and the use of compact cars. Another possible design for parking space is the underground version of the elevated spiral parking garage. Such a garage could be the basement of a high-rise building, and elevators could run from the underground parking area to the work location. MI-JOY INOU ORNL DWG 65-849 IVI31310- 33V - INYO : SOURCE: URBAN UNDERGROUND HIGHWAYS AND PARKING FACILITIES - THE RAND CORP. QINI -urea till! .. --. - Typ 24' 26- - 27.5'—- -22,26_ VI Ni- ORNI - AEC - OFFICIAL Fig.9.Layout of 3- and 4-lone machine-tunnelled highways 25 ORNL DWG 65-847 SOURCE: URBAN UNDERGROUND HIGHWAYS AND PARKING FACILITIES - THE RAND CORP. NINI - Air-assuren Potrol Rescue BEE =7 Removal ORNI - AEC - OFFICIAL Fig.10. Patrol-car design for vehicular tunnels 26 ORNL DWG 65-848 SOURCE: URBAN UNDERGROUND HIGHWAYS AND PARKING FACILITIES - THE RAND CORP. LUL Led . li7777 (a) Lobe of parking space 15'tid X 8.5'm 12 Тур Top view (6) Detail Side view Fig.ll. Parking space under ground for small and compact cars The application of this underground tunnel concept to the city of Chicago is shown in the next slide (Fig. 12). Hoffman points out that novi-s-neccue the excavated rock from the highways and parking area in the center of town could be used to build a new airport in the lake near the center of town. The total project shown in this slide would amount to sixty new lanes of traffic feeding into 3/4 million underground parking spaces and would cost from $4 to $6 billion dollars. It is obvious that investments of this size would only be made after a thorough engineering study of the cost of alternate transportation systems. Perhaps access to central business. districts by individual automobile in the future will be judged infeasible. On the other hand, the trend has been to bring high speed expressways directly into downtown areas, and this trend may be very difficult to reverse. If underground highways and parking areas could be modified at a small percent increase in cost to provide urban blast protection, then this would be a factor favoring their use. Hoffman recommends that a cross-midtown Manhattan six-lane tunnel between Lincoln and Queens tunnels plus 100,000 parking spaces be considered as a prototype experiment. A typical compact ca: parking space shown earlier (Fig. 11) requires more than 120 square feet plus extensive access tunnels. Since 10 square feet is a standard shelter space for one person, even the modest prototype for Manhattan could have significant shelter value. Hoffman's designs involve construction which may be many years away. A more significant event from the standpoint of civil defense is present -- day underground urban construction which is proceeding without regard for its shelter value. One such case in point is the construction of under- ground pedestrian passageways in the Chicago loop. Oliil-I!? - OSS!(!ni TVIJAJO- 3V - INDO 11101110 - IV - INYO TRI: STATE TOLLWAY ORNL DWG.-65-854 II. 14 @ PARKING NORTHWEST TOLLVAY EVANSTON ANNUUMAnuntiusquumaunalpastinn0mmun 10000101 12.LANES wana 6. LANES LAKES --- . ....1 . SHORT · INTERNATIONAL NRPORT MICHIGAN: CHICAGO LINCOLN ARK min EISENHOWER RANT ARK EXP VY. 28 28 NEV AIRPORT CHICA 1 i HACKSON PARK no Leinw @iminuetudimanyu wasimpegno CHICAGO YY INDUSTRIAL DISTRICT Fig. 12. PLANS UNDERGROUND HIGHWAYS & PARKING SYSTEM FOR CHICAGO OES PLAIMES RIVER CALUNET (XPTY. CALUMET SAL CHANNEL LAKE CALUNET SOURCE: URBAN UNDERGROUND HIGHWAYS AND PARKING FACILITIES WOLF LAKE SOUTHWEST NY. CHICAGO ORNI - AC - OFFICIAL ORNI - AEC - OFFICIAL 29 The Chicago pedestrian subway is shown in the next slide (Fig. 13). For those who are not familiar with downtown Chicago, the area covered by the tunnels is about 0.5 square mile (about seven-tenths of a mile on a side). Part of the subway is in being; the remainder should be completed during the next decade. You will notice a resemblance to the central city tunnel grid described earlier (see Fig. 4). The resemblance is even stronger when one looks at a typical cross-section shown in the next slide (Fig. 14). I want to emphasize that this Chicago tunnel grid is being constructed with no attempt to realize any value as a civil defense shelter system. According to civil defense officials, adeguate fallout Shelter space exists in high-rise buildings in the area for all of the peak day population. I draw two conclusions from this example. First, much urban construction of the future with great potential for civil defense use will occur whether or not plans for urban blast protection are made. Second, even small design changes made early in such projects could either provide or make it possible in the future to provide very much improved urban civil defense protection at a modest cost. Are there any questions? -- -- Vous 10-g y INYO - - ................................. ..... 10191510 - DIV-1N80, All NL DWG 65-846 SOURC 7 08 Winter perny CHICAGO PLANNING COMMISSION : HERRE SICHICAGO DOWNTOWN AREA ALL-WEATHER-PEDESTRIAN PASSAGE WAYS. .: V..... . ILLIONS WIT CMKCAGO IIIIIIIIIII PRESENT WACKER LAKE TATCI.. per PROPOSED 1 II ALTERNATE 1 AHI RANDOLPH NT he WINIONS WASHINGTON AIMINGTON 21 CANAL MTU .30 a 75 KW MADISON * ننننننننن F MONROE = LAKE SHORE DRIVE Twi ADAMS TATE 1 .ar JACKSON . M:5:1F:41 . VAN BUREN mere CONGRESS ......... - - O 3 WACKER - FRANKLIN : WELLS : LA SALLE CLARK DEARBOR WABASH Se STATE MICHIGAN vel Fig. 13 ORNL - AC - OFFICIAL ONNI - AEC - OLICIAL . . 1151:0-Siv - 180. . '. NVIDIN10-OV - INTO i 'r .... ORNL DWG-65-853 BUILDING LINE BUILDING LINE - CENTER LINE --STONE VARIES TOP OF CURB ELEV. +14.00 TOP OF STREET PAVEMENTI STAIR DOWN TO PEDESTRIAN SUBWAY- YAL SIDEWALK 1. EW iLK 31 MEMBRANE WATERPROOFING CONCRETE -STAIR L-.NOING PripULTTHFI 18 AIR SPACES ELEC. FIXTURES 4* GLAZED TILE Diritziak: LENGTH VARIES ELEV. -4.750 SCORED CONCRETE FLOORTE GUTIER URAIN PEDESTRIAN SUBWAY TYPICAL CROSS SECTION Fig. 14 PROPOSED PEDESTRIAN SUBWAY SOURCE: CHICAGO PLANNING COMMISSION ORNI - AC - OFFICIAL ORNI - AIC - OFFICIAL .: . DATE FILMED 5/ 14 /65 This report was prepared as an account of Government sponsored work. Neither the United States, nor the Commission, nor any person acting on behalf of the Commission: A. Makes any warranty or representation, expressed or implied, with respect to the accu- racy, completeness, or usefulness of the informacion contained in this report, or that the use of any information, apparatus, method, or process disclosed in this report may not Infringe privately owned rights; or B. Assumes any liabilities with respect to the use of, or for damages resulting from the use of any information, apparatus, method, or proce88 disclosed in this report. As used in the above, "person acting on behalf of the Commission" includes any em- ployee or contractor of the Commission, or employee of such contractor, to the extent that such employee or contractor of the Commission, or employee of such contractor pienares, disseminates, or provides access to, any information pursuant to his employment or coni ract with the Commission, or his employment with such contractor. YA > . EK 2 TOWN a . 42 N1 END 1.