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T H E
HISTORY OF RO ME
MOMMSEN
T H E

HISTORY OF ROME
BY
T H E O DO R M O M M S E N
TRANSLATED
WITH THE SANCTION OF THE AUTHOR
BY
WILLIAM Pu R DIE DICKSON, D.D., LL.D.
PROFESSOR OF DIVINITY IN THE UNIVERSITY OF GLASGOW
A NEW EDITION REVISED THROUGHOUT AND
EMBODYING RECENT ADDITIONS
V O L. II
{
NEW YORK
CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS
I895
CONTENTS
BOOK SECONI)
FROM THE ABOLITION OF THE MONARCHY IN ROME TO
THE UNION OF ITALY—Continued
C H A PTE R VII
s PAGE
STRUGGLE BETWEEN PYRRHUS AND ROME, AND UNION OF
ITALY * e ſº tº - e sº * I
CHA PTE R VIII
LAW–RELIGION–MILITARY SYSTEM-ECONOMIC CONDITION
—NATIONALITY tº © & * º * > 62
C H A P T E R IX
ART AND SCIENCE e & * tº e gº 96
BOOK THIRD ...—--------
, ºf
FROM THE UNION OF ITALY TO THE SUBJUGATION OF
CARTHAGE AND THE GREEK STATES
C H A PTE R I
CARTHAGE tº e * g & g . I31
•r.
vi CONTENTS
C H A P T E R II
- PAGE
THE WAR BETWEEN ROME AND CARTHAGE CONCERNING
SICILY tº tº o o • & tº I6 I
C H A P T E R III
THE EXTENSION OF ITALY TO ITS NATURAL BoundARIES. 203
CHAPTER IV
HAMILCAR AND HANNIBAL. . . tº ſº © • 23.I
C H A P T E R V
THE WAR UNDER HANNIBAL TO THE BATTLE OF CANNAE 266
C H A P T E R VI
THE WAR UNDER HANNIBAL FROM CANNAE To ZAMA . 3oo
C H A P T E R VII
THE WEST FROM THE PEACE OF HANNIBAL TO THE CLOSE
OF THE THIRD PERIOD . º e e . 369
C H A P T E R VIII
THE EASTERN STATES AND THE SECOND MACEDONIAN WAR. 395
CHAPTER IX
THE WAR WITH ANTIOCHUS OF ASIA tº ge • 444
C H A PTE R X
THE THIRD MACEDONIAN WAR gº ... is º . 485
APPENDIX
THE TREATIES BETWEEN ROME AND CARTHAGE . • 523
CHAPTER VII
STRUGGLE BETWEEN PYRRHUS AND ROME, AND
UNION OF ITALY
AFTER Rome had acquired the undisputed mastery of the Relations
world, the Greeks were wont to annoy their Roman masters º
by the assertion that Rome was indebted for her greatness and west.
to the fever of which Alexander of Macedonia died at
Babylon on the 11th of June, 431. As it was not too 823.
agreeable for them to reflect on the actual past, they were
fond of allowing their thoughts to dwell on what might
have happened, had the great king turned his arms—as was
said to have been his intention at the time of his death—
towards the west and contested the Carthaginian supremacy
by sea with his fleet, and the Roman supremacy by land
with his phalanxes. It is not impossible that Alexander
may have cherished such thoughts; nor is it necessary to
resort for an explanation of their origin to the mere
difficulty which an autocrat, who is fond of war and is well
provided with soldiers and ships, experiences in setting
limits to his warlike career. It was an enterprise worthy of
a Greek great king to protect the Siceliots against Carthage
and the Tarentines against Rome, and to put an end to
piracy on either sea; and the Italian embassies from the
Bruttians, Lucanians, and Etruscans,” that along with
* The story that the Romans also sent envoys to Alexander at Babylon
rests on the testimony of Clitarchus (Plin. Hist. Nat. iii. 5, 57), from
WOL. II 33
2 STRUGGLE BETWEEN PYRRHUS BOOK II
numerous others made their appearance at Babylon,
afforded him sufficient opportunities of becoming acquainted
with the circumstances of the peninsula and of entering
into relations with it. Carthage with its many connections
in the east could not but attract the attention of the mighty
monarch, and it was probably one of his designs to convert
the nominal sovereignty of the Persian king over the Tyrian
colony into a real one: it was not for nothing that a
Phoenician spy was found in the retinue of Alexander.
Whether, however, these ideas were dreams or actual
projects, the king died without having interfered in the
affairs of the west, and his ideas were buried with him.
For but a few brief years a Greek ruler had held in his
hand the whole intellectual vigour of the Hellenic race
Combined with the whole material resources of the east.
On his death the work to which his life had been devoted
—the establishment of Hellenism in the east—was by
no means undone; but his empire had barely been united
when it was again dismembered, and, amidst the constant
quarrels of the different states that were formed out of its
ruins, the object of world-wide interest which they were
destined to promote—the diffusion of Greek culture in the
east—though not abandoned, was prosecuted on a feeble
and stunted scale. Under such circumstances, neither the
Greek nor the Asiatico-Egyptian states could think of
acquiring a footing in the west or of turning their efforts
against the Romans or the Carthaginians. The eastern
and western state-systems subsisted side by side for a time
whom the other authorities who mention this fact (Aristus and Asclepiades,
ap. Arrian, vii. 15, 5 ; Memnon, c. 25) doubtless derived it. Clitarchus
certainly was contemporary with these events; nevertheless, his Life of
Alexander was decidedly a historical romance rather than a history; and,
looking to the silence of the trustworthy biographers (Arrian, Z. c. : Liv.
ix. 18) and the utterly romantic details of the account—which represents
the Romans, for instance, as delivering to Alexander a chaplet of gold, and
the latter as prophesying the future greatness of Rome—we cannot but
set down this story as one of the many embellishments which Clitarchus
introduced into the history.
CHAP. VII AND ROME 3
without crossing, politically, each other's path; and Rome
in particular remained substantially aloof from the com-
plications in the days of Alexander's successors. The only
relations established were of a mercantile kind; as in the
instance of the free state of Rhodes, the leading representa-
tive of the policy of commercial neutrality in Greece and
in consequence the universal medium of intercourse in an
age of perpetual wars, which about 448 concluded a treaty
with Rome—a commercial convention of course, such as
was natural between a mercantile people and the masters
of the Caerite and Campanian coasts. Even in the supply
of mercenaries from Hellas, the universal recruiting field
of those times, to Italy, and to Tarentum in particular,
political relations—such as subsisted, for instance, between
Tarentum and Sparta its mother-city—exercised but a very
subordinate influence. In general the raising of mercenaries
was simply a matter of traffic, and Sparta, although it
regularly supplied the Tarentines with captains for their
Italian wars, was by that course as little involved in
hostilities with the Italians, as in the North American war
of independence the German states were involved in
hostilities with the Union, to whose opponents they sold
the services of their subjects.
Pyrrhus, king of Epirus, was himself simply a military
adventurer. He was none the less a soldier of fortune
that he traced back his pedigree to Aeacus and Achilles,
and that, had he been more peacefully disposed, he might
have lived and died as “king” of a small mountain tribe
under the Supremacy of Macedonia or perhaps in isolated
independence. He has been compared to Alexander of
Macedonia; and certainly the idea of founding a Hellenic
empire of the west—which would have had as its core
Epirus, Magna Graecia, and Sicily, would have commanded
hoth the Italian seas, and would have reduced Rome and
Carthage to the rank of barbarian peoples bordering on the
The
historical
position of
Pyrrhus.
4 STRUGGLE BETWEEN PYRRHUS BOOK II
Hellenistic state-system, like the Celts and the Indians—
was analogous in greatness and boldness to the idea which
led the Macedonian king over the Hellespont. But it was
not the mere difference of issue that formed the distinction
between the expedition to the east and that to the west.
Alexander with his Macedonian army, in which the staff
especially was excellent, could fully make head against the
great-king; but the king of Epirus, which stood by the
side of Macedonia somewhat as Hesse by the side of
Prussia, could only raise an army worthy of the name by
means of mercenaries and of alliances based on accidental
political combinations. Alexander made his appearance
in the Persian empire as a conqueror ; Pyrrhus appeared
in Italy as the general of a coalition of secondary states.
Alexander left his hereditary dominions completely secured
by the unconditional subjection of Greece, and by the
strong army that remained behind under Antipater; Pyrrhus
had no security for the integrity of his native dominions
but the word of a doubtful neighbour. In the case of
both conquerors, if their plans should be crowned with
success, their native Country would necessarily cease to be
the centre of their new empire; but it was far more
practicable to transfer the seat of the Macedonian military
monarchy to Babylon than to found a soldier-dynasty in
Tarentum or Syracuse. The democracy of the Greek
republics—perpetual agony though it was—could not be
at all coerced into the stiff forms of a military state; Philip
had good reason for not incorporating the Greek republics
with his empire. In the east no national resistance was to
be expected; ruling and subject races had long lived there
side by side, and a change of despot was a matter of
indifference or even of satisfaction to the mass of the
population. In the west the Romans, the Samnites, the
Carthaginians, might be vanquished; but no conqueror
could have transformed the Italians into Egyptian fellahs,
CHAP. VII AND ROME 5
or rendered the Roman farmers tributaries of Hellenic
barons. Whatever we take into view—whether their own
power, their allies, or the resources of their antagonists—
in all points the plan of the Macedonian appears as a
feasible, that of the Epirot an impracticable, enterprise;
the former as the completion of a great historical task, the
latter as a remarkable blunder ; the former as the founda-
tion of a new system of states and of a new phase of
civilization, the latter as a mere episode in history. The
work of Alexander outlived him, although its creator met
an untimely death; Pyrrhus saw with his own eyes the
wreck of all his plans, ere death called him away. Both
were by nature daring and great, but Pyrrhus was only the
foremost general, Alexander was eminently the most gifted
statesman, of his time; and, if it is insight into what is and
what is not possible that distinguishes the hero from the
adventurer, Pyrrhus must be numbered among the latter
class, and may as little be placed on a parallel with his
greater kinsman as the Constable of Bourbon may be put
in comparison with Louis the Eleventh.
And yet a wondrous charm attaches to the name of the
Epirot—a peculiar sympathy, evoked certainly in some
degree by his chivalrous and amiable character, but still
more by the circumstance that he was the first Greek that
met the Romans in battle. With him began those direct
relations between Rome and Hellas, on which the whole
subsequent development of ancient, and an essential part
of modern, civilization are based. The struggle between
phalanxes and cohorts, between a mercenary army and a
militia, between military monarchy and senatorial govern-
ment, between individual talent and national vigour—this
struggle between Rome and Hellenism was first fought out
in the battles between Pyrrhus and the Roman generals;
and though the defeated party often afterwards appealed
anew to the arbitration of arms, every succeeding day of
6 STRUGGLE BETWEEN PYRF HUS BOOK II
Character
and earlier
history of
Pyrrhus.
313.
307.
302.
battle simply confirmed the decision. But while the
Greeks were beaten in the battlefield as well as in the
senate-hall, their superiority was none the less decided on
every other field of rivalry than that of politics; and these
very struggles already betokened that the victory of Rome
over the Hellenes would be different from her victories
over Gauls and Phoenicians, and that the charm of
Aphrodite only begins to work when the lance is broken
and the helmet and shield are laid aside.
King Pyrrhus was the son of Aeacides, ruler of the
Molossians (about Janina), who, spared as a kinsman and
faithful vassal by Alexander, had been after his death drawn
into the whirlpool of Macedonian family-politics, and lost
in it first his kingdom and then his life (441). His son,
then six years of age, was saved by Glaucias the ruler of
the Illyrian Taulantii, and in the course of the conflicts
for the possession of Macedonia he was, when still a boy,
restored by Demetrius Poliorcetes to his hereditary
principality (447)—but only to lose it again after a few
years through the influence of the opposite party (about
452), and to begin his military career as an exiled prince
in the train of the Macedonian generals. Soon his
personality asserted itself. He shared in the last campaigns
of Antigonus; and the old marshal of Alexander took
delight in the born soldier, who in the judgment of the
grey-headed general only wanted years to be already the
first warrior of the age. The unfortunate battle at Ipsus
brought him as a hostage to Alexandria, to the court of
the founder of the Lagid dynasty, where by his daring and
downright character, and his soldierly spirit thoroughly
despising everything that was not military, he attracted the
attention of the politic king Ptolemy no less than he
attracted the notice of the royal ladies by his manly beauty,
which was not impaired by his wild look and stately tread.
Just at this time the enterprising Demetrius was once more
CHAP. VII AND ROME 7
establishing himself in a new kingdom, which on this
occasion was Macedonia ; of course with the intention of
using it as a lever to revive the monarchy of Alexander.
To keep down his ambitious designs, it was important to
give him employment at home; and Ptolemy, who knew
how to make admirable use of such fiery spirits as the
Epirot youth in the prosecution of his subtle policy, not
only met the wishes of his consort queen Berenice, but
also promoted his own ends, by giving his stepdaughter
the princess Antigone in marriage to the young prince, and
lending his aid and powerful influence to support the
return of his beloved “son” to his native land (458).
Restored to his paternal kingdom, he soon Carried all
before him. The brave Epirots, the Albanians of antiquity,
clung with hereditary loyalty and fresh enthusiasm to the
high-spirited youth—the “eagle,” as they called him. In
the confusion that arose regarding the succession to the
Macedonian throne after the death of Cassander (457), the
Epirot extended his dominions: step by step he gained
the regions on the Ambracian gulf with the important
town of Ambracia, the island of Corcyra (i. 491), and even
a part of the Macedonian territory, and with forces far
inferior he made head against king Demetrius to the
admiration of the Macedonians themselves. Indeed, when
Demetrius was by his own folly hurled from the Macedonian
throne, it was voluntarily proffered by them to his chivalrous
opponent, a kinsman of the Alexandrid house (467). No
one was in reality worthier than Pyrrhus to wear the royal
diadem of Philip and of Alexander. In an age of deep
depravity, in which princely rank and baseness began to
be synonymous, the personally unspotted and morally pure
character of Pyrrhus shone conspicuous. For the free
farmers of the hereditary Macedonian soil, who, although
diminished and impoverished, were far from sharing in
that decay of morals and of valour which the government
296.
297.
tº'
287.
8 STRUGGLE BETWEEN PYRRHUS BOOK II
287.
of the Diadochi produced in Greece and Asia, Pyrrhus
appeared exactly formed to be the fitting king, Pyrrhus,
who, like Alexander, in his household and in the circle of
his friends preserved a heart open to all human sympathies,
and constantly avoided the bearing of an Oriental sultan
which was so odious to the Macedonians; and who, like
Alexander, was acknowledged to be the first tactician of
his time. But the singularly overstrained national feeling
of the Macedonians, which preferred the most paltry
Macedonian sovereign to the ablest foreigner, and the
irrational insubordination of the Macedonian troops
towards every non-Macedonian leader, to which Eumenes
the Cardian, the greatest general of the school of Alexander,
had fallen a victim, put a speedy termination to the rule
of the prince of Epirus. Pyrrhus, who could not exercise
sovereignty over Macedonia with the consent of the
Macedonians, and who was too powerless and perhaps too
high spirited to force himself on the nation against its
will, after reigning seven months left the country to its
native misgovernment, and went home to his faithful
Epirots (467). But the man who had worn the crown of
Alexander, the brother-in-law of Demetrius, the son-in-law
of Ptolemy Lagides and of Agathocles of Syracuse, the
highly-trained tactician who wrote memoirs and scientific
dissertations on the military art, could not possibly end his
days in inspecting at a set time yearly the accounts of the
royal cattle steward, in receiving from his brave Epirots
their customary gifts of oxen and sheep, in thereupon, at
the altar of Zeus, procuring the renewal of their oath of
allegiance and repeating his own engagement to respect the
laws, and—for the better confirmation of the whole—in
carousing with them all night long. If there was no place
for him on the throne of Macedonia, there was no abiding
in the land of his nativity at all; he was fitted for the first
place, and he could not be content with the second. His
CHAP. VII AND ROME 9
views therefore turned abroad. The kings, who were
Quarrelling for the possession of Macedonia, although
agreeing in nothing else, were ready and glad to concur in
aiding the voluntary departure of their dangerous rival;
and that his faithful war-comrades would follow him where-
ever he led, he knew full well. Just at that time the
circumstances of Italy were such, that the project which
had been meditated forty years before by Pyrrhus's kinsman,
his father's Cousin, Alexander of Epirus, and quite recently
by his father-in-law Agathocles, once more seemed feasible;
and so Pyrrhus resolved to abandon his Macedonian
schemes and to found for himself and for the Hellenic
nation a new empire in the west.
The interval of repose, which the peace with Samnium
in 464 had procured for Italy, was of brief duration ; the
impulse which led to the formation of a new league against
Roman ascendency came on this occasion from the Luca-
nians. This people, by taking part with Rome during the
Samnite wars, paralyzed the action of the Tarentines and
essentially contributed to the decisive issue ; and in con-
sideration of their services, the Romans gave up to them
the Greek cities in their territory. Accordingly after the
conclusion of peace they had, in concert with the Bruttians,
set themselves to subdue these cities in succession. The
Thurines, repeatedly assailed by Stenius Statilius the gene-
ral of the Lucanians and reduced to extremities, applied for
assistance against the Lucanians to the Roman Senate—
just as formerly the Campanians had asked the aid of
Rome against the Samnites—and beyond doubt with a like
sacrifice of their liberty and independence. In conse-
quence of the founding of the ſortress Venusia, Rome
could dispense with the alliance of the Lucanians; so the
Romans granted the prayer of the Thurines, and enjoined
their friends and allies to desist from their designs on a
290.
Rising
Of the
Italians
against
Rome.
The
I ucanians.
city which had surrendered itself to Rome. The Luca-
IO STRUGGLE IBETWEEN PYRR H US BOOK II
285.
The
Etruscans
and Celts.
284.
The
Samnites.
nians and Bruttians, thus cheated by their more powerful
allies of their share in the common spoil, entered into
negotiations with the opposition-party among the Samnites
and Tarentines to bring about a new Italian coalition ;
and when the Romans sent an embassy to warn them,
they detained the envoys in captivity and began the war
against Rome with a new attack on Thurii (about 469),
while at the same time they invited not only the Samnites
and Tarentines, but the northern Italians also –the Etrus-
cans, Umbrians, and Gauls—to join them in the struggle
for freedom. The Etruscan league actually revolted, and
hired numerous bands of Gauls; the Roman army, which
the praetor Lucius Caecilius was leading to the help of the
Arretines who had remained faithful, was annihilated under
the walls of Arretium by the Senonian mercenaries of the
Etruscans: the general himself fell with 13, ooo of his men
(470). The Senones were reckoned allies of Rome; the
Romans accordingly sent envoys to them to complain of
their furnishing warriors to serve against Rome, and to re-
quire the surrender of their captives without ransom. But
by the command of their chieftain Britomaris, who had to
take vengeance on the Romans for the death of his father,
the Senones slew the Roman envoys and openly took the
Etruscan side. All the north of Italy, Etruscans, Umbri-
ans, Gauls, were thus in arms against Rome; great results
might be achieved, if its southern provinces also should
seize the moment and declare, so far as they had not
already done so, against Rome. In fact the Samnites,
ever ready to make a stand on behalf of liberty, appear to
have declared war against the Romans ; but weakened and
hemmed in on all sides as they were, they could be of little
service to the league ; and Tarentum manifested its wonted
delay. While her antagonists were negotiating alliances,
settling treaties as to subsidies, and collecting mercenaries,
Rome was acting. The Senones were first made to feel
U HAP. VII AND ROME I I
how dangerous it was to gain a victory over the Romans.
The consul Publius Cornelius Dolabella advanced with a
strong army into their territory; all that were not put to the
sword were driven forth from the land, and this tribe was
erased from the list of the Italian nations (471). In the
case of a people subsisting chiefly on its flocks and herds
such an expulsion en masse was quite practicable ; and the
Senones thus expelled from Italy probably helped to make
up the Gallic hosts which soon after inundated the countries
of the Danube, Macedonia, Greece, and Asia Minor.
The next neighbours and kinsmen of the Senones, the
Boii, terrified and exasperated by a catastrophe which had
been accomplished with so fearful a rapidity, united in-
stantaneously with the Etruscans, who still continued the
war, and whose Senonian mercenaries now fought against
the Romans no longer as hirelings, but as desperate
avengers of their native land. A powerful Etrusco-Gallic
army marched against Rome to retaliate the annihilation of
the Senonian tribe on the enemy's capital, and to extirpate
Rome from the face of the earth more completely than
had been formerly done by the chieftain of these same
Senones. But the combined army was decidedly defeated
by the Romans at its passage of the Tiber in the neighbour-
hood of the Vadimonian lake (471). After they had once
more in the following year risked a general engagement
near Populonia with no better success, the Boii deserted
their confederates and concluded a peace on their own
account with the Romans (472). Thus the Gauls, the
most formidable member of the league, were conquered
in detail before the league was fully formed, and by that
means the hands of Rome were left free to act against
Lower Italy, where during the years 469–47 I the contest
had not been carried on with any vigour. Hitherto the
weak Roman army had with diſſiculty maintained itself in
Thurii against the Lucanians and Bruttians; but now
The
Senones
annihi-
lated.
283,
The Boii.
2
S
3.
282.
285-283.
I2 STRUGGLE BETWEEN PYRRHUS BOOK II
282.
283.
304.
Breach
between
Rome and
Tarentum.
(472) the consul Gaius Fabricius Luscinus appeared with
a strong army in front of the town, relieved it, defeated the
Lucanians in a great engagement, and took their general
Statilius prisoner. The smaller non-Doric Greek towns,
recognizing the Romans as their deliverers, everywhere
voluntarily joined them. Roman garrisons were left
behind in the most important places, in Locri, Croton,
Thurii, and especially in Rhegium, on which latter town
the Carthaginians seem also to have had designs. Every-
where Rome had most decidedly the advantage. The
annihilation of the Senones had given to the Romans a
considerable tract of the Adriatic coast. With a view,
doubtless, to the smouldering feud with Tarentum and the
already threatened invasion of the Epirots, they hastened
to make themselves sure of this coast as well as of the
Adriatic sea. A burgess colony was sent out (about 471)
to the seaport of Sena (Sinigaglia), the former capital of
the Senonian territory; and at the same time a Roman
fleet sailed from the Tyrrhene sea into the eastern waters,
manifestly for the purpose of being stationed in the Adriatic
and of protecting the Roman possessions there."
The Tarentines since the treaty of 450 had lived at
peace with Rome. They had been spectators of the
long struggle of the Samnites, and of the rapid extirpation
of the Senones; they had acquiesced without remonstrance
in the establishment of Venusia, Atria, and Sena, and in
the occupation of Thurii and of Rhegium. But when
the Roman fleet, on its voyage from the Tyrrhene to the
Adriatic sea, now arrived in the Tarentine waters and cast
anchor in the harbour of the friendly city, the long-
cherished resentment at length overflowed. Old treaties,
which prohibited the war-vessels of Rome from sailing to
the east of the Lacinian promontory, were appealed to by
popular orators in the assembly of the citizens. A furious
mob fell upon the Roman ships of war, which, assailed
CHAP. VII AND ROME I3
suddenly in a piratical fashion, succumbed after a sharp
struggle ; five ships were taken and their crews executed
or sold into slavery ; the Roman admiral himself had fallen
in the engagement. Only the Supreme folly and supreme
unscrupulousness of mob-rule can account for those dis-
graceful proceedings. The treaties referred to belonged
to a period long past and forgotten ; it is clear that they
no longer had any meaning, at least subsequently to the
founding of Atria and Sena, and that the Romans entered
the bay on the faith of the existing alliance ; indeed, it
was very much their interest—as the further course of
things showed—to afford the Tarentines no sort of pretext
for declaring war. In declaring war against Rome—if
such was their wish—the statesmen of Tarentum were
only doing what they should have done long before ; and
if they preferred to rest their declaration of war upon the
formal pretext of a breach of treaty rather than upon the
real ground, no further objection could be taken to that
course, seeing that diplomacy has always reckoned it
beneath its dignity to speak the plain truth in plain
language. But to make an armed attack upon the fleet
without warning, instead of summoning the admiral to
retrace his course, was a foolish no less than a barbarous
act—one of those horrible barbarities of civilization, when
moral principle suddenly forsakes the helm and the merest
coarseness emerges in its room, as if to warn us against
the childish belief that civilization is able to extirpate
brutality from human nature.
And, as if what they had done had not been enough,
the Tarentines after this heroic feat attacked Thurii, the
Roman garrison of which capitulated in consequence of
the surprise (in the winter of 472-473); and inflicted
Severe chastisement on the Thurines—the same, whom
Tarentine policy had abandoned to the Lucănians and
thereby forcibly constrained into surrender to Rome—for
2
I 4 STRUCGLE BETWEEN PYRREIUS BOOK II
Attempts
at peace.
281.
their desertion from the Hellenic party to the bar-
barians.
The barbarians, however, acted with a moderation which,
considering their power and the provocation they had re-
ceived, excites astonishment. It was the interest of Rome
to maintain as long as possible the Tarentine neutralicy, and
the leading men in the Senate accordingly rejected the
proposal, which a minority had with natural resentment sub-
mitted, to declare war at once against the Tarentines. In
fact, the continuance of peace on the part of Rome was
proffered on the most moderate terms consistent with her
honour—the release of the captives, the restoration of
Thurii, the surrender of the originators of the attack on the
fleet. A Roman embassy proceeded with these proposals to
Tarentum (473), while at the same time, to add weight to
their words, a Roman army under the consul Lucius
Aemilius advanced into Samnium. The Tarentines could,
without forfeiting aught of their independence, accept these
terms ; and considering the little inclination for war in so
wealthy a commercial city, the Romans had reason to pre-
sume that an accommodation was still possible. But the
attempt to preserve peace failed, whether through the oppo-
sition of those Tarentines who recognized the necessity of
meeting the aggressions of Rome, the sooner the better, by
a resort to arms, or merely through the unruliness of the
city rabble, which with characteristic Greek naughtiness sub-
jected the person of the envoy to an unworthy insult. The
consul now advanced into the Tarentine territory; but in-
stead of immediately commencing hostilities, he offered once
more the same terms of peace ; and, when this proved in
vain, he began to lay waste the fields and country houses,
and he defeated the civic militia. The principal persons
captured, however, were released without ransom; and the
hope was hot abandoned that the pressure of war would give
to the aristocratic party ascendency in the city and so bring
CHAP. VII AND ROME I 5
about peace. The reason of this reserve was, that the
Romans were unwilling to drive the city into the arms of the
Epirot king. His designs on Italy were no longer a secret.
A Tarentine embassy had already gone to Pyrrhus and re-
turned without having accomplished its object. The king
had demanded more than it had powers to grant. It was
necessary that they should come to a decision. That the
civic militia knew only how to run away from the Romans,
had been made sufficiently clear. There remained only
the choice between a peace with Rome, which the Romans
still were ready to agree to on equitable terms, and a treaty
with Pyrrhus on any condition that the king might think
proper; or, in other words, the choice between submission
to the Supremacy of Rome, and subjection to the tyrannis
of a Greek soldier.
The parties in the city were almost equally balanced.
At length the ascendency remained with the national
party—a result, that was due partly to the justifiable
predilection which led them, if they must yield to a
master at all, to prefer a Greek to a barbarian, but partly
also to the dread of the demagogues that Rome, notwith-
standing the moderation now forced upon it by circum-
stances, would not neglect on a fitting opportunity to exact
vengeance for the outrages perpetrated by the Tarentine
rabble. The city, accordingly, came to terms with Pyrrhus.
He obtained the supreme command of the troops of the
Tarentines and of the other Italians in arms against Rome,
along with the right of keeping a garrison in Tarentum.
The expenses of the war were, of course, to be borne by the
city. Pyrrhus, on the other hand, promised to remain no
longer in Italy than was necessary; probably with the tacit
reservation that his own judgment should fix the time during
which he would be needed there. Nevertheless, the prey
had almost slipped out of his hands. While the Tarentine
envoys—the chiefs, no doubt, of the war party—were
Pyrrhus
summoned
to Italy.
16 STRUGGLE BETW EEN PYRRHUS BOOK 11
Landing of
Pyrrhus.
281.
280.
Pyrrhus
and the
coalition.
281.
absent in Epirus, the state of feeling in the city, now hard
pressed by the Romans, underwent a change. The chief
command was already entrusted to Agis, a man favourable
to Rome, when the return of the envoys with the concluded
treaty, accompanied by Cineas the confidential minister of
Pyrrhus, again brought the war party to the helm.
A firmer hand now grasped the reins, and put an end to
the pitiful vacillation. In the autumn of 473 Milo, the
general of Pyrrhus, landed with 30.o.o Epirots and occupied
the citadel of the town. He was followed in the beginning
of the year 474 by the king himself, who landed after a
stormy passage in which many lives were lost. He
transported to Tarentum a respectable but miscellaneous
army, consisting partly of the household troops, Molossians,
Thesprotians, Chaonians, and Ambraciots; partly of the
Macedonian infantry and the Thessalian cavalry, which
Ptolemy king of Macedonia had conformably to stipu-
lation handed over to him ; partly of Aetolian, Acarnanian,
and Athamanian mercenaries. Altogether it numbered
20, ooo phalangitae, 2 ooo archers, 5oo slingers, 3 ooo
cavalry, and 2 o elephants, and thus was not much smaller
than the army with which fifty years before Alexander had
crossed the Hellespont. .* *
The affairs of the coalition were in no very favourable
state when the king arrived. The Roman consul indeed,
as soon as he saw the soldiers of Milo taking the field
against him instead of the Tarentine militia, had abandoned
the attack on Tarentum and retreated to Apulia ; but, with
the exception of the territory of Tarentum, the Romans
virtually ruled all Italy. The coalition had no army in the
field anywhere in Lower Italy; and in Upper Italy the
Etruscans, who alone were still in arms, had in the last
campaign (473) met with nothing but defeat. The allies
had, before the king embarked, committed to him the chief
command of all their troops, and declared that they were
CHAP. VII AND ROME 17
able to place in the field an army of 350,000 infantry and
20, ooo cavalry. The reality formed a sad contrast to these
great promises. The army, whose chief command had been
committed to Pyrrhus, had still to be created ; and for the
time being the main resources available for forming it were
those of Tarentum alone. The king gave orders for the
enlisting of an army of Italian mercenaries with Tarentine
money, and called out the able-bodied citizens to serve in
the war. But the Tarentines had not so understood the
agreement. They had thought to purchase victory, like
any other commodity, with money; it was a sort of breach
of contract, that the king should compel them to fight for
it themselves. The more glad the citizens had been at
first after Milo's arrival to be quit of the burdensome
service of mounting guard, the more unwillingly they now
rallied to the standards of the king : it was necessary to
threaten the negligent with the penalty of death. This
result now justified the peace party in the eyes of all, and
communications were entered into, or at any rate appeared
to have been entered into, even with Rome. Pyrrhus,
prepared for such opposition, immediately treated Tarentum
as a conquered city; soldiers were quartered in the houses,
the assemblies of the people and the numerous clubs
(orvororírta) were suspended, the theatre was shut, the
promenades were closed, and the gates were occupied with
Epirot guards. A number of the leading men were sent
over the sea as hostages; others escaped the like fate by flight
to Rome. These strict measures were necessary, for it was
absolutely impossible in any sense to rely upon the Taren-
tines. It was only now that the king, in possession of that
important city as a basis, could begin operations in the field.
The Romans too were well aware of the conflict which
awaited them. In order first of all to secure the fidelity of
their allies or, in other words, of their subjects, the towns
that could not be depended on were garrisoned, and the
VOL. II 34
Prepara-
tions in
Rome.
I8 STRUGGLE BETWEEN PVRRHUs BOOK II
Com-
Iſlen Cement
of the
conflict
in Lower
Italy.
leaders of the party of independence, where it seemed
needful, were arrested or executed : such was the case with
a number of the members of the senate of Praeneste.
For the war itself great exertions were made ; a war con-
tribution was levied ; the full contingent was called forth
from all their subjects and allies; even the proletarians who
were properly exempt from obligation of service were called
to arms. A Roman army remained as a reserve in the
capital. A second advanced under the consul Tiberius
Coruncanius into Etruria, and dispersed the forces of Volci
and Volsinii. The main force was of course destined for
Lower Italy; its departure was hastened as much as
possible, in order to reach Pyrrhus while still in the territory
of Tarentum, and to prevent him and his forces from
forming a junction with the Samnites and other south
Italian levies that were in arms against Rome. The Roman
garrisons, that were placed in the Greek towns of Lower
Italy, were intended temporarily to check the king's
progress. But the mutiny of the troops stationed in
Rhegium—one of the legions levied from the Campanian
subjects of Rome under a Campanian captain Decius—
deprived the Romans of that important town. It was not,
however, transferred to the hands of Pyrrhus. While on
the one hand the national hatred of the Campanians
against the Romans undoubtedly contributed to produce
this military insurrection, it was impossible on the other
hand that Pyrrhus, who had crossed the sea to shield and
protect the Hellenes, could receive as his allies troops who
had put to death their Rhegine hosts in their own houses.
Thus they remained isolated, in close league with their
kinsmen and comrades in crime, the Mamertines, that is,
the Campanian mercenaries of Agathocles, who had by
similar means gained possession of Messana on the Opposite
side of the straits; and they pillaged and laid waste for
their own behoof the adjacent Greek towns, such as Croton,
CHAP. VII AND ROME I9
where they put to death the Roman garrison, and Caulonia,
which they destroyed. On the other hand the Romans
succeeded, by means of a weak corps which advanced
along the Lucanian frontier and of the garrison of Venusia,
in preventing the Lucanians and Samnites from uniting
with Pyrrhus; while the main force—four legions as it
would appear, and so, with a corresponding number of
allied troops, at least 50,000 strong—marched against
Pyrrhus, under the consul Publius Laevinus.
With a view to cover the Tarentine colony of Heraclea,
the king had taken up a position with his own and the
Tarentine troops between that city and Pandosia + (474).
The Romans, covered by their cavalry, forced the passage
of the Siris, and opened the battle with a vehement and
successful cavalry charge ; the king, who led his cavalry in
person, was thrown from his horse, and the Greek horse-
men, panic-struck by the disappearance of their leader,
abandoned the field to the squadrons of the enemy.
Pyrrhus, however, put himself at the head of his infantry,
and began a fresh and more decisive engagement. Seven
times the legions and the phalanx met in shock of battle,
and still the conflict was undecided. Then Megacles, one
of the best officers of the king, fell, and, because on this
hotly-contested day he had worn the king's armour, the
army for the second time believed that the king had fallen;
the ranks wavered ; Laevinus already felt sure of the
victory and threw the whole of his cavalry on the flank of
the Greeks. But Pyrrhus, marching with uncovered head
through the ranks of the infantry, revived the sinking
courage of his troops. The elephants which had hitherto
been kept in reserve were brought up to meet the cavalry;
the horses took fright at them ; the soldiers, not knowing
how to encounter the huge beasts, turned and fled ; the
* Neal the 1119tle in Anglona, 11ut to be conſoulided with the better
known town of the same name in the district of Cosenza.
Battle near
Heraclea.
280.
2O STRUGGLE BETWEEN PYRF HUS BOOK II
masses of disordered horsemen and the pursuing elephants
at length broke the compact ranks of the Roman infantry,
and the elephants in concert with the excellent Thessalian
cavalry wrought great slaughter among the fugitives. Had
not a brave Roman soldier, Gaius Minucius, the first hastate
of the fourth legion, wounded one of the elephants and
thereby thrown the pursuing troops into confusion, the
Roman army would have been extirpated ; as it was, the
remainder of the Roman troops succeeded in retreating
across the Siris. Their loss was great ; 7 ooo Romans were
found by the victors dead or wounded on the field of battle,
2 ooo were brought in prisoners; the Romans themselves
stated their loss, including probably the wounded carried
off the field, at 15, ooo men. But Pyrrhus's army had
suffered not much less : nearly 4ooo of his best soldiers
strewed the field of battle, and several of his ablest captains
had fallen. Considering that his loss fell chiefly on the
veteran soldiers who were far more difficult to be replaced
than the Roman militia, and that he owed his victory only
to the surprise produced by the attack of the elephants
which could not be often repeated, the king, skilful judge
of tactics as he was, may well at an after period have
described this victory as resembling a defeat; although he
was not so foolish as to communicate that piece of self-
criticism to the public—as the Roman poets afterwards
invented the story—in the inscription of the votive offering
presented by him at Tarentum. Politically it mattered
little in the first instance at what sacrifices the victory was
bought; the gain of the first battle against the Romans was
of inestimable value for Pyrrhus. His talents as a general
had been brilliantly displayed on this new field of battle,
and if anything could breathe unity and energy into the
languishing league of the Italians, the victory of Heraclea
could not fail to do so. But even the immediate results
of the victory were considerable and lasting. Lucania was
CHAP. VII AND ROME 2I
lost to the Romans: Laevinus collected the troops stationed
there and marched to Apulia. The Bruttians, Lucanians,
and Samnites joined Pyrrhus unmolested. With the
exception of Rhegium, which pined under the oppression
of the Campanian mutineers, the whole of the Greek cities
joined the king, and Locri even voluntarily delivered up to
him the Roman garrison ; in his case they were persuaded,
and with reason, that they would not be abandoned to the
Italians. The Sabellians and Greeks thus passed over to
Pyrrhus; but the victory produced no further effect. The
Latins showed no inclination to get quit of the Roman
rule, burdensome as it might be, by the help of a foreign
dynast. Venusia, although now wholly surrounded by
enemies, adhered with unshaken steadfastness to Rome.
Pyrrhus proposed to the prisoners taken on the Siris, whose
brave demeanour the chivalrous king requited by the most
honourable treatment, that they should enter his army in
accordance with the Greek fashion; but he learned that he
was fighting not with mercenaries, but with a nation. Not
one, either Roman or Latin, took service with him.
Pyrrhus offered peace to the Romans. He was too
sagacious a soldier not to recognize the precariousness of
his footing, and too skilled a statesman not to profit
opportunely by the moment which placed him in the most
favourable position for the conclusion of peace. He now
hoped that under the first impression made by the great
battle on the Romans he should be able to secure the
freedom of the Greek towns in Italy, and to call into
existence between them and Rome a series of states of the
second and third order as dependent allies of the new
Greek power; for such was the tenor of his demands: the
release of all Greek towns—and therefore of the Campanian
and Lucanian towns in particular—from allegiance to Rome,
and restitution of the territory taken from the Samnitcs,
Daunians, Lucanians, and Bruttians, or in other words
Attempts
at peace.
22 STRUGGLE BETWEEN PYRIRHUS BOOK II
especially the surrender of Luceria and Venusia. If a
further struggle with Rome could hardly be avoided, it was
not desirable at any rate to begin it till the western
Hellenes should be united under one ruler, till Sicily
should be acquired and perhaps Africa be conquered.
Provided with such instructions, the Thessalian Cineas,
the confidential minister of Pyrrhus, went to Rome. That
dexterous negotiator, whom his contemporaries compared
to Demosthenes so far as a rhetorician might be compared
312-307.
296.
to a statesman and the minister of a sovereign to a popular
leader, had orders to display by every means the respect
which the victor of Heraclea really felt for his vanquished
opponents, to make known the wish of the king to come to
Rome in person, to influence men's minds in the king's
favour by panegyrics which sound so well in the mouth of
an enemy, by earnest flatteries, and, as opportunity offered,
also by well-timed gifts—in short to try upon the Romans
all the arts of cabinet policy, as they had been tested at the
courts of Alexandria and Antioch. The senate hesitated ;
to many it seemed a prudent course to draw back a step
and to wait till their dangerous antagonist should have
further entangled himself or should be no more. But the
grey-haired and blind consular Appius Claudius (censor
442, consul 447, 458), who had long withdrawn from state
affairs but had himself conducted at this decisive moment
to the senate, breathed the unbroken energy of his own
vehement nature with words of fire into the souls of the
younger generation. They gave to the message of the
king the proud reply, which was first heard on this occasion
and became thenceforth a maxim of the state, that Rome
never negotiated so long as there were foreign troops on
Italian ground ; and to make good their words they dis-
missed the ambassador at once from the city. The object
of the mission had failed, and the dexterous diplomatist,
ins'ead of producing an effect by his oratorical art, had
CHAP. VII AND ROME 23
on the contrary been himself impressed by such manly
earnestness after so severe a defeat—he declared at home
that every burgess in that city had seemed to him a
king ; in truth, the courtier had gained a sight of a free
people.
Pyrrhus, who during these negotiations had advanced
into Campania, immediately on the news of their being
broken off marched against Rome, to co-operate with the
Etruscans, to shake the allies of Rome, and to threaten the
city itself. But the Romans as little allowed themselves to
be terrified as cajoled. At the summons of the herald “to
enrol in the room of the fallen,” the young men immediately
after the battle of Heraclea had pressed forward in crowds
to enlist; with the two newly-formed legions and the corps
withdrawn from Lucania, Laevinus, stronger than before,
followed the march of the king. He protected Capua
against him, and frustrated his endeavours to enter into
communications with Neapolis. So firm was the attitude
of the Romans that, excepting the Greeks of Lower Italy,
no allied state of any note dared to break off from the
Roman alliance. Then Pyrrhus turned against Rome itself.
Through a rich country, whose flourishing condition he
beheld with astonishment, he marched against Fregellae
which he surprised, forced the passage of the Liris, and
reached Anagnia, which is not more than forty miles from
Rome. No army crossed his path ; but everywhere the
towns of Latium closed their gates against him, and with
measured step Laevinus followed him from Campania,
while the consul Tiberius Coruncanius, who had just con-
cluded a seasonable peace with the Etruscans, brought up
a second Roman army from the north, and in Rome itself
the reserve was preparing for battle under the dictator
Gnaeus Domitius Calvinus. In these circumstances Pyrrhus
could accomplish nothing; no course was left to him but
to retire. For a time he still remained inactive in Cam-
Pyrrhus
marches
against
Rome.
24 STRUGGLE BETWEEN PYRRHUS BOOK II
280.
Second
year of the
War.
279.
pania in presence of the united armies of the two consuls ;
but no opportunity occurred of striking an effective blow.
When winter came on, the king evacuated the enemy's
territory, and distributed his troops among the friendly
towns, taking up his own winter quarters in Tarentum.
Thereupon the Romans also desisted from their operations.
The army occupied standing quarters near Firmum in
Picenum, where by command of the senate the legions
defeated on the Siris spent the winter by way of punishment
under tents.
Thus ended the campaign of 474. The separate peace
which at the decisive moment Etruria had concluded with
Rome, and the king's unexpected retreat which entirely
disappointed the high-strung hopes of the Italian con-
federates, counterbalanced in great measure the impression
of the victory of Heraclea. The Italians complained of the
burdens of the war, particularly of the bad discipline of the
mercenaries quartered among them, and the king, weary of
the petty quarrelling and of the impolitic as well as un-
military conduct of his allies, began to have a presentiment
that the problem which had fallen to him might be, despite
all tactical successes, politically insoluble. The arrival of
a Roman embassy of three consulars, including Gaius
Fabricius the conqueror of Thurii, again revived in him for
a moment the hopes of peace; but it soon appeared that
they had only power to treat for the ransom or exchange of
prisoners. Pyrrhus rejected their demand, but at the
festival of the Saturnalia he released all the prisoners on their
word of honour. Their keeping of that word, and the
repulse by the Roman ambassador of an attempt at bribery,
were celebrated by posterity in a manner most unbecoming
and betokening rather the dishonourable character of the
later, than the honourable feeling of that earlier, epoch.
In the spring of 475 Pyrrhus resumed the offensive,
and advanced into Apulia, whither the Roman army
CHAP. VII AND ROME 25
marched to meet him. In the hope of shaking the Roman
symmachy in these regions by a decisive victory, the king
offered battle a second time, and the Romans did not
refuse it. The two armies encountered each other near
Ausculum (Ascoli di Puglia). Under the banners of
Pyrrhus there fought, besides his Epirot and Macedonian
troops, the Italian mercenaries, the burgess-force—the white
shields as they were called—of Tarentum, and the allied
Lucanians, Bruttians, and Samnites—altogether 7 o, ooo
infantry, of whom 16, ooo were Greeks and Epirots, more
than 8ooo cavalry, and nineteen elephants. The Romans
were supported on that day by the Latins, Campanians,
Volscians, Sabines, Umbrians, Marrucinians, Paelignians,
Frentanians, and Arpanians. They too numbered above
7o, ooo infantry, of whom 2 o, ooo were Roman citizens,
and 8ooo cavalry. Both parties had made alterations in
their military system. Pyrrhus, perceiving with the sharp
eye of a soldier the advantages of the Roman manipular
organization, had on the wings substituted for the long
front of his phalanxes an arrangement by companies with
intervals between them in imitation of the cohorts, and—
perhaps for political no less than for military reasons—had
placed the Tarentine and Samnite cohorts between the sub-
divisions of his own men. In the centre alone the Epirot
phalanx stood in close order. For the purpose of keeping
off the elephants the Romans produced a species of war-
chariot, from which projected iron poles furnished with
chafing-dishes, and on which were fastened moveable masts
adjusted with a view to being lowered, and ending in an
iron spike—in some degree the model of the boarding-
bridges which were to play so great a part in the first Punic
War.
According to the Greek account of the battle, which
Secns less one sided than the Roman account also extant,
the Greeks had the disadvantage on the first day, as they
Battle of
Ausculum.
26 STRUGGLE BETWEEN PYRREIUS BOOK II
did not succeed in deploying their line along the steep and
marshy banks of the river where they were compelled to
accept battle, or in bringing their cavalry and elephants
into action. On the second day, however, Pyrrhus antici-
pated the Romans in occupying the intersected ground,
and thus gained without loss the plain where he could
without disturbance draw up his phalanx. Vainly did the
Romans with desperate courage fall sword in hand on the
sarissae, the phalanx preserved an unshaken front under
every assault, but in its turn was unable to make any
impression on the Roman legions. It was not till the
numerous escort of the elephants had, with arrows and
stones hurled from slings, dislodged the combatants stationed
in the Roman war-chariots and had cut the traces of the
horses, and the elephants pressed upon the Roman line,
that it began to waver. The giving way of the guard
attached to the Roman chariots formed the signal for universal
flight, which, however, did not involve the sacrifice of many
lives, as the adjoining camp received the fugitives. The
Roman account of the battle alone mentions the circum-
stance, that during the principal engagement an Arpanian
corps detached from the Roman main force had attacked
and set on fire the weakly-guarded Epirot camp ; but, even
if this were correct, the Romans are not at all justified in
their assertion that the battle remained undecided. Both
accounts, on the contrary, agree in stating that the Roman
army retreated across the river, and that Pyrrhus remained
in possession of the field of battle. The number of the
fallen was, according to the Greek account, 6ooo on the
side of the Romans, 35o 5 on that of the Greeks.” Amongst
1 These numbers appear credible. The Roman account assigns,
probably in dead and wounded, 15, ooo to each side ; a later one even
specifies 50oo as dead on the Roman, and 20, ooo on the Greek side.
These accounts may be mentioned here for the purpose of exhibiting, in
one of the few instances where it is possible to check the statement, the
untrustworthiness—almost without exception—of the reports of numbers,
CHAP. VII AND ROME 27
the wounded was the king himself, whose arm had been
pierced with a javelin, while he was fighting, as was his
wont, in the thickest of the fray. Pyrrhus had achieved a
victory, but his were unfruitful laurels; the victory was
creditable to the king as a general and as a soldier, but it
did not promote his political designs. What Pyrrhus needed
was a brilliant success which should break up the Roman
army and give an opportunity and impulse to the wavering
allies to change sides; but the Roman army and the Roman
confederacy still remained unbroken, and the Greek army,
which was nothing without its leader, was fettered for a
considerable time in consequence of his wound. He was
obliged to renounce the campaign and to go into winter
quarters; which the king took up in Tarentum, the Romans
on this occasion in Apulia. It was becoming daily more
evident that in a military point of view the resources of
the king were inferior to those of the Romans, just as,
politically, the loose and refractory Coalition could not
stand a comparison with the firmly-established Roman
symmachy. The sudden and vehement style of the Greek
warfare and the genius of the general might perhaps achieve
another such victory as those of Heraclea and Ausculum, but
every new victory was wearing out his resources for further
enterprise, and it was clear that the Romans already felt them-
selves the stronger, and awaited with a courageous patience
final victory. Such a war as this was not the delicategame Of
art that was practised and understood by the Greek princes.
All strategical combinations were shattered against the full
and mighty energy of the national levy. Pyrrhus felt how
matters stood : weary of his victories and despising his
allies, he only persevered because military honour required
him not to leave Italy till he should have secured his clients
from barbarian assault. With his impatient temperament
which are swelled by the unscrupulous invention of the annalists with
avalanche-like rapidity.
28
STRUGGLE BETWEEN PYRRHUS BOOK II
289.
Relations
of Sicily,
Syracuse,
and
Carthage.
Pyrrhus
invited to
Syracuse.
279.
League
between
Rome and
Carthage.
it might be presumed that he would embrace the first
pretext to get rid of the burdensome duty; and an oppor-
tunity of withdrawing from Italy was soon presented to him
by the affairs of Sicily.
After the death of Agathocles (465) the Greeks of Sicily
were without any leading power. While in the several
Hellenic cities incapable demagogues and incapable tyrants
were replacing each other, the Carthaginians, the old rulers
of the western point, were extending their dominion un-
molested. After Agrigentum had surrendered to them, they
believed that the time had come for taking final steps
towards the end which they had kept in view for centuries,
and for reducing the whole island under their authority;
they set themselves to attack Syracuse. That city, which
formerly by its armies and fleets had disputed the possession
of the island with Carthage, had through internal dissension
and the weakness of its government fallen so low that it was
obliged to seek for safety in the protection of its walls and
in foreign aid ; and none could afford that aid but king
Pyrrhus. Pyrrhus was the husband of Agathocles's daughter,
and his son Alexander, then sixteen years of age, was
Agathocles's grandson. Both were in every respect natural
heirs of the ambitious schemes of the ruler of Syracuse;
and if her freedom was at an end, Syracuse might find com-
pensation in becoming the capital of a Hellenic empire of
the West. So the Syracusans, like the Tarentines, and
under similar conditions, voluntarily offered their sovereignty
to king Pyrrhus (about 475); and by a singular conjuncture
of affairs everything seemed to concur towards the success
of the magnificent plans of the Epirot king, based as they
primarily were on the possession of Tarentum and Syracuse.
The immediate effect, indeed, of this union of the Italian
and Sicilian Greeks under one control was a closer concert
also on the part of their antagonists. Carthage and Rome
now converted their old Commercial treaties into an offensive
CHAP. VII AND ROME 29
and defensive league against Pyrrhus (475), the tenor of 279.
which was that, if Pyrrhus invaded Roman or Carthaginian
territory, the party which was not attacked should furnish
that which was assailed with a contingent on its own terri-
tory and should itself defray the expense of the auxiliary
troops ; that in such an event Carthage should be bound
to furnish transports and to assist the Romans also with a
war fleet, but the crews of that fleet should not be obliged
to fight for the Romans by land; that lastly, both states
should pledge themselves not to conclude a separate peace
with Pyrrhus. The object of the Romans in entering into
the treaty was to render possible an attack on Tarentum
and to cut off Pyrrhus from his own country, neither of
which ends could be attained without the co-operation of
the Punic fleet; the object of the Carthaginians was to
detain the king in Italy, so that they might be able without
molestation to carry into effect their designs on Syracuse."
It was accordingly the interest of both powers in the first
instance to secure the sea between Italy and Sicily. A
powerful Carthaginian fleet of I.2 o sail under the admiral
Mago proceeded from Ostia, whither Mago seems to have
gone to conclude the treaty, to the Sicilian straits. The
Mamertines, who anticipated righteous punishment for their
Outrage upon the Greek population of Messana in the event
of Pyrrhus becoming ruler of Sicily and Italy, attached
themselves closely to the Romans and Carthaginians, and
secured for them the Sicilian side of the straits. The allies
would willingly have brought Rhegium also on the opposite
coast under their power; but Rome could not possibly
* The later Romans, and the moderns following them, give a version of
the league, as if the Romans had designedly avoided accepting the Cartha-
ginian help in Italy. This would have been irrational, and the facts pro-
nounce against it. The circumstance that Mago did not land at Ostia is
to be explained not by any such foresight, but simply by the fact that
I afirim was not at all threatened hy Pyrrhus and sn did not need Cartha-
ginian aid ; and the Carthaginians certainly fought for Rome in front of
Rhegium.
3O STRUGGLE BETWEEN PYRRHUS BOOK II
278.
Third year
of the war.
278.
pardon the Campanian garrison, and an attempt of the
Combined Romans and Carthaginians to gain the city by
force of arms miscarried. The Carthaginian fleet sailed
thence for Syracuse and blockaded the city by sea, while at
the same time a strong Phoenician army began the siege by
land (476). It was high time that Pyrrhus should appear
at Syracuse : but, in fact, matters in Italy were by no means
in such a condition that he and his troops could be dis-
pensed with there. The two consuls of 476, Gaius Fabri-
cius Luscinus, and Quintus Aemilius Papus, both experi-
enced generals, had begun the new campaign with vigour,
and although the Romans had hitherto sustained nothing
but defeat in this war, it was not they but the victors that
were weary of it and longed for peace. Pyrrhus made
another attempt to obtain accommodation on tolerable
terms. The consul Fabricius had handed over to the king
a wretch, who had proposed to poison him on condition of
being well paid for it. Not only did the king in token of
gratitude release all his Roman prisoners without ransom,
but he felt himself so moved by the generosity of his brave
opponents that he offered, by way of personal recompense,
a singularly fair and favourable peace. Cineas appears to
have gone once more to Rome, and Carthage seems to have
been seriously apprehensive that Rome might come to terms.
But the senate remained firm, and repeated its former
answer. Unless the king was willing to allow Syracuse to
fall into the hands of the Carthaginians and to have his
grand scheme thereby disconcerted, no other course remained
than to abandon his Italian allies and to confine himself for
the time being to the occupation of the most important
seaports, particularly Tarentum and Locri. In vain the
Lucanians and Samnites conjured him not to desert them ;
in vain the Tarentines summoned him either to comply
with his duty as their general or to give them back their
city. The king met their complaints and reproaches with
CHAP. VII AND ROME 3I
the consolatory assurance that better times were coming, or
with abrupt dismissal. Milo remained behind in Tarentum;
Alexander, the king's son, in Locri; and Pyrrhus, with his Embarka-
main force, embarked in the spring of 476 at Tarentum for ºº
Syracuse. for Sicily.
By the departure of Pyrrhus the hands of the Romans The war in
were set free in Italy; none ventured to oppose them in Italy flags.
the open field, and their antagonists everywhere confined
themselves to their fastnesses or their forests. The struggle
however was not terminated so rapidly as might have been
expected ; partly in consequence of its nature as a warfare
of mountain skirmishes and sieges, partly also, doubtless,
from the exhaustion of the Romans, whose fearful losses
are indicated by a decrease of 17, ooo in the burgess-roll
from 473 to 479. In 476 the consul Gaius Fabricius 281.275.
succeeded in inducing the considerable Tarentine settle- 278.
ment of Heraclea to enter into a separate peace, which was
granted to it on the most favourable terms. In the
campaign of 477 a desultory warfare was carried on in 277.
Samnium, where an attack thoughtlessly made on some
entrenched heights cost the Romans many lives, and
thereafter in southern Italy, where the Lucanians and
Bruttians were defeated. On the other hand Milo, issuing
from Tarentum, anticipated the Romans in their attempt
to surprise Croton: whereupon the Epirot garrison made
even a successful sortie against the besieging army. At
length, however, the consul succeeded by a stratagem in
inducing it to march forth, and in possessing himself of the
undefended town (477). An incident of more moment 277.
was the slaughter of the Epirot garrison by the Locrians,
who had formerly surrendered the Roman garrison to the
king, and now atoned for one act of treachery by another.
By that step the whole south coast came into the hands of
the Romans, with the exception of Rhegium and Tarentum.
These successes, however, advanced the main object but
32 STRUGGLE BETWEEN PYRF HUS BOOK II
&
Pyrrhus
master of
Sicily.
279.
little. Lower Italy itself had long been defenceless; but
Pyrrhus was not subdued so long as Tarentum remained
in his hands and thus rendered it possible for him to renew
the war at his pleasure, and the Romans could not think
of undertaking the siege of that city. Even apart from the
fact that in siege-warfare, which had been revolutionized by
Philip of Macedonia and Demetrius Poliorcetes, the Romans
were at a very decided disadvantage when matched against
an experienced and resolute Greek commandant, a strong
fleet was needed for such an enterprise, and, although the
Carthaginian treaty promised to the Römans support by
sea, the affairs of Carthage herself in Sicily were by no
means in such a condition as to enable her to grant that
Support.
The landing of Pyrrhus on the island, which, in spite of
the Carthaginian fleet, had taken place without interruption,
had changed at once the aspect of matters there. He had
immediately relieved Syracuse, had in a short time united
under his sway all the free Greek cities, and at the head of
the Sicilian confederation had wrested from the Cartha-
ginians nearly their whole possessions. It was with
difficulty that the Carthaginians could, by the help of their
fleet which at that time ruled the Mediterranean without
a rival, maintain themselves in Lilybaeum; it was with
difficulty, and amidst constant assaults, that the Mamertines
held their ground in Messana. Under such circumstances,
agreeably to the treaty of 475, it would have been the duty
of Rome to lend her aid to the Carthaginians in Sicily, far
rather than that of Carthage to help the Romans with her
fleet to conquer Tarentum ; but on the side of neither ally
was there much inclination to secure or to extend the
power of the other. Carthage had only offered help to the
Romans when the real danger was past ; they in their turn
had done nothing to prevent the departure of the king from
Italy and the fall of the Carthaginian power in Sicily.
CHAP. VII AND ROME 33
Indeed, in open violation of the treaties Carthage had even
proposed to the king a separate peace, offering, in return
for the undisturbed possession of Lilybaeum, to give up all
claim to her other Sicilian possessions and even to place at
the disposal of the king money and ships of war, of course
with a view to his crossing to Italy and renewing the war
against Rome. It was evident, however, that with the
possession of Lilybaeum and the departure of the king the
position of the Carthaginians in the island would be nearly
the same as it had been before the landing of Pyrrhus;
the Greek cities if left to themselves were powerless, and
the lost territory would be easily regained. So Pyrrhus
rejected the doubly perfidious proposal, and proceeded to
build for himself a war fleet. Mere ignorance and short-
sightedness in after times censured this step ; but it was
really as necessary as it was, with the resources of the
island, easy of accomplishment. Apart from the considera-
tion that the master of Ambracia, Tarentum, and Syracuse
could not dispense with a naval force, he needed a fleet to
Conquer Lilybaeum, to protect Tarentum, and to attack
Carthage at home as Agathocles, Regulus, and Scipio did
before or afterwards so successfully. Pyrrhus never was so
near to the attainment of his aim as in the summer of 478,
when he saw Carthage humbled before him, commanded
Sicily, and retained a firm footing in Italy by the possession
of Tarentum, and when the newly-created fleet, which was
to connect, to secure, and to augment these successes, lay
ready for sea in the harbour of Syracuse.
The real weakness of the position of Pyrrhus lay in his
faulty internal policy. He governed Sicily as he had seen
Ptolemy rule in Egypt : he showed no respect to the local
Constitutions; he placed his confidants as magistrates over
the cities whenever, and for as long as, he pleased ; he
made his courtiers judges instcad of thc native jurymcn ;
he pronounced arbitrary sentences of confiscation, banish-
VOL. II 35
276.
The
Sicilian
govern-
ment of
Pyrrhus.
34 STRUGGLE BETWEEN PYRIRHUS BOOK II
Departure
of Pyrrhus
to Italy.
278.
ment, or death, even against those who had been most
active in promoting his coming thither; he placed garrisons
in the towns, and ruled over Sicily not as the leader of a
national league, but as a king. In so doing he probably
reckoned himself according to oriental-Hellenistic ideas a
good and wise ruler, and perhaps he really was so ; but the
Greeks bore this transplantation of the system of the
Diadochi to Syracuse with all the impatience of a nation
that in its long struggle for freedom had lost all habits of
discipline; the Carthaginian yoke very soon appeared to
the foolish people more tolerable than their new military
government. The most important cities entered into
communications with the Carthaginians, and even with the
Mamertines; a strong Carthaginian army ventured again to
appear on the island; and everywhere supported by the
Greeks, it made rapid progress. In the battle which
Pyrrhus fought with it fortune was, as always, with the
“Eagle”; but the circumstances served to show what the
state of feeling was in the island, and what might and must
ensue, if the king should depart.
To this first and most essential error Pyrrhus added a
second ; he proceeded with his fleet, not to Lilybaeum, but
to Tarentum. It was evident, looking to the very ferment
in the minds of the Sicilians, that he ought first of all to
have dislodged the Carthaginians wholly from the island,
and thereby to have cut off the discontented from their last
support, before he turned his attention to Italy; in that
quarter there was nothing to be lost, for Tarentum was safe
enough for him, and the other allies were of little moment
now that they had been abandoned. It is conceivable that
his soldierly spirit impelled him to wipe off the stain of his
not very honourable departure in the year 476 by a brilliant
return, and that his heart bled when he heard the com-
plaints of the Lucanians and Samnites. But problems,
such as Pyrrhus had proposed to himself, can only be
CHAP. VII AND ROME 35
solved by men of iron nature, who are able to control their
feelings of compassion and even their sense of honour;
and Pyrrhus was not one of these.
The fatal embarkation took place towards the end of Fall of the
478. On the voyage the new Syracusan fleet had to iº.
sustain a sharp engagement with that of Carthage, in which
it lost a considerable number of vessels. The departure of
the king and the accounts of this first misfortune sufficed
for the fall of the Sicilian kingdom. On the arrival of the
news all the cities refused to the absent king money and
troops; and the brilliant state collapsed even more rapidly
than it had arisen, partly because the king had himself
undermined in the hearts of his subjects the loyalty and
affection on which every commonwealth depends, partly
because the people lacked the devotedness to renounce
freedom for perhaps but a short term in order to save their
nationality. Thus the enterprise of Pyrrhus was wrecked, Recom-
and the plan of his life was ruined irretrievably; he was ...”
thenceforth an adventurer, who felt that he had been great Italian war.
vº and was so no longer, and who now waged war no longer
s' as a means to an end, but in order to drown thought
\ amidst the reckless excitement of the game and to find, if
possible, in the tumult of battle a soldier's death. Arrived
~ on the Italian coast, the king began by an attempt to get
possession of Rhegium ; but the Campanians repulsed the
attack with the aid of the Mamertines, and in the heat of
the conflict before the town the king himself was wounded
in the act of striking down an officer of the enemy. On
the other hand he surprised Locri, whose inhabitants
suffered severely for their slaughter of the Epirot garrison,
and he plundered the rich treasury of the temple of
Persephone there, to replenish his empty exchequer. Thus
he arrived at Tarentum, it is said with 2 o, ooo infantry and
3ooo cavalry. But these were no longer the experienced
veterans of former days, and the Italians no longer hailed
36 STRUGGLE BETWEEN PY RRIH US BOOK II
Battle near
Beneven-
tum. [276.
Pyrrhus
leaves
Italy.
275.
them as deliverers; the confidence and hope with which
they had received the king five years before were gone;
the allies were destitute of money and of men.
The king took the field in the spring of 479 with the
view of aiding the hard-pressed Samnites, in whose
territory the Romans had passed the previous winter; and
he forced the consul Manius Curius to give battle near
Beneventum on the campus Arusinus, before he could form
a junction with his colleague advancing from Lucania.
But the division of the army, which was intended to take
the Romans in flank, lost its way during its night march
in the woods, and failed to appear at the decisive moment;
and after a hot conflict the elephants again decided the
battle, but decided it this time in favour of the Romans, for,
thrown into confusion by the archers who were stationed to
protect the camp, they attacked their own people. The
victors occupied the camp ; there fell into their hands
1300 prisoners and four elephants—the first that were seen
in Rome—besides an immense spoil, from the proceeds of
which the aqueduct, which conveyed the water of the Anio
from Tibur to Rome, was subsequently built. Without
troops to keep the field and without money, Pyrrhus
applied to his allies who had contributed to his equipment
for Italy, the kings of Macedonia and Asia; but even in his
native land he was no longer feared, and his request was
refused. Despairing of success against Rome and exasper-
ated by these refusals, Pyrrhus left a garrison in Tarentum,
and went home himself in the same year (479) to Greece,
where some prospect of gain might Open up to the desperate
player sooner than amidst the steady and measured course
of Italian affairs. In fact, he not only rapidly recovered
the portion of his kingdom that had been taken away, but
once more grasped, and not without success, at the Mace-
donian throne. But his last plans also were thwarted by
the calm and cautious policy of Antigonus Gonatas, and
CHAP. VII AND ROME 37 f
still more by his own vehemence and inability to tame his Death of
proud spirit; he still gained battles, but he no longer "
gained any lasting success, and met his death in a miserable
street combat in Peloponnesian Argos (482). 272.
In Italy the war came to an end with the battle of Last
Beneventum ; the last convulsive struggles of the national º
party died slowly away. So long indeed as the warrior . . . .
prince, whose mighty arm had ventured to seize the reins
of destiny in Italy, was still among the living, he held, even
when absent, the stronghold of Tarentum against Rome. ~
Although after the departure of the king the peace party Capture of
recovered ascendency in the city, Milo, who commanded Tarentum.
there on behalf of Pyrrhus, rejected their suggestions and
allowed the citizens favourable to Rome, who had erected
a separate fort for themselves in the territory of Tarentum,
to conclude peace with Rome as they pleased, without on
that account opening his gates. But when after the death
of Pyrrhus a Carthaginian fleet entered the harbour, and
Milo saw that the citizens were on the point of delivering
up the city to the Carthaginians, he preferred to hand over
the citadel to the Roman consul Lucius Papirius (482), 272.
and by that means to secure a free departure for himself
and his troops. For the Romans this was an immense
piece of good fortune. After the experiences of Philip
before Perinthus and Byzantium, of Demetrius before
Rhodes, and of Pyrrhus before Lilybaeum, it may be
doubted whether the strategy of that period was at all able
to compel the surrender of a town well fortified, well
defended, and freely accessible by sea; and how different
a turn matters might have taken, had Tarentum become to
the Phoenicians in Italy what Lilybaeum was to them in
Sicily What was done, however, could not be undone.
The Carthaginian admiral, when he saw the citadel in the
hands of the Romans, declared that he had only appeared
before Tarentum conformably to the treaty to lend
º
38 STRUGGLE BETWEEN PYRRHUS BOOK II
Submission
of Lower
Italy.
270.
270.
assistance to his allies in the siege of the town, and set sail
for Africa; and the Roman embassy, which was sent to
Carthage to demand explanations and make complaints re-
garding the attempted occupation of Tarentum, brought back
nothing but a solemn confirmation on Oath of that allega-
tion as to its ally's friendly design, with which accordingly
the Romans had for the time to rest content. The Taren-
tines obtained from Rome, presumably on the intercession
of their emigrants, the restoration of autonomy; but their
arms and ships had to be given up and their walls had to
be pulled down.
In the same year, in which Tarentum became Roman,
the Samnites, Lucanians, and Bruttians finally submitted.
The latter were obliged to cede the half of the lucrative,
and for ship-building important, forest of Sila.
At length also the band that for ten years had sheltered
themselves in Rhegium were duly chastised for the breach
of their military oath, as well as for the murder of the
citizens of Rhegium and of the garrison of Croton. In
this instance Rome, while vindicating her own rights vin-
dicated the general cause of the Hellenes against the bar-
barians. Hiero, the new ruler of Syracuse, accordingly
supported the Romans before Rhegium by sending sup-
plies and a contingent, and in combination with the Roman
expedition against the garrison of Rhegium he made an
attack upon their fellow-countrymen and fellow-criminals,
the Mamertines of Messana. The siege of the latter town
was long protracted. On the other hand Rhegium,
although the mutineers resisted long and obstinately, was
stormed by the Romans in 484; the survivors of the
garrison were scourged and beheaded in the public market
at Rome, while the old inhabitants were recalled and, as
far as possible, reinstated in their possessions. Thus all
Italy was, in 484, reduced to subjection. The Samnites
alone, the most obstinate antagonists of Rome, still in
CHAP. VII AND ROME 39
spite of the official conclusion of peace continued the
struggle as “robbers,” so that in 485 both consuls had
to be once more despatched against them. But even the
most high-spirited national courage—the bravery of despair
—comes to an end ; the Sword and the gibbet at length
carried quiet even into the mountains of Samnium.
For the securing of these immense acquisitions a new
series of colonies was instituted: Paestum and Cosa in
Lucania (481); Beneventum (486), and Aesernia (about
491) to hold Samnium in check ; and, as outposts against
the Gauls, Ariminum (486), Firmum in Picenum (about
490), and the burgess colony of Castrum Novum. Prepara-
tions were made for the continuation of the great southern
highway—which acquired in the fortress of Beneventum a
new station intermediate between Capua and Venusia—as
far as the seaports of Tarentum and Brundisium, and for
the colonization of the latter seaport, which Roman policy
had selected as the rival and successor of the Tarentine
emporium. The construction of the new fortresses and
roads gave rise to some further wars with the small tribes,
whose territory was thereby curtailed : with the Picentes
(485, 486), a number of whom were transplanted to the
district of Salernum ; with the Sallentines about Brundisium
(487, 488); and with the Umbrian Sassinates (487, 488),
who seem to have occupied the territory of Ariminum after
the expulsion of the Senones. By these establishments the
dominion of Rome was extended over the interior of
Lower Italy, and over the whole Italian east coast from
the Ionian sea to the Celtic frontier.
Before we describe the political organization under which
the Italy which was thus united was governed pn the part
of Rome, it remains that we should glance at the maritime
relations that subsisted in the fourth and fifth centuries. At
this period Syracuse and Carthage were the illain competi-
tors for the dominion of the western waters. On the whole,
269.
Construc-
tion of new
fortresses
and roads.
273. 268.
263.
268.
264.
269. 268.
267. 266.
Maritime
relations.
4O STRUGGLE BETWEEN PYRIRHUS EOOK II
406-365.
317-289.
278-276.
Decline of
the Roman
naval
power.
*.
notwithstanding the great temporary successes which
Dionysius (348–389), Agathocles (437–465), and Pyrrhus
(476–478) obtained at sea, Carthage had the preponderance,
and Syracuse sank more and more into a naval power of
the second rank. The maritime importance of Etruria
was wholly gone (i. 415); the hitherto Etruscan island of
Corsica, if it did not quite pass into the possession, fell
under the maritime supremacy, of the Carthaginians.
Tarentum, which for a time had played a considerable part,
had its power broken by the Roman occupation. The
brave Massiliots maintained their ground in their own
waters; but they exercised no material influence over the
course of events in those of Italy. The other maritime
cities hardly came as yet into serious account.
Rome itself was not exempt from a similar fate; its
own waters were likewise commanded by foreign fleets. It
was indeed from the first a maritime city, and in the
period of its vigour never was so untrue to its ancient
traditions as wholly to neglect its war marine or so foolish
as to desire to be a mere continental power. Latium
furnished the finest timber for ship-building, far surpassing
the famed growths of Lower Italy; and the very docks
constantly maintained in Rome are enough to show that
the Romans never abandoned the idea of possessing a fleet
of their own. During the perilous crises, however, which
the expulsion of the kings, the internal disturbances in the
Romano-Latin confederacy, and the unlappy wars with the
>Etruscans and Celts brought upon Rome, the Romans
-
*...
could take but little interest in the state of matters in the
Mediterranean ; and, in consequence of the policy of
Rome directing itself more and more decidedly to the
subjugation of the Italian continent, the growth of its naval
power was arrested. There is hardly any mention of
Latin vessels of war up to the end of the fourth century,
c. 850. except that the votive offering from the Veientine spoil was
CHAP. VII AND ROME 4 I
sent to Delphi in a Roman vessel (360). The Antiates
indeed continued to prosecute their commerce with armed
vessels and thus, as occasion offered, to practise the trade
of piracy also, and the “Tyrrhene corsair.” Postumius,
whom Timoleon captured about 415, may certainly have
been an Antiate ; but the Antiates were scarcely to be
394.
339.
reckoned among the naval powers of that period, and, had
they been so, the fact must from the attitude of Antium
towards Rome have been anything but an advantage to the
latter. The extent to which the Roman naval power had
declined about the year 4oo is shown by the plundering of
the Latin coasts by a Greek, presumably a Sicilian, war
fleet in 405, while at the same time Celtic hordes were
traversing and devastating the Latin land (i. 432). In the
following year (406), and beyond doubt under the
immediate impression produced by these serious events,
the Roman community and the Phoenicians of Carthage,
acting respectively for themselves and for their dependent
allies, concluded a treaty of commerce and navigation—
the oldest Roman document of which the text has reached
us, although only in a Greek translation." In that treaty
the Romans had to come under obligation not to navigate
the Libyan coast to the west of the Fair Promontory (Cape
Bon) excepting in cases of necessity. On the other hand
they obtained the privilege of freely trading, like the
natives, in Sicily, so far as it was Carthaginian ; and in
Africa and Sardinia they obtained at least the right to
dispose of their merchandise at a price fixed with the
concurrence of the Carthaginian officials and guaranteed by
the Carthaginian community. The privilege of free trading
seems to have been granted to the Carthaginians at least
in Rome, perhaps in all Latium ; only they bound them-
-, * The grounds for assigning the document given in Polybius (iii. 22)
not to 245, but to 406, are set forth in my Röm. Chronologie, p. 320 f.
[translated in the Appendix to this volume].
350.
349.
348.
*zer ~ * ****
, ,A."
|s /
509,
348,
42 STRUGGLE BETWEEN PYRRLIUS BOOK II
282.
Roman
fortifica-
tion of the
COa.St.
339.
283.
329.
313.
295.
273.
268.
selves neither to do violence to the subject Latin communi-
ties (i. 452), nor, if they should set foot as enemies on
Latin soil, to take up their quarters for a night on shore—
in other words, not to extend their piratical inroads into
the interior—nor to construct any fortresses in the Latin
land.
We may probably assign to the same period the already
mentioned (p. 12) treaty between Rome and Tarentum,
respecting the date of which we are only told that it was
concluded a considerable time before 472. By it the
Romans bound themselves—for what concessions on the
part of Tarentum is not stated—not to navigate the waters
to the east of the Lacinian promontory; a stipulation by
which they were thus wholly excluded from the eastern
basin of the Mediterranean.
These were disasters no less than the defeat on the Allia,
and the Roman senate seems to have felt them as such and
to have made use of the favourable turn, which the Italian
relations assumed soon after the conclusion of the humiliat-
ing treaties with Carthage and Tarentum, with all energy to
improve its depressed maritime position. The most import-
ant of the coast towns were furnished with Roman colonies:
Pyrgi the seaport of Caere, the colonization of which
probably falls within this period ; along the west coast,
Antium in 415 (i. 462), Tarracina in 425 (i. 462), the island
of Pontia in 441 (i. 476), so that, as Ardea and Circeii had
previously received colonists, all the Latin seaports of con-
sequence in the territory of the Rutuli and Volsci had now
become Latin or burgess colonies; further, in the territory
of the Aurunci, Minturnae and Sinuessa in 459 (i. 492);
in that of the Lucanians, Paestum and Cosa in 481 (p. 39);
and, on the coast of the Adriatic, Sena Gallica and Castrum
Novum about 47 I (p. 12), and Ariminum in 486 (p. 39);
to which falls to be added the occupation of Brundisium,
which took place immediately after the close of the Pyrrhic
CHAP. VII AND ROME 43
war. In the greater part of these places—the burgess or
maritime colonies”—the young men were exempted from
serving in the legions and destined solely for the watching
of the coasts. The well-judged preference given at the
same time to the Greeks of Lower Italy over their Sabellian
neighbours, particularly to the considerable communities of
Neapolis, Rhegium, Locri, Thurii, and Heraclea, and their
similar exemption under the like conditions from furnishing
contingents to the land army, completed the network drawn
by Rome around the coasts of Italy.
But with a statesmanlike sagacity, from which the suc-
ceeding generations might have drawn a lesson, the leading
men of the Roman commonwealth perceived that all these
coast fortifications and coast garrisons could not but prove
inadequate, unless the war marine of the state were again
placed on a footing that should command respect. Some
sort of nucleus for this purpose was already furnished on
the subjugation of Antium (416) by the serviceable war-
galleys which were carried off to the Roman docks; but
the enactment at the same time, that the Antiates should
abstain from all maritime traffic,” is a very clear and distinct
indication how weak the Romans then felt themselves at
sea, and how completely their maritime policy was still
summed up in the occupation of places on the coast.
The
Roman
fleet.
338.
|
* These were Pyrgi, Ostia, Antium, Tarracina, Minturnae, Sinuessa,
Sena Gallica, and Castrum Novum.
* This statement is quite as distinct (Liv. viii. 14 ; interdictum mari
Antiałł populo est) as it is intrinsically credible ; for Antium was inhabited
not merely by colonists, but also by its former citizens who had been nursed
in enmity to Rome (i. 462). This view is, no doubt, inconsistent with the
Greek accounts, which assert that Alexander the Great (+ 431) and
Demetrius Poliorcetes (+ 471) lodged complaints at Rome regarding
Antiate pirates. The former statement is of the same stamp, and perhaps
from the same source, with that regarding the Roman embassy to Babylon
(p. 1). It seems more likely that Demetrius Poliorcetes may have tried
by edict to put down piracy in the Tyrrhene sea which he had never set
eyes upon, and it is not at all inconceivable that the Antiates may have
even as Roman citizens, in defiance of the prohibition, continued for a time
their old trade in an underhand fashion : much dependence must not, how-
ever, be placed even on the second story.
323.
283.
44 STRUGGLE BETWEEN PYRREIUS BOOK II
308.
326.
311.
Thereafter, when the Greek cities of southern Italy, Neapolis
leading the way in 428, were admitted to the clientship of
Rome, the war-vessels, which each of these cities bound
itself to furnish as a war contribution under the alliance to
the Romans, formed at least a renewed nucleus for a Roman
fleet. In 443, moreover, two fleet-masters (duoviri navales)
were nominated in consequence of a resolution of the
burgesses specially passed to that effect, and this Roman
naval force co-operated in the Samnite war at the siege of
Nuceria (i. 480). Perhaps even the remarkable mission
of a Roman fleet of twenty-five sail to found a colony in
Corsica, which Theophrastus mentions in his “ History of
Plants” written about 446, belongs to this period. But
how little was immediately accomplished with all this pre-
... paration, is shown by the renewed treaty with Carthage in
348.
448. While the stipulations of the treaty of 406 relating
to Italy and Sicily (p. 41) remained unchanged, the Romans
were now prohibited not only from the navigation of the
eastern waters, but also from that of the Atlantic Ocean
which was previously permitted, as well as debarred from
holding commercial intercourse with the subjects of Carthage
in Sardinia and Africa, and also, in all probability, from
effecting a settlement in Corsica ; * so that only Carthaginian
Sicily and Carthage itself remained open to their traffic.
We recognize here the jealousy of the dominant maritime
power, gradually increasing with the extension of the Roman
dominion along the coasts. Carthage compelled the
Romans to acquiesce in her prohibitive system, to submit
to be excluded from the seats of production in the west and
306.
N
* According to Serviús. (£a Aen. iv. 628) "it was stipulated in the
Romano-Carthaginian treaties, that no Roman should set foot on (or rather
occupy) Carthaginian, and no Carthaginian on Roman, soil, but Corsica
was to remain in a neutral position between them (ut neque Romani ad
Jitora Carthaginiensium accederent neque Carthaginienses ad litora Roma-
7207?&% . . . . . Corsica esset media inter Romanos et Carthagimienses).
This appears to refer to our present period, and the colonization of Corsica
seems to have been prevented by this very treaty.
CHAP. VII AND ROME 45
east (connected with which exclusion is the story of a public
reward bestowed on the Phoenician mariner who at the
sacrifice of his own ship decoyed a Roman vessel, steering
after him into the Atlantic Ocean, to perish on a sand-bank),
and to restrict their navigation under the treaty to the
narrow space of the western Mediterranean—and all this
for the mere purpose of averting pillage from their coasts
and of securing their ancient and important trading connec-
tion with Sicily. The Romans were obliged to yield to
these terms; but they did not desist from their efforts to
rescue their marine from its condition of impotence.
A comprehensive measure with that view was the
institution of four quaestors of the fleet (quaestores classici)
in 487 : of whom the first was stationed at Ostia the port
Quaestors
of the fleet.
267.
of Rome; the second, stationed at Cales then the capital
of Roman Campania, had to superintend the ports of
Campania and Magna Graecia ; the third, stationed at
Ariminum, superintended the ports on the other side of
the Apennines; the district assigned to the fourth is not
known. These new standing officials were intended to
exercise not the sole, but a conjoint, guardianship of the
coasts, and to form a war marine for their protection. The
objects of the Roman senate—to recover their independence
by sea, to cut off the maritime communications of Tarentum,
to close the Adriatic against fleets coming from Epirus, and
to emancipate themselves from Carthaginian supremacy—
were very obvious. Their already explained relations
with Carthage during the last Italian war discover traces
of such views. King Pyrrhus indeed compelled the two
great cities once more—it was for the last time—to
conclude an offensive alliance ; but the lukewarmness and
faithlessness of that alliance, the attempts of the
Carthaginians to establish themselves in Rhegium and
Tarentum, and the immediate occupation of Brundisium
by the Romans after the termination of the war, show
Variance
between
Rome and
Carthage.
46 UNION OF ITALY BOOK II
Rome and
the Greek
naval
powers, v
306.
350.
United
Italy.
clearly how much their respective interests already came
into collision.
Rome very naturally sought to find support against
Carthage from the Hellenic maritime states. Her old and
close relations of amity with Massilia continued uninter-
rupted. The votive offering sent by Rome to Delphi, after
the conquest of Veii, was preserved there in the treasury
of the Massiliots. After the capture of Rome by the Celts
there was a collection in Massilia for the sufferers by the
fire, in which the city chest took the lead ; in return the
Roman senate granted commercial advantages to the
Massiliot merchants, and, at the celebration of the games in
the Forum assigned a position of honour (Graecostasis) to
the Massiliots by the side of the platform for the senators.
To the same category belong the treaties of commerce
and amity concluded by the Romans about 448 with Rhodes
and not long after with Apollonia, a considerable mercantile
town on the Epirot coast, and especially the closer relation,
so fraught with danger for Carthage, which immediately
after the end of the Pyrrhic war sprang up between Rome
and Syracuse (p. 38).
While the Roman power by sea was thus very far from
keeping pace with the immense development of their power
by land, and the war marine belonging to the Romans in
particular was by no means such as from the geographical
and commercial position of the city it ought to have been,
yet it began gradually to emerge out of the complete nullity
to which it had been reduced about the year 4oo ; and,
considering the great resources of Italy, the Phoenicians
might well follow its efforts with anxious eyes.
The crisis in reference to the supremacy of the Italian
waters was approaching; by land the contest was decided.
For the first time Italy was united into one state under the
sovereignty of the Roman community. What political
prerogatives the Roman community on this occasion with-
CHAP. VII UNION OF ITALY 47
drew from all the other Italian communities and took into
its own sole keeping, or in other words, what conception
in state-law is to be associated with this sovereignty of
Rome, we are nowhere expressly informed, and—a signifi-
cant circumstance, indicating prudent calculation—there
does not even exist any generally current expression for
that conception." The only privileges that demonstrably
belonged to it were the rights of making war, of concluding
treaties, and of coining money. No Italian community
could declare war against any foreign state, or even
negotiate with it, or coin money for circulation. On the
other hand every declaration of war made by the Roman
people and every state-treaty resolved upon by it were
binding in law on all the other Italian communities, and
the silver money of Rome was legally current throughout
all Italy. It is probable that the formulated prerogatives …
of the leading community extended no further. But to
these there were necessarily attached rights of sovereignty
that practically went far beyond them.
The relations, which the Italians sustained to the leading
community, exhibited in detail great inequalities. In this
point of view, in addition to the full burgesses of Rome,
there were three different classes of subjects to be dis-
tinguished. The full franchise itself, in the first place, was
extended as far as was possible, without wholly abandoning
the idea of an urban commonwealth as applied to the
Roman commune. The old burgess-domain had hitherto
been enlarged chiefly by individual assignation in such a
way that southern Etruria as far as towards Caere and
* The clause, by which a dependent people binds itself “to uphold in
a friendly manner the sovereignty of that of Rome" (maiestatem populi
Romani comiter conservare), is certainly the technical appellation of that
mildest form of subjection, but it probably did not come into use till a
considerably later period (Cic. pro Balbo, 16, 35). The appellation of
clientship derived from private law, aptly as in its very indefiniteness it
denotes the relation (Dig. xlix. 15, 7, 1), was scarcely applied to it
officially in earlier times.
The full
Roman
franchise.
48 |UNION OF ITALY BOOK 11
Falerii (i. 433), the districts taken from the Hernici on the
Sacco and on the Anio (i. 485) the largest part of the Sabine
country (i. 492) and large tracts of the territory formerly
Volscian, especially the Pomptine plain (i. 463, 464) were
converted into land for Roman farmers, and new burgess-
districts were instituted mostly for their inhabitants. The
same course had even already been taken with the
Falernian district on the Volturnus ceded by Capua (i. 463).
All these burgesses domiciled outside of Rome were with-
out a commonwealth and an administration of their own;
on the assigned territory there arose at the most market-
villages (fora et conciliabula). In a position not greatly
different were placed the burgesses sent out to the so-called
maritime colonies mentioned above, who were likewise left
in possession of the full burgess-rights of Rome, and
whose self-administration was of little moment. Towards
the close of this period the Roman community appears to
have begun to grant full burgess-rights to the adjoining
communities of passive burgesses who were of like or
closely kindred nationality; this was probably done first
for Tusculum,” and so, presumably, also for the other
communities of passive burgesses in Latium proper, then
at the end of this period (486) was extended to the Sabine
towns, which doubtless were even then essentially Latinized
and had given sufficient proof of their fidelity in the last
severe war. These towns retained the restricted self.
administration, which under their earlier legal position
belonged to them, even after their admission into the
Roman burgess-union ; it was they more than the maritime
colonies that furnished the model for the special common-
wealths subsisting within the body of Roman full burgesses
268.
* That Tusculum as it was the first to obtain passive burgess-rights
(i. 448) was also the first to exchange these for the rights of full burgesses,
is probable in itself and presumably it is in the latter and not in the former
respect that the town is named by Cicero (pro Mur. 8, 19) municipium
antiquissimum. -
CHAP. VII UNION OF ITALY 49
and so, in the course of time, for the Roman municipal
organization. Accordingly the range of the full Roman :
burgesses must at the end of this epoch have extended
northward as far as the vicinity of Caere, eastward as far
as the Apennines, and Southward as far as Tarracina ;
although in this case indeed we cannot speak of boundary
in a strict sense, partly because a number of federal towns
with Latin rights, such as Tibur, Praeneste, Signia, Norba,
Circeii, were found within these bounds, partly because
beyond them the inhabitants of Minturnae, Sinuessa, of
the Falernian territory, of the town Sena Gallica and some
other townships, likewise possessed the full franchise, and
families of Roman farmers were presumably to be even
now found scattered throughout Italy, either isolated or
united in villages.
Among the subject communities the passive burgesses
(cives sine suffragio), apart from the privilege of electing and
being elected, stood on an equality of rights and duties
with the full burgesses. Their legal position was regulated
by the decrees of the Roman comitia and the rules issued
for them by the Roman praetor, which, however, were
doubtless based essentially on the previous arrangements.
Justice was administered for them by the Roman praetor
or his deputies (praefecti) annually sent to the individual
communities. Those of them in a better position, such as
the city of Capua (i. 463), retained self-administration and
along with it the continued use of the native language, and
had officials of their own who took charge of the levy and the
census. The communities of inferior rights such as Caere
(i. 433) were deprived even of self-administration, and this
was doubtless the most oppressive among the different forms
of subjection. However, as was above remarked, there is
already apparent at the close of this period an effort to
incorporate these communities, at least so far as they were
de facſo Latinized, among the full burgesses.
VOL. II 36
Subject
communi
ties.
50 UNION OF ITALY BOOK II
Latins.
Among the subject communities the most privileged
and most important class was that of the Latin towns,
which obtained accessions equally numerous and important
in the autonomous communities founded by Rome within
and even beyond Italy—the Latin colonies, as they were
called—and was always increasing in consequence of new
settlements of the same nature. These new urban com-
munities of Roman origin, but with Latin rights, became
more and more the real buttresses of the Roman rule over
Italy. These Latins, however, were by no means those
with whom the battles of the lake Regillus and Trifanum
had been fought. They were not those old members of
the Alban league, who reckoned themselves originally
equal to, if not better than, the community of Rome, and
who felt the dominion of Rome to be an oppressive yoke,
as the fearfully rigorous measures of security taken against
Praeneste at the beginning of the war with Pyrrhus, and
the collisions that evidently long continued to occur with
the Praenestines in particular, show. This old Latium
had essentially either perished or become merged in Rome,
and it now numbered but few communities politically self-
subsisting, and these, with the exception of Tibur and
Praeneste, throughout insignificant. The Latium of the
later times of the republic, on the contrary, consisted
almost exclusively of communities, which from the be-
ginning had honoured Rome as their capital and parent
city; which, settled amidst regions of alien language and
of alien habits, were attached to Rome by community of
language, of law, and of manners ; which, as the petty
tyrants of the surrounding districts, were obliged doubtless
to lean on Rome for their very existence, like advanced
posts leaning upon the main army; and which, in fine,
in consequence of the increasing material advantages of
Roman citizenship, were ever deriving very considerable
benefit from their equality of rights with the Romans,
CHAP. VII UNION OF ITALY 5I
limited though it was. A portion of the Roman domain,
for instance, was usually assigned to them for their separate
use, and participation in the state leases and contracts was
open to them as to the Roman burgess. Certainly in their
case also the consequences of the self-subsistence granted
to them did not wholly fail to appear. Venusian inscrip-
tions of the time of the Roman republic, and Beneventane
inscriptions recently brought to light," show that Venusia
as well as Rome had its plebs and its tribunes of the
people, and that the chief magistrates of Beneventum bore
the title of consul at least about the time of the Hannibalic
war. Both communities are among the most recent of the
Latin colonies with older rights : we perceive what pre-
tensions were stirring in them about the middle of the fifth
century. These so-called Latins, issuing from the Roman
burgess-body and feeling themselves in every respect on a
level with it, already began to view with displeasure their
subordinate federal rights and to strive after full equaliza-
tion. Accordingly the senate had exerted itself to curtail
these Latin communities—however important they were
for Rome—as far as possible, in their rights and privileges,
and to convert their position from that of allies to that of
subjects, so far as this could be done without removing the
wall of partition between them and the non-Latin com-
munities of Italy. We have already described the abolition
of the league of the Latin communities itself as well as of
their former complete equality of rights, and the loss of the
most important political privileges belonging to them. On
the complete subjugation of Italy a further step was taken,
and a beginning was made towards the restriction of the
personal rights—that had not hitherto been touched—of
the individual Latin, especially the important right of
freedom of settlement. In the case of Ariminum founded
* V. Cervio A. f. cosol dedicavit and Junonei Quiriței sacra. C.
Falcilius L. f. consol dedicavit.
52 UNION OF ITALY BOOK II
in 486 and of all the autonomous communities constituted
afterwards, the advantage enjoyed by them, as compared
with other subjects, was restricted to their equalization with
burgesses of the Roman community so far as regarded
private rights—those of traffic and barter as well as those
of inheritance.” Presumably about the same time the full
right of free migration allowed to the Latin communities
hitherto established—the title of every one of their burgesses
tº gain by transmigration to Rome full burgess-rights there
—was, for the Latin colonies of later erection, restricted to
those persons who had attained to the highest office of the
community in their native home; these alone were allowed
to exchange their colonial burgess-rights for the Roman.
This clearly shows the complete revolution in the position
of Rome. So long as Rome was still but one among the
many urban communities of Italy, although that one might
be the first, admission even to the unrestricted Roman
franchise was universally regarded as a gain for the ad-
268.
* According to the testimony of Cicero (pro Caec. 35) Sulla gave to the
Volaterrans the former Žzes of Ariminum, that is—adds the orator--the 7zes
of the “twelve colonies’’ which had not the Roman civitas but had full
commerczzemz with the Romans. Few things have been so much discussed
as the question to what places this ius of the twelve towns refers; and yet
the answer is not far to seek. There were in Italy and Cisalpine Gaul—
laying aside some places that soon disappeared again—thirty-four Latin
colonies established in all. The twelve most recent of these—Ariminum,
Beneventum, Firmum, Aesernia, Brundisium, Spoletium, Cremona,
Placentia, Copia, Valentia, Bononia, and Aquileia—are those here referred to:
and because Ariminum was the oldest of these and the town for which this
new organization was primarily established, partly perhaps also because it
was the first Roman colony founded beyond Italy, the ius of these colonies
rightly took its name from Ariminum. This at the same time demon-
strates the truth of the view—which already had on other grounds very
high probability—that all the colonies established in Italy (in the wider
sense of the term) after the founding of Aquileia belonged to the class of
burgess-colonies.
We cannot fully determine the extent to which the curtailment of the
rights of the more recent Latin towns was carried, as compared with the
earlier. If intermarriage, as is not improbable but is in fact anything but
definitely established (i. Ig2 ; Diodor. p. 590, 62, ſr. Vai. p. 130, Dind.),
formed a constituent element of the original federal equality of rights,
it was, at any rate, no longer conceded to the Latin colonies of more
recent origin. -
CHAP. VII UNION OF ITALY 53
mitting community, and the acquisition of that franchise by
non-burgesses was facilitated in every way, and was in fact
often imposed on them as a punishment. But after the
Roman community became sole sovereign and all the
others were its servants, the state of matters changed.
The Roman community began jealously to guard its fran-
chise, and accordingly put an end in the first instance to
the old full liberty of migration ; although the statesmen
of that period were wise enough still to keep admission to
the Roman franchise legally open at least to the men of
eminence and of capacity in the highest class of subject
communities. The Latins were thus made to feel that
Rome, after having subjugated Italy mainly by their aid,
had now no longer need of them as before.
Lastly, the relations of the non-Latin allied communities
were subject, as a matter of course, to very various rules,
just as each particular treaty of alliance had defined them.
Several of these perpetual alliances, such as that with the
Hernican communities (i. 445), passed over to a footing
of complete equalization with the Latin. Others, in which
this was not the case, such as those with Neapolis (i. 469),
Nola (i. 475), and Heraclea (p. 31), granted rights com-
paratively comprehensive ; while others, such as the
Tarentine and Samnite treaties, may have approximated
to despotism. &
As a general rule, it may be taken for granted that not
only the Latin and Hernican national confederations—as
to which the fact is expressly stated—but all such confede-
rations subsisting in Italy, and the Samnite and Lucanian
leagues in particular, were legally dissolved or at any rate
reduced to insignificance, and that in general no Italian
Non-Latin
allied com-
munities.
Dissolution
of national
leagues.
community was allowed the right of acquiring property or .
of intermarriage, or even the right of joint consultation and
resolution, with any other. Furthcr; provision must have
been made, under different forms, for placing the military
Furnishing
of contin-
gents.
54 UNION OF ITALY BOOK II
System of .
govern-
Iment.
and financial resources of all the Italian communities at the
disposal of the leading community. Although the burgess
militia on the one hand, and the contingents of the “Latin
name * on the other, were still regarded as the main and
integral constituents of the Roman army, and in that way
its national character was on the whole preserved, the
Roman cives sine suffragio were called forth to join its
ranks, and not only so, but beyond doubt the non-Latin
federate communities also were either bound to furnish
ships of war, as was the case with the Greek cities, or were
placed on the roll of contingent-furnishing Italians (formula
fogatorum), as must have been ordained at once or gradually
in the case of the Apulians, Sabellians, and Etruscans. In
general this contingent, like that of the Latin communities,
appears to have had its numbers definitely fixed, although,
in case of necessity, the leading community was not
precluded from making a larger requisition. This at the
same time involved an indirect taxation, as every community
was bound itself to equip and to pay its own contingent.
Accordingly it was not without design that the supply of
the most costly requisites for war devolved chiefly on the
Latin, or non-Latin federate communities; that the war
marine was for the most part kept up by the Greek
cities; and that in the cavalry service the allies, at least
subsequently, were called upon to furnish a proportion
thrice as numerous as the Roman burgesses, while in
the infantry the old principle, that the contingent of the
allies should not be more numerous than the burgess
army, still remained in force for a long time at least as
the rule.
The system, on which this fabric was constructed and
kept together, can no longer be ascertained in detail from
the few notices that have reached us. Even the numerical
proportions of the three classes of subjects relatively to
each other and to the full burgesses, can no longer be
CHAP. VII UNION OFs ITALY 55
determined even approximately;” and in like manner the
geographical distribution of the several categories over
Italy is but imperfectly known. The leading ideas on
which the structure was based, on the other hand, are so
obvious that it is scarcely necessary specially to set them
forth. First of all, as we have already said, the immediate
circle of the ruling community was extended—partly by
the settlement of full burgesses, partly by the conferring
of passive burgess-rights—as far as was possible without
Completely decentralizing the Roman community, which
* It is to be regretted that we are unable to give satisfactory information
as to the proportional numbers. We may estimate the number of Roman
burgesses capable of bearing arms in the later regal period as about
2O,Ooo (i. I23). Now from the fall of Alba to the conquest of Veii the
immediate territory of Rome received no material extension; in perfect
accordance with which we find that from the first institution of the twenty-
one tribes about 259 (i. 360), which involved no, or at any rate no con-
siderable, extension of the Roman bounds, no new tribes were instituted
till 367. However abundant allowance we make for increase by the
excess of births over deaths, by immigration, and by manumissions, it is
absolutely impossible to reconcile with the narrow limits of a territory of
hardly 650 Square miles the traditional numbers of the census, according
to which the number of Roman burgesses capable of bearing arms in the
Second half of the third century varied between Ioa, ooo and 150, ooo, and
in 362, regarding which a special statement is extant, amounted to 152,573.
These numbers must rather stand on a parallel with the 84,700 burgesses
of the Servian census; and in general the whole earlier census-lists, carried
back to the four lustres of Servius Tullius and furnished with copious
numbers, must belong to the class of those apparently documentary tradi-
tions which delight in, and betray themselves by the very fact of, such
numerical details. -
It was only with the second half of the fourth century that the large
extensions of territory, which must have suddenly and considerably
augmented the burgess roll, began. It is reported on trustworthy
authority and is intrinsically credible, that about 416 the Roman burgesses
numbered 165, ooo; which very well agrees with the statement that ten
years previously, when the whole militia was called out against Latium
and the Gauls, the first levy amounted to ten legions, that is, to 5o, ooo
men. Subsequently to the great extensions of territory in Etruria, Latium,
and Campania, in the fifth century the effective burgesses numbered, on
an average, 250, ooo; immediately before the first Punic war, 280, Ooo to
290, Ooo. These numbers are certain enough, but they are not quite
available historically for another reason, namely, that in them probably
the Roman full burgesses and the “burgesses without vote" not serving,
like the Campanians, in legions of their own, -such, e.g., as the Caerites,—
are included together in the reckoning, while the latter must at any rate
de facto be counted among the subjects (Röm. Forsch. ii. 396).
392.
338.
56 UNION OF ITALY BOOK II
Division
and classi-
fication
of the
subjects.
Aristo-
cratic re-
modelling
of the con-
stitutions
Of the
Italian
communi-
ties.
was an urban one and was intended to remain so. When
the system of incorporation was extended up to and perhaps
even beyond its natural limits, the communities that were
subsequently added had to submit to a position of
subjection ; for a pure hegemony as a permanent relation
was intrinsically impossible. Thus not through any
arbitrary monopolizing of sovereignty, but through the
inevitable force of circumstances, by the side of the class
of ruling burgesses a second class of subjects took its place.
It was one of the primary expedients of Roman rule to
subdivide the governed by breaking up the Italian con-
federacies and instituting as large a number as possible of
Comparatively small communities, and to graduate the
pressure of that rule according to the different categories of
subjects. As Cato in the government of his household
took care that the slaves should not be on too good terms
with one another, and designedly fomented variances and
factions among them, so the Roman community acted on
a great scale. The expedient was not generous, but it was
effectual.
It was but a wider application of the same expedient,
when in each dependent community the constitution was
remodelled after the Roman pattern and a government of
the wealthy and respectable families was installed, which
was naturally more or less keenly opposed to the multitude
and was induced by its material interests and by its wish
for local power to lean on Roman support. The most
remarkable instance of this sort is furnished by the
treatment of Capua, which appears to have been from the
first treated with suspicious precaution as the only Italian
city that could come into possible rivalry with Rome. The
Campanian nobility received a privileged jurisdiction,
separate places of assembly, and in every respect a distinct-
ive position ; indeed they even obtained not inconsiderable
pensions—sixteen hundred of them at 450 stateres (about
CHAP. vii UNION OF ITALY 57
2430) annually—charged on the Campanian exchequer.
It was these Campanian equites, whose refusal to take part
in the great Latino-Campanian insurrection of 41.4 mainly
contributed to its failure, and whose brave swords decided
the day in favour of the Romans at Sentinum in 459
(i. 489); whereas the Campanian infantry at Rhegium
was the first body of troops that in the war with Pyrrhus
revolted from Rome (p. 18). Another remarkable
instance of the Roman practice of turning to account for
340.
295.
their own interest the variances between the orders in the
dependent communities by favouring the aristocracy, is
furnished by the treatment which Volsinii met with in 489.
There, just as in Rome, the old and new burgesses must
have stood opposed to one another, and the latter must
have attained by legal means equality of political rights.
In consequence of this the old burgesses of Volsinii resorted
to the Roman senate with a request for the restoration of
their old constitution—a step which the ruling party in the
city naturally viewed as high treason, and inflicted legal
punishment accordingly on the petitioners. The Roman
senate, however, took part with the old burgesses, and,
when the city showed no disposition to submit, not only
destroyed by military violence the communal constitution
of Volsinii which was in recognized operation, but also, by
razing the old capital of Etruria, exhibited to the Italians a
fearfully palpable proof of the mastery of Rome.
But the Roman senate had the wisdom not to overlook
the fact, that the only means of giving permanence to
despotism is moderation on the part of the despots. On
that account there was left with, or conferred on, the
dependent communities an autonomy, which included a
shadow of independence, a special share in the military and
political successes of Rome, and above all a free communal
constitution—so far as the Italian confederacy extended,
there existed no community of Helots. On that account
265.
Modera-
tion of the
govern-
ment.
58 UNION OF ITALY BOOK II
also Rome from the very first, with a clear-sightedness and
magnanimity perhaps unparalleled in history, waived the
most dangerous of all the rights of government, the right
of taxing her subjects. At the most tribute was perhaps
imposed on the dependent Celtic cantons: so far as the
Italian confederacy extended, there was no tributary com-
munity. On that account, lastly, while the duty of bearing
arms was partially devolved on the subjects, the ruling
burgesses were by no means exempt from it; it is probable
that the latter were proportionally far more numerous
than the body of the allies ; and in that body, again,
probably the Latins as a whole were liable to far greater
demands upon them than the non-Latin allied communities.
There was thus a certain reasonableness in the appro-
priation by which Rome ranked first, and the Latins next
to her, in the distribution of the spoil acquired in war.
The central administration at Rome solved the difficult
problem of preserving its supervision and Control over the
mass of the Italian communities liable to furnish contin-
gents, partly by means of the four Italian quaestorships,
partly by the extension of the Roman censorship over the
whole of the dependent communities. The quaestors of
the fleet (p. 45), along with their more immediate duty, had
to raise the revenues from the newly acquired domains and
to control the contingents of the new allies; they were the
first Roman functionaries to whom a residence and district
out of Rome were assigned by law, and they formed the
necessary intermediate authority between the Roman senate
and the Italian communities. Moreover, as is shown by
the later municipal constitution, the chief functionaries in
every Italian community,” whatever might be their title,
had to undertake a valuation every fourth or fifth year—an
Inter-
mediate
function-
aries.
Valuation
of the
empire.
* Not merely in every Latin one ; for the censorship or so-called
quinquennalitas occurs, as is well known, also among communities whose
constitution was not formed according to the Latin scheme.
CHAP. VII UNION OF ITALY 59
institution, the suggestion of which must necessarily have
emanated from Rome, and which can only have been
intended to furnish the senate with a view of the resources
in men and money of the whole of Italy, corresponding to
the census in Rome.
Lastly, with this military administrative union of the
whole peoples dwelling to the south of the Apennines, as
far as the Iapygian promontory and the straits of Rhegium,
Italy
and the
Italians,
was connected the rise of a new name common to them all
—that of “the men of the toga’’ (togati), which was their
oldest designation in Roman state law, or that of the
“Italians,” which was the appellation originally in use
among the Greeks and thence became universally current.
The various nations inhabiting those lands were probably
first led to feel and own their unity, partly through their .
common contrast to the Greeks, partly and mainly through
their common resistance to the Celts; for, although an
Italian community may now and then have made common
cause with the Celts against Rome and employed the
opportunity to recover independence, yet in the long run
sound national feeling necessarily prevailed. As the
“Gallic field” down to a late period stood contrasted in
law with the Italian, so the “men of the toga " were thus
named in contrast to the Celtic “men of the hose ’’
(braccati); and it is probable that the repelling of the
Celtic invasions played an important diplomatic part as a
reason or pretext for centralizing the military resources of
Italy in the hands of the Romans. Inasmuch as the
Romans on the one hand took the lead in the great
national struggle and on the other hand compelled the
Etruscans, Latins, Sabellians, Apulians, and Hellenes
(within the bounds to be immediately described) alike to
fight under their standards, that unity, which hitherto had
been undefined and latent rather than expressed, obtained
firm consolidation and recognition in state law; and the
6O UNION OF ITALY BOOK II
name Italia, which originally and even in the Greek
authors of the fifth century—in Aristotle for instance—
pertained only to the modern Calabria, was transferred to
the whole land of these wearers of the toga.
The earliest boundaries of this great armed confederacy
led by Rome, or of the new Italy, reached on the western
coast as far as the district of Leghorn south of the Arnus,”
on the east as far as the Aesis north of Ancona. The
townships colonized by Italians, lying beyond these limits,
such as Sena Gallica and Ariminum beyond the Apennines,
and Messana in Sicily, were reckoned geographically as
situated out of Italy—even when, like Ariminum, they
were members of the confederacy or even, like Sena, were
Roman burgess communities. Still less could the Celtic
cantons beyond the Apennines be reckoned among the
fogaſi, although perhaps some of them were already among
the clients of Rome.
The new Italy had thus become a political unity; it was
also in the course of becoming a national unity. Already
the ruling Latin nationality had assimilated to itself the
Sabines and Volscians and had scattered isolated Latin
communities over all Italy; these germs were merely
developed, when subsequently the Latin language became
the mother-tongue of every one entitled to wear the Latin
toga. That the Romans already clearly recognized this as
their aim, is shown by the familiar extension of the Latin
name to the whole body of contingent-furnishing Italian
allies.” Whatever can still be recognized of this grand
* This earliest boundary is probably indicated by the two small town-
Earliest
boundaries
of the
Italian
confeder-
acy.
First steps
towards
the Latin-
izing of
Italy.
ships Ad ſines, of which one lay north of Arezzo on the road to Florence,
the second on the coast not far from Leghorn. Somewhat further to the
south of the latter, the brook and valley of Vada are still called Fiume della
111.
ſène, Valle della ſºme (Targioni Tozzetti, Viaggſ, iv. 430).
* In strict official language, indeed, this was not the case. The fullest
designation of the Italians occurs in the agrarian law of 643, line 21 ;-
[ceivis] Romanus sociumve nominisve Začini, quibus ex formula fogatorum
[milites in terra Italia imperare solent]; in like manner at the 29th line
of the same the peregrinus is distinguished from the Latinus, and in the
CHAP. VII UNION OF ITALY 6I
political structure testifies to the great political Sagacity of
its nameless architects; and the singular cohesion, which
that confederation Composed of so many and so diversified
ingredients subsequently exhibited under the severest
shocks, stamped their great work with the seal of success.
From the time when the threads of this net drawn as
skilfully as firmly around Italy were concentrated in the
hands of the Roman Community, it was a great power, and
took its place in the system of the Mediterranean states in
the room of Tarentum, Lucania, and other intermediate
and-minor states erased by the last wars from the list of
political powers. Rome received, as it were, an official
recognition of its new position by means of the two solemn
embassies, which in 481 were sent from Alexandria to
Rome) and from Rome to Alexandria, and which, though
primarily they regulated only commercial relations, beyond
doubt prepared the way for a political alliance. As
Carthage was contending with the Egyptian government
regarding Cyrene and was soon to contend with that of
Rome regarding Sicily, so Macedonia was contending with
the former for the predominant influence in Greece, with
the latter proximately for the dominion of the Adriatic
coasts. The new struggles, which were preparing on all
sides, could not but influence each other, and Rome, as
mistress of Italy, could not fail to be drawn into the wide
arena which the victories and projects of Alexander the
Great had marked out as the field of conflict for his
SłICCCSSOIS.
decree of the senate as to the Bacchanalia in 568 the expression is used :
me gui's ceivis Romanzas neve nominis Lazënë neve socium quisquam. But
in common use very frequently the second or third of these three sub-
divisions is omitted, and along with the Romans sometimes only those
Zalini nominis are mentioned, sometimes only the socii (Weissenborn on
Liv. xxii. 50, 6), while there is no difference in the meaning. The
designation homines nominis Latini ac socii Italici (Sallust. Jug. 40),
correct as it is in itself, is foreign to the official usus loquendi, which knows
Italia, but not /talici.
New
position of
Rome as
a great
power.
273.
62 LAW-RELIGION.—MILITARY SYSTEM BOOK II
Develop-
ment of
law.
Police.
CHAPTER VIII
LAW-RELIGION.—MILITARY SYSTEM-ECONOMIC
CONDITION.—NATIONALITY
IN the development which law underwent during this
period within the Roman community, probably the most
important material innovation was that peculiar control
which the community itself, and in a subordinate degree
its office-bearers, began to exercise over the manners and
\. e g & º * g
habits of the individual burgesses. The germ of it is to be
sought in the right of the magistrate to inflict property-fines
(multae) for offences against order (i. 192). In the case
of all fines of more than two sheep and thirty oxen or,
after the cattle-fines had been by the decree of the people
430. in 324 commuted into money, of more than 3o 20 libral
asses (430), the decision soon after the expulsion of the
kings passed by way of appeal into the hands of the
community (i. 320); and thus procedure by fine acquired
an importance which it was far from Originally possessing.
Under the vague category of offences against order men
might include any accusations they pleased, and by the
higher grades in the scale of fines they might accomplish
whatever they desired. The dangerous character of such
arbitrary procedure was brought to light rather than
obviated by the mitigating proviso, that these property-
fines, where they were not fixed by law at a definite sum,
should not amount to half the estate belonging to the
CHAP. VIII ECONOMIC CONDITION-NATIONALITY 63
person fined. To this class belonged the police-laws,
which from the earliest times were especially abundant in
the Roman community. Such were those enactments of
the Twelve Tables, which prohibited the anointing of a
dead body by persons hired for the purpose, the dressing it -
out with more than one cushion or more than three purple-
edged coverings, the decorating it with gold or gaudy
chaplets, the use of dressed wood for the funeral pile, and
the perfuming or sprinkling of the pyre with frankincense
or myrrh-wine; which limited the number of flute-players
in the funeral procession to ten at most ; and which forbade
wailing women and funeral banquets—in a certain measure
the earliest Roman legislation against luxury. Such also
were the laws—originating in the conflicts of the orders—
directed against usury as well as against an undue use of
the common pasture and a disproportionate appropriation
of the occupiable domain-land. But far more fraught with
danger than these and similar fining-laws, which at any rate
formulated once for all the trespass and often also the
measure of punishment, was the general prerogative of
every magistrate who exercised jurisdiction to inflict a fine
for an offence against order, and, if the fine reached the
amount necessary to found an appeal and the person fined
did not submit to the penalty, to bring the case before the
community. Already in the course of the fifth century
quasi-criminal proceedings had been in this way instituted
against immorality of life both in men and women, against
the forestalling of grain, witchcraft, and similar matters.
Closely akin to this was the quasi-jurisdiction of the
censors, which likewise sprang up at this period. They
were invested with authority to adjust the Roman budget
and the burgess-roll, and they availed themselves of it,
partly to impose of their own accord taxes on luxury which
differed only in form from penalties on it, partly to abridge
or withdraw the political privileges of the burgess who was
64 LAW-RELIGION.—MILITARY SYSTEM BOOK II
290. 277.
275.
Modifica-
tions in
the laws
reported to have been guilty of any infamous action
i. 406). The extent to which this surveillance was
already carried is shown by the fact that penalties of this
nature were inflicted for the negligent cultivation of a man’s
own land, and that such a man as Publius Cornelius
Rufinus (consul in 464, 477) was struck off the list of
senators by the censors of 479, because he possessed silver
plate to the value of 3360 sesterces (4,34). No doubt,
according to the rule generally applicable to the edicts of
magistrates (i. 335), the sentences of the censors had legal
force only during their censorship, that is on an average
for the next five years, and might be renewed or not by
the next censors at pleasure. Nevertheless this censorial
prerogative was of so immense importance, that in virtue
of it the censorship, originally a subordinate magistracy,
became in rank and consideration the first of all (i. 37 5,
4oo). The government of the senate rested essentially on
this twofold police control supreme and subordinate, vested
in the community and its officials, and furnished with
powers as extensive as they were arbitrary. Like every
such arbitrary government, it was productive of much good
and much evil, and we do not mean to combat the view of
those who hold that the evil preponderated. But we must
not forget that—amidst the morality external certainly but
stern and energetic, and the powerful enkindling of public
spirit, that were the genuine characteristics of this period—
these institutions remained exempt as yet from any really
base misuse; and if they were the chief instruments in
repressing individual freedom, they were also the means by
which the public spirit and the good old manners and
order of the Roman community were with might and main
upheld.
Along with these changes a humanizing and moderniz-
ing tendency showed itself slowly, but yet clearly enough,
in the development of Roman law. Most of the enact-
CHAP. VIII ECONOMIC CONDITION-NATIONALITY 65
ments of the Twelve Tables, which coincide with the laws
of Solon and therefore may with reason be considered as
in substance innovations, bear this character; such as the
securing the right of free association and the autonomy of
the societies that originated under it; the enactment that
forbade the ploughing up of boundary-balks ; and the
mitigation of the punishment of theft, so that a thief not
caught in the act might henceforth release himself from
the plaintiff’s suit by payment of double compensation.
The law of debt was modified in a similar sense, but not
till upwards of a century afterwards, by the Poetelian law
(i. 389). The right freely to dispose of property, which
according to the earliest Roman law was accorded to the
Owner in his lifetime but in the case of death had hitherto
been conditional on the consent of the community, was
liberated from this restriction, inasmuch as the law of the
Twelve Tables or its interpretation assigned to the private
testament the same force as pertained to that confirmed in
the Curies. This was an important step towards the break-
ing up of the clanships, and towards the full carrying out
of individual liberty in the disposal of property. The
fearfully absolute paternal power was restricted by the
enactment, that a son thrice sold by his father should not
relapse into his power, but should thenceforth be free ;
to which—by a legal inference that, strictly viewed, was
no doubt absurd—was soon attached the possibility that a
father might voluntarily divest himself of dominion over
his son by emancipation. In the law of marriage civil
marriage was permitted (i. 112); and although the full
marital power was associated as necessarily with a true
civil as with a true religious marriage, yet the permission
of a connection instead of marriage (i. 73, note), formed
without that power, constituted a first step towards relaxa-
tion of the full power of the husband. The first step
towards a legal enforcement of married life was the tax on
WOL. II * 37
66 LAW-RELIGION.—MILITARY SYSTEM BOOK II
403.
Adminis-
tration
justice.
of
Code of
COIIll?? On
law.
451.
New
450.
367.
judicial
function-
aries.
289.
old bachelors (aes uscorium), with the introduction of
which Camillus began his public career as censor in 35 I.
Changes more comprehensive than those effected in
the law itself were introduced into—what was more import-
ant in a political point of view, and more easily admitted
of alteration—the system of judicial administration. First
of all came the important limitation of the supreme judicial
power by the embodiment of the common law in a written
code, and the obligation of the magistrate thenceforth to
decide no longer according to varying usage, but according
to the written letter, in civil as well as in criminal pro-
cedure (303, 3o4). The appointment of a Supreme
magistrate in Rome exclusively for the administration of
justice in 387 (i. 383), and the establishment of separate
police functionaries which took place contemporaneously
in Rome, and was imitated under Roman influence in all
the Latin communities (i. 383, 452), secured greater speed
and precision of justice. These police-magistrates or aediles
had, of course, a certain jurisdiction at the same time
assigned to them. On the one hand, they were the ordin-
ary civil judges for sales concluded in open market, for
the cattle and slave markets in particular ; and on the
other hand, they ordinarily acted in processes of fines and
amercements as judges of first instance or—which was in
Roman law the same thing—as public prosecutors. In
consequence of this the administration of the laws impos-
ing fines, and the equally indefinite and politically import-
ant right of fining in general, were vested mainly in them.
Similar but subordinate functions, having especial reference
to the poorer classes, pertained to the three night- or blood-
masters (tres viri nocturni or capitales), first nominated in
465 ; they were entrusted with the duties of nocturnal
police as regards fire and the public safety and with the
superintendence of executions, with which a certain
summary jurisdiction was very soon, perhaps even from
CHAP. VIII ECONOMIC CONDITION.—NATIONALITY 67
the outset, associated.” Lastly from the increasing extent
of the Roman community it became necessary, out of re-
gard to the convenience of litigants, to station in the more
remote townships special judges competent to deal at
least with minor civil causes. This arrangement was the
rule for the communities of burgesses sine suffragio
(p. 49), and was perhaps even extended to the more
remote communities of full burgesses,”—the first germs of
a Romano-municipal jurisdiction developing itself by the
side of that which was strictly Roman.
In civil procedure (which, however, according to the
ideas of that period included most of the crimes committed
against fellow-citizens) the division of a process into the
settlement of the question of law before the magistrate
(ius), and the decision of the question of fact by a private
person nominated by the magistrate (ſudicium)—a division
doubtless customary even in earlier times—was on the
abolition of the monarchy prescribed by law (i. 322); and
to that separation the private law of Rome was mainly
indebted for its logical clearness and practical precision.”
* The view formerly adopted, “that these tres viri belonged to the
earliest period, is erroneous, for colleges of magistrates with odd numbers
are foreign to the oldest state-arrangements (Chronol. p. 15, note I2).
Probably the well-accredited account, that they were first nominated
in 465 (Liv. AE2. II), should simply be retained, and the otherwise
suspicious inference of the falsifier Licinius Macer (in Liv. vii. 46), which
makes mention of them before 450, should be simply rejected. At first
undoubtedly the tres viri were nominated by the superior magistrates, as
was the case with most of the later magis/ratus minores ; the Papirian
plebiscitum, which transferred the nomination of them to the community
(Festus, v. Sacramentum, p. 344, Müll.), was at any rate not issued till
after the institution of the office of praetor peregrinus, or at the earliest
towards the middle of the sixth century, for it names the praetor qui inter
cives ius dicit.
* This inference is suggested by what Livy says (ix. 20) as to the re-
organization of the colony of Antium twenty years after it was founded ;
and it is self-evident that, while the Romans might very well impose on
the inhabitant of Ostia the duty of settling all his lawsuits in Rome, the
same course could not be followed with townships like Antium and Sena.
* People are in the habit of praising the Romans as a nation specially
privileged in respect to Jurisprudence, and of gazing with wonder U11 their
admirable law as a mystical gift of heaven ; presumably by way of Speci-
Changes in
procedure.
289.
304.
68 LAW-FELIGION.—MILITARY SYSTEM BOOK II
In actions regarding property, the decision as to what
constituted possession, which hitherto had been left to the
arbitrary caprice of the magistrate, was subjected gradually
to legal rules ; and, alongside of the law of property, a law
of possession was developed—another step, by which the
magisterial authority lost an important part of its powers.
In criminal processes, the tribunal of the people, which
hitherto had exercised the prerogative of mercy, became a
Court of legally secured appeal. If the accused after
hearing (quaestio) was condemned by the magistrate and
appealed to the burgesses, the magistrate proceeded in
presence of these to the further hearing (anquisitio), and,
when he after three times discussing the matter before the
community had repeated his decision, in the fourth diet
the sentence was confirmed tor rejected by the burgesses.
Modification was not allowed. A similar republican spirit
breathed in the principles, that the house protected the
burgess, and that an arrest could only take place out of
doors ; that imprisonment during investigation was to be
avoided ; and that it was allowable for every accused and
not yet condemned burgess by renouncing his citizenship
to withdraw from the consequences of condemnation, so
far as they affected not his property but his person—prin-
ally excusing themselves for the worthlessness of their own legal system.
A glance at the singularly fluctuating and undeveloped criminal law of the
Romans might show the untenableness of ideas so confused even to those
who may think the proposition too simple, that a sound people has a
sound law, and a morbid people an unsound. Apart from the more
general political conditions on which jurisprºdence also, and indeed juris-
prudence especially, depends, the causes of the excellence of the Roman
civil law lie mainly in two features : first, that the plaintiff and defendant
were specially obliged to explain and embody in due and binding form the
grounds of the demand and of the objection to comply with it ; and
secondly, that the Romans appointed a permanent machinery for the
edictal development of their law, and associated it immediately with
practice. By the former the Romans precluded the pettifogging practices
of advocates, by the latter they obviated incapable law-making, so far as
such things can be prevented at all ; and by means of both in conjunction
they satisfied, as far as is possible, the two conflicting requirements, that law
shall constantly be fixed, and that it shall constantly be in accordance
with the spirit of the age.
CHAP. VIII ECONOMIC CONDITION.—NATIONALITY 69
ciples, which certainly were not embodied in formal laws
and accordingly did not legally bind the prosecuting
magistrate, but yet were by their moral weight of the
greatest influence, particularly in limiting capital punish-
ment. But, if the Roman criminal law furnishes a remark-
able testimony to the strong public spirit and to the
increasing humanity of this epoch, it on the other hand
suffered in its practical working from the struggles between
the orders, which in this respect were specially baneful.
The co-ordinate primary jurisdiction of all the public
magistrates in criminal cases, that arose out of these
conflicts (i. 354), led to the result, that there was no
longer any fixed authority for giving instructions, or any .
serious preliminary investigation, in Roman criminal pro-
cedure. And, as the ultimate criminal jurisdiction was
exercised in the forms and by the organs of legislation,
and never disowned its origin from the prerogative of mercy;
as, moreover, the treatment of police fines had an injurious
reaction on the criminal procedure which was externally
very similar ; the decision in criminal causes was pro-
nounced—and that not so much by way of abuse, as in
Some degree by virtue of the constitution—not according
to fixed law, but according to the arbitrary pleasure of the
judges. In this way the Roman criminal procedure was
completely void of principle, and was degraded into the
sport and instrument of political parties; which can the
less be excused, seeing that this procedure, while especially
applied to political crimes proper, was applicable also to
others, such as murder and arson. The evil was aggravated
by the clumsiness of that procedure, which, in concert
with the haughty republican contempt for non-burgesses,
gave rise to a growing custom of tolerating, side by side
with the more formal process, a summary criminal, or
1atllel police, procedure against slavcs and common people.
Here too the passionate strife regarding political processes
7o LAW –RELIGION.—MILITARY SYSTEM BOOK II
Religion.
New gods.
269,
485.
overstepped natural limits, and introduced institutions
which materially contributed to estrange the Romans step
by step from the idea of a fixed moral order in the
administration of justice.
We are less able to trace the progress of the religious
conceptions of the Romans during this epoch. In general
they adhered with simplicity to the simple piety of their
ancestors, and kept equally aloof from superstition and
from unbelief. How vividly the idea of spiritualizing all
earthly objects, on which the Roman religion was based,
still prevailed at the close of this epoch, is shown by the
new “God of silver’’ (Argentinus), who presumably came
into existence only in consequence of the introduction of
the silver currency in 485, and who naturally was the son
of the older “God of copper” (Aesculanus).
The relations to foreign lands were the same as hereto-
fore ; but here, and here especially, Hellenic influences were
on the increase. It was only now that temples began to
rise in Rome itself in honour of the Hellenic gods. The
oldest was the temple of Castor and Pollux, which had been
vowed in the battle at lake Regillus (i. 438) and was
Consecrated on I 5th July 269. The legend associated with
it, that two youths of superhuman size and beauty had been
seen fighting on the battle-field in the ranks of the Romans
and immediately after the battle watering their foaming
steeds in the Roman Forum at the fountain of Iuturna, and
announcing the great victory, bears a stamp thoroughly un-
Roman, and was beyond doubt at a very early period
modelled on the appearance of the Dioscuri—similar down
to its very details—in the famous battle fought about a
century before between the Crotoniates and Locrians at the
river Sagras. The Delphic Apollo too was not only con-
sulted—as was usual with all peoples that felt the influence
of Grecian culture—and presented moreover after special
successes, such as the capture of Veii, with a tenth of the
CHAP. VIII ECONOMIC CONDITION.—NATIONALITY 71
spoil (360), but also had a temple built for him in the city 394.
(323, renewed 401). The same honour was towards the 431. 353.
close of this period accorded to Aphrodite (459), who was 295.
in some enigmatical way identified with the old Roman
garden goddess, Venus;* and to Asklapios or Aesculapius,
who was obtained by special request from Epidaurus in the
Peloponnesus and solemnly conducted to Rome (463). 291.
Isolated complaints were heard in serious emergencies as
to the intrusion of foreign superstition, presumably the art
of the Etruscan haruspices (as in 326); but in such cases 428.
the police did not fail to take proper cognisance of the
matter.
In Etruria on the other hand, while the nation stagnated
and decayed in political nullity and indolent opulence, the
theological monopoly of the nobility, stupid fatalism, wild
and meaningless mysticism, the system of soothsaying and
of mendicant prophecy gradually developed themselves, till
they reached the height at which we afterwards find them.
In the Sacerdotal system no comprehensive changes, so Sacerdotal
far as we know, took place. The more stringent enact- *Y*
ments, that were made about 465 regarding the collection -289.
of the process-fines destined to defray the cost of public
worship, point to an increase in the ritual budget of the
state—a necessary result of the increase in the number of
its gods and its temples. It has already been mentioned
as one of the evil effects of the dissensions between the
orders that an illegitimate influence began to be conceded
to the colleges of men of lore, and that they were employed
for the annulling of political acts (i. 377)—a course by
which on the one hand the faith of the people was shaken,
and on the other hand the priests were permitted to
exercise a very injurious influence on public affairs.
A complete revolution occurred during this epoch in
* Venug probably first appears in the later sense as Amhrodite on
occasion of the dedication of the temple consecrated in this year (Liv. x.
3I : Becker, Zopographie, p. 472).
72 LAW--RELIGION.—MILITARY SYSTEM BOOK II
Military
System.
Manipular
legion.
the military system. The primitive Graeco-Italian military
Organization, which was probably based, like the Homeric,
on the selection of the most distinguished and effective
warriors—who ordinarily fought on horseback—to form a
special vanguard, had in the later regal period been super-
seded by the legio—the old Dorian phalanx of hoplites,
probably eight file deep (i. 118). This phalanx thence-
forth undertook the chief burden of the battle, while the
Cavalry were stationed on the flanks, and, mounted or
dismounted according to circumstances, were chiefly em-
ployed as a reserve. From this arrangement there were
developed nearly at the same time the phalanx of sarrissae
in Macedonia and the manipular arrangement in Italy, the
former formed by closing and deepening, the latter by
breaking up and multiplying, the ranks, in the first
instance by the division of the old Żegio of 84oo into two
/egiones of 42 oo men each. The old Doric phalanx had
been wholly adapted to close combat with the sword and
especially with the spear, and only an accessory and
subordinate position in the order of battle was assigned to
missile weapons. In the manipular legion the thrusting-
lance was confined to the third division, and instead of it
the first two were furnished with a new and peculiar
Italian missile weapon, the Žilum—a square or round
piece of wood, four and a half feet long, with, a triangular
or quadrangular iron point—which had been originally
perhaps invented for the defence of the ramparts of the
camp, but was soon transferred from the rear to the front
ranks, and was hurled by the advancing line into the ranks
of the enemy at a distance of from ten to twenty paces.
At the same time the sword acquired far greater im-
portance than the short knife of the phalangite could ever
have had ; for the volley of javelins was intended in the
first instance merely to prepare the way for an attack
sword in hand. While, moreover, the phalanx had, as if it
CII AP. VIII ECONOM! IC CONDITION.—NATIONALITY 73
were a single mighty lance, to be hurled at once upon the
enemy, in the new Italian legion the smaller units, which
existed also in the phalanx system but were in the order
of battle firmly and indissolubly united, were tactically
separated from each other. Not merely was the close
square divided, as we have said, into two equally strong
halves, but each of these was separated in the direction of
its depth into the three divisions of the hastati, Aríncipes,
and friarii, each of a moderate depth probably amounting
in ordinary cases to only four files; and was broken up
along the front into ten bands (manižuli), in such a way
that between every two divisions and every two maniples
there was left a perceptible interval. It was a mere con-
tinuation of the same process of individualizing, by which
the collective mode of fighting was discouraged even in
the diminished tactical unit and the single combat became
prominent, as is evident from the (already mentioned) de-
cisive part played by hand-to-hand encounters and combats
with the sword. The system of entrenching the camp
underwent also a peculiar development. The place where
the army encamped, even were it only for a single night,
was invariably provided with a regular circumvallation and
as it were converted into a fortress. Little change took
place on the other hand in the cavalry, which in the mani-
pular legion retained the secondary part which it had
occupied by the side of the phalanx. The system of officer-
ing the army also continued in the main unchanged ;
only now over each of the two legions of the regular army
there were set just as many war-tribunes as had hitherto
commanded the whole army, and the number of staff.
officers was thus doubled. It was at this period probably
that the clear line of demarcation became established
between the subaltern officers, who as common soldiers
had to gain their place at the head of the maniples by the
Sword and passed by regular promotion from the lower to
Entrench-
ment of
Camp.
Cavalry.
Officers.
74 LAW-RELIGION.—MILITARY SYSTEM BOOK II
Military
discipline.
Training
and classes
of soldiers.
the higher maniples, and the military tribunes placed at
the head of whole legions—six to each — in whose case
there was no regular promotion, and for whom men of the
better class were usually taken. In this respect it must
have become a matter of importance that, while previously
the subaltern as well as the staff officers had been uniformly
. nominated by the general, after 392 some of the latter
posts were filled up through election by the burgesses
(i. 397). Lastly, the old, fearfully strict, military discipline
remained unaltered. Still, as formerly, the general was at
liberty to behead any man serving in his camp, and to
scourge with rods the staff-officer as well as the common
soldier; nor were such punishments inflicted merely on
account of common Crimes, but also when an officer had
allowed himself to deviate from the Orders which he had
received, or when a division had allowed itself to be
surprised or had fled from the field of battle. On the
other hand, the new military organization necessitated a
far more serious and prolonged military training than the
previous phalanx system, in which the solidity of the mass
kept even the inexperienced in their ranks. If nevertheless
no special soldier-class sprang up, but on the contrary the
army still remained, as before, a burgess army, this object
was chiefly attained by abandoning the former mode of rank-
ing the soldiers according to property (i. 116) and arranging
them according to length of service. The Roman recruit
now entered among the light-armed “skirmishers” (rorarii),
who fought outside of the line and especially with stone
slings, and he advanced from this step by step to the first and
then to the second division, till at length the soldiers of
long service and experience were associated together in the
corps of the friarii, which was numerically the weakest but
imparted its tone and spirit to the whole army.
The excellence of this military organization, which
became the primary cause of the superior political position
CHAP. VIII ECONOMIC CONDITION.—NATIONALITY 75
~~< *
of the Roman community, chiefly depended on the three
great military principles of maintaining a reserve, of Com-
bining the close and distant modes of fighting, and of
combining the offensive and the defensive. The system
of a reserve was already foreshadowed in the earlier
employment of the cavalry, but it was now completely
developed by the partition of the army into three divisions
and the reservation of the flower of the veterans for the last
and decisive shock. While the Hellenic phalanx had
developed the close, and the Oriental squadrons of horse
armed with bows and light missile spears the distant, modes
of fighting respectively, the Roman combination of the
heavy javelin with the sword produced results similar, as
has justly been remarked, to those attained in modern
warfare by the introduction of bayonet-muskets; the volley
of javelins prepared the way for the sword encounter,
exactly in the same way as a volley of musketry now
precedes a charge with the bayonet. Lastly, the elaborate
system of encampment allowed the Romans to combine
the advantages of defensive and offensive war and to
decline or give battle according to circumstances, and in
the latter case to fight under the ramparts of their camp
just as under the walls of a fortress—the Roman, says a
Roman proverb, conquers by sitting still.
That this new military organization was in the main a
Roman, or at any rate Italian, remodelling and improvement
Military
value of the
manipular
legion.
Origin
of the
manipular
of the old Hellenic tactics of the phalanx, is plain. If legion.
some germs of the system of reserve and of the individual-
izing of the smaller subdivisions of the army are found to
occur among the later Greek strategists, especially
Xenophon, this only shows that they felt the defectiveness
of the old system, but were not well able to obviate it.
The manipular legion appears fully developed in the war
with Pyrrhus; when and under what circumstances it arose,
whether at once or gradually, can no longer be ascertained.
76 LAW-RELIGION.—MILITARY SYSTEM BOOK II
The first tactical system which the Romans encountered,
fundamentally different from the earlier Italo-Hellenic
system, was the Celtic sword-phalanx. It is not impossible
that the subdivision of the army and the intervals between
the maniples in front were arranged with a view to resist,
as they did resist, its first and only dangerous charge ; and
it accords with this hypothesis that Marcus Furius Camillus,
the most celebrated Roman general of the Gallic epoch, is
presented in various detached notices as the reformer of
the Roman military system. The further traditions
associated with the Samnite and Pyrrhic wars are neither
sufficiently accredited, nor can they with certainty be duly
arranged;" although it is in itself probable that the pro-
longed Samnite mountain warfare exercised a lasting
influence on the individual development of the Roman
soldier, and that the struggle with one of the first masters
of the art of war, belonging to the school of the great
Alexander, effected an improvement in the technical
features of the Roman military system.
**-*.*.
National In the national economy agriculture was, and continued
“” to be, the social and political basis both of the Roman.
The community and of the new Italian state. The common
** assembly and the army consisted of Roman farmers; what
as soldiers they had acquired by the sword, they Secured as
1. According to Roman tradition the Romans originally carried quad-
rangular shields, after which they borrowed from the Etruscans the round
hoplite shield (cluſeus, dotris), and from the Samnites the later square
shield (scutum, 0upeós), and the javelin (veru) (Diodor. Vaň. Fr. p. 54;
Sallust, Cat. 51, 38; Virgil, Aen. vii. 665; Festus, Ep. v. Samnifes, p.
327, Müll. ; and the authorities cited in Marquardt, Handö. iii. 2, 241).
But it may be regarded as certain that the hoplite shield or, in other words,
the tactics of the Doric phalanx were imitated not from the Etruscans,
but directly from the Hellenes. As to the scutum, that large, cylindrical,
convex leather shield must certainly have taken the place of the flat copper
clupeus, when the phalanx was broken up into maniples; but the undoubted
derivation of the word from the Greek casts suspicion on the derivation of
the thing itself from the Samnites. From the Greeks the Romans derived
also the sling (funda from a pevöövm, like ſides from a pión), (i. 292).
The pilum was considered by the ancients as quite a Roman invention.
CHAP. VIII ECONOMIC CONDITION.—NATIONALITY 77
Colonists by the plough. The insolvency of the middle
class of landholders gave rise to the formidable internal
crises of the third and fourth centuries, amidst which it
seemed as if the young republic could not but be destroyed.
The revival of the Latin farmer-class, which was produced
during the fifth century partly by the large assignations of
land and incorporations, partly by the fall in the rate of
interest and the increase of the Roman population, was at
once the effect and the cause of the mighty development
of Roman power. The acute soldier's eye of Pyrrhus
justly discerned the cause of the political and military
ascendency of the Romans in the flourishing condition of
the Roman farms. But the rise also of husbandry on a
large scale among the Romans appears to fall within this
period. In earlier times indeed there existed landed estates
of-at least comparatively—large size; but their manage-
ment was not farming on a large scale, it was simply a
husbandry of numerous small parcels (i. 245). On the
-l.
-l.
Farming
of estates.
other hand the enactment in the law of 387, not incom- 367.
patible indeed with the earlier mode of management but
yet far more appropriate to the later, viz. that the land-
holder should be bound to employ along with his slaves a
proportional number of free persons (i. 381), may well be
regarded as the oldest trace of the later centralized farming
of estates;” and it deserves notice that even here at its
first emergence it essentially rests on slave-holding. How
it arose, must remain an undecided point; possibly the
Carthaginian plantations in Sicily served as models to the
oldest Roman landholders, and perhaps even the appearance
of wheat in husbandry by the side of spelt (i. 240), which
Varro places about the period of the decemvirs, was con-
nected with that altered style of management. Still less
1 Varro (De R. R. i. 2, 9) evidently conceives the author of the Licinian
agial iail law as farming in pcrSon his extensive lands ; although, We may
add, the story may easily have been invented to explain the cognomen
(Stolo).
}
78 LAW-RELIGION.—MILITARY SYSTEM BOOK II
Inland
intercourse
in Italy.
can we ascertain how far this method of husbandry had
already during this period spread ; but the history of the
wars with Hannibal leaves no doubt that it cannot yet have
become the rule, nor can it have yet absorbed the
Italian farmer class. Where it did come into vogue, how-
ever, it annihilated the older clientship based on the
Arecarium ; just as the modern system of large farms has
been formed in great part by the suppression of petty
holdings and the conversion of hides into farm-fields. It
admits of no doubt that the restriction of this agricultural
clientship very materially contributed towards the distress
of the class of small cultivators.
Respecting the internal intercourse of the Italians with
each other our written authorities are silent ; coins alone
furnish some information. We have already mentioned
(i. 25 1) that in Italy, with the exception of the Greek cities
and of the Etruscan Populonia, there was no coinage during
the first three centuries of Rome, and that cattle in the
first instance, and subsequently copper by weight, served as
the medium of exchange. Within the present epoch
occurred the transition on the part of the Italians from the
system of barter to that of money; and in their money they
were naturally led at first to Greek models. The circum-
stances of central Italy led however to the adoption of
copper instead of silver as the metal for their coinage, and
the unit of coinage was primarily based on the previous
unit of value, the copper pound ; hence they cast their coins
instead of stamping them, for no die would have sufficed
for pieces so large and heavy. Yet there seems from the
first to have been a fixed ratio for the relative value of
copper and silver (250 : 1), and with reference to that ratio
the copper coinage seems to have been issued ; SO that,
for example, in Rome the large Copper piece, the as, was
equal in value to a scruple (sks of a pound) of silver.
It is a circumstance historically more remarkable, that
CHAP. VIII ECONOMIC CONDITION.—NATIONALITY 79
coining in Italy most probably originated in Rome, and in
fact with the decemvirs, who found in the Solonian legisla-
tion a pattern for the regulation of their coinage ; and that
from Rome it spread over a number of Latin, Etruscan,
Umbrian, and east-Italian communities, a clear proof of
\the superior position which Rome from the beginning of
the fourth century held in Italy. As all these communities
subsisted side by side in formal independence, legally the
monetary standard was entirely local, and the territory of
every city had its own monetary system. Nevertheless the
standards of copper coinage in central and northern Italy
may be comprehended in three groups, within which the
Coins in common intercourse seem to have been treated as
homogeneous. These groups are, first, the coins of the
cities of Etruria lying north of the Ciminian Forest and
those of Umbria ; secondly, the coins of Rome and Latium ;
and lastly, those of the eastern seaboard. We have already
observed that the Roman coins held a certain ratio to silver
by weight; on the other hand we find those of the east
coast of Italy placed in a definite proportional relation to
the silver coins which were current from an early period in
southern Italy, and the standard of which was adopted by
the Italian immigrants, such as the Bruttians, Lucanians,
and Nolans, by the Latin colonies in that quarter, such as
Cales and Suessa, and even by the Romans themselves for
their possessions in Lower Italy. Accordingly the inland
traffic of Italy must have been divided into corresponding
provinces, which dealt with one another like foreign nations.
In transmarine commerce the relations we have previ-
ously described (i. 256) between Sicily and Latium, Etruria
and Attica, the Adriatic and Tarentum, continued to sub-
sist during the epoch before us or rather, strictly speaking,
belonged to it; for although facts of this class, which as a
Iule are illeutivued without a date, have becn placed together
for the purpose of presenting a general view under the first
Trans-
marine
COIY]]TherC62.
8o LAW–RELIGION-MILITARY SYSTEM Book 11
411.
300.
period, the statements made apply equally to the present.
The clearest evidence in this respect is, of course, that of
the coins. As the striking of Etruscan silver money after
an Attic standard (i. 257), and the penetrating of Italian
and especially of Latin copper into Sicily (i. 259) testify to
the two former routes of traffic, so the equivalence, which
we have just mentioned, between the silver money of Magna
Graecia and the copper coinage of Picenum and Apulia,
forms, with numerous other indications, an evidence of the
active traffic which the Greeks of Lower Italy, the Tarentines
in particular, held with the east Italian seaboard. The
commerce again, which was at an earlier period perhaps
still more active, between the Latins and the Campanian
Greeks seems to have been disturbed by the Sabellian im-
migration, and to have been of no great moment during
the first hundred and fifty years of the republic. The refusal
of the Samnites in Capua and Cumae to supply the Romans
with grain in the famine of 343 may be regarded as an
indication of the altered relations which subsisted between
Latium and Campania, till at the commencement of the
fifth century the Roman arms restored and gave increased
impetus to the old intercourse. -
Touching on details, we may be allowed to mention, as
one of the few dated facts in the history of Roman commerce,
the notice drawn from the annals of Ardea, that in 454 the
first barber came from Sicily to Ardea ; and to dwell for a
moment on the painted pottery which was sent chiefly from
Attica, but also from Corcyra and Sicily, to Lucania, Cam-
pania, and Etruria, to serve there for the decoration of
tombs—a traffic, as to the circumstances of which we are
accidentally better informed than as to any other article of
transmarine commerce. The commencement of this import
trade probably falls about the period of the expulsion of
the Tarquins; for the vases of the oldest style, which are
of very rare occurrence in Italy, were probably painted in
chap. viii ECONOMIC CONDITION-NATIONALITY 81
the second half of the third century of the city, while those 500-450.
of the chaste style, occurring in greater numbers, belong to
the first half, those of the most finished beauty to the second 450-400.
half, of the fourth century; and the immense quantities of 400-350.
the other vases, often marked by showiness and size but
seldom by excellence in workmanship, must be assigned as
a whole to the following century. It was from the Hellenes 350-250.
undoubtedly that the Italians derived this custom of embel-
lishing tombs; but while the moderate means and fine
discernment of the Greeks confined the practice in their
case within narrow limits, it was stretched in Italy by bar-
baric opulence and barbaric extravagance far beyond its
original and proper bounds. It is a significant circumstance,
however, that in Italy this extravagance meets us only in
the lands that had a Hellenic semi-culture. Any one who
can read such records will perceive in the cemeteries of,
Etruria and Campania—the mines whence our museums have
been replenished—a significant commentary on the accounts
of the ancients as to the Etruscan and Campanian seni-
culture choked amidst wealth and arrogance (i. 436, 457).
The homely Samnite character on the other hand remained
at all times a stranger to this foolish luxury; the absence
of Greek pottery from the tombs exhibits, quite as palpably
as the absence of a Samnite coinage, the slight development
of commercial intercourse and of urban life in this region.
It is still more worthy of remark that Latium also, although
not less near to the Greeks than Etruria and Campania,
and in closest intercourse with them, almost wholly refrained
from such'sepulchral decorations. It is more than probable
—especially on account of the altogether different character
of the tombs in the unique Praeneste—that in this result we
have to recognize the influence of the stern Roman morality
f or—if the expression be preferred—of the rigid Roman
police. Closely conncCtcd with this subject are the already-
mentioned interdicts, which the law of the Twelve Tables
VOL. II 38
82 LAw—RELIGION-MILITARY SYSTEM Book iſ
Capital in
Rome.
fulminated against purple bier-cloths and gold ornaments
placed beside the dead ; and the banishment of all silver
plate, excepting the salt-cellar and sacrificial ladle, from the
Roman household, so far at least as sumptuary laws and
the terror of censorial censure could banish it : even in
architecture we shall again encounter the same spirit of
hostility to luxury whether noble or ignoble. Although,
however, in consequence of these influences Rome probably
preserved a certain outward simplicity longer than Capua
and Volsinii, her commerce and trade—on which, in fact,
along with agriculture her prosperity from the beginning
rested—must not be regarded as having been inconsider-
able, or as having less sensibly experienced the influence
of her new commanding position.
No urban middle class in the proper sense of that
term, no body of independent tradesmen and merchants,
was ever developed in Rome. The cause of this was—in
addition to the disproportionate centralization of capital
which occurred at an early period—mainly the employment
of slave labour. It was usual in antiquity, and was in
fact a necessary consequence of slavery, that the minor
trades in towns were very frequently carried on by slaves,
whom their master established as artisans or merchants;
or by freedmen, in whose case the master not only fre-
quently furnished the capital, but also regularly stipulated
for a share, often the half, of the profits. Retail trading
and dealing in Rome were undoubtedly constantly on the
increase; and there are proofs that the trades which
minister to the luxury of great cities began to be concen-
trated in Rome—the Ficoroni casket for instance was
designed in the fifth century of the city by a Praenestine
artist and was sold to Praeneste, but was nevertheless
manufactured in Rome." But as the net proceeds even of
* The conjecture that Novius Plautius, the artist who worked at this
casket for Dindia Macolnia, in Rome, may have been a Campanian,
cHAP. viii ECONOMIC CONDITION-NATIONALITY 83
retail business flowed for the most part into the Coffers of
the great houses, “no industrial and commercial middle-
class arose to an extent corresponding to that increase.
As little were the great merchants and great manufacturers
marked off as a distinct class from the great landlords.
On the one hand, the latter were from ancient times
(i. 261, 343) simultaneously traders and capitalists, and
combined in their hands lending on security, trafficking on
a great scale, the undertaking of contracts, and the
executing of works for the state. On the other hand, from
the emphatic moral importance which in the Roman
commonwealth attached to the possession of land, and
from its constituting the sole basis of political privileges—
a basis which was infringed for the first time only towards
the close of this epoch (i. 396)—it was undoubtedly at
this period already usual for the fortunate speculator to
invest part of his capital in land. It is clear enough
also from the political privileges given to freedmen possess-
ing freeholds (i. 396), that the Roman statesmen sought
in this way to diminish the dangerous class of the rich who
had no land.
But while neither an opulent urban middle class nor a
strictly close body of capitalists grew up in Rome, it was
constantly acquiring more and more the character of a
great city. This is plainly indicated by the increasing
number of slaves crowded together in the capital (as
attested by the very serious slave conspiracy of 335), and 4
still more by the increasing multitude of freedmen, which
was gradually becoming inconvenient and dangerous, as
we may safely infer from the considerable tax imposed on
Develop-
ment of
Rome as a
great city.
manumissions in 397 (i. 389) and from the limitation of 357.
the political rights of freedmen in 450 (i. 396). For not
only was it implied in the circumstances that the great
is refuted by the old Praenesfine tomh-stones recently discovered, on
which, among other Macolnii and Plautii, there occurs also a Lucius
Magulnius, Son of Plautius (L. Magolnio Pla. ſ.).
304.
84 LAW-RELIGION.—MILITARY SYSTEM BOOK II
Urban
police.
Building.
majority of the persons manumitted had to devote them-
selves to trade or commerce, but manumission itself
among the Romans was, as we have already said, less an
act of liberality than an industrial speculation, the master
often finding it more for his interest to share the profits of
the trade or commerce of the freedman than to assert his
title to the whole proceeds of the labour of his slave. The
increase of manumissions must therefore have necessarily
kept pace with the increase of the commercial and indus-
trial activity of the Romans.
A similar indication of the rising importance of urban
life in Rome is presented by the great development of the
urban police. To this period probably belong in great
measure the enactments under which the four aediles
divided the city into four police districts, and made pro-
vision for the discharge of their equally important and
difficult functions—for the efficient repair of the network of
drains small and large by which Rome was pervaded, as
well as of the public buildings and places; for the proper
cleansing and paving of the streets; for obviating the
nuisances of ruinous buildings, dangerous animals, or foul
smells; for the removing of waggons from the highway
except during the hours of evening and night, and generally
for the keeping open of the communication ; for the unin-
terrupted supply of the market of the capital with good and
cheap grain; for the destruction of unwholesome articles,
and the suppression of false weights and measures; and for
the special oversight of baths, taverns, and houses of bad
fame.
In respect to buildings the regal period, particularly the
epoch of the great conquests, probably accomplished more
than the first two centuries of the republic. Structures
like the temples on the Capitol and on the Aventine and
the great Circus were probably as obnoxious to the frugal
fathers of the city as to the burgesses who gave their task-
CHAP. VIII ECONOMIC CONDITION.—NATIONALITY 85
N
work; and it is remarkable that perhaps the most con-
siderable building of the republican period before the
Samnite wars, the temple of Ceres in the Circus, was a
work of Spurius Cassius (261), who in more than one
respect sought to lead the commonwealth back to the
traditions of the kings. The governing aristocracy more-
over repressed private luxury with a rigour such as the rule
of the kings, if prolonged, would certainly not have dis-
played. But at length even the senate was no longer able
to resist the superior force of circumstances. It was Appius
Claudius who in his epoch-making censorship (442) threw
aside the antiquated rustic system of parsimonious hoarding,
and taught his fellow-citizens to make a worthy use of the
public resources. He began that noble system of public
works of general utility, which justifies, if anything can
justify, the military successes of Rome even from the point
of view of the welfare of the nations, and which even now
in its ruins furnishes some idea of the greatness of Rome to
thousands on thousands who have never read a page of her
493.
Impulse
given to it
312.
history. To him the Roman state was indebted for its
great military road, and the city of Rome for its first
aqueduct. Following in the steps of Claudius, the Roman
senate wove around Italy that network of roads and
fortresses, the formation of which has already been
described (p. 39), and without which, as the history of all
military states from the Achaemenidae down to the creator
of the road over the Simplon shows, no military hegemony
can subsist. Following in the steps of Claudius, Manius
Curius built from the proceeds of the Pyrrhic spoil a second
aqueduct for the capital (482); and some years previously
(464) with the gains of the Sabine war he opened up for
the Velino, at the point above Terni where it falls into the
Nera, that broader channel in which the stream still flows,
with a view to drain the beautiful valley of Rieti and
thereby to gain space for a large burgess settlement along
272.
2.90.
86 LAW-RELIGION.—MILITARY SYSTEM BOOK II
with a modest farm for himself. Such works, in the eyes
of persons of intelligence, threw into the shade the aimless
magnificence of the Hellenic temples.
The style of living also among the citizens now
was altered. About the time of Pyrrhus silver plate
began to make its appearance on Roman tables, and
the chroniclers date the disappearance of shingle roofs
in Rome from 47.o." The new capital of Italy gradually
laid aside its village-like aspect, and now began to embellish
itself. It was not yet indeed customary to strip the temples
in conquered towns of their ornaments for the decoration
of Rome; but the beaks of the galleys of Antium were
displayed at the orator's platform in the Forum (i. 462);
and on public festival days the gold-mounted shields
brought home from the battle-fields of Samnium were
exhibited along the stalls of the market (i. 480). The
proceeds of fines were specially applied to the paving of
the highways in and near the city, or to the erection and
embellishment of public buildings. The wooden booths of
the butchers, which stretched along the Forum on both
sides, gave way, first on the Palatine side, then on that
also which faced the Carinae, to the stone stalls of the
money-changers; so that this place became the Exchange
of Rome. Statues of the famous men of the past,
of the kings, priests, and heroes of the legendary period,
and of the Grecian hospes who was said to have
interpreted to the decemvirs the laws of Solon; honorary
columns and monuments dedicated to the great burgo-
masters who had conquered the Veientes, the Latins, the
Samnites, to state envoys who had perished while executing
Embellish-
nent of
the city.
290.
284.
277.
4. We have already mentioned the censorial stigma attached to Publius
Cornelius Rufinus (consul 464, 477) for his silver plate (p. 64). The
strange statement of Fabius (in Strabo, v. p. 228) that the Romans first
became given to luxury (alo-8600at roſ, TAoûrov) after the Conquest of the
Sabines, is evidently only a historical version of the same rnatter; for the
conquest of the Sabines falls in the first consulate of Rufinus.
CHAP. VIII ECONOMIC CONDITION.—NATIONALITY 87
their instructions, to rich women who had bequeathed their
property to public objects, nay even to celebrated Greek
philosophers and heroes such as Pythagoras and Alcibiades,
were erected on the Capitol or in the Forum. Thus, now
that the Roman Community had become a great power,
Rome itself became a great city.
Lastly Rome, as head of the Romano-Italian con-
Silver
federacy, not only entered into the Hellenistic state-system, standard
of value.
but also conformed to the Hellenic system of moneys and
coins. Up to this time the different communities of northern
and central Italy, with fewekceptions, had struck only a copper
Currency; the South Italian towns again universally had a
currency of silver; and there were as many legal standards
and systems of coinage as there were sovereign communities
in Italy. In 485 all these local mints were restricted to
the issuing of small Coin ; a general standard of currency
applicable to all Italy was introduced, and the coining of the
currency was centralized in Rome; Capua alone continued
to retain its own silver coinage struck in the name of
Rome, but after a different standard. The new monetary
system was based on the legal ratio subsisting between
the two metals, as it had long been fixed (p. 78). The
common monetary unit was the piece of ten asses (which
were no longer of a pound, but reduced to the third of a
pound)—the denarius, which weighed in copper 3} and in
silver ºr, of a Roman pound, a trifle more than the Attic
drachma. At first copper money still predominated in the
coinage ; and it is probable that the earliest silver demarius
was coined chiefly for Lower Italy and for intercourse with
other lands. As the victory of the Romans over Pyrrhus
and Tarentum and the Roman embassy to Alexandria
could not but engage the thoughts of the contemporary
Greek statesman, so the sagacious Greek merchant might
well ponder as he looked on these new Roman drachmae.
Their flat, unartistic, and monotonous stamping appeared
269.
88 LAW-RELIGION.—MILITARY SYSTEM BOOK II
Extension
of the
Latin
nationality.
poor and insignificant by the side of the marvellously
beautiful contemporary coins of Pyrrhus and the Siceliots;
nevertheless they were by no means, like the barbarian
coins of antiquity, slavishly imitated and unequal in weight
and alloy, but, on the contrary, worthy from the first by
their independent and conscientious execution to be placed
on a level with any Greek coin.
Thus, when the eye turns from the development of
constitutions and from the national struggles for dominion
and for freedom which agitated Italy, and Rome in
particular, from the banishment of the Tarquinian house
to the subjugation of the Samnites and the Italian Greeks,
and rests on those calmer spheres of human existence which
history nevertheless rules and pervades, it everywhere
encounters the reflex influence of the great events, by
which the Roman burgesses burst the bonds of patrician
sway, and the rich variety of the national cultures of Italy
gradually perished to enrich a single people. While the
historian may not attempt to follow out the great course of
events into the infinite multiplicity of individual detail, he
does not overstep his province when, laying hold of
detached fragments of scattered tradition, he indicates the
most important changes which during this epoch took place
in the national life of Italy. That in such an inquiry the
life of Rome becomes still more prominent than in the
earlier epoch, is not merely the result of the accidental
blanks of our tradition ; it was an essential consequence
of the change in the political position of Rome, that the
Latin nationality should more and more cast the other
nationalities of Italy into the shade. We have already
pointed to the fact, that at this epoch the neighbouring
lands—southern Etruria, Sabina, the land of the Volscians,
—began to become Romanized, as is attested by the
f almost total absence of monuments of the old native
dialects, and by the occurrence of very ancient Roman
CHAP. VIII ECONOMIC CONDITION.—NATIONALITY 89
; * ~.
f
Y
2
\
inscriptions in those regions; the admission of the Sabines
to full burgess-rights at the end of this period (i. 48)
betokens that the Latinizing of Central Italy was already
at that time the conscious aim of Roman policy. The
numerous individual assignations and Colonial establish-
ments scattered throughout Italy were, not only in a
military but also in a linguistic and national point of view,
the advanced posts of the Latin stock. The Latinizing of
the Italians was scarcely at this time generally aimed at ;
on the contrary, the Roman senate seems to have intention-
ally upheld the distinction between the Latin and the other
nationalities, and they did not yet, for example, allow the
introduction of Latin into official use among the half .
burgess communities of Campania. The force of circum-
stances, however, is stronger than even the strongest
government : the language and customs of the Latin
people immediately shared its predominance in Italy,
and already began to undermine the other Italian
nationalities.
These nationalities were at the same time assailed from
s another quarter and by an ascendency resting on another basis
—by Hellenism. This was the period when Hellenism
began to become conscious of its intellectual superiority to
the other nations, and to diffuse itself on every side.
Italy did not remain unaffected by it. The most remark-
able phenomenon of this sort is presented by Apulia,
which after the fifth century of Rome gradually laid aside
its barbarian dialect and silently became Hellenized. This
change was brought about, as in Macedonia and Epirus,
not by colonization, but by civilization, which seems to
have gone hand in hand with the land commerce of
Tarentum ; at least that hypothesis is favoured by the
facts, that the districts of the Poediculi and Daunii who
were on friendly terms with the Tarentines carried out
their Hellenization more completely than the Sallentines
Progress of
Hellenism
in Italy.
90 LAW-RELIGION.—MILITARY SYSTEM BOOK II
who lived nearer to Tarentum but were constantly at feud
with it, and that the towns that were soonest Graecized,
such as Arpi, were not situated on the coast. The
stronger influence exerted by Hellenism over Apulia than
over any other Italian region is explained partly by its
position, partly by the slight development of any national
culture of its own, and partly also perhaps by its national-
ity presenting a character less alien to the Greek stock
than that of the rest of Italy (i. 12). We have already
called attention (i. 456) to the fact that the southern
Sabellian stocks, although at the outset in concert with the
tyrants of Syracuse they crushed and destroyed the
Hellenism of Magna Graecia, were at the same time affected
by contact and mingling with the Greeks, so that some of
them, such as the Bruttians and Nolans, adopted the
Greek language by the side of their native tongue, and
others, such as the Lucanians and a part of the Campanians,
adopted at least Greek writing and Greek manners.
Etruria likewise showed tendencies towards a kindred
development in the remarkable vases which have been
discovered (p. 80) belonging to this period, rivalling
those of Campania and Lucania ; and though Latium and
Samnium remained more strangers to Hellenism, there
were not wanting there also traces of an incipient and
ever-growing influence of Greek culture. In all branches
of the development of Rome during this epoch, in legis-
lation and coinage, in religion, in the formation of national
legend, we encounter traces of the Greeks; and from the
words, after the conquest of Campania, the Greek influence . .
on Roman life appears rapidly and constantly on the
increase. In the fourth century occurred the erection of .
the “Graecostasis.”—remarkable in the very form of the
word—a platform in the Roman Forum for eminent
Greek strangers and primarily for the Massiliots (p. 46).
CHAP. viii ECONOMIC CONDITION-NATIONALITY 9I
'.
In the following century the annals began to exhibit
Romans of quality with Greek surnames, such as Philipus
or in Roman form Pilipus, Philo, Sophus, Hypsaeus.
Greek customs gained ground : such as the non-Italian
practice of placing inscriptions in honour of the dead on
the tomb—of which the epitaph of Lucius Scipio (consul
in 456) is the oldest example known to us; the fashion,
also foreign to the Italians, of erecting without any decree
of the state honorary monuments to ancestors in public
places—a system begun by the great innovator Appius
Claudius, when he caused bronze shields with images and
eulogies of his ancestors to be suspended in the new
temple of Bellona (442); the distribution of branches of
palms to the competitors, introduced at the Roman
national festival in 461 ; above all, the Greek manners and
habits at table. The custom not of sitting as formerly on
benches, but of reclining on sofas, at table; the postpone”,
ment of the chief meal from noon to between two and three
o'clock in the afternoon according to our mode of reckon-
ing ; the institution of masters of the revels at banquets,
who were appointed from among the guests present,
generally by throwing the dice, and who then prescribed
to the company what, how, and when they should drink;
the table-chants sung in succession by the guests, which,
however, in Rome were not scolia, but lays in praise of
ancestors—all these were not primitive customs in Rome,
but were borrowed from the Greeks at a very early period,
! for in Cato's time these usages were already common and
had in fact partly fallen into disuse again. We must there-
fore place their introduction in this period at the latest.
A characteristic feature also was the erection of statues to
“the wisest and the bravest Greek " in the Roman Forum,
which took place by command of the Pythian Apollo during
the Samnite wars. The selection fell—evidently under
Sicilian or Campanian influence—on Pythagoras and
298.
312.
293.
Adoption
of Greek
habits at
table.
92 LAW–RELIGION.—MILITARY SYSTEM BOOK II
Rome
and the
Romans of
this epoch.
Alcibiades, the saviour and the Hannibal of the western
Hellenes. The extent to which an acquaintance with
Greek was already diffused in the fifth century among
Romans of quality is shown by the embassies of the
Romans to Tarentum—when their mouthpiece spoke, if
not in the purest Greek, at any rate without an interpreter
—and of Cineas to Rome. It scarcely admits of a doubt
that from the fifth century the young Romans who devoted
themselves to state affairs universally acquired a knowledge
of what was then the general language of the world and
of diplomacy.
Thus in the intellectual sphere Hellenism made ad-
vances quite as incessant as the efforts of the Romans to
subject the earth to their sway; and the secondary nation-
alities, such as the Samnite, Celt, and Etruscan, hard
pressed on both sides, were ever losing their inward
vigour as well as narrowing their outward bounds.
* When the two great nations, both arrived at the height
of their development, began to mingle in hostile or in
friendly contact, their antagonism of character was at the
same time prominently and fully brought out—the total
want of individuality in the Italian and especially in the
Roman character, as Contrasted with the boundless
variety, lineal, local, and personal, of Hellenism. There
was no epoch of mightier vigour in the history of Rome
~ than the epoch from the institution of the republic to the
subjugation of Italy. That epoch laid the foundations of
the commonwealth both within and without ; it created a
united Italy; it gave birth to the traditional groundwork of
the national law and of the national history; it originated
the Žilum and the maniple, the construction of roads and
of aqueducts, the farming of estates and the monetary
system ; it moulded the she-wolf of the Capitol and
designed the Ficoroni casket. But the individuals, who
contributed the several stones to this gigantic structure and
chap. vin ECONOMIC CONDITION-NATIONALITY 93
cemented them together, have disappeared without leaving a
trace, and the nations of Italy did not merge into that of Rome
more completely than the single Roman burgess merged
in the Roman community. As the grave closes alike over
all whether important or insignificant, so in the roll of the
Roman burgomasters the empty Scion of nobility stands
undistinguishable by the side of the great statesman. Of
the few records that have reached us from this period none
is more venerable, and none at the same time more
characteristic, than the epitaph of Lucius Cornelius Scipio,
who was consul in 456, and three years afterwards took
part in the decisive battle of Sentinum (i. 489). On the
beautiful sarcophagus, in noble Doric style, which eighty
years ago still enclosed the dust of the conqueror of the
Samnites, the following sentence is inscribed :—
Cornélius Zucius–Scipić Barbātus,
Gmaizéd patré prognátus, -sſórzis złr sapiéresque,
Quoités förma zárðu-tei parésuma fººt,
Consół censór aidiſis—queſſ ſuit apaša zos,
Taurdisid Cisaltma—Sãmunić capić,
Subigſt omné Loucaimamz—ópsidósque abdozłcit.
J– J– J– 9 || – J– J– J
Innumerable others who had been at the head of the
Roman commonwealth, as well as this Roman statesman and
warrior, might be commemorated as having been of noble
birth and of manly beauty, valiant and wise ; but there was
no more to record regarding them. It is doubtless not the
mere fault of tradition that no one of these Cornelii, Fabii,
Papirii, or whatever they were called, confronts us in a distinct
individual figure. The senator was supposed to be no worse
and no better than other senators, nor at all to differ from
them. It was not necessary and not desirable that any
burgess should surpass the rest, whether by showy silver plate
and Hellenic culture, or by uncommon wisdom and excel-
lence. Excesses of the former kind were punished by the
censor, and for the latter the constitution gave no scope.
298.
94 LAW–RELIGION–MILITARY SYSTEM BOOK II
The Rome of this period belonged to no individual; it was
necessary for all the burgesses to be alike, that each of
them might be like a king.
Appius No doubt, even now Hellenic individual development
* asserted its claims by the side of that levelling system ;
and the genius and force which it exhibited bear, no less
than the tendency to which it opposed itself, the full stamp
of that great age. We can name but a single man in
connection with it; but he was, as it were, the incarnation
312. of the idea of progress. Appius Claudius (censor 442 ;
307. 296. consul 447, 458), the great-great-grandson of the decemvir,
was a man of the old nobility and proud of the long line of
his ancestors; but yet it was he who set aside the
restriction which confined the full franchise of the state to
the freeholders (i. 396), and who broke up the old system
of finance (p. 85). From Appius Claudius date not only
the Roman aqueducts and highways, but also Roman
jurisprudence, eloquence, poetry, and grammar. The
publication of a table of the legis actiones, speeches
committed to writing and Pythagorean sentences, and even
innovations in orthography, are attributed to him. We
may not on this account call him absolutely a democrat
or include him in that opposition party which found its
champion in Manius Curius (i, 395); in him on the
contrary the spirit of the ancient and modern patrician
kings predominated—the spirit of the Tarquins and the
Caesars, between whom he forms a connecting link in that
five hundred years’ interregnum of extraordinary deeds and
ordinary men. So long as Appius Claudius took an active
part in public life, in his official conduct as well as his
general carriage he disregarded laws and customs on all
hands with the hardihood and sauciness of an Athenian; till,
after having long retired from the political stage, the blind ū .
old man, returning as it were from the tomb Át the decisive.”
moment, overcame king Pyrrhus in the senate, and first
CHAP. VIII ECONOMIC CONDITION.—NATIONALITY 95
formally and solemnly proclaimed the complete sovereignty
of Rome over Italy (p. 22). But the gifted man came
too early or too late; the gods made him blind on account
of his untimely wisdom. It was not individual genius that
ruled in Rome and through Rome in Italy; it was the one
immoveable idea of a policy—propagated from generation
to generation in the senate—with the leading maxims of
which the sons of the senators became already imbued,
when in the company of their fathers they went to the
council and there at the door of the hall listened to the
wisdom of the men whose seats they were destined at some
future time to fill. Immense successes were thus obtained
at an immense price; for Nike too is followed by her
Nemesis. In the Roman commonwealth there was no
special dependence on any one man, either on soldier or
on general, and under the rigid discipline of its moral
police all the idiosyncrasies of human character were
extinguished. Rome reached a greatness such as no other
state of antiquity attained; but she dearly purchased her
greatness at the sacrifice of the graceful variety, of the easy
abandon, and of the inward freedom of Hellenic life.
96 ART AND SCIENCE BOOK II
CHAPTER IX
ART AND SCIENCE
THE growth of art, and of poetic art especially, in antiquity
was intimately associated with the development of national
festivals. The thanksgiving-festival of the Roman com-
munity, which had been already Organized in the previous
period essentially under Greek influence and in the first
instance as an extraordinary festival,—the Zudi maximi or
Aomani (i. 293), acquired during the present epoch a
longer duration and greater variety in the amusements.
Originally limited to one day, the festival was prolonged by
an additional day after the happy termination of each of
the three great revolutions of 245, 26o, and 387, and thus
at the close of this period it had already a duration of four
days.”
The
Roman
nati
onal
festival.
509.
367.
494.
* The account given by Dionysius (vi. 95; comp. Niebuhr, ii. 40)
and by Plutarch (Cami/Z. 42), deriving his statement from another
passage in Dionysius regarding the Latin festival, must be understood to
apply rather to the Roman games, as, apart from other grounds, is
strikingly evident from comparing the latter passage with Liv. vi. 42
(Ritschl, Pareng. i. p. 313). Dionysius has—and, according to his
wont when in error, persistently—misunderstood the expression Zudi
maxim2.
There was, moreover, a tradition which referred the origin of the
national festival not, as in the common version, to the conquest of the
Latins by the first Tarquinius, but to the victory over the Latins at the
lake Regillus (Cicero, de Div. i. 26, 55 ; Dionys. vii. 71). That the
important statements preserved in the latter passage from Fabius really
relate to the Ordinary thanksgiving-festival, and not to any special votive
solemnity, is evident from the express allusion to the annual recurrence
of the celebration, and from the exact agreement of the sum of the
expenses with the statement in the Pseudo-Asconius (p. 142 Or.).
C II AP. IX ART AND SCIENCE 97
A still more important circumstance was, that, probably
on the institution of the curule aedileship (387) which was
from the first entrusted with the preparation and oversight
of the festival (i. 383), it lost its extraordinary character
and its reference to a special vow made by the general,
and took its place in the series of the ordinary annually
recurring festivals as the first of all, Nevertheless the
government adhered to the practice of allowing the
spectacle proper—namely the chariot-race, which was the
principal performance—to take place not more than once
at the close of the festival. On the other days the
multitude were probably left mainly to furnish amusement
for themselves, although musicians, dancers, rope-walkers,
jugglers, jesters and such like would not fail to make their
appearance on the occasion, whether hired or not. But
about the year 390 an important change occurred, which
must have stood in Connection with the fixing and prolonga-
tion of the festival, that took place perhaps about the same
time. A scaffolding of boards was erected at the expense of
the state in the Circus for the first three days, and suitable
representations were provided on it for the entertainment
of the multitude. That matters might not be carried too
far however in this way, a fixed sum of 2 oo, ooo asses
(24, 20 S5) was once for all appropriated from the exchequer
for the expenses of the festival ; and the sum was not
increased up to the period of the Punic wars. The aediles,
who had to expend this sum, were obliged to defray any
additional amount out of their own pockets; and it is not
probable that they at this time contributed often or
considerably from their own resources. That the new
stage was generally under Greek influence, is proved by its
very name (scaena, gknvá). It was no doubt at first
designed merely for musicians and buffoons of all sorts,
amongst whom the dancers to the flute, particularly those
then so celebrated from Etruria, were probably the most
VOL. II 39
367.
364.
The
Roman
Stage.
98 ART AND SCIENCE BOOK II
Ballad-
singers.
Sačura.
Censure of
art,
distinguished ; but a public stage had at any rate now
arisen in Rome and it soon became open also to the
Roman poets. .
There was no want of such poets in Latium. Latin
“strolling minstrels” or “ballad-singers” (grassafores, spa-
tiatores) went from town to town and from house to house,
and recited their chants (saturae, i. 35), gesticulating and
dancing to the accompaniment of the flute. The measure
was of course the only one that then existed, the so-called
Saturnian (i. 289). No distinct plot lay at the basis of
the chants, and as little do they appear to have been in
the form of dialogue. We must conceive of them as re-
sembling those monotonous—sometimes improvised, some-
times recited—ballads and farantelle, such as one may still
hear in the Roman hostelries. Songs of this sort accord-
ingly early came upon the public stage, and certainly
formed the first nucleus of the Roman theatre. But
not only were these beginnings of the drama in Rome, as
everywhere, modest and humble; they were, in a remark-
able manner, accounted from the very outset disreputable.
The Twelve Tables denounced evil and worthless song-
singing, imposing severe penalties not only upon incanta-
tions but even on lampoons composed against a fellow-
citizen or recited before his door, and forbidding the
employment of wailing-women at funerals. But far more
severely, than by such legal restrictions, the incipient
exercise of art was affected by the moral anathema, which
was denounced against these frivolous and paid trades by
the narrowminded earnestness of the Roman character.
“The trade of a poet,” says Cato, “in former times was
not respected ; if any one occupied himself with it or was
a hanger-on at banquets, he was called an idler.” But
now any one who practised dancing, music, or ballad-
singing for money was visited with a double stigma, in
Consequence of the more and more confirmed disapproval
CHAP. IX ART AND SCIENCE 99
of gaining a livelihood by services rendered for remunera-
tion. While accordingly the taking part in the masked
farces with stereotyped characters, that formed the usual
native amusement (i. 291), was looked upon as an innocent
youthful frolic, the appearing on a public stage for money
and without a mask was considered as directly infamous,
and the singer and poet were in this respect placed quite
on a level with the rope-dancer and the harlequin. Persons
of this stamp were regularly pronounced by the censors
(p. 63 f) incapable of serving in the burgess-army and of
voting in the burgess-assembly. Moreover, not only was
the direction of the stage regarded as pertaining to the
province of the city police—a fact significant enough even
in itself—but the police was probably, even at this period,
invested with arbitrary powers of an extraordinary character
against professional stage-artists. Not only did the police
magistrates sit in judgment on the performance after its
conclusion—on which occasion wine flowed as copiously
for those who had acquitted themselves well, as stripes fell
to the lot of the bungler—but all the urban magistrates
were legally entitled to inflict bodily chastisement and
imprisonment on any actor at any time and at any place.
The necessary effect of this was that dancing, music, and
poetry, at least so far as they appeared on the public stage,
fell into the hands of the lowest classes of the Roman
burgesses, and especially into those of foreigners; and
while at this period poetry still played altogether too in-
significant a part to engage the attention of foreign artists,
the statement on the other hand, that in Rome all the
music, sacred and profane, was essentially Etruscan, and
consequently the ancient Latin art of the flute, which was
evidently at one time held in high esteem (i. 291), had
been supplanted by foreign music, may be regarded as
already applicable to this period.
There is no mention of any poetical literature. Neither
IOO ART AND SCIENCE BOOK II
Roman
historical
composi-
tion.
Registers
of magis-
trateS.
463.
the masked plays nor the recitations of the stage can have
had in the proper sense fixed texts; on the contrary, they
were ordinarily improvised by the performers themselves
as circumstances required. Of works composed at this
period posterity could point to nothing but a sort of Roman
“Works and Days”—counsels of a farmer to his son,"
and the already-mentioned Pythagorean poems of Appius
Claudius (p. 94), the first commencement of Roman
poetry after the Hellenic type. Nothing of the poems of
this epoch has survived but one or two epitaphs in
Saturnian measure (p. 93).
Along with the rudiments of the Roman drama, the
rudiments of Roman historical composition belong to this
period; both as regards the contemporary recording of
remarkable events, and as regards the conventional settle-
ment of the early history of the Roman community.
The writing of Contemporary history was associated
with the register of the magistrates. The register reaching
farthest back, which was accessible to the later Roman
inquirers and is still indirectly accessible to us, seems to
have been derived from the archives of the temple of the
Capitoline Jupiter; for it records the names of the annual
presidents of the community onward from the consul
Marcus Horatius, who consecrated that temple on the
13th Sept. in his year of office, and it also notices the
vow which was made on Occasion of a severe pestilence
under the consuls Publius Servilius and Lucius Aebutius
(according to the reckoning now current, 291), that thence-
forward a nail should be driven every hundredth year into
the wall of the Capitoline temple. Subsequently it was
* A fragment has been preserved :—
Hiberno pulvere, verno luto, grandia farra
Camille metes—
We do not know by what right this was afterwards regarded as the oldest
Roman poem (Macrob. Saá. v. 20 ; Festus, Ep. v. ſlaminius, p. 93, M. ;
Serv. on Virg. Georg. i. 1 or ; Plin. xvii. 2. I4).
* * g
j g
tº p
:
-3
** &
©
*
$º
:
º*.
:
:
gº 3
*3 e Q
CHAP. IX ART AND SCIENCE IOI
t
the state officials who were learned in measuring and in
writing, or in other words, the pontifices, that kept an
official record of the names of the annual chief magistrates,
and thus combined an annual, with the earlier monthly,
calendar. Both these calendars were afterwards compre-
hended under the name of Fasti—which strictly belonged
only to the list of court-days. This arrangement was
probably adopted not long after the abolition of the
monarchy; for in fact an official record of the annual
magistrates was of urgent practical necessity for the
purpose of authenticating the order of succession of official
documents. But, if there was an official register of the
consuls so old, it probably perished in the Gallic conflagra-
tion (364); and the list of the pontifical college was sub-
sequently completed from the Capitoline register which
was not affected by that catastrophe, so far as this latter
reached back. That the list of presidents which we now
have—although in collateral matters, and especially in
genealogical statements, it has been supplemented at
pleasure from the family pedigrees of the nobility—is in
substance based from the beginning on contemporary and
credible records, admits of no doubt. But it reproduces
the calendar years only imperfectly and approximately:
for the consuls did not enter on office with the new year,
or even on a definite day fixed once for all; on the con-
trary from various causes the day of entering on office was
fluctuating, and the inferregna that frequently occurred
between two consulates were entirely omitted in the
reckoning by official years. Accordingly, if the calendar
years were to be reckoned by this list of consuls, it was
necessary to note the days of entering on and of demitting
office in the case of each pair, along with such inferregna
as occurred ; and this too may have been early done.
Dut besides this, the list of the annual magistrates was
adjusted to the list of calendar years in such a way that a
390.
I O2 ART AND SCIENCE BOOK II
509.
Capitoline
€Iſa,
Annals.
pair of magistrates were by accommodation assigned to
each calendar year, and, where the list did not suffice,
intercalary years were inserted, which are denoted in the
later (Varronian) table by the figures 379-383, 421, 430,
445, 453. From 291 U.C. (463 B.C.) the Roman list
demonstrably coincides, not indeed in detail but yet on
the whole, with the Roman calendar, and is thus chrono-
logically certain, so far as the defectiveness of the calendar
itself allows. The 47 years preceding that date cannot
be checked, but must likewise be at least in the main
correct.” Whatever lies beyond 245 remains, chrono-
logically, in oblivion.
No era was formed for ordinary use ; but in ritual
matters they reckoned from the year of the consecration
of the temple of the Capitoline Jupiter, from which the
list of magistrates also started.
The idea naturally suggested itself that, along with the
names of the magistrates, the most important events occur-
ring under their magistracy might be noted ; and from such
notices appended to the catalogue of magistrates the Roman
annals arose, just as the chronicles of the middle ages arose
out of the memoranda marginally appended to the table of
Easter. But it was not until a late period that the pontifices
formed the scheme of a formal chronicle (liber annalis),
which should steadily year by year record the names of all
the magistrates and the remarkable events. Before the
eclipse of the sun noticed under the 5th of June 351, by
which is probably meant that of the 20th June 354, no
solar eclipse was found recorded from observation in the
later chronicle of the city: its statements as to the numbers
of the census only begin to sound credible after the begin-
ning of the fifth century (i. 122, p. 55); the cases of fines
brought before the people, and the prodigies expiated on
403.
400.
1 The first places in the list alone excite suspicion, and may have been
subsequently added, with a view to round off the number of years between
the flight of the king and the burning of the city to I2O.
CHAP. IX ART AND SCIENCE IO3
behalf of the community, appear to have been regularly
introduced into the annals only after the second half of the
fifth century began. To all appearance the institution of
an organized book of annals, and—what was certainly
associated with it—the revision (which we have just
explained) of the earlier list of magistrates so as to make it
a year-calendar by the insertion, where chronologically
necessary, of intercalary years, took place in the first half
of the fifth century. But even after it became a practically
recognized duty of the pontifex maximus to record year
after year campaigns and colonizations, pestilences and
famines, eclipses and portents, the deaths of priests and
other men of note, the new decrees of the people, and the
results of the census, and to deposit these records in his
official residence for permanent preservation and for any
one's inspection, these records were still far removed from
the character of real historical writings. How scanty the
contemporary record still was at the close of this period
and how ample room is left for the caprice of subsequent
annalists, is shown with incisive clearness by a comparison
of the accounts as to the campaign of 456 in the annals
and in the epitaph of the consul Scipio.” The later
historians were evidently unable to construct a readable
and in some measure connected narrative out of these
notices from the book of annals; and we should have
difficulty, even if the book of annals still lay before us
with its original contents, in writing from it in duly
connected sequence the history of the times. Such
chronicles, however, did not exist merely in Rome; every
Latin city possessed its annals as well as its pontifices, as is
clear from isolated notices relative to Ardea for instance,
Ameria, and Interamna on the Nar; and from the collective
* P. 93. According to the annals Scipio commands in Etruria and
his colleague in Samnium, and Lucania is during this year in league with
Rome; according to the epitaph Scipio conquers two towns in Samnium
and all Lucania.
*
IO4 ART AND SCIENCE BOOK II
mass of these city-chronicles some result might perhaps
have been attained similar to what has been accomplished
for the earlier middle ages by the comparison of different
... monastic chronicles. Unfortunately the Romans in later
times preferred to supply the defect by Hellenic or
Family
pedigrees.
Roman
early
history of
Rome.
*
.r-
Hellenizing falsehoods.
Besides these official arrangements, meagrely planned
and uncertainly handled, for commemorating past times
and past events, there can scarcely have existed at this
epoch any other records immediately serviceable for Roman
history. Of private chronicles we find no trace. The
leading houses, however, were careful to draw up genea-
logical tables, so important in a legal point of view, and to
have the family pedigree painted for a perpetual memorial
on the walls of the entrance-hall. These lists, which at
least named the magistracies held by the family, not only
furnished a basis for family tradition, but doubtless at an
early period had biographical notices attached to them.
The memorial orations, which in Rome could not be
omitted at the funeral of any person of quality, and were
ordinarily pronounced by the nearest relative of the
deceased, consisted essentially not merely in an enumera-
tion of the virtues and excellencies of the dead, but also in
a recital of the deeds and virtues of his ancestors; and so
they were doubtless, even in the earliest times, transmitted
traditionally from one generation to another. Many a
valuable notice may by this means have been preserved ;
but many a daring perversion and falsification also may
have been in this way introduced into tradition.
But as the first steps towards writing real history
belonged to this period, to it belonged also the first
attempts to record, and conventionally distort, the primitive
history of Rome. The sources whence it was formed were
of course the same as they are everywhere. Isolated names
like those of the kings Numa, Ancus, Tullus, to whom the
CHAP. IX ART AND SCIENCE IO5
clan-names were probably only assigned subsequently, and
isolated facts, such as the conquest of the Latins by king
Tarquinius and the expulsion of the Tarquinian royal
house, may have continued to live in true general tradition
orally transmitted. Further materials were furnished by
the traditions of the patrician clans, such as the various
tales that relate to the Fabii. Other tales gave a symbolic
and historic shape to primitive national institutions,
especially setting forth with great vividness the origin of ~
rules of law. The sacredness of the walls was thus illus-
trated in the tale of the death of Remus, the abolition of
blood-revenge in the tale of the end of king Tatius (i. 190,
note), the necessity of the arrangement as to the Žons
suff/icius in the legend of Horatius Cocles,” the origin of
the provocatio in the beautiful tale of the Horatii and
Curiatii, the origin of manumission and of the burgess-
rights of freedmen in the tale of the Tarquinian conspiracy
and the slave Vindicius. To the same class belongs the
history of the foundation of the city itself, which was
designed to connect the origin of Rome with Latium and
with Alba, the general metropolis of the Latins. Historical
glosses were annexed to the surnames of distinguished
Romans; that of Publius Valerius the “servant of the
people” (Popſicola), for instance, gathered around it a
whole group of such anecdotes. Above all, the sacred fig-
tree and other spots and notable objects in the city were
associated with a great multitude of sextons' tales of the
same nature as those out of which, upwards of a thousand
years afterwards, there grew up on the same ground the
Mirabilia Urbis. Some attempts to link together these
different tales—the adjustment of the series of the seven
kings, the setting down of the duration of the monarchy
at 240 years in all, which was undoubtedly based on a
' This object of the legend is clear from Pliny the Elder A7. N.
xxxvi. I5, Ioo).
IO6 ART AND SCIENCE BOOK II
296.
289.
calculation of the length of generations," and even the
commencement of an official record of these assumed facts
—probably took place already in this epoch. The outlines
of the narrative, and in particular its quasi-chronology,
make their appearance in the later tradition so unalterably
fixed, that for that very reason the fixing of them must be
placed not in, but previous to, the literary epoch of Rome.
If a bronze casting of the twins Romulus and Remus
sucking the teats of the she-wolf was already placed beside
the Sacred fig-tree in 458, the Romans who subdued
Latium and Samnium must have heard the history of the
Origin of their ancestral city in a form not greatly differing
from what we read in Livy. Even the Aborigines—i.e.
“those from the very beginning”—that simple rudimental
form of historical speculation as to the Latin race—are met
with about 465 in the Sicilian author Callias. It is of the
very nature of a chronicle that it should attach prehistoric
speculation to history and endeavour to go back, if not to
the origin of heaven and earth, at least to the origin of the
community; and there is express testimony that the table
of the pontifices specified the year of the foundation of
Rome. Accordingly it may be assumed that, when the
pontifical college in the first half of the fifth century
proceeded to substitute for the former scanty records—
* . . . " ordinarily, doubtless, confined to the names of the magis-
trates—the scheme of a formal yearly chronicle, it also
added what was wanting at the beginning, the history of
the kings of Rome and of their fall, and, by placing the
institution of the republic on the day of the consecration
of the Capitoline temple, the 13th of Sept. 245, furnished
509.
* They appear to have reckoned three generations to a hundred years
and to have rounded off the figures 233; to 240, just as the epoch between
the king's flight and the burning of the city was rounded off to 120 years
(p. Ioz, note). The reason why these precise numbers suggested them-
selves, is apparent from the similar adjustment (above explained, i. 265)
of the measures of surface.
CHAP. IX ART AND SCIENCE Io?
a semblance of connection between the dateless and the
annalistic narrative. That in this earliest record of the
origin of Rome the hand of Hellenism was at work, can º'
scarcely be doubted. The speculations as to the primitive
and subsequent population, as to the priority of pastoral
life over agriculture, and the transformation of the man
Romulus into the god Quirinus (i. 214), have quite a
Greek aspect, and even the obscuring of the genuinely
national forms of the pious Numa and the wise Egeria by
the admixture of alien elements of Pythagorean primitive
wisdom appears by no means to be one of the most recent
ingredients in the Roman prehistoric annals.
The pedigrees of the noble clans were completed in a
manner analogous to these origines of the community, and
were, in the favourite style of heraldry, universally traced
back to illustrious ancestors. The Aemilii, for instance,
Calpurnii, Pinarii, and Pomponii professed to be descended
from the four sons of Numa, Mamercus, Calpus, Pinus, and
Pompo; and the Aemilii, yet further, from Mamercus, the
son of Pythagoras, who was named the “winning speaker”
(aipúAos).
But, notwithstanding the Hellenic reminiscences that
are everywhere apparent, these prehistoric annals of the
community and of the leading houses may be designated
at least relatively as national, partly because they originated
in Rome, partly because they tended primarily to form
links of connection not between Rome and Greece, but
between Rome and Latium.
It was Hellenic story and fiction that undertook the
task of connecting Rome and Greece. Hellenic legend
exhibits throughout an endeavour to keep pace with the
gradual extension of geographical knowledge, and to form
a dramatized geography by the aid of its numerous stories
of voyagers and emigrants. In this, however, it seldom
follows a simple course. An account like that of the
.*
… t . .
Hellenic
early
history of
Rome.
IO8 ART AND SCIENCE BOOK II
424.
497.
340.
336.
Stesicho-
TUIS. -
632–553. .
earliest Greek historical work which mentions Rome, the
“Sicilian History” of Antiochus of Syracuse (which ended
in 330)—that a man named Sikelos had migrated from
Rome to Italia, that is, to the Bruttian peninsula—such
an account, simply giving a historical form to the family
affinity between the Romans, Siculi, and Bruttians, and
free from all Hellenizing colouring, is a rare phenomenon.
Greek legend as a whole is pervaded—and the more so,
the later its rise—by a tendency to represent the whole
barbarian world as having either issued from the Greeks
or having been subdued by them ; and it early in this
sense spun its threads also around the west. For Italy
the legends of Herakles and of the Argonauts were of less
importance—although Hecataeus (+ after 257) is already
acquainted with the Pillars of Herakles, and carries the
Argo from the Black Sea into the Atlantic Ocean, from the
latter into the Nile, and thus back to the Mediterranean—
than were the homeward voyages connected with the fall
of Ilion. With the first dawn of information as to Italy
Diomedes begins to wander in the Adriatic, and Odysseus
in the Tyrrhene Sea (i. I 77); as indeed the latter localiza-
tion at least was naturally suggested by the Homeric con-
ception of the legend. Down to the times of Alexander
the countries on the Tyrrhene Sea belonged in Hellenic
fable to the domain of the legend of Odysseus; Ephorus,
who ended his history with the year 414, and the so-called
Scylax (about 418) still substantially follow it. Of Trojan
voyages the whole earlier poetry has no knowledge; in
Homer Aeneas after the fall of Ilion rules over the Trojans
that remained at home.
It was the great remodeller of myths, Stesichorus (122–
201) who first in his “Destruction of Ilion ” brought Aeneas
to the land of the west, that he might poetically enrich the
world of fable in the country of his birth and of his adop-
tion, Sicily and Lower Italy, by the contrast of the Trojan
CHAP. IX ART AND SCIENCE Io9
heroes with the Hellenic. With him originated the poetical
outlines of this fable as thenceforward fixed, especially the
group of the hero and his wife, his little son and his aged
father bearing the household gods, departing from burning
Troy, and the important identification of the Trojans with
the Sicilian and Italian autochthones, which is especially
apparent in the case of the Trojan trumpeter Misenus who
gave his name to the promontory of Misenum." The old
poet was guided in this view by the feeling that the
barbarians of Italy were less widely removed from the
Hellenes than other barbarians were, and that the relation
between the Hellenes and Italians might, when measured
poetically, be conceived as similar to that between the
Homeric Achaeans and the Trojans. This new Trojan
fable soon came to be mixed up with the earlier legend of
Odysseus, while it spread at the same time more widely
over Italy. According to Hellanicus (who wrote about
350) Odysseus and Aeneas came through the country of
the Thracians and Molottians (Epirus) to Italy, where the
Trojan women whom they had brought with them burnt
the ships, and Aeneas founded the city of Rome and named
it after one of these Trojan women. To a similar effect,
only with less absurdity, Aristotle (370–432) related that
an Achaean squadron cast upon the Latin coast had been
set on fire by Trojan female slaves, and that the Latins
had originated from the descendants of the Achaeans who
were thus compelled to remain there and of their Trojan
wives. With these tales were next mingled elements from
the indigenous legend, the knowledge of which had been
diffused as far as Sicily by the active intercourse between
Sicily and Italy, at least towards the end of this epoch.
In the version of the origin of Rome, which the Sicilian
* The “Trojan colonies” in Sicily, mentioned by Thucydides, the
pseudo-Scylax, and others, as well as the designation of Capua as a
Trojan foundation in Hecataeus, must also lje Llaced Lo Stesiuliulus and
his identification of the natives of Italy and Sicily with the Trojans.
400.
384-322.
I IO ART AND SCIENCE BOOK II
Callias put on record about 465, the fables of Odysseus,
Aeneas, and Romulus were intermingled."
But the person who really completed the conception
subsequently current of this Trojan migration was Timaeus of
Tauromenium in Sicily, who concluded his historical work
with 492. It is he who represents Aeneas as first founding
Lavinium with its shrine of the Trojan Penates, and as
thereafter founding Rome; he must also have interwoven
the Tyrian princess Elisa or Dido with the legend of Aeneas,
for with him Dido is the foundress of Carthage, and Rome
and Carthage are said by him to have been built in the same
year. These alterations were manifestly suggested by cer-
tain accounts that had reached Sicily respecting Latin
manners and customs, in conjunction with the critical
struggle which at the very time and place where Timaeus
wrote was preparing between the Romans and the Cartha-
ginians. In the main, however, the story cannot have been
derived from Latium, but can only have been the good-
for-nothing invention of the old “gossip-monger” himself.
Timaeus had heard of the primitive temple of the household
gods in Lavinium ; but the statement, that these were
regarded by the Lavinates as the Penates brought by the
followers of Aeneas from Ilion, is as certainly an addition
of his own, as the ingenious parallel between the Roman
October horse and the Trojan horse, and the exact inventory
taken of the sacred Objects of Lavinium—there were, our
worthy author affirms, heralds' staves of iron and copper,
and an earthen vase of Trojan manufacture . It is true
that these same Penates might not at all be seen by any
one for centuries afterwards; but Timaeus was one of the
289.
Timaeus.
262.
* According to his account Romé, a woman who had fled from Ilion
to Rome, or rather her daughter of the same name, married Latinos,
king of the Aborigines, and bore to him three Sons, Romos, Romylos,
and Telegonos. The last, who undoubtedly emerges here as founder of
Tusculum and Praeneste, belongs, as is well known, to the legend of
Odysseus. -
CHAP. IX. ART AND SCIENCE III
historians who upon no matter are so fully informed as upon
things unknowable. It is not without reason that Polybius,
who knew the man, advises that he should in no case be
trusted, and least of all where, as in this instance, he appeals
to documentary proofs. In fact the Sicilian rhetorician,
who professed to point out the grave of Thucydides in
Italy, and who found no higher praise for Alexander than
that he had finished the conquest of Asia sooner than Iso-
crates finished his “Panegyric,” was exactly the man to
knead the naïve fictions of the earlier time into that confused
medley on which the play of accident has conferred so sin-
gular a celebrity.
How far the Hellenic play of fable regarding Italian
matters, as it in the first instance arose in Sicily, gained
admission during this period even in Italy itself, cannot be
ascertained with precision. Those links of connection with
the Odyssean cycle, which we subsequently meet with in
the legends of the foundation of Tusculum, Praeneste,
Antium, Ardea, and Cortona, must probably have been
already concocted at this period ; and even the belief in
the descent of the Romans from Trojan men or Trojan
women must have been established at the close of this
epoch in Rome, for the first demonstrable contact between
Rome and the Greek east is the intercession of the senate
on behalf of the “kindred ” Ilians in 472. That the fable
of Aeneas was nevertheless of comparatively recent origin
in Italy, is shown by the extremely scanty measure of its
localization as compared with the legend of Odysseus; and
at any rate the final redaction of these tales, as well as their
reconciliation with the legend of the origin of Rome, belongs
only to the following age.
While in this way historical composition, or what was so
called among the Hellenes, busied itself in its own fashion
with the prehistoric times of Italy, it left the contemporary
history of Italy almost untouched—a circumstance as signi-
282.
II2 ART AND SCIENCE HOOK II
336.
300.
Jurispru-
dence.
451. 450.
Opinions.
ficant of the sunken condition of Hellenic history, as it is
to be for our sakes regretted. Theopompus of Chios (who
ended his work with 418) barely noticed in passing the
capture of Rome by the Celts; and Aristotle (i. 432),
Clitarchus (p. 1), Theophrastus (p. 44), Heraclides of
Pontus (fabout 450), incidentally mention particular events
relating to Rome. . It is only with Hieronymus of Cardia,
who as the historian of Pyrrhus narrated also his Italian
wars, that Greek historiography becomes at the same time
an authority for the history of Rome.
Among the sciences, that of jurisprudence acquired an
invaluable basis through the committing to writing of the
laws of the city in the years 303, 3o4. This code, known
under the name of the Twelve Tables, is perhaps the oldest
Roman document that deserves the name of a book. The
nucleus of the so-called ſeges regiae was probably not much
more recent. These were certain precepts chiefly of a
ritual nature, which rested upon traditional usage, and were
probably promulgated to the general public under the form
of royal enactments by the college of pontifices, which was
entitled not to legislate but to point out the law. Moreover
it may be presumed that from the commencement of this
period the more important decrees of the senate at any rate
—if not those of the people—were regularly recorded in
writing; for already in the earliest conflicts between the
orders disputes took place as to their preservation
(i. 355, 369).
While the mass of written legal documents thus in-
creased, the foundations of jurisprudence in the proper
sense were also firmly laid. It was necessary that both the
magistrates who were annually changed and the jurymen
taken from the people should be enabled to resort to men
of skill, who were acquainted with the course of law and
knew how to suggest a decision accordant with precedents
or, in the absence of these, resting on reasonable grounds.
CHAP. IX ART AND SCIENCE 1 I3
The pontifices who were wont to be consulted by the people
regarding court-days and on all questions of difficulty and of
legal observance relating to the worship of the gods, delivered
also, when asked, counsels and opinions on other points of
law, and thus developed in the bosom of their college that
tradition which formed the basis of Roman private law, i.
more especially the formulae of action proper for each
particular case. A table of formulae which embraced all
these actions, along with a calendar which specified the
court-days, was published to the people about 450 by
Appius Claudius or by his clerk, Gnaeus Flavius. This
attempt, however, to give formal shape to a science, that as
yet hardly recognized itself, stood for a long time completely
isolated.
That the knowledge of law and the setting it forth were
even now a means of recommendation to the people and of
attaining offices of state, may be readily conceived, although
the story, that the first plebeian pontifex Publius Sempro-
nius Sophus (consul 450), and the first plebeian pontifex
maximus Tiberius Coruncanius (consul 474), were indebted
for these priestly honours to their knowledge of law, is prob-
ably rather a conjecture of posterity than a statement of
tradition.
That the real genesis of the Latin and doubtless also of
the other Italian languages was anterior to this period, and
that even at its commencement the Latin language was sub-
stantially an accomplished fact, is evident from the frag-
ments of the Twelve Tables, which, however, have been
‘ largely modernized by their semi-oral tradition. They
contain doubtless a number of antiquated words and harsh
combinations, particularly in consequence of omitting the
indefinite subject; but their meaning by no means presents,
like that of the Arval chant, any real difficulty, and they
exhibit far more agreement with the language of Cato than
with that of the ancient litanies. If the Romans at the
VOL. II 4O
Table of
formulae
for actions,
300.
304.
280.
Language,
II4 ART AND SCIENCE BOOK II
Technical
style.
Philology.
beginning of the seventh century had difficulty in under-
standing documents of the fifth, the difficulty doubtless pro-
ceeded merely from the fact that there existed at that time
in Rome no real, least of all any documentary, research.
On the other hand it must have been at this period,
when the indication and redaction of law began, that the
Roman technical style first established itself—a style which
at least in its developed shape is nowise inferior to the
modern legal phraseology of England in stereotyped formulae
and turns of expression, endless enumeration of particulars,
and long-winded periods; and which commends itself to
the initiated by its clearness and precision, while the layman
who does not understand it listens, according to his character
and humour, with reverence, impatience, or chagrin.
Moreover at this epoch began the treatment of the native
languages after a rational method. About its commence-
ment the Sabellian as well as the Latin idiom threatened,
as we saw (i. 282), to become barbarous, and the abrasion
of endings and the corruption of the vowels and more
delicate consonants spread on all hands, just as was the
case with the Romanic languages in the fifth and sixth
centuries of the Christian era. But a reaction set in : the
sounds which had coalesced in Oscan, d and r, and the
sounds which had coalesced in Latin, g and Á, were again
separated, and each was provided with its proper sign; o
and u, for which from the first the Oscan alphabet had
lacked separate signs, and which had been in Latin
Originally separate but threatened to coalesce, again
became distinct, and in Oscan even the was resolved
into two signs different in sound and in writing ; lastly,
the writing again came to follow more closely the pronun-
ciation—the s for instance among the Romans being in
many cases replaced by r. Chronological indications point
to the fifth century as the period of this reaction; the
450. Latin g for instance was not yet in existence about 300
CHAP. IX ART AND SCIENCE II 5
but was so probably about 500 ; the first of the Papirian 250.
clan, who called himself Papirius instead of Papisius, was
the consul of 418 ; the introduction of that r instead of s 336.
is attributed to Appius Claudius, censor in 442. Beyond 312.
doubt the re-introduction of a more delicate and precise
pronunciation was connected with the increasing influence
of Greek civilization, which is observable at this very period
in all departments of Italian life; and, as the silver coins of
Capua and Nola are far more perfect than the contem-
porary asses of Ardea and Rome, writing and language
appear also to have been more speedily and fully reduced
to rule in the Campanian land than in Latium. How little,
notwithstanding the labour bestowed on it, the Roman
language and mode of writing had become settled at the
close of this epoch, is shown by the inscriptions preserved
from the end of the fifth century, in which the greatest ‘. .
arbitrariness prevails, particularly as to the insertion or
Omission of m, d and s in final sounds and of n in the body
of a word, and as to the distinguishing of the vowels o ze
and e i.” It is probable that the contemporary Sabellians
were in these points further advanced, while the Umbrians
were but slightly affected by the regenerating influence of
the Hellenes.
In consequence of this progress of jurisprudence and Instruc-
grammar, elementary school-instruction also, which in itself tion.
had doubtless already emerged earlier, must have undergone
* In the two epitaphs, of Lucius Scipio consul in 456, and of the 298.
consul of the same name in 495, m and d are ordinarily wanting in the 259.
termination of cases, yet Luciom and Gnaivod respectively occur once ;
there occur alongside of one another in the nominative Cornelio and ſilios;
cosol, cesor, alongside of consol, censor; aidiles, dedet, ploirume (= plurimi)
Åec (nom. sing.) alongside of aidilis, cepit, quei, hic. Rhotacism is
already carried out completely; we find duomoro (=&omore/m), floërume,
not as in the chant of the Salii foedesum, plusima. Our surviving inscrip-
tions do not in general precede the age of rhotacism ; of the older s only
isolated fraces necur, such as afterwards honos, labos alongside of honor,
Zabor; and the similar feminine praenomina, Maio (= maios maior) and
MŽno in recently found epitaphs at Praeneste.
II6 ART AND SCIENCE BOOK II
.*
‘. .-- *.
a certain improvement. As Homer was the oldest Greek,
and the Twelve Tables was the oldest Roman, book, each
became in its own land the essential basis of instruction ;
and the learning by heart the juristico-political catechism
was a chief part of Roman juvenile training. Alongside
of the Latin “writing-masters” (literatores) there were of
course, from the time when an acquaintance with Greek
was indispensable for every statesman and merchant, also
Greek “language-masters” (grammatici)," partly tutor-slaves,
partly private teachers, who at their own dwelling or that
of their pupil gave instructions in the reading and speaking
of Greek. As a matter of course, the rod played its part
in instruction as well as in military discipline and in police.”
The instruction of this epoch cannot however have passed
beyond the elementary stage : there was no material shade
of difference, in a social respect, between the educated and
the non-educated Roman.
That the Romans at no time distinguished themselves in
the mathematical and mechanical sciences is well known,
and is attested, in reference to the present epoch, by
almost the only fact which can be adduced under this head
with certainty—the regulation of the calendar attempted by
the decemvirs. They wished to substitute for the previous
calendar based on the old and very imperfect frieferis (i.
270 the contemporary Attic calendar of the octaeteris, which
retained the lunar month of 29; days but assumed the solar
year at 365% days instead of 368%, and therefore, without
Exact
sciences.
Regulation
of the
calendar.
* Litterator and grammaticus are related nearly as elementary teacher
and teacher of languages with us; the latter designation belonged by
earlier usage only to the teacher of Greek, not to a teacher of the mother-
tongue. Lifferatus is more recent, and denotes not a schoolmaster but a
man of culture.
* It is at any rate a true Roman picture, which Plautus (Bacch. 431)
produces as a specimen of the good old mode of training children :-
gº ſe zzöz reven?sses domazzm,
Cincticulo praecinctus in sella apud magistrum adsideres;
Si, librum czzm Żegeres, umam Zeccavisses syllabam,
Fiered corium Zam maculoszeme, quam est zułricis palliam.
CHAP. IX ART AND SCIENCE 117
making any alteration in the length of the common year
of 354 days, intercalated, not as formerly 59 days every
4 years, but 90 days every 8 years. With the same
view the improvers of the Roman calendar intended—while
otherwise retaining the current calendar—in the two inter-
calary years of the four years' cycle to shorten not the inter-
calary months, but the two Februaries by 7 days each, and
consequently to fix that month in the intercalary years at
22 and 21 days respectively instead of 29 and 28. But
want of mathematical precision and theological scruples,
especially in reference to the annual festival of Terminus
which fell within those very days in February, disarranged
the intended reform, so that the Februaries of the inter-
calary years came to be of 24 and 23 days, and thus the
new Roman solar year in reality ran to 366} days. Some
remedy for the practical evils resulting from this was found
in the practice by which, setting aside the reckoning by the
months or ten months of the calendar (i. 270) as now no
longer applicable from the inequality in the length of the
months, wherever more accurate specifications were required,
they accustomed themselves to reckon by terms of ten
months of a solar year of 365 days or by the so-called
ten-month year of 304 days. Over and above this, there
came early into use in Italy, especially for agricultural
purposes, the farmers' calendar based on the Egyptian
solar year of 365+ days by Eudoxus (who flourished 386).
A higher idea of what the Italians were able to do in
these departments is furnished by their works of structural
and plastic art, which are closely associated with the
mechanical sciences. Here too we do not find phenomena
of real originality; but if the impress of borrowing, which
the plastic art of Italy bears throughout, diminishes its
artistic interest/there gathers around it a historical interest
all the more lively, because on the one hand it preserves
the most remarkable evidences of an international inter-
368.
Structural
and plastic
art.
I 18 ART AND SCIENCE BOOK II
Architec-
ture.
Etruscan.
Latin.
493.
course of which other traces have disappeared, and on the
other hand, amidst the well-nigh total loss of the history
of the non-Roman Italians, art is almost the sole surviving
index of the living activity which the different peoples of
the peninsula displayed. No novelty is to be reported in
this period; but what we have already shown (i. 306) may
be illustrated in this period with greater precision and on
a broader basis, namely, that the stimulus derived from
Greece powerfully affected the Etruscans and Italians on
different sides, and called forth among the former a richer
and more luxurious, among the latter—where it had any
influence at all—a more intelligent and more genuine, art.
We have already shown how wholly the architecture
of all the Italian lands was, even in its earliest period, per-
vaded by Hellenic elements. Its city walls, its aqueducts,
its tombs with pyramidal roofs, and its Tuscanic temple,
are not at all, or not materially, different from the oldest
Hellenic structures. No trace has been preserved of any
advance in architecture among the Etruscans during this
period; we find among them neither any really new recep-
tion, nor any original creation, unless we ought to reckon
as such the magnificent tombs, e.g. the so-called tomb of
Porsena at Chiusi described by Varro, which vividly recalls
the strange and meaningless grandeur of the Egyptian
pyramids.
In Latium too, during the first century and a half of
the republic, it is probable that they moved solely in the
previous track, and it has already been stated that the
exercise of art rather sank than rose with the introduction
of the republic (p. 84). There can scarcely be named
any Latin building of architectural importance belonging to
this period, except the temple of Ceres built in the Circus
at Rome in 261, which was regarded in the period of the
empire as a model of the Tuscanic style. But towards the
close of this epoch a new spirit appeared in Italian and
CHAP. IX ART AND SCIENCE I 19
particularly in Roman architecture (p. 85) ; the building
of the magnificent arches began. It is true that we are not
entitled to pronounce the arch and the vault Italian
inventions. It is well ascertained that at the epoch of the
genesis of Hellenic architecture the Hellenes were not yet
acquainted with the arch, and therefore had to content
themselves with a flat ceiling and a sloping roof for their
temples; but the arch may very well have been a later
The arch.
invention of the Hellenes originating in more scientific
mechanics; as indeed the Greek tradition refers it to the
natural philosopher Democritus (294–397). With this
priority of Hellenic over Roman arch-building the hypo-
thesis, which has been often and perhaps justly propounded,
is quite compatible, that the vaulted roof of the Roman
great cloaca, and that which was afterwards thrown over
the old Capitoline well-house which originally had a
pyramidal roof (i. 302), are the oldest extant structures in
which the principle of the arch is applied; for it is more
than probable that these arched buildings belong not to the
regal but to the republican period (i. 139), and that in the
regal period the Italians were acquainted only with flat or
overlapped roofs (i. 302). But whatever may be thought
as to the invention of the arch itself, the application of a
principle on a great scale is everywhere, and particularly in
architecture, at least as important as its first exposition ;
and this application belongs indisputably to the Romans.
With the fifth century began the building of gates, bridges,
and aqueducts based mainly on the arch, which is thence-
forth inseparably associated with the Roman name. Akin to
this was the development of the form of the round temple
with the dome-shaped roof, which was foreign to the Greeks,
but was held in much favour with the Romans and was
especially applied by them in the case of the cults peculiar
to them, particularly the non-Greek worship of Vesta."
* The round temple certainly was not, as has been supposed, an imita-
460–357.
I2O ART AND SCIENCE BOOK II
*º-r
Something the same may be affirmed as true of various
subordinate, but not on that account unimportant, achieve-
ments in this field. They do not lay claim to originality or
artistic accomplishment ; but the firmly-jointed stone slabs
of the Roman streets, their indestructible highways, the
broad hard ringing tiles, the everlasting mortar of their
buildings, proclaim the indestructible solidity and the
energetic vigour of the Roman character.
Like architectural art, and, if possible, still more com-
pletely, the plastic and delineative arts were not so much
matured by Grecian stimulus as developed from Greek
seeds on Italian soil. We have already observed (i. 306)
that these, although only younger sisters of architecture,
began to develop themselves at least in Etruria, even
during the Roman regal period ; but their principal
development in Etruria, and still more in Latium, belongs
to the present epoch, as is very evident from the fact that
in those districts which the Celts and Samnites wrested
from the Etruscans in the course of the fourth century there
is scarcely a trace of the practice of Etruscan art. The
plastic art of the Tuscans applied itself first and chiefly to
works in terra-cotta, in Copper, and in gold—materials
which were furnished to the artists by the rich strata of
Plastic and
delineative
art.
Etruscan.
tion of the oldest form of the house ; on the contrary, house architecture
uniformly starts from the square form. The later Roman theology
associated this round form with the idca of the terrestrial sphere or of the
universe surrounding like a sphere the central sun (Fest. v. rufundam, p.
282 ; Plutarch, Mum. II ; Ovid, Fast. vi. 267, seq.). In reality it may
be traceable simply to the fact, that the circular shape has constantly been
recognized as the most convenient and the safest form of a space destined
for enclosure and custody. That was the rationale of the round thesauroi
of the Greeks as well as of the round structure of the Roman store-chamber
or temple of the Penates. It was natural, also, that the fireplace—that is,
the altar of Vesta—and the fire-chamber—that is, the temple of Vesta—
should be constructed of a round form, just as was done with the cistern
and the well-enclosure (puteal). The round style of building in itself was
Graeco-Italian as was the square form, and the former was appropriated
to the store-place, the latter to the dwelling-house; but the architectural
and religious development of the simple tholos into the round temple with
pillars and columns was Latin.
CHAP. IX ART AND SCIENCE I2 I
clay, the copper mines, and the commercial intercourse of
Etruria. The vigour with which moulding in clay was
prosecuted is attested by the immense number of bas-reliefs
and statuary works in terra-cotta, with which the walls,
gables, and roofs of the Etruscan temples were once decor-
ated, as their still extant ruins show, and by the trade which
can be shown to have existed in such articles from Etruria
to Latium. Casting in copper Occupied no inferior place.
Etruscan artists ventured to make colossal statues of bronze
fifty feet in height, and Volsinii, the Etruscan Delphi, was
said to have possessed about the year 489 two thousand
bronze statues. Sculpture in stone, again, began in
Etruria, as probably everywhere, at a far later date, and
was prevented from development not only by internal
causes, but also by the want of suitable material ; the
marble quarries of Luna (Carrara) were not yet opened.
Any one who has seen the rich and elegant gold decora-
tions of the south-Etruscan tombs, will have no difficulty in
believing the statement that Tyrrhene gold cups were
valued even in Attica. Gem-engraving also, although
more recent, was in various forms practised in Etruria.
Equally dependent on the Greeks, but otherwise quite on a
level with the workers in the plastic arts, were the Etruscan
designers and painters, who manifested extraordinary
activity both in outline-drawing on metal and in mono-
chromatic fresco-painting.
On comparing with this the domain of the Italians
proper, it appears at first, contrasted with the Etruscan
riches, almost poor in art. But on a closer view we cannot
fail to perceive that both the Sabellian and the Latin
nations must have had far more capacity and aptitude for
art than the Etruscans. It is true that in the proper Sabellian
territory, in Sabina, in the Abruzzi, in Samnium, there are
hardly found any works of art at all, and even coins are
wanting. But those Sabellian stocks, which reached the
265.
Campanian
and
Sabellian.
I 22 ART AND SCIENCE BOOK II
Latin.
coasts of the Tyrrhene or Ionic seas, not only appropriated
Hellenic art externally, like the Etruscans, but more or less
completely acclimatized it. Even in Velitrae, where prob-
ably alone in the former land of the Volsci their language
and peculiar character were afterwards maintained, painted
terra-cottas have been found, displaying vigorous and
characteristic treatment. In Lower Italy Lucania was to a
less degree influenced by Hellenic art; but in Campania
and in the land of the Bruttii, Sabellians and Hellenes
became completely intermingled not only in language and
nationality, but also and especially in art, and the Cam-
panian and Bruttian coins in particular stand so entirely in
point of artistic treatment on a level with the contemporary
coins of Greece, that the inscription alone serves to dis-
tinguish the one from the other.
It is a fact less known, but not less certain, that Latium
also, while inferior to Etruria in the copiousness and
massiveness of its art, was not inferior in artistic taste and
practical skill. Evidently the establishment of the Romans
in Campania which took place about the beginning of the
fifth century, the conversion of the town of Cales into a
Latin community, and that of the Falernian territory near
Capua into a Roman tribe (i. 463), opened up in the first
instance Campanian art to the Romans. It is true that
among these the art of gem-engraving so diligently
prosecuted in luxurious Etruria is entirely wanting, and we
find no indication that the Latin workshops were, like those
of the Etruscan goldsmiths and clay-workers, occupied in
Supplying a foreign demand. It is true that the Latin
temples were not like the Etruscan overloaded with bronze
and clay decorations, that the Latin tombs were not like the
Etruscan filled with gold ornaments, and their walls shone
not, like those of the Tuscan tombs, with paintings of
various colours. Nevertheless, on the whole the balance
does not incline in favour of the Etruscan nation. The
CHAP. IX ART AND SCIENCE I 23
device of the effigy of Janus, which, like the deity itself, may
be attributed to the Latins (i. 213), is not unskilful, and is
of a more original character than that of any Etruscan work
of art. The beautiful group of the she-wolf with the twins
attaches itself doubtless to similar Greek designs, but was—
as thus worked out—certainly produced, if not in Rome, at
any rate by Romans; and it deserves to be noted that it first
appears on the silver moneys coined by the Romans in and for
Campania. In the above-mentioned Cales there appears to
have been devised soon after its foundation a peculiar kind
of figured earthenware, which was marked with the name of
the masters and the place of manufacture, and was sold over
a wide district as far even as Etruria. The little altars of
terra-cotta with figures that have recently been brought to
light on the Esquiline correspond in style of representation
as in that of ornament exactly to the similar votive gifts of
the Campanian temples. This however does not exclude
Greek masters from having also worked for Rome. The
sculptor Damophilus, who with Gorgasus prepared the
painted terra-cotta figures for the very ancient temple of
Ceres, appears to have been no other than Demophilus of
Himera, the teacher of Zeuxis (about 300). The most in 450.
structive illustrations are furnished by those branches of
art in which we are able to form a comparative judgment,
partly from ancient testimonies, partly from our own
observation. Of Latin works in stone scarcely anything
else survives than the stone sarcophagus of the Roman
consul Lucius Scipio, wrought at the close of this period
in the Doric style; but its noble simplicity puts to shame
all similar Etruscan works. Many beautiful bronzes of an
antique chaste style of art, particularly helmets, candelabra,
and the like articles, have been taken from Etruscan tombs;
but which of these works is equal to the bronze she-wolf
erected from the proceeds of fines in 458 at the Ruminal 296.
fig-tree in the Roman Forum, and still forming the finest
I24. ART AND SCIENCE BOOK II
ornament of the Capitol P And that the Latin metal-
founders as little shrank from great enterprises as the
Etruscans, is shown by the colossal bronze figure of Jupiter
on the Capitol erected by Spurius Carvilius (consul in 461)
from the melted equipments of the Samnites, the chisellings
of which sufficed to cast the statue of the victor that stood
at the feet of the Colossus; this statue of Jupiter was visible
even from the Alban Mount. Amongst the cast copper
Coins by far the finest belong to southern Latium ; the
Roman and Umbrian are tolerable, the Etruscan almost
destitute of any image and often really barbarous. The
fresco-paintings, which Gaius Fabius executed in the temple
of Health on the Capitol, dedicated in 452, obtained in
design and colouring the praise even of connoisseurs trained
in Greek art in the Augustan age ; and the art-enthusiasts
of the empire commended the frescoes of Caere, but with
still greater emphasis those of Rome, Lanuvium, and Ardea,
as masterpieces of painting. Engraving on metal, which
in Latium decorated not the hand-mirror, as in Etruria,
but the toilet-casket with its elegant outlines, was practised
to a far less extent in Latium and almost exclusively in
Praeneste. There are excellent works of art among the
copper mirrors of Etruria as among the caskets of Praeneste;
but it was a work of the latter kind, and in fact a work
which most probably originated in the workshop of a
Praenestine master at this epoch,” regarding which it could
with truth be affirmed that scarcely another product of the
graving of antiquity bears the stamp of an art so finished
in its beauty and characteristic expression, and yet so
perfectly pure and chaste, as the Ficoroni cista.
The general character of Etruscan works of art is, on
the one hand, a sort of barbaric extravagance in material
\.
293.
302.
Character
of Etrus-
Call art.
1 Novius Plautius (p. 82) cast perhaps only the feet and the group on
the lid ; the casket itself may have proceeded from an earlier artist, but
hardly from any other than a Praenestine, for the use of these caskets was
substantially confined to Praeneste,
CHAP. IX ART AND SCIENCE I25
as well as in style ; on the other hand, an utter absence
of original development. Where the Greek master lightly
sketches, the Etruscan disciple lavishes a scholar's diligence;
instead of the light material and moderate proportions of the
Greek works, there appears in the Etruscan an ostentatious
stress laid upon the size and costliness, or even the mere
singularity, of the work. Etruscan art cannot imitate with-
Out exaggerating ; the chaste in its hands becomes harsh,
the graceful effeminate, the terrible hideous, and the volup-
tuous obscene; and these features become more prominent,
the more the original stimulus falls into the background
and Etruscan art finds itself left to its own resources. Still
more surprising is the adherence to traditional forms and a
traditional style. Whether it was that a more friendly con-
tact with Etruria at the outset allowed the Hellenes to
scatter there the seeds of art, and that a later epoch of
hostility impeded the admission into Etruria of the more
recent developments of Greek art, or whether, as is more
probable, the intellectual torpor that rapidly came over the
nation was the main cause of the phenomenon, art in
Etruria remained substantially stationary at the primitive
stage which it had occupied on its first entrance. This,
as is well known, forms the reason why Etruscan art, the
stunted daughter, was so long regarded as the mother, of
Hellenic art. Still more even than the rigid adherence to
the style traditionally transmitted in the older branches of
art, the sadly inferior handling of those branches that came
into vogue afterwards, particularly of sculpture in stone and
of copper-casting as applied to coins, shows how quickly the
spirit of Etruscan art evaporated. Equally instructive are
the painted vases, which are found in so enormous numbers
in the later Etruscan tombs. Had these come into current
use among the Etruscans as early as the metal plates decor-
ated with contouring or the painted terra-cottas, beyond
doubt they would have learned to manufacture them at
- *
I26 ART AND SCIENCE BOOK II
North
Etruscan
and South
Etruscan
art.
home in considerable quantity, and of a quality at least
relatively good; but at the period at which this luxury
arose, the power of independent reproduction wholly failed
—as the isolated vases provided with Etruscan inscriptions
show—and they contented themselves with buying instead
of making them.
But even within Etruria there appears a further remark-
able distinction in artistic development between the southern
and northern districts. It is South Etruria, particularly
in the districts of Caere, Tarquinii, and Volci, that has
preserved the great treasures of art which the nation boasted,
especially in frescoes, temple decorations, gold Ornaments,
and painted vases. Northern Etruria is far inferior; no
painted tomb, for example, has been found to the north of
Chiusi. The most southern Etruscan cities, Veii, Caere,
and Tarquinii, were accounted in Roman tradition the
primitive and chief seats of Etruscan art ; the most
northerly town, Volaterrae, with the largest territory of all
the Etruscan communities, stood most of all aloof from art.
While a Greek semi-culture prevailed in South Etruria,
Northern Etruria was much more marked by an absence
of all culture. The causes of this remarkable contrast
may be sought partly in differences of nationality–South
Etruria being largely peopled in all probability by non-
Etruscan elements (i. 156)—partly in the varying intensity,
of Hellenic influence, which must have made itself very
decidedly felt at Caere in particular. The fact itself admits
of no doubt. The more injurious on that account must
have been the early subjugation of the southern half of
Etruria by the Romans, and the Romanizing—which there
began very early—of Etruscan art. What Northern Etruria,
confined to its own efforts, was able to produce in the
way of art, is shown by the copper coins which essentially
belong to it. -
Let us now turn from Etruria to glance at Latium. The
ſ
CHAP. IX. ART AND SCIENCE 127
latter, it is true, created no new art; it was reserved for a
far later epoch of culture to develop on the basis of the
arch a new architecture different from the Hellenic, and
then to unfold in harmony with that architecture a new
style of sculpture and painting. Latin art is nowhere
original and often insignificant; but the fresh sensibility
and the discriminating tact, which appropriate what is good
in others, constitute a high artistic merit. Latin art seldom
became barbarous, and in its best products it comes quite
up to the level of Greek technical execution. We do not
mean to deny that the art of Latium, at least in its earlier
stages, had a certain dependence on the undoubtedly earlier
Etruscan (i. 305); Varro may be quite right in supposing
that, previous to the execution by Greek artists of the clay
figures in the temple of Ceres (p. 123), only “Tuscanic”
figures adorned the Roman temples; but that, at all events,
it was mainly the direct influence of the Greeks that led
Latin art into its proper channel, is self-evident, and is
very obviously shown by these very statues as well as by
the Latin and Roman coins. Even the application of
graving on metal in Etruria solely to the toilet mirror, and
in Latium solely to the toilet casket, indicates the diversity
of the art-impulses that affected the two lands. It does
not appear, however, to have been exactly at Rome that
Latin art put forth its freshest vigour; the Roman asses
and Roman denarii are far surpassed in fineness and taste of
workmanship by the Latin copper, and the rare Latin silver,
coins, and the masterpieces of painting and design belong
chiefly to Praeneste, Lanuvium, and Ardea. This accords
completely with the realistic and sober spirit of the Roman
republic which we have already described—a spirit which
can hardly have asserted itself with equal intensity in other
parts of Latium. But in the course of the fifth century,
and especially in the second half of it, there was a mighty
activity in Roman art. This was the epoch, in which the
Character
of Latin
art.
I28 ART AND SCIENCE BOOK II
construction of the Roman arches and Roman roads began ;
in which works of art like the she-wolf of the Capitol origin-
ated ; and in which a distinguished man of an Old Roman
patrician clan took up his pencil to embellish a newly
constructed temple and thence received the honorary sur-
name of the “Painter.” This was not accident. Every
great age lays grasp on all the powers of man ; and, rigid
as were Roman manners, strict as was Roman police,
the impulse received by the Roman burgesses as masters
of the peninsula or, to speak more correctly, by Italy united
for the first time as one state, became as evident in the
stimulus given to Latin and especially to Roman art, as
the moral and political decay of the Etruscan nation was
evident in the decline of art in Etruria. As the mighty
national vigour of Latium subdued the weaker nations, it
impressed its imperishable stamp also on bronze and on
marble.
B O O K T H I F. D
FROM THE UNION OF ITALY
TO THE
SUBJUGATION OF CARTHAGE AND THE
GREEK STATES
Arduum res gestas scribere.—SALLUST.
VOL. II 4I
CHAPTER I
CARTHAGE
THE Semitic stock occupied a place amidst, and yet aloof The Phoe-
from, the nations of the ancient classical world. The true “
centre of the former lay in the east, that of the latter in
the region of the Mediterranean ; and, however wars and
migrations may have altered the line of demarcation and
thrown the races across each other, a deep sense of
diversity has always severed, and still severs, the Indo-
Germanic peoples from the Syrian, Israelite, and Arabic
nations. This diversity was no less marked in the case of
that Semitic people which spread more than any other in
the direction of the west—the Phoenicians. Their native
seat was the narrow border of coast bounded by Asia
Minor, the highlands of Syria, and Egypt, and called
Canaan, that is, the “plain.” This was the only name
which the nation itself made use of ; even in Christian
times the African farmer called himself a Canaanite. But
Canaan received from the Hellenes the name of Phoenike,
the “land of purple,” or “land of the red men,” and the
Italians also were accustomed to call the Canaanites
Punians, as we are accustomed still to speak of them as the
Phoenician or Punic race.
The land was well adapted for agriculture; but its ex- Their
cellent harbours and the abundant supply of timber and of *
I32 CARTHAGE BOOK III
Their
intellectual
endow-
mentS.
metals favoured above all things the growth of commerce;
and it was there perhaps, where the opulent eastern
continent abuts on the wide-spreading Mediterranean so
rich in harbours and islands, that commerce first dawned
in all its greatness upon man. The Phoenicians directed
all the resources of courage, acuteness, and enthusiasm to
the full development of commerce and its attendant arts
of navigation, manufacturing, and colonization, and thus
connected the east and the west. At an incredibly early
period we find them in Cyprus and Egypt, in Greece and
Sicily, in Africa and Spain, and even on the Atlantic
Ocean and the North Sea. The field of their commerce
reached from Sierra Leone and Cornwall in the west, east-
ward to the coast of Malabar. Through their hands
passed the gold and pearls of the East, the purple of Tyre,
slaves, ivory, lions’ and panthers’ skins from the interior of
Africa, frankincense from Arabia, the linen of Egypt, the
pottery and fine wines of Greece, the copper of Cyprus, the
silver of Spain, tin from England, and iron from Elba.
The Phoenician mariners brought to every nation whatever
it could need or was likely to purchase; and they roamed
everywhere, yet always returned to the narrow home to
which their affections clung.
The Phoenicians are entitled to be commemorated in
history by the side of the Hellenic and Latin nations; but
their case affords a fresh proof, and perhaps the strongest
proof of all, that the development of national energies in
antiquity was of a one-sided character. Those noble and
enduring creations in the field of intellect, which owe their
origin to the Aramaean race, do not belong primarily to
the Phoenicians. While faith and knowledge in a certain
sense were the especial property of the Aramaean nations
and first reached the Indo-Germans from the east, neither
the Phoenician religion nor Phoenician science and art
ever, so far as we can see, held an independent rank
CHAP. I CARTHAGE . I33
among those of the Aramaean family. The religious con-
ceptions of the Phoenicians were rude and uncouth, and it
seemed as if their worship was meant to foster rather than
to restrain lust and cruelty. No trace is discernible, at
least in times of clear historical light, of any special
influence exercised by their religion over other nations.
As little do we find any Phoenician architecture or plastic
art at all comparable even to those of Italy, to say nothing
of the lands where art was native. The most ancient seat
of scientific observation and of its application to practical
purposes was Babylon, or at any rate the region of the
Euphrates. It was there probably that men first followed
the course of the stars; it was there that they first dis-
tinguished and expressed in writing the sounds of language;
it was there that they began to reflect on time and space
and on the powers at work in nature: the earliest traces of
astronomy and chronology, of the alphabet, and of weights
and measures, point to that region. The Phoenicians
doubtless availed themselves of the artistic and highly
developed manufactures of Babylon for their industry, of
the observation of the stars for their navigation, of the
writing of sounds and the adjustment of measures for their
commerce, and distributed many an important germ of
civilization along with their wares; but it cannot be
demonstrated that the alphabet or any other of those
ingenious products of the human mind belonged peculiarly
to them, and such religious and scientific ideas as they were
the means of conveying to the Hellenes were scattered by
them more after the fashion of a bird dropping grains than
of the husbandman sowing his seed. The power which
the Hellenes and even the Italians possessed, of civilizing
and assimilating to themselves the nations susceptible of
culture with whom they came into contact, was wholly
wanting in the Phoenicians. In the field of Roman
conquest the Iberian and the Celtic languages have disap-
I34 CARTHAGE BOOK III
Their
political
qualities.
537.
474.
peared before the Romanic tongue; the Berbers of Africa
speak at the present day the same language as they spoke
in the times of the Hannos and the Barcides.
Above all, the Phoenicians, like the rest of the Aramaean
nations as compared with the Indo-Germans, lacked the
instinct of political life—the noble idea of self-governing
freedom. During the most flourishing times of Sidon and
Tyre the land of the Phoenicians was a perpetual apple of
contention between the powers that ruled on the Euphrates
and on the Nile, and was subject sometimes to the Assyrians,
sometimes to the Egyptians. With half its power Hellenic
cities would have made themselves independent ; but the
prudent men of Sidon calculated that the closing of the
caravan-routes to the east or of the ports of Egypt would
cost them more than the heaviest tribute, and so they
punctually paid their taxes, as it might happen, to Nineveh
or to Memphis, and even, if they could not avoid it, helped
with their ships to fight the battles of the kings. And, as
at home the Phoenicians patiently bore the oppression of
their masters, so also abroad they were by no means
inclined to exchange the peaceful career of commerce for a
policy of conquest. Their settlements were factories. It
was of more moment in their view to deal in buying and
selling with the natives than to acquire extensive territories
in distant lands, and to Carry out there the slow and difficult
work of colonization. They avoided war even with their
rivals; they allowed themselves to be supplanted in Egypt,
Greece, Italy, and the east of Sicily almost without
resistance; and in the great naval battles, which were
fought in early times for the supremacy of the western
Mediterranean, at Alalia (217) and at Cumae (280), it was
the Etruscans, and not the Phoenicians, that bore the
brunt of the struggle with the Greeks. If rivalry could not
be avoided, they compromised the matter as best they
could ; no attempt was ever made by the Phoenicians to
CHAP, I CARTHAGE I35
conquer Caere or Massilia. Still less, of course, were the
Phoenicians disposed to enter on aggressive war. On the
only occasion in earlier times when they took the field on
the offensive—in the great Sicilian expedition of the African
Phoenicians which ended in their defeat at Himera by Gelo
of Syracuse (274)—it was simply as dutiful subjects of the
great-king and in order to avoid taking part in the campaign
against the Hellenes of the east, that they entered the lists
against the Hellenes of the west ; just as their Syrian
kinsmen were in fact obliged in that same year to share
the defeat of the Persians at Salamis (i. 415).
This was not the result of cowardice; navigation in
unknown waters and with armed vessels requires brave
hearts, and that such were to be found among the Phoe-
nicians, they often showed. Still less was it the result of
any lack of tenacity and idiosyncrasy of national feeling;
on the contrary the Aramaeans defended their nationality
with the weapons of intellect as well as with their blood
against all the allurements of Greek civilization and all the
coercive measures of eastern and western despots, and that
with an obstinacy which no Indo-Germanic people has ever
equalled, and which to us who are Occidentals seems to
be sometimes more, sometimes less, than human. It was
the result of that want of political instinct, which amidst all .
their lively sense of the ties of race, and amidst all their
faithful attachment to the city of their fathers, formed the
most essential feature in the character of the Phoenicians.
Liberty had no charms for them, and they lusted not after
dominion; “quietly they lived,” says the Book of Judges,
“after the manner of the Sidonians, careless and secure,
and in possession of riches.”
Of all the Phoenician settlements none attained a more
rapid and secure prosperity than those which were established
by the Tyrians and Sidonians on the south coast of Spain
and the north coast of Africa—regions that lay beyond the
480.
Carthage.
I36 CARTHAGE BOOK III
reach of the arm of the great-king and the dangerous rivalry
of the mariners of Greece, and in which the natives held
the same relation to the strangers as the Indians in America
held to the Europeans. Among the numerous and
flourishing Phoenician cities along these shores, the most
prominent by far was the “new town,” Karthada or, as the
Occidentals called it, Karchedon or Carthago. Although
not the earliest settlement of the Phoenicians in this region,
and originally perhaps a dependency of the adjoining Utica,
the oldest of the Phoenician towns in Libya, it soon out-
stripped its neighbours and even the motherland through
the incomparable advantages of its situation and the
energetic activity of its inhabitants. It was situated not
far from the (former) mouth of the Bagradas (Mejerda),
which flows through the richest corn district of northern
Africa, and was placed on a fertile rising ground, still
occupied with country houses and covered with groves of
olive and orange trees, falling off in a gentle slope towards
the plain, and terminating towards the sea in a sea-girt
promontory. Lying in the heart of the great North-African
roadstead, the Gulf of Tunis, at the very spot where that
beautiful basin affords the best anchorage for vessels of
larger size, and where drinkable spring water is got close
by the shore, the place proved singularly favourable for
agriculture and commerce and for the exchange of their
respective commodities—so favourable, that not only was
the Tyrian settlement in that quarter the first of Phoenician
mercantile cities, but even in the Roman period Carthage
was no sooner restored than it became the third city in the
empire, and even now, under circumstances far from
favourable and on a site far less judiciously chosen, there
exists and flourishes in that quarter a city of a hundred
thousand inhabitants. The prosperity, agricultural, mercan-
tile, and industrial, of a city so situated and so peopled,
needs no explanation ; but the question requires an answer
CHAP. I CARTHAGE I37
—In what way did this settlement come to attain a de-
velopment of political power, such as no other Phoenician
city possessed P
That the Phoenician stock did not even in Carthage re-
nounce its policy of passiveness, there is no lack of evidence
to prove. Carthage paid, even down to the times of its
prosperity, a ground-rent for the space occupied by the city
to the native Berbers, the tribe of the Maxyes or Maxitani;
and although the sea and the desert sufficiently protected
the city from any assault of the eastern powers, Carthage
appears to have recognized—although but nominally—the
supremacy of the great-king, and to have paid tribute to
Carthage
heads the
WeStern
Phoe-
nicians in
opposition
to the
Hellenes.
him occasionally, in order to secure its commercial com-
munications with Tyre and the East.
But with all their disposition to be submissive and
cringing, circumstances occurred which compelled these
Phoenicians to adopt a more energetic policy. The stream
of Hellenic migration was pouring ceaselessly towards the
west: it had already dislodged the Phoenicians from Greece
proper and Italy, and it was preparing to supplant them
also in Sicily, in Spain, and even in Libya itself. The
Phoenicians had to make a stand somewhere, if they were
not willing to be totally crushed. In this case, where they
had to deal with Greek traders and not with the great-king,
submission did not suffice to Secure the continuance of
their commerce and industry on its former footing, liable
merely to tax and tribute. Massilia and Cyrene were
already founded ; the whole east of Sicily was already in
the hands of the Greeks; it was full time for the Phoeni-
cians to think of serious resistance. The Carthaginians
undertook the task; after long and obstinate wars they set
a limit to the advance of the Cyrenaeans, and Hellenism
was unable to establish itself to the west of the desert of
Tripolis. With Carthaginian aid, moreover, the Phoeni-
cian settlers on the western point of Sicily defended them-
138 CARTHAGE BOOK III
The Car-
thaginian
dominion
in Africa.
450.
selves against the Greeks, and readily and gladly submitted
to the protection of the powerful cognate city (i. 184).
These important successes, which occurred in the second
century of Rome, and which saved for the Phoenicians the
south-western portion of the Mediterranean, served of
themselves to give to the city which had achieved them
the hegemony of the nation, and to alter at the same time
its political position. Carthage was no longer a mere mer-
cantile city: it aimed at the dominion of Libya and of a
part of the Mediterranean, because it could not avoid
doing so. It is probable that the custom of employing
mercenaries contributed materially to these successes. That
custom came into vogue in Greece somewhere about the
middle of the fourth century of Rome, but among the
Orientals and the Carians more especially it was far older,
and it was perhaps the Phoenicians themselves that began
it. By the system of foreign recruiting war was converted
into a vast pecuniary speculation, which was quite in keep-
ing with the character and habits of the Phoenicians.
It was probably the reflex influence of these successes
abroad, that first led the Carthaginians to change the
character of their occupation in Africa from a tenure of
hire and sufferance to one of proprietorship and conquest.
It appears to have been only about the year 3oo of Rome
that the Carthaginian merchants got rid of the rent for
the soil, which they had hitherto been obliged to pay to
the natives. This change enabled them to prosecute a
husbandry of their own on a great scale. From the outset
the Phoenicians had been desirous to employ their capital
as landlords as well as traders, and to practise agriculture
on a large scale by means of slaves or hired labourers; a
large portion of the Jews in this way served the merchant-
princes of Tyre for daily wages. Now the Carthaginians
could without restriction extract the produce of the rich
Libyan soil by a system akin to that of the modern planters;
CHAP. I CARTHAGE I39
slaves in chains cultivated the land—we find single citizens
possessing as many as twenty thousand of them. Nor was
this all. The agricultural villages of the surrounding region
—agriculture appears to have been introduced among the
Libyans at a very early period, probably anterior to the
Phoenician settlement, and presumably from Egypt—were
subdued by force of arms, and the free Libyan farmers
were transformed into fellahs, who paid to their lords a
fourth part of the produce of the soil as tribute, and were
subjected to a regular system of recruiting for the formation
of a home Carthaginian army. Hostilities were constantly
occurring with the roving pastoral tribes (vop.66es) on the
borders; but a chain of fortified posts secured the territory
enclosed by them, and the Nomades were slowly driven
back into the deserts and mountains, or were compelled to
recognize Carthaginian Supremacy, to pay tribute, and to
furnish contingents. About the period of the first Punic
war their great town Theveste (Tebessa, at the sources of
the Mejerda) was conquered by the Carthaginians. These
formed the “towns and tribes (éðvm) of subjects,” which
appear in the Carthaginian state-treaties; the former being
the non-free Libyan villages, the latter the subject Nomades. `
To this fell to be added the sovereignty of Carthage Libyphoe-
over the other Phoenicians in Africa, or the so-called Liby- “”
phoenicians. These included, on the one hand, the
smaller settlements sent forth from Carthage along the
whole northern and part of the north-western coast of
Africa—which cannot have been unimportant, for on the
Atlantic seaboard alone there were settled at one time
3o, ooo such colonists—and, on the other hand, the old
Phoenician settlements especially numerous along the coast
of the present province of Constantine and Beylik of Tunis,
such as Hippo afterwards called Regius (Bona), Hadru-
metum (Susa), Little Leptis (to the south of Susa)—the
second city of the Phoenicians in Africa—Thapsus (in the
I4O CARTHAGE BOOK III
same quarter), and Great Leptis (Lebda to the west of
Tripoli). In what way all these cities came to be subject
to Carthage—whether voluntarily, for their protection
perhaps from the attacks of the Cyrenaeans and Numidians,
or by constraint—can no longer be ascertained; but it is
certain that they are designated as subjects of the Cartha-
ginians even in official documents, that they had to pull
down their walls, and that they had to pay tribute and
furnish contingents to Carthage. They were not liable
however either to recruiting or to the land-tax, but con-
tributed a definite amount of men and money, Little Leptis
for instance paying the enormous sum annually of 365
talents (4,90,ooo); moreover they lived on a footing of
equality in law with the Carthaginians, and could marry
with them on equal terms." Utica alone escaped a similar
fate and had its walls and independence preserved to it,
less perhaps from its own power than from the pious feeling
of the Carthaginians towards their ancient protectors; in
fact, the Phoenicians cherished for such relations a remark-
able feeling of reverence presenting a thorough contrast to
the indifference of the Greeks. Even in intercourse with
* The most precise description of this important class occurs in the
Carthaginian treaty (Polyb. vii. 9), where in contrast to the Uticenses on
the one hand, and to the Libyan subjects on the other, they are called oi
Kapyºmâovíav Štrapyot 80 ou Tois ačTo's vôpious Xpóvtal. Elsewhere they
are spoken of as cities allied (orvppaxtées TróAets, Diod. xx. To) or tributary
(Liv. xxxiv. 62 ; Justin, xxii. 7, 3). Their conubium with the Cartha-
ginians is mentioned by Diodorus, xx. 55; the commercizºme is implied in the
“like laws.” That the old Phoenician colonies were included among the
Libyphoenicians, is shown by the designation of Hippo as a Libyphoe-
nician city (Liv. xxv. 40); on the other hand as to the settlements founded
from Carthage, for instance, it is said in the Periplus of Hanno : ‘‘the
Carthaginians resolved that Hanno should sail beyond the Pillars of
Hercules and found cities of Libyphoenicians.” In substance the word
“Libyphoenicians” was used by the Carthaginians not as a national de-
signation, but as a category of state-law. This view is quite consistent
with the fact that grammatically the name denotes Phoenicians mingled with
Libyans (Liv. xxi. 22, an addition to the text of Polybius); in reality, at
least in the institution of very exposed colonies, Libyans were frequently
associated with Phoenicians (Diod. xiii. 79; Cic. pro Scauro, 42). The
analogy in name and legal position between the Latins of Rome and the
Libyphoenicians of Carthage is unmistakable.
CHAP. I CARTHAGE . I4 I
foreigners it is always “Carthage and Utica” that stipulate
and promise in conjunction ; which, of course, did not
preclude the far more important “new town’ from practi-
cally asserting its hegemony also over Utica. Thus the
Tyrian factory was converted into the capital of a mighty
North-African empire, which extended from the desert of
Tripoli to the Atlantic Ocean, contenting itself in its
western portion (Morocco and Algiers) with the occupation,
and that to some extent superficial, of a belt along the
coast, but in the richer eastern portion (the present districts
of Constantine and Tunis) stretching its sway over the
interior also and constantly pushing its frontier farther to
the South. The Carthaginians were, as an ancient author
significantly expresses it, converted from Tyrians into
Libyans. Phoenician civilization prevailed in Libya just
as Greek civilization prevailed in Asia Minor and Syria
after the campaigns of Alexander, although not with the
same intensity. Phoenician was spoken and written at the
courts of the Nomad sheiks, and the more civilized native
tribes adopted for their language the Phoenician alphabet;"
to Phoenicise them completely suited neither the genius of
the nation nor the policy of Carthage.
The epoch, at which this transformation of Carthage
into the capital of Libya took place, admits the less of
being determined, because the change doubtless took place
gradually. The author just mentioned names Hanno as
the reformer of the nation. If the Hanno is meant who
1 The Libyan or Numidian alphabet, by which we mean that which
was and is employed by the Berbers in writing their non-Semitic language
—one of the innumerable alphabets derived from the primitive Aramaean
one—certainly appears to be more closely related in several of its forms to
the latter than is the Phoenician alphabet ; but it by no means follows
from this, that the Libyans derived their writing not from Phoenicians
but from earlier immigrants, any more than the partially older forms of
the Italian alphabets prohibit us from deriving these from the Greek.
We must rather assume that the Libyan alphabet has been derived from
the Phoenician at a period of the latter earlier than the time at which the
records of the Phoenician language that have reached us were written.
I42 - CARTHAGE BOOK III
Naval
power of
Carthage.
Spain.
lived at the time of the first war with Rome, he can only
be regarded as having completed the new system, the
carrying out of which presumably occupied the fourth and
fifth centuries of Rome.
The flourishing of Carthage was accompanied by a
parallel decline in the great cities of the Phoenician mother-
country, in Sidon and especially in Tyre, the prosperity of
which was destroyed partly by internal commotions, partly
by the pressure of external calamities, particularly of its
sieges by Salmanassar in the first, Nebuchodrossor in the
second, and Alexander in the fifth century of Rome. The
noble families and the old firms of Tyre emigrated for the
most part to the secure and flourishing daughter-city, and
carried thither their intelligence, their capital, and their
traditions. At the time when the Phoenicians came into
contact with Rome, Carthage was as decidedly the first of
Canaanite cities as Rome was the first of the Latin com-
munities.
But the empire of Libya was only half of the power
of Carthage; its maritime and colonial dominion had
acquired, during the same period, a not less powerful
development.
In Spain the chief station of the Phoenicians was the
primitive Tyrian settlement at Gades (Cadiz). Besides
this they possessed to the west and east of it a chain of
factories, and in the interior the region of the silver mines;
so that they held nearly the modern Andalusia and
Granada, or at least the coasts of these provinces. They
made no effort to acquire the interior from the warlike
native nations ; they were content with the possession of
the mines and of the stations for traffic and for shell and
other fisheries ; and they had difficulty in maintaining
their ground even in these against the adjoining tribes.
It is probable that these possessions were not properly
Carthaginian but Tyrian, and Gades was not reckoned
CHAP. I CARTHAGE I43
among the cities tributary to Carthage; but practically, like
all the western Phoenicians, it was under Carthaginian
hegemony, as is shown by the aid sent by Carthage to the
Gaditani against the natives, and by the institution of
Carthaginian trading settlements to the westward of Gades.
Ebusus and the Baleares, again, were occupied by the
Carthaginians themselves at an early period, partly for the
fisheries, partly as advanced posts against the Massiliots,
with whom furious conflicts were waged from these
stations.
In like manner the Carthaginians already at the end of
the second century of Rome established themselves in
Sardinia, which was utilized by them precisely in the same
way as Libya. While the natives withdrew into the
mountainous interior of the island to escape from bondage
as agricultural serfs, just as the Numidians in Africa with-
drew to the borders of the desert, Phoenician colonies
were conducted to Caralis (Cagliari) and other important
points, and the fertile districts along the coast were turned
to account by the introduction of Libyan cultivators.
Lastly in Sicily the straits of Messana and the larger
eastern half of the island had fallen at an early period into
the hands of the Greeks ; but the Phoenicians, with the
help of the Carthaginians, retained the smaller adjacent
islands, the Aegates, Melita, Gaulos, Cossyra—the settle-
ment in Malta especially was rich and flourishing—and
they kept the west and north-west coast of Sicily, whence
they maintained communication with Africa by means of
Motya and afterwards of Lilybaeum and with Sardinia by
means of Panormus and Soluntum. The interior of the
island remained in the possession of the natives, the Elymi,
Sicani, and Siceli. After the further advance of the
Greeks was checked, a state of comparative peace had
prevailed in the island, which even the campaign under-
taken by the Carthaginians at the instigation of the
Sal dinia.
Sicily.
I44 CARTHAGE BOOI& II1
480.
415-413.
Maritime
Supremacy.
Rivalry
with
Syracuse.
406-365.
Persians against their Greek neighbours on the island (274)
did not permanently interrupt, and which continued on
the whole to subsist till the Attic expedition to Sicily
(339–341). The two competing nations made up their
minds to tolerate each other, and confined themselves in
the main each to its own field.
All these settlements and possessions were important
enough in themselves; but they were of still greater moment,
inasmuch as they became the pillars of the Carthaginian
maritime supremacy. By their possession of the south of
Spain, of the Baleares, of Sardinia, of western Sicily and
Melita, and by their prevention of Hellenic colonies on
the east coast of Spain, in Corsica, and in the region of
the Syrtes, the masters of the north coast of Africa
rendered their sea a closed one, and monopolized the
western straits. In the Tyrrhene and Gallic seas alone
the Phoenicians were obliged to admit the rivalry of other
nations. This state of things might perhaps be endured,
so long as the Etruscans and the Greeks served to counter-
balance each other in these waters; with the former, as
the less dangerous rivals, Carthage even entered into an
alliance against the Greeks. But when, on the fall of the
Etruscan power—a fall which, as is usually the case in
such forced alliances, Carthage had hardly exerted all her
power to avert—and after the miscarriage of the great
projects of Alcibiades, Syracuse stood forth as indisputably
the first Greek naval power, not only did the rulers of
Syracuse naturally begin to aspire to dominion over Sicily
and lower Italy and at the same time over the Tyrrhene
and Adriatic seas, but the Carthaginians also were com-
pelled to adopt a more energetic policy. The immediate
result of the long and obstinate conflicts between them and
their equally powerful and infamous antagonist, Dionysius
of Syracuse (348–389), was the annihilation or weakening
of the intervening Sicilian states—a result which both
CHAP. I CARTHAGE I45
parties had an interest in accomplishing—and the division
of the island between the Syracusans and Carthaginians.
The most flourishing cities in the island—Selinus, Himera,
Agrigentum, Gela, and Messana—were utterly destroyed
by the Carthaginians in the course of these unhappy Con-
flicts: and Dionysius was not displeased to see Hellenism
destroyed or suppressed there, so that, leaning for support
on foreign mercenaries enlisted from Italy, Gaul and Spain,
he might rule in greater security over provinces which lay
desolate or which were occupied by military colonies.
The peace, which was concluded after the victory of the
Carthaginian general Mago at Kronion (371), and which
subjected to the Carthaginians the Greek cities of Thermae
(the ancient Himera), Segesta, Heraclea Minoa, Selinus,
and a part of the territory of Agrigentum as far as the
Halycus, was regarded by the two powers contending for
the possession of the island as only a temporary accommoda-
tion ; on both sides the rivals were ever renewing their
attempts to dispossess each other. Four several times—
in 360 in the time of Dionysius the elder; in 41 o in that
of Timoleon ; in 445 in that of Agathocles; in 476 in
that of Pyrrhus—the Carthaginians were masters of all
Sicily excepting Syracuse, and were baffled by its solid
walls; almost as often the Syracusans, under able leaders,
such as were the elder Dionysius, Agathocles, and Pyrrhus,
seemed equally on the eve of dislodging the Africans from
the island. But more and more the balance inclined to
the side of the Carthaginians, who were, as a rule, the
aggressors, and who, although they did not follow out their
object with Roman steadfastness, yet conducted their attack
with far greater method and energy than the Greek city,
rent and worn out by factions, conducted its defence.
The Phoenicians might with reason expect that a pestilence
or a foreign condoffere would not always snatch the prey
from their hands; and for the time being, at least at Sea,
VOL. II 42
383.
309.
344.
278.
I46 CARTHAGE BOOK III
275-194.
348.
306.
Constitu-
tion of
Carthage.
Council.
the struggle was already decided (p. 41): the attempt of
Pyrrhus to re-establish the Syracusan fleet was the last.
After the failure of that attempt, the Carthaginian fleet
commanded without a rival the whole western Mediter-
ranean ; and their endeavours to occupy Syracuse,
Rhegium, and Tarentum, showed the extent of their
power and the objects at which they aimed. Hand in
hand with these attempts went the endeavour to mono-
polize more and more the maritime commerce of this
region, at the expense alike of foreigners and of their own
subjects; and it was not the wont of the Carthaginians to
recoil from any violence that might help forward their
purpose. A contemporary of the Punic wars, Eratosthenes,
the father of geography (479–560), affirms that every
foreign mariner sailing towards Sardinia or towards the
Straits of Gades, who fell into the hands of the Cartha:
ginians, was thrown by them into the sea ; and with this
statement the fact completely accords, that Carthage by
the treaty of 406 (p. 41) declared the Spanish, Sardinian,
and Libyan ports open to Roman trading vessels, whereas
by that of 448 (p. 44), it totally closed them, with the
exception of the port of Carthage itself, against the same.
Aristotle, who died about fifty years before the com-
mencement of the first Punic war, describes the constitution
of Carthage as having changed from a monarchy to an aris-
tocracy, or to a democracy inclining towards oligarchy, for
he designates it by both names. The conduct of affairs
was immediately vested in the hands of the Council of
Ancients, which, like the Spartan gerusia, consisted of the
two kings nominated annually by the citizens, and of twenty-
eight gerusiasts, who were also, as it appears, chosen
annually by the citizens. It was this council which mainly
transacted the business of the state—making, for instance,
the preliminary arrangements for war, appointing levies and
enlistments, nominating the general, and associating with
CHAP, I CARTHAGE I47
him a number of gerusiasts from whom the sub-commanders
were regularly taken ; and to it despatches were addressed.
It is doubtful whether by the side of this small council
there existed a larger one ; at any rate it was not of much
importance. As little does any special influence seem to
have belonged to the kings; they acted chiefly as supreme
judges, and they were frequently so named (shofetes,
praetores). The power of the general was greater. Iso-
crates, the senior contemporary of Aristotle, says that the
Carthaginians had an oligarchical government at home, but
a monarchical government in the field; and thus the office
of the Carthaginian general may be correctly described by
Roman writers as a dictatorship, although the gerusiasts
attached to him must have practically at least restricted his
power and, after he had laid down his office, a regular
official reckoning—unknown among the Romans—awaited
him. There existed no fixed term of office for the general,
and for this very reason he was doubtless different from
the annual king, from whom Aristotle also expressly distin-
guishes him. The combination however of several offices
in one person was not unusual among the Carthaginians,
and it is not therefore surprising that often the same person
appears as at once general and shofete.
But the gerusia and the magistrates were subordinate to
the corporation of the Hundred and Four (in round
numbers the Hundred), or the Judges, the main bulwark
of the Carthaginian oligarchy. It had no place in the
original constitution of Carthage, but, like the Spartan
ephorate, it originated in an aristocratic opposition to the
monarchical elements of that constitution. As public offices
were purchasable and the number of members forming the
Supreme board was small, a single Carthaginian family,
eminent above all others in wealth and military renown, the
clan of Mago (i. 413), threatened to unite in its own hands
the management of the state in peace and war and the
Magis-
trateS.
Judges.
148 CARTHAGE BOOK III
Citizens.
administration of justice. This led, nearly about the time
of the decemvirs, to an alteration of the constitution and to
the appointment of this new board. We know that the
holding of the quaestorship gave a title to admission into
the body of judges, but that the candidate had nevertheless
to be elected by certain self-electing Boards of Five
(Pentarchies); and that the judges, although presumably
by law chosen from year to year, practically remained in
office for a longer period or indeed for life, for which reason
they are usually called “ senators” by the Greeks and
Romans. Obscure as are the details, we recognize clearly
the nature of the body as an oligarchical board constituted
by aristocratic cooptation ; an isolated but characteristic
indication of which is found in the fact that there were in
Carthage special baths for the judges over and above the
common baths for the citizens. They were primarily in-
tended to act as political jurymen, who summoned the
generals in particular, but beyond doubt the shofetes and
gerusiasts also when circumstances required, to a reckoning
on resigning office, and inflicted even capital punishment
at pleasure, often with the most reckless cruelty. Of course
in this as in every instance, where administrative function-
aries are subjected to the control of another body, the real
centre of power passed over from the controlled to the
controlling authority; and it is easy to understand on the
one hand how the latter came to interfere in all matters of
administration—the gerusia for instance submitted import-
ant despatches first to the judges, and then to the people—
and on the other hand how fear of the control at home,
which regularly meted out its award according to success,
hampered the Carthaginian statesman and general in council
and action.
The body of citizens in Carthage, though not expressly
restricted, as in Sparta, to the attitude of passive bystanders
in the business of the state, appears to have had but a very
CHAP, I CARTHAGE I49
slight amount of practical influence on it. In the elections
to the gerusia a system of open corruption was the rule;
in the nomination of a general the people were consulted,
but only after the nomination had really been made by pro-
posal on the part of the gerusia ; and other questions only
went to the people when the gerusia thought fit or could
not otherwise agree. Assemblies of the people with judicial
functions were unknown in Carthage. The powerless-
ness of the citizens probably in the main resulted from
their political organization ; the Carthaginian mess-associa-
tions, which are mentioned in this connection and com-
pared with the Spartan Pheiditia, were probably guilds
under oligarchical management. Mention is made even of
a distinction between “burgesses of the city” and “manual
labourers,” which leads us to infer that the latter held a
very inferior position, perhaps beyond the pale of law.
On a comprehensive view of its several elements, the
Carthaginian constitution appears to have been a govern-
ment of capitalists, such as might naturally arise in a burgess-
community which had no middle class of moderate means
but consisted on the one hand of an urban rabble without
property and living from hand to mouth, and on the other
hand of great merchants, planters, and genteel overseers.
Character
Of the
govern-
Inellt.
The system of repairing the fortunes of decayed grandees at
the expense of the subjects, by despatching them as tax-
assessors and taskwork-overseers to the dependent communi-
ties—that infallible token of a rotten urban oligarchy—was
not wanting in Carthage ; Aristotle describes it as the main
cause of the tried durability of the Carthaginian constitution.
Up to his time no revolution worth mentioning had taken
place in Carthage either from above or from below. The
multitude remained without leaders in consequence of the
material advantages which the governing oligarchy was
able to offer to all ambitious or necessitous men of rank,
and was satisfied with the crumbs, which in the form of
I5O CARTHAGE BOOK III
Capital
and its
electoral corruption or otherwise fell to it from the table of
the rich. A democratic opposition indeed could not fail
with such a government to emerge ; but at the time of the
first Punic war it was still quite powerless. At a later period,
partly under the influence of the defeats which were sus-
tained, its political influence appears on the increase, and
that far more rapidly than the influence of the similar party
at the same period in Rome; the popular assemblies began
to give the ultimate decision in political questions, and broke
down the omnipotence of the Carthaginian oligarchy. After
the termination of the Hannibalic war it was even enacted,
on the proposal of Hannibal, that no member of the council
of a Hundred could hold office for two consecutive years;
and thereby a complete democracy was introduced, which
certainly was under existing circumstances the only means
of saving Carthage, if there was still time to do so. This
opposition was swayed by a strong patriotic and reforming
enthusiasm ; but the fact cannot withal be overlooked, that
it rested on a corrupt and rotten basis. The body
of citizens in Carthage, which is compared by well-
informed Greeks to the people of Alexandria, was so dis-
orderly that to that extent it had well deserved to be
powerless; and it might well be asked, what good could
arise from revolutions, where, as in Carthage, the boys
helped to make them.
From a financial point of view, Carthage held in every
respect the first place among the states of antiquity. At
power in
Carthage.
the time of the Peloponnesian war this Phoenician city
was, according to the testimony of the first of Greek his-
torians, financially superior to all the Greek states, and
its revenues were compared to those of the great-king;
Polybius calls it the wealthiest city in the world. The
intelligent character of the Carthaginian husbandry—which,
as was the case subsequently in Rome, generals and states-
men did not disdain scientifically to practise and to teach
CHAP, I CARTHAGE I5I
—is attested by the agronomic treatise of the Carthaginian
Mago, which was universally regarded by the later Greek
and Roman farmers as the fundamental code of rational
husbandry, and was not only translated into Greek, but
was edited also in Latin by Command of the Roman senate
and officially recommended to the Italian landholders. A
characteristic feature was the close connection between
this Phoenician management of land and that of capital: it
was quoted as a leading maxim of Phoenician husbandry
that one should never acquire more land than he could º
thoroughly manage. The rich resources of the country in
horses, oxen, sheep, and goats, in which Libya by
reason of its Nomad economy perhaps excelled at that time,
as Polybius testifies, all other lands of the earth, were of
great advantage to the Carthaginians. As these were the
instructors of the Romans in the art of profitably working
the soil, they were so likewise in the art of turning to good
account their subjects; by virtue of which Carthage reaped
indirectly the rents of the “best part of Europe,” and of
the rich—and in some portions, such as in Byzacitis and
on the lesser Syrtis, surpassingly productive—region of
northern Africa. Commerce, which was always regarded
in Carthage as an honourable pursuit, and the shipping
and manufactures which commerce rendered flourishing,
brought even in the natural course of things golden
harvests annually to the settlers there ; and we have
already indicated how skilfully, by an extensive and ever-
growing system of monopoly, not only all the foreign but
also all the inland commerce of the western Mediterranean,
and the whole carrying trade between the west and east,
were more and more concentrated in that single harbour.
Science and art in Carthage, as afterwards in Rome,
seem to have been mainly dependent on Hellenic influ-
ences, but they do not appear to have been neglected.
There was a respectable Phoenician literature; and on the
I52 CARTHAGE BOOK III
conquest of the city there were found rich treasures of art
—not created, it is true, in Carthage, but carried off from
Sicilian temples—and considerable libraries. But even
intellect there was in the service of capital; the prominent
features of its literature were chiefly agronomic and geo-
graphical treatises, such as the work of Mago already
mentioned and the account by the admiral Hanno of his
voyage along the west coast of Africa, which was originally
deposited publicly in one of the Carthaginian temples, and
which is still extant in a translation. Even the general
diffusion of certain attainments, and particularly of the
knowledge of foreign languages," as to which the Carthage
of this epoch probably stood almost on a level with Rome
under the empire, forms an evidence of the thoroughly
practical turn given to Hellcnic culture in Carillage. It
is absolutely impossible to form a conception of the mass of
capital accumulated in this London of antiquity, but some
notion at least may be gained of the sources of public
revenue from the fact, that, in spite of the costly system on
which Carthage organized its wars and in spite of the careless
and faithless administration of the state property, the contri-
butions of its subjects and the customs-revenue completely
covered the expenditure, so that no direct taxes were
levied from the citizens ; and further, that even after the
second Punic war, when the power of the state was already
broken, the current expenses and the payment to Rome
of a yearly instalment of 2648,000 could be met, without
levying any tax, merely by a somewhat stricter manage-
ment of the finances, and fourteen years after the peace
the state proffered immediate payment of the thirty-six
* The Steward on a country estate, although a slave, ought, according
to the precept of the Carthaginian agronome Mago (ap. Varro, R. A. i.
I7), to be able to read, and ought to possess some culture. In the pro-
logue of the “Poenulus’’ of Plautus, it is said of the hero of the title:–
Ež is omnes linguas scić, sed dissimulai sciens
Se scire, Poenus plane est; quid veróżs opus'ſ f
CHAP. I CARTIIAGE I53
remaining instalments. But it was not merely the sum
total of its revenues that evinced the superiority of the
financial administration at Carthage. The economical
principles of a later and more advanced epoch are found
by us in Carthage alone of all the more considerable states
of antiquity. Mention is made of foreign state-loans, and
in the monetary system we find along with gold and silver
mention of a token-money having no intrinsic value—a
species of currency not used elsewhere in antiquity. In
fact, if government had resolved itself into mere mercantile
speculation, never would any state have solved the problem
more brilliantly than Carthage.
Let us now compare the respective resources of Carthage
and Rome. Both were agricultural and mercantile cities,
and nothing more ; art and science had substantially the
same altogether subordinate and altogether practical
position in both, except that in this respect Carthage had
made greater progress than Rome. But in Carthage the
moneyed interest preponderated over the landed, in Rome
at this time the landed still preponderated over the
moneyed ; and, while the agriculturists of Carthage were
universally large landlords and slave-holders, in the Rome
of this period the great mass of the burgesses still tilled
their fields in person. The majority of the population in
Rome held property, and was therefore conservative; the
majority in Carthage held no property, and was therefore
accessible to the gold of the rich as well as to the cry of the
democrats for reform. In Carthage there already pre-
vailed all that opulence which marks powerful commercial
cities, while the manners and police of Rome still maintained
at least externally the severity and frugality of the olden
times. When the ambassadors of Carthage returned from
Rome, they told their colleagues that the relations of
intimacy among the Roman scnators surpassed all coil-
ception; that a single set of silver plate sufficed for the whole
Compari-
SOIl ſ
between
Carthage
and Rome.
In their
economy.
I54 CARTHAGE BOOK III
In their
constitu-
tion.
senate, and had reappeared in every house to which the
envoys had been invited. The sneer is a significant token
of the difference in the economic conditions on either side.
In both the constitution was aristocratic; the judges
governed in Carthage, as did the senate in Rome, and both
on the same system of police-control. The strict state of
dependence in which the governing board at Carthage
held the individual magistrate, and the injunction to the
citizens absolutely to refrain from learning the Greek
language and to converse with a Greek only through the
medium of the public interpreter, originated in the same
spirit as the system of government at Rome; but in com-
parison with the cruel harshness and the absolute precision,
bordering on silliness, of this Carthaginian state-tutelage,
the Roman system of fining and censure appears mild and
reasonable. The Roman senate, which opened its doors to
eminent capacity and in the best sense represented the nation,
was able also to trust it, and had no need to fear the magis-
trates. The Carthaginian senate, on the other hand, was
based on a jealous control of administration by the govern-
ment, and represented exclusively the leading families; its
essence was mistrust of all above and below it, and therefore
it could neither be confident that the people would follow
whither it led, nor free from the dread of usurpations on
the part of the magistrates. Hence the steady course of
Roman policy, which never receded a step in times of
misfortune, and never threw away the favours of fortune by
negligence or indifference; whereas the Carthaginians
desisted from the struggle when a last effort might perhaps
have saved all, and, weary or forgetful of their great
national duties, allowed the half-completed building to fall
to pieces, only to begin it in a few years anew. Hence the
capable magistrate in Rome was ordinarily on a good
understanding with his government; in Carthage he was
frequently at decided feud with his masters at home, and
CHAP. I CARTHAGE I55
was forced to resist them by unconstitutional means
and to make common cause with the opposing party of
reform.
Both Carthage and Rome ruled over communities of
lineage kindred with their own, and over numerous others
of alien race. But Rome had received into her citizenship
one district after another, and had rendered it even legally
accessible to the Latin communities; Carthage from the
first maintained her exclusiveness, and did not permit the
dependent districts even to cherish a hope of being some
day placed upon an equal footing. Rome granted to the
communities of kindred lineage a share in the fruits of
victory, especially in the acquired domains ; and sought, by
conferring material advantages on the rich and noble, to
gain over at least a party to her own interest in the other
subject states. Carthage not only retained for herself the
produce of her victories, but even deprived the most
privileged cities of their freedom of trade. Rome, as a rule,
did not wholly take away independence even from the
subject communities, and imposed a fixed tribute on none ;
Carthage despatched her overseers everywhere, and loaded
even the old-Phoenician cities with a heavy tribute, while
her subject tribes were practically treated as state-slaves.
In this way there was not in the compass of the Carthagino-
African state a single community, with the exception of
Utica, that would not have been politically and materially
benefited by the fall of Carthage; in the Romano-Italic
there was not one that had not much more to lose than to
gain in rebelling against a government, which was careful
to avoid injuring material interests, and which never at least
by extreme measures challenged political opposition to
conflict. If Carthaginian statesmen believed that they had
attached to the interests of Carthage her Phoenician subjects
by their greater dread of a Libyan revolt and all the land-
holders by means of token-money, they transferred
In the
treatll3 ent
of their
Subjects.
156 CARTHAGE BOOK III
In finance.
mercantile calculation to a sphere to which it did not apply.
Experience proved that the Roman symmachy, notwith-
standing its seemingly looser bond of Connection, kept
together against Pyrrhus like a wall of rock, whereas the
Carthaginian fell to pieces like a gossamer web as soon as
a hostile army set foot on African soil. It was so on the
landing of Agathocles and of Regulus, and likewise in the
mercenary war; the spirit that prevailed in Africa is
illustrated by the fact, that the Libyan women voluntarily
contributed their ornaments to the mercenaries for their war
against Carthage. In Sicily alone the Carthaginians appear
to have exercised a milder rule, and to have attained on
that account better results. They granted to their subjects
in that quarter comparative freedom in foreign trade, and
allowed them to conduct their internal commerce, probably
from the outset and exclusively, with a metallic currency;
far greater freedom of movement generally was allowed to
them than was permitted to the Sardinians and Libyans.
Had Syracuse fallen into Carthaginian hands, their policy
would doubtless soon have changed. But that result did
not take place; and so, owing to the well-calculated mild-
ness of the Carthaginian government and the unhappy dis-
tractions of the Sicilian Greeks, there actually existed in
Sicily a party really friendly to the Phoenicians; for example,
even after the island had passed to the Romans, Philinus
of Agrigentum wrote the history of the great war in a
thoroughly Phoenician spirit. Nevertheless on the whole
the Sicilians must, both as subjects and as Hellenes, have
been at least as averse to their Phoenician masters as the
Samnites and Tarentines were to the Romans.
In a financial point of view the state revenues of Carthage
doubtless far surpassed those of Rome; but this advantage
was partly neutralized by the facts, that the sources of the
Carthaginian revenue—tribute and customs—dried up far
sooner (and just when they were most needed) than those
CHAP, I CARTHAGE I57
of Rome, and that the Carthaginian mode of conducting
war was far more costly than the Roman.
The military resources of the Romans and Carthaginians
were very different, yet in many respects not unequally
balanced. The citizens of Carthage still at the conquest
of the city amounted to 7oo, ooo, including women and
children,” and were probably at least as numerous at the
close of the fifth century; in that century they were able in
case of need to set on foot a burgess-army of 40, ooo
hoplites. At the very beginning of the fifth century, Rome
had in similar circumstances sent to the field a burgess-army
equally strong (p. 55, note); after the great extensions of
the burgess-domain in the course of that century the number
of full burgesses capable of bearing arms must at least have
doubled. But far more than in the number of men capable
of bearing arms, Rome excelled in the effective condi-
tion of the burgess-soldier. Anxious as the Carthaginian
government was to induce its citizens to take part in
military service, it could neither furnish the artisan and the
manufacturer with the bodily vigour of the husbandman,
nor overcome the native aversion of the Phoenicians to
warfare. In the fifth century there still fought in the
Sicilian armies a “sacred band’’ of 25oo Carthaginians
as a guard for the general ; in the sixth not a single
Carthaginian, officers excepted, was to be met with in the
Carthaginian armies, e.g. in that of Spain. The Roman
farmers, again, took their places not only in the muster-
* Doubts have been expressed as to the correctness of this number, and
the highest possible number of inhabitants, taking into account the avail-
able space, has been reckoned at 250, ooo. Apart from the uncertainty of
such calculations, especially as to a commercial city with houses of six
stories, we must remember that the numbering is doubtless to be under-
stood in a political, not in an urban, sense, just like the numbers in the
Roman census, and that thus all Carthaginians would be included in it,
whether dwelling in the city or its neighbourhood, or resident in its subject
territory or in other lands. There would, of course, be a large number of
such absentecs in the Uase of Carillage ; indeed it is expressly stated that
in Gades, for the same reason, the burgess-roll always showed a far higher
number than that of the citizens who had their fixed residence there.
In their
military
system.
158 CARTHAGE BOOK III
roll, but also in the field of battle. It was the same with
the cognate races of both communities; while the Latins
rendered to the Romans no less service than their own
burgess-troops, the Libyphoenicians were as little adapted
for war as the Carthaginians, and, as may easily be sup-
posed, still less desirous of it, and so they too disappeared
from the armies; the towns bound to furnish contingents
presumably redeemed their obligation by a payment of
money. In the Spanish army just mentioned, composed
of some I 5, ooo men, Only a single troop of cavalry of 45 o
men consisted, and that but partly, of Libyphoenicians.
The flower of the Carthaginian armies was formed by the
Libyan subjects, whose recruits were capable of being
trained under able officers into good infantry, and whose
light cavalry was unsurpassed in its kind. To these were
added the forces of the more or less dependent tribes of
Libya and Spain and the famous slingers of the Baleares,
who seem to have held an intermediate position between
allied contingents and mercenary troops; and finally, in
case of need, the hired soldiery enlisted abroad. So far
as numbers were concerned, such an army might without
difficulty be raised almost to any desired strength; and in
the ability of its officers, in acquaintance with arms, and in
courage it might be capable of Coping with that of Rome.
Not only, however, did a dangerously long interval elapse,
in the event of mercenaries being required, ere they could be
got ready, while the Roman militia was able at any moment
to take the field, but—which was the main matter—there
was nothing to keep together the armies of Carthage but
military honour and personal advantage, while the Romans
were united by all the ties that bound them to their common
fatherland. The Carthaginian officer of the ordinary type
estimated his mercenaries, and even the Libyan farmers,
very much as men in modern warfare estimate cannon-
balls; hence such disgraceful proceedings as the betrayal
CHAP. I CARTHAGE I59
of the Libyan troops by their general Himilco in 358,
which was followed by a dangerous insurrection of the
Libyans, and hence that proverbial cry of “Punic faith,”
which did the Carthaginians no small injury. Carthage ex-
perienced in full measure all the evils which armies of fellahs
and mercenaries could bring upon a state, and more than once
she found her paid serfs more dangerous than her foes.
The Carthaginian government could not fail to perceive
the defects of this military system, and they certainly sought
to remedy them by every available means. They insisted on
maintaining full chests and full magazines, that they might
at any time be able to equip mercenaries. They bestowed
great care on those elements which among the ancients
represented the modern artillery — the construction of
machines, in which we find the Carthaginians regularly
superior to the Siceliots, and the use of elephants, after
these had superseded in warfare the earlier war-chariots :
in the casemates of Carthage there were stalls for 3oo
elephants. They could not venture to fortify the dependent
cities, and were obliged to submit to the occupation of the
towns and villages as well as of the open country by any
hostile army that landed in Africa—a thorough contrast to
the state of Italy, where most of the subject towns had
retained their walls, and a chain of Roman fortresses com-
manded the whole peninsula. But on the fortification of
the capital they expended all the resources of money and
of art, and on several occasions nothing but the strength of
its walls saved the state; whereas Rome held a political
and military position so secure that it never underwent a
formal siege. Lastly, the main bulwark of the state was
their war-marine, on which they lavished the utmost care.
In the building as well as in the management of vessels
the Carthaginians excelled the Greeks; it was at Carthage
that ships were first built of more than three banks of
oars, and the Carthaginian war-vessels, at this period
396.
I6o - CARTHAGE BOOK III
mostly quinqueremes, were ordinarily better sailers than
the Greek; the rowers, all of them public slaves, who
never stirred from the galleys, were excellently trained, and
the captains were expert and fearless. In this respect
Carthage was decidedly superior to the Romans, who, with
the few ships of their Greek allies and still fewer of their
own, were unable even to show themselves in the open Sea
against the fleet which at that time without a rival ruled
the western Mediterranean.
If, in conclusion, we sum up the results of this compari-
son of the resources of the two great powers, the judgment
expressed by a sagacious and impartial Greek is perhaps
borne out, that Carthage and Rome were, when the struggle
between them began, on the whole equally matched. But
we cannot omit to add that, while Carthage had put forth
all the efforts of which intellect and wealth were capable to
provide herself with artificial means of attack and defence,
she was unable in any satisfactory way to make up for the
fundamental wants of a land army of her own and of a
symmachy resting on a self-supporting basis. That Rome
could only be seriously attacked in Italy, and Carthage
only in Libya, no one could fail to see ; as little could
any one fail to perceive that Carthage could not in the long
run escape from such an attack. Fleets were not yet in
those times of the infancy of navigation a permanent heir-
loom of nations, but could be fitted out wherever there
were trees, iron, and water. It was clear, and had been
several times tested in Africa itself, that even powerful
maritime states were not able to prevent enemies weaker
by sea from landing. When Agathocles had shown the
way thither, a Roman general could follow the same course;
and while in Italy the entrance of an invading army simply
began the war, the same event in Libya put an end to it
by converting it into a siege, in which, unless special
accidents should intervene, even the most obstinate and
heroic courage must finally succumb.
C11AP. II WAR BETWEEN ROME AND CARTHAGE I61
CHAPTER II
THE WAR BETWEEN ROME AND CARTHAGE CONCERNING
SICILY . . .”
22* * *
FoR upwards of a century the feud between the Cartha- State of
ginians and the rulers of Syracuse had devastated the fair “”
island of Sicily. On both sides the contest was carried on
with the weapons of political proselytism, for, while
Carthage kept up communications with the aristocratic-
republican opposition in Syracuse, the Syracusan dynasts
maintained relations with the national party in the Greek
cities that had become tributary to Carthage. On both
sides armies of mercenaries were employed to fight their
battles—by Timoleon and Agathocles, as well as by the
Phoenician generals. And as like means were employed
on both sides, so the conflict had been waged on both with
a disregard of honour and a perfidy unexampled in the
history of the west. The Syracusans were the weaker
party. In the peace of 44o Carthage had still limited her 314.
claims to the third of the island to the west of Heraclea
Minoa and Himera, and had expressly recognized the
hegemony of the Syracusans over all the cities to the east-
ward. The expulsion of Pyrrhus from Sicily and Italy
(479) left by far the larger half of the island, and especially 275.
the important Agrigentum, in the hands of Carthage ; the
Syracusans retained nothing but Tauromenium and the
South-east of the island.
WOL. II 43
I62 THE WAR BETWEEN ROME AND BOOK III
Campanian
Iſler C621) - -
aries.
Mamer-
times.
284.
289.
In the second great city on the east coast, Messana, a
band of foreign soldiers had established themselves and
held the city, independent alike of Syracusans and Cartha-
ginians. These new rulers of Messana were Campanian
mercenaries. The dissolute habits that had become pre-
valent among the Sabellians settled in and around Capua
(i. 457), had made Campania in the fourth and fifth
centuries—what Aetolia, Crete, and Laconia were after-
wards—the universal recruiting field for princes and cities
in search of mercenaries. The semi-culture that had been
called into existence there by the Campanian Greeks, the
barbaric luxury of life in Capua and the other Campanian
cities, the political impotence to which the hegemony of
Rome condemned them, while yet its rule was not so stern
as wholly to withdraw from them the right of self-disposal
—all tended to drive the youth of Campania in troops to
the standards of the recruiting officers. As a matter of
course, this wanton and unscrupulous selling of themselves
here, as everywhere, brought in its train estrangement from
their native land, habits of violence and military disorder,
and indifference to the breach of their allegiance. These
Campanians could see no reason why a band of mercen-
aries should not seize on their own behalf any city en-
trusted to their guardianship, provided only they were in a
position to hold it—the Samnites had established their.
dominion in Capua itself, and the Lucanians in a succession,
of Greek cities, after a fashion not much more honourable.
Nowhere was the state of political relations more inviting
for such enterprises than in Sicily. Already the Campanian
captains who came to Sicily during the Peloponnesian war
had insinuated themselves in this way into Entella and
Aetna. Somewhere about the year 47 o a Campanian
band, which had previously served under Agathocles and
after his death (465) took up the trade of freebooters ori
their own account, established themselves in Messana, the
CHAP. II CARTHAGE CONCERNING SICILY I63
second city of Greek Sicily, and the chief seat of the anti-
Syracusan party in that portion of the island which was
still in the power of the Greeks. The citizens were slain º
or expelled, their wives and children and houses were dis-
tributed among the soldiers, and the new masters of the
city, the Mamertines or “men of Mars,” as they called
themselves, soon became the third power in the island, the
north-eastern portion of which they reduced to subjection
in the times of confusion that succeeded the death of
Agathocles. The Carthaginians were no unwilling spectators
of these events, which established in the immediate vicinity
of the Syracusans a new and powerful adversary instead of
a cognate and ordinarily allied or dependent city. With
Carthaginian aid the Mamertines maintained themselves
against Pyrrhus, and the untimely departure of the king
restored to them all their power.
It is not becoming in the historian either to excuse the
perfidious crime by which the Mamertines seized their
power, or to forget that the God of history does not neces-
sarily punish the sins of the fathers to the fourth generation.
He who feels it his vocation to judge the sins of others
may condemn the human agents; for Sicily it might be a
blessing that a warlike power, and one belonging to the
island, thus began to be formed in it—a power which
was already able to bring eight thousand men into the
field, and which was gradually putting itself in a position
to take up at the proper time and on its own resources that
struggle against the foreigners, to the maintenance of which
the Hellenes, becoming more and more unaccustomed to
arms notwithstanding their perpetual wars, were no longer
equal.
In the first instance, however, things took another turn.
A young Syracusan officer, who by his descent from the
family of Gelo and his intimate relations of kindred with
king Pyrrhus as well as by the distinction with which he
Hiero of
Syracuse.
I64 THE WAR BETWEEN ROME AND BOOK III
275-274.
War
between the
Syracusans
and Ma-
mertines.
270.
had fought in the campaigns of the latter, had attracted
the notice of his fellow-citizens as well as of the Syracusan
soldiery—Hiero, son of Hierocles—was called by military
election to command the army, which was at variance with
the citizens (479–480). By his prudent administration, the
nobility of his character, and the moderation of his views,
he rapidly gained the hearts of the citizens of Syracuse—
who had been accustomed to the most scandalous lawless-
ness in their despots—and of the Sicilian Greeks in general.
He rid himself—in a perfidious manner, it is true—of the
insubordinate army of mercenaries, revived the citizen-
militia, and endeavoured, at first with the title of general,
afterwards with that of king, to re-establish the deeply
sunken Hellenic power by means of his civic troops and of
fresh and more manageable recruits. With the Cartha-
ginians, who in concert with the Greeks had driven king
Pyrrhus from the island, there was at that time peace.
The immediate foes of the Syracusans were the Mamer-
tines. They were the kinsmen of those hated mercenaries
whom the Syracusans had recently extirpated ; they had
murdered their own Greek hosts; they had curtailed the
Syracusan territory; they had oppressed and plundered a
number of smaller Greek towns. In league with the
Romans who just about this time were sending their legions
against the Campanians in Rhegium, the allies, kinsmen,
and confederates in crime of the Mamertines (p. 38),
Hiero turned his arms against Messana. By a great
victory, after which Hiero was proclaimed king of the
Siceliots (484), he succeeded in shutting up the Mamer-
tines within their city, and after the siege had lasted some
years, they found themselves reduced to extremity and
unable to hold the city longer against Hiero on their own
resources. It is evident that a surrender on stipulated
conditions was impossible, and that the axe of the execu-
tioner, which had fallen upon the Campanians of Rhegium
CHAP. II CARTHAGE CONCERNING SICILY I65
at Rome, as certainly awaited those of Messana at Syracuse.
Their only means of safety lay in delivering up the city
either to the Carthaginians or to the Romans, both of
whom could not but be so strongly set upon acquiring that
important place as to overlook all other scruples. Whether
it would be more advantageous to surrender it to the
masters of Africa or to the masters of Italy, was doubtful;
after long hesitation the majority of the Campanian bur-
gesses at length resolved to offer the possession of their
sea-commanding fortress to the Romans.
It was a moment of the deepest significance in the history
of the world, when the envoys of the Mamertines appeared
in the Roman senate. No one indeed could then anti-
cipate all that was to depend on the crossing of that narrow
arm of the sea ; but that the decision, however it should
go, would involve consequences far other and more import-
ant than had attached to any decree hitherto passed by
the senate, must have been manifest to every one of the
deliberating fathers of the city. Strictly upright men might
indeed ask how it was possible to deliberate at all, and
how any one could even think of suggesting that the
Romans should not only break their alliance with Hiero,
but should, just after the Campanians of Rhegium had
been punished by them with righteous severity, admit the
no less guilty Sicilian accomplices to the alliance and
friendship of the state, and thereby rescue them from the
punishment which they deserved. Such an outrage on
propriety would not only afford their adversaries matter for
declamation, but must seriously offend all men of moral
feeling. But even the statesman, with whom political
morality was no mere phrase, might ask in reply, how
Roman burgesses, who had broken their military oath and
treacherously murdered the allies of Rome, could be placed
on a level with foreigners who had committed an outrage
on foreigners, where no one had constituted the Romans
The Ma.
mertines
received
into the
Italian
confeder-
acy.
I66 THE WAR IBETWEEN ROME AND BOOK 1 I
judges of the one or avengers of the other ? Had the
question been only whether the Syracusans or Mamertines
should rule in Messana, Rome might certainly have
acquiesced in the rule of either. Rome was striving for
the possession of Italy, as Carthage for that of Sicily; the
designs of the two powers scarcely then went further. But
that very circumstance formed a reason why each desired
to have and retain on its frontier an intermediate power—
the Carthaginians for instance reckoning in this way on
Tarentum, the Romans on Syracuse and Messana
why, if that course was impossible, each preferred to see
these adjacent places given over to itself rather than to the
other great power. As Carthage had made an attempt in
Italy, when Rhegium and Tarentum were about to be
occupied by the Romans, to acquire these cities for itself,
and had only been prevented from doing so by accident,
so in Sicily an opportunity now offered itself for Rome to
bring the city of Messana into its symmachy; should the
Romans reject it, it was not to be expected that the city
would remain independent or would become Syracusan ; they
would themselves throw it into the arms of the Phoenicians.
Were they justified in allowing an opportunity to escape,
such as certainly would never recur, of making themselves
masters of the natural fété de font between Italy and Sicily,
and of securing it by means of a brave garrison on which
they could, for good reasons, rely P. Were they justified
in abandoning Messana, and thereby surrendering the Com-
mand of the last free passage between the eastern and
western seas, and sacrificing the commercial liberty of
Italy P. It is true that other objections might be urged to
the occupation of Messana besides mere scruples of feeling
and of honourable policy. That it could not but lead to a
war with Carthage, was the least of these ; serious as was
such a war, Rome might not fear it. But there was the
more important objection that by crossing the sea the
and
CHAP. II CARTHAGE CONCERNING SICILY 167
Romans would depart from the purely Italian and purely
continental policy which they had hitherto pursued; they
would abandon the system by which their ancestors had
founded the greatness of Rome, to enter upon another
system the results of which no one could foretell. It was
one of those moments when calculation ceases, and when
faith in men's own and in their country's destiny alone gives
them courage to grasp the hand which beckons to them
out of the darkness of the future, and to follow it no one
knows whither. Long and seriously the senate deliberated
on the proposal of the consuls to lead the legions to the
help of the Mamertines; it came to no decisive resolution.
But the burgesses, to whom the matter was referred, were
animated by a lively sense of the greatness of the power
which their own energy had established. The conquest
of Italy encouraged the Romans, as that of Greece en-
couraged the Macedonians and that of Silesia the Prussians,
to enter upon a new political career. A formal pretext for
supporting the Mamertines was found in the protectorate
which Rome claimed the right to exercise over all Italians.
The transmarine Italians were received into the Italian
confederacy;" and on the proposal of the consuls the citizens
resolved to send them aid (489).
Much depended on the way in which the two Sicilian
powers, immediately affected by this intervention of the Ro-
mans in the affairs of the island, and both hitherto nominally
in alliance with Rome, would regard her interference.
Hiero had sufficient reason to treat the summons, by which
the Romans required him to desist from hostilities against
their new confederates in Messana, precisely in the same
way as the Samnites and Lucanians in similar circumstances
had received the occupation of Capua and Thurii, and to
* The Mamertines entered quite into the same position towards Rome
as the Italian communities, bound themselves to furnish ships (Cic Verr.
v. 19, 50), and, as the coins show, did not possess the right of coining
silver,
265.
Variance
between
Rome and
Carthage.
I 6S THE WAR BETWEEN ROME AND BOOK III
265.
answer the Romans by a declaration of war. If, however,
he remained unsupported, such a war would be folly; and
it might be expected from his prudent and moderate policy
that he would acquiesce in what was inevitable, if Carthage
should be disposed for peace. This seemed not impossible.
A Roman embassy was now (489) sent to Carthage, seven
years after the attempt of the Phoenician fleet to gain pos-
session of Tarentum, to demand explanations as to these
incidents (p. 38). Grievances not unfounded, but half.
forgotten, once more emerged—it seemed not superfluous
amidst other warlike preparations to replenish the diplomatic
armoury with reasons for war, and for the coming manifesto
to reserve to themselves, as was the custom of the Romans,
the character of the party aggrieved. This much at least
might with entire justice be affirmed, that the respective
enterprises on Tarentum and Messana stood upon exactly
the same footing in point of design and of pretext, and that
it was simply the accident of success that made the differ-
ence. Carthage avoided an open rupture. The ambass
sadors carried back to Rome the disavowal of the
Carthaginian admiral who had made the attempt on
Tarentum, along with the requisite false oaths: the counter-
complaints, which of course were not wanting on the part
of Carthage, were studiously moderate, and abstained from
characterizing the meditated invasion of Sicily as a ground
for war. Such, however, it was ; for Carthage regarded
the affairs of Sicily—just as Rome regarded those of Italy
—as internal matters in which an independent power could
allow no interference, and was determined to act accord-
ingly. But Phoenician policy followed a gentler course
than that of threatening open war. When the preparations
of Rome for sending help to the Mamertines were at length
So far advanced that the fleet formed of the war-vessels of
Naples, Tarentum, Velia, and Locri, and the vanguard of
the Roman land army under the military tribune Gaius
J
CHAP. II CARTHAGE CONCERNING SICILY 169
Claudius, had appeared at Rhegium (in the spring of 490),
unexpected news arrived from Messana that the Cartha-
ginians, having come to an understanding with the anti-
Roman party there, had as a neutral power arranged a
peace between Hiero and the Mamertines; that the siege
had in consequence been raised; and that a Carthaginian
fleet lay in the harbour of Messana, and a Carthaginian
garrison in the citadel, both under the command of admiral
Hanno. The Mamertine citizens, now controlled by
Carthaginian influence, informed the Roman commanders,
with due thanks to the federal help so speedily accorded to
them, that they were glad that they no longer needed it.
The adroit and daring officer who commanded the Roman
vanguard nevertheless set sail with his troops. But the
Carthaginians warned the Roman vessels to retire, and
even made some of them prizes; these, however, the
Carthaginian admiral, remembering his strict orders to give
no pretext for the outbreak of hostilities, sent back to his
good friends on the other side of the straits. It almost
seemed as if the Romans had compromised themselves as
uselessly before Messana, as the Carthaginians before
Tarentum. But Claudius did not allow himself to be
deterred, and on a second attempt he succeeded in landing.
Scarcely had he arrived when he called a meeting of the
citizens; and, at his wish, the Carthaginian admiral also
appeared at the meeting, still imagining that he should be
able to avoid an open breach. But the Romans seized his
person in the assembly itself; and Hanno and the
Phoenician garrison in the citadel, weak and destitute of a
leader, were pusillanimous enough, the former to give to
his troops the command to withdraw, the latter to comply
with the orders of their captive general and to evacuate the
city along with him. Thus the fête de pont of the island
fell into the hands of the Romans. The Carthaginian
authorities, justly indignant at the folly and weakness of
264.
Carthagi-
nians in
Messana.
Messana
seized
by the
Romans.
17o THE WAR BETWEEN ROME AND BOOK III
War be-
tween the
Romans
and the
Carthagi-
nians and
Syra-
CUIS3LI1S.
their general, caused him to be executed, and declared war
against the Romans. Above all it was their aim to recover
the lost place. A strong Carthaginian fleet, led by Hanno,
son of Hannibal, appeared off Messana; while the fleet
blockaded the straits, the Carthaginian army landing from
it began the siege on the north side. Hiero, who had only
waited for the Carthaginian attack to begin the war with
Rome, again brought up his army, which he had hardly
withdrawn, against Messana, and undertook the attack on
the south side of the city.
But meanwhile the Roman consul Appius Claudius
Caudex had appeared at Rhegium with the main body of
his army, and succeeded in Crossing on a dark night in
spite of the Carthaginian fleet. Audacity and fortune
were on the side of the Romans; the allies, not prepared
for an attack by the whole Roman army and consequently
not united, were beaten in detail by the Roman legions
issuing from the city; and thus the siege was raised. The
Roman army kept the field during the summer, and even
made an attempt on Syracuse ; but, when that had failed
and the siege of Echetla (on the confines of the territories
of Syracuse and Carthage) had to be abandoned with loss,
the Roman army returned to Messana, and thence, leaving
a strong garrison behind them, to Italy. The results
obtained in this first campaign of the Romans out of Italy
may not quite have corresponded to the expectations at
home, for the consul had no triumph ; nevertheless, the
energy which the Romans displayed in Sicily could not
fail to make a great impression on the Sicilian Greeks.
In the following year both consuls and an army twice as
large entered the island unopposed. One of them, Marcus
Valerius Maximus, afterwards called from this campaign
the “hero of Messana’’ (Messalla), achieved a brilliant
victory over the allied Carthaginians and Syracusans.
After this battle the Phoenician army no longer ventured
CHAP. II CARTHAGE CONCERNING SICILY 171
to keep the field against the Romans; Alaesa, Centuripa,
and the smaller Greek towns generally fell to the victors,
and Hiero himself abandoned the Carthaginian side and
made peace and alliance with the Romans (491). He
pursued a judicious policy in joining the Romans as soon
as it appeared that their interference in Sicily was in
earnest, and while there was still time to purchase peace
without cessions and sacrifices. The intermediate states
in Sicily, Syracuse and Messana, which were unable to
follow out a policy of their own and had only the choice
between Roman and Carthaginian hegemony, could not
but at any rate prefer the former ; because the Romans
had very probably not as yet formed the design of conquer-
ing the island for themselves, but sought merely to prevent
its being acquired by Carthage, and at all events Rome
might be expected to substitute a more tolerable treatment
and a due protection of commercial freedom for the
tyrannizing and monopolizing system that Carthage pursued.
Henceforth Hiero continued to be the most important,
the steadiest, and the most esteemed ally of the Romans
in the island.
The Romans had thus gained their immediate object.
By their double alliance with Messana and Syracuse, and
the firm hold which they had on the whole east coast,
they secured, the means of landing on the island and of
maintaining—which hitherto had been a very difficult
matter—their armies there ; and the war, which had
previously been doubtful and hazardous, lost in a great
measure its character of risk. Accordingly, no greater
exertions were made for it than for the wars in Samnium
and Etruria; the two legions which were sent over to the
island for the next year (492) sufficed, in concert with the
Sicilian Greeks, to drive the Carthaginians everywhere into
their fortresses. The commandcr-in-chieſ Uſ the Cartha-
ginians, Hannibal son of Gisgo, threw himself with the
Peace with
Hiero.
263.
Capture
Of Agri-
gentum.
262.
172 THE WAR BETWEEN ROME AND BOOK III
Beginning
of the
maritime
War.
flower of his troops into Agrigentum, to defend to the
last that most important of the Carthaginian inland cities.
|Unable to storm a city so strong, the Romans blockaded
it with entrenched lines and a double camp; the besieged,
who numbered 50, ooo, soon suffered from want of pro-
visions. To raise the siege the Carthaginian admiral
Hanno landed at Heraclea, and cut off in turn the supplies
from the Roman besieging force. On both sides the
distress was great. At length a battle was resolved on, to
put an end to the state of embarrassment and uncertainty.
In this battle the Numidian cavalry showed itself just as
superior to the Roman horse as the Roman infantry was
superior to the Phoenician foot; the infantry decided the
victory, but the losses even of the Romans were very
considerable. The result of the successful stru gle was
somewhat marred by the circumstance that, after the
battle, during the confusion and fatigue of the conqueror;,
the beleaguered army succeeded in escaping from the city
and in reaching the fleet. The victory was nevertheless
of importance; Agrigentum fell into the hands of the
Romans, and thus the whole island was in their power,
with the exception of the maritime fortresses, in which the
Carthaginian general Hamilcar, Hanno's successor in com-
mand, entrenched himself to the teeth, and was not to be
driven out either by force or by famine. The war was
thenceforth continued only by Sallies of the Carthaginians
from the Sicilian fortresses and their descents on the
Italian coasts.
In fact, the Romans now for the first time felt the real
difficulties of the war. If, as we are told, the Carthaginian
diplomatists before the outbreak of hostilities warned the
Romans not to push the matter to a breach, because
against their will no Roman could even wash his hands in
the sea, the threat was well founded. The Carthaginian
fleet ruled the sea without a rival, and not only kept the
CHAP. II CARTHAGE CONCERNING SICILY I73
coast towns of Sicily in due obedience and provided them
with all necessaries, but also threatened a descent upon
Italy, for which reason it was necessary in 492 to retain a
consular army there. No invasion on a large Scale OC-
curred ; but smaller Carthaginian detachments landed on
the Italian coasts and levied contributions on the allies of
Rome, and what was worst of all, completely paralyzed the
commerce of Rome and her allies. The continuance of
such a course for even a short time would suffice entirely
to ruin Caere, Ostia, Neapolis, Tarentum, and Syracuse,
while the Carthaginians easily consoled themselves for the
loss of the tribute of Sicily with the contributions which
they levied and the rich prizes of their privateering. The
Romans now learned, what Dionysius, Agathocles, and
Pyrrhus had learned before, that it was as difficult to
conquer the Carthaginians as it was easy to beat them in the
field. They saw that everything depended on procuring
a fleet, and resolved to form one of twenty triremes and a
hundred quinqueremes. The execution, however, of this
energetic resolution was not easy. The representation
originating in the schools of the rhetoricians, which would
have us believe that the Romans then for the first time
dipped their oars in water, is no doubt a childish tale;
the mercantile marine of Italy must at this time have been
very extensive, and there was no want even of Italian
vessels of war. But these were war-barks and triremes,
such as had been in use in earlier times; quinqueremes,
which under the more modern system of naval warfare
that had originated chiefly in Carthage were almost ex-
clusively employed in the line, had not yet been built in
Italy. The measure adopted by the Romans was there-
fore much as if a maritime state of the present day were to
pass at once from the building of frigates and cutters to
the building of ships of Llle line ; and, just as in such a
Case now a foreign ship of the line would, if possible,
262,
The
Romans
build a
fleet.
I74 THE WAR BETWEEN ROME AND BOOK III
260.
be adopted as a pattern, the Romans referred their master
shipbuilders to a stranded Carthaginian ſenteres as a model.
No doubt the Romans, had they wished, might have
sooner attained their object with the aid of the Syracusans
and Massiliots; but their statesmen had too much sagacity
to desire to defend Italy by means of a fleet not Italian.
The Italian allies, however, were largely drawn upon both
for the naval officers, who must have been for the most
part taken from the Italian mercantile marine, and for the
sailors, whose name (socii navales) shows that for a time
they were exclusively furnished by the allies; along with
these, slaves provided by the state and the wealthier
families were afterwards employed, and ere long also the
poorer class of burgesses. Under such circumstances, and
when we take into account, as is but fair, on the one hand
the comparatively low state of shipbuilding at that time,
and on the other hand the energy of the Romans, there is
nothing incredible in the statement that the Romans
solved within a year the problem—which baffled Napoleon
—of converting a continental into a maritime power, and
actually launched their fleet of I2O sail in the spring of
494. It is true, that it was by no means a match for the
Carthaginian fleet in numbers and efficiency at sea ; and
these were points of the greater importance, as the naval
tactics of the period consisted mainly in manoeuvring. In
the maritime warfare of that period hoplites and archers
no doubt fought from the deck, and projectile machines were
also plied from it; but the ordinary and really decisive mode
of action consisted in running foul of the enemy's vessels,
for which purpose the prows were furnished with heavy
iron beaks: the vessels engaged were in the habit of Sail-
ing round each other till one or the other succeeded in
giving the thrust, which usually proved decisive. Accord-
ingly the crew of an ordinary Greek trireme, consisting of
about 2 oo men, contained only about Io Soldiers, but on
CHAP. II CARTHAGE CONCERNING SICILY I75
the other hand I 7o rowers, from 50 to 60 on each deck;
that of a quinquereme numbered about 300 rowers, and
soldiers in proportion.
The happy idea occurred to the Romans that they
might make up for what their vessels, with their unpractised
officers and crews, necessarily lacked in ability of manoeu-
vring, by again assigning a more considerable part in naval
warfare to the soldiers. They stationed at the prow of each
vessel a flying bridge, which could be lowered in front or
on either side ; it was furnished on both sides with parapets,
and had space for two men in front. When the enemy's
vessel was sailing up to strike the Roman one, or was lying
alongside of it after the thrust had been evaded, the bridge
on deck was suddenly lowered and fastened to its opponent
by means of a grappling-iron : this not only prevented the
running down, but enabled the Roman marines to pass
along the bridge to the enemy's deck and to carry it by
assault as in a conflict on land. No distinct body of
marines was formed, but land troops were employed, when
required, for this maritime service. In one instance as
many as 12 o legionaries fought in each ship on Occasion
of a great naval battle ; in that case however the Roman
fleet had at the same time a landing-army on board.
In this way the Romans created a fleet which was a
match for the Carthaginians. Those err, who represent this
building of a Roman fleet as a fairy tale, and besides they
miss their aim ; the feat must be understood in order to be
admired. The construction of a fleet by the Romans was
in very truth a noble national work—a work through which,
by their clear perception of what was needful and possible,
by ingenuity in invention, and by energy in resolution and
in execution, they rescued their country from a position
which was worse than at first it seemed.
The outset, nevertlleless, was 110 ſavourable to thc
Romans. The Roman admiral, the consul Gnaeus
Naval
victory at
Mylae.
176 THE WAR BETWEEN ROME AND BOOf{ III
260.
Cornelius Scipio, who had sailed for Messana with the first
seventeen vessels ready for sea (494), fancied, when on the
voyage, that he should be able to capture Lipara by a coup
de main. But a division of the Carthaginian fleet stationed
at Panormus blockaded the harbour of the island where the
Roman vessels rode at anchor, and captured the whole
Squadron along with the consul without a struggle. This,
however, did not deter the main fleet from likewise sailing,
as soon as its preparations were completed, for Messana.
On its voyage along the Italian coast it fell in with a
Carthaginian reconnoitring squadron of less strength, on
which it had the good fortune to inflict a loss more than
counterbalancing the first loss of the Romans; and thus
successful and victorious it entered the port of Messana,
where the second consul Gaius Duilius took the command
in room of his captured colleague. At the promontory of
Mylae, to the north-west of Messana, the Carthaginian fleet,
that advanced from Panormus under the command of
Hannibal, encountered the Roman, which here underwent
its first trial on a great scale. The Carthaginians, seeing in
the ill-sailing and unwieldy vessels of the Romans an easy
prey, fell upon them in irregular order; but the newly
invented boarding-bridges proved their thorough efficiency.
The Roman vessels hooked and stormed those of the enemy
as they came up one by one ; they could not be approached
either in front or on the sides without the dangerous bridge
descending on the enemy's deck. When the battle was over,
about fifty Carthaginian vessels, almost the half of the fleet,
were sunk or captured by the Romans; among the latter
was the ship of the admiral Hannibal, formerly belonging to
king Pyrrhus. The gain was great ; still greater the moral
effect of the victory. Rome had suddenly become a naval
power, and held in her hand the means of energetically
terminating a war which threatened to be endlessly prolonged
and to involve the commerce of Italy. in ruin.
CHAP. II CARTHAGE CONCERNING SICILY 177
Two plans were open to the Romans. They might
attack Carthage on the Italian islands and deprive her of
the coast fortresses of Sicily and Sardinia one after another
—a scheme which was perhaps practicable through well-
combined operations by land and sea ; and, in the event
of its being accomplished, peace might either be concluded
with Carthage on the basis of the cession of these islands,
or, should such terms not be accepted or prove unsatisfactory,
the second stage of the war might be transferred to Africa.
Or they might neglect the islands and throw themselves at
once with all their strength on Africa, not, in the adventurous
style of Agathocles, burning their vessels behind them and
staking all on the victory of a desperate band, but covering
with a strong fleet the communications between the African
invading army and Italy; and in that case a peace on
moderate terms might be expected from the consternation
of the enemy after the first successes, or, if the Romans
chose, they might by pushing matters to an extremity com-
pel the enemy to entire surrender.
They chose, in the first instance, the former plan of
operations. In the year after the battle of Mylae (495)
the consul Lucius Scipio captured the port of Aleria in
Corsica—we still possess the tombstone of the general,
which makes mention of this deed—and made Corsica a
naval station against Sardinia. An attempt to establish a
footing in Ulbia on the northern coast of that island failed,
because the fleet wanted troops for landing. In the
succeeding year (496) it was repeated with better success,
and the open villages along the coast were plundered ; but
no permanent establishment of the Romans took place.
Nor was greater progress made in Sicily. Hamilcar
conducted the war with energy and adroitness, not only by
force of arms on sea and land, but also by political
proselytism. Of the numerous small country towns some
every year fell away from the Romans, and had to be
The war on
the coasts
of Sicily
and
Sardinia.
VOL. II 44
259.
258.
178 THE WAR BETWEEN ROME AND BOOK III
Attack
Africa.
257.
OIl
256.
laboriously wrested afresh from the Phoenician grasp ;
while in the coast fortresses the Carthaginians maintained
themselves without challenge, particularly in their head-
quarters of Panormus and in their new stronghold of
Drepana, to which, on account of its easier defence by sea,
Hamilcar had transferred the inhabitants of Eryx. A
second great naval engagement off the promontory of
Tyndaris (497), in which both parties claimed the victory,
made no change in the position of affairs. In this way no
progress was made, whether in consequence of the division
and rapid change of the chief command of the Roman
troops, which rendered the concentrated management of a
series of operations on a small scale exceedingly difficult, or
from the general strategical relations of the case, which
certainly, as the science of war then stood, were unfavour-
able to the attacking party in general (p. 37), and par-
ticularly so to the Romans, who were still on the mere
threshold of scientific warfare. Meanwhile, although the
pillaging of the Italian coasts had ceased, the commerce of
Italy suffered not much less than it had done before the
fleet was built.
Weary of a course of operations without results, and
impatient to put an end to the war, the senate resolved to
change its system, and to assail Carthage in Africa. In the
spring of 498 a fleet of 330 ships of the line set sail for the
coast of Libya: at the mouth of the river Himera on the
south coast of Sicily it embarked the army for landing,
consisting of four legions, under the charge of the two
consuls Marcus Atilius Regulus and Lucius Manlius Volso,
both experienced generals. The Carthaginian admiral
suffered the embarkation of the enemy's troops to take
place ; but on continuing their voyage towards Africa the
Romans found the Punic fleet drawn up in order of battle
off Ecnomus to protect its native land from invasion.
Seldom have greater numbers fought at Sea than were
CHAP. II CARTHAGE CONCERNING SICILY I79
engaged in the battle that now ensued. The Roman fleet
of 330 sail contained at least Ioo, ooo men in its crews,
besides the landing army of about 4o, ooo; the Cartha-
ginian of 350 vessels was manned by at least an equal
number; so that well-nigh three hundred thousand men
were brought into action on this day to decide the
contest between the two mighty civic communities. The
Phoenicians were placed in a single widely-extended line,
with their left wing resting on the Sicilian coast. The
Romans arranged themselves in a triangle, with the ships
of the two consuls as admirals at the apex, the first and
second squadrons drawn out in oblique line to the right
and left, and a third squadron, having the vessels built for
the transport of the cavalry in tow, forming the line which
closed the triangle. They thus bore down in close order
on the enemy. A fourth squadron placed in reserve
followed more slowly. The wedge-shaped attack broke
without difficulty the Carthaginian line, for its centre, which
was first assailed, intentionally gave way, ând the battle
resolved itself into three separate engagements. While the
admirals with the two squadrons drawn up on the wings
pursued the Carthaginian centre and were closely engaged
with it, the left wing of the Carthaginians drawn up along
the coast wheeled round upon the third Roman squadron,
which was prevented by the vessels which it had in tow
from following the two others, and by a vehement'onset in
superior force drove it against the shore ; at the same time
the Roman reserve was turned on the open sea, and assailed
from behind, by the right wing of the Carthaginians. The
first of these three engagements was soon at an end; the
ships of the Carthaginian centre, manifestly much weaker
than the two Roman squadrons with which they were
engaged, took to flight. Meanwhile the two other divisions
of the Romans had a hard struggle with the superior
enemy; but in close fighting the dreaded boarding-bridges
Naval
victory of
Ecnomus.
18O THE WAR BETWEEN ROME AND 13OOK III
Landing of
Regulus in
Africa.
stood them in good stead, and by this means they
succeeded in holding out till the two admirals with their
vessels could come up. By their arrival the Roman reserve
was relieved, and the Carthaginian vessels of the right wing
retired before the superior force. And now, when this
conflict had been decided in favour of the Romans, all the
Roman vessels that still could keep the sea fell on the
rear of the Carthaginian left wing, which was obstinately
following up its advantage, so that it was surrounded and
almost all the vessels composing it were taken. The losses
otherwise were nearly equal. Of the Roman fleet 24 sail
were sunk; of the Carthaginian 3o were sunk, and 64 were
taken.
Notwithstanding its considerable loss, the Carthaginian
fleet did not give up the protection of Africa, and with that
view returned to the gulf of Carthage, where it expected
the descent to take place and purposed to give battle a
second time. But the Romans landed, not on the western
side of the peninsula which helps to form the gulf, but on
the eastern side, where the bay of Clupea presented a
spacious harbour affording protection in almost all winds,
and the town, situated close by the sea on a shield-shaped
eminence rising out of the plain, supplied an excellent
defence for the harbour. They disembarked the troops
without hindrance from the enemy, and established them-
selves on the hill; in a short time an entrenched naval
camp was constructed, and the land army was at liberty to
commence operations. The Roman troops ranged over
the country and levied contributions: they were able to
send as many as 20, ooo slaves to Rome. Through the
rarest good fortune the bold scheme had succeeded at the
first stroke, and with but slight sacrifices: the end seemed
attained. The feeling of confidence that in this respect
animated the Romans is evinced by the resolution of the
senate to recall to Italy the greater portion of the fleet and
CHAP. II CARTHAGE CONCERNING SICILY I81
half of the army; Marcus Regulus alone remained in Africa
with 4o ships, 15, ooo infantry, and 500 cavalry. Their
confidence, however, was seemingly not overstrained. The
Carthaginian army, which was disheartened, did not venture
forth into the plain, but waited to sustain discomfiture in
the wooded defiles, in which it could make no use of its
two best arms, the cavalry and the elephants. The towns
surrendered en masse ; the Numidians rose in insurrection,
and overran the country far and wide. Regulus might
hope to begin the next campaign with the siege of the
capital, and with that view he pitched his camp for the
winter in its immediate vicinity at Tunes.
The spirit of the Carthaginians was broken : they sued
for peace. But the conditions which the consul proposed
—not merely the cession of Sicily and Sardinia, but the
conclusion of an alliance on unequal terms with Rome,
which would have bound the Carthaginians to renounce a
war-marine of their own and to furnish vessels for the
Roman wars—conditions which would have placed Carthage
on a level with Neapolis and Tarentum, could not be
accepted, so long as a Carthaginian army kept the field and
a Carthaginian fleet kept the Sea, and the capital stood
unshaken.
The mighty enthusiasm, which is wont to blaze up
nobly among Oriental nations, even the most abased, on
the approach of extreme peril—the energy of dire necessity
—impelled the Carthaginians to exertions, such as were by
no means expected from a nation of shopkeepers. Hamil-
car, who had carried on the guerilla war against the Romans
in Sicily with so much success, appeared in Libya with the
flower of the Sicilian troops, which furnished an admirable
nucleus for the newly-levied force. The connections and
gold of the Carthaginians, moreover, brought to them
cxcellent Numidian horsemen in troops, and also numerous
Greek mercenaries; amongst whom was the celebrated
Vain nego-
tiations for
peace. “
Prepara-
tions of
Carthage.
182 THE WAR BETWEEN ROME AND BOOK III
captain Xanthippus of Sparta, whose talent for organiza-
tion and strategical skill were of great service to his new
masters." While the Carthaginians were thus making their
preparations in the course of the winter, the Roman general
remained inactive at Tunes. Whether it was that he did
not anticipate the storm which was gathering over his head,
or that a sense of military honour prohibited him from
doing what his position demanded—instead of renouncing
a siege which he was not in a condition even to attempt,
and shutting himself up in the stronghold of Clupea, he
remained with a handful of men before the walls of the
hostile capital, neglecting even to secure his line of retreat
to the naval camp, and neglecting to provide himself with
—what above all he wanted, and what might have been
so easily obtained through negotiation with the revolted
Numidian tribes—a good light cavalry. He thus wantonly
brought himself and his army into a plight similar to that
which formerly befell Agathocles in his desperate adven-
turous expedition.
When spring came (499), the state of affairs had so
changed, that now the Carthaginians were the first to take
the field and to offer battle to the Romans. It was natural
that they should do so, for everything depended on their
getting quit of the army of Regulus, before reinforcements
could arrive from Italy. The same reason should have led
the Romans to desire delay; but, relying on their invin-
cibleness in the open field, they at once accepted battle
notwithstanding their inferiority of strength—for, although
the numbers of the infantry on both sides were nearly the
255.
Defeat of
Regulus.
* The statement, that the military talent of Xanthippus was the primary
means of saving Carthage, is probably coloured ; the officers of Carthage
can hardly have waited for foreigners to teach them that the light African
cavalry could be more appropriately employed on the plain than among
hills and forests. From such stories, the echo of the talk of Greek guard-
rooms, even Polybius is not free. The statement that Xanthippus was
put to death by the Carthaginians after the victory, is a fiction ; he de-
parted voluntarily, perhaps to enter the Egyptian service.
CHAP. II CARTHAGE CONCERNING SICII.Y 183
same, their 4ooo cavalry and I oo elephants gave to the
Carthaginians a decided superiority—and notwithstanding
the unfavourable nature of the ground, the Carthaginians
having taken up their position in a broad plain presumably
not far from Tunes. Xanthippus, who on this day com-
manded the Carthaginians, first threw his cavalry on that of
the enemy, which was stationed, as usual, on the two flanks
of the line of battle ; the few squadrons of the Romans
were scattered like dust in a moment before the masses of
the enemy's horse, and the Roman infantry found itself
outflanked by them and surrounded. The legions, un-
shaken by their apparent danger, advanced to attack the
enemy's line; and, although the row of elephants placed as
a protection in front of it checked the right wing and centre
of the Romans, the left wing at any rate, marching past the
elephants, engaged the mercenary infantry on the right of
the enemy, and overthrew them completely. But this very
success broke up the Roman ranks. The main body
indeed, assailed by the elephants in front and by the
cavalry on the flanks and in the rear, formed square, and
defended itself with heroic courage, but the close masses
were at length broken and swept away. The victorious
left wing encountered the still fresh Carthaginian centre,
where the Libyan infantry prepared a similar fate for it.
From the nature of the ground and the superior numbers
of the enemy's cavalry, all the combatants in these masses
were cut down or taken prisoners; only two thousand men,
chiefly, in all probability, the light troops and horsemen
who were dispersed at the commencement, gained—while
the Roman legions stood to be slaughtered—a start
sufficient to enable them with difficulty to reach Clupea.
Among the few prisoners was the consul himself, who after-
wards died in Carthage; his family, under the idea that he
had not been treated by the Carthaginians according to the
usages of war, wreaked a most revolting vengeance on two
184 THE WAR BETWEEN ROME AND BOOK III
noble Carthaginian captives, till even the slaves were
moved to pity, and on their information the tribunes put a
stop to the shameful outrage."
When the terrible news reached Rome, the first care of
the Romans was naturally directed to the saving of the
force shut up in Clupea. A Roman fleet of 35o sail
immediately started, and after a noble victory at the
Hermaean promontory, in which the Carthaginians lost I 14
ships, it reached Clupea just in time to deliver from their
hard-pressed position the remains of the defeated army
which were there entrenched. Had it been despatched
before the catastrophe occurred, it might have converted
the defeat into a victory that would probably have put an
end to the Punic wars. But so completely had the
Romans now lost their judgment, that after a successful
conflict before Clupea they embarked all their troops and
sailed home, voluntarily evacuating that important and
easily defended position which secured to them facilities for
landing in Africa, and abandoning their numerous African
allies without protection to the vengeance of the Cartha-
ginians. The Carthaginians did not neglect the oppor-
tunity of filling their empty treasury, and of making their
subjects clearly understand the consequences of unfaithful-
ness. An extraordinary contribution of Iooo talents of
silver (4,244,000) and 20, ooo oxen was levied, and the
sheiks in all the communities that had revolted were
crucified; it is said that there were three thousand of them,
and that this revolting atrocity on the part of the Cartha-
ginian authorities really laid the foundation of the revolution
Evacuation
of Africa.
251.
241.
* Nothing further is known with certainty as to the end of Regulus;
even his mission to Rome—which is sometimes placed in 503, sometimes
in 513—is very ill attested. The later Romans, who sought in the fortunes
and misfortunes of their forefathers mere materials for school themes,
made Regulus the prototype of heroic misfortune as they made Fabricius
the prototype of heroic poverty, and put into circulation in his name a
number of anecdotes invented by way of due accompaniment—incon-
gruous embellishments, contrasting ill with serious and sober history.
CHAP. II CARTHAGE CONCERNING SICILY 185
which broke forth in Africa some years later. Lastly, as if
to fill up the measure of misfortune to the Romans even as
their measure of success had been filled before, on the
homeward voyage of the fleet three-fourths of the Roman
vessels perished with their crews in a violent storm; only
eighty reached their port (July 499). The captains had 255.
foretold the impending mischief, but the extemporised
Roman admirals had nevertheless given orders to sail.
After successes so immense the Carthaginians were able Recom-
to resume their offensive operations, which had long been ..."
in abeyance. Hasdrubal son of Hanno landed at Lily- in Sicily.
baeum with a strong force, which was enabled, particularly
by its enormous number of elephants—amounting to 14o
—to keep the field against the Romans: the last battle
had shown that it was possible to make up for the want of
good infantry to some extent by elephants and cavalry.
The Romans also resumed the war in Sicily; the annihila-
tion of their invading army had, as the voluntary evacuation
of Clupea shows, at once restored ascendency in the senate
to the party which was opposed to the war in Africa and
was content with the gradual subjugation of the islands.
But for this purpose too there was need of a fleet; and,
since that which had conquered at Mylae, at Ecnomus,
and at the Hermaean promontory was destroyed, they
built a new one. Keels were at once laid down for 22 o
new vessels of war—they had never hitherto undertaken "
the building of so many simultaneously—and in the in-
credibly short space of three months they were all ready
for sea. In the spring of 5oo the Roman fleet, numbering 254.
3oo vessels mostly new, appeared on the north coast of
Sicily; Panormus, the most important town in Cartha-
ginian Sicily, was acquired through a successful attack from
the seaboard, and the smaller places there, Soluntum,
Cephaloedium, and Tyndaris, likewise fell into the hands
of the Romans, so that along the whole north coast of the
I86 THE WAR BETWEEN ROME AND BOOK I I I
253.
Suspension
of the
maritime
War,
251,
Roman
victory at
Panormus.
island Thermae alone was retained by the Carthaginians.
Panormus became thenceforth one of the chief stations of
the Romans in Sicily. The war by land, nevertheless,
made no progress; the two armies stood face to face before
Lilybaeum, but the Roman commanders, who knew not
how to encounter the mass of elephants, made no attempt
to compel a pitched battle.
In the ensuing year (501) the consuls, instead of pur-
suing sure advantages in Sicily, preferred to make an expe-
dition to Africa, for the purpose not of landing but of
plundering the coast towns. They accomplished their
object without opposition ; but, after having first run
aground in the troublesome, and to their pilots unknown,
waters of the Lesser Syrtis, whence they with difficulty got
clear again, the fleet encountered a storm between Sicily
and Italy, which cost more than 1.5o ships. On this
occasion also the pilots, notwithstanding their representa-
tions and entreaties to be allowed to take the course along
the coast, were obliged by command of the consuls to steer
straight from Panormus across the open sea to Ostia.
Despondency now seized the fathers of the city; they
resolved to reduce their war-fleet to sixty sail, and to
confine the war by sea to the defence of the coasts, and to
the convoy of transports. Fortunately, just at this time,
the languishing war in Sicily took a more favourable turn.
: In the year 502, Thermae, the last point which the Cartha-
ginians held on the north coast, and the important island
of Lipara, had fallen into the hands of the Romans, and
in the following year (summer of 503) the consul Lucius
Caecilius Metellus achieved a brilliant victory over the
army of elephants under the walls of Panormus. These
animals, which had been imprudently brought forward,
were wounded by the light troops of the Romans stationed
in the moat of the town ; some of them fell into the moat,
and others fell back on their own troops, who crowded in
CHAP. II CARTHAGE CONCERNING SICILY 187
wild disorder along with the elephants towards the beach,
that they might be picked up by the Phoenician ships.
One hundred and twenty elephants were captured, and the
Carthaginian army, whose strength depended on these
animals, was obliged once more to shut itself up in its
fortresses. Eryx soon fell into the hands of the Romans
(505), and the Carthaginians retained nothing in the island
but Drepana and Lilybaeum. Carthage a second time
offered peace; but the victory of Metellus and the exhaus-
tion of the enemy gave to the more energetic party the
upper hand in the Senate.
Peace was declined, and it was resolved to prosecute
in earnest the siege of the two, Sicilian cities and for this
purpose to send to sea once more a fleet of 2 oo sail. The
siege of Lilybaeum, the first great and regular siege under-
taken by Rome, and one of the most obstinate known in
history, was opened by the Romans with an important
success: they succeeded in introducing their fleet into the
harbour of the city, and in blockading it on the side facing
the sea. The besiegers, however, were not able to close
the sea completely. In spite of their sunken vessels and
their palisades, and in spite of the most careful vigilance,
dexterous mariners, accurately acquainted with the shallows
and channels, maintained with swift-sailing vessels a regular
communication between the besieged in the city and the
249.
ºr.
Siege of
Lilybaeum.
Carthaginian fleet in the harbour of Drepana. In fact
after some time a Carthaginian Squadron of 50 sail suc-
ceeded in running into the harbour, in throwing a large
quantity of provisions and a reinforcement of Io, ooo men
into the city, and in returning unmolested. The besieging
land army was not much more fortunate. They began
with a regular attack; machines were erected, and in a
short time the batteries had demolished six of the towers
flanking the walls, so that the breach soon appeared to be
practicable. But the able Carthaginian commander Himilco
I88 THE WAR BETWEEN. ROME AND BOOK III
Defeat of
the Roman
fleet before
Drepana.
parried this assault by giving orders for the erection of a
second wall behind the breach. An attempt of the
Romans to enter into an understanding with the garrison
was likewise frustrated in proper time. And, after a first
sally made for the purpose of burning the Roman set of
machines had been repulsed, the Carthaginians succeeded
during a stormy night in effecting their object. Upon this
the Romans abandoned their preparations for an assault,
and contented themselves with blockading the walls by
land and water. The prospect of success in this way was
indeed very remote, so long as they were unable wholly to
preclude the entrance of the enemy's vessels; and the
army of the besiegers was in a condition not much better
than that of the besieged in the city, because their supplies
were frequently cut off by the numerous and bold light
cavalry of the Carthaginians, and their ranks began to be
thinned by the diseases indigenous to that unwholesome
region. The capture of Lilybaeum, however, was of
sufficient importance to induce a patient perseverance in
the laborious task, which promised to be crowned in time
with the desired success.
But the new consul Publius Claudius considered the
task of maintaining the investment of Lilybaeum too
trifling: he preferred to change once more the plan of
operations, and with his numerous newly-manned vessels
suddenly to surprise the Carthaginian fleet which was
waiting in the neighbouring harbour of Drepana. With
the whole blockading squadron, which had taken on board
volunteers from the legions, he started about midnight, and
sailing in good order with his right wing by the shore, and
his left in the open sea, he safely reached the harbour of
Drepana at sunrise. Here the Phoenician admiral Atarbas
was in command. Although surprised, he did not lose his
presence of mind or allow himself to be shut up in the
harbour, but as the Roman ships entered the harbour,
CHAP. II CARTHAGE CONCERNING SICILY 189
which opens to the south in the form of a sickle, on the
one side, he withdrew his vessels from it by the opposite
side which was still free, and stationed them in line on the
outside. No other course remained to the Roman admiral
but to recall as speedily as possible the foremost vessels
from the harbour, and to make his arrangements for battle
in like manner in front of it; but in consequence of this
retrograde movement he lost the free choice of his position,
and was obliged to accept battle in a line, which on the
one hand was outflanked by that of the enemy to the
extent of five ships—for there was not time fully to deploy
the vessels as they issued from the harbour—and on the
other hand was crowded so close on the shore that his
vessels could neither retreat, nor sail behind the line so as
to come to each other's aid. Not only was the battle lost
before it began, but the Roman fleet was so completely
ensnared that it fell almost wholly into the hands of the
enemy. The consul indeed escaped, for he was the first
who fled ; but 93 Roman vessels, more than three-fourths
of the blockading fleet, with the flower of the Roman
legions on board, fell into the hands of the Phoenicians.
It was the first and only great naval victory which the
Carthaginians gained over the Romans. Lilybaeum was
practically relieved on the side towards the sea, for though
the remains of the Roman fleet returned to their former
position, they were now much too weak seriously to
blockade a harbour which had never been wholly closed,
and they could only protect themselves from the attack of
the Carthaginian ships with the assistance of the land army.
That single imprudent act of an inexperienced and crimin-
ally thoughtless officer had thrown away all that had been
with so much difficulty attained by the long and galling
warfare around the fortress; and those war-vessels of the
Romans which his presumption had not forfeited were
shortly afterwards destroyed by the folly of his colleague.
I90 THE WAR BETWEEN ROME AND BOOK II]
Annihila. The second consul, Lucius Junius Pullus, who had received
º the charge of lading at Syracuse the supplies destined for
transport the army at Lilybaeum, and of convoying the transports
fleet. along the south coast of the island with a second Roman
fleet of 12 o war-vessels, instead of keeping his ships
together, committed the error of allowing the first convoy
to depart alone and of only following with the second.
When the Carthaginian vice-admiral, Carthalo, who with a
hundred select ships blockaded the Roman fleet in the
port of Lilybaeum, received the intelligence, he proceeded
to the south coast of the island, cut off the two Roman
squadrons from each other by interposing between them,
and compelled them to take shelter in two harbours of
refuge on the inhospitable shores of Gela and Camarina.
The attacks of the Carthaginians were indeed bravely
repulsed by the Romans with the help of the shore
batteries, which had for some time been erected there as
everywhere along the coast; but, as the Romans could not
hope to effect a junction and continue their voyage, Car-
thalo could leave the elements to finish his work. The
next great storm, accordingly, completely annihilated the .
two Roman fleets in their wretched roadsteads, while the
Phoenician admiral easily weathered it on the open sea
with his unencumbered and well-managed ships. The
Romans, however, succeeded in saving the greater part of
249. the crews and cargoes (505).
Perplexity The Roman senate was in perplexity. The war had
rººm. now reached its sixteenth year; and they seemed to be
farther from their object in the sixteenth than in the first.
In this war four large fleets had perished, three of them
with Roman armies on board ; a fourth select land army
had been destroyed by the enemy in Libya; to say nothing
of the numerous losses which had been occasioned by the
minor naval engagements, and by the battles, and still
more by the outpost warfare and the diseases, of Sicily.
CfIAP. II CARTHAGE CONCERNING SICILY I9 I
What a multitude of human lives the war swept away may
be seen from the fact, that the burgess-roll merely from
502 to 507 decreased by about 40, ooo, a sixth part of the
entire number ; and this does not include the losses of the
allies, who bore the whole brunt of the war by sea, and, in
addition, at least an equal proportion with the Romans of
the warfare by land. Of the financial loss it is not possible
to form any conception ; but both the direct damage
sustained in ships and matériel, and the indirect injury
through the paralyzing of trade, must have been enormous.
An evil still greater than this was the exhaustion of all the
methods by which they had sought to terminate the war.
They had tried a landing in Africa with their forces fresh
and in the full career of victory, and had totally failed.
They had undertaken to storm Sicily town by town; the
lesser places had fallen, but the two mighty naval strong-
holds of Lilybaeum and Drepana stood more invincible
than ever. What were they to do? In fact, there was to
some extent reason for despondency. The fathers of the
city became faint-hearted ; they allowed matters simply to
take their course, knowing well that a war protracted with-
out object or end was more pernicious for Italy than the
straining of the last man and the last penny, but without
that courage and confidence in the nation and in fortune,
which could demand new sacrifices in addition to those
that had already been lavished in vain. They dismissed
the fleet; at the most they encouraged privateering, and
with that view placed the war-vessels of the state at the
disposal of Captains who were ready to undertake a piratical
warfare on their own account. The war by land was con-
tinued nominally, because they could not do otherwise ;
but they were content with observing the Sicilian fortresses
and barely maintaining what they possessed, -measures
which, in the absence of a fleet, required a very numerous
army and extremely costly preparations.
252-247.
192 THE WAR BETWEEN ROME AND BOOK III
Now, if ever, the time had come when Carthage was in
a position to humble her mighty antagonist. She, too, of
course must have felt some exhaustion of resources; but, in
the circumstances, the Phoenician finances could not
possibly be so disorganized as to prevent the Carthaginians
from continuing the war—which cost them little beyond
money—offensively and with energy. The Carthaginian
government, however, was not energetic, but on the con-
trary weak and indolent, unless impelled to action by an
easy and sure gain or by extreme necessity. Glad to be
rid of the Roman fleet, they foolishly allowed their own
also to fall into decay, and began after the example of the
enemy to confine their operations by land and sea to the
petty warfare in and around Sicily.
248-243. Thus there ensued six years of uneventful warfare (506-
Petty war 511), the most inglorious in the history of this century for
** Rome, and inglorious also for the Carthaginian people.
One man, however, among the latter thought and acted
Hamilcar differently from his nation. Hamilcar, named Barak or
* Barcas (i.e. lightning), a young officer of much promise,
247. took over the supreme command in Sicily in the year 507.
His army, like every Carthaginian one, was defective in a
trustworthy and experienced infantry; and the government,
although it was perhaps in a position to create such an
infantry and at any rate was bound to make the attempt,
contented itself with passively looking on at its defeats or
at most with nailing the defeated generals to the cross'
Hamilcar resolved to take the matter into his own hands.
He knew well that his mercenaries were as indifferent to
Carthage as to Rome, and that he had to expect from his .
government not Phoenician or Libyan conscripts, but at
the best a permission to save his country with his troops in
his own way, provided it cost nothing. But he knew him-
self also, and he knew men. His mercenaries cared
nothing for Carthage; but a true general is able to sub-
CHAP. II CARTHAGE CONCERNING SICILY I93
stitute his own person for his country in the affections of
his soldiers; and such an one was this young Commander.
After he had accustomed his men to face the legionaries in
the warfare of outposts before Drepana and Lilybaeum, he
established himself with his force on Mount Ercte (Monte
Pellegrino near Palermo), which commands like a fortress
the neighbouring country ; and making them settle there
with their wives and children, levied contributions from
the plains, while Phoenician privateers plundered the
Italian coast as far as Cumae. He thus provided his
people with copious supplies without asking money from
the Carthaginians, and, keeping up the Communication
with Drepana by sea, he threatened to surprise the impor-
tant town of Panormus in his immediate vicinity. . Not
only were the Romans unable to expel him from his strong-
hold, but after the struggle had lasted awhile at Ercte,
Hamilcar formed for himself another similar position at
Eryx. This mountain, which bore half-way up the town of
the same name and on its summit the temple of Aphrodite,
had been hitherto in the hands of the Romans, who made
it a basis for annoying Drepana. Hamilcar deprived
them of the town and besieged the temple, while the
Romans in turn blockaded him from the plain. The Celtic
deserters from the Carthaginian army who were stationed
by the Romans at the forlorn post of the temple—a reck-
less pack of marauders, who in the course of this siege
plundered the temple and perpetrated every sort of Outrage
—defended the summit of the rock with desperate
courage; but Hamilcar did not allow himself to be again
dislodged from the town, and kept his communications
constantly open by sea with the fleet and the garrison of
Drepana. The war in Sicily seemed to be assuming a turn
more and more unfavourable for the Romans. The
Roman state was losing in that waiſare its money and its
Soldiers, and the Roman generals their repute ; it was
VOL. II 45
I94 THE WAR BETWEEN ROME AND BOOK III
already clear that no Roman general was a match for
Hamilcar, and the time might be calculated when even the
Carthaginian mercenary would be able boldly to measure
himself against the legionary. The privateers of Hamilcar
appeared with ever-increasing audacity on the Italian coast :
already a praetor had been obliged to take the field
against a band of Carthaginian rovers which had landed
there. A few years more, and Hamilcar might with his
fleet have accomplished from Sicily what his son sub-
sequently undertook by the land route from Spain.
A fleet The Roman senate, however, persevered in its inaction;
º* the desponding party for once had the majority there. At
length a number of sagacious and high-spirited men
determined to save the state even without the interposition
of the government, and to put an end to the ruinous
Sicilian war. Successful corsair expeditions, if they had
not raised the courage of the nation, had aroused energy
and hope in a portion of the people; they had already
joined together to form a Squadron, burnt down Hippo on
the African coast, and sustained a successful naval conflict
with the Carthaginians off Panormus. By a private sub-
scription—such as had been resorted to in Athens also,
but not on so magnificent a scale— the wealthy and
patriotic Romans equipped a war fleet, the nucleus of
which was supplied by the ships built for privateering and
the practised crews which they contained, and which
altogether was far more carefully fitted out than had
hitherto been the case in the shipbuilding of the state.
This fact—that a number of citizens in the twenty-third
year of a severe war voluntarily presented to the state two
hundred ships of the line, manned by 6o, ooo sailors—
stands perhaps unparalleled in the annals of history. The
consul Gaius Lutatius Catulus, to whom fell the honour of
conducting this fleet to the Sicilian seas, met there with
almost no opposition : the two or three Carthaginian
CHAP. II CARTHAGE CONCERNING SICILY I95
vessels, with which Hamilcar had made his corsair expedi-
tions, disappeared before the superior force, and almost
without resistance the Romans occupied the harbours of
Lilybaeum and Drepana, the siege of which was now
undertaken with energy by water and by land. Carthage
was completely taken by surprise; even’the two fortresses,
weakly provisioned, were in great danger. A fleet was
equipped at home; but with all the haste which they dis-
played, the year came to an end without any appearance of
Carthaginian sails in the Sicilian waters; and when at
length, in the spring of 513, the hurriedly-prepared vessels
appeared in the offing of Drepana, they deserved the name
of a fleet of transports rather than that of a war fleet ready
for action. The Phoenicians had hoped to land undis-
turbed, to disembark their stores, and to be able to take on
board the troops requisite for a naval battle ; but the
Roman vessels intercepted them, and forced them, when
about to sail from the island of Hiera (now Maritima) for
Drepana, to accept battle near the little island of Aegusa
(Favignana) (1 o March, 513). The issue was not for a
moment doubtful; the Roman fleet, well built and manned,
and admirably handled by the able praetor Publius Valerius
Falto (for a wound received before Drepana still confined
the consul Catulus to his bed), defeated at the first blow
the heavily laden and poorly and inadequately manned
vessels of the enemy; fifty were sunk, and with seventy
prizes the victors sailed into the port of Lilybaeum.
The last great effort of the Roman patriots had borne
fruit; it brought victory, and with victory peace.
The Carthaginians first crucified the unfortunate admiral
—a step which did not alter the position of affairs—and
then despatched to the Sicilian general unlimited authority
to conclude a peace. Hamilcar, who saw his heroic labours
of seven years undone by the fault of others, magnanimously
submitted to what was inevitable without on that account
241.
Victory of
Catulus at
the island
Aegusa.
241.
Conclusion
of peace.
I96 THE WAR BETWEEN ROME AND BOOK III
sacrificing either his military honour, or his nation, or his
own designs. Sicily indeed could not be retained, seeing
that the Romans had now command of the sea; and it was
not to be expected that the Carthaginian government, which
had vainly endeavoured to fill its empty treasury by a state-
loan in Egypt, would make even any further attempt to
vanquish the Roman fleet. He therefore surrendered Sicily.
The independence and integrity of the Carthaginian state
and territory, on the other hand, were expressly recognized
in the usual form; Rome binding herself not to enter into
a separate alliance with the confederates of Carthage, and
Carthage engaging not to enter into separate alliance with
the confederates of Rome, –that is, with their respective
subject and dependent communities; neither was to com-
mence war, or exercise rights of sovereignty, or undertake
recruiting within the other's dominions." The secondary
stipulations included, of course, the gratuitous return of the
Roman prisoners of war and the payment of a war con-
tribution ; but the demand of Catulus that Hamilcar should
deliver up his arms and the Roman deserters was resolutely
refused by the Carthaginian, and with success. Catulus
desisted from his second request, and allowed the Phoeni-
cians a free departure from Sicily for the moderate ransom
of 18 demarii (I 2s.) per man.
If the continuance of the war appeared to the Cartha-
ginians undesirable, they had reason to be satisfied with
these terms. It may be that the natural wish to bring to
Rome peace as well as triumph, the recollection of Regulus
and of the many vicissitudes of the war, the consideration
that such a patriotic effort as had at last decided the victory
could neither be enjoined nor repeated, perhaps even the
* The statement (Zon. viii. 17) that the Carthaginians had to promise
that they would not send any vessels of war into the territories of the
Roman symmachy—and therefore not to Syracuse, perhaps even not to
Massilia—sounds credible enough ; but the text of the treaty says nothing
of it (Polyb. iii. 27).
CHAP. II CARTHAGE CONCERNING SICILY I97
personal character of Hamilcar, concurred in influencing
the Roman general to yield so much as he did. It is
certain that there was dissatisfaction with the proposals of
peace at Rome, and the assembly of the people, doubtless
under the influence of the patriots who had accomplished
the cquipment of the last fleet, at first refused to ratify it.
We do not know with what view this was done, and there-
fore we are unable to decide whether the opponents of
the proposed peace in reality rejected it merely for the
purpose of exacting some further concessions from the
enemy, or whether, remembering that Regulus had sum-
moned Carthage to surrender her political independence,
they were resolved to continue the war till they had gained
that end—so that it was no longer a question of peace,
but a question of conquest. If the refusal took place with
the former view, it was presumably mistaken ; compared
with the gain of Sicily every other concession was of
little moment, and looking to the determination and the
inventive genius of Hamilcar, it was very rash to stake
the securing of the principal gain on the attainment of
secondary objects. If on the other hand the party opposed
to the peace regarded the complete political annihilation of
Carthage as the only end of the struggle that would satisfy
the Roman community, it showed political tact and anticipa-
tion of coming events; but whether the resources of Rome
would have sufficed to renew the expedition of Regulus and
to follow it up as far as might be required not merely to
break the courage but to breach the walls of the mighty
Phoenician city, is another question, to which no one now
can venture to give either an affirmative or a negative answer.
At last the settlement of the momentous question was
entrusted to a commission which was to decide it upon the
spot in Sicily. It confirmed the proposal in substance;
only, the Sum to be paid by Cartliage ſor the costs of the
war was raised to 32 oo talents (4,790, ooo), a third of
198 THE WAR BETWEEN ROME AND BOOK III
241.
Remarks
on the
Roman
, conduct of
the war.
which was to be paid down at once, and the remainder in
ten annual instalments. The definitive treaty included, in
addition to the surrender of Sicily, the cession also of the
islands between Sicily and Italy, but this can only be re-
garded as an alteration of detail made on revision ; for it
is self-evident that Carthage, when surrendering Sicily,
could hardly desire to retain the island of Lipara which
had long been occupied by the Roman fleet, and the
suspicion, that an ambiguous stipulation was intentionally
introduced into the treaty with reference to Sardinia and
Corsica, is unworthy and improbable.
Thus at length they came to terms. The unconquered
general of a vanquished nation descended from the moun-
tains which he had defended so long, and delivered to the
new masters of the island the fortresses which the Phoeni-
cians had held in their uninterrupted possession for at least
four hundred years, and from whose walls all assaults of the
Hellenes had recoiled unsuccessful. The west had peace
(513).
Let us pause for a moment over the conflict, which ex-
tended the dominion of Rome beyond the circling sea that
encloses the peninsula. It was one of the longest and
most severe which the Romans ever waged; many of the
soldiers who fought in the decisive battle were unborn
when the contest began. Nevertheless, despite the incom-
parably noble incidents which it now and again presented,
we can scarcely name any war which the Romans managed
so wretchedly and with such vacillation, both in a military
and in a political point of view. It could hardly be other-
wise. The contest occurred amidst a transition in their
political system—the transition from an Italian policy,
which no longer sufficed, to the policy befitting a great
state, which had not yet been found. The Roman senate
and the Roman military system were excellently organized
for a purely Italian policy. The wars which such a policy
CHAP. II CARTHAGE CONCERNING SICILY I99
provoked were purely continental wars, and always rested
on the capital situated in the middle of the peninsula as
the ultimate basis of operations, and proximately on the
chain of Roman fortresses. The problems to be solved
were mainly tactical, not strategical ; marches and operations
occupied but a subordinate, battles held the first, place;
fortress warfare was in its infancy; the sea and naval war
hardly crossed men's thoughts even incidentally. We
can easily understand—especially if we bear in mind
that in the battles of that period, where the naked weapon
predominated, it was really the hand-to-hand encounter
that proved decisive—how a deliberative assembly might
direct such operations, and how any one who just was
burgomaster might command the troops. All this was
changed in a moment. The field of battle stretched away
to an incalculable distance, to the unknown regions of
another continent, and beyond a broad expanse of sea;
every wave was a highway for the enemy; from any harbour
he might be expected to issue for his onward march. The
siege of strong places, particularly maritime fortresses, in
which the first tacticians of Greece had failed, had now for
the first time to be attempted by the Romans. A land
army and the system of a civic militia no longer sufficed.
It was essential to create a fleet, and, what was more
difficult, to employ it; it was essential to find out the true
points of attack and defence, to combine and to direct
masses, to calculate expeditions extending over long periods
and great distances, and to adjust their co-operation ; if
these things were not attended to, even an enemy far weaker
in the tactics of the field might easily vanquish a stronger
opponent. Is there any wonder that the reins of govern-
ment in such an exigency slipped from the hands of a
deliberative assembly and of commanding burgomasters?
It was plain, that at the beginning of the war the
Romans did not know what they were undertaking; it was
2OO THE WAR BETWEEN ROME AND BOOK III
only during the course of the struggle that the inadequacies
of their system, one after another, forced themselves on
their notice—the want of a naval power, the lack of fixed
military leadership, the insufficiency of their generals, the
total uselessness of their admirals. In part these evils
were remedied by energy and good fortune; as was the
case with the want of a fleet. That mighty creation, how-
ever, was but a grand makeshift, and always remained so.
A Roman fleet was formed, but it was rendered national
only in name, and was always treated with the affection
of a stepmother; the naval service continued to be little
esteemed in comparison with the high honour of serving
in the legions; the naval officers were in great part Italian
Greeks ; the crews were composed of subjects or even of
slaves and outcasts. The Italian farmer was at all times
distrustful of the sea; and of the three things in his life
which Cato regretted one was, that he had travelled by
sea when he might have gone by land. This result arose
partly out of the nature of the case, for the vessels were oared
galleys and the service of the oar can scarcely be ennobled;
but the Romans might at least have formed separate
legions of marines and taken steps towards the rearing of
a class of Roman naval officers. Taking advantage of the
impulse of the nation, they should have made it their aim
gradually to establish a naval force important not only in
numbers but in sailing power and practice, and for such a
purpose they had a valuable nucleus in the privateering
that was developed during the long war; but nothing of
the sort was done by the government. Nevertheless the
Roman fleet with its unwieldy grandeur was the noblest
creation of genius in this war, and, as at its beginning, so
at its close it was the fleet that turned the scale in favour of
Rome.
Far more difficult to be overcome were those deficiencies,
which could not be remedied without an alteration of the
CHAP. II CARTHAGE CONCERNING SICILY 2O I
constitution. That the Senate, according to the strength
of the contending parties within it, should leap from one
system of conducting the war to another, and perpetrate
errors so incredible as the evacuation of Clupea and the
repeated dismantling of the fleet; that the general of one
year should lay siege to Sicilian towns, and his successor,
instead of compelling them to surrender, should pillage the
African coast or think proper to risk a naval battle; and
that at any rate the supreme Command should by law
change hands every year—all these anomalies could not be
done away without stirring constitutional questions the
solution of which was more difficult than the building of a
fleet, but as little could their retention be reconciled with
the requirements of such a war. Above all, moreover,
neither the senate nor the generals could at once adapt
themselves to the new mode of conducting war. The
campaign of Regulus is an instance how singularly they
adhered to the idea that superiority in tactics decides every-
thing. There are few generals who have had such successes
thrown as it were into their lap by fortune : in the year
498 he stood precisely where Scipio stood fifty years later,
with this difference, that he had no Hannibal and no
experienced army arrayed against him. But the Senate
withdrew half the army, as soon as they had satisfied them-
selves of the tactical Superiority of the Romans; in blind
reliance on that superiority the general remained where he
was, to be beaten in strategy, and accepted battle when it
was offered to him, to be beaten also in tactics. This was
the more remarkable, as Regulus was an able and experi-
enced general of his kind. The rustic method of warfare,
by which Etruria and Samnium had been won, was the
very cause of the defeat in the plain of Tunes. The
principle, quite right in its own province, that every true
hirgher is fit for a gencral, was no longer applicable ; the
new system of war demanded the employment of generals
256.
2O2 WAR IBETWEEN ROME AND CARTHAGE BOOK III
who had a military training and a military eye, and every
burgomaster had not those qualities. The arrangement
was however still worse, by which the chief command of
the fleet was treated as an appanage to the chief Command
of the land army, and any one who chanced to be president
of the city thought himself able to act the part not of
general only, but of admiral too. The worst disasters
which Rome suffered in this war were due not to the storms
and still less to the Carthaginians, but to the presumptuous
folly of its own citizen-admirals.
Rome was victorious at last. But her acquiescence in
a gain far less than had at first been demanded and indeed
offered, as well as the energetic opposition which the peace
encountered in Rome, very clearly indicate the indecisive
and superficial character of the victory and of the peace;
and if Rome was the victor, she was indebted for her
victory in part no doubt to the favour of the gods and to
the energy of her citizens, but still more to the errors of
her enemies in the conduct of the war—errors far surpassing
even her own.
CHAP. III THE EXTENSION OF ITALY 2O3
CHAPTER III.
THE EXTENSION OF ITALY TO ITS NATURAL, BOUNDARIES.
THE Italian confederacy as it emerged from the crises of
the fifth century—or, in other words, the State of Italy—
united the various civic and cantonal communities from the
Apennines to the Ionian Sea under the hegemony of
Rome. But before the close of the fifth century these
limits were already overpassed in both directions, and
Italian communities belonging to the confederacy had
sprung up beyond the Apennines and beyond the sea. In
the north the republic, in revenge for ancient and recent
wrongs, had already in 47 I annihilated the Celtic Senones;
in the south, through the great war from 490 to 513, it
had dislodged the Phoenicians from the island of Sicily.
In the north there belonged to the combination headed by
Rome the Latin town of Ariminum (besides the burgess-
settlement of Sena), in the south the community of the
Mamertines in Messana, and as both were nationally of
Italian origin, so both shared in the common rights and
obligations of the Italian Confederacy. It was probably
the pressure of events at the moment rather than any com-
prehensive political calculation, that gave rise to these
extensions of the confederacy; but it was natural that now
at least, after the great successes achieved against Carthage,
new and wider views of policy should dawn upon the Roman
Natural
boundaries
of Italy.
283.
264-241.
2O4. THE EXTENSION OF ITALY BOOK III
Sicily a de-
pendency
of Italy.
government—views which even otherwise were obviously
enough suggested by the physical features of the peninsula.
Alike in a political and in a military point of view Rome
was justified in shifting its northern boundary from the low
and easily crossed Apennines to the mighty mountain-wall
that separates northern from southern Europe, the Alps, and
in combining with the sovereignty of Italy the sovereignty
of the seas and islands on the west and east of the penin-
sula; and now, when by the expulsion of the Phoenicians
from Sicily the most difficult portion of the task had been
already achieved, various circumstances united to facilitate
its completion by the Roman government.
In the western sea which was of far more account for
Italy than the Adriatic, the most important position, the
large and fertile island of Sicily copiously furnished with
harbours, had been by the peace with Carthage transferred
for the most part into the possession of the Romans. King
Hiero of Syracuse indeed, who during the last twenty-two
years of the war had adhered with unshaken steadfastness
to the Roman alliance, might have had a fair claim to an
extension of territory; but, if Roman policy had begun the
war with the resolution of tolerating only secondary states
in the island, the views of the Romans at its close decidedly
tended towards the seizure of Sicily for themselves. Hiero
might be content that his territory—namely, in addition to
the immediate district of Syracuse, the domains of Elorus,
Neetum, Acrae, Leontini, Megara, and Tauromenium—
and his independence in relation to foreign powers, were
(for want of any pretext to curtail them) left to him in their
former Compass; he might well be content that the war
between the two great powers had not ended in the com-
plete overthrow of the one or of the other, and that there
consequently still remained at least a possibility of subsist-
ence for the intermediate power in Sicily. In the
remaining and by far the larger portion of Sicily, at
CHAP. III TO ITS NATURAL BOUND ARIES 2O5
Panormus, Lilybaeum, Agrigentum, Messana, the Romans
effected a permanent settlement. .
They only regretted that the possession of that beautiful
island was not enough to convert the western waters into a
Roman inland sea, so long as Sardinia still remained
Carthaginian. Soon, however, after the conclusion of the
peace there appeared an unexpected prospect of wresting
from the Carthaginians this second island of the Mediter-
ranean. In Africa, immediately after peace had been
concluded with Rome, the mercenaries and the subjects of
the Phoenicians joined in a common revolt. The blame
of the dangerous insurrection was mainly chargeable on the
Carthaginian government. In the last years of the war
Hamilcar had not been able to pay his Sicilian mercenaries
as formerly from his own resources, and he had vainly
requested that money might be sent to him from home ; he
might, he was told, send his forces to Africa to be paid
off. He obeyed ; but as he knew the men, he prudently
embarked them in small subdivisions, that the authorities
might pay them off by troops or might at least separate
them, and thereupon he laid down his command. But all
his precautions were thwarted not so much by the emptiness
of the exchequer, as by the collegiate method of transacting
business and the folly of the bureaucracy. They waited till
the whole army was once more united in Libya, and then
endeavoured to curtail the pay promised to the men. Of
course a mutiny broke out among the troops, and the
hesitating and cowardly demeanour of the authorities showed
the mutineers what they might dare. Most of them were
natives of the districts ruled by, or dependent on, Carthage;
they knew the feelings which had been provoked throughout
these districts by the slaughter decreed by the government
after the expedition of Regulus (p. 184) and by the fearful
pressurc of taxation, and they knew also the character of
their government, which never kept faith and never
Sardinia
Roman.
The
Libyan in-
surrection.
2O6 THE EXTENSION OF ITALY BOOK III
241.
pardoned ; they were well aware of what awaited them,
should they disperse to their homes with pay exacted by
mutiny. The Carthaginians had for long been digging the
mine, and they now themselves supplied the men who could
not but explode it. Like wildfire the revolution spread
from garrison to garrison, from village to village ; the
Libyan women contributed their ornaments to pay the
wages of the mercenaries ; a number of Carthaginian
citizens, amongst whom were some of the most distinguished
officers of the Sicilian army, became the victims of the in-
furiated multitude ; Carthage was already besieged on two
sides, and the Carthaginian army marching out of the city
was totally routed in consequence of the blundering of its
unskilful leader.
When the Romans thus saw their hated and still dreaded
foe involved in a greater danger than any ever brought on
that foe by the Roman wars, they began more and more to
regret the conclusion of the peace of 513—which, if it was
not in reality precipitate, now at least appeared so to all—
and to forget how exhausted at that time their own state
had been and how powerful had then been the standing of
their Carthaginian rival. Shame indeed forbade their
entering into communication openly with the Carthaginian
rebels; in fact, they gave an exceptional permission to the
Carthaginians to levy recruits for this war in Italy, and pro-
hibited Italian mariners from dealing with the Libyans.
But it may be doubted whether the government of Rome
was very earnest in these acts of friendly alliance; for, in
spite of them, the dealings between the African insurgents
and the Roman mariners continued, and when Hamilcar,
whom the extremity of the peril had recalled to the command
of the Carthaginian army, seized and imprisoned a number
of Italian captains concerned in these dealings, the senate
interceded for them with the Carthaginian government and
procured their release. The insurgents themselves appeared
CHAP. III TO ITS NATURAL BOUND ARIES 2O7
to recognize in the Romans their natural allies. The
garrisons in Sardinia, which like the rest of the Carthaginian
army had declared in favour of the insurgents, offered the
possession of the island to the Romans, when they saw that
they were unable to hold it against the attacks of the un-
conquered mountaineers of the interior (about 515); and
similar offers came even from the community of Utica,
which had likewise taken part in the revolt and was
now hard pressed by the arms of Hamilcar. The
latter suggestion was declined by the Romans, chiefly
doubtless because its acceptance would have carried
them beyond the natural boundaries of Italy and
therefore farther than the Roman government was
then disposed to go ; on the other hand they enter-
tained the offers of the Sardinian mutineers, and took
over from them the portion of Sardinia which had
been in the hands of the Carthaginians (516). In this in-
stance, even more than in the affair of the Mamertines, the
Romans were justly liable to the reproach that the great
and victorious burgesses had not disdained to fraternize and
share the spoil with a venal pack of mercenaries, and had
not sufficient self-denial to prefer the course enjoined by
justice and by honour to the gain of the moment. The
Carthaginians, whose troubles reached their height just
about the period of the occupation of Sardinia, were silent
for the time being as to the unwarrantable violence; but,
after this peril had been, contrary to the expectations and
probably contrary to the hopes of the Romans, averted by
the genius of Hamilcar, and Carthage had been reinstated to
her full sovereignty in Africa (517), Carthaginian envoys
immediately appeared at Rome to require the restitution of
Sardinia. But the Romans, not inclined to restore their
booty, replied with frivolous or at any rate irrelevant com-
plaints as to all sorts of injuries which they alleged that the
Carthaginians had inflicted on the Roman traders, and
239.
238.
237.
208 THE EXTENSION OF ITALY BOOK III
hastened to declare war; * the principle, that in politics
power is the measure of right, appeared in its naked
effrontery. Just resentment urged the Carthaginians to
accept that offer of war; had Catulus insisted upon the
cession of Sardinia five years before, the war would prob-
ably have pursued its course. But now, when both islands
were lost, when Libya was in a ferment, and when the state
was weakened to the utmost by its twenty-four years'
struggle with Rome and the dreadful civil war that had
raged for nearly five years more, they were obliged to
submit. It was only after repeated entreaties, and after
the Phoenicians had bound themselves to pay to Rome a
compensation of 12 oo talents (4,292, ooo) for the warlike
preparations which had been wantonly occasioned, that the
Romans reluctantly desisted from war. Thus the Romans
acquired Sardinia almost without a struggle; to which they
added Corsica, the ancient possession of the Etruscans,
where perhaps some detached Roman garrisons still remained
over from the last war (p. 177). In Sardinia, however, and
still more in the rugged Corsica, the Romans restricted
themselves, just as the Phoenicians had done, to an
occupation of the coasts. With the natives in the interior
they were continually engaged in war or, to speak more
correctly, in hunting them like wild beasts; they baited
them with dogs, and carried what they captured to the slave
market; but they undertook no real conquest. They had
occupied the islands not on their own account, but for the
security of Italy. Now that the confederacy possessed the
three large islands, it might call the Tyrrhene Sea its own.
The acquisition of the islands in the western sea of Italy
introduced into the state administration of Rome a distinc-
Corsica.
Method of
adminis-
tration in
the trans-
marine pos-
Sessions.
241.
* That the cession of the islands lying between Sicily and Italy, which
the peace of 513 prescribed to the Carthaginians, did not include the
cession of Sardinia is a settled point (p. 198); but the statement, that the
Romans made that a pretext for their occupation of the island three years
after the peace, is ill attested. Had they done so, they would merely have
added a diplomatic folly to the political effrontery.
CHAP. III TO ITS NATURAL BOUNDARIES 209
tion, which to all appearance originated in mere considera-
tions of convenience and almost accidentally, but neverthe-
less came to be of the deepest importance for all time
following—the distinction between the continental and
transmarine forms of administration, or to use the
appellations afterwards current, the distinction between
Italy and the provinces. Hitherto the two chief magistrates
of the community, the consuls, had not had any legally
defined sphere of action ; on the contrary their official ſield
extended as far as the Roman government itself. Of course,
however, in practice they made a division of functions
between them, and of course also they were bound in every
particular department of their duties by the enactments
existing in regard to it; the jurisdiction, for instance, over
Roman citizens had in every case to be left to the praetor,
and in the Latin and other autonomous communities the
existing treaties had to be respected. The four quaestors
who had been since 487 distributed throughout Italy did
not, formally at least, restrict the consular authority, for in
Italy, just as in Rome, they were regarded simply as auxi-
liary magistrates dependent on the consuls. This mode of
administration appears to have been at first extended also
to the territories taken from Carthage, and Sicily and
Sardinia to have been governed for some years by quaestors
under the superintendence of the consuls ; but the Romans
must very soon have become practically convinced that it
was indispensable to have superior magistrates specially
appointed for the transmarine regions. As they had been
obliged to abandon the concentration of the Roman jurisdic-
tion in the person of the praetor as the community became
enlarged, and to send to the more remote districts deputy
judges (p. 67), so now (527) the concentration of adminis-
trative and military power in the person of the consuls had
to be abandoned. For each of the new transmarine regions
—viz, Sicily, and Sardinia with Corsica annexed to it—
VOL. II 46
267.
Provincial
praetors.
227.
2 IO THE EXTENSION OF ITALY BOOK III
there was appointed a special auxiliary consul, who was in
rank and title inferior to the consul and equal to the
praetor, but otherwise was—like the consul in earlier times
before the praetorship was instituted—in his own sphere of
action at Once commander-in-chief, chief magistrate, and
supreme judge. The direct administration of finance alone
was withheld from these new chief magistrates, as from the
first it had been withheld from the consuls (i. 322); one or
more quaestors were assigned to them, who were in every way
indeed subordinate to them, and were their assistants in the
administration of justice and in command, but yet had speci-
ally to manage the finances and to render account of their ad-
ministration to the senate after having laid down their office.
This difference in the supreme administrative power was
the essential distinction between the transmarine and con-
tinental possessions. The principles on which Rome had
organized the dependent lands in Italy, were in great
part transferred also to the extra-Italian possessions. As
a matter of course, these communities without exception
lost independence in their external relations. As to
internal intercourse, no provincial could thenceforth acquire
valid property in the province out of the bounds of his own
community, or perhaps even conclude a valid marriage.
On the other hand the Roman government allowed, at
least to the Sicilian towns which they had not to fear, a
certain federative organization, and probably even general
Siceliot diets with a harmless right of petition and complaint."
In monetary arrangements it was not indeed practicable at
once to declare the Roman currency to be the only valid
tender in the islands; but it seems from the first to have
Organiza-
tion of the
provinces.
Commer-
cium.
* That this was the case may be gathered partly from the appearance of
the “Siculi" against Marcellus (Liv. xxvi. 26, seq.), partly from the
“conjoint petitions of all the Sicilian communities” (Cicero, Verr. ii. 42,
Io2 ; 45, II4 ; 5o, I46; iii. 88, 204), partly from well-known analogies
(Marquardt, Handb. iii. 1, 267). Because there was no commercium
between the different towns, it by no means follows that there was no
concilium.
CHAP. III TO ITS NATURAL BOUNDARIES * 2II
obtained legal circulation, and in like manner, at least as a
rule, the right of coining in precious metals seems to have
been withdrawn from the cities in Roman Sicily." On the
other hand not only was the landed property in all Sicily
left untouched—the principle, that the land out of Italy fell
by right of war to the Romans as private property, was
still unknown to this century—but all the Sicilian and
Sardinian communities retained self-administration and
some sort of autonomy, which indeed was not assured to
them in a way legally binding, but was provisionally allowed.
If the democratic constitutions of the communities were
everywhere set aside, and in every city the power was trans-
ferred to the hands of a council representing the civic aris-
tocracy; and if moreover the Sicilian communities, at least,
were required to institute a general valuation corresponding
to the Roman census every fifth year; both these measures
were only the necessary sequel of subordination to the Roman
senate, which in reality could not govern with Greek ecclesiae,
or without a view of the financial and military resources of
each dependent community; in the various districts of Italy
also the same course was in both respects pursued.
But, side by side with this essential equality of rights,
there was established a distinction, very important in its
effects, between the Italian communities on the one hand
and the transmarine communities on the other. While the
treaties concluded with the Italian towns imposed on them
a fixed contingent for the army or the fleet of the
Romans, such a contingent was not imposed on the trans-
marine communities, with which no binding paction was
* The right of coining gold and silver was not monopolized by Rome
in the provinces so strictly as in Italy, evidently because gold and silver
money not struck after the Roman standard was of less importance. But
in their case too the mints were doubtless, as a rule, restricted to the
coinage of copper, or at most silver, Small money ; even the most favour-
ably treated communities of Roman Sicily, such as the Mamertines, the
Centuripans, the Halaesines, the Segestans, and also in the main the
Panormitans coined only copper.
Property.
Autonomy.
Tenths and
Cl1Storm.S.
212 THE EXTENSION OF ITALY BOOK III
entered into at all, but they lost the right of arms," with
the single exception that they might be employed on the
summons of the Roman praetor for the defence of their
own homes. The Roman government regularly sent
Italian troops, of the strength which it had fixed, to the
islands; in return for this, a tenth of the field-produce of
Sicily, and a toll of 5 per cent on the value of all articles
of commerce exported from or imported into the Sicilian
harbours, were paid to Rome. To the islanders these taxes
were nothing new. The imposts levied by the Persian
great-king and the Carthaginian republic were substantially
of the same character with that tenth ; and in Greece also
such a taxation had for long been, after Oriental precedent,
associated with the tyrannis and often also with a hege-
mony. The Sicilians had in this way long paid their tenth
either to Syracuse or to Carthage, and had been wont to
levy customs-dues no longer on their own account. “We
received,” says Cicero, “the Sicilian communities into our
clientship and protection in such a way that they continued
under the same law under which they had lived before, and
obeyed the Roman Community under relations similar to
those in which they had obeyed their own rulers.” It is
fair that this should not be forgotten ; but to continue an
injustice is to commit injustice. Viewed in relation not to
the subjects, who merely changed masters, but to their new
rulers, the abandonment of the equally wise and magnani-
mous principle of Roman statesmanship—viz., that Rome
should accept from her subjects simply military aid, and
never pecuniary compensation in lieu of it — was of a
fatal importance, in comparison with which all alleviations
in the rates and the mode of levying them, as well as all
exceptions in detail, were as nothing. Such exceptions
* This is implied in Hiero's expression (Liv. xxii. 37): that he knew
that the Romans made use of none but Roman or Latin infantry and
cavalry, and employed “foreigners" at most only among the light-armed
troops.
CHAP. III TO ITS NATURAL BOUNDARIES 2I3
were, no doubt, made in various cases. Messana was di-
rectly admitted to the confederacy of the fogati, and, like
the Greek cities in Italy, furnished its contingent to the
Roman fleet. A number of other cities, while not admitted
to the Italian military confederacy, yet received in addition
to other favours immunity from tribute and tenths, so that
their position in a financial point of view was even more
favourable than that of the Italian communities. These
were Segesta and Halicyae, which were the first towns of
Carthaginian Sicily that joined the Roman alliance; Cen-
turipa, an inland town in the east of the island, which was
destined to keep a watch over the Syracusan territory in its
neighbourhood;’ Halaesa on the northern coast, which was
the first of the free Greek towns to join the Romans, and
above all Panormus, hitherto the capital of Carthaginian,
and now destined to become that of Roman, Sicily. The
Romans thus applied to Sicily the ancient principle of their
policy, that of subdividing the dependent communities into
carefully graduated classes with different privileges; but, on
the average, the Sardinian and Sicilian communities were
not in the position of allies but in the manifest relation of
tributary subjection.
It is true that this thorough distinction between the
communities that furnished contingents and those that paid
tribute, or at least did not furnish contingents, was not in
law necessarily coincident with the distinction between Italy
and the provinces. Transmarine communities might belong
to the Italian confederacy; the Mamertines for example
were substantially on a level with the Italian Sabellians, and
there existed no legal obstacle to the establishment even of
new communities with Latin rights in Sicily and Sardinia
* This is shown at once by a glance at the map, and also by the
remarkable exceptional provision which allowed the Centuripans to buy
in any part of Sicily. They needed, as Roman spies, the utmost freedom
of movement. We may add that Centuripa appears to have been among
the first cities that went over to Rome (Diodorus, l. xxiii. p. 501).
Commu-
nities
exempted.
Italy
and the
provinces.
2I4 THE EXTENSION OF ITALY BOOK III
any more than in the country beyond the Apennines. Com-
munities on the mainland might be deprived of the right of
bearing arms and become tributary; this arrangement was
already the case with certain Celtic districts on the Po, and
was introduced to a considerable extent in after times.
But, in reality, the communities that furnished contingents
just as decidedly preponderated on the mainland as the
tributary communities in the islands; and while Italian
settlements were not contemplated on the part of the
Romans either in Sicily with its Hellenic civilization or
in Sardinia, the Roman government had beyond doubt
already determined not only to subdue the barbarian land
between the Apennines and the Alps, but also, as their
conquests advanced, to establish in it new communities
of Italic origin and Italic rights. Thus their transmarine
possessions were not merely placed on the footing of land
held by subjects, but were destined to remain on that
footing in all time to come ; whereas the official field
recently marked off by law for the consuls, or, which is
the same thing, the continental territory of the Romans,
was to become a new and more extended Italy, which
should reach from the Alps to the Ionian sea. In the first
instance, indeed, this essentially geographical conception of
Italy was not altogether coincident with the political con-
ception of the Italian confederacy; it was partly wider,
partly narrower. But even now the Romans regarded the
whole space up to the boundary of the Alps as /talia, that
is, as the present or future domain of the togaſi, and, just
as was and still is the case in North America, the boundary
was provisionally marked off in a geographical sense, that
the field might be gradually occupied in a political sense
also with the advance of colonization.”
1 This distinction between Italy as the Roman mainland or consular
sphere on the one hand, and the transmarine territory or praetorial sphere
on the other, already appears variously applied in the sixth century. The
ritual rule, that certain priests should not leave Rome (Val. Max. i. 1, 2),
CHAP. III TO ITS NATURAL BOUND ARIES 215
In the Adriatic sea, at the entrance of which the im-
portant and long-contemplated colony of Brundisium had
at length been founded before the close of the war with
Carthage (5 Io), the Supremacy of Rome was from the very
first decided. In the western sea Rome had been obliged
to rid herself of rivals; in the eastern, the quarrels of the
Hellenes themselves prevented any of the states in the
Grecian peninsula from acquiring or retaining power.
The most considerable of them, that of Macedonia, had
through the influence of Egypt been dislodged from the
upper Adriatic by the Aetolians and from the Peloponnesus
by the Achaeans, and was scarcely even in a position to
defend its northern frontier against the barbarians. How
concerned the Romans were to keep down Macedonia and
its natural ally, the king of Syria, and how closely they
associated themselves with the Egyptian policy directed
to that object, is shown by the remarkable offer which
after the end of the war with Carthage they made to king
Ptolemy III. Euergetes, to support him in the war which
he waged with Seleucus II. Callinicus of Syria (who
reigned 507–529) on account of the murder of Berenice,
and in which Macedonia had probably taken part with the
latter. Generally, the relations of Rome with the Hellenistic
Events
on the
Adriatic
COaStS.
244.
was explained to mean, that they were not allowed to cross the sea (Liv.
Ep. 19, xxxvii. 51 ; Tac. Ann. iii. 58, 71 ; Cic. Phil. xi. 8, 18; comp.
Liv. xxviii. 38, 44, Ep. 59). To this head still more definitely belongs
the interpretation which was proposed in 544 to be put upon the old rule,
that the consul might nominate the dictator only on “Roman ground ’’:
viz. that “Roman ground" comprehended all Italy (Liv. xxvii. 5). The
erection of the Celtic land between the Alps and Apennines into a special
province, different from that of the consuls and subject to a separate
standing chief magistrate, was the work of Sulla. Of course no one will
urge as an objection to this view, that already in the sixth century Gallia
or Ariminum is very often designated as the “official district” (provincia),
usually of one of the consuls. Provincia, as is well known, was in the
older language not—what alone it denoted subsequently—a definite space
assigned as a district to a standing chief magistrate, but the department of
duty fixed for the individual consul, in the first instance by agreement with
his colleague, under concurrence of the senate; and in this sense frequently
individual regions in northern Italy, or even North Italy generally, were
assigned to individual consuls as provincia.
247-225.
210.
2I6 THE EXTENSION OF ITALY BOOK III
239.
Illyrian
piracy.
states became closer; the senate already negotiated even
with Syria, and interceded with the Seleucus just mentioned
on behalf of the Ilians with whom the Romans claimed
affinity.
For a direct interference of the Romans in the affairs of
the eastern powers there was no immediate need. The
Achaean league, the prosperity of which was arrested by
the narrow-minded coterie-policy of Aratus, the Aetolian
republic of military adventurers, and the decayed Mace-
donian empire kept each other in check ; and the Romans
of that time avoided rather than sought transmarine ac-
quisitions. When the Acarnanians, appealing to the
ground that they alone of all the Greeks had taken no
part in the destruction of Ilion, besought the descendants
of Aeneas to help them against the Aetolians, the senate
did indeed attempt a diplomatic mediation ; but when the
Aetolians returned an answer drawn up in their own saucy
fashion, the antiquarian interest of the Roman senators by
no means provoked them into undertaking a war by which
they would have freed the Macedonians from their heredi-
tary foe (about 515).
Even the evil of piracy, which was naturally in such
a state of matters the only trade that flourished on the
Adriatic coast, and from which the commerce of Italy
suffered greatly, was submitted to by the Romans with
an undue measure of patience, —a patience intimately
connected with their radical aversion to maritime war
and their wretched marine. But at length it became
too flagrant. Favoured by Macedonia, which no longer
found occasion to continue its old function of protecting
Hellenic commerce from the corsairs of the Adriatic for the
benefit of its foes, the rulers of Scodra had induced the
Illyrian tribes—nearly corresponding to the Dalmatians,
Montenegrins, and northern Albanians of the present day
—to unite for joint piratical expeditions on a great scale.
CHAP. III TO ITS NATURAL BOUNDARIES 217
With whole squadrons of their swift-sailing biremes, the
well-known “Liburnian * cutters, the Illyrians waged war
by sea and along the coasts against all and Sundry. The
Greek settlements in these regions, the island-towns of
Issa (Lissa) and Pharos (Lesina), the important ports of
Epidamnus (Durazzo) and Apollonia (to the north of
Avlona on the Aous) of course suffered especially, and
were repeatedly beleaguered by the barbarians. Farther to
the south, moreover, the corsairs established themselves in
Phoenice, the most flourishing town of Epirus; partly
voluntarily, partly by constraint, the Epirots and Acar-
nanians entered into an unnatural symmachy with the
foreign freebooters; the coast was insecure even as far as
Elis and Messene. In vain the Aetolians and Achaeans
collected what ships they had, with a view to check the
evil: in a battle on the open sea they were beaten by the
pirates and their Greek allies; the corsair fleet was able
at length to take possession even of the rich and im-
portant island of Corcyra (Corfu). The complaints of
Italian mariners, the appeals for aid of their old allies
the Apolloniates, and the urgent entreaties of the besieged
Issaeans at length compelled the Roman senate to send
at least ambassadors to Scodra. The brothers Gaius and
Lucius Coruncanius went thither to demand that king
Agron should put an end to the disorder. The king
answered that according to the national law of the Illyrians
piracy was a lawful trade, and that the government had
no right to put a stop to privateering ; whereupon Lucius
Coruncanius replied, that in that case Rome would make it
her business to introduce a better law among the Illyrians.
For this certainly not very diplomatic reply one of the
envoys was—by the king's orders, as the Romans asserted
—murdered on the way home, and the surrender of the
murderers was refuscq. The schatc had now no choice
left to it. In the spring of 525 a fleet of 200 ships of 229.
218 THE EXTENSION OF ITALY BOOK III
Expedition
against
Scodra.
Acquisition
of territory
in Illyria.
the line, with a landing-army on board, appeared off
Apollonia; the corsair-vessels were scattered before the
former, while the latter demolished the piratic strongholds ;
the queen Teuta, who after the death of her husband Agron
conducted the government during the minority of her son
Pinnes, besieged in her last retreat, was obliged to accept
the conditions dictated by Rome. The rulers of Scodra
were again confined both on the north and south to the
narrow limits of their original domain, and had to quit
their hold not only on all the Greek towns, but also on
the Ardiaei in Dalmatia, the Parthini around Epidamnus,
and the Atintanes in northern Epirus; no Illyrian vessel
of war at all, and not more than two unarmed vessels in
company, were to be allowed in future to sail to the south
of Lissus (Alessio, between Scutari and Durazzo). The
maritime supremacy of Rome in the Adriatic was asserted,
in the most praiseworthy and durable way, by the rapid
and energetic suppression of the evil of piracy.
But the Romans went further, and established them-
selves on the east coast. The Illyrians of Scodra were
rendered tributary to Rome; Demetrius of Pharos, who
had passed over from the service of Teuta to that of the
Romans, was installed, as a dependent dynast and ally
of Rome, over the islands and coasts of Dalmatia; the
Greek cities Corcyra, Epidamnus, Apollonia, and the
communities of the Atintanes and Parthini were attached
to Rome under mild forms of symmachy. These acquisi-
tions on the east coast of the Adriatic were not sufficiently
extensive to require the appointment of a special auxiliary
consul ; governors of subordinate rank appear to have
been sent to Corcyra and perhaps also to other places, and
the superintendence of these possessions seems to have
been entrusted to the chief magistrates who administered
Italy.” Thus the most important maritime stations in the
* A standing Roman commandant of Corcyra is apparently mentioned
CIHAP. III TO ITS NATURAL BOUNDARIES 219
Adriatic became subject, like Sicily and Sardinia, to the
authority of Rome. What other result was to be expected P
Rome was in want of a good naval station in the upper
Adriatic—a want which was not supplied by her possessions
on the Italian shore; her new allies, especially the Greek
commercial towns, saw in the Romans their deliverers, and
doubtless did what they could permanently to secure so
powerful a protection; in Greece itself no one was in a
position to oppose the movement; on the contrary, the
praise of the liberators was on every one's lips. It may be
a question whether there was greater rejoicing or shame in
Hellas, when, in place of the ten ships of the line of the
Achaean league, the most warlike power in Greece, two
hundred sail belonging to the barbarians now entered her
harbours and accomplished at a blow the task, which
properly belonged to the Greeks, but in which they had
failed so miserably. But if the Greeks were ashamed that
the salvation of their oppressed countrymen had to come
from abroad, they accepted the deliverance at least with a
good grace; they did not fail to receive the Romans
solemnly into the fellowship of the Hellenic nation by ad-
mitting them to the Isthmian games and the Eleusinian
mysteries. -
Macedonia was silent; it was not in a condition to
protest in arms, and disdained to do so in words. No
in Polyb. xxii. 15, 6 (erroneously translated by Liv. xxxviii. 11, comp.
xlii. 37), and a similar one in the case of Issa in Liv. xliii. 9. We have,
moreover, the analogy of the praefectus pro legato insularum Baliarum
(Orelli, 732), and of the governor of Pandataria (Znscr. Afºg. AWeapol.
3528). It appears, accordingly, to have been a rule in the Roman admini-
stration to appoint non-senatorial praefect; for the more remote islands.
But these “deputies” presuppose in the nature of the case a superior
magistrate who nominates and superintends them ; and this superior
magistracy can only have been at this period that of the consuls. Sub-
sequently, after the erection of Macedonia and Gallia Cisalpina into
provinces, the superior administration was committed to one of these two
guvel 1101s; the very territory now in question, the nucleus of the subsequent
Roman province of Illyricum, belonged, as is well known, in part to
Caesar's district of administration.
Impression
in Greece
and Mace-
donia.
22O THE EXTENSION OF ITALY BOOK III
222.
221. 220.
219.
Northern
Italy.
241.
283. 282.
*
resistance was encountered. Nevertheless Rome, by
seizing the keys to her neighbour's house, had converted
that neighbour into an adversary who, should he recover
his power, or should a favourable opportunity occur, might
be expected to know how to break the silence. Had the
energetic and prudent king Antigonus Doson lived longer,
he would have doubtless taken up the gauntlet which the
Romans had flung down, for, when some years afterwards
the dynast Demetrius of Pharos withdrew from the
hegemony of Rome, prosecuted piracy contrary to the
treaty in concert with the Istrians, and subdued the
Atintanes whom the Romans had declared independent,
Antigonus formed an alliance with him, and the troops of
Demetrius fought along with the army of Antigonus at the
battle of Sellasia (532). But Antigonus died (in the
winter 533–4); and his successor Philip, still a boy, allowed
the Consul Lucius Aemilius Paullus to attack the ally of
Macedonia, to destroy his capital, and to drive him from
his kingdom into exile (535). &
The mainland of Italy proper, south of the Apennines,
enjoyed profound peace after the fall of Tarentum : the six
days' war with Falerii (513) was little more than an in-
terlude. But towards the north, between the territory of
the confederacy and the natural boundary of Italy—the
chain of the Alps—there still extended a wide region which
was not subject to the Romans. What was regarded as
the boundary of Italy on the Adriatic coast was the river
Aesis immediately above Ancona. Beyond this boundary
the adjacent properly Gallic territory as far as, and includ-
ing, Ravenna belonged in a similar way as did Italy proper
to the Roman alliance; the Senones, who had formerly
settled there, were extirpated in the war of 47 1–2 (p. 11), and
the several townships were connected with Rome, either as
burgess-colonies, like Sena Gallica (p. 12), or as allied towns,
whether with Latin rights, like Ariminum (p. 39), or with
CHAP. III TO ITS NATURAL BOUNDARIES 22I
Italian rights, like Ravenna. On the wide region beyond
Ravenna as far as the Alps non-Italian peoples were settled.
South of the Po the strong Celtic tribe of the Boii still
held its ground (from Parma to Bologna); alongside of
them, the Lingones on the east and the Anares on the
west (in the region of Parma)—two smaller Celtic cantons
presumably clients of the Boii—peopled the plain. At
the western end of the plain the Ligurians began, who,
mingled with isolated Celtic tribes, and settled on the
Apennines from above Arezzo and Pisa westward, occupied
the region of the sources of the Po. The eastern portion
of the plain north of the Po, nearly from Verona to the
coast, was possessed by the Veneti, a race different from
the Celts and probably of Illyrian extraction. Between
these and the western mountains were settled the
Cenomani (about Brescia and Cremona) who rarely acted
with the Celtic nation and were probably largely inter-
mingled with Veneti, and the Insubres (around Milan).
The latter was the most considerable of the Celtic cantons
in Italy, and was in constant communication not merely
with the minor communities partly of Celtic, partly of
non-Celtic extraction, that were scattered in the Alpine
valleys, but also with the Celtic cantons beyond the Alps.
The gates of the Alps, the mighty stream navigable for
230 miles, and the largest and most fertile plain of the
then civilized Europe, still continued in the hands of the
hereditary foes of the Italian name, who, humbled indeed
and weakened, but still scarce even nominally dependent
and still troublesome neighbours, persevered in their
barbarism, and, thinly scattered over the spacious plains,
continued to pasture their herds and to plunder. It was
to be anticipated that the Romans would hasten to possess
themselves of these regions; the more so as the Celts
gradually began to forget their defeats in the campaigns of
47 I and 472 and to bestir themselves again, and, what 283. 282.
222 THE EXTENSION OF ITALY BOOK III
Celtic
Wallſ S.
238.
236.
236.
232.
was still more dangerous, the Transalpine Celts began
anew to show themselves on the south of the Alps.
In fact the Boii had already renewed the war in 516,
and their chiefs Atis and Galatas had—without, it is true,
the authority of the general diet—summoned the Trans-
alpine Gauls to make common cause with them. The
latter had numerously answered the call, and in 518 a
Celtic army, such as Italy had not seen for long, encamped
before Ariminum. The Romans, for the moment much
too weak to attempt a battle, concluded an armistice, and
to gain time allowed envoys from the Celts to proceed to
Rome, who ventured in the senate to demand the cession
of Ariminum-it seemed as if the times of Brennus had
returned. But an unexpected incident put an end to the
war before it had well begun. The Boii, dissatisfied with
their unbidden allies and afraid probably for their own
territory, fell into variance with the Transalpine Gauls.
An open battle took place between the two Celtic hosts;
and, after the chiefs of the Boii had been put to death by
their own men, the Transalpine Gauls returned home.
The Boii were thus delivered into the hands of the
Romans, and the latter were at liberty to expel them like
the Senones, and to advance at least to the Po; but they
preferred to grant the Boii peace in return for the cession
of some districts of their land (518). This was probably
done, because they were just at that time expecting the
renewed outbreak of war with Carthage; but, after that
war had been averted by the cession of Sardinia, true
policy required the Roman government to take possession
as speedily and entirely as possible of the country up to
the Alps. The constant apprehensions on the part of
the Celts as to such a Roman invasion were therefore
sufficiently justified ; but the Romans were in no haste.
So the Celts on their part began the war, either because
the Roman assignations of land on the east coast (522),
CHAP. III TO ITS NATURAL BOUND ARIES 223
although not a measure immediately directed against them,
made them apprehensive of danger; or because they per-
ceived that a war with Rome for the possession of Lom-
bardy was inevitable; or, as is perhaps most probable,
because their Celtic impatience was once more weary of
inaction and preferred to arm for a new warlike expedition.
With the exception of the Cenomani, who acted with the
Veneti and declared for the Romans, all the Italian Celts
concurred in the war, and they were joined by the Celts of
the upper valley of the Rhone, or rather by a number of
adventurers belonging to them, under the leaders Conco-
litanus and Aneroestus.” With 50,000 warriors on foot,
and 2 o, ooo on horseback or in chariots, the leaders of the
Celts advanced to the Apennines (529). The Romans
had not anticipated an attack on this side, and had not
expected that the Celts, disregarding the Roman fortresses
on the east coast and the protection of their own kinsmen,
would venture to advance directly against the capital. Not
very long before a similar Celtic swarm had in an exactly
similar way overrun Greece. The danger was serious, and
appeared still more serious than it really was. The belief
that Rome's destruction was this time inevitable, and that
the Roman soil was fated to become the property of the
Gauls, was so generally diffused among the multitude in
Rome itself that the government reckoned it not beneath
its dignity to allay the absurd superstitious belief of the
mob by an act still more absurd, and to bury alive a
Gaulish man and a Gaulish woman in the Roman Forum
1 These, whom Polybius designates as the “Celts in the Alps and on
the Rhone, who on account of their character as military adventurers are
called Gaesatae (free lances),” are in the Capitoline Fasti named Germani.
It is possible that the contemporary annalists may have here mentioned Celts
alone, and that it was the historical speculation of the age of Caesar and
Augustus that first induced the redactors of these Fasti to treat them as
“Germans.” If, on the other hand, the mention of the Germans in the
Fasti was based on contemporary records in which cage this is the earli
est mention of the name—we shall here have to think not ºf the Germanic
races who were afterwards so called, but of a Celtic horde.
225.
224 THE EXTENSION OF ITALY BOOK III
with a view to fulfil the oracle of destiny. At the same
time they made more serious preparations. Of the two
consular armies, each of which numbered about 25,ooo
infantry and II oo cavalry, one was stationed in Sardinia
under Gaius Atilius Regulus, the other at Ariminum under
Lucius Aemilius Papus. Both received orders to repair
as speedily as possible to Etruria, which was most
immediately threatened. The Celts had already been
under the necessity of leaving a garrison at home to face
the Cenomani and Veneti, who were allied with Rome;
now the levy of the Umbrians was directed to advance
from their native mountains down into the plain of the
Boii, and to inflict all the injury which they could think of
on the enemy upon his own soil. The militia of the
Etruscans and Sabines was to occupy the Apennines and
if possible to obstruct the passage, till the regular troops
could arrive. A reserve was formed in Rome of 50, ooo
men. Throughout all Italy, which on this occasion recog-
nized its true champion in Rome, the men capable of
service were enrolled, and stores and materials of war were
collected.
All this, however, required time. For once the Romans
had allowed themselves to be surprised, and it was too late
at least to save Etruria. The Celts found the Apennines
hardly defended, and plundered unopposed the rich plains
of the Tuscan territory, which for long had seen no enemy.
They were already at Clusium, three days’ march from
Rome, when the army of Ariminum, under the consul
Papus, appeared on their flank, while the Etruscan militia,
which after crossing the Apennines had assembled in rear
of the Gauls, followed the line of the enemy's march.
Suddenly one evening, after the two armies had already
encamped and the bivouac fires were kindled, the Celtic
infantry again broke up and retreated on the road towards
Faesulae (Fiesole): the Cavalry Occupied the advanced
CHAP. III TO ITS NATURAL BOUND ARIES 225
posts during the night, and followed the main force next
morning. When the Tuscan militia, who had pitched
their camp close upon the enemy, became aware of his
departure, they imagined that the host had begun to
disperse, and marched hastily in pursuit. The Gauls
had reckoned on this very result: their infantry, which
had rested and was drawn up in order, awaited on a well-
chosen battle-field the Roman militia, which came up from
its forced march fatigued and disordered. Six thousand
men fell after a furious combat, and the rest of the militia,
which had been compelled to seek refuge on a hill, would
have perished, had not the consular army appeared just
in time. This induced the Gauls to return homeward.
Their dexterously-contrived plan for preventing the union
of the two Roman armies and annihilating the weaker in
detail, had only been partially successful; now it seemed
to them advisable first of all to place in security their
considerable booty. For the sake of an easier line of
march they proceeded from the district of Chiusi, where
they were, to the level coast, and were marching along the ,
shore, when they found an unexpected obstacle in the way.
It was the Sardinian legions, which had landed at Pisae ;
and, when they arrived too late to obstruct the passage of
the Apennines, had immediately put themselves in motion
and were advancing along the Coast in a direction opposite
to the march of the Gauls. Near Telamon (at the mouth
of the Ombrone) they met with the enemy. While the
Roman infantry advanced with close front along the great
road, the cavalry, led by the consul Gaius Atilius Regulus
in person, made a side movement so as to take the Gauls
in flank, and to acquaint the other Roman army under
Papus as soon as possible with their arrival. A hot cavalry
engagement took place, in which along with many brave
Romans Regulus fell ; but he had not sacrificed his life
in vain : his object was gained. Papus became aware
VOL. II 47
Battle of
Telamon.
226 THE EXTENSION OF ITALY BOOK III
224.
223.
The Celts
attacked in
their own
land.
223.
of the conflict, and guessed how matters stood; he hastily
arrayed his legions, and on both sides the Celtic host was
now pressed by Roman legions. Courageously it made its
dispositions for the double conflict, the Transalpine Gauls
and Insubres against the troops of Papus, the Alpine
Taurisci and the Boii against the Sardinian infantry; the
cavalry combat pursued its course apart on the flank.
The forces were in numbers not unequally matched, and
the desperate position of the Gauls impelled them to the
most obstinate resistance. But the Transalpine Gauls,
accustomed only to close fighting, gave way before the
missiles of the Roman skirmishers; in the hand-to-hand
combat the better temper of the Roman weapons placed
the Gauls at a disadvantage; and at last an attack in
flank by the victorious Roman cavalry decided the day.
The Celtic horsemen made their escape ; the infantry,
wedged in between the sea and the three Roman
armies, had no means of flight. Io, ooo Celts, with their
king Concolitanus, were taken prisoners ; 40,000 others
lay dead on the field of battle ; Aneroestus and his
attendants had, after the Celtic fashion, put themselves to
death.
The victory was complete, and the Romans were firmly
resolved to prevent the recurrence of such surprises by the
complete sºbjugation of the Celts on the south of the Alps.
In the following year (530) the Boii submitted without
resistance along with the Lingones; and in the year after
that (531) the Anares; so that the plain as far as the Po
was in the hands of the Romans. The conquest of the
northern bank of the river cost a more serious struggle.
Gaius Flaminius crossed the river in the newly-acquired
territory of the Anares (somewhere near Piacenza) in 531 ;
but during the crossing, and still more while making good
his footing on the other bank, he suffered so heavy losses
and found himself with the river in his rear in so danger-
CHAP. III TO ITS NATURAL BOUNDARIES 227
ous a position, that he made a capitulation with the enemy
to secure a free retreat, which the Insubres foolishly
conceded. Scarce, however, had he escaped when he
appeared in the territory of the Cenomani, and, united
with them, advanced for the second time from the north
into the canton of the Insubres. The Gauls perceived
what was now the object of the Romans, when it was too
late: they took from the temple of their goddess the
golden standards called the “immovable,” and with
their whole levy, 5o, ooo strong, they offered battle to the
Romans. The situation of the latter was critical : they
were stationed with their back to a river (perhaps the
Oglio), separated from home by the enemy's territory,
and left to depend for aid in battle as well as for their
line of retreat on the uncertain friendship of the Cenomani.
There was, however, no choice. The Gauls fighting in the
Roman ranks were placed on the left bank of the stream ;
on the right, opposite to the Insubres, the legions were
drawn up, and the bridges were broken down that they
might not be assailed, at least in the rear, by their dubious
allies.
In this way undoubtedly the river cut off their retreat,
and their way homeward lay through the hostile army.
But the superiority of the Roman arms and of Roman
discipline achieved the victory, and the army cut its way
through : once more the Roman tactics had redeemed the
blunders of the general. The victory was due to the
soldiers and officers, not to the generals, who gained a
triumph only through popular favour in opposition to the
just decree of the senate. Gladly would the Insubres have
made peace; but Rome required unconditional subjection,
and things had not yet come to that pass. They tried to
maintain their ground with the help of their northern kins-
men; and, with 30, ooo illel cellaries whom they had raised
amongst these and their own levy, they received the two
228 THE EXTENSION OF ITALY BOOK III
The Celts
conquered
by Rome.
238.
consular armies advancing once more in the following year
. (532) from the territory of the Cenomani to invade their
land. Various obstinate combats took place; in a diver-
sion, attempted by the Insubres against the Roman fortress
of Clastidium (Casteggio, below Pavia), on the right bank
of the Po, the Gallic king Virdumarus fell by the hand of
the consul Marcus Marcellus. But, after a battle already
half won by the Celts but ultimately decided in favour of
the Romans, the consul Gnaeus Scipio took by assault
Mediolanum, the capital of the Insubres, and the capture
of that town and of Comum terminated their resistance.
Thus the Celts of Italy were completely vanquished, and
as, just before, the Romans had shown to the Hellenes in
the war with the pirates the difference between a Roman
and a Greek sovereignty of the seas, so they had now
brilliantly demonstrated that Rome knew how to defend
the gates of Italy against freebooters on land otherwise
than Macedonia had guarded the gates of Greece, and that
in spite of all internal quarrels Italy presented as united a
front to the national foe, as Greece exhibited distraction
and discord. -
The boundary of the Alps was reached, in so far as the
whole flat country on the Po was either rendered subject to
the Romans, or, like the territories of the Cenomani and
Veneti, was occupied by dependent allies. It needed time,
however, to reap the consequences of this victory and to
Romanize the land. In this the Romans did not adopt a
uniform mode of procedure. In the mountainous north-
west of Italy and in the more remote districts between the
Alps and the Po they tolerated, on the whole, the former
inhabitants; the numerous wars, as they are called, which
were waged with the Ligurians in particular (first in 516)
appear to have been slave-hunts rather than wars, and,
often as the cantons and valleys submitted to the Romans,
Roman sovereignty in that quarter was hardly more than a
CHAP. III TO ITS NATURAL BOUNDARIES 229
name. The expedition to Istria also (533) appears not to
have aimed at much more than the destruction of the last
lurking-places of the Adriatic pirates, and the establish-
ment of a communication by land along the Coast between
the Italian conquests of Rome and her acquisitions on the
other shore. On the other hand the Celts in the districts
south of the Po were doomed irretrievably to destruction ;
for, owing to the looseness of the ties connecting the Celtic
nation, none of the northern Celtic cantons took part with
their Italian kinsmen except for money, and the Romans
looked on the latter not only as their national foes, but as
the usurpers of their natural heritage. The extensive
assignations of land in 522 had already filled the whole
territory between Ancona and Ariminum with Roman
colonists, who settled here without communal organization
in market-villages and hamlets. Further measures of the
same character were taken, and it was not difficult to dis-
lodge and extirpate a half-barbarous population like the
Celtic, only partially following agriculture, and destitute of
walled towns. The great northern highway, which had
been, probably some eighty years earlier, carried by way of
Otricoli to Narni, and had shortly before been prolonged to
the newly-founded fortress of Spoletium (514), was now
(534) carried, under the name of the “Flaminian’ road,
by way of the newly-established market-village Forum
Flaminii (near Foligno), through the pass of Furlo to the
coast, and thence along the latter from Fanum (Fano) to
Ariminum ; it was the first artificial road which crossed the
Apennines and connected the two Italian seas. Great
zeal was manifested in covering the newly-acquired fertile
territory with Roman townships. Already, to cover the
passage of the Po, the strong fortress of Placentia (Piacenza)
had been founded on the right bank; not far from
it Cremona had been laid out on the left bank, and
the building of the walls of Mutina (Modena), in the
221.
232.
240.
220.
230 THE EXTENSION OF ITALY BOOK III
territory taken away from the Boii, had far advanced ;
already preparations were being made for further assigna-
tions of land and for continuing the highway, when a
sudden event interrupted the Romans in reaping the
fruit of their successes.
CHAP. IV HAMILCAR AND HANNIBAL 23.I
CHAPTER IV
HAMILCAR AND HANNIBAL.
THE treaty with Rome in 513 gave to the Carthaginians 241.
peace, but they paid for it dearly. That the tribute of sº
the largest portion of Sicily now flowed into the enemy's after the
exchequer instead of the Carthaginian treasury, was the *
least part of their loss. They felt a far keener regret when
they not merely had to abandon the hope of monopolizing
all the sea-routes between the eastern and the western
Mediterranean—just as that hope seemed on the eve of
fulfilment—but also saw their whole system of commercial
policy broken up, the south-western basin of the
Mediterranean, which they had hitherto exclusively com-
manded, converted since the loss of Sicily into an open
thoroughfare for all nations, and the commerce of Italy
rendered completely independent of the Phoenician.
Nevertheless the quiet men of Sidon might perhaps have
prevailed on themselves to acquiesce in this result. They
had met with similar blows already ; they had been obliged
to share with the Massiliots, the Etruscans, and the Sicilian
Greeks what they had previously possessed alone ; even
now the possessions which they retained, Africa, Spain,
and the gates of the Atlantic Ocean, were sufficient to
confer power and prosperity. But in truth, where was their
security that these at least would continue in their hands P
The demands made by Regulus, and his very near
232 HAMILCAR AND HANNIBAL BOOK III
War [241.
party and
peace
party in
Carthage.
approach to the obtaining of what he asked, could only be
forgotten by those who were willing to forget; and if
Rome should now renew from Lilybaeum the enterprise
which she had undertaken with so great success from Italy,
Carthage would undoubtedly fall, unless the perversity of
the enemy or some special piece of good fortune should
intervene to save it. No doubt they had peace for the
present; but the ratification of that peace had hung on a
thread, and they knew what public opinion in Rome
thought of the terms on which it was concluded. It might
be that Rome was not yet meditating the conquest of
Africa and was as yet content with Italy; but if the
existence of the Carthaginian state depended on that con-
tentment, the prospect was but a sorry one ; and where was
the security that the Romans might not find it even con-
venient for their Italian policy to extirpate rather than
reduce to subjection their African neighbour P
In short, Carthage could only regard the peace of 513
in the light of a truce, and could not but employ it in
preparations for the inevitable renewal of the war; not for
the purpose of avenging the defeat which she had suffered,
nor even with the primary view of recovering what she had
lost, but in order to secure for herself an existence that
should not be dependent on the good-will of the enemy.
But when a war of annihilation is surely, though in point
of time indefinitely, impending over a weaker state, the
wiser, more resolute, and more devoted men—who would
immediately prepare for the unavoidable struggle, accept it
. at a favourable moment, and thus cover their defensive
policy by a strategy of offence—always find themselves
hampered by the indolent and cowardly mass of the money-
worshippers, of the aged and feeble, and of the thoughtless
who are minded merely to gain time, to live and die in
peace, and to postpone at any price the final struggle. So
there was in Carthage a party for peace and a party for
CHAP. IV HAMILCAR AND HANNIBAL 233
war, both, as was natural, associating themselves with the
political distinction which already existed between the
conservatives and the reformers. The former found its
support in the governing boards, the council of the
Ancients and that of the Hundred, led by Hanno the
Great, as he was called; the latter found its support in the
leaders of the multitude, particularly the much-respected
Hasdrubal, and in the officers of the Sicilian army, whose
great successes under the leadership of Hamilcar, although
they had been otherwise fruitless, had at least shown to
the patriots a method which seemed to promise deliverance
from the great danger that beset them. Vehement feud
had probably long subsisted between these parties, when
the Libyan war intervened to suspend the strife. We have
already related how that war arose. After the governing
party had instigated the mutiny by their incapable adminis-
tration which frustrated all the precautionary measures of the
Sicilian officers, had converted that mutiny into a revolution
by the operation of their inhuman system of government,
and had at length brought the country to the verge of ruin
by their military incapacity—and particularly that of their
leader Hanno, who ruined the army—Hamilcar Barcas, the
hero of Ercte, was in the perilous emergency solicited by
the government itself to save it from the effects of its
blunders and crimes. He accepted the command, and
had the magnanimity not to resign it even when they
appointed Hanno as his colleague. Indeed, when the
indignant army sent the latter home, Hamilcar had the
self-control a second time to concede to him, at the urgent
request of the government, a share in the command ; and,
in spite of his enemies and in spite of such a colleague, he
was able by his influence with the insurgents, by his
dexterous treatment of the Numidian sheiks, and by his
unrivalled gellius ſo organization and generalship, in a
singularly short time to put down the revolt entirely
234 HAMILCAR AND HANNIBAL BOOK III
and to recall rebellious Africa to its allegiance (end
of 517).
During this war the patriot party had kept silence ; now
it spoke out the louder. On the one hand this catastrophe
had brought to light the utterly corrupt and pernicious
character of the ruling oligarchy, their incapacity, their
coterie-policy, their leanings towards the Romans. On the
other hand the seizure of Sardinia, and the threatening
attitude which Rome on that occasion assumed, showed
plainly even to the humblest that a declaration of war by
Rome was constantly hanging like the sword of Damocles
over Carthage, and that, if Carthage in her present
circumstances went to war with Rome, the consequence
must necessarily be the downfall of the Phoenician
dominion in Libya. Probably there were in Carthage not
a few who, despairing of the future of their country,
counselled emigration to the islands of the Atlantic; who
could blame them P But minds of the nobler order disdain
to save themselves apart from their nation, and great
natures enjoy the privilege of deriving enthusiasm from
circumstances in which the multitude of good men despair.
They accepted the new conditions just as Rome dictated
them ; no course was left but to submit and, adding fresh
bitterness to their former hatred, carefully to cherish and
husband resentment—that last resource of an injured
nation. They then took steps towards a political reform."
They had become sufficiently convinced of the incorrigible-
ness of the party in power: the fact that the governing
lords had even in the last war neither forgotten their spite
237.
* Our accounts as to these events are not only imperfect but one-sided,
for of course it was the version of the Carthaginian peace party which was
adopted by the Roman annalists. Even, however, in our fragmentary
and confused accounts (the most important are those of Fabius, in Polyb.
iii. 8 ; Appian. Hisp. 4; and Diodorus, xxv. p. 567) the relations of the
parties appear clearly enough. Of the vulgar gossip by which its
opponents sought to blacken the “revolutionary combination" (étaipeia
rów Troumporárov čv6pétrov) specimens may be had in Nepos (Ham. 3),
to which it will be difficult perhaps to find a parallel.
CHAP. IV HAMILCAR AND HANNIBAL 235
nor learned greater wisdom, was shown by the effrontery
bordering on simplicity with which they now instituted pro-
ceedings against Hamilcar as the originator of the
mercenary war, because he had without full powers from the
government made promises of money to his Sicilian soldiers.
Had the club of officers and popular leaders desired to
overthrow this rotten and wretched government, it would
hardly have encountered much difficulty in Carthage itself;
but it would have met with more formidable obstacles in
Rome, with which the chiefs of the government in Carthage
already maintained relations that bordered on treason. To
all the other difficulties of the position there fell to be
added the circumstance, that the means of saving their
country had to be created without allowing either the
Romans, or their own government with its Roman leanings,
to become rightly aware of what was doing.
So they left the constitution untouched, and the chiefs
of the government in full enjoyment of their exclusive privi-
leges and of the public property. It was merely proposed
and carried, that of the two commanders-in-chief, who at
the end of the Libyan war were at the head of the Cartha-
ginian troops, Hanno and Hamilcar, the former should be
recalled, and the latter should be nominated commander-
in-chief for all Africa during an indefinite period. It was
arranged that he should hold a position independent of the
governing corporations—his antagonists called it an uncon-
stitutional monarchical power, Cato calls it a dictatorship—
and that he could only be recalled and placed upon his
trial by the popular assembly." Even the choice of a
successor was to be vested not in the authorities ºf the
capital, but in the army, that is, in the Carthaginians
* The Barca family conclude the most important state treaties, and the
ratification of the governing board is a formality (Pol. iii. 21). Rome
enters her protcst before theili and Leſore the senate (Pol. iii. 15). The
position of the Barca family towards Carthage in many points resembles
that of the Princes of Orange towards the States-General.
Hamilcar
COIIl-
mander-in-
chief.
236 HAMILCAR AND HANNIBAL BOOK III
Hamilcar's
War
projects.
The army.
serving in the army as gerusiasts or officers, who were
named in treaties also along with the general ; of course
the right of confirmation was reserved to the popular
assembly at home. Whether this may or may not have
been a usurpation, it clearly indicates that the war party
regarded and treated the army as its special domain.
The commission which Hamilcar thus received sounded
but little liable to exception. Wars with the Numidian
tribes on the borders never ceased ; only a short time
previously the “city of a hundred gates,” Theveste
(Tebessa), in the interior had been occupied by the Cartha-
ginians. The task of continuing this border warfare, which
was allotted to the new commander-in-chief of Africa, was
not in itself of such importance as to prevent the Cartha-
ginian government, which was allowed to do as it liked in
its own immediate sphere, from tacitly conniving at the
decrees passed in reference to the matter by the popular
assembly; and the Romans did not perhaps recognize its
significance at all. 3.
Thus there stood at the head of the army the one man,
who had given proof in the Sicilian and in the Libyan wars
that fate had destined him, if any one, to be the saviour of
his country. Never perhaps was the noble struggle of man
with fate waged more nobly than by him. The army was
expected to save the state ; but what sort of army? The
Carthaginian civic militia had fought not badly under
Hamilcar's leadership in the Libyan war; but he knew
well, that it is one thing to lead out the merchants and
artisans of a city, which is in the extremity of peril, for once
to battle, and another to form them into soldiers. The
patriotic party in Carthage furnished him with excellent
officers, but it was of course almost exclusively the culti-
vated class that was represented in it. He had no citizen-
militia, at most a few squadrons of Libyphoenician cavalry.
The task was to form an army out of Libyan forced recruits
CHAP. IV HAMILCAR AND HANNIBAL 237
and mercenaries ; a task possible in the hands of a general
like Hamilcar, but possible even for him only on condition
that he should be able to pay his men punctually and
amply. But he had learned, by experience in Sicily, that
the state revenues of Carthage were expended in Carthage
itself on matters much more needful than the payment of
the armies that fought against the enemy. The warfare
which he waged, accordingly, had to support itself, and he
had to carry out on a great scale what he had already
attempted on a smaller scale at Monte Pellegrino. But
further, Hamilcar was not only a military chief, he was "
also a party leader. In opposition to the implacable
governing party, which eagerly but patiently waited for an
opportunity of overthrowing him, he had to seek support
among the citizens; and although their leaders might be
ever so pure and noble, the multitude was deeply corrupt
and accustomed by the unhappy system of corruption to
give nothing without being paid for it. In particular
emergencies, indeed, necessity or enthusiasm might for the
moment prevail, as everywhere happens even with the most
venal corporations; but, if Hamilcar wished to secure the
permanent support of the Carthaginian community for his
plan, which at the best could only be carried out after a
series of years, he had to supply his friends at home with
regular consignments of money as the means of keeping
the mob in good humour. Thus compelled to beg or to
buy from the lukewarm and venal multitude the permission
to save it; compelled to bargain with the arrogance of men
whom he hated and whom he had constantly conquered,
at the price of humiliation and of silence, for the respite
indispensable for his ends; compelled to conceal from those
despised traitors to their country, who called themselves
the lords of his native city, his plans and his contempt—
the noble hero stood with few like-liiinded friends between
enemies without and enemies within, building upon the
:
:
a * : :* -
e. • I e
$ _ &
& g o tº;
:
tº,
&
&
:
:
The
citizens.
238 HAMILCAR AND HANNIBAL BOOK III
Hamilcar
proceeds to
Spain.
236.
Spanish
kingdom
of the
Barcides.
irresolution of the one and of the other, at once deceiving
both and defying both, if only he might gain means, money,
and men for the contest with a land which, even were the
army ready to strike the blow, it seemed difficult to reach
and scarce possible to vanquish. He was still a young
man, little beyond thirty, but he had apparently, when he
was preparing for his expedition, a foreboding that he would
not be permitted to attain the end of his labours, or to see
otherwise than afar off the promised land. When he left
Carthage he enjoined his son Hannibal, nine years of age,
to swear at the altar of the supreme God eternal hatred to
the Roman name, and reared him and his younger sons
Hasdrubal and Mago—the “lion's brood,” as he called
them—in the camp as the inheritors of his projects, of his
genius, and of his hatred.
The new commander-in-chief of Libya departed from
Carthage immediately after the termination of the mercenary
war (perhaps in the spring of 518). He apparently
meditated an expedition against the free Libyans in the
west. His army, which was especially strong in elephants,
marched along the coast; by its side sailed the fleet, led by
his faithful associate Hasdrubal. Suddenly tidings came
that he had crossed the sea at the Pillars of Hercules and
had landed in Spain, where he was waging war with the
natives—with people who had done him no harm, and
without orders from his government, as the Carthaginian
authorities complained. They could not complain at any
rate that he neglected the affairs of Africa; when the
Numidians once more rebelled, his lieutenant Hasdrubal so
effectually routed them that for a long period there was
tranquillity on the frontier, and several tribes hitherto
independent submitted to pay tribute. What he personally
did in Spain, we are no longer able to trace in detail. His
achievements compelled Cato the elder, who, a generation
after Hamilcar's death, beheld in Spain the still fresh traces
.
:
:
C} {AP. IV HAMILCAR AND HANNIBAL 239
of his working, to exclaim, notwithstanding all his hatred of
the Carthaginians, that no king was worthy to be named by
the side of Hamilcar Barcas. The results still show to us,
at least in a general way, what was accomplished by Hamil-
car as a soldier and a statesman in the last nine years of his
life (518–526)—till in the flower of his age, fighting
bravely in the field of battle, he met his death like Scharn-
horst just as his plans were beginning to reach maturity—
and what during the next eight years (527–534) the heir of
his office and of his plans, his son-in-law Hasdrubal, did to
prosecute, in the spirit of the master, the work which Hamil-
car had begun. Instead of the small entrepôt for trade,
which, along with the protectorate over Gades, was all that
Carthage had hitherto possessed on the Spanish coast, and
which she had treated as a dependency of Libya, a
Carthaginian kingdom was founded in Spain by the
generalship of Hamilcar, and confirmed by the adroit
statesmanship of Hasdrubal. The fairest regions of Spain,
the southern and eastern Coasts, became Phoenician pro-
vinces. Towns were founded ; above all, “Spanish
Carthage” (Cartagena) was established by Hasdrubal on
the only good harbour along the south coast, containing
the splendid “royal Castle” of its founder. Agriculture
flourished, and, still more, mining in consequence of the
fortunate discovery of the silver-mines of Cartagena, which
a century afterwards had a yearly produce of more than
24,360, ooo (36,000,ooo sesterces). Most of the commu-
nities as far as the Ebro became dependent on Carthage
and paid tribute to it. Hasdrubal skilfully by every means,
even by intermarriages, attached the chiefs to the interests
of Carthage. Thus Carthage acquired in Spain a rich
236-228
227-220.
market for its commerce and manufactures; and not only
did the revenues of the province sustain the army, but there
remained a balance to be remitted to Carthage and reserved
for future use. The province formed and at the same time
24O
HAMILCAR AND HANNIBAL BOOK IIl
The Car-
thaginian
govern-
ment and
the
Barcides.
The
Roman
govern-
Iment
and the
Barcides.
trained the army; regular levies took place in the territory
subject to Carthage; the prisoners of war were introduced
into the Carthaginian corps. Contingents and mercenaries,
as many as were desired, were supplied by the dependent
communities. During his long life of warfare the soldier
found in the camp a second home, and found a substitute
for patriotism in fidelity to his standard and enthusiastic
attachment to his great leaders. Constant conflicts with
the brave Iberians and Celts created a serviceable infantry,
to co-operate with the excellent Numidian cavalry.
So far as Carthage was concerned, the Barcides were
allowed to go on. Since the citizens were not asked for
regular contributions, but on the contrary some benefit
accrued to them and commerce recovered in Spain what
it had lost in Sicily and Sardinia, the Spanish war and the
Spanish army with its brilliant victories and important suc-
cesses soon became so popular that it was even possible in
particular emergencies, such as after Hamilcar's fall, to
effect the despatch of considerable reinforcements of African
troops to Spain; and the governing party, whether well or
ill affected, had to maintain silence, or at any rate to con-
tent themselves with complaining to each other or to their
friends in Rome regarding the demagogic Officers and the
mob.
On the part of Rome too nothing took place calculated
seriously to alter the course of Spanish affairs. The first
and chief cause of the inactivity of the Romans was un-
doubtedly their very want of acquaintance with the circum-
stances of the remote peninsula—which was certainly also
Hamilcar's main reason for selecting Spain and not, as
might otherwise have been possible, Africa itself for the
execution of his plan. The explanations with which the
Carthaginian generals met the Roman commissioners sent
to Spain to procure information on the spot, and their
assurances that all this was done only to provide the means
CHAP. IV HAMILCAR AND HANNIBAL 24 I
of promptly paying the war-contributions to Rome, could not
possibly find belief in the senate. But they probably dis-
cerned only the immediate object of Hamilcar's plans, viz. to
procure compensation in Spain for the tribute and the traffic
of the islands which Carthage had lost; and they deemed
an aggressive war on the part of the Carthaginians, and in
particular an invasion of Italy from Spain—as is evident
both from express statements to that effect and from the
whole state of the case—as absolutely impossible. Many,
of course, among the peace party in Carthage saw further;
but, whatever they might think, they could hardly be much
inclined to enlighten their Roman friends as to the impend-
ing storm, which the Carthaginian authorities had long been
unable to prevent, for that step would accelerate, instead of
averting, the crisis; and even if they did so, such denuncia-
tions proceeding from partisans would justly be received
with great caution at Rome. By degrees, certainly, the
inconceivably rapid and mighty extension of the Carthaginian
power in Spain could not but excite the observation and
awaken the apprehensions of the Romans. In fact, in the
course of the later years before the outbreak of war, they
did attempt to set bounds to it. About the year 528,
mindful of their new-born Hellenism, they concluded an
alliance with the two Greek or semi-Greek towns on the
east coast of Spain, Zacynthus or Saguntum (Murviedro, not
far from Valencia), and Emporiae (Ampurias); and when
they acquainted the Carthaginian general Hasdrubal that
they had done so, they at the same time warned him not
to push his conquests over the Ebro, with which he promised
compliance. This was not done by any means to prevent
an invasion of Italy by the land-route—no treaty could
fetter the general who undertook such an enterprise—but
partly to set a limit to the material power of the Spanish
Carthaginians which began to be dangerous, partly to
Secure, in the free communities between the Ebro and the
VOL. II 48
226.
242 HAMILCAR AND HANNIBAL BOOK III
218.
Pyrenees whom Rome thus took under her protection, a
Dasis of operations in case of its being necessary to land
and make war in Spain. In reference to the impending
war with Carthage, which the senate did not fail to see was
inevitable, they hardly apprehended any greater inconveni-
ence from the events that had occurred in Spain than that
they might be compelled to send some legions thither, and
that the enemy would be somewhat better provided with
money and soldiers than, without Spain, he would have
been ; they were at any rate firmly resolved, as the plan of
the campaign of 536 shows and as indeed could not but be
the case, to begin and terminate the next war in Africa,-
a course which would at the same time decide the fate of
Spain. Further grounds for delay were suggested during
the first years by the instalments from Carthage, which a
declaration of war would have cut off, and then by the death
of Hamilcar, which probably induced friends and foes to
think that his projects must have died with him. Lastly,
during the latter years when the senate certainly began to
apprehend that it was not prudent long to delay the renewal
of the war, there was the very intelligible wish to dispose of
the Gauls in the valley of the Po in the first instance, for
these, threatened with extirpation, might be expected to
avail themselves of any serious war undertaken by Rome
to allure the Transalpine tribes once more to Italy, and to
renew those Celtic migrations which were still fraught with
very great peril. That it was not regard either for the
Carthaginian peace party or for existing treaties which with-
held the Romans from action, is self-evident ; moreover, if
they desired war, the Spanish feuds furnished at any
moment a ready pretext. The conduct of Rome in this
view is by no means unintelligible; but as little can it be
denied that the Roman senate in dealing with this matter
displayed shortsightedness and slackness—faults which
were still more inexcusably manifested in their mode of
CHAP. IV HAMILCAR AND HANNIBAL 243
dealing at the same epoch with Gallic affairs. The policy
of the Romans was always more remarkable for tenacity,
cunning, and consistency, than for grandeur of conception
or power of rapid organization—qualities in which the
enemies of Rome from Pyrrhus down to Mithradates often
surpassed her.
Thus the smiles of fortune inaugurated the brilliantly
conceived project of Hamilcar. The means of war were
acquired—a numerous army accustomed to combat and to
conquer, and a constantly replenished exchequer; but, in
order that the right moment might be discovered for the
struggle and that the right direction might be given to it,
there was wanted a leader. The man, whose head and
heart had in a desperate emergency and amidst a despairing
people paved the way for their deliverance, was no more,
when it became possible to carry out his design. Whether
his successor Hasdrubal forbore to make the attack because
the proper moment seemed to him to have not yet come, or
whether, more a statesman than a general, he believed him-
self unequal to the conduct of the enterprise, we are unable
to determine. When, at the beginning of 534, he fell by
the hand of an assassin, the Carthaginian officers of the
Spanish army summoned to fill his place Hannibal, the
eldest Son of Hamilcar. He was still a young man—born
in 505, and now, therefore, in his twenty-ninth year; but
his had already been a life of manifold experience. His
first récollections pictured to him his father fighting in a
distant land and conquering on Ercte; he had keenly
shared that unconquered father's feelings on the peace of
Catulus, on the bitter return home, and throughout the
horrors of the Libyan war. While yet a boy, he had
followed his father to the camp ; and he soon distinguished
himself. His light and firmly-knit frame made him an
excellent runner and fencer, and a fearlcG3 rider at full
speed ; the privation of sleep did not affect him, and he
Hannibal.
220.
249.
244 HAMILCAR AND HANNIBAL BOOK III
knew like a soldier how to enjoy or to dispense with food.
Although his youth had been spent in the camp, he
possessed such culture as belonged to the Phoenicians of
rank in his day; in Greek, apparently after he had become
a general, he made such progress under the guidance of
his confidant Sosilus of Sparta as to be able to compose
state papers in that language. As he grew up, he entered
the army of his father, to perform his first feats of arms
under the paternal eye and to see him fall in battle by his
side. Thereafter he had commanded the cavalry under
his sister's husband, Hasdrubal, and distinguished himself
by brilliant personal bravery as well as by his talents as a
leader. The voice of his comrades now summoned him—
the tried, although youthful general—to the chief command,
and he could now execute the designs for which his father
and his brother-in-law had lived and died. He took up
the inheritance, and he was worthy of it. His contem-
poraries tried to cast stains of various sorts on his character;
the Romans charged him with cruelty, the Carthaginians
with covetousness; and it is true that he hated as only
Oriental natures know how to hate, and that a general who
never fell short of money and stores can hardly have been
other than covetous. But though anger and envy and
meanness have written his history, they have not been able
to mar the pure and noble image which it presents. Laying
was 3.00% aside wretched inventions which furnish their own refuta-
tion, and some things which his lieutenants, particularly
*Hannibal Monomachus and Mago the Samnite, were guilty
cºwº, wº of doing in his name, nothing occurs in the accounts
regarding him which may not be justified under the
circumstances, and according to the international law, of
the times; and all agree in this, that he combined in rare
perfection discretion and enthusiasm, caution and energy.
He was peculiarly marked by that investiye craftiness,
which forms one of the leading traits of the Phoenician
to-
CHAP. IV HAMILCAR AND HANNIBAL
23
y” 245
© .S 2^
character; he was fond of taking singular and unexpected
routes; ambushes and stratăgems of all sorts were familiar
to him ; and he studied the character of his antagonists
ty'
2. Yv
with unprecedented care. By an unrivalled system of
espionage—he had regular spies even in Rome—he kept
himself informed of the projects of the enemy; he himself
was frequently seen wearing disguises and false hair, in
order to procure information on some point or other.
Every page of the history of this period attests his genius in
strategy; and his gifts as a statesman were, after the peace
with Rome, no less conspicuously displayed in his reform
of the Carthaginian constitution, and in the unparalleled
influence which as a foreign exile he exercised in the
cabinets of the eastern powers. The power which he
wielded over men is shown by his incomparable control
over an army of various nations and many tongues—an
army which never in the worst times mutinied against him.
He was a great man; wherever he went, he riveted the
J
,'
eyes of all.
Hannibal resolved immediately after his nomination (in
the spring of 534) to commence the war. The land of the
Celts was still in a ferment, and a war seemed imminent
between Rome and Macedonia : he had good reason now
to throw off the mask without delay and to carry the war
whithersoever he pleased, before the Romans began it at
their own convenience with a descent on Africa. His army
was soon ready to take the field, and his exchequer was
filled by some razzias on a great scale; but the Cartha-
ginian government showed itself far from desirous of
wºo
Rupture
between
Rome[220.
and
Carthage.
despatching the declaration of war to Rome. The place
of Hasdrubal, the patriotic national leader, was even more
difficult to fill in Carthage than that of Hasdrubal the
general in Spain; the peace party had now the ascendency
at home, and persecuted the leaders of the war party with
political indictments. The rulers who had already cut
246 HAMILCAR AND HANNIBAL BOOK III
219.
down and mutilated the plans of Hamilcar were by no
means inclined to allow the unknown young man, who
now commanded in Spain, to vent his youthful patriotism
at the expense of the state ; and Hannibal hesitated
personally to declare war in open opposition to the
legitimate authorities. He tried to provoke the Saguntines
to break the peace; but they contented themselves with
making a complaint to Rome. Then, when a commission
from Rome appeared, he tried to drive it to a declaration
of war by treating it rudely; but the commissioners saw
how matters stood : they kept silence in Spain, with a view
to lodge complaints at Carthage and to report at home
that Hannibal was ready to strike and that war was
imminent. Thus the time passed away; accounts had
already come of the death of Antigonus Doson, who had
suddenly died nearly at the same time with Hasdrubal ; in
Cisalpine Gaul the establishment of fortresses was carried
on by the Romans with redoubled rapidity and energy;
preparations were made in Rome for putting a speedy end
in the course of the next spring to the insurrection in
Illyria. Every day was precious; Hannibal formed his
resolution. He sent summary intimation to Carthage that
the Saguntines were making aggressions on the Torboletes,
subjects of Carthage, and he must therefore attack them;
and without waiting for a reply he began in the spring of
535 the siege of a town which was in alliance with Rome,
or, in other words, war against Rome. We may form some
idea of the views and counsels that would prevail in
Carthage from the impression produced in certain circles
by York's capitulation. All “respectable men,” it was
said, disapproved an attack made “without orders”; there
was talk of disavowal, of Surrendering the daring Officer.
But whether it was that dread of the army and of the
multitude nearer home outweighed in the Carthaginian
council the fear of Rome ; or that they perceived the
CHAP. IV HAMILCAR AND HANNIBAL 247
impossibility of retracing such a step once taken; or that
the mere vis inertiae prevented any definite action, they
resolved at length to resolve on nothing and, if not to wage
war, to let it nevertheless be waged. Saguntum defended
itself, as only Spanish towns know how to conduct defence:
had the Romans showed but a tithe of the energy of their
clients, and not trifled away their time during the eight
months' siege of Saguntum in the paltry warfare with
Illyrian brigands, they might, masters as they were of the
sea and of places suitable for landing, have spared them-
selves the disgrace of failing to grant the protection which
they had promised, and might perhaps have given a
different turn to the war. But they delayed, and the town
was at length taken by storm. When Hannibal sent the
spoil for distribution to Carthage, patriotism and zeal for
war were roused in the hearts of many who had hitherto
felt nothing of the kind, and the distribution cut off all
prospect of coming to terms with Rome. Accordingly,
when after the destruction of Saguntum a Roman embassy
appeared at Carthage and demanded the surrender of the
general and of the gerusiasts present in the camp, and
when the Roman spokesman, interrupting an attempt at
justification, broke off the discussion and, gathering up his
robe, declared that he held in it peace and war and that
the gerusia might choose between them, the gerusiasts
mustered courage to reply that they left it to the choice of
the Roman; and when he offered war, they accepted it (in
the spring of 536).
Hannibal, who had lost a whole year through the
obstinate resistance of the Saguntines, had as usual retired
for the winter of 535–6 to Cartagena, to make all his
preparations on the one hand for the attack of Italy, on
the other for the defence of Spain and Africa; for, as he,
like his father and his brother-in-law, held the supreme
command in both countries, it devolved upon him to take
218.
Prepara-
tions for
attacking
Italy.
219–218.
248 HAMILCAR AND HANNIBAL BOOK III
measures also for the protection of his native land. The
whole mass of his forces amounted to about 120, ooo
infantry and 16,ooo cavalry; he had also 58 elephants, 32
quinqueremes manned, and 18 not manned, besides the
elephants and vessels remaining at the capital. Excepting
a few Ligurians among the light troops, there were no
mercenaries in this Carthaginian army; the troops, with
the exception of some Phoenician squadrons, consisted
mainly of the Carthaginian subjects called out for service
—Libyans and Spaniards. To insure the fidelity of the
latter the general, who knew the men with whom he had
to deal, gave them as a proof of his confidence a general
leave of absence for the whole winter; while, not sharing
the narrow-minded exclusiveness of Phoenician patriotism,
he promised to the Libyans on his oath the citizenship of
Carthage, should they return to Africa victorious. This
mass of troops however was only destined in part for the
expedition to Italy. Some 2 o,000 men were sent to
Africa, the smaller portion of them proceeding to the
capital and the Phoenician territory proper, the majority to
the western point of Africa. For the protection of Spain
12,000 infantry, 25oo cavalry, and nearly the half of the
elephants were left behind, in addition to the fleet stationed
there; the chief command and the government of Spain
were entrusted to Hannibal’s younger brother Hasdrubal.
The immediate territory of Carthage was comparatively
weakly garrisoned, because the capital afforded in case of
need sufficient resources; in like manner a moderate
number of infantry sufficed for the present in Spain, where
new levies could be procured with ease, whereas a compara-
tively large proportion of the arms specially African—
horses and elephants—was retained there. The chief care
was bestowed in securing the communications between
Spain and Africa: with that view the fleet remained in
Spain, and western Africa was guarded by a very strong
CHAP. IV HAMILCAR AND HANNIBAL 249
body of troops. The fidelity of the troops was secured not
only by hostages collected from the Spanish communities
and detained in the stronghold of Saguntum, but by the
removal of the soldiers from the districts where they were
raised to other quarters: the east African militia were
moved chiefly to Spain, the Spanish to Western Africa, the
West African to Carthage. Adequate provision was thus
made for defence. As to offensive measures, a squadron
of 20 quinqueremes with Iooo soldiers on board was to sail
from Carthage for the west coast of Italy and to pillage it,
and a second of 25 sail was, if possible, to re-establish itself
at Lilybaeum; Hannibal believed that he might count
upon the government making this moderate amount of
exertion. With the main army he determined in person to
invade Italy; as was beyond doubt part of the original
plan of Hamilcar. A decisive attack on Rome was only
possible in Italy, as a similar attack on Carthage was only
possible in Libya; as certainly as Rome meant to begin
her next campaign with the latter, so certainly ought
Carthage not to confine herself at the outset either to any
secondary object of operations, such as Sicily, or to mere
defence—defeat would in any case involve equal destruction,
but victory would not yield equal fruit. -
But how could Italy be attacked P. He might succeed
in reaching the peninsula by sea or by land; but if the
project was to be no mere desperate adventure, but a
military expedition with a strategic aim, a nearer basis for
its operations was requisite than Spain or Africa. Hannibal
could not rely for support on a fleet and a fortified harbour,
for Rome was now mistress of the sea. As little did the
territory of the Italian confederacy present any tenable
basis. If in very different times, and in spite of Hellenic
sympathies, it had withstood the shock of Pyrrhus, it was
not to be expected that it would now fall to pieces on the
appearance of the Phoenician general; an invading army
Method of
attack.
25O HAMILCAR AND HANNIBAL BOOK III
would without doubt be crushed between the network of
Roman fortresses and the firmly-consolidated confederacy.
The land of the Ligurians and Celts alone could be to
Hannibal, what Poland was to Napoleon in his very similar
Russian campaigns. These tribes still smarting under
their scarcely ended struggle for independence, alien in
race from the Italians, and feeling their very existence
endangered by the chain of Roman fortresses and highways
whose first coils were even now being fastened around
them, could not but recognize their deliverers in the Phoe-
nician army (which numbered in its ranks numerous
Spanish Celts), and would serve as a first support for it to
fall back upon—a source whence it might draw supplies
and recruits. Already formal treaties were concluded with
the Boii and the Insubres, by which they bound themselves
to send guides to meet the Carthaginian army, to procure
for it a good reception from the cognate tribes and supplies
along its route, and to rise against the Romans as soon as
it should set foot on Italian ground. In fine, the relations
of Rome with the east led the Carthaginians to this same
quarter. Macedonia, which by the victory of Sellasia had
re-established its sovereignty in the Peloponnesus, was in
strained relations with Rome; Demetrius of Pharos, who
had exchanged the Roman alliance for that of Macedonia
and had been dispossessed by the Romans, lived as an
exile at the Macedonian court, and the latter had refused
the demand which the Romans made for his surrender.
If it was possible to combine the armies from the Guadal-
quivir and the Karasu anywhere against the common
foe, it could only be done on the Po. Thus everything
directed Hannibal to Northern Italy; and that the eyes of
his father had already been turned to that quarter, is shown
by the reconnoitring party of Carthaginians, whom the
Romans to their great surprise encountered in Liguria
230. in 524.
CHAP. IV HAMILCAR AND HANNIBAL 25 I
The reason for Hannibal’s preference of the land route
to that by sea is less obvious; for that neither the mari-
time supremacy of the Romans nor their league with
Massilia could have prevented a landing at Genoa, is
evident, and was shown by the sequel. Our authorities
fail to furnish us with several of the elements, on which a
satisfactory answer to this question would depend, and
which cannot be supplied by conjecture. Hannibal had to
choose between two evils. Instead of exposing himself to
the unknown and less calculable contingencies of a sea
voyage and of naval war, it must have seemed to him the
better course to accept the assurances, which beyond doubt
were seriously meant, of the Boii and Insubres, and the
more so that, even if the army should land at Genoa, it
would still have mountains to cross; he could hardly know
exactly, how much smaller are the difficulties presented by
the Apennines at Genoa than by the main chain of the
Alps. At any rate the route which he took was the
primitive Celtic route, by which many much larger hordes
had crossed the Alps: the ally and deliverer of the Celtic
nation might without temerity venture to traverse it.
So Hannibal collected the troops, destined for the
grand army, in Cartagena at the beginning of the favour-
able season ; there were 9o, ooo infantry and I 2, ooo
cavalry, of whom about two-thirds were Africans and a
third Spaniards. The 37 elephants which they took with
them were probably destined rather to make an impression
on the Gauls than for serious warfare. Hannibal's infantry
no longer needed, like that led by Xanthippus, to shelter
itself behind a screen of elephants, and the general had too
much sagacity to employ otherwise than sparingly and with
caution that two-edged weapon, which had as often
occasioned the defeat of its own as of the enemy's army.
With this force the general set out in the spring of 536
from Cartagena towards the Ebro. He so far informed
Departure
Of
Hannibal.
218.
252 HAMILCAR AND HANNIBAL BOOK III
Position of
Rome.
241.
his soldiers as to the measures which he had taken, particu-
larly as to the connections he had entered into with the
Celts and the resources and object of the expedition, that
even the common soldier, whose military instincts length-
ened war had developed, felt the clear perception and the
steady hand of his leader, and followed him with implicit
confidence to the unknown and distant land; and the
fervid address, in which he laid before them the position
of their country and the demands of the Romans, the
slavery certainly reserved for their dear native land, and
the disgrace of the imputation that they could surrender
their beloved general and his staff, kindled a soldierly and
patriotic ardour in the hearts of all.
The Roman state was in a plight, such as may occur
even in firmly-established and sagacious aristocracies. The
Romans knew doubtless what they wished to accomplish,
and they took various steps; but nothing was done rightly
or at the right time. They might long ago have been
masters of the gates of the Alps and have settled matters
with the Celts; the latter were still formidable, and the
former were open. They might either have had friendship
with Carthage, had they honourably kept the peace of 513,
or, had they not been disposed for peace, they might long
ago have conquered Carthage : the peace was practically
broken by the seizure of Sardinia, and they allowed the
power of Carthage to recover itself undisturbed for twenty
years. There was no great difficulty in maintaining peace
with Macedonia; but they had forfeited her friendship for
a trifling gain. There must have been a lack of some
leading statesman to take a connected and commanding
view of the position of affairs; on all hands either too little
was done, or too much. Now the war began at a time and
at a place which they had allowed the enemy to determine ;
and, with all their well-founded conviction of military
superiority, they were perplexed as to the object to be
CHAP. IV HAMILCAR AND HANNIBAL 253
i
aimed at and the course to be followed in their first opera- Their
tions. They had at their disposal more than half a million ...
of serviceable soldiers; the Roman cavalry alone was less the war.
good, and relatively less numerous, than the Carthaginian,
the former constituting about a tenth, the latter an eighth,
of the whole number of troops taking the field. None of
the states affected by the war had any fleet corresponding
to the Roman fleet of 22 o quinqueremes, which had just
returned from the Adriatic to the western sea. The
natural and proper application of this crushing superiority
of force was self-evident. It had been long settled that
the war ought to be opened with a landing in Africa. The
Subsequent turn taken by events had compelled the
Romans to embrace in their scheme of the war a simultane-
ous landing in Spain, chiefly to prevent the Spanish army
from appearing before the walls of Carthage. In accord-
ance with this plan they ought above all, when the war had
been practically opened by Hannibal's attack on Saguntum
in the beginning of 535, to have thrown a Roman army 219.
into Spain before the town fell; but they neglected the
dictates of interest no less than of honour. For eight
months Saguntum held out in vain : when the town passed
into other hands, Rome had not even equipped her arma-
ment for landing in Spain. The country, however, between
the Ebro and the Pyrenees was still free, and its tribes were
not only the natural allies of the Romans, but had also, like
the Saguntines, received from Roman emissaries promises
of speedy assistance. Catalonia may be reached by sea
from Italy in not much longer time than from Cartagena by
£and ; had the Romans started, like the Phoenicians, in
April, after the formal declaration of war that had taken
place in the interval, Hannibal might have encountered the
Roman legions on the line of the Ebro.
At length, certainly, the greater part of thc army and of
the fleet was got ready for the expedition to Africa, and
254 HAMILCAR AND HANNIBAL BOOK III
Hannibal
on the
Ebro.
218.
Hannibal
in Gaul.
the second consul Publius Cornelius Scipio was ordered to
the Ebro ; but he took time, and when an insurrection
broke out on the Po, he allowed the army that was ready
for embarkation to be employed there, and formed new
legions for the Spanish expedition. So although Hannibal
encountered on the Ebro very vehement resistance, it pro-
ceeded only from the natives; and, as under existing
circumstances time was still more precious to him than the
blood of his men, he surmounted the opposition after some
months with the loss of a fourth part of his army, and
reached the line of the Pyrenees. That the Spanish allies
of Rome would be sacrificed a second time by that delay
might have been as certainly foreseen, as the delay itself
might have been easily avoided ; but probably even the
expedition to Italy itself, which in the spring of 536 must
not have been anticipated in Rome, would have been
averted by the timely appearance of the Romans in Spain.
Hannibal had by no means the intention of sacrificing his
Spanish “kingdom,” and throwing himself like a desperado
on Italy. The time which he had spent in the siege of
Saguntum and in the reduction of Catalonia, and the con-
siderable corps which he left behind for the occupation of
the newly-won territory between the Ebro and the Pyrenees,
sufficiently show that, had a Roman army disputed the posses-
sion of Spain with him, he would not have been content to
withdraw from it; and—which was the main point—had
the Romans been able to delay his departure from Spain
for but a few weeks, winter would have closed the passes
of the Alps before Hannibal reached them, and the African
expedition would have departed without hindrance for its
destination.
Arrived at the Pyrenees, Hannibal sent home a portion
of his troops; a measure which he had resolved on from
the first with the view of showing to the soldiers how
confident their general was of success, and of checking the
CHAP. IV HAMILCAR AND HANNIBAL 255
feeling that his enterprise was one of those from which
there is no return home. With an army of 50,000 infantry
and 9ooo cavalry, entirely veteran soldiers, he crossed the
Pyrenees without difficulty, and then took the coast route
by Narbonne and Nimes through the Celtic territory, which
was opened to the army partly by the connections previously
formed, partly by Carthaginian gold, partly by arms. It
was not till it arrived in the end of July at the Rhone
opposite Avignon, that a serious resistance appeared to
await it. The consul Scipio, who on his voyage to Spain
had landed at Massilia (about the end of June), had there
been informed that he had come too late and that Hannibal
had crossed not only the Ebro but the Pyrenees. On
receiving these accounts, which appear to have first opened
the eyes of the Romans to the course and the object of
Hannibal, the consul had temporarily given up his
expedition to Spain, and had resolved in connection with
the Celtic tribes of that region, who were under the
influence of the Massiliots and thereby under that of Rome,
to receive the Phoenicians on the Rhone, and to obstruct
their passage of the river and their march into Italy.
Fortunately for Hannibal, opposite to the point at which he
meant to cross, there lay at the moment only the general
levy of the Celts, while the consul himself with his army of
22, ooo infantry and 2000 horse was still in Massilia, four
days' march farther down the stream. The messengers of
the Gallic levy hastened to inform him. It was the
object of Hannibal to convey his army with its numerous
cavalry and elephants across the rapid stream under the
eyes of the enemy, and before the arrival of Scipio; and he
possessed not a single boat. Immediately by his directions
all the boats belonging to the numerous navigators of the
Rhone in the neighbourhood were bought up at any price,
and the deficiency of boats was slipplied hy rafts made
from ſelled trees; and in fact the whole numerous army
Scipio at
Massilia.
Passage
of the
Rhone,
256 HAMILCAR AND HANNIBAL BOOK III
could be conveyed over in one day. While this was being
done, a strong division under Hanno, son of Bomilcar, pro-
ceeded by forced marches up the stream till they reached a
suitable point for crossing, which they found undefended,
situated two short days' march above Avignon. Here they
crossed the river on hastily constructed rafts, with the view
of then moving down on the left bank and taking the
Gauls, who were barring the passage of the main army, in
the rear. On the morning of the fifth day after they had
reached the Rhone, and of the third after Hanno's
departure, the smoke-signals of the division that had
been detached rose up on the opposite bank and gave to
Hannibal the anxiously awaited summons for the crossing.
Just as the Gauls, seeing that the enemy's fleet of boats
began to move, were hastening to occupy the bank, their
camp behind them suddenly burst into flames. Surprised
and divided, they were unable either to withstand the
attack or to resist the passage, and they dispersed in hasty
flight.
Scipio meanwhile held councils of war in Massilia as to
the proper mode of occupying the ferries of the Rhone, and
was not induced to move even by the urgent messages
that came from the leaders of the Celts. He distrusted
their accounts, and he contented himself with detaching a
weak Roman cavalry division to reconnoitre on the left
bank of the Rhone. This detachment found the whole
enemy’s army already transported to that bank, and occupied
in bringing over the elephants which alone remained on
the right bank of the stream ; and, after it had warmly
engaged some Carthaginian squadrons in the district of
Avignon, merely for the purpose of enabling it to complete
its reconnaissance—the first encounter of the Romans and
Phoenicians in this war—it hastily returned to report at
head-quarters. Scipio now started in the utmost haste
with all his troops for Avignon ; but, when he arrived
CHAP. IV HAMILCAR AND HANNIBAL 257
there, even the Carthaginian Cavalry that had been
left behind to cover the passage of the elephants had
already taken its departure three days ago, and nothing
remained for the consul but to return with weary troops and
little credit to Massilia, and to revile the “cowardly flight”
of thc Punic leader. Thus the Romans had for the third
time through pure negligence abandoned their allies and an
important line of defence; and not only so, but by passing
after this first blunder from mistaken slackness to mistaken
haste, and by still attempting without any prospect of
success to do what might have been done with so much
certainty a few days before, they let the real means of
repairing their error pass out of their hands. When once
Hannibal was in the Celtic territory on the Roman side of
the Rhone, he could no longer be prevented from reaching
the Alps; but if Scipio had at the first accounts proceeded
with his whole army to Italy—the Po might have been
reached by way of Genoa in seven days—and had united
with his corps the weak divisions in the valley of the Po, he
might have at least prepared a formidable reception for the
enemy. But not only did he lose precious time in the march
to Avignon, but, capable as otherwise he was, he wanted
either the political courage or the military Sagacity to change
the destination of his corps as the change of circumstances
required. He sent the main body under his brother Gnaeus
to Spain, and returned himself with a few men to Pisae.
Hannibal, who after the passage of the Rhone had
in a great assembly of the army explained to his troops the
object of his expedition, and had brought forward the
Celtic chief Magilus himself, who had arrived from the
valley of the Po, to address the army through an inter-
preter, meanwhile continued his march to the passes
of the Alps without obstruction. Which of these passes
he should choose, could not he at once determined either
by the shortness of the route or by the disposition of the
WOL. II 49
Hannibal's
passage of
the Alps.
258 HAMILCAR AND HANNIBAL BOOK III
inhabitants, although he had no time to lose either in
circuitous routes or in combat. He had necessarily to
select a route which should be practicable for his baggage,
his numerous cavalry, and his elephants, and in which an
army could procure sufficient means of subsistence either
by friendship or by force; for, although Hannibal had
made preparations to convey provisions after him on
beasts of burden, these could only meet for a few days the
wants of an army which still, notwithstanding its great
losses, amounted to nearly 50,000 men. Leaving out of
view the coast route, which Hannibal abstained from taking
not because the Romans barred it, but because it would
have led him away from his destination, there were only
two routes of note leading across the Alps from Gaul to
Italy in ancient times: the pass of the Cottian Alps
(Mont Genèvre) leading into the territory of the Taurini
(by Susa or Fenestrelles to Turin), and that of the Graian
Alps (the Little St. Bernard) leading into the territory of the
Salassi (to Aosta and Ivrea). The former route is the
shorter; but, after leaving the valley of the Rhone, it
passes by the impracticable and unfruitful river-valleys of the
Drac, the Romanche, and the upper Durance, through a
difficult and poor mountain country, and requires at least a
seven or eight days' mountain march. A military road
was first constructed there by Pompeius, to furnish a
shorter communication between the provinces of Cisalpine
and Transalpine Gaul.
The route by the Little St. Bernard is somewhat longer;
but after crossing the first Alpine wall that forms the
eastern boundary of the Rhone valley, it keeps by the valley
of the upper Isère, which stretches from Grenoble by way of
* It was not till the middle ages that the route by Mont Cenis became
a military road. The eastern passes, such as that over the Poenine Alps
or the Great St. Bernard—which, moreover, was only converted into a
military road by Caesar and Augustus—are, of course, in this case out of
the question.
CHAP. IV IHAMILCAR AND HANNIBAL 259
Chambéry up to the very foot of the Little St. Bernard or,
in other words, of the chain of the higher Alps, and is the
broadest, most fertile and most populous of all the Alpine
valleys. Moreover, the pass of the Little St. Bernard, while
not the lowest of all the natural passes of the Alps, is by
far the easiest; although no artificial road was constructed
there, an Austrian corps with artillery crossed the Alps by
that route in 1815. And lastly this route, which only leads
over two mountain ridges, has been from the earliest times
the great military route from the Celtic to the Italian terri-
tory. The Carthaginian army had thus in fact no choice.
It was a fortunate coincidence, but not a motive influencing
the decision of Hannibal, that the Celtic tribes allied with
him in Italy inhabited the country up to the Little St.
Bernard, while the route by Mont Genèvre would have
brought him at first into the territory of the Taurini, who
were from ancient times at feud with the Insubres.
So the Carthaginian army marched in the first instance
up the Rhone towards the valley of the upper Isère, not, as
might be presumed, by the nearest route up the left bank
of the lower Isère from Valence to Grenoble, but through
the “island’’ of the Allobroges, the rich, and even then
thickly peopled, low ground, which is enclosed on the
north and west by the Rhone, on the south by the Isère,
and on the east by the Alps. The reason of this movement
was, that the nearest route would have led them through
an impracticable and poor mountain-country, while the
“island” was level and extremely fertile, and was separated
by but a single mountain-wall from the valley of the upper
Isère. The march along the Rhone into, and across, the
“island ” to the foot of the Alpine wall was accomplished
in sixteen days : it presented little difficulty, and in the
“island ” itself Hannibal dexterously availed himself of a
ſeud Lllat liad broken out between two chieftains of the
Allobroges to attach to his interests one of the most im-
26o HAMILCAR AND HANNIBAL BOOK III
portant of the chiefs, who not only escorted the Cartha-
ginians through the whole plain, but also supplied them
with provisions, and furnished the soldiers with arms,
clothing, and shoes. But the expedition narrowly escaped
destruction at the crossing of the first Alpine chain, which
rises precipitously like a wall, and over which only a single
available path leads (over the Mont du Chat, near the
hamlet Chevelu). The population of the Allobroges had
strongly occupied the pass. Hannibal learned the state of
matters early enough to avoid a surprise, and encamped at
the foot, until after sunset the Celts dispersed to the
houses of the nearest town; he then seized the pass in the
night. Thus the summit was gained; but on the extremely
steep path, which leads down from the summit to the lake
of Bourget, the mules and horses slipped and fell. The
assaults, which at suitable points were made by the Celts
upon the army in march, were very annoying, not so much of
themselves as by reason of the turmoil which they occasioned;
and when Hannibal with his light troops threw himself
from above on the Allobroges, these were chased doubtless
without difficulty and with heavy loss down the mountain,
but the confusion, in the train especially, was further
increased by the noise of the combat. So, when after
much loss he arrived in the plain, Hannibal immediately
attacked the nearest town, to chastise and terrify the bar-
barians, and at the same time to repair as far as possible
his loss in sumpter animals and horses. After a day's
repose in the pleasant valley of Chambéry the army con-
tinued its march up the Isère, without being detained either
by want of supplies or by attacks so long as the valley
continued broad and fertile. It was only when on the
fourth day they entered the territory of the Ceutrones (the
modern Tarantaise) where the valley gradually contracts,
that they had again greater occasion to be on their guard.
The Ceutrones received the army at the boundary of their
CHAP. IV HAMILCAR AND HANNIBAL 26I
country (somewhere about Conflans) with branches and
garlands, furnished cattle for slaughter, guides, and hostages;
and the Carthaginians marched through their territory as
through a friendly land. When, however, the troops had
reached the very foot of the Alps, at the point where the
path leaves the Isère, and winds by a narrow and difficult
defile along the brook Reclus up to the summit of the St.
Bernard, all at once the militia of the Ceutrones appeared
partly in the rear of the army, partly on the crests of the
rocks enclosing the pass on the right and left, in the hope
of cutting off the train and baggage. But Hannibal, whose
unerring tact had seen in all those advances made by the
Ceutrones nothing but the design of procuring at once
immunity for their territory and a rich spoil, had in expect-
ation of such an attack sent forward the baggage and
cavalry, and covered the march with all his infantry. By
this means he frustrated the design of the enemy, although
he could not prevent them from moving along the mountain
slopes parallel to the march of the infantry, and inflicting
very considerable loss by hurling or rolling down stones.
At the “white stone” (still called la roche &lanche), a high
isolated chalk cliff standing at the foot of the St. Bernard
and commanding the ascent to it, Hannibal encamped with
his infantry, to cover the march of the horses and sumpter
animals laboriously climbing upward throughout the whole
night; and amidst continual and very bloody conflicts he at
length on the following day reached the summit of the pass.
There, on the sheltered table-land which spreads to the
extent of two and a half miles round a little lake, the source
of the Doria, he allowed the army to rest. Despondency
had begun to seize the minds of the soldiers. The paths
that were becoming ever more difficult, the provisions fail-
ing, the marching through defiles exposed to the constant
attacks of foes whom they could not reach, the sorely
thinned ranks, the hopeless situation of the stragglers and
262 HAMILCAR AND HANNIBAL BOOK III
the wounded, the object which appeared chimerical to all
save the enthusiastic leader and his immediate staff—all
these things began to tell even on the African and Spanish
veterans. But the confidence of the general remained ever
the same ; numerous stragglers rejoined the ranks; the
friendly Gauls were near ; the watershed was reached, and
the view of the descending path, so gladdening to the
mountain-pilgrim, opened up : after a brief repose they
prepared with renewed courage for the last and most
difficult undertaking, the downward march. In it the
army was not materially annoyed by the enemy; but the
advanced season—it was already the beginning of September
—occasioned troubles in the descent, equal to those which
had been occasioned in the ascent by the attacks of the
adjoining tribes. On the steep and slippery mountain-
slope along the Doria, where the recently-fallen snow had
concealed and obliterated the paths, men and animals
went astray and slipped, and were precipitated into the
chasms. In fact, towards the end of the first day's march
they reached a portion of the path about 2 oo paces in
length, on which avalanches are constantly descending from
the precipices of the Cramont that overhang it, and where
in cold summers snow lies throughout the year. The
infantry passed over; but the horses and elephants were
unable to cross the smooth masses of ice, on which there
lay but a thin covering of freshly-fallen snow, and the
general encamped above the difficult spot with the baggage,
the cavalry, and the elephants. On the following day the
horsemen, by zealous exertion in entrenching, prepared a
path for horses and beasts of burden; but it was not until
after a further labour of three days with constant reliefs,
that the half-famished elephants could at length be con-
ducted over. In this way the whole army was after a delay
of four days once more united ; and after a further three
days' march through the valley of the Doria, which was ever
CHAP. IV HAMILCAR AND HANNIBAL 263
widening and displaying greater fertility, and whose inhabit-
ants the Salassi, clients of the Insubres, hailed in the Car-
thaginians their allies and deliverers, the army arrived about
the middle of September in the plain of Ivrea, where the
exhausted troops were quartered in the villages, that by
good nourishment and a fortnight's repose they might
recruit from their unparalleled hardships. Had the
Romans placed a corps, as they might have done, of 30, ooo
men thoroughly fresh and ready for action somewhere near
Turin, and immediately forced on a battle, the prospects
of Hannibal’s great plan would have been very dubious ;
fortunately for him, once more, they were not where they
should have been, and they did not disturb the troops of
the enemy in the repose which was so greatly needed."
1 The much-discussed questions of topography, connected with this
celebrated expedition, may be regarded as cleared up and substantially
solved by the masterly investigations of Messrs. Wickham and Cramer.
Respecting the chronological questions, which likewise present difficulties,
a few remarks may be exceptionally allowed to have a place here.
When Hannibal reached the summit of the St. Bernard, ‘‘the peaks
were already beginning to be thickly covered with snow" (Pol. iii. 54);
snow lay on the route (Pol. iii. 55), perhaps for the most part Snow not
freshly fallen, but proceeding from the fall of avalanches. At the St.
Bernard winter begins about Michaelmas, and the falling of snow in
September ; when the Englishmen already mentioned crossed the mountain
at the end of August, they found almost no snow on their road, but the
slopes on both sides were covered with it. Hannibal thus appears to have
arrived at the pass in the beginning of September ; which is quite com-
patible with the statement that he arrived there “when the winter was
already approaching"—for a vyātreuv Tiju Tàs TXeudöos 6&aw (Pol. iii.
54) does not mean anything more than this, least of all, the day of the
heliacal setting of the Pleiades (about 26th October); comp. Ideler,
Chronol. i. 24.I.
If Hannibal reached Italy nine days later, and therefore about the
middle of September, there is room for the events that occurred from that
time up to the battle of the Trebia towards the end of December (trepi
xeiaepués Tporås, Pol. iii. 72), and in particular for the transporting of
the army destined for Africa from Lilybaeum to Placentia. This hypo-
thesis further suits the statement that the day of departure was announced
at an assembly of the army útrö Thu èapuhu &pav (Pol. iii. 34), and there-
fore towards the end of March, and that the march lasted five (or, accord-
ing to App. vii. 4, six) months. If Hannibal was thus at the St. Bernard
in the beginning of September, he must have reached the Rhone at the
beginning of August—for he spent thirty days in making his way from the
Rhone thither—and in that case it is evident that Scipio, who embarked at
264 HAMILCAR AND HANNIBAL BOOK III
Results.
The object was attained, but at a heavy cost. Of the
5o, ooo veteran infantry and the 9ooo cavalry, which the
army had numbered at the crossing of the Pyrenees, more
than half had been sacrificed in the conflicts, the marches,
and the passages of the rivers. Hannibal now, according
to his own statement, numbered not more than 20, ooo
infantry—of whom three-fifths were Libyans and two-fifths
Spaniards—and 6ooo cavalry, part of them doubtless
dismounted: the comparatively small loss of the latter
proclaimed the excellence of the Numidian cavalry no less
than the consideration of the general in making a sparing
use of troops so select. A march of 526 miles or about
33 moderate days’ marching—the continuance and termina-
tion of which were disturbed by no special misfortunes on
a great scale that could not be anticipated, but were, on
the other hand, rendered possible only by incalculable pieces
of good fortune and still more incalculable blunders of the
enemy, and which yet not only cost such sacrifices, but so
fatigued and demoralized the army, that it needed a pro-
longed rest in order to be again ready for action—is a
military operation of doubtful value, and it may be ques-
tioned whether Hannibal himself regarded it as successful.
Only in so speaking we may not pronounce an absolute
censure on the general : we see well the defects of the
plan of operations pursued by him, but we cannot determine
whether he was in a position to foresee them—his route lay
through an unknown land of barbarians—or whether any
other plan, such as that of taking the coast road or of
embarking at Cartagena or at Carthage, would have
exposed him to fewer dangers. The cautious and masterly
execution of the plan in its details at any rate deserves our
admiration, and to whatever causes the result may have
the beginning of summer (Pol. iii. 41) and so at latest by the commence-
ment of June, must have spent much time on the voyage or remained for
a considerable period in singular inaction at Massilia.
CHAP. IV IHAMILCAR AND HANNIBAL 265
been due—whether it was due mainly to the favour of
fortune, or mainly to the skill of the general—the grand
idea of Hamilcar, that of taking up the conflict with Rome
in Italy, was now realized. It was his genius that projected
this expedition; and as the task of Stein and Scharnhorst
was more difficult and nobler than that of York and
Blucher, so the unerring tact of historical tradition has
always dwelt on the last link in the great chain of pre-
paratory steps, the passage of the Alps, with a greater
admiration than on the battles of the Trasimene lake and
of the plain of Cannae.
266 THE WAIR UNIDER HANNIBAL BOOK III
Hannibal
and the
Italian
Celts.
CHAPTER V
THE WAR UNIDER HANNIBAL TO THE BATTLE OF CANNAE
THE appearance of the Carthaginian army on the Roman
side of the Alps changed all at once the situation of affairs,
and disconcerted the Roman plan of war. Of the two
principal armies of the Romans, one had landed in Spain
and was already engaged with the enemy there : it was no
longer possible to recall it. The second, which was
destined for Africa under the command of the consul
Tiberius Sempronius, was fortunately still in Sicily: in
this instance Roman delay for once proved useful. Of
the two Carthaginian squadrons destined for Italy and
Sicily, the first was dispersed by a storm, and some of its
vessels were captured by the Syracusans near Messana;
the second had endeavoured in vain to surprise Lilybaeum,
and had thereafter been defeated in a naval engagement
off that port. But the continuance of the enemy's
squadrons in the Italian waters was so inconvenient, that
the consul determined, before crossing to Africa, to occupy
the small islands around Sicily, and to drive away the
Carthaginian fleet operating against Italy. The summer
passed away in the conquest of Melita, in the chase after
the enemy's squadron, which he expected to find at the
Lipari islands while it had made a descent near Vibo
(Monteleone) and pillaged the Bruttian coast, and, lastly,
in gaining information as to a suitable spot for landing on
CHAP. V TO THE BATTLE OF CANNAE 267
the coast of Africa; so that the army and fleet were still
at Lilybaeum, when orders arrived from the senate that
they should return with all possible speed for the defence
of their homes.
In this way, while the two great Roman armies, each in
itself equal in numbers to that of Hannibal, remained at
a great distance from the valley of the Po, the Romans
were quite unprepared for an attack in that quarter. No
doubt a Roman army was there, in consequence of an
insurrection that had broken out among the Celts even
before the arrival of the Carthaginian army. The founding
of the two Roman strongholds of Placentia and Cremona,
each of which received 6ooo colonists, and more especially
the preparations for the founding of Mutina in the territory
of the Boii, had already in the spring of 536 driven the
Boii to revolt before the time concerted with Hannibal;
and the Insubres had immediately joined them. The
colonists already settled in the territory of Mutina, sud-
denly attacked, took refuge in the town. The praetor
Lucius Manlius, who held the chief command at Ariminum,
hastened with his single legion to relieve the blockaded
colonists; but he was surprised in the woods, and no
course was left to him after sustaining great loss but to
establish himself upon a hill and to submit to a siege there
on the part of the Boii, till a second legion sent from
Rome under the praetor Lucius Atilius succeeded in re-
lieving army and town, and in suppressing for the moment
the Gaulish insurrection. This premature rising of the
Boii on the one hand, by delaying the departure of Scipio
for Spain, essentially promoted the plans of Hannibal; on
the other hand, but for its occurrence he would have found
the valley of the Po entirely unoccupied, except the
fortresses. But the Roman corps, whose two severely
thinned legions did #! number 20,000 soldiers, had
enough to do to keep the Celts in check, and did not
§
218.
268 THE WAR UNDER HANNIBAL BOOK III
Scipio in
the valley
of the PO.
Conflict on
the Ticino.
think of occupying the passes of the Alps. The Romans
only learned that the passes were threatened, when in
August the consul Publius Scipio returned without his army
from Massilia to Italy, and perhaps even then they gave
little heed to the matter, because, forsooth, the foolhardy
attempt would be frustrated by the Alps alone. Thus at the
decisive hour and on the decisive spot there was not even a
Roman outpost. Hannibal had full time to rest his army,
to capture after a three days' siege the capital of the Taurini
which closed its gates against him, and to induce or terrify
into alliance with him all the Ligurian and Celtic communi-
ties in the upper basin of the Po, before Scipio, who had
taken the command in the Po valley, encountered him.
Scipio, who, with an army considerably smaller and very
weak in cavalry, had the difficult task of preventing the
advance of the superior force of the enemy and of repress-
ing the movements of insurrection which everywhere were
spreading among the Celts, had crossed the Po presumably
at Placentia, and marched up the river to meet the enemy,
while Hannibal after the capture of Turin marched down-
wards to relieve the Insubres and Boii. In the plain
between the Ticino and the Sesia, not far from Vercelli,
the Roman cavalry, which had advanced with the light
infantry to make a reconnaissance in force, encountered
the Punic cavalry sent out for the like purpose, both led
by the generals in person. Scipio accepted battle when
offered, notwithstanding the superiority of the enemy; but
his light infantry, which was placed in front of the cavalry,
dispersed before the charge of the heavy cavalry of
the enemy, and while the latter engaged the masses of
the Roman horsemen in front, the light Numidian cavalry,
after having pushed aside the broken ranks of the enemy's
infantry, took the Roman horsemen in flank and rear.
This decided the combat. The loss of the Romans was
very considerable. The consul himself, who made up as a
CHAP. V TO THE BATTLE OF CANNAE 269
soldier for his deficiencies as a general, received a danger-
ous wound, and owed his safety entirely to the devotion of
his son of seventeen, who, courageously dashing into the
ranks of the enemy, compelled his squadron to follow him
and rescued his father. Scipio, enlightened by this combat
as to the strength of the enemy, saw the error which he
had committed in posting himself, with a weaker army, in
the plain with his back to the river, and resolved to return
to the right bank of the Po under the eyes of his antagonist.
As the operations became contracted into a narrower space
and his illusions regarding Roman invincibility departed,
he recovered the use of his considerable military talents,
which the adventurous boldness of his youthful opponent's
plans had: for a moment paralyzed. While Hannibal
was preparing for a pitched battle, Scipio by a rapidly
projected and steadily executed march succeeded in
reaching the right bank of the river which in an evil hour
he had abandoned, and broke down the bridge over the
Po behind his army ; the Roman detachment of 6oo men
charged to cover the process of destruction were, however,
intercepted and made prisoners. But as the upper course
of the river was in the hands of Hannibal, he could not be
prevented from marching up the stream, crossing on a
bridge of boats, and in a few days confronting the Roman
army on the right bank. The latter had taken a position
in the plain in front of Placentia; but the mutiny of a
Celtic division in the Roman camp, and the Gallic insur-
rection breaking out afresh all around, compelled the consul
to evacuate the plain and to post himself on the hills
behind the Trebia. This was accomplished without
notable loss, because the Numidian horsemen sent in
pursuit lost their time in plundering, and setting fire to,
the abandoned camp. In this strong position, with his
left wing resting on the Apennines, his right on the Po
and the fortress of Placentia, and covered in front by the
The
armies at
Placentia.
27o THE WAR UNIDER HANNIBAL BOOK III
Battle on
the Trebia.
Trebia—no inconsiderable stream at that season—Scipio
was unable to save the rich stores of Clastidium (Casteggio)
from which in this position he was cut off by the army of
the enemy; nor was he able to avert the insurrectionary
movement on the part of almost all the Gallic cantons,
excepting the Cenomani who were friendly to Rome; but
he completely checked the progress of Hannibal, and
compelled him to pitch his camp opposite to that of the
Romans. Moreover, the position taken up by Scipio,
and the circumstance of the Cenomani threatening the
borders of the Insubres, hindered the main body of the
Gallic insurgents from directly joining the enemy, and
gave to the second Roman army, which meanwhile had
arrived at Ariminum from Lilybaeum, the opportunity of
reaching Placentia through the midst of the insurgent
country without material hindrance, and of uniting itself
with the army of the Po.
Scipio had thus solved his difficult task completely and
brilliantly. The Roman army, now close on 4o, ooo strong,
and though not a match for its antagonist in cavalry, at least
equal in infantry, had simply to remain in its existing posi-
tion, in order to compel the enemy either to attempt in the
winter season the passage of the river and an attack upon
the camp, or to suspend his advance and to test the fickle
temper of the Gauls by the burden of winter quarters.
Clear, however, as this was, it was no less clear that it was
now December, and that under the course proposed the
victory might perhaps be gained by Rome, but would not
be gained by the consul Tiberius Sempronius, who held
the sole command in consequence of Scipio's wound, and
whose year of office expired in a few months. Hannibal
knew the man, and neglected no means of alluring him to
fight. The Celtic villages that had remained faithful to
the Romans were cruelly laid waste, and, when this brought
on a conflict between the cavalry, Hannibal allowed his
CHAP. V TO THE BATTLE OF CANNAE 271
opponents to boast of the victory. Soon thereafter on a
raw rainy day a general engagement came on, unlooked for
by the Romans. From the earliest hour of the morning
the Roman light troops had been skirmishing with the
light cavalry of the enemy; the latter slowly retreated, and
the Romans eagerly pursued it through the deeply swollen
Trebia to follow up the advantage which they had gained.
Suddenly the cavalry halted ; the Roman vanguard found
itself face to face with the army of Hannibal drawn up for
battle on a field chosen by himself; it was lost, unless the
main body should cross the stream with all speed to its
Support. Hungry, weary, and wet, the Romans came on
and hastened to form in order of battle, the cavalry, as
usual, on the wings, the infantry in the centre. The light
troops, who formed the vanguard on both sides, began the
combat: but the Romans had already almost exhausted
their missiles against the cavalry, and immediately gave
way. In like manner the cavalry gave way on the wings,
hard pressed by the elephants in front, and outflanked right
and left by the far more numerous Carthaginian horse.
But the Roman infantry proved itself worthy of its name:
at the beginning of the battle it fought with very decided
superiority against the infantry of the enemy, and even
when the repulse of the Roman horse allowed the enemy's
cavalry and light-armed troops to turn their attacks against
the Roman infantry, the latter, although ceasing to advance,
obstinately maintained its ground. At this stage a select
Carthaginian band of Iooo infantry, and as many horsemen,
under the leadership of Mago, Hannibal's youngest brother,
suddenly emerged from an ambush in the rear of the
Roman army, and fell upon the densely entangled masses.
The wings of the army and the rear ranks of the Roman
centre were broken up and scattered by this attack, while
the first division, Io, ooo men strong, in compact array broke
through the Carthaginian line, and made a passage for
272 THE WAR UNDER HANNIBAT, f{OOK III
itself obliquely through the midst of the enemy, inflicting
great loss on the opposing infantry and more especially on
the Gallic insurgents. This brave body, pursued but feebly,
thus reached Placentia. The remaining mass was for the
most part slaughtered by the elephants and light troops of
the enemy in attempting to cross the river: only part of
the cavalry and some divisions of infantry were able, by
wading through the river, to gain the camp whither the
Carthaginians did not follow them, and thus they too
reached Placentia. Few battles confer more honour on
the Roman soldier than this on the Trebia, and few at the
same time furnish graver impeachment of the general in
command ; although the candid judge will not forget that
a commandership-in-chief expiring on a definite day was an
unmilitary institution, and that figs cannot be reaped from
thistles. The victory came to be costly even to the victors.
Although the loss in the battle fell chiefly on the Celtic
1 Polybius's account of the battle on the Trebia is quite clear. If
Placentia lay on the right bank of the Trebia where it falls into the Po,
and if the battle was fought on the left bank, while the Roman encamp-
ment was pitched upon the right—both of which points have been dis-
puted, but are nevertheless indisputable—the Roman soldiers must
certainly have passed the Trebia in order to gain Placentia as well as to
gain the camp. But those who crossed to the camp must have made their
way through the disorganized portions of their own army and through the
corps of the enemy that had gone round to their rear, and must then have
crossed the river almost in hand-to-hand combat with the enemy. On
the other hand the passage near Placentia was accomplished after the
pursuit had slackened ; the corps was several miles distant from the field
of battle, and had arrived within reach of a Roman fortress ; it may even
have been the case, although it cannot be proved, that a bridge led over
the Trebia at that point, and that the táte de pont on the other bank was
occupied by the garrison of Placentia. It is evident that the first passage
was just as difficult as the second was easy, and therefore with good
reason Polybius, military judge as he was, merely says of the corps of
Io, ooo, that in close columns it cut its way to Placentia (iii. 74, 6),
without mentioning the passage of the river which in this case was
unattended with difficulty.
The erroneousness of the view of Livy, which transfers the Phoenician
camp to the right, the Roman to the left bank of the Trebia, has lately
been repeatedly pointed out. We may only further mention, that the
site of Clastidium, near the modern Casteggio, has now been established
by inscriptions (Orelli-Henzen, 51.17).
CHAP. V. TO THE BATTLE OF CANNAE 273
insurgents, yet a multitude of the veteran soldiers of
Hannibal died afterwards from diseases engendered by
that raw and wet winter day, and all the elephants perished
except one.
The effect of this first victory of the invading army was,
that the national insurrection now spread and assumed
shape without hindrance throughout the Celtic territory.
The remains of the Roman army of the Po threw themselves
into the fortresses of Placentia and Cremona : completely
cut off from home, they were obliged to procure their
supplies by way of the river. The consul Tiberius
Sempronius only escaped, as if by miracle, from being
taken prisoner, when with a weak escort of cavalry he went
to Rome on account of the elections. Hannibal, who
would not hazard the health of his troops by further
marches at that inclement season, bivouacked for the winter
where he was ; and, as a serious attempt on the larger
fortresses would have led to no result, contented himself
with annoying the enemy by attacks on the river-port of
Placentia and other minor Roman positions. He employed
himself mainly in organizing the Gallic insurrection : more
than 60, ooo foot soldiers and 4ooo horsemen from the
Celts are said to have joined his army.
No extraordinary exertions were made in Rome for the
campaign of 537. The senate thought, and not unreason-
ably, that, despite the lost battle, their position was by no
means fraught with serious danger. Besides the coast-
garrisons, which were despatched to Sardinia, Sicily, and
Tarentum, and the reinforcements which were sent to
Spain, the two new consuls Gaius Flaminius and Gnaeus
Servilius obtained only as many men as were necessary to
restore the four legions to their full complement; additions
were made to the strength of the cavalry alone. The
consuls had to protect the northerſ, ſoutieſ, and slationed
themselves accordingly on the two highways which led
VOL. II 5O
Hannibal
master of
northern
Italy.
Military
and politi-
cal [217.
position of
Hannibal.
274 THE WAR UNIDER HANNIBAL BOOK III
from Rome to the north, the western of which at that time
terminated at. Arretium, and the eastern at Ariminum ;
Gaius Flaminius occupied the former, Gnaeus Servilius the
latter. There they ordered the troops from the fortresses
on the Po to join them, probably by water, and awaited
the commencement of the favourable season, when they
proposed to occupy in the defensive the passes of the
Apennines, and then, taking up the offensive, to descend
into the valley of the Po and effect a junction somewhere
near Placentia. But Hannibal by no means intended to
defend the valley of the Po. He knew Rome better per-
haps than the Romans knew it themselves, and was very
well aware how decidedly he was the weaker and continued
to be so notwithstanding the brilliant battle on the Trebia;
he knew too that his ultimate object, the humiliation of
Rome, was not to be wrung from the unbending Roman
pride either by terror or by surprise, but could only be
gained by the actual subjugation of the haughty city.
It was clearly apparent that the Italian federation was in
political solidity and in military resources infinitely superior
to an adversary, who received only precarious and irregular
support from home, and who in Italy was dependent for
primary aid solely on the vacillating and capricious nation
of the Celts ; and that the Phoenician foot soldier was,
notwithstanding all the pains taken by Hannibal, far in-
ferior in point of tactics to the legionary, had been
completely proved by the defensive movements of Scipio
and the brilliant retreat of the defeated infantry on the
Trebia. From this conviction flowed the two fundamental
principles which determined Hannibal's whole method of
operations in Italy—viz., that the war should be carried
on, in somewhat adventurous fashion, with constant
changes in the plan and in the theatre of operations; and
that its favourable issue could only be looked for as the
result of political and not of military successes—of the
CHAP, V TO THE BATTLE OF CANNAE 275
gradual loosening and final breaking up of the Italian
federation. That mode of carrying on the war was neces-
sary, because the single element which Hannibal had to
throw into the scale against so many disadvantages—his
military genius—only told with its full weight, when he
constantly foiled his opponents by unexpected combina-
tions; he was undone, if the war became stationary.
That aim was the aim dictated to him by right policy,
because, mighty conqueror though he was in battle, he saw
very clearly that on each occasion he vanquished the
generals and not the city, and that after each new battle
the Romans remained just as superior to the Carthaginians
as he was personally superior to the Roman commanders.
That Hannibal even at the height of his fortune never
deceived himself on this point, is worthier of admiration
than his most admired battles.
It was these motives, and not the entreaties of the
Gauls that he should spare their country—which would
not have influenced him—that induced Hannibal now to
forsake, as it were, his newly acquired basis of operations
against Italy, and to transfer the scene of war to Italy
itself. Before doing so he gave orders that all the
prisoners should be brought before him. He ordered the
Romans to be separated and loaded with chains as slaves
—the statement that Hannibal put to death all the Romans
capable of bearing arms, who here and elsewhere fell into
his hands, is beyond doubt at least strongly exaggerated.
On the other hand, all the Italian allies were released
without ransom, and charged to report at home that
Hannibal waged war not against Italy, but against Rome;
that he promised to every Italian community the restora-
tion of its ancient independence and its ancient boundaries;
and that the deliverer was about to follow those whom he
had set free, bringing rclease and levenge. In ſact, when
the winter ended, he started from the valley of the Po to
Hannibal
crosses the
Apen-
nines.
276 THE WAR UNDER HANNIBAL BOOK III
Flaminius.
search for a route through the difficult defiles of the
Apennines. Gaius Flaminius, with the Etruscan army,
was still for the moment at Arezzo, intending to move
from that point towards Lucca in order to protect the vale
of the Arno and the passes of the Apennines, so soon as
the season should allow. But Hannibal anticipated him.
The passage of the Apennines was accomplished without
much difficulty, at a point as far west as possible or, in
other words, as distant as possible from the enemy; but
the marshy low grounds between the Serchio and the Arno
were so flooded by the melting of the snow and the spring
rains, that the army had to march four days in water,
without finding any other dry spot for resting by night than
was supplied by piling the baggage or by the sumpter
animals that had fallen. The troops underwent unutterable
sufferings, particularly the Gallic infantry, which marched
behind the Carthaginians along tracks already rendered
impassable : they murmured loudly and would undoubtedly
have dispersed to a man, had not the Carthaginian cavalry
under Mago, which brought up the rear, rendered flight
impossible. The horses, assailed by a distemper in their
hoofs, fell in heaps ; various diseases decimated the
soldiers; Hannibal himself lost an eye in consequence of
Ophthalmia.
But the object was attained. Hannibal encamped at
Fiesole, while Gaius Flaminius was still waiting at Arezzo
until the roads should become passable that he might
blockade them. After the Roman defensive position had
thus been turned, the best course for the consul, who might
perhaps have been strong enough to defend the mountain
passes but certainly was unable now to face Hannibal in
the open field, would have been to wait till the second
army, which had now become completely superfluous at
Ariminum, should arrive. He himself, however, judged
otherwise. He was a political party leader, raised to
CHAP. V TO THE BATTLE OF CANNAE 277
distinction by his efforts to limit the power of the senate;
indignant at the government in consequence of the
aristocratic intrigues Concocted against him during his
consulship ; carried away, through a doubtless justifiable
opposition to their beaten track of partisanship, into a
scornful defiance of tradition and custom ; intoxicated at
once by blind love of the Common people and equally
bitter hatred of the party of the nobles; and, in addition
to all this, possessed with the fixed idea that he was a
military genius. His campaign against the Insubres of
531, which to unprejudiced judges only showed that good
soldiers often repair the errors of bad generals (p. 226), was
regarded by him and by his adherents as an irrefragable
proof that the Romans had only to put Gaius Flaminius at
the head of the army in order to make a speedy end of
Hannibal. Talk of this sort had procured for him his
second consulship, and hopes of this sort had now brought
to his camp so great a multitude of unarmed followers
eager for spoil, that their number, according to the
assurance of sober historians, exceeded that of the legion-
aries. Hannibal based his plan in part on this circum-
stance. So far from attacking him, he marched past him,
and caused the country all around to be pillaged by the
Celts who thoroughly understood plundering, and by his
numerous cavalry. The complaints and indignation of the
multitude which had to submit to be plundered under the
eyes of the hero who had promised to enrich them, and
the protestation of the enemy that they did not believe
him possessed of either the power or the resolution to
undertake anything before the arrival of his colleague,
could not but induce such a man to display his genius for
strategy, and to give a sharp lesson to his inconsiderate
and haughty foe.
No plan was ever more successful. In haste, the
Consul followed the line of march of the enemy, who
278 THE WAR UNDER HANNIBAL BOOK III
Battle
On the
Trasimene
lake.
passed by Arezzo and moved slowly through the rich valley
of the Chiana towards Perugia. He overtook him in the
district of Cortona, where Hannibal, accurately informed of
his antagonist's march, had had full time to select his field of
battle—a narrow defile between two steep mountain walls,
closed at its outlet by a high hill, and at its entrance by the
Trasimene lake. With the flower of his infantry he barred
the outlet; the light troops and the cavalry placed themselves
in concealment on either side. The Roman columns
advanced without hesitation into the unoccupied pass;
the thick morning mist concealed from them the position
of the enemy. As the head of the Roman line approached
the hill, Hannibal gave the signal for battle; the cavalry,
advancing behind the heights, closed the entrance of the
pass, and at the same time the mist rolling away revealed
the Phoenician arms everywhere along the crests on the
right and left. There was no battle; it was a mere rout.
Those that remained outside of the defile were driven by
the cavalry into the lake. The main body was annihilated
in the pass itself almost without resistance, and most of
them, including the consul himself, were cut down in
the order of march. The head of the Roman column,
formed of 6ooo infantry, cut their way through the infantry
of the enemy, and proved once more the irresistible might
of the legions; but, cut off from the rest of the army and
without knowledge of its fate, they marched on at random,
were surrounded on the following day, on a hill which they
had occupied, by a corps of Carthaginian Cavalry, and—as
the capitulation, which promised them a free retreat, was
rejected by Hannibal—were all treated as prisoners of war.
I5,ooo Romans had fallen, and as many were captured ;
in other words, the army was annihilated. The slight
Carthaginian loss—1500 men—again fell mainly upon the
Gauls.” And, as if this were not enough, immediately
* The date of the battle, 23rd June according to the uncorrected
CHAP. V TO THE BATTLE OF CANNAE 279
after the battle on the Trasiniene lake, the cavalry of the
army of Ariminum under Gaius Centenius, 4ooo strong,
which Gnaeus Servilius had sent forward for the temporary
support of his colleague while he himself advanced by slow
marches, was likewise surrounded by the Phoenician army,
and partly slain, partly made prisoners. All Etruria was
lost, and Hannibal might without hindrance march on
Rome. The Romans prepared themselves for the worst;
they broke down the bridges over the Tiber, and nominated
Quintus Fabius Maximus dictator to repair the walls and
conduct the defence, for which an army of reserve was
formed. At the same time two new legions were summoned
under arms in the room of those annihilated, and the fleet,
which might become of importance in the event of a siege,
was put in order.
But Hannibal was more farsighted than king Pyrrhus.
He did not march on Rome; nor even against Gnaeus
Servilius, an able general, who had with the help of the
fortresses on the northern road preserved his army hitherto
uninjured, and would perhaps have kept his antagonist at
bay. Once more a movement occurred which was quite
unexpected. Hannibal marched past the fortress of
Spoletium, which he attempted in vain to surprise, through
Umbria, fearfully devastated the territory of Picenum which
was covered all over with Roman farmhouses, and halted
on the shores of the Adriatic. The men and horses of his
army had not yet recovered from the painful effects of their
spring campaign ; here he rested for a considerable time to
allow his army to recruit its strength in a pleasant district
and at a fine season of the year, and to reorganize his
Libyan infantry after the Roman mode, the means for
calendar, must, according to the rectified calendar, fall somewhere in
April, since Quintus Fabius resigned his dictatorship, after six months,
in the middle of autumn (Liv. xxii. 31, 7; 32, 1), and must therefore have
entered upon it about the beginning of May. The confusion of the
calendar (p. 117) in Rome was even at this period very great.
Hannibal
on the east
COaSt.
Reorgan-
ization of
the Car-
thaginian
army.
28O THE WAR UNIDER HANNIBAL BOOK III
War in
Lower
Italy.
which were furnished to him by the mass of Roman arms
among the spoil. From this point, moreover, he resumed
his long-interrupted communication with his native land,
sending his messages of victory by water to Carthage. At
length, when his army was sufficiently restored and had
been adequately exercised in the use of the new arms, he
broke up and marched slowly along the coast into southern
Italy.
He had calculated correctly, when he chose this time
for remodelling his infantry. Thé surprise of his antagon-
ists, who were in constant expectation of an attack on the
capital, allowed him at least four weeks of undisturbed
leisure for the execution of the unprecedentedly bold ex-
periment of changing completely his military system in the
heart of a hostile country and with an army still compara-
tively small, and of attempting to oppose African legions to
the invincible legions of Italy. But his hope that the con-
federacy would now begin to break up was not fulfilled. In
this respect the Etruscans, who had carried on their last
wars of independence mainly with Gallic mercenaries, were
of less moment; the flower of the confederacy, particularly
in a military point of view, consisted—next to the Latins—
of the Sabellian communities, and with good reason Hanni-
bal had now come into their neighbourhood. But one
town after another closed its gates; not a single Italian
community entered into alliance with the Phoenicians.
This was a great, in fact an all-important, gain for the
Romans. Nevertheless it was felt in the capital that it
would be imprudent to put the fidelity of their allies to
such a test, without a Roman army to keep the field. The
dictator Quintus Fabius combined the two supplementary
legions formed in Rome with the army of Ariminum, and
when Hannibal marched past the Roman fortress of
Luceria towards Arpi, the Roman standards appeared on
his right flank at Aeca. Their leader, however, pursued a
CHAP. V TO THE BATTLE OF CANNAE 281
course different from that of his predecessors. Quintus
Fabius was a man advanced in years, of a deliberation and
firmness, which to not a few seemed procrastination and
obstinacy. Zealous in his reverence for the good old
times, for the political omnipotence of the senate, and for
the command of the burgomasters, he looked to a method-
ical prosecution of the war as—next to sacrifices and
prayers—the means of saving the state. A political
antagonist of Gaius Flaminius, and summoned to the head
of affairs in virtue of the reaction against his foolish war-
demagogism, Fabius departed for the camp just as firmly
resolved to avoid a pitched battle at any price, as his
predecessor had been determined at any price to fight one ;
he was without doubt convinced that the first elements of
strategy would forbid Hannibal to advance so long as the
Roman army confronted him intact, and that accordingly
it would not be difficult to weaken by petty conflicts and
gradually to starve out the enemy's army, dependent as it
was on foraging for its supplies.
Hannibal, well served by his spies in Rome and in the
Roman army, immediately learned how matters stood, and,
as usual, adjusted the plan of his campaign in accordance
with the individual character of the opposing leader. Pass-
ing the Roman army, he marched over the Apennines into
the heart of Italy towards Beneventum, took the open town
of Telesia on the boundary between Samnium and Campania,
and thence turned against Capua, which as the most im-
portant of all the Italian cities dependent on Rome, and the
only one standing in some measure on a footing of equality
with it, had for that very reason felt more severely than any
other community the oppression of the Roman government.
He had formed connections there, which led him to hope
that the Campanians might revolt from the Roman alliance;
but in this hope he was disappointed. So, retracing his
steps, he took the road to Apulia. During all this march
Fabius.
March to
Capua and
back to
Apulia.
282 THE WAR UNIDER HANNIBAL BOOK III
War in
Apulia.
of the Carthaginian army the dictator had followed along
the heights, and had condemned his soldiers to the
melancholy task of looking on with arms in their hands,
while the Numidian cavalry plundered the faithful allies far
and wide, and the villages over all the plain rose in flames.
At length he opened up to the exasperated Roman army
the eagerly-coveted opportunity of attacking the enemy.
When Hannibal had begun his retreat, Fabius intercepted
his route near Casilinum (the modern Capua), by strongly
garrisoning that town on the left bank of the Volturnus and
occupying the heights that crowned the right bank with his
main army, while a division of 40 oo men encamped on the
road itself that led along by the river. But Hannibal ordered
his light-armed troops to climb the heights which rose
immediately alongside of the road, and to drive before them
a number of oxen with lighted faggots on their horns, so
that it seemed as if the Carthaginian army were thus
marching off during the night by torchlight. The Roman
division, which barred the road, imagining that they were
evaded and that further covering of the road was Super-
fluous, marched by a side movement to the same heights.
Along the road thus left free Hannibal then retreated with
the bulk of his army, without encountering the enemy; next
morning he without difficulty, but with severe loss to the
Romans, disengaged and recalled his light troops. Hanni-
bal then continued his march unopposed in a north-easterly
direction; and by a widely-circuitous route, after traversing
and laying under contribution the lands of the Hirpinians,
Campanians, Samnites, Paelignians, and Frentanians with-
out resistance, he arrived with rich booty and a full chest
once more in the region of Luceria, just as the harvest there
was about to begin. Nowhere in his extensive march had
he met with active opposition, but nowhere had he found
allies. Clearly perceiving that no course remained for him
but to take up winter quarters in the open field, he began
CHAP. V TO THE BATTLE OF CANNAE 283
the difficult operation of collecting the winter supplies
requisite for the army, by means of its own agency, from
the fields of the enemy. For this purpose he had selected
the broad and mostly flat district of northern Apulia, which
furnished grain and grass in abundance, and which could
be completely commanded by his excellent cavalry. An
entrenched camp was constructed at Gerunium, twenty-five
miles to the north of Luceria. Two-thirds of the army
were daily despatched from it to bring in the stores, while
Hannibal with the remainder took up a position to protect
the camp and the detachments sent out.
The master of the horse, Marcus Minucius, who held
temporary Command in the Roman camp during the absence
of the dictator, deemed this a suitable opportunity for
approaching the enemy more closely, and formed a camp in
the territory of the Larinates; where on the one hand by
his mere presence he checked the sending out of detach-
ments and thereby hindered the provisioning of the enemy's
army, and on the other hand, in a series of successful con-
flicts in which his troops encountered isolated Phoenician
divisions and even Hannibal himself, drove the enemy from
their advanced positions and compelled them to concentrate
themselves at Gerunium. On the news of these successes,
which of course lost nothing in the telling, the storm brok.
forth in the capital against Quintus Fabius. It was
not altogether unwarranted. Prüdent as it was on the part
of Rome to abide by the defensive and to expect success
mainly from the cutting off of the enemy's means of sub-
sistence, there was yet something strange in a system of
defence and of starving out, under which, the enemy had
laid waste all central Italy without opposition beneath the
eyes of a Roman army of equal numbers, and had
provisioned themselves sufficiently for the winter by an
organized method of foraging on the greatest scale. Publius
Scipio, when he commanded on the Po, had not adopted
Fabius and
Minucius.
284 THE WAR UNIDER HANNIBAL BOOK III
Q
this view of a defensive attitude, and the attempt of his
successor to imitate him at Casilinum had failed in such a
way as to afford a copious fund of ridicule to the scoffers
of the city. It was wonderful that the Italian communities
had not wavered, when Hannibal so palpably showed them
the superiority of the Phoenicians and the nullity of Roman
aid ; but how long could they be expected to bear the
burden of a double war, and to allow themselves to be
plundered under the very eyes of the Roman troops and of
their own contingents P Finally, it could not be alleged
that the condition of the Roman army compelled the
general to adopt this mode of warfare. It was composed,
as regarded its core, of the capable legions of Ariminum,
and, by their side, of militia called out, most of whom were
likewise accustomed to service; and, far from being dis-
couraged by the last defeats, it was indignant at the but
little honourable task which its general, “Hannibal’s
lackey,” assigned to it, and it demanded with a loud voice
to be led against the enemy. In the assemblies of the
people the most violent invectives were directed against the
obstinate old man. His political opponents, with the
former praetor Gaius Terentius Varro at their head, laid
hold of the quarrel—for the understanding of which we
must not forget that the dictator was practically nominated
by the senate, and the Office was regarded as the palladium
of the conservative party—and, in concert with the dis-
Contented soldiers and the possessors of the plundered
estates, they carried an unconstitutional and absurd resolu-
tion of the people conferring the dictatorship, which was
destined to obviate the evils of a divided command in
times of danger, on Marcus Minucius," who had hitherto
been the lieutenant of Quintus Fabius, in the same way as
* The inscription of the gift devoted by the new dictator on account of
his victory at Gerunium to Hercules Victor—Hercolei sacrom M. Minuci(us)
C. ſ. dictator vović–was found in the year 1862 at Rome, near S. Lorenzo.
CHAP. V TO THE BATTLE OF CANNAE * 285
on Fabius himself. Thus the Roman army, after its
hazardous division into two separate corps had just been
appropriately obviated, was Once more divided ; and not
Only so, but the two sections were placed under leaders who
notoriously followed quite opposite plans of war. Quintus
Fabius of course adhered more than ever to his methodical
inaction ; Marcus Minucius, compelled to justify in the
field of battle his title of dictator, made a hasty attack with
inadequate forces, and would have been annihilated had
not his colleague averted greater misfortune by the season-
able interposition of a fresh corps. This last turn of matters
justified in some measure the system of passive resistance.
But in reality Hannibal had completely attained in this
Campaign all that arms could attain : not a single material
operation had been frustrated either by his impetuous or by
his deliberate opponent; and his foraging, though not
unattended with difficulty, had yet been in the main so
successful that the army passed the winter without complaint
in the camp at Gerunium. It was not the Cwmc/a/or that
saved Rome, but the compact structure of its confederacy
and, not less perhaps, the national hatred with which the
Phoenician hero was regarded on the part of Occidentals.
Despite all its misfortunes, Roman pride stood no less
unshaken than the Roman symmachy. The donations
which were offered by king Hiero of Syracuse and the
Greek cities in Italy for the next campaign—the war
affected the latter less severely than the other Italian allies
of Rome, for they sent no contingents to the land army—
were declined with thanks; the chieftains of Illyria were
informed that they could not be allowed to neglect pay-
ment of their tribute ; and even the king of Macedonia
was once more summoned to surrender Demetrius of
Pharos. The majority of the senate, notwithstanding the
semblance of legitimation which recent events had given to
the Fabian system of delay, had firmly resolved to depart
New war.
like pre-
parations
in Rome.
286 R THE WAR UNIDER HANNIBAL BOOK III
Paullus
and Varro.
219.
from a mode of war that was slowly but certainly ruining
the state; if the popular dictator had failed in his more
energetic method of warfare, they laid the blame of the
failure, and not without reason, on the fact that they had
adopted a half-measure and had given him too few troops.
This error they determined to avoid and to equip an army,
such as Rome had never sent out before—eight legions,
each raised a fifth above the normal strength, and a
corresponding number of allies — enough to crush an
opponent who was not half so strong. Besides this, a
legion under the praetor Lucius Postumius was destined
for the valley of the Po, in order, if possible, to draw off
the Celts serving in the army of Hannibal to their homes.
These resolutions were judicious ; everything depended on
their coming to an equally judicious decision respecting
the supreme command. The stiff carriage of Quintus
Fabius, and the attacks of the demagogues which it
provoked, had rendered the dictatorship and the senate
generally more unpopular than ever : amongst the people,
not without the connivance of their leaders, the foolish
report circulated that the Senate was intentionally pro-
longing the war. As, therefore, the nomination of a
dictator was not to be thought of, the Senate attempted to
procure the election of suitable consuls ; but this only had
the effect of thoroughly rousing suspicion and obstinacy.
With difficulty the senate carried one of its candidates,
Lucius Aemilius Paullus, who had with judgment con-
ducted the Illyrian war in 535 (p. 220); an immense
majority of the citizens assigned to him as colleague the
candidate of the popular party, Gaius Terentius Varro, an
incapable man, who was known only by his bitter opposition
to the senate and more especially as the main author of the
proposal to elect Marcus Minucius co-dictator, and who
was recommended to the multitude solely by his humble
birth and his coarse effrontery.
CHAP. V TO THE BATTLE OF CANNAE 287
While these preparations for the next campaign were
being made in Rome, the war had already recommenced
in Apulia. As soon as the season allowed him to leave
his winter quarters, Hannibal, determining as usual the
course of the war and assuming the offensive, set out from
Gerunium in a southerly direction, and marching past
Luceria crossed the Aufidus and took the citadel of
Cannae (between Canosa and Barletta) which commanded
the plain of Canusium, and had hitherto served the
Romans as their chief magazine. The Roman army
which, since Fabius had conformably to the constitution
resigned his dictatorship in the middle of autumn, was now
commanded by Gnaeus Servilius and Marcus Regulus, first
as consuls then as proconsuls, had been unable to avert a
loss which they could not but feel. On military as well as
on political grounds, it became more than ever necessary
to arrest the progress of Hannibal by a pitched battle.
With definite orders to this effect from the senate, accord-
ingly, the two new commanders-in-chief, Paullus and Varro,
arrived in Apulia in the beginning of the summer of 538.
With the four new legions and a corresponding contingent
of Italians which they brought up, the Roman army rose
to 80,000 infantry, half burgesses, half allies, and 6ooo
cavalry, of whom one-third were burgesses and two-thirds
allies; whereas Hannibal's army numbered Io, ooo cavalry,
but only about 40,000 infantry. Hannibal wished nothing
so much as a battle, not merely for the general reasons
which we have explained above, but specially because the
wide Apulian plain allowed him to develop the whole
superiority of his cavalry, and because the providing
supplies for his numerous army would soon, in spite of
that excellent cavalry, be rendered very difficult by the
. . proximity of an enemy twice as strong and resting on a
chain of fortresses. The leaders of the Roman forces also
had, as we have said, made up their minds on the general
Battle at
Cannae.
216.
288 THE WAR UNDER HANNIBAL BOOK III
question of giving battle, and approached the enemy with
that view ; but the more sagacious of them saw the position
of Hannibal, and were disposed accordingly to wait in the
first instance and simply to station themselves in the
vicinity of the enemy, so as to compel him to retire and
accept battle on a ground less favourable to him. Hannibal
encamped at Cannae on the right bank of the Aufidus.
Paullus pitched his camp on both banks of the stream, so
that the main force came to be stationed on the left bank,
but a strong Corps took up a position on the right immedi-
ately opposite to the enemy, in order to impede his supplies
and perhaps also to threaten Cannae. Hannibal, to whom
it was all-important to strike a speedy blow, crossed the
stream with the bulk of his troops, and offered battle on
the left bank, which Paullus did not accept. But such
military pedantry was disapproved by the democratic
consul—so much had been said about men taking the field
not to stand guard, but to use their swords—and he gave
orders accordingly to attack the enemy, wherever and
whenever they found him. According to the old custom
foolishly retained, the decisive voice in the council of war
alternated between the commanders-in-chief day by day; it
was necessary therefore on the following day to submit, and
to let the hero of the pavement have his way. On the left
bank, where the wide plain offered full scope to the superior
cavalry of the enemy, certainly even he would not fight;
but he determined to unite the whole Roman forces on the
right bank, and there, taking up a position between the
Carthaginian camp and Cannae and seriously threatening
the latter, to offer battle. A division of Io, ooo men was
left behind in the principal Roman camp, charged to
capture the Carthaginian encampment during the conflict
and thus to intercept the retreat of the enemy's army across
the river. The bulk of the Roman army, at early dawn on
the 2nd August according to the uncorrected, perhaps in
CHAP. V TO THE BATTLE OF CAN NAF 289
June according to the correct, calendar, crossed the river
which at this season was shallow and did not materially
hamper the movements of the troops, and took up a
position in line near the smaller Roman camp to the west-
ward of Cannae. The Carthaginian army followed and
likewise crossed the stream, on which rested the right
Roman as well as the left Carthaginian wing. The Roman
cavalry was stationed on the wings: the weaker portion
consisting of burgesses, led by Paullus, on the right next
the river; the stronger consisting of the allies, led by Varro,
on the left towards the plain. In the centre was stationed
the infantry in unusually deep files, under the command of
the consul of the previous year Gnaeus Servilius. Opposite
to this centre Hannibal arranged his infantry in the form of
a crescent, so that the Celtic and Iberian troops in their
national armour formed the advanced centre, and the
Libyans, armed after the Roman fashion, formed the drawn-
back wings on either side. On the side next the river the
whole heavy cavalry under Hasdrubal was stationed, on the
side towards the plain the light Numidian horse. After a
short skirmish between the light troops the whole line was
soon engaged. Where the light cavalry of the Carthaginians
fought against the heavy cavalry of Varro, the conflict was
prolonged, amidst constant charges of the Numidians,
without decisive result. In the centre, on the other hand,
the legions completely overthrew the Spanish and Gallic
troops that first encountered them ; eagerly the victors
pressed on and followed up their advantage. But mean-
while, on the right wing, fortune had turned against the
Romans. Hannibal had merely sought to occupy the left
cavalry wing of the enemy, that he might bring Hasdrubal
with the whole regular cavalry to bear against the weaker
right and to overthrow it first. After a brave resistance,
the Roman horse gave way, and those that were not cut
down were chased up the river and scattered in the plain;
VOL. II 5 I
29O THE WAR UNIDER HANNIBAL BOOK III
Paullus, wounded, rode to the centre to turn or, if not, to
share the fate of the legions. These, in order the better
to follow up the victory over the advanced infantry of the
enemy, had changed their front disposition into a column
of attack, which, in the shape of a wedge, penetrated the
enemy's centre. In this position they were warmly assailed
on both sides by the Libyan infantry wheeling inward upon
them right and left, and a portion of them were compelled
to halt in order to defend themselves against the flank
attack; by this means their advance was checked, and the
mass of infantry, which was already too closely crowded,
now had no longer room to develop itself at all. Mean-
while Hasdrubal, after having completed the defeat of the
wing of Paullus, had collected and arranged his cavalry
anew and led them behind the enemy's centre against the
wing of Varro. His Italian cavalry, already sufficiently
occupied with the Numidians, was rapidly scattered before
the double attack, and Hasdrubal, leaving the pursuit of
the fugitives to the Numidians, arranged his squadrons for
the third time, to lead them against the rear of the Roman
infantry. This last charge proved decisive. Flight was
not possible, and quarter was not given. Never, perhaps,
was an army of such size annihilated on the field of battle
so completely, and with so little loss to its antagonist, as
was the Roman army at Cannae. Hannibal had lost not
quite 6000 men, and two-thirds of that loss fell upon the
Celts, who sustained the first shock of the legions. On the
other hand, of the 76, ooo Romans who had taken their
places in the line of battle 70,000 covered the field,
amongst whom were the consul Lucius Paullus, the pro-
consul Gnaeus Servilius, two-thirds of the staff-officers, and
eighty men of senatorial rank. The consul Gaius Varro
was saved solely by his quick resolution and his good steed,
reached Venusia, and was not ashamed to survive. The
garrison also of the Roman camp, Io, ooo strong, were for
CHAP. V TO THE BATTLE OF CANNAE 29 I
the most part made prisoners of war; only a few thousand
men, partly of these troops, partly of the line, escaped to
Canusium. Nay, as if in this year an end was to be made
with Rome altogether, before its close the legion sent to
Gaul fell into an ambush, and was, with its general Lucius
Postumius who was nominated as consul for the next year,
totally destroyed by the Gauls.
This unexampled success appeared at length to mature the
great political combination, for the sake of which Hannibal
had come to Italy. He had, no doubt, based his plan
primarily upon his army; but with accurate knowledge of
the power opposed to him he designed that army to be
merely the vanguard, in support of which the powers of the
west and east were gradually to unite their forces, so as to
prepare destruction for the proud city. That support how-
ever, which seemed the most secure, namely the sending of
reinforcements from Spain, had been frustrated by the bold-
ness and firmness of the Roman general sent thither,
Gnaeus Scipio. After Hannibal's passage of the Rhone
Scipio had sailed for Emporiae, and had made himself
master first of the coast between the Pyrenees and the Ebro,
and then, after conquering Hanno, of the interior also (536).
In the following year (537) he had completely defeated the
Carthaginian fleet at the mouth of the Ebro, and after his
brother Publius, the brave defender of the valley of the Po,
had joined him with a reinforcement of 8ooo men, he had
even crossed the Ebro, and advanced as far as Saguntum.
Hasdrubal had indeed in the succeeding year (538), after
obtaining reinforcements from Africa, made an attempt in
accordance with his brother's orders to conduct an army
over the Pyrenees; but the Scipios opposed his passage of
the Ebro, and totally defeated him, nearly at the same time
that Hannibal conquered at Cannae. The powerful tribe
of the Celtiberians and numerous other Spanish tribes had
joined the Scipios; they commanded the sea, the passes of
Conse-
quences of
the battle
of Cannae.
Prevention
of rein-
forcements
from
Spain.
218.
217.
292 THE WAR UNDER HANNIBAL BOOK III
Reinforce-
ments from
Africa.
Alliance
between
Carthage
and Mace-
donia.
220-217.
the Pyrenees, and, by means of the trusty Massiliots, the
Gallic coast also. Now therefore support to Hannibal was
less than ever to be looked for from Spain.
On the part of Carthage as much had hitherto been done
in support of her general in Italy as could be expected.
Phoenician squadrons threatened the coasts of Italy and of
the Roman islands and guarded Africa from a Roman land-
ing, and there the matter ended. More substantial assist-
ance was prevented not so much by the uncertainty as to
where Hannibal was to be found and the want of a port
of disembarkation in Italy, as by the fact that for many
years the Spanish army had been accustomed to be self-
sustaining, and above all by the murmurs of the peace party.
Hannibal severely felt the consequences of this unpardon-
able inaction ; in spite of all his saving of his money and
of the soldiers whom he had brought with him, his chests
were gradually emptied, the pay fell into arrear, and the
ranks of his veterans began to thin. But now the news of
the victory of Cannae reduced even the factious opposition
at home to silence. The Carthaginian senate resolved to
place at the disposal of the general considerable assistance
in money and men, partly from Africa, partly from Spain,
including 4ooo Numidian horse and 40 elephants, and to
prosecute the war with energy in Spain as well as in Italy.
The long-discussed offensive alliance between Carthage
and Macedonia had been delayed, first by the sudden death
of Antigonus, and then by the indecision of his successor
Philip and the unseasonable war waged by him and his
Hellenic allies against the Aetolians (534–537). It was
only now, after the battle of Cannae, that Demetrius of
Pharos found Philip disposed to listen to his proposal to
cede to Macedonia his Illyrian possessions—which it was
necessary, no doubt, to wrest in the first place from the
Romans—and it was only now that the court of Pella came
to terms with Carthage. Macedonia undertook to land an
CHAP. V TO THE BATTLE OF CANNAE 293
invading army on the east Coast of Italy, in return for which
she received an assurance that the Roman possessions in
Epirus should be restored to her.
In Sicily king Hiero had during the years of peace main-
tained a policy of neutrality, so far as he could do so with
safety, and he had shown a disposition to accommodate the
Carthaginians during the perilous crises after the peace with
Rome, particularly by sending supplies of corn. There is
no doubt that he saw with the utmost regret a renewed
breach between Carthage and Rome; but he had no power
to avert it, and when it occurred he adhered with well-
calculated fidelity to Rome. But soon afterwards (in the
autumn of 538) death removed the old man after a reign
of fifty-four years. The grandson and successor of the
prudent veteran, the young and incapable Hieronymus,
entered at once into negotiations with the Carthaginian
diplomatists; and, as they made no difficulty in consenting
to secure to him by treaty, first, Sicily as far as the old
Carthagino-Sicilian frontier, and then, when he rose in the
arrogance of his demands, the possession even of the whole
island, he entered into alliance with Carthage, and ordered
the Syracusan fleet to unite with the Carthaginian which
had come to threaten Syracuse. The position of the
Roman fleet at Lilybaeum, which already had to deal with
a second Carthaginian squadron stationed near the Aegates,
became all at once very critical, while at the same time the
force that was in readiness at Rome for embarkation to
Sicily had, in consequence of the defeat at Cannae, to be
diverted to other and more urgent objects.
Above all came the decisive fact, that now at length the
fabric of the Roman confederacy began to be unhinged,
after it had survived unshaken the shocks of two severe
years of war. There passed over to the side of Hannibal
Arpi in Apulia, and Uzentum in Messapia, two old towns
which had been greatly injured by the Roman colonies of
Alliance
between
Carthage
and
Syracuse.
216.
Capua and
most of the
communi-
ties of
Lower
Italy pass
OVer to
Hannibal.
294 THE WAR UNIDER HANNIBAL BOOK II)
Luceria and Brundisium ; all the towns of the Bruttii—who
took the lead—with the exception of the Petelini and the
Consentini who had to be besieged before yielding; the
greater portion of the Lucanians; the Picentes transplanted
into the region of Salernum; the Hirpini; the Sam-
nites with the exception of the Pentri; lastly and chiefly,
Capua the second city of Italy, which was able to bring
into the field 3o, ooo infantry and 4ooo horse, and whose
secession determined that of the neighbouring towns Atella
and Calatia. The aristocratic party, indeed, attached by
many ties to the interest of Rome everywhere, and more
especially in Capua, very earnestly opposed this change of
sides, and the obstinate internal conflicts which arose re-
garding it diminished not a little the advantage which
Hannibal derived from these accessions. He found him-
self obliged, for instance, to have one of the leaders of the
aristocratic party in Capua, Decius Magius, who even after
the entrance of the Phoenicians obstinately contended for
the Roman alliance, seized and conveyed to Carthage; thus
furnishing a demonstration, very inconvenient for himself,
of the small value of the liberty and sovereignty which had
just been solemnly assured to the Campanians by the
Carthaginian general. On the other hand, the south
Italian Greeks adhered to the Roman alliance—a result to
which the Roman garrisons no doubt contributed, but
which was still more due to the very decided dislike of the
Hellenes towards the Phoenicians themselves and towards
their new Lucanian and Bruttian allies, and their attach-
ment on the other hand to Rome, which had zealously em-
braced every opportunity of manifesting its Hellenism, and
had exhibited towards the Greeks in Italy an unwonted
gentleness. Thus the Campanian Greeks, particularly
Neapolis, courageously withstood the attack of Hannibal
in person: in Magna Graecia Rhegium, Thurii, Meta-
pontum, and Tarentum did the same notwithstanding their
CHAP. V TO THE BATTLE OF CANNAE 295
very perilous position. Croton and Locri on the other hand
were partly carried by storm, partly forced to capitulate, by
the united Phoenicians and Bruttians ; and the citizens of
Croton were conducted to Locri, while Bruttian colonists
occupied that important naval station. The Latin colonies
in southern Italy, such as Brundisium, Venusia, Paestum,
Cosa, and Cales, of course maintained unshaken fidelity to
Rome. They were the strongholds by which the con-
Querors held in check a foreign land, settled on the soil of
the surrounding population, and at feud with their neigh-
bours; they, too, would be the first to be affected, if Hanni-
bal should keep his word and restore to every Italian com-
munity its ancient boundaries. This was likewise the case
with all central Italy, the earliest seat of the Roman rule,
where Latin manners and language already everywhere pre-
ponderated, and the people felt themselves to be the com-
rades rather than the subjects of their rulers. The
opponents of Hannibal in the Carthaginian senate did not
fail to appeal to the fact that not one Roman citizen or one
Latin community had cast itself into the arms of Carthage.
This groundwork of the Roman power could only be broken
up, like the Cyclopean walls, stone by ºy
Such were the consequences of the day of Cannae, in which
the flower of the soldiers and officers of the confederacy, a
seventh of the whole number of Italians capable of bearing
arms, perished. It was a cruel but righteous punishment
for the grave political errors with which not merely some
foolish or miserable individuals, but the Roman people them-
selves, were justly chargeable. A constitution adapted for
a small country town was no longer suitable for a great
Attitude
of the
Romans
4…"
power; it was simply impossible that the question as to the
leadership of the armies of the city in such a war should
be left year after year to be decided by the Pandora's box
of the balloting-urn. As a fundamental revision of the
constitution, if practicable at all, could not at least be
296 THE WAR UNDER HANNIBAL BOOK III
|
undertaken now, the practical superintendence of the war,
and in particular the bestowal and prolongation of the
command, should have been at once left to the only
authority which was in a position to undertake it—the
senate—and there should have been reserved for the
comitia the mere formality of confirmation. The brilliant
successes of the Scipios in the difficult arena of Spanish
warfare showed what might in this way be achieved. But
political demagogism, which was already gnawing at the
aristocratic foundations of the constitution, had seized on
the management of the Italian war. The absurd accusa-
tion, that the nobles were conspiring with the enemy
without, had made an impression on the “people.” The
saviours to whom political superstition looked for deliver-
ance, Gaius Flaminius and Gaius Varro, both “new men’
and friends of the people of the purest dye, had accordingly
been empowered by the multitude itself to execute the
plans of operations which, amidst the approbation of that
multitude, they had unfolded in the Forum ; and the
results were the battles on the Trasimene lake and at
Cannae. Duty required that the senate, which now of
course understood its task better than when it recalled half
the army of Regulus from Africa, should take into its hands
the management of affairs, and should oppose such mis-
chievous proceedings ; but when the first of those two
defeats had for the moment placed the rudder in its hands,
it too had hardly acted in a manner unbiassed by the
interests of party. Little as Quintus Fabius may be com-
pared with these Roman Cleons, he had yet conducted the
war not as a mere military leader, but had adhered to his
rigid attitude of defence specially as the political opponent
of Gaius Flaminius ; and in the treatment of the quarrel
with his subordinate, had done what he could to exasperate
at a time when unity was needed. The consequence was,
first, that the most important instrument which the wisdom
CHAP. V TO TII E BATTLE OF CANNAE 297
of their ancestors had placed in the hands of the senate
just for such cases—the dictatorship—broke down in his
hands; and, secondly—at least indirectly—the battle of
Cannae. But the headlong fall of the Roman power was
owing not to the fault of Quintus Fabius or Gaius Varro,
but to the distrust between the government and the
governed—to the variance between the Senate and the
burgesses. If the deliverance and revival of the state were
still possible, the work had to begin at home with the re-
establishment of unity and of confidence. To have per-
ceived this and, what is of more importance, to have done
it, and done it with an abstinence from all recriminations
however just, constitutes the glorious and imperishable
honour of the Roman senate. When Varro—alone of all
the generals who had command in the battle—returned to
Rome, and the Roman senators met him at the gate and
thanked him that he had not despaired of the salvation of
his country, this was no empty phraseology veiling the
disaster under sounding words, nor was it bitter mockery
over a poor wretch ; it was the conclusion of peace between
the government and the governed. In presence of the
gravity of the time and the gravity of such an appeal, the
chattering of demagogues was silent; henceforth the only
thought of the Romans was how they might be able jointly
to avert the common peril. Quintus Fabius, whose
tenacious courage at this decisive moment was of more
service to the state than all his feats of war, and the other
senators of note took the lead in every movement, and
restored to the citizens confidence in themselves and in the
future. The senate preserved its firm and unbending
attitude, while messengers from all sides hastened to Rome
to report the loss of battles, the secession of allies, the
capture of posts and magazines, and to ask reinforcements
for the valley of the Po and for Sicily at a time when Italy
was abandoned and Rome was almost without a garrison.
298 THE WAR UNDER HANNIBAL BOOIK III
Assemblages of the multitude at the gates were forbidden ;
onlookers and women were sent to their houses; the time
of mourning for the fallen was restricted to thirty days that
the service of the gods of joy, from which those clad in
mourning attire were excluded, might not be too long
interrupted—for so great was the number of the fallen, that
there was scarcely a family which had not to lament its
dead. Meanwhile the remnant saved from the field of
battle had been assembled by two able military tribunes,
Appius Claudius and Publius Scipio the younger, at
Canusium. The latter managed, by his lofty spirit and by
the brandished swords of his faithful comrades, to change the
views of those genteel young lords who, in indolent despair
of the salvation of their country, were thinking of escape
beyond the sea. The consul Gaius Varro joined them
with a handful of men ; about two legions were gradually
collected there; the senate gave orders that they should be
reorganized and reduced to serve in disgrace and without
pay. The incapable general was on a suitable pretext
recalled to Rome; the praetor Marcus Claudius Marcellus,
experienced in the Gallic wars, who had been destined to
depart for Sicily with the fleet from Ostia, assumed the
chief command. The utmost exertions were made to
organize an army capable of taking the field. The Latins
were summoned to render aid in the common peril. Rome
itself set the example, and called to arms all the men above
boyhood, armed the debtor-serfs and criminals, and even
incorporated in the army eight thousand slaves purchased by
the state. As there was a want of arms, they took the old
spoils from the temples, and everywhere set the workshops
and artisans in action. The senate was completed, not as
timid patriots urged, from the Latins, but from the Roman
burgesses who had the best title. Hannibal offered a
release of captives at the expense of the Roman treasury;
it was declined, and the Carthaginian envoy who had
CHAP. V TO THE BATTLE OF CANNAE 299
arrived with the deputation of captives was not admitted
into the city: nothing should look as if the senate thought
of peace. Not only were the allies to be prevented from
believing that Rome was disposed to enter into negotia-
tions, but even the meanest citizen was to be made to
understand that for him as for all there was no peace, and
that safety lay only in victory.
300 THE WAR UNDER HANNIBAL BOOK III
CHAPTER VI
THE WAR UNDER HANNIBAf, FROM CANNAE TO ZAMA
The crisis. THE aim of Hannibal in his expedition to Italy had been
to break up the Italian confederacy: after three campaigns
that aim had been attained, so far as it was at all attain-
able. It was clear that the Greek and Latin or Latinized
communities of Italy, since they had not been shaken in
their allegiance by the day of Cannae, would not yield to
terror, but only to force ; and the desperate Courage with
which even in Southern Italy isolated little Country towns,
such as the Bruttian Petelia, maintained their forlorn
defence against the Phoenicians, showed very plainly what
awaited them among the Marsians and Latins. If
Hannibal had expected to accomplish more in this way
and to be able to lead even the Latins against Rome,
these hopes had proved vain. But it appears as if even in
other respects the Italian coalition had by no means
produced the results which Hannibal hoped for. Capua
had at once stipulated that Hannibal should not have the
right to call Campanian citizens compulsorily to arms; the
citizens had not forgotten how Pyrrhus had acted in
Tarentum, and they foolishly imagined that they should
be able to withdraw at once from the Roman and from the
Phoenician rule. Samnium and Luceria were no longer
what they had been, when king Pyrrhus had thought of
marching into Rome at the head of the Sabellian youth.
CHAP. VI FROM CANNAE TO ZAMA 3OI
Not only did the chain of Roman fortresses everywhere cut
the nerves and sinews of the land, but the Roman rule,
continued for many years, had rendered the inhabitants
unused to arms—they furnished only a moderate contingent
to the Roman armies—had appeased their ancient hatred,
and had gained over a number of individuals everywhere
to the interest of the ruling community. They joined the
conqueror of the Romans, indeed, after the cause of Rome
seemed fairly lost, but they felt that the question was no
longer one of liberty ; it was simply the exchange of an
Italian for a Phoenician master, and it was not enthusiasm,
but despair that threw the Sabellian communities into the
arms of the victor. Under such circumstances the war
in Italy flagged. Hannibal, who commanded the southern
part of the peninsula as far up as the Volturnus and
Garganus, and who could not simply abandon these lands
again as he had abandoned that of the Celts, had now
likewise a frontier to protect, which could not be left un-
covered with impunity; and for the purpose of defending
the districts that he had gained against the fortresses which
everywhere defied him and the armies advancing from the
north, and at the same time of resuming the difficult
offensive against central Italy, his forces—an army of about
4o, ooo men, without reckoning the Italian contingents—
were far from sufficient.
Above all, he found that other antagonists were opposed
to him. Taught by fearful experience, the Romans
adopted a more judicious system of conducting the war,
placed none but experienced officers at the head of their
armies, and left them, at least where it was necessary, for
a longer period in command. These generals neither looked
down on the enemy's movements from the mountains,
nor did they throw themselves on their adversary wherever
they found him ; but, keeping the true mean between in-
action and precipitation, they took up their positions in
Marcellus.
3O2 THE WAR UNIDER HANNIBAI, BOOK III
Hannibal
proceeds to
Campania.
entrenched camps under the walls of fortresses, and
accepted battle where victory would lead to results and
defeat would not be destruction. The soul of this new
mode of warfare was Marcus Claudius Marcellus. With
true instinct, after the disastrous day of Cannae, the senate
and people had turned their eyes to this brave and ex-
perienced officer, and entrusted him at once with the actual
Supreme Command. He had received his training in the
troublesome warfare against Hamilcar in Sicily, and had
given brilliant evidence of his talents as a leader as well as
of his personal valour in the last campaigns against the
Celts. Although far above fifty, he still glowed with all
the ardour of the most youthful soldier, and only a few
years before this he had, as general, cut down the mounted
general of the enemy (p. 228)—the first and only Roman
consul who achieved that feat of arms. His life was
consecrated to the two divinities, to whom he erected the
splendid double temple at the Capene Gate—to Honour
and to Valour; and, while the merit of rescuing Rome
from this extremity of danger belonged to no single in-
dividual, but pertained to the Roman citizens collectively
and pre-eminently to the senate, yet no single man contri-
buted more towards the success of the common enterprise
than Marcus Marcellus.
From the field of battle Hannibal had turned his steps
to Campania. He knew Rome better than the simpletons,
who in ancient and modern times have fancied that he
might have terminated the struggle by a march on the
enemy's capital. Modern warfare, it is true, decides a war
on the field of battle; but in ancient times, when the
system of attacking fortresses was far less developed than
the system of defence, the most complete success in the
field was on numberless occasions neutralized by the
resistance of the walls of the capitals. The council and
citizens of Carthage were not at all to be compared to the
CHAP. VI FROM CANNAE TO ZAMA 3O3
senate and people of Rome; the peril of Carthage after the
first campaign of Regulus was infinitely more urgent than
that of Rome after the battle of Cannae; yet Carthage had
made a stand and been completely victorious. With what
colour could it be expected that Rome would now deliver
her keys to the victor, or even accept an equitable peace?
Instead therefore of sacrificing practicable and important
successes for the sake of such empty demonstrations, or
losing time in the besieging of the two thousand Roman
fugitives enclosed within the walls of Canusium, Hannibal
had immediately proceeded to Capua before the Romans
could throw in a garrison, and by his advance had induced
this second city of Italy after long hesitation to join him.
He might hope that, in possession of Capua, he would be
able to seize one of the Campanian ports, where he might
disembark the reinforcements which his great victories had
wrung from the opposition at home.
When the Romans learned whither Hannibal had gone,
they also left Apulia, where only a weak division was re-
tained, and collected their remaining forces on the right
bank of the Volturnus. With the two legions saved from
Cannae Marcus Marcellus marched to Teanum Sidicinum,
where he was joined by such troops as were at the moment
disposable from Rome and Ostia, and advanced—while
the dictator Marcus Junius slowly followed with the main
army which had been hastily formed—as far as the
Volturnus at Casilinum, with a view if possible to save
Capua. That city he found already in the power of the
enemy; but on the other hand the attempts of the enemy
on Neapolis had been thwarted by the courageous resistance
of the citizens, and the Romans were still in good time to
throw a garrison into that important port. With equal
fidelity the two other large coast towns, Cumae and
Nureria, adhered to Rome. In Nola the struggle between
the popular and senatorial parties as to whether they should
Renewal of
the war in
Campania.
3O4 THE WAR UNIDER HANNIBAL BOOK III
215.
215.
attach themselves to the Carthaginians or to the Romans,
was still undecided. Informed that the former were gain-
ing the superiority, Marcellus crossed the river at Caiatia,
and marching along the heights of Suessula. So as to evade
the enemy's army, he reached Nola in sufficient time to
hold it against the foes without and within. In a Sally he
even repulsed Hannibal in person with considerable loss;
a success which, as the first defeat sustained by Hannibal,
was of far more importance from its moral effect than from
its material results. In Campania indeed, Nuceria, Acerrae,
and, after an obstinate siege prolonged into the following
year (539), Casilinum also, the key of the Volturnus, were
conquered by Hannibal, and the severest punishments
were inflicted on the senates of these towns which had
adhered to Rome. But terror is a bad weapon of
proselytism ; the Romans succeeded, with comparatively
trifling loss, in surmounting the perilous moment of their
first weakness. The war in Campania came to a standstill ;
then winter came on, and Hannibal took up his quarters in
Capua, the luxury of which was by no means fraught with
benefit to his troops who for three years had not been
under a roof. In the next year (539) the war acquired
another aspect. The tried general Marcus Marcellus,
Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus who had distinguished
himself in the campaign of the previous year as master of
the horse to the dictator, and the veteran Quintus Fabius
Maximus, took—Marcellus as proconsul, the two others as
consuls—the command of the three Roman armies which
were destined to surround Capua and Hannibal; Marcellus
resting on Nola and Suessula, Maximus taking a position
on the right bank of the Volturnus near Cales, and
Gracchus on the coast near Liternum, covering Neapolis
and Cumae. The Campanians, who marched to Hamae
three miles from Cumae with a view to surprise the
Cumaeans, were thoroughly defeated by Gracchus; Han-
CHAP. VI FROM CANNAE TO ZAMA 3O5
nibal, who had appeared before Cumae to wipe out the
stain, was himself worsted in a combat, and when the
pitched battle offered by him was declined, retreated in ill
humour to Capua. While the Romans in Campania thus
not only maintained what they possessed, but also recovered
Compulteria and other Smaller places, loud complaints
were heard from the eastern allies of Hannibal. A Roman
army under the praetor Marcus Valerius had taken position
at Luceria, partly that it might, in connection with the
Roman fleet, watch the east coast and the movements of
the Macedonians; partly that it might, in connection with
the army of Nola, levy contributions on the revolted
Samnites, Lucanians, and Hirpini. To give relief to these,
Hannibal turned first against his most active opponent,
Marcus Marcellus; but the latter achieved under the walls of
Nola no inconsiderable victory over the Phoenician army,
and it was obliged to depart, without having cleared off the
stain, from Campania for Arpi, in order at length to check
the progress of the enemy's army in Apulia. Tiberius
Gracchus followed it with his corps, while the two other
Roman armies in Campania made arrangements to proceed
next spring to the attack of Capua.
The clear vision of Hannibal had not been dazzled by
his victories. It became every day more evident that he
was not thus gaining his object. Those rapid marches,
that adventurous shifting of the war to and fro, to which
Hannibal was mainly indebted for his successes, were at
an end ; the enemy had become wiser; further enterprises
were rendered almost impossible by the inevitable necessity
of defending what had been gained. The offensive was
not to be thought of ; the defensive was difficult, and
threatened every year to become more so. He could not
Conceal from himself that the second half of his great
task, the subjugation of the Latins and the conquest of
Rome, could not be accomplished with his own forces and
VOL. II 52
The war in
Apulia.
Hannibal
reduced
to the
defensive.
306 THE WAR UNDER HANNIBAL BOOK III
His
prospects
as to rein-
forcements.
those of his Italian allies alone. Its accomplishment
depended on the council at Carthage, on the head-quarters
at Cartagena, on the courts of Pella and of Syracuse. If
all the energies of Africa, Spain, Sicily, and Macedonia
should now be exerted in common against the common
enemy; if Lower Italy should become the great rendezvous
for the armies and fleets of the west, south, and east; he
might hope successfully to finish what the vanguard under
his leadership had so brilliantly begun. The most natural
and easy course would have been to send to him adequate
support from home; and the Carthaginian state, which had
remained almost untouched by the war and had been
brought from deep decline so near to complete victory by
a small band of resolute patriots acting of their own accord
and at their own risk, could beyond doubt have done this.
That it would have been possible for a Phoenician fleet of
any desired strength to effect a landing at Locri or Croton,
especially as long as the port of Syracuse remained open
to the Carthaginians and the fleet at Brundisium was kept
in check by Macedonia, is shown by the unopposed dis-
embarkation at Locri of 40 oo Africans, whom Bomilcar
about this time brought over from Carthage to Hannibal,
and still more by Hannibal's undisturbed embarkation,
when all had been already lost. But after the first
impression of the victory of Cannae had died away, the
peace party in Carthage, which was at all times ready to
purchase the downfall of its political opponents at the
expense of its country, and which found faithful allies in
the shortsightedness and indolence of the citizens, refused
the entreaties of the general for more decided support
with the half-simple, half-malicious reply, that he in fact
needed no help inasmuch as he was really victor; and
thus contributed not much less than the Roman senate to
save Rome. Hannibal, reared in the camp and a stranger
to the machinery of civic factions, found no popular leader
CHAP. VI FROM CANNAE TO ZAMA 3O7
on whose support he could rely, such as his father had
found in Hasdrubal ; and he was obliged to seek abroad
the means of saving his native country—means which itself
possessed in rich abundance at home.
For this purpose he might, at least with more prospect
of success, reckon on the leaders of the Spanish patriot
army, on the connections which he had formed in Syracuse,
and on the intervention of Philip. Everything depended
on bringing new forces into the Italian field of war against
Rome from Spain, Syracuse, or Macedonia; and for the
attainment or for the prevention of this object wars were
carried on in Spain, Sicily, and Greece. All of these were
but means to an end, and historians have often erred in
accounting them of greater importance. So far as the
Romans were concerned, they were essentially defensive
wars, the proper objects of which were to hold the passes
of the Pyrenees, to detain the Macedonian army in Greece,
to defend Messana and to bar the communication between
Italy and Sicily. Of course this defensive warfare was,
wherever it was possible, waged by offensive methods; and,
should circumstances be favourable, it might develop into
the dislodging of the Phoenicians from Spain and Sicily,
and into the dissolution of Hannibal's alliances with Syra-
cuse and with Philip. The Italian war in itself fell for
the time being into the shade, and resolved itself into con-
flicts about fortresses and razzias, which had no decisive
effect on the main issue. Nevertheless, so long as the
Phoenicians retained the offensive at all, Italy always re-
mained the central aim of operations; and all efforts were
directed towards, as all interest centred in, the doing
away, or perpetuating, of Hannibal's isolation in southern
Italy.
Had it been possible, immediately after the battle of
Cannae, to bring into play all the resources on which Han-
nibal thought that he might reckon, he might have been
308 THE WAR UNDER HANNIBAL BOOK III
The send-
ing of rein-
forcements
temporarily
frustrated.
215.
215.
215.
tolerably certain of success. But the position of Hasdrubal
at that time in Spain after the battle on the Ebro was so
critical, that the supplies of money and men, which the
victory of Cannae had roused the Carthaginian citizens to
furnish, were for the most part expended on Spain, without
producing much improvement in the position of affairs
there. The Scipios transferred the theatre of war in the
following campaign (539) from the Ebro to the Guadalquivir;
and in Andalusia, in the very centre of the proper Cartha-
ginian territory, they achieved at Illiturgi and Intibili two
brilliant victories. In Sardinia communications entered
into with the natives led the Carthaginians to hope that
they should be able to master the island, which would
have been of importance as an intermediate station
between Spain and Italy. But Titus Manlius Torquatus,
who was sent with a Roman army to Sardinia, completely
destroyed the Carthaginian landing force, and reassured to
the Romans the undisputed possession of the island (539).
The legions from Cannae sent to Sicily held their ground
in the north and east of the island with courage and
success against the Carthaginians and Hieronymus ; the
latter met his death towards the end of 539 by the hand
of an assassin. Even in the case of Macedonia the
ratification of the alliance was delayed, principally because
the Macedonian envoys sent to Hannibal were captured
on their homeward journey by the Roman vessels of war.
Thus the dreaded invasion of the east coast was temporarily
suspended ; and the Romans gained time to secure the
very important station of Brundisium first by their fleet
and then by the land army which before the arrival of
Gracchus was employed for the protection of Apulia, and
even to make preparations for an invasion of Macedonia
in the event of war being declared. While in Italy the
war thus came to a stand, out of Italy nothing was done
on the part of Carthage to accelerate the movement of
CHAP. VI FROM CANNAE TO ZAMA - 309
new armies or fleets towards the seat of war. The
Romans, again, had everywhere with the greatest energy
put themselves in a state of defence, and in that defensive
attitude had fought for the most part with good results
wherever the genius of Hannibal was absent. Thereupon
the short-lived patriotism, which the victory of Cannae
had awakened in Carthage, evaporated ; the not inconsider-
able forces which had been organized there were, either
through factious opposition or merely through unskilful
attempts to conciliate the different opinions expressed in
the council, so frittered away that they were nowhere of
any real service, and but a very small portion arrived at
the spot where they would have been most useful. At the
close of 539 the reflecting Roman statesman might assure
himself that the urgency of the danger was past, and that
the resistance so heroically begun had but to persevere
in its exertions at all points in order to achieve its object.
First of all the war in Sicily came to an end. It had
formed no part of Hannibal’s original plan to excite a war
on the island; but partly through accident, chiefly through
the boyish vanity of the imprudent Hieronymus, a land
war had broken out there, which—doubtless because
Hannibal had not planned it—the Carthaginian council
took up with especial zeal. After Hieronymus was killed
at the close of 539, it seemed more than doubtful whether
the citizens would persevere in the policy which he had
pursued. If any city had reason to adhere to Rome, that
city was Syracuse; for the victory of the Carthaginians
over the Romans could not but give to the former, at any
rate, the sovereignty of all Sicily, and no one could seriously
believe that the promises made by Carthage to the Syra-
cusans would be really kept. Partly induced by this
consideration, partly terrified by the threatening pre-
parations of the Romans—who made every effort to bring
once more under their complete control that important
215.
War in
Sicily.
215.
Siege of
Syracuse.
3IO THE WAR UNIDER HANNIBAL BOOK III
214.
Carthagi-
nian
expedition
to Sicily.
island, the bridge between Italy and Africa, and now for
the Campaign of 540 sent their best general, Marcus
Marcellus, to Sicily—the Syracusan citizens showed a
disposition to obtain oblivion of the past by a timely
return to the Roman alliance. But, amidst the dreadful
confusion in the city—which after the death of Hieronymus
was agitated alternately by endeavours to re-establish the
ancient freedom of the people and by the coups de main
of the numerous pretenders to the vacant throne, while
the captains of the foreign mercenary troops were the real
masters of the place—Hannibal's dexterous emissaries,
Hippocrates and Epicydes, found opportunity to frustrate
the projects of peace. They stirred up the multitude in
the name of liberty; descriptions, exaggerated beyond
measure, of the fearful punishment that the Romans were
said to have inflicted on the Leontines, who had just been
re-conquered, awakened doubts even among the better
portion of the citizens whether it was not too late to restore
their old relations with Rome; while the numerous Roman
deserters among the mercenaries, mostly runaway rowers
from the fleet, were easily persuaded that a peace on the
part of the citizens with Rome would be their death-
warrant. So the chief magistrates were put to death, the
armistice was broken, and Hippocrates and Epicydes under-
took the government of the city. No course was left to
the consul except to undertake a siege ; but the skilful
conduct of the defence, in which the Syracusan engineer
Archimedes, celebrated as a learned mathematician, especi-
ally distinguished himself, compelled the Romans after
besieging the city for eight months to convert the siege
into a blockade by sea and land.
In the meanwhile Carthage, which hitherto had only sup-
ported the Syracusans with her fleets, on receiving news of
their renewed rising in arms against the Romans had de-
spatched a strong land army under Himilco to Sicily, which
CHAP. VI FROM CANNAE TO ZAMA 3 II
landed without interruption at Heraclea Minoa and imme.
diately occupied the important town of Agrigentum. To
effect a junction with Himilco, the bold and able Hippocrates
marched forth from Syracuse with an army : the position of
Marcellus between the garrison of Syracuse and the two
hostile armics began to be critical. With the help of some
reinforcements, however, which arrived from Italy, he main-
tained his position in the island and continued the blockade
of Syracuse. On the other hand, the greater portion of
the small inland towns were driven to the armies of the
Carthaginians not so much by the armies of the enemy, as by
the fearful severity of the Roman proceedings in the island,
more especially the slaughter of the citizens of Enna,
suspected of a design to revolt, by the Roman garrison
which was stationed there. In 542 the besiegers of Syracuse
during a festival in the city succeeded in scaling a portion
of the extensive outer walls that had been deserted by the
guard, and in penetrating into the suburbs which stretched
from the “island” and the city proper on the shore
(Achradina) towards the interior. The fortress of Euryalus,
which, situated at the extreme western end of the suburbs,
protected these and the principal road leading from the
interior to Syracuse, was thus cut off and fell not long after-
wards. When the siege of the city thus began to assume
a turn favourable to the Romans, the two armies under
Himilco and Hippocrates advanced to its relief, and
attempted a simultaneous attack on the Roman positions,
combined with an attempt at landing on the part of the
Carthaginian fleet and a sally of the Syracusan garrison ; but
the attack was repulsed on all sides, and the two relieving
armies were obliged to content themselves with encamping
before the city, in the low marshy grounds along the Anapus,
which in the height of summer and autumn engender pesti-
lences fatal to those that tarry in them. These pestilences
had often saved the city, oftener even than the valour of its
212.
The Car-
thaginian
troops
destroyed.
312 THE WAR UNIDER HANNIBAL BOOK III
212.
Conquest
Of
Syracuse.
citizens; in the times of the first Dionysius, two Phoenician
armies in the act of besieging the city had been in this way
destroyed under its very walls. Now fate turned the
special defence of the city into the means of its destruc-
tion ; while the army of Marcellus quartered in the suburbs
suffered but little, fevers desolated the Phoenician and
Syracusan bivouacs. Hippocrates died ; Himilco and most
of the Africans died also ; the survivors of the two armies,
mostly native Siceli, dispersed into the neighbouring cities.
The Carthaginians made a further attempt to save the city
from the sea side ; but the admiral Bomilcar withdrew, when
the Roman fleet offered him battle. Epicydes himself, who
commanded in the city, now abandoned it as lost, and made
his escape to Agrigentum. Syracuse would gladly have sur-
rendered to the Romans; negotiations had already begun.
But for the second time they were thwarted by the deserters:
in another mutiny of the soldiers the chief magistrates and a
number of respectable citizens were slain, and the govern-
ment and the defence of the city were entrusted by the
foreign troops to their captains. Marcellus now entered into
a negotiation with one of these, which gave into his hands
one of the two portions of the city that were still free, the
“island ”; upon which the citizens voluntarily opened to him
the gates of Achradina also (in the autumn of 542). If
mercy was to be shown in any case, it might, even according
to the far from laudable principles of Roman public law as
to the treatment of perfidious communities, have been ex-
tended to this city, which manifestly had not been at liberty
to act for itself, and which had repeatedly made the most
earnest attempts to get rid of the tyranny of the foreign
soldiers. Nevertheless, not only did Marcellus stain his
military honour by permitting a general pillage of the
wealthy mercantile city, in the course of which Archimedes
and many other citizens were put to death, but the Roman
senate lent a deaf ear to the complaints which the Syracusans
CHAP. VI FROM CANNAE TO ZAMA 3 I3
afterwards presented regarding the celebrated general, and
neither returned to individuals their pillaged property nor
restored to the city its freedom. Syracuse and the towns
that had been previously dependent on it were classed
among the communities tributary to Rome—Tauromenium
and Neetum alone obtained the same privileges as Messana,
while the territory of Leontini became Roman domain and
its former proprietors Roman lessees—and no Syracusan
citizen was henceforth allowed to reside in the “island,” the
portion of the city that commanded the harbour.
Sicily thus appeared lost to the Carthaginians; but the
genius of Hannibal exercised even from a distance its influ-
ence there. He despatched to the Carthaginian army,
which remained at. Agrigentum in perplexity and inaction
under Hanno and Epicydes, a Libyan cavalry officer
Muttines, who took the command of the Numidian cavalry,
and with his flying Squadrons, fanning into an open flame
the bitter hatred which the despotic rule of the Romans
had excited over all the island, commenced a guerilla war-
fare on the most extensive scale and with the happiest
results; so that he even, when the Carthaginian and Roman
armies met on the river Himera, sustained some conflicts
with Marcellus himself successfully. The relations, however,
which prevailed between Hannibal and the Carthaginian
council, were here repeated on a small scale. The general
appointed by the council pursued with jealous envy the
officer sent by Hannibal, and insisted upon giving battle
to the proconsul without Muttines and the Numidians.
The wish of Hanno was carried out, and he was completely
beaten. Muttines was not induced to deviate from his
course; he maintained himself in the interior of the country,
occupied several small towns, and was enabled by the not
inconsiderable reinforcements which joined him from
Carthage gradually to extend his operations. His successes
were so brilliant, that at length the commander-in-chief,
Guerilla
war in
Sicily.
3I4 THE WAR UNDER HANNIBAL BOOK III
Agrigen-
tun]
occupied
by the
Romans.
Sicily
tranquil-
lized.
Philip of
Macedonia
210.
214.
and his
delay.
2
7
who could not otherwise prevent the cavalry officer from
eclipsing him, deprived him summarily of the command of
the light cavalry, and entrusted it to his own son. The
Numidian, who had now for two years preserved the island
for his Phoenician masters, had the measure of his patience
exhausted by this treatment. He and his horsemen who
refused to follow the younger Hanno entered into negotia-
tions with the Roman general Marcus Valerius Laevinus,
and delivered to him Agrigentum. Hanno escaped in a
boat, and went to Carthage to report to his superiors the
disgraceful high treason of Hannibal’s officer; the Phoeni-
cian garrison in the town was put to death by the Romans,
and the citizens were sold into slavery (544). To secure
the island from such surprises as the landing of 540, the
city received a new body of inhabitants selected from
Sicilians well disposed towards Rome; the old glorious
Akragas was no more. After the whole of Sicily was thus
subdued, the Romans exerted themselves to restore some
sort of tranquillity and order to the distracted island. The
pack of banditti that haunted the interior were driven
together en masse and conveyed to Italy, that from their
head-quarters at Rhegium they might burn and destroy
in the territories of Hannibal's allies. The government
did its utmost to promote the restoration of agriculture
which had been totally neglected in the island. The
Carthaginian council more than once talked of sending a
fleet to Sicily and renewing the war there; but the project
went no further.
Macedonia might have exercised an influence over the
course of events more decisive than that of Syracuse.
From the Eastern powers neither furtherance nor hindrance
was for the moment to be expected. Antiochus the Great,
the natural ally of Philip, had, after the decisive victory of
the Egyptians at Raphia in 537, to deem himself fortunate
in obtaining peace from the indolent Philopator on the
CHAP. VI FROM CANNAE TO ZAMA 3I 5
basis of the status quo ante. The rivalry of the Lagidae
and the constant apprehension of a renewed outbreak of
the war on the one hand, and insurrections of pretenders
in the interior and enterprises of all sorts in Asia Minor,
Bactria, and the eastern satrapies on the other, prevented
him from joining that great anti-Roman alliance which
Hannibal had in view. The Egyptian court was decidedly
on the side of Rome, with which it renewed alliance in
544; but it was not to be expected of Ptolemy Philopator,
that he would support otherwise than by corn-ships.
Accordingly there was nothing to prevent Greece and
Macedonia from throwing a decisive weight into the great
Italian struggle except their own discord ; they might save
the Hellenic name, if they had the self-control to stand by
each other for but a few years against the common foe.
Such sentiments doubtless were current in Greece. The
prophetic saying of Agelaus of Naupactus, that he was afraid
that the prize-fights in which the Hellenes now indulged at
home might soon be over ; his earnest warning to direct
their eyes to the west, and not to allow a stronger power to
impose on all the parties now contending a peace of equal
servitude—such sayings had essentially contributed to bring
about the peace between Philip and the Aetolians (537),
and it was a significant proof of the tendency of that peace
that the Aetolian league immediately nominated Agelaus as
its strategus.
National patriotism was bestirring itself in Greece as in
Carthage: for a moment it seemed possible to kindle a
Hellenic national war against Rome. But the general in
such a crusade could only be Philip of Macedonia; and he
lacked the enthusiasm and the faith in the nation, without
which such a war could not be waged. He knew not how
to solve the arduous problem of transforming himself from
the oppressor into the champion of Greece. His very
delay in the conclusion of the alliance with Hannibal
210.
316 THE WAR UNIDER HANNIBAL BOOK III
216.
215.
214.
damped the first and best zeal of the Greek patriots; and
when he did enter into the conflict with Rome, his mode
of conducting war was still less fitted to awaken sympathy
and confidence. His first attempt, which was made in the
very year of the battle of Cannae (538), to obtain possession
of the city of Apollonia, failed in a way almost ridiculous,
for Philip turned back in all haste on receiving the totally
groundless report that a Roman fleet was steering for the
Adriatic. This took place before there was a formal breach
with Rome; when the breach at length ensued, friend and
foe expected a Macedonian landing in Lower Italy. Since
539 a Roman fleet and army had been stationed at
Brundisium to meet it; Philip, who was without vessels of
war, was constructing a flotilla of light Illyrian barks to
convey his army across. But when the endeavour had to
be made in earnest, his courage failed to encounter the
dreaded quinqueremes at sea ; he broke the promise which
he had given to his ally Hannibal to attempt a landing,
and with the view of still doing something he resolved to
make an attack on his own share of the spoil, the Roman
possessions in Epirus (540). Nothing would have come of
this even at the best ; but the Romans, who well knew that
offensive was preferable to defensive protection, were by no
means content to remain—as Philip may have hoped—
spectators of the attack from the opposite shore. The
Roman fleet conveyed a division of the army from Brundi-
sium to Epirus; Oricum was recaptured from the king, a
garrison was thrown into Apollonia, and the Macedonian
camp was stormed. Thereupon Philip passed from partial
action to total inaction, and notwithstanding all the com-
plaints of Hannibal, who vainly tried to breathe into such
a halting and shortsighted policy his own fire and clearness
of decision, he allowed some years to elapse in armed in-
activity.
Nor was Philip the first to renew the hostilities. The
CHAP. VI FROM CANNAE TO ZAMA 3I7
fall of Tarentum (542), by which Hannibal acquired an
excellent port on the coast which was the most convenient
for the landing of a Macedonian army, induced the Romans
to parry the blow from a distance and to give the Mace-
donians so much employment at home that they could not
think of an attempt on Italy. The national enthusiasm in
Greece had of course evaporated long ago. With the help
of the old antagonism to Macedonia, and of the fresh acts of
imprudence and injustice of which Philip had been guilty,
the Roman admiral Laevinus found no difficulty in organiz-
ing against Macedonia a coalition of the intermediate and
minor powers under the protectorate of Rome. It was
headed by the Aetolians, at whose diet Laevinus had person-
ally appeared and had gained its support by a promise of the
Acarnanian territory which the Aetolians had long coveted.
They concluded with Rome a modest agreement to rob the
other Greeks of men and land on the joint account, so that
the land should belong to the Aetolians, the men and
moveables to the Romans. They were joined by the states
of anti-Macedonian, or rather primarily of anti-Achaean,
tendencies in Greece proper; in Attica by Athens, in the
Peloponnesus by Elis and Messene and especially by Sparta,
the antiquated constitution of which had been just about
this time overthrown by a daring soldier Machanidas, in
order that he might himself exercise despotic power under
the name of king Pelops, a minor, and might establish a
government of adventurers sustained by bands of mercen-
aries. The coalition was joined moreover by those constant
antagonists of Macedonia, the chieftains of the half.
barbarous Thracian and Illyrian tribes, and lastly by Attalus
king of Pergamus, who followed out his own interest with
Sagacity and energy amidst the ruin of the two great Greek
states which surrounded him, and had the acuteness even
now to attach himself as a client to Rome when his assist-
ance was still of some value.
Rome[212.
heads a
Greek
coalition
against
Macedonia.
3.18 THE WAR UNIDER HANNIBAL BOOK III
Resultless
warfare.
Peace
between
Philip and
the Greeks.
It is neither agreeable nor necessary to follow the
vicissitudes of this aimless struggle. Philip, although he
was superior to each one of his opponents and repelled
their attacks on all sides with energy and personal valour,
yet consumed his time and strength in that profitless
defensive. Now he had to turn against the Aetolians, who
in concert with the Roman fleet annihilated the unfortunate
Acarnanians and threatened Locris and Thessaly; now an
invasion of barbarians summoned him to the northern
provinces; now the Achaeans solicited his help against the
predatory expeditions of Aetolians and Spartans ; now king
Attalus of Pergamus and the Roman admiral Publius
Sulpicius with their combined fleets threatened the east
coast or landed troops in Euboea. The want of a war
fleet paralyzed Philip in all his movements; he even went
so far as to beg vessels of war from his ally Prusias of
Bithynia, and even from Hannibal. It was only towards
the close of the war that he resolved—as he should have
done at first—to order the construction of Ioo ships of
war; of these however no use was made, if the order was
executed at all. All who understood the position of
Greece and sympathized with it lamented the unhappy war,
in which the last energies of Greece preyed upon them-
selves and the prosperity of the land was destroyed; re-
peatedly the commercial states, Rhodes, Chios, Mitylene,
Byzantium, Athens, and even Egypt itself had attempted a
mediation. In fact both parties had an interest in coming
to terms. The Aetolians, to whom their Roman allies
attached the chief importance, had, like the Macedonians,
much to suffer from the war; especially after the petty
king of the Athamanes had been gained by Philip, and the
interior of Aetolia had thus been laid open to Macedonian
incursions. Many Aetolians too had their eyes gradually
opened to the dishonourable and pernicious part which the
Roman alliance condemned them to play; a cry of horror
CHAP. VI FIROM CANNAE TO ZAMA 319
pervaded the whole Greek nation when the Aetolians in
concert with the Romans sold whole bodies of Hellenic
citizens, such as those of Anticyra, Oreus, Dyme, and
Aegina, into slavery. But the Aetolians were no longer
free; they ran a great risk if of their own accord they
concluded peace with Philip, and they found the Romans
by no means disposed, especially after the favourable turn
which matters were taking in Spain and in Italy, to desist
from a war, which on their part was carried on with merely
a few ships, and the burden and injury of which fell
mainly on the Aetolians. At length however the Aetolians
resolved to listen to the mediating cities: and, notwith-
standing the counter-efforts of the Romans, a peace was
arranged in the winter of 548–9 between the Greek powers.
Aetolia had converted an over-powerful ally into a dangerous
enemy; but the Roman senate, which just at that time was
summoning all the resources of the exhausted state for the
decisive expedition to Africa, did not deem it a fitting
moment to resent the breach of the alliance. The war
with Philip could not, after the withdrawal of the Aetolians,
have been carried on by the Romans without considerable
exertions of their own ; and it appeared to them more
convenient to terminate it also by a peace, whereby the
state of things before the war was substantially restored and
|Rome in particular retained all her possessions on the
coast of Epirus except the worthless territory of the
Atintanes. Under the circumstances Philip had to deem
himself fortunate in obtaining such terms; but the fact
proclaimed—what could not indeed be longer concealed
—that all the unspeakable misery which ten years of
a warfare waged with revolting inhumanity had brought
upon Greece had been endured in vain, and that the grand
and just combination, which Hannibal had projected
and all Greece had for a moment joined, was shattered
irretrievably.
206-205.
Peace
between
Philip and
Rome.
320 THE WAR UNIDER HANNIBAL BOOK III
Spanish
War.
In Spain, where the spirit of Hamilcar and Hannibal
was powerful, the struggle was more earnest. Its progress
was marked by the singular vicissitudes incidental to the
peculiar nature of the country and the habits of the people.
The farmers and shepherds, who inhabited the beautiful
valley of the Ebro and the luxuriantly fertile Andalusia as
well as the rough intervening highland region traversed
by numerous wooded mountain - ranges, could easily be
assembled in arms as a general levy; but it was difficult
to lead them against the enemy or even to keep them
together at all. The towns could just as little be com-
bined for steady and united action, obstinately as in each
case they bade defiance to the oppressor behind their walls.
They all appear to have made little distinction between the
Romans and the Carthaginians; whether the troublesome
guests who had established themselves in the valley of the
Ebro, or those who had established themselves on the
Guadalquivir, possessed a larger or smaller portion of the
peninsula, was probably to the natives very much a matter
of indifference; and for that reason the tenacity of partisan-
ship so characteristic of Spain was but little prominent in
this war, with isolated exceptions such as Saguntum on the
Roman and Astapa on the Carthaginian side. But, as
neither the Romans nor the Africans had brought with
them sufficient forces of their own, the war necessarily
became on both sides a struggle to gain partisans, which
was decided rarely by solid attachment, more usually by
fear, money, or accident, and which, when it seemed about
to end, resolved itself into an endless series of fortress-
sieges and guerilla conflicts, whence it soon revived with
fresh fury. Armies appeared and disappeared like Sand-
hills on the sea-shore; on the spot where a hill stood
yesterday, not a trace of it remains to-day. In general the
superiority was on the side of the Romans, partly because
they at first appeared in Spain as the deliverers of the land
CHAP. VI FROM CANNAE TO ZAMA 32I
from Phoenician despotism, partly because of the fortunate
selection of their leaders and of the stronger nucleus of
trustworthy troops which these brought along with them.
It is hardly possible, however, with the very imperfect and—
in point of chronology especially—very confused accounts
which have been handed down to us, to give a satisfactory
view of a war so conducted.
The two lieutenant-governors of the Romans in the
peninsula, Gnaeus and Publius Scipio—both of them, but
especially Gnaeus, good generals and excellent adminis-
trators—accomplished their task with the most brilliant
success. Not only was the barrier of the Pyrenees stead-
fastly maintained, and the attempt to re-establish the inter.
rupted communication by land between the commander-in-
chief of the enemy and his head-quarters sternly repulsed;
not only had a Spanish New Rome been created, after the
model of the Spanish New Carthage, by means of the com-
prehensive fortifications and harbour works of Tarraco, but
the Roman armies had already in 539 fought with success
in Andalusia (p. 308). Their expedition thither was
repeated in the following year (540) with still greater
success. The Romans carried their arms almost to the
Pillars of Hercules, extended their protectorate in South
Spain, and lastly by regaining and restoring Saguntum
secured for themselves an important station on the line
from the Ebro to Cartagena, repaying at the same time as
far as possible an old debt which the nation owed. While
the Scipios thus almost dislodged the Carthaginians from
Spain, they knew how to raise up a dangerous enemy to
them in western Africa itself in the person of the powerful
west African prince Syphax, ruling in the modern provinces
of Oran and Algiers, who entered into connections with
the Romans (about 541). Had it been possible to supply
him with a Roman army, great results might have been
expected ; but at that time not a man could be spared from
VOL. II 53
Successes
of the
Scipios.
215.
214.
Syphax
against
Carthage.
213.
322 THE WAR UNIDER HANNIBAL BOOK III
The Scipios
defeated
and killed.
213.
211.
212.
Italy, and the Spanish army was too weak to be divided.
Nevertheless the troops belonging to Syphax himself,
trained and led by Roman officers, excited so serious a
ferment among the Libyan subjects of Carthage that the
lieutenant-commander of Spain and Africa, Hasdrubal
Barcas, went in person to Africa with the flower of his
Spanish troops. His arrival in all likelihood gave another
turn to the matter; the king Gala—in what is now the
province of Constantine—who had long been the rival of
Syphax, declared for Carthage, and his brave son Massinissa
defeated Syphax, and compelled him to make peace.
Little more is related of this Libyan war than the story of
the cruel vengeance which Carthage, according to her wont,
inflicted on the rebels after the victory of Massinissa.
This turn of affairs in Africa had an important effect on
the war in Spain. Hasdrubal was able once more to turn
to that country (543), whither he was soon followed by
considerable reinforcements and by Massinissa himself.
The Scipios, who during the absence of the enemy's
general (541, 542) had continued to plunder and to gain
partisans in the Carthaginian territory, found themselves
unexpectedly assailed by forces so superior that they were
under the necessity of either retreating behind the Ebro or
calling out the Spaniards. They chose the latter course,
and took into their pay 20, ooo Celtiberians; and then, in
order the better to encounter the three armies of the
enemy under Hasdrubal Barcas, Hasdrubal the son of
Gisgo, and Mago, they divided their army and did not
even keep their Roman troops together. They thus
prepared the way for their own destruction. While
Gnaeus with his corps, containing a third of the Roman
and all the Spanish troops, lay encamped opposite to
Hasdrubal Barcas, the latter had no difficulty in inducing
the Spaniards in the Roman army by means of a sum of
money to withdraw—which perhaps to their free-lance ideas
CHAP. VI FROM CANNAE TO ZAMA 323
of morals did not even seem a breach of fidelity, seeing
that they did not pass over to the enemies of their pay-
master. Nothing was left to the Roman general but hastily
to begin his retreat, in which the enemy closely followed
him. Meanwhile the second Roman corps under Publius
found itself vigorously assailed by the two other Phoenician
armies under Hasdrubal son of Gisgo and Mago, and the
daring squadrons of Massinissa's horse gave to the Cartha-
ginians a decided advantage. The Roman camp was
almost surrounded ; when the Spanish auxiliaries already
on the way should arrive, the Romans would be completely
hemmed in. The bold resolve of the proconsul to
encounter with his best troops the advancing Spaniards,
before their appearance should fill up the gap in the
blockade, ended unfortunately. The Romans indeed had
at first the advantage; but the Numidian horse, who were
rapidly despatched in pursuit, soon overtook them and
prevented them both from following up the victory which
they had already half gained, and from marching back,
until the Phoenician infantry came up and at length the
fall of the general converted the lost battle into a defeat.
After Publius had thus fallen, Gnaeus, who slowly retreating
had with difficulty defended himself against the one
Carthaginian army, found himself suddenly assailed at once
by three, and all retreat cut off by the Numidian cavalry,
Hemmed in upon a bare hill, which did not even afford
the possibility of pitching a camp, the whole corps were
cut down or taken prisoners. As to the fate of the general
himself no certain information was ever obtained. A small
division alone was conducted by Gaius Marcius, an
excellent officer of the school of Gnaeus, in safety to the
other bank of the Ebro ; and thither the legate Titus
Fonteius also succeeded in bringing safely the portion of
the corps of Publius that had been left in the camp; most
even of the Roman garrisons scattered in the south of
324 THE WAR UNIDER HANNIBAL BOOK III
Spain
south of
the Ebro
lost to the
Romans.
Nero sent
to Spain.
210.
Publius
Scipio.
Spain were enabled to flee thither. In all Spain south of
the Ebro the Phoenicians ruled undisturbed ; and the
moment seemed not far distant, when the river would be
crossed, the Pyrenees would be open, and the communica-
tion with Italy would be restored. But the emergency in
the Roman camp called the right man to the command.
The choice of the soldiers, passing over older and not
incapable officers, summoned that Gaius Marcius to become
leader of the army; and his dexterous management and,
quite as much perhaps, the envy and discord among the
three Carthaginian generals, wrested from these the further
fruits of their important victory. Such of the Carthaginians
as had crossed the river were driven back, and the line of
the Ebro was held in the meanwhile, till Rome gained
time to send a new army and a new general. Fortunately
the turn of the war in Italy, where Capua had just fallen,
allowed this to be done. A strong legion—12, ooo men—
arriving under the propraetor Gaius Claudius Nero, restored
the balance of arms. An expedition to Andalusia in the
following year (544) was most successful; Hasdrubal Barcas
was beset and surrounded, and escaped a capitulation only
by ignoble stratagem and open perfidy. But Nero was not
the right general for the Spanish war. He was an able
officer, but a harsh, irritable, unpopular man, who had
little skill in the art of renewing old connections or of
forming new ones, or in taking advantage of the injustice
and arrogance with which the Carthaginians after the death
of the Scipios had treated friend and foe in Further Spain,
and had exasperated all against them.
The senate, which formed a correct judgment as to
the importance and the peculiar character of the Spanish
war, and had learned from the Uticenses brought in as
prisoners by the Roman fleet the great exertions which
were making in Carthage to send Hasdrubal and Massinissa
with a numerous army over the Pyrenees, resolved to
CHAP. vi FROM CANNAE TO ZAMA 325
despatch to Spain new reinforcements and an extraordinary
general of higher rank, the nomination of whom they
deemed it expedient to leave to the people. For long—
so runs the story—nobody announced himself as ready to
take in hand the complicated and perilous business; but
at last a young officer of twenty-seven, Publius Scipio (son
of the general of the same name that had fallen in Spain),
who had held the offices of military tribune and aedile,
came forward to solicit it. It is incredible that the Roman
senate should have left to accident an election of such
importance in this meeting of the Comitia which it had
itself suggested, and equally incredible that ambition and
patriotism should have so died out in Rome that no tried
officer presented himself for the important post. If on the
other hand the eyes of the senate turned to the young,
talented, and experienced officer, who had brilliantly
distinguished himself in the hotly-contested days on the
Ticinus and at Cannae, but who still had not the rank
requisite for his coming forward as the successor of men
who had been praetors and consuls, it was very natural to
adopt this course, which compelled the people out of good
nature to admit the only candidate notwithstanding his
defective qualification, and which could not but bring both
him and the Spanish expedition, which was doubtless very
unpopular, into favour with the multitude. If the effect
of this ostensibly unpremeditated candidature was thus
calculated, it was perfectly successful. The son, who went
to avenge the death of a father whose life he had saved
nine years before on the Ticinus; the young man of manly
beauty and long locks, who with modest blushes offered
himself in the absence of a better for the post of danger;
the mere Inilitary tribune, whom the votes of the centuries
now raised at once to the roll of the highest magistracies—
all this inade a wonderful and indclible impression on the
citizens and farmers of Rome. And in truth Publius
326 THE WAR UNDER HANNIBAL BOOK III
Scipio was one, who was himself enthusiastic, and who
inspired enthusiasm. He was not one of the few who by
their energy and iron will constrain the world to adopt and
to move in new paths for centuries, or who at any rate
grasp the reins of destiny for years till its wheels roll over
them. Publius Scipio gained battles and conquered
countries under the instructions of the senate ; with the
aid of his military laurels he took also a prominent position
in Rome as a statesman ; but a wide interval separates
such a man from an Alexander or a Caesar. As an officer,
he rendered at least no greater service to his country than
Marcus Marcellus; and as a politician, although not
perhaps himself fully conscious of the unpatriotic and
personal character of his policy, he injured his country at
least as much, as he benefited it by his military skill. Yet
a special charm lingers around the form of that graceful
hero; it is surrounded, as with a dazzling halo, by the
atmosphere of serene and confident inspiration, in which
Scipio with mingled credulity and adroitness always moved.
With quite enough of enthusiasm to warm men's hearts,
and enough of calculation to follow in every case the
dictates of intelligence, while not leaving out of account
the vulgar; not naïve enough to share the belief of the
multitude in his divine inspirations, nor straightforward
enough to set it aside, and yet in secret thoroughly
persuaded that he was a man specially favoured of the
gods—in a word, a genuine prophetic nature; raised above
the people, and not less aloof from them ; a man of stead-
fast word and kingly spirit, who thought that he would
humble himself by adopting the ordinary title of a king,
but could never understand how the constitution of the
republic should in his case be binding; so confident in his
own greatness that he knew nothing of envy or of hatred,
courteously acknowledged other men's merits, and com-
passionately forgave other men's faults; an excellent officer
CHAP. VI FROM CANNAE TO ZAMA 327
and a refined diplomatist without the repellent special
impress of either calling, uniting Hellenic culture with the
fullest national feeling of a Roman, an accomplished
speaker and of graceful manners—Publius Scipio won the
hearts of soldiers and of women, of his countrymen and of
the Spaniards, of his rivals in the Senate and of his greater
Carthaginian antagonist. His name was soon on every
one's lips, and his was the star which seemed destined to
bring victory and peace to his country.
Publius Scipio went to Spain in 544–5, accompanied by
the propraetor Marcus Silanus, who was to succeed Nero
and to serve as assistant and Counsellor to the young
commander-in-chief, and by his intimate friend Gaius
Laelius as admiral, and furnished with a legion exceeding
the usual strength and a well-filled chest. His appearance
on the scene waſaţpnge signalized, by prºof the bºldest
and most fortunate cou?s de main that are known in history.
Of the three Carthaginian generals Hasdrubal Barcas was
stationed at the sources, Hasdrubal son of Gisgo at
the mouth, of the Tagus, and Mago at the Pillars of
Hercules; the nearest of them was ten days' march from
the Phoenician capital New Carthage. Suddenly in the
spring of 545, before the enemy's armies began to move,
Scipio set out with his whole army of nearly 30, ooo men
and the fleet for this town, which he could reach from the
mouth of the Ebro by the coast route in a few days, and
surprised the Phoenician garrison, not above I ooo men
strong, by a combined attack by sea and land. The town,
situated on a tongue of land projecting into the harbour,
found itself threatened at once on three sides by the
Roman fleet, and on the fourth by the legions; and all
help was far distant. Nevertheless the commandant Mago
defended himself with resolution and armed the citizens,
as the soldiers did riot suſſice to man the walls. A sortie
was attempted; but the Romans repelled it with ease and,
Scipio goes
to Spain.
210-209.

Capture
of New
Carthage.
209.
328 THE WAR UNIDER HANNIBAL BOOK III
without taking time to open a regular siege, began the
assault on the landward side. Eagerly the assailants
pushed their advance along the narrow land approach to
the town ; new columns constantly relieved those that were
fatigued; the weak garrison was utterly exhausted; but
the Romans had gained no advantage. Scipio had not
expected any ; the assault was merely designed to draw
away the garrison from the side next to the harbour,
where, having been informed that part of the latter was
left dry at ebb-tide, he meditated a second attack. While
the assault was raging on the landward side, Scipio sent
a division with ladders over the shallow bank “where
Neptune himself showed them the way,” and they had
actually the good fortune to find the walls at that point
undefended. Thus the city was won on the first day;
whereupon Mago in the citadel capitulated. With the
Carthaginian capital there fell into the hands of the
Romans 18 dismantled vessels of war and 63 transports,
the whole war-stores, considerable supplies of corn, the war-
chest of 6oo talents (more than 24, 140, ooo), ten thousand
captives, among whom were eighteen Carthaginian geru-
siasts or judges, and the hostages of all the Spanish allies
of Carthage. Scipio promised the hostages permission to
return home so soon as their respective communities should
have entered into alliance with Rome, and employed the
resources which the city afforded to reinforce and improve
the condition of his army. He ordered the artisans of
New Carthage, 2 ooo in number, to work for the Roman
army, promising to them liberty at the close of the war,
and he selected the able-bodied men among the remain-
ing multitude to serve as rowers in the fleet. But the
burgesses of the city were spared, and allowed to retain
their liberty and former position. Scipio knew the
Phoenicians, and was aware that they would obey; and
it was important that a city possessing the only excellent
CHAP. VI FROM CANNAE TO ZAMA 329
harbour on the east Coast and rich silver-mines should be
secured by something more than a garrison. *
Success thus crowned the bold enterprise—bold, because
it was not unknown to Scipio that Hasdrubal Barcas had
received orders from his government to advance towards
Gaul and was engaged in fulfilling them, and because the
weak division left behind on the Ebro was not in a position
seriously to oppose that movement, should the return of
Scipio be delayed. But he was again at Tarraco, before
Hasdrubal made his appearance on the Ebro. The hazard
of the game which the young general played, when he
abandoned his primary task in order to execute a dashing
stroke, was concealed by the fabulous success which
Neptune and Scipio had gained in concert. The mar-
vellous capture of the Phoenician capital so abundantly
justified all the expectations which had been formed at
home regarding the wondrous youth, that none could
venture to utter any adverse opinion. . Scipio's command
was indefinitely prolonged; he himself resolved no longer
to confine his efforts to the meagre task of guarding the
passes of the Pyrenees. Already, in consequence of the
fall of New Carthage, not only had the Spaniards on the
north of the Ebro completely submitted, but even beyond
the Ebro the most powerful princes had exchanged the
Carthaginian for the Roman protectorate.
Scipio employed the winter of 545–6 in breaking up his
fleet and increasing his land army with the men thus
acquired, so that he might at once guard the north and
assume the offensive in the south more energetically than
before; and he marched in 546 to Andalusia. There he
encountered Hasdrubal Barcas, who, in the execution of his
long-cherished plan, was moving northward to the help of
his brother. A battle took place at Baecula, in which the
Romans claimed the victory and professed to have made
Io, ooo captives ; but Hasdrubal substantially attained his
209-208.
Scipio
goes to
Andalusia.
208.
33O THE WAR UNDER HANNIIBAL BOOK III
Hasdrubal
crosses the
Pyrenees.
207.
Spain
conquered.
207.
end, although at the sacrifice of a portion of his army.
With his chest, his elephants, and the best portion of his
troops, he fought his way to the north coast of Spain ;
marching along the shore, he reached the western passes
of the Pyrenees which appear to have been unoccupied,
and before the bad season began he was in Gaul, where he
took up quarters for the winter. It was evident that the
resolve of Scipio to combine offensive operations with the
defensive which he had been instructed to maintain was
inconsiderate and unwise. The immediate task assigned
to the Spanish army, which not only Scipio's father and
uncle, but even Gaius Marcius and Gaius Nero had
accomplished with much inferior means, was not enough
for the arrogance of the victorious general at the head of a
numerous army; and he was mainly to blame for the
extremely critical position of Rome in the summer of 547,
when the plan of Hannibal for a combined attack on the
Romans was at length realized. But the gods covered the
errors of their favourite with laurels. In Italy the peril
fortunately passed over ; the Romans were glad to accept
the bulletin of the ambiguous victory of Baecula, and,
when fresh tidings of victory arrived from Spain, they
thought no more of the circumstance that they had had to
combat the ablest general and the flower of the Hispano-
Phoenician army in Italy. *
After the removal of Hasdrubal Barcas the two generals
who were left in Spain determined for the time being to
retire, Hasdrubal son of Gisgo to Lusitania, Mago even to
the Baleares; and, until new reinforcements should arrive
from Africa, they left the light cavalry of Massinissa alone
to wage a desultory warfare in Spain, as Muttines had done
so successfully in Sicily. The whole east coast thus fell
into the power of the Romans. In the following year
(547) Hanno actually made his appearance from Africa
with a third army, whereupon Mago and Hasdrubal
CIIAP. VI FROM CANNAE TO ZAMA 33 I
returned to Andalusia. But Marcus Silanus defeated the
united armies of Mago and Hanno, and captured the
latter in person. Hasdrubal upon this abandoned the idea
of keeping the open field, and distributed his troops among
the Andalusian cities, of which Scipio was during this year
able to storm only one, Oringis. The Phoenicians seemed
vanquished; but yet they were able in the following year
(548) once more to send into the field a powerful army,
32 elephants, 4ooo horse, and 70, ooo foot, far the greater
part of whom, it is true, were hastily-collected Spanish
militia. Again a battle took place at Baecula. The
Roman army numbered little more than half that of the
enemy, and was also to a considerable extent composed of
Spaniards. Scipio, like Wellington in similar circumstances,
disposed his Spaniards so that they should not partake in
the fight—the only possible mode of preventing their
dispersion—while on the other hand he threw his Roman
troops in the first instance on the Spaniards. The day was
206.
nevertheless obstinately contested ; but at length the
Romans were the victors, and, as a matter of course, the
defeat of such an army was equivalent to its complete
dissolution—Hasdrubal and Mago singly made their escape
to Gades. The Romans were now without a rival in the
peninsula ; the few towns that did not submit with good
will were subdued one by one, and some of them were
punished with cruel severity. Scipio was even able to
visit Syphax on the African Coast, and to enter into Com-
munications with him and also with Massinissa with
reference to an expedition to Africa—a foolhardy venture,
which was not warranted by any corresponding advantage,
however much the report of it might please the curiosity
of the citizens of the capital at home. Gades alone, where
Mago held command, was still Phoenician. For a moment
it seemed as if, after the Romans had entered upon the
Carthaginian heritage and had sufficiently undeceived the
332 THE WAR UNIDER HANNIBAL BOOK III
Mago goes
to Italy.
Gades
becomes
Roman.
206.
expectation cherished here and there among the Spaniards
that after the close of the Phoenician rule they would get
rid of their Roman guests also and regain their ancient
freedom, a general insurrection against the Romans would
break forth in Spain, in which the former allies of Rome
would take the lead. The sickness of the Roman general
and the mutiny of one of his corps, occasioned by their
pay being in arrear for many years, favoured the rising.
But Scipio recovered sooner than was expected, and
dexterously suppressed the tumult among the soldiers;
upon which the communities that had taken the lead in the
national rising were subdued at once before the insurrection
gained ground. Seeing that nothing came of this move-
ment and Gades could not be permanently held, the
Carthaginian government ordered Mago to gather together
whatever could be got in ships, troops, and money, and
with these, if possible, to give another turn to the war in
Italy. Scipio could not prevent this—his dismantling of
the fleet now avenged itself—and he was a second time
obliged to leave in the hands of his gods the defence, with
which he had been entrusted, of his country against new
invasions. The last of Hamilcar’s sons left the peninsula
without opposition. After his departure Gades, the oldest
and last possession of the Phoenicians on Spanish soil,
submitted on favourable conditions to the new masters.
Spain was, after a thirteen years' struggle, converted from
a Carthaginian into a Roman province, in which the
conflict with the Romans was still continued for centuries
by means of insurrections always suppressed and yet never
subdued, but in which at the moment no enemy stood
opposed to Rome. Scipio embraced the first moment of
apparent peace to resign his command (in the end of 548),
and to report at Rome in person the victories which he
had achieved and the provinces which he had won.
While the war was thus terminated in Sicily by
CHAP. VI FROM CANNAE TO ZAMA 333
Marcellus, in Greece by Publius Sulpicius, and in Spain by
Scipio, the mighty struggle went on without interruption in
the Italian peninsula. There after the battle of Cannae
had been fought and its effects in loss or gain could by
degrees be discerned, at the commencement of 540, the
fifth year of the war, the dispositions of the opposing
Romans and Phoenicians were the following. North Italy
had been reoccupied by the Romans after the departure of
Hannibal, and was protected by three legions, two of
which were stationed in the Celtic territory, the third as a
reserve in Picenum. Lower Italy, as far as Mount
Garganus and the Volturnus, was, with the exception of
the fortresses and most of the ports, in the hands of
Hannibal. He lay with his main army at Arpi, while
Tiberius Gracchus with four legions confronted him in
Apulia, - resting upon the fortresses of Luceria and
Beneventum. In the land of the Bruttians, where the
inhabitants had thrown themselves entirely into the arms
of Hannibal, and where even the ports—excepting Rhegium,
which the Romans protected from Messana—had been
occupied by the Phoenicians, there was a second
Carthaginian army under Hanno, which in the meanwhile
saw no enemy to face it. The Roman main army of four
legions under the two consuls, Quintus Fabius and Marcus
Marcellus, was on the point of attempting to recover Capua.
To these there fell to be added on the Roman side the
reserve of two legions in the capital, the garrisons placed
in all the seaports—Tarentum and Brundisium having been
reinforced by a legion on account of the Macedonian land-
ing apprehended there—and lastly the strong fleet which
had undisputed command of the sea. If we add to these
the Roman armies in Sicily, Sardinia, and Spain, the
whole number of the Roman forces, even apart from the
garrison service in the fortresses of Lower Italy which was
provided for by the colonists occupying them, may be
Italian
Wºlſe
214.
Position of
the armies.
334 THE WAR UNIDER HANNIBAL BOOK IIl
estimated at not less than 2 oo, ooo men, of whom one-
third were newly enrolled for this year, and about one-half
were Roman citizens. It may be assumed that all the men
capable of service from the 17th to the 46th year were
under arms, and that the fields, where the war permitted
them to be tilled at all, were cultivated by the slaves and
the old men, women, and children. As may well be con-
ceived, under such circumstances the finances were in the
most grievous embarrassment; the land-tax, the main
source of revenue, came in but very irregularly. Yet not-
withstanding these difficulties as to men and money the
Romans were able—slowly indeed and by exerting all their
energies, but still surely—to recover what they had so
rapidly lost; to increase their armies yearly, while those of
the Phoenicians were diminishing; to gain ground year by
year on the Italian allies of Hannibal, the Campanians,
Apulians, Samnites, and Bruttians, who neither sufficed,
like the Roman fortresses in Lower Italy, for their own
protection nor could be adequately protected by the weak
army of Hannibal; and finally, by means of the method
of warfare instituted by Marcus Marcellus, to develop the
talent of their officers and to bring into full play the
superiority of the Roman infantry. Hannibal might doubt-
less still hope for victories, but no longer such victories as
those on the Trasimene lake and on the Aufidus; the
times of the citizen-generals were gone by. No course was
left to him but to wait till either Philip should execute
his long-promised descent or his own brothers should join
him from Spain, and meanwhile to keep himself, his army,
and his clients as far as possible free from harm and in
good humour. We hardly recognize in the obstinate
defensive system which he now began the same general
who had carried on the offensive with almost unequalled
impetuosity and boldness; it is marvellous in a psycho-
logical as well as in a military point of view, that the same
CHAP. VI FROM CANNAE TO ZAMA 335
man should have accomplished the two tasks set to him—
tasks so diametrically opposite in their character—with equal
completeness.
At first the war turned chiefly towards Campania. Han-
nibal appeared in good time to protect its capital, which he
prevented from being invested ; but he was unable either to
wrest any of the Campanian towns held by the Romans from
their strong Roman garrisons, or to prevent—in addition to
a number of less important country towns—Casilinum,
which secured his passage over the Volturnus, from being
taken by the two consular armies after an obstinate defence.
An attempt of Hannibal to gain Tarentum, with the view
especially of acquiring a safe landing-place for the Mace-
donian army, proved unsuccessful. Meanwhile the Bruttian
army of the Carthaginians under Hanno had various en-
counters in Lucania with the Roman army of Apulia ; here
Tiberius Gracchus sustained the struggle with good results,
and after a successful combat not far from Beneventum, in
which the slave legions pressed into service had distinguished
themselves, he bestowed liberty and burgess-rights on his
slave-soldiers in the name of the people.
In the following year (541) the Romans recovered the
rich and important Arpi, whose citizens, after the Roman
soldiers had stolen into the town, made Common cause with
them against the Carthaginian garrison. In general the
bonds of the symmachy formed by Hannibal were relaxing;
a number of the leading Capuans and several of the
Bruttian towns passed over to Rome; even a Spanish divi-
sion of the Phoenician army, when informed by Spanish
emissaries of the course of events in their native land, passed
from the Carthaginian into the Roman service.
The year 542 was more unfavourable for the Romans in
consequence of fresh political and military errors, of which
Hannibal did not fail to take advantage. The connections
which Hannibal maintained in the towns of Magna Graecia
Conflicts
in the
south of
Italy.
Arpi [213.
acquired
by the
Romans.
212.
Tarentum
taken by
Hannibal.
336 THE WAR UNDER HANNIBAL BOOK III
Conflicts
around
Capua.
had led to no serious result ; save that the hostages from
Tarentum and Thurii, who were kept at Rome, were in-
duced by his emissaries to make a foolhardy attempt at
escape, in which they were speedily recaptured by the
Roman posts. But the injudicious spirit of revenge dis-
played by the Romans was of more service to Hannibal
than his intrigues; the execution of all the hostages who had
sought to escape deprived them of a valuable pledge, and
the exasperated Greeks thenceforth meditated how they
might open their gates to Hannibal. Tarentum was actu-
ally occupied by the Carthaginians in consequence of an
understanding with the citizens and of the negligence of the
Roman commandant; with difficulty the Roman garrison
maintained itself in the citadel. The example of Tarentum
was followed by Heraclea, Thurii, and Metapontum, from
which town the garrison had to be withdrawn in order to
save the Tarentine Acropolis. These successes so greatly
increased the risk of a Macedonian landing, that Rome
felt herself compelled to direct renewed attention and
renewed exertions to the Greek war, which had been almost
totally neglected; and fortunately the capture of Syracuse
and the favourable state of the Spanish war enabled her to
do so.
At the chief seat of war, in Campania, the struggle went
on with very varying success. The legions posted in the
neighbourhood of Capua had not yet strictly invested the
city, but had so greatly hindered the cultivation of the soil
and the ingathering of the harvest, that the populous city
was in urgent need of supplies from without. Hannibal
accordingly collected a considerable supply of grain, and
directed the Campanians to receive it at Beneventum ; but
their tardiness gave the consuls Quintus Flaccus and Appius
Claudius time to come up, to inflict a severe defeat on
Hanno who protected the grain, and to seize his camp and
all his stores. The two consuls then invested the town,
CHAP. VI FROM CANNAE TO ZAMA 337
while Tiberius Gracchus stationed himself on the Appian
Way to prevent Hannibal ftom approaching to relieve it.
But that brave officer fell in consequence of the shameful
stratagem of a perfidious Lucanian ; and his death was
equivalent to a complete defeat, for his army, consisting
mostly of those slaves whom he had manumitted, dispersed
after the fall of their beloved leader. So Hannibal found
the road to Capua open, and by his unexpected appearance
compelled the two consuls to raise the blockade which they
had barely begun. Their cavalry had already, before Han-
nibal’s arrival, been thoroughly defeated by the Phoenician
cavalry, which lay as a garrison in Capua under Hanno and
Bostar, and by the equally excellent Campanian horse.
The total destruction of the regular troops and free bands
in Lucania led by Marcus Centenius, a man imprudently
promoted from a subaltern to be a general, and the not
much less complete defeat of the negligent and arrogant
praetor Gnaeus Fulvius Flaccus in Apulia, closed the long
series of the misfortunes of this year. But the stubborn per-
severance of the Romans again neutralized the rapid success
of Hannibal, at least at the most decisive point. As soon
as Hannibal turned his back on Capua to proceed to Apulia,
the Roman armies once more gathered around that city,
one at Puteoli and Volturnum. under Appius Claudius,
another at Casilinum under Quintus Fulvius, and a third
on the Nolan road under the praetor Gaius Claudius Nero.
The three camps, well entrenched and connected with one
another by fortified lines, precluded all access to the place,
and the large, inadequately provisioned city could not but
find itself compelled by the mere investment to surrender -
at no distant time, should no relief arrive. As the winter
of 542–3 drew to an end, the provisions were almost 212-211.
exhausted, and urgent messengers, who were barely able to
steal through the well-guarded Roman lines, requested
speedy help from Hannibal, who was at Tarentum, occupied
VOL. II 54
338 THE WAR UNIDER HANNIBAL BOOK III
Hannibal
marches
towards
Rome.
with the siege of the citadel. With 33 elephants and his
best troops he departed by forced marches from Tarentum
for Campania, captured the Roman post at Calatia, and
took up his camp on Mount Tifata close by Capua, in the
confident expectation that the Roman generals would now
raise the siege as they had done the year before. But the
Romans, who had had time to entrench their camps and
their lines like a fortress, did not stir, and looked on
unmoved from their ramparts, while on one side the Cam-
panian horsemen, on the other the Numidian squadrons,
dashed against their lines. A serious assault could not be
thought of by Hannibal ; he could foresee that his advance
would soon draw the other Roman armies after him to
Campania, if even before their arrival the scarcity of supplies
in a region so systematically foraged did not drive him
away. Nothing could be done in that quarter.
Hannibal tried a further expedient, the last which occurred
to his inventive genius, to save the important city. After
giving the Campanians information of his intention and ex-
horting them to hold out, he started with the relieving army
from Capua and took the road for Rome. With the same
dexterous boldness which he had shown in his first Italian
campaigns, he threw himself with a weak army between the
armies and fortresses of the enemy, and led his troops
through Samnium and along the Valerian Way past Tibur
to the bridge over the Anio, which he passed and encamped
on the opposite bank, five miles from the city. The child-
ren's children of the Romans still shuddered, when they
were told of “Hannibal at the gate”; real danger there
was none. The country houses and fields in the neighbour-
hood of the city were laid waste by the enemy; the two
legions in the city, who went forth against them, prevented
the investment of the walls. Besides, Hannibal had never
expected to surprise Rome by a coup de main, such as
Scipio soon afterwards executed against New Carthage, and
CHAP. VI FROM CANNAE TO ZAMA 339
still less had he meditated a siege in earnest; his only hope
was that in the first alarm part of the besieging army of
Capua would march to Rome and thus give him an oppor-
tunity of breaking up the blockade. Accordingly after a
brief stay he departed. The Romans saw in his withdrawal
a miraculous intervention of the gods, who by portents and
visions had compelled the wicked man to depart, when in truth
the Roman legions were unable to compel him ; at the spot
where Hannibal had approached nearest to the city, at the
second milestone on the Appian Way in front of the
Capenegate, with grateful credulity the Romans erected an
altar to the god “who turned back and protected ”
(Rediculus Tutanus). Hannibal in reality retreated, because
this was part of his plan, and directed his march towards Capua.
But the Roman generals had not committed the mistake on
which their opponent had reckoned ; the legions remained
unmoved in the lines round Capua, and only a weak corps
had been detached on the news of Hannibal's march towards
Rome. When Hannibal learned this, he suddenly turned
against the consul Publius Galba, who had imprudently
followed him from Rome, and with whom he had hitherto
avoided an engagement, vanquished him, and took his
camp by storm.
But this was a poor compensation for the now inevitable
fall of Capua. Long had its citizens, particularly the better
classes, anticipated with sorrowful forebodings what was
coming; the senate-house and the administration of the city
were left almost exclusively to the leaders of the popular
party hostile to Rome. Now despair seized high and low,
Campanians and Phoenicians alike. Twenty-eight senators
chose a voluntary death; the remainder gave over the city
to the discretion of an implacably exasperated foe. Of
course a bloody retribution had to follow; the only discus-
sion was as to whether the process should be long or short:
whether the wiser and more appropriate course was to probe
Capua
capitulates.
340 THE WAR UNDER HANNIBAL BOOK III
Superiority
of the
Romans.
to the bottom the further ramifications of the treason even
beyond Capua, or to terminate the matter by rapid execu-
tions. Appius Claudius and the Roman senate wished to
take the former course; the latter view, perhaps the less
inhuman, prevailed. Fifty-three of the officers and magis-
trates of Capua were scourged and beheaded in the market-
places of Cales and Teanum by the orders and before the
eyes of the proconsul Quintus Flaccus, the rest of the
senators were imprisoned, numbers of the citizens were sold
into slavery, and the estates of the more wealthy were con-
fiscated. Similar penalties were inflicted upon Atella and
Calatia. These punishments were severe; but, when regard
is had to the importance of the revolt of Capua from Rome,
and to what was the ordinary if not warrantable usage of
war in those times, they were not unnatural. And had not
the citizens themselves pronounced their own sentence,
when immediately after their defection they put to death
all the Roman citizens present in Capua at the time of the
revolt P But it was unjustifiable in Rome to embrace this
opportunity of gratifying the secret rivalry that had long
subsisted between the two largest cities of Italy, and of
wholly annihilating, in a political point of view, her hated
and envied competitor by abolishing the constitution of the
Campanian city.
Immense was the impression produced by the fall of Capua,
and all the more that it had not been brought about by
surprise, but by a two years' siege carried on in spite of all
the exertions of Hannibal. It was quite as much a token
that the Romans had recovered their ascendency in Italy,
as its defection some years before to Hannibal had been a
token that that ascendency was lost. In vain Hannibal
had tried to counteract the impression of this news on his
allies by the capture of Rhegium or of the citadel of Taren-
tum. His forced march to surprise Rhegium had yielded
no result. The citadel of Tarentum suffered greatly from
CHAP. VI FROM CANNAE TO ZAMA 34I
famine, after the Tarentino-Carthaginian squadron closed
the harbour; but, as the Romans with their much more
powerful fleet were able to cut off the supplies from that
squadron itself, and the territory, which Hannibal com-
manded, scarce sufficed to maintain his army, the besiegers
on the side next the sea suffered not much less than did the
besieged in the citadel, and at length they left the harbour.
No enterprise was now successful; Fortune herself seemed
to have deserted the Carthaginians. These consequences
of the fall of Capua-the deep shock given to the respect
and confidence which Hannibal had hitherto enjoyed
among the Italian allies, and the endeavours made by
every community that was not too deeply compromised
to gain readmission on tolerable terms into the Roman
symmachy—affected Hannibal much more keenly than the
immediate loss. He had to choose one of two courses;
either to throw garrisons into the wavering towns, in which
case he would weaken still more his army already too
weak and would expose his trusty troops to destruction in
small divisions or to treachery—500 of his select Numidian
horsemen were put to death in this way in 544 on the 210.
defection of the town of Salapia ; or to pull down and burn
the towns which could not be depended on, so as to keep
them out of the enemy's hands—a course, which could not
raise the spirits of his Italian clients. On the fall of Capua
the Romans felt themselves once more confident as to the
final issue of the war in Italy; they despatched considerable
reinforcements to Spain, where the existence of the Roman
army was placed in jeopardy by the fall of the two Scipios;
and for the first time since the beginning of the war they
ventured on a diminution in the total number of their
troops, which had hitherto been annually augmented not-
withstanding the annually-increasing difficulty of levying
thcm, and had risen at last to 23 legions. Accordingly in
the next year (544) the Italian war was prosecuted more 210.
342 THE WAR UNDER HANNIBAL BOOK [ ] I
209.
Tarentum
capitulates.
Hannibal
driven
back.
remissly than hitherto by the Romans, although Marcus
Marcellus had after the close of the Sicilian war resumed
the command of the main army; he applied himself to the
besieging of fortresses in the interior, and had indecisive
conflicts with the Carthaginians. The struggle for the
Acropolis of Tarentum also continued without decisive
result. In Apulia Hannibal succeeded in defeating the
proconsul Gnaeus Fulvius Centumalus at Herdoneae. In
the following year (545) the Romans took steps to regain
possession of the second large city, which had passed over
to Hannibal, the city of Tarentum. While Marcus
Marcellus continued the struggle against Hannibal in
person with his wonted obstinacy and energy, and in a two
days’ battle, beaten on the first day, achieved on the second
a costly and bloody victory; while the consul Quintus
Fulvius induced the already wavering Lucanians and Hir-
pinians to change sides and to deliver up their Phoeni-
cian garrisons; while well-conducted razzias from Rhegium
compelled Hannibal to hasten to the aid of the hard-
pressed Bruttians; the veteran Quintus Fabius, who had
once more—for the fifth time—accepted the consulship
and along with it the commission to reconquer Tarentum,
established himself firmly in the neighbouring Messapian
territory, and the treachery of a Bruttian division of the
garrison surrendered to him the city. Fearful excesses
were committed by the exasperated victors. They put to
death all of the garrison or of the citizens whom they could
find, and pillaged the houses. 30, ooo Tarentines are said
to have been sold as slaves, and 3ooo talents (4,730, ooo)
are stated to have been sent to the state treasury. It
was the last feat in arms of the general of eighty years;
Hannibal arrived to the relief of the city when all was
over, and withdrew to Metapontum.
After Hannibal had thus lost his most important acquisi-
tions and found himself hemmed in by degrees to the
CHAP. VI FROM CANNAE TO ZAMA 343
south-western point of the peninsula, Marcus Marcellus, who
had been chosen consul for the next year (546), hoped that,
in connection with his capable colleague Titus Quintius
Crispinus, he should be able to terminate the war by a
decisive attack. The old soldier was not disturbed by the
burden of his sixty years; sleeping and waking he was
haunted by the one thought of defeating Hannibal and of
liberating Italy. But fate reserved that wreath of victory
for a younger brow. While engaged in an unimportant
reconnaissance in the district of Venusia, both consuls
were suddenly attacked by a division of African cavalry.
Marcellus maintained the unequal struggle—as he had
fought forty years before against Hamilcar and fourteen
years before at Clastidium—till he sank dying from his
horse ; Crispinus escaped, but died of his wounds received
in the conflict (546).
It was now the eleventh year of the war. The danger
which some years before had threatened the very existence
of the state seemed to have vanished ; but all the more
the Romans felt the heavy burden—a burden pressing
more severely year after year—of the endless war. The
finances of the state suffered beyond measure. After the
battle of Cannae (538) a special bank-commission (tres vizi
mensarii) had been appointed, composed of men held in
the highest esteem, to form a permanent and circumspect
board of superintendence for the public finances in these
difficult times. It may have done what it could ; but the
state of things was such as to baffle all financial sagacity.
At the very beginning of the war the Romans had debased
the silver and copper coin, raised the legal value of the
silver piece more than a third, and issued a gold coin far
above the value of the metal. This very soon proved
insufficient; they were obliged to take supplies from the
contractors on credit, and connived at their conduct
because they needed them, till the scandalous malversation
208.
Death of
Marcellus.
208.
Pressure of
the war.
216.
344 THIE WAR UNDER HANNIBAL BOOK III
214.
214.
210.
at last induced the aediles to make an example of Some of
the worst by impeaching them before the people. Appeals
were often made, and not in vain, to the patriotism of the
wealthy, who were in fact the very persons that suffered
comparatively the most. The soldiers of the better classes
and the subaltern officers and equites in a body, either
voluntarily or constrained by the esprit de corps, declined
to receive pay. The owners of the slaves armed by the
state and manumitted after the engagement at Beneventum
(p. 335) replied to the bank-commission, which offered
them payment, that they would allow it to stand Över to
the end of the war (540). When there was no longer
money in the exchequer for the celebration of the national
festivals and the repairs of the public buildings, the
companies which had hitherto contracted for these matters
declared themselves ready to continue their services for a
time without remuneration (540). A fleet was even fitted
out and manned, just as in the first Punic war, by means
of a voluntary loan among the rich (544). They spent the
moneys belonging to minors; and at length, in the year of
the conquest of Tarentum, they laid hands on the last
long-spared reserve fund (24, 164, ooo). The state never-
theless was unable to meet its most necessary payments;
the pay of the soldiers fell dangerously into arrear, parti-
cularly in the more remote districts. But the embarrass-
ment of the state was not the worst part of the material
distress. Everywhere the fields lay fallow : even where the
war did not make havoc, there was a want of hands for the
hoe and the sickle. The price of the medimnus (a bushel
and a half) had risen to 15 demarii (Ios.), at least three
times the average price in the capital; and many would
have died of absolute want, if supplies had not arrived
from Egypt, and if, above all, the revival of agriculture in
Sicily (p. 314) had not prevented the distress from coming
to the worst. The effect which such a state of things must
CHAP. VI FROM CANNAE TO ZAMA 345
have had in ruining the small farmers, in eating away the
savings which had been so laboriously acquired, and in
converting flourishing villages into nests of beggars and
brigands, is illustrated by similar wars of which fuller
details have been preserved.
Still more ominous than this material distress was the
increasing aversion of the allies to the Roman war, which
consumed their substance and their blood. In regard to
the non-Latin communities, indeed, this was of less conse-
quence. The war itself showed that they could do nothing,
so long as the Latin nation stood by Rome; their greater
or less measure of dislike was not of much moment.
Now, however, Latium also began to waver. Most of the
Latin communes in Etruria, Latium, the territory of the
Marsians, and northern Campania—and so in those very
districts of Italy which directly had suffered least from the
war—announced to the Roman senate in 545 that thence-
forth they would send neither contingents nor contributions,
and would leave it to the Romans themselves to defray the
costs of a war waged in their interest. The consternation
in Rome was great ; but for the moment there were no
means of compelling the refractory. Fortunately all the
Latin communities did not act in this way. The colonies
in the land of the Gauls, in Picenum, and in southern Italy,
headed by the powerful and patriotic Fregellae, declared
on the contrary that they adhered the more closely and
faithfully to Rome; in fact, it was very clearly evident to
all of these that in the present war their existence was, if
possible, still more at stake than that of the capital, and
that this war was really waged not for Rome merely, but
for the Latin hegemony in Italy, and in truth for the
independence of the Italian nation. That partial defection
itself was certainly not high treason, but merely, the result
of shortsightedness and exhaustion; beyond doubt these
same towns would have rejected with horror an alliance
The allies,
209.
(``
346 THE WAR UNDER HANNIBAL BOOK III
Hasdru-
bal's
approach.
208.
New arma-
IllentS.
with the Phoenicians. But still there was a variance
between Romans and Latins, which did not fail injuriously
to react on the subject population of these districts. A
dangerous ferment immediately showed itself in Arretium ;
a conspiracy Organized in the interest of Hannibal among
the Etruscans was discovered, and appeared so perilous
that Roman troops were ordered to march thither. The
military and police suppressed this movement without
difficulty; but it was a significant token of what might
happen in those districts, if once the Latin strongholds
ceased to inspire terror.
Amidst these difficulties and strained relations, news
suddenly arrived that Hasdrubal had crossed the Pyrenees
in the autumn of 546, and that the Romans must be pre-
pared to carry on the war next year with both the sons of
Hamilcar in Italy. Not in vain had Hannibal persevered at
his post throughout the long anxious years ; the aid, which
the factious opposition at home and the shortsighted Philip
had refused to him, was at length in the course of being
brought to him by his brother, who, like himself, largely in-
herited the spirit of Hamilcar. Already 8ooo Ligurians,
enlisted by Phoenician gold, were ready to unite with
Hasdrubal ; if he gained the first battle, he might hope
that like his brother he should be able to bring the Gauls
and perhaps the Etruscans into arms against Rome. Italy,
moreover, was no longer what it had been eleven years
before ; the state and the individual citizens were exhausted,
the Latin league was shaken, their best general had just
fallen in the field of battle, and Hannibal was not sub-
dued. In reality Scipio might bless the star of his genius,
if it averted the consequences of his unpardonable blunder
from himself and from his country.
As in the times of the utmost danger, Rome once more
called out twenty-three legions. Volunteers were summoned
to arm, and those legally exempt from military service were
CHAP. VI FROM CANNAE TO ZAMA 347
included in the levy. Nevertheless, they were taken by
surprise. Far earlier than either friends or foes expected,
Hasdrubal was on the Italian side of the Alps (547); the
Gauls, now accustomed to such transits, were readily bribed
to open their passes, and furnished what the army required.
If the Romans had any intention of occupying the outlets
of the Alpine passes, they were again too late; already
they heard that Hasdrubal was on the Po, that he was
calling the Gauls to arms as successfully as his brother had
formerly done, that Placentia was invested. With all haste
the consul Marcus Livius proceeded to the northern army;
and it was high time that he should appear. Etruria and
Umbria were in sullen ferment; volunteers from them re-
inforced the Phoenician army. His colleague Gaius Nero
summoned the praetor Gaius Hostilius Tubulus from
Venusia to join him, and hastened with an army of 40, ooo
men to intercept the march of Hannibal to the north.
The latter collected all his forces in the Bruttian territory,
and, advancing along the great road leading from Rhegium
to Apulia, encountered the consul at Grumentum. An
obstinate engagement took place in which Nero claimed
the victory; but Hannibal was able at all events, although
with some loss, to evade the enemy by one of his usual
adroit flank-marches, and to reach Apulia without hindrance.
There he halted, and encamped at first at Venusia, then
at Canusium : Nero, who had followed closely in his steps,
encamped opposite to him at both places. That Hannibal
voluntarily halted and was not prevented from advancing
by the Roman army, appears to admit of no doubt; the
reason for his taking up his position exactly at this point
and not farther to the north, must have depended on
arrangements concerted between himself and Hasdrubal,
or on conjectures as to the route of the latter's march,
with which we are not acquainted. While the two armics
thus lay inactive, face to face, the despatch from Hasdrubal
Hasdrubal
and
Hannibal
on the
march.
207.
348 THE WAR UNIDER HANNIBAL BOOK III
Hattle of
Sena.
which was anxiously expected in Hannibal's camp was
intercepted by the outposts of Nero. It stated that
Hasdrubal intended to take the Flaminian road, in other
Words, to keep in the first instance along the coast and
then at Fanum to turn across the Apennines towards
Narnia, at which place he hoped to meet Hannibal. Nero
immediately ordered the reserve in the capital to proceed
to Narnia as the point selected for the junction of the two
Phoenician armies, while the division stationed at Capua
went to the capital, and a new reserve was formed there.
Convinced that Hannibal was not acquainted with the
purpose of his brother and would continue to await him
in Apulia, Nero resolved on the bold experiment of
hastening northward by forced marches with a small but
Select corps of 7ooo men and, if possible, in connection
with his colleague, compelling Hasdrubal to fight. He
was able to do so, for the Roman army which he left
behind still continued strong enough either to hold its
ground against Hannibal if he should attack it, or to ac-
company him and to arrive simultaneously with him at the
decisive Scene of action, should he depart.
Nero found his colleague Marcus Livius at Sena Gallica
awaiting the enemy. Both consuls at once marched against
Hasdrubal, whom they found occupied in crossing the Me-
taurus. Hasdrubal wished to avoid a battle and to escape
from the Romans by a flank movement, but his guides left
him in the lurch; he lost his way on the ground strange to
him, and was at length attacked on the march by the
Roman cavalry and detained until the Roman infantry
arrived and a battle became inevitable. Hasdrubal stationed
the Spaniards on the right wing, with his ten elephants in
front of it, and the Gauls on the left, which he kept back.
Long the fortune of battle wavered on the right wing, and
the consul Livius who commanded there was hard pressed,
till Nero, repeating his strategical operation as a tactical
CHAP. VI FROM CANNAE TO ZAMA 349
manoeuvre, allowed the motionless enemy opposite to him
to remain as they stood, and marching round his own army
fell upon the flank of the Spaniards. This decided the
day. The severely bought and very bloody victory was
complete; the army, which had no retreat, was destroyed,
and the camp was taken by assault. Hasdrubal, when he
saw the admirably-conducted battle lost, sought and found
like his father an honourable soldier's death. As an
officer and a man, he was worthy to be the brother of
Hannibal.
On the day after the battle Nero started, and after
scarcely fourteen days’ absence once more confronted
Hannibal in Apulia, whom no message had reached, and
who had not stirred. The consul brought the message
with him ; it was the head of Hannibal’s brother, which
the Roman ordered to be thrown into the enemy's outposts,
repaying in this way his great antagonist, who scorned to
war with the dead, for the honourable burial which he had
given to Paullus, Gracchus, and Marcellus. Hannibal saw
that his hopes had been in vain, and that all was over.
He abandoned Apulia and Lucania, even Metapontum, and
retired with his troops to the land of the Bruttians, whose
ports formed his only means of withdrawal from Italy. By
the energy of the Roman generals, and still more by a con-
juncture of unexampled good fortune, a peril was averted
from Rome, the greatness of which justified Hannibal's
tenacious perseverance in Italy, and which fully bears com-
parison with the magnitude of the peril of Cannae. The
joy in Rome was boundless; business was resumed as in
time of peace; every one felt that the danger of the war
was surmounted.
Nevertheless the Romans were in no hurry to terminate
the war. The state and the citizens were exhausted by the
excessive moral and matcrial strain on thcir energics ; men
gladly abandoned themselves to carelessness and repose.
Death of
Hasdrubal.
Hannibal
retires
to the
Bruttian
territory.
Stagnation
of the war
in Italy.
350 THE WAR UNDER HANNIBAL BOOK III
206.
205.
205.
205.
The army and fleet were reduced ; the Roman and Latin
farmers were brought back to their desolate homesteads ;
the exchequer was filled by the sale of a portion of the
Campanian domains. The administration of the state was
regulated anew and the disorders which had prevailed were
done away; the repayment of the voluntary war-loan was
begun, and the Latin communities that remained in arrears
were compelled to fulfil their neglected obligations with
heavy interest.
The war in Italy made no progress. It forms a brilliant
proof of the strategic talent of Hannibal as well as of the
incapacity of the Roman generals now opposed to him, that
after this he was still able for four years to keep the field in
the Bruttian country, and that all the superiority of his
opponents could not compel him either to shut himself up
in fortresses or to embark. It is true that he was obliged
to retire farther and farther, not so much in consequence
of the indecisive engagements which took place with the
Romans, as because his Bruttian allies were always becoming
more troublesome, and at last he could only reckon on the
towns which his army garrisoned. Thus he voluntarily
abandoned Thurii; Locri was, on the suggestion of Publius
Scipio, recaptured by an expedition from Rhegium (549).
As if at last his projects were to receive a brilliant justifica-
tion at the hands of the very Carthaginian authorities who
had thwarted him in them, these now, in their apprehension
as to the anticipated landing of the Romans, revived of their
own accord those plans (548, 549), and sent reinforcements
and subsidies to Hannibal in Italy, and to Mago in Spain,
with orders to rekindle the war in Italy so as to achieve
some further respite for the trembling possessors of the
Libyan country houses and the shops of Carthage. An
embassy was likewise sent to Macedonia, to induce Philip
to renew the alliance and to land in Italy (549). But it
was too late. Philip had made peace with Rome some
CHAP. VI FROM CANNAE TO ZAMA 35I
months before; the impending political annihilation of
Carthage was far from agreeable to him, but he took no
step openly at least against Rome. A small Macedonian
corps went to Africa, the expenses of which, according to
the assertion of the Romans, were defrayed by Philip from
his own pocket; this may have been the case, but the
Romans had at any rate no proof of it, as the subsequent
course of events showed. No Macedonian landing in Italy
was thought of
Mago, the youngest son of Hamilcar, set himself to his
task more earnestly. With the remains of the Spanish
army, which he had conducted in the first instance to
Minorca, he landed in 549 at Genoa, destroyed the city,
and summoned the Ligurians and Gauls to arms. Gold
and the novelty of the enterprise led them now, as always,
to come to him in troops; he had formed connections
even throughout Etruria, where political prosecutions never
ceased. But the troops which he had brought with him
were too few for a serious enterprise against Italy proper;
and Hannibal likewise was much too weak, and his influence
in Lower Italy had fallen much too low, to permit him to
advance with any prospect of success. The rulers of
Carthage had not been willing to save their native country,
when its salvation was possible; now, when they were
willing, it was possible no longer. y
Nobody probably in the Roman senate doubted either
that the war on the part of Carthage against Rome was
at an end, or that the war on the part of Rome against
Carthage must now be begun ; but unavoidable as was the
expedition to Africa, they were afraid to enter on its prepara-
tion. They required for it, above all, an able and beloved
leader ; and they had none. Their best generals had either
fallen in the field of battle, or they were, like Quintus Fabius
and Quintus Fulvius, too old for such an entirely new and
probably tedious war. The victors of Sena, Gaius Nero
Mago in
Italy.
205.
The
African
expedition
of Scipio.
352 THE WAR UNIDER HANNIBAL BOOK III
205.
and Marcus Livius, would perhaps have been equal to the
task, but they were both in the highest degree unpopular
aristocrats; it was doubtful whether they would succeed
in procuring the command—matters had already reached
such a pass that ability, as such, determined the popular
choice only in times of grave anxiety—and it was more
than doubtful whether these were the men to stimulate the
exhausted people to fresh exertions. At length Publius
Scipioreturned from Spain, and the favourite of the multitude,
who had so brilliantly fulfilled, or at any rate seemed to have
fulfilled, the task with which it had entrusted him, was
immediately chosen consul for the next year. He entered
on office (549) with the firm determination of now realizing
that African expedition which he had projected in Spain.
In the senate, however, not only was the party favourable
to a methodical conduct of the war unwilling to entertain
the project of an African expedition so long as Hannibal
remained in Italy, but the majority was by no means
favourably disposed towards the young general himself.
His Greek refinement and his modern culture and tone of
thought were but little agreeable to the austere and some-
what boorish fathers of the city; and serious doubts existed
both as to his conduct of the Spanish war and as to his
military discipline. How much ground there was for the
objection that he showed too great indulgence towards his
officers of division, was very soon demonstrated by the dis-
graceful proceedings of Gaius Pleminius at Locri, the blame
of which certainly was indirectly chargeable to the scandal-
ous negligence which marked Scipio's supervision. In the
proceedings in the Senate regarding the organization of the
African expedition and the appointment of a general for
it, the new consul, wherever usage or the constitution came
into conflict with his private views, showed no great reluc-
tance to set such obstacles aside, and very clearly indicated
that in case of need he was disposed to rely for support
CHAP. VI FROM CANNAE TO ZAMA 353
against the governing board on his fame and his popularity
with the people. These things could not but annoy the
senate and awaken, moreover, serious apprehension as to
whether, in the impending decisive war and the eventual
negotiations for peace with Carthage, such a general would
hold himself bound by the instructions which he received—
an apprehension which his arbitrary management of the
Spanish expedition was by no means fitted to allay. Both
sides, however, displayed wisdom enough not to push
matters too far. The senate itself could not fail to see that
the African expedition was necessary, and that it was not
wise indefinitely to postpone it; it could not fail to see
that Scipio was an extremely able officer and so far well
adapted to be the leader in such a war, and that he, if any one,
could prevail on the people to protract his command as
long as was necessary and to put forth their last energies.
The majority came to the resolution not to refuse to Scipio
the desired commission, after he had previously observed,
at least in form, the respect due to the supreme governing
board and had submitted himself beforehand to the decree
of the senate. Scipio was to proceed this year to Sicily to
superintend the building of the fleet, the preparation of
siege materials, and the formation of the expeditionary
army, and then in the following year to land in Africa. For
this purpose the army of Sicily—still composed of those
two legions that were formed from the remnant of the army
of Cannae—was placed at his disposal, because a weak
garrison and the fleet were quite sufficient for the protection
of the island; and he was permitted moreover to raise
volunteers in Italy. It was evident that the senate did not
appoint the expedition, but merely allowed it : Scipio did
not obtain half the resources which had formerly been
placed at the command of Regulus, and he got that very
Corps which for years had becn subjected by the senate to
intentional degradation. The African army was, in the
WOL. II 55
354 THE WAR UNIDER HANNIBAL BOOK III
204.
Prepara-
tions in
Africa.
view of the majority of the senate, a forlorn hope of disrated
companies and volunteers, the loss of whom in any event
the state had no great occasion to regret. -
Any one else than Scipio would perhaps have declared
that the African expedition must either be undertaken with
other means, or not at all; but Scipio's confidence accepted
the terms, whatever they were, solely with the view of attain-
ing the eagerly-coveted command. He carefully avoided,
as far as possible, the imposition of direct burdens on the
people, that he might not injure the popularity of the expedi-
tion. Its expenses, particularly those of building the fleet
which were considerable, were partly procured by what was
termed a voluntary contribution of the Etruscan cities—that
is, by a war tribute imposed as a punishment on the Arretines
and other communities disposed to favour the Phoenicians—
partly laid upon the cities of Sicily. In forty days the fleet
was ready for sea. The crews were reinforced by volunteers,
of whom seven thousand from all parts of Italy responded
to the call of the beloved officer. So Scipio set sail for
Africa in the spring of 55o with two strong legions of veterans
(about 30,000 men), 40 vessels of war, and 4oo transports,
and landed successfully, without meeting the slightest re-
sistance, at the Fair Promontory in the neighbourhood of
Utica.
The Carthaginians, who had long expected that the
plundering expeditions, which the Roman squadrons had fre-
quently made during the last few years to the African coast,
would be followed by a more serious invasion, had not only,
in order to ward it off, endeavoured to bring about a revival
of the Italo-Macedonian war, but had also made armed pre-
paration at home to receive the Romans. Of the two rival
Berber kings, Massinissa of Cirta (Constantine), the ruler
of the Massylians, and Syphax of Siga (at the mouth of the
Tafna westward from Oran), the ruler of the Massaesylians,
they had succeeded in attaching the latter, who was far the
CHAP. VI FROM CANNAE TO ZAMA 355
more powerful and hitherto had been friendly to the Romans,
by treaty and marriage alliance closely to Carthage, while
they cast off the other, the old rival of Syphax and ally of
the Carthaginians. Massinissa had after desperate resistance
succumbed to the united power of the Carthaginians and of
Syphax, and had been obliged to leave his territories a prey
to the latter; he himself wandered with a few horsemen in
the desert. Besides the contingent to be expected from
Syphax, a Carthaginian army of 20, ooo foot, 6ooo cavalry,
and 14o elephants—Hanno had been sent out to hunt
elephants for the very purpose—was ready to fight for the
protection of the capital, under the command of Hasdrubal
son of Gisgo, a general who had gained experience in Spain;
in the port there lay a strong fleet. A Macedonian corps
under Sopater, and a consignment of Celtiberian mercenaries,
were immediately expected.
On the report of Scipio's landing, Massinissa immediately
arrived in the camp of the general, whom not long before he
had confronted as an enemy in Spain; but the landless
prince brought in the first instance nothing beyond his per-
sonal ability to the aid of the Romans, and the Libyans, al-
though heartily weary of levies and tribute, had acquired too
bitter experience in similar cases to declare at once for the
invaders. So Scipio began the campaign. So long as he
was only opposed by the weaker Carthaginian army, he had
the advantage, and was enabled after Some successful cavalry
skirmishes to proceed to the siege of Utica; but when Syphax
arrived, according to report with 50,000 infantry and Io, ooo
cavalry, the siege had to be raised, and a fortified naval camp
had to be constructed for the winter on a promontory, which
easily admitted of entrenchment, between Utica and Carthage.
Here the Roman general passed the winter of 550–1. From
the disagreeable situation in which the spring found him he
cxtricated himself by a fortunate coup de main. The Africans,
lulled into security by proposals of peace suggested by Scipio
Scipio
driven
back to the
COaSt.
20 (-203,
356 THE WAR UNIDER HANNIBAL BOOK III
Surprise
of the
Carthagi-
nian camp.
Negotia-
tions for
peace.
with more artifice than honour, allowed themselves to be
surprised on one and the same night in their two camps; the
reed huts of the Numidians burst into flames, and, when the
Carthaginians hastened to their help, their own camp shared
the same fate; the fugitives were slain without resistance by
the Roman divisions. This nocturnal surprise was more
destructive than many a battle; nevertheless the Carthagi-
nians did not suffer their courage to sink, and they rejected
even the advice of the timid, or rather of the judicious, to
recall Mago and Hannibal. Just at this time the expected
Celtiberian and Macedonian auxiliaries arrived; it was re-
solved once more to try a pitched battle on the “Great
Plains,” five days' march from Utica. Scipio hastened to
accept it; with little difficulty his veterans and volunteers
dispersed the hastily-collected host of Carthaginians and
Numidians, and the Celtiberians, who could not reckon on
any mercy from Scipio, were cut down after obstinate resist-
ance. After this double defeat the Africans could no longer
keep the field. An attack on the Roman naval camp
attempted by the Carthaginian fleet, while not unsuccessful,
was far from decisive, and was greatly outweighed by the
capture of Syphax, which Scipio's singular good fortune
threw in his way, and by which Massinissa became to the
Romans what Syphax had been at first to the Carthaginians.
After such defeats the Carthaginian peace party, which
had been reduced to silence for sixteen years, was able
once more to raise its head and openly to rebel against the
government of the Barcides and the patriots. Hasdrubal
son of Gisgo was in his absence condemned by the
government to death, and an attempt was made to obtain
an armistice and peace from Scipio. He demanded the
cession of their Spanish possessions and of the islands of
the Mediterranean, the transference of the kingdom of
Syphax to Massinissa, the surrender of all their vessels of
war except 20, and a war contribution of 4000 talents
CHAP. VI FROM CANNAE TO ZAMA 357
(nearly £1,000,ooo)—terms which seemed so singularly
favourable to Carthage, that the question obtrudes itself
whether they were offered by Scipio more in his own
interest or in that of Rome. The Carthaginian plenipoten-
tiaries accepted them under reservation of their being
ratified by the respective authorities, and accordingly a
Carthaginian embassy was despatched to Rome. But
the patriot party in Carthage were not disposed to give up
the struggle so cheaply; faith in the nobleness of their
cause, confidence in their great leader, even the example
that had been set to them by Rome herself, stimulated
them to persevere, apart from the fact that peace of ne-
cessity involved the return of the opposite party to the
helm of affairs and their own consequent destruction. The
patriotic party had the ascendency among the citizens; it
was resolved to allow the opposition to negotiate for peace,
and meanwhile to prepare for a last and decisive effort.
Orders were sent to Mago and Hannibal to return with all
speed to Africa. Mago, who for three years (549–551)
had been labouring to bring about a coalition in Northern
Machina-
tions of
the Car-
thaginian
patriots.
205-203.
Italy against Rome, had just at this time in the territory of
the Insubres (about Milan) been defeated by the far
superior double army of the Romans. The Roman cavalry
had been brought to give way, and the infantry had been
thrown into confusion ; victory seemed on the point of
declaring for the Carthaginians, when a bold attack by a
Roman troop on the enemy's elephants, and above all a
serious wound received by their beloved and able com-
mander, turned the fortune of the battle. The Phoenician
army was obliged to retreat to the Ligurian coast, where it
received and obeyed the order to embark; but Mago died
of his wound on the voyage.
Hannibal would probably have anticipated the order,
had not the last negotiations with Philip presented to him
a renewed prospect of rendering better service to his
Hannibal
recalled to
Africa.
358 THE WAR UNIDER HANNIBAL BOOK III
203.
country in Italy than in Libya; when he received it at
Croton, where he latterly had his head-quarters, he lost no
time in complying with it. He caused his horses to be
put to death as well as the Italian soldiers who refused to
follow him over the sea, and embarked in the transports
that had been long in readiness in the roadstead of Croton.
The Roman citizens breathed freely, when the mighty
Libyan lion, whose departure no one even now ventured to
compel, thus voluntarily turned his back on Italian ground.
On this occasion the decoration of a grass wreath was
bestowed by the senate and burgesses on the only survivor
of the Roman generals who had traversed that troubled
time with honour, the veteran of nearly ninety years,
Quintus Fabius. To receive this wreath—which by the
custom of the Romans the army that a general had saved
presented to its deliverer—at the hands of the whole
community was the highest distinction which had ever been
bestowed upon a Roman citizen, and the last honorary
decoration accorded to the old general, who died in the
course of that same year (551). Hannibal, doubtless not
under the protection of the armistice, but solely through
his rapidity of movement and good fortune, arrived at
Leptis without hindrance, and the last of the “lion's brood.”
of Hamilcar trode once more, after an absence of thirty-six
years, his native soil. He had left it, when still almost a
boy, to enter on that noble and yet so thoroughly fruitless
career of heroism, in which he had set out towards the
west to return homewards from the east, having described
a wide circle of victory around the Carthaginian sea. Now,
when what he had wished to prevent, and what he would
have prevented had he been allowed, was done, he was
summoned to help and if possible, to save; and he obeyed
without complaint or reproach.
On his arrival the patriot party came forward openly;
the disgraceful sentence against Hasdrubal was cancelled ;
CHAP. VI FROM CANNAE TO ZAMA 359
new connections were formed with the Numidian sheiks
through the dexterity of Hannibal; and not only did the
assembly of the people refuse to ratify the peace practically
concluded, but the armistice was broken by the plundering
of a Roman transport fleet driven ashore on the African
coast, and by the seizure even of a Roman vessel of war
carrying Roman envoys. In just indignation Scipio started
from his camp at Tunes (552) and traversed the rich
valley of the Bagradas (Mejerdah), no longer allowing the
townships to capitulate, but causing the inhabitants of the
villages and towns to be seized en masse and sold. He
had already penetrated far into the interior, and was at
Naraggara (to the west of Sicca, now El Kef, on the frontier
between Tunis and Algiers), when Hannibal, who had
marched out from Hadrumetum, fell in with him. The
Carthaginian general attempted to obtain better conditions
from the Roman in a personal conference; but Scipio, who
had already gone to the extreme verge of concession, could
not possibly after the breach of the armistice agree to
yield further, and it is not credible that Hannibal had any
other object in this step than to show to the multitude that
the patriots were not absolutely opposed to peace. The
conference led to no result.
The two armies accordingly came to a decisive battle at
Zama (presumably not far from Sicca)." Hannibal arranged
his infantry in three lines; in the first rank the Cartha-
ginian hired troops, in the second the African militia and
the Phoenician civic force along with the Macedonian
corps, in the third the veterans who had followed him from
Italy. In front of the line were placed the 80 elephants;
the cavalry were stationed on the wings. Scipio likewise
* Of the two places bearing this name, the more westerly, situated
about 60 miles west of Hadrumetum, was probably the scene of the battle
(comp. Hermes, xx. 144, 318). The time was tlie spring or summer of
the year 552 ; the fixing of the day as the 19th October, on account of
the alleged solar eclipse, is of no account.
Recom-
men Cennent
Of
hostilities.
202.
Battle of
Zama.
202.
360 THE WAR UNIDER HANNIBAL BOOK III
Peace.
disposed his legions in three ranks, as was the wont of the
Romans, and so arranged them that the elephants could
pass through and alongside of the line without breaking it.
Not only was this disposition completely successful, but
the elephants making their way to the side disordered also
the Carthaginian cavalry on the wings, so that Scipio's
cavalry—which moreover was by the arrival of Massinissa’s
troops rendered far superior to the enemy—had little
trouble in dispersing them, and were soon engaged in full
pursuit. The struggle of the infantry was more severe.
The conflict lasted long between the first ranks on either
side; at length in the extremely bloody hand-to-hand
encounter both parties fell into confusion, and were obliged
to seek a support in the second ranks. The Romans
found that support; but the Carthaginian militia showed
itself so unsteady and wavering, that the mercenaries
believed themselves betrayed and a hand-to-hand combat
arose between them and the Carthaginian civic force.
But Hannibal now hastily withdrew what remained of the
first two lines to the flanks, and pushed forward his choice
Italian troops along the whole line. Scipio, on the other
hand, gathered together in the centre as many of the first
line as still were able to fight, and made the second and
third ranks close up on the right and left of the first.
Once more on the same spot began a still more fearful
conflict; Hannibal’s old soldiers never wavered in spite of
the superior numbers of the enemy, till the cavalry of the
Romans and of Massinissa, returning from the pursuit of
the beaten cavalry of the enemy, surrounded them on all
sides. This not only terminated the struggle, but anni-
hilated the Phoenician army; the same soldiers, who
fourteen years before had given way at Cannae, had re-
taliated on their conquerors at Zama. With a handful of
men Hannibal arrived, a fugitive, at Hadrumetum.
After this day folly alone could counsel a continuance
CHAP. VI FROM CANNAE TO ZAMA 361
of the war on the part of Carthage. On the other hand it
was in the power of the Roman general immediately to
begin the siege of the capital, which was neither protected
nor provisioned, and, unless unforeseen accidents should
intervene, now to subject Carthage to the fate which
Hannibal had wished to bring upon Rome. Scipio did
not do so; he granted peace (553), but no longer upon
the former terms. Besides the concessions which had
already in the last negotiations been demanded in favour
of Rome and of Massinissa, an annual contribution of 2 oo
talents (448, ooo) was imposed for fifty years on the
Carthaginians; and they had to bind themselves that they
would not wage war against Rome or its allies or indeed
beyond the bounds of Africa at all, and that in Africa they
would not wage war beyond their own territory without
having sought the permission of Rome—the practical effect
of which was that Carthage became tributary and lost her
political independence. It even appears that the Cartha-
ginians were bound in certain cases to furnish ships of war
to the Roman fleet.
Scipio has been accused of granting too favourable
conditions to the enemy, lest he might be obliged to hand
over the glory of terminating the most severe war which
Rome had waged, along with his command, to a successor.
The charge might have had some foundation, had the first
proposals been carried out ; it seems to have no warrant
in reference to the second. His position in Rome was
not such as to make the favourite of the people, after the
victory of Zama, seriously apprehensive of recall—already
before the victory an attempt to supersede him had been
referred by the senate to the burgesses, and by them
decidedly rejected. Nor do the conditions themselves
warrant such a charge. The Carthaginian city never, after
its hands were thus fied and a powerful neighbour was
placed by its side, made even an attempt to withdraw from
:
:
.
*
º
:
201.
&
:
*
tº
‘.
:
:
362 THE WAR UNIDER HANNIBAL BOOK III
Roman supremacy, still less to enter into rivalry with
Rome; besides, every one who cared to know knew that
the war just terminated had been undertaken much more
by Hannibal than by Carthage, and that it was absolutely
impossible to revive the gigantic plan of the patriot party.
It might seem little in the eyes of the vengeful Italians,
that only the five hundred surrendered ships of war
perished in the flames, and not the hated city itself; spite
and pedantry might contend for the view that an opponent
is only really vanquished when he is annihilated, and
might censure the man who had disdained to punish more
thoroughly the crime of having made Romans tremble.
Scipio thought otherwise; and we have no reason and
therefore no right to assume that the Roman was in this
instance influenced by vulgar motives rather than by the
noble and magnanimous impulses which formed part of
his character. It was not the consideration of his own
possible recall or of the mutability of fortune, nor was it
any apprehension of the outbreak of a Macedonian war at
certainly no distant date, that prevented the self-reliant
and confident hero, with whom everything had hitherto
succeeded beyond belief, from accomplishing the destruction
of the unhappy city, which fifty years afterwards his adopted
grandson was commissioned to execute, and which might
indeed have been equally well accomplished now. It is
much more probable that the two great generals, on whom
the decision of the political question now devolved, offered
and accepted peace on such terms in order to set just and
reasonable limits on the one hand to the furious venge-
ance of the victors, on the other to the obstinacy and
imprudence of the vanquished. The noble-mindedness and
statesmanlike gifts of the great antagonists are no less
apparent in the magnanimous submission of Hannibal to
what was inevitable, than in the wise abstinence of Scipio
from an extravagant and insulting use of victory. Is it to
*g
:
CHAP. VI FROM CANNAE TO ZAMA 363
be supposed that one so generous, unprejudiced, and
intelligent should not have asked himself of what benefit it
could be to his country, now that the political power of the
Carthaginian city was annihilated, utterly to destroy that
ancient seat of commerce and of agriculture, and wickedly
to overthrow one of the main pillars of the then existing
civilization ? The time had not yet come when the first
men of Rome lent themselves to destroy the civilization of
their neighbours, and frivolously fancied that they could
wash away from themselves the eternal infamy of the
nation by shedding an idle tear.
Thus ended the second Punic or, as the Romans more
correctly called it, the Hannibalic war, after it had
devastated the lands and islands from the Hellespont to
the Pillars of Hercules for seventeen years. Before this
war the policy of the Romans had no higher aim than to
acquire command of the mainland of the Italian peninsula
within its natural boundaries, and of the Italian islands and
seas; it is clearly proved by their treatment of Africa on
the conclusion of peace that they also terminated the war
with the impression, not that they had laid the foundation
of sovereignty over the states of the Mediterranean or of
the so-called universal empire, but that they had rendered
a dangerous rival innocuous and had given to Italy
agreeable neighbours. It is true doubtless that other
results of the war, the conquest of Spain in particular,
little accorded with such an idea; but their very successes
led them beyond their proper design, and it may in
fact be affirmed that the Romans came into possession of
Spain accidentally. The Romans achieved the sovereignty
of Italy, because they strove for it; the hegemony—and
the sovereignty which grew out of it—over the territories of
the Mediterranean was to a certain extent thrown into the
hands of the Romans by the force of circumstances without
intention on their part to acquire it.
Results of
the war.
364 THE WAR UNIDER HANNIBAL BOOK III
Out of
Italy.
In Italy.
The immediate results of the war out of Italy were, the
conversion of Spain into two Roman provinces—which,
however, were in perpetual insurrection ; the union of the
hitherto dependent kingdom of Syracuse with the Roman
province of Sicily; the establishment of a Roman instead
of a Carthaginian protectorate over the most important
Numidian chiefs; and lastly the conversion of Carthage
from a powerful commercial state into a defenceless mer-
cantile town. In other words, it established the uncon-
tested hegemony of Rome over the western region of the
Mediterranean. Moreover, in its further development, it
led to that necessary contact and interaction between
the state systems of the east and the west, which the first
Punic war had only foreshadowed; and thereby gave rise
to the proximate decisive interference of Rome in the
conflicts of the Alexandrine monarchies.
As to its results in Italy, first of all the Celts were now
certainly, if they had not been already beforehand, destined
to destruction ; and the execution of the doom was only a
question of time. Within the Roman confederacy the
effect of the war was to bring into more distinct prominence
the ruling Latin nation, whose internal union had been tried
and attested by the peril which, notwithstanding isolated
instances of wavering, it had surmounted on the whole in
faithful fellowship ; and to depress still further the non-
Latin or non-Latinized Italians, particularly the Etruscans
and the Sabellians of Lower Italy. The heaviest punish-
ment or rather vengeance was inflicted partly on the most
powerful, partly on those who were at once the earliest and
latest, allies of Hannibal—the community of Capua, and
the land of the Bruttians. The Capuan constitution was
abolished, and Capua was reduced from the second city
into the first village of Italy; it was even proposed to raze
the city and level it with the ground. The whole soil,
with the exception of a few possessions of foreigners or of
CHAP. VI FROM CANNAE TO ZAMA 365
Campanians well disposed towards Rome, was declared by
the senate to be public domain, and was thereafter parcelled
out to small occupiers on temporary lease. The Picentes
on the Silarus were similarly treated ; their capital was
razed, and the inhabitants were dispersed among the sur-
rounding villages. The doom of the Bruttians was still
more severe ; they were converted en masse into a sort
of bondsmen to the Romans, and were for ever excluded
from the right of bearing arms. The other allies of Han-
nibal also dearly expiated their offence. The Greek cities
suffered severely, with the exception of the few which had
steadfastly adhered to Rome, such as the Campanian
Greeks and the Rhegines. Punishment not much lighter
awaited the Arpanians and a number of other Apulian,
Lucanian, and Samnite communities, most of which lost
portions of their territory. On a part of the lands thus
acquired new colonies were settled. Thus in the year 560
a succession of burgess-colonies was sent to the best ports
of Lower Italy, among which Sipontum (near Manfredonia)
and Croton may be named, as also Salernum placed in the
former territory of the southern Picentes and destined to
hold them in check, and above all Puteoli, which soon
became the seat of the genteel vil/eggiatura and of the
traffic in Asiatic and Egyptian luxuries. Thurii became a
Latin fortress under the new name of Copia (560), and the
rich Bruttian town of Vibo under the name of Valentia
(562). The veterans of the victorious army of Africa were
settled singly on various patches of land in Samnium and
Apulia ; the remainder was retained as public land, and the
pasture stations of the grandees of Rome replaced the
gardens and arable fields of the farmers. As a matter of
course, moreover, in all the communities of the peninsula
the persons of note who were not well affected to Rome
were got rid of, so far as this could be accomplished by
political processes and confiscations of property. Every-
194.
194.
192.
366 THE WAR UNIDER HANNIBAL BOOK III
200.
197.
199.
184.
where in Italy the non-Latin allies felt that their name
was meaningless, and that they were thenceforth subjects
of Rome; the vanquishing of Hannibal was felt as a second
subjugation of Italy, and all the exasperation and all the
arrogance of the victor vented themselves especially on the
Italian allies who were not Latin. Even the colourless
Roman comedy of this period, well subjected as it was to
police control, bears traces of this. When the subjugated
towns of Capua and Atella were abandoned without restraint
to the unbridled wit of the Roman farce, so that the latter
town became its very stronghold, and when other writers of
comedy jested over the fact that the Campanian serfs had
already learned to survive amidst the deadly atmosphere in
which even the hardiest race of slaves, the Syrians, pined
away; such unfeeling mockeries re-echoed the scorn
of the victors, but not less the cry of distress from
the down-trodden nations. The position in which matters
stood is shown by the anxious carefulness, which during
the ensuing Macedonian war the senate evinced in the
watching of Italy, and by the reinforcements which were
despatched from Rome to the most important colonies, to
Venusia in 554, Narnia in 555, Cosa in 557, and Cales
shortly before 570.
What blanks were produced by war and famine in the
ranks of the Italian population, is shown by the example of
the burgesses of Rome, whose numbers during the war had
fallen almost a fourth. The statement, accordingly, which
puts the whole number of Italians who fell in the war under
Hannibal at 3oo, ooo, seems not at all exaggerated. Of
course this loss fell chiefly on the flower of the burgesses,
who in fact furnished the élite as well as the mass of the
combatants. How fearfully the senate in particular was
thinned, is shown by the filling up of its complement after
the battle of Cannae, when it had been reduced to 123
persons, and was with difficulty restored to its normal state
CHAP. VI FROM CANNAE TO ZAMA 367
by an extraordinary nomination of 177 senators. That,
moreover, the seventeen years' war, which had been carried
on simultaneously in all districts of Italy and towards all
the four points of the compass abroad, must have shaken
to the very heart the national economy, is, as a general
position, clear; but our tradition does not suffice to
illustrate it in detail. The state no doubt gained by the
confiscations, and the Campanian territory in particular
thenceforth remained an inexhaustible source of revenue to
the state; but by this extension of the domain system the
national prosperity of course lost just about as much as at
other times it had gained by the breaking up of the state
lands. Numbers of flourishing townships—four hundred,
it was reckoned—were destroyed and ruined ; the capital
laboriously accumulated was consumed ; the population
were demoralized by camp life; the good old traditional
habits of the burgesses and farmers were undermined from
the capital down to the smallest village. Slaves and des-
peradoes associated themselves in robber-bands, of the
dangers of which an idea may be formed from the fact
that in a single year (569) 7ooo men had to be condemned
for highway robbery in Apulia alone ; the extension of the
pastures, with their half-savage slave-herdsmen, favoured
this mischievous barbarizing of the land. Italian agricul-
ture saw its very existence endangered by the proof, first
afforded in this war, that the Roman people could be
supported by grain from Sicily and from Egypt instead of
that which they reaped themselves. .
Nevertheless the Roman, whom the gods had allowed
to survive the close of that gigantic struggle, might look
with pride to the past and with confidence to the future.
Many errors had been committed, but much suffering
had also been endured; the people, whose whole youth
capable of arms had for ten years hardly laid aside shield
or sword, might excuse many faults. The living of
368 THE WAR UNDER HANNIPAL BOOK III
different nations side by side in peace and amity upon the
whole — although maintaining an attitude of mutual
antagonism—which appears to be the aim of modern
phases of national life, was a thing foreign to antiquity.
In ancient times it was necessary to be either anvil or
hammer; and in the final struggle between the victors
victory remained with the Romans. Whether they would
have the judgment to use it rightly—to attach the Latin
nation by still closer bonds to Rome, gradually to Latinize
Italy, to rule their dependents in the provinces as subjects
and not to abuse them as slaves, to reform the constitution,
to reinvigorate and to enlarge the tottering middle class—
many a one might ask. If they should know how to use
it, Italy might hope to see happy times, in which prosperity
based on personal exertion under favourable circumstances,
and the most decisive political supremacy over the then
civilized world, would impart a just self-reliance to every
member of the great whole, furnish a worthy aim for every
ambition, and open a career for every talent. It would,
no doubt, be otherwise, should they fail to use aright their
victory. But for the moment doubtful voices and gloomy
apprehensions were silent, when from all quarters the
warriors and victors returned to their homes ; thanks-
givings and amusements, and rewards to the soldiers and
burgesses were the order of the day; the released prisoners
of war were sent home from Gaul, Africa, and Greece;
and at length the youthful conqueror moved in splendid
procession through the decorated streets of the capital, to
deposit his laurels in the house of the god by whose direct
inspiration, as the pious whispered one to another, he had
been guided in counsel and in action.
CHAP. VII FROM THE PEACE OF HANNIBAL 369
CHAPTER VII
THE WEST FROM THE PEACE OF HANNIBAL TO
THE CLOSE OF THE THIRD PERIOD
THE war waged by Hannibal had interrupted Rome in
the extension of her dominion to the Alps or to the
boundary of Italy, as was even now the Roman phrase, and
in the organization and colonizing of the Celtic territories.
It was self-evident that the task would now be resumed
at the point where it had been broken off, and the Celts
were well aware of this. In the very year of the conclusion
of peace with Carthage (553) hostilities had recommenced
in the territory of the Boii, who were the most immediately
exposed to danger ; and a first success obtained by them
over the hastily-assembled Roman levy, coupled with the
persuasions of a Carthaginian officer, Hamilcar, who had
been left behind from the expedition of Mago in northern
Italy, produced in the following year (554) a general
insurrection spreading beyond the two tribes immediately
threatened, the Boii and Insubres. The Ligurians were
driven to arms by the nearer approach of the danger, and
even the youth of the Cenomani on this occasion listened
less to the voice of their cautious chiefs than to the urgent
appeal of their kinsmen who were in peril. Of “the two
barriers against the raids of the Gauls,” Placentia and
Cremona, the former was sacked—not more than 2 ooo
of the inhabitants of Placentia saved their lives—and
VOL. II 56
Subjuga-
tion of the
valley of
the Po.
Celtic
WarS.
201.
200.
370 FROM THE PEACE OF HANNIBAL BOOK III
199.
198.
197.
196.
the second was invested. In haste the legions advanced
to save what they could. A great battle took place before
Cremona. The dexterous management and the professional
skill of the Phoenician leader failed to make up for the
deficiencies of his troops; the Gauls were unable to with-
stand the onset of the legions, and among the numerous
dead who covered the field of battle was the Cartha-
ginian officer. The Celts, nevertheless, continued the
struggle; the same Roman army which had conquered at
Cremona was next year (555), chiefly through the fault
of its careless leader, almost destroyed by the Insubres;
and it was not till 556 that Placentia could be partially
re-established. But the league of the cantons associated
for the desperate struggle suffered from intestine discord ;
the Boii and Insubres quarrelled, and the Cenomani not
only withdrew from the national league, but purchased
their pardon from the Romans by a disgraceful betrayal
of their countrymen ; during a battle in which the Insubres
engaged the Romans on the Mincius, the Cenomani
attacked in rear, and helped to destroy, their allies and
comrades in arms (557). Thus humbled and left in the
lurch, the Insubres, after the fall of Comum, likewise
consented to conclude a separate peace (558). The
conditions, which the Romans prescribed to the Cenomani
and Insubres, were certainly harder than they had been
in the habit of granting to the members of the Italian
confederacy; in particular, they were careful to confirm
by law the barrier of separation between Italians and
Celts, and to enact that never should a member of these
two Celtic tribes be capable of acquiring the citizenship
of Rome. But these Transpadane Celtic districts were
allowed to retain their existence and their national
constitution—so that they formed not town-domains,
but tribal Cantons—and no tribute, as it would seem, was
imposed on them. They were intended to serve as a
chap. vii TO THE CLOSE OF THE THIRD PERIOD 371
bulwark for the Roman settlements south of the Po, and
to ward off from Italy the incursions of the migratory
northern tribes and the aggressions of the predatory
inhabitants of the Alps, who were wont to make regular
razzias in these districts. The process of Latinizing,
moreover, made rapid progress in these regions; the
Celtic nationality was evidently far from able to oppose
such resistance as the more civilized nations of Sabellians
and Etruscans. The celebrated Latin comic poet Statius
Caecilius, who died in 586, was a manumitted Insubrian ;
and Polybius, who visited these districts towards the close
of the sixth century, affirms, not perhaps without some
exaggeration, that in that quarter only a few villages
among the Alps remained Celtic. The Veneti, on the
other hand, appear to have retained their nationality
longer.
The chief efforts of the Romans in these regions were
naturally directed to check the immigration of the Trans-
alpine Celts, and to make the natural wall, which separates
the peninsula from the interior of the continent, also its
political boundary. That the terror of the Roman name
had already penetrated to the adjacent Celtic cantons
beyond the Alps, is shown not only by the totally passive
attitude which they maintained during the annihilation or
subjugation of their Cisalpine countrymen, but still more
by the official disapproval and disavowal which the Trans-
alpine cantons—we shall have to think primarily of the
Helvetii (between the lake of Geneva and the Main) and
the Carni or Taurisci (in Carinthia and Styria)—expressed
to the envoys from Rome, who complained of the attempts
made by isolated Celtic bands to settle peacefully on the
Roman side of the Alps. Not less significant was the
humble spirit in which these same bands of emigrants first
came to the Roman senate entreating an assignment of
land, and then without remonstrance obeyed the rigorous
168.
Measures
adopted to
check the
immigra-
tions of the
Trans-
alpine
Gauls.
372 FROM THE PEACE OF HANNIBAL BOOK III
186-179.
183-181.
178. 177.
Colonizing
Of the
region on
the south
of the Po.
194.
order to return over the Alps (568-575), and allowed the
town, which they had already founded not far from the
later Aquileia, to be again destroyed. With wise severity
the senate permitted no sort of exception to the principle
that the gates of the Alps should be henceforth closed for
the Celtic nation, and visited with heavy penalties those
Roman subjects in Italy, who had instigated any such
schemes of immigration. An attempt of this kind which
was made on a route hitherto little known to the Romans,
in the innermost recess of the Adriatic, and still more, as it
would seem, the project of Philip of Macedonia for in-
vading Italy from the east as Hannibal had done from the
west, gave occasion to the founding of a fortress in the
extreme north-eastern corner of Italy—Aquileia, the most
northerly of the Italian colonies (571–573)—which was
intended not only to close that route for ever against
foreigners, but also to secure the command of the gulf
which was specially convenient for navigation, and to check
the piracy which was still not wholly extirpated in those
waters. The establishment of Aquileia led to a war with
the Istrians (576, 577), which was speedily terminated by
the storming of some strongholds and the fall of the king,
Aepulo, and which was remarkable for nothing except for
the panic, which the news of the surprise of the Roman
camp by a handful of barbarians called forth in the fleet
and throughout Italy.
A different course was adopted with the region on the
south of the Po, which the Roman senate had determined
to incorporate with Italy. The Boii, who were immediately
affected by this step, defended themselves with the resolu-
tion of despair. They even crossed the Po and made an
attempt to rouse the Insubres once more to arms (560);
they blockaded a consul in his camp, and he was on the
point of succumbing ; Placentia maintained itself with
difficulty against the constant assaults of the exasperated
cHAP. vii TO THE CLOSE OF THE THIRD PERIOD 373
J
natives. At length the last battle was fought at Mutina;
it was long and bloody, but the Romans conquered (561);
and thenceforth the struggle was no longer a war, but a
slave-hunt. The Roman camp soon was the only asylum
in the Boian territory; thither the better part of the still
surviving population began to take refuge; and the victors
were able, without much exaggeration, to report to
Rome that nothing remained of the nation of the Boii but
old men and children. The nation was thus obliged to
resign itself to the fate appointed for it. The Romans
demanded the cession of half the territory (563); the
demand could not be refused, and even within the
diminished district which was left to the Boii, they soon dis-
appeared, and amalgamated with their conquerors.”
After the Romans had thus cleared the ground for
themselves, the fortresses of Placentia and Cremona, whose
colonists had been in great part swept away or dispersed
by the troubles of the last few years, were reorganized, and
new settlers were sent thither. The new foundations were,
in or near the former territory of the Senones, Potentia
1. According to the account of Strabo these Italian Boii were driven by
the Romans over the Alps, and from them proceeded that Boian settle-
ment in what is now Hungary about Stein am Anger and Oedenburg, which
was attacked and annihilated in the time of Augustus by the Getae who
crossed the Danube, but which bequeathed to this district the name of the
Boian desert. This account is far from agreeing with the well-attested
representation of the Roman annals, according to which the Romans
were content with the cession of half the territory; and, in order to explain
the disappearance of the Italian Boii, we have really no need to assume a
violent expulsion—the other Celtic peoples, although visited to a far less
extent by war and colonization, disappeared not much less rapidly and
totally from the ranks of the Italian nations. On the other hand, other
accounts suggest the derivation of those Boii on the Neusiedler See from the
main stock of the nation, which formerly had its seat in Bavaria and
Bohemia before Germanic tribes pushed it towards the south. But it is
altogether very doubtful whether the Boii, whom we find near Bordeaux,
on the Po, and in Bohemia, were really scattered branches of one stock,
or whether this is not an instance of mere similarity of name. The hypo-
thesis of Strabo may have rested on nothing else than an inference from
the similarity of name—an inference such as the ancients drew, often with-
out due reason, in the case of the Cimbri, Veneti, and others.
193.
191.
374 FROM THE PEACE OF HANNIBAL BOOK III
184.
1S4.
189. 183.
183.
187.
171.
187.
Liguria.
(near Recanati not far from Ancona : in 570) and Pisaurum
(Pesaro; in 570), and, in the newly acquired district of the
Boii, the fortresses of Bononia (565), Mutina (571), and
Parma (571); the colony of Mutina had been already
instituted before the war under Hannibal, but that war had
interrupted the completion of the settlement. The con-
struction of fortresses was associated, as was always the
case, with the formation of military roads. The Flaminian
way was prolonged from its northern termination at
Ariminum, under the name of the Aemilian way, to
Placentia (567). Moreover, the road from Rome to
Arretium or the Cassian way, which perhaps had already
been long a municipal road, was taken in charge and con-
structed anew by the Roman community probably in 583 ;
while in 567 the track from Arretium over the Apennines
to Bononia as far as the new Aemilian road had been put
in order, and furnished a shorter communication between
Rome and the fortresses on the Po. By these comprehen-
sive measures the Apennines were practically superseded as
the boundary between the Celtic and Italian territories,
and were replaced by the Po. South of the Po there
henceforth prevailed mainly the urban constitution of the
Italians, beyond it mainly the cantonal constitution of the
Celts; and, if the district between the Apennines and the
Po was still reckoned Celtic land, it was but an empty
Ina Iſle.
In the north-western mountain-land of Italy, whose
valleys and hills were occupied chiefly by the much-sub-
divided Ligurian stock, the Romans pursued a similar
course. Those dwelling immediately to the north of the
Arno were extirpated. This fate befell chiefly the Apuani,
who dwelt on the Apennines between the Arno and the
Magra, and incessantly plundered on the one side the
territory of Pisae, on the other that of Bononia and Mutina.
Those who did not fall victims in that quarter to the sword
cHAP. vii TO THE CLOSE OF THE THIRD PERIOD 375
of the Romans were transported into Lower Italy to the
region of Beneventum (574); and by energetic measures
the Ligurian nation, from which the Romans were obliged
in 578 to recover the colony of Mutina which it had con-
quered, was completely Crushed in the mountains which
separate the valley of the Po from that of the Arno. The
fortress of Luna (not far from Spezzia), established in 577
in the former territory of the Apuani, protected the frontier
against the Ligurians just as Aquileia did against the
Transalpines, and gave the Romans at the same time an
excellent port which henceforth became the usual station
for the passage to Massilia and to Spain. The construction
of the coast or Aurelian road from Rome to Luna, and of
the cross road carried from Luca by way of Florence to
Arretium between the Aurelian and Cassian ways, probably
belongs to the same period.
With the more western Ligurian tribes, who held the
Genoese Apennines and the Maritime Alps, there were
incessant conflicts. They were troublesome neighbours,
accustomed to pillage by land and by sea : the Pisans and
Massiliots suffered no little injury from their incursions and
their piracies. But no permanent results were gained
amidst these constant hostilities, or perhaps even aimed
at ; except apparently that, with a view to have a com-
munication by land with Transalpine Gaul and Spain in
addition to the regular route by sea, the Romans en-
deavoured to clear the great coast road from Luna by way
of Massilia to Emporiae, at least as far as the Alps—beyond
the Alps it devolved on the Massiliots to keep the coast
navigation open for Roman vessels and the road along the
shore open for travellers by land. The interior with its
impassable valleys and its rocky fastnesses, and with its
poor but dexterous and crafty inhabitants, served the
Romans mainly as a school of war for the training and
hardening of soldiers and officers. •
180.
176.
177.
376 FROM THE PEACE OF HANNIBAL BOOK III
Corsica.
Sardinia.
177.
Carthage.
Wars as they are called, of a similar character with
those against the Ligurians, were waged with the Corsicans
and to a still greater extent with the inhabitants of the
interior of Sardinia, who retaliated for the predatory ex-
peditions directed against them by sudden attacks on the
districts along the coast. The expedition of Tiberius
Gracchus against the Sardinians in 577 was specially held
in remembrance, not so much because it gave “peace”
to the province, as because he asserted that he had slain
or captured as many as 8o, ooo of the islanders, and
dragged slaves thence in such multitudes to Rome that
“cheap as a Sardinian * became a proverb. -
In Africa the policy of Rome was substantially summed
up in the one idea, as short-sighted as it was narrow-
minded, that she ought to prevent the revival of the power
of Carthage, and ought accordingly to keep the unhappy
city constantly oppressed and apprehensive of a declaration
of war suspended over it by Rome like the sword of
Damocles. The stipulation in the treaty of peace, that
the Carthaginians should retain their territory undiminished,
but that their neighbour Massinissa should have all those
possessions guaranteed to him which he or his predecessor
had possessed within the Carthaginian bounds, looks
almost as if it had been inserted not to obviate, but to
provoke disputes. The same remark applies to the
obligation imposed by the Roman treaty of peace on the
Carthaginians not to make war upon the allies of Rome;
so that, according to the letter of the treaty, they were not
even entitled to expel their Numidian neighbours from
their own undisputed territory. With such stipulations
and amidst the uncertainty of African frontier questions
in general, the situation of Carthage in presence of a
neighbour equally powerful and unscrupulous and of a
liege lord who was at Once umpire and party in the cause,
could not but be a painful one ; but the reality was worse
CHAP. vii TO THE CLOSE OF THE THIRD PERIOD 377
than the worst expectations. As early as 561 Carthage
found herself suddenly assailed under frivolous pretexts,
and saw the richest portion of her territory, the province of
Emporiae on the Lesser Syrtis, partly plundered by the
Numidians, partly even seized and retained by them.
Encroachments of this kind were multiplied; the level
country passed into the hands of the Numidians, and the
Carthaginians with difficulty maintained themselves in the
larger places. Within the last two years alone, the Cartha-
ginians declared in 582, seventy villages had been again
wrested from them in opposition to the treaty. Embassy
after embassy was despatched to Rome; the Carthaginians
adjured the Roman senate either to allow them to
defend themselves by arms, or to appoint a court of
arbitration with power to enforce their award, or to
regulate the frontier anew that they might at least learn
once for all how much they were to lose; otherwise
it were better to make them Roman subjects at once
than thus gradually to deliver them over to the Libyans.
But the Roman government, which already in 554 had
held forth a direct prospect of extension of territory to
their client, of course at the expense of Carthage, seemed
to have little objection that he should himself take the
booty destined for him ; they moderated perhaps at times
the too great impetuosity of the Libyans, who now
retaliated fully on their old tormentors for their former
sufferings; but it was in reality for the very sake of
inflicting this torture that the Romans had assigned
Massinissa as a neighbour to Carthage. All the requests
and complaints had no result, except either that Roman
commissions made their appearance in Africa and after a
thorough investigation came to no decision, or that in the
negotiations at Rome the envoys of Massinissa pretended a
want of instructions and the matter was adjourned.
Phoenician patience alone was able to submit meekly to
193.
172.
200.
378 FROM THE PEACE OF HANNIBAL BOOK III
Hannibal.
Reform of
the Car-
thaginian
constitu-
tion.
195.
reorganized by the collection of arrears and of embezzled
such a position, and, even to exhibit towards the despotic
victors every attention and courtesy, solicited or unsolicited,
with unwearied perseverance. The Carthaginians especially
courted Roman favour by sending supplies of grain.
This pliability on the part of the vanquished, however,
was not mere patience and resignation. There was still in
Carthage a patriotic party, and at its head stood the man,
who, wherever fate placed him, was still dreaded by the
Romans. It had not abandoned the idea of resuming the
struggle by taking advantage of those complications that
might be easily foreseen between Rome and the eastern
powers; and, as the failure of the magnificent scheme of
Hamilcar and his sons had been due mainly to the Cartha-
ginian oligarchy, the chief object was internally to rein-
vigorate the country for this new struggle. The salutary
influence of adversity, and the clear, noble, and commanding
mind of Hannibal, effected political and financial reforms.
The oligarchy, which had filled up the measure of its guilty
follies by raising a criminal process against the great
general, charging him with having intentionally abstained
from the capture of Rome and with embezzlement of the
Italian spoil—that rotten oligarchy was, on the proposition
of Hannibal, overthrown, and a democratic government was
introduced such as was suited to the circumstances of the
citizens (before 559). The finances were so rapidly
moneys and by the introduction of better control, that the
contribution due to Rome could be paid without burdening
the citizens in any way with extraordinary taxes. The
Roman government, just then on the point of beginning its
critical war with the great-king of Asia, observed the
progress of these events, as may easily be conceived, with
apprehension; it was no imaginary danger that the Cartha-
ginian fleet might land in Italy and a second war under
Hannibal might spring up there, while the Roman legions
CHAP. vii TO THE CLOSE OF THE THIRD PERIOD 379
were fighting in Asia Minor. We can scarcely, therefore,
censure the Romans for sending an embassy to Carthage
(in 559) which was presumably charged to demand the
surrender of Hannibal. The spiteful Carthaginian oligarchs,
who sent letter after letter to Rome to denounce to the
national foe the hero who had overthrown them as having
entered into secret communications with the powers
unfriendly to Rome, were contemptible, but their informa-
tion was probably correct; and, true as it was that that
embassy involved a humiliating confession of the dread
with which the simple shofete of Carthage inspired so
powerful a people, and natural and honourable as it was
that the proud conqueror of Zama should take exception
in the Senate to so humiliating a step, still that confession
was nothing but the simple truth, and Hannibal was of a
genius so extraordinary, that none but sentimental politicians
in Rome could tolerate him longer at the head of the
Carthaginian state. The marked recognition thus accorded
to him by the Roman government scarcely took himself by
surprise. As it was Hannibal and not Carthage that had
carried on the last war, so it was he who had to bear the
fate of the vanquished. The Carthaginians could do
nothing but submit and be thankful that Hannibal, sparing
them the greater disgrace by his speedy and prudent flight
to the east, left to his ancestral city merely the lesser
disgrace of having banished its greatest citizen for ever
from his native land, confiscated his property, and razed
his house. The profound saying that those are the
favourites of the gods, on whom they lavish infinite joys
and infinite sorrows, thus verified itself in full measure in
the case of Hannibal.
A graver responsibility than that arising out of their pro-
ceedings against Hannibal attaches to the Roman govern-
ment for their persistence in suspecting and tormcriting the
city after his removal. Parties indeed fermented there as
Hannibal's
flight.
195.
Continued
irritation
in Rome
towards
Carthage.
38O FROM THE PEACE OF HANNII3AL BOOK III
187.
201.
193.
before ; but, after the withdrawal of the extraordinary man
who had wellnigh changed the destinies of the world, the
patriot party was not of much more importance in Carthage
than in Aetolia or Achaia. The most rational of the
various ideas which then agitated the unhappy city was
beyond doubt that of attaching themselves to Massinissa,
and of converting him from the oppressor into the protector
of the Phoenicians. But neither the national section of
the patriots nor the section with Libyan tendencies attained
the helm ; on the contrary the government remained in the
hands of the oligarchs friendly to Rome, who, so far as
they did not altogether renounce thought of the future,
clung to the single idea of saving the material welfare and
the communal freedom of Carthage under Roman protec-
tion. With this state of matters the Romans might well
have been content. But neither the multitude, nor even
the ruling lords of the average stamp, could rid themselves
of the profound alarm produced by the Hannibalic war;
and the Roman merchants with envious eyes beheld the
city even now, when its political power was gone, possessed
of extensive commercial dependencies and of a firmly
established wealth which nothing could shake. Already in
567 the Carthaginian government offered to pay up at once
the whole instalments stipulated in the peace of 55.3—an
offer which the Romans, who attached far more importance
to the having Carthage tributary than to the sums of money
themselves, naturally declined, and only deduced from it
the conviction that, in spite of all the trouble they had
taken, the city was not ruined and was not capable of ruin.
Fresh reports were ever circulating through Rome as to
the intrigues of the faithless Phoenicians. At one time it
was alleged that Aristo of Tyre had been seen in Carthage
as an emissary of Hannibal, to prepare the citizens for the
landing of an Asiatic war-fleet (561); at another, that the
council had, in a secret nocturnal sitting in the temple of
cHAP. vii TO THE CLOSE OF THE THIRD PERIOD 381
the God of Healing, given audience to the envoys of
Perseus (581); at another there was talk of the powerful
fleet which was being equipped in Carthage for the
Macedonian war (583). It is probable that these and
similar reports were founded on nothing more than, at
most, individual indiscretions; but still they were the
signal for new diplomatic ill usage on the part of Rome,
and for new aggressions on the part of Massinissa, and the
idea gained ground the more, the less sense and reason
there was in it, that the Carthaginian question would not
be settled without a third Punic war.
While the power of the Phoenicians was thus sinking in
the land of their choice, just as it had long ago succumbed
in their original home, a new state grew up by their side.
The northern coast of Africa has been inhabited from time
immemorial, and is inhabited still, by the people, who
themselves assume the name of Shilah or Tamazigt, whom
the Greeks and Romans call Nomades or Numidians, i.e.
the “pastoral ” people, and the Arabs call Berbers, although
they also at times designate them as “shepherds” (Shāwie),
and to whom we are wont to give the name of Berbers or
Kabyles. This people is, so far as its language has been
hitherto investigated, related to no other known nation.
In the Carthaginian period these tribes, with the exception
of those dwelling immediately around Carthage or
immediately on the coast, had on the whole maintained
their independence, and had also substantially retained
their pastoral and equestrian life, such as the inhabitants
of the Atlas lead at the present day; although they were
not strangers to the Phoenician alphabet and Phoenician
civilization generally (p. 141), and instances occurred in
which the Berber sheiks had their sons educated in
Carthage and intermarried with the families of the
Phoenician nobility. It was not the policy of the Romans
to have direct possessions of their own in Africa; they
173.
171.
Numi-
dians.
382 FROM THE PEACE OF HANNIBAL BOOK III
200.
Massinissa.
preferred to rear a state there, which should not be of
sufficient importance to be able to dispense with Roman
protection, and yet should be sufficiently strong to kcep
down the power of Carthage now that it was restricted to
Africa, and to render all freedom of movement impossible
for the tortured city. They found what they sought among
the native princes. About the time of the Hannibalic war
the natives of North Africa were subject to three principal
kings, each of whom, according to the custom there, had a
multitude of princes bound to follow his banner; Bocchar
king of the Mauri, who ruled from the Atlantic Ocean to
the river Molochath (now Mluia, on the boundary between
Morocco and the French territory); Syphax king of the
Massaesyli, who ruled from the last-named point to the
“Perforated Promontory,” as it was called (Seba Rús,
between Jijeli and Bona), in what are now the provinces
of Oran and Algiers; and Massinissa king of the Massyli,
who ruled from the Tretum Promontorium to the boundary
of Carthage, in what is now the province of Constantine.
The most powerful of these, Syphax king of Siga, had been
vanquished in the last war between Rome and Carthage and
carried away captive to Rome, where he died in captivity.
His wide dominions were mainly given to Massinissa;
although Vermina the son of Syphax by humble petition
recovered a small portion of his father's territory from the
Romans (554), he was unable to deprive the earlier ally of
the Romans of his position as the privileged oppressor
of Carthage.
Massinissa became the founder of the Numidian
kingdom; and seldom has choice or accident hit upon a
man so thoroughly fitted for his post. In body sound and
supple up to extreme old age ; temperate and sober like
an Arab ; capable of enduring any fatigue, of standing on
the same spot from morning to evening, and of sitting four-
and-twenty hours on horseback; tried alike as a soldier
cHAP. vii TO THE CLOSE OF THE THIRD PERIOD 383
and a general amidst the romantic vicissitudes of his youth
as well as on the battle-fields of Spain, and not less master
of the more difficult art of maintaining discipline in his
numerous household and order in his dominions; with
equal unscrupulousness ready to throw himself at the feet
of his powerful protector, or to tread under foot his weaker
neighbour ; and, in addition to all this, as accurately
acquainted with the circumstances of Carthage, where he
was educated and had been on familiar terms in the
noblest houses, as he was filled with an African bitterness
of hatred towards his own and his people's oppressors,
this remarkable man became the soul of the revival of his
nation, which had seemed on the point of perishing, and
of whose virtues and faults he appeared as it were a living
embodiment. Fortune favoured him, as in everything, so
especially in the fact, that it allowed him time for his work.
He died in the ninetieth year of his age (516–605), and in
the sixtieth year of his reign, retaining to the last the full
possession of his bodily and mental powers, leaving behind
him a son one year old and the reputation of having been
the strongest man and the best and most fortunate king of
his age.
We have already narrated how purposely and clearly the
Romans in their management of African affairs evinced
their taking part with Massinissa, and how zealously and con-
stantly the latter availed himself of the tacit permission to
enlarge his territory at the expense of Carthage. The whole
interior to the border of the desert fell to the native sove-
reign as it.were of its own accord, and even the upper valley of
the Bagradas (Mejerdah) with the rich town of Vaga became
subject to the king; on the coast also to the east oſ Carthage
he occupied the old Sidonian city of Great Leptis and other
districts, so that his kingdom stretched from the Mauretanian
to the Cyrenaean frontier, enclosed the Carthaginian terri-
tory on every side by land, and everywhere pressed, in the
238-149.
Extension
and civil-
ization of
Numidia.
384 FROM THE PEACE OF HIANNIBAL BOOK III
The State
of culture
in Spain.
closest vicinity, on the Phoenicians. It admits of no doubt,
that he looked on Carthage as his future capital; the Libyan
party there was significant. But it was not only by the
diminution of her territory that Carthage suffered injury.
The roving shepherds were converted by their great king
into another people. After the example of the king, who
brought the fields under cultivation far and wide and be-
queathed to each of his sons considerable landed estates, his
subjects also began to settle and to practise agriculture. As
he converted his shepherds into settled citizens, he converted
also his hordes of plunderers into soldiers who were deemed
by Rome worthy to fight side by side with her legions; and
he bequeathed to his successors a richly-filled treasury, a
well-disciplined army, and even a fleet. His residence Cirta
(Constantine) became the stirring capital of a powerful state,
and a chief seat of Phoenician civilization, which was zeal-
ously fostered at the court of the Berber king—fostered
perhaps studiously with a view to the future Carthagino-
Numidian kingdom. The hitherto degraded Libyan nation-
ality thus rose in its own estimation, and the native manners
and language made their way even into the old Phoenician
towns, such as Great Leptis. The Berber began, under the
aegis of Rome, to feel himself the equal or even the superior
of the Phoenician ; Carthaginian envoys at Rome had to
submit to be told that they were aliens in Africa, and that
the land belonged to the Libyans. The Phoenico-national
civilization of North Africa, which still retained life and vigour
even in the levelling times of the Empire, was far more the
work of Massinissa than of the Carthaginians.
In Spain the Greek and Phoenician towns along the coast,
such as Emporiae, Saguntum, New Carthage, Malaca, and
Gades, submitted to the Roman rule the more readily, that,
left to their own resources, they would hardly have been able
to protect themselves from the natives; as for similar reasons
Massilia, although far more important and more capable of
cIIAP. vii TO THE CLOSE OF THE THIRD PERIOD 385
self-defence than those towns, did not omit to secure a
powerful support in case of need by closely attaching itself to
the Romans, to whom it was in return very serviceable as an
intermediate station between Italy and Spain. The natives,
on the other hand, gave to the Romans endless trouble. It is
true that there were not wanting the rudiments of a national
Iberian civilization, although of its special character it is
scarcely possible for us to acquire any clear idea. We find
among the Iberians a widely diffused national writing, which
divides itself into two chief kinds, that of the valley of the
Ebro, and the Andalusian, and each of these was presumably
subdivided into various branches: this writing seems to have
originated at a very early period, and to be traceable rather
to the old Greek than to the Phoenician alphabet. There
is even a tradition that the Turdetani (round Seville) possessed
lays from very ancient times, a metrical book of laws of
6ooo verses, and even historical records; at any rate this
tribe is described as the most civilized of all the Spanish
tribes, and at the same time the least warlike ; indeed, it
regularly carried on its wars by means of foreign mercenaries.
To the same region probably we must refer the descriptions
given by Polybius of the flourishing condition of agriculture
and the rearing of cattle in Spain—so that, in the absence
of opportunity of export, grain and flesh were to be had at
nominal prices—and of the splendid royal palaces with
golden and silver jars full of “barley wine.” At least a
portion of the Spaniards, moreover, zealously embraced the
elements of culture which the Romans brought along with
them, so that the process of Latinizing made more rapid pro-
gress in Spain than anywhere else in the transmarine pro-
vinces. For example, warm baths after the Italian fashion
came into use even at this period among the natives. Roman
money, too, was to all appearance not only current in Spain
far earlier than elsewhere out of Italy, but was imitated in
Spanish coins; a circumstance in some measure explained by
VOL. II 57
386 FROM THE PEACE OF HANNIBAL BOOK III
195.
154.
the rich silver-mines of the country. The so-called “silver
of Osca” (now Huesca in Arragon), i.e. Spanish denarii with
Iberian inscriptions, is mentioned in 559 ; and the Com-
mencement of their coinage cannot be placed much later,
because the impression is imitated from that of the oldest
Roman denarii.
But, while in the southern and eastern provinces the
culture of the natives may have so far prepared the way
for Roman civilization and Roman rule that these en-
countered no serious difficulties, the west and north on the
other hand, and the whole of the interior, were occupied
by numerous tribes more or less barbarous, who knew little
of any kind of civilization—in Intercatia, for instance, the
use of gold and silver was still unknown about 60 o–and
who were on no better terms with each other than with the
Romans. A characteristic trait in these free Spaniards was
the chivalrous spirit of the men and, at least to an equal
extent, of the women. When a mother sent forth her son
to battle, she roused his spirit by the recital of the feats of
his ancestors; and the fairest maiden unasked offered her
hand in marriage to the bravest man. Single combat was
common, both with a view to determine the prize of valour,
and for the settlement of lawsuits; even disputes among
the relatives of princes as to the succession were settled in
this way. It not unfrequently happened that a well-known
warrior confronted the ranks of the enemy and challenged
an antagonist by name ; the defeated champion then
surrendered his mantle and sword to his opponent, and
even entered into relations of friendship and hospitality
with him. Twenty years after the close of the second
Punic war, the little Celtiberian community of Complega
(in the neighbourhood of the sources of the Tagus) sent a
message to the Roman general, that unless he sent to them
for every man that had fallen a horse, a mantle, and a
sword, it would fare ill with him. Proud of their military
CHAP. vii TO THE CLOSE OF THE THIRD PERIOD 387
honour, so that they frequently could not bear to survive
the disgrace of being disarmed, the Spaniards were never-
theless disposed to follow any one who should enlist their
services, and to stake their lives in any foreign quarrel.
The summons was characteristic, which a Roman general
well acquainted with the customs of the country sent to a
Celtiberian band fighting in the pay of the Turdetani
against the Romans—either to return home, or to enter the
Roman service with double pay, or to fix time and place
for battle. If no recruiting officer made his appearance,
they met of their own accord in free bands, with the view
of pillaging the more peaceful districts and even of captur-
ing and occupying towns, quite after the manner of the
Campanians. The wildness and insecurity of the inland
districts are attested by the fact that banishment into the
interior westward of Cartagena was regarded by the
Romans as a severe punishment, and that in periods of
any excitement the Roman commandants of Further Spain
took with them escorts of as many as 6ooo men. They
are still more clearly shown by the singular relations
subsisting between the Greeks and their Spanish neighbours
in the Graeco-Spanish double city of Emporiae, at the
eastern extremity of the Pyrenees. The Greek settlers,
who dwelt on the point of the peninsula separated on the
landward side from the Spanish part of the town by a wall,
took care that this wall should be guarded every night by a
third of their civic force, and that a higher official should
constantly superintend the watch at the only gate; no
Spaniard was allowed to set foot in the Greek city, and
the Greeks conveyed their merchandise to the natives only
in numerous and well-escorted companies.
These natives, full of restlessness and fond of war—full
of the spirit of the Cid and of Don Quixote—were now to
be tamed and, if possible, civilized by the Romans. In a
military point of view the task was not difficult. It is true
Wars be-
tween the
Romans
and
Spaniards.
388 FROM THE PEACE OF HANNIBAL BOOK III
The
Romans
maintain a
standing
army in
Spain.
that the Spaniards showed themselves, not only when
behind the walls of their cities or under the leadership of
Hannibal, but even when left to themselves and in the
open field of battle, no contemptible opponents; with their
short two-edged sword which the Romans subsequently
adopted from them, and their formidable assaulting
columns, they not unfrequently made even the Roman
legions waver, Had they been able to submit to military
discipline and to political combination, they might perhaps
have shaken off the foreign yoke imposed on them. But
their valour was rather that of the guerilla than of the
soldier, and they were utterly void of political judgment.
Thus in Spain there was no serious war, but as little was
there any real peace ; the Spaniards, as Caesar afterwards
very justly pointed out to them, never showed themselves
quiet in peace or strenuous in war. Easy as it was for a
Roman general to scatter a host of insurgents, it was
difficult for the Roman statesman to devise any suitable
means of really pacifying and civilizing Spain. In fact, he
could only deal with it by palliative measures; because the
only really adequate expedient, a comprehensive Latin
colonization, was not accordant with the general aim of
Roman policy at this period. -
The territory which the Romans acquired in Spain in
the course of the second Punic war was from the beginning
divided into two masses—the province formerly Cartha-
ginian, which embraced in the first instance the present
districts of Andalusia, Granada, Murcia, and Valencia, and
the province of the Ebro, or the modern Arragon and
Catalonia, the fixed quarters of the Roman army during
the last war. Out of these territories were formed the two
Roman provinces of Further and Hither Spain. The
Romans sought gradually to reduce to subjection the
interior corresponding nearly to the two Castiles, which
they comprehended under the general name of Celtiberia,
cHAP. vii TO THE CLOSE OF THE THIRD PERIOD 389
while they were content with checking the incursions of the
inhabitants of the western provinces, more especially those
of the Lusitanians in the modern Portugal and the Spanish
Estremadura, into the Roman territory; with the tribes on
the north coast, the Callaecians, Asturians, and Cantabrians,
they did not as yet come into contact at all. The territories
thus won, however, could not be maintained and secured
without a standing garrison, for the governor of Hither
Spain had no small trouble every year with the chastise-
ment of the Celtiberians, and the governor of the more
remote province found similar employment in repelling the
Lusitanians. It was needful accordingly to maintain in
Spain a Roman army of four strong legions, or about
4o, ooo men, year after year; besides which the general
levy had often to be called out in the districts occupied
by Rome, to reinforce the legions. This was of great
importance for two reasons: it was in Spain first, at least
first on any larger scale, that the military occupation of the
land became continuous; and it was there consequently
that the service acquired a permanent character. The old
Roman custom of sending troops only where the exigencies
of war at the moment required them, and of not keeping
the men called to serve, except in very serious and
important wars, under arms for more than a year, was
found incompatible with the retention of the turbulent and
remote Spanish provinces beyond the sea; it was absolutely
impossible to withdraw the troops from these, and very
dangerous even to relieve them extensively. The Roman
burgesses began to perceive that dominion over a foreign
people is an annoyance not only to the slave, but to the
master, and murmured loudly regarding the odious war-
service of Spain. While the new generals with good reason
refused to allow the relief of the existing corps as a whole, the
men mutinied and threatened that, if they were not allowed
their discharge, they would take it of their own accord.
390 FROM THE PEACE OF HANNIBAL BOOK III
Cato.
201.
197.
195.
The wars themselves, which the Romans waged in
Spain, were but of a subordinate importance. They began
with the very departure of Scipio (p. 332), and continued
as long as the war under Hannibal lasted. After the peace
with Carthage (in 553) there was a cessation of arms in the
peninsula ; but only for a short time. In 557 a general
insurrection broke out in both provinces ; the commander
of the Further province was hard pressed ; the commander
of Hither Spain was completely defeated, and was himself
slain. It was necessary to take up the war in earnest, and
although in the meantime the able praetor Quintus
Minucius had mastered the first danger, the senate resolved
in 559 to send the consul Marcus Cato in person to Spain.
On landing at Emporiae he actually found the whole of
Hither Spain overrun by the insurgents; with difficulty
that seaport and one or two strongholds in the interior
were still held for Rome. A pitched battle took place
between the insurgents and the consular army, in which,
after an obstinate conflict man against man, the Roman
military skill at length decided the day with its last
reserve. The whole of Hither Spain thereupon sent
in its submission : so little, however, was this submission
meant in earnest, that on a rumour of the consul having
returned to Rome the insurrection immediately recom-
menced. But the rumour was false; and after Cato had
rapidly reduced the communities which had revolted for the
second time and sold them en masse into slavery, he decreed
a general disarming of the Spaniards in the Hither province,
and issued orders to all the towns of the natives from the
Pyrenees to the Guadalquivir to pull down their walls on
one and the same day. No one knew how far the command
extended, and there was no time to come to any under-
standing ; most of the communities complied; and of the
few that were refractory not many ventured, when the Roman
army soon appeared before their walls, to await its assault.
cHAP. v11 TO THE CLOSE OF THE THIRD PERIOD 391
These energetic measures were certainly not without
permanent effect. Nevertheless the Romans had almost
every year to reduce to subjection some mountain valley or
mountain stronghold in the “peaceful province,” and the
constant incursions of the Lusitanians into the Further
province led occasionally to severe defeats of the Romans.
In 563, for instance, a Roman army was obliged after
heavy loss to abandon its camp, and to return by forced
marches into the more tranquil districts. It was not till
after a victory gained by the praetor Lucius Aemilius
Paullus in 565," and a second still more considerable
gained by the brave praetor Gaius Calpurnius beyond the
Tagus over the Lusitanians in 569, that quiet for some
time prevailed. In Hither Spain the hitherto almost
nominal rule of the Romans over the Celtiberian tribes was
placed on a firmer basis by Quintus Fulvius Flaccus, who
after a great victory over them in 573 compelled at least
the adjacent cantons to submission ; and especially by his
successor Tiberius Gracchus (575, 576), who achieved
results of a permanent character not only by his arms, by
which he reduced three hundred Spanish townships, but
still more by his adroitness in adapting himself to the views
and habits of the simple and haughty nation. He induced
Celtiberians of note to take service in the Roman army,
* Of this praetor there has recently come to light the following decree
on a copper tablet found in the neighbourhood of Gibraltar and now pre-
served in the Paris Museum : ‘‘L. Aimilius, son of Lucius, Imperator,
has ordained that the slaves of the Hastenses [of Hasta regia, not far
from Jerez de la Frontera], who dwell in the tower of Lascuta [known by
means of coins and Plin. iii. I, 15, but uncertain as to site] should be free.
The ground and the township, of which they are at the time in possession,
they shall continue to possess and hold, so long as it shall please the
people and senate of the Romans. Done in camp on 12 Jan. [564 or
565].” (L. Aimilius L. f. inpeirator decreiviț učeň qui Hastensium servei
in turri Lascutana habitarent, leiberei essent. Agrum oppidumquſe],
Quod ea tempestate posedissent, item possidere habereque ioussit, dum poplus
senatusque Romanus vellet. Act, in castreis a.d. XII. A. Feòr.) This is
the oldest Roman document which we possess in the original, drawn up
three years earlier than the well-known edict of the consuls of the year 568
in the affair of the Bacchanalia.
191.
189.
185.
181.
179. 178.
Gracchus.
190.
189.
186.
392 FROM THIE PEACE OF HANNIBAL BOOK III
Adminis-
tration of
Spain.
197.
181.
171.
and so created a class of dependents; he assigned land to
the roving tribes, and collected them in towns—the Spanish
town Graccurris preserved the Roman's name—and so
imposed a serious check on their freebooter habits; he
regulated the relations of the several tribes to the Romans
by just and wise treaties, and so stopped, as far as possible,
the springs of future rebellion. His name was held in
grateful remembrance by the Spaniards, and Comparative,
peace henceforth reigned in the land, although the Celti
berians still from time to time winced under the yoke.
The system of administration in the two Spanish pro-
vinces was similar to that of the Sicilo-Sardinian province,
but not identical. The superintendence was in both instances
vested in two auxiliary consuls, who were first nominated
in 557, in which year also the regulation of the boundaries
and the definitive organization of the new provinces took
place. The judicious enactment of the Baebian law (573),
that the Spanish praetors should always be nominated for two
years, was not seriously carried out in consequence of the
increasing competition for the highest magistracies, and still
more in consequence of the jealous supervision exercised
over the powers of the magistrates by the Senate ; and in
Spain also, except where deviations occurred in extraordi-
nary circumstances, the Romans adhered to the system of
annually changing the governors—a system especially
injudicious in the case of provinces so remote and with
which it was so difficult to gain an acquaintance. The
dependent communities were throughout tributary; but,
instead of the Sicilian and Sardinian tenths and customs,
in Spain fixed payments in money or other contributions
were imposed by the Romans, just as formerly by the
Carthaginians, on the several towns and tribes: the collec-
tion of these by military means was prohibited by a decree
of the senate in 583, in consequence of the complaints of
the Spanish communities. Grain was not furnished in their
CHAP. vii TO THE CLOSE OF THE THIRD PERIOD 393
case except for compensation, and even then the governor
might not levy more than a twentieth ; besides, conformably
to the just-mentioned ordinance of the Supreme authority, he
was bound to adjust the compensation in an equitable
manner. On the other hand, the obligation of the Spanish
subjects to furnish contingents to the Roman armies had an
importance very different from that which belonged to it at
least in peaceful Sicily, and it was strictly regulated in the
several treaties. The right, too, of coining silver money of
the Roman standard appears to have been very frequently
conceded to the Spanish towns, and the monopoly of coining
seems to have been by no means asserted here by the Roman
government with the same strictness as in Sicily. Rome had
too much need of her subjects everywhere in Spain, not to
proceed with all possible tenderness in the introduction and
handling of the provincial constitution there. Among the
communities specially favoured by Rome were the great
cities along the coast of Greek, Phoenician, or Roman
foundation, such as Saguntum, Gades, and Tarraco, which,
as the natural pillars of the Roman rule in the peninsula,
were admitted to alliance with Rome. On the whole,
Spain was in a military as well as financial point of view a
burden rather than a gain to the Roman commonwealth ;
and the question naturally occurs, Why did the Roman
government, whose policy at that time evidently did not
contemplate the acquisition of countries beyond the sea,
not rid itself of these troublesome possessions? The not
inconsiderable commercial connections of Spain, her im-
portant iron-mines, and her still more important silver-mines
famous from ancient times even in the far east”—which
Rome, like Carthage, took into her own hands, and the
management of which was specially regulated by Marcus
* I Maccab. viii. 3. “And Judas heard what the Romans had done
in the land of Hispania to become masters of the silver and gold mincG
there.”
394 FROM THE PEACE OF HANNIBAL IBOO IV. I l I
195.
Cato (559)—must beyond doubt have Co-operated to induce
its retention ; but the chief reason of the Romans for
retaining the peninsula in their own immediate possession
was, that there were no states in that quarter of similar
character to the Massiliot republic in the land of the Celts
and the Numidian kingdom in Libya, and that thus they
could not abandon Spain without putting it into the power
of any adventurer to revive the Spanish empire of the
Barcides.
CHAP. VIII THE EASTERN STATES 395
CHAPTER VIII
THE EASTERN STATES AND THE SECOND MACEDONIAN WAR
THE work, which Alexander king of Macedonia had begun
a century before the Romans acquired their first footing in
the territory which he had called his own, had in the course
of time—while adhering substantially to the great funda-
mental idea of Hellenizing the east—changed and expanded
into the construction of a system of Helleno-Asiatic states.
The unconquerable propensity of the Greeks for migration
and colonizing, which had formerly carried their traders to
Massilia and Cyrene, to the Nile and to the Black Sea, now
firmly held what the king had won; and under the protec-
tion of the sarissae, Greek civilization peacefully domiciled
itself everywhere throughout the ancient empire of the
Achaemenidae. The officers, who divided the heritage of
the great general, gradually settled their differences, and a
system of equilibrium was established, of which the very
oscillations manifest some sort of regularity.
Of the three states of the first ran'. belonging to this
system—Macedonia, Asia, and Egypt—Macedonia under
Philip the Fifth, who had occupied the throne since 534,
was externally at least very much what it had been under
Philip the Second the father of Alexander—a compact
military state with its finances in good order. On its
northern frontier matters liad resulued their ſoriner ſooting,
after the waves of the Gallic inundation had rolled away;
The
Hellenic
East.
The great
States.
Macedonia.
220.
396 THE EASTERN STATES AND BOOK III
the guard of the frontier kept the Illyrian barbarians in
check without difficulty, at least in ordinary times. In the
south, not only was Greece in general dependent on
Macedonia, but a large portion of it—including all Thessaly
in its widest sense from Olympus to the Spercheius and the
peninsula of Magnesia, the large and important island of
Euboea, the provinces of Locris, Phocis, and Doris, and,
lastly, a number of isolated positions in Attica and in the
Peloponnesus, such as the promontory of Sunium, Corinth,
Orchomenus, Heraea, the Triphylian territory—was directly
subject to Macedonia and received Macedonian garrisons;
more especially the three important fortresses of Demetrias
in Magnesia, Chalcis in Euboea, and Corinth, “the three
fetters of the Hellenes.” But the strength of the state lay
above all in its hereditary soil, the province of Macedonia.
The population, indeed, of that extensive territory was
remarkably scanty; Macedonia, putting forth all her energies,
was scarcely able to bring into the field as many men as were
contained in an ordinary consular army of two legions;
and it was unmistakeably evident that the land had not
yet recovered from the depopulation occasioned by the
campaigns of Alexander and by the Gallic invasion. But
while in Greece proper the moral and political energy of the
people had decayed, the day of national vigour seemed to
have gone by, life appeared scarce worth living for, and even
of the better spirits one spent time over the wine-cup,
another with the rapier, a third beside the student's lamp ;
while in the east and Alexandria the Greeks were able
perhaps to disseminate elements of culture among the dense
native population and to diffuse among that population their
language and their loguacity, their science and pseudo-
science, but were barely sufficient in point of number to
supply the nations with officers, statesmen, and School-
masters, and were far too few to form even in the cities a
middle-class of the pure Greek type; there still existed, on
CHAP. VIII THE SECOND MACEDONIAN WAR 397
the other hand, in northern Greece a goodly portion of the
old national vigour, which had produced the warriors of
Marathon. Hence arose the confidence with which the
Macedonians, Aetolians, and Acarnanians, wherever they
made their appearance in the east, claimed to be, and were
taken as, a better race; and hence the superior part which
they played at the courts of Alexandria and Antioch.
There is a characteristic story, that an Alexandrian who
had lived for a considerable time in Macedonia and had
adopted the manners and the dress of that country, on
returning to his native city, now looked upon himself as a
man and upon the Alexandrians as little better than slaves.
This sturdy vigour and unimpaired national spirit were
turned to peculiarly good account by the Macedonians, as
the most powerful and best organized of the states of
northern Greece. There, no doubt, absolutism had emerged
in opposition to the old constitution, which to some extent
recognized different estates; but sovereign and subject by
no means stood towards each other in Macedonia as they
stood in Asia and Egypt, and the people still felt itself in-
dependent and free. In steadfast resistance to the public
enemy under whatever name, in unshaken fidelity towards
their native country and their hereditary government, and
in persevering courage amidst the severest trials, no nation
in ancient history bears so close a resemblance to the Roman
people as the Macedonians; and the almost miraculous
regeneration of the state after the Gallic invasion redounds
to the imperishable honour of its leaders and of the people
whom they led.
The second of the great states, Asia, was nothing but
Persia superficially remodelled and Hellenized—the empire
of “the king of kings,” as its master was wont to call him-
self in a style characteristic at once of his arrogance and of
his weakness—with the same pretensions to rule from the
Hellespont to the Punjab, and with the same disjointed
Asia.
398 THE EASTERN STATES AND IBOOK III
Egypt.
organization; an aggregate of dependent states in various
degrees of dependence, of insubordinate satrapies, and of
half-free Greek cities. In Asia Minor more especially,
which was nominally included in the empire of the Seleu-
cidae, the whole north coast and the greater part of the
eastern interior were practically in the hands of native
dynasties or of the Celtic hordes that had penetrated thither
from Europe; a considerable portion of the west was in the
possession of the kings of Pergamus, and the islands and
coast towns were some of them Egyptian, some of them
free; so that little more was left to the great-king than the
interior of Cilicia, Phrygia, and Lydia, and a great number
of titular claims, not easily made good, against free cities
and princes—exactly similar in character to the sovereignty
of the German emperor, in his day, beyond his hereditary
dominions. The strength of the empire was expended in
vain endeavours to expel the Egyptians from the provinces
along the coast; in frontier strife with the eastern peoples,
the Parthians and Bactrians ; in feuds with the Celts, who
to the misfortune of Asia Minor had settled within its
bounds ; in constant efforts to check the attempts of the
eastern satraps and of the Greek cities of Asia Minor to
achieve their independence ; and in family quarrels and
insurrections of pretenders. None indeed of the states
founded by the successors of Alexander were free from such
attempts, or from the other horrors which absolute mon-
archy in degenerate times brings in its train ; but in the
kingdom of Asia these evils were more injurious than else-
where, because, from the lax composition of the empire,
they usually led to the severance of particular portions from
it for longer or shorter periods. -
In marked contrast to Asia, Egypt formed a consolidated
and united state, in which the intelligent statecraft of the
first Lagidae, skilfully availing itself of ancient national and
religious precedent, had established a completely absolute
CHAP. VIII THE SECOND MACEDONIAN WAR 399
cabinet government, and in which even the worst misrule
failed to provoke any attempt either at emancipation or dis-
ruption. Very different from the Macedonians, whose
national attachment to royalty was based upon their personal
dignity and was its political expression, the rural population
in Egypt was wholly passive ; the capital on the other hand
was everything, and that capital was a dependency of the
court. The remissness and indolence of its rulers, accord-
ingly, paralyzed the state in Egypt still more than in Mace-
donia and in Asia; while on the other hand when wielded
by men, like the first Ptolemy and Ptolemy Euergetes, such
a state machine proved itself extremely useful. It was one
of the peculiar advantages of Egypt as compared with its
two great rivals, that its policy did not grasp at shadows,
but pursued clear and attainable objects. Macedonia, the
home of Alexander, and Asia, the land where he had estab-
lished his throne, never ceased to regard themselves as
direct continuations of the Alexandrine monarchy and more
or less loudly asserted their claim to represent it at least, if
not to restore it. The Lagidae never tried to found a
universal empire, and never dreamt of conquering India ;
but, by way of compensation, they drew the whole traffic
between India and the Mediterranean from the Phoenician
ports to Alexandria, and made Egypt the first commercial
and maritime state of this epoch, and the mistress of the
eastern Mediterranean and of its coasts and islands. It is
a significant fact, that Ptolemy III. Euergetes voluntarily
restored all his conquests to Seleucus Callinicus except the
seaport of Antioch. Partly by this means, partly by its
favourable geographical situation, Egypt attained, with re-
ference to the two continental powers, an excellent military
position either for defence or for attack. While an oppo-
nent even in the full career of success was hardly in a
position seriously to threaten Egypt, which was almost
inaccessible on any side to land armies, the Egyptians were
4OO THE EASTERN STATES AND BOOK III
able by sea to establish themselves not only in Cyrene, but
also in Cyprus and the Cyclades, on the Phoenico-Syrian
coast, on the whole south and west coast of Asia Minor,
and even in Europe on the Thracian Chersonese. By their
unexampled skill in turning to account the fertile valley of
the Nile for the direct benefit of the treasury, and by a
financial system—equally sagacious and unscrupulous—
earnestly and adroitly calculated to foster material interests,
the court of Alexandria was constantly superior to its
opponents even as a moneyed power. Lastly, the intelligent
munificence, with which the Lagidae welcomed the tendency
of the age towards earnest inquiry in all departments of
enterprise and of knowledge, and knew how to confine such
inquiries within the bounds, and entwine them with the
interests, of absolute monarchy, was productive of direct
advantage to the state, whose ship-building and machine-
making showed traces of the beneficial influence of
Alexandrian mathematics; and not only so, but also
rendered this new intellectual power—the most important
and the greatest, which the Hellenic nation after its political
dismemberment put forth—subservient, so far as it would
consent to be scrviceable at all, to the Alexandrian Court.
Had the empire of Alexander continued to stand, Greek
science and art would have found a state worthy and
capable of containing them. Now, when the nation had
fallen to pieces, a learned cosmopolitanism grew up in it -
luxuriantly, and was very soon attracted by the magnet of
Alexandria, where scientific appliances and collections were
inexhaustible, where kings composed tragedies and ministers
wrote commentaries on them, and where pensions and
academies flourished.
The mutual relations of the three great states are
evident from what has been said. The maritime power,
which ruled the coasts and monopolized the sea, could not
but after the first great success—the political separation of
CHAP. VIII THE SECOND MACEDONIAN WAR 4O1
the European from the Asiatic continent—direct its further
efforts towards the weakening of the two great states on the
mainland, and consequently towards the protection of the
several minor states; whereas Macedonia and Asia, while
regarding each other as rivals, recognized above all their
common adversary in Egypt, and combined, or at any rate
ought to have combined, against it.
Among the states of the second rank, merely an indirect
importance, so far as concerned the contact of the east
with the west, attached in the first instance to that series of
states which, stretching from the southern end of the
Caspian Sea to the Hellespont, occupied the interior and
the north coast of Asia Minor: Atropatene (in the modern
The
kingdoms
of Asia.
Minor.
Aderbijan, South-west of the Caspian), next to it Armenia,
Cappadocia in the interior of Asia Minor, Pontus on the
south-east, and Bithynia on the south-west, shore of the
Black Sea. All of these were fragments of the great
Persian Empire, and were ruled by Oriental, mostly old
Persian, dynasties—the remote mountain-land of Atropatene
in particular was the true asylum of the ancient Persian
system, over which even the expedition of Alexander had
swept without leaving a trace—and all were in the same
relation of temporary and superficial dependence on the
Greek dynasty, which had taken or wished to take the
place of the great-kings in Asia.
Of greater importance for the general relations was the
Celtic state in the interior of Asia Minor. There, inter-
mediate between Bithynia, Paphlagonia, Cappadocia, and
Phrygia, three Celtic tribes—the Tolistoagii, the Tectosages,
and Trocmi–had settled, without abandoning either their
native language and manners or their constitution and their
trade as freebooters. The twelve tetrarchs, one of whom
was appointed to preside over each of the four cantons in
each of the three tribes, formed, with their council of 300
men, the Supreme authority of the nation, and assembled
VOL. II 58
The Celts
of Asia
Minor.
4O2 THE EASTERN STATES AND BOOK III
261.
Pergamus.
at the “holy place " (Drunemetum), especially for the pro-
nouncing of capital sentences. Singular as this cantonal
constitution of the Celts appeared to the Asiatics, equally
strange seemed to them the adventurous and marauding
habits of the northern intruders, who on the one hand
furnished their unwarlike neighbours with mercenaries for
every war, and on the other plundered on their own.
account or levied contributions from the surrounding
districts. These rude but vigorous barbarians were the
general terror of the effeminate surrounding nations, and
even of the great-kings of Asia themselves, who, after
several Asiatic armies had been destroyed by the Celts and
king Antiochus I. Soter had even lost his life in conflict
with them (493), agreed at last to pay them tribute.
In consequence of bold and successful opposition to
these Gallic hordes, Attalus, a wealthy citizen of Pergamus,
received the royal title from his native city and bequeathed
it to his posterity. This new court was in miniature what
that of Alexandria was on a great scale. Here too the
promotion of material interests and the fostering of art and
literature formed the order of the day, and the government
pursued a cautious and sober cabinet policy, the main
objects of which were the weakening the power of its two
dangerous continental neighbours, and the establishing an
independent Greek state in the west of Asia Minor. A
well-filled treasury contributed greatly to the importance of
these rulers of Pergamus. They advanced considerable
sums to the kings of Syria, the repayment of which after-
wards formed part of the Roman conditions of peace.
They succeeded even in acquiring territory in this way;
Aegina, for instance, which the allied Romans and
Aetolians had wrested in the last war from Philip's allies,
the Achaeans, was sold by the Aetolians, to whom it fell in
terms of the treaty, to Attalus for 3o talents (4,730.o).
But, notwithstanding the splendour of the Court and the
CHAP. VIII THE SECOND MACEDONIAN WAR 403
royal title, the commonwealth of Pergamus always retained
something of the urban character ; and in its policy it
usually went along with the free cities. Attalus himself,
the Lorenzo de' Medici of antiquity, remained throughout
life a wealthy burgher; and the family life of the Attalid
house, from which harmony and Cordiality were not
banished by the royal title, formed a striking contrast to the
dissolute and scandalous behaviour of more aristocratic
dynasties.
In European Greece—exclusive of the Roman posses-
sions on the west coast, in the most important of which,
particularly Corcyra, Roman magistrates appear to have
resided (p. 218), and the territory directly subject to
Macedonia—the powers more or less in a position to
pursue a policy of their own were the Epirots, Acarnanians,
and Aetolians in northern Greece, the Boeotians and
Athenians in central Greece, and the Achaeans, Lacedae-
monians, Messenians, and Eleans in the Peloponnesus.
Among these, the republics of the Epirots, Acarnanians,
and Boeotians were in various ways closely knit to Mace-
donia—the Acarnanians more especially, because it was
only Macedonian protection that enabled them to escape
the destruction with which they were threatened by the
Aetolians; none of them were of any consequence. Their
internal condition was very various. The state of things
may to some extent be illustrated by the fact, that among
the Boeotians—where, it is true, matters reached their worst
—it had become customary to make over every property,
which did not descend to heirs in the direct line, to the
syssifia ; and, in the case of candidates for the public
magistracies, for a quarter of a century the primary condi-
tion of election was that they should bind themselves not
to allow any creditor, least of all a foreign one, to sue his
debtor.
The Athenians were in the habit of receiving support
Creece,
Epirots,
Acarna-
nians,
Boeotians.
404 THE EASTERN STATES AND BOOK III
The
Athenians.
The
Aetolians.
The
Achaeans.
against Macedonia from Alexandria, and were in close
league with the Aetolians. But they too were totally
powerless, and hardly anything save the halo of Attic
poetry and art distinguished these unworthy successors of a
glorious past from a number of petty towns of the same
stamp. -
The power of the Aetolian confederacy manifested a
greater vigour. The energy of the northern Greek
character was still unbroken there, although it had degener-
ated into a reckless impatience of discipline and control.
. It was a public law in Aetolia, that an Aetolian might serve
as a mercenary against any state, even against a state in
alliance with his own country; and, when the other Greeks
urgently besought them to redress this scandal, the Aetolian
diet declared that Aetolia might sooner be removed from
its place than this principle from their national code. The
Aetolians might have been of great service to the Greek
nation, had they not inflicted still greater injury on it by
this system of organized robbery, by their thorough hostility
to the Achaean confederacy, and by their unhappy
antagonism to the great state of Macedonia.
In the Peloponnesus, the Achaean league had united
the best elements of Greece proper in a confederacy based
on civilization, national spirit, and peaceful preparation for
self-defence. But the vigour and more especially the
military efficiency of the league had, notwithstanding its
outward enlargement, been arrested by the selfish diplomacy
of Aratus. The unfortunate variances with Sparta, and
the still more lamentable invocation of Macedonian inter-
ference in the Peloponnesus, had so completely subjected
the Achaean league to Macedonian supremacy, that the
chief fortresses of the country thenceforward received
Macedonian garrisons, and the oath of fidelity to Philip
was annually taken there.
The policy of the weaker states in the Peloponnesus,
CHAP. VIII THE SECOND MACEDONIAN WAR 405
Elis, Messene, and Sparta, was determined by their ancient
enmity to the Achaean league—an enmity specially fostered
by disputes regarding their frontiers—and their tendencies
were Aetolian and anti-Macedonian, because the Achaeans
took part with Philip. The only one of these states
possessing any importance was the Spartan military
monarchy, which after the death of Machanidas had passed
into the hands of one Nabis. With ever-increasing hardi-
hood Nabis leaned on the support of vagabonds and
itinerant mercenaries, to whom he assigned not only the
houses and lands, but also the wives and children, of the
citizens; and he assiduously maintained connections, and
even entered into an association for the joint prosecution
of piracy, with the great refuge of mercenaries and
pirates, the island of Crete, where he possessed some
townships. His predatory expeditions by land, and the
piratical vessels which he maintained at the promon-
tory of Malea, were dreaded far and wide ; he was
personally hated for his baseness and cruelty; but
his rule was extending, and about the time of the battle
of Zama he had even succeeded in gaining possession of
Messene. •
Lastly, the most independent position among the inter-
mediate states was held by the free Greek mercantile cities
on the European shore of the Propontis as well as along
the whole coast of Asia Minor, and on the islands of the
Aegean Sea; they formed, at the same time, the brightest
elements in the confused and multifarious picture which
was presented by the Hellenic state-system. Three of
them, in particular, had after Alexander's death again
enjoyed their full freedom, and by the activity of their
maritime commerce had attained to respectable political
power and even to considerable territorial possessions;
namely, Byzantium the mistress of the Bosporus, rendered
wealthy and powerful by the transit dues which she levied
Sparta,
Elis,
Messene.
League of
the Greek
cities.
406 THE EASTERN STATES AND BOOK III
Rhodes.
304.
and by the important corn trade carried on with the Black
Sea; Cyzicus on the Asiatic side of the Propontis, the
daughter and heiress of Miletus, maintaining the closest
relations with the court of Pergamus ; and lastly and above
all, Rhodes. The Rhodians, who immediately after the
death of Alexander had expelled the Macedonian garrison,
had, by their favourable position for commerce and navi-
gation, secured the carrying trade of all the eastern
Mediterranean ; and their well-handled fleet, as well as the
tried courage of the citizens in the famous siege of 450,
enabled them in that age of promiscuous and ceaseless
hostilities to become the prudent and energetic representa-
tives and, when occasion required, champions of a neutral
commercial policy. They compelled the Byzantines, for
instance, by force of arms to concede to the vessels of
Rhodes exemption from dues in the Bosporus; and they
did not permit the dynast of Pergamus to close the Black
Sea. On the other hand they kept themselves, as far as
possible, aloof from land warfare, although they had
acquired no inconsiderable possessions on the opposite
coast of Caria; where war could not be avoided, they
carried it on by means of mercenaries. With their neigh-
bours on all sides they were in friendly relations—with
Syracuse, Macedonia, Syria, but more especially with Egypt
—and they enjoyed high consideration at these courts, so
that their mediation was not unfrequently invoked in the
wars of the great states. But they interested themselves
Quite specially on behalf of the Greek maritime cities,
which were so numerously spread along the coasts of the
kingdoms of Pontus, Bithynia, and Pergamus, as well as on
the coasts and islands of Asia Minor that had been wrested
by Egypt from the Seleucidae; such as Sinope, Heraclea
Pontica, Cius, Lampsacus, Abydos, Mitylene, Chios,
Smyrna, Samos, Halicarnassus and various others. All
these were in substance free and had nothing to do with
CHAP. VIII THE SECOND MACEDONIAN WAR 407
the lords of the soil except to ask for the confirmation of
their privileges and, at most, to pay a moderate tribute :
such encroachments, as from time to time were threatened
by the dynasts, were skilfully warded off sometimes by
cringing, sometimes by strong measures. In this case the
Rhodians were their chief auxiliaries; they emphatically
supported Sinope, for instance, against Mithradates of
Pontus. How firmly amidst the quarrels, and by means of
the very differences, of the monarchs the liberties of these
cities of Asia Minor were established, is shown by the fact,
that the dispute between Antiochus and the Romans some
years after this time related not to the freedom of these
cities in itself, but to the question whether they were to ask
confirmation of their charters from the king or not. This
league of the cities was, in this peculiar attitude towards
the lords of the soil as well as in other respects, a formal
Hanseatic association, headed by Rhodes, which negotiated
and stipulated in treaties for itself and its allies. This
league upheld the freedom of the cities against monarchical
interests; and while wars raged around their walls, public
spirit and civic prosperity were sheltered in comparative
peace within, and art and science flourished without the
risk of being crushed by a dissolute soldiery or corrupted
by the atmosphere of a court.
Such was the state of things in the east, at the time
when the wall of political separation between the east and
the west was broken down and the eastern powers, Philip
of Macedonia leading the way, were induced to interfere
in the relations of the west. We have already set forth to
some extent the origin of this interference and the course
of the first Macedonian war (540-549); and we have
pointed out what Philip might have accomplished during
the second Punic war, and how little of all that Hannibal
was entitled to expect and to count on was really fulfilled.
A fresh illustration had been afforded of the truth, that
Philip,
king of
Mace-
donia.
214-205.
408 THE EASTERN STATES AND BOOK III
of all haphazards none is more hazardous than an ab-
Solute hereditary monarchy. Philip was not the man
whom Macedonia at that time required ; yet his gifts were
far from insignificant. He was a genuine king, in the
best and worst sense of the term. A strong desire to rule
in person and unaided was the fundamental trait of his
character; he was proud of his purple, but he was no less
proud of other gifts, and he had reason to be so. He not
only showed the valour of a soldier and the eye of
a general, but he displayed a high spirit in the conduct of
public affairs, whenever his Macedonian sense of honour
was offended. Full of intelligence and wit, he won the
hearts of all whom he wished to gain, especially of the
men who were ablest and most refined, such as Flamininus
and Scipio; he was a pleasant boon companion and, not
by virtue of his rank alone, a dangerous wooer. But he
was at the same time one of the most arrogant and flagitious
characters, which that shameless age produced. He was
in the habit of saying that he feared none save the gods;
but it seemed almost as if his gods were those to whom
his admiral Dicaearchus regularly offered sacrifice—Godless-
ness (Asebeia) and Lawlessness (Paranomia). The lives of
his advisers and of the promoters of his schemes possessed
no sacredness in his eyes, nor did he disdain to pacify his
indignation against the Athenians and Attalus by the de-
struction of venerable monuments and illustrious works of
art; it is quoted as one of his maxims of state, that
“whoever causes the father to be put to death must also
kill the sons.” It may be that to him cruelty was not,
strictly, a delight; but he was indifferent to the lives and
sufferings of others, and relenting, which alone renders men
tolerable, found no place in his hard and stubborn heart.
So abruptly and harshly did he proclaim the principle that
no promise and no moral law are binding on an absolute
king, that he thereby interposed the most serious obstacles
CHAP. VIII THE SECOND MACEDONIAN WAR 4O9
to the success of his plans. No one can deny that he
possessed sagacity and resolution, but these were, in a
singular manner, combined with procrastination and supine-
ness; which is perhaps partly to be explained by the fact,
that he was called in his eighteenth year to the position of
an absolute sovereign, and that his ungovernable fury
against every one who disturbed his autocratic course by
counter-argument or counter-advice Scared away from him
all independent counsellors. What various causes co-
operated to produce the weak and disgraceful management
which he showed in the first Macedonian war, we cannot
tell; it may have been due perhaps to that indolent
arrogance which only puts forth its full energies against
danger when it becomes imminent, or perhaps to his in-
difference towards a plan which was not of his own devising
and his jealousy of the greatness of Hannibal which put
him to shame. It is certain that his subsequent conduct
betrayed no further trace of the Philip, through whose
negligence the plan of Hannibal suffered shipwreck.
When Philip concluded his treaty with the Aetolians
and Romans in 548–9, he seriously intended to make a
lasting peace with Rome, and to devote himself exclusively
in future to the affairs of the east. It admits of no doubt
that he saw with regret the rapid subjugation of Carthage;
and it may be, that Hannibal hoped for a second declara-
tion of war from Macedonia, and that Philip secretly rein-
forced the last Carthaginian army with mercenaries (p. 351).
But the tedious affairs in which he had meanwhile involved
himself in the east, as well as the nature of the alleged
support, and especially the total silence of the Romans as
to such a breach of the peace while they were searching
Macedonia
[206-205.]
and Asia
attack
Egypt.
for grounds of war, place it beyond doubt, that Philip was
by no means disposed in 55 I to make up for what he ought
to have done ten years before.
He had turned his eyes to an entirely different quarter.
203.
4IO THE EASTERN STATES AND BOOK III
205.
201.
Ptolemy Philopator of Egypt had died in 549. Philip
and Antiochus, the kings of Macedonia and Asia, had
combined against his successor Ptolemy Epiphanes, a child
of five years old, in order completely to gratify the ancient
grudge which the monarchies of the mainland entertained
towards the maritime state. The Egyptian state was to be
broken up; Egypt and Cyprus were to fall to Antiochus;
Cyrene, Ionia, and the Cyclades to Philip. Thoroughly
after the manner of Philip, who ridiculed such considera-
tions, the kings began the war not merely without cause,
but even without pretext, “just as the large fishes devour
the small.” The allies, moreover, had made their calcula.
tions correctly, especially Philip. Egypt had enough to do
in defending herself against the nearer enemy in Syria,
and was obliged to leave her possessions in Asia Minor
and the Cyclades undefended when Philip threw himself
upon these as his share of the spoil. In the year in which
Carthage concluded peace with Rome (553), Philip ordered
a fleet equipped by the towns subject to him to take on
board troops, and to sail along the coast of Thrace. There
Lysimachia was taken from the Aetolian garrison, and
Perinthus, which stood in the relation of clientship to
Byzantium, was likewise occupied. Thus the peace was
broken as respected the Byzantines; and as respected the
Aetolians, who had just made peace with Philip, the good
understanding was at least disturbed. The crossing to
Asia was attended with no difficulties, for Prusias king of
Bithynia was in alliance with Macedonia. By way of
recompense, Philip helped him to subdue the Greek
mercantile cities in his territory. Chalcedon submitted.
Cius, which resisted, was taken by storm and levelled with
the ground, and its inhabitants were reduced to slavery—
a meaningless barbarity, which annoyed Prusias himself
who wished to get possession of the town uninjured,
and which excited profound indignation throughout the
CHAP. VIII THE SECOND MACEDONIAN WAR 4 II
Hellenic world. The Aetolians, whose strategus had com-
manded in Cius, and the Rhodians, whose attempts at
mediation had been contemptuously and craftily frustrated
by the king, were especially offended.
But even had this not been so, the interests of all Greek
commercial cities were at stake. They could not possibly
allow the mild and almost purely nominal Egyptian rule to
be supplanted by the Macedonian despotism, with which
urban self-government and freedom of commercial inter-
course were not at all compatible ; and the fearful treat-
ment of the Cians showed that the matter at stake was not
the right of confirming the charters of the towns, but the
life or death of one and all. Lampsacus had already fallen,
and Thasos had been treated like Cius ; no time was to be
lost. Theophiliscus, the vigilant strategus of Rhodes,
exhorted his citizens to meet the common danger by common
resistance, and not to suffer the towns and islands to become
one by one a prey to the enemy. Rhodes resolved on its
course, and declared war against Philip. Byzantium joined
it; as did also the aged Attalus king of Pergamus, per-
sonally and politically the enemy of Philip. While the
fleet of the allies was mustering on the Aeolian coast,
Philip directed a portion of his fleet to take Chios and
Samos. With the other portion he appeared in person
before Pergamus, which however he invested in vain; he
had to content himself with traversing the level country
and leaving the traces of Macedonian valour on the temples
which he destroyed far and wide. Suddenly he departed
and re-embarked, to unite with his squadron which was at
Samos. But the Rhodo-Pergamene fleet followed him,
and forced him to accept battle in the straits of Chios.
The number of the Macedonian decked vessels was smaller,
but the multitude of their open boats made up for this
inequality, and the soldiers of Pliilip ſought with great
courage. But he was at length defeated. Almost half of
The
Rhodian
Hansa and
Pergamus
oppose
Philip.
4I2 THE EASTERN STATES AND BOOK III
his decked vessels, 24 sail, were sunk or taken ; 6000
Macedonian sailors and 3ooo soldiers perished, amongst
whom was the admiral Democrates; 2 ooo were taken
prisoners. The victory cost the allies no more than 8oo
men and six vessels. But, of the leaders of the allies,
Attalus had been cut off from his fleet and compelled to
let his own vessel run aground at Erythrae ; and Theo-
philiscus of Rhodes, whose public spirit had decided the
question of war and whose valour had decided the battle,
died on the day after it of his wounds. Thus while the
fleet of Attalus went home and the Rhodian fleet remained
temporarily at Chios, Philip, who falsely ascribed the victory
to himself, was able to continue his voyage and to turn
towards Samos, in order to occupy the Carian towns. On
the Carian coast the Rhodians, not on this occasion
supported by Attalus, gave battle for the second time to
the Macedonian fleet under Heraclides, near the little
island of Lade in front of the port of Miletus. The victory,
claimed again by both sides, appears to have been this
time gained by the Macedonians; for while the Rhodians
retreated to Myndus and thence to Cos, the Macedonians
occupied Miletus, and a squadron under Dicaearchus the
Aetolian occupied the Cyclades. Philip meanwhile prose-
cuted the conquest of the Rhodian possessions on the
Carian mainland, and of the Greek cities : had he been dis-
posed to attack Ptolemy in person, and had he not pre-
ferred to confine himself to the acquisition of his own share
in the spoil, he would now have been able to think even
of an expedition to Egypt. In Caria no army confronted
the Macedonians, and Philip traversed without hindrance
the country from Magnesia to Mylasa ; but every town in
that country was a fortress, and the siege-warfare was
protracted without yielding or promising any considerable
results. Zeuxis the satrap of Lydia supported the ally of
his master with the same lukewarmness as Philip had
CHAP. VIII THE SECONI) MACEDONIAN WAR 4 I3
manifested in promoting the interests of the Syrian king,
and the Greek cities gave their support only under the
pressure of fear or force. The provisioning of the army
became daily more difficult; Philip was obliged to-day to
plunder those who but yesterday had voluntarily supplied
his wants, and then he had reluctantly to submit to beg
afresh. Thus the good season of the year gradually drew
to an end, and in the interval the Rhodians had reinforced
their fleet and had also been rejoined by that of Attalus,
so that they were decidedly superior at sea. It seemed
almost as if they might cut off the retreat of the king and
compel him to take up winter quarters in Caria, while the
state of affairs at home, particularly the threatened inter-
vention of the Aetolians and Romans, urgently demanded
his return. Philip saw the danger; he left garrisons
amounting together to 3ooo men, partly in Myrina to keep
Pergamus in check, partly in the petty towns round Mylasa
—Iassus, Bargylia, Euromus and Pedasa—to secure for
him the excellent harbour and a landing place in Caria ;
and, owing to the negligence with which the allies guarded
the sea, he succeeded in safely reaching the Thracian coast
with his fleet and arriving at home before the winter of
5.53-4.
In fact a storm was gathering against Philip in the west,
which did not permit him to continue the plundering of
defenceless Egypt. The Romans, who had at length in
this year concluded peace on their own terms with Carthage,
began to give serious attention to these complications in
the east. It has often been affirmed, that after the con-
quest of the west they forthwith proceeded to the subjugation
of the east; a serious consideration will lead to a juster
judgment. It is only dull prejudice which fails to see that
Rome at this period by no means grasped at the sovereignty
of the Mediterranean states, hut, on the contrary, desired
nothing further than to have neighbours that should not
201-200.
Diplomatic
interven-
tion of
Rome.
4I4 THE EASTERN STATES AND BOOK III
206-205.
205.
be dangerous in Africa and in Greece; and Macedonia
was not really dangerous to Rome. Its power certainly
was far from small, and it is evident that the Roman
senate only consented with reluctance to the peace of
548–9, which left it in all its integrity; but how little any
serious apprehensions of Macedonia were or could be
entertained in Rome, is best shown by the small number
of troops—who yet were never compelled to fight against a
superior force—with which Rome carried on the next war.
The senate doubtless would have gladly seen Macedonia
humbled; but that humiliation would be too dearly
purchased at the cost of a land war carried on in Mace-
donia with Roman troops ; and accordingly, after the with-
drawal of the Aetolians, the senate voluntarily concluded
peace at once on the basis of the status quo. It is therefore
far from made out, that the Roman government concluded
this peace with the definite design of beginning the war at
a more convenient season; and it is very certain that, at
the moment, from the thorough exhaustion of the state
and the extreme unwillingness of the citizens to enter into
a second transmarine struggle, the Macedonian war was in
a high degree unwelcome to the Romans. But now it was
inevitable. They might have acquiesced in the Macedonian
state as a neighbour, such as it stood in 549; but it was
impossible that they could permit it to acquire the best
part of Asiatic Greece and the important Cyrene, to crush
the neutral commercial states, and thereby to double its
power. Further, the fall of Egypt and the humiliation,
perhaps the subjugation, of Rhodes would have inflicted
deep wounds on the trade of Sicily and Italy; and could
Rome remain a quiet spectator, while Italian commerce
with the east was made dependent on the two great
continental powers P Rome had, moreover, an obligation
of honour to fulfil towards Attalus her faithful ally since
the first Macedonian war, and had to prevent Philip, who
CHAP. VIII THE SECOND MAC EDONIAN WAR 4I 5
had already besieged him in his capital, from expelling
him from his dominions. Lastly, the claim of Rome to
extend her protecting arm over all the Hellenes was by no
means an empty phrase: the citizens of Neapolis, Rhegium,
Massilia, and Emporiae could testify that that protection
was meant in earnest, and there is no question at all that
at this time the Romans stood in a closer relation to the
Greeks than any other nation—one little more remote than
that of the Hellenized Macedonians. It is strange that
any should dispute the right of the Romans to feel their
human, as well as their Hellenic, sympathies revolted at
the outrageous treatment of the Cians and Thasians.
Thus in reality all political, commercial, and moral
motives concurred in inducing Rome to undertake the
second war against Philip—one of the most righteous,
which the city ever waged. It greatly redounds to
the honour of the senate, that it immediately resolved
on its course and did not allow itself to be deterred
from making the necessary preparations either by the
exhaustion of the state or by the unpopularity of such
a declaration of war. The propraetor Marcus Valerius
Laevinus made his appearance as early as 553 with the
Sicilian fleet of 38 sail in the eastern waters. The
government, however, were at a loss to discover an
ostensible pretext for the war; a pretext which they needed
in order to satisfy the people, even although they had not
been far too sagacious to undervalue, as was the manner
of Philip, the importance of assigning a legitimate ground
for hostilities. The support, which Philip was alleged to
have granted to the Carthaginians after the peace with
Rome, manifestly could not be proved. The Roman
subjects, indeed, in the province of Illyria had for a con-
siderable time complained of the Macedonian encroach-
ments. In 551 a Roman envoy at the head of the Illyrian
levy had driven Philip's troops from the Illyrian territory;
Prepara-
tions and
pretexts
for second
Mace-
donian
War.
201.
203.
416 THE EASTERN STATES AND BOOK III
202.
and the senate had accordingly declared to the king's
envoys in 552, that if he sought war, he would find it
sooner than was agreeable to him. But these encroach-
ments were simply the ordinary outrages which Philip
practised towards his neighbours; a negotiation regarding
them at the present moment would have led to his humbling
himself and offering satisfaction, but not to war. With
all the belligerent powers in the east the Roman community
was nominally in friendly relations, and might have granted
them aid in repelling Philip's attack. But Rhodes and
Pergamus, which naturally did not fail to request Roman
aid, were formally the aggressors; and although Alexandrian
ambassadors besought the Roman senate to undertake the
guardianship of the boy king, Egypt appears to have been
by no means eager to invoke the direct intervention of the
Romans, which would put an end to her difficulties for the
moment, but would at the same time open up the eastern
sea to the great western power. Aid to Egypt, moreover,
must have been in the first instance rendered in Syria, and
would have entangled Rome simultaneously in a war with
Asia and with Macedonia; which the Romans were natur-
ally the more desirous to avoid, as they were firmly resolved
not to intermeddle at least in Asiatic affairs. No course
was left but to despatch in the meantime an embassy to
the east for the purpose, first, of obtaining—what was not
201,
in the circumstances difficult—the sanction of Egypt to
the interference of the Romans in the affairs of Greece;
secondly, of pacifying king Antiochus by abandoning Syria
to him ; and, lastly, of accelerating as much as possible a
breach with Philip and promoting a coalition of the minor
Graeco-Asiatic states against him (end of 553). At Alex-
andria they had no difficulty in accomplishing their object;
the court had no choice, and was obliged gratefully to
receive Marcus Aemilius Lepidus, whom the senate had
despatched as “guardian of the king” to uphold his
CIIAP. VIII THE SECOND MACEDONIAN WAR 417
interests, so far as that could be done without an actual
intervention. Antiochus did not break off his alliance
with Philip, nor did he give to the Romans the definite
explanations which they desired; in other respects, however
—whether from remissness, or influenced by the declara-
tions of the Romans that they did not wish to interfere in
Syria—he pursued his schemes in that direction and left
things in Greece and Asia Minor to take their course.
Meanwhile, the spring of 554 had arrived, and the war
had recommenced. Philip first threw himself once more
upon Thrace, where he occupied all the places on the
Coast, in particular Maronea, Aenus, Elaeus, and Sestus;
he wished to have his European possessions secured against
the risk of a Roman landing. He then attacked Abydus
on the Asiatic coast, the acquisition of which could not
but be an object of importance to him, for the possession
of Sestus and Abydus would bring him into closer connec-
tion with his ally Antiochus, and he would no longer need
to be apprehensive lest the fleet of the allies might intercept
him in crossing to or from Asia Minor. That fleet com-
manded the Aegean Sea after the withdrawal of the weaker
Macedonian squadron : Philip confined his operations by
sea to maintaining garrisons on three of the Cyclades,
Andros, Cythnos, and Paros, and fitting out privateers.
The Rhodians proceeded to Chios, and thence to Tenedos,
where Attalus, who had passed the winter at Aegina and
had spent his time in listening to the declamations of the
Athenians, joined them with his squadron. The allies
might probably have arrived in time to help the Abydenes,
who heroically defended themselves; but they stirred not,
and so at length the city surrendered, after almost all who
were capable of bearing arms had fallen in the struggle
before the walls. After the capitulation a large portion of
the inhabitants fell by their own hand—the mercy of the
victor consisted in allowing the Abydenes a term of three
VOL. II 59
200.
Progress of
the war.
418 THE EASTERN STATES AND BOOK III
201
days to die voluntarily. Here, in the camp before Abydus,
the Roman embassy, which after the termination of its
business in Syria and Egypt had visited and dealt with the
minor Greek states, met with the king, and submitted the
proposals which it had been charged to make by the
senate, viz. that the king should wage no aggressive war
against any Greek state, should restore the possessions
which he had wrested from Ptolemy, and should consent
to an arbitration regarding the injury inflicted on the
Pergamenes and Rhodians. The object of the Senate,
which sought to provoke the king to a formal declaration
of war, was not gained ; the Roman ambassador, Marcus
Aemilius Lepidus, obtained from the king nothing but the
polite reply that he would excuse what the envoy had said
because he was young, handsome, and a Roman.
Meanwhile, however, the occasion for declaring war,
which Rome desired, had been furnished from another
quarter. The Athenians in their silly and cruel vanity had
put to death two unfortunate Acarnanians, because these
had accidentally strayed into their mysteries. When the
Acarnanians, who were naturally indignant, asked Philip to
procure them satisfaction, he could not refuse the just
request of his most faithful allies, and he allowed them to
levy men in Macedonia and, with these and their own
troops, to invade Attica without a formal declaration of
war. This, it is true, was no war in the proper sense of
the term ; and, besides, the leader of the Macedonian
band, Nicanor, immediately gave orders to his troops to
retreat, when the Roman envoys, who were at Athens at
the time, used threatening language (in the end of 553).
But it was too late. An Athenian embassy was sent to
Rome to report the attack made by Philip on an ancient
ally of the Romans; and, from the way in which the Senate
received it, Philip saw clearly what awaited him ; so that
200, he at once, in the very spring of 554, directed Philocles,
CHAP. VIII THE SECOND MACEDONIAN WAR 419
his general in Greece, to lay waste the Attic territory and
to reduce the city to extremities.
The senate now had what they wanted; and in the
summer of 554 they were able to propose to the comitia a
declaration of war “On account of an attack on a state in
alliance with Rome.” It was rejected on the first occasion
almost unanimously: foolish or evil-disposed tribunes of
the people complained of the senate, which would allow the
citizens no rest; but the war was necessary and, in strict-
ness, was already begun, so that the senate could not
possibly recede. The burgesses were induced to yield by
representations and concessions. It is remarkable that
these concessions were made mainly at the expense of the
allies. The garrisons of Gaul, Lower Italy, Sicily, and
Sardinia, amounting in all to 20,000 men, were exclusively
taken from the allied contingents that were in active service
—quite contrary to the former principles of the Romans.
All the burgess troops, on the other hand, that had
continued under arms from the Hannibalic war, were
discharged ; volunteers alone, it was alleged, were to be
enrolled for the Macedonian war, but they were, as was
afterwards found, for the most part forced volunteers—a
fact which in the autumn of 555 called forth a dangerous
military revolt in the camp of Apollonia. Six legions were
formed of the men newly called out ; of these two remained
in Rome and two in Etruria, and only two embarked at
Brundisium for Macedonia, led by the consul Publius
Sulpicius Galba.
Thus it was once more clearly demonstrated, that the
sovereign burgess assemblies, with their shortsighted
resolutions dependent often on mere accident, were no
longer at all fitted to deal with the complicated and
difficult relations into which Rome was drawn by her
victories ; and that their mischievous intervention in the
working of the state machine led to dangerous modifica-
Declara-
tion [200
of war by
Rome.
199.
42O THE EASTERN STATES AND BOOK III
The
Roman
league.
tions of the measures which in a military point of view
were necessary, and to the still more dangerous course of
treating the Latin allies as inferiors.
The position of Philip was very disadvantageous. The
eastern states, which ought to have acted in unison against
all interference of Rome and probably under other circum-
stances would have so acted, had been mainly by Philip's
fault so incensed at each other, that they were not inclined
to hinder, or were inclined even to promote, the Roman
invasion. Asia, the natural and most important ally of
Philip, had been neglected by him, and was moreover
prevented at first from active interference by being
entangled in the quarrel with Egypt and the Syrian war.
Egypt had an urgent interest in keeping the Roman fleet
out of the eastern waters; even now an Egyptian embassy
intimated at Rome very plainly, that the court of Alexandria
was ready to relieve the Romans from the trouble of inter-
vention in Attica. But the treaty for the partition of
Egypt concluded between Asia and Macedonia threw that
important state thoroughly into the arms of Rome, and
compelled the cabinet of Alexandria to declare that it
would only intermeddle in the affairs of European Greece
with consent of the Romans. The Greek commercial
cities, with Rhodes, Pergamus, and Byzantium at their
head, were in a position similar, but of still greater
perplexity. They would under other circumstances have
beyond doubt done what they could to close the eastern
seas against the Romans; but the cruel and destructive
policy of conquest pursued by Philip had driven them to
an unequal struggle, in which for their self-preservation
they were obliged to use every effort to implicate the great
Italian power. In Greece proper also the Roman envoys,
who were commissioned to organize a second league against
Philip there, found the way already substantially paved for
them by the enemy. Of the anti-Macedonian party—the
CHAP. VIII THE SECOND MACEDONIAN WAR 42I
Spartans, Eleans, Athenians, and Aetolians—Philip might
perhaps have gained the latter, for the peace of 548 had
made a deep, and far from healed, breach in their friendly
alliance with Rome; but apart from the old differences
which subsisted between Aetolia and Macedonia regarding
the Thessalian towns withdrawn by Macedonia from the
Aetolian confederacy—Echinus, Larissa Cremaste, Phar-
salus, and Thebes in Phthiotis—the expulsion of the
Aetolian garrisons from Lysimachia and Cius had produced
fresh exasperation against Philip in the minds of the
Aetolians. If they delayed to join the league against him,
the chief reason doubtless was the ill-feeling that continued
to prevail between them and the Romans.
It was a circumstance still more ominous, that even among
the Greek states firmly attached to the interests of Macedonia
—the Epirots, Acarnanians, Boeotians, and Achaeans—the
Acarnanians and Boeotians alone stood steadfastly by Philip.
With the Epirots the Roman envoys negotiated not without
success; Amynander, king of the Athamanes, in particular
closely attached himself to Rome. Even among the
Achaeans, Philip had offended many by the murder of
Aratus; while on the other hand he had thereby paved the
way for a more free development of the confederacy. Under
the leadership of Philopoemen (502-571, for the first time
strategus in 546) it had reorganized its military system, re-
covered confidence in itself by successful conflicts with
Sparta, and no longer blindly followed, as in the time of
Aratus, the policy of Macedonia. The Achaean league,
which had to expect neither profit nor immediate injury from
the thirst of Philip for aggrandizement, alone in all Hellas
looked at this war from an impartial and national-Hellenic
point of view. It perceived—what there was no difficulty
in perceiving—that the Hellenic nation was thereby sur-
rendering itself to the Romans even before these wishfed or
desired its surrender, and attempted accordingly to mediate
206.
252-183.
208.
422 THE EASTERN STATES AND BOOK III
200.
Landing
of the
Romans
in Mace-
donia.
between Philip and the Rhodians; but it was too late.
The national patriotism, which had formerly terminated the
federal war and had mainly contributed to bring about the
first war between Macedonia and Rome, was extinguished ;
the Achaean mediation remained fruitless, and in vain Philip
visited the cities and islands to rekindle the zeal of the nation
—its apathy was the Nemesis for Cius and Abydus. The
Achaeans, as they could effect no change and were not
disposed to render help to either party, remained neutral.
In the autumn of 554 the consul, Publius Sulpicius Galba,
landed with his two legions and I ooo Numidian cavalry
accompanied even by elephants derived from the spoils of
Carthage, at Apollonia; on receiving accounts of which the
king returned in haste from the Hellespont to Thessaly.
But, owing partly to the far-advanced season, partly to the
sickness of the Roman general, nothing was undertaken by
land that year except a reconnaissance in force, in the course
of which the townships in the vicinity, and in particular the
Macedonian colony Antipatria, were occupied by the Romans.
For the next year a joint attack on Macedonia was concerted
with the northern barbarians, especially with Pleuratus, the
then ruler of Scodra, and Bato, prince of the Dardani, who
of course were eager to profit by the favourable opportunity.
More importance attached to the enterprises of the Roman
fleet, which numbered Ioo decked and 80 light vessels.
While the rest of the ships took their station for the winter
at Corcyra, a division under Gaius Claudius Cento proceeded
to the Piraeeus to render assistance to the hard-pressed Athe-
nians. But, as Cento found the Attic territory already
sufficiently protected against the raids of the Corinthian
garrison and the Macedonian corsairs, he sailed on and ap-
peared suddenly before Chalcis in Euboea, the chief strong-
hold of Philip in Greece, where his magazines, stores of
arms, and prisoners were kept, and where the commandant
Sopater was far from expecting a Roman attack. The unde-
CHAP. vi.11 THE SECOND MACEDONIAN WAR 423
fended walls were scaled, and the garrison was put to death;
the prisoners were liberated and the stores were burnt;
unfortunately, there was a want of troops to hold the im-
portant position. On receiving news of this invasion, Philip
immediately in vehement indignation started from Demetrias
in Thessaly for Chalcis, and when he found no trace of the
enemy there save the scene of ruin, he went on to Athens
to retaliate. But his attempt to surprise the city was a failure,
and even the assault was in vain, greatly as the king exposed
his life; the approach of Gaius Claudius from the Piraeeus,
and of Attalus from Aegina, compelled him to depart. Philip
still tarried for some time in Greece; but in a political and
in a military point of view his successes were equally insig-
nificant. In vain he tried to induce the Achaeans to take
up arms in his behalf; and equally fruitless were his attacks
on Eleusis and the Piraeeus, as well as a scoond attempt on
Athens itself. Nothing remained for him but to gratify his
natural exasperation in an unworthy manner by laying waste
the country and destroying the trees of Academus, and then
to return to the north.
Thus the winter passed away. With the spring of 555
the proconsul Publius Sulpicius broke up from his winter
camp, determined to conduct his legions from Apollonia by
the shortest route into Macedonia proper. This principal
attack from the west was to be supported by three subordi-
nate attacks; on the north by an invasion of the Dardani
and Illyrians; on the east by an attack on the part of the
combined fleet of the Romans and allies, which assembled
at Aegina; while lastly the Athamanes, and the Aetolians
also, if the attempt to induce them to share in the struggle
should prove successful, were to advance from the south.
After Galba had crossed the mountains pierced by the
Apsus (now the Beratiné), and had marched through the
fortile plain of DaşGarctia, he reached the mountain range
which separates Illyria from Macedonia, and crossing it,
Attempt of
the [199.
Romans to
invade Ma-
cedonia.
424 THE EASTERN STATES AND BOOK III
entered the proper Macedonian territory. Philip had
marched to meet him ; but in the extensive and thinly-
peopled regions of Macedonia the antagonists for a time
sought each other in vain; at length they met in the province
of Lyncestis, a fertile but marshy plain not far from the
north-western frontier, and encamped not I ooo paces apart.
Philip's army, after he had been joined by the corps de-
tached to occupy the northern passes, numbered about
20, ooo infantry and 2 ooo cavalry; the Roman army was
nearly as strong. The Macedonians however had the great
advantage, that, fighting in their native land and well
acquainted with its highways and byways, they had little
trouble in procuring supplies of provisions, while they had
encamped so close to the Romans that the latter could not
venture to disperse for any extensive foraging. The consul
repeatedly offered battle, but the king persisted in declining
it; and the combats between the light troops, although the
Romans gained some advantages in them, produced no
material alteration. Galba was obliged to break up his
Camp and to pitch another eight miles off at Octolophus,
where he conceived that he could more easily procure
supplies. But here too the divisions sent out were destroyed
by the light troops and cavalry of the Macedonians; the
legions were obliged to come to their help, whereupon the
Macedonian vanguard, which had advanced too far, were
driven back to their camp with heavy loss; the king himself
lost his horse in the action, and only saved his life through
the magnanimous self-devotion of one of his troopers. From
this perilous position the Romans were liberated through
the better success of the subordinate attacks which Galba
had directed the allies to make, or rather through the weak-
ness of the Macedonian forces. Although Philip had
instituted levies as large as possible in his own dominions,
and had enlisted Roman deserters and other mercenaries,
he had not been able to bring into the field (over and above
CHAP. VIII THE SECON D MACEDONIAN WAR 425
the garrisons in Asia Minor and Thrace) more than the army,
with which in person he confronted the consul ; and
besides, in order to form even this, he had been obliged to
leave the northern passes in the Pelagonian territory unde-
fended. For the protection of the east coast he relied
partly on the orders which he had given for the laying waste
of the islands of Sciathus and Peparethus, which might have
furnished a station to the enemy's fleet, partly on the
garrisoning of Thasos and the coast and on the fleet organ-
ized at Demetrias under Heraclides. For the south frontier
he had been obliged to reckon solely upon the more than
doubtful neutrality of the Aetolians. These now suddenly
joined the league against Macedonia, and immediately in
conjunction with the Athamanes penetrated into Thessaly,
while simultaneously the Dardani and Illyrians overran the
northern provinces, and the Roman fleet under Lucius
Apustius, departing from Corcyra, appeared in the eastern
waters, where the ships of Attalus, the Rhodians, and the
Istrians joined it. *
Philip, on learning this, voluntarily abandoned his position
and retreated in an easterly direction : whether he did so
in order to repel the probably unexpected invasion of the
Aetolians, or to draw the Roman army after him with a
view to its destruction, or to take either of these courses
according to circumstances, cannot well be determined. He
managed his retreat so dexterously that Galba, who adopted
the rash resolution of following him, lost his track, and
Philip was enabled to reach by a flank movement, and to
occupy, the narrow pass which separates the provinces of
Lyncestis and Eordaea, with the view of awaiting the Romans
and giving them a warm reception there. A battle took
place on the spot which he had selected; but the long
Macedonian spears proved unserviceable on the wooded and
uneven ground. The Macedonians were partly turned, partly
broken, and lost many men.
426 THE EASTERN STATES AND BOO'N III
Return
of the
Romans.
But, although Philip's army was after this unfortunate
action no longer able to prevent the advance of the Romans,
the latter were themselves afraid to encounter further un-
known dangers in an impassable and hostile country; and
returned to Apollonia, after they had laid waste the fertile
provinces of Upper Macedonia–Eordaea, Elymaea, and
Orestis. Celetrum, the most considerable town of Orestis
(now Kastoria, on a peninsula in the lake of the same name),
had surrendered to them : it was the only Macedonian town
that opened its gates to the Romans. In the Illyrian land
Pelium, the city of the Dassaretae, on the upper confluents
of the Apsus, was taken by storm and strongly garrisoned to
serve as a future basis for a similar expedition.
Philip did not disturb the Roman main army in its
retreat, but turned by forced marches against the Aetolians
and Athamanians who, in the belief that the legions were
occupying the attention of the king, were fearlessly and
recklessly plundering the rich vale of the Peneius, defeated
them completely, and compelled such as did not fall to make
their escape singly through the well-known mountain paths.
The effective strength of the confederacy was not a little
diminished by this defeat, and not less by the numerous
enlistments made in Aetolia on Egyptian account. The
Dardani were chased back over the mountains by Athena-
goras, the leader of Philip's light troops, without difficulty
and with severe loss. The Roman fleet also did not
accomplish much ; it expelled the Macedonian garrison from
Andros, punished Euboea and Sciathus, and then made
attempts on the Chalcidian peninsula, which were, however,
vigorously repulsed by the Macedonian garrison at Mende.
The rest of the summer was spent in the capture of Oreus
in Euboea, which was long delayed by the resolute defence
of the Macedonian garrison. The weak Macedonian fleet
under Heraclides remained inactive at Heraclea, and did
not venture to dispute the possession of the sea with the
CHAP. VIII THE SECOND MACEDONIAN WAR 427
enemy. The latter went early to winter quarters, the
Romans proceeding to the Piraeeus and Corcyra, the
Rhodians and Pergamenes going home.
Philip might on the whole congratulate himself upon the
results of this campaign. The Roman troops, after an ex-
tremely troublesome campaign, stood in autumn precisely
on the spot whence they had started in spring; and, but for
the well-timed interposition of the Aetolians and the un-
expected success of the battle at the pass of Eordaea,
perhaps not a man of their entire force would have again
seen the Roman territory. The fourfold offensive had every-
where failed in its object, and not only did Philip in autumn
see his whole dominions cleared of the enemy, but he was
able to make an attempt—which, however, miscarried—to
wrest from the Aetolians thestrong town of Thaumaci, situated
on the Aetolo-Thessalian frontier and commanding the plain
of the Peneius. If Antiochus, for whose coming Philip
vainly supplicated the gods, should unite with him in the
next campaign, he might anticipate great successes. For a
moment it seemed as if Antiochus was disposed to do so;
his army appeared in Asia Minor, and occupied some town-
ships of king Attalus, who requested military protection from
the Romans. The latter, however, were not anxious to
urge the great-king at this time to a breach: they sent envoys,
who in fact obtained an evacuation of the dominions of
Attalus. From that quarter Philip had nothing to hope
for.
But the fortunate issue of the last campaign had so
raised the courage or the arrogance of Philip, that, after
having assured himself afresh of the neutrality of the
Achaeans and the fidelity of the Macedonians by the sacri-
fice of some strong places and of the detested admiral
Heraclides, he next spring (556) assumed the offensive and
advanced into the territory of the Atintanes, with a view to
form a well-entrenched camp in the narrow pass, where the
Philip
encamps
on the
Aous.
428 THE EASTERN STATES AND BOOK III
Aous (Viosa) winds its way between the mountains Aeropus
and Asnaus. Opposite to him encamped the Roman army
reinforced by new arrivals of troops, and commanded first
by the consul of the previous year, Publius Villius, and
198, then from the summer of 556 by that year's consul, Titus
Flami- Quinctius Flamininus. Flamininus, a talented man just
minus. thirty years of age, belonged to the younger generation,
who began to lay aside the patriotism as well as the habits
of their forefathers and, though not unmindful of their father-
land, were still more mindful of themselves and of Hellenism.
A skilful officer and a better diplomatist, he was in many
respects admirably adapted for the management of the
troubled affairs of Greece. Yet it would perhaps have been
better both for Rome and for Greece, if the choice had
fallen on one less full of Hellenic sympathies, and if the
general despatched thither had been a man, who would
| neither have been bribed by delicate flattery nor stung by
pungent sarcasm; who would not amidst literary and artistic
reminiscences have overlooked the pitiful condition of the
constitutions of the Hellenic states; and who, while treating .
Hellas according to its deserts, would have spared y
Romans the trouble of striving after unattainable ideals.
The new commander-in-chief immediately had a con-
ference with the king, while the two armies lay face to face
inactive. Philip made proposals of peace ; he offered to
restore all his own conquests, and to submit to an equitable
arbitration regarding the damage inflicted on the Greek
cities; but the negotiations broke down, when he was
asked to give up ancient possessions of Macedonia and
particularly Thessaly. For forty days the two armies lay
in the narrow pass of the Aous; Philip would not retire,
and Flamininus could not make up his mind whether he
should order an assault, or leave the king alone and
reattempt the expedition of the previous year. At length
the Roman general was helped out of his perplexity by the
CHAP, VIII THE SECOND MACEDONIAN WAR 429
treachery of some men of rank among the Epirots—who
were otherwise well disposed to Macedonia—and especially
of Charops. They conducted a Roman Corps of 4000
infantry and 300 cavalry by mountain paths to the heights
above the Macedonian Camp ; and, when the consul
attacked the enemy's army in front, the advance of that
Roman division, unexpectedly descending from the moun-
tains commanding the position, decided the battle. Philip
lost his camp and entrenchments and nearly 2 ooo men,
and hastily retreated to the pass of Tempe, the gate of
Macedonia proper. He gave up everything which he had
held except the fortresses; the Thessalian towns, which he
could not defend, he himself destroyed; Pherae alone
closed its gates against him and thereby escaped destruction.
The Epirots, induced partly by these successes of the
Roman arms, partly by the judicious Inoderation of Flami-
Philip
driven
back to
Tempe.
Greece in
the power
of the
Romans.
ninus, were the first to secede from the Macedonian .
alliance. On the first accounts of the Roman victory the
Athamanes and Aetolians immediately invaded Thessaly,
and the Romans soon followed; the open country was
easily overrun, but the strong towns, which were friendly to
Macedonia and received support from Philip, fell only after
a brave resistance or withstood even the superior foe—
especially Atrax on the left bank of the Peneius, where the
phalanx stood in the breach as a substitute for the wall.
Except these Thessalian fortresses and the territory of the
faithful Acarnanians, all northern Greece was thus in the
hands of the coalition.
The south, on the other hand, was still in the main
retained under the power of Macedonia by the fortresses of
Chalcis and Corinth, which maintained communication
with each other through the territory of the Boeotians who
were friendly to the Macedonians, and by the Achaean
neutrality; and as it was too latc to advance into Macedonia
this year, Flamininus resolved to direct his land army and
430 THE EASTERN STATES AND BOOK III
The
Achaeans
enter into
alliance
with
Rome.
fleet in the first place against Corinth and the Achaeans.
The fleet, which had again been joined by the Rhodian
and Pergamene ships, had hitherto been employed in the
capture and pillage of two of the smaller towns in Euboea,
Eretria and Carystus; both however, as well as Oreus,
were thereafter abandoned, and reoccupied by Philocles the
Macedonian commandant of Chalcis. The united fleet
proceeded thence to Cenchreae, the eastern port of Corinth,
to threaten that strong fortress. On the other side Flami-
ninus advanced into Phocis and occupied the country, in
which Elatea alone sustained a somewhat protracted siege :
this district, and Anticyra in particular on the Corinthian
gulf, were chosen as winter quarters. The Achaeans, who
thus saw on the one hand the Roman legions approaching
and on the other the Roman fleet already on their own
coast, abandoned their morally honourable, but politically
untenable, neutrality. After the deputies from the towns
most closely attached to Macedonia—Dyme, Megalopolis,
and Argos—had left the diet, it resolved to join the coali-
tion against Philip. Cycliades and other leaders of the
Macedonian party went into exile; the troops of the
Achaeans immediately united with the Roman fleet and
hastened to invest Corinth by land, which city—the strong-
hold of Philip against the Achaeans—had been guaranteed
to them on the part of Rome in return for their joining the
coalition. Not only, however, did the Macedonian garrison,
which was 1300 strong and consisted chiefly of Italian
deserters, defend with determination the almost impregnable
city, but Philocles also arrived from Chalcis with a division
of 15oo men, which not only relieved Corinth but also
invaded the territory of the Achaeans and, in concert with
the citizens who were favourable to Macedonia, wrested
from them Argos. But the recompense of such devotedness
was, that the king delivered over the faithful Argives to the
reign of terror of Nabis of Sparta. Philip hoped, after the
CHAP. VIII THE SECOND MACEDONIAN WAR 43 I
accession of the Achaeans to the Roman coalition, to gain
over Nabis who had hitherto been the ally of the Romans;
for his chief reason for joining the Roman alliance had
been that he was opposed to the Achaeans and since 55o
was even at open war with them. But the affairs of
Philip were in too desperate a condition for any one to feel
satisfaction in joining his side now. Nabis indeed accepted
Argos from Philip, but he betrayed the traitor and remained
in alliance with Flamininus, who, in his perplexity at being
now allied with two powers that were at war with each
other, had in the meantime arranged an armistice of four
months between the Spartans and Achaeans.
Thus winter came on ; and Philip once more availed
himself of it to obtain if possible an equitable peace. At
a conference held at Nicaea on the Maliac gulf the king
appeared in person, and endeavoured to come to an under-
standing with Flamininus. With haughty politeness he
repelled the forward insolence of the petty chiefs, and by
marked deference to the Romans, as the only antagonists
on an equality with him, he sought to obtain from them
tolerable terms. Flamininus was sufficiently refined to feel
himself flattered by the urbanity of the vanquished prince
towards himself and his arrogance towards the allies, whom
the Roman as well as the king had learned to despise ;
but his powers were not ample enough to meet the king's
wishes. He granted him a two months' armistice in return
for the evacuation of Phocis and Locris, and referred him,
as to the main matter, to his government. The Roman
senate had long been at one in the opinion that Macedonia
must give up all her possessions abroad ; accordingly, when
the ambassadors of Philip appeared in Rome, they were
simply asked whether they had full powers to renounce all
Greece and in particular Corinth, Chalcis, and Demetrias,
and when they said that they had not, the negotiations were
immediately broken off, and it was resolved that the war
204.
Vain
attempts to
arrange a
peace.
432 THE EASTERN STATES AND BOOK 1 II
197.
Philip
proceeds to
Thessaly.
should be prosecuted with vigour. With the help of the
tribunes of the people, the senate succeeded in preventing
a change in the chief command—which had often proved
so injurious—and in prolonging the command of Flami-
ninus; he obtained considerable reinforcements, and the two
former commanders-in-chief, Publius Galba and Publius
Villius, were instructed to place themselves at his disposal.
Philip resolved once more to risk a pitched battle. To
secure Greece, where all the states except the Acarnanians
and Boeotians were now in arms against him, the garrison
of Corinth was augmented to 6ooo men, while he himself,
straining the last energies of exhausted Macedonia and
enrolling children and old men in the ranks of the phalanx,
brought into the field an army of about 26, ooo men, of
whom 16,ooo were Macedonian phalamgitae.
Thus the fourth campaign, that of 557, began. Flamini-
nus despatched a part of the fleet against the Acarnanians,
who were besieged in Leucas; in Greece proper he became
by stratagem master of Thebes, the capital of Boeotia, in
consequence of which the Boeotians were compelled to
join at least nominally the alliance against Macedonia.
Content with having thus interrupted the communication
between Corinth and Chalcis, he proceeded to the north,
where alone a decisive blow could be struck. The great
difficulties of provisioning the army in a hostile and for the
most part desolate country, which had often hampered its
operations, were now to be obviated by the fleet accompany-
ing the army along the coast and carrying after it supplies
sent from Africa, Sicily, and Sardinia. The decisive blow
came, however, earlier than Flamininus had hoped. Philip,
impatient and confident as he was, could not endure to
await the enemy on the Macedonian frontier: after assem-
bling his army at Dium, he advanced through the pass of
Tempe into Thessaly, and encountered the army of the
enemy advancing to meet him in the district of Scotussa.
chap. viii THE SECOND MACEDONIAN WAR 433
J
The Macedonian and Roman armies—the latter of
which had been reinforced by contingents of the Apolloni-
ates and the Athamanes, by the Cretans sent by Nabis, and
especially by a strong band of Aetolians—contained nearly
equal numbers of combatants, each about 26,ooo men ;
the Romans, however, had the Superiority in cavalry. In
front of Scotussa, on the plateau of the Karadagh, during
a gloomy day of rain, the Roman vanguard unexpectedly
encountered that of the enemy, which occupied a high and
steep hill named Cynoscephalae, that lay between the two
camps. Driven back into the plain, the Romans were
reinforced from the camp by the light troops and the
excellent corps of Aetolian cavalry, and now in turn forced
the Macedonian vanguard back upon and over the height.
But here the Macedonians again found support in their
whole cavalry and the larger portion of their light infantry;
the Romans, who had ventured forward imprudently, were
pursued with great loss almost to their camp, and would
have wholly taken to flight, had not the Aetolian horsemen
prolonged the combat in the plain until Flamininus brought
up his rapidly-arranged legions. The king yielded to the
impetuous cry of his victorious troops demanding the
continuance of the conflict, and hastily drew up his heavy-
armed soldiers for the battle, which neither general nor
soldiers had expected on that day. It was important to
occupy the hill, which for the moment was quite denuded
of troops. The right wing of the phalanx, led by the king
in person, arrived early enough to form without trouble in
battle order on the height; the left had not yet come up,
when the light troops of the Macedonians, put to flight by
the legions, rushed up the hill. Philip quickly pushed the
crowd of fugitives past the phalanx into the middle division,
and, without waiting till Nicanor had arrived on the left
wing will the other half of the phalanx which followed
more slowly, he ordered the right phalanx to couch their
VOL. II 6o
Battle of
Cynosce-
phalae.
434 THE EASTERN STATES AND BOOK III
spears and to charge down the hill on the legions, and the
rearranged light infantry simultaneously to turn them and
fall upon them in flank. The attack of the phalanx,
irresistible on so favourable ground, shattered the Roman
infantry, and the left wing of the Romans was completely
beaten. Nicanor on the other wing, when he saw the king
give the attack, ordered the other half of the phalanx to
advance in all haste; by this movement it was thrown into
confusion, and while the first ranks were already rapidly
following the victorious right wing down the hill, and were
still more thrown into disorder by the inequality of the
ground, the last files were just gaining the height. The
right wing of the Romans under these circumstances soon
overcame the enemy's left; the elephants alone, stationed
upon this wing, annihilated the broken Macedonian ranks.
While a fearful slaughter was taking place at this point, a
resolute Roman officer collected twenty companies, and
with these threw himself on the victorious Macedonian
wing, which had advanced so far in pursuit of the Roman
left that the Roman right came to be in its rear. Against
an attack from behind the phalanx was defenceless, and
this movement ended the battle. From the complete
breaking up of the two phalanxes we may well believe that
the Macedonian loss amounted to 13, ooo, partly prisoners,
partly fallen—but chiefly the latter, because the Roman
soldiers were not acquainted with the Macedonian sign of
surrender, the raising of the sarissae. The loss of the
victors was slight. Philip escaped to Larissa, and, after
burning all his papers that nobody might be compromised,
evacuated Thessaly and returned home.
Simultaneously with this great defeat, the Macedonians
suffered other discomfitures at all the points which they still
Occupied ; in Caria the Rhodian mercenaries defeated the
Macedonian Corps stationed there and compelled it to shut
itself up in Stratonicea ; the Corinthian garrison was
CHAP. VIII THE SECOND MACEDONIAN WAR 435
defeated by Nicostratus and his Achaeans with severe loss,
and Leucas in Acarnania was taken by assault after a
heroic resistance. Philip was completely vanquished; his
last allies, the Acarnanians, yielded on the news of the
battle of Cynoscephalae.
It was completely in the power of the Romans to dictate Prelimi-
peace ; they used their power without abusing it. The em- º: of
pire of Alexander might be annihilated; at a conference of
the allies this desire was expressly put forward by the
Aetolians. But what else would this mean, than to
demolish the rampart protecting Hellenic culture from the
Thracians and Celts? Already during the war just ended
the flourishing Lysimachia on the Thracian Chersonese had
been totally destroyed by the Thracians—a serious warning
for the future. Flamininus, who had clearly perceived the
bitter animosities subsisting among the Greek states, could
never consent that the great Roman power should be the
executioner for the grudges of the Aetolian confederacy,
even if his Hellenic sympathies had not been as much won
by the polished and chivalrous king as his Roman national
feeling was offended by the boastings of the Aetolians, the
“victors of Cynoscephalae,” as they called themselves.
He replied to the Aetolians that it was not the custom of
Rome to annihilate the vanquished, and that, besides, they
were their own masters and were at liberty to put an end to
Macedonia, if they could. The king was treated with all
possible deference, and, on his declaring himself ready now
to entertain the demands formerly made, an armistice for a
considerable term was agreed to by Flamininus in return for
the payment of a sum of money and the furnishing of host-
ages, among whom was the king's son Demetrius, an
armistice which Philip greatly needed in order to expel the
Dardani out of Macedonia.
The final regulation of the complicated affairs of Greece Peace with
* & Mace-
was entrusted by the Senate to a commission of ten persons, :
436 $ . THE EASTERN STATES AND BOOK III
Greece
free.
the head and soul of which was Flamininus. Philip obtained
from it terms similar to those laid down for Carthage. He
lost all his foreign possessions in Asia Minor, Thrace,
Greece, and in the islands of the Aegean Sea; while he re-
tained Macedonia proper undiminished, with the exception
of some unimportant tracts on the frontier and the province
of Orestis, which was declared free—a stipulation which
Philip felt very keenly, but which the Romans could not
avoid prescribing, for with his character it was impossible
to leave him free to dispose of subjects who had once
revolted from their allegiance. Macedonia was further
bound not to conclude any foreign alliances without the
previous knowledge of Rome, and not to send garrisons
abroad ; she was bound, moreover, not to make war out of
Macedonia against civilized states or against any allies of
Rome at all; and she was not to maintain any army exceed-
ing 5ooo men, any elephants, or more than five decked
ships—the rest were to be given up to the Romans. Lastly,
Philip entered into symmachy with the Romans, which
obliged him to send a contingent when requested; indeed,
Macedonian troops immediately afterwards fought side by
side with the legions. Moreover, he paid a contribution of
I ooo talents (4,244, ooo).
After Macedonia had thus been reduced to complete
political nullity and was left in possession of only as much
power as was needful to guard the frontier of Hellas against
the barbarians, steps were taken to dispose of the possessions
ceded by the king. The Romans, who just at that time
were learning by experience in Spain that transmarine
provinces were a very dubious gain, and who had by no
means begun the war with a view to the acquisition of
territory, took none of the spoil for themselves, and thus
compelled their allies also to moderation. They resolved
to declare all the states of Greece, which had previously
been under Philip, free ; and Flamininus was commissioned
CHAP. VIII THE SECOND MACEDONIAN WAR 437
to read the decree to that effect to the Greeks assembled
at the Isthmian games (558). Thoughtful men doubtless
might ask whether freedom was a blessing capable of being
thus bestowed, and what was the value of freedom to a
nation apart from union and unity; but the rejoicing was
great and sincere, as the intention of the senate was sincere
in conferring the freedom.”
The only exceptions to this general rule were, the Illyrian
provinces eastward of Epidamnus, which fell to Pleuratus
the ruler of Scodra, and rendered that state of robbers and
pirates, which a century before had been humbled by the
Romans (p. 218), once more one of the most powerful of
the petty principalities in those regions; some townships
in western Thessaly, which Amynander had occupied and
was allowed to retain ; and the three islands of Paros,
Scyros, and Imbros, which were presented to Athens in
return for her many hardships and her still more numerous
addresses of thanks and courtesies of all sorts. The
Rhodians, of course, retained their Carian possessions, and
the Pergamenes retained Aegina. The remaining allies
were only indirectly rewarded by the accession of the
newly-liberated cities to the several confederacies. The
Achaeans were the best treated, although they were the
latest in joining the coalition against Philip ; apparently
for the honourable reason, that this federation was the best
organized and most respectable of all the Greek states.
All the possessions of Philip in the Peloponnesus and on
the Isthmus, and consequently Corinth in particular, were
incorporated with their league. With the Aetolians on the
other hand the Romans used little ceremony; they were
allowed to receive the towns of Phocis and Locris into
their symmachy, but their attempts to extend it also to
* There are still extant gold staters, with the head of Flamininus and the
inscription “ T. Quincti{us),” struck in Greece under the government of
the liberator of the Hellenes. The use of the Latin language is a signifi-
cant compliment.
196.
Scodra.
The
Achaean
league
enlarged.
The
Aetolians.
438 THE EASTERN STATES AND BOOK III
War
against
Nabis of
Sparta.
204.
195.
Acarnania and Thessaly were in part decidedly rejected, in
part postponed, and the Thessalian cities were organized
into four small independent confederacies. The Rhodian
city-league reaped the benefit of the liberation of Thasos,
Lemnos, and the towns of Thrace and Asia Minor.
The regulation of the affairs of the Greek states, as
respected both their mutual relations and their internal
condition, was attended with difficulty. The most urgent
matter was the war which had been carried on between
the Spartans and Achaeans since 550, in which the duty of
mediating necessarily fell to the Romans. But after various
attempts to induce Nabis to yield, and particularly to give
up the city of Argos belonging to the Achaean league, which
Philip had surrendered to him, no course at last was left to
Flamininus but to have war declared against the obstinate
petty robber-chieftain, who reckoned on the well-known
grudge of the Aetolians against the Romans and on the
advance of Antiochus into Europe, and pertinaciously
refused to restore Argos. War was declared, accordingly,
by all the Hellenes at a great diet in Corinth, and Flami-
ninus advanced into the Peloponnesus accompanied by the
fleet and the Romano-allied army, which included a con-
tingent sent by Philip and a division of Lacedaemonian
emigrants under Agesipolis, the legitimate king of Sparta
(559). In order to crush his antagonist immediately by
an overwhelming Superiority of force, no less than 50, ooo
men were brought into the field, and, the other towns being
disregarded, the capital itself was at once invested; but the
desired result was not attained. Nabis had sent into the
field a considerable army amounting to 15, ooo men, of
whom 5ooo were mercenaries, and he had confirmed his
rule afresh by a complete reign of terror—by the execution
en masse of the officers and inhabitants of the country whom
he suspected. Even when he himself after the first
successes of the Roman army and fleet resolved to yield
CHAP. VIII THE SECOND MACEDONIAN WAR 439
and to accept the comparatively favourable terms of peace
proposed by Flamininus, “the people,” that is to say the
gang of robbers whom Nabis had domiciled in Sparta, not
without reason apprehensive of a reckoning after the victory,
and deceived by an accompaniment of lies as to the nature
of the terms of peace and as to the advance of the Aetoli-
ans and Asiatics, rejected the peace offered by the Roman
general, so that the struggle began anew. A battle took
place in front of the walls and an assault was made upon
them ; they were already scaled by the Romans, when the
setting on fire of the captured streets compelled the assail-
ants to retire.
At last the obstinate resistance came to an end. Sparta
retained its independence and was neither compelled to
receive back the emigrants nor to join the Achaean league;
even the existing monarchical constitution, and Nabis
himself, were left intact. On the other hand Nabis had to
cede his foreign possessions, Argos, Messene, the Cretan
cities, and the whole coast besides; to bind himself
neither to conclude foreign alliances, nor to wage war, nor
to keep any other vessels than two open boats; and lastly
to disgorge all his plunder, to give to the Romans hostages,
and to pay to them a war-contribution. The towns on the
Laconian coast were given to the Spartan emigrants, and
this new community, who named themselves the “free
Laconians” in contrast to the monarchically governed
Spartans, were directed to enter the Achaean league. The
emigrants did not receive back their property, as the
district assigned to them was regarded as a compensation
for it; it was stipulated, on the other hand, that their wives
and children should not be detained in Sparta against their
will. The Achaeans, although by this arrangement they
gained the accession of the free Laconians as well as Argos,
were yet far from content; they had expected that the
dreaded and hated Nabis would be superseded, that the
Settlement
of Spartan
affairs.
44O THE EASTERN STATES AND BOOK III
Final
regulation
of Greece.
emigrants would be brought back, and that the Achaean
symmachy would be extended to the whole Peloponnesus.
Unprejudiced persons, however, will not fail to see that
Flamininus managed these difficult affairs as fairly and justly
as it was possible to manage them where two political
parties, both chargeable with unfairness and injustice,
stood opposed to each other. With the old and deep
hostility subsisting between the Spartans and Achaeans,
the incorporation of Sparta into the Achaean league would
have been equivalent to subjecting Sparta to the Achaeans,
a course no less contrary to equity than to prudence.
The restitution of the emigrants, and the complete restora-
tion of a government that had been set aside for twenty
years, would only have substituted one reign of terror for
another; the expedient adopted by Flamininus was the
right one, just because it failed to satisfy either of the
extreme parties. At length thorough provision appeared
to be made that the Spartan system of robbery by sea and
land should cease, and that the government there, such as
it was, should prove troublesome only to its own subjects.
It is possible that Flamininus, who knew Nabis and could
not but be aware how desirable it was that he should
personally be superseded, omitted to take such a step from
the mere desire to have done with the matter and not to
mar the clear impression of his successes by complications
that might be prolonged beyond all calculation ; it is
possible, moreover, that he sought to preserve Sparta as a
counterpoise to the power of the Achaean confederacy in
the Peloponnesus. But the former objection relates to a
point of secondary importance; and as to the latter view,
it is far from probable that the Romans condescended to
fear the Achaeans.
Peace was thus established, externally at least, among
the petty Greek states. But the internal condition of the
several communities also furnished employment to the
CHAP. VIII THE SECOND MACEDONIAN WAR 44. I
Roman arbiter. The Boeotians openly displayed their
Macedonian tendencies, even after the expulsion of the
Macedonians from Greece; after Flamininus had at their
request allowed their countrymen who were in the service
of Philip to return home, Brachyllas, the most decided
partisan of Macedonia, was elected to the presidency of
the Boeotian confederacy, and Flamininus was otherwise
irritated in every way. He bore it with unparalleled
patience; but the Boeotians friendly to Rome, who knew
what awaited them after the departure of the Romans,
determined to put Brachyllas to death, and Flamininus,
whose permission they deemed it necessary to ask, at least
did not forbid them. Brachyllas was accordingly killed ;
upon which the Boeotians were not only content with
prosecuting the murderers, but lay in wait for the Roman
soldiers passing singly or in small parties through their
territories, and killed about 500 of them. This was too
much to be endured; Flamininus imposed on them a fine
of a talent for every soldier; and when they did not pay it,
he collected the nearest troops and besieged Coronea
(558). Now they betook themselves to entreaty; Flamini-
nus in reality desisted on the intercession of the Achaeans
and Athenians, exacting but a very moderate fine from
those who were guilty; and although the Macedonian
party remained continuously at the helm in the petty
province, the Romans met their puerile opposition simply
with the forbearance of superior power. In the rest of
Greece Flamininus contented himself with exerting his
influence, so far as he could do so without violence, over
the internal affairs especially of the newly-freed com-
munities; with placing the council and the courts in the
hands of the more wealthy and bringing the anti-
Macedonian party to the helm ; and with attaching as
much as possible the civic commonwealths to the Roman
interest, by adding everything, which in each community
196,
442 THE EASTERN STATES AND BOOK III
194,
Results.
should have fallen by martial law to the Romans, to the
common property of the city concerned. The work was
finished in the spring of 560; Flamininus once more
assembled the deputies of all the Greek communities at
Corinth, exhorted them to a rational and moderate use of
the freedom conferred on them, and requested as the only
return for the kindness of the Romans, that they would
within thirty days send to him the Italian captives who
had been sold into Greece during the Hannibalic war.
Then he evacuated the last fortresses in which Roman
garrisons were still stationed, Demetrias, Chalcis along
with the smaller forts dependent upon it in Euboea, and
Acrocorinthus—thus practically giving the lie to the
assertion of the Aetolians that Rome had inherited from
Philip the “fetters” of Greece—and departed homeward
with all the Roman troops and the liberated captives.
It is only contemptible disingenuousness or weakly
sentimentality, which can fail to perceive that the Romans
were entirely in earnest with the liberation of Greece; and
the reason why the plan so nobly projected resulted in so
sorry a structure, is to be sought only in the complete
moral and political disorganization of the Hellenic nation.
It was no small matter, that a mighty nation should have
suddenly with its powerful arm brought the land, which it
had been accustomed to regard as its primitive home and
as the shrine of its intellectual and higher interests, into
the possession of full freedom, and should have conferred
on every community in it deliverance from foreign taxation
and foreign garrisons and the unlimited right of self-
government; it is mere paltriness that sees in this nothing
save political calculation. Political calculation made the
liberation of Greece a possibility for the Romans; it was
converted into a reality by the Hellenic sympathies that
were at that time indescribably powerful in Rome, and
above all in Flamininus himself. If the Romans are liable
CHAP. VIII THE SECOND MACEDONIAN WAR 443
to any reproach, it is that all of them, and in particular
Flamininus who overcame the well-founded scruples of the
senate, were hindered by the magic charm of the Hellenic
name from perceiving in all its extent the wretched
character of the Greek states of that period, and so
allowed yet further freedom for the doings of communities
which, owing to the impotent antipathies that prevailed
alike in their internal and their mutual relations, knew
neither how to act nor how to keep quiet. As things
stood, it was really necessary at once to put an end to
such a freedom, equally pitiful and pernicious, by means
of a superior power permanently present on the spot;
the feeble policy of sentiment, with all its apparent
humanity, was far more cruel than the sternest occupation
would have been. In Boeotia for instance Rome had, if
not to instigate, at least to permit, a political murder,
because the Romans had resolved to withdraw their troops
from Greece and, Consequently, could not prevent the
Greeks friendly to Rome from seeking their remedy in the
usual manner of the country. But Rome herself also
suffered from the effects of this indecision. The war with
Antiochus would not have arisen but for the political
blunder of liberating Greece, and it would not have been
dangerous but for the military blunder of withdrawing the
garrisons from the principal fortresses on the European
frontier. History has a Nemesis for every sin—for an
impotent craving after freedom, as well as for an injudicious
generosity.
444 THE WAR WITH ANTIOCHUS OF ASIA BOOK III
Antiochus
the Great.
223.
CHAPTER IX
THE WAR WITH ANTIOCHUS OF ASIA
IN the kingdom of Asia the diadem of the Seleucidae had
been worn since 531 by king Antiochus the Third, the great-
great-grandson of the founder of the dynasty. He had, like
Philip, begun to reign at nineteen years of age, and had dis-
played sufficient energy and enterprise, especially in his first
campaigns in the east, to warrant his being without too ludi-
crous impropriety addressed in courtly style as “the Great.”
He had succeeded—more, however, through the negligence
of his opponents and of the Egyptian Philopator in particular,
than through any ability of his own—in restoring in Some
degree the integrity of the monarchy, and in reuniting with
his crown first the eastern satrapies of Media and Parthyene,
and then the separate state which Achaeus had founded on
205.
this side of the Taurus in Asia Minor. A first attempt to
wrest from the Egyptians the coast of Syria, the loss of
which he sorely felt, had, in the year of the battle of the
Trasimene lake, met with a bloody repulse from Philopator
at Raphia ; and Antiochus had taken good care not to
resume the contest with Egypt, so long as a man—even
though he were but an indolent one—occupied the Egyptian
throne. But, after Philopator's death (549), the right
moment for crushing Egypt appeared to have arrived ; with
that view Antiochus entered into concert with Philip, and
had thrown himself upon Coele-Syria, while Philip attacked
CHAP. IX THE WAR WITH ANTIOCHUS OF ASIA 445
the cities of Asia Minor. When the Romans interposed in
that quarter, it seemed for a moment as if Antiochus would
make common cause with Philip against them—the course
suggested by the position of affairs, as well as by the treaty
of alliance. But, not far-seeing enough to repel at once
with all his energy any interference whatever by the Romans
in the affairs of the east, Antiochus thought that his best
course was to take advantage of the subjugation of Philip by
the Romans (which might easily be foreseen), in order to
secure the kingdom of Egypt, which he had previously been
willing to share with Philip, for himself alone. Notwith-
standing the close relations of Rome with the court of
Alexandria and her royal ward, the Senate by no means
intended to be in reality, what it was in name, his
“protector;” firmly resolved to give itself no concern about
Asiatic affairs except in case of extreme necessity, and to
limit the sphere of the Roman power by the Pillars of
Hercules and the Hellespont, it allowed the great-king to
take his course. He himself was not probably in earnest
with the conquest of Egypt proper—which was more easily
talked of than achieved—but he contemplated the sub-
jugation of the foreign possessions of Egypt one after another,
and at once attacked those in Cilicia as well as in Syria and
Palestine. The great victory, which he gained in 556 over
the Egyptian general Scopas at Mount Panium near the
sources of the Jordan, not only gave him complete posses-
sion of that region as far as the frontier of Egypt proper,
but so alarmed the Egyptian guardians of the young king
that, to prevent Antiochus from invading Egypt, they sub-
mitted to a peace and sealed it by the betrothal of their
ward to Cleopatra the daughter of Antiochus. When he
had thus achieved his first object, he proceeded in the fol-
lowing year, that of the battle of Cynoscephalae, with a
strong fleet of Ioo decked and 100 open vesscla to Asia
Minor, to take possession of the districts that formerly
446 THE WAR WITH ANTIOCHUS OF ASIA BOOK III
Difficulties
with
Rome.
199–198.
197.
belonged to Egypt on the south and west coasts of Asia
Minor—probably the Egyptian government had ceded these
districts, which were de facto in the hands of Philip, to
Antiochus under the peace, and had renounced all their
foreign possessions in his favour—and to recover the Greeks
of Asia Minor generally for his empire. At the same time
a strong Syrian land-army assembled in Sardes.
This enterprise had an indirect bearing on the Romans,
who from the first had laid it down as a condition for Philip
that he should withdraw his garrisons from Asia Minor and
should leave to the Rhodians and Pergamenes their territory
and to the free cities their former constitution unimpaired,
and who had now to look on while Antiochus took posses-
sion of them in Philip's place. Attalus and the Rhodians
found themselves now directly threatened by Antiochus
with precisely the same danger as had driven them a few
years before into the war with Philip ; and they naturally
sought to involve the Romans in this war as well as in that
which had just terminated. Already in 555–6 Attalus had
requested from the Romans military aid against Antiochus,
who had occupied his territory while the troops of Attalus
were employed in the Roman war. The more energetic
Rhodians even declared to king Antiochus, when in the
spring of 557 his fleet appeared off the coast of Asia Minor,
that they would regard its passing beyond the Chelidonian
islands (off the Lycian coast) as a declaration of war; and,
when Antiochus did not regard the threat, they, emboldened
by the accounts that had just arrived of the battle at
Cynoscephalae, had immediately begun the war and had
actually protected from the king the most important of the
Carian cities, Caunus, Halicarnassus, and Myndus, and the
island of Samos. Most of the half-free cities had submitted
to Antiochus, but some of them, more especially the
important cities of Smyrna, Alexandria Troas, and Lamp-
sacus, had, on learning the discomfiture of Philip, likewise
CHAP. IX THE WAR WITH ANTIOCHUS OF ASIA 447
taken courage to resist the Syrian; and their urgent
entreaties were combined with those of the Rhodians. .
It admits of no doubt, that Antiochus, so far as he was
at all capable of forming a resolution and adhering to it,
had already made up his mind not only to attach to his
empire the Egyptian possessions in Asia, but also to make
Conquests on his own behalf in Europe and, if not to seek
on that account a war with Rome, at any rate to risk it.
The Romans had thus every reason to comply with that
request of their allies, and to interfere directly in Asia;
but they showed little inclination to do so. They not only
delayed as long as the Macedonian war lasted, and gave to
Attalus nothing but the protection of diplomatic inter-
cession, which, we may add, proved in the first instance
effective; but even after the victory, while they doubtless
spoke as though the cities which had been in the hands of
Ptolemy and Philip ought not to be taken possession of by
Antiochus, and while the freedom of the Asiatic cities,
Myrina, Abydus, Lampsacus,” and Cius, figured in Roman
documents, they took not the smallest step to give effect to
it, and allowed king Antiochus to employ the favourable
* According to a recently discovered decree of the town of Lampsacus
(Mitth. des arch. Inst. in Athen, vi. 95) the Lampsacenes after the defeat
of Philip sent envoys to the Roman senate with the request that the town
might be embraced in the treaty concluded between Rome and (Philip) the
king (8tra's avatreptXmóðūgev [év rats ovv6%kats] rats yeuopºvals Papuatous
Tpós rôv [8agiXéal), which the Senate, at least according to the view
of the petitioners, granted to them and referred them, as regarded other
matters, to Flamininus and the ten envoys. From the latter they then
obtain in Corinth a guarantee of their constitution and “letters to the
kings.” Flamininus also gives to them similar letters; of their contents
we learn nothing more particular, than that in the decree the embassy is
described as successful. But if the senate and Flamininus had formally
and positively guaranteed the autonomy and democracy of the Lampsacenes,
the decree would hardly dwell so much at length on the courteous answers,
which the Roman commanders, who had been appealed to on the way for
their intercession with the senate, gave to the envoys.
Other remarkable points in this document are the “brotherhood” of
the Lampsacenes and the Romans, certainly going back to the Trojan
legend, and the mediation, invoked by the former with success, of the
allies and friends of Rome, the Massiliols, w119 were Colluected with the
Lampsacenes through their common mother-city Phocaea.
448 THE WAR WITH ANTIOCHUS OF ASIA BOOK III
opportunity presented by the withdrawal of the Macedonian
garrisons to introduce his own. In fact, they even went so
far as to submit to his landing in Europe in the spring
of 558 and invading the Thracian Chersonese, where he
occupied Sestus and Madytus and spent a considerable
time in the chastisement of the Thracian barbarians and
the restoration of the destroyed Lysimachia, which he had
selected as his chief place of arms and as the capital of the
newly-instituted satrapy of Thrace. Flamininus indeed, who
was entrusted with the conduct of these affairs, sent to the
king at Lysimachia envoys, who talked of the integrity
of the Egyptian territory and of the freedom of all the
Hellenes; but nothing came out of it. The king talked
in turn of his undoubted legal title to the ancient kingdom
of Lysimachus conquered by his ancestor Seleucus, ex-
plained that he was employed not in making territorial
acquisitions but only in preserving the integrity of his
hereditary dominions, and declined the intervention of the
Romans in his disputes with the cities subject to him in
Asia Minor. With justice he could add that peace had
already been concluded with Egypt, and that the Romans
were thus far deprived of any formal pretext for interfering."
The sudden return of the king to Asia occasioned by a
false report of the death of the young king of Egypt, and
the projects which it suggested of a landing in Cyprus or
even at Alexandria, led to the breaking off of the confer-
ences without coming to any conclusion, still less producing
any result. In the following year, 559, Antiochus returned
to Lysimachia with his fleet and army reinforced, and
employed himself in organizing the new satrapy which he
196.
195.
198.
I93.
* The definite testimony of Hieronymus, who places the betrothal of the
Syrian princess Cleopatra with Ptolemy Epiphanes in 556, taken in con-
nection with the hints in Liv. xxxiii. 40 and Appian. Syr. 3, and with the
actual accomplishment of the marriage in 561, puts it beyond a doubt that
the interference of the Romans in the affairs of Egypt was in this case
formally uncalled for.
CHAP. XI THE WAR WITH ANTIOCHUS OF ASIA 449
destined for his son Seleucus. Hannibal, who had been
obliged to flee from Carthage, came to him at Ephesus;
and the singularly honourable reception accorded to the
exile was virtually a declaration of war against Rome.
Nevertheless Flamininus in the spring of 560 withdrew all
the Roman garrisons from Greece. This was under the
existing circumstances at least a mischievous error, if not a
criminal acting in opposition to his own better knowledge;
for we cannot dismiss the idea that Flamininus, in order to
carry home with him the undiminished glory of having
wholly terminated the war and liberated Hellas, contented
himself with superficially covering up for the moment the
Smouldering embers of revolt and war. The Roman
statesman might perhaps be right, when he pronounced
any attempt to bring Greece directly under the dominion
of the Romans, and any intervention of the Romans in
Asiatic affairs, to be a political blunder ; but the opposition
fermenting in Greece, the feeble arrogance of the Asiatic
king, the residence, at the Syrian head-quarters, of the
bitter enemy of the Romans who had already raised the
west in arms against Rome—all these were clear signs of
the approach of a fresh rising in arms on the part of the
Hellenic east, which could not but have for its aim at
least to transfer Greece from the clientship of Rome to
that of the states opposed to Rome, and, if this object
should be attained, would immediately extend the circle of
its operations. It is plain that Rome could not allow this
to take place. When Flamininus, ignoring all these sure
indications of war, withdrew the garrisons from Greece,
and yet at the same time made demands on the king of
Asia which he had no intention of employing his army to
support, he overdid his part in words as much as he fell
short in action, and forgot his duty as a general and as
a citizen in the indulgence of his personal vanity — a
vanity, which wished to confer, and imagined that it had
VOL. II 6 I
194.
45O THE WAR WITH ANTIOCHUS OF ASIA BOOK III
conferred, peace on Rome and freedom on the Greeks
of both continents,
Antiochus employed the unexpected respite in strength-
ening his position at home and his relations with his
neighbours before beginning the war, on which for his part
he was resolved, and became all the more so, the more the
enemy appeared to procrastinate. He now (561) gave his
daughter Cleopatra, previously betrothed, in marriage to
the young king of Egypt. That he at the same time
promised to restore the provinces wrested from his son-in-
law, was afterwards affirmed on the part of Egypt, but
probably without warrant; at any rate the land remained
actually attached to the Syrian kingdom." He offered to
restore to Eumenes, who had in 557 succeeded his father
Attalus on the throne of Pergamus, the towns taken from
him, and to give him also one of his daughters in marriage,
if he would abandon the Roman alliance. In like manner
he bestowed a daughter on Ariarathes, king of Cappadocia,
and gained the Galatians by presents, while he reduced by
arms the Pisidians who were constantly in revolt, and other
small tribes. Extensive privileges were granted to the
Byzantines; respecting the cities in Asia Minor, the king
declared that he would permit the independence of the
old free cities such as Rhodes and Cyzicus, and would
be content in the case of the others with a mere formal
recognition of his sovereignty; he even gave them to under-
stand that he was ready to submit to the arbitration of the
Rhodians. In European Greece he could safely count on
the Aetolians, and he hoped to induce Philip again to take
Prepara-
tions of
Antiochus
for war
with
Rome,
193.
197.
* For this we have the testimony of Polybius (xxviii. 1), which the
sequel of the history of Judaea completely confirms; Eusebius (p. 117,
Mai) is mistaken in making Philometor ruler of Syria. We certainly ſind
... that about 567 farmers of the Syrian taxes made their payments at Alex-
andria (Joseph. xii. 4, 7); but this doubtless took place without detriment
to the rights of sovereignty, simply because the dowry of Cleopatra con-
stituted a charge on those revenues; and from this very circumstance
presumably arose the Subsequent dispute.
CHAP. IX THE WAR WITH ANTIOCHUS OF ASIA 45 I
up arms. In fact, a plan of Hannibal obtained the royal
approval, according to which he was to receive from
Antiochus a fleet of Ioo sail and a land army of Io, ooo
infantry and Iooo Cavalry, and was to employ them in
kindling first a third Punic war in Carthage, and then a
second Hannibalic war in Italy; Tyrian emissaries pro-
ceeded to Carthage to pave the way for a rising in arms
there (p. 38o). Finally, good results were anticipated from
the Spanish insurrection, which, at the time when Hannibal
left Carthage, was at its height (p. 390).
While the storm was thus gathering from far and wide
against Rome, it was on this, as on all occasions, the Hel-
lenes implicated in the enterprise, who were of the least
moment, and yet took action of the greatest importance
and with the utmost impatience. The exasperated and
arrogant Aetolians began by degrees to persuade them-
selves that Philip had been vanquished by them and not
by the Romans, and could not even wait till Antiochus
should advance into Greece. Their policy is character-
istically expressed in the reply, which their strategus gave
soon afterwards to Flamininus, when he requested a copy
of the declaration of war against Rome: that he would
deliver it to him in person, when the Aetolian army should
encamp on the Tiber. The Aetolians acted as the agents
of the Syrian king in Greece and deceived both parties,
by representing to the king that all the Hellenes were
waiting with open arms to receive him as their true
deliverer, and by telling those in Greece who were
disposed to listen to them that the landing of the king
was nearer than it was in reality. Thus they actually
succeeded in inducing the simple obstinacy of Nabis to
break loose and to rekindle in Greece the flame of war
two years after Flamininus's departure, in the spring of
562 ; but in doing so they missed their aim. Nabis
attacked Gythium, one of the towns of the ſree Laconians
Aetolian
intrigues
against
Rome.
192.
452 THE WAR WITH ANTIOCHUS OF ASIA BOOK III
that by the last treaty had been annexed to the Achaean
league, and took it; but the experienced strategus of the
Achaeans, Philopoemen, defeated him at the Barbos-
thenian mountains, and the tyrant brought back barely
a fourth part of his army to his capital, in which Philo-
poemen shut him up. As such a commencement was no
sufficient inducement for Antiochus to come to Europe,
the Aetolians resolved to possess themselves of Sparta,
Chalcis, and Demetrias, and by gaining these important
towns to prevail upon the king to embark. In the first
place they thought to become masters of Sparta, by
arranging that the Aetolian Alexamenus should march
with I ooo men into the town under pretext of bringing
a contingent in terms of the alliance, and should embrace
the opportunity of making away with Nabis and of
occupying the town. This was done, and Nabis was
killed at a review of the troops; but, when the Aetolians
dispersed to plunder the town, the Lacedaemonians found
time to rally and slew them to the last man. The city
was then induced by Philopoemen to join the Achaean
league. After this laudable project of the Aetolians had
thus not only deservedly failed, but had had precisely the
opposite effect of uniting almost the whole Peloponnesus
in the hands of the other party, it fared little better with
them at Chalcis, for the Roman party there called in the
citizens of Eretria and Carystus in Euboea, who were
favourable to Rome, to render seasonable aid against
the Aetolians and the Chalcidian exiles. On the other
hand the occupation of Demetrias was successful, for the
Magnetes to whom the city had been assigned were, not
without reason, apprehensive that it had been promised
by the Romans to Philip as a prize in return for his aid
against Antiochus; several squadrons of Aetolian horse
moreover managed to steal into the town under the
pretext of forming an escort for Eurylochus, the recalled
cHAP. Ix THE WAR WITH ANTIOCHUS OF ASIA 453
head of the opposition to Rome. Thus the Magnetes
passed over, partly of their own accord, partly by com-
pulsion, to the side of the Aetolians, and the latter did
not fail to make use of the fact at the court of the
Seleucid.
Antiochus took his resolution. A rupture with Rome,
in spite of endeavours to postpone it by the diplomatic
palliative of embassies, could no longer be avoided. As
early as the spring of 561 Flamininus, who continued
to have the decisive voice in the senate as to eastern
affairs, had expressed the Roman ultimatum to the envoys
of the king, Menippus and Hegesianax; viz. that he
should either evacuate Europe and dispose of Asia at
his pleasure, or retain Thrace and submit to the Roman
protectorate over Smyrna, Lampsacus, and Alexandria
Troas. These demands had becn again discussed at
Ephesus, the chief place of arms and fixed quarters of
the king in Asia Minor, in the spring of 562, between
Antiochus and the envoys of the senate, Publius Sulpicius
and Publius Villius; and they had separated with the
conviction on both sides that a peaceful settlement was
no longer possible. Thenceforth war was resolved on
in Rome. In that very summer of 562 a Roman fleet
of 30 sail, with 3ooo soldiers on board, under Aulus
Atilius Serranus, appeared off Gythium, where their arrival
accelerated the conclusion of the treaty between the
Achacans and Spartans; the eastern coasts of Sicily and
Italy were strongly garrisoned, so as to be secure against
any attempts at a landing; a land army was expected in
Greece in the autumn. Since the spring of 562 Flami-
ninus, by direction of the senate, had journeyed through
Greece to thwart the intrigues of the opposite party, and
to counteract as far as possible the evil effects of the ill-
timed evacuation of the country. The Aetolians had
already gone so far as formally to declare war in their
Rupture
between
Antiochus
and the
Romans.
193.
192.
192.
454 THE WAR WITH ANTIOCHUS OF ASIA BOOK III
192.
Attitude of
the minor
powers.
Carthage
and
Hannibal.
diet against Rome. But Flamininus succeeded in saving
Chalcis for the Romans by throwing into it a garrison of
5oo Achaeans and 5oo Pergamenes. He made an attempt
also to recover Demetrias; and the Magnetes wavered.
Though some towns in Asia Minor, which Antiochus had
proposed to subdue before beginning the great war, still held
out, he could now no longer delay his landing, unless he
was willing to let the Romans recover all the advantages
which they had surrendered two years before by with-
drawing their garrisons from Greece. He collected the
vessels and troops which were at hand—he had but 4o
decked vessels and Io, ooo infantry, along with 5oo horse
and 6 elephants—and started from the Thracian Chersonese
for Greece, where he landed in the autumn of 562 at
Pteleum on the Pagasaean gulf, and immediately occupied
the adjoining Demetrias. Nearly about the same time a
Roman army of some 25, ooo men under the praetor
Marcus Baebius landed at Apollonia. The war was thus
begun on both sides.
Everything depended on the extent to which that com-
prehensively - planned coalition against Rome, of which
Antiochus came forward as the head, might be realized.
As to the plan, first of all, of stirring up enemies to the
Romans in Carthage and Italy, it was the fate of Hannibal
at the court of Ephesus, as through his whole career, to
have projected his noble and high-spirited plans for
the behoof of people pedantic and mean. Nothing was
done towards their execution, except that some Cartha-
ginian patriots were compromised; no choice was left to
the Carthaginians but to show unconditional submission to
Rome. The camarilla would have nothing to do with
Hannibal—such a man was too inconveniently great for
court cabals; and, after having tried all sorts of absurd
expedients, such as accusing the general, with whose name
the Romans frightened their children, of concert with the
CHAP. IX THE WAR WITH ANTIOCHUS OF ASIA 455
Roman envoys, they succeeded in persuading Antiochus
the Great, who like all insignificant monarchs plumed
himself greatly on his independence and was influenced by
nothing so easily as by the fear of being ruled, into the
wise belief that he ought not to allow himself to be thrown
into the shade by so celebrated a man. Accordingly it
was in solemn council resolved that the Phoenician
should be employed in future only for subordinate enter-
prises and for giving advice—with the reservation, of
course, that the advice should never be followed.
Hannibal revenged himself on the rabble, by accepting
every commission and brilliantly executing all.
In Asia Cappadocia adhered to the great-king; Prusias
of Bithynia on the other hand took, as always, the side of
the stronger. King Eumenes remained faithful to the old
policy of his house, which was now at length to yield to
him its true fruit. He had not only persistently refused
the offers of Antiochus, but had constantly urged the
Romans to a war, from which he expected the aggrandize-
ment of his kingdom. The Rhodians and Byzantines
likewise joined their old allies. Egypt too took the side of
Rome and offered support in supplies and men ; which,
however, the Romans did not accept.
In Europe the result mainly depended on the position
which Philip of Macedonia would take up. It would have
been perhaps the right policy for him, notwithstanding all
the injuries or shortcomings of the past, to unite with
Antiochus. But Philip was ordinarily influenced not by
such considerations, but by his likings and dislikings; and
his hatred was naturally directed much more against the
faithless ally, who had left him to contend alone with the
common enemy, had sought merely to seize his own share
in the spoil, and had become a burdensome neighbour to
him in Thrace, than against the conqueror, who had
treated him respectfully and honourably. Antiochus had,
States of
Asia
Minor.
Mace-
donia.
456 THE WAR WITH ANTIOCHUS OF ASIA Book III
The lesser
Greek
StateS.
Antiochus
in Greece.
moreover, given deep offence to the hot temper of Philip
by the setting up of absurd pretenders to the Macedonian
crown, and by the ostentatious burial of the Macedonian
bones bleaching at Cynoscephalae. Philip therefore placed
his whole force with cordial zeal at the disposal of the
Romans. -
The second power of Greece, the Achaean league,
adhered no less decidedly than the first to the alliance with
Rome. Of the smaller powers, the Thessalians and the
Athenians held by Rome; among the latter an Achaean
garrison introduced by Flamininus into the citadel brought
the patriotic party, which was pretty strong, to reason.
The Epirots exerted themselves to keep on good terms, if
possible, with both parties. Thus, in addition to the
Aetolians and the Magnetes who were joined by a portion
of the neighbouring Perrhaebians, Antiochus was supported
only by Amynander, the weak king of the Athamanes, who
allowed himself to be dazzled by foolish designs on the
Macedonian crown ; by the Boeotians, among whom the
party opposed to Rome was still at the helm ; and in the
Peloponnesus by the Eleans and Messenians, who were in
the habit of taking part with the Aetolians against the
Achaeans. This was indeed a hopeful beginning; and the
title of commander-in-chief with absolute power, which the
Aetolians decreed to the great king, seemed insult added
to injury. There had been, just as usual, deception on
both sides. Instead of the countless hordes of Asia, the
king brought up a force scarcely half as strong as an
ordinary consular army; and instead of the open arms
with which all the Hellenes were to welcome their deliverer
from the Roman yoke, one or two bands of klephts and
some dissolute civic communities offered to the king
brotherhood in arms.
For the moment, indeed, Antiochus had anticipated the
Romans in Greece proper. Chalcis was garrisoned by the
CHAP. IX TIIE WAR WITH ANTIOCHUS OF ASIA 457
Greek allies of the Romans, and refused the first summons;
but the fortress surrendered when Antiochus advanced
with all his force; and a Roman division, which arrived
too late to occupy it, was annihilated by Antiochus at
Delium. Euboea was thus lost to the Romans. Antiochus
still made even in winter an attempt, in concert with the
Aetolians and Athamanes, to gain Thessaly; Thermopylae
was occupied, Pherae and other towns were taken, but
Appius Claudius came up with 2 ooo men from Apollonia,
relieved Larisa, and took up his position there. Antiochus,
tired of the winter campaign, preferred to return to his
pleasant quarters at Chalcis, where the time was spent
merrily, and the king even, in spite of his fifty years and
his warlike schemes, wedded a fair Chalcidian. So the
winter of 562–3 passed, without Antiochus doing much
more than sending letters hither and thither through
Greece: he waged the war—a Roman officer remarked—
by means of pen and ink.
In the beginning of spring 563 the Roman staff arrived
at Apollonia. The commander-in-chief was Manius Acilius
Glabrio, a man of humble origin, but an able general feared
both by his soldiers and by the enemy; the admiral was
Gaius Livius; and among the military tribunes were
Marcus Porcius Cato, the conqueror of Spain, and Lucius
Valerius Flaccus, who after the old Roman wont did not
disdain, although they had been consuls, to re-enter the
army as simple war-tribunes. They brought with them rein-
forcements in ships and men, including Numidian cavalry
and Libyan elephants sent by Massinissa, and the permission
of the senate to accept auxiliary troops to the number of
5ooo from the extra-Italian allies, so that the whole number
of the Roman forces was raised to about 40,000 men.
The king, who in the beginning of spring had gone to the
Aetolians and had thence made an aimless expedition to
Acarnania, on the news of Glabrio's landing returned to his
192-191.
191.
Landing
of the
Romans.
458 THE WAR WITH ANTIOCHUS OF ASIA BOOK III
Battle at
Thermo-
pylae.
head-quarters to begin the campaign in earnest. But incom-
prehensibly, through his own negligence and that of his
lieutenants in Asia, reinforcements had wholly failed to reach
him, so that he had nothing but the weak army—now
further decimated by sickness and desertion in its dissolute
winter-quarters—with which he had landed at Pteleum in
the autumn of the previous year. The Aetolians too, who
had professed to send such enormous numbers into the
field, now, when their support was of moment, brought to
their commander-in-chief no more than 4ooo men. The
Roman troops had already begun operations in Thessaly,
where the vanguard in concert with the Macedonian army
drove the garrisons of Antiochus out of the Thessalian
towns and occupied the territory of the Athamanes. The
consul with the main army followed; the whole force of the
Romans assembled at Larisa.
Instead of returning with all speed to Asia and evacuat-
ing the field before an enemy in every respect superior,
Antiochus resolved to entrench himself at Thermopylae,
which he had occupied, and there to await the arrival of the
great army from Asia. He himself took up a position in
the chief pass, and commanded the Aetolians to occupy the
mountain-path, by which Xerxes had formerly succeeded in
turning the Spartans. But only half of the Aetolian contin-
gent was pleased to comply with this order of the com-
mander-in-chief; the other 2 ooo men threw themselves
into the neighbouring town of Heraclea, where they took no
other part in the battle than that of attempting during its
progress to surprise and plunder the Roman camp. Even
the Aetolians posted on the heights discharged their duty
of watching with remissness and reluctance; their post on
the Callidromus allowed itself to be surprised by Cato, and
the Asiatic phalanx, which the consul had meanwhile assailed
in front, dispersed, when the Romans hastening down the
mountain fell upon its flank. As Antiochus had made no
CHAP. IX THE WAR WITH ANTIOCHUS OF ASIA 459
provision for any case and had not thought of retreat, the
army was destroyed partly on the field of battle, partly
during its flight; with difficulty a small band reached
Demetrias, and the king himself escaped to Chalcis with
5oo men. He embarked in haste for Ephesus; Europe
was lost to him all but his possessions in Thrace, and even
the fortresses could be no longer defended. Chalcis sur-
rendered to the Romans, and Demetrias to Philip, who
received permission—as a compensation for the conquest
of the town of Lamia in Achaia Phthiotis, which he was on
the point of accomplishing and had then abandoned by
orders of the consul—to make himself master of all the
communities that had gone over to Antiochus in Thessaly
proper, and even of the territories bordering on Aetolia, the
districts of Dolopia and Aperantia. All the Greeks that
had pronounced in favour of Antiochus hastened to make
their peace; the Epirots humbly besought pardon for their
ambiguous conduct, the Boeotians surrendered at discretion,
the Eleans and Messenians, the latter after some struggle,
submitted to the Achaeans. The prediction of Hannibal
to the king was fulfilled, that no dependence at all could be
placed upon the Greeks, who would submit to any con-
queror. Even the Aetolians, when their corps shut up in
Heraclea had been compelled after obstinate resistance to
capitulate, attempted to make their peace with the sorely
provoked Romans; but the stringent demands of the
Roman consul, and a consignment of money seasonably
arriving from Antiochus, emboldened them once more to
break off the negotiations and to sustain for two whole
months a siege in Naupactus. The town was already
reduced to extremities, and its capture or capitulation could
not have been long delayed, when Flamininus, constantly
striving to save every Hellenic community from the worst
consequences of its own folly and from the severity of his
ruder colleagues, interposed and arranged in the first
Greece
occupied
by the
Romans.
Resistance
of the
Aetolians.
460 THE WAR WITH ANTIOCHUS OF ASIA Book III
instance an armistice on tolerable terms. This terminated,
at least for the moment, armed resistance in Greece.
Maritime A more serious war was impending in Asia—a war
war, and , e -
prepara which appeared of a very hazardous character on account
º: º, not so much of the enemy as of the great distance and the
Asia. insecurity of the communications with home, while yet,
owing to the short-sighted obstinacy of Antiochus, the
struggle could not well be terminated otherwise than by an
attack on the enemy in his own country. The first object
was to secure the sea. The Roman fleet, which during the
campaign in Greece was charged with the task of interrupt-
ing the communication between Greece and Asia Minor,
and which had been successful about the time of the battle
at Thermopylae in seizing a strong Asiatic transport fleet
near Andros, was thenceforth employed in making prepara-
tions for the crossing of the Romans to Asia next year and
first of all in driving the enemy's fleet out of the Aegean
Sea. It lay in the harbour of Cyssus on the southern shore
of the tongue of land that projects from Ionia towards
Chios; thither in search of it the Roman fleet proceeded,
consisting of 75 Roman, 24 Pergamene, and 6 Cartha-
ginian, decked vessels under the command of Gaius Livius.
The Syrian admiral, Polyxenidas, a Rhodian emigrant, had
only 70 decked vessels to oppose to it; but, as the Roman
fleet still expected the ships of Rhodes, and as Polyxenidas
relied on the superior seaworthiness of his vessels, those of
Tyre and Sidon in particular, he immediately accepted
battle. At the outset the Asiatics succeeded in sinking one
of the Carthaginian vessels; but, when they came to
grapple, Roman valour prevailed, and it was owing solely
to the swiftness of their rowing and sailing that the enemy
lost no more than 23 ships. During the pursuit the
Roman fleet was joined by 25 ships from Rhodes, and the
superiority of the Romans in those waters was now doubly
assured. The enemy's fleet thenceforth kept the shelter of
CHAP. IX THE WAR WITH ANTIOCHUS OF ASIA 461
the harbour of Ephesus, and, as it could not be induced to
risk a second battle, the fleet of the Romans and allies
broke up for the winter; the Roman ships of war proceeded
to the harbour of Cane in the neighbourhood of Pergamus.
Both parties were busy during the winter in preparing
for the next campaign. The Romans sought to gain over
the Greeks of Asia Minor; Smyrna, which had persever-
ingly resisted all the attempts of the king to get possession
of the city, received the Romans with open arms, and the
Roman party gained the ascendency in Samos, Chios,
Erythrae, Clazomenae, Phocaea, Cyme, and elsewhere.
Antiochus was resolved, if possible, to prevent the Romans
from crossing to Asia, and with that view he made zealous
naval preparations—employing Polyxenidas to fit out and
augment the fleet stationed at Ephesus, and Hannibal to
equip a new fleet in Lycia, Syria, and Phoenicia; while he
further collected in Asia Minor a powerful land army from
all regions of his extensive empire. Early next year (564)
the Roman fleet resumed its operations. Gaius Livius left
the Rhodian fleet—which had appeared in good time this
year, numbering 36 sail—to observe that of the enemy in
the offing of Ephesus, and went with the greater portion of
the Roman and Pergamene vessels to the Hellespont in
accordance with his instructions, to pave the way for the
passage of the land army by the capture of the fortresses
there. Sestus was already occupied and Abydus reduced
to extremities, when the news of the defeat of the Rhodian
fleet recalled him. The Rhodian admiral Pausistratus,
lulled into security by the representations of his countryman
that he wished to desert from Antiochus, had allowed
himself to be surprised in the harbour of Samos; he hin-
self fell, and all his vessels were destroyed except five
Rhodian and two Coan ships; Samos, Phocaea, and Cyme
on hearing the news went over to Seleucus, who held the
chief command by land in those provinces for his father.
&
I
90.
Polyxeni-
das and
Pausistra-
tuS.
462 THE WAR WITH ANTIOCHUS OF ASIA BOOK III
But when the Roman fleet arrived partly from Cane, partly
from the Hellespont, and was after some time joined by
twenty new ships of the Rhodians at Samos, Polyxenidas
was once more compelled to shut himself up in the harbour
of Ephesus. As he declined the offered naval battle, and
as, owing to the small numbers of the Roman force, an
attack by land was not to be thought of, nothing remained
for the Roman fleet but to take up its position in like
manner at Samos. A division meanwhile proceeded to
Patara on the Lycian coast, partly to relieve the Rhodians
from the very troublesome attacks that were directed
against them from that quarter, partly and chiefly to
prevent the hostile fleet, which Hannibal was expected to
bring up, from entering the Aegean Sea. When the
squadron sent against Patara achieved nothing, the new
admiral Lucius Aemilius Regillus, who had arrived with
2 o war-vessels from Rome and had relieved Gaius Livius
at Samos, was so indignant that he proceeded thither with
the whole fleet; his officers with difficulty succeeded, while
they were on their voyage, in making him understand that
the primary object was not the conquest of Patara but the
command of the Aegean Sea, and in inducing him to
return to Samos. On the mainland of Asia Minor Seleucus
had in the meanwhile begun the siege of Pergamus, while
Antiochus with his chief army ravaged the Pergamene
territory and the possessions of the Mytilenaeans on the
mainland; they hoped to crush the hated Attalids, before
Roman aid appeared. The Roman fleet went to Elaea
and the port of Adramytium to help their ally ; but, as
the admiral wanted troops, he accomplished nothing.
Pergamus seemed lost; but the laxity and negligence with
which the siege was conducted allowed Eumenes to throw
into the city Achaean auxiliaries under Diophanes, whose
bold and successful Sallies compelled the Gallic mercenaries,
whom Antiochus had entrusted with the siege, to raise it.
CHAP. IX THE WAR WITH ANTIOCHUS OF ASIA 463
In the southern waters too the projects of Antiochus were
frustrated. The fleet equipped and led by Hannibal, after
having been long detained by the constant westerly winds,
attempted at length to reach the Aegean; but at the
mouth of the Eurymedon, off Aspendus in Pamphylia, it
encountered a Rhodian squadron under Eudamus ; and in
the battle, which ensued between the two fleets, the ex-
cellence of the Rhodian ships and naval officers carried
the victory over Hannibal's tactics and his numerical supe-
riority. It was the first naval battle, and the last battle
against Rome, fought by the great Carthaginian. The
victorious Rhodian fleet then took its station at Patara,
and there prevented the intended junction of the two
Asiatic fleets. In the Aegean Sea the Romano-Rhodian
fleet at Samos, after being weakened by detaching the
Pergamene ships to the Hellespont to support the land
army which had arrived there, was in its turn attacked by
that of Polyxenidas, who now numbered nine sail more
than his opponents. On December 23 of the uncorrected
calendar, according to the corrected calendar about the
end of August, in 564, a battle took place at the promon-
tory of Myonnesus between Teos and Colophon ; the
Romans broke through the line of the enemy, and totally
surrounded the left wing, so that they took or sank 42
ships. An inscription in Saturnian verse over the temple
of the Lares Permarini, which was built in the Campus
Martius in memory of this victory, for many centuries
thereafter proclaimed to the Romans how the fleet of the
Asiatics had been defeated before the eyes of king
Antiochus and of all his land army, and how the Romans
thus “settled the mighty strife and subdued the kings.”
Thenceforth the enemy's ships no longer ventured to show
themselves on the open sea, and made no further attempt
to obstruct the crossing of the Roman land army.
The conqueror of Zama had been selected at Rome to
Engage-
ment off
Aspendus.
Battle of
Myon-
IlêSlłS.
190.
464 THE WAR WITH ANTIOCEiu S OF ASTA BOOK Iti
Expedition
to Asia.
conduct the war on the Asiatic continent ; he practically
exercised the supreme command for the nominal com-
mander-in-chief, his brother Lucius Scipio, whose intellect
was insignificant, and who had no military capacity. The
reserve hitherto stationed in Lower Italy was destined for
Greece, the army of Glabrio for Asia: when it became
known who was to command it, 5ooo veterans from the
Hannibalic war voluntarily enrolled, to fight once more
under their beloved leader. In the Roman July, but
according to the true time in March, the Scipios arrived at
the army to commence the Asiatic campaign ; but they
were disagreeably surprised to find themselves instead in-
volved, in the first instance, in an endless struggle with the
desperate Aetolians. The senate, finding that Flamininus
pushed his boundless consideration for the Hellenes too
far, had left the Aetolians to choose between paying an
utterly exorbitant war contribution and unconditional
surrender, and thus had driven them anew to arms; none
could tell when this warfare among mountains and strong-
holds would come to an end. Scipio got rid of the in-
convenient obstacle by concerting a six-months' armistice,
and then entered on his march to Asia. As the one fleet
of the enemy was only blockaded in the Aegean Sea, and
the other, which was coming up from the south, might
daily arrive there in spite of the squadron charged to inter-
cept it, it seemed advisable to take the land route through
Macedonia and Thrace and to cross the Hellespont. In
that direction no real obstacles were to be anticipated ; for
Philip of Macedonia might be entirely depended on,
Prusias king of Bithynia was in alliance with the Romans,
and the Roman fleet could easily establish itself in the
straits. The long and weary march along the coast of
Macedonia and Thrace was accomplished without material
loss; Philip made provision on the one hand for supplying
their wants, on the other for their friendly reception by the
cHAP. IX THE WAR WITH ANTIOCHUS OF ASIA 465
Thracian barbarians. They had lost so much time how-
ever, partly with the Aetolians, partly on the march, that
the army only reached the Thracian Chersonese about the
time of the battle of Myonnesus. But the marvellous
good fortune of Scipio now in Asia, as formerly in Spain
and Africa, cleared his path of all difficulties.
On the news of the battle at Myonnesus Antiochus so
completely lost his judgment, that in Europe he caused
the strongly-garrisoned and well-provisioned fortress of
Lysimachia to be evacuated by the garrison and by the
inhabitants who were faithfully devoted to the restorer of
their city, and withal even forgot to withdraw in like
manner the garrisons or to destroy the rich magazines at
Aenus and Maronea ; and on the Asiatic coast he opposed
not the slightest resistance to the landing of the Romans,
but on the contrary, while it was taking place, spent his
time at Sardes in upbraiding destiny. It is scarcely doubt-
ful that, had he but provided for the defence of Lysimachia
down to the no longer distant close of the summer, and
moved forward his great army to the Hellespont, Scipio
would have been compelled to take up winter quarters on
the European shore, in a position far from being, in a
military or political point of view, secure.
While the Romans, after disembarking on the Asiatic
shore, paused for some days to refresh themselves and to
await their leader who was detained behind by religious
duties, ambassadors from the great-king arrived in their
camp to negotiate for peace. Antiochus offered half the
expenses of the war, and the cession of his European
possessions as well as of all the Greek cities in Asia Minor
that had gone over to Rome; but Scipio demanded the
whole costs of the war and the surrender of all Asia Minor.
The former terms, he declared, might have been accepted,
had the army still been before Lysimachia, or even on the
European side of the Hellespont; but they did not suffice
VOL. II. '. 62
Passage
of the
Hellespont
by the
Romans.
466 THE WAR WITH ANTIOCHUS OF ASIA BOOK III
Battle of
Magnesia.
190.
now, when the steed felt the bit and knew its rider. The
attempts of the great-king to purchase peace from his
antagonist after the Oriental manner by sums of money—
he offered the half of his year's revenues —failed as they
deserved ; the proud burgess, in return for the gratuitous
restoration of his son who had fallen a captive, rewarded the
great-king with the friendly advice to make peace on any
terms. This was not in reality necessary : had the king
possessed the resolution to prolong the war and to draw
the enemy after him by retreating into the interior, a
favourable issue was still by no means impossible. But
Antiochus, irritated by the presumably intentional arrogance
of his antagonist, and too indolent for any persevering and
consistent warfare, hastened with the utmost eagerness to
expose his unwieldy, but unequal, and undisciplined mass
of an army to the shock of the Roman legions.
In the valley of the Hermus, near Magnesia at the foot
of Mount Sipylus not far from Smyrna, the Roman troops
fell in with the enemy late in the autumn of 564. The
force of Antiochus numbered close on 8o,ooo men, of
whom 12, ooo were cavalry ; the Romans—who had along
with them about 5ooo Achaeans, Pergamenes, and Mace-
donian volunteers—had not nearly half that number, but
they were so sure of victory, that they did not even wait for
the recovery of their general who had remained behind sick
at Elaea; Gnaeus Domitius took the command in his stead.
Antiochus, in order to be able even to place his immense
mass of troops, formed two divisions. In the first were
placed the mass of the light troops, the peltasts, bowmen,
slingers, the mounted archers of Mysians, Dahae, and
Elymaeans, the Arabs on their dromedaries, and the scythe-
chariots. In the second division the heavy cavalry (the
Cataphractae, a sort of cuirassiers) were stationed on the
flanks; next to these, in the intermediate division, the
Gallic and Cappadocian infantry; and in the very centre
CHAP. IX THE WAR WITH ANTIOCHUS OF ASIA 467
the phalanx armed after the Macedonian fashion, 16,ooo
strong, the flower of the army, which, however, had not
room in the narrow space and had to be drawn up in
double files 32 deep. In the space between the two
divisions were placed 54 elephants, distributed between the
bands of the phalanx and of the heavy cavalry. The
Romans stationed but a few squadrons on the left wing,
where the river gave protection; the mass of the cavalry
and all the light armed were placed on the right, which
was led by Eumenes; the legions stood in the centre.
Eumenes began the battle by despatching his archers and
slingers against the scythe-chariots with orders to shoot at
the teams ; in a short time not only were these thrown into
disorder, but the camel-riders stationed next to them were
also carried away, and even in the second division the left
wing of heavy cavalry placed behind fell into confusion.
Eumenes now threw himself with all the Roman cavalry,
numbering 3ooo horse, on the mercenary infantry, which
was placed in the second division between the phalanx
and the left wing of heavy cavalry, and, when these gave
way, the cuirassiers who had already fallen into disorder
also fled. The phalanx, which had just allowed the light
troops to pass through and was preparing to advance
against the Roman legions, was hampered by the attack of
the cavalry in flank, and compelled to stand still and to form
front on both sides—a movement which the depth of its
disposition favoured. Had the heavy Asiatic cavalry been
at hand, the battle might have been restored; but the left
wing was shattered, and the right, led by Antiochus in
person, had driven before it the little division of Roman
cavalry opposed to it, and had reached the Roman camp,
which was with great difficulty defended from its attack.
In this way the cavalry were at the decisive moment absent
from the scene of action. The Romans were careful not to
assail the phalanx with their legions, but sent against it the
468 THE WAR WITH ANTIOCHUS OF ASIA BOOK III
Conclusion
of peace.
187.
archers and slingers, not one of whose missiles failed to take
effect on the densely-crowded mass. The phalanx neverthe-
less retired slowly and in good order, till the elephants
stationed in the interstices became frightened and broke the
ranks. Then the whole army dispersed in tumultuous flight;
an attempt to hold the camp failed, and only increased the
number of the dead and the prisoners. The estimate of the
loss of Antiochus at 5o, ooo men is, considering the infinite
confusion, not incredible; the legions of the Romans had
never been engaged, and the victory, which gave them a
third continent, cost them 24 horsemen and 3oo foot
soldiers. Asia Minor submitted; including even Ephesus,
whence the admiral had hastily to withdraw his fleet, and
Sardes the residence of the court.
The king sued for peace and consented to the terms
proposed by the Romans, which, as usual, were just the
same as those offered before the battle and consequently
included the cession of Asia Minor. Till they were ratified,
the army remained in Asia Minor at the expense of the
king ; which came to cost him not less than 30 oo talents
(4,730, ooo). Antiochus himself in his careless fashion
soon consoled himself for the loss of half his kingdom ; it
was in keeping with his character, that he declared himself
grateful to the Romans for saving him the trouble of
governing too large an empire. But with the day of
Magnesia Asia was erased from the list of great states ;
and never perhaps did a great power fall so rapidly, so
thoroughly, and so ignominiously as the kingdom of the
Seleucidae under this Antiochus the Great. He himself
was soon afterwards (567) slain by the indignant inhabit-
ants of Elymais at the head of the Persian gulf, on occasion
of pillaging the temple of Bel, with the treasures of which
he had sought to replenish his empty coffers.
The Roman government, after having achieved the
victory, had to arrange the affairs of Asia Minor and of
cHAp. ix. THE WAR WITH ANTIOCHUS OF ASIA 469
Greece. If the Roman rule was here to be erected on a
firm foundation, it was by no means enough that Antiochus
should have renounced the Supremacy in the west of Asia
Minor. The circumstances of the political situation there
have been set forth above (p. 4or ſº). The Greek free cities
on the Ionian and Aeolian coast, as well as the kingdom of
Pergamus of a substantially similar nature, were certainly
the natural pillars of the new Roman supreme power, which
here too came forward essentially as protector of the
Hellenes kindred in race. But the dynasts in the interior
of Asia Minor and on the north coast of the Black Sea had
hardly yielded for long any serious obedience to the kings of
Asia, and the treaty with Antiochus alone gave to the Romans
no power over the interior. It was indispensable to draw
a certain line within which the Roman influence was hence-
forth to exercise control. Here the element of chief
importance was the relation of the Asiatic Hellenes to the
Celts who had been for a century settled there. These
had formally apportioned among them the regions of Asia
Minor, and each one of the three cantons raised its fixed
tribute from the territory laid under contribution. Doubt-
less the burgesses of Pergamus, under the vigorous guid-
ance of their presidents who had thereby become hereditary
princes, had rid themselves of the unworthy yoke; and the
fair afterbloom of Hellenic art, which had recently emerged
afresh from the soil, had grown out of these last Hellenic
wars sustained by a national public spirit. But it was a
vigorous counterblow, not a decisive success; again and
again the Pergamenes had to defend with arms their urban
peace against the raids of the wild hordes from the eastern
mountains, and the great majority of the other Greek
cities probably remained in their old state of dependence.”
* From the decree of Lampsacus mentioned at p. 447, it appears pretty
certain that the Lampsacenes requested from the Massiliots not merely
intercession at Rome, but also intercession with the Tolistoagii (so the Celts,
elsewhere named Tolistobogi, are designated in this document and in the
Expedition
against
the Celts
of Asia
Minor.
47o THE WAR WITH ANTIOCHUS OF ASIA BOOK III
If the protectorate of Rome over the Hellenes was to be
in Asia more than a name, an end had to be put to this
tributary obligation of their new clients; and, as the Roman
policy at this time declined, much more even in Asia than
on the Graeco-Macedonian peninsula, the possession of the
country on its own behalf and the permanent occupation
therewith connected, there was no course in fact left but
to carry the arms of Rome up to the limit which was to
be staked off for the domain of Rome's power, and
effectively to inaugurate the new supremacy among the
inhabitants of Asia Minor generally, and above all in the
Celtic cantons.
This was done by the new Roman commander-in-chief,
Gnaeus Manlius Volso, who relieved Lucius Scipio in Asia
Minor. He was subjected to severe reproach on this score;
the men in the senate who were averse to the new turn of
policy failed to see either the aim, or the pretext, for such a
war. There is no warrant for the former objection, as directed
against this movement in particular ; it was on the con-
trary, after the Roman state had once interfered in Hellenic
affairs as it had done, a necessary consequence of this
policy. Whether it was the right course for Rome to
undertake the protectorate over the Hellenes collectively,
may certainly be called in question; but regarded from
the point of view which Flamininus and the majority led
by him had now taken up, the overthrow of the Galatians
was in fact a duty of prudence as well as of honour.
Better founded was the objection that there was not at the
time a proper ground of war against them ; for they had not
been, strictly speaking, in alliance with Antiochus, but had
only according to their wont allowed him to levy hired
troops in their country. But on the other side there fell
Pergamene inscription, C. J. Gr. 3536,-the oldest monuments which
mention them). Accordingly the Lampsacenes were probably still about
the time of the war with Philip tributary to this canton (comp. Liv.
xxxviii. 16).
CHAP. IX THE WAR WITH ANTIOCHUS OF ASIA 471
the decisive consideration, that the sending of a Roman
military force to Asia could only be demanded of the
Roman burgesses under circumstances altogether extra-
ordinary, and, if once such an expedition was necessary,
everything told in favour of carrying it out at once and
with the victorious army that was now stationed in Asia.
So, doubtless under the influence of Flamininus and of
those who shared his views in the senate, the campaign
into the interior of Asia Minor was undertaken in the
spring of 565. The consul started from Ephesus, levied
contributions from the towns and princes on the upper
Maeander and in Pamphylia without measure, and then
turned northwards against the Celts. Their western
canton, the Tolistoagii, had retired with their belongings
to Mount Olympus, and the middle canton, the Tectosages,
to Mount Magaba, in the hope that they would be able
there to defend themselves till the winter should compel
the strangers to withdraw. But the missiles of the Roman
slingers and archers—which so often turned the scale against
the Celts unacquainted with such weapons, almost as in
more recent times firearms have turned the scale against
savage tribes—forced the heights, and the Celts succumbed
in a battle, such as had often its parallels before and after
on the Po and on the Seine, but here appears as singular
as the whole phenomenon of this northern race emerging
amidst the Greek and Phrygian nations. The number of
the slain was at both places enormous, and still greater that
of the captives. The survivors escaped over the Halys to
the third Celtic canton of the Trocmi, which the consul
did not attack. That river was the limit at which the
leaders of Roman policy at that time had resolved to halt.
Phrygia, Bithynia, and Paphlagonia were to become de-
pendent on Rome; the regions lying farther to the east were
left to themselves.
The affairs of Asia Minor were regulated partly by the
189.
472 THE WAR WITH ANTIOCHUS OF ASIA BOOK III
189.
Regulation
of the
affairs of
Asia
Minor.
peace with Antiochus (565), partly by the ordinances of a
Roman commission presided over by the consul Volso.
Antiochus had to furnish hostages, one of whom was his
younger son of the same name, and to pay a war-contribution
—proportional in amount to the treasures of Asia—of 15,000
Euboic talents (4,3,600,ooo), a fifth of which was to be paid
at once, and the remainder in twelve yearly instalments.
He was called, moreover, to cede all the lands which he
possessed in Europe and, in Asia Minor, all his possessions
and claims of right to the north of the range of the Taurus
and to the west of the mouth of the Cestrus between
Aspendus and Perga in Pamphylia, so that he retained
nothing in Asia Minor but eastern Pamphylia and Cilicia.
His protectorate over its kingdoms and principalities of
course ceased. Asia, or, as the kingdom of the Seleucids
was thenceforth usually and more appropriately named,
Syria, lost the right of waging aggressive wars against the
western states, and in the event of a defensive war, of
acquiring territory from them on the conclusion of peace;
lost, moreover, the right of navigating the sea to the west
of the mouth of the Calycadnus in Cilicia with vessels of
war, except for the conveyance of envoys, hostages, or
tribute; was further prevented from keeping more than
ten decked vessels in all, except in the case of a defensive
war, from taming war-elephants, and lastly from the
levying of mercenaries in the western states, or receiving
political refugees and deserters from them at court. The
war vessels which he possessed beyond the prescribed
number, the elephants, and the political refugees who had
sought shelter with him, he delivered up. By way of
compensation the great-king received the title of a friend of
the Roman commonwealth. The state of Syria was thus by
land and sea completely and for ever dislodged from the
west; it is a significant indication of the feeble and loose
organization of the kingdom of the Seleucidae, that it alone
CHAP. IX THE WAR WITH ANTIOCHUS OF ASIA 473
of all the great states conquered by Rome never after the first
conquest desired a second appeal to the decision of arms.
The two Armenias, hitherto at least nominally Asiatic Armenia.
satrapies, became transformed, if not exactly in pursuance
with the Roman treaty of peace, yet under its influence
into independent kingdoms; and their holders, Artaxias and
Zariadris, became founders of new dynasties.
Ariarathes, king of Cappadocia, whose land lay beyond Cappa-
the boundary laid down by the Romans for their protector. *
ate, escaped with a money-fine of 6oo talents (4,146, ooo);
which was afterwards, on the intercession of his son-in-law
Eumenes, abated to half that sum.
Prusias, king of Bithynia, retained his territory as it Bithynia.
stood, and so did the Celts; but they were obliged to
promise that they would no longer send armed bands
beyond their bounds, and the disgraceful payments of
tribute by the cities of Asia Minor came to an end. The
Asiatic Greeks did not fail to repay the benefit—which
was certainly felt as a general and permanent one—with
golden chaplets and transcendental panegyrics.
In the western portion of Asia Minor the regulation of The free
the territorial arrangements was not without difficulty, espe- º
cially as the dynastic policy of Eumenes there came into
collision with that of the Greek Hansa. At last an un-
derstanding was arrived at to the following effect. All the
Greek cities, which were free and had joined the Romans
on the day of the battle of Magnesia, had their liberties
confirmed, and all of them, excepting those previously
tributary to Eumenes, were relieved from the payment of
tribute to the different dynasts for the future. In this way
the towns of Dardanus and Ilium, whose ancient affinity
with the Romans was traced to the times of Aeneas,
became free, along with Cyme, Smyrna, Clazomenae,
Erythrae, Chios, Colophon, Miletus, and other names of
old renown. Phocaea also, which in spite of its capitula-
474, THE WAR WITH ANTIOCHUS OF ASIA BOOK III
Extension
of the
kingdom of
Pergamus.
tion had been plundered by the soldiers of the Roman fleet
—although it did not fall under the category designated in
the treaty—received back by way of compensation its
territory and its freedom. Most of the cities of the
Graeco-Asiatic Hansa acquired additions of territory and
other advantages. Rhodes of course received most con-
sideration ; it obtained Lycia exclusive of Telmissus, and
the greater part of Caria south of the Maeander ; besides,
Antiochus guaranteed the property and the claims of the
Rhodians within his kingdom, as well as the exemption
from customs-dues which they had hitherto enjoyed.
All the rest, forming by far the largest share of the spoil,
fell to the Attalids, whose ancient fidelity to Rome, as well
as the hardships endured by Eumenes in the war and his
personal merit in connection with the issue of the decisive
battle, were rewarded by Rome as no king ever rewarded
his ally. Eumenes received, in Europe, the Chersonese
with Lysimachia; in Asia—in addition to Mysia which he
already possessed—the provinces of Phrygia on the
Hellespont, Lydia with Ephesus and Sardes, the northern
district of Caria as far as the Maeander with Tralles and
Magnesia, Great Phrygia and Lycaonia along with a portion
of Cilicia, the district of Milyas between Phrygia and Lycia,
and, as a port on the Southern sea, the Lycian town
Telmissus. There was a dispute afterwards between
Eumenes and Antiochus regarding Pamphylia, as to how
far it lay on this side of or beyond the prescribed boundary,
and accordingly belonged to the former or to the latter.
He further acquired the protectorate over, and the right of
receiving tribute from, those Greek cities which did not
receive absolute freedom; but it was stipulated in this case
that the cities should retain their charters, and that the
tribute should not be heightened. Moreover, Antiochus
had to bind himself to pay to Eumenes the 35o talents
(4,85, ooo) which he owed to his father Attalus, and like-
CHAP. IX THE WAR WITH ANTIOCHUS OF ASIA 475
wise to pay a compensation of 127 talents (4.31, ooo) for
arrears in the supplies of corn. Lastly, Eumenes obtained
the royal forests and the elephants delivered up by
Antiochus, but not the ships of war, which were burnt:
the Romans tolerated no naval power by the side of their
own. By these means the kingdom of the Attalids became
in the east of Europe and Asia what Numidia was in Africa,
a powerful state with an absolute constitution dependent
on Rome, destined and able to keep in check both Mace:
donia and Syria without needing, except in extraordinary
cases, Roman support. With this creation dictated by
policy the Romans had as far as possible combined the
liberation of the Asiatic Greeks, which was dictated by
republican and national sympathy and by vanity. About
the affairs of the more remote east beyond the Taurus and
Halys they were firmly resolved to give themselves no
concern. This is clearly shown by the terms of the peace
with Antiochus, and still more decidedly by the peremptory
refusal of the senate to guarantee to the town of Soli in
Cilicia the freedom which the Rhodians requested for it.
With equal fidelity they adhered to the fixed principle of
acquiring no direct transmarine possessions. After the
Roman fleet had made an expedition to Crete and had
accomplished the release of the Romans sold thither into
slavery, the fleet and land army left Asia towards the end
of the summer of 566; on which occasion the land army, 188.
which again marched through Thrace, in consequence of
the negligence of the general suffered greatly on the route
from the attacks of the barbarians. The Romans brought
nothing home from the east but honour and gold, both of
which were already at this period usually conjoined in the
practical shape assumed by the address of thanks—the
golden chaplet.
European Greece also had been agitated by this Asiatic settlement
war, and needed reorganization. The Aetolians, who had of Greece.
476 THE WAR WITH ANTIOCHUS OF ASIA BOOK III
190.
Conflicts
and peace
with the
Aetolians.
189.
not yet learned to reconcile themselves to their insignifi-
cance, had, after the armistice concluded with Scipio in
the spring of 564, rendered intercourse between Greece
and Italy difficult and unsafe by means of their Cephal-
lenian corsairs; and not only so, but even perhaps while
the armistice yet lasted, they, deceived by false reports as
to the state of things in Asia, had the folly to place
Amynander once more on his Athamanian throne, and to
carry on a desultory warfare with Philip in the districts
occupied by him on the borders of Aetolia and Thessaly,
in the course of which Philip suffered several discomfitures.
After this, as a matter of course, Rome replied to their
request for peace by the landing of the consul Marcus
Fulvius Nobilior. He arrived among the legions in the
spring of 565, and after fifteen days' siege gained possession
of Ambracia by a capitulation honourable for the garrison;
while simultaneously the Macedonians, Illyrians, Epirots,
Acarnanians, and Achaeans fell upon the Aetolians. There
was no such thing as resistance in the strict sense; after
repeated entreaties of the Aetolians for peace the Romans
at length desisted from the war, and granted conditions
which must be termed reasonable when viewed with refer-
ence to such pitiful and malicious opponents. The
Aetolians lost all cities and territories which were in the
hands of their adversaries, more especially Ambracia which
afterwards became free and independent in consequence of
an intrigue concocted in Rome against Marcus Fulvius,
and Oenia which was given to the Acarnanians: they
likewise ceded Cephallenia. They lost the right of making
peace and war, and were in that respect dependent on the
foreign relations of Rome. Lastly, they paid a large sum
of money. Cephallenia opposed this treaty on its own
account, and only submitted when Marcus Fulvius landed
on the island. In fact, the inhabitants of Same, who feared
that they would be dispossessed from their well-situated
CHAP. IX THE WAR WITH ANTIOCHUS OF ASIA 477
town by a Roman colony, revolted after their first sub-
mission and sustained a four months' siege ; the town,
however, was finally taken and the whole inhabitants were
sold into slavery.
In this case also Rome adhered to the principle of con-
fining herself to Italy and the Italian islands. She took no
portion of the spoil for herself, except the two islands of
Cephallenia and Zacynthus, which formed a desirable sup-
plement to the possession of Corcyra and other naval
stations in the Adriatic. The rest of the territorial gain
went to the allies of Rome. But the two most important
of these, Philip and the Achaeans, were by no means
content with the share of the spoil granted to them. Philip
felt himself aggrieved, and not without reason. He might
safely say that the chief difficulties in the last war—diffi-
culties which arose not from the character of the enemy,
but from the distance and the uncertainty of the communi-
cations—had been overcome mainly by his loyal aid. The
senate recognized this by remitting his arrears of tribute
and sending back his hostages; but he did not receive
those additions to his territory which he expected. He
got the territory of the Magnetes, with Demetrias which he
had taken from the Aetolians; besides, there practically
remained in his hands the districts of Dolopia and
Athamania and a part of Thessaly, from which also the
Aetolians had been expelled by him. In Thrace the
interior remained under Macedonian protection, but nothing
was fixed as to the coast towns and the islands of Thasos and
Lemnos which were de facto in Philip's hands, while the
Chersonese was even expressly given to Eumenes; and it
was not difficult to see that Eumenes received possessions
in Europe, simply that he might in case of need keep not
only Asia but Macedonia in check. The exasperation of
the proud and in many respects chivalrous king was natural;
it was not chicane, however, but an unavoidable political
Mace-
donia.
478 THE WAR WITH ANTIOCHUS OF ASIA BOOK III
The
Achaeans.
The
Achaean
patriots.
necessity that induced the Romans to take this course.
Macedonia suffered for having once been a power of the
first rank, and for having waged war on equal terms with
Rome; there was much better reason in her case than in
that of Carthage for guarding against the revival of her old
powerful position.
It was otherwise with the Achaeans. They had, in the
course of the war with Antiochus, gratified their long-che-
rished wish to bring the whole Peloponnesus into their
confederacy; for first Sparta, and then, after the expulsion
of the Asiatics from Greece, Elis and Messene had more
or less reluctantly joined it. The Romans had allowed
this to take place, and had even tolerated the intentional
disregard of Rome which marked their proceedings. When .
Messene declared that she wished to submit to the Romans
but not to enter the confederacy, and the latter thereupon
employed force, Flamininus had not failed to remind the
Achaeans that such separate arrangements as to the disposal
of a part of the spoil were in themselves unjust, and were,
in the relation in which the Achaeans stood to the Romans,
more than unseemly ; and yet in his very impolitic com-
plaisance towards the Hellenes he had substantially done
what the Achaeans willed. But the matter did not end
there. The Achaeans, tormented by their dwarfish thirst
for aggrandizement, would not relax their hold on the town
of Pleuron in Aetolia which they had occupied during the
war, but on the contrary made it an involuntary member of
their confederacy; they bought Zacynthus from Amynander
the lieutenant of the last possessor, and would gladly have
acquired Aegina also. It was with reluctance that they
gave up the former island to Rome, and they heard with
great displeasure the good advice of Flamininus that they
should content themselves with their Peloponnesus.
The Achaeans believed it their duty to display the inde-
pendence of their state all the more, the less they really
CHAP. IX THE WAR WITH ANTIOCHUS OF ASIA 479
had ; they talked of the rights of war, and of the faithful
aid of the Achaeans in the wars of the Romans; they
asked the Roman envoys at the Achaean diet why Rome
should concern herself about Messene when Achaia put
no questions as to Capua ; and the spirited patriot, who
had thus spoken, was applauded and was sure of votes at
the elections. All this would have been very right and
very dignified, had it not been much more ridiculous.
There was a profound justice and a still more profound
melancholy in the fact, that Rome, however earnestly she
endeavoured to establish the freedom and to earn the
thanks of the Hellenes, yet gave them nothing but anarchy
and reaped nothing but ingratitude. Undoubtedly very
generous sentiments lay at the bottom of the Hellenic anti-
pathies to the protecting power, and the personal bravery
of some of the men who took the lead in the movement
was unquestionable; but this Achaean patriotism remained
not the less a folly and a genuine historical caricature.
With all that ambition and all that national susceptibility
the whole nation was, from the highest to the lowest, per-
vaded by the most thorough sense of impotence. Every
one was constantly listening to learn the sentiments of
Rome, the liberal man no less than the servile; they thanked
heaven, when the dreaded decree was not issued; they
were sulky, when the senate gave them to understand that
they would do well to yield voluntarily in order that they
might not need to be compelled ; they did what they were
obliged to do, if possible, in a way offensive to the Romans,
“to save forms ”; they reported, explained, postponed,
evaded, and, when all this would no longer avail, yielded
with a patriotic sigh. Their proceedings might have claimed
indulgence at any rate, if not approval, had their leaders
been resolved to fight, and had they preferred the destruc-
tion of the nation to its bondage; but neither Philopoemen
nor Lycortas thought of any such political suicide—they
48o THE WAR WITH ANTIOCHUS OF ASIA BOOK III
Quarrels
between
Achaeans
and
Spartans.
wished, if possible, to be free, but they wished above all to
live. Besides all this, the dreaded intervention of Rome
in the internal affairs of Greece was not the arbitrary act of
the Romans, but was always invoked by the Greeks them-
selves, who, like boys, brought down on their own heads
the rod which they feared. The reproach repeated ad
nauseam by the erudite rabble in Hellenic and post-
Hellenic times—that the Romans had been at pains to stir
up internal discord in Greece—is one of the most foolish
absurdities which philologues dealing in politics have ever
invented. It was not the Romans that carried strife to
Greece—which in truth would have been “carrying owls to
Athens"—but the Greeks that carried their dissensions to
Rome.
The Achaeans in particular, who, in their eagerness to
round their territory, wholly failed to see how much it
would have been for their own good that Flamininus had
not incorporated the towns of Aetolian sympathies with
their league, acquired in Lacedaemon and Messene a very
hydra of intestine strife. Members of these communities
were incessantly at Rome, entreating and beseeching to be
released from the odious connection; and amongst them,
characteristically enough, were even those who were indebted
to the Achaeans for their return to their native land. The
Achaean league was incessantly occupied in the work of
reformation and restoration at Sparta and Messene ; the
wildest refugees from these quarters determined the
measures of the diet. Four years after the nominal admis-
sion of Sparta to the confederacy matters came even to
open war and to an insanely thorough restoration, in which
all the slaves on whom Nabis had conferred citizenship
were once more sold into slavery, and a colonnade was
built from the proceeds in the Achaean city of Megalopolis;
the old state of property in Sparta was re-established, the
laws of Lycurgus were superseded by Achaean laws, and
CHAP. IX THE WAR WITH ANTIOCHUS OF ASIA 481
the walls were pulled down (566). At last the Roman 188.
senate was summoned by all parties to arbitrate on all these
doings—an annoying task, which was the righteous punish-
ment of the sentimental policy that the Senate had pursued.
Far from mixing itself up too much in these affairs, the
senate not only bore the sarcasms of Achaean candour with
exemplary composure, but even manifested a culpable
indifference while the worst outrages were committed.
There was cordial rejoicing in Achaia when, after that
restoration, the news arrived from Rome that the senate
had found fault with it, but had not annulled it. Nothing
was done for the Lacedaemonians by Rome, except that
the senate, shocked at the judicial murder of from sixty to
eighty Spartans Committed by the Achaeans, deprived the
diet of criminal jurisdiction over the Spartans—truly a
heinous interference with the internal affairs of an inde-
pendent state | The Roman statesmen gave themselves as
little concern as possible about this tempest in a nut-shell,
as is best shown by the many complaints regarding the
superficial, contradictory, and obscure decisions of the
senate ; in fact, how could its decisions be expected to be
clear, when there were four parties from Sparta simultane-
ously speaking against each other at its bar P. Add to this
the personal impression, which most of these Peloponnesian
statesmen produced in Rome ; even Flamininus shook his
head, when one of them showed him on the one day how
to perform some dance, and on the next entertained him
with affairs of state. Matters went so far, that the senate
at last lost patience and informed the Peloponnesians that
it would no longer listen to them, and that they might do
what they chose (572). This was natural enough, but it 182.
was not right; situated as the Romans were, they were
under a moral and political obligation earnestly and stead-
fastly to rectify this melancholy state of things. Callicrates
the Achaean, who went to the senate in 575 to enlighten 179.
VOL. II 63
482 THE WAR WITH ANTIOCHUS OF ASIA BOOK III
Death of
| Iannibal.
it as to the state of matters in the Peloponnesus and to
demand a consistent and calm intervention, may have had
somewhat less worth as a man than his Countryman
Philopoemen who was the main founder of that patriotic
policy; but he was in the right.
Thus the protectorate of the Roman community now
embraced all the states from the eastern to the western end
of the Mediterranean. There nowhere existed a state that
the Romans would have deemed it worth while to fear.
But there still lived a man to whom Rome accorded this
rare honour—the homeless Carthaginian, who had raised
in arms against Rome first all the west and then all the
east, and whose schemes perhaps had been only frustrated
by infamous aristocratic policy in the former case, and by
stupid court policy in the latter. Antiochus had been
obliged to bind himself in the treaty of peace to deliver up
Hannibal; but the latter had escaped, first to Crete, then
to Bithynia," and now lived at the court of Prusias king of
Bithynia, employed in aiding the latter in his wars with
Eumenes, and victorious as ever by sea and by land. It
is affirmed that he was desirous of stirring up Prusias also
to make war on Rome; a folly, which, as it is told, sounds
very far from credible. It is more certain that, while the
Roman senate deemed it beneath its dignity to have the
old man hunted out in his last asylum—for the tradition
which inculpates the Senate appears to deserve no credit—
Flamininus, whose restless vanity sought after new oppor-
tunities for great achievements, undertook on his own part
to deliver Rome from Hannibal as he had delivered the
Greeks from their chains, and, if not to wield—which was
not diplomatic—at any rate to whet and to point, the
* The story that he went to Armenia and at the request of king
Artaxias built the town of Artaxata on the Araxes (Strabo, xi. p. 528 ;
Plutarch, Luc. 31), is certainly a fiction ; but it is a striking circumstance
that Hannibal should have become mixed up, almost like Alexander, with
Oriental fables.
CHAP. IX THE WAR WITH ANTIOCHUS OF ASIA 483
dagger against the greatest man of his time. Prusias, the
most pitiful among the pitiful princes of Asia, was delighted
to grant the little favour which the Roman envoy in
ambiguous terms requested ; and, when Hannibal saw his
house beset by assassins, he took poison. He had long
been prepared to do so, adds a Roman, for he knew the
Romans and the word of kings. The year of his death is
uncertain ; probably he died in the latter half of the year
571, at the age of sixty-seven. When he was born, Rome
was contending with doubtful success for the possession of
Sicily; he had lived long enough to see the West wholly
subdued, and to fight his own last battle with the Romans
against the vessels of his native city which had itself
become Roman ; and he was constrained at last to remain
a mere spectator, while Rome overpowered the East as the
tempest overpowers the ship that has no one at the helm,
and to feel that he alone was the pilot that could have
weathered the storm. There was left to him no further
hope to be disappointed, when he died; but he had
honestly, through fifty years of struggle, kept the oath
which he had sworn when a boy. -
About the same time, probably in the same year, died
also the man whom the Romans were wont to call his
183.
Death of
Scipio.
conqueror, Publius Scipio. On him fortune had lavished .
all the successes which she denied to his antagonist—
successes which did belong to him, and successes which
did not. He had added to the empire Spain, Africa, and
Asia; and Rome, which he had found merely the first
community of Italy, was at his death mistress of the
civilized world. He himself had so many titles of victory,
that some of them were made over to his brother and his
cousin.” And yet he too spent his last years in bitter
vexation, and died when little more than fifty years of age
in voluntary banishment, leaving orders to his relatives not
* Africanus, Asiagenus, Hispallus.
4S4 THE WAR WITH ANTIOCHUS OF ASIA Book III
to bury his remains in the city for which he had lived and
in which his ancestors reposed. It is not exactly known
what drove him from the city. The charges of corruption
and embezzlement, which were directed against him and
still more against his brother Lucius, were beyond doubt
empty calumnies, which do not sufficiently explain such
bitterness of feeling ; although it is characteristic of the
man, that instead of simply vindicating himself by means
of his account-books, he tore them in pieces in presence
of the people and of his accusers, and summoned the
Romans to accompany him to the temple of Jupiter and to
celebrate the anniversary of his victory at Zama. The
people left the accuser on the spot, and followed Scipio to
the Capitol; but this was the last glorious day of the
illustrious man. His proud spirit, his belief that he was
different from, and better than, other men, his very decided
family-policy, which in the person of his brother Lucius
especially brought forward a clumsy man of straw as a
hero, gave offence to many, and not without reason.
While genuine pride protects the heart, arrogance lays it
open to every blow and every sarcasm, and corrodes even
an originally noble-minded spirit. It is throughout,
moreover, the distinguishing characteristic of such natures
as that of Scipio—strange mixtures of genuine gold and
glittering tinsel—that they need the good fortune and the
brilliance of youth in order to exercise their charm, and,
when this charm begins to fade, it is the charmer himself
that is most painfully conscious of the change.
CHAP. X THE THIRD MACEDONIAN WAR 485
V CHAPTER X.
THE THIRD MACEDONIAN WAR
PHILIP of MACEDONIA was greatly annoyed by the treatment
which he met with from the Romans after the peace with
Antiochus; and the subsequent course of events was not
fitted to appease his wrath. His neighbours in Greece
and Thrace, mostly communities that had once trembled
at the Macedonian name not less than now they trembled
at the Roman, made it their business, as was natural, to
retaliate on the fallen great power for all the injuries which
since the times of Philip the Second they had received at
the hands of Macedonia. The empty arrogance and venal
anti-Macedonian patriotism of the Hellenes of this period
found vent at the diets of the different confederacies and
in ceaseless complaints addressed to the Roman senate.
Philip had been allowed by the Romans to retain what he
had taken from the Aetolians; but in Thessaly the con-
federacy of the Magnetes alone had formally joined the
Aetolians, while those towns which Philip had wrested
from the Aetolians in other two of the Thessalian confed-
eracies—the Thessalian in its narrower sense, and the
Perrhaebian—were demanded back by their leagues on the
ground that Philip had only liberated these towns, not
conquered them. The Athamanes too believed that they
might crave their freedom ; and Filmenes demanded the
maritime cities which Antiochus had possessed in Thrace
Dissatis-
faction of
Philip with
Rome.
486 THE THIRD MACEDONIAN WAR BOOK III
proper, especially Aenus and Maronea, although in the
peace with Antiochus the Thracian Chersonese alone had
been expressly promised to him. All these complaints and
numerous minor ones from all the neighbours of Philip as
to his supporting king Prusias against Eumenes, as to
competition in trade, as to the violation of contracts and
the seizing of cattle, were poured forth at Rome. The
king of Macedonia had to submit to be accused by the
sovereign rabble before the Roman senate, and to accept
justice or injustice as the senate chose ; he was compelled
to witness judgment constantly going against him ; he had
with deep chagrin to withdraw his garrisons from the
Thracian coast and from the Thessalian and Perrhaebian
towns, and Courteously to receive the Roman commissioners,
who came to see whether everything required had been
carried out in accordance with instructions. The Romans
were not so indignant against Philip as they had been
against Carthage; in fact, they were in many respects even
favourably disposed to the Macedonian ruler ; there was
not in his case so reckless a violation of forms as in that of
Libya; but the situation of Macedonia was at bottom
substantially the same as that of Carthage. Philip, how-
ever, was by no means the man to submit to this infliction
with Phoenician patience. Passionate as he was, he had
after his defeat been more indignant with the faithless ally
than with the honourable antagonist; and, long accustomed
to pursue a policy not Macedonian but personal, he had
seen in the war with Antiochus simply an excellent oppor-
tunity of instantaneously revenging himself on the ally who
had disgracefully deserted and betrayed him. This object
he had attained; but the Romans, who saw very clearly
that the Macedonian was influenced not by friendship for
Rome, but by enmity to Antiochus, and who moreover
were by no means in the habit of regulating their policy by
such feelings of liking and disliking, had carefully abstained
CHAP. X THE THIRD MACEDONIAN WAR 487
from bestowing any material advantages on Philip, and had
preferred to confer their favours on the Attalids. From
their first elevation the Attalids had been at vehement feud
with Macedonia, and were politically and personally the
objects of Philip's bitterest hatred ; of all the eastern
powers they had contributed most to maim Macedonia
and Syria, and to extend the protectorate of Rome in the
east; and in the last war, when Philip had voluntarily and
loyally embraced the side of Rome, they had been obliged
to take the same side for the sake of their very existence.
The Romans had made use of these Attalids for the purpose
of reconstructing in all essential points the kingdom of
Lysimachus—the destruction of which had been the most
important achievement of the Macedonian rulers after
Alexander—and of placing alongside of Macedonia a state,
which was its equal in point of power and was at the same
time a client of Rome. In the special circumstances a
wise sovereign, devoted to the interests of his people,
would perhaps have resolved not to resume the unequal
struggle with Rome; but Philip, in whose character the
sense of honour was the most powerful of all noble, and
the thirst for revenge the most potent of all ignoble,
motives, was deaf to the voice of timidity or of resignation,
and nourished in the depths of his heart a determination
once more to try the hazard of the game. When he
received the report of fresh invectives, such as were wont
to be launched against Macedonia at the Thessalian diets,
he replied with the line of Theocritus, that his last sun had
not yet set.”
Philip displayed in the preparation and the concealment
of his designs a calmness, earnestness, and persistency
which, had he shown them in better times, would perhaps
have given a different turn to the destinies of the world.
In particular the submissiveness towards Rome, by which
* "Höm yöp ºppégèm trăv6' &\tov ćppa šeóðkew (i. Ioz).
The latter
years of
Philip.
488 THE THIRD MACEDONIAN WAR Book III
183.
he purchased the time indispensable for his objects, formed
a severe trial for the fierce and haughty man ; nevertheless
he courageously endured it, although his subjects and the
innocent occasions of the quarrel, such as the unfortunate
Maronea, paid severely for the suppression of his resent-
ment. It seemed as if war could not but break out as
early as 571 ; but by Philip's instructions, his younger son,
Demetrius, effected a reconciliation between his father and
Rome, where he had lived some years as a hostage and
was a great favourite. The Senate, and particularly
Flamininus who managed Greek affairs, sought to form in
Macedonia a Roman party that would be able to paralyze
the exertions of Philip, which of course were not unknown
to the Romans; and had selected as its head, and perhaps
as the future king of Macedonia, the younger prince who
was passionately attached to Rome. With this purpose in
view they gave it clearly to be understood that the senate
forgave the father for the sake of the son ; the natural
effect of which was, that dissensions arose in the royal
household itself, and that the king's elder son, Perseus,
who, although the offspring of an unequal marriage, was
destined by his father for the succession, sought to ruin his
brother as his future rival. It does not appear that
Demetrius was a party to the Roman intrigues; it was only
when he was falsely suspected that he was forced to
become guilty, and even then he intended, apparently,
nothing more than flight to Rome. But Perseus took
care that his father should be duly informed of this
design ; an intercepted letter from Flamininus to Deme-
trius did the rest, and induced the father to give orders
that his son should be put to death. Philip learned,
when it was too late, the intrigues which Perseus had
concocted; and death overtook him, as he was medi-
tating the punishment of the fratricide and his exclusion
179. from the throne. He died in 575 at Demetrias, in his
CHAP. X TIIE THIRD MACEDONIAN WAR 489
fifty-ninth year. He left behind him a shattered kingdom
and a distracted household, and with a broken heart
confessed to himself that all his toils and all his crimes had
been in vain.
His son Perseus then entered on the government, with-
out encountering opposition either in Macedonia or in the
Roman senate. He was a man of Stately aspect, expert in
all bodily exercises, reared in the camp and accustomed to
command, imperious like his father and unscrupulous in the
choice of his means. Wine and women, which too often
led Philip to forget the duties of government, had no charm
for Perseus; he was as steady and persevering as his father
had been fickle and impulsive. Philip, a king while still a
boy, and attended by good fortune during the first twenty
years of his reign, had been spoiled and ruined by destiny;
Perseus ascended the throne in his thirty-first year, and, as
he had while yet a boy borne a part in the unhappy war
with Rome and had grown up under the pressure of
humiliation and under the idea that a revival of the state
was at hand, so he inherited along with the kingdom of
his father his troubles, resentments, and hopes. In fact he
entered with the utmost determination on the continuance
of his father's work, and prepared more zealously than ever
for war against Rome; he was stimulated, moreover, by
the reflection, that he was by no means indebted to the
goodwill of the Romans for his wearing the diadem of
Macedonia. The proud Macedonian nation looked with
pride upon the prince whom they had been accustomed to
see marching and fighting at the head of their youth ; his
countrymen, and many Hellenes of every variety of lineage,
conceived that in him they had found the right general for
the impending war of liberation. But he was not what he
seemed. He wanted Philip's geniality and Philip's elasticity
—those truly royal qualities, which success obscured and
tarnished, but which under the purifying power of adversity
King
Perseus.
490 THE THIRD MACEDONIAN WAR BOOK III
Resources
of Mace-
donia.
recovered their lustre. Philip was self-indulgent, and
allowed things to take their course; but, when there was
occasion, he found within himself the vigour necessary for
rapid and earnest action. Perseus devised comprehensive
and subtle plans, and prosecuted them with unwearied
perseverance; but, when the moment arrived for action
and his plans and preparations confronted him in living
reality, he was frightened at his own work. As is the wont
of narrow minds, the means became to him the end; he
heaped up treasures on treasures for war with the Romans,
and, when the Romans were in the land, he was unable to
part with his golden pieces. It is a significant indication
of character that after defeat the father first hastened to
destroy the papers in his cabinet that might compromise
him, whereas the son took his treasure-chests and embarked.
In ordinary times he might have made an average king, as
good as or better than many another; but he was not
adapted for the conduct of an enterprise, which was from
the first a hopeless one unless some extraordinary man
should become the soul of the movement.
The power of Macedonia was far from inconsiderable.
The devotion of the land to the house of the Antigonids
was unimpaired; in this one respect the national feeling
was not paralyzed by the dissensions of political parties. A
monarchical constitution has the great advantage, that
every change of sovereign supersedes old resentments and
quarrels and introduces a new era of other men and fresh
hopes. The king had judiciously availed himself of this,
and had begun his reign with a general amnesty, with the
recall of fugitive bankrupts, and with the remission of
arrears of taxes. The hateful severity of the father thus
not only yielded benefit, but conciliated affection, to the
son. Twenty-six years of peace had partly of themselves
filled up the blanks in the Macedonian population, partly
given opportunity to the government to take serious steps
CHAP. X THE THIRD MACEDONIAN WAR 491
towards rectifying this which was really the weak point of
the land. Philip urged the Macedonians to marry and
raise up children ; he occupied the coast towns, whose
inhabitants he carried into the interior, with Thracian
colonists of trusty valour and fidelity. He formed a barrier
on the north to check once for all the desolating incursions
of the Dardani, by converting the space intervening between
the Macedonian frontier and the barbarian territory into a
desert, and by founding new towns in the northern pro-
vinces. In short he took step by step the same course in
Macedonia, as Augustus afterwards took when he laid
afresh the foundations of the Roman empire. The army
was numerous—30, ooo men without reckoning contingents
and hired troops—and the younger men were well exercised
in the constant border warfare with the Thracian barbarians.
It is strange that Philip did not try, like Hannibal, to
organize his army after the Roman fashion; but we can
understand it when we recollect the value which the Mace-
donians set upon their phalanx, often conquered, but still
withal believed to be invincible. Through the new sources
of revenue which Philip had created in mines, customs,
and tenths, and through the flourishing state of agriculture
and commerce, he had succeeded in replenishing his
treasury, granaries, and arsenals. When the war began,
there was in the Macedonian treasury money enough to pay
the existing army and Io, ooo hired troops for ten years,
and there were in the public magazines stores of grain for
as long a period (18,000,ooo medimni or 27, ooo, ooo
bushels), and arms for an army of three times the strength
of the existing one. In fact, Macedonia had become a
very different state from what it was when surprised by the
outbreak of the second war with Rome. The power of the
kingdom was in all respects at least doubled : with a power
in every point of view far inferior Hannibal had been able
to shake Rome to its foundations.
492 THE THIRD MACEDONIAN WAR BOOK III
Attempted
coalition
against
Rome.
Bastarnae.
Its external relations were not in so favourable a posi-
tion. The nature of the case required that Macedonia
should now take up the plans of Hannibal and Antiochus,
and should try to place herself at the head of a coalition
of all oppressed states against the Supremacy of Rome;
and certainly threads of intrigue ramified in all directions
from the court of Pydna. But their success was slight.
It was indeed asserted that the allegiance of the Italians
was wavering; but neither friend nor foe could fail to see
that an immediate resumption of the Samnite wars was not
at all probable. The nocturnal conferences likewise be-
tween Macedonian deputies and the Carthaginian senate,
which Massinissa denounced at Rome, could occasion no
alarm to serious and sagacious men, even if they were not,
as is very possible, an utter fiction. The Macedonian
court sought to attach the kings of Syria and Bithynia to
its interests by intermarriages; but nothing further came
of it, except that the immortal simplicity of the diplomacy
which seeks to gain political ends by matrimonial means
once more exposed itself to derision. Eumenes, whom
it would have been ridiculous to attempt to gain, the
agents of Perseus would have gladly put out of the way:
he was to have been murdered at Delphi on his way
homeward from Rome, where he had been active against
Macedonia; but the pretty project miscarried.
Of greater moment were the efforts made to stir up
the northern barbarians and the Hellenes to rebellion
against Rome. Philip had conceived the project of
crushing the old enemies of Macedonia, the Dardani in
what is now Servia, by means of another still more bar-
barous horde of Germanic descent brought from the left
bank of the Danube, the Bastarnae, and of then marching
in person with these and with the whole avalanche of
peoples thus set in motion by the land-route to Italy
and invading Lombardy, the Alpine passes leading to
CHAP. X THE THIRD MACEIDONIAN WAR 493
which he had already sent spies to reconnoitre—a grand
project, worthy of Hannibal, and doubtless immediately
suggested by Hannibal’s passage of the Alps. It is
more than probable that this gave occasion to the founding
of the Roman fortress of Aquileia (p. 372), which was
formed towards the end of the reign of Philip (573), and
did not harmonize with the system followed elsewhere by
the Romans in the establishment of fortresses in Italy.
The plan, however, was thwartéd by the desperate resist-
ance of the Dardani and of the adjoining tribes concerned ;
the Bastarnae were obliged to retreat, and the whole horde
were drowned in returning home by the giving way of the
ice on the Danube. The king now sought at least to
extend his clientship among the chieftains of the Illyrian
land, the modern Dalmatia and northern Albania. One
of these who faithfully adhered to Rome, Arthetaurus,
perished, not without the cognizance of Perseus, by the
hand of an assassin. The most considerable of the whole,
Genthius the son and heir of Pleuratus, was, like his father,
nominally in alliance with Rome; but the ambassadors of
Issa, a Greek town on one of the Dalmatian islands, in-
formed the senate, that Perseus had a secret understanding:
with the young, weak, and drunken prince, and that the
envoys of Genthius served as spies for Perseus in Rome.
In the regions on the east of Macedonia towards the
lower Danube the most powerful of the Thracian chieftains,
the brave and sagacious Cotys, prince of the Odrysians
and ruler of all eastern Thrace from the Macedonian
frontier on the Hebrus (Maritza) down to the fringe of
coast covered with Greek towns, was in the closest
alliance with Perseus. Of the other minor chiefs who in
that quarter took part with Rome, one, Abrupolis prince
of the Sagaei, was, in consequence of a predatory ex-
pedition directed against Amphipolis on the Strymon,
defeated by Perseus and driven out of the country. From
Genthius.
Cotys.
494 THE THIRD MACEDONIAN WAR BOOK III
Greek
national
party.
these regions Philip had drawn numerous Colonists, and
mercenaries were to be had there at any time and in any
number.
Among the unhappy nation of the Hellenes Philip and
Perseus had, long before declaring war against Rome,
carried on a lively double system of proselytizing, attempt-
ing to gain over to the side of Macedonia on the one
hand the national, and on the other—if we may be per-
mitted the expression—the communistic, party. As a
matter of course, the whole national party among the
Asiatic as well as the European Greeks was now at heart
Macedonian ; not on account of isolated unrighteous acts
on the part of the Roman deliverers, but because the
restoration of Hellenic nationality by a foreign power
involved a contradiction in terms, and now, when it was
in truth too late, every one perceived that the most de-
testable form of Macedonian rule was less fraught with
evil for Greece than a free constitution springing from
the noblest intentions of honourable foreigners. That
the most able and upright men throughout Greece should
be opposed to Rome was to be expected ; the venal aristo-
cracy alone was favourable to the Romans, and here and
there an isolated man of worth, who, unlike the great
majority, was under no delusion as to the circumstances
and the future of the nation. This was most painfully
felt by Eumenes of Pergamus, the main upholder of that
extraneous freedom among the Greeks. In vain he treated
the cities subject to him with every sort of consideration;
in vain he sued for the favour of the communities and
diets by fair-sounding words and still better-sounding gold ;
he had to learn that his presents were declined, and that
all the statues that had formerly been erected to him were
broken in pieces and the honorary tablets were melted
down, in accordance with a decree of the diet, simultane-
170, ously throughout the Peloponnesus (584). The name of
CHAP. X THE THIRD MACEDONIAN WAR 495
Perseus was on all lips; even the states that formerly
were most decidedly anti-Macedonian, such as the
Achaeans, deliberated as to the cancelling of the laws
directed against Macedonia ; Byzantium, although situated
within the kingdom of Pergamus, sought and obtained
protection and a garrison against the Thracians not from
Eumenes, but from Perseus, and in like manner Lampsacus
on the Hellespont joined the Macedonian: the powerful
and prudent Rhodians escorted the Syrian bride of king
Perseus from Antioch with their whole magnificent war-
fleet—for the Syrian war-vessels were not allowed to appear
in the Aegean—and returned home highly honoured and
furnished with rich presents, more especially with wood
for shipbuilding ; commissioners from the Asiatic cities,
and consequently subjects of Eumenes, held secret con-
ſerences with Macedonian deputies in Samothrace. That
sending of the Rhodian war-fleet had at least the aspect of
a demonstration ; and such, certainly, was the object of
king Perseus, when he exhibited himself and all his army
before the eyes of the Hellenes under pretext of performing
a religious ceremony at Delphi. That the king should
appeal to the support of this national partisanship in the
impending war, was only natural. But it was wrong in
him to take advantage of the fearful economic disorganiza-
tion of Greece for the purpose of attaching to Macedonia
all those who desired a revolution in matters of property
and of debt. It is difficult to form any adequate idea of
the unparalleled extent to which the commonwealths as
well as individuals in European Greece—excepting the
Peloponnesus, which was in a somewhat better position in
this respect—were involved in debt. Instances occurred
of one city attacking and pillaging another merely to get
money—the Athenians, for example, thus attacked Oropus
—and among the Aetolians, Perrhaebians, and Thessalians
formal battles took place between those that had property
496 THE THIRD MACEDONIAN WAR BOOK III
Rupture
with
Perseus.
197.
and those that had none. Under such circumstances the
worst outrages were perpetrated as a matter of course;
among the Aetolians, for instance, a general amnesty was
proclaimed and a new public peace was made up solely
for the purpose of entrapping and putting to death a
number of emigrants. The Romans attempted to mediate ;
but their envoys returned without success, and announced
that both parties were equally bad and that their animosities
were not to be restrained. In this case there was, in fact,
no longer other help than the officer and the executioner;
sentimental Hellenism began to be as repulsive as from
the first it had been ridiculous. Yet king Perseus sought
to gain the support of this party, if it deserve to be called
such—of people who had nothing, and least of all an
honourable name, to lose—and not only issued edicts in
favour of Macedonian bankrupts, but also caused placards
to be put up at Larisa, Delphi, and Delos, which summoned
all Greeks that were exiled on account of political or other
offences or on account of their debts to come to Mace-
donia and to look for full restitution of their former
honours and estates. As may easily be supposed, they
came ; the social revolution Smouldering throughout
northern Greece now broke out into open flame, and the
national-social party there sent to Perseus for help. If
Hellenic nationality was to be saved only by such means,
the question might well be asked, with all respect for
Sophocles and Phidias, whether the object was worth the
COSt.
The senate saw that it had delayed too long already, and
that it was time to put an end to such proceedings. The
expulsion of the Thracian chieftain Abrupolis who was in
alliance with the Romans, and the alliances of Macedonia
with the Byzantines, Aetolians, and part of the Boeotian
cities, were equally violations of the peace of 557, and suf-
ficed for the Official war-manifesto : the real ground of war
CHAP. X. THE THIRD MACEDONIAN WAR 497
was that Macedonia was seeking to convert her formal
Sovereignty into a real one, and to supplant Rome in the
protectorate of the Hellenes. As early as 581 the Roman
envoys at the Achaean diet stated pretty plainly, that an
alliance with Perseus was equivalent to casting off the
alliance of Rome. In 582 king Eumenes came in person
to Rome with a long list of grievances and laid open to the
Senate the whole situation of affairs; upon which the senate
unexpectedly in a secret sitting resolved on an immediate
declaration of war, and furnished the landing-places in Epirus
with garrisons. For the sake of form an embassy was sent
to Macedonia, but its message was of such a nature that
Perseus, perceiving that he could not recede, replied that he
was ready to conclude with Rome a new alliance on really
equal terms, but that he looked upon the treaty of 557 as
cancelled; and he bade the envoys leave the kingdom
within three days. Thus war was practically declared.
This was in the autumn of 582. Perseus, had he wished,
might have occupied all Greece and brought the Mace-
donian party everywhere to the helm, and he might perhaps
have crushed the Roman division of 5ooo men stationed
under Gnaeus Sicinius at Apollonia and have disputed the
landing of the Romans. But the king, who already began
to tremble at the serious aspect of affairs, entered into
discussions with his guest-friend the consular Quintus
Marcius Philippus, as to the frivolousness of the Roman
declaration of war, and allowed himself to be thereby
induced to postpone the attack and once more to make an
effort for peace with Rome: to which the senate, as might
have been expected, only replied by the dismissal of all
Macedonians from Italy and the embarkation of the legions.
Senators of the older school no doubt censured the “new
wisdom * of their colleague, and his un-Roman artifice;
but the object was gained and the winter passed away with-
out any movement on the part of Perseus. The Roman
VOL. II . 64
173
172.
197.
172.
498 THE THIRD MACEDONIAN WAR BOOK IIl
diplomatists made all the more zealous use of the interval
to deprive Perseus of any support in Greece. They were
Sure of the Achaeans. Even the patriotic party among
them—who had neither agreed with those social movements,
nor had soared higher than the longing after a prudent
neutrality—had no idea of throwing themselves into the
arms of Perseus; and, besides, the opposition party there
had now been brought by Roman influence to the helm,
and attached itself absolutely to Rome. The Aetolian
league had doubtless asked aid from Perseus in its internal
troubles; but the new strategus, Lyciscus, chosen under the
eyes of the Roman ambassadors, was more of a Roman
partisan than the Romans themselves. Among the
Thessalians also the Roman party retained the ascendency.
Even the Boeotians, old partisans as they were of Macedonia,
and sunk in the utmost financial disorder, had not in their
collective capacity declared openly for Perseus; nevertheless
at least three of their cities, Thisbae, Haliartus and Coronea,
had of their own accord entered into engagements with him.
When on the complaint of the Roman envoy the govern-
ment of the Boeotian confederacy communicated to him
the position of things, he declared that it would best appear
which cities adhered to Rome, and which did not, if they
would severally pronounce their decision in his presence;
and thereupon the Boeotian confederacy fell at once to
pieces. It is not true that the great structure of Epami-
nondas was destroyed by the Romans; it actually collapsed
before they touched it, and thus indeed became the prelude
to the dissolution of the other still more firmly consolidated
leagues of Greek cities." With the forces of the Boeotian
towns friendly to Rome the Roman envoy Publius Lentulus
laid siege to Haliartus, even before the Roman fleet appeared
in the Aegean. -
1 The legal dissolution of the Boeotian confederacy, however, took
place not at this time, but only after the destruction of Corinth (Pausan.
vii. I4, 4 ; xvi. 6).
CHAP, X THE THIRD MACEDONIAN WAR 499
Chalcis was occupied with Achaean, and the province of
Orestis with Epirot, forces: the fortresses of the Dassa-
retae and Illyrians on the west frontier of Macedonia were
occupied by the troops of Gnaeus Sicinius; and as soon as
the navigation was resumed, Larisa received a garrison of
2 ooo men. Perseus during all this remained inactive and
had not a foot's breadth of land beyond his own territory,
when in the spring, or according to the official calendar in
June, of 583, the Roman legions landed on the west coast.
It is doubtful whether Perseus would have found allies of
any mark, even had he shown as much energy as he dis-
played remissness; but, as circumstances stood, he remained
of course completely isolated, and those prolonged attempts at
proselytism led, for the time at least, to no result. Carthage,
Genthius of Illyria, Rhodes and the free cities of Asia Minor,
and even Byzantium hitherto so very friendly with Perseus,
offered to the Romans vessels of war; which these, how-
ever, declined. Eumenes put his land army and his ships
on a war footing. Ariarathes king of Cappadocia sent
hostages, unsolicited, to Rome. The brother-in-law of
Perseus, Prusias II. king of Bithynia, remained neutral.
No one stirred in all Greece. Antiochus IV. king of Syria,
designated in court style “the god, the brilliant bringer
of victory,” to distinguish him from his father the “Great,”
bestirred himself, but only to wrest the Syrian coast during
this war from the entirely impotent Egypt.
But, though Perseus stood almost alone, he was no con-
temptible antagonist. His army numbered 43, ooo men ;
of these 21, ooo were phalangites, and 4ooo Macedonian
and Thracian cavalry; the rest were chiefly mercenaries.
The whole force of the Romans in Greece amounted to
between 30, ooo and 4o, ooo Italian troops, besides more
than Io, ooo men belonging to Numidian, Ligurian, Greek,
Cretan, and especially Pergamene contingents. To these
was added the fleet, which numbered only 4o decked
Prepara-
tions for
Walſ.
171.
Beginning
of the war.
5OO THE THIRD MACEDONIAN WAR BOOK III
The
Romans
invade
Thessaly.
Their lax
and unsuc-
cessful
manage-
ment of
the war.
vessels, as there was no fleet of the enemy to oppose it—
Perseus, who had been prohibited from building ships of
war by the treaty with Rome, was only now erecting docks
at Thessalonica—but it had on board Io, ooo troops, as it
was destined chiefly to co-operate in sieges. The fleet was
commanded by Gaius Lucretius, the land army by the
consul Publius Licinius Crassus.
The consul left a strong division in Illyria to harass Ma-
cedonia from the west, while with the main force he started,
as usual, from Apollonia for Thessaly. Perseus did not
think of disturbing their arduous march, but contented him-
self with advancing into Perrhaebia and occupying the
nearest fortresses. He awaited the enemy at Ossa, and not
far from Larisa the first conflict took place between the
cavalry and light troops on both sides. The Romans were
decidedly beaten. Cotys with the Thracian horse had de-
feated and broken the Italian, and Perseus with his Mace-
donian horse the Greek, cavalry; the Romans had 2 ooo foot
and 2 oo horsemen killed, and 6oo horsemen made prisoners,
and had to deem themselves fortunate in being allowed to
cross the Peneius without hindrance. Perseus employed
the victory to ask peace on the same terms which Philip
had obtained : he was ready even to pay the same sum.
The Romans refused his request: they never concluded
peace after a defeat, and in this case the conclusion of
peace would certainly have involved as a consequence the
loss of Greece.
The wretched Roman commander, however, knew not
how or where to attack; the army marched to and fro in
Thessaly, without accomplishing anything of importance.
Perseus might have assumed the offensive; he saw that the
Romans were badly led and dilatory; the news had passed
like wildfire through Greece, that the Greek army had
been brilliantly victorious in the first engagement; a second
victory might lead to a general rising of the patriot party,
CHAP. X THE THIRD MACEDONIAN WAR 5oſ
and, by commencing a guerilla warfare, might produce
incalculable results. But Perseus, while a good soldier, was
not a general like his father; he had made his preparations
for a defensive war, and, when things took a different turn,
he felt himself as it were paralyzed. He made an unimport-
ant success, which the Romans obtained in a second cavalry
combat near Phalanna, a pretext for reverting, as is the
habit of narrow and obstinate minds, to his first plan and
evacuating Thessaly. This was of course equivalent to re-
nouncing all idea of a Hellenic insurrection: what might
have been attained by a different course was shown by the
fact that, notwithstanding what had occurred, the Epirots
changed sides. Thenceforth nothing serious was accom-
plished on either side. Perseus subdued king Genthius,
chastised the Dardani, and, by means of Cotys, expelled
from Thrace the Thracians friendly to Rome and the Per-
gamene troops. On the other hand the western Roman
army took some Illyrian towns, and the consul busied himself
in clearing Thessaly of the Macedonian garrisons and
making sure of the turbulent Aetolians and Acarnanians by
occupying Ambracia. But the heroic courage of the Romans
was most severely felt by the unfortunate Boeotian towns
which took part with Perseus; the inhabitants as well of
Thisbae, which surrendered without resistance as soon as
the Roman admiral Gaius Lucretius appeared before the city,
as of Haliartus, which closed its gates against him and had
to be taken by storm, were sold by him into slavery ;
Coronea was treated in the same manner by the consul
Crassus in spite even of its capitulation. Never had a Roman
army exhibited such wretched discipline as the force under
these commanders. They had so disorganized the army
that, even in the next campaign of 584, the new consul
Aulus Hostilius could not think of undertaking anything
serious, especially as the new admiral Lucius Hortensius
showed himself to be as incapable and unprincipled as his
170.
502 THE THIRD MACEDONIAN WAR BOOK III
Abuscs in
the army.
predecessor. The fleet visited the towns on the Thracian
coast without result. The western army under Appius
Claudius, whose head-quarters were at Lychnidus in the
territory of the Dassaretae, sustained one defeat after
another: after an expedition to Macedonia had been utterly
unsuccessful, the king in turn towards the beginning of
winter assumed the aggressive with the troops which were no
longer needed on the south frontier in consequence of the
deep snow blocking up all the passes, took from Appius
numerous townships and a multitude of prisoners, and
entered into connections with king Genthius; he was able
in fact to attempt an invasion of Aetolia, while Appius
allowed himself to be once more defeated in Epirus by the
garrison of a fortress which he had vainly besieged. The
Roman main army made two attempts to penetrate into
Macedonia: first, ovel the Cambunian mountains, and then
through the Thessalian passes; but they were negligently
planned, and both were repulsed by Perseus.
The consul employed himself chiefly in the reorganization
of the army—a work which was above all things needful,
but which required a sterner man and an officer of greater
mark. Discharges and furloughs might be bought, and
therefore the divisions were never up to their full numbers;
the men were put into quarters in summer, and, as the
officers plundered on a large, the common soldiers plundered
on a small, scale. Friendly peoples were subjected to the
most shameful suspicions: for instance, the blame of the
disgraceful defeat at Larisa was imputed to the pretended
treachery of the Aetolian cavalry, and, what was hitherto
unprecedented, its officers were sent to be criminally tried
at Rome ; and the Molossians in Epirus were forced by
false suspicions into actual revolt. The allied states had
war-contributions imposed upon them as if they had been
conquered, and if they appealed to the Roman senate, their
citizens were executed or sold into slavery: this was done,
CHAP. X THE TIIIRD MACEDONIAN WAR 503
for instance, at Abdera, and similar outrages were Committed
at Chalcis. The senate interfered very earnestly : " it
enjoined the liberation of the unfortunate Coroneans and
Abderites, and forbade the Roman magistrates to ask
contributions from the allies without its leave. Gaius
Lucretius was unanimously condemned by the burgesses.
But such steps could not alter the fact, that the military
result of these first two campaigns had been null, while the
political result had been a foul stain on the Romans, whose
extraordinary successes in the east were based in no small
degree on their reputation for moral purity and solidity as
compared with the scandals of Hellenic administration.
Had Philip commanded instead of Perseus, the war would
presumably have begun with the destruction of the Roman
army and the defection of most of the Hellenes; but Rome
was fortunate enough to be constantly outstripped in
blunders by her antagonists. Perseus was content with
entrenching himself in Macedonia—which towards the south
and west is a true mountain-fortress—as in a beleaguered
to Wn.
The third commander-in-chief also, whom Rome sent to
Macedonia in 585, Quintus Marcius Philippus, that already-
mentioned upright guest-friend of the king, was not at all
equal to his far from easy task. He was ambitious and
enterprising, but a bad officer. His hazardous venture of
crossing Olympus by the pass of Lapathus westward of
Tempe, leaving behind one division to face the garrison of
the pass, and making his way with his main force through
impracticable defiles to Heracleum, is not excused by the
fact of its success. Not only might a handful of resolute
men have blocked the route, in which case retreat was out
of the question; but even after the passage, when he stood
* The recently discovered decree of the senate of 9th Oct. 584, which
regulates the legal relations of Thisbae (Ephemeris epigraphica, 1872, p.
2/8, ſig. ; Mººk. d, u, ch. Izasó, in Athen, iv. 235, fig.), gives a clear
insight into these relations.
Marcius
enters(169
Macedonia
through
the pass of
Tempe.
170.
5O4 THE THIRD MACEDONIAN WAR BOOK III
The armies
on the
Elpius.
with the Macedonian main force in front and the strongly-
fortified mountain-fortresses of Tempe and Lapathus
behind him, wedged into a narrow plain on the shore and
without supplies or the possibility of foraging for them, his
position was no less desperate than when, in his first con-
sulate, he had allowed himself to be similarly surrounded
in the Ligurian defiles which thenceforth bore his name.
But as an accident saved him then, so the incapacity Of
Perseus saved him now. As if he could not comprehend
the idea of defending himself against the Romans other-
wise than by blocking the passes, he strangely gave himself
over as lost as soon as he saw the Romans on the Mace-
donian side of them, fled in all haste to Pydna, and
ordered his ships to be burnt and his treasures to be sunk.
But even this voluntary retreat of the Macedonian army
did not rescue the consul from his painful position. He
advanced indeed without hindrance, but was obliged after
four days' march to turn back for want of provisions; and,
when the king came to his senses and returned in all haste
to resume the position which he had abandoned, the
Roman army would have been in great danger, had not
the impregnable Tempe surrendered at the right moment
and handed over its rich stores to the enemy. The com-
munication with the south was by this means secured to
the Roman army; but Perseus had strongly barricaded
himself in his former well-chosen position on the bank of
the little river Elpius, and there checked the farther
advance of the Romans. So the Roman army remained,
during the rest of the summer and the winter, hemmed in
in the farthest corner of Thessaly; and, while the crossing of
the passes was certainly a success and the first substantial
one in the war, it was due not to the ability of the Roman,
but to the blundering of the Macedonian, general. The
Roman fleet in vain attempted the capture of Demetrias,
and performed no exploit whatever, The light ships of
CHAP. X THE THIRD MACEDONIAN WAR 505
Perseus boldly cruised between the Cyclades, protected
the corn-vessels destined for Macedonia, and attacked the
transports of the enemy. With the western army matters
were still worse: Appius Claudius could do nothing with
his weakened division, and the contingent which he asked
from Achaia was prevented from coming to him by the
jealousy of the consul. Moreover, Genthius had allowed
himself to be bribed by Perseus with the promise of a great
sum of money to break with Rome, and to imprison the
Roman envoys; whereupon the frugal king deemed it
superfluous to pay the money which he had promised, since
Genthius was now forsooth compelled, independently of it,
to substitute an attitude of decided hostility to Rome for
the ambiguous position which he had hitherto maintained.
Accordingly the Romans had a further petty war by the
side of the great one, which had already lasted three years.
In fact had Perseus been able to part with his money, he
might easily have aroused enemies still more dangerous to
the Romans. A Celtic host under Clondicus— Io, ooo
horsemen and as many infantry—offered to take service with
him in Macedonia itself; but they could not agree as to
the pay. In Hellas too there was such a ferment that a
guerilla warfare might easily have been kindled with a little
dexterity and a full exchequer; but, as Perseus had no
desire to give and the Greeks did nothing gratuitously, the
land remained quiet.
At length the Romans resolved to send the right man
to Greece. This was Lucius Aemilius Paullus, son of the
consul of the same name that fell at Cannae; a man of the
old nobility but of humble means, and therefore not so
successful in the comitia as on the battle-field, where he had
remarkably distinguished himself in Spain and still more
so in Liguria. The people elected him for the second
time consul in the year 586 on account of his merits—
a course which was at that time rare and exceptional. He
Paullus.
I68.
506 THE THIRD MACEDONIAN WAR IBOOK III
Perseus
is driven
back to
Pydna.
Battle of
Pydna.
168.
was in all respects the right man: an excellent general of
the old school, strict as respected both himself and his
troops, and, notwithstanding his sixty years, still hale and
vigorous ; an incorruptible magistrate—“one of the few
Romans of that age, to whom one could not offer money,”
as a contemporary says of him—and a man of Hellenic
culture, who, even when commander-in-chief, embraced the
opportunity of travelling through Greece to inspect its
works of art.
As soon as the new general arrived in the camp at Hera-
cleum, he gave orders for the ill-guarded pass at Pythium
to be surprised by Publius Nasica, while skirmishes between
the outposts in the channel of the river Elpius occupied
the attention of the Macedonians; the enemy was thus
turned, and was obliged to retreat to Pydna. There on
the Roman 4th of September, 586, or on the 22nd of
June of the Julian calendar—an eclipse of the moon,
which a scientific Roman officer announced beforehand
to the army that it might not be regarded as a bad omen,
affords in this case the means of determining the date—
the outposts accidentally fell into conflict as they were
watering their horses after midday ; and both sides
determined at once to give the battle, which it was
originally intended to postpone till the following day.
Passing through the ranks in person, without helmet or
shield, the grey-headed Roman general arranged his men.
Scarce were they in position, when the formidable phalanx
assailed them ; the general himself, who had witnessed
many a hard fight, afterwards acknowledged that he had
trembled. The Roman vanguard dispersed; a Paelignian
cohort was overthrown and almost annihilated; the legions
themselves hurriedly retreated till they reached a hill close
upon the Roman camp. Here the fortune of the day
changed. The uneven ground and the hurried pursuit
had disordered the ranks of the phalanx; the Romans
CHAP. X THE THIRD MACEDONIAN WAR 507
in single cohorts entered at every gap, and attacked it on
the flanks and in rear ; the Macedonian cavalry which
alone could have rendered aid looked calmly on, and
soon fled in a body, the king among the foremost ; and
thus the fate of Macedonia was decided in less than an
hour. The 3ooo select phalangites allowed themselves
to be cut down to the last man ; it was as if the phalanx,
which fought its last great battle at Pydna, had itself
wished to perish there. The overthrow was fearful ;
20,000 Macedonians lay on the field of battle, I I, ooo were
prisoners. The war was at an end, on the fifteenth day
after Paullus had assumed the command ; all Macedonia
submitted in two days. The king fled with his gold
—he still had more than 60 oo talents (A, 1,460, coo)
in his chest—to Samothrace, accompanied by a few
faithful attendants. But he himself put to death one of
these, Evander of Crete, who was to be called to account as
instigator of the attempted assassination of Eumenes; and
then the king's pages and his last comrades also deserted
him. For a moment he hoped that the right of asylum
would protect him ; but he himself perceived that he was
clinging to a straw. An attempt to take flight to Cotys
failed. So he wrote to the consul; but the letter was
not received, because he had designated himself in it as
king. He recognized his fate, and surrendered to the
Romans at discretion with his children and his treasures,
pusillanimous and weeping so as to disgust even his con-
querors. With a grave satisfaction, and with thoughts
turning rather on the mutability of fortune than on his own
present success, the consul received the most illustrious
captive whom Roman general had ever brought home.
Perseus died a few years after, as a state prisoner,
at Alba on the Fucine lake; 1 his son in after years
1 The story, that the Romans, in order at once to keep the promise
which had guaranteed his life and to take vengeance on him, put him
to death by depriving him of sleep, is certainly a fable,
Perseus
taken
prisoner
508 THE THIRD MACEDONIAN WAR BOOK III
Defeat and
capture of
Genthius.
Macedonia
broken up.
earned a living in the same Italian country town as
a clerk.
Thus perished the empire of Alexander the Great, which
had subdued and Hellenized the east, I 44 years after its
founder's death.
That the tragedy, moreover, might not be without its
accompaniment of farce, at the same time the war against
“king” Genthius of Illyria was also begun and ended by
the praetor Lucius Anicius within thirty days. The
piratical fleet was taken, the capital Scodra was captured,
and the two kings, the heir of Alexander the Great and
the heir of Pleuratus, entered Rome side by side as
prisoners.
The senate had resolved that the peril, which the unsea-
sonable gentleness of Flamininus had brought on Rome,
should not recur. Macedonia was abolished. In the
conference at Amphipolis on the Strymon the Roman
Commission ordained that the compact, thoroughly mon-
archical, single state should be broken up into four
republican-federative leagues moulded on the system
of the Greek confederacies, viz. that of Amphipolis in
the eastern regions, that of Thessalonica with the Chal-
cidian peninsula, that of Pella on the frontiers of Thessaly,
and that of Pelagonia in the interior. Intermarriages
between persons belonging to different confederacies were
to be invalid, and no one might be a freeholder in more
than one of them. All royal officials, as well as their
grown-up sons, were obliged to leave the country and
resort to Italy on pain of death ; the Romans still dreaded,
and with reason, the throbbings of the ancient loyalty.
The law of the land and the former constitution otherwise
remained in force; the magistrates were of course nomi-
nated by election in each community, and the power in
the communities as well as in the confederacies was placed
in the hands of the upper class. The royal domains and
CHAP, X THE THIRD MACEDONIAN waR 509
royalties were not granted to the Confederacies, and these
were specially prohibited from working the gold and silver
mines, a chief source of the national wealth ; but in 596
they were again permitted to work at least the silver-
mines." The import of salt, and the export of timber
for shipbuilding, were prohibited. The land-tax hitherto
paid to the king ceased, and the confederacies and com-
munities were left to tax themselves; but these had to pay
to Rome half of the former land-tax, according to a rate
fixed once for all, amounting in all to Ioo talents annually
(A24, ooo).” The whole land was for ever disarmed, and
the fortress of Demetrias was razed ; on the northern
frontier alone a chain of posts was to be retained to guard
against the incursions of the barbarians. Of the arms
given up, the Copper shields were sent to Rome, and the
rest were burnt.
The Romans gained their object. The Macedonian
land still on two occasions took up arms at the call of
princes of the old reigning house; but otherwise from that
time to the present day it has remained without a history.
Illyria was treated in a similar way. The kingdom of
Genthius was split up into three small free states. There
too the freeholders paid the half of the former land-tax to
* The statement of Cassiodorus, that the Macedonian mines were
reopened in 596, receives its more exact interpretation by means of the
coins. No gold coins of the four Macedonias are extant ; either there-
fore the gold - mines remained closed, or the gold extracted was converted
into bars. On the other hand there certainly exist silver coins of Ma-
cedonia prima (Amphipolis) in which district the silver-mines were
situated. For the brief period, during which they illust have been struck
(596–608), the number of them is remarkably great, and proves either
that the mines were very energetically worked, or that the old royal money
was recoined in large quantity.
* The statement that the Macedonian commonwealth was “relieved of
seignorial imposts and taxes" by the Romans (Polyb. xxxvii. 4) does
not necessarily require us to assume a subsequent remission of these taxes :
it is sufficient, for the explanation of Polybius' words, to assume that the
hitherto seignorial tax now became a public one. The continuance of
the constitution granted to the province of Macedonia by Paullus down
to at least the Augustan age (Liv. xlv. 32 ; Justin. xxxiii. 2), would, it is
true, be compatible also with the remission of the taxes.
158.
Illyria
broken up.
158-146.
5 IO THE THIRD MACEDONIAN WAR BOOK III
Cotys.
Humilia-
tion of the
Greeks in
general.
Course
pursued
with
Pergamus.
their new masters, with the exception of the towns, which
had adhered to Rome and in return obtained exemption
from land-tax—an exception, which there was no oppor-
tunity to make in the case of Macedonia. The Illyrian
piratic fleet was confiscated, and presented to the more
reputable Greek communities along that coast. The
Constant annoyances, which the Illyrians inflicted on the
neighbours by their corsairs, were in this way put an end.
to, at least for a lengthened period.
Cotys in Thrace, who was difficult to be reached and
might conveniently be used against Eumenes, obtained
pardon and received back his captive son.
Thus the affairs of the north were settled, and Macedonia
also was at last released from the yoke of monarchy—in
fact Greece was more free than ever; a king no longer
existed anywhere.
But the Romans did not confine themselves to cutting
the nerves and sinews of Macedonia. The senate resolved
at once to render all the Hellenic states, friend and foe, for
ever incapable of harm, and to reduce all of them alike to
the same humble clientship. The course pursued may
itself admit of justification ; but the mode in which it was
carried out in the case of the more powerful of the Greek
client-states was unworthy of a great power, and showed
that the epoch of the Fabii and the Scipios was at an end.
The state most affected by this change in the position
of parties was the kingdom of the Attalids, which had been
created and fostered by Rome to keep Macedonia in check,
and which now, after the destruction of Macedonia, was
forsooth no longer needed. It was not easy to find a
tolerable pretext for depriving the prudent and considerate
Eumenes of his privileged position, and allowing him to fall
into disfavour. All at once, about the time when the
Romans were encamped at Heracleum, strange reports were
circulated regarding him—that he was in secret intercourse
CHAP. X THE THIRD MACEDONIAN WAR 5II
with Perseus; that his fleet had been suddenly, as it were,
wafted away; that 5oo talents had been offered for his non-
participation in the Campaign and I 50o for his mediation
to procure peace, and that the agreement had only broken
down through the avarice of Perseus. As to the Pergamene
fleet, the king, after having paid his respects to the consul,
went home with it at the same time that the Roman fleet
went into winter quarters. The story about corruption was
as certainly a fable as any newspaper canard of the present
day; for that the rich, cunning, and consistent Attalid, who
had primarily occasioned the breach between Rome and
Macedonia by his journey in 582 and had been on that
account wellnigh assassinated by the banditti of Perseus,
should—at the moment when the real difficulties of a war,
of whose final issue, moreover, he could never have had any
serious doubt, were overcome—have sold to the instigator
of the murder his share in the spoil for a few talents, and
should have perilled the work of long years for so pitiful a
consideration, may be set down not merely as a fabrication,
but as a very silly one. That no proof was found either in
the papers of Perseus or elsewhere, is sufficiently certain;
for even the Romans did not venture to express those
suspicions aloud. But they gained their object. Their
wishes appeared in the behaviour of the Roman grandees
towards Attalus, the brother of Eumenes, who had
commanded the Pergamene auxiliary troops in Greece.
Their brave and faithful comrade was received in Rome
with open arms and invited to ask not for his brother, but
for himself—the senate would be glad to give him a kingdom
of his own. Attalus asked nothing but Aenus and Maronea.
The senate thought that this was only a preliminary request,
and granted it with great politeness. But when he took
his departure without having made any further demands,
and the senate came to perceive that the reigning family in
Pergamus did not live on such terms with each other as
172.
512 THE THIRD MACEDONIAN WAR BOOK III
were customary in princely houses, Aenus and Maronea
were declared free cities. The Pergamenes obtained not a
foot's breadth of territory out of the spoil of Macedonia ; if
after the victory over Antiochus the Romans had still saved
forms as respected Philip, they were now disposed to hurt
and to humiliate. About this time the senate appears to
have declared Pamphylia, for the possession of which
Eumenes and Antiochus had hitherto contended, inde-
pendent. What was of more importance, the Galatians—
who had been substantially in the power of Eumenes, ever
since he had expelled the king of Pontus by force of arms
from Galatia and had on making peace extorted from him
the promise that he would maintain no further communi-
cation with the Galatian princes—now, reckoning beyond
doubt on the variance that had taken place between
Eumenes and the Romans, if not directly instigated by the
latter, rose against Eumenes, overran his kingdom, and
brought him into great danger. Eumenes besought the
mediation of the Romans ; the Roman envoy declared his
readiness to mediate, but thought it better that Attalus,
who commanded the Pergamene army, should not
accompany him lest the barbarians might be put into ill
humour. Singularly enough, he accomplished nothing ; in
fact, he told on his return that his mediation had only
exasperated the barbarians. No long time elapsed before
the independence of the Galatians was expressly recognized
and guaranteed by the senate. Eumenes determined to
proceed to Rome in person, and to plead his cause in the
senate. But the latter, as if troubled by an evil conscience,
suddenly decreed that in future kings should not be allowed
to come to Rome; and despatched a quaestor to meet him
at Brundisium, to lay before him this decree of the senate,
to ask him what he wanted, and to hint to him that they
would be glad to see his speedy departure. The king was
long silent ; at length he said that he desired nothing
CHAP. X THE THIRD MACEDONIAN WAR SI3
farther, and re-embarked. He saw how matters stood :
the epoch of half-powerful and half-free alliance was at an
end; that of impotent subjection began.
Similar treatment befell the Rhodians. They had a
singularly privileged position : their relation to Rome
assumed the form not of symmachy properly so called, but
of friendly equality; it did not prevent them from enter-
ing into alliances of any kind, and did not compel them to
supply the Romans with a contingent on demand. This
very circumstance was presumably the real reason why their
good understanding with Rome had already for some time
been impaired. The first dissensions with Rome had
arisen in consequence of the rising of the Lycians, who
were handed over to Rhodes after the defeat of Antiochus,
against their oppressors who had (576) cruelly reduced
them to slavery as revolted subjects; the Lycians, however,
asserted that they were not subjects but allies of the
Rhodians, and prevailed with this plea in the Roman
Senate, which was invited to settle the doubtful meaning of
the instrument of peace. But in this result a justifiable
sympathy with the victims of grievous oppression had
perhaps the chief share; at least nothing further was done
on the part of the Romans, who left this as well as other
Hellenic quarrels to take their course. When the war with
Perseus broke out, the Rhodians, like all other sensible
Greeks, viewed it with regret, and blamed Eumenes in par-
ticular as the instigator of it, so that his festal embassy was
not even permitted to be present at the festival of Helios
in Rhodes. But this did not prevent them from adhering
to Rome and keeping the Macedonian party, which existed
in Rhodes as well as everywhere else, aloof from the helm
of affairs. The permission given to them in 585 to export
grain from Sicily shows the continuance of the good under-
standing with Rome. All of a sudden, shortly before the
battle of Pydna, Rhodian envoys appeared at the Roman
WOL. II 65
Humilia-
tion of
Rhodes,
178.
169.
5I4 THE THIRD MACEDONIAN WAR BOOK III
head-quarters and in the Roman senate, announcing that
the Rhodians would no longer tolerate this war which was
injurious to their Macedonian traffic and their revenue
from port-dues, that they were disposed themselves to
declare war against the party which should refuse to make
peace, and that with this view they had already concluded
an alliance with Crete and with the Asiatic cities. Many
caprices are possible in a republic governed by primary
assemblies; but this insane intervention of a commercial
city—which can only have been resolved on after the fall
of the pass of Tempe was known at Rhodes—-requires
special explanation. The key to it is furnished by the
well-attested account that the consul Quintus Marcius, that
master of the “new-fashioned diplomacy,” had in the camp
at Heracleum (and therefore after the occupation of the
pass of Tempe) loaded the Rhodian envoy Agepolis with
civilities and made an underhand request to him to
mediate a peace. Republican wrongheadedness and vanity
did the rest; the Rhodians fancied that the Romans had
given themselves up as lost; they were eager to play the
part of mediator among four great powers at once ; com-
munications were entered into with Perseus; Rhodian
envoys with Macedonian sympathies said more than they
should have said ; and they were caught. The senate,
which doubtless was itself for the most part unaware of
those intrigues, heard the strange announcement, as may
be conceived, with indignation, and was glad of the favour-
able opportunity to humble the haughty mercantile city.
A warlike praetor went even so far as to propose to the
people a declaration of war against Rhodes. In vain the
Rhodian ambassadors repeatedly on their knees adjured
the Senate to think of the friendship of a hundred and
forty years rather than of the one offence; in vain they
sent the heads of the Macedonian party to the scaffold or to
Rome; in vain they sent a massive wreath of gold in token
CHAP. X THE THIRD MACEDONIAN WAR 5 I5
of their gratitude for the non-declaration of war. The up-
right Cato indeed showed that strictly the Rhodians had
committed no offence and asked whether the Romans were
desirous to undertake the punishment of wishes and thoughts,
and whether they could blame the nations for being appre-
hensive that Rome might allow herself all license if she had
no longer any one to fear? His words and warnings were in
vain. The Senate deprived the Rhodians of their possessions
on the mainland, which yielded a yearly produce of 12 o
talents (4,29, ooo). Still heavier were the blows aimed at
the Rhodian commerce. The very prohibition of the import
of salt to, and of the export of shipbuilding timber from,
Macedonia appears to have been directed against Rhodes.
Rhodian commerce was still more directly affected by the
erection of the free port at Delos; the Rhodian customs-
dues, which hitherto had produced I, ooo, ooo drachmae
(A41, ooo) annually, sank in a very brief period to 150,000
drachmae (4,6180). Generally, the Rhodians were para-
lyzed in their freedom of action and in their liberal and
bold commercial policy, and the state began to languish.
Even the alliance asked for was at first refused, and was
only renewed in 590 after urgent entreaties. The equally
guilty but powerless Cretans escaped with a sharp rebuke.
With Syria and Egypt the Romans could go to work
more summarily. War had broken out between them ;
and Coelesyria and Palaestina formed once more the
subject of dispute. According to the assertion of the
Egyptians, those provinces had been ceded to Egypt on
the marriage of the Syrian Cleopatra : this however the
court of Babylon, which was in actual possession, disputed.
Apparently the charging of her dowry on the taxes of the
Coelesyrian cities gave occasion to the quarrel, and the
Syrian side was in the right; the breaking out of the war
was occasioned by the death of Cleopatra in 581, with
which at latest the payments of revenue terminated. The
164.
Interven-
tion in the
Syro-
Egyptian
Walſ.
173.
5 I6 THE THIRD MACEDONIAN WAR BOOK III
171.
168.
war appears to have been begun by Egypt; but king
Antiochus Epiphanes gladly embraced the opportunity of
once more—and for the last time—endeavouring to achieve
the traditional aim of the policy of the Seleucidae, the
acquisition of Egypt, while the Romans were employed in
Macedonia. Fortune seemed favourable to him. The
king of Egypt at that time, Ptolemy VI. Philometor, the
son of Cleopatra, had hardly passed the age of boyhood
and had bad advisers; after a great victory on the Syro-
Egyptian frontier Antiochus was able to advance into the
territories of his nephew in the same year in which the
legions landed in Greece (583), and soon had the person
of the king in his power. Matters began to look as if
Antiochus wished to possess himself of all Egypt in
Philometor's name; Alexandria accordingly closed its gates
against him, deposed Philometor, and nominated as king
in his stead his younger brother, named Euergetes II., or
the Fat. Disturbances in his own kingdom recalled the
Syrian king from Egypt; when he returned, he found that
the brothers had come to an understanding during his
absence; and he then continued the war against both.
Just as he lay before Alexandria, not long after the battle
of Pydna (586), the Roman envoy Gaius Popillius, a harsh
rude man, arrived, and intimated to him the command of
the senate that he should restore all that he had conquered
and should evacuate Egypt within a set term. Antiochus
asked time for consideration ; but the consular drew with
his staff a circle round the king, and bade him declare his
intentions before he stepped beyond the circle. Antiochus
replied that he would comply ; and marched off to his
capital that he might there, in his character of “the god,
the brilliant bringer of victory,” celebrate in Roman fashion
his conquest of Egypt and parody the triumph of Paullus.
Egypt voluntarily submitted to the Roman protectorate;
and thereupon the kings of Babylon also desisted from the
CHAP. X THE THIRD MACEDONIAN WAR 5 I?
last attempt to maintain their independence against Rome.
As with Macedonia in the war waged by Perseus, the
Seleucidae in the war regarding Coelesyria made a similar
and similarly final effort to recover their former power; but it
is a significant indication of the difference between the two
kingdoms, that in the former case the legions, in the latter
the abrupt language of a diplomatist, decided the controversy.
In Greece itself, as the two Boeotian cities had already
paid more than a sufficient penalty, the Molottians alone
remained to be punished as allies of Perseus. Acting on
secret orders from the senate, Paullus in one day gave
up seventy townships in Epirus to plunder, and sold
the inhabitants, 150, ooo in number, into slavery. The
Aetolians lost Amphipolis, and the Acarnanians Leucas,
on account of their equivocal behaviour; whereas the
Athenians, who continued to play the part of the begging
poet in their own Aristophanes, not only obtained a gift of
Delos and Lemnos, but were not ashamed even to petition
for the deserted site of Haliartus, which was assigned to
them accordingly. Thus something was done for the
Muses; but more had to be done for justice. There was
a Macedonian party in every city, and therefore trials for
high treason began in all parts of Greece. Whoever had
served in the army of Perseus was immediately executed;
whoever was compromised by the papers of the king or the
statements of political opponents who flocked to lodge
informations, was despatched to Rome; the Achaean
Callicrates and the Aetolian Lyciscus distinguished them-
selves in the trade of informers. In this way the more
conspicuous patriots among the Thessalians, Aetolians,
Acarnanians, Lesbians and so forth, were removed from
their native land; and, in particular, more than a thousand
Achaeans were thus disposed of—a step taken with the
view not so much of prosecuting those who were carried
off, as of silencing the childish opposition of the Hellenes,
Measures
of security
in Greece.
518 THE THIRD MACEDONIAN WAR BOOK III
Rome and
her depen-
dencies.
To the Achaeans, who, as usual, were not content till they
got the answer which they anticipated, the senate, wearied
by constant requests for the commencement of the investi-
gation, at length roundly declared that till further orders
the persons concerned were to remain in Italy. There
they were placed in country towns in the interior, and
tolerably well treated ; but attempts to escape were
punished with death. The position of the former officials
removed from Macedonia was, in all probability, similar,
This expedient, violent as it was, was still, as things stood,
the most lenient, and the enraged Greeks of the Roman
party were far from content with the paucity of the execu-
tions. Lyciscus had accordingly deemed it proper, by way
of preliminary, to have 500 of the leading men of the
Aetolian patriotic party slain at the meeting of the diet; the
Roman commission, which needed the man, suffered the
deed to pass unpunished, and merely censured the employ-
ment of Roman soldiers in the execution of this Hellenic
usage. We may presume, however, that the Romans
instituted the system of deportation to Italy partly in order
to prevent such horrors. As in Greece proper no power
existed even of such importance as Rhodes or Pergamus,
there was no need in its case for any further humiliation ;
the steps taken were taken only in the exercise of justice—
in the Roman sense, no doubt, of that term—and for the
prevention of the most scandalous and palpable outbreaks
of party discord.
All the Hellenistic states had thus been completely
subjected to the protectorate of Rome, and the whole
empire of Alexander the Great had fallen to the Roman
commonwealth just as if the city had inherited it from his
heirs. From all sides kings and ambassadors flocked to
Rome to congratulate her; and they showed that fawning
is never more abject than when kings are in the ante-
chamber. King Massinissa, who only desisted from
CHAP. X THE TIIIRD MACEDONIAN WAR 5.I.9
presenting himself in person on being expressly prohibited
from doing so, ordered his son to declare that he regarded
himself as merely the beneficiary, and the Romans as the
true proprietors, of his kingdom, and that he would always
be content with what they were willing to leave to him.
There was at least truth in this. But Prusias king of
Bithynia, who had to atone for his neutrality, bore off the
palm in this contest of flattery; he fell on his face when
he was conducted into the senate, and did homage to
“the delivering gods.” As he was so thoroughly con-
temptible, Polybius tells us, they gave him a polite reply,
and presented him with the fleet of Perseus.
The moment was at least well chosen for such acts of
homage. Polybius dates from the battle of Pydna the full
establishment of the universal empire of Rome. It was in
fact the last battle in which a civilized state confronted
Rome in the field on a footing of equality with her as a
great power; all subsequent struggles were rebellions or
wars with peoples beyond the pale of the Romano-Greek
civilization—with barbarians, as they were called. The
whole civilized world thenceforth recognized in the Roman
senate the supreme tribunal, whose commissions decided
in the last resort between kings and nations; and to acquire
its language and manners foreign princes and youths of
quality resided in Rome. A clear and earnest attempt to
get rid of this dominion was in reality made only once—
by the great Mithradates of Pontus. The battle of Pydna,
moreover, marks the last occasion on which the senate still
adhered to the state-maxim that they should, if possible,
hold no possessions and maintain no garrisons beyond the
Italian seas, but should keep the numerous states dependent
on them in order by a mere political supremacy. The aim
of their policy was that these states should neither decline
into utter weakness and anarchy, as had nevertheless
happened in Greece nor emerge out of their half-free
S2O THE THIRD MACEDONIAN WAR BOOK III
The
Italian and
eXtra-
Italian
policy of
Rome.
position into complete independence, as Macedonia had
attempted to do not without success. No state was to be
allowed utterly to perish, but no one was to be permitted
to stand on its own resources. Accordingly the vanquished
foe held at least an equal, often a better, position with the
Roman diplomatists than the faithful ally ; and, while a
defeated opponent was reinstated, those who attempted
to reinstate themselves were abased—as the Aetolians,
Macedonia after the Asiatic war, Rhodes, and Pergamus
learned by experience. But not only did this part of
protector soon prove as irksome to the masters as to the
servants; the Roman protectorate, with its ungrateful
Sisyphian toil that continually needed to be begun afresh,
showed itself to be intrinsically untenable. Indications of
a change of system, and of an increasing disinclination on
the part of Rome to tolerate by its side intermediate states
even in such independence as was possible for them, were
very clearly given in the destruction of the Macedonian
monarchy after the battle of Pydna. The more and more
frequent and more and more unavoidable intervention in
the internal affairs of the petty Greek states through their
misgovernment and their political and social anarchy; the
disarming of Macedonia, where the northern frontier at
any rate urgently required a defence different from that of
mere posts; and, lastly, the introduction of the payment
of land-tax to Rome from Macedonia and Illyria, were so
many symptoms of the approaching conversion of the client
states into subjects of Rome.
If, in conclusion, we glance back at the career of Rome
from the union of Italy to the dismemberment of Mace-
donia, the universal empire of Rome, far from appearing as
a gigantic plan contrived and carried out by an insatiable
thirst for territorial aggrandizement, appears to have been
a result which forced itself on the Roman government
without, and even in opposition to, its wish. It is true that
CHAP. X THE THIRD MACEDONIAN WAR 52I
the former view naturally suggests itself—Sallust is right
when he makes Mithradates say that the wars of Rome
with tribes, cities, and kings originated in one and the
same prime cause, the insatiable longing after dominion
and riches; but it is an error to give forth this judgment
—influenced by passion and the event—as a historical
fact. It is evident to every one whose observation is not
superficial, that the Roman government during this whole
period wished and desired nothing but the sovereignty of
Italy; that they were simply desirous not to have too
powerful neighbours alongside of them ; and that—not
out of humanity towards the vanquished, but from the
very sound view that they ought not to suffer the kernel of
their empire to be stifled by the shell—they earnestly
opposed the introduction first of Africa, then of Greece,
and lastly of Asia into the sphere of the Roman protector-
ate, till circumstances in each case compelled, or at least
suggested with irresistible force, the extension of that
sphere. The Romans always asserted that they did not
pursue a policy of conquest, and that they were always the
party assailed; and this was something more, at any rate,
than a mere phrase. They were in fact driven to all their
great wars with the exception of that concerning Sicily—
to those with Hannibal and Antiochus, no less than to
those with Philip and Perseus—either by a direct aggres-
sion or by an unparalleled disturbance of the existing
political relations; and hence they were ordinarily taken
by surprise on their outbreak. That they did not after
victory exhibit the moderation which they ought to have
done in the interest more especially of Italy itself; that
the retention of Spain, for instance, the undertaking of the
guardianship of Africa, and above all the half-fanciful
scheme of bringing liberty everywhere to the Greeks, were
in the light of Italian policy grave errors, is sufficiently
clear. But the causes of these errors were, on the one
522 THE THIRD MACEDONIAN WAR BOOK III
hand a blind dread of Carthage, on the other a still blinder
enthusiasm for Hellenic liberty; so little did the Romans
exhibit during this period the lust of conquest, that they,
on the contrary, displayed a very judicious dread of it.
The policy of Rome throughout was not projected by a
single mighty intellect and bequeathed traditionally from
generation to generation; it was the policy of a very able
but somewhat narrow-minded deliberative assembly, which
had far too little power of grand combination, and far too
much of a right instinct for the preservation of its own
commonwealth, to devise projects in the spirit of a Caesar
or a Napoleon. The universal empire of Rome had its
ultimate ground in the political development of antiquity
in general. The ancient world knew nothing of a balance
of power among nations; and therefore every nation which
had attained internal unity strove either directly to subdue
its neighbours, as did the Hellenic states, or at any rate
to render them innocuous, as Rome did, –an effort, it is
true, which also issued ultimately in subjugation. Egypt
was perhaps the only great power in antiquity which
seriously pursued a system of equilibrium : on the opposite
system Seleucus and Antigonus, Hannibal and Scipio, came
into collision. And, if it seems to us sad that all the
other richly-endowed and highly-developed nations of
antiquity had to perish in order to enrich a single one
out of the whole, and that all in the long run appear to
have only arisen to contribute to the greatness of Italy
and to the decay involved in that greatness, yet historical
justice must acknowledge that this result was not produced
by the military superiority of the legion over the phalanx,
but was the necessary development of the international
relations of antiquity generally—so that the issue was not
decided by provoking chance, but was the fulfilment of an
unchangeable, and therefore endurable, destiny.
APPENDIX (to PAGE 41)
THE TREATIES BETWEEN ROME AND CARTHAGE
[Extracted from Dr. Mommsen's work on Roman Chronology (p. 273
f)—a book which, in addition to its intrinsic merits, derives a
peculiar interest from the fact that it is written in friendly controversy
with the author's own brother.]
THE earliest treaty between Rome and Carthage, given by Polybius,
is stated by him to have been concluded karū, Aeſktov 'Iowvwov Bpodrov
kal Mápkov 'Opértov.” I have formerly endeavoured to defend this
date as documentary,” but I have now to confess myself mistaken.
Painful as it is to witness the disappearance of the last star which
seemed to light the anxious pilot in navigating the dark seas of early
history, an unprejudiced consideration shows that the Polybian date is
not documentary, and is probably erroneous. -
Respecting the treaties between Rome and Carthage, we have, in
addition to the evidence of Polybius, the following statements.
406 U.C.—Diodorus,” undoubtedly on the authority of Fabius :
'Etr. 5* roºrov (under the consuls of this year) ‘Papuatous pièv trpès
Kapyºmbovlovs trpárov ovv6%kat é-yévoviro. Livy : *—Cum Carthagimien-
sibus legatis foedus ictum, cum amicitiam ac societatem petentes
zenissent,
448 U.C.—Livy : *— Cum Carthaginiensibus eodem ammo foedus
tertio renovatum legatisque eorum, qui ad id zemerant, comiter munera
Ž2$$62,
475 U.C.—Livy :9–Cum Carthagimiensibus quarto foedus reno-
zatum est. This treaty is indisputably the third of Polybius.
The inconsistency between Polybius on the one hand and Fabius
on the other is manifest. The former too says expressly that even in
his time the oldest men, and those most cognisant of public matters in
Rome and in Carthage, were unacquainted with these documents,”
and, as on that account he excuses Philinus for having remained
ignorant of them, he must have held a similar view regarding the
1 Polyb. iii. 22. * In earlier editions of the History. 8 xvi. 69.
* vii. 27; and thence Orosius, iii. 7 : £rimum illud ictum cum Carthaginiensi.
&us foedus. *ix. 43. 6 Ep. 13.
7 iii 26, a railro–rać” #16 c irt rai ‘Paylaimi, rai K apyºorío, o: ºrpsgrflºrator rai
uáAtarta Sokoëvres trepi ră rotwº orwovčáçew #yváovv.
524 APPENDIX
…
3.
expression of Fabius, that the treaty of 406 was the first treaty between
Rome and Carthage. On the other hand Polybius by no means says
—what he has often been made to say—that he had himself discovered
the documents, and that no one had made use of them before him.
On the contrary, it is probable that they came to light on occasion of
the endless diplomatic negotiations which preceded the third Punic
war, and that it then became apparent that they were unknown to the
leading statesmen in the Roman and Carthaginian Senates. Perhaps
they were brought to light by Cato, who had sufficient inducement to
search for them in the Roman archives, and who, when he charged
the Carthaginians with having six times before 536 broken their
compacts with Rome," must have taken some trouble to ascertain the
contents of the earlier treaties. Polybius either gained his knowledge
of them from the oral communications of Cato or of some third person,
or—as there is nothing to prevent us from assuming—derived them
from Cato's historical work. Livy follows, as he so often does,
different authorities—as to 406 Fabius, as to 448 and 475 an authority
agreeing with Polybius.” *
The traditional testimony, therefore stands thus: the one party
reckons the treaties of 245, 448, 475, as first, third, and fourth; the
other reckons that of 406 as the first, and therefore, beyond doubt,
those of 448 and 475 as the second and third. In the first place, the
latter view is supported by the fact that it has the older authorities in
its favour. In the second place, it is evident that there were in the
Roman archives in Cato's time only two treaties with Carthage, which
preceded that of 475; which would suit very well, if that were the
third, but not if it were the fourth, treaty, especially as the missing
treaty must have been not the first, but either the second or the third,
of the four. In the third place, it would be very delightful to meet
with a document dating from the legendary period; but on that very
account such an occurrence is far from probable.
While all these considerations tell in favour of the earlier and
evidently more unbiassed tradition, in reality neither on internal nor
external grounds can the Polybian date be vindicated. The document
does not bear internal traces of so great an antiquity; if it lay before
us without date, we should simply infer from it that it must be earlier
than 416. That in the seventh century treaties of alliance had the
date officially attached to them, at least if they were concluded by the
1 Cato, Orig. 2. iv. ag. Nonium, z. duodevicesimo, p. Too M. : Deinde duodezz-
cesimo (rather duoetzicesimo) anno Žost dimwissum bel/um, Quod quattuor et zigºtá
ammos ſuit, Carthagimiensis sertum de Voedere decermere (rather decessere). The
fifth breach of the peace was probably constituted in his view by the occurrences
which led to the cession of Sardinia in 517, the fourth by the declaration of war in
490, the third by the attempt on Tarentum in 482. The first two I know no means
of determining. In reference to the number and order of the treaties—to throw
light on which the passage has often been employed—nothing is deducible from it.
2 The proposal to harmonize the statements of Livy by counting the diplomatic
congratulations of the Carthaginians in 411 (Liv. vii. 43) as a second treaty, simply
substitutes one piece of negligence for another, because Livy ought to have said this,
had he meant it. It is. moreover, unwarranted, when an inconsistency between
Fabius and Polybius is established, to explain away the traces of the same incon-
sistency in Livy.
APPENDIX 525
senate, is no doubt evident from the treaty with the community of
Astypalaea (Corp. Inscr. Graec. 2485), and that relating to Asclepiades
the Clazomenian and others (C. A. Gr. 5879); but the age of this
custom is not incontestably established, and the only inference which.
it warrants is, that the first treaty with Carthage might, not that it
must, have been dated. Polybius himself by no means refers his
statement of the year to this source which would dispel all doubt, and
moreover he specifies the time of the second and third treaties in so
general and reserved a manner, that in these cases at least he cannot
possibly have found a specification of the year. The circumstance (to
which I was formerly disposed to attach some weight) that the second
treaty of Polybius seemed not to suit the year 448 well, because Tyre
after the time of Alexander the Great can hardly have had the
independent right of stipulating with a foreign power, was of some
importance, so long as the choice between 3% and 448 seemed open :
but the constitutional relations subsisting between the Greek and
Phoenician mercantile cities and the crown of Asia, as well as those
between Tyre and Carthage, are far from being ascertained to such an
extent that on that ground we should refuse to believe other important
testimonies. The only grounds that remain are, the impossibility of
discovering the source of the mistake, and the weight of the authority
of Polybius. But, desirable as it is, with a view to complete con-
viction, to point out not only the error, but also the truth from which
every error proceeds, we cannot possibly be required, in the case of
such a specification of time presenting itself wholly apart from its
original connection, to hold it as true until we have shown in what
way the author came by the erroneous number. Lastly, the authority
of Polybius is undoubtedly, in his own field of investigation, one of the
highest furnished to us by antiquity; but in this case his account
refers to an epoch which he did not seek independently to investigate,
and as to which he took his facts in good faith from some Roman
work. He specifies the year of the foundation of the city, and the
duration of the reigns of the kings; but fable does not become
converted into history because he has placed it on record. Histori-
cal criticism must therefore place the first treaty between Rome
and Carthage in 406, and the two following, accordingly, in 448 and **, *.
475. It follows that no proof can be drawn from the statement of
Polybius in favour of the historical character of the pair of consuls
marking the year at the head of our list; while conversely, after their
unhistorical character has been otherwise demonstrated, the Polybian
date necessarily falls with them.
END OF WOL. II
2
UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN
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