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BIBLIOGRAPHIC SURVEYS OF OTHER AREAS OF THE WORLD
The Army Library, Administrative Services Directorate, The Adjutant General’s Office, has pre-
pared in recent years the following additional bibliographic surveys of literature, all of which are
the products of in-house research and which are on sale by the Superintendent of Documents,
Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.
MIDDLE EAST: TRICONTINENTAL HUB, April 1968, DA PAM 550–2–1
USSR, 1969, DA PAM 550-6 - -
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN, 1969, DA PAM 550-7
NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND NATO, 1970, DA PAM 50–1
COMMUNIST EASTERN EUROPE, 1971, DA PAM 550–8
COMMUNIST CHINA, 1971, DA PAM 550–9
PACIFIC ISLANDS AND TRUST TERRITORIES, 1971, DA PAM 550–10
COMMUNIST NORTH KOREA, 1971, DA PAM 550–11 -
INSULAR SOUTHEAST ASIA, 1972, DA PAM 550–12
JAPAN, OKINAWA, REPUBLIC OF CHINA (TAIWAN), AND REPUBLIC OF KOREA,
1972, DA PAM 550–13
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
- Washington, D.C. 20402 — Price $8.75
Stock Number 0820–0428
gº-a * ..
* ***)
. * tº • \rrº
\scº º \º
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR MILITARY OFERATIONS
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310
FOREWORD
This pamphlet of bibliographic material on Peninsular Southeast
Asia has been compiled by research analysts of the US Army Library
in response to a need for sources of information on this area of
the world.
Peninsular Southeast Asia--Burma, Thailand, Laos, and Cambodia--is
a key geographic area lying at the hub of a major world artery of
communication. Strategically, it is a buffer and to some extent an
insulator between China and the rest of Southeast Asia and the area
beyond. US interests in the region are directed toward encouraging
the development of independent nations capable of assuming greater
responsibility for economic advancement and security. It is in-
creasingly important that we better understand the region's socio-
economic and politico-military conditions in order to assess the
future prospects for regional survival.
It is believed that the material in this pamphlet will prove useful
to those who have an interest in Peninsular Southeast Asia. The
bibliographic information provided includes a wide range of source
material on subjects that are basic to a knowledge of the area and
its inhabitants. Hopefully, increased knowledge will lead to a
better understanding of this tumultuous region.
eutenant General, GS
Deputy Chief of Staff
for Military Operations

ANALYSTS' NOTE
This unclassified bibliographic survey was prepared at the request of
the Director, International and Civil Affairs, ODCSOPS, United States
Army.
The publications included in this pamphlet are available in the open
holdings of The Army Library, Pentagon. Selections were made from
several thousand periodical articles, books, studies and reports, both
friendly and unfriendly. No effort has been made to delete or exclude
references by reason of their controversial nature. On the other hand,
inclusion of entries does not represent an official endorsement of the views
expressed.
The information appearing in the abstracts is supported by 36 ap-
pendixes comprised of charts, tables, maps, and texts of military, political,
economic, and sociological nature. The maps, 17 of which are in color,
provide the regional geographic picture of Peninsular Southeast Asia, as
well as the political and economic aspects of Burma, Cambodia, Laos,
and Thailand.
The preparation and publication of a separate bibliographic survey of
literature on Vietnam is contemplated during 1973. Accordingly, this
pamphlet does not include Vietnam as a specific subject.
The Research Analysts of The Army Library gratefully acknowledge
the information obtained from the publications of the various specialists
in the Federal Agencies of the Washington, D.C. area. Special apprecia-
tion is extended to the Central Intelligence Agency and to the Army Topo-
graphic Command for their excellent maps; also to the T.N. Dupuy
Associates, Dunn Loring, Virginia, for permission to make extracts from
their Almanac of World Military Power.
iii
PAMPHLET
No. 550–14
BIBLIOGRAPHIC SURVEY OF LITERATURE,
(This pamphlet contains copyright material)
Pam 550–14
HEADQUARTERS
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
WASHINGTON, D.C., 15 September 1972
*ENINsular SOUTHEAST ASIA: A
1972
CHAPTER I
WHITHER PENINSULAR SOUTHEAST ASIA:
AN OVERVIEW
(See also Map Appendixes HH and II)
CHAPTER II
PENINSULAR SOUTHEAST ASIA: REGIONAL ASPECTS
:
(See also DA PAM 550–12, Insular Southeast
Asia, A Bibliographic Survey, 1971)
Peninsular Southeast Asia: Miscellaneous Aspects (See also Biblio-
graphies in VII-J) -----------------------------------------------
Regional Defense, Security, and Cooperation (See also by Country) . . .
1. Miscellaneous Aspects - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
2. ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
3. SEATO (Southeast Asia Treaty Organization) (See also Appendix
B and VII—J–1—d) - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - --~ * m * * * * * *-* * * * * * *m.
The Threat of Communism (See also by Country and Appendix C) . . . .
The Dimensions of Political Development - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Chinese Minority in Peninsular Southeast Asia (See also by Country)
Peninsular Southeast Asia in the Global Perspective - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
1. Boundaries and Frontiers (See also by Country) - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
2. Peninsular Southeast Asia and Communist China’s Rimland Strategy
a. Miscellaneous Aspects - - - - - - - - - - ---------------------------- .
b. China's Policies and the Indochina War (See also IV–D–2–b)
3. Peninsular Southeast Asia and India . - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
4. Peninsular Southeast Asia and Japan . - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ... , " " ºr ºr * ,
a. Miscellaneous Aspects - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
b. Economic Influence and Potential - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
c. Japan and the Balance of Power in the *PSEA Region (See also
DA PAM 550–13, 1971, for Japan) - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
d. Soviet View of Japan's Influence in PSEA - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
5. Peninsular Southeast Asia and Australia and New Zealand - - - - - - - -
a. Miscellaneous Aspects - - - - - - - - - .* = = = = <= <= − = - sº, s- = - = * * * * * * * * * * * * * - *
Page
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19
21
22
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23
28
31
32
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*PSEA—Peninsular Southeast Asia.
35
36
36
36
322 |
- K63
1672
Év.vx
J.
b. Australia and Collective Security of the PSEA Region . . .
6. Peninsular Southeast Asia and the United States - - - - - - - - - - . . . . . .
a. Miscellaneous Aspects - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - . . . . . . . . .
b. The Nixon Doctrine - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - . . . - - - - - - • * ~ * * ~ * ~ *
c. Vietnam War, PSEA, and U.S. Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
d. Treaties and Alliances - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
7. Peninsular Southeast Asia and the USSR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
a. Miscellaneous Aspects - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
b. Military Aid - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
c. Sino-Soviet Struggle for Influence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
8. Peninsular Southeast Asia and the Philippines and Canada
Economic Aspects - - - - - - - - - - - - • * * . . ºr - - - - --> * * * * ~ *- ~ * * * * * * * ~ *- - - - *-* - - - - - - - - -
1. Miscellaneous Aspects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2. Petroleum - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - — -- - - - - - - - - - - -
3. Regional Cooperation (See also by Country)
a. Miscellaneous Aspects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
b. The Mekong River Basin: The Development of Its Economic
Potential (See also by Country) - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - . . . . . - - - -
The Land and the People (See also by Country and Appendixes) . . . . . .
Population and Demography (For Minorities See also Ethnic Map in
Appendix JJ) ----------------------------------------------------
Buddhism. As a Political Force (See also by Country) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
History (See also by Country) . . . . . . . . . . . . . - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
CHAPTER III
BURMA
(See also Appendixes and Source Materials)
Whither Burma: An Overview . . . . . . . . - - - - - - . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Descriptive Miscellany (See also Map Appendixes H and I) . . . . . .
Government and Politics - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
1. Miscellaneous Aspects - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - -
2. Burma and U Nu - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
3. Burma and General Ne Win - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
a. Miscellaneous Aspects - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
b. Socialism ---------------------------------------------------
National Security and Armed Forces (See also Appendixes E and F) . .
Foreign Relations - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
1. Communist China and Her Influences (See also H-2 Below) - ... - - - - -
2. USSR --------------------------------------------------------
3. United States (See also Nixon Doctrine in II–F–6–b) . . . . . . . .
Boundaries and Frontiers - - . . . . . . . - - - - - * * * * * *- a-- * *-* , -- a-- . . . . * ** - - - - - - - -
The Land and the People (See also Appendix D) . . . . . . . . . . --- - - - - - -
Internal Conditions - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
1. Sociological Aspects - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
2. Communism (See also Appendix G) - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
3. Minorities and Minorities’ Problems (See also Map in Appendix JJ) -
4. Buddhism -----------------------------------------------------
Page
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70
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73
74
74
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74
75
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vi
S&A5
3(21/2-
Economic Aspects - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
1. Miscellaneous Aspects - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
2. Petroleum - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
History ---------------------------------------------------------
1. Miscellaneous Histories - - - - - - … • - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - *** - - - * * * * * * * *
2. World War II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - - - - - - -, * * * * * * * * * * * * * * -- * : * ~ * * * -- * -
CHAPTER IV
CAMBODIA
(See also Appendixes and Source Materials)
Whither Cambodia: An Overview - -- ... -- - - - - - - - - - -- * ~ * -- - - - - - -
Insurgencies and Incursions: The Pros and Cons of the Crossfire in
Cambodia ... --- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ~ *- sº - - - - - - - - * * - - - - - - - , , ºr -º
Descriptive Miscellany (See also Map Appendixes N and O) . . . . .
Government and Politics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1. Miscellaneous Aspects - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . -- - -
2. The Fall of Sihanouk's Regime (See also F-1 Below) . . . . . . . . . . .
a. Miscellaneous Aspects - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
b. Sihanouk Speaks from Peking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3. Cambodia Under Lon Nol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Cambodia's Search for National Security (See also Appendixes K
and L) ------------------------ * * * ~ *-* - - -º- ºr - - - - - - a -, * * * * * * * * * ** * * * * * * * *-* * * -
1. Miscellaneous Aspects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . --- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ---
2. Armed Forces - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Foreign Relations - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Pseudo-Neutrality Under Sihanouk - . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Cambodia and Her Neighbors - - - - - - - - - • * = < * : * ~ * * * *- • * * * *** -- ~ * * ~ *- - -- *-* * * *
Cambodia and Communist China . . . . -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - * ... • * * *- - * * *-* *- - -
Cambodia and India - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - . . . . .
Cambodia and the United States (See also Nixon Doctrine in II–F–
6–b and Appendix A) - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
:
Boundaries and Frontiers ... - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - * * * * * *
The Land and the People (See also Appendixes J and P)
Internal Conditions - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - • * * * * * * : * ~ * *- - - - - ~ *
1. Miscellaneous Aspects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
2. In the Wake of War: Refugees and Civilian War Casualty Problems -
3. Communism (See also Appendix M) . . . . . . - * * *-* * * * *-* *-* -- * * * * * * * * * * = * ~ *
4. Chinese in Cambodia --...----------------...-- > * * * * * * * * * * * ** = -s. * * =
5. Buddhism and Its Influences . . . . -------------- * ~ * * *-* * * *-* → - - - - - - - -= - - - - -
Economic Aspects - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - * ~ * * *-* * * * *-* * * * * * * * *- * * * *-* * * * * * * * * : * ~ *-* * * *
1. Miscellaneous Aspects - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - *** * * * * * * *-* * * ~ *
2. The Mekong River Basin: The Development of Its Economic
Potential ----------------------------------------------------
3. Rubber and Petroleum - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -• * * * * * * * = ~ *
Page
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i
CHAPTER V
LAOS
(See also Appendixes and Source Materials)
Whither Laos: An Overview - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Laos in the Cross Fire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . * ~ * * * * * , ~
Miscellaneous Aspects - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - • * * * *-* * * * *
Background to the War in Laos - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
The War in Laos and the War in Indochina: Their Co-relationship
North Vietnamese and Pathet Lao Operations in Laos - - - - - - - - - - - -
Incursion into Laos by South Vietnam, 1971 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
:
Descriptive Miscellany (See also Map Appendixes U, V, W, X, and Y)
Government and Politics - - - - - - - - - . . -- - - - * ~ *-* = *-* - - - - - - - - - - - - - * * * * * * ~ * -- * * * * *-* =
1. Miscellaneous Aspects - - - - - - - - • * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *-* * * * * * * -- ~ * sm
2. The Constitution - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
3. Laotian Internal Differences and the War in Laos - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Laos’ Search for National Security (See also Appendixes R and S) . . . .
1. Miscellaneous Aspects . . . . . . . - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - . . . . . .
2. Armed Forces . . . - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - * - - - - - - - sº am - . . . * * * *-*.
Foreign Relations - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
1. Laos and Her Neighbors - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
2. Laos and Communist China - - - - - - - * * * * * * *-* * * * * * * * * * * *-* * * * * * * * * * * * *
3. Laos and India -----------------------------------------------
4
. Laos and the United States: American Policies and Actions (See
also II–F–6–b) - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
a. Miscellaneous Aspects - - - - - - - - - - - - - - • * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *-* * * * * *
b. The Scope of United States Involvement in Laos: Past and
Present (See also Appendix A) - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(1) Miscellaneous Aspects - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(2) United States Aid to Laos - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Boundaries and Frontiers: The Influence of Events Across the Borders
The Land and the People (See also Ethnic Map in Appendix JJ) - - - - -
Internal Conditions - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
1. Miscellaneous Aspects - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
2. In the Wake of War: Refugees and Civilian War Casualty Problems
3. Communism (See also Section on North Vietnam and Pathet Lao
B–5 Above) - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ** * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
Economic Aspects - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
1. Miscellaneous Aspects - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ,
Strategic Import of Laos - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - .
Page
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138
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139
140
140
143
144
144
145
145
146
146
2. The Mekong River Basin: The Development of Its Economic
Potential -----------------------------------------------------
3. Petroleum ----------------------------------------------------
147
147
147
150
150
:
CHAPTER VI
THAILAND
(See also Appendixes and Source Materials)
Whither Thailand: An Overview - . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Insurgencies and Incursions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Strategic Import of Thailand - - - - - - - - - . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - - - - -
Descriptive Miscellany (Including the Land and the People) (See also
Appendixes Z, DD, EE, and FF) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . -- - - - - - -
Government and Politics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1. Miscellaneous Aspects ... - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — —
2. The Constitution - - - - - - - = ~ * * * * * ~ * = - *-* * *-* * ~ * * * * * * * * * : - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- * * *
Thailand's Search for National Security (See also Appendixes AA
and BB) --------------------------------------------------------
1. Miscellaneous Aspects - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
2. Armed Forces - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
3. The Threat from Internal and External Communism (See also
II–F–2) - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - -
Foreign Relations - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
1. Miscellaneous Aspects - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - --> - - - - w & Ҽ ~...~ * *-* * * * * * * ** - - -
2. Thailand and Her Neighbors - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - . . . . - * * * * * * * * * --> - - - - - - - -
3. Thailand and SEATO (See also Appendix B) - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
4. Thailand and the Indochina War - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - -
5. Thailand and Communist China - - - - - - - - - - - - - - • * * * * * = * * * * * * * * * * * * *
6. Thailand and India - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
7. Thailand and the United States - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
a. Miscellaneous Aspects - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ** * * * * * * * ** -- --
b. Thailand and the Nixon Doctrine (See also II–F–6–b) . . . . . . . .
c. United States Aid to Thailand - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
8. Thailand and the USSR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Boundaries and Frontiers - - - . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - - - - - -
Internal Conditions (Including Sociological Aspects) - . . . . . . . • * * * * * - - -
1. Communism and Communist Aggression (See F-3 Above) . . . . .
2. Population and Population Problems ... - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - . . .
8. Religion ---------------------------------------------------- - -
a. Miscellaneous Aspects - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
b. Buddhism --------------------------------------------------
4. Minorities, Tribes, and Refugees (See also Ethnic Maps in Appen-
dix GG and JJ) ----------- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
a. Miscellaneous Aspects - - - - - - - - - - ----------------------------
b. Chinese in Thailand - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - * * * * * * * * * * me amº - arº s -- * * * * **
5. Education -----------------------------------------------------
Economic Aspects - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Miscellaneous Aspects - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Aid and Trade - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Agriculture (Including Forestry) - - - . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Finance and Financial Policy - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Industry ---------------------------------------------- .* = m, sº sº, sº - *
:
Page
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172
173
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178
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181
182
182
183
183
183
184
184
184
185
185
187
187
188
188
190
191
193
193
Potential ------------------------------------------------------ te
7. Petroleum -----------------------------------------------------
K. History ----------------------------------------------------------
CHAPTER VII
SOURCE MATERIALS FOR RESEARCH
AND REFERENCE
A. Miscellaneous Materials - - - - - - - - - - - - ~ * * = a-- --- - - - - - - - - - * - - - - - wº: “ - * * * * * * * * * * * * *
B. Atlases ------------------. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- * * * * * * * * ~ * * * * * * * * = a - a-- - - -- . . sº.
C. Directories (Including Aircraft & Warship Directories) . . . . . . . . . .
D. Encyclopedias . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • * ~ * - - - - - - --> -º ºm. * * * * * * -- - - - - - - - - -
E. Handbooks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - - - - - - - - - -- -: * ~ *-* -
F. Language Textbooks - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - -
G. Research Guides - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - • * * * ** -- a- - -
H. Travel Guides - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
I. Yearbooks - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - --, - - -
J. Bibliographies - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -ºr sm - - * *-* * * * * *-ºs º º mº m 'mº sº * * * *- :º º
1. Southeast Asia: Regional Aspects - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - * - - - - - - - - * * ~ * ~ * = ... - - -
a. Miscellaneous Bibliographies - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - -
b. Contemporary Southeast Asia: An Overview . . . . . . .
c. Sociological Aspects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - - - - - - - - - - -
d. SEATO -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - --- - - - - - - - - - - -
2. Peninsular Southeast Asia by Country (Burma, Cambodia, Laos
and Thailand) - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ‘- – - - - - - - -
a. Miscellaneous Bibliographies - - - - - - - - ---> -- - - - - - - - - - - - --- - - - - - - - - - - - - -
b. Burma -----------------------------------------------------
c. Cambodia ---------------------------------------------------
d. Laos -------------------------------------------------------
e. Thailand ------------------------------------- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
APPENDIXES
A. U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970’s: Laos and Cambodia . . .
B. Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty—SEATO (Text) . . . . . . . . .
C. Communist Parties Around the Perimeter of China—Including Burma,
Cambodia, Laos, and Thailand (Table and Text) - - - - - - - . • * * * * * * *-* * * * * * * *
D. Union of Burma: Background Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
E. Burma: National Security (National Defense and Internal Security) -
F. Burma’s Military Posture—With Map (Black and White) - . . . . . . . .
G. Burma: Strength of Communist Party Organization . . . . . . . . . . . .
H. Burma: Map with Insets—(Color) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
I. Burma: Vegetation—Map—(Color) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
J. The Khmer Republic (Cambodia): Background Notes (Including Aboli-
tion of Monarchy and Dismissal of Sihanouk) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - - - - - - -
K. Cambodia under Sihanouk: National Security (Public Order and
6. The Mekong River Basin: The Development of Its Economic
Safety; and the Armed Forces) - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Page
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207
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215
220
222
229
250
254
257
259
261
269
Page
L. Cambodia's Politico-Military Posture Under Lon Nol - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 303
M. Cambodia: Strength of Communist Party Organization - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 308
N. Cambodia: Map with Insets (Color) - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 311
O. Cambodia: Administrative Divisions—Map (Color) - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 313
P. Cambodia: Ethnic Groups—Map (Color) - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 315
Q. Kingdom of Laos: Background Notes - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 317
R. Laos: National Security (Public Order and Safety; and the Armed
Forces) ---------------------------------------------------------- 325
S. Laotian Military Posture—With Map (Black and White) - - - - - - - - - - - 357
T. Laos: Strength of Communist Party Organization - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - 360
U, Laos: Map With Insets (Color) - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 364
V. Laos: Administrative Divisions—Map (Color) - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 365
W. Laos: Communist Administrative Divisions—Map (Color) . . . . . . . . . . -- 367
X. Laos [Military Regions]—Map (Color) - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 369
Y. North Laos—Map (Color) - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 371
Z. Kingdom of Thailand: Background Notes ... - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 373
AA. Thailand: National Security (National Defense and Internal Security) 381
BB. Thailand's Military Posture—With Map (Black and White) - - - - - "- - - - - 407
CC. Thailand: Strength of Communist Party Organization - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 411
DD. Thailand: Map With Insets (Color) - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 414
EE. Thailand: Administrative Divisions—Map (Color) . . . . . . . . . . * * *rm -- * * * * * 415
FF. Northern Thailand: Selected Ethnic Groups—Map (Color) - - - - - - - - - - - 417
GG. Khmers in Thailand—Map (Color) - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 419
HH. Southern Asia—Map (Color—Edition 2—TPC, Sheet 7, Series 1106) . . . 421
II. Southern Asia—Map (Color—Edition 1—AMS, Sheet 8, Series 1106) - - - 422
J.J. The Peoples of Mainland Southeast Asia—Map (Color—National
Geographic Society) - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 423
MAP INDEX
(Regional and Country Maps)
Burma (Black and White) - - - - - - - - •- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- * ~ * * * * *-* - - - - - , =
251
Burma (With Insets—Color) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - - - Faces blank page 258
Burma: Vegetation (Color) - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ... as ºm m - * * * * *... •- * * * = Faces blank page 260
Cambodia (With Insets—Color) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - - - - - - Faces blank page 312
Cambodia: Administrative Divisions (Color)
Faces blank page
314
Cambodia: Ethnic Groups (Color) - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Faces blank page 316
Laos (Black and White) - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 358
Laos (With Insets—Color) -- . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Faces page 364
Laos: Administrative Divisions (Color) - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Faces blank page 366
Laos: Communist Administrative Divisions (Color) . . . . . . . . . . . Faces blank page 368
Laos [Military Regions] (Color) ... - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Faces blank page 370
North Laos (Color) - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Faces blank page 372
Thailand (Black and White) - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 408
Thailand (With Insets—Color) - - - - - - - - . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Faces page 414
Thailand: Administrative Divisions (Color) -- . . - - - - - - --- - * ** - - - - - - - - - Faces blank page 416
Northern Thailand: Selected Ethnic Groups (Color) . . . . . . . . . . . Faces blank page 418
Khmers in Thailand (Color) - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ... - - - - - Faces blank page 420
Southern Asia (Color—Edition 2—TPC, Sheet 7, Series 1106) - - -
Southern Asia (Color—Edition 1—AMS, Sheet 8, Series 1106) - - -
The Peoples of Mainland Southeast Asia (Color—National
Geographic Society)
In pocket in back of manual
In pocket in back of manual
In pocket in back of manual
PENINSULAR SOUTHEAST ASIA: A BIBLIOGRAPHIC SURVEY
OF LITERATURE, 1972
CHAPTER I
WHITHER PENINSULAR SOUTHEAST ASIA: AN OVERVIEW
(See also Map Appendixes HH and II)
EMERGING SOUTHEAST ASIA; A
STUDY IN GROWTH AND STAGNATION,
by Donald W. Fryer. New York, McGraw-Hill
Book Co., 1970. 486p.
The Region (Southeast Asia in the Mod-
ern World; The Land and Its Utilization; Ur-
banization, Industrialization and Moderniza-
tion); Progress (Thailand; The Philippines;
Malaysia and Singapore); Stagnation (Indone-
sia; The Union of Burma; Vietnam, Laos and
Cambodia); Prospect (The Destiny of South-
east Asia). With selected bibliography, maps,
and diagrams.
THE FUTURE OF SOUTH-EAST ASIA,
by Brig. F. W. Speed, in The Army Quarterly
and Defence Journal, v. 101, no. 1 (October
1970) 36–43.
“Looking into South-East Asia from the
relative serenity of Australia and New Zea-
land, a watcher sees a region in turmoil. Can
the dust be penetrated and the future read? In
the former French colonies of Indo-China,
North and South Vietnam are engaged in a
full-scale People’s War, with an overlay of
western-style warfare waged by Americans,
now in the process of substantial force reduc-
tion. Laos is similarly involved, though in
lower key, with dissidents based on the north-
eastern provinces, heavily supported by North
Vietnamese. Cambodia, after years of fence-sit-
ting, during which time her eastern provinces
were a corridor for North Vietnamese forces
operating in South Vietnam, has now been
pulled into the Maelstrom. To the west and
south, across the Mekong River, Thailand, in-
dependent throughout the colonial era, has for
years sought to contain subversion in its north-
ern and eastern provinces. Now Thailand has
been drawn in to support the Cambodian gov-
ernment, in areas just across their border.
Burma, formerly an uneasy British possession,
has been seeking for over 20 years to establish
the ‘Burmese Way to Socialism,” in the face of
centrifugal forces of varied ethnic groups.”
With map.
ISSUES IN THE FUTURE OF ASIA:
COMMUNIST AND NON-COMMUNIST AL-
TERNATIVES, ed. by Richard Lowenthal.
New York, Praeger, 1969. 177 p.
“The basic issues in Asia are whether
or not the Asian nations will successfully ac-
complish the gigantic task of social, economic,
cultural, and political modernization, and what
form of leadership they will develop. Initially
many new Asian states assumed that the only
road to independent development was the
‘non-capitalistic road,” requiring a break with
the West and some reliance on the Soviet bloc.
The Soviet Union and China responded differ-
ently to Asian needs, with the USSR giving
priority to economic growth while the Chinese,
stressing classical communist doctrine, worked
to promote active conflicts with the West with-
out regard for economic growth. The present
political situation allows the Asian nations to
choose between East and West and to obtain
aid from either or both sides . . . Asian na-
tions have responded to the disruption of their
traditional society by trying to synthesize so-
cialist programs and modern Buddhism and to
preserve their national identity with a modern
vision of planning for development and social
1
justice as conceived by Asian nationalists like
Sun Yat-sen. Neither religion nor nationalism,
however, provide a bulwark against the ad-
vance of totalitarian communism. If they are
to be effective alternatives to communism, they
must be combined with effective non-commun-
ist programs for solving the problems of
agrarian reform, national integration, and
over-all development . . .”
THE MYTH OF ASIA, by John M. Stead-
man. New York, Simon and Schuster, 1969.
353 p.
“This . . . book . . . shows . . . that the
West overestimates the unity of Asia, that in-
deed to think of Asia as a unity is profoundly
mistaken, both in history and today. There are
at least three Asias—the cultural complex of
China and Japan, that of India and its related
cultures, and Islam, which has been closest to
the West and has most influenced the West,
particularly in earlier science, mathematics
and astronomy. This is one aspect only of the
book’s main theme. It is extremely illuminat-
ing about Asian cultures, about religion and
art, no less than science and philosophy. The
book has an important contribution to make in
the crucial issue of our time, relations between
East and West, and to the understanding of
them. It gives the historical background, essen-
tial to the comprehension of the greatest politi-
cal dilemma of today. So much depends upon
our getting it right, and this thoughtful and
scholarly book offers significant help to all se-
rious minds at this crossroads. In the end, in
showing that the monolithic concept of Asia is
untrue, that there is and always has been at
least as much variety and diversity in the East
as in the West, the implications of the book are
hopeful: One sees the unity of mankind under
the diversities and conflicts of both East and
West.” Deals with many countries of Asia, in-
cluding Burma, Cambodia, Laos, and Thailand,
among others. With select bibliography.
NEW TIDES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA, by
William P. Bundy, in Foreign Affairs, v. 49,
no. 2 (January 1971) 187–200.
“For three decades now, Southeast Asia
has been the scene and cockpit of struggles
among great powers. Can it now be moved
away from this status—unenviable and totally
unwanted by its peoples? Can one outline a
picture of conditions there that meets the de-
sires of Southeast Asians and is at the same
time compatible with the basic interests of all
the major powers? Are such conditions more |
realizable now than ever before? If so, how
can one move from here to there, and in par-
ticular how, if they were made the ultimate
goal, would this affect the play of the hand (in
all quarters) in bringing the war in Indochina
to a conclusion? This is the broad and proper
way to frame the problem. Indeed, it is the one
that fits any thoughtful definition of U.S. na-
tional interests. What we care about, and
should have always defined as our objective,
can be simply stated as ‘conditions for lasting
peace’ there—or for that matter any where
else in the world. This real goal should be seen
affirmatively and above all in terms of the as-
pirations of the 250 million people whose hopes
and fears, however inarticulate and vague, de-
fine the true tides of the future. Before trying
to outline “conditions for lasting peace’ in
Southeast Asia, and certainly before making
any judgment as to the possibility of attaining
them, let us look at what has happened there
in the last five years. The picture is wholly dif-
ferent from what it was in the spring and sum-
mer of 1965, when the culminating series of
major American decisions in Vietnam was
taken . . . March of 1968 brought a turning
point both in Southeast Asia and in American
policy and politics. Not only the outcome in
Vietnam but the willingness of the United
States to remain engaged in Southeast Asia
were suddenly seen to be in grave doubt. This
is not to say that the promising elements of
1965–67 had disappeared. Economic growth of
individual nations, regional cooperation and
multilateral aid continued, and still continue.
Indonesia and Thailand, in particular, have
taken the lead in the Association of Southeast
Asian Nations (ASEAN), the first grouping in
this area for political and economic coopera.
tion.”
NEW WINDS OVER SOUTHEAST ASIA,
by Wing Comdr. Maharaj K. Chopra, in Mili.
tary Review, v. 48, no. 9 (September 1968)
10–18. -
“It is a paradox of contemporary life
that, whereas the number of states is multiply-
ing and their frontiers are becoming rigid, the
problems confronting them are becoming inter-
2
state and regional in character. This is cer-
tainly true of Southeast Asia, thanks to its ge-
ography, history, and the new, fast-developing
trends. Southeast Asia comprises the 10 states
of Burma, Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, North
Vietnam, South Vietnam, Malaysia, Singapore,
Indonesia, and the Philippines.” Common Fea-
tures; Common Problems; New Constitution
(Thailand); Economic and Social Fields; Se-
curity Arrangements; etc.
SEATO: AN AILING ALLIANCE, by Paul
E. Eckel, in World Affairs, v. 134, no. 2 (Fall
1971) 97–114.
“When President Lyndon B. Johnson
sent ground combat forces into South Vietnam
in 1965, he gave as one of his main reasons the
United States’ “obligation under the Southeast
Asia Collective Defense Treaty” (miscalled
SEATO). Although SEATO was a convenient
peg on which to hand this decision, the treaty
never obligated the United States to take such
action. In fact, the words ‘commitment,” “obli-
gation,’ or ‘pledge’ are noticeably absent in the
document. SEATO members knew full well
that nothing in the alliance put them into a
warlike posture as was the case in the NATO
pact which asserted that an “attack on one is
an attack on all.” The . . . fact is, therefore,
that the United States came to the aid of South
Vietnam not because it had to, but because it
wanted to and did so with the fullest support of
Congress. The other countries in SEATO could
have acted in the same way, thereby demon-
strating their unity of purpose as the treaty
proposes, but in the main they were content to
let the Americans do it. To fill in some of the
gaps in this controversial matter we shall take
a long hard look at the collection of nations
which form SEATO and how that organization
dealt with the problems which beset its three
protocol states: Laos, Cambodia, and South
Vietnam. We may come to see why the member
nations interpreted their responsibilities as
they did and why the United States is fighting
such a lonely war in Indochina. Hopefully,
such an examination will shed some light into
the . . . future as we grope our way to a work-
able formula for accommodation.” SEATO’s
Cold War Legacy; The Monroe Doctrine For-
mula; Laos—The Buffeted Buffer; Cambodia
—A Pandora's Box; Vietnam—“So Let the
Americans do it”; SEATO-An Anachronism;
Pax Asiana—A Timorous Beginning.
SOUTHEAST ASIA; A SURVEY, by Rich-
ard Butwell. New York, Foreign Policy
Association, December 1968. 63 p. (Headline
Series No. 192.)
This survey of Southeast Asia which in-
cludes information also on Burma, Cambodia,
Laos, and Thailand, among others, deals with
the following: What Is Southeast Asia?; The
Years Since World War II; The Problems of
Nation-Building and Survival; Regionalism—
How Firm a Foundation—and Future?; The
United States and Southeast Asia.
SOUTHEAST ASIA TOMORROW, by Mel-
vin Gurtov. Baltimore, Johns Hopkins, 1970.
114 p.
“In view of the probable American
withdrawal from Vietnam, it is time to reas-
sess the American role and responsibility in
Southeast Asia. It is generally held that with-
drawal under unfavorable circumstances would
result in communist-sponsored wars of libera-
tion, increased Chinese militancy, and the ero-
sion of security and stability in Asia. However,
the US has no vital security interests in the
area. The takeover of a single nation by hostile
forces would not threaten American security.
The US does have a broad security function,
i.e., preventing a hostile power from dominat-
ing the region, and nonsecurity interests which
require protecting certain states from aggres-
sion. The major problem is not responding to
overt aggression but dealing with the dynamic
changes and political confusion of the area . . .
The US should adopt a flexible attitude to-
ward revolutionary movements and toward its
allies. An anti-communist right-wing regime
may prove as undesirable as a leftist regime
and may hamper political progress and eco-
nomic development as much as any leftist re-
gime. Adopting a single standard for determin-
ing the US response to the revolutionary move-
ments or political opposition is not advisable.
In dealing with its allies, the US should make
a distinction between protecting a nation
against aggression and preserving a bad gov-
ernment . . . There is no reason to expect the
worst after an American withdrawal from
Vietnam and modification of its policy toward
Southeast Asia. Given the nature of politics in
3
SEA, the results will be ambiguous. But by
demonstrating its confidence in the ability of
the region's governments and adopting a flexi-
ble approach toward both its allies and hostile
powers, the US may help Southeast Asia
achieve the stability that has evaded it until
now.”
WHAT FUTURE FOR ASIA, by W. W.
Rostow, in Reader's Digest (December 1970)
109–111.
“By the year 2000, the vast arc of na-
tions that stretches from Korea to Iran will
have reached technological maturity—and
enormous power. How will that power be
wielded? The answer lies with us . . . What is
Asia? Asia is where about 60 percent of hu-
manity now lives and will continue to live. In
the year 2000, Asia's population will be more
than ten times that of the United States— say,
3.7 billion Souls. Anyone who has recently been
to Asia knows it is a region on the march. We
are all familiar with the extraordinary growth
of Japan, now the third industrial power in
the world and closing fast on a sluggish Soviet
Union. But the modernization of old societies
is also moving forward in South Korea and
Taiwan, Thailand and Malaysia and Singapore,
and in India, Pakistan, Iran and Indonesia as
Well.”
CHAPTER II
PENINSULAR SOUTHEAST ASIA: REGIONAL ASPECTS
(See also DA PAM 550–12, Insular Southeast
Asia, A Bibliographic Survey, 1971)
A. Peninsular Southeast Asia: Miscel-
laneous Aspects (See also Bibliogra-
phies in VII—J)
THE ASIANS: THEIR HERITAGE AND
THEIR DESTINY, by Paul Thomas Welty.
3rd ed. Philadelphia, J.B. Lippincott, 1970. 351
D.
This book attempts to give “some under-
standing of the social and economic environ-
ment in which most Asians live and of the var-
ious systems of thought which influence their
approach to present-day problems, just as the
thinking of people in a Western culture is
influenced by their environment and tradi-
tions... “The Asians’. . . put its main emphasis
on this . . . task, while also giving the main
outlines of geography, history, politics and
government, for the main areas of Asia from
Pakistan round to Japan [and also including,
among many others, Burma, Cambodia, Laos,
and Thailand].
THE CHANGING FACE OF SOUTHEAST
ASIA, by Amry Vandenbosch and Richard But-
well. Lexington, University of Kentucky Press,
1966. 438 p.
- “When the authors set out to revise
their 1957 study, Southeast Asia among the
World Powers, the scene had changed so dras-
tically that they could retain only the histori-
cal sections of their country studies. This,
then, is a new account of Southeast Asian af-
fairs, with separate chapters on Indonesia, Ma-
laysia, the Philippines, Viet Nam, Laos, Cam-
bodia, Burma and Thailand, the region as a
whole, and U.S. policy. The authors are con-
cerned not only with the eight nations’ internal
and international politics but especially with
the relationship between the two.”
CONTEMPORARY SOUTHEAST ASIA, by
Claude A. Buss. New York, Van Nostrand
Reinhold Co., 1970. 280 p. (An Anvil Origi-
nal.)
“A Survey of recent history from the
Southeast Asians’ point of view . . . Part I es-
tablishes the ecology of the Southeast Asian
states and includes a chronological table of
major events since 1945. The first chapter de-
scribes the scene in Southeast Asia at the close
of World War II. Succeeding chapters trace
historical and political developments in the
Philippines, Burma, Malaysia and Singapore,
Indonesia, Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, and Thai-
land. The concluding chapter looks ahead, into
the 1970’s to impeding changes in cultural
values, social organization, economic trends,
political evolution, and international relations
of the entire region. Part II consists of official
documents and public statements.”
EAST ASIA ON THE MOVE, by William P.
Bundy, in Department of State Bulletin, v. 59,
no. 1514 (1 July 1968) 16–24.
The author states: “It is my purpose
here to draw back from the immediate critical
developments that occupy the headlines and to
look at East Asia today as a whole and in the
broader context of history. For it is only in
this context that we can truly assess the signif-
icance and meaning of current developments,
including the war in Viet-Nam and the pros-
pects for peace there . . . Over the 4 years that
I have focused exclusively on East Asia in my
present position, I have been struck by the ov-
erwhelming, and perhaps inevitable, flow of
spot information on developments that appear
to be critical at a particular moment. There
has been far too little of the kind of interpre-
5
|
tive writing and reporting that would put the
whole situation in focus. My thesis in a nut-
shell is that, from any fair perspective of his-
tory, the economic, social, and political devel-
opment of East Asia over the last 23 years—
since the end of World War II—has been at an
extraordinary pace and shows enormous con-
structive potentialities as well as actual
achievements. This rapid change has been ac-
companied, as so often in history, by internal
violence and external conflict in many cases.
And for this there can be only regret. Yet
given the profound instability of the postwar
situation, a much higher degree of violence and
conflict might well have been predicted; but
the fact is that conflict on a regional or even
larger scale has so far been averted . . . In
modern terms the national map of Asia is
largely new; The nations of East Asia are
enormously varied; Virtually all of the non-
Communist nations of East Asia feel a threat
to their security from aggressive Communist
neighbors; East Asia is in a tremendous and
historic process of change.” Progress in the
Area. As a Whole; U.S. Policy; Northeast
Asia; Southeast Asia; etc. --
AN EYE FOR THE DRAGON; SOUTH-
EAST ASIA OBSERVED, 1954–1970, by Den-
nis Bloodworth. New York, Farrar, Straus and
Giroux, 1970. 414 p.
“The author digs . . . into his newspa-
per files and store of anecdotes for a . . . look
at [all of] Southeast Asia . . . It is . . . a
blend of history, politics, personality, religion,
and superstition. Bloodworth’s constant theme
is the inability of East and West to understand
one another.” He touches many times specifi-
cally on Burma, Cambodia, Laos, and Thai-
land, among others. With chronology and bibli-
ography.
MAN, STATE, AND SOCIETY IN CON-
TEMPORARY SOUTHEAST ASIA, ed. by
Robert O. Tilman. London, Pall Mall, 1970.
637 p.
This book consists of a collection “of
previously published articles [and deals with]
man and his relations with his political and
social environment in Southeast Asia. The au-
thors are concerned with the setting, its histor-
ical, cultural, geographical, and political as-
pects, and tradition, modernization, and social
change. Each country is represented by at least
one article.” With bibliography. |
TOURISM IN SOUTHEAST ASIA, by Wil-
lard A. Hanna. Hanover, N. H., American Uni-.
versities Field Staff, Inc., 1967. 11 p. (Field-
staff Reports, Southeast Asia Series, v. 15,
no. 13.)
“In some countries of Southeast Asia,
tourism is a new industry of such swift
growth, rich profits, and multiple side-effects
that certain other countries have become at
once envious and dismayed . . . The stale de-
bate over the desirability of tourism now seems
quite pointless, save that in certain Southeast
Asian countries the governments still persist
in their eventually futile efforts to control the
flow of travelers rigorously by contriving bu-
reaucratic hurdles—making visas difficult if
not impossible to get, making entry and exit
formalities as time- and temper-consuming as
possible, and demonstrating at every opportu-
nity that a laissez-passer is a privilege con-
ferred by very important officials upon those
persons deemed worthy of it by reason of their
humility and rectitude. Today, these cruel com-
ments apply especially to Burma; but until re-
cently they applied equally well to Indonesia,
and they are not altogether irrelevant else-
where. Thailand, Singapore, and Malaysia,
however, deserve honorable mention for mak-
ing the tourist feel welcome—so long, at least,
as he shows no disposition to loiter about after
the initial courtesy period of two weeks to a
month.” -
THE WEST AND THE ‘NEW ASIA,' by
Richard L. Walker, in Modern Age, (Spring
1967) 153–160.
“The ‘new Asia’ of the mid-1950’s was
strongly anti-colonialist and favorably dis-
posed toward Communist China and Russia.
United by their anti-colonialism, the Afro-
Asian nations were considered a third force in
the world. The accent on anti-colonialism has
been replaced by a preponderant concern with
development and security problems which have
often led to disagreements. Asian leaders who
looked to China for an ideology and a disci-
pline leading to stability and modernization
have been disillusioned. In the process, they
have discovered that modernization can best be
achieved by practical methods often unrelated
6
to ideology. The stand-off between Communist
China and, the US has provided a frame-work
in which the countries of Europe have been
able to involve themselves in the future of
Asia. The ‘new Asia’ of the 1960's is pragmatic
and has close ties with the West. The real rev-
olution is taking place in the non-Communist
sector, where programs of reform and modern-
ization are providing better housing, food,
and clothing as well as educational opportu-
nity. New patterns of relationships have devel-
oped as illustrated by the Asian Development
Bank and ASPAC. Asian leaders today accent
interdependence.”
B. Regional Defense, Security, and Co-
operation (See also by Country)
1. Miscellaneous Aspects
THE ASIAN BALANCE OF POWER : A
COMPARISON WITH EUROPEAN PRECE-
DENTS, by Coral Bell. London, Institute for
Strategic Studies, 1968. 14 p. (Adelphi Paper
No.44.)
“Asia needs a balance of power coali-
tion, similar to NATO, to deter Chinese expan-
sionism in the next decade. It was the tradi-
tionally European concept of balance of power,
not containment, which halted Soviet advances
in post-war Europe. Containment is at best a
military strategy for stop-gap action to pre-
vent any territorial acquisition by the adver-
sary. Military containment has been tried in
Vietnam and has proved too costly in relation
to its effectiveness. A balance of power coali-
tion in Asia would have not only military, but
political and economic cohesion in deterring
China . . . The Asian coalition, therefore, would
include only those countries which are definitely
Western-oriented and have common political,
economic, and social interests to protect, such
as Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, the Philip-
pines, Taiwan, Japan, New Zealand, and Aus-
tralia. Burma, Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam
should be made neutral buffer states . . .
However, a balance of power coalition is
not in the Asian tradition, and it will still be
difficult to organize. Moreover, Asian coun-
tries alone cannot present China with a credi-
ble deterrent. A merely regional coalition will
not be effective against China’s increasing nu-
clear potential. Asian countries need the eco-
nomic, military, and nuclear backing of the
US. A considerable input of Western military
resources will be required for at least a decade
and a US defense arrangement, similar to the
Japanese-American pact, will be needed for
much longer.
ASIA’S SELF-DEFENSE PLAN: A HEDGE
AGAINST U.S. PULLOUT, in U.S. News &
World Report, v. 66, no. 10 (10 March 1969)
80–81.
“It is just a starter, but the United
States is about to get help with its far-reach-
ing defense burden in Southeast Asia. Four
countries in the region, led by Australia, are
combining military forces to build a wall
against danger of Red China. Others may join
later. To American officials, it is a welcome
change.” A Force of 175,000; Aim of Alliance;
Feared—Another Vietnam; Worry—Role of
U.S.; Intent—“Pay Our Own Way.”
COLLECTIVE SECURITY IN ASIA;
DANGERS ABOUND, by Adm. John S.
McCain, Jr., in Vital Speeches of the Day,
v. 37, no. 24 (1 October 1971) 749–757.
Delivered at the American Legion Na-
tional Convention, Houston, Texas, August 31,
1971. In reviewing the security situation in
East Asia, Adm. McCain states: “The threat of
communist aggression in Asia affects the peace
of the area and the problem of collective secur-
ity throughout this vast region. Its significance
is underscored by the fact that in my area of
responsibility, the United States Pacific Com-
mand, live more than one-third of the people
on earth. It is also an area of riches and pov-
erty, of peace and war, of ancient civilizations,
nationalism, and competing ideas. Its political
spread surprises many. For there are actually
27 different national flags represented in this
area . . . As the Commander in Chief of all
United States Pacific Forces, I have the re-
sponsibility for the defense of our national in-
terests from Southeast Asia to Northeast Asia
and in the entire Pacific. I constantly move
about this vast area of the world to visit all
the subordinate commands. In geography, the
Pacific Command covers about two-fifths of the
earth’s entire surface, some eighty-five million
square miles of ocean, continents, and islands.
It extends from the shores of California to
India, an East-West span of about ten thou-
7
sand miles. Its North-South axis extends from
the Bering Sea to Antarctica.”
THE FUTURE ROLE OF THE UNITED
STATES IN ASIA AND THE PACIFIC, by G.
J. Pauker, Santa Monica, Calif., The Rand
Corp., April 1968.9 p. (P-3828.)
“The text of a statement to the Subcom-
mittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs of the U.S.
House of Representatives, suggesting general
directions for U.S. and Asian political affairs.
American experience in Southeast Asia has
shown that intervention should be considered
only when the major Asian balance of power is
in danger from a nation or coalition with hege-
monial ambitions. Insurgency and subversion
should be countered through ad hoc security
arrangements among Southeast Asian and
Southwest Pacific countries, including Aus-
tralia and New Zealand. The U.S. role would
be to furnish an overall nuclear deterrent
against massive conventional attacks and to
supply industrial resources so as to coordinate
the military capabilities of SEA nations. The
United States need not actually participate in
the defense plans of those nations.”
THE LAOS FACTOR IN A VIETNAM
EQUATION, by Stanley G. Langland, in Inter-
national Affairs, (October 1969) 631–647.
“Laos has historically served as a buffer
against Chinese expansionism, and its location
on the Mekong River is of strategic importance
to all of SEA. Control of Laos would enhance
the communist position in the entire region
and pose a grave threat to Thailand in particu-
lar. Ho Chi Minh hoped to extend his influence
over Laos, but the task of subverting South
Vietnam rated a higher priority and drained
off all available resources. Once all of Vietnam
is ‘unified’ under communist rule, however,
aggression will most logically be aimed at
Laos. There cannot be lasting peace in Viet-
nam without a simultaneous settlement in
Laos since communist forces presently in
Laos would continue to threaten both South
Vietnam and the non-communist areas of
Laos . . .”
MILITARY ASPECTS OF INTERNATION-
AL RELATIONS IN THE DEVELOPING
AREAS, by C. C. Menges. Santa Monica,
Calif., The Rand Corp., December 1966. 104 p.
(P–3480.)
“An examination of the relationship be.
tween armaments and international politics in
the developing countries of six regions: Near
East, South Asia, Southeast Asia, North Af.
rica, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Latin America,
Special characteristics of arms control in the
developing countries, implications of nuclear ||
proliferation, and arms control measures ar
discussed.” * .
THE MILITARY BALANCE 1970–1971–
PART V ; ASIA AND ASIA AND AUSTRA:
LASIA, in Aerospace International, v. 6, no. 6
(November–December 1970) 54–57.
Provides the following information for.
some countries of Peninsular Southeast Asia,
among others: general population and GNP in-
formation, and strength and organizational in-
formation on the armies, navies, air forces, and
paramilitary forces.
PROBLEMS OF DEFENCE OF SOUTH
AND EAST ASIA, ed. by K. K. Sinha. Bom-
bay, Manaktalos, 1969. 479 p.
A collection of articles of which the fol.
lowing are of interest to the bibliographic sur-
vey of literature on Peninsular Southeast
Asia: Role of the Republic of China in Collec-
tive Defense, by Wu Chen-Tsai; Nationalist
Chinese Military Strength—Its Use in South-
East Asia, by Joyce K. Kallgren; Various
Questions
Hideo Sekino; [South] Korea's Defense Prob.
lem and the Security of South-East Asia, by
Hong-Chul, Kihm; etc.
PROBLEMS OF STRATEGY IN THE PA-
CIFIC AND INDIAN OCEANS, by George G.
Thompson. New York, National Strategy In-
formation Center, Inc., 1970. 42 p. (Strategy
Papers No.5.) -
“The author analyzes the contemporary
configurations of geopolitics in the Pacific and
Indian ocean basins, and the abiding interests
of all the great powers in these vast regions." |
Geographical Characteristics; Past Patterns of
Power; The Oceanic Aspects of Asian Prob-
lems; Some Problems of the Present (The Pa- |
cific Ocean, China, Japan, Southeast Asia, Aus-
tralasia, The Indian Ocean); etc.
REDS HEAT UP LAOS—REAL KEY T0
ASIA2 in U.S. News & World Report, v. 64,
no. 25 (17 June 1968) 86–88. . . .
Concerning Japan's Defense, by
8
“While battles in Vietnam make head-
lines, it’s the struggle in Laos that could deter-
mine the future of Southeast Asia. Today, Laos
is an infiltration corridor for the Communist
drive to seize South Vietnam. Tomorrow it
could be the route for other conquests.”
A SYSTEMS APPROACH TO SECURITY
IN THE INDIAN OCEAN ARC, by Sheldon
W. Simon, in Orbis (Summer 1970) 401–442.
“Systems analysis suggests that most of
the states in the Indian Ocean arc hold certain
common views about the region. They see it,
following a projected Anglo-American with-
drawal, as particularly vulnerable to Chinese
and Vietnamese insurgency operations. They
are not, however, enthusiastic about a possible
collective security arrangement with the
USSR, designed to protect them against China.
The general Asian trend appears to be against
a visible land-based presence of any external
power. From their point of view, bases are an
insult to the host country’s sovereignty, in-
crease the probability of attack upon them-
selves during war, and serve as a battleground
for other powers. Moreover, they do not consi-
der the threat to their security serious enough
to require common defense arrangements.
Ideally, the Asian states seem to favor an ar-
rangement whereby they would assume pri-
mary responsibility for regional security,
though not necessarily through a formal de-
fense pact, while relying on the larger powers
for material support. Japan, India, and Indo-
nesia, the three essential states in any security
arrangement, show little interest in formal re-
gional multilateral collaboration. Since the US
defense role in Southeast Asia is not likely to
be replaced by a regional security arrangement
in the near future, the US may wish to provide
logistical support and training to Laos, Cam-
bodia, and Thailand, where North Vietnamese
troop involvement is likely to continue well
after the war in Vietnam is terminated. Such
support activities could be based in Japan, Oki-
nawa, the Republic of Korea, Taiwan, the Phil-
ippines, and Thailand. As long as the US role
is confined to support activities, it will not
generate extensive anti-Americanism. However,
should the US be called upon to provide air
cover, it might be wise to employ bases located
only in those states which are directly support-
ing the defending government . . .”
TO ESTABLISH AN ASIAN AND PA-
CIFIC COLLECTIVE SECURITY SYSTEM,
in Asian Outlook, v. 6, no. 2 (February 1971)
2–4.
“To carry out the so-called ‘Nixon doc-
trine’—the U.S. policy in Asia—the American
government has started withdrawing its troops
from Asia at an accelerated speed . . . The
first difficult problem that may take place is
the continuous deterioration of the war situa-
tion in Laos and Cambodia and the incessant
expansion of Communist subversive activities
in Thailand . . . The second difficult problem
is: The reduction of the Communist military
threat in South Vietnam is not entirely due to
the decline of the Communist strength as un-
derstood by the United States. Rather, they
pretend that their strength has shrunk in
order to lure the United States into accelerat-
ing the withdrawal of its troops . . . The third
difficult problem is: It is possible that once all
American troops are pulled out from Southeast
Asia and can no longer be sent back there, the
Red Chinese will openly help the Communists
in Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia and Thailand
launch an all-out attack in an attempt to seize
all of Southeast Asia . . . Before the United
States withdraws its troops, it should make the
necessary deployments actively so that the free
Asian countries can take over the responsibil-
ity of defending the security and peace of
Asia.”
TOWARDS REGIONAL SECURITY IN
SOUTH-EAST ASIA, by R. W. Bradford, in
Army Journal, Australia, no. 252 (May 1970)
15–25.
“The security of South-East Asia is at
once a critical and controversial problem. It is
critical because the countries of this broad
area are endangered by a wide range of threats
to their stability and security, threats which
arise out of their own internal weaknesses and
the external pressures of subversion and con-
ventional attack—and in the future there will
be the problem of confronting a nuclear armed
China. It is controversial because of the seri-
ous disagreement about the best way to defend
the area. The support of external powers in a
front line and guarantor role is at present es-
sential to the security of the indigenous coun-
tries, and, in the absence of a regional security
9
alliance, is likely to remain so for some
time . . . The proposed British withdrawal from
Malaysia and Singapore by 1971 and the likeli-
hood of an American withdrawal from the
Asian mainland in the post-Vietnam era indi-
cate that the future responsibility for the in-
ternal security of the South-East Asian region
will rest with the indigenous nations alone.
These nations will then have to solve their in-
tramural problems collectively, for to remain
as individual nations would be to encourage the
endemic threats that have played havoc with
the security of the region for the last twenty
years. It is against the background of these
threats that the ability of the South-East
Asian nations to develop a regional cohesion
must be assessed.” The author concludes that
“ASEAN is the only regional arrangement
that appears to have the potential to meet . . .
threats.” With short bibliography.
U.S. POLICY AND THE SECURITY OF
ASIA, by Fred Greene. New York, McGraw-
Bill, 1968.
“Since the domination of Asia by a sin-
gle power or political system would threaten
US security, the US must take steps to prevent
Chinese control of Asia. Containment of China
requires a continued American military pres-
ence along China’s perimeter. The indepen-
dence of Japan, India, and the small states on
the Asian mainland is threatened by China and
Chinese-supported wars of liberation. China is
following a reckless policy in support of Asian
communism which is synonymous with Chinese
control . . . Other powers do not now agree
that “China represents a clear and present dan-
ger.” Hopefully they will come to recognize this
before ‘the inevitable confrontation’.”
THE U.S. ROLE IN THE PACIFIC COM-
MUNITY, by William P. Rogers. Washington,
Department of State, 1969. 9 p. (Publication
No. 8489, East Asian and Pacific Series 182.)
Text of an address by Secretary of State
Rogers before the National Press Club at Can-
berra, Australia, on August 8, 1969.-Asian-
Pacific Security: Vietnam; Period of Change
in Asia and the Pacific Community; Commun-
ist China’s Power; Reaffirming U.S. Interests
in the Pacific; Collective Security in Asia; Our
Asian Policy.
WHAT Is SECURITY IN souTHEAST
ASIA 2 by Frank N. Trager, in Air University
Review, v. 20, no. 1 (November–December
1968) 103–112.
“Let’s think first about what security in
Southeast Asia is from the point of view of
Southeast Asians . . .
dence, none of the Southeast Asian countries
any longer had designs on their neighbors.
There had been a time when the Thai and the
Vietnamese in fact had designs upon Cam-
bodia; and in their centuries-long march down
this mainland Southeast Asian peninsula, they
had squeezed Cambodia into smaller confines,
So, too, the Burmese once had rampant dy-
nasties; and Indonesians may have had ideas
of reviving a greater Malayo-Indonesian state.
But by and large, at the end of World War II
such past “glories’ were past. To repeat, in
terms of security, after these countries had at-
tained independence, there should have been no
threat to the area—but there was.”
2. ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asia
Nations)
ASA AND ASEAN, 1961–1967: SOUTH.
EAST ASIAN REGIONALISM, by Vincent K.
Pollard, in Asian Survey, v. 10, no. 3 (March
1970) 244–255. -
“The comparatively short but turbulent
political development of the Association of
Southeast Asia (ASA) from July 1961
through August 1967 provides an excellent op-
portunity to understand how a subregional
pattern of alliance, apparently ‘promising' in
terms of publicly stated objectives, can often
fail to meet those objectives in the context of
Sino-American relations. The development of
ASA up until the launching of the Association
of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in Au-
gust 1967 also affords examples of how the pol-
icy makers within these Southeast Asian inter-
national organizations relate to the American
foreign policy objective of ‘containing’ China.
The central, but not exclusive, focus of this
study relates the notion of regionalism pro-
moted by ASA and ASEAN to the ideological
thrust of the organizations’ declared foreign
policy. These aspects, in turn, are related to
the frequency and nature of the American per
In terms of security,
there should have been no threat, there should
have been no problem. At the time of indepen-
|
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10
ception of these organizations. The paper does
not attempt to take into account developments
subsequent to August 1967. The focus will be
on an examination of the individual and collec-
tive self-perception of the ASA and ASEAN
states, as revealed through their public diplo-
macy, and related to (1) contemporary events
and (2) their varying perceptions of the two
major national bloc actors in East and South-
east Asia—China and the U.S. We will there-
by tentatively suggest the major political
meanings ASA and ASEAN assumed in the
respective foreign policies of the several ASA
states.”
ASEAN: INCHING FORWARD, by S.M.
Ali, in Far Eastern Economic Review, v. 72,
no. 14 (3 April 1971) 15–16.
“For the five members of ASEAN (As-
sociation of Southeast Asian Nations), a good
deal of satisfaction stems from the simple but
well-publicised fact that the alliance has sur-
vived. When the foreign ministers of Indone-
sia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand and the
Philippines met in Manila last month for their
incredibly short two-day fourth ministerial
conference, they were happy to acknowledge
this fact and happier still to note that some-
how, without anyone trying very hard,
ASEAN is growing slowly but steadily. One
reason ASEAN has at last recovered from its
continuing sense of crisis is that both Malaysia
and the Philippines have recognised they have
nothing to gain by kicking up another fuss
over Sabah.”
REGIONAL CO-OPERATION AND DE-
VELOPMENT POLICY : THE ASIAN EX-
AMPLE, by Eugene R. Black, in The Virginia
Quarterly Review (Winter 1968) 1–18.
The regional associations emerging in
non-communist Asia provide important lessons,
not only for future US policy in Asia, but also
for development policy in general. The coun-
tries of Asia do not form a cohesive regional
unit, but their interests do overlap and inter-
act. For example, both Japan and, to a lesser
extent, Taiwan are now able to help in eco-
nomic development programs, which serve the
common interest of security, expanding mar-
kets, and improved sources of supply. In-
creased food production in Southeast Asia, as
a case in point, could alleviate food deficits in
India and Pakistan. Australia and New Zea-
land, too, are turning to the problems of their
neighbors as their ties with the Common-
wealth loosen; both have much to contribute to
and gain from economic growth and stability
in Asia. Regional cooperation over the past few
years has generally been of three types: (1)
super-regional organizations, such as ECAFE,
the Colombo Plan, and the Asian Development
Bank which include most Asian countries as
well as some industrialized countries from out-
side the region; (2) regional and subregional
organizations such as ASPAC, ASEAN, and
ASA which are exclusively Asian; and (3)
non-structured, ad hoc associations such as the
Ministerial Conference on Southeast Asian
Development and student and technical ex-
changes. How these various activities will
develop or what their relationships to one an-
other will be cannot yet be predicted. Their suc-
cess or failure will depend upon whether or not
they represent the desires and aspirations of
the Asians themselves.”
THE SECURITY GAP—CAN ASIANS
FILL IT? by S. M. Ali, in Far Eastern Eco-
nomic Review (Hong Kong), reprinted in
Atlas, (April 1968) 31 plus.
“The outcome in Vietnam will decide
both the timing and composition of any new
defense alliance for SEA countries. When the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN) came into being last year, the mem-
bers—Malaysia, the Philippines, Indonesia,
Singapore, and Thailand—discussed the ques-
tion of regional defense, but were unsuccessful
in their efforts to extend the new alliance be-
yond the realm of economic cooperation. How-
ever, with a possible US withdrawal from the
region, it is certain that the non-communist
countries will start thinking about a new ar-
rangement to fill their defense needs. President
Marcos of the Philippines has cleverly linked
the need for new thinking on regional defense
with the problem of internal subversion. At
the ASEAN meeting, he spoke of a ‘security
gap in SEA,” and called for ‘refashioning pos-
tures and positions’ to meet any new threat . . .
In the final analysis, what is needed is ef-
fective coordination between the defense of one
country and that of another so that they pool
their resources with common defense objec-
tives, set up machinery for joint planning, and
11
thus develop maximum self-sufficiency in de-
fense on a regional basis. CENTO, the defense
alliance binding Pakistan, Iran and Turkey,
could provide a model, with the difference that
the US may not be required to associate itself
even as an observer (as in CENTO). Although
it is inevitable that any defense alliance in this
region becomes a part of the East-West cold
war, there is still the chance that an effective
‘fourth force’ can develop in Asia . . .”
SOUTHEAST ASIA AND SECURITY, by
Soedjatmoko, in Military Review, v. 50, no. 7
(July 1970) 40–48.
The author states: “It is important for
the clarity of our vision to free ourselves from
the obsession that all of us inevitably have with
the Vietnam war and the manner of its resolu-
tion. After all, the future of the Southeast
Asian region will not be determined solely by
the outcome of that war. The population of
Vietnam, or even of the whole of erstwhile In-
dochina together, constitutes less than one-
third of the total population of Southeast Asia.
On the other hand, Indonesia’s population
alone accounts for almost half of that total. In
keeping the Vietnam war in its proper propor-
tions, it is important to realize that, if Indone-
sia had become a Communist country, any mili-
tary gains in the Vietnam war would have
been nullified . . . Out of our own national ex-
perience, we in Indonesia more than ever be-
lieve that this is the crucial element in the
equation. Without such a will and determina-
tion, the infusion of external power will fail
to make much difference. The domino theory,
therefore, is to us rather a gross oversimplifi-
cation of the nature of the historical processes
that go on in the area. It obscures and distorts
rather than illuminates our understanding and
offers no guidelines for realistic policy . . . It
is important, therefore, to see the Association
of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) not as a
prelude to a military alliance, but very defi-
nitely as an attempt to speed up the economic
development and political viability of the re-
gion as a whole, as well as that of the individ-
ual member countries. ASEAN is an expres-
sion of the will and determination that exist
among its member nations to shape their own
future and to work out their problems of sta-
bility and economic development in freedom
. . . It should be noted that ASEAN–in its
present composition of Thailand, the Philip-
pines, Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia—
was, from its inception, only seen as a begin-
º
ning. I do not think that its members have re-
linquished the hope that eventually ASEAN
will include all other nations in Southeast
Asia.” This article was condensed from an ad-
dress by His Excellency, the Indonesian Ambas.
sador to the U.S., at the Center for Cultural
and Technical Interchange between East and
West in Honolula, on May 14, 1969. This analy-
sis is a digest which appeared in Survival,
Great Britain, October 1969.
3. SEATO (Southeast Asia Treaty organi.
zation) (See also Appendia; B and VII—J–1—d)
THE AFRO–ASIAN HEARTLAND . . . A
STUDY, by Rocco M. Paone, in Marine Corps
Gazette (January 1966) 20–26.
“Is the struggle between the US and
Red China in Vietnam only a limited objective
in a large struggle for ‘an exciting and much
larger stake,” the Afro-Indian Ocean Area?
Professor Paone, who teaches at the US Naval
Academy, believes the answer is affirmative,
The nation(s) that can influence the countries
in the Afro-Asian Ocean region “would have
predominant political power in the world.” The
region extending from southern Africa along
the eastern section of the continent across
southern and southeast Asia to Australia is the
main artery of communication between the
West and Far East. It has natural resources
vital to China’s developing economy. Since
China is not able financially to purchase these
goods, it must obtain them by expansion,
Aggression in Vietnam and attempts to alienate
the area from the US are initial steps in the
Chinese expansion. A nuclear deterrent to the
Chinese thrust could be found in a multi-na-
tional task or strike force. Forces recruited
from navies of the US, United Kingdom, Aus-
tralia, India, and other volunteer nations (in-
cluding old aircraft carriers, dual purpose
planes, Polaris submarines, missile surface
ships, and destroyers) could provide that de-
terrent. Since nuclear warheads would not be
stored within an area nation, there would be
no political repercussions. A community inter-
est does now exist, as shown by SEATO,
CENTO, the Colombo Plan, US assistance, and
British bases. The opportunity to provide self-
12
defense would appeal to national pride and
promote cohesion. With many participants,
there would be no implications of US political
superiority of this joint undertaking.”
ALLIANCES; LATENT WAR COMMUNI-
TIES IN THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD,
ed. by Francis A. Beer. New York, Holt, Rine-
hart and Winston, Inc., 1970. 384 p.
Of particular interest to the DA PAM
on Peninsular Southeast Asia is the discussion
of SEATO by George Modelski, providing a
historical background as well as the structure,
and present and future of SEATO. With: se-
lected bibliography, brief chronologies, treaty
abstracts, organization charts, and military
forces.
ASIAN SCENE, in SEATO Record, v. 10,
no. 5 (October 1971) 5–11.
“In his annual public report for
1970–71—issued on SEATO Day (September
8)—SEATO Secretary-General Jesus Vargas
comments on ‘The Asian Scene’ and lists
SEATO activities during the past year. His re-
view of developments in Asia [includes also de-
velopments in Laos, Cambodia, Thailand, and
Burma, as well as the other SEATO
countries].”
COLLECTIVE DEFENSE TREATIES
WITH MAPS, TEXTS OF TREATIES, A
CHRONOLOGY, STATUS OF FORCES
AGREEMENTS, AND COMPARATIVE
CHART. Washington, Government Printing
Office, 21 April 1969. 514 p. (91st Congress 1st
Session, Committee Print.)
Provides background information on
commitments of the U.S. under collective se-
curity treaties for the use of its military forces
abroad for mutual defense. Among many oth-
ers includes text and other information on the
following: Southeast Asia Collective Defense
Treaty (SEATO); etc.
COLLECTIVE SECURITY IN ASIA—
‘SEATO AND INDISPENSABLE INSTRU-
MENT OF ALLIED MUTUAL DEFENCE IN
SOUTH-EAST ASIA,’ in SEATO Record, v. 9,
no. 4 (August 1970) 28–29.
“The threat of Communist aggression in
Asia affected the peace of the area and the
problem of collective security throughout the
region, Admiral John S. McCain, Jr., USN, C-
in-C Pacific, told a SEATO Orientation Course
on June 15. In the Pacific, the Communists
were using the whole gamut of threats, both
active and potential, that they had at their dis-
posal. There was also the continuing global
threat which the free World faced from the
ambitions, goals, and activities of Communist
countries. ‘We must recognize it if there is to
be peace. Only a firm, positive posture on our
part, backed by adequate military capabilities
—the deterrent power vital to our national in-
terests—can assure.the security of this region,
and with it, that of the Free World,” said Ad-
miral McCain . . . Admiral McCain said that
there was clear evidence of Peking's aggressive
designs in the mounting Chinese Communist-
directed and supported insurgency in Northern
Burma. In North and North-East Thailand in-
surgency was inspired and directed by Peking
and Hanoi. The Royal Thai Government was
moving to meet the threat. “The outcome is not
yet clear, but there is solid ground for confi-
dence that unless the external basis of the in-
surgency is magnified, the Thai authorities
will, with continued U.S. material and ad-
visory assistance, progressively bring the in-
surgency under control,” said the speaker.
Regarding the future of Cambodia and Laos,
President Nixon had explained that the U.S.
was exploring ‘methods through which the neu-
trality of countries like Cambodia and Laos,
who cannot possibly defend themselves,” would
be “guaranteed without having the intervention
of foreign forces’.”
IS SEATO OBSOLETE? by Comdr. Roger
J. Miller, in United States Naval Institute Pro-
ceedings, v. 94, no. 11 (November 1968) 56–63.
“Since its creation on 8 September 1954,
the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization has
been criticized continuously and severely from
many quarters . . . Criticisms have intensified
with SEATO's apparent inability to respond
effectively to conditions presented by the Viet-
nam conflict. It is clear that SEATO’s value as
a military alliance in the current Southeast
Asian strategic environment should be evalu-
ated.” Strategic Defects; Treaty Limitation;
Organizational Limitations; Reduction of the
Effective Treaty Area; Military Accomplish-
ments; Options; and A Strengthened Alliance.
13
REGIONAL SECURITY COOPERATION
IN ASIA AND THE PACIFIC, by Sung Hon
Lee, in Asian Outlook, v. 5, no. 9 (September
1970) 17–20 plus.
Under the deteriorating cold war situa-
tion, the United States was obliged to
adopt the containment policy in order to check
the spread of Communism. Thus, the U.S. set
up military bases around the Communist
sphere and a series of collective defense sys-
tems such as NATO, ANZUS and SEATO
came into being. Furthermore, the U.S. con-
clude bilateral pacts with a great number of
nations in an effort to block the advance of
Communism from Europe to Asia all along. In
the deployment of this anti-Communist policy
of the U.S., military considerations surpassed
political considerations. Particularly in the
Asian scene, the communization of mainland
China and the outbreak of Korean War
marked a decisive moment in causing the U.S.
to shift its Asian policy.” Background;
ASPAC and Other Developments; Nixon Doc-
trine and Asian Response; Prospects of Re-
gional Security Cooperation; etc.
REVIEW OF THE VIETNAM CONFLICT
AND ITS IMPACT ON U.S. MILITARY
COMMITMENTS ABROAD. REPORT OF
THE SPECIAL SUBCOMMITTEE ON NA-
TIONAL DEFENSE POSTURE, OF THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
TUNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRE-
SENTATIVES, NINETIETH CONGRESS,
SECOND SESSION, UNDER AUTHORITY
OF H.RES.124, AUGUST 24, 1968. Washing-
ton, Government Printing Office, 1968. 84 p.
(Committee Print.)
Of special interest are the following
portions of the report dealing with: Southeast
Asia Collective Defense Treaty; Cambodia,
Laos, and Thailand.
SEATO: A CRITIQUE, by Ronald C. Nairn,
in Pacific Affairs, v. 41, no. 1 (Spring 1968)
5–18.
“Perhaps the least conspicuous actor in
the Southeast Asia crisis has been the South-
east Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO). Yet,
the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty,
including its Protocol, extending over South
Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, is relevant to
actual events as they have unfolded since the
treaty was signed in Manila in September
1954. This article argues that SEATO is a fail.
ure, that it has failed to match action with the
treaty concept and intentions (of providing for
security in Southeast Asia through a regional
alliance). The article explores the more impor-
tant aspects of the external and internal dy-
namics of SEATO and seeks to support its as-
sertion that the Treaty was conceptually, and
in actuality, irrelevant to Southeast Asian situ-
ations. This article is oriented toward military
and defense issues which were the raison
d’etre for SEATO.”
SEATO: AN AILING ALLIANCE, by Paul
E. Eckel, in World Affairs, v. 134, no. 2 (Fall
1971) 97–114.
“When President Lyndon B. Johnson
sent ground combat forces into South Vietnam
in 1965, he gave as one of his main reasons the
United States’ “obligation under the Southeast
Asia Collective Defense Treaty” (miscalled
SEATO). Although SEATO was a convenient
peg on which to hang this decision, the treaty
never obligated the United States to take such
action. In fact, the words “commitment,” “obli-
gation,’ or ‘pledge’ are noticeably absent in the
document. SEATO members knew full well
that nothing in the alliance put them into a
warlike posture as was the case in the NAT0.
pact which asserted that an ‘attack on one is!
an attack on all.” The . . . fact is, therefore,
that the United States came to the aid of South
Vietnam not because it had to, but because it
wanted to and did so with the fullest support of
Congress. The other countries in SEATO could
have acted in the same way, thereby demon-
strating their unity of purpose as the treaty
proposes, but in the main they were content to
let the Americans do it. To fill in some of the
gaps in this controversial matter we shall take
a long hard look at the collection of nations
which form SEATO and how that organization
dealt with the problems which beset its three
protocol states: Laos, Cambodia, and South
Vietnam. We may come to see why the member
nations interpreted their responsibilities as
they did and why the United States is fighting
such a lonely war in Indochina. Hopefully,
such an examination will shed some light into
the . . . future as we grope our way to a work
able formula for accommodation.” SEATO's
14
Cold War Legacy; The Monroe Doctrine For-
mula; Laos—The Buffeted Buffer; Cambodia
—A Pandora's Box; Vietnam—“So Let the
Americans do it”; SEATO—An Anachronism;
Pax Asiana—A Timorous Beginning.
SEATO REPORT, 1968–1969, by Lt. Gen.
Jesus M. Vargas. Bangkok, Thailand, South-
east Asia Treaty Organization, 1969. 40 p.
Contents: The Asian Scene (General
Review, South Vietnam, Laos, Thailand,
Burma, Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia,
Singapore, and Cambodia); Role of Collective
Security; Defence Against Subversion; Eco-
nomic Situation and Mutual Assistance (Pakis-
tan, Philippines, Thailand, and Mutual Assist-
ance); SEATO Sponsored Projects (Asian
Institute of Technology, Pakistan-SEATO
Cholera Research Laboratory, Military Techni-
cal Training School, Motor Mechanics Training
Centre, Vehicle Rebuild Workshop, Skilled La-
bour Project, Meteorological Telecommunica-
tions Project, Agricultural Research Project,
Community Development Activities, Hill Tribes
Research); SEATO Cultural Programme.
SEATO’S CAPABILITIES FOR COUN-
TERSUBVERSION, by Maj. Joel J. Snyder, in
Air University Review, v. 21, no. 6 (September—
October 1970) 51–60.
“The fifteenth anniversary of the
Southeast Asia Treaty Organization in Septem-
ber 1969 was a crucial one. Critics of the alli-
ance have continued to assail its usefulness
. . . Despite SEATO’s well-known weaknesses
and asserted diminishing potential as a defen-
sive alliance, nearly all of the eight member
nations—Australia, Thailand, New Zealand,
Pakistan, Philippines, France, United King-
dom, United States—continue to solidly en-
dorse the organization. At the May 1969 Coun-
cil of Ministers meeting in Bangkok and again
in the fifteenth anniversary ceremonies, mem-
ber nations’ representatives spoke strongly in
terms of SEATO’s continuing role in collective
security and economic and cultural endeavors.
The question that remains about SEATO is
simply why it continues to survive despite its
limitations.”
THE SECURITY OF SOUTHERN ASIA,
by D. E. Kennedy. New York, Praeger, 1965.
308 p.
“The present Asian system of defense
alliances stemmed from the bilateral treaty of
1951 between the US and the Philippines. Its
evolution, in the view of the author, was essen-
tially complete with the institution of SEATO
three years later. But Kennedy maintains that
the integrity of the nation-state as a unit con-
stitutes the most effective available resistance
to Communist subversion in Southern Asia. He
recommends that, in addition to military capa-
bilities against subversion and local aggression,
some form of credible deterrence be estab-
lished with the US and the UK as guarantors
and not as immediate defenders. Without mili-
tary resources—a major handicap for an Asian
system of deterrence—India and Japan are in-
capable of taking the place of the US in any
military confrontation with China. Their inter-
ests would persist in nonalliance or in bilateral
arrangements, as demonstrated by SEATO’s
failure to galvanize regional, multilateral par-
ticipation in Asia defense. Multilateral or even
bilateral arrangements in that area are becom-
ing obsolete. Only the general threat of nuclear
retaliation through a blanket Great Power
guarantee can do away with the need for mili-
tary commitments by the individual countries
and relieve them of what they fear are danger-
ous anti-Chinese militaristic policies. Kennedy
concludes that the defense of Southern Asia as
a region is outmoded.” .
THE SOUTHEAST ASIA COLLECTIVE
DEFENSE TREATY IN UNITED STATES
FOREIGN POLICY STRATEGY, by Lorne S.
Black. Pittsburgh, University of Pittsburgh,
1964. 131 p. (Unpublished Masters Degree
Thesis in Public and International Affairs.)
Southeast Asia 1945–1954—The Forces
Requiring Consideration (India and Pakistan,
Burma, Malaya and Malaysia, Indonesia, Aus-
tralia and New Zealand, The Republic of the
Philippines, Thailand, Indo-China); The
United States Seeks to Define Its Security In-
terest in Southeast Asia; The United States
View of Motives of Southeast Asian Nations in
Relation to SEATO; Evaluation of the Sources
of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense
Treaty. With bibliography.
SOUTHEAST ASIA IN UNITED STATES
POLICY, by Russell H. Fifield. New York,
15

Praeger, 1963. 488 p. (Published for the Coun-
cil on Foreign Relations.)
“This book seeks to set forth current
conditions and problems and develop a ration-
ale for American policy in Southeast Asia in
the years ahead, suggesting guidelines for
making it applicable through different instru-
mentalities. Since specific policy goals will
vary with time, the changing circumstances,
and the countries involved, it examines the
constants and variables, the continuities and
the possible developments.” The contents: di-
mensions of the challenge; evolutions of US
policy; Communist China in Southeast Asia;
the American military posture; SEATO; indi-
rect aggression: challenge and response; South-
east Asia diplomacy and US involvement; the
economic dynamics of stability; the United
States and Southeast Asian leadership; cohe-
sion of the West: difficulties and adjustments;
counterweight potential of India and Japan;
and US policy for the future. Concludes: “If
the recent past is a measure of the future, the
next ten years will bring marked changes in
the American outlook on Asia. The United
States has generally focused its foreign policy
on Europe, but the coming developments in the
Far East may well contribute to a gradual
shift in orientation, thus fulfilling the prophe-
cies of a number of prominent Americans long
since dead. In the pattern that is emerging in
world politics the United States will continue
to need Asian friends and many states in the
Far East will want the support of Washington.
The United States must be willing and able to
assist the Southeast Asians in measuring up to
the manifold challengés of Communist China.
With the possible help of India and Japan as
Asian counterweights and with the support of
Australia, New Zealand, and Great Britain and
Western associates, the United States should
eventually achieve a real measure of success in
trying to create conditions where the countries
of Southeast Asia, through their individual
and collective efforts, will be able to develop in-
to strong, stable and responsible members of
the world community.”
C. The Threat of Communism (See also
by Country and Appendix C)
THE ASSAULT ON THE WEST, by Ian
Greig. Surrey, England, 1968. 357 p.
“Mr. Greig has made a special study of
Communist political warfare techniques. His
aim in this work is to present a general survey
of the strategy and tactics employed by Inters
national Communism in its bid for world dom;
nation during the last 20 years. In THE AS:
SAULT ON THE WEST he gives many new
facts about the global nature of Communis;
bloc propaganda activities [including that of
Communist China], foreign broadcasts, news
agencies, international front organisations, es:
pionage, subversion, Communist Parties and
their methods and finally Communist terrorism
and guerilla warfare. The information pre:
sented is thoroughly documented and has been
drawn from Communist policy statements, of.
ficial reports of Western Governments and the
statements of defectors who actually took part
in the events described. The author believe
that despite the occurrence of the Sino-Soviet
split and other changes which have taken place
in the Communist world in recent years, the
threat posed by the Communist assault on the
West is increasing in scope and intensity
rather than decreasing. Rejecting the view
that the Cold War is over or as one national
newspaper put it that “the world conspiracy of
Communism is dying its natural death,’ the au.
thor points out that the main thrust of the
Communist offensive is now being centered
upon attempts to gain control or influence over
the developing countries of Asia, Africa and
South America in which areas of the world the
West’s vital sources of raw materials lie . , ,
The achievements of China, though on a lesser
scale, are still impressive: she has reduced
Tibet to colonial status; been instrumental in
the expulsion of France from the East and be.
come the dominant power of South-East Asia,
and has engaged the West’s leading champion
in what amounts to a bitter war by proxy. But
she has also emerged as a revolutionary world
power, reaching out tentacles of subversion
and intrigue to every continent.” ' ' '
THE BATTLE CRY IS TO CREATE TWO,
THREE . . . MANY VIET NAMS, by Major
Ernesto “Che” Guevara, in Tricontinental
Magazine (June 1967). º
* “Create two, three, many Viet Nams'
is the appeal to Asians, Africans, and Latin
Americans, in an article purportedly written
by Cuba's Major Ernesto “Che' Guevara, and
16
scheduled for publication in the first (June
1967) issue of Tricontinental Magazine. The
magazine is an organ of the Afro-Asian-Latin
American Peoples’ Solidarity Organization
(AALAPSO). In Vietnam, “the most powerful
imperialist power is feeling the drain caused
by a poor and backward nation.” The author
calls on the “exploited of the world’ not to fear
war, but to “hit hard and incessantly at every
point of confrontation.” By creating more Viet-
nams, the downtrodden of three continents can
topple American power. The history of crises
on three continents during the past 21 years
serves as background for posing the question
as to “possibilities for the short-term or med-
ium-term liberation of peoples.” Latin America
is seen as the most fertile ground for forcing
another Vietnam. In Africa, political and so-
cial evolution does not indicate a continental
revolutionary situation. Only when the black
masses in South Africa or Rhodesia begin their
real revolutionary struggle, will a new era
have started in Africa. In Asia, however, the
situation is explosive. Points of friction are not
just Vietnam and Laos, but in Cambodia, Thai-
land, Malaysia, and of course Indonesia, where
we cannot believe the last word has been
Said'.”
BUDDHISM OR COMMUNISM : WHICH
HOLDS THE FUTURE OF ASIA 2 by Ernst
Benz, New York, Doubleday & Co., 1965. 234 p.
Translated from German. “. . . Believes
Buddhism still exerts a strong spiritual force,
influencing the lives of many Asians. Modern
Buddhism displays a distinct sense of political
mission and sees its special task as that of
achieving the ‘Buddhist conception of peace.”
Buddha is regarded by many of his modern
disciples as a great social reformer as well as a
great religious teacher. Modern Buddhism is
indeed a philosophy of love, peace and the mid-
dle way. But the countries, in which it is
rooted are being buffeted by storms of conflict
and change that make the middle way a peril-
ous road. Buddhist social ethics and the
Buddhist program of socialism do not exclude
the possibility of a ‘pact with Communism,”
especially if the blueprint of a social Utopia is
interpreted as the ultimate state of Nirvana—
the supreme spiritual reward.”
THE CHALLENGE OF COMMUNIST
CHINA, by William P. Bundy, in Air Force
and Space Digest, v. 49, no. 4 (April 1966)
73–77 plus.
“The present leadership of Red China is
dedicated to the promotion of communism in
the emerging world through violent revolution.
They see misnamed “wars of national libera-
tion’ as the path to communization of the
world. They have delineated their violent credo
publicly. It is vital that the United States, as
the leader of the free and non-Communist
world, be aware of and resist this drive. We
must seek to curtail Peiping's dangerous ambi-
tion while at the same time building up the
free nations of Asia and bordering areas, all
the while working to open the possibility of in-
creased contacts in the hope that a new genera-
tion of Chinese leadership will see the folly of
drives for world conquest and find ways for
that ancient land to pursue a peaceful course
as a member of the community of nations.”
COMMUNISM IN ASIA, by Donald S. Zago-
ria, in Commentary (February 1965).
“The growing Communist coalition in
Asia today is oriented toward Peking. Its pri-
mary objective is to eliminate the American
presence from Asia in order to expand Com-
munist power and influence. It is essential to
the success of US policy in Asia that Ameri-
cans understand the appeal Communism has to
the peoples of the newly developing nations
there. One key factor which has influenced the
widespread acceptance of Communism is the
imposition of ‘nations’ upon culturally dispa-
rate peoples with age-old feuds. The Commu-
nists have proven themselves masters at
manipulating tribal grievances. In effect, Com-
munism in the underdeveloped world has be-
come an outlet for deep-rooted cultural
tensions. Another factor is the profound dis-
ruption of traditional societies resulting from
the impact of Western colonialism. Asian in-
tellectuals emerged from the experience with a
divided attitude toward their former colonial
masters. They admired the accomplishments of
the West, and at the same time hated the West
for imposing on them national humiliation. In
Communism, they found a blueprint for the
rapid industrialization of their countires in an
anti-Western setting. Their wounded national-
ism explains, in part, why economic aid is un-
likely to offset their anti-Westernism. It is not
17
poverty alone which produces the protest; it is
the intangible desire for equality with the
West . . .”
THE COMMUNIST REVOLUTION IN
ASIA: TACTICS, GOALS AND ACHIEVE-
MENTS, ed. by Robert A. Scalapino. New Jer-
sey, Prentice Hall, 1965. 405 p.
“This survey of the major Asian Com-
munist Parties shows how Marxism has been
adapted to the individual countries. Commu-
nism has been molded by the particular eco-
nomic, political and social background of the
country concerned, by the personalities of the
ruling elite and by the rival Soviet Chinese ef-
forts to win supporters. The fact that there are
more Communist party members and more peo-
ple ruled by Communists in Asia than on any
other continent accounts for the flexibility of
Marxism. For example, in India, Ceylon,
Burma and Japan, the Communists are deeply
split, divided by fissions that antedate the
public airing of the Sino-Soviet dispute. In In-
donesia, the Communist Party, despite Marx-
ism’s historical antipathy to religion, has
threatened to expel any member conducting .
anti-religious propaganda. The implicit lesson
of this book is that we must learn to differenti-
ate among the various forms of Communism.
Behind Marxism in Asia lies the pride of deep
nationalism and the attachment to ancient cul-
ture. When this lesson is learned, as the re-
viewer points out, we will have achieved the
same level of sophistication which we have ac-
quired in Europe in determining the differ-
ences as well as the similarities among Com-
munists.”
THE NINTH CCP CONGRESS AND THE
WORLD COMMUNIST CONFERENCE:
THEIR MEANING FOR ASIA, by Frank N.
Trager and Robert F. Bordonaro, in Orbis,
v. 13, no. 3 (Fall 1969) 736–762.
“In April and June 1969, the rival cen-
ters for world communist leadership convened
two long-postponed party conferences. The one
in Peking was held first. Contrary to previous
practice, the Communist Party of China
(CCP) did not invite other communist parties
and friendly groups. The meeting in Moscow,
initiated by the Communist Party of the Soviet
Union (CPSU), sought to maximize the attend-
ance of communist parties and fraternal ele-
ments. Each gathering heard speeches by their
respective leaders and adopted resolutions oi
policy, i.e., a combination of communist ideok
ogy (theory) and strategy (practice). The con:
tent of these documents with reference to their
implications for the noncommunist states of
Asia is the subject of this article.” tº
A SENSE OF ASIA, by Sol Sanders. New
York, Scribner's, 1969. 339 p. .
“Since WW II, 24 states have been
created in Asia. Their borders are often artifi.
cial, and conflicts within each state are accen:
tuated by local nationalism, isolation of vil.
lages, and demands of urban elites for political
progress. The elites have adopted European
standards and are alienated from the people.
They have also been demoralized by the prob.
lems of increasing population, food production,
and education. The population of Asia doubles
every 28 years and is largely unemployed
Family planning programs have had limited
success because of technical and social obsta.
cles . . . During the last 20 years, the gap be.
tween underdeveloped Asian nations and those
of the industrialized world has increased
Many Asians have assumed that Russia in 1914
was an underdeveloped country like their own
and have followed the Russian model of cen:
tralized economic planning with emphasis on:
heavy industry, leaving agriculture to take
care of itself until later. Aid-giving nations en-
couraged this trend by selling machinery and
industrial plants in Asia. But bureaucracies
could not manage the increased work, and tra.
ditional methods of agriculture failed. The
Asian nations have now been forced to pay
more attention to agriculture. However, re.
search is slow and capital is still diverted to in:
dustrial projects. Many Asian elites still look
to communism as a model for modernization,
Communists also appeal to local antagonism
against the regime, and the sizeable Overseas
Chinese community is attracted to Communist
China. Young people find Chinese communism
more direct and relevant than the Soviet ver,
sion, but the Cultural Revolution has changed
many of their views about China. The stability
of its regime is in doubt, and it clearly has not
solved the problems of transferring power
without violence. Furthermore, the Chinese,
like other Asians, have been unable to solve
the problems of population increase, food pro-
18
&
duction, and education. Communism thus re-
mains a foreign doctrine which has not proved
its relevance to Asian problems. The Ameri-
cans rather than the Chinese are the real revo-
lutionaries in Asia. They are not only com-
pletely outside the complex Asian societies but
are also the only group willing to adopt new
forms. The mere presence of Americans has an
enormous impact. Through its official pro-
grams, the US offers hope for population con-
trol through simple, inexpensive contracep-
tives, increased food production through new
types of grain, and a modest industry. The US
will not have an effective policy in Asia unless
it accepts the desperate nature of the situation,
adopts a long-term approach, recognizes that
its effort can at best be marginal, avoids a
‘mechanistic' approach, and encourages Asian
nations to take concerted action on their prob-
lems. . .”
WHICH WILL BE THE NEXT VIET-
NAM? by Carl T. Rowan, in Reader's Digest,
(March 1969) 96–100. -
“The Asian communists have concluded
that the US is a ‘paper tiger’ which cannot
stem the tide of Maoist revolt in Asia. As pro-
Western nations and neutrals anxiously watch
the negotiations in Paris, the Asian commu-
nists are busy setting up their priorities for
post-Vietnam insurgencies. In 1964, Peking de-
clared that Thailand would be the next target
for Chinese-inspired “liberation.” Thailand
reacted by contributing 6000 combat troops to
the war in Vietnam, hoping that communist
operations in Vietnam and Laos could be re-
duced and a wider war in Thailand could be
prevented. At home the Thai government
launched a vigorous military campaign against
the communist insurgents and accelerated
rural development programs to deprive the
rebels of their local support. Last year the
Thais were confident that they could defeat the
insurgents without the aid of US combat
troops. But recently, guerrilla activities in
Thailand have increased. The government esti-
mates that 2370 insurgents operate in the
country-side; in the north, they have formed
units large enough to ambush regular Thai
military forces. As US public support for Viet-
nam decreases and the Paris talks lag, Thai-
land becomes more anxious about its future
. . . Peking does not limit its attacks to pro-
Western governments, however; both the neu-
tral governments of Laos and Cambodia have
been the targets of Chinese-supported subver-
sion. In 1967, attacks by communist guerrillas
and North Vietnamese regulars in Laos became
so widespread that the US was on the verge of
introducing combat troops into Laos. However,
the Laotian Army, supported by US bombing
raids, was able to turn back the communists.
Even Prince Sihanouk of Cambodia, cited by
some as an authority for the ‘civil war’ theory
of the Vietnam conflict, complains of Chinese-
directed subversion in Cambodia. Thus, a com-
munist take-over in SEA has become a likeli-
hood for the post-Vietnam era. To some
Americans, this would be a fair price for peace
in Vietnam; to millions of Asians it would be
the “bitterest and most devastating defeat in
9 y 9
American history’.
D. The Dimensions of Political Develop-
ment
ASIAN NATIONALISM IN THE TWEN-
TIETH CENTURY, by J. Kennedy. New
York, St. Martin’s Press, 1968. 244 p.
“This book attempts within a concise
framework to survey, analyse and illustrate
the growth and nature of twentieth-century
nationalism in Asia [including Southeast
Asia].” Part II of this book on source readings
contains one part also on Southeast Asia.
THE CHALLENGE OF WORLD POLITICS
IN SOUTH AND SOUTHEAST ASIA, by
Werner Levi. Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Pren-
tice-Hall, Inc., 1968. 186 p.
The Elitist Nature of Foreign Policies;
The Problem of Nationalism; Regionalism;
Nonalignment—The Expectation and the Re-
sult; The United Nations; Tensions and Con-
flicts; The Major Nations; etc. Discussed,
among many nations of the region are Burma,
Cambodia, Laos, and Thailand.
THE DIMENSIONS OF CONFLICT IN
SOUTHEAST ASIA, by Bernard K. Gordon.
Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice-Hall, 1966.
201 p.
“This discussion of internal conflicts
and regional cooperation in Southeast Asia is
the first serious attempt to examine the politics
of the area entirely apart from its relationship
19
to global politics. Three disputes are covered:
the Philippine claim to North Borneo; the
boundary disputes between Cambodia and its
neighbors; and the Indonesian-Malaysian
quarrel . . .”
REGION OF REVOLT; FOCUS ON
SOUTHEAST ASIA, by Milton Osborne. New
York, Pergamon Press, 1970. 166 p.
“Essential . . . for everyone concerned
with understanding the current situation, not
only in Indochina, but the whole of the South-
east Asian region. Southeast Asia has a long
history of unrest and disorder, and Professor
Osborne aims to present recent events in the
area in the context of this history. Throughout
the book he puts forward the argument that
much of the commentary on Southeast Asian
affairs which has appeared over the last few
years has been written on the basis of funda-
mental misunderstanding of the realities of the
Southeast Asian region. The book is a correc-
tive to those surveys which reflect an obsessive
fear of Communism and an inability to per-
ceive the effect of continuing social, political
and economic inequalities throughout the coun-
tries of this part of the world. Particular at-
tention is given to events in Malaya, the Phil-
ippines, Viet-Nam and Cambodia since the
Second World War, set in the context of the his-
torical phenomenon of revolt. The treatment of
recent developments in Cambodia . . . is one of
the first discussions of any length of events
leading up to the deposition of Prince Sihan-
Ouk in March 1970.”
A SHORT INTRODUCTION TO THE
HISTORY AND POLITICS OF SOUTHEAST
ASIA, by Richard Allen. New York, Oxford
TJniversity Press, 1970. 306 p.
“This brief survey of Southeast Asian
political history concentrates on the colonial pe-
riod and on the Indochina conflict since 1946.”
SOUTHEAST ASIA: TODAY AND TO-
MORROW: PROBLEMS OF POLITICAL DE-
VELOPMENT, by Richard Butwell. 2nd rev.
ed. London, Pall Mall, 1969. 245 p.
“Following a brief survey of the history
of the area before 1945, the author focuses on
the major political changes in each country in
the 1950’s and 1960’s. In his analysis he tries
to chart trends and forces within the area
which will shape the history of the several
countries in the past decade.” With bibliogra.
phy. -
souTHEAST ASIA’s POLITICAL SYS
TEM by Lucian W. Pye. Englewood Cliff,
N.J., Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1967. 98 p.
“This series is dedicated to the proposil
tion that it is no longer valid or profitable tº
study comparative politics within an essen.
tially North American and European-centered
frame of reference . . . Politically speaking
the history of the twentieth century is in large
part the history of the re-emergence of non:
European areas and states to positions of inde.
pendence and prominence on the world scene
. . . Southeast Asia is a region of great diver.
sity and contrast. Each of the nine leading
countries of the region—Indonesia, the Philip.
pines, Burma, Malaysia, Thailand, Vietnam,
Cambodia, Laos, and Singapore—represents a
distinct and separate tradition. And within
each country further diversities abound, for
none has an homogeneous population. No other
region of the world offers such a rich array of
major religions. Malaysia and Indonesia are Is.
lamic countries; the Philippines is the only
Christian country in Asia; and the remainder
of mainland Southeast Asia consists of Bud.
dhistic societies that adhere to different be.
liefs. Behind these religious differences are ad.
ditional disparities in customs and historical
experience. The 180 million Southeast Asians
employ more than 150 different languages and
dialects, most of which are mutually unintelli.
gible.” With bibliography.
TIME OUT OF HAND: REVOLUTION
AND REACTION IN SOUTHEAST ASIA, by
Robert Shaplen. London, Andre Deutsch, 1969.
429 p.
“This political history of Southeast
Asia discusses events in Indonesia, Malaysia,
the Philippines, Thailand, Cambodia, Laos, and
Vietnam. Much of the book has previously ap.
peared in The New Yorker . . . This book con-
tains analyses of these countries . . . Scenes of
fighting in the north of Laos; a . . . character
sketch of . . . Prince Sihanouk of Cambodia
[among many other items] . . .” -
20
E. Chinese Minority in Peninsular
Southeast Asia (See also by
Country)
THE FUTURE OF THE OVERSEAS
CHINESE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA, by Lea E.
Williams, New York, McGraw-Hill Book Co.,
1966. 143 p. (Published for the Council on For-
eign Relations.)
“Surveys the present situation of the
important Chinese populations of Southeast
Asia and arrives at conclusions which should
be of significance for U.S. policy.” Contents:
The Scene and the Problem; Overseas Chinese
Diversity, Assets, and Handicaps; Historical
Foundations; The Maneuvers of the Commu-
nists and the Nationalists; Causes and Signs of
Change; American Policy and the Overseas
Chinese. With: A Selected Bibliography of
Works in English.
ONCE AGAIN THE FEAR, by Robert
Norton, in Far Eastern Economic Review, v.
72, no. 2 (15 May 1971) 57–58.
“A student group in Phnom Penh has
warned that unless Chinese characters are
banned from public view, it will take matters
into its own hands. For the Chinese in Cam-
bodia, times may be changing . . . The Chinese
population’s problem in Cambodia is classically
Southeast Asian—holding economic power
under native political control. And like other
nations in the region, the problem is not re-
cent. Chinese have been migrating the area for
more than a century, and are mostly Tiechieu,
Cantonese or Hokkienese; they were helped by
the French policy of double colonisation—in-
troducing Chinese and Vietnamese immigrants
into the economically sluggish areas of Indo-
china to revitalise and exploit local labour and
assets . . . The Cambodian feeling toward the
local Chinese is ambiguous. On one hand the
Khmer admires the economic expertise, aggres-
siveness and prosperity of the local Chinese
. . . On the other hand, situations in which the
Khmer may feel exploited in his own country
by a foreigner, can be explosive. This is a
rather common occurence through the Chinese
proclivity for such professions as banking,
moneylending and speculation, and as entre-
preneurs, contractors, retail merchants, whole-
sale dealers and transporters.”
OVERSEAS CHINESE AFFAIRS AND
THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION, by Stephen
Fitzgerald, in The China. Quarterly, no. 40
(October–December 1969) 103–126.
“The Cultural Revolution in the field of
Overseas Chinese affairs has induced a state of
paralysis in the bureaucracy, has accelerated
the tendency to extinction of domestic Overseas
Chinese status, and reduced policy towards the
Chinese abroad to long periods of silence, si-
lence punctuated until late 1968 by protests
against incidents involving the Chinese in
South-east Asia. The Cultural Revolution also
has provided an insight into the Overseas
Chinese policies of the People's Republic of
China since 1949. Part I of this paper deals
with the latter of these two aspects, while Part
II is concerned with the impact of the Cultural
Revolution on Overseas Chinese policies and
institutions.”
THE OVERSEAS CHINESE IN SOUTH-
EAST ASIA, by Niu Sien-chong, in NATO’s
Fifteen Nations, v. 16, no. 4 (August–Sep-
tember 1971) 52–56.
“The Overseas Chinese (hua-chiao) in
South-east Asia have a long historical back-
ground. Long before the discovery of America
there were Chinese settlements in the Nan-
yang—the Chinese name for South-east Asia,
means ‘South Ocean.” In fact, no one really
knows how long those Chinese communities ex-
isted in the area . . . The far from even distri-
bution of the Overseas Chinese throughout
South-east Asia is not surprising, because the
migration was not planned but developed in
response to opportunities. Today the main
areas of concentration are Malaysia, Singa-
pore, Thailand, and Indonesia. These people
came from South-east China, mainly from the
Kwantung, Fukien, Kwangsi, and Kiangsi
Provinces.” Number and Influence; Culture
and Organization; Red China’s Strategy; Na-
tionalists’ Contribution; Singapore’s Experi-
ment; Future and Hope.
THE WEALTH AND POWER OF THE
OVERSEAS CHINESE, by Louis Kraar, in
Fortune, v. 83, no. 3 (March 1971) 78–81.
“Millions of expatriate Chinese knit a
strong web of commerce through South-east
Asia, from Burma to the Philippines. They
21
dominate the economic life of villages, cities,
and even nations in a part of the world where
the native populations, because of cultural atti-
tudes and historic colonial policies, often lack
the experience and lust for profit that the
Chinese bring to business. In many of the
countries where they operate, the Chinese must
deal with political instability and corruption,
and racial hostility that sometimes erupts into
violence. Some hostility also springs from the
envy of less successful local residents because
the Chinese, by their very enterprise, often
preempt the available business opportunities.
But as a group they survive and prosper, and
many international banks and corporations
find the overseas Chinese to be invaluable as
managers and allies. Many of the most promi-
nent members of this international expatriate
community, some of whom are pictured in the
accompanying portfolio, are men who have
been driven from one country to another by
war or xenophobia, and who have had to start
all over again in a new setting. This ability to
build a new fortune in still another strange
land is a telling testimonial to their extraordi-
nary determination, and to their acumen.”
F. Peninsular Southeast Asia in the Glo-
bal Perspective
1. Boundaries and Frontiers (See also by
Country)
ASIAN FRONTIERS: STUDIES IN A
CONTINUING PROBLEM, by Alastair Lamb.
New York, Frederick A. Praeger, 1968, 246 p.
“An . . . account of boundary disputes,
many of which have their origins in or before
the period of colonial domination. The regions
covered include Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan,
India, Nepal, Bhutan, Burma, Thailand, Laos,
Cambodia, North and South Vietnam, China,
Mongolia, and the Asian republics of the
USSR. Explosive subjects, such as Kashmir,
the Sino-Indian crisis and the Sino-Soviet bor-
der, are treated in detail. Thirty maps assist
the reader in following the textual material.”
BOUNDARY CONCEPTS AND PRAC-
TICES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA, by Robert L.
Solomon, in World Politics, v. 23, no. 1 (Octo-
ber 1970) 1–23.
“Territory is important to people; the
manner in which it is divided up is often criti-
cal. The European approach to territorial
problems developed mainly in response to Eu-
ropean historical experience; the traditional
-s
literature in the fields of geography and his- -
tory makes scant reference to non-Western
boundary concepts and practices. European and
Southeast Asian approaches to territorial is-
sues differ significantly. In the aggregate, the
differences are imposing, if somewhat ab-
stract; in detail, the continuing disparities in
outlook and administrative practice are consid-
erable relevance to current policy decisions.
This analysis will attempt to develop models of
Western and Southeast Asian experience by
reference to historical example. The intent is
to demonstrate the influence of the local envi-
ronment on the development and interaction of .
two rather distinct ways of thinking about
boundaries, territory, and sovereignty . . . Be-
cause of the conflicts between the older peoples
—such as the Pyus, Mons, Khmers, and Chams
—and the newer immigrants—the Burmans, ,
Thais, and Vietnamese—‘the shape of main-
land Southeast Asian boundaries had not yet
become stabilized’ when the colonial powers ar-
rived . . . As long as the colonial powers were
on the scene to lend authoritative enforcement
to their international boundaries and internal
administrative divisions, these arrangements
were neither unreasonable nor particularly
damaging in their effects on local society.
Movement of peoples continued across bounda-
ries; administrative penetration was not radi-
cally of obtrusively increased . . . Many of the
pressures on Southeast Asian boundaries stem
from questions of ethnic identification and re-
lations of central governments to minority pop-
ulations. In the past, “tribal groups, discon-
tented with their lot under a particular
government, could easily shift countries by
crossing over an undefined or uncontrolled
border without becoming a matter of concern
to their new hosts’.” -
COMMUNIST CHINA: ITS SOUTHERN
BORDER LANDS, by David P. Mozingo, in
SAIS Review, v. 12, no. 2 (Winter 1968)
43–54.
“Great powers are extremely sensitive
to any developments which pose real or poten-
tial danger to their strategic interests along or
near their frontiers. The southern border lands
22
have occupied a special place in the strategic
outlook of every Chinese Government since the
Ch'in dynasty. For more than a thousand years
the main direction of Han Chinese expansion
and migration was southward. Some tribes
were subjugated; others were driven as far
south as the border regions of present-day
Burma, Thailand, Laos and Vietnam. To en-
force central control over these territories one
Chinese Government after another has had to
effect new subjugations of the southern tribes.
After the eighteenth century the southward
march of the Hans was checked substantially
by the decline of Manchu power, by the West-
ern colonization of South and Southeast Asia,
and by the increasing flow of China’s rural
populations into its newly rising seaports and
commercial centers. Under communist rule
these trends not only continue, but also have
been accelerated by Peking's industrialization
program and the priority it has given to popu-
lating and developing the northwest provinces.
Politically, the southern border territories
have presented more problems than assets for
the Chinese Communist Government.”
THE FRONTIERS OF CHINA, by Fran-
cis Watson. New York, Frederick A. Praeger,
1966.224 p.
I. Communism or Imperialism (includ-
ing: Aspects of Frontier Policy); II. The
Northern Marches in History (including: The
Central Asian Area; The Manchurian Area);
III. The Question of Tibet (including: Tibet-
China Boundaries; Partition of Tibet); IV. A
New China on the Frontiers: 1950–1955 (in-
cluding: The Yalu River: Frontier or Semi-
Frontier; Warnings in Burma and India); V.
The Bandung Phase: 1954–1959 (including:
India, Burma and The McMahon Line; Motives
of Chinese Policy); VI. Effects of the Tibet
Crisis: 1959–1960 (including: Peking Widens
the Dispute); VII. Frontier Fence-Mending
(including: Buffer-Zones in Chinese Policy; Ne-
gotiations with Nepal); VIII. The Politics of
Invasion and Withdrawal (including: The Un-
declared War With India); IX. Sino-Soviet
Border Tensions (Including: The Illusion of
Stability; Trouble in Sinkiang; Behind the
Mongolian Settlements; The North-Eastern
Zone; Matters of Principle; The Soviet and the
Indian Question); X. Frontiers in a New Era
(including: A Nuclear Posture; Maps Under
Revision; New Look at the North-East; Indo-
China as a Frontier Zone). Bibliography.
Maps.
SOVEREIGNTY OF THE SEA. Wash-
ington, Department of State, October 1969. 33
p. (Geographic Bulletin no. 3.)
The Total Ocean Environment; Offshore
Jurisdiction; The Territorial Sea; The Conti-
nental Shelf; Freedom of the Seas; Law of the
Sea Problems; The Baseline; Boundaries in
the Sea; Charts for identifying Offshore Fea-
tures. Includes information on Burma, Cam-
bodia, and Thailand. With selected bibliogra-
phy.
2. Peninsular Southeast Asia, and Communist
China’s Rimland Strategy.
a. Miscellaneous Aspects
THE ARMS RACE AND SINO-SOVIET
RELATIONS, by Walter C. Clemens, Jr.
Stanford, The Hoover Institution on War, Rev-
olution and Peace, 1968. 335 p.
“The deciding issue in the Sino-Soviet
split was the question of arms control. The 1963
test ban treaty became a symbol to the Chinese
of the attempt of the ‘have nations’ to prevent
a ‘have-not nation’ from gaining a nuclear
arsenal and consequent influence in the Third
World . . . China’s sudden rise to nuclear status,
made possible by Russia’s contradictory nuclear
policy, has had a profound effect on the super-
powers, the communist bloc, and the Third
World. The development of the Chinese arsenal
has far outstripped expectations and has forced
the superpowers to reappraise their security
systems, intelligence evaluations, and defense
policies. While Western Europe seems uncon-
cerned with China’s nuclear sabre-rattling, ex-
pecting China to mellow with age, Russia has
developed a defense system which protects it
against the Chinese as well as the Americans,
and members of the Warsaw Pact feel that
they should receive as much nuclear aid as
China did. Among the Asian countries, some
have kowtowed to China on the grounds that
China will eventually control the region, while
others have tried to set up mutual defense al-
liances under the leadership of India and
Japan, the nations with the most to fear from
a powerful, belligerent China. These reactions
to China’s nuclear position held the key to
non-proliferation and the balance of terror.
23
Both Japan and India could join the nuclear
club in as little as 18 months’ time, setting a
precedent for other threshold nations such as
Israel, Egypt, Brazil, and Argentina. Being the
most directly threatened, India is more likely
than Japan to go nuclear, but the government
wishes to avoid dependence on nuclear weap-
ons. Japan has consistently condemned the
Chinese nuclear tests while seeking closer cul-
tural ties with China and developing its own
nuclear potential for peaceful uses. Nations al-
ready possessing nuclear weapons may over-
react to the Chinese threat, causing a spiraling
arms race based on faulty intelligence. At-
tempts to avoid such an arms race led to the
test ban treaty of 1963 . . . If the Kremlin
reacts to the Chinese nuclear capability by en-
larging its ABM system, the general stability
of the Soviet-US arms competition would prob-
ably be shattered, thus destroying all hope for
agreement on underground testing, the control
of fissionable materials, and a halt to nuclear
proliferation . . .”
THE BALANCE OF POWER IN ASIA,
by Alastair Buchan, in NATO’s Fifteen Nations
(December 1967–January 1968) 38–44.
[For assessing the military power of
the various nations in Asia, the author states:]
“. . . Militarily, by 1975 China will have 121
million men of military age, but not enough
equipment or petroleum to sustain protracted
non-nuclear conflict. It will have some naval
capacity, though it has no naval tradition.
China will have a land-based ICBM force, but
of a size which the US could deter, destroy by
pre-emptive attack, or minimize by a relatively
light ABM system. So, China is not likely to
challenge the US or the USSR in 1975 any
more than in 1967 because their power will
have grown faster than China's. Moreover, it
is doubtful that China will develop a bolder
nuclear doctrine than the four countries which
now possess nuclear weapons. With one of the
world’s greatest population densities, China
will remain extremely vulnerable to nuclear at-
tack. China’s nuclear capability in 1975, while
small in relation to that of the super powers,
could still threaten its neighbors, although
such a threat could be offset by American as-
surances of protection. This presumably is the
reason why Peking prefers national Japanese
and Indian nuclear programs to any form of
US guarantees to Asian powers. However,
Chinese nuclear weapons may have some mar-
ginal utility as a means of instilling fear into
the less literate Asian peoples. The real instru-
ment of Chinese power will lie in its ability to
divide the Asian nations and to encourage po-
litical and revolutionary warfare where local
corruption or maladministration makes this
strategy profitable. Likely target countries are
Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, and the Philip-
pines. The continuing frustration or contain-
ment of China’s ideological and national ambi-
tions will lead it either to dominate or to
neutralize as many of the non-communist Asian
states as possible, just as it appears to be doing
with Pakistan . . .”
CHANGES IN CHINESE ATTENTION
TO SOUTHEAST ASIA, 1967–1969: THEIR
RELEVANCE FOR THE FUTURE OF THE
AREA, by Daniel Tretiak, in Current Scene;
Developments in Mainland China, v. 7, no. 21
(1 November 1969) 1–17.
“During the past several years there
have been important changes in the direction
of Chinese foreign policy toward Southeast
Asia. This article will examine the nature of
the changes and conclude by suggesting proba-
ble trends in Chinese policy toward Southeast
Asia in the next few years.” Changes in
Chinese Attention Levels to Burma, Indonesia,
Malaysia, Thailand, and Laos; Changing
Chinese Attention Levels to Vietnam.
CHINA AND SOUTHEAST ASIA, by
Stephen C. Y. Pan, in Current History, v. 57,
no. 337 (September 1969) 164–167.
“The Cultural Revolution in mainland
China, which began in 1966, has made inroads
into every phase of Chinese life. Its impact on
the rest of Asia has been considerable.”
CHINA AND THE WORLD; AN ANAL-
YSIS OF COMMUNIST CHINA’S FOREIGN
POLICY, by Vidya Prakash Dutt. New York,
Frederick A. Praeger 1966. 356 p.
“This book attempts to study the main
currents of Communist China’s foreign policy
and the course of Peking’s foreign relations
with principal countries and areas of the world
since 1958. It analyzes various phases of Pe-
king's foreign policy, the assumptions behind
it, the domestic background, and the element of
24
traditions and continuity in China’s foreign
policy goals.”
CHINA IN ASIA, by C. P. Fitzgerald, in
Current History, v. 53, no. 313 (September
1967) 129–134 plus.
Analyzes China’s role in Asia. Early
Rule in Asia; China’s Aims; Policy and Possi-
bilities; Limits on Chinese Policy; Military
Power; etc.
CHINA’S ASIAN POLICY, by Werner
Levi, in Current History, v. 51, no. 301 (Sep-
tember 1966) 153–158.
“As this author evaluates the situation,
“The general approach China has taken in its
attempt to establish hegemony in South and
Southeast Asia can be characterized as cau-
tious.” The states of South and Southeast Asia,
he notes, are situated in what China would like
to establish as ‘a sphere of influence or buffer
region’.”
THE CHINESE NUCLEAR THREAT, by
A. H. S. Candlin, in The Army Quarterly and
Defence Journal, v. 92, no. 1 (April 1966)
50–60.
“On the 16th October 1964, . . . a fire-
ball rose over the Takla Mahan Desert and
Red China registered an irrefutable claim to be
the first Asiatic member of the nuclear club. It
was, in no way, a surprise or an unexpected
event. However deplorable it may have been as
an accession to Chinese military strength and
to the future capabilities of that most menac-
ing country, if anything this trial was some-
thing of an anti-climax after a period of tense
waiting due to the extension of the develop-
ment time-scale . . . Even if allowance is made
for an obvious desire to disparage the Russians
with a view to displacing them from their posi-
tion of leadership, it seems clear that abso-
lutely basic differences exist between Soviet
and Chinese attitudes towards both political
and military strategy and that a correct assess-
ment of these attitudes is most important. In
addition, there are many crucial questions that
require to be answered about the Chinese nu-
clear programme itself which can be seen to
have a number of most unusual features. The
first and perhaps most important question is: is
the programme in its military form a full-scale
programme directed towards the acquisition of
a modern arsenal with weapons in the mega-
ton range? Next, it may be asked whether
proper attention is being paid to means of de-
livery in intercontinental terms? Attendant on
this second question is its corollary: is the use
of the nuclear weapon foreseen by its uses
within a military and strategic context or, al-
ternatively, is it regarded only as a political
weapon, a means of gaining ‘face’ among the
nearby Asiatic nations to whom the New
China is a threat, or also a means of black-
mailing such nations into submission? In addi-
tion to the above questions there is the last,
namely: what is the time-scale of development
of the weapon and of its means of delivery?”
CHINESE RIMLAND STRATEGY, by
Lt. Col. John R. D. Cleland, in Military Re-
view, v. 47, no. 1 (January 1967) 3–13.
“The nations on the periphery of China
are those most squarely under the Communist
Chinese gun today. The military power of
Communist China is a force with which they
must reckon in their political, diplomatic, eco-
nomic, and military affairs. The rimland na-
tions comprise four distinct areas: South Asia
. . . . Indochina . . . The Far East . . . The
Maphilindo States-Malaysia, the Philippines,
and Indonesia. When the Chinese Communist
came to power in 1949, their programs in-
cluded the liberation of all of the territory of
China, plus support for the other wars of ‘na-
tional liberation’ that were being waged in
Asia. Furthermore, they were already looking
to their borders and those lands that had once
been under Chinese domination . . . No study
of China’s rimland strategy is complete with-
out considering that she will have a strategic
and tactical nuclear delivery capability in the
not too distant future. This capability could be
used effectively by Peking to further its objec-
tives in the rimland area. The Chinese Com-
munists are relying on people's wars, subver-
sion, and political action to achieve their goals
in this area.” Middle Kingdom Concept; Politi-
cal Influence; Strategy Toward Indochina;
Thailand; Vietnam; Far East Strategy; Tai-
wan; Japan; Maphilindo Area; etc.
COMMUNIST CHINA IN WORLD POLI-
TICS, by Harold C. Hinton. New York, Hough-
ton Mifflin Co., 1966. 527 p.
“This book represents an effort to un-
25
derstand and communicate as much as possible,
of what is significant about the important, in-
teresting, and complex subject that is the for-
eign policy and relations of Communist
China.” Background (The Roots of Communist
China’s Foreign Policy; Fifteen years of Com-
munist China’s Foreign Policy); Communist
China on the World Stage (Maoism; Objectives
and Instrumentalities of Foreign Policy; The
Sino-Soviet Alliance and the West; China and
International Communism; Communist China’s
Policy Toward the Middle East, Africa, and
Latin America); Communist China as an
Asian Power (The Korean War; The Indo-
china Crisis; Taiwan and the Offshore Islands;
Border Problems and Policy; Communist
China and Northeast Asia; Communist China
and Southeast Asia; Communist China and
South Asia); In Conclusion (The Chinese Nu-
clear Test and the Fall of Khrushchev; Some
Reflections on Coping with Communist China).
With bibliographical note.
COUNTERINSURGENCY: LESSONS
FROM THE EARLY CHINESE AND JAPA-
NESE EXPERIENCE AGAINST THE COM-
MUNISTS, by Roy C. Hillam, in Orbis, v. 12,
no. 1 (Spring 1968) 226–246.
“The idea of guerrilla warfare is not
new, but its application by the communists in
underdeveloped areas, particularly in Asia, has
presented new and complex problems to the
West . . . The strategy used by modern insur-
gents is largely that developed by Mao Tse-
tung at Chingkanshan in the late 1920's, and
then tested and revised through years of expe-
rience against the Chinese Nationalists and the
Japanese invaders during the 1930's and
1940’s. These strategies were ultimately suc-
cessful in China and have had a varying range
of applicability in Southeast Asia.”
DOES CHINA WANT WAR 2 by Col. Her-
bert L. Duncan, in The Army Quarterly and
Defence Journal, v. 94, no. 2 (July 1967)
218–228.
“China watchers in Hong Kong, Asian
scholars in universities and government
officials at the highest level are preoccupied
these days in trying to fathom the intentions
of the Chinese Communist Government to-
wards other nations, and particularly its inten-
tions toward South Viet Nam and the nations
and more frustrated than expansionist. They
of Asia. Current United States policy is based
on an assumption that Communist China is an |
aggressive power with expansionist aims that
must be contained within her present bounda.
ries. This assumption is one of the fundamen.
tals in U.S. support of the South Vietnamese,
Laotian and Thailand governments against in.
surgent groups which are being sponsored and
assisted by the Peking Government. Dissenting
groups in the United States that oppose cur.;
rent U.S. policy challenge the validity of the
assumption that China is aggressive and ex-
pansionist. These groups view China’s behav.
iour as more nationalistic than communistic,
say that China is seeking leadership and influ.
ence more than territory, and that she is find.
ing Communist theory useful in explaining the
imperialist destruction of China’s rightful
pre-eminence in the world. China is avoiding
war, not seeking war, and only maintaining
her own security and looking after the long.
run interests of her people, according to this
view.” Contents: China Is Aggressive and Ex-
pansionist—Fact or Myth?; Communist China's
Objectives; The Risk of War; China's
Capability for War; The Wars That China
Wants; Chinese Strategy; The Prospect for
Change in Communist China’s Policy; etc.
HOW COMMUNIST CHINA NEGOTI.
ATES, by Arthur Lall. New York, Columbia
University Press, 1968. 291 p. -
“Communist Chinese diplomats appar.
ently have little training in foreign affairs . . .
Chinese delegations to negotiations are gener.
ally two or three times as large as those of
other countries. This provides experience for
the diplomats and creates an impression of
power. It also allows group discussion before
the delegation presents its views to the confer.
ence. By functioning as a group, the Chinese
prevent individuals within the group from em.
barrassing the government. They are so at.
tuned to this method that they do not do well in
individual diplomacy. The Chinese group is
well-disciplined and normally has an impressive
mastery of the issue under consideration. It
dogmatically asserts its point of view, but if it
must compromise, the group will adopt a ‘con.
sensus’ rather than a ‘majority' position. This
procedure allows it to make concessions back.
stage without being shown to have ‘lost’ in the

26
negotiations . . . In Asia, China cultivates
close relations with small states such as Burma
and Ceylon but opposes larger states which are
or may become rivals to China. China also op-
poses states having close alliances with the US
on the grounds that such states, being under
the influence of a non-Asian power, cannot be
considered Asian states. Thus the policy of
peaceful coexistence is applied to those states
which in some way “lean’ toward China but not
to states which are closer to the West or which
may rival China . . . The Chinese still believe
that the spread of communism is inevitable.
But they find that temporarily necessary com-
promises may be reached through peaceful ne-
gotiation. Despite ideological bombast, their at-
titudes are determined by their national
interests, their desire for a viable world bal-
ance, and their attempt to create a certain
image of China on the international scene.”
MAO TSE-TUNG GAZES UPON FIVE
CONTINENTS, by Ernst Henri, in Atlas (De-
cember 1967) 14–15.
“This article [reprinted from a Soviet
periodical] is of particular interest because it
reflects a Soviet viewpoint imputing to Mao
Tse-tung aspirations to construct an Oriental
version of a ‘Super-Reich.” Mao and his asso-
ciates developed a concrete plan of expansion
as far back as the 1950s. The first stage of the
‘great strategic blueprint’ included Korea,
Mongolia, Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, Indone-
sia, Malaysia, Burma, and other nations on the
periphery of China. In the second stage, China
would expand over the Hindustan Peninsula,
into Soviet Central Asia, the Soviet Far East,
and finally the Near East. The final stage is
not quite apparent, but Chinese intentions are
clearly stated: no continent has been omitted
from the projected ‘Maoization’ of the world.
Present reality does not exist for the Mao
group; its hallucinations have become deci-
sions. It is obvious that Peking has decided
that at some point a global war—exterminat-
ing one-third to one-half of the world’s popula-
tion—will be necessary for realization of Mao’s
‘Super-Reich.” That is why China continually
does everything possible to increase interna-
tional tension.”
THE NEW BALANCE OF POWER IN
ASIA AND THE PACIFIC, by Hedley Bull, in
Foreign Affairs (July 1971) 669–681.
& &
Believes that the struggle to
maintain the balance of power in Asia is no
longer between the US and the USSR alone; it
now also includes China. Since acquiring a nu-
clear capability, China has caused major policy
shifts in many Asian and Pacific countries . . .
Thus, the three powers have attempted to de-
velop an equilibrium; each fears an alliance of
the other two, but avoids siding with either
. . . US policy has changed, Bull believes, be-
cause Vietnam has shown the Americans that
they cannot rely solely on their military might
to keep peace. Growing Chinese capabilities re-
Quire a new interpretation of the role of the
US nuclear shield in protecting Asian nations
. . . Middle-sized Asian powers are thus begin-
ning to rely on friendlier relationships with all
major powers, rather than on American force
alone. They are seeking a balance of power
which gives them security and they prefer di-
plomacy to war. India, for example, has found
Russia willing to help it in its border dispute
with China; on the other hand, the decreasing
American influence in Asia has moved India to
seek a settlement with China . . . Japan’s de-
velopment as a leading industrial nation has
enhanced its position in Asian affairs. If it be-
comes a fourth great power in Asia, with a nu-
clear capability, the balance of power will be
further confused. The process of finding and
maintaining an equilibrium would again throw
Asia into a diplomatic frenzy. Rising national-
ist feelings and the emergence of defense as a
national priority seem to be leading Japan in
this direction. Such a course would generate
opposition from the rest of the world; how-
ever, Bull argues that Japan may not have to
arm itself. He believes that, in the future, mili-
tary power may not determine world leader-
ship, in which case Japan's economic and dip-
lomatic strength would be sufficient to label
Japan a great nation . . .”
THE PEKING SUMMIT AS OTHERS SAW
IT, in Newsweek, v. 79, no. 10 (6 March 1972)
28.
The response of leaders of many regions
of the world, including Southeast Asian re-
sponse to President Nixon's visit to Communist
China in February 1972.
SINO-SOVIET ATTITUDES TOWARD
REVOLUTIONARY WARS, by Bryce F.
Denno, in Orbis, (Winter 1968) 1193–1207.
27
“The Chinese communists depend on
revolutionary war as an instrument of foreign
policy more than the Soviets. The USSR has
been recognized as a great power for four dec-
ades and is surrounded' by friendly nations, ex-
cept for China. Although the Soviets have not
abandoned their desire to hasten the ‘histori-
cally inevitable’ transformation of the world to
communism, their major goals now are to
avoid thermonuclear war and to develop their
economy. China has not been recognized as a
great power or a leader in the communist
world and is surrounded by enemies. The
Chinese, therefore, seek to expel Western mili-
tary and political presence from the Far East,
recapture ‘lost territory,’ and gain status as a
superpower. China feels that some of these
goals can be achieved by supporting internal
revolutions. China’s advocacy of guerrilla war-
fare, as opposed to the Soviet Union’s support
for more conventional campaigns, is partially
due to the differences in Chinese and Russian
military experiences . . .”
THE SOUTHEAST ASIAN VIEW OF
CHINA, by Bernard K. Gordon, in Current
History, (September 1968) 165–170.
“Southeast Asia is the natural outlet for
China’s “great power’ quest . . . The large pro-
portion of poverty-ridden, rural, peasants in
SEA promises great gain at minimal risk for
the Chinese Communists, and the presence of
the US in the region provides China with the
pretext of an American invasion for exercising
a ‘self-protective’ influence over the region.
China is now unwilling to allow even those
SEA nations not associated with the American
presence to exist in peace. Cambodia and
Burma are plagued with Peking-supported in-
surgents, despite their frequent statements of
friendship toward China and condemnation of
the US . . . China’s unprovoked aggressive-
ness in Southeast Asia is cooling its formerly
cordial relations with area leaders . . . In
Cambodia, for example, Prince Sihanouk has
threatened to turn the country over to the US
rather than allow Chinese-sponsored insur-
gents to slowly take over. Southeast Asians
view China from three perspectives: first, as
the traditional, alien, great power of the region
with a long history of domination; second, as
the parent of the overseas Chinese who are
widely resented, feared, and distrusted because
of their strong influence on the economy of
Southeast Asia; and third, as an emerging
Asian nation, admired for its accomplishments
in centralizing government and excluding
Western Powers. This third aspect outweighed
the negative ones until China began to show its
belligerence in the 1960s. Since then, China
has been one of the prime causes for the suc.
cess of non-Chinese regional cooperation in
Southeast Asia. What started out to be eco.
nomic integration has expanded into military
cooperation. The trend toward regional defense
will increase unless China returns to its
former policy of ‘peaceful coexistence,” which
seems unlikely.”
b. China’s Policies and the Indochinſ,
War (See also IV—D—2–b)
THE AFRO-ASIAN OCEAN HEART.
LAND: A STUDY, by Rocco M. Paone, in M.
rine Corps Gazette, v. 50, no. 1 (January 1966)
21–26.
“The author advances a seldom-reported
reason why we must fulfill our commitment in
Southeast Asia; that a Viet Cong victory in
Viet-Nam is really only a limited objective for
Communist China.” Under discussion: The dy.
namic significance of the Afro-Asian oceam
heartland; Communist China's interest in the
Afro-Asian ocean heartland; implementation of
United States and Western policy; a multi-na-
tional strike force; some basic international
considerations (in formulating any geopolitical
concept for this area). Concludes: “The con-
cept of an Afro-Asian Ocean Heartland, imple.
mented by a multinational carrier based nu-
clear deterrent, is positive and bold and fits the
requirements of contemporary and near future
policy of the United States and the West as
well. This heartland, including as it does one
of the most important sea areas of the world, is
vital to the security of the West, and must be
protected against the aggressive policy of the
Communist Chinese government in that region
of the world, if the United States is to remain
the leader of western diplomacy. Within this
frame of thought then, the present strife in
Viet-Nam offers a much greater challenge than
the independence of South Viet-Nam; it in-
volves the concept of autonomy for the whole
of the Afro-Asian Ocean region of the world.
Supremacy in this area is the ultimate object.
tive of the present Communist Chinese govern.
28
ment and the achievement of this aim must be
denied by the United States.” With map show-
ing Afro-Asian area of the world within which
90% of the world’s rubber, 60% of all uranium
—plus one fifth of US trade is comprised.
CHINA AND THE DOMINOES, by Rhoads
Murphey, in Asian Survey, v. 6, no. 9 (Septem-
ber 1966) 510–515.
“The most remarkable thing about the
so-called domino theory is that it is apparently
taken seriously by so many otherwise intelli-
gent people. To borrow a term popular with
many domino-fanciers, the main thrust of this
paper is to examine the bite of the theory in
the part of the world to which it is currently
most often applied, and to offer some alterna-
tive hypotheses based on an examination of ac-
tual circumstances rather than on imaginary
analogy. In any kind of inquiry, there is no
substitute for information and reasoning as the
basis for theory or prediction. Problems, sim-
ple or perplexing, are not effectively solved by
ignoring relevant data and depending instead
on abstract formulae divorced from the reality
at hand. Briefly stated, the domino theory as it
is most commonly asserted for Southeast Asia
maintains that unless the allegedly expansion-
ist drive of Communist China is blocked by
military means, Chinese and/or Communist
power will overwhelm Laos and South Viet-
nam, and that this will automatically be fol-
lowed in a cumulative causal chain by the simi-
lar overwhelming first of adjacent Thailand
and Cambodia, then of the countries adjacent
to them, and so on until the whole of Southeast
Asia, and perhaps India, Pakistan, Ceylon, the
Middle East, and Africa are struck down
through the transmission of the first impulse
—the first fallen domino of what is seen as an
unbroken continuum leading spatially outward
from it. Although the foregoing may have a
somewhat straw-man quality as a result of its
brevity, we are obliged to examine the hypoth-
esis, if only because a great many people, in-
cluding those in high office, appear to subscribe
to it, or at least to consider it among other hy-
potheses on which policy decisions may be
based.”
CHINA: THE ILLUSION OF POWER, by
Richard L. Walker, in Air University Review,
(May-June 1969) 16–24.
“US policy has been a major force in re-
straining Peking's ambitions and in creating
viable Asian alternatives to the violent Chinese
approach to development. The US has realisti-
cally allowed the Chinese model of Develop-
ment and the myth of idyllic communism to
discredit themselves. Despite wide fluctuation
in assessments of Chinese power, American
foreign policy-makers have not been deluded
into thinking China is a superpower. Basing
China’s future role in Asian development on its
historic domination of the region would over-
look the recent development of Japan and the
independent spirit of the smaller Asian states.
Only 20 million of China's 800 million people
are engaged in modern technological produc-
tion. In general the Chinese are illiterate, hun-
gry, apathetic, and ineffective, and their low
incomes make them unlikely customers for
Western manufacturers. Despite China’s nu-
clear capability, its potential power must be
measured against the social and economic
weakness that its investment in nuclear weap-
ons has caused. Furthermore, actual Chinese
involvement in revolutionary movements is not
nearly as great as Peking's propagandists
would have the world believe. Peking’s power
appears sizeable because of the instability of its
neighbors. Nevertheless, the illusion of power
may be as important as power itself. For exam-
ple, in Vietnam, the ‘great China’ myth has in-
timidated some American leaders and may well
have prevented the US from taking more ef-
fective tactical and strategic approaches.
Chinese leaders have consistently taken advan-
tage of their inflated image for nuclear black-
mail and to promote ‘wars of liberation” as an
inexpensive path to world revolution . . .”
THE DISQUIETING SITUATION IN THE
FAR EAST, by Francois Joyaux, in Revue de
defense nationale (April 1969) 603–609. In
French. -
“The struggle against ‘revisionism” has
become the very basis of the new revolutionary
vitality in Maoist China, and is manifesting it-
self in increasingly dangerous border clashes.
In fact, the anti-revisionist struggle against
the USSR is taking precedence in China over
the traditionally primary struggle on behalf of
the Third World countries against American
“imperialism.” This became all the more evident
when China indicated its willingness to sign a
29
peaceful coexistence agreement with the US,
which would allow China to concentrate more
of its effort on its anti-Soviet campaign . . .
China’s desire to participate directly or indi-
rectly in the Paris talks on Vietnam is another
motive for resuming contact with US officials.
Since it was party to the 1954 and 1962 Geneva
Accords, China does not want to be left out of
any agreements which may have a deep effect
on Asia. Furthermore, no permanent solution
to the problems of Southeast Asia can be de-
cided without at least the tacit agreement of
China, and the US is quite aware of this.”
FROM THE VIETNAM WAR TO AN IN-
DOCHINA WAR, by Jean Lacouture, in For-
eign Affairs (July 1970) 617–628.
“The Vietnam War became the Second
Indochina War during the last week of April
1970 when North Vietnamese, NLF, Pathet
Lao, and Cambodia representatives of the In-
dochinese Left met in southern China to seal
an alliance . . . The countries of Vietnam,
Laos, and Cambodia, which form Indochina,
are a strange combination of Chinese influence,
Confucian tradition, and Indian Buddhism . . .
The original intent of the Indochinese Com-
munist Party, founded in 1930, called for a so-
cial revolution in Vietnam and a political one
in the whole peninsula. The ICP was mostly
Vietnamese, even through 1945 when Ho Chi
Minh launched the revolution, and it wasn’t
until 1951 that the three Indochinese move-
ments concluded a Viet-Lao-Kmer alliance to
extend the fighting to the whole peninsula . . .
With the war spreading and wreaking havoc,
the most startling aspect of the President’s
April 30 decision is its disregard for General
Giap’s constant belief that every extension of
the battle serves his interests because the side
with the greater firepower should concentrate
its area of fighting, and because the revolution-
aries count on the support of the people among
whom they are fighting, whereas the foreign
force must win them over. By spreading the
fighting the US is contributing to the revolu-
tionary unification of Indochina. Although the
evolution of the Indochina war would seem to
be the fulfillment of Peking’s hopes, China ap-
parently does not mean, at this time, to at-
tempt to control the Indochinese area and is
limiting itself to attacking the US role in the
harshest terms and rejoicing in the fact that
American power is entrapped in Asian rice
paddies. Revolution in Indochina does not
mean Chinese domination. Indochina is fight-
ing under a Chinese banner, but its aim is to
survive under its own colors.”
THE FUTURE OF MAINLAND SOUTH-
EAST ASIA, by Frank N. Trager, in Military
Review, v. 50, no. 1 (January 1970) 3–16.
“Mainland Southeast Asia has been a
target area for Peking in earlier dynasties, and
Communist China under Mao Tse-tung has
been no exception. Peking, frequently said to
have conducted a ‘cautious’ foreign policy, has
not been cautious in Asia. It has proceeded to
gobble up Tibet, to incite North Korea, to at-
tack India, and again to threaten it in the Pak-
istan-India war of 1965. During the ‘cultural
revolution,’ China has been active in violating
its treaties and downgrading its ‘friendly' rela-
tions with Burma and Cambodia while openly
supporting a so-called war of ‘national libera-
tion’ in the former. It has fomented strife in
Thailand by energizing the Communist Party
of Thailand. It has given support to the Pathet
Lao and North Vietnamese Communists in
their attacks on the Lao Provinces of Phong
Saly, Sam Neua, and Xieng Khouang. It has
supplied North Vietnam with materiel and
about 50,000 specially trained engineering and
artillery troops. A political victory for Viet-
namese Communists in the Republic of Viet-
nam—that is, a coalition government “imposed'
on Saigon—would help free them to weaken
Laos and Cambodia, add to the dangers of
Thailand and Burma, and, of course, irrepara-
bly weaken the Republic of Vietnam.”
IMAGE AND REALITY IN INDOCHINA,
by Harrison E. Salisbury, in Foreign Affairs,
(April 1971) 381–393.
“Examines the history of Indochina for
the past 30 years, pointing out many instances
where the involved nations misjudged each
other's actions and motives. At no time was
there greater misperception than in the
1965–66 period when the US was constantly
escalating the war. The US image of Vietnam
at that time is unclear. Sometimes Washington
seemed to regard Hanoi as an instrument of
Soviet policy, sometimes as an instrument of
Chinese policy, and occasionally as an intransi-
gent native communist movement. As for
30
North Vietnam, Salisbury says Hanoi officials
told him thay they regarded the US as replac-
ing France in the area and that the huge war
effort was for the benefit of the capitalists who
wished to exploit the natural resources of Viet-
nam. The Chinese told Salisbury that they saw
the US escalation as an opening move in an
all-out assault on China, with the collaboration
of Moscow. At this same time, Moscow feared
that the Chinese would involve them in a war
with the US—a fear that spurred them to give
some assistance to the US in the search for
peace. By 1969 both the Chinese and Soviets
had changed their perception of Vietnam, tend-
ing to view it as a ‘front” in their own growing
confrontation, rather than as a US-Viet-
namese confrontation. For this reason China
opposed the Paris peace negotiations, fearing
such a move would lead the US and USSR
closer to detente. Moscow, on the other hand,
favored negotiations, believing the end of the
war would be a blow to Chinese communist
movements. The wide differences among the
communist powers were evident in the Cam-
bodian events of 1970. The Chinese used the
coup to sponsor a summit of the Indochina
communist movements in support of Sihanouk.
The Russians, excluded from the meeting,
snubbed Sihanouk, maintained relations with
the Lon Nol government, and insisted that
their satellites do the same. Moreover, they
blamed the Chinese for the US action in Cam-
bodia and Vietnam on the grounds that China
had failed to form a ‘united front' against US
aggression. Salisbury fears that distortion be-
tween image and reality has by no means run
its course in Indochina . . .”
THE SINO-SOVIET STRUGGLE FOR
ASIA, by Ernst Kux, in Swiss Review of
World Affairs, v. 19, no. 5 (August 1969) 11–
12.
“Brezhnev's recent suggestion for an
Asian collective security system is part of the
spreading cold war between Moscow and Pe-
king. It is developing into a struggle to deter-
mine America's post-Vietnam successor in
Asia.”
STORM OVER ASIA; CHINA AND
SOUTHEAST ASIA: THRUST AND RE-
SPONSE, by Robert Karr McCabe. New York,
The New American Library, 1967. 225 p.
“This is a book about war, though not a
war story, because war and death are cardinal
facts in today’s Asia. This is a book about
peace as well, for the hº of peace and prog-
ress is a part of every Asian's dreams. In sum,
this is a book about Asia under storm clouds—
but it includes . . . an implicit promise that
the storm is not forever.” Chapter I—The Kill-
ing Ground (Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos);
Chapter II—A Problem of Posture (Thai-
land); Chapter III—The Hermetic Hermit
(Burma).
3. Peninsular Southeast Asia and India.
INDIA AND THE FUTURE OF ASIA, by
Patwant Singh. New York, Alfred A. Knopf,
1966. 264 p.
Picture in the Mid-Sixties; History’s
Legacy; Partition; The Anatomy of a Develop-
ing Economy; Foreign Affairs; India and
China—The Continuing Confrontation; De-
fense; Outlook in the Mid-Seventies; Bibliog-
raphy. Includes references to relations with
other countries of Asia, such as Burma, Cam-
bodia, Laos, and Thailand, among others.
INDIAN FOREIGN POLICY IN CAM-
BODIA, LAOS, AND VIETNAM, 1947–1964,
by D. A. SarDesai. Berkeley, University of
California Press, 1968. 336 p.
“This . . . study of Indian foreign pol-
icy in key areas of Southeast Asia adds a new
and most welcome dimension to the literature
on the former Indo-Chinese states. The evalua-
tion of Prime Minister Nehru's views in his
plans for the neutralization of southern Asia
and the Indian role in the International Truce
Commission in Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam is
analyzed.”
THE INDIANIZED STATES OF SOUTH-
EAST ASIA, by G. Coedès, ed. by Walter F.
Vella. Honolulu, East-West Center Press, 1968.
403 p.
An historical study of Southeast Asia,
producing “less . . . a history presenting all
the details than to offer a synthesis showing
how the various elements of the history are re-
lated.” This history begins with a pre-history
dissertation to “The End of the Indian King-
dom” in the early 1500's and provides informa-
tion also on the countries of Peninsular South-
east Asia, among others.
31
4. Peninsular Southeast Asia and Japan
a. Miscellaneous Aspects
JAPAN: HER ROLE IN WORLD AF-
FAIRS, by H. E. Nobuhiko Ushiba, in Naval
War College Review, v. 23, no. 8 (April 1971)
14–21.
“Ambassador Ushiba comments on both
economic and political changes that have oc-
curred in Japan since World War II and the
resultant effects they have had on Japan’s role
in the world. Characterized by a swiftly grow-
ing economy dependent on overseas markets
and raw materials, and a population still un-
willing to approve of war as an instrument of
national policy, the Japanese have evolved
over recent years a policy promoting peace and
political stability in Asia through economic aid
and trade. No longer ‘America’s junior partner
in Asia,” the Japanese now perceive of their
role as being an equal to the United States in
Asia, capable of pursuing independent policies
which together with the actions of America
will do more than anything else to determine
the future of all Asia.”
JAPAN’S FUTURE WORLD ROLE AND
JAPANESE-AMERICAN RELATIONS, by
Kazushige Hirasawa, in Orbis, v. 15, no. 1
(Spring 1971) 338–350.
“Stability in the Asian Pacific region is
inconceivable without a continuing, close, coop-
erative relationship between Japan and the
United States. Reassuringly, this relationship
has been basically solid for more than two dec-
ades. So far there have been no deep or endur-
ing anxieties in any of the three areas that
form its foundations: military, political and
economic. Nonetheless, the character of Japa-
nese-American relations could be altered,
subtly or substantially, by historic changes
now taking place in the Asian Pacific. These
include the rising power and international sta-
tus of China, as well as Japan’s own growing
economic power, and the still uncertain strate-
gic situation that will emerge as the Nixon Doc-
trine is implemented. The environment in
which the Japanese-American relationship op-
erates is being restructured. It follows, there-
fore, that neither Japan nor the United States
can afford to treat their relationship as auto-
matic. Neglect in maintaining the viability of
the relationship, or failure to adapt and adjust
it to changing circumstances, could have ad-
verse consequences for both countries and for
their common interests in the years immedi-
ately ahead. If together they cope successfully
with challenges that are already visible, there
is every reason for confidence that the relation-
ship will achieve a new and durable stability.
Relations between the two countries have al-
ready reached a delicate stage, entering a test
period which could extend through the first
half of the 1970’s. By far the most troublesome
test is the military problem centering on the
security of the Far East. Another is the politi-
cal problem centering on China. A third is the
economic problem, which—despite the volatil-
ity of issues such as the current textile dispute
—is probably the easiest for the two countries
to work out. The handling of this agenda is
complicated by differences in priorities be-
tween the two partners. In her approach to
preserving stability in Asia, the United States
seems to place importance on military, political
and economic affairs, in that order while
Japan reverses these priorities. Japan’s forte
is her economy, and this is the area in which
she can make her greatest international contri-
bution, especially toward the stability and
prosperity of the Asian Pacific. She is least
qualified to play a significant military role;
therefore the military will be the most diffi-
cult aspect of Japanese-American relations to
adjust.”
REGIONAL COOPERATION IN SOUTH-
EAST ASIA AND JAPAN'S ROLE, by
Yung-Hwan Jo, in The Journal of Politics, V.
30, no. 3 (August 1968) 780–797.
“In recent years, many inter-nation in-
stitutions of regional and functional coopera-
tion have been created in developing areas of
the world. Asia is no exception. Today there
appear signs of an increasing awareness on the
part of the leaders in Asia about the necessity
of meeting their national needs through re-
gional cooperation. Would this trend increase
opportunities for Japan, the dominant power
of the region, to play a more effective role in
processes of regional activities? What are the
potentialities and the limitations of Japan's
bid for such a role in non-Communist Asia,
especially in Southeast Asia where the inter-
ests of China, India, and Japan converge? The
purpose of this paper is to examine these ques-
32
tions by way of analyzing the basis of Japan's
Asian diplomacy and Asia’s response to such a
policy without losing sight of the roles being
played by other major powers.”
b. Economic Influence and Potential
ASIAN DEVELOPMENT AFTER VIET-
NAM. Tokyo, Asahi Evening News, 1968?
194 p.
Proceedings and Lectures, Asian Devel-
opment Symposium, sponsored by Asahi Shim-
bun, 20–22 May 1968, Tokyo. Of particular in-
terest to the bibliographic survey of literature
On Peninsular Southeast Asia: What Should
Be the Aim and Attitudes of the Developed
Countries and What Should Japan’s Role Be in
the Asian Perspective?; Japan and the New
World of the Pacific; and The Role of Japan in.
Asian Regional Development.
JAPAN AND SOUTHEAST ASIA, by Niu
Sien-chong, in Military Review, v. 5, no. 10
(October 1971) 63–71.
“A visitor to Southeast Asia is immedi-
ately struck by the enormous impact of Japan.
Evidence of successful Japanese trade can be
found everywhere. Japan is the largest or sec-
ond largest trading partner with every country
in the region except Cambodia where it is
third. If the present rate continues, Japanese
investments in Southeast Asia could reach the
billion-dollar level within the next five years.
Japan's aid, directly or through regional insti-
tutions, is beginning to make itself felt. An in-
creasing presence is noticeable in many cities,
and the people have benefited immeasurably
from the advantages of Japanese economic in-
volvement.”
JAPAN AND SOUTHEAST ASIA IN THE
1970's, by Kei Wakaizumi, in Current History,
v. 60. no. 356 (April 1971) 200–206 plus.
“‘What may Japan’s option be in Asia?
This is the question—not an easy one for us—
being asked more and more seriously by
thoughtful Japanese.” As this Japanese spe-
cialist sees it, “Perhaps the consensus answer
for the moment is that Japan should contrib-
ute to the development efforts of the Asian
countries as much as possible, with an eye on
the long-term historical perspective and long-
range national interests’.” Economic Relation-
ships; Japan's Aid Program; Development
Strategy in the 1970's; Japan’s Increasing
Awareness; Japan’s Future Role?
JAPAN IN ASIA’S FUTURE, by W. Mac-
mahon Ball, in The Nation (15 January 1968)
82–84.
“Japan and the US both believe that
Japan can play a key role in Asia, but they dif-
fer on the nature of that role. The disagree-
ment focuses on Japan's assessment that
Chinese ambitions are limited and can be ac-
commodated without danger to Japan’s na-
tional interests. The Japanese are more wor-
ried by the threat of war than by the threat of
communist expansion. They fear that even a
limited conventional war between the US and
China or Russia would embroil Japan. Above
all, they fear a nuclear war which might oblit-
erate their nation. The shelter of the American
nuclear deterrent is reassuring. However, the
Japanese may not be able to retain this protec-
tion without giving moral, material, or per-
haps military support to US objectives in East
Asia. The Japanese argue that economic and
technical aid can do more than military inter-
vention to help the non-communist countries of
Southeast Asia maintain their independence.
Consequently, Japan has defined an economic
role for itself in Asia by making bold interna-
tional economic commitments. It has joined the
Organization for European Cooperation and
Development and has agreed, as a member of
OCED’s Development Assistance Committee, to
lift its foreign aid to one per cent of its GNP.
Japan also has matched the US contribution of
$200 million to the Asian Development Bank
and has promised $100 million to the Bank’s
special agricultural fund . . .”
JAPAN IN POSTWAR ASIA, by Lawrence
Olson. New York, Praeger Publishers, 1970.
292 p.
“Lawrence Olson is an old Japan hand”
and has had the benefit of wide and frequent
travel throughout most of Asia. Drawing on an
imposing number of Japanese and other for-
eign sources, as well as interesting insights
based on many personal interviews, Olson has
produced an original assessment of postwar
trends in Japanese economic relations with
other Asian countries. His study also contains
an informative . . . review of various attitudes
33"
toward foreign trade and toward mutual trad-
ing partners. To be sure, the coverage of the
volume is less than comprehensive, particu-
larly because of the omission of Pakistan, Cey-
lon, Hong Kong and the whole of the Asiatic
Middle East. The main problems of Japanese
reparations and early trade are, however,
covered.” With bibliography.
JAPANESE INTERESTS IN SOUTH-
EAST ASIA—A JAPANESE VIEW, by
Akira Onishi, in Asian Survey, v. 11, no. 4
(April 1971) 413–421.
“For more than two decades since the
end of World War II, the Japanese economy
has shown a dramatic achievement. The aver-
age real economic growth has been sustained at
a rate of around 10% per annum. This has
brought Japan to the position of the third
largest country in the world as measured by
GNP, although its per capita GNP was only
U.S. $1,600 in 1969, This huge economic activ-
ity has been concentrated in a small area. As a
result, it seems that Japan is rapidly ap-
proaching a super-high density society which
humanity has never experienced before. Ac-
cording to the New Socio-Economic Develop-
ment Plan (1970–1975), the GNP of Japan is
expected to expand at a rate of 10.6% per
annum in the first half of the 1970s and reach
U.S. $400 billion by 1975 from the present U.S.
$200 billion. Japan's GNP in 1970 is larger
than the total of GNP of the developing Asian
region. This area’s per capita income is less
than one-tenth of Japan's. It is easy to foresee
that the income gap between Japan and the de-
veloping nations in Southeast Asia will con-
tinue to grow at a higher rate than in the
1960s. Japan is now in a position to promote a
truly international development effort by mak-
ing its full contribution and at the same time
counter the increasing antagonism directed
toward Japan.” -
JAPAN’S ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH
ASIA, by Koji Taira, in Current History, v. 60,
no. 356 (April 1971) 225–230 plus.
“‘It may not be an exaggeration to say
that with that characteristic decisiveness dem-
onstrated at several historic moments in her
past, Japan smashed into the sanctuary of the
advanced countries during the 1960’s.” Evalu-
ating Japanese trade and aid, this specialist
warns of the “soft-line imperialism of economic
aid . . . the basic problem in the relationship
between developed and less developed countries
today . . .”
JAPAN'S 21ST CENTURY: SOME POSSI.
BLE TRENDS, by Raymond Lamont Brown,
in Contemporary Review, v. 216, no. 1251
(April 1970) 175—177.
“That Japan has emerged as a major in-
dustrial power among the nations of the world
has now become an internationally accepted re-
ality . . . By now even the most introspective
government realises all this for the Japanese
businessman-tourist appears in places once the
habitat only of German and American. The
scene is set, Japan appears ready, uniquely
prepared by a thousand years of rumbullious
history in the Far East, to act as mediating
agent for international peace . . . Even now the
spectre of emergent Japan is taking up a pre-
liminary stance to overshadow China as the
dominant power in Asia.”
THE REACH OF JAPAN'S INDUSTRY IN
THE PACIFIC, by Maj. David F. Wissmar III.
Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala., Air Command
and Staff College, 1968. 139 p. (Thesis no.
1340–68.) -
“Japan's rapid economic recovery and
growth since World War II and her subsequent
reach into world markets has brought her to
fourth place among industrial nations. This
thesis studies Japan's reach into the Asia-Pa-
cific region and examines the scope of Japanese
penetration into the region. It concludes that
Japan's economic ties are still mainly with the
West; however, Japan has the economic poten-
tial to greatly aid, in co-operation with other
nations, the development of the Asia-Pacific
area. This study further concludes that as
Japan joins in the trade and industrial growth
of the Asia-Pacific area, certain adjustments
and problems must be corrected internally be-
fore she can meet the needs of overseas mar-
kets.”
WHEN WAR'S DOLLARS GO, JAPAN'S
READY WITH YEN, in Atlas, v. 18, no. 1
(July 1969) 31 plus.
“Once the B-52s are grounded and
weapons stacked in South Veitnam, the silent
struggle for economic equilibrium begins in
34
Southeast Asia. Thailand, Korea, Taiwan, the
Philippines and Singapore—as well as South
Vietnam—get lavish helpings of dollars be-
cause of the war. Elsewhere among neighbor-
ing non-Communist nations, economies move
haltingly. If U.S. billions shrink to millions—
and that appears certain after peace comes—
Asian must fend for Asians. The source of
aid? Japan, the greatest industrial power in
the East. But the Japanese role is complex,
often entangled with old suspicions and U.S. in-
terests. Sekai, the liberal Japanese intellectual
monthly, looks ahead in a wide-ranging exami-
nation of Japan’s expanding economic influ-
ence.”
c. Japan and the Balance of Power in
the *PSEA Region (See also DA PAM 550–13,
1971, for Japan)
JAPAN–ALL ASIA WATCHES AND
WONDERS, by Carl T. Rowan, in Reader's
Digest, v. 97, no. 580 (August 1970) 103–107.
“Again the Japanese have the might—
economic and military—to dominate the Far
East. How will they use it?”
JAPAN AND PACIFIC ASIA IN THE
1970's, by Herman Kahn and Max Singer, in
Asian Survey, v. 11, no. 4 (April 1971)
399–412.
“How will Japan in the '70s affect the
outlook for countries like South Vietnam.”
Some of the major possibilities incude the fol-
lowing: 1. That the growth of Japan will have
as profound an impact on Asia and the world
as the rise of Prussia and the unification of
Germany had on Europe and the world a cen-
tury ago. 2. One of the results of the rise and
activity of Japan will be the development in
world consciousness of a region that we call
the non-communist Pacific Asia (NOCPA)
which will be one of the most dynamic and sig-
nificant regions in the world, and which will be
for many purposes the basic setting within
which South Vietnam will operate. 3. Because
of large trade surpluses in future years, Japan
will become the major investor and aid-giver
in Asia, which, of course, is of great economic
significance to South Vietnam. 4. That one of
the basic patterns of Japanese activity will in-
creasingly be the establishment of labor-inten-
sive work in other parts of NOCPA, including
South Vietnam, with Japanese capital and
management. The above suggests that among
the themes of future Asian history will be
some of the following: First, struggle to de-
velop or resist a regional consciousness linking
Japan with the small developed countries such
as Australia and New Zealand, the fast-grow-
ing Sino-culture areas—South Korea, Taiwan,
Hong Kong, Singapore—and the other develop-
ing countries, principally Indonesia. Second, in
the pattern of relations between Japan and the
small countries of her economic hinterland;
what will the adjustment process be like? To
what extent will the subjects of the Japanese
economic invasion act together? Third, that
Japan will constitute a rival to China in areas
which a number of Americans seem to think
are within China’s natural sphere of influence.
In this paper we will try to provide some basic
background for evaluating these themes and
their implications.”
JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES IN
ASIA, by Robert E. Osgood, in SAIS Review
(Spring 1967) 4–21.
“Americans want Japan to break out of
its isolation and pacifism. In the US view,
Japan, a thriving nation with great power po-
tential, is getting all the benefits of its alliance
with the US without carrying a proper share
of the burdens. Aside from the equity of that
demand, there is a need to replace or to supple-
ment US policy in the Pacific which has been
dominated by the attempt to contain China.
The US now seeks an equilibrium of power
that does not depend only upon the direct pres-
ence of a preponderant American force. Japan’s
assumption of a more active role in Asia raises
the key question of renewing her military
power and the possible acquisition of nuclear
weapons. Americans might welcome the addi-
tion of an Asian counterpoise to China’s nu-
clear force, provided that Japan’s foreign pol-
icies were congenial with American policies.
On the other hand, if Japan were to regard as
a primary purpose of its independent nuclear
force the reduction of American influence in
Asia and the pursuit of an independent policy,
few Americans could be expected to favor such
a force. Perhaps the only alternative consistent
with American interest is to foster a multipo-
lar balance of power including Japan. If Japan
35
can contribute to a stable balance of power in
Asia without a military force other than that
used for its own defense, Japan’s emergence
from isolation would be advantageous to the
US.”
d. Soviet View of Japan’s Influence in
PSEA
JAPAN AND THE DEVELOPING COUN-
TRIES, by A. Krasilnikov, in International Af-
fairs, Moscow, no. 2 (February 1971) 41–44
plus.
“Events of the last decade show that
Japanese monopoly capital is openly laying
claim to the leading role in Asia and to greater
freedom of action in Africa and Latin America;
it has frequently put pressure on its West Eu-
ropean and American competitors. In a sober
assessment of the situation, The Times
[Japan] wrote anxiously last June that “Ja-
pan’s shadow over the Asian region, including
mainland China, had never been heavier. In
the trade area . . . which is the real impact
that determines the status of economic rela-
tions with Japan, she left an imbalance in 1969
of no less than $2,100 million to her credit.”
1970 was marked by a further drive by Japan
in the inter-imperialist struggle for markets
and big profits.”
JAPAN AT THE TURN OF THE DEC-
ADE, by M. Slodkovsky, in International Af-
fairs, Moscow, no. 6 (June 1970) 44–49.
“In recent years, there have been con-
siderable changes in Japan’s international sta-
tus and internal situation. The propaganda of
her economic successes and the Ministry of Fi-
nance projects, under which Japan would sur-
pass the USA in the 1980s and become one of
the world's greatest and most powerful coun-
tries . . . is already beginning to sound like a
national demand for ‘the status of third power’
today, and of the first in the future. By sup-
porting Washington’s aggressive policy, her
ruling circles are conditioning the people for
the elaboration and, given certain circum-
stances, the independent pursuit of a similar
policy. It is impossible to understand Japan's
present economic boom without analysing the
role of her military-industrial complex, which
has coalesced with that of the USA. With the
permanent military tension and endless wars
waged by US imperialism in Southeast Asia
and the Far East, Japan has become a kind of
factory producing weapons and military equip-
ment for the aggressors and the US-sponsored
puppet militarist cliques. The Japanese islands
are being widely used as a base in the fight
against Asian national liberation movements
and independent states.” -
5. Peninsular Southeast Asia and Australia i
and New Zealand
a. Miscellaneous Aspects
AN ANALYSIS OF AUSTRALIAN FOR-
EIGN POLICY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA, by
Maj. Zenon J. Siekirski. Maxwell Air Force
Base, Ala., Air Command and Staff College,
1968. 73 p. (Thesis no. 1105–68.)
“This study examines Australian for-
eign policy by first revealing several important
elements of Australian national power. An ex-
amination of threats to Australian security is
followed by an explanation of treaties and de-
fense agreements that involve Australia and
the United States. It also reveals Australian
economic and military assistance to Southeast
Asia, with special reference to South Vietnam,
It concludes that Australian objectives and
foreign policy in Southeast Asia are very simi-
lar to those of the United States. In addition, it
appears that this similarity in foreign policy
will continue for sometime in the future.”
AUSTRALIA: AN APPRAISAL OF HER
ROLE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA, by Col. Robert
K. Carson. Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala., Air
University, Air War College, 1969. 24 p. (Re-
search Report No. 3734.) -
“An assessment of Australia's military
contribution in Vietnam is made to determine
whether that country is doing as much as it
should be doing to deter communism in South-
east Asia. The communist threat to Australia's
security is reviewed and important aspects of
her economy are covered. The modernization
and expansion of her armed forces since 1963
are described. Defense policy and implications
of British withdrawal from Singapore and Ma-
laysia are discussed. Chronology of Australia's
military involvement in Vietnam is given. As-
sessment shows that Australia is contributing
her fair share to the security of Southeast
Asia.” - -
36
AUSTRALIA FACES SOUTHEAST ASIA:
THE EMERGENCE OF A FOREIGN POL-
ICY, by Amry and Mary Belle Vandenbosch.
Lexington, University of Kentucky - Press,
1968. 175 p.
“An account of the effect of British
withdrawal from Asia and of Australia’s read-
justment in its foreign policies toward its now
politically unstable and volatile neighbors.” Of
special interest are the following chapters:
Postwar Reappraisal of External Policy; Aus-
tralia's Future in Asia; Bibliography; etc.
AUSTRALIA IN WORLD AFFAIRS,
1961–1965, ed. by Gordon Greenwood and Nor-
man Harper. Melbourne, F.W. Chesire, 1968.
503 p. (for the Australian Institute of Interna-
tional Affairs.)
“Eleven distinguished Australian schol-
ars review Australian foreign policy and rela-
tions in the period from 1961 through 1965.
Topics covered include the Australian diplo-
matic service; economic and defense policies;
the United Nations; relations with the United
States, Japan, China, and the nations of South
and Southeast Asia; Papua-New Guinea, and
the South Pacific Commission.”
AUSTRALIA: THE NEW SOUTH-EAST
ASIAN POWER, by Peter Robinson, in The
Royal Air Forces Quarterly, v. 10, no. 2 (Sum-
mer 1970) 103–108. -
“National emergence and the changing
political face of South-East Asia together
bring sharply into focus the role of Australia
in this vast and developing area. Australia’s an-
nouncement that it intended to commit two
battalions of troops, 42 jet interceptors and a
naval vessel to the defence of Malaysia and
Singapore after British forces finally with-
draw in 1971 has a significance out of all pro-
portion to the modest size of the military force
involved. Primarily, it is significant because it
firmly commits Australia to regionalist respon-
sibilities; for the first time in its history, Aus-
tralia is cautiously adopting the stance of a
leading regional power. Inevitably, its growing
industrial strength will become more closely
linked, more inextricably intertwined with the
economic development of the neighbouring
countries with which it is co-operating in mili-
tary and diplomatic terms. The military com-
mitment is thus merely the tip of the iceberg
which demonstrates an Australian presence.
As a natural corollary to this, Australia is now
faced with the necessity of playing an activist
role—economically and diplomatically—in en-
suring the stability of the region . . . Yet the
fundamental fact about Australia's relation-
ship with South-east Asia in comparison with
that of Britain, the U.S. or France is that it is
part of the region and they are not. It is a fact
of life which has only very recently been ac-
cepted in Australia, but it has already assumed
the status of conventional wisdom—both in-
dustrially and economically. Moreover, despite
obvious racial and cultural differences between
Australians and their neighbours, they have—
at least to date—been accepted completely by
other South-east Asian countries as legitimate
members of the region.”
FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE WHITE
AUSTRALIA POLICY, by Herbert I. London,
in Orbis, v. 13, no. 2 (Summer 1969) 556–577.
“Events in the twentieth century have
demonstrated that immigration policy is linked
to foreign relations. Its characteristics, and
particularly its racist connotations, can cause
international disequilibrium. Even though it is
not a casus belli, it is a potentially inflamma-
tory factor that can interfere with a whole
range of relations between states, including
strategic defense decisions, trade, diplomacy
and international agreements. Soon after the
White Australia policy became federal legisla-
tion it interfered with Australian-Asian rela-
tions . . . Combining with the Australian fear
of “Yellow Hordes' and the ‘Yellow Peril,’
which manifested a belief in imminent Asian
invasion, was the threat to security posed by a
nonwhite minority group within the country.
It was argued that this minority could exert
diplomatic pressure on the government or
could provoke tensions that would weaken the
national security. “Populate or Perish’ thus be-
came an early national slogan. In order to con-
vince Asians that settlement was not feasible
and the land was extensively utilized, Aus-
tralia needed a much larger population, pre-
dominantly British and homogeneously white.
This was considered the most effective way of
preserving and securing the nation . . . The
formulation of foreign policy, strategic consid-
erations and trade agreements are not usually
37
intentionally designed to vitiate ‘White Aus-
tralia' principles. Neither are the events of re-
cent Asian history and the European migration
program consciously intended to prepare public
opinion for a radical change in the immigra-
tion policy. But all of these factors have made
‘White Australia’ an embarrassment and, more
importantly, a deterrent to the smooth func-
tioning of foreign affairs. At present the policy
is not enough of an embarrassment or an ob-
stacle to foreign dealings to warrant its com-
plete abandonment . . . If the recent past is
any guide to future policy decisions, foreign af-
fairs will soon surpass immigration policy as a
government priority.”
NEW ATTITUDES FOR A NEW DEC-
ADE: SOME CONCLUSIONS FOR AUSTRA-
LIAN POLICY TOWARDS ASIA IN THE
1970s, by Robert O’Neill, in Australian Out-
look, v. 24, no. 2 (August 1970) 111–123.
“It has been postulated that the main
problem of Australian foreign policy has been
to reconcile our history with our geography.
While this encapsulation has had some rele-
vance in recent decades, it does scant justice to
the makers of Australian history for whom ge-
ography did not have its current significance.
Nineteenth century Australia was an outpost
of Europe and for Australians the various
countries of Asia were like wayside hamlets
along the road which sustained our existence.
Nonetheless, times have changed and Australia
has found herself in the position of having to
re-examine the whole basis of her foreign pol-
icy. We now recognise that what were once
thought to be hamlets are in fact cities whose
magnitude approaches that of the declining
metropolis at the end of the road and that in-
stead of one road we are faced with several. An
examination of the direction which Australian
foreign policy might take in the 1970s is diffi-
cult to commence without a review of the envi-
ronment: first the great powers; second the
countries of Asia which are important to Aus-
tralia; and third the interests and objectives of
Australia herself. In the light of these three
factors we may proceed to a formulation of
some guide lines for policy.”
A PART OF ASIA 2 by Maj. A. R. Roberts,
in Army Journal, Australia, no. 245 (October
1969) 3–11.
“Among the most widely accepted of
pouplar Australian cliches is that ‘Australia is
a part of Asia.’ Its users range from Cabin;
Ministers to Communists and it is in danger of
becoming one of those stock phrases that form
the small change of political word-coining:
Historically and culturally, Australia has been
not a part of Asia but the farthest extension of
European society in that area. Geographically;
the phrase is not so much wrong as meaning
less. Those who use it seem to think that loci,
tion is the only factor to be considered. If loca:
tion were all, then Spain is a part of Africal
and Northern Africa is a part of Europe. In
fact, very much stronger cases can be made for
these statements about geographical relation.
ships than for our local variation.” Awareness
of Asia; Why Aid to Asia?; Regional Defense;
Changing Policies; Trade with Asia; etc. The
author concludes: “Australia may never be
able to regard itself as ‘part of Asia.” Unless it
learns to live with Asia, and with South-East
Asia in particular, it cannot hope to be given a
voice in establishing the stable and prosperous
region it needs in order to survive.”
TOWARD A NEW BALANCE IN ASIA:
AN AUSTRALIAN VIEW, by Bruce Grant, in
Foreign Affairs, (July 1969) 711–720.
“. . . . The prospect of US withdrawal
from SEA has prompted some Australian
leaders to urge a return to a ‘mainland strat-
egy.” However, the decision to keep forces in
Malaysia and Singapore after the British leave
in 1971 indicates the Australian intention to
continue the ‘forward defense' policy. The ma.
jority of Australians regard continuation of
their regional obligations as the only feasible
course. Nevertheless, Australians are skeptical
about the ability of Asian nations to achieve an
effective collective security system. The ‘Nix.
on-Kissinger' strategy which calls for Asian
nations to form a collective buffer between the
US and China is not popular in Australia. Can-
berra considers a coherent regional security
system impossible because Japan, India, and
Indonesia, the three largest non-communist na
tions in Asia, are unwilling to assume promi-
nent roles in defense alliances. Australia would
prefer that the US maintain a military pres.
ence on China’s borders and retain its capabil.
ity for undertaking preventive operations in
SEA. However, eventually, both Australia and








38
the US must adjust to new objectives in Asia.
Military containment of China is no longer a
viable policy. The US and its allies must shift
to a diplomatic and political balancing of China
which will give regional institutions an oppor-
tunity to develop. A neutral, independent
Southeast Asia will be an effective instrument
in containing China.”
NEW ZEALAND AND ITS PACIFIC
NEIGHBORS, by Hans-Peter Stoffel, in Swiss
Review of World Affairs, v. 20, no. 9 (Decem-
ber 1970) 10–11.
“Since Captain Cook's landing two
hundred years ago New Zealand has main-
tained very close ties to its British ‘mother-
land.’ The majority of its immigrants still
come from Great Britain; the United Kingdom
continues to occupy first place in its foreign
trade statistics and Westminister’s attitudes on
international problems are equally weighty in
determining Auckland's foreign policy guide-
lines. But in conjunction with the discussion of
British entry into the Common Market and the
tangible economic upswing in Southeast Asia,
New Zealand’s attention is being drawn—vol-
untarily or of necessity—to its nearer neigh-
bors who, in the event of a narrowing of the
English market, might become new trading
partners.”
b. Australia and Collective Security of
the PSEA Region
AUSTRALIA: BASTION OF DEMOC-
RACY IN THE SOUTH PACIFIC, by Gene-
vieve Collins Linebarger, in World Affairs, v.
131, no. 3 (October, November, December
1968) 153–161. g
“Australia is politically a democracy
with a prime minister and an elected parlia-
ment on the British Commonwealth model . . .
Australia is in a more vulnerable position than
was the United States in regard to Asian im-
migration . . . Australian Prime Ministers
have cooperated successfully and to mutual
advantage with the United States . . .
Australia is a member of two multilateral trea-
ties affecting its relationship with the United
States. These are ANZUS (Australia-New Zea-
land-United States) and SEATO (South-East
Asia Treaty Organization, which involves Aus-
tralia, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, the
United States, France, Pakistan, the Philip-
pines and Thailand) . . . The only remaining
Asian forces of the SEATO community besides
Australia and New Zealand . . . are the Phil-
ippines and Thailand each of which has mili-
tary and strategic weaknesses, both as to nu-
merical force and deployment . . . Australia and
New Zealand—particularly Australia as it is
the larger of the two countries—have been
especially ardent in participating in SEATO
activities. This support of SEATO has been
one of the factors behind the aid given the
United States in Viet-Nam. Australia has fa-
vored collective security and in physical evi-
dence of this support has deployed military
forces in Malaysia and Thailand as well as in
South Viet-Nam . . . Since World War II there
has been a steady permanent Australian armed
forces, so that at present Australia has the
highest level and most effective defense force it
has ever had outside of wartime mobilization.
The leaders of the countries of Southeast Asia
know that Australia is ready to assist as neces-
sary in maintaining the security of those coun-
tries . . . Australia has not shirked its obliga-
tions as a democratic leader in the South Pa-
cific. It has given troops, financial aid and
training to its neighboring countries. It has
been concerned with the physical protection,
economic betterment, and the educational and
political development of the portion of New
Guinea which it administers. Australia is in-
deed an ally in democracy which the United
States should acknowledge proudly and grate-
fully.” - .
AUSTRALIAN NEWS-LETTER: AUS-
TRALIA'S ARMED FORCES, by Brig. F. W.
Speed, in The Army Quarterly and Defence
Journal, v. 97, no. 1 (October 1968) 30–37.
“Australia’s armed forces are at a
crossroads. Australia and New Zealand now
accept that in all probablility Britain will
withdraw militarily from South-East Asia by
1971. These two partners in the British Com-
monwealth Strategic Reserve in South-East
Asia, soon to be disbanded, hope it will be pos-
sible for Britain to keep its promise to take
part in major exercises after 1970; and they
are joined in this by Malaysia and Singapore.
The Australian Government’s policy on reten-
tion of its forces in the area has as yet not
emerged. Immediately after the new Prime
Minister (Mr. J. G. Gorton) took office, it
seemed that Australian troops might be pulled
39
back concurrently with the British with-
drawal, and that Australia would rely on mo-
bile formations in readiness on the mainland.
However, following Mr. Gorton’s first official
visit to South-East Asia, and the five-power
talks in Kuala Lumpur in June, it became evi-
dent that his views had matured. He seems now
to acknowledge that South-East Asia has a
more significant influence on Australia’s future
than he had at first appreciated and that Aus-
tralia must adhere to its defensive arrange-
ments within that area.” Australia's Strategic
Concept; Composition and Strength of the
Forces; Deployment; National Service; Inte-
gration-Unification; The Near Future.
AUSTRALIA’S NEW SEARCH FOR COL-
LECTIVE SECURITY, by Justus M. van der
Kroef, in Orbis, v. 13, no. 2 (Summer 1969)
526—555.
“At the end of August 1968, a “top se-
cret’ eighty-page ‘fundamental strategic reas-
sessment’ of Australia's defense policy, pre-
pared by the Defense and External Affairs
Departments in Canberra, was distributed for
study among the members of Prime Minister
John Gorton’s cabinet. The document, the es-
sential points of which . . . [are] summarized
. ., was designed to serve as a basis for the
government's position in future parliamentary
debates and national elections, culminating a
period of incisive interministerial discussions,
augmented by extensive press and other public
comment, on Australia's new defense and for-
eign policy needs in Southeast Asia. These dis-
cussions and commentaries, though part of the
seemingly endless and often intense public dis-
cussion about Australia's proper relationship
with her northwestern neighbors that has en-
livened the Australian political and academic
scenes, since the end of World War II, had in
‘recent months’ been quickened by a number of
factors. Among these, Britain’s accelerated
military withdrawal from Southeast Asia had
been perhaps the most important.”
6. Peninsular Southeast Asia and the United
States
a. Miscellaneous Aspects
ALTERNATIVE FUTURES FOR SOUTH-
EAST ASIA AND UNITED STATES POL-
ICY, in Orbis, (Spring 1971) 381–402.
Prof. Trager recommends an early ex-
Asian communist powers is imminent. The S0-
amination of US interests, commitments and
policy in Southeast Asia to determine the ex;
tent of our future cooperation with actual and
potential partners there . . . Except for North
Vietnam, Southeast Asia states, at the time of
their independence, opted for Western-style dé
mocracy. However, along with communist in.
surgency, several states have suffered from
ethnic or religious strife. They have also had
difficulty developing a foreign policy that
would guarantee external peace. Most have
sought and achieved membership in the United
Nations and signed treaties to provide for Col.
lective security. In these unstable conditions, it
has been quite an accomplishment for the non:
communist states to survive over two decades
of externally stimulated and supported insur.
gencies. The Nixon Doctrine calls for an over,
due examination of allies, friends, and foes
based on present conditions rather than on
those of the Truman era when many determi.
nations were made . . . In addition to Viet.
namization withdrawals, US personnel reduc.
tions in Korea, Thailand, Japan and the
Philippines will result in a total Asian reduc.
tion of 417,000 troops, which will emphasize the
US “lower profile’ approach. This is an extraor.
dinarily complicated and delicate task, consid:
ering there is no assurance that detente with
called Cold War has never been cold in
Asia during the past 25 years—in fact, its tem.
perature has risen continuously. Trager main-
tains the Nixon Administration has not defined
US interests in Asia as clearly as it has those
in Europe. He believes US interests are to: (1)
assist the independent states of free Asia to
maintain their security and stability; (2) pre-
vent these countries from being overrun by
communist aggressors; (3) encourage coopera-
tive ventures by these states to promote their
security, stability and living standards; (4)
prevent any one country, such as China or
Japan, from imposing hegemony over most of
Asia.”
AMERICA AND EAST ASIA: A NEW
THIRTY YEARS WAR.? by Richard Harris.
New York, George Braziller, 1968. 80 p. . .
“The current conflict between East Asia
and America is ideological. The US and China,
which has influenced other East Asian cul-
tures, believe that their view of man and soci-
40
ety is superior to that of other civilizations and
that anyone who challenges their beliefs is evil
or misguided . . . Since 1949, the conflict be-
tween China and the US has spread to other
East Asian countries. The US initially believed
that the Chinese Government was coupled with
the monolithic and domino theories of com-
munist expansion. However, communist coun-
tries do not form a single bloc and China, in
fact, gives little aid to independent revolution-
ary movements in East Asia . . . Because of its
original commitment to China, the US has
made of Chinese communism an enemy more vi-
cious than any other. As the old commitment
fades, China will no longer occupy a central
position in American thought. Communist ide-
ology, in some East Asian nations, has been
adapted to local needs, and it is thus not ex-
portable. Although a natural impulse toward
democracy exists in the rest of Asia, it does
not exist in East Asia. For the time being, East
Asia is going through a process of self-renewal
and a crisis of revulsion against the outside
world. It will take time for East Asia to de-
velop satisfactory relations with other nations.
The rest of the world must recognize and make
allowances for East Asia’s distinctiveness.”
AMERICAN POWER—ASIAN REALITY,
by Akira Iriye, in Interplay, (July 1968) 9–14.
“In the post-war period nationalism has
spread throughout Asia, accompanied by the
determination of Asians to be free of Western
domination. The US has been cast in the role
of a foreign power attempting to perpetuate
Western control of the Orient. However, ‘for
the United States to deny that it is an Asian
power is to forget its own history, and, indeed,
to ignore its own role in the making of his-
tory.’ Since the annexation of Hawaii and the
Philippines in 1898, the US has played an ever
expanding role in Asia. While this historic in-
volvement does not make continued US pres-
ence inevitable, in reality, the US cannot turn
its back on the Orient. Many Asians are im-
bued with Western ideas, and their mental
habits and outlooks are no longer ‘traditional’
or ‘Oriental.” Furthermore, since the Korean
War, the US, representing anti-communism in
Asia, has provided an increasing amount of ec-
onomic and military aid to non-communist
countries. These countries are turning more
and more frequently to the US as a major
trade partner and vital source of goods and
capital. In view of modern technological ad-
vances, population movement, and economic in-
terdependence among nations, it is doubtful
that Asia will ever revert to its pre-Western
phase of history. Any definition of ‘Asia” must
now include a Western presence. Despite con-
tinuing criticism, the US is involved in Viet-
nam ‘not as a Western nation, but as an Asian
power.” The status quo would be destroyed
without this American commitment.”
AMERICA’S ASIA; DISSENTING ES-
SAYS ON ASIAN-AMERICAN RELATIONS,
ed. by Edward Friedman & Mark Selden. New
York, Pantheon Books, 1971. 458 p.
“This book [with essays by various
authors] explores the . . . interaction between
American perceptions and American power,
power in the making and unmaking of contem-
porary Asia . . . [The] focus is at once Asia
and America.”
ASIA: HOW STAND THE DOMINOE 2 in
Newsweek, v. 78, no. 13 (27 September 1971)
47 plus.
“The very fact that an American Presi-
dent is actively seeking a détente with the rul-
ers of Communist China has wrought funda-
mental changes in the power balance of Asia.
“The Nixon visit,” says a Western diplomat
there, ‘means that we are seeing the removal
of rigid lines between non-Communists and
Communists, between the goodies and the bad-
dies.’ And with the possible exception of the
principals involved—the Americans and the
Chinese—no one will be so profoundly and di-
rectly affected by this development as the na-
tions of East and Southeast Asia. All ten of
Southeast Asia’s countries live in China’s
shadow. Three of them—North Vietnam, Laos
and Burma—have borders with China. Two of
them—Singapore and Malaysia—have huge
populations of Chinese descent. Most of the
countries have Maoist guerrilla movements,
and four—North and South Vietnam; Laos
and Cambodia—are directly positioned in
Southeast Asia’s war zone. Except for North
Vietnam, all have lived directly or tacitly
under the American umbrella. And now that
this protective umbrella is being at least par-
tially withdrawn, all of them are faced with
major political readjustments. NEWSWEEK's
Hong Kong bureau chief Maynard Parker last
41
week completed an extensive tour of all the
Southeast Asian lands outside the Indochina
peninsula . . . He reports on how these coun-
tries are adjusting to the new realities. In a
companion piece, former U.S. Under Secretary
of State George W. Ball discusses the larger
implications of the changing U.S. policy in
Asia and the special impact of Mr. Nixon's
China initiative on Japan.”
THE ASIAN BALANCE OF POWER: AN
AMERICAN VIEW, by William Chapin. Lon-
don, The Institute for Strategic Studies, April
1967. 12 p. (Adelphi Papers Number Thirty-
five.)
“Asia seems fated to be the main centre
of world tension for years to come. Its political
conflicts are as difficult to resolve as they are
dangerous to peace, and Asia, unlike most of
the rest of the world, has only an uncertain re-
lation to the central balance of power in which
the United States and the Soviet Union play
the dominant roles. This central balance can
never fully cover Asia (Asia is too big and too
important for that). But it is also unlikely that
Asia will develop any really independent bal-
ance system, for the United States as well as
the Soviet Union will probably remain heavily
involved in Asian affairs for a long time to
come. The important task now is to work to-
wards a limited regional balance of power in
which Asian states [including those of Penin-
Sular Southeast Asia] assume greater respon-
siblity for the peace of their continent and the
freedom of the smaller states . . . Almost all
Asian countries border on China or are reason-
ably close to it, and with China’s emergence as
a united and strong power the Middle Kingdom
has again become the country around which
the politics of Asia revolve.”
ASIAN DILEMMA: UNITED STATES,
JAPAN AND CHINA, ed. by Elaine Burnell.
Santa Barbara, Calif., Center for the Study of
Democratic Institutions, 1969, 236 p.
“US policy in Asia has failed. The
American tendency to associate Asian anti-pov-
erty efforts with communism has created anti-
American feeling and driven Asian nations
into the communist camp, and the American
effort to establish cooperative governments in
order to contain China has led to a confronta-
tion with China . . . The American policy to
contain and isolate China is based on the myth.
of an aggressive China, but Chinese foreign
policy is basically defensive. Although China.
has acted in Tibet and India to demarcate and
stabilize its frontiers, it has not tried to expand
. . China resents the American re.
fusal to treat it as an equal and sees the Ameri-
can containment policy as a threat: its actions.
in Korea, Vietnam, and other Asian nations are
by force .
designed to prevent American encirclement,
Rather than try to isolate China, the US.
should help bring China into the community of
nations Although a reduction of the
American role in Asia is recommended, com.
plete withdrawal might lead to war in Korea,
confrontations such as that between Indonesia
and Malaysia, and Japanese rearmament. The
American presence assures freedom of the seas
for Japan, protection for South Korea, and de-
terrence of overt aggression. The future role of
the US in Asia should be defined in large part
by Japan, which should become the senior
member of the Japanese-US partnership,
Japan is capable of assuring its own defense
against a conventional threat but cannot take
over all of the current US responsibility in the
area. Japan is also in a better position than the
US to lead China into the community of na-
tions, since it has cultural and economic rela-
tions with China which are supported by
public opinion and a greater interest in Asian
stability than the US.”
BETWEEN TWO WORLDS: POLICY,
PRESS AND PUBLIC OPINION IN ASIAN.
AMERICAN RELATIONS, by John Hohen.
berg. New York, Praeger, 1967. 507 p.
“This book is based upon interviews
with both Asians and Americans—policy-mak
ers, newsmen, and the public. A tabulation of
responses to questionnaires by 91 correspon-
dents in Asia covers their working conditons,
the credibility of their news sources, and the
possibilities for improvements in the Asian-
American news exchange.”
A BROAD LOOK AT OUR ASIAN POL.
ICY, by Edwin O. Reischauer, in The New
York Times Magazine (10 March 1968) 23"
plus.
“The US has exaggerated its interests
in Asia and its capacity to deal with them. The
goal of building ‘military dikes' against com:
H
42
munism in Asia is not only unnecessary, but
also impossible . . . The ‘frenetic’ effort to
bring stability to Asia has actually inhibited
the development of an effective international
response. Most countries now expect the US to
undertake the responsibility for maintaining
stability in any situation. The US may well
have to bear a major share of the burden for
stability in the less developed world, but it can
no longer do it alone. A new policy in Asia
could consist of a ‘more-than-SEATO-like' ap-
proach, in that it would be international rather
than regional in origin, organization, and
objectives. Yet, it would be a “less-than-SEA-
TO-like' approach in that its commitment
would be limited to a general international
framework of peace and stability. Such a pol-
icy would reduce the US military involvement
in Asia to a minor supporting role and allow
more productive involvement in economic and
technological assistance. The danger of Soviet
or Chinese domination in Asia seems remote
because of the poverty, backwardness and vio-
lent nationalism in the area. Yet, if either the
Chinese or Russians prove to be such ‘super-
men' as to overcome these difficulties, “we mere
mortals obviously could not compete with them
and might as well make obeisance ourselves’.”
CONTAINMENT IN ASIA RECONSID-
ERED, by David P. Mozingo, in World Poli-
tics (April 1967) 361–377.
“The US attempt to apply the policy of
‘containment’ to Asia is a conspicuous failure.
By portraying Peking as the greatest threat to
Asia's security, the US has tried to build a
united anti-China front similar to the anti-So-
viet bloc formed by NATO. The parallels, how-
ever, are weak and most Asian leaders remain
unconvinced: (1) Newly formed Asian states
fear their more immediate and historic ene-
mies more that they fear the Chinese. (2)
China has not fomented internal revolution in
any Asian nation which has not aligned itself
with the anti-China clique. (3) Russia, the US,
Japan, and India have strong influence
throughout Asia and there is no ‘power vac-
uum' such as existed in Europe immediately
after World War II. (4) Communist parties
which have attained power in other Asian na-
tions have not become “satellites of Peking,” but
have proved to be nationalistic and ofter harder
for the Chinese to handle than the weak
non-communist regimes which preceded them.
(5) No communist party has been successful
in its bid for power where the non-communist
elite has had the support of the native
population. The greatest asset communist
movements in Asia possess is not Chinese
support, but the corruption and lack of pro-
gressiveness among the non-communist ruling
factions. US policies assume that American
ideals of freedom and democracy are natural
outgrowths of Asian political structures—if
only the Chinese are contained, democracy will
flourish. But most Asian nations have no tradi-
tion of political freedom and the alternative to
communism is usually equally as unrepresenta-
tive as rightist military or aristocratic control.
In these instances, the communists often win
popular support because of their reform ideol-
ogy and dedication . . .”
THE FUTURE UNITED STATES ROLE
IN ASIA AND IN THE PACIFIC. HEAR-
INGS BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON
ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS, OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, NINE-
TIETH CONGRESS, SECOND SESSION,
FEBRUARY 29, MARCH 4, 7, 13, 14, 19, 20,
APRIL 4, 1968. Washington, Government
Printing Office, 1968.
Includes an assessment also of the fu-
ture role of the US in Peninsular Southeast
Asia. s &
LEGACY OF THE COLD WAR IN INDO-
CHINA, by Townsend Hoopes, in Foreign Af-
fairs (July 1970) 601–616.
“The cold war legacy led the present
generation of US political leaders to allow the
country to become enmeshed in the Indochina
morass . . . After Korea, it was almost inevita-
ble that the US would view the impending
French departure from Indochina as merely
the opening of another avenue for communist
expansion in Asia. We could not envision local,
independent communist action. We had little
perception that we might be frustrating a
widely supported national independence move-
ment by lending our aid and prestige to colo-
nial puppets who could not gain significant
support from the Vietnamese people, and who
could not govern without the direct presence of
a large US expeditionary force. Our judgment
43
then reflected the historical and political truth
for America at the time, for it was based on di-
rect encounters with Stalinism at many stra-
tegic points on the globe. The tragedy has been
that the US response to the cold war led us
progressively to action beyond the rational re-
quirements of our national security. The
Chinese communist menace was inflated, and
the American defense line drawn through
Southeast Asia. Notwithstanding changes in
the communist situation between 1954 and
1964, American policy in Vietnam was based
on the proposition that the expansion of “Inter-
national Communism’ presented everywhere a
direct menace to US security and had to be
stopped by whatever means necessary . . . Al-
though US policies toward Southeast Asia
were well intentioned and pursued in the earn-
est belief of defending freedom, American
leaders failed to grasp that the US interest in
Southeast Asia is limited, not vital . . . Presi-
dent Nixon had the opportunity to take definite
steps toward liquidating the war during his
first months in office, without political risks for
himself. It was the chance to lead the nation
firmly away from a decade of self-deception in
Indochina, to admit a national mistake and by
that cleansing act begin to restore the national
balance . . . The decision to invade Cambodia
brought to a climax an already growing crisis
of confidence in the national leadership. The
President underestimated the risks of his policy
for the continued cohesion of our society. It
showed that the Indochina issue is a virulent
poison in the national bloodstream, reaching
all segments of the population, but permeating
those citizens under 25 years of age who are
called upon to do the actual fighting and who
by 1975 will comprise nearly half the popula-
tion. It made clear the grave peril of extending
our national preoccupation with the Indochina
war for an indefinite period. There is rapidly
widening agreement in the Congress, the press,
the intelligentsia, and even in the silent major-
ity that (1) the US does not and cannot control
events in Southeast Asia, and neither can the
Russians or the Chinese; (2) the US has no
vital interest at stake in Indochina, and it can
accept and adjust to whatever outcome is ar-
rived at by the people who live there; (3) the
US must wholly terminate its military role in
Indochina, by the end of 1971 at the very lat-
est, or else accept grave risks of national disin-
tegration; and (4) our elected leaders can ex.
tricate the country from Vietnam with reason.
able poise and dignity, without a traumatic
loss of self-confidence, and without a lapse into
mindless isolation.” ºf
THE NEW MULTIPOLAR BALANCE IN.
EAST ASIA: IMPLICATIONS FOR UNITED
STATES POLICY, by A. Doak Barnett, in The
Annals (July 1970) 73–84. . º
“The Sino-Soviet conflict, the re-emerg.
ence of Japan, and the trend toward a reduced
US military role in East Asia is producing a
new four-power balance in the area which may
be an improvement over the past bilateral bal.
ance. The new balance may reduce the danger
of local conflicts escalating into confrontations
between major powers. Although a Sino-Soviet
war or a decision by Japan to “go nuclear'
could upset the new balance, the US should use
its influence to prevent these occurrences, im-
plement the Guam Doctrine, and adjust its pol-
icies in the area . . . The Southeast Asian na
tions are already beginning to adjust to this
new situation and are realizing that they must
assume larger responsibilities for solving their
domestic and foreign policy problems, and
must widen their international relation. The
main danger to stability of the region is likely
to come not from actions by any big power but
from North Vietnamese pressures against its
immediate neighbors. What happens there will
depend on whether compromise political settle.
ments can be reached for Vietnam, Laos, and
Cambodia that have the backing of the big
powers. This new balance should facilitate US
efforts to move gradually toward implementa.
tion of the Guam Doctrine. Although its Sev.
enth Fleet and Polaris submarines will have to
continue providing a nuclear deterrent, and it
will need to retain some bases in East Asia,
these bases can be reduced. It must avoid direct
use of US combat forces in local conflicts
which do not involve external aggression by a
major power. It should approve multilateral
political and economic involvements and strive
for agreements among the major powers toº
forgo military intervention in areas such as
Southeast Asia . . .” -
THE NEXT DECADE IN AMERICAN
FOREIGN POLICY, by Charles Maechling,
44
Jr., in The Virginia Quarterly Review (Sum-
mer 1969) 369–385.
“The world is entering a new and peril-
ous era of international relations. Western in-
fluence is declining in Asia and Africa, the post-
war system of anticommunist alliances is
deteriorating, and the political and military im-
portance of the Third World is rising. Fluidity
and polycentrism are likely to be the hallmark
of the next decade . . . The short-range picture
is not very encouraging. It portrays a decline
in the relative strength of the West vis-à-vis
the Third World. A concomitant factor is the
progressive degeneration in the global system
of public order. Thus, the US faces the ‘agoniz-
ing reappraisal' predicted by the late John
Foster Dulles. The US will have to come to
terms with the limitation of its power. Three
major options are available to the US. It can
disregard the great alteration in the world
power equation. It can liquidate its more un-
realistic commitments. Or it can seek a tran-
sient politico-military accommodation with the
Soviet Union or China. None of the choices are
satisfactory, but the first would be disastrous.
The first task of the new Administration
should be to make an objective assessment of
the US position in the world. A next step must
be an evaluation of national resources. Third,
the US must decide what kind of defense es-
tablishment it needs in light of altered require-
ments. It is likely that the range of US com-
mitments overseas will be reduced drastically.
US foreign policy will become more restrained
in both word and deed. There will be no per-
manent allies, only permanent interests. Gra-
tuitous and doctrinaire espousal of African and
Asian “liberation movements’ at the expense of
good relations with European governments
will be jetisoned. Military strategy will center
on command of the sea and strategic mobility
y?
ſe
THE PROMISE OF THE NEW ASIA;
UNITED STATES POLICY IN THE FAR
EAST AS STATED BY PRESIDENT JOHN-
SON ON HIS PACIFIC JOURNEY. Washing-
ton, Department of State, 1966. 64 p. (Publica-
tion 8166).
“From his takeoff at Dulles Interna-
tional Airport in Virginia [18 October 1966],
to his most distant landing in Malaysia, Presi-
dent Johnson passed through 8 countries and
12 times zones . . . Though the war in Viet-
Nam is immediate issue which drew the Presi-
dent of the United States, and six allied Chiefs
of State, to Manila, the larger issue was the de-
velopment of the Pacific era. Out of the Manila
Conference came a historic declaration of prin-
ciples expressing the hope of the Pacific peo-
ples for an end to war between men and mean-
ingful progress in man’s ancient war against
poverty, illiteracy, and disease. As war was
discussed, it was the war of the shield, not the
sword. As peace was discussed, it was the
peace of reconciliation, not of conquest. Presi-
dent Johnson at each stage of his journey
spelled out American support of the common
goals of the Pacific peoples. In Manila he again
committed the people and resources of the
United States to stand firm against aggression
and to aid those who wish to build. In New
Zealand, Australia, the Philippines, South
Viet-Nam, Thailand, Malaysia, and Korea, he
stressed American determination that the
dawn of the Pacific era shall be a dawn of
peace.”
THE PROMISE OF THE NEW ASIA;
UNITED STATES POLICY IN THE FAR
EAST AS STATED BY PRESIDENT JOHN-
SON ON HIS PACIFIC JOURNEY. Washing-
ton, Department of State, 1966. 64 p. (Publica-
tion 8166, Far Eastern Series 152.)
Out of the journey which began October
17 “came a historic declaration of principles
expressing the hope of the Pacific peoples for
an end to war between men and meaningful
progress in man’s ancient war against poverty,
illiteracy, and disease . . . President Johnson
at each stage of his journey spelled out Ameri-
can support of the common goals of the Pacific
peoples. In Manila he again committed the peo-
ple and resources of the United States to stand
firm against aggression and to aid those who
wish to build. In New Zealand, Australia, the
Philippines, South Viet-Nam, Thailand, Malay-
sia, and Korea, he stressed American determi-
nation that the dawn of the Pacific era shall be
a dawn of peace.” -
RESPONSIBILITY FOR ASIA; PASSING
THE BUCK TO TOKYO, by Albert Axelbank,
in The Nation, v. 211, no. 10 (5 October 1970)
293–295. . .
“The U.S. State Department and the
45
Pentagon are convinced that Japan is now
strong enough to take over some of the less
flammable “responsibilities of American power’
in Asia. Japan has demonstrated an ability to
do so and is preparing for an expanded role in
Asian security . . . This will mean in practice
that the United States and Japan will exert
complementary power to carry out a joint
Asian policy. At first, America will provide the
military power, Japan the economic. It will be
a one-two punch, a continuing and mighty at-
tempt to stop the ally. Japan will take over
more functions from the Americans. This joint
strategy, to be increasingly shouldered by
Tokyo, means that the present split in Korea,
the Taipei-Peking impasse, and what may be
called the ‘permanent flux’ in Indochina, are to
be regarded as static arrangements for the
1970s. Such being the case, it is natural that
America wishes the Japanese nation to forsake
any hope for a change in the status quo in East
Asia; and to make, on the contrary, a deter-
mined drive to preserve it. Yet to preserve the
existing order in the region means that Japan
must involve itself much more intimately as a
leader in a regional collective security system.
At present, no more than fledgling interrela-
tions exist, with Washington’s backing and
blessing. But only a regional power, it is said,
and only one with super-power status—which
Japan now has or soon will have—can effec-
tively lead and defend the anti-Communist re-
gimes. Furthermore, all hope for a solution to
the ‘China problem’ in the 1970s must be post-
poned, for by 1975, it is officially anticipated,
the expanded system of regional security in
the Far East will be operating full-blast, with
Japan as the fulcrum. This is the goal of mili-
tary men in most of the countries of non-Com-
munist Asia.”
SHOULD THE U.S. WITHDRAW FROM
ASIA 2 by Owen Harries, in Foreign Affairs,
(October 1968) 15–25. -
“. . . . Vietnam critics usually argue
that US military forces should never again be
engaged on the SEA mainland because the re-
gion is not strategically important to the US or
to the world balance of power. Yet for 20
years, Britain, France, Russia, China, and the
US have acted as if they had meaningful inter-
ests in SEA. In addition, events in SEA affect
Japan, India, and Indonesia, whose futures are
surely important to the major powers. It seems
apparent, therefore, that the critics are more
interested in changing the region's significance.
than in evaluating it. The dissenters believe
that a US military commitment to the SEA
mainland is counterproductive and doomed to
failure. Some contend that the Chinese are des.
tined to rule the region, while others maintain
that China is not a threat to its neighbors and,
therefore, US forces are not needed to contain
it; still others argue that any military commit.
ment is irrelevant since local social and politi.
cal conditions are the decisive factors in the
outcome of a struggle. But they cannot have it
both ways. If China is viewed as attempting to
take over the region, a military response is not
‘inappropriate.’ And a massive intervention by
the Chinese would not necessarily be a decisive
disadvantage if it is indeed true that only local
social and economic factors will determine the
outcome. Many critics of the domino theory
stress the individuality of each Asian nation in
assessing its susceptibility to subversion with- i.
out realizing that the military effectiveness of
the US will also vary with the ability of the
Asian nation to defend itself. Experience, such
as that of the British in Malaya, proves that
generalizations about the ineffectivenss and
counter-productiveness of a foreign military
presence in SEA are frequently incorrect. It is
also invalid to separate military and political
responses as if they were mutually exclusive;
the fact that a struggle may be primarily polit.
ical does not necessarily mean that the mili-
tary factor is irrelevant . . .”
SOUTHEAST ASIA IN UNITED STATES
POLICY, by Russell H. Fifield. New York,
Praeger, 1963. 488 p. (Published for the Coun-
cil on Foreign Relations.)
“This book seeks to set forth current
conditions and problems and develop a ratio-
nale for American policy in Southeast Asia in
the years ahead, suggesting guidelines for
making it applicable through different instru.
mentalities. Since specific policy goals will
vary with time, the changing circumstances,
and the countries involved, it, examines the
constants and variables, the continuities and
the possible developments.” The contents: di.
mensions of the challenge; evolutions of US
policy; Communist China in Southeast Asia;
the American military posture; SEATO; indi.
46
rect aggression: challenge and response;
Southeast Asia diplomacy and US involve-
ment; the economic dynamics of stability; the
United States and Southeast Asian leadership;
cohesion of the West: difficulties and adjust-
ments; counterweight potential of India and
Japan; and US policy for the future. Con-
cludes: “If the recent past is a measure of the
future, the next ten years will bring marked
changes in the American outlook on Asia. The
United States has generally focused its foreign
policy on Europe, but the coming developments
in the Far East may well contribute to a grad-
ual shift in orientation, thus fulfilling the
prophecies of a number of prominent Ameri-
cans long since dead. In the pattern that is
emerging in world politics the United States
will continue to need Asian friends and many
states in the Far East will want the support of
, Washington. The United States must be will-
ing and able to assist the Southeast Asians in
measuring up to the manifold challenges of
Communist China. With the possible help of
India and Japan as Asian counterweights and
with the support of Australia, New Zealand,
and Great Britain and Western associates, the
United States should eventually achieve a real
measure of success in trying to create condi-
tions where the countries of Southeast Asia,
through their individual and collective efforts,
will be able to develop into strong, stable and
responsible members of the world community.”
SOUTHEAST ASIA TOMORROW: PROB-
LEMS AND PROSPECTS FOR U.S. POLICY,
by Melvin Gurtov. Baltimore, The Johns Hop-
kins Press, 1970. 114 p.
“Gurtov, a member of the Social Sci-
ences Department of The Rand Corporation,
suggests that the vital U.S. interests in Asia
are the defense of Japan, Korea, Aus-
tralia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Thai-
land and Taiwan and the easing of tensions
with Communist China. Nonvital interests are
Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia, Burma, Viet
Nam, Laos and Cambodia. He proposes certain
changes in American perceptions of Southeast
Asia and in policies to deal with instability
there; takes issue with the notion that the out-
come in Vietnam will critically affect regional
security and the future of ‘wars of national
liberation’; and explores such issues as China’s
foreign policy and nuclear capability, Soviet
interests in the region, Japan’s expanding role,
and the prospects for regional cooperation.”
TOWARD DISENGAGEMENT IN ASIA:
A STRATEGY FOR AMERICAN FOREIGN
POLICY, by Bernard K. Gordon. Englewood
Cliffs, N.J., Prentice-Hall, 1969. 186 p.
“American goals in Asia since 1894
have been the prevention of hegemony by a
hostile power and the establishment of a re-
gional balance of power. The US has been will-
ing to go to war to prevent first Japanese then
Chinese hegemony, but the Government has
justified this policy in terms of protecting
American nationals and trade, and supporting
an orderly process of change . . . By promot-
ing cooperation and economic development and
supporting the re-emergence of Japan, the US
has opened the possibility of the establishment
of a multibloc system in the 1970s, ending the
present confrontation between China and the
US in the area. A new perception of Commu-
nist China and the development problems of
smaller states has led Southeast Asia to an in-
terest in cooperation on development projects
in order to make subversion more difficult. The
logical organization to carry out this program
is the Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN). Unlike SEATO, it is an indigenous
neutral organization capable of political, cul-
tural, and economic, as well as military, coordi-
nation. Its members—Japan, Thailand, the
Philippines, Malaysia, and Indonesia—recog-
nize that the primary. responsibility for de-
fense cooperation belongs to Southeast Asia,
but they realize that assistance from the US
and Australia is needed to maintain their mili-
tary capability. With Japanese economic aid,
the Southeast Asians could provide and equip a
30–35,000-man counterinsurgency force. Given
reasonable goals and the assistance of Japan,
the US, and Australia, a meaningful defense
cooperative could be formed by the 1970s. An
ASEAN counterinsurgency force would be an
appropriate response to the likely ranges of
threat in SEA and serve to counterbalance, not
to contain, China . . . America must rely more
and more on proxies such as Australia and
Japan to achieve its objective of providing for
the security of SEA without provoking Com-
munist China.”
UNBIND YOUR SONS: THE CAPTIVITY
47
OF AMERICA IN ASIA, by Alex Campbell.
New York, Liveright, 1970. 366 p.
“The Truman and Eisenhower Doc-
trines were initially designed to stop commu-
nist Russia but after 1949 the US decided that
it was necessary to contain communist China.
The US erroneously believed that China was a
strong military power and that it planned to
take over Asia before attacking the US. It has
since maintained this anti-Chinese theory de-
spite the fact that Chinese military ventures
have always been limited and are unlikely in
the future because of the Sino-Soviet split . . .
Most Asians are convinced that US policy in
Asia is wrong, and that it is a mistake for the
US to concentrate on communism, which in
their view is just one of several problems in
Asia and not a major one. They do not believe
in the domino theory and do not want Ameri-
can military protection; they are reluctant to
join anti-communist military alliances and are
allergic to American military bases.
American bases are unwanted and resented as
an affront to Asian nationalism. Instead of mil-
itary protection from a great power, most
Asians seek practical political and economic
arrangements to enable them to improve their
living conditions. They are willing to receive
aid from both East and West, but they refuse
to choose between socialism and capitalism.
Most Asian nations are developing economic
systems which combine elements of both so-
cialism and capitalism. Unless the US recog-
nizes that nationalism and the desire for mod-
ernization, not communism, are the key forces
in Asia, it will not be able to adopt an effective
Asian policy . . .”
UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY,
1969–1970; A REPORT OF THE SECRE-
TARY OF STATE. Washington, Department
of State, March 1971. 617 p. (Publication 8575,
General Foreign Policy Series 254.)
Includes a report on 1969–1970 US For-
eign policy in Southeast Asia, among other re-
gions of the world.
THE U.S. POLICY AND THE SECURITY
OF ASIA, by Fred Greene. New York,
McGraw-Hill, 1968. 429 p. (Published for the
Council on Foreign Relations.)
This is the eighth volume in the series
on the United States and China in World Af-
fairs, which is being sponsored by the Council
on Foreign Relations. “In this study Professor
Fred Greene has undertaken the exceedingly
difficult assignment of examining American se,
curity interests in Asia . . . His approach has
been to see the problems of national security
within the context of dynamically changing
Asia . . .” Part I. U.S. SECURITY INTER.
ESTS IN ASIA: 1. The Scope of Security Com.
siderations; 2. Perspectives of the U.S. In
volvement in Asia; Part 3. The Vital Interest;
A Balance of Power in Asia; 4. Problems of Im.
plementing a Balance of Power in Asia. Part
II. THE AMERICAN TREATY SYSTEM: 5,
The Chronology of Treaty-Making; 6. The
Western Pacific Allies; 7. The SEATO Area;
8. The Indian Subcontinent; 9. Problems of the
American Presence; 10. Fear of American
Changes and Withdrawal. Part III. THE
COMMUNIST TREAT IN ASIA: 11. Asian
and Western Views; 12. Force in Chinese Di-
plomacy; Threat from Hanoi. Part IV. THE
NUCLEAR FACTOR: 14. China as a Nuclear
Power; 15. Proliferation, Arms Control, and
the Future Balance in Asia. Part V. PAT.
TERNS AND PROBLEMS FOR AMERICAN |
SECURITY .POLICY IN ASIA: 16. Allies,
Neutrals, and American Security Policy; 17.
United States Policy and China.
WHERE DOES BRITAIN'S RETREAT
FROM THE EAST LEAVE US? by Gerald L.
Steibel, in American Legion Magazine (May
1968) 12–17.
“British military withdrawal from the
Far East and the Persian Gulf creates serious
security problems for the US. These regions
are strategically and economically important,
but many of the governments in the areas are
not stable, intra-regional disputes abound, and
wide-scale poverty makes the countries ripe for
communist exploitation. The US would like the
states formerly protected by the British to de-
velop regional defense alliances with minimal
US participation. Malaysia has suggested a
‘Commonwealth Brigade' made up of itself,
Singapore, Australia, and New Zealand, with
Britain as backstop. Also, the ASEAN na-
tions—Thailand, the Philippines, Indonesia,
Malaysia, and Singapore—have considered ex-
tending their economic association to include
defense arrangements. However, there are
problems in both proposals. Australia and New
48
Zealand have limited resources and will not
bind themselves to any regional defense alli-
ance unless the US is strongly committed.
Thailand and Singapore, the anchor points of
the system, are strongly anti-communist, but if
the US shows signs of wavering in its Asian
commitment, they might become “neutrals,’ and
reach an accommodation with the communists.
Pres. Marcos of the Philippines organized
ASEAN but he will face strong domestic oppo-
sition if he tries to evolve it into a defense
pact; and to complicate matters, both Singa-
pore and Malaysia mistrust Indonesia, which
has not completely abandoned its territorial
claims against them . . .”
b. The Niacom Doctrine
THE NIXON DOCTRINE AND OUR
ASIAN COMMITMENTS, by Earl C. Ravenal,
in Foreign Affairs, v. 49, no. 2 (January 1971)
201–217.
“Eighteen months after its enunciation
at Guam the Nixon Doctrine remains obscure
and contradictory in its intent and application.
It is not simply that the wider pattern of war
in Indochina challenges the Doctrine’s promise
of a lower posture in Asia. More than that,
close analysis and the unfolding of events ex-
pose some basic flaws in the logic of the Ad-
ministration’s evolving security policy for the
new decade. The Nixon Doctrine properly in-
cludes more than the declaratory policy orien-
tation. It comprises also the revised worldwide
security strategy of “1 1/2 wars’ and the new
defense decision-making processes such as
‘fiscal guidance budgeting.” These elements
have received little comment, especially in
their integral relation to our commitments in
Asia. But the effects of this Administration’s
moves in these areas will shape and constrain
the choices of the United States for a long time
to come. The President’s foreign policy decla-
ration of February 1970 promised that “our in-
terests, our foreign policy objectives, our strat-
egies and our defense budgets are being
brought into balance—with each other and
with our overall national priorities.” After a
decade of burgeoning military spending and
entanglement in foreign conflict, the nation has
welcomed the vision of lower defense budgets
balanced by a reduction in American involve-
ment overseas, particularly in Asia. Actually,
however, the Administration's new policies and
decision processes do not bring about the pro-
posed balance; in fact, they create a more seri-
ous imbalance. Essentially we are to support
the same level of potential involvement with
smaller conventional forces. The specter of in-
tervention will remain, but the risk of defeat or
stalemate will be greater; or the nuclear
threshold will be lower. The fundamental is-
sues of interests, commitments and alliances
are not resolved.”
NIXON DOCTRINE IN AMERICA’S
ASIAN POLICY, by Sung Wen-ming, in Asian
Outlook, v. 5, no. 5 (May 1970) 15–17.
“On the eve of his visit to countries in
Asia on July 25, 1969, President Nixon issued
a statement of Guam which later became
known to the world as the Guam Doctrine or
the Nixon Doctrine. It has now become the pri-
mary foundation stone of America’s policy to-
ward Asia. Although Nixon's statement was
made in a casual manner, and the press was
not allowed to quote him, later events proved
that his statement was not made on the spur of
the moment and that it truly represented the
basic Asian policy of the present administra-
tion. According to Nixon, the primary signifi-
cance of this so-called Nixon Doctrine was that
the United States will keep all its treaty com-
mitments with Asian nations but will not add
new commitments. As to the internal security
of these nations, unless it involves a nuclear
threat by a major power, the United States
will encourage and hope that Asian nations
will shoulder their own responsibilities. Here-
after, U.S. support and assistance to Asia will
be primarily economic.”
THE NIXON DOCTRINE IN SOUTHEAST
ASIA, by Richard Butwell, in Current History,
v. 61, no. 364 (December 1971) 321–326 plus.
“Evaluating the effects of the Nixon
Doctrine on insular Southeast Asia and on
mainland Southeast Asia, our . . . author con-
cludes that “The Nixon Doctrine—in its appli-
cation to other parts of Asia and the world as
well as to Southeast Asia—may turn out to be
one of the most valuable shifts in United
States foreign policy in several decades' . . .
The American role in Southeast Asia has not
changed dramatically as a result of the Nixon
Doctrine. The preliminary outline of the new
49
policy was revealed on Guam in July, 1969,
when President Richard M. Nxon was en route
to meetings with leaders of the Philippines,
Thailand and Indonesia. The number of Ameri-
can fighting men in Vietnam has decreased by
nearly two-thirds in the two years since the
President signaled a reduced military role for
the United States in the area. But the United
States still plays a key role in support of the
anti Communist South Vietnamese regime; it
has become a major prop of the Cambodian
government of Lon Nol; and it has enlarged its
participation in the war in Laos since 1969.
The American commitment to Thailand, em-
bodied in the 1954 Manila Treaty and in a 1962
United States-Thai bilateralization of their
SEATO defense relationship, has not been al-
tered. United States forces mainly airmen en-
gaged in the air war over Vietnam and Laos,
have been reduced nearly 40 per cent, and
United States aid to the Thai has dropped
since President Nixon's Guam press confer-
ence. But the United States is still Thailand’s
number one ally, her chief source of foreign
assistance and, possibly more than ever before,
the Bangkok government's main hope that the
Communist wars afflicting neighboring Laos
and Cambodia will not spill over into Thai-
land.”
PERSPECTIVE ON ASIA: THE NEW U.S.
DOCTRINE AND SOUTHEAST ASIA. RE-
PORT OF SENATOR MIKE MANSFIELD
[UPON COMPLETION OF TRIP TO
SOUTHEAST ASIA] TO THE COMMITTEE
ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, UNITED
STATES SENATE. Washington, Government
Printing Office, 1969, 15 p.
The President’s New Asian Doctrine;
Reactions to the New Asian Doctrine; The
New Doctrine and Southeast Asian Countries
(The Philippines, Indonesia, Burma, Cam-
bodia, and Laos); etc.
SELECTIVE NONINVOLVEMENT IN
SOUTHEAST ASIA: US SECURITY POL-
ICY IN THE SEVENTIES, by Bernard K.
Gordon. McLean, Va., Research Analysis
Corp., 1970. 28 p. (Paper—RAC–P–59.)
“In all global regions, the nations
[including those of Peninsular Southeast Asia]
closely tied to the US find it essential to shape
their foreign and defense policies for the
1970's in the light of President Nixon's Guam.
Doctrine. Probably the concern is greatesti
among the nations bordering the Pacific, par.
ticularly in Southeast Asia. Demands for with
drawal from that region have been current for
some time in the US, and there is every reason.
to believe that US policy makers will strive tº
avoid any recurrence of the difficulties and
frustrations that have accompanied US efforts |
in Vietnam. But what of Southeast Asia after ||
Vietnam 2 Does major US concern with that
region essentially come to an end when the
Vietnam effort has been brought to a resolu-
tion? Is there likely to be a need for continued
US concern with the defense and security prob-
lems of the region, and if so, are there direc.
tions for US policy which need to be identified
at the beginning of the decade?” With bibliog.
raphy. .
SETTING THE COURSE THE FIRST
YEAR; MAJOR POLICY STATEMENTS BY
PRESIDENT RICHARD NIXON. New York,
Funk & Wagnalls, 1970. 500 p.
Includes references to Cambodia, Laos,
and Thailand.
SHOULD THE UNITED STATES RE-
TAIN A MILITARY PRESENCE IN EU-
ROPE AND ASIA 2 by Robert L. Pfaltzgraff,
Jr., in The Annals (September 1971) 1–10.
“Mr. Pfaltzgraff maintains that,
whereas the 1950s and 1960s were decades in
which the US made its military presence felt
around the world, the 1970s will be a decade of
constricting US defense commitments abroad
. . . The Nixon Doctrine, Pfaltzgraff says, rec-
ognizes the need to adopt a “lower profile' in
our foreign policy, assuming that the era of
US strategic supremacy and global involve-
ment has ended. Under the new strategy, the
US will ‘maintain in peacetime general pur-
pose forces adequate for simultaneously meet-
ing a major Communist attack in either
Europe or Asia, assisting allies against non-
Chinese threats in Asia, and contending with
a contingency elsewhere.” This new posture as-
sumes a series of power centers will supplement
or replace US capabilities in Europe and the
rimlands of Asia . . . In Asia, the US must
rely on small, highly mobile, naval forces rather
than on land-based forces for counterin-
surgency operations. The limited US military
50
presence in Asia will require greater diplo-
matic ingenuity to ensure a distribution of
power satisfactory to US interests . . .”
THE UNITED STATES As A PACIFIC
POWER, by William C. Johnstone, in Current
History (April 1970) 193 plus.
“In 1852, before he became Secretary of
State under Abraham Lincoln, William H. Se-
ward declared that he could foresee the day
when the Pacific Ocean rather than the Atlan-
tic would become the chief theater of events
for America. However, with the exception of
China, the US showed little interest in the area
before Pearl Harbor. World War II and the
subsequent communist victory on mainland
China extended US Pacific interests and en-
larged those interests to cover not only the
whole Pacific area but most of the Asian conti-
nent . . . The key states in the [U.S.] alliance
system are Japan, Australia and New Zealand.
All are important industrialized states, share
with the US an interest in the future economic
and political stability of the area, and are free
of insurgencies that have plagued Asian states
since 1945. However, the alliances with South
Korea, Taiwan the Philippines, and Thailand
contribute very little to US military-political
power in the Pacific. They are part of the re-
sponsibilities that the US has assumed as a
military power. During the past two decades
the US has learned that great power has its
limitations. From its experiences in Vietnam,
the US has learned that there is problably no
mixture of political-economic power that will
enable a big power to reorder the lives and pol-
itics of weak states in its own image. Likewise,
the US has learned that China’s large territory
and huge population impose many strains on
the current regime's attempt to make China
equal to the two super-powers. With these les-
sons in mind, the Nixon administration is at-
tempting to diminish US involvement in the
area. However, given the unstable inter-
national environment of the vast Asian-Pacific
area, it is uncertain whether the US can suc-
cessfully disengage and at the same time retain
its political-military power for future use.”
UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY
FOR THE 1970’s: A NEW STRATEGY FOR
PEACE, by Richard Nixon. New York, Ban-
tam Books, Inc., 1970. 120 p. -
This is the President's report to the
Congress and the nation on American foreign
policy. The report covers the field of America’s
policies and concerns, stating the accomplish-
ments of the past year, the issues of today, and
the agenda for the future. Contents: The Na-
tional Security Council System; Partnership
and the Nixon Doctrine (Europe, The Western
Hemisphere, Asia and the Pacific, Vietnam,
The Middle East, Africa, International Eco-
nomic Policy, The United Nations); America’s
Strength; An Era of Negotiation; etc.
c. Vietnam War, PSEA, and U.S. Policy
AMERICA’S STAKE IN ASIA, by Drew
Middleton. New York, Lippincott, 1968. 240 p.
“Red China’s blueprint for world domi-
nation through ‘revolutionary movement’ was
drawn by Marshal Lin Piao in 1965, in an arti-
cle calling for communists to control the coun-
tryside and eventually surround the cities
held by the imperialists. North America and
Western Europe may be considered ‘cities,”
while Asia, Africa, and Latin America are
‘rural areas.” The revolution has been held
back in the ‘cities,’ but has been growing in the
underdeveloped areas. America has a stake in
thwarting the fulfillment of that blueprint.
However, no counterweight to China can be es-
tablished in Asia without the aid of India and
Japan . . . While Asians must help themselves,
an American commitment to Asia is also neces-
sary in order to protect Asian countries
from communist pressure and help them build
economic defenses against subversion. In Viet-
nam, the American objective must be to prove
that a war of national liberation cannot suc-
ceed and to guide the economy to the point
where the people will be able to resist subver-
sion after the war.”
ASIA AFTER VIETNAM, by Richard M.
Nixon, in Reader's Digest, (March 1968)
88–92.
Reprinted and condensed from Foreign
Affairs, October 1967. “The American presence
in Vietnam has had a powerful influence in
strengthening the rest of Asia against commu-
nism. In this challenging and prophetic article,
the former Vice President looks beyond the
war to the emergence of a dynamic community
of nations which will hold Asia on the course
toward freedom.” -
51
AT WAR WITH ASIA, by Noam Chomsky.
New York, Pantheon Books, 1970. 313 p.
The author surveys very critically the
American presence in Vietnam, and also de-
votes two chapters on : the “invasion” of Cam-
bodia by the U.S. . . . as well as the Cambodian
and Laotian involvement in the Southeast
Asian conflict. “No greater need faces the
world today than to confront and avoid the
dangers inherent in America’s war in Asia. No
concerned American, whatever his politics, can
afford to remain ignorant of the issues . . . in
this new book or of the data, much of it rarely
published . . . Professor Chomsky examines
the many effects on America’s war in Indo-
china and tries to answer the questions that un-
derlie this longest of our conflicts. Drawing in
part on his recent visit to North Vietnam and
Laos and in part on his extensive reading in
the field, he discusses the historical, political,
and economic reasons behind our first involve-
ment in an Asian land war. He then examines
what this has really meant in terms of our mil-
itary strategy, and what its eventual effect can
be, both on Asians and on Americans . . .”
THE CASE FOR AND AGAINST MILI-
TARY WITHDRAWAL FROM VIETNAM
AND KOREA, by Fred Greene, in The Ameri-
can Academy of Political and Social Science,
Annals, v. 390 (July 1970) 1–17.
“The pros and cons of rapid military
withdrawal from Vietnam are both strong, but
in the public debate are not mutually respon-
sive. The case against rapid withdrawal from
Vietnam rests on the presumed danger of the
precedent of . broken United States commit-
ments, the blow to the viability of divided
states elsewhere, the increase in the prestige of
China, the domino theory, the encouragement
of other wars of liberation. The case for with-
drawal, based on a notion of the demise of the
monolithic, unalterably aggressive nature of
world communism, argues that Southeast Asia
is not of vital interest to us, that Hanoi's ac-
tions are, if not justified, understandable, and
that Communist governments in the Southeast
Asia are neither particularly dangerous to us
nor anathema to their populaces. Vietnamiza-
tion has many advantages for us, but, given a
weak government, runs the risk of a failure,
endangering American troops. Troops should be
withdrawn from South Korea, both for its
good and our own.”
REVIEW OF THE VIETNAM CONFLICT
AND ITS IMPACT ON U.S. MILITARY
COMMITMENTS ABROAD. REPORT OF
THE SPECIAL SUBCOMMITTEE ON NA-
TIONAL DEFENSE POSTURE, OF THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRE-
SENTATIVES, NINETIETH CONGRESS,
SECOND SESSION, UNDER AUTHORITY
OF H. R.E.S. 124, AUGUST 24, 1968. Wash-
ington, Government Printing Office, 1968. 84 p.
(Committee Print.)
Of special interest are the following
portions of the report dealing with: Southeast
Asia Collective Defense Treaty; Cambodia,
Laos, and Thailand.
SOUTHEAST ASIA: STRATEGIC AL-
TERNATIVES AFTER VIETNAM, by Col.
Murray Marks, in Naval War College Review
(May 1969) 94–99.
“US strategy in Southeast Asia has been
deficient in meeting the region’s economic,
political, sociological, and psychological require-
ments. The US desire to promote self-determi-
nation, regional security, economic develop-
ment, and a climate suitable for development
of democracy and independence has been ham-
pered by the lack of a “grand strategy.” To
promote these objectives and prevent another
ground war in Asia, the US should encourage
regional defense. The force requirements for
such a defense could be met by some 4,000,000
military personnel of 15 non-communist coun-
tries in the area. A US back-up force would
consist of substantial military power in the
Western Pacific and the nuclear umbrella. The
US withdrawal should be gradual and based on
the developing ability of indigenous forces. An
important part of developing this ‘grand strat-
egy' will be the support of the collective secur-
ity system that South Korea is considering for
the defense of the Asian and Pacific region.
After the Vietnam war, the US will have three
options in withdrawing and selecting a suitable
power base. (1) Select bases on the rim of
Asia, while retaining its present power base in
South Korea, a greatly reduced operation in
Thailand, and a peacekeeping force in South
Vietnam. The participation of Japan, Aus.
52
tralia, and New Zealand should be encouraged.
The availability of the Singapore naval facili-
ties would provide a superior logistical capabil-
ity for the US Navy. A naval base on the NW
coast of Australia for nuclear powered sub-
marines would serve US Navy requirements in
the Indian Ocean. (2) Withdraw to and main-
tain power bases on Japan, Okinawa, Taiwan,
and the Philippines if this posture is consid-
ered sufficient to satisfy US commitments and
superpower requirements. (3) Withdraw to
and build up the mid-Pacific islands such as
Wake and Guam. Together with the military
forces on Hawaii this would offer sufficient
proximity after the development of the C–5A
and fast deployment logistics ships, without
the political problems associated with bases on
foreign soil . . .”
VIETNAM AND UNITED STATES POL-
ICY IN ASIA, by Robert E. Hunter, in Inter-
national Affairs (April 1968) 202–213.
“A stated objective of US foreign policy
is to create an Asian security system in which
China can be included without threatening the
independence of its neighbors. However, the
American presence in Vietnam is in many
ways a divisive factor in the establishment of
such a system. (1) This presence is a threat to
Chinese security and stimulates China’s ag-
gressiveness. (2) It is forcing a polarization of
politics in Southeast Asia, since nations feel
compelled to choose between China and the US.
(3) It provides a focus for anti-Western na-
tionalism and thus stimulates increased revolu-
tionary activity. Even if the “domino theory’ is
true, only a conclusive military victory in Viet-
nam would prevent other “dominoes’ in SEA
from falling. If the US continues merely to
deny victory to the enemy, Vietnam will serve
as a precedent to encourage other revolution-
ary wars in SEA, wasting vast quantities of
US resources and ultimately discouraging any
US commitment in Asia at all. Furthermore,
by stressing Chinese involvement in Vietnam,
the US is magnifying its own shortcomings
and enhancing China’s image. Other nations
may feel more impelled to reach accommoda-
tion with the Chinese. Instead of “buying time’
with which to implement long-range objectives
in Asia, the Vietnam war is destroying the
basis for cooperation in Asia. Chinese nuclear
development is cutting the time left for the
peaceful integration of China into the world
community. The US should reduce its losses in
Vietnam and concentrate on the more crucial
need to reach an agreement with China.”
WHAT IS OUR ROLE IN EAST ASIA 2 by
D. F. Fleming, in The Western Political Quar-
terly (March 1965)
“. . . . If our basic purpose is to keep
China out of SE Asia, we defeat it by extend-
ing the war and bringing in Chinese troops.
Only a negotiated settlement can really fore-
stall the entry of Chinese troops, first into
North Vietnam and then in the South—an
eventuality that all Vietnamese dread. We hear
the cry that “If we accept neutralization that
will certainly be followed by a Communist
take-over.” That could be . . . Since the USSR
gained missile power capable of destroying us,
we have been able to start ending the cold war
with her. This, too, will happen in China in the
next ten or twenty years, “after which there
will be no question of our clinging to the
fringes of China and occupying islands in the
Formosa Strait which she believes to be hers.”
When China ‘gains the power to destroy us she
will take control of the fringe of East Asia and
leave it to us to convert a local war into a
world holocaust.” The basic choice before us is
between ‘destroying China with our nation-
killing weapons soon or beginning to make
peace with her’.”
WHAT WE MUST Do To win IN ASIA,
by Hanson W. Baldwin, in Reader's Digest,
(November 1965) 111–116.
“War in Viet Nam can have only one
conclusion: victory. Victory means the elimina-
tion of the Viet Cong from South Vietnam.
What the US has done so far has been too little
and too late. The policy of gradualism could
lead to stalemate, and perhaps to ultimate de-
feat . . . Viet Nam is only one of the global
obligations of the US. If the US is to win in
Viet Nam while holding the gates elsewhere,
the US must have a partial mobilization and
call-up of reserves. The military budget must
be increased and production lines speeded up.
Victory in Viet Nam will prove that the pro-
gram of communist aggression can be defeated,
will discourage the process of political dissolu-
tion and decay which has gripped Southeast
53
Asia since World War II, and will attract wa-
vering Asian countries to our side.”
d. Treaties and Alliances
THE SOUTHEAST ASIA COLLECTIVE
DEFENSE TREATY IN UNITED STATES
FOREIGN POLICY STRATEGY, by Lorne S.
Black. Pittsburgh, University of Pittsburgh,
1964. 131 p. (Unpublished Masters Degree
Thesis in Public and International Affairs.)
Southeast Asia 1945–1954—The Forces
Requiring Consideration (India and Pakistan,
Burma, Malaya and Malaysia, Indonesia, Aus-
tralia and New Zealand, The Republic of the
Philippines, Thailand, Indo-China); The
United States Seeks to Define Its Security In-
terest in Southeast Asia; The United States
View of Motives of Southeast Asian Nations
in Relation to SEATO; Evaluation of the
Sources of the Southeast Asia Collective De-
fense Treaty. With bibliography.
TREATIES AND ALLIANCES OF THE
WORLD; AN INTERNATIONAL SURVEY
COVERING TREATIES IN FORCE AND
COMMUNITIES OF STATE. New York,
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1968, 214 p.
“This survey is designed to present the
state of affairs with regard to groupings of
States and their principal treaties with each
other in force at April 1968.” Among many
others includes: Treaties and Agreements with
South and East Asia and the Pacific area.
THE UNITED STATES AND EASTERN
ASIA. New York, Freedom House, Public Af-
fairs Institute, 20 December 1967. 19 p.
“Southeast Asia, which comprises ten
separate states and nearly 250 million people,
may well hold the key to political equilibrium
for Asia as a whole. At stake in Vietnam is the
fate of many other peoples as well. A commu-
nist victory would encourage wars of national
liberation, upset the equilibrium in Asia, seri-
ously damage the US credibility, and deeply af-
fect the morale and policies of other Asian al-
lies and neutrals. . .” .
7. Peninsular Southeast Asia and the USSR
a. Miscellaneous Aspects
RUSSIA IN SOUTHEAST ASIA, in News-
week, v. 71, no. 15 (12 April 1971) 49–50.
“Despite the olive branch that Lenoid
Brezhnev extended to Communist China at last
week’s Soviet Party Congress, Moscow and Pe-
king remain bitter foes. In recent months, both
Communist giants have continued to reinforce
their garrisons along the 4,000-mile border be-
tween them. And less ostentatiously—but no
less significantly—the Kremlin has begun to ex-
pand its diplomatic, economic and military in-
fluence in the area that China has traditionally
considered to be its own backyard–Southeast
Asia. “The Russians aren’t coming to Southeast
Asia,” a Western diplomat stationed in the area
commented last week. “They’ve already ar-
rived.” So they have. In the two years since
Brezhnev audaciously proposed the formation
of an anti-Chinese ‘Asian collective security
system,” the Russians seem to have relegated
that idea to the back burner. But, meantime,
the Soviet presence in Southeast Asia—a part
of the world that once regarded the Russians.
with about the same enthusiasm as an epi-
demic of smallpox—has been expanding at an
impressive rate . .
tions have their own reasons for welcoming
diplomatic relations with the Russians. Laos
and Cambodia, both engaged in a bloody strug-
. Other Southeast Asian na-
gle with Communist insurgents and their spon-
sors in Hanoi, prize their Soviet embassies as
proof of their “neutrality’ in world affairs. In
Bangkok, government officials see the Russians
as a possible foil against the Chinese.”
RUSSIAN INTEREST IN SOUTHEAST
ASIA: OUTLINES AND SOURCES 1803–
1970, by R. Quested, in Journal of South-
east Asian Studies, v. 1, no. 2 (September
1970) 48–60.
“The establishment of diplomatic ties
by the Soviet Union with all the countries of
Southeast Asia except the Philippines and
South Vietnam, and the growing influence
sought by it in the area, indicates that the pub-
lication of more work on Russian relations
with Southeast Asia would be of interest, and
it is the purpose of this article to survey the
course of these relations to date, to see what
general picture emerges and what possibilities
of further research exist.” The Tsarist Period
1803–1917; The Tsarist Consulate in Singa-
pore; Tsarist Russia and Indonesia, Thailand,
Burma, Philippines, Indo-China; Tsarist Rus-
54
sian Scholarship on Southeast Asia; Soviet Re-
lations with Southeast Asia; etc.
SOVIET ASIAN POLICY TODAY, by
Zafar Imam, in Contemporary Review (July
1966) 6–14. -
“With 8 of its 15 republics in Asia, the
USSR is an Asian power . . . Khrushchev saw
the advantages of identifying Russia with the
national aspirations of the developing Asian
states. But difficulties arose from at least two
directions: US determination to use Asian na-
tionalism in the struggle against communism;
and the determined Chinese effort to dominate
Asia. Friendship with India was the only area
free of stress. Later, the spirit of accommoda-
tion in US-Soviet relations allowed the USSR
to start viewing Asia from an Asian rather
than from a superpower perspective . . . The
border states such as Afghanistan are receiv-
ing more economic aid and experiencing more
peaceful conditions along their frontiers. Rus-
sia has done little to establish effective con-
tacts with countries now aligned with the
West, such as Malaysia, the Philippines, and
Thailand. Soviet policy in Asia seems less
harmful to the West than it was before the
Sino-Soviet split. Besides, the intensity of
Asian nationalism provides an effective limita-
tion to Soviet influence.”
SOVIET STRATEGIES IN SOUTHEAST
ASIA, by Charles B. McLane. Princeton, Prin-
ceton University Press, 1966. 483 p.
“Professor McLane's definitive study of
Soviet policy in Southeast Asia deals with the
eras of Lenin and Stalin, but nonetheless
places current Soviet policies—and dilemmas
—in perspective. One of the key points energ-
ing from the book is the gap between doctrine
and action in past Soviet policy toward this
area. The author shows conclusively that dur-
ing most of the period from 1917 to 1953 So-
viet pronouncements on Southeast Asian af-
fairs were not matched by deep operational in-
volvement there. There was never any genuine
effort to organize a coordinated revolutionary
apparatus for all of Southeast Asia, and Soviet
policy for the most part was limited to advis-
ing local Communist parties—often belatedly
—as to the current “line.” Professor McLane
attributes this not only to distance and scarcity
of Soviet resources, but also to Stalin’s failure
to grasp the potential importance of the area
to the USSR. This was a defect which Stalin’s
successors are still trying to remedy.”
b. Military Aid
ARMS FOR THE THIRD WORLD: SO-
VIET MILITARY AID DIPLOMACY, by
Wynfred Joshua and Stephen P. Giberts. Balti-
more, Johns Hopkins Press, 1969. 169 p.
While the book is primarily devoted to
Soviet military aid diplomacy, it also delves
into the factor of how Sino-Soviet rivalry in-
fluences Soviet arms aid. Includes tables of So-
viet Bloc arms aid in the various regions of the
world including South and Southeast Asia as
well as other pertinent information on these
regions of the world, among others. Selected
Bibliography.
MORE AND MORE SOVIET ARMS KEEP
WAR GOING, in U.S. News & World Report,
v. 62, no. 14 (3 April 1967) 31.
“The latest evidence speaks for itself.
Russian aid, not Red Chinese, is providing the
sinews of war against the U.S. in Southeast
Asia.”
c. Sino-Soviet Struggle for Influence
CHINA, RUSSIA AND THE U.S., by Oscar
Gass, in Commentary, v. 43, no. 3 (March
1967) 65–78.
“In these next years, a grave political
and moral problem for the United States, in its
relations with other countries, will be the ab-
sence of an equal—an equal in wealth, military
power, and worldwide commitment. By these
measures, China today is a small country. Her
people still live close by hunger. Even in East
Asia alone, China does not have anything like
the relative military capacity which was pos-
sessed, a quarter century ago, by imperial
Japan. Culturally and morally, she seems also
—especially in recent months—to be again
turning inward. And, at the beginning of 1967,
China is politically isolated. No government
accords her first friendship, except the govern-
ment of primitive Albania. No foreign Com-
munist party (as distinguished from a splinter
group) stands firm to the Maoist allegiance,
except the tiny party of New Zealand. What a
falling off this is from the high expectations
with which the Communist leadership, on Oc-
55
tober 1, 1949, proclaimed the People's Republic
of China! The USSR of 1967, while of greatly
higher material capability than China, is still
too remotely second to be named equal to the
U.S. except by diplomatic amenity.”
SINO-SOVIET ATTITUDES TOWARD
REVOLUTIONARY WARS, by Bryce F.
Denno, in Orbis, (Winter 1968) 1193–1207.
“The Chinese communists depend on rev-
olutionary war as an instrument of foreign
policy more than the Soviets. The USSR has
been recognized as a great power for four dec-
ades and is surrounded by friendly nations, ex-
cept for China. Although the Soviets have not
abandoned their desire to hasten the ‘histori-
cally inevitable’ transformation of the world to
communism, their major goals now are to
avoid thermonuclear war and to develop their
economy. China has not been recognized as a
great power or a leader in the communist
world and is surrounded by enemies. The
Chinese, therefore, seek to expel Western mili-
tary and political presence from the Far East,
recapture “lost territory,’ and gain status as a
superpower. China feels that some of these
goals can be achieved by supporting internal
revolutions. China’s advocacy of guerrilla war-
fare, as opposed to the Soviet Union's support
for more conventional campaigns, is partially
due to the differences in Chinese and Russian
military experiences . . .”
THE SINO-SOVIET STRUGGLE FOR
ASIA, by Ernst Kux, in Swiss Review of
World Affairs, v. 19, no. 5 (August 1969)
11–12.
“Brezhnev’s recent suggestion for an
Asian collective security system is part of the
spreading cold war between Moscow and Pe-
king. It is developing into a struggle to deter-
mine America’s post-Vietnam successor in
Asia.” -
8.Peninsular Southeast Asia, and the Phil-
£ppines and Canada
CANADA AND THE. CHANGING PA-
CIFIC, by Jean-Luc Pepin, in Eaſternal Af-
fairs, Canada, v. 21, no. 6 (June 1969)
235–242.
An address by the Canadian Minister of
Industry, Trade and Commerce to the Vancou-
ver Board of Trade, May 5, 1969, reporting on
his “recent” trip to Japan, Thailand, Malaysia;
Singapore, Australia, and New Zealand, and
commenting on general impressions and spe:
cific trade problems, projects and opportuni-
ties. Areas of Specific Change; Canada and the
Pacific; Trade Results of Specific Policy;
Three Key Exports; Canadian Projects; etc.
THE ROLE OF THE PHILIPPINES IN
THE DEFENSE OF SOUTHEAST ASIA, by
Maj. Jack K. Walker. Maxwell Air Force Base,
Ala., Air Command and Staff College, 1968,
137 p. (Thesis no. 1295–68.) . .
“The role of the Philippines in the De.
fense of Southeast Asia consists of two parts;
Philippine participation in regional organiza-
tions, and provisions for U.S. bases on Philip.
pine soil. The study discusses the impact of
foreign and domestic influences on Philippine
fulfillment of this dual role. The major conclu-
sions of the thesis is that the future defense
role of the Philippines will be based on the
successful resolution of the following prob- |
lems: The Role of the Military; Struggle
Against Communism; Capable Political
Leadership; U.S. Philippine Relations.”
G. Economic Aspects
1. Miscellaneous Aspects
AID AND SQUEEZE IN ASIA, by Frances
D. Starner, in The Nation (27 May 1968)
696–700.
“Much of the US aid to SEA goes to
line the pockets of government officials in the
traditional Asian pattern of ‘squeeze money'
for performing their public functions or doing
private favors. Although this corruption as-
saults our moral fiber, all too frequently our
officials come to terms with dishonesty through
necessity or neglect. For example, US diplo-
mats preferred to overlook the flagrant mis-
handling of military assistance funds by Mar.
shal Sarit, former Thai Chief of State, rather
than to chance alienating his staunchly “anti-
communist’ regime. In Laos, the US under-
wrote an extensive import program to relieve a
critical shortage of necessities caused by
Pathet Lao devastation of the countryside,
Laotian merchants quickly worked out a
scheme to export to Thailand at a high rate of
56
exchange the goods bought with US subsidies
. . . Some Westerners suggest that corruption
should simply be accepted as an integral part
of the openly personal system of government
in SEA. Payment for official favors is just one
aspect of the type of personal rule which
Asians best understand. However, the US is
not spending billions of aid dollars to reinforce
tribalism and feudalism in Asia. Enriching
mandarins and accentuating the gross inequali-
ties of Asian society do not promote democ-
racy. Asia’s Marxists tend to be puritanical
where the use of public funds is concerned. Be-
cause they are revolutionaries, they are not
concerned with traditional niceties. The many
USAID dollars which go to bolstering the per-
sonal power of corrupt officials, rewarding ava-
rice rather than efficiency, provide another
propaganda platform readily exploited by in-
surgents.”
ASIAN DRAMA: AN INQUIRY INTO
THE POWERTY OF NATIONS, by Gunnar
Myrdal. New York, The Twentieth Century
Fund, 1968. 3 vols. 2284 p.
“The failure of social and economic de-
velopment in South and Southeast Asia is ex-
posed in such detail and honesty that these vol-
umes will be a basic source in studying the
field of economic development. Volume. I ex-
plores economic conditions as they have been
shaped by past and present social and political
factors. The remaining volumes cover the prin-
cipal obstacles to economic progress. The ideol-
ogy of planning, the appalling population ex-
plosion, and the foolish optimism of the early
'50s which hoped to solve the problem of labor
utilization by increased investment, educa-
tion, and health are extensively analyzed.”
ASIAN ECONOMIC STATISTICS, in Eco-
nomic Bulletin for Asia and the Far East, v.
20, no. 2 (September 1969) 51–97.
A periodic feature of this UN Bulletin
providing a series of tables on the following
for all countries of Asia and the Far East in-
cluding, among many others, some of Peninsu-
lar Southeast Asia: Regional Statistics, Pro-
duction, Transport, External Trade, Prices,
Employment and Wages, and Finance.
ASIA’s EMERGING INDUSTRIAL REVO-
LUTION, in Business Week, (13 December
1969) 60–61. - .
“Pacific nations are on the verge of a
great economic leap forward . . . Like a sput-
tering fuse, industry is moving southward
along the Pacific rim of Asia and firing rapid
economic growth. In the past decade, Taiwan
and South Korea have launched themselves on a
trajectory of rapid industrial expansion. A pall
of dirty Smog over Hong Kong testifies to its
success in attracting industry, and in the proc-
ess creating an air pollution problem as well
as a labor shortage. Farther south, Singapore
is converting itself into an indistrial city-state,
while Thailand is developing a more balanced
pattern of factories and farms. Giant Indone-
sia, rich in resources and with a market of
120-million people, seems set for a big-scale ef-
fort to develop its industrial potential along
with its agriculture, forests, oil, and minerals.
Even South Vietnam should be ready for a
rapid expansion of agriculture and light indus-
try soon after the war's end, according to a
study by New York’s Development & Resources
Corp., headed by David E. Lilienthal, former
chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission.”
A BRIEF REVIEW OF STRUCTURAL
DEVELOPMENT IN THE DEVELOPING
ECAFE COUNTRIES, by A. Holub, in Eco-
nomic Bulletin for Asia and the Far East, v.
21, no. 1/2 (June/September 1970) 4–42.
“Until recently, less attention has been
placed in studies of economic development on
structural change than on economic growth, al-
though they are intimately related and equally
important. While an attempt is made in this
paper to focus on the former rather than on
the latter, it is not intended to discuss struc-
tural change in great depth. Only one major set
of relationships—the proportions among agri-
culture, industry and services—is dealt with in
the following four sections. The first section
sketches the conceptual approach and the
method employed; the second presents an out-
line of long-term change in sectoral propor-
tions in the developed countries; the following
two sections concern structural development in
the developing ECAFE countries during the
last two decades; and the final section provides
a summary and conclusion. The tables and
graphs are contained in the statistical annex
. . . This study deals with changes in the sec-
toral structure of total product and employed
labour force in the developing ECAFE coun-
57
tries. The sectoral structure is defined in terms
of the shares of these magnitudes attributable
to three major sectors; agriculture, industry
and services.”
DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE TO
SOUTHEAST ASIA. New York, Committee
for Economic Development, July 1970. 83 p.
Principles of Development Assistance to
Southeast Asia; Economic Development in
Southeast Asia; External Assistance to South-
east Asia; The Essentials for Rapid Develop-
ment; Recommendations to Assisting Countries
and International Organizations; etc. With
seven statistical tables. Includes information on
the following, among others, Burma, Cambodia,
Laos, and Thailand.
SOUTHEAST ASIA BUILDS FOR THE
POST-VIETNAM AGE, in Fortune, v. 8, no. 3
(15 August 1969) 76–80 plus.
“The preoccupation with the war in
Vietnam has distracted attention from some
very real and favorable economic changes
going on throughout Southeast Asia. For all
their internal political dissensions and their
territorial disputes, Asian nations are slowly
moving toward regional economic thinking and
planning. The Asian Development Bank, which
is being capitalized at nearly $1 billion and
being guided principally by Asians, is only one
example of the trend toward cooperative un-
dertakings. Japan is making a contribution to
regionalism, too, although its growing presence
is raising fears of hegemony reminiscent of the
old ‘Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere’
of pre-World War II days. Among East Asia’s
more immediate difficulties will be the adjust-
ment to the gradual withdrawal of U.S. forces
in Vietnam. But Asian leaders are confident
that they can adjust.”
2. Petroleum
WORLD CRUDE OUTPUT CONTINUES
UP, in World Oil, v. 172, no. 3 (15 February
1971) 104 plus.
A statistical review of world crude oil
production, including figures for the following
country, among many others: Burma. See also:
World Oil Output to Rise 8%, in World Oil, v.
170, no. 3 (15 Februray 1970) 96–97. -
WORLD TABULATION OF PETROLEUM
DATA (AS OF YEAR-END, 1967), in World
Petroleum Report, v. 14, (1968) 22–25.
Tabulated chart for all countries, in-
cluding Burma, Cambodia, and Thailand, on
crude oil production, percent change, crude re."
serves (proved and probable), consumption,
and percent change. Other charts provide addi-
tional Worldwide information including that of
Asia and the Far East: trends in refining ca-
pacity, capacity of tanker fleets, etc. •
THE world's PROCESSING PLANTs,
in World Petroluen, v. 41, no. 8 (August 1970)
74 plus.
“A complete directory of the world's re-
fineries and petrochemical plants. Included are
all facilities—presently operating, planned or
under construction—in all countries outside
the USA including the USSR and other Com-
munist nations where reliable information was
obtainable. The first section is on refineries,
Immediately following it is the section on pe-
trochemical plants. For convenience, the list-
ing is alphabetical by company name under
each specific country. The countries are ar-
ranged in major geographical areas and also
listed alphabetically in those areas.” In the
section on Asia and Far East, information is
supplied for the following countries, among
others: Burma, Cambodia, and Thailand.
world-wide SUPPLY AND DEMAND
WILL RISE 5% IN 1970, by William C. Uhl, in
World Petroleum, v. 41, no. 1 (January 1970)
18–19. -
“Non-Communist nations may produce
37.5 million b/d this year. Consumption is ex-
pected to reach 37.2 million b/d. Large growth
in output of oil shown by Libya, Nigeria,
Oman, and Indonesia. Eastern Hemisphere de-
mands gains remain strong.” Also provides
some statistical data, on the following, among
others: Asia/Far East as a region, as well as
Burma, Laos, and Thailand. .
3. Regional Cooperation (See also by Coun-
try)
a. Miscellaneous Aspects
THE ASIAN HIGHWAY, by M. S. Ahmad,
in Economic Bulletin for Asia and the Far
East, v. 19, no. 1 (June 1968) 45–48.
“The Asian Highway project was . . .
drawn up to connect the capitals and impor-
tant seaports of the countries of Asia and at
58
the same time to provide access to important
historical places and others of religious impor-
tance. It would thus contribute to the expan-
sion of national and international trade, open
up isolated regions through feeder roads, stim-
ulate tourist traffic and facilitate pilgrimages
to holy places. This project was approved by
ECAFE at its annual session in March 1959
. . . The Asian Highway network comprises
eighty-three routes (including some blank
numbers) with a total length of 57,000 km. Of
these, 34,000 km are the international priority
routes, connecting all Asian Highway countries
by at least one through-route. The planners of
the Asian Highway system realized that very
high costs of construction make it impossible
to develop immediately all the routes in each
country to a high standard of international
roads. First priority was, therefore, given to
linking the existing main roads of the coun-
tries bringing them up to the minimum inter-
national standard and thereafter filling the
gaps . . . Priority route A-1 traverses eight
countries: Iran, Afghanistan, West Pakistan,
India, East Pakistan, Burma, Thailand, Cam-
bodia, and the Republic of Viet-Nam . . .
Route A–2 crosses nine countries: Iran, West
Pakistan, India Nepal, East Pakistan, Burma,
Thailand, Malysia, Singapore and Indonesia.”
THE KRA ISTHMUS CANAL, by Willard
A. Hanna. Hanover, New Hampshire, Ameri-
can Universities Field Staff, Inc., 1967. 5 p.
(Fieldstaff Reports, Southeast Asia Series, v.
15, no. 12.)
“To cut a canal across the fifty- to sev-
enty-five-mile-wide Isthmus of Kra, and thus
chop 1,500 miles off the sea route between Eu-
rope and the Far East—this is a scheme which
has bemused no few enterprising persons in
Thailand and elsewhere since the middle of the
nineteenth century . . . At this point, the Kra
Canal scheme enters the stratospheric reaches
of international politics—from which it may,
of course, one day descend. It may, that is,
given an end to the war in Vietnam; a favor-
able decision on the part of the Thai govern-
ment; a feasibility survey irresistible to
bankers; a development of the sort of regional
cooperative spirit which would lead Cambodia
and Burma, for instance, to trust in and rely
upon Thailand, and lead Singapore to renounce
its own aspirations to play almost exactly the
role envisioned for the Kra scheme. Mr. Chow
Kwanyun is undismayed, for he is confident
that the world will one day, perhaps even in
his lifetime, give the proposal serious consider-
ation.”
REGIONALISM AND INSTABILITY IN
SOUTHEAST ASIA, by Bernard K. Gordon, in
Orbis (Summer 1966) 438–457.
“Regionalism has not taken root in
Southeast Asia. There are many political con-
flicts among the nations and little agreement
on what cooperation would mean in practice.
Yet, regionalism continues to attract support-
ers because it seems to promise different bene-
fits to different national leaders. In 1961 and
1963 two important—though faltering—steps
toward regional cooperation were taken: the
Association for Southeast Asia (the Philip-
pines, Malaysia, and Thailand) and MAPHIL-
INDO (Malaysia-Philippines-Indonesia). Other
measures include the Asian Development
Bank, the UN Economic Commission on Asia
and the Far East, the Japanese-sponsored
meetings fostering some form of economic co-
operation, and the Korean-sponsored confer-
ence for Asian and Pacific Cooperation
(ASPAC). One approach to stability would be
the creation of the Association of Southeast
Asian New Emerging Forces. ASANEFOS
would include Indonesia, the ASA members,
and hopefully could attract Cambodia and
Burma. Such an association would mean that
the interest in regionalism of the colorful but
less prosperous states (such as Indonesia) had
begun to converge with the interests of the
more efficient small states (the ASA group).
Another essential element, the interest and
support of the great powers, is developing. The
combination of these elements would provide a
practical basis for making regionalism work in
Southeast Asia.”
b. The Mekong River Basin: The De-
velopment of Its Economic Potential (See also
by Country)
AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT IN
THE MEKONG BASIN; GOALS, PRIORI-
TIES, AND STRATEGIES. Washington, Re-
sources for the Future, Inc., 1971. 108 p. (A
Staff Study.)
“The report begins by assessing the de-
mand-supply conditions for an expanded agri-
59
culture in the Mekong River Basin, proceeds to
evaluate what limitations are imposed by phys-
ical and human resource conditions, specifies
the measures that are needed to achieve condi-
tions favorable to modernizing agriculture, and
inquires into ‘what criteria might serve to es-
tablish a sequence of development. Within this
rather conventional-looking scheme, unconven-
tional attention is given to the human and in-
stitutional setting in which development takes
place. The reason for this is that “progress’ is
equated not only with increased output or a
growing stock of physical facilities but also
with a rising ability of the people in the region
to gain a measure of material security—via a
rising income—in a social context that would
secure for them widening choices in matters of
production, consumption, location, and life
styles generally. The questions are not there-
fore merely what the river could help to pro-
duce and how that production could be utilized,
but also-and prominently—what the aspira-
tions of the region’s people are, what pace and
character of development would be least de-
structive of their system of values and beliefs,
and how the latter could be gradually altered
to become consonant with the requirements of
modern agriculture . . . The area affected by
the course of the river and its tributaries meas-
ures nearly a quarter of a million square
miles. It comprises practically all of Laos and
Cambodia, two-fifths of South Vietnam, and
one-third of Thailand. Close to 30 million peo-
ple now live in the area of the watershed in-
volved. That figure is likely to double by the
end of the century. The potential for power
generation and irrigation is large.”
5 NEW MEKONG PROJECTS; CAM-
BODIA, LAOS AND THAILAND TO BENE-
FIT, in SEATO Record, v. 9, no. 2 (April
1970) 40–41. -
“Five new undertakings in Thailand, .
Laos and Cambodia will be carried out as part
of the over-all Mekong development project,
with aid from New Zealand, Philippines,
United Kingdom and the United States, as a
result of agreements signed at the Mekong co-
ordinating committee's recent session in Phnom
Penh. The agreements call for activities relat-
ing to agriculture, fisheries, mineral resources,
manpower training, navigation, social needs
and other aspects of development. Responsibil-
ities will be shared, under most of the agree,
ments, by the assisting governments, the com;
mittee, and the Mekong Secretariat. In
Thailand, the undertakings will entail appren.
ticeship training at a boat building centre at
Nong Khai, and a study of socio-economic as:
pects of fisheries in the Nam Pong reservoir. In
Cambodia, there will be a demonstration of the
use of fertilizer, and a survey in the Battam,
bang area. Laos will be aided with mapping
and interpretation following a mineral survey."
THE MEKONG PROJECT, by Willard A.
Hanna. Hanover, N.H., American Universities
Field Staff, Inc., 1968. 7 pts. (Fieldstaff Ré.
ports Southeast Asia Series, v. 16, nos. 10–14,
16, 17.)
I. The River and the Region. II. The
Evolution of the Design. III. The *Agency and
the Rationale. IV. The Test at Nam Ngum. W.
The Prize at Pa Mong. VI. Delta Development.
VII. The Enigma of Cambodia. “When and if
peace comes to mainland Southeast Asia, it
cannot be a genuine, lasting peace unless it is
followed by plenty—and prospects for plenty
now seem to be contingent largely upon one
project or, rather, one master scheme. This is a
program of a scale and scope so audacious as
perhaps to disguise the very magnitude of the
problem to which, at best, it can provide only a
partial, preliminary answer. It is the Mekong
Development Project: twenty years ago an
E.C.A.F.E. (Economic Mission for Asia and
the Far East) dream, ten years ago a tentative
proposal, but today a schedule for massive
multinational co-operation. The Project is dé.
signed to transform the social and economic
base of the Lower Mekong Basin by utilizing
the potential of the Mekong River for power,
irrigation, navigation, and various related pur.
poses. The direct effect within the next twen:
ty-five years should be to triple the Gross Na.
tional Product of the four riparian nations
(Laos, Thailand, Cambodia, and Vietnam), tº
raise the average per capita income at least 50
per cent above the present dangerously low $65
to $100 level, and thus to create tremendous |
new opportunities for modern progress . . . ]
The consequences may include the creation
within the region of a whole new climate of S0-
cial and economic co-operation—and also, it is
profoundly to be hoped, of political accommo-
dation.” (*The four-nation Committee for the
60
Coordination of Investigations of the Lower
Mekong Basin.)
THE MEKONG; RIVER OF TERROR
AND HOPE, by Peter T. White, in National
Geographic, v. 134, no. 6 (December 1968)
737-787.
An essay of the land and the poeple of
the area with maps and numerous photos also
on the Mekong River which traverses, among
others, Burma, Laos, Thailand, and Cambodia.
The Hope of the Mekong Project (A Plan to
Revolutionize Life for Millions of Southeast
Asians by Harnessing the River for Power and
Irrigation); New Ways for a Lao Farmer; Lao
Guerrillas Threaten Officials; Thailand Guards
a Precarious Peace; Chinese Soldiers Hold
Corner of Burma; Foreigners Crowd into
Vientiane; Rice Crop Fertilized by Monsoon;
Phnom Penh, Cambodia, City Built Where
Floating Buddhas Stopped; Dams Hold Prom-
ise and Problems; etc.
| THE MEKONG SCHEME: GUIDELINE
FOR A SOLUTION TO STRIFE IN SOUTH-
EAST ASIA, by W. R. Derrick Sewell, in
Asian Survey (June 1968) 448–455.
“The “Mekong Scheme' is a program de-
signed to develop the tremendous potential of
Southeast Asia’s now unharnessed Mekong
River. The Mekong flows 2,625 miles, through
China, Burma, Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, and
South Vietnam and drains 307,000 square
miles. At present, there is no dam on the main-
stream of the river and no bridge across it. If
developed, the river could irrigate over twen-
ty-four million acres, substantially increasing
the rice crop, and could be navigated for more
than 1,000 miles. It could provide large quanti-
ties of low cost power which would stimulate
industry and raise the area’s standard of liv-
ing. In addition, vast flooding which plagues
the region each year would be reduced. By im-
proving transportation and communication, the
Mekong scheme would increase trade between
the nations of Southeast Asia and lessen politi-
cal tension in the area. The Mekong scheme
was initiated in 1951 when the UN's Economic
Commission for Asia and the Far . East
(ECAFE) undertook a survey of the river. Al-
though the initial report was received with en-
thusiasm, interest in the development project
waned due to hostilities in the area and was
not revived until 1956. In 1957 the US Bureau
of Reclamation and four internationally known
experts sponsored by ECAFE undertook a
study of the Mekong. Their reports emphasized
the need for basin-wide, international plan-
ning. In response to this report, Cambodia,
Laos, Thailand, and South Vietnam set up the
Committee for the Coordination of Investiga-
tions of the Lower Mekong Basin (the Mekong
Committee). The US, France, Canada, and
Japan were among the first countries to offer
financial assistance to the Mekong Committee.
Now twenty countries and thirteen UN agen-
cies provide support for the development pro-
gram. Hydrologic and meteorologic networks
have been set up, the river has been exten-
sively surveyed, and a comprehensive develop-
ment plan should be completed by the commit-
tee this year . . .”
THE REDISCOVERIES OF THE ME-
KONG, by Willard A. Hanna. Hanover, N.H.,
American Universities Field Staff, Inc., 1970. 7
pts (Fieldstaff Reports, Southeast Asia Series,
v. 18, nos. 1, 2, 4, 7, 8, 9, 10.)
I. Mekongologues and Mekongophiles.
II. Early Travelers and Adventurers. III. Sev-
enteenth Century Traders and Missionaries.
IV. Seekers of Curiosities and Antiquities. V.
Scientific Explorers in the Main River Valley.
VI. Scientific Explorers in the Mountainous In-
terior. VII. Empathetic Colonizers.-‘‘The Me-
kong seems to have exercised an electric sort of
elective affinity upon impressionable Latinate
adventurers—Spanish, Portuguese, Italian,
and especially French. Almost all of the dis-
coverers, or rather, since discovery began long
before the records, the rediscoverers of the Me-
kong fell under the magical-mystical spell of
the region and the people. In the Mekong val-
ley almost anything seemed possible if only the
enlightened foreigner could somehow civilize
the noble savage, penetrate the primeval jun-
gle, and tame the mighty river . . . Its head-
waters are fed by the melting snows of the
high Himalayas of central Tibet. The true
source, thus, lies far from Yunnan, even
though, according to Chairman Mao Tse-tung's
geographers as well as to Fra Marini, Tibet
seems indistinguishable from China proper.
Rising in the Himalayas, the Mekong flows for
750 turbulent miles through Tibet itself, then
China (in fact Yunnan), then another and little
61
less agitated 150 miles along the mountainous Communist China, Nationalist China, Indone.
Yunnan-Burma border. From there, much sia, Japan, North Korea, South Korea, Laos,
more calmly in the later stages except for Malaysia, Mongolia, New Zealand, Philippines,
stretches of rapids and in seasons of flood, it Singapore, Thailand, North and South Viet.
passes for 1,500 miles between or through nam, and Small States and Dependencies.
Laos, Thailand, Cambodia, and Vietnam to MONSOON ASIA; A GEOGRAPHIC AL
empty at last into the South China Sea . . . - tº |
e e SURVEY, by Harry Robinson. New York,
After being known sporadically and for the Frederick A. Praeger, 1967. 561 p. f
most part inaccurately to the Western world :
for half a millennium, the Mekong may now be “This study is planned in two main
on the eve of a truly millennial revelation of parts: an introductory section dealing with the
all its hoarded potential for wealth and power. general geographical framework of the region,
Geographically and historically the Mekong the physical and cultural background, the re-
valley stratifies itself in a manner which has Sources, agr iculture and industry, and some as-
always made it difficult for the inhabitants or pects of political geography, followed by a sec |
anyone else either to detect or to impose upon ond, and larger, section which is concerned
it any grand single unifying design. For conve- with the regional geography of Monsoon Asia,
nience of description, geographers divide it each country being dealt with in general, and
into three segments—the Upper Mekong, the then by regions . . . Emphasis has been placed
lower Mekong, and the Delta, each quite dis- upon two aspects: first, the historical and cul: ;
tinctive in its characteristics.” tural background and, second, recent economic
changes and developments. Furthermore, very
H. The Land and the People (See also significant economic changes, with all their so-
by Country and Appendixes) cial and political implications, are taking
place within the region; but it is not easy to
THE CLIMATES OF SOUTH-EAST ASIA, procure immediate information on these mat-
by H. S. Hodges and G. R. Webb, in Army
ſº ters and an attempt has been made to give a
Journal, Australia, no. 228 (May 1968) 29-44 reasonably up-to-date account of the changes
“The two basic determinants of the nat- in process. The maps have been kept relatively
ural environment of any theatre of land war- simple to give clarity.” Contents: The Monsoon
fare are the surface features of the land and Region—Introduction; The Physical Back-
the climate. The natural vegetation (largely ground; Resources and Economy; The Human
undisturbed by man within the tropics) Background; The Indian Sub-Continent; India
through which the war is fought, and the soils —Social and Economic Geography; India—Re-
on which it is fought, are broadly determined gional Geography; Pakistan; Nepal, Sikkim
by the relief and climate. This paper is con- and Bhutan; Ceylon; South-East Asia;
cerned with the climate of South-East Asia Burma; Thailand; Cambodia, Laos and Viet-
[including Peninsular Southeast Asia] and its nam; Malaysia; Indonesia; The Philippine Is-
direct effects on troops, equipment, stores and lands; The Chinese People's Republic; China
operations.” —Economic and Regional Geography; Hong
THE FAR EAST AND SOUTHWEST PA. .”.º.º.º.
g e neral and Regional Geography. With: bibli.
CIFIC, 1971, by Harold C. Hinton. Washing- ography, illustrations, and tables
ton, Stryker-Post Publications, Inc., 1971. 88 p. 9 9 gº
Historical Background (The People of PEOPLE AN D PROGRESS IN EAST
Asia; Religious Beliefs; Medieval Conquerors; ASIA, by Eli Ginzberg. New York, Columbia
Economic Background; Nationalism, Commu. University, 1968. 290 p. -
nism and Revolution in Twentieth Century Eli Ginzberg states: “In January-Feb.
Asia); The Land and the People of the follow- ruary 1967 I had the opportunity to travel
ing, including area, population, climate, official through East Asia on a Specialist Grant from
language, ethnic background, principal reli- the U.S. Department of State. My itinerary
gions, chief commercial products, currency, na- took me to Japan, Korea, Thailand, Malaysia,
tional flag, etc. : Australia, Burma, Cambodia, Singapore, Indonesia, Vietnam and Hong |

62
Kong, whose combined populations total about
270 million. My primary concern in each of
these countries was to discuss with key leader-
ship groups, in and out of government, the
problems that they face in designing a more ef-
fective manpower policy in order to speed their
economic growth. I was briefed before I left; I
was briefed while in the area; and after my re-
turn I reviewed key documents. This manu-
script represents in the first instance my effort
to order within a manpower framework the
wealth of impressions and reactions resulting
from my intense, if short, visit to eight East
Asian countries. As such, it represents an ef-
fort to apply the manpower approaches and
techniques that my associates and I have been
developing at Columbia University over the
past three decades to the problems of economic
development in East Asia.” Nationhood; The
Military; Rural Life; Education; Skill Acqui-
sition; Women; Management; Of Time and
Progress; In Search of Perspective.
SOUTH ASIA; A BACKGROUND BOOK,
by Angus Maude. Chester Springs, Pa., Dufour
Editions, 1966. 176 p.
The Area Surveyed; India; India’s
Neighbors; Burma; Indochina and Thailand
(Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, and Thailand);
Malaysia, Singapore and the Philippines; Indo-
nesia; The Asian Dilemma. With maps.
\
SOUTHEAST ASIA; HISTORY, CUL-
TURE, PEOPLE, by Edward Graff and Harold
E. Hammond. Bronxville, N.Y., Cambridge
Book Co., Inc., 1967. 154 p.
Southeast Asia—The Land; Early His-
tory of Southeast Asia; The People of the
Hills, Plains and Villages; The arrival of the
Europeans (The Special Case of Thailand,
among others); Language and Culture of
Southeast Asia; The New Nations—Their
Problems and Promise (Burma, Malaysia,
Singapore, Philippines, Indonesia, Laos, Cam-
bodia, Vietnam, Thailand, among others); The
Foreign Relations of Southeast Asian Nations;
and Bibliography.
THAILAND, BURMA, LAOS, AND CAM-
BODIA, by John F. Cady. Englewood Cliffs,
N.J., Prentice-Hall, 1966. 152 p.
Current Realities and Interrelation-
ships; Historical Beginnings; Classical Cam-
bodia, Burma, and Siam; Buddhist South-
east Asia, 1530 to 1780; Parting of the Ways,
Mindon and Mongkut; The Impact of Colonial
Rule; and Inter-War Decades and World War
II. With : Suggested Reading.
I. Population and Demography (For
Minorities See also Ethnic Map in
Appendix JJ)
ASIA’S POPULATION PROBLEMS, ed. by
S. Chandrasekhar. New York, Frederick A.
Praeger, 1967. 311 p.
Includes following chapters and appen-
dixes of interest to the bibliography on Penin-
sular Southeast Asia: Asia’s Population
Problems and Solutions; Demographic and
Economic Data for Asian Countries; etc.
ETHNIC GROUPS OF MAINLAND
SOUTHEAST ASIA, by Frank M. Lebar and
others. New Haven, Human Relations Area
Files Press, 1964. 288 p.
Sino-Tibetan (Sinitic, Tibeto-Bruman,
Karen, Miao-Yao); Austrasiatic (Mon-khmer,
Viet-Muong, Senoi-Senang); Tai–Kadai; Ma-
layo-Polynesian (Cham, Malay); Bibliogra-
phy; Map (Ethnolinguistic Groups of Mainland
Southeast Asia).
ETHNOGRAPHIC ATLAS, by George Peter
Murdock. Pittsburgh, University of Pittsburgh
Press, 1967. 128 p.
“This atlas lends itself to a wide variety
of professional uses. The reader may employ it
to obtain a quick and approximate answer to
specific questions about the content of any in-
cluded culture, e.g., what is the level of its sub-
sistence economy, the general character of its
social organization, or its degree of political in-
tegration. He can rapidly survey variations in
culture within any geographical area, and if he
desires to go further, he can utilize the biblio-
graphical references to lead him to the ethno-
graphic sources that are likely to prove the
most helpful. By simple counting he can ascer-
tain the approximate incidence and distribu-
tion, either for the world as a whole or for any
particular region, of social or cultural phenom-
ena in which he may have a special interest,
e.g., avunculocal residence, ambilineal descent,
circumcision, games of strategy, or endoga-
mous castes. If he wishes to undertake field
63
work in an area which is relatively untouched
ethnographically, he can readily ascertain by
elimination the most promising possibilities,
e.g., Wadai in Africa, eastern Turkey, the Bis-
marck Archipelago, or the Montana in South
America. Other potential uses are legion. But
the particular one which the author has had in
mind from the outset, and which has largely
guided his efforts, is the facilitation of compar-
ative research, especially of cross-cultural
studies of a quantitative nature which require
a sample of the world’s cultures.” Partial con-
tents: Classification by clusters, codes, tables,
additional bibliography.
SOME RESULTS FROM ASIAN POPULA-
TION GROWTH STUDIES, by William Selt-
zer, in Population. Studies, v. 23, no. 3 (Novem-
ber 1969) 395–406.
“Coverage estimates of births and
deaths derived from the matching experience of
a relatively comprehensive group of studies
conducted in Asia [including Thailand] and
employing dual collection systems are presented
and analysed. Major conclusions based on these
Asian studies include: (1) coverage of live
births has generally been more complete than
that for deaths; (2) nevertheless, unadjusted
rates of natural increase tend to be underesti-
mates; (3) there is great variability within
each type of collection system in the coverage
rates observed; and (4) one-time household sur-
veys, as a group, seem to be particularly sub-
ject to underreporting of vital events.”
A SOURCEBOOK ON POPULATION, in
Population Bulletin, v. 25, no. 5 (November
1969) 51 p.
“In August 1966, the Population Refer-
ence Bureau issued its first comprehensive bib-
liography—a 20-page, non-annotated list of se-
lected books, periodicals and other publications
on population and demography . . . The pres-
ent Sourcebook began as an updating of its
predecessor . . . The Sourcebook is divided
into two major sections: a population bibliog-
raphy [with annotations] . . . and a guide to
population organizations and programs . . . It
also includes a glossary of common demogra-
phic terms . . . The purpose of the bibliography
ish to introduce the layman to general works on
population and then, in some 50 categories and
subcategories, to offer a broad spectrum of
more specialized but, insofar as possible, non-
technical treatments.” The section on national
and regional studies includes a subsection on
Asia. :
world POPULATION PROJECTION
1965–2000, in Population Bulletin, v. 21, no.4|
(October 1965) 73–99.
The United Nations demographers have
come up with some startling projections. If the
present trend of population growth continues;
world population will reach 7.4 billion by the
year 2000. The article discusses: how projec.
tions are made, the “continued trends” projec.
tion, population density, outlook by regions;
With numerous statistical charts. º
f
J. Buddhism As A Political Force (Se
also by Country)
BUDDHISM OR COMMUNISM: WHICH
HOLDS THE FUTURE OF ASIA 2 by Ernst
Benz, (Translated from the German.) New ||
York, Doubleday & Co., 1965. 234 p. •
“. . . Believes Buddhism still exerts a
strong spiritual force, influencing the lives of
many Asians. Modern Buddhism displays a dis.
tinct sense of political mission and sees its spé.
cial task as that of achieving the ‘Buddhist
conception of peace.” Buddha is regarded by
many of his modern disciples as a great social
reformer as well as a great religious teacher.
Modern Buddhism is indeed a philosophy of
love, peace and the middle way. But the coun:
tries in which it is rooted are being buffeted by
storms of conflict and change that make the
middle way a perilous road. Buddhist social
ethics and the Buddhist program of socialism
do not exclude the possibility of a ‘pact with
Communism,” especially if the blueprint of a
social Utopia is interpreted as the ultimate
state of Nirvana—the supreme spiritual re.
ward.”
THE 1,000-YEAR STRUGGLE, by James
Joseph Dalton, in Far Eastern Economic R&
view, v. 67, no. 10 (5 March 1970) 18–20 plus
“The gulf between the Buddhists and
the [Burmese] State seems as wide today as
during the period of British rule. Can the
‘great peace’ era last?”
• *

64
THE NEW FACE OF BUDDHA: BUD-
DHISM AND POLITICAL POWER IN
SOUTHEAST ASIA, by Jerrold Schecter, New
York, Coward-McCann, 1967. 277 p.
“The Buddhist efforts to dominate poli-
tics in Southeast Asia went unperceived until
monks turned themselves into human torches
in front of Vietnamese pagodas in 1965. How-
ever, Buddhism is so deeply interwoven into
the cultural and political fabric of Southeast
Asia that knowledge of its substance is vital to
an understanding of the Area. Buddhism is an
ideological tie which extends throughout
Southeast Asia—perhaps the only tie common
to the whole region. As such, it is a force
which must be used or overcome by the com-
munists who intend to found Asian unity on
Marxism. Buddhism has failed in its attempt
to become part of the modern political process
of the Far East. However, the Buddhist philos-
ophy has played a great part in molding the
character of Southeast Asia’s leaders . . . The
subtle strategy of the Buddhist mind is usually
ignored by US diplomats, who are prone to
view Asians as inscrutable or simply dull.”
K. History (See also by Country)
A CONCISE HISTORY OF SOUTHEAST
ASIA, by Nicholas Tarling. New York, Fred-
erick A. Praeger, 1966. 334 p.
Part One—Southeast Asia to About
1760; Part Two—Southeast Asia, 1760–1942;
Part Three–Southeast Asia Since 1942; Pro-
vides historical information also for the follow-
ing countries, among others: Burma, Cam-
bodia, Laos, and Thailand.
EAST ASIA’S TURBULENT CENTURY__
WITH AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC DOCU-
MENTS, by Young Hum Kim. New York, Ap-
pleton-Century-Crofts, 1966. 386 p.
“The countries of East Asia—China,
Korea, and Japan—are experiencing political,
social, economic, and ideological changes that
have taken place with unprecedented vigor
since the mid-nineteenth century . . . This
book has been written . . . to help better un-
derstand the history of East Asia during the
last 125 years . . . The book is divided into five
parts and fifteen chapters. Part Five contains
49 major selected documents connected with
United States relations with East Asia, and
two Sino-Russian treaties.” The following
parts of the book concentrate on Korea: Chap-
ter 1—The Opening of East Asia (The Open-
ing of Korea). Chapter 3–Korea—The Arena
(Precarious Independence; Power Rivalry;
The Sino-Japanese War and the Triple Inter-
vention; The Russo-Japanese Contest). Chap-
ter 12—Korea—Exemplar of the Divided
World (Liberated But Divided; One Nation
with Two Governments; The Communists
Strike; A Modern Pyrrhic Victory). Chapter
13—Armed Coexistence (The Korean Armis-
tice; The Geneva Conference and Aid to Korea.)
Chapter 15—The Lingering Turbulence (Ko-
rea—An Unfinished Unification).
THE EMERGENCE OF MODERN
SOUTHEAST ASIA: 1511–1957, ed. by John
Bastin. Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice-Hall,
Inc., 1967. 179 p.
“This book deals with the 450 years of
Southeast Asian history that commenced with
the arrival of the Portuguese in the Straits of
Malacca at the beginning of the sixteenth cen-
tury and ended with the departure of the
Dutch, French, Americans, and British from
Indonesia, Indo-China, the Philippines, Burma,
and Malaysia after the Second World War.
During this period, which has been described
in somewhat broader context as the Vasco da
Gama epoch of Asian history, all the countries
of Southeast Asia, with the notable exception
of Thailand, were at one time or another sub-
ject to Western rule. The nature of this rule
and the means by which it was imposed dif-
fered considerably from one part of the region
to another and presents the historian of coloni-
alism in Southeast Asia with an extremely var-
iegated pattern for analysis. Although there
were undoubtedly subsidiary factors account-
ing for early Western penetration into South-
east Asia (especially the religious motive), the
overriding consideration was the desire to ex-
ploit the economic resources of the area, espe-
cially the fine spices of eastern Indonesia.” In-
cludes information on such subjects as: British
Colonial Rule in Burma; French Rule in Cam-
bodia; Some Characteristics of Burmese Na-
tionalism; etc.
A HISTORY OF MODERN SOUTHEAST
ASIA: COLONIALISM, NATIONALISM
65
AND DECOLONIZATION, by John Bastin
and Harry J. Benda. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.,
Prentice-Hall, 1968. 214 p.
“The authors combine colonial history
with social history to provide a . . . twofold
analysis of the Southeast Asian region. Stress-
ing comparative interpretations, the authors
describe the growth of the colonial regimes,
the Southeast Asian response to the West, the
crucial period of Japanese occupation, and the
difficulties of modern decolonization.” With
bibliography.
IN SEARCH OF SOUTHEAST ASIA; A
MODERN HISTORY, ed. by David Joel Stein-
berg. New York, Praeger Publishers, 1971. 522
D.
“In this . . . study of Southeast Asia
since the eighteenth century, six historians of
this generation explore anew the creative proc-
ess by which Southeast Asians have been
adapting their cultures to a world in change.
Large influences, such as climate and ecology
or the worldwide thrust of science and technol-
ogy, are linked to the economic, social, politi-
cal, and cultural dimensions of Southeast
Asia’s modern transformation. The organiza-
tion of the book along thematic lines allows
the authors to examine the evolution of institu-
tions and to analyze the process of change on a
regional basis. They focus on the peoples of
Southeast Asia by exploring their agriculture
and crafts, their social relations and political
structures, their changing economies and ex-
pectations, and their religions and cultures,
The very multiplicity of languages and cul
tures in Southeast Asia has made it extremely
difficult for a single scholar to master the com.
plex history of the region. Because each of the
authors of this history is a specialist in a dif.
ferent area, their book is based on sources in a
dozen languages of the region. At the same
time, the interest of one or another of them in
intellectual, political, social, or economic his
tory has stimulated the thinking of all the oth.
ers. The advantages of collaboration are alsº
reflected in an extensive bibliographical essay
based on the unified structure of the book; in
nine new maps that portray the physical, lin:
guistic, political, and social factors that have
shaped the region’s modern history; in a gloº,
sary; and in a note on the transcription ºf
Southeast Asian languages.”
THE WEST IN ASIA, 1850–1914, by Mi
chael Edwardes. New York, G. P. Putnam's
Sons, 1967. 216 p. i
“A survey of Western imperialism in
Asia [including Peninsular Southeast Asia
and its effects on Asian problems today . . .
I’roceeding country by country (Portugal
Spain, Holland, Great Britain, France, Russia,
and the United States), he covers . . . [the]
events of their incursions in Asia—military
political or economic . . . [He] then explore,
the period of western rivalries and conflicting
interests. The final section of the book is com:
cerned with aspect of imperialism.” With am;
notated bibliography. * -
66
CHAPTER III
BURMA
(See also Appendixes and Source Materials)
A. Whither Burma: An Overview
BURMA: THE OBSCURE DOMINO, by
Richard Butwell, in Current History, v. 59, no.
352 (December 1970) 339–344 plus.
“. . . Today Burma is not only a politi-
cal backwater but also a curiously and chroni-
cally divided land that is retrogressing eco-
‘nomically while striving to remain aloof from
the major foreign policy problems of its own
part of the world.” Why No “Vietnam.”?; In-
dochina's Impact; Politics Burmese Style; Bur-
ma's Economy; The Future.
CONTEMPORARY SOUTHEAST ASIA, by
Claude A. Buss. New York, Van Nostrand
Reinhold Co., 1970. 280 p. (An Anvil Origi-
nal.)
“A Survey of recent history from the
Southeast Asians’ point of view . . . Part I es-
tablishes the ecology of the Southeast Asian
states and includes a chronological table of
major events since 1945. The first chapter de-
scribes the scene in Southeast Asia at the close
of World War II. Succeeding chapters trace
historical and political developments in the
Philippines, Burma, Malaysia and Singapore,
Indonesia, Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, and Thai-
land. The concluding chapter looks ahead, into
the 1970's, to impending changes in cultural
values, social organization, economic trends,
political evolution, and international relations
of the entire region. Part II consists of official
documents and plublic statements.”
EMERGING SOUTHEAST ASIA; A
STUDY IN GROWTH AND STAGNATION,
by Donald W. Fryer, New York, McGraw-Hill
Book Co., 1970. 486 p.
The Region (Southeast Asia in the Mod-
ern World; The Land and Its Utilization; Ur-
banization, Industrialization and Moderniza-
tion); Progress (Thailand; The Philippines;
Malaysia and Singapore); Stagnation (Indone-
sia; The Union of Burma; Vietnam, Laos and
Cambodia); Prospect (The Destiny of South-
east Asia). With selected bibliography, maps,
and diagrams.
THE FUTURE OF SOUTH-EAST ASIA,
by Brig. F. W. Speed, in The Army Quarterly
and Defence Journal, v. 101, no. 1 (October
1970) 36–43.
“Looking into South-East Asia from the
relative serenity of Australia and New Zea-
land, a watcher sees a region in turmoil. Can
the dust be penetrated and the future read? In
the former French colonies of Indo-China,
North and South Vietnam are engaged in a
full-scale People's War, with an overlay of
western-style warfare waged by Americans,
now in the process of substantial force reduc-
tion. Laos is similarly involved, though in
lower key, with dissidents based on the north-
eastern provinces, heavily supported by North
Vietnamese. Cambodia, after years of fence-sit-
ting, during which time her eastern provinces
were a corridor for North Vietnamese forces
operating in South Vietnam, has now been
pulled into the Maelstrom. To the west and
south, across the Mekong River, Thailand, in-
dependent throughout the colonial era, has for
years sought to contain subversion in its north-
ern and eastern provinces. Now Thailand has
been drawn in to support the Cambodian gov-
ernment, in areas just across their border.
Burma, formerly an uneasy British possession,
has been seeking for over 20 years to establish
the ‘Burmese Way to Socialism,” in the face of
centrifugal forces of varied ethnic groups.”
With map.
67
NEW WINDS OVER SOUTHEAST ASIA,
by Wing Comdr. Maharaj K. Chopra, in Mili-
tary Review, v. 48, no. 9 (September 1968)
10–18.
“It is a paradox of contemporary life
that, whereas the number of states is multiply-
ing and their frontiers are becoming rigid, the
problems confronting them are becoming inter-
state and regional in character. This is
certainly true of Southeast Asia, thanks to its
geography, history, and the new, fast-develop-
ing trends. Southeast Asia comprises the 10
states of Burma, Thailand, Laos, Cambodia,
North Vietnam, South Vietnam, Malaysia,
Singapore, Indonesia, and the Philippines.”
Common Features; Common Problems; New
Constitution (Thailand); Economic and Social
Fields; Security Arrangements; etc.
THE MYTH OF ASIA, by John M. Stead-
man. New York, Simon and Schuster, 1969.
353 p.
“This . . . book . . . shows . . . that the
West overestimates the unity of Asia, that in-
deed to think of Asia as a unity is profoundly
mistaken, both in history and today. There are
at least three Asias—the cultural complex of
China and Japan, that of India and its related
cultures, and Islam, which has been closest to
the West and has most influenced the West,
particularly in earlier science, mathematics
and astronomy. This is one aspect only of the
book's main theme. It is extremely illuminat-
ing about Asian cultures, about religion and
art, no less than science and philosophy. The
book has an important contribution to make in
the crucial issue of our time, relations between
East and West, and to the understanding of
them. It gives the historical background, essen-
tial to the comprehension of the greatest politi-
cal dilemma of today. So much depends upon
our getting it right, and this thoughtful and
scholarly book offers significant help to all se-
rious minds at this crossroads. In the end, in
showing that the monolithic concept of Asia is
untrue, that there is and always has been at
least as much variety and diversity in the East
as in the West, the implications of the book are
hopeful: One sees the unity of mankind under
the diversities and conflicts of both East and
West.” Deals with many countries of Asia, in-
cluding Burma, Cambodia, Laos, and Thailand,
among others. With select bibliography.
and military supplies were requested to com.
B. Descriptive Miscellany (See also Map
Appendixes H and I)
AREA HANDBOOK FOR BURMA, by T. D
Roberts and others. Washington, Department
of the Army, June 1968. 375 p. (DA PAM
550–61.)
This area handbook discusses in deli
the social, political, economic, and national s:
curity aspects of Burma. Includes: bibliogr:
phies, glossary, illustrations, and tables. Sº
also appendixes to the bibliographic survey onl
Peninsular Southeast Asia. º
i
THE ASIANS; THEIR HERITAGE AND
THEIR DESTINY, by Paul Thomas Welt)
3rd ed. Philadelphia, J. B. Lippincott, 1970,
351 p. ºf
This book attempts to give “some under:
standing of the social and economic environ;
ment in which most Asians live and of the var.
ious systems of thought which influence thei
approach to present-day problems, just as the
thinking of poeple in a Western culture is in:
fluenced by their environment and tradition;
. . . “The Asians' . . . put its main emphasis
on this . . . task, while also giving the main|
outlines of geography, history, politics and
government, for the main areas of Asia from
Pakistan round to Japan [and also including,
among many others, Burma, Cambodia, Laos,
and Thailand]. º
BURMA AND SUBVERSION, by Lt. Cl
James S. Welch, in Military Review, v. 49,
no. 8 (August 1969) 46—54.
“The foreign policy theme of Burma,
since she came into formal existence on 4 Jan.
uary 1948, has been one of positive neutrality
between the East and the West. Twice rebuffel
by the United States within 18 months of inde
pendence—first when a regional military alli.
ance was suggested and later when small arms
ter Communist insurgency—the Burmese have
charted an independent course with great suc.
cess. Although Burmese political philosophy
has been described as Marxist Buddhism, Ont
of the early leaders of the Anti-Fascist People:
Freedom League (AFPFL) best expressed the
Burmese approach when he said: ‘We follow
the line that is best for Burma, not what any.

68
one who has never seen Burma decides is good
for her. We will select what we want from
other systems, both from the East and from
the West’.” Nonalignment Policy; Geography;
Burmese Buddhism; Colonial Heritage; The
Insurrections; Economic Development; Benev-
olent Dictatorship; National Unity; Commu-
nist Target; and Strategic Location.
BURMA: 1968—A NEW BEGINNING 2 by
Frank N. Trager, in Asian Survey, v. 9, no. 2
(February 1969) 104–114.
“In these pages last year I indicated
that the picture in Burma had begun to
brighten at the end of 1967. In some major re-
spects, especially with regard to domestic secu-
rity and political stirrings, Burma continued to
show improvement in 1968. The persisting and
still serious weakness was, as in 1967, the re-
gime's inability to regain its former preemi-
nent position as the first ranking—or even a
foremost ranking—rice exporter. Internation-
ally, Burma in 1968 cautiously sought to learn
Something about such Asian regional develop-
ments as the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (ASEAN) and the Asian and Pacific
Council (ASPAC). The New York Times on
January 5, 1969 carried a one-inch Reuters
story from Rangoon to the effect that “rebels in
southern Burma put a price on the heads of
newsmen reporting their activities . . . $720
for a live newsman and $360 for a dead one.’
There were times, during this past period,
when officials in Rangoon, not in the blood-
thirsty mood of their rebel opponents, would
have nonetheless agreed in principle with them
on this issue. On March 28, 1968, the Burma
Communist Party (BCP) celebrated its twen-
tieth anniversary of insurgency against the gov-
ernment.”
A GRAPHIC LOOK AT THE LANDS AND
PEOPLES OF SOUTHEAST ASIA
[INCLUDING BURMA, CAMBODIA, LAOS,
AND THAILAND], in National Geographic, v.
139, no. 3 (March 1971) 295–365.
Part 1–Mosaic of Cultures; Part 2–
New Light on a Forgotten Past; Part 3–
Pagan, on the Road to Mandalay.
THE FAR EAST AND SOUTHWEST PA-
CIFIC, 1971, by Harold C. Hinton. Washing-
ton, Stryker-Post Publications, Inc., 1971. 88 p.
Historical Background (The People of
Asia; Religious Beliefs; Medieval Conquerors;
Economic Background; Nationalism, Commu-
nism and Revolution in Twentieth Century
Asia); The Land and the People of the follow-
ing including area, population, climate, official
language, ethnic background, principal reli-
gions, chief commercial products, currency, na-
tional flag, etc.: Australia, Burma, Cambodia,
Communist China, Nationalist China, Indone-
sia, Japan, North Korea, South Korea, Laos,
Malaysia, Mongolia, New Zealand, Philippines,
Singapore, Thailand, North and South Viet-
nam, and Small States and Dependencies.
INDIA AND THE FUTURE OF ASIA, by
Patwant Singh. New York, Alfred A. Knopf,
1966. 264 p.
Picture in the Mid-Sixties; History's
Legacy; Partition; The Anatomy of a Develop-
ing Economy; Foreign Affairs; India and
China—The Continuing Confrontation; De-
fense; Outlook in the Mid-Seventies; Bibliog-
raphy. Includes references to relations with
other countries of Asia, such as Burma, Cam-
bodia, Laos, and Thailand, among others.
SOUTH ASIA; A BACKGROUND BOOK,
by Angus Maude. Chester Springs, Pa., Dufour
Editions, 1966. 176 p.
The Area Surveyed; India; India's
Neighbors; Burma; Indochina and Thailand
(Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, and Thailand);
Malaysia, Singapore and the Philippines; Indo-
nesia; The Asian Dilemma. With maps.
SOUTHEAST ASIA; A SURVEY, by Rich-
ard Butwell. New York, Foreign Policy As-
sociation, December 1968. 63 p. (Headline Se-
ries No. 192.)
This survey of Southeast Asia which in-
cludes information also on Burma, Cambodia,
Laos, and Thailand, among others, deals with
the following: What Is Southeast Asia?; The
Years Since World War II; The Problems of
Nation-Building and Survival; Regionalism—
How Firm a Foundation—and Future?; The
United States and Southeast Asia.
STATUS OF THE WORLD'S NATIONS.
rev. ed. Washington, Department of State, Bu-
reau of Intelligence and Research, 1969. 21 p.
(Geographic Bulletin No. 2.)
69

This Geographic Bulletin identifies each
state in the world (including Burma, Cam-
bodia, Laos, and Thailand) that is generally
accepted as independent. It includes enumera-
tion and official nomenclature of the countries
. . . Two names appear for each state: a short
form for use in maps, in lists, and for general
narration; a long form for more formal usage
and for official documents. An appendix gives
such details as the area, population, and identi-
fication of capital of each country. Text and
notes explain many of the exceptions one finds
in the complex pattern of sovereignties
throughout the world.
THAILAND, BURMA, LAOS, AND CAM-
BODIA, by John F. Cady. Englewood Cliffs,
N.J., Prentice-Hall, 1966. 152 p.
Current Realities and Interrela-
tionships; Historical Beginnings; Classical
Cambodia, Burma, and Siam; Buddhist South-
east Asia, 1530 to 1780; Parting of the Ways,
Mindon and Mongkut; The Impact of Colonial
Rule; and Inter-War Decades and World War
II. With: Suggested Reading. -
TOURISM IN SOUTHEAST ASIA, by Wil-
lard A. Hanna. Hanover, N. H., American Uni-
versities Field Staff, Inc., 1967. 11 p. (Field-
staff Reports, Southeast Asia Series, v. 15, no.
13.)
“In some countries of Southeast Asia,
tourism is a new industry of such swift
growth, rich profits, and multiple side-effects
that certain other countries have become at
Once envious and dismayed . . . The stale de-
bate over the desirability of tourism now seems
quite pointless, save that in certain Southeast
Asian countries the governments still perisist
in their eventually futile efforts to control the
flow of travelers rigorously by contriving bu-
reaucratic hurdles—making visas difficult if
not impossible to get, making entry and exit
formalities as time-and temper-consuming as
possible, and demonstrating at every opportu-
nity that a laissez-passer is a privilege con-
ferred by very important officials upon those
persons deemed worthy of it by reason of their
humility and rectitude. Today, these cruel com-
ments apply especially to Burma; but until re-
cently they applied equally well to Indonesia,
and they are not altogether irrelevant else-
where. Thailand, Singapore, and Malaysia,
the economic malaise—yet the sense of histori:
however, deserve honorable mention for mak
ing the tourist feel welcome—so long, at lead
as he shows no disposition to loiter about aft:
*
the initial courtesy period of two weeks to;
e
month.” |
THE UNION OF BURMA; AGE TWENT
TWO, by John Badgley, in Asian Survey, v.11
no. 2 (February 1971) 149–158.
The author states: “Burma and I fin
met in a Johns Hopkins seminar when º
Union was eight and I was twenty six. We wis
ited again this past summer in Rangoon, sil
months after the Union's twenty second birth
day . . . Myanma (the country of Burmese) iſ
a serious, if youthful society, and Rangoon for
the first time seemed a Burmese city. My im,
pression of a modernizing Asian country belie
the observations of many Burmese ex-patriata
and of most Western journalists—Henry Kamm
and Harrison Salisbury of the New York
Times, Lee Lescaze of the Washington Post
and reporters for the Observer and even the
Far Eastern Economic Review who emphasiſ,
movement was powerful. What is my evi
dence?” With bibliography. - -
C. Government and Politics
1. Miscellaneous Aspects
BURMA: A PROFILE, by Norma Bixle
New York, Praeger Publishing Co., 1971
244 p. -
“Sympathetic concern for the difficultic,
which Burma has encountered over the last
decade. She writes as a journalist resident in
the country for three extended visits from 195;
to 1967, contributing here a succession of . , ,
essays covering the country's economy, people.
Society, educational policies, and culture . . .
She is not pessimistic over the outcome, but is
much concerned that some constructive solº
tion be found for problems of internal division
and popular frustration. The usefulness of th:
book is enhanced by four . . . maps and eight
pages of photographs of Rangoon, Mandala),
and Pagan . . . The author . . . ventures . . .
in a survey of Burma's history from pre-Pagal
times to 1958, in sixty-odd pages. She posit;
some . . . theories about the earliest Burmal
tribesmen entering via northeast India, the
70
alleges that Burma's peoples never rebelled
against their kings, and that Adipati Ba Maw
appointed Ne Win Commander-in-Chief of the
Burma army . . . Mrs. Bixler’s assessment of
General Ne Win's role since 1958 is . . . highly
. critical. She credits as genuine the Gen-
eral's alleged concern to forestall Burma's po-
litical disintegration and to oblige the country
to dispense with outside advice and assistance.
She then criticizes Revolutionary Council
spokesmen for their surfeit of exhortation and
their dismal administrative performance, but
is confident that substantial improvements can
be realized if and when commonsense adjust-
ments are made. She argues . . . that Burma
differs from Thailand not by reason of the dis-
ruptive colonial experience of the former but
rather because Burma historically failed to as-
similate its minority peoples, a policy which
must eventually be rectified.”
BURMA AND SUBVERSION, by Lt. Col.
. James S. Welch, in Military Review, v. 49, no.
8 (August 1969) 46—54.
“The foreign policy theme of Burma,
since she came into formal existence on 4 Jan-
uary 1948, has been one of positive neutrality
between the East and the West. Twice rebuffed
by the United States within 18 months of inde-
pendence—first when a regional military alli-
ance was suggested and later when small arms
and military supplies were requested to coun-
ter Communist insurgency—the Burmese have
charted an independent course with great suc-
cess. Although Burmese political philosophy
has been described as Marxist Buddhism, one
of the early leaders of the Anti-Fascist Peoples
Freedom League (AFPFL) best expressed the
Burmese approach when he said: “We follow
the line that is best for Burma, not what any-
one who has never seen Burma decides is good
for her. We will select what we want from
other systems, both from the East and from
the West’.” Nonalignment Policy; Geography;
Burmese Buddhism; Colonial Heritage; The
Insurrections; Economic Development; Benev-
olent Dictatorship; National Unity; Commu-
nist Target; and Strategic Location.
BURMA'S SOCIALIST DICTATORSHIP,
by Peter Hess, in Swiss Review of World Af-
fairs, v. 8, no. 3 (June 1968) 25–26.
“The author of this brief analysis of
conditions presently prevailing in Burma is the
Meue Zürcher Zeitung's correspondent sta-
tioned in Bombay. His comments are based on
a recent visit to Rangoon. In comparison with
the turbulent postwar years the regime of Gen-
eral Ne Win, which at the beginning of March
was able to observe the sixth anniversary of
its revolution, has brought political stability to
Burma. Some of the students, of the Buddhist
monks and of the politicians who supported
former Premier U Nu and more liberal princi-
ples of government, resisted the military rule
on several occasions but by now have yielded to
the pressure. At the beginning of last year and
a few weeks ago again around a thousand of
the imprisoned oppositional politicians have
been released, a fact which is evaluated here as
a sign that Ne Win now feels secure in the sad-
dle. Communist China’s hostile attitude toward
Ne Win has considerably contributed to his ob-
taining the support by now also of those
groups of Burma's population which pre-
viously had rejected him.”
BURMESE AND MALAYSIAN STUDENT
POLITICS: A PRELIMINARY COMPARA-
TIVE INQUIRY, by Josef Silverstein, in Jour-
mal of Southeast Asian Studies, v. 1, no. 1
(March 1970) 3–22.
“Students and politics are a well known
duo in other countries of Southeast Asia. Indo-
nesia saw them play an important role in the
counter revolution of 1965; South Vietnam
witnessed their widespread involvement in the
Anti-Diem Movement of 1963 and Burma
watched and followed their political activity
from as early as 1920. In most cases, there are
historical accounts of these events but thus
far, there has been no attempt to study compar-
atively the phenomena of students and politics
in the area of Southeast Asia. What, if any-
thing is there in common among the students
of the area? Is it an historical accident that at
some point in time, they leave their books and
enter the political arena? Why do they remain
politically active in some countries and not in
others? These are but a few questions which
need to be answered if students as a political
force is to be understood and dealt with analyt-
ically and generally rather than uniquely and
historically as it has been in the past. Al-
71
though Burma and Malaysia probably have
more differences than similarities, they provide
a good basis to begin a comparative inquiry for
several reasons; both were under the colonial
rule of the British ; both were occupied by the
Japanese during the Second World War; both
have racial minority problems; both had but
one university at the time of independence; both
look to their university graduates as the chief
recruiting ground for the future leaders in
most walks of life. For this writer, the two
provide an excellent basis for comparison be-
cause he lived and taught in the two countries
and had widespread contact with the students.
Before attempting a comparative and analyti-
cal inquiry it is necessary to briefly trace the
history, traditions and environment which in-
fluence the students in the two countries.”
THE CHALLENGE OF WORLD POLITICS
IN SOUTH AND SOUTHEAST ASIA, by
Werner Levi. Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Pren-
tice-Hall, Inc., 1968. 186 p.
The Elitist Nature of Foreign Policies;
The Problem of Nationalism; Regionalism;
Nonalignment—The Expectation and the Re-
sult; The United Nations; Tensions and Con-
flicts; The Major Nations; etc. Discussed,
among many nations of the region are Burma,
Cambodia, Laos, and Thailand.
THE CHANGING FACE OF SOUTHEAST
ASIA, by Amry Vandenbosch and Richard But-
well. Lexington, University of Kentucky Press,
1966.438 p.
“When the authors set out to revise
their 1957 study, Southeast Asia among the
World Powers, the scene had changed so dras-
tically that they could retain only the histori-
cal sections of their country studies. This, then,
is a new account of Southeast Asian affairs,
with separate chapters on Indonesia, Malaysia,
the Philippines, Viet Nam, Laos, Cambodia,
Burma and Thailand, the region as a whole,
and U.S. policy. The authors are concerned
not only with the eight nations’ internal and
international politics but especially with the
relationship between the two.”
CONSTITUTION OF NATIONS. VOLUME
II—ASIA, AUSTRALIA AND OCEANIA, by
Amos J. Peaslee. Rev. 3rd ed. The Hague,
Netherlands, Martinus Nijhoff, 1966. 632 p.
Texts of constitutions for the following
countries, among other: Burma, Cambodia
Laos, and Thailand. :
THE MILITARY AND POLITICA,
CHANGE IN ASIA, by John P. Lovell and (;
I. Eugene Kim, in Pacific Affairs, v. 40, nos.1
and 2 (Spring and Summer 1967) 113–123.
“The indigenous military establish
ments of most of the nation-states of Ail
[including Burma and Thailand] are engage
in activities which place them in vital position
in relationship both to international communiſ
cations and to intrasocietal communication:
Their access and receptivity, in most cases, i.
ideas that are ‘modern’, coupled with their Cº.
tacts with and influence upon broad sectors
their societies from the “grass roots’ level uſ
means that the military have a tremendous pº
tential for imparting or shaping the basic pº
litical norms and beliefs affecting political
change. This is not to say that the role of th:
military as agent of political change is nece:
sarily good, any more than modernization i
necessarily good. Indeed, the point to stressi
that far too little is known about the social and
political consequences of various military aſ
tivities such as those described.”
POLITICS AMONG BURMANS, by Jº
Badgley. Athens, Ohio University Center ſy
International Studies, 1970. 96 p. . .
The book “is based on interviews with
84 intermediate-level leaders in Lower Chind
win, 1961–1962. Its values lie less in its cover
age or comprehensiveness than in the ‘humal
quality of politics' revealed in the profiles (ſ
the leaders . . . Additionally, there are , , ,
hypotheses on the relation between educatiº
and ethnocentrism in Burmans and the proW
ative judgment on the military regime tº
thus far ‘. . . it has failed to capture the vital
ity or tap the creative abilities of ld
9 99
leaders’. -
. . .
PROGRESSIVE, PRODUCTIVE, PATRſ
OTIC BURMA, by Willard A. Hanna. Hº
over, N.H., American Universities Field Staff
Inc., 1968. 18 p. (Fieldstaff Reports, Southed
Asia Series, v. 16, no. 1.)
“Ever since 1962 General Ne Win's R&
olutionary Government’ has been biº
steering the Union of Burma among self-dº




72
pitfalls down the ‘Burmese Way to Socialism.”
In exactly one respect the regime has per-
formed with quite uncharacteristic efficiency:
It has succeeded in virtually isolating itself
from the rest of the world. Therefore, develop-
ments in present-day Burma have gone largely
unobserved and unreported, except by the
Burmese themselves—and, most specifically, by
the official Burmese, whose versions are sus-
pect. Those foreign observers who come armed
with diplomatic passports can still gain admis-
sion to Rangoon and, if they are hardy enough
to brave the transportation and the accommoda-
tions, they may journey on upcountry. Al-
though very, very few either can or do, they
may even report their findings. All others,
however, must first convince the professionally
suspicious Burmese authorities that their mo-
tives are pure, and then, after much delay and
expense, they may be granted a stopover visa
good for exactly twenty-four hours. The Ne
Win government does occasionally make a
vague response to international importunities
that it reassociate itself with the world at
large, but it neither supplies nor permits the
collection of any really extensive or reliable in-
formation about the state of the nation. What
hard information does leak out indicates that
General Ne Win's presumably activist and rev-
olutionary government is making an even
worse mess of administration and development
than did ex-Prime Minister U Nu's dreamily
neutralist regime.”
SOUTHEAST ASIA’S POLITICAL SYS-
TEMS, by Lucian W. Pye. Englewood Cliffs,
N.J., Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1967. 98 p.
“This series is dedicated to the proposi-
tion that it is no longer valid or profitable to
study comparative politics within an essen-
tially North American and European-centered
frame of reference . . . Politically speaking,
the history of the twentieth century is in large
part the history of the re-emergence of non-
European areas and states to positions of inde-
pendence and prominence on the world scene . . .
Southeast Asia is a region of great diver-
sity and contrast. Each of the nine leading
countries of the region—Indonesia, the Philip-
pines, Burma, Malaysia, Thailand, Vietnam,
Cambodia, Laos, and Singapore—represents a
distinct and separate tradition. And within
each country further diversities abound, for
none has an homogeneous population. No other
region of the world offers such a rich array of
major religions. Malaysia and Indonesia are Is-
lamic countries; the Philippines is the only
Christian country in Asia; and the remainder
of mainland Southeast Asia consists of Bud-
dhistic societies that adhere to different be-
liefs. Behind these religious differences are ad-
ditional disparities in customs and historical
experience. The 180 million Southeast Asians
employ more than 150 different languages and
dialects, most of which are mutually unintelli-
gible.” With bibliography. •
2. Burma, and U Nu,
BURMA: A NEW KIND OF VIETNAM?
EXCLUSIVE INTERVIEW WITH U NU, in
War/Peace Report, v. 9, no. 10 (December
1969) 3–8.
“Deposed as Prime Minister by General
Ne Win in 1962, U Nu spent five years in
prison. After being released he determined to
topple the government with force, laying aside
his Buddhist principle of nonviolence. Here he
gives his reasons.” -
BURMA: BUDDHA VS. GENERAL, in
Newsweek, v. 77, no. 12 ( 22 March 1971) 40
plus.
“Each evening shortly after dusk, thou-
sands of Burmese turn on their radios and lis-
ten as the soft voice of former Premier U Nu
quietly exhorts them to overthrow their govern-
ment. Once a dreamy ascetic given to meditation
and to following the advice of fortune-tellers,
the 63-year-old U Nu now preaches violent
revolution. And while the deck is stacked
against him, U Nu still poses the most serious
threat that Burma's strong man, Gen. Ne Win,
has faced in his nine years of dictatorship. Re-
cently, Newsweek Hong Kong bureau chief
Maynard Parker traveled to Burma to assess
the revolt, and last week he filed this report.”
U NU OF BURMA, by Richard Butwell.
Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1969.
327 p. -
“Butwell compiles in chronological and
topical fashion most of what is known in En-
glish about U Nu's political career . . . Partic-
ularly valuable is . . . [the] blow-by-blow ac-
count of the AFPFL split and the first Army
coup . . . [This book is] the conjunction of U
73
Nu and Burma during the middle years of the
20th century. . .” With bibliography.
3. Burma, and General Ne Win.
a. Miscellaneous Aspects
BURMA AND GENERAL NE WIN, by
Maung Maung. New York, Asia Publishing
House, 1969. 332 p.
“Recent political events in Burma as
seen through the endeavors of the builder of
its modern armed forces and leader of its care-
taker government.”
BURMA UNDER NE WIN, in Swiss Re-
view of World Review, v. 20, no. 2 (May 1970)
8–9.
“Some years ago it was Sukarno, last
year Ayub Khan, and now Norodom Sihanouk:
one by one the apparently well-anchored
thrones of Southeast Asia’s self-assured rulers
have been shaken and toppled. Burma's Gen-
eral Ne Win now enjoys seniority among this
region’s chiefs of state. His rule is also being
undermined, even openly challenged, but with
only minimal chances of success. According to
most observers the leading opponents of the
present regime are the Communist and separat-
ist rebel groups of varying strength which
now dominate or at least endanger broad
stretches of the jungle-covered areas in north-
ern and eastern Burma. These groups have
more or less become a traditional part of inde-
pendent Burma's recent history and, unfortun-
ately, one can hardly imagine this country
without them. The greatest danger to the Ran-
goon regime is represented by the Kachin Inde-
pendence Army in the north and the Shan in
the northeast.”
b. Socialism
THE BULL LET LOOSE, by David Baird,
in Far Eastern Economic Review, v. 72, no. 16
(17 April 1971) 19–22.
“The Burmese way to socialism is a
long haul through arid foothills. The people
are not benefiting from doctrinaire economics.
Yet neither U Nu nor any other force looks
like topping Bo Jo Ne Win . . . You can’t ex-
pect to drink clear water from a newly dug
well. So runs a typically homespun Burmese
saying, frequently quoted by the military re-
gime which has just celebrated its 9th anniver-
&
2}
º
sary in power. Unfortunately only the most op:
timistic among the 28 million people of Burma
see any prospect of the water clearing in the
foreseeable future. And, given the chance,
many would be only too pleased to quench their
thirst sooner at a source less revolutionarily
pure. But the opportunity appears unlikely tº
arise as long as General Ne Win continues as
chairman of the Revolutionary Council. If the
steely general, at 64, has any doubts about
progress along the Burmese Way to Socialism,
he has not revealed them. Any second thoughts
about the economic theories which have
brought a country rich in resources to the edge
of bankruptcy are hidden from the public eye."
THE BURMESE WAY TO SOCIALISM
BEYOND THE WELFARE STATE, by Mya
Maung, in Asian Survey, v. 10, no. 6 (June
1970) 533–551. * .
“This article . . . does not concern itself
with the political and ethical justification of
‘the Burmese Way to Socialism,” but rather
with its economic effects. At the outset it must
be noted that the sources of statistical data and |
information on the functioning of the Burmese
economy since 1962 are rather limited and un:
reliable. It is essential, however, to record and
analyze the series of economic actions taken by
the military government. With that in mind,
this study will scrutinize the economic effects
of the Burmese experiment with a command
economy. The main hypothesis of this study is
that a ‘simple’ transfer of ownership and con-
trol of resources from the private to the public
sector in the name of equity and justice does
not automatically create efficiency or elevate
technology, and that inefficiency may emerge
due to the inflexibility of large-scale public
programs, bureaucratic delays, institutional
disruption of the market mechanism, inactions
and conflicts among the governmental agen.
cies, loopholes and evasion associated with 8
system of direct controls and the disincentive
effects of socialization.” -
D. National Security and Armed Force
(See also Appendixes E and F)
THE ASIAN BALANCE OF POWER: A
COMPARISON WITH EUROPEAN PRECE.
DENTS, by Coral Bell. London, Institute for

74
Strategic Studies, 1968. 14 p. (Adelphi Paper
No. 44.)
“Asia needs a balance of power coali-
tion, similar to NATO, to deter Chinese expan-
sionism in the next decade. It was the tradi-
tionally European concept of balance of power,
not containment, which halted Soviet advances
in post-war Europe. Containment is at best a
military strategy for stop-gap action to pre-
vent any territorial acquisition by the adver-
sary. Military containment has been tried in
Vietnam and has proved too costly in relation
to its effectiveness. A balance of power coali-
tion in Asia would have not only military, but
political and economic cohesion in deterring
China . . . The Asian coalition, therefore,
would include only those countries which are
definitely Western-oriented and have common
political, economic, and social interests to pro-
tect, such as Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore,
the Philippines, Taiwan, Japan, New Zealand,
and Australia. Burma, Cambodia, Laos, and
Vietnam should be made neutral buffer states
. . . However, a balance of power coalition is
not in the Asian tradition, and it will still be
difficult to organize. Moreover, Asian countries
alone cannot present China with a credible de-
terrent. A merely regional coalition will not be
effective against China’s increasing nuclear po-
tential. Asian countries need the economic, mil-
itary, and nuclear backing of the US. A consid-
erable input of Western military resources will
be required for at least a decade and a US de-
fense arrangement, similar to the Japanese-
American pact, will be needed for much longer.
THE MILITARY BALANCE 1970–1971—
PART V: ASIA AND AUSTRALASIA, in
Aerospace International, v. 6, no. 6 (Novem-
ber–December 1970) 54–56 plus.
A strategic survey of the military bal-
ance of this area of the world, including a sur-
vey of the following countries, among many
others: Burma, Cambodia, Laos, and Thailand.
Provides the strengths of the Armies, Navies,
Marine Corps, Air Forces, as well as Paramili-
tary Forces.
WHAT IS SECURITY IN SOUTHEAST
ASIA 2 by Frank N. Trager, in Air University
Review, v. 20, no. 1 (November–December
1968) 103–112.
“Let’s think first about what security in
Southeast Asia is from the point of view of
Southeast Asians . . . In terms of security,
there should have been no threat, there should
have been no problem. At the time of indepen-
dence, none of the Southeast Asian countries
any longer had designs on their neighbors.
There had been a time when the Thai and the
Vietnamese in fact had designs upon Cam-
bodia; and in their centuries-long march down
this mainland Southeast Asian peninsula, they
had squeezed Cambodia into smaller confines.
So, too, the Burmese once had rampant dy-
nasties; and Indonesians may have had ideas
of reviving a greater Malayo-Indonesian state.
But by and large, at the end of World War II
such past “glories’ were past. To repeat, in
terms of security, after these countries had at-
tained independence, there should have been no
threat to the area—but there was.”
WORLD MILITARY EXPENDITURES,
1970. Washington, U.S. Arms Control and Dis-
armament Agency, Economic Bureau, 1970. 37
p. (Publication 58.)
Provides information on World Military
expenditures and related data for 120 countries
including Burma, Cambodia, Laos, and Thai-
land, among others. With 8 charts, 6 tables,
and statistical notes.
E. Foreign Relations
1. Communist China and Her Influences
(See also H-2 Below)
BETWEEN VIETNAM AND CHINA, by
Christian Müller, in Swiss Review of World
Affairs, v. 20, no. 5 (August 1970) 12–21.
“Some time ago Christian Müller, a
young member of the NZZ's (Switzerland's
Neue Zürcher Zeitung) foreign affairs staff,
was sent on an extended special assignment to
Asia. His reports, which have been appearing
periodically . . ., provide valuable insights into
that troubled part of the world (Burma, Laos,
Cambodia, and Nepal) caught between the In-
dochinese tragedy and the growing might of a
renascent China.”
BURMA’S CHINA CRISIS: THE
CHOICES AHEAD, by John H. Badgley, in
Military Review, v. 48, no. 4 (April 1968)
80–84.
75
Condensed from the original, published
in Asian Survey, November 1967. “The middle
ground has eroded in Asia. As the cold war
fever has declined, “neutralism’ has become
meaningless foreign policy. In the past four
years, the Asian international scene has
changed as though it had passed through a cat-
aclysmic war. The Bandung spirit of Afro-
Asian amity died with the Sino-Indian border
conflict in October 1962. The transition to a
new power arrangement was symbolized in
June 1967 as the Burmese and Cambodian
Governments, the last of Asia’s important neu-
trals, joined India and Indonesia, as well as
those states aligned with the United States, in
being denounced by China. Burma’s two-dec-
ade-old friendship policy toward China ap-
peared to be bankrupt. The process of forming
a new China policy is not completed for Asia’s
ex-neutrals, but there can be no doubt as to the
direction in which Burma’s Bogyoke Ne Win
and his Revolutionary Council is being pressed.
China Maoists have utilized their last levers of
domestic influence in Burma—an insurgent
Communist Party and the Chinese students—
to force the issue. Not since the insurrection
began in May 1948 has any Burmese Govern-
ment been so challenged domestically and
abroad.”
CHANGES IN CHINESE ATTENTION TO
SOUTHEAST ASIA, 1967–1969: THEIR
RELEVANCE FOR THE FUTURE OF THE
AREA, by Daniel Tretiak, in Current Scene;
Developments in Mainland China, v. 7, no. 21
(1 November 1969) 1–17.
“During the past several years there
have been important changes in the direction
of Chinese foreign policy toward Southeast
Asia. This article will examine the nature of
the changes and conclude by suggesting proba-
ble trends in Chinese policy toward Southeast
Asia in the next few years.” Changes in
Chinese Attention Levels to Burma, Indonesia,
Malaysia, Thailand, and Laos; Changing
Chinese Attention Levels to Vietnam. * ,
THE FUTURE OF MAINLAND SOUTH-
EAST ASIA, by Frank N. Trager, in Military
Review, v. 50, no. 1 (January 1970) 3–16.
“Mainland Southeast Asia has been a
target area for Peking in earlier dynasties, and
Communist China under Mao Tse-tung has
been no exception. Peking, frequently said to
have conducted a ‘cautious’ foreign policy, has
not been cautious in Asia. It has proceeded to
gobble up Tibet, to incite North Korea, to at
tack India, and again to threaten it in the Pak.
istan-India war of 1965. During the ‘cultural
revolution,’ China has been active in violating
its treaties and downgrading its ‘friendly’ rela.
tions with Burma and Cambodia while openly
supporting a so-called war of ‘national libera.
tion’ in the former. It has fomented strife in
Thailand by energizing the Communist Party
of Thailand. It has given support to the Pathet
Lao and North Vietnamese Communists in
their attacks on the Lao Provinces of Phong
Saly, Sam Neua, and Xieng Khouang. It has
supplied North Vietnam with materiel and
about 50,000 specially trained engineering and
artillery troops. A political victory for Viet.
namese Communists in the Republic of Viet.
nam—that is, a coalition government ‘imposed'
on Saigon—would help free them to weaken
Laos and Cambodia, add to the dangers of
Thailand and Burma, and, of course, irrepara.
bly weaken the Republic of Vietnam.” .
MAO TSE—TUNG GAZES UPON FIVE
CONTINENTS, by Ernst Henri, in Atlas (De.
cember 1967) 14–15.
“This article [reprinted from a Soviet
periodical] is of particular interest because it
reflects a Soviet viewpoint imputing to Mao
Tse-tung aspirations to construct an Oriental
version of a “Super-Reich.” Mao and his ass0.
ciates developed a concrete plan of expansion
as far back as the 1950s. The first stage of the
‘great strategic blueprint’ included Korea,
Mongolia, Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, Indone.
sia, Malaysia, Burma, and other nations on the
periphery of China. In the second stage, China
would expand over the Hindustan Peninsula,
into Soviet Central Asia, the Soviet Far East,
and finally the Near East. The final stage is
not quite apparent, but Chinese intentions are
clearly stated: no continent has been omitted
from the projected ‘Maoization’ of the world
Present reality does not exist for the Maſ
group; its hallucinations have become deci.
sions. It is obvious that Peking has decided
that at some point a global war—exterminat
ing one-third to one-half of the world's popula:
tion—will be necessary for realization of Mao's
‘Super-Reich.” That is why China continually

76
does everything possible to increase interna-
tional tension.”
MAO’S MEN IN BURMA, in Atlas, v. 14, no.
4 (October 1967) 31–32.
From Mainstream Weekly, New Delhi.
—“Whatever Mao Tse-tung’s preoccupations in
his own vast land, he supports and, in fact,
presses on with another Asian “war of libera-
tion'—this one against neighboring and
friendly Burma. New Delhi’s Mainstream
Weekly reports on Maoists in Burma.”
PEKING, HANOI, AND GUERRILLA IN-
SURGENCY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA, by Jus-
tus M. van der Kroef, in Southeast Asian Per-
spectives, no. 3 (September 1971) 1–67.
“How have mainland China and North
Vietnam performed in world affairs over the
past two decades? What are some of the
main directions of their current policy? In
the monograph . . . Professor Justus M. van
der Kroef attempts to deal with one important
aspect of the latter question. His essay is an
exhaustive examination of the dimensions of
Peking's and Hanoi's ongoing support for
Communist-led insurrections and revolutionary
wars in all the countries of Southeast Asia. In
his . . . compilation of the facts, no single
exhibit is perhaps entirely persuasive. But the
cumulative weight of his evidence is over-
whelming.” Partial contents: Introduction;
Burma and Thailand; Indochina; Malaysia and
Singapore; Indonesia and the Philippines; etc.
RED GIANTS BATTLE OVER ASIA, in
U.S. News & World Report, v. 71, no. 12 (20
September 1971) 42–45. -
“Military aid . . . trade pacts . . . sub-
version. These are only some of the weapons
in a potentially explosive rivalry for domi-
nance in South Asia [ and elsewhere]. James
N. Wallace of ‘U.S. News & World Report'
toured the area for an on-the-scene report of
what's at stake.” He reports where Russia and
China vie for supremacy. For instance, “Russia
is offering new economic aid to Burma.”
SINO-BURMESE RELATIONS: THE END
OF THE PAUK PHAW ERA, by Frank N.
Trager, in Orbis, v. 11, no. 4 (Winter 1968)
1034–1054.
“On March 2, 1962, General Ne Win,
who has been Burma’s military commander
since independence in January 1948 and has
been fighting internal communist and noncom-
munist rebellions for two decades, executed a
coup d’etat and took control of the Burmese
government. This remarkable military officer
was one of the earliest nationalist Thakins, a
comrade-in-arms of Bogyoke Aung San who
led Burma to independence, a former Deputy
Prime Minister (1949–1950) under U Nu, and
the Prime Minister of the ‘caretaker govern-
ment” which ruled from September 26, 1958 to
the free general elections of February 6, 1960
(organized and supervised by Ne Win). He is
now Chairman of the Revolutionary Council
that rules Burma without benefit of constitu-
tion or parliament. Since the coup, the Council
has adopted an eclectic domestic policy known
as the ‘Burmese Way to Socialism’ and has
carefully continued and nurtured what I have
frequently called Burma’s honest neutralist
foreign policy first adopted in 1950.”
STORM OVER ASIA; CHINA AND
SOUTHEAST ASIA: THRUST AND RE-
SPONSE, by Robert Karr McCabe. New York,
The New American Library, 1967. 225 p.
“This is a book about war, though not a
war story, because war and death are cardinal
facts in today’s Asia. This is a book about
peace as well, for the hope of peace and prog-
ress is a part of every Asian's dreams. In sum,
this is a book about Asia under storm clouds—
but it includes . . . an implicit promise that
the storm is not forever.” Chapter I—The Kill-
ing Ground (Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos);
Chapter II—A Problem of Posture (Thailand);
Chapter III—The Hermetic Hermit (Burma).
2. USSR
RUSSIAN INTEREST IN SOUTHEAST
ASIA: OUTLINES AND SOURCES
1803–1970, by R. Quested, in Journal of South-
east Asian Studies, v. 1, no. 2 (September
1970) 48–60. - -
“The establishment of diplomatic ties
by the Soviet Union with all the countries of
Southeast Asia except the Philippines and
South Vietnam, and the growing influence
sought by it in the area, indicates.that the pub-
lication of more work on Russian relations with
Southeast Asia would be of interest, and it is the
77
purpose of this article to survey the course of
these relations to date, to see what general pic-
ture emerges and what possibilities of further
research exist.” The Tsarist Period 1803–1917;
The Tsarist Consulate in Singapore; Tsarist
Russia and Indonesia, Thailand, Burma, Phil-
ippines, Indo-China; Tsarist Russian Scholar-
ship on Southeast Asia; Soviet Relations with
Southeast Asia; etc.
RED GIANTS BATTLE OVER ASIA, in
U.S. News & World Report, v. 71, no. 12 (20
September 1971) 42–45.
“Military aid . . . trade pacts . . . sub-
version. These are only some of the weapons in
a potentially explosive rivalry for dominance
in South Asia [and elsewhere]. James N. Wal-
lace of ‘U.S. News & World Report' toured the
area for an on-the-scene report of what’s at
stake.” He reports where Russia and China vie
for supremacy. For instance, “Russia is offer-
ing new economic aid to Burma.”
3. United States (See also Nixon Doctrine in
II–F–6—b)
ASIA: HOW STAND THE DOMINOES2 in
Newsweek, v. 78, no. 13 (27 September 1971)
47 plus.
“The very fact that an American
President is actively seeking a détente with
the rulers of Communist China has wrought
fundamental changes in the power balance
of Asia. “The Nixon visit,” says a Western
diplomat there, ‘means that we are seeing
the removal of rigid lines between non-Com-
munists and Communists, between the goodies
and the baddies.” And with the possible excep-
tion of the principals involved—the Americans
and the Chinese—no one will be so profoundly
and directly affected by this development as
the nations of East and Southeast Asia. All ten
of Southeast Asia's countries live in China's
shadow. Three of them—North Vietnam, Laos
and Burma—have borders with China. Two of
them—Singapore and Malaysia—have huge
populations of Chinese descent. Most of the
countries have Maoist guerrilla movements,
and four—North and South Vietnam; Laos
and Cambodia—are directly positioned in
Southeast Asia’s war zone. Except for North
Vietnam, all have lived directly or tacitly
under the American umbrella. And now that
this protective umbrella is being at least par-
º
g
. . . . . ;
..].
tially withdrawn, all of them are faced with
major political readjustments. NEWSWEEK's
Hong Kong bureau chief Maynard Parker last
week completed an extensive tour of all the
Southeast Asian lands outside the Indochina
peninsula . . . He reports on how these coun-
tries are adjusting to the new realities. In a
companion piece, former U.S. Under Secretary
of State George W. Ball discusses the larger
implications of the changing U.S. policy in
Asia and the special impact of Mr. Nixon's
China initiative on Japan.”
PERSPECTIVE ON ASIA: THE NEW U.S.
DOCTRINE AND SOUTHEAST ASIA. RE.
PORT OF SENATOR MIKE MANSFIELD
[UPON COMPLETION OF TRIP TO
SOUTHEAST ASIA] TO THE COMMITTEE
ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, UNITED
STATES SENATE. Washington, Government
Printing Office, 1969. 15 p.
The President’s New Asian Doctrine;
Reactions to the New Asian Doctrine; The
New Doctrine and Southeast Asian Countries
(The Philippines, Indonesia, Burma, Cam-
bodia, and Laos); etc.
REVIEW OF UNITED STATES GOVERN.
MENT OPERATIONS IN SOUTH ASIA,
1967. REPORT OF SENATOR ALLEN J. EL-
LENDER TO THE COMMITTEE ON AP.
PROPRIATIONS, UNITED STATES SEN.
ATE. Washington, Government Printing
Office, 1968. 380 p. (90th Congress, 2d Session,
Senate, Document No. 77.) -
This report represents the findings of
the Senator's inspection trip for the purpose of
observing and evaluating our numerous gov-
ernmental activities in this section of the
world. The trip began on 23 November 1967
and ended on 24 December 1967. Contents.
Conclusions and Recommendations; Third
Country Aid; The Agricultural Situation in
India; Country Reports (Afghanistan, Burma,
Ceylon, India, Nepal, Pakistan); An Evalua.
tion of a Decade of U.S. Foreign Operations;
The Balance of Payments Problem; etc.
STUDY MISSION TO CENTRAL AND
SOUTHEAST ASIA, NOVEMBER—DE.
CEMBER 1966. REPORT OF SENATORS
GALE W. MCGEE AND FRANK E. MOSS
TO THE COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIA-
78
TIONS AND THE COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC
WORKS, UNITED STATES SENATE,
APRIL 6, 1967. 15 p. (90th Congress, 1st Ses-
sion, Senate, Document No. 17.)
“The intent and purpose of the trip was
to attempt to gauge the moods and to assess
pending potential crisis questions in the south
Asian countries lying along the periphery of
both the Soviet Union and China. The particu-
lar goals included the following: (1) To reas-
sess the postulates of American foreign policy
toward central and south Asian countries in
the light of the changes wrought by 20 years
of cold war and the convulsions of independ-
ence and new expectations among the peoples
of Far East. (2) To measure the estimates of
China both as to intents and capabilities. (3)
To obtain firsthand impressions of attitudes
and suggestions in regard to the American
presence and purpose in South Vietnam. (4)
To study the food crisis in India and the di-
mensions of a program of action necessary to
achieve food self-sufficiency. (5) To evaluate in
Indonesia the new elements of power, the
chances for stability, and the most effective
form of a new American program of coopera-
tion there. (6) To reassess in the perspective
of the rapidly changing events of Asia the ef-
fectiveness and requirements of American eco-
nomic assistance programs and other overseas
operations. Among the countries studied within
the context of these goals were Turkey Iraq,
Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, Nepal,
Burma, Thailand, Malaysia (Sabah and Sara-
wak), and Indonesia.”
F. Boundaries and Frontiers
ASIAN FRONTIERS: STUDIES IN A
CONTINUING PROBLEM, by Alastair Lamb.
New York, Frederick A. Praeger, 1968. 246 p.
“An . . . account of boundary disputes,
many of which have their origins in or before
the period of colonial domination. The regions
covered include Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan,
India, Nepal, Bhutan, Burma, Thailand, Laos,
Cambodia, North and South Vietnam, China,
Mongolia, and the Asian republics of the
USSR. Explosive subjects, such as Kashmir,
the Sino-Indian crisis and the Sino-Soviet bor-
der, are treated in detail. Thirty maps assist
the reader in following the textual material.”
COMMUNIST CHINA: ITS SOUTHERN
BORDER LANDS, by David P. Mezingo, in
SAIS Review, v. 12, no. 2 (Winter 1968)
43–54.
“Great powers are extremely sensitive
to any developments which pose real or poten-
tial danger to their strategic interests along or
near their frontiers. The southern border lands
have occupied a special place in the strategic
outlook of every Chinese Government since the
Ch’in dynasty. For more than a thousand years
the main direction of Han Chinese expansion
and migration was southward. Some tribes
were subjugated; others were driven as far
south as the border regions of present-day
Burma, Thailand, Laos and Vietnam. To en-
force central control over these territories one
Chinese Government after another has had to
effect new subjugations of the southern tribes.
After the eighteenth century the southward
march of the Hans was checked substantially
by the decline of Manchu power, by the West-
ern colonization of South and Southeast Asia,
and by the increasing flow of China’s rural
populations into its newly rising seaports and
commercial centers. Under communist rule
these trends not only continue, but also have
been accelerated by Peking's industrialization
program and the priority it has given to popu-
lating and developing the northwest provinces.
Politically, the southern border territories
have presented more problems than assets for
the Chinese Communist Government.”
THE SINO-BURMESE BORDER SETTLE-
MENT, by N. M. Ghatate, in India Quarterly,
v. 24, no. 1 (January–March 1968) 17–44.
“On achieving her independence in
1948, Burma inherited all the territory pre-
viously governed by the British. Although on
some maps Burma's borders were clearly de-
marcated, in actuality her frontier with China
was only partly settled and even this partial
delimitation had not been wholly accepted by
the rulers of China, Nationalist or Communist,
because they viewed this delimitation as an im-
position of imperialist Britain's will upon
weak China. Before the British occupation of
Burma, there is no record of any treaty defin-
ing the Sino-Burmese border. However, we find
that all throughout history, both the Burmese
and the Chinese kings regarded the rugged
79
forest-covered borderlands inhabited by tribes
like the Shans, the Wa’s and the Kachins as
their own . . . Both sides made compromises.
The Chinese Government agreed to the
Burmese view regarding the watershed princi-
ple in delimiting the border east of the Izurazi
Pass, before the area was surveyed; the
Burmese government withdrew from their pre-
vious position that they could not offer more
than 56 sq. miles in Hpimaw area and agreed
to let the Joint Commission decide the exact
amount of territory to be ceded to China.”
SOVEREIGNTY OF THE SEA. Washing-
ton, Department of State, October 1969. 33 p.
(Geographic Bulletin no. 3.)
The Total Ocean Environment; Offshore
Jurisdiction; The Territorial Sea; The Conti-
nental Shelf; Freedom of the Seas; Law of the
Sea Problems; The Baseline; Boundaries in
the Sea; Charts for identifying Offshore Fea-
tures. Includes information on Burma, Cam-
bodia, and Thailand. With selected bibliogra-
phy.
G. The Land and the People (See also
Appendix D)
BURMA; OFFICIAL STANDARD NAMES
APPROVED BY THE UNITED STATES
BOARD ON GEOGRAPHIC NAMES. Wash-
ington, Department of the Interior, Office of
Geography, March 1966. 725 p. (Gazetteer No.
96.) - -
This gazetteer contains about 52,000
entries for places and features in Burma. The
name coverage corresponds approximately to
that of maps at the scale of 1:250,000.
BURMA. by F. S. V. Donnison. London, Er-
nest Benn, 1970. 263 p.
“Mr. Donnison provides the reader with
a sketch of the geographical structure of the
country and of its people's characteristics—so
far as the characteristics of millions of people
can be generalised—and these sections of the
book are followed by useful summaries of Bur-
ma’s history up to recent decades. The greater
part of the book is, however, devoted to the
rise of the nationalist movement, the stages by
which this movement triumphed in 1948, and
the country's fortunes since independence was
attained in that year. Important sections of the
book thus cover events and situations in which
Mr. Donnison himself, as an administrator,
was closely concerned.” With bibliography.
THE MEKONG; RIVER OF TERROR
AND HOPE, by Peter T. White, in National
Geographic, v. 134, no. 6 (December 1968)|
737 787.
An essay of the land and the people of
the area with maps and numerous photos also
on the Mekong River which traverses, among
others, Burma, Laos, Thailand, and Cambodia:
The Hope of the Mekong Project (A Plan to
Revolutionize Life for Millions of Southeast
Asians by Harnessing the River for Power and
Irrigation); New Ways for a Lao Farmer; LaQ
Guerrillas Threaten Oficials; Thailand Guards
a Precarious Peace; Chinese Soldiers Hold
Corner of Burma; Foreigners Crowd into
Vientiane; Rice Crop Fertilized by Monsoon;
Phnom Penh, Cambodia, City Built Where
Floating Buddhas Stopped; Dams Hold Prom.
ise and Problems; etc.
MONSOON ASIA; A GEOGRAPHICAL
SURVEY, by Harry Robinson. New York,
Frederick A. Praeger, 1967. 561 p.
“This study is planned in two main
parts: an introductory section dealing with the
general geographical framework of the region,
the physical and cultural background, the re.
sources, agriculture and industry, and some as:
pects of political geography, followed by a sec.
ond, and larger, section which is concerned
with the regional geography of Monsoon Asia,
each country being dealt with in general, and |
then by regions . . . Emphasis has been placed
upon two aspects: first, the historical and cul: ;
tural background and, second, recent economic
changes and developments. Furthermore, very |
significant economic changes, with all their so-
cial and political implications, are taking place
within the region; but it is not easy to procurº
immediate information on these matters and
an attempt has been made to give a reasonably
up-to-date account of the changes in process.
The maps have been kept relatively simple tº
give clarity.” Contents: The Monsoon Region
—Introduction; The Physical Background; Ré.
sources and Economy; The Human Back
ground; The Indian Sub-Continent; India-
Social and Economic Geography; India—R&
gional Geography; Pakistan; Nepal, Sikkim

80
and Bhutan; Ceylon; South-East Asia;
Burma; Thailand; Cambodia, Laos and Viet-
nam; Malaysia; Indonesia; The Philippine Is-
lands; The Chinese People's Republic; China
—Economic and Regional Geography; Hong
Kong, Macao and Taiwan; Korea; Japan—
General and Regional Geography. With: bib-
liography, illustrations, and tables.
SOUTHEAST ASIA; HISTORY, CUL-
TURE, PEOPLE, by Edward Graff and Harold
E. Hammond. Bronxville, N.Y., Cambridge
Book Co., Inc., 1967. 154 p.
Southeast Asia—The Land; Early His-
tory of Southeast Asia; The People of the
Hills, Plains and Villages; The arrival of the
Europeans (The Special Case of Thailand,
among others); Language and Culture of
Southeast Asia; The New Nations—Their
Problems and Promise (Burma, Malaysia,
Singapore, Philippines, Indonesia, Laos, Cam-
bodia, Vietnam, Thailand, among others); The
Foreign Relations of Southeast Asian Nations;
and Bibliography.
SOUTH-EAST ASIA—RACE, CULTURE,
AND NATION, by Guy Hunter. New York,
Oxford University Press, 1966. 190 p. (Pub-
lished for the Institute of Race Relations, Lon-
don.) * . -
The author explores the following
themes “as part of a single process in the de-
velopment of the nations of South-East Asia:
(a) the transition from tradition to modernity;
(b) the establishment of national identity, le-
gitimacy, and unity out of diversity which
reappeared when the colonial blanket was
whipped off; (c) the complications introduced
in (a) and (b) by racial and ethnic diversity.”
These problems are also considered for the fol-
lowing countries of Peninsular Southeast Asia,
among others: Burma, Cambodia, Laos, and
Thailand. -
WE THE BURMESE; VoICES FROM
BURMA, ed. by Helen G. Trager. New York,
Frederick A. Praeger, 1969. 297 p. -
“Gathered together in this book are
Burmese views of Burma and the Burmese way
of life. They are presented in various forms—
as short stories, poems, photographs, folktales,
speeches, cartoons, news items and editorials,
essays, biographies, etc.” With chronology of
important events in Burmese history, glossary,
and bibliography.
H. Internal Conditions
1. Sociological Aspects
ASIA, EAST BY SOUTH: A CULTURAL
GEOGRAPHY, by J. E. Spencer and William
L. Thomas. Second ed. New York, John Wiley
& Sons, Inc., 1971. 669 p.
“This volume is concerned with cultural
geography in its widest interpretation. Most of
the materials with which cultural geographers
must deal are tangible and can be viewed in
terms of regional distribution and analysis.
These tangibles form the primary contexts of
discussion throughout the book.” Part I–Sys-
tematic Geography; Part II—The Regional
Expression of Cultures (including among oth-
ers: Southeast Asia—A Cultural Shatterbelt;
The Irrawaddy Valley and Burma; The Evolu-
tion of Thailand; Cambodia; etc.); Part III—
For Use in Reference (including among oth-
ers a Selected Bibliography). .
THE CLASS STRUCTURE OF BURMA:
CONTINUITY AND CHANGE, by Moshe Lis-
sak, in Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, v.
1, no. 1 (March 1970) 60–73.
“The purpose of this article is to review
some of the changes that have taken place in
the stratification of Burmese society since the
thirties, and find out to what extent signs of a
more modern class structure can be discerned
and of what it consists.” .
INTELLECTUALS AND THE NATIONAL
VISION: THE BURMESE CASE, by John
Badgley, in Asian Survey, v. 9, no. 8 (August
1969) 598–613. : -
“This article is a report on one aspect of
the national revolution in Burma. More pre-
cisely, it is an interpretation of how the prob-
lem of national political development is per-
ceived by writers who face this giant public
issue. Do any authors articulate a national vi-
sion that inspires identification among Burmese
as Burmese? If so, where does this vision seem
to be leading in terms of national policy? Do
they espouse only ideology and revisionism, or is
the standard intellectual aloofness—that anti-
rural quality communists know as ‘bourgeois
81

intellectualism'—a barrier to any significant
political statement by Burmese writers?”
WORLD SURVEY OF EDUCATION. IV:
HIGHER EDUCATION. New York, UNESCO
Center, 1966. 1433 p.
The information contained in this vol-
ume was received before the end of June 1964.
The table of contents, with all references to
the names and status of countries (including
Burma, Cambodia, Laos, and Thailand) and
territories, was drawn upon on 1 September
1963, and subsequent changes are therefore not
reflected. The educational system, the develop-
ment of higher education, university institu-
tions, etc. With bibliography on higher educa-
tion.
2. Communism (See also Appendia; G)
AN ANALYSIS OF COMMUNIST INSUR-
GENCY IN BURMA (U), by Maj. Charles E.
Getz. Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala., Air Com-
mand and Staff College, 1970. 70 p.
(M–35582–7–S, Research Study no. 0525–70.)
“The impact of communist insurgency
has influenced the internal stability of the
country of Burma. This study analyzes this im-
pact in light of the environmental factors and
the past and present relationships between the
government and the Burmese communists. The
study concludes that the communist insurgents
have been split by personal and ideological dif-
ferences, hampered by their inability to effect
a united front comprised of all insurgent
groups, and restricted by the lack of support
from the USSR or Communist China. Because
of these factors, the communists do not possess
the capability of overthrowing the present
Burmese government without substantial out-
side support.”
COLD WAR OPERATIONS: THE POLI-
TICS OF COMMUNIST CONFRONTATION;
PART XI–COMMUNISM IN ASIA, by
Lyman B. Kirpatrick, Jr., in Naval War Col-
lege Review, v. 21, no. 3 (November 1968)
57–63.
A summary of the status of commu-
nism in the various countries in Asia, includ-
ing the following, among others: Burma, Cam-
bodia, Laos, and Thailand.
DANGER IN BURMA, by Giselher Wirsi,
in Atlas, v. 15, no. 4 (April 1968) 39–42. ".
“Will Burma become a second Wieſ.
nam? Giselher Wirsing, editor of West Ger;
many's . . . Lutheran weekly, Christ und.
Welt, comes very close to answering ‘yes’ to his
own question. Tragically poor in the wake of
hasty socialization, Burma could fall to the
Communists like a withered plum . . .”
WORLD STRENGTH OF THE COM:
MUNIST PARTY ORGANIZATIONS, 23rd
ANNUAL REPORT; 1971 EDITION. Wash.;
ington, Department of State, Bureau of Intel
ligence and Research, 1971. 248 p. (Publication |
8526.)
“This report contains the 23rd annual |
global survey of communist parties . . . This
issue, like its predecessors, gives information
on party membership and on voting and parlia.
mentary strength wherever applicable, tº
gether with a brief analysis of the importance
of each communist party in its domestic politi |
cal environment.” Includes information On
many countries, including, among others, the
following: Burma, Cambodia, Laos, and Thai.
land. See also appendixes for the bibliography
on Peninsular Southeast Asia. .
3. Minorities and Minorities’ Problems (Seº
also Map in Appendia; J)
BABES IN THE WOOD, by James Dalton
in Far Eastern Economic Review, v. 69, no. 34
(20 August 1970) 27–32.
“Today Burma is the scene of more civil
wars than any other nation. The minorities'
problem is as far from being solved as ever ...,
“Separation, accommodation, unification—what
is it to be? Nothing is more urgent for
Burma and her minorities than the correct set.
tlement of this question. If we dally or make
the wrong decision our blood, treasure, and
time will go on being wasted; lost, lost, tº
what ultimate end for all of us no man here
can rightly say.” Slowly, almost painfully,
Prime Minister U Nu closed his remarks be:
fore a gathering of ethnic minority leaders in
Rangoon in February 1962. Only a few day;
remained for U Nu's government. On March?
it was eliminated by an army coup. Today,
eight years and several thousand lives later, U
Nu's question remains; but the situation of
82
Burma's ethnic minorities has altered radi-
cally. Burmans, the dominant ethnic group,
comprise more than 18 million of Burma’s total
population. They are concentrated along the
Irrawaddy, Chindwin, and Sittang Rivers.
For several centuries they have held varying
degrees of suzerainty over neighbouring ethnic
groups. The Karens, about three million, are
spread through southern and eastern Burma.
Often intermixed with the Burma villages,
85% Buddhist, they are, as Prime Minister U
Nu remarked, ‘kith and kin to us’.”
THE KARENS-FIRST OUT OF THE
GOURD, by Preecha Chaturaphand, in
SEATO Record, v. 10, no. 5 (October 1971)
27–34.
“Spread across northern Thailand and
Burma, the Karens are a kaleidoscopic people
embracing widely diverse religions and tradi-
tions.” This survey of the Karens deals with:
The Household; Co-operation Between House-
holds; Marriage; Karen Women; Religion and
Religious Leadership; Civil Leadership; Law
and Order; Making a Living; and Relations
with the Outside World.
REVOLUTIONARY REGIONALISM IN
SOUTHEAST ASIA, by Robert Dickson
Crane, in The Reporter (2 May 1968) 11–16.
“The new states of Southeast Asia were
formed from colonial empires without regard
to the ethnic or cultural homogeneity of the
populations. Consequently, most SEA countries
have several linguistic, religious, and ethnic
groups within their borders. As the drive to-
ward centralism and nation-building on the
Western model has increased in the area, some
governments have tried to force these ethnic
minorities to assimilate into the dominant cul-
tural pattern of the country. These attempts to
infuse a spirit of ‘national unity’ into divergent
peoples, however, have instead rekindled the
nationalism of the minorities and pushed them
into open rebellion. In fact, some ethnic groups
are beginning to join forces with their kins-
men across national boundaries, and previously
uncoordinated national resistance movements
are developing into region-wide rebellions
aimed at large-scale reorganizations of politi-
cal power. The two largest resistance move-
ments have developed among the Nagas of
northeastern India and the Shans of Burma
. . . The Shans are just beginning their rebel-
lion. They originally supported the federal
state, but were alienated by Gen Ne Win’s at-
tempts to centralize political power in Ran-
goon, fearing this would place them in a posi-
tion of permanent political inferiority. They
have joined other disaffected minorities, such
as the strongly Baptist Chins, who rebelled
against the establishment of Buddhism as the
state religion; the Karens of the southwest
panhandle; and the Kachins, the only procom-
munist Burmese group. The government felt
secure as long as these dissident groups were
divided, but they are now moving toward
greater cooperation. The Shans and Karens,
for example, are forming a strong, non-com-
munist coalition . . . The leaders of all these
groups support regional efforts to bring about
freedom and greater economic development.
They reject the exaggerated Western emphasis
on national unity and intend to modernize their
societies through an Asian cultural frame-
work. They are not ethnic separatists; they are
working to promote minority cultural develop-
ment through a larger regional confederation
which transcends present national boundaries.
These Chinese communists have infiltrated some
of these movements and will no doubt attempt
to gain control of the rebels by supplying them
with training and arms. However, the major
movements are strongly anti-communist and
will remain so, provided the US does not inter-
vene on behalf of the central governments. The
US, therefore, should not oppose the new revo-
lution because of cries of communist subversion
from central government leaders.”
4. Buddhism.
THE 1,000-YEAR STRUGGLE, by James
Joseph Dalton, in Far Eastern Economic Re-
view, v. 67, no. 10 ( 5 March 1970) 18–20 plus.
“The gulf between the Buddhists and
the [Burmese] State seems as wide today as
during the period of British rule. Can the
‘great peace’ era last?” .
I. Economic Aspects -
1. Miscellaneous Aspects
THE ASIAN HIGHWAY, by M. S. Ahmad,
in Economic Bulletin for Asia and the Far
East, v. 19, no. 1 (June 1968) 45–48.
83
“The Asian Highway project was . . .
drawn up to connect the capitals and impor-
tant seaports of the countries of Asia and at
the same time to provide access to important
historical places and others of religious impor-
tance. It would thus contribute to the expan-
sion of national and international trade, open
up isolated regions through feeder roads, stim-
ulate tourist traffic and facilitate pilgrimages
to holy places. This project was approved by
ECAFE at its annual session in March 1959
. . . The Asian Highway network comprises
eighty-three routes (including some blank
numbers) with a total length of 57,000 km. Of
these, 34,000 km are the international priority
routes, connecting all Asian Highway countries
by at least one through-route. The planners of
the Asian Highway system realized that very
high costs of construction make it impossible
to develop immediately all the routes in each
country to a high standard of international
roads. First priority was, therefore, given to
linking the existing main roads of the coun-
tries bringing them up to the minimum inter-
national standard and thereafter filling the
gaps . . . Priority route A–1 traverses eight
countries: Iran, Afghanistan, West Pakistan,
India, East Pakistan, Burma, Thailand, Cam-
bodia, and the Republic of Viet-Nam . . .
Route A–2 crosses nine countries: Iran, West
Pakistan, India Nepal, East Pakistan, Burma,
Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia.”
BURMA AND PAKISTAN: A COMPARA-
TIVE STUDY OF DEVELOPMENT, by Mya
Maung. New York, Praeger, 1971. 164 p.
“The author . . . uses the two nations
to illustrate his thesis that varying degrees of
economic development can be explained at least
as much by the cultural factor of ‘openness’ or
tolerance of variability as by the more ortho-
dox economic causal factors.”
BURMA: 1967—A BETTER ENDING
THAN BEGINNING, by Frank N. Trager, in
Asian Survey, v. 8, no. 2 (February 1968)
110–119.
“The year 1967 began inauspiciously for
Burma. The Gross National Product again reg-
istered a decline in the budget year . . . The
improvement in paddy and other agricultural
products and in mineral development, the ap-
pointment of the new Economic Committee
under Ne Win, and the willingness to argue
the merits of a policy in public rather than be
satisfied with merely labeling the policy “the
Burmese Way to Socialism’ all brighten the
forthcoming year for Burma.” With bibliogra.
phy. -
BURMA'S SOFT SPOT, in Far Eastern E6.
onomic Review, v. 72, no. 23 ( 5 June 1971)
15–16.
“When the Ne Win government closed
Burma’s border with Thailand recently in a
move to tighten security along its long eastern
frontier, it seemed the curtain which had been
partially lifted had come down completely
again. However, in South Thailand’s tin-rich
province of Ranong, just opposite Burma's Wic.
toria Point, this certainly does not apply.
Lying on Thailand’s western coastline some
600 miles south of Bangkok, Ranong is noted
for its tin mining industry and picturesque
motor route, a part of the Asian Highway,
winding through heavily-jungled mountains,
The town of Ranong itself, just below the Isth-
mus of Kra, is only 20 minutes by boat from
Victoria Point (Kaw Thaung), a free port
which at one time handled a considerable vol.
ume of Burma’s foreign trade traffic but now is
little more than a rundown trading post. Thai
tourists can still cross with relative ease to
Victoria Point.”
COMMUNIST STATES AND DEVELOP.
ING COUNTRIES: AID AND TRADE IN
1970. Washington, Department of State, Bu.
reau of Intelligence and Research, 22 Septem-
ber 1971.45 p. (Research Study RECS-15.)
“The aid and trade activities of the
three principal communist regions the (USSR,
East Europe, and the People's Republic of
China) with the less developed countries of the
non-communist world [including Burma, Cam.
bodia, Laos, and Thailand] are reviewed an:
nually by INR. This study incorporates eco-
nomic and military aid and technical assistance
data through the end of 1970, complete trade
figures through 1969, and preliminary trade
data for 1970.”
DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE TO
SOUTHEAST ASIA. New York, Committee
for Economic Development, July 1970. 83 p.
Principles of Development Assistance tº

84
Southeast Asia; Economic Development in
Southeast Asia; External Assistance to South-
east Asia; The Essentials for Rapid Develop-
ment; Recommendations to Assisting Countries
and International Organizations; etc. With
seven statistical tables. Includes information
on the following, among others, Burma, Cam-
bodia, Laos, and Thailand.
ECONOMIC SURVEY OF ASIA AND THE
FAR EAST, 1969. Bangkok, Thailand, United
Nations, 1969. 285 p. (E/CN.11/935.)
This “Survey” is the twenty-third in a
series of reports prepared annually by the sec-
retariat of the Economic Commission for Asia
and the Far East. A major object of the “Sur-
vey” is the analysis of recent economic devel-
opments in the countries of Asia and the Far
East (including Burma, Cambodia, Laos, and
Thailand, among others), and of international
developments that affect them. Particular at-
tention is paid to the analysis of economic pol-
icy and of policy issues. With numerous tables.
IRON AND STEEL PLANTS OF THE
ECAFE COUNTRIES, in United Nations—
Asian Industrial Development News, no. 4
(1969) 53–69.
A directory listing country, company or
organization, location, year established, prod-
uct mix, production capacity, actual output,
and remarks. Includes the following countries,
among the others which are members of the
UN’s Economic Commission for Asia and the
Far East: Burma and Thailand.
JAPAN 1971, in Far Eastern Economic Re-
view, v. 71, no. 13, Supplement (27 March
1971) 25–70.
The annual Japan supplement of the
Far Eastern Economic Review, including the
following articles: The New Empire, by Derek
Davies; Johoka—Key to a Superstate, by Greg-
ory Clark; The New Elite Moves In, by To-
shio Yoshimura; Looking Beyond the Boom, by
John Roberts; Time for a Machiavelli Touch,
by Koji Nakamura; The Economic Invasion
Myth, by Henry Scott Stokes; and Japan and
Australia, Burma, Ceylon, Hongkong, India,
Indonesia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Philippines,
Singapore, South Korea, South Vietnam, Tai-
wan, and Thailand.
LABOR LAW AND PRACTICE IN THE
UNION OF BURMA, by Janet L. Norwood.
Washington, Department of Labor, Bureau of
Labor Statistics, April 1964. 59 p. (BLS Re-
port No. 264.)
The Country and Its Workers (Geo-
graphic Setting, Political and Economic Back-
ground, The People and Their Culture, Edu-
cation and Health, Manpower Resources);
Government and Labor; Labor and Manage-
ment; Conditions of Employment. With Tables
and Chart. -
REGIONALISM AND INSTABILITY IN
SOUTHEAST ASIA, by Bernard K. Gordon, in
Orbis (Summer 1966) 438–457.
“Regionalism has not taken root in
Southeast Asia. There are many political con-
flicts among the nations and little agreement
on what cooperation would mean in practice.
Yet, regionalism continues to attract support-
ers because it seems to promise different bene-
fits to different national leaders. In 1961 and
1963 two important—though faltering—steps
toward regional cooperation were taken: the
Association for Southeast Asia (the Philip-
pines, Malaysia, and Thailand) and MAPHIL-
INDO (Malaysia-Philippines-Indonesia.) Other
measures include the Asian Development
Bank, the UN Economic Commission on Asia
and the Far East, the Japanese-sponsored
meetings fostering some form of economic co-
operation, and the Korean-sponsored confer-
ence for Asian and Pacific Cooperation
(ASPAC). One approach to stability would be
the creation of the Association of Southeast
Asian New Emerging Forces. ASANEFOS
would include Indonesia, the ASA members,
and hopefully could attract Cambodia and
Burma. Such an association would mean that
the interest in regionalism of the colorful but
less prosperous states (such as Indonesia) had
begun to converge with the interests of the
more efficient small states (the ASA group).
Another essential element, the interest and
support of the great powers, is developing. The
combination of these elements would provide a
practical basis for making regionalism work in
Southeast Asia.” - -
THE RICE INDUSTRY OF BURMA
1852–1940, by Cheng Siok-Hwa. Kulala Lum-
pur, University of Malaya Press, 1968. 307 p.
85
“Mrs. Cheng concludes that the prewar
setup of Burma’s rice industry, though benefit-
ing non-Burmese most, was far more efficient
and successful than it is today.”
THE SEARING SUMMER WIND, by David
Baird, in Far Eastern Economic Review, v. 72,
no. 18 (1 May 1971) 47–50.
“In declaring war against that old devil,
the profit motive, General Ne Win’s govern-
ment has saddled itself with a deadly mixture:
bungling at the top, and apathy and black mar-
keteering at every other level.”
THAILAND, BluRMA, in Quarterly Eco-
nomic Review, no. 2 (27 May 1971) 1–15.
This quarterly review summarizes the
political and economic situations of Thailand
and Burma for the past quarter. This quar-
terly is one of a series of 70 quarterly economic
reviews, published in London by The Econo-
mist Intelligence Unit Ltd.
WATER LEGISLATION IN ASIA AND
THE FAR EAST. PARTS 1 AND 2. New York,
United Nations, 1967 and 1968. 2 v. (Economic
Commission for Asia and The Far East, Water
Resources Series, No. 31 and No. 35.)
Review of existing water legislation:
Part 1—Afghanistan, Brunei, Burma, Repub-
lic of China, Hong Kong, Iran, Japan, New
Zealand, Philippines, and Thailand; Part 2
(A)—Water legislation in Australia (South
Australia and Victoria as Examples), Cam-
bodia, Ceylon, India, Republic of Korea, Laos,
Singapore, Republic of Vietnam and Western
Samoa; Part 2 (B)—Proceedings of the Work-
ing Group of Experts on Water Codes.
2. Petroleum
WORLD CRUDE CAPACITY NOW 48
MILLION B/D, by William C. Uhl, in World
Petroleum, v. 41, no. 8 (August 1970) 26–28.
“Growth rates in process construction
will remain strong. Outlook for 1973 is for a
23.6% gain, to almost 60 million barrels daily.
Investment needs, for both refining and petro-
chemicals, will be over $21 thousand million in
coming three years.” Several statistical tables
are included showing world petroleum refining,
world refining expansion, current world pet-
rochemical plants, etc. Included is information
on the following, among others: Asia and Far
£
East as a region, and Burma, Cambodia, and
Thailand.
world CRUDE OUTPUT CONTINUES
UP, in World Oil, v. 172, no. 3 (15 February
1971) 104 plus.
A statistical review of world crude oi :
production, including figures for the following
country, among many others: Burma. See also:
World Oil Output to Rise 8%, in World Oil, v.
170, no. 3 (15 February 1970) 96–97. -
WORLD CRUDE OUTPUT TO INCREASE
7%, in World Oil, v. 168, no. 3 (15 February
1969) 113–114.
Surveys world crude oil production and
provides a statistical chart which includes fig.
ures also for crude oil production for 1968 and
1967 for Burma and Thailand, among others.
See also: World Crude Oil Yield Nears 38 Mil.
lion BPD, in World Oil v. 166, no. 3 (15 Febru-
ary 1968) 120 plus; and World Crude Output
Continues Up, in World Oil, v. 172, no. 3 (15
February 1971) 104 plus.
WORLD OIL OUTPUT TO RISE 8%, in
World Oil, v. 170, no. 3 (February 1970)
96–97. .
Provides information on world crude oil
production by countries (including Burma and
Thailand) for 1968 and 1969.
world PETROLEUM REPORT 70, in
World Petroleum, v. 16 (1970) 2–134.
An annual review of international oil
operations, including: Special Reports and
Area Studies (e.g.—World Summary and Re-
view; Oil at the United Nations—1969; Far
East and Asia; etc.); National Studies (e.g.—
Burma and Thailand, etc.).
WORLD PETROLEUM REPORT '71, in
World Petroleum, v. 17, no. 10 (1971) 19–106.
An annual review of international oil.
operations,
World Summary and Review (with information
on Burma and Thailand); etc.
THE world's PROCESSING PLANTS, in
World Petroleum, v. 41, no. 8 (August 1970)
74 plus. -
“A complete directory of the world's re-
fineries and petrochemical plants. Included are
all facilities—presently operating, planned or
including among many others:


86
under construction—in all countries outside
the USA including the USSR and other Com-
munist nations where reliable information was
obtainable. The first section is on refineries.
Immediately following it is the section on pet-
rochemical plants. For convenience, the list-
ing is alphabetical by company name under
each specific country. The countries are ar-
ranged in major geographical areas and also
listed alphabetically in those areas.” In the
section on Asia and Far East, information is
supplied for the following countries, among
others: Burma, Cambodia, and Thailand.
WORLD-WIDE SUPPLY AND DEMAND
WILL RISE 5% IN 1970, by William C. Uhl, in
World Petroleum, v. 41, no. 1 (January 1970)
18–19.
“Non-Communist nations may produce
37.5 million b/d this year. Consumption is ex-
pected to reach 37.2 million b/d. Large growth
in output of oil shown by Libya, Nigeria,
Oman, and Indonesia. Eastern Hemisphere de-
mand gains remain strong.” Also provides
Some statistical data, on the following, among
others: Asia/Far East as a region, as well as
Burma, Laos, and Thailand.
J. History
1. Miscellaneous Histories
THE BURMESE WAR OF 1824–26; A
NINETEENTH-CENTURY VIETNAM? by
R. J. Pearsall, in The Army Quarterly and
Defence Journal, v. 100, no. 2 (July 1970)
233–240.
“The theory that history occurs in cy-
cles will probably never be so impelling again
as it was amongst intellectuals who came to
maturity in the nineteen-forties, though a com-
parison between the First Burmese War of
1824–26 and the present Vietnam War may en-
courage a re-evaluation of the notion, for, in-
deed, the parallels are astonishing. This need
not be a quaint academic foray; there are les-
sons to be learned, not the least of which is
that a settlement imposed by force by a West-
ern power on an Eastern country is rarely per-
manent. The geography of Burma and Vietnam
are not dissimilar. Both contain a large delta
area and a rugged interior of uplands, and in
both countries the centres of the native civili-
zation were located far away from the delta re-
gion. In Vietnam, Hue; in Burma, Mandalay.
The delta cities, Rangoon in Burma, Saigon in
Vietnam, never had the same cultural influ-
ence. Like Vietnam, Burma was situated by a
benign providence to be a classic buffer state,
in her case between the British in India and
the French in Vietnam, but like most buffer
states, the superpowers could not resist the oc-
casional prod.”
A CONCISE HISTORY OF SOUTHEAST
ASIA, by Nicholas Tarling. New York, Fred-
erick A. Praeger, 1966. 334 p.
Part One—Southeast Asia to About
1760; Part Two—Southeast Asia, 1760–1942;
Part Three—Southeast Asia Since 1942. Pro-
vides historical information also for the follow-
ing countries, among others: Burma, Cam-
bodia, Laos, and Thailand.
CONFLICT IN THE TWENTIETH CEN-
TURY, by David Wood. London, The Institute
for Strategic Studies, June 1968. 27 p. (Adel-
phi Papers, no. 48.) -
“The aim of this paper is to give a brief
survey of the most identifiable wars and local
conflicts that have taken place in the seventy
years since 1898.” Includes, among many oth-
ers, the following which occurred in Asia:
World War II (Asia), 1941–1945; Burmese
Civil War, 1948–1954; Burmese Border Trou-
bles, 1950–1954; Laos Civil War, 1959-present;
etc.
THE EMERGENCE OF MODERN
SOUTHEAST ASIA: 1511–1957, ed. by John
Bastin. Engléwood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice-Hall,
Inc., 1967. 179 p.
“This book deals with the 450 years of
Southeast Asian history that commenced with
the arrival of the Portuguese in the Straits of
Malacca at the beginning of the sixteenth cen-
tury and ended with the departure of the
Dutch, French, Americans, and British from
Indonesia, Indo-China, the Philippines, Burma,
and Malaysia after the Second World War.
During this period, which has been described
in somewhat broader context as the Vasco da
Gama epoch of Asian history, all the countries
of Southeast Asia, with the notable exception
of Thailand, were at one time or another sub-
ject to Western rule. The nature of this rule
87
and the means by which it was imposed dif-
fered considerably from one part of the region
to another and presents the historian of coloni-
alism in Southeast Asia with an extremely var-
iegated pattern for analysis. Although there
were undoubtedly subsidiary factors account-
ing for early Western penetration into South-
east Asia (especially the religious motive), the
overriding consideration was the desire to ex-
ploit the economic resources of the area, espe-
cially the fine spices of eastern Indonesia.” In-
cludes information on such subjects as: British
Colonial Rule in Burma; French Rule in Cam-
bodia; Some Characteristics of Burmese Na-
tionalism; etc.
HISTORY OF BURMA, by Maung Htin
Aung. New York, Columbia University Press,
1967. 350 p. -
As part of this history of Burma the au-
thor “has set himself the . . . task of elucidat-
ing the coups and countercoups which have
been a hallmark of Burmese governance. He
examines at length the broad aspects of British
colonial policy of establishing protectorates in
Burma ruled by native kings and satrapies.”
2. World War II
ARMOURED OPERATIONS DURING
THE EARLY PHASES OF THE RECON-
QUEST OF BURMA, by Lt. Col. E. H. Dar, in
The Army Quarterly and Defense Journal, v.
101, no. 3 (April 1971) 342–349.
“Armoured operations during the recon-
quest of Burma between December 1944, and
the capture of Mandalay in March 1945, have
not received very much attention. It is often
assumed that Burma was not very good tank
country and it is true that the number of ar-
moured formations employed there was lim-
ited. The role they played in the reconquest is,
therefore, little known and rarely discussed.
It is here proposed to examine these opera-
tions, to relate them to the strategic environ-
ment and to study the influence of terrain and
logistics on the conduct of operations and their
strategy.” With map.
ASIATIC LAND BATTLES: ALLIED WIC-
TORIES IN CHINA AND BURMA, by Col.
Trevor N. Dupuy. New York, Franklin Watts,
Inc., 1963. 66 p. (The Military History of
World War II: Volume 10.)
: -
.*
Early Land Battles in Asia; The Long:
Road Back to Burma; The Japanese Strike'
Back in Burma and China; The Struggle for
North Burma; End of the China-Burma-India
Theater; Victory in Burma; Victory—and a
New War—in China. With photos. i.
f
BREAKTHROUGH IN BURMA: MEM.
OIRS OF A REVOLUTION, 1939–1946, by Ba
Maw. New Haven, Yale University Press,
1968. 460 p. -
l
“World War II was only a part of Bur.
ma's long struggle for independence. Shortly
before the war, the Thakin party, the Stu.
dents’ Organization, and Dr. Ba Maw's Siny.
etha Party formed the Freedom Bloc, with the
goal of independence from Britain. Ba Maw,
virtual dictator of the Bloc, turned to Japan |
for help in fighting the British. Japan re.
sponded by setting up a training camp in 1941
for thirty Burmese who were to form the nu-
cleus of an Independence Army. The Thakin
party dominated this Army and provided liai.
son between the Bloc and the Japanese. In De-
cember 1941 Japan invaded Burma in order to
cut China's supply along the Burma Road. The
Burmese Independence Army followed the Jap-
anese, occasionally assisting in mopping-up Op.
erations and establishing local administrations,
It thus served as the ‘Burmese face’ of the war
by winning local cooperation for the Japanese,
while furthering its own aims by establishing
a Burmese administration to take over after
independence. However, the Independence
Army antagonized the Burmese by its high-
hand attempts to impose its authority and the
Japanese by its attempts to take control over
local areas . . . In August 1943, Burma became
independent, with Ba Maw as head of state and
Aung San as Minister of War . . . As the war
began to go against Japan, tension between
Burma and Japan increased. The Burmese gov-
ernment remained loyal, expecting the retreat-
ing Japanese to leave behind enough weapons to
permit the Burmese to continue their war
against the British. The Defense Army, how-
ever, wanted to be on the winning side and as
the most powerful group in Burma, was able to
force the government to switch to the British
side before the war ended.”


88
CHINA-BURMA-INDIA, A STUDY IN
COMBINED COMMAND, by Col. Charles J.
Canella in Military Review (July 1965).
“Existing alliances, between the U.S.
and other nations, make it evident that in any
future joint operations a highly co-ordinated
and effective command center will be needed to
direct the combined war effort. Stain emerges
whenever a multinational command must solve
problems involving conflicting national inter-
ests, disparate military doctrines, and different
languages. Three interdependent factors deter-
mine the success of combined operations: (1) a
common strategy; (2) communicating strategy
to field commanders; and (3) joint command
structure of forces in the field. A classic exam-
ple of the interplay of these forces in World
War II occurred during the operations in Chi-
na-Burma and India of Combined American,
British and Chinese forces. There was inade-
quate strategic guidance, and a poorly designed
command apparatus. A careful study of this
example of conflicting concepts and procedures
could prevent similar pitfalls in any future op-
erations . . . The outcome of this combined
CBI folly was a great loss in time, material
and effort. Although operation of combined
forces has greatly improved since then, NATO
might find another careful look at its command
structure profitable.”
CHRONOLOGICAL MILITARY HISTORY
OF WORLD WAR II, by Trevor Nevitt Du-
puy. New York, Franklin Watts, Inc., 1965. 34
p. -
Includes Southwest Pacific and the Pa-
cific Ocean Areas, with information on the
Burma Theater of Operations, among others.
THE LONGEST RETREAT; THE BURMA
CAMPAIGN, 1942, by Tim Carew. London,
Hamish Hamilton, 1969. 276.p.
This is the “story of the British Army's
longest retreat” . . . from the onslaught of the
Japanese during World War II. With bibliog-
raphy and illustrations.
WALKOUT WITH STILWELL IN
BURMA, by Frank Dorn. New York, Thomas
Y. Crowell, 1971. 258 p.
The author states that: “This is a per-
sonal account of the first Burma Campaign and
the march from north Burma to India by Gen-
eral Joseph W. Stilwell and a group of one
hundred and fifteen people in May, 1942, after
the British and Chinese armies had been de-
feated by the Japanese. As General Stilwell’s
senior aide-de-camp, I had opportunities to ob-
serve men and events in more detail than most
participants in the disastrous campaign and re-
treat. This book, and Stilwell’s report on the
campaign, which I also wrote at his sugges-
tion, were based primarily on telegraphic-style
notes and comments I jotted down in a small
notebook. Official reports, messages and orders
provided additional historical background
when needed. Letters and recorded conversa-
tions helped to fill out my own observations
and memory.” -
89
CHAPTER IV
CAMBODIA
(See also Appendixes and Source Materials)
A. Whither Cambodia: An Overview
ASIA: HOW STAND THE DOMINOES2 in
Newsweek, v. 78, no. 13 (27 September 1971)
47 plus.
“The very fact that an American Presi-
dent is actively seeking a détente with the rul-
ers of Communist China has wrought funda-
mental changes in the power balance of Asia.
“The Nixon visit,” says a Western diplomat
there, ‘means that we are seeing the removal
of rigid lines between non-Communists and
Communists, between the goodies and the bad-
dies.’ And with the possible exception of the
principals involved—the Americans and the
Chinese—no one will be so profoundly and di-
rectly affected by this development as the na-
tions of East and Southeast Asia. All ten of
Southeast Asia’s countries live in China’s
shadow. Three of them—North Vietnam, Laos,
and Burma—have borders with China. Two of
them—Singapore and Malaysia—have huge
populations of Chinese descent. Most of the
countries have Maoist guerrilla movements,
and four—North and South Vietnam; Loas
and Cambodia—are directly positioned in
Southeast Asia’s war zone. Except for North
Vietnam, all have lived directly or tacitly
under the American umbrella. And now that
this protective umbrella is being at least par-
tially withdrawn, all of them are faced with
major political readjustments. NEWSWEEK's
Hong Kong bureau chief Maynard Parker last
week completed an extensive tour of all the
Southeast Asian lands outside the Indochina
peninsula . . . He reports on how these coun-
tries are adjusting to the new realities. In a
companion piece, former U.S. Under Secretary
of State George W. Ball discusses the larger
implications of the changing U.S. policy in
Asia and the special impact of Mr. Nixon';
China initiative on Japan.” s
CONTEMPORARY SOUTHEAST ASIA, )
Claude A. Buss. New York, Van Nostrand
Reinhold Co., 1970. 280 p. (An Anvil Origi,
nal.) * ,
“A Survey of recent history from the
Southeast Asians' point of view . . . Part Ies.
tablishes the ecology of the Southeast Asian
states and includes a chronological table of
major events since 1945. The first chapter dé.
scribes the scene in Southeast Asia at the closé
of World War II. Succeeding chapters trace his.
torical and political developments in the Phil.
ippines, Burma, Malaysia and Singapore, Indº-
nesia, Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, and Thailand
The concluding chapter looks ahead, into the
1970’s, to impeding changes in cultural values,
social organization, economic trends, political
evolution, and international relations of the en-
tire region. Part II consists of official docu.
ments and public statements.” |
EMERGING SOUTHEAST ASIA; A|
STUDY IN GROWTH AND STAGNATION,
by Donald W. Fryer. New York, McGraw-Hill
Book Co., 1970. 486 p. |
The Region (Southeast Asia in the Mod.
ern World; The Land and Its Utilization; Ur.
banization, Industrialization and Moderniza.
tion); Progress (Thailand; The Philippines;
Malaysia and Singapore); Stagnation (Indone.
sia; The Union of Burma; Vietnam, Laos and
Cambodia); Prospect (The Destiny of South.
east Asia). With selected bibliography, maps,
and diagrams.
THE FUTURE OF CAMBODIA, by Nor).
dom Sihanouk, in Foreign Affairs (October
1970) 1–10.

90
“Lon Nol and President Nixon, who de-
cided to support him in order to keep his dicta-
torial regime in power at all costs, have left
the non-communist “Sihanoukist’ Khmers no
alternative but armed struggle and revolution
to restore independence, neutrality, territorial
integrity, and democracy to Cambodia. In
April 1970 they formed a National United
Front with the communist ‘Red Khmers’ and
made common cause with the other revolu-
tionary peoples of Vietnam, Laos, China, and
North Korea. Washington has created a
Phnompenh-Saigon-Bangkok-Vietiane axis, or
de facto federation, to keep the countries of the
region in the “American camp’ and to prevent
their peoples from embracing communism or
socialism. But the Nixon government is not de-
fending the worthy American ideals of free-
dom, democracy, and independence in defend-
ing the regimes of Lon Nol and his kind in
Southeast Asia. Although the US may be de-
fending its own interests in fighting the propa-
gation of communism in Asia, it is hypocrisy
to assert that the US is defending the interests
of the Indochinese peoples in preventing at all
costs regimes like those of Lon Nol and
Nguyen Cao Ky from falling to communism. I
am not and will not become a communist, for I
disavow nothing of my religious beliefs or of
my nationalism. But the Indochinese peoples
will not accept having the interests of reaction-
ary, fascist, militarist and corrupt leaders im-
posed on them, or having a great white power
insist that for their own sakes they should
take dictatorship in place of democracy and
the satellization of their country in place of
national independence. To peoples who are con-
tinually exploited by feudalistic bourgeois dic-
tatorships, communism can only be a deliver-
ance since in China, North Vietnam, and North
Korea the problems of social injustice, corrup-
tion, militarist or bourgeois dictatorship, and
national independence are being or will be
solved thereby . . . Neutralization for Laos
and Cambodia is still possible if the US stops
its armed interventions or those of its allies in
these two countries; otherwise it will push
these Front members more and more into the
Asian socialist camp . . .”
THE FUTURE OF MAINLAND SOUTH-
EAST ASIA, by Frank N. Trager, in Military
Review, v. 50, no. 1 (January 1970) 3–16.
“Mainland Southeast Asia has been a
target area for Peking in earlier dynasties, and
Communist China under Mao Tse-tung has
been no exception. Peking, frequently said to
have conducted a ‘cautious’ foreign policy, has
not been cautious in Asia. It has proceeded to
gobble up Tibet, to incite North Korea, to at-
tack India, and again to threaten it in the Pak-
istan-India war of 1965. During the ‘cultural
revolution,’ China has been active in violating
its treaties and downgrading its ‘friendly’ rela-
tions with Burma and Cambodia while openly
supporting a so-called war of ‘national libera-
tion’ in the former. It has fomented strife in
Thailand by energizing the Communist Party
of Thailand. It has given support to the Pathet
Lao and North Vietnamese Communists in their
attacks on the Lao Provinces of Phong Saly,
Sam Neua, and Xieng Khouang. It has sup-
plied North Vietnam with materiel and about
50,000 specially trained engineering and artil-
lery troops. A political victory for Vietnamese
Communists in the Republic of Vietnam—that
is, a coalition government “imposed’ on Saigon
—would help free them to weaken Laos and
Cambodia, add to the dangers of Thailand and
Burma, and, of course, irreparably weaken the
Republic of Vietnam.”
THE FUTURE OF SOUTH-EAST ASIA, by
Brig. F. W. Speed, in The Army Quarterly and
Defence Journal, v. 101, no. 1 (October 1970)
36–43.
“Looking into South-East Asia from the
relative serenity of Australia and New Zea-
land, a watcher sees a region in turmoil. Can
the dust be penetrated and the future read? In
the former French colonies of Indo-China,
North and South Vietnam are engaged in a
full-scale People's War, with an overlay of
western-style warfare waged by Americans,
now in the process of substantial force reduc-
tion. Laos is similarly involved, though in
lower key, with dissidents based on the north-
eastern provinces, heavily supported by North
Vietnamese. Cambodia, after years of fence-sit-
ting, during which time her eastern provinces
were a corridor for North Vietnamese forces
operating in South Vietnam, has now been
pulled into the Maelstrom. To the west and
south, across the Mekong River, Thailand, inde-
pendent throughout the colonial era, has for
years sought to contain subversion in its north-
91
J -
ern and eastern provinces. Now Thailand has
been drawn in to support the Cambodian gov-
ernment, in areas just across their border.
Burma, formerly an uneasy British possession,
has been seeking for over 20 years to establish
the ‘Burmese Way to Socialism,” in the face of
centrifugal forces of varied ethnic groups.”
With map. ** , *
NEW WINDS OVER SOUTHEAST ASIA,
by Wing Comdr. Maharaj K. Chopra, in Mili-
tary Review, v. 48, no. 9 (September 1968)
10–18. -
“It is a paradox of contemporary life
that, whereas the number of states is multiply-
ing and their frontiers are becoming rigid,
the problems confronting them are becoming
interstate and regional in character. This is
certainly true of Southeast Asia, thanks to its
geography, history, and the new, fast-develop-
ing trends. Southeast Asia comprises the 10
states of Burma, Thailand, Laos, Cambodia,
North Vietnam, South Vietnam, Malaysia,
Singapore, Indonesia, and the Philippines.”
Common Features; Common Problems; New
Constitution (Thailand); Economic and Social
Fields; Security Arrangements; etc.
B. Insurgencies and Incursions: The
Pros and Cons of the Crossfire
in Cambodia
AGGRESSION: OUR ASIAN DISASTER,
by William L. Standard. New York, Random
House, 1971. 228 p.
A very critical “analysis” of U.S. ac-
tions in Vietnam, with an introduction by
Wayne Morse. Included as Chapter 10—“The
Cambodian Invasion: An Invitation to Disas-
ter.”
THE ANT AND THE ELEPHANTS, by
Boris Baczynskyi, in Far Eastern Economic
Review, v. 73, no. 33 (14 August 1971) 23–25.
“Cambodia, neutral so long, was drawn
into the Indochina conflict just as the US—on
which it depends for survival—was withdraw-
ing. Now, poor and half-occupied by the
enemy, it can only watch helplessly as the
giants talk.” .
AS U.S. LEAVES CAMBODIA—SUCCESS
OR FAILURE 2 in U.S. News and World Re-
port, v. 69, no. 1 (6 July 1970) 9–10.
ºf
it.
“A resounding ‘well done” greeted vict).
rious GI’s heading out of Cambodia, back tº
bases in Vietnam. Gains were impressive-
with Red sanctuaries busted wide open, th:
enemy routed. Get close to the scene of fight
ing, though, and it's clear that despite Ameri
can success along the border regions, danger of
failure elsewhere in Cambodia is still aſ
worry.” .
AT WAR WITH ASIA, by Noam Chomsky.
New York, Pantheon Books, 1970. 313 p. - -
The author surveys very critically the
American presence in Vietnam, and also dº;
votes two chapters on: the “invasion” of
Cambodia by the U.S. . . . as well as the Cam,
bodian and Laotian involvement in the South.
east Asian conflict.
CAMBODIA CAUGHT IN A CROSS FIRE
in Newsweek, v. 75, no. 18 (4 May 1970)
22–25.
“For more than a decade, the kingdom
of Cambodia seemed less a part of turbulent
Indochina than of the land of let's pretend
While savage battles raged in neighboring
Veitnam and Laos, Jackie Kennedy could still
visit the ancient ruins of Angkor Wat and
Prince Norodom Sihanouk, Cambodia's fum:
loving Chief of State, found time to stage film
festivals, usually featuring his own movies
The versatile Sihanouk walked a neutralist
tightrope with such consummate agility that
most of his bedazzled countrymen were even
able to overlook the thousands of Communis;
troops who infested their eastern provinces
But six weeks ago, Sihanouk's house of cards
came tumbling down, and when the war finally
descended upon Cambodia in deadly earnest, it
caught the country almost totally unprepared
Last week, Cambodia was paying loan shark's
interest on its borrowed time. For the small
ill-trained and poorly equipped Cambodian
Army, the last six weeks have been among the
most ignominious ever endured by any army,
North Vietnamese and Viet Cong troops have
pushed the Cambodians back with almost dis.
dainful ease, seizing control of large chunks ºf
six of the country’s most populous and prosper.
ous provinces and driving to within less than
20 miles of the capital at Phnom Penh.” -


92
CAMBODIA CONCLUDED; Now IT's
TIME TO NEGOTIATE. A REPORT BY
RICHARD NIXON, PRESIDENT OF THE
UNITED STATES. Washington, Department
of State, 30 June 1970. 28 p. (Publication
8544.)
The President states: “Together with
the South Vietnamese, the Armed Forces of the
United States have ‘just’ completed successfully
the destruction of enemy base areas along the
Cambodian-South Vietnam frontier. All Amer-
ican troops have withdrawn from Cambodia on
schedule announced at the start of the opera-
tion . . . At this time, it is important to review
the background for the decision, the results of
the operation, their larger meaning in terms of
the conflict in Indochina—and to look down
the road to the future.”
THE CAMBODIA STRIKE; DEFENSIVE
ACTION FOR PEACE. A REPORT TO THE
NATION BY RICHARD NIXON, PRESI-
DENT OF THE UNITED STATES, APRIL
30, 1970. Washington, Government Printing
Office, 1970. 10 p. (Publication 8529).)
The President explains how despite a
warning, North Vietnam increased its military
aggression, particularly in Cambodia. Cam-
bodia sent out a call to the U.S. for assistance.
The President explains also why we are assist-
ing Cambodia, and how.
CAMBODIA: DECEMBER 1970. A STAFF
REPORT PREPARED FOR THE USE OF
THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELA-
TIONS, UNITED STATES SENATE, DE-
CEMBER 16, 1970. Washington, Government
Printing Office, 1970. 9 p. (91st Congress, 2d
Session, Committee Print.)
Introduction—Cambodia 9 Months
After Sihanouk's Fall; The Military Situation
in Early December; U.S. Military Support for
Cambodia; South Vietnamese Military Support
for Cambodia; The Economic Situation; etc.
CAMBODIA: THE WIDENING WAR IN
INDOCHINA, ed. by Jonathan S. Grant and
others. New York, Washington Square Press,
1971. 355 p.
A book produced by “The Committee of
Concerned Asian Scholars (CCAS),” providing
source material “on a new combat zone in the
Indochina war.” Contents: The Widening
War; Prelude to Crisis; The Coup, the Inva-
sion, and Beyond; The Instrument of War—
Ecocide; America’s Harvest; etc. With maps
and selected bibliography.
CAMBODIA'S LOST PATRIMONY, in
Newsweek, v. 75, no. 25 (22 June 1970) 24
plus.
“‘For the next year or two,’ Deputy
U.S. Ambassador to South Vietnam Samuel
Berger predicted recently, ‘most of the fighting
will probably be done in Cambodia and Laos.’
In the long run, that judgment may prove over-
optimistic. But the combat that flared spo-
radically over the Indochinese peninsula last
week made the ambassador look like a good
short-haul prophet. In South Vietnam, the bat-
tlefields were generally quiet, apart from scat-
tered enemy attacks on military installations
and civilian targets. Instead, most of the sig-
nificant action centered on the southern pan-
handle of Laos and on Central Cambodia,
where North Vietnamese troops captured the
fabled ruins of Angkor Wat. Angkor was
seized by the North Vietnamese as they re-
treated from the neighboring town of Siem
Reap. At Angkor, they not only seized the
nearby tourist hotels but occupied the complex
of ancient structures that once were the capital
of the fabled Khmer empire. Built between the
ninth and twelfth centuries, the temple of
Angkor Wat and the sprawling walled city of
Angkor Thom are universally regarded as one
of the supreme glories of world architecture.
Now Angkor, with its canals and reservoirs,
terraced paddies and awesome statuary, had
also become a privileged sanctuary for the
North Vietnamese. And Cambodian troops were
determined not to shell or bomb the buildings
since, as one Cambodian officer put it, “the tem-
ples are our patrimony'.”
CAMBODIA'S WAR, by Douglas Pike, in
Southeast Asian Perspectives, no. 1 (March
1971) 1–48. -
“The monograph is divided into two
main parts, following a brief background chap-
ter. The first part deals with the deadly but lit-
tle known war between the Cambodians and
the Vietnamese Communists from about 1965
to March 1970. In this period, the Cambodian
struggle was completely intertwined with the
93
Vietnam War, and had little life of its own.
Communist activities and the Cambodian gov-
ernment’s counterstrategies were geared di-
rectly to the course of events in the Vietnam
War. The second part deals with the more or
less independent revolutionary guerrilla war
or people's war that the Vietnamese and Cam-
bodian Communists launched in the summer of
1970, a war with its own existence and which
could very well go on after the Vietnam War
has largely ended.”
CONFLICT IN INDOCHINA: A READER
ON THE WIDENING WAR IN LAOS AND
CAMBODIA, ed. by Marvin and Susan Gettle-
man and Lawrence and Carol Kaplan. New
York, Random House, 1970. 461 p.
“Documents, articles, speeches, radio
broadcasts, and other statements on the war in
Laos and Cambodia. The editors stress the
need for historical perspective as a prerequi-
site for understanding and resolving the pres-
ent conflict. The contributors include scholars,
journalists, and participants in the conflict,
most of whom are strongly critical of U.S. in-
volvement.” Contents: Early heritage and colo-
nialism; Independence and the Geneva Accords
of 1954; The struggle for neutrality in Laos;
The struggle for neutrality in Cambodia; The
furtive war in Laos; The war spreads to Cam-
bodia; Selected bibliography.
40 DAYS WITH THE ENEMY, by Richard
Dudman. New York, Liveright, 1971. 182 p.
“On May 7, 1970, Richard Dudman of
the St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Elizabeth Pond of
the Christian Science Monitor, and Mike Mor-
row of the Dispatch News Service Interna-
tional were captured by Cambodian guerrillas
en route to Phnom Penh following the
US/SVN campaign into Cambodia. Although
the guerrillas hated the “American aggressors,”
the reporters were well treated and protected
by special revolutionary soldiers. According to
the indigenous guerrillas, the overthrow of
Prince Sihanouk's government and Pres. Nix-
on’s simultaneous decision to move US troops
into Cambodia had served to unite the civilians
and members of the United National Front of
Cambodia with the government in exile against
the Americans and South Vietnamese. The
Cambodians were so dedicated to the cause of
liberating Indochina from the ‘foreigners’ that
many of them left their families to join the
guerrillas. Guerrilla fighters were normally
trained for a minimum of one year before their
loyalty was accepted. They were agile and
crafty as saboteurs and night fighters, striking
their enemy's most vulnerable positions. They
had developed an incredible sixth sense for de-
tecting impending US attacks. By observing |
US troop movements and aircraft patterns,
they could predict the American course of ac.
tion . . . The guerrillas often spoke of their rew.
olutionary goals . . . The three reporters saw
the Cambodian guerrillas as brave, trustwor.
thy, concerned individuals who were willing to
die for their freedom. The Cambodians have
been subjugated and exploited many times, and
the fight for self-determination has become a
part of their way of life. The guerrilla organi.
zation, the hard core of the Cambodian resist.
ance, is respected and encouraged by the peo-
ple. The guerrillas do not believe that the
Americans are “bad” people, simply that they
are wrong in thinking that they know best
what is best for the Asians. Cambodian dedica-
tion to freedom makes American intervention
in South East Asia seem futile; the Americans
there are fighting a costly war on strange
ground against a determined but invisible
enemy.” -
THE KHMER REPUBLIC: THAT WAS
THE CAMBODIA THAT WAS, by Bernard K.
Gordon and Kathryn Young, in Asian Survey,
v. 11, no. 1 (January 1971) 26–40.
“Nineteen Seventy was of course the
most eventful year in the history of modern
Cambodia. The period was highlighted by
these major events: first and foremost, Prince
Norodom Sihanouk, the nation’s leader and its
leading figure for 29 years, was ousted and
went to China. The monarchy itself was re-
moved, and Cambodia has become the ‘Khmer
Republic.” Second, the post-Sihanouk leader-
ship demanded the removal from Cambodia of
the North Vietnamese and NLF-VC forces,
which for years had made relatively unham-
pered use of portions of the national territory
bordering on Laos and South Vietnam. This
led shortly to widened Vietnamese military op-
erations within Cambodia—to such an extent
that within a few weeks after Sihanouk's re-
moval the security of the state—and of Phnom
Penh—seemed under imminent threat. In this

94
environment, the United States undertook an
unprecedented and direct two-month interven-
tion of US ground forces in Cambodia—a step
that was accompanied by widespread domestic
furor among Americans.” With bibliography.
LETTER FROM INDO-CHINA, by Robert
Shaplen, in The New Yorker (24 April 1971)
104–129.
“According to Mr. Shaplen, the only
good effect of the recent South Vietnamese in-
vasion of Laos was the possible postponement
of any major communist offensive in the South.
Contrary to expectations, it did not speed up
the end of the fighting, promote further negoti-
ations, or insure the success of the Vietnamiza-
tion program. Instead, it increased Hanoi's de-
termination to continue fighting and led to a
reaffirmation of Chinese and Russian pledges
of assistance. Furthermore, the Laotian inva-
sion apparently did not succeed in eliminating
the quantities of North Vietnamese troops or
supplies estimated. Recouping losses on both
sides will be difficult, but communist reserves
appear to be large . . . Politically, the Laos in-
vasion may have further diminished the status
of the already unpopular President Thieu and
jeopardized his chances for reelection. Both of
his opponents—Vice-President Ky and retired
General Minh–are gaining support among the
local leaders, and some observers speculate
that Thieu may withdraw before the election
. . . Cambodia and Laos are extremely dissat-
isfied with the widening of the war. Both coun-
tries are undergoing internal political conflicts,
and both resent the presence of all Vietnamese
—Northerners and Southerners. In Laos,
Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma has been
trying unsuccessfully to reestablish the tripar-
tite government of left-wing, right-wing, and
neutralist elements which was set up under the
Geneva formula of 1962. Government forces
are trying to counter communist aggression,
and communist propaganda is attempting to
convince the people that the Pathet Lao is re-
sponsible for “repulsing’ the South Vietnamese
invasion. However, the Laotian communists
want to escape from Hanoi's domination and
are seeking Russian support for establishing a
new coalition government with more commun-
ist representation. And Peking, which resents
Hanoi's plan to take Laos by force and wishes
to maintain its position in the northwestern
part of the country, is making every effort to
please Laotian communist leaders. In Cam-
bodia, one phase of the war consists of South
Vietnamese efforts to prevent North Vietnamese
from reestablishing sanctuaries and supply
lines. The other phase involves the struggle for
the country itself between the Cambodian com-
munists and the forces of the government's
new Republic. The Cambodian government
forces are being trained by US advisers, but
observers fear that sufficiently rapid progress
is not being made or that the type of training
being stressed will result in the same conven-
tional force which has proved ineffective in
Vietnam. Western advisers generally believe
that Cambodia will survive as long as it does
not become North Vietnam’s primary target
y 9
THE LONG WAY TO SAIGON, by T. D.
Allman, in Far Eastern Economic Review, v.
73, no. 36 (4 September 1971) 21–23.
“Neither the Americans nor the Viet-
namese communists seem interested in Cam-
bodia itself. They use it merely to win the war
in Vietnam the cheap way . . . There are cer-
tain areas of similarity between the Vietnam-
ese communist support for their Cambodians
—the Khmer Rouge, the Sihanoukists, the lib-
eration army: no single term has evolved to de-
scribe the various anti-government groups—
and the American commitment to their Cambo-
dians, the Lon Nol regime. Both involvements,
Hanoi's and Washington’s, are the product of
two, partly contradictory objectives. On the
one hand, both are committed to supporting
congenial Cambodian elements in the struggle
for the country; on the other hand, they seek
to use these elements to win the war in Viet-
nam as cheaply as possible.”
THE PRESIDENTIAL DECISION ON
THE CAMBODIAN OPERATION, by Col.
Russell H. Smith, Air University Review (Sep-
tember–October 1971) 46–52.
“In late April 1970, the President was
faced with making one of three choices regard-
ing a communist buildup in Cambodia, accord-
ing to the author: (1) he could do nothing; (2)
he could provide massive military assistance
to the weak Lon Nol government; and (3) he
could clean out the major North Vietnamese
and Viet Cong sanctuaries in Cambodia which
95
had been serving as bases for attacks on South
Vietnam . . . He opted for the last, after care-
fully studying the military, political, and inter-
national considerations. He made the decision
on the advice of the JCS, the National Security
Council, and the Washington Special Actions
Group, recently formed for the express pur-
pose of handling crisis management . . . Mili-
tarily, precedent had been made for such an
incursion when the South Vietnamese had pre-
viously attacked these Cambodian sanctuaries
in strength following two years of occasional
attacks with at least tacit Cambodian ap-
proval. Of least importance was the interna-
tional consideration, but the reactions of the
Soviet Union, Communist China and Japan
were studied. Col. Smith points out that, from
the Administration’s point of view, subsequent
events proved that most of the military criti-
cism of the Cambodian incursion was invalid
. . . One domestic political objection that was
more enduring was the continuing conflict with
Congress on the Constitutional authority of the
President to commit US forces to combat with-
out Congressional consent. The President an-
swered this objection by saying that the need
for quick action and strategic surprise pre-
cluded prior official notification of Congress
. . . The international consequences of the de-
cision are even more unresolved. It is uncertain
whether the action enhanced or retarded the
chance for a negotiated peace, or whether it
committed the US to the survival of Cambodia.
The Administration maintains that, as for the
future, Cambodia will have to exist within the
framework of the Nixon Doctrine; that is, US
forces in Southeast Asia will continue to de-
cline and the US has no intention of getting in-
volved in Cambodia with American troops. The
President said in his report to the nation that
Cambodia must either defend itself or depend
on regional associations for mutual defense.
Cambodia may be the first test of this doc-
trine.”
THE PRICE OF NEUTRALITY, in Far
Eastern Economic Review, v. 67, no. 9 (26
February 1970) 25–28.
“Cambodians constantly are being told
by Radio Phnom Penh and the US Armed
Forces network of American withdrawals
from South Vietnam. But for those Cambodians
living along the border with South Vietnam
ministry to the US embassy in Phnom Penh.
- ?
- s
§
the American presence—bombers and helicopter
gunships—is still very much a frightening re.
ality. US incursions into Cambodian territory,
if minor airspace violations are counted, total
hundreds a month and produce a flood of
official protests from the Cambodian foreign
But the protests seem to achieve little and
some Cambodians feel the incursions are delib.
erate . . . What is not open to question is that
communist troops, undoubtedly to a lesser ex-
tent than the American command in Saigon
contends, do use Cambodian territory—espe-
cially in the desolate northeast frontier regions
as ‘sanctuary’. What is also evident is that of
the 27 people killed at Dak Dam, not one was
Vietnamese, communist or otherwise.”
REBELLION OR SUBVERSION IN CAM-
BODIA 2 by Michael Leifer, in Current Hig-
tory, v. 56, no. 330 (February 1969) 88–93
plus.
“The question is whether the process of
insurgency which Cambodia has recently expe.
rienced is a product of internal circumstances
or whether it can be justly attributed to out.
side intervention. The position of the Cam-
bodian government is categorical. It insists
that the uprisings are the direct result of a po-
litical decision taken outside Cambodia.”
THE ROAD TO PHNOM PENH; CAM-
BODIA TAKES UP THE GUN, by Banning
Garrett, in Ramparts, v. 9, no. 2 (August
1970) 32–34 plus. *
According to Banning Garrett “On
March 18, an American-backed military coup
overthrew the neutralist government of Prince.
Norodom Sihanouk, forcing the Cambodian
left into all-out insurgency and providing
American counterinsurgents with yet another
Vietnam. First South Vietnam; then Laos;
now Cambodia—American power has finally
toppled the last domino in Indochina into
communist revolution. For over a decade, the
United States had tried to unseat Sihanouk
and replace him with a right-wing regime,
Though a conservative in domestic policies, Si-
hanouk jealously guarded his country's inde.
pendence, knowing that entangling alliances
could only lead Cambodia straight into the In-
dochina war, and from there into a full-scale
revolution of her own. He also knew that if
96
Cambodia ever became a junior partner in
America's Asian alliances, she would open her-
self to the territorial expansion of her tradi-
tional enemies, the Thais and the South Viet-
namese. He was right. General Lon Nol,
Cambodia's new ruler, has abandoned neutral-
ity. South Vietnam's General Thieu has agreed
to occupy Cambodia, defending Lon Nol from
the Cambodian people, at least until a successful
Cambodianization of the war permits the with-
drawal of South Vietnamese combat troops.
The Thais have volunteered military aid and
their own combat troops. And the Americans,
striking from air and land, are turning Cam-
bodia into the newest battlefield in an unending
war. Sihanouk, meanwhile, is now chief of his
country’s revolutionary movement.”
THE SECOND INDOCHINA WAR . CAM-
BODIA AND LAOS, by Wilfred G. Burchett.
New York, International Publishers, 1970.
204 p. -
“A journalist long known for his leftist
views asserts that the U.S. incursions into
Cambodia and Laos in 1970 represent ‘a logical
extension of policies followed by the United
States . . . deliberately planned to fill the
power vacuum' created by the collapse of
French colonialism.”
SECRETARY ROGER'S NEWS CONFER-
ENCE OF JANUARY 29, in Department of
State Bulletin, v. 64, no. 1651 (15 February
1971) 189–197.
Among other items discusses: Defense
of Cambodia; The Question of U.S. Ground
Troops in Cambodia; U.S. and Cambodian In-
terests; etc.
UNITED STATES MILITARY ACTIONS
IN CAMBODIA: QUESTIONS OF INTER-
NATIONAL LAW, by John R. Stevenson.
Washington, Department of State, July 1970. 7
p. (Publication 8539.)
The author presents “the administra-
tions views on the questions of international
law arising out of the ‘current’ South Vietna-
mese and United States operations in Cam-
bodia.”
UNITED STATES MILITARY ACTIONS
IN CAMBODIA: QUESTIONS OF INTER-
NATIONAL LAW, by John R. Stevenson, in
Department of State Bulletin, v. 62, no. 1617
(22 June 1970) 765–770.
Mr. Stevenson presents “the administra-
tion’s views on the questions of international
law arising out of the ‘current’ South Vietna-
mese and United States operations in Cam-
bodia.”
WEST TO CAMBODIA, by Brig. Gen.
S.L.A. Marshall. New York, Cowles, 1968.
253 p.
“In early 1968 there was a fierce debate
on Capitol Hill, which carried over into our na-
tional press . . . The question: Should our
forces fighting along the Cambodian border en-
gage in hot pursuit when the enemy crossed
into so-called neutral territory?” The author
“offers a close view of three operations of units
of the 4th and 25th Infantry Divisions and
Special Forces. The Vietnamese-Cambodian
border had to be protected from enemy infil-
tration . . . The events took place between
mid-August and the end of November 1966.”
With glossary.
WIDER WAR: THE STRUGGLE FOR
CAMBODIA, THAILAND, AND LAOS, by
Donald Kirk. New York, Praeger, 1971. 305 p.
“. . . Analysis of the overall struggle
occurring in the Indochinese peninsula . . . The
conflicts which have been taking-place in Cam-
bodia, Thailand, and Laos at the same time as
that occurring in Vietnam, . . . present critical
situations and uncertain future resolutions
. Thai-Vietnamese rivalry for control of
Cambodian and Laotian territory on either side
of the Mekong River long predates the US at-
tempt to stop the spread of communism in
these Indochinese states; . . . the ethnic, reli-
gious, economic, political, and military conflicts
in all four countries are deeply interwoven . . .
The opposing Indochinese factions seem so bit-
terly irreconcilable that the region will likely
endure more horrible and extensive war before
some settlement, however unhappy, emerges.
Despite President Nixon's announcement at the
outset of the invasion into Cambodia on April
30, 1971, that “we shall avoid a wider war,’ the
struggle in Indochina seems to have expanded
inevitably. After many years of active involve-
ment in Indochina, the US has not mediated
the various but related conflicts; some argue
that US involvement may have even aggra-
97
vated them. At best, it may have delayed their
settlement on Indochinese terms. “Wider war’
will probably run its course whether the US
remains in Indochina or withdraws . . . Kirk
suggests that US withdrawal from the strug-
gle is probably the wisest course, since no
amount of intervention by any of the outside
powers could bring a satisfactory peace to the
Indochinese, who seemingly must endure more
suffering before evolving their own satisfac-
tory accommodation.”
C. Descriptive Miscellany (See also
Map Appendixes N and O)
AREA HANDBOOK FOR CAMBODIA, by
Frederick P. Munson and others. Washington,
Department of the Army, October 1968. 364 p.
(DA PAM 550–50.)
This area handbook, aside from provid-
ing a country summary, discusses in detail the
social, political, economic, and national secu-
rity aspects of Cambodia. Includes: bibli-
ographies, glossary, illustrations, and tables.
See also appendixes to the bibliographic survey
on Peninsular Southeast Asia.
THE ASIANS: THEIR HERITAGE AND
THEIR DESTINY, by Paul Thomas Welty.
3rd ed. Philadelphia, J. B. Lippincott, 1970.
351 p.
This book attempts to give “some under-
standing of the social and economic environ-
ment in which most Asians live and of the var-
ious systems of thought which influence their
approach to present-day problems, just as the
thinking of people in a Western culture is in-
fluenced by their environment and traditions
. . . “The Asians' . . . put its main emphasis
on this . . . task, while also giving the main
outlines of geography, history, politics and
government, for the main areas of Asia from
Pakistan round to Japan [and also including,
among many others, Burma, Cambodia, Laos,
and Thailand].”
CAMBODIA, by Peter A. Poole, in Focus, v.
21, no. 6 (February 1971) 1–12.
Physical Setting; Climate and Vegeta-
tion; The People; Historical Highlights;
Changing Society; Economic Activities; Fish-
ing and Forestry; Manufacturing, Transport,
and Trade; Development Plans; The Future;
Ethnic Minority Groups—Source of Regional
Instability (The Vietnamese, The Chinese, The
Thais and Other Groups); Maps; Suggested
Readings.
THE CHANGING FACE OF SOUTHEAST
ASIA, by Amry Vandenbosch and Richard But.
well. Lexington, University of Kentucky Press,
1966. 438 p.
“When the authors set out to revise
their 1957 study, Southeast Asia among the
World Powers, the scene had changed so dras.
tically that they could retain only the histori.
cal sections of their country studies. This,
then, is a new account of Southeast Asian af.
fairs, with separate chapters on Indonesia, Ma-
laysia, the Philippines, Viet Nam, Laos, Cam-
bodia, Burma and Thailand, the region as a
whole, and U.S. policy. The authors are con-
cerned not only with the eight nations’ internal
and international politics but especially with
the relationship between the two.”
AN EYE FOR THE DRAGON; SOUTH.
EAST ASIA OBSERVED, 1954–1970, by Den.
nis Bloodworth. New York, Farrar, Straus and
Giroux, 1970. 414 p.
“The author digs . . . into his newspa-
per files and store of anecdotes for a . . . look
at [all of] Southeast Asia . . . It is . . . a blend
of history, politics, personality, religion, and
superstition. Bloodworth’s constant theme is
the inability of East and West to understand
one another.” He touches many times specifi.
cally on Burma, Cambodia, Laos, and Thai-
land, among others. With chronology and bibli.
ography. -
THE FAR EAST AND SOUTHWEST PA-
CIFIC, 1971, by Harold C. Hinton. Washing.
ton, Stryker-Post Publications, Inc., 1971. 88 p.
Historical Background (The People of
Asia; Religious Beliefs; Medieval Conquerors;
Economic Background; Nationalism, Commu-
nism and Revolution in Twentieth Century
Asia); The Land and the People of the follow.
ing, including area, population, climate, official
language, ethnic background, principal reli- |
gions, chief commercial products, currency, na-
tional flag, etc.: Australia, Burma, Cambodia,
Communist China, Nationalist China, Indo-
nesia, Japan, North Korea, South Korea, Laos,
Malaysia, Mongolia, New Zealand, Philippines,
Singapore, Thailand, North and South Viet-
nam, and Small States and Dependencies.

98
MONSOON ASIA; A GEOGRAPHICAL
SURVEY, by Harry Robinson. New York,
Frederick A. Praeger, 1967. 561 p.
“This study is planned in two main
parts: an introductory section dealing with the
general geographical framework of the region,
the physical and cultural background, the re-
sources, agriculture and industry, and some as-
pects of political geography, followed by a sec-
ond, and larger, section which is concerned
with the regional geography of Monsoon Asia,
each country being dealt with in general, and
then by regions . . . Emphasis has been placed
upon two aspects: first, the historical and cul-
tural background and, second, recent economic
changes and developments. Furthermore, very
significant economic changes, with all their so-
cial and political implications, are taking place
within the region; but it is not easy to procure
immediate information on these matters and
an attempt has been made to give a reasonably
up-to-date account of the changes in process.
The maps have been kept relatively simple to
give clarity.” Contents: The Monsoon Region
—Introduction; The Physical Background; Re-
sources and Economy; The Human Back-
ground; The Indian Sub-Continent; India—
Social and Economic Geography; India—Re-
gional Geography; Pakistan; Nepal, Sikkim
and Bhutan; Ceylon; South-East Asia;
Burma; Thailand; Cambodia, Laos and Viet-
nam; Malaysia; Indonesia; The Philippine Is-
lands; The Chinese People's Republic; China—
Economic and Regional Geography; Hong
Kong, Macao and Taiwan; Korea; Japan—
General and Regional Geography. With: bibli-
ography, illustrations, and tables.
THE MYTH OF ASIA, by John M. Stead-
man. New York, Simon and Schuster, 1969.
353 p.
“This . . . book . . . shows . . . that the
West overestimates the unity of Asia, that in-
deed to think of Asia as a unity is profoundly
mistaken, both in history and today. There are
at least three Asias—the cultural complex of
China and Japan, that of India and its related
cultures, and Islam, which has been closest to
the West and has most influenced the West,
particularly in earlier science, mathematics
and astronomy. This is one aspect only of the
book's main theme. It is extremely illuminat-
ing about Asian cultures, about religion and
art, no less than science and philosophy. The
book has an important contribution to make in
the crucial issue of our time, relations between
East and West, and to the understanding of
them. It gives the historical background, essen-
tial to the comprehension of the greatest politi-
cal dilemma of today. So much depends upon
our getting it right, and this thoughtful and
scholarly book offers significant help to all se-
rious minds at this crossroads. In the end, in
showing that the monolithic concept of Asia is
untrue, that there is and always has been at
least as much variety and diversity in the East
as in the West, the implications of the book are
hopeful: One sees the unity of mankind under
the diversities and conflicts of both East and
West.” Deals with many countries of Asia, in-
cluding Burma, Cambodia, Laos, and Thailand,
among others. With select bibliography.
SOUTHEAST ASIA; A SURVEY, by Rich-
ard Butwell. New York, Foreign Policy As-
sociation, December 1968. 63 p. (Headline Se-
ries No. 192.)
This survey of Southeast Asia which in-
cludes information also on Burma, Cambodia,
Laos, and Thailand, among others, deals with
the following: What Is Southeast Asia?; The
Years Since World War II; The Problems of
Nation-Building and Survival; Regionalism—
How Firm a Foundation—and Future?; The
United States and Southeast Asia.
STATUS OF THE WORLD'S NATIONS.
rev. ed. Washington, Department of State, Bu-
reau of Intelligence and Research, 1969. 21 p.
(Geographic Bulletin No. 2.) -
This Geographic Bulletin identifies each
state in the world (including Burma, Cam-
bodia, Laos, and Thailand) that is generally
accepted as independent. It includes enumera-
tion and official nomenclature of the countries
. . . Two names appear for each state: a short
form for use in maps, in lists, and for general
narration; a long form for more formal usage
and for official documents. An appendix gives
such details as the area, population, and identi-
fication of capital of each country. Text and
notes explain many of the exceptions one finds
in the complex pattern of sovereignties
throughout the world. -
99
D. Government and Politics
1. Miscellaneous Aspects
CONSTITUTION OF NATIONS. VOLUME
II—ASIA, AUSTRALIA AND OCEANIA, by
Amos J. Peaslee. Rev. 3rd ed. The Hague,
INetherlands, Martinus Nijhoff, 1966. 632 p.
Texts of constitutions for the following
countries, among other: Burma, Cambodia,
Laos, and Thailand.
LEAVE THEM OR ALIENATE THEM, by
Bobert Norton, in Far Eastern Economic Re-
view, v. 72, no. 21 (22 May 1971) 22–24.
“So far Cambodia's peasants have not
been ‘involved’ in the war to the extent to
which it has long afflicted their Vietnamese
counterparts. Any change could cloud the peas-
antry’s tolerance of government in Phnom
Penh.”
REGION OF REVOLT; FOCUS ON
SOUTHEAST ASIA, by Milton Osborne. New
York, Pergamon Press, 1970. 166 p.
“Essential . . . for everyone concerned
with understanding the current situation, not
only in Indochina, but the whole of the South-
east Asian region. Southeast Asia has a long
history of unrest and disorder, and Professor
Osborne aims to present recent events in the
area in the context of this history. Throughout
the book he puts forward the argument that
much of the commentary on Southeast Asian
affairs which has appeared over the last few
years has been written on the basis of funda-
mental misunderstanding of the realities of the
Southeast Asian region. The book is a correc-
tive to those surveys which reflect an obsessive
fear of Communism and an inability to per-
ceive the effect of continuing social, political
and economic inequalities throughout the coun-
tries of this part of the world. Particular
attention is given to events in Malaya, the
Philippines, Viet-Nam and Cambodia since the
Second World War, set in the context of the
historical phenomenon of revolt. The treatment
of recent developments in Cambodia . . . is one
of the first discussions of any length of events
leading up to the deposition of Prince Sihan-
Ouk in March 1970.” -
º
JA
2,
REGIONAL DISUNITY IN CAMBODIA,
by Milton Osborne, in Australian Outlook, w,
22, no. 3 (December 1968) 317–33. : .
“A . . . neglected aspect of contempº-
rary Cambodian affairs, to which this present
article is directed, is that of the problem of re.
gional disunity. It is the frequent boast of the
Cambodian Government that almost alone
amongst the states of Southeast Asia Cam,
bodia has avoided the internal difficulties
which have so plagued the area. This presenta.
tion of the facts has been widely accepted by
outside observers, in part because of the dis.
tinct absence from Cambodia of many of the
features of disunity which are so apparent and
so troublesome for other countries in the
Southeast Asian region. The two largest mi.
nority groups in Cambodia, the Chinese and
the Vietnamese, have not been a source of dif.
ficulty in any marked fashion since Cambodia
attained independence in 1953 . . . This survey
of possible factors which might be invoked as
an explanation of the regional disunity which
is now apparent in Cambodia has given little
attention to the problems associated with Cam-
bodia's political system. . . . Nevertheless, the
question should be asked, “To what extent has
the occurrence of regional disunity involved
developments within the specifically politi.
cal’ 2’’ •
SOUTHEAST ASIA’s POLITICAL SYS.
TEMS, by Lucian W. Pye. Englewood Cliffs,
N.J., Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1967. 98 p.
“This series is dedicated to the proposi-
tion that it is no longer valid or profitable to
study comparative politics within an essen-
tially North American and European-centered
frame of reference . . . Politically speaking,
the history of the twentieth century is in large
part the history of the re-emergence of non-
European areas and states to positions of in-
dependence and prominence on the world
scene . . . Southeast Asia is a region of great
diversity and contrast. Each of the nine lead.
ing countries of the region—Indonesia, the
Philippines, Burma, Malaysia, Thailand, Viet.
nam, Cambodia, Laos, and Singapore—repre:
sents a distinct and separate tradition. And
within each country further diversities
abound, for none has an homogeneous popula:
100
tion. No other region of the world offers such a
rich array of major religions. Malaysia and In-
donesia are Islamic countries; the Philippines
is the only Christian country in Asia; and the
remainder of mainland Southeast Asia consists
of Buddhistic Societies that adhere to different
beliefs. Behind these religious differences are
additional disparities in customs and historical
experience. The 180 million Southeast Asians
employ more than 150 different languages and
dialects, most of which are mutually unintelli-
gible.” With bibliography.
2. The Fall of Sihanouk's Regime (See also
F-1 Below)
a. Miscellaneous Aspects
CAMBODIA: BETWEEN SCYLLA AND
CHARYBDIS, by Roger M. Smith, in Asian
Survey, v. 8, no. 1 (January 1968) 72–79.
“Twelve years ago Prince Norodom Si-
hanouk, Cambodia's Chief of State, gave up
the throne and stepped directly into politics in
the hope that the elite and people would rally
behind him in one mass political movement—
the Sangkum Reastr Niyum—to work for
Cambodia's greater interests: national unity.
the preservation of independence and territo-
rial integrity, and economic and social develop-
ment. He feared that political factionalism
would not only weaken the country and hinder
its development, but eventually would be ex-
ploited by hostile external forces. Similarly, by
adhering to a policy of nonalignment in foreign
affairs, Sihanouk hoped to deprive politicians
of a further issue of contention. A neutral
stance, moreover, might persuade Cambodia's
neighbors and the major powers that she
posed no threat to their interests and that
nothing useful would be gained from meddling
in her affairs. Unfortunately, the efforts on
both the domestic and international fronts fell
short of their intended effects: factionalism
flourished within the Sangkum and in 1967
developed into armed violence; and foreign
powers—China and North Vietnam—were re-
vealed to be fishing in Cambodia's troubled
waters.” With bibliography.
CAMBODIA: RUNAWAY COUP D’ETAT,
by Milton Osborne, in The Nation, v. 210 no.
22 (8 June 1970) 678-680.
“One of the few certainties that may be
recorded about contemporary Cambodia is that
in deposing Prince Norodom Sihanouk the
leaders of the March 18 coup have temporarily,
at least, opened a frighteningly large Pan-
dora's box. The commitment of U.S. troops to
Cambodian territory, together with South Viet-
namese units which seem likely to remain
longer than the deadline set by Mr. Nixon,
has brought death and destruction to the coun-
tryside in the eastern border regions. The in-
tentions of the Vietnamese Communist troops
in Cambodia remain unclear, but they are un-
doubtedly able to harass the poorly trained
and equipped Cambodian army. Meanwhile,
Cambodian left-wing forces are organizing to
capitalize on the situation and so to pose a fur-
ther threat to General Lon Nol's government.
The background factors which contributed to
Sihanouk's deposition have been present for sev-
eral years. They went unrecognized, however,
by a great many commentators on Cambodia
because of the emotionally and political appeal
which Prince Sihanouk's policies had for ob-
servers disenchanted with the authoritarian
regimes of the Right and the Left which govern
so many Southeast Asian states.”
CHANGING CAMBODIA, by David P.
Chandler, in Current History, v. 59, no. 352
(December 1970) 333–338 plus.
“Cambodia's sudden entrance onto the
world scene in March and April, 1970, was an
event that neither Cambodia nor the world was
ready for, since they had hidden from each
other for so long behind mutual indifference,
misinformation and cliches . . . On March 18,
1970, both houses of the Cambodian Parlia-
ment voted unanimously in open session to re-
move Prince Norodom Sihanouk from his posi-
tion as Chief of State. Economic and Political
Problems of the 1960's; A Government-in-
Exile; etc.”
COUP IN CAMBODIA—HOW SIHANOUT
LOST OUT, in U.S. News & World Report, v.
68, no. 13 (30 March 1970) 18–20.
“Growing fear of Hanoi—and frustra-
tion with a mercurial ruler. Those factors ig-
nited an explosion, altered the political stance
of Cambodia overnight.”
THE FOUR-YEAR COUP, by Nayan R.
Chanda, in Far Eastern Economic Review, v.
68, no. 26 (25 June 1970) 26–28.
101

“The cracks began to appear in Sihan-
ouk’s Sangkum regime as early as 1966 and
whatever rumour might suggest about outside
influences contributing to Lon Nol's takeover
in Phnom Penh the conflict has been of Cam-
bodia’s own making.”
SIHANOUK: PRINCE ON A TIGHTROPE,
by Nicholas Turner, in Reader's Digest (May
1969) 177–182.
“What is Cambodia’s debonair, mer-
curial, enigmatic chief of state really after?
. . . A flamboyant king who quit his throne to
enter politics as a “royal socialist,’ a composer
who is a basketball and volleyball enthusiast, a
movie director who stars in his own films, a
headache to Washington and Peking but the
beloved leader of his own people—this remark-
able combination is Prince Norodom Sihanouk,
descendant of the god-kings of Angkor and
enigmatic ruler of Cambodia.”
TIME OUT OF HAND: REVOLUTIONT
AND REACTION IN SOUTHEAST ASIA, by
Robert Shaplen. London, Andre Deutsch, 1969.
429 p.
“This political history of Southeast
Asia discusses events in Indonesia, Malaysia,
the Philippines, Thailand, Cambodia, Laos, and
Vietnam. Much of the book has previously ap-
peared in The New Yorker . . . This book con-
tains analyses of these countries . . . Scenes
of fighting in the north of Laos; a . . . charac-
ter sketch of . . . Prince Sihanouk of Cam-
bodia [among many other items] . . .”
b. Sihanouk Speaks from Peking
BREAK WITH THE PAST, by Sisowath
Sirik Matak, in Far Eastern Economic Review,
v. 71, no. 10 (6 March 1971) 27–30.
“From Peking, Prince Sihanouk, in a
series of interviews and articles, has accused
his successors of betrayal and treason. The act-
ing head of state of the Khmer Republic re-
plies . . . To understand the meaning of events
in Cambodia during 1970, which radically
changed the fate of the Khmer nation, it is
necessary to trace back and consider the coun-
try’s political situation over the past few
years. The ousting of Prince Norodom Sihan-
ouk, the defensive war against North Viet-
namese and Vietcong communist aggressors—
and the change of regime together with the
proclamation of the republic—constituted a
logical, inevitable outcome of preexisting
causes.” º:
witH SIHANOUK IN PEKING, by Ale
sandro Casella, in The Nation, v. 212, no. 10 (.
March 1971) 305–308.
“Mr. Casella is employed in the Fal
Eastern Documentation Center of the Geneva
Graduate Institute of International Studies
Early this winter he received through th:
Chinese Consulate in Geneva a visa to visit Pº
king, his purpose being to interview Prince Si
hanouk, who had earlier agreed to the meeting
The two-hour conversation, which is printed in
part below, took place at Sihanouk's villa, situ.
ated in a large compound near Peking's Fish. .
erman’s Court.” Responses are recorded tº
many questions, a sample of which follow from
among others: “Your Highness, when you
were in Phnom Penh, you felt that Cambodia
should follow a policy of neutrality. Why!
. . . In view of the situation today, do you feel
that your policy of Neutrality has been a fail.
ure? . . . At the time of the coup you were in
France. Why didn’t you return to Cambodia!|
. . . Do you feel that the Americans played a
role in the coup that overthrew you? . . .
How would you define the aid that you ré.
ceived from abroad? . . . Why doesn’t the S0.
viet Union help you? . . . How do you see the
future for Indochina; will it be Red or Pink!
. . . Don’t you think that the Chinese leaders
would still prefer a Red Cambodia? . . .”
3. Cambodia. Under Lon Nol
ANATOMY OF A COUP, by T. D. Allman,
in Far Eastern Economic Review, v. 67, no. 15
(9 April 1970) 17–21.
“The situation in Cambodia remains un-
decided. Last week, the new government
headed by General Lon Nol seemed firmly—if
warily—in control, closing the country's inter.
national airports when a crisis loomed. A ful
week after Prince Norodom Sihanouk had been
ousted, violent demonstrations calling for his
return broke out in Kompong Cham near the
South Vietnam border. Phnom Penh claimed
the rioting was the work of Vietnamese com:
munist agitators and was not a spontaneous
outburst by ordinary Cambodians. Predictably
enough, the week in Phnom Penh was not
102
without its rumours of Vietnamese communist
forces readying for a confrontation with the
35,000-man Cambodian army, even moving up
for an attack on the capital. But the extent of
North Vietnamese and Vietcong military ambi-
tions to topple the men who ousted Sihanouk
was clouded. The new regime, requesting the
aid of UN Secretary General U Thant in per-
suading Hanoi and its southern arm to respect
Cambodia's territorial rights, complained to
the Security Council over continuing infiltra-
tion. But Lon Nol’s administration did not
seek an immediate session of the council, indi-
cating that Phnom Penh saw no immediate
threat. Hopes that the new government might
be able to find some formula to mollify the
North Vietnamese and the Vietcong faded
when Hanoi and South Vietnam’s Provisional
Revolutionary Government quit their diplo-
matic missions in Cambodia. In Peking, the
Chinese were keeping fairly quite about the
coup while Sihanouk issued fierce denuncia-
tions of those responsible for his downfall. In
Phnom Penh, the government countered the
possibility of the prince capitalising on his old
popularity by issuing a spate of charges
against his personal integrity and patriotism.
It was, most agreed, the end of an era, but as
pro-Sihanouk demonstrations continued in
Outlying areas of Cambodia last week, there
was considerable doubt as to whether a new
One had yet begun.”
CAMBODIA: THE LONGEST YEAR, by R.
P. W. Norton, in Far Eastern Economic Re-
view, v. 71, no. 12 (20 March 1971) 14–15.
“The most significant thing about the
first anniversary of the Lon Nol government is
that there is one. While pointing to the sur-
prising longevity of the government has be-
come almost as much of a cliche as predicting
its demise was last year, it should nevertheless
be recalled that the press was almost univer-
sally erroneous in its prediction of doom for
the new government.”
CAMBODIA'S RELUCTANT DRAGONS,
by Robert Norton, in Far Eastern Economic
Review, v. 72, no. 19 (8 May 1971) 5–6.
“Cambodia, it seems, will keep its re-
Spected figurehead—but as figurehead only—af-
ter more than two weeks of uncertainty. The
new man, as ‘premier-delegate’ is Sirik Matak,
who will operate with three deputy prime min-
isters under him, probably retaining the key
portfolio of defence which Lon Nol held before
his illness and departure for Hawaii . . . Why
was a cabinet change—in the middle of the
war—necessary? It is generally conceded that
with few exceptions all the ministers in Lon
Nol's cabinet were competent, and the political
equation at least allowed the war to be waged
under a unified national leadership and saved
the nation from a series of debilitating power
struggles. The reasons for the change are ob-
lique and had been building up for some time.
The ouster of Sihanouk and the proclamation
of a republic seven months later was a national
catharsis. For some it meant a chance for po-
litical expression after an era of silence; oth-
ers regarded it as a possibility for participa-
tory democracy. But for almost everyone, it
was an end to gross corruption and misman-
agement.”
LON NOL’S HIGH HAND, in Time, (20
March 1972) 23.
“After two years of halting prepara-
tion, Cambodia was all set to promulgate a new
constitution this-week, adopting a presidential
form of government . . . Lon Nol . . . pro-
nouncing the draft of the constitution unaccept-
able, . . . disolved the Constituent Assembly
. . and proclaimed himself chief of state and
sole authority.” &
WHAT CAMBODIA WANTS FROM U.S.;
INTERVIEW WITH PREMIER LON NOL, in
U.S. News & World Report, v. 68, no. 15 (13
April 1970) 30–31.
“Friendship with America—but no
arms right now. That is the formula laid down
by Pnompenh’s new leader in an interview
with Charles Foltz, Jr., of the staff of ‘U.S.
News & World Report’.”
E. Cambodia's Search for National
Security (See also Appendixes K
and L)
1. Miscellaneous Aspects
THE ASIAN BALANCE OF POWER : A
COMPARISON WITH EUROPEAN PRECE-
DENTS, by Coral Bell. London, Institute for
103
Strategic Studies, 1968. 14 p. (Adelphi Paper
No. 44.)
“Asia needs a balance of power coali-
tion, similar to NATO, to deter Chinese expan-
sionism in the next decade. It was the tradi-
tionally European concept of balance of power,
not containment, which halted Soviet advances
in post-war Europe. Containment is at best a
military strategy for stop-gap action to pre-
vent any territorial acquisition by the adver-
sary. Military containment has been tried in
Vietnam and has proved too costly in relation
to its effectiveness. A balance of power coali-
tion in Asia would have not only military, but
political and economic cohesion in deterring
China . . . The Asian coalition, therefore,
would include only those countries which are
definitely Western-oriented and have common
political, economic, and social interests to pro-
tect, such as Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore,
the Philippines, Taiwan, Japan, New Zealand,
and Australia. Burma, Cambodia, Laos, and
Vietnam should be made neutral buffer states
. . . However, a balance of power coalition is
not in the Asian tradition, and it will still be
difficult to organize. Moreover, Asian countries
alone cannot present China with a credible de-
terrent. A merely regional coalition will not be
effective against China’s increasing nuclear po-
tential. Asian countries need the economic, mil-
itary, and nuclear backing of the US. A consid-
erable input of Western military resources will
be required for at least a decade and a US de-
fense arrangement, similar to the Japanese-
American pact, will be needed for much
longer.”
CAMBODIA: THE SEARCH FOR SECU-
RITY, by Michael Leifer. New York, Praeger, -
1967, 209 p.
“The Thai and the Vietnamese are the
traditional enemies of Cambodia. Modern Cam-
bodia is much smaller than the Empire of
Kambuja, which lost much territory to Thai-
land and South Vietnam. Pressure from these
two was relieved when the French established
control over Indochina, but was again exerted
under the Japanese in World War II. Because
of the war in Vietnam, the situation is more
precarious now. If North Vietnam wins and
unites Vietnam, Cambodia can expect pressure
from Vietnam and probably China. If the
1963 two important—though faltering—step;|
South Vietnamese win, the old squeezeº,
Thailand and Vietnam will be resumed. Pri.
ity as well as gaining independence frºm
France. However, his policy of neutrality (a
succeed only if the superpowers respect Cam,
bodian independence, ‘either in their own in
terest or through fear of provoking eaſ
other,’ and if there is an ideal balance of powd
in Indochina. This was the situation when Sil
hanouk announced the policy of neutrality bil
since then the balance has become uncertain
and Cambodian policy has been forced tº
change. Since Communist China is certainº
become the dominant power in the region
Cambodia courts the good will of Peking in th:
hope that it will restrain Thailand and Wié.
nam. Sihanouk relies on national unity to pr;
serve Cambodia as a nation.” . . .
REGIONALISM AND INSTABILITY
SOUTHEAST ASIA, by Bernard K. Gordon, in
Orbis (Summer 1966) 438–457.
“Regionalism has not taken root in
Southeast Asia. There are many political COM,
flicts among the nations and little agreement
on what cooperation would mean in practice.
Yet, regionalism continues to attract support.
ers because it seems to promise different bent.
fits to different national leaders. In 1961 and
toward regional cooperation were taken: the
Association for Southeast Asia (the Philip.
pines, Malaysia, and Thailand) and MAPHIL.
INDO (Malaysia-Philippines-Indonesia). Other
measures include the Asian Development Bank,
the UN Economic Commission on Asia and the
Far East, the Japanese-sponsored meetings foº.
tering some form of economic cooperation, and
the Korean-sponsored conference for Asian and
Pacific Cooperation (ASPAC). One approacht
stability would be the creation of the Associa.
tion of Southeast Asian New Emerging Force,
ASANEFOS would include Indonesia, the ASA
members, and hopefully could attract Cambodia
and Burma. Such an association would mean
that the interest in regionalism of the colorful
but less prosperous states (such as Indonesia)
had begun to converge with the interests of th
more efficient small states (the ASA group)
Another essential element, the interest an



104
support of the great powers, is developing. The
combination of these elements would provide a
practical basis for making regionalism work in
Southeast Asia.”
A SYSTEMS APPROACH TO SECURITY
IN THE INDIAN OCEAN ARC, by Sheldon
W. Simon, in Orbis (Summer 1970) 401–442.
“Systems analysis suggests that most of
the states in the Indian Ocean arc hold certain
common views about the region. They see it,
following a projected Anglo-American with-
drawal, as particularly vulnerable to Chinese
and Vietnamese insurgency operations. They
are not, however, enthusiastic about a possible
collective security arrangement with the
USSR, designed to protect them against China.
The general Asian trend appears to be against
a visible land-based presence of any external
power. From their point of view, bases are an
insult to the host country’s sovereignty, in-
crease the probability of attack upon thcm
selves during war, and serve as a battleground
for other powers. Moreover, they do not consid-
er the threat to their security serious enough
to require common defense arrangements.
Ideally, the Asian states seem to favor an ar-
rangement whereby they would assume pri-
mary responsibility for regional security,
though not necessarily through a formal de-
fense pact, while relying on the larger powers
for material support. Japan, India, and Indo-
nesia, the three essential states in any security
arrangement, show little interest in formal re-
gional multilateral collaboration. Since the US
defense role in Southeast Asia is not likely to
be replaced by a regional security arrangement
in the near future, the US may wish to provide
logistical support and training to Laos, Cam-
bodia, and Thailand, where North Vietnamese
troop involvement is likely to continue well
after the war in Vietnam is terminated. Such
support activities could be based in Japan, Oki-
nawa, the Republic of Korea, Taiwan, the Phil-
ippines, and Thailand. As long as the US role
is confined to support activities, it will not gen-
erate extensive anti-Americanism. However,
should the US be called upon to provide air
Cover, it might be wise to employ bases located
Only in those states which are directly support-
ing the defending government . . .”
TO ESTABLISH AN ASIAN AND PA-
CIFIC COLLECTIVE SECURITY SYSTEM,
in Asian Outlook, v. 6, no. 2 (February 1971)
2–4.
“To carry out the so-called ‘Nixon doc-
trine’—the U.S. policy in Asia—the American
government has started withdrawing its troops
from Asia at an accelerated speed . . . The
first difficult problem that may take place is
the continuous deterioration of the war situa-
tion in Laos and Cambodia and the incessant
expansion of Communist subversive activities
in Thailand . . . The second difficult problem
is: The reduction of the Communist military
threat in South Vietnam is not entirely due to
the decline of the Communist strength as un-
derstood by the United States. Rather, they
pretend that their strength has shrunk in
order to lure the United States into accelerat-
ing the withdrawal of its troops . . . The third
difficult problem is: It is possible that once all
American troops are pulled out from Southeast
Asia and can no longer be sent back there, the
Red Chinese will openly help the Communists
in Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia and Thailand
launch an all-out attack in an attempt to seize
all of Southeast Asia . . . Before the United
States withdraws its troops, it should make the
necessary deployments actively so that the free
Asian countries can take over the responsibil-
ity of defending the security and peace of
Asia.”
WHAT IS SECURITY IN SOUTHEAST
ASIA 2 by Frank N. Trager, in Air University
Review, v. 20, no. 1 (November–December
1968) 103–112.
“Let’s think first about what security in
Southeast Asia is from the point of view of
Southeast Asians . . . In terms of security,
there should have been no threat, there should
have been no problem. At the time of indepen-
dence, none of the Southeast Asian countries
any longer had designs on their neighbors.
There had been a time when the Thai and the
Vietnamese in fact had designs upon Cam-
bodia; and in their centuries-long march down
this mainland Southeast Asian peninsula, they
had squeezed Cambodia into smaller confines.
So, too, the Burmese once had rampant dy-
nasties; and Indonesians may have had ideas
of reviving a greater Malayo-Indonesian state.
105
But by and large, at the end of World War II
such past “glories’ were past. To repeat, in
terms of security, after these countries had at-
tained independence, there should have been no
threat to the area—but there was.”
2. Armed Forces
THE MILITARY BALANCE 1970–1971—
PART V: ASIA AND AUSTRALASIA, in
Aerospace International, v. 6, no. 6 (Novem-
ber–December 1970) 54–56 plus.
A strategic survey of the military bal-
ance of this area of the world, including a sur-
vey of the following countries, among many
others: Burma, Cambodia, Laos, and Thailand.
Provides the strengths of the Armies, Navies,
Marine Corps, Air Forces, as well as Paramili-
tary Forces.
WORLD MILITARY EXPENDITURES,
1970. Washington, U.S. Arms Control and Dis-
armament Agency, Economic Bureau, 1970. 37
p. (Publication 58.)
Provides information on World Military
expenditures and related data for 120 countries
including Burma, Cambodia, Laos, and Thai-
land, among others. With 8 charts, 6 tables,
and statistical notes.
F. Foreign Relations
1. Pseudo-Neutrality Under Sihanouk
CAMBODIAN NEUTRALITY, by William
E. Willmott, in Current History, (January
1967) 36–40 plus.
“The central issue of Cambodian for-
eign policy is the preservation of its integrity
and independence in the face of its much
larger neighbors and of the world powers, who
see Southeast Asia as one of the battlefields for
their own cold war confrontation. Tradition-
ally Cambodia has seen Thailand and Vietnam
as the main threats to its national integrity,
and today Cambodia suffers continual harass-
ment along both its Thai and Vietnamese bor-
ders. Fundamental to Cambodian antagonism
for the US is the fact that both Thailand and
South Vietnam are firmly allied to the US.
Cambodia considers the US military action in
Vietnam a threat to its internal security and
peace. As US direct involvement increases, the
expansion of the war into Cambodia appean
ever more imminent to that nation. There haſ
been some recent indications that the US Staff
Department is beginning to recognize thiſ
Cambodia fears its neighbors’ threats to its nº
tional integrity. One of the few hopeful sign
for a Cambodian-American rapprochementi
the naming of the “Boulevard Senator Mali
field’ in Phnom Penh on July 24, 1966. Thiſ
our hopes should be reduced to such smil
signs, in a nation whose friendship for tº
West—and particularly for the US—wi;
strong only ten years ago, is indeed unfortſ:
ate. That the nation involved is one of the fa
in the world developing entirely independent
peacefully, and somewhat democratically is
tragedy of American foreign policy.” -
CAMBODIA'S PRECARIOUS BALANC;
by Ernst Kux, in Swiss Reivew of World Aſ
fairs, v. 20, no. 1 (April 1970) 17–18.
“The . . . . article was written short
before Prince Sihanouk was toppled from Offi
by his own ministers. Despite its being thu
dated, it provides excellent background on th
circumstances leading up to this latest shifti
the Asian constellation. Southeast Asia's fº
quently cited dominoes have not yet toppled
they have begun to quiver perilously. To .
extent this is true is demonstrated by Cam
bodia's increasingly neurotic-seeming *
This country, which was regarded as a mº
for a “neutralized’ Southeast Asia and is 5
regarded as such by optimists in Washings
and elsewhere, has been pushed off balance a
is having growing difficulty in maintaining;
minimum of independence. Its º:
being reduced to a state in which the compei
forces in this area can operate unhindered tº
with increasing ruthlessness . . . Here the gº
world powers are wrestling openly with Omē!
other for influence and for the º
an operational base for their interests in S0ſ
east Asia.”
CRACKING A SMILE, by T. D. Allman
Far Eastern Economic Review, v. 67, no. º
February 1970) 23–25. |
f
•1'.
“Masterly diplomacy by Prince Sid
ouk has kept his nation amazingly troubleſ
in a much-troubled Indochina. But his bath
far from won. Allman looks for signs of Cf








106
in Cambodia's neutral smile. American mili-
tary involvement in Indochina waning, Cam-
bodia's relations with the Vietnamese commu-
mists are becoming the major foreign policy
preoccupation of Prince Norodom Sihanouk
and his continuing effort to win international
recognition and respect for his country’s vul-
merable frontiers.”
“NEUTRAL” CAMBODIA—A THORN IN
U.S. SIDE, in U.S. News & World Report, v.
66, no. 3 (20 January 1969) 38–39.
“Cambodia, already a Red Sanctuary,
may wake up some day and find itself through
as a nation. A member of the staff of ‘U.S.
News & World Report' tells the story from the
Scene.” Smuggling Encouraged; Threat from
Thailand?; Palsy-Walsy with Reds?; Rice on
Bicycles; Will U.S. Move In?; etc.
2. Cambodia and Her Neighbors
CAMBODIA AND ITS NEIGHBORS, by
Charles E. Finan, in Military Review, v. 51,
no. 6 (June 1971) 75–83.
“Since the decline of the great Khmer
Empire—which at its height in the 12th and
13th centuries extended through a large part
Of what is now Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, and
Vietnam—Cambodia's chief concern in its rela-
tions with its neighbors of Southeast Asia has
been fear for its survival as a national entity.
This fear has lent a remarkable consistency to
Cambodian foreign relations over the centuries
... . The threat is perceived mostly as that of
hegemony over, or outright occupation of,
Cambodian territory by one of its more power-
ful neighbors. To counter that threat, the de-
posed Cambodian leader, Prince Norodom Si-
hanouk, espoused a form of neutralism which
leaned toward the Communists. Sihanouk ap-
parently believed it more likely that Com-
munist China and the North Vietnamese would
maintain Southeast Asia within their spheres
of influence than that the United States would
continue to maintain a significant presence in
the area indefinitely. On the other hand, he was
forced to develop national policies within an
evaluation of the threat which included not only
the designs of these powers, particularly the
North Vietnamese on Cambodia, but also dan-
gers represented by the Thais and South Viet-
namese. Thus, with one hand, he juggled Cam-
bodian relations with the Communist powers
while, with the other, he manipulated overtures
for greater friendship with the United States,
not only to counter the former, but also to per-
suade the latter to curb the Republic of Viet-
nam and Thailand.” Cambodia’s History; Lao
Relations; Vietnamese Expansion; Cultural
Differences; A Ruled Colony; Vietnamese Dom-
inance; Twice Colonized; Cambodian Animos-
ity; etc.
CAMBODIA’S STRATEGY OF SUR-
VIVAL, by David Chandler, in Current His-
tory, v. 57, no. 340 (December 1969) 344–348
plus.
“Throughout 1969, Sihanouk persisted
in his customary strategy of survival, condi-
tioned in part by an unshakable animosity to-
ward Bangkok and Saigon, by a distrust of
United States interests in Southeast Asia, and
by the fact that his tactics have succeeded thus
far.”
THE CHALLENGE OF WORLD POLITICS
IN SOUTH AND SOUTHEAST ASIA, by
Werner Levi. Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Pren-
tice-Hall, Inc., 1968. 186 p.
The Elitist Nature of Foreign Policies;
The Problem of Nationalism; Regionalism;
Nonalignment—The Expectation and the Re-
sult; The United Nations; Tensions and Con-
flicts; The Major Nations; etc. Discussed,
among many nations of the region are Burma,
Cambodia, Laos, and Thailand.
THE ROLE OF THE THAIS AND THE VI-
ETNAMESE IN CAMBODIA. Die Rolle der
Thais und der Vietnamesen in Kambodscha, by
D. R. SarDesai, in Europa-Archiv, V. 26 (10
January 1971) 30–38. In German.
“Traces the history of Cambodia’s rela-
tionships with its neighbors and suggests that
in view of age-old ideological and territorial
feuds between these countries their recent
“friendship' will not last. The current rela-
tionships are based solely on the drastic shifts
in defense requirements that occurred in the
spring of 1970.”
‘THIS IS THE VOICE OF . . .,’ by Boris
Baczynskyi, in Far Eastern Economic Review,
73, no. 34 (21 August 1971) 25–26.
“Cambodia’s seven million people are
107

receiving a great deal of attention these days,
much of it over the airwaves. But sounds are
sometimes not what they seem and listeners
must be sceptical when they hear . . . An old
French Indochina president, who nightly re-
gales Westerners assembled at various Phnom
Penh watering holes with ever-fresh analyses
of Cambodia's plight, says that seven in the
evening is radio-listening time for the
Khmers: soldiers of the Khmer Republic and
communist forces string antennas out of fox-
holes; peasants press little receivers to their
ears; even Prime Minister Lon Nol turns on
his bed-side radio. All, the Frenchman asserts,
are listening to Radio Peking, and the voice of
deposed leader Prince Norodom Sihanouk. The
old Indochina hand exaggerates, of course.
There are other listening hours and broadcast-
ers. Besides Radio Peking, there are five other
communist radio stations broadcasting for
Cambodian listeners. Radio Hanoi and Libera-
tion Radio (Vietcong) stations are listened to
only by the few Khmer ideological communists.
Radio Moscow offers mild fare of little interest
to anybody. The clandestine Voice of the Na-
tional United Front of Kampuchea, which ac-
cording to one source broadcasts out of a hole
in the ground in northeastern Kratie province,
according to another out of southern North
Vietnam, produces a weak short-wave signal
which occasionally fades out even on good re-
ceivers. The Voice of NUFK in French is also
weak and probably has few listeners besides
the United States foreign broadcast monitors
in Bangkok. In addition, there is another sta-
tion that claims to be the Voice of NUFK but
is actually a CIA (Central Intelligence
Agency) supported psychological ploy aiming
to discredit Prince Sihanouk and his cause.
The station’s transmitters are in Laos and
broadcasts are in Khmer. It apparently sup-
ports Sihanouk, his exile government in Peking,
and the Vietnamese communists, but actually
feeds its listeners with information injurious
to the communist cause. The station transmits
three times a day, every day (morning, after-
noon and night) on two shortwave frequencies
from a CIA-managed military camp northwest
of Pakse in Southern Laos. According to in-
formed sources, broadcasts began in the spring
of 1970, soon after Sihanouk was voted out of
office.”
3. Cambodia, and Communist China,
BETWEEN VIETNAM AND CHINA, hº
Christian Müller, in Swiss Review of World
Affairs, v. 20, no. 5 (August 1970) 12–21.
“Some time ago Christian Müller, a
young member of the NZZ's (Switzerland's
Neue Zürcher Zeitung) foreign affairs staff
was sent on an extended special assignment tº
Asia. His reports, which have been appearing
periodically . . ., provide valuable insights intº
that troubled part of the world (Burma, Laº,
Cambodia, and Nepal) caught between the Im.
dochinese tragedy and the growing might of
renascent China.” . .
CHINA’S AID TO CAMBODIA, by Alain.
Gérard Marsot, in Pacific Affairs, v. 42, no,'
(Summer 1969) 189–198.
“The policy of economic aid adopted by
China towards various countries is one of the
more pradoxical characteristics of the Peking
regime. China is a developing country that is
faced by severe economic problems. In tackling
these problems she has come up against trº
mendous obstacles and suffered major 8%
backs; yet only three years after coming tº
power the Communist regime started giving
foreign aid, on a scale it could ill afford, first tº
Communist countries and from 1956 on tº
non-Communist countries as well . . . An at
amination of the motives behind China's poliſ
of economic aid to Cambodia involves a consid
eration of the political relations between th:
two countries, who share neither a commū
frontier nor a common ideology of culture.”
MAO TSE-TUNG GAZES UPON FIVB
CONTINENTS, by Ernst Henri, in Atlas (Dº
cember 1967), 14–15.
“This article [reprinted from a Sović
periodical] is of particular interest because:
reflects a Soviet viewpoint imputing to Mº
Tse-tung aspirations to construct an Oriend
version of a “Super-Reich.” Mao and his agº
ciates developed a concrete plan of expansi.
as far back as the 1950s. The first stage of #|
‘great strategic blueprint’ included Korč
Mongolia, Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, Indoº
sia, Malaysia, Burma, and other nations ontº
periphery of China. In the second stage, Chiſ
would expand over the Hindustan Peninsill.
108
into Soviet Central Asia, the Soviet Far East,
and finally the Near East. The final stage is
not quite apparent, but Chinese intentions are
clearly stated: no continent has been omitted
from the projected “Maoization’ of the world.
Present reality does not exist for the Mao
group; its hallucinations have become deci-
sions. It is obvious that Peking has decided
that at some point a global war—exterminat-
ing one-third to one-half of the world’s popula-
tion—will be necessary for realization of Mao’s
'Super-Reich.” That is why China continually
does everything possible to increase interna-
tional tension.”
THE SOUTHEAST ASIAN VIEW OF
CHINA, by Bernard K. Gordon, in Current
History, (September 1968) 165–170.
“Southeast Asia is the natural outlet for
China's ‘great power' quest . . . The large pro-
portion of poverty-ridden, rural, peasants in
SEA promises great gain at minimal risk for
the Chinese Communists, and the presence of
the US in the region provides China with the
pretext of an American invasion for exercising
a 'self-protective’ influence over the region.
China is now unwilling to allow even those
SEA nations not associated with the American
presence to exist in peace. Cambodia and
Burma are plagued with Peking-supported in-
surgents, despite their frequent statements of
friendship toward China and condemnation of
the US . . . China’s unprovoked aggressive-
mess in Southeast Asia is cooling its formerly
COrdial relations with area leaders . . . In
Cambodia, for example, Prince Sihanouk has
threatened to turn the country over to the US
rather than allow Chinese-sponsored insur-
gents to slowly take over. Southeast Asians
view China from three perspectives: first, as
the traditional, alien, great power of the region
with a long history of domination; second, as
the parent of the overseas Chinese who are
widely resented, feared, and distrusted because
of their strong influence on the economy of
Southeast Asia; and third, as an emerging
Asian nation, admired for its accomplishments
in centralizing government and excluding
Western Powers. This third aspect outweighed
the negative ones until China began to show its
| belligerence in the 1960s. Since then, China
| has been one of the prime causes for the suc-
w
cess of non-Chinese regional cooperation in
Southeast Aisa. What started out to be eco-
nomic integration has expanded into military
cooperation. The trend toward regional defense
will increase unless China returns to its
former policy of ‘peaceful coexistence,” which
seems unlikely.”
STORM OVER ASIA, CHINA AND
SOUTHEAST ASIA: THRUST AND RE-
SPONSE, by Robert Karr McCabe. New York,
The New American Library, 1967. 225 p.
“This is a book about war, though not a
war story, because war and death are cardinal
facts in today’s Asia. This is a book about
peace as well, for the hope of peace and prog-
ress is a part of every Asian's dreams. In sum,
this is a book about Asia under storm clouds—
but it includes . . . an implicit promise that
the storm is not forever.” Chapter I—The Kill-
ing Ground (Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos);
Chapter II—A Problem of Posture (Thai-
land); Chapter III—The Hermetic Hermit
(Burma).
WHICH WILL BE THE NEXT WIET-
NAM? by Carl T. Rowan, in Reader's Digest,
(March 1969) 96–100.
“The Asian communists have concluded
that the US is a ‘paper tiger’ which cannot
stem the tide of Maoist revolt in Asia. As pro-
Western nations and neutrals anxiously watch
the negotiations in Paris, the Asian commu-
nists are busy setting up their priorities for
post-Vietnam insurgencies. In 1964, Peking de-
clared that Thailand would be the next target
for Chinese-inspired “liberation.” Thailand
reacted by contributing 6000 combat troops to
the war in Vietnam, hoping that communist
operations in Vietnam and Laos could be re-
duced and a wider war in Thailand could be
prevented. At home the Thai government
launched a vigorous military campaign against
the communist insurgents and accelerated
rural development programs to deprive the
rebels of their local support. Last year the
Thais were confident that they could defeat the
insurgents without the aid of US combat
troops. But recently, guerrilla activities in
Thailand have increased. The government esti-
mates that 2370 insurgents operate in the coun-
try-side; in the north, they have formed units
large enough to ambush regular Thai military
109
forces. As US public support for Vietnam de-
creases and the Paris talks lag, Thailand be-
comes more anxious about its future . . . Pe-
king does not limit its attacks to pro-Western
governments, however; both the neutral gov-
ernments of Laos and Cambodia have been the
targets of Chinese-supported subversion. In
1967, attacks by communist guerrillas and
North Vietnamese regulars in Laos became so
widespread that the US was on the verge of
introducing combat troops into Laos. However,
the Laotian Army, supported by US bombing
raids, was able to turn back the communists.
Even Prince Sihanouk of Cambodia, cited by
some as an authority for the ‘civil war' theory
of the Vietnam conflict, complains of Chinese-
directed subversion in Cambodia. Thus, a
communist take-over in SEA has become a
likelihood for the post-Vietnam era. To some
Americans, this would be a fair price for peace
in Vietnam; to millions of Asians it would be
the “bitterest and most devastating defeat in
9 99
American history’.
4. Cambodia and India.
- INDIA AND THE FUTURE OF ASIA, by
Patwant Singh. New York, Alfred A. Knopf,
1966. 264 p.
Picture in the Mid-Sixties; History’s
Legacy; Partition; The Anatomy of a Develop-
ing Economy; Foreign Affairs; India and
China—The Continuing Confrontation; De-
fense; Outlook in the Mid-Seventies; Bibliog-
raphy. Includes references to relations with
other countries of Asia, such as Burma, Cam-
bodia, Laos, and Thailand, among others.
INDIAN FOREIGN POLICY IN CAM-
BODIA, LAOS, AND WIETNAM, 1947–1964,
by D. A. SarDesai. Berkeley, University of
California Press, 1968, 336 p.
“This . . . study of Indian foreign pol-
icy in key areas of Southeast Asia adds a new
and most welcome dimension to the literature
on the former Indo-Chinese states. The evalua-
tion of Prime Minister Nehru's views in his
plans for the neutralization of southern Asia
and the Indian role in the International Truce
Commission in Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam is
analyzed.”
5. Cambodia and the United States (See also
Nizon Doctrine in II–F–6—b and Appendia A)
ars,” and the various chapters were written by
CAMBODIA: MAY 1970. A STAFF RE.
PORT PREPARED FOR THE USE OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE, JUNE 7, 1970.
Washington, Government Printing Office, 1970.
15 p. (91st Congress, 2d Session, Committee
Print.) -
The Chain of Events Since Sihanouk's
Fall; The View from Saigon; The View from
Phnom Penh; The Mysteries of Military As
sistance to Cambodia; and Looking Ahead.
CAMBODIA: WHY U.S. IS GETTING IN
DEEPER, in U.S. News & World Report, v. 7)
no. 5 (1 February 1971) 19–20. -
“Decision to step up air support, other
aid goes for beyond fate of Cambodia itself. It
is the safety of GI’s in Vietnam that’s the real
issue.”
FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT, 1969.
HEARINGS BEFORE THE COMMITTEE
ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, UNITED
STATES SENATE, NINETY-FIRST CON.
GRESS, FIRST SESSION, ON S.2347, JULY
14, 15, 18, AND AUGUST 6, 1969. Washing.
ton, Government Printing Office, 1969. 336 p.
Includes military assistance informatim
on Cambodia, Laos, and Thailand among many
others. -
THE INDOCHINA STORY; A FULLY
DOCUMENTED ACCOUNT. New York, Pan.
theon Books, 1970. 347 p.
This book was prepared and published
by “The Committee of Concerned Asian Schol.
many authors, very critically protesting Amer.
ica's presence in Vietnam. Part I–Who Is th:
United States Fighting in Indochina? (Wić.
nam—The Open War; Laos—The Soviet War;
Cambodia—The Balancing Act; Thailand-
The Client State); Part II–How Is the Unite
States Fighting in Indochina?; Part III—Whſ
Is the United States Fighting in Indochina!
Part IV—What Can the Future Hold for Indº
china? With: Chronologies for Vietnam, Laº
Cambodia, and Thailand; Glossary; and Bibli
ography.
PERSPECTIVE ON ASIA: THE NEW US
DOCTRINE AND SOUTHEAST ASIA. Rº
PORT OF SENATOR MIKE MANSFIEL

110
[UPON COMPLETION OF TRIP TO
SOUTHEAST ASIA] TO THE COMMITTEE
ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, UNITED
STATES SENATE. Washington, Government
Printing Office, 1969. 15 p.
The President's New Asian Doctrine;
Reactions to the New Asian Doctrine; The
New Doctrine and Southeast Asian Countries
(The Philippines, Indonesia, Burma, Cam-
bodia, and Laos); etc.
REVIEW OF THE VIETNAM CONFLICT
AND ITS IMPACT ON U.S. MILITARY
COMMITMENTS ABROAD. REPORT OF
THE SPECIAL SUBCOMMITTEE ON NA-
TIONAL DEFENSE POSTURE, OF THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENT-
ATIVES, NINETIETH CONGRESS, SEC-
OND SESSION, UNDER AUTHORITY OF H.
RES. 124, AUGUST 24, 1968. Washington,
Government Printing Office, 1968. 84 p. (Com-
mittee Print.)
Of special interest are the following
portions of the report dealing with: Southeast
Asia Collective Defense Treaty; Cambodia,
Laos, and Thailand.
SETTING THE COURSE THE FIRST
YEAR; MAJOR POLICY STATEMENTS BY
PRESIDENT RICHARD NIXON. New York,
Funk & Wagnalls, 1970. 500 p.
Includes references to Cambodia, Laos,
and Thailand.
TO AMEND THE FOREIGN ASSIST-
ANCE ACT OF 1961 (SUPPLEMENTAL AU-
THORIZATION FOR ASSISTANCE TO
CAMBODIA AND OTHER COUNTRIES).
HEARINGS BEFORE THE COMMITTEE
ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, HOUSE OF REP-
RESENTATIVES, NINETY-FIRST CON-
GRESS, SECOND SESSION, ON H. R. 19845,
TO AMEND THE FOREIGN ASSISTANCE
ACT OF 1961, NOVEMBER 25, 30, December
1 AND 2, 1970. Washington, Government
Printing Office, 1970. 227 p.
WHAT CAMBODIA WANTS FROM U.S.;
INTERVIEW WITH PREMIER LON NOL, in
U.S. News & World Report, v. 68, no. 15 (13
April 1970) 30–31.
“Friendship with America—but no
arms right now. That is the formula laid down
by Pnompenh's new leader in an interview
with Charles Foltz, Jr., of the staff of ‘U.S.
News & World Report’.”
G. Boundaries and Frontiers
ASIAN FRONTIERS: STUDIES IN A
CONTINUING PROBLEM, by Alastair Lamb.
New York, Frederick A. Praeger, 1968. 246 p.
“An . . . account of boundary disputes,
many of which have their origins in or before
the period of colonial domination. The regions
covered include Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan,
India, Nepal, Bhutan, Burma, Thailand, Laos,
Cambodia, North and South Vietnam, China,
Mongolia, and the Asian republics of the
USSR. Explosive subjects, such as Kashmir,
the Sino-Indian crisis and the Sino-Soviet bor-
der, are treated in detail. Thirty maps assist
the reader in following the textual material.”
CAMBODIA’S SEARCH FOR FIRM BOR-
DERS, by Wing Comdr. Maharaj K. Chopra,
in Military Review, v. 49, no. 11 (November
1969) 3–9.
“A visitor to Cambodia is immediately
struck by two phenomena—the magnificence of
its treasures in the shape of Angkor Wat, and
its air of excitement over the border issue
[involving Thailand, Laos, and Republic of
Vietnam]. The two are different, of course, and
yet if one looks deep into Cambodia's past, they
are not unrelated. Angkor Wat is a famous
temple . . . Angkor Wat is a landmark not
only to the glory of Cambodia, but also of its
decay to which its present travails can be
traced.” Historical Background; Cambodia's
Claims; etc. With map.
SOVEREIGNTY OF THE SEA. Washing-
ton, Department of State, October 1969. 33 p.
(Geographic Bulletin no. 3.)
The Total Ocean Environment; Offshore
Jurisdiction; The Territorial Sea; The Conti-
nental Shelf; Freedom of the Seas; Law of the
Sea Problems; The Baseline; Boundaries in
the Sea; Charts for identifying Offshore Fea-
tures. Includes information on Burma, Cam-
bodia, and Thailand. With selected bibliogra-
phy.
111
H. The Land and the People (See also
Appendixes J and P)
ASIA, EAST BY SOUTH: A CULTURAL
GEOGRAPHY, by J. E. Spencer and William
L. Thomas. Second ed. New York, John Wiley &
Sons, Inc., 1971. 669 p.
“This volume is concerned with cultural
geography in its widest interpretation. Most of
the materials with which cultural geographers
must deal are tangible and can be viewed in
terms of regional distribution and analysis.
These tangibles form the primary contexts of
discussion throughout the book.” Part I–Sys-
tematic Geography; Part II—The Regional
Expression of Cultures (including among oth-
ers: Southeast Asia—A Cultural Shatterbelt;
The Irrawaddy Valley and Burma; The Evolu-
tion of Thailand; Cambodia; etc.); Part III—
For Use in Reference (including among oth-
ers a Selected Bibliography).
CAMBODIA PROVINCIAL MAPS. Wash-
ington, Central Intelligence Agency, Director-
ate of Intelligence, Office of Basic and Geo-
graphic Intelligence, October 1971. n.p.
A collection of 21 page-size maps, con-
sisting of: one general map of Cambodia; one
map showing all administrative divisions; and
nineteen province maps. Generally the follow-
ing information is detailed on all of the maps:
international, province, and district bounda-
ries; province and district capitals; railroads;
principal roads; airfields; trails; etc.
A GRAPHIC LOOK AT THE LANDS AND
PEOPLES OF SOUTHEAST ASIA [INCLUD-
ING BURMA, CAMBODIA, LAOS, AND
THAILAND], in National Geographic, v. 139,
no. 3 (March 1971) 295–365.
Part 1—Mosaic of Cultures; Part 2—
New Light on a Forgotten Past; Part 3–
Pagan, on the Road to Mandalay.
THE KHMERS OF CAMBODIA; THE
STORY OF A MYSTERIOUS PEOPLE, by I.
G. Edmonds. Indianapolis, The Bobbs-Merrill
Co., 1970. 160 p.
“Cambodia, the land of the Khmers . . .
[is] a strange race who came from no one
knows where, built a mysterious empire, and
then saw that great civilization collapse for
reasons as unknown as the race's origin. Fº
the last 105 years Cambodia has been a coli
try scarcely known to the Western world. ,
[However] Cambodia is now regularly in th
headlines
ested in Cambodia because it shares a bords
with Vietnam.” Contents: The Land of th
Khmers; The Sons of Kambu; The Rise ºf
Angkor Thom; The Great King; Jayavarmam
VII, Hero of Heroes; Life in Angkor Thom,
The Fall of Angkor; The Bitter Years; Sihan,
ouk; The Uncrowned King; Cambodia Under
Sihanouk; Cambodia at Play and at Work
Life in the Villages; The Bonze; The Hill Pº
ple; Cambodia and the Modern World; Bibliog
raphy.
THE MEKONG; RIVER OF TERRO.
AND HOPE, by Peter T. White, in Nationſ
Geographic, v. 134, no. 6 (December 1968)
737—787.
An essay of the land and the people ºf
the area with maps and numerous photos als
on the Mekong River which traverses, among
others, Burma, Laos, Thailand, and Cambodia
The Hope of the Mekong Project (A Plan tº
Revolutionize Life for Millions of Southeas:
Asians by Harnessing the River for Power and
Irrigation); New Ways for a Lao Farmer; Laſ
Guerrillas Threaten Officials; Thailand Guard;
a Precarious Peace; Chinese Soldiers Hol
Corner of Burma; Foreigners Crowd intº
Vientiane; Rice Crop Fertilized by Monsoon
Phnom Penh, Cambodia, City Built Wheſ:
floating Buddhas Stopped; Dams Hold Prom
ise and Problems; etc.
SOUTH ASIA; A BACKGROUND BOOK
by Angus Maude. Chester Springs, Pa., Dufouſ
Editions, 1966. 176 p.
The Area Surveyed; India; India;
Neighbors; Burma; Indochina and Thailand
(Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, and Thailand);
Malaysia, Singapore and the Philippines; Indº
nesia; The Asian Dilemma. With maps.
SOUTHEAST ASIA; HISTORY, CUI,
TURE, PEOPLE, by Edward Graff and Harol
E. Hammond. Bronxville, N.Y., Cambridg:
Book Co., Inc., 1967. 154 p.
Southeast Asia—The Land; Early His
tory of Southeast Asia; The People of th:
. . . The world has become intº
l

112
Hills, Plains and Villages; The arrival of the
Europeans (The Special Case of Thailand,
among others); Language and Culture of
Southeast Asia; The New Nations—Their
Problems and Promise (Burma, Malaysia,
Singapore, Philippines, Indonesia, Laos, Cam-
bodia, Vietnam, Thailand, among others); The
Foreign Relations of Southeast Asian Nations;
and Bibliography.
SOUTH-EAST ASIA—RACE, CULTURE,
AND NATION, by Guy Hunter. New York,
Oxford University Press, 1966. 190 p. (Pub-
lished for the Institute of Race Relations, Lon-
don.)
The author explores the following
themes “as part of a single process in the de-
velopment of the nations of South-East Asia:
(a) the transition from tradition to modernity;
(b) the establishment of national identity, le-
gitimacy, and unity out of diversity which
reappeared when the colonial blanket was
whipped off; (c) the complications introduced
in (a) and (b) by racial and ethnic diversity.”
These problems are also considered for the fol-
lowing countries of Peninsular Southeast Asia,
among others: Burma, Cambodia, Laos, and
Thailand.
UNRAVAGED CITY, by Robert Norton, in
Far Eastern Economic Review, v. 72, no. 19 (8
May 1971) 57–58.
“Ricebowl of Cambodia, birthplace of
Phnom Penh's leading politicians and of
Khmer Rouge organisers, Battambang retains
its fierce independence—and could be the key
to the nation’s postwar recovery.”
I. Internal Conditions
1. Miscellaneous Aspects
CAMBODIA: SHADOW OVER ANGKOR,
by Bernard K. Gordon, in Military Review, v.
49, no. 8 (August 1969) 27–37.
Condensed from the original published
in Asian Survey, January 1969. “The title of
this article is from Prince Norodom Sihan-
ouk's newest film, ‘Shadow Over Angkor,”
which was released for public showing during
Cambodia's National Day celebrations in No-
vember 1968. It may not be by accident that
the film was released in 1968, for while Cam-
bodia did not become more secure or less sub-
ject to threat than she had been before, both
internal and external developments suggest
that 1968 saw the beginning of a period of
reassessment for Prince Sihanouk. Two devel-
opments, in particular, highlighted Cambodia's
concerns during the year. The first was the in-
creasing realization, in contrast to views ex-
pressed by the Prince several years ago, that
the United States was not about to suffer a de-
feat in Vietnam. The second was the growing
recognition that insurgency within Cambodia,
rather than being only a sporadic and geo-
graphically spotty problem, was beginning to
represent a continuing malaise of widening
geographical proportions.” Interaction Appar-
ent; Explicit Warnings; Sihanouk's Response;
Survival; Shift in Emphasis; Type of Threats;
Movement Tactic; Bombing Halt Reaction;
Restore US Ties; etc.
THE DREAM AND THE NIGHTMARE, by
Nayan Chanda, in Far Eastern Economic Re-
view, v. 73, no. 29 (17 July 1971) 24–25.
“In promising a new, clean republican
world after Sihanouk's overthrow, Cambodia's
leaders seem to have underestimated the mili-
tary burden the cancellation of his policies
made inevitable. Now, politically and economi-
cally, the chickens are coming home to roost.”
THREE-WAY BALANCING ACT, by R. P.
W. Norton, in Far Eastern Economic Review,
v. 71, no. 10 (6 March 1971) 28–26.
“Compared with Laos, all is quiet on the
Cambodian front, both military and economic—
and the degree of future US intervention re-
mains an unanswered question.”
WORLD SURVEY OF EDUCATION. IV:
HIGHER EDUCATION. New York, UNESCO
Center, 1966. 1433 p.
The information contained in this vol-
ume was received before the end of June 1964.
The table of contents, with all references to
the names and status of countries (including
Burma, Cambodia, Laos, and Thailand) and
territories, was drawn upon on 1 September
1963, and subsequent changes are therefore not
reflected. The educational system, the develop-
ment of higher education, university institu-
tions, etc. With bibliography on higher educa-
tion.
113
2. In the Wake of War: Refugees and Civil-
iam War Casualty Problems
REFUGEE AND CIVILIAN WAR CAS-
|UALTY PROBLEMS IN LAOS AND CAM-
BODIA. HEARING BEFORE THE SUBCOM-
MITTEE TO INVESTIGATE PROBLEMS
CONNECTED WITH REFUGEES AND ES-
CAPEES, OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE
JUDICIARY, UNITED STATES SENATE,
NINETY-FIRST CONGRESS, SECOND SES-
SION, MAY 7, 1970. Washington, Government
Printing Office, 1970. 107 p.
REFUGEE AND CIVILIAN WAR CAS-
UALTY PROBLEMS IN INDOCHINA. A
STAFF REPORT PREPARED FOR THE
USE OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVES-
TIGATE PROBLEMS CONNECTED WITH
REFUGEES AND ESCAPEES, OF THE
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
UNITED STATES SENATE, SEPTEMBER
28, 1970. Washington, Government Printing
Office, 1970. 107 p. (91st Congress, 2d Session,
Committee Print.)
“This report continues the subcommit-
tee’s effort to document the devastating impact
of the Indochina war on the civilian popula-
tion, and to make the case again that the prob-
lems of war refugees and civilian casualties
must be a matter of vital concern to the Ameri-
can people and their Government . . . With the
spreading of war into Cambodia, fear has now
gripped almost the entire population of Indo-
china, vastly increasing human misery, the
flow of refugees, and the occurrence of civilian
war casualties . . . In Cambodia alone, over
the last four to five months the population of
Phnom Penh has doubled—from some 700,000
to well over 1 million persons . . . In Laos—
where we have been witnessing the familiar
pattern of Vietnam in the destruction of the
countryside, the generation of refugees, and
the occurrence of civilian war casualties—the
situation among civilians continues to deterior-
ate.” Contents: South Vietnam (The Refugee
Situation; Civilian War Casualties; Social
Welfare and Rehabilitation); Laos (The Refu-
gee Situation; Civilian War Casualties); Cam-
bodia; etc. With appendices.
WAR-RELATED CIVILIAN PROBLEMS
IN INDOCHINA. PART II: LAOS AND CAM-
BODIA. HEARINGS BEFORE THE SUB.
COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE PROB.
LEMS CONNECTED WITH REFUGEES
AND ESCAPEES, OF THE COMMITTEE
ON THE JUDICIARY, UNITED STATES
SENATE, NINETY-SECOND CONGRESS,
FIRST SESSION, APRIL 21 AND 22, 1971,
Washington, Government Printing Office, 1971,
173 p. -
3. Communism (See also Appendia: M)
COLD WAR OPERATIONS: THE POLI.
TICs of COMMUNIST CONFRONTATION,
PART XI—COMMUNISM IN ASIA, by
Lyman B. Kirpatrick, Jr., in Naval War Col.
lege Review, v. 21, no. 3 (November 1968)
57–63.
A summary of the status of communism
in the various countries in Asia, including the
following, among others: Burma, Cambodia,
Laos, and Thailand.
THE RED AWAKENING, by Harald
Munthe-Kaas, in Far Eastern Economic Ré.
view, v. 69, no. 32 (6 August 1970) 55–57. .
“Rebellion in Battambang province
brought Cambodia's communist front, the
Khmer Rouge, back to life. In those days Si-
hanouk was its bitterest enemy. Today they
stand together against Premier Lon Nol and |
his Phnom Penh government.”
SIHANOUK: THORNS EACH SIDE, in
Far Eastern Economic Review, v. 68, no. 3 (15
January 1970) 26–27. -
“Guerillas or bandits or revolutionaries |
—whatever they are labelled by the outside
world, the Khmer Rouge and the Khmer Loell
are staying-put . . . There has been some omi.
nous movement lately in the mountains of Pur.
sat Province that run all the way down to the
shores of the Tonle Sap where Prince Norodom
Sihanouk occasionally waterskiis with foreign
guests. And all the way across the other side of
his Cambodia similar ominous movements have
been observed in eastern Mondolkiri Province,
They are movements of little bands of men,
ill-fed, often ragged, carrying an odd assort.
ment of rifles and arms, determined to estab:
lish two new major base camp areas for their
organisations—the Khmer Rouge and the
Khmer Loeu.”

114
WORLD STRENGTH OF THE COMMU-
NIST PARTY ORGANIZATIONS. 23d
ANNUAL REPORT; 1971 EDITION. Wash-
ington, Department of State, Bureau of Intelli-
gence and Research, 1971. 248 p. (Publication
8526.)
“This report contains the 23rd annual
global survey of communist parties . . . This
issue, like its predecessors, gives information
On party membership and on voting and parlia-
mentary strength wherever applicable, to-
gether with a brief analysis of the importance
of each communist party in its domestic politi-
cal environment.” Includes information on
many countries, including, among others, the
following: Burma, Cambodia, Laos, and Thai-
land. See also appendixes for the bibliography
On Peninsular Southeast Asia. -
4. Chinese in Cambodia
THE CHINESE IN CAMBODIA, by Wil-
liam E. Willmott. Vancouver, University of
British Columbia Publications Centre, 1967.
132 p.
“Although research has been done on
the Chinese minorities in Thailand, Maylaysia,
the Philippines and Indonesia, this is the first
study to be published on the Chinese in Cam-
bodia. The author, an anthropologist, by no
means confines himself to disciplinary con-
Cerns. Rather, he examines the position of the
Chinese in Cambodian society from historical,
economic, legal and demographic points of
View.”
ONCE AGAIN THE FEAR, by Robert Nor-
ton, in Far Eastern Economic Review, v, 72,
no. 2 (15 May 1971) 57–58.
“A student group in Phnom Penh has
warned that unless Chinese characters are
banned from public view, it will take matters
into its own hands. For the Chinese in Cam-
bodia, times may be changing . . . The Chinese
population's problem in Cambodia is classically
Southeast Asian—holding economic power
under native political control. And like other
nations in the region, the problem is not re-
cent. Chinese have been migrating the area for
more than a century, and are mostly Tiechieu,
Cantonese or Hokkienese; they were helped by
the French policy of double colonisation—in-
troducing Chinese and Vietnamese immigrants
into the economically sluggish areas of Indo-
china to revitalise and exploit local labour and
assets . . . The Cambodian feeling toward the
local Chinese is ambiguous. On one hand the
Rhmer admires the economic expertise, aggres-
siveness and prosperity of the local Chinese
. . . On the other hand, situations in which the
Khmer may feel exploited in his own country
by a foreigner, can be explosive. This is a
rather common occurrence through the
Chinese proclivity for such professions as
banking, money lending and speculation, and as
entrepreneurs, contractors, retail merchants,
wholesale dealers and transporters.”
THE POLITICAL STRUCTURE OF THE
CHINESE COMMUNITY IN CAMBODIA, by
W. E. Willmott. New York, Humanities Press,
1970. 211 p. (London School of Economics,
Monographs on Social Anthropology No. 42.)
“A field study of organized Chinese life
in Cambodia, past and present . . . It relates
its conclusions on the evolution of the struc-
ture of the Cambodian Chinese community to
the evidence from other overseas Chinese com-
munities, and moves on to a comparison be-
tween overseas Chinese social organizations
and the organization of cities in China.” With:
a list of works cited.
5. Buddhism and Its Influences
CHURCH AND STATE IN CAMBODIA, by
John C. Haughey, in America, v. 125, no. 11
(16 October 1971) 279–281.
“From on the scene in Cambodia Fr.
Haughey reports on impressions of the impor-
tant role of Buddhism in that country’s con-
flicts—and on his own frank interview with
Premier Lon Nol.”
J. Economic Aspects
1. Miscellaneous Aspects
THE ASIAN HIGHWAY, by M. S. Ahmad,
in Economic Bulletin for Asia and the Far
East, v. 19, no. 1 (June 1968) 45–48.
“The Asian Highway project was . . .
drawn up to connect the capitals and impor-
tant seaports of the countries of Asia and at
the same time to provide access to important
115
historical places and others of religious impor-
tance. It would thus contribute to the expan-
sion of national and international trade, open
up isolated regions through feeder roads, stim-
ulate tourist traffic and facilitate pilgrimages
to holy places. This project was approved by
ECAFE at its annual session in March 1959
. . . The Asian Highway network comprises
eighty-three routes (including some blank
numbers) with a total length of 57,000 km. Of
these, 34,000 km are the international priority
routes, connecting all Asian Highway countries
by at least one through-route. The planners of
the Asian Highway system realized that very
high costs of construction make it impossible
to develop immediately all the routes in each
country to a high standard of international
roads. First priority was, therefore, given to
linking the existing main roads of the coun-
tries bringing them up to the minimum inter-
national standard and thereafter filling the
gaps . . . Priority route A–1 traverses eight
countries: Iran, Afghanistan, West Pakistan,
India, East Pakistan, Burma, Thailand, Cam-
bodia, and the Republic of Viet-Nam . . .
Route A–2 crosses nine countries: Iran, West
Pakistan, India Nepal, East Pakistan, Burma,
Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia.”
COMMUNIST STATES AND DEVELOP-
ING COUNTRIES: AID AND TRADE IN
1970. Washington, Department of State, Bu-
reau of Intelligence and Research, 22 Septem-
ber 1971. 45 p. (Research Study RECS-15.)
“The aid and trade activities of the
three principal communist regions the (USSR,
East Europe, and the People's Republic of
China) with the less developed countries of the
non-communist world [including Burma, Cam-
bodia, Laos, and Thailand] are reviewed an-
nually by INR. This study incorporates eco-
nomic and military aid and technical assistance
data through the end of 1970, complete trade
figures through 1969, and preliminary trade
data for 1970.”
DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE TO
SOUTHEAST ASIA. New York, Committee
for Economic Development, July 1970. 83 p.
Principles of Development Assistance to
Southeast Asia; Economic Development in
Southeast Asia; External Assistance to South-
east Asia; The Essentials for Rapid Develop.
ment; Recommendations to Assisting Countries
and International Organizations; etc. With
seven statistical tables. Includes information
on the following, among others, Burma, Cam.
bodia, Laos, and Thailand. -
ECONOMIC survey OF ASIA AND THE
FAR EAST, 1969. Bangkok, Thailand, United
Nations, 1969. 285 p. (E/CN.11/935.)
This “Survey” is the twenty-third in a
series of reports prepared annually by the S&
retariat of the Economic Commission for Asia
and the Far East. A major object of the “Sur.
vey” is the analysis of recent economic devel.
opments in the countries of Asia and the Far
East (including Burma, Cambodia, Laos, and
Thailand, among others), and of international
developments that affect them. Particular at.
tention is paid to the analysis of economic pol.
icy and of policy issues. With numerous tables,
FOREIGN TRADE STATISTICS OF ASIA
AND THE FAR EAST, 1966. New York,
United Nations, Economic Commission for
Asia and the Far East, 1969. 622 p. (Vol. W.
Series A, No. 2.)
This issue of the Foreign Trade Statis.
tics of Asia and the Far East is the fifth in a
series designed to provide both summary and
detailed trade statistics of the countries of the
region. This issue relates to some countries of
Peninsular Southeast Asia (including Cam.
bodia, Laos, and Thailand) in the ECAFE re.
gion, among many others. *
GOING NOWHERE, by Francois Nivolon, in
Far Eastern Economic Review, v. 69, no. 29
(16 July 1970) 32–33.
“Development projects have come to a
standstill in war-torn Cambodia. Development
aid promises remain only promises. The nå.
tion’s main foreign exchange earning indus.
tries—rubber and rice—are suffering badly. In
Laos the picture is similar.”
INDOCHINA: VIETNAM, LAOS, CAM.
BODIA, in Quarterly Economic Review, no, 2
(30 June 1971) 1–14. . -
This quarterly review summarizes the
political and economic situations of Vietnam,
Laos, and Cambodia for the past quarter. This
quarterly is one of a series of 70 quarterly eCO.

116
nomic reviews, published in London by The
Economist Intelligence Unit Ltd.
WATER LEGISLATION IN ASIA AND
THE FAR EAST, PARTS 1 AND 2. New York,
United Nations, 1967 and 1968. 2 v. (Economic
Commission for Asia and The Far East, Water
Resources Series, No. 31 and No. 35.)
Review of existing water legislation:
Part 1–Afghanistan, Brunei, Burma, Republic
of China, Hong Kong, Iran, Japan, New Zea-
land, Philippines, and Thailand; Part 2 (A)—
Water legislation in Australia (South Aus-
tralia and Victoria as Examples), Cambodia,
Ceylon, India, Republics of Korea, Laos,
Singapore, Republic of Vietnam and Western
Samoa; Part 2 (B)—Proceedings of the Work-
ing Group of Experts on Water Codes.
2. The Mekong River Basin: The Develop-
merit of Its Economic Potential
AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT IN
THE MEKONG BASIN; GOALS, PRIORI-
TIES, AND STRATEGIES. Washington, Re-
Sources for the Future, Inc., 1971. 108 p. (A
Staff Study.)
“The report begins by assessing the de-
mand-supply conditions for an expanded agri-
culture in the Mekong River Basin, proceeds to
evaluate what limitations are imposed by phys-
ical and human resource conditions, specifies
the measures that are needed to achieve condi-
tions favorable to modernizing agriculture, and
inquires into what criteria might serve to es-
tablish a sequence of development. Within this
rather conventional-looking scheme, unconven-
tional attention is given to the human and in-
stitutional setting in which development takes
place. The reason for this is that “progress’ is
equated not only with increased output or a
growing stock of physical facilities but also
with a rising ability of the people in the region
to gain a measure of material security—via a
rising income—in a social context that would
Secure for them widening choices on matters of
production, consumption, location, and life
styles generally. The questions are not there-
fore merely what the river could help to prod-
uce and how that production could be utilized,
but also-and prominently—what the aspira-
tions of the region’s people are, what pace and
character of development would be least de-
structive of their system of values and beliefs,
and how the latter could be gradually altered
to become consonant with the requirements of
modern agriculture . . . The area affected by
the course of the river and its tributaries meas-
ures nearly a quarter of a million square
miles. It comprises practically all of Laos and
Cambodia, two-fifths of South Vietnam, and
one-third of Thailand. Close to 30 million peo-
ple now live in the area of the watershed in-
volved. That figure is likely to double by the
end of the century. The potential for power
generation and irrigation is large.”
5 NEW MEKONG PROJECTS; CAM-
BODIA, LAOS AND THAILAND TO BENE-
FIT, in SEATO Record, v. 9, no. 2 (April
1970) 40–41.
“Five new undertakings in Thailand,
Laos and Cambodia will be carried out as part
of the over-all Mekong development project,
with aid from New Zealand, Philippines,
United Kingdom and United States, as a result
of agreements signed at the Mekong co-ordi-
nating committee’s recent session in Phnom
Penh. The agreements call for activities relat-
ing to agriculture, fisheries, mineral resources,
manpower training, navigation, social needs
and other aspects of development. Responsibil-
ities will be shared, under most of the agree-
ments, by the assisting governments, the
committee, and the Mekong Secretariat. In
Thailand, the undertakings will entail appren-
ticeship training at a boat building centre at
Nong Khai, and a study of socio-economic
aspects of fisheries in the Nam Pong reservoir.
In Cambodia, there will be a demonstration of
the use of fertilizer, and a survey in the Bat-
tambang area. Laos will be aided with mapping
and interpretation following a mineral survey.”
THE MEKONG PROJECT, by Willard A.
Hanna. Hanover, N.H. American Universi-
ties Field Staff, Inc., 1968. 7 pts. (Fieldstaff
Reports Southeast Asia Series, v. 16, nos.
10–14, 16, 17.)
I. The River and the Region. II. The
Evolution of the Design. III. The * Agency and
the Rationale. IV. The Test at Nam Ngum. V.
The Prize at Pa Mong. VI. Delta Development.
VII. The Enigma of Cambodia. “When and if
peace comes to mainland Southeast Asia, it
117
cannot be a genuine, lasting peace unless it is
followed by plenty—and prospects for plenty
now seem to be contingent largely upon one
project or, rather, one master scheme. This is
a program of a scale and scope so audacious as
perhaps to disguise the very magnitude of the
problem to which, at best, it can provide only a
partial, preliminary answer. It is the Mekong
Development Project: twenty years ago an
E.C.A.F.E. (Economic Mission for Asia and
the Far East) dream, ten years ago a tentative
proposal, but today a schedule for massive
multinational co-operation. The Project is de-
signed to transform the social and economic
base of the Lower Mekong Basin by utilizing
the potential of the Mekong River for power,
irrigation, navigation, and various related pur-
poses. The direct effect within the next twen-
ty-five years should be to triple the Gross Na-
tional Product of the four riparian nations
(Laos, Thailand, Cambodia, and Vietnam), to
raise the average per capita income at least 50
per cent above the present dangerously low $65
to $100 level, and thus to create tremendous
new opportunities for modern progress . . .
The consequences may include the creation
within the region of a whole new climate of so-
cial and economic co-operation—and also, it is
profoundly to be hoped, of political accommo-
dation.” (*The four-nation Committee for the
Coordination of Investigations of the Lower
Mekong Basin.)
THE MEKONG SCHEME: GUIDELINE
FOR A SOLUTION TO STRIFE IN SOUTH-
EAST ASIA, by W. R. Derrick Sewell, in
Asian Survey (June 1968) 448–455.
“The “Mekong Scheme' is a program de-
signed to develop the tremendous potential of
Southeast Asia’s now unharnessed Mekong
River. The Mekong flows 2,625 miles, through
China, Burma, Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, and
South Vietnam and drains 307,000 square
miles. At present, there is no dam on the
mainstream of the river and no bridge across
it. If developed, the river could irrigate over
twenty-four million acres, substantially in-
creasing the rice crop, and could be navigated
for more than 1,000 miles. It could provide
large quantities of low cost power which would
stimulate industry and raise the area’s stand-
ard of living. In addition, vast flooding which
plagues the region each year would be reducei
By improving transportation and communit:
tion, the Mekong scheme would increase trade
between the nations of Southeast Asia and
lessen political tension in the area. The M&
kong scheme was initiated in 1951 when the
UN’s Economic Commission for Asia and the i
Far East (ECAFE) undertook a survey of the
river. Although the initial report was received
with enthusiasm, interest in the development
project waned due to hostilities in the area and
was not revived until 1956. In 1957 the US Bil.
reau of Reclamation and four internationally
known experts sponsored by ECAFE under.
took a study of the Mekong. Their reports em.
phasized the need for basin-wide, international
planning. In response to this report, Cambodia,
Laos, Thailand, and South Vietnam set up the
Committee for the Coordination of Investiga.
tions of the Lower Mekong Basin (the Mekong
Committee). The US, France, Canada, and
Japan were among the first countries to offer
financial assistance to the Mekong Committee.
Now twenty countries and thirteen UN agen.
cies provide support for the development prº-
gram. Hydrologic and meteorologic networks.
have been set up, the river has been extem.
sively surveyed, and a comprehensive develop.
ment plan should be completed by the commit.
tee this year . . .”
3. Rubber and Petroleum
CAMBODIA BACK AT THE PLANTA
TION, in Newsweek, v. 76, no. 22 (30 Novem.
mer 1970) 79–80.
“In the Western world, rubber trees
exist mainly as dusty, scrawny specimens in
the corners of doctors’ waiting rooms. But in
Cambodia they are stately legions of carefully
spaced giants, stretching across a 120-mile
crescent from the South Vietnamese border tº
Kompong Thom, 80 miles north of Phnom
Penh. They are also a cornerstone of the coun.
try’s fragile economy—the source of $20 mil.
lion a year in foreign, currency and 100,000
desperately needed jobs. And because of that
the trees are the centerpieces of one of the Cù-
rious ironies of the war in Indochina. Like all
of Cambodia, the rubber industry is suffering
from the bombing, guerrilla fighting and slow
decay of the war. As Cambodia's Commissioner
for Rubber Agriculture, Kol Touch, summed

118
up sadly last week: “Our plantations are faced
with slow death. In five weeks of fighting this
spring, we lost the fruits of 50 years of invest-
ments and labor’.”
WORLD CRUDE CAPACITY Now 48
MILLION B/D, by William C. Uhl, in World
Petroleum, v. 41, no. 8 (August 1970) 26–28.
“Growth rates in process construction
will remain strong. Outlook for 1973 is for a
23.6% gain, to almost 60 million barrels daily.
Investment needs, for both refining and petro-
chemicals, will be over $21 thousand million in
Coming three years.” Several statistical tables
are included showing world petroleum refining,
world refining expansion, current world petro-
chemical plants, etc. Included is information
On the following, among others: Asia and Far
East as a region, and Burma, Cambodia, and
Thailand.
THE WORLD'S PROCESSING PLANTS,
in World Petroleum, v. 41, no. 8 (August 1970)
74 plus.
“A complete directory of the world’s re-
fineries and petrochemical plants. Included are
all facilities—presently operating, planned or
under construction—in all countries outside
the USA including the USSR and other Com-
munist nations where reliable information was
Obtainable. The first section is on refineries.
Immediately following it is the section on pe-
trochemical plants. For convenience, the list-
ing is alphabetical by company name under
each specific country. The countries are ar-
ranged in major geographical areas and also
listed alphabetically in those areas.” In the
section on Asia and Far East, information is
supplied for the following countries, among
others: Burma, Cambodia, and Thailand.
K. History
BACKGROUND INFORMATION RELAT-
ING TO SOUTHEAST ASIA AND
WIETNAM (5th Rev. Ed.). Washington, Gov-
ernment Printing Office, March 1969. 272 p.
(91st Congress, 1st Session, Committee on For-
eign Relations, United States Senate, Commit-
tee Print.)
This Committee Print “contains mate-
rial deemed useful in discussion of the situa-
tion in Southeast Asia . . . [and] is limited to
statements by officials of the executive branch
and pertinent official documents, with the ex-
ception of the material on the positions of
South Vietnam, North Vietnam, and the Na-
tional Liberation Front.” Contains the follow-
ing among many others: Summary Chronology
of Events in Southeast Asia, June 5,
1948—March 6, 1969; U.S. Recognition of Viet-
nam, Laos and Cambodia—Statement by the
Department of State, February 7, 1970; Eco-
nomic Aid Program—Note from the American
Charge d’Affaires at Saigon to the Chiefs of
State of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, May
24, 1950; The Defense of Indochina—Commu-
nique Regarding Discussions between Repre-
sentatives of the United States, France, Viet-
nam, and Cambodia, June 18, 1952; Agreement
on the Cessation of Hostilities in Cambodia,
July 20, 1954; Agreement on the Cessation of
Hostilities in Laos, July 20, 1954; Southeast
Asia Collective Defense Treaty and Protocol
Thereto, September 8, 1954; Declaration on the
Neutrality of Laos, July 23, 1962; etc.
A CONCISE HISTORY OF SOUTHEAST
ASIA, by Nicholas Tarling. New York, Fred-
erick A. Praeger, 1966. 334 p.
Part One—Southeast Asia to About
1760; Part Two—Southeast Asia, 1760–1942;
Part Three—Southeast Asia Since 1942. Pro-
vides historical information also for the follow-
ing countries, among others: Burma, Cam-
bodia, Laos, and Thailand.
THE EMERGENCE OF MODERN
SOUTHEAST ASIA: 1511–1957, ed. by John
Bastin. Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice-Hall,
Inc., 1967. 179 p.
“This book deals with the 450 years of
Southeast Asian history that commenced with
the arrival of the Portuguese in the Straits of
Malacca at the beginning of the sixteenth cen-
tury and ended with the departure of the Dutch,
French, Americans, and British from Indone-
sia, Indo-China, the Philippines, Burma, and
Malaysia after the Second World War. During
this period, which has been described in some-
what broader context as the Vasco da Gama
epoch of Asian history, all the countries of
Southeast Asia, with the notable exception of
Thailand, were at one time or another subject
to Western rule. The nature of this rule and
119
the means by which it was imposed differed
considerably from one part of the region to an-
other and presents the historian of colonialism
in Southeast Asia with an extremely varie-
gated pattern for analysis. Although there
were undoubtedly subsidiary factors account-
ing for early Western penetration into South-
east Asia (especially the religious motive), the
overriding consideration was the desire to ex-
ploit the economic resources of the area, espe-
cially the fine spices of eastern Indonesia.” In-
cludes information on such subjects as: British
Colonial Rule in Burma; French Rule in Cam-
bodia; Some Characteristics of Burmese Na.
tionalism; etc. -
THAILAND, BURMA, LAOS, AND CAM
BODIA, by John F. Cady. Englewood Cliff;
N.J., Prentice-Hall, 1966. 152 p. |
Current Realities and Interreh,
tionships; Historical Beginnings; Classical
Cambodia, Burma, and Siam; Buddhist South.
east Asia, 1530 to 1780; Parting of the Ways
Mindon and Mongkut; The Impact of Colonial
Rule; and Inter-War Decades and World War
II. With: Suggested Reading.

120
CHAPTER V
LAOS
(See also Appendixes and Source Materials)
A. Whither Laos: An Overview
AFTER THE FIGHTING IN VIETNAM IS
OWER: THE FUTURE OF LAOS, by George
Mc T, Kahin, in The New Republic, v. 165, nos.
4 and 5 (24 and 31 July 1971) 15–16.
“All parties concerned remain con-
winced that neither a ceasefire nor a political
Settlement can be attained in Laos so long as
the war continues in Vietnam and Cambodia.
Even the chances for a ceasefire limited to
northern Laos (above the Ho Chi Minh trail)
are regarded as very slim so long as the fight-
ing continues in these neighboring countries.
Nevertheless, Prince Souvanna Phouma, Prime
Minister of the Royal Laotian government, is
now beginning to look ahead and prepare, the
ground in anticipation of an end to the con-
flicts elsewhere in Indochina. He appears con-
winced that in the long run the future of Laos
depends more upon China than any other
power, and that without Chinese support its
independence and effective neutralization can-
not be secure.” -
CONTEMPORARY SOUTHEAST ASIA, by
Claude A. Buss. New York, Van Nostrand
Reinhold Co., 1970. 280 p. (An Anvil Origi-
mal.)
“A Survey of recent history from the
Southeast Asians’ point of view . . . Part I es-
tablishes the ecology of the Southeast Asian
states and includes a chronological table of
major events since 1945. The first chapter de-
Scribes the scene in Southeast Asia at the close
of World War II. Succeeding chapters trace
historical and political developments in the
Philippines, Burma, Malaysia and Singapore,
Indonesia, Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, and Thai-
land. The concluding chapter looks ahead, into
the 1970's, to impending changes in cultural
values, social organization, economic trends,
political evolution, and international relations
of the entire region. Part II consists of official
documents and public statements.”
THE FUTURE OF MAINLAND SOUTH-
EAST ASIA, by Frank N. Trager, in Military
Review, v. 50, no. 1 (January 1970) 3–16.
“Mainland Southeast Asia has been a
target area for Peking in earlier dynasties, and
Communist China under Mao Tse-tung has
been no exception. Peking, frequently said to
have conducted a ‘cautious’ foreign policy, has
not been cautious in Asia. It has proceeded to
gobble up Tibet, to incite North Korea, to at-
tack India, and again to threaten it in the Pak-
istan-India war of 1965. During the “cultural
revolution,’ China has been active in violating
its treaties and downgrading its “friendly' rela-
tions with Burma and Cambodia while openly
supporting a so-called war of ‘national libera-
tion’ in the former. It has fomented strife in
Tailand by energizing the Communist Party of
Thailand. It has given support to the Pathet
Lao and North Vietnamese Communists in
their attacks on the Lao Provinces of Phong
Saly, Sam Neua, and Xieng Khouang. It has
supplied North Vietnam with materiel and
about 50,000 specially trained engineering and
artillery troops. A political victory for Viet-
namese Communists in the Republic of Viet-
nam—that is, a coalition government ‘imposed’
on Saigon—would help free them to weaken
Laos and Cambodia, add to the dangers of
Thailand and Burma, and, of course, irrepara-
bly weaken the Republic of Vietnam.”
THE FUTURE OF SOUTH-EAST ASIA, by
Brig. F. W. Speed, in The Army Quarterly and
121
Defence Journal, v. 101, no. 1 (October 1970)
36–43.
“Looking into South-East Asia from the
relative serenity of Australia and New Zea-
land, a watcher sees a region in turmoil. Can
the dust be penetrated and the future read? In
the former French colonies of Indo-China,
North and South Vietnam are engaged in a
full-scale People's War, with an overlay of
western-style warfare waged by Americans,
now in the process of substantial force reduc-
tion. Laos is similarly involved, though in lower
key, with dissidents based on the north-eastern
provinces, heavily supported by North Viet-
namese. Cambodia, after years of fence-sitting,
during which time her eastern provinces were
a corridor for North Vietnamese forces operat-
ing in South Vietnam, has now been pulled
into the Maelstrom. To the west and south,
across the Mekong River, Thailand, indepen-
dent throughout the colonial era, has for years
sought to contain subversion in its northern
and eastern provinces. Now Thailand has been
drawn in to support the Cambodian govern-
ment, in areas just across their border. Burma,
formerly an uneasy British possession, has
been seeking for over 20 years to establish the
‘Burmese Way to Socialism,” in the face of cen-
trifugal forces of varied ethnic groups.” With
map.
LAOS ON THE CUTTING EDGE OF THE
KNIFE, Laos auf des Messers Schneide, by Jo-
seph Roucek, in Europa-Archiv, v. 25 (25 July
1970) 497–504. In German.
“Describes the geographic position,
history, and international political situation of
Laos, and the development of American inter-
est there. Roucek points out the relative small-
ness of the American expenditure in men and
money in Laos. He concludes that the destiny
of Laos ‘will depend on the game of power pol-
itics in which Washington, Moscow, and Pe-
king are engaged’.”
LAOS: THE CONTEST OF WILLS, by Ar-
thur J. Dommen, in Current History, v. 61, no.
364 (December 1971) 350–356 plus.
“Since the departure of the French,
there have been two radically different percep-
tions of the situation in Laos: North Vietnam
and the United States started from different
premises and have interpreted events in a dif-
ferent manner. North Vietnam’s perspecin.
emerged from a history of Vietnamese inter.
vention across the Annannte Mountains, the
interests that the Indochinese Communist
party and the Viet Minh pursued in acting bº.
yond Vietnam’s frontiers, the temptations that
followed the collapse of the French empire in
Indochina, with its aspirations for unity, its
preferential role for the Vietnamese, and its
plans for an Indochinese federation. Hanoi saw |
the conflict in Laos as part of an American
scheme to perpetuate the partition of Vietnam
It regarded the United States as France's suſ.
cessor in Indochina, as an aggressive and Col.
nialist power that was intervening in an area
where the American had no right to be and the
Vietnamese belonged. The United States per.
spective, on the other hand, emerged from a
different historical tradition. Americans, hay.
ing won their independence from a colonial
power in a revolutionary war, had an equally
strong distaste for foreign intervention . . . .
The gap between these two contradictory per.
spectives remained constant with the passage
of time . . . Under present conditions, any
settlement in Laos in isolation from Vietnam
is impossible. The wars in Vietnam, Laos, and
Cambodia have come to resemble communicat.
ing receptacles in which the level of fluid in
one is affected by any change in the level of
fluid in any of the others . . . The neutraliza.
tion of Laos, and possibly of the other coun.
tries of Indochina, has become part of a vastin.
ternational diplomatic operation whose begin.
nings can still be perceived only dimly. Peacº
in Indochina, like the war, is indivisible.”
LETTER FROM INDO-CHINA, by Robert
Shaplen, in New Yorker (15 August 1970)
71–82. .
“New opportunities for peace in Wieſ.
nam, Cambodia, and Laos are emerging. Given
more time and enough American dollars, the
Saigon government might grow somewhat
stronger and somewhat more acceptable to the
people, if not necessarily popular. Consequently,
Hanoi is faced with the dilemma of whether Or
not it should reduce these possibilities by S00m
entering into talks that, although possibly re.
sulting in something less than the ‘provisional
coalition government’ the communists have
been demanding, would enable them to get a

122
foot in the door of Saigon. Although a com-
munist-desired de facto partition of South
Wietnam is unlikely, such a settlement is likely
in Laos and Cambodia. There is already a
precedent in Laos for de facto partition; and
Cambodian Prince Sihanouk is reported to be
hinting that the communists would accept a
partition that would give them, and him, control
of the northern part of the country. The Lon
Nol regime can hardly ignore the facts that the
Communists already hold at least half of Cam-
bodia and that the untrained Cambodian Army
has no more than a fifty-fifty chance of surviv-
ing continued communist pressure. If it is un-
able by fall to hold a line running through the
Country from northwest to southeast, it may be
forced to buy time by accepting some such com-
promise. Even a divided Cambodia might once
more achieve a shaky form of neutrality, and
might, like Laos, eventually move toward a co-
alition, which could even involve the restora-
tion of Sihanouk as titular chief of state. The
central problem throughout Indochina is how
to effect troop withdrawals by the North Viet-
namese and the Americans after a series of
ceasefires, and how to create an international
supervisory mechanism that could maintain
peace while political discussions begin. Guer-
rilla activity and terrorism, especially in South
Vietnam, would have to be limited. If the North
Vietnamese agree to regional ceasefires and to
a regrouping of their mainforce elements pend-
ing withdrawal, and if they accept the princi-
ple of a stepped-up American withdrawal in
place of a complete and immediate one, politi-
Cal settlement could be reached without a re-
newal of uncontrollable violence . . .”
NEW WINDs over souTHEAST ASIA,
by Wing Comdr. Maharaj K. Chopra, in Mili-
tary Review, v. 48, no. 9 (September 1968)
10–18.
“It is a paradox of contemporary life
that, whereas the number of states is multiply-
ing and their frontiers are becoming rigid, the
problems confronting them are becoming inter-
state and regional in character. This is cer-
tainly true of Southeast Asia, thanks to its ge-
Ography, history, and the new, fast-developing
trends. Southeast Asia comprises the 10 states
of Burma, Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, North
Vietnam, South Vietnam, Malaysia, Singapore,
Indonesia, and the Philippines.” Common Fea-
tures; Common Problems; New Consitution
(Thailand); Economic and Social Fields; Se-
curity Arrangements; etc.
B. Laos in the Cross Fire
1. Miscellaneous Aspects
THE INDOCHINA STORY; A FULLY
DOCUMENTED ACCOUNT. New York, Pan-
theon Books, 1970. 347 p.
This book was prepared and published
by “The Committee of Concerned Asian Schol-
ars,” and the various chapters were written by
many authors, very critically protesting Amer-
ica’s presence in Vietnam. Part I–Who Is the
United States Fighting in Indochina? (Viet-
nam—The Open War; Laos—The Soviet War;
Cambodia—The Balancing Act; Thailand—
The Client State); Part II—How Is the United
States Fighting in Indochina?; Part III—Why
Is the United States Fighting in Indochina?
Part IV—What Can the Future Hold for Indo-
china? With: Chronologies for Vietnam, Laos,
Cambodia, and Thailand; Glossary and Bibli-
ography.
LAOS: WAR AND REVOLUTION, ed. by
Nina S. Adams and Alfred W. McCoy. New
York, Harper and Row, 1971. 482 p.
“The Committee of Concerned Asian
Scholars (CCAS) assembles here a mass of es-
sential data concerning the U.S. engagement,
1964–1971 in ‘the most protracted and exten-
sive bombing of civilian targets in history.”
[The Committee further contends that] The
policy of substituting obliteration from the air
for control of the ground appears as a military
failure and a moral tragedy.”
PEKING-KMT AXIS, by Bob Norton, in
Far Eastern Economic Review, v. 71, no. 1 (2
January 1971) 14–15.
“Probably the biggest anachronism in
Asia is the truncated Ninety-third Kuomintang
Division of Chiang Kai-shek now inhabiting
sparsely populated areas of Laos, Burma and
northern Thailand. Their presence—long con-
sidered a potential pretext for Chinese military
incursions—has usually been ignored by the
governments on whose soil they are squatting,
in the vain hope that they will somehow van-
123
ish. Every so often, however, trouble develops
in the mountainous frontier region bringing
into clear focus that there are still over 3,000
KMT troops within three days' march of
China's sensitive Yunnan province. Last month
in Thailand's mountainous Chiang Rai prov-
ince bordering Laos, a two-day battle took
place between KMT irregulars and local Meo
tribesmen, leaving at least 27 of the Meo and
10 Chinese killed. Further clashes were ex-
pected to take place in the remote region and
the nearby Thai Third Army was placed on
full alert.” . -
THE SECOND INDOCHINA WAR: CAM-
BODIA AND LAOS, by Wilfred G. Burchett.
New York, Iñternational Publishers, 1970.
204 p.
“A journalist long known for his leftist
views asserts that the U.S. incursions into
Cambodia and Laos in 1970 represent ‘a logical
extension of policies followed by the United
States . . . deliberately planned to fill the
power vacuum' created by the collapse of
French colonialism.” -
WHICH WILL BE THE NEXT VIET-
NAM? by Carl T. Rowan, in Reader's Digest,
(March 1969) 96–100.
“The Asian communists have concluded
that the US is a ‘paper tiger' which cannot
stem the tide of Maoist revolt in Asia. As pro-
Western nations and neutrals anxiously watch
the negotiations in Paris, the Asian commun-
ists are busy setting up their priorities for
post-Vietnam insurgencies. In 1964, Peking de-
clared that Thailand would be the next target
for Chinese-inspired “liberation.” Thailand
reacted by contributing 6000 combat troops to
the war in Vietnam, hoping that communist
operations in Vietnam and Laos could be re-
duced and a wider war in Thailand could be
prevented. At home the Thai government
launched a vigorous military campaign against
the communist insurgents and accelerated
rural development programs to deprive the reb-
els of their local support. Last year the Thais
were confident that they could defeat the insur-
gents without the aid of US combat troops. But
recently, guerrilla activities in Thailand have
increased. The government estimates that 2370
insurgents operate in the countryside; in the
north, they have formed units large enought,
ambush regular Thai military forces. As US
... public support for Vietnam decreases and the
Paris talks lag, Thailand becomes more amy.
ious about its future . . . Peking does not limit
its attacks to pro-Western governments, how.
ever; both the neutral governments of Laos and
Cambodia have been the targets of Chines;
supported subversion. In 1967, attacks by COm
munist guerrillas and North Vietnamese reg|
lars in Laos became so widespread that the US
was on the verge of introducing combat troops
into Laos. However, the Laotian Army, Sup
ported by US bombing raids, was able to tum
back the communists.”
2. Strategic Import of Laos
LAOS IN THE SECOND INDOCHINA |
WAR, by Arthur J. Dommen, in Current Hig.
tory, v. 59, no. 352 (December 1970) 326–33,
plus.
“Since 1964, there have been two sepa.
rate wars in Laos . . . the war in northern
Laos . . . [and] . . . the war along the Ho Chi
Minh Trail. Because of the vicissitudes of the
war in Indochina in 1970, the possibility has
been created of some sort of partial disengage.
ment by both sides in northern Laos.”
REDS HEAT UP LAOS—REAL KEY TO
ASIA 2 in U.S. News & World Report, v. 64
no. 25 (17 June 1968) 86–88.
“While battles in Vietnam make head.
lines, it’s the struggle in Laos that could deter.
mine the future of Southeast Asia. Today, Laº
is an infiltration corridor for the Communist
drive to seize South Vietnam. Tomorrow it
could be the route for other conquests.”
3. Background to the War in Laos
BETWEEN VIETNAM AND CHINA, by |
Christian Muller, in Swiss Review of World
Affairs, v. 20, no. 5 (August 1970) 12–21.
“Some time ago Christian Muller, a
young member of the NZZ's Switzerland's
Neue Zurcher Zeitung) foreign affairs staff,
was sent on an extended special assignment tº
Asia. His reports, which have been appearing
periodically . . ., provide valuable insights intº
that troubled part of the world (Burma, LaCŞ.
Cambodia, and Nepal) caught between the Im.

124
dochinese tragedy and the growing might of a
renascent China.”
CONFLICT IN INDOCHINA: A READER
ON THE WIDENING WAR IN LAOS AND
CAMBODIA, ed. by Marvin and Susan Gettle-
man and Lawrence and Carol Kaplan. New
York, Random House, 1970. 461 p.
“Documents, articles, speeches, radio
broadcasts, and other statements on the war in
Laos and Cambodia. The editors stress the
need for historical perspective as a prerequi-
site for understanding and resolving the pres-
ent conflict. The contributors include scholars,
journalists, and participants in the conflict,
most of whom are strongly critical of U.S. in-
Volvement.” Contents: Early heritage and colo-
nialism; Independence and the Geneva Accords
of 1954; The struggle for neutrality in Laos;
The struggle for neutrality in Cambodia; The
furtive war in Laos; The war spreads to
Cambodia; Selected bibliography.
CONFLICT IN LAOS: THE POLITICS OF
NEUTRALIZATION, by Arthur J. Dommen.
rev. ed. New York, Frederick A. Praeger, 1971.
454 p.
“As Saigon Bureau Chief for the Los
Angeles Times, Arthur Dommen speaks from
wide experience in Southeast Asian affairs.
Updating his earlier work on the history of
Laos, its French colonial period, the events of
the Second World War and the postindepend-
ence movement, he now traces the erosion of
the 1962 Geneva agreement from the coup of
April 1964 to the South Vietnamese invasion of
Laos in February 1971. It is his contention
that the neutralization of Laos by interna-
tional accord, to which China would be a party,
presents the only possibility of peace for that
nation. Such an accord must be accompanied
by a settlement in Viet Nam and Cambodia.”
LAOS: SEARCH FOR PEACE IN THE
MIDST OF WAR, by Paul F. Langer, in Asian
Survey, v. 8, no. 1 (January 1968) 80–86.
“At the start of 1967, the picture in
Laos looked very bleak. In theory, the strategi-
cally important country had been neutralized
and sealed against foreign intervention by the
Geneva Accords of 1962. The three feuding po-
litical factions—‘rightists,” “neutralists,’ and
the Communist-led Neo Lao Hak Sat (NLHS,
commonly called the Pathet Lao)—had agreed
to make peace with each other and to rule the
country jointly through a government of na-
tional union. Unfortunately for the Laotian
people, the practice was another matter.” With
bibliography.
LAOS: THE SIDESHOW WAR, in Om Rec-
ord, v. 5, no. 2 (Winter 1970) 97–117.
“The invasion of Vietnamese communist
forces in 1953 marked a return to civil war in
Laos. In 1954, the convening of a Geneva Con-
ference on Indochina gave new hope for an end
to the Laotian civil war. However, in 1955,
fighting was resumed in Laos. This war once
again involved three factions in the Laotian
political scene: pro-communist (headed by
Prince Souphanouvong), rightist (headed by
Prince Boun Oum), and neutralist (headed by
Prince Souvanna Phouma); it also involved
the United States and the other great powers.”
A chronological summary of events in and af-
fecting Laos from : 21 July 1954 to 23 October
1969.
1962 GENEVA AGREEMENTS ON LAOS:
NECESSITY OR EXPEDIENCY 7 by Capt.
Harry N. Key, Jr., Maxwell Air Force Base,
Ala., Air War College, 1970. 106 p.
(M–32983–U, Professional Study no. 3941.)
“The 1962 Geneva Conference was an
attempt to stop the fighting in Laos as well as
to ensure that country's existence and neutral-
ity. This study examines the Laotian political,
military, and social factors which affected the
stability of Laos. American objectives and for-
eign policy for Laos are examined against the
backdrop of the Geneva Agreements. As the
results of the Conference provided for a coali-
tion government which included pro-commun-
ist Pathet Lao leaders, American agreement to
the accords did not appear to be in consonance
with the stated goals and policies for Laos.
This study concludes by examining the courses
of action that were available to American pol-
icy-makers for a Laotian solution and answers
the question as to whether the settlement at
Geneva was in the best interests of the United
States.”
4. The War in Laos and the War in Indo-
chima: Their Co-relationship
125
AFTER THE FIGHTING IN VIETNAM IS
OVER: THE FUTURE OF LAOS, by George
Mc T. Kahin, in The New Republic, v. 165, nos.
4 and 5 (24 and 31 July 1971) 15–16.
“All parties concerned remain con-
vinced that neither a ceasefire nor a political
settlement can be attained in Laos so long as
the war continues in Vietnam and Cambodia.
Even the chances for a ceasefire limited to
northern Laos (above the Ho Chi Minh trail)
are regarded as very slim so long as the fight-
ing continues in these neighboring countries.
Nevertheless, Prince Souvanna Phouma, Prime
Minister of the Royal Laotian government, is
now beginning to look ahead and prepare the
ground in anticipation of an end to the con-
flicts elsewhere in Indochina. He appears con-
vinced that in the long run the future of Laos
depends more upon China than any other
power, and that without Chinese support its
independence and effective neutralization can-
not be secure.”
LAOS, by Hugh D. S. Greenway, in Atlantic
Magazine (March 1969) 20–26.
“Although Laos has not appeared on the
agenda of the Paris peace talks, both sides
know that there can be no real peace in Indo-
china until the Laotian question is settled too.
Both American bombing and North Vietnam-
ese infiltration violate the 1962 Geneva Ac-
cords, which set up a neutralist Laos under a
tripartite coalition government of left, right,
and center. By 1964 the Vietnam war had esca-
lated to the point where both the US and NVN
found it necessary to violate Laotian neutral-
ity. The country reverted to civil war and the
neutralists were forced to take sides with ei-
ther the communist Pathet Lao or the Royal-
ists. Territorial control never changes despite
advances by the Royal Lao Army during the
wet season and counter-offensives by the Pathet
Lao during the dry season. The Royal Laotian
Army controls the Mekong valley and two-
thirds of the population, and the Pathet Lao
controls the other two-thirds of the land but
only one-third of the population. The Ameri-
cans and the North Vietnamese respect this
status quo. Both sides in Laos agree that the
basis for a peace settlement should be a return
to the tripartite agreement of 1962. With its
eye on the Paris peace conference, in Novem-
ber the Pathet Lao called its third Extraori
nary Conference since 1956 and issued a 1.
point program designed to broaden the based
its struggle. The Pathet Lao insists that tº
US stop bombing and the Center-Royalist Pº
mier, Prince Souvanna Phouma, insists thi
when the Vietnamese war ends and Hanoihal
no further use for, the Pathet Lao, the laid
will rejoin the ‘tripartite' government, Bì
sides ignore the fact that the third force, #
neutralists, no longer exists. The bipolarizatiº
of Laotian politics is partly a result of #|
American presence. It is conceivable, therefº
that when the US withdraws from Wieman
the opposing factions in Laos will be able
create some form of temporary neutralist blº
acceptable to both sides, and return to a tripſ:
tite government. Because the Pathet Lao laſh!
the nationalistic appeal the Vietcong has #
tained, and because the international aspects.
the war have not been allowed to get Outd
hand as in Vietnam, there is reason for Oji
mism in Laos. If the big powers will leave Laſ
alone to achieve internal peace and securi;
the country may be able to serve as a neut
buffer between the Vietnamese and the Thai
between communists and non-communists, all
between Chinese and Western interests i
Southeast Asia.”
LAOS: BUFFER STATE OR BATTI;
GROUND, by Hugh Toye. New York, Oxfor
University Press, 1968. 245 p.
“A regular soldier observes the politid
and military development of Laos and its plaſ,
in international politics, especially as a Cºmſø
of the cold war in Southeast Asia, 1940–1984'
The Historical Antecedents (Vietnam and tº
Indian-influenced States of Indo-China; Tº
Consequences of French Rule); The Devel}
ment of the Problem, 1940–1964 (Laos in #|
Second World War; Laos and the Indo-Chiu
War; The Problem of Neutrality; The Laotia.
Civil War; The Geneva Conference 1961-6
and the Renewal of Conflict). With illustr;
tions maps, and bibliography.
THE LAOS FACTOR IN A WIETNA
EQUATION, by Stanley G. Langland, in Infº
national Affairs, (October 1969) 631–647.
“Laos has historically served as abſº
against Chinese expansionism, and its locatiº


126
On the Mekong River is of strategic importance
to all of SEA. Control of Laos would enhance
the communist position in the entire region
and pose a grave threat to Thailand in particu-
lar, Ho Chi Minh hoped to extend his influence
Over Laos, but the task of subverting South
Wietnam rated a higher priority and drained
off all available resources. Once all of Vietnam
is ‘unified’ under communist rule, however, ag-
gression will most logically be aimed at Laos.
There cannot be lasting peace in Vietnam
without a simultaneous settlement in Laos
since communist forces presently in Laos
would continue to threaten both South Viet-
nam and the non-communist areas of Laos . . .
LAOS: FALLING DOMINO 2 by J. L. S.
Girling, in Pacific Affairs, v. 43, no. 3 (Fall
1970) 370-383.
“The Laos situation looks simple. But
like many problems it is simple to explain from
a distance; it is more complicated the nearer
One gets. The opposite is true of the domino
theory. If this were not so, it would be hard to
explain why the old myth, which does not
stand up to close examination, should have
such remarkable staying power . . . Before
describing the characteristics of the domino
theory, or rather of its advocates, and then
applying it to the situation in Laos, it is first
necessary to point out what the theory is not
. . . What are the prospects for Laos? Obvi-
ously it will continue to be part of the battle-
ground so long as the struggle for South Viet-
mam continues. Secondly, the outcome of that
struggle will affect, if not determine, the bal-
ance of advantage in Laos . . . Only a political
Settlement in South Vietnam, which takes the
form of a coalition of all major elements, can
help to ensure a more balanced outcome in
Laos. But rather than a return to a political
struggle for all Laos, which would favor the
more organised, better trained and more
highly motivated and younger Pathet Lao
leaders over the traditional Rightist ‘old
guard,' perhaps the existing division between
tribal and ‘settled’ Laos will be maintained.
Each section would depend on and act as a
buffer for its more powerful neighbour. And a
formal central government in Vientiane could
be revived to preserve the illusion of a sover-
eign united state. To return to the theme of
his paper: Laos is not a domino, but two
halves of a domino, and if these are falling,
they seem to be doing so in opposite directions.
Paradoxically, therefore, it is the internal
weaknesses of Laos which mark it out as a
suitable candidate for a domino; but it is pre-
cisely the importance of these specific “local”
factors which invalidates the theory as such.”
5. North Vietnamese and Pathet Lao Opera-
tions in Laos
ANATOMY OF A CRISIS: THE LAOTIAN
CRISIS OF 1960–1961, by Bernard B. Fall.
Garden City, N.Y., Doubleday, 1969. 283 p.
“The origins, major actions and proba-
ble consequences for Asia, the United States
and the world of the still unresolved contro-
versy between the Pathet Lao and the Royal
Laotian government forces.”
AT THE FRONT IN LAOS, by Werner R.
Galle, in Swiss Review of World Affairs, v. 19,
no. 7 (October 1969) 12–15.
“With much of the world’s attention
firmly focussed on Vietnam, the unending hos-
tilities in neighboring Laos have been largely
forgotten. An NZZ (Switzerland’s Neue
Zürcher Zeitung) contributor here presents an
eye-witness analysis of a situation which may
have important consequences for the future of
all Southeast Asia.” Setbacks of the Govern-
ment Troops; Domestic Troubles; etc.
CONFLICT IN THE TWENTIETH CEN-
TURY, by David Wood. London, The Institute
for Strategic Studies, June 1968. 27 p. (Adel-
phi Papers, no. 48.)
“The aim of this paper is to give a brief
survey of the most identifiable wars and local
conflicts that have taken place in the seventy
years since 1898.” Includes, among many oth-
ers, the following which occurred in Asia:
World War II (Asia), 1941—1945; Burmese
Civil War, 1948–1954; Burmese Border Trou-
bles 1950–1954; Laos Civil War, 1959–present;
etc.

127
HITTING THE TRAIL, by Gene Gregory, in
Far Eastern Economic Review, v. 72, no. 24.
(12 June 1971) 59–60 plus.
“Hanoi's ability to wage its war against
South Vietnam throughout the Sixties has de-
pended largely on its ability to use the Ho Chi
Minh Trail. Gene Gregory who visited the trail
even before it won its historic name sees it as
still the key to the outcome of the Indochinese
War. From Luang Prabang, Jean Bernard de-
scribes the mood in Laos’ royal capital as com-
munist forces continue to menace the city. Last
week battles were raging within 15 miles of
Luang Prabang which is now crowded with
100,000 refugees.”
LAOS AND VIETNAM—THE SAME
WAR, by Elbridge Durbrow, in Washington
Report, American Security Council (6 April
1970) 1–4. *
“‘Hanoi's intensified aggression against
South Vietnam started in Laos in 1959.’ Com-
munist support for the puppet Pathet Lao forces
in northeastern Laos in 1959 served as a con-
venient diversion for Hanoi's main goal, reacti-
vation of the Ho Chi Minh Trail in eastern
and southern Laos, which was essential for the
‘liberation’ of South Vietnam. Massive Soviet
aid to the Pathet Lao forces in late 1960 and
early 1961 brought strong protests from Presi-
dent Kennedy and led to negotiations that cul-
minated in a shaky compromise in July 1962.
In the meantime, Hanoi continued its buildup
of forces and supplies in South Vietnam and
consolidated its hold over the Ho Chi Minh
Trail. “There is, therefore, no question about
creating a ‘new Vietnam’ in Laos: there has al-
ways been just one Vietnamese war, which
started in, and continues in, Laos and Cam-
bodia as well as South Vietnam’.”
LAOS IN THE SHADOW OF VIETNAM,
by Peter Hess, in Swiss Review of World Af-
fairs, v. 18, no. 5 (August 1968) 9–11. -
“With North Vietnamese troops taking
an increasing part in the fighting, hostilities
have intensified lately in the Kingdom of Laos,
where a seesaw power struggle is being played
out in the shadow of Vietnam.” Communists
and Royalists; The Communist Offensive; Tha
Aims of the Offensive; etc.
LAOS: THE FICTION OF NEUTRALITY!
by Tran Van Dinh, in The New Republic (2.
February 1968) 27–29. - -
“An undeclared war is being fought
along the Laotian portion of the 700-mile-long
Ho Chi Minh trail, between the North Wieſ.
namese and the Pathet Lao on one side, and the
US, South Vietnam, and Thailand on the other.
The war remains undeclared in order to keepa
facade of neutrality for Laos. Although the US
denies it, Premier Kittikachorn has admitted
that US planes based in Thailand have been
bombing the Ho Chi Minh trail in Laos. In D3.
cember, the US flew 6,722 combat sorties Over
Laos, compared with 5,692 over North Wieſ.
nam. The average of 220 daily sorties into Laos
is about three times the number flown Over
North Vietnam. Despite the intensive bombing
80 per cent of North Vietnamese troops and
supplies moving along the Ho Chi Minh trail
get through to the South. Last November, Thai
authorities announced that three North Wiet.
namese battalions were marching toward the
Mekong border and only ground operations in
Laos could stop them. The seriousness of the
Laotian situation has increased . . . The
Pathet Lao claims control of two-thirds of the
territory and one-third of the population of
Laos . . . No settlement of the Vietnam War
can now leave out of account the problems in
Laos.”
LAOS: THE PATHET LAO THREAT (U),
by Maj. Raymond E. Hamilton. Maxwell Air
Force Base, Ala., Air Command and Staff Col.
lege, 1970. 149 p. (M–35582–7–S, Research
Study no. 0630–70.)
“The Pathet Lao forces represent the
ethnic pro-Communist threat to the security of
Laos. This study traces the evolution of the
movement and examines the leadership, the Or.
ganizational structure, internal working rela.
tions, and foreign influence. It also assesses the
movement's appeal at the rice roots level, and
the Pathet Lao fighting man’s effectiveness,
The study concludes that the Pathet Lao is
dominated by and dependent upon the North
Vietnamese forces for support and guidance. It
also concludes that the movement is not solidly
supported by the Laotian masses as often
claimed, and they are being relegated more and

128
more to a combat support role for the more nu-
merous and aggressive North Vietnamese.”
MARCHING INTO MISERY, by Arnold
Abrams, in Far Eastern Economic Review, v.
72, no. 17 (24 April 1971) 21–24.
“The annual dry season North Vietnam-
ese offensive is on in Laos—with more punch
behind it than ever. And this year, the refu-
gees from the mountains of the north have no-
where further to retreat.”
NORTH VIETNAM AND THE PATHET
LA0, by Paul F. Langer and Joseph J. Zasloff.
Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1970.
262 p.
“The Vietnamese communist (Viet
Minh) under Ho Chi Minh helped create the
communist movement, the Pathet Lao, in Laos
and played a vital role in every stage of its de-
velopment . . . In 1950 the Viet Minh helped
establish a resistance government in Laos . . .
At the 1954 Geneva Conference, the Viet Minh
spoke for the Pathet Lao. Although most of the
Wiet Minh soldiers then left Laos, some Viet-
namese advisers remained. In 1956, a legal po-
litical party, the Neo Lao Hak Sat, was
formed, with Souphanouvong as chairman, as
a front for the Laotian communists; the NLHS
was controlled by North Vietnam, which con-
tinued to train Pathet Lao Soldiers. The 1962
Geneva Conference legitimized the Pathet
Lao's control of almost half of Laos, including
Sam Neua, Phong Saly, and the Ho Chi Minh
Trail. It also established a coalition government.
However, Souphanouvong left the coalition
government in April 1963 and resumed the
civil war. It is clear that he could not have
done so without North Vietnamese approval
and support. North Vietnam never completely
withdrew its troops from Laos, although it has
always denied their presence. North Vietnam-
ese soldiers have disguised their presence by
wearing Laotian uniforms, adopting Laotian
names, and avoiding contact with the local
population. The ineffectiveness of the Interna-
tional Control Commission has also helped:
members of the ICC have rarely been allowed
to visit communist zones, and the Polish repre-
sentatives have blocked ICC attempts to inves-
tigate North Vietnam’s role in Laos. The
North Vietnamese still train and indoctrinate
Laotian soldiers. They have military advisers
in every NLHS province who report regularly
to headquarters in North Vietnam and make
most decisions. The North Vietnamese also
have political advisers at all key points in the
Laotian communist movement . . . The US and
Thailand, recognizing that North Vietnam is
probably capable of taking over all of Laos, do
not want to provoke a North Vietnamese at-
tack on Laos. North Vietnam is presently un-
likely to try to take over Laos without provo-
cation. Its primary goals are to defeat South
Vietnam and rebuild the North; access to
South Vietnam via Laos and secure frontiers
serve its present needs. An attack on Laos
would divert needed resources from its pri-
mary goals. In addition, it would be an overt
violation of the Geneva Accords . . . It is pos-
sible that North Vietnam may try to take over
Iaos in the future . . . Although its interest in
the Ho Chi Minh Trail may decrease after the
war, it will probably continue to support the
Pathet Lao as a valuable ally and will continue
to consider the Laotian border provinces essen-
tial to its security. Furthermore, if the North
Vietnamese win the war in Vietnam, their Lao-
tian allies may exert pressure for more aid in
the hope of winning a similar victory in Laos.”
THE NORTH VIETNAMESE MILITARY
ADVISER IN LAOS: A FIRST HAND AC-
COUNT, by Paul Langer and Joseph J. Zasloff.
Santa Monica, Calif., The Rand Corp., July
1968. 40 p. (Memorandum RM-5688—ARPA.)
“This study is concerned with the expe-
rience of a North Vietnamese military adviser
to a Pathet Lao battalion operating in North-
ern Laos.” Contents: The Political Context;
The Adviser, Mai Dai Hap; His Account
(Reassignment, Preparation for Service in
Laos, Deployment to Laos via China, Func-
tions and Responsibilities of the Adviser, His
Personal Life, Combat Experiences, and Defec-
tion).
REVOLUTION IN LAOS: THE NORTH
VIETNAMESE AND THE PATHET LAO, by
P. F. Langer and J. J. Zasloff. Santa Monica,
Calif., Rand Corporation, 1969. 233 p. (RM-
5935–ARPA.)
129
“The communist Pathet Lao movement
has been heavily subsidized by the North Viet-
namese communists for two decades. Laotian
communist forces operated from bases in
North Vietnam in the 1950s, moved to the bor-
der regions of eastern Laos in the 1950s, and
have extended their influence westward toward
the Mekong River since then. The consistent
communist successes in Laos have as a rule
been due to the superior military abilities of
North Vietnamese armed forces. The North
Vietnamese have supported the communist mil-
itary advance in three ways: (1) North Viet-
namese troops guarding the infiltration routes
to South Vietnam via Laos have effectively
blocked the operation of noncommunist forces
in this area; (2) North Vietnamese military de-
tachments assigned directly to Pathet Lao
forces have played an active role in combat op-
erations aganist the Royal Lao Government;
and (3) North Vietnamese military advisers
have been placed throughout the military com-
mand of the Pathet Lao. Training camps in
North Vietnam for Pathet Lao cadres allow
consistent infiltration of trained guerrillas into
Laos. These camps also provide the necessary
logistical support for communist forces in
Laos. In addition to military assistance, the
North Vietnamese provide thorough political
indoctrination for the Pathet Lao cadres . . .”
THIS IS LAOS—A VIETNAM IN THE
1MAKING, by Egisto Corradi, in Atlas, v. 15,
no. 1 (January 1968) 28–29 plus.
The author contends that—“To a close-
up observer, Laos today lies in the eye of the
hurricane of major warfare. What is happen-
ing in Laos parallels what has happened in
Vietnam. The North Vietnamese constitute a
formidable military force on Laotian soil and
—with the Pathet Lao, another Vietcong—
match the non-Communist forces. In the Red-
occupied east, over the heavily guarded Ho Chi
Minh Trail, a steady stream of men and arms
flows into the war against South Vietnamese,
American and allied forces. In . . . the . . . re-
port from inside Laos . . . , correspondent
Egisto Corradi, writing for Milan’s Corriere
della Sera, explores every .
in Laos have taken or may take.”
TIME OUT OF HAND: REVOLUTION
AND REACTION IN SOUTHEAST AISA, by
. . turn that events -
Robert Shaplen. London, Andre Deutsch, 1%
429 p. *
“This political history of Southead
Asia discusses events in Indonesia, Malaysial
the Philippines, Thailand, Cambodia, Laos, and
Vietnam. Much of the book has previously aſ
peared in The New Yorker . . . This book coºl
tains analyses of these countries . . . Scenes (i.
fighting in the north of Laos.”
6. Incursion into Laos by South Vietnam
1971
BALANCE SHEET ON LAOS—VICTORY
OR DEFEAT 2 in U.S. News & World Report
v. 70, no. 14 (5 April 1971) 15–17.
“Cut through the smoke of a confusing
campaign in Laos and it’s clear that South and
North both paid a heavy price in their unend.
ing war. For the U.S., however, the battling
set the stage for another big withdrawal of
GI’s.”
BEHIND THE LAOS INVASION, by I.
Biriuzov, in New Times, Moscow, no. 8 (24
February 1971) 8–9.
“The invasion of Laos was planned at
least 5 years ago. Like the Cambodian inter.
vention with which it is linked, this violation
of a neutral country is part of the overall
American scheme to erect a neocolonial bloc
consisting of Bangkok, Saigon, Pnompenh, and
Veintiane. Other and equally dangerous ag-
gressions are being urged on the Americans by
the South Vietnam regime. Although the
Nixon administration can appease domestic
criticism by troop withdrawals, it cannot ex-
pect to produce the same effect abroad, even in
Japan. In addition to isolating the Americans
internationally, the Laos venture will aggra.
vate the existing military tensions in Indo-
china and Southeast Asia in general.”
LAOS INVASION.—THE U.S. GAMBLE, in
U.S. News & World Report, v. 70, no. 8 (22
February 1971) 15–18.
“South Vietnam's daring strike against
an enemy stronghold brought a new turn in
the war. If it works, it could lead to faster
withdrawal of GI's. Failure would endanger
Nixon's strategy. It was a risk the President
decided to take.”

130
LETTER FROM INDO-CHINA, by Robert
Shaplen, in The New Yorker (24 April 1971)
104–129.
“According to Mr. Shaplen, the only
good effect of the recent South Vietnamese in-
vasion of Laos was the possible postponement
of any major communist offensive in the South.
Contrary to expectations, it did not speed up
the end of the fighting, promote further negoti-
ations, or insure the success of the Vietnamiza-
tion program. Instead, it increased Hanoi's de-
termination to continue fighting and led to a
reaffirmation of Chinese and Russia pledges of
assistance. Furthermore, the Laotian invasion
apparently did not succeed in eliminating the
quantities of North Vietnamese troops or sup-
plies estimated. Recouping losses on both sides
will be difficult, but communist reserves appear
to be large . . . Politically, the Laos invasion
may have further diminished the status of the
already unpopular President Thieu and jeopar-
dized his chances for reelection. Both of his op-
ponents—Vice-President Ky and retired Gen-
eral Minh–are gaining support among the
local leaders, and some observers speculate
that Thieu may withdraw before the election
. . . Cambodia and Laos are extremely dissat-
isfied with the widening of the war. Both coun-
tries are undergoing internal political conflicts,
and both resent the presence of all Vietnamese
—Northerners and Southerners. In Laos,
Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma has been
trying unsuccessfully to reestablish the tripar-
tite government of left-wing, right-wing, and
neutralist elements which was set up under the
Geneva formula of 1962. Government forces
are trying to counter communist aggression,
and communist propaganda is attempting to
convince the people that the Pathet Lao is re-
sponsible for “repulsing’ the South Vietnamese
invasion. However, the Laotian communists
want to escape from Hanoi's domination and
are seeking Russian support for establishing a
new coalition government with more commun-
ist representation. And Peking, which resents
Hanoi's plan to take Laos by force and wishes
to maintain its position in the northwestern
part of the country, is making every effort
to please Laotian communist leaders. In Cam-
bodia, one phase of the war consists of South
Vietnamese efforts to prevent North Vietnamese
from reestablishing sanctuaries and supply
lines. The other phase involves the struggle for
the country itself between the Cambodian com-
munists and the forces of the government’s new
Republic. The Cambodian government forces
are being trained by US advisers, but observers
fear that sufficiently rapid progress is not be-
ing made or that the type of training being
stressed will result in the same conventional
force which has proved ineffective in Vietnam.
Western advisers generally believe that Cam-
bodia will survive as long as it does not become
North Vietnam’s primary target . . .”
THE WAR IN INDOCHINA; ASSESSING
THE LAOS INVASION, in Newsweek, v. 77,
no. 14 (5 April 1971) 25–26 plus.
“When the Army of the Republic of
Vietnam (ARVN) swaggered into Laos early
in February, there were predictions from the
allied camp that decisive days lay ahead. Rich-
ard Nixon himself declared that Hanoi's
troops would ‘have to fight or give up the
struggle to conquer South Vietnam,’ and pre-
sumably the President had a firm opinion on
what the outcome of such a show-down would
be. But the North Vietnamese did make a stand,
and although they suffered heavy casualties,
they eventually pursued the battered and be-
draggled ARVN invaders back across the bor-
der. Whatever the South Vietnamese may have
achieved during their 45 days in the Laotian
cauldron, the manner of their going suggested
that Lam Son 719 had been a costly miscalcula-
tion. Clearly, the invasion had ended much ear-
lier—and with less to show for the effort—
than allied planners had originally hoped.”
THE WAR IN LAOS; AN EXCLUSIVE
REPORT ON THE INVASION THAT
STALLED, in Life, v. 70, no. 9 (12 March
1971) 20–29. - -
“One month ago, 16,000 South Vietnam-
ese troops clanked off into the mists of Laos—
and a curtain dropped behind them . . Now a
first-hand account of what happened to the
ARVN spearhead comes from Akihiko Oka-
mura, a Japanese free-lance photographer on
assignment for Life. Okamura managed to
smuggle himself aboard one of the lead ARVN
column's trucks and remained with it for two
weeks, taking pictures inside Laos. He reports
. . . that after three days and 16 miles, the ad-
vance was stopped cold.”
131
C. Descriptive Miscellany (See also Map
Appendixes, U,V,V,X, and Y)
AREA HANDBOOK FOR LAOS, by T. D.
Roberts and others, Washington, Department
of the Army, June 1967. 349 p. (DA PAM
550–58.)
This area handbook discusses in detail
the social, political, economic, and national Se-
curity aspects of Laos. Includes: bibliogra-
phies, glossary, illustrations, and tables. See
also appendixes to the bibliographic survey on
Peninsular Southeast Asia.
THE ASIANS; THEIR HERITAGE AND
THEIR DESTINY, by Paul Thomas Welty.
3rd ed. Philadelphia, J. B. Lippincott, 1970. 351
D.
This book attempts to give “some under-
standing of the social and economic environ-
ment in which most Asians live and of the var-
ious systems of thought which influence their
approach to present-day problems, just as the
thinking of people in a Western culture is in-
fluenced by their environment and traditions
. . . ‘The Asians' . . . put its main emphasis
on this . . . task, while also giving the main
outlines of geography, history, politics and
government, for the main areas of Asia from
Pakistan round to Japan’ [and also including,
among many others, Burma, Cambodia, Laos,
and Thailand].
EMERGING SOUTHEAST ASIA; A
STUDY IN GROWTH AND STAGNATION,
by Donald W. Fryer. New York, McGraw-Hill
Book Co., 1970. 486 p.
The Region (Southeast Asia in the Mod-
ern World; The Land and Its Utilization; Ur-
banization, Industrialization and Moderniza-
tion); Progress (Thailand; The Philippines;
Malaysia and Singapore); Stagnation (Indone-
sia; The Union of Burma; Vietnam, Laos and
Cambodia); Prospect (The Destiny of South-
east Asia). With selected bibliography, maps,
and diagrams.
AN EYE FOR THE DRAGON; SOUTH-
EAST ASIA OBSERVED, 1954–1970, by Den-
nis Bloodworth. New York, Farrar, Straus and
Giroux, 1970. 414 p.
“The author digs . . . into his newsps.
per files and store of anecdotes for a . . . loºk
at [all of] Southeast Asia . . . It is . . . .
blend of history, politics, personality, religion|
and superstition. Bloodworth's constant them:
is the inability of East and West to understani
one another.” He touches many times specifi.
cally on Burma, Cambodia, Laos, and Thai
land, among others. With chronology and bibli
ography. -
THE FAR EAST AND SOUTHWEST PA.
CIFIC, 1971, by Harold C. Hinton. Washing.
ton, Stryker-Post Publications, Inc., 1971.88 p.
Historical Background (The People of
Asia; Religious Beliefs; Medieval Conquerors;
Economic Background; Nationalism, Commu.
nism and Revolution in Twentieth Century
Asia); The Land and the People of the follow.
ing, including area, population, climate, official
language, ethnic background, principal reli.
gions, chief commercial products, currency, na.
tional flag, etc.: Australia, Burma, Cambodia,
Communist China, Nationalist China, Indone.
sia, Japan, North Korea, South Korea, Laos,
Malaysia, Mongolia, New Zealand, Philippines,
Singapore, Thailand, North and South Wiet.
nam, and Small States and Dependencies.
THE MYTH OF ASIA, by John M. Stead
man. New York, Simon and Schuster, 1969,
353 p.
“This . . . book . . . shows . . . that the
West overestimates the unity of Asia, that in-
deed to think of Asia as a unity is profoundly
mistaken, both in history and today. There are
at least three Asias—the cultural complex of
China and Japan, that of India and its related
cultures, and Islam, which has been closest to
the West and has most influenced the West,
particularly in earlier science, mathematics
and astronomy. This is one aspect only of the
book's main theme. It is extremely illuminat.
ing about Asian cultures, about religion and
art, no less than science and philosophy. The
book has an important contribution to make in
the crucial issue of our time, relations between
East and West, and to the understanding of
them. It gives the historical background, essen-
tial to the comprehension of the greatest polit-
ical dilemma of today. So much depends upon
our getting it right, and this thoughtful and

132
scholarly book offers significant help to all se-
rious minds at this crossroads. In the end, in
showing that the monolithic concept of Asia is
untrue, that there is and always has been at
least as much variety and diversity in the East
as in the West, the implications of the book are
hopeful: One sees the unity of mankind under
the diversities and conflicts of both East and •
West.” Deals with many countries of Asia, in-
cluding Burma, Cambodia, Laos, and Thailand,
among others. With select bibliography.
SOUTH ASIA; A BACKGROUND BOOK,
by Angus Maude. Chester Springs, Pa., Dufour
Editions, 1966. 176 p. . . .
The Area Surveyed; India; India's
Neighbors; Burma; Indochina and Thailand.
(Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, and Thailand);
Malaysia, Singapore and the Philippines; Indo-
nesia; The Asian Dilemma. With maps.
| SOUTHEAST ASIA: A SURVEY, by Rich-
ard Butwell. New York, Foreign Policy As-
sociation, December 1968. 63 p.
This survey of Southeast Asia which in-
cludes information also on Burma, Cambodia,
Laos, and Thailand, among others, deals with
the following: What Is Southeast Asia?; The
Years Since World War II; The Problems of
Nation-Building and Survival; Regionalism—
How Firm a Foundation—and Future?; The
United States and Southeast Asia.
STATUS OF THE WORLD'S NATIONS.
rev. ed. Washington, Department of State, Bu-
reau of Intelligence and Research, 1969. 21 p.
(Geographic Bulletin No. 2.)
This Geographic Bulletin identifies
each state in the world (including Burma,
Cambodia, Laos, and Thailand) that is gener-
ally accepted as independent. It includes enu-
meration and official nomenclature of the coun-
tries . . . Two names appear for each state: a
short form for use in maps, in lists, and for
general narration; a long form for more formal
usage and for official documents. An appendix
gives such details as the area, population, and
identification of capital of each country. Text
and notes explain many of the exceptions one
finds in the complex pattern of sovereignties
throughout the world.
D. Government and Politics
1. Miscellaneous Aspects
CONFLICT IN LAOS: THE VILLAGE
POINT OF VIEW, by Thomas H. Stanton, in
Asian Survey, v. 8, no. 11 (November 1968)
887–900.
“In the summer of 1966 the Royal Lao
Government (RLG) faced a parliamentary cri-
sis. Strong regional factions in the National
Assembly demanded that Prime Minister Sou-
., vanna Phouma redistribute the cabinet seats
left vacant by the withdrawal from the gov-
ernment of the Neo Lao Hak Xat (NLHX, or
Pathet Lao political front) deputies. After
much maneuvering, the Prime Minister man-
aged to retain these seats for the NLHX,
should it return to the formally neutralist gov-
ernment. Although this delicate situation re-
ceived close attention from the Western press,
it had no meaning whatsoever for the average
Lao villager, who probably does not recognize
the name of the National Assembly in which
he is represented. It will be the purpose of this
paper to direct the attention of the reader
away from the well publicized affairs of the
small Lao urban elite to the crucial arena of
Lao domestic politics today—the village. Once
we have examined the nature of elite politics
from the perspective of the villager, we shall
be able to draw conclusions that are very rele-
vant not only to the struggle between the RLG
and Pathet Lao (PL) in Laos, but also to the
analogous conflicts currently taking place in
Northeast Thailand and Vietnam.”
LAOS: AN INSIDE AFFAIR, by Robert
Norton, in Far Eastern Economic Review, v.
72, no. 19 (8 May 1971) 19.
“The recent abortive rightwing coup in
Laos served to emphasise the factionalism of
Vientiane politics, especially among the right.
General Phoumi Nosavan, former rightwing
strongman now in political exile in Bangkok
who has denied any complicity in the at-
tempted coup, gave in a recent interview his
view of events in Laos. This is the general’s
fourth political exile.”
souTHEAST ASIA’s POLITICAL SYS.
TEMS, by Lucian W. Pye. Englewood Cliffs,
N.J., Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1967. 98 p.
133
“This series is dedicated to the proposi-
tion that it is no longer valid or profitable to
study comparative politics within an essen-
tially North American and European-centered
frame of reference . . . Politically speaking,
the history of the twentieth century is in large
part the history of the re-emergence of non-
European areas and states to positions of inde-
pendence and prominence on the world scene
. . . Southeast Asia is a region of great diver-
sity and contrast. Each of the nine leading
countries of the region—Indonesia, the Philip-
pines, Burma, Malaysia, Thailand, Vietnam,
Cambodia, Laos, and Singapore—represents a
distinct and separate tradition. And within
each country further diversities abound, for
none has an homogeneous population. No other
region of the world offers such a rich array of
major religions Malaysia and Indonesia are Is-
lamic countries; the Philippines is the only
Christian country in Asia; and the remainder
of mainland Southeast Asia consists of Bud-
dhistic societies that adhere to different be-
liefs. Behind these religious differences are ad-
ditional disparities in customs and historical
experience. The 180 million Southeast Asians
employ more than 150 different languages
and dialects, most of which are mutually unin-
telligible.” With bibliography.
2. The Constitution
CONSTITUTION OF NATIONS. VOLUME
II—ASIA, AUSTRALIA AND OCEANIA, by
Amos J. Peaslee. Rev. 3rd ed. The Hague,
Netherlands, Martinus Nijhoff, 1966. 632 p.
Texts of constitutions for the following
countries, among other: Burma, Cambodia,
Laos, and Thailand. s
CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES
OF THE WORLD. A SERIES OF UPDATED
TEXTS, CONSTITUTIONAL CHRONOLO-
GIES, AND ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRA-
PHIES, ed. by A. P. Blaustein and G. H. Flanz.
Dobbs Ferry, New York, Oceana Publications,
Inc., 1971. v. 2. With a chapter on Laos.
TRADITIONAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW: A STUDY OF CHANGE IN LAOS, by
Joseph J. Westermeyer, in Asian Survey, v. 11,
no. 6 (June 1971) 562–569.
“Two years of observation-participa-
tion in Laos by the author revealed that social
, 'g
yº
problem-solving occurs within two systems ºf
law. On one hand a traditional unwritten law,
taught by the family and Buddhist monk,
operates within the Lao village. In addition
there is the written code of the central govem.
ment, practiced in special government build
ings located at the provincial capitals, serving
to further isolate it from the people. Both sy;
tems of law coexist in time and space. Certain
problems fall naturally within the province ºf
traditional law, while others are relegated tº
the law of the central government. This paper
seeks to demonstrate the situations appropriate
to each system and to show their separate ye;
integrated modes of operation. Specific exam.
ples mostly originate from Vietiane province."
3. Laotian Internal Differences and the War
in Laos
THE ROCKY ROAD TO PEACE, by R. P.
W. Norton, in Far Eastern Economic Review,
v. 71, no. 4 (23 January 1971) 43–45.
“Optimism for a settlement to the com.
flict in Laos ebbs and flows but in Vientiane the
feeling is that peace talks must start soon. The
big question is whether Laotian elements can
ever bury their differences.”
TOWARD NEGOTIATIONS IN LAOS, by
Arthur J. Dommen, in Asian Survey, v. 11, mO.
1 (January 1971) 41–50.
“For some years conditions have been
more favorable for a peace settlement in Laos
than in South Vietnam. By the end of 1970
they were more favorable in Laos than in Cam.
bodia. The short-term aims of the principal
belligerents in the Indochina War involve Laos
only tangentially. The scale of the fighting in
Laos directly depends on decisions reached in
Hanoi, Saigon and Washington rather more
than in Vietiane and Sam Neua. The people of
Laos, of all the peoples of Indochina, have the
least desire to be fighting each other on their
own. There is still only one head of state in
Laos and still a common acceptance of the idea
of a unified government, compared to two rival
heads of state and governments in South Viet-
nam and Cambodia. Lastly, an agreed formula
for a peace settlement exists in Laos in the
form of the 1962 Geneva Protocol which, if ad-
hered to by all concerned, would bring the con-
flict there to an end. Yet, in spite of these ad-
vantages, peace cannot come to Laos until the


134
situation there can be disentangled from the
situation in Vietnam. In 1970 events in Laos
moved in the direction of such a disentangle-
ment. The crux of the problem for the Lao fac-
tions in arriving at negotiations has always
been the difficulty of gaining a sufficient meas-
ure of independence from their foreign allies.
Put another way, the difficulty has been to
guarantee the foreign supporters of the Lao
factions on one side and the other that their
vital interests will not be compromised by al-
lowing the Lao to negotiate among them-
selves.” With bibliography. .
E. Laos’ Search for National Security
(See also Appendixes R and S)
1. Miscellaneous Aspects
THE ASIAN BALANCE OF POWER: A
COMPARISON WITH EUROPEAN PRECE-
DENTS, by Coral Bell. London. Institute for
Strategic Studies, 1968. 14 p. (Adelphi Papers
No. 44.)
“Asia needs a balance of power coali-
tion, similar to NATO, to deter Chinese expan-
sionism in the next decade. It was the tradi-
tionally European concept of balance of power,
not containment, which halted Soviet advances
in post-war Europe. Containment is at best a
military strategy for stop-gap action to pre-
went any territorial acquisition by the adver-
sary. Military containment has been tried in
Vietnam and has proved too costly in relation
to its effectiveness. A balance of power coali-
tion in Asia would have not only military, but
political and economic cohesion in deterring
China . . . The Asian coalition, therefore,
would include only those countries which are
definitely Western-oriented and have common
political, economic, and social interests to pro-
tect, such as Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore,
the Philippines, Taiwan, Japan, New Zealand,
and Australia. Burma, Cambodia, Laos, and
Vietnam should be made neutral buffer states
. . . However, a balance of power coalition is
not in the Asian tradition, and it will still be
difficult to organize. Moreover, Asian countries
alone cannot present China with a credible de-
terrent. A merely regional coalition will not be
effective against China’s increasing nuclear po-
tential. Asian countries need the economic, mil-
itary, and nuclear backing of the US. A consid-
erable input of Western military resources will
be required for at least a decade and a US de-
fense arrangement, similar to the Japanese-
American pact, will be needed for much
longer.”
BACKGROUND INFORMATION RELAT-
ING TO SOUTHEAST ASIA AND WIETNAM
(5th Rev. Ed.). Washington, Government
Printing Office, March 1969. 272 p. (91st Con-
gress, 1st Session, Committee on Foreign Rela-
tions, United States Senate, Committee Print.)
This Committee Print “contains mate-
rial deemed useful in discussion of the sit-
uation in Southeast Asia . . . [and] is limited
to statements by officials of the executive
branch and pertinent official documents, with
the exception of the material on the positions
of South Vietnam, North Vietnam, and the Na-
tional Liberation Front.” Contains the follow-
ing among many others: Summary Chronology
of Events in Southeast Asia, June 5,
1948—March 6, 1969; U.S. Recognition of Viet-
nam, Laos and Cambodia—Statement by the
Department of State, February 7, 1970; Eco-
nomic Aid Program—Note from the American
Charge d’ Affaires at Saigon to the Chiefs of
State of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, May
24, 1950; The Defense of Indochina—Commu-
nique Regarding Discussions between Repre-
sentatives of the United States, France, Viet-
nam, and Cambodia, June 18, 1952; Agreement
on the Cessation of Hostilities in Cambodia,
July 20, 1954; Agreement on the Cessation of
Hostilities in Laos, July 20, 1954; Southeast
Asia Collective Defense Treaty and Protocol
Thereto, September 8, 1954; Declaration on the
Neutrality of Laos, July 23, 1962; etc.
A SYSTEMS APPROACH TO SECURITY
IN THE INDIAN OCEAN ARC, by Sheldon
W. Simon, in Orbis (September 1970) 401–442.
“Systems analysis suggests that most of
the states in the Indian Ocean arc held certain
common views about the region. They see it,
following a projected Anglo-American with-
drawal, as particularly vulnerable to Chinese
and Vietnamese insurgency operations. They
are not, however, enthusiastic about a possible
collective security arrangement with the
USSR, designed to protect them against China.
The general Asian trend appears to be against
a visible land-based presence of any external
135
power. From their point of view, bases are an
insult to the host country’s sovereignty, in-
crease the probability of attack upon them-
selves during war, and serve as a battleground
for other powers. Moreover, they do not consid-
der the threat to their security serious enough
to require common defense arrangements.
Ideally, the Asian states seem to favor an ar-
rangement whereby they would assume pri-
mary responsibility for regional security,
though not necessarily through a formal de-
fense pact, while relying on the larger powers
for material support. Japan, India, and Indone-
sia, the three essential states in any security
arrangement, show little interest in formal re-
gional multilateral collaboration. Since the US
defense role in Southeast Asia is not likely to be
replaced by a regional security arrangement in
the near future, the US may wish to provide
logistical support and training to Laos, Cam-
bodia, and Thailand, where North Vietnamese
troop involvement is likely to continue well
after the war in Vietnam is terminated. Such
support activities could be based in Japan,
Okinawa, the Republic of Korea, Taiwan, the
Philippines, and Thailand. As long as the US
role is confined to support activities, it will not
generate extensive anti-Americanism. However,
should the US be called upon to provide air
cover, it might be wise to employ bases located
only in those states which are directly support-
ing the defending government . . .”
2. Armed Forces
THE MILITARY BALANCE 1970–1971—
PART V: ASIA AND AUSTRALASIA, in
Aerospace International, v. 6, no. 6 (Novem-
ber–December 1970) 54–56 plus.
A strategic survey of the military bal-
ance of this area of the world, including a sur-
vey of the following countries, among many
others: Burma, Cambodia, Laos, and Thailand.
Provides the strengths of the Armies, Navies,
Marine Corps, Air Forces, as well as Paramili-
tary Forces.
WORLD MILITARY EXPENDITURES,
1970. Washington, U.S. Arms Control and Dis-
armament Agency, Economic Bureau, 1970. 37
p. (Publication 58.)
Provides information on World Military
expenditures and related data for 120 countries
including Burma, Cambodia, Laos, and Thai
land, among others. With 8 charts, 6 tables,
and statistical notes. -
F. Foreign Relations
1. Laos and Her Neighbors
THE CHALLENGE OF WORLD POLI.
TICS IN SOUTH AND SOUTHEAST ASIA
by Werner Levi. Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Pren.
tice-Hall, Inc., 1968. 186 p.
The Elitist Nature of Foreign Policies;
The Problem of Nationalism; Regionalism;
Nonalignment—The Expectation and the Ré.
sult; The United Nations; Tensions and Con.
flicts; The Major Nations; etc. Discussed,
among many nations of the region are Burma,
Cambodia, Laos, and Thailand.
THE CHANGING FACE OF SOUTHEAST
ASIA, by Amry Vandenbosch and Richard But
well. Lexington, University of Kentucky Press,
1966. 438 p.
“When the authors set out to revise
their 1957 study, Southeast Asia among the
World Powers, the scene had changed so dras.
tically that they could retain only the histori.
cal sections of their country studies. This,
then, is a new account of Southeast Asian af.
fairs, with separate chapters on Indonesia, Ma-
laysia, the Philippines, Viet Nam, Laos, Cam-
bodia, Burma and Thailand, the region as a
whole, and U.S. policy. The authors are con-
cerned not only with the eight nations' internal
and international politics but especially with
the relationship between the two.”
2. Laos and Communist China
CHANGES IN CHINESE ATTENTION TO
SOUTHEAST ASIA, 1967–1969: THEIR
RELEVANCE FOR THE FUTURE OF THE
AREA, by Daniel Tretiak, in Current Scene;
Developments in Mainland China, v. 7, no. 21
(1 November 1969) 1–17.
“During the past several years there
have been important changes in the direction
of Chinese foreign policy toward Southeast
Asia. This article will examine the nature of
the changes and conclude by suggesting proba-
ble trends in Chinese policy toward Southeast
Asia in the next few years.” Changes in
Chinese Attention Levels to Burma, Indonesia,

136
Malaysia, Thailand, and Laos; Changing
Chinese Attention Levels to Vietnam.
CHINA AND THE DOMINOES, by Rhoads
Murphey, in Asian Survey, v. 6, no. 9 (Septem-
ber 1966) 510–515.
“The most remarkable thing about the
S0-called domino theory is that it is apparently
taken seriously by so many otherwise intelli-
gent people. To borrow a term popular with
many domino-fanciers, the main thrust of this
paper is to examine the bite of the theory in
the part of the world to which it is currently
most often applied, and to offer some alterna-
tive hypotheses based on an examination of ac-
tual circumstances rather than on imaginary
analogy. In any kind of inquiry, there is no
substitute for information and reasoning as the
basis for theory or prediction. Problems, simple
Or perplexing, are not effectively solved by ig-
noring relevant data and depending instead on
abstract formulae divorced from the reality at
hand, Briefly stated, the domino theory as it is
most commonly asserted for Southeast Asia
maintains that unless the allegedly expansion-
ist drive of Communist China is blocked by
military means, Chinese and/or Communist
power will overwhelm Laos and South Viet-
nam, and that this will automatically be fol-
lowed in a cumulative causal chain by the simi-
lar overwhelming first of adjacent Thailand
and Cambodia, then of the countries adjacent
to them, and so on until the whole of Southeast
Asia, and perhaps India, Pakistan, Ceylon, the
Middle East, and Africa are struck down
through the transmission of the first impulse
—the first fallen domino of what is seen as an
unbroken continuum leading spatially outward
from it. Although the foregoing may have a
Somewhat straw-man quality as a result of its
brevity, we are obliged to examine the hypoth-
esis, if only because a great many people, in-
cluding those in high office, appear to subscribe
to it, or at least to consider it among other hy-
potheses on which policy decisions may be
based.”
COMMUNIST CHINA AND THE CON-
FERENCE ON LAOS, by Chae-Jin Lee, in
Military Review, v. 50, no. 2 (February 1970)
24–36.
Condensed from the original, published
in Asian Survey, July 1969. “The direction of
Communist China's approach toward Laos has
often been influenced by changes in the balance
of politics in Vietiane. Just such a development
took place in August 1960 when Captain Kong
Le, an obscure parachute commander, staged a
successful coup d’etat overthrowing the pro-US
government of Premier Tiao Somsanith and
General. Phoumi Nosavan. As Kong Le de-
clared a neutral foreign policy, the Chinese
seized this fortuitous opportunity to denounce
the US presence in Laos and to attempt to en-
hance their influence there. They promptly en-
dorsed Kong Le’s efforts and encouraged him
to form a broad united front with the Pathet
Lao against Phoumi Nosavan's right-wing
groups. As soon as neutralist Prince Souvanna
Phouma was reinstated as Premier in Septem-
ber, Premier Chou En-lai sent him a congratu-
latory ‘message hoping that China and Laos
would establish and develop friendly, peaceful
relations. After rejecting Premier Souvanna
Phouma's overtures for national unity, Phoumi
Nosavan organized a ‘New Revolutionary Com-
mittee’ at Savannakhet under the titular
leadership of Prince Boun Oum and pledged to
fight against Kong Le. Even though the United
States recognized Souvanna Phouma's govern-
ment, it attached great importance to this be:
ginning of a ‘revolution’ at Savannakhet and
gave military assistance to Phoumi Nosavan's
troops through channels in Thailand. The am-
biguity of the US position inevitably increased
Souvanna Phouma's suspicions and, in effect,
drove him toward the Communist embrace. In
the face of Phoumi Nosavan’s growing mili-
tary activities during October and November,
Souvanna Phouma concluded a series of politi-
cal agreements with Prince Souphanouvong
and the Pathet Lao in order to accept economic
and military assistance from Moscow, Peking,
and Hanoi . . . On 24 April, the Soviet Union
and Great Britain reached agreement on three
measures leading to the ‘International Confer-
ence for the Peaceful Settlement of the Laotian
Question.” Indeed, from December 1960 to
April 1961, there gradually emerged a tacit un-
derstanding among the major powers with re-
gard to the general formula for a negotiated
settlement in Laos: An international neutrali-
zation of Laos to be supervised by the Interna-
tional Control Commission. A coalition govern-
137
ment to be composed of three rival factions
under Souvanna Phouma's premiership . . . In
a sense, the Geneva Conference marked an at-
tempt to resolve one aspect of the Sino-Ameri-
can conflict in Southeast Asia. The Chinese
scored a considerable diplomatic victory. They
forced the United States to accept the with-
drawal of its military advisors and SEATO’s
protective umbrella from Laos, to agree to the
reduction of the commission’s power, and to
acknowledge the coalition government with
Pathet Lao representation . . . At Geneva, the
Chinese maintained a remarkable degree of
outward unity and coordination with Moscow
and Hanoi in order to defend common interests
and denounce Western proposals. But they
could not always conceal their subtle differ-
ences with Moscow in diplomatic tactics and
strategic calculations vis-à-vis Laos and the
United States . . . To solve such difficult issues
as SEATO's role and military integration, the
Chinese relied on the decisions among the Lao-
tian groups which they could manipulate more
confidently than the Geneva Conference itself.”
COMMUNIST CHINA: ITS SOUTHERN
BORDER LANDS, by David P. Mezingo, in
SAIS Review, v. 12, no. 2 (Winter 1968)
43–54.
“Great powers are extremely sensitive
to any developments which pose real or poten-
tial danger to their strategic interests along or
near their frontiers. The Southern border lands
have occupied a special place in the strategic
outlook of every Chinese Government since the
Ch’in dynasty. For more than a thousand years
the main direction of Han Chinese expansion
and migration was southward. Some tribes
were subjugated; others were driven as far
south as the border regions of present-day
Burma, Thailand, Laos and Vietnam. To en-
force central control over these territories one
Chinese Government after another has had to
effect new subjugations of the southern tribes.
After the eighteenth century the southward
march of the Hans was checked substantially
by the decline of Manchu power, by the West-
ern colonization of South and Southeast Asia,
and by the increasing flow of China’s rural
populations into its newly rising seaports and
commercial centers. Under communist rule
these trends not only continue, but also have
been accelerated by Peking’s industrializatiº
program and the priority it has given to popi
lating and developing the northwest provinces
Politically, the southern border territoria
have presented more problems than assets in
the Chinese Communist Government.” -
COMMUNIST CHINA’s POLICY TO
WARD LAOS: A CASE STUDY, 1954–1961
by Chae-Jin Lee. Lawrence, University of Kal.
sas, Center for East Asian Studies, 1970. 161)
(Research Publication no. 6.)
“Contents: The Chinese Communis;
conception of Laos; The Chinese policy ºf
peaceful coexistence: China and the first Gº
neva formula on Laos. The Bandung ‘spirit
and Sino-Laotian relations. Peking and th:
peaceful unification of Laos; The Chinese pºl
icy of assertive pressure: Collapse of the pºll
icy of peaceful coexistence. Assertive an
proaches toward Laos. The United Nations|
presence and its effects; The Chinese policy of
negotiations at the second Geneva conference,
A prelude to the Geneva conference on LaCŞ.
Chinese positions and tactics at Geneva. Eval.
ation of the second Geneva formula; The
Chinese policy of reappraisal after the Geneva
conference: Development of the second Geneva
formula. Gradual erosion of a “neutralized
Laos. Reorientation of Chinese policy in LaCŞ.
Laos, the Vietnam war, and the Chinese cul
tural revolution; Evaluation and implications."
STORM OVER ASIA; CHINA AND
SOUTHEAST ASIA: THRUST AND RE.
SPONSE, by Robert Karr McCabe. New York,
The New American Library, 1967. 225 p.
“This is a book about war, though not a
war story, because war and death are cardinal
facts in today’s Asia. This is a book about
peace as well, for the hope of peace and prog.
ress is a part of every Asian's dreams. In sum,
this is a book about Asia under storm clouds—
but it includes . . . an implicit promise that
the storm is not forever.” Chapter I—The Kill.
ing Ground (Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos);
Chapter II—A Problem of Posture (Thai.
land); Chapter III—The Hermetic Hermit
(Burma). -
3. Laos and India.
INDIA AND THE FUTURE OF ASIA, by
Patwant Singh. New York, Alfred A. Knopf
1966. 264 p.

138
Picture in the Mid-Sixties; History’s
Legacy; Partition; The Anatomy of a Develop-
ing Economy; Foreign Affairs; India and
China—The Continuing Confrontation; De-
fense; Outlook in the Mid-Seventies; Bibliog-
raphy. Includes references to relations with
other countries of Asia, such as Burma, Cam-
bodia, Laos, and Thailand, among others.
INDIAN FOREIGN POLICY IN CAM-
BODIA, LAOS, AND VIETNAM, 1947–1964,
by D. A. SarDesai. Berkeley, University of Cal-
ifornia Press, 1968. 336 p.
“This . . . study of Indian foreign pol-
icy in key areas of Southeast Asia adds a new
and most welcome dimension to the literature
On the former Indo-Chinese states. The evalua-
tion of Prime Minister Nehru’s views in his
plans for the neutralization of southern Asia
and the Indian role in the International Truce
Commission in Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam is
analyzed.”
4. Laos and the United States: American
Policies and Actions (See also II–F–6–b)
a. Miscellaneous Aspects
ASIA: HOW STAND THE DOMINOES2 in
Newsweek, v. 78, no. 13 (27 September 1971)
47 plus.
“The very fact that an American Presi-
dent is actively seeking a détente with the rul-
ers of Communist China has wrought funda-
mental changes in the power balance of Asia.
"The Nixon visit,” says a Western diplomat
there, ‘means that we are seeing the removal
of rigid lines between non-Communists and
Communists, between the goodies and the bad-
dies.’ And with the possible exception of the
principals involved—the Americans and the
Chinese—no one will be so profoundly and di-
rectly affected by this development as the na-
tions of East and Southeast Asia. All ten of
Southeast Asia’s countries live in China’s
shadow. Three of them—North Vietnam, Laos
and Burma—have borders with China. Two of
them—Singapore and Malaysia—have huge
populations of Chinese descent. Most of the
Countries have Maoist guerrilla movements,
and four—North and South Vietnam; Laos
and Cambodia—are directly positioned in
Southeast Asia’s war zone. Except for North
Vietnam, all have lived directly or tacitly
under the American umbrella. And now that
this protective umbrella is being at least par-
tially withdrawn, all of them are faced with
major political readjustments. .NEWSWEEK's
Hong Kong bureau chief Maynard Parker last
week completed an extensive tour of all the
Southeast Asian lands outside the Indochina
peninsula . . . He reports on how these coun-
tries are adjusting to the new realities. In a
companion piece, former U.S. Under Secretary
of State George W. Ball discusses the larger
implications of the changing U.S. policy in
Asia and the special impact of Mr. Nixon's
China initiative on Japan.”
PERSPECTIVE ON ASIA: THE NEW U.S.
DOCTRINE AND SOUTHEAST ASIA. RE-
PORT OF SENATOR MIKE MANSFIELD
[UPON COMPLETION OF TRIP TO
SOUTHEAST ASIA] TO THE COMMITTEE
ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, UNITED
STATES SENATE. Washington, Government
Printing Office, 1969. 15 p. -
The President’s New Asian Doctrine;
Reactions to the New Asian Doctrine; The
New Doctrine and Southeast Asian Countries
(The Philippines, Indonesia, Burma, Cambodia,
and Laos); etc.
SETTING THE COURSE THE FIRST
YEAR; MAJOR POLICY STATEMENTS BY
PRESIDENT RICHARD NIXON. New York,
Funk & Wagnalls, 1970. 500 p.
Includes references to Cambodia, Laos,
and Thailand.
TO ESTABLISH AN ASIAN AND PA-
CIFIC COLLECTIVE SECURITY SYSTEM,
in Asian Outlook, v. 6, no. 2 (February 1971)
2–4.
“To carry out the so-called ‘Nixon doc-
trine’—the U.S. policy in Asia—the American
government has started withdrawing its troops
from Asia at an accelerated speed . . . The
first difficult problem that may take place is
the continuous deterioration of the war situa-
tion in Laos and Cambodia and the incessant
expansion of Communist subversive activities
in Thailand . . . The second difficult problem
is: The reduction of the Communist military
threat in South Vietnam is not entirely due to
139
the decline of the Communist strength as un-
derstood by the United States. Rather, they
pretend that their strength has shrunk in
order to lure the United States into accelerat-
ing the withdrawal of its troops . . . The third
difficult problem is: It is possible that once all
American troops are pulled out from Southeast
Asia and can no longer be sent back there, the
Red Chinese will openly help the Communists
in Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia and Thailand
launch an all-out attack in an attempt to seize
all of Southeast Asia . . . Before the United
States withdraws its troops, it should make the
necessary deployments actively so that the free
Asian countries can take over the responsibil-
ity of defending the security and peace of
Asia.”
WIDER WAR: THE STRUGGLE FOR
CAMBODIA, THAILAND, AND LAOS, by
Donald Kirk. New York, Praeger, 1971. 305 p.
& &
. . . Analysis of the overall struggle
occurring in the Indochinese peninsula . . . The
conflicts which have been taking-place in Cam-
bodia, Thailand, and Laos at the same time as
that occurring in Vietnam, . . . present critical
situations and uncertain future resolutions
. Thai-Vietnamese rivalry for control of
Cambodian and Laotian territory on either side
of the Mekong River long predates the US at-
tempt to stop the spread of communism in
these Indochinese states; . . . the ethnic, reli-
gious, economic, political, and military conflicts
in all four countries are deeply interwoven . . .
The opposing Indochinese factions seem so bit-
terly irreconcilable that the region will likely
endure more horrible and extensive war before
some settlement, however unhappy, emerges.
Despite President Nixon’s announcement at the
outset of the invasion into Cambodia on April
30, 1971, that “we shall avoid a wider war,’ the
struggle in Indochina seems to have expanded
inevitably. After many years of active involve-
ment in Indochina, the US has not mediated
the various but related conflicts; some argue
that US involvement may have even aggra-
vated them. At best, it may have delayed their
settlement on Indochinese terms. “Wider war’
will probably run its course whether the US
remains in Indochina or withdraws . . . Kirk
suggests that US withdrawal from the strug-
gle is probably the wisest course, since no
amount of intervention by any of the outsid:
powers could bring a satisfactory peace to th:
Indochinese, who seemingly must endure moſt
suffering before evolving their own satisfac.
tory accommodation.” •
b. The Scope of United States Involº.
ment in Laos: Past and Present (See also Ap.
pendia; A) .
(1) Miscellaneous Aspects
IF YOU WONDER WHAT U.S. IS D0.
ING IN LAOS, in U.S. News & World Report,
v. 68, no. 1 (5 January 1970) 28–29.
“Just as the U.S. is starting to pull Oil
of one war in Southeast Asia, critics in Col.
gress are worrying about involvement in all
other. Attention is turned to embattled Laºs, I
What is that war all about? How deeply is the
U.S. involved? Here’s the full picture.”
LAOS, by Lt. Col. Edgar W. Duskin, in
Military Review, v. 48, no. 3 (March 1968) 3-
10. -
“At the time of the signing of the Geneva
accords of 1962, there was a great fear among |
the US military leaders and among some mem.
bers of Congress and the Department of State |
that Laos would fall under Communist doming
tion within six months. Communist Pathet Laſ
troops were foreseen as menacing Thailand all
along the banks of the Mekong within a very
short time. Many still feel strongly that any tº
periment in coalition government which in
cludes the Communists is an automatic invita.
tion to disaster. Those holding the opposite CŞ.
treme point of view, point to success in LaCŞ.
and some of them advocate a similar solutions:
the best way out of the Vietnam dilemma. Th:
withdrawal of the US Military Assistance Ad
visory Group in 1962, under terms of the at
cords, took Laos from the front pages. Exceſ
for those whose duties required close following
of subsequent events there, little general inter.
est has been evidenced in the country.” TW
Impressions about the Current State of Affair
in Laos; Situation in 1962; Operation Triangle
in 1964; Clearing Route 13; Conditions under
Which Progress Has Occurred in Laos; etc.
LAOS: ANATOMY OF AN AMERICAN
INVOLVEMENT, by Roland A. Paul, in For.
eign Affairs (April 1971) 533–547.
“According to the author, when Presi.

140
dent Kennedy came to office in 1961, he was
startled to learn that almost 700 American
soldiers were in Laos, while about 500 Soviet
troops were there providing logistics support
to the Pathet Lao and their North Vietnamese
allies. Fearing the possible consequences of a
confrontation and considering American inter-
ests in Laos to be small, Kennedy sought to dis-
engage. This resulted in negotiations and the
Geneva Accords of 1962 under which the Lao-
tians established a tripartite government com-
posed of right-wing royalist elements under
General Phoumi Nosavan, neutralist elements
under Prince Souvanna Phouma and communist
elements whose nominal leader was Prince Sou-
phanouvong (Souvanna Phouma's half broth-
er). The balance of power in the government
was given to the neutralists, and Souvanna
Phouma became Prime Minister, a post he still
holds today. Although the Americans and the
Russians left Laos, the North Vietnamese failed
to withdraw most of their 6,000-man force. Af-
ter a peaceful year, fighting broke out again.
The war in Laos is not a single war, but two
distinct conflicts being fought for different pur-
pOSes and to some extent by different forces.
One conflict is for political control of Laos, in
which the current government forces are sup-
ported by Americans and Thais against the
Pathet Lao and their North Vietnamese allies
in northern and central Laos and, to some ex-
tent, in the Mekong River Valley. The other
Conflict involves the efforts of the North Viet-
namese to use the Ho Chi Minh trail in the
eastern part of the Laotian panhandle to supply
their forces fighting in South Vietnam and
Cambodia, and the efforts of the American and
South Vietnamese to interdict them. Until the
recent invasion by South Vietnamese troops,
Supported by US air power, the American in-
Wolvement was mainly in northern and central
Laos. The US is also concerned over roadbuild-
ing efforts by 10,000 Chinese in the northern-
most provinces of Laos . . . It seems unlikely to
Mr. Paul that the US will send ground combat
troops to defend the Vientiane government . . .”
THE LIMITS OF COERCIVE DIPLO-
MACY; LAOS, CUBA, VIETNAM, by Alex-
ander L. George and others. Boston, Little,
Brown and Company, 1971. 268 p.
“This book emerges from a new research
program on ‘Theory and Practice in [U.S.]
International Relations’.” Contents: The Devel-
opment of Doctrine and Strategy; The Laos
Crisis, 1960–61; The Cuban Missile Crisis,
1962; The Vietnam Intervention, 1964–65; and
Comparisons and Lessons.
NIXON ON LAOS: HANOI’S TROOP
BUILD-UP–A NEW APPEAL, in SEATO
Record, v. 9, no. 2 (April 1970) 18–19.
“In a 3,000 word statement on Laos,
President Nixon on March 6 called on the Soviet
Union and Britain to help in bringing peace to
Laos. The following are extracts from that
statement: “In the light of the increasingly
massive presence of North Vietnamese troops
and their recent offensives in Laos, I have writ-
ten letters today to British Prime Minister Wil-
son and Soviet Premier Kosygin asking their
help in restoring the 1962 Geneva agreements
for that country. As co-chairmen of that con-
ference, the United Kingdom and the Soviet
Union have particular responsibilities for see-
ing that its provisions are honoured. My letters
note the persistent North Vietnamese violations
of the accords and their current offensives;
support the Laotian Prime Minister’s own cur-
rent appeal to the co-chairmen for consulta-
tions; urge the co-chairmen to work with other
signatories of the Geneva accords; and pledge
full United States co-operation’.”
OUR INVOLVEMENT IN LAOS, by Robert
Shaplen, in Foreign Affairs, v. 48, no. 3 (April
1970) 478–493.
“The debate over Laos, almost as in-
tense if not as bitter as the Vietnam debate,
has done more than clarify the nature of the
American involvement in that patchwork king-
dom which has played a secondary but signifi-
cant role in the Vietnam war while also engag-
ing in its own struggle to survive as a unitary
nation. The Senate's dual actions in prohibit-
ing the use of ground combat troops in both
Laos and Thailand, and in curbing the right of
the President to make a ‘national commitment’
to any country without prior Congressional ap-
proval, have temporarily satisfied the common
determination to avoid another Vietnam.” But
the fundamental problem of how American
141
policy should be made and conducted in South-
east Asia has only begun to be reexamined.
The broad outlines of our future policy in Asia
were given by President Nixon during his
Asian trip last year, most fully at his prelimi-
nary stopover in Guam, but much remains
hazy about the nature of our current commit-
ments and responsibilities there. The President
and other administration officials in speeches
and press conferences since then have reem-
phasized that, in line with reducing “our in-
volvement and our presence’ around the world,
as Mr. Nixon put it in his State of the Union
Message, the nations of Southeast Asia will
henceforth have to bear the main burden of de-
fending themselves against all but the most
flagrant—including nuclear—forms of aggres-
sion. Still unclear and requiring further reap-
praisal are such substantive matters as the
prerogatives of the Executive and the Depart-
ments of State and Defense to make agree-
ments or pledges short of treaties with foreign
countries without ‘the advice and consent’ of
the Senate.”
PRESIDENT KENNEDY AND THE NEU-
TRALIZATION OF LAOS, by Kenneth L.
Hill, in The Review of Politics, v. 31, no. 3
(July 1969) 353–369.
“Soon after John F. Kennedy became
President, difficult foreign policy decisions had
to be made. Even before he assumed the bur-
dens of office, he knew an early judgment
would be required concerning United States
policies vis-a-vis Laos. Throughout 1960, Com-
munist forces in Laos and their allies won nu-
merous military victories and the Laotian
Royal Army was unable to check their ad-
vances. The United States and other SEATO
members were understandably disturbed. They
now had to contemplate a total Communist vic-
tory with all its potentially painful and embar-
rassing consequences. These consequences wor-
ried President-elect Kennedy and prior to his
inauguration, he and his advisors began sys-
tematically examining all their policy alterna-
tives; they found that none were really attrac-
tive. President Kennedy’s response to the
Laotian crisis is interesting because it provided
his first opportunity to initiate specific changes
in American foreign policy. He obviously had
serious reservations about President Eisenhow-
er’s conception of America’s role in the inter.
national political system and these were dº
tailed during the 1960 presidential compaigi
As Kennedy’s Laotian policies began to tak,
shape, the contrasting styles of the two admin.
istrations quickly became apparent. If Kem;
dy’s Laotian policies require a descriptiº
label, the term ‘disengagement' would perhaps
be best. It reveals the nature of the changú
made and suggests the relationship betwº
these changes and what has come to be known
9 y 9
as the ‘new isolationism’.
RECURRING PROBLEMS IN LAOS, I
Elizabeth Urrows, in Current History, v, fil
no. 340 (December 1969) 361—363 plus,
This review of the recurring problem,
confronting Laos brings to the fore the fad
that “After eight years of American preocºl.
pation with the conflict in Vietnam, attentiºn
is once again broadening to include Thailani;
and Laos.”
SCOPE OF THE U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN
LAOS; A STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT
NIXON. Washington, Department of Stahl
May 1970. 5 p. (Publication 8524.) .
The President states: “North Wić,
Nam's military escalation in Laos has intensi
fied public discussion in this country. The pur.
pose of this statement is to set forth the reCOſ
of what we found in January 1969 and the pſ.
icy of this administration since that time.”
SECURITY AGREEMENTS AND COM.
MITMENTS ABROAD. REPORT TO THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE, BY THE SU}
COMMITTEE ON SECURITY AGRE;
MENTS AND COMMITMENTS ABROAD
DECEMBER 21, 1970. Washington, Govem.
ment Printing Office, 1970. 28 p. (91st Cº.
gress, 2d Session, Committee Print.)
“The primary thrust of this reportist
emphasize that in order to play its role in for
eign policy formulation and legislative suppoſi
the Congress must be both informed an
active.” Partial contents: Major Problem
Areas (The Philippines, Laos, Thailand, Tº
Republic of China, Japan/Okinawa, KOttº
Ethiopia, NATO, Spain, Foreign Development
of Tactical Nuclear Weapons, Intelligence At
tivities Abroad, Secrecy); and Foreign Poliº

142
Implications of United States Military Bases
Abroad.
"WE SEEK NO WIDER WAR IN LAOS,” in
Atlas, v. 19, no. 3 (March 1970) 32 plus.
“The continuing conflict in Laos sporad-
ically produces a rash of headlines in the U.S.
press which are quickly forgotten. Some time
ago, for instance, Senator J. W. Fulbright
questioned America’s ten-year involvement in
Laos, but after some fulmination the issue
faded. Arnold Abrams, a . . . correspondent
now writing for Hong Kong's . . . Far Eastern
ECOnomic Review, raises the question anew
with a sweeping . . . examination of the un-
publicized battles now taking place in the Lao-
tian underbrush. No, U.S. officials assured
Abrams, America seeks no wider war in Laos
, , , and the writer was reminded of other
words in other places . . .”
(2) United States Aid to Laos
FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT, 1969.
HEARINGS BEFORE THE COMMITTEE
ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, UNITED
STATES SENATE, NINETY-FIRST CON-
GRESS, FIRST SESSION, ON S.2347, JULY
14, 15, 18, AND AUGUST 6, 1969. Washing-
ton, Government Printing Office, 1969. 336 p.
Includes military assistance information
On Cambodia, Laos, and Thailand among many
Others.
THE FOREIGN ASSISTANCE PRO-
GRAM; [U.S. PRESIDENT'S] ANNUAL RE-
PORT TO THE CONGRESS, FISCAL YEAR
1970, Washington, Government Printing Office,
1971, 82 p.
Chapter V deals with U.S. aid to East
Asia, and more specifically to the following,
among others: Laos and Thailand.
OUR SECRET WAR IN LAOS, by Denis
Warner, in The Reporter (April 22, 1965)
“Prince Souvanna Phouma has not only
Survived the past two coups in Laos, but has
also emerged as a strong and successful leader.
With the first coup, Souvanna became thor-
Oughly disillusioned with the Pathet Lao and
agreed to a new American role. With the sec-
Ond coup, Souvanna strengthened his position
as head of the rightist-neutralist coalition and
restored full military control to a loyal high
command. The Communist successes in Laos,
which culminated in the April coup, made it
imperative that the U.S. take a more active
role than it had since the 1962 neutralization
agreements. The U.S. had two choices: it could
denounce the Geneva Agreement and openly in-
tervene in the war again; or it could fight fire
with fire and follow the Pathet Lao ground
rules. It chose the latter. The instrument for
this new policy was Air America, a CIA para-
military operation. By airlifting supplies, Air
America made friends of the loyal tribesmen
and the refugees of the Pathet Lao. Only the
tribesmen along the Ho Chi Minh Trail have
not been won over. The airlifts, together with
|U.S. reconnaissance missions and retaliatory
flights, went a long way in halting Communist
advances. More important, the American inter-
vention provided a climate of confidence in
which the government may begin to govern.
The divisions between the rightists-neutralists
and the Pathet Lao now appear unbridgeable.
That this happened before all Laos fell into
Communist hands is a stroke of good fortune
which the anti-Communist leaders who
brought about the Geneva Agreements scarcely
deserve.”
RELATIONSHIP OF U.S. MILITARY AID
TO GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IN
LAOS, by Lt. Col. John A. Smith. Maxwell Air
Force Base, Ala., Air War College, 1968. 315 p.
(Research Report No. 3679; M-32983–5.)
A brief summary of the geographic, de-
mographic, economic, political, and military
factors influencing the Lao scene introduces a
discussion of the military and nonmilitary aid
given to Laos. A chronological study is then
made of the period from World War II
through February 1968, with particular atten-
tion to the role of military aid in all its facets
in promoting, or denigrating from, governmen-
tal stability. Major emphasis is given to the pe-
riod after the 1962 Geneva Conference. It is
concluded that military aid given to Laos in re-
cent years has promoted stability, that such
aid does not necessarily require large forces
in-country to be most effective, and that back-
ing an anticommunist, rather than a noncom-
munist, faction does not always produce the
best results.

143
REVIEW OF THE VIETNAM CONFLICT
AND ITS IMPACT ON U.S. MILITARY
COMMITMENTS ABROAD. REPORT OF
THE SPECIAL SUBCOMMITTEE ON NA-
TIONAL DEFENSE POSTURE, OF THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
JNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRE-
SENTATIVES, NINETIETH CONGRESS,
SECOND SESSION, UNDER AUTHORITY
OF H.RES.124, AUGUST 24, 1968. Washing-
ton. Government Printing Office, 1968. 84 p.
(Committee Print.)
Of special interest are portions of the
report dealing with: Southeast Asia Collective
Defense Treaty; Cambodia, Laos, and Thai-
land.
U.S. FOREIGN AID IN EAST ASIA; PRO-
POSED FISCAL YEAR 1970 PROGRAM.
Washington, Agency for International Devel-
opment, 1970. 39 p.
Includes some of the following informa-
tion for Laos and Thailand, among other coun-
tries of East Asia: Program Summary; U.S.
Aid Objectives; Problems and Progress; FY
1970 Program (Stabilization, Security and De-
velopment Projects, Rural Development,
Public Health, Family Planning, Roads, Refu-
gees, Civil Police Administration, Agriculture,
Human Resources Development, Public Admin-
istration, Export Promotion, etc.).
G. Boundaries and Frontiers: The In-
fluence of Events Across the Borders
ASIAN FRONTIERS: STUDIES IN A
CONTINUING PROBLEM, by Alastair Lamb.
New York, Frederick A. Praeger, 1968. 246 p.
“An . . . account of boundary disputes,
many of which have their origins in or before
the period of colonial domination. The regions
covered include Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan,
India, Nepal, Bhutan, Burma, Thailand, Laos,
Cambodia, North and South Vietnam, China,
Mongolia, and the Asian republics of the
USSR. Explosive subjects, such as Kashmir,
the Sino-Indian crisis and the Sino-Soviet bor-
der, are treated in detail. Thirty maps assist
the reader in following the textual material.”
PRESSURES ON LAOS, by Charles Smith,
in Asian Affairs, v. 57, New Series, V.I, Part
III (October 1970) 285–292.
“The irruption of the Vietnamese wº
into Cambodia earlier this year and the appa.
ent destruction of Cambodia's once-prized nå.
trality, have been watched with varying is
grees of concern, agitation and distress ||
Cambodia’s neighbours. There is probably m
capital, however, where the Cambodian affi
has been followed more closely and with mon
thought for the lessons that might be learnt
from it, than Vientiane, the small river-sik
town which has been the seat of the Govem.
ment of Laos since the country's post-war ind;
pendence. Laos not only has common borden
with Cambodia and the two Vietnams, and
history of being involved on its own account,
an alarming extent with the Vietnam war. It
also shared with Cambodia, until the time ſi
the coup against Prince Sihanouk, the doubtful
distinction of being one of the two statº
through which Communist arms and supplit
passed on their way to Vietnam. It is becaus.
of this involuntary link between the two coul.
tries that the Cambodian coup holds special
and alarming implications for the neutrali;
Government in Vientiane.”
H. The Land and the People (See alsº
Ethnic Map in Appendix JJ)
A GRAPHIC LOOK AT THE LANDS AND
PEOPLES OF SOUTHEAST ASIA|
[INCLUDING BURMA, CAMBODIA, LAOS
AND THAILAND], in National Geographi;
v. 139, no. 3 (March 1971) 295–365.
Part 1—Mosaic of Cultures; Part 2–
New Light on a Forgotten Past; Part 3–
Pagan, on the Road to Mandalay. -
THE MEKONG; RIVER OF TERROR
AND HOPE, by Peter T. White, in Nationſ
Geographic, v. 134, no. 6 (December 1968)
737—787.
An essay of the land and the people ºf
the area with maps and numerous photos alsº
on the Mekong River which traverses, among
others, Burma, Laos, Thailand, and Cambodia.
The Hope of the Mekong Project (A Plan tº
Revolutionize Life for Millions of Southea:
Asians by Harnessing the River for Power and
Irrigation); New Ways for a Lao Farmer; Lºſ
Guerrillas Threaten Officials; Thailand Guard;
a Precarious Peace; Chinese Soldiers Hol

144
Corner of Burma; Foreigners Crowd into
Wientiane; Rice Crop Fertilized by Monsoon;
Phnom Penh, Cambodia, City Built Where
Floating Buddhas Stopped; Dams Hold Prom-
ise and Problems; etc.
MONSOON ASIA; A GEOGRAPHICAL
SURVEY, by Harry Robinson. New York,
Frederick A. Praeger, 1967. 561 p.
“This study is planned in two main
parts: an introductory section dealing with the
general geographical framework of the region,
the physical and cultural background, the re-
sources, agriculture and industry, and some as-
pects of political geography, followed by a sec-
Ond, and larger, section which is concerned
with the regional geography of Monsoon Asia,
each country being dealt with in general, and
then by regions . . . Emphasis has been placed
upon two aspects: first, the historical and cul-
tural background and, second, recent economic
changes and developments. Furthermore, very
significant economic changes, with all their so-
cial and political implications, are taking place
within the region; but it is not easy to procure
immediate information on these matters and
an attempt has been made to give a reasonably
up-to-date account of the changes in process.
The maps have been kept relatively simple to
give clarity.” Contents: The Monsoon Region
—Introduction; The Physical Background; Re-
Sources and Economy; The Human Back-
ground; The Indian Sub-Continent; India—So-
Cial and Economic Geography; India—Re-
gional Geography; Pakistan; Nepal, Sikkim
and Bhutan; Ceylon; South-East Asia;
Burma; Thailand; Cambodia, Laos and Viet-
nam; Malaysia; Indonesia; The Philippine Is-
lands; The Chinese People's Republic; China
—Economic and Regional Geography; Hong
Kong, Macao and Taiwan: Korea; Japan—
General and Regional Geography. With: bibli-
Ography, illustrations, and tables.
THE NEED FOR CROSS-CULTURAL
KNOW-HOW : CULTURAL BEHAVIOR OF
THE PEOPLES OF LAOS, by Gunther Lange.
Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala., Air Command
and Staff College, 1969. 162 p. (Research
Study No. 0740–69; M-35582–7–U.)
“The need for cross-cultural training
for Air Force personnel under special mission
and survival conditions is analyzed. After ex-
ploring cultural differences, cross-cultural
problems are examined. This appraisal in-
cludes the evaluation of cross-cultural contacts
of U.S. military personnel in Laos. A study of
the cultural behavior of the peoples of Laos is
performed, including customs and taboos of se-
lected tribes. The vast difference between East-
ern and Western values is illustrated. The
study concludes with an urgent need for train-
ing in cross-cultural relations. It recommends a
basic, informal program, and provides guide-
lines.”
SOUTHEAST ASIA; HISTORY, CUL-
TURE, PEOPLE, by Edward Graff and Harold
E. Hammond. Bronxville, N.Y., Cambridge
Book Co., Inc., 1967. 154 p.
Southeast Asia—The Land; Early His-
tory of Southeast Asia; The People of the
Hills, Plains and Villages; The arrival of the
Europeans (The Special Case of Thailand,
among others); Language and Culture of
Southeast Asia; The New Nations—Their Prob-
lems and Promise (Burma, Malaysia, Singa-
pore, Philippines, Indonesia, Laos, Cambodia,
Vietnam, Thailand, among others); The For-
eign Relations of Southeast Asian Nations;
and Bibliography.
SOUTH-EAST ASIA—RACE, CULTURE,
AND NATION, Guy Hunter. New York, Ox-
ford University Press, 1966. 190 p. (Published
for the Institute of Race Relations, London.)
The author explores the following
themes “as part of a single process in the de-
velopment of the nations of South-East Asia:
(a) the transition from tradition to modernity;
(b) the establishment of national identity, le-
gitimacy, and unity out of diversity which
reappeared when the colonial blanket was
whipped off; (c) the complications introduced
in (a) and (b) by racial and ethnic diversity.”
These problems are also considered for the fol-
lowing countries of Peninsular Southeast Asia,
among others: Burma, Cambodia, Laos, and
Thailand.
I. Internal Conditions
1. Miscellaneous Aspects
VIENTIANE DOZES THROUGH THE
145

WAR, by Alan Castro, in Atlas, v. 19, no. 8 (Au-
gust 1970) 2931.
“Laos has been on and off the front
pages of the world’s press for fifteen years,
and one would think its capital city would
throb with talk of the nearby battlefront. But
in fact, as journalist Alan Castro discovered,
Vientiane continues on its quiet way, leaving
the back-thumping war-talk to the city’s
American residents . . . Castro, born in Macau,
and a Far Eastern correspondent for 23 years,
set down his impressions for the weekly Asia
Magazine.”
WORLD SURVEY OF EDUCATION. IV:
HIGHER EDUCATION. New York, UNESCO
Center, 1966. 1433 p.
The information contained in this vol-
ume was received before the end of June 1964.
The table of contents, with all references to
the names and status of countries (including
Burma, Cambodia, Laos, and Thailand) and
territories, was drawn upon on 1 September
1963, and subsequent changes are therefore not
reflected. The educational system, the develop-
ment of higher education, university institu-
tions, etc. With bibliography on higher educa-
tion.
2. In the Wake of War: Refugees and Civil-
iam War Casualty Problems
REFUGEE AND CIVILIAN WAR CAS-
UALTY PROBLEMS IN INDOCHINA. A
STAFF REPORT PREPARED FOR THE
USE OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVES-
TIGATE PROBLEMS CONNECTED WITH
REFUGEES AND ESCAPEES, OF THE
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
UNITED STATES SENATE, SEPTEMBER
28, 1970. Washington, Government Printing
Office, 1970. 107 p. (91st Congress, 2d Session,
Committee Print.)
“This report continues the subcommit-
tee’s effort to document the devastating impact
of the Indochina war on the civilian popula-
tion, and to make the case again that the prob-
lems of war refugees and civilian casualties
must be a matter of vital concern to the Ameri-
can people and their Government . . . With the
spreading of war into Cambodia, fear has now
gripped almost the entire population of Indo-
china, vastly increasing human misery, the
flow of refugees, and the occurrence of civilian
war casualties . . . In Cambodia alone, OW&
the last four to five months the population ºf
Phnom Penh has doubled—from some 7000'ſ
to well over 1 million persons . . . In Laos–
where we have been witnessing the familiar
pattern of Vietnam in the destruction of th
countryside, the generation of refugees, and
the occurrence of civilian war casualties—i.
situation among civilians continues to deterior.
ate.” Contents: South Vietnam (The Refugº
Situation; Civilian War Casualties; Social
Welfare and Rehabilitation); Laos (The Reſ;
gee Situation; Civilian War Casualties); Cam.
bodia; etc. With appendices.
REFUGEE AND CIVILIAN WAR CAS
UALTY PROBLEMS IN LAOS AND CAM.
BODIA. HEARING BEFORE THE SUBCOM.
MITTEE TO INVESTIGATE PROBLEMS
CONNECTED WITH REFUGEES AND ES.
CAPEES, OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE
JUDICIARY, UNITED STATES SENATE
NINETY-FIRST CONGRESS, SECON)
SESSION, MAY 7, 1970. Washington, Govem.
ment Printing Office, 1970. 107 p.
WAR-RELATED CIVILIAN PROBLEMS
IN INDOCHINA. PART II: LAOS AN)
CAMBODIA. HEARINGS BEFORE TH}|
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE
PROBLEMS CONNECTED WITH REFU.
GEES AND ESCAPEES, OF THE COMMIT.
TEE ON THE JUDICIARY, UNITE)
STATES SENATE, NINETY-SECOND CON.
GRESS, FIRST SESSION, APRIL 21 AND
22, 1971. Washington, Government Printing
Office, 1971. 173 p.
3. Communism (See also Section on Norff
Vietnam and Pathet Lao B–5 Above)
THE BATTLE CRY IS TO CREATE TWO
THREE . . . MANY VIET NAMS, by Majºr
Ernesto “Che” Guevara, in Tricontineni
Magazine (June 1967).
“‘Create two, three, many Viet Nams'
is the appeal to Asians, Africans, and Latin
Americans, in an article purportedly writieſ
by Cuba's Major Ernesto “Che' Guevara, all
scheduled for publication in the first (Juſt
1967) issue of Tricontinental Magazine, Tit
magazine is an organ of the Afro-Asian-Lali
American Peoples’ Solidarity Organizatil
146
(AALAPSO). In Vietnam, “the most powerful
imperialist power is feeling the drain caused
by a poor and backward nation.” The author
Calls On the ‘exploited of the world’ not to fear
War, but to ‘hit hard and incessantly at every
point of confrontation.” By creating more Viet-
mams, the downtrodden of three continents can
topple American power. The history of crises
On three continents during the past 21 years
serves as background for posing the question
as to ‘possibilities for the short-term or med-
ium-term liberation of peoples.” Latin America
is seen as the most fertile ground for forcing
another Vietnam. In Africa, political and so-
Cial evolution does not indicate a continental
revolutionary situation. Only when the black
masses in South Africa or Rhodesia begin their
real revolutionary struggle, will a new era
have started in Africa. In Asia, however, the
situation is explosive. Points of friction are not
just Wietnam and Laos, but in Cambodia, Thai-
land, Malaysia, and of course Indonesia, ‘where
we cannot believe the last word has been
Said'.”
COLD WAR OPERATIONS: THE POLI-
TICS OF COMMUNIST CONFRONTATION;
PARTXI—COMMUNISM IN ASIA, by Lyman
B. Kirpatrick, Jr., in Naval War College Re-
view, v. 21, no. 3 (November 1968) 57–63.
A summary of the status of communism
in the various countries in Asia, including the
following, among others: Burma, Cambodia,
Laos, and Thailand.
WORLD STRENGTH OF THE COMMU-
NIST PARTY ORGANIZATIONS. 23rd
ANNUAL REPORT; 1971 EDITION. Wash-
ington, Department of State, Bureau of Intelli-
gence and Research, 1971. 248 p. (Publication
8526.) .
“This report contains the 23rd annual
global survey of communist parties . . . This
issue, like its predecessors, gives information
On party membership and on voting and parlia-
mentary strength wherever applicable, to-
gether with a brief analysis of the importance
of each communist party in its domestic politi-
Cal environment.” Includes information on
many countries, including, among others, the
following: Burma, Cambodia, Laos, and Thai-
land. See also appendixes for the bibliography
On Peninsular Southeast Asia.
J. Economic Aspects
1. Miscellaneous Aspects
DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE TO
SOUTHEAST ASIA. New York, Committee
for Economic Development, July 1970. 83 p.
Principles of Development Assistance to
Southeast Asia; Economic Development in
Southeast Asia; External Assistance to South-
east Asia; The essentials for Rapid Develop-
ment; Recommendations to assisting Countries
and International Organizations; etc. With
seven statistical tables. Includes information
on the following, among others, Burma, Cam-
bodia, Laos, and Thailand.
COMMUNIST STATES AND DEVELOP-
ING COUNTRIES: AID AND TRADE IN
1970. Washington, Department of State, Bu-
reau of Intelligence and Research, 22 Septem-
ber 1971. 45 p. (Research Study RECS-15.)
“The aid and trade activities of the
three principal communist regions the (USSR,
East Europe, and the People's Republic of
China) with the less developed countries of the
non-communist world [including Burma, Cam-
bodia, Laos, and Thailand] are reviewed an-
nually by INR. This study incorporates eco-
nomic and military aid and technical assistance
data through the end of 1970, complete trade
figures through 1969, and preliminary trade
data for 1970.”
ECONOMIC EVOLUTION OF LAOS
1957–1967, by Maj. Keith R. Grimes. Maxwell
Air Force Base, Ala., Air Command and Staff
College, 1968. 159 p. (Thesis no. 0460–68;
M–35582–7–5.) -
“The economic development of Laos
from 1957 through 1967 is described and ana-
lyzed. The author built the basis of his eco-
nomic study upon an examination of Laos’ eco-
nomic foundation—its physical, ethnic, and
cultural structure and its existing social capi-
tal and past economic patterns. Agricultural
and non-agricultural production were then
studied, followed by an investigation of fiscal,
monetary, and trade conditions during the pe-
riod. The Mekong Project, the Kingdom’s great-
est single avenue toward development was
studied last. The writer concluded, if hostilities
remain at the 1967 level some economic devel-
147
opment is possible—specifically agricultural
development. He recommends continued eco-
nomic assistance from the United States. With-
out it the future of Laos is dismal.”
ECONOMIC SURVEY OF ASIA AND THE
FAR EAST, 1969. Bangkok, Thailand, United
Nations, 1969. 285 p. (E/CN.11/935.)
This “Survey” is the twenty-third in a
series of reports prepared annually by the sec-
retariat of the Economic Commission for Asia
and the Far East. A major object of the “Sur-
vey” is the analysis of recent economic devel-
opments in the countries of Asia and the Far
East (including Burma, Cambodia, Laos, and
Thailand, among others), and of international
developments that affect them. Particular at-
tention is paid to the analysis of economic pol-
icy and of policy issues. With numerous tables.
FOREIGN TRADE STATISTICS OF
ASIA AND THE FAR EAST, 1966. New
York, United Nations, Economic Commission
for Asia and the Far East, 1969. 622 p. (Vol.
V, Series A, No. 2.)
This issue of the Foreign Trade Statis-
tics of Asia and the Far East is the fifth in a
series designed to provide both summary and
detailed trade statistics of the countries of the
region. This issue relates to countries of Penin-
sular Southeast Asia (including Cambodia,
Laos, and Thailand) in the ECAFE region,
among many others.
GOING NOWHERE, by Francois Nivolon,
in Far Eastern Economic Review, v. 69, no. 29
(16 July 1970) 32–33.
“Development projects have come to a
standstill in war-torn Cambodia. Development
aid promises remain only promises. The na-
tion’s main foreign exchange earning indus-
tries—rubber and rice—are suffering badly. In
Laos the picture is similar.”
INDOCHINA : VIETNAM, LAOS, CAM-
BODIA, in Quarterly Economic Review, no. 2
(30 June 1971) 1–14.
This quarterly review summarizes the
political and economic situations of Vietnam,
Laos, and Cambodia for the past quarter. This
quarterly is one of a series of 70 quarterly eco-
nomic reviews, published in London by the
Economist Intelligence Unit Ltd.
- ºf H
LABOR LAW AND PRACTICE IN THE
KINGDOM OF LAOS, by Theodore Bleecket
Washington, Department of Labor, Bureau of
Labor Statistics, 1970. 52 p. (BLS Report Nº.
381.)
The Country and Its Workers (Gº.
graphic, Political, and Economic Factors
Cultural and Social Factors; Manpower Rº
sources); Government and Labor; Conditions(ſ
Employment; Selected Bibliography; Tablº;
Map.
LAOS AND VIETNAM: LOOKING TO.
WARD POSTWAR REHABILITATION, by
Daisuke Kitagawa, in The Christian Century
v. 85, no. 36 (4 September 1968) 1099–1102.
“In both, the basic problem is how tº
help create the collective will on the part ºf
the native people to modernize their economy."
The Legacy of Colonialism; Rehabilitation and
Reconstruction; The Pathet Lao and th:
N.L.F.; etc.
REPORT FROM LAOS, by Louis Kraar, in |
Fortune, v. 78, no. 3 (1 September 1968) 51-5.
plus.
How “with a government that asks m)
questions—and need the revenues—Laos has
become a major gold-smuggling center.”
WATER LEGISLATION IN ASIA AND
THE FAR EAST. PARTS 1 AND 2, New
York, United Nations, 1967 and 1968. 2 v. (E.
onomic Commission for Asia and the Far East.
Water Resources Series, No. 21 and No. 35.)
Review of existing water legislation.
Part 1–Afghanistan, Brunei, Burma, Republic
of China, Hong Kong, Iran, Japan, New Zea.
land, Philippines and Thailand; Part 2 (A)—
Water legislation in Australia (South Aus.
tralia and Victoria as Examples), Cambodia
Ceylon, India, Republic of Korea, Laos, Sing:
pore, Republic of Vietnam and Westem
Samoa; Part 2 (B)—Proceedings of the Work
ing Group of Experts on Water Codes.
2. The Mekong River Basin: The Devel).
ment of Its Economic Potential
AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT IN
THE MEKONG BASIN; GOALS, PRIOR!.
TIES, AND STRATEGIES. Washington, R&
sources for the Future, Inc., 1971. 108 p. (A
Staff Study.) -
148
“The report begins by assessing the de-
mand-supply conditions for an expanded agri-
Culture in the Mekong River Basin, proceeds to
evaluate what limitations are imposed by phys-
ical and human resource conditions, specifies
the measures that are needed to achieve condi-
tions favorable to modernizing agriculture, and
inquiries into what criteria might serve to es-
tablish a sequence of development. Within this
rather conventional-looking scheme, unconven-
tional attention is given to the human and in-
stitutional setting in which development takes
place. The reason for this is that “progress’ is
equated not only with increased output or a
growing stock of physical facilities but also
with a rising ability of the people in the region
to gain a measure of material security—via a
rising income—in a social context that would
secure for them widening choices in matters of
production, consumption, location, and life
styles generally. The questions are not therefore
merely what the river could help to produce
and how that production could be utilized, but
also-and prominently—what the aspirations
Of the region's people are, what pace and char-
acter of development would be least destructive
of their system of values and beliefs, and how
the latter could be gradually altered to become
Consonant with the requirements of modern ag-
riculture . . . The area affected by the course
of the river and its tributaries measures nearly
a quarter of a million square miles. It com-
prises practically all of Laos and Cambodia,
two-fifths of South Vietnam, and one-third of
Thailand. Close to 30 million people now live
in the area of the watershed involved. That
figure is likely to double by the end of the cen-
tury. The potential for power generation and
irrigation is large.”
5 NEW MEKONG PROJECTS; CAM-
BODIA, LAOS AND THAILAND TO BENE-
FIT, in SEATO Record, v. 9, no. 2 (April
1970) 40–41.
“Five new undertakings in Thailand,
Laos and Cambodia will be carried out as part
of the over-all Mekong development project,
with aid from New Zealand, Philippines,
United Kingdom and United States, as a result
of agreements signed at the Mekong co-ordi-
nating committee's recent session in Phnom
Penh. The agreements call for activities relat-
ing to agriculture, fisheries, mineral resources,
manpower training, navigation, social needs
and other aspects of development. Responsibili-
ties will be shared, under most of the agree-
ments, by the assisting governments, the
committee, and the Mekong Secretariat. In
Thailand, the undertakings will entail appren-
ticeship training at a boat building centre at
Nong Khai, and a study of socio-economic as-
pects of fisheries in the Nam Pong reservoir.
In Cambodia, there will be a demonstration of
the use of fertilizer, and a survey in the Bat-
tambang area. Laos will be aided with map-
ping and interpretation following a mineral
survey.”
THE MEKONG PROJECT, by Willard A.
Hanna. Hanover, N.H., American Universities
Field Staff, Inc., 1968. 7 pts. (Fieldstaff Re-
ports Southeast Asia Series, v. 16, nos. 10–14,
16, 17.)
I. The River and the Region. II. The Evo-
lution of the Design. III. The *Agency and the
Rationale. IV. The Test at Nam Ngum. V. The
Prize at Pa Mong. VI. Delta Development. VII.
the Enigma of Cambodia. “When and if peace
comes to mainland Southeast Asia, it cannot be
a genuine, lasting peace unless it is followed by
plenty—and prospects for plenty now seem to
be contingent largely upon one project or,
rather, one master scheme. This is a program
of a scale and scope so audacious as perhaps to
disguise the very magnitude of the problem to
which, at best, it can provide only a partial,
preliminary answer. It is the Mekong Develop-
ment Project: twenty years ago an E.C.A.F.E.
(Economic Mission for Asia and the Far
East) dream, ten years ago a tentative pro-
posal, but today a schedule for massive multi-
national co-operation. The Project is designed to
transform the social and economic base of the
Lower Mekong Basin by utilizing the potential
of the Mekong River for power, irrigation, nav-
igation, and various related purposes. The di-
rect effect within the next twenty-five years
should be to triple the Gross National Product
of the four riparian nations (Laos, Thailand,
Cambodia, and Vietnam), to raise the average
per capita income at least 50 per cent above the
present dangerously low $65 to $100 level, and
thus to create tremendous new opportunities
for modern progress . . . The consequences

149
may include the creation within the region of a
whole new climate of social and economic co-
operation—and also, it is profoundly to be
hoped, of political accommodation.” (*The
four-nation Committee for the Coordination of
Investigations of the Lower Mekong Basin.)
THE MEKONG SCHEME: GUIDELINE
FOR A SOLUTION TO STRIFE IN SOUTH-
EAST AISA, by W. R. Derrick Sewell, in
Asian Survey (June 1968) 448–455.
“The “Mekong Scheme' is a program de-
signed to develop the tremendous potential of
Southeast Asia’s now unharnessed Mekong
River. The Mekong flows 2,625 miles, through
China, Burma, Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, and
South Vietnam and drains 307,000 square
miles. At present, there is no dam on the main-
stream of the river and no bridge across it. If
developed, the river could irrigate over twen-
ty-four million acres, substantially increasing
the rice crop, and could be navigated for more
than 1,000 miles. It could provide large quanti-
ties of low cost power which would stimulate
industry and raise the area’s standard of liv-
ing. In addition, vast flooding which plagues
the region each year would be reduced. By im-
proving transportation and communication, the
Mekong scheme would increase trade between
the nations of Southeast Asia and lessen politi-
cal tension in the area. The Mekong scheme
was initiated in 1951 when the UN’s Economic
Commission for Asia and the Far East
(ECAFE) undertook a survey of the river. Al-
though the initial report was received with en-
thusiasm, interest in the development project
waned due to hostilities in the area and was
not revived until 1956. In 1957 the US Bureau
of Reclamation and four internationally known
experts sponsored by ECAFE undertook a
study of the Mekong. Their reports emphasized
the need for basin-wide, international plan-
ning. In response to this report, Cambodia,
Laos, Thailand, and South Vietnam set up the
Committee for the Coordination of Investiga-
tions of the Lower Mekong Basin (the Mekong
Committee). The US, France, Canada, and
Japan were among the first countries to offer
financial assistance to the Mekong Committee
Now twenty countries and thirteen UN ageſ.
cies provide support for the development prº
gram. Hydrologic and meteorologic network,
have been set up, the river has been exten,
sively surveyed, and a comprehensive develo).
ment plan should be completed by the commit.
tee this year . . .”
3. Petroleum.
WORLD-WIDE SUPPLY and DEMAND
WILL RISE 5% IN 1970, by William C. Uhl
in World Petroleum, v. 41, no. 1 (January
1970) 18–19.
“Non-Communist nations may produſ:
37.5 million b/d this year. Consumption is ex.
pected to reach 37.2 million b/d. Large growth
in output of oil shown by Libya, Nigeria,
Oman, and Indonesia. Eastern Hemisphere dé.
mands gains remain strong.” Also provides
some statistical data, on the following, among
others: Asia/Far East as a region, as well as
Burma, Laos, and Thailand. -
K. History -
A CONCISE HISTORY OF SOUTHEAST
ASIA, by Nicholas Tarling. New York, Fred.
erick A. Praeger, 1966. 334 p.
Part One—Southeast Asia to About
1760; Part Two—Southeast Asia, 1760–1942;
Part Three—Southeast Asia Since 1942, Prº-
vides historical information also for the follow.
ing countries, among others: Burma, Cam.
bodia, Laos, and Thailand.
THAILAND, BURMA, LAOS, AND CAM.
BODIA, by John F. Cady. Englewood Cliffs,
N.J., Prentice-Hall, 1966. 152 p.
Current Realities and Interrelation.
ships; Historical Beginnings; Classical Cam.
bodia, Burma, and Siam ; Buddhist Southeast
Asia, 1530 to 1780; Parting of the Ways, Min.
don and Mongkut; The Impact of Colonial Rule,
and Inter-War Decades and World War II,
With : Suggested Reading. -

150
CHAPTER VI
THAILAND
(See also Appendixes and Source Materials)
A. Whither Thailand: An Overview
THE FUTURE OF MAINLAND SOUTH-
EAST ASIA, by Frank N. Trager, in Military
Review, v. 50, no. 1 (January 1970) 3–16.
“Mainland Southeast Asia has been a
target area for Peking in earlier dynasties, and
Communist China under Mao Tse-tung has
been no exception. Peking, frequently said to
have conducted a “cautious’ foreign policy, has
not been cautious in Asia. It has proceeded to
gobble up Tibet, to incite North Korea, to at-
tack India, and again to threaten it in the Pak-
istan-India war of 1965. During the “cultural
revolution,’ China has been active in violating
its treaties and downgrading its “friendly' rela-
tions with Burma and Cambodia while openly
supporting a so-called war of ‘national libera-
tion' in the former. It has fomented strife in
Thailand by energizing the Communist Party
Of Thailand. It has given support to the Pathet
LaO and North Vietnamese Communists in
their attacks on the Lao Provinces of Phong
Saly, Sam Neua, and Xieng Khouang. It has
supplied North Vietnam with materiel and
about 50,000 specially trained engineering and
artillery troops. A political victory for Viet-
namese Communists in the Republic of Viet-
nam—that is, a coalition government “imposed’
On Saigon—would help free them to weaken
Laos and Cambodia, add to the dangers of
Thailand and Burma, and, of course, irrepara-
bly weaken the Republic of Vietnam.”
THE FUTURE OF SOUTH-EAST ASIA, by
Brig. F. W. Speed, in The Army Quarterly and
Defence Journal, v. 101, no. 1 (October 1970)
36–43,
“Looking into South-East Asia from the
relative serenity of Australia and New Zea-
land, a watcher sees a region in turmoil. Can
the dust be penetrated and the future read? In
the former French colonies of Indo-China,
North and South Vietnam are engaged in a
full-scale People's War, with an overlay of
western-style warfare waged by Americans,
now in the process of substantial force reduc-
tion. Laos is similarly involved, though in
lower key, with dissidents based on the north-
eastern provinces, heavily supported by North
Vietnamese. Cambodia, after years of fence-sit-
ting, during which time her eastern provinces
were a corridor for North Vietnamese forces
operating in South Vietnam, has now been
pulled into the Maelstrom. To the west and
south, across the Mekong River, Thailand, in-
dependent throughout the colonial era, has for
years sought to contain subversion in its north-
ern and eastern provinces. Now Thailand has
been drawn in to support the Cambodian gov-
ernment, in areas just across their border.
Burma, formerly an uneasy British posses-
sion, has been seeking for over 20 years to es-
tablish the ‘Burmese Way to Socialism,” in the
face of centrifugal forces of varied ethnic
groups.” With map. .
THE MYTH OF ASIA, by John M. Stead-
man. New York, Simon and Schuster, 1969.
353 p. 8.
“This . . . book . . . shows. . . that the
West overestimates the unity of Asia, that in-
deed to think of Asia as a unity is profoundly
mistaken, both in history and today. There are
at least three Asias—the cultural complex of
China and Japan, that of India and its related
cultures, and Islam, which has been closest to
the West and has most influenced the West,
particularly in earlier science, mathematics
and astronomy. This is one aspect only of the
book’s main theme. It is extremely illumina-
151
ting about Asian cultures, about religion and
art, no less than science and philosophy. The
book has an important contribution to make in
the crucial issue of our time, relations between
East and West, and to the understanding of
them. It gives the historical background, essen-
tial to the comprehension of the greatest politi-
cal dilemma of today. So much depends upon
our getting it right, and this thoughtful and
scholarly book offers significant help to all se-
rious minds at this crossroads. In the end, in
showing that the monolithic concept of Asia is
untrue, that there is and always has been at
least as much variety and diversity in the East
as in the West, the implications of the book are
hopeful: One sees the unity of mankind under
the diversities and conflicts of both East and
West.” Deals with many countries of Asia, in-
cluding Burma, Cambodia, Laos, and Thailand,
among others. With select bibliography.
NEW TIDES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA, by
William P. Bundy, in Foreign Affairs, v. 49,
no. 2 (January 1971) 187–200.
“For three decades now, Southeast Asia
has been the scene and cockpit of struggles
among great powers. Can it now be moved
away from this status—unenviable and totally
unwanted by its peoples? Can one outline a
picture of conditions there that meets the de-
sires of Southeast Asians and is at the same
time compatible with the basic interests of all
the major powers? Are such conditions more
realizable now than ever before? If so, how
can one move from here to there, and in par-
ticular how, if they were made the ultimate
goal, would this affect the play of the hand (in
all quarters) in bringing the war in Indochina
to a conclusion? This is the broad and proper
way to frame the problem. Indeed, it is the one
that fits any thoughtful definition of U.S. na-
tional interests. What we care about, and
should have always defined as our objective,
can be simply stated as ‘conditions for lasting
peace’ there—or for that matter any where
else in the world. This real goal should be seen
affirmatively and above all in terms of the as-
pirations of the 250 million people whose hopes
and fears, however inarticulate and vague, de-
fine the true tides of the future. Before trying
to outline ‘conditions for lasting peace’ in South-
east Asia, and certainly before making any
judgment as to the possibility of attaining
them, let us look at what has happened ther:
in the last five years. The picture is wholly dif.
ferent from what it was in the spring and sum.
mer of 1965, when the culminating series ºf
major American decisions in Vietnam was
taken . . . March of 1968 brought a turning
point both in Southeast Asia and in American
policy and politics. Not only the outcome in
Vietnam but the willingness of the United
States to remain engaged in Southeast Asia
were suddenly seen to be in grave doubt. This
is not to say that the promising elements ºf
1965–67 had disappeared. Economic growth of
individual nations, regional cooperation and
multilateral aid continued, and still continue
Indonesia and Thailand, in particular, have
taken the lead in the Association of Southeast
Asian Nations (ASEAN), the first grouping in
this area for political and economic coopera.
tion.”
NEW WINDS OVER SOUTHEAST ASIA,
by Wing Comdr. Maharaj K. Chopra, in Mil.
tary Review, v. 48, no. 9 (September 1968)
10–18.
“It is a paradox of contemporary life
that, whereas the number of states is multiply.
ing and their frontiers are becoming rigid, the
problems confronting them are becoming inter.
state and regional in character. This is cer.
tainly true of Southeast Asia, thanks to its gé.
ography, history, and the new, fast-developing
trends. Southeast Asia comprises the 10 states
of Burma, Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, North
Vietnam, South Vietnam Malaysia, Singapore,
Indonesia, and the Philippines.” Common Fe3.
tures; Common Problems; New Constitution
(Thailand); Economic and Social Fields; St.
curity Arrangements; etc.
RINGING THE CHANGES, by Denis Hor.
gan, in Far Eastern Economic Review, v, 71,
no. 2 (9 January 1971) 8 plus.
“For six years the government of Thai.
land has watched as colossal forces raged
around Southeast Asia. Bangkok can now look
to the future with realism and a hardening
sense of relief. Faced with at least a vocally
menacing leadership in Peking and an aggres:
sive Hanoi, Thailand found it natural to align
itself more closely with what was seen as the
only power capable of offering effective guar.

152
antees in a highly problematic future. The de-
cision to forge links with the US may well
have been entirely appropriate and correct at
the time but changing events have demon-
strated to the Thais that policies must never be
less dynamic than the forces which shape
them. Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman
greeted the new year with the beginnings of an
important shift in Thailand’s longstanding pol-
icies towards the communist world and the
United States.”
THAILAND AFTER VIETNAM, by Rich-
ard Butwell, in Current History, v. 57, no.
340 (December 1969) 339–343 plus.
“If the 1970's require greater self-reli-
ance on the part of the Southeast Asian na-
tions, it should be remembered that no nation
in the area has been more self-reliant over a
longer period of history than Thailand.” Reac-
tion to Nixon Policy; The Military Future; Re-
lations with Other Nations; Liberalization ver-
sus Coups; and Continued Economic Growth.
THAILAND: ANOTHER VIETNAM? by
Daniel Wit. New York, Scribner, 1968. 205 p.
“An analysis of the environment and
governmental system of this ‘vigorous propo-
ment of [America's] role as an Asian power
and stabilizer' whose future support and sta-
bility depend largely, in the author's opinion,
On its recalcitrant northeast area.”
THAILAND: DE-ESCALATION AND UN-
CERTAINTY, by Frank C. Darling, in Asian
Survey, v. 9, no. 2 (February 1969) 115–121.
“Winston Churchill once remarked that
SOvereign nations possess no permanent
friends and no permanent enemies; they pos-
sess only permanent interests. During 1968
Certain aspects of this fundamental principle
of international politics became painfully ap-
parent to some elements of the Thai govern-
ment. The de-escalation of American military
power in the Vietnamese war and the possibil-
ity of a retrenchment in American policy in
Southeast Asia aroused a growing sense of
doubt and uncertainty among officials in the
Thai Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The develop-
ments jolted these officials into a deeper realiza-
tion that important sectors of their national life
are intimately related to the vagaries of inter-
national affairs.” With bibliography.
WHAT FUTURE FOR ASIA, by W. W.
Rostow, in Reader’s Digest (December 1970)
109–111.
“By the year 2000, the vast arc of na-
tions that stretches from Korea to Iran will
have reached technological maturity—and
enormous power. How will that power be
wielded ? The answer lies with us . . . What is
Asia? Asia is where about 60 percent of hu-
manity now lives and will continue to live. In
the year 2,000, Asia's population will be more
than ten times that of the United States—say,
3.7 billion souls. Anyone who has recently been
to Asia knows it is a region on the march. We
are all familiar with the extraordinary growth
of Japan, now the third industrial power in
the world and closing fast on a sluggish Soviet
Union. But the modernization of old societies is
also moving forward in South Korea and Tai-
wan, Thailand and Malaysia and Singapore,
and in India, Pakistan, Iran and Indonesia as
Well.”
WHO SAYS THAILAND’S NEXT!? by
Wayne A. O’Neil, in The New Republic, v. 164,
no. 1 and 2 (2 and 9 January 1971) 23–27.
“Louis Lomax wrote a book entitled
‘Thailand: The War that Is, the War that Will
Be'; Daniel Wit, one called “Thailand: Another
Vietnam?" and ‘Atlas' magazine asked on its
cover ‘Is Thailand Next?' It may be, but why?
And next for what? In the 19th century before
Thailand became a satellite of the British Em-
pire, or in the late 1930’s before Thailand was
more than less willingly occupied by the Japa-
nese, we could also have asked the question, ‘Is
Thailand next?” and have referred to the ex-
ternal threat posed by England and France in
Southeast Asia and later by Japan. Today,
keeping alive the fiction that ‘stable' countries
can only be toppled from without, the question-
ers assume that the threat to Thailand is ex-
ternal: the threat of Peking and international
communism, or at least Peking-led Asian com-
munism. The facts to support the notion that
China is directly or in any serious way indi-
rectly supporting or developing a revolution in
Thailand are few.”
153
B. Insurgencies and Incursions
AN ANALYSIS OF COMMUNIST INSUR-
GENCY IN NORTHEAST THAILAND (U),
..by Maj. Winfield S. Harpe. Maxwell Air Force
Base, Ala., Air Command and Staff College,
1970. 79 p. (M-35582–7–S, Research Study
no. 0645–70.)
“Thailand, long regarded as the ‘land of
the free,’ faces a serious insurgent threat in
her Northeast provinces. Recent policy asser-
tions by the United States concerning future
involvement in Southeast Asia indicate that
Thailand must, for the most part, ‘go it alone’
in meeting this threat. This paper analyzes the
capability of the Thais to meet this responsi-
bility through a discussion of the situation, the
threat, and the Government's responsiveness.
The author concludes that Thailand is capable
of containing the insurgency at its present
level. However, serious doubts arise concerning
her ability to respond to substantial increase in
magnitude of the threat. Some recommenda-
tions to gain this ability are offered by the au-
thor.”
DEVELOPMENT AND SECURITY IN
THAILAND: LESSONS FROM OTHER
ASIAN COUNTRIES, by Richard Lee Hough,
in Asian Survey, v. 9, no. 3 (March 1969)
178—187. -
“This article selectively discusses key
aspects of the experiences which several Asian
countries have had with problems of rural de-
velopment and/or insurgency. The intent is to
distill and interpret these aspects so that they
bear constructively upon more or less compara-
ble problems in Thailand today, particularly in
the Northeast.”
HYDRA IN CAMOUFLAGE, in Far East-
ern Economic Review, v. 73, no. 37 (11 Septem-
ber 1971) 27–29. -
“Guerillas are still an urgent problem
in the north and northeast [Thailand], and so-
lutions cannot be simply reached through fire-
power and promises of civic aid. But racial ten-
sions are easing in some areas.”
NERVOUS THAILAND . . . WHAT IT'S
LIKE TO BE ‘NEXT,” by Arnold Abrams, in
Atlas, v. 19, no. 7 (July 1970) 19–20.
“If both North and South Vietnam were
|
in hailing distance over the hills and yout
nearest neighbors were Laos and Cambodia,
you’d be worried, too. But to Bangkok's official
—and to American authorities behind the
scenes—the threat is not only from without
Increased activities of Peking-trained guerril
las in Thailand's northeast make the nation's
leaders wonder whether it isn’t simply a maſ.
ter of time . . . Arnold Abrams, American.
born correspondent for . . . Far Eastem
Economic Review, . . . examines the nervº
wracking waiting game being waged in Oli
Siam.”
NORTHEAST THAILAND: TOMORROW's
VIET NAM? by J. L. S. Girling, in Foreign
Affairs (January 1968) 388–397.
“Northeast Thailand is not likely to be
come another South Vietnam. The insurgency
in the area has been checked by intensified gy.
ernment development and by the communist
failure to achieve immediate results. Commu.
nist propaganda claims the majority of the vil.
lagers seek the overthrow of the government
Actually, they want the government to do more
for them. In contrast, the Viet Minh (now Wieſ
Cong) has been the effective government in
large rural areas of South Vietnam for more
than twenty years. Other features of the Thäi
insurgency reveal striking dissimilarities: the
virtual absence of sabotage; the paucity ºf
communist attacks on civil officials; and the
lack of rugged terrain. The guerrillas need Or.
ganization and leadership to expand the insur.
gency. In China and in Vietnam the effective
organization of party, army and administri.
tion on a territorial base was a tremendol;
achievement. There is no evidence, however,
that the communists have attained anything
near that stage in Northeast Thailand. None ºf
the Thai communists appear to have the quali
ties of a Ho Chi Minh or a Mao Tse-tung. Far
from achieving national reputations, Thai COm.
munists have little more than local signifi.
cance. There is little internal ‘feudal' oppre;
sion, and the impact of military control at th:
top is blurred both by civilian administration
and by the indifference of the bulk of the pop||
lation to politics. As for the external, or ‘impº
rialist’ enemy which served to rally largº
numbers of Chinese and Vietnamese to the COTP
munist cause, there is more awareness in Thai
154
land of the threat from Vietnam, Cambodia,
and China than of an American ‘occupation.”
In short, the breakdown of the existing regime,
almost a sine qua non of a successful insur-
gency, has not occurred in Thailand nor does it
Seemlikely in the near future.”
PEKING, HANOI, AND GUERRILLA IN-
SURGENCY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA, by Jus-
tus M. van der Kroef, in Southeast Asian Per-
spectives, no. 3 (September 1971) 1–67.
“How have mainland China and North
Vietnam performed in world affairs over the
past two decades? What are some of the main
directions of their current policy? In the
monograph . . . Professor Justus M. van der
Kroef attempts to deal with one important as-
pect of the latter question. His essay is an ex-
haustive examination of the dimensions of
Peking's and Hanoi's ongoing support for Com-
munist-led insurrections and revolutionary
wars in all the countries of Southeast Asia. In
his . . . compilation of the facts, no single
exhibit is perhaps entirely persuasive. But the
Cumulative weight of his evidence is over-
whelming.” Partial contents: Introduction;
Burma and Thailand; Indochina; Malaysia and
Singapore; Indonesia and the Philippines; etc.
PEKING-KMT AXIS, by Bob Norton, in
Far Eastern Economic Review, v. 71, no. 1 (2
January 1971) 14–15.
“Probably the biggest anachronism in
Asia is the truncated Ninety-third Kuomintang
Division of Chiang Kai-shek now inhabiting
sparsely populated areas of Laos, Burma and
northern Thailand. Their presence—long con-
sidered a potential pretext for Chinese military
incursions—has usually been ignored by the
governments on whose soil they are squatting,
in the vain hope that they will somehow van-
ish, Every so often, however, trouble develops
in the mountainous frontier region bringing
into clear focus that there are still over 3,000
KMT troops within three days’ march of
China's sensitive Yunnan province. Last month
in Thailand's mountainous Chiang Rai prov-
ince bordering Laos, a two-day battle took
place between KMT irregulars and local Meo
tribesmen, leaving at least 27 of the Meo and
10 Chinese killed. Further clashes were ex-
pected to take place in the remote region and
the nearby Thai Third Army was placed on
full alert.”
THAILAND–ITS VULNERABILITY TO
INSURGENCY, by Maj. Forrest G. Johnson.
Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala., Air Command
and Staff College, 1968. 171 p. (Thesis No.
0635–68; M-35582–7—U.)
“In Thailand, communist infiltration
and subversion are more imminent than ever
before. The government’s ability to suppress
these activities, and at the same time further
the nation's political, economic, and social
progress is of vital interest to the free world.
This thesis discusses Thailand’s political struc-
ture at both the national and provincial level.
In analyzing the government, specific attention
is directed to those factors which influence po-
litical stability. The immediate communist
threat is analyzed along with the government's
efforts to suppress insurgency activities. The
thesis concludes that the present political
structure and government are adequate to
deter wide-spread insurgency activities within
the nation’s borders.”
THAILAND: THE INSURGENCY PROB-
LEM, by Maj. Ronald C. Smith, Maxwell Air
Force Base, Ala., Air Command and Staff Col-
lege, 1971. 72 p. (M-35582–7–U, Research
Study no. 1825–71.)
“Thailand currently faces a threat to its
security from communist-backed insurgency.
This study analyzes the seriousness of the
threat including the underlying causes, insur-
gent groups, and political factors. An histori-
cal approach is used to trace the evolution of
the Thai nation, its political system, and the
insurgent movement in the country. The paper
concludes that there are weaknesses in the po-
litical system which give rise to political, so-
cial, and economic grievances among the di-
verse ethnic groups which inhabit the outlying
provinces. A further conclusion is that there is
sufficient unity within Thai society to with-
stand insurgency for the present.”
THAILAND’S NORTHEAST: REGIONAL
UNDERDEVELOPMENT, “INSURGENCY,”
AND OFFICIAL RESPONSE, by Peter F.
Bell, in Pacific Affairs, v. 42, no. 1 (Spring
1969) 47–54.
“The object of this note is to give some

155
critical account of the background and current
situation in northeast Thailand, and of the
ways in which recent concern has been ex-
pressed at the official level. The recent atten-
tion which has been focused upon the area, as a
by-product of its having become the meeting
ground of a number of competing political in-
terests, has led to an influx of academic re-
search teams and developmental units (foreign
and Thai), yet the most persistent fact re-
mains the lamentably crude level of our under-
standing of the social, political, and economic
dynamics of the region. Consequently, the in-
formation base for the counter-insurgency ef-
fort is very weak.”
C. Strategic Import of Thailand
THAILAND: THE STRATEGIC CENTRE
IN SOUTH-EAST ASIA, by Niu Sien-chong,
in NATO's Fifteen Nations, v. 13, no. 5 (Octo-
ber–November 1968) 14–19.
“Thailand comprises a strategic area in
the centre of the mainland of South-East Asia.
After 1948 the surrounding countries became
embroiled in bitter armed conflicts either with
their former colonial rulers or with local com-
munist insurgents. Only Thailand has ap-
peared as an oasis of stability in a desert of tur-
moil. So its political, economical, and military
importance to the free world is quite obvious.”
The Land and the People; The Economy; Rela-
tions with the United States; A Two-Phased
*U.S. Policy; Communist Threat; Future Pros-
pects; and Population Problems.
THAILAND STRATEGIC CENTRE OF
SOUTH-EAST ASIA, by Niu Sien-Chong, in
An Cosantoir, v. 39, no. 1 (January 1969)
18–23.
“Thailand comprises a strategic area in
the centre of the mainland of Southeast Asia.
After 1948 the surrounding countries became
embroiled in bitter armed conflicts either with
their former colonial rulers or with local com-
munist insurgents only Thailand has appeared
as an oasis of stability in a desert of turmoil.
So its political, economical, and military im-
portance to the free world is quite obvious.”
The Land; A Well-Run Economy; Relations
with the United States; Communist Threat;
Future Prospects.
D. Descriptive Miscellany (Includit
the Land and the People) (See alsº
Appendixes Z, DD, EE, and FF)
AREA HANDBOOK FOR THAILAND, .
Harvey H. Smith and others. Washington, D.
partment of the Army, September 1968, 558,
(DA PAM 550–53.) .
This area handbook, aside from provil.
ing a country summary, discusses in detailth
social, political, economic, and national SCCI.
ity aspects of Thailand. Includes: bibliogr:
phies, glossary, illustrations, and tables, &
also appendixes to the bibliographic survey Ol
Peninsular Southeast Asia.
ASIA, EAST BY SOUTH: A CULTURA
GEOGRAPHY, by J. E. Spencer and William||
L. Thomas. Second ed. New York, John Wiki
& Sons, Inc., 1971. 669 p.
“This volume is concerned with cultun
geography in its widest interpretation. Mostd
the materials with which cultural geographen
must deal are tangible and can be viewed in
terms of regional distribution and analysis
These tangibles form the primary contexts ºf
discussion throughout the book.” Part I–Sy;
tematic Geography; Part II—The Regional
Expression of Cultures (including among oth
ers: Southeast Asia—A Cultural Shatterhºl,
The Irrawaddy Valley and Burma; The EVOl.
tion in Thailand; Cambodia; etc.) Part III-
For Use in Reference (including among 0th
ers a Selected Bibliography).
THE ASIANS: THEIR HERITAGE AND
THEIR DESTINY, by Paul Thomas Well,
3rd ed. Philadelphia, J. B. Lippincott, 1971
351 p.
This book attempts to give “some under
standing of the social and economic envir).
ment in which most Asians live and of the War.
ious systems of thought which influence their
approach to present-day problems, just as th:
thinking of people in a Western culture is il.
fluenced by their environment and traditions,
“The Asians' . . . put its main emphasis (1.
this . . . task, while also giving the main Olſº
lines of geography, history, politics and gº
ernment, for the main areas of Asia from Pāk
istan round to Japan” [and also including
among many others, Burma, Cambodia, Laſ'
and Thailand].
}

156
CONTEMPORARY SOUTHEAST ASIA, by
Claude A. Buss. New York, Van Nostrand
Reinhold Co., 1970. 280 p. (An Anvil Origi-
mal.)
“A Survey of recent history from the
Southeast Asians’ point of view . . . Part I es-
tablishes the ecology of the Southeast Asian
states and includes a chronological table of
major events since 1945. The first chapter de-
scribes the scene in Southeast Asia at the close
of World War II. Succeeding chapters trace
historical and political developments in the
Philippines, Burma, Malaysia and Singapore,
Indonesia, Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, and Thai-
land. The concluding chapter looks ahead, into
the 1970's, to impending changes in cultural
values, social organization, economic trends,
political evolution, and international relations
of the entire region. Part II consists of official
documents and public statements.”
EMERGING SOUTHEAST ASIA; A
STUDY IN GROWTH AND STAGNATION,
by Donald W. Fryer. New York, McGraw-Hill
B00k Co., 1970. 486 p.
The Region (Southeast Asia in the Mod-
ern World; The Land and Its Utilization; Ur-
banization, Industrialization and Moderniza-
tion); Progress (Thailand; The Philippines;
Malaysia and Singapore); Stagnation (Indone-
sia; the Union of Burma; Vietnam, Laos and
Cambodia); Prospect (The Destiny of South-
east Asia). With selected bibliography, maps,
and diagrams.
AN EYE FOR THE DRAGON; SOUTH-
EAST ASIA OBSERVED, 1954–1970, by Den-
mis Bloodworth. New York, Farrar, Straus and
Giroux, 1970. 414 p.
“The author digs . . . into his newspa-
per files and store of anecdotes for a . . . look
at [all of] Southeast Asia . . . It is . . . a
blend of history, politics, personality, religion,
and superstition. Bloodworth’s constant theme
is the inability of East and West to understand
One another.” He touches many times specifi-
cally on Burma, Cambodia, Laos, and Thai-
land, among others. With chronology and bibli-
Ography. .
THE FAR EAST AND SOUTHWEST PA-
CIFIC, 1971, by Harold C. Hinton. Washing-
ton, Stryker-Post Publications, Inc., 1971. 88 p.
Historical Background (The People of
Asia; Religious Beliefs; Medieval Conquerors;
Economic Background; Nationalism, Commu-
nism and Revolution in Twentieth Century
Asia); The Land and the People of the follow-
ing, including area, population, climate, official
language, ethnic background, principal reli-
gions, chief commercial products, currency, na-
tional flag, etc.: Australia, Burma, Cambodia,
Communist China, Nationalist China, Indone-
sia, Japan, North Korea, South Korea, Laos,
Malaysia, Mongolia, New Zealand, Philippines,
Singapore, Thailand, North and South Viet-
nam, and Small States and Dependencies.
A GRAPHIC LOOK AT THE LANDS AND
PEOPLES OF SOUTHEAST ASIA
[INCLUDING BURMA, CAMBODIA, LAOS,
AND THAILAND], in National Geographic,
v. 139, no. 3 (March 1971) 295–365.
Part 1—Mosaic of Cultures; Part 2—
New Light on a Forgotten Past; Part 3–
Pagan, on the Road to Mandalay.
MONSOON ASIA; A GEOGRAPHICAL
SURVEY, by Harry Robinson. New York,
Frederick A. Praeger, 1967. 561 p.
“This study is planned in two main
parts: an introductory section dealing with the
general geographical framework of the region,
the physical and cultural background, the re-
sources, agriculture and industry, and some as-
pects of political geography, followed by a sec-
ond, and larger, section which is concerned
with the regional geography of Monsoon Asia,
each country being dealt with in general, and
then by regions . . . Emphasis has been
placed upon two aspects: first, the historical
and cultural background and, second, recent
economic changes and developments. Further-
more, very significant economic changes, with
all their social and political implications, are
taking place within the region; but it is not
easy to procure immediate information on
these matters and an attempt has been made to
give a reasonably up-to-date account of the
changes in process. The maps have been kept
relatively simple to give clarity.” Contents:
The Monsoon Region—Introduction; the Phys-
ical Background; Resources and Economy; The
Human Background; The Indian Sub-Conti-
nent; India—Social and Economic Géography;
157
India—Regional Geography; Pakistan; Nepal,
Sikkim and Bhutan; Ceylon; South-East Asia;
Burma; Thailand; Cambodia, Laos and Viet-
nam; Malaysia; Indonesia; The Philippine
Islands; The Chinese People's Republic;
China—Economic and Regional Geography;
Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan; Korea; Ja-
pan—General and Regional Geography. With :
bibliography, illustrations, and tables.
PEOPLE AND PROGRESS IN EAST
ASIA, by Eli Ginzberg. New York, Columbia
University, 1968. 290 p.
Eli Ginzberg states: “In January-Feb-
ruary 1967 I had the opportunity to travel
through East Asia on a Specialist Grant from
the U.S. Department of State. My itinerary
took me to Japan, Korea, Thailand, Malaysia,
Singapore, Indonesia, Vietnam and Hong
Kong, whose combined populations total about
270 million. My primary concern in each of
these countries was to discuss with key leader-
ship groups, in and out of government, the
problems that they face in designing a more ef-
fective manpower policy in order to speed their
economic growth. I was briefed before I left; I
was briefed while in the area; and after my re-
turn I reviewed key documents. This manu-
script represents in the first instance my effort
to order within a manpower framework the
wealth of impressions and reactions resulting
from my intense, if short, visit to eight East
Asian countries. As such, it represents an ef-
fort to apply the manpower approaches and
techniques that my associates and I have been
developing at Columbia University over the
past three decades to the problems of economic
development in East Asia.” Nationhood; The
Military; Rural Life; Education; Skill Acqui-
sition; Women; Management; Of Time and
Progress; In Search of Perspective.
THE RICE BOWL OF ASIA, by David M.
Davies. South Brunswick, N.J., A. S. Barnes
and Co., 1967. 176 p.
This book deals with the role played by
Siam and her people in the past as well as in
the present. The book contains “some of the
gleanings and impressions which . . . [the
author] gathered . . —there as an English
lecturer . . . .” The Thais; “Land of the
Free”; The Great City; The Men of the Robes;
Thirst in a Land of Rivers; Women Deman
One Husband One Wife; The Old and the New |
The Badlands; A Pick and Shovel Paradiº
Some Thai Folk Tales; etc.
SOUTH ASIA; A BACKGROUND BOOK
by Angus Maude. Chester Springs. Pa., Dufour
Editions, 1966. 176 p.
The Area Surveyed; India; India's
Neighbors; Burma; Indochina and Thailani
(Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, and Thailand);
Malaysia, Singapore and the Philippines; Indº.
nesia; The Asian Dilemma. With maps.
SOUTHEAST ASIA; A SURVEY, by Rich.
ard Butwell. New York, Foreign Policy A.
sociation, December 1968. 63 p. (Headline S;
ries No.192.)
This survey of Southeast Asia which in
cludes information also on Burma, Cambodia,
Laos, and Thailand, among others, deals with
the following: What Is Southeast Asia?; The
Years Since World War II; The Problems ºf |
Nation-Building and Survival; Regionalism—
How Firm a Foundation—and Future?; The
United States and Southeast Asia.
SOUTHEAST ASIA; HISTORY, CUI,
TURE, PEOPLE, by Edward Graff and Haroli |
E. Hammond. Bronxville, N.Y., Cambridg:
Book Co., Inc., 1967. 154 p. -
Southeast Asia—The Land; Early His
tory of Southeast Asia; The People of the
Hills, Plains and Villages; The arrival of the
Europeans (The Special Case of Thailand,
among others); Language and Culture ºf
Southeast Asia; The New Nations—Their
Problems and Promise (Burma, Malaysia,
Singapore, Philippines, Indonesia, Laos, Cam.
bodia, Vietnam, Thailand, among others); The
Foreign Relations of Southeast Asian Nations;
and Bibliography.
SOUTH-EAST ASIA—RACE, CULTURE,
AND NATION, by Guy Hunter. New York,0x.
ford University Press, 1966. 190 p. (Published
for the Institute of Race Relations, London.)
The author explores the following
themes “as part of a single process in the dº.
velopment of the nations of South-East Asia.
(a) the transition from tradition to modern-
ity; (b) the establishment of national identity,
legitimacy, and unity out of diversity which
158
reappeared when the colonial blanket was
whipped off; (c) the complications introduced
in (a) and (b) by racial and ethnic diversity.”
These problems are also considered for the fol-
lowing countries of Peninsular Southeast Asia,
among others: Burma, Cambodia, Laos, Thai-
land. -
STATUS OF THE WORLD'S NATIONS,
rew, ed. Washington, Department of State, Bu-
reau of Intelligence and Research, 1969. 21 p.
(Geographic Bulletin No. 2.)
This Geographic Bulletin identifies each
state in the world (including Burma, Cam-
bodia, Laos, and Thailand) that is generally
accepted as independent. It includes enumera-
tion and official nomenclature of the
Countries . . . Two names appear for each
state: a short form for use in maps, in lists,
and for general narration; a long form for
more formal usage and for official documents.
An appendix gives such details as the area,
population, and identification of capital of each
COuntry. Text and notes explain many of the
exceptions one finds in the complex pattern of
SOvereignties throughout the world.
STUDY MISSION TO CENTRAL AND
SOUTHEAST ASIA, NOVEMBER—DE-
CEMBER 1966. REPORT OF SENATORS
GALE W. MCGEE AND FRANK E. MOSS
TO THE COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIA-
TIONS AND THE COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC
WORKS, UNITED STATES SENATE,
APRIL 6, 1967. 15 p. (90th Congress, 1st Ses-
sion, Senate, Document No. 17)
“The intent and purpose of the trip was
to attempt to gauge the moods and to assess
pending potential crisis questions in the south
Asian countries lying along the periphery of
both the Soviet Union and China. The particu-
lar goals included the following: (1) To reassess
the postulates of American foreign policy to-
Ward central and south Asian countries in the
light of the changes wrought by 20 years of
Cold war and the convulsions of independence
and new expectations among the peoples of the
Far East. (2) To measure the estimates of
China both as to intents and capabilities.
(3) To obtain firsthand impressions of atti-
tudes and suggestions in regard to the Ameri-
Can presence and purpose in South Vietnam.
(4) To study the food crisis in India and the
dimensions of a program of action necessary to
achieve food self-sufficiency. (5) To evaluate
in Indonesia the new elements of power, the
chances of stability, and the most effective
form of a new American program of coopera-
tion there. (6) To reassess in the perspective
of the rapidly changing events of Asia the ef-
fectiveness and requirements of American eco-
nomic assistance programs and other overseas
operations. Among the countries studied
within the context of these goals were Turkey,
Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan, India Ne-
pal, Burma, Thailand, Malaysia (Sabah and
Sarawak), and Indonesia.”
THAILAND, by Leonard Unger, in Focus,
v. 21, no. 3 (November 1970) 1–12.
Historical Highlights; The People; The
Resource Base; The Economy; Prospects for
the Future; Maps; and Suggested Readings.
THAILAND: THE POLITICS OF PASSIV-
ITY, by Donald Hindley, in Pacific Affairs,
v. 41, no. 3 (Fall 1968) 355–371
“During the thirteenth century, Thai
peoples began their migration from Yunnan
south into the Chao Phya valley, conquering
and assimilating the existing Mon and Khmer
population. From the Khmers they obtained
their script, architectural skills, and the con-
cept of the godking. In this way the Thai polit-
ical elite entered history. The present Chakkri
dynasty was founded in 1782 by the last rebel-
lious general who successfully usurped the
throne . . . Today, the military leadership oc-
cupies the apex of the Thai political system, as
it has for all but three of the past thirty-six
years. Within the military, the army has clear
dominance, having firmly quelled power-plays
in the late 1940’s and the 1950’s, that involved
variously the air force, navy, marines and po-
lice. This does not, however, make the army
leaders the only important people in the for-
mulation of national policy . . . These ele-
ments of the Thai life-view are traditional.
Nothing has shaken the Thais enough for
many to question them. Society and politics
have been modernized to a degree, but without
a profound disruption of the pre-existing value
and deferential systems. Such conservatism is
a normal human characteristic and is not un-
159
known even among large pockets in the so-
called modernized states. Beneath the over-
arching Thai culture are several groups which,
from the experience of other non-Western
countries, might be expected to spawn an ac-
tive opposition to the military dictatorship:
the peasants, the urban working class, the
urban middle class, the Buddhist clergy, the
royalists, the students, and the armed forces. A
closer examination of each concludes this ex-
ploration of the reasons why such an opposi-
tion has not materialized in Thailand.”
E. Government and Politics
1. Miscellaneous Aspects
LOCAL AUTHORITY AND ADMINIS-
TRATION IN THAILAND, ed. by Fred R.
Von der Mehden and David A. Wilson. Berke-
ley, University of California Press, 1970.
302 p.
“This book is a . . . by-product of in-
creased United States interest in Thailand. It
derives from a conference held at the Univer-
sity of California, Los Angeles in July 1970
with distinguished Thai and United States
participants . . . William A. Sommers . . . chal-
lenges some organizational stereotypes with his
‘pancake model.” Thomas looks at local author-
ity and development programs in the four Mus-
lim provinces of Thailand. Among other things,
he shows very neatly how different aspects of
various government programs are often work-
ing at cross-purposes; there is also an . . . ac-
count of relations between the commune chief
and his villagers.”
THE NORTHEASTERN THAI VILLAGE:
A NON-PARTICIPATORY DEMOCRACY, by
Stephen B. Young, in Asian Survey, v. 8, no. 11
(November 1968) 873–886.
“Research activities in Thailand have
produced a number of excellent studies of vil-
lage life and rural attitudes towards various
problems. But no study as yet has taken for its
primary task the investigation of what might
be called the political sphere of village life. Ac-
curate descriptions of institutionalized political
positions in and around the village exist; ex-
aminations of village problem-solving have
greatly contributed to understanding the deci-
sion-making structure within a village. But
still an attempt to organize the significanti
mensions of politics in a rural village in Order
to ascertain just what politics and power meal
in the context of village life might be usefulin
making us more sensitive to some important
realities of Northeast Thailand. According, this
paper will focus only on politics as perceive
within for northeastern villages.”
POLITICAL PARTIES IN THAILAND, by
Frank C. Darling, in Pacific Affairs, v. 44, mO,!
(Summer 1971) 228–241. -
“The evolution of political parties in
Thailand has confronted some of the same
problems as those encountered by political Or.
ganizations in other non-Western societies, but
some have been unique. The formation of polit.
ical parties has occurred intermittently with
movements toward an enfranchised electorate
and the establishment of representative legis.
lative bodies at the national, provincial, or m.
nicipal levels. This development has taken
place slowly and erratically because of power.
ful traditional forces, the large Thai peasant
class, the small Thai bureaucratic class, and
the domination of the national economy until
recently by Chinese and Europeans. Sinſ:
World War II the vagaries of the international
environment have likewise affected internal
conditions in hampering the formation of polit.
ical parties . . . The re-emergence of political
parties has reduced the likelihood that futurº
successions of political power will take place
by a coup d’etat. Military officers will continu?
to play an important role in the political sys.
tem, and their control of the armed forces will
remain an important source of political power.
Yet military leaders seem increasingly inclined
to rely on the government party in seeking and
maintaining authority rather than on the
naked use of military power. The development
of political parties has likewise added signifi.
cantly to the international stature of Thailand
by providing some substance to the endeavor of
the Thai government to change from a purely
military-dominated system to a form of consti.
tutional democracy.”
THE POLITICAL SYSTEM OF THAI.
LAND, by Maj. Joseph F. Garlett. Maxwell
Air Force Base, Ala., Air Command and Staff
College, 1970. 43 p. (M-35582–7—U, Research
Study no. 0515–70.)
160
“This study investigates the communist
threat and its effect upon the stability of the
Thai government. Thailand's political history is
examined to understand its influence on the
present government structure. This study at-
tempts to identify the communist threat and
show the Thai government's reaction to the
insurgency. The study concludes that the Thai
government possesses the stability necessary
to deal with communist aggression and develop
strong economic and political reforms. This
study recommends that the Thai government
initiate and operate its reform programs, with
minor help from the United States.”
POLITICS AMALGAMATED: THE THAI
EXAMPLE, by J. L. S. Girling, in Australian
Outlook, v.24, no. 3 (December 1970) 263—276.
“Rather than contribute to another
analysis of Thai politics . . . this article . . .
Observes some areas of interaction, where in-
terests merge or overlap. These areas are: for-
eign policy and domestic interests; interlock-
ing leadership—military, government, party
and economic; and urban-rural, official-
villager relations. In each of the first two areas
there is a certain lack of differentiation, as
Thais themselves see it. In the last, the divide
between urbanised elite and rural masses is
real enough, although for a long time not polit-
ically significant. But fear of insurgency and
the drive for development have in recent years
stimulated an official attempt to narrow the
gap—to ‘communicate.” These administrative
efforts, which are still patchy, may become
mullified by serious, emerging problems which
are not easily susceptible to management: no-
tably, population pressures, trade imbalance
and export difficulties, erosion of traditional
Village attitudes and activities and, finally, na-
tional insecurity.”
THE ROLE OF THE OPPOSITION IN
THAILAND, in Swiss Review of World Af-
fairs, v. 18, no. 6 (September 1968) 15–17.
“At a press conference some time ago
Mr. Prabhas, Thai Minister of the Interior,
hinted at the dangers that might in his opinion
threaten Thailand, in addition to Communist
subversion. He was referring to the small but
Constantly expanding intellectual opposition
that can hardly be called a group even though
its exponents are to be encountered at every
turn. Its representatives are journalists, law-
yers, some university professors, students, art-
ists, but also some engineers, technicians and
even a few members of the bureaucracy, the
police and the army. Perhaps one should speak
of a potential rather than an actual opposition
in this connection; for there is no definite or—
ganization, and most of the dissenters have re-
signed themselves to an inner opposition to the
present government which finds expression in
the downhearted belief that politics is of neces-
sity always a dirty business . . . Business has
never identified with the opposition. For Thai-
land’s economy is largly controlled by foreign-
ers.”
SOUTHEAST ASIA’S POLITICAL SYS-
TEMS, by Lucian W. Pye. Englewood Cliffs,
N.J., Prentice-Hall, Inc. 1967. 98 p.
“This series is dedicated to the proposi-
tion that it is no longer valid or profitable to
study comparative politics within an essen-
tially North American and European-centered
frame of reference . . . Politically speaking,
the history of the twentieth century is in large
part the history of the re-emergence of non-
European areas and states to positions of inde-
pendence and prominence on the world
scene . . . Southeast Asia is a region of great
diversity and contrast. Each of the nine lead-
ing countries of the region—Indonesia, the
Philippines, Burma, Malaysia, Thailand, Viet-
nam, Cambodia, Laos, and Singapore—repre-
sents a distinct and separate tradition. And
within each country further diversities abound,
for none has an homogeneous population. No
other region of the world offers such a rich
array of major religions. Malaysia and Indone-
sia are Islamic countries; the Philippines is
the only Christian country in Asia; and the re-
mainder of mainland Southeast Asia consists
of Buddhistic societies that adhere to different
beliefs. Behind these religious differences are
additional disparities in customs and historical
experience. The 180 million Southeast Asians
employ more than 150 different languages and
dialects, most of which are mutually unintellig-
ible.” With bibliography.
THAILAND: STABILITY AND ESCALA-
TION, by Frank C. Darling, in Asian Survey,
v. 8, no. 2 (February 1968) 120–126.
161

“Throughout 1967 three major factors
contributed to the continuation of political sta-
bility in Thailand. The ruling regime main-
tained a high level of unity and agreement
within its own ranks in spite of considerable
differences in personal background and
outlook . . . A second factor promoting politi-
cal stability was the economic progress of the
kingdom . . . Another factor affecting politi-
cal stability throughout the year was the inter-
mittent effort toward constitutional reform.”
With bibliography.
THAILAND: TOWARD FUNDAMENTAL
CHANGE, by Clark D. Neher, in Asian Sur-
vey, v. 11, no. 2 (February 1971) 131–138.
“The political system of Thailand has
long been characterized by a high degree of
continuity and stability. The promulgation of a
new Constitution in 1968 and the National As-
sembly elections of 1969 did not significantly
alter the bureaucratic-elitist system of govern-
ment. The year 1970 assumes particular impor-
tance, however, as Thailand appears to have
broken with tradition of continuity and to have
moved in fundamentally new directions in the
spheres of politics, economics, and foreign af-
fairs.” With bibliography.
THAILAND’S NEW COURSE, by J. L. S.
Girling, in Pacific Affairs, v. 42, no. 3 (Fall
1969) 346–359.
“There is a new flexibility in Thai poli-
tics, both external and internal. The reason for
this is clearly to bring Thailand more into line
with changing conditions. The previous policy
suited its times, at least from the point of view
of a military-dominated, security-conscious,
conservatively-inclined regime. There was then
a community of interest between Thai
governments . . . and successive Dnited
States administrations, whether Republican or
Democratic. This was reflected in U.S.
commitments . . . The Thai government’s
reaction to the changing environment, if by no
means a reversal of the previous policy, is still
quite remarkable when compared with what
was being said and done only a year or two
ago. Further, the external uncertainty into
which the Thai government has been drawn,
again in contrast to the stability and security
afforded by the American alliance for almost
two decades, has clearly affected the internal
posture of the ruling group—or rather, the
more forward-looking members of it. Howels:
is it possible to explain the shift towards dº.
mocracy—however gradual and circum,
scribed—other than as a way of provid.
ing a broader popular base for the regime,
particularly when it comes to confront, për.
haps alone, more difficult and even critical
times?”
TIME OUT OF HAND: REVOLUTION
AND REACTION IN SOUTHEAST ASIA, by
Robert Shaplen. London, Andre Deutsch, 1964
429 p.
“This political history of Southeas:
Asia discusses events in Indonesia, Malaysia,
the Philippines, Thailand, Cambodia, Laos, mad
Vietnam. Much of the book has previously ap.
peared in The New Yorker . . . This b00k
contains analyses of these countries . . . Scene:
of fighting in the north of Laos; a . . . character
sketch of . . . Prince Sihanouk of Cambois
[among many other items] . . .”
2. The Constitution
CONSTITUTION OF NATIONS. WOLUME
II—ASIA, AUSTRALIA AND OCEANIA, by
Amos J. Peaslee. Rev. 3rd ed. The Haguë.
Netherlands, Martinus Nijhoff, 1966. 632 p.
Texts of constitutions for the following
countries, among others: Burma, Cambodia,
Laos, Thailand. -
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND ELEC.
TIONS IN THAILAND, by Clark D. Neher, in
Pacific Affairs, v. 43, no. 2 (Summer 1970)
240–257.
“Although contemporary Thai goverſ.
mental structure is underwritten by a constiti.
tion based on free elections and the principlº
of separation of power, substantial changº
have been made in each of these elements &
they have been integrated into the Thai Cul.
ture. The result has been a distinctive political
system which can only be partially understoºd
in a Western framework of analysis. In Jumº
1968, Thailand promulgated its eighth consti.
tution since the 1932 revolution which replaced
the absolute monarchy with bureaucratic rº
gime. The new constitution set the stage fºr
another major political event—the election;
for national assembly representatives on Feb.
162
ruary 10, 1969, the tenth election since the re-
volution but the first since December 1957
under Field-Marshal Sarit Thannarat. The
Thai propensity for changing constitutions has
been referred to as ‘faction constitutionalism,”
whereby each successive draft reflects, makes
legitimate, and strengthens major changes in
factional dominance.”
F. Thailand's Search for National Se-
º (See also Appendixes AA and
B
1. Miscellaneous Aspects
THE IMPACT OF DEVELOPMENT IN
THE ASIAN PACIFIC [INCLUDING
THAILAND] ON SOUTH ASIA AND THE
INDIAN OCEAN BASIN, 1972–1984, by
James McGarry & Daniel Tretiak. Falls
Church, Va., Westinghouse Corp., Center for
Advanced Studies & Analyses, 1971. 42 p.
(ASA Monograph No.7.)
“This monograph . . . , explores the
major considerations likely to shape the chang-
ing balance of power and policies of the major
powers in the Indian Ocean area. It concen-
trates upon policy alternatives respecting this
area available to Japan, the United States,
China, the Soviet Union, and Indonesia. One of
the most timely values lies in its insights res-
pecting the essential stability of the balance of
power in the Indian Ocean area, resulting both
from the large number of major states with in-
fluence in the area and the limited degree to
which military actions of any one in this area
Can essentially modify the structure of the
power balance.”
THE PRECARIOUS POSITION OF THAI-
LAND, by Lt. Col. Frederick J. Kroesen, in
Military Review (December 1964)
“The continental portion of SE Asia is
the most threatened region in the world. Thai-
land, the author says, is the primary objective
Of the Communists in this area. The respect
and friendship which have grown between
Thailand and the United States should prove a
potent deterrent to Communist aims any time
in the near future, provided both nations meet
their responsibilities and commitments. The
settlement which ultimately evolves in Laos
will guide the Thais as to U.S. intentions.
Thailand’s pro-West leanings may well be
abandoned if the Communists succeed in estab-
lishing a common border along the Mekong
River. The loss of Laos will be indicative of
Western weakness and a lack of will which
might next sacrifice Thailand. The battle for
South Vietnam and the cold war struggle for
Cambodia are related to the Laos problem, but
neither is watched in Thailand so much as
Laos as a barometer of Western determination
to thwart Communism in SE Asia.”
THE SECURITY GAP—CAN ASIANS
FILL IT? by S. M. Ali, in Far Eastern Eco-
nomic Review (Hong Kong), reprinted in
Atlas, (April 1968) 31 plus.
“The outcome in Vietnam will decide
both the timing and composition of any new
defense alliance for SEA countries. When the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN) came into being last year, the mem-
bers—Malaysia, the Philippines, Indonesia,
Singapore, and Thailand—discussed the ques-
tion of regional defense, but were unsuccessful
in their efforts to extend the new alliance be-
yond the realm of economic cooperation. How-
ever, with a possible US withdrawal from the
region, it is certain that the non-communist
countries will start thinking about a new ar-
rangement to fill their defense needs. President
Marcos of the Philippines has cleverly linked
the need for new thinking on regional defense
with the problem of internal subversion. At
the ASEAN meeting, he spoke of a ‘security
gap in SEA,” and called for “refashioning pos-
tures and positions’ to meet any new
threat . . . In the final analysis, what is
needed is effective coordination between the de-
fense of one country and that of another so
that they pool their resources with common de-
fense objectives, set up machinery for joint
planning, and thus develop maximum self-suf-
ficiency in defense on a regional basis. CENTO,
the defense alliance binding Pakistan, Iran and
Turkey, could provide a model, with the differ-
ence that the US may not be required to asso-
ciate itself even as an observer (as in
CENTO). Although it is inevitable that any
defense alliance in this region becomes a part
of the East-West cold war, there is still the
chance that an effective ‘fourth force’ can de-
velop in Asia . . . .”

163
SOUTHEAST ASIA AND SECURITY, by
Soedjatmoko, in Military Review, v. 50, no. 7
(July 1970) 40–48.
The author states: “It is important for
the clarity of our vision to free ourselves from
the obsession that all of us inevitably have
with the Vietnam war and the manner of its
resolution. After all, the future of the South-
east Asian region will not be determined solely
by the outcome of that war. The population of
Vietnam, or even of the whole of erstwhile In-
dochina together, constitutes less than one-
third of the total population of Southeast Asia.
On the other hand, Indonesia’s population
alone accounts for almost half of that total. In
keeping the Vietnam war in its proper propor-
tions, it is important to realize that, if Indone-
sia had become a Communist country, any mili-
tary gains in the Vietnam war would have
been nullified . . . Out of our own national
experience, we in Indonesia more than ever be-
lieve that this is the crucial element in the
equation. Without such a will and determina-
tion, the infusion of external power will fail to
make much difference. The domino theory,
therefore, is to us rather a gross oversimplifi-
cation of the nature of the historical processes
that go on in the area. It obscures and distorts
rather than illuminates our understanding and
offers no guidelines for realistic policy . . . It
is important, therefore, to see the Association
of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) not as a
prelude to a military alliance, but very defi-
nitely as an attempt to speed up the economic
development and political viability of the re-
gion as a whole, as well as that of the individ-
ual member countries. ASEAN is an expres-
sion of the will and determination that exist
among its member nations to shape their own
future and to work out their problems of sta-
bility and economic development in
freedom . . . It should be noted that ASEAN–
in its present composition of Thailand, the
Philippines, Malaysia, Singapore, and Indone-
sia—was, from its inception, only seen as a be-
ginning. I do not think that its members have
relinquished the hope that eventually ASEAN
will include all other nations in Southeast
Asia.” This article was condensed from an ad-
dress by His Excellency, the Indonesian Am-
bassador to the U.S., at the Center for Cultural
and Technical Interchange between East all
West in Honolulu, on May 14, 1969. This anal
ysis is a digest which appeared in Survival
Great Britain, October 1969. -
THE SOUTHEAST ASIA CRISIS; BACK
GROUND PAPERS AND PROCEEDING
OF THE EIGHTH HAMARSKJOL)
FORUM, ed. by Lyman M. Tandel, Jr. Dobh
Ferry, N.Y., Oceana Press, Inc., 1966. 226 p.
(Published for The Association of the Bar (ſ
the City of New York.)
“The United States Ambassador tº
Thailand from 1961 to 1963 gives an 'acCOml
of the historical backgrounds, current pil.
terns, and future prospects for Southeas:
Asia . . . [He describes] previous attempts ºf
neutralization in the area and [presents] suſ,
gestion for a possible U.N. role in the Vietnam,
ese and other Southeast Asian crises . . . 0}
servations and comments on the topic by for
participants at the forum conclude the b00k'."
With bibliography.
A SYSTEMS APPROACH TO SECURITY
IN THE INDIAN OCEAN ARC, by Sheldºm
W. Simon, in Orbis, (Summer 1970) 401–4.
“Systems analysis suggests that most ºf
the states in the Indian Ocean arc hold certain
common views about the region. They see it
following a projected Anglo-American with
drawal, as particularly vulnerable to Chines:
and Vietnamese insurgency operations. They
are not, however, enthusiastic about a possibl:
collective security arrangement with the
USSR, designed to protect them against China
The general Asian trend appears to be agains:
a visible land-based presence of any external
power. From their point of view, bases are aſ
insult to the host country's sovereignty, in
crease the probability of attack upon them.
selves during war, and serve as a battleground
for other powers. Moreover, they do not consi
der the threat to their security serious enough
to require common, defense arrangement.
Ideally, the Asian states seem to favor an ar.
rangement whereby they would assume pri.
mary responsibility for regional security
though not necessarily through a formal dº.
fense pact, while relying on the larger power
for material support. Japan, India, and Indº-
nesia, the three essential states in any security

164
arrangement, show little interest in formal re-
gional multilateral collaboration. Since the US
defense role in Southeast Asia is not likely to
be replaced by a regional security arrangement
in the near future, the US may wish to provide
logistical support and training to Laos, Cam-
bodia, and Thailand, where North Vietnamese
troop involvement is likely to continue well
after the war in Vietnam is terminated. Such
support activities could be based in Japan, Oki-
nawa, the Republic of Korea, Taiwan, the Phil-
ippines, and Thailand. As long as the US role
is confined to support activities, it will not gen-
erate extensive anti-Americanism. However,
kihould the US be called upon to provide air
Over, it might be wise to employ bases located
Only in those states which are directly support-
ing the defending government . . . .”
THAILAND: A CONFRONTATION, by
Charles W. Koburger, in Military Review (No-
vember 1967) 51—55.
“Wictory without actual fighting is the
goal of confrontations in which the mere pres-
Once of military force prevents another power
from attaining its goals. Mishandled, a con-
frontation may lead to a limited war or, if
major powers are involved, a general war. The
US action in Thailand in 1962 and 1963 ex-
emplified a successful confrontation. In the
spring of 1962, acting within the scope of the
Manila Treaty and in response to a formal
Thai request for assistance, the US sent com-
bat forces to Thailand to help protect its bor-
der with Laos. Soon after the arrival of US
forces, the Communist Pathet Lao advance to-
Ward Thailand stopped. American forces were
them withdrawn. The following year the US
staged war games in Thailand to demonstrate
is continued interest in the area. Thus, by the
simple presence of its forces, the US helped
protect Thailand from communist attack,
providing a temporary local military stability
and restoring the status quo ante. The US
thereby fulfilled its pledge of assistance to
Thailand, proved its determination to support
SEAT0, and demonstrated its willingness to
withdraw forces as soon as its goals were ob-
tained. The Thailand deployment vindicated
the basic concepts underlying such multilateral
security organizations as SEATO and proved
that US power can and will be used effectively
in such situations.”
THAILAND–THE AMBIGUOUS DOMINO,
by Alan Bennett, in Conflict Studies, no. 1 (De-
cember 1969) 1–14.
“Discusses Thailand's reappraisal of its
ties and commitments to the West in the wake
of the evident decision of the United States to
withdraw its military forces from Southeast
Asia. Bennett explores various alternatives
under consideration by Thai leaders, including
improvement of relations with Communist
China and the formation of a regional alliance
with other non-Communist Southeast Asian
states. He finds Thailand better prepared to
cope with Communist insurgents than it was
prior to establishing close ties to the United
States.”
THAILAND STRESSES ANTI-COMMUN-
IST SOLIDARITY, by Chu Yen-hsun, in Asian
Outlook, v. 6, no. 2 (February 1971) 33–34.
“At the first Southeast Asia Business
Forum sponsored by Stanford University in
Bangkok and attended by more than two
hundred leaders of industry and commerce
both in Southeast Asia and other parts of the
world, Thai Minister of Foreign Affairs
Thanat Khoman emphasized the importance of
regional cooperation. United action will lead to
common benefits, he stated, but disunion will
only lead to mutual harm. In analysing the pres-
ent Southeast Asian situation, Thanat be-
lieves that if the war is not won, peace will not
be won either. For this reason, he stresses that
the only alternative confronting the nations of
Southeast Asia in their present state of discord
is that of solidarity and unity.”
TO ESTABLISH AN ASIAN AND PA-
CIFIC COLLECTIVE SECURITY SYSTEM,
in Asian. Outlook, v. 6, no. 2 (February 1971)
2–4.
“To carry out the so-called ‘Nixon doc-
trine’—the U.S. policy in Asia—the American
government has started withdrawing its troops
from Asia at an accelerated speed . . . The
first difficult problem that may take place is
the continuous deterioration of the war situa-
tion in Laos and Cambodia and the incessant
expansion of Communist subversive activities

165
in Thailand . . . The second difficult problem
is: The reduction of the Communist military
threat in South Vietnam is not entirely due to
the decline of the Communist strength as un-
derstood by the United States. Rather, they
pretend that their strength has shrunk in
order to lure the United States into accelerat-
ing the withdrawal of its troops . . . The
third difficult problem is: It is possible that
once all American troops are pulled out from
Southeast Asia and can no longer be sent back
there, the Red Chinese will openly help the
Communists in Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia and
Thailand launch an all-out attack in an at-
tempt to seize all of the Southeast
Asia . . . Before the United States withdraws
its troops, it should make the necessary deploy-
ments actively so that the free Asian countries
can take over the responsibility of defending
the security and peace of Asia.
WHAT IS SECURITY IN SOUTHEAST
ASIA 2 by Frank N. Trager, in Air University
Review, v. 20, no. 1 (November–December
1968) 103–112.
“Let’s think first about what security in
Southeast Asia is from the point of view of
Southeast Asians . . . In terms of security,
there should have been no threat, there should
have been no problem. At the time of indepen-
dence, none of the Southeast Asian countries
any longer had designs on their neighbors.
There had been a time when the Thai and the
Vietnamese in fact had designs upon Cam-
bodia; and in their centuries-long march down
this mainland Southeast Asian peninsula, they
had squeezed Cambodia into smaller confines.
So, too, the Burmese once had rampant dy-
nasties; and Indonesians may have had ideas
of reviving a greater Malayo-Indonesian state.
But by and large, at the end of World War II
such past “glories’ were past. To repeat, in
terms of security, after these countries had at-
tained independence, there should have been no
threat to the area—but there was.”
2. Armed Forces
THE ASIAN BALANCE OF POWER: A
COMPARISON WITH EUROPEAN PRECE-
DENTS, by Coral Bell. London, Institute for
Strategic Studies, 1968. 14 p. (Adelphi Paper
No. 44.)
“Asia needs a balance of power Cºl.
tion, similar to NATO, to deter Chinese expal.
sionism in the next decade. It was the trai
tionally European concept of balance of powd
not containment, which halted Soviet advan&
in post-war Europe. Containment is at best
military strategy for stop-gap action to prº
vent any territorial acquisition by the advº
sary. Military containment has been tried in
Vietnam and has proved too costly in relatim
to its effectiveness. A balance of power CDai
tion in Asia would have not only military, hi
political and economic cohesion in deterri
China . . . The Asian coalition, therefon,
would include only those countries which aſ:
definitely Western-oriented and have comml
political, economic, and social interests to pſ,
tect, such as Thailand, Malaysia, Singapº
the Philippines, Taiwan, Japan, New Zealani
and Australia. Burma, Cambodia, Laos, and
Vietnam should be made neutral buff.
states . . . However, a balance of power Cºal
tion is not in the Asian tradition, and it wil
still be difficult to organize. Moreover, Asim
countries alone cannot present China with !
creditable deterrent. A merely regional COi
tion will not be effective against China's in
creasing nuclear potential. Asian countris
need the economic, military, and nuclear baſk
ing of the U.S. A considerable input of Westem
military resources will be required for at lead
a decade and a US defense arrangement, simi
lar to the Japanese-American pact, will k
needed for much longer. .
THE BALANCE OF POWER IN ASIA, )
Alastair Buchan, in NATO'S Fifteen Natiº
(December 1967–January 1968) 38–44.
[For assessing the military power
the various nations in Asia, the authſ
states:] “ . . . Militarily, by 1975 China wil
have 121 million men of military age, but nº
enough equipment or petroleum to sustain prº
tracted non-nuclear conflict. It will have SOſ.
naval capacity, though it has no naval trai
tion. China will have a land-based ICBM fort,
but of a size which the US could deter, destſ)
by preemptive attack, or minimized by a rel;
tively light ABM system. So, China is I
likely to challenge the US or the USSR in 1%
any more than in 1967 because their pow?
will have grown faster than China's. Moſt
166
over, it is doubtful that China will develop a
hºlder nuclear doctrine than the four countries
which now possess nuclear weapons. With one
Of the world's greatest population densities,
China will remain extremely vulnerable to nu-
Clear attack. China’s nuclear capability in
1975, while small in relation to that of the
Super powers, could still threaten its neigh-
bors, although such a threat could be offset by
American assurance of protection. This pre-
sumably is the reason why Peking prefers na-
tional Japanese and Indian nuclear programs
to any form of US guarantees to Asian powers.
However, Chinese nuclear weapons may have
SOme marginal utility as a means of instilling
fear into the less literate Asian peoples. The
real instrument of Chinese power will lie in its
ability to divide the Asian nations and to en-
(Ourage political and revolutionary warfare
where local corruption or maladministration
makes this strategy profitable. Likely target
(Ountries are Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia,
and the Philippines. The continuing frustra-
tion or containment of China’s ideological and
mational ambitions will lead it either to domi-
mate Or to neutralize as many of the non-com-
munist Asian states as possible, just as it ap-
pears to be doing with Pakistan . . . .”
THE MILITARY AND POLITICAL
CHANGE IN ASIA, by Joh P. Lovell and C. I.
Eugene Kim, in Pacific Affairs, v. 40, nos. 1 and
2 (Spring and Summer 1967) 113–123.
"The indigenous military establishments
Of most of the nation-states of Asia [including
Burma and Thailand] are engaged in activities
which place them in vital positions in relation-
ship both to international communications and
tº intrasocietal communications. Their access
and receptivity, in most cases, to ideas that are
'modern’, coupled with their contacts with and
influence upon broad sectors of their societies
from the 'grass roots’ level up, means that the
military have a tremendous potential for im-
parting or shaping the basic political norms
and beliefs affecting political change. This is
not to say that the role of the military as agent
ºf political change is necessarily good, any
more than modernization is necessarily good.
Indeed, the point to stress is that far too little
is known about the social and political conse-
quences of various military activities such as
those described.”
THE MILITARY BALANCE 1970–1971—
PART. V: ASIA AND AUSTRALASIA, in
Aerospace International, v. 6, no. 6 (November—
December 1970) 54–56 plus.
A strategic survey of the military bal-
ance of this area of the world, including a sur-
vey of the following countries, among many
others: Burma, Cambodia, Laos, and Thailand.
Provides the strengths of the Armies, Navies,
Marine Corps, Air Forces, as well as Paramili-
tary Forces.
MILITARY PORT OPERATIONS IN
THAILAND, by Col. William H. Parmenter.
Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala., Air War Col-
lege, 1969. 59 p. (Research Report No. 3815;
M–32983–U.)
“Historical highlights portraying prob-
lems in oversea port operations during
World War II, Korean War, and the War in
Vietnam. The buildup of logistical activities to
support U.S. Air Force operations in Thailand
is included. Terminal operations in Bangkok
and Sattahip are described to emphasize the
importance of base development planning
when building port facilities. How Bangkok
port congestion hastened the shift of military
port operations to the Sattahip-Vayama com-
plex is discussed. A summary of construction
effort on roads, depots, POL systems, and the
new port is included. Location of the new port
in Thailand versus location of the new port in
Saigon is presented to illustrate the advantage
of positioning terminals away from population
centers and near open water. The author be-
lieves the Sattahip complex is useful as a de-
terrent to aggression and counter-insurgencies.
He concludes with a projection of how military
ports of the future will operate and their appli-
cation in counter-insurgencies.”
THE ROYAL THAI MARINE CORPS, by
Rear Adm. Sonong Nisalak, in Am Cosantoir,
v. 39, no. 6 (June 1969) 191–194.
How “the Royal Thai Marines, with the
longest history of Asia’s Marine Corps, has
carved a little reputation of its own in the east-
ern hemisphere.”
THE ROYAL THAI NAVY, by D. A. Van

167
Harssen, in U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings
(June 1966) 78–83.
“Since 1951 the Royal Thai Navy has
progressed steadily toward becoming once again
a force in the Gulf of Siam. Although the Thai
Navy has received considerable support through
the Military Assistance Program (MAP), pre-
sent advances have resulted primarily from the
dynamic efforts of recent Thai naval leadership.
The threat of sea lane interdiction, whether by
massive attack or guerrilla raid, continues to
confront the Thai Navy. The beaches and shel-
tered islands of the Kra shoreline are natural
routes to Thailand’s hinterland . . . There are
2,000 officers and 16,000 enlisted men in the
Navy, and 130 officers and 3,200 enlisted men
in the Marine Corps. A system of in-country
schools staffed largely by graduates of US
MAP training courses provides a regular input
of technically trained men. Also personnel
training in the operation and maintenance of
modern equipment found in the fleet must be
developed via MAP. For officer training there
is a new Royal Thai Naval Academy with a
brigade strength of 150 cadets. On May 5, 1966,
the Thai government announced that it was re-
sponding to a request from the government of
South Vietnam in sending naval vessels, ini-
tially an LST and a costal patrol boat, to Viet-
namese waters.”
WORLD MILITARY EXPENDITURES,
1970. Washington, U.S. Arms Control and Dis-
armament Agency, Economic Bureau, 1970. 37
p. (Publication 58.)
Provides information on World Mitary
expenditures and related data for 120 countries
including Burma, Cambodia, Laos, and Thai-
land, among others. With 8 charts, 6 tables,
and statistical notes.
3. The Threat from Internal and Easternal
Communism (See also II–F–2)
THE BATTLE CRY IS TO CREATE TWO,
THREE . . . MANY VIET NAMS, by Major
Ernesto “Che” Guevara, in Tricontinental
Magazine (June 1967).
“‘Create two, three, many Vietnams,” is
the appeal to Asians, Africans, and Latin
Americans, in an article purportedly written
by Cuba's Major Ernesto “Che' Guevara, and
scheduled for publication in the first (June
1967) issue of Tricomtimental Magazine. The
magazine is an organ of the Afro-Asian-Lali
American Peoples’ Solidarity Organizatim
(AALAPSO). In Vietnam, “the most powerſ
imperialist power is feeling the drain Calſº
by a poor and backward nation.’ The auth
calls on the “exploited of the world’ not to ful
war, but to ‘hit hard and incessantly at €7.7
point of confrontation.” By creating more Wii;
nams, the downtrodden of three continents (m
topple American power. The history of Criº
on three continents during the past 21 yam
serves as background for posing the questin
as to “possibilities for the short-term or mº,
ium-term liberation of peoples.” Latin Ameria
is seen as the most fertile ground for forti,
another Vietnam. In Africa, political and SOji
evolution does not indicate a continental reVol,
tionary situation. Only when the black massºsil
South Africa or Rhodesia begin their real ºf
volutionary struggle, will a new era haw
started in Africa. In Asia, however, the sity
tion is explosive. Points of friction are not jº
Vietnam and Laos, but in Cambodia, Thailani
Malaysia, and of course, Indonesia, where wº
cannot believe the last word has been said'."
CHINA, RUSSIA, AND THE U.S., by 05:
Gass, in Commentary (April 1967) 39–46.
“Vietnam is a testing ground for it
power policies and interactions. The Chimè.
view the Vietnam conflict as a perfect examki
of the Marxian war of liberation. Peking #
clares its unwavering support for the Hami
Vietcong cause, although the support thus ſº
is mostly verbal. Russia expresses sympati
for the communist cause, but is less than gº
erous with military and economic assistalſ:
and on several occasions has tried to media?:
peaceful solution. The US, of course, conside;
itself allied with the legitimate representatiº
of the South Vietnamese people, the govem.
ment in Saigon, and intends to preserve tº
South's right to freedom and democracy, H(Y,
ever, in response to the limited interventil
policy of Moscow and Peking, the US has ini
tiated a limited objective policy which pſ:
cludes any American take-over of North Wid
nam. This policy makes it possible for Nº
Vietnam to keep up the war, although he
chances of victory are remote. She can purº
the war with no risk to her territorial intº
rity and small risk to her economic compal

168
and civilian population. Meanwhile, there is al-
ways the hope that world opinion will force
the US out of Vietnam and leave all of Indo-
China open for communist activity. Hanoi real-
iſes, as few proponents of American retreat do,
that if the US withdraws from South Vietnam,
Thailand will be almost indefensible, and the
smaller surrounding states will be easy victo-
ries for communism . . . .”
COLD WAR OPERATIONS: THE POLI-
TICS OF COMMUNIST CONFRONTATION;
PART XI–COMMUNISM IN ASIA, by
Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, Jr., in Naval War Col-
lºgº Review, v. 21, no. 3 (November 1968) 57–
63, -
A summary of the status of communism
in the various countries in Asia, inlcuding the
following, among others: Burma, Cambodia,
LAOS, and Thailand.
COMMUNIST AGGRESSION IN THAI-
LAND, by Gen. Praphas Charusathiora. n.p.,
md.
A translation of a Thai document at-
tempting to add “to our knowledge of Thai-
land's efforts in countering the Communist
inSurgency.” The author, a Commander of Com-
munist Suppression in the Royal Thai Supreme
Command, “describes the operations and prin-
tiples of armed conflict . . . This document is
Written for all Thai citizens, to enable them to
hºme acquainted with Communist objectives,
practices, and methodology.”
COMMUNIST TACTICS IN RURAL
AREAS EXPOSED AT SEMINAR, in SEATO
Rword, v. 9, no. 2 (April 1970) 3–12.
“Communist activities in remote, devel-
Oping areas of South-East Asia vary in degree
from Country to country, and even from one lo-
Cality to another within the same country, but
there is a fundamental pattern in their subver-
Śive and terroristic tactics which aim at creat-
ing armed conflict leading to an eventual Com-
munist seizure of power. These were the points
tº emerge from the five-day seminar on “Village
Defence and Development,’ which closed in
Bangkok on March 20. The methods and tech-
miques used by the Communists, and the
Counter-measures being carried out by various
free-world governments were fully discussed by
participants from the ten nations represented
at seminar. Seminar Director General Surakij
Mayalarp (Thailand) pointed out in his closing
remarks that although the seminar could not be
expected to produce resolutions immediately
applicable to all situations owing to differing
circumstances prevailing in the various coun-
tries affected by Communist subversion and in-
surgency, “nevertheless, each participating
country can reap benefits from the ideas and
experiences gained in this seminar by adapting
them from practical application to their local
conditions.” The seminar, sponsored by the
Royal Thai Government, originated from the
concern felt by participating governments for
security problems affecting the rural areas of
South-East Asian countries particularly vul-
nerable to Communist subversion.”
THAILAND: THE WAR THAT IS, THE
WAR THAT WILL BE, by Louis E. Lomax.
New York, Random House, 1967. 175 p.
“Thailand may be the next battlefield
for control of Southeast Asia. The Thai Com-
munist Party consists of only 5,000 active
members, but its strength has been increasing
since 1960. At that time, the leadership
switched from a pro-Moscow to a pro-Peking
policy. Money, men, material, and ideas began
to flow from China into north and northeast
Thailand. The Russian revolutionary line of in-
citing revolt among students and workers was
abandoned for the more Asian approach of
Mao Tse-tung. Promising young revolutionar-
ies are sent from Thailand to North Vietnam
and China to train. Some Chinese advisers are
dispatched to Thailand, but the emphasis is on
the Thais themselves. Dissident elements are
carefully cultivated because a Maoist revolu-
tion depends upon indigenous support, with
full exploitation of local grievances. The com-
munists base their program on rural disaffec-
tion caused by decades of neglect and repres-
sion by the central government. Thais have
little sense of nationalism; their loyalties are
strongest on the village level. The communists
are liberal with their promises to villagers,
shrewd in their criticism of the central author-
ities, and calculating in their terror campaigns,
making representatives and lackeys of the

169
Bangkok regime almost the sole objects of their
attacks. The increasing presence of American
troops and installations in Thailand presents a
potentially explosive situation, which could
easily embroil the US in another Asian war.
Thus far the Thai communists have concen-
trated on consolidating their own organization
and establishing a rural power base. However,
the US has already involved men, money, and
equipment in the central government’s at-
tempts to uproot the communists. The insur-
gents know that they have only to launch at-
tacks against the large US airbases or supply
depots to enmesh the Americans in a full-scale
counter-insurgency in Thailand. The rebels
feel that conflict is inevitable, but they are in
no hurry; time is an ally they intend to use to
their greatest advantage.”
THE UNITED FRONT IN THAILAND; A
DOCUMENTARY ANALYSIS, by Donald E.
Weatherbee. Columbia, University of South
Carolina, Institute of International Studies,
1970. 103 p. (Studies in International Affairs
No. 8).
“This study presents an analysis of but
one aspect of communist revolutionary strat-
egy in Thailand.” Contents: The Political
Model; The Political Background; The Emerg-
ence of a United Front in Thailand; The
Front, The CPT, and the Armed Struggle; The
Front's Future, and Map of Thai Provinces
with Insurgent Activity.
WHICH WILL BE THE NEXT VIET-
NAM? by Carl T. Rowan, in Reader's Digest,
(March 1969) 96–100.
“The Asian communists have concluded
that the US is a ‘paper tiger’ which cannot
stem the tide of Maoist revolt in Asia. As pro-
Western nations and neutrals anxiously watch
the negotiations in Paris, the Asian communists
are busy setting up their priorities for post-
Vietnam insurgencies. In 1964, Peking de-
clared that Thailand would be the next target
for Chinese-inspired “liberation.” Thailand
reacted by contributing 6000 combat troops to
the war in Vietnam, hoping that communist
operations in Vietnam and Laos could be re-
duced and a wider war in Thailand could be
prevented. At home the Thai government
were confident that they could defeat theim,
ton, Department of State, Bureau of Intd;
land. See also appendixes for the bibliograp
launched a vigorous military campaign again
the communist insurgents and acceler:
rural development programs to deprive them,
les of their local support. Last year the Ti
gents without the aid of US combat troopsk
recently, guerrilla activities in Thailand h
increased. The government estimates 23||||
surgents operate in the country-side; in h
north, they have formed units large enough
ambush regular Thai military forces. As ||
public support for Vietnam decreases and
Paris talks lag, Thailand becomes more am
ious about its future . . . Peking does |
limit its attacks to pro-Western governmä
however; both the neutral governments i
Laos and Cambodia have been the targest
Chinese-supported subversion. In 1967, alſº
by communist guerrillas and North Within
ese regulars in Laos became so widespreadth
the US was on the verge of introducing Cºmº
troops into Laos. However, the Laotian Am
supported by US bombing raids, was able
turn back the communists. Even Prince Sin
ouk of Cambodia, cited by some as an auth
ity for the ‘civil war' theory of the Wiehu
conflict, complains of Chinese-directed Suhº
sion in Cambodia. Thus, a communist takeº
in SEA has become a likelihood for the pº
Vietnam era. To some Americans, this Wi
be a fair price for peace in Vietnam; tomi
lions of Asians it would be the “bitterests
most devastating defeat in American historſ'
WORLD STRENGTH OF THE COMM,
NIST PARTY ORGANIZATIONS. 23rd Al
NUAL REPORT; 1971 EDITION. Washi:
ence and Research, 1971. 248 p. (Publicaid
8526.)
“This report contains the 23rd amº
global survey of communist parties . . . Tº
issue, like its predecessors, gives informali
on party membership and on voting and pati,
mentary strength wherever applicable, k
gether with a brief analysis of the important
of each communist party in its domestic pi
cal environment.” Includes information
many countries, including, among others, tº
following: Burma, Cambodia, Laos, and Tº
on Peninsular Southeast Asia.













170
G. Foreign Relations
1. Miscellaneous Aspects
BANGKOK AND THE DOMINO THEORY,
in Swiss Review of World Affairs, v. 19, no. 10
(January 1970) 17–18.
“Seni Pramoj, leader of the weak oppo-
sition in Thailand, recently declared that in
the course of its history his country has always
bent with the wind like a flexible bamboo pole,
without breaking, and must continue to remain
elastic in hope that no storm will develop.
Since the beginning of the American with-
drawal in Vietnam, Foreign Minister Thanat
Koman has been even more concrete in his
statements. He points to the fact that, during
the colonial epoch, Thailand successfully ma-
neuvered between Britain and France in order
to retain its traditional independence. But
when communism threatened to overrun all of
Indochina the Thais let the Americans into the
COuntry, since the USA was the only power
available which seemed in a position to check
the rapidly growing menace from Hanoi and
Peking. Now, he says, for reasons of their own
the Americans have decided to pull in their
horns in Asia and this will create a power vac-
uum into which something else must flow. But
the prospect of finding substitute allies is not
Very comforting. The Chinese colossus is act-
ing in a manner half reflective, half aggres-
sive, Nevertheless it is possible that Thai gen-
rals have their lines out to realists of a very
difficult political shading in Peking. The
Chinese minority in Thailand is large, well in-
tegrated and has even provided the country
with a number of prominent ministers. In
Other words, there are family ties which reach
across the frontier. At the same time the Thai
Chinese are the capitalistic element in the coun-
try and are certainly not anxious for a change
along socialist lines.”
BANGKOK, MANILA, by Ross Terrill, in
Atlantic, (July 1969) 22–27.
“Changing conditions in East Asia are
Compelling Thailand and the Philippines to
reappraise their strongly pro-American for-
eign policies. Thai Foreign Minister Thanat
Khoman has supported the US out of concern
for Thailand's survival, not from any love of
democracy. The presence of US troops in Thai-
land antedated the expansion of the Vietnam
conflict, and US forces are more involved in
Thai counterinsurgency than is officially ad-
mitted. Their withdrawal would probably
create a crisis for the present regime, but
Thanat is trying to keep his choices open in
case of US disengagement from the Asian
mainland. Gestures of friendship to China are
being made. Similarly, Thanat is improving re-
lations with Cambodia, and trying to make a
new agreement on Laos part of a Vietnam
settlement . . . .”
THE CHALLENGE OF WORLD POLITICS
IN SOUTH AND SOUTHEAST ASIA, by
Werner Levi. Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Pren-
tice-Hall, Inc., 1968. 186 p.
The Elitist Nature of Foreign Policies;
The Problem of Nationalism; Regionalism;
Nonalignment—The Expectation and the Re-
sult; The United Nations; Tensions and Con-
flicts; The Major Nations; etc. Discussed,
among many other nations of the region are
Burma, Cambodia, Laos, and Thailand.
THE CHANGING FACE OF SOUTHEAST
ASIA, by Amry Vandenbosch and Richard But-
well. Lexington, University of Kentucky
Press, 1966. 438 p.
“When the authors set out to revise
their 1957 study, Southeast Asia among the
World Powers, the scene had changed so dras-
tically that they could retain only the histori-
cal sections of their country studies. This,
then, is a new account of Southeast Asian af-
fairs, with separate chapters on Indonesia, Ma-
laysia, the Philippines, Viet Nam, Laos, Cam-
bodia, Burma and Thailand, the region as a
whole, and U.S. policy. The authors are con-
cerned not only with the eight nations’ internal
and international politics but especially with
the relationship between the two.”
SMALL STATES IN ALLIANCES: ICE-
LAND, THAILAND, AUSTRALIA, by Donald
E. Nuechterlein, in Orbis, v. 13, no. 2 (Summer
1969) 600–623.
“During the past fifteen years scholars
have devoted an increasing amount of research
to the study of new states in the international
community. Part of this research has dealt
with the foreign policies of new states, but in
most cases the emphasis has been on states

171
that have chosen nonalignment as a policy.
This article is concerned with the reasons why
certain small states join alliances with great
powers, instead of adopting nonalignment, and
the factors that cause them to remain in alli-
ance after the passage of time. For purposes of
comparison, three small states that are allied
with the United States were chosen for discus-
sion: Iceland (NATO), Thailand (SEATO),
and Australia (ANZUS). All three decided be-
tween 1949 and 1954 to accept a military alli-
ance with the United States, and other West-
ern powers, rather than follow a nonaligned or
neutralist policy, each for a different reason.
Their reasons are analyzed in terms of seven
major factors that influenced their foreign pol-
icy decisions: (1) historical, (2) geographic,
(3) economic, (4) external threat, (5) internal
security, (6) military capability, and (7) re-
ceptivity to foreign bases. A section entitled
“Prospects for the Alliances’ assesses the rele-
vance of these factors to the foreign policies
of these states today.”
THAILAND AND MULTIPOLARITY, by
Renneth T. Young, in Current History, v. 61,
no. 364 (December 1971) 327–331 plus.
“. . . . The new expression of Thai-
land's diplomacy of maneuver has added a flexi-
bility and an opening for accommodation
which have not existed before in the Pacific
Asian context . . . Indeed, Thailand has be-
come the key link between northeast and
southeast Asia in the growing network of po-
litical, economic, cultural and military ex-
changes among governments, private organiza-
tions, and regional institutions in both
areas . . . Thailand’s adaptable diplomacy an-
ticipates Asia’s new multipolarity . . . Thailand
is enmeshed in this multipolarity. Multiple di-
plomacy is as natural to Thailand as blades to
a fan. Thailand is taking her own diplomatic
initiatives in adjusting to the new thrusts and
rivalries of the major powers. She is vitally
concerned with finding a new balance of power.
Thai leaders are developing a “composite for-
eign policy” of friendship with outside powers
and regional cooperation with Asian states.
Internal circumstances and external develop-
ments lead Thailand’s diplomacy toward multi-
polarity.”
2. Thailand and Her Neighbors
REGIONALISM AND INSTABILITY ||
SOUTHEAST ASIA, by Bernard K. Gordoni
Orbis (Summer 1966) 438–457.
“Regionalism has not taken roºt i
Southeast Asia. There are many political tº
flicts among the nations and little agreems
on what cooperation would mean in pradiº
Yet, regionalism continues to attract suppºſ,
ers because it seems to promise different bº
fits to different national leaders. In 1961 aſ
1963 two important—though faltering—ºft,
toward regional cooperation were taken: tº
Association for Southeast Asia (the Phi,
pines. Malaysia, and Thailand) and MAPHI,
INDO (Malaysia-Philippines-Indonesia). Othº
measures include the
Bank, the UN Economic Commission on Ail
and the Far East, the Japanese-sponsº
meetings fostering some form of economic &
operation, and the Korean-sponsored COmfº
ence for Asian and Pacific Cooperatin
(ASPAC). One approach to stability would!
the creation of the Association of South&
Asian New Emerging Forces. ASANEFºl
would include Indonesia, the ASA membém
and hopefully could attract Cambodia all
Burma. Such an association would mean tº
the interest in regionalism of the colorful hi
less prosperous states (such as Indonesia) hiſ
begun to converge with the interests of tº
more efficient small states (the ASA group||
Another essential element, the interest all
support of the great powers, is developing. Tº
combination of these elements would provideº
practical basis for making regionalism worki
Southeast Asia.”
THAILAND-MALAYSIA: CRAMPINTH}
TOE, by Bob Norton, in Far Eastern Economi.
Review, v. 71, no. 1 (2 January 1971) 7-4,
“The predominantly social air of Tu
Razak's first official visit to Bangkok , , , i.
in itself fitting commentary on the cordialrd;
Asian Developmål
tions between Malaysia and Thailand. The sk
potential source of friction is the communiº
terrorist separatist activity in Thailani;
southern provinces. The upsurge in the tº
gious guerrillas’ activity in southern Thailº
coinciding with the change of power in Malº

172
sia a few months ago had prompted specula-
ion among the Thais that Razak's government
would be less than conscientious in enforcing
the anti-terrorist agreements signed by the two
nations in March of this year (which allows
troops of both countries to cross the border in
'hot pursuit” up to five miles and remain for 72
hours). But Razak assured Thanom that he
had no intention of interfering in Thailand’s
internal problems, and even called for the es-
tablishment of a joint demarcation committee
to settle the ill-defined frontiers, a proposal
which the Thais are now considering.”
THAILAND: THE KEY TO SEA RE-
GIONAL DEVELOPMENT, by Maj. Clifford
H. Rees, Jr. Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala., Air
Command and Staff College, 1969. 131 p. (Re-
Search Study No. 1035–69; M-35582–7–U.)
“For the United States to “go it alone”
indefinitely in containing Asian communism
would not only place an unbearable burden on
her, but also heighten the chance of nuclear
War, while undercutting the independent devel-
0pment of the nations of Southeast Asia. The
primary restraint to communist ambitions in
Asia should be exercised by the nations in the
path of those ambitions. In Southeast Asia re-
gional development and cooperation are neces-
Sary to provide this restraint. This paper
analyzes the physical, cultural, economic, and
political environment of Thailand to determine
if she can successfully structure her behavioral
patterns and organize her society systemati-
Cally to achieve the essential pre-conditions for
modernization, and thereby lead Southeast
Asian regional development. This study con-
cludes that Thailand is capable of providing
the requisite leadership for regional develop-
ment and the foreign policy of the United
States should be altered to reap maximum ben-
efit from this capability.”
THAILAND: TRAPPED IN THE BAM-
B00 IMAGE, by Astri Suhrke-Goldstein, in
Australian Outlook, v. 22, no. 3 (December
1968) 334–346.
“The uncertainties surrounding the fu-
ture of United States policy in Vietnam and
South-east Asia have been particularly trou-
blesome for Thailand. The speech by President
Lyndon B. Johnson on March 31, 1968 gave a
strong impetus to lingering Thai doubts about
their increasingly close relationship with the
United States, and encouraged a reassess-
ment of Thai foreign policy. As yet there are
no definite crystallizations, and it would be
premature to say that a new foreign policy is
in the making. The Thai government seems
firmly committed to the post-World War II pol-
icy aim of staunch opposition to its northern
Communist neighbours, and to reject the con-
cepts of non-alignment, neutrality and accom-
modation. It is rather the policy tactics which
are now being questioned, and in a long-range
perspective the United States alliance is seen
as yielding its first place to regional co-opera-
tion among a select group of Asian states.
There is, of course, a distinct possibility that
emphasis on new policy tactics will in turn
modify present policy aims.”
THAILAND’S ROLE IN SOUTHEAST
ASIA, by Kenneth Young, in Current History,
v. 56, no. 330 (February 1969) 94–99 plus.
“As in Vietnam, it is by the bullet, not
the ballot, that the Communists plan to take
over Southeast Asia. As many Communist
defectors have claimed, if the Communists can
topple Thailand, they will have achieved the
goal of Peking, Hanoi and the Asian Commu-
nists in general . . . To ask if Thailand is “an-
other Vietnam’ or to assert that there should
be ‘no more Vietnams’ in Thailand is to miss
the point about Thailand's development and
importance. Thailand is so different from Viet-
nam that the comparison is irrelevant and mis-
leading, although it is often made in our
media. Thailand is viable, unified, dynamic,
and progressing rapidly in her own way. As
Vietnam is the hinge of Southeast Asia (to use
my expression), Thailand is the swing state,
the keystone for Asian regional cooperation. A
strong and viable Thailand is indispensible for
the growth of organized Southeast Asian re-
sponsibility and the reduction of preponderant
United States commitments. Thailand’s success
in domestic progress and regional diplomacy
is one of the most significant factors in Asia’s
prospects for the 1970’s.”
3. Thailand and SEATO (See also Appen-
dia; B)
SEATO ALLIES JOIN THAILAND IN
173
VITAL GOVERNMENT_TO-PEOPLE PROJ-
ECT, in SEATO Record, v. 9, no. 1 (February
1970) 36–38.
“A project initiated by the Royal Thai
Government to bring more news and informa-
tion about their own country to villagers living
in remote area of the country has been given a
boost by two of its allies in SEATO. In a cere-
mony held at SEATO Headquarters two jeeps—
gifts from the Governments of New Zealand
and the Philippines—were handed over to
Thailand’s Department of Public Relations to
be used in its Mobile Units Programme de-
signed to promote closer government-people re-
lationships especially among isolated regions.
Equipped with audio-visual items and acces-
sories including slide-film projectors, genera-
tors, loud-speakers and tape recorders, the
jeeps, each costing $14,850, will help the De-
partment in implementing this programme,
which also aims at providing the people with
the opportunity of making known to the Gov-
ernment their needs and problems.”
SEATO COUNCIL OF MINISTERS
MEETS AT BANGKOK, in Department of
State Bulletin, v. 60, no. 1563 (9 June 1969)
477–481.
“The Council of Ministers of the
Southeast Asia Treaty Organization met at
Bangkok, Thailand, May 20–21. [Included] is
a statement mady by Secretary Rogers at the
opening session on May 20, together with the
text of the final communique issued at the close
of the meeting on May 21.”
4. Thailand and the Indochima, War
MILITARY CIVIC ACTION IN THAI-
LAND, by Col. Chaiyo Krasin, in Military Re-
view, v. 48, no. 1 (January 1968) 73–77.
“In much of rural Thailand, the major
preoccupation of the people is with the basic
factors of human existence—food, clothing,
shelter, and medical care. The cultural advan-
tages available to people in urban areas are
much greater than those available to people in
the rural areas. This culture gap is one of the
greatest problems confronting the Thai Gov-
ernment. If all the people are not raised to a
minimum level of social well being, the prog-
ress of the country will be slowed. Further-
more, in those areas of weakness, the Commun
ists intervene with sabotage, murder, and, fil
ally, insurgent warfare. Recognizing the nº
to improve conditions in remote areas, the Thi
Government in 1962 directed the National &
curity Command to organize a military (i.
action effort within Thailand. The governmºſ
further directed its appropriate civilian Mimi,
tries to provide assistance to the civic actim
effort. The project began on 15 August 1962:
Ban Na Ko village in Kalasin Province in
northeast Thailand.”
THAILAND AND THE CAMBODIAN
CONFLICT, by Kenneth T. Young, in Currºº
History, v. 59, no. 352 (December 1970) 35l.
355.
“The folly of embroiling Thailand $
cretly and expediently in the war in Vietnam
instead of facilitating Thailand’s crucial COM
tribution, vital leadership and special role in
the more significant long-range task of striſ.
turing and powering Southeast Asian regional
ism has been expensive, writes this specialiſ,
who maintains that our involvement of Thäi
land in the military operations of the Ind
china war may have compromised that ess||
tial role and complicated Thailand's effortsº
promote regional political solutions to th:
Cambodian problem.”
THAI AID TO WIETNAM, in SEATO R.
cord, v. 9, no. 1 (February 1970) 26–27.
“Military assistance from the Rºy.
Thai Government to the Republic of Vietnam
has been extended for many years and has
taken many forms, says Major General Swaii
Makkaroon, Commander of the Black Panthèſ
Division, in review of his country's aid to th:
embattled republic. Thailand's 11,568-măl
army force in Vietnam is the largest combſ
group ever to leave the homeland and fightin:
foreign country. Like the troops from the Rº
public of Korea, the Thais place equal emphy
sis on combat tactics and civic action.”
THAILAND AND THE STRUGGLE FOR
SOUTHEAST ASIA, Donald E. Nuechterlein
Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1965. 279 |
“A U.S. government official who serve
in Thailand from 1961 to 1963 reports on Thái.
land's foreign policy since World War II
with an introduction to the historical S&

174
ting of the preceding century. The author
provides a valuable account of the 1961–1962
Laotian crisis when Thailand’s faith in
SEATO and her American ally was weakened.
Although Washington tried to reassure Bang-
kok of its determination to fight communist
aggression, the Thai government remained
skeptical of U.S. intentions as late as the U.S.
Presidential election in 1964.”
THAILAND IN THE SHADOW OF THE
WIETNAM WAR, by Ernst Kux, in Swiss Re-
view of World Affairs, v. 18, no. 1 (April 1968)
21–22.
“The author of this article is the Neue
Zürcher Zeitung’s specialist in Communist ide-
Ology and strategy. His observations and con-
Clusions regarding the situation in Thailand
are based on a visit he made to that country.
The conflict in Southeast Asia appears to be
spreading more and more to Laos and Cam-
bodia and even to Thailand. Reports on guer-
rilla raids in the border provinces of the Sia-
mese kingdom are becoming more frequent,
and the Bangkok Government is forced to take
drastic measures. Since the beginning of 1967
unrest has been growing in the north, at the
three-cornered meeting point of the frontiers
with Burma and Laos, while the situation in
Nan province is considered to be critical. In
Thailand the first phase of a Communist ‘peo-
ple's war of liberation” had obviously begun be-
fore the United States and Bangkok's direct
engagement in South Vietnam.”
THAILAND IN THE SHADOW OF THE
WIETNAM WAR, by Ernst Kux, in Military
Review, v. 48, no. 7 (July 1968) 54–58.
Condensed from original, published in
Swiss Review of World Affairs, April 1968.
"The conflict in Southeast Asia appears to be
Spreading more and more to Laos and Cam-
bodia and even to Thailand. Reports on guer-
rilla raids in the border provinces of Thailand
are becoming more frequent, and the Bangkok
Government is forced to take drastic measures.
Since the beginning of 1967, unrest has been
growing in the north, at the three-cornered
meeting point of the frontiers with Burma and
Laos, while the situation in Nan Province is
(Onsidered to be critical. In Thailand, the first
phase of a Communist ‘people's war of libera-
tion” had obviously begun before the United
States and Bangkok's direct engagement in
South Vietnam . . . It is quite significant for
the present situation in Southeast Asia that
the by-no-means-friendly neighbors—Burma,
Thailand, Laos, and Cambodia—are all faced
by a growing Communist subversive movement
and that statesmen like Ne Win, Thanom Kitti-
kachorn, Souvanna Phouma, and Norodom Si-
hanouk, so widely differing from each other by
stature and inclination, are issuing the same
warnings. The collaboration between Bangkok
and Vientiane in combating Communist under-
ground activities extending across the common
Mekong frontier seems of late to have been fol-
lowed by an intensification of contacts between
Thailand and Burma due to the unrest in the
north. The solidarity of the free Asian coun-
tries, even more than the presence of US pro-
tective power, should, according to views pre-
vailing in Bangkok, help to ward off the threat
of Communist subversion.”
THAILAND: PRIVILEGED SANCTU-
ARY, by Orville Schell, in The New Republic
(September 30, 1967) 16–19.
“Thailand has become a ‘bomb rack’ for
the US, a ‘privileged sanctuary” from which to
launch the air war against North Vietnam. We
have eight air bases and 40,000 troops there,
intended not to help Thailand fight communist
insurgency, but solely to fight in Vietnam. In
1965 we provided Thailand with $76.5 million
military and economic aid; $87 million in
1966; $110 million in 1967. The B-52 base at
Sattahip cost $200 million alone. This invest-
ment in facilities and aid is obviously not
meant to fight the estimated 1500 insurgents in
Thailand. Thais and Americans alike, with an
eye on the situation in Vietnam, are extremely
wary about Americanizing the struggle against
insurgents. Both insist publicly that the Thais
can handle it, and they are making significant
efforts to do so. Yet communist strength in the
northeastern provinces is estimated at double
what it was a year ago. Some entire districts
are under communist control and an average of
ten officials at local levels are being assassi-
nated each month by North Vietnamese and
Chinese infiltrators. At the same time, an esti-
mated 4,000 to 10,000 Thais are being trained
in China. In these circumstances, the prospects

175
for continued and increased insurgency activi-
ties raise the grim possibility of greater Amer-
ican involvement.”
WIDER WAR : THE STRUGGLE FOR
CAMBODIA, THAILAND, AND LAOS, by
Donald Kirk. New York, Praeger, 1971. 305 p.
&
‘. . . . Analysis of the overall struggle
occurring in the Indochinese peninsula . . . The
conflicts which have been taking place in Cam-
bodia, Thailand, and Laos at the same time
as that occuring in Vietnam, . . . present
critical situations and uncertain future reso-
lutions . . . Thai-Vietnamese rivalry for control
of Cambodian and Lotian territory on either
side of the Mekong River long predates the US
attempt to stop the spread of communism in
these Indochinese states; . . . the ethnic, relig-
ious, economic, political, and military conflicts
in all four countries are deeply interwoven . . .
The opposing Indochinese factions seem so bit-
terly irreconcilable that the region will likely
endure more horrible and extensive war before
some settlement, however unhappy, emerges.
Despite President Nixon's announcement at the
outset of the invasion into Cambodia on April
30, 1971, that “we shall avoid a wider war,’ the
struggle in Indochina seems to have expanded
inevitably. After many years of active involve-
ment in Indochina, the US has not mediated
the various but related conflicts; some argue
that US involvement may have even aggra-
vated them. At best, it may have delayed their
settlement on Indochinese terms. “Wider war’
will probably run its course whether the US
remains in Indochina or withdraws . . . Kirk
suggests that US withdrawal from the struggle
is probably the wisest course, since no amount
of intervention by any of the outside powers
could bring a satisfactory peace to the Indo-
chinese, who seemingly must endure more suf-
fering before evolving their own satisfactory
accommodation.”
5. Thailand and Communist China.
THE ATLANTIC REPORT: THAILAND,
in Atlantic Monthly (April 1966) 17–21.
“The Thailand United Patriotic Front,
which was set up under the sponsorship of Pe-
king in January 1965, is attempting to create
an active war of national liberation in Thai.
land. In northeast Thailand, the communis;
already have the sort of hold on isolated wil.
lages that facilitated the VC move in South
Vietnam from subversion to armed insurgency
in 1959. In the southern provinces near the
Malayan border, the Communist Party, driven
out of Malaya fourteen years ago, has set up
headquarters with about 500 to 700 men under
arms. There is genuine concern in exposé
Thailand that its fate may be linked with th:
success or failure of US efforts in WN. Th;
Thai leaders fear that, in the event of a fail.
ure, the US would not undertake a new war |
against communism in Thailand. Furthermoſt
if the US could not win in VN, what reasons
are there to believe that it could win in Thai. I
land? To help alleviate Thai fears and met:
any offensive or defensive needs that might|
arise if the VN war continues, the US has been
steadily building up its capabilities in Thái |
land . . . .” -
CHANGES IN CHINESE ATTENTION TO
SOUTHEAST ASIA, 1967–1969: THEIR
RELEVANCE FOR THE FUTURE OF THE
AREA, by Daniel Tretiak, in Current Scellº,
Developments in Mainland China, v. 7, no. 2.
(1 November 1969) 1–17.
“During the past several years theſ:
have been important changes in the direction
of Chinese foreign policy toward Southeast
Asia. This article will examine the nature of
the changes and conclude by suggesting prohá.
ble trends in Chinese policy toward Southeas:
Asia in the next “few years.” Changes in
Chinese Attention Levels to Burma, Indonesia,
Malaysia, Thailand, and Laos; Changing
Chinese Attention Levels to Vietnam.
CHINESE RIMLAND STRATEGY, by It
Col. John R. D. Cleland, in Military Review
v. 47, no. 1 (January 1967) 3–13.
“The nations on the periphery of Chim:
are those most squarely under the Communis
Chinese gun today. The military power ºf
Communist China is a force with which the
must reckon in their political, diplomatic, e();
nomic, and military affairs. The rimland m3.
tions comprise four distinct areas: South
Asia . . . Indochina . . . The Far East , , ,
The Maphilindo States—Malaysia, the Philip.
176
pines, and Indonesia. When the Chinese Com-
munist came to power in 1949, their programs
included the liberation of all of the territory
of China, plus support for the other wars of
‘mational liberation’ that were being waged in
Asia. Furthermore, they were already looking
to their borders and those lands that had once
been under Chinese domination . . . No study
of China’s rimland strategy is complete with-
Out considering that she will have a strategic
and tactical nuclear delivery capability in the
not too distant future. This capability could be
used effectively by Peking to further its ob-
jectives in the rimland area. The Chinese Com-
munists are relying on people's wars, surver-
sion, and political action to achieve their goals
in this area.” Middle Kingdom Concept; Polit-
ical Influence; Strategy Toward Indochina;
Thailand; Vietnam; Far East Strategy; Tai-
Wan; Japan; Maphilindo Area; etc.
THE CHINESE THREAT TO WORLD
ORDER, by Sukich Nimmanheminda, in The
American Academy of Political and Social Sci-
ence, Annals (July 1967) 59–63.
“The large numbers of ethnic Chinese
in most Southeast Asian countries constitute a
greater threat to their independence than does
the prospect of military conquest by Red
China. China can exert great influence on these
COuntries by virture of its influence on the un-
assimilated ethnic Chinese. Military expedi-
tions are therefore unnecessary, particularly
since they might bring about intervention by
Superior powers and run the risk of annihila-
tion. Thailand is the only country in the area
which has actively encouraged its Chinese resi-
dents to assimilate, thereby deminishing
China's influence. Paradoxically, therefore,
Thailand's enlightened policies toward its eth-
mic Chinese may have increased the danger of
a military confrontation with Red China. The
danger is still not too likely, however, because
the American attitude and action in Vietnam is
the 'greatest deterrent in the world’ to a
Chinese military threat.”
COMMUNIST CHINA: ITS SOUTHERN
BORDER LANDS, by David P. Mozingo, in
SAIS Review, v. 12, no. 2 (Winter 1968) 43–54.
“Great powers are extremely sensitive
to any developments which pose real or poten-
tial danger to their strategic interests along or
near their frontiers. The southern border lands
have occupied a special place in the strategic
outlook of every Chinese Government since the
Ch’in dynasty. For more than a thousand years
the main direction of Han Chinese expansion
and migration was southward. Some tribes
were subjugated; others were driven as far
south as the border regions of present-day
Burma, Thailand, Laos and Vietnam. To en-
force central control over these territories one
Chinese Government after another has had to
effect new subjugations of the southern tribes.
After the eighteenth century the southward
march of the Hans was checked substantially
by the decline of Manchu power, by the West-
ern colonization of South and Southeast Asia,
and by the increasing flow of China’s rural
populations into its newly rising seaports and
commercial centers. Under communist rule
these trends not only continue, but also have
been accelerated by Peking's industrialization
program and the priority it has given to popu-
lating and developing the northwest provinces.
Politically, the southern border territories
have presented more problems than assets for
the Chinese Communist Government.”
MAO TSE-TUNG GAZES UPON FIVE
CONTINENTS, by Ernst Henri, in Atlas (De-
cember 1967) 14–15.
“This article [reprinted from a Soviet
periodical] is of particular interest because it
reflects a Soviet viewpoint imputing to Mao
Tse-tung aspirations to construct an Oriental
version of a ‘Super-Reich.” Mao and his asso-
ciates developed a concrete plan of expansion
as far back as the 1950’s. The first stage of the
‘great strategic blueprint’ included Korea,
Mongolia, Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, Indone-
sia, Malaysia, Burma, and other nations on the
periphery of China. In the second stage, China
would expand over the Hindustan Peninsula,
into Soviet Central Asia, the Soviet Far East,
and finally the Near East. The final stage is
not quite apparent, but Chinese intentions are
clearly stated: no continent has been omitted
from the projected ‘Maoization’ of the world.
Present reality does not exist for the Mao
group; its hallucinations have become decisions.
It is obvious that Peking has decided that at
some point a global war-exterminating one-
177

third to one-half of the world’s population—
will be necessary for realization of Mao’s
‘Super-Reich.” That is why China continually
does everything possible to increase interna-
tional tension.”
A POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY OF REVO-
LUTION: CHINA, VIETNAM, AND THAI-
LAND, by Robert W. McColl, in The Journal
of Conflict Resolution, v. 11, no. 2 (June 1967)
153–167.
“‘Wars of liberation’ and ‘guerrilla
warfare’ are familiar terms today. Still, little
discussion has focused on their operational as-
pects, particularly the creation, location, and
use of ‘base areas’ or ‘Independent regimes.”
This is the more remarkable as one of the
greatest frustrations in attempting to combat
this form of political activity is the location
and elimination of guerrilla forces and their
leaders. It is the significance of the location of
such guerrilla bases that is the focus for this
paper. The consistency of locational elements
in the guerrilla bases in the cases of China and
Vietnam (and apparently in Latin America
and Africa) provides the basis for a reasonable
degree of precision in predicting their location
in any traditional-transitional country. Locat-
ing them permits control of their development;
once firmly established, however, the base area
seems to become virtually immutable—witness
the known base areas in South Vietnam at the
present time.” With references.
STORM OVER ASIA, CHINA AND
SOUTHEAST ASIA : THRUST AND RE-
SPONSE, by Robert Karr McCabe. New York,
The New American Library, 1967. 225 p.
“This is a book about war, though not a
war story, because war and death are cardinal
facts in today’s Asia. This is a book about
peace as well, for the hope of peace and prog-
ress is a part of every Asian's dreams. In sum,
this is a book about Asia under storm clouds—
but it includes . . . an implicit promise that
the storm is not forever.” Chapter I—The Kill-
ing Ground (Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos);
Chapter II—A Problem of Posture (Thai-
land); Chapter III—The Hermetic Hermit
(Burma).
THAILAND: PEKING’S NEXT RURAL
BASE AREA IN ENCIRCLEMENT,” by Lt.
Col. Bruce F. Myers, in Naval War Colleſ,
Review, v. 19, no. 10 (June 1967) 23–51.
“In analyzing Peking’s foreign relation;
with Thailand, it is well to reaffirm what Com.
munist China’s overall objectives in Southeas:
Asia are . . . In summary, Chinese Commi,
nist foreign relations with Thailand evidences
continuing intent to reassert her historic hegº.
mony over her border areas, to the exclusion ºf
Western (primarily U.S. and SEATO) influ.
ence on mainland Asia and a fostering of the
‘Monroe Doctrine’ concept of ‘Asia for
Asians’.” With bibliography.
6. Thailand and India.
INDIA AND THE FUTURE OF ASIA, by
Patwant Singh. New York, Alfred A. Knopf
1966. 264 p.
Picture in the Mid-Sixties; History's
Legacy; Partition; The Anatomy of a Develop.
ing Economy; Foreign Affairs; India and
China—The Continuing Confrontation; D&
fense; Outlook in the Mid-Seventies; Bibliog. I
raphy. Includes references to relations with
other countries of Asia, such as Burma, Cam.
bodia, Laos, Thailand, among others.
7. Thailand and the United States
a. Miscellaneous Aspects.
THE INDOCHINA STORY; A FULLY
DOCUMENTED ACCOUNT. New York, Pan.
theon Books, 1970. 347 p.
This book was prepared and published
by “The Committee of Concerned Asian Schol.
ars,” and the various chapters were written by
many authors, very critically protesting Amer.
ica’s presence in Vietnam. Part I–Who Is the
United States Fighting in Indochina? (Wié.
nam—The Open War; Laos—The Soviet War;
Cambodia—The Balancing Act; Thailand—
The Client State); Part II—How Is the United
States Fighting in Indochina?; Part III—Why
Is the United States Fighting in Indochina!
Part IV—What Can the Future Hold for Indo-
china? With: Chronologies for Vietnam, Laos,
Cambodia, and Thailand; Glossary; and Bibli.
ography.
A NEW AMERICAN POLICY IN THAI.
LAND, by Frank C. Darling, in Air University
Review, v. 21, no. 5 (July–August 1970) 58–64.
“Since the end of World War II the
178
United States and Thailand have cooperated
actively in a joint effort to promote the terri-
torial security and economic development of
Southeast Asia . . . In spite of widespread
COOperation during the past two decades, Amer-
ican Thai relations face numerous uncertainties
in the 1970s. Many Americans are questioning
the role of the United States in Southeast Asia.
Others want a more vigorous policy in deterring
Communist aggression . . . Thailand is deeply
Concerned with the path American policy will
follow after the settlement in Vietnam . . .
Thus the important questions arise: What
actions by the United States lie ahead? What
Course will American policy follow in Southeast
Asia? What commitments will the United
States maintain in Thailand?”
PRIME MINISTER OF THAILAND
WISITS THE UNITED STATES, in Depart-
ment of State Bulletin, v. 58, no. 1509 (27 May
1968) 674–679.
“Prime Minister Thanom Kittikachorn
Of Thailand, accompanied by his wife, Than-
puying Chongkol, and party, visited the United
States May 2–13. The Prime Minister met with
President Johnson and other Government of-
ficials in Washington May 8–10 during the
Official portion of his visit. [Included] are texts
of an exchange of greetings between President
Johnson and Prime Minister Thanom at a wel-
Coming ceremony on the South Lawn of the
White House on May 8, their exchange of
toasts at a dinner at the White House that even-
ing, and a joint communique issued on May 9
following their talks.”
SOUTHEAST ASIA: STRATEGIC AL-
TERNATIVES AFTER VIETNAM, by Col.
Murray Marks, in Naval War College Review
(May 1969) 94–99.
“US strategy in Southeast Asia has
been deficient in meeting the region's economic,
political, sociological, and psychological re-
quirements. The US desire to promote self-de-
termination, regional security, economic devel-
opment, and a climate suitable for development
of democracy and independence has been ham-
pered by the lack of a “grand strategy.” To
promote these objectives and prevent another
ground war in Asia, the US should encourage
regional defense. The force requirements for
such a defense could be met by some 4,000,000
military personnel of 15 non-communist coun-
tries in the area. A US back-up force would
consist of substantial military power in the
Western Pacific and the nuclear umbrella. The
US withdrawal should be gradual and based on
the developing ability of indigenous forces. An
important part of developing this ‘grand strat-
egy’ will be the support of the collective secu-
rity system that South Korea is considering for
the defense of the Asian and Pacific region.
After the Vietnam war, the US will have
three options in withdrawing and selecting a
suitable power base. (1) Select bases on the
rim of Asia, while retaining its present power
base in South Korea, a greatly reduced opera-
tion in Thailand, and a peacekeeping force
in South Vietnam. The participation of Japan,
Australia, and New Zealand should be en-
couraged. The availability of the Singapore
naval facilities would provide a superior lo-
gistical capability for the US Navy. A naval
base on the NW coast of Australia for nuclear
powered submarines would serve US Navy
requirements in the Indian Ocean. (2) With-
draw to and maintain power bases in Japan,
Okinawa, Taiwan, and the Philippines if this
posture is considered sufficient to satisfy
US commitments and superpower require-
ments. (3) Withdraw to and build up the
mid-Pacific islands such as Wake and Guam.
Together with the military forces on Hawaii
this would offer sufficient proximity after the
development of the C-5A and fast deployment
logistics ships, without the political problems
associated with bases on foreign soil . . . .”
THAILAND AND THE UNITED STATES,
by Frank C. Darling. Washington, D.C., Public
Affairs Press, 1965. 243 p.
“The US has done much to enhance the
national security of Thailand, but at the same
time has contributed to the present imbalance
in the Thai political system. The author con-
tends that if the US had followed enlightened
British lead to destroy militarism and promote
democracy immediately after World War II,
constitutional democracy in Thailand might
not have failed. However, US policy supported
the military, recharged their will to resist
communism, and thus made it possible for the
military to suppress the liberal political ele-
179
ment. US policy error was compounded when
the US supported Marshal Sarit's benevolent
absolutism. The major shortcoming of Sarit's
rule, according to the author, was his failure to
promote a stable political system. He did not
extablish a legal framework to check arbitrary
executive action, nor did he foster suitable
channels for popular participation in public af-
fairs.”
U.S. AND THAILAND SIGN MEMORAN-
DUM OF UNDERSTANDING ON INTER-
NATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL, in De-
partment of State Bulletin, v. 65, no. 1686 (18
October 1971) 411–413.
“Remarks by Secretary Rogers and
Thanat Khaman, Foreign Minister of Thai-
land, made in the White House press briefing
room on September 28, together with the text
of a memorandum of understanding signed
that day. Ronald L. Ziegler, Press Secretary to
President Nixon, introduced Secretary Rogers
and Foreign Minister Thanat.”
THE UNITED STATES AND THE FU-
TURE OF THAILAND, by David A. Wilson,
New York, Frederick A. Praeger, 1970. 181 p.
“David A. Wilson writes that “Thailand
seems to promise an opportunity for the
United States to contribute to the realization
of the Sort of World it wishes . . . The first 78
pages of this volume provide a succinct review
of the evolving honeymoon between Thailand
and the United States from its historical back-
ground, through the Southeast Asia Treaty Or-
ganization of the 1950’s, and its transmogrif-
cation into a defense commitment in
1962 . . . The facts and analyses that Wilson
provides on Thailand’s security policy, her
problems of national integration, the situation
with respect to communism and revolutionary
warfare, and politics in Thailand are generally
impeccable.” With map, tables, chart, and bib-
liography.
b. Thailand and the Niacon Doctrine
(See also II–F–6–b)
THE CHANGING THAI-UNITED STATES
ALLIANCE: IMPLICATION FOR THE
NIXON DOCTRINE IN ASIA, by Ensign John
D. Caswell, in Naval War College Review, (Oc-
tober 1971) 59–74.
|
. . . Caswell sees Thailand's present
policy as trying to maintain the political status
quo, while preparing for a partial transfer ºf
allegiances if unavoidable. Although Bangkºk
will gain few, if any, political advantages from
closer relations with Hanoi and Peking in lie
of a workable American alliance, it is evident
that many of the economic benefits derived from
the close relationship with the US will dis.
appear if the American presence is remove
or replaced. Thailand’s continuing anti-COm.
munist role depends largely on the future rºl:
of the US in Asia—an issue far from resolved
today. Thus, the best the Thai rulers can hop;
to do is to assume a more neutral stance and |
thereby improve their chances of accommoda!.
ing to the major regional power of the future,
whoever it may be. To implement this policy
of ‘hedging bets,’ Thailand has begun to Open
contacts with Peking and Hanoi, while retain.
ing most ties with the US and expanding COm.
versations with the Russians. Its refusal to issue
any public statement in support of the US
sponsored South Vietnamese incursion intº
Laos in March 1971 is indicative of its desire
to ease away from Washington association. At
cording to Caswell, the Thais feel they have
been left in a dangerously exposed position as a
result of their longstanding intimate relations
with the US. They suspect the US will never
again fight in an Asian land war for an ally,
Elements of bitterness and a feeling that Thai
land is being sold out have characterized SOmē
recent official statements . . . The US must
decide if it has an important role to play in
Thailand. Not enough public attention has
been given to balancing a proper US military
commitment to Thailand with necessary ecº-
nomic and political developmental efforts, in
order to bring stability and independence tº
the region. Although the Nixon Doctrine.im.
plies a lowered military profile abroad, it
should not be taken to mean that American in.
terests overseas are correspondingly dimin.
ished, nor should it be too eagerly seized upon
by a war-weary public as a panacea for COr.
recting all the ills of past US policy in South.
east Asia. To the extent that future US policy
in Asia is characterized by the military aspects
of the Nixon Doctrine alone, it will fail be:
cause it simply provides American guns to be
fired by Asian soldiers rather than helping Our
66
180
Asian allies develop the kind of popular politi-
cal base necessary to achieve governments ca-
pable of resisting aggression or subversion.
This cannot be stressed enough at a time when
foreign aid and commitments abroad in general
are coming increasingly under fire in Con-
gress.”
THE LOVERS PART, by Timothy Allman,
in Far Eastern Economic Review, v. 69, no. 33
(13 August 1970) 23–25.
“Bangkok and Washington have been
holding hands too long for parting to be such
Sweet Sorrow. There’s bitterness in the air and
tough times ahead without the US to buoy up
the Thai economy . . . The Nixon doctrine,
through a combination of direct administration
policy and restrictions imposed by congress,
appears headed for one of its first tests in
Thailand, a country that during the last 15
years has become extremely dependent, both
economically and militarily, on American lar-
gesse. As far as Thailand is concerned, the doc-
trime, basically asks the question: can a small,
anti-communist state take up the slack, espe-
cially in areas of collective defence, as the US
reduces, or at least refrains from expanding,
the level of subsidisation of the Thai military
forces and economy? The answer in Thailand
is not yet clear. But the first effect of US un-
willingness to undertake obligations the Thais
Consider necessary for their own security has
been a simmering economic and military crisis,
the first real crisis this country has faced since
the Wietnam War began.”
THE NIXON DOCTRINE AND THAI-
LAND, in SEATO Record, v. 10, no. 2 (April
1971) 15–17.
“In an address on the ‘Economic Impli-
Cations of the Nixon Doctrine in Thailand,’ the
United States Ambassador to Thailand, Mr.
Leonard Unger, told an International Manage-
ment Seminar in Bangkok that the U.S. would
avoid unacceptable risks which could come
from reducing its military and other presences
in Asia too rapidly. “Therefore, our military
and economic aid may actually increase for the
next few years,” he said.” This article is part
of Ambassador Unger's March 2 address.
SETTING THE COURSE THE FIRST
YEAR; MAJOR POLICY STATEMENTS BY
PRESIDENT RICHARD NIXON. New York,
Funk & Wagnalls, 1970. 500 p.
Includes references to Cambodia, Laos,
and Thailand.
THAILAND: FIRST BIG TEST OF THE
NIXON DOCTRINE, in U.S. News & World
Report, v. 69, no. 8 (24 August 1970) 51–53.
“With danger expanding along their
borders, Thai leaders are anxious, counting on
U.S. to back up talk with firm commitments of
arms and money.”
c. United States Aid to Thailand.
FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT, 1969.
HEARINGS BEFORE THE COMMITTEE
ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, UNITED
STATES SENATE, NINETY-FIRST CON-
GRESS, FIRST SESSION, ON S.2347, JULY
14, 15, 18, AND AUGUST 6, 1969. Washington,
Government Printing Office, 1969. 336 p.
Includes military assistance information
on Cambodia, Laos, and Thailand among many
others. -
THE FOREIGN ASSISTANCE PRO-
GRAM; [U.S. PRESIDENT'S] ANNUAL RE-
PORT TO THE CONGRESS, FISCAL YEAR
1970. Washington, Government Printing Office,
1971. 82 p.
Chapter V deals with U.S. aid to East
Asia, and more specifically to the following,
among others: Laos and Thailand.
REPORT BY SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE
HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERV-
ICES, FOLLOWING A VISIT TO SOUTH-
EAST ASIA, JANUARY 13–17, 1970, ON
THE MILITARY CONSTRUCTION RE-
QUIREMENTS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
[INCLUDING THAILAND], March 11, 1970.
Washington, Government Printing Office, 1970.
pp. 5967–85. (H.A.S.C. No. 91–48.)
REVIEW OF THE VIETNAM CONFLICT
AND ITS IMPACT ON U.S. MILITARY
COMMITMENTS ABROAD. REPORT OF
THE SPECIAL SUBCOMMITTEE ON NA-
TIONAL DEFENSE POSTURE, OF THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRE-
SENTATIVES, NINETIETH CONGRESS,
181
SECOND SESSION, UNDER AUTHORITY
OF H.RES.124, AUGUST 24, 1968. Washing-
ton, Government Printing Office, 1968. 84 p.
(Committee Print.)
Of special interest are the following
portions of the report dealing with: Southeast
Asia Collective Defense Treaty; Cambodia,
Laos, and Thailand.
SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND AMERI-
CAN DIPLOMACY; THE POLITICS OF
GLOBAL HEALTH, by Freeman H. Quimby.
Washington, Government Printing Office, May
1971.79 p. (Committee Print, Subcommittee on
National Security Policy and Scientific Devel-
opments of the Committee on Foreign Affairs,
U.S. House of Representatives.)
Among the information on U.S. aid to
foreign countries in the field of biomedical re-
search and training and in the field of general
medical research, is included information also
on Thailand. See especially tables 6 and 8.
SECURITY AGREEMENTS AND COM-
MITMENTS ABROAD. REPORT TO THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
UNITED STATES SENATE, BY THE SUB-
COMMITTEE ON SECURITY AGREE-
MENTS AND COMMITMENTS ABROAD,
DECEMBER 21, 1970. Washington, Govern-
ment Printing Office, 1970. 28 p. (91st Con-
gress, 2d Session, Committee Print.)
“The primary thrust of this report is to
emphasize that in order to play its role in for-
eign policy formulation and legislative sup-
port, the Congress must be both informed and
active.” Partial contents: Major Problem
Areas (The Philippines, Laos, Thailand, The
Republic of China, Japan/Okinawa, Korea,
Ethiopia, NATO, Spain, Foreign Development
of Tactical Nuclear Weapons, Intelligence Ac-
tivities Abroad, Secrecy); and Foreign Policy
Implications of United States Military Bases
Abroad.
U.S. FOREIGN AID IN EAST ASIA; PRO-
POSED FISCAL YEAR 1970 PROGRAM.
Washington, Agency for International Devel-
opment, 1970, 39 p.
Includes some of the following informa-
tion for Laos and Thailand, among other coun-
tries of East Asia: Program Summary; U.S.
Aid Objectives; Problems and Progress; FY
1970 Program (Stabilization, Security and D&
velopment Projects, Rural Development,
Public Health, Family Planning, Roads, Refu.
gees, Civil Police Administration, Agriculture,
Human Resources Development, Public Admin.
istration, Export Promotion, etc.). -
8. Thailand and the USSR
RUSSIAN INTEREST IN SOUTHEAST
ASIA: OUTLINES AND SOURCES
1803–1970, by R. Quested, in Journal of South.
east Asian Studies, v.1, no. 2 (September 1970)
48–60. -
“The establishment of diplomatic ties
by the Soviet Union with all the countries ºf
Southeast Asia except the Philippines and
South Vietnam, and the growing influence
sought by it in the area, indicates that the pub.
lication of more work on Russian relations
with Southeast Asia would be of interest, and
it is the purpose of this article to survey the
course of these relations to date, to see what
general picture emerges and what possibilities
of further research exist.” The Tsarist Period
1803–1917; The Tsarist Consulate in Singa.
pore; Tsarist Russia and Indonesia, Thailand,
Burma, Philippines, Indo-China; Tsarist Rus.
sian Scholarship on Southeast Asia; Soviet Ré.
lations with Southeast Asia; etc.
H. Boundaries and Frontiers
ASIAN FRONTIERS: STUDIES IN A
CONTINUING PROBLEM, by Alastair Lamb,
New York, Frederick A. Praeger, 1968. 246 p.
“An . . . account of boundary dis.
putes, many of which have their origins in Or
before the period of colonial domination. The
regions covered include Iran, Afghanistan,
Pakistan, India, Nepal, Bhutan, Burma, Thai.
land, Laos, Cambodia, North and South Wieſ.
nam, China, Mongolia, and the Asian republics
of the USSR. Explosive subjects, such as
Kashmir, the Sino-Indian crisis and the Sinſ.
Soviet border, are treated in detail. Thirty
maps assist the reader in following the textual
material.” .
SOVEREIGNTY OF THE SEA. Washing.
ton, Department of State, October 1969. 33 p.
(Geographic Bulletin no. 3.)
The Total Ocean Environment; Offshort
Jurisdiction; the Territorial Sea; The Conti.

182
mental Shelf; Freedom of the Seas; Law of the
Sea Problems; The Baseline; Boundaries in
the Sea; Charts for identifying Offshore Fea-
tures. Includes information on Burma, Cam-
bOdia, and Thailand. With selected bibliogra-
phy.
I. Internal Conditions (Including Socio-
logical Aspects)
1. Communism and Communist Aggression
(See F-3 Above)
2. Population and population Problems
RELIGIOUS FERTILITY DIFFEREN-
TIALS IN THAILAND, 1960, by Sidney Gold-
stein, in Population Studies, v. 24, no. 3 (No-
vember 1970) 325–337.
“Although the evidence supporting high
fertility in Thailand is clear-cut, little is
known about fertility differentials within the
population. As part of a larger investigation, a
special 1% tabulation of the 1960 Thai census
data on number of children ever-born to mar-
ried women has been analysed to determine the
extent of differentials by religion and urban-
rural status. The finding point to considerable
differentials among Buddhists, Moslems, and
Confucianists. Standardizing for age, the num-
ber of children ever-born to Moslems averaged
well below the number born to Buddhists. Con-
fucian fertility was intermediate. Within spe-
cific age groups, the number of children ever-
born to Moslem women was considerably below
the Buddhist average and the differentials
were sharper in the higher age groups. By con-
trast, Confucian fertility was highest of all in
the age groups under 33, but lower than the
Buddhist averages among older women. Signifi-
cant urban-rural differentials also exist. For
both the Buddhist and the Confucian women,
fertility is markedly lower in urban than in
rural categories. When controlling for both age
and urban-rural status, Buddhist and Confu-
Cian differences tend to be minimal. By con-
trast, Moslem fertility was highest in the most
urban category—Bangkok—but was considera-
bly lower and substantially below the fertility
levels of Buddhists and Confucianists in all
Other urban-rural categories. The census data
in themselves do not permit adequate analysis
for the reasons for the differentials. Later age
at marriage in urban places may be a signifi-
cant factor in accounting for the overall differ-
entials in urban-rural fertility; but this rela-
tion is much less clear for specific religious
groups, particularly since Moslems marry at a
considerably earlier age. More frequent divorce
and remarriage may lower Moslem rates.
Poorer health may also be a factor.”
SOURCES OF STABILITY AND INSTA-
BILITY IN RURAL THAI SOCIETY, by Ste-
ven Piker, in Journal of Asian Studies, v. 27,
no. 4 (August 1968) 777–790.
“Ongoing cultures, by virtue of the per-
sonalities they produce and the social arrange-
ments they embody, create tensions or strains
for their individual members; and they provide
as well for the institutionalized expression and
alleviation, if not complete reduction, of these
tensions in culturally approved channels. In
this view, cultural stability refers not to the
absence of persisting conflict on the individual
or social level; but rather to a high degree of
complementarity between institutionalized
sources of strain or conflict for the individual,
and institutionalized arrangements for tension
reduction or expression. This conception of sta-
bility does not assume that all relatively stable
cultures are equally productive of psychologi-
cal well-being, even assuming this nebulous
condition could be specified. Nor does it assert
that all stable cultures are equally adaptive in
the face of external pressures. It does imply,
however, that sources of conflict and channels
for its expression will be sufficiently balanced
to insure perpetuation of culturally standard-
ized social arrangements and beliefs over many
generations. In what follows, this conception
of cultural stability will be applied to rural
Thai society, and the following points will be
argued: 1) The Thai peasant exhibits a pro-
nounced ambivalence along the dimension of de-
pendence-independence. This is a continuing
source of potential conflict for the individual,
since the entailed behavior patterns are mutu-
ally contradictory. 2) Traditionally, implied
conflict has been alleviated through availabil-
ity of viable strategies both of dependence and
independence. 3) Events of the past one
hundred years have reduced or removed the ac-
cessibility to traditional strategies of depen-
dence and independence, whereas the sources
183
of the ambivalence have persisted, or have
been enhanced.”
WORLD POPULATION; AN ANALYSIS
OF VITAL DATA, by Nathan Keyfitz and Wil-
helm Flieger. Chicago, The University of Chi-
cago Press, 1968. 672 p.
This book “was first conceived as a col-
lection of birth, death and population statis-
tics, all by age and sex, for whatever countries
and periods of time these are available. It has
been expanded to provide nine additional tables
for each population . . . The book contains
some 300,000 separate items of information.”
Includes information also, among others, for
Thailand.
3. Religion.
a. Miscellaneous Aspects
CHURCH AND STATE IN THAILAND, by
Yoneo Ishii, in Asian Survey, v. 8, no. 10 (Octo-
ber 1968) 864–871.
“The state religion of Thailand is Ther-
avada Buddhism, which was introduced from
Ceylon and is distinguished from the Mahay-
ana Buddhism of Japan, China, Tibet, Korea
and Vietnam. Statistics show that 93.4% of
the Thai are Buddhists. While anthropological
surveys conducted in Thai farming villages
during the past twenty years have consistently
pointed to the central role the Buddhist temple
plays as the pillar of Thai village life, too little
research has so far been done on Buddhist in-
stitutions on the national level. It is hoped that
this gap will be partially filled by the follow-
ing discussion of the more important features
in the history of the relationship between the
Buddhist order and the state.”
THE RELATIONSHIP OF BELIEF SYS-
TEMS TO BEHAVIOR IN RURAL THAI SO-
CIETY, by Steven Piker, in Asian Survey, v. 8,
no. 5 (May 1968) 384–399.
The author states: “The sociology of re-
ligion begins with the supposition that a deter-
minate relationship exists between the content
of religious ideas and orientation to the mun-
dane world. This initial premise, moreover, is
often extended to state that religious beliefs
are in some sense prepotent over ideas pertain-
ing to nonreligious activities, and for this rea-
son impart content or structure to the latter
In support of the first part of the supposition,
a number of correspondences between the CO,
tent of Thai magico-animistic beliefs and the
orientation of the Thai peasant to the mundam:
world will be outlined. I do not agree, however,
with the extension of the supposition. Therº,
fore, I shall draw further on Thai materials tº
suggest that the explanation for the observed
correspondences lies not primarily in the prepº,
tency of religious ideas, but rather in the Ontº,
genesis of Thai peasant personality, which it.
self gives general content and structure both tº
definitions of mundane, interpersonal situs.
tions and to orientation to the world of the sl.
pernatural.”
b. Buddhism.
Bl]DDHISM AND NATIONAL INTEGRA.
TION IN THAILAND, by Charles F. Keyes, in
The Journal of Asian Studies, v. 30, no. 3 (May
1971) 551–567.
“In 1965, the Thai government, through
the Department of Public Welfare, launched a
program of Buddhist missions to the hill tribes |
of North Thailand that was to be carried Out
by members of the Thai Buddhist clergy, the
Sangha. The purpose of the program was tº
strengthen sentimental ties [of Thai] with the
tribal people and to create loyalties [of the
tribal people] to the nation through develop.
ment of strong beliefs in Buddhism. This p0k
icy that aims at the bringing of marginal peſ.
ple into the national fold of Thailand through
conversion to Buddhism would seem to have its
origins in policies concerning the relationship
between Buddhism and national integration
that were first formulated in the reign of King
Culalongkorn at the end of the last century.”
BUDDHIST FACTORS IN POPULATION
GROWTH AND CONTROL.; A SURVEY
BASED ON THAILAND AND CEYLON, by
T. O. Ling, in Population Studies, v. 23, no. 1
(March 1969) 53–60.
“Although Buddhist doctrine and insti.
tutions do not directly encourage the procrea:
tion of children, the Buddhist countries of
South Asia (for the purposes of this paper,
Ceylon, Burma, Thailand and Cambodia) have
high fertility rates. The first half of this paper
is devoted to examining possible reasons for

184
this: particularly, whether there are non-
Buddhist factors which produce high fertility
and outweigh the negative Buddhist attitude,
Or whether there are less obvious factors
within the structure of Buddhist culture which
tend to produce high fertility indirectly; this
preliminary review of evidence favours the lat-
ter explanation. In the second half of the paper
South Asian Buddhist attitudes to policies of
population control are examined. While in the-
Ory there is no Buddhist opposition to family
planning, apart from the general Buddhist
rejection of abortion, some differences of atti-
tude toward other methods are observable be-
tween Ceylon and Thailand, the Buddhist op-
position to contraception being stronger in the
former than in the latter. It is suggested that
the differences in attitude may be due to the
larger proportion of non-Buddhists in the pop-
ulation of Ceylon than in Thailand, although
the opposition is expressed in primarily doc-
trinal terms.” -
4. Minorities, Tribes, and Refugees (See also
Ethnic Maps in Appendia. GG and JJ)
a. Miscellaneous Aspects
THE KARENS FIRST OUT OF THE
GOURD, by Preecha Chaturaphand, in SEATO
Record, v. 10, no. 5 (October 1971) 27–34.
“Spread across northern Thailand and
Burma, the Karens are a kaleidoscopic people
embracing widely diverse religions and tradi-
tions.” This survey of the Karens deals with:
The Household; Co-operation Between House-
holds; Marriage; Karen Women; Religion and
Religious Leadership; Civil Leadership; Law
and Order; Making a Living; and Relations
with the Outside World.
MINORITY GROUPS IN THAILAND, by
Joann L. Schrock and others. Washington, De-
partment of the Army, February 1970. 1135 p.
(DA PAM No. 550–107, Ethnographic Study
Series.)
“This book was prepared to provide mil-
itary and other personnel with a convenient
Compilation of basic facts about the social, eco-
nomic, and political practices of minority
groups in Thailand. There are 18 chapters,
COvering 19 minority groups. Each chapter is a
Self-contained unit consisting of a descriptive
report of a given group, suggestions for per-
sonnel working with that group, and a bibliog-
raphy. The descriptive reports are based on
openly published material and include com-
ments by consultants knowledgeable in the
area. Although the report contains the latest
information available, there are some gaps and
some of the material may be outdated.” Con-
tents: The Kui, The Vietnamese, The Chinese,
The Khmer, The Lisu, The Lahu, The Lu, The
Khmu, The Sham, The Meo, The Yao, The Haw,
The Karen, The Akha, The Lawa, The Malays,
The Mon, The Indians and Pakistanis. With
18 maps and 44 illustrations and short biblio-
graphy. . -
SOCIAL AND CULTURAL BEHAVIOR
OF THE LAWA HILL TRIBE OF THAI-
LAND by Maj. Homer D. Pattison. Maxwell
Air Force Base, Ala., Air Command and Staff
College, 1969. 41 p. (Research Study
No. 0950–69; M-35582–7—U.)
“This study is an attempt to consolidate
the available data pertaining to the society and
culture of the Lawa hill tribe in Northern
Thailand, one of many indigenous ethnic mi-
nority groups in Southeast Asia. This group is
examined in terms of their history, social or-
ganization, economy and religion.”
SOUTHEAST ASIAN TRIBES, MINORI-
TIES, AND NATIONS, ed. by Peter Kunstad-
ter. Princeton, Princeton University Press,
1967. 2 V.
“Papers from two 1965 conferences con-
centrating largely on Thailand and limited to
rural rather than urban minorities.”
SPIRITS OF CHANGE CAPTURE THE
KARENS, by Peter Kunstadter, in National
Geographic, v. 141, no. 2 (February 1972) 267–
284.
A study of the Karens of Thailand and
“how they came to predominate in the land of
the Lua.” The author delves into a description
of the land and the people, the agricultural,
pursuits, customs, education, the economy, etc.
With numérous photos. See also: Living with
Thailand's Gentle Lua, by the same author, in
the July 1966 Geographic; and Mosaic of Cul-
tures, by Peter T. White, and the supplement
map, Peoples of Mainland Southeast Asia, in
185
the March 1971 Geographic. This map also ap-
pears as an appendix to this bibliographic sur-
vey on Peninsular Southeast Asia.
THE THAI MUSLIMS: SOME ASPECTS
OF MINORITY INTEGRATION, by Astri
Suhrke, in Pacific Affairs, v. 43, no. 4 (Winter
1970) 531–547.
“What is the relationship between eth-
nic and economic integration and how is this
viewed in official policy? What is the role of
the socio-political structure of a given minority
in furthering or hampering its integration into
the national fabric, and how does the central
government use the local leadership structure?
Under what circumstances has a policy of inte-
gration led to a policy of assimilation, or, to
what extent does the government regard eth-
nic diversity as an impediment to economic in-
teraction and political unity on the national
level? The literature on integration of ethnic
minorities in Southeast Asia is quite volumi-
nous. This article is merely another micro-
study which may throw further light on the
above questions. It follows a historical-political
approach rather than the usual anthropologi-
cal one. The problem in this case—the Muslim
population in Southern Thailand—has as yet
been a relatively minor one and has conse-
quently been somewhat neglected both by the
central Thai government and by scholars. Po-
tentially, however, this is a serious minority
issue as shown by the underlying patterns of
tension which sporadically burst into local un-
rest and revolts.”
THAILAND: THE CHANGING SOCIETY
OF THE NORTHEAST AND THE THAI-LAO
MINORITY, by Capt. Ronald J. Silva. Max-
well Air Force Base, Ala., Air Command and
Staff College, 1969. 98 p. (Research Study
No. 1155–69; M-35582–7–U.)
“In assessing the role of the Royal Thai
Government in promoting social, cultural and
economic programs in the Northeast region of
Thailand, one is confronted with conflicting
views of the relationship that exists between
the Central Thai and the tribal peoples of the
Northeast. This study highlights the interac-
tion between these groups by reviewing histor-
ical, cultural, and social backgrounds of the
various Thai peoples in an effort to provide an
understanding of the problems that face the
central government today. The problems ºf
communist insurgency in the Northeast, the
sympathies of the Thai-Lao peoples to the new
threat, and the country’s participation as a
member of the Free World are discussed. The
study concludes by reviewing the prospects of
freedom in light of today’s threat of commu.
nism in Southeast Asia.”
THAILAND'S VIETNAMESE REFU.
GEES: CAN THEY BE ASSIMILATED? by
Peter A. Poole, in Pacific Affairs, v. 40, nos, 3
and 4 (Fall and Winter 1967–68) 324–332.
“The Thais, more than most Southeast.
ern Asian people, have succeeded in incorpſ.
rating large numbers of foreign immigrants
into their society. In 1967, the Thai Govern.
ment showed itself sufficiently confident of the
loyalties of the vast “overseas Chinese' popula.
tion to remove restrictions on teaching the
Chinese language in schools throughout the
kingdom. However, a group of less than fifty
thousand Vietnamese refugees who came tº
Thailand just after World War II remained a
source of deep concern to the authorities. Thai
officials recently described these refugees who
are concentrated in the Northeast along the
Mekong River, as a “built-in bridgehead' for
any Communist invasion of the country. The
question of whether Thailand could absorb the
Vietnamese refugees did not concern the all.
thorities until several years after their arrival,
because it was generally assumed that most of
them would return to Indochina when the fight.
ing between France and the Viet Minh
ended . . . To summarize, the older genera.
tion of refugees are likely to retain their Wieſ.
namese identity; those who are practicing
Buddhists or Catholics tend to emphasize the
exclusively Vietnamese features of their reli-
gion and to erect barriers against their assimi.
lation by Thai society. Moreover, most of the
older refugees are vulnerable to the economic
pressures of the Communist organization, a sit.
uation that is compounded by their refugee sta.
tus. Many of the refugees’ children, on the
other hand, have developed fairly strong roots
in Thailand, and have comparatively little in-
terest in Vietnam. They are now being edu.
cated in Thai schools; and many more than in
the past are electing to marry Thais—in part
186
to escape from the restrictions that go with
their parents’ refugee status. Provided North
Wietnam does not invade Thailand, they seem
likely to make a positive contribution to Thai
Society and to be absorbed by it as millions of
other immigrants of Asian stock have been.”
TRIBESMEN AND PEASANTS IN
NORTH THAILAND, ed. by Peter Hinton.
Chiang Mai, Thailand, Tribal Research Centre,
1969. 117 p.
This collection of a dozen papers is the
Outcome Of symposium held at
the . . . Centre . . . in 1967 . . . Two pa-
pers concern ethnic relations . . . Two papers
deal with the Yuan (Northern Thai) near
Chiang Mai . . . Two papers . . . [deal] with
the possible contribution of linguistics to bet-
ter Thai-minority relations.”
THE VIETNAMESE IN THAILAND: A
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE, by Peter A.
P00le, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1970.
180 p.
“The legal, political and cultural status
Of the estimated 70–80,000 Vietnamese refu-
gees in Thailand, many of whom desire to re-
main there, the prospects for their assimilation
and how they affect Thai relations with North
and South Vietnam.”
b. Chinese in Thailand
THE OVERSEAS CHINESE IN SOUTH-
EAST ASIA, by Niu Sien-chong, in NATO'S
Fifteen Nations, v. 16, no. 4 (August–September
1971) 52–56.
“The Overseas Chinese (hua-chiao) in
South-east Asia have a long historical back-
ground. Long before the discovery of America
there were Chinese settlements in the Nanyang
—the Chinese name for South-east Asia,
means ‘South Ocean’. In fact, no one really
knows how long those Chinese communities ex-
isted in the area . . . The far from even dis-
tribution of the Overseas Chinese throughout
South-east Asia is not surprising, because the
migration was not planned but developed in
response to opportunities. Today the main
areas of concentration are Malaysia, Singa-
pore, Thailand, and Indonesia. These people
Came from South-east China, mainly from the
Kwantung, Fukien, Kwangsi, and Kiangsi
Provinces.” Number and Influence; Culture
and Organization; Red China’s Strategy; Na-
tionalists’ Contribution; Singapore’s Experi-
ment; Future and Hope.
5. Education
CIVIC ACTION IN THAILAND, by Frank-
lin Mark Osanka, in Military Review, v. 48,
no. 12 (December 1968) 46–50.
“The Mitrapab Education Foundation
in Thailand provides an example of a nongov-
ernmental program of civic action. “Mitrapab’
is a Thai word meaning friendship, and the
foundation is more commonly known as “Mitra-
pab–Thai-American.” The organization is
composed of Thai and United States military
and civilian personnel dedicated to the task of
building a four-room school in every province
in Thailand. The Mitrapab schools do not rep-
resent a one-way contribution. Local province
officials and ordinary citizens become actively.
involved and share equally in the success. The
foundation is a marriage of education, military
civic action, and community self-help.”
MITRAPAB MEANS MORE SCHOOLS
FOR CHILDREN OF THAILAND, by Pra-
monda Bandharangski, in SEATO Record, v. 9,
no. 5 (October 1970) 38–39.
“MITRAPAB is the Thai Word for
friendship. The Thai-American Mitrapab Edu-
cation Foundation is an organisation composed
of military personnel from the U.S. and Royal
Thai Forces, Thai Police, and civilians. Its aim
is to build a four-room schoolhouse in every
province of Thailand.”
THE POLITICS OF REFORM IN THAI-
LAND: EDUCATION IN THE REIGN OF
KING CHULALONGKORN, by David K.
Wyatt. New Haven, Yale University Press,
1970. 425 p. -
“In the late 19th century Thailand went
through a process of modernisation and na-
tional development, while at the same time
faced with an eagerly expanding Europe. The
preservation of national independence therefore
presented a challenge to the country's rulers.
King Chulalongkorn came to the throne in
1868 and committed himself to a policy of cre-
ative modernisation and educational reform,
which directly shaped the development of mod-
187
ern Thailand. Chulalongkorn's early education
was supervised by the English teacher Mrs.
Anna Leonwens, who was hired by his father
King Mungkut and whose memories later be-
came popularised in the story “Anna and the
King of Siam’.” With bibliography.
A POST-MORTEM OF MANPOWER
FORECASTS IN THAILAND, by Mark Bloug,
in The Journal of Development Studies, v. 8,
no. 1 (October 1971) 59–78.
“Educational planning, in the modern
sense of the term, goes back in Thailand no
further than 1962, when the Second Economic
and Social Development Plan (1962/66) was
launched. The Second Plan included a plan for
the educational system as did the Third Plan
(1967/71) which is now drawing to a close.
These two educational plans were based on a
variety of methods, including those of making
long-term forecasts of manpower require-
ments. Between 1963 and 1967, five different
groups prepared manpower forecasts for Thai-
land, some of which looked no further than
1970, while others projected manpower re-
quirements up to 1968. In this paper we will
try to assess the quality of these forecasts and,
so far as it is possible, to compare prediction
with outcome. The paper consists of four parts.
We begin with a brief review of background
data in order to highlight the problems of
manpower forecasting an economy such as that
of Thailand. The second section is devoted to a
detailed discussion of the first and most ambi-
tious of the five forecasts that have been made
in Thailand. This is followed by brief evalua-
tions of the remaining four forecasts. In the
last section, we will consider the influence that
these forecasts actually exerted on educational
planning in Thailand.”
THAILAND'S YOUNG INTELLECTUALS,
by John Audric, in Contemporary Review,
v. 214, no. 1241 (June 1969) 296–298.
“When the Thai government promul-
gated the long awaited constitution last June,
it announced that a general election would be
held 240 days later so that the rice farmers
who form about 85 per cent of the population
would have the opportunity of voting. It was
hoped that this timing would be regarded as
proof of its democratic intentions. There have
been 26 coups and 30 governments since #
1932 coup abolished absolute monarchy. Th;
military clique which has held sway for th
past twelve years is plainly disturbed by th
result. The government’s United Thai People
Party has 75 seats, but the main Oppositim
Party scored a triumph with 57. The Indepen.
dents, who scored 72, are much sought afterly
both government and opposition parties, and
although Thailand’s strong man, General Prº
phass, the Deputy Prime Minister and Com.
mander-in-Chief of the Army can be relić
upon to make it worthwhile for some Indepen.
dents to swing over to the government side
there is a growing force to be reckoned with
This is composed of students and young inſ:
lectuals, and they are watched with some slº.
picion by the government, for it has not been
forgotten that it was the demonstration by th:
students in 1957 against the rigged election;
which overthrew the government. Moreover, i.
was a group of students lead by Pridi PanOm.
yong who formed the People's Party which, On
June 24, 1932, by a bloodless coup overthrºw
the absolute monarchy.”
WORLD SURVEY OF EDUCATION. IV.
HIGHER EDUCATION. New York, UNESCO
Center, 1966. 1433 p.
The information contained in this Vol.
ume was received before the end of June 1964
The table of contents, with all references tº
the names and status of countries (including
Burma, Cambodia, Laos, and Thailand) and
territories, was drawn upon 1 September 1963,
and subsequent changes are therefore mſſ
reflected. The educational system, the develop.
ment of higher education, university institu.
tions, etc. With bibliography on higher educa.
tion. -
J. Economic Aspects
1. Miscellaneous Aspects
ANNUAL PLANNING IN THAILAND, by
Snoh Unakul, in Economic Bulletin for Asia
and the Far East, v. 20, no. 1 (June 1969)
68–80.
“Thailand’s First Economic Develop.
ment Plan was unveiled in 1961 and covered
the years 1961–66. This plan came about as 8

188
Rºxxº-
rº, ; , º, .
result of a general need for an overall rather
than a project-by-project and year-by-year
view of the developmental effort. The early ex-
pression of this need was the request by the
Thai Government to the World Bank that a
mission be sent to analyse the economy thor-
Oughly and recommend a course of
action . . . The Second plan, now in opera-
tion, covers the period 1967–71. It
was . . . decided to keep the Second Plan
under constant review so that revision and re-
medial measures could be promptly carried
Out . . . It may be useful by way of illustra-
tion to go into some detail over the uncertain-
ties and changes that led to the formulation of
the Annual Plan for 1968.”
THE ASIAN HIGHWAY, by M. S. Ahmad,
in Economic Bulletin for Asia and the Far
East, v. 19, no. 1 (June 1968) 45–48.
“The Asian Highway project
was . . . drawn up to connect the capitals and
important seaports of the countries of Asia
and at the same time to provide access to im-
portant historical places and others of reli-
gious importance. It would thus contribute to
the expansion of national and international
trade, open up isolated regions through feeder
roads, stimulate tourist traffic and facilitate
pilgrimages to holy places. This project was
approved by ECAFE at its annual session in
March 1959 . . . The Asian Highway network
Comprises eighty-three routes (including some
blank numbers) with a total length of 57,000
km. Of these, 34,000 km are the international
priority routes, connecting all Asian Highway
Countries by at least one through-route. The
planners of the Asian Highway system realized
that very high costs of construction make it
impossible to develop immediately all the
routes in each country to a high standard of in-
ternational roads. First priority was, there-
fore, given to linking the existing main roads
Of the countries bringing them up to the mini-
mum international standard and thereafter fill-
ing the gaps . . . Priority route A–1 traverses
eight countries: Iran, Afghanistan, West Pak-
istan, India, East Pakistan, Burma, Thailand,
Cambodia, and the Republic of Viet-
Nam . . . Route A–2 crosses nine countries:
Iran, West Pakistan, India Nepal, East Pakis-
tan, Burma, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore
and Indonesia.”
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN GEN-
ERAL: THAILAND IN PARTICULAR, by
Maj. Crawford O. Murphy, Jr. Maxwell Air
Force Base, Ala., Air Command and Staff Col-
lege, 1970. 104 p. (M-35582–7—U, Research
Study no. 1010–70.) -
“This paper summarizes the major tac-
tics that are necessary for developing nations
to use to generate and sustain economic devel-
opment and growth. Following the general dis-
cussions, the specific example of Thailand is
analyzed and found to be very much aware of
the proper growth tactics and Thailand is
practicing them. Finally, a quantitative eco-
nomic analysis of Thailand is presented to ver-
ify that the economy is responding to proper
policy, and to document a very satisfactory
rate of growth.”
ECONOMIC SURVEY OF ASIA AND THE
FAR EAST, 1968. Bangkok, United Nations,
1969. 250 p. (E/CN.11/878.)
Part Two: Current Economic Develop-
ments; Chapter III, Economic Development
and Economic Policy—Report on the State of
Nine Asian Developing Economies in 1968
(Ceylon, Taiwan, India, Indonesia, Republic
of Korea, Malaysia, Pakistan, Philippines, and
Thailand).
ECONOMIC SURVEY OF ASIA AND THE
FAR EAST, 1969. Bangkok, Thailand, United
Nations, 1969. 285 p. (E/CN.11/935.)
This “Survey” is the twenty-third in a
series of reports prepared annually by the sec-
retariat of the Economic Commission for Asia
and the Far East. A major object of the “Sur-
vey” is the analysis of recent economic devel-
opments in the countries of Asia and the Far
East (including Burma, Cambodia, Laos, and
Thailand, among others), and of international
developments that affect them. Particular at-
tention is paid to the analysis of economic pol-
icy and of policy issues. With numerous tables.
JAPAN 1971, in Far Eastern Economic Re-
view, v. 71, no. 13, Supplement (27 March
1971) 25–70.
The annual Japan supplement of the
189
Far Eastern Economic Review, including the
following articles: The New Empire, by Derek
Davies; Johoka—Key to a Superstate, by Greg-
ory Clark; The New Elite Moves In, by To-
shio Yoshimura; Looking Beyond the Boom, by
John Roberts; Time for a Machiavelli Touch,
by Koji Nakamura; The Economic Invasion
Myth, by Henry Scott Stokes; and Japan and
Australia, Burma, Ceylon, Hongkong, India,
Indonesia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Philippines,
Singapore, South Korea, South Vietnam, Tai-
wan, and Thailand.
THAILAND, BURMA, in Quarterly Eco-
nomic Review, no. 2 (27 May 1971) 1–15.
This quarterly review summarizes the
political and economic situations of Thailand
and Burma for the past quarter. This quar-
terly is one of a series of 70 quarterly eco-
nomic reviews, published in London by The
Economist Intelligence Unit Ltd.
TOURISM IN SOUTHEAST ASIA, by Wil-
lard A. Hanna. Hanover, N.H., American Uni-
versities Field Staff, Inc., 1967. 11 p.
(Fieldstaff Reports, Southeast Asia Series,
v. 15, no. 13.)
“In some countries of Southeast Asia,
tourism is a new industry of such swift
growth, rich profits, and multiple side-effects
that certain other countries have become at
once envious and dismayed . . . The stale de-
bate over the desirability of tourism now seems
quite pointless, save that in certain Southeast
Asian countries the governments still persist
in their eventually futile efforts to control the
flow of travelers rigorously by contriving bu-
reaucratic hurdles—making visas difficult if
not impossible to get, making entry and exit
formalities as time- and temper-consuming as
possible, and demonstrating at every opportu-
nity that a laissez-passer is a privilege con-
ferred by very important officials upon those
persons deemed worthy of it by reason of their
humility and rectitude. Today, these cruel com-
ments apply especially to Burma; but until re-
cently they applied equally well to Indonesia,
and they are not altogether irrelevant else-
where. Thailand, Singapore, and Malaysia,
however, deserve honorable mention for mak-
ing the tourist feel welcome—so long, at least,
as he shows no disposition to loiter about after
the initial courtesy period of two weeks to a
month.”
WATER LEGISLATION IN ASIA AND
THE FAR EAST. PARTS 1 AND 2. New
York, United Nations, 1967 and 1968. 2 v. (Ec.
onomic Commission for Asia and The Far
East, Water Resources Series, No. 31 and No.
35.)
Review of existing water legislation:
Part 1—Afghanistan, Brunei, Burma, Republic
of China, Hong Kong, Iran, Japan, New Zea.
land, Philippines, and Thailand; Part 2
(A)—Water legislation in Australia (South
Australia and Victoria as Examples), Cam.
bodia, Ceylon, India, Republic of Korea, Laos,
Singapore, Republic of Vietnam and Western
Samoa; Part 2 (B)—Proceedings of the Work.
ing Group of Experts on Water Codes.
2. Aid and Trade
COMMUNIST STATES AND DEVELOP.
ING COUNTRIES: AID AND TRADE IN
1970. Washington, Department of State, Bu.
reau of Intelligence and Research, 22 Septem:
ber 1971. 45 p. (Research Study RECS-15.)
“The aid and trade activities of the
three principal communist regions the (USSR,
East Europe, and the People's Republic of
China) with the less developed countries of the
non-communist world [including Burma, Cam.
bodia, Laos, and Thailand] are reviewed am.
nually by INR. This study incorporates eCº.
nomic and military aid and technical assistance
data through the end of 1970, complete trade
figures through 1969, and preliminary trade
data for 1970.” -
DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE TO
SOUTHEAST ASIA. New York, Committee
for Economic Development, July 1970. 83 p.
Principles of Development Assistant to
Southeast Asia; Economic Development in
Southeast Asia; Recommendations to Assisting
Countries and International Organizations;
etc. With seven statistical tables. Includes in:
formation on the following, among others,
Burma, Cambodia, Laos, and Thailand.
FOREIGN TRADE STATISTICS OF ASIA
AND THE FAR EAST, 1966. New York,
United Nations, Economic Commission for
190
... A ". .
*::: -
Asia and the Far East, 1969. 622 p. (Vol. V, Se-
ries A, No. 2.)
This issue of the Foreign Trade Statis-
tics for Asia and the Far East is the fifth in a
Series designed to provide both summary and
detailed trade statistics of the countries of the
region. This issue relates to some countries of
Peninsular Southeast Asia (including Cam-
bodia, Laos, and Thailand) in the ECAFE re-
gion, among many others.
INTERNATIONAL AID TO THAILAND:
THE NEW COLONIALISM? by Ronald C.
Nairn, New Haven, Yale University Press,
1966. 228 p.
“The ineffectiveness of two U.N. aid
programs in Thailand is described here with
the larger aim of illuminating U.N. aid proc-
esses in general, offering some basis for pre-
dicting their outcome, and emphasizing the
need for U.N. and other aid agencies to reeval-
uate their procedures. A study of this sort—
pointing to such shortcomings as lack of lan-
guage training among technicians, discrepan-
ties between the aid offered and the recipients’
needs, and inflexibility of the program—is
doubtless welcome. However, the author's as-
sessment of the Thai situation is an oversim-
plification, particularly in its explanation of
the attitudes of the Thai peasants and the
Bangkok elite.”
3. Agriculture (Including Forestry)
AGRICULTURAL CHANGE AND PEAS-
ANT CHOICE IN A THAI WILLAGE, by Mi-
chael Moerman. Berkeley, University of Cali-
fornia Press, 1968. 227 p.
“In this first book-length study of the
Social consequences and implications of rice
farming—the descriptive detail of which is ex-
Ceedingly interesting—the author employs an
ethnoscientific approach, demonstrates the es-
sential rationality of the production decisions
made by peasants, and presents a refinement of
the concept of ‘peasant.” This is the most de-
tailed anthropological account of Asian wet-
rice farming available in English, and the first
One of its length on the Tai-lue to appear in a
European language.”
DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY IN THAI-
LAND: A STUDY IN ECONOMIC GROWTH,
by Robert J. Muscat. New York, Frederick A.
Praeger, 1967. 325 p.
“A study in the tradition of political
economy, this work moves from description
and analysis to recommendations for public
policy.” The author includes extensive sections
on agriculture.
DEVELOPMENTS IN THAILAND’S
NORTHERN HIGHLANDS, by G. A. Ough-
ton, in SEATO Record, v. 10, no. 5 (October
1971) 40–45.
“The South-East Asian Peninsula has a
well-documented and often turbulent history.
However, there are important factors influenc-
ing the area in these modern times which are
completely new to the scene and which are
creating sudden and profound effects on long-
established traditions and ways of life. These
factors are population-growth and modern
communications and agro-industrial technol-
ogy. Never before in history have there been so
many people competing for space to earn a liv-
ing from Thailand's soil-surface, and never be-
fore has mankind had such powerful technol-
ogy which, if correctly applied, can bring such
great social and economic benefits but which, if
incorrectly applied, can trigger such tremen-
dous damage. In addition, the effects of agri-
cultural advances in other countries in the
region are radically altering the pattern of
Thailand’s traditional exports, so generating a
move to rapidly intensify and diversify agri-
cultural, forestry, and industrial production in
an effort to maintain export income. In this sit-
uation, the northern highland zone with its
freedom from flooding, its temperate climate,
and its not-too-dry dry-season, represents a na-
tional asset of rapidly increasing potential
value, particularly from a forestry and agri-
cultural viewpoint.”
THE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF
THAI AGRICULTURE, by T. H. Silcock. Ith-
aca, Cornell University Press, 1970. 250 p.
“A . . . study of Thai agriculture,
including such aspects as the impact of a
rapidly developing rural road network, the
trend toward commercial farming, the record
of government policies, problems of measuring
agricultural produce and the rate of growth,
and individual crop analyses.”
191
FOREST DESTRUCTION . . . THE
PROBLEM AND TWO POSSIBLE SOLU-
TIONS, by F. G. B. Keen, in SEATO Record,
v. 9, no. 3 (June 1970) 3–7.
“The heavy concentration of Smoke cov-
ering almost all of North Thailand in the latter
half of the dry season should sound a note of
warning to those interested in the future well-
being of Thailand. In a recent journey from
Chiang Mai to Mae Sai on the Burma border,
via Chiang Rai, the smoke from forest fires
never once rose above a ceiling of about 300 ft.
and in many places tree tops were partially ob-
scured. One frequently hears the statement
that Thailand, especially North Thailand, has
always burned in the dry season, and that
therefore it cannot be a matter for concern. It
is claimed that the onset of the wet season puts
out the fires and stimulates rapid re-growth
which restores the forest annually. There are
at least two reasons why this complacent view-
point is unjustified wherever it exists.”
LAND TENURE IN THAILAND, by Torie
Yano, in Asian Survey, v. 8, no. 10 (October
1968) 853–863.
“Because of the preconception that
Thailand’s rural society is predominated by
owner-cultivators and has no serious land
problems, investigation has seldom been done
on Thailand’s land system. But with issues of
tenancy coming to the fore recently in Central
Thailand, attention is now being paid both at
home and abroad to the land system. Although
Thailand’s tenant problem itself is not yet very
serious, its social context is worthy of closer
study. Comprehensive research should be done
on the kinship structure, the inheritance of
land, the customary laws on land ownership,
the community formation process, and agricul-
tural techniques in relation to social mobility.
The problem of land tenure should be studied
on a broader basis, not only from the viewpoint
of rural social structure but from that of the
relationship of land tenure to social mobility
and the modernization of the customary laws.”
MULTIHOUSEHOLD COMPOUNDS IN
NORTHERN THAILAND, by Koichi Mizuno,
in Asian Survey, v. 8, no. 10 (October 1968)
842–852.
“This article will try to throw light on
the synchronism of agricultural reproduction
and family cycle in a village in Northeast Thai.
land by discussing the nature of landless culti-
vators, the cooperation of kinsmen, and the
process of formation and decomposition of the
multihousehold compound. Although multi.
household compounds are found in other parts
of the country, those which will be treated
here seem to preserve better the original struc.
ture and functions of the compound.”
OF DUCKS AND GEESE AND PIGS FOR
BANGKOK, by Albert Ravenholt. Hanover,
New Hampshire, American Universities Field
Staff, Inc., 1970. 10 p. (Fieldstaff Reports,
Southeast Asia Series, v. 18, no. 5.)
“Anupongs Chiewcharnvlijit, together
with his brothers, owns and operates Thai
Roong Kit, a modern, mechanized farm on the
western edge of Thailand’s fertile Bangkok
Plain. The family typifies a phenomenon that
partially accounts for Thailand's progressive
image in Southeast Asia: assimilation of the
Chinese population.
SIGNIFICANCE OF INTRACOUNTRY
VARIATIONS FOR ASIAN AGRICUL. -
TURAL PROSPECTS: CENTRAL AND
NORTHEASTERN THAILAND, by Jere R.
Behrman, in Asian Survey, v. 8, no. 5 (March
1968) 157–173. .
“The examination of intracountry agri.
cultural variations . . . may be of interest bº.
cause of concerns for efficiency, equity and pol.
itics. The remainder of this article is devoted
to an examination of such variations across the
fifty provinces of Central and Northeasterm
Thailand: In Section I, the degree and causes
of such variations are discussed. In Section II,
the policy implications and agricultural pros.
pects are examined in light of the existing war.
iations and the three concerns outlined.”
THAILAND’S PIONEERING FARMER.
PRINCE, by Albert Ravenholt. Hanover, N.H.,
American Universities Field Staff, Inc., 1970.
12 p. (Fieldstaff Reports, Southeast Asia St.
ries, v. 18, no. 6.)
“Thai agriculture is at a critical croSS.
road: the fertile Bangkok Plain is being eX.
hausted and population pressure on readily
available cultivable land is fast becoming

192
acute. Eighty-seven-year-old Prince Sithiporn
has energetically dedicated his life to the cause
of Thai farmers and the promotion of modern
farming methods.”
4. Finance and Financial Policy
FINANCE AND DEVELOPMENT IN
THAILAND, by Alek A. Rozental. New York,
Frederick A. Praeger, 1970. 386 p.
“Beginning with his conceptual frame-
work, connecting financial institutions to eco-
nomic development, the author proceeds to show
such connection in the Thai economy. The next
chapter (3) shows the substantial role of the
"unorganized’ money market in the financing of
rural households. Then there are three chap-
ters describing and analyzing commercial
banking, branch banking, and central banking,
respectively. Chapter 7 which follows is proba-
bly the most important contribution of the
b00k—supplying the results of the survey on
the financing of urban enterprises conducted
by the author. Next the author shows the pau-
city of long term financing in Thailand. The
b00k ends with the author's conclusions and
recommendations.” With tables and charts.
FINANCIAL POLICY IN POSTWAR
THAILAND: EXTERNAL EQUILIBRIUM
AND DOMESTIC DEVELOPMENT, by Jo-
seph E. Haring and Larry E. Westphal, in
Asian Survey, v. 8, no. 5 (May 1968) 364–377.
“Thailand, perhaps more than any
other country, has been able to achieve rapid
and substantial growth without inflation since
World War II. Blessed with huge rice crops in
a world hungry for rice, Thailand’s astute
money managers were able to restore order
quickly—and with less inflation, as measured
by wholesale prices, than the United States
had for the two decades following the war. Of
course, the strong preferences of the Thai peo-
ple for their own consumer products, and later
On the receipt of foreign aid, were also helpful
in maintaining convertibility and a stable price
level. Taking as a frame of reference the rela-
tionship between equilibrium in the balance of
payments and domestic economic growth, this
article will examine the role of financial policy
in Thailand since World War II.”
RURAL TAXATION IN THAILAND, by
Trent J. Bertrand, in Pacific Affairs, v. 42, no.
2 (Summer 1969) 178–188.
“The Thai economy has recorded im-
pressive progress in the past decade. During
the period from 1958 to 1962, the gross domes-
tic product at constant prices grew at an aver-
age rate of 6.5 per cent per annum. From 1962
to 1968, this rate of growth accelerated to an
average slightly above 8 per cent per annum.
Despite this strong overall performance, there
remain certain unsatisfactory aspects of the
pattern of development. Perhaps foremost
among these has been the degree to which eco-
nomic gains have failed to find adequate reflec-
tions in the rural areas of the country. Sharp
differences persist between the standards of
living in rural and urban areas (most notably
the metropolitan center of Bangkok-Thon-
buri). In this article, the Thai system of taxing
the agricultural sector is analyzed to isolate its
effect on rural development. The first part de-
scribes the system of rural taxation; this is
followed by an analysis of its effect on rural
development; and the article concludes with a
consideration of policy alternatives.”
5. Industry
THE ASIAN COCONUT COMMUNITY, in
Economic Bulletiºn for Asia and the Far East,
v. 19, no. 3 (December 1968) 17–23.
Present Position of the Coconut Industry
in Asia (Including Thailand): The Asian Co-
conut Community; Agreement Establishing
the Asian Coconut Community.
ASIA’s EMERGING INDUSTRIAL REvo-
LUTION, in Business Week, (13 December
1969) 60–61.
“Pacific nations are on the verge of a
great economic leap forward . . . Like a sput-
tering fuse, industry is moving southward
along the Pacific rim of Asia and firing rapid
economic growth. In the past decade, Taiwan
and South Korea have launched themselves on
a trajectory of rapid industrial expansion. A
pall of dirty smog over Hong Kong testifies to
its success in attracting industry, and in the
process creating an air pollution problem as
well as a labor shortage. Farther south, Singa-
pore is converting itself into an industrial
city-state, while Thailand is developing a more
193
balanced pattern of factories and farms. Giant
Indonesia, rich in resources and with a market
of 120-million people, seems set for a big-scale
effort to develop its industrial potential along
with its agriculture, forests, oil, and minerals.
Even South Vietnam should be ready for a
rapid expansion of agriculture and light indus-
try soon after the war’s end, according to a
study by New York’s Development & Resources
Corp., headed by David E. Lilienthal, former
chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission.”
IRON AND STEEL PLANTS OF THE
ECAFE COUNTRIES, in United Nations—
Asian Industrial Development News, no. 4
(1969) 53–69.
A directory listing country, company or
organization, location, year established, prod-
uct mix, production capacity, actual output,
and remarks. Includes the following countries,
among the others which are members of the
UN’s Economic Commission for Asia and the
Far East: Burma and Thailand.
6. The Mekong River Basin: The Develop-
ment of Its Economic Potential
AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT IN
THE MEKONG BASIN; GOALS, PRIORI-
TIES, AND STRATEGIES, Washington, Re-
sources for the Future, Inc., 1971. 108 p. (A
Staff Study.)
“The report begins by assessing the de-
mand-supply conditions for an expanded agri-
culture in the Mekong River Basin, proceeds to
evaluate what limitations are imposed by phys-
ical and human resource conditions, specifies
the measures that are needed to achieve condi-
tions favorable to modernizing agriculture, and
inquires into what criteria might serve to es-
tablish a sequence of development. Within this
rather conventional-looking scheme, unconven-
tional attention is given to the human and in-
stitutional setting in which development takes
place. The reason for this is that ‘progress’ is
equated not only with increased output or a
growing stock of physical facilities but also
with a rising ability of the people in the region
to gain a measure of material security—via a
rising income—in a social context that would
secure for them widening choices in matters of
production, consumption, location, and life
styles generally. The questions are not there-
fore merely what the river could help to pro-
duce and how that production could be utilized,
but also-and prominently—what the aspira.
tions of the region’s people are, what pace and
character of development would be least de-
structive of their system of values and beliefs,
and how the latter could be gradually altered
to become consonant with the requirements of
modern agriculture . . . The area affected by
the course of the river and its tributaries meas.
ures nearly a quarter of a million square
miles. It comprises practically all of Laos,
Cambodia, two-fifths of South Vietnam, and
one-third of Thailand. Close to 30 million peo-
ple now live in the area of the watershed in-
volved. That figure is likely to double by the
end of the century. The potential for power
generation and irrigation is large.”
5 NEW MEKONG PROJECTS; CAM.
BODIA, LAOS AND THAILAND TO BENE.
FIT, in SEATO Record, v. 9, no. 2 (April 1970)
40–41.
“Five new undertakings in Thailand,
Laos and Cambodia will be carried out as part
of the over-all Mekong development project,
with aid from New Zealand, Philippines,
United Kingdom and United States, as a result
of agreements signed at the Mekong co-ordi-
nating committee’s recent session in Phnom
Penh. The agreements call for activities relat-
ing to agriculture, fisheries, mineral resources,
manpower training, navigation, social needs
and other aspects of development. Responsibil-
ities will be shared, under most of the agree-
ments, by the assisting governments, the
committee, and the Mekong Secretariat,
In Thailand, the undertakings will entail ap-
prenticeship training at a boat building centre
at Nong Khai, and a study of socio-economic
aspects of fisheries in the Nam Pong reservoir.
In Cambodia, there will be a demonstration of
the use of fertilizer, and a survey in the Bat-
tambang area. Laos will be aided with mapping
and interpretation following a mineral survey."
THE MEKONG PROJECT, by Willard A.
Hanna. Hanover, N.H., American Universi.
ties Field Staff, Inc., 1968. 7 pts. (Fieldstaff
Reports Southeast Asia Series, v. 16, nos. 10-
14, 16, 17.)
I. The River and the Region. II. The
194
Evolution of the Design. III. The *Agency and
the Rationale. IV. The Test at Nam Ngum.
W. The prize at Pa Mong. VI. Delta Develop-
ment. VII. The Enigma of Cambodia. “When
and if peace comes to mainland Southeast Asia,
it cannot be a genuine, lasting peace unless it is
followed by plenty—and prospects for plenty
now seem to be contingent largely upon one
project or, rather, one master scheme. This is a
program of a scale and scope so audacious as
perhaps to disguise the very magnitude of the
problem to which, at best, it can provide only a
partial, preliminary answer. It is the Mekong
Development Project: twenty years ago an
E.C.A.F.E. (Economic Mission for Asia and
the Far East) dream, ten years ago a tentative
proposal, but today a schedule for massive
multinational co-operation. The Project is de-
signed to transform the social and economic
base of the Lower Mekong Basin by utilizing
the potential of the Mekong River for power,
irrigation, navigation, and various related pur-
poses. The direct effect within the next twen-
ty-five years should be to triple the Gross Na-
tional Product of the four riparian nations
(Laos, Thailand, Cambodia, and Vietnam), to
raise the average per capita income at least 50
per cent above the present dangerously low $65
to $100 level, and thus to create tremendous
new opportunities for modern progress . . . The
Consequences may include the creation within
the region of a whole new climate of social and
economic co-operation—and also, it is pro-
foundly to be hoped, of political accomoda-
tion.” (*The four-nation Committee for the Co-
Ordination of Investigations of the Lower
Mekong Basin.)
THE MEKONG; RIVER OF TERROR
AND HOPE, by Peter T. White, in National
Geographic, v. 134, no. 6 (December 1968)
737-787.
An essay of the land and the people of
the area with maps and numerous photos also
On the Mekong River which traverses, among
Others, Burma, Laos, Thailand, and Cambodia:
The Hope of the Mekong Project (A Plan to
Revolutionize Life for Millions of Southeast
Asians by Harnessing the River for Power and
Irrigation); New Ways for a Lao Farmer; Lao
Guerrillas Threaten Officials; Thailand Guards
a Precarious Peace; Chinese Soldiers Hold
Corner of Burma; Foreigners Crowd into
Vientiane; Rice Crop Fertilized by Monsoon;
Phnom Penh, Cambodia, City Build Where
Floating Buddhas Stopped; Dams Hold Prom-
ise and Problems; etc.
THE MEKONG SCHEME: GUIDELINE
FOR A SOLUTION TO STRIFE IN SOUTH-
EAST ASIA, by W. R. Derrick Sewell, in
Asian Survey (June 1968) 448–455.
“The “Mekong Scheme' is a program de-
signed to develop the tremendous potential of
Southeast Asia’s now unharnessed Mekong
River. The Mekong flows 2,625 miles, through
China, Burma, Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, and
South Vietnam and drains 307,000 square
miles. At present, there is no dam on the main-
stream of the river and no bridge across it. If
developed, the river could irrigate over twen-
ty-four million acres, substantially increasing
the rice crop, and could be navigated for more
than 1,000 miles. It could provide large quanti-
ties of low cost power which would stimulate
industry and raise the area’s standard of liv-
ing. In addition, vast flooding which plagues
the region each year would be reduced. By im-
proving transportation and communication, the
Mekong scheme would increase trade between
the nations of Southeast Asia and lessen politi-
cal tension in the area. The Mekong scheme
was initiated in 1951 when the UN’s Economic
Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECA-
FE) undertook a survey of the river. Although
the initial report was received with enthu-
siasm, interest in the development project
waned due to hostilities in the area and was
not revived until 1956. In 1957 the US Bureau
of Reclamation and four internationally known
experts sponsored by ECAFE undertook a
study of the Mekong. Their reports emphasized
the need for basin-wide, international plan-
ning. In response to this report, Cambodia,
Laos, Thailand, and South Vietnam set up the
Committee for the Coordination of Investiga-
tions of the Lower Mekong Basin (the Mekong
Committee). The US, France, Canada, and
Japan were among the first countries to offer
financial assistance to the Mekong Committee.
Now twenty countries and thirteen UN agen-
cies provide support for the development pro-
gram. Hydrologic and meteorologic networks
have been set up, the river has been exten-
195
sively surveyed, and a comprehensive develop-
ment plan should be completed by the commit-
tee this year . . . "
7. Petroleum.
WORLD CRUDE CAPACITY NOW 48
MILLION B/D, by William C. Uhl, in World
Petroleum, v. 41, no. 8 (August 1970) 26–28.
“Growth rates in process construction
will remain strong. Outlook for 1973 is for a
23.6% gain, to almost 60 million barrels daily.
Investment needs, for both refining and petro-
chemicals, will be over $21 thousand million in
coming three years.” Several statistical tables
are included showing world petroleum refining,
world refining expansion, current world petro-
chemical plants, etc. Included is information on
the following, among others: Asia and Far
East as a region, and Burma, Cambodia, and
Thailand.
WORLD CRUDE OUTPUT TO INCREASE
7%, in World Oil, v. 168, no. 3 (15 February
1969) 113–114.
Surveys world crude oil production and
provides a statistical chart which includes fig-
ures also for crude oil production for 1968 and
1967 for Burma and Thailand, among others.
See also: World Crude Oil Yield Nears 38 Mil-
lion BPD, in World Oil, v. 166, no. 3 (15 Febru-
ary 1968) 120 plus; and World Crude Output
Continues Up, in World Oil, v. 172, no. 3 (15
February 1971) 104 plus.
WORLD OIL OUTPUT TO RISE 8%, in
World Oil, v. 170, no. 3 (February 1970) 96–97.
Provides information on world crude oil
production by countries (including Burma and
Tailand) for 1968 and 1969.
WORLD PETROLEUM REPORT '70, in
World Petroleum, v. 16 (1970) 2–134.
An annual review of international oil
operations, including: Special Reports and
Area Studies (e.g.—World Summary and Re-
view; Oil at the United Nations—1969; Far
East and Asia; etc.); National Studies (e.g.—
Burma and Thailand, etc.).
WORLD PETROLEUM REPORT '71, in
World Petroleum, v. 17, no. 10 (1971) 19–106.
An annual review of international oil
operations, including among many others:
World Summary and Review (with informa.
tion on Burma and Thailand); etc.
THE WORLD'S PROCESSING PLANTS
in World Petroleum, v. 41, no. 8 (August 1970)
74 plus. &
“A complete directory of the world's re.
fineries and petrochemical plants. Included are
all facilities—presently operating, planned Or
under construction—in all countries outside
the USA including the USSR and other Com.
munist nations where reliable information was
obtainable. The first section is on refineries,
Immediately following it is the section on pet.
rochemical plants. For convenience, the list.
ing is alphabetical by company name under
each specific country. The countries are ar.
ranged in major geographical areas and also
listed alphabetically in those areas.” In the
section on Asia and Far East, information is
supplied for the following countries, among
others: Burma, Cambodia, and Thailand.
WORLD-WIDE SUPPLY AND DEMAND
WILL RISE 5% IN 1970, by William C. Uhl, in
World Petroleum, v. 41, no. 1 (January 1970)
18–19.
“Non-Communist nations may produce
37.5 million b/d this year. Consumption is ex-
pected to reach 37.2 million b/d. Large growth
in output of oil is shown by Libya, Nigeria,
Oman, and Indonesia. Eastern Hemisphere de-
mands gains remain strong.” Also provides
some statistical data, on the following, among
others: Asia/Far East as a region, as well as
Burma, Laos, and Thailand.
K. History
A CONCISE HISTORY OF SOUTHEAST
ASIA, by Nicholas Tarling. New York, Fred.
erick A. Praeger, 1966. 334 p.
Part One—Southeast Asia to About
1760; Part Two—Southeast Asia, 1760–1942;
Part Three—Southeast Asia Since 1942. Pro-
vides historical information also for the follow-
ing countries, among others: Burma, Cam.
bodia, Laos, and Thailand.
THAILAND AND WORLD WAR II, by Di-
reck Jayanama. Washington, Office, Chief of
Military History, 1968. 2 v.
196
This book on Thailand and World War
II is divided into three parts: The first part
deals with the relationship of warfare in Eu-
rope to that which was fought in Asia; the sec-
0nd part deals with events during the war in
Asia until the end of it; while the third part
deals with the post-war situation. This is a
translation from the Thai language.
THAILAND, BURMA, LAOS, AND CAM-
BODIA, by John F. Cady. Englewood Cliffs,
N.J., Prentice-Hall, 1966. 152 p.
Current Realities and Interrela-
tionships; Historical Beginnings; Classical
Cambodia, Burma, and Siam; Buddhist South-
east Asia, 1530 to 1780; Parting of the Ways,
Mindon and Mongkut; The Impact of Colonial
Rule; and Inter-War Decades and World War
II. With: Suggested Reading.
THE VIETNAMESE IN THAILAND: A
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE, by Peter A.
Poole. Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1970.
180 p.
“This book contains a wealth of infor-
mation on the Vietnamese minority in
Thailand . . . The book begins with a histori-
cal survey of the early relations between the
Thai and Vietnamese kingdoms and the differ-
ent migrations of Vietnamese refugees to
Thailand . . . .”

197
CHAPTER VII
SOURCE MATERIALS FOR RESEARCH AND REFERENCE
A. Miscellaneous Materials
BACKGROUND INFORMATION RELAT-
ING TO SOUTHEAST ASIA AND WIETNAM
(5th Rev. Ed.). Washington, Government
Printing Office, March 1969. 272 p. (91st Con-
gress, 1st Session, Committee on Foreign Rela-
tions, United States Senate, Committee Print.)
This Committee Print “contains mate-
rial deemed useful in discussion of the situa-
tion in Southeast Asia . . . [and] is limited
to statements by officials of the executive
branch and pertinent official documents, with
the exception of the material on the positions
of South Vietnam, North Vietnam, and the Na-
tional Liberation Front.” Contains the follow-
ing among many others: Summary Chronology
of Events in Southeast Asia, June 5,
1948–March 6, 1969; U.S. Recognition of Viet-
nam, Laos and Cambodia—Statement by the
Department of State, February 7, 1970; Eco-
nomic Aid Program—Note from the American
Charge d’Affaires at Saigon to the Chiefs of
State of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, May
24, 1950; The Defense of Indochina—Com-
munique Regarding Discussions between Rep-
resentatives of the United States, France, Viet-
nam, and Cambodia, June 18, 1952; Agreement
on the Cessation of Hostilities in Cambodia,
July 20, 1954; Agreement on the Cessation
of Hostilities in Laos, July 20, 1954; Southeast
Asia Collective Defense Treaty and Protocol
Thereto, September 8, 1954; Declaration on the
Neutrality of Laos, July 23, 1962; etc.
BROADCASTING STATIONS OF THE
WORLD. Washington, Foreign Broadcast In-
formation Service, 1 January 1971. 4 pts.
Part I–Amplitude Modulation Broad-
casting Stations According to Country and
City; Part II—Amplitude Modulation Broad-
casting Stations According to Frequency; Part
III—Frequency Modulation Broadcasting Sta-
tions According to Country and City and Fré.
Quency; Part IV—Television Stations. Im.
cludes, among many others, the following
countries of Peninsular Southeast Asia.
Burma, Cambodia, Laos, and Thailand.
A DICTIONARY OF BATTLES, by David
Eggenberger. New York, Thomas Y. Crowell
1967. 528 p.
Attempts to provide the essential details
of all the major battles in recorded history (in.
cluding war in the Pacific) . . . Covers more
than 1,560 separate and distinct military em.
gagements, from the first battle of Megiddo in
1479 B.C. to the fighting in Vietnam during the
1960's. The battles are listed alphabetically
and identified by war, revolution, political
movement, and so on. Maps.
THE FAR EAST AND AUSTRALASIA,
1970; A SURVEY AND DIRECTORY OF
ASIA AND THE PACIFIC. London, Europa
Publications Limited, 1970. 1368 p.
“The Far East and Australasia, of
which this is the second edition, is an annual
survey and directory of the states and territº
ries of the area extending eastwards from Af.
ghanistan and fanning out in the north
through the Soviet Union to the Bering Strait,
and in the south through southern Asia tº
Australia, New Zealand and the Pacific territº.
ries. The book deals with an area of great
physical and cultural diversity; for this rea,
son, the four major regional units—South,
South-East and East Asia, and Australasia
and the Pacific territories—are treated 35
separate sections. The possibility of greatºr
co-operation within the Asian and Pacific ré.
gion as a whole is strongly mooted, however,
and the territories on the periphery, i.e. Auš.
tralasia and the Soviet Far East and Siberia,
are studied to a large extent from the point ºf
198
view of their relations with the wider area of
Asia and the Pacific. In addition to the four
sections on the constituent regions of the area,
the book includes a preliminary section con-
taining general introductory features and
Chapters on regional co-operative organiza-
tions, and it ends with a Who’s Who of promi-
ment men and women active in, or closely asso-
ciated with, the area. The publication has a
twofold purpose: to provide a systematic direc-
tory of political and economic organization in
each country, and to serve as an introduction
to the problems that the region in general and
each country in particular are encountering in
developing viable economic, social and political
structures. Directory sections on each country
COver the constitution, government, diplomatic
representation, parliament, political parties,
judicial system, religion, communications
media, finance, trade and industry (leading
trade associations and principal industrial
COmpanies), power, transport, tourism, learned
80Cieties and research institutes, museums, art
galleries and libraries, universities and other
higher educational institutions. Statistical sur-
Veys have been compiled, in most cases with
the assistance of national statistical offices, and
generally provide basic statistics expressed in
the national units of measurement and ac-
Counting.” With reference material, maps, and
diagrams.
B. Atlases
THE INTERNATIONAL ATLAS. Chicago,
Rand McNally & Co., 1969. Various paging.
Includes geographic information also on
Countries of Peninsular Southeast Asia (in-
cluding, among others, Burma, Cambodia,
Laos, Thailand).
1971 COMMERCIAL ATLAS AND MAR-
KETING GUIDE. 102nd ed. Chicago, Rand
McNally & Co., 1971. 657 p.
Includes, among many others, maps on
Burma, Cambodia, Laos, and Thailand. The
Section on general world information includes:
air line distances; altitudes of selected cities;
latest official population figures; gazetteer
index of countries, regions and political divi-
sions and world political information table;
general index of foreign places and physical
features; steamship distances; time chart;
world facts and comparisons; and world physi-
cal comparisons.
READER'S DIGEST GREAT WORLD
ATLAS. 3rd ed. Pleasantville, N.Y. The Read-
er's Digest Association, 1968. 232 p.
Part two includes maps of the various
countries of Asia, among others, and includes
maps also of Burma, Cambodia, Laos, and
Thailand.
THE TIMES ATLAS OF THE WORLD;
COMPREHENSIVE EDITION. 2ND ED.
REV. Boston, Houghton Mifflin Co., 1971. 272 p.
Includes, among others, information on
the following countries of Peninsular South-
east Asia: Burma, Cambodia, Laos, and Thai-
land.
C. Directories (Including Aircraft &
Warship Directories)
FLAGS OF THE WORLD, ed. by E. M. C.
Barraclough. London, Frederick Warne & Co.,
Ltd, 1969. 284 p. .
With 370 flags in full color (including
those of Burma, Cambodia, Laos, and Thai-
land); over 375 text drawings; and bibliogra-
phy.
JANE's FIGHTING SHIPS, 1971–72, ed. by
Raymond V. B. Blackman. New York,
McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1971. 729 p.
Ship Reference Section; Table of Naval
Strengths; Naval Aircraft and Missiles; Index
of Named Ships. This information is supplied
for the following, among many others: Burma,
Cambodia, Laos, and Thailand.
JANE'S WORLD RAILWAYS, 1970–71, ed.
by Henry Sampson. London, Jane's Yearbooks,
1970. 686 p.
With reports on and tabulated details of
railways in: Europe, North America, South
America, Africa, Asia, and Australasia.
NATIONAL ANTHEMS OF THE WORLD,
ed. by Martin Shaw and Henry Coleman. Lon-
don, Pitman Publishing Co., 1963. 408 p.
Includes among many others those of
Burma, Cambodia, Laos, and Thailand.

199
PORTS OF THE WORLD, 1969. 23rd ed.
London, Benn Brothers (Marine Publications)
Limited, 1969. 860 p.
Detailed port information contained in
the following main geographical sections:
United Kingdom, Europe, Africa, North Amer-
ica, Central America, and the West Indies,
South America, Asia, Australasia, and the Pa-
cific Islands.
WEYERS FLEET POCKET BOOK. Weyers
Flotten-Taschenbuch, 1969/70. ed. by Gerhard
Albrecht. Munich, J. F. Lehmann Verlag,
1970. 447 p.
With 1188 sketches of ships and deck
plans, and also sketches of aircraft as well as
329 photos. Includes information for countries
of Peninsular Southeast Asia, among many
others (Burma, Cambodia, Thailand, etc.)
WEYER'S WARSHIPS OF THE WORLD,
1971, comp. by Gerhardt Albrecht. Annapolis,
Maryland, United States Naval Institute, 1971.
458 p.
This is the edition in the English lan-
guage of this “old and well regarded naval an-
nual.” Published in Germany, this annual has
come out almost every year since 1900. It pro-
vides fleet lists (with details such as length
beam, draft, crew, building yard, remarks,
etc.) for many countries of the world, includ-
ing Burma, Cambodia, and Thailand.
WORLD AVIATION DIRECTORY. Wash-
ington, Aviation Division, Ziff-Davis Publish-
ing Co., 1970. 1316 p. (V. 31, no. 2)
Lists aviation companies and officials
covering the U.S., Canada, and 150 countries in
Europe, Central and South America, Africa
and Middle East, Asia and Australasia (includ-
ing Burma, Cambodia, Laos, and Thailand).
WORLD WHO’S WHO IN SCIENCE;
FROM ANTIQUITY TO THE PRESENT, ed.
by Allen G. Debus. Chicago, The A. N. Marquis
Co., 1968. 1855 p.
A biographical dictionary of notable sci-
entists; and a component volume of The Mar-
quis Biographical Library. The highest per-
centage of individuals included here are from
the U.S. and the countries of Western Europe.
Broad coverage was attempted for Eastern Eu-
rope, Central and South America and the Ori.
ent. -
D. Encyclopedias
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF WORLD TRAVEL
NEW REVISED EDITION; VOLUME II-
EUROPE, AFRICA, THE MIDDLE EAST
ASIA, THE PACIFIC, ed. by Nelson Double,
day and C. Earl Cooley, and rev. by Marjorit
Zelko. Garden City, N.Y., Doubleday & Cº,
1967.
Discusses the land, the climate, the p&
ple, agriculture, industry, history, etc.
HARPER ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE
MODERN WORLD; A CONCISE REFER.
ENCE HISTORY FROM 1760 TO THE
PRESENT, ed. by Richard B. Morris and Grà.
ham W. Irwin. New York, Harper & Row, 1970
1271 p.
In two parts: a basic chronology, and a
topical chronology. With information on many |
countries of the world, including those of in
terest to the bibliography on Peninsular South |
east Asia.
STANDARD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE |
WORLD'S RIVERS AND LAKES, ed. by R.
Kay Gresswell and Anthony Huxley. New
York, Putnam, 1966. 384 p.
With illustrations and maps, accompº.
nying dictionaries of rivers and lakes. Include:
information for those studying Peninsular
Southeast Asia, among others.
WORLDMARK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE
NATIONS; VOLUME 4, ASIA & AUSTRA:
LASIA. ed. by Louis Barron. New York
Worldmark Press, Harper & Row, 1967. 392 p.
“A practical guide to the geographit,
historical, political, social, and economic statiſ;
of all nations, their international relationship',
and the United Nations system.” Some of this
information is included for the following,
among many others: Burma, Cambodia, LaCŞ.
and Thailand. ºf
E. Handbooks
ARMED FORCES OF THE WORLD; A
REFERENCE HANDBOOK, ed. by Robert C.
Sellers. 3rd ed. New York, Praeger Publisher,
1971. 296 p.

200
º
Provides the following information for
many countries of the world, including Burma,
Cambodia, Laos, and Thailand, among others:
defense budget; population; manpower in the
armed forces; defense as % of GNP; Army,
Navy, and Air Force manpower; principal
equipment; and other miscellaneous data on
the armed forces.
ASIA; A HANDBOOK, ed. by Guy Wint.
New York, Frederick A. Praeger, 1966. 856 p.
“Much of this book [with contributions
by many authors] is about relations between
the new Asian states and the rest of the
world . . . Much space is allotted to history,
along with the data of the present and sur-
mises about the future . . . A great variety of
facts is set out in this book—in the form of
Country-by-country [including Burma, Cam-
bodia, Laos, and Thailand] basic information
and surveys, essays on political, social, eco-
nomic, cultural and religious aspects of Asia,
maps, and extracts from treaties and agree-
ments signed since the last war. Contributors
have been deliberately left free to describe the
picture as they see it.” See also: Asia Hand-
book: Specially Revised and abridged for This
Edition, ed. by Guy Wint. Harmondsworth,
Middlesex, England, Penguin Books, 1969.
735 p.
OTHER LANDS, OTHER PEOPLES; A
COUNTRY-BY-COUNTRY FACT BOOK.
Washington, National Education Association
Of the United States, Committee on Interna-
tional Relations, 1970. 309 p.
This book describes 141 independent or
quasi-independent nations. Among the nations
described are Burma, Cambodia, Laos, Thai-
land, providing information on the following:
location and size; geographical features; cit-
its; people, language, religion; political back-
ground; government; economy; education; hol-
idays; international relations; etc.
1970 WORLD RADIO-TV HANDBOOK, ed.
by J. M. Frost. 24th ed. New York, London,
Denmark, Billboard A. G., 1970. 400 p.
The sections on Asia and the Pacific
provide information of broadcasting stations
located, among many others, in some countries
Of Peninsular Southeast Asia (including,
among others, Burma, Cambodia, Laos, and
Thailand.).
POLITICAL HANDBOOK AND ATLAS
OF THE WORLD, 1970, ed. by Richard P.
Stebbins and Alba Amoia. New York, Simon
and Shuster, 1970. 534 p. (Published for the
Council on Foreign Relations.)
Governments and intergovernmental
Organizations as of September 1, 1970, with
supplementary data through January 1, 1970.
Provides the following information for some
countries of Peninsular Southeast Asia (in-
cluding Burma, Cambodia, Laos, and Thai-
land), among many others: Political status;
area; population; capital; other urban centers;
official language; GNP; monetary unit; Chair-
man of the Presidium of the Supreme People's
Assembly; Premier and Secretary-General of
Korean Workers’ Party; Political background;
constitution and government; foreign rela-
tions; political parties; parliament; cabinet;
news media; diplomatic representation.
THE REFERENCE HANDBOOK OF THE
ARMED FORCES OF THE WORLD, ed. by
Robert C. Sellers. 2nd ed. Garden City, N.Y.,
Robert C. Sellers & associates, 1968. n.p.
Includes the following information for
some countries of Peninsular Southeast Asia,
(including, among others, Burma, Cambodia,
Laos, and Thailand) among many others: de-
fense budget, population, manpower in armed
forces, defense as % of GNP, Army (man-
power, equipment), Navy (manpower, equip-
ment), Air Force (manpower, equipment),
defense agreements, MAP type of assistance re-
ceived from Red China and the USSR, con-
scription law.
F. Language Textbooks
EASY THAI; AN INTRODUCTION TO
THE THAI LANGUAGE, by Gordon H. Alli-
son. Rutland, Vt., Charles E. Tuttle Co., 1969.
105 p.
“With exercises and Answer Key. A
gradual and cumulative system.”
LAO; BASIC COURSE, by Warren G. Yates
and others. Washington, Department of State,
Foreign Service Institute, 1970–71. 2 v.
Volume I provides introductory mate-
201
rial in modern spoken Lao. Volume II is a con-
tinuation of Volume I, and provides an orga-
nized set of materials designed to produce
greater proficiency in the use of the Lao lan-
guage, and at the same time to provide a gen-
eral introduction to Lao culture.
G. Research Guides
A GUIDE TO REFERENCE MATERIALS
ON SOUTHEAST ASIA, comp. by Donald
Clay Johnson. New Haven, Yale University
Press, 1970. 160 p.
Based on the collections in the Yale and
Cornell University Libraries. “It is a system-
atic guide to not only the key general bibliog-
raphies, dictionaries, directories, atlases,
statistics, and other general compendia of infor-
mation on the area but also to the pertinent
reference materials in the social sciences, hu-
manities, and natural sciences. Only works in
the Roman alphabet are included; the number
of works cited totals more than 2,200.” In-
cludes references on the following countries,
among others: Burma, Cambodia, Laos, and
Thailand.
RESEARCH RESOURCES; ANNOTATED
GUIDE TO THE SOCIAL SCIENCES, by
John Brown Mason. Santa Barbara, Calif.,
ABC-Clio Press, 1968. 2 v.
“‘Research Resources’ is designed as a
comprehensive, interdisciplinary guide to the
literature of international relations and recent
history . . . ‘Research Resources’ provides
worldwide coverage . . . annotated, of
hundreds of research aids—both books and pe-
riodicals. It acquaints students with the char-
acter and scope of some 150 periodicals con-
taining articles on international relations and
recent history, including journals devoted to
translations of foreign language material, and
the characteristics of leading American and
foreign newspapers and usefulness of the vari-
ous types of research aids and efficient ways of
utilizing them. An appended section on New
and Ceased Publications enables the reader to
keep abreast of constant changes in the period-
ical and reference field . . . The relationship
between science, government and international
relations is included in the coverage. References
to selected areas of education are of special
value . . . Annotations have been furnished in
the field of ethics, philosophy, and religion
since so many students today relate the study
of international relations and history to the
quest for a purpose in life and for an under.
standing of the basic character of government
and politics.” Includes research resources tº
many areas of the world, including many deal.
ing with Asia.
H. Travel Guides
ALL THE BEST IN JAPAN AND THE
ORIENT, by Sydney Clark. New York, Doll
Mead & Co., 1967. 509 p.
This travel guide includes Hong Kong,
Macao, Taiwan (Formosa), Thailand and the
Philippines. With illustrations and maps,
FODOR'S GUIDE TO JAPAN AND EAST
ASIA, 1968, ed. by Eugene Fodor and others
New York, David McKay, 1968. 755 p.
“A definitive handbook of the Far East
and Southeast Asia [including among other
Burma, Cambodia, Laos, and Thailand]; 7%
pages of text; map of East Asia; 13 COuntry
maps; 14 city plans; illustrations in color and
black and white.”
SOUTHEAST ASIA, by Mary Bentº
Smith. Menlo Park, Calif., Land Books, 1%
160 p.
A travel guide (with photos) covering
the following countries of Southeast Asia: Th:
Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singaporº,
Thailand, Burma, Cambodia, Laos, and South
Vietnam. |
I. Yearbooks
THE ANNUAL REGISTER; WORLD
EVENTS IN 1970, ed. by Ivison Macadam
New York, St. Martin’s Press, 1971. 548 p.
Chapter VII deals with East and South
East Asia, and including information in paſſ
on: South East Asian Regional Conferent&
and Organizations; Burma, Cambodia, Laº,
and Thailand; etc.
DEMOGRAPHIC YEARBOOK, TWENTY.
FIRST ISSUE, 1969. New York, United Nº.
tions, Department of Economic and Social Aſ
fairs, 1970. 694 p.

202
Includes fragmentary demographic in-
formation on Burma, Cambodia, Laos, and
Thailand, among others.
THE EUROPA YEAR BOOK, 1971; VOL-
UME II—AFRICA, THE AMERICAS, ASIA,
AUSTRALASIA. London, Europa Publications
Limited, 1971. 1726 p.
Provides the following-type information
for many countries of the world, including
Burma, Cambodia, Laos, and Thailand: back-
ground information, statistical survey (area
and population, agriculture, forestry, fishing,
mining, industry, finance, external trade, tour-
ism, transport, communications media, and ed-
ucation), the Constitution, the government,
diplomatic representation, parliament, political
parties, judicial system, religion, the press,
publishers, radio and television, finance, trade
and industry, power and power sources, trans-
port, tourism, and universities.
FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC REVIEW
1969 YEAR BOOK. Hong Kong, Stechert-
Hafner Book News, 1969. 324 p.
“A review of events in Asia in 1968 and
the prospects for 1969, giving full account of
political, economic and social affairs
in . . . [many countries of the Far East, in-
cluding, among others some of Peninsular
Southeast Asia, such as Burma, Cambodia,
Laos, and Thailand], with details of the inter-
national relations between them and the rest of
the world.”
INTERNATIONAL YEAR BOOK AND
STATESMEN'S WHO’S WHO, 1971. London,
Burke's Peerage, 1969. Various paging.
Part One: International Organizations
(United Nations, Specialized Agencies, Inter-
Governmental Organizations, Other Interna-
tional and National Organizations); Organiza-
tion of Foreign Ministries of Great Powers
(Charts); Colored Map of the World. Part
Two: States of the World (In Alphabetical Se-
quence); Part Three: Biographical Section. In-
cludes this information also for some of the
Countries of Peninsular Southeast Asia (includ-
ing among others, Burma, Cambodia, Laos, and
Thailand).
MINERALS YEARBOOK, 1969, VOLUME
IV. AREA REPORTS: INTERNATIONAL.
Washington, Department of the Interior, Bu-
reau of Mines, 1971. 942 p.
Of particular interest to the bibliogra-
phy on Peninsular Southeast Asia are the chap-
ters dealing with the minerals and mineral in-
dustries of the following countries, among
many others: Burma and Thailand.
THE NEW YORK TIMES WORLD ECO-
NOMIC REVIEW AND FORECAST 1968, 3d.
be Lee Kanner. Princeton, N.J., D. Van Nos-
trand, 1968. 256 p.
“An international survey of the year's
most significant business and financial events,
with . . . forecasts of trends in the United
States, Canada, Europe, Latin America, Asia,
the Middle East and Africa. Illustrated with
charts, maps and photographs.” Includes the
following among many others: Burma—Un-
certainty After Crisis; Cambodia Unusual
Austerity; Laos—An Economy of Anomolies;
Thailand—Drought Cuts Growth; etc.
THE STATESMAN’S YEAR-BOOK. STA-
TISTICAL AND HISTORICAL ANNUAL OF
THE STATES OF THE WORLD FOR THE
YEAR 1971–72, ed. by John Paxton. London,
Macmillan, 1971. 1569 p.
Provides also a great deal of current in-
formation about many countries of the world
including, among others: Burma, Cambodia,
Laos, and Thailand. This annual is an encyclo-
pedia of all nations, and is as well an interna-
tional Almanac that “gives almost every fact
and statistic you need about the states of the
union or nations of the world.”
STATISTICAL YEARBOOK 1970. TWEN-
TY-SECOND ISSUE. New York, United Na-
tions, Department of Economic and Social Af-
fairs, Statistical Office, 1971. 814 p.
Contents: special tables; world sum-
mary tables; tables on population, manpower,
agriculture, forestry, fishing, industrial pro-
duction, mining and quarrying, manufacturing,
construction, energy, internal and external
trade, transport, communications, consump-
tion, balance of payments, wages and prices,
national accounts, finance, international capital
flow, health, housing, education and mass com-
munications. Some information may be found
on the following countries, among others:
Burma, Cambodia, Laos, and Thailand.
203
YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL
TRADE STATISTICS 1968. New York,
United Nations, 1970. 941 p. (Statistical Office
of the United Nations ST/STAT/SER.G/19.)
Summary tables on world trade by re-
gions and countries; world exports by prove-
nance and destination; world and regional ex-
port and import quantum and price indices of
terms of trade; indices by commodity classes.
Also table for individual countries including
Burma, Cambodia, and Thailand.
YEARBOOK OF THE UNITED NATIONS,
1968. New York, United Nations, Office of
Public Information, 1971. 1215 p. (v. 22.)
Includes information dealing with ques-
tions concerning, among many others, Burma,
Cambodia, Laos, and Thailand.
J. Bibliographies
1. Southeast Asia: Regional Aspects
a. Miscellaneous Bibliographies
[SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY], in THE
MYTH OF ASIA, by John M. Steadman. New
York, Simon and Schuster, 1969. pp. 321–332.
The unity or disunity of Asia, the cul-
tural complex, the religion, philosophy, art and
aesthetics, politics, etc.
[SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY (PERIODI-
CALS], in THE FAR EAST AND AUSTRAL-
ASIA, 1971; A SURVEY AND DIRECTORY
OF ASIA AND THE PACIFIC. London,
Europa Publications Limited, 1971. pp. 1373–
1376.
Includes citations to periodicals from
various countries of Peninsular Southeast
Asia.
b. Contemporary Southeast Asia: An
Overview
[BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE], in A CON-
CISE HISTORY OF SOUTHEAST ASIA, by
Nicholas Tarling. New York, Frederick A.
Praeger, 1966. pp. 312–316.
[BIBLIOGRAPHY], in AN EYE FOR THE
DRAGON; SOUTHEAST ASIA OBSERVED,
1954–1970, by Dennis Bloodworth. New York,
Farrar Straus and Giroux, 1970. pp. 401–408.
[BIBLIOGRAPHY], in CONTEMPORARY
SOUTHEAST ASIA, by Claude A. Buss, New
York, Van Nostrand Reinhold Co., 19ſ,
pp. 273–276. (An Anvil Original.)
[BIBLIOGRAPHY], in IN SEARCH OF
SOUTHEAST ASIA; A MODERN HISTORY,
ed. by David Joel Steinberg. New York, Praº.
ger Publishers, 1971. pp. 439–498.
[SELECTED REFERENCES], in THE
ASIANS; THEIR HERITAGE AND THEIR
DESTINY, by Paul Thomas Welty. 3rd ed
Philadelphia, J. B. Lippincott, 170. pp. 333–34%.
With references specifically on the fºl.
lowing, among others: Southeast Asia.
c. Sociological Aspects
[BIBLIOGRAPHICAL SUGGESTIONS], in
ASIA, EAST BY SOUTH: A CULTURAL
GEOGRAPHY, by J. E. Spencer and William
L. Thomas. Second ed. New York, John Wiley &
Sons, Inc., 1971. pp. 626–641.
[BIBLIOGRAPHY], in ETHNIC GROUPS
OF MAINLAND SOUTHEAST ASIA, by
Frank M. Lebar and others. New Haven,
Human Relations Area Files Press, 1964
pp. 267–279. - -
[FURTHER READING], in ASIAN NA.
TIONALISM IN THE TWENTIETH CEN.
TURY, by J. Kennedy. New York, St. Martin's
Press, 1968. pp. 229–235.
Includes references on Southeast Asia,
among others.
[SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY OF WORKS
IN ENGLISHI, in THE FUTURE OF THE
OVERSEAS CHINESE IN SOUTHEAST
ASIA [including Peninsular Southeast Asia),
by Lea E. Williams. New York, McGraw-Hill
Book Company, 1966. pp. 127–131. (Published
for the Council on Foreign Relations.)
d. SEATO.
[BIBLIOGRAPHY], in THE SOUTHEAST
ASIA COLLECTIVE DEFENSE TREATY IN
UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY
STRATEGY, by Lorne S. Black. Pittsburgh
University of Pittsburgh, 1964. pp. 128-131.
(Unpublished Masters Degree Thesis in Public
and International Affairs.)
204
[SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY], in ALLI-
ANCES; LATENT WAR COMMUNITIES IN
THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD [INCLUD-
ING SEATO], ed. by Francis A. Beer. New
York, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1970.
pp. 329–338.
2, Peninsular Southeast Asia by Country
(Burma, Cambodia, Laos and Thailand)
0. Miscellaneous Bibliographies
[ANNOTATED LIST OF READINGS], in
A HISTORY OF MODERN SOUTHEAST
ASIA; COLONIALISM, NATIONALISM,
AND DECOLONIZATION, by John Bastin and
Harry J. Benda. Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Pren-
tice-Hall, 1968. pp. 203–209.
Includes readings for the following,
among others: Burma, Cambodia, Laos, and
Thailand.
ASIA, SOUTHEASTERN (EXCLUDING
WIETNAM), SELECTED UNCLASSIFIED
REFERENCES. Maxwell Air Force Base,
Ala., Air University Library, December 1970.
39 p. (Special Bibliography, No. 156—Revised
—Supplement No. 7, Part I.)
• References include articles and books on
U.S. policy in Southeast Asia and on the fol-
lowing aspects of Burma, Cambodia, Laos, and
Thailand, among others: General Information,
Communism, Economic Aspects, Military As-
pects, Politics and Government and Psycho-So-
dial Aspects.
ASIA . . . A LIST OF CURRENT SOCIAL
SCIENCE RESEARCH BY PRIVATE
SCHOLARS AND ACADEMIC CENTERS.
Washington, Department of State, Office of Ex-
ternal Research, 1968. 117 p. (External Re-
search 2.27–1968.)
This publication records social science
research on Asia currently in progress or com-
pleted during the period January through De-
Cember 1967 and unpublished as of the latter
date, Includes, among many others, papers on
Burma, Cambodia, Laos, and Thailand. .
[BIBLIOGRAPHYI, in MONSOON ASIA;
A GEOGRAPHICAL SURVEY, by Harry
Robinson. New York, Frederick A. Praeger,
1967, pp. 545–552.
With citations on the following coun-
tries, among many others: Burma, Cambodia,
Laos, and Thailand.
[BIBLIOGRAPHY], in SELECTIVE NON-
INVOLVEMENT IN SOUTHEAST ASIA: US
SECURITY POLICY IN THE SEVENTIES,
by Bernard K. Gordon, McLean, Virginia, Re-
search Analysis Corp., 1970. p. 28. (Paper—
RAC-p–59.)
With several citations dealing with
Burma and Cambodia, among others.
BIBLIOGRAPHY OF ASIAN STUDIES,
1968, in The Journal of Asian Studies, v. 28,
no. 5 (September 1969) 1–388. -
An annual bibliography produced as
no. 5 of The Journal of Asian Studies, a quar-
terly periodical. Included are listings of books,
articles dealing with various aspects of Asia as
a whole as well as all of the countries compris-
ing Asia, including Burma, Cambodia, Laos,
and Thailand, among many others.
BIBLIOGRAPHY OF PUBLICATIONS ON
THE LANGUAGES OF THE WORLD. Wash-
ington, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Army
Map Service Library, 1967? 2 v.
Chapter I—Europe and USSR; Chapter
II—South Asia and Far East [including Bur-
mese, Cambodian, Lao and Thai languages] ;
Chapter III—Africa; Chapter IV—Western
Hemisphere.
COMMUNIST CHINA; A BIBLIOGRAPH-
IC SURVEY, 1971 EDITION, by Harry Mos-
kowitz and Jack Roberts. Washington, Depart-
ment of the Army, 1971. 253 p. (DA PAM
550–9.)
This bibliographic survey updates DA
PAM 20–67, February 1966 as well as DA
PAM 20–61, January 1962 [also by the same
authors], and endeavors to shed light on Com-
munist China in its internal and external
image during the intervening years. Of partic-
ular importance to the bibliography on Penin-
sular Southeast Asia are the citations and
abstracts dealing with Communist China's for-
eign relations with Burma, Laos, and Thai-
land. 800 abstracts, 17 maps, and 23 appen-
dixes.
[SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY], in CON-
FLICT IN INDOCHINA: A READER ON
THE WIDENING WAR IN LAOS AND CAM-
BODIA, ed. by Marvin and Susan Gettleman

205
and Lawrence and Carol Kaplan. New York,
Random House, 1970.
[SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY], in
EMERGING SOUTHEAST ASIA; A STUDY
IN GROWTH AND STAGNATION, Donald W
Fryer. New York, McGraw-Hill Book Co.,
1970. pp. 451–473.
Includes sections dealing also, among
others, with Burma, Cambodia, Laos, and
Thailand.
[SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY], in
SOUTHEAST ASIA TODAY-AND TOMOR-
ROW; PROBLEMS OF POLITICAL DEVEL-
OPMENT, by Richard Butwell. 2nd rev. ed.
New York, Praeger Publishers, 1969.
pp. 230–240.
Includes titles dealing also specifically
with Burma, Cambodia, Laos, and Thailand.
[SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY], in THE
INDOCHINA STORY; A FULLY DOCU-
MENTED ACCOUNT. New York, Pantheon
Books, 1970. pp. 344–347.
. With citations [many of them critical]
dealing with Indochina, Vietnam, Laos and
Cambodia.
[SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY ON THE
SOUTHEAST ASIA CRISIS], in THE
SOUTHEAST ASIA CRISIS; BACKGROUND
PAPERS AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE
EIGHTH HAMMARSKJOLD FORUM, ed. by
Lyman M. Tandel, Jr. Dobbs Ferry, N.Y.,
Oceana Press, Inc., 1966. pp. 199–226. (Pub-
lished for the Association of the Bar of the
City of New York.)
Includes citations for the following,
among others: Bibliography of Bibliographies;
Historical Materials; Documentary Sources;
U.N. Documents (Cambodia and Vietnam;
Thailand Situation; Laos Situation; Cambo-
dia-Thailand Situation; Admission to Member-
ship—Cambodia and Laos; Refugees in Cam-
bodia); China and Communism in Southeast
Asia; SEATO; etc. -
[SUGGESTED READING], in STORM
OVER ASIA, CHINA AND SOUTHEAST
ASIA: THRUST AND RESPONSE, by Robert
Karr McCabe. New York, The New American
Library, 1967. pp. 209–216.
Includes citations on Burma, Cambodia,
Laos, and Thailand, among others.
[SUGGESTED READINGS], in THAI.
LAND, LAOS, AND CAMBODIA, by John F.
Cady. Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice-Hall,
1966. pp. 143–146.
Titles deal mainly with histories and
descriptive material on the lands and the peſ.
ples.
b. Burma.
AN ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY ON
THE CLIMATE OF BURMA, by Annie E.
Grimes. Silver Spring, Md., U.S. Department
of Commerce, Environmental Science Services
Administration, Environmental Data Service,
May 1970. 105 p. (ESSA Technical Memoram.
dum EDSTM-BC 102.)
Contents: Map of the Far East; Map of
Southeast Asia; Map of Burma; Sources and
Abstracts; Author Index; and Subject Heading
Index. -
[BIBLIOGRAPHIES], in AREA HAND.
BOOK FOR BURMA, by T. D. Roberts and
others. Washington, Department of the Army,
June 1968. pp. 345–359. (DA PAM 550–61.)
EAST ASIA AND PACIFIC AREA, SPE.
CIAL PAPERS AVAILABLE. Washington
Department of State, Office External Research,
Foreign Affairs Research Documentation Cem.
ter, October 1969. 79 p.
This publication is one of a series list.
ing social science research papers added to the
Foreign Affairs Research Documentation Cºl.
ter. Included, among many others, are paper;
on Burma, Cambodia, Laos, and Thailand.
SOURCES OF INFORMATION REGARD.
ING LABOR IN BURMA, in LABOR LAW
AND PRACTICE IN THE UNION OF
BURMA, by Janet L. Norwood. Washington,
Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statis.
tics, April 1964. pp. 57–59. (BLS Report No.
264.)
c. Cambodia.
BIBLIOGRAPHY OF ASIAN STUDIES
1968, in The Journal of Asian Studies, v.2%
no. 5 (September 1969) 1–388.
Titles are listed in the following seſ.
tions of the annual bibliography: Asia; Fat
East; China; Taiwan; Hongkong and MacAO:
Tibet; Mongolia; Central Asia and Soviet Far

206
East; Korea; Japan; Southeast Asia; Philip-
pines; Indonesia; Malaysia, Singapore, Bru-
nei; Vietnam; Cambodia; Laos; Thailand;
Burma; South Asia; Ceylon; Pakistan; Hima-
laya; India.
[BIBLIOGRAPHIES], in AREA HAND-
B00K FOR CAMBODIA, by Frederick P.
Munson and others. Washington, Department
Of the Army, October 1968. pp. 329–341. (DA
PAM 550–50.)
EAST ASIA AND PACIFIC AREA. SPE-
CIAL PAPERS AVAILABLE. Washington,
Department of State, Office External Research,
Foreign Affairs Research Documentation Cen-
ter, October 1969. 79 p.
This publication is one of a series list-
ing social science research papers added to the
Foreign Affairs Research Documentation Cen-
ter, Included, among many others, are papers
On Burma, Cambodia, Laos, and Thailand.
[LIST OF WORKS CITED], in THE PO-
LITICAL STRUCTURE OF THE CHINESE
COMMUNITY IN CAMBODIA, by W. E. Will-
mott, New York, Humanities Press, 1970.
pp. 192–199. (London School of Economics,
Monographs on Social Anthropology No. 42.)
[SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY], in CAM-
BODIA: THE WIDENING WAR IN INDO-
CHINA, ed. by Jonathan S. Grant and others.
New York, Washington Square Press, 1971.
pp. 345–350.
d. Laos
[BIBLIOGRAPHY], in COMMUNIST
CHINA’S POLICY TOWARD LAOS: A CASE
STUDY, 1954–1967, by Chae-Jin Lee. Law-
rence, University of Kansas, Center for East
Asian Studies, 1970. pp. 151–157. (Research
Publication no. 6.)
[BIBLIOGRAPHY], in LAOS: BUFFER
STATE OR BATTLEGROUND, by Hugh
Toye, New York, Oxford University Press,
1968, pp. 219–230.
[BIBLIOGRAPHIES], in AREA HAND-
B00K FOR LAOS, by T. D. Roberts and oth-
ers, Washington, Department of the Army,
June 1967. pp. 313–333. (DA PAM 550–58.)
EAST ASIA AND PACIFIC AREA. SPE-
CIAL PAPERS AVAILABLE. Washington,
Department of State, Office External Research,
Foreign Affairs Research Documentation Cen-
ter, October 1969. 79 p.
This publication is one of a series list-
ing social science research papers added to the
Foreign Affairs Research Documentation Cen-
ter. Included, among many others, are papers
on Burma, Cambodia, Laos, and Thailand.
[SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY, by Leonard
P. Adams III, in LAOS: WAR AND REVO-
LUTION, ed. by Nina S. Adams and Alfred W.
McCoy. New York, Harper & Row, 1970.
pp. 463–466. (A Publication of the Committee
of Concerned Asian Scholars.)
[SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY], in LABOR
LAW AND PRACTICE IN THE KINGDOM
OF LAOS, by Theodore Bleecker. Washington,
Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statis-
tics, 1970. pp. 49–50. (BLS Report No. 381.)
[SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY], in LAOS:
WAR AND REVOLUTION, ed. by Nina S.
Adams and Alfred W. McCoy. New York, Har-
per & Row, 1970. pp. 463–466. (Harper Colo-
phon Books, CN221.)
e. Thailand
AN ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY OF
THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AND ADJA-
CENT AREAS. SOUTHWEST PACIFIC
AREA, GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, AL-
LIED GEOGRAPHICAL SECTION, 1944, 3 v.
Volume III (Malaya, Thailand, Indo
China, the China Coast, and the Japanese Em-
pire).
[BIBLIOGRAPHIES], in AREA HAND-
BOOK FOR THAILAND, by Harvey H. Smith
and others. Washington, Department of the
Army, September 1968. pp. 495–533. (DA PAM
550–53.)
EAST ASIA AND PACIFIC AREA. SPE-
CIAL PAPERS AVAILABLE. Washington,
Department of State, Office External Research,
Foreign Affairs Research Documentation Cen-
ter, October 1969. 79 p.
This publication is one of a series list-
ing social science research papers added to the
Foreign Affairs Research Documentation Cen-
ter. Included, among many others, are papers
on Burma, Cambodia, Laos, and Thailand.

207
APPENDIXES
A.
B.
:
i
S.
.
A
A.
BB.
U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970’s: Laos and Cam-
bodia ------------------------------------------
Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty—SEATO
(Text) -----------------------------------------
Communist Parties Around the Perimeter of China—
Including Burma, Cambodia, Laos, and Thailand
(Table and Text) - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ----------------
Union of Burma: Background Notes - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Burma: National Security (National Defense and
Internal Security) - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Burma’s Military Posture—With Map (Black and
White) ----------------------------------------
Burma: Strength of Communist Party Organization - - -
Burma: Map with Insets—(Color) - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Burma: Vegetation—Map—(Color) - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
The Khmer Republic (Cambodia): Background Note;
(Including Abolition of Monarchy and Dismissal of
Sihanouk) -------------------------------------
Cambodia under Sihanouk; National Security (Public
Order and Safety; and the Armed Forces) - - - - - - - -
Cambodia’s Politico-Military Posture Under Lon Nol - -
Cambodia: Strength of Communist Party Organization.--
Cambodia: Map with Insets (Color) - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ---
Cambodia: Administrative Divisions—Map (Color) - -
Cambodia: Ethnic Groups—Map (Color) - - - - - - - - - - - -
Kingdom of Laos: Background Notes - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Laos: National Security (Public Order and Safety;
and the Armed Forces) - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Laotian Military Posture—With Map (Black and
White) ----------------------------------------
Laos: Strength of Communist Party Organization - - - -
Laos: Map With Insets (Color) - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Laos: Administrative Divisions—Map (Color) - - - - - - - -
Laos: Communist Administrative Divisions—Map
(Color) ----------------------------------------
Laos [Military Regions]—Map (Color) - - - - - - - - - - - - -
North Laos—Map (Color) - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Kingdom of Thailand: Background Notes - - - - - - - - - - - -
Thailand: National Security (National Defense and
Internal Security) - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Thailand’s Military Posture—With Map (Black and
White) ----------------------------------------
Thailand: Strength of Communist Party Organization --
Thailand: Map With Insets (Color) - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Thailand: Administrative Divisions—Map (Color) - - - -
Northern Thailand: Selected Ethnic Groups—Map
(Color) -------------------------- --------------
Khmers in Thailand—Map (Color) - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Southern Asia—Map (Color—Edition 2—TPC, Sheet
7, Series 1106) - - - - - - - - - - ---------- — — — — — — — — — — — — — —
Page
210
215
220
222
229
250
254
257
259
261
269
303
308
311
313
315
317
325
357
360
364
365
367
369
371
373
381
CC.
DD.
EE.
FF.
GG.
HH.
407
411
414
415
417
419

208
II. Southern Asia—Map (Color—Edition 1—AMS, Sheet
8, Series 1106) ---------------------------------
J.J. The Peoples of Mainland Southeast Asia—Map (Color—
National Geographic Society) - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
209
APPENDIX A
U.S. FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE 1970’s:
LAOS AND CAMBODIA
[From: U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970's: The Emerging Structure of
Peace. A Report to the Congress by Richard Nixon, President of the
United States, February 9, 1972. Washington, Government Printing Office,
1972.]
210
Laos and Cambodia
Vietnam is the central theater in what is, in fact, a wider war. For
Hanoi has made the war an Indochina conflict by spreading its troops
throughout the peninsula.
In 1971, with their position deteriorating in South Vietnam itself, the
North Vietnamese continued, and have now stepped up, their aggres-
sion in Laos and Cambodia. Hanoi maintains over 60,000 troops in Cam-
bodia and more North Vietnamese troops in Laos, some 100,000, than
in South Vietnam.
The situation in Laos and Cambodia are similar in many respects:
—Both of these countries have totally defensive military establish-
ments; neither poses any conceivable threat to North Vietnam.
—The neutrality, independence, and territorial integrity of both coun-
tries have been inscribed in international agreements which Hanoi
signed, but contemptuously ignores. .
—North Vietnamese troops for years have used both countries as infil-
tration corridors, staging bases, and sanctuaries for attacks against
South Vietnam.
—North Vietnam continues to threaten the legitimate governments in
both countries in order to further its attacks on South Vietnam, but
also perhaps with the intention of taking Laos and Cambodia
themselves.
—The overwhelming numbers of North Vietnamese troops in both
countries strip away any pretense that the conflicts in Laos and
Cambodia are civil wars. -
The Lao and Cambodian governments have tried to restore their
independence and neutrality through diplomatic means; failing that,
they have been forced to turn to their friends for support of their defense.
The United States and other nations have responded to their requests
for assistance. We have supported both diplomatic efforts to bring
peace to Laos and Cambodia, and defensive military efforts in the
absence of a settlement. $ .
On the diplomatic front, we have always backed the efforts of Lao
Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma—the neutralist leader supported by
Hanoi at the time of the 1962 Geneva Accords—to reinstitute those
Accords. In Cambodia we long tolerated a difficult military situation
and we encouraged negotiations when Prince Sihanouk was first deposed
by the National Assembly in March 1970.
Our negotiating proposals on Vietnam have consistently been ad-
dressed to the broader Indochina context. In the face of North Viet-
nam's refusal to address these problems at the conference table, we have
continued the policies of previous Administrations in extending military
and economic support to the Royal Lao Government. We have provided
military assistance for Cambodia since the spring of 1970, when North
Vietnamese troops moved out of the border sanctuaries and extended
their operations into broader areas of Cambodia.
Our constant objectives in both countries have been to ensure the
momentum of Vietnamization and our withdrawals, to protect American
and allied lives, and to help maintain the precarious balance within
these two countries as they fight to restore their independence and
neutrality. - ! -
In both countries our activities are limited, requested, supportive, and
defensive. -
Laos and Cambodia Provide for Their Own Defense. In Laos,
government forces continue to offer a tenacious defense despite years
of combat against a numerically superior enemy. The struggle there ebbs -
and flows on a seasonal basis. The Laotian conflict is, in effect, two wars.
In the north, North Vietnamese troops maintain pressure on the very
government which Hanoi helped to create in 1962. In the south, the
enemy concentrates on expanding and protecting the Ho Chi Minh trail
complex which is vital to its military strength in South Vietnam and
Cambodia. -
The Cambodian Government, faced with the assault on its independ-
ence, has rallied the population to the cause of national survival. From
a lightly-equipped and largely ceremonial force of 35,000 men in 1970,
the Cambodian army has now grown to approximately 200,000, for
the most part volunteers. .
The army has fought bravely, but it lacks training, equipment, and
experience. And it faces over 60,000 well-equipped North Vietnamese
troops, hardened and experienced by years of war.
Despite the measures which they are taking in their own defense, these
two countries are clearly no match for a much larger North Vietnam, and
they must have external assistance to survive. It would be a grim develop-
ment indeed if these two small nations, so clearly the victims of external
aggression, were overwhelmed because of restrictions placed on American
and other allied aid while North Vietnam continued to receive the full
backing of its own allies. . . . . . . .
Neither country has requested the deployment of U.S. troops. They are
manning the front lines. Thus, there are not—and there will not be—
any U.S. ground combat troops in either country. -
Together With Other Countries, We Provide Military And Eco-
nomic Assistance. In Laos, this remains as outlined in my comprehensive
report of March 1970—military aid for regular and irregular Lao forces
when requested by the Lao Government; reconnaissance flights and air
operations to interdict North Vietnamese troops and supplies on the Ho
212
Chi Minh Trail; logistic and air support for Lao forces when requested
by the Government. We also provide economic assistance to control infla-
tion, support essential Government services, and assist economic
development. . -
In Cambodia, we have given military assistance since April 1970 and
economic assistance and PL 480 programs since March 1971. With the
approval of the government we are also conducting air interdiction mis-
sions against enemy personnel and supplies that are, or can be, used in
offensives against American and allied forces in South Vietnam.
South Vietnam Has Mounted Defensive Operations Against
North Vietnamese Forces in Their Laotian and Cambodian Base
Areas. I have already described the purposes of these operations and
noted the increasing South Vietnamese capabilities that they have dem-
onstrated. In Cambodia, operations are at the request of the Government
and serve to relieve enemy pressures against Cambodia as well as South
Vietnam. In Laos, the South Vietnamese operations were strictly limited
in objective and duration.
It is senseless to claim that these operations against enemy sanctuaries
serve to widen the Vietnam war. Not a single South Vietnamese soldier
has gone anywhere except where tens of thousands of North Vietnamese
troops have been entrenched for years, violating one country's territory
to attack another. It is Hanoi which widened the conflict long ago.
As I said in last year's Foreign Policy Report:
“The arguments against South Vietnam's defensive actions sug-
gest that Hanoi has the right—without provocation and with com-
plete immunity—to send its forces into Laos and Cambodia, threaten
their governments, and prepare to bring its full strength to bear on
South Vietnam itself.
“The choice for South Vietnam is not between limiting and ex-
panding the war. It is between what it is doing in self-defense and
passively watching the menace grow along its borders.”
The presence and activities of North Vietnamese troops in Laos and
Cambodia are indefensible. Nevertheless, we can expect the Lao and
Cambodian peoples to be subjected to additional attacks as Hanoi pur-
sues its aims in the region. These countries ask nothing but to be left
alone to shape their own destinics. They have demonstrated their cour-
age, and their determination to try to provide for their own defense.
Together with others, we shall continue to provide the support that
will help to sustain them in their struggle.
º † §§
213
I once again appeal to the other side to join in the search for peace
in Indochina. Proposals now on the negotiating table could end this
conflict on a basis that would respect the sacrifices of all participants.
It is long past time to still the sound of war, to return the men of
both sides to their families, and to devote the energies of all to the
fruitful tasks of peace. - -
214
APPENDIX B
souTHEAST ASIA COLLECTIVE DEFENSE
TREATY-SEATO (TEXT).
[From: Collective Defense Treaties. Washington, Government Printing
Office, 1967. (91st Congress, 1st Session, Committee Print).]
215
SOUTHEAST ASIA COLLECTIVE I) EFENSE TREATY
Treaty and Protocol signed at Manila September 8, 1954;
Ratification advised by the Senate of the United States of
America February 1, 1955; Ratified by the President of
the United States of America February 4, 1955; Ratifica-
tion of the United States of America deposited with the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines Febru-
ary 19, 1955; Proclaimed by the President of the United
States of America March 2, 1955; Entered into force Feb-
ruary 19, 1955 -
Treaty and Protocol ratified by Australia, France, New
Zealand, Pakistan, the Republic , of the Philippines,
Thailand, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland, and the United States of America
NoTE.—By protocol the parties to the Southeast Asia
Collective Defense Treaty designated the States of Cam-
bodia and Laos and the free territory under the jurisdiction
of the State of Vietnam for the purposes of Article IV of
the Treaty. Subsequently, Cambodia indicated dis-
interest in the protection of the Southeast Asia treaty.
Also, in the Geneva Declaration on the Neutrality of
Laos, the Royal Government of Laos declared that it
will not “recognize the protection of any alliance or mili-
tary coalition, including SEATO” and the United States
and other nations agreed to “respect the wish of the
Kingdom of Laos not to recognize the protection of any
alliance or military coalition, including SEATO.”
The Parties to this Treaty,
Recognizing the sovereign equality of all the Parties,
Reiterating their faith in the purposes and principles set forth in
the Charter of the United Nations and their desire to live in peace
with all peoples and all governments, -
Reaffirming that, in accordance with the Charter of the United
Nations, they uphold the principle of equal rights and self-determina-
tion of peoples, and declaring that they will earnestly strive by every
peaceful means to promote self-government and to secure the in-
dependence of all countries whose peoples desire it and are able to
undertake its responsibilities,
Desiring to strengthen the fabric of peace and freedom and to up-
hold the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of
law, and to promote the economic well-being and development of all
peoples in the treaty area,
Intending to declare publicly and formally their sense of unity, so
that any potential aggressor will appreciate that the Parties stand
together in the area, and -
216
Desiring further to coordinate their efforts for collective defense
for the preservation of peace and security,
Therefore agree as follows:
ARTICLE I
The Parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the United
Nations, to settle any international disputes in which they may be
involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace
and security and justice are not endangered, and to refrain in their
international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner
inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.
ARTICLE II
In order more effectively to achieve the objectives of this Treaty
the Parties, separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effec-
tive self-help and mutual aid will maintain and develop their individual
and collective capacity to resist armed attack and to prevent and
counter subversive activities directed from without against their
territorial integrity and political stability.
ARTICLE III
The Parties undertake to strengthen their free institutions and to
cooperate with one another in the further development of economic
measures, including technical assistance, designed both to promote
economic progress and social well-being and to further the individual
and collective efforts of governments toward these ends.
ARTICLE IV
1. Each Party recognizes that aggression by means of armed attack
in the treaty area against any of the Parties or against any State or
territory which the Parties by unanimous agreement may hereafter
designate, would endanger its own peace and safety, and agrees that
it will in that event act to meet the common danger in accordance
with its constitutional processes. Measures taken under this para-
aph shall be immediately reported to the Security Council of the
nited Nations. -
2. If, in the opinion of any of the Parties, the inviolability or the
integrity of the territory or the sovereignty or political independence
of any Party in the treaty area or of any other State or territory to
which the provisions of paragraph 1 of this Article from time to time
apply is threatened in any way other than by armed attack or is
affected or threatened by any fact or situation which might endanger
the peace of the area, the Parties shall consult immediately in order
to agree on the measures which should be taken for the common
defense. - - . - - -
3. It is understood that no action on the territory of any State
designated by unanimous agreement under paragraph 1 of this Article
or on any territory so designated shall be taken except at the invita-
tion or with the consent of the government concerned.
217
ARTICLE V
The Parties hereby establish a Council, on which each of them
shall be represented, to consider matters concerning the implementa-
tion of this Treaty. The Council shall provide for consultation with
regard to military and any other planning as the situation obtaining
in the treaty area may from time to time require. The Council shall
be so organized as to be able to meet at any time.
ARTICLE VI
This Treaty does not affect and shall not be interpreted as affecting
in any way the rights and obligations of any of the Parties under the
Charter of the United Nations or the responsibility of the United
Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security.
Each Party declares that none of the international engagements now
in force between it and any other of the Parties or any third party is
in conflict with the provisions of this Treaty, and undertakes not to
enter into any international engagement in conflict with this Treaty.
ARTICLE VII
Any other State in a position to further the objectives of this
Treaty and to contribute to the security of the area may, by unani-
mous agreement of the Parties, be invited to accede to this Treaty.
Any State so invited may become a Party to the Treaty by depositing
its instrument of accession with the Government of the Republic
of the Philippines. The Government of the Republic of the Philip-
pines shall inform each of the Parties of the deposit of each such
instrument of accession. - -
ARTICLE VIII
As used in this Treaty, the “treaty area” is the general area of
Southeast Asia, including also the entire territories of the Asian
Parties, and the general area of the Southwest Pacific not including
the Pacific area north of 21 degrees 30 minutes north latitude. The
Parties may, by unanimous agreement, amend this Article to include
within the treaty area the territory of any State acceding to this
Treaty in accordance with Article VII or otherwise to change the
treaty area. -
ARTICLE IX
1. This Treaty shall be deposited in the archives of the Government
of the Republic of the Philippines. Duly certified copies thereof
shall be transmitted by that government to the other signatories.
2. The Treaty shall be ratified and its provisions carried out by
the Parties in accordance with their respective constitutional proc-
esses. The instruments of ratification shall be deposited as soon as
possible with the Government of the Republic of the Philippines,
which shall notify all of the other signatories of such deposit.
3. The Treaty shall enter into force between the States which have
ratified it as soon as the instruments of ratification of a majority of
the signatories shall have been deposited, and shall come into effect
with respect to each other State on the date of the deposit of its
instrument of ratification. - -
218
ARTICLE X
This Treaty shall remain in force indefinitély, but any Party may
cease to be a Party one year after its notice of denunciation has been
given to the Government of the Republic of the Philippines, which
shall inform the Governments of the other Parties of the deposit of
each notice of denunciation.
ARTICLE XI
The English text of this Treaty is binding on the Parties, but when
the Parties have agreed to the French text, thereof and have so
notified the Government of the Republic of the Philippines, the
French text shall be equally authentic and binding on the Parties.
UNDERSTANDING of THE UNITED STATES of AMERICA
The United States of America in executing the present Treaty
does so with the understanding that its recognition of the effect of
aggression and armed attack and its agreement with reference thereto
in Article IV, paragraph 1, apply only to communist aggression but
affirms that in the event of other aggression or armed attack it will
consult under the provisions of Article IV, paragraph 2.
Protocol to the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty
DESIGNATION of STATES AND TERRITORY As To Which PRovisions
of ARTICLE IV AND ARTICLE III ARE To BE APPLICABLE
The Parties to the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty
unanimously designate for the purposes of Article IV of the Treaty
the States of Cambodia and Laos and the free territory under the
jurisdiction of the State of Vietnam. .
The Parties further agree that the above mentioned states and
territory shall be eligible in respect of the economic measures con-
templated by Article III. -
This Protocol shall enter into force simultaneously with the coming
into force of the Treaty.
NoTE.—Subsequently, Cambodia has indicated disinterest in the
protection of the Southeast Asia Treaty. In the Geneva Declaration
on the Neutrality of Laos, the Royal Government of Laos declared
that it will not “recognize the protection of any alliance or military
coalition, including SEATO” and the United States and other nations
agreed to “respect the wish of the Kingdom of Laos not to recognize
the protection of any alliance or military coalition, including SEATO.”
219
APPENDIX C
COMMUNIST PARTIES AROUND THE
PERIMETER OF CHINA—INCLUDING BURMA,
CAMBODIA, LAOS, AND THAILAND
(Table and Text)
[From: Issues in United States Foreign Policy. No. 4.—Communist China,
ed. by John Kimball, Washington, Department of State, December 1969.
(Publ. 8499).] * *
220
WMUNIST PARTIES ARound
THE PERIMETER OF CHINA
In light of Mao's announced intention to
support revolutionary activity in neighbor-
ing Countries to the south, and the division
among Asian Communist parties over the
SimOSoviet dispute, the question of the
status, strength, policies, and unity of
Asia's Communist Parties takes on added
importance. Below are estimates by the
Intelligence, and Research Bureau of the
Department of State, published in World
Strength of the Communist Party Organi-
isſions (1968 edition):
Of the ruling Communist Parties out-
side Asia only one fully sides with China
inthesino-Soviet dispute: Albania (66,327;
in power). Non-Asian countries in which
there appears to be an open split in the
party on the Sino-Soviet dispute include:
Belgium, Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Leba-
non, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, Portugal,
Spain, Switzerland.
Many of the Communist Parties listed
in the table, although relatively small in
card-carrying membership, dominate larger
front organizations. For example, the Cen-
tral Committee of the People's Party of
Laos (Phak Pasason Lao) controls the
Laotian Patriotic Front (Neo Lao Hak Sat,
NLHS) and the Front's administration, but
the People's Party itself is apparently con-
trolled by North Viet-Nam's Lao Dong
Party. The People's Party, whose member-
ship is unknown, also controls the Lao
People's Liberation Army, which numbers
more than 50,000.
In Cambodia fewer than 100 ethnic
Cambodians are believed to belong to the
Communist People's Revolutionary Party,
SIN0-SOVIET
(OUNTRY CP MEMBERSHIP LEGAL STATUS DISPUTE
Mºhamistan 200 est. Pro-Soviet
Mistralia 5,000 - Open split
Blma White flag 5,000 est. Both proscribed Pro-China
- Red flag 500 est. 10/63 Pro-Soviet
Cambodia 100 Position unknown
ſtylom 1,900 Open split
China, Communist 17,000,000 In power
China, Rep. of Negligible Proscribed 7/47
Hºng Kong Part of CCP Proscribed 1949 Pro-China
India 125,000 Open split
|ſionesia 150,000 Proscribed 3/66 Position unknown
lipin 250,000 - Independent
Mºſes, North 1,600,000 In power Independent
Mºſta, South Negligible Proscribed 12/48
lºſs Unknown Neutral
Malaysia 2,000 Proscribed 7/48 Pro-Chinese
| Mongolia, Outer 48,570 in power Pro-Soviet
Nepal 8,000 All parties Internal factions
proscribed 1960 -
MºW lealand 400 * Open split
Pakistan 1,450 Proscribed 7/54 Unknown
Philippines 1,750 Proscribed 6/57 Neutral
Singapore 200 Proscribed 1948 Pro-Chinese
Miland 1,450 Proscribed Pro-Chinese
Witt.ſſam, North 760,000 In power Neutral
Witt Nam, South No estimate available Proscribed 10/56 Neutral
but a sizable number of Communist cadre
are thought to be active in the tightly
organized Vietnamese community in Cam-
bodia. Taking direction from the Lao Dong
Party of North Viet-Nam, which operates
through the National Liberation Front,
Vietnamese Communists have infiltrated
South Viet-Nam's community associations
and schools. In the Cambodian Chinese
community, pro-Peking leaders are also in
control of community organizations and
schools.
The Communist Party of India (CPI)
split in 1964 against the background of
the Sino-Soviet quarrel and longstanding
ideological and personality differences. In
the elections of February 1967, the pro-
Soviet CPI (Right) gained 7,053,037 votes
and 23 seats in Parliament; the pro-
Chinese CPI (Marxist) gained 6,502,608
votes and 19 seats in the 520-member
lower house. Communists have, from time
to time, dominated state government coali-
tions. Presently the CPI (Marxist) domi-
nates the state government of Kerala and,
through a front, also that of West Bengal.
In a further development, a faction desir-
ing revolution now, the Naxalites, has split
off from the CPI (Marxist), which the
Naxalites consider too conservative. The
departure of these ardent Maoist revolu-
tionaries reduces the strength of the CPI
(Marxist) to some extent.
In Japan the Communist Party (JCP)
received less than 5 percent of the vote in
the January 1967 general elections. Never-
theless, the party has been able to exert
disruptive pressures greater than its elec-
toral strength would indicate because of
its ability to muster agitators and street
demonstrators in the major cities. In this
respect, Communist discipline has shown
itself consistently superior to that of other
leftist organizations. During 1966 the JCP
broke away from its uncompromising pro-
Peking stand with the result that Japanese
Communist front organizations have been
split into pro- and anti-Peking groups.
Peking is trying to fuse the pro groups
into one organization, but with doubtful
success to date.
221
APPENDIX D
UNION OF BURMA
BACKGROUND NOTES
[Washington, Department of State, November 1971, Publication 7931.]
222
NOVEMBER 1971
UNION OF BURNAA
Population: 28.3 million (1971 est.)
Capital: Rangoon
The Union of Burma, with an area of 262,000
square miles (almost the size of Texas), is the
largest country on the Southeast Asian mainland.
Facing the Bay of Bengal and the Andaman Sea on
the west and south, it shares land borders with
Thailand, Laos, the People's Republic of China,
India, and East Pakistan.
. Burma is rimmed on the north, east, and west
by mountain ranges with elevations up to 15,000
feet above sea level along the Chinese border and
8,000 feet along the Indian border. The mountains
have contributed to Burma’s isolation from neigh-
boring countries, and the rivers and dense forests
have discouraged east-west movement of its peo-
ple. The Irrawaddy River is the country's eco-
nomic lifeline and major transportation system,
connecting Rangoon with Mandalay in the central
area,
Located at about the same latitude as Mexico,
Burma has a tropical, monsoon climate. The
annual rainfall varies from 200 inches on the
coastal areas to only 30 inches in the central
“dry zone.” Mean annual temperatures range
from about 80° F. in southern Burma to the middle.
70's in the northern lowlands. During the hot
season (March to May) temperatures often exceed
100° F. in central Burma. . . -
The Burmese flag consists of six white stars
on a blue rectangular field in the upper left corner;
the rest of the banner is red. The large star
commemorates the resistance movement in World
War II; the five smaller surrounding stars repre-
sent the unity of Burma’s principal ethnic strains.
White denotes purity, truth, and steadfastness;
blue, the night sky; and red, courage.
THE PEOPLE
Burma’s total population is estimated at 28.3
million, with an annual growth rate of about 2.2
percent. The density for the country as a whole
is approximately 108 people per square mile, but
the population (predominantly rural) is concen-
trated in the lower valleys of the Irrawaddy,
Chindwin, and Sittang Rivers. Rangoon, the capital,
has about 1.7 million inhabitants; the next two
largest cities, Mandalay and Moulmein, have pop-
ulations of 215,000 and 200,000, respectively.
The dominant ethnic group is the Burmans, who
comprise more than 20 million of the total popula-
tion. The Karens, approximately 3 million in num-
ber, are spread throughout southern and eastern
Burma. The Shans, numbering about 1.5 million,
are ethnically related to the Thai and inhabit
mainly the eastern plateau region. Other major
indigenous ethnic groups are Chins in the north-
west and Kachins in the north—about 1 million
altogether. In addition, it is estimated that there
are about 400,000 Chinese and 120,000 Indians and
Pakistanis in Burma. The European population is
very small. - - -
Theravada Buddhism—an older form of Bud-
dhism prevalent in most of Southeast Asia—is the
faith of approximately 85 percent of the Burmese.
Minority religions of importance are Islam,
Christianity, and primitive animism. -
Many languages and subsidiary dialects are
spoken by Burma’s ethnic groups. Burmese, which
is related to Tibetan, is the language of the major-
ity of the people and the official national language.
English is still the second language among the
educated and official elements of society, but its
use has declined in recent years.
The Burmese Government offers free educa-
tion from primary to university level and is ex-
panding its facilities for an increased number of
students. It is estimated that 88 percent of pri-
mary school-aged children (6-9) are now attend-
ing school (usually in half-day sessions); only a
small percentage of older children, however, can
now be accommodated in the middle and high
schools. In rural areas, traditional Buddhist
schools provide basic skills for primary school-
aged children. Government literacy campaigns
have contributed to a rising literacy rate—an es-
timated 64 percent in 1971. Universities are lo-
cated at Rangoon, Mandalay, and five other
smaller cities. There also are several technical
schools and three medical schools. Recent college
graduates have experienced difficulties in finding
employment, and the Government currently is en-
couraging students to attend technical schools
from which employment opportunities are greater.
HISTORY
Burma was unified for the first time during the
11th century by King Anawrahta. It remained
independent until 1287, when Kublai Khan’s Mongol
hordes invaded the country and destroyed political


order. There followed five centuries of internal
disorganization compounded from the mid-16th
century on by intermittent wars with Siam (now
Thailand). A new dynasty was established and the
country reunited under King Alaungpaya in the
late 18th century. Under his and his successor’s
rule, Burma repelled a Chinese invasion and
came into conflict with the British who were
vying with the French for dominance in the area.
Burma was annexed to British India during the
course of three Anglo-Burmese wars between 1824
and 1886. Burma’s last King, Thibaw, was exiled
by the British and the entire monarchical system
was destroyed. During the colonial era there was
a large influx of Indians and Chinese who, along
with the British, came to control much of the coun-
try’s economy. Burma was separated from India
in 1937 and granted a constitution which provided
a limited measure of self-government.
During World War II the Japanese occupied
Burma and granted a fictitious independence under
a puppet regime led by anti-British nationalists.
These Burmese nationalists later turned against
the Japanese and aided the Allied forces in retaking
the country. Probably no other Southeast Asian
country suffered such wholesale devastation dur-
ing the war as did Burma.
A coalition of nationalist forces, the Anti-
Fascist People’s Freedom League (AFPFL),
emerged as the principal political organization
following the Japanese defeat in 1945 and the
restoration of British authority. Under AFPFL
leadership the various groups and regions within
British Burma eventually joined together to form
the Union of Burma, which on January 4, 1948,
became a fully independent nation outside the
(British) Commonwealth of Nations.
During the first decade of independence the
Burmese Government was. controlled by the
AFPFL headed by Prime Minister U Nu who had
become President of that organization following
the assassination in 1947 of Burma’s greatest
wartime and postwar hero, Gen. Aung San. The
new Government carried on the tradition of par-
liamentary democracy inherited from the British
and dedicated itself to the creation of a Socialist
welfare state. It showed vigor during the early
years of independence by successfully consolidat-
ing its power and holding the Union together in
the face of revolts by Communists and other
dissident groups. However, in 1958 the AFPFL
split, precipitating a political crisis which led to
an army takeover in September of that year led
by the Chief of Staff, Gen. Ne Win. Preserving
constitutional forms, Ne Winset up a “caretaker”
Government with himself as Prime Minister and
having the limited objective of restoring order
and stability necessary for new elections. U Nu
and his faction of the AFPFL, renamed the Union
Party, won an overwhelming majority in elections
held in early 1960 and took office in April of that
year.
Despite its popular backing, the U Nu govern-
ment proved ineffective and indecisive in coping
with growing problems of internal security,
national unity, and economic development. Its
difficulties were compounded by factional dissen- ;
sion within the Union Party similar to that which
had split the AFPFL in 1958. This caused Gen,
Ne Win to intervene again. By a coup d'état on
March 2, 1962, he deposed the U Nu government,
set aside the constitution, and established a new
revolutionary Government.
GOVERNMENT
Burma has no constitution; at the present time
rule is by military decree. The Government is
headed by a 15-member executive body, called the
Union Revolutionary Council, composed of senior
officers of the armed forces and four civilians,
Gen. Ne Win, Chief of Staff, is Chairman of the
council and in that capacity is Chief of State, ex-
ercising full Legislative, executive, and judicial
powers. Subordinate to the Union Revolutionary
Council and responsible for administration of the
24 ministries is the Council of Ministers (cabinet)
composed of a Prime Minister and 10 other mem-
bers, Most cabinet ministers are also members
Of Union Revolutionary Council.
The Supreme Court and High Court were abol-
ished in 1962 and replaced by the Chief Court, con-
sisting of a panel of six judges. It serves as the
final court of appeals except in cases tried by the
Special Crimes Courts (created after 1962) from
which appeal is solely to the Union Revolutionary
Council. While most pre-1962 laws have remained
in effect without basic changes, the Union Revolu-
tionary Council has promulgated laws on special
issues. The judiciary is seen as an institution
serving the ends of the state rather than as an in-
dependent institution. -
The Union of Burma consists of Burma Proper,
four constituent states (Kachin, Shan, Kawthule,
and Kayah), and the Chin Special Division. Admin-
istrative control is exercised from Rangoon down-
ward to the local level through a hierarchy of Se-
curity and Administrative Councils as well as
through appointed Supreme Councils in the con-
stituent states and in the Chin Special Division.
POLITICAL CONDITIONS
Since seizing power in 1962 Gen. Ne Win has
attempted to effect a thorough and radical trans-
formation of Burmese society under the Union
Revolutionary Council’s basic program, “the Bur-
mese way to socialism.” Led by a new elite con-
sisting of senior military officers and leftist in-
tellectuals, the program rejects parliamentary
democracy in favor of authoritarian political con-
trol through the single party system. Gen. Ne Win
and other Union Revolutionary Council members
hold the key positions in the Burma Socialist Pro-
gram Party (BSPP), the only political party. It was
a cadre party until the 1971 First Party Congress
at which time the BSPP was proclaimed a mass
party and given theoretical control of the Govern-
ment. The Union Revolutionary Council was si-
multaneously enlarged to include four civilians,

224
The Government’s economic objectives aim at
virtually complete government control of eco-
nomic activity with almost no role for private en-
terprise, except in the agricultural sector.
In implementing his program, Gen. Ne Win has
encountered a certain amount of opposition but
has been able to maintain firm control. Opponents
within the Government have resigned while all po-
litical parties, except the BSPP, have been out-
lawed and many politicians placed under detention.
Since 1966-67 Gen. Ne Win has made several
moves aimed at increasing civilian support for his
military Government, including the release of
most detainees and invitations to various prom-
inent Burmese to participate in advising the Gov-
ernment on various matters.
U Nu was released from detention in 1966 and
left Burma in 1969. He has never relinquished his
claim to being the legitimate Prime Minister of
Burma and is currently attempting to overthrow
the Ne Win government. To this end, U Nu has en-
listed the cooperation of various insurgent groups
within Burma.
A draft of a new Socialist constitution was
begun in late 1970 to implement the program pro-
mulgated by Gen. Ne Win after his 1962 coup. Elec-
tions were held in early 1971.for delegates to the
First Party Congress of the single government-
sponsored political party, the BSPP which con-
vened in June 1971. While the Government opposes
a return to competing political parties, some form
of legislature is envisaged in the future.
Problems of Insurgency
China, this organization has seriously limited gov-
ernment control along the China-Burma border in
the northeastern region of the Shan State.
ECONOMY
Burma is an agricultural country heavily de-
pendent on its leading product, rice. It also pro-
duces cotton, timber, and rubber and has impor-
tant mineral resources (lead, zinc, tungsten, and
petroleum), which provide an impressive potential
for economic development. Burma's total produc-
tion has been increasing at a very low rate in
recent years and per capita income was estimated
in 1970 to have remained about U.S. $70 per year,
one of the lowest in the world. *
product (GNP) was about $3.9 billion in 1970–
71. Production in some industries and mining en-
terprises has declined, primarily as a result of
the continued insurgencies, the drastic cutback in
imports, and the unsettling impact of nationaliza-
tion. Burma’s few industries include agricultural
and wood processing, textiles, footwear, and min-
ling. - - -
The Government annnounced its first 4-year
economic development plan in early 1971; it went
into operation on October 1. While few details are
available, the plan calls for an overall increase in
national production of 19 percent.
Trade
A major problem of the Government, as for
all Burmese Governments since independence,
has been disaffection among Burma’s ethnic
minorities and insurgent uprisings conducted by
members of these minorities as well as by two
Outlawed Communist parties (“White Flags” and
“Red Flags”). Gen. Ne Win attempted to end the
insurgency during 1963 by peace negotiations
with the various groups. All the negotiations
failed before the year was over, except for those
with a Karen group, the Karen National Defense
Organization (KNDO), which had some limited
success in reducing insurgency. Kachin, Shan, and
Karen rebellions are still in progress, however,
representing extremist elements who demand
Secession from the Union or extreme forms of
autonomy within the Union. To find a combina-
tion of political, economic, and military measures
to harmonize relations between the Central Gov-
ernment and the minorities is probably the most
Critical long-term problem facing Burma.
The principal insurgent group, the White Flag
Communists, has suffered serious setbacks in its
longstanding strongholds in central Burma, partly
as a result of internal dissension. In 1967, how-
ever, a new White Flag organization, “The North-
east Command,” was formed under the leadership
of a Chinese Communist-trained Kachin, Naw
Seng. With the support of the People’s Republic of
While Burma’s exports during fiscal year 1970,
totaling approximately $131 million, showed an in-
crease over the immediately preceding years,
they were still far below pre-World War II figures.
Imports in 1970 totaled about $195 million despite
efforts to restrict imports.
Rice is overwhelmingly the most important
export product of the country, followed by forestry
products (primarily teak), cotton, rubber, metals,
and ores. Major imports consist of machinery
and transport equipment, textiles, yarns and
fabrics, paper products, and foodstuffs. Burma
formerly led the world in rice exports. The drop
in rice prices on the world market and greater
self-sufficiency among Burma’s traditional rice
purchasers have caused a marked decline in Bur-
ma’s rice sales during the last few years. Alter-
native sources of foreign exchange are being
sought. Burma’s imports conne primarily from
Japan and the United Kingdom and other west
European countries.
Exports to the United States in recent years
have totaled about $1–2.5 million a year and
included lumber, ores, and precious stones. Im-
ports from the United States have recently ranged
from about $10–24 million per year, composed
chiefly of machinery, agricultural products, and
transport equipment.
Gross national

225
Trend TOWard Socialism .
Since independence all Burmese economic
policies have been based on socialism. Faith in
socialism as an ideology has been reinforced by
a nationalistic desire to reduce, through national-
ization of private enterprises, the economic power
of foreign minorities (i.e., Indians and Chinese)
who had long dominated private trade, finance,
and industry in Burma. -
This Socialist trend has been accentuated since
the advent of the present regime whose program
envisages almost total nationalization of industry
and trade. Initial strides toward this goal were
taken in 1963 and 1964 with the nationalization.
of all foreign and private banks, the imposition
of steep tax rates on private businesses, and the
nationalization of all foreign trade. By the end
of 1965 the Government had taken control or
ownership of all important industries and domes-
tic trade. Several hundred other commercial and
industrial enterprises were taken over by the
Government in late 1968 and early 1969. While
agriculture has not been directly nationalized,
the Government has a virtual monopoly of the
marketing and processing of agricultural pro-
ducts. One direct result of the nationalization
program has been the repatriation of many
thousands of Indians, Pakistanis, and Chinese.
The economic policies of the Ne Win govern-
ment have eliminated foreign private investment
and economic or technical assistance formerly
received from foreign private agencies, such as
the Ford Foundation. At the same time, although
Gen. Ne Win insists that Burma must rely pri-
marily on its own resources for economic develop-
ment, the Government continues to accept aid
from international organizations as well as from
individual countries, primarily Japan and the Fed-
eral Republic of Germany.
FOREIGN RELATIONS
Nonalignment has been the cornerstone of Bur-
mese foreign policy under all Governments since
1948. The Burmese consider that such a policy
calls for the avoidance of international commit-
ments, except through international organizations,
and an impartial approach to issues between the
major powers. It also includes acceptance of eco-
nomic assistance without ‘‘strings” from any will-
ing contributors, Communist and non-Communist.
While Gen. Ne Win has continued Burma’s
traditional neutral foreign policy, there has been
some change in atmosphere as a result of his
Government’s acute sensitivity to foreign influ-
ence and possible foreign subversive interference.
This has led to a reduction in Burma's economic,
political, and cultural contacts with the outside
World. Under Gen. Ne Win the Burmese Govern-
ment has maintained its membership in many
international organizations, including the United
Nations and several of its specialized agencies,
the Colombo Plan, and the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA).
In their foreign relations the Burmese natural-
ly attach special importance to their powerful
neighbor, China, with which they share a 1,200-
mile border. Burma was the first non-Commu-
nist country to recognize the Communist regime
in China in 1949. A high point in the relations
between the two countries was reached in 1960.
when an historic border dispute was settled and
a Treaty of Friendship and Mutal Non-Aggression
was signed. China’s attempt to export the “Cul-
tural Revolution” to the Chinese in Burma led to
serious riots at Rangoon in June 1967 and caused
a sharp deterioration in Sino-Burmese relations,
During 1970–71 there was some improvement in
relations leading to an exchange of ambassadors
and a visit by Gen. Ne Win to Peking in August
1971. During that visit the suspended 1961 eco-
nomic assistance agreement between the two coun-
tries was revived.
U.S. POLICY
The United States historically has supported
Burmese independence and respected Burma's
foreign policy of nonalignment. In the past it also
gave considerable material assistance to Burmese
efforts to promote economic development,
strengthen national unity, and improve internal
security. U.S. relations with the Burmese Govern-
ment under Gen. Ne Win, although not as close as
under previous Governments, have been correct
and friendly. Gen. and Madame Ne Win made a
state visit to the United States in September 1966,
From 1950 to 1953 Burma received $19,6
million in economic grants from the United States
under programs which provided technical aid as
well as material assistance. These programs
were suspended in 1953 at the request of the
Burmese Government.
U.S. economic cooperation with Burma was
resumed on February 1, 1956, with the signing
of a Public Law 480 (Food for Peace) agreement
providing for sale to Burma, for local currency,
of $21.7 million worth of surplus agricultural com-
modities. Other joint programs undertaken since
that date include the following: -
e June 30, 1956–An agreement was signed to
provide Burma with $1.1 million worth of tech-
nical services in exchange for rice for United
States use in relieving a serious food shortage in
East Pakistan. -
e March 21, 1956—A new bilateral Economic
Cooperation Agreement was signed.
• March 21, 1957—A loan agreement was
signed providing for $25 million of dollar funds
to help finance economic development projects.
To date, 11 such projects have been essentially
completed.
e May 27, 1958—A second Public Law 480
agreement was signed providing for sale to
Burma, for local currency, of $17 million worth
of surplus agricultural commodities. -
e May 29, 1958–A dollar loan agreement was
signed enabling the Burmese Government to pur-
chase $8.8 million worth of transportation, com-
munications, and other equipment for the Burmese
police.

226
• June 29, 1958—A military sales agreement
was signed permitting Burma to buy, for local
currency, military equipment from the United
States.
... • August 25, 1958–The United States sold to
Burma, for local currency, the equivalent of $5
million worth of U.S.-owned Indian rupees to
enable Burma to purchase Indian textiles.
e November 8, 1962—A third Public Law 480
agreement was signed providing for sale to Burma,
for local currency, of $10.7 million worth of
surplus agricultural commodities, mostly cotton.
In addition to the above, the United States in
June 1959 agreed to grant up to $28 million as
a dollar contribution to a new highway from
Rangoon to Mandalay and to grant $2 million
toward dollar costs of a new liberal arts college
for Rangoon University. The road project was
canceled at the request of the Burmese Govern-
ment in May 1964. The college is in process of
Construction.
From the local currency (kyats) paid by Burma
for the surplus agricultural commodities, the
United States has granted $6 million equivalent
toward local costs of the liberal arts college
project. Another $12.2 million equivalent of these
kyats has been granted, and another $19.3 million
equivalent has been loaned to the Burmese
Government to support other development activi-
ties,
There have been no new aid agreements be-
tween the United States and Burma since 1962. At
present, U.S. assistance is limited to the comple-
tion of several projects initiated under earlier
COmmitments.
After 1962 the educational and cultural ex-
change program with Burma was limited to occa-
sional exchanges of athletes. In 1970 the Govern-
ment of Burma invited an American musician, an
American athlete, and an American professor of
physics to visit Burma. In 1971 two American
professors (physics and mathematics) went to
Burma to teach, and three Burmese medical ex-
perts visited the United States. Plans for a more
extensive mutual exchange program during 1972
are now being negotiated at Rangoon.
PRINCIPAL GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS
Union Revolutionary Council
Chairman-Gen. Ne Win Col. Hla Han
Brig. San Yu Col. Maung Lwin
Brig. Sein Win Col. Tin U
Brig. Thaung Dan Dr. Maung Maung
Col. Thaung Kyi U Ba Nyein.
Col. Maung Shwe Mahn Tha Myaing
Col. Than Sein U Ba Nyein
Col. Kyaw Soe
Council of Ministers (Cabinet)
Chairman; Prime Minister; Defense—Gen. Ne Win
Deputy Prime Minister; Finance and Revenue; Na-
tional Planning–Brig. San Yu
Cooperatives; Trade—Col. Maung Lwin
Mines–Commodore Thaung Tin
Public Works and Housing–Brig. Sein Win
Agriculture and Forests; Land Nationalization—
Col. Thaung Kyi
Industry; Labor—Col. Maung Shwe
Home Affairs; Judicial Affairs; Democratization
of Local Administration; Religious Affairs; Im-
migration, National Registration, and Census—
Col. Kyaw Soe
Foreign Affairs; Education; Health—Col. Hla Han
Transport and Communications—Col. Than Sein
Relief, Resettlement, and National Solidarity; So-
cial Welfare; Information; Union Culture—Brig.
Thaung Dan
Ambassador to the U.S.–U San Maung
Ambassador to the U.N.-U Lwin
Burma maintains an Embassy in the United
States at 2300 S Street, N.W., Washington, D.C.
20008.
PRINCIPAL U.S. OFFICIALS
Ambassador—Edwin W. Martin
Counselor of Embassy–Benjamin A. Fleck
Political/Economic Affairs Officer—William M.
Owen
Acting AID Affairs Officer—John J. Benoit
Public Affairs Officer (USIS)—Harold G. McCone-
ghey
Army Attaché–Col. Archie W. Summers
Naval Attaché–Cmdr. John R. Chadwick
Air Attaché-Lt. Col. Harry J. Winne
The U.S. Embassy in Burma is located at 581
Merchant Street, Rangoon. There is also a Con-
sulate at Mandalay.
READING LIST
American University. Area Handbook for Burma.
Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing
Office, 1971.
Butwell, Richard. U Nu of Burma. Stanford: Stan-
ford University Press, 1961. -
Collis, Maurice. Trials in Burma. London: Faber
and Faber, 1938. -
Donnison, F.S.V. Burma. New York: Praeger,
1970. -
Johnstone, W. C. Burma’s Foreign Policy: A
Study in Neutralism. Canbridge: Harvard
University Press, 1962. .
Kunstadter, Peter, ed. Southeast Asian Tribes,
Minorities, and Nations. Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1967.

227
Nash, Manning. The Golden Road to Modernity:
Village Life in Contemporary Burma, New York:
Wiley, 1965.
Pye, Lucian W. Politics, Personality, and Nation
Building: Burma’s Search for Identity. New
Haven: Yale University Press, 1962.
Tinker, Hugh. The Union of Burma: A. Study of
the First Years of Independence. London: Ox-
ford University Press, 1961.
Trager, Frank N. Burma from Kingdom to Re-
public: A Historical and Political Analysis.
New York: Praeger, 1966. -
U Maung Maung, ed. Aung San of Burma. The
Hague: M. Nijhoff, 1962. .
U Maung. Maung. Burma and General Ne whº,
York: Asia Publishing House, 1969. **s
U Maw Ba. Breakthrough in Burma: Memoirs
of a Revolution, 1939-1946. New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1968.
Vandenbosch, Amry, and Butwell, Richard. The
Changing Face of Southeast Asia, Lexington,
University of Kentucky Press, 1966. -
Walinsky, Louis J. Economic Development in
Burma, 1951-1960. New York: Twentieth Cen.
tury Fund, 1962.
Woodman, Dorothy. The Making of Burma. London,
Cresset Press, 1962.
DEPARTMENT of STATE PUBLICATION 7931
Revised November 1971

228
APPENDIX E
BURMA
- NATIONAL SECURITY
(NATIONAL DEFENSE AND INTERNAL
SECURITY)
[Reprinted from: Area Handbook for Burma, by John W. Henderson and
others. Washington, Department of the Army, 1971 (DA Pam 550–61).]
NATIONAL SECURITY
NATIONAL DEFENSE AND INTERNAL SECURITY
Burmese national defense forces in late 1970 consisted of an
army, a navy, and an air force, all subordinate to the Ministry of
Defense, which functioned in the dual capacity of a government
ministry and a triservice military headquarters. Command and staff
organization was patterned on the British system. The army, with a
strength of approximately 120,000 officers and men in 1970, was
by far the dominant element; the navy and the air force, with total
strengths of about 6,000 and 7,000, respectively, had limited capa-
bilities but often were able to provide effective support for the
army’s operations. Overall strength of the armed forces was esti-
mated at about 140,000. -
The country was almost entirely dependent on outside aid for its
armament and equipment as well as for some of its military train-
ing. Both the United States and Great Britain made significant
contributions to the developrºcnt of the armed forces over the
years. Materiel, however, has not been at a high level of sophisti-
cated weaponry, and the umbalanced forces, although they have
some heavy weapons and equipment, have operated primarily as
light infantry with negligible stupporting arms and services. Despite
long involvement in guerrilla-type operations, the military establish-
ment has had little experience in conventional warfare.
The armed forces are maintained entirely on a volunteer basis,
except for the conscription of a few needed doctors and qualified
technicians. The National Serrice Law of 1959 provided for uni-
versal military service, but it has never been implemented. It has, in
fact, never been needed, as voluntary enlistments have met force
levels easily. The universities at Rangoon and Mandalay each
maintain a corps of student trainees but, other than these, there is
no organized reserve or training program. As far as can be deter-
mined, there is no overall mobilization plan, and the development
of such a plan would be difficult because significant expansion of
the armed forces would be restricted by shortages of equipment,
facilities, and qualified training instructors.
Military service has received widely varying degrees of ac-
ceptance, but by and large the military has been considered a
desirable and respected career. The serviceman as an individual has
been in a favored segment of society, and his environment and
conditions of service have met a relatively high local standard.
Although their daily routines are arduous and personnel frequently
are faced with the hazards of their calling, the soldier, sailor, and
airman have status, a degree of Security, and many amenities that
would be difficult to achieve in civilian life.
Responsibility for law enforcement and the maintenance of pub-
lic order is vested in the National People’s Police, a large,
centralized body within the Ministry of Home Affairs. In 1970 its
strength was estimated at about 42,000 members. The force has
£wo main elements: the Rangoon City Police, whose operations are
restricted to the metropolitan area of the capital; and the Burma
Civil Police, which operates on a countrywide basis. The National
People's Police works closely with the army, and in the past the
transfer of: personnel from one to the other and the periodic
absorption of entire police units into the military made it difficult
at times to distinguish one from the other. The reorganization of
police into the unified National People's Police in 1964 was an
effort to set up a civilian force separate from the army that would
become exclusively concerned with law and order and the pre-
vention and detection of crime.
The preservation of public order and security has been a major
problem because continuing political unrest, marked by violence
and revolt, has been widespread. Despite religious and family tra-
ditions of respect for authority and adherence to social discipline,
the atmosphere of yiolence and rebellion has encouraged crime and
brigandage and has contributed to a rhanifest disrespect for law and
order. The roots of these chronic disturbances go deep into the past
and are a heritage of the country’s confused and turbulent history.
Aggressive opposition to the government has been fomented by
longstanding ethnic hostilities, tribal animosities, and separatist
aspirations of once-autonomous enclaves and has been further
aggravated in recent years by communist-inspired disaffection. The
result has been that the civilian police and the armed forces have
had to devote much of their energies to its suppression.
Statistics on the incidence of crime were fragmentary and in-
complete, but limited records available in 1970 indicated that
crimes of violence, armed robbery, and larceny, stemming largely
from social tensions and instability resulting from political in-
surgency, were particularly prevalent. Also of concern was the penal
and correctional system, which was outdated and lacked adequate
facilities for most effective operation. Some progress in the re-
duction of crime was claimed by publicity sources in 1970, and in
the battle against insurgency the government apparently had
achieved considerable success. Barring unforeseen developments,
231
the forces should be able to maintain this momentum toward a
sure, if gradual, improvement in national peace, order, and safety.
MILITARY HISTORY AND TRADITION
The country’s military tradition combines aspects of its ancient
monarchical heritage with the British forms and doctrines of its
more recent colonial tutelage. For centuries the Burmans of the
central Irrawaddy Valley resorted to armed force to establish or
maintain control over their immediate neighbors or to defend
themselves. They even undertook protracted and more distant
campaigns into China, India, and Siam (Thailand). At one time or
another all peoples in the area had been subject to the Burman
crown so that militant nationalism became deeply rooted in their
culture (see ch. 3, Historical Setting).
For 700 years after the country’s unification in 1057, the
kingdom experienced local warfare, suppressed uprisings, occasional
clashes with neighboring powers, and rare periods of tranquillity.
The local nature of these operations and the predominance of
Burman victories gave the country a false sense of security. Con-
sequently, there was little incentive to spur improvements or
modernization of the armed forces, and they remained stagnant,
ignoring the progress being made in the world around them.
After the British annexed Burma in 1886, Burmese military
tradition was interrupted, and there was a period of relative tran-
quillity, during which Burmese military forces virtually disinte-
grated. In time, the British came to look upon the Burmans as an
obviously unmartial ethnic group, and they recruited from non-
Burman sources.
There was, nevertheless, some participation in military activities
during these years. In 1887 an engineer company was recruited
among the Burmans and proved itself capable and resourceful.
During World War I four battalions of Burmans were organized as
the Burma Rifles and saw active duty in Mesopotamia and Palestine.
They established an excellent combat record, but their lax disci-
pline, high absentee rate, and belligerence toward other ethnic
groups led to a decision to bar Burmans from the regular forces. -
When Burma was separated from India in 1937, a radical change
took place in the attitude toward military service. National pride
spurred a renewed interest in the country’s armed forces, and there
was a gradual buildup of indigenous Burmese elements, both as
officers and in the ranks. By the beginning of World War II there
were several Burmese battalions in the army. These forces were
among those that, under Japanese sponsorship, revolted against the
British in 1941 and 1942 and, later in 1945 as the Burma National
Army, joined forces with the British against the Japanese. S
232
After the war the increase in Burman participation continued and
was greatly stimulated by independence in 1948. In 1970, after
several phases of development and reorganization in which efforts
to desegregate eihnic elements and absorb minority groups were
made, the services became an intensely nationalistic force that was
predominantly Burman in makeup and outlook. The armed forces
are trying to maintain continuity with past tradition by empha-
sizing those unifying factors that can contribute to the country’s
well-being and solidarity.
THE ARMED FORCES AND THE GOVERNMENT
Legal Basis
The Constitution of 1947 gave Parliament full authority to raise
and maintain armed forces and provided the initial basis on which
the Burmese military establishment was founded. This authority
disappeared in 1962, however, with the military coup led by Gen-
eral Ne Win. The Revolutionary Council took and remained in
power, and in 1970 General Ne Win served as both chairman of the
Council of Ministers and minister of defense and also was chairman
of the Revolutionary Council, giving him broad authority over the
military establishment.
Top Command
Command of the armed forces is channeled downward from the
chairman of the Revolutionary Council through the Council of
Ministers, the Ministry of Defense, and the chief of staff of the
Burma Defense Services. In theory, it is the minister of defense who
exercises political and military control and who, under normal
circumstances, provides civilian supervision over military activities.
He is advised by the Defense Council Executive Committee, a high
policymaking body of senior officers that serves as a consultative
group on matters of military administration and operation.
The chief of staff of the Burma Defense Services is the supreme
operational commander of all military forces, and his office in the
Ministry of Defense serves as a general headquarters for the es-
tablishment as a whole. He is assisted by three vice chiefs of staff-
one each for the army, the navy, and the air force—who are
commanders of their respective services as well as deputies to the
defense chief, and by the combined Defense Services Staff. The
staff has three major components: the Chief of Staff Department,
known as the “G” Staff; the Adjutant General's Department, or
“A” Staff; and the Quartermaster General's Department, or “Q”
Staff. There are also four special office chiefs: the inspector general,
the director of procurement, the controller of military accounts,
and the judge advocate general. Each vice chief of staff also has a
small staff each organized in similar fashion, to handle particular
service operations. Staff responsibilities and functions conform
closely to standard British military practice.
Missions
The army has the dual mission of defending the nation's terri-
torial integrity and assisting the police in preserying internal order
and security. This entails the traditional military responsibility of
maintaining a constant state of readiness to defend the nation and
to implement its military policies. The navy, in addition to defend-
ing the national coastline and patrolling territorial waters, is charged
with patrolling inland waterways and providing transport and
tactical support to the ground forces. The air force's mission is the
air defense of the country and the provision of air support to the
army and the navy.
Conditions since independence, including the absence of any
external aggression, have permitted scant attention to the task of
defending the country from outside attack, as the military forces
have found it difficult to maintain minimum national stability and
to counter an endless succession of dissident uprisings. The services
have been meeting these commitments effectively, and constant
warfare has given them a background of combat experience and an
army of battle-hardened veterans. Although emphasis is on infantr
rather than a balanced force, the military establishment has been
well adapted to Burmese needs as evidenced by the success against
various insurgencies.
THE ARMED FORCES AND THE ECONOMY
The ratio of defense spending to the total cost of government has
been high, and sums devoted to military expenditures have been
rising steadily, keeping pace with expanding national budgets.
Published figures indicate that K601 million (4.76 kyat equal
US$1) were allotted to defense for the 1970/71 fiscal year. This
amount was about 35 percent of the K1.7 billion of current
expenditures for orditary government activities under the minis-
tries, or a little over 6 percent of the gross national product (GNP).
Immediately after independence Burma avoided a serious drain
On its limited financial resources by accepting generous British aid
234
in the form of weapons, equipment, and grants. Later, however, the
government decreed that no military assistance would be sought or
accepted except on a reimbursable basis. Since that time it has
purchased some arms and equipment from the United Kingdom and
in 1958 concluded a military sales agreement with the United States
that permitted Burma to buy military equipment for local currency.
Defense costs have been an ever-increasing burden on the national
economy. -
MANPOWER AND THAINING
Source and Quality of Manpower
About 250,000 young men reach the military age of eighteen
years annually, so there is more than enough manpower to meet the
country’s military requirements. The number of men in uniform is
small in relation to the total population, representing less than 2
percent of the able-bodied males in 1970. The withdrawal of this
small number from civilian pursuits has had no appreciable effect
on the economy nor has it created any manpower shortages in
agriculture or industry. The economy in fact profited somewhat
from the service experience of the young men because many of
them were able to acquire skills that served them in good stead
upon their return to civilian life. -
There is a law establishing universal compulsory military service
but, except for the single category of doctors and, occasionally, for
a few critically needed specialists, the status and benefits offered by
a military career have made conscription unnecessary. Although
only about one-half of the eligible males are usually found fit for
military duty, there are still enough men available to make the
selection of applicants a difficult and painstaking process. Aside
from ethnic considerations, which frequently complicate selection,
the greatest problem has been finding men with educational quali-
fications and mechanical aptitude to train as technical specialists.
Although under the British men from the minority groups were
the mainstay of the Burmese forces, since independence national
policies have favored the acceptance of Burmans in increasing
numbers, and the leadership has become Burmese. Although Bur-
mans constitute an increased proportion of men in service, there are
many men of other ethnic affiliation, particularly Karens, Chins,
and Kachins. Minority elements have performed creditably and have
been among the best and most reliable troops in the national ser-
vice. The ethnic Burnhan tends to be individualistic, with an in-
herent distaste for regimentation and discipline. He, nevertheless,
responds well to capable leadership and in combat usually proves to
be a courageous and effective soldier. -
Procurement and Training of Officers
Procurement of officers is based on voluntary application or on
recommendation from the ranks. Qualifying requirements are high
and limit applicants to young men with good health and better than
average education. Candidates must be high school graduates be-
tween eighteen and twenty-five years of age and, in addition to
physical qualification, must pass a rigid entrance examination. Most
candidates come from urban middle class families, and many are
college graduates. -
Two principal training facilities turn out officers for the three
services, with all cadets receiving the same fundamental instruction
before branching out into their respective specialties. The Defense
Services Academy at Maymyc, the school for all regular officers
regardless of the service they desire, has a four-year course. The
academy achieved university status in 1964 and grants bachelor
degrees to its graduates. About 100 candidates are admitted each
year, and approximately 50 are commissioned at the end of the
course. The Officer Training School conducts a six-month course to
train emergency or reserve officers and an additional limited number
of selected graduates from the University Training Corps. The course
is similar to that of the United States Reserve Officers Training Corps.
Graduates of the academy or the training school who enter the
army are assigned directly to tactical units or to advanced training in
one of several army technical schools. Those going into the navy or air
force continue specialized training at either the Naval Training School
or the air force Flying Training School, where they receive ad-
vanced instruction in their service specialties. The naval school qual-
ifies officers for shipboard duties; the air force school qualifies
officers to the pilots or trains them for other aircrew functions.
There are several levels of advanced professional training, and
most officers attend either a senior troop school or a staff college in
the course of their careers. A variety of schools offer intermediate-
level and higher level courses for platoon and company com-
manders, and there are several advanced branch schools and
staff-level war colleges for senior officers. The Defense Services
Staff College provides the most advanced training for officers of the
three services. It has a nine-month course for selected senior officers
that includes administration, tactics, combined operations, and
government.
Procurement and Training of Enlisted Personnel
Enlisted personnel for all services are procured by voluntary en-
listment. The National Service Law of 1959 was enacted to ensure
the availability of manpower in case of emergency rather than be-
cause of any problem in maintaining the forces at desired strength.
Under its provisions all citizens between the ages of eighteen and
forty-five years, both male and female. are subject to compulsory
military service for two years. The law has never been invoked,
however, and there is no clear indication of what forms and pat-
terns conscription would follow. -
Recruiting is handled by boards located at major cities and towns
and by itinerant teams that periodically visit outlying rural popula-
tion center. Candidates are selected on the basis of examination and
personal interview. Terms of enlistment range from four to six
years, with a commitment to remain in inactive reserve status for a
specified period upon termination of the enlistment. There is no
reserve organization or program, however, so this has not yet en-
tailed any obligation.
Each service has its own stations for receiving recruits and con-
ducting their basic training. The army has a number of recruit train-
ing depots, and the navy and the air force have special installations
in their school complexes. Basic training tåkes about ten weeks,
after which a man is given his permanent assignment. Later he may
be selected for advanced technical training or be sent to a noncom-
missioned officers’ training school. All three services maintain
schools for advanced training in branch specialties, including admin-
istrative, technical, and tactical instruction. -
Graduates of the University Training Corps who do not go on to
train for a commission may be appointed noncommissioned offi-
cers, and a number enter the services in this way. Most noncommis-
sioned officers, however, come up through the ranks and are
selected on the basis of experience and proven capability. Most of
them are caregr men with several years of service and generally
constitute the backbone of the military establishment. A shortage
of noncommissioned officers usually exists. -
ARMED FORCES ORGANIZATION
Army
Below headquarters, the army operates through six major mili-
tary districts, designated thé Central, Eastern, Southeastern, South-
western, Northwestern, and Rangoon commands. (In the summer of
1970 a new strategic area command was established to deal with
insurgency problems in rural areas of the northern Shan State and
the southern Kachin State, formerly under the administrative con-
trol of the Eastern and Northwestern commands. This strategic area
command is directly responsible to the Ministry of Defense.) Each
237
command is in the charge of a general officer who reports directly
to the vice chief of staff (army) and is responsible for all activities
in his area. A variable number of combat units are assigned to these
districts as dictated by operational requirements. There are also
fixed garrisons spread throughout the country; the majority are in
the strategic central valley between Rangoon and Mandalay.
Army units in 1971 were mainly infantry, some battalions of
which were parachute trained, and included elements of armor,
artillery, and engineers as well as administrative support troops.
They were organized principally into battalions, the infantry battal-
ion of approximately 750 men being the basic tactical combat unit.
The army's arms inventory is largely of the light-infantry type
but also includes fairly substantial quantities of heavy-infantry
weapons and some artillery and armor. Most materiel is from British
or United States sources, and much of it in 1970 was, or was
becoming, obsolescent. -
Navy
In 1970 the navy was a small force of about fifty-seven vessels,
mostly patrol ships and landing craft. It had one minesweeper, one
frigate, a number of gunboats of various sizes, and a few motor
torpedo boats. All vessels were of foreign origin, and the navy was
dependent on outside aid for spare parts and virtually all naval
supplies. . -
Rangoon is the principal naval base and the location of the naval
dockyard as well as storage and supply facilities. There are three
naval subcommands—the Irrawaddy, the Tenasserim, and the Bas-
sein naval regions. Units afloat are subordinate to their regional
commanders, except for those based on Rangoon, which are direct-
ly controlled by the vice chief of staff (navy). Some of the larger
vessels operate in ocean waters, but most are used for river patrol
duty and support of army operations against insurgents.
Air Force
The air force is small but active, providing limited air-ground
support to the army and transportation and medical evacuation for
operations in otherwise difficult and inaccessible terrain. Its com-
plement of aircraft totaled about seventy airplanes in 1970, includ-
ing some jet fighter-bombers and trainers, piston-engine transports,
trainers, liaison planes, and helicopters. Pilots are trained locally in
sufficient quantity to meet the needs of the force. -
Tactical air organization consists of operational wings grouped by
function as fighter, transport, and administrative elements. They are
238
based at some fifteen airfields dispersed about the country. The
major field is Mingaladon Airfield, Burma's international airport
near Rangoon. Most fields have limited fuel storage. Despite its
shortages, problems, and limitations, the air force is a valuable asset
in the irregular type of warfare in which the armed forces are pri-
marily engaged.
CONDITIONS OF SERVICE
The general environment and physical conditions surrounding
garrison life conform to British patterns, most installations retaining
the atmosphere of a colonial post. While some army units are as-
signed to fixed posts, the constant state of hostilities in some areas
requires many troops to spend most of their time in the field.
For the most part, the serviceman is well cared for by the author-
ities, and conditions of service are at a high level of dignity and
comfort in relation to local standards. Daily routine is exacting and
often dangerous, but discipline is not severe. The serviceman has
status, recognition, and security. Military posts compare favorably
with civilian facilities, and their type of tropical construction meets
the needs of the services. Quarters, food, and pay are as good as a
man could find outside the service and, in many cases, considerably
better.
There are several advantages that add attraction to a military
career, such as accrual of leave, medical care, retirement, and sur-
vivor benefits. Pay is considered good in relation to that of compar-
ably skilled groups in the civilian sector. Supplementary allowances
for quarters, rations, families, special skills, and hazardous duty
substantially augment basic rates to attractive levels. Rations are
good and provide greater variety and balance than local dietary
patterns provide. - -
Retirement may be for disability, length of service, or age and
can be statutory or granted upon request. Retirement pay may
reach a maximum of 75 percent of the active duty rate. There is
also a scale of survivor benefits that provide pensions to widows of
men disabled or killed on active duty or in action. Leave policies are
liberal, men of all ranks accruing thirty days a year. All personnel
receive free medical attention, and their families are also eligible
when facilities are available.
UNIFORMS, INSIGNIA, AND DECORATIONS
The rank and grade structure of the three services designates
personnel as officers and “other ranks.” Navy and air force ranks
239
conform to British equivalents; those of the army parallel those of
the United States Army.
Officers’ insignia are displayed on shoulder boards, and non-
commissioned officers’ chevrons are worn on the upper sleeve.
Officers utilize a system of brass bars, stars, and wreathed,
crossed swords. The five-pointed stars are surmounted by the
national arms within a circle; the bars represent stylized, extended.
leaves. Noncommissioned off cers’ chevrons are worn with the
points down; the combat arras use black stripes on a red base,
and the colors are reversed for specialists and members of sup-
portive services. -
The uniforms of all three services are patterned after those of
the British. The navy uses the traditional blue or white, and the
air force has a blue uniform similar in color to that of the Royal
Air Force. There are three types of army uniform: a service
uniform and a field uniform for all ranks and a dress uniform for
officers. Enlisted men’s uniforms are of cotton, and both types
are of similar design, consisting of shirt and trousers tucked into
short leggings. The service uniform is khaki, and the field uniform
is green. *
The officers’ dress uniform is khaki worsted or gabardine for
summer and a darker colored wool for winter. Officers wear the
standard visored cap; enlisted men have a wide-brimmed brush hat
of felt or cloth, usually with a chinstrap. All ranks, on occasion,
wear a beret, or a helmet. -
There are three classes of national honors: orders, titles, and
decorations, all of which are for military personnel. Two national
honors, the Order of the Dhamma and the Order of the Union of
Burma, are the country's highest awards. They are presented to
three and five classes, the two highest grades being the Grand Com-
mander and the Grand Officer. There are five titles that are given
for meritorious service, bestowing on the recipient a lifelong title,
which he appends to his name. Each title also carries with it a
corresponding medal, which is usually a neck decoration.
There are six decorations for military heroism and for long and
meritorious service. The two highest, for valor, are the Aung San
Thuriya and the Aung San Tazeit, awarded for exceptional acts of
gallantry on the battlefield. Following these in precedence are the
Thiha Thura Tazeit, the Thiha Bala Tazeit, and the Thura Tazeit.
The final decoration, the Sit Himu Htan Guang Tazeit, is for long,
faithful, and honorable service.
There are other forms of recognition for acts or service that do
not warrant a higher award. The British-derived system of “mention
in dispatches” has been used extensively, and there is a wide variety
of service medals, commemorative awards, and campaign stars that
are issued periodieally.
LOGISTICS
The Quartermaster General’s Department at general headquarters
in Rangoon handles logistic matters for the three services, except
for major purchases, which are made by the director of procure-
ment. Virtually all military hardware originates outside the country
as do most other supplies, although there is some local production
of small arms, ammunition, and clothing.
Procurement is complicated by a lack of funds, long supply lines,
and the timelag in deliveries from abroad. Distribution is poor be-
cause of insufficient transport and a sparse road net. Storage and
issue are reasonably efficient from about twenty-five depots, bases,
and supply points throughout the country. The general staff has
given the matter of logistics maximum attention, and the structure
for handling supply and maintenance is well organized. Personnel
perform creditably and, in spite of the manifold problems, materials
are distributed and are able to maintain the force’s operations.
Supplies' needed for day-to-day operations are decentralized
down to battalion level, but many items, particularly perishable
rations, are purchased by units in the field. Battalions also distrib-
ute clothing and organizational equipment, and many requisition
food, shelter, transportation, and labor from local sources.
In general, individual weapons are sufficient and are maintained
in satisfactory condition. Reserve materiel and equipment, however,
are limited. Spare parts are critically short, and this situation to-
gether with the lack of qualified technicians, so hampers mainte-
nance that frequently much equipment is idle.
Navy logistic activities are centered at the main naval dockyard in
Rangoon. Facilities can handle most ship repair, but major over-
hauls have to be performed abroad. Virtually all naval supplies are
stored and issued at the naval supply depot in Rangoon. The princi-
pal air force supply and maintenance base is Mingaladon Airfield,
where storage, repair, and overhaul activities are centered. A few
other bases have minimum facilities for minor maintenance and
refueling.
INTERNAL ORDER AND SECURITY
The country’s social environment with respect to human behav-
ior has been described as permissive. The people pride themselves
on the tolerance of their formal religion and are loath to judge their
fellow men. Burmese culture tends to recognize human frailty, and
a certain degree of human error is tolerated. Laws and statutes
often are not applied rigidly, in the belief that inexorable natural
laws taught by Buddhism will in themselves punish the malefactor.
241
This reluctance to judge another is reflected in an unwillingness
to criticize an offender, whether the criticism is directed at a single
individual or at society as a whole. This propensity can create a
misleading picture of harmony and accord while inner conflicts
actually ferment and become acute. Feelings can reach a point
where they erupt in sudden explosions, whose roots are not readily
discernible, as they did in the Saya San rebellion against the British
in 1930 and 1931. Although poorly organized and mystically ori-
ented, this revolt was a spontaneous expression of suppressed griev-
ances that spread swiftly and brought thousands of poorly armed
villagers into violent conflict with police and military forces. It was
easily subdued, but the fanatical tenacity of the rebels both sur-
prised and shocked authorities. This same pattern is reflected in the
individual, and sudden and unexpected violence is a common char-
acteristic of Burmese criminal behavior.
The major problem in maintaining public order and safety in
1970 was disaffection among ethnic minorities. Insurgent uprisings
among them, inspired and led inainly by the White Flag party (see
Glossary) and to a lesser extent by the Red Flag party (see Glos-
sary), were serious and continuing. The principal leader of the Red
Flag Communists was captured in 1970, and the group probably
could field no more than a few hundred armed men. The govern-
rnent tried to negotiate with the dissidents in 1963 but failed with
all groups except the Karen National Defense Organization. Extrem-
ists armong the Karens, as well as others among the Kachins and
Shan who want secession or extreme autonomy, continued to stir
up turmoil (see ch. 9, Political Dynamics).
The principal insufgent group is the White Flag communist organ-
ization. It suffered serious setbacks in central Burma as a result of
government suppression and bitter internal party disunity. Accord-
ingly a new White Flag group, called the Northeast Command, was
formed under Naw Seng, a Kachin trained in Communist China.
Supported by Communist China, this group has seriously limited
government control measures along the Burmese-Chinese border in
northeastern Shan State. -
Apart from communist inspiration, minority disaffection, indi-
vidualism, and disrespect for authority have prolonged lawlessness
in some areas. The government has met with some successes in the
battle for law and order, but there is still a formidable fight ahead
before the country achieves true internal order and security.
THE NATIONAL PEOPLE'S POLICE
The National People’s Police, organized under the Ministry of
Home Affairs, consists of the Bürma Civil Police and the Rangoon
242
City Police. This centralized force was responsible for law and order
on a nationwide basis. In 1964 the police were developed as a
unified force that is organizationally independent from the military
establishment. The army has continued to dominate the police;
however, in 1970 an army officer occupied the principal command
position of director general, and army officers had most of the
other senior posts. . -
The mission of the police is to maintain law and order, preserve
the peace, protect life and property, prevent and detect crime, and
apprehend offenders. They have initial responsibility in controlling
subversion but in large-scale outbreaks have to be aided by the
armed forces. -
Police general headquarters in Rangoon determines policy, super-
vises operations, and directs the activities of subordinate units. The
director general, assisted by a vice director general, reports directly
to the minister of home affairs. The Police Council, made up of
ranking police, army, and cabinet officials, is the senior policy-
making body and serves in an advisory capacity to the force.
Organization and Operations
Police headquarters consists of the staff elements and special
activities of the force as well as operational control mechanisms for
directing outlying components. It has two special departments and
two principal staff sections, the Supply and Finance Section and
the Administration and Training Section. These sections handle all
matters within their jurisdictions for the entire force on a nation-
wide basis. There is no separate operations element; rather the chain
of command runs directly from the office of the director general to
subordinate units in the field.
The two special activities are the Criminal Investigation Depart-
ment (CID) and the Special Intelligence Department (SID). The
mission of the CID is inherent in its name; that of the SID is
intelligence and counterintelligence activities. The SID reportedly
had a strength of some 500 men in 1970; about one-half were
... stationed in Rangoon, and the rest were at rural eutposts. The CID
had a strength estimated at approximately 1,300 men in 1970,
assigned to the Crime Bureau, the Scientific Bureau, and the Rail-
way Police Bureau.
The Rangoon City Police is, in effect, an autonomous metro-
politan force operating exclusively within the capital city and its
environs. It is headed by a director and had a strength estimated in
1970 at about 3,700 officers and men. In addition to regular law
enforcement, it is responsible for registration of motor vehicles and
the surveillance of foreigners and, with the navy, safeguards the
security of Rangoon harbor. Other routine duties include the usual
police activities associated with urban life, such as sanitation, traffic
control, and the suppression of vice.
The Burma Civil Police comprises all forces stationed outside the
capital and forms the bulk of the National People’s Police. Its uni-
formed members are the patrolmen on the beat and the rural con-
stables who protect people and property. its primary mission is the
enforcement of law and order, but its members also guard govern-
ment property and the residences of high officials. Also, it is often
called on to assist in operations against insurgents.
The Burma Civil Police is crganized into twelve subordinate geo-
graphic regions corresponding to the seven administrative divisions
of Burma and one for each of the constituent states. Each region is
headed by a director or vice director and is subdivided into districts,
subdistricts, stations, and outposts. Much of the operational control
of police activities is exercised by the army through its direction of
what the government called “security and administrative commit-
tees,” composed of military and civil officials at the various levels.
Despite the official separation and independence of the police
forces, until 1967 there was considerable acrimony and strained
relations between the two services. Miajor police grievances were
their apparent subordination to the military and the imposition of
army regulations on their units, complaints of low supply priorities
vis-a-vis the military, and changes of alleged lack of army support to
isolated police posts. It is true that at tirnes numerous police sta-
tions were attacked and that no support for them was forthcoming
from the army. In most cases, however, this was because the army's
lack of mobility made it impossible to reach the outposts in time.
The government has shown an awareness of these problems and
deficiencies and constantly has sought to remedy them. Major meas-
ures included stopping the integration of better trained police units
and individuals into the army, issuing new and better equipment to
the police as rapidly as possible, and providing for increased police
compensation in the national budget. Police morale has improved
considerably and has been reflected in more favorable press cover-
age and an encouraging new atricsphere of service and cooperation.
*sº
Conditions of Service
The average city police headquarters is adequate but far from
luxurious. Usually housed in a frºnze building enclosed by a fence
or harbed wire, it offers isºsic facilities for administration, housing,
arid sºftly storiº gº. Miºst rural pºlice posts are strictly utilitarian,
gener:}ly consisting of a rustic, fºrt-like Cornpound, closely gº ºrded
3. b.
•º
***
i
rid sºrrounded by barbed wire. Čsed for housing the garrison and
sometimes police families, it can be used for a defense strong; ), ºr t
when r.2cessary. Mostly, however, rural posts are bases of opera.
tions for fixed guard posts and constant area-surveillance patrols.
All but the remotest outlying posts are tied into the police com-
munications net, linking them with headquarters in Rangoon. They
are adequately supplied with transportation, and there are generally
enough trucks, sedans, jeeps, or motorcycles to meet local needs.
Rural patrols are conducted mostly by motor vehicle, but the force
also has many patrol boats for covering rivers and coastal areas.
Police Equipment and Training
Much of the police equipment; and a great deal of the basic police
training in modern techniques originated with a United States pro-
gram initiated in 1950 and continued until 1965. About US$8.8
million was used to supply the police with arms, vehicles, uniforms,
and other needed equipment. As part of the program several Bur-
mese police officers were sent to the United States for advanced
training, and many specialists were given instruction in supply,
radio maintenance, and antiriot duties. Since 1965, when the pro-
gram was phased out, some technicians have been sent to police
schools in other countries, but there is no indication that this prac-
tice is a continuing effort.
The most common form of instruction is on-the-job training in
the unit of assignment. The Police Officers Academy in Mandalay
conducts annual courses for officer candidates and also has a course
of advanced instruction for officers at the intermediate level.
Rank, Pay, Uniforms, and Decorations
With the formation of the National People's Police a new grade
structure was introduced. The changes were not radical, and new
grades continued to conform closely to British precedents. Ranks
below the director level range from constable up to superintendent;
usually advancement follows a progressive course up through
corporal, sergeant, station officer, and inspector.
Pay increases have brought police compensation into line with
equivalent army ranks and have done much to allay police disaf-
fection vis-a-vis the military. The pay was at a level considered
good by local standards and consistent with the country’s eco-
notnic level.
Police uniforms closely resemble British military wear for the
tropics. Army khaki uniforms with distinctive insignia are worn in
the field and in hot weather. For garrison or urban duty enlisted
men wear blue trousers with a bluish-gray angora shirt. Headgear
is either a beret or wide-brimmed Gurkha hat. Noncommissioned
officers wear their chevrons on the right sleeve only.
Officers have a blue or khaki service coat and wear a peaked
service cap or a beret for field duty. Noncommissioned officers
and officers armed with a pistol; patrolrmen carry only a baton
unless issued other weapons in an emergency. The Metropolitan
Division of the Rangoon City Police—that is, the patrolmen, the
traffic police, and the motorcycle squads—have a distinctive uni-
form consisting of a white jacket worn with dark-blue trousers or
breeches.
The police have their own decorations distinct from those of
the military, although police may receive any of the national
orders. There are four medals specifically for police personnel,
one of which is reserved for officers. They are given for gallantry,
distinguished service, or conspicuous devotion to duty. The two
higher awards carry with them a monetary allowance, rated ac-
cording to the rank of the recipient.
Related Intelligence Activities
Counterintelligence activities have required as much effort as
the control of ordinary crime, if not more, so the police and
security agencies have had to work closely together. Two of
these, the National Intelligence Bureau (NIB) and the Bureau of
Special Investigations (BSI), are most prominent. Although both
of these have little responsibility in the criminal field, there was
an overlap of interests that often required their joint, action with
the police in the areas of subversion and insurgency.
The NIB is made up of the country’s various intelligence and
specialized security agencies—the Military Intelligence Service (MIS)
of the Ministry of Defense, the CID and the SID of the National
People's Police, and the BSI. Headed by a director of the MIS, the
NIB is a component of the Central Security and Administrative
Committee. Its main function is the top-level coordination of the
intelligence activities of the armed forces, the police, and other civil
agencies. - - -
The BSI is directly under the office of the chairman of the
Revolutionary Council. It was originally organized to investigate
corruption among political leaders and government employees, but
this aspect of its work seems to have been dropped. The agency is
engaged mostly in investigating possible threats to the regime and
running down suspected activity of a subversive or an anti-
governmental nature. g
THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM
The judicial system originally consisted of the Penal Code and
the Criminal Procedure Code and the hierarchy of courts estab-
lished to adjudicate violations of the law. Both of the codes were
adapted from their Indian counterparts—the Penal Code from the
Indian Penal Code of 1860 and the Criminal Code from the Indian
Criminal Procedure Code of 1898. They were ultimately combined
into the Burma Code which, with necessary amendments from time
to time, is the law of the land.
Criminal Codes
The Burma Code is a compilation of all statutory laws, acts, and
regulations covering various other judicial activities, such as police
and prisons. It has ten basic volumes and several augmentations
concerned with laws applicable to the states and the special division
of Chin. The Penal Code appears in Volume VIII, and the Criminal
Procedure Code, in volumes IV and VII. Changes and annendments
are published annually and are brought out periodically as the situa-
tion requires. The Penal Code is comprehensive and modern. It
deals with the competence of the law, categories of offenses and
criminal responsibility, and the types and linnits of punishments.
One section is concerned with offenses germane to the armed forces
and serves as the basis for military justice. Two general levels of .
offenses are recognized: felonies, or serious crimes, and misde-
meanors, or minor infractions. Criminal responsibility is precisely
defined and takes into account possible extenuating and mitigating
factors, such as self-defense or impairment of mental faculties.
Ignorance of the law is not considered an excuse, but involuntary
intoxication may be a moderating factor. Children under seven
years of age are not held criminally liable for their acts; penalties
for minors between seven and twelve years of age are considerably
less severe than penalties usually imposed. -
The code groups various offenses into broad categories, which, in
turn, are broken down into specific types of violations. The major
categories distinguish between crimes against the state; against pub-
lic tranquillity; against persons or property; and against public
health, safety, and morality. Other broad areas include offenses
against public justice, public servants, coins and stamps, marriage,
and religion. There are also brief sections covering defamation,
intimidation, insult, and annoyance.
Punishments are treated in some detail and, although courts have
some degree of latitude, the range of punishments is carefully de-
fined. Punishments include the death penalty; transportation, which
247
is exile to a penal colony; fine; and imprisonment, which may in-
volve hard labor. The code also authorizes whipping, but this form
of punishment is seldom practiced.
Felonies are defined as those crines subject to the death penalty
or imprisonment for three years or more. Misdemeanors are usually
redressed by a fine, but they may draw short terms of confinement.
There is little information on transporation (penal exile) practice,
but in the past it involved shipment of condemned prisoners to
detention facilities on offshore islands.
Courts and Criminal Procedures
There are three levels of courts in Burma to deal with criminal
matters. The single Chief Court in Rangoon is the country’s final
arbiter in questions of law and fact, and in criminal matters it is the
final court of appeal. Below the Chief Court are sessions courts,
established in most priiicipal ic wins aſid cities. Sessions courts have
original jurisdiction in cases involving felonies and serious crimes for
which punishments of five years or more are authorized. Below the
sessions courts are the magistrate’s courts, found in most localities
throughout the country, that deal with lesser crimes for which pun-
ishments of not more than two years’ imprisonment may be
imposed (see ch. 8, Political System and Values).
The Criminal Procedure Code prescribes the competence of each
type of court, specifies the functions and responsibilities of judicial
officials, outlines rules of evidence, and regulates the conduct of
preliminary proceedings and trials. Minor offenses are prosecuted
by complaint, and major crimes are prosecuted by indictment, but
there is no grand jury.
Minor offenders are brought directly before a lower court judge
or magistrate, who prepares charges and issues a summons to the
accused; major cases are referred to the attorney general’s office,
which determines jurisdiction and venue. The code provides for the
use of writs of habeas corpus and for the arrangement of bail at the
discretion of the court. - 4.
THE PENAL SYSTEM
The country’s prison administration, under the direction of the
Ministry of Home Affairs, is regulated by provisions of the Burma
Code. The system is loosely organized, however, and most deten-
tion facilities receive little central guidance or supervision. The code
provides for certain standards and procedures, but in practice they
are not strictly observed. In 1971 there was a prison facility of
some kind in most towns of any size, but most of them were old
buildings in poor repair that were generally unsanitary and over-
crowded. &
There is almost no official publication of pehal statistics and, of
the negligible amount of information put out by the government,
virtually none reaches the outside world. Infrequent reports of
questionable reliability give an indication but do not provide a clear
picture of the situation. The best information available indicates
that there were about forty detention facilities in the country in
1971. About ten of these were central prisons; twenty were district
jails; and ten were subjails or guardhouses.
The central prisons are the largest and best equipped facilities.
They accommodate felons from the cities in which they are located
and from its environs. The jails were generally used for short-term
prisoners convicted of minor offenses. There is also one reforma-
tory for juvenile offenders, called a training school, located in
Rangoon. Juvenile delinquency was increasing in urban areas, but it
had not yet reached critical proportions in 1971. The country’s
average prison population as of the mid-1960s was estimated at
approximately 6,000 inmates in any given month.
The central prisons in Rangoon and Mandalay are the most
extensive installations. Both are large and secure but lack modern
facilities, and conditions in them are described as poor. The rest of
the prisons range from crude single detention rooms to sizable city
jails. Most consist of a frame or log enclosure surrounded by a
barbed-wire fence. • .
The code prescribed the treatment of prisoners and specified that
imprisonment should be for rehabilitation as well as for punish-
ment. There was, however, no indication of any corrective program.
None of the country’s penal institutions are known to have work-
shops or handicraft facilities, and none have teachers, social work-
ers, vocational training instructors, or medical personnel assigned to
their regular staffs. Nevertheless, the treatment of prisoners is gen-
erally good, and Burmese jails compare favorably with most others
in Southeast Asia.
249
APPENDIX F.
[BURMA'S MILITARY POSTUREI
[Reprinted with permission from: The Almanac of World Military Power,
First Edition, by Col. T. N. Dupuy, U.S. Army, Ret. Dunn Loring, Va.,
T. N. Dupuy Associates, 1970.]
250
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BURMA The integrated Defense Services Staff is dominated by the
Pyidaungsu Myanma Nainggandaw Army. Vice Chiefs of Staff for Army, Navy and Air Force
Union of Burma . administer their respective service affairs while a “G” staff
- - directs operations, with an “A” staff for non-supply adminis-
KWERPOTENTIAL STATISTICS tration, and a “Q” staff for logistics, on the British pattern.
- There are also directorates for certain special functions.
Area: 262,000 square miles - Control of units in the field is exercised through the
Population: 25,811,000 ~ * appropriate. Vice Chief of Staff to six army area commands
Total Active Armed Forces: 150,700 (.58% population) and three naval regions. Two naval regions, Arakan and
Gios National Product: $1.73 billion ($67 per capita) Tenasserim, correspond to the army's Northwest and South-
Annual Military Expenditures: $116 million (6.8% GNP; east Commands, respectively, while the third naval region,
45.5%total budget) - Irrawaddy, overlaps several commands. Operational controlin
Fuel Production: Oil: 4.5 million barrels - . the field is unified. -
Electric Power Output: 400 million kwh - -
Merchant Marine: 8 ships; 45,000 gross tons . -
Civil Air Fleet: 7 propjet, 8 piston transports POLITICO-MILITARY Policy
DEFENSESTRUCTURE Burma's salient policy is neutrality and non-alignment,
- . - seeking security through support of the UN. This policy is
By the military coup d'etat of 2 March 1962 the previous complicated by Burma's strategic position, its economic and
Miamentary form of government was abolished and replaced cultural ties to the Indian sub-continent and to the West, and
by a Revolutionary Council of 14 military officers. The its 1,300-mile border with Communist China.
Council Chairman is Defense Forces Chief of Staff, General Ne Thus Burma must placate China while avoiding any close
Win, who thus acts as chief of state and head of the involvement with it which would alienate either its Western or
wimment. He also serves as his own Minister of Defence. In Soviet Bloc friends. Likewise, placation of China requires
this fourfold role he is advised by the Council Executive avoidance of close military or political ties with China's rivals
Cºmmittee of senior officers. or enemies. This influences: the degree of foreign presence in



251
Burma, the sources of its assistance in economic development
and overt military aid, and its voting in the UN on questions
affecting China. &
Although Burma is a federalized union, it is dominated by
the majority Burmans (75% of the population). This
dominance is resented by many of the minority populations,
mostly hill tribesmen, living in five semi-autonomous states.
The consequences of the two basic policies of international
non-alignment and domestic centralization have in large part
been responsible for a third policy: maintaining large armed
forces and incurring large defense expenditures with little in
the way of external support, and despite a weak economy.
Priority has been given internal security rather than defense
against external threats. Therefore the Army is largely light
infantry battalions, the Navy a coastal and river patrol and
landing force, with the Air Force structured for ground
Support.
Although the Defense Services are maintained at strength
by voluntary enlistments of four or six years, a National
Service Law prescribes conscription of all citizens between 18
and 45, and physicians, engineers, and technicians to age 56.
This ensures adequate manpower in an emergency and the
availability of scarce skills at all times.
STRATEGIC PROBLEMS
Burma's geographical location, separating Southeast Asia
from the Indian sub-continent and providing access to the
Indian Ocean from southwest China, caused it to be a major
theater of operations in World War II. This strategic location is
just as important today.
China has a relatively easy invasion route from Yunnan
Province across northern Burma to India's Assam province,
and is reputedly subverting Naga tribesmen on the Indo-Burma
border. China also wishes to control the Kunming-Lashio-
Rangoon road and rail route (the “Burma Road” of World War
II fame), which would link southwest China to the sea. India is
said to have a tacit understanding with Burma over joint
defense of the Assam-northern Burma area in the event of a
Chinese invasion.
The Communist Party split in 1946 into a Trotskyite “Red
Flag” faction, now numbering some 600 followers, and a
Stalinist “White Flag” faction which is now pro-Mao and
numbers about 3,000. Both are outlawed, are underground in
jungle bases, conduct forays against the Government and
citizenry which are little more than banditry, and have little
popular support. The White Flags do receive training and
support from China. sº -
Elements of the three principal ethnic minorities — Karens,
Shans, and Kachins — are in revolt allegedly to secure complete
autonomy for their states. The KNDO (Karen National
Defense Organization) numbers over 5,000 armed men and
recently has been coordinating operations with the White Flag'
Communists under the name National Democratic United
Front (NDUF). Securely based in the hills on the Burma-Thai
border they buy arms and supplies in Thailand and are also
- ºf , , f'
. . . . .';.
aligned with exiled Burman dissidents in the Natiºn
Liberation Council (NLC).
The Shan Independence Army (SIA) is quiescent at ſh
present after surrender of several hundred members. Colin
of the Thais, they obtain arms from Thailand and Laos will
funds derived from opium growing and smuggling. The Kadim
Independence Army (KIA), several thousand lºſt
cooperates with the White Flags in central Burma and withi;
Indian Nagas who traverse the Kachin State on their wayſ,
and from training in China. A 1,000-man Kachin unit Ofth
Chinese Army based in Yunnan gives training to KIA memºn
and is available for any invasion. #
Remnants of the Chinese Nationalist Yunnan Army ſkill
the Shan States of Burma in 1949 and for years recruitedlod
people, lived off the opium trade, and received mility
support from Taiwan to fight the Chinese Communists, hiſ
used it to fight the Burmese. Some 3,500 armed men remainin
northwestern Thailand and Laos with perhaps some death.
ments still in Burma. -
Without a more liberal and enlightened policy of dai,
with the minorites, and without a more prosperous Oºl
economy, there is little likelihood that the ethnic insurgentis
will be suppressed. The pinpricks of the Communists and ſh
so-called Chinese Nationalists are also likely to contil
indefinitely. -
MILITARY ASSISTANCE
Upon achieving independence from Britain in 1948Bum
was provided with equipment for its three services. MOR
British equipment has been added by purchase or gal
through the years. A British joint training mission served unil
1953 and special schooling in England has continued. Traini;
has also been received in India and Israel. -
During the early insurgencies, shortly after independent,
India provided quantities of arms and ammunition and the US
provided patrol boats. Later Israel presented small quantil
of small arms and heavy infantry weapons. -
An ammunitionſ and sub-machinegun factory wº
established with Italian assistance, a rifle factory with Wºl
German help, and a naval dockyard with Yugoslav adiº.
Yugoslavia also has sold or given ten river gunboats in
quantities of 120mm mortars, 75mm pack howitzers, and
MG-42 machine guns.
The largest amount of military assistance has come from
the U.S. through a unique military sales agreement condui;
in 1958, and still in effect, which enables Burma to purchiº
equipment with its own soft currency. The total amouſ
bought under this agreement has never been revealed bull
figure of $35 million has been quoted. The equipment;
known to include jet fighters, helicopters, gunboats, in
landing craft and is believed also to include quantities ºf
heavy weapons and transportation, communications, and
engineering equipment. A number of Burmese officers and
NCO's also have received training in the US.
252
* * * *
AuſANCES - - 7 patrol boats (YP)
, 5 torpedo boats/fast patrol boats (PT/PTF)
Buma is a member of the UN. It rejected membership in 1 coastal transport(APC)
the Commonwealth but has joined a number of international 8 landing craft mechanized (LMC)
cºnsultative and economic organizations including the 4 landing craft support large (LSSL)
|Colombo Plan Council. It is a member of no mutual defense 1 landing craft utility (LCU)
ºr collective security alliance but advocates collective security 12 river gunboats (PGR) (2 large)
“through the UN. Burma sent a small staff detachment to the 9 river transports (“S” boats)
UNOperation in the Congo in 1960. c. 100 river patrol boats (“L” boats; operated by Navy,
i. From shortly after independence to the present, Burma has Army, police, and civil departments).
been plagued with a variety of insurgencies: domestic Naval Bases: Monkey Point, Seitkyi, and Sinmalaik in the
communist, ethnic minority, and external Chinese Nationalist. Rangoon area; and Sittwe (Akyab), Moulmein, Meigui.
These various groups may still number as many as 20,000 and Bassein.
ãmed men, but factionalism has precluded fully coordinated -
ision against the government. AIR FORCE
Personnel: 6,500
ARMY Organization:
2 fighter-bomber squadrons (F-86F, “Vampire,” AT-33)
Personnel: 138,000 - - 2 COIN squadrons (“Provost”)
Organization: 6 area commands (Central, Eastern, South- 1 transport squadron
east, Southwest, Northwest, and Rangoon) 1 helicopter squadron
11 brigades (territorial task forces within the area Major Aircraft Types
commands) 75 combat aircraft
c. 100 infantry battalions 12 F-86F fighters
2 armored battalions 5 “Vampire” FB-11 fighters
2 artillery battalions 12 AT-33 armed trainers -
1 engineer battalion 6 “Vampire” T-55 armed trainers
Major Equipment Inventory: 40 “Provost.” T-53 armed trainers
medium tanks (“Comet,” M4) 46 other aircraft
armored cars (“Humber,” “Ferret”) 6 C-47 transports
light artillery pieces (25-pounder, 105mm, 75mm) 4 C-45 transports
medium artillery pieces (155mm) 6 DHC-3 “Otter” transports
* * 2 Bristol “Freighter” transports
. 10 U-17A utility/liaison
NAVY 18 helicopters (OH-13, “Alouette” III, HH-43B)
& . Air Bases: Mingaladon (Rangoon), Meiktila (2), Hmawbi,
Personnel: 6,200 (includes 800 Marines) Mandalay, Myitkyina, and Kengtung.
Organization: 3 naval regions (Irrawaddy, Arakan,
Tennasserim) PARAMILITARY
Major Units: - -
1 escort (PF) The People's Police Force number 10,000 and is under the
1 escortſminesweeper (PF/MSF) Minister of Home Affairs. Armed village defense and local
2 patrol escorts (PCE) militia exist under the aegis of the Burma Socialist Program ,
6 patrol gunboats (PGM) Party (BSPP).
253
APPENDIX G
. BURMA -
STRENGTH OF COMMUNIST PARTY
ORGANIZATION
[Reprinted from: World Strength of the Communist Party Organizations.
23rd Annual Report, 1971 Edition. Washington, Department of State,
Bureau of Intelligence and Research, 1971 (Publication 8526).]
254
• BURMA
MTIONAL POLITICAL STATUS
The Revolutionary Council of the Union of Burma, with Chief of
State General Ne Win as Chairman, controls all legislative
and executive functions in the country. There are no representative
institutions in Burma, and the only legal political party is the
Official Burma Socialist Program Party (BSPP), which was formed
by the government. *
(munist Party Membership: No estimate available
Communist parties in Burma have long been illegal; there have
historically been two Communist organizations, both underground,
With occasional aboveground fronts. The Communist Party of Burma
(CPB--or White Flag), with probably a few thousand adherents, is
actively engaged in armed insurgency against the Burmese Government.
A number of ethnic minority insurgent groups have contacts with
the CPB and with Communist China; these include the left-wing
Karen National Unity Party (KNUP) and a portion of the Kachin
Independence Army (KIA). The feeble Burma Communist Party (BCP--
Or Red Flag) insurgent group, with perhaps a few hundred adherents,
Was probably destroyed as a cohesive organization with the capture,
in November 1970, of its leader Thakin Soe, although some offshoots,
such as those in the Arakan region, may survive.
leading Party Figures and Position:
Thakin Zin - CPB Chairman
Thakin Ba Thien Tin - CPB Vice-Chairman and Politburo Member
Principal Publications: None
Area of Communist Activity
Although there have been scattered clashes throughout Burma,
(Omunist insurgent activity has concentrated recently in the northern
Shân State. The government has released relatively little information
On the fighting there, but it is apparently heavy at times, with a
few large battles causing casualties in the hundreds on both sides.
General Ne Win has stated publicly that insurgents are reported to
receive some material assistance and advice from Communist China as
Well,
255
BURMA (continued)
The CPB remains unstintingly loyal to Mao Tse-tung, particularly
since it undertook its own "cultural revolution" which culminated
in September 1968 in the murder of its long-time party chairman,
Thakin Than Tun. The party's present vice chairman, Thakin Ba
Thien Tin, is reportedly living in Communist China. CPB party
statements follow carefully the Communist Chinese line and condem
"Soviet revisionism."
On July 23 some 200 Burmese youths, ostensibly representing "anti-
war" and "anti-imperialism" groups, demonstrated in Rangoon against
the war in Vietnam. These demonstrations, reportedly attended by
Chinese, North Korean, and North Vietnamese diplomats, were the
first publicly pro-Communist displays in recent years.
256
APPENDIX H
BURMA
(MAP WITH INSETS-COLOR)

257
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º vision º - - º Kyaukseº - º \ † Textiles †oy
Cox's sº / - . -- | r S H A N \ p L. A TE º sº Wood and bamboo products
l Pakokku, /> yingyan º - J I # Petroleum refinery
\ - - Lawksawk Kunhjºng Kéng -
\ \-sº M ND A Lº Y \ º 2 Ta-kaw Tung pi Electric power
- 220 - - y - ~ º 753. } ſº Building materials
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º, Maungdaw - 7. - Chau --- - Popa Hill 498 *Thazi- - - - Q ---
- - *> Sal º awenyaung Jºº QNamsang Mong Hipayak & Fertilizer
* ---> ~ aſ: es” Kyaukpadaung º - _2~ | N & -6489 Pbagzn Lead, silver and zinc
- - \ - - - º -- - -
- - º 519 ºf Kala % ºlº 2. Hawng Luk Sn W. Tin and tungsten
CŞ -y ~ -367 (3. Yenangyau º \ - º Lake | \ kº º ſ # Oilfield
- R ** 6526 º - - hin 2COs ~
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\ §§ º ſo º \ \ - Fang
Bononga Islands& o ...Anº 3. Pyjnmanaº º
- y : 2 - -
WS. \ -502.2 - - Ü la \
Kyaukpyu º - ~Yº--
O \ 1 s º º
º - ºdºune Thayetmyo º sº \
SLAND º, see \º | T E ETHNIC GROUPS
–456,o - - × - -
Taungup º " -* Paukkaung- oungoº, - ~~ Maºh. - -
º º, fººtrome (Pye) → º - Chiang Maio
ISLAND º ( * ~ Nºmmenek
O T Rhwedaung O - ºn !) -
B A Y Gaw - º º º ſ
Sandowa WS 2. º
Zalunº \. º |
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~ of 81 ~ º POPULATION
(º (
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Gwa Uttaradit \/
isit
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H A |\ A N D
Seikkyiuſ,
B E N G A L sei That Tak N A Phitsanulok
Basse
Shwebo
- N ºr -
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º artaban-2 6×2, º -
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OF THE wº Sittwe N
M A R T A B A N W \
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PREPARIS NORTH CHANNEL Sam Ong 1. Këng Tung
3. -
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2PREPARIS & Lop Buri
ISLAN * …
D G sittwe" º
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s Sara
PREPARIS SOUTH CHANNEL Buri
hr3 Nakh
i Ayutthay
ISLANDS |--
- Nakhon -
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* BANGK
Chéºhoengsa \
A N D A M A N Chon Buri TIBETO-BURMAN ******
o [ ] Burman - rangoon y
- C Chin ". . . K_y
- º
Kachin - 72
BURNAA - [ ] º
C. Other
1. Lahu 2. Lisu 3. Naga
- International boundary S E. A o 4. Akha
- Islands W
-x- International boundary, KAREN º
indefinite or in dispute } [ ] Karen and º S
- - - o |
----- Division or state boundary MERGUI ) [T] Kayah º .*. *...*
- - - ov.
12– (3) National capital -z - Uenasseri / 12- TAI W/ (, TTL | |
- - - - - o º [] Shan o to so zoo
Mandalay Division or state capital 2 - º º Persons per square kilometer
to - - -
— Meter-gage railroad - (i. { MON-KHMER • *,
- 5. Mon 6. Wa 7. Palaung
- Main road ARCHIPELAGO - G U. L F
0 ºr P TANIS +
- - - - - Other road • * , A INDIANS AND PAKIS S ſ?
- 4 D CHINESE * (?
+ Airfield O F
- - - -- "Other Indians, Pakistanis, and Chinese
J. Principal port - - & are º º the º
~ Secondary port 2 < º S I A M
Populated places - -
O O O ow
ver 100,000 (). .9. humphon
O 25,000 to 100,000 -
- Under 25,000 D w
- - - d - o
Spot elevations in feet , K aun º
-- Ranong
Scale 1:3,990,000 O /.
*== 1:9 150 victoria Pointº º Q
Statute Miles
O 50 1OO 150 `-- ~ ! (!! \ 0. Oſ
Kilometers º
THAILAND -
| NAMEs and Bounda RY REPRESENTA Tion 4.
92 95 ARE NoT NEcessa R. LY AUTHORITATI've C. 100
PRINTED BY THE DEFENSE MAPPING AGENCY TOPOGRAPHIC CENTER


































































APPENDIX I
BURMA: VEGETATION
(MAP–COLOR)
259
*
*
S.
y
->
*Dibrugarh
GAUHAT
º Hai
Kohima
SHILLongs, -
Hsia-kuan
-
Sylheto
sºilchar Imphalo
–4 - 24
Agartala
*
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& A
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-
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d ©MANDALAY, Mong
| - al/_\ Yang.
aga'ſ -
/
• Lawksawk Kunhing keng"
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shwehyaung. Mong Hipayak
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lake -
-20
- /
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-
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-
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BURMA Myawaa
GULF
16- [ ] Broadleaf Evergreen Rain or
Forest predominant MARTABAN' s
[T] Deciduous Forest predominant |
* >
Hill Evergreen Forest predominant
C Swamp Forest ,-Ye
[ ] Dry Zone Vegetation; mainly Scrub -
with some Deciduous Forest \º
- wº
[ ] Mixture of Scrub, Grassland, º
Rain Forest (particularly along
streams), Deciduous Forest, and
Hill Evergreen Forest ARCHIPElagº -
- - " Tav
p º
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- - : THAILAND ".
Dry Crops º
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* , MERGUI ".
* K 0. ARCHIPELAGO i,j
o so 100 150 - 5. GULF or
Statute Miles F'. SIAM
o so 100 150 ^ (Tº - 5 &
Kilometer- - 100 - *
- I nam-Es and Boundar-Y REPRE-ENTATION I * E. -
92 Are Nor secessarily Aurºorºtative 96 º º
s— 1. I º
PRINTED BY THE DEFENSE MAPPING AGENCY TOPOGRAPHIC CENTER



















































APPENDIX J
THE KHMER REPUBLIC
(CAMBODIA)
BACKGROUND NOTES
(Including Abolition of Monarchy and Dismissal of Sihanouk)
* & [Washington, Department of State, November 1970, Publication 7747.]
261
November 1970
THE KHM ER REPUBLIC
-TIZ."
SV
(CAMBO DIA)
Population: 7 million (1970 est.)
Capital. Phnom Penh
Cambodia, a land of rice paddies and
forest-covered hills and mountains on the
Southeast Asian peninsula, has an area of
about 66,000 square miles, approximately the
Si2e of Missouri. The central area is level.
formed by the basin of the Mekong River and
the great lake of Tonle Sap, and provides ideal
Conditions for rice cultivation. Along the 380-
mile border with Thailand in the northwest
funS a prominent and nearly continuous escarp-
ment; a generally level plain is bounded with
Laos to the northeast, South Viet-Nam to the
east, and forested hills and mountains to the
Southeast. The southwestern coastline on the
Gulf of Thailand is irregular, fronted by
flufflè?OuS offshore islands, some of which are
inhabited. The highest point in Cambodia,
Phnom Aural in the western mountains, rises
5,741 feet above sea level.
The climate is like that of most other
tropical monsoon-belt countries. There is a
dry Season from October to May. Annual
rainfall at Phnom Penh is approximately 58
inches. Year-round temperature varies from
about 680 F. to 970 F., and the humidity is
consistently high. December and January are
the most comfortable months.
The Cambodian flag is blue with three white
Stars in the upper right corner. The top left
COrner is red on which appears in white the
towers of Angkor Wat.
THE PEOPLE
Cambodia's total population is estimated
at Close to 7 million with a growth rate of 2.2
percent annually. The population density (about
104 persons per square mile) is low in com-
parison to other Southeast Asian countries.
Approximately 10 percent of the people live
in Phnom Penh.
Most of the people are ethnic Cambodians
(Khmers). Cambodian society generally ex-
hibits features common to other countries of
Southeast Asia but is notably integrated and
homogeneous. The Khmer majority, making
up 85 percent of the population, is composed
primarily of farmers living in small villages:
there are few large landholders or tenant
ta?mers. In recent years, however, the num-
be? of Khmers in the urban population has
increased sharply. and with the expansion of
the modern educational system large numbers
fºrground Notes
of Khmers are becoming active in business,
government, and other urban occupations.
Ethnic minorities consist of approximately
450,000 Chinese, 200,000 Vietnamese, 80,000
Cham-Malays (Moslems descended from the
people of the ancient kingdom of Champa),
50,000 Khmer Loeu (hill tribesmen), 20,000
Thai and Lao, and 5,000 Europeans (mostly
French). There is also a small Burmese
minority, important in the exploitation of gem
deposits near Pailin. The Chinese community
is important in trade and commerce and in-
cludes many of the pepper planters of the
southwest. Three out of four Chinese speak
the Teochiu dialect. The Vietnamese, many
of whom migrated to Cambodia during the
period of French colonial rule, are merchants,
artisans, and professional workers; there are
also an estimated 25,000 Vietnamese fishermen
around the lake of Tonle Sap. Some 100,000
Vietnamese have returned to South Viet-Nam
since March 1970 because of Cambodian secur-
ity measures to prevent their exploitation by
the North Vietnamese/Viet Cong.
Social cohesion and stability derive from a
common language (Khmer), a shared sense of
national identity, a largely homogeneous pop-
ulation, and the pervading influence of Therav-
ada Buddhism, the national religion.
Primary and secondary school enrollment
in 1968 totaled 1.1 million students, a figure
which more than tripled after 1954. Cambodia
has a long tradition of primary education in
monastery schools, with secondary and higher
education before independence largely confined
to an upper-class elite. Today, however, sec-
ondary education is available to most Cam-
bodians, and the Government has established
nine universities. The most important are the
National University of Phnom Penh, the Univer-
sity of Fine Arts, and the Technical University,
all located at the capital. More recently, uni-
versities have been established in the provin-
cial centers of Battambang, Kompong Cham,
and TakeO. -
With the growth of its educational system.
Cambodia is increasingly faced with the prob-
lem of finding suitable employment for its
university and secondary-school graduates.
HISTORY
Cambodia appears on the historical scene
as a vassal of the empire of Funan (c. 100-500
A.D.), which from its port of Oc-Eo on the

262
Gulf of Thailand traded with China, India, and
the Roman Mediterranean. The Khmer people,
meanwhile, had been moving gradually south-
ward down the Mekong valley; their state of
Chen-la gradually ceased to be a vassal of
Funan and eventually overthrew the empire
in the 6th century. It is from the name of an
early ruler, Kambu Svayambhuva, that the
modern term "Cambodia" is derived. A period
of war, civil strife, and foreign domination
followed the fall of Funan, but the accession
to the throne in 802 of the new Khmer King,
Jayavarman II, marked the beginning of the
magnificent Khmer empire which at its peak
ruled much of modern Thailand, Laos, and
South Viet-Nam, as well as Cambodia. Khmer
art and architecture were superb, as evidenced
by the extensive ruins at Angkor, the ancient
imperial capital, near the modern town of
Siem Reap in northwestern Cambodia. Cam-
bodian power declined after the Thai sacked
Angkor for the second time in the 14th century.
In the course of disastrous wars with Chams,
Thai, and Vietnamese, Cambodia was reduced
to approximately its present borders by the
beginning of the 19th century.
French Protectorate and Independence
Increasing pressure from Siam (now Thai-
land) and Viet-Nam had almost extinguished
Cambodian independence by the time a stronger
power, France, appeared in the region. A
French protectorate was established at the
request of Cambodia King Ang Duong in 1863,
and Cambodia was saved from dissolution.
In the early 1940's Japan began military
moves aimed at the establishment of the
"Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere"
and took de facto control of Cambodia. The
Thai Government, which had reached an ac-
commodation with Japan, asked the French
to cede portions of northwestern Cambodia
to Thailand; when the French rejected this
proposal, Thai forces invaded Cambodia in
January 1941 but were defeated by the French.
The Japanese intervened, and French authori-
ties subsequently surrendered the north-
western provinces of Battambang and Siem
Reap to Thailand. During most of World War
II, until the spring of 1945, the Vichy French
were permitted by Japan to continue nominal
administrative control of Cambodia.
Allied forces occupied Phnom Penh
after the surrender of Japan. In January 1946
Cambodia was recognized as an autonomous
kingdom within the French Union, and the two
northwestern provinces were returned by
Thailand. -
After World War II the Cambodian Govern-
ment began negotiations to achieve a greater
degree of independence from France. In Feb-
ruary 1946 the French protectorate over
Cambodia was replaced by a new arrange-
ment, and in November 1949 Cambodia signed
an accord with France which brought it into
the French Union as an Associated State.
King Norodom Sihanouk, who was elected
at the age of 19 to the Cambodian throne in 1941
by a Crown Council, persisted in attempts to
obtain fuller independence for his country.
Impatient with what he considered French
delays, the King began a public international
and diplomatic campaign against French rule
in June 1952. In June 1953, after travels abroad
promoting his cause, he went into exile, refus-
ing to return to Phnom Penh until Cambodia
was independent. King Sihanouk’s actions has-
tened the French Government’s announcement
on July 4, 1953, of its readiness to “perfect”
the independence and sovereignty of Cambodia
(and the other two Indochinese states, Laos and
Viet-Nam). Subsequent negotiations culminated
on November 9, 1953, when the King announced
the successful achievement of full indepen-
dence; the date was celebrated as Cambodia’s
national day.
Events Leading to Geneva Agreements
After World War II France was faced with
a difficult military situation in Indochina.
Vietnamese Communists sought to portray
their struggle as a national uprising for com-
plete independence while the French attempted
to reestablish their control. In 1946 France
accorded recognition to the Democratic Re-
public of Viet-Nam as a free state within the
Indochinese Federation and the French Union
and agreed to gradually withdraw its troops
from Viet-Nam. Bitter fighting broke out,
however, and an 8-year conflict followed which
spread to neighboring Cambodia and Laos.
Viet Minh forces (purportedly a coalition of
all anti-French Vietnamese groups) infiltrated
into Cambodia from Viet-Nam, seeking to
drive a wedge between French-supported areas
in Indochina. The Cambodians were limited in
their self-defense structure, having to rely
almost entirely on French armed forces.
Unable to maintain the burden of war on three
fronts, the French were defeated on May 7,
1954, by Viet Minh forces at Dien Bien Phu,
North Viet-Nam. Pressure to end the Indo-
china war had increased, and the Geneva con-
ference was called to set the peace terms.
Geneva Agreements of 1954
The plenary sessions of the Geneva con-
ference concerning Indochina began on May 8,
1954. Cambodia, Laos, and the State (later
Republic) of Viet-Nam—the three Associated
States — were participants along with France,
mainland China, the United States, the Demo-
cratic Republic of Viet-Nam (the Viet Minh),
the U.S.S.R., and the United Kingdom, the
latter two acting as cochairmen. The Royal
Cambodian delegation insisted that it was the
only government which truly represented the
Cambodian people, and it rejected a dissident
Viet Minh-sponsored group which called itself.
the Free Cambodians (or "Khmer Issarak").
The conference produced four documents
which are known collectively as the "Geneva
agreements of 1954": three separate cease-fire
agreements covering Cambodia, Laos, and
Viet-Nam, respectively, and an unsigned final
declaration. The Agreement on the Cessation
of Hostilities in Cambodia of July 20, 1954,
provided for a cease-fire, withdrawal of all
foreign armed forces and military personnel,
and the establishment of an International Con-
trol Commission (ICC) — representatives of
Canada, India, and Poland—to supervise its
execution.
All conference participants, except the
United States and the State of Viet-Nam, asso-
ciated themselves (by voice) with the final
declaration. The U.S. delegate, Under Secre-
tary of State Walter Bedell Smith, stated that
U.S. policy with regard to the Geneva agree-
ments would be to refrain from the threat or
the use of force to disturb the agreements and
that the United States would view any renewal
of aggression in violation of the agreements
with grave concern and as seriously threatening
international peace and security. While the
official Cambodian delegation agreed to neu-
trality of the three Indochinese states, it in-
sisted on a provision in the cease-fire agree-
ment that left the Cambodian Government free
to call for outside military assistance should
the Viet Minh again threaten its territory, or
should others do so.
Cambodian Neutrality
In a protocol to the Southeast Asia Collec-
tive Defense Treaty (the "Manila Pact”),
which entered into force February 19, 1955,
the signatory states designated Cambodia,
Laos, and Viet-Nam as states to which article
IV of the treaty could apply at the invitation
or with the consent of the country concerned.
(Article IV provides for collective defense
measures in case of armed attack.) While
continuing Cambodia'a posture of neutrality,
Prince Sihanouk (who had abdicated the throne
in March 1955), perhaps seeing the advantages
of more contact with the Asian Communist
governments in order to maintain his "neutral”
balance, announced in early 1956 Cambodia's
rejection of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organi-
zation (SEATO) “umbrella.” In September 1957
the Government enacted a law to define neutral-
ity as noncommitment to a military alliance or
ideological bloc. It declared that Cambodia
would abstain from such alliances and from ag-
gressive actions.
Cambodia twied to hold to this commitment
of neutrality as its neighboring countries of
Laos and particularly the Republic of Viet-
Nam came under increased Communistattack.
The Vietnamese Communists in the late 1950's
had reactivated their insurgent apparatus in
South Viet-Nam. and terrorism and guerrilla
operations intensified in the early 1960's.
After a brief lull, and the 14-nation Geneva
conference on Laos of 1962, fighting again
broke out in Laos in April 1963. Prince
Sihanouk did not note publicly that Cambodian
provinces were being occupied by North Viet-
namese Army/Viet Cong (NWA/WC) troops
until 1968, although their presence was quite
obvious by the mid-1960's.
Recent Events
After a series of increasingly energetic
military and political efforts to force an
NVA/VC withdrawal, Prince Sihanouk, follow-
ing a 2-month medical retreat in France,
scheduled a trip in March 1970 to Moscow and
Peking to solicit their help in ridding Came
bodia of NVA/VC troops. He was in Moscow
on March 18 when the two houses of the
Cambodian Parliament dismissed him as Chief
of State for reasons of economic and governe
ment policy. The Government he had appointed
in August 1969 remained in office, however, with
Gen. Lon Nol continuing as Prime Minister,
Lon Nol's government repeatedly proposed
negotiations looking toward a peaceful with-
drawal of NVA/VC forces from Cambodia,
The NWA/WC, however, rejected these pro-
posals. Initially they took measures to defend
their base areas against Cambodian military
pressure, and in early April 1970 began moving
out of their sanctuaries and deeper in Came
bodian territory in an effort to establish a
solid Communist-held zone reaching to the
port of Kompong Som (formerly Sihanoukville)
and the sea along the nearly 600-mile-long
Cambodian-South Vietnamese border. This
movement would have changed considerably
the sanctuary situation which had continued
over the previous 5 years and would have
enhanced the threat to U.S. and South Wiete
namese forces during a period when Viets
namization was proceeding in South Viet-Nam,
On April 30 President Nixon, acting under
his constitutional authority as Commander in
Chief, announced that the United States, in
conjunction with the Government of the Re-
public of Viet-Nam, was launching military
operations into NWA/WC-controlled territory
in Cambodia for a period of exactly 2 months
to protect its military forces and the procè88
of Vietnamization in the Republic of Viet-Nam,
Under chapter VIII of the United Nations Chafe
ter, the use of armed force is permitted. When
authorized by the United Nations or a regional
organization within the scope of its competence
under chapter VIII or, where the Security
Council has not acted as was the case in Cam-
bodia, in individual or collective self-defense
against an armed attack. The Cambodian Gow-
ernment announced its approval of this tem"
porary U.S. incursion as a means of preSeºwº.
ing its territory as well as its neutrality,
The direct objective of this military Ope
eration was to capture enemy stores and
supplies, disrupt Communist logistics and
communications capabilities, and prevent the
NVA/VC from building forces in these Sant”
tuary areas in preparation for attacks on U.S.

264
and South Vietnamese troops. U.S. cross-
border operations terminated on June 30 as
scheduled.
On that date the President announced guide-
lines for future U.S. policy toward Cambodia:
(1) there will be no U.S. ground personnel in
Cambodia other than the regular staff of the
U.S. Embassy at Phnom Penh; (2) there will
be no U.S. advisers with Cambodian military
units; (3) the United States will conduct, with
the approval of the Cambodian Government,
air interdiction missions against the enemy
efforts to move supplies and personnel through
Cambodia toward South Viet-Nam and to re-
establish base areas in Cambodia related to
the war in Viet-Nam; (4) the United States will
turn over material captured in the sanctuary
areas in Cambodia to the Cambodian Govern-
ment to help it defend its neutrality and in-
dependence; (5) the United States will provide
military assistance to the Cambodian Govern-
ment in the form of small arms and relatively
unsophisticated equipment in types and quanti-
ties suitable for its army; (6) the United States
will encourage other countries of the region
to give diplomatic support to the independence
and neutrality of Cambodia and will welcome ef-
forts of the 11 Asian nations which met May 16-
17 at Djakarta to encourage other Asian co-
operation to this end; and (7) the United States
will encourage and support the efforts of
third countries who wish to furnish Cambodia
with troops or material to help Cambodia
preserve its neutrality and independence.
In a nationally televised interview in July
President Nixon indicated that the limited in-
cursions into Cambodia had been very effective.
U.S. and South Vietnamese troops captured and
destroyed more than a 12 months’ supply of the
enemy’s small arms ammunition, more than a
14 months’ supply of their mortars, and more
than a 4 months’ supply of their rice, in addi-
tion to the considerable number of enemy per-
Sonnel killed or captured (approximately
15,000). The President stated that Cambodia’s
chances of surviving as a neutral nation were
infinitely better in July than they had been on
April 30 because of this action against the
North Vietnamese sanctuaries and Supply lines.
He added that at the present time the Cambodian
Government has far more support among its
people, as well as the backing of the Asian na-
tions which met at Djakarta supporting Cam-
bodia's neutrality and territorial integrity.
GOVERNMENT
The monarchy was abolished and Cambodia
was proclaimed the Khmer Republic on October
9, 1970. The monarchy had existed for centur-
les, with a King, in modern times, designated
by his predecessor or by a Crown Council.
However, after the death in 1960 of his father,
Prince Sihanouk assumed the title ‘‘Chief of
State” and the throne remained vacant, with his
mother, Queen Kossamak, representing the
throne but not in a ruling capacity. The country
is presently headed by Cheng Heng, formerly
President (or “Chairman”) of the National
Assembly and constitutionally next in line as
Chief of State. He was installed by Sihanouk as
Acting Chief of State January 6, 1970, when the
Prince went to France for a rest cure and, after
Sihanouk's dismissal, remained in that posi-
tion.
The present Cambodian Constitution, pro-
mulgated May 6, 1947, vests executive power
in the Council of Ministers (cabinet), which is
headed by a Prime Minister and responsible
to the National Assembly. A revised constitu-
tion has been drafted to reflect the change from
monarchy to Republic. It is the intention of the
Cambodian Government to submit it to a
national referendum when security conditions
in the country feasibly permit.
The Cambodian Parliament is bicameral.
The National Assembly (lower house), with
82 members, is elected by universal adult
suffrage to a 4-year term, and the Senate
(upper house) has 24 members, who represent
professional and regional interests and are
elected by indirect suffrage. The National
Assembly passes the laws and sends them to
the Senate; the Assembly can override any
objection of the Senate by a vote of an absolute
majority of the Assembly members.
The judicial system incorporates French
juridical practices with traditional Cambodian
forms. The Constitution states that the sepa-
ration of powers (executive, legislative, and
judicial) is alien to Cambodian tradition and
these judicial powers are exercised in the
name of the Chief of State. In practice,
however, with certain exceptions, separation
does exist. It is noteworthy also that the power
to interpret the Constitution is assigned to the
National Assembly, not the judiciary.
There are four types of tribunals in crimi-
nal matters—the local courts (misdemeanors),
courts of first instance (lesser offenses), crim-
inal courts (felonies), and the Court of Review.
Until independence, Cambodians and foreign
nationals who violated French laws were tried
by French courts under French law. At pres-
ent, Cambodian courts have full jurisdiction.
Administratively, Cambodia is divided into
20 Provinces (khet), the autonomous capital
city of Phnom Penh, and five other autonomous
municipalities —Kirirom, Kep, Bokor, Pailin.
and Kompong Som. Phnom Penh is admin-
istered by a Governor assisted by an appointed
municipal commission. Each provincial Gov-
ernor represents the Central Government and
is responsible to the Minister of the Interior.
The Governors supervise the administrative
subdivisions: districts (srok), townships
(sangkat, or khum), and villages (phum) of
the Province. Since 1969 a number of sub-
provinces (anouckhet), incorporating two or
three districts, have been created to improve
administrative control, especially in remote
or insurgent-plagued areas.
265
POLITICAL CONDITIONS
Vietnamese, especially the NVA/VC whose
presence Prince Sihanouk was obliged to
tolerate. The Cambodian Government has in-
dicated that it wishes to preserve Cambodia's
neutrality as well as to improve the present
economic situation. While Prince Sihanouk
and his cabinet ministers were agreed in
opposing NVA/VC incursions, they disagreed
Over Some economic and constitutional ques-
tions. The Lon Nol government, under Sihanouk,
pursued a program of economic liberalization
and restriction of Sihanouk’s extraconstitu-
tional authority.
Following his dismissal from office,
Sihanouk at a May 5, 1970, press conference
at Peking announced the formation of a “Royal
Government of National Union” under the
leadership of the “National United Front of
Kampuchea’’ (Cambodia). The “front” was
termed a liberation organization which was
promised support by North Viet-Nam and
Other Communist nations. Sihanouk is Chief
of State of this exile government, as well as
Chairman of the National United Front (FUNK);
a former Cambodian Premier, Penn Nouth, is
the Prime Minister. A number of individuals
whom Sihanouk himself had earlier denounced
as Communists are represented on this cabinet.
The Chinese Communists announced recogni-
tion of this government as have the North
Vietnamese, Cuba, and some other countries.
However, most countries continue to recognize
the Lon Nol government as the only legitimate
Government of Cambodia.
ECONOMY
The Cambodian economy depends heavily on
agriculture, stockraising, and fishing. Efforts
are underway to create an industrial base.
Although the Cambodian economy is at a low
level of development, economic conditions are
normally satisfactory, primarily because of
the country's food resources. Even though
farms are small, methods primitive, and
productivity low, rice output is usually more
than adequate. There is little pressure on
land resources. Rice exports were approxi-
mately 250,000 metric tons and rubber ex-
ports about 50,000 tons in 1968. In 1968 total
imports amounted to U.S. $115 million and
exports $88.5 million. Trade with the United
States was about $1.8 million.
Cambodia's balance of trade has generally
been unfavorable even though imports are
tightly restricted. (Most imports and exports .
were handled by a government foreign trade
monopoly.) However, a relatively favorable
foreign exchange position has been maintained
by the Cambodian Government.
Although deficient in mineral resources,
Cambodia has an abundance of soil, water,
and forest resources which provides a foun-
In March 1955 King Sihanouk abdicated the
throne in favor of his father in order to more
fully integrate himself in Cambodia's political
life. Reverting to the title of Prince, he
founded a new movement to unite the nation's
political energies. This movement, the Sang-
kum Reastr Niyum (People's Socialist Com-
munity), usually referred to as the Sangkum,
quickly subsumed and eclipsed all other or-
ganized political activity. In these years
Sihanouk served as leader of the Sangkum
and at times as Prime Minister.
Following the death on April 3, 1960, of the
reigning monarch, King Norodom Suramarit,
Prince Sihanouk assumed the office of Chief
of State. He had demonstrated overwhelming
popular support for his policies in a national
referendum in June. -
Since the end of World War II, national
elections have been held in Cambodia on six
occasions: December 1947, September 1951,
September 1955, March 1958 (when women
voted for the first time), June 1962, and Sep-
tember 1966. In the last four elections the
Sangkum won all the seats in the National As-
sembly. In 1966, however, numerous Sangkum
candidates ran in each constituency so that
voters had a free choice among a wide variety
of ideological positions and personalities.
Elections scheduled for late 1970 have been
postponed pending the return of peace to the
countryside.
Until recently the political scene in Cam-
bodia was dominated by the prominence of
Prince Sihanouk. Although he was deposed on
March 18, 1970, as Chief of State, his Prime
Minister and many of the government officials
he appointed remained in office, and the
Sangkum party continues much as before.
A small Communist-oriented party, the
Pracheachon, may still exist. Leftwing ele-
ments within the Sangkum lost much of their
influence after the outbreak of insurgent activ-
.ity in early 1967. The insurgency, originally
confined to the northwestern province of Bat-
tambang, spread to other parts of the country
in 1968, and the ethnic Khmer insurgents
(known as “Khmer Rouge”) were joined by
rebel Khmer Loeu tribesmen in northeastern
Cambodia. Insurgent activity continued on a
limited scale, and Prince Sihanouk often
charged that it was directed by foreign Com-
munist powers. While this activity was re-
ported at some length in the Official Cambodian
press, it was not until the fall of 1968 that
details of the NVA/VC incursions on Cam-
bodian territory were published.
The Khmer Government, headed by Prime
Minister Lon Nol, appears to have the support
of the urban population—including the educated,
the military, young people, and civil servants—
and, to a more undetermined extent, the rural
population which has a strong feeling of
independence and an inherent distrust of the
dation for substantial economic growth. De-
velopment has proceeded slowly, however, due
to administrative difficulties and a shortage
of funds. Budgeted revenues since 1964 have
266
been from 15 to 20 percent below expenditures,
causing the Cambodians to adopt only a limited
number of economic development projects.
After terminating U.S. aid in 1963, Cam-
bodia pursued an economic policy of self-help.
In December 1968, however, Prince Sihanouk
announced a change because, he indicated, such
a policy no longer served the needs of develop-
ment. He announced that in the future Cambodia
would participate actively in, and seek aid from,
regional and multilateral economic organiza-
tions. It would also attempt to expand tourism
and encourage private foreign investment,
especially in a new free trade zone at the port
of Kompong Som. In general, this policy has
been continued by the present Government to
the extent possible considering the disruption
of the economy occasioned by overt Commu-
nist aggression.
A serious limitation to the country's eco-
nomic capabilities is the excessive dependence
on two crops, rice and rubber. Virtually all
requirements for manufactured goods must be
met by imports. The low level of annual in-
come ($112 per capita in 1967) provides a
limited tax base and little prospect for mobi-
lizing sufficient internal savings to finance an
adequate level of investment. The most recent
figure for gross national product (GNP) is
for 1967 when it amounted to about $850
million.
Cambodia's major commercial outlet is
the port completed in early 1960 with French
aid at Kompong Som on the Gulf of Thailand.
Phnom Penh is also normally a busy small
port that accommodates vessels of less than
2,500 tons which ply the Mekong River.
In recent years Cambodia received eco-
nomic aid from mainland China and the
U.S.S.R. The Chinese Communist program
consisted primarily of direct-aid industrial
plants (textile, plywood, paper, glass, and
cement) along with a new airfield at Siem
Reap. Soviet aid has consisted of a 500-bed
hospital, built at an estimated cost of $10
million, and a technical institute. Czechoslo-
vakia provided a suger refinery, a tire factory,
and a tractor-assembly plant at an estimated
cost of $14 million under a loan agreement
made in 1961. Recent loans have been provided
by East Germany, Denmark, France, Japan,
the Asian Development Bank (ADB), and other
aid donors.
FOREIGN RELATIONS
The Khmer Government follows a for-
eign policy of neutrality and seeks to promote
friendly relations with all countries on the
basis of reciprocity. Under Prince Sihanouk,
Cambodia supported Communist positions
on most international issues, strongly criti-
cizing U.S. policy, particularly in Southeast
Asia. With Sihanouk's departure from office,
however, the Cambodian Government has
pledged itself to a more consistent neutrality.
Historically, Cambodia's relations with
neighboring Thailand and the Republic of
Viet-Nam have been subject to mutual sus-
picion stemming from centuries of conflict.
In recent years relations have been marred
by sporadic flare-ups of feeling over border
incidents, disputed territory, and alleged Thai
and Vietnamese support to subversive groups.
Recently, however, there has been a growing
community of interest with these neighboring
countries, particularly with respect to the
NVA/VC intrusions on Cambodian territory.
While relations were broken with Thailand in
October 1961 and with the Republic of Viet-
Nam in August 1963, in June 1970 these
countries joined with Cambodia in announcing
that diplomatic ties were being resumed.
Cambodian policy has long been directed
at Securing international guarantees, or at
least assurances of respect, for its territorial
integrity within its present frontiers. Since
1966 more than 40 countries have issued
statements along these lines. The war in
Viet-Nam, however, has imposed great strains
on Cambodian policy. NVA/VC forces had
been increasingly open in their disregard for
Cambodian neutrality, maintaining and ex-
panding base areas and supply lines on Cam-
bodian territory. Cambodia has called for
international support to rid its territory of
these unlawful incursions by circulating a
letter to the United Nations and by requesting
the aid of friendly nations. -
Cambodia is a member of the United Na-
tions and several of its specialized agencies,
the Colombo Plan, and other regional and
multilateral institutions, such as the Asian
Development Bank.
U.S.-CAMBODIAN RELATIONS
The United States recognized Cambodia on
February 7, 1950. Relations deteriorated in
the early 1960's and were broken in May 1965
by Cambodia, following a serious incident on
its border with South Viet-Nam. NVA/VC .
forces had been using their illegal Sanctuary
areas in Cambodia to direct fire at U.S. and
South Vietnamese troops across the Cambodian
borders. In self-protection, U.S. elements
would return this fire, sometimes inflicting
casualties among the Cambodians. Such inci-
dents were at times due to human error but
more particularly were caused by NVA/VC
provocations. Diplomatic relations were re-
stored on July 2, 1969, by mutual agreement.
The United States recognizes and respects
Cambodia's sovereignty, independence, neu-
trality, and territorial integrity within its
present frontiers. From 1955 until the Cam-
bodian Government stopped U.S. aid in 1963,
we extended to Cambodia approximately $309.6
million in economic grant aid and some $83.7
million in military assistance. In the earlier
years of independence this aid was devoted to
repairing physical damage resulting from
hostilities in Indochina; the establishment and
267
support of military forces required to maintain
internal security; the stabilization of the dis-
organized economy; and the expansion of some
capital facilities needed to stimulate economic
growth. In the last category, the major project
was the construction of a 130-mile, all-weather
highway which, by linking Phnom Penh with the
new port (then Sihanoukville, now Kompong
Som) on the Gulf of Thailand, gave Cambodia
its first direct route to new lands capable of
Substantial economic development.
In April 1970 President Nixon announced
that the United States would provide small
arms and other material to support the defense
of Cambodia against armed aggression by
NVA/VC troops. This aid amounted to approxi-
mately $8.9 million in fiscal year 1970. Thus
far in FY 1971, $40 million in aid has been
granted to Cambodia.
PRINCIPAL GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS
Chief of State — CHENG Heng
Prime Minister; Minister of National De-
fense – Lt. Gen. LON Nol
Deputy Prime Minister in Charge of the Prime
Minister's Office – SISOWATH Sirik Matak
Minister of State in Charge of Justice and
Relations with Parliament— YEM Sambaur
Minister of Interior, National Security, and
Religious Affairs -OP Kim Ang
Minister of Industry – PROM Thos
Minister of Education—CHHANN Sokhum
Minister of Agriculture — UN Tramuch
Minister of Commerce, Supply, and Trans-
port–HOU Hong
Minister of Finance —TIM Nguon
Minister of Foreign Affairs — KOUN Wick
Minister of Information — KEUKY Lim
Ambassador to the U.S.—SONN Voeunsai
Ambassador to the U.N. — KHIM. Tith
Cambodia maintains an Embassy in the
United States at 4500 16th Street, N.W.,
Washington, D.C. 20011.
PRINCIPAL U.S. OFFICIALS
Ambassador—Emory C. Swank
Deputy Chief of Mission–Lloyd M. Rives
The U.S. Embassy in Cambodia is located
on Preh Norodom Blvd., Phnom Penh.
READING LIST
American University. Area Handbook for
Cambodia. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Govern-
ment Printing Office, 1968.
Department of State. The Cambodia Strike:
Defensive Action for Peace. Pub. 8529,
(President's report to the Nation of April 30.)
Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing
Office, 1970.
Department of State. Cambodia in Perspective:
Vietnamization Assured. Pub. 8536. (Presi-
dent's interim report to the Nation of
June 3.) Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1970.
Department of State. Cambodia Concluded:
Now Its Time to Negotiate. Pub. 8544.
(President's report to the Nation of June 30.)
Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing
Office, 1970. - -
Department of State. A Conversation with the
President. Pub. 8545. Washington, D.C.:
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1970.
Gordon, Bernard K. Dimensions of Conflict
in Southeast Asia. New York: Prentice-Hall,
1966.
Leifer, Michael. Cambodia, The Search for
Security. New York: Praeger, 1967.
Osborne, Milton. The French Presence in
Cochin-China and Cambodia. Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1969.
Smith, Roger M. Cambodia's Foreign Policy.
Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1965.
Williams, Maslyn. The Land in Between: The
Cambodian Dilemma. New York: Morrow,
1970.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE PUBLICATION 7747, Revised November 1970
268
APPENDIX K
CAMBODIA
[UNDER SIHANOUK]
NATIONAL SECURITY -
(PUBLIC ORDER AND SAFETY; AND THE
ARMED FORCES)
[Reprinted from: Area Handbook for Cambodia, by Frederick P. Munson
and others. Washington, Department of the Army, October 1968 (DA PAM
No. 550–50).]
269
... * * * *
** - -
:: ; ºz.
NATIONAL SECURITY
PUBLIC ORDER AND SAFETY
Cambodians are, by and large, an orderly and law-abiding
geople. Because of a high code of personal morality rooted in
Buddhist ethics, they adhere, for the most part, to the disciplines
imposed by family and social group. The long, violent years of the
Indochina War disrupted the tranquility that had prevailed in
the country for almost 100 years, and gave lawless elments the op-
portunity to gain an ascendancy that required a major national
effort to suppress. -
T}uring the first few years of independence banditry and dissi-
dent guerrilla activity became a serious problem, but a vigorous
campaign by combined army and police forces succeeded in re-
storing order to the country. In April, 1967 insurgent activity
broke out in Battambang Province and dissident activity also
erupted in northeastern Cambodia among the tribal peoples. Bo-
cause of the threat to the country’s security the army took com-
mand of the military, paramilitary and police units in various
Sectors.
Statistics on the incidence of crime are incomplete and cannot
be confirmed, but the limited records available indicated a rela-
tively low rate for the area. Violations of administrative regula-
tions, such as health, antinoise or licensing ordinances, were the
most prevalent types of offenses, while theft was at a lower level,
and crimes of violence, from assault to homicide, were extremely
rare. There was no evidence of organized banditry, and life and
property were generally secure throughout the country.
Penal codes and codes of criminal proccoiures introduced during
the colonial regime were still the country's basic criminal law in
1967. The government had made some revisions in the courts and
judicial system, but the changes were not radical and did not
depart from familiar French precedents. Courts were generally
equitable, and justice tended to be lenient rather than harsh or
oppressive.
Law enforcement is in the hands of the Royal Khmer Police.
a loosely centralized force under the Secretary of State for Sur-
face Defense, a subordinate activity of the Ministry of the In.
torior (see ch, 13, The Governmental Systºm; ch. :26, The Armed
Forces). It was given its present designation in 1959 as a result
of a reorganization that blought under one authority all of the
country's law enforcCºnnent activitics. It includes rural and niu-
nicipal police organizations, as well as the paramilitary Surface
Defense Force comprising the Provincial Guard and the Chivapol.
The scattered distribution pattern of the country’s population
in thousands of small villages and few urban centers makes it
difficult for any level of government to operate an efficient police
system. In small settlements of 300 or less which cannot afford to
maintain a police force, the problem is even further aggravated.
In spite of this, however, the country's police force, combining
professional and volunteer forces, has becrl able to achieve a note-
worthy record of maintaining law and order and ensuring a high
degree of internal security.
SOCIAL CONTROLS
Respect for constituted authority is traditional in Cambodian
Society, and the influence of family and kinship group has created
an attitude and outlook responsive to an ordered and disciplined
code of behavior. Ingrained loyalty to the king, now transferred
to the Chief of State, has served as a restraining influence in
governing individual conduct, and the traditional hierarchy of au-
thority is recognized and accepted. Religion has also had an im-
portant role in conditioning the people, and pacific Buddhist doc-
trines have fostered a degree of tranquility and nomaggressive-
IlêSS.
After the arrival of the French in the nineteenth century, the
colonial regime introduced a modern judicial and police frame-
work patterned after France. This was new in form, but not
radically different in principle or concept, since it conformed gen-
erally to accepted attitudes toward crime and punishment. Ac-
ceptance was further facilitated by the retention of many tradi-
tional forms and usages and their incorporation into the new
codes. In general the people had no difficulty in adjusting to the
new patterns of behavior, and for years the French found Cam-
bodia one of the more tractable territories in their colonial em-
plpe. -
Urbanization has been slow throughout the country, although
Phnom Penh has had a marked growth since World War II.
Other than the capital, there are only 10 towns with populations
ranging from 10,000 to 45,000. As a consequence social and eco-
nomic change has been gradual, and the country has escaped
most of the modern categories of crime associated with burgeon-
ing cities.
Throughout the countryside the concept of public order based
271
on national law is generally accepted without question, and the
modern courts are the instruments of official authority. The re-
straints instilled by family and group ties continue to exert their
influence, but the control mechanism of the country is consider-
ably more modern than traditional.
Title II of the Constitution—Liberties, Rights and Duties of
Cambodians—is designed as a bill of rights to protect the in-
dividual and ensure the equitable administration of justice.
Among the principles outlined are cquality under the law, the as-
sumption of innocence until guilt is proved, freedom from arbi-
trary search and arrest and the opportunity for an adequate de-
fense. The Constitution further ensures freedom of the press,
freedom of religion, movem?nt and assembly and the right of
peaceful demonstration. Title V is concerned with the judiciary
and prescribes the jurisdiction, structure and composition of the
major tribunals. -
The public attitude toward the police has varied over the years,
from respect to fear. The use of foreigners, especially Vietnam-
ese, as policemen did much ºo alienate the police from the peo-
ple, and the emphasis on enforcing compliance with alien French
laws and regulations fomented an attitude of prejudice and dis-
trust. Since independence the public’s image of the police has
improved. By the early 1960's there were no foreigners on the
force, better training refined and improved police performance
and methods, and the continuing emphasis was to establish the
police as the friends and protectors of the community.
Other than a thin veneer of police supervision, the citizen is
confronted with few mechanical controls or repressions. The po-
lice control the issuance of passports, and foreign travel is care-
fully regulated. Ordinances aftecting the economy, such as price
controls and marking requirements, are strictly enforced, and
hotel registers must be submitted periodically for official inspec-
tion. There are, however, no indications of a national identity
card program of the kind that exists in many other former
French colonies, and in general the law-abiding citizen meets
with little police intrusion into his daily life.
THE JUDHCIAL SYSTEM
The judicial system is based on French juridical principles but
incorporates, to an exterit, traditional forms and practices that
have been adapted to conform to modern French legal codes.
The first modern penal code was introduced by the French shortly
after the establishment of the protectorate. It was periodically
revised over the years, the latest revision being 1956, and it is
that edition which was in force in 1967.
272
The extraterritorial system of separtite jurisdictions for Cam-
bodians and non-Cambodians in effect during the colonial era was
done away with immediately after independence, and all residents
of the country are not subject to trial by Cambodian courts. Al-
though all French courts were abolished at that time, the court
structure remains essentially the one built upon the framework
established by the French and pattermed closely along Western
lines.
The Constitution states that the principle of separation of the
executive, legislative and judicial powers of government is alien
to Cambodian tradition. It provides that judicial power is exer-
cised in the name of the king by the various tribunals according
to their degree of jurisdiction. In practice, except for the execu-
tive powers granted to the king, or, in 1967 the Chief of State,
separation does exist, and one of the principal responsibilities
of the High Council of the Magistracy is to ensure the independ-
ence of judges (see ch. 13, The Governmental System). -
The judicial mechanism does not, however, provide checks to
executive or legislative power, and it is frequently vulnerable to
outside influences and pressures. Further, it does not have the
power to interpret the Constitution, a prerogative which is as-
signed, without appeal, to the National Assembly. Nevertheless,
the combination of traditional and Western concepts of juris-
prudence has resulted in a system that has generally provided
both individual safeguards and clear functional delineations.
Police officers are empowered to act as a summary court and
may fine offenders on the spot for traffic violations or minor po-
lice regulations. When fines cannot be paid, prison terms may be
imposed. This is a practice that often led to abuses and harass-
rºlent of the people and in recent years has brought strong cor-
rective action by the Chief of State. -
An anticorruption committee headed by Prince Sihanouk has
been active since 1962 and has slowly been effecting needed re-
forms. Several high police officials have been dismissed, and the
range of penalties that could be imposed directly has been dras-
tically reduced. Maximum fines for simple infractions at the mis-
demeanor level have been reduced from 10,000 to 500 riels (see
Glossary), and prison terms for these offenses reduced from 2
years to 5 days.
Penalties imposed by the courts are classified in two basic
categories: criminal or correctional punishment. Within each
category there are three degrees, ranging in severity from first
up to third. Criminal punishment involves felonies and serious
offenses, and the maximum category, criminal punishment of the
third degree, carries the death penalty or life imprisonment. First
degree criminal penalties entail imprisonment ranging from 6 to
273
10 years; second degree ranges from 6 years to any maximum,
excluding a life term. Correctional imprisonment is applied in
cases of lesser offenses where a sentence may not exceed 5 years
of imprisonment. Correctional penalties of the first degree range
from 6 days to 1 month, second degree from 1 month to 1 year
and third degree from 1 to 5 years. The limits of allowable punish-
ment generally determine the level of court to which a case is
referred.
Crinitiaal Court Structure
The court structure is fundamentally a continuation of the
French system of the colonial era, although some changes have
been effected since independence. Article 113 of the 1956 revision
of the Constitution states that the organization of the judiciary
is regulated by a special law and that conformance with the provi-
sions of this law will be em.5ured by the High Council of the Magis-
tracy. Titled The Judicial Organization of Cambodia, the law
prescribes in general terrns the types of courts authorized and
outlines their cornposition and limits of jurisdiction.
The court structure in 1967 cornprised four types of tribunals
concerned with criminal matters; the local courts, courts of first
instance, criminal courts and the Court of Review. The one Court
of Review was similar in funiction to the French Court of Cassa-
tion (Cour de Cassation) and was the final court of appeal ºn
criminal matters. Although there was a court designated the
Court of Appeal in the judicial framework, its jurisdiction was
limited to civil cases.
The competence of the various types of trial court was gen-
erally determined by the levels of criminal offenses recognized by
the penal code. Thus misdemeanors (contraventions de police)
are referred to a local court; the lesser criminal offenses (délits)
are tried by a court of first instance; and felonies (crimes) are
assigned to a criminal court. In certain special cases, appeals from
the findings of local courts could be carried directly to the Court
of Review on questions of lax, but the normal channel was to the
court of first instance in the area. Decisions of these latter courts
were appealed to the criminal court, and the criminal court's find-
ings were in turn appealed to the Court of Review, which in any
case reviewed their legal rulings on a routine basis.
Local courts were summary in nature, and a single magistrate
functioned in a manner similar to an American justice of the
peace, conducting all aspects of a trial. Courts of first instance,
presided over by three magistrates and employing a jury of six
men, were found in each of the provinces. Eight criminal courts,
operating in a similar manner, were distributed throughout var-
ious parts of the country. -
There were numerous other types of courts, but these had
specialized and limited functions and were not part of the nornial
criminal court hierarchy. There were commercial courts for civil
arbitration and special military tribunals, which not only tried
military personnel, but also civilians charged with treason or at-
tempting to overthrow the government by force. The High Council
of the Magistracy was essentially a disciplinary court to deal
with offenses committed by members of the judiciary. The Peo-
ple's Tribunal, an elected body which replaced the former High
Court of Justice, had jurisdiction over corruption or offenses com-
mitted in office by members of the Council of Ministers (see ch.
13, The Governmental System).
Criminal Court Procedures
Criminal matters are governed by the procedural section of the
penal code of 1956, which has its roots in the colonial system of
jurisprudence. Numerous laws and ordinances promulgated since
independence have effected a variety of changes to better adapt
the code to current needs that have been relatively minor in
nature, and criminal procedures continue to follow a definitely
traditional French pattern. The code for the most part provides
general guidance rather than specific instruction, but it does
prescribe the jurisdictions of the various types of court, the re-
sponsibilities of judicial officials, and the conduct of preliminary
proceedings and trials.
The criminal procedures in force in 1967 to an extent eliminate
some of the inequities that had caused dissatisfaction during the
colonial era. Regulations are set forth governing rules of custody,
conduct of preliminary investigations and imposition of punish-
ments, as well as limiting precautionary arrest and pretrial de-
tention. Though still based on French sources, the code departs
sufficiently from French law to give it a national character, and
it attempts to accelerate the process of justice while reconciling
the requirements of public order with the rights of the in-
dividual. . -
As in the French system the prosecutor is the key figure in
criminal procedure. Offenses reported by a civil or police official
are submitted to the prosecutor, who determines disposition, juris-
diction and venue in the case. He is not concerned with misde-
meanors, which are handled independently by the local courts,
but with more serious offenses. He may refer a case directly to a
lower court or submit it to an examining magistrate for review.
Under the supervision of the prosecutor, the examining judge
makes a judicial investigation of the case, collects evidence and
interviews witnesses. As a result of his recommendation the case
may be dismissed, referred to a lower court or returned to the
275
prosecutor for arraignment of the offender before a higher court.
The conduct of trials closely parallels French procedure, and
the law specifies an open and public court. The procedure followed
in a multiple-judge trial, as in a criminal court, follows a rigidly
prescribed routine; after selection of the jury, which functions
like a jury under Anglo-Saxon law, the trial opens with a reading
of the charges by the prosecutor. The accused is then identified
and sworn in. The charges are explained by the presiding judge,
who is the senior magistrate, and then the accused enters his
pleas. He may elect to make a statement at this time givir g a
brief explanation of his side of the case.
After opening statements by the prosecution and the defense,
the presiding magistrate begins interrogation of the accused.
Witnesses are then examined and cross-examined, after which
both sides make their closing arguments; the defense follows
the prosecution. The jury ther retires to reach its findings, and
upon completion of its deliberations, the court is reconvened and
the verdict announced. If found not guilty the accused is imme-
diately released; if found guilty, court is again adjourned while
the judges confer to determine the sentence. The court then re-
convenes, and the sentence is announced.
There are few curbs or restrictions regarding admissibility
of evidence, and such matters as hearsay and leading questions
are evaluated by the judges on their own merits. Bail is provided
for but is not often used, and the right of a hearing on a writ of
habeas corpus, which is a relatively recent concept in French
jurisprudence, is still a somewhat unfamiliar novelty in Cam-
bodian law. The procedures prescribed by the code are frequently
circumvented in actual practice, and leniency or sympathy on
the part of the judges reportedly make for frequent liberties
with prescribed guidelines, more often than not in favor of the
accused.
NATIONAL POLICE SERVICE
The Royal Khmer Police consists of the National Police, the
Municipal Police (of Phnom Penh), the Town. Police and the Sur-
face Defense Force. This last is a paramilitary force which is
under police jurisdiction during normal times but reverts to con-
trol under the Ministry of National Defense in times of emergency
or hostilities. The mission of the police force is to maintain
law and order, preserve the peace, protect life and property,
prevent and detect crime and bring offenders to justice. In addi-
tion to their normal law enforcement duties, the police are
charged with internal security and have the primary responsibil-
ity for patrolling and guarding the country's borders.
276
Headquarters of the Royal Khmer Police is at Phnom Penh,
from where it determinos holicy, supervises operations and directs
the activities of subordinate units. In practice, outlying units
enjoy a considerable degree of autonomy, as shortages of super-
visory personnel, distance from the capital and limited connmu-
nications preclude very close or frequent contacts with Phnom
Penh. The headquarters is headed by a Director of Royal Police,
who is directly responsible to the Secretary of State for Surface
Defense under the Ministry of the Interior.
The Municipal Police and the Town Police are uniformed forces
operating entirely in urban areas. The National Police operates
in plainclothes, and its responsibilities cover the entire country.
The Surface Defense Force wears army-type uniforms distin-
guished by a distinctive shoulder board which bears the police
device of a stylized pyramid capped with a small rayed sunburst.
The Surface Defense Force uses army ranks and insignia, but the
police elements have their own police grade structure. -
Police ranks include only three officer grades, which ascen
from inspector to chief and commissioner. There is, however, a
wide range of noncommissioned levels, starting with policemen
and moving up through “brigadier” or corporal, to sergeant and
sergeant superior class. Each level incorporates an in-grade pro-
motion system of classes that moves a man up from third to first
class. Above sergeant first class there are three senior grades,
Sergeant at large, special sergeant at large, and Sergeant Superior
class.
Uniforms closely resemble those of the army and are basically
khaki, but a white uniform is authorized for ceremony and dress.
Policemen and noncommissioned officer grades are indicated by
bars or chevrons worn on the shoulder board. Only a policeman
trainee has no insignia of rank and wears a plain shoulder board.
A policeman 3d class is indicated by one green bar, 2d class by
two and 1st class by one silver chevron. “Brigadiers” use silver
chevrons, 3d class starting with two, 2d class adding a thin
silver chevron and 1st class a gold one. A sergeant 3d class uses
three silver chevrons, adds a thin gold one for 2d class, and is
marked by two silver bars for 1st. Sergeant at large has one gold
and one silver stripe. The two top grades are indicated by one
gold bar, special sergeant at large adding a bank of silver leaves
across the shoulder board, and superior class using gold leaves.
The Royal Khmer Police has a total strength of approximately
14,000 men and women. This does not include the Surface De-
fense Force, with its Provincial Guard and Chivapol. These lat-
ter, however, are part-time; auxiliaries who are not professional
members of the force. Police recruiting is done on a local basis,
and candidates are selected through public competitive examina-
277
tions, which are held periodically in the major cities. Applicants
must hold a secondary school diploma or its equivalent and must
be between 18 and 25 years of age. Police pay compares favorably
with army compensation, and there are usually enough applicants
to insure a wide field of selection. Higher police officials are ap-
pointed by the Minister of the Interior on recommendation from
the Secretary of State for Surface Defense.
The Našional Police
The National Police is patterned after the Süreté forces which
were maintained in the country under French rule. Sometimes
called secret police, the National Police more properly constitutes
a bureau of investigation and political surveillance. Some of its
activities are clandestime, and as a result, little is publicized
regarding its operations. Although occupied with subversion and
internal security, it has a wide range of other responsibilities,
and the greater part of its efforts are probably devoted to the
more prosaic police functions concerned with conventional non-
political crime. In 1967 it numbered some 1,500 men.
National Police Headquarters at Phnom Penh is organized
into five principal sections: criminal, economic, immigration, ad-
ministrative and special police. The administrative section, in
addition to handling personnel, pay, records and the like, has
the responsibility for all matters concerned with traffic. It is
charged with maintaining order on the highways, controls the is-
sue of licenses and conducts accident investigations. The special
police operates in the more sensitive areas of police activities
and is mainly concerned with subversion and threats to the sta-
bility of the government. It investigates possible sources of dissi-
dence and is charged with the security of government officials and
installations. It operates in a covert manner, and its activities
are classified as secret.
The criminal section, in effect the criminal investigation de-
partment of the Royal Rhmer Police, is responsible for the pre-
vention and detection of crime and the apprehension of criminals.
It operates much like the detective force of any Western law en-
forcement agency, has charge of fingerprints and criminal files
and maintains a detection laboratory.
The economic section is concerned with the enforcement of gov-
ernment regulations affecting trade, commerce and other aspects
of the economy. These include price controls, marking of mer-
chandise, honest weights and hoarding and extend to smuggling
and illegal arms traffic. The immigration section handles such
matters as passports and visas, travel controls, residence permits,
alien restrictions and questions ºf citizenship. Most of its activi-
278
ties are of a routine nature, with much of its efforts going into
guarding the borders against illega; entry into the country.
Municipal and Town Police
Cities and towns have their own urban police establishments
which operate within their limits and immediate environs. The
police force of the capital is called the Municipal Police, and the
organized forces of the other cities and towns are known as Town
Police. Some of the smaller towns use members of the Provincial
Guard of the Surface Defense Force, in which case they are also
considered urban, or Town Police. It is estimated that 2,500 pro-
vincial guardsmen are assigned to this type of duty. In the more
densely populated areas the police and military forces operate
effectively together when needed. In less accessible areas, how-
ever, such as the remote border regions, distance and diffi-
culty of mobility make such cooperation considerably less ef-
fective.
The Municipal Police is responsible for the maintenance of law
and order in Phnom Penh. Except for offenses that come within
the province of the National Police, as those where national se-
curity is involved or where provincial boundaries have been
crossed, it has sole jurisdiction over all law enforcement activities
in the capital. It is generally conceded to be an efficient and
effective force and is considered locally to be the most important
instrument of public order in the country.
This force, with a strength of 1,500, is headed by a commis-
sioner designated Chief of the Municipal Police. He is directly
responsible to the Royal Delegate to the Municipality of Phnom
Penh, but in technical matters he is under the Secretary of State
for Surface Defonse. In addition to his regular police duties, the
chief presides over the local count of Phnom Penh and is also
responsible for the Royal Police Academy, the principal training
facility for all components of the Royal Khmer Police.
Police headquarters is organized into two principal operational
elements, the criminal police section and the public order and
traffic section. The criminal section is charged with the protec-
tion of persons and property and the suppression and investiga-
tion of crime, and its members serve as patrolmen on the beat
and as city detectives. The section maintains an extensive crime
laboratory, which is manned by veteran police specialists trained
in modern criminology. The traffic section is charged with the
many traffic regulatory functions within the city.
The city has six precincts, each with its own commissioner.
There are six police stations dispersed throughout the city at key
locations where they afford centralized coverage for their areas.
For the most part, each precinct operates independently within
279
280
its own jurisdiction, but coordinates with headquarters when
necessary, and may either assist or ask for assistance, if needed,
from the other precincts. Manpower is allotted as dictated by
the density of population or by the importance of the area, but
in general, the six areas are not particularly disparate in as-
signed strengths. The city is well equipped with police transpor-
tation, and there are adequate quantities of trucks, sedans and
motorcycles.
The Town Police constitute the individual forces supported by
the various cities and towns throughout the country. They are
found mostly in provincial capitals and are a completely decen-
tralized force, their only area of contact being their mutual sub-
ordination to Royal Rhmer Police Headquarters at Phnom Penh.
Indirectly they come within the province of the Secretary of
State for Surface Defense, but normally they operate entirely in-
dependently, with possibly infrequent policy guidance from the
secretary’s office.
The Surface Defense Force
What little police protection or attention is given to the vil-
lages is provided by the Surface Defense Force. Formed originally
in 1952 as the Territorial Defense Force, it was organized as a
military force to support the army in its suppression of in-
surgency. Upon the pacification of the country in 1955, the force
was assigned to police duties, and since 1960 has been used
principally as a constabulary.
The Surface Defense Force consists of the Provincial Guard.
and the Chivapol. The Provincial Guard is the professional ele-
ment of the force, and its members are the only personnel on
full-time active duty. Numbering over 10,000 men, its mission is
the maintenance of law and order in the provinces and the remote
border areas. In many towns that do not have the resources to
maintain their own municipal force, guardsmen act as urban
police, and the 2,500 who are assigned to this type of duty are
detailed to the Town Police. The great majority of guardsmen,
however, exercise their police duties in their home villages. Here,
backed by the nominal authority of the Royal Khmer Police,
they are usually the sole representatives of government law en-
forcement.
The Chivapol is a local, part-time volunteer militia designed to
assist other police elements in case of need. It is estimated to
total approximately 50,000 men and women, but strength reports
are unreliable, as many of its members are entirely inactive. It
was organized in 1954 to back the Provincial Guard when the
sudden Communist Viet Minh invasion of northeastern Cambodia
%
%-
.
º
created a threatening situation. It was, in effect, a general niobil-
ization for the defense of the country, and over 100,000 were
enrolled. The organization was retained after the crisis, passed
and continues its limited activities in support of the regul: , 1,0}icc
somewhat in the manner of sheriff's deputies in the United States.
TRAINING
The Royal Police Academy in Phnom Penh is the principal
institution for training police personmel. It was built and equipped
under the United States Agency for International Development
(AID) program and opened its doors in 1960 to develop police
officers trained in modern methods and techniques. It offers 250
students basic training for new recruits and conducts a variety
of advanced professional courses for officers and noncommissioned
officers. Its broad curriculum, which is available to all compo-
nents of the Royal Khmer Police, is taught by French and Cam-
bodian police specialists.
The most advanced study offered by the academy is a 2-year
course for inspectors, a course largely devoted to staſſ work and
theoretical and practical management. Other courses range from
3 months to a year and cover such fields as criminal law, scientific
methods, investigative procedures and highway traffic control.
There are basic courses in police duties and public relations,
where classroom work combines with field trips and practical
application of techniques. At all levels considerable emphasis is
given to the use of weapons and self-defense, and all students
are given practical training in judo and other means of pro-
tection.
In addition to the academy, there is a Basic Training Center
for Police at Kompong Chhnang, some 50 miles north of the
capital. This institution, established in 1953, was the country’s
sole police training facility until the formation of the academy.
Since 1960 it has been used almost exclusively for the Provincial
Guard. Its capacity is 350 students, and it handles basic and ad-
vanced training for members of the guard and for occasional se-
lected students from the Chivapol. Both training center and
academy have modern, efficient plants, with adequate classrooms,
dormitories and laboratory facilities. The quality of training
meets a high standard and has shown steady progress and im-
provement over the years. -
In the past it had been customary to send a number of police
officers abroad each year for specialized courses in foreign schools.
Many attended courses in French and other European institu-
tions, and a few were enrolled in police courses in the United
States. When the academy opened, the number sent abroad was
sharply reduced as the local school enlarged and improved the
281
scope of its instruction. The country’s emphasis on self-suffi-
ciency starting in the early 1960’s further limited overseas train-
ing, and in 1967 there were apparently no police students being
trained outside the country.
PRISONS
The country’s prison system is rudimentary and conceded to
be inadequate, particularly if measured by Western standards.
It still suffers from a system that was for all of Indochina. It
had been French practice to raove their prisoners around to any
institution in the entire area; as the number of criminal cases in
the country was insignificant during the colonial era, the major
detention facilities were located outside of Cambodian territory,
mostly in what is now Vietnam.
Information on present-day facilities is extremely limited, and
what there is available is vague and unreliable. Some of the bet-
ter, more modern prisons are Xnown to be located in Phnom Penh
as well as some of the provincial capitals. These are frame build-
ings with reasonably secure arrangements, in contrast to the
average village jail, which is often a temporary bamboo cage set
between the stilts of the chief's hut. Except for the few per-
manent structures in the largei towns, facilities for incarceration
are fragile and insecure; any but the most unimaginative prisoner
could break out at will, yet very few do. Among the larger penal
facilities are the Central Prison in the capital and a prison camp
on the island of Antay, just off Kep near the eastern end of the
coast. This latter accommodates over 1,000 inmates. .
The prison system is under a Director of Prisons who is sub-
ordinate to the Minister of the Interior. The directors for the past
10 years have been generally enlightened in their outlook and
progressive in their administration. Many reforms have been in-
stituted, including liberalization of prison procedures, providing
trade schools and language classes and making newspapers and
other reading material available to inmates. A parole system has
been established and appears to be working with marked suc-
cess. Many deficiencies remain, however, as prisons are generally
overcrowded and uncomfortable and sanitray facilities even in
the capital’s Central Prison are imadequate or nonexistent. In
most of the smaller jails prischers must rely on family or friends
to supply their food and other basic needs. -
, , ºf
...tº
282
THE ARMED FORCES
The Royal Khmer Armed Forces (Forces Armées Royales
Khméres—FARK) consist of the army, the navy and the air
force. The navy and air force are subordinate to the army, which
is by far the dominant component of the military establishment,
and are directly under the jurisdiction of the Chief of the General
Staff, who is the army commander. In late 1967 total military
strength amounted to over 35,000 men, some 32,000 of whom
were in the ground forces. Cambodia had one of the smallest na-
tional military force among the countries in Southeast Asia.
In addition to the regular establishment, there was a sizable
paramilitary element designated the Surface Defense Force. This
comprised the Provincial Guard of some 11,000 men, a volunteer
reserve force called the Chivapol, which numbered 50,000, and
the National Police. The Surface Defense Force was an auxiliary
force under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of the Interior, but
it reverted to the control of the Ministry of National Defense in
the event of hostilities (see ch. 25, Public Order and Safety).
The Cambodian armed forces have maintained a noteworthy
record of avoiding involvement in politics. They have remained
largely aloof from the political scene and have exercised no sig-
nificant influence on the government. In addition, they are able to
occupy much of their time in civic action programs which pro-
mote security in remote border areas, accomplish needed public
works and contribute to bolstering the national economy.
Cambodians are not an aggressive or militaristic people and
their sociological and religious background is not one to foster
the development of an effective modern army. Nevertheless, dur-
ing the later years of coloniai rule the French instilled in the
people a sense of pride in the armed forces that carried over and
was, in fact, stimulated in independence. French rule in the
country was not harsh, and, as a result of the generally satis-
factory relationship, French iuſiuence remains a significant
factor, particularly in the armed forces. After 15 years of auton-
omy, the armed forces still retain the atmosphere and appearance
of a French colonial establishment.
The serviceman as an individual is in a favored segment of the
283
society, and his environment and conditions of service meet
a high local standard. The soldier's daily routine is not too
stronuous or demanding. He has status, relativo security and
many amenities and advantages that would be difficult to at-
tain in civilian life. The armed forces are recognized as an in-
tegral and essential part of the social structure, and the military
are a familiar and accepted facet of the national scene.
Military strength is maintained almost entirely on a volunteer
basis. There is a conscription law, promulgated in 1954, which
provides for compulsory military service by all qualified males
between the ages of 21 and 35. The government has rarely had to
resort to conscription, however, as voluntary enlistments have
maintained the forces at desired levels with no difficulty. The
benefits and relatively high pay offered by a military career gen-
erally serve to attract more volunteers than can normally be
absorbed by the services, and, as a result, the draft law has only
been applied in a few isolated instances involving needed spe-
cialists.
The country is almost entirely dependent on outside aid for
its armament, equipment and materiel, as well as for much of its
military training. The military forces are small, and their arma-
ment is limited and unsophisticated, but they are reasonably
well trained and competent. Their dependence on outside sources,
however, seriously limits their independence of action, and de-
ficiencies are most evident in the materiel field. Logistic support
facilities are barely adequate for peacetime needs, and the sys-
tem would be hard pressed to cope with operations of any extent
or scope in the event of hostilities.
THE MILITARY TRADITION IN NATIONAL LIFE
The country’s modest military tradition combines aspects of
its ancient monarchial heritage with the French doctrines and
techniques of its more recent colonial tutelage. Cambodia's his-
tory is filled with reports of wars of rival kingdoms and dynastic
strife; as the Khmer people see the glories of Angkor Wat re-
flected in present-day Cambodia, so the military exploits of an
earlier age serve as an inspirational legacy to the present heirs
of its ancient tradition. The twelfth century bas-reliefs of the
ruined citadels of the past depicted the battles of the Khmer
against their invaders, and ancient chronicles were filled with
their warlike deeds at a period when they dominated the area.
The martial spirit was not long lived, however. As the people
became converted to Theravada Buddhism the pacific nature of
the new creed gradually supplanted the aggressive drive that had
marked the earlier years. For several hundred years, beginning in
the fifteenth century, the country was relatively peaceful and
284
submissive, and the result was that it was dominated by its more
belligerent neighbors.
The nineteenth century saw Cambodia beset by a series of
aggressive acts on the part of its traditional enemies; these acts
threatened its territory and independence. In 1857 King Ang
Duong, the founder of the present dynasty, sought security for
his country by allying himself with the French, who were then
occupied with the conquest of Annam to the east. This alliance
resulted in a French protectorate being proclaimed in 1864, the
agreement providing that France would undertake to defend
Cambodia against both external and internal enemies. After the
signing of the treaty, the country’s armed forces were placed
under French command and remained so until Cambodia gained
its independence in 1953 (see ch. 3, Historical Setting).
The first modern military force in the country, the Royal
Cambodian Army, was organized in 1946 as part of the French
colonial forces. All of its officers were French, but in 1949 a new
accord provided for the formation of a new national army to be
commanded by Cambodian officers. The national force was built
up slowly over the years, and increasing numbers of Cambodian
officers acquired their rank in the services. Nevertheless, when
the final transfer to Cambodian command was effected in October
1953, the new accord provided that French advisers and techni-
cians would be furnished to the new army and that French offi-
cers would be permitted to command its units as needed.
These former elements of the French Union Forces formed the
basis of the present-day establishment. Totaling some 10,000
men, they were subsequently augmented by nationalist guerrilla
troops, who rallied to the king, and by irregular security forces,
particularly the Provincial Guard of the Surface Defense Force.
In 1954 the navy and air force were organized, and the name
Royal Cambodian Army was changed to the Royal Khmer Armed
Forces (Forces Armées Royales Khméres—FARK).
The FARK took part in several successful campaigns to rid the
country of dissident guerrillas whose operations in outlying areas
marred the first years of independence. They also fought against
Viet Minh forces that were operating in Cambodia until they
were withdrawn as a result of the 1954 Geneva Agreement that
was ostensibly to end hostilities in Indochina. The armed forces
retain as a primary responsibility the defense of the nation
against foreign attack, but since 1958 they have been used in-
creasingly in an economic role to develop outlying districts
through civic action projects.
The military tradition of the army in 1967 rested solidly on a
French foundation, absorbed over the years through amicable
relations and a paternalistic guardianship. Because of France's
285
longstanding and continuing commitment to Calhº (dia's armed
forces they reflect a marked French influence in doctrine, outlook
and appearance.
FOREIGN INFLUENCE
From the time of the establishment of the protectorate, the
country was suffused in a French military atmosphere that was
fostered and maintained by the presence of French troops and
the integration of Cambodians into the French colonial army.
After the independence of the country in 1953, the original mili-
tary cadres were all French colonial service veterans who carried
over into the Cambodian forces the French patterns of their
training, both in concepts and in physical externals.
At the start the army relied exclusively on the French for the
schooling of its officers and the training of its enlisted men;
French theoretical and tactical doctrines became so thoroughly
ingrained that they are still paramount in influencing military
thinking. Developments over the next few years, however, wit-
messed the decline of France's fortunes in its colonial empire and
the gradual increase of United States involvement in Southeast
Asia. These changes were reflected in a decrease in French aid
and a significant rise in United States assistance. From 1953
through 1963 the United States was the major source of the
country’s military aid, and a United States Military Assistance
Advisory Group (MAAG) provided specialized training in
United States-furnished equipment and assisted in staff plan-
ning. - -
France, nevertheless, continued to dominate training, although
instruction in the use of American weapons and equipment was
provided by American technicians. This never reached signifi-
cant proportions, however, and it left little permanent influence
on Cambodian military concepts or doctrines. Since the termi-
nation of United States aid in 1963, the principal source of
materiel has been from the Communist bloc, particularly the
Soviet Union and Communist China. -
France still furnishes some logistic support in materiel and
equipment, but it is in the field of training that it continues to
occupy a dominant position. In 1967 the French Military Mission
was the only such foreign group in the country, and numerous
French officers were attached to the general staff in advisory
capacities. French advisers were found throughout the military
school system, and the majority of Cambodian students in the
military services who were trained abroad continued to be sent
to French schools and academies.
Little evidence remains of the period of confrontation with
the Japanese during World War II. Japanese influence was min-
286
&º
.
.
imal and transitory, and left only minor vestiges of its brief as-
sociation with the Cambodian armed forces. Communist influ-
ence on the military has not proved a very effective force, and
the services have remained for the most part fundamentally
anti-Communist. There have been no other outside pressures that
have had any significant impact, and in 1967 it did not appear
likely that the predominance of French influence would be sup-
planted for some time to come.
THE ARMED FORCES AND THE GOVERNMENT
In J.967 the government was still operating under the Constitu-
tion of 1947 as amended in 1965. This instrument devotes scant
attention to the armed forces; Article 45 designates the king
as the supreme commander of the armed forces; and Article 42
specifies that he creates and confers all military ranks. Article
49 decrees that military personnel on active duty may not vote in
national elections and may be appointed but not elected to public
office. -
Subsequent amendments and modifications have effected neces-
sary changes to conform to new conditions, and provision has
been made for the Chief of State to assume the functions nor-
mally those of the king (see ch. 3, Historical Setting). The rela-
tionship between the military and civil components of govern-
ment has been left largely to the discretion of the Chief of
State, and appropriate laws or decrees have been promulgated
as necessary. -
The Chief of State, Prince Norodom Sihanouk, exercises com-
mand of the armed forces through two distinct channels, one
civil and one military. The civil channel extends from the su-
preme commander through the President of the Council of Minis-
ters (Prime Minister) to the Minister of National Defense, who
is responsible for the administrative and support services of the
armed forces. He does not, however, have operational functions,
and he exercises no operational control over the military services.
Operational control of the military forces adheres to a strictly
military chain of command extending directly from the Su-
preme commander to the Commander in Chief of the Armed
Forces. The Commander in Chief has as his principal subordi-
nate the Chief of the General Staff. The decisions of the Chief
of the General Staff are implemented by General Headquarters
of the FARK, which serves as the headquarters element for the
three services.
From 1955 to 1966 the positions of Minister of National De-
fense, Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces and Chief of
the General Staff were held by the same person, a lieutenant
general in the army. This facilitated coordination between the
287
military and civil components and did nuch to eliminate possible
confusion in a coniplicated contmand structure. This was changed
in 1966, however, with the appointment of a new defense Minis-
ter of National Defense who did not hold an active military
command position. In 1967 the rciationships between the various
command and advisory elements were still somewhat tenuous
and were in the process of being decided and defined in official
terms.
THE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT AND THE
NATIONAL ECONOMY
The development of the armed forces immediately after inde-
pendence was facilitated by French and United States aid in
weapons, equipment and budgetary support. This eased signifi-
cantly what otherwise would have been a serious drain on the
country’s slim resources. By 1963, however, the country’s philos-
ophy of nonalignment resulted in a cessation of United States
aid and a sizable decrease in French support. Since that time,
despite a fair amount of assistance from the Communist bloc,
the cost of maintaining its military establishment has become a
growing burden on the country's economy, and the government
has been having increasing diſficulty in meeting its military
budget commitments. &
During the mid-1960's approximately one-quarter of the ma-
tional budget was devoted to military expenditures, a ratio con-
siderably lower than most of the country’s Southeast Asian
neighbors. The military budget for fiscal year 1967 (fiscal year
coincides with calendar year) was approximately 1,700 million
riclis (see Glossary), which was just under 25 percent of the total
budget. This was somewhat lower than the 890 million riels for
the previous year, which had been 27 percent of the national
budget. This outlay did not include the budgetary support of the
Surface Defense Force, which was borne by the Ministry of the
Interior, but this normally has been a relatively insignificant
item.
The country does derive some economic gain from the use of
the regular armed forces for civic action projects. Since 1958
the services have been engaged as much in public works to develop
the economy as in training or strictly military duties. Close to
1,000 miles of new roads have been completed; over 50 bridges
have been built; several dams and airfields have been constructed;
and over 100 schools have been established throughout the coun-
try. Military personnel have assisted in agricultural programs
both in the field and at army-established model farms, and the
men and their wives have served extensively as teachers in the
new schools built under civic action.
;
.
The use of the military in an economic role was originally
confined largely to the more populous areas in the central portion
of the country, but starting in 1961 the emphasis was shifted to
the development of more remote regions. A program was started
with four border provinces, two in the southwest and two in the
northeast, placing them directly under control of the FARK, to
be administered by a military governor. These areas (now con-
sisting of five provinces) were inhabited largely by hill tribes
which had never been fully integrated into the national Society,
and the civic action programs served the dual purpose of develop-
ing the territory economically and giving the people a sense of
identity with the nation. The project has made slow, steady
progress and has resulted in an additional benefit in developing
a national consciousness that rºakes the areas less vulnerable to
subversion. There are plans to extend its application to additional
outlying territories.
The number of men in regular military service is small in
relation to the total population, amounting to about 2 percent of
the able-bodied males. The withdrawal of this small number
from normal civilian pursuits does not have any appreciable ef-
fect on the oconomy, nor does it create any manpower shortages
in agriculture or industry. Any full mobilization or large-scale
increase in the size of the forces would not necessarily constitute
a military manpower problem, but it would be an economic drain
on resources that would prove unacceptable except in the most
serious emergency.
The armed forces require a continuing supply of foreign arma-
ment, munitions and other materiel in order to function, and
they need credits and other financial support. Nevertheless, in the
face of world conditions and major power commitments in
Southeast Asia, it appears probable that Cambodia will continue
to receive foreign assistance to meet its growing military needs.
MANPOWER
In 1967 there were nearly 1.5 million men in the 15- to 49-
year age bracket, of which 50 percent were considered qualified
for military service. An average of some 60,000 young men
reaching the military age of 18 each year ensures ample man-
power to meet the country’s military requirements. The status
and benefits of a military career have attracted enough volun-
teers to make conscription uſinecessary, and it did not appear
that connpulsory service would have to be resorted to for some
tine to come.
Despite only half of the eligible males proving qualified for
induction, there are still enough men available so that the serv-
ices can be carefully selective in accepting applicants. The unified
character of the nation's manpower is strikingly evident, as a
289
preponderant majority of the men share a common religion,
language and ethnic background. Although there are no diffi-
culties with respect to numbers, there is, nevertheless, a
perennial problem in finding men with the education and me-
chanical aptitudes to train as leaders and technical specialists.
The average Cambodian is generally intensely loyal and patri-
otically motivated. He is good natured and normally not overly
aggressive, but he responds well to capable leadership and has
proved to be a courageous and effective soldier. Most of the men
come from rural backgrounds. About 50 percent are illiterate,
and they come into the service with little or no mechanical or
technical skills. Many are completely unfamiliar with rudimen-
tary tools or simple mechanical devices and must be grounded in
basic fundamentals before going on to more advanced training
in the complex equipment of modern warfare.
The country’s military schools regularly turn out well trained
junior officers, but their output is small, and the supply of pro-
fessional officers rarely, if ever, meets the demand. Even military
academies, which have a high priority call on qualified man-
power, have difficulty in obtaining candidates with the educa-
tional qualifications needed to fill their small quotas.
Procurement and Training of Officers
Officer procurement is on the basis of direct appointment,
voluntary application or selection from the ranks. Over half of
the candidates attend military schools; about a third are com-
missioned from the ranks; and the rest are given direct appoint-
ments. The number of applicants is usually below the needs of
the services, and the military training schools have tried to be
realistic in the matter of entrance requirements. Nevertheless,
they must maintain relatively high standards, and, as a result,
the required scholastic and physical qualifications tend to limit
the field of applicants to well-to-do young men who have an edu-
cation well above the country's average. -
The Khmer Military School at Phnom Penh is the basic insti-
tution for training cadets for the army. It offers a 3-year course
leading to a regular commission and a degree equivalent to a
bachelor of science. Founded by the French in 1946, it gradu-
ates classes that average 50 students annually. Candidates for
admission must be between 18 and 25 years of age and are re-
quired to have completed secondary school. Applicants with high-
er educational qualifications may be admitted directly to the
second year of study. In addition to military subjects, the cur-
riculum also includes mathematics, science, history, geography,
French and English.
The school also offers several specialized courses. A 1-year
course trains noncommissioned officers who have qualified as
.
candidates for a commission, and a similar course trains reserve
officers. Special short courses of 6 to 12 months are given to
provide preflight training for air force cadets and basic training
for naval officer candidates.
There is one additional training facility for army ofticers, the
School of Application, at Kompong Chhnang. All newly com-
missioned officers are required to attend its specialized 1-year
course in infantry tactics and ground force operations. Among
the numerous other schools offering specialized army instruction
are the Infantry Training Center, the Jungle Warfare School
and the Engineering School. These are not exclusively for officers,
although there are provisions for training them in conjunction
with courses for enlisted meri. *
Candidates for regular commissions in the navy are selected
by competitive examination. They first receive basic military
training at the army's Khmer Military School and then go on to
2 years’ additional study at the Naval Instruction Center at the
Chrui Changvar Naval Base. They receive instruction in naviga-
tion, communications, ordnar.ce, radio and small arms. The next
step is enrollment in the French Naval Academy near Brest,
France, where they pursue a 3-year course at either the Line
Officers School or the Naval Engineering School. Upon successful
completion of the Academy curriculum, they are usually assigned
for a 9-month probationary period to a French navy training
cruiser, after which they are appointed ensigns first class.
Air force cadets begin their training with attendance for 1
year at the Khmer Military School. They then enter the Royal
Flying School at Phnom Penh for ground and flight training.
Upon completion of this phase the cadet is graduated as a proba-
tionary pilot-officer and is sent out of the country for advanced
training and transition flying. -
There is one high-level career school, the Royal Khmer Military
Academy, located at Phnom Penh. It was founded in 1955 for
officers of the three services. Its curriculum offers both staff
and command courses of a minimum of 1 year's duration. Battal-
ion and company commanders' courses and an advanced staff
course are included. Before entering the Academy, the student
must have completed a special 1-year correspondence course de-
signed to prepare him for the phase he is to study at the school.
The French Military Mission plays an important role in the
training of officers, as it does in all training. French advisers and
instructors are found throughout the military school system, and
French officers are assigned as consultants at various staff levels
in all three services. Cambodians are gradually replacing some
French instructors, but they are still a small percentage, par-
ticularly in the navy and the air force.
291
"rocurement and Training of Enlisted Personnel
The strength of the armed forces was maintained at a rela-
tively constant level from 1957 to 1967. This was accomplished
almost exclusively through voluntary enlistments. Only twice
since the compulsory service law was enacted in 1954 has it been
necessary to resort to conscription, and this was done to fill a’
small number of specialist vacancies that occurred soon after the
law's promulgation. e
Voluntary enlistments are open to physically qualified male
citizens between the ages of 18 and 25. The term of enlistment is
for 3 years for the combat arms and 6 years for the technical
services; reenlistments are accepted on a year to year basis.
Women may volunteer for service in the armed forces and are
used extensively in the higher headquarters and the technical
services. They are employed primarily at clerical duties, but they
also serve as drivers, switchboard operators and parachute
packers.
Recruit training for the army arid the air force is conducted at
the Infantry Training Center at Pursat, some 100 miles north-
west of Phnom Penh. Recruits undergo an 8-week basic course
and then go on to advanced training in the arm or specialty to
which they have been assigned. Airmen report to air force in-
stallations to continue their training. Navy recruits receive all
their introductory instruction at the Naval Instruction Center
at Chrui Changvar and, after basic training, are assigned to
specific career fields. French Military Mission personnel assist
in training at all navy and air force schools and at most army
schools.
The navy and the air force have most of their training facil-
ities concentrated at their principal bases, and they occasionally
send men to army technical schools for instruction in jointly
needed specialties. The army has a number of technical schools
which provide basic and advanced courses in engineering, com-
munications, armor and other branch subjects. Navy men re-
ceive much of their advanced instruction aboard ship, and air-
men are promptly assigned practical work in tactical units un-
der experienced instructors. - .
In all three services after a man is assigned to a unit his train-
ing is continuous throughout his military career. In addition to
on-the-job instruction and small unit exercises, a number of
men are permitted to attend formal courses for specialized train-
ing and advanced career schools. These opportunities are lim-
ited, however, and are usually reserved for noncommissioned
officers. Noncommissioned officers usually come up from the ranks
and are selected on the basis of experience and proven capability.
- *>3' .
`... . . . Y.
... .33%
Most are career men who have had several years’ Service. Al-
though all components suffer from a shortage of experienced
noncommissioned officers, this group in general constitutes one
of the principal elements of the military services.
MISSION AND ORGANIZATION OF THE ARMED FORCES
The army has two primary missions: to defend the country's
territorial integrity against external aggression and to assist in
maintaining internal security. This entails the traditional mili-
tary responsibility of ensuring a constant state of readiness to
repel any invader and to implement the government's military
policies. In addition, the army is charged with developing prim-
itive regions of the country through civic action and with
directing a national sports program.
The navy's principal mission is to defend the national coast-
line and to police territorial waters. It is also charged with pa-
trolling inland waterways and, where possible, providing trans-
port and tactical support to the ground forces. The mission of
the air force is primarily the air defense of the country, but it is
also responsible for providing air transport and tactical support
to the army. The air force also has the additional responsibility
of participating in civic action and providing a pool of pilots for
civil aviation. -
In the first few years of independence the armed forces were
required to take the field against scattered dissident elements
that were threatening security in outlying areas. The insurgent
forces were not large, however, and they were neither well
equipped nor well organized. The royal forces’ operations were
successful for the most part, and from the end of the 1950's to
early 1967, there was no significant insurgency. The army gained
a limited background of combat experience, but it was experience
based on restricted, irregular operations, usually confined to
small unit tactics in engagements using small arms exclusively.
The armed forces have actually been more concerned with civic
action than with military pursuits. Since 1967, however, with the
outbreak of insurgency in Battambang Province and other areas,
the armed forces have been involved on several occasions in
multi-battalion operations.
In 1967, of the 35,000 men in the armed forces, more than 90
percent were in the army, and the principal emphasis was on the
infantry. The navy and air force were, in effect, token forces
that were of some support value but could contribute little in the
event of major hostilities.
In 1907 the basic organization of the armed forces remained
fundamentally unchanged from that carried over from the
French, and a residual French influence continued to pervade all
293
294
levels of the military structure. The army is the basic elºërit of
the arm,ed forces and cffectively overshadows the other services.
Despite a trend toward increased autonomy for the navy and air
force, they continue to be under army direction, and their com-
mandel's subordinate to the Chief of the General Staff. who is an
army officer. The General Staff fulfills normal staff functions for
all three services, but at the operational level each component
has a small, specialized staff to handle its own particular activ-
ities. .
The Minister of National Defense is responsible for the ad-
ministrative and support Services of the armed forces. These
services comprise a variety of support activities which include
quartermaster, ordnance, engineer, signal, military justice and
medical services. The Minister also has under his jurisdiction the
Director of Personnel, the Director of Research and the Office
of Civic Affairs. The Minister, however, has no operational func-
tion and exercises no direct control over the military services.
Operational control of the military forces extends directly
from the supreme commander to the Commander in Chief of the
Armed Forces. The Commander in Chief is, in effect, the coun-
try’s senior military officer, and he directs military operations
subject to the policies of the Chief of State. He has as his princi-
pal subordinate the Chief of the General Staff (see fig. 6).
General Headquarters of the FARK is at Phnom Penh. The
staff is organized along conventional lines and adheres closely to
the pattern of the French army. Following French precedent,
chiefs of bureaua (sections) are charged with personnel, intelli-
gence, plans and operations and logistics. To these have been
added a fifth bureau for information and morale and a sixth for
security. In addition to the Inspector General, who is re-
sponsible only to the supreme commander, two staff inspectors,
one for training and one for logistics, complete the headquarters
organization.
The various technical services under the Ministry of National
Defense have officers attached to General Headquarters who ful-
fill the functions of a special staff. The unusual arrangement of
having most of the support elements outside of the military
command structure is one that could create complications in that
it places the Commander in Chief in a position where he must,
in effect, contract for such services as ordnance, signal or engi-
neering. In the past, however, problems usually have been
avoided by having the top military and civilian positions in the
defense hierarchy occupied by the same person.
Reported data and statistical estimates concerning the organ-
ization of the service components vary widely. The latest figures
available indicate that in early 1967 the Royal Cambodian
º
‘. .33%
CHIEF OF STATE
Supreme Commander
- - |
Inspector General
Commander in Chief
of the
Armed Forces
Prime Minister
Minister Chief
of the
General Staff
;
of _> Gºº
National Defense
General Headquarters
| of the
l
Surf Administrative FARK
. SurlăC0.
and
Defense Su rt
: Force ppo
Services
| | | | | | | |
1st Bureau
Personnel
2d Bureau
Intelligence
3d Bureau
Plans
and
Operations
4th Bureau
Logistics
5th Bureau
Information
and
Morale
6th Bureau -
Security
|
Chief of Staff
Navy
* Command
* * * Liaison
Chief of Staff
Military
Regions
Army
Military
Schools
General
Reserve
l FARK -- Forces Armées Royales Khmeres (Royal Khmer Armed Forces).
Under Ministry of National Defense during emergencies only.
Chief of Staff
Air Force
Command Structure of the Cambodian Armed Forces

295
Army's strength of over 30,000 men was organized into between
30 and 40 standard infantry battalions. In addition, there were
two parachute battalions and two Royal Guard Battalions. The
army framework also included one known armored reconnais-
sance regiment and an antiaireraft artillery brigade.
Arms and equipment inventories included fairly substantial
quantities of armor, artillery and heavy infantry weapons, rang-
ing from French AMX-13 light tanks to 105-mm howitzers. The
armament did not, however, represent a very sophisticated level
of weaponry, and much of the couipment was old and approach-
ing obsolescence. Additional materiel was expected from Com-
munist bloc sources.
The country is divided into five geographic regions which
divide the area into roughly equal segments. Where they coin-
cide, regional boundaries generally follow those of the political
provinces, but each military region encompasses several prov-
inces. Regional commanders are directly responsible to the Chief
of the General Staff and exercise command over all units sta-
tioned in their areas, with the exception of military training
schools and General Reserve units. The General Reserve is a
strategic military reserve in Czistence rather than an inactive
force to be called to duty in case of need. It is centered in the
general area of Phnom Penh, has units dispersed in numerous
military regions and constitutes a sizable composite force, com-
prising infantry, paratroop and armored units.
The Royal Cambodian Navy was originally part of the army,
but it became a separate service in 1954. It is a small force de-
signed for coastal and river patrol duty and for tactical support
of ground force operations in the maintenance of internal secur-
ity. In late 1967 it had a strength of some 1,400 officers and men,
which included a commando infantry force of about 200 for use
in amphibious operations. -
The navy's operational forces are organized into three princi-
pal elements: a river división, a coastal force and a sea force.
The river division is based at Chrui Changvar, across the river
from the capital, where the naval repair and construction facil-
ities are also located. The other elements are stationed at Ream,
on the Gulf of Siam. The naval inventory of over 50 small vessels
inciudes two patrol boats, a gupport gunboat, several amphibious
landing craft and a variety of 30rvice and utility ships.
In late 1967 the Royal Carr:bodian Air Force, with around
2,000 men, was one of the 3rmallest in Southeast Asia. It had
about 100 aircraft, which it;cluded several jet fighters and light
bombers. Designed primarily to support the ground forces, it is
used mostly to provide aerial rºupply, paradrops and the trans-
port of personnel. The operational elements form a composite
squadron, although they are organizatiºnally divided intº 3 pit-
rate operatiºn it and technical group. Aircraf
units in 1967 included M I (?-17 jet ſighters, A-1 Skyrºider light
bombers & French) and T-28 Trojan ground attack aircr:#ft.
There were also a number of jet trainers, 12 C-17 transports arid
other miscellaneous transports, including SG V (ºral helicopters.
CONDITIONS OF SERVICE
The general environment and physical conditions surrounding
military life have not changed significantly since French colonial
times. Many of the facilities of the colonial era continued in use,
and many of the newer ones still adhered to familiar French pat-
terns. The life of ihe serviceman, though not one of ease, was not
particularly austere, and he was, for the most part, well cared
for by the authorities. He was respected and well compensated,
and the conditions under which he served rated relatively high
in comparison with normal local standards. • . -
Military posts were scattered throughout the country, with a
heavy concentration in the Phnom Penh area. Although primi-
tive by Western standards they compared favorably with most
civilian facilities and adequately met the needs of the services.
In general, quarters, food and pay were as good as a man could
find outside the service and often were considerably better. There
were separate accommodations for officers, and on most stations,
housing for families was provided. Troop barracks were mostly
of tropical wooden frame construction, but occasionally there
were more elaborate buildings of stucco and tile. .
There were other advantages that added attraction to a mili-
tary career, such as medical care, Žetirement pay, accrued leave
and survivor benefits. Rations were generally superior in both
quality and quantity to the food consumed by much of the popu-
lation; standards of nutrition were higher and provided greater
variety and a more balanced diet. Although menus were built on
a rice base and were repetitious from a European point of view,
meals conformed to local dietary patterns, and the average sol-
dier considered himself well fed. - -
There are no reliable recent figures on current pay scales, but
it is evident that the military are adequately paid by Southeast
Asian standards. Basic pay rates were raised moderately in 1967.
The latest figures available, however, were for 1965. These
ranged from the equivalent of $14.65 a month for a private first
class to $192.00 for a colonel (and navy or air force counterparts).
A 1.laster sergeant received $43.00 a month; and a captain,
$97.71. In addition to base pay, there was a wide variety of
supplementary allowances for officers and men, including family
and station allowances, as well as additional compensation for
t ill ºperational
297
specialists, paratroops and flying personnel. Every man received
a fixed ration allowance, and there were generous reenlistment
bonuses and equipment allowances for officers and men.
In 1967 retirement procedures still followed the French army
system. Retirement could be for disability, length of service or
age and could be statutory or granted on request. Retired pay is
geared to length of service and grade held; a man may retire
with a partial pension after 15 years’ active duty; he is entitled
to a full pension after 25 years' service. The retirement plan is
contributory, 6 percent of a man’s pay being withheld each
month. Service leave policies are liberal; all ranks accrue ordi-
nary leave at the rate of 30 days a year, with special provisions
for emergency situations.
All military personnel receive free medical treatment at mili-
tary hospitals or infirmaries, and members of the immediate
family are eligible for treatment where facilities are available.
Although there is a shortage of military doctors, medical service
is maintained at a relatively high level. There is a well-equipped
120-bed military hospital in Phnom Penh, and three 30-bed
dispensaries are located at Rompong Speu, Battambang and
Kompong Cham. These were built and furnished through the
United States Agency for International Development (AID) pro-
gram, and they have modern dental, X-ray and laboratory
equipment. Smaller dispensaries have been set up in several of
the border provinces, where they offer treatment to the hill
tribesmen in the area as well as to military personnel and their
dependents.
Very little information is available on military justice or the
conduct of courts-martial. The average serviceman has a back-
ground of traditional respect for authority and deference to his
elders; he considers obedience a normal adjunct of military life;
therefore, discipline is not a major problem in the armed forces.
In general, the French system of military justice is followed.
There is one permanent four-man court which sits at General
Headquarters, in Phnom Penh and handles the more serious cases
involving rhembers of the armed forces. Commanding officers
have relatively wide disciplinary powers, and court-martial is
generally resorted to only in cases of major offenses.
UNIFORMS, INSIGNIA AND DECORATIONS
The rank and grade structure of all three services has been
adopted from the French almost without change, and insignia
or rank closely follow the French pattern for both officers and
nºncommissioned officers. Army and air force ranks are identicai
and use the French titles, whereas the navy uses the distinctive
designations of the French naval service. Officers’ insignia of
298
grade are displayed on shoulder boards; the army and navy use a
basic dark blue and the air foree a lighter blue. Some of the army
services have a distinctive color, such as light green for para-
troops and maroon for medical corpsmen. Noncommissioned of-
ficers’ chevrons are worn on the upper left sleeve or, for dress
occasions, on shoulder boards.
General officer shoulder boards have gold stripe of laurel-like
leaves marking the outer edge, and grade is indicated by small
silver stars. Other officer ranks use narrow bands of gold (or gold
and silver) braid across the end of the shoulder boards. Noncom-
missioned officers wear chevrons of gold braid or colored cloth
(indicating branch of service). These closely resemble United
States equivalents and are worn with the points upward for the
combat arms and reversed for the services. Adjudants and ad-
judants chef wear officer-type insignia on the shoulder, and
aspirant (officer candidate), a distinct grade that ranks just be-
low second lieutenant, has its own officer-style insignia (see table
19).
Responsibilities for commissioned officers generally follow
Western practice; lieutenants command platoons; captains are
in charge of companies; and lieutenant colonels or majors com-
mand battalions. Among noncommissioned officers, squad leaders
are generally sergeants, with corporals as assistants. Higher
ranks as well as adjvºdants may occupy staff positions or serve as
platoon sergeants, specialists or unit sergeant majors.
The uniforms of the military services, furnished for the most
part by France, follow French design, with minor changes in de-
tail and insignia to lend a national character. Except for the
navy, which wears the standard white of the French service,
uniforms are built up from the basic tropical outfit of khaki
shirts and trousers. Shorts and short-sleeved shirts are worn as
the weather dictates, and long trousers are tucked into combat
boots or leggings for field or garrison wear and worn loose with
low-quarter shoes for dress. Officers wear the conventional serv-
ice coat blouse for off-duty and dress occasions, and they also
have a white dress uniform. He adgear includes berets, bush hats,
oversea caps and peaked garrison caps, and helmets are worn
frequently in the field. -
A national emblem of the arms of Cambodia is worn by all
officers; it is centered on their shoulder boards along with their
insignia of rank. The air force arms add stylized wings, and the
navy insigne incorporates a fouled anchor. The national arms are
also used as a cap ornament and as the central theme of other
badges and devices, such as buttons and pilots' wings. The army
has adopted distinctive branch insignia of brass or enamel, which
are worn on the shirt collar or the lapel of the blouse. The in-
Ranks and 1,...s: º, ... ... the Cambodian Armed Forces
Army and Alir Force S 4 rºw Insignia
Lieutenant Général . . . . . . . * * * * Three stars.
Major Général . . . . . . . . . . Two stars.
Général de Brigade . . . . . . - . . Oric star.
Colonel - - - - - - - - . . . . . . Capitains de V', is “all Five gold stripes, grouped
3 and 2.
Lieutenant Colonel . . Capita::,c de Fr. :ate Five stripes grouped 3 and
2, alternate gold and
0. silver.
Commandant . . . . . . . . Capitairie de Corvette Four gold stripes, grouped
3 and 1.
Capitaine - - - - - - - - - - - - Licutºria "it j, Vaisseau Three gold stripes.
Lieutenant - - - - - - - - - - Enseig fic 1 r. CŞ::sse . . Two gold stripes.
Sous Lieutenant . . . . . . Enseigne - - - - One gold stripe. -
Aspirant - - - - - - - - - - - - Aspirant . . . . One gold stripe, broken by
two transverse black
A lines. -
Adjudant chef - - - - - - - Maitre I’rincipal . . . One gold stripe, thin red
line lengthwise through
center.
Adjudant - - - - - - - - - - - - Premier Maître . . One silver stripe; thin red
line lengthwise through
A. center.
Sergent chef - - - - - - - - - Maitre ºme Classe . . . . . Three gold chevron.
Sergent - - - - - - - - - - - - - Maître A ' ' ' ' ' ' " One gold chevron.
Caporal chef - - - - - - - - - Quartier maitre, I re Two chevrons in color of
Classe. basic arm, with thin
A gold chevron below.
Caporal - - - - - - - - - - - - - Quartiermaitre . . . . . Two chevrons in color o:
basic arm (crimson for
- infantry).
Soldat. 1ne Classe - - - - n.a. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . One chevron in color o:
basic arm.
Soldat - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Il-a- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
fantry uses crossed rifles; artillery, crossed cannon; engineers, a
stylized temple tower; quartermaster, a flaming grenade; and
medical, a caduceus superimposed on a red cross. Pilots' wings
are gold colored, and paratroops' badges are silver.
The Cambodian serviceman presents a generally favorable ap-
pearance; he is neat, clean and usually proud of his uniform.
His clothing and personal equipment are of good quality, are
simple and comfortable and adequately meet his needs. His ap-
pearance has not changed radically from the soldier of the
French colonial army, but the accessories and distinctive devices
of his uniform are designed to keep him conscious of his unique
nati ol Status.
T Juntry makes extensive use of awards and decoration's,
and the military are particularly conscious of the many national
... : :"...ºr
300
symbols of official recognition. Awards are highly prized and are
worn with pride. There are several strictly military decorations
and nurnerous national orders and awards designed to reward
individual accomplishment or outstanding service of either a
military or a civil nature. Civilian and, in rare cases, military
awards may be presented to foreign nationals.
The ranking decoration is the Grand Collar of the National
Order of Independemee, which is given in a single class for ex-
ceptional services to the kingdom. This is followed by the Royal
Order of Cambodia, which closely parallels the French Legion of
Honor in form and structure and consists of five grades ranging
upward from Chevalier through Officer, Commander, Grand Offi-
cer and Grand Cross. Next in order of precedence are two mili-
tary awards, the Sena Jayaseddh Medal, presented in one class
for exceptional military services, and the National Defense
Medal, which comes as a bronze, silver, or gold star for acts of
heroism in action. -
Three additional decorations are often awarded to military
personnel but are not restricted to services of a military nature:
the Medal of the Crown, a single class award; the Medal of the
Kingdom, in bronze, silver or gold categories; and the Anussara
Medal of Royal Remembrance, also limited to one basic class.
Campaign and service medals are issued periodically, and a va-
riety of other specialized orders and decorations recognize
achievement in such fields as sports, agriculture, literature, labor
and cleanliness. There is also a special medal of merit for women.
Article 42 of the Constitution, as annended in 1956, states that
the King (now Chief of State) is grand master of all of the
orders of the kingdom and makes all appointments thereto.
LOGISTICS
Responsibility for planning and controlling the procurement
of supplies and equipment rests with the Ministry of National
Defense. Little procurement of materiel for the armed forces is
undertaken within the country itself, however, as logistic support
for the military is almost entirely dependent on foreign aid and
assistance. Virtually all arms and equipment must originate out-
side of the country, as there is no internal capability for the
manufacture of weapons, munitions, vehicles or other heavy
items of military hardware. - * .
Until 1955 most military supplies were provided by France,
and from 1955 until 1963 the United States was the principal
source of arms and equipment. Since the termination of United
States aid in 1963, the country has been largely dependent on
assistance from the Communist bloc, but France continues to
provide limited support in some categories. There has been a
301
fairly steady ſlow of materiel from Communist China and the
Soviet Union, and earlier stocks of French and United States
equipment are gradually being replaced by more modern mate-
riel from these sources.
Storage and issue procedures are centrally controlled by the
Ministry of National Defense. Central depots are maintained for
each of the technical services, mostly in the vicinity of Phnom
Penh, and these serve as stock control and distribution points
for filling requisitions from the army, navy or air force. In most
supply matters the army generally serves the other components,
but both the navy and the air force have small logistic activities
to handle their own specialized needs.
The separate organizational structure of the support elements,
which places their functions outside of the operational chain of
command, requires complex and time-consuming procedures. Re-
quests for supplies must be requisitioned through the Ministry of
National Defense and, consecuently, channeled from the field
back through the Chief of the General Staff and the Commander
in Chief of the Armed Forces. In practice, however, there is
actually some decentralization; numerous field stations have been
set up in various parts of the country for the direct issue of am-
munition, fuel and medical supplies without requiring formal
requisitioning procedures. *
The major support facility is; the logistic center at Lovek, some
30 miles north of the capital, which is the maintenance center
for all ordnance and quartermaster materiel. It includes over 30
separate structures and provides a modern installation where
major repairs can be performed on weapons, vehicles and other
equipment. The center also has facilities for the manufacture of
shoes and clothing in small quantities. -
In general, there are adequate quantities of basic items, such as
uniforms and personal equipment for routine operations. Suffi-
cient quantities of individual weapons are available, and they are
maintained in reasonably good condition. Few depots are able
to maintain adequate stock levels. The logistic services are mar-
ginally adequate for peacetime needs, but they would have diffi-
culty meeting requirements of a wartime situation.
The navy's facilities are centered at the naval base at Chrui
Changvar, and lesser activities exist at some of the smaller coastal
and river stations. Ship maintenance is accomplished at the main
base's Fleet Repair Facility, and most shore-based naval supplies
are handled by the base's naval warehouses. The air force has its
main storage and issue point at Phnom Penh, which handles
virtually all aircraft maintenance and has four well-equipped
hangars where most of this work can be performed. Most of the
maintenance, excluding major overhauls that are performed out-
side of the country, is supervised by French advisory personnel.
302
APPENDIX L
ICAMBODIA's Politico-MILITARY POSTURE
UNDER LON NOLI
[Reprinted with permission from: The advanced copy of The Almanac
of World Military Power, Second Edition, by Col. T. N. Dupuy, U.S.
Army, Ret., Dunn Loring, Va., T. N. Dupuy Associates, 1972.]
303
CAMBODIA
Khmer Republic
Power Potential Statistics
Area: 69,898 square miles
Population: 7,000,000 .
Total Active Armed Forces: 179,000 (2.56% population)
Gross National Product: $910 million (estimate; $130 per
capita) - •
Annual Military Expenditures: $336 million (36.9% GNP)
Electric Power Output: 128.3 million kwh
Merchant Marine: 3 ships; 4,230 gross tons
Civil Air Fleet: 3 piston transports
Defense Structure
Control of the Khmer Armed Forces is vested in Marshal Lon
Nol, who is at once President, Prime Minister and Commander in
Chief of the armed forces, of which the Army is by far the pre-
dominant service. It is difficult to trace the chain of command
further at this period of the war, especially since a new con-
stitution is not yet promulgated at the time of writing. There
is, however, a Chief of Staff and a General Staff.
Politico-Military Policies
The current politico-military policy of Cambodia, under the
presidency of Marshal Lon Nol, is in marked contrast to that of
the former Chief of State, Prince Norodom Sihanouk, whom the
government, under the premiership of Lon Nol, deposed in March
1970, while Sihanouk was in Moscow. (He was later tried in
absentia for treason and sentenced to death.) Sihanouk's declared
policy of remaining uninvolved brought him to tolerate the
establishment of several North Vietnamese divisions in eastern
Cambodia near the South Vietnam border, and to permit the
supply of these troops and the Viet Cong via extensions of the
Ho Chi Minh Trail, routes up Communist-controlled waterways
of the Mekong delta, and by sea from the west coast of Cambodia.
He determinedly failed to expand the weak Cambodian army or to
oppose the encroaching forces other than by unheeded diplomatic
representations to the Soviet Union and Communist China.
After the March 1970 coup Marshal (then General) Lon Nol
promptly recalled reservists and former soldiers, and called on all
men aged 18 to 40 to volunteer for the army. He also closed the
western ports to all ships supplying the hostile forces. In late
May, martial law was decreed, and a month later “general mobili-
304
zation” was ordered, whereby “all citizens” between 18 and 60
are required to perform military or other service “in the national
interest,” and the requisitioning of property and financial re-
sources was authorized. The economic efficacy of this decree is
unclear, but it did result in large increases in the army—larger
than could be adequately trained before being exposed to combat.
The nation became the Khmer Republic in October.
General Lon Nol suffered a stroke in February 1971, which
necessitated two months of complete inactivity. The resultant gov-
ernment crisis was in the end solved by making Lon Nol titular
Prime Minister with the rank of Marshal, while his deputy
handled day-to-day problems of government and defense. In
October, a cabinet decision accepted by Lon Nol dissolved parlia-
ment, whose elective term ended that month, and made its mem-
bers delegates to a constituent assembly to produce a republican
constitution. (Truly representative elections were impossible with
the North Vietnamese in control of half the country.) In March
1972 Marshal Lon Nol, apparently completely recovered, pro-
claimed himself President, “having also the function of Prime
Minister,” to head a government composed of a vice-president and
a national security council.
Strategic Problems
Cambodia’s present strategic problem is to gain the time for
survival within the restricted area left it by the North Vietnamese
Army-Viet Cong (NVA/VC) attacks. In 1970 Cambodia lost all
control of five northern and northeastern provinces and the north-
ern parts of two others northeast of Tonle Sap—in general all
territory northeast of Highway 6. In addition much of the
territory along the South Vietnam border was and still is at
least intermittently occupied by the NVA/VC. The government
thus controls somewhat less than half the country. Control is
only nominal because though greater in numbers, the partially
trained Cambodian troops are unable to prevent the infiltration
of the enemy even in critical areas. Highway 4, from Phnom
Penh to Kompong Som (formerly Sihanoukville) has been cut
and blocked more than once, and the capital itself has been
attacked by mortar and rocket fire. One sapper attack on its
airfield destroyed many of its aircraft early in 1971. In such
efforts the enemy is aided by relatively small numbers of native
Communists, the Khmer Rouge. -
South Vietnamese efforts have in general been of help to Cam-
bodia, in defeating the invaders near the border, sometimes alone
and at others in conjunction with Cambodian troops. South Viet-
namese troops have also convoyed supply trucks on Highway 4,
assisting in breaking through roadblocks. From among the numer-
ous ethnic Cambodians long resident in southwest Vietnam troops
have been raised, trained and equipped by the U.S. Army. Some
2,000 have been sent to Cambodia, where they have proved to be
effective fighters. The process continues, and others are being
similarly trained in southern Laos from among Cambodian ref-
305
ugees from the northern provinces. Australia has also accepted
Cambodians for military training.
The Cambodian strategic position is precarious and strongly
dependent on foreign aid to procure the time to raise its army's
fighting capabilities.
Military Assistance
From 1955 to 1963, when Cambodia terminated U.S. aid,
America supplied $83.7 million in military assistance (and $309.6
million in economic aid). The U.S. resumed military aid in 1970,
to the extent of $8.9 mllion, and quantities of captured Russian
and Chinese weapons, ammunition and equipment taken from the
NVA/VC. Aid in FY 1971 amounted to over $25.5 million. In
1963 Cambodia accepted its first Communist aid, fighter aircraft
from the USSR. Military equipment and economic assistance were
received from communist countries—notably the Soviet Union
and Communist China—but ceased with the change of govern-
ment. ;
Alliances
Cambodia is a member of the UN; it is not a member of any
formal military association. Diplomatic relations with Thailand
and the Republic of Viet Nam, severed in the early 1960s, were
resumed in 1970. -
Army
Personnel: 175,000
Organization:
200 infantry and commando battalions
1 armored car battalion
1 tank regiment
3 parachute battalions
Major Equipment Inventory:
light tanks (M-24, AMX-13)
armored cars (M-8 and M—20)
scout cars (M–3)
APCs (BTR-40 and BTR-152)
36 M-109 self-propelled 105mm howitzers
105mm howitzers (French)
76mm and 122mm guns (Soviet)
light and medium AA guns and field artillery (Soviet,
French, and Chinese)
10 Cessna O—1 liaison aircraft
Navy - .
Personnel: 1,600 (includes 150 Marines)
Major Units:
2 patrol vessels (PC)
2 support gunboats (LSIL and LCI)
2 torpedo boats (PT)
6 patrol boats (YP)
306
4 landing craft (EDIC and LCU)
over 30 small patrol craft
Major Naval Bases: Ream, Chran Changvar (Phnom Penh),
Kompong Som
Air Force
Personnel: 2,400
Organization:
1 fighter-bomber squadron (MiG-15/17, “Magister”)
1 ground attack squadron (T-28D, A–1D)
1 transport squadron (C–46, C-47, I1–14)
1 aerial observation squadron (O-1)
1 helicopter squadron (“Alouette” II and III, “Iroquois”)
1 training squadron (GY–80 “Horizon”)
1 liaison flight (DHC–2, An–2, Cessna 170)
Major Aircraft Types:
68 combat aircraft
4 “Magister” armed trainers
20 A–1D ground attack bombers
24 MiG-15/17 fighter-bombers*
20 T-28 armed trainers
90 other aircraft
18 C-47 transports
10 miscellaneous transports (An–2, “Beaver,” “Fla-
mant,” C–46, I1–14)
45 miscellaneous trainers
3 H–34 helicopters
1 Mi-4 helicopter
10 “Alouette” II helicopters
“Iroquois”
Major Air Bases: Seam Reap, Battambang, Pochentong
(Phnom Penh.)
Paramilitary
About 100,000 to 150,000 recently raised and lightly armed
police and home guard type units.
T- -
ºsibly all destroyed in Phnom Penh raid; may be replaced by A-37s.
307
APPENDIX M
CAMBODIA
STRENGTH OF COMMUNIST PARTY
ORGANIZATION
[Reprinted from: World Strength of the Communist Party Organizations.
23rd Annual Report, 1971 Edition. Washington, Department of State,
Bureau of Intelligence and Research, 1971 (Publication 8526).]
308
- CAMBODIA
NATIONAL POLITICAL STATUS
Date of last election: September 11, 1966
Following Prince Norodom Sihanouk's deposition as Chief of State
by unanimous vote of the National Assembly and Council of the
Kingdom on March 18, 1970, and Sihanouk's formation of a Royal
Government of National Union (RGNU) in Peking seven weeks later,
the Cambodian monarchy was abolished and The Khmer Republic
(GKR) proclaimed -- again by unanimous parliamentary vote -- on
October 9, 1970. A new constitution is being drafted; in the
interim executive power is vested in a cabinet accountable to the
National Assembly and a largely ceremonial chief of state elected
by the Assembly. The life of the National Assembly was extended
by proclamation for one year in November 1970, as widespread
insecurity rendered scheduled elections infeasible.
(Ommunist Party Membership:
The Cambodian Communist movement has led a shadowy existence since
1962, when its front, the Pracheachon (People's) Party, was *
forced underground. . At peak strength, the Pracheachon Party may
hāWe had 1,000 members and a few thousand sympathizers. With the
Citbreak of the Khmer Rouge insurgency in 1967, those remaining
leftist leaders, including some known Communists, who escaped
arrest or execution went either into exile or underground. The
Cambodian People's Revolutionary Party (PRP) is now presumed
to be primus inter pares in the Vietnamese Communist-sponsored
Cambodian insurgent movement, the National United Front of Kampuchea
(FUNK), under Sihanouk's titular leadership. Although the PRP is
rarely mentioned by Communist sources, Sihanouk has stated flatly
that the FUNK within Cambodia is led by Communists and that Red
Khmer is the majority element within the RGNU. It is probable
that the PRP has been expanded rapidly since Sihanouk was deposed,
and it may include now as many as 1,000 members.

leading Party Figures and Position:
(hieu Samphan - Allegedly, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of
Defense of the RGNU and member of the FUNK Poliburo;
said to be leading "the resistance" within Cambodia.
The GKR believes Samphan was executed at Sihanouk's
order in 1967.
thau Seng - Possibly member of French Communist Party, RGNU "Minister
for Special Missions" and FUNK Politburo member.
309
CAMB0DIA (continued)
Principal Publications: Unknown
The Agence Khmer d'Information and the Voice of FUNK, both
established in the summer of 1970, are the leading insurgent
propaganda organs.
Area of Communist Activity
Until it received massive military and organizational aid from the
Vietnamese Communists following the fall of Sihanouk in March 1970,
the Communist insurgency was poorly coordinated and limited to
border areas. An official Cambodian journal estimated Khmer
Rouge strength at 1400 in November 1969. The Khmer Rouge has
been integrated into FUNK, supposedly a union of all anti-GKR
elements, under the titular leadership of Sihanouk. Local FUNK
administration have been established in areas of Cambodia overrun
by WC/NWA forces -- especially in the north and northeast -- and
it initiated a hasty conscription of military forces of uncertain
size. At present, the FUNK functions primarily as a fig-leaf for
Vietnamese Communist activity in Cambodia. It is heavily dependent
on Vietnamese Communist aid and is apparently highly responsive
to Vietnamese Communist direction. FUNK's appeal to the ethnic
Cambodian population is believed to be minimal. Conversely, the lar;
urbanized Chinese and Vietnamese minorities historically have
been more favorable to the Communists. - -
The insurgent movement's declared aims are the armed overthrow.
of the GKR, withdrawal of all "imperialist" forces from Cambodia,
and establishment of a "progressive-nationalist" government in
Phnom Penh. - - - - -
310
º
&
APPENDIX N
CAMBODIA
(MAP WITH INSETS-COLOR)
311
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, ,
APPENDIX O
CAMBODIA: ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISIONS
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C. Aſ I V A S E A
136
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APPENDIX P
CAMBODIA: ETHNIC GROUPS
(MAP—COLOR)
315
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Bound ARY REPREs EnTATION is
194 Not N. Ec-Essa Ri LY AUTHORitative 196
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APPENDIX Q
KINGDOM OF LAOS
BACKGROUND NOTES
[Washington, Department of State, August 1970, Publication 8301.]
317
Population: 2.9 million (est.)
Capital: Vientiane (Administrative)
Luang Prabang (Royal)
Strategically situated in the heart of the
Southeast Asian peninsula, the Kingdom of Laos
shares common borders with six other nations:
on the north with Communist China (264 miles);
on the east, substantially along the watershed
formed by the Annamite Cordillera, with North
Viet-Nam (1,018 miles) and the Republic of
Viet-Nam (301 miles); on the south with Cam-
bodia (366 miles); on the south and west with
Thailand (1,090 miles, of which more than 500
are along the Mekong River); and on the north-
west with Burma (147 miles). Laos is roughly
shaped like Italy but, unlike Italy, does not have
access to the sea. The total area is approxi-
mately 91,000 square miles, slightly less than
Illinois and Indiana combined. A large part of
the terrain, particularly in the north, is covered
by dense jungle and rugged mountains, the latter
sometimes rising more than 9,000 feet.
The climate of Laos is monsoonal, with
three seasons. There are 5 months of heavy
rainfall, from May through September. In
October, when the rains start tapering off, a
cool season begins that lasts through January.
February through April is hot and humid. In
April, the warmest month, the temperature at
Vientiane normally ranges between 72° and
93°F., and in January, the coolest month, be-
tween 57° and 83°F. However, temperatures of
103°F. have been recorded in April and 39°F.
in January. Humidity is high most of the year.
The flag of Laos consists of a three-headed
white elephant, standing on five steps under a
white parasol, against a red field. The ele-
phant exemplifies the historic kingdom of Lane
Xang–Land of a Million Elephants—and the
three heads represent the three former princi-
palities of Luang Prabang, Vientiane, and
Champasak. The parasol symbolizes mon-
archy. The five steps represent Buddhism's
five commandments against murder, theft,
falsehood, adultery, and drinking alcohol.
THE PEOPLE
The people number about 2.9 million—an
estimate, since no accurate census has ever
been taken. This sparse population is spread
unevenly, with the greatest concentration in
the Mekong Valley and the tributaries of the
Mekong River. The growth rate is estimated
to be 2.4 percent annually.
About half of the people are ethnic Lao—the
principal valley inhabitants and the politically
and culturally doininant group. The Lao are
descendants of the Tai, a people who migrated
from southwestern China, principally in the 13th
century. Mountain tribes of Sinitic (Meo and
Yao), Tibeto-Burman (Akah and Lahu), and Tai
ethnolinguistic strains are found in northern
Laos. Many of these same tribes, as well as
others of Indonesian or proto-Malay back-
ground (Lave and Nyaheun), inhabit central and
Southern Laos. The lack of common origin,
customs, language, traditions, and beliefs
among the various minorities hinders the
political unification of the Kingdom. There are
also influential minorities of Vietnamese and
Chinese and smaller groups of Cambodians,
Indians, and Pakistanis. More than a thousand
French and other Europeans and Americans
are in Laos, but few are permanent residents.
The predominant as well as state religion
of the Kingdom is Theravada Buddhism, com-
mon also to Cambodia, Thailand, Burma, and
Ceylon. It is not unusual, however, to see spirit
shrines in Buddhist temples. While the moun-
tain tribes are principally animist, some of
them have adopted Buddhism while retaining a
measure of their old beliefs. -
Lao, the dominant language in the country
and the lingua franca among tribal groups, is
tonal like others of the Sino-Thai family.
Some textbooks have been developed in Lao for
the primary grades, but French remains the
principal language of Secondary education.
French serves as the second official language
and is used commonly in government and com-
merce. Probably not more than 25 percent of
the population is literate. Furthermore, the
numerous tribal groups possess their own
languages or dialects with no historic written
form, and the Vietnamese and Chinese retain
their own school systems.
HISTORY
In the mid-14th century King Fa Ngum
united Laos, established his capital at Luang
Prabang, and ruled an area that would today
encompass not only Laos but also much of
northeastern Thailand and the southernmost
part of Yunnan Province of China. In the fol-
lowing century the Vietnamese began periodic
incursions into Laos, a practice which persists
to this day. By the 18th century Thailand and
Viet-Nam had begun their competition for Lao
soil.
* ,s
AUGUST 1970

318
In the early 19th century the Thai of Siam
(now Thailand) obtained ascendancy over much
of what is now Laos and retained their hold for
the most part until France supplanted Siam in
1893. The Franco-Siamese Treaty of 1907 de-
fined the boundaries of Laos as they exist to-
day. The French technically treated Luang
Prabang as a protectorate and directly ad-
ministered the other principalities.
During World War II Japan did not take over
full control of Laos until March 1945, and just
prior to their defeat the Japanese persuaded the
King of Luang Prabang to declare his kingdom
independent. In September 1945 the Prime Min-
ister of the "independent" government pro-
claimed the creation of the Kingdom of Laos,
including the areas of Vientiane and Champasak,
under the King of Luang Prabang. In October a
provincial government formed by the "Lao
Issara" (Free Lao) leaders "dethroned" the
King because of his alleged loyalty to the
French. In May 1946 French troops occupied
Laos and recognized the sovereignty of the King
of Luang Prabang over the entire country.
Laos gained "independence" within the
French Union in 1949, but France did not recog-
nize Laos as a fully sovereign state until Octo-
ber 1953. At that time Laos reaffirmed its ad-
herence to the French Union, but this
relationship was dissolved upon the conclusion
of the 1954 Geneva agreements. From 1954 to
1960 pro-Westernor conservative governments
held power, including the brief interval in 1957–
58 of a coalition government which had some
Communist ministers.
A Communist movement, originally dis-
guised as the Free Lao Front (Neo Lao Issara)
and later renamed the Lao Patriotic Front
(Neo Lao Hak Sat—NLHS), was formed under
North Vietnamese auspices in Communist
territory in North Viet-Nam in 1950. The
ostensible leader was, and remains, Prince
Souphanouvong. The ranking Lao in the Secret
People's Party of Laos (Phak Pasason Lao—
PPL) has apparently been Kaysone Phomvi-
ham, however. The PPL reportedly is respon-
sive to the Lao Dong, the Vietnamese Com-
munist Party in Hanoi.
Under the Geneva agreements of 1954,
North Vietnamese and all but 5,000 French
forces were to withdraw from Laos and other
parts of what had been French Indochina.
However, North Vietnamese forces continued
to occupy substantial areas of the country.
The NLHS, however, - was permitted by the
terms of these agreements to regroup in the
two northern Laos provinces of Phong Saly and
Houa Phan, pending NLHS reintegration into
the national Lao community. Prolonged at-
tempts at political and military integration
failed. Following the collapse of the coalition
government, the new rightist governmentim-
prisoned Souphanouvong and other NLHS
leaders in Vientiane. After Souphanouvong's
escape the NLHS resumed insurgency in 1959.
The presence of a United Nations investigatory
subcommittee in late 1959 restored an uneasy
peace which existed until mid-1960.
In August 1960 a young paratroop com-
mander in Vientiane, Kong Le, seized the
capital in a coup. In an attempt to avert civil
war among the non-Communist e le ments,
Prince Souvanna Phouma, a former Prime
Minister, was again called upon to form a
government. Gen. Phoumi Nosavan, a leader
of the conservative, anti-Communist faction,
at first agreed to serve in the Government but
Soon reversed his decision and established a
military headquarters in southern Laos from
which he mounted a campaign to retake the
capital. He recaptured Vientiane in December
1960, and Kong Le retreated with his troops
to the northeast and joined forces with the
NLHS.
In early January 1961 NLHS and Kong Le
forces, supplied by the Soviet Union, and ad-
vised and encadred by the North Vietnamese,
seized the strategic Plain of Jars, where they
established headquarters. By the spring of
1961 the NLHS appeared to be in a position to
take over the entire country. To help counter
this threat, the United States in 1961 pro-
vided tactical military advisers for the Lao
Government forces.
Geneva Conference 1961-62. In its desire to
help Laos, the United States thus was faced
with three alternatives: the loss of Laos to the
Communists; military intervention, involving
U.S. troops and other outside forces; or abate-
ment of the crisis through international and
internal negotiations to achieve a neutral
status for the Kingdom that would permit it to
survive as a nation. Following discussions be-
tween President Kennedy and Soviet Premier
Khrushchev at Vienna during the spring of 1961,
the decision was reached that a peaceful settle-
ment transferring the struggle from the mili-
tary to the political domain was the most desir-
able of the possible alternatives. Bipartisan
Congressional leadership was consulted on this
decision. The United States thus participated in
the 14-nation conference convened at Geneva in
May 1961 which, after long and difficult negotia-
tions, resulted in the signing of new Geneva
agreements on July 23, 1962.* They provided
certain international guarantees for the inde-
pendence and neutrality of Laos. .
On the internal level the three Lao factions—
conservative, neutralist, and Communist—
reached agreement in June 1962 on the forma-
tion of a Government of National Union under
the premiership of Prince Souvanna Phouma.
Kong Le's neutralist forces constituted Sou-
vanna's principal military strength.
Of immediate importance under the 1962
Geneva agreements was the requirement that
all foreign military personnel leave the country
within 75 days of the signing, exceptfor a small
French training mission. Under the supervi-
sion of the International Control Commission
*The 14 participants who signed the protocol were: Burma, Cam-
bodia, Canada, People's Republic of [mainland]China, Democratic Re-
public of [North] Viet-Nam, France, India, Laos, Poland, Republic of
[South] Viet-Nam, Thailand, U.S.S.R., the United Kingdom, and the
United States. &
319
(ICC), consisting of political and military rep-
resentatives of India, Canada, and Poland, all
666 U.S. military advisory personnel departed
from Laos before the deadline of October 7,
1962. There have been no U.S. combat troops
in Laos. Only 40 North Vietnamese civilian
advisers were withdrawn through ICC check-
points leaving about 6,000 North Vietnamese
troops in Laos.
After the Conference. Within a few months
of the signing of the 1962 Geneva agreements,
the Pathet Lao (the NLHS military forces now
called the Lao People's Liberation Army—
LPLA) began maneuvering, with North Vietnam-
ese support, to subvert or eliminate Kong Le's
neutralist military forces. Following the assas-
sination on April 1, 1963, of the left-leaning For-
eign Minister, Quinim Pholsena, minor skir-
mishing broke into open hostilities when the
Pathet Lao attacked Kong Le's troops in posi-
tions the two forces had held jointly. These ag-
gressive Pathet Lao tactics not only failed to de-
stroy the neutralist forces but resulted in much
closer political as well as military cooperation
between the neutralists and the conservatives.
Before the outbreak of fighting in April 1963,
the two NLHS ministers withdrew from Vienti-
ane, leaving NLHS representation in the Gov-
ernment in the hands of the two NLHS secre-
taries of state of cabinet rank. By mid-1964
the NLHS secretaries of state had also left.
On April 19, 1964, following the failure of
tripartite negotiations on the Plain of Jars
among the leaders of the three factions, dis-
gruntled military elements led by Generals
Kouprasith Abhay and Siho Lanphouthacoul at-
tempted to take over the Government by force.
The- United States and other foreign repre-
sentatives, however, encouraged Prime Min-
ister Souvanna to continue in office and resist
the efforts to displace him. By April 23 the
coup leaders had agreed to restore the Prime
Minister and his government.
In mid-May 1964 the Pathet Lao took ad-
vantage of some dissidence within neutralist
ranks and attacked in great strength Kong Le's
forces on the Plain of Jars. This deliberate
attack prompted the Prime Minister to seek
additional military assistance. The United
States continued, within the framework of the
Geneva agreements, to supply military equip-
ment and supplies for the Lao Armed Forces,
and, at Lao Government request, initiated
reconnaissance flights over Communist areas.
By June 1964 the reconnaissance flights were
accompanied by armed escorts authorized to
fire back if fired upon.
The British, at the request of Prime Min-
ister Souvanna, invited on May 26 the signa-
tories of the Geneva agreements to begin con-
sultations at Vientiane on means of restoring
peace. The United States and several other
signatories accepted the invitation, which the
Communist states spurned. At the close of the
consultations in June, the representatives con-
cluded that the Pathet Lao, with North Vietnam-
ese support, had initiated the attacks against
the neutralists and that the deteriorating mili-
tary situation in Laos presented a grave threat
to the peace of Southeast Asia. They recom-
mended a cease-fire and withdrawal under
ICC verification to positions held before the
most recent fighting.
Efforts on the part of the three Laofactions
to resolve their difficulties, in meetings at
Paris during August and September 1964, like-
wise produced no basic concessions except a
general agreement to continue talking. Low-
level talks continued sporadically and abor-
tively at Vientiane until 1966.
Events 1965-67. At Vientiane on January 31,
1965, Col. Bounleut Saycocie led some forces
in a "demonstration," declaring that he wished
to show that many professional army officers
were not interested in politics but desired a
truly unified general staff that would get rid of
Gen. Siho as well as certain "bad elements"in
the army. The "demonstration" provoked spo-
radic clashes between Fifth Region and police
forces which finally erupted into open battle at
Vientiane on February 3. Maj. Gen. Phoumi
Nosavan, then Deputy Prime Minister, at-
tempted to give the impression that he had the
overwhelming support of the Lao Army. He
stated that he had lost confidence in the general
staff, in the Government, and in Souvanna and
felt constrained to take charge of the situation.
Second Military Region troops attacked Vienti-
ane from the south in support of Phoumi. Gen.
Siho's police, when faced with an ultimatum to
disperse peacefully, fought back, resulting in
considerable destruction in the city. The forces
under Col. Bounlet somewhat belatedly rallied
to the Government and played a major role
in destroying the last police resistance. Gen.
Phoumi has since lived in exile in Thai-
land.
The February fracas settled many military
and political problems, but constitutional prob-
lems remained. The National Assembly elected
in 1960 was coming to the end of its 5-year
mandate, and the Government concluded,
somewhat reluctantly, that regular elections
could not be held because of internal warfare.
Accordingly, a National Congress amended the
Constitution, giving the King three options
during times of crisis. The King selected the
option of nominating deputies following popular
consultations, and the Fifth Legislature, whose
mandate was limited to 2 years, entered into
session on August 18. The NLHS had been in-
vited to participate in the selection process,
but refused.
In January and again in June 1966, the Na-
tional Assembly mounted separate interpella-
tions of the Government, the second series con-
tinuing into September. Their sponsor
introduced a motion of censure against the
Government at the end of August, and the
Assembly rejected the Government's budgetin
mid-September. Prime Minister Souvanna then
asked the King to dissolve the Assembly. After
consulting his Council, the King dissolved the
Assembly as of October 7. Elections for the
Sixth Legislature were held on January 1, 1967,
when 142 non-Communist candidates competed
320
for the Assembly's 59 seats. The new As-
sembly, elected under normal constitutional
provisions rather than the special ones that
brought the Fifth Legislature into being, has a
full 5-year mandate. The Sixth Legislature
held its first session January 30, 1967. Although
there are no sharply defined party alignments,
a firm majority of the deputies were elected
with the Support of regional leaders, military
as well as political, who in turn had pledged to
support Souvanna Phouma.
North Vietnamese Aggression. Each dry
season since 1964, the North Vietnamese—with
decreasing assistance from about 50,000 Pathet
Lao forces—have successfully attacked gov-
ernment-held strongpoints in Houa Phan
Province (formerly Sam Neua), and each wet
season Royal Lao Government forces have
attempted to retrieve them. In March 1965, the
North Vietnamese assaulted an officers' train-
ing School east of Savannakhet; student de-
fenders with help from the Lao Air Force
accounted for 200 enemy dead. In November,
a similar attack was mounted against the
Mekong River town of Thakhek, and again
many North Vietnamese soldiers were killed
and captured. In early 1968, North Vietnamese
forces seized Nam Bac Valley, which the
Government had retaken in the summer of 1966
after more than 6 years of Communist control.
During 1969 Communist pressure built up
considerably and more government-held areas
in northern and southern Laos were lost. In
June, at the peak of the offensive, the neutralist
base of Muong Soui, west of the Plain of Jars,
was captured. This base had been in the
Government's hands since before the 1962
Geneva agreements. During the summer a
counterattack by government forces, intending
to relieve this pressure by cutting the enemy's
extended supply lines, caught the North Vietna-
mese forces by surprise, requiring them to
abandon their hold on the Plain of Jars. They
left behind huge stores of arms, ammunition,
and other supplies cached on the Plain, along
with tanks, armored cars, and artillery pieces,
indications of their probable intention of
launching a major offensive. During the final
months of 1969 and in January 1970 Hanoi sent
an additional 13,000 troops, into Laos (for a
total of 67,000 in that country) and rebuilt its
stocks and supply lines. The North Vietnamese
retook the Plain of Jars in February, re-
captured Muong Soui, and thrust south toward
the headquarters of Gen. Vang Pao, Com-
mander of Military Region II, at Long Tieng.
By late spring 1970 fighting had gradually
Stabilized in the north although a serious threat
of renewed enemy action remained. In the south
two Province capitals, Attopeu and Saravane,
never before occupied by the Communists, fell
on April 30 and June 9, respectively.
Internal Negotiations. Following the North
Vietnamese decision early in 1968 to engage
in negotiations at Paris leading to a possible
settlement in Southeast Asia, the NLHS grad-
ually worked out a similar program to attain
its goals in Laos through political as well as
military means. In July the NLHS announced
that the previous basis of a Lao internal
solution—the tripartite agreements of 1961–
62—was no longer acceptable and called for a
Solution to the Lao problem on the basis of the
1962 Geneva agreements and "realities of the
present situation." Essential elements of the
new NLHS position appear to be: (1) a willing-
ness to engage in talks, provided certain
military conditions are met; (2) an attempt to
discredit the Prime Minister's credentials as
a neutralist leader and head of the Government
of National Union; (3) the touting of the dis-
sident neutralists as a separate party Succeed-
ing Souvanna's neutralist movement; and (4)
the forecasting of an important role for the
King of Laos, probably as the authority for
convening talks and giving force to the decisions
reached. -
These elements were apparent in the NLHS
five-point proposal of March 6, 1970, for an
internal settlement which called for withdrawal
of all U.S. assistance to Laos, including an end
to all U.S. bombing. In a reply dated April 9,
Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma proposed a
cease-fire, immediate withdrawal under ICC
supervision of all foreign forces, and a meet-
ing of "all interested parties" to discuss their
differences.
On February 28, 1970, Prime Minister
Souvanna called for consultations among the
14 signatories of the 1962 Geneva agreements
to discuss violations. Despite strong support
from the United States and the United Kingdom,
the U.S.S.R. and other Communist signatories
have not been responsive, and there is little
immediate prospect for holding such consulta-
tions.
GOVERNMENT
Laos is a constitutional parliamentary mon-
archy. Under the December 1957 revision of the
Constitution, originally promulgated by the
King in May 1947, the franchise was extended
to women. General elections normally are held
every 5 years. Constitutional amendments
passed in 1965 give the King other options
during times of crisis.
The bicameral legislature is composed of a
National Assembly of 59 members which wields
the real legislative power of the country, and
a less active King's Council of 12 elder states-
men appointed directly by the King, six upon
Assembly recommendation. The King's Council
can return for reconsideration legislation the
Assembly has passed. A majority vote of the
Assemblymen present overrides King's Council
objections.
The Prime Minister is designated by the
King in consultation with political leaders. The
Prime Minister submits his proposed cabinet
to the National Assembly for approval, a favor-
able two-thirds majority of Assemblymen
present being required for investiture. As-
semblymen who are candidates for ministerial
posts may not participate in the vote of confi-
dence for a new government. Members of the
321
Cabinet need not be Assemblymen. The NLHS
recognizes neither the present nor the previous
two legislatures and refused to participate in
the national elections of July 1965 and Janu-
ary 1967.
The Constitution provides that the judicial
power shall be separate and independent of the
executive and legislative powers. In practice,
the judiciary is the least vigorous branch of
the Government.
Because of extreme factional strife and open
fighting in Laos, the three principal Lao group-
ings—conservative, neutralist, and Commu-
nist—agreed in June 1962 to form a tripartite
Government of National Union under the
premiership of Prince Souvanna Phouma, with
carefully balanced participation by the three
factions. The Cabinet had 11 neutralists, four
rightists, and four Communists. Although the
formation of this tripartite government was
extraconstitutional, the King invested it under
article 15 of the Constitution.
In 1963 Communist cabinet members with-
drew from Vientiane and from active partici-
pation in the Gövernment of National Union,
and others were designated to carry on their
work. The Communist cabinet members retain
their portfolios in name, the door has been left
open for their return, and the tripartite gov-
ernment remains undisturbed at least inform.
The Prime Minister has attempted without
success to persuade the Communist ministers
to resume active participation in the Govern-
ment. He has also made other changes in
cabinet portfolios from the 1962 roster, but the
NLHS has denounced them as illegal.
POLITICAL CONDITIONS
The intrinsic barriers to unity and a sense
of nationhood described earlier have been in-
creased by the internal and external Communist
threat. Efforts to bridge the gulf between the
Central Government and the people in the
countryside have been handicapped further by
the dearth of communications, particularly
roads. Only a few thousand individuals, many
of them French-educated, participate in gov-
ernment and politics; the bulk of the population
is illiterate and politically passive. Popular
identification with the country, the Govern-
ment, and the Crown—although stronger than
in the past—is limited, and regional and family
loyalties continue to play a predominant role
in domestic politics. º
The Lao political situation is further com-
plicated by more than two decades of interna-
tional contention in Southeast Asia. The 1962
Geneva design for national reconciliation and
territorial unification has been unworkable so
far because of North Vietnamese and NLHS
intransigence. The internal struggles persist.
Today the Communists occupy perhaps half of
the Lao territory. They also control about 25
percent of the Lao population, generally tribal
groups inhabiting the rugged and sparsely
populated uplands' bordering Communist China
and the two Viet-Nams. The populous Mekong
lowlands are under government jurisdiction,
and there is considerable support for the
central Lao authority among many of the upland
ethnic minority groups, notably the Meo and
Yao.
The departure of the NLHS from the
tripartite government in 1963 reduced it to a
neutralist-conservative coalition. The result
has been the achievement of a substantial
degree of political stability in government-
held areas. Neutralist-conservative coopera-
tion has grown, and in policy terms there is
little distinction between the two. Political
groupings in Laos generally consist of rather
loose coalitions around personalities, fre-
quently along lines of clan and regional loyal-
ties.
The Lao Communist political organization-
the Neo Lao Hak Sat(NLHS)- is neither strong
nor deeply rooted in Laos; it is almost com-
pletely a creature of the North Vietnamese on
whose support and direction it has become
increasingly dependent. With substantial, even
dominating, North Vietnamese help, the NLHS
has retained firm control over the areas it
occupies and has allowed only a few outsiders
to enter On conducted visitS.
The 1962 Geneva agreements provided for
International Control Commission (ICC) in-
vestigations, undertaken by majority vote, in
an effort to make the ICC a more effective
policing instrument than it had been under the
1954 Geneva agreements. The Communists
considered that the internal Lao arrangements,
which provided for an NLHS veto on all im-
portant matters, would effectively prevent ICC
actions to which they were opposed. This has
not always been the case; a few meaningful in-
vestigations of North Vietnamese violations
have been undertaken by majority ICC deci-
sion, and the results of the investigations have
been forwarded informally to the Geneva con-
ference cochairmen, the United Kingdom and
the U.S.S.R. Communist China considers the
ICC mandate expired, the NLHS and North
Vietnamese hold that the ICC exists but cannot
function, while the U.S.S.R. and Poland wish to
keep it dormant for possible future resuscita-
tion.
ECONOMY
An underdeveloped country with most of its
natural resources unexploited or unsurveyed,
Laos is further handicapped by its isolation
from the sea. Some 85 percent of the people
are subsistence farmers supplying the bulk of
their own needs, even weaving their own cloth.
Laos was once self-sufficient in rice. Now be-
cause of insurgency, a large share of its food
needs have to be imported. Since almost all
manufactured products also come from abroad,
there is a serious balance-of-payments deficit.
In 1968 the gross national product (GNP) was
approximately U.S. $202 million with a per
capita GNP of $72. In that same year imports
amounted to about $42 million, and exports
were estimated at $2.8 million, primarily tin,
322
timber, and coffee. Laos' major trading part-
ners are Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, and
Japan.
Forests cover about two-thirds of Laos;
about 50 percent of the forest land has com-
mercial possibilities if the costs of access can
be worked out. The difficulties of internal
transport pose a serious obstacle to economic
development. There are no railroads in Laos;
and the Mekong, while navigable by small craft
and a potentially important transportation link,
is interrupted by falls and rapids which prevent
effective commercial use of several sections
of the river. The road network is elemental,
and frequently interdicted by blown-up bridges
and natural calamities.
The budget for fiscal year 1970 anticipated
expenditures of $34.6 million, revenues of $17
million, and a deficit of $17.6 million. Ap-
proximately $17 million was budgeted for mili-
tary expenditures. This unbalanced fiscal con-
dition is fundamentally caused by the need to
meet North Vietnamese military aggression.
In order to counteract adverse effects on the
economy and monetary system of Laos by such
large deficit spending, a number of foreign aid
donor governments adopted in 1963 an Inter-
national Monetary Fund (IMF) recommendation
for a Foreign Exchange Operations Fund
(FEOF). The FEOF sells U.S. dollars to main-
tain a kip open market rate that has remained
at about 500 kip = $1.00 since January 1964.
Five countries—Australia, Japan, the United
Kingdom, France, and the United States—have
contributed foreign exchange to FEOF. This
unique program has kept inflation in Laos to
an average of about 8 percent annually for 6
years.
The Agency for International Development
(AID) maintains one of its largest overseas
mission in Laos. U.S. economic aid during
fiscal year 1970 was $52 million and will
remain at about the same level in FY 1971.
The economic assistance program has three
basic objectives: (1) FEOF is the principal
instrument of the stabilization program; (2)
development efforts are directed principally
toward increasing agricultural production; and
(3) refugee care absorbs a substantial share of
the AID security budget.
For the immediate future, Lao develop-
ment efforts will be limited severely as in past
years by the country's task of coping with the
dislocation caused by foreign invasion. More
than 600,000 persons have fled from areas oc-
cupied by Communist forces. As of the summer
of 1970, more than 250,000 people were still
in refugee status. A disproportionately high
percentage of men serve in the armed forces
which contributes greatly to the manpower
Shortage.
* .
FOREIGN RELATIONS
Lao foreign policy derives from the 1962
Geneva agreements. Laos undertook to estab-
lish diplomatic relations with all nations,
starting with its neighbors, on the basis of
equality and respect for Lao independence and
sovereignty. Laos renounced any intention of
the use or threat of force that might impair
the peace of other countries, as well as any
interference in their internal affairs. The Lao
Government simultaneously declared that it
was the will of the Lao people to protect the
Sovereignty, independence, neutrality, unity,
and territorial integrity of Laos. It therefore
appealed to all states to refrain from any
actions inconsistent with these principles.
In pursuit of its stated desire for friendly
relations with all states, the Lao Government
established and maintains diplomatic relations
with its neighbors and all other signatories of
the 1962 Geneva agreements. Laos is a member
of the United Nations and several of its special-
ized agencies and participates in several
nonmilitary regional and international organi-
zations, such as the Asian Development Bank
(ADB), the Asian and Pacific Council (ASPAC),
and the Mekong Committee. Laos formally
excluded itself from the protective umbrella
of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization
(SEATO) by stating in the Declaration on the
Neutrality of Laos (which is incorporated in the
Geneva agreements) that it would not recognize
the protection of any military alliance, in-
cluding SEATO.
In accordance with its continued policy of
neutrality and independence, the Lao Govern-
ment has formally and publicly denounced
North Vietnamese aggression, which has taken
two forms: use of Lao territory to further the
war in South Viet-Nam and support of the Lao
Communist movement through attacks in Laos.
Consistent with the provisions of the 1962
agreements, Laos has sought military supplies
for self-defense as well as economic assist-
ance for self-development.
U. S. POLICY
The United States firmly endorses the ef-
forts of the Lao Government to preserve its
independence and neutrality and considers that
the full implementation of the 1962 Geneva
agreements offers the best method to obtain
these objectives. The United States continues
to support the government of Prime Minister
Souvanna Phouma and is cooperating fully with
his diplomatic efforts to restore these agree-
ments. The United States has repeatedly em-
phasized at the Paris meetings on Viet-Nam
that a peaceful Viet-Nam settlement must also
provide for the withdrawal of North Vietnamese
forces from Laos.
Confronted with continuing outside aggres-
sion, Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma has
called on the United States at various times
since 1962 to assist his government in pre-
serving Lao neutrality and integrity. In 1963
when North Vietnamese and Pathet Lao forces
attacked neutralist forces and occupied and
fortified the area of the Ho Chi Minh trail in
southeastern Laos, Prime Minister Souvanna
Phouma requested American aid in the form of
supplies and munitions. This assistance was
323
provided in accordance with the Lao Govern-
ment's right under the Geneva agreements to
seek help in its self-defense. In 1964, to meet
Communist escalation on the Plain of Jars and
the Ho Chi Minh trail, the United States re-
sponded to Lao Government requests by in-
creasing training and logistic support and
initiating certain interdictory flight missions
against the invaders.
All U.S. aid is requested, supportive,
limited, and defensive. U.S. air power con-
tinues to be used along the Ho Chi Minh trail
in southeastern Laos to reduce the flow of
supplies from North Viet-Nam to South Viet-
Nam and thereby save American and Allied
lives. Reconnaissance flights continue to be
carried out in northern Laos. The U.S. Air
Force also flies combat support missions for
Lao forces when requested to do so by the
Royal Lao Government. There are no American
ground combat troops stationed in Laos. Of the
1,040 Americans there, military and civilian,
320 are engaged in a military advisory capacity,
and 323 are logistics personnel.
The United States began giving economic
aid to Laos in 1946 and since 1955 has sub-
stantially assisted Laos in maintaining its
independence in the face of external and in-
ternal Communist pressure. Economic as-
sistance alone totaled $695 million through
June 1970. This is given primarily to control
inflation, support essential government serv-
ices—including relief to more than 250,000
Lao refugees uprooted by hostilities—and a
limited amount of economic development. The
United States is also a major contributor to
regional projects benefiting Laos. It has
pledged half the funds for the $31 million Nam
Ngum Dam on a tributary of the Mekong River.
PRINCIPAL GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS
Chief of State–King Sri SAVANG VATTHANA
Crown Prince –VONG SAVANG
Inspector General of the Kingdom—Prince
BOUN OUM na Champassak
President of the King's Council–OUTHONG
Souvannavong -
President of the National Assembly—PHOUI
Sananikone
Prime Minister, Minister of Foreign Affairs,
Defense, Veterans' Affairs, and Rural
Affairs—Prince SOUVANNA PHOUMA
Deputy Prime Minister, Minister of National
Economy and Planning—Prince SOUPHA-
NOUVONG (absent)
Deputy Prime Minister, Minister of National
Education, Fine Arts, Sports, and Youth—
LEUAM Insisiengmay
Minister of Finance, Acting Minister of Na-
tional Economy, Delegate of Minister of
Defense—SISOUK na Champassak
Minister of Information, Propaganda, and
Tourism–PHOUMI Vongvichit (absent)
Minister of Interior and Social Welfare —
PHENG Phongsavan
Minister of Justice and Acting Minister of
Planning—INPENG Suryadhay
Minister of Post and Telecommunications,
Public Health, and Acting Minister of In-
formation, Propaganda, and Tourism-
Prince SISOUMANG Sisaleumsak
Minister of Public Works and Transport—
NGON Sananikone
Commander-in-Chief, Lao Armed Forces-
Maj. Gen. OUAN Rathikoun
Chargé d'Affaires ad interim to the U.S. and
the U.N.—LANE Phathammavong
Laos maintains an Embassy in the United
States at 2222 S Street, N.W., Washington,
D.C. 20008.
PRINCIPAL U.S. OFFICIALS
Ambassador–G. McMurtrie Godley
Deputy Chief of Mission–Monteagle Stearns
Director, U.S. AID Mission—Charles A. Mann
Public Affairs Officer (USIS)—Keith E. Adam-
SOIn
Army Attaché—Lt. Col. Edgar A. Duskin
Air Force Attaché—Col. Hayden C. Currie
The U.S. Embassy in Laos is located near
Black Stupa Circle, Vientiane.
READING LIST
na Champassak, Sisouk: Storm Over Laos.
New York: Praeger, 1961.
Dommen, Arthur J. Conflict in Laos. New
York: Praeger, 1964.
Halpern, Joel M. Economy and Society of Laos.
New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964.
Halpern, Joel M. Government, Politics and
Social Structure in Laos. New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1964.
LeBar, Frank M., and Suddard, Adrienne, eds.
Laos: Its People, Its Society, Its Culture.
New Haven: Human Relations Area Files
Press, 1960.
Modelski, George, ed. International Confer-
ence on the Settlement of the Laotian Ques-
tions, 1961-62. Vancouver: University of
British Columbia Press, 1962.
SarDesai, D. R. Indian Foreign Policy in
Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam, 1947-1964.
Berkeley: University of California Press,
1968. -
Toye, Hugh. Laos: Buffer State or Battle-
ground. London: Oxford University Press,
1968,

Wolfkill, Grant, and Rose, Jerry A. Reported
to Be Alive. London: Allen, 1966.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE PUBLICATION 8301, Revised August 1970
324
APPENDIX R
LAOS
NATIONAL SECURITY
(PUBLIC ORDER AND SAFETY; AND THE
ARMED FORCES)
[Reprinted from: Area Handbook for Laos, by T. D. Roberts and others.
Washington, Department of the Army, June 1967 (DA PAM 550–58).]
325
NATIONAL SECURITY
PUBLIC ORDER AND SAFETY
There are no published statistics on crime, but incomplete rec-
ords available in 1966 indicated a low incidence of lawlessness.
Larceny, bicycle theft and banditry were the most prevalent types
of offense, and crimes of violence, from assault to homicide, were
relatively rare. Although frequently threatened in many areas by
the hostilities of warring factions, life and property were generally
secure from crime. Laotians have, of necessity, accepted the vio-
lence of warfare, but they have done so with reluctance, and
neither their observance of the law nor their respect for authority
has been seriously affected. -
The penal code and code of criminal procedure introduced dur-
ing the colonial regime were still the country's basic criminal law
in 1966. The government had made numerous revisions in its
judicial system, but the changes were not great and did not depart
from familiar French precedents. Courts were generally equitable,
and justice tended to be lenient.
Law enforcement is in the hands of the Lao National Police
Corps, a centralized force responsible for the entire country.
Numbering over 5,000 men, it was completely reorganized in 1966,
and at the end of the year was still in a state of transition. In
recent years the police force was often neglected by the govern-
ment and, at times, used by various factions as a political tool.
There were prospects that the Royal Ordinance of May 25, 1966,
effecting its reorganization would ensure an independent, modern
force that could devote its energies exclusively to the maintenance
of law and order and fulfill its function of protecting the internal
welfare of the nation.
There is virtually no information available on public order in
the areas of the country controlled by the Pathet Lao. From all
indications, strict discipline is imposed by them and by their back-
ers from outside the country, but no reliable data have been made
public concerning the police, the court system or the incidence of
CI’ll ſle.
326
social CoNTROLs
Respect for constituted authority has been traditional in Laotian
society, and the influence of family and kinship group has made
for an attitude and outlook responsive to an ordered and dis-
ciplined code of behavior. Loyalty to and respect for the king,
which is ingrained in the average citizen, has served as a restrain-
ing influence in governing individual conduct, and the traditional
hierarchy of authority is recognized and accepted. Buddhist doc-
trines of resignation and tranquility have also had an important
role in conditioning the Laotian. This is evident in his calm
acceptance of adversity, his lack of aggression and his kindliness
to his fellow man and to animals.
At the end of the nineteenth century the French colonial regime
introduced a modern judicial and police framework patterned after
that of France. New in form, but not radically different in prin- -
ciple or concept, it followed generally accepted attitudes toward
crime and punishment. Acceptance was further facilitated by
retaining many traditional forms and usages and incorporating
them into the new codes. The people had no difficulty in adjusting
to the new patterns of behavior. -
There is no marked trend toward urbanization. Social and eco-
nomic changes have come relatively slowly, and as a result the
country has escaped most of the modern categories of crime asso-
ciated with mushrooming cities. Wants are few, and the sub-
sistence economy provides an acceptable standard of living with
the exertion of a minimum of effort. Throughout the part of the
country controlled by the royal government, the concept of public
order based on the supremacy of national law is generally accepted
without question, and the modern courts are the instruments of
official authority. The restraints instilled by family and group ties
continued to exert their influence, but the control mechanism of
the country was considerably more modern than traditional.
The public's attitude toward the police has fluctuated over the
years, usually in response to the state of the force itself, but for
the most part, the police were generally effective; they were heeded
and obeyed and, in some instances, feared.
CRIMINAL COURTS AND PROCEDURE
The first modern penal code was introduced by the French in
1900. It has not been fully codified or modernized, but it has been
periodically revised over the years, the latest revision being that of
1953, as amended in 1963. Although the code has generally served
its purpose, its lack of definition, together with an acute shortage
of qualified legal personnel, has at times handicapped the efficiency
of the judiciary, despite an elaborate court structure built up on
327
the framework established by the French and patterned along
Western lines. -
The court structure is fundamentally an adaptation of the
French system of the colonial era, although it has been reorganized
on various occasions and expanded substantially since inde-
pendence. Law No. 67 of March 31, 1950, specifies in general terms
the types of courts authorized and prescribes their composition
and limits of jurisdiction. The criminal court structure in 1966
comprised four types of tribunal: the Court of Cassation; courts
of appeal and criminal courts; courts of first instance; and justice
of the peace courts. O
The Court of Cassation was located at Vientiane. It served as
final arbiter on questions of law and fact and in criminal matters
was the final court of appeal. It did not try cases, but it reviewed
the findings of lower courts as needed and adjudicated appeals
based on questions of proper interpretation of the law raised by
the decisions of the subordinate courts. The court was composed
of a president and four counselors, who acted in the capacity of
assessors or lay judges.
There were three courts of appeal, which sat in the cities of
Luang Prabang, Vientiane and Pakse. They reviewed cases on
appeal from the courts of first instance and were concerned ex-
clusively with the appellate function. The court consisted of three
judges who were advised and assisted by four counselors, or as-
sessors. Offenses committed within their areas of jurisdiction were
referred for trial to a justice of the peace in the case of minor
infractions, or to a criminal court in more serious cases.
The three criminal courts were associated geographically with
the courts of appeal, but they were not permanent tribunals. They
were constituted annually for the duration of a single session to
handle their accumulated docket but, if required, could be called
into special session at any time by the minister of justice. These
courts were courts of general jurisdiction, which tried serious
cases involving felonies and major crimes. Composed of a presi-
dent and two judges, they could impose any legally recognized
punishment. They sometimes used two assessors, who acted in the
capacity of jurors, but whose recommendations were not binding
on the magistrates trying the case. -
Courts of first instance were found in all the provincial capitals.
Those in the provinces of Luang Prabang, Vientiane, Kham-
mouane, Savannakhet and Sedone were designated courts of first
instance of the first class, and those of the remaining 11 provinces
were called courts of the first instance of the second class. The
first-class courts were composed of a president and two other
judges; the second-class courts had a single magistrate presiding.
328
All heard appeals referred to them from the decisions of justices
of the peace and had original jurisdiction in cases of lesser crimi-
nal offenses. They could impose fines or other correctional penalties
and imprisonment up to a maximum of 5 years.
Justice of the peace courts were established at the district level
in each province, but reports from 1963, the latest available, indi-
cated that of 103 authorized courts, only 68 were functioning. At
the lowest level of the judicial hierarchy, these courts consisted
of a single justice whose jurisdiction was limited to misdemeanors.
His judgment was final in cases where punishment was limited to a
fine, but only in the first degree, that is, subject to review and
appeal, in cases where the penalty involved imprisonment. Jus-
tices of the peace could generally impose a maximum of 5 days'
incarceration.
Justices of the peace in rural sections held “extended compe-
tence,” which gave them jurisdiction over all the village groups
within their district. In some of the more inaccessible areas, vil-
lage headmen still adjudicated minor infractions of the law in
traditional tribal courts.
The entire formal court apparatus is under the minister of jus-
tice, who names all magistrates subject to confirmation by the king.
His ministry publishes the Journal Judiciare, or official legal
journal, which is issued periodically and contains a record of
major judicial actions, developments in jurisprudence and per-
sonnel information. Apart from the formal court structure, there
is another body with judicial powers under specified conditions—
the King's Council. In addition to its executive and legislative func-
tions, this body has the constitutional authority to declare itself a
high court of impeachment in cases of Cabinet members arraigned
by the National Assembly on charges of crimes or offenses com-
mitted in connection with their official duties.
Procedures in criminal matters are governed by a code that has
its roots in the colonial system of jurisprudence. After the French
relinquished control of the legal apparatus in 1953, the Royal
Government had plans to revise its procedures, but in 1966 there
was no comprehensive clarification or codification of the pertinent
statutes. As a result, criminal procedures continue to follow a
definitely French pattern, although numerous laws and ordinances
have effected a variety of changes to adapt the code to local needs.
The code for the most part provides general guidance rather
than specific instruction, but it does prescribe the jurisdictions of
the various types of court, the responsibilities of judicial officials
and the conduct of preliminary proceedings and trials. The prin-
cipal departures from French procedure are in the preliminaries
rather than in the mechanics of trial, the most noteworthy change
329
being the broadening of authority for the apprehension of of.
fenders. Because of the shortage of law enforcement and judicial
personnel, arresting authority has been extended to include district
and township officials and, in some cases, village headmen.
As in the French system, the prosecutor is the key figure in
criminal procedure. Offenses reported to any civil or police official
are officially submitted to the prosecutor, who determines disposi-
tion, jurisdiction and venue in the case. He may refer a case di-
rectly to a lower court or, in cases involving more serious crimes,
submit it to an examining magistrate for examination. Under the
supervision of the prosecutor, the examining judge makes a judi-
cial investigation of the case, collects evidence and interviews
witnesses, whom he may call as needed. As a result of his recom-
mendation, the case may be dismissed, referred to a lower court
or returned to the prosecutor for arraignment of the offender
before a higher criminal court.
The conduct of trials closely parallels French procedure, and the
law specifies an open and public court. Lower courts are summary
in nature and generally quite informal, but the procedure followed
in a multiple-judge trial, such as a criminal court, follows a
rigidly prescribed routine. There is no jury system as such, but
both criminal courts and courts of first instance employ assessors,
or jurés, as they are called, who assist and advise the judges and
make recommendations on the findings. These lay judges partici-
pate fully in the procedings, and, though the verdict of the pre-
siding magistrate need not conform to their recommendations,
their views generally carry considerable weight.
A trial at a criminal court opens with a reading of the charges
and the entering of pleas. After opening statements by the prose-
cution and the defense, the court proceeds to interrogation, which
may begin with the questioning of the accused by the presiding
magistrate.
Witnesses are then examined and cross-examined, after which
arguments are given by both sides. The judges then retire, along
with the assessors, to reach their findings by majority opinion of
the judges. Court is then reconvened, and the verdict is announced,
after which the prisoner is either discharged or sentenced.
There are no formal rules with respect to the admissibility of
evidence, and such matters as hearsay and leading questions are
evaluated by the judges on their own merits. Bail is provided for
but is not often used, and the right of a hearing on a writ of habeas
corpus, which is a relatively recent concept in French jurispru-
dence, is still somewhat of an unfamiliar novelty in Laotian law.
In actual practice the procedures prescribed by the code are fol-
lowed as guidelines rather than strict rules.
«»
330
THE NATIONAL POLICE .
In late 1966 the Lao National Police Corps, the Tamrouat, was
in a period of transition that was the latest in a series of shakeups
and reorganizations that it had undergone periodically since the
country achieved its independence. The Corps was returned to
civil jurisdiction under the Ministry of the Interior in 1964 after
almost 5 years of military control during which the force virtually
lost its identity and suffered serious damage both in its profes-
sional competence and in its rapport with the people. -
The rift that characterized the nation's political situation was
reflected to an extent in the police. Information concerning pro-
cedures and organizational responsibility for carrying out civil
police activities in Pathet Lao territory was lacking in 1966. The
area under government control, however, supported two distinct
establishments, the national police and the neutralist police asso-
ciated with Kong Le's forces. There were plans to consolidate these
two forces, and some progress had been made in discussing a basis
for agreement. At the end of the year, however, this integration
had not been successfully accomplished.
Background
During the period of the protectorate, the French employed a
variety of law enforcement organizations, and the country fre-
quently had as many as four different police establishments operat-
ing at the same time. These included the Indigenous Guard, the
Sûreté Fédérale (Federal Security Police) and the Colonial Gen-
darmery. Although the rank and file of these units included some
Laotians, they were composed mostly of Vietnamese, and command
was almost exclusively in the hands of French officers.
It was not until 1947 that local organizations were formed, with
the creation of the Police and Indochinese Immigration Service
(Service de la Police et de l’Immigration Indochinoise) and the
Laotian Gendarmery Force (Forces de Gendarmerie Laotiennes).
The immigration force was under the Ministry of the Interior; it
was charged with “controlling aliens and maintaining law and
order.” It started off with a strength of 8 men; later it was in-
creased to 30. The gendarmery was patterned after the gen-
darmery of France and numbered 2,500 officers and men. It was
largely made up of Laotians, a few of whom held noncommissioned
officer rank, but the command consisted exclusively of French
gendarmery officers. The unit was under the Ministry of National
Defense, and its mission was “to enforce law and order in rural
areas, to combat. Viet Minh activity and to patrol the borders.”
During this period many urban police forces were created in the
country's cities and towns. They were financed by and responsible
to the municipality, and they served to furnish strictly local protec-
331
tion. The Sûreté Fédérale, however, had jurisdiction over all of
Indochina and functioned as a national criminal investigation
agency; several other organizations also had extensive and some-
times overlapping jurisdictions that confused the situation and
resulted in frequent clashes. The first unified police organization
was created in 1949 by Royal Ordinance No. 147 of November 9,
which instituted the Lao National Police Service. Most police
organizations continued to retain their individual status for
another 5 years, and in fact a number of others were created and
disbanded during this period.
By 1961 all of the various police forces had been consolidated
into the Lao National Police, as it was then called. The Gendar-
mery and the Sûreté Fédérale were merged with the national
establishment in 1955, and the Commandos National Guard, which
had been formed in 1951, was disbanded in 1958 and its personnel
integrated into the regular police. With the dissolution or absorp-
tion of the other existing units, the unified service embarked on a
broad training program that was to result in a marked upgrading
of police effectiveness and a general improvement in all phases of
its operations.
The police training program was mostly under the sponsorship
of the United States Police Aid Project, which began operation in
1955 in response to a request from the Royal Government. The
United States provided nine police advisers and four technicians
from countries other than the United States and Laos and fur-
nished large-scale commodity support in weapons, uniforms, ve-
hicles and communications equipment. Counterpart funds were
also made available for the construction of a number of precinct
stations and the National Police Academy at Done Noune, 7 miles
from Vientiane. .
The United States aid project was discontinued in 1961 as a
result of a series of upheavals within the country which brought
about a disruption of police activities and threatened to destroy
the national identity and usefulness of the force. In August 1960,
Kong Le's coup resulted in his occupation of the National Police
Academy and the disarming of the police in Vientiane. For the next
4 months the police in the area virtually ceased to function as a
law enforcement organization. In December of that year General
Phoumi Nosavan's counterrevolutionary forces took over the city
of Vientiane after a 3-day battle. He set up a paramilitary organi-
zation called the Directorate of National Coordination and gave
command to one of his supporters, Lieutenant Colonel Siho Lam-
phoutacoul, who was later promoted to general.
In January 1961 the Lao National Police was removed from the
control of the Ministry of the Interior, and its members were
332
absorbed by the Directorate of National Coordination and the
armed forces. For the next few years Nosavan supporters were
brought in in large numbers, most of them untrained for the police
profession. This undermined the force's integrity and capability
and reduced the efficiency of police operations.
This state of affairs continued until 1965. In February of that
year the Directorate joined rebellious army units in an unsuccess-
ful coup led by General Nosavan. Nosavan and Siho were forced
to flee to Thailand, and the Lao National Police regained its inde-
pendent status. The government indicated that it intended to re-
organize the force completely and requested the United States to
reinstate its assistance program. A survey was conducted by the
Office of Public Safety of the United States Agency for Interna-
tional Development (AID), and its report, published in May 1965,
indicated a favorable reaction to the request.
Plans for the reorganization of the police were completed by a
royal ordinance on May 25, 1965. At the end of the year the force
was in the process of transition to the new structure. It had been
designated the Lao National Police Corps, and its subordination to
the Ministry of the Interior was confirmed. Most of the changes
effected were designed to strengthen civilian control, and the grade
structure was completely revised to get away from military ranks.
The neutralist police came into being in 1962 as a result of
Kong Le’s rapprochement with the government and the continuing
autonomy of his regime. With virtually absolute control in the
areas of the country that he occupied, he assumed direction of such
police as there were in his territories. His force was small. Al-
though he claimed a strength of close to 500 men, indications were
that he had something over 200. The men are poorly trained and
have practically no equipment. At the time they were visited in
1965 by the United States Aid Survey Team, team members re-
ported that not one man had a complete uniform, and the force had
no weapons, vehicles or even a headquarters. -
According to the AID Survey Report, officials of both the na-
tional and neutralist police expressed agreement in 1965 that the
two forces should be consolidated. Despite this general view, the
merger had not been accomplished by late 1966. Differences over
the command and grade structure, training procedures and other
lesser details prevented any real progress in bringing the forces
together. With the many obstructions to integration, United States
AID officials were of the opinion that police consolidation could not
take place until there was a higher level amalgamation of all of
Kong Le’s military forces with those of the government.
333
Organization and Operation
In 1966 the Lao National Police Corps was the country's only
law enforcement agency with a formal organizational structure.
With a strength of over 5,000 men, it was a highly centralized
force under the Ministry of the Interior and Social Welfare and
was designed to fulfill the functions of both a local and a national
police. Its mission was to “maintain public security and the execu-
tion of laws and regulations, and to insure the maintenance of
order in collaboration with the armed forces and public services
of the realm.”
The reorganization of the national police, which was completed
in 1966, was concerned more with matters affecting personnel than
with basic operational structure. Few changes were made in the
established framework, but some minor positions were consoli-
dated, and a number of designation changes were effected. A new
grade system, converting all military ranks to police equivalents,
was introduced, and distinct police uniforms and insignia of grade
were authorized.
Police authority traditionally has been subordinate to that of the
local administrative chief. Ordinances enacted in 1957 clearly
established the provincial governor (chao khoweng) as the senior
civil official in the province and the district chief (chao muong)
as the senior authority in the district. Although these ordinances
were largely ignored during the period of police domination by the
Directorate of National Coordination, the official government
position was reaffirmed in 1964 in a joint directive issued by the
prime minister and the minister of the interior, which stated that
the provincial governor was the senior official of the government;
it exhorted local police officials to give him direct cooperation and
collaboration.
The Lao National Police Corps consists of a central head-
quarters, called the General Directorate of National Police, and two
major subordinate operational elements, the Urban Police and the
Surburban (territorial) Police. There is a deputy director and, at
the Directorate level, an assistant for inspection and one for ad-
ministrative services. Directly below this level are two additional
operational sections concerned with special duties, the Judiciary
Police Service and the Immigration Police. Three staff sections,
Materiel, Communications, and Training, complete the head-
quarters organization.
The General Directorate is in Vientiane. From its central head-
quarters it directs all of the country’s police components; it deter-
mines policy, supervises operations and guides the activities of
subordinate elements on a nationwide basis. Although remoteness
and difficulties of communications give many of the field forces a
334
degree of autonomy in handling local problems, basic policy guid-
ance and overall control are firmly maintained by centralized
administration and a program of frequent supervisory inspections.
At the headquarters staff level, the Materiel and Communica-
tions Sections are charged with the supervision of their respective
fields on a national basis. The Training Section is directly respon-
sible for the activities of the National Police Academy and exer-
cises indirect supervision over all field training, which is the re-
sponsibility of provincial commanders. In addition to the staff
elements, the Immigration Police and the Judiciary Police Service
both work directly out of police headquarters.
The immigration unit is concerned with the movement of people
in and out or within the country and is responsible for issuing
visas, residence permits and travel authorizations. It also main-
tains all immigration, census and vital statistics records. The Judi-
ciary Police Service by law includes all government officials who
have any connection with detecting, investigating and prosecuting
crimes; consequently, all government attorneys and their sub-
ordinates are judiciary police officers. Apart from these, however,
the active police element of the Service constitutes the country's
criminal investigation department and is concerned with the pre-
vention and detection of crime and the apprehension of criminals.
It is the Corps’ detective force, and operates almost exclusively in
plain clothes.
The principal components of the law enforcement mechanism
are the Urban Police and the Suburban Police. Comprising all the
metropolitan and rural forces stationed throughout the country,
they constitute the bulk of the country’s police strength. With
similar duties, the two elements are distinguished only by their
locales of operation. Their uniformed members are the patrolman
on the beat, the country constable, the defender of the law and the
protector of people and property.
Urban Police units operate within the limits of cities and towns
and are found in urban centers with a population large enough
to warrant a concentrated law enforcement effort requiring at
least 100 policemen. There is usually a police commission headed
by a commissioner, and the city is divided into precincts, each
normally commanded by an inspector. Urban Police have the duties
and responsibilities of a standard metropolitan force and, besides
the usual control of crime, additional responsibilities associated
with urban life, such as sanitation, traffic control and suppression
of vice.
The Suburban Police constitute the law enforcement elements
that control the outlying rural areas of the country. Under direct
command of the General Directorate of National Police at Vien-
335
tiane, units are decentralized to the provinces, where each provin-
cial commissioner has a force composed of subordinate police sec-
tions, normally in charge of an inspector, or smaller brigades,
under command of a noncommissioned officer. Units are deployed
as dictated by concentrations of population and conduct regular
surveillance of their assigned areas of responsibility. They usually
cover a sizeable territory, but they are prepared to move quickly to
any threatened locality in the event of emergency. In 1966 there
were provincial police commissions in all the provinces except
Phong Saly, Houa Phan and Xieng Khouang, all three of which
were largely under Pathet Lao control.
The new grade structure introduced with the 1966 reorganiza-
tion represents a radical departure from past practice where army
ranks had been used exclusively for police officers and noncom-
missioned officers. The new designations generally follow the
French police pattern, and each level incorporates an in-grade pro-
motion system of classes that moves a man up from lower to first
class and to “principal,” the highest designation authorized for
any specific grade. Principal controller, the equivalent of general
officer, is the highest position authorized, and the men are police-
men, with “brigadier” used for noncommissioned officer rank. Pay,
which is good by local standards, parallels comparable army scales
(see table 8).
Uniforms closely resemble those of the army and are basically
khaki, with a white uniform authorized for ceremonial and dress
wear. Policeman and noncommissioned officer grades are indicated
by chevrons, and officers wear green shoulder boards displaying
insignia of rank. A patrolman third class wears one white chevron,
and first class wears three. Brigadiers use silver or silver and gold
combinations, according to class. Officers’ insignia are similar to
army equivalents, but employ a rosette rather than a star. First
category officers have a silver border around their shoulder boards,
and first class commissioners and above add elaborate embroidery
and crossed palms. Regulations provide for campaign, work, leave,
ceremonial, parade and evening uniforms, but only rarely are more
than one or two categories of dress furnished.
Training
Police training in late 1966 was just entering a new cycle after
the progressive and profitable era from 1955 to 1960 which was
interrupted by the fallow Directorate of National Coordination
period from 1961 to 1965. The government had reinstituted a broad
and comprehensive program, and substantial progress was being
made.
From early 1957 to the end of 1960, a total of 812 policemen
received 3 months' basic training at the National Police Academy.
Table 8. Grades and Pay of the Lao National Police Corps, October 1966
Grade Y'ormer designation Maximum monthly pay
(in kips *)
First category:
Principal controller - - - Major general - - - - - - - - - - - - - 30,480
Controller From colonel to brigadier 20,829
Fourth to first class. general.
Commissioner Lieutenant colonel to colonel. 19,050
Seventh to first class.
Second category:
Assistant commissioner Major -------------------- 16,809
Sixth to first class.
Inspector From lieutenant to captain-- 9,652
Sixth to first class
and student.
Third category:
Principal brigadier Master Sergeant ----------- 10,414
Three classes.
Brigadier Sergeant first class- - - - - - - - - 6,477
Three classes.
Under brigadier Staff sergeant ------------- 4,318
Three classes.
Policeman Private to sergeant. - - - - - - - - 3,048
Two classes and
probationary.
* Approximately K500 equaled US$1 at the free market rate during 1966—see Glossary.
Some 387 other policemen were trained locally in different sections
of the country in courses conducted by United States technical
personnel and third country contract technicians. An additional
838 police officers were trained abroad. Over 400 of these were
sent to Thailand, and the rest attended schools in the United
States, the Philippines, Singapore, Hong Kong and Malaya. The
United States bore the cost of this training except in the latter
three countries, where costs were shared with the British. The
French sponsored the training of 61 officers in France, and an
equal number completed the 4-year course at the Thailand Police
College under an agreement between the Lao and Thai Gov-
ernments.
With the closing of the National Police Academy in 1961, formal
police training came to a virtual halt. Some on-the-job instruction
was conducted, but it had little professional guidance and was not
very effectual. The one exception was that about 10 officers were
sent each year to the Thailand Police College. -
Upon the return of more normal conditions in 1965, the director
of the Lao National Police Corps instituted refresher courses to
337
reindoctrinate his personnel in civilian police concepts. By mid-
1966, 248 police officers and noncommissioned officers had been
graduated from a special training course at Camp Don Tiou about
14 miles from the capital, an interim facility set up pending the
reopening of the Police Academy at Done Noune. Three officers
were also sent to the United States to attend the course at the Inter-
national Police Academy in Washington.
The Police Corps has several ambitious plans to ensure the
quality of its training. In addition to reactivation of the Police
Academy, a school for inspectors and a high-level institution for
commissioned officers are projected. Decentralized local programs
are being coordinated and standardized, and a maximum of per-
sonnel is being sent to overseas training schools. Continued prog-
ress on all of these projects depends on the availability of funds,
but these appear to be forthcoming, steadily, if somewhat slowly.
THE PENAL SYSTEM
There is scant information on the prison and correctional system
of the Royal Lao Government and none on the facilities or opera-
tions of the neutralists or the Pathet Lao. The government main-
tains a rudimentary prison system, but it comprises the barest
facilities and is not organized or centrally controlled. Although
the Ministry of Justice is officially charged with the responsibility
for prisons and most such institutions are on police property, for
the most part the army is relied on for their upkeep and operation.
Each provincial capital has a prison which is controlled and
operated by the governor's staff. In addition to the provincial pri-
sons, the National Prison in Vientiane serves in the dual capacity
of national and provincial prison. It is the country's most elaborate
penal institution and virtually the only one housed in a finished
building and with even the barest facilities. Half of its space is
allocated for use of the military. There is no national law control-
ling the operation of provincial prisons, and government guidance
or coordination appears to be entirely lacking.
Most detention facilities are extremely primitive. Construction
usually consists of an enclosure of frame or log surrounded by a
barbed wire fence. There are no amenities or facilities, and few
programs exist for the utilization of prison labor. In military
compounds an effort is made to reeducate captured enemy
soldiers, but in general there are no programs of prisoner welfare
or training. Prison administration is elementary but prisoners
generally get sufficient food, and there is no widespread mistreat-
ment or brutality. The prison system appears to be generally
accepted by the people, and there is no evidence of dissatisfaction
or military crusades for improvement. -
Continuing hostilities have created a need for additional deten-
338
tion space, and since 1954 the government has periodically resorted
to the use of internment camps to house its prisoners. These have
been makeshift compounds stressing security but little else. They
have usually maintained three levels of restraint, ranging from
Class I internees, made up of rebel leaders considered dangerous,
to Class III prisoners, comprising individuals suspected of sub-
versive activity. Many of these camps have been set up, abandoned
and often reactivated in response to changing conditions in the
political climate.
THE ARMED FORCES
At the end of 1966 there were still three separate armed forces
in Laos, the Lao Armed Forces, the Communist Pathet Lao and
the Neutralist Forces of General Kong Le. They had been engaged
in sporadic guerrilla warfare virtually since the country gained its
first limited independence from France in 1949.
The Lao Armed Forces consisted of the Royal Laotian Army,
which claimed a strength of some 65,000 men, the Royal Lao
Air Force of approximately 1,000 men and a small naval force
of 450 men called the Laotian River Flotilla, which operated
on the Mekong River. The central government could also call
on the Lao National Police Corps of approximately 5,000 men
and a variety of irregular local defense units totaling some
28,000 partially trained tribesmen.
The Pathet Lao is the military force of the Communists, and
it supports the Laotian Communist party and the Neo Lao Hak
Xat. It consists of only ground forces, and in 1966 was estimated
to have a strength of 20,000, augmented by about 15,000 regular
Vietnamese troops and advisers. -
It also included up to 3,000 dissident former neutralists who
defected to the Pathet Lao under the leadership of General Kham-
mouane and Colonel Deuane. - -
The Neutralist forces numbered approximately 10,000 men.
It was once allied with the Pathet Lao, but switched to fighting
the Communists in 1962 after growing ideological differences
and Communist intransigence demonstrated that the two groups
could not work together. “The Neutralist Army was set up as a
result of a coup by Kong Le in 1960. -
None of the three armed forces has had sufficient time or the
resources to develop a well-rounded establishment, and all have
been handicapped by inexperienced leadership, a scarcity of
technical skills, training deficiencies and an inadequate logistical
support structure. Continuous warfare has, nevertheless, given
them a background of combat experience that has forged them
into veteran forces well adapted to their operational tasks.
The country’s divided forces reflect the political rift in a
land where one of its segments is dedicated to the overthrow
339
of the legitimate government. At the same time, the position of
national unity is maintained by a facade of integration at the
top government level, by repeated but fruitless efforts to achieve
nationwide coalition and by a leadership that continues to view
its divergent courses as possible paths to unity.
There have been efforts to integrate the three diverse forces
into a single national army, the latest under the provisions of
the 1962 Geneva Agreement on Laos. By the end of 1966, the
neutralists were in close coordination with the regular armed
forces of the government and were working on the details of
integration.
MILITARY TRADITION IN NATIONAL LIFE
In the distant past, great empires flourished and declined in
the Indochinese peninsula, and the history of Laos began with
a distinctly martial flavor. Fa Ngoun, who founded the Kingdom
of Lan Xang in the fourteenth century, consolidated by force of
arms a realm that was considerably larger than present-day Laos.
For the next 31/2 centuries Lan Xang held its own, with varying
fortunes, in the turbulent company of aggressive Siamese, Burmese
and Annamite kingdoms.
In 1707 the direct royal line expired, and the kingdom was
divided into three parts. This brought to a close the era of
Laot military distinction. Thereafter, the area that is now Laos
became subject, at different times, to its western and eastern
neighbors, Siam and Annann (now Thailand and South Vietnam).
Under the French protectorate established in the nineteenth
century, Laos again acquired a degree of sovereign entity. From
the time of the first French military representation in 1893
until its withdrawal in 1954, France's colonial army in Indochina
was charged with the internal security and defense of the kingdom.
This period of foreign domination and tutelage was not one to
create an atmosphere furthering a sense of national purpose or
inspiring outstanding military achievements.
The military establishment of the central government had its
legal basis in the Franco-Laotian Convention of 1949, which
established the kingdom as an independent state within the French
Union. Starting as a 1,200-man constabulary-type force, which
was named the Laot National Army, the army grew steadily over
the years and became an increasingly important factor in the
country's subsequent development. It was, however, commanded
almost exclusively by French officers and noncommissioned officers
and was under the operational control of the French commander
in chief in Indochina. ' .
In 1950 the deteriorating military situation in Vietnam re-
quired the transfer of all available French troops from Laos
340
into the threatened area. The weakening of troop strength made
it imperative that Laos develop its own forces, and this was made
possible by the allocation of funds from the joint revenues of
the Associated States (Indochina). By the end of the year troop
strength had been increased to 3,000, and in December the Laotian
National Army, commanded by French officers, smashed a Viet
Minh attempt to establish a permanent base 60 miles east of Pakse,
in what is now Sedone Province. In late 1952 the Laotian National
Army had grown to over 12,000, and Laos was the most peaceful
state in Indochina. .
Steady increases in strength continued over the next few
years, and Laotian officers and noncommissioned officers eventually
replaced the French. After the departure of the French colonial
army from the area, the country was thrown on its own resources
to meet its increasing military commitments, although substantial
aid in arms and materiel was forthcoming from both France and
the United States. In 1966 the armed forces, then called the
Armed Forces of the Kingdom, had a strength of over 50,000 men
and was an increasingly significant factor in the political and
cultural life of the nation.
The development of a new military tradition has been slow in
the face of an irregular, ruthless type of warfare where the
issues were not always clearly defined and the enemy was often
a fellow countryman. Moreover, for both the population as a whole
and the armed forces themselves, identification with the nation
was a relatively new concept, since traditionally the interests of
most people were focused locally on their village or kinship area.
There were, nevertheless, indications that a national military
tradition was gradually developing. Years of warfare were
creating a bond that fostered the growth of national consciousness.
The importance of the military to the country’s safety, welfare
and stability was being stressed by government officials and
furthered by army psychological units throughout their command
areas. Parades and ceremonies were frequent and well received
by the people. National symbols with military significance, such
as the three-headed elephant of the national flag, were given
ready acceptance and acclaim. In the Royal Armed Forces there
was evidence of improved spirit and morale. . -
The attitudes and values of the non-government forces in 1966
were more difficult to determine or to assess. From what is known
of the activities of the Pathet Lao it is clear that they pursue
the Communist line, and their troops are subjected to propaganda,
indoctrination and ideological coercion. Political commissars at-
tached to military units hold scheduled periods of instruction to
mold the minds of the men along prescribed lines, and the instill-
341
ing of a traditional image as liberators resisting the “imperialists”
undoubtedly forms an important part of the program.
The men in the Neutralist forces appeared to be following
an ancient Asian, warlord tradition, with loyalties focused on
an individual leader. The fact that Kong Le kept his forces vir-
tually intact for over 6 years demonstrates the strong hold he
had on his men.
FOREIGN INFLUENCES
The armed forces have always been the product of French
guidance and design, molded by French military tradition and
usage. From the time of the earliest French penetration, the
country was suffused in a French military atmosphere, which was
fostered and maintained by the presence of French troops and the
integration of Laotians into the French colonial army.
When the Lao territorial Army was formed in 1949, the original
cadres were all veterans of French colonial service who carried
over to the Laotian forces the French patterms of their training,
in concepts and physical externals. For the first few years of
its existence, the army continued to rely exclusively on the
French for the schooling of its officers and the training of its
enlisted men; French tactical and theoretical doctrines became
so thoroughly ingrained that they still bear significant weight in
influencing military thinking.
After 1954 (the year of the fall of Dien Bien Phu), however,
France’s declining fortunes in its colonial empire and the gradual
increase of United States involvement in Asia had brought about
a pronounced change in the Lao military support situation. A
sizeable United States Military Assistance Advisory Group from
1959 to 1962 had taken over a large part of the training of Lao
forces.
The 1962 Geneva Agreement prohibited the “introduction into
Laos of armament, munitions, and military equipment of all
kinds,” except for “a specified quantity of armaments in categories
classified as necessary for the country's defense.” The agree-
ment also banned all foreign troops except for a small French
military mission which was permitted to remain and is continuing
its military assistance program, though on a considerably reduced
scale. United States influence left its imprint, however, and many
aspects of its military theory and doctrine are clearly in evidence
in the functioning and operations of the government forces.
The history and activities of the Pathet Lao clearly indicate
that the movement is dominated by the ideology of international
communism and is especially closely related to the communism
of North Vietnam. The movement began in 1950, the result of
subversion instigated by the Communist-backed Viet Minh regime
342
of North Vietnam, which at that time dropped its nationalist
facade and openly proclaimed its Communist character (see ch 3,
Historical Setting).
The movement gained adherents over the years and, with
increasing assistance from and participation by its Communist
neighbors, improved steadily in organization and strength. Viet
Minh cadres formed the backbone of its military organization and,
by unceasing coercion and propaganda, made every effort to instill
a spirit of militant aggressiveness in the Laotian soldiers. The
combat efficiency of Pathet Lao units has demonstrated the effec-
tiveness of Communist political indoctrination and rigorous train-
ing methods. -
There was little indication that General Kong Le’s Neutralist
forces had been exposed to foreign pressures or influences of
any significance. The paratroopers of the original battalion em-
ployed for the coup had been French trained, and had experienced
the usual contacts with instructors and mission personnel. This,
however, was probably not of sufficient length of time or concentra-
tion to have had any particular effect on their views or attitudes.
The General's early acceptance of Pathet Lao support appears
to have been opportunistic rather than stemming from conviction,
and, in fact, the intrusion of Communist pressures and propaganda
methods into his operations was one of the factors that contributed
to his later separation from the Pathet Lao.
THE ARMED FORCES AND THE GOVERNMENT
In theory the country’s three separate armed forces are sub-
ordinate to the same government. Because of failure to effect
a fusion of the military establishments as called for in the 1962
Geneva Agreement on Laos, however, these forces remain divided,
serving different masters. The Provisional Government of Na-
tional Union authorized by the 1962 agreement was the legitimate
government of the country in 1966, so the relations between the
government and the armed forces were those with the Armed
Forces of the Kingdom, including the Neutralist Forces (see ch 13,
The Governmental System). -
The basic relationships between the government and the armed
forces are governed by the Constitution of 1947, promulgated
under the colonial regime but extensively amended after inde-
pendence. It declares Laos to be a unitary, indivisible democratic
kingdom. National sovereignty derives from the people, and the
king is to exercise that sovereignty in accordance with the pro-
visions of the Constitution. The king is the supreme head of the
armed forces and is empowered to establish civil and military
posts and make appointments to them in accordance with the
343
law. He may not declare war without the agreement of two-thirds
of the membership of the National Assembly.
The king's actual command of the armed forces is, in fact,
restricted, as he must exercise his powers through the intermedi-
ary of the minister of national defense. The minister, in turn, is
responsible to the National Assembly for the proper direction of
his department. The Superior Council of the National Armed
Forces acts in the capacity of a joint staff as a consultative
and advisory body on matters of defense policy. It is made up of
the chiefs of services and designated staff officers.
The military high command, directly subordinate to the minister
of defense, is headed by the commander in chief. He has two
deputy commanders and a General Staff. The General Staff of
the Armed Forces is under a chief of staff, who is assisted by a
director of administration, plans and training. Two deputy chiefs
of staff, for operations and logistics, respectively, complete the
General Staff. Subordinate to the chief for operations are directors
of psychological warfare, operations, plans and training, and
intelligence; the chief for logistics has subordinate directors of
personnel, logistics and transportation.
Because almost continuous warfare has marked the country's
brief span as an independent nation, its military leaders have
necessarily exerted a significant influence on the political scene.
There has been a degree of separation between the civil and
military components of government, and the civil administration
has generally been supreme, but there has been a noticeable
tendency in recent years toward increased involvement in politics
on the part of the military. This is probably unavoidable, since
most ranking officers are members of the small number of wealthy,
influential families that normally furnishes the country's leader-
ship.
MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT AND THE NATIONAL ECONOMY
A large percentage of the government's revenue—usually over
50 percent—is devoted to the support of the Royal Armed Forces.
Budget estimates for fiscal year 1966 (July 1, 1965–June 30, 1966)
indicated that the armed forces were allotted K8.4 billion, or 57.1
percent, of the country's total budget of K14.7 billion. This com-
pared with K3.9 billion (50.6 percent) in 1965, and K3.5 billion
in 1964 (approximately K500 equaled US$1 at the free market
exchange rate during 1966—see Glossary). -
Despite these expenditures—which are large in a country with
a subsistence economy based almost entirely on agriculture—the
armed forces are largely dependent on aid from foreign sources.
The high percentage indicates that the government recognizes
that support of its military operations is essential.
The influx of aid funds, for any purpose, bolsters the economy
somewhat, as these funds represent revenues that the government
would not be receiving from other sources. The sums channeled
to the military provide a sizeable group with cash assets that
they would not normally have; they eventually filter down into
local economies. The number of men in military service represents
some 25 percent of all eligible and qualified males, a relatively high
ratio for the area. Many members of the armed forces receive
technical training of value to the civilian economy that they could
not acquire outside the military.
There are no details available on the economic aspects of the
support received by the Pathet Lao. It is known that the Pathet
Lao military effort is entirely Communist supported and receives
all its funds, armament and most of its supplies either directly and
largely from North Vietnam, or to a much lesser extent from
Communist China. Budgets, if they exist, are not made public,
and there is little effort to maintain the fiction of identity with
the Government of National Union, although in theory Pathet Lao
areas should participate and share in the national budget. As the
Pathet Lao accept support from a power that is interfering
militarily in Laos, however, it would be difficult for it to obtain
a share of the Lao government revenues. From all indications,
Communist aid is provided directly, on an informal basis of demon-
strated needs.
MANPOWER
Military manpower statistics are of uncertain reliability. There
has never been an official census, and there are few demographic
figures available. Early 1966 estimates indicated a population of
between 2 million and 2.5 million, with approximately 500,000
men of military age. Of these, about 50 percent are considered
physically fit for service. Probable averages of men reaching
the military age of 18 would indicate some 20,000 annually.
Although many young men in Communist-controlled areas are
not available to the central government, there are still enough
to meet the requirements of the armed forces, but standards of
physical and intellectual fitness are low, and candidates for enlist-
ment require careful screening.
The armed forces have been maintained on a volunteer basis
since their inception under the French protectorate. Once accepted
for service, the Laotian soldier has demonstrated a ready accept-
ance of discipline and a capacity to endure physical hardship and
primitive conditions. This is somewhat offset, however, by a low
educational level and a complete lack of technical skills; illiteracy
is about 70 to 75 percent.
Even those who meet physical standards for enlistment are
345
vulnerable to many ailments that undermine the health of the
population at large; they often suffer from a variety of endemic
diseases that sap their energy and reduce their effectiveness.
Among the more prevalent diseases are tuberculosis, dysentery,
yaws, malaria and trachoma, all present at generally high rates.
Dietary deficiencies and debilitating parasites further contribute
to a reduction of physical standards.
There are no exact figures available, but it is recognized that
the manpower of the government military forces is drawn prin-
cipally from the Lao ethnic group. Estimates in 1966 placed
the percentage at 56. The Lao are the country's politically domi-
nant and best educated group; they furnish virtually the entire
leadership of the armed forces. The Meo, hardy mountaineers,
mostly from Xieng Khouang Province, make up some 24 percent;
the Tai, 10 percent; and the other 10 percent are from the balance
of the minority groups. The Pathet Lao are reported to be recruited
principally from the Mountain Mon-Khmer and Thai tribes.
It is unlikely that more than a small handful of the country's
military is in the service because of basic ideological conviction.
Location, circumstance and self-interest usually determine their
affiliation, and in time their loyalties are fixed by association and
mutually shared experiences. In few cases would a soldier have
an alternative to a military career. With a history of constant
warfare that has spanned most of his adult years, military service
has become a way of life. -
Procurement and Training of Officers
From 1959 until 1962 the United States Military Assistance
Advisory Group contributed substantially to the training of the
armed forces. The Advisory Group was withdrawn in 1962, and
the training function reverted to the French, who had been author-
ized to assume sole responsibility under the provisions of the
1962 Geneva Agreement. Except for the short period of United
States participation, training has been conducted almost exclu-
sively by the French. -
In addition to attendance at numerous training establishments
set up in various parts of the country, a number of officers of
the Armed Forces and a few enlisted specialists are sent for
additional schooling to training facilities in neighboring countries
and France. Over 10 percent of the officers have attended French
schools and academies and taken specialized courses in various
branch and service institutions, and military medical and technical
schools. Some have been sent to the French Staff College (Ecole
d’Etat Major) and the War College (Ecole Supérieur de Guerre).
There are two officer training facilities in the country, the
Lao Military Academy for regular officers and the Reserve Officers
Training School. Officer procurement is on the basis of selection
from the ranks or voluntary application, but because of a shortage
of qualified candidates the schools rarely operate at capacity.
Although they try to be realistic in the matter of entrance require-
ments, training academies must maintain relatively high stand-
ards, and, as a result, it is rare that a new class is able to open
with a full complement. The required scholastic and physical
qualifications generally limit the field of applicants to young men
of the well-to-do families, with an education well above the coun-
try’s norm. Although there have been marked improvements in the
last few years in the civilian school system and in the diffusion
of educational opportunities, it will be some time before this will
be reflected in an increase of qualified candidates for officer train-
ing (see ch 9, Education).
Procurement and Training of Enlisted Personnel
In 1950 the central government issued a decree requiring .18
months’ military service for all qualified males, but it has never
been necessary to resort to conscription. The country’s economy
offers young men few career opportunities, and the high pay and
relative advantages of military service usually attract a surplus
of prospective recruits eager to volunteer for the armed forces.
Minimum age for enlistment is set at 16, and a man may sign
up for a period of from 6 months to 5 years. The shorter terms
are designed to provide a military background for schoolteachers
and other specialists and technicians essential to government
operation. Recruiting offices are available in most centers of
population, and new men are accepted as vacancies or needs arise.
They are given physical examinations, and those who qualify are
sent to one of the several basic training centers in the various
geographic areas of the country. Upon completion of basic train-
ing, which may last from 6 to 12 weeks, a man may be assigned
to a tactical unit or be selected for specialist training, in which
case he is sent to a technical school.
Once assigned to a unit, a man's training is continuous through-
out his military career. When not actually engaged in combat, he
receives on-the-job instruction in his specialized field. Noncom-
missioned officers usually come from the ranks and are selected
on the basis of experience and proven capability. Most are career
men with several years’ service, and the corps of noncommissioned
officers generally constitutes one of the principal mainstays of the
military services. A few have been able to attend formal courses
for specialized training, but their number has not been sufficient
to ensure a uniform or consistent quality of supervision and
instruction. The Noncommissioned Officers Training School in
Vientiane offers advanced professional training for selected senior
347
noncommissioned officers. Although this school has a capability for
handling some 500 men a year, actual attendance is usually well
below capacity.
The training mission maintained by France is not prepared to
provide a broad program covering the entire military establish-
ment. Its efforts are confined to specific essential areas; in other
fields much of its work is only superficially advisory. In the fields
that it covers it does provide an effective leveſ of training, but
this is not of sufficient scope to meet the full needs of the armed
forces. The armed forces has been further handicapped by the
almost continuous state of hostilities, which has required the
commitment of a large proportion of its strength to military
operations; thus, it has been unavailable for any comprehensive
program of individual and unit training. Results consequently
have been spotty and, in many areas, inadequate.
The little that is known about the training of Pathet Lao troops
conforms to the expected Communist pattern. Most training,
including unending political instruction and indoctrination, is
conducted or supervised by the Vietnamese advisors or Chinese
observers attached to Pathet Lao units. The performance of North
Vietnamese troops in the field would indicate a relatively good
quality of instruction. There is no information on schools or more
formal aspects of training, but it is known that periodic quotas,
usually men selected for their political reliability, are sent for
advanced training to technical facilities in Communist countries.
Service in any of the armed forces offers the average young
man a desirable and respected career that for the most part is
eagerly sought after. There are indications of some involuntary
impressment in Pathet Lao areas, but in the government forces the
number of volunteers more than meets military personnel re-
quirements. As an individual the serviceman in the royal forces
is in a favored segment of the society, and his environment and
conditions of service meet a high local standard. Although his
routine is relatively arduous and on occasion he must face the
hazards of his vocation, he has status, a degree of security and
many amenities and advantages that would be difficult to obtain in
civilian life.
MISSION AND ORGANIZATION OF THE ARMED FORCES
The mission of the armed forces is the preservation of the
kingdom's national integrity. This entails the traditional military
responsibility of maintaining a state of readiness to defend the
nation and implement its military policies. The Pathet Lao, on
the other hand, have an avowed mission to win the support of the
people, suborn the government and establish a Communist regime
over the entire country.
The ground forces in addition to territorial defense, have had
a further responsibility to preserve internal security. The mission
of the Royal Lao Air Force is the air defense of the country and
provision of air support to the ground forces. This includes recon-
naissance, medical evacuation and tactical air support. The Laotian
River Flotilla is charged with patrolling the Mekong River and
transporting military personnel and supplies as required. Years
of constant warfare have given the armed forces a background
of combat experience that has resulted in an army of battle-hard-
aned veterans. It was, however, experience based on limited opera-
:ions, usually confined to small-unit tactics in engagements using
only small arms. None of the country’s armies as constituted in
1966 was a balanced force, and none was a sophisticated military
establishment in the modern sense.
The limited scope of the country's military establishment has
dictated a basic organizational structure that is direct and un-
complex. Both government and antigovernment forces follow the
same general pattern, but a somewhat more formal framework is
evident in the more sophisticated establishment of the royal
government. .
The Royal Armed Forces comprise the ground forces the Royal
Lao Air Force, Lao River Flotilla and Auto Defense Forces. The
ground forces are the dominant component and, in effect, control
and direct the other elements of the armed forces. Headquarters
of the armed forces, as well as the headquarters of the air force,
are at Vientiane, where the General Staff of the Armed Forces of
the kingdom is located. -
Directly under the General Staff are the arms and services,
the Artillery Command, Armored Command, Air Force, Quarter-
master, Engineers and Medical Corps, as well as two major tactical
commands, the Northern Front and the Southern Front. These
control the seven military zones into which the country is divided,
and each zone commander is charged with responsibility for
operational and administrative control of all troops and installa-
tions in his area.
The battalion is the largest tactical unit and is composed of a
headquarters, a headquarters company and three field companies.
Rifle companies have a headquarters, a heavy weapons platoon and
three to five rifle platoons. Paratroops battalions are similarly
organized, and artillery and armored forces operate in battalion-
size elements called “groups.” These usually operate independently
under direction of the commander of the zone in which they are
located. -
In late 1966 there were sufficient stocks of small arms and
individual equipment for the government forces. These consisted
349
generally of conventional, infantry-type weapons and included
machineguns, recoilless rifles, grenades, mortars and some artil-
lery. Largest weapons in the inventory were United States 105-
mm howitzers. There were a few old tanks and armored cars,
but these were limited, as was the artillery, to passable main roads
and could not be employed during the rainy season. Vehicle and
equipment maintenance was marginal and was complicated by
shortages of spare parts and qualified maintenance personnel.
Both the air force and the river force were small and had a
simple organizational structure. Both were component elements of
the army. The Royal Laotian Air Force consisted of a single
squadron, with operational flights designated for transport and
tactical air support.
The Lao River Flotilla was organized into a headquarters sec-
tion and five squadrons. It had its headquarters at Chinaimo,
in the vicinity of Vientiane. Its equipment consisted of landing
craft and a variety of miscellaneous patrol and cargo craft. These
were mostly shallow-draft vessels designed for river operations.
In late 1966 the River Flotilla had over 50 craft, which were con-
ducting regular patrols along all the navigable sections of the
Mekong and its major tributaries.
The Auto Defense Forces constitute a type of regional militia
that is used as a guerrilla force to support the regular army.
They are indirectly responsible to zone commanders through the
local army commanders in their areas. Most of them are loosely
organized into companies of approximately 100 men; in practice
they are usually more responsive to their local leaders than to the
regular military chain of command. The troops generally operate
in their home areas and some are used extensively in irregular
activities. - -
Information on the Pathet Lao forces is scanty and generally
unreliable. The Neutralist forces adhere to battalion composition,
but data are not available on the specifics of its organization.
Neutralist headquarters are at Vang Vieng in Vientiane Province,
and most of the troops are concentrated in that area and around
Muong Soui. The Neutralists are reported to have some artillery,
up to 105-mm howitzers. While he was supported by the Pathet
Lao, Kong Le received about 40 light tanks from the Soviet Union,
but by 1964 he had lost over 30 of them; by 1966 he had none
that were operational.
The Neutralist force is neutral only in that it has so far re-
sisted integration with the Royal Armed Forces. The army affirms
its loyalty to the king. Although nominally subordinate to the
General Staff of the Regular Armed Forces, the Neutralist forces
350
operate much more independently than the Regular Armed Forces
and to date maintain a distinct identity.
Most of the information about the Pathet Lao and the Com-
munist forces supporting them stems from intelligence estimates
based on observation, interrogation and, much of it, on surmise.
It is, nevertheless, valid for the most part for forming an approxi-
mation of the general situation. It is known that, following the
usual Communist pattern, the Pathet Lao forces are completely
subordinate to the local political organization, the Neo Lao Hak
Xat. Communist advisers, both Chinese and Vietnamese, are at-
tached to virtually all units, and it is probable that they direct
most of the operations. Vietnamese troops are integrated into
Pathet Lao formations, either by cadres in individual units or by
incorporating North Vietnamese units into the Pathet Lao organi-
zation.
Pathet Lao forces also included two relatively small groups
who deserted from the Neutralist forces. These were known by
the names of their commanders and designated the Deuane dis-
sidents and the Khammouane dissidents.
CONDITIONS OF SERVICE
The general environment and physical conditions surrounding
military life have not changed significantly since French colonial
times. Many facilities constructed under the French protectorate
continued in use, and many of the newer ones still followed
familiar French patterns. Despite almost 15 years of independence,
most military installations still retained the appearance and at-
mosphere of a French colonial garrison.
The life of a soldier in the Pathet Lao was somewhat more
austere than in the government forces, due in part to circum-
stances of geography, and in part to differences in attitudes and
outlook. In the government forces, however, the serviceman was
for the most part well cared for by the authorities, and his
conditions of service were at a high level of dignity and comfort
in relation to normal local standards. The serviceman’s life was
not one of ease. Discipline was strict and could be severe, but if
a man observed the rules he could expect fair treatment and
recognition for his efforts. -
Military posts were scattered throughout the country; these
adequately met the needs of the services. In general, quarters,
food and pay were as good as a man could find outside the service,
and in many cases they were considerably better. There were
separate accommodations for officers, and on some stations there
was housing for families. Troop barracks were mostly of wooden
frame construction with corrugated tin roofs, but occasionally
there were more elaborate buildings of stucco with tile roofs.
351
There were other advantages that added attraction to a military
career, such as accrual of leave, medical care, survivor benefits
and plans for a retirement system that was expected to be adopted
in the near future. Rations were generally superior in both quan-
tity and quality to the food consumed by much of the population;
standards of nutrition were higher and provided greater variety
and a more balanced diet. Menus were built on a rice base and
conformed to local dietary patterns; the average soldier considered
himself well fed.
Military pay was good by Southeast Asian standards and was
a significant factor affecting the high enlistment and reenlistment
rate. There was no valid comparison with civilian earnings, as
there was no wage-earning labor forces to use as a yardstick,
but servicemen make up a sizeable percentage of the small number
of Laotians who are on a money economy.
UNIFORMS, INSIGNIA AND DECORATIONS
The rank and grade structure of the Armed Forces is the
same for the army, air force and river force and has undergone
virtually no change from that in use in the French army during the
colonial era. It follows the army pattern, which generally con-
forms to standard Western equivalents. The Neutralist forces
adhere to the same pattern, and the Pathet Lao is similar in most
respects, but with some changes in designations and terminology.
In general, areas of responsibility for commissioned officers follow
usual military practice, with lieutenants commanding platoons
and captains in charge of companies. Among noncommissioned
officers, squad leaders are usually sergeants, and corporals serve
as assistants; higher grades may occupy staff positions or serve as
platoon sergeants or unit Sergeant majors.
Officers’ insignia of grade are displayed on shoulder boards, and
noncommissioned officers' chevrons are worn on the upper sleeve.
In 1959 French insignia, which had been used exclusively up to
that time, were replaced by a new Laotian system, although
French nomenclature was retained. Shoulder boards are red, with
a 14-inch gold border for general and field grade officers, and a
thin-line gold border for company grade. Starting with field grade,
a gold device of a wreathed trident is augmented with the appro-
priate number of stars to indicate grade. Field grade stars are
mounted on a circular lotus-leaf rosette. For field wear, shoulder
boards are replaced by a small rectangular cloth tab bearing the
insignia and worn over the right pocket. Noncommissioned officers'
chevrons are of gold or silver cloth, worn with the points down.
There is little strict uniformity, however, and many variations are
seen (see table 9). .
352
Table 9. Rank and Insignia of the Royal Armed Forces of Laos, October 1966
Rank United States equivalent Insignia
Général de division- - Major general - - - - - - 3 silver stars
Général de brigade--- Brigadier general - - - 2 silver stars
Colonel ------------- Colonel ------------ Field grade device and 3 gold
stars
Lieutenant colonel -- Lieutenant colonel 5- Field grade device and 2 gold
stars -
Commandant ------- Major ------------- Field grade device and 1 gold
Star
Capitaine ---------- Captain ----------- 3 gold stars
Lieutenant --------- First lieutenant - - - - - 2 gold stars
Sous lieutenant - - - - - Second lieutenant - - - 1 gold star
Aspirant -------- - - - Officer candidate - - - - 1 yellow stripe across end of
shoulder board
Elève officier - - - - - - - - Cadet or probationary 1 yellow stripe broken by 2
officer transverse black bars
Adjudant chef - - - - - - Chief warrant officer - 1 gold stripe across end of
shoulder board
Adjudant ---------- Warrant officer - - - - - 3 gold chevrons
Sergent chef - - - - - - - Master sergeant - - - - 2 gold chevrons
Sergent ------------ Sergeant first class -- 1 gold chevron
Corporal chef - - - - - - - Sergeant ----------- 3 silver chevrons
Caporal ------------ Corporal ----------- 2 silver chevrons
Soldat 1” classe- - - - - Private first class- - - - 1 silver chevron
Soldat ------------- Private ------------ None
The uniforms of the country's armies are basically similar;
they are built up from tropical khaki shirts and trousers and
elaborated with identifying accessories and insignia to lend a
factional or national character. The uniforms of the government
forces have been furnished by France or the United States and
follow their standard pattern and design. Pathet Lao forces receive
their uniforms from North Vietnamese or Chinese sources, and
their cut and tailoring reflect Communist styling. Uniforms are
simple and utilitarian, and are designed for operational use rather
than formal or ceremonial wear.
The basic uniform of the Royal Armed Forces is the khaki
shirt and trousers. Shirt sleeves are rolled above the elbow for
field wear as the weather dictates; trousers are tucked into com-
bat boots or leggings for field or garrison wear and worn loose
with low-quarter shoes for dress. Headgear is usually the red
beret or khaki fatigue cap for enlisted men; officers wear the
peaked garrison cap. Air force men sometimes wear the blue
French calot, or overseas cap. Officers also have a khaki coat and
a white dress uniform for off-duty wear. Class A uniforms and
garrison caps are sometimes issued to enlisted men for special
353
duties or assignments. The king's Royal Guard and other special
ceremonial formations wear the red beret with a red web belt.
All troops wear plain red shoulder boards for dress.
Troops are issued garrison uniforms, battle dress and fatigues.
These are known as the number 1 parade uniform, combat uniform
and work uniform. Field uniforms are identical for officers and
enlisted men are are sometimes worn with a steel helmet. Khaki
trousers and long-sleeved shirts are worn by noncommissioned
officers and men for dress. Battalions have distinctive unit badges;
officers wear them as metal devices suspended from the button
of the right breast pocket; enlisted men have cloth patches worn
on the left sleeve at the shoulder. Identifying branch insignia
of metal are worn by officers and occasionally by enlisted men.
French-type paratroops and airborne badges are sometimes worn
—the former over the right pocket of the shirt and the latter
usually on the right side of the beret. Pilot's wings closely resemble
the United States insigne. -
When possible, each man is furnished a complete set of uni-
forms, web belt, canteen, mess gear, raincoat and other necessary
equipment. In addition, he receives a supply of personal items,
such as towels and socks. Clothing and equipment are of generally
good quality, are simple and comfortable and adequately meet
the soldier's needs. His appearance has not changed radically from
the soldier of the French colonial forces, but accessories and
distinctive devices are designed to stress his consciousness of
service to an independent nation.
There are three major national decorations that may be awarded
for military accomplishment or outstanding civil service. The
country’s senior decoration is the Order of the Million Elephants
and the White Parasol. Established in 1844, it closely parallels the
French Legion of Honor in form and structure and consists of
five grades ranging upward from chevalier through officer, com-
mander, grand officer and grand cross. The ribbon is red decorated
with a yellow line design. It may be awarded to foreign personnel
as well as Laotians.
The Phagna Mahonosit order serves the same purpose, but has
a lower precedence. It is named after Mahonosit, a famous his-
torical military leader; Phagna indicates honor or award. It is
presented to nationals only and carries with it titles in various
degrees somewhat similar to the British orders of knighthood.
The third ranking national order is the Order of the Reign.
This is awarded in three classes, distinguished by medals of gilt,
silver or bronze. It is a circular medal bearing the king's profile
on the obverse. The ribbon is yellow with red edges. In 1962 an
additional medal for meritorious service was established, the
354
Medal of Government Recognition. It may be awarded to both civil
and military personnel for outstanding accomplishment during
times of hostilities.
There are two service-type medals for military personnel.
The Combat Medal is similar in purpose to the United States
Combat Infantryman’s Badge, and the Order of War Veterans
is a general service award for active duty during hostilities. The
ribbon is red, with wide white stripes edged in yellow. The country
has several other specialized orders and awards to recognize
achievement in various fields, such as the Order of Civic Merit and
the Order of Agricultural Merit. These are closely patterned after
French counterparts. .
LOGISTICS
The logistic support of government forces is almost entirely
dependent on outside aid and assistance, mostly from the United
States and France. Virtually all military supplies must originate
outside of the country, as there is no internal capability for the
manufacture of arms, munitions, vehicles or other items of mili-
tary hardware, and there is an extremely limited maintenance capa-
bility in qualified personnel or equipment. Internal distribution of
supplies is effected from central depots to the military zones. This
is the responsibility of the general staff, where individual technical
service chiefs directly subordinate to the Deputy Chief of Staff for
Logistics maintain and control base depots in the Vientiane and
Savannakhet areas. These depots are also responsible for fourth
echelon, or depot level maintenance.
In general there are adequate quantities of basic items on
hand, such as uniforms and personal equipment for routine opera-
tions. Sufficient quantities of modern individual weapons exist,
and they are maintained in good condition. There are only limited
stockpiles of reserve materiel, however, to meet emergencies or
cope with special situations. The shortage of transportation is
the result of the high percentage of vehicles out of operation
because of the lack of spare parts or unavailability of maintenance
technicians. Telecommunications equipment is obsolete for the
most part and often in a state of disrepair. In spite of the prob-
lems, however, materials do get through, and the forces are able to
maintain the limited-scale operations they are prepared to under-
take.
The armed forces control no military hospitals, and civilian
hospitals, which are responsible for both military and civilian
patients, are utilized. Most hospitals have a separate military
section which includes a laboratory, storerooms and, in some
instances, separate operating rooms. X-ray facilities are used
jointly. In cases of emergency near centers of population. ambu-
355
lances assigned to civilian hospitals are used. Although there is
no formal system of medical or battlefield evacuation, most sick
or wounded troops are evacuated by air.
Although little is known of the logistic arrangements of the
Neutralist forces and the Pathet Lao, there is every indication
that they are faced with similar problems. The neutralist forces
are becoming increasingly dependent on the central government
and, thus indirectly, on foreign aid. They have also received some
direct assistance from other countries. Pathet Lao requirements
are met from Chinese and North Vietnamese sources, but there
is no specific information on their modus operandi. Experience
in the field and examination of captured men and materials have
not indicated any relatively greater capability or success in Com-
munist logistic operations.
Military justice during the colonial era relied entirely on the
established system found throughout the French military estab-
lishment. This was based on permanent military tribunals that
were set up to try all offenses subject to the military penal code.
Each of the component areas of Indochina, Laos included, had its
permanent court that handled all military cases except those in-
volving minor infractions subject to nonjudicial punishment.
After independence the country established its own system,
patterned largely on French precedents. In 1966 the system was
still in a period of formation and development because of a
perennial lack of qualified personnel to administer it. Little infor-
mation has been released on the details of its operation, but it
is known that the normal judiciary functions of the armed forces
are under the direction of a chief justice who heads a headquarters
staff section called the Military Justice Division. It has been diffi-
cult to find qualified personnel for this staff section, and at no time
has it had more than a handful of officers and men.
There are indications that only one type of court is used, con-
vened as needed and made up of officers selected from prepared
lists of eligibles. Courts-martial appear to be used only in cases
of serious offenses, and usually they sit at army headquarters in
Vientiane. In line with the precedent of the French army, both
officers and noncommissioned officers have relatively wide latitude
in dispensing summary justice and may mete out punishments
within prescribed limits, including restriction and confinement,
without resorting to a formal trial. In practice the greater per-
centage of military offenses is handled in this way.
APPENDIX S
[LAOTIAN MILITARY POSTUREI
[Reprinted with permission from: The Almanac of World Military Power,
First Edition, by Col. T. N. Dupuy, U.S. Army, Ret. Dunn Loring, Va.,
T. N. Dupuy Associates, 1970.]
357
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LAOS ... "
Royaume de Laos Total Active Armed Forces: 107,400 total (3.82% pop".
Kingdom of Laos lation): 62,400 Royal Lao Forces, 35,000 Path"
Lao, 10,000 Neutralists - ...
POWER POTENTIAL STATISTICS - Gross Nationaiproduct: $200 million ($72 per capit) -
Annual Military Expenditures: $35 million (17%0".
Area: 91,429 square miles c.50% budget)
Population: 2,800,000 Electric Power Output: 15 million kwh








358
Civil Air Fleet: 5 piston transports
STRATEGIC BACKGROUND
In 1949 this former French colony was granted
independence within the French Union as the United Kingdom
ºf Laos. Internal opposition soon developed under the
kadership of Communist oriented Prince Souphanouvong,
who organized the Pathet Lao (Free Lao) movement. Early in
1953, Viet Minh troops, and Pathet Lao forces organized in
Witt Nam, invaded eastern Laos to plunge the nation into civil
Mr. This was interrupted by the Geneva Agreement of July
1954, which provided, inter alia, for the integration of the
hlhet Lao into the government and into the army.
Some dissidence continued in the following years, with the
%thet Lao maintaining control of much of northern and
tastern Laos, while the neutralist Prime Minister — Prince
Souvanna Phouma — attempted to reach agreement with
his half-brother, Prince Souphanouvong, without success.
Hince Souvanna Phouma resigned under pressure from a
ight-wing group which had been alarmed by the growing
military and political strength of the Pathet Lao. This group
tºtablished a conservative government and ruled by decree.
This led the Pathet Lao to intensify hostilities against the
military assistance. During the following two years there was a
£fies of coups and counter coups, the situation being further
(Omplicated when a portion of the Royal Lao Army mutinied
ind took the field as an independent neutralist army. In the
(Unfused, low intensity, three-cornered war, the Pathet Lao,
with substantial military assistance from North Viet Nam was
ille to extend the areas under its control.
A new 14-nation Geneva Conference in 1961-1962
itempted to establish a basis for bringing peace to Laos. This
ki to the establishment in mid-1962 of a new Government of
National Union under Prince Souvanna Phouma. The Geneva
Conference then agreed to the withdrawal of foreign troops
ſtom Laos, and international guarantees of Laotian
idependence and neutrality.
Slight progress toward integration of the Pathet Lao into
he government and the armed forces was made in 1962-1963,
hiſ political assassinations and coups soon led the Pathet Lao
| renew overt rebellion. Intermittent hostilities have con-
inued, the Pathet Lao being supported by North Viet Nam.
Hinoi's stake in Laos had been increased by growing American
iWolvement in the Viet Nam War, and the consequent
§stical reliance of North Vietnamese and Vietcong forces in
With Viet Nam upon the so-called Ho Chi Minh Trail, which
ſms through eastern Laos. Prince Souvanna Phouma,
ſparently having become increasingly disillusioned and em-
illered by Pathet Lao intransigence and continued armed
thellion, gave tacit consent to U.S. Air Force operations
inst the Ho Chi Minh Trail. He also requested American
military assistance, which has been provided in unspecified
|||Ounts. -
gºvernment, which then sought and obtained American
CURRENT MILITARY SITUATION
A military stalemate exists. The Pathet Lao still controls all
of eastern Laos, and much of the northern and southern
regions of the country, although the government has reduced
the area under communist control from about two-thirds of
the country to about one-half. This region is now dominated
by some 40,000 North Vietnamese troops, who are protecting
the Ho Chi Minh Trail. The neutralist units retain their
autonomy; however, they generally support the government
and have been partially integrated into the Royal Lao Army.
ROYAL LAO ARMY
Personnel: 60,000 regular forces, 10,000 partly integrated
neutralists
Organization:
10 mobile groups (average 3 battalions per group)
24 mobile infantry battalions
6 parachute battalions
40 garrison battalions
Major Equipment Inventory:
light tanks (M-24)
armored cars (M-8)
60 light artillery pieces (105mm howitzers, heavy
mortars)
19 light aircraft
ROYAL LAO NAVY
Personnel 400
Major Units: 5-10 small river gunboats and landing craft
ROYAL LAO AIR FORCE
Personnel: 2,000
Major Aircraft Types:
50 combat aircraft
50 T-28D trainers (armed for ground-support)
73 other aircraft -
20 T-28D trainers
10 C-47 transports
6 other transports aircraft
28 miscellaneous trainer/support aircraft
9 helicopters
PATHET LAO FORCES
Personnel: 35,000 approximately
Organization: Unknown
Major Equipment Inventory:
light tanks (PT-76)
armored cars (BTR-40)
Foreign Support: Approximately 5 regiments of North
Vietamese combat troops, totalling about 20,000 men,
plus 20-25,000 support troops are in northeastern and
eastern Laos, protecting and maintaining the Ho Chi
Minh Trail.
359
APPENDIX T
LAOS
STRENGTH OF COMMUNIST PARTY
ORGANIZATION
[Reprinted from: World Strength of the Communist Party Organizations.
23rd Annual Report, 1971 Edition. Washington, Department of State,
Bureau of Intelligence and Research, 1971 (Publication 8526).]
360
LAOS
NATIONAL POLITICAL STATUS
Date of last election: January 1, 1967
A constitutional monarchy, Laos has been governed since 1962
by an extra-constitutional, internationally sanctioned tripartite
group called the Provisional Government of National Union.
Since 1963, when effective participation by the Communist-oriented
faction ceased, the Neutralists and Rightist elements have administered
the government-controlled areas. The Lao legislative branch is
bicameral: a King's Council (half of whose 12 members are appointed
by the King, half selected by the National Assembly) and an elected
National Assembly. Candidates for the Lao National Assembly (a
body whose powers are essentially consultative until the Provisional
Government of National Union is dissolved) were officially non-partisan.
The Communists did not participate in the election or allow voting
in Communist-held territory.
Communist Party Membership: 12,000 - 14,000
The Communist part of Laos, Phak Pasason Lao (Lao People's Party,
LPP), purports to be a secret nationalſTorganization of elite
disciplined cadre that directs the Neo Lao Hak Sat (the Lao Patriotic
Front, LPF). Actually, the motives and ideology of LPP members
are frequently obscure and quite likely rather diverse. Its discipline,
While far from rigid, is perhaps slightly better than that of its
RLG opponents. Its existence has long been public knowledge, although
not widely publicized either by the government or the LPF. However,
during the past two years LPF broadcasts, and publications have occasionall,
distinguished between "the Party" and "the Front" without, however,
applying the LPP label to the former group. The Lao Communist party
appears to accept North Vietnamese direction with little questioning.
North Vietnam's support and relative power, combined with the pervasive
presence of its soldiers and cadres throughout the LPF "zone," make
the LPP's major policy decisions almost totally subject to Hanoi's
approval. Estimates of Phak Pasason Lao membership range from 12,000
to 14,000 of the 800,000 to 900,000 Lao under LPF administration.
The military arm of the Front, the Lao People's Liberation Army
(LPLA, formerly known as the Pathet Lao), probably numbers more than
43,000 troops. A dissident neutralist element of about 2,000 men
Called the "Patrotic Neutralist Forces" allied with the LPLA in 1964.
Leading Party Figures and Position:
Kaysone Phomvihan, Secretary-General of the Lao People's Party and
Vice-Chairman of the LPF.
Mouhak Phoumsavan, Deputy Secretary General of the LPP and Standinq
Member of LPF Central Committee.
Prince Souphanouvong, Reportedly member of the LPP and Chairman of
the LPF Central Committee.
361
; :ºx.
LA0S (continued)
Principal Publications:
The LPP does not acknowledge authorship of publicly circulated
documents. The LPF relies chiefly on radio broadcasts (Radio
Pathet Lao and the Patriotic Neutralist Forces Radio) to present
its views. Khaosan Pathet Lao (Pathet Lao News Agency) has often
been cited by the LPF and other groups as the journalistic source
of broadcasts and news reports. The Lao Patriotic Front Information
Bureau in Hanoi (officially opened December 1969) has released several
pamphlets put out by "Neo Lao Hak Sat Editions" and printed by the
Lao Hak Sat Press. Examples of these paper-back publications include
Twelve Years of Intervention and Aggression of the American Imperialists

in Laos (1966), L'Imperialisme Americain (1967), and Phoumi Wongvichit's
Laos and the Victorious Struggle of the Lao People Against US Neo-
Colonialism (although published in English in 1969, internal evidence
suggests the book was written in 1967).
Areas of Communist Activity
The LPF effectively withdrew from the tripartite Government of
National Union in 1963, and has continued its insurgency since then.
The Communists control more than half the territory of Laos,
principally along the mountainous northern and eastern borders,
in which about one-third of the total Lao population lives.
In February 1970, North Vietnamese and LPLA forces drove the
Government forces from their positions on the Plain of Jars that
the RLG had surprisingly seized six months previously. North Vietnamese
forces in the south, perhaps in reaction to events in Cambodia, also
seized two south Laos provincial capitals in April and June. North
Vietnamese troop deployments in the Ho Chi Minh Trail area running
through South Laos continued during the 1970–71 dry season. Sharp
clashes have occurred in both north and south, but, since July,
have not resulted in dramatic territorial changes.
In 1968, the LPF adopted the position that an internal settlement
had to be based on the 1962 Geneva Accords and "the realities of the
current situation: thereby presumably modifying the Lao tripartite
agreements on 1962 for the purpose of seeking a larger share of
political power. On March 6, 1970, the LPF made a more specific
five-point proposal for a Lao political settlement. A special LPF
envoy is now discussing with Prime Minister Prince Souvanna Phouma
a possible meeting between representatives of the government and
the LPF. A major eventual objective of the LPF (and behind the
scenes Hanoi) is probably to secure a total bombing halt in Laos.
While the Prime Minister has agreed to the placing of a bombing
halt on the agenda of possible future talks, he has noted that
activities in the Ho Chi Minh Trail area, including the issue of
362
LAOS (continued)
US bombing, are a separate subject that would have to be settled
between North Vietnam and the United States. Elsewhere in Laos,
Souvanna has sought to link a reduction in bombing to a reduction
of North Vietnamese troops. Neither the LPF nor Hanoi has ever
acknowledged any North Vietnamese military presence in Laos.
The Communist movement in Laos is under the effective control of
the North Vietnamese and is dependent upon Hanoi for military support
as well as policy direction. North Vietnamese troops in Laos are
estimated at over 90,000, outnumbering LPLA troops. In addition, the
Chinese in the northwest corner of Laos, apparently with a view to
extending their influence in at least that part of the country, are
building a major road system and have provided technical support
elsewhere in Communist-controlled areas of Laos.
APPENDIX U
LAOS
(MAP WITH INSETS-COLOR)
100 102 N º -
> ſº S Lao Catº Bac Quang N sº
2 T \s. Dong Khe - Cº.
o
º - CŞ. N- Lung-chou o Ts
Ou Neua - \ *- |
N -
\ l \ º' C | H N. A
\ \ Muang Khoa So N - P'ing-
ou Tay! NJ- ~ *C. sº Bac Kan N hsiang -Cº
_^ º S. & K- - - - C. g-ming
2 ~ ul - \
2- N. Nam 9 Y Lai cº º - Na Sam
-22 – - > -º- º º- -- - 22-
- y > - - Than Uyen - Vº -
- | _^ -- º ^\ Dong Djang -
- o
| __ – Tº- -- - *- º ->
\ ( Tuyen Quang - - Lang so C -
- \s
Ta-lo -
\ ſº
- - A
Tuan Giad orhi º -
Nahia Lo Thai Nguyenººr Dinh Lap
Dien Bien Phu ſ º -
--
- ºsſ
..Minneapolis º * º
- Na San - -
ſ Oshkosh -
BU R/M A * * *
J Dubuq * - º
- Chicago" -
-
innati
--
2^ ~~ Muang Luong ~~
L^ - f Ban Xien Kok . ( Nam Tha L– / J
_Wān Séng o - * º
_^ -
\
P
}
º ~!
2^ Muong Luong
“, - Samneuf - Nº. Tha. -
Chiang Houe _-- \ - - A. "mºons sai
Saen .sa. n Coc Nang * / - Muong Ham - A.
Chiang." * ~ 7425. gº Samneua.
º G F PA RA BANG A 2---
––ſ
º _^"Pak Seng
2- ) -
º - /~~~ 20-
Pak Beng_/ - Z/ Sam Teu -Sayaboury *:
*39angphrabang -Wang Vieng
//- / º º
N_ Nay tº - -
2 --~~ Paklay - | -
Ban n -
ventº
Deo
Barthélémy
Muong Sen
…”
º Muong Sou º
- Qi Y -
- ſu- - - Nong Hét
~~~!
Khan-ouane
G U L F º
ECONOMIC ACTIVITY
avannakhet -
Xiangkhoang -
Sepone-
|Ban Muong Nga
2- ºr ING
Băn Thieng
Phayao
— - O F - Forest (some areas of slash A Forest products (logs,
Z. - and burn cultivation) lumber, gums, resins) º º
- - | Grassland \} Opium - _
Ban Ta Viang ``Tha Thom { --- |
- –? "92.49 Sº - Rice * Livestock -
$ / Vang Vieng J s º Sn T * Saravane
n Tin -
s º - ~ & \ T O N K I N *... sºdone
/ | º - Fe Iron ore º
ºv –/ \ - As
& - ( -----
A- N º \ 3540. |- * -----
- INgum Lºom ſº N E º
Ban Phon Hong * *
N-
V E N T | A º
- | S&Paksane ~ Ban º
/ -> º Sa
2- U → Y º
\_^ -º
º
Ban Hat Kiengº ** 2.
Phrae 3e. MUI RON
Pa Mona Dºn Y U ^-
|- ... º \'sza | - K H A M M CS \ d
posed) -' Phon Phisai
PK8. - /IENTIANE__ on Y \, N | -7 Tan Ap 18-
º º Tº /2 N Ban Thong Ka ſ Ş. 1. SN ),
Deu: \ Banº ) S$ La Ron -
- | —º Nong 2 \,. Phon Tiou & Trong ſº 42 ºf
Chiang Khan Ǻns Khai *1. Su § l s 12 2. %, 42
‘s º º
W N *s § N > -7 2Donbai Dinh Ba Don
Š *akhram 627 \ - Deo Mu N
Ban Phu S. - * \ º Gig Q -" º
º - - º - / - -
ttaradit cº - sº \ Nhommarath, "aggs }_º oury xºnº
tº º - - \ / º º
- Na Phao") --> _ -
L s \ - - -
Oei | º - \) .” - Spong Hoi y -
Udon Thani Ban Mahaxa N
| O Phang Khon Nakhon Phanom Akhammouane & "" º Q - ſº Vu.c. Ni - º
Ban Som * Deo Ban Karai
C-
QP Abandoned between
Dong Hoi and Dºng Ho
h Linh
DEMARCATION LINE
T
H A L A N D ſº
bonrotona Dł
(Nam Phone
KV2
POPULATION
Persons per square mile
o 2.6 26 130
O ſ to 5o
Persons per square kilometer
\
Phitsanulok
)
|
s *
-
Kºhong Sedone
Mukdahan
Phichit" Phetchabun
-
|-
Maha Sarakham
Ban
Toumlan
& Ban Phai ſ
ZZ
w
n
*—77–7-y ^
LAOS _Tº
| \ .
- |--
N
-
Ban ſ
Thateng
International boundary
––– Province boundary
© National capital
Attopeu. Province capital
— Railroad
Road
Bua Yai
Mº'? & º - N \ \ ^ ºf N. t
Hrº twº ºr -61AIEAU/DEs º
Warin Chamrap Pak BOLOVENS
ZZ Sisaket - - Song º
2. \se Do NE &
ºf 2 Buriram -
- - - - - Trail (possibly motorable -
(p y atchasina Surin
in dry season)
ſ + Airfield
Populated places N-
© Over 30,000 \ ~ -
O O to 30,000
º º ETHNIC GROUPS
ncier I U, º-
- —º TAI SINO-TIBETAN
- Lao [ ] Meo
§. Tribal Yao
- (temple rui - -
Spot elevations in feet p Chéom Ksan MON-KHMER Tibeto-Burman
Samrong º | Cambodian
o | - Lolo Selected tribal group
Siem Pang º Tribal
º
Scale 1:1,750,000
O 25 50 75
-14- I-II - . I I - —-
statute Miles ==-
O 25 50 75 `-
º official Lao sources refer to all tribal groups as "Lao Theung"
Kilometers
TATION RN
BAN K NAMEs AND Bounda RY REPRESEN - Andaung ---
º _ºgº. 102 _ ARE Not Necessa Riº Avº"; 104 - Pech -----
PRINTED BY THE DEFENSE MAPPING AGENCY TOPOGRAPHIC CENTER

































































































































APPENDIX V
LAOS: ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISIONS
(MAP–COLOR)

365
Muang Luongo
Nam Tha
H O U A
KHON G
Prabang
/ I E N T I A N E
WIENTIANE
I L A N D
XIANGKHOANG
B C R I. K. H. A. N. E.
"N-.. ſº
NL-
Samneuao
H O U A E HANT:
(SAM NEUA)
Xiangkhoang
O
o Paksane
l
NE \.
º
kHAMMoua
* T )
-
G U L F
O F
O N K I N
ºf of stay |
- I
- LAOS
2-ºx
º ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISIONS 2. Nº
-
- Internal administrative
boundary
O Internal administrative
capital
...--
- ...,’
14– ſ
25 50 75 100 Miles 2.
"Tº Tº ſº. -->
-
C. A M B O D I A
names and Boundar-R-E-PREs Entation
ARE NOT NEC Essa R. L. Y. A UTHORITATIVE
PRINTED BY THE DEFENSE MAPPING
Khammouane
P. (Thakhek) N. -
Qs *-n.
3 Noi _-_Y
". D tion Li
\ *___y- ernarcation ne
oSavannakhet ºn -
*Nº. * A W
2 *
Sºſhi" Sº V.
Nº.
SARAVANE -
v.APikHANUHong ºr souTH
oSaravane -
O Khq \VIET-NAM
10ng -
Sédqne N.
M98 Num Mº X-r ..)
(º o Paksé J
**, *,\;=PoWE) Arro E = u \º
y *qChampassak
- oºttopeu
}***") E.A.K.
- .- :
- {T>2". …' J
..~"—...~...~~...~~~~~. ..~~ ...” N.— :
\ ſº sit HANDo) ER d
-- ^ —º º, -
-- -- - - *)-4-
S.J.
)
ſ
106
Lº
-
AGENCY TOPOGRAPHIC CENTER







































APPENDIX w
LAOS: COMMUNIST ADMINISTRATIVE
DIVISIONS
(MAP—COLOR)
367
182 106
Pai-se
-
Shih-p'ing
- Ching-ku - C H | N A
• Meng-tzu
-
Fu-hsing-chen "Ha Giang
Lao Cai
- | T, N. Lai Cha
Phong
sº O \
Mengºla PHoNo
SALY - S
Djen Bien
Phu
Muang Luon?
Nam Tha
Samneua
O
SAM NEUA
HOUA PHAN
NOR
XIENG KHOUANG
XIANGKHOANG
Xiangkhoang G U L F
O F
Jºh TO N K.I.N.
BORI KHANE
Paksane
'''." J & KHAMMoUANE Y - 18-
wº - TV
ong Khai º 3.
º
Udon Thani" oKhammouane
-QS º
Phit | §. DEMARCATION
itsanulok — ºr LINE
T H A | L A Sépone -
--- -
N Savannakhet E Séno
- Khon Kaen SAVANNA KH ET SOUT Hue"
~
VIETNAM
NAMES AND BOUNDARY Representation
A RE NOT NEC Ess ARILY AuTH of ITAT-1 v E
LAOS wn, sº Ubon
- -- - - - - Ratchathani.
Communist Administrative Divisions
--A ºn Pººsa K.
Champassaka
Communist province boundary
= Royal Lao Government (RLG)
province boundary”
O RLG province capital -
CHAMRAssak
14-
*RLG province names are given only where RLG -
names or boundaries differ from the Communist.
O 25 50 75 100 Miles
H-I-T-I-1–T-1–
( O 25 50 75 100 Kilometers C A M B O D
ſ
Tº 132 º
PRINTED BY THE DEFENSE MAPPING AGENCY TOPOGRAPHIC CENTER












































APPENDIX X
LAOS [MILITARY REGIONS]
(MAP–COLOR)
369
102
- Ching-ku
"Fu-Hsing-chen
Shih-p'ing C H | N A
Ko-chius
Pai-se
-
- Meng-tzu
Cao
Bang
Na Sam.
Bac Kan 22-
(
BU R M A
++O L.A. * } Muong-
. \Phitsanulok
_º Meng-la
- -
o .*
Muang Luon Z
Nam #º
Sai
ºf R
2–~~
- Lou A \ Hou A PHA. N. E.
Pak B |º (sAMNEu A)
aK Beng G y Q 2-.
S 5. s º X: A N G KHO ANG
ayaboury / - Xi O
& O *" G U L F.
* f | * * O F
O
§ º TO N KIN
2. º ſ
> -
&
& < -
Mgº ºn 1 VIENT ANE
º
Chiang ºf ſong Khai
Khan
T H A
NAMEs AND Bound ARY REPREs Entation
ARE NOT NEC Ess ARILY AUTHORITATIVE
Udon Thani"
Lang Sons
hai
uyen
*Kep
Samneua
O
-
-
A N
- a .
Savannakhet 5 Séno
- Khon Kaen SA v A.N. N.A.K.
Muong ºs
Nông Tº VIETNAM
*-* -
Lº º
-Ban Bac
|- sºn,
LAOS
Military region boundary
---...- Province boundary
O Province capital
O 25 50 75 100 Miles
H–1—T-T-I-T--
O 25 50 75 100 Kilometers
º s.A RAv A.NE
---
Ubon
Ratchathani
Stung Treng
106
Z/
PRINTED BY THE DEFENSE MAPPING AGENCY TOPOGRAPHIC CENTER

















































APPENDIX Y
NORTH LAOS
(MAP—COLOR)
371
Fu-hsing-che
(SSu-mao).
º
º,
o
N.
NORTH LAOS
22 \ // Road /~/
! ~\49. 22-
- Y — — — Trail
gºſo 26 N. | 2- ~4 -
: -- - -- 20 40 60 Miles
( -- .../ -PHong Saly 40 60 Kilometers
** \ ...-- { %
- C 191
Weng-ſal
B U R M A ; Mºgoșºº...)
Ing/ * Bañº-
_2^ º Bořene)412 M … "
- Muaſig Luongº UOng, Z 45
Nam Thå º
~ 3 Muongº vº
o Nam Yu ) Sai º / TT
3/ /~ - ſº
H uei- º 46 |
C § º,S 2/
777 > 4
.." r’Muong Houn
ſ Pak Bengo-
-* MEKONG ºf OUANGPHRABANG
ſº S- - 5
4/13 Ó 7] Ban º Cº-º.’
C Nong
*7 Xiangkhöänge 2. He
- |
13 \o
Ong Q4
º: * Loſha Thom
~~ y
52
\
13 4\
13 Paksane
Šsº
V|E AN -
#2,”
{{<
NONG KHA
UDON THAN | C
*PHTSANULok
tº D
Sé lſº
SAVANNAKH Y
/ 10 NAMEs and soundary Keeresentation Mukdahanº O
A RE NoT NEcEssa Ril-Y AUTHORITATIVE
=
PRINTED BY THE DEFENSE MAPPING AGENCY TOPOGRAPHIC CENTER












APPENDIX Z
KINGDOM OF THAILAND
BACKGROUND NOTES
[Washington, Department of State, November 1970, Publication 1961.]
373
Population: 35 million (1970 est.)
Capital: Bangkok
The Kingdom of Thailand, formerly known as
Siam, is located in the heart of mainland Southeast
Asia. It has an area of approximately 200,000
square miles—about the size of Wyoming and
Colorado combined. Thailand has common boun-
daries with Burma on the west and north, Laos On
the north and east, Cambodia on the Southeast,
and Malaysia on the south. The shape of the coun-
try has often been compared to the head of an
elephant with its trunk extending down the Malay
Peninsula. South of the main portion of the country
and east of peninsular Thailand lies the Gulf of
Siam.
Thailand’s topography is diversified. There
are four main geographic regions—central, north-
east, north, and South:
e The central region is dominated by Thai-
land’s most important river, the Chao Phraya.
The land is rich in alluvium and watered by an
extensive network of canals and irrigation proj-
ects.
e The northeastern region, a large plateau
rising about 1,000 feet above the central plain,
comprises roughly one-third of the country. A
great deal of this land is poor and suffers from
occasional droughts or floods depending on the
Season. The topography of the plateau makes ir-
rigation difficult, but planned irrigation and flood
control projects on the Mekong River, whichforms
much of the border with Laos, should improve
agricultural potential. Completion of these proj-
ects, however, is not expected for some years.
e Northern Thailand is primarily a region of
mountains and valleys and comprises about one-
quarter of the nation. The mountains, running
north and south are forested, and the valleys be-
tween them are narrow but fertile.
e The southern region, a long Sliver of land
extending from central Thailand south to Malaysia,
is covered in great part by rain forest.
Thailand is a tropical land, high in tempera-
ture and humidity. The climate of much of the
country is dominated by monsoons. In most re-
gions there are three seasons: rainy (June-
October), cool (November-February), and hot
(March–May). Rainfall varies but is generally
heaviest in the South and lightest in the northeast.
Thailand's flag is comprised of twored stripes,
top and bottom; two white inner stripes; and a
wider blue center band. The blue represents royal-
ty, the white Buddhism, and the red stands for
Thailand itself, whose name means “Free Nation.”
THE PEOPLE
Thailand’s population of 35 million is composed
primarily of people of Thai stock. The principal
minority groups are an estimated 2 million ethnic
Chinese located in the larger urban areas, most of
whom have integrated into the Thai society; about
800,000 Malay-speaking Moslems in the south-
ernmost provinces; the various hill tribes in the
north, estimated at about 286,000; and 45,000 Viet-
namese, mostly in the northeast. Thai society is:
predominantly rural in nature and is most heavily
concentrated in the valleys and plains of the north,
.northeast, and central regions. The population
density for the country as a whole is about 190
persons per square mile. The population growth
rate is approximately 3.3 percent a year. Bangkok,
the capital, has about 2.8 million inhabitants
(1970 estimate).
The language of the country is Thai, of which
there are a number of regional dialects. English
Serves as the Second language among the educated
and Official elements of Society.
For some years universal education through
the fourth grade has been offered in all parts of
the Kingdom, and the Government is currently
seeking to extend this to the seventh grade. There
are universities in the capital, in the northern city
of Chiang Mai, in the northeastern city of Khon
Kaen, and in the south, where a new university is
being established with colleges in Songkhla, Yala,
and Pattani. Thailand’s literacy rate is approxi-
mately 70 percent.
Buddhism Of the Theravada School is the reli-
gion of more than 90 percent of the Thai, but the
Government permits religious freedom and a
great number of other religions are represented
throughout the country.
HISTORY
More than 1,000 years ago the ancestors of
the Thai began migrating from southern China,
where an independent Thai kingdom formerly
existed. This process was greatly accelerated
when southern China was overrun by the Mongols
under Kublai Khan in the 13th century. During that
century what was to become modern Thailand had
its beginnings in a kingdom with a capital at
Sukothai in the north. In the 14th century the
capital was transferred to Ayutthaya on the Chao
November 1970

374
of Ministers (cabinet), headed by the Prime Minis-
ter (Head of Government). The King appoints as
Prime Minister the leader of the political party
which wins the most seats in the parliamentary
election. Other Ministers are appointed by the
King, and the cabinet as a whole is responsible
to Parliament. Ministers can be removed from
office at any time by a vote of no-confidence by
the two Houses of Parliament voting together. The
Council of Ministers frames and implements all
important national policies and is the center
around which the entire political system revolves.
Thailand’s bicameral Parliament consists of a
Senate (upper house) and a House of Representa-
tives (lower house). The membership of the latter
is 219, based on one popularly elected Repre-
sentative for every 150,000 persons, with each
Province receiving at least one Representative
regardless of its population. Representatives are
elected to 4-year terms. The Senate is three-
fourths the size of the House of Representatives;
there are now 164 Senators. They are appointed
for 6-year terms by the Council of Ministers with
the King’s approval. -
The present judicial system evolved from a
combination of customary and Western-based
laws. The highest court in Thailand is the Supreme
Court whose justices are appointed by the King.
Thailand’s most important administrative
divisions are the 71 Provinces. Each Province is
headed by a Governor, appointed by the Minister
of Interior. Elected provincial assemblies enact
local government ordinances.
POLITICAL CONDITIONS
Phraya River, a few miles north of Bangkok. This
kingdom had some contact with the West, beginning
with the Portuguese in the 16th century, but until
the 19th century its relations with its neighbors
in Southeast Asia were of primary importance.
Toward the end of the 18th century Burmese
armies overwhelmed the kingdom. Rama I, founder
of the present ruling dynasty, was one of the
leaders who eventually drove out the Burmese.
He established the capital at its present location,
Bangkok, in 1782. His successors, especially after
the British victory over Burma in 1826, were to
find themselves increasingly preoccupied by a new
threat, that, of European colonialism.
Rama III began the process of accommodating
to Western power with the negotiation of a treaty
of amity and commerce with the British in 1826.
More important steps in this direction were made
by Rama IV, known in the West as King Mongkut,
and by Rama V (King Chulalongkorn), who carried
Out a virtual revolution of modernization in the
Thai Government during the last quarter of the
19th century. These great monarchs combined
diplomatic skill with recognition of the need to
modernize the state structure and thus made it .
possible for Thailand to survive as an independent
state, the only country in South and Southeast Asia
which was never colonized by a European power.
European predominance in Southeast Asia was
challenged in the 20th century by the Japanese.
When Japan struck at the Philippines and Malaya .
in December 1941, it also invaded Thailand. Faced
with overwhelming Japanese power, which quickly
caused the collapse of Western forces in the area,
Thailand acceded to Japanese demands. Although
nominally an ally of Japan during World War II,
Thailand was in effect an occupied country.
The defeat of Japan was followed by an era of
increasingly close relations with the United States,
which had extended assistance to Thailand in the
immediate postwar period. Thailand saw a threat
to its independence by the victory of the Commu-
nist forces on mainland China in 1949 and has
been an active participant, along with the United
States, in efforts to check Communist expansion in
Southeast Asia.
GOVERNMENT
Thailand is a constitutional monarchy, which
functions through a cabinet, parliament, and a
highly centralized administrative system. The
King (Chief of State), although technically with
little direct power, is the popular symbol of na-
tional unity and identity. A Privy Council is
appointed by the King from among members of
the nobility and elder statesmen to advise him
and, under certain conditions, to appoint a regency
to exercise royal powers. The Privy Council
provides a link between the throne and the Gov-
ernment and, on occasion, has demonstrated some
influence over governmental decisions.
Under the 1968 Constitution the executive
branch of the Government is vested in the Council
A limited constitutional monarchy was estab-
lished in 1932, following a revolution which ended
the absolute monarchy. Since then Thailand has
had eight constitutions and nine nationwide elec-
tions. These events have reflected the widespread
acceptance by Thailand’s educated elite of the
desirability of representative government. How-
ever, such governmental changes were innova-
tions for the Thai people and were complicated by
stresses related to World War II. There was much
political confusion—before and after the war—and
the Government was controlled most Of the time
by military regimes which seized power in a
Series of almost-bloodless coups. The last such
coup took place in 1958 when Field Marshal SARIT
Thanarat took power. He banned political parties,
imposed martial law, and appointed a Constituent
Assembly to draft a new constitution. After
Marshal Sarit’s death in December 1963, lead-
ership of the ruling group passed smoothly to his
Deputy Prime Minister, Field Marshal THANOM
Kittikachorn.
Prime Minister Thanom reiterated Marshal
Sarit’s assurances that a new constitution would
be promulgated—one that would restore a parlia-
mentary system of government and allow some
popular participation through an elected lower
house. In February 1968 the Constituent Assembly
375
approved Thailand’s present Constitution, and it
was promulgated by the King on June 20, 1968,
at which time elections were set for February
1969.
Elections for provincial and municipal assem-
blies had been held in 1967-68 but candidates had
not been permitted to form political parties and
had to base their campaigns on local issues. In
October 1968, with the passage of the Political
Parties Act, parties were officially permitted to
organize, and candidates could begin campaigning
for the national elections.
The pro-Government United Thai People’s
Party (Saha Pracha Thai—SPT) and the opposition
Democrat Party contested the elections on a
nationwide scale, but a large portion of the can-
didates ran as independents. The SPT, Prime
Minister Thanom’s party, won 75 seats in Parlia-
ment and was later joined by 25 independents. The
Democratic Party won 57 seats, while the remain-
ing 62 seats were evenly divided between inde-
pendents and members of smaller parties. In the
intervening months additional independent parlia-
mentary Representatives have joined or otherwise
aligned themselves with the SPT, so that it enjoys
an effective majority, although some members
have, on Occasion, voted against the Government.
Internal Security
Thailand is a stable, largely peaceful nation
which has been spared much of the turmoil ex-
perienced by other Southeast Asian countries
since World War II. The relative stability and
tranquility enjoyed by Thailand stem from a num-
ber of factors: a strong sense of national identity
among the Thai people; respect for the institution
of the monarchy and for the King and Queen;
absence of large, disaffected ethnic minorities;
relatively good economic conditions; and a long
history of independence. The revolutionary ap-
peals of anticolonialism and communism have
thus had little impact on Thailand as contrasted
with most of its neighbors.
The Communist Party of Thailand (CPT) was
established in 1942, although Communist or-
ganizations in Thailand date to the 1920’s. The
leadership of the Communist movement in Thai-
land has been largely Chinese or Sino-Thai, and
the CPT has closely followed the Peking line.
Communist propaganda is beamed to Thailand by
a clandestine radio station established in 1962,
the “Voice of the People of Thailand” (VOPT).
The VOPT has since announced the establishment
of two Communist front organizations: the Thai-
land Independence Movement—TIM (December
1964) and the Thailand Patriotic Front—TPF
(January 1965).
The Communists have also attempted to estab-
lish typical front groups of farmers, women,
youth, and so forth, but none of these has taken
root among the Thai population.
Recent Internal Security Developments
Communist infiltration and subversion, which
had begun secretly as early as 1959, was brought
into the open in 1965 with armed insurgent attacks
on Thai security forces and systematic assassina-
tions of loyal village leaders in northeast Thai-
land, the country’s poorest region. To meet this
challenge the Thai Government—with U.S. advice
and material assistance-embarked on an ac-
celerated program of economic and Social de-
velopment.
During 1966 and 1967 the Communist in-
surgents maintained a steady rate of assassina-
tions of loyal villagers and held meetings in which
villagers were forced to listen at gunpoint to anti-
Government propaganda. In 1967 insurgency broke
out in the far north where Communist agents had
begun recruitment among Meo hill tribesmen to
receive training as insurgents as early as 1959.
By 1968 the Government’s counterinsurgency
efforts seemed to have stalemated the guerrillas
in the northeast. However, in 1970 incidents of
Communist terrorism and sabotage, some seri-
Ous, increased in both areas.
It is estimated that during the past 10 years
more than 1,500 village youths and tribesmen
have been taken from Thailand to North Viet-Nam,
Communist China, and Communist-controlled
areas of Laos to be trained as insurgents. These
efforts have not succeeded, however, in enlisting
any mass following in rural areas in Thailand,
and the continuing emphasis on terroristic meth-
Ods reflects the failure of subversive agents to
win over and indoctrinate any significant propor-
tion of Thai villagers.
In the far south, along the Malaysian border,
insurgents under the direction of the Communist
Party of Malaya took refuge in Thailand after
having been driven out of Malaysia in the late
1950’s. Although their objective remains Ma-
laysia, these Communist insurgents maintain
bases in the southernmost provinces of Thailand
where they gather recruits, funds, and supplies.
Recent months have seen an increase in the level
of conflict between the Communist terrorists and
the Thai and Malaysian security authorities, who
are cooperating against the terrorists.
North of this area, but still in peninsular Thai-
land, a group of several hundred Thai insurgents
under the control of the Communist Party of Thai-
land are actively engaged in terrorism and anti-
government propaganda.
ECONOMY
The Thai economy is both fast-developing (8
percent average annual gross national product
growth rate since 1960) and stable, an unusual
combination. Thailand has shunned excessive
deficit financing, built up comfortable foreign
exchange reserves, and created a stable currency
readily convertible at free market rates (about 21
baht = U.S. $1.00). These conditions, created by
376
Public transportation in Thailand now reaches
most larger towns by rail, all-weather highways,
and air. Highways have been greatly improved in
the last decade. Numerous feeder roads are now
being built which will connect many rural areas
that were accessible ... only by foot, oxcart, or
elephant-back a decade or two ago. One of the
most noted of the new roads is the Friendship
Highway, built with U.S. aid, that connects Bangkok
with the northeastern plateau and with Nong Khai
On the Lao border near Vientiane. The Thai
Government is participating in international plans
for the Asian Highway; that part of it in Thailand
is nearly completed.
Telephone service reaches the major towns,
with more than 100,000 telephones in use through-
out the country. Television programs are now ac-
cessible to the more populated locations in Thai-
land, with an estimated 350,000 TV sets now in
use. Two black-and-white channels and one color
channel can now be received in Bangkok.
Thailand has joined the International Tele-
communications Satellite Consortium (INTEL-
SAT) and has had a receiving station for the com-
munications satellite in operation over the Pacific
Ocean since 1967. The volume of communications
traffic in the first year was five times what had
been predicted. A second antenna is now under
construction. It is to be aimed at the satellite
which will be sent up over the Indian Ocean to
provide communication links with South Asia,
Africa, and Europe.
In the development sphere, Thailand coop-
erates with a number of international agencies
concerned with stimulating economic develop-
ment.
FOREIGN RELATIONS
Thailand's history of freedom from Western
conscious Thai efforts, have facilitated develop-
ment and attracted foreign investment.
Internally, the Thai economy continues to
rest largely on an agricultural base, with rice
the major crop. In 1964 Thailand was the largest
rice exporter in the world, but, although rice con-
tinues to be the major Thai export, the market
for this commodity is declining. The 1960’s saw
a dramatic diversification of Thai agriculture.
This has been reflected in the increasing im-
portance of new exports, notably corn, tapioca,
and kenaf (a fiber used in ropemaking). Rubber
continues to be the second most important foreign
exchange earner, while corn now competes with
tin for third place. In 1969 Thai exports amounted
to about U.S. $710 million, the bulk of which went
to its major export partners, Japan, the United
States, Malaysia, Singapore, and Hong Kong.
Imports into Thailand for 1969 amounted to
$1.3 billion, excluding U.S. military equipment.
The major import items included machinery and
transportation equipment, petroleum products,
metal manufactures, textiles, and chemicals.
These imports came, for the most part, from
Japan, the United States, the Federal Republic of
Germany, and the United Kingdom.
Despite the manifest economic progress which
Thailand has experienced in the last 10 years,
per capita income is still only about $180 per
year. The benefit of the increase in gross national
product (GNP) to $6.3 billion in 1969 has been
partially offset by the yearly population increase
of more than 3 percent.
The Thai Government has embarked on a
concerted effort to broaden the base of the
nation’s economy. A large part of the national
budget goes to education - and economic develop-
ment. Efforts in the latter category are largely
concentrated on basic irrigation, transportation,
communications, and power facilities.
The Thai economy is relatively free of con-
trols and relies primarily on private rather than
public enterprise. The Government is interested
in industrialization and is receptive to prospec-
tive private foreign investment. The present good
health of the Thai economy has enabled the coun-
try to depend increasingly on international lending
institutions for foreign capital for economic de-
velopment projects. The International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) has
played a major role by financing the Chao Phraya
irrigation project, railway rehabilitation, port
development, highway construction, and the com-
bined irrigation and hydroelectric project (the
Bhumibol Dam) at Yanhee in northern Thailand.
Another project of great significance for Thailand
and neighboring countries is the Mekong River
Development Program, which includes power and
irrigation dams in Laos and Cambodia as well as
in Thailand.
Tourism, which also contributes to the nation’s
economic well-being, has increased dramatically
in recent years. The number of tourists visiting
Thailand in 1969 was approximately 450,000; about
30 percent of these were U.S. citizens.
domination sets the country apart from its
neighbors. Preservation of the nation’s inde-
pendence continues to be the keystone of govern-
ment policy. Thailand has been a consistent
supporter of free world viewpoints in inter-
national conferences. It is an active member of
international and regional Organizations, Some of
which include: the United Nations and Several of
its specialized agencies; the Economic Commis-
sion for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE), whose
secretariat is at Bangkok; the Asian Development
Bank (ADB); the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (ASEAN); and the Asian and Pacific
Council (ASPAC). Thailand has developed in-
creasingly close ties with most other Southeast
Asian countries. It cooperates with Malaysia,
Laos, and Cambodia in dealing with mutual
security problems.
Since Thailand’s post-World War II foreign
policy has been based on collective security and
support of the United Nations, it was the first
country to offer ground forces to join those of
the United States under the U.N. Command to
resist Communist aggression in Korea, where
377
the Thai battalion served with distinction. In
1954 Thailand became a charter member of the
Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO),
which has its headquarters at Bangkok.
Thailand has considered North Viet-Nam’s
dispatch of some 40,000 troops to Laos and sev-
eral hundred thousand to South Viet-Nam as
threats to its own security. In 1965 it began
sending armed forces units to assist South Viet-
Nam, and by February 1969 these forces had
reached a total of more than 11,000 combat troops
(the “Black Leopards”) plus small air and naval
units. In 1970 it was announced that Thai forces
would be withdrawn from Viet-Nam.
As part of its contribution to collective secur-
ity in the area, Thailand has permitted the U.S.
Air Force to use certain Thai bases to carry out
operations in connection with the Viet-Nam war.
U.S. forces in Thailand for this purpose totaled
more than 40,000 as of mid-1970.
The following statements by Foreign Minister
Thanat highlight some of Thailand’s basic foreign
policy objectives:
“...a nation must primarily rely on its own
resources to combat subversion and guerrilla
warfare within its own territory, while at the same
time concentrating on developing its economic and
social strength as the best long-term guarantee
against the so-called ‘revolutionary war’ which
is as much 'political' as 'military'. ... small na-
tions threatened with the expansionistic policy of
a great neighboring power must learn to cooper-
ate with like-minded nations in the same area to
forge regional solidarity and cooperation so as to
augment their own individual and collective
strength in political, economic, and social fields,
and to form a power base whereby they can,
through the method of ‘collective political de-
fense,” better face the threat confronting them.”
(January 1, 1970) e
“(For the smaller nonnuclear states) salva-
tion lies in redoubling their national efforts and in
working closely and systematically with those
like-minded nations which share the same Stake
in the peace and Secure well-being of the area.
This will require novel methods of consultation,
cooperation, and coordination between themselves
in the first place and also with those outside
powers which show an interest in the task of
peace-building. Thus, the true spirit of region-
alism will have to be based not so much on formal
treaties but on practical joint undertakings which
will bind the parties through joint concrete inter-
est rather than ideological consideration.” (Feb-
ruary 24, 1970) -
‘‘The nations in this area should also be able
to combine into a cohesive grouping and forge a
new sense of solidarity and work together for
mutual benefit. This new form of partnership on
an equal footing, if successful, can preserve and
maintain peace and prosperity in this area. That
is the policy in which Thailand has been very
much attached to and has been playing an active
role in promoting regional cooperation and
. United States.
regional sense of solidarity. This seems, in our
opinion, the future policy.” (May 28, 1970)
U.S. -THAI RELATIONS
Official U.S.-Thai relations date from 1835
when the two countries signed a treaty of amity
and commerce, the first United States treaty with
an Asian country. Since the end of World War II
cooperation between the two countries has become
much closer in the face of the Communist threat
to the peace and security of Southeast Asia.
Thailand is of importance to the United States
because it is a stable, friendly nation, strategi-
cally located in an area of major interest to the
Furthermore, the United States
and Thailand share a common viewpoint on many
world problems. They are among the signatories
of the 1954 SEATO treaty. Article IV(1) of this
treaty provides that, in the event of armed attack
in the treaty area (which includes Thailand), each
member would “act to meet the common danger
in accordance with its constitutional processes.”
In a communique issued by Secretary of State
Rusk and Thai Foreign Minister Thanat on March
6, 1962, the Secretary reaffirmed that in the event
of Communist armed attack against Thailand, the
SEATO obligation of the United States is “indi-
vidual as well as collective.” On May 20, 1969,
Secretary of State Rogers endorsed the Rusk-
Thanat communique as a valid restatement of the
responsibilities set forth in article IV (1) of the
treaty. -
Internal security and defense considerations
require larger expenditures for modernization and
maintenance of the military and police than the
Thai budget can sustain. At the same time Thai-
land faces an urgent need for economic and social
progress for which large expenditures are re-
quired. Thailand’s security is inextricably related
to its continued economic progress. º
As a staunch ally of the United States, Thai-
land received more than $700 million worth of
military assistance during the 1946-69 period.
Military aid consists of equipment, essential Sup-
plies, and assistance in the construction and im-
provement of key facilities and installations. U.S.
military advisory personnel in Thailand oversee
the delivery of equipment to the Thai Armed
Forces and the training of Thai military per-
Sonnel in its use and maintenance. .
U.S. grant assistance to Thailand under various
economic assistance programs totaled $472.8
million during the fiscal period 1946-69 inclusive.
Loans under U.S. economic assistance programs
during the same period totaled $125.6 million,
of which about $63 million in principle and interest
has been repaid. In addition to these amounts,
Thailand, as a participant in a number of regional
projects, has received substantial grant and loan
assistance from regional aid funds. Economic
assistance has been extended in a number offields,
including rural development and security, health,
family planning, and improvement of government
378
services. There are approximately 250 Peace
Corps volunteers in Thailand, almost half of whom
teach English. The rest are engaged in the rural
development and health programs. -
U.S. military and economic aid programs have
the common goal of strengthening Thailand as an
independent country which will be a stabilizing
force in Southeast Asia and a deterrent to further
Communist aggression and subversion in that
area, -
Ameriean forces are not and have not been
engaged in eombat in Thailand. With respect to
defense against Communist aggression through
... subversion or in any way other than armed attaek,
Thailand and the United States agree that U.S. . - .
PRINCIPAL GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS
assistance should take the form of military and
economic assistance programs. Such programs
enhance Thailand’s ability to prevent and counter
externally-supported subversion and at the same
time to continue economic development. During
his visit to the United States in 1968, Prime
Minister Thanom stressed that although it would
accept foreign assistance in the form of training,
equipment, and advice, the Royal Thai Government
regarded defeating the insurgency as a Thai
responsibility to be carried out by its own forces.
Thus, although there are U.S. military personnel
in Thailand engaged in training Thai personnel,
these Americans are not allowed to accompany
Thai forces in combat activities. -
In 1969 U.S. and Thai leaders agreed that
there should be consultations leading to a gradual
reduction in the level of U.S. forces in Thailand.
(There were at the time about 48,000 personnel
in Thailand, mostly U.S. Air Force, the great
majority in connection with the war in Viet-Nam.)
Following talks at Bangkok and New York between
U.S. and Thai representatives, President Nixon
and Prime Minister Thanom announced on Sep-
tember 30, 1969, that the two Governments had
agreed that 6,000 U.S. military personnel would
be withdrawn from Thailand by July 1, 1970. (This
withdrawal was carried out on schedule.) It was
also announced that the two Governments would
Continue to evaluate the level of U.S. Armed
Forces in Thailand in light of their assessment
of developments in the Viet-Nam conflict. Con-
versations in the summer of 1970 led to a deci-
sion that an additional 9,800 U.S. military per-
sonnel would be withdrawn by July 1, 1971.
Thailand, as an important U.S. ally in East
Asia, is especially affected by the Nixon Doctrine.
As enunciated at Guam in the summer of 1969 and
Subsequently elaborated on by the administration,
the doctrine states that: (1) the United States will
honor its commitments (e.g., the SEATO pact) by
providing a shield for the freedom of an ally;
(2) conventional defense is the responsibility of the
country directly concerned, with the United States
assisting where it will make a difference and
where U.S. interests are involved; (3) insurgencies
are best handled by threatened governments with
police, paramilitary action, and economic and
social reforms; and (4) new commitments by the
United States will be viewed in the light of careful
. cost.
‘assessment of U.S. national interests, specific
threats to those interests, and U.S. capacity to
contain those threats at an acceptable risk and
In a statement at Bangkok on July 28, 1969,
President Nixon said, “What we seek for Asia is
a community of free nations able to go their own
way and seek their own destiny with whatever
cooperation we can provide—a community of in-
dependent. Asian countries, each maintaining its
own traditions and yet each developing through
mutual cooperation. In such an arrangement, we
stand ready to play a responstbie role in accord-
ance with our commitments and basic interests.”
Y
Chief of State–King BHUMIBOL Adulyadej
President, Priyy Council–Prince DHANI Niwat
(Krommun Bidyalabh Prutiyakon)
Prime Minister; Minister of Defense-Field Mar-
shal THANOM Kittikachorn -
Minister in the ‘Prime Minister’s Office—Lt. Gen.
SAWAENG Senanarong
Deputy Prime Minister; Minister of Interior—
Gen. PRAPHAT Charusathien
Deputy Prime Minister; Minister of National
Development—POTE Sarasin
Minister of Foreign Affairs–THANAT Khoman
Minister of Justice–Luang CHAMROON Nittisat.
Minister of Economic Affairs—BUNCHANA
Atthakor \
Minister of Agriculture–M. R. CHAKTHONG
Thongyai
Minister of Industry—PONG Punnakan
Minister of Public Health–PRASERT Ruchira-
wOng
Minister of Education—SUKIT Nimmanhaemind
Minister of Finance—SERM Vinicchayakul
Minister of Communications—Air Chief Marshal
DAWEE Chulasap
Ambassador to the U.S.–SUNTHORN Honglada-
rCIn
Ambassador to the U.N.—ANAND Panyarachun
Thailand maintains an Embassy in the United
States at 2300 Kalorama Road, N.W., Washington,
D.C. 20008.
PRINCIPAL U.S. OFFICIALS
Ambassador—Leonard Unger
Deputy Chief of Mission-George S. Newman
Counselor for Political Affairs—Lawrence G.
Pickering
Counselor for Economic Affairs–Konrad Bekker
Director, U.S. AID Mission-Rey M. Hill
Chief, Joint U.S. Military Assistance Advisory
Group—Maj. Gen. Louis T. Seith, USAF
Counselor for Public Affairs (USIS)—Keith Adam-
SOIl
The U.S. Embassy in Thailand is located at 95
Wireless Road, Bangkok. There are also Con-
Sulates at Chiang Mai, Songkhla, and Udorn.
379
READING LIST
American University. Area Handbook for Thai-
land, Washington, D.C. U.S. Government Print-
ing Office, 1968.
Cady, John F. Southeast Asia: Its Historical
Development. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964.
Chu, Valentin. Thailand Today: A Visit to Modern
Siam. New York: Crowell, 1968.
Coedes, George. The Making of South East Asia.
Berkeley: University of California Press, 1966.
Hall, D. G. E. A History of South-East Asia, 2d
ed. London: Macmillan, 1964.
Ingram, James C. Economic Change in Thailand
Since 1850. Stanford: Stanford University Press,
1955.
Kahin, George McT., ed. Governments and Politics
of Southeast Asia, 2d ed. Ithaca: Cornell Uni-
versity Press, 1964.
Neuchterlein, Donald E. Thailand and the Struggle
for Southeast Asia. Ithaca: Cornell University
Press, 1965.
Riggs, Fred W. Thailand: The Modernization of
a Bureaucratic Policy. Honolulu: East-West
Center Press, 1966.
Skinner, G. William. Chinese Society in Thailand:
An Analytical History. Ithaca: Cornell Univer-
sity Press, 1957. -
Vella, Walter F. The Impact of the West on Gov-
ernment in Thailand. Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1955. -


Wilson, David A. Politics in Thailand, Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, 1962.
Wilson, David A. The United States and the Future
of Thailand. New York: Praeger, 1970.
Wit, Daniel. Thailand, Another Vietnam? New
York: Scribner, 1968. -
DEPARTMENT OF STATE PUBLICATION 7961
Revised November 1970
380
APPENDIX AA
THAILAND
NATIONAL SECURITY
(NATIONAL DEFENSE AND INTERNAL
SECURITY)
[Reprinted from: Area Handbook for Thailand, by John W. Henderson
and others. Washington, Department of the Army, 1971 (DA PAM 550–
53).] -
381
NATIONAL SECURITY
NATIONAL DEFENSE ANd interNAL
. . . SECURITY •
Conditions both of national security and of internal order were
generally good and under control in mid-1970. No foreign power
posed a direct threat to national existence, although the overthrow
of Prince Norodom Sihanouk in Cambodia and subsequent Com-
munist armed attacks on the new government there created fears
that the disturbances might spread into Thailand. This was looked
upon as a real possibility because Communist subversive activity
within the country was a problem of long standing that had-been
growing increasingly serious during the 1960s.
Three major areas, all of which were along or near the borders,
were involved: the Northeastern Khorat Plateau Region, especially
in the more remote districts of provinces facing Laos; the Southern
Peninsula Region in areas near Malaysia; and the northern tier of
provinces adjacent to Burma. The Communist problem was not
generally considered to be an indigenous one but, rather, was be-
lieved to be an externally directed effort and part of the overall
Communist aggression in Southeast Asia. The movement was pre-
dominantly controlled by Communist China, extensively assisted by
North Vietnam and the Pathat Lao in Laos.
Elsewhere in the country the people were generally law abiding
and orderly. Habits of obedience and respect for authority were
inculcated in the Thai by centuries of rule under monarchs whose
authority was both secular and religious. The moral sanctions of
Buddhism and the pressures for conformity in village communities
where most of the people lived further reinforced traditional values
placed on personal restraint and public harmony. Political coups,
although frequent in the past, involved relatively little bloodshed;
riots and public disturbances requiring large-scale police action were
I3re OCCUITTell CeS.
The maintenance of public law and order was the primary re-
sponsibility of the National Police Department, a subdivision of the
Ministry of the Interior. This agency was also charged with support-
ing the armed forces in any national emergency. The department
controlled all police activity and exercised strong influence in prose-
382
cutions in the courts and, therefore, in the application of the law.
In 1970 the overall strength of police forces was estimated to be
about 80,000 most of which were located in the metropolitan Bang-
kok area and in the northeastern sections of the country, where the
threat or subversion was strongest.
Laws governing criminal behavior are contained in the Penal Code
of 1956 as revised. The code is based mainly on French and British
legal concepts but contains a trace of traditional Thai elements. The
influence of Thai tradition is notably apparent in the character of
the moral propositions and the general definition of public order set
forth in the code. In addition to the formal criminal code, Thai
citizens who are Muslims are held accountable to Islamic rules and
usages. - -
The administration of justice is carried out through courts of the
Ministry of Justice. These courts are organized in a graded hier-
archy, whose original jurisdictions are predicated on the seriousness
of the alleged offenses they are called upon to adjudicate (see ch. 9,
Political System and Values). Jury trials do not exist, and decisions
are rendered by judges of the courts without assistance. Convicted
offenders may appeal judgments against them, if desired, to the
Supreme Court, which is the highest court in the land and whose
determinations are final. .
The country’s military establishment consists of the Royal Thai
Army (RTA); the Royal. Thai Navy (RTN), including a corps of
marines; and the Royal Thai Air Force (RTAF). The combined
strength of these forces in 1970 was estimated to be approximately
180,000. The RTA numbered almost 120,000, the RTN just over
30,000, and the RTAF about 30,000 officers and men. All compo-
nents were equipped with arms and matériel supplied by the
United States and were trained in accordance with United States
military concepts and practice.
NATIONAL SECURITY AND DEFENSE FORCES
For a people regarded by themselves and others as peaceable, the
Thai have had much experience in warfare. From early times, with
few exceptions, the country’s kings were military leaders, and the
history of their reigns is replete with accounts of armed conflicts
(see ch. 3, Historical Setting).
Thailand’s history, in fact, has been an almost constant struggle to
maintain freedom and national identity, and emphasis has been
placed on teaching this history as a basis for developing patriotism
and a strong national spirit. This historical emphasis, coupled with
the time-honored value of respect for authority, inculcated basic
social attitudes in Thai youths that enable them to accept military
life and become well-disciplined members of the armed forces. De-
383
spite this background, however, no military cult or warrior class had
developed. Between wars the peasants went back to the land, and
the few retainers and mercenaries who made up the permanent
military establishment enjoyed no special privileges or prestige and
exercised no particular influence in national life.
Little was done to improve the professional quality or capabilities
of the military establishment until after 1950, when the Thai en-
tered into various assistance agreements with the United States,
including a Military Assistance Program (MAP). Under MAP a com-
prehensive modernization program was initiated based on United
States advice, matériel assistance, and training. By 1970 these mea-
sures had transformed the Thai armed forces into a modern estab-
lishment with greatly improved capabilities for national defense and
internal security.
The acceptance of Western influences by the rulers of Thailand at
the outset of the twentieth century significantly affected the role of
the military. By the 1930s many officers had attended Európean
military schools, where they learned not only military techniques
but also new social and political patterns and concepts.
Similarly, considerable numbers of civilians had studied abroad
and were concerning themselves with liberalizing the governmental
system. The civilian leaders enlisted support among some of the
military, and the combination, in a coup d’etat in June 1932,
brought about the transformation of the absolute monarchy into a
constitutional institution. The military leaders were soon at odds
with the new civilian prime minister. Ultimately, in June 1933 they
seized power in a second coup. -
The pattern established by these events persisted with subsequent
coups. All these shifts of power were carried out by military leaders
assisted the the armed forces. Rather than being inspired by a wish
to change the system of government, these appeared to be caused
by rivalry between military leaders. A feature of these contests was
that the achievement of high political office by an officer in some
cases tended to weaken his personal connections and his influence
within the military establishment. In the last coup (1958), Field
Marshal Phibul Songgram was overthrown by a military group
leaded by Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat, who died in 1963 and was
succeeded by his deputy, Field Marshal Thanom Kittikachorn, who
has continued the military regime ever since.
Military leaders have exercised their authority in the name of the
king and, while some have suspended, modified, or redrafted the
constitution, they have not formally challenged the constitutional
principle. They have shown little disposition to alter the basic poli-
tical and economic order and have tended to work through existing
governmental institutions. Civilian career officials appear to have
384
accepted without resentment the dominance of military men in the
major executive positions of control.
By 1967 the two most powerful men in the government were
Field Marshal Thanom Kittikachorn and General Praphas Charusa-
thira. In addition to occupying the principal political post of prime
minister, Marshal Thanom was also supreme cqmmander of the
armed forces and minister of defense. General Praphas was deputy
prime minister and concurrently deputy supreme commander of the
armed forces, commander in chief of the Royal Thai Army, and
minister of the interior.
The armed forces, together with the National Police Department,
have the threefold missions of maintaining internal security, guard-
ing the life and property of the citizenry, and guarding the country
against external aggression. The most urgent of these missions in
1970 was defense of the country against Communist-led insurgency.
Thailand has also assumed limited military obligations as a result of
membership in the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO)
and the United Nations. -
The army is responsible primarily for planning and directing mili-
tary operations to oppose any threat to national security and with
training and equipping the ground forces in accordance with these
plans. The navy's basic mission is to protect the seaward approaches
to the country and to assist in the suppression of subversive activity
in the maintenance of internal security. The air force is charged
with providing tactical air support to ground and naval forces and
to counterinsurgency units. It also coordinates civil and military
aviation and provides technical training for civil air specialists.
Armed Forces Organization
High Command
The 1968 Constitution declares that the king is the head of the
Thai armed forces, but actually he has little direct military authori-
ty. Functional control instead was exercised in 1970 by Marshal
Thanom Kittikachorn in his triple role of prime minister, minister
of defense, and supreme commander of the armed forces. In carry-
ing out his duties, Marshal Thanom is advised by the Council of
Ministers (the cabinet) and the National Security Council and is
assisted by one deputy supreme commander (see fig. 5).
The National Security Council advises the prime minister on sub-
jects that pertain to national security and require cabinet approval
or action. It consists of the prºme minister as chairman; his deputy;
the secretary general of the National Security Council; the ministers
of defense, foreign affairs, the interior, communications, and fi-
nance; and the supreme commander of the armed forces. The prime
minister dominates the council, holding three of its authorized
Seats.

| KING
|
T- T PRIME MANISTER | T
l L | 1.
COUNCIL OF NATIONAL
MINISTERS SECURITY
(CA81NET) COUNCIL
| MINISTER OF DEFENSE H- --> --
l_
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OEFENSE COUNCIL
TO THE MINISTER
SUPREME COMMANDER OF THE ARMED FORCES
OEPUTY SUPREME COMMANDER OF THE ARM5D FORCES
OFFICE OF THE . - |
HSUPREME COMMAND
UNDER SECRETARY HEADouarrers
Secretariat *:of the *: ** - . s º Armed Forces º, |
ides-de-camp up! ogistics n
Department I. to the King Commander (J-4) Staff College Training School
Judge Advocate Fingace Adjuton! Genero's *:::::::" Armed Forces *::::::::
General Dept. Deportment Deportment cº- Survey Dept. Preporatory School
Defense Energy Armed Force Directorate of Directorate of
- - * Joint Personnel Education ond Amarººn Budget Office
Department industrial Dept. (J-1) Research Security Center
i : -
Comoanies supplying Factories supplying Oirectorate of National Armed Forces . Oſſice of SEATO
fuel to the the Armed Forces Joint intelligence Defense Intelligence Medical Research
Armed Forces (J-2) College Center . Projects
Directorgle of Coordinating
• * - ADVISORY Joint Operations Committee with
(J-3) - JUSMAG
cº e º 'º e º º SUPERVISORY I - TI
•= COMMAND Royal The Royal Tho, Royal Thai
Army Novy Air Force
Note”- SEATO, Southeast Asia Treoty Organization: JUSMAG, Joint United States Military Advisory Group.
Figure 5. High Command of the Royal Thai Armed Forces, 1970
The Ministry of Defense is charged with supervising the operation
and administration of the army, the navy, and the air force and
coordinates their policies with those of other governmental agencies
concerned with national security. It is organized into the Office of
the Secretary to the Minister, the Office of the Under Secretary,
and the Supreme Command Headquarters. The Office of the Secre-
tary to the Minister is concerned primarily with political affairs and
with the preparation of matters to be considered by the Council of
Ministers. The Office of the Under Secretary is responsible for func-
tions not allocated to other offices in the ministry. -
The Supreme Command Headquarters is the most important in
the military command structure and is responsible for maintaining
the armed forces in a state of combat readiness. It is provided with
administrative and general staff sections for exercising command
over the three military services and also supervises certain special
activities, projects, and schools (see fig. 6). .
The defense Council within the ministry advises the minister of
defense on military matters, particularly those pertaining to draft
laws, budget allocations, and the mobilization, training, and deploy-
ment of the armed forces. It is composed of the minister (chair-
man), the under secretary of defense and his deputy, the Supreme
386
- Suprerre Cornmonder
- of the Armed Forces
—- —J.--
Commonder in Chief Cornry, order in Cnieſ ; Cerrºre- 3er ºn cºeſ]
Royal Thai Navy - - Royo. Tho, Army |Boro Thai A.r Force | -
Generol Special Generol , Special Air Force ~sº Tspecial
Stoff Group Stoſſ Group Stoff - Siqff Haqf s. Group | serº Group
Logistics Educolion Technicol Troining Logistic Education
Service Group Group Sloff Staff Support Group Group
| Noval Operations Area commonds - |
Group ond Combo! Forces. | combo Group
| Navol District |Royal Marines] | Army Areas Combat Forces Tactical Air -
| Commond |
| Royol Fleet |
Figure 6. Field Command of the Royal Thai Armed Forces, 1970
commander of the armed forces, the chief of staff of the supreme
command, the commanders in chief of the three military services
and their deputies, the chiefs of staff of the three services, and not
more than three additional general officers selected by the minister.
Each of the three armed services is headed by a commander who
is directly responsible to the supreme commander of the armed
forces. Their functions are similar to those of their counterparts in
the United States armed forces: the army chief of staff, the chief of
naval operations, and the chief of the air force staff. Although the
three services are equal under existing laws, the army in fact is the
dominant component, and key positions in both the armed forces
structure and other parts of the government are held by senior army
officers. *
The Royal Thai Army
The commander in chief of the Royal Thai Army (RTA) is
charged with carrying out the directives and missions issued to him
by the minister of defense. He is assisted by one deputy and two
assistant commanders in chief, a chief of staff, and members of the
army headquarters organization. Headquarters is formed into five
general sections: general staff, special staff, technical staff, training
staff, and area commands and combat forces. The functions and
procedures of the general, special, and technical staffs are similar to
those employed by the United States Army.
The training staff is concerned with the overall educational and
training activities of the RTA and the army reserve personnel. It is
composed of four groups: the Army Field Forces, comparable to
the United States Continental Army Command; the Army War Col-




387
lege; the Command and General Staff College; and the Chulachom-
klao Royal Military Academy.
In addition to these groups, there is the Territorial Defense De-
partment of the ministry, which plans and supervises the training of
reserve personnel. Since organized reserve units are lacking, this
department is concerned chiefly with supervising the military train-
ing courses in schools and universities.
Territorially, the RTA operates through regional area commands
for both tactical and administrative purposes. Each area is divided
into military circules, which are subdivided into military districts
and provinces in which varying numbers of tactical and service units
are stationed. The chain of command proceeds from the basic unit
upward through military district and military circle headquarters to
the area command headquarters and from them to the commander
in chief of the army.
Tactically, the RTA is organized into three infantry divisions and
one regimental combat team supported by appropriate engineer,
antiaircraft artillery, signal, and transportation battalions. The over-
all strength of the RTA, including headquarters personnel, is about
120,000 officers and men. - -
The Royal Thai Navy
The commander in chief of the Royal Thai Navy (RTN) is assisted
by a deputy commander in chief and the chief of the naval general
staff. His highly centralized naval headquarters is divided into five
groups: general staff, special staff, logistics service, education, and
naval operations. The functions of the first four of these groups are
roughly similar to those of corresponding groups in the RTA com-
mand structure.
The Naval Operations Group includes the Royal Fleet, the Royal
Marines, and the Naval District. The commander in chief of the
Royal Fleet is responsible for the training, employment, and ad-
ministration of the naval operating forces and for maintaining them
in a state of combat readiness. The commander of the Royal Marines
is responsible for training and equipping the naval landing forces.
The commander of the Naval District is responsible for administra-
tion and discipline at both the naval base of Bangkok and the one at
Sattahip, about seventy-five miles southeast of the capital.
The RTN has a total complement of about sixty vessels, the major
ones of which are frigates, transports, armed gunboats, and patrol
craft. Other vessels include minesweepers, minelayers, landing ships
and craft, oilers, and a variety of small craft. Including headquarters
personnel and about 7,000 in the Royal Marines, the RTN has a
total strength of approximately 30,000 officers and men. There are
no submarines, no naval air arms, and no aircraft carriers, but there
is a Royal Naval College at Paknam. - • -
The Royal Thai Air Force
The Royal Thai Air Force (RTAF), under its own commander in
chief, is a separate and coequal component of the defense establish-
ment. The commander in chief, aided by a vice commander in chief
and a deputy commander in chief, is responsible for organizing,
training, and equipping the RTAF and for coordinating its opera-
tions with those of the army and the navy to attain a united defense
of the kingdom. The command structure consists of five groups:
RTAF headquarters, special service, logistic support, education, and
combat. - -
The RTAF Headquarters Group consists of the Office of the
Commander, the Don Muang Air Base, and seven directorates that
perform the usual general staff functions. The Special Service
Group is composed of two directorates, welfare and civil aviation,
the latter being concerned with coordinating the activities of civil
and military aviation. The Logistics Support Group and the Educa-
tion Group carry out the normal supply and training missions com-
mon to a service headquarters.
The Defense Forces and National Economy
Manpower
The main source of personnel for the armed forces is conscrip-
tion, which is administered for all services by the army in accord-
ance with provisions of the Military Service Act of 1954. The main
source of manpower is basically the ethnic Thai, who constitute
close to 90 percent of the total population; but all ethnic groups are
equally liable to service. Most inductees come from rural areas and
are reliable, hardy, physically fit, adaptable, and capable of per-
forming military duties in a creditable manner. They are accus-
tomed to working outdoors in tropical heat, humid climate, and
monsoonal rains; are predominantly Buddhist; and possess a keen
interest in learning and developing new skills. The average conscript
accepts his military obligations as a patriotic duty.
Under the law all male Thais must register when they become
eighteen years of age but are not liable for compulsory service until
they reach twenty-one. At that time they are notified to report for
a physical examination to determine whether or not they are fit for
military duty. On the basis of this examination they are divided
into four categories: those who are fully qualified to service in
combat units; those who are partially disabled and eligible for duty
in service units only; those with minor correctable defects deferred
until the next callup; and those who are physically disqualified and
exempt. - •
In addition to exemption for physical reasons, priests and monks,
389
career teachers, cadets attending the military academies, persons
undergoing military training (men of draft age may enlist before
being called up), students in certain technical courses, and persons
convicted of a crime with a penalty of ten years’ imprisonment are
also freed from draft obligations. Waivers are also granted under the
law in cases of personal hardship, such as to men who are the sole
support of parents or minor children and to students in the later
stages of their education. -
The total induction each year averages about 30,000 men, far less
than the total available. Because the supply does outstrip the need,
exemptions and waivers are granted liberally, and only men in the
best physical condition are selected for service. Those who are se-
lected are customarily sent to the nearest army, navy, or air force
installation where the need is greatest. At these places they are
assigned to units for training and then to appropriate elements for
duty.
Active duty in one of these services is for two years, after which
the individual is released and goes into unassigned reserve status for
an additional twenty-three years. During this period of reserve serv-
ice he is liable to recall at any time the need arises. The priority of
recall is based on age, the youngest reserves being reinducted first.
Noncommissioned officers (NCO) are, in most cases, former con-
scripts who have reenlisted to make the military service a career. On
the basis of efficient performance they are selected to attend an
NCO school and upon graduation are returned to their units in their
new status. A limited number of NCOs also are procured by placing
graduates of the reserve training programs conducted by the Terri-
torial Defense Department of the Ministry of Defense on active
duty. .
The officer corps of the armed forces is generally composed of
graduates of the service academies and of officer candidate schools.
It also includes a small number of reserve officers who have com-
pleted courses given to Reserve Officer Training Corps students in
colleges and universities and decide to make a career in one of the
armed forces. A few officers with special qualifications have been
commissioned directly from civilian life.
The grade and rank structures of the three armed services are
similar to those of comparable components of the United States
forces. The king grants all commissions, and appointments to non-
commissioned grades are authorized by the minister of defense.
Military Budget -
Steps taken by the government to strengthen the Thai military
posture are reflected in the steady rise of the military budget. Be-
tween 1962 and 1965 it rose an average of more than 8 percent to
the equivalent of about US$92.5 million. In 1966 the rise was more
390
than 12 percent to US$104.4 million. Since 1966 it has continued
its upward trend until in 1970 the budget reached a value estimated
to be over US$235 million. The army's share of the budget has
generally exceeded that of the navy and the air force combined.
Training
Training of the Thai armed forces has increased in scope and
intensity since the implementation of the United States Military
Assistance Program (MAP) in 1950. With MAP support and the
guidance of the United States Military Advisory Group, weapons
were replaced by modern armament, and increased fund outlays
were made for training purposes. Training facilities were expanded,
military instruction courses in the United States were made avail-
able to Thai officers, and conventional training was augmented by
intensified programs dealing with counterinsurgency.
In the army new conscripts customarily undergo a sixteen-week
recruiting program. The first eight weeks are devoted to basic train-
ing and the second eight weeks to more advanced branch and spe-
cialist training. This is followed by an annual unit training cycle
that lasts the rest of the year.
The annual unit training cycle proceeds in three phases. About
two months are allocated for training and testing in squad, section,
and platoon tactics. The second phase of company- and battalion-
level exercises follows progressively, and the cycle usually ends with
some form of regimental or combined maneuver. - -
In the navy basic training lasts for eight to eleven weeks, depend-
ing on the ultimate assignment of the individual. The course is
devoted to the elementary aspects of seamanship, navigation, ord-
nance and gunnery, and damage control. Recruits in the Royal
Marines also attend the normal naval basic training course, but
those selected for advanced training receive an additional eight
weeks of training in special amphibious warfare along counterin-
surgency lines.
Naval unit training is generally conducted at the naval squadron
level. Shipboard drills, including team gunnery and other underway
training, take place throughout the entire training cycle. Underway
training for fleet units is also maintained throughout the training
year. Unit and advanced training in the Royal Marines encompasses
a thirty-six week cycle and is considered to be excellent, particu-
larly with respect to special operations and counterinsurgency tech-
niques.
Air force training is basically the same as that of the United States
Air Force. Upon completion of their basic training, recruits are
selected for more advanced programs. Flight training (primary and
advanced) was conducted at the Nakhon Ratchasima airbase in the
northeast but in 1970 was being transferred to a new facility in
391
Nakhon Pathom Province. The predominant portion of air technical
training takes place at the school complex situated at Don Muang
Air Base.
More advanced and specialized individual training is provided by
the many formal schools of the armed forces. No single command
or staff agency exercises general supervision over all the various
schools, as this function is decentralized to the commanders in
chiefs for the schools in their services. Matters affecting the whole
system of military education and problems of coordination between
schools, however, are usually resolved within the Directorate of
Education and Research at Supreme Command Headquarters. This
directorate also supervises the operation of the combined and
special service schools, such as the National Defense College, the
Armed Forces Staff College, the Military Technical Training School,
sponsored by the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO),
and the Armed Forces Academies Preparatory School. -
The National Defense College at Bangkok is the highest level mili-
tary school in the country. Its ten-week course, conducted for
about forty high-ranking civilian officials and senior military police
officers each year, covers military, political, and economic subjects.
Its principal objective is to encourage understanding between mili-
tary and civilian officials in planning and directing national security
interests. . - - -
The Armed Forces Staff College, also at Bangkok, is the second
highest military school. It has an annual enrollment of about
thirty-five senior officers selected from the three armed services.
The school's aim is to produce senior general staff officers qualified
to serve on joint or combined staffs. •
The SEATO-sponsored Military Technical Training School offers
a three-year course designed to provide NCOs with specialty train-
ing in technical fields. Its subjects include automobile mechanics,
engineering and construction, radio and telecommunications main-
tenance, and electronics. -
The Armed Forces Academies Preparatory School in Bangkok
provides two years of premilitary instruction to selected youths
expecting to enter one of the service academies or the National
Police Academy. Candidates for admission must be between the
ages of fifteen and nineteen and possess a secondary school educa-
tion or its equivalent. They are chosen in competitive examination,
and usually there are more than fifteen applicants for each of the
250 vacancies that are available each year.
Each of the three armed services operates its own service aca-
demy, of which the army’s Chulachomklao Royal Military Aca-
demy is the largest and oldest. These service academies serve as the
principal sources of junior officers for the three services. The course
of instruction in each is five years, and graduating classes are fairly
uniform at about 175 each. .
392
The army, the navy, and the air force also maintain separate
command and general staff colleges to train selected officers of the
rank of major or its equivalent in advanced military tactics and
general staff techniques. For certain officers of the army and navy,
generally colonels and captains, respectively, provision is made for
advanced study and preparation for higher command at their sepa-
rate war colleges. * . ... * .
NCO schools exist throughout the armed forces to provide tech-
nical specialists as required. These schools are oriented primarily
toward career enlisted men and offer courses of varying length in
vocational specialties. In all three services some academic instruc-
tion along technical lines is made available to junior officers before
certain assignments. - * . - e
A sizable number of selected officers from all armed forces are
sent abroad to the United States each year to attend special courses
and to receive advanced technical training. Others are assigned to
United States units operating in the Pacific area for observer train-
ing under operational conditions.
Logistics
The focal point for all armed forces logistics matters is the Direc-
torate of Joint Logistics (J-4) within Supreme Command Head-
quarters. This office acts as a planning and coordinating staff for
the three services and as the principal liaison channel for all con-
tacts with foreign aid missions. Actual procurement and allocation
of arms, equipment, and supplies, however, rest with the individual
service commanders who control the facilities and support units
within their forces. . . . *
A very heavy percentage of the armed forces matériel require- .
ments must be acquired from outside sources. The bulk is furnished
by the United States and flows through MAP channels. In each
military service a senior staff element has overall responsibility for
logistic services, but most of the actual functions are carried out by
the technical services (quartermaster, ordnance, signal, transporta-
tion) or their equivalents.
Awards and Decorations
Formal honors and symbols of merit occupy an important place
in the Thai tradition, and all military personnel receive and wear
awards and decorations with great pride. The Thai government
grants numerous awards, and outstanding acts of heroism, courage,
and meritorious service receive quick recognition by superiors (see
table 14). There are no awards or decorations for Thai military
personnel that are peculiar to any one of the three services.
393
Military Justice
The military justic system of the Thai armed forces is adminis-
tered by the minister of defense through his Judge Advocate Gen-
eral Department, which supervises the various military courts of the
army, navy, and air force. In structure and procedures the system
follows United States practice. . .
All serious cases are tried by the appropriate courts, which are
divided into three categories: the courts of first instance, including
those operated by military units as well as the formal courts within
the various regions, provinces, and at Bangkok; the Military Appeal
Court; and the Military Supreme Court. The last two courts are
located in the capital, and their judges are appointed by royal de-
cree. The authority to appoint judges of the various military courts,
however, is delegated to the minister of defense and the appropriate
military commanders. In time of war a military court may be estab-
lished when necessary by any ranking commanding officer who has
at least one army battalion or an equivalent naval or air force ele-
ment under his command. - , a
The types of punishment meted out to convicted officers and
men alike may range from reprimand to death. In time of war
desertion, surrender to the enemy, treason, and murder, usually
carry the death penalty. All sentences, however, are subject to pos-
sible reduction by the reviewing authority, and death sentences are
automatically postponed for sixty days to permit petitioning for
clemency to the king, who is empowered to pardon any convicted
person. -
Thailand is a signer of the 1949 Geneva Convention dealing with
prisoners of war. In keeping with this obligation, the government
enacted a law in 1955 providing in effect that all rules and regula-
tions of the convention would take precedence over any conflicting
Thai laws concerning prisoners.
THE POLICE SYSTEM
The National Police Department is a unitary agency having exclu-
sive responsibility for performing all police missions for the entire
country. Its components include the National Police Department
headquarters at Bangkok, the Provincial Police, the Metropolitan
Police, the Criminal Investigation Bureau, and the Education Bur-
eau. The organization is quasi-military in character, and all ranks
except the lowest (constable) correspond to military ranks. The
annual police budget has been increasing steadily, rising from the
equivalent of about US$45 million in 1967 to a value estimated to
approach US$60 million in 1970. - .
In addition to the regular components and still within the Minis-
394
Table 14. Thai Military Awards and Decorations
(in accepted order of precedence)
Title
The Most Illustrious order of the Royal House
of Chakkri . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The Ancient and Auspicious Order of the Nine Gems
The Most Illustrious Order of Chula Chom Klao
The Most Exalted order of the White Elephant . . . . .
..} -
The Most Noble Order of the Crown of Thailand . . . .
The Vallabhabhorn Order . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • .
The Vajira Mala Order . . . . . ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The Rama Medal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The Chakra Mala Medal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . … e e
The Rajaruchi Medal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • - - - - - - - • * *
The Rajaniyom Medal . . . . . . • * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
The Chai Smorabhum Medal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The Medal of Bravery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The Border Service Medal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . e o e
The Home Front Service Medal . . . . . . . . . …
Estab- Remarks
lished
1882 Awarded for meritorious service to members of the
family and heads of state.
1869 Awarded to high government officials of the
Buddhist religion.
1873 Awarded for meritorious service to the sovereign.
Given in three classes.
1911 An order of merit.
1918 Awarded for military and naval services to the
state. Given in four classes.
1861 Awarded for meritorious service to the state.
Given in eight classes.
1869 Awarded for meritorious service to the state.
Given in eight classes.
1919 Awarded for personal services to the king.
1911 Do.
1918 Awarded for gallantry in action. -
1882 Awarded as token of royal appreciation.
1873 Awarded to military personnel for twenty-five years'
honorable service.
1873 Awarded to military personnel for fifteen years’ -
- honorable service.
1897 Awarded to officers and warrant officers of His
Majesty's Guard Regiment.
1912 Awarded for lifesaving. w
1941 Awarded for service in the Indochina conflict.
1941 Awarded to members of the defense and police forces
for courageous actions during the Indochina conflict.
1941 Awarded for courageous and honorable service in a
frontier area.
1941 Awarded to those who performed auxiliary war duties
in support of the fighting forces during the
Indochin conflict.
§
*
*... . 396
try of the Interior but outside the National Police Department,
there is a Volunteer Defense Corps under the supervision of the
Department of Local Administration. This completely volunteer
Organization is a part-time militia, which functions as an auxiliary
police force to supplement security measures at the village level. In
time of full emergency, this force of over 20,000 men would be
expanded and mobilized as a reserve force to serve under the Minis-
try of Defense. -
The formal functions of the National Police Department include
more than the enforcement of laws and the apprehension and in-
vestigation of offenders. The department also bears responsibility
for the internal security of the country under conditions of less
than full insurgency. In case of invasion all components of the
police system, except the Metropolitan Police, are expected to
mobilize and bear the brunt of fighting until the army can deploy
its forces to the field. In case of war, the mobilized police units
would be placed under the Ministry of Defense and would serve
with, but would not be incorporated into, military formations.
Because the counterinsurgency role of the police has become in-
creasingly important, conventional police missions have been modi-
fied to include greater cooperation with representatives of other
government agencies. Realizing that the betterment of local condi-
tions reduces dissatisfaction and the subversive potential in de-
pressed areas, the usual police security efforts have been augmented
by assigning teams of economic and sociological specialists to oper-
ate and improve living standards in rural areas. .
National Police Department Headquarters
The National Police Department headquarters administers all
components of the police system. It is headed by a director general,
who holds the rank of general and who is aided by two deputy
directors general and one assistant director general, all of whom are
lieutenant generals. The comprehensive scope of the functions per-
formed by the headquarters is indicated by its numerous divisions,
bureaus, an offices. In addition to the usual headquarters adminis-
trative sections, it includes divisions dealing with legal affairs, prose-
cution, finance, supplies, research and planning, immigration, alien
registration, tax controls, communications, technical services, medi-
cal services, welfare, crime detection, and matters affecting foreign
nationals. It also has an inspector general's office directly respon-
sible to the director general.
- Provincial Police - -
The Provincial Police, which includes the Border Patrol Police,
constitutes the largest component of the National Police Depart-
ment in terms of both manpower and geographic responsibility. The
forces are charged with providing police services and protection to
every city and town in Thailand except the metropolitan Bangkok
area and to every rural area. Rural areas contiguous to national land
borders are the unique responsibilities of the Border Patrol Police.
The Provincial Police bear the brunt of law enforcement activities
and in many cases are the principal representatives of the central
government's authority. -
The Provincial Police are headed by a commissioner who reports
directly to the director general of the National Police Department.
The country is divided administratively into nine police regions of
varying size, ranging from six to eleven provinces each. Each region
is headed by a commander who operates out of his own regional
headquarters to control the administration, operation, and training
of forces in his territory. Each province in a region is in charge of a
police superintendent who supervises the operation of all police
units and of all district police stations and substations in his area.
Since 1966 two new types of specialized forces have been de-
veloped to improve village security and to suppress insurgency. At
the village level, units of twelve to fifteen men, selected from the
village at large or from members of the Volunteer Defense Corps,
are formed to augment police security operations. The units func-
tion under the regular Provincial Police, from whom they receive
their training and equipment. The second type of specialized force
involves larger units of about fifty men assigned to, and controlled
by, each regional police headquarters. After receiving special
counterinsurgency training, they are stationed at headquarters as
highly mobile, quick-reaction forces to reinforce police units in
trouble areas. - . . - . . . . . . .
The Border Patrol Police, although an integral part of the Provin-
cial Police, operate with a great deal of autonomy, usually main-
taining a separate headquarters, in the region to which they are
assigned. They are responsible for the maintenance of law and order
and the protection of the borders against smuggling, illegal entry,
infiltration of subversive elements, and banditry. They are also
charged with the support of civic action projects and counterin-
Surgency programs. - * * ... •
The basic operating unit is the line platoon of thirty men de-
ployed to the field and supported by one or more heavy weapons
platoons stationed at area headquarters as a mobile reserve support
force. There is also a special police aerial reinforcement unit to
transport these units where needed. -.
In support of civic action programs the Border Patrol Police oper-
ate over 150 schools in remote areas and construct many others for
civilian operation. They have built small airstrips for communica-
tions and the movement of supplies, established medical aid sta-
397
tions, and dispensed limited assistance in agricultural projects.
Working among ethnic minorities, they have created development
centers complete with dispensaries, trading facilities, and schools.
Metropolitan Police
The Metropolitan Police are assigned the responsibility of pro-
viding all police service for the capital city of Bangkok and its
immediately surrounding area. Organizationally, the Metropolitan
Police Force is divided into three areas, which are the northern
Bangkok, the southern Bangkok and the Thon Buri divisions. To-
gether they are manned by some 6,000 officers and men in about
forty precincts, which are patrolled on a twenty-four-hour basis. .
Other elements of the Metropolitan Police are in the Traffic Po-
lice Division; the Police Fire Brigade; and mobile patrol, police dog,
juvenile aid, and building safeguard components. The Traffic Police
Division, in addition to traffic control, provides mounted escorts
and guards of honor for the king and serves as a riot control force
to prevent unlawful demonstrations and disperse unruly crowds.
The Criminal Investigation Bureau
The Criminal Investigation Bureau is charged with helping local
police, both provincial and metropolitan, in preventing and sup-
pressing crimes and in minimizing activities that threaten national
security. It also controls most of the specialized units, such as the
Railway Police, the Marine Police, the Highway Patrol, and the
Forestry Police. It has jurisdiction over the whole country, in-
cluding the capital area. . . . - .
In addition to directing the special police forces (railway, marine,
highway, and forestry), which enforce laws in areas indicated by
their names, the bureau has five other divisions and offices for
modern police work. The Crime Suppression Division conducts in-
vestigations of criminal offenses everywhere and has an emergency
unit to take care of disorders, sabotage, counterfeiting, cheating and
fraud, gambling, narcotics use, secret societies, and criminal associa-
tions. The Special Branch Division carries out activities that are
obscure because they deal with classified information and are not
publicized. The Criminal Record Office collects and maintains rec-
ords, including dossiers and fingerprints of known criminals and
persons suspected of wrongdoing. The Scientific. Crime Detection
Laboratory is a well-equipped facility capable of performing all
forms of chemical nd physical analysis required for scientific crime.
detection work. The Licenses Division registers and licenses fire-
arms, vehicles, gambling, hotels, and various other shops and enter-
prises as required by law.
398
The Education Bureau
The Education Bureau is responsible for police education and
training and for improving the efficiency of all police personnel. It
discharges is mission through the operation of the Police Officers’
Cadet Academy at Sam Phran, the Detective Training School in
Bangkok, the Noncommissioned Officers’ Training School at Bang
Khen, the Metropolitan Police Training School at Bang Khen, and
four provincial police training schools at Nakhon Pathom, Lam-
pang, Nakhon Ratchasima, and Yala.
In addition to these schools, the Education Bureau also supervises
a training center operated by the Border Patrol Police at Phitsanu-
lok to retrain its line platoons in countersubversive techniques and
in the conduct of counterinsurgency operations in jungle areas. It
further supervises four chaiya (victory) centers established by the
Provincial Police at Chiengmai, Udon Thani, Nakhon Ratchasima,
and Pattani to familiarize and train regular provincial police per-
sonnel in modern counterguerrilla concepts.
CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
- The Penal Code
The Criminal Code of 1956 is the basic body of laws governing
criminal behavior and how to deal with it. Its provisions incorporate
features taken from French, English, Italian, Japanese, and Indian
sources but retain a trace of traditional Thai elements. •
The code begins by defining numerous terms, such as fraudulent,
assault, and official documents, and then provides instructions for
the application of the criminal law, including explanations regarding
penalties, criminal liability, principals, accessories, and judgments.
The code also specifies the actions to be taken in the case of re-
peated offenses and of offenses that involve violations of more than
one provision of the law.
Twelve types of felonies are listed. The first category consists of
crimes against the security of the kingdom, including crimes against
the royal family, against the internal and external security of the
state, and against maintaining friendly relations with foreign states.
Crimes relating to public administration, such as malfeasance in
office and crimes against public officials, form a second category.
Crimes relating to justice, such as perjury or crimes against the
police or the judiciary, constitute a third major group. Other felo-
nies include crimes against religion; crimes against public peace and
security; crimes relating to false money and counterfeiting seals,
stamps, and documents; crimes against trade, including the use of
false weights and measures and misrepresentations of goods; sexual
399
offenses; crimes against the person; crimes against liberty and repu-
tation, such as false imprisonment, kidnapping, and libel; crimes
against property; and such offenses as misappropriation and the
receipt of stolen property.
The code also lists a wide assortment of petty offenses that are
classed as misdemeanors. Misdemeanors are officially defined as vio-
lations punishable by imprisonment for not more than one month
or a fine not exceeding the equivalent of US$50 or both.
Five penalties are reognized by the code: death, imprisonment,
detention (restricted residence), fines, and forfeiture of property to
the state. The death sentence is mandatory for murder or attempted
murder of any member of the royal family or for any offense likely
to endanger the life of the king, murder of a public official or
anyone assisting a public official in the performance of his duty,
murder committed in perpetrating another offense or to escape
punishment, matricide or patricide, premeditated murder, or mur-
der accompanied by torture. Other murders may be punishable by
death but usually involve only imprisonment. Execution is by firing
squad; sentences to life imprisonment normally expire in twenty
years, which is the maximum prison term. . -
Children under eight years of age are not subject to criminal
penalties; juveniles between the ages of seven and fifteen are not
subject to fine or imprisonment but may be restricted to their
homes, placed on probation, or sent to a vocational training school.
Such juvenile delinquents may simply be admonished by the court
and released, or the parents may be required to show that they have
taken measures to ensure against repeated violations for as much as
three years and to pay a sum not exceeding the equivalent of
US$50 in compensation for damages caused by the delinquent with-
in this period. Offenses committed by minors over fourteen but not
over seventeen years of age may be penalized by fines or periods of
confinement, the length of which is one-half of those prescribed for
adults committing the same crimes.
Criminal Courts
Criminal cases or points of criminal law come before three types
of courts: any of the various types of courts of the first instance in
the provinces, the Court of Appeals in Bangkok, and the Supreme
Court, also in Bangkok (see ch. 9, Political System and Values).
None of these courts employ the jury system; criminal trials are
heard by one or more judges, the number depending on the gravity
of the charge. Subject to juridical regulations established by the
Supreme Court, trial procedure is left to the discretion of the pre-
siding judges. - - -
The independence of the judiciary is prescribed by the Constitu-
tion, but there are limiting factors. Actually, the executive branch
may establish or abolish courts on the recommendation of the De-
partment of Justice. Moreover, the Judicial Service Commission ap-
pointed by the king is charged with recruiting, appointing, trans-
ferring, or removing judges. Also, judges salaries are included in the
budget of the Ministry of Justice, which is voted annually by the
National Assembly. - - -
Judges are recruited through competitive examinations held an-
nually. Successful candidates are placed on probationary status and
receive judicial training for one year before they are eligible for
appointment to full judgeships. There is a progressive system of
promotion until retirement at age sixty. Judges are not regarded as
civil servants and are not subject to civil service controls.
- Criminal Procedures
Responsibility for the administration of criminal law is divided
between the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Justice.
The National Police Department in the Ministry of the Interior is
charged with detecting and investigating crimes, with collecting evi-
dence, and with bringing the accused before the court. The Public
Prosecution Department, also in the Ministry of the Interior, repre-
sents the state in criminal proceedings and conducts the prosecu-
tion. The Ministry of Justice supervises the operation of the courts.
The first step in a criminal case is a preliminary investigation
carried out by a police officer. Searches of the houses or persons of
suspects and others thought to be implicated may be made. War-
rants for these searches are required and to be valid must state the
reason for the search, the identity of the person or place to be
searched, the name and official position of the officer making the
search, and the nature of the offense charged. . . . . . . .
Similar procedures apply for arrest warrants, but a senior police
officer may make an arrest without a warrant when the offense is of
a serious nature, when the violator is taken in flagrante delicto, or
when he is found in possession of a weapon or instrument com-
monly used for criminal purposes. Private citizens may arrest with-
out warrant anyone caught in the act of committing a serious crime.
An arrested person must be taken promptly to a police station,
where the arrest warrant is read and explained to him. He may then
be held or released on bail. The provisions for bail and security are
defined by law. . -
Following an arrest, a further and more detailed investigation of
the case is made, but it may not begin until the complainant—the
state or a private individual—has submitted and signed a full bill of
particulars. At the beginning of this phase the accused must be
warned that any statement he makes may be used against him in
401
court. Threats, promises, or coercion may not be used by the in-
vestigator to induce the accused to make self-incriminating state-
ments. -
When the investigation has been completed, a report is filed with
the public prosecutor, who then prepares an indictment, a copy of
which must be given to the accused or to his counsel. The alleged
violator is then haled into court to enter his plea of guilty or not
guilty. Based on this plea and the evidence that has been developed,
the decision to accept the case for trial or to dismiss all charges lies
with the judge. -
Trials are normally held in open court, and the accused is pre-
sumed to be innocent until proved guilty. If the defendent has no
counsel and wishes to be represented, the court will appoint a de-
fense attorney. During the trial the accused or his counsel may
cross-examine. prosecution witnesses and reexamine defense wit-
nesses. He may also refuse to answer questions or to give evidence
that might be incriminating. At the conclusion of the argument the
court is usually recessed while the judge arrives at his decision; it
must, however, be reconvened within three days and the judgment
read to the accused in open court. The presiding judge, after an-
nouncing the sentence, frequently cancels half of it if the accused
has confessed to his crimes. If the convicted person wishes to ap-
peal, he must do so within fifteen days. The case is then transferred
to the Court of Appeals, which may réverse or reduce the sentence
but cannot increase the penalty imposed by the original trial court.
THE INCIDENCE OF CRIME
Published crime statistics are virtually nonexistent because the
National Police Department, which is responsible for computing
annual crime rates and indices in each province, does not release its
findings. The Ministry of Justice, however, publishes yearly sum-
maries of convictions in the courts of first instance, which provide
indication of the relative number and types of crimes committed.
From them it appears that the most common offenses are those
against public administration, those against public justice, those in-
volving riot and general violence, libel and slander, murder and
assault, theft and armed robbery, and a variety of petty offenses.
The most serious, although not the most numerous, crimes are
offenses against the royal family or against the state (particularly
those directly affecting national security), assassination of a public
official, or any murder involving cruelty or torture. The most preva-
lent, after violations of the antigambling laws, are thefts and contra-
ventions of the narcotics and excise laws. .
In general, organized crime is rare except for the illicit trade in
opium, which persists in spite of the progress of police reforms. In
402
Bangkok and some of the larger towns, the activity of gangs, mostly
youths, seems to be giving the authorities increasing concern.
Mounting insurgency has also given rise to offenses against the state
and those involving general violence. - .
The highest incidence of crime appears to be in the group under
twenty-five years of age, whose members constitute almost half of
all persons committed to prison. Most of these young offenders
come from the tenement districts of Bangkok and include a high
proportion classed as hooligans.
Insurgency
Insurgency is one of the most pressing problems facing law and
order authorities in Thailand. It occurs primarily in the remote
provinces of the Northeastern Khorat Plateau Region, in the South-
ern Peninsula Region adjacent to Malaysia, and in the northern tier
of provinces facing Burma. The problem is more extensive in the
northeast than in the other two areas. This region is the poorest
part of the nation; cut off from Bangkok by rough terrain and poor
communications, it has long evidenced discontent and dissatisfac-
tion with the lack of interest shown by earlier Thai governments.
Also, the people there have a strong ethnic link with the neigh-
boring Laotians and have developed a fairly extensive and homo-
geneous river culture with them. Furthermore, about 40,000 refu-
gees who fled from Vietnam during the Indochina War (1946—54)
are located in the region and have remained unassimilated. -
The Communists have attempted to exploit these dissatisfactions
by all means possible. Propaganda broadcasts have been constant,
agents have been infiltrated from Laos, Thai natives have been sent
to Hanoi and Peking for guerrilla training, revolutionary movements
have been fostered, and small bands of armed dissidents have been
organized in scattered jungle areas. These have gradually increased
their activities, and many incidents of terrorism, assassinations, and
armed clashes with Thai security forces have taken place. In 1970,
especially after the coup in Cambodia that deposed Prince Noro-
dom Sihanouk and after Communist forces launched open war
against the new government, these incidents increased. Estimates of
the number of armed dissidents in northeast Thailand vary greatly,
but there are probably only 1,500 that are fully organized, with
support from several times that number of followers and sympa-
thizers,
In the south the problem of active subversion is smaller but of
nearly equal intensity. The insurgents number 600 to 800 and are in
part ethnic survivors of the 1958–60 guerrilla war in Malaysia who
sought sanctuary on the Thai side of the border. Their effort is
fostered and controlled by the rather small Communist Party of
403
* * '** -
*... r. -
* * : " . . .
* : *.* “ . . . .
\ . . . .
Malaysia, which is linked with the Communist activity in the north-
east. The actual number of sympathizers and supporters is unknown
but may be as high as 25,000. The Malaysian government is cooper-
ating with the Thai police in launching joint counterinsurgency
operations and improving the security of the area.
Communist agitation, recruiting, and organization in northern
Thailand are associated with the 250,000 rather primitive, staunch-
ly independent hill peoples, who have little loyalty to, or contact
with, the central government. Most of these peoples are involved in
the illegal growing and marketing of opium and in illicit cutting of
teakwood. Shan and Karen tribesmen in rebellion against the Bur-
mese government also move back and forth across the border and
add to the problem. -
There are also more than 3,000 organized Chinese Nationalist
exile troops which operate rather freely in the northern area.
Pushed out of southern China when the Communists took over in
1949, they have refused repatriation to Taiwan, which was arranged
earlier for a larger number. Their principal income reportedly comes
from serving as armed escort units for the opium caravans moving
southward. -
Smuggling and Black Marketing
Smuggling and black marketing deprive the government of much-
needed revenue, and the cost of controlling these activities is a
considerable loss to the national economy. The principal clandes-
tine trade is in opium, heroin, and other narcotics. Thailand is a
source of some opium, but much larger quantities are brought in
from Southern China, Burma, and Laos. Thai authorities are greatly
concerned about the traffic, and periodic drives are undertaken to
suppress it. Most of the opium is seized in transit from northern
Thailand, whence it is carried by foot, motor vehicle, railway, and
airplane to Bangkok. At Bangkok some of the drug is sold to local
dealers, but a greater portion is shipped to Singapore and Hong
Kong. With the rise in insurgency, the smuggling of guns has in-
creased sharply, and a sizable amount of opium-for-guns trade is
known to exist.
The smuggling of other items is generally limited to small-scale
operations by persons seeking quick profits despite the risk of fines
and confiscation. The trade, some of which is into and some out of
the country, involves a few food products and various items of
consumer goods. Rice reportedly is smuggled out of Laos, Burma,
and Southern China. Gem stones, mainly from Burma, are traded
clandestinely in Bangkok. Thai customs officials occasionally arrest
agents attempting to smuggle in wristwatches and platinum jewelry
from Hong Kong. Some illicit gold traffic is carried on between
Thailand and Laos. Other items of interest to smugglers include
transistor radios, alcoholic beverages, and miscellaneous drugs, such
as antibiotics.
THE PENAL SYSTEM
The penal system is administered by the Department of Correc-
tions within the Ministry of the Interior. The government’s policy
in operating the system is to use its facilities to reduce crime by
correcting and rehabilitating offenders rather than by punishing
them. The system contains forty-six special institutions, including
seven central and five regional prisons, twenty-three prison camps,
seven correctional institutions, one detention home, and three re-
formatories. In addition, the eighty-four provincial and district and
the forty-five metropolitan police stations are used as places of
confinement for offenders whose sentences are for terms not ex-
ceeding one year.
The seven central and five regional prisons house the bulk of
prisoners with relatively long-term sentences. Khlong Prem Central
Prison in Bangkok is one of the oldest and largest and is designed to
have a capacity of over 6,000 inmates. One of the twenty-three
prison camps, located at Pulao Terutao on an island in the Strait of
Malacca, is isolated and administered separately; all other camps are
integral parts of the main prisons with which they are collocated.
The size of the camps varies, as does the number of inmates they
can accommodate. The average inmate population is about fifty
selected good-conduct prisoners, who engage principally in agricul-
tural pursuits to prepare them for productive lives after release.
Among the seven correctional institutions, one at Ayutthaya and
one in Bangkok deal primarily with youthful offenders of eighteen
to twenty-five years of age serving terms up to five years in dura-
tion. The Women’s Correctional Institution is also located in Bang-
kok, and the specialized Medical Correctional Institution for drug
addicts and other prisoners requiring medical attention is located in
Pathum Thani Province northwest of the capital. Two minimum
security correctional centers are located at Rayong and at Phitsanu-
lok. The Maximum Security Institution for Habitual Criminals is
operated at Nakhon Pathom.
Of the three reformatories, the Ban Lat Yao (sometimes called
Lardyao) facility, just north of Bangkok, receives the bulk of the
more recalcitrant juvenile delinquents and has a capacity of about
2,000. Extensive rehabilitation activities are undertaken there;
those who fail to respond are sent to a second reformatory near
Rayong, which is operated on the prison farm principle. A third
reformatory at Prachuap Khiri Khan, about 125 miles southwest of
Bangkok, is used only to accommodate the overflow from the other
two institutions. -
Additional special facilities for juvenile offenders, called observa-
tion and protection centers, are administered by the Central Juve-
nile Court and the Central Observation and Protection Center of the
Department of Justice. Three of these centers are operated in Bang-
kok, Songkhla, and Nakhon Ratchasima.
A center is attached to each juvenile court and assists it in caring
for and supervising delinquent children charged with criminal of-
fenses, both before and after trial. Probation officers, social work-
ers, physicians, psychiatrists, and teachers are assigned to the cen-
ters. They help the court collect information on the background
and home environment of offenders and take them in custody
pending trial. They then accompany the children into court and
report to the court on their mental and physical conditions.
Health conditions in all types of penal institutions have improved,
but more hospital facilities are needed. Since most prisoners are
relatively uneducated, each facility operates extensive special in-
struction classes. On the average, over 20,000 illiterate prisoners are
enrolled each year, of whom about one-half become reasonably
literate. Vocational training and workshops also have been estab-
lished in most prisons. Products from prison labor are sold, and 35
percent of the net profit is returned to the prisoners. A small por-
tion, credited outright to the individual prisoner, may be spent
during his incarceration; the greater part is put into a savings fund
to afford the prisoner a basis for a new start when he is released.
Prisoners are graded or classified as to conduct into six classes:
excellent, very good, good, fair, bad, and very bad. Those in the
first three categories are considered eligible for parole and may be
released when they have completed two-thirds, three-fourths, and
four-fifths, respectively, of their terms.
*
APPENDIX BB
[THAILAND’S MILITARY POSTUREI
[Reprinted with permission from: The Almanac of World Military Power,
First Edition, by Col. T. N. Dupuy, U.S. Army, Ret. Dunn Loring, Va.,
T. N. Dupuy Associates, 1970.]
407
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.
-:
THAILAND
.:- .** - - - - Internations; bound
* * © National capital
—-- Railroad
Road
* * * * * Track or trail
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Mikes : -
100 150;
5''' ºn 160 150 kilomeles º
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-.
THAILAND
Prades Thai
POWER POTENTIAL STATISTICS
Area: 200,148 square miles
Population: 33,100,000
Total Active Armed Forces: 176,400 (including security
forces; .53% population)
Gross National Product: $5.2 billion ($158 per capita),
Annual Military Expenditures: $125 million (2.41% GNP;
15.1% total budget)
Electric Power Output: 1.5 billion kwh
Merchant Marine: 13 ships; 43,000 gross tons
Civil Air Fleet: 4 jets, 3 propjets, and 8 piston transports
DEFENSE STRUCTURE
The King of Thailand is the nominal commander in chief of
the armed forces of this constitutional monarchy. Actual
control is exercised by the Prime Minister — who is a military
man — and his cabinet, which includes several other military
men. By law the Minister of Defense exercises centralized
command over the three independent services; he is assisted in
this function by a Defense Council, of which he is Chairman.
At present the Prime Minsiter, Field Marshal Thanom Kittika-
chorn, is also Minister of Defense.
POLITICO-MILITARY POLICY
Thailand's principal national objective is to preserve
independence from foreign control.
Since 1950 Thailand has committed itself firmly to the
West in a determined but circumspect policy of opposing
Communism in Southeast Asia. Thailand was an original
signatory of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty in
1954, and the SEATO headquarters is located in Bangkok.
Thailand has supported the United States' military effort in
South Viet Nam in two significant respects. First, a number of
operational US air bases have been established on Thai.
territory. Secondly, in 1969, a selected Thai Combat force
of approximately division strength was sent to join the allied
forces supporting the government of South Viet Nam.
The armed forces are maintained by conscription. All men
between the ages of 21 and 30 are subject to conscription to
perform two years of military service; about 20 percent
actually serve. .
STRATEGIC PROBLEMS
Thailand has a number of serious strategic problems that
pose severe challenges to the traditional Thai qualities of
adroitness, compromise, and determination, which kept Thai-
land independent during the colonial era in Southeast Asia,
The internal stability is uncertain; the nation has suffered a




408
number of coups, counter coups, and attempted coups since
World War II. This tendency to instability, however, may have
been lessened in recent years by the steady improvement in
the economy, and by determined governmental efforts to
spread the benefits of greater national wealth.
The ancient hostility between Burma and Thailand seems
to have abated since Burma regained its independence in 1948.
The equally traditional and ancient enmity with Cambodia has
persisted, however. A boundary dispute led to a disruption of
diplomatic relations between Cambodia and Thailand in 1961.
Although the dispute has since been resolved by the World
Court, and the decision accepted by both sides, normal
diplomatic relations have not been re-established. This hos-
tility inhibits cooperative efforts to meet the threat which
communist subversion poses to both nations.
While 85 percent of the people are ethnic Thais, three
minority groups present, serious defense problems. There are
more than 3,000,000 Chinese in Thailand, about 10 percent of
the population. The loyalty of these Chinese-Thais has not yet
been really tested, but they are susceptible to pressures from
Communist China. Chinese have been prominent among the
participants in exposed espionage groups, and apparently they
play key roles in the subersive activities which have been going
On for nearly ten years in northeastern and southern Thailand.
The communist-supported insurgency which exists in
northeastern Thailand is unquestionably related to the Viet-
namese War, although it also represents an independent
communist effort to penetrate the nations of Southeast Asia
by exploiting ethnic minorites and economic underdevelop-
ment. There are over 300,000 mountain tribal peoples in
northern and northeastern Thailand who are not related to the
Thais, and who feel little or no loyalty to Bangkok. This
is relatively poor country, with few resources, and the central
government has not, until recently, paid much attention to the
area. As a result there are at least 1,000 active insurgent
terrorists in the region, many of them mountain tribesmen,
and they have considerable local sympathy and indirect
support. Some 40,000 Vietnamese, many loyal to Ho Chi
Minh, also inhabit this area. -
In the southernmost provinces of Thailand, some 700,000
Malays make up a majority of the population. They, too, have
little loyalty to the Bangkok government and thus are quite
apathetic about communist terrorist activity. This activity has
gone on along the rough, jungled Thai-Malaysia border since
before 1960, when about 1,000 remnants of the Malayan
insurgents retreated to this region after defeat by British and
Malay forces. Although a substantial number of these com-
munist terrorists are. Chinese, they also include Malays, who
have been able to obtain some support from the local
population just north of the border.
MILITARYASSISTANCE
Before becoming involved in the Vietnamese War, Thailand
had benefitted greatly from substantial US economic and
military assistance. In recent years this military assistance has
increased as both the United States and Thailand have seen
mutual benefit to the strengthening of Thai military
capabilities to make the nation a Free World bastion in
Southeast Asia. Since 1950 this aid has totalled more than
$600 million. In addition to the American combat and support
forces in Thailand—totalling about 50,000 troops—there is a US
Military Advisory Group of over 600 assisting the Thai armed
forces in the utilization of the American equipment which has
been provided them. Many Thai military men receive training
in the United States.
ALLIANCES
Thailand's two principal alliances are the collective security
SEATO pact, and its mutual security treaty with the United
States. In addition, Thailand is a member of the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations, established in August 1967, with
Indonesia, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Singapore; this
Association was established to further non-military
collaboration and mutual assistance.
ARMY
Personnel: 95,000
Organization:
3 infantry divisions
1 armored division
33 infantry battalions
4 motorized infantry battalions
3 AAA battalions
4 engineer battalions
1 signal battalion
1 transportation battalion
Deployment: Thailand sent ground troops to South Viet
Nam beginning in 1967; by 1969 enough had been sent
to form a light division of 12,000 men.
Major Equipment Inventory:
M-24 light tanks
M-41 light tanks
144 light artillery pieces (105mm howitzer)
54 medium artillery pieces (155mm howitzer)
SAM launchers (“Hawk”)
armored half-tracks (M-2)
scout cars (M3A1, M-8)
80 light aircraft -
helicopters
Reserves: There is a reserve organization of unknown
strength with three categories for priority of call-up in
case of mobilization.
NAVY
Personnel: 21:000 naval (15,000 Navy; 6,000 Marines)
Organization:
ASW Squadron
Mine Squadron
Patrol Squadron
Air Squadron
Service Squadron ,
Royal Thai Marine Brigade
Major Units:
1 destroyer escort (DE)
4 patrol escorts (PF)
1 escort minesweeper (PF/MSF)
2 armored gunboats
2 coastal minelayers (MMC)
4 coastal minesweepers (MSC)
20 escorts (PCE, PC, PCS, SC)
4 patrol gunboats (PGM)
6 patrol boats (YP)
6 landing ships (3 LST, 3 LSM)
8 landing craft (2 LCI, 6 LCU)
15 miscellaneous support craft
3 amphibian partol bombers
'Major Naval Bases: Paknam (mouth of Chao Praya River),
Sattahip -
AIR FORCE
Personnel: 25,000
Organization:
1 all-weather interceptor squadron (F-86L)
3 fighter bomber squadrons (F-5A/B, F-86F)
3 counter-insurgency patrol squadrons (T-28D, T-6)
1 bomber squadron (B-26K) -
1 reconnaissance squadron (RT-33A)
2 transport squadrons
1 helicopter wing
- 2 trainer/support squadrons
Major Aircraft Types:
155 combat aircraft
20 F-86L interceptors
25 F-5A/B fighter-bombers
40 F-86F fighter-bombers
10 B-26K light bombers
40 T-28D armed trainers for counter-insurgency -
20 T-6 armed trainers for counter-insurgency
334 other aircraft
6 RT-33A reconnaissance aircraft . . .
28 medium transports (C-45, C-47, C-54A, C-123B,
... etc.) ~
70 helicopters
230 miscellaneous trainer/support aircraft
Major Air Bases: Bangkok, Udon Thani,” Don Muang'
Khorat,” Takhli,” Ubon,” Nongkai, Prachuab,
Kokekathion, Utapao,” Nakhon Phanom”
*Bases also used by USAF.
PARAMILITARY
The Provincial Police have a strength of 28,000. The Thai
Border Patrol Police has a strength of 7,000 men, and is
equipped with 46 aircraft. These, and all municipal highway
and investigation police are under Thai National Police
Department, which is part of the Ministry of the Interior.
The Volunteer Defense Corps, with 25,000 men, is avail.
able for home guard type missions in times of emergency.
410
APPENDIX CC
THAILAND
STRENGTH OF COMMUNIST PARTY
ORGANIZATION
[Reprinted from: World Strength of the Communist Party Organizations.
23rd Annual Report, 1971 Edition. Washington, Department of State,
Bureau of Intelligence and Research, 1971 (Publication 8526).]
411
THAILAND
NATIONAL POLITICAL STATUS
Thailand is a constitutional monarchy. The constitution promulgated
in 1968 provides for a strong and independent executive, headed
by a Prime Minister, and a bicameral legislature with one appointed
and one elected house. The elected house is provided with the
power to originate, reject, and delay legislation, but on
certain questions, such as no-confidence motions and attempts to
override executive vetoes, it is required to vote jointly with the
appointed Senate. Political parties representing the government
and several opposition factions are active, but the Communist Party
and all groups appearing to be Communist fronts are prohibited.
Date of last election: February 10, 1969
Since the Communist Party of Thailand (CPT) is an underground
organization, accurate figures on its membership are not available.
Total membership, however, probably is less than a thousand. This
figure does not include Communist-led armed insurgents, which are
referred to in propaganda as the Thai People's Liberation Army.
The CPT in Bangkok and other urban areas is composed largely of
Chinese and Sino-Thai, and its relationship to the various insurgent
activities in the border areas is not clear.
Leading Party Figures and Principal Publications:
Not known
Areas of Communist Activity.
A number of relatively unrelated Communist insurgencies are being
carried on simultaneously in several parts of the country. The most
active of these is in north Thailand, where ethnic minority tribes
in the mountains near the Lao border have rapidly expanded Communist
activity since 1967. Their most spectacular feats to date were in
June 1970, when three USIS employees were ambushed and killed on a
highway in Nan province, and in September of the same year, when the
province governor and police chief and a high-ranking military officer
were killed in Chiang Rai province. In addition, the Communists have
*
412
THAILAND (continued)
proclaimed "liberated areas" in the north, a step not yet taken
elsewhere in Thailand. Insurgency by ethnic Thai in the northeast
has been less troublesome since the major government offensives
in 1969, but recent organizational activity by the Communists there
may increase their potential in the future. Other ethnic Thai
insurgencies in the west-central (Prachuap Khirikhan province) and
mid-southern (Nakorn Sri Thammarat and other provinces) regions of
the country occasionally flare up as well. In the southern border
areas near Malaysia, ethnic. Malay and Chinese insurgents, a spill-
over from the 1950 Malayan Emergency, remain active. There is
concern that they may be linked with a small Moslem separatist
movement in the southern provinces. Altogether, an estimated
total of 5,000 Communist insurgents are active in Thailand.
The Thai government's most successful recent move against the CPT
hierarchy in Bangkok was the arrest in July of the CPT treasurer,
former Politburo member Prasert Eiewchai, and ten others. Prasert
Was the first major CPT leader arrested since 1967, when some 35
CPT leaders were rounded up in Bangkok.
The Communist insurgents receive outside encouragement and support
for their activities. Propaganda broadcasts from Peking, Hanoi,
the Pathet Lao, and the clandestine Voice of the Thai People
continually attack the Thai government and exhort the Thai insurgents
to persist in their armed struggle. Although North Vietnam provides
considerable support, the CPT follows the ideological line of
Communist China, and Peking is generally regarded as providing
direction and inspiration to the Thai Communist movement.
413
APPENDIX DD
THAILAND
(MAP WITH INSETS-COLOR)
*
* -
"As 414
... . .
*** < '' . -
...- : * . . .
2< ... . . .
I I -
98 > 100 — T I
Hawng Luk__ 104 Phu Lv º
- y 6
Mae Sa _- - *Sº —" ch 4. ECONOMIC ACTIVITY
- º (samneus Nam Dinh / º
- \ a Hoi Xuan º º - -
º - & Ninh Binh
alwº __ & A
º º
A\ - zº - 20-
Fang G Chian 2T
gº º Rai º ) -
Loi-k P. º º * Khan Thanhy- -
-Kaw º
T º - Bal N O R TH"
TAN EN Mae Suai º Banta ~T. Ban
º - Muong Soul. ~~ → -Chieng
B U R M A – º – `-- `-- -
-67 od } Kham - < Jº Muong Sen V | E T NAM
- Xiangkhoang - _Phú U L F
º, `s ſº º } A \ C S Cua Rao -* Qui G
Son º - - 5492 Sº,
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-666.2 N Alignment is approxi \ \– Sº -
N | Vang TN con-Nu`
- \ X *Vieng Y Cuong
Nammehek L- - Chiang Maiº - º
Ngao º \
| -**Lamp ſ - \
ſº º
- 305E \ º
& /
Chom Thong \ - s Paksane
* - º -
\ º pang Bung •. S -
\ ^ he Sariang *N Ö. S. V2, Ngº Kan * A- º
-vº º
Q Hot ‘Phrae sº *** y ea, \
-1.8%- - cle
º +- º 4 * . NIENTIANE -<!
º Sº Den .4770 º | º - w
# S. al - - § º \ & ſ -
E\ \ - -
*/ g § - Ban Phu. ~
2 º > Uttaraditz sº S. -
~ - \ º, sº ~
Nº! º 3- Š. Thoen arº, S ^__ *Na -
\ S - –A Sé 39x9 Egg Phao [ ] Ağı * Z Fishing
SNKyaiktº 2- D - > mainly rice
Khuon Safm Ngao Saywankhalok N ---- Ban Phang Nakhon Phanon*MRhammouane- - | Rubber C Corn
Phumiphon " U - N_ Y- Khon - ( nakh; ) N. - | Teak K Kenaf
- Dam - 53.58 º `-- *No g Bua - - 228O Yº: ſ º - -
q Lamphu Sakonic - [ ] other forest
Th K Sukhothai p Nakºnon ſ - * ~ Major dam site
aton _
(1 Hºwam/Purg ſ
Taº Aſae º Dam That Phanom INDUSTRY AND MINING
Phong * Oil refinery Sn Tin
Ubonratanºſº F
(Nam Phongº Nam Phong - - 2024 e Iron
`- - * Cement plant E -
Chum Phae º Mukd Fluorite
Kamphaeng K H O R º T º ahaneh A Tin smelter W Tungsten
Phet - º - X -
º Khon Kaen j alasin Hieng Jº Hydroelectric
- fºs sº Bang \ powerplant
3. º | --- ol WEGETATION
-16 ~ - RO L A S
º × - -
-- -3.394 - -
- & S. L A. T E A U
S O Chai aphum, T- ~
Nakhon Saw - º -
- º
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3. ~ ſ Bua Yai Khong|Sédone
Uthai Than Z- ~2 -
\ - -
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Lam Narai V. º \ N | Mºm Mºn Tha Tum bon Ratchathaºſ : \
º - .º. - - - - \Paksé+-
ſº \ / º ºne-º ETHNIC GROUPS
- Nakhor \ - \
Khok : Ratchasirnaſºa , Buriram \ \
amrong c - –99: łº | - * Det Udom \
- -52 /Surin -
p Buri ź Khu - -
--- han -
2^* S ------- * A.Kantharalak
T c --- * -- - - - - -
5. #2% Kaeng Khoi > Prakhon - Q -
ºk, Sara Buri º ~~ & Chai p H A QM DO N G R A K - - - - Jº • *
§.N. `_ s KHAO × - - ( -
º G - - TH |U º £º *udon Thanie -
ºu- ākhon Nayok 3255 / emple rulº
- samrons: cheom- &\ºonB Phi Iok
-14 arº- - ) Ksan ^ tsanulo - -
Ta Phraya F- º Mukdahan
ſ 0. - º
/. gº” Yº - Roi * *
- ſ Q -
S- % J º upon "
S-Poinet //-, Ratchathani
Aranyaprathet&olpet - / 2 --~7
\- t --~~ *2- º
\ \ \ Sisophonº ` *ś, Q • Lop Buri - "Nakho .
T º Ratchasima º º
A N D A M A N B. U R M Samut º - lo- -L/ Cº., -
\ | ongkhram :\ \ Siem Reap N º
- º
º -384.5 \ -- L Agricultural area º
\ 0. -> - R inly ri
S E Phet Buri; \ B .* C § & man y rice) /
A º attambang -1. & S. [ ] Tropical evergreen forest
sso. ' * S. [ ] Teak forest
ng º - ~ Sº
º º - Sø Broadleaf deciduous | | Sattahi -
KADAN N &- º - [T]*. attahip º
º - -
º KYUN º Hua Hinº - * > Kººs - C Coniferous forest \\
- > - Man A Prach
D Ö & \, ', ) Cºursat - - Mangrove º, 0
o - º ºul -- P - §) º
E. 7. Pran Buriſ >
2 º * -6° Gºn CºA O); D \| A
o Sr. w -
C2 S 2 ºr no Yº onpong \ - humph TAI AUSTROASIATIC
C nang \ umphon - -
-12 2 • Tenasserim [ ] Thai, Phu Thai C Khmer
- |\ Kompong Chame O 0 SINO-TIBETAN Khmu, Lawa
\ Q Karen * Vietnamese
cºcº - • C) | Lahu MALAYO-POLYNESIAN
- | Lisu Malays
Khennarak
ºne PHNOM PEN Hä - Med - Chaonam (Moken)
-- * Chinese * Other ethnic group
M E R G U
KOH º
A R C H | P E L A ongkhla
| Takeo -
£7 C Narathiwat
BATE DE
KoMPONG
KOH. RONG SOM -
ihanoukvill Chau
< Siha º yº
- Ban Pak Nann ( –
200 º
-10 –ZADETKY 3.
KYUN - R
Ö g Suan
Hºko PHANGAN cº POPULATION
J) º G U L. F
So 0 º
- - - --_ſ - V
§ Dº SAMU Kien Long
0 Sº-
Quan Long -
T H A I L A N D Hº.
0 ha Sala
- Region (phak) boundary
- (nonadministrative)
|Nakºon Si
Thamnarat Province (changwat) boundary
P ſºng -
ana - -
º +--- Railroad INDEx TO PROVINCES º “Nºh
- - --
^ - - - Th 37. Phetchabun º
-8 - - `-- Sai Major road (Thailand only) } ºne 38. Phich it -Q
K0IPHUKET *H** ** – || - |-8- 3. Chachoengsao 39. Phitsanulok
h d 4. Chainat 40. Phra Nakhon
Other roa 5. Chaiyaphum 41. Phra Nakhon
Chumphon 6. Chanthaburi Si Ayutthaya
O- \ | | TTT----- Trail - 7. Chiang Mai 42. Phrae
ALE ral 0. 8. Chiang Rai 43. Phuket
o g ź. § 9. Chon Buri ; º º Kh
- º - - - - Q 10. Chumphon . Prachuap Khiri Khan -
KO º º- 9. + Airfield • C) 11. º 45. Ranong. T
- 8. - t # º: Phet #. º Buri
o - - - . Kanchanaburi . Rayong
o Kantang | Principal port ſ 14. Khon Kaen 49. Roi Et -
C- 16- D 15. Krabi º sº º -
16. Lampan . Samut Prakan
2 J. Secondary port 17. tº: 52. Samut Sakhon O
º X^Songkhla W 18. Loei 53. Samut Songkhram
L 2 4. 19. Lop Buri 54. Sara Buri
2. . 20. Mae Hong Son 55. Satun /
ºys Populated places *g º 21. Maha Sarakham ; sº J
65 22. Nakhon Nayok . Sisake -
y^ - © Over 50,000 º 23. Nakhon Pathom 58. Songkhla º
ſ o 20,000 to 50,000 - - ź. §: º § §§§ - J -(chumphon
. Nakhon Ratchasima . Supnan Burl
S T R A / T Ko TARUTA0 * Under 20,000 55 º 26. Nakhon Sawan 61. Surat Thani º
Sa ... Cºg 27. Nakhon Si Thammarat 62. Surin
~~~ Yº º 28. Nan 63. Tak - o
O F O - ~ 29. Narathiwat 64. Thon Buri • Cº Persons per square mile
N- - t 30. Nong Khai, 65. Trang º | O 13o 518
- Trulau Narathiwa #. ºn # ºn Rºman & & *
- - . Pathum Than - on Ratchatman N - ,- -
MA. L. A C C A - LANGKAWI Spot elevations in feet 33. Pattani 63. Udon Thani * Jº ſy o 1 50 º
º ºr T at 34. Phangnga 69. Uthai Thani N warns s Persons per square kilometer
|S o 35. Phatthalung 70. Uttaradit ºrhammarat"
.S. 3Kota Baharu Scale 1:3,000,000 36. Phet Buri 71. Yala ºn
-6 T- - .º. %iºmas Note: - - - º *
- º-ri, - ote: Provinces have the same names as their capitals,
º - - - -6- t Phra Nakhon wh apital is in Bangkok Phuket
º 2–4, 59 75 100 except Phra whose capital is in Bangkok. Q º
- Statute Miles N
_^ O 25 50 75 100 - *- Songkhla
N_ Kilometers º º
98 NAMEs and BOUNDARY REPREsentatº 100 - A Y \ N - T •o Q N ſ
*Re not necessº'y AuthoritATIVE M\A L S A 102 uala Kerai \ 104. 106 \-
- -
PRINTED BY THE DEFENSE MAPPING AGENCY TOPOGRAPHIC CENTER













































































































APPENDIX EE
THAILAND: ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISIONS
(MAP–COLOR)
415
|
B U
|
98
}
R M A *—"NA
*N..
: O
..~! Chiang ſº
Rai
ºv.
§
8
THAILAND
ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISIONS
NOTE: Provinces have the same names as their
capitals except Phra Nakhon, whose capital
is within Bangkok.
50 170 150 Miles
i i
100 150 Kilometers
O
Udon
68 Thani
º -
DEMAR toºl- -
LINE–º
-
solº
VIET-NAM
|
Ubon
"&
Lop Buri
O
Ratchas
Nakhc
SUMAT
G
9
Nº.
akhon Si Thammarat
2-
Y-
º
O
* ||
RA º M A L A Y S I A
ndonesia)
8 Boundar-Y REPREs EnTation is 102
l
not necessaril-Y authoritATIVE
Province (changwat) boundary
Region (phak) boundary
1. ANG THONG 37. PHETCHABUN
2. BURIRAM 38. PHICHIT
3. CHACHOENGSAO 39. PHITSANULOK
4. CHAINAT 40. PHRA NAKHON
5. CHAIYAPHUM 41. PHRA NAKHON
6. CHANTHABUR SI AYUTTHAYA
7. CHIANG MAI 42. PHRAE
8. CHIANG RAI 43. PHUKET
9. CHON BURI 44. PRACHIN BURI
10. CHUMPHON 45. PRACHUAP KHIRI KHAN
ll. KALASIN 46. RANONG
12. KAMPHAENG PHET 47. RAT BURI
13. KANCHANABURI 48. RAYONG
14. KHON KAEN 49. ROI ET
15. KRABI 50. SAK NAKHON
16. LAMPANG 51. SAMUT SAKHON
17. LAMPHUN 52. SAMUT SONGKHRAM
18. LOEl 53. SAMUT PRAKAN
19. LOP BURI 54. SARA BURI
20. MAE HONG SON 55. SATUN
21. MAHA SARAKHAM 56. SING BUR
22. NAKHON NAYOK 57. SISAKET
23. NAKHON PATHOM 58. SONGKHLA
24. NAKHON PHANOM 59. SUKHOTHAI
25. NAKHON RATCHASIMA 60. SUPHAN BURI
26. NAKHON SAWAN 61. SURAT THAN
27. NAKHON SI THAMMARAT 62. SURIN
28. NAN 63. TAK
29. NARATHIV/AT 64. THON BURI
30. NONG KHAI 65. TRANG
31. NONTHABURI 66. TRAT
32. PATHUM THAN 67. UBON RATCHATHANI
33. PATTANI 68. UDON THANI
34. PHATTHALUNG 69. UTHAI THAN
35. PHANGNGA 70. UTTARADIT
36. PHET BURI 71. YALA
PRINTED BY THE DEFENSE MAPPING AGENCY TOPOGRAPHIC CENTER
















APPENDIX FF
NORTHERN THAILAND
SELECTED ETHNIC GROUPS
(MAP–COLOR)
417
y
Bound ARY REPREs En ration is
not N.E.C. Essa R. L. Y. A U THORITAT-1 v E
L. A. O. S
Ngaoe
! ºn
1979
M
20-
ºuttaradit
º Sawankhalok *Dan Sai
§
º akhon Thai -
Sukhothai º ) A
°. ºhitsanulok sº
*>
\\
O Phetchabun
Phishit O
OF
MARTA BA N. 72
-
-15 Sºs
yuzayat
NORTHERN THAILAND
Selected Ethnic Groups
[T] Meo
[T] Lahu
D. Karen
Changwat (province) boundary
O Selected changwat center
1. (same as changwat name)
NOTE: Ethnic tones represent overall areal
distribution, and not contiguity of settlement.
O
25 50 75 Miles
L l l l l 1 l l
TTTTTT
O 25
i
so 75 Kilometers
*-
i
Uthai Thani C
-
º -
º
º Bachoengsao
º
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APPENDIX GG
KHMERS IN THAILAND
(MAP—COLOR)
419
* º
277
*
| ~
Qſ)
^ || 2/72
Ban O C-2 N
L --- - - -
am Naº 4%: RA
rt.
- Nakho
o Ratchasi
º
--~~ N
Sa º Ø
£2.
Nong Khai º &
”? & -: L Kosſ -
º 22 & -
SA)KON Nakhon -
hani N Phanom Sá Bang º
hammouane
D O A N | hakhek)
1739 /Sakon
Nakhon S3 Nof
p H P H A N
2103
NAKHON Séno
Lººk A K S N PHANO
Kh / - L Mukdahan W. Savannakhet
On Wae \. -T)
* Maña l_-
arakham - * -
- KH (2)/R - - 568. * —- 3. Bang Hie":
HAIYAP UAA Phai Roi Et
\ HA Khemmarat Jº
"33d Chaiyaphum SARAKHAM
R/6 E(T) O N
/ <2
*AHAT HAN
&
.393
Ubon
º Ç tohat i
tºm Muſ,”
Warin P
Chamrap
Det ".
4-ſprachi
Fº Buri
-
2/ º
sº
º HOENGSAO
Buri
Ban
U Taphao 0
G U L F O F
THAI L.A. N. D.
Se
º Khmers in Thailand
[T] Major Khmer area (little intermixing
with other ethnic groups)
[Z Secondary Khmer area (considerable
intermixing with other ethnic groups)
Kui Selected tribal group
+-- Railroad
Road
— — — Trail O
Changwat (province)
boundary
Changwat adminis-
trative center
Spot elevations in feet
|
O 25 50
H++++--
75 Miles
i
25 50
i
75 Kilometers
16-
º REPREs ENTATION is
T NEcE 102
S "ºss ARILY AUTHoRITATIVE
si- I
104.
I Nó/
PRINTED BY THE DEFENSE MAPPING AGENCY TOPOGRAPHIC CENTER















APPENDIx HH
- SOUTHERN ASIA
(COLOR MAP—EDITION 2-TPC, SHEET 7,
SERIES 1106)
(Map in pocket)
APPENDIX II
SOUTHERN ASIA
(COLOR MAP—EDITION 1-AMS, SHEET 8,
SERIES 1106)
(Map in pocket)
APPENDIX JJ
THE PEOPLES OF MAINLAND SOUTHEAST ASIA
(NATIONAL GEOGRAPHIC SOCIETY MAP–
- COLOR)
(Map in pocket)
By Order of the Secretary of the
Official:
VERNE L. BOWERS
Major General, United States Army
The Adjutant General
Distribution:
Active Army: To be distributed on the basis of one copy to each DA Form 12–9 account for Education and
Training—D (Block No. 503) plus: - -
JCS (10)
OSA (5)
OCSA (5)
DCSOPS (8)
DCSPER (3)
DCSLOG (3)
COA (3)
CRD (5)
CORC (3)
ACSFOR (3)
ACSI (10)
TAG (5)
COE (5)
TJAG (3)
ACSC–E (3)
CINFO (3)
ARNG: None.
USAR : None.
Army :
Illin
CMH (5)
CNGB (3)
CAR (3)
OPO (3)
TPMG (3)
CONARC (5)
USACDC (5)
AMC (5)
USASTRATCOM (8)
AADCOM (3)
SHAPE (5)
CINCAL (3)
CINCUSEUR (5)
CINCPAC (25)
USCINCSO (3)
USSTRICOM (10)
For explanation of abbreviations see AR 310–50.
USASA (5)
USCINCMEAFSA (5)
USARAL (3)
USAREUR (5)
USARPAC (15)
USARSO (3)
MDW (5)
CONUS Armies (5)
III Corps (8)
XVIII Abn Corps (8)
NWC (10)
ICAF (10)
AFSC (10)
USAWC (10)
USACGSC (5)
USMA (5)
... • *.*.*
* *. i.
..º.º.º. -
, , , , . -
BRUCE PALMER, JR
General, U. S. Army
Acting Chief of Staff
# us. GoverNMENT PRINTing office, 19720—4364" -s

424
WOR
LD 1:5,000,000
INDONESIA
EDITION 2–AMS
SHEET 9
SERIES 1106
20°
18°
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CHIN HILL
92°. SPECIAL §§on 94°
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102°
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Prince of W
Endeavour
;
:
1106
Edition
THE DELINEATION OF
2–AMS
|NTERNATIONAL BOUNDARIES ON
THIS MAP MUST NOT BE CONSIDERED AUTHORITATIVE
Boundary,
Boundary,
Boundary,
Boundary,
Boundary,
Boundary,
Boundary,
Boundary,
Armistice,
Railway in operation
Principal a
Secondary
Dry weathe
Track, trail
Caravan track
Great Wall
Airport or
Oil pipeline
Heights (in
Form lines
Sea bed de
CONVENTIONAL SIGNS
international or intercolonial, demarcated
international or intercolonial, undemarcated
international or intercolonial, in dispute
major civil subdivision
trust territory
administrative
oblast in U.S.S.R.
minor civil subdivision
cease fire, or demarcation line
-------------------------
| weather road
all weather road
r road
or winter trail
of China -------------
mportant landing field ©
meters) 2563.
(in meters) º
pths (in meters) 8.27
Bathymetric form lines in meters e-Rºs
River, perennial, surveyed— — ºc
Towns of more than
1,000,000 inhabitants MOSCOW
River, perennial, unsurveyed--> -- ~~~~
- - Towns of 500,000 to
River, intermittent— ----------> 1,000,000 inhabitants—RANGOON
Lake, permanent - Towns of 100,000 to
Lake, intermittent ato -- 'º Hanoi
ake, intermitten -
** Towns of 50,000 to
Areas subject to flooding * 100,000 inhabitants Ellore
It * - ſº Towns of 10,000 to
Salt pan * * * 50,000 inhabitants Manado
Glacier Towns of less than
Well - 10,000 inhabitants Yung-hsun
Marsh -- - - Capital of independent
Meters
5000
4000
3000
2000
1000
500
200
Sea Level 0
200
500
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
7000
8000
GRADIENT TINTS
Feet
16404
13123
9842
6562
3281
1640
656
Fathons
109
273
546
109.4
1640
218.7
2734
3280
3827
4,374
GEOGRAPHIC NAMES OR THEIR SPELLINGS
DO NOT NECESSARILY REFLECT RECOGNI-
TION OF THE POLITICAL STATUS OF AN AREA
BY THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT.
REFER CORRECTIONS TO THIS MAP To commanding OFFICER. ARMY MAP SERVICE, WASHINGTON, D. C. 20315
PRINCIPAL SOURCES
Maps on format of International Map of the World, 1:1,000,000
(France, Britain, and U.S.A.), U.S. A. F. Operational Navigation
chart (onc), 1:1,000,000, St. Louis, world Aeronautical chart.
1:1.000,000, U. S. A. F. Wash., Pilotage charts, 1:500,000,
U. S. A. F. Wash. Aeronautical Approach Charts, 1:250,000,
U. S. A. F. wash., various maps by A. M. S. Wash. World Aero
nautical chart. 1:1.000,000, ICAO (sheets issued by France). The
Times atlas, Mid-Century Edition, Edinburgh, 1955-59, various
Soviet sources, including Atlas Mira, Moscow, 1954, Atlas
Morskoi, Moscow, 1950-58. (Map of U.S.S.R.), 1:2,500,000,
Moscow, 1949 and 1958, many Oblast maps, Physical Map of
China, 1:4,000,000, Peking, 1957, Atlas of the Chinese People's
Republic, Shanghai, 1957
CONVERSION SCALE
METERS
900
800
600
500
400
FEET
3000
2000
Canal, navigable
Canal, irrigation
Elevation of lake
Sand and sand dunes
Manila is the seat of government
Eleu -30
* other towns and villages—so
state of colony—º
Capital of (state or other)
major civil subdivision—º
Capital of oblast in U.S.S.R.—º
Oblasts are named only when name differs from capital
9000
4920
Scale 1:5,000,000 (Approximate)
1OO O 1OO 2O 3OO 4OO 500 Statute Miles
EL-D-T-T-T- ~ - - -
1OO O 1OO 2OO 3OO 4OO 500 6OO 7OO 8OO
E-E-E-E-ED-E- - F- - F-
1 OO O 1OO 200 300
H
MILLER oe LATED stEREOGRAPHIC PRouection
ADJOINING SHEETS
AS ONE PROJECTION COVERS ALL TEN SHEETS OF THE MAP
THEY CAN BE FITTED TOGETHER AS A UNIT IF So DESIRED
400 Nautical Miles
900 Kilometers
1000
4-68 PRINTED BY ARMY
MAP SERVICE, CORPS OF ENGINEERS
GLOSSARY
Air ------------------------------------- lake Pan-tao . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . peninsula
Anggi --------------------------------- stream Pegunungan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . mountains
Ao -------------------------------------- bay Pha -------------------------------. mountain
Baie . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ---------------------- bay Phu . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . area name, village, settlement
Ban . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ---------------- village Pointe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . point
Batang . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ---------------- stream Poulo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . island(s), rocks
Batu - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - rock Pulao . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . island(s), rocks
Bon --------------------------------- mountain Pulau ----------------------------. island rock
Bukit --------------------------- mountain, hill Schiereiland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . peninsula
Bulu ---------------------------. mountain, hill Se ----------------------------- stream, river
Chiang ------------------- river, bay, harbor, inlet Selat ---------------------. . . . . . strait, channel
Chiao -----------------------------. cape, point Sha ----------------------------. sand, island
Chong ---------------------- bay, channel, strait Shan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . hill, island, mountain
Chou ---------------------------------- island Shan-mo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . mountain range
Chu . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . mountain Song --------------------------------. stream
Ch'un-tao . . . . . . . . . . . . ------------- island group Stung -------------------------------- stream
Con ----------------------------------- island Sungai, Sungei . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . river, stream
Cu, Culao ------------------------------ island Tao ----------------------------------. island
Cua ------------------------------ river mouth Tandjung . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . cape, point
Dak ---------------------------------- stream Teluk ------------------------------. bay, gulf
Danau ---------------------------------- lake Tonle ----------------------------------. lake
Gunung ------------------------- mountain, hill Tou -----------------------------------. cape
Hai-hsia -------------------------------- strait Udjung ---------------------------. cape, point
Hon ----------------------------------- island Wai ---------------------------------. stream
Hsu ----------------------------------- island Wan -------------------------------. bay, gulf
he . . . . … island Yok -------------------------------. mountain
Kali ---------------------------------- stream
Kas ----------------------------------- island
Kenohan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . -------- lake
Kepulauan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . islands
Khao . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . hill, mountains, peak
Ko ------------------------------------ island
Kon ---------------------------- hill, mountain ABBREVIATIONS
La ----------------------------------- stream
Laem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . cape, peninsula, headland B . . . . . . . Baie . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . bay
lam ---------------------------------- stream Bt. . . . . . . Bukit . ---------------- mountain, hill
Laut ----------------------------------- lake G - Gunung . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . mountain, hill
Lieh-tao . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . island group ------- he º- island
Ling ------------------------------- mountain P. . . . . . . Pulau, Pulo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . island
Mae nam - - - - - - - stream, estuary Peg: . . . . Pegunungan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . mountains
Maung . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . village, settlement S. . . . . . . Sungai, Sungei . . . . . . . . . . river, stream
Muara . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . estuary, mouth St. . . . . . Stung . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . stream
Nam . . . . . . . . . . ----------------------- stream Tel. T. ... Teluk ..................... bay, gulf
Ngoc ------------------------------- mountain Tg. . . . . . Tandjung . . . . . . . ......... cape, point
Nusa ---------------------------------- island Ug. . . . . . . Udjang . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . cape, point
STOCK NO. 1106X9WT * * * * *02

















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ſae
ſae.
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