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THE LIFE
OF
GEORGE WASHINGTON
COMMANDER IN CHIEF OF THE
AMERICAN FORCES
DURING THE WAR WHICH ESTABLISHED THE INDEPENDENCE OF HIS COUNTRY
AND FIRST PRESIDENT OF THE
UNITED STATES
COMPILED UNDER THE INSPECTION OF
THE HONOURABLE BUSHROD WASHINGTON.from &lt;Origtnal tPaper%
BEQUEATHED TO HIM BY HIS DECEASED RELATIVE
BY
JOHN MARSHALL
WITH AN INTRODUCTION BY
HON. HENRY ST. GEORGE TUCKER
FORMER PRESIDENT OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION

eIW BortE
WALTON BOOK COMPANY
MCMXXX

PUBLISHERS' NOTE
The text followed in this issue of Marshall's Life of
Washington is that of the edition of i848, published
in Philadelphia.
No alterations have been made in the text; the
peculiarities and idiosyncrasies of the author's style
have been retained unchanged.
The original work had no index. As it is of special
importance as a reference book, this deficiency has
been supplied.

THE LIFE
OF
GEORGE WASHINGTON
VOLUME ONE

IN COMMEMORATION OF THE
TWO HUNDREDTH ANNIVERSARY OF HIS BIRTH
THREE THOUSAND COPIES OF THIS
BI-CENTENARY EDITION
OF THE
LIFE OF GEORGE WASHINGTON BY JOHN MARSHALL
HAVE BEEN PRINTED
AND THE WORK COMPLETED AND PUBLISHED
FEBRUARY MCMXXX.

2- V
INTRODUCTION
THE union of two such names as Washington and Marshall in
any publication must naturally excite the interest of the American public, and that will be so even though it means a new
edition of a book published in I832.
The purpose, therefore, of the publishers to bring out a new
edition of John Marshall's "Life of Washington" will naturally
create great interest in the minds of the reading public, and this
will be greatly enhanced, after the lapse of nearly one hundred
years, if the reader keeps in mind how the development of the
United States in that great period, in commerce, education, and
the arts and sciences, and especially in the evolution of our constitutional history, has been effected by the initial actions of the
first President of the United States, and their effect upon the
constitutional development of these several subjects; and in
view of John Marshall's unparalleled position in the development of the Constitution of the country, it will be of exceeding interest, also, to the student of American history to see how
far the views of the great Chief Justice, as expressed in his
opinions after the close of Washington's Administration, coincided with those of the President in those matters.
This book reveals the most meticulous care on the part of the
great Chief Justice in recording the Administration of President Washington, and many of the subjects referred to by him
will seem to the reader unnecessary to be noted; but one motive
which seemed to fill the public mind of that day more than any
other was the sincere and patriotic sentiment which pervaded
the leaders that the foundations of the new Republic were to
be laid deep in a determined effort that the great principles of
civil liberty and of national honor should be protected and preserved at any cost; and in their various ramifications, embracing
some things of importance and others which seem to be trivial,~
the Chief Justice seemed to feel it necessary to record them all.
V

INTRODUCTION

It was natural that, in the beginning of the Government, the
chief motive for which was the regulation of commerce between the States and foreign countries, that subject should have
been especially noticed. Questions of taxation arising under the
first tariff bill, our foreign relations, especially with Great Britain and France, embracing the matter of treaties, and notably
under Washington's Administration the Jay Treaty, were subjects much discussed. The relief which was found by the new
government in the regulations of commerce by the Congress of
the United States was fully and generally satisfactory. Yet, at
that distant day none living, not even. the great Chief Justice
himself, could have dreamed of the future development of that
subject, of which he was to become the masterful interpreter.
The life of the greatest American, written by the greatest
American jurist, cannot, and will not, fail to attract the attention throughout the United States of thoughtful men and
women, who will find in it a mine of interesting facts and suggestions on the early administration of the Government.
HENRY ST. GEORGE TUCKER.
Lexington, Virginia,
November 6, i929.

P R E F A C E

TO THE SECOND EDITION
THE author persuades himself that no apology will be required
for offering to his fellow-citizens a revised edition of the LIFE
OF GENERAL WASHINGTON.
The period during which he lived, and acted a conspicuous
part in American affairs, was the most interesting of American
history. The war of our revolution, the very instructive interval between its termination and the adoption of our present
constitution, the organization of the new government, and the
principles which were developed in its first operation, form great
epochs, claiming the attention not only of every statesman, but
of every American unwilling to remain ignorant of the history
of his country, and the character of his countrymen.
The transactions of this period constitute the subject of the
following pages. In compiling them, the Author has relied
chiefly on the manuscript papers of General Washington. These
have supplied the requisite information respecting all facts immediately connected with himself. But as many occurrences
are unavoidably introduced in which he acted no direct part, it
has been drawn occasionally from other sources.
The history of General Washington, from the time of his
appointment to the command of the American armies, is the
history of his country. Yet the peculiar character of biography
seemed to require that his private opinions, and his various
plans, whether carried into execution or neglected, should be
given more in detail than might be deemed proper in a general
history. Copious extracts have, therefore, been made from his
correspondence. Many political events, too, especially during
the war, while his particular duties were of a military character,
seem less appropriate to his biography, than to a professed history of the United States. These are alluded to incidentally.
The great questions which were debated in Congress during
Vi

viii PREFACE
the first operations of the government, have not yet lost their
interest. Deep impressions were then made respecting the subjects themselves, and the persons by whom the various important
propositions then discussed were supported or opposed, which
are not yet entirely effaced. Justice to the patriot statesmen,
who then devoted their time and talents to the public service,
requires that the reasons on which they acted should be known.
The arguments, therefore, for and against those measures which
had most influence over the opinion of the nation, are substantially stated. They are necessarily collected from the papers of
the day.
Other transactions of immense importance at the time, conveying lessons as instructive as experience can give, in which
almost every individual took some part, passed under the view
of the nation, and are detailed, in some degree, from the observation of the author himself. In stating these, which belong
equally to history and biography, his endeavour has been to
represent sentiments and actions, leaving it to the reader to
draw his own conclusions from them.
The work was originally composed under circumstances
which might afford some apology for its being finished with
less care than its importance demanded. The immense mass of
papers which it was necessary to read, many of them interesting when written, but no longer so, occupied great part of that
time which the impatience of the public could allow for the
appearance of the book itself. It was therefore hurried to the
press without that previous careful examination, which would
have resulted in the correction of some faults that have been
since perceived. In the hope of presenting the work to the
public in a form more worthy of its acceptance, and more satisfactory to himself, the author has given it a careful revision.
The language has been, in some instances, altered-he trusts
improved; and the narrative, especially that part of it which
details the distresses of the army during the war, relieved from
tedious repetitions of the same suffering. The work is reduced
in its volume, without discarding any essential information.

THE LIFE

OF
GEORGE WASHINGTON
CHAPTER I
GEORGE WASHINGTON, the third son of Augustine Washington,
was born on the 22d of February, I732, near the
banks of the Potowmac, in the county of Westmore- 73
land, in Virginia. His father first married Miss Butler, who died
in I728; leaving two sons, Lawrence and Augustine. In I730, he
intermarried with Miss Mary Ball, by whom he had four sons,
George, John, Samuel and Charles; and one daughter Betty,
who intermarried with Colonel Fielding Lewis, of Fredericksburg.
His great grand-father, John Washington, a gentleman of a
respectable family, had emigrated from the north of England
about the year i657, and settled on the place where Mr. Washington was born.
At the age of ten years he lost his father. Deprived of one
parent, he became an object of more assiduous attention to the other; who continued to impress those 1742.
principles of religion and virtue on his tender mind, which constituted the solid basis of a character that was maintained
through all the trying vicissitudes of an eventful life. But his
education was limited to those subjects, in which alone the sons
of gentlemen, of moderate fortune, were, at that time, generally instructed. It was confined to acquisitions strictly useful,
not even extending to foreign languages.
In I743, his eldest brother intermarried with the daughter of
the Honourable George William Fairfax, then a member of the
I

THIE LIFE OF

council; and this connexion introduced Mr. Washington to
Lord Fairfax, the proprietor of the Northern Neck
I of Virginia, who offered him, when in his eighteenth
year, an appointment as surveyor, in the western part of that
territory. His patrimonial estate being inconsiderable, this
appointment was readily accepted; and in the performance of
its duties, he acquired that information respecting vacant lands,
and formed those opinions concerning their future value, which
afterwards contributed greatly to the increase of his private
fortune.
Those powerful attractions which the profession of arms
presents to young and ardent minds, possessed their full influence over Mr. Washington. Stimulated by the enthusiasm of
military genius, to take part in the war in which Great Britain
was then engaged, he had pressed so earnestly to
1747. enter into the navy, that, at the age of fifteen, a
midshipman's warrant was obtained for him. The interference
of a timid and affectionate mother deferred the commencement,
and changed the direction of his military career.
75 *. Four years afterwards, at a time when the militia
were to be trained for actual service, he was appointed one of
the Adjutants General of Virginia, with the rank of Major.
The duties annexed to this office soon yielded to others of a
more interesting character.
France was beginning to develop the vast plan of connecting
her extensive dominions in America, by uniting Canada with
Louisiana. The troops of that nation had taken possession of a
tract of country claimed by Virginia, and had commenced a
line of posts, to be extended from the lakes to the Ohio. The
attention of Mr. Dinwiddie, Lieutenant Governor of that Province, was attracted to these supposed encroachments; and he
deemed it his duty to demand, in the name of the King his
master, that they should be suspended.
This mission was toilsome and hazardous. The Envoy would
be under the necessity of passing through an extensive and
almost unexplored wilderness, intersected with rugged mountains and considerable rivers, and inhabited by fierce savages,
who were either hostile to the English, or of doubtful attachment. While the dangers and fatigues of this service deterred

GEORGE WASHINGTON

others from undertaking it, they seem to have possessed attractions for Mr. Washington, and he engaged in it with alacrity.
On receiving his commission, he left Williamsburg and arrived, on the I4th of November, at Wills' creek,
then the extreme frontier settlement of the English, 753
where guides were engaged to conduct him over the Alleghany
mountains. After surmounting the impediments occasioned by
the snow and high waters, he reached the mouth of Turtle creek,
where he was informed that the French General was dead, and
that the greater part of the army had retired into winter quarters. Pursuing his route, he examined the country through
which he passed with a military eye, and selected the confluence
of the Monongahela and Alleghany rivers, the place where fort
Du Quesne was afterwards erected by the French, as an advantageous position, which it would be adviseable to seize and to
fortify immediately.
After employing a few days among the Indians in that neighbourhood, and procuring some of their chiefs to accompany
him, whose fidelity he took the most judicious means to secure,
he ascended the Alleghany river. Passing one fort at the mouth
of French creek, he proceeded up the stream to a second, where
he was received by Monsieur Le Gardeur de St. Pierre, the commanding officer on the Ohio, to whom he delivered the letter of
Mr. Dinwiddie, and from whom he received an answer with
which he returned to Williamsburg. The exertions made by
Mr. Washington on this occasion, the perseverance with which
he surmounted the difficulties of the journey, and the judgment
displayed in his conduct towards the Indians, raised
him in the public opinion, as well as in that of the
Lieutenant Governor. His journal,' drawn up for the inspection of Mr. Dinwiddie, was published, and impressed his countrymen with very favourable sentiments of his understanding
and fortitude.
As the answer from the commandant of the French forces on
the Ohio indicated no disposition to withdraw from that country, it was deemed necessary to make some preparations to
maintain the right asserted over it by the British crown; and
1 See note, No. I, at the end of the volume.

THE LIFE OF

the assembly of Virginia authorized the executive to raise a
regiment for that purpose, to consist of three hundred men.
The command of this regiment was given to Mr. Fry; and
Major Washington was appointed Lieutenant Colonel. Anxious
to be engaged in active service, he obtained permission, about
the beginning of April, to advance with two companies to the
Great Meadows in the Alleghany mountains. By this movement he hoped to cover that frontier, to make himself more
perfectly acquainted with the country, to gain some information respecting the situation and designs of the French, and to
preserve the friendship of the savages. Soon after his arrival at
that place, he was visited by some friendly Indians, who informed him that the French, having dispersed a party of workmen employed by the Ohio company to erect a fort on the
south-eastern branch of the Ohio, were themselves engaged in
completing a fortification at the confluence of the Alleghany
and Monongahela rivers: a detachment from which place was
then on its march towards his camp. Open hostilities had not
yet commenced; but the country was considered as invaded:
and several circumstances were related, confirming the opinion
that this party was approaching with hostile views. Among
others, it had withdrawn itself some distance from the path,
1 With an unaffected modesty which the accumulated honours of his after life
could never impair, Major Washington, though the most distinguished military man
then in Virginia, declined being a candidate for the command of this regiment. The
following letter written on the occasion to Colonel Richard Corbin, a member of
the council, with whom his family was connected by the ties of friendship and of
affinity, was placed in the hands of the author by Mr. Francis Corbin, a son of that
gentleman.
"DEAR SIR,-In a conversation at Green Spring you gave me some room to hope
for a commission above that of a Major, and to be ranked among the chief officers of
this expedition. The command of the whole forces is what I neither look for, expect,
or desire; for I must be impartial enough to confess, it is a charge too great for my
youth and inexperience to be intrusted with. Knowing this, I have too sincere a love
for my country, to undertake that which may tend to the prejudice of it. But if I
could entertain hopes that you thought me worthy of the post of Lieutenant-colonel,
and would favour me so far as to mention it at the appointment of officers, I could
not but entertain'a true sense of the kindness.
I flatter myself that under a skilful commander, or man of sense, (which I most
sincerely wish to serve under,) with my own application and diligent study of my
duty, I shall be able to conduct my steps without censure, and in time, render myself worthy of the promotion that I shall be favoured with now."
The commission he solicited was transmitted to him by Mr. Corbin, in the following laconic letter:
"DEAR GEORGE,-I inclose you your commission. God prosper you with it.
Your friend, RICHARD CORBIN."

GEORGE WASHINGTON5

and had encamped for the night in a bottom, as if to ensure
concealment. Entertaining no doubt of the unfriendly designs with which these troops were advancing, Lieutenant
Colonel 'Washington resolved 'to anticipate 'them. Availing
himself of the offer made by the Indians to serve him as guides,
he proceeded through a dark and rainy night to the French
encampment, which he completely surrounded. At daybreak,
his troops fired and rushed upon the party, which immediately
surrendered. One man only escaped capture; and M. Jumonville alone, the commanding officer, was killed.
While the regiment was on its march to loin the detachment
advanced in front, the command devolved on Lieutenant Colonel Washington by the death of Colonel Fry. Soon after
its arrival, it was reinforced by two independent companies
of regulars. After erecting a small stockade at the Great
Meadows, Colonel Washington commenced his march towards
fort Du Quesne, with the intention of dislodging the French
from that place. He had proceeded about thirteen miles, when
he was met by some friendly Indians, who informed him that
the French and their savage allies, "eas numerous as the pigeons
in the woods," were advancing rapidly to meet him. Among
those who brought this information, was a trusty chief, only
two days from the fort on the Ohio, who had observed the
arrival of a considerable reinforcement at that place, and had
heard their intention of marching immediately to attack the
English, with a corps composed of eight hundred French and
four hundred Indians. This intelligence was corroborated by
information previously received from deserters, who had reported that a reinforcement was expected.
The troops commanded by Colonel 'Washington were almost
destitute of provisions; and the ground he occupied was not
adapted to military purposes. A road at some distance, leading
through other defiles in the mountains, would enable the French
to pass into his rear, intercept his supplies, and starve him into a
surrender, or fight him with a superiority of three to one.
In this hazardous situation, a council of war unanimously
advised a retreat to the fort at the Great Meadows, now termed
fort Necessity where the two roads united, and where the face
of the country was such as not to permit an enemy to pass

THE LIFE OF

unperceived. At that place, it was intended to remain, until
reinforcements of men, and supplies of provisions, should
arrive.
In pursuance of this advice, Colonel Washington returned to
uly. fort Necessity, and began a ditch around the stockJuly ade. Before it was completed, the French, amountJuly 3 ing to about fifteeen hundred men, commanded by
Monsieur de Villier, appeared before the fort, and immediately
commenced a furious attack upon it. They were received with
great intrepidity by the Americans, who fought partly within
the stockade, and partly in the surrounding ditch, which was
nearly filled with mud and water. Colonel Washington continued the whole day on the outside of the fort, encouraging the
soldiers by his countenance and example. The assailants fought
under cover of the trees and high grass, with which the country
abounds. The engagement was continued with great resolution from ten in the morning until dark; when Monsieur de
Villier demanded a parley, and offered terms of capitulation.
July 4 The proposals first made were rejected; but, in the
course of the night, articles were signed, by which the
fort was surrendered, on condition that its garrison should be
allowed the honours of war-should be permitted to retain
their arms and baggage, and be suffered to march without
molestation into the inhabited parts of Virginia. The capitulation being in French-a language not understood by any person
in the garrison, and being drawn up hastily in the night, contains an expression which was inaccurately translated at the
time, and of which advantage has been since taken, by the
enemies of Mr. Washington, to imply an admission on his part,
that Monsieur Jumonville was assassinated. An account of the
transaction was published by Monsieur de Villier, which drew
from Colonel Washington, a letter to a friend, completely disproving'the calumny. Though entirely discredited at the time,
it was revived at a subsequent period, when circumstances, well
understood at the date of the transaction, were supposed to be
forgotten.1
The loss of the Americans in this affair is not ascertained.

1 See note, No. II, at the end of the volume.

GEORGE WASHINGTON

From a return made on the 9th of July, at Wills' Creek, it
appears that the killed and wounded, of the Virginia regiment,
amounted to fifty-eight; but the loss sustained by the two
independent companies is not stated. That of the assailants
was supposed to be more considerable.
Great credit was given to Colonel Washington by his countrymen, for the courage displayed on this occasion. The legislature evinced its satisfaction with the conduct of the whole
party, by passing a vote of thanks' to him, and the officers
under his command; and by giving three hundred pistoles, to
be distributed among the soldiers engaged in the action.
The regiment returned to Winchester, to be recruited; soon
after which it was joined by a few companies from North
Carolina and Maryland. On the arrival of this reinforcement,
the Lieutenant Governor, with the advice of council, regardless
of the condition or number of the forces, ordered them immediately to march over the Alleghany mountains, and to expel
the French from fort Du Quesne, or to build one in its vicinity.
The little army in Virginia, which was placed under the command of Colonel Innes, from North Carolina, did
not, as now reinforced, exceed half the number of the August.
enemy, and was neither provided with the means of moving, nor
with supplies for a winter campaign. With as little consideration,
directions had been given for the immediate completion of the
regiment, without furnishing a single shilling for the recruiting
service. Although a long peace may account for many errors
at the commencement of war, some surprise will be felt at such
ill-considered and ill-judged measures. Colonel Washington
remonstrated strongly against these orders, but pre-September
pared to execute them. The assembly, however,
'To the vote of thanks, the officers made the following reply:
"We, the officers of the Virginia regiment, are highly sensible of the particular
mark of distinction with which you have honoured us, in returning your thanks for
our behaviour in the late action; and can not help testifying our grateful acknowledgments, for your "high sense" of what we shall always esteem a duty to our
country and the best of kings.
"Favoured with your regard, we shall zealously endeavour to deserve your applause, and, by our future actions, strive to convince the worshipful house of burgesses, how much we esteem their approbation, and, as it ought to be, regard it as
the voice of our country.
Signed for the whole corps,
GEO: WASHINGTON."

THE LIFE OF

having risen without making any provision for the farther
prosecution of the war, this wild expedition was laid aside, and
the Virginia regiment was reduced to independent companies.
In the course of the winter, orders were received "for settling
the rank of the officers of his majesty's forces when serving with
the provincials in North America." These orders directed ""that
all officers commissioned by the King, or by his General in
North America, should take rank of all officers commissioned
by the Governors of the respective provinces: and farther, that
the general and field officers of the provincial troops should
have no rank when serving with the general and field officers
commissioned by the crown; but that all captains, and other
inferior officers of the royal troops, should take rank over provincial officers of the same grade, having senior commissions."
Strong as was his attachment to a military life, Colonel Washington possessed in too eminent a degree the proud and punctilious feelings of a soldier, to submit to a degradation so humiliating as was produced by his loss of rank. Professing his
unabated inclination to continue in the service, if permitted to
do so without a sacrifice too great to be made, he retired indignantly from the station assigned him, and answered the
various letters which he received, pressing him still to hold his
commission, with assurances that he would serve with pleasure,
when he should be enabled to do so without dishonour.
His eldest brother had lately died, and left him a considerable
estate on the Potowmac. This gentleman had served in the
expedition against Carthagena; and, in compliment to the admiral who commanded the fleet engaged in that enterprise, had
named his seat Mount Vernon. To this delightful spot Colonel
Washington withdrew, resolving to devote his future attention
to the avocations of private life. This resolution was not long
maintained.
General Braddock, being informed of his merit, his knowl11755 edge of the country which was to be the theatre of
Marc action, and his motives for retiring from the service,
gratified his desire to make one campaign under a
person supposed to possess some knowledge of war, by inviting
him to enter his family as a volunteer aid-de-camp.
Having determined to accept this invitation, he joined the

GEORGE WASHINGTON

Commander-in-chief, immediately after his departure from
Alexandria, and proceeded with him to Wills' Creek. June.
The army, consisting of two European regiments and
a few corps of provincials, was detained at that place until the
i zth of June, by the difficulty of procuring wagons, horses, and
provisions. Colonel Washington, impatient under these delays,
suggested the propriety of using pack horses instead of wagons,
for conveying the baggage. The commander-in-chief, although
solicitous to hasten the expedition, was so attached to the usages
of regular war, that this salutary advice was at first rejected;
but, soon after the commencement of the march, its propriety
became too obvious to be longer neglected.
On the third day after the army had moved from its ground,
Colonel Washington was seized with a violent fever,
which disabled him from riding on horseback, and J 5
was conveyed in a covered wagon. General Braddock, who
found the difficulties of the march greater than had been expected, continuing to consult him privately, he strenuously
urged that officer to leave his heavy artillery and baggage with
the rear division of the army; and with a chosen body of troops
and some pieces of light artillery, to press forward with the
utmost expedition to fort Du Quesne. In support of this
advice, he stated that the French were then weak on the Ohio,
but hourly expected reinforcements. During the excessive
drought which prevailed at that time, these could not arrive;
because the river Le Bceuf, on which their supplies must be
brought to Venango, did not then afford a sufficient quantity
of water for the purpose. A rapid movement therefore might
enable him to carry the fort, before the arrival of the expected
aid; but if this measure should not be adopted, such were the
delays attendant on the march of the whole army, that rains
sufficient to raise the waters might reasonably be expected, and
the whole force of the French would probably be collected
for their reception; a circumstance which would render the success of the expedition doubtful.
This advice according well with the temper of the Commanderin-chief, it was determined in a council of war, held at the
Little Meadows, that twelve hundred select men, to be commanded by General Braddock in person, should advance with

THE LIFE OF

the utmost expedition against fort Du Quesne. Colonel Dunbar
was to remain with the residue of the two regiments, and all
the heavy baggage.
Although this select corps commenced its march with only
June I thirty carriages, including ammunition wagons, the
19. hopes which had been entertained of the celerity of
its movements were not fulfilled. "I found," said Colonel
Washington, in a letter to his brother, written during the
march, "that instead of pushing on with vigour, without regarding a little rough road, they were halting to level every
mole-hill, and to erect bridges over every brook." By these
means they employed four days in reaching the great crossing
of the Yohiogany, only nineteen miles from the Little Meadows.
Colonel Washington was obliged to stop at that place;-the
physician having declared that his life would be endangered by
continuing with the army. He obeyed, with reluctance, the
positive orders of the general to remain at this camp, under the
protection of a small guard, until the arrival of Colonel Dunbar; having first received a promise that means should be used
to bring him up with the army before it reached fort Du
Quesne.
The day before the action of the Monongahela he rejoined the
general in a covered wagon; and, though weak, entered on the
duties of his station.
In a short time after the action had commenced, Colonel
Washington was the only aid remaining alive, and unwounded.
The whole duty of carrying the orders of the Commander-inchief, in an engagement with marksmen who selected officers,
Jul and especially those on horseback, for their objects,
Y 9' devolved on him alone. Under these difficult circumstances he manifested that coolness, that self possession,
that fearlessness of danger which ever distinguished him, and
'which are so necessary to the character of a consummate soldier.
Two horses were killed under him, and four balls passed through
his coat; but, to the astonishment of all, he escaped unhurt,while every other officer on horseback was either killed or
wounded. "I expected every moment," says an eye-witness,'
' Dr. Craik.

GEORGE WASHINGTON

I I

"to see him fall. His duty and situation exposed him to every
danger. Nothing but the superintending care of Providence
could have saved him from the fate of all around him."
At length, after an action of nearly three hours, General
Braddock, under whom three horses had been killed, received a
mortal wound; and his troops fled in great disorder. Every
effort to rally them was ineffectual until they had crossed the
Monongahela, when, being no longer pursued, they were again
formed. The general was brought off in a small tumbril by
Colonel Washington, Captain Stewart of the guards, and his
servant. The defeated detachment retreated with the utmost
precipitation to the rear division of the army; soon after which,
Braddock expired. In the first moments of alarm, all the stores
were destroyed, except those necessary for immediate
use; and not long afterwards, Colonel Dunbar August.
marched the remaining European troops to Philadelphia, in
order to place them in, what he termed, winter quarters.
Colonel Washington was greatly disappointed and disgusted
by the conduct of the regular troops in this action. In his letter
to Lieutenant Governor Dinwiddie, giving an account of it, he
said, "They were struck with such an inconceivable panic, that
nothing but confusion and disobedience of orders prevailed
among them. The officers in general behaved with incomparable bravery, for which they greatly suffered; there being upwards of sixty killed and wounded-a large proportion out of
what we had.
"The Virginia companies behaved like men, and died like
soldiers; for, I believe, out of three companies on the ground
that day, scarce thirty men were left alive. Captain Peronny,
and all his officers down to a corporal, were killed. Captain
Poulson had almost as hard a fate for only one of his escaped.
In short, the dastardly behaviour of the regular troops, (so
called,) exposed those who were inclined to do their duty, to
almost certain death; and, at length, in spite of every effort to
the contrary, they broke, and ran as sheep before hounds; leaving the artillery, ammunition, provisions, baggage, and in short
every thing a prey to the enemy: and when we endeavoured to
rally them, in hopes of regaining the ground, and what we had
left upon it, it was with as little success as if we had attempted

THE LIFE OF

to have stopped the wild bears of the mountains, or the rivulets
with our feet: for they would break by, in spite of every effort
to prevent it."'1
Colonel Washington had long been the favourite soldier of
Virginia; and his reputation grew with every occasion for exertion. His conduct in this battle had been universally extolled;2
and the common opinion of his countrymen was, that, had his
advice been pursued, the disaster had been avoided. The assembly was in session, when intelligence was received of this defeat,
and of the abandonment of the colony by Colonel Dunbar.
The legislature, perceiving the necessity of levying troops for
the defence of the province, determined to raise a regiment, to
consist of sixteen companies, the command of which was offered
to Colonel Washington; who was also designated, in his commission, as the Commander-in-chief of all the forces raised and
to be raised in the colony of Virginia. The uncommon privilege
of naming his Field Officers was added to this honourable manifestation of the public confidence.
Retaining still his prepossessions in favour of a military life,
he cheerfully embraced this opportunity of re-entering the
army. After making the necessary arrangements for the recruiting service, and visiting the posts on the frontiers, which
he placed in the best state of defence of which they were susceptible; he set out for the seat of government, where objects
of the first importance required his attention; but was overtaken below Fredericksburg by an express, carrying the intelligence, that a large number of French and Indians, divided into
several parties, had broken up the frontier settlements; were
murdering and capturing men, women, and children; burning
1 In another letter, he says, "We have been beaten, shamefully beaten-shamefully
beaten by a handful of men, who only intended to molest and disturb our march!
Victory was their smallest expectation! But see the wondrous works of Providence,
the uncertainty of human things! We, but a few moments before, believed our numbers almost equal to the force of Canada; they only expected to annoy us. Yet,
contrary to all expectation and human probability, and even to the common course
of things, we were totally defeated, and have sustained the loss of every thing."
In a sermon preached not long after the defeat of General Braddock, the Rev.
Mr. Davies, speaking of that disaster, and of the preservation of Colonel Washington,
said: "I can not but hope that Providence has preserved that youth to be the saviour
of this country." These words were afterwards considered as prophetic; and were
applied by his countrymen to an event very opposite to that which was contemplated
by the person who uttered them.

GEORGE WASHINGTON

13,

their houses, and destroying their crops. The troops stationed
among them for their protection, were unequal to that duty;
and, instead of being able to afford aid to the inhabitants, were
themselves blocked up in their forts.
Colonel Washington hastened back to Winchester, where the
utmost confusion and alarm prevailed. His efforts to raise the
militia were unavailing. Attentive only to individual security,
and regardless of the common danger, they could not be drawn
from their families. Instead of assembling in arms, and obtaining safety by meeting their invaders, the inhabitants fled into
the lower country, and increased the general terror. In this
state of things, he endeavoured to collect and arm the men who
had abandoned their houses, and to remove their wives and
children to a distance from this scene of desolation and carnage.
Pressing orders were at the same time despatched to the newly
appointed officers, to forward their recruits; and to the county
lieutenants, east of the Blue Ridge, to hasten their militia to
Winchester: but before these orders could be executed, the party
which had done so much mischief, and excited such alarm, had
re-crossed the Alleghany mountains.
Early in the following spring, the enemy made another
irruption into the inhabited country, and did great
mischief. The number of troops on the regular A756.
establishment was totally insufficient for the protection prl
of the frontier, and effective services from the militia was found to
be unattainable. The Indians, who were divided into small
parties concealed themselves with so much dexterity, as seldom to
be perceived until the blow was struck. Their murders were frequently committed in the very neighbourhood of the forts; and
the detachments from the garrisons, employed in scouring the
country, were generally eluded, or attacked to advantage. In
one of these skirmishes, the Americans were routed, and Captain Mercer was killed. The people either abandoned the country, or attempted to secure themselves in small stockade forts,
where they were in great distress for provisions, arms, and
ammunition; were often surrounded, and sometimes cut off.
Colonel Washington was deeply affected by this state of things.
"I see their situation," said he, in a letter to the Lieutenant Governor, "I know their danger, and participate their sufferings,

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without having it in my power to give them farther relief than
uncertain promises. In short I see inevitable destruction in so
clear a light, that unless vigorous measures are taken by the assembly, and speedy assistance sent from below, the poor inhabitants now in forts must unavoidably fall, while the remainder are flying before the barbarous foe. In fine, the melancholy
situation of the people; the little prospect of assistance; the gross
and scandalous abuses cast upon the officers in general, which is
reflecting upon me in particular for suffering misconduct of
such extraordinary kind; and the distant prospect, if any, of
gaining reputation in the service, cause me to lament the hour
that gave me a commission, and would induce me, at any other
time than this of imminent danger, to resign, without one hesitating moment, a command from which I never expect to reap
either honour or benefit; but, on the contrary, have almost an
absolute certainty of incurring displeasure below, while the
murder of helpless families may be laid to my account here."
Colonel Washington had been prevented from taking post at
fort Cumberland by an unfortunate and extraordinary difficulty, growing out of an obscurity in the royal orders, respecting the relative rank of officers commissioned by the king, and
those commissioned by the governor. A Captain Dagworthy,
who was at that place, and of the former description, insisted on
taking the command, although it had been committed to Lieutenant Colonel Stevens; and, on the same principle, he contested
the rank of Colonel Washington also. This circumstance had
retained that officer at Winchester, where public stores to a considerable amount were deposited, with only about fifty men to
guard them. In the deep distress of the moment, a council of war
was called, to determine whether he should march this small body
to some of the nearest forts, and, uniting with their petty garrisons, risk an action; or wait until the militia could be raised. The
council unanimously advised a continuance at Winchester. Lord
Fairfax, who commanded the militia of that and the adjacent
counties, had ordered them to his assistance; but they were slow
in assembling. The unremitting exertion of three days, in the
county of Frederick, could produce only twenty men.
The incompetency of the military force to the defence of the
country having become obvious, the assembly determined to

GEORGE WASHINGTON

augment the regiment to fifteen hundred men. In a letter addressed to the house of burgesses, Colonel Washington urged the
necessity of increasing it still farther, to two thousand men; a
less number than which could not possibly, in his opinion, be
sufficient to cover the extensive frontier of Virginia, should the
defensive system be continued. In support of this demand, he
stated, in detail, the forts which must be garrisoned; and observed, that, with the exception of a few inhabitants in forts on
the south branch of the Potowmac, the north mountain near
Winchester had become the frontier; and that, without effectual
aid, the inhabitants would even pass the Blue Ridge. He farther
observed that the woods seemed "alive with French and Indians;" and again described so feelingly the situation of the inhabitants, that the assembly requested the governor to order half
the militia of the adjoining counties to their relief; and the
attorney general, Mr. Peyton Randolph, formed a company of
one hundred gentlemen, who engaged to make the campaign, as
volunteers. Ten well trained woodsmen, or Indians, would have
rendered more service.
The distress of the country increased. As had been foreseen,
Winchester became almost the only settlement west of the Blue
Ridge, on the northern frontier; and fears were entertained
that the enemy would soon pass even that barrier, and ravage
the country below. Express after express was sent to hasten the
militia, but sent in vain. At length, about the last of April, the
French and their savage allies, laden with plunder, prisoners, and
scalps, returned to fort Du Quesne.
Some short time after their retreat, the militia appeared. This
temporary increase of strength was employed in searching the
country for small parties of Indians, who lingered behind the
main body, and in making dispositions to repel another invasion.
A fort was commenced at Winchester, which, in honour of the
general who had been appointed to the command of the British
troops in America, was called fort Loudoun, and the perpetual
remonstrances of Colonel Washington at length effected some
improvement in the laws for the government of the troops.
Instead of adopting, in the first instance, that military code
which experience had matured, the assembly passed occasional
acts to remedy particular evils as they occurred; in consequence

i 6

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of which, a state of insubordination was protracted, and the
difficulties of the commanding officer increased. Slight penalties
were at first annexed to serious military offences; and when an
act was obtained to punish mutiny and desertion. with death,
such crimes as cowardice in action, and sleeping on a post, were
pretermitted. It was left impossible to hold a general court martial, without an order from the governor; and the commanding
officer was not at liberty to make those arrangements in other
respects which his own observation suggested, but shackled by
the control of others, who could neither judge so correctly, nor
be so well informed as himself.
These errors of a government unused to war, though continually remarked by the officer commanding the troops, were
slowly perceived by those in power, and were never entirely
corrected.
Successive incursions continued to be made into the country
by small predatory parties of French and Indians, who kept up a
perpetual alarm, and murdered the defenceless, wherever found.
In Pennsylvania, the inhabitants were driven as far as Carlisle;
and in Maryland, Fredericktown, on the eastern side of the Blue
Ridge, became a frontier. With the Virginia regiment, which
did not yet amount to one thousand men, aided occasionally by
militia, Colonel Washington was to defend a frontier of near
four hundred miles in extent, and to complete a chain of forts.
He repeatedly urged the necessity and propriety of abandoning fort Cumberland, which was too far in advance of the settlements, and too far north, to be useful, while it required for its
defence a larger portion of his force than could be spared with a
proper regard to the safety of other and more advantageous
positions. The governor, however, thought the abandonment of
it improper, since it was a "king's fort;" and Lord Loudoun,
on being consulted, gave the same opinion.
Among the subjects of extreme chagrin to the commander
of the Virginia troops, was the practice of desertion. The prevalence of this crime was ascribed, in a considerable degree, to the
ill-judged parsimony of the assembly. The daily pay of a
soldier was only eight pence, out of which two pence were
stopped for his clothes. This pay was inferior to what was received in every other part of the continent; and, as ought to

GEORGE WASHINGTON

have been foreseen, great discontents were excited by a distinction so invidious. The remonstrances of the commanding officer,
in some degree, corrected this mischief; and a full suit of regimentals was allowed to each soldier, without deducting its price
from his pay.
This campaign furnishes no event which can interest the
reader, yet the duties of the officer, though minute, were arduous; and the sufferings of the people, beyond measure afflicting.
It adds one to the many proofs which have been afforded, of
the miseries to be expected by those who defer preparing the
means of defence, until the moment when they ought to be
used; and then, rely almost entirely, on a force neither adequate
to the danger, nor of equal continuance.
It is an interesting fact to those who know the present situation of Virginia, that, so late as the year I 756, the Blue Ridge
was the north-western frontier; and that she found immense
difficulty in completing a single regiment to protect the inhabitants from the horrors of the scalping knife, and the still
greater horrors of being led into captivity by savages who
added terrors to death by the manner of inflicting it.
As soon as the main body of the enemy had withdrawn from
the settlements, a tour was made by Colonel Washington to the
south-western frontier. There, as well as to the north, continued
incursions had been made; and there too, the principal defence
of the country was entrusted to an ill-regulated militia. The
fatal consequences of this system are thus stated by him, in a
letter to the Lieutenant Governor: "'The inhabitants are so sensible of their danger, if left to the protection of these people,
that not a man will stay at his place. This I have from their
own mouths, and the principal inhabitants of Augusta county.
The militia are under such bad order and discipline, that they
will come and go, when and where they please, without regarding
time, their officers, or the safety of the inhabitants, but consulting solely their own inclinations. There should be, according to your honour's orders, one-third of the militia of these
parts on duty at a time; instead of that, scarce one-thirtieth is
out. They are to be relieved every month, and they are a great
part of that time marching to and from their stations; and they
will not wait one day longer than the limited time, whether re

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lieved or not, however urgent the necessity for their continuance may be." Some instances of this, and of gross misbe'
haviour, were then enumerated; after which, he pressed the
necessity of increasing the number of regulars to two thousand
men.
After returning from this tour, to Winchester, he gave the
Lieutenant Governor, in curious detail, a statement of the situation in which he found the country, urging, but urging in vain,
arguments which will always be suggested by experience, against
relying chiefly on militia for defence.
Sensible of the impracticability of defending such an extensive frontier, Colonel Washington continued to press the policy
of enabling him to act on the offensive. The people of Virginia, he thought, could be protected only by entering the
country of the enemy; giving him employment at home, and removing the source of all their calamities by taking possession
of fort Du Quesne.
"As defensive measures," he observed in a letter to the Lieutenant Governor, "are evidently insufficient for the security and
safety of the country, I hope no arguments are necessary to
evince the necessity of altering them to a vigorous offensive war,
in order to remove the cause." But in the event, that the assembly should still indulge their favourite scheme of protecting
the inhabitants by forts along the frontiers, he presented a
plan, which, in its execution, would require two thousand men
-these were to be distributed in twenty-two forts, extending
from the river Mayo to the Potowmac, in a line of three hundred and sixty miles. In a letter written about the same time
to the speaker of the assembly, he said, "The certainty of advantage, by an offensive scheme of action, renders it, beyond
any doubt, preferable to our defensive measures. Our scattered
force, so separated and dispersed in weak parties, avails little
to stop the secret incursions of the savages. We can only perhaps put them to flight, or frighten them to some other part of
the country, which answers not the end proposed. Whereas,
had we strength enough to invade their lands, we should restrain them from coming abroad, and leaving their families.
We should then remove the principal cause, and have stronger
probability of success; we should be free from the many alarms,

GEORGE WASHINGTON

I9,

mischiefs, and murders, that now attend us; we should inspirit
the hearts of our few Indian friends, and gain more esteem with
them. In short, could Pennsylvania and Maryland be induced
to join us in an expedition of this nature, and to petition his Excellency Lord Loudoun for a small train of artillery, with some
engineers, we should then be 'able, in all human probability, to
subdue the terror of fort Du Quesne; retrieve our character
with the Indians; and restore peace to our unhappy frontiers."
His total inability to act offensively, or even to afford protection to the frontiers of Virginia, was not the only distressing
and vexatious circumstance to which he was exposed. The Lieutenant Governor, to whose commands he was subjected in every
minute particular, and who seems to have been unequal to the
difficulties of his station, frequently deranged his system by
orders which could not be executed without considerable hazard
and inconvenience. Colonel Washington could not always restrain his chagrin on such occasions; and, on one of them, observed in a letter to an intimate friend, who possessed great
influence in the country, "whence it arises, or why, I am truly
ignorant, but my strongest representations of matters relative to
the peace of the frontiers are disregarded, as idle and frivolous;
my propositions and measures, as partial and selfish; and all my
sincerest endeavours for the service of my country, perverted to
the worst purposes. My orders are dark, doubtful, and uncertain: to-day approved, to-morrow condemned; left to act and
proceed at hazard; accountable for the consequences, and blamed
without the benefit of defence. If you can think my situation
capable of exciting the smallest degree of envy, or of affording
the least satisfaction, the truth is yet hid from you, and you entertain notions very different from the reality of the case. However, I am determined to bear up under all these embarrassments some time longer, in the hope of better regulations under
Lord Loudoun, to whom I look for the future fate of Virginia."
Not long after this letter was written, Lord Loudoun, in
whose person the offices of Governor and Commander-in-chief
were united, arrived in Virginia. A comprehensive statement of
the situation of the colony, in a military point of view, and of
the regiment in particular, was drawn up and submitted to him
by Colonel Washington. In this he enumerated the errors

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which had prevented the completion of his regiment, showed
the insufficiency of the militia for any military purpose, and
demonstrated the superiority of an offensive system over that
which had been pursued.
This statement was probably presented by Colonel Washington in person, who was permitted, during the winter, to visit
Lord Loudoun in Philadelphia, where that nobleman met the
Governors of Pennsylvania, Maryland, and North Carolina, and
the Lieutenant Governor of Virginia, in order to consult with
them on the measures to be taken, in their respective Provinces,
for the ensuing campaign. He was, however, disappointed in
his favourite hope of being able to act offensively against the
French on the Ohio. Lord Loudoun had determined to direct
all his efforts against Canada, and to leave only twelve hundred
men in the middle and southern colonies. Instead of receiving
assistance, Virginia was required to send four hundred men to
South Carolina. Not discouraged by these disappointments,
Colonel Washington continued indefatigable in his endeavours
to impress on Mr. Dinwiddie, and on the assembly, the importance of reviving, and properly modifying their military
code, which had now expired, of making a more effective militia
law, and of increasing their number of regular troops.
So far from succeeding on the last subject, he had the mortification to witness a measure which crushed his hopes of an
adequate regular force. Being unable to complete the regiment
by voluntary enlistment, the assembly changed its organization,
May. and reduced it to ten companies; each to consist of
one hundred men. Yet his anxious wishes continued
to be directed towards fort Du Quesne. In a letter written
about this time to Colonel Stanwix, who commanded in the
middle colonies, he said, "You will excuse me, sir, for saying,
that I think there never was, and perhaps never again will be, so
favourable an opportunity as the present for reducing fort Du
Quesne. Several prisoners have made their escape from the Ohio
this spring, and agree in their accounts, that there are but three
hundred men left in the garrison; and I do not conceive that the
French are so strong in Canada, as to reinforce this place, and
defend themselves at home this campaign: surely then this is too
precious an opportunity to be lost."

GEORGE WASHINGTON

But Mr. Pitt did not yet direct the councils of Britain; and
a spirit of enterprise and heroism did not yet animate her generals. The campaign to the north was inglorious; and to the
west, nothing was even attempted, which might relieve the
middle colonies.
Large bodies of savages, in the service of France, once more
spread desolation and murder over the whole country, west of
the Blue Ridge. The regular troops were inadequate to the protection of the inhabitants; and the incompetency of the defensive system to their security became every day more O
apparent. "I exert every means," said Colonel Washington, in a letter to Lieutenant Governor Dinwiddie, "to protect a much distressed country; but it is a task too arduous. To
think of defending a frontier of more than three hundred and
fifty miles extent, as ours is, with only seven hundred men, is
vain and idle; especially when that frontier lies more contiguous
to the enemy than any other.
"I am, and for a long time have been, fully convinced, that
if we continue to pursue a defensive plan, the country must be
inevitably lost."
In another letter he said, "The raising a company of rangers,
or augmenting our strength in some other manner, Oct. 24.
is so far necessary, that, without it, the remaining inhabitants of this once fertile and populous valley will scarcely
be detained at their dwellings until the spring. And if there is
no expedition to the westward then, nor a force more considerable than Virginia can support, posted on our frontiers; if we
still adhere, for the next campaign, to our destructive defensive
schemes, there will not, I dare affirm, be one soul living on this
side the Blue Ridge the ensuing autumn, if we except the troops
in garrison and a few inhabitants of this town, who may shelter
themselves under the protection of this fort. This I know to be
the immoveable determination of all the settlers of this country."
To the Speaker of the assembly he gave the same opinion; and
added, "I do not know on whom these miserable undone people
are to rely for protection. If the assembly are to give it to
them, it is time that measures were at least concerting, and not
when they ought to be going into execution, as has always been
the case. If they are to seek it from the Commander-in-chief,

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it is time their condition was made known to him. For I can
not forbear repeating again, that, while we pursue defensive
measures, we pursue inevitable ruin."
It was impossible for Colonel Washington, zealous in the
service of his country, and ambitious of military fame, to observe the errors committed in the conduct of the war, without
censuring them. These errors were not confined to the military
affairs of the colony. The Cherokee and Catawba Indians, had
hitherto remained faithful to the English, and it was
1757. very desirable to engage the warriors of those tribes
heartily in their service; but so miserably was the intercourse
with them conducted, that, though a considerable expense was
incurred, not much assistance was obtained, and great disgust
was excited among them. The freedom with which the Commander-in-chief of the Virginia forces censured public measures, gave offence to the Lieutenant Governor, who considered
these censures as manifesting a want of respect for himself.
Sometimes he coarsely termed them impertinent; and at other
times, charged him with looseness in his information, and inattention to his duty. On one of these occasions,
Aug. 27. Colonel Washington thus concluded a letter of detail, "Nothing remarkable has happened, and therefore I have
nothing to add. I must beg leave, however, before I conclude,
to observe, in justification of my own conduct, that it is with
pleasure I receive reproof when reproof is due, because no person can be readier to accuse me, than I am to acknowledge an
error, when I have committed it; nor more desirous of atoning
for a crime, when I am sensible of being guilty of one. But, on
the other hand, it is with concern I remark, that my best endeavours lose their reward; and that my conduct, although I
have uniformly studied to make it as unexceptionable as I could,
does not appear to you in a favourable point of light. Otherwise, your honour would not have accused me of loose behaviour,
and remissness of duty, in matters where, I think, I have rather
exceeded than fallen short of it. This, I think, is evidently the
case in speaking of Indian affairs at all, after being instructed in
October. very express terms, 'Not to have any concern with, or
management of Indian affairs.' This has induced me
to forbear mentioning the Indians in my letters to your honour

GEORGE WASHINGTON

of late, and to leave the misunderstanding, which you speak of,
between Mr. Aikin and them, to be related by him."
Not long after this, he received a letter informing him of
some coarse calumny, reflecting on his veracity and honour,
which had been reported to the Lieutenant Governor. He enclosed a copy of this letter to Mr. Dinwiddie, and thus addressed
him,-"I should take it infinitely kind if your honour would
please to inform me whether a report of this nature was ever
made to you; and, in that case, who was the author of it."
"It is evident from a variety of circumstances, and especially
from the change in your honour's conduct towards me, that
some person, as well inclined to detract, but better skilled in the
art of detraction than the author of the above stupid scandal,
has made free with my character. For I cannot suppose, that
malice so absurd, so barefaced, so diametrically opposite to truth,
to common policy, and, in short, to every thing but villany, as
the above is, could impress you with so ill an opinion of my
honour and honesty."
"If it be possible that****, for my belief is staggered, not
being conscious of having given the least cause to any one, much
less to that gentleman, to reflect so grossly; I say, if it be possible
that**** could descend so low as to be the propagator of this
story, he must either be vastly ignorant of the state of affairs
in this country at that time, or else, he must suppose that the
whole body of the inhabitants had combined with me in executing the deceitful fraud. Or why did they, almost to a man,
forsake their dwellings in the greatest terror and confusion;
and while one half of them sought shelter in paltry forts, (of
their own building,) the other should flee to the adjacent counties for refuge; numbers of them even to Carolina, from whence
they have never returned?
"These are facts well known; but not better known than
that these wretched people, while they lay pent up in forts, destitute of the common supports of life, (having in their precipitate flight forgotten, or rather, been unable to secure any kind
of necessaries,) did despatch messengers of their own, (thinking
I had not represented their miseries in the piteous manner they
deserved,) with addresses to your honour and the assembly,
praying relief. And did I ever send any alarming account, with

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out sending also the original papers (or the copies) which gave
rise to it?
"That I have foibles, and perhaps many of them, I shall not
deny. I should esteem myself, as the world also would, vain and
empty, were I to arrogate perfection.
"Knowledge in military matters is to be acquired only by
practice and experience; and if I have erred, great allowance
should be made for want of them; unless my errors should appear to be wilful; and then, I conceive, it would be more generous to charge me with my faults, and to let me stand or fall
according to evidence, than to stigmatize me behind my back.
"It is uncertain in what light my services may have appeared
to your honour: but this I know, and it is the highest consolation I am capable of feeling, that no man that ever was employed in a public capacity, has endeavoured to discharge the
trust reposed in him with greater honesty, and more zeal for
the country's interest than I have done; and if there is any person living, who can say with justice that I have offered any intentional wrong to the public, I will cheerfully submit to the
most ignominious punishment that an injured people ought to
inflict. On the other hand, it is hard to have my character arraigned, and my actions condemned, without a hearing.
"I must therefore again beg in more plain, and in very earnest
terms, to know if * * * * has taken the liberty of representing
my conduct to your honour with such ungentlemanly freedom
as the letter implies. Your condescension herein will be acknowledged a singular favour."
In a letter, some short time after this, to the Lieutenant Governor, he said, "I do not know that I ever gave your honour
cause to suspect me of ingratitude; a crime I detest, and would
most carefully avoid. If an open, disinterested behaviour carries offence, I may have offended; for I have all along laid it
down as a maxim, to represent facts freely and impartially, but
not more so to others than to you, sir. If instances of my ungrateful behaviour had been particularized, I would have answered them. But I have been long convinced that my actions
and their motives have been maliciously aggravated." A request
that he might be permitted to come to Williamsburg for the
settlement of some accounts, which he was desirous of adjusting

GEORGE WASHINGTON

under the inspection of the Lieutenant Governor, who proposed
to leave the province in the following November, was refused in
abrupt and disobliging terms. In answer to the letter containing
the refusal, Colonel Washington, after stating the immoveable
disposition of the inhabitants to leave the country unless more
sufficiently protected, added, "To give a more succinct account
of their affairs than I could in writing, was the principal, among
many other reasons, that induced me to ask leave to come down.
It was not to enjoy a party of pleasure that I asked leave of absence. I have indulged with few of those, winter or summer."
Mr. Dinwiddie soon afterwards took leave of Virginia, and
the government devolved on Mr. Blair, the President of the
Council. Between him and the commander of the colonial troops
the utmost cordiality existed.
After the close of this campaign, Lord Loudoun returned to
England, and General Abercrombie succeeded to the command
of the army. The department of the middle and southern provinces was committed to General Forbes, who, to the inexpressible gratification of Colonel Washington, determined to undertake an expedition against fort Due Quesne.
He urged an early campaign, but he urged it ineffectually;
and, before the troops were assembled, a large body
of French and Indians broke into the country, and 758.
renewed the horrors of the tomahawk and scalping-knife. The
county of Augusta was ravaged, and about sixty persons were
murdered. The attempts made to intercept these savages were
unsuccessful; and they re-crossed the Alleghany, with their
plunder, prisoners, and scalps.
At length, orders were given to assemble the regiment at Winchester, and be in readiness to march in fifteen days. May 24.
On receiving them, Colonel Washington called in his
recruiting parties; but so inattentive had the government been
to his representations that, previous' to marching his regiment,
he was under the necessity of repairing to Williamsburg, personally to enforce his solicitations for arms, ammunition, money,
and clothing. That these preparations for an expedition vitally
interesting to Virginia, should remain to be made after the
season for action had commenced, does not furnish stronger
evidence of the difficulties encountered by the chief of the mili

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tary department, than is given by another circumstance of about
the same date. He was under the necessity of pointing out and
urging the propriety of allowing to his regiment, which had performed much severe service, the same pay which had been
granted to a second regiment, voted the preceding session of
Assembly, to serve for a single year.
Among other motives for an early campaign, Colonel Washington had urged the impracticability of detaining the Indians.
His fears were well founded. Before a junction of the troops
had been made, these savages became impatient to return to
their homes; and, finding that the expedition would yet be delayed a considerable time, they left the army, with promises to
rejoin it at the proper season.
In pursuance of the orders which had been received, the
June 4 Virginia troops moved in detachments from Winchester to fort Cumberland, where they assembled
early in July: after which, they were employed in opening a road
to Raystown, where Colonel Bouquet was stationed. As the
English were continually harassed by small parties of French
and Indians, the general had contemplated advancing a strong
detachment over the Alleghany mountains, for the purpose of
giving them employment at home. By the advice of Colonel
Washington this plan was relinquished. In support of his
opinion, he stated the probability that a large force was collected
at fort Du Quesne, and the impracticability of moving a strong
detachment, without such a quantity of provisions, as would
expose it to the danger of being discovered and cut to pieces.
He advised to harass them with small parties, principally of
Indians; and this advice was pursued.
Colonel Washington had expected that the army would march
by Braddock's road: but, late in July, he had the mortification
July. to receive a letter from Colonel Bouquet, asking an
interview with him, in order to consult on opening
a new road from Raystown, and requesting his opinion on that
route. "I shall," says he, in answer to this letter, "most cheerfully work on any road, pursue any route, or enter upon any
service, that the general or yourself may think me usefully employed in, or qualified for; and shall never have a will of my
own, when a duty is required of me. But since you desire me

GEORGE WASHINGTON

to speak my sentiments freely, permit me to observe, that, after
having conversed with all the guides, and having been informed
by others acquainted with the country, I am convinced that a
road, to be compared with General Braddock's, or indeed that
will be fit for transportation even by pack-horses, can not be
made. I own I have no predilection for the route you have in
contemplation for me."
A few days after writing this letter, he had an interview with
Colonel Bouquet, whom he found decided in favour of opening the new road. After their separation, Colonel Washington,
with his permission, addressed to him a letter to be laid before
General Forbes, then indisposed at Carlisle, in which he stated
his reasons against this measure. He concluded his arguments
against the new road: arguments which appear to be unanswerable, by declaring his fears that, should the attempt be made,
they would be able to do nothing more than fortify some post
on the other side of the Alleghany, and prepare for another
campaign. This he prayed Heaven to avert.
He was equally opposed to a scheme which had been suggested
of marching by the two different routes, and recommended an
order of march by Braddock's road, which would bring the
whole army before fort Du Quesne in thirty-four days, with a
supply of provisions for eighty-six days.
In a letter of the same date addressed to Major Halket, aid of
General Forbes, Colonel Washington thus expressed his forebodings of the mischiefs to be apprehended from the adoption
of the proposed route. "I am just returned from a conference
held with Colonel Bouquet. I find him fixed-I think I may
say unalterably fixed-to lead you a new way to the Ohio,
through a road, every inch of which is to be cut at this advanced season, when we have scarcely time left to tread the
beaten track, universally confessed to be the best passage through
the mountains.
"If Colonel Bouquet succeeds in this point with the general,
all is lost! all is lost indeed! our enterprise is ruined! and we
shall be stopped at the Laurel hill this winter; but not to gather
laurels, except of the kind which cover the mountains. The
southern Indians will turn against us, and these colonies will be
desolated by such an accession to the enemy's strength. These

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must be the consequences of a miscarriage; and a miscarriage,
the almost necessary consequence of an attempt to march the
army by this route."
Colonel Washington's remonstrances and arguments were
unavailing; and the new route was adopted. His extreme chagrin at this measure, and at the delays resulting from it, was
expressed in anxious letters to Mr. Fauquier, then governor of
Virginia, and to the speaker of the house of burgesses.
In a letter to the speaker, written while at fort Cumberland,
September he said: "We are still encamped here; very sickly, and
dispirited at the prospect before us. That appearance of glory which we once had in view-that hope-that
laudable ambition of serving our country, and meriting its applause, are now no more: all is dwindled into ease, sloth, and
fatal inactivity. In a word, all is lost, if the ways of men in
power, like certain ways of Providence, are not inscrutable.
But we who view the actions of great men at a distance can only
form conjectures agreeably to a limited perception; and, being
ignorant of the comprehensive schemes which may be in contemplation, might mistake egregiously in judging of things from
appearances, or by the lump. Yet every f* *-l will have his notions-will prattle and talk away; and why may not I? We seem
then, in my opinion, to act under the guidance of an evil genius.
The conduct of our leaders, if not actuated by superior orders,
is tempered with something-I do not care to give a name to.
Nothing now but a miracle can bring this campaign to a happy
issue." He then recapitulated the arguments he had urged against
attempting a new road, and added, "but I spoke unavailingly.
The road was immediately begun; and since then, from one to
two thousand men have constantly wrought on it. By the last
accounts I have received, they had cut it to the foot of the
Laurel hill, about thirty-five miles; and I suppose, by this time,
fifteen hundred men have taken post about ten miles further, at
a place called Loyal Hanna, where our next fort is to be constructed.
"We have certain intelligence that the French strength at fort
Du Quesne did not exceed eight hundred men, the thirteenth ultimo; including about three or four hundred Indians. See how
our time has been misspent-behold how the golden opportunity

GEORGE WASHINGTON

is lost-perhaps, never to be regained! How is it to be accounted
for? Can General Forbes have orders for this?-Impossible.
Will then our injured country pass by such abuses? I hope not.
Rather let a full representation of the matter go to his majesty;
let him know how grossly his glory and interests, and the public
money have been prostituted."
Colonel Washington was soon afterwards ordered to Raystown. Major Grant had been previously detached from the
advanced post at Loyal Hanna, with a select corps of Sept. 2i.
eight hundred men, to reconnoitre the country about
fort Du Quesne. In the night he reached a hill near the fort,
and sent forward a party for the purpose of discovery. They
burnt a log house, and returned. Next morning, Major Grant
detached Major Lewis, of Colonel Washington's regiment, with
a baggage guard, two miles into his rear; and sent an engineer,
with a covering party, within full view of the fort, to take a
plan of the works. In the mean time he ordered the reveilles to
be beaten in different places. An action soon commenced, on
which Major Lewis, leaving Captain Bullett, with about fifty
Virginians to guard the baggage, advanced with the utmost
celerity to support Major Grant. The English were defeated
with considerable loss; and both Major Grant and Major Lewis
were taken prisoners. In this action, the Virginians evidenced
the spirit with which they had been trained. Out of eight officers, five were killed, a sixth wounded, and a seventh taken
prisoner. Captain Bullett, who defended the baggage with great
resolution, and contributed to save the remnant of the detachment, was the only officer who escaped unhurt. Of one hundred
and sixty-two men, sixty-two were killed on the spot, and two
wounded. This conduct reflected high honour on the commanding officer of the regiment as well as on the troops; and he received, on the occasion, the compliments of the general. The
total loss was two hundred and seventy-three killed, and fortytwo wounded.
It was at length determined that the main body of the army
should move from Raystown; and the general called on the
colonels of regiments, to submit severally to his Oct 8
consideration, a plan for his march. That proposed

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by Colonel Washington has been preserved, and appears to have
been judiciously formed.
-They reached the camp at Loyal Hanna, through a road inNov. describably bad, about the fifth of November; where,
as had been predicted, a council of war determined
that it was unadviseable to proceed farther this campaign. It
would have been almost impossible to winter an army in that
position. They must have retreated from the cold inhospitable
wilderness into which they had penetrated, or have suffered immensely; perhaps have perished. Fortunately, some prisoners
were taken, who informed them of the extreme distress of the
fort. Deriving no support from Canada, the garrison was weak;
in great want of provisions; and had been deserted by the
Indians. These encouraging circumstances changed the resolution which had been taken, and determined the general to prosecute the expedition.
Colonel Washington was advanced in front; and, with immense labour, opened a way for the main body of the army.
The troops moved forward with slow and painful steps until
Nov. they reached fort Du Quesne, of which they took
peaceable possession; the garrison having on the preceding night, after evacuating and setting it on fire, proceeded
down the Ohio in boats.
To other causes than the vigour of the officer who conducted
this enterprise, the capture of this important place is to be ascribed. The naval armaments of Britain had intercepted the
reinforcements designed by France for her colonies; and the
pressure on Canada was such as to disable the governor of that
province from detaching troops to fort Du Quesne. Without
the aid of these causes, the extraordinary and unaccountable delays of the campaign must have defeated its object.
The works were repaired, and the new fort received the name
of the great minister, who, with unparalleled vigour and talents,
then governed the nation.
After furnishing two hundred men from his regiment as a
garrison for fort Pitt, Colonel Washington marched back to
Winchester; whence he soon afterwards proceeded to Williamsburg, to take his seat in the General Assembly, of which he had

GEORGE WASHINGTON

been elected a member by the county of Frederick, while at fort
Cumberland.
A cessation of Indian hostility being the consequence of expelling the French from the Ohio, Virginia was relieved from
the dangers with which she had been threatened; and the object
for which alone he had continued in the service, after perceiving that he should not be placed on the permanent establishment, was accomplished. His health was much impaired, and
his domestic affairs required his attention.
Impelled by these and other motives of a private nature, he
determined to withdraw from a service, which he might now
quit without dishonour, and, about the close of the year, resigned his commission, as colonel of the first Virginia regiment,
and commander-in-chief of all the troops raised in the colony.
The officers whom he had commanded were greatly attached
to him. They manifested their esteem and their regret at
parting, by a very affectionate address,' expressive of the high
opinion they entertained both of his military and private character.
This opinion was not confined to the officers of his regiment.
It was common to Virginia; and had been adopted by the British
officers with whom he served. The duties he performed, though
not splendid, were arduous; and were executed with zeal, and
with judgment. The exact discipline he established in his regiment, when the temper of Virginia was extremely hostile to
discipline, does credit to his military character, and the gallantry
the troops displayed, whenever called into action, manifests
the spirit infused into them by their commander.
The difficulties of his situation, while unable to cover the
frontier from the French and Indians, who were spreading death
and desolation in every quarter, were incalculably great; and
no better evidence of his exertions, under these distressing circumstances, can be given, than the undiminished confidence
still placed in him, by those whom he was unable to protect.
The efforts to which he incessantly stimulated his country
for the purpose of obtaining possession of the Ohio; the system
1 See note, No. III, at the end of the volume.

32 THE LIFE OF
for the conduct of the war which he continually recommended;
the vigorous and active measures always urged upon those by
whom he was commanded manifest an ardent and enterprising
mind, tempered by judgment, and quickly improved by
experience.
Not long after his resignation, he was married to Mrs. Custis;
a young lady to whom he had been for some time attached; and
who, to a large fortune and fine person, added those amiable
accomplishments which ensure domestic happiness, and fill, with
silent but unceasing felicity, the quiet scenes of private life.

GEORGE WASHINGTON

CHAPTER II
THE attention of Colonel Washington, for several years after
his marriage, was principally directed to the management of
his estate. He continued a most respectable member of the
legislature of his country, in which he took an early and a decided part against the claims of supremacy asserted by the British
Parliament. As hostilities approached, he was chosen by the
independent companies, formed through the northern parts of
Virginia, to command them; and was elected a member of the
first congress which met in Philadelphia. The illustrious patriots
who composed it, soon distinguished him as the soldier of
America, and placed him on all those committees whose duty
it was to make arrangements for defence. When it became
necessary to appoint a commander-in-chief, his military character, the solidity of his judgment, the steady firmness of his
temper, the dignity of his person and deportment, the confidence inspired by his patriotism and integrity, and the independence of his fortune, combined to designate him, in the
opinion of all, for that important station. Local jealousy was
suppressed, not only by the enthusiasm of the moment, but by
that policy which induced the sagacious delegation from New
England, to prefer a commander-in-chief from the south.
On the I4th of June, he was unanimously chosen "General,
and Commander-in-chief of the armies of the United
Colonies, and all the forces now raised, or to be 1775.
raised by them."'
On the succeeding day, when the President communicated
this appointment to him, he expressed his high sense of the
honour conferred upon him, and his firm determination to exert
every power he possessed in the service of his country and of her
"glorious cause." At the same time he acknowledged the distress he felt from a consciousness that his abilities and military
1 See note, No. IV, at the end of the volume.

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experience might not be equal to the extensive and important
trust.
He declined all compensation, for his services; and avowed
an intention to keep an exact account of his expenses, which
he should rely on Congress to discharge.
A special commission was directed, and a resolution unanimously passed, declaring that "Congress would maintain, assist,
and adhere to him, as the General and Commander-in-chief of
the forces raised, or to be raised, for the maintenance and preservation of American liberty with their lives and fortunes."
He prepared, without delay, to enter upon the arduous duties
of his office; and, remaining only a few days in New York,
where several important arrangements were to be made, proceeded to the head quarters of the American army.
As all orders of men concurred in approving his appointment, all concurred in expressing their satisfaction at that event,
and their determination to afford him entire support. A committee of the Congress of Massachusetts waited to receive him
at Springfield, on the confines of the colony, and to escort him
to the army. On his arrival, an address was presented to him
by the House of Representatives, breathing the most cordial
affection, and testifying the most exalted respect. His answer1 was well calculated to keep up impressions essential to
the success of that arduous contest into which the United Colonies had entered.
The first moments after his arrival in camp were employed
July in reconnoitring the enemy, and examining the
u y9.strength and situation of the American troops.
The main body of the British army, under the immediate
command of General Howe, was entrenching itself strongly
1 It is in the following terms:
"Gentlemen,-Your kind congratulations on my appointment and arrival, demand
my warmest acknowledgments, and will be ever retained in grateful remembrance.
In exchanging the enjoyments of domestic life for the duties of my present honourable but arduous situation, I only emulate the virtue and public spirit of the whole
Province of Massachusetts, which, with a firmness and patriotism without example,
has sacrificed all the comforts of social and political life, in support of the rights of
mankind, and the welfare of our common country. My highest ambition is to be
the happy instrument of vindicating these rights, and to see this devoted Province
again restored to peace, liberty, and safety. "GEO: WASHINGTON."

GEORGE WASHINGTON

3 5

on Bunker's hill. Three floating batteries lay in Mystic river,
near the camp, and a twenty gun ship below the ferry, between
Boston and Charlestown. A strong battery on the Boston side
of the water, on Cop's or Cope's hill, served to cover and
strengthen the post on Bunker's hill. Another division was
deeply entrenched on Roxbury neck. The light horse, and an
inconsiderable body of infantry, were stationed in Boston.
The American army lay on both sides of Charles river. The
right, occupied the high grounds about Roxbury; whence it
extended towards Dorchester; and the left was covered by Mystic
or Medford river, a space of at least twelve miles. These extensive lines could not be contracted without opening to the
British general a communication with the country.
For the purpose of a more distinct arrangement, the army was
thrown into three grand divisions. That part of it which lay
about Roxbury, constituted the right wing, and was commanded
by Major General Ward; the troops near Mystic or Medford
river formed the left, which was placed under Major General
Lee. The centre, including the reserve, was under the immediate command of General Washington, whose head quarters
were at Cambridge.
The army consisted of fourteen thousand five hundred men;
but several circumstances combined to render this force less
effective than its numbers would indicate.
So long had the hope of avoiding open hostilities been indulged, that the time for making preparations to meet them
had passed away unemployed, and the neglect could not be
remedied. On General Washington's arrival in camp, he had
ordered a return of the ammunition to be made; and the report
stated three hundred and three barrels of powder to be in store.
A few days after this return, the alarming discovery was made,
that the actual quantity was not more than sufficient to furnish
each man with nine cartridges. This mistake had been produced by a misapprehension of the committee of supplies, (for
the magazines were not yet in possession of military officers,)
who, instead of returning the existing quantity, reported the
whole which had been originally furnished by the Province.
Though the utmost exertions were made, this critical state of

4
3 6 THE LIFE OF
things continued about a fortnight, when a small supply of
powder was received from Elizabethtown, in New Jersey.' The
utmost address was used to conceal from the enemy this alarming deficiency but when it is recollected, in how many various
directions, and to what various bodies, application for assistance
was unavoidably made, it will appear scarcely possible that
those efforts at concealment could have been completely successful. It is more probable that the communications which
must have been made to the British general were discredited;
and that he could not permit himself to believe, that an army
without bayonets, would be hardy enough to maintain the
position occupied by the Provincials, if destitute of ammunition.
The troops were also in such need of tents, as to be placed
in barracks, instead of being encamped in the open field; and
were almost destitute of clothing. They had, too, been raised
by the colonial governments; each of which organized its quota
on different principles. From this cause resulted not only a
want of uniformity, but other defects which were much more
important. In Massachusetts, the soldiers had chosen their
platoon officers, and generally lived with them as equals. This
unmilitary practice was the certain index of that general insubordination which pervaded every department. The difficulty
of establishing principles of order and obedience, always considerable among raw troops, was increased by the short terms
for which enlistments had been made. The quotas of some of
the colonies would be entitled to a discharge in November;
and none were engaged to continue in service longer than the
last of December. The early orders evidence a state of things
still more loose and unmilitary than was to be inferred from
the circumstances under which the war had been commenced.
An additional inconvenience, derived from this mixed agency
of local governments with that of the Union, was thus stated
by General Washington in a letter addressed to congress:""I should be extremely deficient in gratitude as well as justice,
'A circumstance attending this transaction, will furnish some idea of the difficulties encountered by those who then conducted the affairs of America. All-important
to the general safety as was the speedy replenishment of the magazines of that army
which lay encamped in front of the enemy, the committee of Elizabethtown was
under the necessity of transmitting this powder secretly, lest the people of the
neighbourhood should seize and detain it for their own security.

GEORGE WASHINGTON

if I did not take the first opportunity to acknowledge the readiness and attention which the congress and different committees
have shown to make every thing as convenient and agreeable
as possible; but there is a vital and inherent principle of delay, incompatible with military service, in transacting business
through such various and different channels.' I esteem it my
duty, therefore, to represent the inconvenience that must unavoidably ensue from a dependence on a number of persons
for supplies; and submit it to the consideration of congress,
whether the public service will not be best promoted by appointing a Commissary General for the purpose."2
Every military operation was also seriously affected by the
total want of engineers, and the deficiency of working tools.
To increase difficulties already so considerable, the appointment of general officers, made by congress, gave extensive dissatisfaction, and determined several of those who thought themselves injured, to retire from the service.
These disadvantages deducted essentially from the capacity
of the American force: but under them all, the General observed with pleasure "the materials for a good army." These
were "a great number of men, able bodied, active, zealous in the
cause, and of unquestionable courage." Possessed of these materials, he employed himself indefatigably in their organization. The army was arranged into divisions and brigades; and
congress was urged to the appointment of a Paymaster, Quartermaster General, and such other general staff as are indispensable
in the structure of a regular military establishment.
The two armies continued to work on their respective fortifications, without seriously molesting each other. Slight skirmishes occasionally took place, in which little execution was
done; and, although the Americans made some advances, no
attempt was made to dislodge them.
The Commander-in-chief submitted with reluctance to this
state of apparent inactivity. He felt the importance of destroying the army in Boston, before it should be strengthened
1The General was under the necessity of carrying on a direct correspondence, not
only with the several colonial governments, but with the committees of all the
important towns and some inferior places.
'It is strange that an army should have been formed without such an officer.

3 8

THE LIFE OF

by reinforcements in the ensuing spring; and with a view to
this object, frequently reconnoitred its situation, and was
assiduous in collecting every information respecting its strength.
The result of his observations and inquiries seems
to have been, a strong inclination to the opinion, that
to carry the works by storm, though hazardous, was not impracticable. A council of general officers being unanimously of
opinion, that for the present at least, the attempt ought not to
be made, it was laid aside.
A rigorous blockade being maintained, the British army began to suffer considerably for fresh meat and vegetables. The
small parties which sailed from Boston, in quest of these articles,
were frequently disappointed by the vigilance of the minute
men. But the continuance of active exertion, which this service
required on the part of the inhabitants of the sea coast, soon
became burdensome; and the governors of the several colonies
pressed for detachments from the main army. Although it was
impossible to spare the troops required, without hazarding the
cause of the colonies, great irritation was excited by the refusal
to comply with these demands of particular protection. They
at length became so importunate, and the unavoidable refusal
to comply with them was so ill received, that congress was
induced to pass a resolution, declaring that the army before
Boston was designed only to oppose the enemy at that place,
and ought not to be weakened by detachments for the security
of other parts of the country. At Newport, in Rhode Island,
the committee sought to secure the place, by entering into a
compromise with Captain Wallace, who commanded the ships
of war on that station, stipulating that he should be furnished
with provisions on condition of his sparing the town, and
committing no depredations on the country. This compromise contravened so essentially the general plan of distressing
the British forces, that General Washington deemed it necessary
to interpose, and represent to the Governor of that province,
the mischief to be apprehended from so dangerous a practice.
While the blockade of Boston was thus perseveringly maintained, other events of considerable importance took place
elsewhere.
In July, Georgia joined her sister colonies, and chose delegates

GEORGE WASHINGTON

to represent her in congress: after which, the style of 'The
thirteen United Colonies' was assumed; and by that title, the
English Provinces, confederated and in arms,, were thenceforward designated.
After a recess of one month, congress again assembled at
Philadelphia. The state of the colonies, and the letters of the
Commander-in-chief being immediately taken into Set
consideration, the scarcity of arms and ammunition
engaged their most serious attention. Great exertions 1 had been
made, by importation and by domestic manufacture, to extricate the country from this perilous situation; but the supplies
were unequal to the necessities of the army; and the danger
resulting from the want of articles, so vitally essential in war,
still continued to be great.
The importance of a maritime force to the military operations
of a country possessing an immense extent of sea coast must
always be sensibly felt; and, in an early stage of the contest,
the particular attention of the United Colonies was directed
more immediately to this interesting object, by an event not
very unusual in war, but which, at this time, excited no ordinary
degree of resentment.
Orders had been issued to the commanders of the British
ships of war to proceed, as in the case of actual rebellion, against
those seaport towns which were accessible, and in which any
troops should be raised, or military works erected.
Falmouth, a flourishing village on the sea coast of Massachusetts, having given some particular offence, a small naval force,
commanded by Captain Mowat, was, under colour of these orders, detached for its destruction. After making an ineffectual
effort to induce the inhabitants to deliver up their arms and
ammunition, and four of the principal citizens as hostages, he
commenced a furious cannonade and bombardment, by which
the town was reduced to ashes. An attempt was then made
to penetrate into the country; but the militia and minute men,
rather irritated than intimidated by this wanton act of un'The agents of congress had the address to purchase all the powder on the coast
of Africa, and that within the British forts, without attracting notice; and to seize
the magazine in the island of Bermuda. Great exertions were also made in the
interior to obtain saltpetre and sulphur, for the manufacture of that important
article.

THE LIFE OF

availing devastation, drove the party, which had landed, back
to their ships.
This measure was loudly reprobated throughout America,
and contributed, not a little, to turn the attention of the
United Colonies to their marine. It was one immediate motive
with the convention of Massachusetts, for granting letters of
marque and reprisal; and was assigned by congress, in addition
to the capture of American merchantmen on the high seas, as
an inducement for fitting out some ships of war; to man which
they directed two battalions of marines to be recruited.
Though congress deferred granting general letters of reprisal,
they adopted a measure of equal efficacy, but less hostile in
appearance. Their ships of war were authorized to capture all
vessels employed in giving assistance to the enemy; the terms
used in their resolution were such as comprehended every possible capture. A few small cruisers had already been fitted
out by the directions of General Washington; and the coasts
soon swarmed with the privateers of New England. These naval
exertions were attended with valuable consequences. Many
captures were made; and important supplies of ammunition
were thus obtained.
Although the British army had manifested no intention to
evacuate Boston, fears were continually entertained for New
York. Mr. Tryon, who was popular in that province, had
been lately recalled from North Carolina, and appointed its
governor. His utmost influence was employed in detaching
that colony from the union; and his exertions were seconded
by the Asia man of war, whose guns commanded the town.
The consequence of these intrigues and of this terror was, that
even in the convention, disaffection to the American cause began openly to show itself; and a determination to join the
king's standard is said to have been expressed with impunity.
These threatening appearances were rendered the more serious
by some confidential communications from England, stating the
intention of administration to send a fleet into the Hudson,
and to occupy both New York and Albany. Under the alarm
thus excited, an effort was made in Congress to obtain a resolution for seizing the governor. He had, however, been artful
enough to make impressions in his favour; and he was defended

GEORGE WASHINGTON

by a part of the delegation from New York with so much earnestness that, for a time, the advocates of the proposition forbore to press it. Afterwards, when the increasing defection
in that province induced Congress to resume the Oct. 6.
subject, the resolution was expressed in general terms;
and assumed the form of a recommendation, to those who
exercised the legislative and executive functions in the several
provinces, "to arrest and secure every person in the respective
colonies, whose going at large might, in their opinion, endanger
the safety of the colony, or the liberties of America." Intelligence of this resolution is supposed to have been received by
the governor, who, after some correspondence with the mayor
of the city respecting his personal safety, retired for security
on board the Halifax packet, and continued to carry on his
intrigues with nearly as much advantage as while on shore.
But the subject which, next to the supply of arms and ammunition, most interested the American government, was the
re-enlistment of the army.
On the z9th of September, at the earnest solicitation of General Washington, a committee had been appointed by congress,
with directions to repair to the camp at Cambridge; there to
consult with the Commander-in-chief, and with the chief
magistrates of New Hampshire, Connecticut, and Rhode Island,
and the council of Massachusetts, "on the most effectual method
of continuing, supporting, and regulating a continental army."
On the return of this committee, congress determined that
the new army should consist of twenty thousand three hundred
and seventy-two men, including officers; to be raised as far as
practicable from the troops already in service. Unfortunately,
in constituting this first military establishment of the union,
an essential error was committed; the consequences of which
ceased only with the war. The soldiers, instead of being engaged for an unlimited time, were enlisted for the term of only
one year, if not sooner discharged by congress. It is not easy
to account entirely for this fatal error. With their jealousy
of a permanent army, were probably intermingled hopes that
the war would not be of long duration, and fears that much
difficulty would be encountered in prevailing on men to enter
into engagements of unlimited extent. Perhaps the habits of

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the northern colonies, where it had been usual to raise men
for a single campaign, may have contributed to this measure.
Whatever may have been its motives, its consequences were of
the most serious nature; and it brought the American cause,
more than once, into real hazard.
Other resolutions accompanied that for raising and establishing the new army, which exhibit the perilous condition of
the country, and its want of those means, which were indispensable to the support of the arduous conflict in which it was
engaged.
One resolution ordered the detention, at a valuation, of the
arms of those soldiers who should refuse to re-enlist, although
they were private property, and but ill adapted to military
purposes; another, offered two dollars to every recruit who
would supply himself with a blanket; a third, ordered the purchase of any cloths which could be procured, without regard
to colour, to be delivered to the soldiers, after deducting the
price from their pay; and a fourth, required the soldiers to
furnish their own arms, or to pay for the use of those which
might be supplied by the government.
Before the arrangements made by the committee were confirmed by congress, General Washington proceeded to take the
preparatory steps for carrying them into execution.
It being understood that the engagements of the officers,
as well as of the soldiers, would expire with the year; the whole
army was to be formed anew. The officers therefore were required to signify in writing to their respective colonels, their
determination to leave, or to continue in the service; that it
might be communicated to congress through the officer commanding brigades.
The urgency of the case could not produce a compliance
with these orders. Many disregarded them; and others annexed
conditions to their remaining in the service. Repetitions of
them became necessary; and an unconditional declaration was
required.' But that high spirit and enthusiastic ardour, which
1 In this state of things, several officers, supposing that commissions and rank
might depend on recruiting men, began, without permission, to recruit soldiers, to
serve particularly under the officer enlisting them. Every military principle required
that this practice should be arrested; and it was peremptorily forbidden in general
orders.

GEORGE WASHINGTON

had brought such numbers into the field after the battle of
Lexington, was already beginning to dissipate; and that alacrity
for the service, which had been expected, was not displayed.
The orders of the day contain the most animating exhortations
to the army, and the strongest appeals to its patriotism; but
there was an ominous hesitation in forming new engagements.
At length, with such labour, the officers were arranged, upon
which, recruiting orders were issued. But the sufferings of the
army for fuel, clothes, and even provisions, had been great;
and to this cause may be attributed the tardiness with which
the soldiers in camp enrolled themselves. One officer from each
company was employed to recruit in the country; but their
progress was not such as the crisis demanded; and the army
was dissolving by the expiration of the time for which it had
been enlisted. The impatience of the soldiers to revisit their
friends, overcame all their solicitude for maintaining the blockade of Boston; and it was with great difficulty that those entitled to a discharge were detained in camp even for ten days;
at the end of which time a body of militia was expected to
supply their places. This fact, however, did not convince the
governments of the United Colonies, that it was possible to
rely too much on individual patriotism; and that the American
cause, if defended entirely by temporary armies, must be often
exposed to imminent hazard.
Perceiving the difficulty of recruiting the army, the General
earnestly recommended to congress, to try the effect N
of a bounty. This proposition was not adopted until Nov. 3
late in January; and, on the last day of December, when all the
old troops, not engaged on the new establishment, were disbanded, only nine thousand six hundred and fifty men had
been enlisted for the army of 1776; many of whom were unavoidably permitted to be absent on furlough. Their numbers,
however, were considerably augmented during the winter; and,
in the mean time, the militia cheerfully complied with the
requisitions made on them.
Notwithstanding these complicated difficulties and embarrassments, the General viewed with deep mortification the
semblance of inactivity to which his situation compelled him
to submit. In the commencement of the contest, while the

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minds of many were undetermined, it was of vast importance
to secure the public confidence, and it was necessary to pay
some attention even to the public caprice. The real difficulties
under which he laboured, were not generally known. His numbers were exaggerated, and his means of carrying on offensive
operations were magnified. The expulsion of the British army
from Boston had been long since anticipated by many; and
those were not wanting, who endeavoured to spread discontent
by insinuating that the Commander-in-chief was desirous of
prolonging the war, in order to continue his own importance.
To these symptoms of impatience, and to the consequences they
might produce, he could not be insensible; but it was not in his
power to silence such complaints, by disclosing to the world his
real situation. His views still continued to be directed towards
Boston; and, congress having manifested a disposition favourable to an attack on that place, the general officers had been
again assembled, and had again advised unanimously against
the measure. Supposing that fears for the safety of the town
might embarrass the proceedings of the army congress resolved,
"'that if General Washington and his council of war
should be of opinion that a successful attack might
be made on the troops in Boston, he should make it in any
manner he might think expedient, notwithstanding the town
and property in it might be thereby destroyed."
Whilst waiting for a favourable opportunity to execute this
bold plan, the American General availed himself of the occasional aids received from the militia, to make advances on
the besieged, and to seize positions which would favour ulterior
operations. Ploughed Hill, Cobble Hill, and Lechmere's Point,
were successively occupied and fortified. His approaches were
carried within half a mile of the works on Bunker's hill;
and his guns drove their floating batteries from their stations,;
and protected others constructed under his orders.
Hitherto, the object of the war had been a redress of grievances. The language, that it was a war against a corrupt administration, had been carefully observed; and allegiance to the
British crown was universally avowed. The progress, however,
of the public mind towards independence, though slow, was
certain; and measures were necessarily taken, which apparently

GEORGE WASHINGTON

tended to that object. Among these, was the act of establishing temporary governments in place of that revolutionary
system which followed the suspension of the ancient institutions.
The first application on this subject was made by Massachusetts; 1 and her example was soon followed by other colonies.
These applications could not fail to draw forth the sentiments
of members on the very interesting question of separation from
the mother country. They who wished to lead public opinion
to independence, were desirous of establishing a regular government in each province, entirely competent to the administration of its affairs; while they who were hostile to that event,
opposed every measure which might either incline the colonies
towards it, or strengthen the opinion in Great Britain, that it
was the real object of all who had resisted the legislative supremacy of parliament. A resolution was with difficulty obtained in the case of New Hampshire, which formed a precedent
for others of the same nature, recommending to the provincial
convention to call a full and free representation of the people,
who should establish such form of government as would best
promote the general happiness, and most effectually secure peace
and good order in the colony, during the continuance of the
present dispute with Great Britain. Without this last clause,
which still maintained the appearance of preserving the ancient
connexion with the parent state, the recommendation would not
have been made. About the same time, congress also resolved
that it would be extremely dangerous to the liberties and welfare of America, for any colony separately to petition the king
or either house of parliament.
Having taken into consideration a proclamation, declaring
certain persons in the colonies to have forgotten. their allegiance,
and to be in a state of open rebellion, and threatening with
punishment those who should be found carrying on -correspondence with them;-congress declared, "in the name of the
people of these United Colonies, and by the authority according to the purest maxims of representation derived from them,
1On this application congress recommended that an assembly and council should
be chosen in the usual way, who should exercise the powers of government until a
Governor of his Majesty's appointment should consent to govern the colony according to its charter.

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that whatever punishment shall be inflicted upon any persons
in the power of their enemies, for favouring, aiding, or abetting
the cause of American liberty, shall be retaliated in the same
kind, and in the same degree, upon those in their power, who
have favoured, aided, or abetted, or shall favour, aid, or abet
the system of ministerial oppression."
The British army, the command of which, on the recall of
General Gage, had devolved upon General Howe, still remained inactive in Boston; and was still closely blocked up
on the land side. The history of this winter campaign, is a
history of successive struggles on the part of the American
general, with the difficulties imposed by the want of arms, ammunition, and permanent troops, on a person extremely solicitous, by some grand and useful achievement, to prove himself
worthy of the high station to which the voice of his country
had called him.
Considering the resolution relative to the attack on Boston
6 as indicating the desire of congress on that subject,
Jauay he assured the president that an attempt would be
January. made to put it in execution the first moment he should
perceive a probability of success. If this should not occur, as soon
as might be expected or wished, he prayed that his situation might
be recollected, and that congress would do him the justice to
believe, that circumstances, not inclination on his part, occasioned the delay. "It is not," said he, "in the pages of history
to furnish a case like ours. To maintain a post within musket
shot of the enemy for six months together, without ammunition; and at the same time, to disband one army and recruit
another, within that distance of twenty-odd British regiments,
is more than, probably, ever was attempted. But if we succeed
as well in the latter, as we have hitherto done in the former,
I shall think it the most fortunate event of my whole life."
In the month of January a council of war, at which Mr.
John Adams, a member of congress, and Mr. Warren, president of the provincial congress of Massachusetts, assisted: Resolved, "that a vigorous attempt ought to be made on the
ministerial troops in Boston, before they can be reinforced in
the spring, if the means can be provided, and a favourable opportunity should offer." It was farther advised, "that thirteen

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GEORGE WASHINGTON

regiments of militia should be asked for from Massachusetts
and the neighbouring colonies, in order to put the army in a
condition to make the attempt. The militia to assemble on the
first of February, and to continue in service, if necessary, until
the first of March." The colonies readily complied with these
requisitions; but so mild had the season hitherto been, that the
waters about Boston continued open. "Congress would discover
in my last," said the general, on the nineteenth of January,
"my motives for strengthening these lines with militia. But
whether, as the weather turns out exceedingly mild, (insomuch
as to promise nothing favourable from ice,) and there is no
appearance of powder, I shall be able to attempt any thing
decisive, time only can determine. No man upon earth wishes
to destroy the nest in Boston more than I do; no person would
be willing to go greater lengths than I shall to accomplish it,
if it shall be thought adviseable; but if we have no powder to
bombard with, nor ice to pass on, we shall be in no better
situation than we have been all the year: we shall be in a worse,
as their works are stronger."
Early in January, the Commander-in-chief received unquestionable intelligence that an armament was equipping in Boston, to sail under General Clinton on a secret expedition. Many
considerations induced him to believe that New York was its
destination. He thought the possession of the Hudson of great
importance to the British: and that the numerous adherents to
the royal cause in New York, furnished an additional reason
for transferring the seat of war to that colony. Whilst deliberating on this subject, he received a letter from General
Lee, requesting to be detached to Connecticut, for the purpose
of assembling a body of volunteers, who should march into
New York, and be employed both for the security of that place,
and the expulsion or suppression of a band of tories collecting
on Long Island. Though inclined to the adoption of this measure, delicacy towards those who exercised the powers of civil
government in the colony, suspended his decision on it. Mr.
John Adams, who possessed great and well merited influence,
was then at Watertown, attending the provincial convention;
and with him, the general held some communications respecting
his powers. That gentleman being decidedly of opinion that

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they extended to the case, General Lee was detached, with instructions to raise a body of volunteers in Connecticut, to reinforce the battalions of New Jersey and New York, which were
placed under his command. His orders were to proceed to
New York; to examine the fortifications of the city, and up
the river; to put them in the best possible state of defence;
to disarm all persons whose conduct rendered them justly suspected of designs unfriendly to the government, especially those
on Long Island; and to collect the arms and ammunition in their
possession, for the use of the army.
No difficulty was found in raising the volunteers required
from Connecticut. The people of that province were zealous
and enterprising, and Governor Trumbull having sanctioned
the measure, troops were immediately embodied, and Lee commenced his march for New York at the head of twelve hundred
men.
The inhabitants of that place were much alarmed at his
approach. Captain Parker of the Asia man of war had threatened that he would destroy the town in the event of its being
entered by any considerable body of provincials; and it was
believed that these threats would be executed.
A committee of safety, which had been appointed to exercise the powers of government during the recess of the provincial congress, addressed a letter to General Lee, expressing
astonishment at the report that he was about to enter the town
February. without previously intimating his design, and pressing him earnestly not to pass the confines of Connecticut, until they could have further explantions with him.
Holding in utter contempt the threats of Captain Parker,
Lee continued his march; and, in a letter' to congress, represented in such strong terms the impolicy of leaving the military
arrangements for New York under the control of the local
government, that congress appointed three of their own body,
to consult with him and the council of safety, respecting the
defence of the place; and instructed him to obey the directions
of that committee.
Lee soon acquired that ascendancy which is the prerogative

1 See note, No. V, at the end of the volume.

GEORGE WASHINGTON

of a superior mind, over those who were sent for his government, and they directed him to execute whatever he suggested.
A plan recommended by him, for fortifying the city and preserving its connexion with Long Island, was adopted, and
prosecuted with vigour.
General Clinton arrived almost at the same instant with
General Lee, but without troops. He said openly, that none
were coming; that no hostilities were contemplated against
New York; and that he was, himself, merely on a visit to his
friend Tryon. "If it be really so," added General Lee, in his
letter containing this communications "it is the most whimsical
piece of civility I ever heard of." General Clinton did not
affect to conceal that his real object was to proceed to North
Carolina, where he expected that five regiments from Europe
would join the small force he should carry with him.
About the middle of February, the cold was intense, and the
ice became sufficiently firm to bear the troops. General Washington was now disposed to execute the bold plan he had
formed, of attacking General Howe in Boston; but a council
of war being almost unanimous against the measure, it was
abandoned. The want of ammunition for the artillery was a
principal inducement to this opinion.
The attempt, probably, would not have succeeded, and must
certainly have been attended with considerable loss. But the
advice of the council seems to have been adopted with regret.
In communicating their opinion to congress, the general observed,, "Perhaps the irksomeness of my situation may have
given different ideas to me, from those which influence the
gentlemen I consulted; and might have inclined me to put
more to the hazard than was consistent with prudence. If it
had this effect, I am not sensible of it, as I endeavoured to
give the subject all the consideration a matter of such importance required. True it is, and I can not help acknowledging, that I have many disagreeable sensations on account
of my situation; for, to have the eyes of the whole continent
fixed on me, with anxious expectation of hearing some great
event, and to be restrained in every military operation for
want of the necessary means to carry it on, is not very pleasing;
especially as the means used to conceal my weakness from the

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enemy, conceal it also from our friends, and add to their
wonder."
Late in February, various appearances among the British
troops indicated an intention to evacuate Boston; but as these
appearances might be deceptive, and he had now received a
small supply of powder, General Washington determined to
prosecute vigorously a plan he had formed, to force General
Howe either to come to an action, or to abandon the town.
Since the allowance of a bounty, recruiting had been more
successful; and the regular force had been augmented to rather
more than fourteen thousand men. In addition to these troops,
the Commander-in-chief had called to his aid about six thousand of the militia of Massachusetts. Thus reinforced, he determined to take possession of the heights of Dorchester, and
to fortify them. As the possession of this post would enable
him to annoy the ships in the harbour and the soldiers in the
town, he was persuaded that a general action would ensue. But
if this hope should be disappointed, his purpose was to make
the works on the heights of Dorchester only preparatory to
seizing and fortifying Nook's Hill, and the points opposite
the south end of Boston, which commanded the harbour, a
great part of the town, and the beach from which an embarkation must take place in the event of a retreat.
To facilitate the execution of this plan, a heavy bombardment and cannonade were commenced on the town
March and on the British lines, which were repeated the
two succeeding nights. On the last of them, immediately after
the firing had begun, a strong detachment, under the command
of General Thomas, took possession of the heights without
opposition. Such was their activity and industry through the
night that, although the ground was almost impenetrable, the
works were sufficiently advanced by the morning, nearly to
cover them. When daylight disclosed their operations to the
British, a considerable degree of embarrassment appeared, and an
ineffectual fire was commenced on the party in possession of
the heights, who in turn opened a battery on the besieged;
and continued with unremitting labour to strengthen their
position.
It was necessary to dislodge the Americans from the heights,

GEORGE WASHINGTON

5 I

or to evacuate the town; and General Howe, as had been foreseen, determined to embrace the former part of the alternative.
Three thousand chosen men, to be commanded by Lord Percy,
were ordered on this service. These troops were embarked,
and fell down to the castle, in order to proceed up the river
to the intended scene of action; but were scattered by a furious
storm, which disabled them from immediately prosecuting the
enterprise. Before they could again be in readiness for the
attack, the works were made so strong, that the attempts
to storm them was thought unadviseable, and the evacuation of
the town became inevitable.
In the expectation that the flower of the British troops would
be employed against the heights of Dorchester, General Washington had concerted a plan for availing himself of that occasion, to attack Boston itself. The storm which defeated the
proposed attack on the heights defeated this enterprise also.
The determination to evacuate Boston was soon communicated. A paper signed by some of the select men of the town,
and brought out with a flag, stated the fact. This paper was
accompanied by propositions said to be made on the part of
General Howe, but not signed by him, relative to the security
of the town, and the peaceable embarkation of his army. As
these propositions were not addressed to the Commander-inchief, and were not authenticated by the signature of General
Howe, nor by any act obligatory on him, General Washington
thought it improper directly to notice them; and ordered the
officer to whom they were delivered to return an answer stating
the reasons why they were not treated with more attention.
The determination, however, to continue his advances and to
secure Nook's Hill, was changed; and considerable detachments
were moved towards New York, before the actual evacuation
of Boston. This event took place on the i7th of March; and,
in a few days, the whole fleet sailed out of Nantasket roads,
directing its course eastward.
The recovery of this important town gave great joy to the
United Colonies. Congress passed a vote of thanks to the General and his army, "for their wise and spirited conduct in the
siege and acquisition of Boston;" and directed a medal of gold
to be struck in commemoration of the event.

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As soon as the British fleet had put to sea, the American
army proceeded by divisions to New York, where it arrived
on the i4th of April.
During the siege of Boston, an altercation concerning prisoners took place between the commanders of the respective
armies, which was viewed with great interest throughout
America. The character of the war-a war between a sovereign
and those who professed to be his subjects, led to a course of
conduct on the part of the British General, which the actual
state of things did not justify.
General Gage, as Governor of Massachusetts, had received
all the irritations of which his mind was susceptible-irritations which seemed to have had no inconsiderable influence over
his conduct as Commander-in-chief. He regarded the Americans merely as rebels; and treated them as if the great national
resistance they were making on principle, was to be viewed as
the act of a few daring and turbulent individuals, rising against
laws of unquestionable obligation, who would soon be quelled,
and punished for their disobedience of legitimate authority. In
this spirit, he threw some distinguished gentlemen of Boston,
and the American officers and soldiers who fell into his hands,
into the common jail of felons; and treated them, without respect to military rank or condition, not as prisoners of war,
but as state criminals.
General Washington remonstrated very seriously against this
unjustifiable measure. Considering political opinion entirely
out of the question, and "conceiving the obligations of humanity, and the claims of rank, to be universally binding, except in the case of retaliation;" he expressed the hope he had
entertained, "that they would have induced, on the part of
the British General, a conduct more comformable to the rights
they gave." While he claimed the benefits of these rights, he
declared his determination "to be regulated entirely, in his
conduct towards the prisoners who should fall into his hands,
by the treatment which those in the power of the British General should receive."
To this letter, a haughty and intemperate answer was returned, retorting the complaints concerning the treatment of
prisoners, and affecting to consider it as an instance of clemency,

GEORGE WASHINGTON

that the cord was not applied to those whose imprisonment
was complained of. To this answer, General Washington gave
a manly and dignified reply, which was, he said, "to close their
correspondence perhaps forever;" and which concluded with
saying, "If your officers, our prisoners, receive from me a treatment different from what I wished to show them, they and you
will remember the occasion of it."
The result of this correspondence was communicated to the
council of Massachusetts,' who were requested to order the
British officers then on parole to be confined in close jail, and
the soldiers to be sent to such place of security as the general
court should direct.
On the recall of General Gage, the command devolved on
General Howe, whose conduct was less exceptionable; and this
rigorous treatment of prisoners was relaxed.
Not long after this correspondence with General Gage, while
Montgomery was employed in the siege of St. John's, Colonel
Ethan Allen was captured in a bold and rash attempt on Montreal. Under the pretext of his having acted without authority,
he was put in irons, and sent to England as a traitor.
While he was yet in Canada, congress requested the Commander-in-chief to inquire into the fact. He addressed a letter
to Sir William Howe, requiring explanations on it, and assuring him that General Prescot, who had been taken in Canada,
and was understood to have contributed to the severities inflicted on Colonel Allen, should receive exactly the fate of that
officer.
General Howe, not holding any authority in Canada, or not
choosing to enter fully into this subject, General Schuyler was
directed to make particular inquiries into the conduct of Prescot; and congress, on being informed of the inefficacy of the
application to General Howe, ordered that officer into close jail.
1 In the early part of the war, congress had appointed no commissary of prisoners;
nor had the government taken upon itself the custody of them. They were entrusted
for safe keeping to the respective legislatures and committees, to whom it was necessary to apply for the execution of every order respecting them.

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CHAPTER III
DURING these transactions, events of great interest were passing still further north.
Serious dissatisfaction prevailed in Canada. The measures of
administration had disquieted the British settlers,
775. without conciliating the ancient inhabitants. At the
same time, the regular troops had been chiefly ordered to Boston, and the province left almost entirely undefended. These
facts were known in the United Colonies. It was also known
that military stores to an immense amount had been deposited
in Quebec, and that preparations were making to invade the
colonies from that quarter. The possession of that country
was believed to be all important; and its present temper countenanced the opinion, that its weight would be thrown into the
scale of that party, which should first show a force in
June. it sufficient for the protection of its inhabitants. The
facility with which Crown Point and Ticonderoga had been
taken, and the command of the lakes George and Champlain
acquired, added to the motives already stated, inspired congress
with the daring design of anticipating the plans meditated in
Canada, by taking possession of that province.
In June, u77S5 a resolution passed that body, directing General Schuyler to repair to Ticonderoga, and take the proper
measures for securing that post and Crown Point, and for retaining the command of the lakes. He was, at the same time
authorized, if he should find the measure not disagreeable to the
Canadians, to take possession of St. John's and Montreal, and to
pursue any other steps which might have a tendency to promote
the peace and security of the United Colonies.
Near three thousand men from New England and New York
were designed for this service. A number of batteaux were
directed to be built at Ticonderoga and Crown Point, to convey
them along lake Champlain, and fifty thousand dollars in specie
were voted for the expenses of the army in Canada.

GEORGE WASHINGTON

General Schuyler, who was at New York when this important command was confided to him, hastened to Ticonderoga,
in order to make the necessary arrangements for the enterprise.
The troops of that department, belonging to different colonies,
stationed at different places, and acknowledging no one commanding officer, were found in a state of entire disorganization.
The stores were misapplied, or wasted; no subordination nor
camp discipline was observed; and had the enemy been in a
condition to attempt to coup de main, Ticonderoga and Crown
Point would have been lost, with as much facility as they had
been acquired.
Schuyler immediately commenced the task of preparing vessels for the transportation of the troops; a task the more laborious and tedious, as the timber for the batteaux September.
was then to be procured from the woods. Before September
the preparations were complete, or the soldiers destined for the
expedition were assembled, the impatience expressed by the
discontented in Canada rendered an immediate movement adviseable. Orders were therefore given to General Montgomery to
embark with the troops then in readiness; and General Schuyler
having directed the expected reinforcements to rendezvous at
the Isle Aux Noix, followed and joined him before he reached
that place.
Circular letters to the Canadians, exhorting them to rouse
and assert their liberties, and declaring, that the Americans
entered their country, not as enemies, but as friends and protectors, were immediately dispersed among them; and to improve the favourable impression which had been made, it was
determined to advance directly to St. John's. On the sixth of
September, the American army, amounting to about one thousand men, entirely destitute of artillery, embarked on the Sorel,
and proceeding down that river, landed within a mile and a half
of the fort. The intelligence received during the evening, determined them to return to the Isle Aux Noix, and wait for
their remaining troops and artillery.
The Isle Aux Noix lies at the junction of the Sorel with lake
Champlain; and to prevent the armed vessels at St. John's from
entering the latter, a boom was drawn across the narrow
channel, at the point of union between those waters.

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While at that place, General Schuyler became so ill as to be
confined to his bed; and the command devolved on Montgomery.
Late in September the artillery was brought up, and reinSet. forcements arrived, which augmented the army to
nearly two thousand men;-upon which Montgomery again proceeded to the investment of St. John's. This
place was garrisoned by five or six hundred regulars, with about
two hundred Canadian militia, and was well provided with artillery and military stores. The army of Canada, as well as the
other armies of the United Colonies, was almost entirely withOctober. out powder; and, of consequence, the siege advanced
slowly. Its necessities in this respect, were fortunately relieved by the capture of fort Chamblee, which, being
supposed to be covered by St. John's, was not in a defensible
condition. In this place, about one hundred and twenty barrels
of gunpowder were taken, after which the siege of St. John's
was prosecuted with vigour; but the garrison made a resolute
defence, and for some time indulged the hope of being relieved.'
Colonel M'Clean, a veteran officer, with his regiment of royal
highland emigrants, and a few hundred Canadians, was posted
near the junction of the Sorel with the St. Lawrence. General
Carleton was at Montreal, where he had collected about a thousand men, chiefly Canadians. At the head of these troops, he
hoped to effect a junction with M'Clean, after which he designed to march with his whole force against Montgomery, and
endeavour to raise the siege; but, on attempting to cross over
from Montreal, he was encountered and entirely defeated at
Longueisle by a detachment of the American troops under
Colonel Warner. Another party advanced on M'Clean. Being
entirely abandoned by his Canadians so soon as they were informed of the defeat of the governor, and having also received
information that Arnold was approaching Point Levi, M'Clean
retreated to Quebec. The Americans occupied the post he had
abandoned, and erected batteries on a point of land at the junction of the Sorel with the St. Lawrence; where they also constructed several armed rafts and floating batteries, in order to
IAnual Register.

GEORGE WASHINGTON

prevent Carleton with the vessels at Montreal from escaping
down the river.
Montgomery was pressing the siege of St. John's with great
vigour, and had advanced his works near the fort, when the
account of the success at Longueisle reached him. On receiving
this intelligence, he sent a flag by one of the prisoners, with a
letter to Major Preston, the commanding officer, demanding a
surrender of the place. All hopes of relief having Nov 3
now vanished, the garrison capitulated, on being
allowed the honours of war.
Scarcely was this first success obtained, when the consequences
of short enlistments began to be felt. The time of service for
which the troops had engaged being about to expire, great difficulty was experienced in prevailing on them to proceed farther;
and before the General could induce them to march against
Montreal, he was under the necessity of stipulating explicitly,
that all who wished it should be discharged at that place. Having effected this compromise, he proceeded against Montreal;
while his floating batteries, under Colonel Easton, advanced up
the St. Lawrence, and not only prevented the armed vessels of
the enemy from escaping to Quebec, but drove them still higher
up the river.
Montreal was not in a condition to be defended. After engaging to allow the Canadians their own laws, the free Nov.
exercise of their religion, and the privilege of governing themselves, Montgomery took peaceable possession of
the town; and Governor Carleton retired to his flotilla. While
preparations were making to attack these vessels, the Governor
was conveyed in a boat with muffled oars down the river, in a
dark night, and made his escape to Quebec. The fleet soon
afterwards surrendered, and the General prepared, with the utmost expedition, to proceed with the few troops who were willing to follow him, to the capital of Canada.
Diminished as his army was by the discharge of those who
claimed the performance of his engagements made at St. John's,
it was necessary to leave a part of it at Montreal, St. John's, and
Chamblee, to garrison those places-keep open the communication between Quebec and the United Colonies-preserve the dependence of the Canadians-overawe the Indians, and hold in

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check the garrisons above him at Detroit and Niagara. These
essential objects, though provided for with the utmost possible
economy of men, formed such deductions from his force, as to
leave little more than three hundred soldiers to follow their
General in the enterprise against Quebec.
Foreseeing that the whole force of Canada would be concentrated about Montreal, General Washington had
August. planned an expedition against Quebec, to be carried
on by a detachment from his camp before Boston, which was
to march by the way of Kennebec river; and, passing through
the dreary wilderness lying between the settled parts of Maine
and the St. Lawrence, to enter Canada about ninety miles below Montreal.
The object of this hardy enterprise was to compel Carleton,
either to draw his troops from the upper country and leave the
passage open to the army invading the province by the way of
the river Sorel, or, if he should maintain that position, to take
possession of Quebec. All his accounts assured him that this
place was unable to hold out against the force which would appear before it; and, if attacked by an American army before
the return of Carleton, would surrender without firing a shot.
This arduous enterprise was committed to Colonel.Arnold.
About a thousand men, consisting of New England infantry,
some volunteers,1 a company of artillery under Captain Lamb,
and three companies of riflemen, were selected for the service.
Such delays in expediting this detachment were occasioned
by the derangements of the army, that Arnold could not commence his march until the middle of September.
The success of the expedition depending in a great measure
on the friendly temper of the province against which it was
directed, the instructions given to Arnold earnestly inculcated
the cultivation of a good understanding with the Canadians;
and even enjoined an abandonment of the enterprise, should
this sudden invasion of their country threaten to irritate them,
and induce them to take up arms against the United Colonies.
He was furnished with about one thousand pounds in specie to
1 Colonel Burr, since Vice President of the United States, was of this number.

GEORGE WASHINGTON

defray contingent expenses, and with a cargo of manifestoes to
be dispersed through Canada.
The opinion which had been formed of the favourable disposition of the Canadians was not disproved by the event. They
gave essential aid to the Americans, and cheerfully facilitated
their march through that province. But the previous difficulties to be surmounted were much greater than had been apprehended. The intermediate country, which had never been well
explored, opposed obstacles to the march, which only perseverance like that of Arnold and of his brave and hardy followers,
could have conquered. Colonel Enos, who commanded the rear
division, consisting of one third of the detachment, returned
from the Dead river, a branch of the Kennebec. At first, his
appearance excited the utmost indignation in the army; yet, on
being arrested, he was acquitted by a court martial, on the principle that it was absolutely impracticable to obtain provisions
on the route to preserve the troops from perishing with famine.
Arnold, who at the head of the first two divisions, still prosecuted his march, was thirty-two days traversing a hideous
wilderness, without seeing a house, or any thing human. Notwithstanding the zealous and wonderfully persevering exertions
of his men, the obstacles he encountered so protracted his march,
that he did not reach the first settlements on the Chaudiere,
which empties itself into the St. Lawrence, near Quebec, until
the 3d of November.
On the high grounds which separate the waters of the Kennebec from those of the St. Lawrence, the scanty remnant of provisions was divided among the companies; each of which was
directed, without attempting to preserve any connexion with
the other, to march with the utmost possible celerity into the
inhabited country. Whilst those who gained the front were yet
thirty miles from the first poor and scattered habitations which
composed that frontier of Canada, their last morsel of food was
consumed. But, preceded by Arnold, who went forward for
the purpose of procuring for them something which might
satisfy the demands of nature, the troops persevered in their
labours with a vigour unimpaired by the hardships they had
encountered, until they once more found themselves in regions
frequented by human beings,

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After a march of such unexampled fatigue, no more time
was allowed for repose than was barely sufficient to collect the
rear, and to refresh the men. During this short respite from
toil, the address signed by General Washington was published,
and every assurance given to the people, that they came to
protect, and not to plunder them. The line of march was resumed; and, on the 9th of November, this gallant corps reached
Point Levi, opposite Quebec.
The town was almost entirely without a garrison, and nothing could exceed the astonishment of its inhabitants. Could
Arnold have immediately crossed the St. Lawrence, and have
availed himself of the first consternation, it is believed that
he might have entered the place without opposition; but a high
wind, and the want of boats, rendered the passage of the river
impossible.
One of his Indian messengers, despatched with letters to General Schuyler, had either betrayed him or been intercepted;
and thus intelligence of his approach was communicated to
Colonel M'Clean who was then at the mouth of the Sorel.
Trembling for the capital of the province, that gallant veteran
determined to throw himself into it, and endeavour to defend
it. In the mean time, the winds continued so high for several
nights as to render the passage of the river in the canoes which
had been collected too hazardous to be attempted; and it was
only in the night that the Americans could hope to cross, because four ships of war were distributed at different stations
in the river, and armed boats were employed to ply around
them. Whilst the Americans were thus unavoidably detained
on the south side of the St. Lawrence, Colonel M'Clean, with
his corps of emigrants, entered the city.
At length the wind moderated; and Arnold determined to
attempt the river. Eluding the armed vessels, and conquering a
rapid current, he, with great difficulty and danger, crossed over
in the night, and landed his little army about a mile and a
half above the place which is rendered memorable
Nov. 4. by the disembarkation of Wolfe. The passage of
the rugged cliffs which continue on the northern bank of the
St. Lawrence for some distance above Quebec, being impracticable at this place, he marched down on the shore to Wolfe's

GEORGE WASHINGTON

Cove, and ascending with his band of hardy followers the same
precipice which had opposed such obstacles to the British hero;
he, too, formed his small corps on the heights near the plains
of Abraham.
The dangerous and difficult operations of crossing the river
in canoes, whilst the passage was vigilantly guarded by ships
of war, and of gaining the almost perpendicular heights of the
opposite shore, were completed, soon after midnight, by the
advance party, consisting of the rifle companies. While waiting for the residue of the detachment, a council of all the
officers was held for the purpose of determining on their
future measures. Although destitute of every implement required for an assault, Arnold proposed to march immediately
against Quebec. He counted on surprising the place, and finding the gates open; but this opinion, which was not earnestly
pressed, was overruled.
Though disappointed in the expectation of surprising Quebec,
Arnold did not immediately relinquish the hope of obtaining
possession of that important place. Not superior to the garrison in point of numbers, and without a single piece of artillery,
he was obviously incapable of acting offensively; but he flattered himself that a defection in the town might yet put it in
his hands. With this view, he paraded on the adjacent heights
for some days, and sent two flags to demand a surrender. But
the presence of Colonel M'Clean restrained those measures which
the fears of the inhabitants dictated. Deeming any communication with the assailants dangerous, he refused to receive the
flag, and fired on the officer who bore it. Intelligence was soon
obtained, that the first alarm Was visibly wearing off, and giving
place to other sentiments unfavourable to the hope of gaining
Quebec. Fears for the vast property contained in the town
had united the disaffected; who were, at their own request,
embodied and armed. The sailors too were landed, and placed
at the batteries; and, by these means, the garrison had become
more numerous than the American army.
After collecting those who had been left on the south side
of the St. Lawrence, Arnold could not parade more than seven
hundred men, and they were in no condition to risk an action.
In their laborious march through the wilderness, nearly one

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third of their muskets had been rendered useless; and their
ammunition had sustained such damage that the riflemen had
not more than ten, nor the other troops more than six rounds
for each man. Under these circumstances, it was
Nov. 19. thought most adviseable to retire to Point Aux
Trembles, twenty miles above Quebec, and there await the
arrival of Montgomery. On their march, they saw the vessel
which conveyed General Carleton; and afterwards found he
had been on shore at Point Aux Trembles, a few hours before
they reached that place.'
In war, the success of the most judicious plans often depends
on accidents not to be foreseen nor controlled. Seldom has the
truth of this proposition been more clearly demonstrated, than
in the issue of the expedition conducted by Colonel Arnold.
The situation of Canada conformed exactly to the expectations
of the American general. Not suspecting that so bold and difficult an enterprise could be meditated, its Governor had left
Quebec entirely defenceless, and had drawn the strength of the
province towards the lakes. Could Arnold have reached that
place a few days sooner-could he even have crossed the river
on his first arrival at Point Levi-or had Colonel Enos been
able to follow the main body with his division of the detachment-every probability favours the opinion, that this hardy
and well conceived expedition would have been crowned with
the most brilliant success. Nay, more-had Arnold been careful
to relieve the inhabitants of the town from all fears respecting
their property, there is reason to believe, they would have refused to defend it. But although this bold enterprise was
planned with judgment, and executed with vigour; although the
means employed were adequate to the object; yet the concurrence of several minute and unfavourable incidents entirely defeated it, and deprived it of that eclat to which it was justly
entitled.
Having clothed his almost naked troops at Montreal, General
Montgomery, at the head of about three hundred men, proceeded with his usual expedition to join Colonel Arnold at Point
Aux Trembles, where he supplied the troops of that officer with
1 In the account of this expedition much use has been made of a journal kept by
Colonel Heth who served iD it as a Lieutenant in Morgan's company of riflemen.

GEORGE WASHINGTON

clothes provided at Montreal; and afterwards marched with
their united forces directly to Quebec. But, before
his arrival, Governor Carleton, who had entered the Dec..
town, was making every preparation for a vigorous defence.
The garrison now consisted of about fifteen hundred men, of
whom eight hundred were militia, and between four and five
hundred were seamen. Montgomery's effective force was stated,
by himself, at only eight hundred. His situation would have
filled with despair a mind less vigorous, less sanguine, and less
brave. His numbers were not sufficient to render success probable, according to any common principle of calculation; and
the prospect of their being diminished might be rationally entertained. But, relying on their courage, on himself and his
fortune, and on the fears of the garrison; stimulated, too, by
the high expectations formed throughout America of his success, and by the dread of disappointing those expectations, he
determined to lay immediate siege to the town.
In a few days he opened a six gun battery within seven hundred yards of the walls; but his artillery was too light to make
a breach, and he did not calculate on any effect from it. His
object was to amuse the garrison, and conceal his real design.
Although the troops supported the excessive hardships to
which they were exposed, with constancy and firmness, Montgomery feared that such continued sufferings would overcome
them; and, as he would soon have no legal authority to retain
a part of them, he apprehended that he should be abandoned
by that part. Impressed with the real necessity of taking
decisive steps, and impelled by his native courage, this gallant
officer determined to risk an assault.
Of such materials was his little army composed, that the
most desperate hardihood could not hope to succeed in the
purposed attempt, unless it should receive the approbation of
all his troops. It was therefore necessary, not only to consult
the officers individually on this delicate subject, but to obtain
also the cheerful assent of the soldiers to the meditated enterprise. The proposition was at first received coldly by a part
of Arnold's corps, who were, by some means, disgusted with
their commanding officer; but the influence of Morgan, who
was particularly zealous for an assault, and who held up as a

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powerful inducement, the rights conferred by the usages of
war on those who storm a fortified town, at length prevailed;
and the measure was almost unanimously approved.
Whilst the general was preparing for the assault, the garrison received intelligence of his design from a deserter. This
circumstance induced him to change the plan, which had
originally been to attack both the upper and lower towns at
the same time. That finally adopted, was to divide the army
into four parts; and while two of them, consisting of Canadians
under Major Livingston, and a small party under Major Brown,
were to distract the garrison by making two feints against the
upper town at St. John's and Cape Diamond; the other two, led,
the one by Montgomery in person, and the other by Arnold,
were to make real attacks on opposite sides of the lower town.
After gaining that, it would yet be extremely difficult to conquer the obstacles to be surmounted in forcing their way to
the upper town; but, as all the wealth of the city would then
be in their power, it was confidently expected that the inhabitants, to secure their property, would compel the governor
to capitulate.
Between four and five in the morning, the signal was given;
and the several divisions moved to the assault under
Dec.3 a. violent storm of snow. The plan was so well
concerted, that from the side of the river St. Lawrence, along
the fortified front round to the basin, every part seemed equally
threatened.1 Montgomery advanced at the head of the New
York troops, along the St. Lawrence, by the way of Aunce de
Mere, under Cape Diamond. The first barrier on this side, at
the Pot Ash, was defended by a battery, in which a few pieces
of artillery were mounted; about two hundred paces in front
of which was a block-house and picket. The guard placed at
the block-house being chiefly Canadians, after giving a random
and harmless fire, threw away their arms, and fled in confusion
to the barrier. Their terrors were communicated to those who
defended this important pass; and from the intelligence afterwards received by the American prisoners in Quebec, it appears
that the battery was for a time deserted.
1 Letter of Governor Carleton.

GEORGE WASHINGTON

Unfortunately, the difficulties of the route rendered it impossible for Montgomery to avail himself instantly of this first
impression. Cape Diamond, around which he was to make his
way, presents a precipice, the foot of which is washed by the
river, where such enormous and rugged masses of ice had been
piled on each other, as to render the way almost impassable.'
Along the scanty path leading under the projecting rocks of
the precipice, the Americans pressed forward in a narrow file,
until they reached the block-house and picket. Montgomery,
who was himself in front, assisted with his own hand to cut
down or pull up the pickets, and open a passage for his troops:
but the roughness and difficulty of the way had so lengthened
his line of march, that he found it absolutely necessary to halt
a few minutes. Having re-assembled about two hundred men,
he advanced boldly and rapidly at their head, to force the
barrier. One or two persons had now ventured to return to
the battery, and seizing a slow-match, discharged a gun, when
the American front was within forty paces of it. This single
and accidental fire proved fatal to the enterprise. The general,
with Captains M'Pherson and Cheeseman, the first of whom
was his aid, together with his orderly sergeant and a private
were killed upon the spot. The loss of their general, in whom
their confidence had been so justly placed, discouraged the
troops; and Colonel Campbell, on whom the command devolved, made no attempt to reanimate them. This whole division retired precipitately from the action, and left the garrison
at leisure to direct its undivided force against Arnold.
At the common signal for the attack, the division commanded by his officer moved in files along the street of St.
Roques towards the Saut de Matelots, where the first barrier
had been constructed, and a battery of two twelve pounders
erected. In imitation of Montgomery, he too led the forlorn
hope in person, and was followed by Captain Lamb with his
company of artillery, and a field piece mounted on a sled.
Close in the rear of the artillery was the main body, in front
of which was Morgan's company of riflemen, commanded by
himself. The path along which the troops were to march was

' Annual Register.

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so narrow, that the two pieces of artillery in the battery were
capable of raking with grape shot every inch of the ground;
whilst the whole right flank was exposed to an incessant fire
of musketry from the walls, and from the pickets of the
garrison.
In this order Arnold advanced along the St. Charles with
the utmost intrepidity. The alarm was immediately given, and
the fire on his flank commenced. As he approached the barrier,
he received a musket ball in the leg which shattered the bone,
and was carried off the field. Morgan rushed forward to the
battery at the head of his company, and received from one of
the pieces, almost at its mouth, a discharge of grape shot,
which killed only one man. The barricade was instantly
mounted, on which the battery was deserted without a discharge from another gun. The captain of the guard, with the
greater number of his men, were made prisoners.
Morgan formed his troops in the streets within the barrier,
and took into custody several English and Canadian burghers;
but his situation soon became extremely critical. He was not
followed by the main body of the division-he had no guideand was, himself, totally ignorant of the situation of the town.
It was yet dark-and he had not the slightest knowledge of
the course to be pursued, or of the defences to be encountered.
Under these circumstances, it was thought unadviseable to advance farther. They were soon joined by Lieutenant Colonel
Green, and Majors Bigelow and Meigs, with several fragments
of companies, so as to constitute altogether about two hundred
men.
As the light of day began to appear, this gallant party was
again formed, with Morgan's company in front; and, with one
voice, loudly called on him to lead them against the second
barrier, which was now known to be less than forty paces from
them, though concealed by an angle of the street from their
immediate view. Seizing the few ladders brought with them,
they again rushed forward; and under an incessant fire from
the battery, and from the windows overlooking it, applied their
ladders to the barricade; and maintained for some time a fierce,
and, on their part, a bloody contest. Exposed thus, in a narrow
street, to a galling fire, and finding themselves unable to force

GEORGE WASHINGTON

the barrier, or to discharge more than one in ten of their fire
arms-the violence of the storm having unfitted them for service; many of the assailants threw themselves into the stone
houses on each side, which afforded them a shelter both from
the storm and from the enemy. After continuing some time
in this situation, Morgan proposed to cut their way back to the
American camp. They were prevented from adopting this daring resolution, only by the suggestion that the attack led by
Montgomery, of whose fate they were ignorant, might possibly
be successful; and that, in the event of his having entered the
opposite part of the town, their co-operation might be useful
to him. On this account, they determined still to maintain
their situation. But the force of the enemy increasing considerably, they soon perceived that they were no longer masters
of their own destinies, and surrendered themselves prisoners of
war.1
In this bold attack on Quebec, the loss on the part of the
garrison was inconsiderable. That of the Americans was about
four hundred men, three hundred and forty of whom were
prisoners. It fell chiefly on Arnold's division. Captain Hendricks of the Pennsylvania riflemen, Lieutenant Humphries of
Morgan's company, and Lieutenant Cooper of Connecticut,
were among the slain. Captains Lamb and Hubbard, and Lieutenants Steele and Tisdale, were among the wounded. Every
officer at the second barrier received several balls through his
clothes, and some of them were severely scorched by the powder
from the muzzles of the muskets discharged at them. But the
loss most deplored, and most fatal to the hopes of the American
army, was that of their general.
Richard Montgomery was a native of Ireland, and had served
with reputation in the late war. After its conclusion he settled in New York, where he married an American lady, and
took a decided part with the colonies in their contest with Great
Britain. His military reputation was high throughout America.
In the history of his achievements, while commanding in Canada, we perceive the bold, skilful, and active partizan; and,
so far as a judgment can be formed of a capacity for conduct1 In this account of the attempt to storm Quebec, free use is made of Colonel
Heth's journal.

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ing the movements of a large army from judicious management of a small one, we can not hesitate to allow him the talents
of an able general. At the head of a small body of undisciplined
troops, drawn from different colonies, unwilling to be commanded by a stranger, jealous of him in the extreme, often
disposed to disobedience, and anxious for their homes, he conquered difficulties which not many would have ventured to
meet; and, until his last fatal moment, was uniformly successful. In little more than two months, he made himself master
of Canada, from the lakes to Quebec: and, as if determined to
triumph over the climate itself, laid siege, in the depth of winter, to that important fortress. His measures seem to have been
taken with judgment, and were certainly executed with great
courage and unremitting exertion. When he appears to have
risked much, and to have exposed his troops to excessive hardships, this line of conduct was not inconsiderately chosen. The
state of his affairs left him only the alternative between attempting to storm Quebec, or abandoning the great object
of the expedition. Nor was his attempt so hopeless a measure
as the strength of the place, and the event might, at first view,
induce us to suppose. The design was worthy of the lofty spirit
which formed it; though hazardous, it was not desperate; and
if great courage was required to crown it with success, great
courage was employed in its execution. He counted, and with
reason, on the fears of the garrison, and on the immense extent
of ground to be guarded. Had he not fallen himself, or been
deserted by his troops, it is even yet believed the enterprise
would have succeeded. The progress made by Arnold's division
gives great countenance to this opinion.
To manifest the high sense entertained of his services, congress directed a monument, expressing the circumstances of his
death and the gratitude of his country, to be erected to his
memory.
The Americans, being no longer in a condition to continue
the siege, retired about three miles from the city; where, though
inferior in numbers to the garrison, they maintained
1776. the blockade. By preserving this bold countenance,
January. they retained the confidence of the Canadians; which
saved their affairs, for a time, from total ruin.

GEORGE WASHINGTON

Governor Carleton was content to preserve Quebec, until the
reinforcements he expected in the spring should enable him to
act on the offensive. He therefore determined not to hazard
an attack, with a garrison on which it was unsafe to rely; and
Arnold, on whom the command had devolved, remained undisturbed. Although badly wounded, he retained his courage
and activity; and, though deserted by those whose terms of
service had expired, so as to be reduced at one time to about
five hundred effective men, he discovered no disposition to sink
under the weight of adverse fortune.
While the affairs of the colonies wore this gloomy aspect in
Canada, congress was indulging sanguine hopes of annexing that
province to the union. Nine regiments, including one to be
raised in that colony, were voted for its defence during the ensuing campaign; and General Schuyler was directed to construct
a number of batteaux at Ticonderoga, for the purpose of transporting the troops to the scene of action.
Whilst adopting these measures, congress received the melancholy intelligence of the disaster of the 3ist December. Far from being dispirited by this reverse of Ja *7 -fortune, that body redoubled its exertions to hasten reinforcements to the army in Canada, and urged the several conventions to collect for its use all the specie they could obtain.
These measures were, in some degree, accelerated by having
been anticipated by the Commander-in-chief.'
The service in Canada being deemed of too much importance
to be entrusted to Colonel, now Brigadier General
Arnold, or to General Wooster; and the health of F 7
General Schuyler not admitting of his proceeding to Quebec;
General Thomas, an officer who had acquired reputation at
Roxbury, was ordered to take command of the army in thatprovince.
In the hope of exciting throughout Canada the sentiments
which prevailed in the United Colonies, and of forming with
it a perfect union, three commissioners, Mr. Franklin, Mr. Chase,
'On the first intelligence received in the camp at Boston of the fate of Montgomery, General Washington, though extremely delicate respecting the assumption
of power, without waiting for the orders of congress, had immediately requested the
New England governments to raise several regiments to reinforce that army. This
proceeding was approved by congress.

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and Mr. Carroll,1 were deputed with full powers on this subject,
and with instructions to establish a free press. These commissioners were directed to assure the people that they would be
permitted to adopt such form of government as should be
agreeable to themselves; to exercise freely all the rights of conscience; and to be considered as a sister colony, governed by
the same general system of mild and equal laws which prevailed
in the other colonies, with only such local differences as each
might deem conducive to its own happiness. They were also
instructed to inquire into the conduct of the American army,
and to correct any irregularities which might be offensive to
the people.
Congress seems to have entertained the opinion expressed by
General Washington in a letter to General Schuyler, "that the
Province could be secured only by laying hold of the affections
of the people, and engaging them heartily in the common
cause." In pursuance of this opinion, they adopted the magnanimous policy of compensating those individuals who had
suffered for their adherence to the Americans.
In the mean time Arnold maintained the blockade of Quebec.
But reinforcements were slow in arriving, notwithstanding
every exertion to hasten them, and from the first of January
to the first of March, the effective force before that place had
never exceeded seven hundred men, and had often been as low
as five hundred. In March, reinforcements arrived in greater
numbers, and the army was increased to seventeen hundred;
but this number was soon reduced by the small-pox, which
had made its way into camp, where, in contempt of orders,
it was propagated by inoculation.
To render the blockade in any degree effectual, this small
army which occupied the island of Orleans and both sides of
the St. Lawrence, was spread over a circuit of twenty-six miles,
and divided by three ferries. The establishment of discipline
had been impracticable, if attempted; and the Canadians were
often injured and irritated. There is reason to believe that
even General Arnold was disposed to think himself in the country of an enemy; and that, in repressing disorders, he did not
1 They were accompanied by Mr. Carroll, a bishop of the Roman Catholic church,

GEORGE WASHINGTON

exert that energy which he had always displayed conspicuously
in the field.
Many causes combined to diminish the attachment originally
manifested by the Canadians to the United Colonies. The necessities of his situation compelled General Arnold to issue a
proclamation making paper money current, under the promise
of redeeming it in four months, and denouncing those as
enemies, who should refuse to receive it. The Canadians were
unwilling to exchange their property or labour, for an article
of such uncertain value; and the discontents excited by the attempt to force it on them were very considerable.
Another circumstance, which had great influence with reflecting men, was the obvious incompetence of the American
force to its object. The Canadians had expected a powerful
army-sufficient for the protection of the country; and their
disappointment in this respect, produced a great change in their
opinions and conduct.
The dissatisfaction arising from these causes was augmented
by the priests. They, as a body, were never cordial in the
American interest; and having been, since the death of Montgomery, very injudiciously neglected, had become almost universally hostile to the views of the United Colonies.
General Carleton was no stranger to the revolution which
was taking place in the minds of the Canadians, and entertained the hope of raising the siege by their assistance. A
detachment of about sixty men, from the garrison of Quebec,
landed twelve leagues below the town on the south side of
the river, and were joined by about two hundred and fifty
Canadians, who were rapidly increasing in numbers, when
they were suddenly attacked by a detachment sent by Arnold,
which surprised their advance guard, killed a few, took some
prisoners, and dispersed the residue.
As the season of the year approached when reinforcements
from England might be expected, Arnold deemed it necessary
to recommence active operations, and to resume the siege. His
batteries were again erected, and were opened on the ad of
April, but without much effect. He had not weight of metal to
make a breach in the wall, nor an engineer capable of directing

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a siege, nor artillerists who understood the management of the
pieces.
On the ist of April, Wooster had arrived, and, on the succeeding day, Arnold's horse fell with him, and so bruised one
of his legs as to confine him to his bed for some time. Believing
himself to be neglected, he obtained leave of absence as soon
as he was able to move, and took the command at Montreal.
A considerable part of the army having become entitled to
a discharge, no inducement could prevail on them to continue
longer in so severe a service. This deduction from Wooster's
Apr i force was the more sensibly felt, because the present
situation of the roads, the lakes, and the St. Lawrence,
suspended the arrival of the reinforcements destined for his aid.
Among the first who reached camp after this state of things
took place, was General Thomas. He arrived on the ist of
May, and found an army consisting of nineteen hundred men;
of whom, less than one thousand, including officers, were effective. Among these were three hundred entitled to discharge,
who refused to do duty, and insisted importunately on being
immediately dismissed. This small force was still more enfeebled by being so divided that it was impracticable to unite
more than three hundred men at any one point. All the magazines contained but one hundred and fifty barrels of powder,
and six days provisions; nor could adequate supplies from the
country people be obtained, as the Canadians no longer manifested any disposition to serve them.
The river began to open below, and it was certain, that the
British would seize the first moment of its being practicable,
to relieve this important place. Amidst these unpromising circumstances, the hopes of taking Quebec appeared to General
Thomas to be chimerical, and a longer continuance before the
town both useless and dangerous. It was apparent that the
first reinforcements which should arrive would deprive him
entirely of the use of the river, and consequently would embarrass the removal of his sick, and military stores. No object
remained to justify this hazard.
Under these impressions, he called a council of war, which
My unanimously determined, that the army was not in
May S a condition to risk an assault-that the sick should

GEORGE WASHINGTON

be removed to the Three Rivers, and the artillery and other
stores embarked in their boats, in order to move to a more
defensible position. On the evening of the same day, intelligence
was received that a British fleet was below; and, y 6
the next morning, five ships, which had, with much
labour and danger, made their way up the river through the ice,
appeared in sight. They soon entered the harbour, and landed
some men whilst the Americans were assiduously employed in
the embarkation of their sick and stores-an operation carried
on the more slowly, because the first appearance of the ships
deprived them of the aid expected from the teams and carriages of the Canadians.
About noon, Carleton made a sortie at the head of one thousand men, formed in two divisions, and supported by six field
pieces. The Americans had thrown up no intrenchments, and
could not bring into action more than three hundred men.
Under these circumstances, victory was scarcely possible, and
could have produced no important effect. General Thomas,
therefore, with the advice of the field officers about him, determined not to risk an action, and ordered his troops to retreat
up the river. This was done with much precipitation, and
many of the sick, with all the military stores, fell into the
hands of the enemy. The army continued its retreat to the
Sorel, where General Thomas was seized with the small pox,
of which he died.1
1 Whilst the troops of the United Colonies were flying from the vicinity of Quebec, an unexpected calamity befel them in a different quarter of that province.
Colonel Bedel, with three hundred and ninety continental troops and two field
pieces, had been stationed at the Cedars, a point of land about forty miles above
Montreal, which projected far into the St. Lawrence, and could be approached only
on one side. Early in the spring, General Carleton had planned an expedition against
this post, the execution of which was committed to Captain Forster, who commanded
at an English station on Oswegachie. At the head of a company of regulars and
a body of Indians, amounting in the whole to six hundred men, he appeared before
the American works early in May. Two days previous to his appearance, Colonel
Bedel had received intelligence of his approach; and, leaving the fort to be commanded by Major Butterfield, had proceeded himself to Montreal, to solicit assistance.
Arnold, who then commanded at that place, immediately detached Major Sherburne
to the Cedars with one hundred men; and prepared to follow, in person, at the head
of a much larger force.
Although the place could have been easily defended, the besiegers having no artillery-Major Butterfield, intimidated by the threat, that should any Indians be killed
during the siege, it would be out of the power of Captain Forster to restrain the
savages from massacreing every individual of the garrison, consented to a capitulation, by which the whole party became prisoners of war. The next day, Major

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The Americans were much dissatisfied with the conduct of
this gentleman. To him they, in some degree attributed the
disasters which ruined their affairs in Canada. But this censure
was unjust. He took command of the army when it was too
weak to maintain its ground, and when the time for saving
the sick and the military stores had passed away.
The siege of Quebec, instead of being continued longer,
ought to have been abandoned at an earlier period. This was
the real fault of those who commanded in Canada. It is to be
ascribed to the reluctance always felt by inexperienced officers
to disappoint the public expectation, by relinquishing an enterprise concerning which sanguine hopes have been entertained;
and to encounter the obloquy of giving up a post, although it
can no longer with prudence be defended. In the perseverance
with which the siege of Quebec was maintained, these motives
operated with all their force, and they received an addition,
from the unwillingness felt by the Americans, to abandon those
of their friends who had taken so decisive a part in their favour,
as to be incapable of remaining in safety behind them.
After the death of General Thomas reinforcements assembled
at the mouth of the Sorel, which increased the army
June 4 to four or five thousand men, who were commanded
by General Sullivan. The friendly Canadians who had supposed themselves abandoned, manifested great joy at the arrival
of a force which appeared to them very considerable; and
offered every assistance in their power. Sullivan calculated on
their joining him in great numbers, and entertained sanguine
hopes of recovering and maintaining the post of De Chambeau.
Sherburne approached without having received any information that Butterfield had
surrendered. Within about four miles of the Cedars, he was attacked by a considerable body of Indians; and, after a sharp conflict, surrendered at discretion.
On being informed of these untoward events, Arnold, at the head of seven hundred
men, marched against the enemy then at Vaudreuil, in the hope of recovering the
American prisoners. When preparing for an engagement, he received a flag, accompanied by Major Sherburne, giving him the most positive assurance that if he persisted in his design, it would be entirely out of the power of Captain Forster to
prevent his savages from pursuing their horrid customs, and disencumbering themselves of their prisoners by putting every man to death. This massacre was already
threatened; and Major Sherburne confirmed the information. Under the influence
of this threat, Arnold desisted from his purpose, and consented to a cartel, by which
the prisoners were delivered up to him; he agreeing, among other things, not only to
deliver as many British soldiers in exchange for them, but also, that they should
immediately return to their homes.

GEORGE WASHINGTON

As a previous measure, it was necessary to dislodge the enemy at
the Three Rivers.
Carleton was not immediately in a situation to follow up
the blow given the Americans at Quebec, and to drive them
entirely out of the province; but the respite allowed them was
not of long duration.
Towards the end of May large reinforcements arrived, which
augmented the British army in Canada to about thirteen thousand men. The general rendezvous appointed for these troops
was at the Three Rivers. The army was greatly divided. A
considerable corps, commanded by General Frazer, had reached
the Three Rivers, and the main body was on its way from
Quebec. The distance from the Sorel was about fifty miles,
and several armed vessels and transports, full of troops, lay
about five miles higher up than the Three Rivers, full in the
way.'
General Thompson, who commanded the army after the illness of General Thomas, understanding the party at the Three
Rivers to consist of about eight hundred men, partly Canadians,
had detached Colonel St. Clair with between six and seven
hundred men, to attack it, if there should be any probability
of doing so with advantage. Colonel St. Clair advanced to
Nicolet, where, believing himself not strong enough for the
service on which he had been ordered, he waited for further
reinforcements, or additional instructions. At this time General Sullivan arrived; and, understanding the enemy to be weak
at the Three Rivers ordered Gen. Thompson to join Colonel
St. Clair at Nicolet, with a reinforcement of nearly fourteen
hundred men, to take command of the whole detachment, and
to attack the troops lying at the Three Rivers, provided there
was a favourable prospect of success.
General Thompson joined Colonel St. Clair at Nicolet, and,
believing himself strong enough to perform the service consigned to him, fell down the river by night, and passed to the
other side, with the intention of surprising Frazer. The plan
was to attack the village a little before daybreak, at the same

1 Annual Register.

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instant, at each end; whilst two smaller corps were drawn up
to cover and support the attack.
The troops passed the armed vessels without being perceived,
but arrived at Three Rivers about an hour later than had
been intended; in consequence of which they were discovered,
and the alarm was given at their landing. To avoid the fire
of some ships in the river, they attempted to pass through
what appeared to be a point of woods, but was in reality
a deep morass three miles in extent. The delays occasioned
by their detention in this morass, gave General Frazer full time
to land some field pieces, and prepare for their reception; while
General Nesbit fell into their rear, and cut off their return to
the boats. They advanced to the charge, but were soon repulsed; and finding it impracticable to return the way they
came, were driven some miles through a deep swamp, which
they traversed with inconceivable toil, and every degree of
distress. The British at length gave over the pursuit.
In this unfortunate enterprise, General Thompson and Colonel
Irwin, with about two hundred men, were made prisoners; and
from twenty to thirty were killed. The loss of the British was
inconsiderable.
The whole American force in Canada now amounted to
about eight thousand men, not one half of whom were fit for
duty. About two thousand five hundred effectives were with
General Sullivan at the Sorel. The whole were in a state of
total insubordination-much harassed with fatigue-and dispirited by their late losses, by the visible superiority of the
enemy, and by the apprehension that their retreat would be
entirely cut off. Under all these discouraging circumstances,
General Sullivan. formed the rash determination of defending
the post at Sorel; and was induced only by the unanimous
opinion of his officers, and a conviction that the troops would
not support him, to abandon it a few hours before
June 14. the British took possession of it. The same causes
drew him reluctantly from Chamblee and St. John's; but he
Je 8 resolved to remain at the Isle Aux Noix, until he
June 1. should receive orders to retreat. He had been joined
at St. John's by General Arnold, who had crossed over at
Longueisle just in time to save the garrison of Montreal.

GEORGE WASHINGTON

The Isle Aux Noix is a low unhealthy place, badly supplied
with water; where the troops were so universally seized with
fevers, as to compel General Sullivan to retire to the Isle Lamotte. At that place he received the orders of General Schuyler
to embark on the lakes for Crown Point.
The armed vessels on the Sorel and St. Lawrence were destroyed, and the fortifications of Chamblee and St. John's set
on fire. All the baggage of the army, and nearly all the military
stores were saved.
The British army, during the whole retreat, followed close
in the rear, and took possession of the different posts which
the Americans had occupied, immediately after they were
evacuated.
On the Sorel the pursuit stopped. The Americans had the
command of the lake, and the British general deemed it prudent
to wrest it from them before he advanced farther. To effect
this, it was necessary to construct a number of vessels, which
required time and labour. Meanwhile, General Gates was ordered to take command of the northern army, which was directed to be reinforced with six thousand militia.
Thus terminated the enterprise against Canada. It was a
bold, and at one period, promised to be a successful effort to
annex that extensive province to the United Colonies. The
dispositions of the Canadians favoured the measure; and had
Quebec fallen, there is reason to believe the colony would have
entered cordially into the union. Had a few incidents turned
out fortunately; had Arnold been able to reach Quebec.a few
days sooner, or to cross the St. Lawrence on his first arrivalor had the gallant Montgomery not fallen in the assault of the
3ist December, it is probable the expedition would have been
crowned with complete success. But the radical causes of failure, putting fortune out of the question, were to be found
in the lateness of the season when the troops were assembled,
in a defect of the preparations necessary for such a service, and
still more in the shortness of the time for which the men were
enlisted. Had the expedition been successful, the practicability
of maintaining the country is much to be doubted. Whilst General Montgomery lay before Quebec, and expected to obtain possession of the place, he extended his views to its preservation. His

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plan required a permanent army of ten thousand men; strong
fortifications at Jacques Cartier, and the rapids of Richelieu;
and armed vessels in the river, above the last place. With this
army and these precautions, he thought the country might be
defended; but not with an inferior force.
It seems, therefore, to have been an enterprise requiring means
beyond the ability of Congress; and the strength exhausted
on it would have been more judiciously employed in securing
the command of the lakes George and Champlain, and the
fortified towns upon them.
While General Carleton was making preparations to enter the
lakes, General Schuyler was using his utmost exertions to retain
the command of them. But, so great was the difficulty of procuring workmen and materials, that he found it impossible
to equip a fleet which would be equal to the exigency. It consisted of only fifteen small vessels; the largest of which was a
schooner mounting twelve guns, carrying six and four pound
balls. The command of this squadron, at the instance of General Washington, was given to General Arnold.
With almost incredible exertions, the British General conOctober. structed a powerful fleet; and, afterwards, dragged
up the rapids of St. Therese and St. John's, a vast
number of long boats and other vessels, among which was a
gondola weighing thirty tons. This immense work was completed in little more than three months; and, as if by magic,
General Arnold saw on Lake Champlain, early in October, a
fleet consisting of near thirty vessels; the largest of which, the
Inflexible, carried eighteen twelve-pounders. This formidable
fleet, having on board General Carleton himself, and navigated
by seven hundred prime seamen under the command of Captain
Pringle, proceeded immediately in quest of Arnold, who was
advantageously posted between the island of Valicour and the
western main.
Notwithstanding the disparity of force, a warm action ensued. A wind, unfavourable to the British, kept the Inflexible
and some other large vessels at too great a distance to render any
service. This circumstance enabled Arnold to keep up the engagement until night, when Captain Pringle discontinued it, and
anchored his whole fleet in a line, as near the vessels of his ad

GEORGE WASHINGTON

versary as was practicable. In this engagement, the best
schooner belonging to the American flotilla was burnt, and a
gondola was sunk.
In the night, Arnold attempted to escape to Ticonderoga;
and, the next morning, was out of sight; but, being immediately
pursued, was overtaken about noon, and brought to action a
few leagues short of Crown Point. He kept up a warm engagement for about two hours, during which the vessels that
were most ahead escaped to Ticonderoga. Two gallies and five
gondolas, which remained, made a desperate resistance. At
length one of them struck; after which Arnold ran the remaining vessels on shore, and blew them up; having first saved his
men, though great efforts were made to take them.
On the approach of the British army, a small detachment,
which had occupied Crown Point as an out-post, evacuated the
place, and retired to Ticonderoga, which Schuyler determined
to defend to the last extremity.
General Carleton took possession of Crown Point, and advanced a part of his fleet into Lake George, within view of
Ticonderoga. His army also approached that place, as if designing to invest it; but, after reconnoitring the works, and observing the steady countenance of the garrison, he thought it too
late to lay siege to the fortress. Re-embarking his army, he returned to Canada, where he placed it in winter quarters; making
the Isle Aux Noix his most advanced post.

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CHAPTER IV
WHILST the war was carried on thus vigorously in the north,
the southern colonies were not entirely unemployed.
I775 The convention of Virginia determined to raise two
regiments of regular troops for one year, and to enlist
a part of the militia as minute-men.
Lord Dunmore, the Governor of the colony, who was joined
by the most active of the disaffected, and by a number of slaves
whom he had encouraged to run away from their masters, was collecting a naval force, which threatened to be extremely troublesome in a country so intersected with large navigable rivers as
the colony of Virginia. With this force he carried on a slight
predatory war, and, at length, attempted to burn the town of
Hampton. The inhabitants, having received intimation of his
design, gave notice of it to the commanding officer at Williamsburg, where some regulars and minute-men were stationed. Two
companies were despatched to their assistance, who arrived
just before the assault was made, and obliged the assailants to
retreat, with some loss, to their vessels.
In consequence of this repulse, his Lordship proclaimed marN. tial law; summoned all persons capable of bearing
arms to repair to the royal standard, or be considered
as traitors; and offered freedom to all indented servants and
slaves who should join him.'
This proclamation made some impression about Norfolk,
where the Governor collected such a force of the disaffected and
negroes, as gave him an entire ascendancy in that part of the
colony.
Intelligence of these transactions being received at Williamsburg, a regiment of regulars and about two hundred minutemen, were ordered down under the command of Colonel Wood1 Gazette-Remembrancer.

GEORGE WASHINGTON

8 I

ford,' for the defence of the inhabitants. Hearing of their approach, Lord Dunmore took a well chosen position on the north
side of Elizabeth river, at the Great Bridge, where it was necessary for the provincials to cross in order to reach Norfolk; at
which place he had established himself in some force. Here he
erected a small fort on a piece of firm ground surrounded by a
marsh, which was accessible, on either side, only by a long causeway. Colonel Woodford encamped within cannon-shot of this
post, in a small village at the south end of the causeway; across
which, just at its termination, he constructed a breast-work;
but, being without artillery, was unable to make any attempt on
the fort.
In this position both parties continued for a few days, when
Lord Dunmore ordered Captain Fordyce, the commanding officer at the Great Bridge, though inferior in numbers, to storm
the works of the provincials. Between day-break Dec 9
and sunrise, this officer, at the head of about sixty
grenadiers of the I4th regiment, who led the column, advanced
along the causeway with fixed bayonets, against the breast-work.
The alarm was immediately given; and, as is the practice with
raw troops, the bravest rushed 'to the works, where, regardless
of order, they kept up a heavy fire on the front of the British
column. Captain Fordyce, though received so warmly in front,
and taken in flank by a party posted on a small eminence on his
right, marched up with great intrepidity, until he fell dead
within a few steps of the breast-work. The column immediately
broke and retreated; but being covered by the artillery of the
fort, was not pursued.
In this ill-judged attack, every grenadier is said to have been
killed or wounded; while the Americans did not lose a single
man.
The following night, the fort was evacuated. The provincial
troops proceeded to Norfolk, under the command of Colonel
Howe of North Carolina, and Lord Dunmore took refuge on
board his vessels.
After taking possession of the town, the American soldiers
frequently amused themselves by firing into the vessels in the
1 The author was in this expedition, and relates the circumstances attending it
chiefly from his own observation.

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6 harbour, from the buildings near the water. Irritated
J776. by this, Lord Dunmore determined to destroy the
January. houses immediately on the shore; and, on the night of
the first of January, under cover of a heavy cannonade, landed a
body of troops, and set fire to a number of houses near the river.
The provincials, who entertained strong prejudices against this
station, saw the flames spread from house to house without making any attempt to extinguish them. After the fire had continued several weeks, in which time it had consumed about fourfifths of the town, Colonel Howe, who had waited on the convention to urge the necessity of destroying the place, returned
with orders to burn the remaining houses; which
were carried into immediate execution.
Thus was destroyed the most populous and flourishing town
in Virginia. Its destruction was one of those ill-judged measures,
of which the consequences are felt long after the motives are
forgotten.
After Norfolk was laid in ashes, Lord Dunmore continued a
predatory war on the rivers-burning houses, and robbing plantations-which served only to distress a few individuals, and to
increase the detestation in which he was held through the country. At length, his wretched followers, wearied with their
miserable condition, were sent to Florida.'
As the war became more serious, the convention deemed it
necessary to increase the number of regular regiments from two
to nine, which were afterwards taken into the continental
service.
In North Carolina, Governor Martin, though obliged to take
refuge on board a ship of war, in Cape Fear river, indulged the
hope of being able to reduce that colony.
A body of ignorant and disorderly men on the western frontier, styling themselves regulators, had attempted by arms, some
time before the existing war, to control and stop the administration of justice. After failing in this attempt, they became as
hostile to the colonial, as they had been to the royal government.
The province also contained many families who had lately
Virginia Gazette.

GEORGE WASHINGTON

emigrated from the highlands of Scotland; and who, retaining
their attachment to the place of their nativity, transferred it to
the government under which they had been bred. From the
union of these parties, Governor Martin entertained sanguine
hopes of making a successful struggle for North Carolina. His
confidence was increased by the assurances he had received, that a
considerable land and naval armament was destined for the
southern colonies.
To prepare for co-operating with this force, should it
arrive; or, in any event, to make an effort to give the ascendancy
in North Carolina to the royal cause, he sent several commissions to the leaders of the highlanders, for raising and commanding regiments; and granted one to a Mr. M'Donald, their
chief, to act as their general. He also sent them a proclamation,
to be used on a proper occasion, commanding all persons, on
their allegiance, to repair to the royal standard. This was erected
by General M'Donald at Cross Creek, about the middle of February, and nearly fifteen hundred men arranged themselves
under it.
Upon the first advice that the loyalists were assembling, Brigadier General Moore marched at the head of a provincial regiment, with such militia as he could suddenly collect, Feb. 15.
and some pieces of cannon, and took a strong position
within a few miles of them. General M'Donald soon approached, and sent a letter to Moore, enclosing the Feb. o.
Governor's proclamation, and recommending to him
and his party to join the King's standard by a given hour the
next day. The negotiation was protracted by Moore, in the
hope that the numerous bodies of militia who were advancing
to join him, would soon enable him to surround his adversary.
M'Donald, at length, perceived his danger, and, suddenly decamping, endeavoured by forced marches to extricate himself
from it, and join Governor Martin and Lord William Campbell,
who were encouraged to commence active operations by the
arrival of General Clinton in the colony.
The provincial parties, however, were so alert in every part
of the country, that he found himself under the necessity of engaging Colonels Caswell and Lillington, who, with about one
thousand minute-men and militia, had entrenched themselves

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directly in his front, at a place called Moore's Creek Bridge.
The royalists were greatly superior in number, but were under
the disadvantage of being compelled to cross the bridge, the
planks of which were partly taken up, in the face of the intrenchments occupied by the provincials. They commenced
the attack however with great spirit; but Colonel M'Leod who
commanded them, in consequence of the indisposition of
M'Donald, and several others of their bravest officers and men,
having fallen in the first onset, their courage deserted them, and
they fled in great disorder, leaving behind them their general
and several others of their leaders, who fell into the hands of
the provincials.'
This victory was of eminent service to the American cause
in North Carolina. It broke the spirits of a great body of men,
who would have constituted a formidable reinforcement to an
invading army; increased the confidence of the provincials in
themselves, and attached to them the timid and wavering, who
form a large portion of every community.
General Clinton, who was to command in the south, had left
Boston with a force too inconsiderable to attempt any thing
until he should be reinforced by the troops expected from Europe. After parting with Governor Tryon in New York, he
had proceeded to Virginia, where he passed a few days with
Lord Dunmore; but finding himself too weak to effect any
thing in that province, he repaired to North Carolina, and remained with Governor Martin until the arrival of Sir Peter
Parker. Fortunately for the province, the unsuccessful insurrection of M'Donald had previously broken the strength and spirits
of the loyalists, and deprived them of their most active chiefs;
Ma in consequence of which, the operations which had
May. been meditated against North Carolina were deferred.
Clinton continued in Cape Fear until near the end of May,
when, hearing nothing certain from General Howe, he determined to make an attempt on the capital of South Carolina.
Early in the month of April, a letter from the secretary of
state to Mr. Eden, the royal governor of Maryland, disclosing
the designs of administration against the southern colonies, was
1 Annual Register-Gordon-Ramsay âGazette.

GEORGE WASHINGTON

intercepted in the Chesapeake; and thus, South Carolina became
apprized of the danger which threatened its metropolis. Mr.
Rutledge, a gentleman of vigour and talents, who had been
chosen president of that province on the dissolution of the regal
government, adopted the most energetic means for placing it in
a posture of defence.
In the beginning of June, the British fleet came to anchor off
the harbour of Charleston. The bar was crossed with
some difficulty; after which, it was determined to
commence operations by silencing a fort on, Sullivan's island.
During the interval between passing the bar and attacking
the fort, the continental troops of Virginia and North Carolina
arrived in Charleston; and the American force amounted to
between five and six thousand men, of whom two thousand five
hundred were regulars. This army was commanded by General
Lee, whose fortune it had been to meet General Clinton at New
York, in Virginia, and in North Carolina. Viewing with a military eye the situation of the post entrusted to his care, Lee was
disinclined to hazard his army by engaging it deeply in the defence of the town; but the solicitude of the South Carolinians
to preserve their capital, aided by his confidence in his own
vigilance, prevailed over a caution which was thought extreme,
and determined him to attempt to maintain the place.
Two regular regiments of South Carolina, commanded by
Colonels Gadsden and Moultrie, garrisoned fort Johnson and fort
Moultrie. About five hundred regulars, and three hundred militia under Colonel Thompson, were stationed in some works which
had been thrown up on the north-eastern extremity of Sullivan's
island; and the remaining troops were arranged on Hadrell's
Point, and along the bay in front of the town. General Lee
remained in person with the troops at Hadrell's Point, in the
rear of Sullivan's island. His position was chosen in such a
manner as to enable him to observe and support the operations
in every quarter, and especially to watch and oppose any attempt
of the enemy to pass from Long Island to the continent; a
movement of which he seems to have been particularly
apprehensive.
The British ships, after taking their stations, commenced an
incessant and heavy cannonade on the American works. Its

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effect, however, on the fort, was not such as had been expected.
This was attributable to its form, and to its materials. It was
very low, with merlons of great thickness; and was constructed
of earth, and a species of soft wood common in that country,
called the palmetto, which, on being struck with a ball, does not
splinter, but closes upon it.
The fire from the fort was deliberate; and, being directed
with skill, did vast execution. The garrison united the cool
determined courage of veterans, with the enthusiastic ardour of
youth. General Lee crossed over in a boat, to determine whether
he should withdraw them; and was enraptured by the ardour they
displayed. They assured him they would lose the fort only with
their lives; and the mortally wounded breathed their last, exhorting their fellow soldiers to the most heroic defence of the place.
The engagement continued until night. By that time, the
ships were in such a condition, as to be unfit to renew the action
on the ensuing day. The Bristol lost one hundred and eleven
men, and the Experiment seventy-nine. Captain Scott, of the
one, lost his arm; and Captain Morris, of the other, was mortally
wounded. Lord Campbell, late Governor of the province, who
served as a volunteer on board one of these vessels, was also mortally wounded; and both ships were so shattered, as to inspire
hopes that they would be unable to repass the bar. About nine,
they slipped their cables and moved off. A few days afterwards, the troops were re-embarked, and all farther designs
Jul against the southern colonies being for the present
July 5. relinquished, the squadron sailed for New York.'
The attack on fort Moultrie was supported by the British seamen with their accustomed bravery; and the slaughter on board
the ships was uncommonly great. The loss of the Americans, in
killed and wounded, was only thirty-five men.
Great and well merited praise was bestowed on Colonel
Moultrie, who commanded the fort, and on the garrison, for the
resolution displayed in defending it. Nor was the glory acquired on this occasion confined to them. All the troops that
had been stationed on the island partook of it: and the thanks
of the United Colonies were voted by congress to General Lee,

1 Annual Register-Gordon-Ramsay âLetters of General Lee.

GEORGE WASHINGTON

Colonel Moultrie, Colonel Thompson, and the officers and men
under their command.
This fortunate event, for such it may well be termed, though
not of much magnitude in itself, was, like many other successes
attending the American arms in the commencement of the war,
of great importance in its consequences. By impressing on the
colonists a conviction of their ability to maintain the contest, it
increased the number of those who resolved to resist British
authority, and assisted in paving the way to a declaration of
independence.
Even before the evacuation of Boston, it had been foreseen
that New York must become the seat of war; and that most important military operations would be carried on in that colony.
The fortifications which had been commenced for the defence
of its capital were indefatigably prosecuted; and, after the arrival of General Washington, these works, combined with those
to be erected in the passes through the highlands up the Hudson, were the objects of his unremitting attention.
The difficulty which had been experienced in expelling the
British from Boston, had demonstrated the importance of preventing their establishment in New York; and had contributed
to the determination of contesting with them, very seriously,
the possession of that important place. The execution of this
determination, however, was difficult and dangerous. The defence of New York, against an enemy commanding the sea, requires an army capable of meeting him in the open field, and
of acting offensively both on Long and York Islands. Congress
had not adopted measures which might raise such an army.
The Commander-in-chief, in his letters to that body, had long
and earnestly urged the policy of bringing the whole strength
of the country into regular operation. The government was
not inattentive to his remonstrances; but many circumstances
combined to prevent such a military establishment as the exigency required.
The congress which assembled in I775, had adjourned with
strong hopes that the differences between the Mother Country
and the Colonies would soon be adjusted to their mutual satisfaction. When the temper manifested both by the king and

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his parliament had dissipated these hopes, and the immense preparations of Great Britain for war, evinced the necessity of
preparations equally vigorous on the part of America, the resolution to make them was finally taken. But, unaccustomed to
the great duties of conducting a war of vast extent, they could
not estimate rightly the value of the means employed, nor calculate the effects which certain causes would produce. Opinions
of the most pernicious tendency prevailed; from which they receded slowly, and from which they could be ultimately forced
only by melancholy experience.
The most fatal among these was the theory, that an army
could be created every campaign for the purposes of that campaign; and that such temporary means would be adequate to
the defence of the country. They relied confidently on being
able on any emergency, to call out a force suited to the occasion:
-they relied too much on the competence of such a force to the
purposes of war, and they depended too long on the spirit of
patriotism, which was believed to animate the mass of the people.
Under these impressions, the determination to form a permanent army was too long delayed; and the measures necessary to
raise such an army were deferred, till their efficacy became doubtful. It was not until June, 1776, that the representations of the
Commander-in-chief could obtain a resolution, directing
soldiers to be enlisted for three years, and offering a bounty of
ten dollars to each recruit. The time when this resolution could
certainly have been executed, had passed away. That zeal for
the service, which was manifested in the first moments of the
war, had long since begun to abate; and though the determination to resist had become more general, that enthusiasm which
prompts individuals to expose themselves to more than an equal
share of danger and hardship, was visibly declining. The progress of these sentiments seems to have been unexpected; and the
causes producing such effects appear not to have been perceived.
The regiments voted by congress were incomplete; and that
bounty, which, if offered in time, would have effected its object, came too late to fill them.
It was not in numbers only that the weakness of the American army consisted. In arms, ammunition, tents, and clothes,
its deficiency was such as to render it unfit for the great pur

GEORGE WASHINGTON

poses of war, and inferior, in all these respects, to the enemy
which it was destined to encounter.
But, however inadequate to the object the regular force might
be, both the government and the Commander-in-chief were determined to defend New York; and congress passed a resolution
to reinforce the army with thirteen thousand eight hundred
militia. For the defence of the middle colonies, and for the
purpose of repelling any attempt to land on the Jersey shore, it
was resolved to form a flying camp, to be composed of ten thousand men, to be furnished by Pennsylvania, Delaware, and
Maryland. The militia, both of the flying camp and of the
army at New York, were to be engaged to serve until the first of
December; and the Commander-in-chief was empowered to call
on the neighbouring colonies for such additional temporary aids
of militia, as the exigencies of his army might render necessary.
Great and embarrassing as were the difficulties already noticed,
they were augmented by the disaffection of the city of New
York, and of the adjacent islands. Although Governor Tryon
had found it necessary to take refuge on board some ships lying
in the harbour, he had been permitted to continue an open intercourse with the inhabitants, which enabled him to communicate
freely with the royalists; and to concert plans of future cooperation. This intercourse was broken off by the arrival of
the Commander-in-chief;-yet a plot was formed, through the
agency of the mayor, to rise in favour of the British on their
landing; and, as was understood, to seize and deliver up General
Washington himself. This plot had extended to the American
army, and even to the general's guards. It was fortunately discovered in time to be defeated; and some of the persons concerned were executed. About the same time a similar plot was
discovered in the neighbourhood of Albany; and there too, executions were found necessary.
Hitherto, the sole avowed object of the war had been a redress of grievances. The utmost horror had been expressed at
the idea of attempting independence; and the most anxious desire of re-establishing the union which had so long subsisted between the two countries on its ancient principles, was openly
and generally declared. But however sincere these declarations
might have been at the commencement of the conflict, the opera

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tion of hostilities was infallible. To profess allegiance and respect for a monarch with whom they were at open war, was an
absurdity too great to be long continued. The human mind,
when it receives a strong impulse, does not, like projectiles, stop
at the point to which the force originally applied may have been
calculated to carry it. Various causes act upon it in its course.
When the appeal was made to arms, a great majority of those
who guided the councils and led the forces of America, wished
only for a repeal of the acts of parliament which had occasioned
their resistance to the authority of the crown; and would have
been truly unwilling to venture upon the unexplored field of
self-government. For some time, prayers were offered for the
king, in the performance of divine service; and, in the proclamation of a fast by congress, in June, i775, one of the motives for
recommending it, was, to beseech the Almighty "to bless our
rightful sovereign King George III. and inspire him with wisdom."
The prejudices in favour of a connexion with England, and
of the English constitution, gradually, but rapidly yielded to republican principles, and a desire for independence. New strength
was every day added to the opinions, that a cordial reconciliation with Great Britain had become impossible; that mutual
confidence could never be restored; that reciprocal jealousy, suspicion, and hate, would take the place of that affection, which
could alone render such a connexion happy and beneficial; that
even the commercial dependence of America upon Britain, was
greatly injurious to the former, and that incalcuable benefits
must be derived from opening to themselves the markets of the
world; that to be governed by a distant nation or sovereign, unacquainted with, and unmindful of their interests, would, even
if reinstated in their former situation, be an evil too great to be
voluntarily borne. But victory alone could restore them to that
situation-and victory would give them independence. The
hazard was the same; and since the risk of every thing was unavoidable, the most valuable object ought, in common justice,
and common prudence, to be the reward of success. With such
horror, too, did they view the present war, as to suppose it could
not possibly receive the support of a free people. The alacrity

GEORGE WASHINGTON

therefore with which the English nation entered into it, was
ascribed to a secret and dangerous influence, which was, with
rapid progress, undermining the liberties and the morals of the
mother country; and which, it was feared, would cross the Atlantic, and infect the principles of the colonists likewise, should
the ancient connexion be restored. The intercourse of America with the world, and her own experience, had not then been
sufficient to teach her the important truth, that the many, as
often as the few, can abuse power, and trample on the weak,
without perceiving that they are tyrants; that they too, not unfrequently, close their eyes against the light; and shut their
ears against the plainest evidence, and the most conclusive reasoning.
It was also urged, with great effect, that the possibility of obtaining foreign aid would be much increased by holding out the
dismemberment of the British empire, to the rivals of that nation, as an inducement to engage in the contest.
American independence became the general theme of conversation; and more and more the general wish. The measures
of congress took their complexion from the temper of the people. Their proceedings against the disaffected became more and
more vigorous; their language respecting the British government was less the language of subjects, and better calculated to
turn the public attention towards congress and the provincial
assemblies, as the sole and ultimate rulers of the country. General letters of marque and reprisal were granted; and the
American ports were opened to all nations and people, not subject to the British crown.
At length, a measure was adopted, which was considered by
congress and by America in general, as deciding the
question of independence. Hitherto, it had been rec- May 6.
ommended to particular colonies, to establish temporary institutions for the conduct of their affairs during the existence of
the contest; but now, a resolution was offered, recommending
generally to such colonies as had not already established them,
the adoption of governments adequate to the exigency. Mr.
John Adams, Mr. Rutledge, and Mr. Richard Henry Lee, all
zealous advocates for independence, were appointed a committee,

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May to prepare a proper preamble to the resolution. The
report of these gentlemen was accepted, and the resolution passed.'
The provincial assemblies and conventions acted on this recommendation; and governments were generally established. In
Connecticut and Rhode Island, it was deemed unnecessary to
make any change in their actual situation, because, in those
colonies, the executive, as well as the whole legislature, had
always been elected by themselves. In Maryland, Pennsylvania,
and New York, some hesitation was at first discovered; and the
assemblies appeared unwilling to take this decisive step. The
public opinion, however, was in favour of it, and finally prevailed.
The several colonies, now contemplating themselves as sovereign states, and mingling with the arduous duty of providing
means to repel a powerful enemy, the important and interesting
labour of framing governments for themselves and their posterity, exhibited the novel spectacle of matured and enlightened
societies, uninfluenced by external or internal force, devising,
according to their own judgments, political systems for their
own government.
With the exceptions already stated, of Connecticut and Rhode
Island, whose systems had ever been in a high degree democratic,
the hitherto untried principle was adopted, of limiting the departments of government by a written constitution, prescribing
bounds not to be transcended by the legislature itself.
The solid foundations of a popular government were already
laid in all the colonies. The institutions received from England
were admirably calculated to prepare the way for temperate and
rational republics. No hereditary powers had ever existed; and
every authority had been derived either from the people or the
king. The crown being no longer acknowledged, the people
remained the only source of legitimate power. The materials
1 Before the vote on the question of independence was taken, congress passed
resolutions, declaring that all persons residing within, or passing through any one of
the United Colonies, owed allegiance to the government thereof; and that any such
person who should levy war against any of the United Colonies, or adhere to the
king of Great Britain, or other enemies of the said colonies, or any of them, should
be guilty of treason: and recommending it to the several legislatures to pass laws for
their punishment.

GEORGE WASHINGTON

in their possession, as well as their habits of thinking, were
adapted only to governments in all respects representative; and
such governments were universally adopted.
The provincial assemblies, under the influence of congress,
took up the question of independence; and, in some instances,
authorized their representatives in the great national council,
to enter into foreign alliances. Many declared themselves in
favour of a total and immediate separation from Great Britain;
and gave instructions to their representatives conforming to this
sentiment.
Thus supported by public opinion, congress determined to
take this decisive step; and on the 7th of June, a reso- June 7.
lution to that effect was moved by Richard Henry
Lee, and seconded by John Adams. The resolution was referred to a committee, who reported it in the following terms.
"Resolved, that these United Colonies are, and of right ought
to be free and independent states; and that all political connexion between them and the state of Great Britain is, and ought
to be, totally dissolved."
This resolution was referred to a committee of the whole, in
which it was debated on Saturday the 8th, and Monday the ioth
of June. It appearing that New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, and South Carolina were not yet
matured for the measure, but were fast advancing to that state,
the debate was adjourned to the first of July, when it was resumed. In the mean time, a committee' was appointed to prepare the declaration of independence, which was reported on
the 28th of June, and laid on the table. On the first of July
the debate on the original resolution was resumed. The question
was put in the evening of that day, and carried in the affirmative
by the votes of New Hampshire, Connecticut, Massachusetts,
Rhode Island, New Jersey, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina,
and Georgia, against Pennsylvania and South Carolina. Delaware was divided; and the delegates from New York, having declared their approbation of the resolution, and their conviction
that it was approved by their constituents also, but that their
1Mr. Jefferson, Mr. John Adams, Mr. Franklin, and Mr. R. R. Livingston. Mr.
R. H. Lee, the mover of the resolution, had been compelled by the illness of Mrs.
Lee to leave congress the day on which the committee was appointed.

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instructions, which had been drawn near twelve months before,
enjoined them to do nothing which might impede reconciliation
with the mother country, were permitted to withdraw from the
question. The report of the committee was put off till the next
day at the request of Mr. Rutledge of South Carolina, who expressed the opinion that his colleagues would then concur in the
resolution for the sake of unanimity. The next day South
Carolina did concur in it. The votes of Pennsylvania and Delaware were also changed by the arrival of other members. Congress then proceeded to consider the declaration of independence.
After some amendments1 it was approved, and signed by every
member present except Mr. Dickenson.2
This declaration was immediately communicated to the armies
who received it with enthusiasm. It was also proclaimed
throughout the United States, and was generally approved by
those who had engaged in the opposition to the claims of the
British Parliament. Some few individuals, who had been zealous
supporters of all measures which had for their object only a redress of grievances, and in whose bosoms the hope of accommodation still lingered,-either too timid to meet the arduous conflict which this measure rendered inevitable, or, sincerely believing that the happiness of America would be best consulted by
preserving their political connexion with Great Britain, viewed
the dissolution of that connexion with regret. Others, who
afterwards deserted the American cause, attributed their defection to this measure. It was also an unfortunate truth, that
in the whole country between New England and the Potowmac,
which was now become the great theatre of action, although the
majority was in favour of independence, a formidable minority
existed, who not only refused to act with their countrymen, but
were ready to give to the enemy every aid in their power.
It can not, however, be questioned, that the declaration of
independence was wise, and well-timed. The soundest policy
required that the war should no longer be a contest between subjects and their acknowledged sovereign.
1See Appendix, Note No. VI.
Mr. Jefferson's Correspondence, v. i. p. 14.

GEORGE WASHINGTON

CHAPTER V
WHILE congress was deliberating in Philadelphia on the great
question of independence, the British fleet appeared before New
York.
On evacuating Boston, General Howe had retired to Halifax;
where he purposed to remain till reinforcements should arrive
from England. But the situation of his army in that place was
so uncomfortable, and the delays in the arrival of the troops
from Europe were so great, that he at length resolved to sail for
New York, with the forces already under his command.
In the latter end of June, he arrived off Sandy Hook, in the
Grey Hound; and, on the 29th of that month, the first division
of the fleet from Halifax reached that place. The rear division
soon followed; and the troops were landed on Staten Island, on
the third and fourth of July. They were received with great
demonstrations of joy by the inhabitants, who took the oaths of
allegiance to the British crown, and embodied themselves under
the authority of the late Governor Tryon, for the defence of the
island. Strong assurances were also received from Long Island,
and the neighbouring parts of New Jersey, of the favourable
dispositions of a great proportion of the people to the royal
cause.
It was foreseen that the provisions remaining on the small
islands about New York, must fall into the possession of the
invading army, and General Washington had intended to remove them to a place of safety; but, the existing state of public
opinion requiring the co-operation of the several committees,
this measure of wise precaution could not be completely executed; and General Howe, on his arrival, obtained ample supplies
for his army.
The command of the fleet destined for the American service
was intrusted to Lord Howe, the brother of the general; and
they were both constituted commissioners for restoring peace to

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the colonies, and granting pardons, with such exceptions as they
should think proper to make. He arrived at Staten Island on
the twelfth of July.
The difficulty of closing the Hudson against an enemy possessing a powerful fleet was soon demonstrated. Two frigates passed
the batteries without injury, and took a station which enabled
them to cut off the communication by water, between the army
at New York, and that at Ticonderoga. An attempt to set these
frigates on fire failed in its execution, and only a tender was
burnt;-soon after which these vessels returned to the fleet.
Lord Howe was not deterred by the declaration of IndepenJuly I4 dence from trying the influence of his powers for
pacification. He sent on shore, by a flag, a circular
letter, dated off the coast of Massachusetts, 'addressed severally
to the late governors under the crown, enclosing a declaration,
which he requested them to make public. This declaration
announced his authority to grant pardons to any number or
description of persons, who, during the tumult and disorders of
the times, might have deviated from their just allegiance, and
who might be willing, by a speedy return to their duty, to reap
the benefits of the royal favour; and to declare any colony,
town, port, or place, in the peace and under the protection of
the crown, and excepted from the penal provisions of the act of
parliament prohibiting all trade and intercourse with the colonies. Assurances were also given that the meritorious services
of all persons who should aid and assist in restoring public
tranquillity in the colonies, or in any parts thereof, would be
duly considered.
These papers were immediately transmitted by the CommanJuly I9. der-in-chief to congress, who resolved that they
should "be published in the several gazettes, that the
good people of the United States might be informed of what
nature were the commissioners, and what the terms, with the
expectation of which, the insidious court of Britain had sought
to amuse and disarm them; and that the few who still remained
suspended by a hope, founded either in the justice or moderation of their late king, might now, at length, be convinced, that
the valour alone of their country is to save its liberties."
About the same time, Lord Howe sent, with a flag, a letter

GEORGE WASHINGTON

addressed to "George Washington, esquire," which the general
refused to receive, as "it did not acknowledge the public character with which he was invested by congress, and in no other
character could he have any intercourse with his lordship."
In a resolution approving this proceeding, congress directed,
"that no letter or message be received on any occasion whatever
from the enemy, by the Commander-in-chief, or others, the
commanders of the American army, but such as shall be directed
to them in the characters they respectively sustain."
The commissioners felt some difficulty in recognising either
the civil or military character conferred on individuals by the
existing powers in America; and yet it was desirable, either for
the purpose of effecting a pacification, or, if that should be impracticable, of increasing the divisions already existing, to open
negotiations, and hold out the semblance of restoring peace.
They cast about for means to evade this preliminary obstacle
to any discussion of the terms they were authorized to propose;
and, at length, Colonel Patterson, adjutant general July 20
of the British army, was sent on shore by General
Howe, with a letter directed to George Washington, &amp;c. &amp;c. &amp;c.
He was introduced to the general, whom he addressed by the
title of "Excellency;" and, after the usual compliments, opened
the subject of his mission, by saying, that General Howe much
regretted the difficulties which had arisen respecting the address
of the letters; that the mode adopted was deemed consistent
with propriety, and was founded on precedent, in cases of ambassadors and plenipotentiaries, where disputes or difficulties had
arisen about rank; that General Washington might recollect he
had, last summer, addressed a letter to "the honourable William
Howe;" that Lord, and General Howe, did not mean to derogate
from his rank, or the respect due to him, and that they held his
person and character in the highest esteem;-but that the direction, with the addition of &amp;c. &amp;c. &amp;c. implied every thing
which ought to follow. Colonel Patterson then produced a
letter which he said was the same that had been sent, and which
he laid on the table.
The general declined receiving it, and said, that a letter directed to a person in a public character, should have some description or indication of that character; otherwise it would be con

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sidered as a mere private letter. It was true the etceteras implied
every thing, and they also implied any thing; that the letter to
General Howe, alluded to, was an answer to one received from
him under a like address; which, having been taken by the officer
on duty, he did not think proper to return, and therefore answered in the same mode of address; and that he should absolutely decline any letter relating to his public station, directed
to him as a private person.
Colonel Patterson then said, that General Howe would not
urge his delicacy farther, and repeated his assertions that no
failure of respect was intended.
After some conversation relative to the treatment of prisoners, Colonel Patterson said, that the goodness and benevolence of
the king had induced him to appoint Lord Howe, and General
Howe, his commissioners to accommodate the unhappy dispute
at present subsisting: that they had great powers, and would
derive much pleasure from effecting the accommodation; and
that he wished this visit to be considered as the first advance
towards so desirable an object.
General Washington replied, that he was not vested with
any powers on this subject; but he would observe that, so far
as he could judge from what had yet transpired, Lord Howe
and General Howe were only empowered to grant pardons; that
those who had committed no fault, wanted no pardon; and that
the Americans were only defending what they deemed their
indubitable rights. This, Colonel Patterson said, would open a
very wide field for argument: and, after expressing his fears
that an adherence to forms might obstruct business of the
greatest moment and concern, he took his leave.
The substance of this conversation was communicated to
congress, who directed its publication.
The reinforcements to the British army, of whom about four
hundred and fifty had been captured by the AmerAugust. ican cruisers, were now arriving daily from Europe;
and General Howe had also been joined by the troops from
Charleston. His strength was estimated at twenty-four thousand men.
To this army, alike formidable for its numbers, its discipline,
and its equipments,-aided in its operations by a numerous fleet,

GEORGE WASHINGTON

and conducted by commanders of skill and experience, was opposed a force, unstable in its nature,-incapable, from its structure, of receiving discipline,-and inferior to its enemy, in
numbers, in arms, and in every military equipment. It consisted, when General Howe landed on Staten Island, of ten
thousand men, who were much enfeebled by sickness. The diseases which always afflict new troops, were increased by exposure to the rain and night air, without tents. At the instance
of the General, some regiments, stationed in the different states,
were ordered to join him; and, in addition to the requisitions of
men to serve until December-requisitions not yet complied
with-the neighbouring militia were called into service for the
exigency of the moment. Yet, in a letter written to congress
on the 8th of August, he stated that "for the several posts on
New York, Long, and Governor's Island, and Paulus Hook, the
army consisted of only seventeen thousand two hundred and
twenty-five men, of whom three thousand six hundred and
sixty-eight were sick; and that, to repel an immediate attack, he
could count certainly on no other addition to his numbers, than
a battalion from Maryland under the command of Colonel
Smallwood." This force was rendered the more inadequate to
its objects by being necessarily divided for the defence of posts,
some of which were fifteen miles distant from others, with
navigable waters between them.
"These things," continued the letter, "are melancholy, but
they are nevertheless true. I hope for better. Under every disadvantage, my utmost exertions shall be employed to bring
about the great end we have in view; and, so far as I can judge
from the professions and apparent dispositions of my troops, I
shall have their support. The superiority of the enemy, and
the expected attack, do not seem to have depressed their spirits.
These considerations lead me to think that though the appeal
may not terminate so happily as I could wish, yet the enemy will
not succeed in their views without considerable loss. Any advantage they may gain, I trust will cost them dear."
Soon after this letter, the army was reinforced by Smallwood's
regiment, and by two regiments from Pennsylvania, with a body
of New England and New York militia, which increased it to
twenty-seven thousand men, of whom one fourth were sick.

too

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A part of the army was stationed on Long Island, under the
command of Major General Sullivan. The residue occupied different stations on York Island, except two small detachments,
one on Governor's Island, and the other at Pauius Hook; and except a part of the New York militia under General Clinton,
who were stationed on the Sound, towards New Rochelle, and
about East and West Chester, in order to oppose any sudden
attempt which might be made to land above Kingsbridge, and
cut off the communication with the country.
Expecting daily to be attacked, and believing that the influence of the first battle would be considerable, the Commanderin-chief employed every expedient which might act upon that
enthusiastic love of liberty, that indignation against the invaders of their country, and that native courage, which were
believed to animate the bosoms of his soldiers; and which were
Aug 2 relied on as substitutes for discipline and experience.
Ag. ' "The time," say his orders issued soon after the arrival of General Howe, "is now near at hand, which must determine whether Americans are to be freemen or slaves; whether
they are to have any property they can call their own; whether
their houses and farms are to be pillaged and destroyed, and
themselves consigned to a state of wretchedness from which no
human efforts will deliver them. The fate of unborn millions
will now depend, under God, on the courage and conduct of
this army. Our cruel and unrelenting enemy leaves us only
the choice of a brave resistance, or the most abject submission.
We have therefore to resolve to conquer or to die. Our own,
our country's honour, call upon us for a vigorous and manly
exertion; and if we now shamefully fail, we shall become infamous to the whole world. Let us then rely on the goodness of
our cause, and the aid of the Supreme Being, in whose hands
victory is, to animate and encourage us to great and noble actions. The eyes of all our countrymen are now upon us, and
we shall have their blessings and praises, if happily we are the
instruments of saving them from the tyranny meditated against
them. Let us therefore animate and encourage each other, and
show the whole world that a freeman contending for liberty, on
his own ground, is superior to any slavish mercenary on earth."
To the officers, he recommended coolness in time of action;

GEORGE WASHINGTON

IOI

and to the soldiers, strict attention and obedience, with a becoming firmness and spirit.
He assured them that any officer, soldier, or corps, distinguished by any acts of extraordinary bravery, should most
certainly meet with notice and rewards; whilst, on the other
hand, those who should fail in the performance of their duty,
would as certainly be exposed and punished.
Whilst preparations were making for the expected engagement, intelligence was received of the repulse of the
British squadron which had attacked fort Moultrie. g
The Commander-in-chief availed himself of the occasion of
communicating this success to his army, to add a spirit of emulation to the other motives which should impel them to manly
exertions. "This glorious example of our troops," he said,
"under the like circumstances with ourselves, the General hopes,
will animate every officer and soldier to imitate, and even to outdo them, when the enemy shall make the same attempt on us.
With such a bright example before us of what can be done by
brave men fighting in defence of their country, we shall be
loaded with a double share of shame and infamy, if we do not
acquit ourselves with courage, and manifest a determined resolution to conquer or die."
As the crisis approached, his anxiety increased. Endeavouring
to breathe into his army his own spirit, and to give them his
own feeling, he thus addressed them. "The enemy's whole reinforcement is now arrived; so that an attack must, and will soon
be made. The General, therefore, again repeats his earnest request that every officer and soldier will have his arms and
ammunition in good order; keep within his quarters and encampments as far as possible; be ready for action at a moment's
call; and when called to it, remember, that liberty, property,
life, and honour, are all at stake; that upon their courage and
conduct, rest the hopes of their bleeding and insulted country;
that their wives, children, and parents, expect safety from them
only; and that we have every reason to believe, that heaven will
crown with success so Just a cause.
"The enemy will endeavour to intimidate by show and appearance, but remember, they have been repulsed on various occasions by a few brave Americans; their cause is bad; and if op

I02

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posed with firmness and coolness on their first onset, with our
advantage of works, and knowledge of the ground, the victory
is most assuredly ours. Every good soldier will be silent and attentive, wait for orders, and reserve his fire until he is sure of
doing execution; of this the officers are to be particularly careful."
He directed explicitly that any soldier who should attempt to
conceal himself, or retreat without orders, should instantly be
shot down; and solemnly promised to notice and reward those
who should distinguish themselves. Thus did he, by infusing
those sentiments which would stimulate to the greatest individual exertion, into every bosom, endeavour to compensate for
the want of arms, of discipline, and of numbers.
As the defence of Long Island was intimately connected with
that of New York, a brigade had been stationed at Brooklyn, a
post capable of being maintained for a considerable time. An
extensive camp had been marked out and fortified at the same
place. Brooklyn is a village on a small peninsula made by East
river, the Bay, and Gowan's Cove. The encampment fronted
the main land of the island, and the works stretched quite across
the peninsula, from Whaaleboght Bay in the East river on the
left, to a deep marsh on a creek emptying into Gowan's Cove,
on the right. The rear was covered and defended against an
attack from the ships, by strong batteries on Red Hook and on
Governor's Island, which in a great measure commanded that
part of the bay, and by other batteries on East river, which kept
open the communication with York Island. In front of the
camp was a range of hills covered with thick woods, which extended from east to west nearly the length of the island, and
across which were three different roads leading to Brooklyn
ferry. These hills, though steep, are every where passable by infantry.
The movements of General Howe indicating an intention to
make his first attack on Long Island, General Sullivan was
strongly reinforced. Early in the morning of the twentyAu t second, the principal part of the British army, under
the command of General Clinton, landed under cover
of the guns of the fleet, and extended from the ferry at the

GEORGE WASHINGTON

I03

Narrows, through Utrecht and Gravesend, to the village of
Flatland.1
Confident that an engagement must soon take place, General Washington made still another effort to inspire his troops
with the most determined courage. "The enemy," said he, in
addressing them, "have now landed on Long Island,.
and the hour is fast approaching, on which the hon- ug. 23
our and success of this army, and the safety of our bleeding
country depend. Remember, officers and soldiers, that you are
freemen, fighting for the blessings of liberty-that slavery will
be your portion and that of your posterity, if you do not acquit
yourselves like men." He repeated his instructions respecting
their conduct in action, and concluded with the most animating and encouraging exhortations.
Major General Putnam was now directed to take command
at Brooklyn, with a reinforcement of six regiments; A
and he was charged most earnestly by the Com- Aug.
mander-in-chief, to be in constant readiness for an attack, and
to guard the woods between the two camps with his best troops.
General Washington had passed the day at Brooklyn, making
arrangements for the approaching action; and, at Aug. 26
night, had returned to New York.
The Hessians under General De Heister composed the centre
of the British army at Flatbush; Major General Grant commanded the left wing which extended to the coast, and the
greater part of the British forces under General Clinton, Earl
Percy and Lord Cornwallis turned short to the right, and approached the opposite coast of Flatland.1
The two armies were now separated from each other by the
range of hills already mentioned. The British centre at Flatbush was scarcely four miles distant from the American lines at
Brooklyn; and a direct road led across the heights from the one
to the other. Another road, rather more circuitous than the
first, led from Flatbush by the way of Bedford, a small village
on the Brooklyn side of the hills. The right and left wings of
1 General Howe's letter.

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the British army were nearly equi-distant from the American
works, and about five or six miles from them. The road leading from the Narrows along the coast, and by the way of
Gowan's Cove; afforded the most direct route to their left; and
their right might either return by the way of Flatbush and
unite with the centre, or take a more circuitous course, and enter a road leading from Jamaica to Bedford. These several roads
unite between Bedford and Brooklyn, a small distance in front
of the American lines.
The direct road from Flatbush to Brooklyn was defended by a
fort which the Americans had constructed in the hills; and the
coast and Bedford roads were guarded by detachments posted
on the hills within view of the British camp. Light parties of
volunteers were directed to patrol on the road leading from
Jamaica to Bedford; about two miles from which, near Flatbush, Colonel Miles of Pennsylvania was stationed with a regiment of riflemen. The convention of New York had directed a
small body of militia to be assembled on the high grounds, near
the enemy, under the command of General Woodhull, for the
purpose of interrupting their communication with their numerous friends in that neighbourhood; but he was not placed
under the orders of the regular officer commanding on the
island.
About nine at night, General Clinton silently drew off the
van of the British army across the country, in order to seize
a pass in the heights about three miles east of Bedford, on the
Jamaica road. In the morning, about two hours
Aug. 27 before day-break, within half a mile of the pass, his
patrols fell in with and captured one of the American parties,
which had been stationed on this road. Learning from his
prisoners that the pass was unoccupied, General Clinton immediately seized it; and, on the appearance of day, the whole
column passed the heights, and advanced into the level country
between them and Brooklyn.
Before Clinton had secured the passes on the road from
Jamaica, General Grant advanced along the coast at the head
of the left wing, with ten pieces of cannon. As his first object
was to draw the attention of the Americans from their left,

Scale of Miles.
0 1 * J

4.5

of
and part of
Shewiu the 1'oituino of the
AAmericean &amp; British
Armies
before, at, and after
mte Eujagjement on the
HEIGHTS
1776.
*e

GEORGE WASHINGTON

1O5

he moved slowly, skirmishing as he advanced with the light
parties stationed on that road.'
This movement was soon communicated to General Putnam,
who reinforced the parties which had been advanced in front;
and, as General Grant continued to gain ground, still stronger
detachments were employed in this service. About three in the
morning, Brigadier General Lord Stirling was directed to meet
the enemy, with the two- nearest regiments, on the road leading from the Narrows. Major General Sullivan, who commanded all the troops without the lines, advanced at the head
of a strong detachment on the road leading directly to Flatbush; while another detachment occupied the heights between
that place and Bedford.
About the break of day, Lord Stirling reached the summit of
the hills, where he was joined by the troops which had been
already engaged, and were retiring slowly before the enemy,
who almost immediately appeared in sight. A warm cannonade was commenced on both sides, which continued for several
hours; and some sharp, but not very close skirmishing took
place between the infantry. Lord Stirling, being anxious only
to defend the pass he guarded, could not descend in force from
the heights; and General Grant did not wish to drive him from
them until that part of the plan, which had been entrusted to
Sir Henry Clinton, should be executed.
In the centre, General De Heister, soon after daylight, began
to cannonade the troops under General Sullivan; but did not
move from his ground at Flatbush, until the British right had
approached the left and rear of the American line. In the
mean time, in order the more effectually to draw their attention
from the point where the grand attack was intended, the fleet
was put in motion, and a heavy cannonade was commenced
on the battery at Red Hook.
About half past eight, the British right having then reached
Bedford, in the rear of Sullivan's left, General De Heister
ordered Colonel Donop's corps to advance to the attack of
the hill; following, himself, with the centre of the army. The
approach of Clinton was now discovered by the American left,
1 General Howe's letter.

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which immediately endeavoured to regain the camp at Brooklyn. While retiring from the woods by regiments, they encountered the front of the British. About the same time, the
Hessians advanced from Flatbush, against that part of the detachment which occupied the direct road to Brooklyn.' Here,
General Sullivan commanded in person; but he found it difficult to keep his troops together long enough to sustain the
first attack. The firing heard towards Bedford had disclosed
the alarming fact, that the British had turned their left flank,
and were getting completely into their rear. Perceiving at
once the full danger of their situation, they sought to escape
it by regaining the camp with the utmost possible celerity. The
sudden rout of this party enabled De Heister to detach a part
of his force against those who were engaged near Bedford. In
that quarter, too, the Americans were broken, and driven back
into the woods; and the front of the column led by General
Clinton, continuing to move forward, intercepted and engaged
those who were retreating along the direct road from Flatbush. Thus attacked both in front and rear, and alternately
driven by the British on the Hessians, and by the Hessians back
again on the British, a succession of skirmishes took place in
the woods, in the course of which, some parts of corps, forced
their way through the enemy, and regained the lines of Brooklyn, and several individuals saved themselves under cover of
the woods, but a great proportion of the detachment was killed
or taken. The fugitives were pursued up to the American
works; and such is represented to have been the ardour of the
British soldiers, that it required the authority of their cautious
commander to prevent an immediate assault.
The fire towards Brooklyn gave the first intimation to the
American right, that the enemy had gained their rear. Lord
Stirling perceived the danger, and that he could only escape
it by retreating instantly across the creek. This movement was
immediately directed; and, to secure it, his lordship determined
to attack, in person, a British corps under Lord Cornwallis,
stationed at a house rather above the place at which he intended
to cross the creek. About four hundred men of Smallwood's

1 General Howe's letter.

GEORGE WASHINGTON

107

regiment were drawn out for this purpose, and the attack
was made with great spirit. This small corps was brought up
several times to the charge; and Lord Stirling stated that he
was on the point of dislodging Lord Cornwallis from his
post; but the force in his front increasing and General Grant
also advancing on his rear, the brave men he commanded were
no longer able to oppose the superior numbers which assailed
them on every quarter; and those who survived were, with
their General, made prisoners of war. This attempt, though
unsuccessful, gave an opportunity to a large part of the detachment to save themselves by crossing the creek.
The loss sustained by the American army in this battle could
not be accurately ascertained by either party. Numbers were
supposed to have been drowned in the creek, or suffocated in
the marsh, whose bodies were never found; and exact accounts
from the militia are seldom to be obtained, as the list of the missing is always swelled by those who return to their homes.
General Washington did not admit it to exceed a thousand
men; but in this estimate he must have included only the regular troops. In the letter written by General Howe, the amount
of prisoners is stated at one thousand and ninety-seven; among
whom were Major General Sullivan, and Brigadiers Lord Stirling and Woodhull, by him named Udell. He computes the
loss of the Americans at three thousand three hundred men;
but his computation is probably excessive. He supposes, too,
that the troops engaged on the heights, amounted to ten thousand; but they could not have much exceeded half that number. His own loss, is stated at twenty-one officers, and three
hundred and forty-six privates; killed, wounded and taken.
As the action became warm, General Washington passed over
to the camp at Brooklyn, where he saw, with inexpressible
anguish, the destruction in which his best troops were involved, and from which it was impossible to extricate them.
Should he attempt anything in their favour with the men remaining within the lines, it was probable the camp itself would
be lost, and that whole division of his army destroyed.
Should he bring over the remaining battalions from New York,
he would still be inferior in point of numbers; and his whole
army, perhaps the fate of his country, might be staked on the

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issue of a single battle thus inauspiciously commenced. Compelled to behold the carnage of his troops, without being able
to assist them, his efforts were directed to the preservation of
those which remained.
Believing the Americans to be much stronger than they were
in reality, and unwilling to commit any thing to hazard, General Howe made no immediate attempt to force their lines. He
encamped in front of them; and, on the twenty-eighth at
night, broke ground in form, within six hundred yards of a
redoubt on the left.
In this critical state of things, General Washington determined to withdraw from Long Island. This difficult movement was effected on the night of the twenty-eighth, with
such silence, that all the troops and military stores, with the
greater part of the provisions, and all the artillery, except such
heavy pieces as could not be drawn through the roads, rendered almost impassable by the rains which had fallen, were
Aug. 29 carried over in safety. Early next morning, the
British out-posts perceived the rear guard crossing
the East river, out of reach of their fire.
From the commencement of the action on the morning
of the twenty-seventh, until the American troops had crossed
the East river on the morning of the twenty-ninth, the exertions and fatigues of the Commander-in-chief were incessant.
Throughout that time, he never closed his eyes, and was almost constantly on horseback.
The manner in which this critical operation was executed,
and the circumstances under which it was performed, added
greatly to the reputation of the American general, in the opinion of all military men. To withdraw, without loss, a defeated, dispirited, and undisciplined army from the view of
an experienced and able officer, and to transport them in safety
across a large river, while watched by a numerous and vigilant
fleet, require talents of no ordinary kind; and the retreat from
Long Island may justly be ranked among those skilful manceuvres which distinguish a master in the art of war.
The attempt to defend Long Island was so perilous in itself,
and so disastrous in its issue, that it was condemned by many

GEORGE WASHINGTON

o09

at the time, and is yet represented as a great error of the Commander-in-chief. But, in deciding on the wisdom of measures,
the event will not always lead to a correct judgment. Before
a just opinion can be formed, it is necessary to consider the
previous state of things-to weigh the motives which induced
the decision-and to compare the value of the object, and the
probability of securing it, with the hazards attending the
attempt.
It was very desirable to preserve New York, if practicable;
or, if that could not be done, to consume the campaign in the
struggle for that place. The abandonment of Long Island, besides giving the enemy secure and immediate possession of an
extensive and fertile country, would certainly facilitate the
success of his attempt upon New York. It was therefore to
be avoided, if possible.
The impossibility of avoiding it was not evident until the
battle was fought. It is true, that the American force on the
island could not have been rendered equal, even in point of
numbers, to that of the British; but, with the advantage of the
defencible country through which the assailants were to pass,
and of a fortified camp which could be attacked only on one
side, hopes might be entertained, without the imputation of
being over sanguine, of maintaining the position for a considerable time; and, ultimately, of selling it at a high price.
This opinion is supported by the subsequent movements of
General Howe, who, even after the victory of the twentyseventh, was unwilling to hazard an assault on the American
works, without the co-operation of the fleet; but chose rather
to carry them by regular approaches. Nor would the situation
of the troops on Long Island have been desperate, even in the
event of a conjoint attack by land and water, before their
strength and spirits were broken by the action of the twentyseventh. The East river was guarded by strong batteries on
both sides, and the entrance into it from the bay was defended
by Governor's Island, which was fortified, and in which two
regiments were stationed. The ships could not lie in that river,
without first silencing those batteries-a work not easily accomplished. The aid of the fleet, therefore, could be given only at

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the point of time when a storm of the works should be intended;
and when that should appear practicable, the troops might be
withdrawn from the island.
There was then considerable hazard in maintaining Long Island; but not so much as to demonstrate the propriety of relinquishing a post of such great importance, without a struggle.
With more appearance of reason, the General has been condemned for not having guarded the road which leads over the
hills from Jamaica to Bedford.
The written instructions given to the officer commanding
on Long Island, two days previous to the action, directed that
the woods should be well guarded, and the approach of the
enemy through them rendered as difficult as possible. But his
numbers were not sufficient to furnish detachments for all the
defiles through the mountains; and if a corps, capable of making an effectual resistance, had been posted on this road, and
a feint had been made on it, while the principal attack was by
the direct road from Flatbush, or by that along the coast, the
events of the day would probably have been not less disastrous.
The columns marching directly from Flatbush must, on every
reasonable calculation, have been in possession of the plain in
the rear of the detachment posted on the road from Jamaica,
so as to intercept its retreat to the camp. So great is the advantage of those who attack, in being able to choose the point
against which to direct their grand effort.
The most adviseable plan, then, appears to have been, to
watch the motions of the enemy so as to be master of his designs; to oppose with a competent force every attempt to seize
the heights; and to guard all the passes in such a manner as to
receive notice of his approach through any one of them, in
sufficient time to recall the troops maintaining the others.
This plan was adopted-and the heavy disasters of the day
are attributable, principally, to the failure of those charged
with the execution of that very important part of it which
related to the Jamaica road. The letter of General Howe states
that an American patrolling party was taken on this road; and
General Washington, in a private and confidential communication to a friend, says, "This misfortune happened, in a great
measure, by two detachments of our people who were posted

GEORGE WASHINGTON

I I I

in two roads leading through a wood, to intercept the enemy
in their march, suffering a surprise, and making a precipitate
retreat."
The events of this day, too, exhibited a practical demonstration of a radical defect in the structure of the army. It did not
contain a single corps of cavalry. That miscalculating economy
which refuses the means essential to the end, was not sufficiently
relaxed to admit of so expensive an establishment. Had the
General been furnished with a few troops of light-horse, to
serve merely as videts, it is probable that the movement so
decisive of the fate of the day could not have been made
unnoticed. The troops on the lines do not appear to have
observed the column which was withdrawn, on the evening of
the twenty-sixth, from Flatbush to Flatland. Had this important manceuvre been communicated, it would, most probably, have turned the attention of General Putnam, more particularly, to the Jamaica road. It is to the want of videts that
a failure to obtain this important intelligence is to be ascribed.
The necessity of changing the officer originally intrusted with
the command, was also an unfortunate circumstance, which
probably contributed to the event which happened.
Whatever causes might have led to this defeat, it gave a
gloomy aspect to the affairs of America. Heretofore, her arms
had been frequently successful, and her soldiers had always
manifested a great degree of intrepidity. A confidence in themselves, a persuasion of superiority over the enemy, arising from
the goodness of their cause, and their early and habitual use
of fire arms, had been carefully encouraged. This sentiment
had been nourished by all their experience preceding this event.
When they found themselves, by a course of evolutions in
which they imagined they perceived a great superiority of
military skill, encircled with unexpected dangers, from which
no exertions could extricate them, their confidence in themselves and in their leaders was greatly diminished, and the approach of the enemy inspired the apprehension that some
stratagem was concealed, from which immediate flight alone
could preserve them.
In a letter from General Washington to congress, the state
of the army after this event was thus feelingly described: "Our

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Set 2situation is truly distressing. The check our detachept 2. ment sustained on the 27th ultimo, has dispirited too
great a proportion of our troops, and filled their minds with
apprehension and despair. The militia, instead of calling forth
their utmost efforts to a brave and manly opposition, in order
to repair our losses, are dismayed, intractable, and impatient
to return. Great numbers of them have gone off; in some
instances, almost by whole regiments; in many, by half ones
and by companies, at a time. This circumstance, of itself, independent of others, when fronted by a well appointed enemy,
superior in number to our whole collected force, would be sufficiently disagreeable; but when it is added, that their example
has infected another part of the army; that their want of
discipline, and refusal of almost every kind of restraint and
government, have rendered a like conduct but too common in
the whole; and have produced an entire disregard of that order
and subordination necessary for the well doing of an army,
and which had, been before inculcated as well as the nature of
our military establishment would admit of; our condition is
still more alarming, and with the deepest concern I am obliged
to confess my want of confidence in the generality of the troops.
"All these circumstances fully confirm the opinion I ever
entertained, and which I, more than once, in my letters, took
the liberty of mentioning to congress, that no dependence could
be' placed in a militia, or other troops than those enlisted and
embodied for a longer period than our regulations have hitherto
prescribed. I am persuaded, and am as fully convinced as of any
one fact that has happened, that our liberties must, of necessity,
be greatly hazarded, if not entirely lost, if their defence be
left to any but a permanent army."
The first use made by Lord Howe of the victory of the 27th
of August, was to avail himself of the impression it had probably made on congress, by opening a negotiation in conformity
with his powers as a commissioner. For this purpose, General
Sullivan was sent on parole to Philadelphia, with a verbal message, the import of which was, "that though he could not at
present treat with congress as a political body, yet he was very
desirous of having a conference with some of its members, whom

GEORGE WASHINGTON

I I 3

he would consider, for the present, only as private gentlemen,
and meet them as such at any place they would appoint.
"That, in conjunction with General Howe, he had full powers
to compromise the dispute between Great Britain and America,
on terms advantageous to both; the obtaining of which detained
him near two months in England, and prevented his arrival in
New York before the declaration of independence took place.
"That he wished a compact might be settled at this time,
when no decisive blow was struck, and neither party could
allege being compelled to enter into such agreement.
"That in case congress were disposed to treat, many things
which they had not as yet asked, might, and ought to be granted
them; and that if, upon the conference, they found any probable ground of an accommodation, the authority of congress
must be afterwards acknowledged-otherwise the compact
would not be complete."
This proposition was not without its embarrassments. Its
rejection would give some countenance to the opinion, that, if
independence were waived, a restoration of the ancient connexion between the two countries, on principles formerly
deemed constitutional, was still practicable; an opinion which
would have an unfavourable effect on the public sentiment.
On the other hand, to enter into a negotiation under such
circumstances, might excite a suspicion, that their determination
to maintain the independence they had declared, was not immoveable; and that things were in such a situation, as to admit
of some relaxation in the measures necessary for the defence of
the country.
The answer given to Lord Howe, through General Sullivan,
was, "that congress, being the representatives of the free and
independent States of America, can not, with propriety, send
any of its members to confer with his Lordship in their private
characters; but that, ever desirous of establishing peace on reasonable terms, they will send a committee of their body to
know whether he has any authority to treat with persons authorized by congress for that purpose, on behalf of America;
and what that authority is;-and to hear such propositions as
he shall think proper to make, respecting the same."
The President was, at the same time, directed to communi

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cate to General Washington the opinion of congress, that no
propositions for making peace "ought to be received or attended
to, unless the same be made in writing, and addressed to the
representatives of the United States in congress, or persons authorized by them: And if applications on that subject be made
to him by any of the commanders of the British forces, that
he inform them, that these United States, who entered into the
war only for the defence of their lives and liberties, will cheerfully agree to peace on reasonable terms, whenever such shall
be proposed to them in manner aforesaid."
It is worthy of remark, that, in these resolutions, congress
preserves the appearance of insisting on the independence of
the United States, without declaring it to be the indispensable
condition of peace.
Mr. Franklin, Mr. John Adams, and Mr. Edward Rutledge,
all zealous supporters of independence, were appointed "to receive the communications of Lord Howe."
They waited on his Lordship; and, on their return, reported,
that he had received them on the iith of September, on Staten
Island, opposite to Amboy, with great politeness.
He opened the conversation by acquainting them, that
though he could not treat with them as a committee of congress, yet, as his powers enabled him to confer and consult
with any private gentlemen of influence in the colonies, on the
means of restoring peace between the two countries, he was
glad of this opportunity of conferring with them on that
subject; if they thought themselves at liberty to enter into a
conference with him in that character. The committee observed to his Lordship, that, as their business was to hear, he
might consider them in what light he pleased, and communicate to them any propositions he might be authorized to make
for the purpose mentioned; but that they could consider themselves in no other character than that in which they were
placed by order of congress. His Lordship then proceeded to
open his views at some length. He offered peace only on the
condition that the colonies should return to their allegiance
and obedience to the British crown. He made no explicit propositions as inducements to this measure, but gave assurances that
there was a good disposition in the king and his ministers to

GEORGE WASHINGTON

I I 5

make the government easy to them, with intimations that, in
case of submission, the offensive acts of parliament would be
revised, and the instructions to the Governors reconsidered;
so that, if any just causes of complaint were found in the acts,
or any errors in government were found to have crept into the
instructions, they might be amended or withdrawn.
The committee gave it as their opinion to his Lordship, that
a return to the domination of Great Britain was not now to be
expected. They mentioned the repeated humble petitions of
the colonies to the king and parliament, which had been treated
with contempt, and answered only by additional injuries; the
unexampled patience which had been shown under their tyrannical government; and that it was not until the late act of
parliament, which denounced war against them, and put them
out of the king's protection, that they declared their independence; that this declaration had been called for by the people
of the colonies in general, and that every colony had approved
it when made,-and all now considered themselves as independent states, and were settling, or had settled, their
governments accordingly; so that it was not in the power of
congress to agree for them that they should return to their
former dependent state; that there was no doubt of their inclination for peace, and their willingness to enter into a treaty
with Britain, that might be advantageous to both countries;
that though his Lordship had, at present, no power to treat
with them as independent states, he might, if there was the
same good disposition in Britain, much sooner obtain fresh
powers from his government, for that purpose, than powers
could be obtained by congress, from the several colonies, to consent to a submission.
His Lordship then expressed his regret that no accommodation was like to take place, and put an end to the conference.
These fruitless negotiations produced no suspension of
hostilities.
The British army, now in full possession of Long Island, was
posted from Bedford to Hurlgate; and thus fronted and threatened York Island from its extreme southern point, to the part
opposite the northern boundary of Long Island, a small distance

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below the heights of Haerlem, comprehending a space of about
nine miles.
The two armies were divided only by the East river, which
is generally less than a mile wide.
Immediately after the victory at Brooklyn, dispositions were
Sept. 4 made by the enemy to attack New York, and a part
of the fleet sailed round Long Island, and appeared
in the Sound. Two frigates passed up the East river, without
receiving any injury from the batteries, and anchored behind
a small island which protected them from the American artillery. At the same time, the main body of the fleet lay at
anchor close in with Governor's Island, from which the American troops had been withdrawn, ready to pass up either the
North or East river, or both, and act against any part of York
Island.
These movements indicated a disposition, not to make an
attack directly on New York, as had been expected, but to
land near Kingsbridge, and take a position which would cut
off the communication of the American army with the country.
Aware of the danger of his situation, General Washington
began to remove such stores as were not immediately necessary; and called a council of general officers for the purpose of
deciding, whether New York should be evacuated without delay, or longer defended.
In his letter communicating to congress the result of this
council, which was against an immediate evacuation, he manifested a conviction of the necessity of that measure, though he
yielded to that necessity with reluctance. Speaking of the enemy, he observed, "It is now extremely obvious from their movements, from our intelligence, and from every other circumstance, that, having their whole army upon Long Island, except
about four thousand men who remain on Staten Island, they
mean to enclose us in this island, by taking post in our rear,
while their ships effectually secure the front; and thus, by cutting off our communication with the country, oblige us to fight
them on their own terms, or surrender at discretion; or, if that
shall be deemed more adviseable, by a brilliant stroke endeavour
to cut this army to pieces, and secure the possession of arms and
stores, which they well know our inability to replace.

GEORGE WASHINGTON

I I7

"Having their system unfolded to us, it becomes an important consideration how it could be most successfully opposed. On every side there is a choice of difficulties, and experience teaches us, that every measure on our part (however
painful the reflection) must be taken with some apprehension,
that all our troops will not do their duty.
"In deliberating upon this great question," he added, "it was
impossible to forget that history, our own experience, the advice of our ablest friends in Europe, the fears of the enemy, and
even the declarations of congress, demonstrate that, on our side,
the war should be defensive;-(it has even been called a war of
posts;)-that we should, on all occasions, avoid a general action,
nor put any thing to the risk, unless compelled by necessity,
into which we ought never to be drawn."
After communicating the decision which had been made by
the council of officers, he stated the opinion of those who were
in favour of an immediate evacuation with such force, as to
confirm the belief that it remained his own.
The majority, who overruled this opinion, did not expect to
be able to defend the city, permanently, but to defer the time
of losing it, in the hope of wasting so much of the campaign,
before General Howe could obtain possession of it, as to prevent
his undertaking any thing farther until the following year.
They therefore advised a middle course between abandoning the
town absolutely, and concentrating their whole strength for its
defence. This was, to form the army into three divisions; one
of which should remain in New York; the second be stationed
at Kingsbridge; and the third occupy the intermediate space,
so as to support either extreme. The sick were to be immediately
removed to Orange Town. A belief that congress was inclined
to maintain New York at every hazard, and a dread of the unfavourable impression which its evacuation might make on the
people, seem to have had great influence in producing the determination to defend the place yet a short time longer.
This opinion was soon changed. The movements of the
British general indicated clearly an intention either Sept. i o.
to break their line of communication, or to enclose
the whole army in York Island. His dispositions were alike calculated to favour the one or the other of those objects. The

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general, who had continued to employ himself assiduously in
the removal of the military stores to a place of safety,' called
a second council to deliberate on the farther defence
Sept. 12. of the city, which determined, by a large majority,
that it had become not only prudent, but absolutely necessary
to withdraw the army from New York.
In consequence of this determination, Brigadier General Mercer, who commanded the flying camp on the Jersey shore, was
directed to move up the North river, to the post opposite fort
Washington; and every effort was used to expedite the removal of the stores.
On the morning of the fifteenth, three ships of war proceeded
Sept. I5. up the North river as high as Bloomingdale; a movement which entirely stopped the farther removal- of
stores by water. About eleven on the same day, Sir Henry
Clinton, with a division of four thousand men who had embarked
at the head of New Town bay, where they had lain concealed
from the view of the troops posted on York Island, proceeded
through that bay into the East river, which he crossed; and,
under cover of the fire of five men of war, landed at a place
called Kipp's bay, about three miles above New York.
The works thrown up to oppose a landing at this place, were
of considerable strength, and capable of being defended for
some time; but the troops stationed in them abandoned them
without waiting to be attacked, and fled with precipitation. On
the commencement of the cannonade, General Washington
ordered the brigades of Parsons and Fellowes to the support of
the troops posted in the lines, and rode himself towards the
scene of action. The panic of those who had fled from the
works, was communicated to the troops ordered to sustain
them; and the Commander-in-chief had the extreme mortification to meet the whole party retreating in the utmost disorder,
totally regardless of the great efforts made by their generals to
stop their disgraceful flight. Whilst General Washington was
exerting himself to rally them, a small corps of the enemy appeared; and they again broke and fled in confusion. The only
1He had, on the first appearance of the enemy in force before New York, urged
the removal of the women and children, with their most valuable effects, to a place
of safety.

GEORGE WASHINGTON

I 9

part to be taken was immediately to withdraw the few remaining troops from New York, and to secure the posts on the
heights. For this latter purpose, the lines were instantly
manned; but no attempt was made to force them. The retreat
from New York was effected with an inconsiderable loss of men,
sustained in a skirmish at Bloomingdale; but all the heavy artillery, and a large portion of the baggage, provisions, and military stores, much of which might have been saved had the post
at Kipp's bay been properly defended, were unavoidably abandoned. In this shameful day, one colonel, one captain, three
subalterns, and ten privates were killed: one lieutenant colonel,
one captain, and one hundred and fifty-seven privates were
missing.
The unsoldierly conduct displayed on this occasion was not
attributable to a want of personal courage, but to other causes.
The apprehensions excited by the defeat on Long Island had not
yet subsided; nor had the American troops recovered their confidence either in themselves or in their commanders. Their
situation appeared to themselves to be perilous; and they had
not yet acquired that temper which teaches the veteran to do his
duty wherever he may be placed; to assure himself that others
will do their duty likewise; and to reply that those, who take
into view the situation of the whole, will not expose him to useless hazard; or neglect those precautions which the safety and
advantage of the whole may require.
Unfortunately, there existed in a great part of the army,
several causes, in addition to the shortness of enlistments and
reliance on militia, which were but too operative in obstructing
the progress of these military sentiments. In New England,
whence the supplies of men had been principally drawn, the
zeal excited by the revolution had taken such 'a direction, as in
a great degree to abolish those distinctions between the platoon
officers and the soldiers, which are indispensable to the formation of an army suited to all the purposes of war. It has been
already said that these officers, who constitute an important part
of every army, were, in many companies, elected by the privates.
Of consequence, a disposition to associate with them on the
footing of equality, was a recommendation of more weight, and
frequently conducted more to the choice, than individual merit.

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Gentlemen of high rank have stated that, in some instances,
men were elected, who agreed to put their pay in a common
stock with that of the soldiers, and divide eqaally with them.
It is not cause of wonder, that among such officers, the most disgraceful and unmilitary practices should frequently prevail;
and that the privates should not respect them sufficiently, to acquire habits of obedience and subordination. This vital defect
had been in some degree remedied, in new modelling the army
before Boston; but it still existed to a fatal extent.
Having taken possession of New York, General Howe stationed a few troops in the town; and, with the main
Sept. I5. body of his army, encamped on the island near the
American lines. His right was at Horen's Hook on the East
river, and his left reached the North river near Bloomingdale;
so that his encampment extended quite across the island, which
is, in this place, scarcely two miles wide; and both his flanks were
covered by his ships.
The strongest point of the American lines was at Kingsbridge,
both sides of which had been carefully fortified. M'Gowan's
Pass, and Morris's Heights were also occupied in considerable
force, and rendered capable of being defended against superior
numbers. A strong detachment was posted in an intrenched
camp on the heights of Haerlem, within about a mile and a half
of the British lines.
The present position of the armies favoured the views of the
American General. He wished to habituate his soldiers, by a
series of successful skirmishes, to meet the enemy in the field;
and he persuaded himself that his detachments, knowing a
strong intrenched camp to be immediately in their rear, would
engage without apprehension, would soon display their native
courage, and would speedily regain the confidence they had lost.
Opportunities to make the experiments he wished were soon
Sept.. afforded. The day after the retreat from New York,
the British appeared in considerable force in the plains
between the two camps; and the General immediately rode to
his advanced posts, in order to make in person such arrangements as this movement might require. Soon after his arrival,
Lieutenant Colonel Knowlton of Connecticut, who, at the head
of a corps of rangers, had been skirmishing with this party,

GEORGE WASHINGTON

III

came in, and stated their numbers on conjecture at about three
hundred men; the main body being concealed in a wood.
The General ordered Colonel Knowlton with his rangers, and
Major Leitch with three companies of the third Virginia regiment, which had joined the army only the preceding day, to
gain their rear, while he amused them with the appearance of
making dispositions to attack their front.
This plan succeeded. The British ran eagerly down a hill,
in order to possess themselves of some fences and bushes, which
presented an advantageous position against the party expected
in front; and a firing commenced-but at too great a distance
to do any execution. In the mean time, Colonel Knowlton, not
being precisely acquainted with their new position, made his
attack rather on their flank than rear; and a warm action ensued.
In a short time, Major Leitch, who had led the detachment
with great intrepidity, was brought off the ground mortally
wounded, having received three balls through his body; and
soon afterwards the gallant Colonel Knowlton also fell. Not
discouraged by the loss of their field officers, the captains maintained their ground, and continued the action with great animation. The British were reinforced; and General Washington
ordered some detachments from the adjacent regiments of New
England and Maryland, to the support of the Americans. Thus
reinforced, they made a gallant charge, drove the enemy out of
the wood into the plain, and were pressing him still farther,
when the General, content with the present advantage, called
back his troops to their intrenchments.1
In this sharp conflict, the loss of the Americans, in killed and
wounded, did not exceed fifty men. The British lost more than
double that number. But the real importance of the affair was
derived from its operation on the spirits of the whole army. It
was the first success they had obtained during this campaign;
and its influence was very discernible. To give it the more
effect, the parole the next day was Leitch; and the General, in
his orders, publicly thanked the troops under the command of
1The author received the account of this skirmish from the Colonel of the third
Virginia Regiment, and from the Captains commanding the companies that were
engaged.

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that officer, who had first advanced on the enemy, and the others
who had so resolutely supported them. He contrasted their conduct with that which had been exhibited the day before; and
the result, he said, evidenced what might be done where officers
and soldiers would exert themselves. Once more, therefore, he
called upon them so to act, as not to disgrace the noble cause in
which they were engaged. He appointed a successor to "the
gallant and brave Colonel Knowlton, who would," he said,
"have been an honour to any country, and who had fallen
gloriously, fighting at his post."
In this active part of the campaign, when the utmost stretch
of every faculty was required, to watch and counteract the plans
of a skilful and powerful enemy, the effects of the original
errors committed by the government, in its military establishment, were beginning to be so seriously felt, as to compel the
Commander-in-chief to devote a portion of his time and attention to the complete removal of the causes which produced
them.
The situation of America was becoming extremely critical.
The almost entire dissolution of the existing army, by the expiration of the time for which the greater number of the troops
had been engaged, was fast approaching. No steps had been
taken to recruit the new regiments which congress had resolved
to raise for the ensuing campaign and there was much reason to
apprehend, that in the actual state of things, the terms offered
would not hold forth sufficient inducements to fill them.
With so unpromising a prospect before him, the General
found himself pressed by an army, permanent in its establishment, supplied with every requisite of war, formidable for its
discipline and the experience of its leaders, and superior to him
in numbers. These circumstances, and the impressions they
created, will be best exhibited by an extract from a
Sept. 24. letter written at the time to congress. It is in these
words: "From the hours allotted to sleep, I will borrow a few
moments to convey my thoughts, on sundry important matters, to congress. I shall offer them with that sincerity which
ought to characterize a man of candour; and with the freedom
which may be used in giving useful information, without incurring the imputation of presumption.

GEORGE WASHINGTON

123

"We are now, as it were, upon the eve of another dissolution
of our army. The remembrance of the difficulties which happened upon that occasion last year; the consequences which
might have followed the change, if proper advantages had been
taken by the enemy; added to a knowledge of the present temper and disposition of the troops; reflect but a very gloomy
prospect upon the appearance of things now, and satisfy me,
beyond the possibility of doubt, that unless some speedy and
effectual measures are adopted by congress, our cause will be
lost.
"It is in vain to expect that any, or more than a trifling part of
this army, will engage again in the service, on the encouragement
offered by congress. When men find that their townsmen and
companions are receiving twenty, thirty, and more dollars, for a
few months service, (which is truly the case,) this can not be
expected, without using compulsion; and to force them into the
service would answer no valuable purpose. When men are irritated, and their passions inflamed, they fly hastily and cheerfully
to arms; but after the first emotions are over, to expect among
such people as compose the bulk of an army, that they are influenced by any other motives than those of interest, is to look
for what never did, and I fear never will happen; the congress
will deceive themselves therefore if they expect it.
"A soldier, reasoned with upon the goodness of the cause he
is engaged in, and the inestimable rights he is contending for,
hears you with patience, and acknowledges the truth of your
observations; but adds, that it is of no more consequence to
him than to others. The officer makes you the same reply, with
this further remark, that his pay will not support him, and he
can not ruin himself and family to serve his country, when
every member of the community is equally benefited and interested by his labours. The few, therefore, who act upon principles of disinterestedness, are, comparatively speaking, no more
than a drop in the ocean. It becomes evidently clear, then, that
as this contest is not likely to become the work of a day; as the
war must be carried on systematically; and to do it, you must
have good officers; there is, in my judgment, no other possible
means to obtain them, but by establishing your army upon a
permanent footing, and giving your officers good pay. This

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will induce gentlemen, and men of character, to engage; and,
until the bulk of your officers are composed of such persons as
are actuated by principles of honour and a spirit of enterprise,
you have little to expect from them. They ought to have such
allowances as will enable them to live like, and support the
character of gentlemen, and not be driven by a scanty pittance
to the low and dirty arts which many of them practise, to filch
the public of more than the difference of pay would amount
to, upon an ample allowance. Besides, something is due to the
man who puts his life in your hands, hazards his health, and forsakes the sweets of domestic enjoyments. Why a captain in the
continental service, should receive no more than five shillings
currency per day, for performing the same duties that an officer
of the same rank in the British service receives ten shillings
sterling for, I never could conceive; especially, when the latter
is provided with every necessary he requires, upon the best
terms, and the former can scarcely procure them at any rate.
There is nothing that gives a man consequence, and renders him
fit for command, like a support that renders him independent of
every body but the state he serves.
"With respect to the men, nothing but a good bounty can
obtain them upon a permanent establishment, and for no shorter
time than the continuance of the war ought they to be engaged; as facts incontestably prove that the difficulty and cost
of enlistments increase with time. When the army was first
raised at Cambridge, I am persuaded the men might have been
got, without a bounty, for the war: after that, they began to see
that the contest was not likely to end so speedily as was imagined,
and to feel their consequence, by remarking, that to get their
militia, in the course of the last year, many towns were induced
to give them a bounty. Foreseeing the evils resulting from this,
and the destructive consequences which would unavoidably follow short enlistments, I took the liberty, in a long letter, (date
not now recollected, as my letter book is not here,) to recommend the enlistments for and during the war, assigning such
reasons for it, as experience has since convinced me, were well
founded. At that time, twenty dollars would, I am persuaded,
have engaged the men for this term: but it will not do to look
back-and if the present opportunity is slipped, I am persuaded

GEORGE WASHINGTON

125

that twelve months more will increase our difficulties four fold.
I shall therefore take the liberty of giving it as my opinion, that
a good bounty be immediately offered, aided by the proffer of at
least a hundred, or a hundred and fifty acres of land, and a suit
of clothes, and a blanket, to each non-commissioned officer and
soldier, as I have good authority for saying, that however high
the men's pay may appear, it is barely sufficient, in the present
scarcity and dearness of all kinds of goods, to keep them in
clothes, much less to afford support to their families. If this
encouragement, then, is given to the men, and such pay allowed
to the officers, as will induce gentlemen of liberal character and
liberal sentiments to engage; and proper care and caution be
used in the nomination, (having more regard to the characters
of persons than the number of men they can enlist,) we should,
in a little time, have an army able to cope with any that can be
opposed to it, as there are excellent materials to form one out of:
but whilst the only merit an officer possesses is his ability to raise
men; whilst those men consider and treat him as an equal, and
in the character of an officer, regard him no more than a broomstick, being mixed together as one common herd; no order nor
discipline can prevail, nor will the officer ever meet with that respect which is essentially necessary to due subordination.
"To place any dependence upon militia, is assuredly resting
upon a broken staff. Men just dragged from the tender scenes
of domestic life; unaccustomed to the din of arms; totally unacquainted with every kind of military skill, which, being followed by a want of confidence in themselves, when opposed to
troops regularly trained, disciplined, and appointed-superior
in knowledge, and superior in arms-makes them timid, and
ready to fly from their own shadows. Besides, the sudden
change in their manner of living, particularly in their lodging,
brings on sickness in many, impatience in all; and such an unconquerable desire of returning to their respective homes, that
it not only produces shameful and scandalous desertions among
themselves, but infuses the like spirit into others. Again, men
accustomed to unbounded freedom and no control, can not
brook the restraint which is indispensably necessary to the good
order and government of an army; without which, licentiousness,
and every kind of disorder, triumphantly reign. To bring men

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to a proper degree of subordination, is not the work of a day, a
month, or a year; and unhappily for us, and the cause we are
engaged in, the little discipline I have been labouring to establish
in the army under my immediate command, is in a manner done
away by having such a mixture of troops as have been called together within these few months."
The frequent remonstrances of the Commander-in-chief; the
opinions of all military men; and the severe, but correcting hand
of experience, had at length produced some effect on the government of the union;-and soon after the defeat on Long
Island, congress had directed the committee composing the
board of war, to prepare a plan of operations for the next succeeding campaign. Their report proposed a permanent army to
be enlisted for the war, and to be raised by the several states,
in proportion to their ability. A bounty of twenty dollars was
offered to each recruit; and small portions of land to every
officer and soldier.
The resolutions adopting this report were received by the
Commander-in-chief soon after the transmission of the foregoing letter. Believing the inducements they held forth for the
completion of the army to be still insufficient, he, in his letter
acknowledging the receipt of them, urged in the most serious
terms, the necessity of raising the pay of the officers, and the
bounty offered to recruits. "Give me leave to say, sir," he observed, "I say it with due deference and respect, (and my knowledge of the facts, added to the importance of the cause, and the
stake I hold it in, must justify the freedom,) that your affairs
are in a more unpromising way than you seem to apprehend.
"Your army, as mentioned in my last, is upon the eve of political dissolution. True it is, you have voted a larger one in
lieu of it; but the season is late, and there is a material difference
between voting battalions, and raising men. In the latter, there
are more difficulties than Congress seem aware of; which makes
it my duty (as I have been informed of the prevailing sentiments of this army) to inform them, that unless the pay of the
officers (especially that of the field officers) is raised, the chief
part of those that are worth retaining will leave the service at
the expiration of the present term; as the soldiers will also, if

GEORGE WASHINGTON

127

some greater encouragement is not offered them, than twenty
dollars and one hundred acres of land."
After urging in strong terms the necessity of a more liberal
compensation to the army, and stating that the British were
actually raising a regiment with a bounty of ten pounds sterling
for each recruit, he added, "when the pay and establishment of
an officer once become objects of interested attention, the sloth,
negligence, and even disobedience of orders, which at this time
but too generally prevail, will be purged off;-but while the
service is viewed with indifference; while the officer conceives
that he is rather conferring than receiving an obligation: there
will be a total relaxation of all order and discipline; and every
thing will move heavily on, to the great detriment of the service,
and inexpressible trouble and vexation of the general.
"The critical situation of our affairs at this time will justify
my saying, that no time is to be lost in making fruitless experiments. An unavailing trial of a month, to get an army upon
the terms proposed, may render it impracticable to do it at all,
and prove fatal to our cause; as I am not sure whether any rubs
in the way of our enlistments, or unfavourable turn in our
affairs, may not prove the means of the enemy's recruiting men
faster than we do."
After stating at large the confusion and delay, inseparable
from the circumstance that the appointments for the new army
were to be made by the states, the letter proceeds, "upon the
present plan, I plainly foresee an intervention of time between
the old and new army, which must be filled with militia, if to
be had, with whom no man, who has any regard for his own
reputation, can undertake to be answerable for consequences.
I shall also be mistaken in my conjectures, if we do not lose the
most valuable officers in this army, under the present mode of
appointing them; consequently, if we have an army at all, it will
be composed of materials not only entirely raw, but, if uncommon pains are not taken, entirely unfit: and I see such a distrust and jealousy of military power, that the Commander-inchief has not an opportunity, even by recommendation, to give
the least assurances of reward for the most essential services.
"In a word, such a cloud of perplexing circumstances appears

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before me, without one flattering hope, that I am thoroughly
convinced, unless the most vigorous and decisive exertions are
immediately adopted to remedy these evils, the certain and absolute loss of our liberties will be the inevitable consequence: as
one unhappy stroke will throw a powerful weight into the
scale against us, and enable General Howe to recruit his army, as
fast as we shall ours; numbers being disposed, and many actually
doing so already. Some of the most probable remedies, and such
as experience has brought to my more intimate knowledge, I
have taken the liberty to point out; the rest I beg leave to submit to the consideration of congress.
"I ask pardon for taking up. so much of their time with my
opinions, but I should. betray that trust which they and my
country have reposed in me, were I to be silent upon matters so
extremely interesting."
On receiving this very serious letter, congress passed resolutions conforming to many of its suggestions. The pay of the
officers was raised, and a suit of clothes allowed annually to each
soldier: The legislatures of the states having troops in the continental service, either at New York, Ticonderoga, or New
Jersey, were requested to depute committees to those places in
order to officer the regiments on the new establishment: and it
was recommended to the committees to consult the General on
the subject of appointments.

GEORGE WASHINGTON

I29

CHAPTER VI
THE armies did not long retain their position on York Island.
General Howe was sensible of the strength of the American
camp, and was not disposed to force it. His plan was to compel
General Washington to abandon it, or to give battle in a situation in which a defeat must be attended with the total destruction
of his army. With this view, after throwing up entrenchments
on M'Gowan's hill for the protection of New York, he determined to gain the rear of the American camp, by the New
England road, and also to possess himself of the North river
above Kingsbridge. To assure himself of the practicability of
acquiring the command of the river, three frigates passed up it
under the fire from fort Washington, and from the
opposite post on the Jersey shore, afterwards called O7c7 9.
fort Lee, without sustaining any injury from the
batteries, or being impeded by the chevaux-de-frise which had
been sunk in the channel between those forts.
This point being ascertained, he embarked a great part of his
army on board flat bottomed boats, and, passing Oct. I2
through Hurl Gate into the Sound, landed at Frog's
Neck, about nine miles from the camp on the heights of
Haerlem.
In consequence of this movement, Washington strengthened
the post at Kingsbridge, and detached some regiments to West
Chester for the purpose of skirmishing with the enemy, so soon
as he should march from the ground he occupied. The road
from Frog's Point to Kingsbridge leads through a strong country, intersected by numerous stone fences, so as to render it
difficult to move artillery, or even infantry, in compact columns,
except along the main road, which had been broken up in several places. The General, therefore, entertained sanguine hopes
of the event, should a direct attack be made on his camp.
General Howe continued some days waiting for his artillery,

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military stores, and reinforcements from Staten Island, which
were detained by unfavourable winds.
In the mean time, as the habits of thinking in America required that every important measure should be the result of consultation, and should receive the approbation of a majority, the
propriety of removing the American army from its present
situation was submitted to a council of the general
t * 6officers. After much investigation, it was declared
to be impracticable, without a change of position, to keep up
their communication with the country, and avoid being compelled to fight under great disadvantages, or to surrender themselves prisoners of war. General Lee, who had just arrived
from the south, and whose experience as well as late success gave
great weight to his opinions, urged the necessity of this movement with much earnestness. It was, at the same time, determined to hold fort Washington, and to defend it as long as
possible. A resolution of congress of the iith of October, desiring General Washington, by every art and expense, to obstruct, if possible, the navigation of the river, contributed, not
inconsiderably, to this determination.
In pursuance of this opinion of the military council, measures
were taken for moving the army up the North river, so as to
extend its front, or left, towards the White Plains, beyond the
British right, and thus keep open its communication with the
country. The right, or rear division, remained a few days longer
about Kingsbridge under the command of General Lee, for the
security of the heavy baggage and military stores, which, in
consequence of the difficulty of obtaining wagons, could be
but slowly removed.
General Howe, after uniting his forces at Pell's Point, moved
Oct. i 8. forward his whole army, except four brigades destined for the defence of New York, through Pelham's manor, towards New Rochelle. Some skirmishes took
place on the march with a part of Glover's brigade, in which
the conduct of the Americans was mentioned with satisfaction
by the Commander-in-chief; and, as General Howe took post at
Oct. New Rochelle, a village on the Sound, General Washington occupied the heights between that place and
the North River.

GEORGE WASHINGTON

13 I

At New Rochelle, the British army was joined by the second
division of Germans, under the command of General Knyphausen, and by an incomplete regiment of cavalry from Ireland;
some of whom had been captured on their passage. Both armies
now moved towards the White Plains, a strong piece of ground
already occupied by a detachment of militia. The main body
of the American troops formed a long line of entrenched camps,
extending from twelve to thirteen miles, on the different heights
from Valentine's Hill, near Kingsbridge, to the White Plains,
fronting the British line of march, and the Brunx, which divided the two armies. The motions of General Howe were
anxiously watched, not only for the purposes of security, and of
avoiding a general action, but in order to seize any occasion
which might present itself of engaging his out-posts with advantage. While the British army lay at New Rochelle, the position of a corps of American loyalists commanded by Major
Rogers, was supposed to furnish such an occasion. He was advanced, farther eastward, to Mamaroneck, on the Sound, where
he was believed to be covered by the other troops. An attempt
was made to surprise him in the night, by a detachment which
should pass between him and the main body of the British army,
and, by a coup de main, bear off his whole corps. Major Rogers
was surprised, and about sixty of his regiment killed and taken.
The loss of the Americans was only two killed, and eight or ten
wounded; among the latter was Major Green of Virginia, a
brave officer, who led the detachment, and who received a ball
through his body.
Not long afterwards, a regiment of Pennsylvania riflemen,
under Colonel Hand, engaged an equal number of Hessian
chasseurs, with some advantage.
The caution of the English general was increased by these
evidences of enterprise in his adversary. His object seems to
have been to avoid skirmishes, and to bring on a general action,
if that could be effected under favourable circumstances; if not,
he calculated on nearly all the advantages of a victory from the
approaching dissolution of the American army. He proceeded
therefore slowly. His march was in close order, his encampments compact, and well guarded with artillery; and the utmost circumspection was used to leave no vulnerable point.

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As the sick and baggage reached a place of safety, General
Washington gradually drew in his out-posts, and took possession of the heights on the east side of the Brunx, fronting the
head of the British columns, at the distance of seven or eight
miles from them. The next day, he was joined by General Lee,
who after securing the sick and the baggage, had, with considerable address, brought up the rear division of the army; an operation the more difficult as the deficiency of teams was such that a
large portion of the labour usually performed by horses or
oxen, devolved on men.
General Washington was encamped on high broken ground,
with his right flank on the Brunx. This stream meandered so as
also to cover the front of his right wing, which extended along
the road leading towards New Rochelle, as far as the brow of
the hill where his centre was posted. His left, which formed
almost a right angle with his centre, and was nearly parallel to
his right, extended along the hills northward, so as to keep possession of the commanding ground, and secure a retreat, should
it be necessary, to a still stronger position in his rear.
On the right of the army, and on the west side of the Brunx,
about one mile from camp, on a road leading from the North
River, was a hill, of which General M'Dougal was ordered to
take possession, for the purpose of covering the right flank.
His detachment consisted of about sixteen hundred men, principally militia; and his communication with the main army
was open, that part of the Brunx being passable without
difficulty.
Intrenchments were thrown up to strengthen the lines.
General Howe, having made arrangements to attack Washington in his camp, advanced early in the morning in two
Oct columns, the right commanded by Sir Henry ClinO ton, and the left by General Knyphausen; and, about
ten, his van appeared in full view, on which a cannonade commenced without much execution on either side.
The British right formed behind a rising ground, about a
mile in front of the American camp, and extending from the
road leading from Mamaraneck towards the Brunx, stood opposed to the American centre.
On viewing Washington's situation, Howe, who accompanied

-I~r~

H7aop p A X s E

GEORGE WASHINGTON

I33

Knyphausen, determined to carry the hill occupied by
M'Dougal, as preliminary to an attack on the centre and right
of the American camp. He therefore directed Colonel Rawle,
with a brigade of Hessians, to cross the Brunx and make a circuit so as to turn M'Dougal's right flank, while Brigadier General Leslie, with a strong corps of British and Hessian troops
should attack him in front. When Rawle had gained his position, the detachment commanded by Leslie also crossed the
Brunx, and commenced a vigorous attack.' The militia in the
front line immediately fled; but the regulars maintained their
ground with great gallantry. Colonel Smallwood's regiment
of Maryland, and Colonel Reitzimer's of New York, advanced
boldly towards the foot of the hill to meet Leslie, but, after
a sharp encounter, were overpowered by numbers, and compelled to retreat. General Leslie then attacked the remaining
part of M'Dougal's forces, who were soon driven from the
hill, but kept up for some time an irregular fire from the
stone walls about the scene of action. General Putnam, with
Beal's brigade, was ordered to support them; but not having
arrived till the hill was lost, the attempt to regain it was
deemed unadvisable, and the troops retreated to the main army.
In this animated engagement, the loss was supposed to be
nearly equal. That of the Americans was between three and
four hundred in killed, wounded, and taken. Colonel Smallwood was among the wounded.
General Washington continued in his lines expecting an
assault. But a considerable part of the day having been exhausted in gaining the hill which had been occupied by
M'Dougal, the meditated attempt on his intrenchments was
postponed until the next morning; and the British army lay
on their arms the following night, in order of battle, on the
ground taken during the day.
This interval was employed by General Washington in
strengthening his works, removing his sick and baggage, and
preparing for the expected attack by adapting the arrangement
of his troops to the existing state of things. His left maintained
its position; but his right was drawn back to stronger ground.
1 General Howe's letter.

I34

THE LIFE OF

Perceiving this, and being unwilling to leave any thing to
hazard, Howe resolved to postpone farther offensive operations,
until Lord Percy should arrive with four battalions from New
York, and two from Mamaraneck. This reinforcement was
received on the evening of the thirtieth, and preparations were
then made to force the American intrenchments the next morning. In the night, and during the early part of the succeeding day, a violent rain still farther postponed the assault.
Having now removed his provisions and heavy baggage to
much stronger ground, and apprehending that the British general, whose left wing extended along the height, taken from
M'Dougal, to his rear, might turn his camp, and occupy the
strong ground to which he designed to retreat, should an
attempt on his lines prove successful, General Washington
Nov. I. changed his position in the night, and withdrew to
the heights of North Castle, about five miles from
the White Plains.
Deeming this position too strong to be attempted with
prudence, General Howe determined to change his plan of
operations, and to give a new direction to his efforts.'
While forts Washington and Lee were held by the Americans, his movements were checked, and York Island insecure.
With a view to the acquisition of these posts, he directed General Knyphausen to take possession of Kingsbridge, which was
defended by a small party of Americans placed in fort Independence. On his approach, this party retreated to fort Washington; and Knyphausen encamped between that place and
Kingsbridge.
In the mean time, General Howe retired slowly down the
North river. His designs were immediately penetrated by the
Nov American general, who perceived the necessity of
passing a part of his army into Jersey, but was restrained from immediately leaving the strong ground he occuNov 6. pied by the apprehension that his adversary might,
in that event, return suddenly and gain his rear.
A council of war was called, which determined unanimously,
that, should General Howe continue his march towards New
1 General Howe's letter.

GEORGE WASHINGTON

I 3

York, all the troops raised on the west side of the Hudson
should cross that river, to be afterwards followed by those
raised in the eastern part of the continent, leaving three thousand men for the defence of the Highlands about the North
river.
In a letter to congress communicating this movement of the
British army, and this determination of the council, the general said, "I can not indulge the idea that General Howe, supposing him to be going to New York, means to close the campaign, and to sit down without attempting something more.
I think it highly probable, and almost certain, that he will
make a descent with part of his troops into the Jerseys; and,
as soon as I am satisfied that the present manoeuvre is real, and
not a feint, I shall use all the means in my power to forward
a part of our force to counteract his designs.
"I expect the enemy will bend their force against fort Washington, and invest it immediately. From some advices, it is
an object that will attract their earliest attention."
He also addressed a letter to the governor of New Jersey,
expressing a decided opinion that General Howe would not
content himself with investing fort Washington, but would
invade the Jerseys; and urging him to put the militia in the
best possible condition to reinforce the army, and to take the
place of the new levies, who could not, he suggested, be depended on to continue in service one day longer than the first
of December, the time for which they were engaged.
Immediate intelligence of this movement was likewise given
to General Greene, who commanded in the Jerseys; and his attention was particularly pointed to fort Washington.
As the British army approached Kingsbridge, three ships
of war passed up the North River, notwithstanding the fire
from forts Washington and Lee, and notwithstanding the additional obstructions which had been placed in the channel.
On being informed of this, another letter was addressed to
General Greene, stating that this fact was so plain a proof of the
inefficacy of all the obstructions thrown in the river,
as to justify a change in the dispositions. which had
been made. "If," continued the letter, "we can not prevent
vessels from passing up, and the enemy are possessed of the

13 6

THE LIFE OF

surrounding country, what valuable purpose can it answer to
attempt to hold a post from which the expected benefit can
not be derived? I am therefore inclined to think it will not
be prudent to hazard the men and stores at Mount Washington; but as you are on the spot, I leave it to you to give such
orders respecting the evacuation of the place, as you may think
most advisable; and so far revoke the orders given to Colonel
Magaw to defend it to the last."
Measures were now taken to cross the North River with
the troops which had been raised on its western side, and General Washington determined to accompany that division of the
army. The eastern regiments remained on. the eastern side
of the river, under the command of General Lee, with orders
to join the Commander-in-chief, should the British army cross
the Hudson.
After visiting the posts about Peekskill, and making all the
arrangements in his power for their defence, General WashNov. I3 ington passed the North River in the rear of the
troops designed to act in the Jerseys, and proceeded
to the quarters of General Greene, near fort Lee.
From too great a confidence 1 in the strength of fort Washington, and a conviction of its importance, General Greene
had not withdrawn its garrison under the discretionary orders
he had received, but still indulged a hope that the post might
be maintained, or, should its situation become desperate, that
means might be found to transport the troops across the river
to the Jersey shore, which was defended by fort Lee.
Mount Washington is a high piece of rocky ground, near
the North River, very difficult of ascent, especially towards the
north, or Kingsbridge. The fort was capable of containing
about one thousand men; but the lines and outworks, which
were chiefly on the southern side, towards New York, were
drawn quite across the island. The ground was naturally
strong, the approaches difficult, and the fortifications, though
EExtract of a letter from General Greene, dated September rith, 1778.
"Remember the effect that the loss of the garrison of fort Washington had; there
were men enough to have defended themselves against all the army had they not been
struck with a panic; but, being most of them irregular troops, they lost their confidence when the danger began to grow pressing, and fell a prey to their own fears."
-Life of Greene, v. I, p. 12.

GEORGE WASHINGTON

137

not sufficient to resist heavy artillery, were believed to be in a
condition to resist any attempt to carry them by storm. The
garrison consisted of troops, some of whom were among the
best in the American army; and the command had been given
to Colonel Magaw, a brave and intelligent officer, in whom great
confidence was placed.
General Howe, after retiring from the White Plains, encamped at a small distance from Kingsbridge, on the heights
of Fordham; and, having made the necessary Nov. 13 -preparations for an assault, summoned the garrison N
to surrender, on pain of being put to the sword.
Colonel Magaw replied, that he should defend the place to the
last extremity, and communicated the summons to General
Greene at fort Lee, who transmitted it to the Commander-inchief, then at Hackensack. He immediately rode to fort Lee,
and, though it was late in the night, was proceeding to fort
Washington, where he expected to find Generals Putnam and
Greene, when, in crossing the river, he met those officers returning from a visit to that fort. They reported that the
garrison was in high spirits, and would make a good defence;
on which he returned with them to fort Lee.
Early next morning, Colonel Magaw posted his troops, partly
on a commanding hill north of the fort, partly in Nov. i6.
the outermost of the lines drawn across the island
on the south of the fort, and partly between those lines, on
the woody and rocky heights fronting Haerlem River, where
the ground being extremely difficult of ascent, the works were
not closed. Colonel Rawlings, of Maryland, commanded on
the hill towards Kingsbridge; Colonel Cadwallader, of Pennsylvania, in the lines, and Colonel Magaw himself continued in
the fort.
The strength of the place had not deterred the British general
from resolving to carry it by storm; and, on receiving the
answer of Colonel Magaw, arrangements were made for a vigorous attack next day. About ten, the assailants appeared before
the works, and moved to the assault in four different quarters.
Their first division consisting of Hessians and Waldeckers,
amounting to about five thousand men, under the command
of General Knyphausen, advanced on the north side of the fort,

I38

THE LIFE OF

against the hill occupied by Colonel Rawlings, who received
them with great gallantry. The second, on the east, consisting
of the British light infantry and guards, was led by Brigadier
General Matthews, supported by Lord Cornwallis, at the head
of the grenadiers and the thirty-third regiment. These troops
crossed Haerlem River in boats, under cover of the artillery
planted in the works, which had been erected on the opposite
side of the river, and landed within the third line of defence
which crossed the island. The third division was conducted
by Lieutenant Colonel Stirling, who passed the river higher
up; and the fourth by Lord Percy, accompanied by General
Howe in person. This division was to attack the lines in front,
on the south side.'
The attacks on the north and south by General Knyphausen
and Lord Percy, were made about the same instant, on Colonels
Rawlings and Cadwallader, who maintained their ground for a
considerable time; but, while Colonel Cadwallader was engaged
in the first line against Lord Percyo the second and third divisions which had crossed Haerlem River made good their landing, and dispersed the troops fronting that river, as well as a detachment sent by Colonel Cadwallader to support them. These
being overpowered, and the British advancing between the fort
and the lines, it became necessary to abandon them. In retreating to the fort, some of the men were intercepted by the
division under Colonel Stirling, and made prisoners.
The resistance on the north was of longer duration. Rawlings
maintained his ground with firmness, and his riflemen did vast
execution. A three gun battery also played on Knyphausen
with great effect. At length, the Hessian columns gained the
summit of the hill; after which, Colonel Rawlings, who perceived the danger which threatened his rear, retreated under
the guns of the fort.
Having carried the lines, and all the strong ground adjoining them, the British general again summoned Colonel Magaw
to surrender. While the capitulation was in a course of arrangement, General Washington sent him a billet, requesting
him to hold out until the evening, when means should be at

' General Howe's letter.

GEORGE WASHINGTON

139

tempted to bring off the garrison. But Magaw had proceeded
too far to retreat; and it is probable the place could not have
resisted an assault from so formidable a force as threatened
it. The greatest difficulties had been overcome; the fort was
too small to contain all the men; and their ammunition was
nearly exhausted. Under these circumstances the garrison became prisoners of war.
The loss on this occasion was the greatest the Americans
had ever sustained. The garrison. was stated by General Washington at about two thousand men. Yet, in a report published
as from General Howe, the number of prisoners is said to be
two thousand and six hundred, exclusive of officers. Either
General Howe must have included in his report persons who
were not soldiers, or General Washington must have comprehended the regulars only in his letter. The last conjecture
is most probably correct. The loss of the assailants, according
to Mr. Stedman, amounted to eight hundred men. This loss
fell heaviest on the Germans.
On the surrender of fort Washington, it was determined
to evacuate fort Lee; and a removal of the stores was immediately commenced. Before this operation could be completed,
a detachment commanded by Lord Cornwallis,
amounting to about six thousand men, crossed the
North River below Dobb's ferry, and endeavoured, by a rapid
march, to enclose the garrison between the North and Hackensack Rivers. An immediate retreat from that narrow neck of
land had become indispensable, and was with difficulty effected.
All the heavy cannon at fort Lee, except two twelve pounders,
with a considerable quantity of provisions and military stores,
including three hundred tents were lost.
After crossing the Hackensack, General Washington posted
his troops along the western bank of that river, but was unable to dispute its passage. At the head of about three thousand
effectives, exposed, without tents, in an inclement season; he was
in a level country, without a single intrenching tool, among
people far from being zealous in the American cause. In other
respects this situation was dangerous. The Passaic, in his rear,
after running several miles nearly parallel to the Hackensack,
unites with that river below the ground occupied by the

I40

THE LIFE OF

Americans, who were consequently still exposed to the hazard
of being inclosed between two rivers.
This gloomy state of things was not brightened by the
prospect before him. In casting his eyes around, no cheering
object presented itself. No confidence could be placed on receiving reinforcements from any quarter. But, in no situation
could Washington despond. His exertions to collect an army,
and to impede the progress of his enemy, were perseveringly
continued. Understanding that Sir Guy Carlton no longer
N. threatened Ticonaeroga, he directed General Schuyler
to hasten the troops of Pennsylvania and Jersey to
his assistance, and ordered 1 General Lee to cross the North
River, and be in readiness to join him, should the enemy continue the campaign. But, under the influence of the same fatal
cause which had acted elsewhere, these armies too were melting
away, and would soon be almost totally dissolved. General
Mercer, who commanded a part of the flying camp stationed
about Bergen, was also called in; but these troops had engaged
to serve only till the ist of December, and, like the other six
months men, had already abandoned the army in great numbers.
No hope existed of retaining the remnant after they should
possess a legal right to be discharged; and there was not much
probability of supplying their places with other militia. To
New England he looked with anxious hope; and his requisitions
on those states received prompt attention. Six thousand militia
from Massachusetts, and a considerable body from Connecticut,
were ordered to his assistance; but some delay in assembling
them was unavoidable, and their march was arrested by the
appearance of the enemy in their immediate neighbourhood.
Three thousand men, conducted by Sir Henry Clinton, who
were embarked on board a fleet commanded by Sir Peter Parker,
sailed late in November from New York, and, without much
opposition took possession of Newport. This invasion excited
serious alarm in Massachusetts and Connecticut, and these states
retained for their own defence, the militia who had been embodied at the instance of the Commander-in-chief.
Not intending to maintain his present position, General Wash1See note No. VII at the end of the volume.

GEORGE WASHINGTON

141

ington had placed some regiments along the Hackensack to
afford the semblance of defending its passage until his stores
could be removed; and, with the residue of the troops, crossed
the Passaic, and took post at Newark. Soon after he had
marched, Major General Vaughan appeared before the new
bridge over Hackensack. The American detachment which
had been left in the rear, being unable to defend it, broke it
down, and retired before him over the Passaic.
Having entered the open country, General Washington determinied to halt a few days on the south side of this river,
make some show of resistance, and endeavour to collect such
a force as would keep up the semblance of an army. His letters, not having produced such exertions as the public exigencies
required, he deputed General Mfflin to the government of
Pennsylvania, and Colonel Reid, his Adjutant General, to the
government of New Jersey, with orders to represent the real
situation of the army, and the certainty that, without great
reinforcements, Philadelphia must fall into the hands of the
enemy, and the state of Jersey be overrun.
While thus endeavouring to strengthen himself with militia,
he pressed General Lee to hasten his march, and cautioned him
to keep high enough up the country to avoid the enemy, who,
having got possession of the mail containing one of his late
letters, would certainly endeavour to prevent the junction of
the two armies.
This perilous state of things was rendered still more critical
by indications of an insurrection in the county of Monmouth,
in Jersey, where great numbers favoured the royal cause. In
other places, too, a hostile temper was displayed, and an indisposition to farther resistance began to be manifested throughout that state. These appearances obliged him to make detachments from the militia of his army, to overawe the disaffected
of Monmouth, who were on the point of assembling in force.
As the British army crossed the Passaic, General Washington
abandoned his position behind that river; and the Nov z8.
day Lord Cornwallis entered Newark, he retreated
to Brunswick, a small village on the Raritan.
At this place, the levies drawn from Maryland and Jersey

I42

THE LIFE OF

Dec. i to compose the flying camp, became entitled to their
discharge. No remonstrances could detain them;
and he sustained the mortification of seeing his feeble army still
more enfeebled by being entirely abandoned by these troops,
in the face of an advancing enemy. The Pennsylvania militia
belonging to the flying camp were engaged to serve till the
ist of January. So many of them deserted, that it was deemed
necessary to place guards on the roads, and ferries over the
Delaware, to apprehend and send them back to camp. The Governor of New Jersey was again pressed for assistance, but it
was not in his power to furnish the aid required. The well
affected part of the lower country was overawed by the British
army; and the militia of Morris and Sussex came out slowly and
reluctantly.
While at Brunswick, attempts were made to retard the advance of the British army by movements indicating an intention to act on the offensive; but this feint was unavailing.
Lord Cornwallis continued to press forward, and, as his advanced guards showed themselves on the opposite side of the
bridge, General Washington evacuated the town, and marched
through Princeton to Trenton. Directions had already been
given to collect all the boats on the Delaware from
Dec. 2. Philadelphia upwards for seventy miles, in the hope
that the progress of the enemy might be stopped at this river;
and that, in the mean time, reinforcements might arrive which
would enable him to dispute its passage.
Having, with great labour, transported the few remaining
military stores and baggage over the Delaware, he determined
to remain as long as possible on the northern banks of that
river.
The army which was thus pressed slowly through the Jerseys,
was aided by no other cavalry than a small corps of badly
mounted Connecticut militia, commanded by Malor Shelden;
and was almost equally destitute of artillery. Its numbers, at
no time during the retreat, exceeded four thousand men, and
on reaching the Delaware, was reduced to less than three thousand; of whom, not quite one thousand were militia of New
Jersey. Even among the continental troops there were many
whose term of service was about to expire.

GEORGE WASHINGTON

I143

Its defectiveness of numbers did not constitute its only
weakness. The regulars were badly armed, worse clad, and
almost destitute of tents, blankets, or utensils for dressing their
food. They were composed chiefly of the garrison of fort
Lee, and had been obliged to evacuate that place with too
much precipitation to bring with them even those few articles
of comfort and accommodation with which they had been furnished. The Commander-in-chief found himself at the head
of this small band of soldiers, dispirited by their losses and
fatigues, retreating almost naked and barefooted, in the cold
of November and December, before a numerous, well appointed,
and victorious army, through a desponding country, much more
disposed to obtain safety by submission, than to seek it by
a manly resistance.
In this crisis of American affairs, a proclamation was issued
by Lord and General Howe, as commissioners appointed on
the part of the crown for restoring peace to America, commanding all persons assembled in arms against his majesty's
government, to disband and return to their homes; and all
civil officers to desist from their treasonable practices, and relinquish their usurped authority. A full pardon was offered
to every person who would, within sixty days, appear before
certain civil or military officers of the crown, claim the benefit
of that proclamation, and testify his obedience to the laws
by subscribing a declaration of his submission to the royal
authority. Copies of it were dispersed through the country,
after which numbers flocked in daily, to make their peace
and obtain protection. The contrast between the splendid
appearance of the pursuing army, and that of the ragged
Americans who were flying before them, could not fail to
nourish the general opinion that the contest was approaching
its termination.
Among the many valuable traits in the character of Washington, was that unyielding firmness of mind which resisted
these accumulated circumstances of depression, and supported
him under them. Undismayed by the dangers which surrounded him, he did not for an instant relax his exertions,
nor omit any thing which could obstruct the progress of the
enemy, or improve his own condition. He did not appear to

144

THE LIFE OF

despair of the public safety, but struggled against adverse fortune with the hope of yet vanquishing the difficulties which
surrounded him; and constantly showed himself to his harassed
and enfeebled army, with a serene, unembarrassed countenance,
betraying no fears in himself, and invigorating and inspiring
with confidence the bosoms of others. To this unconquerable
firmness, to this perfect self-possession under the most desperate
circumstances, is America, in a great degree, indebted for her
independence.
After removing his baggage and stores over the Delaware,
D. 6 and sending his sick to Philadelphia, the American
ec. 6. General, finding that Lord Cornwallis still continued
in Brunswick, detached twelve hundred men to Princeton in
the hope that this appearance of advancing on the British might
not only retard their progress, but cover a part of the country,
and reanimate the people of Jersey.
Some portion of this short respite from laborious service was
devoted to the predominant wish of his heart,-preparations
for the next campaign,-by impressing on congress a conviction of the real causes of the present calamitous state of things.
However the human mind may resist the clearest theoretic reasoning, it is scarcely possible not to discern obvious and radical errors, while smarting under their destructive consequences.
The abandonment of the army by whole regiments of the flying camp, in the face of an advancing and superior enemy; the
impracticability of calling out the militia of Jersey and Pennsylvania in sufficient force to prevent Lord Cornwallis from
overrunning the first state, or restrain him from entering the
last, had it not been saved by other causes, were practical lessons on the subjects of enlistments for a short time, and a
reliance on militia, which no prejudice could disregard, and
which could not fail to add great weight to the remonstrances
formerly made by the Commander-in-chief, which were now
repeated.
The exertions of General Mifflin to raise the militia of Pennsylvania, though unavailing in the country, were successful in
Philadelphia. A large proportion of the inhabitants of that
city capable of bearing arms, had associated for the general defence; and, on this occasion, fifteen hundred of them marched

GEORGE WASHINGTON

114S.

to Trenton; to which place a German battalion was also ordered by congress. On the arrival of these troops, Dec. 7.
General Washington commenced his march to Princeton, but was stopped by the intelligence that Lord Cornwallis,
having received large reinforcements, was advancing rapidly
from Brunswick by different routes, and endeavouring to gain
his rear.
On receiving this intelligence, he crossed the Delaware, and
posted his army in such a manner as to guard the Dec. 8.
fords. As his rear passed the river, the van of the
British army appeared in sight. The main body took post at
Trenton, and detachments were placed both above and below,
while small parties, without interruption from the people of the
country, reconnoitred the Delaware for a considerable distance.
From Bordentown below Trenton the course of the river turns
westward, and forms an acute angle with its course from Philadelphia to that place; so that Lord Cornwallis might cross a considerable distance above, and be not much, if any, farther from
that city than the American army.
The British General made some unsuccessful attempts to seize
a number of boats guarded by Lord Stirling, about Coryell's
Ferry; and, in order to facilitate his movements down the river,
on the Jersey shore, repaired the bridges below Trenton, which
had been broken down by order of General Washington. He
then advanced a strong detachment to Bordentown, giving indications of an intention to cross the Delaware at the same time
above and below; and either to march in two columns to Philadelphia, or completely to envelop the American army in the
angle of the river. To counteract this plan, the American General stationed a few gallies to watch the movements of his enemy below, and aid in repelling any effort to pass over to the
Pennsylvania shore; and made such a disposition of his little
army as to guard against any attempt to force a passage above,
which he believed to be the real design.
Having made his arrangements, he waited anxiously for reinforcements; and, in the mean time, sent daily parties over the
river to harass the enemy, and to observe his situation.
The utmost exertions were made by government to raise the
militia. In the hope that a respectable body of continental

I46

THE LIFE OF

troops would aid these exertions, General Washington had directed General Gates, with the regulars of the northern army,
and General Heath, with those'at Peekskill, to march to his assistance.
Although General Lee had been repeatedly urged to join the
Commander-in-chief, he proceeded slowly in the execution of
these orders, manifesting a strong disposition to retain his separate command, and rather to hang on, and threaten the rear
of the British army, than to strengthen that in its front. With
this view he proposed establishing himself at Morristown. On
receiving a letter from General Washington disapproving this
proposition, and urging him to hasten his march, Lee'still avowed
a preference for his own plan, and proceeded reluctantly towards
the Delaware. While passing through Morris county, at the
distance of twenty miles from the British encampment, he, very
incautiously, quartered under a slight guard, in a house about
three miles from his army. Information of this circumstance
was given by a countryman to Colonel Harcourt, at that time
detached with a body of cavalry to watch his movements, who
immediately formed and executed the design of seizing him.
Early in the morning of the i zth of December, this officer
reached Lee's quarters, who received no intimation of his danger
until the house was surrounded, and he found himself a prisoner.
He was carried off in triumph to the British army, where he
was, for some time, treated as a deserter from the British
service.
This misfortune made a serious impression on all America.
The confidence originally placed in General Lee had been increased by his success in the southern department, and by a belief that his opinions, during the military operations in New
York, had contributed to the adoption of those judicious movements which had, in some measure, defeated the plans of General Howe in that quarter. It was also believed that he had
dissented from the resolution of the council of war for maintaining forts Washington and Lee. No officer, except the Commander-in-chief, possessed, at that time, in so eminent a degree,
the confidence of the army, or of the country; and his loss was,
almost universally, bewailed as one of the greatest calamities
which had befallen the American arms. It was regretted by

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GEORGE WASHINGTON

147

no person more than by General Washington himself. He respected the merit of that eccentric veteran, and sincerely
lamented his captivity.
General Sullivan, on whom the command of that division devolved after the capture of Lee, promptly obeyed the orders
which had been directed to that officer; and, crossing the Delaware at Philipsburg, joined the Commander-in-chief. Dec io
On the same day General Gates arrived with a few D o
northern troops. By these and other reinforcements, the army
was augmented to about seven thousand effective men.
The attempts of the British general to get possession of boats
for the transportation of his army over the Delaware having
failed, he gave indications of an intention to close the campaign,
and to retire into winter quarters. About four thousand men
were cantoned on the Delaware at Trenton, Bordentown, the
White Horse, and Mount Holly; and the remaining part of the
army of Jersey was distributed from that river to the Hackensack. Strong corps were posted at Princeton, Brunswick, and
Elizabethtown.
To intimidate the people, and thereby impede the recruiting
service, was believed to be no inconsiderable inducement with
General Howe, for covering so large a portion of Jersey. To
counteract these views, General Washington ordered three of
the regiments from Peekskill to halt at Morristown, and to
unite with about eight hundred militia assembled at that place
under Colonel Ford. General Maxwell was sent to take command of these troops, with orders to watch the motions of the
enemy, to harass him in his marches, to give intelligence of all
his movements, to keep up the spirits of the militia, and to prevent the inhabitants from going within the British lines, and
taking protection.
The short interval between this cantonment of the British
troops, and the recommencement of active operations, was employed by General Washington in repeating the representations
he had so often made to congress, respecting preparations for
the ensuing campaign. The dangers resulting from a reliance
on temporary armies had been fully exemplified; and his remonstrances on that subject were supported by that severe experience which corrects while it chastises. In the course of the

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THE LIFE OF

campaign, he had suffered greatly from the want of cavalry, of
artillery, and of engineers. His ideas on these important subjects had been already stated to congress, and were now reurged.
With respect to the additional expense to be incurred by the
measures recommended, he observed, "that our funds were not
the only object now to be taken into consideration. The enemy,
it was found, were daily gathering strength from the disaffected.
This strength, like a snow ball by rolling, would increase, unless
some means should be devised to check effectually the progress
of their arms. Militia might possibly do it for a little while;
but in a little while also, the militia of those states which were
frequently called upon would not turn out at all, or would turn
out with so much reluctance and sloth, as to amount to the same
thing. Instance New Jersey! Witness Pennsylvania! Could any
thing but the river Delaware have saved Philadelphia?
"Could any thing," he asked, "be more destructive of the recruiting business than giving ten dollars bounty for six weeks
service in the militia, who come in, you can not tell how; go, you
can not tell when; and act, you can not tell where; who consume
your provisions, exhaust your stores, and leave you at last in a
critical moment.
"These, sir," he added, "are the men I am to depend upon ten
days hence. This is the basis upon which your cause will rest,
and must for ever depend, until you get a large standing army
sufficient of itself to oppose the enemy."
He also hinted the idea, extremely delicate in itself, of enlarging his powers so as to enable him to act, without constant
applications to congress for their sanction of measures, the immediate adoption of which was essential to the public interests.
"This might," he said, "be termed an application for powers too
dangerous to be trusted." He could only answer, "that desperate diseases required desperate remedies. He could with
truth declare that he felt no lust for power, but wished with as
much fervency as any man upon this wide extended continent,
for an opportunity of turning the sword into a plough-share;
but his feelings as an officer and a man had been such as to force
him to say, that no person ever had a greater choice of difficulties
to contend with than himself."
After recapitulating the measures he had adopted, which were

GEORGE WASHINGTON

I49

~not within his power, and urging many other necessary arrangements, he added, "it may be thought I am going a good deal out
of the line of my duty to adopt these measures, or to advise thus
freely. A character to lose; an estate to forfeit; the inestimable
blessing of liberty at stake; and a life devoted, must be my excuse."
The present aspect of American affairs was gloomy in the extreme. The existing army, except a few regiments, affording
an effective force of about fifteen hundred men, would dissolve
in a few days. New Jersey had, in a great measure, submitted;
and the militia of Pennsylvania had not displayed the alacrity
expected from them. General Howe would, most probably,
avail himself of the ice which would soon form, and of the dissolution of the American army, to pass the Delaware and seize
Philadelphia. This event was dreaded, not only on account of
its intrinsic importance, but of its peculiar effect at this time,
when an army was to be recruited on which the future hopes of
America were to rest. It was feared, and with reason, that it
would make such an impression on the public mind as to deter
the American youth from engaging in a contest becoming desperate.
Impelled by these considerations, General Washington meditated a blow on the British army, while dispersed in its cantonments, which might retrieve the affairs of America in the
opinion of the public, and recover the ground that had been
lost.
He formed the daring plan of attacking all the British posts
on the Delaware at the same instant. If successful in all, or any
of these attacks, he hoped not only to wipe off the impression
made by his losses, and by his retreat, but also to relieve Philadelphia from immediate danger, and to compel his adversary to
compress himself in such a manner as no longer to cover the
Jerseys.
The positions taken to guard the river were equally well
adapted to offensive operations.
The regulars were posted above Trenton from Yardley's up to
Coryell's Ferry. The Pennsylvania flying camp, and Jersey
militia, under the command of General Irvine, extended from
Yardley's to the ferry opposite Bordentown; and General Cad

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wallader with the Pennsylvania militia lay still lower down the
river.
In the plan of attack which had been digested, it was proposed
to cross in the night at M'Konkey's Ferry, about nine miles
above Trenton; to march down in two divisions, the one taking
the river road, and the other the Pennington road, both which
lead into the town; the first, towards that part of the western
side which approaches the river, and the last towards the north.
This part of the plan was to be executed by the General in person, at the head of about two thousand four hundred continental troops. It was thought practicable to pass them over the
river by twelve, and to reach the point of destination by five in
the morning of the next day, when the attack was to be made.
General Irvine was directed to cross at the Trenton Ferry, and to
secure the bridge below the town, in order to prevent the escape
of the enemy by that road. General Cadwallader was to pass
over at Dunk's Ferry, and carry the post at Mount Holly. It had
been in contemplation to unite the troops employed in fortifying Philadelphia, to those at Bristol, and to place the whole
under General Putnam; but such indications were given in that
city of an insurrection of the royal cause, that this part of the
plan was abandoned. The cold on the night of the 2 5th was
very severe. Snow, mingled with hail and rain, fell in great
quantities, and so much ice was made in the river that, with
every possible exertion, the division conducted by the General
in person could not effect its passage until three, nor commence
Dec. 6 its march down the river till near four. As the distance to Trenton by either road is nearly the same,
orders were given to attack at the instant of arrival, and, after
driving in the out-guards, to press rapidly after them into the
town, and prevent the main body from forming.
General Washington accompanied the upper column, and
arriving at the out-post on that road, precisely at eight, drove
it in, and, in three minutes, heard the fire from the column
which had taken the river road. The picket guard attempted
to keep up a fire while retreating, but was pursued with such
ardour as to be unable to make a stand. Colonel Rawle, who
commanded in the town, paraded his men, and met the assailants.
In the commencement of the action, he was mortally wounded,

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I 5I

upon which the troops, in apparent confusion, attempted to gain
the road to Princeton. General Washington threw a detachment into their front, while he advanced rapidly on them in person. Finding themselves surrounded, and their artillery already seized, they laid down their arms, and surrendered themselves prisoners of war. About twenty of the enemy were
killed, and about one thousand made prisoners. Six field pieces,
and a thousand stand of small arms were also taken. On the
part of the Americans, two privates were killed; two frozen
to death; and one officer, Lieutenant Monroe,' of the third Virginia regiment, and three or four privates wounded.
Unfortunately, the ice rendered it impracticable for General
Irvine to execute that part of the plan which was allotted to
him. With his utmost efforts, he was unable to cross the river;
and the road towards Bordentown remained open. About five
hundred men, among whom was a troop of cavalry, stationed in
the lower end of Trenton, availed themselves of this circumstance, and crossing the bridge in the commencement of the action, escaped down the river. The same cause prevented General
Cadwallader from attacking the post at Mount Holly. With
great difficulty a part of his infantry passed the river, but
returned on its being found absolutely impracticable to cross
with the artillery.
Although this plan failed in so many of its parts, the success
attending that which was conducted by General Washington in
person was followed by the happiest effects.
Had it been practicable for the divisions under Generals Irvine
and Cadwallader to cross the river, it was intended to proceed
from Trenton to the posts at and about Bordentown, to sweep
the British from the banks of the Delaware,2 and to maintain a
position in the Jerseys. But finding that those parts of the plan
'Since President of the United States.
A fact has been stated to the author which shows to what an extent the plan
might have been executed had it been possible to cross the river. Colonel Reed, who
was with the division of Cadwallader, passed the ferry with the van of the infantry,
and immediately despatched some trusty persons to examine the situation of the
troops at Mount Holly. The report made by his messengers was, that they had
looked into several houses in which the soldiers were quartered, and had found them
generally fast asleep, under the influence, as was supposed, of the spirituous liquors
they had drunk the preceding day, which was Christmas-day. That there appeared
to be no apprehension of danger, nor precaution against it.

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had failed, and supposing the British to remain in force below,
while a strong corps was posted at Princeton, General Washington thought it unadvisable to hazard the loss of the very important advantage already gained, by attempting to increase it,
and recrossed the river with his prisoners and military stores.
Lieutenant Colonel Baylor, his aid-de-camp, who carried the intelligence of this success to congress, was presented with a horse
completely caparisoned for service, and recommended to the
command of a regiment of cavalry.
Nothing could surpass the astonishment of the British commander at this unexpected display of vigour on the part of the
American General. His condition, and that of his country, had
been thought desperate. He had been deserted by all the troops
having a legal right to leave him; and, to render his situation
completely ruinous, nearly two-thirds of the continental soldiers
still remaining with him, would be entitled to their discharge
on the first day of January. There appeared to be no probability of prevailing on them to continue longer in the service,
and the recruiting business was absolutely at an end. The spirits
of a large proportion of the people were sunk to the lowest
point of depression. New Jersey appeared to be completely subdued; and some of the best judges of the public sentiment were
of opinion that immense numbers in Pennsylvania, also, were determined not to permit the sixty days allowed in the proclamation of Lord and Sir William Howe, to elapse, without availing themselves of the pardon it proffered. Instead of offensive
operations, the total dispersion of the small remnant of the
American army was to be expected, since it would be rendered
too feeble by the discharge of those engaged only until the last
day of December, to attempt, any longer, the defence of the
Delaware, which would by that time, in all probability, be passable on the ice. While every appearance supported these opinions, and the British General, without being sanguine, might
well consider the war as approaching its termination, this bold
and fortunate enterprise announced to him, that he was contending with an adversary who could never cease to be formidable while the possibility of resistance remained. Finding the
conquest of America more distant than had been supposed, he
determined, in the depth of winter to recommence active op

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I53

erations; and Lord Cornwallis, who had retired to New York
with the intention of embarking for Europe, suspended his departure, and returned to the Jerseys in great force, for the purpose of regaining the ground which had been lost.
Meanwhile, Count Donop, who commanded the troops below
Trenton, on hearing the disaster which had befallen Colonel
Rawle, retreated by the road leading to Amboy, and joined
General Leslie at Princeton. The next day, General Cadwallader crossed the Delaware, with orders to harass the enemy,
but to put nothing to hazard until he should be joined by the
continental battalions, who were allowed a day or two of repose, after the fatigues of the enterprise against Trenton. General Mifflin joined General Irvine with about fifteen hundred
Pennsylvania militia, and those troops also crossed the river.
Finding himself once more at the head of a force with which it
seemed practicable to act offensively, the General determined to
employ the winter in endeavouring to recover Jersey.
With this view, he ordered General Heath to leave a small
detachment at Peekskill, and with the main body of the New
England militia, to enter Jersey, and approach the British cantonments on that side. General Maxwell was ordered, with all
the militia he could collect, to harass their flank and rear, and
to attack their out-posts on every favourable occaDec 3 sion, while the continental troops, led by himself, recrossed the Delaware, and took post at Trenton. On the last
day of December, the regulars of New England were entitled to
a discharge. With great difficulty, and a bounty of ten dollars,
many of them were induced to renew their engagements for six
weeks.
The British were now collected in force at Princeton under
Lord Cornwallis; and appearances confirmed the intelligence, secretly1 obtained, that he intended to I777.
attack the American army.
Generals Mifflin and Cadwallader, who lay at Bordentown
and Crosswix, with three thousand six, hundred militia, were
1 In this critical moment, when correct intelligence was so all important, Mr.
Robert Morris raised on his private credit in Philadelphia, five hundred pounds in
specie, which he transmitted to the Commander-in-chief, who employed it in procuring information not otherwise to have been obtained.

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therefore ordered to join the Commander-in-chief, whose whole
effective force, with this addition, did not exceed five thousand
men.
Lord Cornwallis advanced upon him the next morning; and
about four in the afternoon, the van of the British
army reached Trenton. On its approach, General
Washington retired across the Assumpinck, a creek which runs
through the town. The British attempted to cross the creek at
several places, but finding all the fords guarded, they desisted
from the attempt, and kindled their fires. The Americans
kindled their fires likewise, and a cannonade was kept up on
both sides till dark.
The situation of General Washington was again extremely
critical. Should he maintain his position, he would certainly be
attacked next morning, by a force so very superior, as to render
the destruction of his little army inevitable. Should he attempt
to retreat over the Delaware, the passage of that river had been
rendered so difficult by a few mild and foggy days which had
softened the ice, that a total defeat would be hazarded. In any
event, the Jerseys would, once more, be entirely in possession of
the enemy; the public mind again be depressed; recruiting discouraged; and Philadelphia, a second time, in the grasp of General Howe.
In this embarrassing state of things, he formed the bold design
of abandoning the Delaware, and marching, by a circuitous
route, along the left flank of the British army, into its rear, at
Princeton, where its strength could not be great; and, after beating the troops at that place, to move rapidly to Brunswick,
where the baggage and principal magazines of the army lay
under a weak guard. He indulged the hope that this manceuvre would call the attention of the British general to his own
defence. Should Lord Cornwallis, contrary to every reasonable
calculation, proceed to Philadelphia, nothing worse could happen
in that quarter, than must happen should the American army
be driven before him; and some compensation for that calamity
would be obtained by expelling the enemy completely from
Jersey, and cutting up, in detail, all his parties in that state.
This plan being approved by a council of war, preparations
were made for its immediate execution. As soon as it was dark,

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I55

the baggage was removed silently to Burlington; and, about
one in the morning, after renewing their fires, and leaving their
guards to go the rounds as usual; the army decamped Jan 3
with perfect silence, and took a circuitous route along
the Quaker road to Princeton, where three British regiments had
encamped the preceding night, two of which commenced their
march early in the morning to join the rear of their army at
Maidenhead. At sunrise, when they had proceeded about two
miles, they saw the Americans on their left, advancing in a
direction which would enter the road in their rear. They immediately faced about, and, repassing Stony Brook, moved under
cover of a copse of wood towards the American van, which was
conducted by General Mercer. A sharp action ensued, which,
however, was not of long duration. The militia, of which the
advanced party was principally composed, soon gave way; and
the few regulars attached to them were not strong enough to
maintain their ground. While exerting himself gallantly to
rally his broken troops, General Mercer was mortally wounded,
and the van was entirely routed. But the fortune of the day
was soon changed. The main body, led by General Washington
in person, followed close in the rear, and attacked the British
with great spirit. Persuaded that defeat would irretrievably
ruin the affairs of America, he advanced in the very front of
danger, and exposed himself to the hottest fire of the enemy. He
was so well supported by the same troops who, a few days before, had saved their country at Trenton, that the British, in
turn, were compelled to give way. Their line was broken, and
the two regiments separated from each other. Colonel Mawhood, who commanded that in front, and was, consequently,
nearest the rear division of the army, under Lord Cornwallis, retired to the main road, and continued his march to Maidenhead.
The fifty-fifth regiment, which was on the left, being hard
pressed, fled in confusion across the fields into a back road, leading between Hillsborough and Kingston towards Brunswick.
The vicinity of the British forces at Maidenhead secured Colonel
Mawhood, and General Washington pressed forward to Princeton. The regiment remaining in that place took post in the
college, and made a show of resistance; but some pieces of artillery being brought up to play upon that building, it was

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abandoned, and the greater part of them became prisoners.
A few saved themselves by a precipitate flight to Brunswick.
In this engagement, rather more than one hundred British
were killed in the field, and near three hundred were taken
prisoners. The loss of the Americans, in killed, was somewhat
less, but in their number was included General Mercer, a valuable
officer, who had served with the Commander-in-chief during
his early campaigns in Virginia, and was greatly esteemed by
him. Colonels Haslet and Potter, Captain Neal of the artillery,
Captain Fleming and five other valuable officers, were also
among the slain.
On the return of the day-light, Lord Cornwallis discovered
that the American army had decamped in the night; and immediately conceived the whole plan. Alarmed at the danger
which threatened Brunswick, he marched with the utmost expedition for that place, and was close in the rear of the American army before it could leave Princeton.
The situation of General Washington was again perilous in
the extreme. His small army was exhausted with fatigue. His
troops had been without sleep, all of them one night, and some
of them, two. They were without blankets, many of them
were bare-footed and otherwise thinly clad, and were eighteen
miles from his place of destination. He was closely pursued
by a superior enemy who must necessarily come up with him
before he could accomplish his designs on Brunswick. Under
these circumstances he abandoned the remaining part of his
original plan, and took the road leading up the country to
Pluckemin, where his troops were permitted to refresh themselves. Lord Cornwallis continued his march to Brunswick,
which he reached in the course of that night.
The sufferings of the American soldiers had been so great
from the severity of the season, and the very active service in
which they had been engaged; their complaints, especially on
the part of the militia, were so loud; their numbers were reducing so fast by returning home, and by sickness; that General
Washington found it impracticable to continue offensive operations. He retired to Morristown, in order to put his men
under cover, and to give them some repose.
The bold, judicious, and unexpected attacks made at Trenton

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I157

and Princeton, had a much more extensive influence than would
be supposed from a mere estimate of the killed and taken. They
saved Philadelphia for the winter; recovered the state of Jersey;
and, which was of still more importance, revived the drooping
spirits of the people, and gave a perceptible impulse to the recruiting service throughout the United States.
The problem, that a nation can be defended against a permanent force, by temporary armies, by occasional calls of the husbandman from his plough to the field, was completely disproved; and, in demonstrating its fallacy, the independence
of America had nearly perished in its cradle. The utmost
efforts were now directed to the creation of.an army for the ensuing campaign, as the only solid basis on which the hopes of
the patriot could rest. During the retreat through the Jerseys, and while the expectation prevailed that no effectual resistance could be made to the British armies, some spirited men
indeed were animated to greater and more determined exertions;
but this state of things produced a very different effect on the
great mass, which can alone furnish the solid force of armies. In
the middle states especially, the panic of distrust was perceived.
Doubts concerning the issue of the contest became extensive;
and the recruiting service proceeded so heavily and slowly as
to excite the most anxious solicitude for the future.
The. affairs of Trenton and Princeton were magnified into
great victories; and were believed by the body of the people to
evidence the superiority of their army and of their general.
The opinion that they were engaged in a hopeless contest,
yielded to a confidence that proper exertions would ensure ultimate success.
This change of opinion was accompanied with an essential
change of conduct; and, although the regiments required by
congress were not completed, they were made much stronger
than was believed to be possible before this happy revolution
in the aspect of public affairs.
The firmness of congress throughout the gloomy and trying
period which intervened between the. loss of fort Washington
and the battle of Princeton, gives the members of that time a
just claim to the admiration of the world, and to the gratitude
of their fellow citizens. Undismayed by impending dangers,

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they did not, for an instant, admit the idea of surrendering the
independence they had declared, and purchasing peace by returning to their colonial situation. As the British army advanced through Jersey, and the consequent insecurity of Philadelphia rendered an adjournment from that place a necessary
measure of precaution, their exertions seemed to increase with
their difficulties. They sought to remove the despondence which
was seizing and paralysing the public mind, by an address to the
states, in which every argument was suggested which could
rouse them to vigorous action. They made the most strenuous
efforts to animate the militia, and impel them to the field, by
the agency of those whose popular eloquence best fitted them
for such a service.
When reassembled at Baltimore, the place to which they had adjourned, their resolutions exhibited no evidence of conD776. fusion or dismay; and the most judicious efforts were
made to repair the mischief produced by past errors.
Declaring that, in the present state of things, the very existence of civil liberty depended on the right execution of military powers, to a vigorous direction of which, distant, numerous,
and deliberative bodies were unequal, they authorised General
Washington to raise sixteen additional regiments, and conferred
upon him, for six months, almost unlimited powers for the
conduct of the war.
Towards the close of 1776, while the tide of fortune was
running strongest against them, some few members, distrusting
their ability to make a successful resistance, proposed to authorise their commissioners at the court of Versailles to transfer
to France the same monopoly of their trade which Great Britain
had possessed.' This proposition is stated to have been relinquished, because it was believed that concessions of this kind
would impair many arguments which had been used in
favour of independence, and disunite the people. It was next
proposed to offer a monopoly of certain enumerated articles;
but the unequal operation of this measure gave to the proposition a speedy negative. Some proposed offering to France an
offensive and defensive league; but this also was rejected. The
more enlightened members argued that, though the friendship
of small states might be purchased, that of France could not.

GEORGE WASHINGTON

11S9

They alleged that, if she would risk a war with Great Britain
by openly espousing their cause, she would not be induced to
that measure by the prospect of direct advantages, so much
as by a desire to lessen the overgrown power of a dangerous
rival.' It was therefore urged that the most certain means of
influencing France to interfere, was an assurance that the
United States were determined to persevere in refusing to resume their former allegiance. Under the influence of this
better opinion, resolutions were again entered into, directing
their commissioners in Europe to give explicit assurances of their
determination at all events to maintain their independence.
Copies of these resolutions were sent to the principal courts
of Europe; and agents were appointed to solicit their friendship to the new formed states.2 These despatches fell into the
hands of the British, and were published by them; a circumstance which promoted the views of congress, who were persuaded that an apprehension of their coming to an accommodation with Great Britain constituted a material objection to
the interference of foreign courts, in what was represented
as merely a domestic quarrel. A resolution adopted in the
deepest distress, to listen to no terms of reunion with their
parent state, would, it was believed, convince those who wished
for the dismemberment of the British empire, that sound policy
required their interference so far as to prevent the conquest
of the United States.
1 Ramsay.
2Secret Journals of Congress, vol. ii. p. 38, and post.

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CHAPTER VII
THE effect of the proclamation published by Lord and General
I7 Howe on taking possession of New Jersey, was, in
Ja777r a great degree, counteracted by the conduct of the
nurye invading army. Fortunately for the United States, the
hope that security was attainable by submission, was soon dissipated. Whatever may have been the exertions of their General
to restrain his soldiers, they still considered and treated the inhabitants rather as conquered rebels than returning friends.
Indulging in every species of licentiousness, the plunder and
destruction of property were among the least offensive of the
injuries they inflicted. The persons, not only of the men, but
of that sex through which indignities least to be forgiven, and
longest to be remembered, are received, were exposed to the
most irritating outrage. Nor were these excesses confined to
those who had been active in the American cause. The lukewarm, and even the loyalists, were the victims of this indiscriminating spirit of rapine and violence.
The effect of such proceedings on a people whose country
had never before been the seat of war, and whose non-resistance
had been occasioned solely by the expectation of that security
which had been promised as the reward of submission to the
royal authority, could not fail to equal the most sanguine hopes
of the friends of the revolution. A sense of personal wrongs
produced a temper which national considerations had proved
too weak to excite; and, when the battles of Trenton and
Princeton relieved the inhabitants from fears inspired by the
presence of their invaders, the great body of the people flew
to arms; and numbers who could not be brought into the field
to check the advancing enemy, and prevent the ravages which
uniformly afflict a country that becomes the seat of war, were
prompt in avenging those ravages. Small bodies of militia
scoured the country, seized on stragglers, behaved unexceptionably well in several slight skirmishes, and were collecting in

GEORGE WASHINGTON

such numbers as to threaten the weaker British posts with the
fate which had befallen Trenton and Princeton.
To guard against that spirit of enterprise which his adversary
had displayed to such advantage, General Howe determined
to strengthen his posts by contracting them. The positions
taken for the purpose of covering the country were abandoned;
and the British force in New Jersey was collected at New
Brunswick, on the Raritan, and at Amboy, a small town at the
mouth of that river.
Feeble as was the American army, this movement was not
effected without some loss. On the evacuation of Elizabethtown, General Maxwell attacked the British rear, and captured
about seventy men with a part of their baggage.
The American troops had been so diminished by the extreme
severity of the service, that it was with much difficulty the appearance of an army could be maintained. Fresh militia and
volunteers arrived in camp, whose numbers were exaggerated
by report. These additions to his small remaining regular force
enabled the General to take different positions near the lines
of the enemy, to harass him perpetually, restrain his foraging
parties, and produce considerable distress in his camp.
While, with little more than an imaginary army, General
Washington thus harassed and confined his adversary, he came
to the hazardous resolution of freeing himself and his Jan.
troops from the fear of a calamity which he found
it impossible to elude, and which had proved more fatal in his
camp than the sword of the enemy.
Inoculation having been rarely practised in the western world,
the American youth remained liable to the small pox. Notwithstanding the efforts to guard against this disease, it had
found its way into both the northern and middle army, and
had impaired the strength of both to an alarming degree. To
avoid the return of the same evil, the General determined to inoculate all the soldiers in the American service. With the utmost secrecy, preparations were made to give the infection in
camp; and the hospital physicians in Philadelphia were ordered
to carry all the southern troops, as they should arrive, through
the disease. Similar orders were also given to the physicians
at other places; and thus an army exempt from the fear of

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a calamity which had, at all times endangered the most important operations, was prepared for the ensuing campaign.
This example was followed through the country; and this alarming disease was no longer the terror of America.
As the main body of the British army was cantoned in Jersey,
and a strong detachment occupied Rhode Island, General Washington believed that New York could not be perfectly secure.
His intelligence strengthened this opinion; and, as an army,
respectable in point of numbers, had been assembled about
Peekskill, he ordered General Heath to approach New York for
the purpose of foraging, and, should appearances favour the
attempt, of attacking the forts which guarded the entrance into
the island. The hope was entertained that General Howe,
alarmed for New York, might either withdraw his troops from
Jersey, or so weaken his posts in that state as to endanger them.
Should this hope be disappointed, it was believed that something
handsome might be done, either on York or Long Island.
In pursuance of this plan, General Heath marched down to
West Chester, and summoned fort Independence to surrender;
but, the garrison determining to hold the place, a council of
war deemed it unadvisable to risk an assault. An embarkation
of troops which took place about that time, at Rhode Island,
alarmed General Heath for his rear, and induced him to resume his ground in the Highlands.
Though this attempt entirely failed, the Commander-inchief still meditated important operations during the winter.
All the intelligence from Europe demonstrated the necessity of
these operations, and the fallacy of the hope, still extensively
cherished that the war would be abandoned by Great Britain.
The administration was still supported by great majorities in
parliament; and the nation seemed well disposed to employ all
its means to reannex to the empire, what were still denominated,
revolted colonies. It was not to be doubted that large reinforcements would arrive in the spring; and the safety of the
nation would be in hazard should General Howe remain in
full force till they should be received. The utmost efforts
were made by the Commander-in-chief to collect a sufficient
number of troops to enable him to give a decisive blow to some
one of the positions of his enemy. The state sovereignties,

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x 63

where the real energies of government resided, were incessantly
urged to fill their regiments, and to bring their quotas into the
field, and congress, at his instance, passed resolutions authorizing
him to draw the troops from Peekskill and to call out the
militia of the neighbouring states. "It being," these resolutions
proceed to say, "the earnest desire of congress, to make the
army under the immediate command of General Washington
sufficiently strong, not only to curb and confine the enemy
within their present quarters, and prevent their drawing support of any kind from the country, but, by the divine blessing,
totally to subdue them before they can be reinforced."
These resolves were communicated to the general, in a letter,
manifesting the confident expectation of congress that the desire
expressed in them would soon be realized. But the energy
displayed in their passage, could not be maintained in their
execution.
Many causes concurred to prevent the collection of a force
competent to those vigorous operations which the enterprising
genius of the Commander-in-chief had provisionally planned,
and the sanguine temper of congress had anticipated. Some of
the state assemblies did not even complete the appointment
of officers till the spring; and then, bitter contests concerning
rank remained to be adjusted when the troops should join the
army. After these arrangements were made, the difficulty of
enlisting men was unexpectedly great. The immense hardships
to which the naked soldiers had been exposed, during a winter
campaign, in the face of a superior enemy; the mortality resulting from those hardships, and probably from an injudicious arrangement of the hospital department which was found to be
the tomb of the sick; had excited a general disgust to the
service; and a consequent unwillingness to engage in it.
From these causes the army continued so feeble that the general, instead of being able to execute the great designs he had
meditated entertained serious fears that Sir William Howe
would take the field during the winter, force his positions, cross
the Delaware on the ice, and proceed to Philadelphia. In the
apprehension of this attempt, and to avoid that confusion
which would result from the removal of stores in the crisis of
military operations, he had taken the precaution, as soon as the

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armies were in winter quarters, to convey those which were
most valuable to a distance from the route which it was supposed the British army would pursue.
The real condition of the army is exhibited in a letter from
the Commander-in-chief to congress, in answer to that which
enclosed the resolutions already mentioned, and which expressed
the brilliant schemes of victory formed by the government.
March 4 "Could I," said the general, "accomplish the imM portant objects so eagerly wished by congress; confining the enemy within their present quarters, preventing their
getting supplies from the country, and totally subduing them
before they are reinforced, I should be happy indeed. But what
prospect or hope can there be of my effecting so desirable a work
at this time? The enclosed return,1 to which I solicit the most
serious attention of congress comprehends the whole force I
have in Jersey. It is but a handful, and bears no proportion
on the scale of numbers to that of the enemy. Added to this,
the major part is made up of militia. The most sanguine in
speculation can not deem it more than adequate to the least
valuable purposes of war."
Though unable to act with the vigour he wished, the American general kept up a war of skirmishes through the winter.
In the course of it, the British loss was believed to be considerable; and hopes were entertained that, from the scarcity of
forage, neither their cavalry nor draft horses would be in a
condition to take the field when the campaign should open.
Their foraging parties were often attacked to advantage. Frequent small successes, the details of which filled the papers
throughout the United States, not only increased the confidence of the American soldiers, but served greatly to animate
the people.
The hope of collecting a sufficient force during the winter
to make any valuable impression on the British army being
disappointed, the views of the General were directed to the next
campaign.
As the new army was to be raised by the authority of the
state governments, he urged on them the necessity of bringing
1 See note No. VIII at the end of the volume.

GEORGE WASHINGTON

i65

a respectable force into the field early in the spring, with all
the earnestness which was suggested by his situation, and zeal
for the service.
In Connecticut and Massachusetts, the country was laid off
into districts, each of which was required, by a given day, to
furnish a soldier enlisted for three years, or during the war;
in default of which, one person, from those capable of bearing
arms, was to be drafted to serve until the first of the ensuing
January. The Commander-in-chief, though still deprecating
the introduction of men into the army whose terms of service
would be of short duration, felt the necessity of submitting
to this expedient, as the most eligible which could now be
adopted.
In Virginia, where the same difficulty attended enlistments,
it was proposed by the executive to fill the regiments with
volunteers, who should engage to serve for six months. This
plan was submitted to General Washington by Governor Henry,
and his opinion asked upon it. "I am under the necessity of
observing," said the General in reply, "that the volunteer plan
which you mention will never answer any valuable purpose,
and that I can not but disapprove the measure. To the short
engagements of our troops may be fairly and justly ascribed
almost every misfortune that we have experienced."
In a subsequent letter to the same gentleman, enforcing
earnestly the necessity of bringing a sufficient army into the
field, though coercive measures should be adopted, some alternatives were suggested, which, in a later period of the war, constituted the basis of various experiments to furnish the quota
of troops required from that state.
As the season for active operations approached, fresh difficulties, growing out of the organization of the American system, unfolded themselves. As every state was exposed to invasion, and the command of the ocean enabled the British
general to transfer the war, at pleasure, to any part of the
Union, the attention of each was directed exclusively to its
particular situation. Each state in the neighbourhood of the
great theatre of action, contemplating its own danger, claimed
the protection which is due from the whole to its parts. Although the object of the confederation was the same with that

i 66

THE LIFE OF

pursued by each of its members, the spirit incident to every
league could not be controlled in an empire where, notwithstanding the existence of a head, the essentials of government resided in the members. It was displayed in repeated efforts
to give to the energies of the army such various directions, as
would leave it unable to effect any great object, or to obstruct
any one plan the enemy might form. The patriotism of the
day however, and the unexampled confidence placed by all the
state governments in the Commander-in-chief, prevented the
mischiefs this spirit is so well calculated to generate. His representations made their proper impression; and the intention
of retaining continental troops for local defence was abandoned,
though with some reluctance. The burthen, however, of calling militia from their domestic avocations, at every threat of
invasion, to watch every military post in each state, became so
intolerable, that the people cast about for other expedients to
relieve themselves from its weight. The plan of raising regular
corps, to be exclusively under state authority, and thus be a
perpetual substitute for the yeomanry of the country, presented itself as the most effectual and convenient mode of protecting the coasts from insult.
During the winter, General Howe kept his troops in their
quarters, attending to their comfort. As the season for more
active operations approached, his first attention was directed
to the destruction of the scanty supplies prepared by the Americans for the ensuing campaign. A small place on the Hudson
called Peekskill, about fifty miles above New York, was generally the residence of the officer commanding in the Highlands,
and was used for the reception of stores, to be distributed into
the neighbouring posts as occasion might require. Its strength,
like that of all others depending for defence on militia, was
subject to great fluctuation. As soon as the ice was out of the
river, General Howe took advantage of its occasional weakness, to carry on an expedition against it, for the purpose of
destroying the stores there deposited, or of bringing them away.
Colonel Bird was detached up the river on this service, with
March about five hundred men, under convoy of a frigate
'and some armed vessels. General M'Dougal, whose
numbers did not at that time exceed two hundred and fifty men,

GEORGE WASHINGTON

i 67

received timely notice of his approach, and exerted himself for
the removal of the stores into the strong country in his rear.
Before this could be effected, Colonel Bird appeared; and
M'Dougal, after setting fire to the remaining stores and barracks, retired into the strong grounds in the rear of Peekskill.
The British detachment completed the conflagration, and returned to New York. During their short stay, a piquet guard
was attacked by Colonel Willet, and driven in with the loss of
a few men; a circumstance, believed by General M'Dougal, to
have hastened the re-embarkation of the detachment.
Military stores to a considerable amount had likewise been
deposited at Danbury, on the western frontier of Connecticut.
Although this place is not more than twenty miles from the
Sound, yet the roughness of the intervening country, the frequent passage of troops from the eastward through the town,
and the well known zeal of the neighbouring militia, were believed sufficient to secure the magazines collected at it. Against
Danbury an expedition was projected; and two thousand men
under the command of Governor Tryon, major general of the
provincials in the British service, assisted by Brigadiers Agnew
and Sir William Erskine, were employed in it.
On the i 5th of April the fleet appeared off the coast of
Connecticut and in the evening the troops were landed without opposition between Fairfield and Norwalk. General Silliman,
then casually in that part of the country, immediately despatched expresses to assemble the militia. In the mean time
Tryon proceeded to Danbury, which he reached about two
the next day. On his approach, Colonel Huntingdon who had
occupied the town with about one hundred and fifty men,
retired to a neighbouring height, and Danbury, with the magazines it contained, was consumed by fire. General Arnold,
who was also in the state superintending the recruiting service,
joined General Silliman at Reading, where that officer had collected about five hundred militia. General Wooster, who had
resigned his commission in the continental service, and been
appointed major general of the militia, fell in with them at the
same place, and they proceeded in the night through a heavy
rain to Bethel, about eight miles from Danbury. Having
heard next morning that Tryon, after destroying the town and

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magazines, was returning, they divided their troops; and General Wooster, with about three hundred men fell in his rear,
while Arnold, with about five hundred, crossing the country,
took post in his front at Ridgefield. Wooster came up with
his rear about eleven in the morning, attacked it with great
gallantry, and a sharp skirmish ensued, in which he was mortally wounded,' and his troops were repulsed. Tryon then
proceeded to Ridgefield, where he found Arnold already intrenched on a strong piece of ground, and prepared to dispute
his passage. A warm skirmish ensued, which continued nearly
an hour. Arnold was at length driven from the field; after
which he retreated to Paugatuck, about three miles east of
Norwalk. At break of day next morning, after setting Ridgefield on fire, the British resumed their march. About eleven
in the forenoon, they were again met by Arnold, whose numbers increased during the day to rather more than one thousand men; among whom were some continental troops. A continued skirmishing was kept up until five in the afternoon,
when the British formed on a hill near their ships. The Americans attacked them with intrepidity, but were repulsed and
broken. Tryon, availing himself of this respite, re-embarked
his troops, and returned to New York.
The loss of the British amounted to about one hundred and
seventy men. That of the Americans, was represented by Tryon,
as being much more considerable. By themselves, it was not
admitted to exceed one hundred. In this number, however,
were comprehended General Wooster, Lieutenant Colonel Gould,
and another field officer, killed; and Colonel Lamb wounded.
Several other officers and volunteers were killed.
Military and hospital stores to a considerable amount, which
were greatly needed by the army, were destroyed in the magazines at Danbury; but the loss most severely felt was rather
more than one thousand tents, which had been provided for
the campaign about to open.
Not long afterwards this enterprise was successfully retaliated. A British detachment had been for some time employed in collecting forage and provisions on the eastern end

Congress voted a monument to his memory.

GEORGE WASHINGTON

i69

of Long Island. Howe supposed this part of the country to be
so completely secure by the armed vessels which incessantly
traversed the Sound, that he confided the protection of the
stores, deposited at a small port called Sagg Harbour, to a
schooner with twelve guns, and a company of infantry.
General Parsons, who commanded a few recruits at New
Haven, thinking it practicable to elude the cruisers in the bay,
formed the design of surprising this party, and other adjacent
posts, the execution of which was entrusted to Lieutenant Colonel Meigs, a gallant officer, who had accompanied Arnold in
his memorable march to Quebec. He embarked with about
two hundred and thirty men, on board thirteen whale boats,
and proceeded along the coast of Guilford, where he was to
cross the Sound. With about one hundred and seventy of
his detachment, under convoy of two armed sloops,
he proceeded across the Sound to the north division May 23.
of the island near South Hold, in the neighbourhood of which
a small foraging party, against which the expedition was in
part directed, was supposed to lie; but they had marched two
days before to New York. The boats were conveyed across
the land, a distance of about fifteen miles, into a bay which
deeply intersects the eastern end of Long Island, where the
troops re-embarked. Crossing the bay, they landed at two in
the morning, about four miles from Sagg Harbour, which place
they completely surprised, and carried with charged bayonets.
At the same time, a division of the detachment secured the
armed schooner, and the vessels laden with forage, which were
set on fire, and entirely consumed. Six of the enemy were
killed, and ninety taken prisoners. A very few escaped under
cover of the night.
The object of his expedition being effected without the loss
of a man, Colonel Meigs returned to Guilford with his prisoners. "Having," as was stated in the letter to General Parsons, "moved with such uncommon celerity, as to have transported his men, by land and water, ninety miles in twentyfive hours." Congress directed a sword to be presented to him,
and passed a resolution expressing the high sense entertained
of his merit, and of the prudence, activity, and valour, displayed
by himself and his party.

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The exertions made by the Commander-in-chief through the
winter to raise a powerful army for the ensuing campaign, had
not been successful. The, hopes respecting its strength which
the flattering reports made from every quarter had authorised
him to form, were cruelly disappointed; and he found himself
not only unable to carry into effect the offensive operations
he had meditated, but unequal even to defensive war. That
steady and persevering courage, however, which had supported
himself and the American cause through the gloomy scenes of
the preceding year, did not forsake him; and that sound judgment which applies to the best advantage those means which
are attainable, however inadequate they may be, still remained.
His plan of operations was adapted to that which he believed
his enemy had formed. He was persuaded either that General
Burgoyne would endeavour to take Ticonderoga, and to penetrate to the Hudson, in which event General Howe would cooperate with him by moving up that river, and attempting to
possess himself of the forts and high grounds commanding its
passage; or that Burgoyne would join the grand army at New
York by sea; after which the combined armies would proceed
against Philadelphia.
To counteract the designs of the enemy, whatever they might
be, to defend the three great points, Ticonderoga, the Highlands of New York, and Philadelphia, against two powerful
armies so much superior to him, in arms, in numbers, and in
discipline, it was necessary to make such an arrangement of
his troops as would enable the parts reciprocally to aid each
other, without neglecting objects of great, and almost equal
magnitude which were alike threatened, and were far asunder.
To effect these purposes, the troops of New England and New
York were divided between Ticonderoga and Peekskill, while
those from Jersey to North Carolina inclusive, were directed
to assemble at the camp to be formed in Jersey. The more
southern troops remained in that weak quarter of the union for
its protection.
These arrangements being made, and the recruits collected,
the camp at Morristown was broken up, the detachments called
May z8 in, and the army assembled at Middlebrook, just
behind a connected ridge of strong and command

GEORGE WASHINGTON

I7I

ing heights. north of the road leading to Philadelphia, and
about ten miles from Brunswick.
This camp, the approaches to which were naturally difficult,
was rendered still more defensible by intrenchments. The
heights in front commanded a prospect of the course of the
Raritan, the road to Philadelphia, the hills about Brunswick,
and a considerable part of the country between that place and
Amboy; so as to afford a full view of the most interesting movements of the enemy.
The force brought into the field by America required all
the aid which could be derived from strong positions, and unremitting vigilance. On the 2oth of May, the total of the army
in Jersey, excluding cavalry and artillery, amounted to only
eight thousand three hundred and seventy-eight men, of whom
upwards of two thousand were sick. The effective rank and
file were only five thousand seven hundred and thirty-eight.
Had this army been composed of the best disciplined troops,
its inferiority, in point of numbers, must have limited its operations to defensive war; and have rendered it incompetent
to the protection of any place, whose defence would require a
battle in the open field. But more than half the troops 1 were
unacquainted with the first rudiments of military duty, and
had never looked an enemy in the face. As an additional cause
of apprehension, a large proportion of the soldiers, especially
from the middle states, were foreigners, many of them servants,
in whose attachment to the American cause full confidence
could not be placed.
General Washington anticipating a movement by land towards Philadelphia, had taken the precaution to give orders
for assembling on the western bank of the Delaware, an army
of militia, strengthened by a few continental troops, the command of which was given to General Arnold, who was then in
Philadelphia, employed in the settlement of his accounts.
The first and real object of the campaign, on the part of
General Howe, was the acquisition of Philadelphia. He intended
to march through Jersey; and, after securing the submission
'The extreme severity of the service, aided perhaps by the state of the hospitals,
had carried to the grave more than two-thirds of the soldiers who had served the
preceding campaign, and been engaged for more than one year.

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of that state, to cross the Delaware on a portable bridge constructed in the winter for the purpose, and proceed by land
to that city. If, in the execution of this plan, the Americans
could be brought to a general action on equal ground, the advantages of the royal army must insure a victory. But should
Washington decline an engagement, and be again pressed over
the Delaware, the object would be as certainly obtained.
Had Sir William Howe taken the field before the continental
troops were assembled, this plan might probably have been executed without any serious obstruction; but the tents and camp
equipage expected from Europe did not arrive until General
Washington had collected his forces, and taken possession of
the strong post on the heights of Middlebrook. It would be
dangerous to attack him on such advantageous ground; for,
although his camp might be forced, victory would probably
be attended with such loss, as to disable the victor from reaping
its fruits.
If it was deemed too hazardous to attack the strong camp
at Middlebrook; an attempt to cross the Delaware, in the face
of an army collected on its western bank, while that under
General Washington remained unbroken in his rear, was an
experiment of equal danger. It comported with the cautious
temper of Sir William Howe to devise some other plan of
operation to which he might resort, should he be unable to
seduce the American general from his advantageous position.
The two great bays of Delaware and Chesapeake suggested
the alternative of proceeding by water, should he be unable to
manceuvre General Washington out of his present encampment.
The plan of the campaign being settled, and some small reinJune forcements with the expected camp equipage being
e. received from Europe, General Howe, leaving a garrison in New York, and a guard in Amboy, assembled his army
at Brunswick, and gave strong indications of an
June 12. intention to penetrate through the country to the
Delaware, and reach Philadelphia by land.
Believing this to be his real design, Washington placed a select
13. corps of riflemen under the command of Colonel
June Morgan, an officer who had distinguished himself in
the unfortunate attempt to storm Quebec, and in whom those

GEORGE WASHINGTON

I173

peculiar qualities which fit a man for the command of a partisan
corps, designed to act on the lines of a formidable enemy, were
eminently united.
He was ordered to take post at Vanvighton's Bridge on the
Raritan, just above its confluence with the Millstone River, to
watch the left flank of the British army, and seize every occasion to harass it.
Early in the morning of the I4th, Sir William Howe, leaving
two thousand men under the command of General Matthews at
Brunswick, advanced in two columns towards the Delaware.
The front of the first, under Lord Cornwallis, reached Somerset Court House, nine miles from Brunswick, by the appearance of day; and the second, commanded by General de Heister,
reached Middlebush about the same time.
This movement was made with the view of inducing General
Washington to quit his fortified camp, and approach the Delaware,' in which event, the British General expected to bring
on an engagement on ground less disadvantageous than that
now occupied by the American army. But the officer understood the importance of his position too well to abandon it. On
the first intelligence that the enemy was in motion, he drew
out his whole army, and formed it, to great advantage, on the
heights in front of his camp. This position was constantly
maintained. The troops remained in order of battle during
the day; and, in the night, slept on the ground to be defended.
In the mean time the Jersey militia, with an alacrity theretofore
unexampled in that state, took the field in great numbers.
They principally joined General Sullivan, who had retired from
Princeton, behind the Sourland hills towards Flemingtown,
where an army of some respectability was forming, which could
readily co-operate with that under the immediate inspection of
the Commander-in-chief.
The settled purpose of General Washington was to defend
his camp, but not to hazard a general action on other ground.
He had therefore determined not to advance from the heights
he occupied, into the open country, either towards the enemy,
or the Delaware.

1 General Howe's letter.

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THE LIFE OF

The object of General Howe seems to have been, by acting
on his anxiety for Philadelphia, to seduce him from the strong
ground about Middlebrook, and tempt him to approach the
Delaware, in the hope of defending its passage. Should he
succeed in this, he had little doubt of being able to bring on
an engagement, in which he counted with certainty on victory. The considerations which restrained General Howe from
attempting to march through Jersey, leaving the American
army in full force in his rear, had determined Washington to
allow him to proceed to the Delaware, if such should be his
intention. In that event, he had determined to throw those
impediments only in the way of the hostile army which might
harass and retard its march; and, maintaining the high and
secure grounds north of the road to be taken by the enemy,
to watch for an opportunity of striking some important blow
with manifest advantage.
He was not long in penetrating the designs of his adversary.
"The views of the enemy," he writes to General Arnold in a
letter of the I7th, "must be to destroy this army, and get
possession of Philadelphia. I am, however, clearly of opinion,
that they will not move that way until they have endeavoured
to give a severe blow to this army. The risk would be too great
to attempt to cross a river, when they must expect to meet a
formidable opposition in front, and would have such a force
as ours in their rear. They might possibly be successful, but the
probability would be infinitely against them. Should they be
imprudent enough to make the attempt, I shall keep close upon
their heels, and will do every thing in my power to make the
project fatal to them.
"But, besides the argument in favour of their intending, in
the first place, a stroke at this army, drawn from the policy of
the measure, every appearance contributes to confirm the
opinion. Had their design been for the Delaware in the first
instance, they would probably have made a secret, rapid march
for it, and not have halted so as to awaken our attention, and
give us time to prepare for obstructing them. Instead of that
they have only advanced to a position necessary to facilitate
an attack on our right, the part in which we are most exposed.
In addition to this circumstance, they have come out as light

GEORGE WASHINGTON

I7S

as possible, leaving all their baggage, provisions, boats, and
bridges, at Brunswick. This plainly contradicts the idea of their
intending to push for the Delaware."
Finding the American army could not be drawn from its
strong position, General Howe determined to waste no more
time in threatening Philadelphia by land, but to withdraw from
Jersey, and to embark his army as expeditiously as possible for
the Chesapeake or the Delaware. On the night of the i 9th he
returned to Brunswick, and on the 2zd to Amboy, from which
place, the heavy baggage and a few of his troops passed into
Staten Island, on the bridge which had been designed for the
Delaware.
General Washington had expected this movement from
Brunswick, and had made arrangements to derive some advantage from it. General Greene was detached with three brigades
to annoy the British rear; and Sullivan and Maxwell were ordered to co-operate with him. In the mean time the army
paraded on the heights of Middlebrook, ready to act as circumstances might require.
About sunrise, Colonel Morgan drove in a piquet guard,
soon after which that division commenced its march to Amboy.
Some sharp skirmishing took place between this party and Morgan's regiment, but the hope of gaining any important advantage was entirely disappointed; and the retreat to Amboy was
effected with inconsiderable loss.
In order to cover his light parties, which still hung on the
British flank and rear, General Washington advanced six or
seven miles, to Quibbletown on the road to Amboy;
and Lord Stirling's division was pushed still farther, June 24.
to the neighbourhood of the Metucking Meeting House, for
the purpose of co-operating with the light parties, should the
retreat to Staten Island afford an opportunity of striking at
the rear.
Believing it now practicable to bring on an engagement, and
probably hoping to turn left of the American army, and gain
the heights in its rear, General Howe, in the night of the 25th,
recalled the troops from Staten Island; and, early next morning, made a rapid movement, in two columns, towards Westfield. The right, under the command of Lord Cornwallis, took

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the route by Woodbridge to the Scotch Plains; and the left,
6 led by Sir William Howe in person, marched by
June * Metucking Meeting House, to fall into the rear of
the right column. It was intended that the left should take a
separate road, soon after this junction, and attack the left flank
of the American army at Quibbletown; while Lord Cornwallis
should gain the heights on the left of the camp at Middlebrook.
Four battalions with six pieces of cannon were detached to
Bonhamtown.1
About Woodbridge, the right column fell in with one of
the American parties of observation which gave notice of this
movement. General Washington discerned his danger, put
the whole army instantly in motion, and regained the camp
at Middlebrook. Lord Cornwallis fell in with Lord Stirling,
and a sharp skirmish ensued, in which the Americans were
driven from their ground with the loss of three field pieces,
and a few men. They retreated to the hills about the Scotch
plains, and were pursued as far as Westfield. Perceiving the
passes in the mountains on the left of the American camp
to be guarded, and the object of this skilful manoeuvre to be,
June consequently, unattainable, his lordship returned
through Rahway to Amboy; and the whole army
crossed over to Staten Island.
General Washington was now again left to his conjectures
respecting the plan of the campaign. Before Sir William Howe
Jul 2. had, in any degree disclosed his views, intelligence
was received of the appearance of Burgoyne on Lake
Champlain, and that Ticonderoga was threatened. This intelligence strengthened the opinion that the design of Howe
must be to seize the passes in the mountains on the Hudson,
secure the command of that river, and effect a junction between the two armies. Yet he could not permit himself to
yield so entirely to this impression, as to make a movement
which might open the way by land to Philadelphia. His army
therefore maintained its station at Middlebrook; but arrangements were made to repel any sudden attack on the posts which
defended the Hudson.
1 General Howe's letter.

GEORGE WASHINGTON

I177

Some changes made in the stations of the British ships and
troops having relieved the American General from his apprehensions of a sudden march to Philadelphia, he advanced Sullivan's division to Pompton Plains, on the way to Peekskill;
and proceeded with the main body of his army, to Morristown;-thus approaching the highlands of New York, without
removing so far from Middlebrook as to be unable to regain
that camp should General Howe indicate an intention to seize it.
Meanwhile, the British General prosecuted, diligently, his plaq
of embarkation, which was, necessarily, attended with circumstances indicating a much longer voyage than that up the North
river. These circumstances were immediately communicated
to the eastern states, and congress was earnestly pressed to
strengthen the fortifications on the Delaware, and to increase
the obstructions in that river.
In the midst of these appearances, certain intelligence was
received that Burgoyne was in great force on the lakes, and
was advancing against Ticonderoga. This intelligence confirmed
the opinion that the main object of Howe must be to effect a
junction with Burgoyne on the North River. Under this impression, General Washington ordered Sullivan to Peekskill,
and advanced, himself, first to Pompton Plains, and J 1 6
afterwards to the Clove, where he determined to
remain until the views of the enemy should be disclosed.
While the General thus anxiously watched the movements
of his adversary, an agreeable and unexpected piece of intelligence was received from New England. The command of the
British troops in Rhode Island had devolved on General Prescot.
Thinking himself perfectly secure in an island, the water surrounding which was believed to be entirely guarded by his
cruisers, and at the head of an army greatly superior to any
force then collected in that department, he indulged himself
in convenient quarters, rather distant from camp; and was
remiss with respect to the guards about his person. Information of this negligence was communicated to the main, and a
plan was formed to surprise him. This spirited enterprise was
executed, with equal courage and address, by Lieutenant Colonel
Barton of the Rhode Island militia.
On the night of the i oth, he embarked on board four whale

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boats, at Warwick Neck, with a party consisting of about
forty persons, including Captains Adams, and Philips, and
several other officers. After proceeding about ten miles by
water, unobserved by the British guardboats, although several
ships of war lay in that quarter, he landed on the west of the
island, about midway between Newport and Bristol ferry, and
marching a mile to the quarters of Prescot, dexterously seized
the sentinel at his door, and one of his aids. The general himself was taken out of bed, and conveyed to a place of safety.
The success of this intrepid enterprise diffused the more joy
throughout America, because it was supposed to secure the
liberation of General Lee, by enabling General Washington to
offer an officer of equal rank in exchange for him.
Congress expressed a high sense of the gallant conduct of
Colonel Barton, and his party; and presented him with a sword
as a mark of approbation.
As the fleet fell down towards Sandy Hook, General Washington withdrew slowly from the Clove, and disposed his army
in different divisions, so as to march to any point which might
be attacked.
At length, the embarkation was completed, and the fleet
put to sea.

GEORGE WASHINGTON

179

CHAPTER VIII
ON receiving intelligence that the British fleet had sailed from
New York, the American army commenced its
march to the Delaware. About the time of its de- 1777.
parture, a letter from Sir William Howe, directed to July.
General Burgoyne at Quebec, was delivered to General Putnam by
the person who had received it, as was said, for the purpose of
carrying it to Quebec, and was transmitted by Putnam to the
Commander-in-chief. In this letter, General Howe said that
"he was exhibiting the appearance of moving to the southwards
while his real intent was against Boston, from whence he would
co-operate with the army of Canada." This stratagem entirely
failed. General Washington, at once, perceived that the letter
was written with a design that it should fall into his handsi
and mislead him with respect to the views of the writer.
While the utmost vigilance and judgment were required to
conduct the operations of the army under the immediate command of General Washington, the transactions in the north
were too vitally interesting not to engage a large share of
his attention. He not only hastened the march of those generals who were designed to act in that department, and pressed
the governors of the eastern states to reinforce the retreating
army with all their militia, but made large detachments of
choice troops from his own;-thus weakening himself in order
to strengthen other generals whose strength would be more
useful. The fame of being himself the leader of the victorious
army did not, with false glare, dazzle his judgment, or conceal the superior public advantage to be derived from defeating
the plans of Burgoyne.
On the 3oth of July, all doubts respecting the destination
of the British fleet were supposed to be removed by its appearance off the capes of Delaware; and orders were immediately
given for assembling the detached parts of the army in the
neighbourhood of Philadelphia. Scarcely were these orders

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THE LIFE OF

given, when the aspect of affairs was changed, and they were
countermanded. An express from Cape May brought the information that the fleet had sailed out of the bay of Delaware,
and was proceeding eastward. From this time, no intelligence
respecting it was received until about the 7th of August, when
it appeared a few leagues south of the capes of Delaware, after
which it disappeared, and was not again seen until late in that
month. The fact was, that on entering the capes of Delaware,
the difficulties attending an attempt to carry his fleet up that
bay and river, determined General Howe to relinquish his
original design, and to transport his army to the Chesapeake.
Contrary winds prevented his gaining the mouth of that bay
until the i6th of August.
The several divisions of the army were immediately ordered
to unite in the neighbourhood of Philadelphia, and the militia
of Pennsylvania, Maryland, Delaware, and the northern counties of Virginia, were directed to take the field.
The British fleet, after entering the Chesapeake, sailed up it
with favourable winds, and entered Elk river, up which the
admiral proceeded as high as it was safely navigable; and on
the z25th of August the troops were landed at the ferry.
1 These orders were received by General Sullivan, who had been encamped about
Hanover, in Jersey, on his return from an expedition to Staten Island. The British
force on that island amounted to between two and three thousand men, of whom
nearly one thousand were provincials, who were distributed along the coast, opposite
the Jersey shore. The Europeans occupied a fortified camp near the watering place;
and General Sullivan thought it practicable to surprise the provincials, and bring
them off before they could be supported by the Europeans. Only six boats had been
procured for the conveyance of his troops; yet they crossed over into the island
before day undiscovered, and completely surprised two of the provincial parties, commanded by Colonels Lawrence and Barton, both of whom, with several officers and
men were taken. The alarm being given, Sullivan attempted to withdraw from the
island. The number of boats not being sufficient for the embarkation of all his
troops at the same time, some confusion obtained among them. General Campbell
advanced in force on the rear guard while waiting for the return of the boats, which
was captured after making a gallant resistance.
This enterprise was well planned, and in its commencement, happily executed; but
ought not to have been undertaken without a number of boats sufficient to secure
the retreat.
The loss of the British in prisoners amounted to eleven officers, and one hundred
and thirty privates. That of the Americans, is stated by Sullivan, at one major, one
captain, one lieutenant, and ten privates killed, and fifteen wounded, and nine officers,
and one hundred and twenty-seven privates prisoners. General Campbell, in his
account of the action says, that he made two hundred and fifty-nine prisoners,
among whom were one lieutenant colonel, three majors, two captains, and fifteen
inferior officers.

GEORGE WASHINGTON

i8i

The British army, at its disembarkation, has been generally
computed at eighteen thousand men. They were in good health
and spirits, admirably supplied with all the implements of war,
and led by an experienced general, of unquestionable military
talents.
The day before Sir William Howe landed, the American
army marched through Philadelphia, and proceeded to the
Brandywine. The divisions of Greene and Stephen were advanced nearer to the Head of Elk, and encamped behind White
Clay creek.
Congress had directed General Smallwood and Colonel Gist
to take command of the militia of Maryland, who had been
ordered by General Washington to assemble near the head of
the bay. The militia of the lower counties of Delaware, commanded by General Rodney, were directed also to assemble in
the British rear, and to co-operate with those of Maryland.
Colonel Richardson's continental regiment, which had been
stationed on the Eastern shore, was ordered to join this corps.
The militia of Pennsylvania, commanded by Major General
Armstrong, were united with the main body of the army. Great
exertions were used to bring them promptly into the field, and
they came forward generally with some degree of alacrity.
Although the numbers required by Congress did not assemble,
more appeared than could be armed.
The real strength of the American army can not be accurately
stated. It was estimated by Sir William Howe at fifteen thousand, including militia; and this estimate did not far exceed
their real total, as exhibited by the returns. But it is a fact,
attributable in some degree to the badness of their clothing,
and scarcity of tents, and in some degree to the neglect of the
commissary department, to provide those articles of food which
contribute to the preservation of health, that the effective force
was always far below the total number. The effectives, including militia, did not exceed eleven thousand.
Morgan's regiment of riflemen having been detached to the
northern army, a corps of light infantry was formed for the
occasion, the command of which was given to General Maxwell. This corps was advanced to Iron Hill, about three miles
in front of White Clay creek; The cavalry, consisting of four

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regiments, amounting to about nine hundred men, including
persons of every description, were employed principally on
the lines.
One division of the British army, commanded by Sir William
Howe in person, had taken post at Elkton, with its van advanced to Gray's Hill. General Knyphausen, with a second
division, had crossed the ferry and encamped at Cecil Court
House. He was directed to march up on the eastern side of
the river, and to join Sir William, Howe seven or eight miles
south of Christiana. The intention to make this movement
being disclosed by the preparatory arrangements, General Washington advised Maxwell to post a choice body of men in the
night on an advantageous part of the road, in order to annoy
him on his march. In the morning of the third of September,
the two divisions under Lord Cornwallis and General Knyphausen, moved forward and formed a junction at Pencader, or
Atkins' tavern, where they encamped. In their way, the column
led by Lord Cornwallis fell in with and attacked Maxwell,
who retreated over White Clay creek, with the loss of about
forty killed and wounded.
The whole American army, except the light infantry, took
a position behind Red Clay creek, on the road leading from
the camp of Sir William Howe to Philadelphia. On this ground,
the general thought it probable that the fate of Philadelphia,
and of the campaign, might be decided; and he resorted to all
the means in his power to encourage his troops, and stimulate
them to the greatest exertions.
On the 8th of September, the British army was again put
in motion. The main body advanced by Newark, upon the
right of the Americans, and encamped within four miles of
that place, extending its left still farther up the country. Meanwhile, a strong column made a show of attacking in front,
and, after manceuvring some time, halted at Milton, within
two miles of the centre.
General Washington was soon convinced that the column
in front was designed only to amuse, while the left should effect
the principal and real object. Believing that object to be to
turn his right, and cut off his communication with Philadel

GEORGE WASHINGTON

i83

phia, he changed his ground, and, crossing the Brandywine
early in the night, took post behind that river, at Chadd's Ford.
General Maxwell was advanced in front, and placed, advantageously on the hills south of the river, on the road leading over
the ford. The militia under General Armstrong were posted
at a ford two miles below Chadd's; and the right extended
some miles above, with a view to other passes deemed less practicable. In this position, General Washington attended the
movements of the adverse army.
In the evening, Howe marched forward in two columns,
which united, early the next morning, at Kennet's Square;
after which he advanced parties on the roads leading Sept.
to Lancaster, to Chadd's Ford, and to Wilmington. Sept.
The armies were now within seven miles of each other, with
only the Brandywine between them, which opposed no obstacle
to a general engagement. This was sought by Howe, and not
avoided by Washington. It was impossible to protect Philadelphia without a victory and this object was deemed throughout America, and especially by congress, of such magnitude as
to require that an action should be hazarded for its attainment.
In the morning of the i ith, soon after day, information was
received that the whole British army was in motion, advancing
on the direct road leading over Chadd's Ford. The Americans
were immediately under arms, and placed in order of battle,
for the purpose of contesting the passage of the river. Skirmishing soon commenced between the advanced parties; and, by ten,
Maxwell's corps, with little loss on either side, was driven over
the Brandywine below the ford. Knyphausen, who commanded this column, paraded on the heights, reconnoitred the
American army, and appeared to be making dispositions to force
the passage of the river. A skirt of woods, with the river, divided
him from Maxwell's corps, small parties of whom occasionally
crossed over, and kept up a scattering fire, by which not much
execution was done. At length one of these parties, led by
Captains Waggoner and Porterfield, engaged the British flank
guard very closely, killed a captain with ten or fifteen privates,
drove them out of the wood, and were on the point of taking
a field piece. The sharpness of the skirmish soon drew a large

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body of the British to that quarter, and the Americans were
again driven over the Brandywine.'
About eleven in the morning, information reached General
Washington that a large column with many field pieces, had
taken a road leading from Kennet's Square, directly up the
country, and had entered the great valley road, down which
they were marching to the upper fords of the Brandywine. This
information was given by Colonel Ross of Pennsylvania, who
was in their rear, and estimated their numbers at five thousand
men.
On receiving this information, Washington is said to have
determined to detach Sullivan and Lord Stirling to engage
the left division of the British army, and with the residue of
his troops, to cross Chadd's Ford in person, and attack Kynphausen. Before this plan could be executed, counter intelligence was received inducing an opinion that the movement of
the British on their left was a feint, and that the column under
Lord Cornwallis, after making demonstrations of crossing the
Brandywine above its forks, had marched down the southern
side of that river to reunite itself with Knyphausen.
Not long after the first communication was made by Colonel
Ross, information was received from Colonel Bland of the
cavalry, which produced some doubt respecting the strength
of this column. He saw only two brigades; but the dust appeared to rise in their rear for a considerable distance. A major
of the militia came in, who alleged that he left the forks of
the Brandywine so late in the day that it was supposed Lord
Cornwallis must have passed them by that time, had he continued his march in that direction, and who asserted that no
enemy had appeared in that quarter. Some light horsemen who
had been sent to reconnoitre the road, returned with the same
information.
The uncertainty produced by this contradictory intelligence
was at length removed; and about two in the afternoon, it was
ascertained that the column led by Lord Cornwallis, after making a circuit of about seventeen miles, had crossed the river
above its forks, and was advancing in great force.
'lThe author was an eye-witness of this skirmish.

GEORGE WASHINGTON I85
A change of disposition was immediately made. The divisions commanded by Sullivan, Stirling, and Stephen, took new
ground, advanced farther up the Brandywine, and fronted the
British column marching down that river. The division commanded by Wayne remained at Chadd's Ford, to keep Knyphausen in check; in which service Maxwell was to co-operate.
Greene's division, accompanied by General Washington in person, formed a reserve, and took a central position between the
right and left wings.
The divisions detached against Lord Cornwallis formed
hastily on an advantageous piece of ground, above Birmingham Meeting House, with their left near the Brandywine, and
having both flanks covered by a thick wood. The artillery
was judiciously posted, and the disposition of the whole was
well made. Unfortunately, Sullivan's division, in taking its
ground, made too large a circuit, and was scarcely formed
when the attack commenced.
On perceiving the Americans, the British army was formed
in order of battle; and, about half past four, the action began.
It was kept up warmly for some time. The American right
first gave way, and by its flight exposed the flank of the remaining divisions to a galling fire. The line continued to break
from the right, and, in a short time, was completely routed.
The right wing made some attempts to rally, but, being briskly
charged, again broke, and the flight became general.
On the commencement of the action on the right, General
Washington pressed forward with Greene, to the support of
that wing; but, before his arrival, its rout was complete, and
he could only check the pursuit. For this purpose, the ioth
Virginia regiment commanded by Colonel Stevens, and a regiment of Pennsylvania commanded by Colonel Stewart, neither
of which had been in action, were posted advantageously on
the road taken by the defeated army. The impression made
by the fire of these regiments, and the approach of night, induced Sir William Howe, after dispersing them, to give over
the pursuit.
When the American right was found to be fully engaged
with Lord Cornwallis, Knyphausen made real dispositions for
crossing the river. Chadd's Ford was defended by an intrench

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THE LIFE OF

ment and battery, with three field pieces, and a howitzer. After
some resistance, the work was forced; and, the defeat of the
right being known, the left wing also withdrew from its
ground. The whole army retreated that night to Chester, and
the next day to Philadelphia.
The loss sustained by the Americans in this action, has been
estimated at three hundred killed, and six hundred wounded.
Between three and four hundred, principally the wounded,
were made prisoners.
As must ever be the case in new raised armies, unused to
danger, and from which undeserving officers have not been
expelled, their conduct was not uniform. Some regiments, especially those which had served the preceding campaign, maintained their ground with the firmness and intrepidity of
veterans, while others gave way as soon as they were pressed.
The authors of a very correct history of the war,' speaking
of this action, say, "a part of their troops, among whom were
particularly numbered some Virginia 2 regiments, and the whole
corps of artillery, behaved exceedingly well in some of the
actions of this day, exhibiting a degree of order, firmness, and
resolution, and preserving such a countenance in extremely
sharp service, as would not have discredited veterans. Some
other bodies of their troops behaved very badly." 3
The official letter of Sir William Howe stated his loss at rather
less than one hundred killed, and four hundred wounded. As
the Americans sustained very little injury in the retreat, this
inequality of loss can be ascribed only to the inferiority of
their arms. Many of their muskets were scarcely fit for service;
and, being of unequal caliber, their cartridges could not be so
well fitted, and, consequently, their fire could not do as much
'Annual Register.
' The third Virginia regiment commanded by Colonel Marshall, which had performed extremely severe duty in the campaign of 1776, was placed in a wood on the
right, and in front of Woodford's brigade, and Stephen's division. Though attacked
by much superior numbers, it maintained its position without losing an inch of
ground, until both its flanks were turned, its ammunition nearly expended, and more
than half the officers, and one third of the soldiers were killed and wounded. Colonel
Marshall, whose horse had received two balls, then retired in good order to resume
his position on the right of his division; but it had already retreated.
s Deboore's brigade broke first; and, on an inquiry into his conduct being directed,
he resigned. A misunderstanding existed between him and Sullivan, on whose right
he was stationed.

GEORGE WASHINGTON

i87

execution as that of the enemy. This radical defect was felt
in all the operations of the army.
From the ardour with which the Commander-in-chief had
inspired his troops before this action, it is probable that the
conflict would have been more severe, had the intelligence respecting the movement on the left of the British army been less
contradictory. Raw troops, changing their ground in the moment of action, and attacked in the agitation of moving, are
easily thrown into confusion. This was the critical situation
of a part of Sullivan's division, and was the cause of the right's
breaking before Greene could be brought up to support it;
after which, it was impossible to retrieve the fortune of the day.
But had the best disposition of the troops been made at the
time, which subsequent intelligence would suggest, the action
could not have terminated in favour of the Americans. Their inferiority in numbers, in discipline, and in arms, was too great
to leave them a probable prospect of victory. A battle however
was not to be avoided. The opinion of the public, and of congress, demanded it. The loss of Philadelphia, without an attempt to preserve it, would have excited discontents which, in
the United States, might be productive of serious mischief;
and action, though attended with defeat, provided the loss be
not too great, must improve an army in which, not only the
military talents, but even the courage, of officers, some of
them of high rank, remained to be ascertained.
Among the wounded was the Marquis de la Fayette, and
Brigadier General Woodford.
The battle of Brandywine was not considered as decisive by
congress, the General, or the army. The opinion was carefully
cherished that the British had gained only the ground; and that
their loss was still more considerable than had been sustained
by the Americans. Congress appeared determined to risk another
battle for the metropolis of America. Far from discovering
any intention to change their place of session, they passed vigorous resolutions for reinforcing the army, and directed General Washington to give the necessary orders for completing
the defences of the Delaware.
From Chester, the army marched through Darby, over the
Schuylkill bridge, to its former ground, near the falls of that

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THE LIFE OF

river. General Greene's division, which, having been less in
action, was more entire than any other, covered the rear; and
the corps of Maxwell remained at Chester until the next day,
as a rallying point for the small parties, and straggling soldiers,
who might yet be in the neighbourhood.
Having allowed his army one day for repose and refreshment, General Washington recrossed the Schuylkill, and proceeded on the Lancaster road, with the intention of risking
another engagement.
Sir William Howe passed the night of the i i th on the field
of battle. On the succeeding day, he detached Major General
Grant with two brigades to Concord meeting-house; and on
the I3th, Lord Cornwallis joined General Grant, and marched
towards Chester. Another detachment took possession of Wilmington; to which place the sick and wounded were conveyed.
To prevent a sudden movement to Philadelphia by the lower
road, the bridge over the Schuylkill was loosened from its
moorings, and General Armstrong was directed, with the Pennsylvania militia to guard the passes over that river.
On the i5th, the American army, intending to gain the left
of the British, reached the Warren tavern, on the Lancaster
road, twenty-three miles from Philadelphia. Intelligence was
received, early next morning, that Howe was approaching in two
columns. It being too late to reach the ground he had intended
to occupy, Washington resolved to meet and engage him in
front.
Both armies prepared, with great alacrity, for battle. The
6 advanced parties had met, and were beginning the
Sept. i 6skirmish, when they were separated by a heavy rain,
which, becoming more and more violent, rendered the retreat
)f the Americans a measure of absolute necessity. The inferiority
of their arms never brought them into such imminent peril as
on this occasion. Their gun-locks not being well secured, their
muskets soon became unfit for use. Their cartridge-boxes had
been so inartificially constructed, as not to protect their ammunition from the tempest. Their cartridges were soon damaged;
and this mischief was the more serious, because very many of
the soldiers were without bayonets.
The army being thus rendered unfit for action, the design

GEORGE WASHINGTON

i89

of giving battle was reluctantly abandoned, and a retreat commenced. It was continued all the day, and great part of the
night, through a cold and most distressing rain, and very deep
roads. A few hours before day, the troops halted at the Yellow
Springs, where their arms and ammunition were examined, and
the alarming fact was disclosed, that scarcely a mus- S
ket in a regiment could be discharged, and scarcely ept. 7.
one cartridge in a box was fit for use. This state of things
suggested the precaution of moving to a still greater distance,
in order to refit their arms, obtain a fresh supply of ammunition, and revive the spirits of the army. The General
therefore retired to Warwick furnace, on the south branch of
French Creek, where ammunition and a few muskets might
be obtained in time to dispute the passage of the Schuylkill,
and make yet another effort to save Philadelphia.
The extreme severity of the weather had entirely stopped
the British army. During two days, General Howe made no
other movement than to unite his columns.
From French Creek, General Wayne was detached with his
division into the rear of the British, with orders to join General
Smallwood and, carefully concealing himself and his movements,
to seize every occasion which this march might offer, of engaging them to advantage. Meanwhile, General Washington
crossed to Schuylkill at Parker's ferry, and encamped on both
sides of Perkiomen Creek.
General Wayne lay in the woods near the entrance of the
road from Darby into that leading to Lancaster, about three
miles in the rear of the left wing of the British troops encamped at Trydruffin, where he believed himself to be perfectly secure. But the country was so extensively disaffected
that Sir William Howe received accurate accounts of his position
and of his force. Major General Gray was detached to surprise
him, and effectually accomplished his purpose. About eleven,
in the night of the zoth, his piquets, driven in with charged
bayonets, gave the first intimation of Gray's approach. Wayne
instantly formed his division; and while his right sustained
a fierce assault, directed a retreat by the left, under cover of a
few regiments who, for a short time, withstood the violence
of the shock. In his letter to the Commander-in-chief, he says

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that they gave the assailants some well-directed fires which
must have done considerable execution; and that, after retreating from the ground on which the engagement commenced,
they formed again, at a small distance from the scene of action;
but that both parties drew off without renewing the conflict.
He states his loss at about one hundred and fifty 1 killed and
wounded. The British accounts admit, on their part, a loss of
only seven.
When the attack commenced, General Smallwood, who was
on his march to join Wayne, a circumstance entirely unexpected by General Gray, was within less than a mile of him;
and, had he commanded regulars, might have given a very
different turn to the night. But his militia thought only of
their own safety; and, having fallen in with a party returning
from the pursuit of Wayne, fled in confusion with the loss of
only one man.
Some severe animadversions on this unfortunate affair having
been made in the army, General Wayne demanded a court martial, which, after investigating his conduct, was unanimously
of opinion, "that he had done every thing to be expected from
an active, brave, and vigilant officer;" and acquitted him with
honour.
Having secured his rear, by compelling Wayne to take a
S. greater distance, Sir William Howe marched along the
ep * valley road to the Schuylkill, and encamped on the
bank of that river, from the Fatland ford up to French Creek,
along the front of the American army. To secure his right
from being turned, General Washington again changed his position, and encamped with his left near, but above the British
right.
General Howe now relinquished his plan of bringing Washington to another battle; and, thinking it advisable, perhaps,
to transfer the seat of war to the neighbourhood of
Sept. 22* his ships, determined to cross the Schuylkill, and
take possession of Philadelphia. In the afternoon, he ordered
one detachment to cross at Fatland ford which was on his right,
and another to cross at Gordon's ford, on his left, and to take
1 The British accounts represent the American loss to have been much more considerable. It probably amounted to at least three hundred men.

GEORGE WASHINGTON

I9I1

possession of the heights commanding them. These orders were
executed without much difficulty, and the American troops
placed to defend these fords were easily dispersed.
This service being effected, the whole army marched by its
right, about midnight, and crossing at Fatland without opposition. proceeded a considerable distance towards Philadelphia,
and encamped, with its left near Sweed's ford, and its right on
the Manatawny road, having Stony run in its front.
It was now apparent that only immediate victory could save
Philadelphia from the grasp of the British general, whose situation gave him the option of either taking possession of that
place, or endeavouring to bring on another engagement. If,
therefore, a battle must certainly be risked to save the capital,
it would be necessary to attack the enemy.
Public opinion, which a military chief finds too much difficulty in resisting, and the opinion of Congress required a battle;
but, on a temperate consideration of circumstances, Washington
came to the wise decision of avoiding one for the present.
His reasons for this decision were conclusive. Wayne and
Smallwood had not yet joined the army. The continental troops
ordered from Peekskill, who had been detained for a time by
an incursion from New York, were approaching; and a reinforcement of Jersey militia, under General Dickinson, was also
expected.
To these powerful motives against risking an engagement,
other considerations of great weight were added, founded on
the condition of his soldiers. An army, manceuvring in an open
country, in the face of a very superior enemy, is unavoidably
exposed to excessive fatigue, and extreme hardship. The effect
of these hardships was much increased by the privations under
which the American troops suffered. While in almost continual
motion, wading deep rivers, and encountering every vicissitude
of the seasons, they were without tents, nearly without shoes,
or winter clothes, and often without food.
A council of war concurred in the opinion the Commanderin-chief had formed, not to march against the enemy, but to
allow his harassed troops a few days for repose, and to remain
on his present ground until the expected reinforcements should
arrive.

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Immediately after the battle of Brandywine, the distressed
situation of the army had been represented to congress, who
had recommended it to the executive of Pennsylvania to seize
the cloths and other military stores in the ware houses of Philadelphia, and, after granting certificates expressing their value,
to convey them to a place of safety. The executive, being unwilling to encounter the odium of this strong measure, advised
that the extraordinary powers of the Commander-in-chief
should be used on the occasion. Lieutenant Colonel Hamilton,
one of the general's aids, a young gentleman already in high estimation for his talents and zeal, was employed on.this delicate
business. "Your own prudence," said the General, in a letter
to him while in Philadelphia, "will point out the least exceptional means to be pursued; but remember, delicacy and a
strict adherence to the ordinary mode of application must
give place to our necessities. We must, if possible, accommodate
the soldiers with such articles as they stand in need of, or we
shall have just reason to apprehend the most injurious and
alarming consequences from the approaching season."
All the efforts however of this very active officer could not
obtain a supply, in any degree, adequate to the pressing and
increasing wants of the army.
Colonel Hamilton was also directed to cause the military stores
which had been previously collected to a large amount in Philadelphia, and the vessels which were lying at the wharves, to
be removed up the Delaware. This duty was executed with so
much vigilance that very little public property fell, with the
city, into the hands of the British general, who entered it on the
26th of September. The members of congress separated on the
eighteenth, in the evening, and reassembled at Lancaster on
the twenty-seventh of the same month.
From the z5th of August, when the British army landed at
the Head of Elk, until the 26th of September when it entered
Philadelphia, the campaign had been active, and the duties
of the American general uncommonly arduous. The best English
writers bestow high economiums on Sir William Howe for his
military skill, and masterly movements during this period.
At Brandywine especially, Washington is supposed to have
been "outgeneraled, more outgeneraled than in any action dur

GEORGE WASHINGTON

I93

ing the war." If all the operations of this trying period be
examined, and the means in possession of both be considered,
the American chief will appear, in no respect, inferior to his
adversary, or unworthy of the high place assigned to him in
the opinions of his countrymen. With an army decidedly
inferior, not only in numbers, but in every military requisite
except courage, in an open country, he employed his enemy
near thirty days in advancing about sixty miles. In this time
he fought one general action; and, though defeated, was able
to reassemble the same undisciplined, unclothed, and almost
unfed army; and, the fifth day afterwards, again to offer battle.
When the armies were separated by a storm which involved
him in the most distressing circumstances, he extricated himself from them, and still maintained a respectable and imposing
countenance.
The only advantage he is supposed to have given was at the
battle of Brandywine; and that was produced by the contrariety
and uncertainty of the intelligence received. A general must
be governed by his intelligence, and must regulate his measures
by his information. It is his duty to obtain correct information; and among the most valuable traits of a military character, is the skill to select those means which will obtain it.
Yet the best selected means are not always successful; and, in
a new army, where military talent has not been well tried by the
standard of experience, the general is peculiarly exposed to the
chance of employing not the best instruments. In a country,
too, which is covered with wood, precise information of the
numbers composing different columns is to be gained with
difficulty.
It has been said "that the Americans do not appear to have
made all the use that might be expected of the advantages
which the country afforded for harassing and impeding the
British army."
In estimating this objection, it ought to be recollected that
General Smallwood was directed, with the militia of Maryland
and Delaware, supported by a regiment of continental troops,
to hang on and harass the rear of the enemy: that General
Maxwell, with a select corps consisting of a thousand men,
was ordered to seize every occasion to annoy him on his march:

194 THE LIFE OF
that General 'Wayne with his division, was afterwards detached to unite with Smaliwood, and command the whole force
collected in the rear, which would have been very respectable.
If the militia did not assemble in the numbers expected, or
effect the service allotted to them, their failure is not attributable
to General 'Washington. His calls on them had been early and
energetic; and the state of his army did not admit of his making larger detachments from it to supply the place they had
been designed to fill.
Loud complaints had been made against General Maxwell by
the officers of his corps; and a court was ordered to inquire
into his conduct, by whom he was acquitted. Whether that
officer omitted to seize the proper occasions to annoy the enemy,
or the cautious and compact movements of Sir 'William Howe
afforded none, can not be easily ascertained. General 'Washington felt the loss of Morgan, and wrote pressingly to Gates,
after his success against Burgoyne, to restore him that officer,
with his regiment, as soon as possible.

GEORGE WASHINGTON

I95

CHAPTER IX
PHILADELPHIA being lost, General Washington sought to make
its occupation inconvenient and insecure, by rendering it inaccessible to the British fleet. With this 777
design, works had been erected on a low marshy island in
the Delaware, near the junction of the Schuylkill, which, from
the nature of its soil, was called Mud island. On the opposite
shore of Jersey, at a place called Red Bank, a fort had also
been constructed which was defended with heavy artillery.
In the deep channel between, or under cover of these batteries,
several ranges of frames had been sunk, to which, from their
resemblance to that machine, the name of chevaux-de-frise had
been given. These frames were so strong and heavy as to be
destructive of any ship which might strike against them, and
were sunk in such a depth of water as rendered it equally
difficult to weigh them or cut them through; no attempt to
raise them, or to open the channel in any manner could be
successful until the command of the shores on both sides should
be obtained.
Other ranges of these machines had been sunk about three
miles lower down the river; and some considerable works were
in progress at Billingsport on the Jersey side, which were in
such forwardness as to be provided with artillery. These works
and machines were farther supported by several galleys mounting heavy cannon, together with two floating batteries, a number
of armed vessels and some fire ships.
The present relative situation of the armies gave a decisive
importance to these works. Cutting off the communication of
General Howe with his fleet they prevented his receiving supplies by water, while the American vessels in the river above
fort Mifflin, the name given to the fort on Mud island, rendered
it difficult to forage in Jersey, General Washington hoped to

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render his supplies on the side of Pennsylvania so precarious
as to compel him to evacuate Philadelphia.
The advantages of this situation were considerably diminished
by the capture of the Delaware frigate.
The day after Lord Cornwallis entered Philadelphia, three
batteries were commenced for the purpose of acting against
any American ships which might appear before the town. While
yet incomplete, they were attacked by two frigates, assisted by
several galleys and gondolas. The Delaware, being left by the
tide while engaged with the battery, grounded and was captured; soon after which, the smaller frigate, and the other
vessels, retired under the guns of the fort. This circumstance
was the more interesting, as it gave the British General the
command of the ferry, and, consequently, free access to Jersey,
and enabled him to intercept the communication between the
forts below, and Trenton, from which place the garrisons were
to have drawn their military stores.
All the expected reinforcements, except the state regiment
and militia from Virginia, being arrived, and the detached parties being called in, the effective strength of the army amounted
to eight thousand continental troops, and three thousand militia.
With this force, General Washington determined to approach
the enemy, and seize the first favourable moment to attack him.
In pursuance of this determination, the army took
Sept. 3~ a position on the Skippack road, about twenty miles
from Philadelphia, and sixteen from Germantown,-a long village stretching on both sides the great road leading northward
from Philadelphia, which forms one continued street nearly
two miles in length. The British line of encampment crossed
this village at right angles near the centre, and Lord Cornwallis,
with four regiments of grenadiers, occupied Philadelphia. The
immediate object of General Howe being the removal of the
obstructions in the river, Colonel Stirling, with two regiments,
had been detached to take possession of the fort at Billingsport,
which he accomplished without opposition. This service being
effected, and the works facing the water destroyed, Colonel
Stirling was directed to escort a convoy of provisions from
Chester to Philadelphia. Some apprehensions being entertained

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197

for the safety of this convoy, another regiment was detached
from Germantown, with directions to join Colonel Oct. 3.
Stirling.'
This division of the British force appeared to Washington
to furnish a fair opportunity to engage Sir William Howe with
advantage. Determining to avail himself of it, he formed a
plan for surprising the camp at Germantown, and attacking
both wings, in front and rear, at the same instant.
The divisions of Sullivan and Wayne, flanked by Conway's
brigade, were to march down the main road, and, entering the
town by the way of Chestnut Hill, to attack the left wing;
while General Armstrong, with the Pennsylvania militia, was
to move down the Manatawny road2 by Vanduring's mill, and
turning the left flank to attack in the rear. The Commanderin-chief accompanied this column.
The divisions of Greene and Stephens, flanked by
M'Dougal's brigade, were to take a circuit by the Lime Kiln
road, and, entering the town at the market house, to attack
the right wing.
The militia of Maryland and Jersey, under Generals Smallwood and Forman, were to march down the old York road,
and turning the right to fall upon its rear.
The division of Lord Stirling, and the brigades of Nash and
Maxwell, were to form a corps de reserve.
Parties of cavalry were silently to scour'the roads to prevent
observation, and to keep up the communication between the
heads of the several columns.
The necessary arrangements being made, the army moved from
its ground at seven in the afternoon. Before sunrise
the next morning, the advance of the column led by Oct. 4.
Sullivan, encountered and drove in a picket placed at Mount
Airy, the house of Mr. Allen.3 The main body followed close
in the rear, and engaging the light infantry and the 4oth regiment, posted at the head of the village, soon forced them to
give way, leaving their baggage behind them. Though closely
pursued, Lieutenant Colonel Husgrave threw himself with five
1 Annual Register.-Stedman.
Better known as the Ridge road.
8 Since Robinson's.

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companies of the 4oth regiment into a large stone house belonging to Mr. Chew, which stood directly in the way of
Wayne's division, and poured on the Americans an incessant
and galling fire of musketry from its doors and windows. After
making some unsuccessful, and bloody attempts to carry this
house by storm, and then battering it for a few minutes with
field artillery, which was found too light to make any impression on its walls, a regiment was left to observe the party
within it, while the troops who had been checked by Colonel
Musgrave again moved forward, passing to the left of the house.
In rather more than half an hour after Sullivan had been
engaged, the left wing, having formed the line, came also into
action; and, attacking the light infantry posted in front of
the British right wing, soon drove it from its ground. While
rapidly pursuing the flying enemy, Woodford's brigade,' which
was on the right of this wing, was arrested by a heavy fire from
Chew's house, directed against its right flank. The inefficiency
of musketry against troops thus sheltered being instantly perceived, the brigade was drawn off to the left by its commanding officers, and the field-pieces attached to it were ordered up
to play on the house, but were too light to be of service. Some
time was consumed in this operation, and the advance of the
brigade was, of course, retarded. This part of the line was
consequently broken, and the two brigades composing the division of Stephens were not only separated from each other, but
from the other division which was led by General Greene
in person. That division, consisting of the brigades of Muhlenberg and Scott, pressing forward with eagerness, encountered
and broke a part of the British right wing, entered the village,
and made a considerable number of prisoners.
Thus far the prospect was flattering. The attack had been
made with great spirit; several brigades had entered the town;
and such an impression had been made on the British army as
to justify the expectation that its wings might be separated from
each other, and a complete victory be obtained. Had the
American troops possessed the advantages given by experience;
had every division of the army performed with precision the
'The author was in this brigade, and describes this part of the action from his
own observation.

GEORGE WASHINGTON

I99

part allotted to it, there is yet reason to believe that the hopes
inspired by this favourable commencement would not have
been disappointed. But the face of the country, and the darkness of the morning produced by a fog of uncommon density,
co-operating with the want of discipline in the army, and the
derangements of the corps from the incidents at Chew's house,
blasted these flattering appearances, and defeated the enterprise.
The ground over which the British were pursued abounded
with small and strong enclosures, which frequently broke the
line of the advancing army. The two divisions of the right
wing had been separated at Chew's house; and immediately after
their passing it, the right of the left wing was stopped at the
same place, so as to cause a division of that wing also. The
darkness of the morning rendered it difficult to distinguish
objects even at an inconsiderable distance; and it was impossible for the Commander-in-chief to learn the situation of the
whole, or to correct the confusion which was commencing. The
divisions and brigades separated at Chew's house could not be
reunited; and, even among those parts which remained entire,
a considerable degree of disorder was soon introduced by the
impediments to their advance. Some regiments pursuing with
more vivacity than others, they were separated from each other,
their weight lessened, and their effect impaired. The darkness
which obstructed the reunion of the broken parts of the American army, also prevented their discerning the real situation of
the enemy, so as to improve the first impression; and, in some
instances, some corps being in advance of others, produced uncertainty whether the troops, seen indistinctly, were friends
or foes.
The attacks on the flanks and rear, which formed a part
of the original plan, do not appear ever to have been made.
The Pennsylvania militia came in view of the chasseurs who
flanked the left of the British line, but did not engage them
closely. The Maryland and Jersey militia just showed themselves on the right flank, about the time Greene was commencing a retreat.
These embarrassments gave the British time to recover from
the consternation into which they had been thrown. General
Knyphausen, who commanded their left, detached two brigades

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to meet the right of Sullivan which had penetrated far into the
village, before his left, which had been detained at Chew's
house, could rejoin him; and the action became warm in this
quarter. The British right also recovered from its surprise,
and advanced on that part of Greene's division which had entered the town. After a sharp engagement these two brigades
began to retreat, and those which were most in advance were
surrounded and compelled to surrender. About the same time
the right wing also began to retreat. It is understood that they
had expended their ammunition.
Every effort to stop this retrograde movement proved ineffectual. The division of Wayne fell back on that of Stephens,
and was for an instant mistaken for the enemy. General confusion prevailed, and the confidence felt in the beginning of
the action was lost. With infinite chagrin General Washington
was compelled to relinquish his hopes of victory, and turn his
attention to the security of his army. The enemy not being
sufficiently recovered to endanger his rear, the retreat was made
without loss, under cover of the division of Stephens, which
had scarcely been in the engagement.
In this battle, about two hundred Americans were killed,
near three times that number wounded, and about four hundred were made prisoners. Among the killed was General Nash
of North Carolina; and among the prisoners, was Colonel
Matthews of Virginia, whose regiment had penetrated into the
centre of the town.
The loss of the British, as stated in the official return of General Howe, did not much exceed five hundred in killed and
wounded, of whom less than one hundred were killed; among
the latter were Brigadier General Agnew and Colonel Bird.
The American army retreated the same day, about twenty
miles, to Perkiomen Creek, where a small reinforcement, consisting of fifteen hundred militia and a state regiment, was received from Virginia; after which it again advanced towards
Philadelphia, and encamped once more on Skippack creek.
The plan of the battle of Germantown must be admitted to
have been judiciously formed; and, in its commencement, to
have been happily conducted. But a strict adherence to it by

GEORGE WASHINGTON

20I

those who were entrusted with the execution of its several
parts, was indispensable to its success.
Major General Stephens, who commanded the right division
of the left wing, was cashiered for misconduct on the retreat,
and for intoxication.
Congress expressed, in decided terms, their approbation both
of the plan of this enterprise, and of the courage with which
it was executed; for which their thanks were given to the
general and the army.'
The attention of both armies was now principally directed to
the forts below Philadelphia.
The loss of the Delaware frigate, and of Billingsport, greatly
discouraged the seamen by whom the gallies and floating batteries were manned. Believing the fate of America to be decided,
an opinion strengthened by the intelligence received from their
connexions in Philadelphia, they manifested the most alarming
defection, and several officers as well as sailors deserted to the
enemy. This desponding temper was checked by the battle of
Germantown, and by throwing a garrison of continental troops
into the fort at Red Bank, called fort Mercer, the defence of
'On hearing that General Howe had landed at the head of the Chesapeake, Sir
Henry Clinton, for the purpose of averting those aids which Washington might draw
from the north of the Delaware, entered Jersey at the head of three thousand men.
On the approach of General M'Dougal with a body of continental troops from Peekskill, and on hearing that the militia were assembling under General Dickinson, he
returned to New York and Staten Island with the cattle he had collected, having
lost in the expedition only eight men killed and twice as many wounded.
M'Dougal continued his march towards the Delaware; and the utmost exertions
were made both by Governor Livingston and General Dickinson to collect the militia
for the purpose of aiding the army in Pennsylvania. The success of their exertions
did not equal their wishes. The militia being of opinion that there was danger of a
second invasion from New York, and that their services were more necessary at home
than in Pennsylvania, assembled slowly and reluctantly. Five or six hundred crossed
the Delaware at Philadelphia, about the time Sir William Howe crossed the Schuylkill, and were employed in the removal of stores. On the approach of the British
army, they were directed to avoid it by moving up the Frankford road; but the
commanding officer, having separated himself from his corps, was taken by a party
of British horse employed in scouring the country; on which the regiment dispersed,
and returned by different roads to Jersey. With much labour General Dickinson
assembled two other corps amounting to about nine hundred men, with whom he was
about to cross the Delaware when intelligence was received of the arrival at New
York of a reinforcement from Europe. He was detained in Jersey for the defence
of the state, and the militia designed to serve in Pennsylvania were placed under
General Forman. About six hundred of them reached the army a few days before
the battle of Germantown, immediately after which they were permittd to return.

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which had been entrusted to militia. This fort commanded the
channel between the Jersey shore and Mud Island; and the
American vessels were secure under its guns. The militia of
Jersey were relied on to reinforce its garrison, and also to form
a corps of observation which might harass the rear of any detachment investing the place.
To increase the inconvenience of General Howe's situation by
intercepting his supplies, six hundred militia, commanded by
General Potter crossed the Schuylkill, with orders to scour the
country between that river and Chester; and the militia on the
Delaware, above Philadelphia, were directed to watch the roads
in that vicinity.
The more effectually to stop those who were seduced by the
hope of gold and silver to supply the enemy at this critical time,
congress passed a resolution subjecting to martial law and to
death, all who should furnish them with provisions, or certain
other enumerated articles, who should be taken within thirty
miles of any city, town or place, in Jersey, Pennsylvania, or
Delaware, occupied by British troops.
These arrangements being made to cut off supplies from the
country, General Washington reoccupied the ground from
which he had marched to fight the battle of Germantown.
Meanwhile, General Howe was actively preparing to attack
fort Mifflin from the Pennsylvania shore. He erected some
batteries at the mouth of the Schuylkill in order to command
Webb's ferry, which were attacked by Commodore Hazlewood,
and silenced, but, the following night, a detachment crossed
over Webb's ferry into Province Island, and constructed a slight
work opposite fort Mifflin, within two musket shots of the
block-house, from which they were enabled to throw shot and
shells into the barracks. When day-light discovered this work,
three galleys and a floating battery were ordered to attack it, and
the garrison surrendered. While the boats were bringing off
the prisoners, a large column of British troops were seen marching into the fortress, upon which the attack on it was renewed,
but without success; and two attempts made by Lieutenant
Colonel Smith to storm it, failed. In a few nights, works were
completed on the high ground of Province Island which enfiladed the principal battery of fort Mifflin, and rendered it

GEORGE WASHINGTON

203

necessary to throw up some cover on the platform to protect
the men who worked the guns.
The aids expected from the Jersey militia were not received.
"Assure yourself," said Lieutenant Colonel Smith, in a letter
pressing earnestly for a reinforcement of continental troops,
C"that no dependence is to be put on the militia; whatever men
your excellency determines on sending, no time is to be lost."
The garrison of fort Mifflin was now reduced to one hundred
and fifty-six effectives, and that of Red Bank did not much
exceed two hundred.
In consequence of these representations, Colonel Angel, of
Rhode Island, with his regiment, was ordered to Red Bank, and
Lieutenant Colonel John Greene, of Virginia, with about two
hundred men, to fort Mifflin.
Immediately after the battle of Brandywine, Admiral Howe
sailed for the Delaware, where he expected to arrive in time to
meet and co-operate with the army in and about Philadelphia.
But the winds were so unfavourable, and the navigation of the
bay of Delaware so difficult, that his van did not get into the
river until the 4th of October. The ships of war and transports
which followed, came up from the sixth to the eighth, and
anchored from New Castle to Reedy Island.
The frigates, in advance of the fleet, had not yet succeeded
in their endeavours to effect a passage through the lower double
row of chevaux-de-frise. Though no longer protected by the fort
at Billingsport, they were defended by the water force above,
and the work was found more difficult than had been expected.
It was not until the middle of October that the impediments
were so far removed as to afford a narrow and intricate passage
through them. In the mean time, the fire from the Pennsylvania shore had not produced all the effect expected from
it; and it was perceived that greater exertions would be necessary for the reduction of the works than could safely be made
in the present relative situation of the armies. Under this impression, General Howe, soon after the return of the American
army to its former camp on the Skippack, withdrew his troops
from Germantown into Philadelphia, as preparatory to a combined attack by land and water on forts Mercer and Mifflin.
After effecting a passage through the works sunk in the river

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at Billingsport, other difficulties still remained to be encountered
by the ships of war. Several rows of chaveaux-de-frise had been
sunk about half a mile below Mud Island, which were protected
by the guns of the forts, as well as by the moveable water
force. To silence these works, therefore, was a necessary preliminary to the removal of these obstructions in the channel.
On the zi st of October, a detachment of Hessians, amounting
to twelve hundred men, commanded by Colonel Count Donop,
crossed the Delaware at Philadelphia, with orders to storm the
fort at Red Bank. The fortifications consisted of extensive
outer works, within which was an intrenchment eight or nine
feet high, boarded and fraized. Late in the evening of the
twenty-second, Count Donop appeared before the fort, and
attacked it with great intrepidity. It was defended with equal
resolution. The outer works being too extensive to be manned
by the troops in the fort, were used only to gall the assailants
while advancing. On their near approach, the garrison retired
within the inner intrenchment, whence they poured upon the
Hessians a heavy and destructive fire. Colonel Donop received
a mortal wound; and Lieutenant Colonel Mengerode, the second in command, fell about the same time. Lieutenant Colonel
Minsing, the oldest remaining officer, drew off his troops, and
returned next day to Philadelphia. The loss of the assailants
was estimated by the Americans at four hundred men. The
garrison was reinforced from fort Mifflin, and aided by the
galleys which flanked the Hessians in their advance and retreat.
The American loss, ins killed and wounded, amounted to only
thirty-two men.
The ships having been ordered to co-operate with Count
Donop, the Augusta, with four smaller vessels, passed the lower
line of chevaux-de-frise, opposite to Billingsport, and lay above
it, waiting until the assault should be made on the fort. The
flood tide setting in about the time the attack commenced,
they moved with it up the river. The obstructions sunk in the
Delaware had in some degree changed its channel, in consequence of which the Augusta and the Merlin grounded, a
considerable distance below the second line of chevaux-de-frise
and a strong wind from the north so checked the rising of the
tide, that these vessels could not be floated by the flood. Their

GEORGE WASHINGTON

205

situation, however, was not discerned that evening, as the
frigates which were able to approach the fort, and the batteries from the Pennsylvania shore, kept up an incessant fire
on the garrison, till night put an end to the cannonade. Early
next morning it was recommenced, in the hope that, under
its cover, the Augusta and the Merlin might be got off. The
Americans, on discovering their situation, sent four fire ships
against them, but without effect. Meanwhile, a warm cannonade took place on both sides, in the course of which the Augusta
took fire, and it was found impracticable to extinguish the
flames. Most of the men were taken out, the frigates withdrawn, and the Merlin set on fire; after which the Augusta
blew up, and a few of the crew were lost in her.
This repulse inspired congress with flattering hopes for the
permanent defence of the posts on the Delaware. That body
expressed its high sense of the merits of Colonel Greene of
Rhode Island, who had commanded in fort Mercer; of Lieutenant Colonel Smith of Maryland, who had commanded in
fort Mifflin; and of Commodore Hazlewood, who commanded
the galleys; and presented a sword to each of these officers,
as a mark of estimation in which their services were held.
The situation of these forts was far from justifying this confidence of their being defensible. That on Mud Island had been
unskilfully constructed, and required at least eight hundred
men fully to man the lines. The island is about half a mile
long. Fort Mifflin was placed at the lower end, having its
principal fortifications in front for the purpose of repelling
ships coming up the river. The defences in the rear consisted
only of a ditch and palisade, protected by two block houses,
the upper story of one of which had been destroyed in the
late cannonade. Above the fort were two batteries opposing
those constructed by the British. on Province and Carpenter's
Islands, which were separated from Mud Island only by a
narrow passage between four and five hundred yards wide.
The vessels of war, engaged in the defence of the Delaware,
were partly in the service of the continent, and partly in that
of the state of Pennsylvania, under a Commodore who received
his commission from the state. A misunderstanding took place
between him and Lieutenant Colonel Smith, and also between

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him and the officers of the continental navy; and it required
all the authority of the Commander-in-chief to prevent these
differences from essentially injuring the service.
The garrison of fort Mifflin consisted of only three hundred
continental troops, who were worn down with fatigue, and
constant watching, under the constant apprehension of being
attacked from Province Island, from Philadelphia, and from
the ships below.
Having failed in every attempt to draw the militia of Jersey
to the Delaware, General Washington determined to strengthen
the garrison by farther drafts from his army. Three hundred
Pennsylvania militia were detached, to be divided between the
two forts; and, a few days afterwards, General Varnum was
ordered, with his brigade, to take a position about Woodbury,
near Red Bank, and to relieve and reinforce the garrisons of
both forts as far as his strength would permit. The hope was
entertained that the appearance of so respectable a continental
force might encourage the militia to assemble in greater numbers.
Aware of the advantage to result from a victory over the
British army while separated from the fleet, General Washington had been uniformly determined to risk much to gain one.
He had, therefore, after the battle of Germantown, continued
to watch assiduously for an opportunity to attack his enemy
once more to advantage. The circumspect caution of General
Howe afforded none. After the repulse at Red Bank, his measures were slow but certain; and were calculated to insure the
possession of the forts without exposing his troops to the hazard
of an assault.
In this state of things, intelligence was received of the successful termination of the northern campaign, in consequence
of which great part of the troops who had been employed against
Burgoyne, might be drawn to the aid of the army in Pennsylvania. But it was feared that, before these reinforcements
could arrive, Sir William Howe would gain possession of the
forts, and remove the obstructions to the navigation of the
Delaware. This apprehension furnished a strong motive for
vigorous attempts to relieve fort Mifflin. But the relative
force of the armies, the difficulty of acting offensively against
Philadelphia, and above all, the reflection that a defeat might

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207

disable him from meeting his enemy in the field even after the
arrival of the troops expected from the north, determined General Washington not to hazard a second attack under existing
circumstances.
To expedite the reinforcements for which he waited, Colonel
Hamilton was despatched to General Gates with directions to
represent to him the condition of the armies in Pennsylvania;
and to urge him, if he contemplated no other service of more
importance, immediately to send the regiments of Massachusetts and New Hampshire to aid the army of the middle department. These orders were not peremptory, because it was
possible that some other object (as the capture of New York)
still more interesting than the expulsion of General Howe from
Philadelphia, might be contemplated by Gates; and Washington meant not to interfere with the accomplishment of such
object.
On reaching General Putnam, Colonel Hamilton found that
a considerable part of the northern army had joined that officer,
but that Gates had detained four brigades at Albany for an
expedition intended to be made in the winter against
Ticonderoga.
Having made such arrangements with Putnam as he supposed
would secure the immediate march of a large body of continental
troops from that station, Colonel Hamilton proceeded to Albany for the purpose of remonstrating to General Gates against
retaining so large and valuable a part of the army unemployed
at a time when the most imminent danger threatened the vitals
of the country. Gates was by no means disposed to part with
his troops. He could not believe that an expedition then preparing at New York, was designed to reinforce General Howe;
and insisted that, should the troops then embarked at that
place, instead of proceeding to the Delaware, make a sudden
movement up the Hudson, it would be in their power, should
Albany be left defenceless, to destroy the valuable arsenal which
had been there erected, and the military stores captured with
Burgoyne, which had been chiefly deposited in that town.
Having, after repeated remonstrances, obtained an order directing three brigades to the Delaware, Hamilton hastened back
to Putnam, and found the troops which had been ordered to

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join General Washington, still at Peekskill. The detachment
from New York had suggested to Putnam the possibility of
taking that place; and he does not appear to have made very
great exertions to divest himself of a force he deemed necessary
for an object the accomplishment of which would give so much
splendour to his military character. In addition to this circumstance, an opinion had gained ground among the soldiers that
their share of service for the campaign had been performed,
and that it was time for them to go into winter quarters. Great
discontents too prevailed concerning their pay, which the government had permitted to be more than six months in arrears;
and in Poor's brigade, a mutiny broke out, in the course of
which a soldier who was run through the body by his captain,
before he expired, shot the captain dead who gave the wound.
Colonel Hamilton came in time to borrow money from the
governor of New York, to put the troops in motion; and they
proceeded by brigades to the Delaware. But these several delays retarded their arrival until the contest for the forts on that
river was terminated.
The preparations of Sir William Howe being completed, a
large battery on Province Island of twenty-four and thirtytwo pounders, and two howitzers of eight inches each, opened,
early in the morning of the ioth of November, upon fort
Mifflin, at the distance of five hundred yards, and kept up
an incessant fire for several successive days. The blockhouses
were reduced to a heap of ruins; the palisades were beaten down;
and most of the guns dismounted and otherwise disabled. The
barracks were battered in every part, so that the troops could
not remain in them. They were under the necessity of working
and watching the whole night to repair the damages of the day,
and to guard against a storm, of which they were in perpetual
apprehension. If in the day, a few moments were allowed for
repose, it was taken on the wet earth, which, in consequence
of heavy rains, had become a soft mud. The garrison was relieved by General Varnum every forty-eight hours; but his
brigade was so weak that half the men were constantly on duty.
Colonel Smith was decidedly of opinion, and General Varnum
concurred with him, that the garrison could not repel an assault, and ought to be withdrawn; but General Washington still

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209

cherished the hope that the place might be maintained until he
should be reinforced from the northern army. Believing that
an assault would not be attempted until the works were battered down, he recommended that the whole night should be
employed in making repairs. His orders were that the place
should be defended to the last extremity; and never were orders
more faithfully executed.
Several of the garrison were killed, and among them Captain
Treat, a gallant officer, who commanded the artillery. Colonel
Smith received a contusion on his hip and arm which compelled him to give up the command, and retire to Red Bank.
Major Fleury, a French officer of distinguished merit, N
who served as engineer, reported to the Commanderin-chief that, although the blockhouses were beaten down, all
the guns in them, except two, disabled, and several breaches
made in the walls, the place was still defensible; but the garrison was so unequal to the numbers required by the extent of
the lines, and was so dispirited by watching, fatigue, and constant exposure to the cold rains which were almost incessant
that he dreaded the event of an attempt to carry the place
by storm. Fresh troops were ordered to their relief from
Varnum's brigade, and the command was taken, first by Colonel
Russell, and afterwards by Major Thayer. The artillery, commanded by Captain Lee, continued to be well served. The besiegers were several times thrown into confusion, and a floating
battery which opened on the morning of the i4th, was silenced
in the course of the day.
The defence being unexpectedly obstinate the assailants
brought up their ships as far as the obstructions in
the river permitted, and added their fire to that of Nov. 5
the batteries which was the more fatal as the cover for the
troops had been greatly impaired. The brave garrison, however,
still maintained their ground with unshaken firmness. In the
midst of this stubborn conflict, the Vigilant and a sloop of war
were brought up the inner channel, between Mud and Province
Islands, which had, unobserved by the besieged, been deepened
by the current in consequence of the obstructions in the main
channel; and, taking a station within one hundred yards of the
works, not only kept up a destructive cannonade, but threw

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hand grenades into them; while the musketeers from the round
top of the Vigilant killed every man that appeared on the
platform.
Major Thayer applied to the Commodore to remove these
vessels, and he ordered six galleys on the service; but, after
reconnoitring their situation, the galleys returned without attempting any thing. Their report was that these ships were
so covered by the batteries on Province Island as to be unassailable.
It was now apparent to all that the fort could be no longer
defended. The works were in ruins. The position of the
Vigilant rendered any farther continuance on the island a
prodigal and useless waste of human life; and on the i6th,
about eleven at night, the garrison was withdrawn.'
A second attempt was made to drive the vessels from their
stations with a determination, should it succeed, to repossess
the island; but the galleys effected nothing; and a detachment
from Province Island soon occupied the ground which had been
abandoned.
The day after receiving intelligence of the evacuation of
fort Mifflin, General Washington deputed Generals De Kalb
and Knox, to confer with General Varnum and the officers at
fort Mercer on the practicability of continuing to defend the
obstructions in the channel, to report thereon, and to state the
force which would be necessary for that purpose. Their report
was in favour of continuing the defence. A council of the navy
officers had already been called by the Commodore in pursuance
of a request of the Commander-in-chief made before the evacuation had taken place, who were unanimously of opinion that it
would be impracticable for the fleet, after the loss of the island,
to maintain its station, or to assist in preventing the chevauxde-frise from being weighed by the ships of the enemy.
General Howe had now completed a line of defence from
the Schuylkill to the Delaware; and a reinforcement from New
York had arrived at Chester. These two circumstances enabled
him to form an army in the Jerseys sufficient for the reduction
of fort Mercer, without weakening himself so much in Phila1 In stating the defence of Mud Island, the author has availed himself of the
journal of Major Fleury.

GEORGE WASHINGTON

2 I I

delphia as to put his line in hazard. Still deeming it of the
utmost importance to open the navigation of the Delaware
completely, he detached Lord Cornwallis about one in the
morning of the I7th, with a strong body of troops to Chester.
From that place, his lordship crossed over to Billingsport, where
he was joined by the reinforcement from New York.
General Washington received immediate intelligence of the
march of this detachment, which he communicated to General
Varnum with orders that fort Mercer should be defended to the
last extremity. With a view to military operations in that
quarter, he ordered one division of the army to cross the river
at Burlington, and despatched expresses to the northern troops
who were marching on by brigades, directing them to move
down the Delaware on its northern side until they should receive farther orders.
Major General Greene, an officer who had been distinguished
early in the war by the Commander-in-chief for the solidity
of his judgment and his military talents, was selected for this
expedition. A hope was entertained that he would be able,
not only to protect fort Mercer, but to obtain some decisive
advantage over Lord Cornwallis; as the situation of the fort,
which his lordship could not invest without placing himself
between Timber and Manto Creeks, would expose the assailants
to great peril from a respectable force in their rear. But, before
Greene could cross the Delaware, Lord Cornwallis approached
with an army rendered more powerful than had been expected by the junction of the reinforcement from New York;
and fort Mercer was evacuated.
A few of the smaller galleys escaped up the river, and the
others were burnt by their crews.
Washington still hoped to recover much of what had been
lost. A victory would restore the Jersey shore, and this object
was deemed so important, that General Greene's instructions
indicated the expectation that he would be in a condition to
fight Lord Cornwallis.
The judicious officer feared the reproach of avoiding an
action less than the just censure of sacrificing the real interests
of his country by engaging the enemy on disadvantageous terms.
The numbers of the British exceeded his, even counting his

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militia as regulars; and he determined to wait for Glover's
brigade, which was marching from the north. Before its arrival, Lord Cornwallis took post on Gloucester Point, a point
of land making deep into the Delaware, which was entirely
under cover of the guns of the ships, from which place he was
embarking his baggage and the provisions he had collected
for Philadelphia.'
Believing that Lord Cornwallis would immediately follow
the magazines he had collected, and that the purpose of Sir
William Howe was with his united forces, to attack the American army while divided, General Washington ordered Greene
to recross the Delaware, and join the army.
Thus after one continued struggle of more than six weeks,
in which the continental troops displayed great military virtues,
the army in Philadelphia secured itself in the possession of that
city, by opening a free communication with the fleet.2
While Lord Cornwallis was in Jersey, and General Greene
on the Delaware above him, the reinforcements from the north
being received, an attack on Philadelphia was strongly pressed
by several officers high in rank; and was in some measure urged
by that torrent of public opinion, which, if not resisted by a
very firm mind, overwhelms the judgment, and by controlling
measures not well comprehended, may frequently produce, especially in military transactions, the most disastrous effects.
It was stated to the Commander-in-chief, that his army was
"While Lord Cornwallis lay on Gloucester Point, about one hundred and fifty
men of Morgan's rifle corps under Lieutenant Colonel Butler, and an equal number
of militia, the whole under the Marquis de la Fayette, who still served as a volunteer, attacked a picket consisting of about three hundred men, and drove them
with the loss of twenty or thirty killed, and a greater number wounded, quite
into their camp; after which the Americans retired without being pursued.
"While these transactions were passing on the Delaware, General Dickinson projected another expedition against the post on Staten Island. He collected about
two thousand men, and requested General Putnam to make a diversion on the side
of Kingsbridge, in order to prevent a reinforcement from New York.
Knowing that success depended on secrecy, he had concealed his object even
from his field-officers, until eight of the night in which it was to be executed.
Yet by three next morning, information of his design was given to General Skinner, who, being on his guard, saved himself and his brigade, by taking refuge, on
the first alarm, in some works too strong to be carried by assault. A few prisoners
were made and a few men killed, after which General Dickinson brought off his
party with the loss of only three killed and ten slightly wounded.

GEORGE WASHINGTON

1I3

now in greater force than he could expect it to be at any
future time; that being joined by the troops who had conquered Burgoyne, his own reputation, the reputation of his
army, the opinion of congress, and of the nation, required
some decisive blow on his part. That the rapid depreciation of
the paper currency, by which the resources for carrying on
the war were dried up, rendered indispensable some grand
effort to bring it to a speedy termination.
The plan proposed was, that General Greene should embark
two thousand men at Dunk's ferry, and descending the Delaware in the night, land in the town just before day, attack
the enemy in the rear, and take possession of the bridge over
the Schuylkill. That a strong corps should march down on
the west side of that river, occupy the heights enfilading the
works of the enemy, and open a brisk cannonade upon them,
while a detachment from it should march down to the bridge,
and attack in front at the same instant, that the party descending the river should commence its assault on the rear.
Not only the Commander-in-chief, but some of his best
officers, those who could not be impelled by the clamours of the
ill-informed to ruin the public interests, were opposed to this
mad enterprise.
The two armies they said were now nearly equal in point
of numbers, and the detachment under Lord Cornwallis could
not be supposed to have so weakened Sir William Howe as to
compensate for the advantages of his position. His right was
covered by the Delaware, his left by the Schuylkill, his rear
by the junction of those two rivers, as well as by the city of
Philadelphia, and his front by a line of redoubts extending
from river to river, and connected by an abbattis, and by
circular works. It would be indispensably necessary to carry all
these redoubts; since to leave a part of them to play on the
rear of the columns, while engaged in front with the enemy
in Philadelphia, would be extremely hazardous.
Supposing the redoubts carried, and the British army driven
into the town, yet all military men were agreed on the great
peril of storming a town. The streets would be defended by an
artillery greatly superior to that of the Americans, which would

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attack in front, while the brick houses would be lined with
musketeers whose fire must thin the ranks of the assailants.
A part of the plan, on the successful execution of which the
whole depended, was, that the British rear should be surprised
by the corps descending the Delaware. This would require
the concurrence of too many favourable circumstances to be
calculated on with any confidence. As the position of General
Greene was known, it could not be supposed that Sir William
Howe would be inattentive to him. It was probable that not
even his embarkation would be made unnoticed; but it was presu'ming a degree of negligence which ought not to be assumed,
to suppose that he could descend the river to Philadelphia undiscovered. So soon as his movement should be observed, the
whole plan would be comprehended, since it would never be
conjectured that General Greene was to attack singly.
If the attack in front should fail, which was not even improbable, the total loss of the two thousand men in the rear
must follow; and General Howe would maintain his superiority
through the winter.
The situation of America did not require these desperate
measures. The British general would be compelled to risk a
battle on equal terms, or to manifest a conscious inferiority
to the American army. The depreciation of paper money was
the inevitable consequence of immense emissions without corresponding taxes. It was by removing the cause, not by sacrificing the army, that this evil was to be corrected.
Washington possessed too much discernment to be dazzled
by the false brilliant presented by those who urged the necessity of storming Philadelphia, in order to throw lustre round
his own fame, and that of his army; and too much firmness
of temper, too much virtue and real patriotism, to be diverted
from a purpose believed to be right, by the clamours of faction or the discontents of ignorance. Disregarding the importunities of mistaken friends, the malignant insinuations of
enemies, and the expectations of the ill-informed; he persevered
in his resolution to make no attempt on Philadelphia. He
saved his army, and was able to keep the field in the face of his
enemy; while the clamour of the moment wasted in air, and is
forgotten.

GEORGE WASHINGTON

21I

The opinion that Sir William Howe meditated an attack on
the American camp, was not ill founded. Scarcely had Lord
Cornwallis returned to Philadelphia, and Greene to the American army, when unquestionable intelligence was received that
the British general was preparing to march out in full strength,
with the avowed object of forcing Washington from his position, and driving him beyond the mountains.
On the 4th of December, Captain M'Lane, a vigilant officer
on the lines, discovered that an attempt to surprise the American camp at White Marsh was about to be made, and communicated the information to the Commander-in-chief. In
the evening of the same day, General Howe marched out of
Philadelphia with his whole force; and, about eleven at night,
M'Lane, who had been detached with one hundred chosen men,
attacked the British van at the Three Mile Run, on the Germantown road, and compelled their front division to change its
line of march. He hovered on the front and flank of the advancing army, galling them severely until three next morning,
when the British encamped on Chestnut Hill, in front of the
American right, and distant from it about three miles. A
slight skirmish had also taken place between the Pennsylvania
militia under General Irvine, and the advanced light Dec. 6.
parties of the enemy, in which the general was
wounded, and the militia, without much other loss, were
dispersed.
The range of hills on which the British were posted, approached nearer to those occupied by the Americans, as they
stretched northward.
Having passed the day in reconnoitring the right, Sir William Howe changed his ground in the course of the night, and
moving along the hills to his right, took an advantageous position, about a mile in front of the American left. The next day
he inclined still farther to his right, and, in doing so, approached
still nearer to the left wing of the American army. Supposing
a general engagement to be approaching, Washing- D
ton detached Gist with some Maryland militia, and ec. 7.
Morgan with his rifle corps, to attack the flanking and advancing parties of the enemy. A sharp action ensued? in which
Major Morris, of Jersey, a brave officer in Morgan's regiment,

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was mortally wounded, and twenty-seven of his men were killed
and wounded. A small loss was also sustained in the militia.
The parties first attacked were driven in; but the enemy reinforcing in numbers, and Washington, unwilling to move from
the heights, and engage on the ground which was the scene
of the skirmish, declining to reinforce Gist and Morgan, they,
in turn, were compelled to retreat.
Sir William Howe continued to manceuvre towards the flank,
and in front of the left wing of the American army. Expecting to be attacked in that quarter in full force, Washington
made such changes in the disposition of his troops as the occasion required; and the day was consumed in these movements.
In the course of it, the American chief rode through every
brigade of his army, delivering, in person, his orders, respecting
the manner of receiving the enemy, exhorting his troops to rely
principally on the bayonet, and encouraging them by the steady
firmness of his countenance, as well as by his words, to a vigorous performance of their duty.' The dispositions of the evening indicated an intention to attack him the ensuing morning; but in the afternoon of the eighth, the British suddenly
filed off from their right, which extended beyond the American left, and retreated to Philadelphia. The parties detached
to harass their rear could not overtake it.
The loss of the British in this expedition, as stated in the
official letter of General Howe, rather exceeded one hundred
in killed, wounded, and missing; and was sustained principally
in the skirmish of the 7th, in which Major Morris fell.
On one former occasion had the two armies met, uncovered
by works, with superior numbers on the side of the Americans.
The effective force of the British was then stated at twelve
thousand men. It has been since declared by an author2 who
then belonged to it, but who, though a candid writer, appears
to have imbibed prejudices against Sir William Howe, to have
amounted to fourteen thousand. The American army consisted
of precisely twelve thousand one hundred and sixty-one continental troops, and three thousand two hundred and forty-one
militia. This equality in point of numbers, rendered it a prudent
The author states this on his own observation.
Stedman.

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217

precaution to maintain a superiority of position. As the two
armies occupied heights fronting each other, neither could attack without giving to its adversary some advantage in the
ground; and this was an advantage which neither seemed willing
to relinquish.
The return of Sir William Howe to Philadelphia without
bringing on an action, after marching out with the avowed
intention of fighting, is the best testimony of the respect which
he felt for the talents of his adversary, and the courage of the
troops he was to encounter.
The cold was now becoming so intense that it was impossible
for an army neither well clothed, nor sufficiently supplied with
blankets, longer to keep the field in tents. It had become necessary to place the troops in winter quarters; but in the existing
state of things the choice of winter quarters was a subject for
serious reflection. It was impossible to place them in villages
without uncovering the country, or exposing them to the hazard
of being beaten in detachment.
To avoid these calamities, it was determined to take a strong
position in the neighbourhood of Philadelphia, equally distant
from the Delaware above and below that city; and there to
construct huts, in the form of a regular encampment, which
might cover the army during the winter. A strong piece of
ground at Valley Forge, on the west side of the Schuylkill, between twenty and thirty miles from Philadelphia, was selected
for that purpose; and some time before day on the morning of
the iith of December, the army marched to take possession
of it. By an accidental concurrence of circumstances, Lord
Cornwallis had been detached the same morning at the head
of a strong corps, on a foraging party on the west side of the
Schuylkill. He had fallen in with a brigade of Pennsylvania
militia commanded by General Potter, which he soon dispersed;
and, pursuing the fugitives, had gained the heights opposite
Matron's ford, over which the Americans had thrown a bridge
for the purpose of crossing the river, and had posted troops to
command the defile called the Gulph, just as the front division
of the American army reached the bank of the river. This
movement had been made without any knowledge of the intention of General Washington to change his position, or any

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design of contesting the passage of the Schuylkill; but the troops
had been posted in the manner already mentioned for the sole
purpose of covering the foraging party.
Washington apprehended, from his first intelligence, that
General Howe had taken the field in full force. He therefore
recalled the troops already on the west side, and moved rather
higher up the river, for the purpose of understanding the real
Dec. 2. situation, force, and designs of the enemy. The next
day Lord Cornwallis returned to Philadelphia; and,
in the course of the night, the American army crossed the river.
Here the Commander-in-chief communicated to his army, in
general orders, the manner in which he intended to dispose
of them during the winter. He expressed, in strong terms, his
approbation of their conduct, presented them with an encouraging state of the future prospects of their country, exhorted them
to bear with continuing fortitude the hardships inseparable from
the position they were about to take, and endeavoured to convince their judgments that those hardships were not imposed on
them by unfeeling caprice, but were necessary for the good
of their country.
The winter had set in with great severity, and the sufferings
of the army were extreme. In a few days, however, these sufferings were considerably diminished by the erection of logged
huts, filled up with mortar, which, after being dried, formed
comfortable habitations, and gave content to men long unused
to the conveniences of life. The order of a regular encampment was observed; and the only appearance of winter quarters,
was the substitution of huts for tents.

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CHAPTER X
WHILE, with inferior numbers, General Washington maintained
a stubborn contest in the middle states, events of
great variety and importance were passing in the north.
After Sir Guy Carleton had distributed his army, for winter
quarters, in the several villages from the Isle Aux Noix and
Montreal to Quebec, General Burgoyne, who had served under
him, embarked for England, in order to communicate a full
statement of affairs in the northern department; and to assist
in making arrangements for the ensuing campaign. The American army, having been formed for only one year, dissolved of
itself at the expiration of that term, and could scarcely furnish
even the appearance of garrisons in their forts.
The defence of this frontier was assigned to the regiments
directed to be raised in Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and the
north western parts of New York; but the recruiting service
advanced so slowly, and so much difficulty was found in clothing and arming those who were enlisted, that it became indispensable to call in the aid of the militia; and the plan of the
campaign on the part of the British was involved in so much
obscurity that General Washington deemed it adviseable to
direct eight of the regiments of Massachusetts to rendezvous
at Peekskill.
The service of General Schuyler in the northern. department
had been more solid than brilliant. Dissatisfied with his situation, and disgusted with the injustice 1 he supposed himself to
experience, he had for some time meditated a resignation, and
had been retained in the service only by the deep interest he
felt in the struggle of his country for independence. So soon
1 When the command of the operating army was given to General Thomas in
March i776, the head quarters of General Schuyler had been fixed by congress at
Albany, and that resolution remained in force. General Gates was now directed
to repair to Ticonderoga and take command of the army; and Major General St.
Clair was ordered to the same place to serve under him.

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as his fears for Ticonderoga were removed by the partial opening of Lake Champlain, he waited in person on congress for
the purpose of adjusting his accounts, obtaining an inquiry into
his conduct, and supporting those necessary measures of
defence in the north, which were suggested by his perfect
knowledge of the country. At his request, a committee, consisting of a member from each state, was appointed to inquire
into his conduct during the time he had held a command in the
army. The arduous services performed by this meritorious
officer, when investigated, were found so far to exceed any estimate which had been made of them, that congress deemed
it essential to the public interest to prevail on him
May 22. to retain his commission. The resolution which fixed
his head quarters at Albany was repealed, and he was directed
to proceed forthwith to the northern department, and to take
the command of it.
On his arrival, he found the army of the north not only too
weak for the objects entrusted to it, but badly supplied with
arms, clothes, and provisions. From a spy who had been seized
near Onion River, he obtained information that General Burgoyne was at Quebec, and was to command the British forces
in that department so soon as they should march out of Canada.
That while Ticonderoga should be attacked by the main army,
Sir John Johnson, with a strong body of British, Canadians,
and Indians, was to penetrate to the Mohawk by Oswego, and
place himself between fort Stanwix and fort Edward.
General Schuyler was sensible of the danger which threatened him, and made every exertion to meet it. After completing
his arrangements at Ticonderoga for sustaining a siege, he had
proceeded to Albany, for the purpose of attending to his supplies, and of expediting the march of reinforcements, when he
received intelligence from General St. Clair, who was entrusted
with the defence of Ticonderoga, that Burgoyne had appeared
before that place.
In the course of the preceding winter, a plan for penetrating
to the Hudson, from Canada, by the way of the lakes, had been
digested in the cabinet of London. General Burgoyne, who
assisted in forming it, was entrusted with its execution, and
was to lead a formidable army against Ticonderoga as soQn as

GEORGE WASHINGTON

22I

the season would permit. At the same time a smaller party
under Colonel St. Leger, composed of Canadians, newly raised
Americans, and a few Europeans, aided by a powerful body of
Indians, was to march from Oswego, to enter the country by
the way of the Mohawk, and to join the grand army on the
Hudson.
Burgoyne reached Quebec as soon as it was practicable to
sail up the St. Lawrence, and appeared in full force on the river
Bouquet, on the western banks of lake Champlain, June 22.
much earlier than the American general had supposed to be possible. At this place he met the Indians in a
grand council, after which he gave them a war feast. Much
of the cruelty afterwards perpetrated by the savages has been
attributed to this unfortunate officer; but justice requires the
admission that his speech was calculated rather to diminish than
increase their habitual ferocity. He endeavoured to impress
on them the distinction between enemies in the field, and the
unarmed inhabitants, many of whom were friends; and, addressing himself to their avarice, promised rewards for prisoners, but none for scalps. It was perhaps fortunate for America,
that, in some instances, peculiarly calculated to excite and interest the human feelings, these feeble restraints were disregarded.
After publishing a manifesto at Putnam River, designed to act
on the hopes and fears of the people of the country through
which he was to pass, he halted a few days at Crown Point, to
make the necessary dispositions for investing Ticonderoga.
From Crown Point, the royal army advanced on both sides
the lake, keeping up a communication between its divisions,
by means of the fleet; and on the ist of July encamped 'within
four miles of the American works. A strong party was pushed
forward to Three Mile Point; and the fleet anchored just beyond
the range of the guns of the fort. The next day they took
possession, without opposition, of the important post at Mount
Hope, which commanded, in part, the lines on the northern
side, and entirely cut off the communication with lake George.
The weakness of his garrison induced General St. Clair, to
give up this post without a struggle. Believing it to be impracticable to support it without hazarding a general action, he

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determined to concentrate his force about Ticonderoga and
Mount Independence.
After taking possession of Mount Hope, the British lines were
extended on the western side of Champlain, from thq mountain
quite to the lake, so as completely to inclose the garrison on
that side. The German division under Major General Reidisel,
which occupied the eastern shore of the lake, was encamped
at Three Mile Point, and had pushed forward a detachment near
the rivulet, which runs east of Mount Independence.
The besiegers laboured assiduously to bring up their artillery
and complete their works. Sugar Hill, a rugged mountain
standing at the confluence of the waters that unite at Ticonderoga, which overlooks the fortress and had been thought inaccessible, was examined; and the report being that the ascent,
though extremely difficult, was practicable, the work was immediately commenced, and was pressed with so much vigour
that the batteries might have opened next day. The garrison
was not in a condition to check these operations.
The situation of St. Clair was now at its crisis. Only the
ground between the Eastern run and the South river remained
open; and this he was informed would be occupied the next
day, so that the investment would be complete. The place must
be immediately evacuated, or maintained at the hazard of losing
the garrison when it should be no longer tenable.
Between these cruel alternatives, General St. Clair did not
hesitate to choose the first; but deeming it prudent to take the
advice of a council of war, he convened the general officers,
who unanimously advised the immediate evacuation of the fort.
Preparations for the retreat were instantly commenced. The
invalids, the hospital, and such stores as could be moved in the
course of the night, were put on board the batteaux, which
proceeded under the guard of Colonel Long, up the South
river to Skeensborough; and, before day on the morning of
the 6th of July, the main body of the army directed its march
to the same place.
In the hope of making considerable progress before his retreat
should be discovered, General St. Clair had ordered the troops
to observe the most profound silence, and, particularly, to set
nothing on fire. These judicious orders were disobeyed; and,

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213

before the rear guard was in motion, the house which had been
occupied by General De Fermoy was in flames. This served as
a signal to the besiegers, who immediately entered the works.
The main body of the retreating army was rapidly pursued by
Generals Frazer and Reidisel, while General Burgoyne, in person, followed the detachment under Colonel Long.
The bridge, the boom, and those other works, the construction of which had employed the labour of ten months, were cut
through by nine in the morning, so as to afford a passage for
the Royal George and Inflexible frigates, as well as for the gun
boats, which engaged the American galleys, about three in the
afternoon, near the falls of Skeensborough.
In the mean time, three regiments had disembarked at some
distance from the fort, with the intention of attacking it by
land, and cutting off the retreat of the garrison, as well as that
of the detachment in the boats and galleys. This manoeuvre being discovered, the works and batteaux were set on fire, and
the troops retired to fort Anne. On this occasion, the baggage
of the army, and a great quantity of military stores were either
destroyed by the Americans, or taken by the British.
Knowing that he could save his army only by the rapidity
of his march, General St. Clair reached Castletown, thirty miles
from Ticonderoga, on the night succeeding the evacuation of
the fort. The rear guard under Colonel Warner halted six miles
short of that place. Having been augmented by those who from
excessive fatigue had fallen out of the line of march, it amounted
to rather more than one thousand men.
The next morning at five, they were overtaken and attacked
by General Frazer with eight hundred and fifty men. The
action was warm and well contested. In its commencement, two regiments of militia, which lay July 7
within two miles of Colonel Warner, were ordered to his assistance. Instead of obeying these orders, they consulted their
own safety, and hastened to Castletown. Had these orders
been executed, the corps which attacked Warner would probably have been cut to pieces. While the action was maintained with equal spirit on both sides, General Reidisel arrived
with his division of Germans, and the Americans were routed.
In this action, Colonel Francis, several other officers, and up

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wards of two hundred men were left dead on the field; and
one colonel, seven captains, ten subalterns, and two hundred and
ten privates were made prisoners. Near six hundred are supposed to have been wounded, many of whom must have perished
in attempting to escape through the woods towards the inhabited country. The British state their own loss at thirtyfive killed, among whom was one field officer, and one hundred
and forty-four wounded, including two majors, and five inferior officers. It is scarcely credible, notwithstanding the difference in arms, that in a well contested action, the disparity in
the killed could have been so considerable. It is the less probable, as the pursuit was not of long continuance.
To avoid that division of the British army which had proceeded up the North River, St. Clair changed his route; and
directed his march to Rutland, to which place he ordered
Warner also to retire. At Rutland he fell in with several soldiers who had been separated from their corps; and, two days
afterwards, at Manchester, was joined by Warner with about
ninety men. From this place he proceeded to fort Edward,
where he met General Schuyler.
After taking possession of Skeensborough, Burgoyne had
found it necessary to suspend the pursuit, and to give his army
refreshment. The troops were in some disorder; distinct corps
were intermingled, and his detachments were far apart from
each other. He determined therefore to halt a few days at
that place, in order to reassemble and arrange him army.
Colonel Long having been directed to defend fort Anne,
the ninth regiment of British, under Lieutenant Colonel Hill,
had been detached against that place. It being understood that
the Americans were in some force, two other regiments, under
Brigadier Powell, were ordered to support the first party. Before
the arrival of this reinforcement, Colonel Long attacked the
ninth regiment, and a sharp skirmish ensued, in which the British
kept their ground, and the advantage was claimed by both
parties. Hearing that a reinforcement was approaching, Long
set fire to the works at fort Anne, and retired to fort Edward.
At Stillwater, on his way to Ticonderoga, General Schuyler
was informed of the evacuation of that place; and, on the

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225

same day, at Saratoga, of the loss of the stores at Skeensborough.
He had heard nothing from General St. Clair; and was seriously apprehensive for that officer and his army, which, after
the junction of Colonel Long, consisted of about fifteen hundred continental troops, and the same number of militia. They
were dispirited by defeat, without tents, badly armed, and
had lost great part of their stores and baggage. The country
was generally much alarmed; and even the well affected discovered more inclination to take care of themselves than to
join the army. In this gloomy state of things, no officer could
have exerted more diligence and skill than were displayed by
Schuyler. Having fixed his head quarters at fort Edward, he
employed to the utmost advantage the short respite from action
which Burgoyne unavoidably gave. The country between
Skeensborough and fort Edward was almost entirely unsettled,
was covered with thick woods, and of a surface extremely
rough, and much intersected with creeks and morasses. Wood
creek was navigable with batteaux as far as fort Anne; and
military stores of every description might be transported up it.
He obstructed its navigation by sinking numerous impediments
in its course, broke up the bridges, and rendered the roads
impassable. He was also indefatigable in driving the live stock
out of the way, and in bringing from fort George to fort Edward, the ammunition and other military stores which had been
deposited at that place. Still farther to delay the movements
of the British, he posted Colonel Warner on their left flank,
with instructions to raise the militia in that quarter. The hope
was entertained, that the appearance of a respectable force,
threatening the flank and rear of the invading army, would
not only retard its advance, but would induce General Burgoyne
to weaken it, in order to strengthen the garrison of Ticonderoga.
While thus endeavouring to obstruct the march of the enemy,
Schuyler was not less attentive to the best means of strengthening his own army. Reinforcements of regular troops were
earnestly solicited; the militia of New England and New York
were required to take the field, and all his influence in the
surrounding country was exerted to reanimate the people, and
to prevent their defection from the American cause.

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While at Skeensborough General Burgoyne issued a second
proclamation' summoning the people of the adjacent country
to send ten deputies from each township to meet Colonel Skeene
at Castletown, in order to deliberate on such measures as might
still be adopted to save those who had not yet conformed to his
first, and submitted to the royal authority. General Schuyler apprehending some effect from this paper, issued a counter proclamation, stating the insidious designs of the enemy. Warning the
inhabitants, by the example of Jersey, of the danger to which
their yielding to this seductive proposition would expose them,
and giving them the most solemn assurances that all who should
send deputies to this meeting, or in any manner aid the enemy,
would be considered as traitors, and should suffer the utmost
rigour of the law.
The evacuation of Ticonderoga was a shock for which no part
of the United States was prepared. Neither the strength of the
invading army, nor of the garrison had been understood. When
therefore intelligence was received that a place, on the fortifications of which much money and labour had been expended,
which was considered as the key to the whole north-western
country, and supposed to contain a garrison nearly equal to the
invading army, had been abandoned without a siege; that an
immense train of artillery, and all the military stores, had either
fallen into the hands of the enemy, or been destroyed; that the
army, on its retreat, had been attacked, defeated, and dispersed;
astonishment pervaded all ranks of men; and the conduct of the
officers was universally condemned. Congress recalled all the
generals of the department, and directed an inquiry into their
conduct. Throughout New England especially, the most bitter
aspersions were cast on them; and General Schuyler, who, from
some unknown cause, had never been viewed with favour in
that part of the continent, was involved in the common charge
of treachery, to which this accumulation of unlooked for calamity was generally attributed by the mass of the people.
On the representations of General Washington, the recall of
the officers was suspended, until he should be of opinion that the
service would not suffer by the measure; and, on a full inquiry
1 Remem.

GEORGE WASHINGTON

127

afterwards made into their conduct. they were acquitted of all
blame.
In a letter of St. Clair to the Commander-in-chief, stating his
motives for evacuating Ticonderoga, he represented the strength
of his garrison, including nine hundred militia, who would consent to stay but a few days, at only three thousand effective
rank and file, many of whom were without bayonets. The lines
required ten thousand to man them properly. He also affirmed,
that his supply of provisions was sufficient for only twenty days,
and that the works on the Ticonderoga side were incomplete,
with their flanks undefended. He justified his having failed to
call in a larger reinforcement of militia, by the scarcity of provisions, the supply on hand not having been procured until
General Schuyler had resumed the command in the department;
and attributed his not having evacuated the place in time to preserve his army and stores, to the prevalent opinion that there was
not a sufficient force in Canada to attempt so hardy an enterprise,
and to his not being at liberty to adopt that measure but in the
last necessity.
A court of inquiry justified his conduct, and he retained the
confidence of the Commander-in-chief.
On learning the distressed state of the remnant of the army,
General Washington made great exertions to repair its losses,
and to reinforce it. The utmost industry was used to procure a
supply of tents; artillery and ammunition were forwarded from
Massachusetts; the remaining troops of that state were ordered
to that department; and General Lincoln, who possessed, in a
high degree, the confidence of the New England militia, was
directed to raise and command them. General Arnold, so often
distinguished for his gallantry in the field, was ordered to the
northern army, in the hope that his presence and reputation
might reanimate the troops; and Colonel Morgan, with his corps
of riflemen, was detached on the same service. Through the
present dark gloom, Washington discerned a ray of light, and
already cherished the hope that much good might result from
present evil. "The evacuation of Ticonderoga and Mount Independence," said he in a letter of the i 5th of July, to General
Schuyler, "is an event of chagrin and surprise, not apprehended,
nor within the compass of my reasoning. This stroke is severe

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indeed, and has distressed us much. But, notwithstanding
things at present wear a dark and gloomy aspect, I hope a spirited
opposition will check the progress of General Burgoyne's arms,
and that the confidence derived from success will hurry him into
measures that will, in their consequences, be favourable to us.
We should never despair. Our situation has before been unpromising, and has changed for the better. So, I trust, it will
again. If new difficulties arise, we must only put forth new
exertions, and proportion our efforts to the exigency of the
times."
On receiving a letter from General Schuyler of the seventeenth, stating the divided situation of the British army, he
seemed to anticipate the event which afterwards occurred, and
to suggest the measure in which originated that torrent of misfortune with which Burgoyne was overwhelmed. "Though our
affairs," he said in reply to this information, "have for some days
past worn a dark and gloomy aspect, I yet look forward to a
fortunate and happy change. I trust General Burgoyne's army
will meet, sooner or later, an effectual check; and, as I suggested
before, that the success he has met with will precipitate his ruin.
From your accounts, he appears to be pursuing that line of conduct which, of all others, is most favourable to us. I mean
acting in detachment. This conduct will certainly give room
for enterprise on our part, and expose his parties to great hazard.
Could we be so happy as to cut one of them off, though it should
not exceed four, five, or six hundred men, it would inspirit the
people, and do away much of their present anxiety. In such an
event, they would lose sight of past misfortune; and, urged at
the same time by a regard for their own security, would fly to
arms, and afford every aid in their power."
After allowing a short repose to his army, General Burgoyne
proceeded with ardour to the remaining objects of the campaign.
The toils and delays which must be encountered in reaching the
Hudson were soon perceived. He found it necessary to open
Wood creek, and to repair the roads and bridges which Schuyler
had broken up. Such was the unavoidable delay of this difficult
operation, that the army did not arrive on the Hudson, in the
neighbourhood of fort Edward, till the fourteenth of July. At
this place it was necessary again to halt, in order to bring

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229

artillery, provisions, batteaux, and other articles from fort
George.
The time afforded by this delay had been employed by
Schuyler to the utmost advantage. Some reinforcements of continental troops had arrived from Peekskill, and the militia had
been assembled; but his strength did not yet afford a reasonable
prospect of success in a contest with the enemy opposed to him.
On this account, as Burgoyne approached fort Edward, Schuyler
retired over the Hudson to Saratoga, and soon afterwards to Stillwater, not far from the mouth of the Mohawk. At this place,
General Lincoln, who had been detached to take command of
the militia assembling at Manchester, was ordered to rejoin him,
and he fortified his camp in the hope of being strong enough to
defend it.
At Stillwater, information was obtained that Burgoyne had
evacuated Castletown; so that the only communication with
Ticonderoga, whence nearly all his supplies were drawn, was
through lake George; and that the garrison of that important
place had been reduced to three hundred men. In consequence
of this intelligence, the orders to General Lincoln were countermanded, and he was directed with the militia of Massachusetts,
New Hampshire, and of the Grants, making, as was understood,
a total of between two and three thousand men, to place himself
in the rear of the British army, and cut off its communication
with the lakes. Here too he was informed that Colonel St. Leger,
with a large body of Indians, in addition to his regulars, had
penetrated from Oswego, by the way of the Oneida lake and
Wood creek, to the Mohawk, where he had laid siege to fort
Schuyler, and had totally defeated General Herkimer, who had
raised the militia of Tryon county, in order to relieve the fort.
The importance of protecting the inhabitants from the savages,
and of preventing a junction between St. Leger and Burgoyne,
and the consequent loss of the country on the Mohawk, determined Schuyler, weak as he was, to detach Major General
Arnold with three continental regiments to raise the siege. The
army was so enfeebled by this measure, that its removal to a place
of greater security became necessary, and it was withdrawn to
some islands in the confluence of the Hudson and the Mohawk,

230

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where the camp was deemed more defensible. Burgoyne had
now marched down the east side of the Hudson,
Aug. IS. and his advanced parties had crossed the river, and
occupied the ground at Saratoga.
On the 3d of August, after a message vaunting of his strength,
and demanding a surrender, which was answered by a declaration that the fort would be defended to the last extremity, St.
Leger invested fort Schuyler. The garrison amounted to six hundred men, all continental troops, who were commanded by
Colonel Gansevoort. The besieging army rather exceeded fifteen
hundred, of whom from six to nine hundred were Indians.
On the approach of the enemy, General Herkimer, who commanded the militia of Tryon county, assembled them in considerable numbers, and gave information to the garrison, about
eleven in the morning of the sixth, of his intention to force a
passage that day through the besieging army. Gansevoort determined to favour the execution of this design by a vigorous
sortie; and upwards of two hundred men, to be commanded by
Lieutenant Colonel Willet, were drawn out for that purpose.
Unfortunately St. Leger received information the preceding
day of Herkimer's approach, and, early in the morning, placed a
strong party, composed of regulars and Indians, in ambuscade
on the road along which he was to march. His first notice of it
was given by a heavy discharge of small arms, which was followed by a furious attack from the Indians with their tomahawks. He defended himself with resolution; but was defeated
with great slaughter. The general and several of the field officers
were wounded; and many others, among whom were several
persons of distinction, were killed or taken prisoners. The loss
was estimated at four hundred men. The destruction was prevented from being still more complete, by the very timely sortie
made by Lieutenant Colonel Willet, which checked the pursuit,
and recalled those engaged in it to the defence of their own
camp.
As soon as Gansevoort understood that Herkimer was advancing, the sortie which he had planned was made. Lieutenant
Colonel Willet fell on the camp of the besiegers, and routed
them at the first onset. After driving them, some into the

GEORGE WASHINGTON

23 I

woods, and others over the river, he returned to the fort without the loss of a man.
Burgoyne had received early intimation of the arrival of St.
Leger before fort Schuyler; and was aware of the advantage to
be derived from an immediate and rapid movement down the
Hudson. But the obstacles to his progress multiplied daily, and
each step produced new embarrassments. Not more than onethird of the horses expected from Canada had arrived; and
Schuyler had been active in removing the draft cattle of the
country. With unremitting exertion, he had been able to transport from fort George to the Hudson, a distance of eighteen
miles, only twelve batteaux, and provisions.for four days in advance. The defectiveness of his means to feed his army until it
should reach the abundant country below him, presented an impediment to his farther progress, not readily to be surmounted.
The difficulty of drawing supplies from fort George would increase every day with the increasing distance; and the communications, already endangered by a considerable body of
militia assembling at White Creek, could be secured only by
larger detachments from his army than he was in a condition to
make. These were strong inducements to attempt some other
mode of supply.
It was well known that large magazines of provisions for the
use of the American army were collected at Bennington, which
place was generally guarded by militia, whose numbers varied
from day to day. The possession of these magazines would enable him to prosecute his ulterior plans without relying for supplies from Lake George; and he determined to seize them.
To try the affections of the country, to complete a corps of
loyalists, and to mount Reidisel's dragoons, were subordinate objects of the expedition.' Lieutenant Colonel Baum with five
hundred Europeans, and a body of American loyalists, was detached on this service.
To facilitate the enterprise, and be ready to take advantage of
its success, Burgoyne moved down the east side of the Hudson,
and threw a bridge of rafts over that river for the passage of
his van, which took post at Saratoga. At the same time Lieu1 Letter of Burgoyne.

232

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tenant Colonel Brechman, with his corps, was advanced to
Batten Hill, in order, if necessary, to support Colonel Baum.1
On approaching Bennington, Baum discovered that he should
have to encounter a much more considerable force than had
been suspected. The New Hampshire militia, commanded by
General Starke, had reached that place on their way to camp;
and, uniting with Colonel Warner, made in the whole about two
thousand men.
Perceiving his danger, Baum halted about four miles from
Bennington, and despatched an express for a reinforcement. In
the mean time, he strengthened his position by intrenchments.
Lieutenant Colonel Brechman was immediately ordered to
his assistance; but, such was the state of the roads that, though
the distance was only twenty-four miles, and his march was
pressed unremittingly from eight in the morning of the i 5th,
he did not reach the ground on which Baum had encamped,
until four in the afternoon of the next day.2
In the mean time, General Starke determined to attack him in
his intrenchments. So confident were the provincials belonging
to this party, of the attachment of the country to the royal
cause, that the American troops, while making their dispositions
for the attack, were mistaken for armed friends coming to join
them. On discovering his error, Baum prepared for the contest, and made a gallant defence. His works however were
carried by storm, and great part of his detachment killed, or
taken prisoners. A few escaped into the woods, and saved
themselves by flight.
Brechman arrived during the pursuit, and obtained from the
fugitives, the first intelligence of the disaster which had befallen
them. He immediately attacked the parties of militia who were
engaged in the pursuit, and gained some advantage over them.
Fortunately for the Americans, Colonel Warner8 came up at
this critical juncture with his continental regiment, and restored,
and continued the action, until the main body of the militia reassembled, and came to support him. Brechman in turn was
compelled to retire; but he maintained the engagement until
1 Letter of Burgoyne.
a Ibid.
' Gordon.

GEORGE WASHINGTON

233

dark, when, abandoning his artillery and baggage, he saved his
party under cover of the night.
One thousand stand of arms, and nine hundred swords were
taken in this battle. General Burgoyne represented his loss in
men at about four hundred; but thirty-two officers, and five
hundred and sixty-four privates, including Canadians and
loyalists, were made prisoners. The number of the dead was
not ascertained, because the action with Brechman had been
fought in the woods, and been continued for several miles.
The British general therefore must have included in his estimate of loss, only his European troops.
This important success was soon followed by another of equal
influence on the fate of the campaign.
Fort Schuyler had been fortified with more skill, and was defended with more courage, than St. Leger had expected. His
artillery made no impression on its walls; and his Indians, who
were much better pleased with obtaining plunder and scalps,
than besieging fortresses, became intractable, and manifested
great disgust with the service. In this temper, they understood
that Arnold was advancing with a large body of continental
troops; and, soon afterwards were told that Burgoyne and his
army had been totally defeated; a report probably founded on
the affair at Bennington. Unwilling to share the misfortune of
their friends, they manifested a determination not to await the
arrival of Arnold. The efforts of St. Leger to detain them
being ineffectual, many of them decamped immediately, and the
rest threatened to follow.
The time for deliberation was past. The camp was broken
up with indications of excessive alarm. The tents were left
standing; and the artillery, with great part of the baggage,
ammunition, and provisions, fell into the hands of the Americans. ITe retreating army was pursued by a detachment from
the garrison; and it was stated by deserters, that the Indians
plundered the remaining baggage of the officers, and massacred
such soldiers as could not keep up with the line of march. St.
Leger returned to Montreal, whence he proceeded to Ticonderoga, with the intention of joining General Burgoyne by that
route.
The decisive victory at Bennington, and the retreat of St.

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Leger from fort Schuyler, however important in themselves,
were still more so in their consequences. An army, which had
spread terror and dismay in every direction, which had, previously, experienced no reverse of fortune, was considered as already beaten; and the opinion became common, that the appearance of the great body of the people in arms, would secure
the emancipation of their country. It was too an advantage of
no inconsiderable importance resulting from this change of
public opinion, that the disaffected became timid, and the
wavering who, had the torrent of success continued, would have
made a merit of contributing their aid to the victor, were no
longer disposed to put themselves and their fortunes in hazard,
to support an army whose fate was so uncertain.
The barbarities which had been perpetrated by the Indians belonging to the invading armies, excited still more resentment
than terror. As the prospect of revenge began to open, their
effect became the more apparent; and their influence on the
royal cause was the more sensibly felt because they had been
indiscriminate.
The murder of Miss M'Crea passed through all the papers of
the continent: and the story, being retouched by the hand of
more than one master, excited a peculiar degree of sensibility.'
But there were other causes of still greater influence in producing
the events which afterwards took place. The last reinforcements of continental troops arrived in camp about this time, and
added both courage and strength to the army. The harvest,
which had detained the northern militia upon their farms, was
over; and General Schuyler, whose continued and eminent
services had not exempted him from the imputation of being a
traitor, was succeeded by General Gates, who possessed a large
share of the public confidence.
When Schuyler was directed by congress to resume the command of the northern department, Gates withdrew himself from
it. When the resolution passed recalling the general officers who
had served in that department, General Washington was requested to name a successor to Schuyler. On his expressing a wish
to decline this nomination, and representing the inconvenience
See note No. IX. at the end of the volume.

GEORGE WASHINGTON

235

of removing all the general officers, Gates was again directed to
repair thither and take the command, and their resolution to recall the brigadiers was suspended until the Commander-in-chief
should be of opinion that it might be carried into effect with
safety.
Schuyler retained the command until the arrival of Gates,
which was on the i9th of August, and continued his exertions
to restore the affairs of the department, though he felt acutely
the disgrace of being recalled in this critical and interesting state
of the campaign. "It is" said he, in a letter to the Commanderin-chief, "matter of extreme chagrin to me to be deprived of the
command at a time when, soon if ever, we shall probably be
enabled to face the enemy; when we are on the point of taking
ground 1 where they must attack to a disadvantage, should our
force be inadequate to facing them in the field; when an opportunity will, in all probability, occur, in which I might evince
that I am not what congress have too plainly insinuated by taking the command from me."
If error be attributable to the evacuation of Ticonderoga, no
portion of it was committed by Schuyler. His removal from
the command was probably severe and unjust as respected himself; but perhaps wise as respected America. The frontier towards the lakes was to be defended by the troops of New England; and, however unfounded their prejudices against him
might be, it was prudent to consult them.
Notwithstanding the difficulties which multiplied around him,
Burgoyne remained steady to his purpose. The disasters at
Bennington and on the Mohawk produced no disposition to
abandon the enterprise and save his army.
It had now become necessary to recur to the slow and toilsome mode of obtaining supplies from fort George. Having,
with persevering labour, collected provision for thirty days in
advance, he crossed the Hudson on the i3th and i4th of September, and encamped on the heights and plains of Saratoga,
with a determination to decide the fate of the expedition in a
general engagement.
General Gates, having been joined by all the continental
1 The islands in the mouth of the Mohawk.

2.36

THE LIFE OF

troops destined for the northern department, and reinforced by
large bodies of militia, had moved from his camp in the islands,
and advanced to the neighbourhood of Stillwater.
The bridges between the two armies having been broken
down, the roads being excessively bad, and the country covered
with wood, the progress of the British army down the; river was
slow. On the night of the I7th, Burgoyne encamped within four
miles of the American army, and the next day was employed in
repairing the bridges between the two camps.' In the morning
of the i9th he advanced in full force towards the American left.
Morgan was immediately detached with his corps to observe
the enemy, and to harass his front and flanks. He fell in with
a picket in front of the right wing, which he attacked with vivacity, and drove in upon the main body. Pursuing with too much
ardour, he was met in considerable force, and, after a severe
encounter, was compelled, in turn, to retire in some disorder.
Two regiments being advanced to his assistance, his corps was
rallied, and the action became more general. The Americans
were formed in a wood, with an open field in front, and invariably repulsed the British corps which attacked them; but
when they pursued those corps to the main body, they were in
turn driven back to their first ground. Reinforcements were
continually brought up, and about four in the afternoon, upwards of three thousand American troops 2 were closely engaged with the whole right wing of the British army commanded by General Burgoyne in person. The conflict was extremely severe, and only terminated with the day. At dark, the
Americans retired to their camp, and the British, who had found
great difficulty in maintaining their ground, lay all night on their
arms near the field of battle.
In this action the killed and wounded on the part of the
Americans were between three and four hundred. Among the
former were Colonels Coburn and Adams, and several other
valuable officers. The British loss has been estimated at rather
more than five hundred men.
Each army claimed the victory; and each believed itself to
1Letter of Burgoyne.
2The accounts of the day stated that the Americans were commanded by General
Arnold, but General Wilkinson says that no general officer was in the field.

GEORGE WASHINGTON.237

have beaten near the whole of the hostile army with only a part
of its own force. The advantage however, taking all circumstances into consideration, was decidedly with the Americans.
In a conflict which nearly consumed the day, they. found themselves at least equal to their antagonists. In every quarter they
had acted on the offensive; and, after an encounter for several
hours, had not lost an inch of ground. They had not been
driven from the field, but had retired from it at the close of
day, to the camp from which they had marched to battle. Their
object, which was to check the advancing enemy, had been obtained; while that of the British General had failed. In the
actual state of things, to fight without being beaten was, on
their part, victory; while, on the part of the British, to fight
without a decisive victory, was defeat. The Indians, who found
themselves beaten in the woods by Morgan, and restrained from
scalping and plundering the unarmed by Burgoyne, who saw
before them the prospect of hard fighting without profit, grew
tired of the service, and deserted in great numbers. The Canadians and Provincials were not much more faithful; and Burgoyne soon perceived that his hopes must rest almost entirely on
his European troops.
With reason, therefore, this action was celebrated throughout
the United States as a victory, and considered as the precursor
of the total ruin of the invading army. The utmost exultation was displayed, and the militia were stimulated to fly to arms,
and complete the work so happily begun.
General Lincoln, in conformity with directions which have
been stated, had assembled a considerable body of New England
militia in the rear of Burgoyne, from which he drew three parties
of about five hundred men each. One of these was detached
under the command of Colonel Brown, to the north end of lake
George, principally to relieve a number of prisoners who were
confined there, but with orders to push his success, should he
be fortunate, as far as prudence would admit. Colonel Johnson,
at the head of another party, marched towards Mount Independence, and Colonel Woodbury, with a third, was detached to
Skeensborough to cover the retreat of both the others. With
the residue, Lincoln proceeded to the camp of Gates.
Colonel Brown, after marching all night, arrived, at the break

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of day, on the north end of the lake, where he found a small post
which he carried without opposition. The surprise was complete; and he took possession of Mount Defiance, Mount Hope,
the landing place, and about two hundred batteaux. With the
loss of only three killed and five wounded, he liberated one hundred American prisoners, and captured two hundred and ninetythree of the enemy. This success was joyfully proclaimed
through the northern states. It was believed confidently that
Ticonderoga and Mount Independence were recovered; and the
militia were exhorted, by joining their brethren in the army, to
insure that event if it had not already happened.
The attempt on those places however failed. The garrison repulsed the assailants; who, after a few days, abandoned the siege.
On their return through lake George in the vessels they had captured, the militia made an attack on Diamond Island, the depot
of all the stores collected at the north end of the lake. Being
again repulsed, they destroyed the vessels they had taken, and
returned to their former station.
The day after the battle of Stillwater, General Burgoyne took
a position almost within cannon shot of the American camp,
fortified his right, and extended his left to the river. Directly
after taking this ground he received a letter from Sir Henry
Clinton, informing him that he should attack fort Montgomery
about the 2oth of September. The messenger returned with information that Burgoyne was in extreme difficulty, and would
endeavour to wait for aid until the i zth of October.1
Both armies retained their position until the 7th of October.
Burgoyne, in the hope of being relieved by Sir Henry Clinton;
and Gates, in the confidence of growing stronger every day.
Having received no farther intelligence from Sir Henry, and
being reduced to the necessity of diminishing the ration issued to
his soldiers, the British General determined to make one more
trial of strength with his adversary. In execution of this determination, he drew out on his right fifteen hundred choice
troops, whom he commanded in person, assisted by Generals
Philips, Reidisel, and Frazer.
The right wing was formed within three-quarters of a mile
1 Letter of Burgoyne.

GEORGE WASHINGTON

239

of the left of the American camp; and a corps of rangers,
Indians, and provincials, was pushed on through secret paths, to
show themselves in its rear, and excite alarm in that quarter.'
These movements were perceived by General Gates, who determined to attack their left, and, at the same time, to fall on
their right flank. Poor's brigade, and some regiments Oct. 7.
from New Hampshire, were ordered to meet them in
front; while Morgan with his rifle corps made a circuit unperceived, and seized a very advantageous height covered with wood
on their right. As soon as it was supposed that Morgan had
gained the ground he intended to occupy, the attack was made
in front and on the left, in great force. At this critical moment Morgan poured in a deadly and incessant fire on the front
and right flank.
While the British right wing was thus closely pressed in front,
and on its flank, a distinct division of the American troops was
ordered to intercept its retreat to camp, and to separate it from
the residue of the army. Burgoyne perceived the danger of his
situation, and ordered the light infantry under General Frazer,
with part of the 24th regiment, to form a second line, in order
to cover the light infantry of the right, and secure a retreat.
While this movement was in progress, the left of the British
right was forced from its ground, and the light infantry was
ordered to its aid. In the attempt to execute this order, they
were attacked by the rifle corps, with great effect; and Frazer
was mortally wounded. Overpowered by numbers, and pressed
on all sides by a superior weight of fire, Burgoyne, with great
difficulty, and with the loss of his field pieces, and great part of
his artillery corps, regained his camp. The Americans followed
close in his rear; and assaulted his works throughout their whole
extent. Towards the close of day, the intrenchments were
forced on their right; and General Arnold, with a few men, actually entered their works; but his horse being killed under him,
and himself wounded, the troops were forced out of them; and it
being nearly dark, they desisted from the assault. The left of
Arnold's division was still more successful. Jackson's regiment
of Massachusetts, then led by Lieutenant Colonel Brooks, turned
1 Remem.

240

THE LIFE OF

the right of the encampment, and stormed the works occupied
by the German reserve. Lieutenant Colonel Brechman who
commanded in them was killed, and the works were carried.
The orders given by Burgoyne to recover them were not executed; and Brooks maintained the ground he had gained.
Darkness put an end to the action; and the Americans lay all
night with their arms in their hands, about half a mile from
the British lines ready to renew the assault with the return of
day. The advantage they had gained was decisive. They had
taken several pieces of artillery, killed a great number of men,
made upwards of two hundred prisoners, among whom were
several officers of distinction, and had penetrated the lines in a
part which exposed the whole to considerable danger.
Unwilling to risk the events of the next day on the same
ground, Burgoyne changed his position in the course of the
night, and drew his whole army into a strong camp on the river
heights, extending his right up the river. This movement extricated him from the danger of being attacked the ensuing
morning by an enemy already in possession of part of his works.
General Gates perceived the strength of this position, and was
not disposed to hazard an assault. Aware of the critical situation of his adversary, he detached a party higher up the Hudson
for the purpose of intercepting the British army on its retreat,
while strong corps were posted on the other side of the river to
guard its passage.
This movement compelled Burgoyne again to change his position, and to retire to Saratoga. About nine at night the retreat
was commenced, and was effected with the loss of his hospital,
containing about three hundred sick, and of several batteaux
laden with provision and baggage. On reaching the ground to
O. be occupied, he found a strong corps already inOct. 1. trenched on the opposite side of the river, prepared to
dispute its passage.
From Saratoga, Burgoyne detached a company of artificers,
under a strong escort, to repair the roads and bridges towards
fort Edward. Scarcely had this detachment moved, when the
Americans appeared in force on the heights south of Saratoga
creek, and made dispositions which excited the apprehension of a
design to cross it and attack his camp. The Europeans escort

GEORGE WASHINGTON

241

ing the artificers were recalled, and a provincial corps, employed
in the same service, being attacked by a small party, ran away
and left the workmen to shift for themselves.
No hope of repairing the roads remaining, it became impossible to move the baggage and artillery.
The British army was now almost completely environed by a
superior force. No means remained of extricating itself from
difficulties and dangers which were continually increasing, but
fording a river, on the opposite bank of which a formidable
body of troops was already posted; and then escaping to fort
George, through roads impassable by artillery or wagons, while
its rear was closely pressed by a victorious enemy.'
A council of general officers called to deliberate on their
situation, took the bold resolution to abandon every thing but
their arms and such provisions as the soldiers could carry; and,
by a forced march in the night up the river, to extricate themselves from the American army; and crossing at fort Edward,
or at a ford above it, to press on to fort George.
Gates had foreseen this movement, and had prepared for it.
In addition to placing strong guards at the fords of the Hudson,
he had formed an intrenched camp on the high grounds between
fort Edward and fort George. The scouts sent to examine the
route returned with this information, and the plan was abandoned as impracticable.
1 Mr. Gordon, in his history of the war, states himself to have received from
General Glover an anecdote, showing, that all these advantages were on the point
of being exposed to imminent hazard. "On the morning of the eleventh, Gates
called the general officers together, and informed them of his having received certain
intelligence, which might be depended upon, that the main body of Burgoyne's
army was marched off for fort Edward with what they could take; and that the
rear guard only was left in the camp, who, after awhile, were to push off as fast
as possible, leaving the heavy baggage behind. On this it was concluded to advance
and attack the camp in half an hour. The officers repaired immediately to their
respective commands. General Nixon's being the eldest brigade, crossed the Saratoga
creek first. Unknown to the Americans, Burgoyne had a line formed behind a parcel
of brush-wood, to support the park of artillery where the attack was to be made.
General Glover was upon the point of following Nixon. Just as he entered the water,
he saw a British soldier making across, whom he called and examined." This soldier
was a deserter, and communicated the very important fact that the whole British army
were in their encampment. Nixon was immediately stopped: and the intelligence conveyed to Gates, who countermanded his orders for the assault, and called back his
troops, not without sustaining some loss from the British artillery.
Gordon is confirmed by General Wilkinson, who was adjutant general in the
American army. The narrative of the general varies from that of Gordon only in
minor circumstances.

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Nothing could be more hopeless than the condition of the
British army, or more desperate than that of their general, as
described by himself. In his letter to Lord George Germain,
secretary of state for American affairs, he says, "A series of hard
toil, incessant effort, stubborn action, until disabled in the collateral branches of the army by the total defection of the
Indians; the desertion, or timidity of the Canadians and provincials, some individuals excepted; disappointed in the last hope of
any co-operation from other armies; the regular troops reduced
by losses from the best parts, to three thousand five hundred
fighting men, not two thousand of which were British; only
three days provisions, upon short allowance, in store; invested
by an army of sixteen thousand men; and no appearance of retreat remaining; I called into council all the generals, field officers, and captains commanding corps, and by their unanimous
concurrence and advice, I was induced to open a treaty with
Major General Gates."
A treaty was opened with a general proposition, stating the
willingness of the British general to spare the further effusion
of blood, provided a negotiation could be effected on honourable
terms.
This proposition was answered by a demand that the whole
army should ground their arms in their encampment, and surrender themselves prisoners of war. This demand was instantly
rejected, with a declaration that if General Gates designed to
insist on it, the negotiation must immediately break off, and
hostilities recommence. On receiving this decided answer, Gates
receded from the rigorous terms at first proposed; and a convention was signed, in which it was agreed that the British
Oct. army, after marching out of their encampment with
all the honours of war, should lay down their arms,
and not serve against the United States till exchanged. They
were not to be detained in captivity, but to be permitted to embark for England.
The situation of the armies considered,' these terms were
highly honourable to the British general, and favourable to his
'The American army consisted of nine thousand and ninety-three continental
troops. The number of the militia fluctuated; but amounted, at the signature of
the convention, to four thousand one hundred and twenty-nine. The sick exceeded
two thousand five hundred men.

GEORGE WASHINGTON

143

nation. They were probably more advantageous than would
have been granted by General Gates, had he entertained no
apprehension from Sir Henry Clinton, who was, at length, making the promised diversion on the North River, up which he had
penetrated as far as IEsopus.
The draughts made from Peekskill for both armies had left
that post in a situation to require the aid of militia for its security. The requisitions of General Putnam were complied
with; but the attack upon them being delayed, the militia, who
were anxious to seed their farms, became impatient; many deserted; and General Putnam was induced to discharge the residue.
Governor Clinton immediately ordered out half the militia
of New York, with assurances that they should be relieved
in one month by the other half. This order was executed so
slowly that the forts were carried before the militia were in the
field.
Great pains had been taken, and much labour employed, to
render this position, which is naturally strong, still more secure.
The principal defences were forts Montgomery and Clinton.
They had been constructed on the western bank of the Hudson,
on very high ground, extremely difficult of access, and were
separated from each other by a small creek which runs from
the mountains into the river. These forts were too much elevated to be battered from the water, and the hills on which
they stood were too steep to be ascended by troop landing at
the foot of them. The mountains, which commence five or six
miles below them, are so high and rugged, the defiles, through
which the roads leading to them pass, so narrow, and so commanded by the heights on both sides, that the approaches to
them are extremely difficult and dangerous.
To prevent ships from passing the forts, chevaux-de-frise had
been sunk in the river, and a boom extended from bank to bank,
which was covered with immense chains stretched at some distance in its front. These works were defended by the guns of the
forts, and by a frigate and galleys stationed above them, capable
of opposing with an equal fire in front any force which might
attack them by water from below.
Fort Independence is four or five miles below forts Mont

244

THE LIFE OF

gomery and Clinton, and on the opposite side of the river, on a
high point of land; and fort Constitution is rather more than
six miles above them, on an island near the eastern shore. Peekskill, the general head quarters of the officer commanding at the
station, is just below fort Independence, and on the same side of
the river. The garrisons had been reduced to about six hundred
men; and the whole force under General Putnam did not much
exceed two thousand. Yet this force, though far inferior to
that which General Washington had ordered to be retained at
the station, was, if properly applied, more than competent to
the defence of the forts against any numbers which could be
spared from New York. To insure success to the enterprise, it
was necessary to draw the attention of Putnam from the real
object, and to storm the works before the garrisons could be
aided by his army. This Sir Henry Clinton accomplished.
Between three and four thousand men embarked at New
York, and landed on the 5th of October at Verplank's Point,
on the east side of the Hudson, a short distance below Peekskill, upon which General Putnam retired to the heights in his
rear. On the evening of the same day, a part of these troops reembarked, and the fleet moved up the river to Peekskill Neck, in
order to mask King's ferry, which was below them. The next
morning, at break of day, the troops destined for the enterprise,
landed on the west side of Stony Point, and commenced their
march through the mountains, into the rear of forts Clinton
and Montgomery.' This disembarkation was observed; but the
morning was so foggy that the numbers could not be distinguished; and a large fire which was afterwards perceived at the
landing place, suggested the idea that the sole object of the party
on shore was the burning of some store houses. In the mean time,
the manceuvres of the vessels, and the appearance of a small
detachment left at Verplank's Point, persuaded General Putnam that the meditated attack was on fort Independence.
His whole attention was directed to this object; and the real
designs of the enemy were 'not suspected, until a heavy firing
from the other side of the river announced the assault on forts
Clinton and Montgomery. Five hundred men were instantly
'Letter of Sir Henry Clinton.

GEORGE WASHINGTON

245

detached to reinforce the garrisons of those places; but, before
this detachment could cross the river the forts were in possession
of the British.
Having left a battalion at the pass of Thunderhill, to keep.
up a communication, Sir Henry Clinton had formed his army
into two divisions one of which consisting of nine hundred men,
commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Campbell, made a circuit by
the forest of Deane, in order to fall on the back of fort Montgomery; while the other, consisting of twelve hundred men,
commanded by General Vaughan, and accompanied by Sir
Henry Clinton in person, advanced slowly against fort Clinton.1
Both posts were assaulted about five in the afternoon. The
works were defended with resolution, and were maintained
until dark, when, the lines being too extensive to be completely
manned, the assailants entered them in different places. The
defence being no longer possible, some of the garrison were
made prisoners, while their better knowledge of the country
enabled others to escape. Governor Clinton passed the river
in a boat, and General James Clinton, though wounded in the
thigh by a bayonet, also made his escape. Lieutenant Colonels
Livingston and Bruyn, and Majors Hamilton and Logan were
among the prisoners. The loss sustained by the garrisons was
about two hundred and fifty men. That of the assailants, was
stated by Sir H. Clinton, at less than two hundred. Among
the killed were Lieutenant Colonel Campbell, and two other field
officers.
As the boom and chains drawn across the river could no longer
be defended, the continental frigates and galleys lying above
them were burnt, to prevent their falling into the hands of
the enemy. Fort Independence and fort Constitution were
evacuated the next day, and Putnam retreated to Fishkill. General Vaughan, after burning Continental village, where stores to
a considerable amount had been deposited, proceeded, at the
head of a strong detachment, up the river to.Esopus, which he
also destroyed.2
1 Letter of Sir Henry Clinton.
2 Intelligence of the success of Sir Henry Clinton on the North River was received
by General Burgoyne, in the night after the convention at Saratoga had been agreed
upon, but before the articles had been signed and executed. The British general
had serious thoughts of breaking off the treaty.

2.46

THE LIFE OF

General Putnam, whose army had been augmented by reinforcements of militia to six thousand men, detached General
Parsons with two thousand, to repossess himself of Peekskill,
and of the passes in the highlands; while, with the residue, he
watched the progress of the enemy up the river. The want
of heavy artillery prevented his annoying their ships in the
Hudson.
On the capitulation of Burgoyne, near five thousand men had
been detached by Gates to his aid. Before their arrival, General
Vaughan had returned to New York, whence a reinforcement
to General Howe was then about to sail.
Great as was the injury sustained by the United States from
this enterprise, Great Britain derived from it no solid advantage. It was undertaken at too late a period to save Burgoyne; and though the passes in the highlands were acquired,
they could not be retained. The British had reduced to ashes
every village, and almost every house within their power; but
this wanton and useless destruction served to irritate, without
tending to subdue. A keenness was given to the resentment
of the injured, which outlasted the contest between the two
nations.
The army which surrendered at Saratoga exceeded five thousand men. On marching from Ticonderoga, it was estimated
at nine thousand. In addition to this great military force,
the British lost, and the Americans acquired, a fine train of
artillery, seven thousand stand of excellent arms, clothing for
seven thousand recruits, with tents, and other military stores,
to a considerable amount.
The thanks of congress were voted to General Gates and
his army; and a medal of gold, in commemoration of this great
event, was ordered to be struck, and presented to him by the
President, in the name of the United States. Colonel Wilkinson, the Adjutant General, whom he strongly recommended,
was appointed Brigadier General by brevet.
In the opinion that the British would not immediately
abandon the passes in the highlands, congress ordered Putnam
to join General Washington with a reinforcement not exceeding two thousand five hundred men, and directed Gates to take
command of the army on the Hudson, with unlimited powers

GEORGE WASHINGTON

147

to call for aids of militia from the New England States, as
well as from New York and New Jersey.
A proposition to authorize the Commander-in-chief, after
consulting with General Gates and Governor Clinton, to increase the detachment designed to strengthen his army, if he
should then be of opinion that it might be done without
endangering the objects to be accomplished by Gates, was
seriously opposed. An attempt was made to amend this proposition so as to make the increase of the reinforcement to depend
on the assent of Gates and Clinton; but this amendment was
lost by a considerable majority, and the original resolution was
carried. These proceedings were attended with no other consequences than to excite some degree of attention to the state
of parties.
Soon after the capitulation of Burgoyne, Ticonderoga and
Mount Independence were evacuated, and the garrison retired
to Isle Aux Noix and St. Johns.
The effect produced by this event on the British cabinet
and nation, was great and immediate. It seemed to remove
the delusive hopes of conquest with which they had been flattered, and suddenly to display the mass of resistance which
must yet be encountered. Previous to the reception of this
disastrous intelligence, the employment of savages in the war
had been the subject of severe animadversion. Parliament was
assembled on the 2oth of November; and, as usual, addresses
were proposed in answer to the speech from the throne, entirely approving the conduct of the administration. In the
House of Lords, the Earl of Chatham moved to amend the address by introducing a clause recommending to his Majesty,
an immediate cessation of hostilities, and the commencement of
a treaty of conciliation, "to restore peace and liberty to America,
strength and happiness to England, security and permanent
prosperity to both countries." In the course of the very animated observations made by this extraordinary man in support
of his motion, he said,' "But, my lords, who is the man that,
in addition to the disgraces and mischiefs of war, has dared
to authorize and associate to our arms the tomahawk and scalp1 Life of Chatham.-Belsham.

248

THE LIFE OF

ing-knife of the savage? to call into civilized alliance the wild
and inhuman inhabitant of the woods? to delegate to the merciless Indian the defence of disputed rights, and to wage the
horrors of his barbarous war against our brethren? My Lords,
these enormities cry aloud for redress and punishment. Unless
thoroughly done away they will be a stain on the national
character. It is not the least of our national misfortunes that
the strength and character of our army are thus impaired.
Familiarized to the horrid scenes of savage cruelty, it can no
longer boast of the noble and generous principles which dignify
a soldier. No longer sympathize with the dignity of the royal
banner, nor feel the pride, pomp, and circumstance of glorious war that makes ambition virtue. What makes ambition
virtue? the sense of honour. But is this sense of honour consistent with the spirit of plunder, or the practice of murder?
Can it flow from mercenary motives? or can it prompt to cruel
deeds?" 1
The conduct of administration, however, received the full
approbation of large majorities; but the triumph these victories
in Parliament afforded them was of short duration. The disastrous issue of an expedition from which the most sanguine
expectations had been formed, was soon known, and the mortification it produced was extreme. A reluctant confession of the
calamity was made by the minister, and a desire to restore peace
on any terms consistent with the integrity of the empire found
its way into the cabinet.
1 See note No. X. at the end of the volume.

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GEORGE WASHINGTON

249

CHAPTER XI
THE army under the immediate command of General Washington was engaged through the winter in endeavouring to stop the intercourse between Philadelphia and 777'
the country. To effect this object General Smallwood was detached with one division to Wilmington; Colonel Morgan was
placed on the lines on the west side of the Schuylkill; and
General Armstrong, with the Pennsylvania militia, was stationed near the old camp at White Marsh. Major Jameson,
with two troops of cavalry, and M'Lane's infantry, was directed
to guard the east, and Captain Lee with his troop, the west
side of that river. General Count Pulaski, a Polish nobleman
who commanded the horse, led the residue of the cavalry to
Trenton, where he trained them for the ensuing campaign.
One of the first operations meditated by General Washington
after crossing the Schuylkill was the destruction of a large
quantity of hay which remained in the islands above the mouth
of Derby Creek, within the power of the British. Early in the
morning after his orders for this purpose had been D
given, Sir William Howe marched out in full force,.
and encamped between Derby and the middle ferry, so as completely to cover the islands; while a foraging party removed the
hay. Washington, with the intention of disturbing this operation, gave orders for putting his army in motion, when the
alarming fact was disclosed, that the commissary's stores were
exhausted, and that the last ration had been delivered and
consumed.
Accustomed as were the continental troops to privations
of every sort, it would have been hazarding too much to move
them, under these circumstances, against a powerful enemy.
In a desert, or in a garrison where food is unattainable, courage,
patriotism, and habits of discipline enable the soldier to conquer
wants which, in ordinary situations, would be deemed invincible.

25o

THE LIFE OF

But to perish in a country abounding with provisions, requires
something more than fortitude; nor can soldiers readily submit,
while in such a country, to the deprivation of food. It is not
therefore surprising that, among a few of the troops, some
indications of a mutiny appeared. It is much more astonishing
that the great body of the army bore a circumstance so irritating,
and to them so unaccountable, without a murmur.
On receiving intelligence of the fact, General Washington
ordered the country to be scoured, and provisions, for supplying the pressing wants of the moment, to be seized wherever
found. In the mean time, light parties were detached to harass
the enemy about Derby, where Sir William Howe, with his
accustomed circumspection, kept his army so compact, and his
soldiers so within the lines, that an opportunity to annoy him
was seldom afforded even to the vigilance of Morgan and Lee.
After completing his forage, he returned, with inconsiderable
loss, to Philadelphia.
That the American army, while the value still retained by
paper bills placed ample funds in the hands of government,
should be destitute of food, in the midst of a state so abounding with provisions as Pennsylvania, is one of those extraordinary facts which can not fail to excite attention.
Early in the war, the office of commissary general had been
conferred on Colonel Trumbull, of Connecticut, a gentleman
fitted by his talents, activity and zeal, for that important station. Yet, from the difficulty of arranging so complicated a
department in its commencement, without the advantages of
experience, complaints were repeatedly made of the insufficiency
of supplies.
The subject was taken up by congress; but the remedy administered, as well from the time of its application, as from
the ingredients of which it was composed, served only to increase the disease. The system was not completed until near
midsummer; and then its arrangements were such that Colonel
Trumbull refused to accept the office assigned to him; and new
men were to be called into service at a time when the strongest necessity required the exertions of those who understood
the plan of supplies for the campaign in all its modifications.
In addition to the commissary of purchases, and a commissary

GEORGE WASHINGTON

25 I

general of issues, each to be appointed by congress, the new
plan contemplated four deputies in each department, also to
be appointed by that body, who were not accountable to, nor
removable by the head of the department, but might be suspended, and accused before congress who should examine the
charge, and either remove the accused from his office, or reinstate him in it.
This imperium in imperio, erected in direct opposition to the
opinion of the Commander-in-chief, drove Colonel Trumbull
from the army. Congress however persisted in the system; and
the effects of deranging so important a department as that
which feeds the troops, in the midst of a campaign, were not
long in unfolding themselves. In every military division of the
continent, loud complaints were made of the deficiency of supplies. The success of Gates appears to have been more endangered by this cause, than by the movement of Sir Henry
Clinton up the Hudson. The army of General Washington
was often greatly embarrassed, and his movements not unfrequently suspended, by the want of provisions. The present total
failure of all supply was preceded, for a few days, by the issuing
of meat unfit to be eaten. Representations on this subject were
made to the Commander-in-chief, who, on the morning that
Sir William Howe moved out to Derby, and before intelligence
of that movement had been received, communicated them to
congress.
That body had authorized the Commander-in-chief to seize
provisions for the use of his army within seventy miles of head
quarters; and either to pay for them in money, or in certificates,
for the redemption of which the faith of the United States
was pledged. The odium of this measure was increased by the
failure of the government to provide funds to take up these
certificates when presented.
At the same time, the provisions carried into Philadelphia
were paid for in specie at a good price. The inhabitants of that
part of Pennsylvania were not zealous in support of the war,
and the difference between prompt payment in gold or silver,
and a certificate, the value of which was often diminished by
depreciation before its payments, was too great not to influence
their wishes and their conduct. Such was the dexterity they

252

THE LIFE OF

employed that, notwithstanding the rigour of the laws, and
the vigilance of the troops stationed on the lines, they often
succeeded in concealing their provisions from those who were authorized to impress for the army, and in conveying them
privately into Philadelphia.
General Washington exercised the powers confided to him
with caution, but he did exercise them; and by doing so, acquired
considerable supplies. Congress appeared as much dissatisfied
with the lenity of the Commander-in-chief, as the people were
with his rigour, in consequence of which the subject was taken
into consideration, his forbearance disapproved, and instructions
given for the rigorous exertions in future of the powers with
which he was invested. In reply to the letter communicating
these resolves, the general stated the conduct he had observed,
insisted that provisions had been taken very extensively, and
repeated his opinion, that such measures would be much more
readily submitted to if executed by the civil authority.
In obedience however to the will of congress, he issued a
proclamation, requiring the farmers within seventy miles of
head quarters, to thrash out one half of their grain by the first
of February, and the residue by the first of March, under the
penalty of having the whole seized as straw.
The success of this experiment did not correspond with the
wishes of congress. It was attended with the pernicious consequences which had been foreseen by the general, to avoid which
he had considered this system as a dernier resort, of which
he was to avail himself only in extreme cases. In answer to
a letter on this subject from the board of war, he said, "I shall
use every exertion that may be expedient and practicable for
subsisting the army, and keeping it together; but I must observe, that this never can be done by coercive means. Supplies
of provisions and clothing must be had in another way, or it can
not exist. The small seizures that were made of the former
some time ago, in consequence of the most pressing and urgent
necessity-when the alternative was to do that or dissolveexcited the greatest alarm and uneasiness imaginable, even
among some of our best and warmest friends. Such procedures
may relieve for an instant, but eventually will prove of the
most pernicious consequence. Besides spreading disaffection and

GEORGE WASHINGTON

253

jealousy among the people, they never fail, even in the most
veteran armies, to raise in the soldiery a disposition to licentiousness, plunder, and robbery, which it has ever been found exceeding difficult to suppress; and which has not only proved
ruinous to the inhabitants, but, in many instances, to the
armies themselves." In a subsequent letter to congress, he added,
"I regret the occasion which compelled us to the measure the
other day, and shall consider it as among the greatest of our
misfortunes to be under the necessity of practising it again.
I am now obliged to keep several parties from the army thrashing grain, that our supplies may not fail; but this will not do."
About this time, a strong combination was forming against
the Commander-in-chief, into which several members of congress, and a very few officers of the army are believed to have
entered.
The splendour with which the capture of a British army had
surrounded the military reputation of General Gates, acquired
some advocates for the opinion that the arms of America would
be more fortunate, should that gentleman be elevated to the
supreme command. He could not be supposed hostile himself
to the prevalence of this opinion, and some parts of his conduct would seem to warrant a belief that, if it did not originate
with him, he was not among the last to adopt it. After the
victory of the seventh of October had opened to him the
prospect of subduing the army of Burgoyne, he not only
omitted to communicate his success to General Washington,
but carried on a correspondence with General Conway, in which
that officer expressed great contempt for the Commander-inchief. When the purport of this correspondence was disclosed
to General Washington, Gates demanded the name of the informer in a letter far from being conciliatory in its terms,
which was accompanied with the very extraordinary circumstance of being passed through congress.'
The state of Pennsylvania too, chagrined at the loss of its
capital, and forgetful of its own backwardness in strengthening
the army, which had twice fought superior numbers in its
defence, furnished many discontented individuals. They im

1 See note No. XI. at the end of the volume.

254

THE LIFE OF

puted it to General Washington as a fault that, with forces
inferior to his enemy in numbers, and in every equipment,
he had not effected the same result which had been produced
in the north, by a continental army, in itself, much stronger
than its adversary, and so reinforced by militia as to treble
his numbers. On the report that General Washington was
moving into winter quarters, the legislature of that state addressed a remonstrance to congress on the subject, manifesting,
in very intelligible terms, their dissatisfaction with the Commander-in-chief. About the same time, a new board of war
was created, of which General Gates was appointed the President, and General Mifflin, who was supposed to be of the party
unfriendly to Washington, was one of its members. General
Conway, who was probably the only brigadier in the army
that had joined this faction, was appointed inspector general,
and was promoted, above senior brigadiers, to the rank of
major general. These were evidences that, if the hold which the
Commander-in-chief had taken of the affections and confidence of the army and of the nation could be loosened, the
party in congress disposed to change their general, was far
from being contemptible in point of numbers. But to loosen
this hold was impossible. The indignation with which the idea
of such a change was received even by the victorious troops
who had conquered under Gates, forms the most conclusive
proof of its strength. Even the northern army clung to Washington as the saviour of his country.
These machinations to diminish the well-earned reputation
of the Commander-in-chief, could not escape his notice. They
made, however, no undue impression on his steady mind, nor
did they change one of his measures. His sensibilities seem to
have been those of patriotism, of apprehension for his country,
rather than of wounded pride. His desire to remain at the head of
the army seemed to flow from the conviction that his retaining
that station would be useful to his country, rather than from the
gratification his high rank might furnish to ambition. When
he unbosomed himself to his private friends, the feelings and
sentiments he expressed were worthy of Washington. To Mr.
Laurens, the president of congress, and his private friend, who,
in an unofficial letter, had communicated an anonymous accu

GEORGE WASHINGTON

255

sation made to him as president, containing heavy charges
against the Commander-in-chief, he said, "I can not sufficiently
express the obligation I feel towards you for your friendship
and politeness upon an occasion in which I am deeply interested. I was not unapprized that a malignant faction had been
for some time forming to my prejudice, which, conscious as I
am of having ever done all in my power to answer the important purposes of the trusts reposed in me, could not but
give me some pain on a personal account; but my chief concern
arises from an apprehension of the dangerous consequences which
intestine dissensions may produce to the common cause.
"As I have no other view than to promote the public good,
and am unambitious of honours not founded in the approbation of my country, I would not desire, in the least degree, to
suppress a free spirit of inquiry into any part of my conduct
that even faction itself may deem reprehensible. The anonymous
paper handed you exhibits many serious charges, and it is my
wish that it may be submitted to congress. This I am the more
inclined to, as the suppression or concealment may possibly
involve you in embarrassment hereafter, since it is uncertain
how many, or who, may be privy to the contents.
"My enemies take an ungenerous advantage of me. They
know the delicacy of my situation, and that motives of policy
deprive me of the defence I might otherwise make against their
insidious attacks. They know I can not combat their insinuations, however injurious, without disclosing secrets it is of the
utmost moment to conceal. But why should I expect to be
free from censure, the unfailing lot of an elevated station?
Merit and talents which I can not pretend to rival, have ever
been subject to it. My heart tells me it has been my unremitted aim to do the best which circumstances would permit.
Yet I may have been very often mistaken in my judgment of
the means, and may in many instances deserve the imputation
of error." 1
Fortunately for America, these combinations only excited
resentment against those who were believed to be engaged in
them.

1 See note No. XII. at the end of the volume.

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Soon after being informed of the unfavourable disposition
of some members of congress towards him, and receiving the
memorial of the legislature of Pennsylvania against his going into
winter quarters, the general also discovered the failure already
mentioned in the commissary department. On this occasion,
he addressed congress in terms of energy and plainness which
he had used on no former occasion. In his letter to that body
he said, "Full as I was in my representation of the matters in
the commissary's department yesterday, fresh and more powerful
reasons oblige me to add that I am now convinced beyond a
doubt that, unless some great and capital change suddenly takes
place in that line, this army must inevitably be reduced to one
or other of these three things-to starve, dissolve, or disperse
in order to obtain subsistence. Rest assured, sir, that this is not
an exaggerated picture, and that I have abundant reason to
suppose what I say.
"Saturday afternoon, receiving information that the enemy,
in force, had left the city, and were advancing towards Derby
with apparent design to forage, and draw subsistence from that
part of the country, I ordered the troops to be in readiness,
that I might give every opposition in my power; when, to
my great mortification, I was not only informed, but convinced, that the men were unable to stir on account of a
want of provisions; and that a dangerous mutiny, begun the
night before and which with difficulty was suppressed by the
spirited exertions of some officers, was still much to be apprehended from the want of this article.
"This brought forth the only commissary in the purchasing
line in this camp, and with him this melancholy and alarming
truth, that he had not a single hoof of any kind to slaughter,
and not more than twenty-five barrels of flour! From hence,
form an opinion of our situation, when I add that he could not
tell when to expect any.
"All I could do under these circumstances, was to send out a
few light parties to watch and harass the enemy, whilst other
parties were instantly detached different ways to collect, if
possible, as much provision as would satisfy the present pressing
wants of the soldiers; but will this answer? No, sir. Three or
four days of bad weather would prove our destruction. What

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157

then is to become of the army this winter? And if we are
now as often without provisions as with them, what is to become of us in the spring, when our force will be collected,,
with the aid perhaps of militia, to take advantage of an early
campaign before the enemy can be reinforced? These are
considerations of great magnitude, meriting the closest attention,
and will, when my own reputation is so intimately connected
with, and to be affected by the event, justify my saying, that
the present commissaries are by no means equal to the execution
of the office, or that the disaffection of the people surpasses
all belief. The misfortune, however, does, in my opinion, proceed from both causes; and, though I have been tender heretofore
of giving any opinion, or of lodging complaints, as the change
in that department took place contrary to my judgment, and
the consequences thereof were predicted, yet, finding that the
inactivity of the army, whether for want of provisions, clothes,,
or other essentials, is charged to my account, not only by the
common vulgar, but by those in power; it is time to speak
plain in exculpation of myself. 'With truth, then, I can declare
that no man, in my opinion, ever had his measures more impeded than I have, by every department of the army. Since
the month of July, we have had no assistance from the quartermaster general; and to want of assistance from this department,
the commissary general charges great part of his deficiency.
To this I am to add that, notwithstanding it is a standing
order (often repeated) that the troops shall always have two
days provision by them, that they may be ready at any sudden
call; yet, scarcely any opportunity has ever offered of taking
advantage of the enemy, that has not been either totally obstructed, or greatly impeded, on this account; and this, the
great and crying evil is not all. Soap, vinegar, and other articles
allowed by congress, we see none of, nor have we seen them,
I believe, since the battle of Brandywine. The first, indeed, we
have little occasion for; few men having more than one shirt,
many, only the moiety of one, and some, none at all. In addition to which, as a proof of the little benefit from a clothier
general, and at the same time, as a farther proof of the inability
of an army under the circumstances of this to perform the
common duties of soldiers, we have, by a field return this day

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made, besides a number of men confined to hospitals for want
of shoes, and others in farmers' houses on the same account, no
less than two thousand eight hundred and ninety-eight men,
now in camp, unfit for duty, because they are bare-foot, and
otherwise naked. By the same return, it appears that our whole
strength in continental troops, including the eastern brigades,
which have joined us since the surrender of General Burgoyne,
exclusive of the Maryland troops sent to Wilmington, amounts
to no more than eight thousand two hundred in camp fit for
duty; notwithstanding which, and that since the fourth instant,
our number fit for duty, from the hardships and exposures they
have undergone, particularly from the want of blankets, have
decreased near two thousand men, we find gentlemen, without
knowing whether the army was really going into winter quarters or not, (for I am sure no resolution of mine would warrant the remonstrance,) reprobating the measure as much as if
they thought the soldiers were made of stocks or stones, and
equally insensible of frost and snow; and moreover, as if they
conceived it easily practicable for an inferior army, under the
disadvantages I have described ours to be, which are by no
means exaggerated, to confine a superior one, in all respects well
appointed and provided for a winter's campaign within the
city of Philadelphia, and to cover from depredation and waste
the states of Pennsylvania, Jersey, &amp;c. But what makes this
matter still more extraordinary in my eye is, that these very
gentlemen, who were well apprised of the nakedness of the
troops from ocular demonstration, who thought their own soldiers worse clad than others, and advised me, near a month ago,
to postpone the execution of a plan I was about to adopt, in
consequence of a resolve of Congress for seizing clothes, under
strong assurances that an ample supply would be collected in
ten days, agreeably to a decree of the state; (not one article
of which by the by is yet come to hand,) should think a
winter's campaign, and the covering of their states from the
invasion of an enemy, so easy and practicable a business. I
can assure those gentlemen, that it is a much easier and less
distressing thing to draw remonstrances in a comfortable room,
by a good fire-side, than to occupy a cold bleak hill, and sleep
under frost and snow, without clothes or blankets. However,

GEORGE WASHINGTON.259

although they seem to have little feeling for the naked and
distressed soldiers, I feel superabundantly for them, and from
my soul pity those miseries which it is not in my power either to
relieve or to prevent."
The representations made in this letter were not exaggerated.
The distresses of the army, however, so far as respected clothing, did not arise from the inattention of congress. Measures
for the importation of clothes had been adopted early in the
war, but had not produced the effect expected from them.
Vigorous but ineffectual means had also been taken to obtain
supplies from the interior. The unfortunate non-importation
agreements which preceded the commencement of hostilities,
had reduced the quantity of goods in the country below the
ordinary amount, and the war had almost annihilated foreign
commerce. The progress of manufactures did not equal the consumption; and such was the real scarcity, that exactions from
individuals produced great distress, without relieving the want
of the army. A warm blanket was a luxury in which not many
participated, either in the camp or in the country.
In the northern states, where the sea coast was too extensive,
and the ports too numerous to be completely guarded, and
where the people were more inclined to maritime enterprise,
supplies both of arms and clothes were attainable in a more
considerable degree than in those farther south; but the large
sums of money expended in that part of the union for the
support of the army, had lessened the value of the currency
there more rapidly than elsewhere, and a consequent high
nominal price was demanded for imported articles. Congress
deemed the terms on which some large contracts had been made
by the clothier general in Massachusetts, so exorbitant, as to
forbid their execution; and at the same time, addressed a letter
to the state government, requesting that the goods should be
seized for the use of the army, at prices to be fixed by the
legislature, in pursuance of a resolution of the 22d of November.
These recommendations from congress, so far as they exhorted the states to supply the wants of the soldiers, were
strongly supported by the general. In his letters to the several
governors, he represented the very existence of the army, and

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the continuance of the contest, as depending on their exertions
in this respect.
To recruit the army for the ensuing campaign became again
an object of vital importance; and the Commander-in-chief
again pressed its necessity on congress, and on the states. To
obtain a respectable number of men by voluntary enlistment
had, obviously, become impossible. Coercion could be employed
only by the state governments; and it required all the influence
of General Washington to induce the adoption of a measure so
odious in itself, but so indispensable to the acquirement of means
to meet the crisis of the war, which, in his judgment, had not
yet passed away. He enclosed to each state a return of its
troops on continental establishment, thereby exhibiting to each
its own deficiency. To those who had not resorted to coercive
means, he stated the success with which they had been used
by others; and he urged all, by every motive which could operate on the human mind, to employ those means early enough
to enable him to anticipate the enemy in taking the field.
To the causes which had long threatened the destruction of
the army, the depreciation of paper money was now to be
added. It had become so considerable that the pay of an officer
would not procure even those absolute necessaries which might
protect his person from the extremes of heat and cold. The
few who possessed small patrimonial estates found them melting
away; and others were unable to appear as gentlemen. Such
circumstances could not fail to excite disgust with the service,
and a disposition to leave it. Among those who offered their
commissions to the Commander-in-chief, were many who, possessing a large portion of military pride, and therefore feeling
with peculiar sensibility the degradation connected with poverty
and rags, afforded the fairest hopes of becoming the ornaments
of the army. This general indifference about holding a commission; this general opinion that an obligation was conferred,
not received by continuing in the service, could not fail to be
unfavourable, not only to that spirit of emulation which stimulates to bolder deeds than are required, but to a complete execution of orders, and to a rigid observance of duty.
An officer whose pride was in any degree wounded, whose
caprice was not indulged, who apprehended censure for a fault

GEORGE WASHINGTON

26i

which his carelessness about remaining in the army had probably seduced him to commit, was ready to throw up a commission which, instead of being valuable, was a burden almost too
heavy to be borne.
With extreme anxiety the Commander-in-chief watched the
progress of a temper which, though just commencing, would
increase, he feared, with the cause that produced it. He was,
therefore, early and earnest in pressing the consideration of this
important subject on the attention of congress.
The weak and broken condition of the continental regiments, the strong remonstrances of the General, the numerous
complaints received from every quarter, determined congress
to depute a committee to reside in camp during the winter,
for the purpose of investigating the state of the army, and reporting such reforms as the public good might require.
This committee repaired to head quarters in the month of
January. The Commander-in-chief laid before them a general
statement, taking a comprehensive view of the condition of the army, and detailing the remedies necessary for the correction of existing abuses, as well as those
regulations which he deemed essential to its future prosperity.
This paper, exhibiting the actual state of the army, discloses
defects of real magnitude in the existing arrangements. In
perusing it, the reader is struck with the numerous difficulties,
in addition to those resulting from inferiority of numbers, with
which the American general was under the necessity of contending. The memorial is too long to be inserted, but there are
parts which ought not to be entirely overlooked. The neglect
of the very serious representation it contained respecting a
future permanent provision for the officers, threatened, at an
after period, to be productive of such pernicious effects, that
their insertion in this place will not, it is presumed, be unacceptable.
He recommended as the basis of every salutary reform, a
comfortable provision for the officers, which should render their
commissions valuable; to effect which the future, as well as the
present, ought to be contemplated.
"A long and continual sacrifice of individual interest for the
general good, ought not," he said, "to be expected or required.

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The nature of man must be changed, before institutions built
on the presumptive truth of such a principle can succeed.
"This position," he added, "is supported by the conduct of
the officers of the American army, as well as by that of all other
men. At the commencement of the dispute, in the first effusions of zeal, when it was believed the service would be temporary, they entered into it without regard to pecuniary considerations. But finding its duration much longer than had
been at first expected, and that, instead of deriving advantage
from the hardships and dangers to which they are exposed, they
were, on the contrary, losers by their patriotism, and fell far
short of even a competency for their wants, they have gradually abated in their ardour; and, with many, an entire disinclination to the service, under present circumstances, has taken
place. To this, in an eminent degree, must be ascribed the
frequent resignations daily happening, and the more frequent
importunities for permission to resign, from some officers of the
greatest merit.
"To this also may be ascribed the apathy, inattention, and
neglect of duty, which pervade all ranks; and which will necessarily continue and increase, while an officer, instead of gaining any thing, is impoverished by his commission, and conceives
he is conferring, not receiving a favour, in holding it. There
can be no sufficient tie on men possessing such sentiments. Nor
can any method be adopted to compel those to a punctual
discharge of duty, who are indifferent about their continuance
in the service, and are often seeking a pretext to disengage
themselves from it. Punishment, in this case, would be unavailing. But when an officer's commission is made valuable
to him, and he fears to lose it, you may exact obedience from
him.
"It is not indeed consistent with reason or justice that one set
of men should make a sacrifice of property, domestic ease, and
happiness; encounter the rigours of the field, the perils and
vicissitudes of war, without some adequate compensation, to obtain those blessings which every citizen will enjoy in common
with them. It must also be a comfortless reflection to any man,
that, after he may have contributed to secure the rights of his
country, at the risk of his life, and the ruin of his fortune, there

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will be no provision made to prevent himself and his family,
from sinking into indigence and wretchedness."
With these and other arguments, General Washington recommended in addition to present compensation, a half pay and
pensionary establishment for the army.
"I urge my sentiments," said he, "with the greater freedom,
because I can not, and shall not, receive the smallest benefit
from the establishment; and can have no other inducement for
proposing it than a full conviction of its utility and propriety."
The wants and distresses of the army, when actually seen
by the committee of congress, made a much deeper impression
than could have been received from any statement whatever.
They endeavoured to communicate to congress the sentiments
felt by themselves, and to correct the errors which had been
committed. But a numerous body, if it deliberate at all, proceeds slowly in the conduct of executive business; and will seldom afford a prompt corrective to existing mischiefs, especially
to those growing out of its own measures.
Much of the sufferings of the army was attributed to mismanagement in the quartermaster's department, which, notwithstanding the repeated remonstrances of the Commander-in-chief,
had long remained without a head. This subject was taken up
early by the committee, and proper representations made respecting it. But congress still remained under the influence
of those opinions which had already produced such mischievous
effects, and were still disposed to retain the subordinate officers
of the department in a state of immediate dependence on their
own body. In this temper, they proposed a plan which, not
being approved in camp, was never carried into execution.
While congress was deliberating on the reforms proposed, the
distresses of the army approached their acme, and its dissolution
was threatened. Early in February, the commissaries gave notice that the country, to a great distance, was actually exhausted;
and that it would be impracticable to obtain supplies for the
army longer than to the end of that month. Already the threatened scarcity began to be felt, and the rations issued were often
bad in quality, and insufficient in quantity. General Washington found it necessary again to interpose his personal exertions to procure provisions from a distance.

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In the apprehension that the resources of the commissary department would fail before the distant supplies he had taken
measures to obtain could reach him, and that the enemy designed
to make another incursion into the country around Philadelphia,
for the purpose of gleaning what yet remained in possession of
the inhabitants, he detached General Wayne, with orders to
seize every article proper for the use of an army within fifteen
miles of the Delaware, and to destroy the forage on the islands
between Philadelphia and Chester.
To defeat the object of this foraging party, the inhabitants
concealed their provisions and teams, and gave to the country
every appearance of having been entirely pillaged. Before any
sufficient aid could be obtained by these means, the bread, as
well as the meat, was exhausted, and famine prevailed in camp.
In an emergency so pressing, the Commander-in-chief used
every effort to feed his hungry army. Parties were sent out to
glean the country; officers of influence were deputed to Jersey,
Delaware and Maryland; and circular letters were addressed to
the governors of states by the committee of congress in camp
and by the Commander-in-chief, describing the wants of the
army, and urging the greatest exertions for its immediate relief.
Fortunately for America, there were features in the character
of Washington which, notwithstanding the discordant materials
of which his army was composed, attached his officers and soldiers so strongly to his person, that no distress could weaken
their affection, nor impair the respect and veneration in which
they held him. To this sentiment is to be attributed, in a great
measure, the preservation of a respectable military force, under
circumstances but too well calculated for its dissolution.
Through this severe experiment on their fortitude, the native
Americans persevered steadily in the performance of their duty;
but the conduct of the Europeans, who constituted a large part
of the army, was, to a considerable extent, less laudable; and at
no period of the war was desertion so frequent as during this
winter. Aided by the disaffected, deserters eluded the vigilance
of the parties who watched the roads, and great numbers escaped
into Philadelphia with their arms.
In a few days, the army was rescued from the famine with
which it had been threatened, and considerable supplies of pro

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265

visions were laid up in camp. It was perceived that the difficulties which had produced such melancholy effects, were created
more by the want of due exertion in the commissary department, and by the efforts of the people to save their stock for
a better market, than by any real deficiency of food in the
country.
This severe demonstration seems to have convinced congress
that their favourite system was radically vicious, and the subject
was taken up with the serious intention of remodeling the commissary department on principles recommended by experience.
But such were the delays inherent in the organization of that
body, that the new system was not adopted until late in April.
At no period of the war had the situation of the American
army been more perilous than at Valley Forge. Even when the
troops were not entirely destitute of food, their stock of provisions was so scanty that a quantity sufficient for one week
was seldom in store. Consequently, had General Howe moved
out in force, the American army could not have remained in
camp; and their want of clothes disabled them from keeping
the field in the winter. The returns of the first of February
exhibit the astonishing number of three thousand nine hundred
and eighty-nine men in camp, unfit for duty for want of
clothes. Scarcely one man of these had a pair of shoes. Even
among those returned capable of doing duty, many were so
badly clad, that exposure to the cold of the season must have
destroyed them. Although the total of the army exceeded
seventeen thousand men, the present effective rank and file
amounted to only five thousand and twelve.
While the sufferings of the soldiers filled the hospitals, a
dreadful mortality continued to prevail in those miserable receptacles of the sick. A violent putrid fever swept off much
greater numbers than all the diseases of the camp.
If then during the deep snow which covered the earth for a
great part of the winter, the British general had taken the
field, his own army would indeed have suffered greatly, but the
American loss is not to be calculated.
Happily, the real condition of Washington was not well
understood by Sir William Howe; and the characteristic attention of that officer to the lives and comfort of his troops, saved

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the American army. Fortunately, he confined his operations to
those small excursions that were calculated to enlarge the comforts of his own soldiers, who, notwithstanding the favourable
dispositions of the neighbouring country, were much distressed
for fuel, and often in great want of forage and fresh provisions.
The vigilance of the parties on the lines, especially on the south
side of the Schuylkill, intercepted a large portion of the supplies intended for the Philadelphia market; and corporal punishment was frequently inflicted on those who were detected in
attempting this infraction of the laws. As Captain Lee was
particularly active, a plan was formed, late in January, to surprise and capture him in his quarters. An extensive circuit
was made by a large body of cavalry, who seized four of his
patroles without communicating an alarm. About break of day
the British horse appeared; upon which Captain Lee placed his
troopers that were in the house, at the doors and windows, who
behaved so gallantly as to repulse the assailants without losing
a horse or man. Only Lieutenant Lindsay and one private were
wounded. The whole number in the house did not exceed ten.'
That of the assailants was said to amount to two hundred. They
lost a sergeant and three men with several horses, killed; and
an officer and three men wounded.
The result of this skirmish gave great pleasure to the Commander-in-chief, who had formed a high opinion of Lee's talents
as a partisan. He mentioned the affair in his orders with strong
marks of approbation; and, in a private letter to the captain,
testified the satisfaction he felt. For his merit through the
preceding campaign, congress promoted him to the rank of
major, and gave him an independent partisan corps to consist
of three troops of horse.
While the deficiency of the public resources, arising from the
alarming depreciation of the bills of credit, manifested itself
in all the military departments, a plan was matured in congress,
and in the board of war, without consulting the Commanderin-chief, for a second irruption into Canada. It was proposed
to place the Marquis de Lafayette at the head of this expedition,
1 Major Jameson was accidentally present, and engaged in this skirmish.

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and to employ Generals Conway and Starke, as the second and
third in command.
This young nobleman, possessing an excellent heart, and all
the military enthusiasm of his country, had left France early in
1777, in opposition to the will of his sovereign, to engage in
the service of the United States. His high rank, and supposed
influence at the court of Versailles, secured him the unlimited
respect of his countrymen in America; and, added to his frankness of manners and zeal in their cause, recommended him
strongly to congress. While the claims of others of the same
country to rank were too exorbitant to be gratified, he demanded no station in the army; would consent to receive no
compensation, and offered to serve as a volunteer. He had
stipulated with Mr. Deane for the rank of major general without emolument; and, on his arrival in America, that rank was
conferred on him, but without any immediate command. In
that capacity, he sought for danger, and was wounded at the
battle of Brandywine. He attached himself with the ardour
of youth to the Commander-in-chief, who smoothed the way to
his receiving a command in the army equal to his rank.
The first intimation to General Washington that the expedition was contemplated, was given in a letter from the president
of the board of war of the 24th of January, inclosing one of
the same date to the Marquis, requiring the attendance of that
nobleman on congress to receive his instructions. The Commander-in-chief was requested to furnish Colonel Hazen's regiment, chiefly composed of Canadians, for the expedition; and
in the same letter, his advice and opinion were asked respecting
it. The northern states were to furnish the necessary troops.
Without noticing the manner in which this business had been
conducted, and the marked want of confidence it betrayed,
General Washington ordered Hazen's regiment to march towards Albany; and the Marquis proceeded immediately to the
seat of congress. At his request, he was to be considered as an
officer detached from the army of Washington, to remain under
his orders, and Major General the Baron de Kalb was added to
the expedition; after which the Marquis repaired in person to
Albany to take charge of the troops who were to assemble at

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that place in order to cross the lakes on the ice, and attack
Montreal.
On arriving at Albany, he found no preparations made for
the expedition. Nothing which had been promised being in
readiness, he abandoned the enterprise as impracticable. Some
time afterward, congress also determined to relinquish it; and
General Washington was authorized to recall both the Marquis
de Lafayette, and the Baron de Kalb.
While the army lay at Valley Forge, the Baron Steuben arrived in camp. This gentleman was a Prussian officer, who
came to the United States with ample recommendations. He
was said to have served many years in the armies of the great
Frederick; to have been one of the aids de camp of that consummate commander; and to have held the rank of lieutenant
general. He was, unquestionably, versed in the system of field
exercise which the king of Prussia had introduced, and was well
qualified to teach it to raw troops. He claimed no rank, and
offered to render his services as a volunteer. After holding a
conference with congress, he proceeded to Valley Forge.
Although the office of inspector general had been bestowed
on Conway, he had never entered on its duties; and his promotion to the rank of major general had given much umbrage to
the brigadiers, who had been his seniors. That circumstance,
in addition to the knowledge of his being in a faction hostile
to the Commander-in-chief, rendered his situation in the army
so uncomfortable, that he withdrew to York, in Pennsylvania,
which was then the seat of congress. When the expedition to
Canada was abandoned, he was not directed, with Lafayette and
de Kalb, to rejoin the army. Entertaining no hope of being
permitted to exercise the functions of his new office, he resigned his commission about the last of April, and, some time
afterwards, returned to France.' On his resignation, the Baron
1 General Conway, after his resignation, frequently indulged in expressions of extreme hostility to the Commander-in-chief. These indiscretions were offensive to
the gentlemen of the army. In consequence of them, he was engaged in an altercation with General Cadwallader, which produced a duel, in which Conway received
a wound, supposed for some time to be mortal. While his recovery was despaired
of, he addressed the following letter to General Washington.
Philadelphia, July 23d, 1778.
Sir,-I find myself just able to hold the pen during a few minutes, and take

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Steuben, who had, as a volunteer, performed the duties of inspector general, much to the satisfaction of the Commanderin-chief, and of the army, was, on the recommendation of
General Washington, appointed to that office with the rank of
major general, without exciting the slightest murmur.
This gentleman was of real service to the American troops.
He established one uniform system of field exercise; and, by
his skill and persevering industry, effected important improvements through all ranks of the army during its continuance at
Valley Forge.
While it was encamped at that place, several matters of great
interest engaged the attention of congress. Among
them, was the stipulation in the convention of Sara- 777
toga for the return of the British army to England. Boston
was named as the place of embarkation. At the time of the
capitulation, the difficulty of making that port early in the
winter was unknown to General Burgoyne. Consequently, as
some time must elapse before a sufficient number of vessels for
the transportation of his army could be collected, its embarkation might be delayed until the ensuing spring.
On receiving this unwelcome intelligence, he applied to General Washington to change the port of embarkation, and to
substitute Newport, in Rhode Island, or some place on the
Sound, for Boston. If any considerations not foreseen should
make this proposal objectionable, he then solicited this indulgence for himself and his suite. This request was communicated to congress, in terms favourable to that part of the
application which respected General Burgoyne and his suite;
but the objections to any change in the convention which might
expedite the transportation of the army, were too weighty to
be disregarded; and the general pressed them earnestly on congress. This precaution was unnecessary. The facility with
which the convention might be violated by the British, and the
this opportunity of expressing my sincere grief for having done, written, or said
any thing disagreeable to your excellency. My career will soon be over, therefore,
justice and truth prompt me to declare my last sentiments. You are, in my eyes,
the great and good man. May you long enjoy the love, veneration, and esteem
of these states, whose liberties you have asserted by your virtues.
I am with the greatest respect, sir,
Your excellency's most obedient humble servant,
PHS. CONWAY.

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captured army be united to that under General Howe, seems
to have suggested itself to the American government, as soon
as the first rejoicings were over; and such was its then existing
temper, that the faith and honour of British officers were believed to be no securities against their appearing again in the
field. Under this impression, a resolution had passed early in
November, directing General Heath to transmit to the board
of war a descriptive list of all persons comprehended in the
convention, "in order that, if any officer, soldier, or other
person of the said army should hereafter be found in arms
against these states in North America, during the present contest, he might be convicted of the offence, and suffer the punishment in such case inflicted by the law of nations."
No other notice was taken of the application made by General
Burgoyne to congress through the Commander-in-chief, than
to pass a resolution "that General Washington be directed to
inform General Burgoyne that congress will not receive, nor
consider, any proposition for indulgence, nor for altering the
terms of the convention of Saratoga, unless immediately directed to their own body."
Contrary to expectation, a fleet of transports for the reception
of the troops reached Rhode Island, on its way to Boston, in
the month of December. But, before its arrival, the preconceived
suspicions of congress had ripened into conviction: several circumstances combined to produce this result. General Burgoyne,
dissatisfied with the accommodations prepared for his officers
in Boston, had, after a fruitless correspondence with General
Heath, addressed a letter to General Gates, in which he complained of the inconvenient quarters assigned his officers, as a
breach of the articles of the convention. This complaint was
considered by congress as being made for the purpose of letting
in the principle, that the breach of one article of a treaty discharges the injured party from its obligations.
This suspicion was strengthened by the indiscreet hesitation
of General Burgoyne to permit the resolution requiring a descriptive list of his troops to be executed. His subsequent relinquishment of the objection did not remove the impression
it had made.
It was also alleged, that the number of transports was not

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sufficient to convey the troops to Europe; nor was it believed
possible that Sir William Howe could have laid in, so expeditiously, a sufficient stock of provisions for the voyage.
These objections to the embarkation of Burgoyne's troops
were strengthened by some trivial infractions of the convention,
which, it was contended, gave congress a strict right to detain
them. It was stipulated that "the arms" should be delivered
up; and it appeared that several cartouch boxes and other military accoutrements, supposed to be comprehended in the technical term arms, had been detained. This was deemed an
infraction of the letter of the compact, which, on rigid principle,
justified the measures afterwards adopted by congress.
The whole subject was referred to a committee who reported
all the circumstances of the case, whereupon congress came to
several resolutions, enumerating the facts already mentioned, the
last of which was in these words: "Resolved, therefore, that the embarkation of Lieutenant General 77 8.
Burgoyne, and the troops under his command, be sus- Jan. 8.
pended, until a distinct and explicit ratification of the convention
of Saratoga shall be properly notified by the court of Great
Britain to congress."
These resolutions, together with the report on which they were
founded, were transmitted to the several states, and to General
Washington. Two copies of them were sent to General Heath,
with directions to deliver one of them to General Burgoyne, and
with farther directions, "to order the vessels which may have
arrived, or which shall arrive, for the transportation of the army
under Lieutenant General Burgoyne, to quit without delay, the
port of Boston."
On receiving these resolutions, General Burgoyne addressed a
letter to congress, containing papers, on which he founded a
defence of his conduct, and insisted on the embarkation of his
army, as stipulated in the convention; but the committee, to
whom these papers were referred, reported their opinion, after
the most attentive consideration of them, to be, "cthat nothing
therein contained was sufficient to induce congress to recede
from their resolves of the 8th of January last, respecting the
convention of Saratoga. This application was accompanied by
another letter from General Burgoyne, to be delivered if the

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army should still be detained, in which, in consideration of the
state of his health, he solicited permission to return to England.
This request was readily granted.
The impression made on the British nation by the capitulation
of Burgoyne, notwithstanding the persevering temper of the
king, at length made its way into the cabinet, and produced
resolutions in favour of pacific measures.
After the rejection of repeated motions made by the opposition members tending to the abandonment of the American
war, Lord North gave notice, in the House of Commons, that
he had digested a plan of reconciliation which he designed
shortly to lay before the house.
In conformity with this notice, he moved for leave to bring
in, "first, A bill for removing all doubts and apprehensions concerning taxation by the Parliament of Great Britain in any of
the colonies and plantations of North America.
"Second. A bill to enable his Majesty to appoint commissioners with sufficient powers to treat, consult, and agree upon
the means of quieting the disorders now subsisting in certain
of the colonies of North America."
The first contained a declaration that Parliament will impose
no tax or duty whatever payable within any of the colonies
)f North America, except only such duties as it may be expedient
to impose for the purposes of commerce, the net produce of
which should always be paid and applied to and for the use of
the colonies in which the same shall be respectively levied, in
like manner as other duties collected under the authority of
their respective legislatures are ordinarily paid and applied.
The second authorized the appointment of commissioners by
the crown, with power to treat either with the existing governments, or with individuals, in America; provided that no stipulations which might be entered into should have any effect until
approved in Parliament, other than is afterward mentioned.
It is then enacted, that the commissioners may have power "to
proclaim a cessation of hostilities in any of the colonies, to suspend the operation of non-intercourse law; and farther, to
suspend, during the continuance of the act, so much of all or
any of the acts of Parliament which have passed since the
xoth day of February, I763, as relates to the colonies.

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273

"To grant pardon to any number or description of persons,
and to appoint a governor in any colony in which his majesty
had heretofore exercised the power of making such appointments."
These bills passed both houses of Parliament with inconsiderable opposition.
Intelligence of the treaty between the United States and
France having been received by the minister about the time
of their being introduced, copies of them, before they had gone
through the requisite forms, were hurried to America, to be laid
before congress and the public, in the hope and expectation
that they might counteract the effects which it was feared the
treaty with France would produce.
General Washington received early information of their arrival, and entertained serious fears of their operation. He was
apprehensive that the publication of a proposition for the
restoration of peace on the terms originally required by America,
would greatly increase the numbers of the disaffected; and immediately forwarded the bills to congress in a letter suggesting the policy of preventing their pernicious influence on
the public mind by all possible means, and especially through
the medium of the press.
This letter was referred to a committee, consisting of Messrs.
Morris, Drayton, and Dana, by whom a report was made, investigating the bills with great acuteness as well as asperity.
This report, and the resolutions upon it, were ordered to be
published. Other resolutions were passed the succeeding day,
recommending it to the states to pardon under such limitations
as they might think proper to make, such of their misguided
fellow-citizens as had levied war against the United States.
This resolution was accompanied by an order directing it to
be printed in English and in German, and requesting General
Washington to take such measures as he should deem most
effectual for circulating the copies among the American recruits
in the enemy's army.'
1 This request afforded the Commander-in-chief a fair retort on Major General
Tryon. That officer had addressed a letter to him enclosing the bills brought into
Parliament, and containing, to use the language of General Washington himself,
"the more extraordinary and impertinent request" that their contents should be
communicated through him to the army. General Washington now acknowledged

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During these transactions, the frigate La Sensible arrived with
the important intelligence that treaties of alliance and of commerce, had been formed between the United States of America
and France. The treaties themselves were brought by Mr.
Simeon Deane, the brother of the American Minister in Paris.
This event had long been anxiously expected, and the delay
attending it had been such as to excite serious apprehension
that it would never take place.
France was still extremely sore under the wounds inflicted
during the war which terminated in 1763. It was impossible
to reflect on a treaty which had wrested from her so fair a part
of North America, without feeling resentments which would
seek the first occasion of gratification.
The growing discontents between Great Britain and her
colonies were, consequently, viewed at a distance with secret
satisfaction; but rather as a circumstance which might have
some tendency to weaken and embarrass a rival, and which
was to be encouraged from motives of general policy, than as
one from which any definite advantage was to be derived.
France appears, at that time, to have required, and wished for,
repose. The great exertions of the preceding disastrous war
had so deranged her finances, that the wish to preserve peace
seems to have predominated in her cabinet. The young monarch, who had just ascended the throne, possessed a pacific, unambitious temper, and the councils of the nation were governed
by men alike indisposed to disturb the general tranquillity. The
advice they gave the monarch was, to aid and encourage the
colonies secretly, in order to prevent a reconciliation with the
mother country, and to prepare privately for hostilities, by
improving his finances, and strengthening his marine; but to
avoid every thing which might give occasion for open war. The
system which for a time regulated the cabinet of Versailles,
conformed to this advice. While the utmost attention was paid
to the Minister of Britain, and every measure to satisfy him
was openly taken, intimation was privately given to those of
the United States, that these measures were necessary for the
the receipt of this letter, and, in return, enclosed to Governor Tryon copies of the
resolution just mentioned, with a request that he would be instrumental in making
them known to the persons on whom they were to operate.

GEORGE WASHINGTON

2.7

present, but they might be assured of the good will of the
French government.
During the public demonstration of dispositions favourable
to England, means were taken to furnish aids of ammunition
and arms, and to facilitate the negotiation of loans to the United
States; and the owners of American privateers, though forbidden to sell their prizes, or to procure their condemnation, found
means to dispose of them privately.
Meanwhile, another party was formed in the cabinet, to
whose political system subsequent events gave the ascendency.
Its avowed object was to seize the present moment to revenge
past injuries, humble the haughty rival of France, and dismember her empire.
Matters remained in a fluctuating state until December, I777.
Privately encouraged, but discountenanced publicly, the prospects of the American Ministers varied according to the complexion of American affairs.
Intelligence of the convention of Saratoga reached France
early in December, I777. The American deputies took that
opportunity to press the treaty which had been under consideration for the preceding twelve months; and to urge the
importance, at this juncture, when Britain would, most probably, make proposals for an accommodation,' of communicating
to congress, precisely, what was to be expected from France
and Spain.
They were informed by M. Girard, one of the secretaries of
the king's council of state, that it was determined to acknowledge the independence of the United States, and to make a
treaty with them. That his Most Christian Majesty was resolved
not only to acknowledge, but to support their independence.
That in doing this, he might probably soon be engaged in a
war; yet he should not expect any compensation from the
United States on that account; nor was it pretended that he
acted wholly for their sakes; since, besides his real good will
to them, it was manifestly the interest of France that the power
1 Congress, in their first instructions to their commissioners, directed them to
press the immediate declaration of France in favour of the United States, by suggesting that a reunion with Great Britain might be the consequence of delay.Secret Journal of Congress, v. ii, p. 30.

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of England should be diminished by the separation of her
colonies. The only condition he should require would be that
the United States, in no peace to be made, should give up their
independence, and return to their obedience to the British
government.
On determining to take this decisive course, the cabinet of
Versailles had despatched a courier to his Catholic majesty with
information of the line of conduct about to be pursued by
France. On his return, the negotiation was taken up in earnest,
and a treaty of friendship and commerce was soon concluded.
This was accompanied by a treaty of alliance eventual and
defensive between the two nations, in which it was declared,
that if war should break out between France and England
during the existence of that with the United States, it should
be made a common cause; and that neither of the contracting
parties should conclude either truce or peace with Great Britain
without the formal consent of the other, first obtained; and
they mutually engaged "not to lay down their arms until the
independence of the United States shall have been formally,
or tacitly assured by the treaty, or treaties that shall terminate
the war."
It was the wish of the ministers of the United States to
engage France immediately in the war; and to make the alliance,
not eventual, but positive. This proposition however was
rejected.
In a few weeks after the conclusion of these negotiations,
the Marquis de Noailles announced officially to the court of
London, the treaty of friendship and commerce France had
formed with the United States. The British government, considering this notification as a declaration of war, published a
memorial for the purpose of justifying to all Europe the hostilities it had determined to commence.
Soon after their commencement, the Count de Vergennes
received private intelligence that it was contemplated in the
cabinet of London to offer to the United States an acknowledgment of their independence as the condition of a separate
peace. He immediately communicated this intelligence to the
American ministers, requesting them to lose no time in stating
to congress that, though war was not declared in form, it had

GEORGE WASHINGTON

2-77

commenced in fact; and that he considered the obligations of
the treaty of alliance as in full force; consequently that neither
party was now at liberty to make a separate peace. Instructions
of a similar import were given to the minister of France in
the United States.
The despatches containing these treaties were received by the
president on Saturday the second of May, after congress had
adjourned. That body was immediately convened, the despatches
were opened, and their joyful contents communicated.
In the exultation of the moment, the treaty of alliance, as well
as that of commerce and friendship was published; a circumstance which, not without reason, gave umbrage to the cabinet
of Versailles; because that treaty, being only eventual, ought
not to have been communicated to the public but by mutual
consent.
From this event, which was the source of universal exultation
to the friends of the revolution, the attention must be directed
to one which was productive of very different sensations.
Among the various improvements which struggling humanity
has gradually engrafted on the belligerent code, none have contributed more to diminish the calamities of war, than those
which meliorate the condition of prisoners. No obligations
will be more respected by the generous and the brave; nor are
there any, the violation of which could wound the national
character more deeply, or expose it to more lasting or better
merited reproach.
In wars between nations nearly equal in power, and possessing rights acknowledged to be equal, a departure from modern
usage in this respect is almost unknown; and the voice of the
civilized world would be raised against the potentate who could
adopt a system calculated to re-establish the rigours and misery
of exploded barbarism. But in contests between different parts
of the same empire, those practices which mitigate the horrors
of war yield, too frequently, to the calculations of a blind and
erring resentment. The party which supports the ancient state
of things, often treats resistance as rebellion, and captives as
traitors. The opposite party, supporting also by the sword principles believed to be right, will admit of no departure from
established usage, to its prejudice; and may be expected, if pos

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sessing the power, to endeavour, by retaliating injuries, to compel the observance of a more just and humane system. But
they participate in the fault imputable to their adversaries, by
manifesting a disposition to punish those whom they deem
traitors, with the same severity of which they so loudly and
justly complain, when they are themselves its victims.
General Gage, as Commander-in-chief of the British army,
in the harshness of spirit which had been excited while governor of Massachusetts, not only threw all his prisoners into a
common jail, but rejected every proposition for an exchange
of them. When the command devolved on Sir William Howe,
this absurd system was abandoned, and an exchange' took
place to a considerable extent. But the Americans had not
made a sufficient number of prisoners to relieve all their citizens,
and many of them still remained in confinement. Representations were continually received from these unfortunate men,
describing in strong terms, the severity of their treatment.
They complained of suffering almost the extremity of famine,
that even the supply of provisions allowed them was unsound,
and that they were crowded into prison ships, where they became the victims of disease.
When charged with conduct so unworthy of his character
and station, Sir William Howe positively denied its truth.
It would be unjust to ascribe this excess of inhumanity to an
officer who, though perhaps severe in his temper, did not mingle
cruelties in his general system, which would excite universal
indignation in other wars. It must be admitted that his supplies of provisions were neither good nor abundant; and that
the American soldiers, in their own camp, were unhealthy. But
the excessive mortality prevailing among the prisoners can be
accounted for on no ordinary principles; and the candid, who
were least inclined to criminate without cause, have ever been
persuaded that, if his orders did not produce the distress which
'In the execution of this agreement, the inconveniences arising from having committed the custody of prisoners to the several states, was severely felt. In addition
to the delay inseparable from the necessity of inquiring for them, and collecting
them from different places, they were often sent in without the knowledge of
General Washington; and, in some instances, they passed unobserved, with permits
from a state government, through his camp, into that of the enemy. These irregularities, and the remonstrances of the Commander-in-chief at length, induced con',
gress to appoint a commissary of prisoners.

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279

existed, his authority was not interposed with sufficient energy,
to correct the abuses which prevailed.
The capture of General Lee furnished an additional ground
of controversy on the subject of prisoners. As he had been an
officer in the British service, whose resignation had not, perhaps, been received when he entered into that of America, a
disposition was, at first, manifested to consider him as a deserter,
and he was closely confined. On receiving information of this
circumstance, congress directed General Howe to be assured
that Lieutenant Colonel Campbell, and five Hessian field-officers, should be detained, and should experience precisely the
fate of General Lee. These officers were taken into close custody,
and informed that the resolution announced to General Howe
should be strictly enforced.
The sentiments of the Commander-in-chief on the subject of
retaliation, seem to have been less severe than those of congress.
So great was his abhorrence of the cruelties such a practice
must generate, that he was unwilling to adopt it in any case
not of absolute and apparent necessity. Not believing that of
General Lee to be such a case, he remonstrated strongly against
these resolutions. But congress remained inflexible; and the
officers designated as the objects of retaliation, were kept in
rigorous confinement until General Lee was declared to be a
prisoner of war.1
The resolutions of congress respecting the prisoners taken at
the Cedars, were also the source of much embarrassment and
chagrin to the Commander-in-chief. Alleging that the capitulation had been violated on the part of the enemy, and that the
savages had been permitted to murder some of the prisoners, and
to plunder others, they withheld their sanction from the agreement entered into by General Arnold with Captain Forster,
and refused to allow other prisoners to be returned in exchange
for those liberated under that agreement, until the murderers
should be given up, and compensation made for the baggage
said to have been plundered. As the fact alleged was not
clearly established, Sir William Howe continued to press General Washington on this subject. Reminding him of the im1 See note No. XII at the end of the volume.

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portance of a punctilious observance of faith, plighted in engagements like that made by General Arnold, he persisted
to hold the Commander-in-chief personally bound for an
honourable compliance with military stipulations entered into
by an officer under his authority.
General Washington, feeling the keenness of the reproach,
pressed congress to change their resolution on this subject; but
his remonstrances were, for a long time, unavailing.
After the sufferings of the prisoners in New York had been
extreme, and great numbers had perished in confinement, the
survivors were liberated for the purpose of being exchanged;
but so miserable was their condition, that many of them died
on their way home. For the dead as well as the living, General
Howe claimed a return of prisoners, while General Washington
contended that reasonable deductions should be made for those
who were actually dead, of diseases under which they laboured
when permitted to leave the British prisons.
Until this claim should be admitted, General Howe rejected
any partial exchange. General Washington was immoveable in
his determination to repel it; and thus all hope of being relieved
in the ordinary mode appeared to be taken from those whom the
fortune of war had placed in the power of the enemy.
In the mean time, the sufferings of the American prisoners
increased with the increasing severity of the season. Information continued to be received, that they suffered almost the extremity of famine. Repeated remonstrances, made on this subject to the British general, were answered by a denial of the
fact. He continued to aver that the same food, both in
quantity and quality, was issued to the prisoners, as to British
troops when in transports, or elsewhere, not on actual duty;
and that every tenderness was extended to them, which was
compatible with the situation of his army. He yielded to the
request made by General Washington to permit a commissary
to visit the jails, and demanded passports for an agent to administer to the wants of British prisoners.
When Mr. Boudinot, the American commissary of prisoners,
who was appointed by General Washington to visit the jails in
Philadelphia, met Mr. Ferguson, the British commissary, he

GEORGE WASHINGTON

18 i

was informed that General Howe thought it unnecessary for
him to come into the city, as he would himself inspect the
situation and treatment of the prisoners. There is reason to
believe that their causes of complaint, so far as respected provisions, did not exist afterwards in the same degree as formerly;
and that the strong measures subsequently taken by congress,
were founded on facts of an earlier date.
But clothes and blankets were also necessary, and the difficulty
of furnishing them was considerable. General Howe would
not permit the purchase of those articles in Philadelphia; and
they were not attainable elsewhere.
To compel him to abandon this distressing restriction, and
to permit the use of paper money within the British lines, congress resolved, that no prisoner should be exchanged until all
the expenditures made in paper for the supplies they received
from the United States, should be repaid in specie, at the rate
of four shillings and sixpence for each dollar. They afterwards
determined, that from the ist day of February, no British
commissary should be permitted to purchase any provisions
for the use of prisoners west of New Jersey, but that all supplies for persons of that description should be furnished from
British stores.
Sir William Howe remonstrated against the last resolution
with great strength and justice, as a decree which doomed a
considerable number of prisoners, far removed into the country,
to a slow and painful death by famine; since it was impracticable to supply them immediately from Philadelphia. The
severity of this order, was in some degree mitigated by a resolution that each British commissary of prisoners should receive
provisions from the American commissary of purchases, to be
paid for in specie, according to the resolution of the i9th
of December, I777.
About the same time, an order was hastily given by the board
of war, which produced no inconsiderable degree of embarrassment; and exposed the Commander-in-chief to strictures
not less severe than those he had applied to the British general.
General Washington had consented that a quartermaster,
with a small escort, should come out of Philadelphia, with

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clothes and other comforts for the prisoners who were in possession of the United States. He had expressly stipulated for
their security, and had given them a passport.
While they were travelling through the country, information
was given to the board of war that General Howe had refused
to permit provisions to be sent in to the American prisoners in
Philadelphia by water. This information was not correct. General Howe had only requested that flags should not be sent up
or down the river without previous permission obtained from
himself. On this information, however, the board ordered Lieutenant Colonel Smith immediately to seize the officers, though
protected by the passport of General Washington, their horses,
carriages, and the provisions destined for the relief of the British
prisoners; and to secure them until farther orders, either from
the board or from the Commander-in-chief.
General Washington, on hearing this circumstance, despatched
one of his aids with orders for the immediate release of the
persons and property which had been confined; but the officers
refused to proceed on their journey, and returned to Philadelphia.'
This untoward event was much regretted by the Commanderin-chief. In a letter received some time afterwards, General
Howe, after expressing his willingness that the American prisoners should be visited by deputy commissaries, who should inspect their situation, and supply their wants required, as the
condition on which this indulgence should be granted, "that
a similar permit should be allowed to persons appointed by
him, which should be accompanied with the assurance of General Washington, that his authority will have sufficient weight
to prevent any interruption to their progress, and any insult
to their persons." This demand was ascribed to the treatment
to which officers under the protection of his passport had already
been exposed.
General Washington lamented the impediment to the exchange of prisoners, which had hitherto appeared to be insuperable; and made repeated, but ineffectual efforts to remove it.
General Howe had uniformly refused to proceed with any
' They alleged that their horses had been disabled, and the clothing embezzled.

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283

cartel, unless his right to claim for all the diseased and infirm,
whom he had liberated, should be previously admitted.
At length, after all hope of inducing him to recede from
that high ground had been abandoned, he suddenly relinquished
it of his own accord, and acceded completely to the proposition
of General Washington for the meeting of commissioners, in
order to settle equitably the number to which he should be
entitled for those he had discharged in the preceding winter.
This point being adjusted, commissaries were mutually appointed, who were to meet on the ioth of March, in Germantown, to arrange the details of a general cartel.
The Commander-in-chief had entertained no doubt of his
authority to enter into this agreement. On the fourth of
March, however, he had the mortification to perceive in a newspaper, a resolution of congress calling on the several states for
the amounts of supplies furnished the prisoners, that they
might be adjusted according to the rule of the loth of December, before the exchange should take place.
On seeing this embarrassing resolution, General Washington
addressed a letter to Sir William Howe, informing him that
particular circumstances had rendered it inconvenient for the
American commissioners to attend at the time appointed, and
requesting that their meeting should be deferred from the
i oth to the 2Ist of March. The interval was successfully employed in obtaining a repeal of the resolution.
It would seem probable that the dispositions of congress on
the subject of an exchange, did not correspond with those of
General Washington. From the fundamental principle of the
military establishment of the United States at its commencement, an exchange of prisoners would necessarily strengthen
the British, much more than the American army. The war
having been carried on by troops raised for short times, aided
by militia, the American prisoners, when exchanged, returned
to their homes as citizens, while those of the enemy again took
the field.
General Washington, who was governed by a policy more
just, and more permanently beneficial, addressed himself seriously to congress, urging, as well the injury done the public
faith, and his own personal honour, by this infraction of a

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solemn engagement, as the cruelty and impolicy of a system
which must cut off for ever all hopes of an exchange, and
render imprisonment as lasting as the war. He represented
in strong terms the effect such a measure must have on the
troops on whom they should thereafter be compelled chiefly to
rely, and its impression on the friends of those already in captivity. These remnonstrances produced the desired effect, and
the resolutions were repealed. The commissioners met according to the second appointment; but, on examining their powers,
it appeared that those given by General Washington were expressed to be in virtue of the authority vested in him; while
those given by Sir William Howe contained no such declaration.
This omission produced an objection on the part of the
United States; but General Howe refused to change the language,
alleging that he designed the treaty to be of a personal nature,
founded on the mutual confidence and honour of the contracting generals; and had no intention either to bind his
government, or to extend the cartel beyond the limits and
duration of his own command.
This explanation being unsatisfactory to the American commissioners and General Howe persisting in his refusal to make
the required alteration in his powers, the negotiation was broken
off, and this fair prospect of terminating the distresses of
numerous unfortunate persons passed away, without effecting
the good it had promised.
Some time after the failure of this negotiation for a general
cartel, Sir William Howe proposed that all prisoners actually
exchangeable should be sent in to the nearest posts, and returns
made of officer for officer of equal rank, and soldier for soldier, as far as numbers would admit; and that if a surplus of
officers should remain, they should be exchanged for an equivalent in privates.
On the representations of General Washington, congress acceded to this proposition, so far as related to the exchange of
officer for officer, and soldier for soldier; but rejected the part
which admitted an equivalent in privates for a surplus of officers,
because the officers captured with Burgoyne were exchangeable
within the powers of General Howe. Under this agreement,

GEORGE WASHINGTON z8 5
an exchange took place to a considerable extent; but as the
Americans had lost more prisoners than they had taken, unless
the army of Burgoyne should be brought into computation,
many of their troops were still detained in captivity.,

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CHAPTER XII
THE position at Valley Forge had been taken for the purpose of
covering the country, protecting the magazines, and
I77 ' cutting off all supplies to Philadelphia. Although
the intercourse of the inhabitants with that place could not be
entirely prevented; the sufferings of the British army from
the scarcity of fresh provisions and forage were considerable;
and, as the spring opened, several expeditions were undertaken
both to relieve their own wants, and to distress the army of the
United States.
About the middle of March, Colonel Mawhood and Major
Simcoe, who were detached into Jersey at the head of about
twelve hundred men, landed at Salem, nearly opposite Reedy
Island, and dispersed the small bodies of militia who were stationed in that part of the country.
General Washington had given early intelligence of this
expedition to Governor Livingston; and had requested that he
would immediately order out the militia to join Colonel Shreve,
whose regiment was detached into Jersey; but the legislature
had neglected to make provision for paying them; and the
governor could not bring them into the field. Colonel Shreve,
on his arrival at Haddonfield, the place at which they had been
directed to assemble, found less than one hundred men.
March Colonel Ellis, their commanding officer, remarked, in
a letter to the governor, that "without some standing
force, little was to be expected from the militia, who, being alone
not sufficient to prevent the incursions of the enemy, each one
naturally consults his own safety, by not being found in
arms."
Mawhood, of course, was unrestrained; and the devastation
committed by his party was wantonly distressing. Its course
of destruction was preceded by a summons to Colonel Hand,
the commanding officer of the militia, to lay down his arms,
which was accompanied with a threat of the consequences to

GEORGE WASHINGTON

2z87

result from his refusal. This threat was too faithfully executed.
After completing his forage, without molestation, Mawhood
returned to Philadelphia. During the continuance of this
incursion, which lasted six or seven days, not more than two
hundred men could be collected to reinforce Colonel Shreve,
who was consequently unable to effect any thing, and did not
even march to the lower parts of Jersey, which were plundered
without restraint.'
Not long after this incursion into Jersey, an enterprise was
undertaken against General Lacy, who, with a small number
of Pennsylvania militia, seldom amounting to six hundred,
and sometimes not exceeding fifty, watched the roads leading
to Philadelphia on the north side of the Schuylkill, and was
generally posted within twenty miles of that town.
This expedition was entrusted to Colonel Abercrombie and
Major Simcoe, who avoided all the posts Lacy had established
for his security, and threw a body of troops into his rear before
he discovered their approach. After a short resistance, he escaped with the loss of a few men killed, and all his baggage.
His corps was entirely dispersed, and he was soon afterwards
relieved by General Potter.
To maintain the command of the water as far as was practicable, congress had ordered impediments to be sunk in many
of the rivers of common use, so as to obstruct the passage up
them, and had constructed frigates, and other smaller vessels,
to be" employed above those impediments or elsewhere, as the
occasion might require. Several of them had been commenced
above Philadelphia, but were not completed when the British
obtained the command of the river. General Washington then
became apprehensive for their safety, and repeatedly expressed
his desire that they should be sunk in such a manner as to be
weighed with difficulty, should any attempt be made to raise
them. The persons, however, who were entrusted by congress
with this business, supposed it would be equally secure to put
plugs in their bottoms, which might be drawn out on the
approach of danger.
Against these vessels, and some stores collected at Borden1 See note No. XIV at the end of the volume.

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town, an expedition was planned which ended in their total
destruction. General Dickenson was in the neighbourhood, but
his force was too small to interrupt the execution of the design; and General Maxwell, who had been ordered to his assistance, was retarded in his march by a heavy rain, which did
not obstruct the movement of the British, who passed up the
river in vessels.
To cover the country more effectually on the north of the
Schuylkill, to form an advance guard for the security of the
May i 8. main army, and to be in readiness to annoy the
rear of the enemy, should he evacuate Philadelphia,
an event believed to be in contemplation, General Washington
detached the Marquis de Lafayette, with more than two thousand choice troops, to take post near the lines. As this corps
formed a very valuable part of the army, the Commanderin-chief recommended in his instructions to General Lafayette
the utmost attention to its safety; and, particularly, to avoid
any permanent station, as a long continuance in one position
would facilitate the execution of measures which might be concerted against him.
The Marquis crossed the Schuylkill and took post near Barren-hill church, eight or ten miles in front of the army. Immediate notice' of his arrival was given to Sir William Howe,
who reconnoitred his position, and formed a plan to surprise
and cut him off.
On the night of the i9th of May, General Grant with five
thousand select troops, took the road which leads up the
Delaware, and consequently diverges from Barren-hill. After
marching some distance, he inclined to the left, and passing
White Marsh, where several roads unite, took one leading to
Plymouth meeting-house, the position he was directed to occupy, something more than a mile in the rear of the Marquis,
between him and Valley Forge. He reached his point of destina1General Wilkinson, in his memoirs, says that this notice was given by a person
formerly a lieutenant in Proctor's regiment of artillery, who, disgusted at being discarded from the American service, became a spy to Sir William Howe; and, the
better to fulfil his new engagements, kept up his acquaintance with his former
comrades, and frequently visited the camp at Valley Forge. To avoid the suspicion
which would be excited by his going into Philadelphia, a rendezvous had been
established on Frankford Creek, where he met a messenger from General Howe,
to whom his communications were delivered, This statement is certainly correct.

GEORGE WASHINGTON

289

tion rather before sunrise. Here the roads fork; the one leading to the camp of Lafayette, and the other to Matron's ford
over the Schuylkill.
In the course of the night, General Gray, with a strong detachment, had advanced up the Schuylkill on its south side,
along the ridge road, and taken post at a ford two or three
miles in front of the right flank of Lafayette, while the residue
of the army encamped on Chestnut hill.
Captain M'Clane, a vigilant partisan of great merit, was posted
on the lines some distance in front of Barren-hill. In the course
of the night, he fell in with two British grenadiers at Three Mile
Run, who informed him of the movement made by Grant,
and also that a large body of Germans was getting ready to
march up the Schuylkill. Immediately conjecturing the object,
M'Clane detached Captain Parr, with a company of riflemen,
across the country to Wanderers hill, with orders to harass
and retard the column advancing up the Schuylkill, and hastened in person 1 to the camp of Lafayette. He arrived soon after
daybreak, and communicated the intelligence he had received.
It was, not long afterwards, confirmed by the fire of Parr on
the Ridge road, and by an inhabitant who had escaped from
White Marsh as the British column passed that place.2
1 Extracts of letters from the adjutant general and the officer of the day to
Captain M'Clane.
Camp Valley Forge, May 2ist, I778
Dear Captain,-I am happy you have with your brave little party conducted with
so much honour to yourself. The Marquis effected, owing to your vigilance, a
glorious retreat as well as a difficult one.
Signed ALEX SCAMMELL, Adj. Gen.
Camp Valley Forge, May 23d, 1778.
Dear Captain,-I am pleased to hear you are still doing something to distinguish
yourself in the eyes of your country. I have the pleasure to inform you that your
conduct with the Marquis has been very pleasing to his Excellency and the whole
army.
I am your obedient servant,
CHARLES SCOTT, Brig. Gen. and officer of the day.
2The danger with which this detachment was threatened, was perceived from
the camp at Valley Forge, soon after it had been communicated to Lafayette.
Alarm-guns were fired to announce it to him, and the whole army was put under
arms, to act as circumstances might require. It has been erroneously stated that
General Washington was unapprised of this movement of the British army until
its object was defeated. The author was in camp at the time, saw the Commanderin-chief, accompanied by his aids and some of the general officers ride, soon
after sun-rise, to the summit of the hill on the side of which the huts were con

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Thus surrounded with danger, Lafayette took with promptitude and decision the only course which could preserve him.
Ma He instantly put his troops in motion, and passed
over at Matson's ford, which was rather nearer to
General Grant, than to himself, without being intercepted by
that officer, or sustaining a greater loss than nine men.
General Grant, who reached the ground lately occupied by
Lafayette soon after it was abandoned, followed his rear, and
appeared at the ford just after the Americans had crossed it;
but, finding them advantageously posted, did not choose to
attack them; and the whole army returned to Philadelphia,
having effected nothing.
He did not escape censure for having allowed the great advantage he had acquired, to slip through his hands unused.
He might with the utmost certainty have reached Matson's
ford before the Marquis, and have cut off the only retreat
which remained for him. But the same skill and address were
not displayed in executing this plan as in forming it'd
In the statement of this affair made by General Lafayette, he
represents himself to have advanced the head of a column towards Grant, as if to attack him, while the rear filed off rapidly
towards the Schuylkill. This movement gained ground even
for the front, which, while it advanced towards the enemy,
also approached the river, and at the same time induced General
Grant to halt, in order to prepare for battle.
While this manceuvre was performing in the face of the detachment under Grant, a small party was thrown into the
church yard, on the road towards General Gray, which also
gave the appearance of an intention to attack in that quarter.
By these dispositions, happily conceived, and executed with
regularity, the Marquis extricated himself from the destruction
which had appeared almost inevitable. In a letter to congress,
General Washington termed it "a timely and handsome retreat,"
and certainly the compliment was merited.
structed, and look anxiously towards the scene of action through a glass. He
witnessed too the joy with which they returned after the detachment had crossed
the Schuylkill.
1 It has been said that his troops were excessively fatigued by a march of upwards
of twenty miles, and that he waited, confident that the Marquis could not escape
him, for information that Gray had reached his position.

GEORGE WASHINGTON

29I

It might be supposed that this young nobleman had not displayed the same degree of military talent in guarding against
the approach of danger, as in extricating himself from it.
But the imputation which generally attaches to an officer who
permits an enemy to pass unobserved into his rear, is removed
by a circumstance stated by Lafayette. The Pennsylvania
militia were posted on his left flank with orders to guard the
roads about White Marsh. Without his knowledge, they changed
their position, and retired into the rear, leaving that important
pass open to the enemy.
This was the last enterprise attempted by Sir William Howe.
He resigned the command of the army into the hands of Sir
Henry Clinton, and embarked for Great Britain. About the
same time, orders were received for the evacuation of Philadelphia. The part it was now evident France was about to
take in the war, and the naval force which had been prepared
by that power before she declared herself, rendered that city
a dangerous position, and determined the administration to
withdraw the army from the Delaware.
The preparations for this movement could not be made unobserved; but they indicated equally an embarkation of the
whole army, or an intention to march to New York through
Jersey. The last was believed by the American chief to be
most probable; and he made every exertion to take advantage
of the movement. His detachments were called in, and the
state governments were pressed to expedite the march of their
levies.
In the mean time Sir Henry Clinton hastened his preparations for the evacuation of Philadelphia; and the opinion that he
intended to reach New York through Jersey, gained ground.
General Maxwell, with the Jersey brigade, was ordered over
the Delaware to take post at Mount Holly, and to join Major
General Dickenson, who was assembling the militia of that
state for the purpose of co-operating with the continental
troops, in breaking down the bridges, felling trees in the roads,
and otherwise embarrassing the march of the British General.
In this state of things intelligence was received that great
part of the British army had crossed the Delaware, June 17.
and that the residue would soon follow.

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The opinion of the General officers was required on the
course now to be pursued. General Lee, who had been lately
exchanged, and whose experience gave great weight to his
opinions, was vehement against risking either a general or partial engagement. The British army was computed at ten thousand effective men, and that of the Americans amounted to
between ten and eleven thousand. General Lee was decidedly
of opinion that, with such an equality of force, it would be
"criminal" to hazard an action. He relied much on the advantageous ground on which their late foreign connexions had
placed the United States, and contended that defeat alone could
now endanger their independence. To this he said the army
ought not to be exposed. It would be impossible he thought to
bring on a partial action, without risking its being made general,
should such be the choice of the enemy, since the detachment
which might engage must be supported, or be cut to pieces.
A general action ought not to be fought unless the advantage
-was manifestly with the American army. This at present was
not the case. He attributed so much to the superior discipline
of the enemy as to be of opinion that the issue of the engagement would be, almost certainly, unfavourable.
General Du Portail, a French officer of considerable reputation, maintained the same opinions; and the Baron de Steuben
concurred in them. The American officers seem to have been
influenced by the counsels of the Europeans; and, of seventeen
Generals, only Wayne and Cadwallader were decidedly in
favour of attacking the enemy. Lafayette appeared inclined to
that opinion without openly embracing it; and General Greene
was inclined to hazard more than the counsels of the majority
would sanction. The country, he thought, must be protected;
and if, in doing so, an engagement should become unavoidable,
it would be necessary to fight.
On the morning of the i8th, Philadelphia was evacuated;1
and, by two in the afternoon, all the British troops were encamped on the Jersey shore, from Cooper's Creek to Red Bank.
As the British army moved down Second street, Captain M'Lane, with a few
light horse and one hundred infantry, entered the city, and cut off, and captured
one Captain, one Provost Marshal, one guide to the army, and thirty privates,
without losing a man.

GEORGE WASHINGTON

293

Although they availed themselves to a great extent of the
transportation by water, yet their line of march was so lengthened and encumbered by baggage, and the weather was so
intensely hot, that they were under the necessity of proceeding
slowly. Indeed their movements wore the appearance of purposed delay; and were calculated to favour the opinion that Sir
Henry Clinton was willing to be overtaken, and wished for a
general engagement.
As his line of march, until he passed Crosswicks, led directly
up the Delaware, General Washington found it necessary to
make an extensive circuit, and to cross the river at Coryell's
Ferry; after which he kept possession of the high grounds in
Jersey, thereby retaining the choice of bringing on, or avoiding
an action.
As Sir Henry Clinton encamped at, and about, Allentown,
the main body of the American army lay in Hope- June 24
well township, about five miles from Princeton. June 24
Major General Dickenson, with about one thousand militia,
and Maxwell's brigade, hung on Sir Henry Clinton's left flank.
General Cadwallader, with Jackson's regiment and a few militia,
was in his rear; and Colonel Morgan with a regiment of six
hundred men watched his right.
Notwithstanding the almost concurrent opinion of his general officers against risking an action, Washington appears to
have been strongly inclined to that measure. He could not be
persuaded that, with an army rather superior in point of numbers to his enemy, too much was hazarded by fighting him.
The situation of the two armies was, therefore, once more submitted to the consideration of the general officers, who were
asked whether it would be adviseable, of choice, to hazard a
general action? And, if it would, whether it should be brought
on by an immediate general attack, by a partial attack, or by
taking such a position as must compel the enemy to become the
assailants?
If the council should be of opinion that it was unadviseable
to hazard an engagement, then he asked what measures could
be taken with safety to the army, to annoy the enemy in his
march, should he proceed through the Jerseys?
The proposition respecting a general action was decidedly

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negative. But it was proposed to strengthen the corps on the
left flank of the enemy with a reinforcement of fifteen hundred men, and' to preserve, with the main body of the army,
a relative position which would enable it to act as circumstances
might require.
In pursuance of this opinion, the troops on the lines were
strengthened with a detachment of fifteen hundred select men,
commanded by General Scott; and the army moved forward the
next day to Kingston.
Though the council had been almost unanimous against a
general action, several officers, whose opinions were highly valued, secretly wished for something more than light skirmishing.
Knowing this, General Washington, who was still in favour of
an engagement, determined to take his measures on his own
responsibility. As the British army moved towards Monmouth
June25, court-house, he ordered Brigadier General Wayne,
with an additional detachment of one thousand select
men, to join the advanced corps. As the continental troops,
now constituting the front division, amounted to at least four
thousand men, he deemed it proper that they should be commanded by a major general. Lee had a right to claim this tour
of duty; but, as he had declared himself openly and strongly
against hazarding even a partial engagement, and supposed that
nothing further would be attempted than merely to reconnoitre
the enemy, and restrain plundering parties, he showed no inclination to assert his claim. Unintentionally promoting the
private wishes of General Washington, that the command should
be given to an officer whose view of the service comported
more with his own, Lee yielded this important tour of duty
to Lafayette. The orders given to this general were, to proceed
immediately with the detachment; and, after forming a junction with General Scott, and taking command of the troops
on the lines, to gain the enemy's left flank and rear; give him
every practicable annoyance; and attack by detachment, or
with his whole force, as the occasion might require.
These dispositions and orders could scarcely fail to bring on
an engagement. Wayne had openly supported that measure;
and Lafayette, though against seeking a general action, had been
in favour of a partial one. Of consequence, should any proper

GEORGE WASHINGTON

2-9

occasion offer, he would certainly attack with his whole force,
which would as certainly produce such a state of things as
would render it proper to support him with the whole army.
Immediately after the march of this detachment, General
Washington moved to Cranberry, that he might be in readiness
to support his front division. June z6.
The intense heat of the weather; a heavy storm;
and a temporary want of provisions, prevented the army from
continuing its march that day. The advanced corps had pressed
forward, and taken a position about five miles in rear of the
British army, with the intention of attacking it next morning
on its march. Thinking this corps too remote to be supported
in case of action, General Washington ordered the marquis to
file off by his left towards Englishtown. These orders were
executed early in the morning of the twenty-seventh.
Lafayette had scarcely taken command of the advanced party,
when General Lee began to regret having yielded it to him.
He perceived that, in the opinion of all the general officers,
great importance was attached to it, and that his reputation
was in danger of being impaired by connecting his strenuous
opposition to even a partial action, with his declining the command of a very strong detachment, which, it was believed,
would engage the rear of the enemy. He therefore solicited
earnestly for the command he had before declined.
To relieve the feelings of Lee, without wounding those of
Lafayette, General Washington detached him with two additional brigades to Englishtown, to support the marquis. He
would, of course, have the direction of the whole front division,
which would now amount to five thousand continental troops;
but it was expressly stipulated, that if any enterprise had been
already formed by Lafayette, it should be carried into execution, as if the commanding officer had not been changed. Lee
acceded to this condition; and, with two additional brigades,
joined the front division of the army, encamped at Englishtown. The rear division also moved forward, and encamped
about three miles in his rear. Morgan's corps still hovered on
the right flank of the British, and General Dickenson on their
left.
Sir Henry Clinton occupied the high grounds about Mon

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mouth court-house, having his right flank in the skirt of a small
wood, while his left was secured by a very thick one, and
a morass running towards his rear. His whole front was also
covered by a wood, and for a considerable distance towards
his left, by a morass.
This position seemed unassailable; and the British were within
twelve miles of the high grounds about Middletown, after
reaching which they would be perfectly secure.
Under these circumstances, General Washington ordered Lee
to attack the British rear the moment it should move from
its ground.
About five in the morning, intelligence was received from
General Dickenson that the front of the enemy was
June 28....t 1i
in motion. The troops were immediately put under
arms, and Lee was ordered to attack the rear, "unless there
should be powerful reasons to the contrary." He was at the
same time informed that the rear division would be on its
march to support him.
Sir Henry Clinton had observed the appearances on his flanks
and rear on the twenty-seventh; and, conjecturing that the
American army was in his neighbourhood, had changed the
order of his march. The baggage was placed under the care
of General Knyphausen, while the strength and flower of his
army, entirely unincumbered, formed the rear division, under
the particular command of Lord Cornwallis, who was accompanied by the Commander-in-chief.
To avoid pressing on Knyphausen, Cornwallis remained on
his ground until about eight; and then, descending from the
heights of Freehold into an extensive plain, took up his line
of march in rear of the front division.1
General Lee had made dispositions for executing the orders
given the preceding evening, and repeated in the morning;
and, soon after the British rear had moved from its ground,
prepared to attack it. General Dickenson had been directed
to detach some of his best troops, to take such a position as to
co-operate with him; and Morgan was ordered to act on the
right flank.
1 Letter of Sir Henry Clinton.

GEORGE WASHINGTON

197

Lee appeared on the heights of Freehold soon after Lord
Cornwallis had left them; and, following the British into the
plain, ordered General Wayne to attack the rear of their covering party with sufficient vigour to check it, but not to press
it so closely as either to force it up to the main body, or to
draw reinforcements to its aid. In the mean time, he intended
to gain the front of this party by a shorter road, and, intercepting its communication with the line, to bear it off before it
could be assisted.
While in the execution of this design, a gentleman in the
suite of General Washington came up to gain intelligence; and
Lee communicated to him his present object.
Before he reached the point of destination, there was reason
to believe that the British rear was much stronger than had
been conjectured. The intelligence on this subject being contradictory, and the face of the country well calculated to conceal the truth, he deemed it adviseable to ascertain the fact
himself.
Sir Henry Clinton, soon after the rear division was in full
march, received intelligence that an American column had
appeared on his left flank. This being a corps of militia was
soon dispersed, and the march was continued. When his rear
guard had descended from the heights, he saw it followed by
a strong corps, soon after which a cannonade was commenced
upon it; and, at the same time, a respectable force showed itself
on each of his flanks. Suspecting a design on his baggage, he
determined to attack the troops in his rear so vigorously, as
to compel a recall of those on his flanks; and, for this purpose,
marched back his whole rear division. This movement was in
progress as Lee advanced for the purpose of reconnoitring. He
soon perceived his mistake respecting the force of the British
rear, but still determined to engage on that ground, although
his judgment disapproved the measure; there being a morass
immediately in his rear, which would necessarily impede the
reinforcements which might be advancing to his aid, and embarrass his retreat should he be finally overpowered.
This was about ten. While both armies were preparing for
action, General Scott (as stated by General Lee) mistook an
oblique march of an American column for a retreat; and, in

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the apprehension of being abandoned, left his position, and repassed the ravine in his rear.
Being himself of opinion that the ground was unfavourable,
Lee did not correct the error he ascribed to Scott, but ordered
the whole detachment to regain the heights. He was closely
pressed, and some slight skirmishing ensued without much loss
on either side.
As soon as the firing announced the commencement of the
action, the rear division of the army advanced rapidly to the
support of the front. As they approached the scene of action,
General Washington, who had received no intelligence from
Lee giving notice of his retreat, rode forward, and, to his
utter astonishment and mortification, met the advanced corps
retiring before the enemy, without having made a single effort
to maintain its ground. The troops he first saw neither understood the motives which had governed General Lee, nor his
present design; and could give no other information than that,
by his orders, they had fled without fighting.
General Washington rode to the rear of the division, where
he met General Lee, to whom he spoke in terms of some warmth,
implying disapprobation of his conduct.
Orders were immediately given to Colonel Stewart and Lieutenant Colonel Ramsay to form their regiments for the purpose
of checking the pursuit; and General Lee was directed to take
proper measures with the residue of his force to stop the British
column on that ground. The Commander-in-chief then rode
back to arrange the rear division of the army.
These orders were executed with firmness; and, when forced
from his ground, Lee brought off his troops in good order, and
was directed to form in the rear of Englishtown.
This check afforded time to draw up the left wing and second line of the American army on an eminence, covered by
a morass in front. Lord Stirling, who commanded the left
wing, brought up a detachment of artillery under Lieutenant
Colonel Carrington, and some field pieces, which played with
considerable effect on a division of the British which had passed
the morass, and was pressing on to the charge. These pieces,
with the aid of several parties of infantry, effectually stopped
the advance of the enemy.

GEORGE WASHINGTON

299

Finding themselves warmly opposed in front, the British attempted to turn the left flank of the American army, but were
repulsed. They then attempted the right with as little success.
General Greene had advanced a body of troops with artillery to
a commanding piece of ground in his front, which not only
disappointed the design of turning the right, but enfiladed the
party which yet remained in front of the left wing. At this
moment, General Wayne was advanced with a body of infantry
to engage them in front, who kept up so hot and well directed a
fire, that they soon withdrew behind the ravine, to the ground
on which the action had commenced immediately after the
arrival of General Washington. '
The position now taken by the British army was very strong.
Both flanks were secured by thick woods and morasses; and their
front was accessible only through a narrow pass. The day had
been intensely hot, and the troops were much fatigued. Notwithstanding these circumstances, General Washington resolved
to renew the engagement. For this purpose he ordered Brigadier
General Poor, with his own and the North Carolina brigade, to
gain their right flank, while Woodford with his brigade should
turn their left. At the same time the artillery was ordered to
advance and play on their front. These orders were obeyed
with alacrity; but the impediments on the flanks of the British
were so considerable that, before they could be overcome, it was
nearly dark. Farther operations were therefore deferred until
next morning; and the brigades which had been detached to the
flanks of the British army continued on their ground through
the night, and the other troops lay on the field of battle with
their arms in their hands. General Washington passed the night
in his cloak in the midst of his soldiers.
The British employed the early part of the night in removing
their wounded; and, about midnight, marched away in such
silence that their retreat was not perceived until day.
As it was certain that they must gain the high grounds about
1 General Lafayette, in a communication made to the author respecting this
battle, expresses himself thus: "Never was General Washington greater in war than
in this action. His presence stopped the retreat. His dispositions fixed the victory.
His fine appearance on horseback, his calm courage, roused by the animation produced by the vexation of the morning, (le depit de la matinee) gave him the air
best calculated to excite enthusiasm."

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Middletown before they could be overtaken; as the face of
the country afforded no prospect of opposing their embarkation;
and as the battle already fought had terminated in a manner to
make a general impression favourable to the American arms;
it was thought proper to relinquish the pursuit. Leaving a
detachment to hover about the British rear, the main body of
the army moved towards the Hudson.
The Commander-in-chief was highly gratified with the conduct of his troops in this action. Their behaviour, he said,
after recovering from the first surprise occasioned by the unexpected retreat of the advanced corps, could not be surpassed.
General Wayne was particularly mentioned; and the artillery
were spoken of in terms of high praise.
The loss of the Americans in the battle of Monmouth was
eight officers and sixty-one privates killed, and about one hundred and sixty wounded. Among the slain were Lieutenant
Colonel Bonner of Pennsylvania, and Major Dickenson of Virginia, both of whom were much regretted. One hundred and
thirty were missing; but a considerable number of these afterwards rejoined their regiments.
In his official letter, Sir Henry Clinton states his dead and
missing at four officers, and one hundred and eighty-four privates. His wounded at sixteen officers and one hundred and
fifty-four privates. This account, so far as respects the dead,
can not be correct, as four officers, and two hundred and fortyfive privates were buried on the field by persons appointed for
the purpose, who made their report to the Commander-in-chief;
and some few were afterwards found, so as to increase the number to nearly three hundred. The uncommon heat of the day
proved fatal to several on both sides.
As usual, when a battle has not been decisive, both parties
claimed the victory. In the early part of the day, the advantage
was certainly with the British; in the latter part, it may be
pronounced with equal certainty to have been with the Americans. They maintained their ground, repulsed the enemy, were
prevented only by the night, and by the retreat of the hostile
army from renewing the action, and suffered less in killed
and wounded than their adversaries.
It is true that Sir Henry Clinton effected what he states to have

GEORGE WASHINGTON

301I

been his principal object,-the safety of his baggage. But when
it is recollected that the American officers had decided against
hazarding an action, that this advice must have trammeled the
conduct, and circumscribed the views of the Commanderin-chief, he will be admitted to have effected no inconsiderable object in giving the American arms that appearance
of superiority which was certainly acquired by this engagement.
Independent of the loss sustained in the action, the British
army was considerably weakened in its march from Philadelphia to New York. About one hundred prisoners were made,
and near one thousand soldiers, chiefly foreigners, deserted while
passing through Jersey.
The conduct of Lee was generally disapproved. As, however,
he had possessed a large share of the confidence and good opinion
of the Commander-in-chief, it is probable that explanations
might have been made which would have rescued him from the
imputations that were cast on him, and have restored him to the
esteem of the army, could his haughty temper have brooked
the indignity he believed to have been offered him on the field
of battle. General Washington had taken no measures in consequence of the events of that day, and would probably have
come to no resolution concerning them without an amicable
explanation, when he received from Lee a letter expressed in
very unbecoming terms, in which he, in the tone of a superior,
required reparation for the injury sustained "from the very
singular expressions" said to have been used on the day of the
action by the Commander-in-chief.
This letter was answered by an assurance that, so soon as
circumstances would admit of an inquiry, he should
have an opportunity of justifying himself, to the July 30.
army, to America, and to the world in general; or of convincing
them that he had been guilty of disobedience of orders, and
misbehaviour before the enemy. On his expressing a wish for
a speedy investigation of his conduct, and for a court-martial
rather than a court of inqury, he was arrested.
First. For disobedience of orders in not attacking the enemy
on the z8th of June, agreeably to repeated instructions.
Secondly. For misbehaviour before the enemy on the same

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day, in making an unnecessary, disorderly, and shameful retreat.
Thirdly. For disrespect to the Commander-in-chief in two
letters.
Before this correspondence had taken place, strong and specific
charges of misconduct had been made against General Lee by
several officers of his detachment, and particularly by Generals
Wayne and Scott. In these, the transactions of the day, not
being well understood, were represented in colours much more
unfavourable to Lee, than facts, when properly explained,
would seem to justify. These representations, most probably,
induced the strong language of the second article in the charge.
A court-martial, over which Lord Stirling presided, after a
tedious investigation, found him guilty of all the charges exhibited against him, and sentenced him to be suspended for
one year. This sentence was, afterwards, though with some
hesitation, approved, almost unanimously, by congress. The
court softened, in some degree, the severity of the second
charge, by finding him guilty, not in its very words, but "of
misbehaviour before the enemy, by making an unnecessary,
and, in some few instances, a disorderly retreat."
Lee defended himself with his accustomed ability. He proved
that, after the retreat had commenced, in consequence of General Scott's repassing the ravine, on the approach of the enemy,
he had designed to form on the first advantageous piece of
ground he could find; and that, in his own opinion, and in the
opinion of some other officers, no safe and advantageous position had presented itself until he met General Washington; at
which time it was his intention to fight the enemy on the
very ground afterwards taken by that officer. He suggested
a variety of reasons in justification of his retreat, which, if
they do not absolutely establish its propriety, give it so questionable a form as to render it probable that a public examination never would have taken place, could his proud spirit have
stooped to offer explanation instead of outrage, to the Commander-in-chief.
His suspension gave general satisfaction through the army.
Without being masters of his conduct as a military man, they
perfectly understood the insult offered to their general by his
letters; and, whether rightly or not, believed his object to have

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303

been to disgrace Washington, and to obtain the supreme command for himself. So devotedly were all ranks attached to their
general, that the mere suspicion of such a design, would have
rendered his continuance in the army extremely difficult.
Whatever judgment may be formed on the propriety of his
retreat, it is not easy to justify, either the omission to keep the
Commander-in-chief continually informed of his situation and
intentions, or the very rude letters written after the action
was over.
The battle of Monmouth gave great satisfaction to congress.
A resolution was passed unanimously, thanking General Washington for the activity with which he marched from the camp
at Valley Forge, in pursuit of the enemy; for his distinguished
exertions in forming the line of battle, and for his great good
conduct in the action; and he was requested to signify the thanks
of congress to the officers and men under his command, who
distinguished themselves by their conduct and valour in the
battle.
After remaining a few days on the high grounds of Middletown, Sir Henry Clinton proceeded to Sandy-hook, July 5.
whence his army passed over to New York.

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CHAPTER XIII
BEFORE General Washington could reach the ground he designed to occupy, intelligence was received that a powerful
French fleet, under the command of the Count
1778 D'Estaing, had appeared off Chingoteague inlet, the
northern extremity of the coast of Virginia.
The Count had sailed from Toulon on the 13th of April, with
twelve ships of the line and six frigates, having on board a
respectable body of land forces. His destination was the Delaware; and he hoped to find the British fleet in that river, and
their army in Philadelphia. An uncommon continuance of adverse winds, protracted his voyage across the Atlantic to the
extraordinary length of eighty-seven days. This unusual circumstance saved the British fleet and army.
On reaching the capes of the Delaware, the Count announced
his arrival to congress; and, having failed in accomplishing his
first object, proceeded along the coast to New York, in the hope
of being able to attack the British fleet in the harbour of that
place.
Sir Henry Clinton was again indebted to some fortunate incidents for his safety.
The violent storms of the preceding winter had broken
through the narrow isthmus by which Sandy-hook was connected with the continent, and had converted the peninsula into
an island. This rendered it necessary for the army to pass from
the main to the hook on a bridge of boats, which would have
been impracticable, if obstructed by a superior fleet. It was
effected the very day on which D'Estaing appeared off Chingoteague inlet.
At Paramus, in Jersey, General Washington received a letter
from the president of congress, advising him of this important
J I event, and requesting that he would concert measures
with the Count for conjoint and offensive operations.
The next day he received a second letter on the same subject,

GEORGE WASHINGTON

305

enclosing two resolutions, one directing him to co-operate with
the French admiral, and the other authorising him to call on
the states from New Hampshire to New Jersey inclusive, for
such aids of militia as he might deem necessary for the operations of the allied arms.
He determined to proceed immediately to the White Plains,
whence the army might co-operate with more facility in the
execution of any attempt which might be made by the fleet,
and despatched Lieutenant Colonel Laurens, one of his aids de
camp, with all the information relative to the enemy, as well as
to his own army, which might be useful to D'Estaing. Lieutenant
Colonel Laurens was authorised to consult on future conjoint
operations, and to establish conventional signals for the purpose
of facilitating the communication of intelligence.
The French admiral, on arriving off the Hook, despatched
Major de Choisi, a gentleman of his family, to General Washington, for the purpose of communicating fully his views and
his strength. His first object was to attack New York. If this
should be found impracticable, he was desirous of turning his
attention to Rhode Island. To assist in coming to a result on
these enterprises, General Washington despatched Lieutenant
Colonel Hamilton with such farther communications as had
been suggested, by inquiries made since the departure of Lieutenant Colonel Laurens.
Fearing that the water on the bar at the entrance of the harbour, was not of sufficient depth to admit the passage of the
largest ships of the French fleet without much difficulty and
danger, General Washington had turned his attention to other
objects which might be, eventually, pursued. General Sullivan,
who commanded the troops in Rhode Island, was directed to
prepare for an enterprise against Newport; and the Ju1
Marquis de Lafayette was detached with two brigades y z
to join him at Providence. The next day Lieutenant Colonel
Hamilton returned to camp with the final determination of the
Count D'Estaing to relinquish the meditated attack on the fleet
in the harbour of New York, in consequence of the impracticability of passing the bar.
General Greene was immediately ordered to Rhode Island, of
which state he was a native; and Lieutenant Colonel Laurens

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was directed to attach himself to the French admiral, and to
facilitate all his views by procuring whatever might give them
effect; after which he was to act with the army under Sullivan.
The resolution being taken to proceed against Rhode Island,
the fleet got under way, and, on the 25th of July, appeared off
Newport, and cast anchor about five miles from that place,
just without Brenton's edge; soon after which, General Sullivan
went on board the Admiral, and concerted with him a plan of
operations for the allied forces. The fleet was to enter the harbour, and land the troops of his Christian Majesty on the west
side of the island, a little to the north of Dyer's island. The
Americans were to land at the same time on the opposite coast,
under cover of the guns of a frigate.
Although the appearance of the French fleet had animated the
whole country, and had produced a considerable degree of
alacrity for the service; although the success of the enterprise
essentially depended on maintaining a superiority at sea, which
there was much reason to apprehend would soon be wrested
from them; yet such are the delays inseparable from measures
to bring husbandmen into the field as soldiers, that the operations against Newport were suspended for several days on this
account.
As the militia of New Hampshire and Massachusetts apAug. 8. proached General Sullivan joined General Greene at
Tiverton, and it was agreed with the Admiral that
the fleet should enter the main channel immediately, and that
the descent should be made the succeeding day. The ships of
war passed the British batteries and entered the harbour, without receiving or doing any considerable damage.
The militia not arriving precisely at the time they were expected, General Sullivan could not hazard the movement which
had been concerted, and stated to the Count the necessity of
postponing it till the next day. Meanwhile, the preparations for
the descent being perceived, General Pigot drew the troops
which had been stationed on the north end of the island into
the lines at Newport.
On discovering this circumstance the next morning, Sullivan determined to avail himself of it, and to take immediate
possession of the works which had been abandoned. The whole

GEORGE WASHINGTON

307

army crossed the east passage, and landed on the north end of
Rhode Island. This movement gave great offence to the Admiral, who resented the indelicacy supposed to have been committed by Sullivan in landing before the French, and without
consulting him.
Unfortunately, some difficulties, on subjects of mere punctilio,
had previously arisen. The Count D'Estaing was a land as well
as sea officer, and held the high rank of lieutenant general in
the service of France. Sullivan being only a major general,
some misunderstanding on this delicate point had been apprehended; and General Washington had suggested to him the
necessity of taking every precaution to avoid it. This, it was
supposed, had been effected in their first conference, in which
it was agreed that the Americans should land first, after
which the French should land, to be commanded by the Count
D'Estaing in person. The motives for this arrangement are not
stated; but it was most probably made solely with a view to
the success of the enterprise. Either his own after-reflections or
the suggestions of others dissatisfied the Count with it, and he
insisted that the descent should be made on both sides of the
island precisely at the same instant, and that one wing of the
American army should be attached to the French, and land
with them. He also declined commanding in person, and wished
the Marquis de Lafayette to take charge of the French troops as
well as of the Americans attached to them.
It being feared that this alteration of the plan might endanger
both its parts, D'Estaing was prevailed on to reduce his demand
from one wing of the American army to one thousand militia.
When, afterwards, General Sullivan crossed over into the island
before the time to which he had himself postponed the descent,
and without giving previous notice to the Count of this movement, some suspicions seem to have been excited, that the
measure was taken with other views than were avowed, and
no inconsiderable degree of excitement was manifested. The
Count refused to answer Sullivan's letter, and charged Lieutenant Colonel Fleury, who delivered it, with being more an
American than a Frenchman.
At this time a British fleet appeared, which, after sailing close
into the land, and communicating with General Pigot, with

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drew some distance, and came to anchor off point Judith, just
without the narrow inlet leading into the harbour.
After it had been ascertained that the destination of the
Count D'Estaing was America, he was followed by a squadron
of twelve ships of the line under Admiral Byron, who was
designed to relieve Lord Howe, that nobleman having solicited
his recall. The vessels composing this squadron meeting with
weather unusually bad for the season, and being separated in
different storms, arrived, after lingering through a tedious passage, in various degrees of distress, on different and remote parts
of the American coast. Between the departure of D'Estaing
from the Hook on the 23d of July, and the 3oth of that month,
four ships of sixty-four and fifty guns arrived at Sandy Hook.
This addition to the British fleet, though it left Lord Howe
considerably inferior to the Count D'Estaing, determined him
to attempt the relief of Newport. He sailed from New York
on the 6th of August; and, on the 9th, appeared in sight of the
French fleet, before intelligence of his departure could be received by the Admiral.
At the time of his arrival the wind set directly into the harbour, so that it was impossible to get out of it; but it shifted
suddenly to the north east the next morning, and the Count
determined to stand out to sea, and give battle.
Aug. 10. Previous to leaving port, he informed General Sullivan that, on his return, he would land his men as that officer
should advise.
Not choosing to give the advantage of the weather-gage,
Lord Howe also weighed anchor and stood out to sea. He was
followed by D'Estaing; and both fleets were soon out of sight.
The militia were now arrived; and Sullivan's army amounted
to ten thousand men. Some objections were made by Lafayette
to his commencing operations before the return of D'Estaing.
That officer advised that the army should be advanced to a
position in the neighbourhood of Newport, but should not
break ground until the Count should be in readiness to act in
concert with them. It was extremely desirable to avoid whatever might give offence to the great ally on whose assistance
so much depended; but time was deemed of such importance to
an army which could not be kept long together, that this advice

GEORGE WASHINGTON

309

was overruled, and it was determined to commence the siege
immediately.
Before this determination could be executed, a furious storm
blew down all the tents, rendered the arms unfit for immediate
use, and greatly damaged the ammunition, of which fifty rounds
had just been delivered to each man. The soldiers,
having no shelter, suffered extremely; and several Au. 5.
perished in the storm, which continued three days. On the
return of fair weather the siege was commenced, and continued
without any material circumstance for several days.
As no intelligence had been received from the Admiral, the
situation of the American army was becoming very critical.
On the evening of the i9th, their anxieties were relieved for a
moment by the reappearance of the French fleet.
The two Admirals, desirous the one of gaining, and the other
of retaining the advantage of the wind, had employed two days
in manceuvring, without coming to action. Towards the close
of the second, they were on the point of engaging, when they
were separated by the violent storm which had been felt so
severely on shore, and which dispersed both fleets. Some single
vessels afterwards fell in with each other, but no important capture was made; and both fleets retired in a very shattered condition, the one to the harbour of New York, and the other to
that of Newport.
A letter was immediately despatched by D'Estaing to Sullivan, informing him that, in pursuance of orders from the King,
and of the advice of all his officers, he had taken the resolution
to carry the fleet to Boston. His instructions directed him to
sail for Boston should his fleet meet with any disaster, or should
a superior British fleet appear on the coast.
This communication threw Sullivan and his army into despair.
General Greene, and the Marquis de Lafayette were directed to
wait on the Admiral with a letter from Sullivan remonstrating
against this resolution, and to use their utmost endeavours to
induce him to change it.
They represented to him the certainty of carrying the garrison if he would co-operate with them only two days, urged
the impolicy of exposing the fleet at sea, in its present condition,
represented the port of Boston as equally insecure with that of

3to

THE LIFE OF

Newport, and added that the expedition had been undertaken
on condition that the French fleet and army should co-operate
with them; that confiding in this co-operation, they had brought
stores into the island to a great amount, and that to abandon the
enterprise in the present state of things, would be a reproach
and disgrace to their arms. To be deserted at such a critical
moment would have a pernicious influence on the minds of the
American people, and would furnish their domestic foes, as well
as the common enemy with the means of animadverting severely
on their prospects from an alliance with those who could abandon them under circumstances such as the present. They concluded with wishing that the utmost harmony and confidence
might subsist between the two nations, and especially between
their officers; and entreated the Admiral, if any personal indiscretions had appeared in conducting the expedition, not to permit them to prejudice the common cause.
Whatever impression these observations may have made on
the Count, they could not change the determination he had
formed.
General Greene, in his representation of this conversation,
stated that the principal officers on board the fleet were the
enemies of D'Estaing. He was properly a land officer, and they
were dissatisfied with his appointment in the navy. Determined
to thwart his measures, and to prevent, as far as could be justified, his achieving any brilliant exploit, they availed themselves
of the letter of his instructions, and unanimously persevered in
advising him to relinquish the enterprise, and sail for Boston.
He could not venture, with such instructions, to act against
their unanimous opinion; and, although personally disposed to
re-enter the harbour, declined doing so, and sailed from the
island.
On the return of Greene and Lafayette, Sullivan made yet
another effort to retain the fleet. He addressed a second letter
to the Admiral, pressing him, in any event, to leave his land
forces. The bearer of this letter was also charged with a protest
signed by all the general officers in Rhode Island except Lafayette, the only effect of which was to irritate D'Estaing, who
proceeded, without delay, on his voyage to Boston.
Thus abandoned by the fleet, Sullivan called a council of

GEORGE WASHINGTON

3 I I

general officers, who were in favour of attempting an assault if
five thousand volunteers who had seen nine months service
could be obtained for the enterprise; but the departure of the
fleet had so discouraged the militia, that this number could not
be procured; and, in a few days, the army was reduced by desertion to little more than five thousand men. As the British were
estimated at six thousand, it was determined to raise the siege,
and retire to the north end of the island, there to fortify, and
wait the result of another effort to induce D'Estaing to return.
In the night of the 28th, the army retired by two roads leading to the works on the north end of the island, having its rear
covered by Colonels Livingston and Laurens, who commanded
light parties on each.
Early next morning the retreat was discovered by the British,
who followed in two columns, and were engaged on each road
by Livingston and Laurens, who retreated slowly and kept up
the action with skill and spirit until the English were brought
into the neighbourhood of the main body of the Americans,
drawn up in order of battle on the ground of their encampment. The British formed on Quaker Hill, a very strong piece
of ground, something more than a mile in front of the American
line.
Sullivan's rear was covered by strong works; and in his front,
rather to the right, was a redoubt. In this position, the two
armies cannonaded each other for some time, and a succession of
skirmishes was kept up in front of both lines until about two in
the afternoon, when the British advanced in force, attempted to
turn the right flank, and made demonstrations of an intention
to carry the redoubt in front of the right wing. General
Greene, who commanded that wing, advanced to its support,
and a sharp engagement was continued for about half an hour,
when the British retreated to Quaker Hill. The cannonade was
renewed, and kept up intermingled with slight skirmishing until
night.
According to the return made by General Sullivan, his loss in
killed, wounded and missing was two hundred and eleven. That
of the British, as stated by General Pigot, amounted to two
hundred and sixty.
The next day, the cannonade was renewed, but neither army

3 I12

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was inclined to attack the other. The British waited for reinforcements, and Sullivan had at length determined to retire
from the island.
The Commander-in-chief had observed some movements
among the British transports indicating the embarkation of
troops, and had suggested to Sullivan the necessity of securing
his retreat. A fleet of transports soon put to sea with a large
body of troops, of which immediate notice was given to Sullivan
in a letter recommending his retreat to the continent. This
reinforcement, which consisted of four thousand men, commanded by Sir Henry Clinton in person, was delayed by adverse
winds until the letter of General Washington was received, and
the resolution to evacuate the island was taken. The whole
Aug. 31. army passed over to the continent unobserved by the
enemy, and disembarked about Tiverton by two in
the morning.
Never was retreat more fortunate. Sir Henry Clinton arrived
the next day, and the loss of the American army would have
been inevitable.
The complete success of this expedition had been confidently
anticipated throughout America; and the most brilliant results
had been expected from the capture of so important a part of
the British army as the garrison of Newport. The chagrin produced by disappointment was proportioned to the exaltation of
their hopes. In general orders issued by Sullivan, soon after the
departure of D'Estaing, he permitted some expressions to escape
him which were understood to impute to the Count D'Estaing,
and to the French nation, an indisposition to promote the interests of the United States. These insinuations wounded the
feelings of the French officers, and added, in no small degree, to
the resentments of the moment. In subsequent orders, the General sought to correct this indiscretion; and alleged that he had
been misunderstood by those who supposed him to blame the
Admiral, with whose orders he was unacquainted, and of whose
conduct he was, consequently, unable to judge. He also stated
explicitly the important aids America had received from France,
aids of which he ought not to be unmindful under any disappointment; and which should prevent a too sudden censure
of any movement whatever.

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of part of
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American &amp; British
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NEWPORT
and the subsequent Action
on the 2. of v.&amp;t
1778.

GEORGE WASHINGTON

3 I 3

The Count D'Estaing, on his part, addressed a letter to congress containing a statement of all the movements of his fleet
subsequent to its arrival on the coast, in which his chagrin and
irritation were but ill concealed.
In congress, after approving the conduct of Sullivan and his
army, an indiscreet proposition was made to inquire into the
causes of the failure of the expedition; but this was set aside by
the previous question.
In the first moments of vexation and disappointment, General Sullivan had addressed some letters to the governor of
Rhode Island, complaining bitterly of being abandoned by the
fleet. These despatches were transmitted by the governor to
the speaker of the assembly, and were on the point of being
submitted publicly to the house, when they were fortunately
arrested by General Greene, who had been introduced on the
floor, and placed by the side of the chair; and to whom they
were shown by the speaker.
The discontent in New England generally, and in Boston particularly, was so great as to inspire fears that the means of
repairing the French ships would not be supplied. To guard
against the mischief which might result from this temper, as
well as for other objects, General Hancock had repaired from
camp to Boston, and Lafayette had followed him on a visit to
D'Estaing.
The consequences to be apprehended from this unavailing
manifestation of ill temper, soon induced all reflecting men to
exert themselves to control it. In the commencement of its
operation, General Washington, foreseeing the evils with which
it was fraught, had laboured to prevent them. He addressed
letters to General Sullivan, to General Heath, who commanded
at Boston, and to other individuals of influence in New England,
urging the necessity of correcting the intemperance of the
moment, and of guarding against the interference of passion
with the public interest.
Soon after the transmission of these letters, he received a
resolution of congress, directing him to take every measure in
his power to prevent the publication of the protest entered into
by the officers of Sullivan's army. In his letter, communicating
this resolution, he said, "the disagreement between the army

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under your command and the fleet, has given me very singular
uneasiness. The continent at large is concerned in our cordiality,
and it should be kept up by all possible means, consistent with
our honour and policy. First impressions, you know, are generally longest retained, and will serve to fix, in a great degree,
our national character with the French. In our conduct towards
them, we should remember that they are a people old in war,
very strict in military etiquette, and apt to take fire when others
scarcely seem warm. Permit me to recommend in the most
particular manner, the cultivation of harmony and good agreement, and your endeavours to destroy that ill humour which
may have found its way among the officers. It is of the utmost
importance too, that the soldiers and the people should know
nothing of this misunderstanding, or, if it has reached them,
that means may be used to stop its progress, and prevent its
effects." In a letter to General Greene, after expressing his fears
that the seeds of dissension and distrust, might be sown between
the troops of the two nations, he added, "I depend much on
your temper and influence, to conciliate that animosity which,
I plainly perceive by a letter from the Marquis, subsists between
the American and French officers in our service. This, you may
be assured, will extend itself to the Count, and to the officers
and men of his whole fleet, should they return to Rhode Island,
unless a reconciliation shall have taken place. The Marquis
speaks kindly of a letter from you to him on this subject. He
will therefore take any advice from you in a friendly way; and,
if he can be pacified, the other French gentleman will, of course,
be satisfied; since they look up to him as their head. The
Marquis grounds his complaint on a general order of the 24th
of August, and upon the universal clamour that prevailed
against the French nation.
""I beg you will take every measure to keep the protest entered
into by the general officers from being made public. Congress,
sensible of the ill consequences that will flow from our differences being known to the world, have passed a resolve to that
purpose. Upon the whole, my dear sir, you can conceive my
meaning,1 better than I can express it, and I therefore fully
1 Alluding, it is presumed, to the delicacy of suggesting to General Sullivan
the mischief to be apprehended from any intemperate expressions.

GEORGE WASHINGTON

3 I 5

depend on your exerting yourself to heal all private animosities
between our principal officers and the French, and to prevent al
illiberal expressions and reflections that may fall from the army
at large."
The general also seized the first opportunity to recommence
his correspondence with the Count; and his letters, without
noticing the disagreement which had taken place, were calculated
to sooth every angry sensation which might have been excited.
A letter from the Admiral stating the whole transaction, was
answered by General Washington in a manner so perfectly
satisfactory, that the irritation which threatened such serious
mischief, appears to have entirely subsided.
Congress also, in a resolution which was made public, expressed their perfect approbation of the conduct of the Count,
and directed the president to assure him, in the letter which
should transmit it, that they entertained the highest sense of
his zeal and attachment.
These prudent and temperate measures restored harmony to
the allied armies.
The storm under which the French fleet had suffered so
severely, did considerable damage also to that of Lord Howe.
The British, however, had sustained less injury than the French,
and were soon in a condition to put again to sea. Having
received information that the Count D'Estaing had made for
Boston, Lord Howe sailed for the same port, in the hope of
reaching it before him. But in this he was disappointed. On
entering the bay he found the French fleet already in Nantasket
Road, where such judicious dispositions had been made for its
defence, that he relinquished the idea of attacking it, and returned to New York; where he resigned the command to Admiral Gambier, who was to retain it till the arrival of Admiral
Byron.
Finding that General Sullivan had retreated to the continent,
Sir Henry Clinton returned to New York, leaving the command of the troops on board the transports with Major General
Gray, who was directed to conduct an expedition to the eastward, as far as Buzzards bay.
Gray entered Acushnet river, where he destroyed a number

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of privateers with their prizes, and some merchant vessels.
He also reduced part of the towns of Bedford and
Sept. S Fairhaven to ashes, in which some military and naval
stores had been collected. The troops re-embarked the next
day, before the militia could be assembled in sufficient force to
oppose them, and sailed to Martha's Vineyard, where they destroyed several vessels, and some salt works, and levied a heavy
contribution of live stock on the inhabitants.
While so large a detachment from the British army was
depredating the coasts of New England, preparations were
making in New York for some distant expedition; and many
were of opinion that the French fleet was its object. To be in
readiness to oppose a combined attack by sea and land on the
fleet, General Gates was directed with three brigades, to proceed
by easy marches as far as Danbury, in Connecticut. And Washington moved northward to Fredericksburg; while General Putnam was detached with two brigades to the neighbourhood of
West Point, and General M'Dougal, with two others, to join
General Gates at Danbury.
Soon after the return of General Gray from New England,
the British army moved up the North River on each
Sept. 22. side in great force. The column on the west side,
commanded by Lord Cornwallis, consisting of about five thousand men, took a position with its right on the river, and its left
extending to Newbridge, on the Hackensack, while the other
division, which was commanded by General Knyphausen, consisting of about three thousand men, was advanced about the
same distance on the east side of the Hudson. The command of
the river enabled these two columns to communicate freely with
each other; and, at any time, to reunite. Although General
Washington conjectured that this movement was made for the
purpose of foraging, yet it was possible that the passes in the
Highlands might be its object; and orders were given to the
detachments on the lines to hold themselves in readiness to
anticipate the execution of such a design.
Colonel Baylor, with his regiment of cavalry, had crossed the
Hackensack early in the morning of the 27th of September, and
taken quarters at Taupaun, or Herringtown, a small village near
New Taupaun, where some militia were posted. Immediate

GEORGE WASHINGTON

3 I7

notice of his position was given to Lord Cornwallis, who formed
a plan to surprise and cut off both the cavalry and militia.
The party designed to act against Colonel Baylor was commanded by General Gray, and that against the militia, by Lieutenant Colonel Campbell.
That part of the plan which was to be executed by Campbell
was defeated by delays in passing the river, during S 8
which a deserter gave notice of his approach, and the ept z8.
militia saved themselves by flight. But the corps commanded
by General Gray, guided by some of the country people, eluded
the patrols, got into the rear of the sergeant's guard which had
been posted at a bridge over the Hackensack, cut it off without
alarming Baylor, and completely surprised his whole regiment.
The British troops rushed into a barn where the Americans
slept; and, refusing to give quarter, bayoneted for a time all
they saw. Of one hundred and four privates, sixty-seven were
killed, wounded, and taken. The number of prisoners, amounting
to about forty, is stated to have been increased by the humanity
of one of Gray's captains, who, notwithstanding his orders, gave
quarter to the whole of the fourth troop. Colonel Baylor and
Major Clough, who were both wounded with the bayonet, the
first dangerously, the last mortally, were among the prisoners.
Three days after this affair, Colonel Richard Butler, with a
detachment of infantry, assisted by Major Lee with a part of his
cavalry, fell in with a small party of chasseurs and yagers under
Captain Donop, which he instantly charged, and, without the
loss of a man, killed ten on the spot, and took the officer commanding the chasseurs, and eighteen of the yagers, prisoners.
Only the extreme roughness of the country, which impeded the
action of the cavalry, and prevented part of the infantry from
coming up, enabled a man of the enemy to escape. Some interest was taken at the time in this small affair, because it seemed,
in some measure, to revenge the loss of Colonel Baylor.
After completing their forage, the British army returned to
New York.
This movement had been, in part, designed to cover an expedition against Little Egg Harbour, which was completely successful; and the works and store-houses at the place, as well as
the merchandise and vessels, were entirely destroyed.

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It has been already stated that Count Pulaski had been appointed general of the American cavalry. The dissatisfaction
given by this appointment to the officers, had induced him to
resign his commission, but, thirsting for military fame, and
zealous in the American cause, he obtained permission to raise
a legionary corps, which he officered chiefly with foreigners, and
commanded in person. In this corps, one Juliet, a deserter, had
been admitted as an officer. The Count had been ordered to
march from Trenton towards Little Egg Harbour, and was
lying eight or ten miles from the coast, when this Juliet again
deserted, carrying with him intelligence of Pulaski's strength
and situation. A plan was formed to surprise him, which succeeded completely so far as respected his infantry, who were
put to the bayonet. The British accounts of this expedition
assert that the whole corps was destroyed. Pulaski stated his
loss at about forty; and averred that on coming up with his
cavalry to the relief of his infantry, he repulsed the enemy. It
is probable that the one account diminishes the importance of
this enterprise as much as the other magnifies it.
Admiral Byron reached New York, and took command of the
fleet about the middle of September. After repairing his shattered vessels, he sailed for the port of Boston. Soon after his
arrival in the bay, fortune disconcerted all his plans. A furious
storm drove him out to sea, and damaged his fleet so much that
he found it necessary to put into the port of Rhode Island
to refit. This favourable moment was seized by the Count
D'Estaing, who sailed, on the 3d of November, for the West
Indies.
Thus terminated an expedition from which the most important advantages had been anticipated. A variety of accidents
had defeated plans judiciously formed, which had every probability in their favour.
The Marquis de Lafayette, ambitious of fame on another
theatre, was desirous of returning to France. Expecting war on
the continent of Europe, he was anxious to tender his services
to his king, and to his native country.
From motives of real friendship as well as of policy, General
Washington was desirous of preserving the connexion of this
officer with the army, and of strengthening his attachment to

GEORGE WASHINGTON

319

America. He therefore expressed to congress his wish that
Lafayette, instead of resigning his commission, might have unlimited leave of absence, to return when it should be convenient
to himself; and might carry with him every mark of the confidence of the government.
This policy was adopted by congress in its full extent. The
partiality of America for Lafayette was well placed. Never did
a foreigner, whose primary attachments to his own country
remained undiminished, feel more solicitude for the welfare of
another, than was unceasingly manifested by this young nobleman, for the United States.
There being no prospect of an active winter campaign in the
northern or middle states, and the climate admitting of military
operations elsewhere, a detachment from the British army, consisting of five thousand men commanded by Major General
Grant, sailed, early in November, under a strong convoy, for the
West India Islands; and, towards the end of the same month,
another embarkation was made for the southern parts of the
continent. This second detachment was commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Campbell, who was escorted by Commodore
Hyde Parker, and was destined to act against the southern states.
As a force sufficient for the defence of New York yet remained, the American army retired into winter quar â D
ters. The main body was cantoned in Connecticut,
on both sides the North River, about West Point, and at Middlebrook. Light troops were stationed nearer the lines; and the
cavalry were drawn into the interior to recruit the horses for
the next campaign. In this distribution, the protection of the
country, the security of important points, and a cheap and convenient supply of provisions, were consulted.
The troops again wintered in huts; but they were accustomed
to this mode of passing that inclement season. Though far from
being well clothed, their condition in that respect was so much
improved by supplies from France, that they disregarded the
inconveniences to which they were exposed.

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CHAPTER XIV
ABOUT the time that Commodore Parker sailed for the southern
states, the commissioners appointed to give effect to
1778. the late conciliatory acts of Parliament, embarked
for Europe. They had exerted their utmost powers to effect
the object of their mission, but without success. Great Britain
required that the force of the two nations should be united
under one common sovereign; and America was no longer disposed, or even at liberty to accede to this condition. All those
affections, which parts of the same empire should feel for each
other, had been eradicated by a distressing war; the great body
of the people were determined, at every sacrifice, to maintain
their independence; and the treaty with France had pledged the
honour and the faith of the nation, never to consent to a reunion
with the British empire.
The commissioners arrived in Philadelphia while that place
was yet in possession of their army, and are understood to have
brought positive orders for its evacuation. Their arrival was
immediately announced to General Washington by Sir Henry
Clinton, who was joined with them in the commission, and a
passport was requested for their secretary, Doctor Ferguson, as
the bearer of their first despatches to congress. The Commanderin-chief declined granting this passport until he should receive
the instructions of his government; on which a letter addressed
""To the president and other the members of congress," was forwarded in the usual manner. Copies of their commission, and
of the acts of Parliament on which it was founded, together
with propositions conforming to those acts, drawn in the most
conciliatory language, were transmitted with this letter.
Some observations having been introduced into it reflecting on
the conduct of France,1 the reading was interrupted, and a
1 The offensive words were "insidious interposition of a power which has, from
the first settlement of the colonies, been actuated with enmity to us both; and
notwithstanding the pretended date or present form of the French offers."

GEORGE WASHINGTON

32I

motion made to proceed no farther in consequence of this offensive language to his most Christian Majesty. This motion
producing some debate, and adjournment was moved and carried. When congress reassembled, the warmth of the preceding
day had not entirely subsided; but, after several ineffectual
motions to prevent it, the letter was read and committed. The
answer which was reported by the committee, and transmitted
to the commissioners, declared that "nothing but an earnest
desire to spare the farther effusion of human blood, could have
induced them to read a paper containing expressions so disrespectful to his most Christian Majesty, the good and great ally
of these states, or to consider propositions so derogatory to the
honour of an independent nation.
"That the acts of the British Parliament, the commission from
their sovereign, and their letter, supposed the people of the
United States to be subjects of the crown of Great Britain, and
were founded on the idea of dependence, which is totally inadmissible.
"That congress was inclined to peace, notwithstanding the
unjust claims from which this was originated, and the savage
manner in which it was conducted. They would therefore be
ready to enter upon the consideration of a treaty of peace and
commerce, not inconsistent with treaties already subsisting,
when the King of Great Britain should demonstrate a sincere
disposition for that purpose. The only solid proof of this
disposition would be an explicit acknowledgment of the independence of these states, or the withdrawing his fleets and
armies."
On the i3th of July, after arriving at New York, the commissioners addressed a second letter to congress, expressing their
regrets that any difficulties were raised which must prolong the
calamities of war; and reviewing the letter of congress in terms
well calculated to make an impression on those who had become
weary of the contest, and to revive ancient prejudices in favour
of England and against France.
This letter being read, congress resolved that, as neither the
independence of the United States was explicitly acknowledged,
nor the fleets and armies withdrawn, no answer should be given
to it.

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It would seem that the first letter of congress must have
convinced the British commissioners that no hope could be indulged of restoring peace on any other terms than the independence of the United States. Congress must have been equally
certain that the commissioners were not empowered to acknowledge that independence, or to direct the fleets and armies of
Great Britain to be withdrawn. The intercourse between them
therefore, after the first communications were exchanged, and
all subsequent measures, became a game of skill, in which the
parties played for the affections and passions of the people; and
was no longer a diplomatic correspondence, discussing the interests of two great nations with the hope of accommodation.
The first packet addressed by the commissioners to congress,
contained several private letters, written by Governor Johnson
to members of that body, in which he blended, with flattering
expressions of respect for their characters and their conduct,
assurances of the honours and emoluments to which those would
be entitled who should contribute to restore peace and harmony
to the two countries and to terminate the present war.
A few days before the receipt of the letter of the I 3th of July,
congress passed a resolution requiring that all letters of a public
nature received by any member from any subject of the British
crown, should be laid before them. In compliance with this resolution, the letters of Governor Johnson were produced; and, some
time afterwards, Mr. Read stated, in his place, a direct offer which
had been made him by a third person, of a considerable sum of
money, and of any office in the gift of the crown, as an inducement to use his influence for the restoration of harmony between
the two countries. Congress determined to communicate these
circumstances to the American people, and made a solemn declaration, in which, after reciting the offensive paragraphs of the
private letters, and the conversation stated by Mr. Read, they
expressed their opinion "that these were direct attempts to corrupt and bribe the congress of the United States, and that it
was incompatible with their honour to hold any manner of
correspondence or intercourse with the said George Johnson,
Esquire, especially to negotiate with him upon affairs in which
the cause of liberty is interested." After an unsuccessful attempt to involve the other commissioners in the same exclusion.

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323

this declaration was transmitted to them while they were expecting an answer to a remonstrance on the detention of the
army of General Burgoyne.
On receiving it, Mr. Johnson withdrew from the commission,
declaring that he should be happy to find congress inclined to
retract their former declaration, and to negotiate with others on
terms equally conducive to the happiness of both countries. This
declaration was accompanied by one signed by the other commissioners, in which, without admitting the construction put
by congress on his letters, or the authority of the person who
held the conversation with Mr. Read, they denied all knowledge
of those letters or of that conversation. They at the same time
detailed the advantages to be derived by America from the
propositions they had made, "advantages," they added, "decidedly superior to any which could be expected from an unnatural alliance with France, only entered into by that nation
for the purpose of prolonging the war after the full knowledge
on their part of the liberal terms intended to be offered by
Great Britain." With this declaration was transmitted a copy of
the former remonstrance 1 against the detention of the convention troops, without the signature of Governor Johnson, and an
extract from the instructions given by the Secretary of State to
Sir Henry Clinton, authorising him to demand, in express
terms, a performance of the convention made with General
Burgoyne, and, if required, to renew and ratify all its conditions in the name of the king.
All the publications of the British commissioners indicate an
opinion that they could be more successful with the people than
with congress; and, not unfrequently betray the desire that the
constituents of that body might be enabled to decide on the
measures taken by their representatives.
On the part of congress, it was deemed of the utmost importance to keep the public mind correct, and to defeat all
attempts to make unfavourable impressions on it. Several members of that body entered the lists as disputants, and employed
their pens with ability and success, as well in serious arguments
1 Some expressions having been used in the letter, respecting the convention troops,
which were deemed disrespectful, no other reply was made to it than that "congress
gave no answer to insolent letters."

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as in rousing the various passions which influence the conduct of
men. The attempt to accomplish the object of the mission by
corruption was wielded with great effect; and it was urged with
equal force that should the United States now break their faith
with France,, and treat on the footing of dependence, they would
sacrifice all credit with foreign nations, would be considered by
all as faithless and infamous, and would forfeit all pretensions
to future aid from abroad; after which the terms now offered
might be retracted, and the war be recommenced. To these
representations were added the certainty of independence, and
the great advantages which must result from its establishment.
The letters of the commissioners were treated as attempts to sow
divisions among the people of which they might afterwards avail
themselves, and thus effect by intrigue, what had been found
unattainable by arms.
These essays were read with avidity, and seem to have produced all the effect which was expected from them among the
friends of the revolution.
The commissioners appear still to have cherished the hope, that
a complete knowledge of the terms they had offered, operating
on the disappointment of the extravagant hopes which had been
founded on the arrival of a French fleet, would make a great
impression on a large portion of the American people. This
opinion induced them, before their departure, to publish a
manifesto, addressed, not only to congress, but to all the provincial assemblies, and all the inhabitants of the colonies of whatever denomination, briefly recapitulating the several steps they
had taken to accomplish the object of their mission, and the
refusal of congress even to open a conference with them. They
declared their readiness still to proceed in the execution of the
powers contained in their commission, and to treat either with
deputies from all the colonies conjointly, or with any provincial
assembly or convention individually, at any time within the
space of forty days from the date of their manifesto. They
also proclaimed a general pardon for all treasons and rebellious
practices committed at any time previous to the date of their
manifesto, to such as should, within the term of forty days,
withdraw from their opposition to the British government, and
conduct themselves as faithful and loyal subjects. To enable

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325

all persons to avail themselves of this proffered pardon, thirteen
copies of the manifesto were executed, one of which was transmitted by a flag of truce to each state. A vast number of copies
were printed, and great exertions were made by flags and other
means to disperse them among the people.
On being informed of these proceedings, congress, without
hesitation, adopted the course which the government of an
independent nation is bound to pursue, when attempts are made
by a foreign power to open negotiations with unauthorised
individuals. They declared the measure "to be contrary to the
law of nations, and utterly subversive of that confidence which
could alone maintain those means which had been invented to
alleviate the horrors of war; and, therefore, that the persons
employed to distribute such papers, were not entitled to the
protection of a flag." They recommended it to the executive
departments in the respective states, "to secure, in close custody,
every person who, under the sanction of a flag, or otherwise,
was found employed in circulating those manifestoes." At the
same time, to show that these measures were not taken for the
purpose of concealment, they directed a publication of the
manifesto in the American papers. Care, however, was taken
to accompany it with comments made by individuals, calculated
to counteract its effect. A vessel containing a cargo of these
papers being wrecked on the coast, the officers and crew were
made prisoners; and the requisition of Admiral Gambier for
their release, in consequence of the privilege afforded by his flag,
was answered by a declaration that they had forfeited that privilege by being charged with seditious papers.
Not long after the publication of this paper, a counter manifesto was issued by congress, in which, after touching on subjects which might influence the public mind, they "solemnly
declare and proclaim, that if their enemies presume to execute
their threats, or persist in their present course of barbarity, they
will take such exemplary vengeance as shall deter others from a
like conduct."
Thus ended this fruitless attempt to restore a connexion which
had been wantonly broken, the reinstatement of which had
become impracticable. With the war, and with independence,
a course of opinion had prevailed in America, which not only

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opposed great obstacles to a reunion of the two countries under
one common sovereign, but, by substituting discordant materials
in the place of the cement which formerly bound them together,
rendered such an event undesirable even to the British themselves. The time was arrived when the true interest of that
nation required the relinquishment of an expensive war, the
object of which was unattainable, and which, if attained, could
not be long preserved; and the establishment of those amicable
relations which reciprocal interest produce between independent
states, capable of being serviceable to each other by a fair and
equal interchange of good offices.
This opinion, however, was not yet embraced by the cabinet
of London; and great exertions were still to be made for the
reannexation of the American states to the British empire. Even
the opposition was not united against a continuance of the war
for the object now proposed; and the Earl of Chatham, who
had endeavoured first to prevent the conflict, and afterwards to
produce conciliation, closed his splendid life in unavailing efforts
to prevent that dismemberment which had become inevitable.'
1The author has been favoured by his estimable friend, Major General Scott,
with the perusal of an introduction written by Mr. L. De Sevelinges, to Botta's
"History of the war of the independence of the United States of America," translated into French.
Mr. De Sevelinges professes to have received the most precious explanations, relative to incidents and motives, from a gentleman equally distinguished for his knowledge and his character, whose situation enabled him to become acquainted with
facts which were concealed from the public. Speaking of the attempt made
by Mr. Johnstone, he says, p. 19, it was essential "to break off all communication with the agents of the British minister. Mr. Girard directed all his efforts
to this object, and had the good fortune to effect it.
But the English faction of tories subsisted. It was powerful from the credit
of its chiefs."
In a note on this passage, he says, "The most influential were Samuel Adams and
Richard Lee, (Richard H. Lee,) the brother of Arthur Lee, one of the deputies of
congress in France. He was convicted of having secret intelligence with the British
minister."
It would be injustice to the memoirs of these distinguished patriots to attempt
their vindication against this atrocious and unfounded calumny. A calumny supported by no testimony, nor by a single circumstance wearing even the semblance
of probability, and confuted by the whole tenour of their lives. The annals of
the American revolution do not furnish two names more entirely above suspicion
than Samuel Adams and Richard Henry Lee. With the first gentleman the author
was not personally acquainted. With the last he was; and can appeal with confidence to every man who knew him, to declare the conviction, that he died as he
lived, a pure and devoted, as well as enlightened friend of American independence.
The same character was maintained by Mr. Adams.
In casting about for the foundation of this calumny, the author is inclined to

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327

In the midst of these transactions with the commissioners of
Great Britain, the Sieur Girard arrived at Philadelphia, in the character of MinisterqPlenipotentiary of July 4
his Most Christian Majesty.
The joy produced by this event was unbounded; and he was
received by congress with great pomp.
While these diplomatic concerns employed the American cabinet, and while the war seemed to languish on the Atlantic, it
raged to the west in its most savage form.
The difficulties which the inability of the American government to furnish the neighbouring Indians with those European
articles which they were accustomed to use, opposed to all the
efforts of congress to preserve their friendship, have already been
noticed. Early in I778, there were many indications of a general disposition among those savages to make war on the United
States; and the frontiers, from the Mohawk to the Ohio, were
threatened with the tomahawk and the scalping knife. Every
representation from that country supported the opinion that a
war with the Indians should never be defensive; and that, to
obtain peace, it must be carried into their own country. Detroit,
whose governor was believed to have been particularly active in
exciting hostilities, was understood to be in a defenceless condition; and congress resolved on an expedition against that place.
This enterprise was entrusted to General M'Intosh, who commanded at Pittsburg, and was to be carried on with three thousand men, chiefly militia, to be drawn from Virginia. To
facilitate its success, the resolution was also taken to enter the
country of the Senecas at the same time, by the way of the
look for it in the opinions entertained by these gentlemen, on subjects connected
with the negotiations for peace.
Since the publication of the secret journals of congress, it is generally known
that France countenanced the claim of Spain to circumscribe the western boundary
of the United States, by the line prescribed in the royal proclamation of I763,
for settlement of vacant lands. After Great Britain had consented to acknowledge the independence of 'the United States, it was 'understood by those who were
acquainted with the views of the belligerents, that a disposition existed on the
part of France and Spain, to continue the war for objects in which the United
States felt no interest,-among others, for Gibraltar and Jamaica. Some American
statesmen, and the Lees were of the number, probably Mr. Adams also, were extremely apprehensive that the miseries of their country would be prolonged for
these objects. It is not impossible that the sentiments of these gentlemen on these
subjects, being in opposition to the views of France, might, though founded entirely in American policy, be attributed to British intrigues.

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Mohawk. The officer commanding on the east of the Hudson
was desired to take measures for carrying this resolution into
execution; and the commissioners for Indian affairs, at Albany,
were directed to co-operate with him.
Unfortunately, the acts of the government did not correspond with the vigour of its resolutions. The necessary preparations were not made, and the inhabitants of the frontiers remained without sufficient protection, until the plans against
them were matured, and the storm which had been long gathering, burst upon them with a fury which spread desolation
wherever it reached.
About three hundred white men, commanded by Colonel
John Butler, and about five hundred Indians, led by the Indian
chief Brandt, who had assembled in the north, marched late in
June against the settlement of Wyoming. These troops embarked on the Chemung or Tyoga, and descending the Susquehanna, landed at a place called the Three Islands, whence they
marched about twenty miles, and crossing a wilderness, and
passing through a gap in the mountain, entered the valley of
Wyoming near its northern boundary. At this place a small
fort called Wintermoots had been erected, which fell into their
hands without resistance, and was burnt. The inhabitants who
were capable of bearing arms assembled on the first alarm at
Forty fort, on the west side of the Susquehanna, four miles
below the camp of the invading army.
The regular troops, amounting to about sixty, were commanded by Colonel Zebulon Butler;' the militia by Colonel
Dennison. Colonel Butler was desirous of awaiting the arrival
of a small reinforcement under Captain Spalding, who had been
ordered by General Washington to his aid on the first intelligence of the danger which threatened the settlement; but the
militia generally, believing themselves sufficiently strong to repel
the invading force, urged an immediate battle so earnestly, that
Colonel Butler yielded to their remonstrances, and on the 3d of
July marched from Forty fort at the head of near four hundred
men to attack the enemy.
The British and Indians were prepared to receive him. Their
'This gentleman is stated not to have been of the same family with the leader
of the invading army.

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329

line was formed a small distance in front of their camp, in a
plain thinly covered with pine, shrub oaks, and under growth,
and extended from the river about a mile to a marsh at the foot
of the mountain. The Americans advanced in a single column,
without interruption, until they approached the enemy, when
they received a fire which did not much mischief. The line of
battle1 was instantly formed, and the action commenced with
1 The representation of this battle, and of the circumstances attending the destruction of the Wyoming settlement, have been materially varied from the
statement made of them in the first edition. The papers of General Washington
furnished allusions to the transaction, but no particular account of it. The author
therefore relied on Mr. Gordon and Mr. Ramsay, whose authority was quoted. Soon
after the work was published, he received a letter from a gentleman then residing
in that country, (Mr. Charles Miner,) who asserted with confidence that the
statement was incorrect, and gave himself a minute detail of events, collected
from persons who were in the settlement at the time, and witnessed them.
The author has been since indebted to the same gentleman for a statement
of the battle, and of the events which followed it, drawn up by one of the
descendants of Colonel Zebulon Butler, to which the certificates of several gentlemen are annexed, who were engaged in the action. These documents, with one
which will be mentioned, convince him that the combined treachery and savage
ferocity which have been painted in such vivid colours, in the narratives that
have been given of this furious and desolating irruption, have been greatly exaggerated. Historic truth demands that these misstatements should be corrected.
The other document alluded to, is a letter from Zebulon Butler to the board of
war, making his report of the transaction. The letter has been lately found among
his papers, and is copied below.
Grandenhutten, Penn Township, July iotb, 1778.
Honoured Sir,-On my arrival at Westmoreland, (which was only four days after
I left Yorktown,) I found there was a large body of the enemy advancing on that settlement. On the first of July we mustered the militia, and marched towards them by
the river above the settlement,-found and killed two Indians at a place where the
day before they had murdered nine men engaged in hoeing corn. We found some
canoes, &amp;c. but finding we were above their main body, it was judged prudent to return. And as every man had to go to his own house for his provision, we could not
muster again till the 3d of July. In the mean time, the enemy had got possession of
two forts, one of which we had reason to believe was designed for them, though they
burnt them both. The inhabitants had seven forts for the security of their women
and children, extending about ten miles on the river, and too many men would stay in
them to take care of them; but after collecting about three hundred of the most spirited of them, including Captain Hewitt's company, I held a council with the officers,
who were all agreed that it was best to attack the enemy before they got any farther.
We accordingly marched,-found their situation,-formed a front of the same extension of the enemy's, and attacked from right to left at the same time. Our men stood
the fire well for three or four shots, till some part of the enemy gave way; but unfortunately for us, through some mistake, the word retreat was understood from some
officer on the left, which took so quick that it was not in the power of the officers to
form them again, though I believe, if they had stood three minutes longer, the enemy
would have been beaten. The utmost pains were taken by the officers, who mostly fell.
A lieutenant colonel, a major and five captains, who were in commission in the militia,
all fell. Colonel Durkee, and Captains Hewitt and Ransom were likewise killed. In
the whole, about two hundred men lost their lives in the action on our side. What
number of the enemy were killed is yet uncertain, though I believe a very consider

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spirit. The Americans rather gained ground on the right where
Colonel Butler commanded, until a large body of Indians passing through the skirt of the marsh turned their left flank, which
was composed of militia, and poured a heavy and most destructive fire on their rear. The word "retreat" was pronounced by
some person, and the efforts of the officers to check it were unavailing. The fate of the day was decided, and a flight commenced on the left which was soon followed by the right. As
soon as the line was broken, the Indians, throwing down their
rifles and rushing upon them with the tomahawk completed the
confusion. The attempt of Colonel Butler and of the officers to
restore order were unavailing, and the whole line broke and fled
in confusion. The massacre was general, and the cries for mercy
were answered by the tomahawk. Rather less than sixty men
escaped, some to Forty fort, some by swimming the river, and
some to the mountain. A very few prisoners were made, only
three of whom were preserved alive, who were carried to
Niagara.
Further resistance was impracticable. Colonel Dennison proable number. The loss of these men so intimidated the inhabitants, that they gave
up the matter of fighting. Great numbers ran off, and others would comply with
the terms that I had refused. The enemy sent flags frequently-the terms you will
see in the enclosed letter. They repeatedly said they had nothing to do with any but
the inhabitants, and did not want to treat with me. Colonel Dennison, by desire of
the inhabitants, went and complied,-which made it necessary for me and the little
remains of Captain Hewitt's company to leave the place. Indeed it was determined
by the enemy to spare the inhabitants after their agreement, and that myself and the
few continental soldiers should be delivered up to the savages. Upon which I left the
place, and came scarcely able to move, as I have had no rest since I left Yorktown. It
has not been in my power to find a horse or man to wait on the board till now. I must
submit to the board what must be the next step. The little remains of Hewitt's company (which are about fifteen) are gone to Shamoken, and Captain Spalding's company, I have heard, are on the Delaware. Several hundred of the inhabitants are
strolling in the country destitute of provisions, who have large fields of grain and
other necessaries of life at Westmoreland. In short, if the inhabitants can go back,
there may yet be saved double the quantity of provisions to support themselves, otherwise they must be beggars, and a burthen to the world.
I have heard from men that came from the place since the people gave up, that the
Indians have killed no person since, but have burnt most of the buildings, and are
collecting all the horses they can, and are moving up the river. They likewise say
the enemy were eight hundred, one-half white men. I should be glad that, if possible, there might be a sufficient guard sent for the defence of the place, which will be
the means of saving thousands from poverty-but must submit to the wisdom of congress. I desire farther orders from the honourable board of war with respect to myself, and the soldiers under my direction.
I have the honour to be
Your Honour's most obedient humble servant,
ZEBULON BUTLER.

GEORGE WASHINGTON

3 3 I

posed terms of capitulation, which were granted to the inhabitants. It being understood that no quarter would be allowed
to the continental troops, Colonel Butler with his few surviving
soldiers fled from the valley.
The inhabitants generally abandoned the country, and, in
great distress, wandered into the settlements on the Lehigh and
the Delaware. The Indians, as is the practice of savages, destroyed the houses and improvements by fire, and plundered the
country. After laying waste the whole settlement, they withdrew from it before the arrival of the continental troops, who
were detached to meet them.
To cover every part of the United States would have required
a much greater number of men than could be raised. Different
districts were therefore unavoidably exposed to the calamities
ever to be experienced by those into the bosom of whose country
war is carried. The militia in every part of the Union, fatigued
and worn out by repeated tours of duty, required to be relieved
by continental troops. Their applications were necessarily resisted; but the danger which threatened the western frontier had
become so imminent; the appeal made by its sufferings to
national feeling was so affecting, that it was determined to spare
a more considerable portion of the army for its defence, than
had been allotted to that part of the Union, since the capture of
Burgoyne. On the first intelligence of the destruction of
Wyoming, the regiments of Hartley and Butler, with the remnant of Morgan's corps, commanded by Major Posey, were detached to the protection of that distressed country. They were
engaged in several sharp skirmishes, made separate incursions
into the Indian settlements, broke up their nearest villages, destroyed their corn, and by compelling them to retire to a greater
distance, gave some relief to the inhabitants.
While the frontiers of New York and Pennsylvania were thus
suffering the calamities incident to savage warfare, a fate equally
severe was preparing for Virginia. The western militia of that
state had made some successful incursions into the country
north-west of the Ohio, and had~taken some British posts on the
Mississippi. These were erected into the county of Illinois; and
a regiment of infantry, with a troop of cavalry, were raised for
its protection. The command of these troops was given to

3 32

THE LIFE OF

Colonel George Rogers Clarke, a gentleman whose courage,
hardihood, and capacity for Indian warfare, had given repeated
success to his enterprises against the savages.
This corps was divided into several detachments, the strongest
of which remained with Colonel Clarke at Kaskaskia. Colonel
Hamilton, the Governor of Detroit, was at Vincennes with
about six hundred men, principally Indians, preparing an expedition, first against Kaskaskia, and then up the Ohio to Pittsburg; after which he purposed to desolate the frontiers of
Virginia. Clarke anticipated and defeated his design by one
of those bold and decisive measures, which, whether formed on
a great or a small scale, mark the military and enterprising
genius of the man who plans and executes them.
He was too far removed from the inhabited country to hope
for support, and was too weak to maintain Kaskaskia
779. and the Illinois against the combined force of regulars and Indians by.which he was to be attacked so soon as the
season for action should arrive. While employed in preparing
for his defence, he received unquestionable information that
Hamilton had detached his Indians on an expedition against the
frontiers, reserving at the post he occupied only about eighty
Febr regulars, with three pieces of cannon and some swivels.
Clarke instantly resolved to seize this favourable moment. After detaching a small galley up the Wabash with
orders to take her station a few miles below Vincennes, and to
permit nothing to pass her, he marched in the depth of winter
with one hundred and thirty men, the whole force he could
collect, across the country from Kaskaskia to Vincennes. This
march, through the woods, and over high waters, required sixteen days, five of which were employed in crossing the drowned
lands of the Wabash. The troops were under the necessity of
wading five miles in water, frequently up to their breasts. After
subduing these difficulties, this small party appeared before the
town, which was completely surprised, and readily consented to
change its master. Hamilton, after defending the fort a short
time, surrendered himself and his garrison prisoners of war.
With a few of his immediate agents and counsellors, who had
been instrumental in the savage barbarities he had encouraged,

GEORGE WASHINGTON

333

he was, by order of the executive of Virginia, put in irons, and
confined in a jail.
This expedition was important in its consequences. It disconcerted a plan which threatened.destruction to the whole
country west of the Alleghany mountains; detached from the
British interest many of those numerous tribes of Indians south
of the waters immediately communicating with the great lakes;
and had, most probably, considerable influence in fixing the
western boundary of the United States.
We have already seen that congress, actuated by their wishes
rather than governed by a temperate calculation of
the means in their possession, had, in the preceding I778.
winter, planned a second invasion of Canada, to be conducted
by the Marquis de Lafayette; and that, as the generals only were
got in readiness for this expedition, was necessarily laid aside.
The design, however, seems to have been suspended, not abandoned. The alliance with France revived the latent wish to
annex that extensive territory to the United States. That
favourite subject was resumed; and, towards autumn, a plan
was completely digested for a combined attack to be made by
the allies on all the British dominions on the continent, and on
the adjacent islands of Cape Breton and Newfoundland. This
plan was matured about the time the Marquis de Lafayette
obtained leave to return to his own country, and was ordered to
be transmitted by that nobleman to Doctor Franklin, the minister of the United States at the court of Versailles, with instructions to induce, if possible, the French cabinet to accede to it.
Some communications respecting this subject were also made to
the Marquis, on whose influence in securing its adoption by his
own government, much reliance was placed; and, in October,
1778, it was, for the first time, transmitted to General Washington, with a request that he would inclose it by the Marquis,
with his observations on it, to Doctor Franklin.
This very extensive plan of military operations for the ensuing
campaign, prepared entirely in the cabinet, without consulting,
so far as is known, a single military man, consisted of many
parts.
Two detachments, amounting, each, to sixteen hundred men,

334

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were to march from Pittsburg and Wyoming against Detroit,
and Niagara.
A third body of troops, which was to be stationed on the
Mohawk during the winter, and to be powerfully reinforced in
the spring, was to seize Oswego, and to secure the navigation of
Lake Ontario with vessels to be constructed of materials to be
procured in the winter.
A fourth corps was to penetrate into Canada by the St. Francis,
and to reduce Montreal, and the posts on Lake Champlain, while
a fifth should guard against troops from Quebec.
Thus far America could proceed unaided by her ally. But,
Upper Canada being reduced, another campaign would still be
necessary for the reduction of Quebec. This circumstance
would require that the army should pass the winter in Canada;
and, in the mean time. the garrison of Quebec might be largely
reinforced. It was therefore essential to the complete success of
the enterprise, that France should be induced to take a part in it.
The conquest of Quebec, and of Halifax, was supposed to be
an object of so much importance to France as well as to the
United States, that her aid might be confidently expected.
It was proposed to request his most Christian Majesty to furnish four or five thousand troops, to sail from Brest, the beginning of May, under convoy of four ships of the line and four
frigates; the troops to be clad as if for service in the West
Indies, and thick clothes to be sent after them in August. A
large American detachment was to act with this French army;
and it was supposed that Quebec and Halifax might be reduced
by the beginning or middle of October. The army might then
either proceed immediately against Newfoundland, or remain in
garrison until the spring, when the conquest of that place might
be accomplished.
It had been supposed probable that England would abandon
the farther prosecution of the war on the continent of North
America, in which case the government would have a respectable
force at its disposal, the advantageous employment of which
had engaged in part the attention of the Commander-in-chief.
He had contemplated an expedition against the British posts in
Upper Canada as a measure which might be eventually eligible,
and which might employ the arms of the United States to

GEORGE WASHINGTON

335

advantage, if their troops might safely be withdrawn from the
sea board. He had however considered every object of this sort
as contingent. Having estimated the difficulties to be encountered in such an enterprise, he had found them so considerable as
to hesitate on the extent which might safely be given to the
expedition, admitting the United States to be evacuated by the
British armies.
In this state of mind, he received the magnificent plan already
prepared by congress. He was forcibly struck with the impracticability of executing that part of it which was to be undertaken by the United States, should the British armies continue
in their country; and with the serious mischief which would
result to the common cause, as well from diverting so considerable a part of the French force from other objects to one which
was, in his opinion, so unpromising, as from the ill impression
which would be made on the court and nation by the total
failure of the American government to execute its part of a
plan originating with itself; a failure which would, most probably, sacrifice the troops and ships employed by France.
On comparing the naval force of England with that of
France in the different parts of the world, the former appeared
to him to maintain a decided superiority; and consequently to
possess the power of shutting up the ships of the latter which
might be trusted into the St. Lawrence. To suppose that the
British government would not avail itself of this superiority on
such an occasion, would be to impute to it a blind infatuation,
or ignorance of the plans of its adversary, which could not be
safely assumed in calculations of such serious import.
A plan too, consisting of so many parts, to be prosecuted both
from Europe and America, by land and by water; which, to be
successful, required such a harmonious co-operation of the
whole, such a perfect coincidence of events, appeared to him to
be exposed to too many accidents, to risk upon it interests of
such high value.
In a long and serious letter to congress, he apologised for not
obeying their orders to deliver the plan with his observations
upon it to the Marquis; and, entering into a full investigation of
all its parts, demonstrated the mischiefs, and the dangers, with
which it was replete. This letter was referred to a committee,

3 36

THE LIFE OF

whose report admits the force of the reasons urged by the
Commander-in-chief against the expedition, and their own conviction that nothing important could be attempted unless the
British armies should be withdrawn from the United States; and
that, even in that event, the present plan was far too complex.
Men, however, recede slowly and reluctantly from favourite
and flattering projects on which they have long meditated; and
the committee, in their report, proceeded to state the opinion
that the posts held by the British in the United States would
probably be evacuated before the active part of the ensuing
campaign; and that, therefore, eventual measures for the expedition ought to be taken.
This report concludes with recommending "that the general
should be directed to write to the Marquis de Lafayette on that
subject; and also to write to the minister of these states at the
court of Versailles very fully, to the end that eventual measures
may be taken, in case an armament should be sent from France
to Quebec, for co-operating therewith, to the utmost degree,
which the finances and resources of these states will admit."
This report also was approved by congress, and transmitted to
the Commander-in-chief; who felt himself greatly embarrassed
by it. While his objections to the project retained all their
force, he found himself required to open a correspondence for
the purposes of soliciting the concurrence of France in an expedition he disapproved, and of promising a co-operation he
believed to be impracticable. In reply to this communication,
he said, "The earnest desire I have strictly to comply in every
instance, with the views and instructions of congress, can not
but make me feel the greatest uneasiness, when I find myself in
circumstances of hesitation or doubt, with respect to their directions. But the perfect confidence I have in the justice and
candour of that honourable body, emboldens me to communicate, without reserve, the difficulties which occur in the execution of their present order; and the indulgence I have experienced on every former occasion, induces me to imagine that
the liberty I now take will not meet with disapprobation."
After reviewing the report of the committee, and stating his
objections to the plan, and the difficulties he felt in performing
the duty assigned to him, he added, "But if congress still think

GEORGE WASHINGTON

337

it necessary for me to proceed in the business, I must request
their more definitive and explicit instructions, and that they will
permit me, previous to transmitting the intended despatches, to
submit them to their determination.
"I could wish to lay before congress more minutely the state
of the army, the condition of our supplies, and the requisites
necessary for carrying into execution an undertaking that may
involve the most serious events. If congress thinks this can be
done more satisfactorily in a personal conference, I hope to have
the army in such a situation before I can receive their answer, as
to afford me an opportunity of giving my attendance."
Congress acceded to his request of a personal interview; and,
on his arrival in Philadelphia, a committee was appointed to confer with him, as well on this particular subject as on the general
state of the army and of the country.
The result of these conferences was, that the expedition
against Canada was entirely, though reluctantly,' given up, and
every arrangement recommended by the Commander-in-chief,
received the attention to which his judgment and experience
gave all his opinions the fairest claim.
1 See note No. XV at the end of the volume.

338

THE LIFE OF

CHAPTER XV
AFTER the relinquishment of that extensive plan of conquest
which had been meditated against Canada, no other
779. object seemed to call forth the energies of the nation,
and a general languor appeared to diffuse itself through all the
civil departments. The alliance with France was believed to
secure independence; and a confidence that Britain could no
longer prosecute the war with any hope of success-a confidence
encouraged by communications from Europe-prevented those
exertions which were practicable, but which it was painful to
make. This temper was seen and deplored by the Commanderin-chief, who incessantly combated the opinion that Britain was
about to relinquish the contest, and insisted that great and
vigorous exertions on the part of the United States was still
necessary to bring the war to a successful termination.
It being no longer practicable to engage soldiers by voluntary enlistment, and government not daring to force men into
the service for three years, or during the war, the vacant ranks
were scantily supplied with drafts for nine, twelve, and eighteen
months. A great proportion of the troops were discharged in
the course of each year; and, except that the old officers remained, almost a new army was to be formed for every campaign.
Although the Commander-in-chief pressed congress and the
state governments continually and urgently, to take timely
measures for supplying the places of those who were leaving the
service, the means adopted were so slow and ineffectual in their
operation, that the season for action never found the preparations completed; and the necessity of struggling against superior
numbers was perpetual.
The pleasing delusion that the war was over, to which the
public mind delighted to surrender itself, made no impression on
the judgment of Washington. Viewing objects through a more
correct medium, he perceived that Great Britain had yet much

GEORGE WASHINGTON

339

to hope, and America much to fear from a continuance of
hostilities. He feared that the impression which the divisions,
and apparent inertness of the United States, had made on the
British commissioners, would be communicated to their government; and this consideration increased his anxiety in favour of
early and vigorous preparations for the next campaign. Yet it
was not until the 23d of January that congress passed the resolution, authorizing the Commander-in-chief to re-enlist the army,
nor, until the 9th of March that the requisition was made on the
several states for their quotas. The bounty offered by the first
resolution being found insufficient, the government was again
under the necessity of resorting to the states. Thus, at a season
when the men ought to have been in camp, the measures for
raising them were still to be adopted.
About this period, several circumstances conspired to foment
those pernicious divisions and factions in congress, which, in
times of greater apparent danger, patriotism would have suppressed.
The ministers of the United States, in Europe, had reciprocally
criminated each other, and some of them had been recalled.
Their friends in congress supported their respective interests
with considerable animation; and, at length, Mr. Deane published a manifesto, in which he arraigned at the bar of the
public, the conduct not only of those concerned in foreign
negotiations, but of the members of Congress themselves.
The irritation excited by these and other contests, was not a
little increased by the appearance, in a New York paper, of an
extract from a letter written by Mr. Laurens, the president of
congress, to Governor Huiston, of Georgia, which, during the
invasion of that state, was found among his papers. In this
letter, Mr. Laurens had unbosomed himself with the unsuspecting confidence of a person communicating to a friend the inmost operations of his mind. In a gloomy moment, he had
expressed himself with a degree of severity, which even his own
opinion, when not under the immediate influence of chagrin,
would not entirely justify, and had reflected on the integrity
and patriotism of members, without particularising the individuals he deigned to censure.
These altercations added much to the alarm with which Gen

34o

THE LIFE OF

eral Washington viewed that security which had insinuated itself
into the public mind; and his endeavours were unremitting to
impress the same apprehensions on those who were supposed
capable of removing the delusion. In his confidential letters to
gentlemen of the most influence in the several states, he represented in strong terms the dangers which yet threatened the
country, and earnestly exhorted them to a continuance of those
sacrifices and exertions which he still deemed essential to the
happy termination of the war. The dissensions in congress; the
removal of individuals of the highest influence and character
from the councils of the nation to offices in the respective states;
the depreciation of the currency; the destructive spirit of speculation which the imaginary gain produced by this depreciation
had diffused throughout the union; a general laxity of principles; and an unwillingness to encounter personal inconvenience
for the attainment of the great object, in pursuit of which so
much blood and treasure had been expended; were the rocks on
which, he apprehended, the state vessel might yet split, and to
which he endeavoured, incessantly, to point the attention of
those whose weight of political character enabled them to guide
the helm.
"I am particularly desirous of a free communication of sentiments with you at this time," says the General in a letter written
to a gentleman of splendid political talents, "because I view
things very differently, I fear from what people in general do,
who seem to think the contest at an end, and that to make
money, and get places, are the only things now remaining to be
done. I have seen without despondency, even for a moment,
the hours which America has styled her gloomy ones; but I have
beheld no day since the commencement of hostilities, when I
have thought her liberties in such imminent danger as at present. Friends and foes seem now to combine to pull down the
goodly fabric we have hitherto been raising at the expense of so
much time, blood, and treasure."
After censuring with some freedom the prevailing opinions of
the day, he added, "To me it appears no unjust simile to compare
the affairs of this great continent to the mechanism of a clock,
each state representing some one or other of the smaller parts of
it, which they are endeavouring to put in fine order, without

GEORGE WASHINGTON

34I

considering how useless and unavailing their labour is, unless the
great wheel, or spring, which is to set the whole in motion, is
also well attended to, and kept in good order. I allude to no
particular state, nor do I mean to cast reflections upon any one
of them, nor ought I, it may be said, to do so on their representatives; but, as it is a fact too notorious to be concealed, that congress is rent by party; that much business of a trifling nature and
personal concernment, withdraws their attention from matters
of great national moment at this critical period; when it is also
known that idleness and dissipation take place of close attention
and application, no man who wishes well to the liberties of this
country, and desires to see its rights established, can avoid crying out-where are our men of abilities? Why do they not
come forth to save their country? Let this voice, my dear sir,
call upon you, Jefferson, and others. Do not, from a mistaken
opinion that we are to sit down under our vine and our own figtree, let our hitherto noble struggle end in ignominy. Believe
me when I tell you there is danger of it. I have pretty good
reasons for thinking that administration, a little while ago, had
resolved to give the matter up, and negotiate a peace with us
upon almost any terms; but I shall be much mistaken if they do
not now, from the present state of our currency, dissensions, and
other circumstances, push matters to the utmost extremity.
Nothing I am sure will prevent it but the intervention of Spain,
and their disappointed hope from Russia."
The circumstances in the situation and temper of America,
which made so deep an impression on the Commander-in-chief,
operated with equal force on the British commissioners, and induced them to think that, by continuing the war, more favourable terms than were now demanded might be obtained. They
seem to have taken up the opinion that the mass of the people,
fatigued and worn out by the complicated calamities of the
struggle, sincerely desired an accommodation on the terms proposed by Great Britain; and that the increasing difficulties resulting from the failure of public credit, would induce them to
desert congress, or compel that body to accede to those terms.
These opinions, when communicated to the government, most
probably contributed to protract the war.
The narrative of military transactions will now be resumed.

342

THE LIFE OF

The British arms had heretofore been chiefly directed against
the northern and middle states. The strongest parts of the
American continent were pressed by their whole force; and,
with the exception of the attempt on Sullivan's island in I776
no serious design had yet been manifested to make an impression
in the south. Entertaining the most confident hopes of recovering all the colonies, the British government had not prosecuted
the war with a view to partial conquest. But the loss of the
army commanded by Burgoyne, the alliance of America with
France, and the unexpected obstinacy with which the contest
was maintained, had diminished their confidence; and, when the
pacific propositions made in 1778 were rejected, the resolution
seems to have been taken to change, materially, the object of
their military operations; and, maintaining possession of the
islands of New York, to direct their arms against the southern
states, on which, it was believed, a considerable impression
might be made.
It was not unreasonable to suppose that the influence of this
impression might extend northward; but, however this might
be, the actual conquest and possession of several states would,
when negotiations for a general peace should take place, give a
complexion to those negotiations, and afford plausible ground
for insisting to retain territory already acquired. The most
active and interesting operations therefore of the succeeding
campaigns, were in the southern states.
Lieutenant Colonel Campbell, who sailed from the Hook
about the last of November I778 escorted by a small squadron
commanded by Commodore Hyde Parker, reached the isle of
Tybee, near the Savannah, on the 23d of December; and, in a
few days, the fleet and the transports passed the bar, and
anchored in the river.
The command of the southern army, composed of the troops
of South Carolina and Georgia, had been committed to Major
General Robert Howe, who, in the course of the preceding summer, had invaded East Florida.' The diseases incident to the
climate, made such ravages among his raw soldiers, that, though
he had scarcely seen an enemy, he found himself compelled to
So early as January 1776, congress had recommended the reduction of St. Augus.
tine to the southern colonies.-Secret Journals of Congress, page 38.

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GEORGE WASHINGTON

343

hasten out of the country with considerable loss. After this
disastrous enterprise, his army, consisting of between six and
seven hundred continental troops, aided by a few hundred
militia, had encamped in the neighbourhood of the town of
Savannah, situated on the southern bank of the river bearing
that name. The country about the mouth of the river is one
tract of deep marsh, intersected by creeks and cuts of water,
impassable for troops at any time of the tide, except over causeways extending through the sunken ground.
Without much opposition, Lieutenant Colonel Campbell effected a landing on the z9th, about three miles below the town;
upon which Howe formed his line of battle. His left was
secured by the river; and along the whole extent of his front
was a morass which stretched to his right, and was believed by
him to be impassable for such a distance, as effectually to secure
that wing.
After reconnoitring the country, Colonel Campbell advanced
on the great road leading to Savannah; and, about three in the
afternoon, appeared in sight of the American army. While
making dispositions to dislodge it, he accidentally fell in with a
negro, who informed him of a private path leading through the
swamp, round the right of the American lines to their rear.
Determining to avail himself of this path, he detached a column
under Sir James Baird, which entered the morass unperceived by
Howe.
As soon as Sir James emerged from the swamp, he attacked
and dispersed a body of Georgia militia, which gave the first
notice to the American general of the danger which threatened
his rear. At the same instant, the British troops in his front
were put in motion, and their artillery began to play upon him.
A retreat was immediately ordered, and the continental troops
were under the necessity of running across a plain, in front of
the corps which had been led into their rear by Sir James Baird,
who attacked their flanks with great impetuosity, and considerable effect. The few who escaped, retreated up the Savannah,
and, crossing that river at Zubly's ferry, took refuge in South
Carolina.
The victory was complete, and decisive in its consequences.
About one hundred Americans were either killed in the field, or

344

THE LIFE OF

drowned in attempting to escape through a deep swamp.
Thirty-eight officers, and four hundred and fifteen privates,
were taken. Forty-eight pieces of cannon, twenty-three mortars, the fort with all its military-stores, a large quantity of
provisions collected for the use of the army, and the capital of
Georgia, fell into the hands of the conqueror. These advantages
were obtained at the expense of only seven killed, and nineteen
wounded.
No military force now remained in Georgia, except the garrison of Sunbury, whose retreat to South Carolina was cut off.
All the lower part of that state was occupied by the British,
who adopted measures to secure the conquest they had made.
The inhabitants were treated with a lenity as wise as it was
humane. Their property was spared, and their persons protected. To make the best use of victory, and of the impression
produced by the moderation of the victors, a proclamation was
issued, inviting the inhabitants to repair to the British standard,
and offering protection to those who would return to their
allegiance.
The effect of these measures did not disappoint those who
adopted them. The inhabitants flocked in great numbers to the
royal standard; military corps for the protection of the country
were formed; and posts were established for a considerable distance up the river.
The northern frontier of Georgia being supposed to be settled
into a state of quiet, Colonel Campbell turned his attention
towards Sunbury, and was about to proceed against that place,
when he received intelligence that it had surrendered to General
Prevost.
Sir Henry Clinton had ordered that officer to co-operate from
East Florida, with Colonel Campbell. On hearing that the
Jan. 9. troops from the north were off the coast, he entered
the southern frontier of Georgia, and invested Sunbury, which, after a slight resistance, surrendered at discretion.
Having placed a garrison in the fort, he proceeded to Savannah,
took command of the army, and detached Colonel Campbell
with eight hundred regulars and a few provincials to Augusta,
which fell without resistance, and thus the whole state of
Georgia was reduced.

GEORGE WASHINGTON

345

While the expedition conducted by Lieutenant Colonel Campbell was preparing at New York, congress was meditating the
conquest of East Florida.
The delegates of South Carolina and Georgia, anxious that a
general of more experience than Howe should command in the
southern department, had earnestly pressed that he should be
recalled, and that General Lincoln, whose military reputation
was high, should be appointed to succeed him. In compliance
with their solicitations, Howe was ordered in September, 1778,
to repair to the head quarters of General Washington, and Lincoln was directed to proceed immediately to Charleston, in
South Carolina, in order to take command in the southern
department. In pursuance of this resolution, General Lincoln
repaired to Charleston, where he found the military affairs of
the country in a state of utter derangement. Congress had
established no continental military chest in the southern department. This omission produced a dependence on the government
of the state for supplies to move the army on any emergency,
and consequent subjection of the troops in continental service
to its control. The militia, though taken into continental service, considered themselves as subject only to the military code
of the state. These regulations threatened to embarrass all
military operations, and to embroil the general with the civil
government.
While Lincoln was labouring to make arrangements for the
ensuing campaign, he received intelligence of the appearance of
the enemy off the coast. The militia of North Carolina, amounting to two thousand men, commanded by Generals Ash and
Rutherford, had already reached Charleston; but were unarmed,
and congress had been unable to provide magazines in this part
of the union. These troops were, therefore, entirely dependent
on South Carolina for every military equipment; and arms
were not delivered to them until it was too late to save the capital of Georgia.
So soon as it was ascertained that the British fleet had entered
the Savannah river, General Lincoln proceeded with the utmost
expedition towards the scene of action. On his march, he
received intelligence of the victory gained over General Howe;

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and was soon afterwards joined by the remnant of the defeated
army at Purysburg, a small town on the north side
Jan. 3. of the Savannah, where he established his head
quarters.
The regular force commanded by General Prevost must have
amounted to at least three thousand effective men;
and this number was increased by irregulars who had
joined him in Georgia. The American army rather exceeded
three thousand six hundred men, of whom not quite two thousand five hundred were effective. Something more than one
thousand were continental troops, part of whom were new
levies; the rest were militia.
The theatre of action was so well adapted to defensive war,
that, although General Prevost was decidedly superior to his
adversary, it was difficult to extend his conquests into South
Carolina. With the view of entering that state by the way of
the sea coast, he detached Major Gardner with about two hundred men, to take possession of the island of Port Royal. That
officer, soon after reaching his place of destination, was attacked
by General Moultrie, and compelled to retreat with considerable
loss. This repulse checked the designs of Prevost on South
Carolina.
From the commencement of the war, a considerable proportion of the western inhabitants of the three southern states had
been attached to the royal cause. The first successes of the British
were soon communicated to them, and they were invited to
assemble and join the king's standard at Augusta. About seven
hundred embodied themselves on the frontiers of South Carolina, and began their march to that place. They were overtaken by Colonel Pickens at the head of the neighbouring
militia, near Kittle Creek, and defeated with considerable loss.
Colonel Boyd, their leader, was among the slain; and several of
those who escaped were apprehended, tried, and five of them
executed as traitors. About three hundred reached the British
out-posts, and joined the royal standard. This defeat broke the
spirits of the tories for a time; and preserved quiet in the west.
As the American army gained strength by reinforcements of
militia, General Lincoln began to contemplate offensive operations. A detachment had been stationed nearly opposite to

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347

Augusta under General Ash, and he purposed joining that officer
so soon as a sufficient force could be collected, and attempting
to recover the upper parts of Georgia. Before he was able to
execute this plan, General Prevost withdrew his troops from
Augusta to Hudson's Ferry. Ash was then ordered to cross the
Savannah, and take post near the confluence of Briar Creek with
that river. This camp was thought unassailable. Its left was
covered by a deep swamp, and by the Savannah. The front was
secured by Briar Creek, which is unfordable several miles, and
makes an acute angle with the river.
Having determined to dislodge the Americans from this position, Prevost kept up the attention of General Lincoln by the
semblance of a design to cross the Savannah; and, at the same
time amused General Ash with a feint on his front, while Lieutenant Colonel Prevost made a circuit of about fifty
miles, and, crossing Briar Creek fifteen miles above March 3.
the ground occupied by Ash, came down, unperceived and
unsuspected, on his rear. Ash, unused to the stratagems of war,
was so completely engaged by the manceuvres in his front, that
Lieutenant Colonel Prevost was almost in his camp before any
intelligence of his approach was received. The continental
troops under General Elbert were drawn out to oppose him, and
commenced the action with great gallantry; but most of the
militia threw away their arms and fled in confusion. As they
precipitated themselves into the swamp and swam the river not
many of them were taken. General Elbert and his small band
of continental troops, aided by one regiment of North Carolina
militia, were soon overpowered by numbers, and the survivors
were compelled to surrender themselves prisoners of war. The
killed, and taken amounted to between three and four hundred
men. General Elbert and Colonel M'Intosh were among the
latter. But the loss sustained by the American army was much
more considerable. The dispersed militia returned to their
homes; and not more than four hundred and fifty of them
could be reassembled.
This victory was supposed to give the British such complete
possession of Georgia, that a proclamation was issued the succeeding day by General Prevost, establishing civil government, and
appointing executive and judicial officers to administer it.

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These disasters, instead of terrifying South Carolina into submission, animated that state to greater exertions. Mr. John
Rutledge, a gentleman of great talents and decision, was elected
governor; and the legislature passed an act empowering him and
the council to do every thing that appeared to him and them
necessary for the public good. All the energies of the state were
drawn forth. The militia were called out in great numbers, and
the laws for their government were rendered more severe.'
Thus reinforced, General Lincoln resumed his plan for reApril 23 covering the upper parts of Georgia; and marched
the main body of his army up the Savannah.
This river was now swelled greatly beyond its usual limits;
and the swamps, marshes, and creeks which intersect the country
being full seemed to present an almost impassable barrier to an
invading army. A small military force being deemed sufficient
to arrest the progress of an enemy through a route which, if at all
practicable, was so difficult, about eight hundred of the state
militia, aided by two hundred continental troops, were left with
General Moultrie for the defence of the country.
Aware of the importance of this movement, and hoping to recall Lincoln by alarming him for the safety of Charleston, GenApril z8. eral Prevost suddenly crossed the Savannah with three
thousand men; and, advancing rapidly on General
Moultrie, obliged him to retreat with precipitation. The militia
could not be prevailed on to defend the passes with any degree
of firmness; and Moultrie, instead of drawing aid from the
surrounding country, sustained an alarming diminution of numbers by desertion.
On the passage of the river by Prevost, an express had been
despatched to Lincoln with the intelligence. Persuaded that the
British general could meditate no serious attempt on Charleston,
and that the real object was to induce him to abandon the
enterprise in which he was engaged, he detached a reinforcement
of three hundred light troops to aid Moultrie, and crossing the
Savannah himself, continued his march down the south side of
that river towards the capital of Georgia.
Though the original purpose of General Prevost had been
1 Ramsay.

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349

limited to the security of Georgia, the opposition he encountered
was so much less than he had expected; the temper of the country
was so apparent; the assurances of those who flocked to his
standard; of the general disposition of the people to terminate
the calamities of war by submission, were so often and so confidently repeated, that he was emboldened to extend his views,
and to hazard the continuation of his march to Charleston.
On receiving intelligence of this threatening aspect of affairs
in South Carolina, Lincoln recrossed the Savannah, and hastened
to the relief of that state.
The situation of Charleston was extremely critical. The inhabitants, entirely unapprehensive of an attack by land, had
directed their whole attention to its protection against an invasion by sea. Had Prevost continued his march with the rapidity
with which it was commenced, the place must have fallen. But,
after having gained more than half the distance, he halted,
and consumed two or three days in deliberating on his future
measures. While his intelligence determined him to proceed,
and assured him of a state of things which rendered success
almost certain, that state of things was rapidly changing. Fortifications on the land side were commenced and prosecuted with
unremitting labour, the neighbouring militia were drawn into
the town; the reinforcements detached by General Lincoln, and
the remnant of the legion of Pulaski arrived; and the governor
also entered the city, at the head of some troops which had been
stationed at Orangeburg.
The next morning Prevost crossed Ashly river, and encamped
just without cannon shot of the works. The town
was summoned to surrender, and the day was spent y
in sending and receiving flags. The neutrality of South Carolina during the war, leaving the question whether that state
should finally belong to Great Britain or the United States, to
be settled in the treaty of peace, was proposed by the garrison,
and rejected by Prevost; who required that they should surrender themselves prisoners of war. This proposition being also
rejected, the garrison prepared to sustain an assault. But an
attempt to carry the works by storm was too hazardous to be
made; and Prevost came to the prudent resolution of decamping that night, and recrossing Ashly river.

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The British army passed into the island of St. James, and
thence to that of St. John's, which lies south of Charleston
harbour; soon after which General Lincoln encamped in the
neighbourhood, so as to confine them in a great degree to the
island they occupied. This island is separated from the main
land by an inlet, to which the name of Stono river has been
given; and the communication is preserved by a ferry. A British
post was established upon the main land at this ferry, and
works were thrown up in front for its defence. When Prevost
commenced his retreat, and the troops were moving from island
to island, the occasion seemed a fair one for attacking it. Only
eight hundred men, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Maitland, defended it; but a large corps still lay on the island. To
prevent these troops from supporting those on the main land
General Moultrie, who commanded in Charleston, was ordered
to pass over a body of militia into James's island, who should
amuse the enemy in St. John's, while a real attack should be
made on the post at the ferry. About seven in the
morning, General Lincoln commenced this attack
with about one thousand men; and continued it with great
spirit, until he perceived that strong reinforcements were crossing over from the island; when he called off his troops, and
retreated, unmolested, to his old ground.
General Moultrie had been unable to execute that part of the
plan which devolved on him. Boats were not in readiness to
convey the men into James's island, and consequently the feint
on St. John's was not made.
The loss of the Americans, in killed and wounded, amounted
to twenty-four officers, and one hundred and twenty-five privates. That of the British was stated to be rather less.
Three days after this action, the posts at Stono and St. John's
were evacuated. The heat now became too excessive for active
service; and the British army, after establishing a post on the
island contiguous to Port Royal and St. Helena, retired into
Georgia and St. Augustine.
The American militia dispersed, leaving General Lincoln at
the head of about eight hundred men; with whom he retired to
Sheldon, where his primary object was to prepare for the next
campaign, which it was supposed would open in October.

GEORGE WASHINGTON

3 Is I

The invasion of the southern states wore so serious an aspect,
that Bland's regiment of cavalry, and the remnant of that lately
Baylor's, now commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Washington,
with the new levies of Virginia, were ordered to repair to
Charleston, and to place themselves under the command of General Lincoln. The execution of these orders was for a time suspended by the invasion of Virginia.
An expedition against that state had been concerted in the
spring between Sir Henry Clinton and Sir George Collier, the
Commander-in-chief of the British naval force on the American
station. The land troops assigned to this service were commanded by General Matthews. The transports, on board of
which they embarked, were convoyed by the Admiral in person.
On the 9th of May the fleet entered the Chesapeake, and the
next day anchored in Hampton Roads.
Virginia had raised a regiment of artillery for the performance of garrison duty in the state, which had been distributed
along the eastern frontier; and slight fortifications had been constructed in the most important situations, which were defensible
on the side of the water, but were not tenable against a military
force strong enough to act on land. Fort Nelson, on the west
side of Elizabeth river, garrisoned by about one hundred and
fifty soldiers, commanded by Major Matthews, was designed to
protect the towns of Norfolk and Portsmouth, which were on
each side of the river lust above it; and the town of Gosport,
which lies still higher up on a point of land intervening between
two branches of the river. Norfolk and Portsmouth were places
of the most considerable commerce in Virginia. Large supplies
for the army were deposited in them; and the state government
had established at Gosport a marine yard, where ships of war
and other vessels were building, for which naval stores were
collected to a very great amount. The destruction of these
vessels and stores constituted the principal object of General
Matthews.
On the morning of the tenth, the fleet entered Elizabeth river,
and the troops were landed about three miles below the fort,
without opposition. Foreseeing that the works would be attacked the next morning on the land side, the garrison evacuated
the fort in the night, and took refuge in a deep and extensive

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swamp, called the Dismal, which could not be penetrated without difficulty, even by single persons.
The whole sea-board, on the south side of James's river, being
now in possession of General Matthews, he fixed his head quarters at Portsmouth, whence small parties were detached to
Norfolk, Gosport, Kemps' landing, and Suffolk, where military
and naval stores to a great amount, and several vessels richly
laden, fell into his hands.
This invasion was of short duration. General Matthews, after
destroying the magazines which had been collected in the small
towns near the coast, and the vessels in the rivers, was ordered
by Sir Henry Clinton to return to New York, where he arrived
towards the last of May.
The Admiral and General were both so impressed with the
importance of Portsmouth as a permanent station, that they
united in representing to the Commander-in-chief the advantages to be derived from keeping possession of it. But, in the
opinion of Sir Henry Clinton, the army did not at that time
admit of so many subdivisions; and, with a view to more interesting objects, Portsmouth was evacuated.

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CHAPTER XVI
THE barbarities committed by the Indians, in the course of the
preceding year, on the inhabitants of the western
frontiers, had added motives of mingled resentment
and humanity to those of national interest, for employing a
larger force in the protection of that part of the union than had
heretofore been devoted to it.
General Washington had always believed that it was impossible to defend the immense western frontier by any chain of
posts which could be established; and that the country would
be protected much more certainly by offensive than by defensive
war. His plan was to penetrate into the heart of the Indian
settlements with a force competent to the destruction of their
towns; and also to reduce the British post at Niagara, which
gave its possessors an almost irresistible influence over the six
nations. This plan constituted one of the various subjects of
conference with the committee of congress in Philadelphia, and
received the entire approbation of that body.
The state governments also took a strong interest in the protection of their western settlements. Connecticut, New York,
and Pennsylvania, applied, severally, to congress, urging the
adoption of such vigorous measures as would secure the frontiers
against a repetition of the horrors which had been already perpetrated. These papers were referred to the committee which
had been appointed to confer with General Washington, in conformity with whose report it was resolved, "that the Commanderin-chief be directed to take efficient measures for the protection
of the inhabitants, and chastisement of the savages."
The Six Nations had made some advances towards acquiring
the comforts of civilized life. Several comfortable houses were
to be seen in their populous villages; and their fertile fields and
orchards yielded an abundant supply of corn and fruit. Some
few of their towns were attached to the United States; but, in
general, they were under the influence of the British. Many of

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the loyalists had taken refuge among them, and had added to
their strength without diminishing their ferocity. It was determined to lead a force into these villages, sufficient to overpower any numbers they could possibly bring into the field, and
to destroy the settlements they had made. To guard against
reinforcements from Canada, means were used to inspire that
colony with fears for itself.
As the army destined for this expedition was about to move,
alarming symptoms of discontent appeared in a part of it. The
Jersey brigade, which had been stationed during the winter at
Elizabethtown, was ordered early in May, to march by regiments. This order was answered by a letter from General
Maxwell, stating that the officers of the first regiment had delivered a remonstrance to their Colonel, addressed to the legislature of the state, declaring that, unless their complaints on the
subjects of pay and support should obtain the immediate attention of that body, they were, at the expiration of three days, to
be considered as having resigned; and requesting the legislature,
in that event, to appoint other officers to succeed them. They
declared, however, their readiness to make every preparation for
obeying the orders which had been given, and to continue their
attention to the regiment until a reasonable time should elapse
for the appointment of their successors. "This," added the
letter of General Maxwell, "is a step they are extremely unwilling to take, but it is such as I make no doubt they will all take;
nothing but necessity âtheir not being able to support themselves in time to come, and being loaded with debts contracted
in time past, could have induced them to resign at so critical a
juncture."
The intelligence conveyed in this letter made a serious impression on the Commander-in-chief. He was strongly attached to
the army and to its interests; had witnessed its virtue and its
sufferings; and lamented sincerely its present distresses. The
justice of the complaints made by the officers could no more be
denied, than the measure.they had adopted could be approved.
Relying on their patriotism and on his own influence, he immediately wrote a letter to General Maxwell, to be laid before
them, in which, mingling the sensibility of a friend with the
authority of a general, he addressed to their understanding and

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355

to their love of country, observations calculated to invite their
whole attention to the consequences which must result from the
step they were about to take.
"The patience and perseverance of the army," proceeds the
letter, "have been, under every disadvantage, such as to do them
the highest honour both at home and abroad, and have inspired
me with an unlimited confidence of their virtue, which has consoled me amidst every perplexity and reverse of fortune, to
which our affairs, in a struggle of this nature, were necessarily
exposed. Now that we have made so great a progress to the
attainment of the end we have in view, so that we can not fail
without a most shameful desertion of our own interests, any
thing like a change of conduct would imply a very unhappy
change of principles, and a forgetfulness, as well of what we owe
to ourselves, as to our country. Did I suppose it possible this
could be the case, even in a single regiment of the army, I should
be mortified and chagrined beyond expression. I should feel it
as a wound given to my own honour, which I consider as embarked with that of the army at large. But this I believe to be
impossible. Any corps that was about to set an example of the
kind, would weigh well the consequences, and no officer of common discernment and sensibility would hazard them. If they
should stand alone in it, independent of other consequences,
what would be their feelings on reflecting that they had held
themselves out to the world in a point of light inferior to the
rest of the army. Or if their example should be followed, and
become general, how could they console themselves for having
been the foremost in bringing ruin and disgrace upon their
country. They would remember that the army would share a
double portion of the general infamy and distress, and that the
character of an American officer would become as infamous as it
is now glorious.
"I confess the appearances in the present instance are disagreeable; but I am convinced they seem to mean more than they
really do. The Jersey officers have not been outdone by any
others in the qualities either of citizens or soldiers; and I am confident, no part of them would seriously intend any thing that
would be a stain on their former reputation. The gentlemen
can not be in earnest; they have only reasoned wrong about the

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means of obtaining a good end, and, on consideration, I hope
and flatter myself they will renounce what must appear to be
improper. At the opening of a campaign, when under marching
orders for an important service, their own honour, duty to the
public and to themselves, and a regard to military propriety, will
not suffer them to persist in a measure which would be a violation of them all. It will even wound their delicacy, coolly to
reflect that they have hazarded a step, which has an air of dictating terms to their country, by taking advantage of the necessity
of the moment.
"The declaration they have made to the state, at so critical a
time, that unless they obtain relief in the short period of three
days, they must be considered out of the service, has very much
that aspect; and the seeming relaxation of continuing until the
state can have a reasonable time to provide other officers, will
be thought only a superficial veil. I am now to request that
you will convey my sentiments to the gentlemen concerned, and
endeavour to make them sensible that they are in an error. The
service for which the regiment was intended will not admit of
delay. It must at all events march on Monday morning, in the
first place to camp, and farther directions will be given when it
arrives. I am sure I shall not be mistaken in expecting a prompt
and cheerful obedience."
The representations of this letter did not completely produce
the desired effect. The officers did not recede from their
claims. In an address to the Commander-in-chief, they expressed their unhappiness that any act of theirs should give him
pain, but proceeded to justify the step they had taken. Repeated memorials had been presented to their legislature, which
had been received with promises of attention, but had been
regularly neglected. "At length," said they, "we have lost all
confidence in our legislature. Reason and experience forbid
that we should have any. Few of us have private fortunes;
many have families who already are suffering every thing that
can be received from an ungrateful country. Are we then to
suffer all the inconveniences, fatigues, and dangers of a military
life, while our wives and our children are perishing for want of
common necessaries at home;-and that without the most distant prospect of reward, for our pay is now only nominal? We

GEORGE WASHINGTON

3 57

are sensible that your excellency can not wish nor desire this
from us.
"We are sorry that you should imagine we meant to disobey
orders. It was and still is our determination to march with our
regiment, and to do the duty of officers until the legislature
should have a reasonable time to appoint others, but no longer.
"We beg leave to assure your Excellency, that we have the
highest sense of your ability and virtues;-that executing your
orders has ever given us pleasure;-that we love the service, and
we love our country;-but when that country gets so lost to
virtue and justice as to forget to support its servants, it then
becomes their duty to retire from its service."
This letter was peculiarly embarrassing. To adopt a stern
course of proceeding might hazard the loss of the Jersey line, an
event not less injurious to the service, than painful to himself.
To take up the subject without doing too much for the circumstances of the army, would be doing too little for the occasion.
He therefore declined taking any other notice of the letter, than
to declare through General Maxwell that, while they continued
to do their duty in conformity with the determination they had
expressed, he should only regret the part they had taken, and
should hope they would perceive its impropriety.
The legislature of New Jersey, alarmed at the decisive step
taken by the officers, was at length induced to pay some attention to their situation; they consenting, on their part, to withdraw their remonstrance. In the meantime, they continued to
perform their duty; and their march was not delayed by this
unpleasant altercation.
In communicating this transaction to congress, General Washington took occasion to remind that body of his having frequently urged the absolute necessity of some general and adequate provision for the officers of the army. "I shall only
observe," continued the letter, "that the distresses in some corps
are so great, either where they were not until lately attached
to any particular state, or where the state has been less provident,
that the officers have solicited even to be supplied with the
clothing destined for the common soldiery, coarse and unsuitable
as it was. I had not power to comply with the request.
"The patience of men animated by a sense of duty and honour,

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will support them to a certain point, beyond which it will not
go. I doubt not congress will be sensible of the danger of an extreme in this respect, and will pardon my anxiety to obviate it."
Before the troops destined for the grand expedition were put
in motion, an enterprise of less extent was undertaken, which
was completely successful. A plan for surprising the towns of
the Onondagas, one of the nearest of the hostile tribes, having been formed by General Schuyler, and approved by the
Commander-in-chief, Colonel Van Schaick, assisted by Lieutenant Colonel Willet, and Major Cochran, marched from fort
Schuyler on the morning of the x9th of April, at the head of
between five and six hundred men; and, on the third day,
reached the point of destination. The whole settlement was
destroyed, after which the detachment returned to fort Schuyler
without the loss of a single man. For this handsome display of
talents as a partisan, the thanks of congress were voted to
Colonel Van Schaick, and the officers and soldiers under his
command.
The cruelties exercised by the Indians in the course of the
preceding year, had given a great degree of importance to the
expedition now meditated against them; and the relative military strength and situation of the two parties, rendered it
improbable that any other offensive operations could be carried
on by the Americans in the course of the present campaign.
The army under the command of Sir Henry Clinton, exclusive
of the troops in the southern department, was computed at
between sixteen and seventeen thousand men. The American
army, the largest division of which lay at Middlebrook, under
the immediate command of General Washington, was rather
inferior to that of the British in real strength. The grand total,
except those in the southern and western country, including
officers of every description, amounted to about sixteen thousand. Three thousand of these were in New England under the
command of General Gates; and the remaining thirteen thousand
were cantoned on both sides of the North River. The bare
statement of numbers, must show the incompetency of the
American army to the expulsion of the British from either New
York or Rhode Island. On their part, therefore, the plan of -the
campaign was, necessarily, defensive; and the hazards and diffi

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359

culties attending the execution of even a defensive plan were
considerable.
Independent of an extensive coast, at all places accessible to
the invading army, the Hudson, penetrating deep into the
country which was to be the theatre of action, gave great advantages in their military operations to those who commanded the
water.
After the destruction of forts Clinton and Montgomery in
1777, it had been determined to construct the fortifications intended for the future defence of the North River, at West
Point, a position which, being more completely embosomed in
the hills, was deemed more defensible. The works had been
prosecuted with unremitting industry, but were far from being
completed.
Some miles below West Point, about the termination of the
highlands, is King's ferry, where the great road, affording the
most convenient communication between the middle and eastern
states, crosses the North River. The ferry is completely commanded by the two opposite points of land. That on the west
side, a rough and elevated piece of ground, is denominated
Stony Point; and the other, on the east side, a flat neck of land
projecting far into the water, is called Verplank's Point. The
command of King's ferry was an object worth the attention of
either army; and Washington had comprehended the points
which protect it within his plan of defence for the highlands.
A small but strong work, termed fort Fayette, was completed
at Verplank's, and was garrisoned by a company commanded by
Captain Armstrong. The works on Stony Point were unfinished. As the season for active operations approached, Sir
Henry Clinton formed a plan for opening the campaign with
a brilliant coup de main up the North River; and, towards the
latter end of May, made preparations for the enterprise.
These preparations were immediately communicated to General Washington, who was confident that the British general
meditated an attack on the forts in the highlands, or designed
to take a position between those forts and Middlebrook, in
order to interrupt the communication between the different
parts of the American army, to prevent their reunion, and to
beat them in detail. Measures were instantly taken to counter

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act either of these designs. The intelligence from New York
was communicated to Generals Putnam and McDougal, who
were ordered to hold themselves in readiness to march; and, on
the i9th of May, the army moved by divisions from Middlebrook towards the highlands. On the 3oth, the British army,
commanded by Sir Henry Clinton in person, and convoyed by
Sir George Collier, proceeded up the river; and General
Vaughan, at the head of the largest division, landed next morning, about eight miles below Verplank's. The other division,
under the particular command of General Patterson, but accompanied by Sir Henry Clinton, advancing farther up, landed on
the west side within three miles of Stony Point.
That place being immediately abandoned, General Patterson
took possession of it on the same afternoon. He dragged some
heavy cannon and mortars to the summit of the hill
in the course of the night; and, at five next morning, opened a battery on fort Fayette, at the distance of about
one thousand yards. During the following night, two galleys
passed the fort, and, anchoring above it, prevented the escape
of the garrison by water; while General Vaughan invested it
closely by land. No means of defending the fort, or of saving
themselves remaining, the garrison became prisoners of war.
Immediate directions were given for completing the works at
both posts, and for putting Stony Point, in particular, in a
strong state of defence.
It is scarcely supposable that the views of Sir Henry Clinton
in moving up the river, were limited to this single acquisition.
The means employed were so disproportioned to the object, as
to justify a belief that he contemplated farther and more important conquests. Whatever may have been his plans, the
measures of precaution taken by Washington counteracted their
execution; and before Clinton was in a situation to proceed
against West Point, General M'Dougal was so strengthened, and
the American army took such a position on the strong grounds
about the Hudson, that the enterprise became too hazardous to
be farther prosecuted.
After completing the fortifications on both sides the river, at
King's ferry, Sir Henry Clinton placed a strong garrison in each
fort, and proceeded down the river to Philipsburg. The relative

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36i

situation of the hostile armies presenting insuperable obstacles
to any grand operation, they could be employed offensively only
on detached expeditions. Connecticut, from its contiguity to
New York, and its extent of sea coast, was peculiarly exposed to
invasion. The numerous small cruizers which plied in the
Sound, to the great annoyance of British commerce, and the
large supplies of provisions drawn from the adjacent country,
for the use of the continental army, furnished great inducements to Sir Henry Clinton to direct his enterprises particularly
against that state. He also hoped to draw General Washington
from his impregnable position on the North River into the low
country, and thus obtain an opportunity of striking at some
part of his army, or of seizing the posts, which were the great
object of the campaign. With these views, he planned an expedition against Connecticut, the command of which was given
to Governor Tryon, who reached New Haven bay on the 5th of
July, with about two thousand six hundred men.
General Washington was at the time on the lines, examining
in person the condition of the works on Stony and Verplank's
Points; in consequence of which, the intelligence which was
transmitted to head quarters that the fleet had sailed, could not
be immediately communicated to the governor of Connecticut,
and the first intimation which that state received of its danger,
was given by the appearance of the enemy. The militia assembled in considerable numbers with alacrity; but the British
effected a landing, and took possession of the town. After destroying the military and naval stores found in the place, they
re-embarked, and proceeded westward to Fairfield, which was
reduced to ashes. The good countenance shown by the
militia at this place is attested by the apology made by General Tryon for the wanton destruction of private property,
which disgraced his conduct. "The village was burnt," he says,
"to resent the fire of the rebels from their houses, and to mask
our retreat."
From Fairfield the fleet crossed the Sound to Huntingdon bay,
where it remained until the eleventh, when it recrossed that
water, after which the troops were landed in the night on the
cow pasture, a peninsula on the east side of the bay of Norwalk.
About the same time, a much larger detachment from the British

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army directed its course towards Horse Neck, and made demonstrations of a design to penetrate into the country in that
direction.
On the first intelligence that Connecticut was invaded, General Parsons, a native of that state, had been directed by General
Washington to hasten to the scene of action. Placing himself at the head of about one hundred and fifty continental
troops, who were supported by considerable bodies of militia, he
attacked the British in the morning of the twelfth, as soon as
they were in motion, and kept up an irregular distant fire
throughout the day. But being too weak to prevent the destruction of any particular town on the coast, Norwalk was
reduced to ashes; after which the British re-embarked, and returned to Huntington bay, there to wait for reinforcements. At
this place, however, Tryon received orders to return to the
White Stone; where, in a conference between Sir Henry Clinton
and Sir George Collier, it was determined to proceed against
New London with an increased force.
On the invasion of Connecticut, the Commander-in-chief was
prompt in his exertions to send continental troops from the
nearest encampments to its aid; but, before they could afford
any real service, Sir Henry Clinton found it necessary to recall
Tryon to the Hudson.
General Washington had planned an enterprise against the
posts at King's ferry, comprehending a double attack, to be
made at the same time, on both. But the difficulty of a perfect
co-operation of detachments, incapable of communicating with
each other, determined him to postpone the attack on Verplank's, and to make that part of the plan dependent on the
success of the first. His whole attention therefore was turned
to Stony Point; and the troops destined for this critical service,
proceeded on it as against a single object.
The execution of the plan was entrusted to General Wayne,
who commanded the light infantry of the army. Secrecy was
deemed so much more essential to success than numbers, that no
addition was made to the force already on the lines. One brigade
was ordered to commence its march, so as to reach the scene of
action in time to cover the troops engaged in the attack, should
any unlooked for disaster befall them; and Major Lee of the

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light dragoons, who had been eminently useful in obtaining the
intelligence which led to the enterprise, was associated with
General Wayne, as far as cavalry could be employed in such a
service. The night of the fifteenth, and the hour of twelve,
were chosen for the assault.
Stony Point is a commanding hill, projecting far into the
Hudson, which washes three-fourths of its base. The remaining
fourth is, in a great measure, covered by a deep marsh, commencing near the river on the upper side, and continuing into
it below. Over this marsh there is only one crossing place; but
at its junction with the river, is a sandy beach, passable at low
tide. On the summit of this hill stood the fort, which was furnished with heavy ordnance. Several breast-works and strong
batteries were advanced in front of the main work; and, about
half way down the hill, were two rows of abattis. The batteries
were calculated to command the beach and the crossing place of
the marsh, and to rake and enfilade any column which might be
advancing from either of those points towards the fort. In
addition to these defences, several vessels of war were stationed
in the river, and commanded the ground at the foot of the hill.
The garrison consisted of about six hundred men, commanded
by Colonel Johnson.
General Wayne arrived about eight in the afternoon at Spring
Steel's, one and a half miles from the fort; and made his dispositions for the assault.
It was intended to attack the works on the right and left
flanks at the same instant. The regiments of Febiger and of
Meigs, with Major Hull's detachment, formed the right column;
and Butler's regiment, with two companies under Major Murfree, formed the left. One hundred and fifty volunteers, led
by Lieutenant Colonel Fleury and Major Posey, constituted the
van of the right; and one hundred volunteers under Major
Stewart, composed the van of the left. At half past eleven the
two columns moved to the assault, the van of each with unloaded muskets, and fixed bayonets. They were each preceded
by a forlorn hope of twenty men, the one commanded by
Lieutenant Gibbon, and the other by Lieutenant Knox. They
reached the marsh undiscovered; and, at twenty minutes after
twelve, commenced the assault.

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Both columns rushed forward under a tremendous fire. Surmounting every obstacle, they entered the works at the point of
the bayonet; and, without discharging a single musket, obtained
possession of the fort.
The humanity displayed by the conquerors was not less conspicuous, nor less honourable than their courage. Not an individual suffered after resistance had ceased.
All the troops engaged in this perilous service manifested a
degree of ardour and impetuosity, which proved them to be
capable of the most difficult enterprises; and all distinguished
themselves, whose situation enabled them to do so. Colonel
Fleury was the first to enter the fort and strike the British
standard. Major Posey mounted the works almost at the same
instant, and was the first to give the watch word-"The fort's
our own."-Lieutenants Gibbon and Knox performed the service allotted to them with a degree of intrepidity which could
not be surpassed. Of twenty men who constituted the party of
the former, seventeen were killed or wounded.
Sixty-three of the garrison were killed, including two officers.
The prisoners amounted to five hundred and forty-three, among
whom were one lieutenant colonel, four captains, and twenty
subaltern officers. The military stores taken in the fort were
considerable.'
The loss sustained by the assailants was not proportioned to
the apparent danger of the enterprise. The killed and wounded
did not exceed one hundred men; General Wayne, who marched
with Febiger's regiment in the right column, received a slight
wound in the head which stunned him for a time, but did not
compel him to leave the column. Being supported by his aids,
he entered the fort with the regiment. Lieutenant Colonel Hay
was also among the wounded.
Although the design upon fort Fayette had yielded to the
desire of securing the success of the attack on Stony Point, it had
not been abandoned. Two brigades under General M'Dougal
had been ordered to approach the works on Verplank's, in which
Colonel Webster commanded, and be in readiness to attack them
the instant General Wayne should obtain possession of Stony
1 The author was in the covering party, visited the fort next day, and conversed
with the officers who had been engaged in storming the works.

GEORGE WASHINGTON

36S

Point. That this detachment might not permit the favourable
moment to pass unimproved, Wayne had been requested to
direct the messenger who should convey the intelligence of his
success to the Commander-in-chief, to pass through M'Dougal's
camp, and give him advice of that event. He was also requested
to turn the cannon of the fort against Verplank's, and the vessels
in the river. The last orders were executed, and a heavy cannonade was opened on fort Fayette, and on the vessels, which
compelled them to fall down the river. Through some misconception, never explained, the messenger despatched by General
Wayne did not call on M'Dougal, but proceeded directly to
head quarters. Thus, every advantage expected from the first
impression made by the capture of Stony Point was lost; and
the garrison had full leisure to recover from the surprise occasioned by that event, and to prepare for an attack. This change
of circumstances made it necessary to change the plan of operation. General Howe was directed to take the command of
M'Dougal's detachment, to which some pieces of heavy artillery
were to be annexed. He was ordered, after effecting a breach in
the walls, to make the dispositions for an assault, and to demand
a surrender; but not to attempt a storm until it should be dark.
To these orders, explicit instructions were added not to hazard
his party by remaining before Verplank's, after the British
should cross Croton river in force.
Through some unaccountable negligence in the persons charged
with the execution of these orders, the battering artillery was
not accompanied with suitable ammunition; and the necessary
intrenching tools were not brought. These omissions were supplied the next day; but it was then too late to proceed against
Verplank's.
On receiving intelligence of the loss of Stony Point, and of
the danger to which the garrison of fort Fayette was exposed,
Sir Henry Clinton relinquished his views on Connecticut, and
made a forced march to Dobbs' ferry. Some troops were immediately embarked to pass up the river, and a light corps was
pushed forward to the Croton. This movement relieved fort
Fayette.
The failure of the attempt to obtain possession of Verplank's
Point, leaving that road of communication still closed, diminished

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the advantages which had been expected to result from the
enterprise so much, that it was deemed unadvisable to maintain
Stony Point. On reconnoitring the ground, General Washington believed that the place could not be rendered secure with a
garrison of less than fifteen hundred men; a number which
could not be spared from the army without weakening it too
much for farther operations. He determined therefore to evacuate Stony Point, and retire to the highlands. As soon as this
resolution was executed, Sir Henry Clinton repossessed himself
of that post, repaired the fortifications, and placed a stronger
garrison in it; after which he resumed his former situation at
Philipsburg.
The two armies watched each other for some time. At length,
Sir Henry Clinton, finding himself unable to attack Washington
in the strong position he had taken, or to draw him from it, and
being desirous of transferring the theatre of active war to the
south, withdrew into York island, and was understood to be
strengthening the fortifications erected for its defence, as preparatory to the large detachments he intended making to reinforce
the southern army.
Although this movement was made principally with a view
to southern operations, it was in some degree hastened by the
opinion, that New York required immediate additional protection during the absence of the fleet, which was about to sail for
the relief of Penobscot.
Early in June, Colonel M'Clean, with six hundred and fifty
men, had penetrated from Nova Scotia into the eastern parts of
Maine, and taken possession of a strong piece of ground on the
Penobscot, which he had begun to fortify.
The state of Massachusetts, alarmed at an invasion which
threatened a serious diminution of territory, determined to dislodge him. A respectable fleet, commanded by Commodore
Saltonstal, and an armny of near four thousand men, under General Lovell, were prepared with so much celerity, that the whole
armament appeared in the Penobscot as early as the 2 5th of July.
M'Clean had taken possession of a peninsula on the eastern
side of Penobscot, and had intrenched the isthmus connecting it
with the continent. The part towards the river was steep and
difficult of access; and was also defended by his frigates and

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367

batteries, the principal of which was constructed about the
centre of the peninsula.
After being repulsed in his first attempt, General Lovell effected a landing on the western part of the peninsula, where he
ascended a precipice of two hundred feet; and, with the loss of
only fifty men killed and wounded, drove the party which defended it from the ground. A battery was erected within seven
hundred and fifty yards of the main work of the besieged, and
a warm cannonade was kept, up for several days on both sides.
Perceiving the difficulty of carrying the place with a militia
impatient to return to their homes, General Lovell represented
his situation to the government of Massachusetts, who applied to
General Gates, then commanding at Providence, for a reinforcement of four hundred continental troops. This request was
readily granted, and Jackson's regiment was ordered to Penobscot. In the mean time an ineffectual cannonade was continued, and preparations were made to storm the works on the
arrival of the expected reinforcements.
Such was the posture of affairs on the i3th of August, when
Lovell received information that Sir George Collier had entered
the river with a superior naval force. He re-embarked his whole
army the following night, and drew up his flotilla in a crescent
across the river, as if determined to maintain its position. This
show of resistance was made in the hope of stopping Sir George
Collier until the land forces on board the transports could be
conveyed up the river, and disembarked on the western shore.
But the British admiral was too confident in his strength to permit this stratagem to succeed; and, as he approached, the Americans sought for safety in flight. A general chase and unresisted
destruction ensued. The ships of war were blown up, and the
transports fled in the utmost confusion up the river. Being
pursued by the British squadron, the troops landed in a wild
uncultivated country; and were obliged to explore their way,
without provisions, through a pathless wilderness, for more than
a hundred miles. Exhausted with famine and fatigue, they at
length gained the settled parts of the country, after having lost
several men who perished in the woods.
While Sir Henry Clinton continued encamped just above
Haerlem with his upper posts at Kingsbridge, and the American

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army preserved its station in the Highlands, a bold plan was
formed for surprising a British post at Powles Hook, which was
executed with great address by Major Lee.
This officer was employed on the west side of the river with
directions to observe the situation of the British in Stony Point,
but, principally, to watch the motions of their main army.
While his parties scoured the country, he obtained intelligence
which suggested the idea of surprising and carrying off the garrison at Powles Hook, a point of land on the west side of the
Hudson, immediately opposite the town of New York, penetrating deep into the river. On the point nearest New York, some
works had been constructed, which were garrisoned by four or
five hundred men.
A deep ditch, into which the water of the river flowed, having
over it a drawbridge connected with a barred gate, had been cut
across the isthmus, so as to make the Hook, in reality, an island.
This ditch could be passed only at low water. Thirty paces
within it was a row of abattis running into the river; and some
distance in front of it, is a creek fordable only in two places.
This difficulty of access, added to the remoteness of the nearest
corps of the American army, impressed the garrison with the
opinion that they were perfectly secure; and this opinion produced an unmilitary remissness in the commanding officer,
which did not escape the vigilance of Lee.
On receiving his communications, General Washington was
inclined to favour the enterprise they suggested; but withheld
his full assent, until he was satisfied that the assailants would be
able to make good their retreat.
The Hackensack, which communicates with the waters of the
Hudson below New York, runs almost parallel with that river
quite to its source, and is separated from it only a few miles.
This neck is still farther narrowed by a deep creek which divides
it, and empties into the Hackensack below fort Lee. West of
that river runs the Passaick, which unites with it near Newark,
and forms another long and narrow neck of land. From Powles
Hook to the new bridge, the first place where the Hackensack
could be crossed without boats, the distance is fourteen miles;
and from the North River to the road leading from the one
place to the other, there are three points of interception, the

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369

nearest of which is less than two miles, and the farthest not more
than three. The British were encamped in full force along the
North river, opposite to these points of interception. To diminish the danger of the retreat, it was intended to occupy the roads
leading through the mountains of the Hudson to the Hackensack with a select body of troops.
Every preparatory arrangement being made, the night of the
eighteenth of August was fixed on for the enterprise. A detachment from the division of Lord Stirling, including three hundred men designed for the expedition, was ordered down as a
foraging party. As there was nothing unusual in this movement, it excited no suspicion. Lord Stirling followed with five
hundred men, and encamped at the new bridge.
Major Lee, at the head of three hundred men, took the road
through the mountains which ran parallel to the North River;
and, having secured all the passes into York Island, reached the
creek which surrounds the Hook between two and three in the
morning. He passed first the creek, and then the ditch undiscovered; and, about three in the morning, entered the main
work, and with the loss of only two killed and three wounded,
made one hundred and fifty-nine prisoners, including three
officers. Very few of the British were killed. Major Sutherland, who commanded the garrison, threw himself with forty or
fifty Hessians into a strong redoubt, which it was thought unadviseable to attack, because the time occupied in carrying it
might endanger the retreat. Wasting no time in destroying
what could easily be replaced, Major Lee hastened to bring off
his prisoners and his detachment.
To avoid the danger of retreating up the narrow neck of
land which has already been described, some boats had been
brought in the course of the night to Dow's Ferry on the Hackensack, not far from Powles Hook. The officer who guarded
them was directed to remain until the arrival of the troops engaged in the expedition, which, it was understood, would happen before day. The light having made its appearance without
any intelligence from Major Lee, the officer having charge of
the boats conjectured that the attack had been postponed; and,
to avoid discovery, retired with them to Newark. The head of
the retreating column soon afterwards reached the ferry; and,

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fatigued as they were by the toilsome march of the preceding
night, were compelled to pass as rapidly as possible up the narrow neck of land between the two rivers to the new bridge. A
horseman was despatched with this information to Lord Stirling,
and the line of march was resumed.
About nine in the preceding evening, Major Buskirk had been
detached up the North River with a considerable part of the
garrison of Powles Hook, and some other troops, for the purpose
of falling in with the American party supposed to be foraging
about the English neighbourhood.
On receiving intelligence of the disappointment respecting
the boats, Lord Stirling took the precaution to detach Colonel
Ball with two hundred fresh men to meet Lee, and cover his
retreat. Just after Ball had passed, Buskirk entered the main
road, and fired on his rear. Taking it for granted that this was
only the advanced corps of a large detachment sent to intercept
the party retreating from Powles Hook, Ball made a circuit to
avoid the enemy; and Buskirk, finding a detachment he had
not expected, took the same measure to secure his own retreat.
The two parties narrowly missing each other, returned to their
respective points of departure; and Lee reached the new bridge
without interruption.'
This critical enterprise reflected much honour on the partisan
with whom it originated, and by whom it was conducted. General Washington announced it to the army in his orders with
much approbation; and congress bestowed upon it a degree of
applause more adapted to the talent displayed in performing the
service than to its magnitude.
A few days after the surprise of Powles Hook, the long
expected fleet from Europe, under the command of Admiral
Arbuthnot, having on board a reinforcement for the British
army, arrived at New York. This reinforcement however did
not enable Sir Henry Clinton to enter immediately on that active
course of offensive operations which he had meditated. It was
soon followed by the Count D'Estaing, who arrived on the
southern coast of America with a powerful fleet; after which
the British General deemed it necessary to turn all his attention
I The author states these facts from his own observation, and conversations with
other officers of the detachment.

GEORGE WASHINGTON

371

to his own security. Rhode Island, and the posts up the North
River was evacuated, and the whole army was collected in New
York, the fortifications of which were carried on with unremitting industry.
The Count D'Estaing and Admiral Byron, having sailed about
the same time from the coast of North America, met in the
West Indies, where the war was carried on with various success.
St. Lucia surrendered to the British, in compensation for which
the French took St. Vincents and Grenada. About the time of
the capture of the latter island, D'Estaing received reinforcements which gave him a decided naval superiority; after which
a battle was fought between the two hostile fleets, in which the
Count claimed the victory, and in which so many of the British
ships were disabled that the Admiral was compelled to retire
into port in order to refit.
The earnest representations made on the part of the United
States had prevailed on the cabinet of Versailles to instruct the
Count D'Estaing to afford them all the aid in his power; and the
present moment seemed a fit one for carrying these orders into
execution. Letters from General Lincoln, from the executive of
South Carolina, and from the French consul at Charleston, urged
him to pay a visit to the southern states; and represented the
situation of the British in Georgia to be such that his appearance
would insure the destruction of the army in that quarter, and
the recovery of the state.
Yielding to these solicitations, the Count sailed with twentytwo ships of the line, and eleven frigates, having on board six
thousand soldiers, and arrived so suddenly on the southern coast
of America, that the Experiment of fifty guns, and three frigates,
fell into his hands. A vessel was sent to Charleston with information of his arrival, and a plan was concerted for the siege
of Savannah. D'Estaing was to land three thousand men at
Beaulieu on the i i th of September, and Lincoln was to cross the
Savannah on the same day with one thousand Americans, and
effect a junction with him.
The town of Savannah was, at that time, the head quarters
of General Prevost. Apprehending no immediate danger, he
had weakened the garrison by establishing several out-posts
in Georgia; and by leaving Colonel Maitland with a strong

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detachment in the island of Port Royal, in South Carolina.
On the appearance of the French fleet, expresses were despatched to Colonel Maitland and to all the out-posts, directing
the troops to repair without loss of time to Savannah. These
orders were promptly obeyed; and, on the ioth of September,
the several detachments in Georgia had all arrived in safety,
except the sick and convalescents of the garrison of Sunbury,
who were intercepted.
On the i ith, General Lincoln reached Zubly's Ferry, and, on
the i 5th, was assured that the French had disembarked in force.
A junction of the two armies was formed the next day before
the town of Savannah.
On the night of the I2th, the Count D'Estaing had landed
about three thousand men at Beaulieu; and the next day, before
the arrival of General Lincoln, had summoned the garrison to
surrender to the arms of the King of France. Being desirous of
gaining time, General Prevost answered the summons in such a
manner as to encourage the opinion that he designed to capitulate; in the expectation of which a suspension of hostilities for
twenty-four hours was granted. In that important interval,
Colonel Maitland arrived from Beaufort, with the troops which
had been stationed at that place.
As the French were in possession of the main channel by
which the Savannah communicates with the sea, Colonel Maitland entered the town by a route which had been deemed impracticable. He came round by Dawfuskie, an island north of
the mouth of the river, and landing in a deep marsh, drew his
boats through it into the Savannah, above the place where the
ships lay at anchor, and thence made his way by small parties
into the town.
On receiving this reinforcement, the resolution was taken to
defend the place to the last extremity; and, the next day, this
determination was communicated to the Count D'Estaing.
After bringing up the heavy ordnance and stores from the
fleet, the besieging army broke ground; and, by the first of
October, had pushed their sap within three hundred yards of the
abattis on the left of the British lines. Several batteries were
opened on the besieged which played almost incessantly upon
their works, but made no impression on them.

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373

The situation of D'Estaing was becoming critical. More time
had already been consumed on the coast of Georgia than he had
supposed would be necessary for the destruction of the British
force in that state. He became uneasy for the possessions of
France in the West Indies, and apprehensive for the safety of
the ships under his command. The naval officers remonstrated
strenuously against longer exposing his fleet on an insecure coast,
at a tempestuous season of the year, and urged the danger of
being overtaken by a British squadron, when broken and scattered by a storm, with a degree of persevering earnestness which
the Count found himself incapable of resisting.
In a few days the lines of the besiegers might have been carried by regular approaches, into the works of the besieged, which
would have rendered the capture of the town and garrison inevitable. But D'Estaing declared that he could devote no more
time to this object; and it only remained to raise the siege, or to
attempt the works by storm. The latter part of the alternative
was adopted.
On.the left of the allied army, was a swampy hollow way
which afforded a cover for troops advancing on the right flank
of the besieged, to a point within fifty yards of their principal
work. It was determined to march to the main attack along
this hollow; and, at the same time, to direct feints against other
parts of the lines.
On the morning of the 9th of October, before day, a heavy
cannonade and bombardment were commenced from all the
batteries, as preliminary to the assault. About three thousand
five hundred French, and one thousand Americans, of whom
between six and seven hundred were regulars, and the residue
militia of Charleston, advanced in three columns, led by D'Estaing
and Lincoln, aided by the principal officers of both nations, and
made a furious assault on the British lines. Their reception was
warmer than had been expected. The fire from the batteries
of the besieged reached every part of the columns of the assailants which had emerged from the swamp, and did great execution. Yet the allied troops advanced with unabated ardour,
passed through the abattis, crossed the ditch, and mounted the
parapet. Both the French and Americans planted their standards on the walls, and were killed in great numbers, while en

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deavouring to force their way into the works. For about fifty
minutes, the contest was extremely obstinate. At length, the
columns of the assailants began to relax, and a pause was manifested on the assault.
In this critical moment, Major Glaziers, at the head of a body
of grenadiers and marines, rushing suddenly from the lines,
threw himself on those who had made their way into the redoubts, and drove them over the ditch and abattis into the
hollow through which they had marched to the attack. It
became apparent that farther perseverance could produce no
advantage, and a retreat was ordered.
In this unsuccessful attempt, the French lost in killed and
wounded, about seven hundred men. Among the latter, were
the Count D'Estaing himself, Major General De Fontanges, and
several other officers of distinction. The continental troops lost
two hundred and thirty-four men, and the Charleston militia,
who, though associated with them in danger, were more fortunate, had one captain killed, and six privates wounded.
The loss of the garrison was astonishingly small. In killed
and wounded, it amounted only to fifty-five. So great was the
advantage of the cover afforded by their works.
After this repulse, the Count D'Estaing announced to General Lincoln, his determination to raise the siege. The remonstrances of that officer were unavailing; and the removal of the
heavy ordnance and stores was commenced. This being accomplished, both armies moved from their ground on the evening
of the i8th of October. The Americans, recrossing the Savannah at Zubly's ferry, again encamped in South Carolina, and
the French re-embarked.
Although the issue of this enterprise was the source of severe
chagrin and mortification, the prudence of General Lincoln
suppressed every appearance of dissatisfaction, and the armies
separated with manifestations of reciprocal esteem.
The hopes which had brought the militia into the field being
disappointed, they dispersed; and the affairs of the southern
states wore a more gloomy aspect than at any former period.
On receiving intelligence of the situation of Lincoln, congress passed a resolution requesting General Washington to order
the North Carolina troops, and such others as could be spared

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from the northern army, to the aid of that in the south; and
assuring the states of South Carolina and Georgia of the attention of government to their preservation; but requesting them,
for their own defence, to comply with the recommendations
formerly made respecting the completion of their continental
regiments, and the government of their militia while in actual
service.
During these transactions in the south, the long meditated
expedition against the Indians was prosecuted with success.
The largest division of the western army was to assemble at
Wyoming, on the main branch of the Susquehanna, and General Sullivan expected to leave that place in the month of June.
Such, however, were the delays in procuring provisions and
military stores, that it was the last of July 1 before he could
move from the place of rendezvous.
Another body of troops, designed to compose a part of the
western army, had passed the winter on the Mohawk. On the
22d of August, these two divisions united, and the whole army,
amounting to five thousand men, marched up the Tyoga, which
led into the heart of the Indian country.
Such extensive and tedious preparations could not be made
unobserved. The plan of operations contemplated. by Sullivan
seems to have been completely understood; and, notwithstanding the vast superiority of his force, the Indians determined to
defend their country. They resolved to risk a general action
for its preservation, and selected the ground for the conflict
with judgment.
About a mile in front of Newtown, they collected their
whole force, estimated by General Sullivan at fifteen hundred
men, but by themselves at only eight hundred, commanded
by the two Butlers, Grey, Johnson, M'Donald, and Brandt.
Five companies of whites, calculated at two hundred men, were
1 While Sullivan was preparing to invade their country, the savages were not inactive. At the head of a small party of whites and Indians, Joseph Brandt fell upon
the frontiers of New York, murdered several of the inhabitants, carried others into
captivity, and burnt several houses. He was pursued by about one hundred and fifty
militia, whom he drew into an ambuscade, and entirely defeated. A few days afterwards, Captain M'Donald, at the head of a small party, of whom a third were British, took a fort on the west branch of the Susquehanna, and made the garrison,
amounting to thirty men, prisoners of war. The women and children, contrary to
the usage of Indians, were permitted to retire into the settled country.-Gordon.

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united with them. They had constructed a breast-work about
half a mile in length, on a piece of rising ground. The right
flank of this work was covered by the river, which, bending
to the right, and winding round their rear, exposed only their
front and left to an attack. On the left, was a high ridge nearly
parallel to the general course of the river, terminating somewhat below the breast-work; and still farther to the left, was
another ridge running in the same direction, and leading to
the rear of the American army. The ground was covered with
pine interspersed with low shrub-oaks, many of which, for the
purpose of concealing their works, had been cut up and stuck
in front of them, so as to exhibit the appearance of being still
growing. The road, after crossing a deep brook at the foot
of the hill, turned to the right, and ran nearly parallel to the
breast-work, so as to expose the whole flank of the army to
their fire, if it should advance without discovering their position.
Parties communicating with each other were stationed on
both hills, so as to fall on the right flank and rear of Sullivan,
as soon as the action should commence.
About eleven in the morning of the 29th of August, this
work was discovered by Major Par, who commanded the advance guard of the army; upon which, General Hand formed
the light infantry in a wood, about four hundred yards distant
from the enemy, and stood upon his ground until the main
body should arrive. In the mean time, a continual skirmishing
was kept up between Par's rifle corps, and small parties of
Indians who sallied from their works, and suddenly retreated,
apparently with the hope of being incautiously pursued.
Conjecturing that the hills on his right were occupied by the
savages, Sullivan ordered General Poor to take possession of
that which led into his rear, and, thence, to turn the left, and
gain the rear, of the breast-work; while Hand, aided by the
artillery, should attack in. front. These orders were promptly
executed. While -the artillery played on the works, Poor pushed
up the mountain, and a sharp conflict commenced, which was
sustained for some time, with considerable spirit on both sides.
Poor continued to advance rapidly, pressing the Indians before
him at the point of the bayonet, and occasionally firing on
them. They retreated from tree to tree, keeping up an irregular

GEORGE WASHINGTON37

377

fire, until he gained the summit of the hill. Perceiving that
their flank was completely uncovered by this movement, and
that they were in danger of being surrounded, the savages abandoned their breast-work, and, crossing the river, fled with the
utmost precipitation.
This victory cost the Americans about thirty men. The ascertained loss of the Indians was also inconsiderable. But they were
so intimidated, that every idea of farther resistance was abandoned. As Sullivan advanced, they continued to retreat before
him without harassing his main body, or even skirmishing with
his detachments, except in a single instance.
He penetrated far into the heart of their country, which his
parties scoured, and laid waste in every direction. Houses,
corn-fields, gardens, and fruit trees, shared one common fate;
and Sullivan executed strictly the severe but necessary orders
he had received, to render the country completely uninhabitable for the present, and thus to compel the hostile Indians, by
want of food, to remove to a greater distance.
The objects of the expedition being accomplished, Sullivan
returned to Easton in Pennsylvania, having lost only forty men
by sickness and the enemy.
The devastation of the country has been spoken of with some
degree of disapprobation; but this sentiment is the result rather
of an amiable disposition in the human mind to condemn whatever may have the appearance of tending to aggravate the miseries of war, than of reflection. Circumstances existed which
reconciled to humanity this seeming departure from it. Great
Britain possessed advantages which ensured a controlling influence over the Indians, and kept them in almost continual war
with the United States. Their habitual ferocity seemed to have
derived increased virulence from the malignity of the whites
who had taken refuge among them; and there was real foundation for the opinion that an annual repetition of the horrors
of Wyoming could be prevented only by disabling the savages
from perpetrating them. No means in the power of the United
States promised so certainly to effect this desirable object, as
the removal of neighbours: whose hostility could be diminished
only by terror, and whose resentments were to be assuaged only
by fear.

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While Sullivan laid waste the country on the Susquehanna,
another expedition under Colonel Brodhead, was carried on
from Pittsburg up the Alleghany, against the Mingo, Munscy,
and Seneca tribes. At the head of between six and seven hundred men, he advanced two hundred miles up the river, and
destroyed the villages and cornfields on its head branches. Here
too the Indians were unable to resist the invading army.
After one unsuccessful skirmish, they abandoned their villages to a destruction which was inevitable, and sought for
personal safety in their woods.
On receiving the communications of General Sullivan, congress passed a vote approving his conduct, and that of his army.
That approbation, however, seems not to have extended beyond
his conduct in the Indian country. His demands for military
stores for the expedition had been so high; in his conversations
with his officers, he had so freely censured the government for
its failure to comply with those demands; in general orders,
he had so openly complained of inattention to the preparations
necessary to secure the success of the enterprise; that considerable offence was given to several members of congress, and still
more to the board of war. From the operation of these causes,
when Sullivan, at the close of the campaign, complained of ill
health, and offered, on that account, to resign his commission,
the.endeavours of his friends to obtain a vote requesting him
to continue in the service, and permitting him to retire from
actual duty until his health should be restored, were overruled;
and his resignation was accepted. The resolution permitting
him to resign was, however, accompanied with one thanking
him for his past services.
Although these great exertions to terminate Indian hostility
did not afford complete security to the western frontiers, they
were attended with considerable advantages. The savages,
though not subdued, were intimidated; and their incursions
became less formidable, as well as less frequent.
The summer of I779 passed away without furnishing any
circumstance in America which could be supposed to have a
material influence on the issue of the war. In Europe, however,
an event took place which had been long anxiously expected,
and was believed to be of decisive importance. Spain at length

GEORGE WASHINGTON

379

determined to make one common cause with France against
Great Britain. It was supposed that the two powers would be
able to obtain a complete ascendency at sea; and that their
combined fleets would maintain a superiority on the American
coast, as well as in Europe.
From the first determination of France to take part in the
war, it appears to have been the earnest wish of the cabinet of
Versailles to engage Spain likewise in the contest.
Her resentments against England, her solicitude to diminish
the naval strength of that nation, and her wish to recover
Jamaica, Gibraltar, and the Floridas, urged her to seize the fair
occasion now offered of dismembering the British empire, and
accomplishing these favourite objects. But her dread of the
effect which the independence of the United States might produce on her own colonies, mingled with some apprehensions of
danger from the contest she was about to provoke, had produced an appearance of irresolution, which rendered her future
course, for a time, uncertain. In this conflict of opposite interests, the influence of the cabinet of Versailles, and the jealousy
of the naval power of Britain, at length obtained the victory;
and his Catholic Majesty determined to prevent the reannexation of the United States to their mother country; but to effect
this object by negotiation rather than by the sword.
In pursuance of this pacific system, he offered his mediation
to the belligerent powers. This proposition was readily accepted
by France; but the minister of his Britannic Majesty evaded
any explicit arrangements on the subject, while he continued
to make general verbal declarations of the willingness of his
sovereign to give peace to Europe under the mediation of his
Catholic Majesty. In consequence of these declarations, the
Spanish minister proposed a truce for a term of years, and that
a congress of deputies from the belligerent powers should assemble at Madrid to adjust the terms of a permanent treaty; into
which deputies from the United States were to be admitted,
as the representatives of a sovereign nation. Although an explicit acknowledgment of their independence was not to be
required, it was to be understood that they should be independent in fact, and should be completely separated from the
British empire.

I3 8 o

THE LIFE OF

This negotiation was protracted to a considerable length; and
in the mean time, all the address of the cabinet of London was
used to detach either France or the United States from their
alliance with each other. Notice of it was given to the American government by the minister of France at Philadelphia, as
well as by Mr. Arthur Lee, one of their agents in Europe; and
congress was repeatedly urged by the former, to furnish those
who might be authorised to represent them in the conferences
for a general treaty, with ample powers and instructions to
conclude it. An extraordinary degree of solicitude was manifested to hasten the full powers, and to moderate the claims of
the United States.
It seems to have been the policy of the cabinet of Versailles
to exclude the American States from a share of the fisheries,
and to limit their western boundary to the settlements then
made. Either from a real apprehension that the war might
be protracted should the United States insist on the acknowledgment of their independence as a preliminary to any treaty,
or from an opinion that such preliminary acknowledgment
would leave the terms of the treaty less under the control of
France, and the American plenipotentiaries more masters of
their own conduct, Monsieur Girard laboured to persuade congress to recede from that demand. If they could be independent
in fact, he thought the form not worth contending for.'
While congress was employed in debating the instructions to
their ministers, the negotiation was brought to a close. As
Spain became prepared for hostilities, the offered mediation was
pressed in such terms as to produce the necessity of either accepting or rejecting it. This drew from the cabinet of London
a declaration that the independence of the United States was
inadmissible; upon which his Catholic Majesty determined to
take part in the war.
On the departure of his minister from London without taking leave, the British government issued letters of marque and
reprisal against the vessels and subjects of the Spanish crown;
and a powerful Spanish fleet, which had been preparing during
'The author has seen notes taken by a member of congress, of communications
made by Mr. Girard, when admitted to an audience, which avow these sentiments,
The secret journals of congress sustain this statement.

GEORGE WASHINGTON

3 8I

the negotiation, was expedited, to co-operate with that of
France. Yet the independence of the United States was not
acknowledged, nor was their minister accredited. Despatches,
giving notice of the hostilities meditated by his Catholic Majesty,
were forwarded to Don Galvez, the governor of Louisiana, who
collected a considerable military force at New Orleans, and
reduced the settlements held by the British crown on the Mississippi, which had not been apprized of the war.
Intelligence of this important event was given to congress
while that body was deliberating on the instructions to their
negotiators. It is not impossible that this information had some
influence on those deliberations; and, rendering the American
government less solicitous about the future conduct of Spain,
diminished the motives for making territorial sacrifices to that
power. Their ministers were ordered to make it a preliminary
article to any negotiation, that Great Britain should agree to
treat with the United States, as sovereign, free, and independent; and that their independence should be expressly assured
and confirmed by the terms of the treaty itself.
That the United States might be enabled to avail themselves
without further delays, of any occasion which might be presented for terminating the war, Mr. John Adams, who was
already in Europe, was authorised to negotiate a treaty of
peace, and a commercial treaty with Great Britain; and Mr.
Jay, at that time president of congress, was appointed minister
plenipotentiary to the court of Madrid, with instructions to
insist on the free navigation of the Mississippi;-a claim to
which Spain objected, and which was discountenanced by
France.
As the campaign drew to a close without affording any solid
foundation for the hope that the war was about to terminate,
General Washington repeated those efforts which he had made
so often and so unsuccessfully, to induce early preparations for
the ensuing year. He submitted to the view of his government
a detailed report'of the whole army, which exhibited the alarming fact, that by the last of the following June, the terms of
service of nearly one-half the men under his command would
expire.
It was not the least considerable of the inconveniences attend

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ing the complex system of government then prevailing in the
United States, that measures essential to the safety of the nation
were never taken in season. Thus, when the time for raising
the quotas of the respective states by voluntary enlistment had
passed away, and the necessity of resorting to coercive means
had become absolute, those means were so delayed, and so irregularly put in execution, that the terms of service of different
portions of the army expired almost every month in the year;
and raw troops, ignorant of the first rudiments of military duty,
were introduced in the most critical moments of a campaign.
Had timely and correspondent measures been taken by the
states to raise their respective quotas by a specified time in the
depth of winter, the recruits would have received the advantage
of a few months training before they were brought into actual
service, and the General, that of a certain uninterrupted force
for each campaign. This course of proceeding had been continually recommended, and the recommendation had been as
continually neglected.
"In the more early stages of the contest," said the Commander-in-chief to congress, in a letter of the 8th of November,
"when men might have been enlisted for the war, no man, as
my whole conduct, and the uniform tenor of my letters will
evince, was ever more opposed to short enlistments than I was;
and while there remained a prospect of obtaining recruits on a
permanent footing in the first instance, as far as duty and a
regard to my station would permit, I urged my sentiments in
favour of it. But the prospect of keeping up an army by
voluntary enlistments being changed, or at least standing on
too precarious and uncertain a footing to depend on for the
exigency of our affairs, I took the liberty in February, 1778,
in a particular manner, to lay before the committee of arrangement then with the army at Valley Forge, a plan for an annual
draught, as the surest and most certain, if not the only means
left us, of maintaining the army on a proper and respectable
ground. And, more and more confirmed in the propriety of
this opinion by the intervention of a variety of circumstances,
unnecessary to detail, I again took the freedom of urging the
plan to the committee of conference in January last; and, having reviewed it in every point of light, and found it right,

GEORGE WASHINGTON

3 83

at least the best that has occurred to me, I hope I shall be
excused by congress in offering it to them, and in time for
carrying into execution for the next year; if they should conceive it necessary for the states to complete their quotas of
troops.
"'The plan I would propose is, that each state be informed by
congress annually of the real deficiency of its troops, and called
upon to make it up, or such less specific number as congress
may think proper, by a draught. That the men draughted
join the army by the first of January, and serve until the first
of January in the succeeding year. That from the time the
draughts join the army, the officers of the states from which
they come, be authorised and directed to use their endeavours
to enlist them for the war, under the bounties granted to the
officers themselves, and to the recruits, by the act of the 23d
of January, 1779, viz.: ten dollars to the officer for each recruit,
and two hundred to the recruits themselves. That all state,
county, and town bounties to draughts, if practicable, be entirely abolished, on account of the uneasiness and disorders they
create among the soldiery, the desertions they produce, and for
other reasons which will readily occur. That on or before the
first of October annually, an abstract, or return, similar to the
present one, be transmitted to congress, to enable them to make
their requisitions to each state with certainty and precision.
This I would propose as a general plan to be pursued; and I
am persuaded that this, or one nearly similar to it, will be found
the best now in our power, as it will be attended with the least
expense to the public, will place the service on the footing
of order and certainty, and will be the only one that can advance the general interest to any great extent."
These representations on the part of the Commander-in-chief
were not more successful than those which had before been
made. Although the best dispositions existed in congress, the
proceedings of that body were unavoidably slow; and the difficulty of effecting a concert of measures among thirteen sovereign states, was too great to be surmounted. In consequence
of these radical defects in the system itself, the contributions
of men made by the states continued to be irregular, uncertain,
and out of season; and the army could never acquire that con

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sistency and stability, which would have resulted from an exact
observance of the plan so often recommended.
On receiving information of the disaster which had been
sustained by the allied arms at Savannah, Sir Henry Clinton
resumed his plan of active operations against the southern states.
A large embarkation took place soon after that event had been
announced to him, which sailed from the Hook towards the
end of December. The troops were commanded by himself in
person, and the fleet by Admiral Arbuthnot. The defence of
New York and its dependencies were entrusted to General
Knyphausen.
The preparations made in New York for some distant enterprise were immediately communicated by his faithful intelligencers to General Washington, who conjectured the object,
and hastened the march of the troops designed to reinforce
General Lincoln.
The season for action in a northern climate being over, the
General turned his attention to the distribution of his troops
in winter quarters. Habit had familiarised the American army
to the use of huts constructed by themselves; and both officers
and men were content to pass the winter in a hutted camp.
In disposing of the troops, therefore, until the time for action
should return, wood and water, a healthy situation, convenience
for supplies of provisions, stations which would enable them
to cover the country, and to defend particular positions, were
the objects taken into consideration, and were all to be consulted.
With a view to these various circumstances, the army was
thrown into two great divisions. The northern was to be
commanded by General Heath; and its chief object was the
security of West Point, and of the posts on the North River,
as low as King's ferry. Subordinate to this was the protection
of the country on the Sound, and down the Hudson the neighbourhood of Kingsbridge. The other and principal division
under the immediate command of General Washington, was
put under cover, late in December, in the neighbourhood of
Morristown.

GEORGE WASHINGTON

385

CHAPTER XVII
THE departure of the French fleet produced a sudden change
in the prospects of the southern states. The sanguine hopes which had been entertained of the recovery of Georgia, gave place to gloomy and well founded apprehensions for South Carolina.
The facility with which General Prevost had passed through
the state, and the assurances he had received of the indisposition
of a large portion of the people to defend themselves, disclosed
too certainly the true situation of the country, not to convince
all discerning men that a real attempt at conquest would be
made the ensuing year. General Lincoln perceived the approaching danger, without being able to provide against it. His
power, as a military commander, was too limited, and his
influence on the government of the state too weak, to draw
forth even the means it possessed in time for its protection.
Though the preservation of its metropolis was of vast importance to the state, no preparations were making to put it
in a condition to stand a siege. The forts on the islands were
in ruins, and the works across the neck remained unfinished.
The representations made on this subject to the governor by
General Lincoln were not disregarded; but from some defect
in the existing law, the executive found it impracticable to
obtain labour for these interesting objects.
Admiral Arbuthnot arrived at Savannah on the 31st of January. One of his transports, which had been separated from
the fleet in a storm, was brought into Charleston harbour on
the 23d of that month; and the prisoners gave the first certain
intelligence that the expedition from New York was destined
against the capital of South Carolina.
Before the middle of February, the fleet entered the harbour,
or inlet, of North Edisto; and landed the troops without opposition on St. John's Island. A part of the fleet was sent round
to blockade the harbour of Charleston, while the army pro

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THE LIFE OF

ceeded slowly and cautiously from Stono Creek to Wappoo
Cut, and through the islands of St. John and St. James.
This delay, in the event so fatal, but then deemed so propitious to the American arms, was employed to the utmost
advantage in improving the defences of Charleston. The legislature had enabled the executive to employ slaves to work
on the fortifications; and had passed an act delegating great
powers to the Governor and such of his council as he could
conveniently consult. Under these acts, six hundred slaves
were employed on the works, and vigorous, though not very
successful measures were taken by the executive to assemble the
militia of the country. The fallacious hope was entertained
that, if the town could be rendered defensible, the garrison
would be made sufficiently strong by reinforcements from the
north, and by the militia of the state, to maintain the place
and compel Sir Henry Clinton to raise the siege.
The American army being too weak to make any serious
opposition to the progress of the British through the country,
the cavalry, with a small corps of infantry, were directed to
hover on their left flank; and the other troops, consisting of
about fourteen hundred regulars fit for duty, aided by the
militia, were drawn into the town, and employed on the
works.
Understanding that great exertions were making to improve
the fortifications, and that the garrison was gaining strength,
Sir Henry Clinton ordered General Patterson to join him with
the troops which could be spared from Georgia, and directed
Lieutenant Colonel Tarlton, after supplying the horses which
had been lost during a very stormy voyage from New York,
to cover his march through South Carolina. In one of the
excursions of that active officer to disperse the militia who
assembled to oppose the progress of Patterson through the country, his cavalry encountered Lieutenant Colonel Washington,
who commanded the remnant of Baylor's regiment, and were
driven back with some loss; but the want of infantry disabled
Washington from pressing his advantage.
In defending Charleston, the command of the harbour is
of great importance. To preserve this advantage, congress had
ordered four frigates to South Carolina, which, with the marine

i
I
I

0 Te~t0) Jr

of tlie S3iege of
CHARLEZSTON
S. CAROTLINA..

Lempries

Scale of Yards
600q- M 2000 160 0 tOE 950

4z4

GEORGE WASHINGTON

387

force belonging to the state, and two French vessels, were placed
under the command of Commodore Whipple.
General Washington was the more sanguine in the hope of
defending the harbour, because it was understood that the bar
was impassable by a ship of the line, and that even a large
frigate could not be brought over it, without first taking out
her guns, or careening her so much that the crew would be
unable to work her.
On sounding within the bar it was discovered that the water
was too shallow for the frigates to act with any effect, and
that, in making the attempt, they would be exposed to the
fire of the batteries which the assailants had erected. Under
these circumstances, the officers of the navy were unanimously
of opinion that no successful opposition could be made at the
bar, and that the fleet might act more advantageously in concert
with the fort on Sullivan's Island.
The intention of disputing the passage over the bar being
abandoned, Commodore Whipple moored his squad- March 2o.
ron in a line with fort Moultrie, in a narrow passage
between Sullivan's Island and the middle ground; and the
British ships without their guns, passed the bar and anchored in
five fathom hole.
It being now thought impossible to prevent the fleet from
passing fort Moultrie, and taking such stations in Cooper river
as would enable them to rake the batteries on shore, and to
close that communication between the town and country, the
plan of defence was once more changed, and the armed vessels
were carried into the mouth of Cooper river, and sunk in a
line from the town to Shute's folly.
This was the critical moment for evacuating the town. The
loss of the harbour rendered the defence of the place, if not
desperate, so improbable, that the hope to maintain it, could
not have been rationally entertained by a person, who was not
deceived by the expectation of aids much more considerable
than were actually received.
When this state of things was communicated to General
Washington, by Lieutenant Colonel Laurens, he said in reply,
"The impracticability of defending the bar, I fear, amounts
to the loss of the town and garrison. At this distance it is

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impossible to judge for you. I have the greatest confidence in
General Lincoln's prudence; but it really appears to me, that
the propriety of attempting to defend the town, depended on
the probability of defending the bar; and that when this ceased,
the attempt ought to have been relinquished. In this, however, I suspend a definitive judgment, and wish you to consider
what I say as confidential." Unfortunately, this letter did not
arrive in time to influence the conduct of the besieged.
Having crossed Ashley river, Sir Henry Clinton moved down
the neck, and, on the night of the first of April, broke ground
within eight hundred yards of the American lines.
The defences of Charleston had been constructed under the
direction of a Mr. Laumay, a French gentleman in the American
service; and, although not calculated to resist a regular siege,
were far from being contemptible.
While the besiegers were employed on their first parallel, the
garrison received a considerable reinforcement. General Woodford, who had marched from Morristown in December, entered
the town with the old continental troops of the Virginia line,
now reduced to seven hundred effectives. General Hogan, with
the line of North Carolina, had arrived before him. The garrison consisted of rather more than two thousand regular troops,
of about one thousand North Carolina militia, and of the citizens of Charleston. The exertions of the Governor to bring
in the militia of South Carolina had not succeeded.
By the 9th of April, Sir Henry Clinton completed his first
parallel extending across the neck, and mounted his guns in
battery. His works formed an oblique line, from six to seven
hundred yards distant from those of the besieged. About the
same time, Admiral Arbuthnot passed Sullivan's island, under
a heavy and well directed fire from fort Moultrie, then commanded by Colonel Pinckney, and anchored under James' island
near fort Johnson, just out of gunshot of the batteries of the
town.
Being now in complete possession of the harbour, the British
General and Admiral sent a joint summons to General Lincoln,
demanding the surrender of the town, to which he returned
this firm and modest answer, "Sixty days have elapsed since it
has been known that your intentions against this town were

GEORGE WASHINGTON

389

hostile, in which, time has been afforded to abandon it; but
duty and inclination point to the propriety of supporting it
to the last extremity."
On receiving this answer, the besiegers opened their batteries,
but seemed to rely principally on proceeding by sap quite into
the American lines.
About this time, the Governor with half the members of
the council, went into the country, in the hope of collecting a
respectable force in the rear, and on the left flank of the besieging army. The Lieutenant Governor, and the other members
of the council remained in town.
Hitherto, Sir Henry Clinton had not extended his lines north
of Charleston neck, and the communication of the garrison
with the country northeast of Cooper remained open. The
American cavalry, under the command of General Huger, had
passed that river, and was stationed in the neighbourhood of
Monk's corner, about thirty miles above Charleston. As an
additional security to this, the only remaining communication,
two posts of militia were established, one between the Cooper
and the Santee rivers, to which the Governor repaired in person;
and another at a ferry on the Santee, where boats were to be
collected for the purpose of facilitating the.passage of the American army over that river, should it be deemed adviseable to
evacuate the town.
Such importance was attached to this object, that Lincoln,
after Woodford had entered Charleston, detached a part of his
regular troops, to throw up some works about nine miles above
the town, on Wando, the eastern branch of Cooper, and on
Lamprere's point. The militia, it was hoped, though unwilling
to enter Charleston, might be drawn to these posts.
After the fleet had entered the harbour, Sir Henry Clinton
turned his attention to the country on the east of Cooper, to
acquire the possession of which it was necessary to disable the
American cavalry. This service was committed to A 1
Lieutenant Colonel Webster, who detached Tarlton pri 14.
with the horse and a corps of infantry to execute it. He succeeded completely. Conducted in the night through unfrequented paths to the American videttes, he entered the camp
with them, killed and- took about one hundred men, and dis

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persed the residue, who saved themselves on foot in a swamp.
Near fifty wagons loaded with military stores, and about four
hundred horses, fell into the hands of the victors.
This decisive blow gave Lieutenant Colonel Webster possession of the whole country between Cooper and Wando; and
closed the only route by which the garrison could have retreated.
The besiegers had now commenced their second parallel, and
it became every day more apparent that the town must ultimately yield to their regular approaches. An evacuation was
proposed, and Lincoln is understood to have been in favour
of that measure; but the remonstrances of the principal inhabitants, who entreated him not to abandon them to the fury of
a disappointed enemy, added to the great difficulty which must
attend such an attempt, especially when opposed by the civil
government, deterred him from adopting the only course which
afforded even a probability, by saving his army, of saving the
southern states.
Soon after the affair at Monk's corner, Sir Henry Clinton
received a reinforcement of three thousand men from New
York. This addition to his strength enabled him to detach
largely to the aid of Lieutenant Colonel Webster, after which
Lord Cornwallis took command of the troops on that side of
Cooper river.
Upon this change of situation, Lincoln called another council
April 20. of war. Notwithstanding the multiplied difficulties
attending an evacuation of Charleston, he appears
to have been still inclined to it. But a number of fortunate
circumstances must have concurred to render a retreat possible;
and the attempt was effectually prevented by the opposition
of the civil government. The opinion seems to have prevailed,
that the escape of the garrison would be followed by the
destruction of the town, and the ruin of its inhabitants.
The council advised that a capitulation should be proposed,
and that the town should be surrendered on condition that the
garrison should be at liberty still to bear arms, and that the
inhabitants should be secured in their persons and property.
These propositions being rejected, hostilities recommenced.
The besiegers had completed their second parallel, and had
begun the third, when Colonel Henderson made a vigorous sally

GEORGE WASHINGTON

391

on their right, which was attended with some success. That
this was the only sortie made during the siege, is to be ascribed
to the weakness of the garrison. General Lincoln deemed it
necessary to reserve all his strength to man his lines in the event
of an assault, or to force a retreat, should he determine to
evacuate the city.
In this state of things, General Du Portail, who had been
directed to join the southern army, was conducted by secret
ways into the town. He perceived the impossibility of defending the place, and repeated the proposition for attempting a
retreat. This proposition was again rejected; and it only remained to defer the surrender as long as possible, in the vain
hope that some fortunate occurrence might bring relief.
Every day diminished this hope, and added to the difficulties
of the besieged. The admiral took possession of Mount Pleasant,
which induced the immediate evacuation of Lamprere's point;
soon after which the garrison of fort Moultrie, amounting to
about two hundred men,1 surrendered themselves prisoners of
war. On the same day, the cavalry which had
escaped the disaster at Monk's corner, and had been May 7.
reassembled under the command of Colonel White, of New
Jersey, was again surprised and defeated by Lieutenant Colonel
Tarlton at Lanneau's ferry.
The investment of the town was now complete; the advances
were rapid; and it became obvious that the place could be
defended only a few days longer. The besiegers had finished
their third parallel; and by a sap pushed to the dam that supplied the canal with water, had drained it in many places to
the bottom. The garrison, fatigued and worn out with constant duty, was too weak to man the lines sufficiently; their
guns were almost all dismounted; most of the embrasures demolished; their shot nearly expended; their provisions, with
the exception of a few cows, entirely consumed; and the
approaches of the besiegers so near, that their marksmen frequently picked off the men from the guns, and killed 2 any
person who showed himself above the works.
1 After the fleet passed the fort, Colonel Pinckney and a part of the garrison were
withdrawn.
'Colonel Parker and Captain Peyton, two valuable officers from Virgina, fell in
this manner.

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In this state of things, the garrison was summoned, a second
time, to surrender; on which a council was again called, which
advised a capitulation. In pursuance of this advice, General
Lincoln proposed terms which were refused, and hostilities
recommenced.
The besiegers now advanced their works in front of their
third parallel, crossed the canal, pushed a double sap to the
inside of the abattis, and approached within twenty yards of
the American works. Preparations for an assault by sea and
land were making. With less than three thousand men, many
of whom were militia, lines three miles in extent were to be
defended against the flower of the British army, assisted by a
powerful maritime force. Convinced that success was not possible, the citizens prepared a petition to General Lincoln,
entreating him to surrender the town on the terms which had
been offered by the besiegers.
This proposition was made and accepted; and the capitulation
was signed on the i2th of May.
The town, and all public stores were surrendered. The garrison, as well the citizens who had borne arms as the continental troops, militia, and sailors, were to be prisoners of war.
The garrison were to march out of town, and to deposite their
arms in front of their works; but their drums were not to beat
a British march, nor their colours to be reversed. The militia
were to retire to their homes on parole, and their persons and
property, as well as the persons and property of the inhabitants
of the town, to be secure while they strictly adhered to their
paroles.
These terms being agreed on, the garrison laid down their
arms, and General Leslie was appointed to take possession of
the town.
The defence of Charleston was obstinate, but not bloody.
The besiegers conducted their approaches with great caution;
and the besieged, too weak to hazard repeated sorties, kept
within their lines. The loss on both sides was nearly equal.
That of the British was seventy-six killed and one hundred and
eighty-nine wounded; and that of the Americans, excluding
the inhabitants of the town not bearing arms, was ninety-two
killed, and one hundred and forty-eight wounded.

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393

From the official returns made to Sir Henry Clinton by his
deputy adjutant general, the number of prisoners, exclusive
of sailors, amounted to five thousand six hundred and eighteen
men. This report, however, presents a very incorrect view of
the real strength of the garrison. It includes every male adult
inhabitant of the town. The precise number of privates in the
continental regiments, according to the report made to congress by General Lincoln, was one thousand nine hundred
and seventy-seven; of whom five hundred were in the hospital.
The unfortunate are generally condemned; and the loss of
the garrison of Charleston so maimed the force, and palsied
the operations of the American government in the south, that
censure was unsparingly bestowed on the officer who had undertaken and persevered in the defence of that place. In his
justificatory letter to the Commander-in-chief, General Lincoln
detailed at large the motives of his conduct, and stated the
testimony on which those delusive hopes of substantial assistance
were founded, which tempted himn to remain in town, until
the unexpected arrival of the reinforcement from New York
deprived him of the power to leave it.
The importance of that great mart of the southern states,
which had become the depot for the country to a considerable
extent around it; the magazines and military stores there collected, which, from the difficulty of obtaining wagons, could
not be removed; the ships of war, which must be sacrificed
should the town be evacuated; the intention of congress that
the place should be defended; the assurances received that the
garrison should be made up to ten thousand men, of whom
nearly one half would be regular troops; the anxious solicitude
of the government of South Carolina; all concurred to induce
the adoption of a measure which, in its consequences, was
extremely pernicious to the United States. In the opinion of
those who were best enabled to judge of his conduct, General
Lincoln appears to have been completely justified. The confidence of his government, and the esteem of the Commanderin-chief, sustained no diminution.
Sir Henry Clinton was aware of the impression his conquest
had made, and of the value of the first moments succeeding it.

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Calculating on the advantages to be derived from showing an
irresistible force in various parts of the country at the same
time, he made three large detachments from his army;-the
first and most considerable, towards the frontiers of North
Carolina; the second to pass the Saluda to Ninety-Six; and the
third up the Savannah towards Augusta.
Lord Cornwallis, who commanded the northern detachment,
received intelligence, soon after passing the Santee, that Colonel
Buford, with about four hundred men, was retreating in perfect
security towards North Carolina. He detached Lieutenant
Colonel Tarlton with his legion, the infantry being mounted,
in pursuit of this party. That officer, by making a movement
of near one hundred miles in two days, overtook Buford, in
a line of march, at the Waxhaws, and demanded a surrender
on the terms which had been granted to the garrison of Charleston. This was refused. While the flags were passing, Tarlton
continued to make his dispositions for the assault, and, the
instant the truce was over, his cavalry made a furious charge
on the Americans, who had received no orders to engage, and
who seem to have been uncertain whether to defend themselves
or not. In this state of dismay and confusion, some fired on
the assailants, while others threw down their arms and begged
for quarter. None was given. Colonel Buford escaped with
a few cavalry; and about one hundred infantry, who were in
advance, saved themselves by flight; but the regiment was
almost demolished. Tarlton, in his official report, says that one
hundred and thirteen were killed on the spot, one hundred and
fifty so badly wounded as to be incapable of being moved, and
fifty-three were brought away as prisoners. The loss of the
British was five killed and fourteen wounded.
Tarlton gives a very different account of the circumstances
which preceded this massacre. He says that the demand for a
surrender was made long before Buford was overtaken, and
was answered by a defiance; that, on overtaking him, the British
vanguard made prisoners of a serjeant and four light dragoons,
in the presence of the two commanders, who immediately prepared for action; that as he advanced to the charge, when
within fifty paces, the American infantry presented, and were

GEORGE WASHINGTON

395

commanded by their officers to retain their fire until the British
cavalry should be nearer.1
The American officers who survived the carnage of the day,
generally assert that flags passed after being overtaken, that they
had received no orders from Colonel Buford when the charge
was made, and that the fire of their troops was retained until
the enemy was upon them, because they did not think themselves authorised to give it. The facts that Buford's field pieces
were not discharged, and that the loss was so very unequal,
are not to be reconciled with the idea of deliberate preparation
for battle, and justify the belief that the statement made by
the American officers is correct.
After the defeat by Buford, scarcely the semblance of opposition remained in South Carolina and Georgia. The military
force employed by congress was nearly destroyed; the spirit of
resistance seemed entirely broken; and a general disposition to
submit to the victor displayed itself in almost every part of
the country.
The two other detachments saw no appearance of an enemy.
They received the submission of the inhabitants, who either
became neutral by giving their paroles, not to bear arms against
his Britannic Majesty, or took the oaths of allegiance, and
resumed the character of British subjects.
To keep up this disposition, garrisons were posted in different stations, and a series of measures was pursued for the
purpose of settling the civil affairs of the province, and of
giving stability to the conquest which had been made.
So entirely did the present aspect of affairs convince Sir
Henry Clinton of the complete subjugation of the state, and
of the favourable disposition of the people towards the British
government, that he ventured to issue a proclamation, in which he discharged the militia who were June 3.
prisoners from their paroles, with the exception of those who
were taken in Charleston and fort Moultrie, and restored them
'Lieutenant Bowyer, an American officer who was in the engagement, near the
person of Colonel Buford, in a letter which the author has lately seen, states this affair in a manner not much conflicting with the statement made of it by Colonel
Tarlton.

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to all the rights and duties of British subjects; declaring, at
the same time, that such of them as should neglect to return
to their allegiance, should be considered and treated as enemies
and rebels.
This proclamation disclosed to the inhabitants their real situation. It proved that a state of neutrality was not within their
reach; that the evils of war were unavoidable; that they must
arrange themselves on the one side or the other; and that the
only alternative presented to them was, to drive the enemy out
of their country, or take up arms against their countrymen.
With the most sanguine hopes that the southern states would
ne be re-united to the British empire, Sir Henry Clinton embarked for New York, leaving about four
thousand British troops in South Carolina, under the command
of Lord Cornwallis.
His lordship found it necessary to suspend the expedition
he had meditated against North Carolina. The impossibility
of supporting an army in that state before harvest, as well as
the intense heat of the season, required this delay. His first
care was to distribute his troops through South Carolina and
the upper parts of Georgia, so as to promote the great and
immediate objects of enlisting the young men who were willing
to join his standard, of arranging the plan of a militia, and of
collecting magazines at convenient places.
In the mean time, he despatched emissaries to his friends in
North Carolina, to inform them of the necessary delay of his
expedition into their country, and to request them to attend
to their harvest, collect provisions, and remain quiet until late
in August or early in September, when the King's troops would
be ready to enter the province.
The impatience of the royalists, stimulated by the triumph
of their friends in a neighbouring state, and by the necessary
severities of a vigilant government, could not be restrained by
this salutary counsel. Anticipating the immediate superiority
of their party, they could not brook the authority exercised
over them, and broke out into premature and ill concerted
insurrections, which were vigorously encountered, and generally
suppressed. One body of them, however, amounting to about
eight hundred men, led by Colonel Bryan, marched down the

GEORGE WASHINGTON

397

east side of the Yadkin to a British post at the Cheraws, whence
they proceeded to Camden.
Having made his dispositions, and fixed on Camden as the
place for his principal magazines, Cornwallis left the command
of the frontiers to Lord Rawdon, and retired to Charleston for
the purpose of making those farther arrangements of a civil
nature, which the state of affairs and the interest of his sovereign might require.
His lordship, as well as Sir Henry Clinton, seems to have
supposed the state of South Carolina to be as completely subdued in sentiment as in appearance. Impatient to derive active
aids from the new conquest, his measures were calculated to
admit of no neutrality. For some time these measures seemed
to succeed, and professions of loyalty were made in every
quarter. But under this imposing exterior, lurked a mass of
concealed discontent, to which every day furnished new ailment,
and which waited only for a proper occasion to show itself.
The people of the lower parts of South Carolina, though far
from being united, were generally attached to the revolution,
and had entered into the war with zeal. They were conducted
by a high spirited and intelligent gentry, who ardently sought
independence as a real and permanent good.
Several causes had combined to suspend the operation of this
sentiment. Many of their leaders were prisoners; and the brilliant successes of the British arms had filled numbers with
despair. Others were sensible of the inutility of present resistance; and a still greater number, fatigued and harassed with
militia duty, were willing to withdraw from the conflict, and,
as spectators, to await its issue. To compel these men to share
the burdens of the war, was to restore them to their former
friends.
Late in March, General Washington had obtained the consent
of congress to reinforce the southern army with the troops of
Maryland and Delaware, and with the first regiment of artillery.
This detachment was to be commanded by the Baron De Kalb,
a German veteran who had engaged early in the service of the
United States.
Such, however, was the deranged state of American finances,
and such the depression of public credit, that these troops could

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not be put immediately in motion. They were at length
embarked at the Head of Elk, and conveyed by water to Petersburg, in Virginia, whence they marched towards South Carolina.
Their progress was delayed by that difficulty of obtaining subsistence which had induced Lord Cornwallis to suspend the
invasion of North Carolina until harvest should be gathered.
No preparations having been made for them, they were reduced
to the necessity of spreading themselves over the country in
small detachments to collect corn, and grind it for their daily
food. In this manner they proceeded through the upper parts
of North Carolina to Deep river, and encamped near Buffalo
ford in July. At this place the Baron halted for a few days,
in some uncertainty respecting his future course.1
The militia of North Carolina, commanded by General Caswell, were beyond the Pedee, on the road to Camden, and had
nearly consumed the scanty supplies which could be gleaned
from a country that was far from being productive. The Baron
was meditating on a plan for leaving the direct road and moving
up the country to the fertile banks of the Yadkin, when the
approach of Major General Gates was announced by the arrival
of his aid-de-camp, Major Armstrong.'
Aware of the danger to which the loss of Charleston had
exposed that part of the confederacy, congress deemed it of the
utmost importance to select a general for that department, in
whom great military talents should be combined with that
weight of character which might enable him to draw out the
resources of the country. They turned their eyes on Gates;2
and sanguine hopes were entertained that the conqueror of
Burgoyne would prove the saviour of the southern states. On
the i3th of June, he was called to the command in the southern
department, and was directed to repair immediately to the
army. He entered, without loss of time, on the duties of his
station; and, on the 25th of July, reached the camp, where he
was received by the Baron De Kalb with the utmost cordiality
and respect.
The approach of this army, and the information that great
I Journal of Colonel Williams.
I This appointment was made without consulting the Commander-in-chief. He
had determined, if consulted, to recommend General Greene.

GEORGE WASHINGTON

399

exertions were making in Virginia to augment it, revived the
hopes of South Carolina, and brought again into action a spirit
supposed to be extinguished. The British troops having occupied the north-western parts of the state, the most active friends
of the revolution in that quarter had fled from their homes, and
sought an asylum in North Carolina and Virginia. As the
discontents of their countrymen increased, and the prospect of
being supported by regular troops brightened, a small body of
these exiles, amounting to less than two hundred, assembled
together, and choosing Colonel Sumpter, an old continental
officer, for their chief, entered South Carolina. They skirmished
with the royal militia and small corps of regulars on the frontiers, sometimes successfully, and always with the active courage
of men fighting for the recovery of their property. The followers of Sumpter were soon augmented to six hundred men;
and a disposition once more to take up arms showed itself in
various parts of the state. Some corps of militia, which had
been embodied under the authority of Lord Cornwallis, deserted
his standard, and joined their countrymen. Perceiving this
change of temper, the British general thought it necessary to
draw in his out-posts, and to collect his troops into larger bodies.
On taking command of the southern army, General Gates
directed the troops to hold themselves in readiness to march at
a moment's warning; and, on the morning of the 27th, put the
whole in motion. Disregarding the judicious remonstrances
which were made to him against pursuing the direct road, he
determined on taking the nearest route to the advanced post
of the British on Lynch's creek, a few miles from Camden.
The motives assigned by himself for passing through this barren
country were, the necessity of uniting with Caswell, who had
evaded the orders repeatedly given him to join the army, the
danger of dispiriting the troops, and intimidating the people
of the country, by pursuing a route not leading directly towards
the enemy, and the assurances he had received that supplies
would overtake him, and would be prepared for him on the
road.
These assurances were not fulfilled; and, the country being
still more barren than had been anticipated, the distress of the
army was extreme. The soldiers subsisted on a few lean cattle

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found in the woods, and a very scanty supply of green corn
and peaches. Encouraged by the example of their officers, who
shared all their sufferings, and checked occasional murmurs,
they struggled through these difficulties, and, after effecting a
junction' with General Caswell and with Lieutenant Colonel
Porterfield,' the army reached Clermont, sometimes called
Rugely's mills, on the i3th of August. Possession was taken
of this place without any opposition from Lord Rawdon, who,
on the approach of the American army, drew in his out-posts,
and assembled all his forces at Camden.2
The day after the arrival of Gates at Clermont, he was joined
by seven hundred militia from Virginia, commanded by Brigadier General Stevens, an officer of considerable merit, who,
during the campaigns of I777 and I778, had commanded a
continental regiment. On the same day, an express arrived
from Colonel Sumpter, with information that an escort of
clothing, ammunition, and other stores for the garrison at
Camden, was on the way from Ninety-Six, and must pass the
Wateree at a ferry about a mile from Camden, which was covered by a small redoubt on the opposite side of the river. One
hundred regular infantry with two brass field-pieces, were
immediately detached to join Colonel Sumpter, who was ordered
to reduce the redoubt, and to intercept the convoy.3
To attract the attention of the garrison in Camden, and thus
co-operate with the expedition under Sumpter, it was determined in a council of general officers to put the army in motion
that evening, and to take a post about seven miles from Camden
with a deep creek in front.
The sick, the heavy baggage, and the military stores were
ordered under a guard to Waxhaws,4 and the army was directed
to be in readiness to march precisely at ten in the evening in
the following order.
Colonel Armand's legion composed the van. Porterfield's
1 This valuable officer was pressing forward to Charleston when that place surrendered. Continuing to advance, he was within one day's march of Colonel Buford,
when that officer was defeated. Colonel Porterfield still remained on the frontiers of
the Carolinas; and had the address not only to avoid the fate of every other corps
sent to the relief of Charleston, but to subsist his men; and keep up the semblance
of holding that part of South Carolina. Journal of Colonel Williams.
8 Colonel Williams says these orders were not executed.
4 Journal of Colonel Williams.

GEORGE WASHINGTON

4o01

light infantry, reinforced by a company of picked men from
Stevens's brigade, covered the right flank of the legion; while
Major Armstrong's light infantry of North Carolina militia,
reinforced in like manner from Caswell's division, covered the
left. The Maryland division, followed by the North Carolina
and Virginia militia, with the artillery, composed the main body
and rear guard; and the volunteer cavalry were equally distributed on the flanks of the baggage.
In the event of an attack in front by the British cavalry, the
infantry on the flanks were directed to march up, and to continue their fire on the assailants. It was supposed they would
enable Colonel Armand to resist the shock; and. his orders were
positive to maintain his ground against the cavalry, whatever
their numbers might be.1
At the time of communicating these orders to Colonel Otho
H. Williams, the Deputy Adjutant General, Gates, showed him
a rough estimate of the army, making it upwards of seven
thousand. Convinced that this estimate was exaggerated,
Colonel Williams availed himself of his means of information
to make an abstract of the whole, which he presented to the
general, and which exhibited exactly three thousand and fiftytwo in the column of present fit for duty, of whom more than
two-thirds were militia. Gates expressed some surprise at the
numbers, but said, "there are enough for our purpose," and
directed the orders to be issued to the army. About ten at
night, the line of march was taken up, and the army had
advanced about half way to Camden, when a firing commenced
in front.2
Intelligence of the approach of the American army, and of
the defection of the country between Pedee and the Black river,
had been communicated to Lord Cornwallis, and had induced
him to hasten in person to Camden, which place he reached the
day Gates arrived at Clermont.
The British army did not much exceed two thousand men,
of whom about nineteen hundred were regulars; but, as the
whole country was rising, Lord Cornwallis apprehended that
1 Journal of Colonel Williams. 2 Ibid.

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every day would strengthen his enemy, and therefore determined to attack him in his camp; hoping, by a prompt execution
of this resolution, to surprise him. By one of those caprices
of fortune on which great events often depend, he marched
from Camden to attack Gates in Clermont, at the very hour
that Gates had chosen to move his forces from that place
towards Camden.'
About half past two in the morning, the advanced parties of
Aug 6 the hostile armies, to their mutual surprise, met in
Ag. I the woods, and began to skirmish with each other.
Some of Armand's cavalry being wounded by the first fire,
threw the others into disorder, and the whole recoiled so suddenly that the first Maryland regiment, composing the front of
the column was broken, and the whole line thrown into consternation. From this first impression, the raw troops never
recovered. The light infantry, however, particularly Porterfield's corps, behaved so well as to check the advance of the
British. Unfortunately, their gallant commander received a
mortal wound, which compelled him to leave his regiment. Yet
a part of it kept its ground; and, with the aid of the legion
infantry, stopped the British van; upon which order was restored to the American army.
The officers were immediately employed in forming a line of
battle in front. The Maryland division, including the troops
of Delaware, were on the right, the North Carolina militia in
the centre, and the Virginia militia on the left.
In this rencounter some prisoners were made, from one of
whom Colonel Williams drew the information that the British
army, consisting of near three thousand men, commanded by
Lord Cornwallis in person, was in full march five or six hundred
yards in front. This intelligence was immediately communicated to General Gates, who had supposed Lord Cornwallis to
be still in Charleston. The general officers were asssembled in
the rear of the line, and this information submitted to them.
After a short silence, Stevens said, "Gentlemen, is it not too
late to do anything but fight?" No other advice being given,
General Gates, who seems to have been himself disposed to risk
1 Journal of Colonel Williams.

GEORGE WASHINGTON

403

a battle, directed the officers to repair to their respective
commands.
The ground on which the army was drawn up was so narrowed by a marsh on each flank, as to admit of removing the
first Maryland brigade, so as to form a second line about two
hundred yards in rear of the first. The artillery was placed in
the centre of the first line, and Armstrong's light infantry was
ordered to cover a small interval between the flank of the left
wing and the marsh.
Frequent skirmishes occurred during the night between the
advanced parties, with scarcely any other effect than to discover
the situation of the armies, evince the intention of the generals,
and serve as a prelude to the events of the succeeding morning.
At dawn of day the British appeared in front, advancing in
column. Lieutenant Colonel Webster commanded on the right,
and Lord Rawdon on the left. The seventy-first regiment
composed the reserve. Four field pieces were attached to the
left, and'one to the corps de reserve.
Captain Singleton opened some field pieces on the front of the
column, at the distance of about two hundred yards, soon after
which the American left was ordered to commence the action.
It was then perceived that the British right was advancing in
line; and as Stevens led on his brigade in good order, Colonel
Williams advanced in front with a few volunteers, intending
by a partial fire to extort that of the enemy at some distance,
and thereby diminish its effect on the militia. The experiment
did not succeed. The British rushed forward with great impetuosity, firing and huzzaing at the same time; and the terrified
militia, disregarding the exertions of Stevens, who, in a firm
tone of courage, endeavoured to inspire them with confidence
in the bayonets they had just received, threw down their loaded
muskets, fled from the field with the utmost precipitation, and
were followed by the light infantry of Armstrong. The whole
North Carolina division, except one regiment commanded by
Colonel Dixon, an old continental officer, which was posted
nearest the continental troops, followed the shameful example.
Other parts of the same brigade, which was commanded by
Gregory, paused for an instant; but the terror of their brethren
was soon communicated to them, and they also threw away

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their arms, and sought for safety in flight. Their general, while
endeavouring to rally them, was dangerously wounded.
Tarlton's legion charged them as they broke, and pursued
them in their flight. Gates, in person, assisted by their generals,
made several efforts to rally the militia; but the alarm in their
rear still continuing, they poured on like a torrent, and bore him
with them. He hastened with General Caswell to Clermont,
in the hope of stopping a sufficient number of them at their
old encampment, to cover the retreat of the continental troops;
but this hope was entirely disappointed. Believing the continental troops also to be dispersed, he gave up all as lost, and
retreated with a few friends to Charlotte, about eighty miles
from the field of battle, where he left General Caswell to
assemble the neighbouring militia, and proceeded himself to
Hillsborough, in order to concert some plan of farther defence
with the government.
Entirely deserted by the militia who composed the whole
centre and left wing of the army, the continental troops, with
the Baron De Kalb at their head, were left without orders, under
circumstances which might have justified a retreat. But taking
counsel from their courage, and seeing only the path of duty,
they preferred the honourable and dangerous part of maintaining their position. They were charged by Lord Rawdon about
the time the militia on their left were broken by Webster; but
the charge was received with unexpected firmness. The bayonet
was occasionally resorted to by both parties, and the conflict
was maintained for near three-quarters of an hour with equal
obstinacy. During this time, the regiment on the left of the
second Maryland brigade being covered by the reserve, so that
it could be only engaged in front, gained ground and made
prisoners.
The reserve, having its left entirely exposed, was flanked by
the British right wing under Webster; who, after detaching a
part of his cavalry and light infantry in pursuit of the flying
militia, wheeled on that brigade, and attacking it in front and
round the left flank, threw it into some disorder. The soldiers
were, however, quickly rallied, and renewed the action with
unimpaired spirit. Overpowered by numbers, they were again
broken, and by the exertion of their officers were again formed,

GEORGE WASHINGTON

405

so as still to maintain the combat, and still to cover the flank
of their brethren of the second brigade, who were in a manner
blended with the enemy, and who kept up a desperate conflict
in the hope of yet obtaining the victory.
The fire of the whole British army was now directed against
these two devoted brigades. They had not lost an inch of
ground when Lord Cornwallis, perceiving that they were without cavalry, pushed his dragoons upon them, and at the same
instant, charged them with the bayonet. These gallant troops
were no longer able to keep the field. They were at length
broken; and, as they did not give way until intermingled with
the enemy, they dispersed and fled in confusion. Before they
were reduced to this last extremity, the Baron De Kalb, who
fought on foot with the second Maryland brigade, fell under
eleven wounds. His aid-de-camp, Lieutenant Colonel Du
Buysson, received him in his arms, announced his rank and
nation to the surrounding foe, and begged that they would
spare his life. While thus generously exposing himself to save
his friend, he received several wounds, and, with his general,
was taken prisoner. The Baron expired in a few hours, and
spent his last breath in dictating a letter, expressing the warmest affection for the officers and men of his division, and the
most exalted admiration of their courage and good conduct.'
Never was a victory more complete. Every corps was broken
and dispersed in the woods. The general officers were divided
from their men; and, except Rutherford of the North Carolina
militia who was made a prisoner, reached Charlotte at different
times. Colonel Williams, who witnessed the whole battle, and
bore a conspicuous part in it, concludes his very animated
description of it, with the observation, that "if in this affair
the militia fled too soon, the regulars may be thought almost
as blameable for remaining too long on the field; especially after
all hope of victory must have been despaired of." He censures
freely the conduct of the brigadiers, who gave, he says, no
orders whatever to their brigades.
About two hundred wagons, with a great part of the baggage,
military stores, small arms, and all the artillery, fell into the
'Journal of Colonel Williams.

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hands of the conqueror. The loss of men could never be accurately ascertained, as no returns were received from the militia.
Of the North Carolina division, between three and four hundred were made prisoners, and between sixty and one hundred
were wounded. Of the Virginia militia, three were wounded
on the field; and, as they were the first to fly, not many were
taken.
For the numbers engaged, the loss sustained by the regulars
was considerable. It amounted to between three and four hundred men, of whom a large portion were officers. The British
accounts state the loss of the American army at eight or nine
hundred killed, and about one thousand prisoners; while their
own is said to be only three hundred and twenty-five, of whom
two hundred and forty-five were wounded. Although many
of the militia were killed during the flight, this account is
probably exaggerated. It would seem too, that while the continental troops kept the field, the loss on both sides, in that part
of the action, must have been nearly equal.
On his retreat, the day of the battle, General Gates received
information of the complete success of Sumpter. That officer
had, on the evening that Lord Cornwallis marched from Camden, reduced the redoubt on the Wateree, captured the guard,
and intercepted the escort with the stores.
This gleam of light cheered the dark gloom which enveloped
his affairs but for a moment. He was soon informed that this
corps also was defeated, and entirely dispersed.
On hearing of the disaster which had befallen Gates, Sumpter
began to retreat up the south side of the Wateree. Believing
himself out of danger, he had halted on the twenty-eighth,
during the heat of the day, near the Catawba ford, to give his
harassed troops some repose. At that place he was overtaken
by Tarlton, who had been detached in pursuit of him on the
morning of the i7th, and who, advancing with his accustomed
celerity, entered the American camp so suddenly, as in a great
measure to cut off the men from their arms. Some slight
resistance made from behind the wagons was soon overcome,
and the Americans fled precipitately to the river and woods.
Between three and four hundred of them were killed and
wounded; their baggage, artillery, arms and ammunition were

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lost; and the prisoners and stores they had taken were recovered.
This advantage was gained with the loss of only nine men
killed and six wounded.
Two videttes had been placed by Sumpter,* on the road along
which Tarlton had advanced, who fired upon-his van and killed
one of his dragoons, upon which they were both sabred. We
are informed by Colonel Tarlton that the inquiries made by
Sumpter respecting the two shots, were answered by an assurance from an officer, just returned from the advanced sentries,
that the militia were firing at cattle.
Intelligence of this disaster reached Charlotte next day. Generals Smallwood and Gist were then arrived at that place, and
about one hundred and fifty straggling, dispirited, half famished officers and soldiers had also dropped in. It was thought
adviseable to retreat immediately to Salisbury. From that place,
General Gates directed the remnant of the troops to march to
Hillsborough, where he was endeavouring to assemble another
army, which might enable him yet to contend for the southern
states.

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CHAPTER XVIII
WHILE disasters thus crowded on each other in the southern
states, the Commander-in-chief found himself sur780 rounded with difficulties, which required his utmost
exertions to avoid calamities equally distressing. His urgent
requisitions for men to supply the places of those who were
leaving the service, were not complied with, and the soldiers
who remained, could scarcely be preserved from' either perishing
with cold and hunger, or dispersing and living on plunder.
General Greene and Colonel Wadsworth, who had, for the
preceding year, been at the head of the quartermaster and commissary departments, possessed distinguished merit, and had
employed assistants of unquestionable ability and integrity. Yet,
for a great part of the campaign, the rations were frequently
reduced, and the army was rarely supplied with provisions for
more than a few days in advance. Soon after coming into
winter quarters, the magazines were exhausted, and afforded
neither meat nor flour to be delivered to the men.
This state of things had been long foreseen; and all the means
in the power of the Commander-in-chief had been used to
prevent it. Repeated representations of the actual famine with
which the army was threatened, had been made to congress,
and to the state governments; but no adequate relief was afforded; and such was the condition of the finances, so embarrassing the state of affairs, that it was perhaps attainable only
by measures which the governments could not venture to adopt.
The rapid depreciation of the continental currency, had long
been viewed with apprehensive anxiety by the enlightened
friends of the revolution, and various unsuccessful expedients
had been essayed for the purpose of checking its progress. All
perceived that the great quantity in circulation was the principal cause of the diminution of its value; and congress had
resolved not to exceed two hundred millions of dollars in their
emissions. In the mean time, the utmost endeavours were used

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to defer an evil so justly dreaded, and among the expedients
employed, was that of withholding from the public agents, the
money which was necessary for public purposes. This unwise
experiment, while it defeated its own object, threatened the dissolution of the American army.
The difference between the value of the article at the times
of contract and of payment was soon perceived, and, of course,
influenced its price. But this was the least mischievous consequence of this mistaken policy. The public agents contracted
enormous debts which they were unable to discharge. Repeated
disappointments destroyed their credit; and, towards the close
of the year 1779, they found it impracticable to obtain supplies
for the subsistence of the army.
From these causes, the contracts entered into could not be
co-extensive with the public wants; and many of those which
were made were not complied with.
In this critical state of things, an entire revolution was made
in the commissary department. Such was the prejudice against
the system adopted by Great Britain, for supplying by contract,
that it had been usual to allow, as a compensation to the commissary, a stipulated commission on all the monies expended on
public account. After some time, this allowance was supposed
to be an inducement to purchase at high prices; and an arrangement was made on the first of January, by which the commissary general was to receive a fixed nominal salary in the
paper currency, and was permitted to appoint assistants whose
compensations were also fixed, and who were to defray, out of
those compensations, all the expenses attending the transactions
of the business. The practice of allowing them rations and
forage was discontinued.
This new system was unfortunately so modified as to increase
the embarrassments of the department. It was found difficult
to obtain assistants and agents for the compensation allowed;
and those who were willing to be employed, were unequal to
the duties assigned them.
For several days, the soldiers were reduced to half allowance,
and sometimes to less. At length, affairs came to the crisis
which had long been threatened; and, early in January, a letter
was received from Colonel Wadsworth, informing the general

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that it was absolutely out of his power to supply the army
longer with meat, as he was without money, and had totally
exhausted his credit. About the same time, the assistant commissary, residing in camp, gave notice that his stock of provisions was on the point of being expended, and that he had no
immediate prospect of a farther supply.
This state of things, compelled the Commander-in-chief to
adopt efficacious measures, to relieve the immediate and pressing
wants of his soldiers. He required from each county in the
state of Jersey, a quantity of meat and flour proportioned to
its resources, to be raised and forwarded to the army within a
limited time, not exceeding six days. In a circular letter addressed to the magistrates, he stated the pressing wants of the
army, and the necessity of resorting to coercion should his
requisition fail.
To the honour of the magistrates and people of New Jersey,
although their country was much exhausted, the supplies required were instantly furnished, and a temporary relief obtained.
The patient and uncomplaining fortitude with which the
soldiers bore their sufferings, was strong evidence of their
patriotism, and could not fail to make a deep impression on
their general. But while their virtues excited his sensibilities,
he expressed his fears very freely to congress, that they might
be too severely tried.
The unusual severity of the winter, seemed to furnish an
opportunity for active enterprise, which the Commander-inchief observed, without being able to improve. The garrison
of New York and its immediate dependencies, was supposed
to be reduced to ten or eleven thousand effectives; and the
security heretofore derived from its insular situation no longer
existed. The ice was so strong that the whole army, with its
train of wagons and artillery, might pass over without danger.
This circumstance afforded a glorious occasion for striking a
blow, which, if successful, would most probably terminate the
war. The effort would seem not to have exceeded the strength
of America, could that strength have been exerted in proper
season; but the government possessed neither sufficient energy
nor concentration of power to call it forth; and this opportunity passed away, as many which present themselves in the

GEORGE WASHINGTON

4Ii

course of human affairs, must pass away, if those who should
take advantage of them, only begin to deliberate about making
preparations in the season for action.
The force under- the immediate command of General Washington, was decidedly inferior to that in New York; and so
far was he from having reason to expect immediate reinforcements, that congress had not agreed'on making a requisition for
them. In addition to this feebleness in point of numbers, the
soldiers were not half clothed; provisions for immediate use
could be obtained only by contributions from the people; the
quartermaster's department was unable to put an army in motion; and the military chest did not contain a dollar.
Under the pressure of this combination of discouraging circumstances, the active mind of Washington still looked forward
to the possibility of deriving some advantage from the exposed
situation of his adversary.
The troops on Staten Island were computed at one thousand
or twelve hundred men; and the firm bridge of ice now uniting
that island to the Jersey shore, seemed to furnish an opportunity
for bearing off this corps. General Washington determined to
make the attempt with two thousand five hundred men, to be
commanded by Major General Lord Stirling. The more distant
troops moved down on sleds; and, to favour a surprise, the
opinion was inculcated that they only constituted a relief for
the detachment already on the lines.
On the night of the i4th of January, Lord Stirling moved
over from De Hart's point; and, detaching Lieutenant Colonel
Willet to Decker's house, where Buskirk's regiment was stationed, proceeded himself to the watering place, where the main
body was posted. Notwithstanding the precautions which had
been taken, the alarm had been given at each post, and the
troops had saved themselves in their works; so that only a few
prisoners were made. Contrary to the intelligence previously
received, the communication with New York was still open;
and the works appeared too strong to justify the hazard of
attempting to carry them by assault.
The object of the expedition being unattainable, Lord Stirling
commenced his retreat, which was effected with inconsiderable
loss. A body of cavalry, which charged his rear, was repulsed;

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but, from the intenseness of the cold, and the defectiveness of
his means to protect his men from it, some of them were frost
bitten, and a few stragglers were made prisoners.
The excessive cold continuing, the rivers were soon afterwards
completely blocked up. Even arms of the sea were passable
on the ice; and the islands about the mouth of the Hudson,
presented the appearance of one whole and unbroken continent.
This state of things produced a great degree of suffering among
all classes in New York. The supplies usually received by water
failed totally, and a great scarcity of provisions and of fuel
was the consequence. To increase this scarcity, the American
troops on the lines were so disposed as to interrupt the communication between the country and the town; and these
arrangements produced a partisan war, in which the advantage
was rather on the side of the British.
In one of the most important of these skirmishes, Captain
Roberts, of Massachusetts, with fourteen of his men, were killed
on the spot; seventeen were wounded, of whom three died in
a few days; and Lieutenant Colonel Thompson, of Massachusetts, who commanded the party, two captains, four subalterns,
and ninety non-commissioned officers and privates were made
prisoners.
The emission of the full sum of two hundred millions of
dollars in continental bills of credit, which congress had solemnly resolved not to exceed, had been completed in November,
1779, and the money was expended. The requisitions on the
states to replenish the treasury by taxes were not fully complied
with; and, had they even been strictly observed, would not have
produced a sum equal to the public expenditure. It was therefore necessary to devise other measures for the prosecution of
the war. During the distresses which brought the army to the
brink of dissolution, these measures were under consideration.
So early as December, I779, congress had determined to change
the mode of supplying the army from purchases to requisitions
of specific articles on the several states. As preliminary to this
system, commissioners were appointed to make the estimates,
and to introduce every practicable reform in the expenditures.
This subject was under deliberation until the a5th of February,
when sundry resolutions were passed, apportioning on the states

GEORGE WASHINGTON

4I3

their respective quotas of provisions, spirits, and forage, for the
ensuing campaign. The value of the several articles was estimated in specie; and assurances were given that accounts
between the states should be regularly kept, and finally settled
in Spanish milled dollars.
For the purpose of inducing and facilitating a compliance
with these requisitions, congress also resolved, "cthat any state
which shall have taken the necessary measures for furnishing
its quota, and have given notice thereof to congress, shall be
authorized to prohibit any continental quartermaster or commissary from purchasing within its limits."
These resolutions, constituting the basis of a new system on
which the future subsistence of the army was essentially to
depend, were too deeply interesting not to receive the anxious
attention of the Commander-in-chief. With regret, he communicated to congress the radical defects he perceived in their
arrangements, with his apprehensions that this untried scheme
would fail in practice.
His judgment, and the judgment of all men engaged in high
and responsible situations, was decidedly in favour of conducting the war on a national rather than on a state system. But,
independent of this radical objection, economy had been so
much more consulted than the probable necessities of the army,
that, in almost every article, the estimate had fallen far short
of the demand to be reasonably expected.
The total omission to provide means for supplying occasional
deficiencies from the surplus resources of any particular state,
was an error of still greater magnitude. It was obvious that
the demand in any state which should become the theatre of
war, would be much greater than its quota; and experience had
shown that the carriage of specific articles from distant places
was always difficult and expensive, and sometimes impracticable.
Yet no means were adopted to supply such extraordinary demand, whatever might be the resources of the country. A
still more radical objection to the system was the principle,
enabling any state which should take means to comply with the
requisition, and should notify those means to the government
of the United States, to prohibit the continental agents from
making any purchases within its territory. Amonig the states

4I14

THE LIFE OF

which adopted the proposition of congress was New Jersey, in
which the largest division of the army was stationed. Its legislature passed an act prohibiting the purchase of provisions
within its jurisdiction by the staff of the continental line, under
severe penalties; and refused to authorize its own agents to
provide for any emergency however pressing. It was an additional objection to these requisitions, that they specified no
periods of the year within which certain portions of the articles
demanded should be raised, and consequently might be complied with, although the army should be left destitute of every
necessary for a considerable part of the campaign.
These suggestions, however, with others less material to the
military operations, did not receive the attention which was
due to their importance. A disposition in the members of
congress, growing inevitably out of the organization of the
government, to consult the will of their respective states, and
to prefer that will to any other object, had discovered itself at
an early period, and had gained strength with time. The state
of the national treasury was calculated to promote this disposition. It was empty, and could be replenished only by taxes,
which congress had not the power to impose; or by new emissions of bills of credit, which the government had pledged the
public faith not to make, and which would rest for their redemption only on that faith, which would be violated in the
very act of their emission. Under these circumstances, it required a degree of energy seldom found, to struggle with surrounding difficulties for the preservation of a general system,
and to resist the temptation to throw the nation at the feet of
the states, in whom the vital principle of power, the right to
levy taxes, was exclusively vested. While the continental currency preserved its value, this essential defect of the constitution
was, in some measure, concealed. The facility with which
money was obtained from the press, was a temporary substitute
for the command of the resources of the country. But when
this expedient failed, it was scarcely possible to advance a single
step, but under the guidance of the respective states.
Whatever might be the future effect of this system it was
impracticable to bring it into immediate operation. The legislatures of the several states, by whom it was to be adopted, and

GEORGE WASHINGTON4i

4x5

carried into execution, were, many of them, not then in session;
and were to meet at different times through the ensuing spring.
It was consequently to be expected that great part of the summer would pass away before the supplies to be raised by the
measure, could be brought into use. In the mean time, and
until a new scheme of finance, which accompanied the requisition of specific articles, should be tried, there was no regular
provision for the army. Bills to the amount of ~ioo,ooo sterling, payable at six months' sight, were drawn on Mr. Jay, and
others to the same amount, on Mr. Laurens, who were empowered to negotiate loans in Europe. These bills were sold in small
sums on pressing occasions; and the loan offices remained open
for the purpose of borrowing from individuals.
This new scheme of finance was a second essay to substitute
credit unsupported by solid funds, and resting solely on the
public faith, for money.
The vast quantity of bills unavoidably emitted before the
establishment of regular governments possessing sufficient energy
to enforce the collection of taxes, or to provide for their redemption, and before the governments of Europe were sufficiently confident of their stability to afford them aid or credit,
was assigned by congress as the principal cause of that depreciation which had taken place in the continental currency. The
United States were now, they said, under different circumstances. Their independence was secure; their civil governments
were established and vigorous; and the spirit of their citizens
ardent for exertion. The government being thus rendered competent to the object, it was necessary to reduce the quantity
of paper in circulation, and to appropriate funds that should
ensure the punctual redemption of the bills.
For these purposes, the several states were required to continue
to bring into the continental treasury, monthly, from February
to April inclusive, their full quotas of fifteen millions of dollars.
In complying with this requisition, one Spanish milled dollar
was to be received in lieu of forty dollars of the paper currency.
The bills so brought in were not to be reissued, but destroyed;
and other bills, not to exceed one dollar for every twenty
received in discharge of taxes, were to be emitted.
These bills were to be redeemable within six years, and were

4I6

THE LIFE OF

to bear an interest of five per centum per annum, to be paid
at the time of their redemption in specie, or, at the election of
the holder, annually, in bills of exchange drawn by the United
States on their commissioners in Europe at four shillings and
six pence sterling for each dollar. They were to be issued in
ascertained proportions on the funds of the several states, with
a collateral security on the part of the government, to pay the
quota of any particular state, which the events of the war might
render incapable of complying with its own engagements. The
bills were to be deposited in the continental loan-offices of the
several states, and were to be signed only as the money then in
circulation should be brought in by taxes or otherwise. After
being signed, six-tenths of them were to be delivered to the
states on whose funds they were to be issued, and the remaining
four-tenths to be retained for the use of the continent.
The operation of this scheme of finance was necessarily suspended by the same causes which suspended that for requiring
specific articles. It depended on the sanction and co-operation
of the several state legislatures, many of which were yet to
convene.
As it would be impracticable to maintain the value of the
money about to be emitted, should the states continue to issue
bills of credit, they were earnestly requested to suspend future
emissions, and to call the current paper out of circulation. But
the time for this measure was not yet arrived, and many of
the states continued the use of the press till late in the following
year.
The establishment of the army for the ensuing campaign, was
fixed at thirty-five thousand two hundred and eleven men, and
the measures for recruiting it were founded on the state system,
which was become entirely predominant.
The few intelligent statesmen who could combine practical
good sense with patriotism, perceived the dangerous inefficacy
of a system which openly abandoned the national character, and
proceeded on the principle that the American confederacy was
no more than an alliance of independent nations.
That great delays would be experienced, that the different
parts of the plan would be acted on too unequally and too
uncertainly to furnish a solid basis for military calculations,

GEORGE WASHINGTON

4I7

that the system would be totally deranged in its execution, were
mischiefs foreseen and lamented by many, as resulting inevitably from a course of measures to which the government of
the Union was under the painful necessity of submitting.
"Certain I am," said the Commander-in-chief, in a confidential letter to a member of the national legislature, "that unless
congress speaks in a more decisive tone; unless they are vested
with powers by the several states, competent to the great purposes of the war, or assume them as matter of right, and they
and the states respectively act with more energy than they
hitherto have done, our cause is lost. We can no longer drudge
on in the old way. By ill-timing the adoption of measures, by
delays in the execution of them, or by unwarrantable jealousies;
we incur enormous expenses, and derive no benefit from them.
One state will comply with a requisition from congress; another
neglects to do it; a third executes it by halves; and all differ in
the manner, the matter, or so much in point of time, that we
are all working up hill, and, while such a system as the present
one, or rather want of one, prevails, we ever shall be unable
to apply our strength or resources to any advantage.
"This, my dear sir, is plain language to a member of congress;
but it is the language of truth and friendship. It is the result
of long thinking, close application, and strict observation. I
see one head gradually changing into thirteen; I see one army
branching into thirteen; and, instead of looking up to congress
as the supreme controlling power of the United States, consider
themselves as dependent on their respective states. In a word,
I see the power of congress declining too fast for the respect
which is due to them as the great representative body of America, and am fearful of the consequences."
But whatever might be his objections to the proposed system,
General Washington was unremitting in his endeavours to render the plan. perfect in detail, and to give to its execution all
the aid which his situation and influence enabled him to afford.
The distresses of the army for food, which had found temporary relief in the particular exertions of the magistrates and
people of New Jersey, soon returned; and it became once more
necessary, even after the magazines had been in some degree
replenished, to recur to the same persons for assistance. The

4I8

THE LIFE OF

supplies of forage had failed, and a great proportion of the
horses had perished, or been rendered unfit for use. Neither
funds nor credit were possessed for the purchase of others, and
the quarter-master-general found himself unable to transport
provisions from remote magazines into camp. This circumstance reduced the Commander-in-chief to the painful necessity
of calling on the patriotism of private citizens, under the penalty
of a military impressment, should a voluntary contribution be
refused, for those means of conveyance which the government
could not supply.
The want of food was not the only difficulty to be surmounted. Others of a serious nature presented themselves. The
pay of an officer was reduced by the depreciation of the currency, to such a miserable pittance as to be unequal to the supply
of the most moderate demands. The pay of a major general
would no longer hire an express rider, and that of a captain
would not purchase the shoes in which he marched. The American officers were not rich; and many of them had expended
their little all in the service. If they had exhausted their private
funds, or if they possessed none, they could rely only on the
state to which they belonged for such clothing as the state might
be willing or able to furnish. These supplies were so insufficient
and unequal, as to produce extreme dissatisfaction. In the lines
of some of the states, the officers gave notice in a body, of their
determination to resign on a given day, if some decent and
certain provision should not be made for them. The remonstrances of the Commander-in-chief produced an offer to serve
as volunteers until their successors should be appointed; and,
on the rejection of this proposition, they were with difficulty
induced to remain in service.
Under these complicated embarrassments, it required all that
enthusiastic patriotism which pre-eminently distinguishes the
soldier of principle; all that ardent attachment to the cause of
their country which originally brought them into the field, and
which their sufferings could not diminish; all the influence of
the Commander-in-chief, whom they almost adored; to retain
in the service men who felt themselves neglected, and who
believed themselves to be the objects of the jealousy of their
country, rather than of its gratitude.

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419

Among the privates, causes of disgust grew out of the very
composition of the army, which increased the dissatisfaction
produced by their multiplied wants.
The first effort made to enlist troops for the war, had, in some
degree, succeeded. While these men found themselves obliged
to continue in service without compensation, and often without
the common necessaries of life, they perceived the vacant ranks
in their regiments filled up by men who were to continue only
for a few months, and who received bounties for that short
service, from individuals or from the states, which were of great
real value, and which appeared to soldiers not acquainted with
the actual state of depreciation, to be immense. They could
not fail to compare situations, and to repine at engagements
which deprived them of advantages which they saw in possession of others. Many were induced to contest those engagements;1 many to desert a service in which they experienced such
irritating inequalities; and all felt with the more poignant indignation, those distressing failures in the commissary department, which so frequently recurred.
In consequence of the strong representations made to congress on these various causes of disquiet, a committee of three
members repaired to camp for the purpose of consulting with
the Commander-in-chief on such arrangements as the means in
possession of the government would enable it to make, and the
present state of the army might require. In representing the
condition of the troops, they said, "That the army was unpaid
for five months; that it seldom had more than six days provisions in advance, and was on several occasions, for several successive days, without meat; that the army was destitute of
forage; that the medical department had neither tea, chocolate,
wine, or spirituous liquors of any kind; that every department
of the army was without money, and had not even the shadow
of credit left; that the patience of the soldiers, borne down by
the pressure of complicated sufferings, was on the point of being
exhausted."
1 In some instances, the civil power of the state in which such soldiers happened
to be, attempted to interfere and to discharge even those belonging to the lines of other
states, who asserted their right to be discharged. It was with some difficulty the
general could arrest this dangerous interposition.

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To relieve this gloomy state of things by transfusing into it a
ray of hope for the future, a resolution was passed, declaring
that congress would make good to the line of the army, and to
the independent corps thereof, the deficiency of their original
pay, which had been occasioned by the depreciation of the
continental currency; and that the money or other articles heretofore received, should be considered as advanced on account,
to be comprehended in the settlement to be finally made. The
benefits of this resolution were confined to those who were
then in actual service, or should thereafter come into it, and
who were engaged for the war or for three years.
This resolution was published in general orders, and had considerable influence on the army, but not sufficient to remove the
various causes of dissatisfaction which existed, and were continually multiplying. The engagement to make good the depreciation of their pay, was an act of justice too long withheld;
and no promise for the future, could supply the place of present
comfortable subsistence. No hope was given that their condition, in this respect, would be improved. For a considerable
time, the troops received only from one-half to one-eighth of a
ration of meat and, at length, were several days without a single
pound of that necessary article.
This long course of suffering had unavoidably produced some
relaxation of discipline, and had gradually soured the minds of
the soldiers to such a degree, that their discontents broke out
into actual mutiny.
On the 2 5th of May, two regiments belonging to Connecticut
paraded under arms with a declared resolution to return home, or
to obtain subsistence at the point of the bayonet. The soldiers of
the other regiments, though not actually joining the mutineers,
showed no disposition to suppress the mutiny. By great exertions
on the part of the officers, aided by the appearance of a neighbouring brigade of Pennsylvania, then commanded by Colonel
Stewart, the leaders were secured, and the two regiments brought
back to their duty. Some sentiments, however, were disclosed
by the soldiers, in answer to the remonstrances of their officers,
of a serious and alarming nature. Their pay was now five
months in arrear, and the depreciation of the money, they said,
was such, that it would be worth nothing when received. When

GEORGE WASHINGTON

4.21

reminded of the late resolution of congress for making good the
loss sustained by depreciation, of the reputation acquired by
their past good conduct, and of the value of the object for which
they were contending; they answered that their sufferings were
too great to be longer supported; that they wanted present relief; and must have some present substantial recompense for
their services. A paper was found in the brigade, which appeared to have been brought by some emissary from New York,
stimulating the troops to the abandonment of the cause in which
they were engaged.
The discontents of the army, and the complaints excited in
the country by the frequent requisitions on the people of New
Jersey, had been communicated, with such exaggeration, to the
officer commanding in New York, as to induce the opinion that
the American soldiers were ready to desert their standards; and
the people of New Jersey to change their govern- J 6
ment. To countenance these dispositions, General
Knyphausen embarked at Staten Island, and landed in the night
with about five thousand men at Elizabethtown Point, in New
Jersey. Early next morning he marched towards Springfield, by
the way of Connecticut Farms, but soon perceived that the real
temper, both of the country and the army, had been misunderstood.
On the appearance of the enemy, the militia assembled with
alacrity, and aided the small patrolling parties of continental
troops in harassing him on his march from Elizabethtown to the
Connecticut Farms, a distance of five or six miles, where a halt
was made. In a spirit of revenge, unworthy the general of an
army, more in the character of Tryon who was present, than of
Knyphausen who commanded, this settlement was reduced to
ashes.'
From the Farms, Knyphausen proceeded to Springfield. The
'This circumstance would scarcely have deserved notice had it not been accompanied by one of those melancholy events, which even war does not authorise, and
which made, at the time, a very deep impression.
Mrs. Caldwell, the wife of the clergyman of the village, had been induced to remain
in her house, under the persuasion that her presence might protect it from pillage, and
that her person could not be endangered, as Colonel Dayton who commanded the militia determined not to stop in the settlement. 'While sitting in the midst of her children, with a sucking infant in her arms, a soldier came up to the window and discharged his musket at her. She received the ball in her bosom, and instantly expired.

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Jersey brigade, commanded by General Maxwell, and the militia
of the adjacent country, took an advantageous position at that
place, and seemed determined to defend it. Knyphausen halted
in its neighbourhood, and remained on his ground until night.
Having received intelligence of this movement, General
Washington put his army in motion early in the same morning
that Knyphausen marched from Elizabethtown Point, and advanced to the Short Hills, in the rear of Springfield, while the
June 8. British were in the neighbourhood of that place. Dispositions were made for an engagement the next
morning, but Knyphausen retired in the night to the place of
his disembarkation.
General Washington continued on the hills near Springfield,
too weak to hazard an engagement, but on ground chosen by
himself. His continental troops did not exceed three thousand
men. A return of the whole army under his immediate command, made on the 3d of June, exhibited in the column, of
present, fit for duty, only three thousand seven hundred and
sixty, rank and file. So reduced was that force on which
America relied for independence. "You but too well know,"
said General Washington in a letter to a friend, giving an account of this incursion, "and will regret with me the cause which
justifies this insulting manceuvre on the part of the enemy. It
deeply affects the honour of the states, a vindication of which
could not be attempted in our present circumstances, without
most intimately hazarding their security; at least so far as it
may depend on the preservation of the army. Their character,
their interest, their all that is dear, call upon them in the most
pressing manner, to place the army immediately on a respectable
footing."
The long continuance of Knyphausen at Elizabethtown,
strengthened a suspicion that Sir Henry Clinton was about to
return from South Carolina, and intended, without disembarking his troops, to proceed up the Hudson to West Point; and
that the movement into Jersey was a feint designed to cover
the real object.
The letters of the Commander-in-chief, addressed about this
period, to those who might be supposed to possess influence in
the government of the union, or in those of the states, exhibit

GEORGE WASHINGTON

423

his conjectures respecting the designs of his adversary, as well as
his apprehensions from the condition of his own army. To the
committee of congress, in camp, he observed, "General Knyphausen still continues in the Jerseys with all the force which can
be spared from New York, a force greatly superior to ours.
Should Sir Henry join him, their superiority will be decided,
and equal to almost any thing they may think proper to attempt. The enemy, it is true, are at this time inactive; but
their continuance in their present position, proves that they
have some project of importance in contemplation. Perhaps
they are only waiting until the militia grow tired and return
home, (which they are doing every hour,) to prosecute their
designs with the less opposition. This would be a critical moment for us. Perhaps they are waiting the arrival of Sir
Henry Clinton, either to push up the North River against the
Highland posts, or to bend their whole force against this army.
In either case, the most disastrous consequences are to be apprehended. You, who are well acquainted with our situation, need
no arguments to evince the danger.
"The militia of this state have run to arms, and behaved with
an ardour and spirit of which there are few examples. But perseverance, in enduring the rigours of military service, is not to
be expected from those who are not by profession obliged to it.
The reverse of this opinion has been a great misfortune in our
affairs, and it is high time we should recover from an error of
so pernicious a nature. We must absolutely have a force of a
different composition, or we must relinquish the contest. In a
few days, we may expect to rely almost entirely on our continental force, and this, from your own observation, is totally
inadequate to our safety. The exigency calls loudly on the
states to carry all the recommendations of the committee into
the most vigorous and immediate execution; but more particularly that for completing our batteries by a draught with all
possible expedition."
In this precise state of things, he received intelligence of the
return of Sir Henry Clinton from the conquest of June i8.
South Carolina.
The regular force in New York and its dependencies was now
estimated at twelve thousand men, great part of whom might

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be drawn into the field for any particular purpose, because Sir
Henry Clinton could command about four thousand militia
and refugees for garrison duty.
In communicating to congress the appearance of the British
fleet off the Hook, General Washington observed, "a very
alarming scene may shortly open, and it will be happy for us if
we shall be able to steer clear of some serious misfortune in this
quarter. I hope the period has not yet arrived, which will
convince the different states by fatal experience, that some of
them have mistaken the true situation of this country. I flatter
myself, however, that we may still retrieve our affairs if we have
but a just sense of them, and are actuated -by a spirit of liberal
policy and exertion equal to the emergency. Could we once see
this spirit generally prevailing, I should not despair of a prosperous issue of the campaign. But there is no time to be lost.
The danger is imminent and pressing; the obstacles to be surmounted are great and numerous; and our efforts must be instant, unreserved, and universal."
On the arrival of Sir Henry Clinton, the design of acting
offensively in the Jerseys was resumed; but, to divide the American army, demonstrations were made of an intention to seize
West Point. To be in readiness for either object, General
Greene was left at Springfield with two brigades of continental
troops, and with the Jersey militia; while, with the greater part
of his army, General Washington proceeded slowly towards
Pompton, watching attentively the movements of the British,
and apparently unwilling to separate himself too far from
Greene. He had not marched farther than Rockaway, eleven
miles beyond Morristown, when the British army advanced
from Elizabethtown towards Springfield in great force. General
Washington detached a brigade to hang on their right flank,
and returned with the residue of his army five or six miles, in
order to be in a situation to support Greene.
Early in the morning of the I3d, the British army moved in
two columns, with great rapidity, towards Springfield. Major
Lee was advanced on the Vauxhall road, which was taken by
the right column; and Colonel Dayton on the direct road, which
was taken by the left. Both these corps made every possible
exertion to check the advancing enemy, while General Greene

GEORGE WASHINGTON

425

concentrated his little army at Springfield. Scarcely had he
made his dispositions, when the British front appeared, and a
cannonade commenced between their van and the American
artillery which defended a bridge over Rahway, a small river
running east of the town, which was guarded by Colonel Angel
with less than two hundred men. Colonel Shreve was posted at
a second bridge, also over a branch of the Rahway, in order to
cover the retreat of Angel from the first. Major Lee with his
dragoons and the piquets under Captain Walker, supported by
Colonel Ogden, was directed to defend a bridge on the Vauxhall road. The residue of the continental troops were drawn up
on high ground, in the rear of the town, with the militia on
their flanks.
The right column of the British advanced on Lee, who disputed the passage of the bridge until a considerable body of the
enemy forded the river above him, and gained the point of a
hill which endangered his position. At this instant, their left
attacked Colonel Angel, who defended himself with persevering gallantry. The conflict was sharp, and was maintained for
about half an hour, when, compelled by superior numbers to
give way, he retired in good order, and brought off his wounded.
His retreat was covered by Colonel Shreve, who, after Angel
had passed him, was ordered by General Greene to join his
brigade. The English then took possession of the town and
reduced it to ashes.
The obstinate resistance which had been encountered; the gallantry and discipline displayed by the continental troops who
had been engaged, the strength of Greene's position; the firm
countenance maintained by his troops, small detachments of
whom kept up a continual skirmishing with a view to save a
part of the town; all contributed to deter Sir Henry Clinton
from a farther prosecution of his original plan. He withdrew
that afternoon to Elizabethtown; and, in the following night,
passed over to Staten Island. It is probable that the caution
manifested during this expedition is to be ascribed to the intelligence that a formidable fleet and army from France were daily
expected on the coast.
When the Marquis de Lafayette obtained permission to visit
his native country, he retained, with his rank in the American

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army, that zeal for the interests of the United States, which the
affectionate attentions he had received, and the enthusiasm of a
soldier in the cause of those for whom he had made his first
campaigns, were calculated to inspire in a young and generous
mind, in favour of an infant people, struggling for liberty and
self-government with the hereditary rival of his nation.
He was received at the court of Versailles with every mark
of favour and distinction; 1 and all his influence was employed
in impressing on the cabinet, the importance and policy of
granting succours to the United States.
Having succeeded in this favourite object, and finding no
probability of active employment on the continent of Europe,
he obtained permission to return to America. He arrived late in
April at Boston, and hastened to head quarters; whence he proceeded to the seat of Government with the information that his
most Christian Majesty had consented to employ a considerable
land and naval armament in the United States, for the ensuing
campaign. This intelligence gave a new impulse both to congress and the state legislatures. The states from New Hampshire to Virginia inclusive, were required to pay, within thirty
days, ten millions of dollars, part of their quotas which became
due on the first of March; and specie bills to the amount of fifty
thousand dollars were drawn on Messieurs Franklin and Jay.
These sums were sacredly appropriated to the objects of bringing
the army into the field, and forwarding their supplies.
The defects in the requisition system, which had been suggested by General Washington, were corrected;' and the committee in camp, at the head of which was the late General
Schuyler, was empowered, at the request of the Commander-inchief, to take such measures as were in the power of congress,
for drawing out the resources of the nation.
To give effect to these resolutions, the several state legislatures from New Hampshire to Virginia inclusive, were requested to invest the Executives, or some other persons, with
1 After he had visited the ministers, an arrest of eight days, during which he resided
with his relation the Marshal de Noailles, was imposed on him for the sake of form
and in honour of the royal authority, which he had disregarded by proceding to America. After the expiration of this term he presented himself to the King, who graciously said he pardoned his disobedience, in consideration of his good conduct and
of his services.-Letter from Gen. Lafayette.

GEORGE WASHINGTON

42-T

powers sufficiently ample to comply with such applications as
might be made to them by the committee in camp, and a
circular letter was addressed to the state governments, urging
them to second the efforts of Congress.
Letters equally stimulating were written by the committee
from camp; and the well earned influence of the Commanderin-chief was also employed to induce an exertion proportioned
to the crisis. In addition to those incentives which might operate on ardent minds, he endeavoured, by a temperate review
of the situation and resources of the belligerent powers, to convince the judgment that America would have real cause to
fear the issue of the contest, should she neglect to improve the
advantage to be afforded by the succours expected from France.'
Under the impressions produced by these representations, the
state legislatures, generally, passed the laws which were required;
but the energy displayed in their passage was not maintained in
their execution. In general, the assemblies followed the example
of congress, and apportioned on the several counties or towns
within the state, the quota to be furnished by each. This division of the state was again to be subdivided into classes, each of
which was to furnish a man by contributions or taxes imposed
upon itself.
These operations were slow and unproductive.
It was not on the state sovereignties only that beneficial
effects were produced by a candid statement of public affairs,
several patriotic individuals contributed largely from their private funds to the aid of the public. The merchants, and other
citizens of Philadelphia, with a zeal guided by that sound discretion which turns expenditure to the best account, established
a bank, for the support of which they subscribed ~3 i5,000,
Pennsylvania money, to be paid, if required, in specie, the principal object of which was to supply the army with provisions
and rum. By the plan of this bank, its members were to derive
no emolument whatever from the institution. For advancing
their credit and their money, they required only that congress
should pledge the faith of the union to reimburse the costs and
charges of the transaction in a reasonable time, and should give
' See notc No. XVI at the end of the volume.

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such assistance to its execution as might be in their power.
The ladies of Philadelphia too gave a splendid example of
patriotism, by large donations for the immediate relief of the
suffering army. This example was extensively followed; but
it is not by the contributions of the generous that a war can or
ought to be maintained. The purse of the nation alone can
supply the expenditures of a nation; and, when all are interested
in a contest, all ought to contribute to its support. Taxes, and
taxes only, can furnish for the prosecution of a national war,
means which are just in themselves, or competent to the object.
Notwithstanding these donations, the distresses of the army,
for clothing especially, still continued; and were the more
severely felt when a co-operation with French troops was expected. So late as the 20oth of June, General Washington informed congress, that he still laboured under the painful and
humiliating embarrassment of having no shirts for the soldiers,
many of whom were destitute of that necessary article. "For
the troops to be without clothing at any time," he added, "is
highly injurious to the service, and distressing to our feelings;
but the want will be more peculiarly mortifying when they
come to act with those of our allies. If it be possible, I have no
doubt, immediate measures will be taken to relieve their distress.
"It is also most sincerely wished, that there could be some
supplies of clothing furnished to the officers. There are a great
many whose condition is still miserable. This is, in some instances, the case with the whole lines of the states. It would be
well for their own sakes, and for the public good, if they could
be furnished. They will not be able, when our friends come to
co-operate with us, to go on a common routine of duty; and if
1 This instance of patriotism on the part of our fair and amiable countrywomen, is
far from being single. Their conduct throughout the war was uniform. They shared
with cheerfulness and gaiety, the privations and sufferings to which the distress of the
times exposed their country. In every stage of this severe trial, they displayed virtues
which have not been always attributed to their sex, but which it is believed they will,
on every occasion calculated to unfold them, be found to possess. With a ready acquiescence, with a firmness always cheerful, and a constancy never lamenting the
sacrifices which were made, they not only yielded up all the elegancies, delicacies, and
even conveniences to be furnished by wealth and commerce, relying on their farms and
on domestic industry for every article of food and raiment, but, consenting to share
the produce of their own labour, they gave up without regret, a considerable portion
of the covering designed for their own families, to supply the wants of the distressed
soldiers; and heroically suppressed the involuntary sigh which the departure of their
brothers, their sons, and their husbands, for the camp, rended from their bosoms,

GEORGE WASHINGTON

429

they should, they must, from their appearance, be held in low
estimation."
This picture presents in strong colours, the real patriotism of
the American army. One heroic effort, though it may dazzle
the mind with its splendour, is an exertion most men are capable of making; but continued patient suffering and unremitting perseverance, in a service promising no personal emolument,
and exposing the officer unceasingly, not only to wants of every
kind, but to those circumstances of humiliation which seem to
degrade him in the eyes of others, demonstrate a fortitude of
mind, a strength of virtue, and a firmness of principle, which
ought never to be forgotten.
As the several legislative acts for bringing the army into the
field, did not pass until the months of June and July, General
Washington remained uninformed of the force on which he
might rely, and was consequently unable to form any certain
plan of operations.
This suspense was the more cruelly embarrassing, as, in the
event of an attempt upon New York, it was of the utmost importance that the French fleet should, on its arrival, take possession of the harbour, which was then weakly defended. But,
should this measure be followed by a failure to furnish the
requisite support, it would not only be ineffectual; but, in a very
possible state of things, might sacrifice the fleet itself.
Should it be ascertained that the states were either unable or
unwilling to make the exertions necessary for the siege of New
York, other objects presented themselves against which the allied
arms might be turned to advantage. To avoid the disgrace
and danger of attempting what could not be effected, and the
reproach of neglecting any attainable object, were equally desirable, and equally required a correct knowledge of the measures
which would be taken by the states.
In a letter to congress communicating his anxiety on this
interesting subject, and his total want of information respecting
it, General Washington observed, "The season is come when we
have every reason to expect the arrival of the fleet, and yet, for
want of this point of primary consequence, it is impossible for
me to form a system of co-operation. I have no basis to act
upon; and, of course, were this generous succour of our ally

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now to arrive, I should find myself in the most awkward, embarrassing, and painful situation. The general and the admiral,
from the relation in which I stand, as soon as they approach
our coast, will require of me a plan of the measures to be pursued, and there ought of right to be one prepared; but circumstanced as I am, I can not even give them conjectures. From
these considerations, I have suggested to the committee, by a
letter I had the honour of addressing them yesterday, the indispensable necessity of their writing again to the states, urging
them to give immediate and precise information of the measures
they have taken and of the result. The interest of the states, the
honour and reputation of our councils, the justice and gratitude
due to our allies, all require that I should, without delay, be
enabled to ascertain and inform them, what we can or can not
undertake. There is a point which ought now to be determined,
on the success of which all our future operations may depend,
on which, for want of knowing our prospects, I can make
no decision. For fear of involving the fleet and army of
our allies in circumstances which would expose them, if not
seconded by us, to material inconvenience and hazard, I shall
be compelled to suspend it, and the delay may be fatal to our
hopes."
The tardy proceedings of the states were not less perplexing
to congress than to the Commander-in-chief. To the minister
of his most Christian Majesty, who had in the preceding January
communicated the probability of receiving succour from France,
that body, without calculating accurately the means of complying with its engagements, had pledged itself unequivocally for
effectual co-operation. The minister was assured, that the
United States had expectations on which they could rely with
confidence, of bringing into the field, for the next campaign, an
army of twenty-five thousand men; and that such numbers of
militia might be added to this continental force, as would render
it competent to any enterprise against the posts occupied by the
British within the United States.
Assurances were also given that ample supplies of provisions
for the combined armies should be laid up in magazines under
the direction of congress. The French minister addressed congress on this subject about the time that General Washington

GEORGE WASHINGTON

431I

expressed so strongly, the necessity of knowing with certainty,
on what reinforcements he was to calculate.
Thus pressed by their general and their ally, congress renewed their urgent requisitions on the states, and desired the
several governments to correspond weekly with the committee
at head quarters, on the progress made in complying with them.
In the mean time, General Washington meditated unceasingly
on the course to be pursued in the various contingencies which
might happen; and endeavoured to prepare for any plan of
operations which circumstances might render adviseable. The
arrival of Sir Henry Clinton, diminished the variety of aspects
in which the relative situation of the two armies was to be
contemplated, and rendered the success of an attempt on New
York more doubtful. It was now thought adviseable that the
armament from France, instead of sailing directly to the Hook,
should proceed in the first instance to Rhode Island; where,
after disembarking the troops, and providing for the sick,
it might wait until a definitive plan of operation should be
concerted.
On the i 3th of July, while the result of the measures adopted
by the several states remained uncertain, the French fleet entered
the harbour of Newport, and letters were soon afterwards received from the Count de Rochambeau and the Chevalier Ternay, the officers commanding the land and naval forces, transmitting to General Washington an account of their arrival, of
their strength, their expectations, and their orders.
The troops designed to serve in the United States had assembled, early in the year, at Brest; but the transports at that place
having been chiefly employed for an armament destined for the
West Indies; and the ports from which it had been intended to
draw others, being blockaded, only the first division, consisting
of five thousand men, had arrived at Newport; but letters from
France contained assurances that the second division of the army
might soon be expected.
To obviate those difficulties which had occurred on former
occasions respecting rank, the orders given to Lieutenant General Count de Rochambeau, which were inclosed in his first
letter, placed him entirely under the command of General
Washington. The French troops were to be considered as

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auxiliaries, and were, according to the usages of war, to cede
the post of honour to the Americans.'
Convinced that cordial harmony between the allied forces
was essential to their success, both generals cultivated carefully
the friendly dispositions felt by the troops towards each other.
Warm professions of reciprocal respect, esteem, and confidence,
were interchanged between them; and each endeavoured to impress on the other, and on all the military and civil departments,
the conviction that the two nations, and two armies, were united
by the ties of interest and affection. On this occasion, General
Washington recommended to his officers, as a symbol of friendship and affection for their allies, to engraft on the American
cockade, which was black, a white relief, that being the colour
of the French cockade.
Late as was the arrival of the French troops, they found the
Americans unprepared for active and offensive operations. Not
even at that time were the numbers ascertained which would be
furnished by the states. Yet it was necessary for General Washington to communicate a plan of the campaign to the Count de
Rochambeau.
The season was already so far advanced that preparations for
the operations contemplated eventually, on the arrival of the
second division of the French fleet, must be immediately made,
or there would not be time, though every circumstance should
prove favourable, to execute the design against New York.
Such a state of things so ill comported with the engagements of
congress, and with the interests of the nation, that, trusting to
his being enabled, by the measures already taken by the states,
to comply with what was incumbent on him to perform, he
determined to hazard much rather than forego the advantages
to be derived from the aids afforded by France. In communicating this resolution to congress, he said-"Pressed on all sides
by a choice of difficulties in a moment which required decision,
I have adopted that line of conduct which comported with the
dignity and faith of congress, the reputation of these states, and
the honour of our arms. I have sent on definitive proposals of
co-operation to the French general and admiral. Neither the
1 These orders were given at the instance of General La Fayette.-Correspondence
with General La Fayette.

GEORGE WASHINGTON

433

period of the season, nor a regard to decency, would permit
delay. The die is cast, and it remains with the states either to
fulfil their engagements, preserve their credit, and support their
independence, or to involve us in disgrace and defeat. Notwithstanding the failures pointed out by the committee, I shall
proceed on the supposition that they will, ultimately, consult
their own interest and honour; and not suffer us to fail for the
want of means which it is evidently in their power to afford.
What has been done, and is doing, by some of the states, confirms the opinion I have entertained of sufficient resources in
the country. Of the disposition of the people to submit to any
arrangement for bringing them forth, I see no reasonable ground
to doubt. If we fail for want of proper exertions in any of the
governments, I trust the responsibility will fall where it ought;
and that I shall stand justified to congress, my country, and
the world."
A decisive naval superiority however was considered as the
basis of any enterprise to be undertaken by the allied arms.
This naval superiority being assumed, the outlines of the plan
were drawn, and the 5th of August was named as the day on
which the French troops should re-embark, and the American
army assemble at Morrissania.
This plan was committed to Major General the Marquis de
Lafayette, who was authorized to explain the situation to the
American army, and the views of the General, to the Count
de Rochambeau. It was to be considered as preliminary to any
operation-that the fleet and army of France should continue
their aid until the enterprise should succeed, or be abandoned
by mutual consent.
The Chevalier de Ternay did not long maintain his superiority at sea. Three days after he reached Newport, Admiral
Greaves arrived with six ships of the line, and transferred it to
the British. On his appearance off the Hook, Arbuthnot passed
the bar with four ships of the line; and hearing that De Ternay
had reached Rhode Island, proceeded thither, and cruised off the
harbour. The Count de Rochambeau had been put into possession of all the forts and batteries about Newport, and the fleet
had been moved in a line so as to co-operate with the land
forces. This position appearing too formidable to be attempted

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by the fleet alone, Arbuthnot continued to cruise off Block
Island.
As the commanders of the allied forces still cherished the hope
of acquiring a superiority at sea, the design on New York was
only suspended. This hope was strengthened by intelligence
that the Count de Guichen had been joined in the West Indies
by a powerful Spanish armament. The Chevalier de Ternay
had despatched a packet to inform him that he was blocked up
by a superior force, and to solicit such, reinforcements as the
situation of the Count might enable him to spare. Relying on
the success of this application, and on the arrival of the second
division of the squadron from Brest, the American general impatiently expected the moment when De Ternay would be
enabled to act offensively.
In this crisis of affairs, a derangement took place in a most
important department, which threatened to disconcert the whole
plan of operations, though every other circumstance should
prove favourable.
The immense expenditure of the quartermaster's department
-the inadequacy of the funds with which it was supplied-the
reciprocal disgusts and complaints produced by these causes, had
determined congress to make still another radical change in the
system. This subject had been taken up early in the winter;
but such were the delays inseparable from the proceedings of the
government, that the report of the committee was not made
until the month of March, nor finally decided on until the
middle of July.
This subject was too interesting to the army, and to the
important operations meditated for the campaign, not to engage
the anxious attention of the Commander-in-chief. At his request, the quartermaster general, while the army lay in winter
quarters, repaired to Philadelphia for the purpose of giving congress all the information he possessed. He proposed to withdraw
the management of the department almost entirely from the
civil government, and to place it under the control of the person
who should be at its head, subject only to the direction of the
Commander-in-chief.
The views of congress were entirely different. While the subject remained suspended before that body, it was taken up by

GEORGE WASHINGTON

43 5

the committee of co-operation at head quarters, where the combined experience and talents of Generals Washington, Schuyler,
and Greene, were employed in digesting a system adapted to the
actual situation of the United States, which was recommended
to congress. To give the more weight to his opinion by showing its disinterestedness, General Greene offered to continue in
the discharge of the duties assigned to him without any other
extra emolument than his family expenses. This plan, whatever
might have been its details, was, in its general outlines, unacceptable to congress. A system was, at length, completed by
that body, which General Greene believed to be incapable of
execution. Resolving not to take upon himself the responsibility of measures the issue of which must be calamitous and disgraceful, he determined to withdraw from a station in which he
despaired of being useful.
Apprehending the worst consequences from his resignation
in so critical a moment, General Washington pressed him to
suspend this decisive step, until the effect of an application from
himself and from the committee of co-operation should be
known. Their representations produced no effect. The resolution to make this bold experiment was unalterable. General
Greene's resignation was accepted; and the letter conveying it
excited so much irritation, that a design was intimated of suspending his command in the line of the army. But these
impressions soon wore off, and the resentment of the moment
subsided. Colonel Pickering, who succeeded General Greene,
possessed, in an eminent degree, those qualities which fitted him
to combat and subdue the difficulties of his department. To
great energy of mind and body, he added a long experience in
the affairs of the continent, with an ardent zeal for its interests;
and General Greene himself, with several of the former officers,
at the request of the Commander-in-chief, continued for some
time after their resignation, to render all the services in their
power; but there was a defect of means, for which neither
talents nor exertion could compensate.
In the commissary department the same distress was experienced. General Washington was driven to the necessity of
emptying the magazines at West Point, and of foraging on a
people whose means of subsisting themselves were already nearly

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exhausted by the armies on both sides. The inadequate supplies
drawn from these sources afforded but a short relief; and, once
more, at a time when the public imagination was contemplating
brilliant plans, the execution of which required steady courage
with persevering labour, and consequently ample magazines, the
army was frequently reduced to the last extremity by the want
of food.
So great were the embarrassments produced by the difficulty
of procuring subsistence that, although the second division of
the fleet from Brest was daily expected, General Washington
found it necessary to countermand the orders under which the
militia were marching to camp.
Such was the state of preparation for the campaign, when intelligence was brought by the Alliance frigate that the port of
Brest was blockaded. In the hope, however, that the combined
fleets of France and Spain would be able to raise the blockade,
General Washington adhered steadily to his purpose respecting
New York, and continued his exertions to provide the means for
its execution. The details of the plan of co-operation continued
to be the subject of a correspondence with the Count de Rochambeau, and the Chevalier de Tunay; and, at length, a
personal interview was agreed upon, to take place on the 2ist of
September, at Hartford, in Connecticut.
In this interview, ulterior eventual measures, as well as an
explicit and detailed arrangement for acting against New York,
were the subjects of consideration. No one of the plans, however, then concerted for the present campaign, was carried into
execution. All, except an invasion of Canada, depended on a
superiority at sea, which was soon rendered almost hopeless by
certain information that the Count de Guichen had sailed for
Europe.
Not long after receiving this information, Admiral Rodney
arrived at New York with eleven ships of the line and four
frigates. This reinforcement not only disconcerted all the plans
of the allies, but put it in the power of the British to prosecute
in security their designs in the south.
It may well be supposed that the Commander-in-chief did
not relinquish, without infinite chagrin, the sanguine expectations he had formed of rendering this summer decisive of the

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437

war. Never before had he indulged so strongly the hope of
happily terminating the contest. In a letter to an intimate
friend, this chagrin was thus expressed. "We are now drawing
to a close an inactive campaign, the beginning of which appeared pregnant with events of a very favourable complexion.
I hoped, but I hoped in vain, that a prospect was opening which
would enable me to fix a period to my military pursuits, and
restore me to domestic life. The favourable disposition of
Spain, the promised succour from France, the combined force
in the West Indies, the declaration of Russia (acceded to by
other powers of Europe, humiliating the naval pride and power
of Great Britain) the superiority of France and Spain by sea in
Europe, the Irish claims and English disturbances, formed in the
aggregate an opinion in my breast, (which is not very susceptible
of peaceful dreams) that the hour of deliverance was not far
distant; for that, however unwilling Great Britain might be to
yield the point, it would not be in her power to continue the
contest. But alas! these prospects, flattering as they were, have
proved delusive; and I see nothing before us but accumulating
distress. We have been half of our time without provisions,
and are likely to continue so. We have no magazines, nor
money to form them. We have lived upon expedients until we
can live no longer. In a word, the history of the war is a history of false hopes and temporary devices, instead of system and
economy. It is in vain, however, to look back, nor is it our
business to do so. Our case is not desperate, if virtue exists in
the people, and there is wisdom among our rulers. But to suppose that this great revolution can be accomplished by a temporary army; that this army will be subsisted by state supplies;
and that taxation alone is adequate to our wants, is in my opinion absurd, and as unreasonable as to expect an inversion of the
order of nature to accommodate itself to our views. If it were
necessary, it could be easily proved to any person of a moderate
understanding, that an annual army, or any army raised on the
spur of the occasion, besides being unqualified for the end designed, is, in various ways that could be enumerated, ten times
more expensive than a permanent body of men under good
organization and military discipline; which never was, nor will
be the case with raw troops. A thousand arguments, resulting

438 THE LIFE OF
from experience and the nature of things, might also be adduced
to prove that the army, if it is to depend upon state supplies,
must disband or starve, and that taxation alone (especially at
this late hour) can not furnish the means to carry on the war.
Is it not time to retract from error, and benefit by experience?
Or do we want farther proof of the ruinous system we have
pertinaciously adhered to."

GEORGE WASHINGTON

439

CHAPTER XIX
WHILE the public mind was anticipating great events from the
combined arms of France and America, treason lay
concealed in the American camp, and was plotting I780
the ruin of the American cause.
The great services and military talents of General Arnold, his
courage in battle, and patient fortitude under excessive hardships, had secured to him a high place in the opinion of the
army and of his country.
Not having sufficiently recovered from the wounds received
before Quebec and at Saratoga to be fit for active service, and
having large accounts to settle with the government which required leisure, he was, on the evacuation of Philadelphia in 1778,
appointed to the command in that place.
Unfortunately, that strength of principle and correctness of
judgment, which might enable him to resist the various seductions to which his fame and rank exposed him in the metropolis
of the union, were not associated with the firmness which he had
displayed in the field, and in the most adverse circumstances.
Yielding to the temptations of a false pride, and forgetting that
he did not possess the resources of private fortune, he indulged
in the pleasures of a sumptuous table and expensive equipage,
and soon swelled his debts to an amount which it was impossible
to discharge. Unmindful of his military character, he engaged
in speculations which were unfortunate; and with the hope of
immense profit, took shares in privateers which were unsuccessful. His claims against the United States were great, and he
looked to them for the means of extricating himself from the
embarrassments in which his indiscretions had involved him;
but the commissioners to whom his accounts were referred for
settlement, had reduced them considerably; and, on his appeal
from their decision to congress, a committee reported that the
sum allowed by the commissioners was more than he was entitled to receive.

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He was charged with various acts of extortion on the citizens
of Philadelphia, and with peculating on the funds of the continent. Not the less soured by these multiplied causes of irritation, from the reflection that they were attributable to his own
follies and vices, he gave full scope to his resentments, and indulged himself in expressions of angry reproach against, what
he termed, the ingratitude of his country, which provoked those
around him, and gave great offence to congress. Having become peculiarly odious to the government of Pennsylvania, the
Executive of that state exhibited formal charges against him to
congress, who directed that he should be arrested and brought
before a court martial. His trial was concluded late in January,
I779, and he was sentenced to be reprimanded by the Commander-in-chief. This sentence was approved by congress and
carried into execution.
From the time the sentence against him was approved, if not
sooner, his proud, unprincipled spirit revolted from the cause of
his country, and determined him to seek an occasion to make
the objects of his resentment, the victims of his vengeance.
Turning his eyes on West Point as an acquisition which would
give value to treason, and inflict a mortal wound on his former
friends, he sought the command of that fortress for the purpose
of gratifying both his avarice and his hate.'
To New York, the safety of West Point was peculiarly interesting; and, in that state, the reputation of Arnold was particularly high. To its delegation he addressed himself; and one
of its members had written a letter to General Washington, suggesting doubts respecting the military character of Howe, to
whom its defence was then entrusted, and recommended Arnold
for that service. This request was not forgotten. Some short
time afterwards, General Schuyler mentioned to the Commander-in-chief a letter he had received from Arnold intimating his wish to join the army, but stating his inability, in
consequence of his wounds, to perform the active duties of the
I The author is informed by General Lafayette that Arnold, while commanding at
West Point, endeavoured to obtain from General Washington the names of his secret
emissaries in New York, and his means of communicating with them. He pressed
Lafayette, who had also his private intelligencers, for the same information. His applications were of course unsuccessful. It cannot be doubted that his object was to
commit the additional crime of betraying them to Sir Henry Clinton.

GEORGE WASHINGTON

44I

field. General Washington observed that, as there was a prospect of a vigorous campaign, he should be gratified with the aid
of General Arnold. That so soon as the operations against New
York should commence, he designed to draw his whole force into
the field, leaving even West Point to the care of invalids and a
small garrison of militia. Recollecting however the former
application of a member of congress respecting this post, he
added, that "if, with this previous information, that situation
would be more agreeable to him than a command in the field,
his wishes should certainly be indulged."
This conversation being communicated to Arnold, he caught
eagerly at the proposition, though without openly discovering
any solicitude on the subject; and, in the beginning of August,
repaired to camp, where he renewed the solicitations which had
before been made indirectly.
At this juncture, Sir Henry Clinton embarked on an expedition he meditated against Rhode Island, and General Washington was advancing on New York. He offered Arnold the left
wing of the army, which that officer declined under the pretexts
mentioned in his letter to General Schuyler.
Incapable of suspecting a man who had given such distinguished proofs of courage and patriotism, the Commander-inchief was neither alarmed at his refusal to embrace so splendid
an opportunity of recovering the favour of his countrymen, nor
at the embarrassment accompanying that refusal. Pressing the
subject no farther, he assented to the request which had been
made, and invested Arnold with the command of West Point.
Previous to his soliciting this station, he had, in a letter to
Colonel Robinson, signified his change of principles, and his
wish to restore himself to the favour of his Prince by some signal proof of his repentance. This letter opened the way to a
correspondence with Sir Henry Clinton, the immediate object
of which, after obtaining the appointment he had solicited, was
to concert the means of delivering the important post he commanded to the British general.
Major John Andre, an aid-de-camp of Sir Henry Clinton,
and adjutant general of the British army, was selected as the
person to whom the maturing of Arnold's treason, and the
arrangements for its execution should be entrusted. A corre

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spondence was carried on between them under a mercantile
disguise, in the feigned names of Gustavus and Anderson;
and, at length, to facilitate their communications, the Vulture sloop of war moved up the North River, and took a
station convenient for the purpose, but not so near as to excite
suspicion.
The time when General Washington met the Count de
Rochambeau at Hartford was selected for the final adjustment
of the plan; and, as a personal interview was deemed necessary,
Major Andre came up the river, and went on board the Vulture.
Se The house of a Mr. Smith, without the American
ept. posts, was appointed for the interview; and to that
place both parties repaired in the night-Andre being brought
under a pass for John Anderson, in a boat despatched from the
shore. While the conference was yet unfinished, day light approached; and, to avoid discovery, Arnold proposed that Andre
should remain concealed until the succeeding night. He is
understood to have refused peremptorily to be carried within
the American posts; but the promise to respect this objection
was not observed. They continued together the succeeding day;
and when, in the following night, his return to the Vulture was
proposed, the boatmen refused to carry him because she had
shifted her station during the day, in consequence of a gun
which was moved to the shore without the knowledge of Arnold,
and brought to bear upon her. This embarrassing circumstance
reduced him to the necessity of endeavouring to reach New
York by land. To accomplish this purpose, he reluctantly
yielded to the urgent representations of Arnold; and, laying
aside his regimentals, which he had hitherto worn under a surtout, put on a plain suit of clothes, and received a pass from
General Arnold, authorizing him, under the name of John
Anderson, to proceed on the public service to the White Plains,
or lower if he thought proper.
With this permit, he had passed all the guards and posts on
the road unsuspected, and was proceeding to New York in perfect security, when one of three militia men who were employed between the lines of the two armies, springing suddenly
from his covert into the road, seized the reins of his bridle, and
stopped his horse. Losing his accustomed self-possession, Major

GEORGE WASHINGTON

443

Andre, instead of producing the pass' from General Arnold,
asked the man hastily where he belonged? He replied "to
below;" a term implying that he was from New York. "And
so," said Andre, not suspecting deception, "am I." He then
declared himself to be a British officer on urgent business, and
begged that he might not be detained. The appearance of the
other militia men disclosed his mistake, too late to correct it.
He offered a purse of gold, and a valuable watch, with tempting
promises of ample reward from his government, if they would
permit him to escape; but his offers were rejected, and his captors proceeded to search him. They found concealed in his
boots, in Arnold's hand writing, papers containing all the information which could be important respecting West Point.
When carried before Lieutenant Colonel Jameson, the officer
commanding the scouting parties on the lines, he still maintained
his assumed character, and requested Jameson to inform his commanding officer that Anderson was taken. Jameson despatched
an express with this communication. On receiving it, Arnold
comprehended the full extent of his danger, and, flying from
well merited punishment, took refuge on board the Vulture.
When sufficient time for the escape of Arnold was supposed
to have elapsed, Andre, no longer affecting concealment, acknowledged himself to be the adjutant general of the British
army. Jameson, seeking to correct the mischief of his indiscreet
communication to Arnold, immediately despatched a packet to
the Commander-in-chief containing the papers which had been
discovered, with a letter from Andre, relating the manner of his
capture, and accounting for the disguise he had assumed.
The express was directed to meet the Commander-in-chief,
who was then on his return from Hartford; but, taking different roads,2 they missed each other, and a delay attended the
'Mr. Johnson says he did produce it; but that, on being surprised, he had thrust
a paper containing a plan of the route in his boot, which, having been perceived, was
demanded, and led to his discovery.
2 General Lafayette adds some circumstances which are not found among the
manuscript papers of General Washington. The Commander-in-chief with Generals
Lafayette and Knox had turned from the direct route in order to visit a redoubt. Colonels Hamilton and M'Henry, the aids-de-camp of Generals Washington and Lafayette, went forward to request Mrs. Arnold not to wait breakfast. Arnold received
Andre's billet in their presence. He turned pale, left them suddenly, called his wife,
communicated the intelligence to her and left her in a swoon, without the knowledge
of Hamilton and M'Henry. Mounting the horse of his aid-de-camp, which was

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delivery of the papers, which insured the escape of Arnold.
Every precaution was immediately taken for the security of
West Point; after which, the attention of the Commander-inchief was turned to Andre. A board of general officers, of which
Major General Greene was president, and the two foreign generals, Lafayette and Steuben, were members, was called, to
report a precise state of his case, and to determine the character
in which he was to be considered, and the punishment to which
he was liable.
The frankness and magnanimity with which Andre had conducted himself from the time of his appearance in his real character, had made a very favourable impression on all those with
whom he had held any intercourse. From this cause he experienced every mark of indulgent attention which was compatible with his situation; and, from a sense of justice as well
as of delicacy, was informed, on the opening of the examination,
that he was at liberty not to answer any interrogatory which
might embarrass his own feelings. But, as if only desirous to
rescue his character from imputations which he dreaded more
than death, he confessed every thing material to his own condemnation, but would divulge nothing which might involve
others.
The board reported the essential facts which had appeared,
with their opinion that Major Andre was a spy, and ought to
suffer death. The execution of this sentence was ordered to take
place on the day succeeding that on which it was pronounced.
Superior to terrors of death, but dreading disgrace, Andre was
deeply affected by the mode of execution which the laws of war
decree to persons in his situation. He wished to die like a soldier,
not as a criminal. To obtain a mitigation of his sentence in this
respect, he addressed a letter' to General Washington, replete
with the feelings of a man of sentiment and honour. But the
ready saddled, and directing him to inform General Washington on his arrival that
Arnold was gone to receive him at West Point, he gained the river shore, and was
conveyed in a canoe to the Vulture.
The Commander-in-chief, on his arrival, was informed that Arnold awaited him at
West Point. Taking it for granted that this step had been taken to prepare for his
reception, he proceeded thither without entering the house, and was surprised to find
that Arnold was not arrived. On returning to the quarters of that officer he received
Jameson's despatch, which disclosed the whole mystery.
1 See note XVII at the end of the volume.

GEORGE WASHINGTON

445

occasion required that the example should make its full impression, and this request could not be granted. He encountered his
fate with composure and dignity; and his whole conduct interested the feelings of all who witnessed it.
The general officers lamented the sentence which the usages of
war compelled them to pronounce; and never perhaps Oct..
did the Commander-in-chief obey with more reluctance the stern mandates of duty and policy. The sympathy excited among the American officers by his fate, was as universal as
it is unusual on such occasions; and proclaims alike the merit of
him who suffered, and the humanity of those who inflicted the
punishment.
Great exertions were made by Sir Henry Clinton, to whom
Andre was particularly dear, first, to have him considered as
protected by a flag of truce, and afterwards, as a prisoner of war.
Even Arnold had the hardihood to interpose. After giving a
certificate of facts tending, as he supposed, to exculpate the prisoner, exhausting his powers of reasoning on the case, and appealing to the humanity of the American general, he sought to
intimidate that officer, by stating the situation of many of the
most distinguished individuals of South Carolina, who had forfeited their lives, but had hitherto been spared through the
clemency of the British general. This clemency, he said, could
no longer be extended to them should Major Andre suffer.
It may well be supposed that the interposition of Arnold
could have no influence on Washington. He conveyed Mrs.
Arnold to her husband in New York,' and also transmitted his
clothes and baggage, for which he had written; but, in every
other respect, his letters, which were unanswered, were also
unnoticed.
1 General Lafayette mentions a circumstance not previously known to the author,
which serves to illustrate the character of Washington, and to mark the delicacy
of his feelings towards even the offending part of that sex which is entitled to all
the consolation and protection man can afford it.
The night after Arnold's escape, when his letter respecting Andr6 was received,
the general directed one of his aids to wait on Mrs. Arnold, who was convulsed with
grief, and inform her that he had done every thing which depended on him to arrest
her husband, but that, not having succeeded, it gave him pleasure to inform her that
her husband was safe. It is also honourable to the American character, that during
the effervescence of the moment, Mrs. Arnold was permitted to go to Philadelphia, to
take possession of her effects, and to proceed to New York under the protection of a
flag, without receiving the slightest insult.

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The mingled sentiments of admiration and compassion excited
in every bosom for the unfortunate Andre, seemed to increase
the detestation in which Arnold was held. "Andre," said General Washington in a private letter, "has met his fate with that
fortitude which was to be expected from an accomplished man
and a gallant officer; but I am mistaken if at this time Arnold
is undergoing the torments of a mental hell. He wants feeling.
From some traits' of his character which have lately come to my
knowledge, he seems to have been so hardened in crime, so lost
to all sense of honour and shame, that, while his faculties still
enable him to continue his sordid pursuits, there will be no time
for remorse."
From motives of policy, or of respect for his engagements, Sir
Henry Clinton conferred on Arnold the commission of a brigadier general in the British service, which he preserved throughout
the war. Yet it is impossible that rank could have rescued him
from the contempt and detestation in which the generous, the
honourable, and the brave, could not cease to hold him. It was
impossible for men of this description to bury the recollection of
his being a traitor, a sordid traitor, first the slave of his rage,
then purchased with gold, and finally secured at the expense of
the blood of one of the most accomplished officers in the British
army.
His representations of the discontent of the country and of
the army concurring with reports from other quarters, had
excited the hope that the loyalists and the dissatisfied, allured by
British gold, and the prospect of rank in the British service,
would flock to his standard, and form a corps at whose head he
might again display his accustomed intrepedity. With this hope
he published an address to the inhabitants of America, in which
he laboured to palliate his own guilt, and to increase their dissatisfaction with the existing state of things.
This appeal to the public was followed by a proclamation
addressed "To the officers and soldiers of the continental army,;
1 This allusion is thus explained in a private letter from Colonel Hamilton-"This
man (Arnold) is in every sense despicable. In addition to the scene of knavery and
prostitution during his command in Philadelphia, which the late seizure of his papers
has unfolded, the history of his command at West Point is a history of little as well
as great villanies. He practised every dirty act of peculation, and even stooped to
connexions with the suttlers to defraud the public."

GEORGE WASHINGTON

447

who have the real interests of their country at heart, and who
are determined to be no longer the tools and dupes of congress
or of France."
The object of this proclamation was to induce the officers and
soldiers to desert the cause they had embraced from principle, by
holding up to them the very flattering offers of the British general, and contrasting the substantial emoluments of the British
service with their present deplorable condition. He attempted
to cover this dishonourable proposition with a decent garb, by
representing the base step he invited them to take, as the only
measure which could restore peace, real liberty, and happiness,
to their country.
These inducements did not produce their intended effect.
Although the temper of the army might be irritated by real
suffering, and by the supposed neglect of government, no
diminution of patriotism had been produced. Through all the
hardships, irritations, and vicissitudes of the war, Arnold remains the solitary instance of an American officer who abandoned the side first embraced in this civil contest, and turned
his sword upon his former companions in arms.
When the probable consequences of this plot, had it been
successful, were considered, and the combination of apparent
accidents by which it was discovered and defeated, was recollected, all were filled with awful astonishment; and the devout
perceived in the transaction, the hand of Providence guiding
America to independence.
The thanks of congress were voted to the three militia men 1
who had rendered this invaluable service; and a silver medal,
with an inscription expressive of their fidelity and patriotism,
was directed to be presented to each of them. In addition to this
flattering testimonial of their worth, and as a farther evidence
of national gratitude, a resolution was passed granting to each,
two hundred dollars per annum during life, to be paid in specie
or an equivalent in current money.
The efforts of General Washington to obtain a permanent
military force, or its best substitute, a regular system for filling
vacant ranks with draughts who should join the army on the
'Their names were John Paulding, David Williams, and Isaac Vanwert.

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first day of January in each year, were still continued. Notwithstanding the embarrassments with which congress was surrounded, it is not easy to find adequate reasons for the neglect of
representations so interesting, and of recommendations apparently so essential to the safety of the United States.
Private letters disclose the fact that two parties still agitated
congress. One entered fully into the views of the Commanderin-chief. The other jealous of the army, and apprehensive of its
hostility to liberty when peace should be restored, remained unwilling to give stability to its constitution by increasing the numbers who were to serve during the war. They seemed to dread the
danger from the enemy to which its fluctuations would expose
them, less than the danger which might be apprehended for the
civil authority from its permanent character. They caught with
avidity at every intelligence which encouraged the flattering
hope of a speedy peace,1 but entered reluctantly into measures
founded on the supposition that the war might be of long duration. Perfectly acquainted with the extent of the jealousies entertained on this subject, although, to use his own expressions to
a friend, "Heaven knows how unjustly," General Washington
had foreborne to press the necessity of regular and timely reinforcements to his army so constantly and so earnestly as his own
judgment directed. But the experience of every campaign furnished such strong additional evidences of the impolicy and danger of continuing to rely on temporary expedients, and the
uncertainty of collecting a force to co-operate with the auxiliaries from France was so peculiarly embarrassing, that he at
length resolved to conquer the delicacy by which he had been in
some degree restrained, and to open himself fully on the subjects
The following extract from a private letter of General Washington to a member
of congress, shows how sensible he was of the mischief produced by this temper.
"The satisfaction I have in any successes that attend us, even in the alleviation of
misfortunes, is always allayed by the fear that it will lull us into security. Supineness, and a disposition to flatter ourselves, seem to make parts of our national character. When we receive a check and are not quite undone, we are apt to fancy we have
gained a victory; and when we do gain any little advantage, we imagine it decisive,
and expect the war immediately to end. The history of the war is a history of false
hopes and temporary expedients. Would to God they were to end here! This winter, if I am not mistaken, will open a still more embarrassing scene than we have yet
experienced, to the southward. I have little doubt, should we not gain a naval superiority, that Sir Henry Clinton will detach to the southward to extend his conquests.
I am far from being satisfied that we shall be prepared to repel his attempts."

GEORGE WASHINGTON49

449

which he deemed more essential than any other to the success of
the war.
In August, while looking anxiously for such a reinforcement
to the Chevalier de Ternay as would give him the command of
the American seas, and while uncertain whether the campaign
might not pass away without giving a single advantage promised
at its opening, he transmitted a letter to congress, fully and
freely imparting his sentiments on the state of things.
As this letter contains an exact statement of American affairs,
according to the view taken of them by General 'Washington,
and a faithful picture of the consequences of the ruinous policy
which had been pursued, drawn by the man best acquainted
with them, copious extracts from it will, at least, be excused.
After examining the sources of supplies for the campaign, he
proceeds to say"-"But while we are meditating offen-Aust
sive operations which may not be undertaken at all,Aust
or, being undertaken, may fail, I am persuaded congress are not
inattentive to the present state of the army, and will view in the
same light with me the necessity of providing in time against a
period (the first of January) when one-half of our present force
will dissolve. The shadow of an army that will remain, will have
every motive, except mere patriotism, to abandon the service,
without the hope which has hitherto supported them, of a
change for the better. This is almost extinguished now, and
certainly will not outlive the campaign, unless it finds something
more substantial to rest upon. This is a truth of which every
spectator of the distresses of the army can not help being convinced. Those at a distance may speculate differently; but on
the spot an opinion to the contrary, judging human nature on
the usual scale, would be chimerical.
The honourable the committee of congress, who have seen and
heard for themselves, will add their testimony to mine; and the
wisdom and justice of congress can not fail to give it the most
serious attention. To me it will appear miraculous, if our affairs
can maintain themselves much longer in their present train. If
either the temper or the resources of the country will not admit
of an alteration, we may expect soon to be reduced to the humiliating condition of seeing the cause of America, in America,
upheld by foreign arms. The generosity of our allies has a claim

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to all our confidence, and all our gratitude; but it is neither for
the honour of America, nor for the interest of the common
cause, to leave the work entirely to them."
He then reviewed the resources of Great Britain; and, after
showing her ability still to prosecute the war, added-"&lt;The inference from these reflections is, that we can not count upon a
speedy end of the war; and that is the true policy of America
not to content herself with temporary expedients, but to endeavour, if possible, to give consistency and solidity to her measures.
An essential step to this will be immediately to devise a plan and
put it in execution, for providing men in time to replace those
who will leave us at the end of the year; and for subsisting and
for making a reasonable allowance to the officers and soldiers.
"'The plan for this purpose ought to be of general operation,
and such as will execute itself. Experience has shown that a
peremptory draught will be the only effectual one. If a draught
for the war or for three years can be effected, it ought to be
made on every account; a shorter period than a year is inadmissible.
""To one who has been witness to the evils brought upon us by
short enlistments, the system appears to have been pernicious
beyond description; and a crowd of motives present themselves
to dictate a change. It may easily be shown that all the misfortunes we have met with in the military line, are to be attributed to this cause.
"Had we formed a permanent army in the beginning, which,
by the continuance of the same men in service, had been capable
of discipline, we never should have to retreat with a handful of
men across the Delaware in 1776, trembling for the fate of
America, which nothing but the infatuation of the enemy could
have saved; we should not have remained all the succeeding winter
at their mercy, with sometimes scarcely a sufficient body of men
to mount the ordinary guards, liable at every moment to be dissipated, if they had only thought proper to march against us;
we should not have been under the necessity of fighting at
Brandywine with an unequal number of raw troops, and afterwards of seeing Philadelphia fall a prey to a victorious army; we
should not have been at Valley Forge with less than half the
force of the enemy, destitute of every thing in a situation nei

GEORGE WASHINGTON

45I

ther to resist nor to retire; we should not have seen New York
left with a handful of men, yet an overmatch for the main army
of these states, while the principal part of their force was detached for the reduction of two of them; we should not have
found ourselves this. spring so weak as to be insulted by five
thousand men, unable to protect our baggage and magazines,
their security depending on a good countenance, and a want of
enterprise in the enemy; we should not have been, the greatest
part of the war, inferior to the enemy, indebted for our safety
to their inactivity, enduring frequently the mortification of
seeing inviting opportunities to ruin them, pass unimproved for
want of a force which the country was completely able to
afford; to see the country ravaged, our towns burnt, the inhabitants plundered, abused, murdered, with impunity from the same
cause."
After presenting in detail the embarrassments under which
the civil departments of the army also had laboured, in consequence of the expensiveness and waste inseparable from its temporary character, he proceeded to observe-"There is every reason to believe, that the war has been protracted on this account.
Our opposition being less, made the successes of the enemy
greater. The fluctuation of the army kept alive their hopes;
and at every period of a dissolution of a considerable part of it,
they have flattered themselves with some decisive advanages.
Had we kept a permanent army on foot, the enemy could have
had nothing to hope for, and would in all probability have
listened to terms long since. If the army is left in its present
situation, it must continue an encouragement to the efforts of
the enemy; if it is put in a respectable one, it must have a
contrary effect; and nothing I believe will tend more to give us
peace the ensuing winter. Many circumstances will contribute
to a negotiation. An army on foot, not only for another campaign, but for several campaigns, would determine the enemy
to pacific measures, and enable us to insist upon favourable
terms in forcible language. An army insignificant in numbers,
dissatisfied, crumbling to pieces, would be the strongest temptation and they could have to try the experiment a little longer. It
is an old maxim that the surest way to make a good peace is to
be well prepared for war.

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"I can not forbear returning in this place to the necessity of a
more ample and equal provision for the army. The discontents on
this head have been gradually matured to a dangerous extremity.
There are many symptoms that alarm and distress me. Endeavours are using to unite both officers and men in a general refusal
of the money, and some corps now actually decline receiving it.
Every method has been taken to counteract it, because such a
combination in the army would be a severe blow to our declining currency. The most moderate insist that the accounts of
depreciation ought to be liquidated at stated periods, and certificates given by government for the sums due. They will not be
satisfied with a general declaration that it shall be made good.
"I have often said, and I beg leave to repeat it, the half pay
provision is in my opinion the most politic and effectual that can
be adopted. On the whole, if something satisfactory be not
done, the army (already so much reduced in officers by daily
resignations as not to have a sufficiency to do the common duties
of it) must either cease to exist at the end of the campaign, or
will exhibit an example of more virtue, fortitude, self-denial,
and perseverance, than has perhaps ever yet been paralleled in
the history of human enthusiasm.
"The dissolution of the army is an event that can not be
regarded with indifference. It would bring accumulated distress upon us; it would throw the people of America into a
general consternation; it would discredit our cause throughout
the world; it would shock our allies. To think of replacing the
officers with others is visionary. The loss of the veteran soldiers
could not be replaced. To attempt to carry on the war with
militia against disciplined troops, will be to attempt what the
common sense and common experience of mankind will pronounce to be impracticable. But I should fail in respect to
congress to dwell on observations of this kind in a letter to
them."
At length the committee presented their report, reorganizing
the regiments, reducing their number, and apportioning on the
several states their respective numbers to complete the establishment. This report, being approved by congress, was transmitted to the Commander-in-chief for his consideration. By this
arrangement, the states were required to recruit their quotas for

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453

the war, and to bring them into the field by the first of January;
but, if in any state, it should be found impracticable to raise
the men for the war by the first day of December, it was recommended to such state to supply the deficiency with men
engaged to serve for not less than one year.
In compliance with the request of congress, General Washington submitted his objections to the plan, in a long and
respectful letter.
He recommended that legionary corps should be substituted
in the place of regiments entirely of cavalry. He thought it
more adviseable that the infantry attached to the cavalry should
compose a part of the corps permanently, than that it should
be drawn occasionally from the regiments of foot.
The reduction in the number of regiments appeared to him a
subject of great delicacy. The last reduction, he said, had occasioned many to quit the service, independent of those who were
discontinued; and had left durable seeds of discontent among
those who remained. The general topic of declamation was,
that it was as hard as dishonourable, for men who had made
every sacrifice to the service, to be turned out of it, at the pleasure of those in power, without an adequate compensation. In
the maturity to which their uneasiness had now risen from a
continuance of misery, they would be still more impatient
under an attempt of a similar nature.
It was not, he said, the intention of his remarks to discourage
a reform, but to show the necessity of guarding against the ill
effects which might otherwise attend it, by making an ample
provision both for the officers who should remain in the service,
and for those who should be reduced. This should be the basis
of the plan; and without it, the most mischievous consequences
were to be apprehended. He was aware of the difficulty of making a present provision sufficiently ample to give satisfaction; but
this only proved the expediency of making one for the future,
and brought him to that which he had so frequently recommended as the most economical, the most politic, and the most
effectual, that could be devised; this was half pay for life. Supported by the prospect of a permanent provision, the officers
would be tied to the service, and would submit to many momentary privations, and to those inconveniences, which the situation

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of public affairs rendered unavoidable. If the objection drawn
from the principle that the measure was incompatible with the
genius of the government should be thought insurmountable, he
would propose a substitute, less eligible in his opinion, but which
would answer the purpose. It was to make the present half pay
for seven years, whole pay for the same period. He also recommended that depreciation on the pay received, should be made
up to the officers who should be reduced.
No objection occurred to the measure now recommended, but
the expense it would occasion. In his judgment, whatever would
give consistency to the military establishment, would be ultimately favourable to economy. It was not easy to be conceived, except
by those who had witnessed it, what an additional waste and
increased consumption of every thing, and consequently what
an increase of expense, resulted from laxness of discipline in an
army; and where officers thought they did a favour by holding
their commissions, and the men were continually fluctuating,
to maintain discipline was impossible. Nothing could be more
obvious to him than that a sound military establishment and
real economy were the same. That the purposes of war would
be greatly promoted by it was too clear to admit of argument.
He objected also to the mode of effecting the reduction. This
was by leaving it to the several states to select the officers who
should remain in service. He regretted that congress had not
thought proper to retain the reduction and incorporation of the
regiments under their own discretion. He regretted that it
should be left to the states, not only because it was an adherence
to the state system, which in the arrangements of the army,
he disapproved; but because also he feared it would introduce
much confusion and discontent in a business which ought to
be conducted with the greatest circumspection. He feared also
that professing to select the officers to be retained in service
would give disgust both to those who should be discontinued,
and to those who should remain. The former would be sent
away under the public stigma of inferior merit, and the latter
would feel no pleasure in a present preference, when they reflected that, at some future period, they might experience a
similar fate.
He wished with much sincerity that congress had been pleased

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455

to make no alteration in the term of service, but had confined
their requisition to men who should serve for the war, to be
raised by enlistment, draught, or assessment, as might be found
necessary. As it now stood, there would be very few men for
the war, and all the evils of temporary engagements would still
be felt. In the present temper of the states, he entertained the
most flattering hopes that they would enter on vigorous measures to raise an army for the war, if congress appeared decided
respecting it; but if they held up a different idea as admissible,
it would be again concluded that they did not think an army
for the war essential. This would encourage the opposition
of men of narrow, interested, and feeble tempers, and enable
them to defeat the primary object of the revolution.
This letter was taken into consideration; and the measures
it recommended were pursued in almost every particular. Even
the two great principles which were viewed with most jealousy,
-an army for the war, and half pay for life,-were adopted.
It would have greatly abridged the calamities of America, could
these resolutions have been carried into execution. Every effort
for the purpose was made by the Commander-in-chief.
To place the officers of the army in a situation which would
render their commissions valuable, and hold out to them the
prospect of a comfortable old age, in a country saved by their
blood, their sufferings, and the labours of their best years, was
an object which had always been dear to the heart of General
Washington, and he had seized every opportunity to press it on
congress. That body had approached it slowly, taking step
after step with apparent reluctance, as the necessity of the
measure became more and more obvious.
The first resolution on the subject, passed in May, I778, allowed to all military officers who should continue in service
during the war, and not hold any office of profit under the
United States or any of them, half pay for seven years, if they
lived so long. At the same time the sum of eighty dollars, in
addition to his pay, was granted to every non-commissioned
officer and soldier who should serve to the end of the war. In
I779 this subject was resumed. After much debate, its farther
consideration was postponed; and the officers and soldiers were
recommended to the attention of their several states, with a

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declaration that their patriotism, valour, and perseverance, in
defence of the rights and liberties of their country, had entitled
them to the gratitude, as well as the approbation of their fellow
citizens.
In I780, a memorial from the general officers, depicting in
strong terms the situation of the army, and requiring present
support, and some future provision, was answered by a reference
to what had been already done, and by a declaration "That
patience, self-denial, fortitude and perseverance, and the cheerful sacrifice of time and health, are necessary virtues which
both the citizen and soldier are called to exercise, while struggling for the liberties of their country; and that moderation,
frugality and temperance, must be among the chief supports,
as well as the brightest ornaments of that kind of civil government which is wisely instituted by the several states in this
Union."
This philosophic lecture on the virtues of temperance to men
who were often without food, and always scantily supplied,
was ill calculated to assuage irritations fomented by the neglect
which was believed to have been sustained. In a few days afterwards, the subject was brought again before congress, and a
more conciliating temper was manifested. The odious restriction, limiting the half pay for seven years to those who should
hold no post of profit under the United States or any of them,
was removed; and the bounty allowed the men was extended
to the widows and orphans of those who had died or should
die in the service; at length, the vote passed which has been
stated, allowing half pay for life to all officers who should serve
in the armies of the United States to the end of the war.
Resolutions were also passed, recommending it to the several
states to make up the depreciation on the pay which had been
received by the army; and it was determined that their future
services should be compensated in the money of the new emission, the value of which, it was supposed, might be kept up by
taxes and by loans.
While the government of the union was thus employed in
maturing measures for the preservation of its ability establishment, the time for action passed away without furnishing any
material event. The hostile armies continued to watch each

GEORGE WASHINGTON

457.

other until the season of the year forced them out of the field.
Just before retiring into winter quarters, a handsome enterprise was executed by Major Talmadge, of Colonel Sheldon's
regiment of light dragoons. That gentleman had been generally
stationed on the lines, on the east side of the North River, and
had been distinguished for the accuracy of his intelligence.
He was informed that a large magazine of forage had been
collected at Coram, on Long Island, which was protected by the
militia of the country, the cruisers in the Sound, and a small
garrison in its neighbourhood.
At the head of a detachment of eighty dismounted dragoons,
under the command of Captain Edgar, and of eight Nov. 2 i.
or ten who were mounted, he passed the Sound where
it was twenty miles wide, marched across the island in the night,
and so completely surprised the fort, that his troops entered
the works on three different sides before the garrison was prepared to resist them. The British took refuge in two houses
connected with the fortifications, and commenced a fire from
the doors and windows. These were instantly forced open; and
the whole party, amounting to fifty-four, among whom were
a lieutenant colonel, captain, and subaltern, were killed or taken.
Stores to a considerable amount were destroyed, the fort was
demolished, and the magazines were consumed by fire. The
objects of the expedition being accomplished, Major Talmadge
recrossed the Sound without having lost a man. On the recommendation of General Washington, congress passed a resolution,
expressing a high sense of the merit of those engaged in the
expedition.
No objects for enterprise presenting themselves, the troops
were placed in winter quarters early in December. The Pennsylvania line was stationed near Morristown; the Jersey line
about Pompton, on the confines of New York and New Jersey;
and the troops belonging to the New England states, at West
Point, and in its vicinity, on both sides the North River. The
line of the state of New York remained at Albany, to which
place it had been detached for the purpose of opposing an invasion from Canada.
Major Carlton, at the head of one thousand men, composed
of Europeans, Indians, and Tories, had made a sudden irruption

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into the northern parts of New York, and taken forts Ann
and George, with their garrisons. At the same time, Sir John
Johnson, at the head of a corps composed of the same materials,
appeared on the Mohawk. Several sharp skirmishes were fought
in that quarter with the continental troops, and a regiment of
new levies, aided by the militia of the country. General Clinton's brigade was ordered to their assistance; but before he could
reach the scene of action, the invading armies had retired, after
laying waste the whole country through which they passed.
While the disorder of the American finances, the exhausted
state of the country, and the debility of the government, determined Great Britain to persevere in offensive war against
the United States, by keeping alive, her hopes of conquest,
Europe assumed an aspect not less formidable to the permanent
grandeur of that nation, than hostile to its present views. In
the summer of i78o, Russia, Sweden, and Denmark, entered
into the celebrated compact, which has been generally denominated "THE ARMED NEUTRALITY." Holland had
also declared a determination to accede to the same confederacy;
and it is not improbable that this measure contributed to the
declaration of war which was made by Great Britain against
that power towards the close of the present year.
The long friendship which had existed between the two nations was visibly weakened from the commencement of the
American war. Holland was peculiarly desirous of participating
in that commerce which the independence of the United States
would open to the world; and, from the commencement of
hostilities, her merchants, especially those of Amsterdam,
watched the progress of the war with anxiety, and engaged in
speculations which were profitable to themselves and beneficial
to the United States. The remonstrances made by the British
minister at the Hague against this conduct, were answered in
the most amicable manner by the government, but the practice
of individuals continued the same.
When the war broke out between France and England, a
number of Dutch vessels trading with France, laden with materials for ship building, were seized, and carried into the ports
of Great Britain, although the existing treaties between the two
nations were understood to exclude those articles from the list

GEORGE WASHINGTON

459

of contraband of war. The British cabinet justified these acts
of violence, and persisted in refusing to permit naval stores to
be carried to her enemy in neutral bottoms. This refusal, however, was accompanied with friendly professions, with an offer
to pay for the vessels and cargoes already seized, and with proposals to form new stipulations for the future regulation of
that commerce.
The States General refused to enter into any negotiations for
the modification of subsisting treaties; and the merchants of all
the great trading towns, especially those of Amsterdam, expressed the utmost indignation at the injuries they had sustained.
In consequence of this conduct, the British government required those succours which were stipulated in ancient treaties,
and insisted that the casus foederis had now occurred. Advantage was taken of the refusal of the States General to comply
with this demand, to declare the treaties between the two nations at an end.
The temper produced by this state of things, inclined Holland to enter into the treaty for an armed neutrality; and, in
November, the Dutch government acceded to it. Some unknown causes prevented the actual signature of the treaty on
the part of the States General, until a circumstance occurred
which was used for the purpose of placing them in a situation
not to avail themselves of the aid stipulated by that confederacy
to its members.
While Mr. Lee, one of the ministers of the United States,
was on a mission to the courts of Vienna and Berlin, he fell in
company with a Mr. John de Neufwille, a merchant of Amsterdam, with whom he held several conversations on the subject
of a commercial intercourse between the two nations, the result
of which was, that the plan of an eventual commercial treaty
was sketched out, as one which might thereafter be concluded
between them. This paper had received the approbation of
the Pensionary Van Berkel, and of the city of Amsterdam, but
not of the States General.
Mr. Henry Laurens, late president of congress, was deputed
to the States General with this plan of a treaty, for the double
purpose of endeavouring to complete it, and of negotiating a
loan for the use of his government. On the voyage he was

-8.

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captured by a British frigate; and his papers, which he had
thrown overboard, were rescued from the waves by a British
sailor. Among them was found the plan of a treaty which
has been mentioned, and which was immediately transmitted
to Sir Joseph Yorke, the British minister at the Hague, to be
laid before the government.
The explanations of this transaction not being deemed satisfactory by the court of London, Sir Joseph Yorke received
orders to' withdraw from the Hague, soon after which war was
proclaimed against Holland.
This bold measure, which added one of the first maritime
powers in Europe to the formidable list of enemies with whom
Britain was already encompassed, was perhaps, not less prudent
than courageous.
There are situations, to which only high minded nations are
equal, in which a daring policy will conduct those who adopt
it, safely through the very dangers it appears to invite; dangers
which a system suggested by a timid caution might multiply
instead of avoiding. The present was, probably, one of those
situations. Holland was about to become a member of the
armed neutrality, after which her immense navigation would
be employed, unmolested, in transporting the property of the
enemies of Britain, and in supplying them with all the materials for ship-building, or the whole confederacy must be encountered.
America, however, received with delight the intelligence
that Holland also was engaged in the war: and founded additional hopes of its speedy termination on that event.

GEORGE WASHINGTON

46i

CHAPTER XX
IN the South, Lord Cornwallis, after having nearly demolished
the American army at Camden, found himself under
the necessity of suspending, for a few weeks, the 1780.
new career of conquest on which he had intended to enter.
His army was enfeebled by sickness as well as by action; the
weather was intensely hot, and the stores necessary for an expedition into North Carolina had not been brought from
Charleston. In addition, a temper so hostile to the British interests had lately appeared in South Carolina as to make it
unsafe to withdraw any considerable part of his force from
that state, until he should subdue the spirit of insurrection
against his authority. Exertions were made in other parts of
the state, not inferior to those of Sumpter in the north-west.
Colonel Marion, who had been compelled by the wounds he received in Charleston to retire into the country, had been promoted by Governor Rutledge to the rank of a brigadier general.
As the army of Gates approached South Carolina, he had entered
the north eastern parts of that state with only sixteen men; had
penetrated into the country as far as the Santee; and was successfully rousing the well-affected inhabitants to arms, when
the defeat of the i6th of August chilled the growing spirit of
resistance which he had contributed to increase.
With the force he had collected, he rescued about one hundred
and fifty continental troops who had been captured at Camden,
and were on their way to Charleston. Though compelled, for
a short time, to leave the state, he soon returned to it, and at
the head of a few spirited men, made repeated excursions from
the swamps and marshes in which he concealed himself, and
skirmished successfully with the militia who had joined the
British standard, and the small parties of regulars by whom
they were occasionally supported.
His talents as a partisan, added to his knowledge of the
country, enabled him to elude every attempt to seize him; and

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such was his humanity as well as respect for the laws, that no
violence or outrage was ever attributed to the party under his
command.
The interval between the victory of the i6th of August, and
the expedition into North Carolina, was employed in quelling
what was termed the spirit of revolt in South Carolina. The efforts of the people to recover their independence were considered as new acts of rebellion, and were met with a degree
of severity which policy was supposed to dictate, but which
gave a keener edge to the resentments which civil discord never
fails to engender. Several of the most active militia men who
had taken protections as British subjects, and entered into the
British militia, having been afterwards found in arms, and made
prisoners at Camden, were executed as traitors. Orders were
given to officers commanding at different posts to proceed in
the same manner against persons of a similar description; and
these orders were, in many instances, carried into execution.
A proclamation was issued for sequestering the estates of all
those inhabitants of the province, not included in the capitulation of Charleston, who were in the service, or acting under the
authority of congress, and of all those who, by an open avowal
of what were termed rebellious principles, or by other notorious
acts should manifest a wicked and desperate perseverance in
opposing the re-establishment of royal authority.'
While taking these measures to break the spirit of independence, Lord Cornwallis was indefatigable in urging his preparations for the expedition into North Carolina.
The day after the battle near Camden, emissaries had been
despatched into that state for the purpose of inviting the friends
of the British government to take up arms. Meanwhile the
utmost exertions were continued to embody the people of the
country as a British militia; and Major Ferguson was employed
in the district of Ninety Six, to train the most loyal inhabitants,
and to attach them to his own corps.2 After being employed
for some time in Ninety Six, he was directed to enter the western parts of North Carolina, for the purpose of embodying the
royalists in that quarter.

I Rean.

2 Sted.

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463

The route marked out for the main army was from Camden,
through the settlement of the Waxhaws to Charlottestown, in
North Carolina. On the 8th of September Lord Cornwallis
moved from Camden, and reached Charlotte late in that month,
where he expected to be joined by Ferguson. But in attempting
to meet him, Ferguson was arrested by an event as important
as it was unexpected.
Colonel Clarke, a refugee from Georgia, had formed a plan
for the reduction of Augusta, which was defended only by a
few provincials, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel
Brown. About the time Lord Cornwallis commenced his march
from Camden, Clarke advanced against Augusta, at the head
of a body of irregulars whom he had collected in the frontiers
of North and South Carolina, and invested that place. Brown
made a vigorous defence; and the approach of Lieutenant
Colonel Cruger with a reinforcement from Ninety Six, compelled Clarke to relinquish the enterprise, and to save himself
by a rapid retreat. Intelligence of the transactions at Augusta
was given to Ferguson, who, to favour the design of intercepting Clarke, moved nearer the mountains, and remained longer
in that country than had been intended. This delay proved
fatal to him. It gave an opportunity to several volunteer corps
to unite, and to constitute a formidable force. The Sept. 25.
hardy mountaineers inhabiting the extreme western
parts of Virginia and North Carolina, assembled on horseback
with their rifles, under Colonels Campbell, M'Dowell, Cleveland,
Shelby, and Sevier, and moved with their accustomed Sept
velocity towards Ferguson. On receiving notice of
their approach, that officer commenced his march for Charlotte,
despatching, at the same time, different messengers to Lord
Cornwallis with information of his danger. These messengers
being intercepted, no movement was made to favour his retreat.
When within about sixteen miles of Gilbert-town, where
Ferguson was then supposed to lie, Col. M'Dowell Oct.
was deputed to Gates with a request that he would
appoint a general officer to command them; and, in the mean
time, Colonel Campbell of Virginia was choosen for that purpose. On reaching Gilbert-town, and finding that the British
had commenced their retreat, it was determined to follow them

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with the utmost celerity. At the Cowpens, this party was
Oct. 6. joined by Colonels Williams, Tracy, and Branan, of
South Carolina, with about four hundred men,
who also gave information respecting the distance and situation
of their enemy. About nine hundred choice men were selected,
by whom the pursuit was continued through the night, and
through a heavy rain; and, the next day, about three in the
Oct 7 afternoon, they came within view of Ferguson, who,
finding that he must be overtaken, had determined
to await the attack on King's mountain, and was encamped on
its summit,-a ridge five or six hundred yards long, and sixty
or seventy wide.
The Americans, who had arranged themselves into three columns, the right commanded by Colonel Sevier and Major Winston, the centre by Colonels Campbell and Shelby, and the left
by Colonels Cleveland and Williams, immediately rushed to
the assault. The attack was commenced by the centre, while
the two wings gained the flanks of the British line; and, in about
five minutes, the action became general. Ferguson made several
impetuous charges with the bayonet, which, against riflemen,
were necessarily successful. But, before any one of them could
completely disperse the corps against which is was directed, the
heavy and destructive fire of the others, who pressed him on
all sides, called off his attention to other quarters, and the broken
corps was rallied, and brought back to the attack.
In the course of these successive repulses, the right and centre
had become intermingled, and were both, by one furious charge
of the bayonet, driven almost to the foot of the mountain.
With some difficulty they were rallied and again brought into
the action; upon which the British, in turn, gave way, and were
driven along the summit of the ridge, on Cleveland and Williams, who still maintained their ground on the left. In this
critical state of the action, Ferguson received a mortal wound,
and instantly expired. The courage of his party fell with him,
and quarter was immediately demanded.' The action continued
rather more than an hour.
1 The details of this battle are chiefly taken from a paper signed by Colonels Campbell, Shelby, and Cleveland, and published in the Virginia Gazette of the i8th of November, 1780.

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46S

In this sharp action one hundred and fifty of Ferguson's
party were killed on the spot, and about the same number were
wounded. Eight hundred and ten, of whom one hundred were
British troops, were made prisoners, and fifteen hundred stand
of excellent arms were taken.
The Americans fought under cover of trees, and their loss
was inconsiderable; but among the slain was Colonel Williams,
who was greatly and justly lamented. As cruelty generally
begets cruelty, the example set by the British at Camden was
followed, and ten of the most active of the royalists were selected
from the prisoners, and hung upon the spot. The victorious
mountaineers, having accomplished the object for which they
assembled, returned to their homes.
The destruction of this party arrested the progress of Lord
Cornwallis in North Carolina, and inspired serious fears for the
posts in his rear. He retreated to Wynnsborough, between
Camden and Ninety Six, where he waited for rein- Oct. 14.
forcements from New York.
The victory obtained on the i6th of August having suggested views of more extensive conquest in the south, Sir Henry
Clinton had determined to send a large reinforcement to the
southern army. In the opinion that Lord Cornwallis could
meet with no effectual resistance in the Carolinas, he had
ordered the officer commanding this reinforcement to enter the
Chesapeake in the first instance, and to take possession of the
lower parts of Virginia, after which he was to obey the orders
he should receive from Lord Cornwallis, to whom a copy of
his instructions had been forwarded.
The detachment amounted to near three thousand men,
under the command of General Leslie. It sailed on the 6th of
October, and, entering James river after a short passage, took
possession of the country on the south side as high as Suffolk.
After a short time, Leslie drew in his out-posts, and began to
fortify Portsmouth. At this place he received orders from Lord
Cornwallis to repair to Charleston by water.
While Cornwallis waited at Wynnsborough for this reinforcement, the light corps of his army were employed in suppressing
the parties which were rising in various quarters of the country,
in opposition to his authority. Marion had become so formida

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ble as to endanger the communication between Camden and
Charleston. Tarlton was detached against him, and Marion
was under the necessity of concealing himself in the swamps.
From the unavailing pursuit of him through marshes which
were scarcely penetrable, Tarlton was called to a different quarter, where an enemy supposed to be entirely vanquished, had
reappeared in considerable force.
Sumpter had again assembled a respectable body of mounted
militia, at the head of which he advanced towards the posts occupied by the British. On receiving intelligence of his approach,
Earl Cornwallis formed a plan for surprising him in his camp
on Broad river, the execution of which was committed to Major
Wemyss. That officer marched from Wynnsborough at the
Nov. head of a regiment of infantry and about forty
dragoons, reached the camp of Sumpter several hours
before day, and immediately charged the out piquet, which
made but a slight resistance. Only five shot are said to have
been fired, but from these Wemyss received two dangerous
wounds which disabled him from the performance of his duty.
The assailants fell into confusion, and were repulsed with the
loss of their commanding officer and about twenty men. After
this action, Sumpter crossed Broad river, and, having formed a
junction with Clarke and Branan, threatened Ninety Six.
Alarmed for the safety of that post, Earl Cornwallis recalled
Tarlton, and ordered him to proceed against Sumpter. So rapid
was his movement that he had nearly gained the rear of his
enemy before notice of his return was received. In the night preceding the day on which he expected to effect his purpose, a
deserter apprized Sumpter of the approaching danger, and that
officer began his retreat. Tarlton, pursuing with his usual
rapidity, overtook the rear guard at the ford of the Ennoree,
and cut it to pieces; after which, fearing that Sumpter would
save himself by passing the Tyger, he pressed forward, with, as
he states, about two hundred and eighty cavalry and mounted
infantry, and, in the afternoon, came within view of the Americans, who were arranged in order for battle.
Sumpter had reached the banks of the Tyger, when the firing
Nov. 20. of his videttes announced the approach of his enemy.
He immediately posted his troops to great advantage

GEORGE WASHINGTON

467

on a steep eminence, having their rear and part of their right
flank secured by the river, and their left covered by a barn of
logs, into which a considerable number of his men were thrown.
Tarlton, without waiting for his infantry, or for a field piece
left with them in his rear, rushed to the charge with his usual
impetuosity. After several ineffectual attempts to dislodge the
Americans, he retired from the field with great precipitation and
disorder, leaving ninety-two dead, and one hundred wounded.
After remaining in possession of the ground for a few hours,
Sumpter, who was severely wounded in the action, crossed the
Tyger, after which his troops dispersed. His loss was only three
killed, and four wounded.
Availing himself of the subsequent retreat and dispersion of
the American militia, Tarlton denominated this severe check a
victory; while congress, in a public resolution, voted their thanks
to General Sumpter and the militia he commanded, for this and
other services which had been previously rendered.
The shattered remains of the army defeated near Camden,
had been slowly collected at Hillsborough, and great exertions
were made to reorganize and reinforce it. The whole number
of continental troops in the southern army amounted to about
fourteen hundred men.
On receiving intelligence that Lord Cornwallis had occupied
Charlotte, Gates detached Smallwood to the Yadkin, with directions to post himself at the ford of that river, and to take command of all the troops in that quarter of the country. The
more effectually to harass the enemy, a light corps was selected
from the army and placed under the command of Morgan, now
a brigadier general.
As Lord Cornwallis retreated, Gates advanced to Charlotte,
Smallwood encamped lower down the Catawba on the road to
Camden; and Morgan was pushed forward some distance in his
front. In the expectation that farther active operations would
be postponed until the spring, Gates intended to pass the winter
in this position. Such was the arrangement of the troops when
their general was removed.
On the Sth of November, without any previous indications
of dissatisfaction, congress passed a resolution requiring the
Commander-in-chief to order a court of inquiry on the conduct

468

THE LIFE OF

of General Gates as commander of the southern army, and to
appoint some other officer to that command, until the inquiry
should be made.
Washington, without hesitation, selected Greene for that important and difficult service. In a letter to congress recommending him to their support, he mentioned General Greene as "an
officer in whose abilities, fortitude, and integrity, from a long
and intimate experience of them, he had the most entire confidence." To Mr. Matthews, a delegate from South Carolina, he
said, "You have your wish in the officer appointed to the
southern command. I think I am giving you a general; but
what can a general do without men, without arms, without
clothing, without stores, without provisions?" About the same
time the legion of Lee was ordered into South Carolina.
Greene hastened to the army he was to command; and, on
the second of December, reached Charlotte, then its head quarters. Soon after his arrival in camp, he was gratified with the
intelligence of a small piece of good fortune obtained by the
address of Lieutenant Colonel Washington.
Smallwood, having received information that a body of royal
militia had entered the country in which he foraged, for the
purpose of intercepting his wagons, detached Morgan and Washington against them. Intelligence of Morgan's approach being
received, the party retreated; but Colonel Washington, being
able to move with more celerity than the infantry, resolved to
make an attempt on another party, which was stationed at
Rugely's farm, within thirteen miles of Camden. He found
them posted in a logged barn, strongly secured by abbattis, and
inaccessible to cavalry. Force being of no avail, he resorted to
the following stratagem. Having painted the trunk of a pine,
and mounted it on a carriage so as to resemble a. field piece, he
paraded it in front of the enemy, and demanded a surrender.
The whole party, consisting of one hundred and twelve men,
with Colonel Rugely at their head, alarmed at the prospect of
a cannonade, surrendered themselves prisoners of war.'
To narrow the limits of the British army, and to encourage
the inhabitants, Greene detached Morgan west of the Catawba,
'The author received this account both from General Morgan and Colonel Washington.

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GEORGE WASHINGTON

469 -

with orders to take a position near the confluence of the Pacolet
with the Broad River. His party consisted of rather more than
three hundred chosen continental troops, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Howard, of Maryland, of Washington's regiment of light dragoons, amounting to about eighty men, and of
two companies of militia from the northern and western parts
of Virginia commanded by Captains Triplet and Taite, which
were composed almost entirely of old continental soldiers. He
was also to be joined on Broad River by seven or eight hundred
volunteers and militia commanded by General Davidson, and
by Colonels Clarke and Few.
After making this detachment, Greene, for the purpose of
entering a more plentiful country, advanced lower down the
Pedee, and encamped on its east side, opposite the Cheraw hills.
Lord Cornwallis remained at Wynnsborough, preparing to commence active operations, so soon as he should be joined by Leslie.
The position he occupied on the Pedee was about seventy
miles from Wynnsborough, and towards the north of east from
that place. The detachment commanded by Morgan had taken
post at Grindal's ford on the Pacolet, one of the south forks of
Broad River, not quite fifty miles north west of Wynnsborough.
The active courage of his troops, and the enterprising temper of
their commander, rendered him extremely formidable to the
parties of royal militia who were embodying in that quarter of
the country.
Supposing Morgan to have designs on Ninety Six, Lord Cornwallis detached.Lieutenant Colonel Tarlton with his legion, part
of two regiments of infantry, and a corps of artillery with two
field pieces, consisting altogether of about one thousand men,
across the Broad River, to cover that important post. As he lay
between Greene and Morgan, he was desirous of preventing their
junction, and of striking at one of them while unsupported by
the other. To leave it uncertain against which division his first
effort would be directed, he ordered Leslie to halt at Camden
until the preparations for entering North Carolina should be
completed. Having determined to penetrate into that state by
the upper route, he put his army in motion and I 8
directed his course north westward, between the J78a.
Catawba and Broad Rivers. Leslie was directed to January

470

THE LIFE OF

move up the banks of the former, and to join him on the march;
and Tarlton was ordered to strike at Morgan. Should that officer escape Tarlton, the hope was entertained that he might be
intercepted by the main army.1
High waters delayed Cornwallis and Leslie longer than had
been expected; but Tarlton overcame the same obstacles, and
reached Morgan before a correspondent progress was made by
the other divisions.1
The combined movements of the British army were communicated to General Morgan on the I4th of January. Perceiving the insecurity of his own position, he retired across the
Pacolet, the fords over which he was desirous of
defending. But a passage of that river being effected
at a ford about six miles below him, he made a precipitate retreat; and, on the evening of the same day, his pursuers occupied
the camp he had abandoned. Morgan retired to the Cowpens,
where he determined to risk a battle. It was believed that he
might have crossed the Broad River, or have reached a mountainous country which was also near him, before he could have
been overtaken; and the superiority of his adversary was so
decided as to induce his best officers to think that every effort
ought to be made to avoid an engagement. But Morgan had
great and just confidence in himself and in his troops, he was
unwilling to fly from an enemy not so decidedly his superior as
to render it madness to fight him; and he also thought that, if
he should be overtaken while his men were fatigued and retreating, the probability of success would be much less than if he
should exhibit the appearance of fighting from choice.
These considerations determined him to halt earlier than was
absolutely necessary.2
Tarlton, having left his baggage under a strong guard, with
orders not to move until break of day, recommenced
Jan. 17. the pursuit at three in the morning.
Before day, Morgan was informed of his approach, and prepared to receive him.
Letter of Lord Cornwallis.-Stedman.
2 These reasons for his conduct were given to the author by General Morgan soon
after his return from the southern campaign.

GEORGE WASHINGTON

47I1

Although censured by many for having determined to fight,
and by some for the ground he chose, all admit the judgment
with which his disposition was made.
On an eminence, in an open wood, he drew up his continental
troops, and Triplet's corps, deemed equal to continentals,
amounting to between four and five hundred men, who were
commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Howard. In their rear, on
the descent of the hill, Lieutenant Colonel Washington was
posted with his cavalry, and a small body of mounted Georgia
militia commanded by Major M'Call, as a corps de reserve.
On these two corps rested his hopes of victory, and with them
he remained in person. The front line was composed entirely
of militia, under the command of Colonel Pickens. Major
M'Dowell, with a battalion of North Carolina volunteers, and
Major Cunningham, with a battalion of Georgia volunteers,
were advanced about one hundred and fifty yards in front of
this line, with orders to give a single fire as the enemy approached, and then to fall back into the intervals, which were
left for them in the centre of the first line. The militia, not
being expected to maintain their ground long, were ordered to
keep up a retreating fire by regiments, until they should pass the
continental troops, on whose right they were directed again to
form. His whole force, as stated by himself, amounted -to only
eight hundred men.
Soon after this disposition was made, the British van appeared
in sight. Confident of a cheap victory, Tarlton formed his line
of battle, and his troops rushed forward with great impetuosity,
shouting as they advanced.
After a single well directed fire, M'Dowell and Cunningham
fell back on Colonel Pickens, who, after a short but warm conflict, retreated into the rear of the second line.' The British
pressed forward with great eagerness; and, though received by
the continental troops with a firmness unimpaired by the route
of the front line, continued to advance. Soon after the action
with the continental troops had commenced, Tarlton ordered up
his reserve. Perceiving that the enemy extended beyond him
" Some of them formed afterwards, and renewed the action on Howard's right.

472

THE LIFE OF

both on the right and left, and that, on the right especially, his
flank was on the point of being turned, Howard ordered the
company on his right to change its front, so as to face the British
on that flank. From some mistake in the officer commanding
this company, it fell back, instead of fronting the enemy, upon
which the rest of the line, supposing a change of ground for
the whole to have been directed, began to retire in perfect order.
At this moment General Morgan rode up, and directed the
infantry to retreat over the summit of the hill, about one
hundred yards to the cavalry. This judicious but hazardous
movement was made in good order, and extricated the flanks
from immediate danger. Believing the fate of the day to be
decided, the British pressed on with increased ardour, and in
some disorder; and when the Americans halted, were within
thirty yards of them. The orders then given by Howard to face
the enemy were executed as soon as they were received; and the
whole line poured in a fire as deadly as it was unexpected. Some
confusion appearing in the ranks of the enemy, Howard seized
the critical moment, and ordered a charge with the bayonet.
These orders were instantly obeyed, and the British line was
broken.
At the same moment the detachment of cavalry on the
British right was routed by Washington. The militia of Pickens,
who rode to the ground, had tied their horses in the rear of
Howard's left. When the front line was broken, many of them
fled to their horses, and were closely pursued by the cavalry,
who, while the continental infantry were retiring, passed their
flank, and were cutting down the scattered militia in their rear.
Washington, who had previously ordered his men not to fire a
pistol, now directed them to charge the British cavalry with
drawn swords. A sharp conflict ensued, but it was not of long
duration. The British were driven from the ground with considerable slaughter, and were closely pursued. Both Howard
and Washington. pressed the advantage they had respectively
gained, until the artillery, and great part of the infantry had
surrendered. So sudden was the defeat, that a considerable part
of the British cavalry had not been brought into action; and,
though retreating, remained unbroken. Washington, followed
by Howard with the infantry, pursued them rapidly, and at

GEORGE WASHINGTON

473

tacked' them with great spirit; but, as they were superior to
him in numbers, his cavalry received a temporary check; and in
this part of the action he sustained a greater loss than in any
other. But the infantry coming up to support him, Tarlton
resumed the retreat.2
In this engagement upwards of one hundred British, including ten commissioned officers, were killed; twenty-nine commissioned officers, and five hundred privates were made prisoners.
Eight hundred muskets, two field pieces, two standards, thirtyfive baggage wagons, and one hundred dragoon horses, fell into
the hands of the conquerors.
Tarlton retreated towards the head quarters of Lord Cornwallis, then about twenty-five miles from the Cowpens.
This complete victory cost the Americans less than eighty
men in killed and wounded.
Seldom has a battle in which greater numbers were not engaged, been so important in its consequences as that of the Cowpens. Lord Cornwallis was not only deprived of a fifth of his
numbers, but lost a most powerful and active part of his army.
Unfortunately, Greene was not in a condition to press the advantage. The whole southern army did not much exceed two
thousand men, a great part of whom were militia.
The camp of Lord Cornwallis at Turkey creek on the east side
of Broad river, was as near as the Cowpens to the fords at which
Morgan was to cross the Catawba. Of consequence, that officer
had much cause to fear that, encumbered as he was with prisoners and military stores, he might be intercepted before he
could pass that river. Comprehending the full extent of his
danger, he abandoned the baggage he had taken, and leaving
his wounded under the protection of a flag, detached the militia
as an escort to his prisoners, and brought up the rear in person
1 In the eagerness of pursuit, Washington advanced near thirty yards in front of
his regiment. Three British officers, observing this, wheeled about, and made a charge
upon him. The officer on his right aimed a blow to cut him down as an American serjeant came up, who intercepted the blow by disabling his sword arm. The officer on
his left was about to make a stroke at him at the same instant, when a waiter, too
small to wield a sword, saved him by wounding the officer with a ball from a pistol.
At this moment, the officer in the centre, who was believed to be Tarlton, made a
thrust at him which he parried; upon which the officer retreated a few paces, and
then discharged a pistol at him, which wounded his horse.
' The author has received statements of this action from General Morgan and from
Colonels Howard and Washington.

474

THIE LIFE OF

with his regulars. Passing Broad river on the evening of the
day on which the battle was fought, he hastened to the Catawba,
which he crossed on the 23d, at Sherald's ford, and encamped on
its eastern bank.
Lord Cornwallis employed the i8th in forming a junction
with Leslie. Early next morning he put his army in motion,
and, on the 25th, reached Ramsay's mills, where the roads taken
by the two armies unite. At this place, to accelerate his future
movements, he destroyed his baggage; and, after collecting a
small supply of provisions, resumed the pursuit. He reached
Sherald's ford in the afternoon of the 29th; and, in the night,
an immense flood of rain rendered the river impassable.
While Morgan remained on the Catawba, watching the motions of the British army, and endeavouring to collect the militia,
General Greene arrived, and took command of the detachment.
In his camp on the Pedee, opposite the Cheraw hills, Greene
had been joined by Lee's legion, amounting to about one hundred cavalry, and one hundred and twenty infantry. The day
after his arrival, he was ordered to join Marion for the purpose
of attempting to carry a British post at Georgetown, distant
about seventy-five miles from the American army. The fort
was surprised, but the success was only partial.
On receiving intelligence of the victory at the Cowpens,
Greene detached Stevens' brigade of Virginia militia, whose
terms of service were on the point of expiring, to conduct the
prisoners to Charlottesville in Virginia, and turned his whole
attention to the effecting of a junction between the two divisions of his army. It was principally with a view to this object
that he hastened to the detachment under Morgan, leaving the
other division to be commanded by General Huger.
Early in the morning of the first of February, Lord Cornwallis forced a passage over the Catawba, at a private ford which
was defended by General Davidson, with about three hundred
North Carolina militia. Davidson was killed, and his troops
dispersed. They were followed by Tarlton, who, hearing in the
pursuit, that several bodies of militia were assembling at a
tavern about ten miles from the ford, hastened to the place of
rendezvous, and charging them with his usual impetuosity,
broke their centre, killed some, and dispersed the whole party.

GEORGE WASHINGTON

475

It was found impracticable to bring the militia into the field,
and Huger, who had been directed to march to Salisbury, was
ordered to effect a junction between the two divisions of the
army at some place farther north.
Greene retreated along the Salisbury road, and, in the evening
of the third, crossed the Yadkin at the trading ford. His passage
of the river, then already much swollen by the rain of the
preceding day, was facilitated by boats which had been previously collected. The rear guard, which, being impeded by the
baggage of the whigs who fled from Salisbury did not cross till
midnight, was overtaken by the van of the British army, and a
skirmish ensued in which some loss was sustained, but the
Americans effected the passage of the river.
The rains having rendered the Yadkin unfordable, and the
boats being collected on the opposite side, the pur- Feb. 9.
suit was necessarily suspended; but Greene continued
his march to Guilford court house where he was joined by
Huger.
After some delay, and apparent hesitation respecting his
movements, Lord Cornwallis marched up the Yadkin, which he
crossed near its source on the morning of the eighth.
After the junction between the divisions of Huger and Morgan, the infantry of the American army, including six hundred
militia, amounted to about two thousand effectives; and the
cavalry to between two and three hundred. Lord Cornwallis
lay twenty-five miles above them at Salem, with an army estimated from twenty-five hundred to three thousand men, including three hundred cavalry. Having failed in his attempt
to prevent the junction of the two divisions of the American
army, his object was to place himself between Greene and Virginia, and force that officer to a general action before he could
be joined by the reinforcements which were known to be preparing for him in that state. His situation favoured the accomplishment of this object.
Greene, on the other hand, was indefatigable in his exertions
to cross the Dan without exposing himself to the hazard of a
battle. To effect this object, the whole of his cavalry, with the
flower of his infantry, amounting together to rather more than
seven hundred men, were formed into a light corps, for the

47-6

THE LIFE OF

purpose of harassing and impeding the advance of the enemy,
until the less active part of his force, with the baggage and military stores should be secured. Morgan being rendered incapable of duty by severe indisposition, the command of this corps
was conferred on Colonel Otho H. Williams.
Lord Cornwallis had been informed that it would be impossible to obtain boats at the ferries on the Dan in sufficient numbers for the transportation of the American troops before he
could overtake them. And, as the river could not be forded
below, he calculated with confidence on succeeding in his object
by keeping above Greene, and prevent his reaching those shallow fords by which alone it was thought possible to escape into
Virginia.
Dix's ferry is about fifty miles from Guilford court house,
and was almost equidistant from the two armies. Considerably
below, and more than seventy miles from Guilford court house,
were two other ferries, Boyd's and Irwin's, which were only
four miles apart. By directing their march towards the lower
and more remote ferries, the distance from Lord Cornwallis was
so much ground gained; and by despatching an officer with a
few men to Dix's, the boats at that, and at an intermediate
ferry, might be brought down the river in time to meet the
army at the intended crossing place. These facts being suggested by Lieutenant Colonel Carrington, quartermaster general for the southern department, the proposition was instantly
adopted, and an officer despatched to bring the boats from above
down to Boyd's ferry.'
The next day both armies resumed their line of march. While
General Greene pressed forward to Boyd's, Williams gained an
intermediate road leading to Dix's ferry, and thus placed himself between the two armies! a small distance in front of the
one, and considerably in rear of the other. Such was the boldness and activity of this corps that Lord Cornwallis found it
necessary to temper the eagerness of his pursuit with caution.
Yet he moved with great rapidity;-marching nearly thirty
miles each day. On the morning of the third day, he attempted
to surprise the Americans by marching from the rear of his
'The author received this fact from Colonel Carrington.

GEORGE WASHINGTON

477

column into the road which had been taken by them, while his
van proceeded slowly on its original route. Information of this
movement was received, and Lieutenant Colonel Lee charged
his advanced cavalry with such impetuosity, as to cut a company nearly to pieces. A captain and several privates were
made prisoners. The whole British army turned into this road
and followed in the rear of Williams, who used every effort to
delay their march.
The measures adopted by Greene for collecting the boats
were successful; and, on the fourteenth, he effected the passage
of his troops and stores.
When Williams supposed that the American army had reached
the Dan, he left the road leading to Dix's ferry, and entering
that which Greene had taken; urged his march to the lower
ferries with the utmost celerity. Lord Cornwallis, being at
length informed that Greene had taken the lower road, turned
into it about the same time by a nearer way, and his front was
in sight of the rear of Williams. So rapid were the movements
of both armies that, in the last twenty-four hours, the Americans marched forty miles; and the rear had scarcely touched
the northern bank, when the van of the enemy appeared on the
opposite shore.
That General Greene was able to effect this retreat without
loss, evidences the judgment with which he improved every
favourable circumstance.
The exertions, the fatigues, the sufferings, and the patience
of both armies, during this long, toilsome, and rapid pursuit,
were extreme. Without tents, without spirits, often without
provisions, and always scantily supplied with them; through
deep and frozen roads, high waters, and frequent rains; each
performed, without a murmur, the severe duties assigned to it.
The difference between them consists only in this,-the British
troops were well clothed; the Americans were almost naked,
and many of them barefooted.
Great praise was bestowed by the general on his whole army;
but the exertions of Colonel Williams, and of Lieutenant Colonel Carrington were particularly noticed.
Although that part of North Carolina through which the
armies had passed, was well affected to the American cause, such

478

THE LIFE OF

was the rapidity with which they moved, and such the terror
inspired by the presence of the enemy, that no aid was drawn
from the militia. Indeed, those who had joined the army from
the more remote parts of the country could not be retained;
and, when it reached the Dan, the militia attached to it did not
exceed eighty men.
Having driven Greene out of North Carolina, Lord Cornwallis turned his attention to the re-establishment of regal
authority in that state. For this purpose, he proceeded by easy
Feb. I 8. marches to Hillsborough, at that time its capital,
where he erected the royal standard, and issued a
proclamation inviting the inhabitants to repair to it, and to
assist him in restoring the ancient government.
As soon as it was known that General Greene had entered
Virginia, he was reinforced by six hundred militia drawn from
the neighbouring counties, the command of which was given to
General Stevens.
Apprehensive that Lord Cornwallis, if left in the undisturbed possession of North Carolina, would succeed, to the extent of his hopes; in recruiting his army and procuring the submission of the people, General Greene determined, on receiving
this small reinforcement, to re-enter that state; and, avoiding
a general engagement, to keep the field against a superior enemy,
who had demonstrated his capacity for rapid movement and
hardy enterprise.
On the i8th, while Lord Cornwallis remained on the opposite
shore, the legion of Lee had passed the Dan. On the 2ist, the
light infantry also recrossed it; and, on the 23d, they were followed by the main body of the army.
The light infantry hung round the quarters of the enemy,
while the main body advanced slowly, keeping in view the
roads to the western parts of the country, from which a considerable reinforcement of militia was expected.'
General Greene was not mistaken in the consequences of
1 The western militia had been engaged in a war with the Cherokee Indians, who,
neglected by the United States, and incited by the British, had determined once more
to take up the hatchet. The militia from the western parts of Virginia and North
Carolina entered their country, burnt their towns, containing near one thousand
houses, destroyed fifty thousand bushels of grain, killed twenty-nine men, took several prisoners, and compelled the nation to sue for peace.

GEORGE WASHINGTON

479

leaving Lord Cornwallis in the peaceable possession of North
Carolina. He was informed that seven independent companies
were raised in one day. A large body of royalists had begun to
embody themselves on the branches of the Haw river; and
Colonel Tarlton, with the cavalry of his legion and some infantry, was detached from Hillsborough to favour their rising,
and to conduct them to the British army.
Intelligence of the movements of the loyalists and of Tarlton
being received, Greene ordered Lieutenant Colonel Lee with the
cavalry of his legion, and General Pickens with between three
and four hundred militia, who had just formed a junction near
Hillsborough, to move against both parties.
In a long lane, Lee, whose cavalry was in front of the whole
detachment, came up with the royalists. He was Feb. z
mistaken by them for Tarlton, whom they had not
yet seen, to whose encampment they were proceeding, and
whose corps was then taking refreshment, not much more than
a mile distant from them. Perceiving their mistake, Lee received their expressions of joy and attachment, and had just
reached their colonel, to whom he was about to make communications which might have enabled him to proceed on his
design of surprising Tarlton, when the infantry who followed
close in his rear, were recognised by the insurgents; and a firing
took place between them. It being apparent that this circumstance must give the alarm to the British, Lee changed his plan,
and turning on the royalists, who still supposed him to be a
British officer, cut them to pieces while they were making
protestations of loyalty, and asserting that they were "the very
best friends of the king." More than one hundred, among
whom was Colonel Pyle, their leader, fell under the swords of
his cavalry. This terrible but unavoidable carnage broke, in a
great measure, the spirits of the tories in that part of the
country. Some who were on their march to join the British
standard, returned, determined to await the issue of events
before they went too far to recede.
The hope of surprising Tarlton being thus disappointed,
Pickens and Lee determined to postpone the attack till the
morning; and took a position for the night between him and a
corps of militia which was advancing from the western counties

480

THE LIFE OF

of Virginia under Colonel Preston. Tarlton had meditated an
attempt on this corps; but at midnight, when his troops were
paraded to march on this design, he received an express from
Lord Cornwallis, directing his immediate return to the army.
In obedience to this order, he began his retreat long before day,
and crossed the Haw, just as the Americans, who followed him,
appeared on the opposite bank. Two pieces of artillery commanded the ford and stopped the pursuit.
To approach more nearly the great body of the loyalists, who
Feb. were settled between Haw and Deep rivers, and to
take a position in a country less exhausted than that
around Hillsborough, Lord Cornwallis crossed the Haw, and
encamped on Allimance creek.
As the British army retired, General Greene advanced. Not
being yet in a condition to hazard an engagement, he changed
his ground every night. In the course of the critical movements, which were made in order to avoid an action, and at the
same time to overawe the loyalists, and maintain a position
favourable to a junction with the several detachments who
were marching from different quarters to his assistance, he derived immense service from a bold and active light infantry,
and from a cavalry which, though inferior in numbers, was
rendered superior in effect to that of his enemy, by being much
better mounted. They often attacked boldly and successfully,
and made sudden incursions into the country, which so intimidated the royalists, that Lord Cornwallis found it difficult
to obtain intelligence. By these means, all his attempts to bring
the American general to action were frustrated; and his lordship was under the necessity of keeping his men close in their
quarters.
During this hazardous trial of skill, Lord Cornwallis moved
March 6. out in full force towards Reedy fork, where the light
infantry lay, in the hope of surprising that corps
under cover of a thick fog, and probably with ulterior views
against General Greene. His approach was perceived, and a
sharp skirmish ensued between a part of the light infantry, and
a much superior body of British troops commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Webster, in which the loss was supposed to be
nearly equal. The advance of the British army obliged Wil

GEORGE WASHINGTON

48i

liams to retire; and General Greene, by recrossing the Haw and
uniting with the light infantry on its north eastern bank at the
Rocky ford, disappointed any farther designs which might
have been formed against the army then under his command, or
against the reinforcements which were approaching. Being
thus foiled, Lord Cornwallis withdrew to Deep river, and General Greene fell back to the Iron-works on Troublesome creek.
At length his reinforcements, though much inferior to the
number he had been taught to expect, were received, and
Greene, in his turn, sought a battle. With this viewMarch 4
he dissolved the corps of light infantry, advanced
towards his enemy, and encamped within eight miles of him, at
Guilford court house.
His army, including officers, amounted to about four thousand five hundred men, of whom not quite two thousand were
continental troops and the residue consisted of Virginia and
North Carolina militia. Those of Virginia were commanded by
Generals Stevens and Lawson, and by Colonels Preston, Campbell, and Lynch; and those of North Carolina, by Generals
Butler and Eaton.
Of the four regiments which composed the continental infantry, only one, the first of Maryland, was veteran. The other
three consisted of new levies, with a few old continental soldiers
interspersed among them. The legion of Lee, and the cavalry
of Washington, like the first regiment of Maryland, added every
advantage of experience to approved courage; and nearly all the
officers commanding the new levies were veteran.
Having determined to risk an action, Greene chose his
ground with judgment. Early in the morning of the i 5th, the
fire of his reconnoitring parties announced the approach of the
enemy on the great Salisbury road, and his army was immediately arranged in order of battle. It was drawn up in three
lines, on a large hill, surrounded by other hills, chiefly covered
with trees and underwood.
The front line was composed of the two brigades of North
Carolina militia, who were posted to great advantage on the
edge of the wood, behind a strong rail fence, with an extensive
open field in front.
The two brigades of Virginia militia formed the second line.

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They were drawn up entirely in the wood, about three hundred
yards in rear of the first, and on either side of the great Salisbury road.
The third line was placed about three hundred yards in rear
of the second, and was composed of continental troops. The
Virginia brigade, commanded by General Huger, was on the
right; that of Maryland, commanded by Colonel Williams, was
on the left. They were drawn up obliquely, with their left
diverging from the second line, and partly in open ground.
The first and third regiments of dragoons, amounting to one
hundred and two troopers, Kirkwood's company of light infantry, and a regiment of militia riflemen under Colonel Lynch,
formed a corps of observation for the security of the right
flank, which was commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Washington. The legion, consisting of one hundred and sixty-eight
horse and foot, and a body of riflemen commanded by Colonels
Campbell and Preston, formed a corps of observation for the
security of the left flank, which was placed under Lieutenant
Colonel Lee. The artillery was in the front line, in the great
road leading through the centre, with directions to fall back as
the occasion should require.
Though Lord Cornwallis was sensible that the numbers of
the American army were greatly augmented by troops whose
continuance in service would be of short duration, he deemed
it so important to the interests of his sovereign to maintain the
appearance of superiority in the field, that he was unwilling
March i to decline the engagement now offered him. On
the advance of Greene, therefore, he prepared for
action; and early in the morning moved from his ground, determined to attack the adverse army wherever it should be
found. About four miles from Guilford court house, the advance, led by Lieutenant Colonel Tarlton, fell in with Lee, and
a sharp skirmish ensued, which was terminated by the appearance of such large bodies of British troops, as rendered it prudent for Lee to retire. His Lordship continued to advance
until he came within view of the American army. His disposition for the attack was then made in the following order.
The seventy-first British regiment, with the German regiment of Bose, led by General Leslie, and supported by the first

GEORGE WASHINGTON

483

battalion of the guards under Colonel Norton, formed the
right, and the twenty-third and thirty-third regiments, led by
Lieutenant Colonel Webster, and supported by Brigadier General O'Hara with the grenadiers and second battalion of the
guards, formed the left. The light infantry of the guards and
the Yagers, posted in the wood on the left of the artillery, and
the cavalry in column behind it in the road, formed a corps of
observation.'
This disposition being made, the British troops advanced to
the charge, with the cool, intrepidity which discipline inspires.
The North Carolina militia were not encouraged by the great
advantages of their position to await the shock. They broke
instantly; and, throwing away their arms and flying through
the woods, sought their respective homes.
The British then advanced on the second line, which received
them with more firmness; and maintained their ground for
some time with great resolution. Lord Cornwallis perceiving
the corps on his flanks, brought the whole of his reserved infantry into the line. On the right, General Leslie brought up
the guards to oppose Lee; and, on the left, Webster changed his
front to the left, and attacked Washington, while the grenadiers and second battalion of guards moved forward to occupy
the place which he had just quitted.2
The ground being unfavourable to the action of horse,
Washington had posted Lynch's riflemen, with whom he remained in person, on a height covered with thick woods; and
had drawn up his cavalry and continental infantry about one
hundred yards in their rear. On being attacked by Webster,
the riflemen broke; and Washington, finding it impossible to
rally them, rejoined his cavalry.
The British continuing to advance, and it being well understood that the militia could not stand the bayonet, General
Stevens, who had received a ball in his right thigh, ordered his
brigade to retreat. Lawson's brigade having given way a short
time before, the second line was entirely routed; and the enemy
advanced boldly on the third.
The several divisions of the British army had been separated

1 Letter of Lord Cornwallis.-Stedman.

2 Ibid.

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from each other by extending themselves to the right and left
in order to encounter the distinct corps which threatened their
flanks; and by advancing in regiments at different times, as the
different parts of the second line had given way. The thickness of the wood increased the difficulty of restoring order.
They pressed forward with great eagerness, but with a considerable degree of irregularity.
Greene, in this state of the action, entertained the most sanguine hopes of a complete victory. His continental troops
were fresh, in perfect order, and upon the point of engaging an
enemy, broken into distinct parts, and probably supposing the
severity of the action to be over. This fair prospect was
blasted by the misconduct of a single corps. The second regiment of Maryland was posted at some distance from the first,
in open ground; its left forming almost a right angle with the
line, so as to present a front to any corps which might attack
on that flank. The British in advancing, inclined to the right;
and the second battalion of guards entered the open ground
immediately after the retreat of Stevens, and rushed on the
second regiment of Maryland while the first was engaged with
Webster. Without waiting to receive the charge, that regiment
broke in confusion. By pursuing them, the guards were thrown
into the rear of the first regiment, from which they were concealed by the unevenness of the ground, and by a skirt of
wood.
Greene was himself on the left, and witnessed the misfortune
without being able to remedy it. His militia being entirely
routed, the flight of one-fourth of his continental troops would
most probably decide the fate of the day. Unwilling to risk
his remaining three regiments, only one of which could be safely
relied on, without a man to cover their retreat should the event
prove unfortunate, he ordered Colonel Greene of Virginia to
withdraw his regiment from the line, and to take a position in
the rear, for the purpose of affording a rallying point, and of
covering the retreat of the two regiments which still continued
in the field.
The Guards were soon called from the pursuit of the second
Maryland regiment, and led by Lieutenant Colonel Stuart
against the first. About this time Webster, finding himself

GEORGE WASHINGTON

48 y

overpowered by the first Maryland regiment, then commanded
by Colonel Gunby, and by Kirkwood's company and the remaining regiment of Virginia, with whom he was engaged at
the same time, had in a great measure withdrawn from the
action, and retired across a ravine into an adjoining wood. This
critical respite enabled Gunby to provide for the danger in his
rear. Facing about, he met the Guards, and a very animated
fire took place on both sides, during which the Americans continued to advance.
In this critical moment, Lieutenant Colonel Washington, who
was drawn to this part of the field by the vivacity of the fire,
made a furious charge upon the Guards and broke their ranks.
At this juncture, Gunby's horse was killed under him, and the
command devolved on Lieutenant Colonel Howard. The regiment advanced with such rapidity that Gunby could not overtake it, and was within thirty yards of the Guards when they
were charged by the cavalry. Almost at the same instant the
Maryland infantry rushed upon them with the bayonet, and
following the horse through them, were masters of the whole
battalion. In passing through it, Captain Smith of the infantry
killed its commanding officer.
After passing through the Guards into the open ground where
the second regiment had been originally posted, Howard perceived several British columns, with some pieces of artillery.
Believing his regiment to be the sole infantry remaining in the
field, he retreated in good order, and brought off some prisoners.
The cavalry also retreated.'
About the same time the remaining Virginia regiment commanded by Colonel Hawes, and Kirkwood's infantry, who were
still engaged with Webster, were directed by General Greene to
retreat. The artillery was unavoidably abandoned; the horses
which drew the pieces being killed, and the woods too thick to
admit of their being dragged elsewhere than along the great
' After passing through the Guards into the cleared ground, Washington, who always led the van, perceived an officer surrounded by several persons who appeared to
be aids-de-camp. Believing this to be Lord Cornwallis, he rushed forward in the hope
of making him a prisoner, but was arrested by an accident. His cap fell from his
head, and, as he leaped to the ground to recover it, the officer leading the column was
shot through the body, and rendered incapable of managing his horse. The animal
wheeled round with his rider, and galloped off the field. He was followed by all the
cavalry, who supposed that this movement had been directed.

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road. The retreat was made in good order, and Greene, in
person, brought up the rear.
Though the action was over on the right and centre, Campbell's riflemen still maintained their ground on the extreme of
the American left, against General Leslie with the regiment of
Bose and the first battalion of Guards.
After the Guards had routed the brigade commanded by
Lawson, they were attacked on their right flank by the infantry
of Lee's legion and by Campbell's riflemen, and were driven
behind the regiment of Bose, which having moved with less
impetuosity, was advancing in compact order.
This regiment sustained the American fire until Lieutenant
Colonel Norton was able to rally the guards and to bring them
back to the charge; after which the action was maintained with
great obstinacy on both sides until the battle was decided on the
right. Lieutenant Colonel Tarlton was then ordered to the
support of Leslie. The legion infantry had retreated, and only
a few resolute marksmen remained in the rear of Campbell
who continued firing from tree to tree. Being unable to
resist a charge of cavalry, they were quickly driven from the
field.
Two regiments of infantry and a detachment of cavalry pursued the right wing and centre of the Americans for a short
distance, but were soon ordered to return. On examining his
situation, Lord Cornwallis found himself too much weakened,
and his troops too much fatigued by the action, to hazard its
renewal, or to continue the pursuit. General Greene halted
about three miles from the field of battle, behind Rudy fork
creek, for the purpose of collecting his stragglers; after which
he retired about twelve miles, to the iron works on Troublesome creek, the place appointed for the rendezvous of his army
in the event of its being defeated.
The returns made immediately after the action, exhibited a
loss in killed, wounded and missing in the continental troops, of
fourteen commissioned officers, and three hundred and twelve
non-commissioned officers and privates. Major Anderson, a
valuable officer of Maryland, was killed; and General Huger,
who commanded the continental troops of Virginia, was
wounded.

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487

The same return states the loss of the militia at four captains
and seventeen privates killed; and, in addition to General
Stevens, one major, three captains, eight subalterns, and sixty
privates, were wounded. A great proportion of this part of
the army was missing; but it seems to have been expected that
they would either rejoin their corps, or be found at their
homes.
The victory at Guilford was dearly purchased. Official accounts state the loss of the British army at five hundred and
thirty-two men, among whom were several officers of high
rank and distinguished merit. Lieutenant Colonel Stuart of the
guards was killed, and Lieutenant Colonel Webster, who was
ranked by his enemies among the best officers in the British
service, was mortally wounded. This loss, when compared with
the numbers brought by Lord Cornwallis into the field, was
very considerable. The Americans did not compute his troops
at more than two thousand rank and file, but his own accounts
state them at only fourteen hundred and forty-five.
No battle in the course of the war reflects more honour on
the courage of the British troops, than that of Guilford. On
no other occasion have they fought with such inferiority of
numbers, or disadvantage of ground. Estimating his first line
at nothing, General Greene's army consisted of three thousand
two hundred men, posted on ground chosen by himself; and his
disposition was skilfully made.
The American general, expecting to be again attacked, prepared for another engagement. But the situation of Lord
Cornwallis had become too desperate to hazard a second battle,
or to maintain his position. He found himself under the necessity of retreating to a place of greater security, where provisions
might be obtained.
When the expedition into North Carolina was originally
meditated, Major Craig, at the head of a small military and
naval force, took possession of Wilmington, a town near the
mouth of Cape Fear, and extended his authority several miles
up the river. Lord Cornwallis now looked to a communication
with this post for aids which had become indispensable to the
farther operations of the campaign.
On the third day after the battle, he broke up his encamp

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ment, and proceeded by slow and easy marches towards Cross
March it8. creek.
General Greene, on hearing that the British army
was retreating, resolved to follow it. The difficulty of subsisting
the troops in an exhausted and hostile country; and the necessity
of waiting for a supply of ammunition, impeded the march of his
army so much that he did not reach Ramsay's mills until the
28th of March.
At this place Lord Cornwallis had halted, and here General
Greene expected to overtake and attack him. But, on the
approach of the American army, his lordship resumed his march
to Cross creek, and afterwards to Wilmington, where he arrived on the 7th of April.
General Greene gave over the pursuit at Ramsay's mills. So
excessive had been the sufferings of his army from the want of
provisions, that many of the men fainted on the march, and it
had become absolutely necessary to allow them some repose and
refreshment. The expiration of the time for which the Virginia militia had been called into service, furnished an additional motive for suspending the pursuit.
At this place, the bold and happy resolution was taken to
carry the war into South Carolina.
The motives which induced the adoption of this measure were
stated by himself in a letter communicating his determination
to the Commander-in-chief. It would compel Lord Cornwallis
to follow him, and thus liberate North Carolina, or to sacrifice
all his posts in the upper parts of South Carolina and Georgia.
The Southern army amounted to about seventeen hundred
effectives. That of Lord Cornwallis is understood to have been
still less numerous. So impotent were. the means employed for
the conquest and defence of states which were of immense
extent and value.
This unexpected movement gave a new aspect to affairs, and
produced some irresolution in the British general respecting his
future operations. After weighing the probable advantages and
disadvantages of following Greene into South Carolina, he
decided against this retrograde movement and determined to
advance into Virginia.

GEORGE WASHINGTON

489

CHAPTER XXI
THE evacuation of Portsmouth by Leslie afforded Virginia but
a short interval of repose. So early as the 9th of I78
December, I780, a letter from General Washington
announced to the governor that a large embarkation, supposed
to be destined for the south, was about taking place at New
York. On the 3oth, a fleet of transports under convoy, having
on board between one and two thousand men, commanded by
General Arnold, anchored in Hampton road. The troops were
embarked the next day on board vessels adapted to the navigation, and proceeded up James' river under convoy of two small
ships of war. On the fourth of January they reached Westover,
which is distant about twenty-five miles from Richmond, the
capital of Virginia.
On receiving intelligence that a fleet had entered the capes,
General Nelson was employed in raising the militia of the lower
country; and on the 2d of January orders were issued to call
out those above the metropolis and in its neighbourhood.
On reaching Westover, Arnold landed with the greater part
of his army, and commenced his march towards Richmond.
The few continental troops at Petersburg were ordered to the
capital; and between one and two hundred militia, who had
been collected from the town and its immediate vicinity, were
directed to harass the advancing enemy. This party Jan.
was too feeble for its object; and, the day after
landing at Westover, Arnold entered Richmond, where he
halted with about five hundred men. The residue, amounting
to about four hundred, including thirty horse, proceeded under
Lieutenant Colonel Simcoe to Westham, where they burnt a
valuable foundry, boring mill, powder magazine, and other
smaller buildings, with military stores to a considerable amount,
and many valuable papers belonging to the government, which
had been carried thither as to a place of safety.
This service being effected, Lieutenant Colonel Simcoe re

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joined Arnold at Richmond; where the public stores, and a
large quantity of rum and salt, the property of private individuals, were entirely destroyed.
Leaving Richmond the next day, the army returned to Westover1 on the seventh; and, re-embarking on the morning of the
tenth, proceeded down the river. It was followed by the Baron
Steuben, who commanded in Virginia; and, near Hoods, Colonel Clarke drew a party of them into an ambuscade, and gave
them one fire with some effect; but, on its being partially returned, the Americans broke and fled in the utmost confusion.2
Arnold proceeded slowly down the river; and on the twentieth reached Portsmouth, where he manifested the intention of
establishing a permanent post.
The loss of the British in this expedition, was stated in the
gazette of New York, at seven killed, including one subaltern,
and twenty-three wounded, among whom was one captain.
This small loss was sustained almost entirely in the ambuscade
near Hoods.
In the north, the year commenced with an event, which, for a
time, threatened the American cause with total ruin.
The accumulated sufferings and privations of the army constitute a large and interesting part of the history of that war
which gave independence to the United States. Winter, without much lessening their toils, added to those sufferings. The
soldiers were perpetually on the point of starving, were often
entirely without food; were exposed without proper clothing to
the rigours of the season, and had now served almost twelve
months without pay.
This state of things had been of such long continuance that
scarcely the hope of a change could be indulged. It produced,
unavoidably, some relaxation of discipline; and the murmurs,
occasionally escaping the officers, sometimes heard by the soldiers, were not without their influence.
In addition to the general causes of dissatisfaction, the Penn.
sylvania line complained of a grievance almost peculiar to itself.
1 While the army lay at Westover, Lieutenant Colonel Simcoe, at the head of less
than fifty horse, attacked and dispersed a body of militia at Charles City court house,
with the loss of only one man killed, and three wounded.
g The author witnessed this skirmish.

GEORGE WASHINGTON

49I1

When congress directed enlistments to be made for three
years, or during the war, the recruiting officers of Pennsylvania,
in some instances, instead of engaging their men, definitively,
for the one period or the other, engaged them generally for
three years, or the war. This ambiguity in the terms of enlistment produced its natural effect. The soldier claimed his discharge at the expiration of three years, and the officer insisted
on retaining him in service during the war. The soldier submitted with the more reluctance to the supposed imposition, as
he constantly witnessed the immense bounties given to those
who were not bound by a former enlistment.
The discontents which these various causes had been long
fomenting, broke out on the night of the ist of January, in an
open and almost universal revolt of the line.
On a signal given, the great body of the non-commissioned
officers and privates paraded under arms, avowing the determination to march to the seat of congress, and either obtain
redress of their complicated grievances, or serve no longer. In
the attempt to suppress the mutiny, six or seven of the mutineers
were wounded on the one side; and on the other, Captain Billing
was killed, and several other officers were dangerously wounded.
The authority of General Wayne availed nothing. On cocking
his pistol, and threatening some of the most turbulent, the
bayonet was presented to his bosom; and he perceived that
strong measures would produce his own destruction, and perhaps the massacre of every officer in camp. A few regiments
who did not at first join the mutineers, were paraded by their
officers; but, had they even been willing to proceed to extremities, they were not strong enough to restore order. Infected
quickly with the general contagion, or intimidated by the
threats of the mutineers, they joined their comrades; and the
whole body, consisting of about thirteen hundred men, with six
field pieces, marched, under the command of their serleants,
towards Princeton.
The next day, General Wayne, accompanied by Colonels
Butler and Stewart, officers possessing, in a high degree, the
affections of the soldiery, followed them, in the hope of bringing them back to their duty, or at least of dividing them. They
were overtaken near Middlebrook, and invited by a written

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message from General Wayne, to appoint one man from each
regiment to state the grievances of which they complained.
In consequence of this invitation, a serjeant from each regiment met the officers at their quarters, and some verbal communications were made, from the complexion of which sanguine hopes were entertained that the affair might be terminated
without farther hazard, or much injury to the service.
On the following day, the line of march was resumed, and
T the soldiers proceeded to Princeton. The proposij 3 tions of the general and field officers were reported
to them, and a committee of serjeants, to whom they were
referred, stated their claims. These were:
ist. A discharge for all those who had served three years under
their original engagements, whatever those engagements might
have been, and who had not taken the increased bounty, and
re-enlisted for the war.
2nd. An immediate payment of all their arrears of pay and
clothing, as well to those who should be discharged, as to those
who should continue in service.
3rd. The residue of their bounty, and future real pay to
those who should continue in the army.
General Wayne being unwilling to discharge all those who
had not re-enlisted for the war, the subject was referred to the
civil power.
On receiving intelligence of the mutiny, congress appointed
a committee to confer with the executive of Pennsylvania respecting it. The result of this conference was that both the
committee, and the governor with some members of the executive council, left Philadelphia for the purpose of endeavouring
to accommodate this dangerous commotion.
At his head quarters, at New Windsor, on the North River,
General Washington received intelligence of this alarming
mutiny. Accustomed as he had been to contemplate hazardous
and difficult situations, it was not easy, under existing circumstances, to resolve instantly on the course it was most prudent
to pursue. His first impression-to repair to the camp of the
mutineers-soon gave place to opinions which were formed on
more mature reflection.
It was almost certain that the business was already in the

GEORGE WASHINGTON

493

hands of the civil government, with whose arrangements it
might be improper for him to interfere. Independent of this
consideration, other motives of irresistible influence detained
him on the North River.
The most important among those subjects of complaint which
were alleged as the causes of the mutiny, were true in fact,
were common to the whole army, and were of a nature to disseminate too generally those seeds of disquiet, which had attained their full growth and maturity in the Pennsylvania line.
Strong symptoms of discontent had already been manifested;
and it was, therefore, impossible to say with confidence, how
far the same temper existed among the other troops; or how
far the contagion of example had or would spread.
The danger arising from this state of things was much increased by the circumstance that the river was perfectly open,
and afforded Sir Henry Clinton an easy and rapid transportation for his army to West Point, should the situation of its
garrison invite an enterprise against that post.
It was an additional consideration of great weight, that it
might have a most pernicious influence on the discipline of the
whole army, should the authority of the Commander-in-chief
be disregarded. He ought not to place himself in a situation
where his orders might be disobeyed with impunity; an event
much to be apprehended, should he repair to the camp of the
mutineers, unattended by a military force adequate to the
occasion.
Such a force could not be immediately commanded. His
effectives in the Highlands amounted only to thirteen hundred
and seventy-six men; and that whole division of the army, dispersed at various and distant stations, excluding the sick and
those on furlough, did not exceed four thousand. Assuming
therefore the fidelity of the troops, it was impracticable to
march immediately with a force sufficient to reduce the Pennsylvania line, without leaving the Highlands undefended. Nor
was it unworthy of consideration that, in the actual situation of
the mutineers, the probability of their being attacked by such
a force might drive them to the enemy, or disperse them, events,
either of which would deprive the army of a valuable part of
its strength.

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It was therefore thought adviseable to leave the negotiation
with the civil power, and to prepare for those measures which
ought to be adopted in the event of its failure. The disposition
of the troops on the North River was sounded, and found to be
favourable; after which, a detachment of eleven hundred men
was ordered to be in readiness to move on a moment's warning.
On the first notice of the mutiny, the militia of Jersey took the
field under General Dickinson, and measures were taken to call
out those of New York should the occasion require it.
To avail himself of an event appearing so auspicious to the
Jan. 4 royal cause, Sir Henry Clinton ordered a large body
of troops to be in readiness to move on the shortest
notice; and despatched three emissaries with tempting offers to
the revolters; and instructions to invite them, while the negotiation should be depending, to take a position behind the South
River, where they should be effectually covered by detachments from New York. While these measures were taking,
Sir Henry kept his eye on West Point, and held himself in
readiness to strike at that place, should any movement on the
part of General Washington open to him a prospect of success.'
His emissaries were immediately seized by the revolters, and
their proposals communicated to General Wayne, with assurances of the utter detestation in which every idea of going over
to the common enemy was held.
This favourable symptom, however, was accompanied by suspicious circumstances. They retained the British emissaries in
their own possession; and could not be induced to cross the
Delaware, or to march from Princeton. They would not permit any of their former officers, other than those already mentioned, to enter their camp; and General St. Clair, the Marquis
de Lafayette, and Lieutenant Colonel Laurens, were ordered to
leave Princeton.
Such was the state of things when the committee of congress,
and President Read with a part of his executive council, arrived
in the neighbourhood of the revolters. The former having
delegated their power to the latter, a conference was held with
the serjeants who now commanded, after which proposals were
made and distributed among the troops for consideration.
' Letter of Sir Henry Clinton.

GEORGE WASHINGTON

495

In these proposals the government offered,
ist. To discharge all those who had enlisted indefinitely for
three years or during the war, the fact to be examined into by
three commissioners, to be appointed by the executive; and to
be ascertained, when the original enlistment could not be produced, by the oath of the soldier.
2dly. To give immediate certificates for the depreciation on
their pay, and to settle the arrearages as soon as circumstances
would admit.
3dly. To furnish them immediately with certain specified
articles of clothing which were most wanted.
On receiving these propositions, the troops agreed to march
to Trenton. At that place the terms were accepted, with the
addition that three commissioners should also be deputed by the
line, who, conjointly with those of the executive should constitute the board authorized to determine on the claims of the
soldiers to be discharged; and thereupon the British emissaries
were surrendered, who were tried, condemned, and executed as
spies.
Until the investigation should be made, and discharges given
to those who should be found entitled to them, the serjeants
retained their command. In consequence of the irksomeness of
this state of things, the business was pressed with so much precipitation, that before the enlistments themselves could be
brought from the huts, almost the whole of the artillery, and of
the five first regiments of infantry, were liberated on the testimony of their own oaths. The enlistments being then produced, it was found that not many of the remaining regiments
had engaged on the terms which, under the compact, would
entitle them to leave the service; and that, of those actually
dismissed, far the greater number had been enlisted absolutely
for the war. The discharges given, however, were not cancelled; and the few who were to remain in service received furloughs for forty days.
Thus ended, in a temporary dissolution of the whole line of
Pennsylvania, a mutiny, which a voluntary performance of
much less than was extorted, would have prevented; and which,
in the actual condition of the army, was of a nature and extent
to inspire the most serious alarm.

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The dangerous policy of yielding even to the just demands of
soldiers made with arms in their hands, was soon illustrated.
The success of the Pennsylvania line inspired that of Jersey,
many of whom were also foreigners, with the hope of obtaining
similar advantages. On the night of the 20th, a part of the
Jersey brigade, which had been stationed at Pompton, rose in
arms; and, making precisely the same claims which had been
yielded to the Pennsylvanians, marched to Chatham, where a
part of the same brigade was cantoned, in the hope of exciting
them also to join in the revolt.
General Washington, who had been extremely chagrined at
the issue of the mutiny in the Pennsylvania line, and who
was now assured of the confidence to be placed in the fidelity of
the eastern troops, who were composed of natives, determined,
by strong measures, to stop the farther progress of a spirit
which threatened the destruction of the army, and ordered a
detachment to march against the mutineers, and to bring them
to unconditional submission. General Howe, who commanded
this detachment, was instructed to make no terms with the
insurgents while in a state of resistance; and, as soon as they
should surrender, to seize a few of the most active leaders, and
to execute them on the spot. These orders were promptly
obeyed, and the Jersey mutineers returned to their duty.
In the hope of being more successful with the revolters of
Jersey than he had been with those of Pennsylvania, Sir Henry
Clinton offered them the same terms which had been proposed
to the mutineers at Princeton; and General Robertson, at the
head of three thousand men, was detached to Staten Island with
the avowed purpose of crossing over into Jersey, and covering
any movement which they might make towards New York.
The emissary, being in the American interest, delivered his
papers to the officer commanding at the first station to which
he came. Other papers were dispersed among the mutineers;
but the mutiny was crushed too suddenly to allow time for the
operation of these propositions.
The vigorous measures taken in this instance were happily
followed by such an attention on the part of the states, to the
actual situation of the army, as checked the progress of discontent. Influenced by the representations of the Commander

GEORGE WASHINGTON

497

in-chief, they raised three months pay in specie, which they
forwarded to the soldiers, who received it with joy, considering
it as evidence that their fellow citizens were not entirely unmindful of their sufferings.
Although the army was thus reduced to such extreme distress,
the discontents of the people were daily multiplied by the contributions which they were required to make, and by the irritating manner in which those contributions were drawn from
them. Every article for public use was obtained by impressment; and the taxes were either unpaid, or collected by coercive
means. Strong remonstrances were made against this system,
and the dissatisfaction which pervaded the mass of the community, was scarcely less dangerous than that which had been
manifested by the army.
To the judicious patriots throughout America, the necessity
of giving greater powers to the federal government became
every day more apparent; but the efforts of enlightened individuals were too feeble to correct that fatal disposition of power
which had been made by enthusiasm uninstructed by experience.
To relieve the United States from their complicated embarrassments, a foreign loan seemed an expedient of indispensable
necessity, and from France they hoped to obtain it. Congress
selected Lieutenant Colonel Laurens, a gentleman whose situation in the family of the Commander-in-chief had enabled him
to take a comprehensive view of the military capacities and
weaknesses of his country, for this interesting service; and instructed him also to urge the advantage of maintaining a naval
superiority in the American seas. Before his departure, he
passed some days at head quarters, and received from General
Washington in the form of a letter, the result of his reflections
on the existing state of things.
In this paper he detailed the pecuniary embarrassments of
the government, and represented, with great earnestness, the
inability of the nation to furnish a revenue adequate to the
support of the war. He dwelt on the discontents which the
system of impressment had excited among the people, and expressed his fears that the evils felt in the prosecution of the war,
might weaken the sentiments which began it.

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From this state of things, he deduced the vital importance of
an immediate and ample supply of money, which might be the
foundation for substantial arrangements of finance, for reviving public credit, and giving vigour to future operations; as
well as of a decided effort of the allied arms on the continent
to effect the great objects of the alliance, in the ensuing campaign.
Next to a supply of money, he considered a naval superiority
in the American seas, as an object of the deepest interest.
To the United States, it would be of decisive importance, and
France also might derive great advantages from transferring the
maritime war to the coast of her ally.
The future ability of the United States to repay any loan
which might now be obtained was displayed; and he concluded
with assurances that there was still a fund of inclination and
resource in the country, equal to great and continued exertions,
provided the means were afforded of stopping the progress of
disgust, by changing the present system, and adopting another
more consonant with the spirit of the nation, and more capable
of infusing activity and energy into public measures; of which
a powerful succour in money must be the basis. "The people
were discontented, but it wash with the feeble and oppressive
mode of conducting the war, not with the war itself."
With reason did the Commander-in-chief thus urge on the
cabinet of Versailles, the policy of advancing a sum of money
to the United States which might be adequate to the exigency.
Deep was the gloom with which their political horizon was
overcast. The British, in possession of South Carolina, and of
Georgia, had overrun the greater part of North Carolina also;
and it was with equal hazard and address that Greene maintained himself in the northern frontier of that state.
A second detachment from New York was making a deep
impression on Virginia, where the resistance had been neither so
prompt nor so vigorous' as the strength of that state and the
unanimity of its citizens had given reason to expect.
The perplexities and difficulties in which the affairs of
America were involved, were estimated by the British govern1 A slave population must be unfavourable to great and sudden exertions by militia,

GEORGE WASHINGTON

499

ment even above their real value. Intercepted letterb of this
date from the minister, expressed the most sanguine hopes that
the great superiority of force at the disposal of Sir Henry Clinton, would compel Washington with his feeble army to take
refuge on the eastern side of the Hudson.
Even congress relaxed for an instant from its habitual firmness; and, receding from the decisive manner in which that
body had insisted on the territorial and maritime rights of the
nation, directed the American minister at Madrid to relinquish,
if it should be absolutely necessary, the claims of the United
States to navigate the Mississippi below the thirty-first degree of
north latitude, and to a free port on the banks of that river
within the Spanish territory. It is remarkable that only Massachusetts, Connecticut, and North Carolina, dissented from
this resolution; New York was divided." On a subsequent day,
the subject was again brought forward, and a proposition was
made for still farther concessions to Spain; but this proposition
was negatived by all the states.2
Happily for the United States, Mr. Jay, their minister at the
court of Madrid, required as the price of the concessions he was
instructed to make, that the treaty he was labouring to negotiate should be immediately concluded.
The establishment of a revenue subject to the exclusive control and direction of the continental government, was connected
inseparably with the restoration of credit. The efforts therefore to negotiate a foreign loan were accompanied by resolutions requesting the respective states to place a fund under the
control of congress, which should be both permanent and productive. A resolution was passed, recommending to the respective states to vest a power in congress to levy for the use of
the United States a duty of five per centum advalorem on all
goods imported into any of them; and also on all prizes condemned in any of the American courts of admiralty.
This fund was to be appropriated to the payment of both the
principal and interest of all debts contracted in the prosecution
Secret journals of Congress, v. 2, pp. 393, 396, 407. This measure was moved
by the delegation from Virginia, in consequence of instructions of zd Jan. 178 I,
Sec. Io, H. at large, 538.
2 Secret journals of Congress, v. 2, p. 468.

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of the war; and was to continue until those debts should be
completely discharged.
Congress, at that time, contained several members who perceived the advantages which would result from bestowing on
the government of the nation the full power of regulating commerce, and, consequently, of increasing the import as circumstances might render adviseable; but state influence predominated, and they were overruled by great majorities. Even the
inadequate plan which they did recommend was never adopted.
Notwithstanding the greatness of the exigency, and the pressure of the national wants, never, during the existence of the
confederation, did all the states unite in assenting to this recommendation; so unwilling are men possessed of power, to place
it in the hands of others.
About the same time a reform was introduced into the
administration, the necessity of which had been long perceived.
From a misplaced prejudice against institutions sanctioned by
experience, all the great executive duties had been devolved
either on committees of congress, or on boards consisting of
several members. This unwieldy and expensive system had
maintained itself against all the efforts of reason and public
utility. But the scantiness of the national means at length prevailed over prejudice, and the several committees and boards
yielded to a secretary for foreign affairs, a superintendent of
finance, a secretary of war, and a secretary of marine. But so
miserably defective was the organization of congress, as an
executive body, that the year had far advanced before this
measure, the utility of which all acknowledged, could be carried into complete operation by making all the appointments.
About this time the articles of confederation were ratified.
Much difficulty was encountered in obtaining the adoption of
this instrument. The numerous objections made by the states
yielded successively to the opinion that a federal compact would
be of vast importance in the prosecution of the war. One impediment it was found peculiarly difficult to remove. Within
the chartered limits of several states, were immense tracts of
vacant territory, which, it was supposed, would constitute a
large fund of future wealth; and the states not possessing that
advantage insisted on considering this territory as a joint acqui

GEORGE WASHINGTON

50I

sition. At length this difficulty also was surmounted; and, in
February, 178i, to the great joy of America, this interesting
compact was rendered complete.' Like many other human in1 The secret journals of congress, published under the resolutions of March 27th,
s8i8, and April aist, i82o, contain "A History of the Confederation." The course
of public opinion on a most important point-the nature of the connexion which
ought to be maintained between these United States-may be in some degree perceived in the progress of this instrument, and may not be entirely uninteresting to the
American reader.
So early as July, I775, Doctor Franklin submitted "Articles of Confederation and
perpetual union" to the consideration of congress, which were to continue in force
until a reconciliation with Great Britain should take place on the terms demanded by
the colonies. Into this confederation, not only all the British colonies on the continent, but Ireland and the West India islands were to be admitted.
Congress was to consist of members chosen by each colony in proportion to its numbers, and was to sit in each successively. Its powers were to embrace the external
relations of the country, the settling of all disputes between the colonies, the planting
of new colonies; and were to extend to ordinances on such general subjects as,
though necessary to the general welfare, particular assemblies can not be competent
to, viz. "Those that may relate to our general commerce, or general currency; the
establishment of ports; and the regulation of our common forces."
The executive was to consist of a council of twelve, selected by congress from its
own body, one-third of whom were tct be changed annually.
Amendments were to be proposed by congress; and, when approved by a majority
of the colonial assemblies, were to become a part of the constitution.
In June, 1776, a committee was appointed to prepare and digest the form of a confederation to be entered into between the United Colonies, which brought in a draft
(in the hand writing of Mr. John Dickinson) on the izth of the succeeding month.
This report was under debate until the s4th of November, I777, on which day congress agreed on the articles afterwards adopted by the states.
In the scheme supposed to be prepared by Mr. Dickinson, the confederation is considered as an alliance of sovereign states, who meet as equals by their deputies assembled to deliberate on their common concerns, each sovereign having a voice. This
principle was retained; but several modifications in the language and principle of the
original scheme were made, which indicate a watchful and growing jealousy of the
powers of congress.
In each, an article is introduced reserving the rights of the states. That which is
found in the report, "reserves to each state the sole and exclusive regulation and government of its'internal police, in all matters that shall not interfere with the articles
of this confederation."
This article was so modified as to declare that "each state retains its sovereignty,"
"and every power, jurisdiction and right, which is not by this confederation expressly
delegated to the United States in congress assembled."
This denial of all incidental powers had vast influence on the affairs of the United
States. It defeated, in many instances, the granted powers, by rendering their exercise impracticable.
The report permits the states to impose duties on imports and exports; provided
they "do not interfere with any stipulations in treaties hereafter entered into by the
United States."
The confederation confines this restriction on the power of the state to such duties
as interfere with the stipulations in treaties entered into "in pursuance of any treaties already proposed by congress to the courts of France and Spain."
Each plan assigns to the state in which troops shall be raised for the common defence, the power of appointing the field and inferior officers. The confederation adds
the power of filling up such vacancies as may occur.
The report inhibits a state from endeavouring by force to obtain compensation for

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stitutions, it was productive, neither in war nor in peace, of all
the benefits which its sanguine advocates had expected. Had
advances made or injuries suffered during the war, which shall not be allowed by congress.
The confederation omits this inhibition.
The report gives to congress the power of making treaties.
The confederation adds a proviso, "that no treaty of commerce shall be made whereby the legislative power of the respective states shall be restrained from imposing such
imports and duties on foreigners as their own people are subjected to, or from prohibiting the exportation or importation of any species of goods or commodities whatever."
The report authorizes congress to appoint "courts for the trial of all crimes, frauds,
and piracies committed on the high seas, or on any navigable river not within a county
or parish."
The confederation limits the jurisdiction to "piracies and felonies committed on the
high seas."
Both empower congress to appoint courts for the trial of appeals in cases of capture;
but the confederation provides that no member of congress shall be appointed a judge
of any such court.
Both empower congress to settle differences between the states. The confederation
prescribes minutely the manner in which this power shall be exercised.
Both empower congress "to regulate the trade and manage all affairs with the Indians." The confederation provides "that the legislative right of any state within its
own limits be not infringed or violated."
The report gives the power of "establishing and regulating post offices throughout
all the United Colonies (states) on the lines of communication from one colony (state)
to another."
The confederation varies the phraseology and adds, "and exacting such postage on
the papers passing through the same as may be requisite to defray the expenses of the
said office."
The report places many important portions of the executive power in a council of
state, to consist of one delegate from each state to be named annually by the delegates
of that state.
The confederation empowers congress to appoint a committee to sit in the recess of
congress, to be denominated "a committee of the states," and to consist of one delegate from each state, to exercise such powers as congress might from time to time vest
them with.
A few of the states agreed to ratify the confederation unconditionally. By many,
amendments were proposed which were steadily rejected by congress. It was obvious
that the delays would be almost interminable should congress relax this determination, because every change would make it necessary again to submit the instrument
as amended to the several states. It is remarkable that Jersey alone proposed an enlargement of the powers of congress. That state was desirous of investing the representatives of the state with the power of regulating commerce.
The states possessing no vacant lands, or an inconsiderable quantity within their
chartered limits, pressed earnestly and perseveringly their claim to participate in the
advantages of territory, which was, they said, acquired by the united arms of the
whole; and Maryland refused, on this account, to accede to the confederation. At
length, several of the states empowered their members in congress to ratify that instrument as forming a union between the twelve states who had assented to it. Maryland, alarmed at the prospect of being excluded from the union, gave her reluctant
consent to the confederation, accompanied by a protest, in which she still asserted her
claim to her interest in the vacant territory which should be acknowledged at the
treaty of peace, to be within the United States.
It required the repeated lessons of a severe and instructive experience to persuade
the American people that their greatness, their prosperity, their happiness, and even
their safety, imperiously demanded the substitution of a govyernment for their favourite
league.

GEORGE WASHINGTON

503

peace been made before any agreement for a permanent union
was formed, it is far from being improbable that the different
parts might have fallen asunder, and a dismemberment have
taken place. If the confederation really preserved the idea of
union until the good sense of the nation adopted a more efficient system, this service alone entitles that instrument to the
respectful recollection of the American people, and its framers
to their gratitude.
Such was the defensive strength of the positions taken by the
adverse armies on the Hudson, and such their relative force, that
no decisive blow could be given by either in that quarter of the
continent. The anxious attentions of General Washington,
therefore, were unremittingly directed to the south. One of
those incidents which fortune occasionally produces, on the
seizing or neglect of which the great military events frequently
depend, presented, sooner than was expected, an opportunity
which he deemed capable of being improved to the destruction
of the British army in Virginia.
The French fleet, from its arrival on the American coast, had
been blocked up in the harbor of Newport; and the land forces
of that nation had been reduced to a state of inactivity by the
necessity of defending their ships. Late in January, a detachment from the British fleet was encountered on the east end
of Long Island by a furious storm, in which such damage was
sustained as to destroy for a time the naval superiority which
Arbuthnot had uniformly preserved.
To turn this temporary superiority to advantage, Monsieur
Destouches resolved to detach a ship of the line, with two frigates, to the Chesapeake; a force which the delegation from Virginia had assured him would be sufficient for the purpose.
On receiving certain accounts of the loss sustained in the
storm, General Washington conceived the design of improving
that circumstance by immediate and powerful operations
against Arnold. Confident that the critical moment must be
seized, or the enterprise would fail, he ordered a detachment of
twelve hundred men, under the command of the Marquis de
Lafayette, to the head of the Chesapeake; there to embark for
that part of Virginia which was to become the theatre of action, under convoy of a French frigate, for which he applied

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to the admiral. He immediately communicated this measure
to the Count De Rochambeau, and to Monsieur Destouches, to
whom he also stated his conviction that no serious advantage
could be expected from a few ships, unaided by land troops.
"There were," he said, "a variety of positions to be taken by
Arnold, one of which was Portsmouth, his present station,
where his ships might be so protected by his batteries on the
shore as to defy a mere naval attack; and where he would certainly be able to maintain himself until the losses sustained in
the late storm should be repaired, and the superiority at sea recovered, when he would unquestionably be relieved."
To insure the success of the expedition, he recommended that
the whole fleet should be employed on it, and that a detachment of one thousand men should be embarked for the same
service.
These representations did not prevail. The original plan had
already been put in execution. On the 9th of February, a sixtyfour gun ship with two frigates, under Monsieur De Tilley, had
sailed for the Chesapeake; and, as some of the British ships had
been repaired, the French admiral did not think it prudent to
put to sea with the residue of his fleet.
As had been foreseen by General Washington, De Tilley
found Arnold in a situation not to be assailed with any prospect
of success. After showing himself therefore in the bay, and
making an ineffectual attempt to enter Elizabeth river, he returned to Newport. At the capes, he fell in with the Romulus,
a fifty-gun ship, coming from Charleston to the Chesapeake,
which he captured.
Both the Count De Rochambeau, and the Chevalier Destouches, being well disposed to execute the plans suggested by
General Washington, they determined, on the return of Monsieur De Tilley, to make a second expedition to the Chesapeake
with the whole fleet, and eleven hundred men. General Washington, therefore, hastened to Newport, that in a personal conference with them, he might facilitate the execution of an enterprise from which he still entertained sanguine hopes.
Early on the 6th of March he reached Newport, and went
instantly on board the Admiral, where he was met by the

GEORGE WASHINGTON

50S

Count De Rochambeau. It was determined that a detachment
from the army, then in perfect readiness, should be embarked
under the Count De Viominil; and that the fleet should put
to sea as soon as possible. The wind was favourable to the French,
and adverse to the British. Yet the fleet did not sail until the
evening of the eighth. It appears from a letter of Monsieur
Destouches, that this delay was in some measure attributable
to a disaster which befel one of his frigates in getting out of
port; and there is reason to suppose that it may be ascribed to a
want of supplies. Whatever may have been the cause, Arnold
is most probably indebted to it for his escape from the fate
which his treason merited.
Two days after Destouches had sailed, he was followed by
Arbuthnot, who overtook him off the capes of Virginia. A
partial engagement ensued which continued about an hour,
when the fleets were separated.
The French admiral called a council of war the next day, in
which it was declared unadviseable to renew the action, and he
returned to Newport.
The arrival of two thousand men commanded by General
Philips, gave the British a decided superiority in March z6.
Virginia, and changed the destination of Lafayette,
who had been ordered to join the southern army, but to whom
the defence of that state was now committed. The troops
under his command being taken chiefly from the eastern regiments, had imbibed strong prejudices against a southern climate; and desertions became so frequent as to threaten the dissolution of the corps.
This unpromising state of things was completely changed
by a happy expedient adopted by Lafayette. Appealing to the
generous principles of his soldiers, principles on which the feelings of his own bosom taught him to rely, he proclaimed in
orders, that he was about to enter on an enterprise of great
danger and difficulty, in which he persuaded himself his soldiers would not abandon him. If, however, any individual of
the detachment was unwilling to accompany him, a permit to
return should most assuredly be granted him.
This measure had the desired effect, and put an end to deser

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tion.1 To keep up the good dispositions of the moment, this
ardent young nobleman, who was as unmindful of fortune as
he was ambitious of fame, borrowed from the merchants of
Baltimore, on his private credit, a sum of money sufficient to
purchase shoes, linen, spirits, and other articles of immediate
necessity for the detachment.2
Having made these preparations for the campaign, he
marched with the utmost celerity to the defence of Virginia.
That state was in great need of assistance. The enemy had
penetrated deep into its bosom, and was committing those excesses on its inhabitants to which a country unable to repel
invasion must always be exposed.
General Philips, on his arrival, took command of all the British troops in Virginia; and, after completing the fortification
of Portsmouth, commenced offensive operations.
About two thousand five hundred men were embarked on
board some small vessels, and landed at various places in the
April. neighbourhood of Williamsburg. Different detachments spread themselves over the lower part of that
neck of land which is made by York and James rivers; and,
after destroying, without opposition, a ship yard belonging to
the state, with some armed vessels and public stores, re-embarked and proceeded to City Point, where they landed in the
afternoon of the 24th. The next day they marched against
Petersburg, at which place, immense quantities of tobacco and
other stores were deposited.
Baron Steuben was not in a situation to check their progress.
The levies of Virginia had marched to the aid of General Greene;
and the whole number of militia, at that time in the field, did
not much exceed two thousand men. Unwilling to abandon
so important a place as Petersburg without the semblance of
fighting, the baron posted about one thousand men a mile below
the town with orders to skirmish with the enemy. The British
1 The author was assured by General Lafayette that this was true. Such was
the enthusiasm of the moment, that a lame serjeant hired a place in a cart to keep up
with the army.
2 It is not unworthy of notice, that the ladies of Baltimore charged themselves with
the toil of immediately making up the summer clothing for the troops. Innumerable
instances of their zeal in the common cause of their country were given in every state
in the union.

GEORGE WASHINGTON

507

troops, without being able to bring him to a close engagement,
were two or three hours employed in driving him across the
Appomattox, the bridge over which being taken up as soon as
the militia had passed it, farther pursuit became impracticable.
This skirmish having terminated with scarcely any loss on
either side, the baron retreated towards Richmond, and Philips
took quiet possession of Petersburg; where he destroyed a considerable quantity of tobacco, and all the vessels lying in the
river.
This service being accomplished, Arnold was detached
through Osbornes to Warwick, between which place and Richmond, a respectable naval force, consisting of small armed
vessels, had been collected with the intention of co-operating
with the French fleet against Portsmouth; and a few militia
were stationed on the northern bank of the river to assist in
defending the flotilla.
The crews of the vessels, on-receiving a fire from a few field
pieces ordered by Arnold to the bank, scuttled them, escaped
to the opposite shore, and dispersed with the militia. Philips
marched with the residue of the army to Chesterfield court
house, the place of rendezvous for the new levies of Virginia,
where he destroyed the barracks with a few public
stores; after which he joined Arnold in the neigh- April 30.
bourhood of Warwick, and marched without interruption to
Manchester, a small town on the southern bank of James river,
immediately opposite to Richmond; where, as was the general
practice, the warehouses were set on fire, and all the tobacco
consumed.
On the preceding evening, the Marquis de Lafayette, who had
made a forced march from Baltimore, arrived with his detachment at Richmond; and that place, in which a great proportion
of the military stores of the state were then collected, was saved,
for the time, from a visit which was certainly designed.
The regular troops composing this detachment were joined by
about two thousand militia, and sixty dragoons. Not thinking
it adviseable to attempt the passage of the river in the presence
of so respectable an army, General Philips retired to Bermuda
Hundred, a point of land in the confluence of the May y.
James and Appomattox, at which place he re-em

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barked his troops, and fell down the river to Hog Island.
The Marquis fixed his head quarters on the north of Chiccahominy, about eighteen miles from Richmond; where he remained until a letter from Lord Cornwallis called Philips again
up James river.
When that nobleman determined on marching from Wilmington into Virginia, he signified his wish that the British
troops in that state, should take their station at Petersburg.
On receiving this letter, Philips proceeded to comply with
the request it contained. As soon as the fleet moved
May ' up the river, Lafayette returned to the defence of
Richmond. Having, on his arrival, received intelligence that
Lord Cornwallis was marching northward, and finding Philips
landed at Brandon on the south side of the river, he was persuaded that a junction of the two armies must be intended, and
hastened to take possession of Petersburg1 before
ay 3. Philips could reach that place. In this however he
was anticipated by the British general; upon which he recrossed
James river, and, encamping a few miles below Richmond, used
his utmost exertions to remove the military stores in that town
to a place of greater security.
In this position his army was permitted to repose itself but
a few days. Lord Cornwallis, after passing through North
Carolina and the southern parts of Virginia without encountering much opposition, and effecting a junction with Arnold,
who had succeeded by the death of Philips to the command of
the army in Virginia,2 found himself at the head of a force
which nothing in that state could resist; and determined on a
vigorous plan of offensive operations. His immediate object
was to bring the Marquis to an action; for which purpose he
crossed James river at Westover where he was joined by a reinforcement from New York, and attempted by turnMay 4 ing the left flank of the American army, to get into
1General Lafayette states that this movement also facilitated the transportation
of some military stores to the southern army, which were greatly needed.
2 General Philips died the day on which the army entered Petersburg. Arnold on
succeeding to the command addressed a letter to Lafayette, which the American
general refused to receive, informing the officer who brought it, and whom he treated
in other respects with great politeness, that he would receive no letter from Arnold.Cor. of Lafayette.

GEORGE WASHINGTON

5o9

its rear. Lafayette was not in a condition to risk an engagement. His objects were the security of the public stores, the
preservation of his small army for future services, and a junction with the Pennsylvania line which was on its march southward, under the command of General Wayne. As Lord Cornwallis crossed James river, he retired towards the upper country,
inclining his route to the north in order to favour a junction
with Wayne.
The fine horses found in the stables of private gentlemen,
gave to the British general an efficient cavalry; and enabled him
to mount so many infantry, as to move large detachments with
unusual rapidity. With these advantages, he was so confident
of overtaking and destroying his enemy, as to say exultingly
in a letter which was intercepted, "the boy can not escape me."
His sanguine hopes however were disappointed. Lafayette
moved with so much celerity and caution as to convince Cornwallis of the impracticability of overtaking him, or of preventing his junction with Wayne.
After marching some distance up the northern side of Northanora, his lordship relinquished the pursuit, and turned his attention to other objects which were more attainable.
Military stores had been collected in various parts of the middle country, and, among others, at the Point of Fork, a point
of land made by the confluence of the Rivanna and Fluvanna,
the two branches of James river. Colonel Simcoe was detached
with five hundred men against this post, which was protected
by between five and six hundred new levies, and a few militia.
Tarlton, with two hundred and fifty cavalry and mounted infantry, was ordered at the same time against Charlottesville,
where the general assembly was in session. So rapid were his
movements that a mere accident prevented his entering the
town before any notice of his approach was given. A private
gentleman, Mr. Jouiette, who was acquainted with a nearer
route than the great road, hastened to Charlottesville on a fleet
horse with the interesting intelligence, and entered the town
about two hours before the British cavalry. Nearly all 1 the
members of the legislature made their escape, and reassembled
1 Seven fell into the hands of Tarlton.

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at Staunton, on the western side of the Blue Ridge. Tarlton,
after destroying the stores at Charlottesville, proceeded down
the Rivanna to the Point of Fork.
The detachment commanded by Simcoe, being composed
chiefly of infantry, could not move with equal celerity. That
officer, however, conducted his march with so much secrecy
and address, that Steuben seems to have been either unapprised
of his approach, or to have had no accurate information of his
numbers. Intelligence of the expedition to Charlottesville had
reached him, and he had prudently employed himself in removing his stores from the Point of Fork to the south side of
the Fluvanna.
The river was at the time unfordable; and the boats were
all secured on the southern bank. Yet Steuben, suspecting the
detachment of Simcoe to be the van of the British army, or apprehending that Tarlton might get into his rear, withdrew precipitately in the night, and marched near thirty miles, leaving
behind him such stores as could not be removed. These were
destroyed next morning by a small detachment of men who
crossed the river in a few canoes.
To secure his junction with Wayne, and to keep open his communication towards the north, Lafayette had crossed the Rapidan.
These movements of the two armies had thrown Lord Cornwallis between Lafayette and the military stores which had
been transported from Richmond up James river, and deposited
at different places, but principally at Albemarle old court house,
high up that river. To this place Lord Cornwallis directed his
march.
The Marquis, having effected a junction with the Pennsylvania line consisting of eight hundred men, recrossed the
Rapidan, and advanced with so much celerity towards the British
army, that he encamped within a few miles of it, while upwards of a day's march from its point of destination.
Confident that the object of the American general must be
to protect the magazines on the Fluvanna, Lord Cornwallis encamped at Elk island, and advanced his light troops to a position
commanding the road, by which it was supposed the Americans
must pass.

GEORGE WASHINGTON

5II

Lafayette however discovered in the night a nearer road
which had long been disused; and the next morning the British
general had the mortification to perceive that the American army
had crossed the Rivanna, and taken a strong position behind the
Mechunk creek, which, in a great measure, commanded the
route leading from the camp of his lordship to Albemarle old
court house. At this place a considerable reinforcement of
mountain militia was received.
Apprehending the force opposed to him to be greater than
it was in reality, and probably desirous of transferring
the war to the lower country, Lord Cornwallis
abandoned the objects he had pursued, and retired first to Richmond, and afterwards to Williamsburg.
The Marquis followed with cautious circumspection. On the
i 8th of June, he was reinforced by four or five hundred new
levies under the Baron Steuben, which augmented his army to
four thousand men, of whom two thousand were regulars. That
of Lord Cornwallis was, probably, rather more numerous.
As the British army retreated to Williamsburg, Lafayette,
who sought a partial, though he avoided a general engagement,
pressed its rear with his light parties. Colonel Simcoe, who
covered the retreat, was overtaken by Colonel Butler about six
miles from Williamsburg, and a sharp action ensued. The
Americans claimed the advantage; but were compelled to retire
by the approach of the whole British army.
In the bold and rapid course taken by Lord Cornwallis
through the lower and central parts of Virginia, much private
as well as public property' was destroyed; and the resources
1 While the British army overran the country, their ships sailed up the rivers, pillaged the farms, received the slaves who fled from their masters, and, in some instances reduced the houses to ashes. While they were in the Potowmac, a flag was
sent on shore at Mount Vernon, requiring a supply of fresh provisions. The steward
of General Washington, believing it to be his duty to save the property of his principal, and entertaining fears for the magnificent buildings of the Commander-in-chief,
went on board with the flag, carried a supply of fresh provisions, asked the restoration
of the slaves who had taken refuge in the fleet, and requested that the buildings might
be spared. Mr. Lund Washington, to whom the general had entrusted the m.1nagement of his estate, communicated these circumstances to him, and informed him that
he too had sustained considerable losses. "I am sorry," said the general, in reply, "to
hear of your loss; I am a little sorry to hear of my own. But that which gives me
most concern is, that you should have gone on board the vessels of the enemy and furnished them with refreshments. It would have been a less painful circumstance to
me to have heard, that in consequence of your non-compliance with their request, they

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of the state were considerably diminished; but no solid advantage was obtained. Although, from various causes, especially
from a want of arms, and from that general repugnance which
a harassed, unpaid militia, will universally manifest to military
service, less resistance was encountered than was to be expected
from the strength and population of the state; no disposition
was openly manifested to join the royal standard, or to withdraw from the contest. The Marquis complained of "much
slowness, and much carelessness in the country; but the dispositions of the people," he said, "were good, and they required
only to be awakened." This, he thought, would be best effected by the presence of General Washington, an event for
which he expressed the most anxious solicitude. But Washington deemed it of more importance to remain on the Hudson,
for the purpose of digesting and conducting a grand plan of
combined operations then meditated against New York, by the
execution of which he counted more certainly on relieving the
southern states, than by any other measure it was in his power
to adopt.
An express carrying letters, communicating to congress the
result of his consultations on this subject, with the commanders
of the land and naval forces of France, was intercepted in
Jersey. The interesting disclosure made by these letters, alarmed
Sir Henry Clinton for the safety of New York, and determined
him to require the return of a part of the troops in Virginia.
Supposing himself too weak, after complying with this requisition, to remain at Williamsburg, Lord Cornwallis took the
resolution of retiring to Portsmouth.
July 4 In pursuance of this resolution, he marched from
Juy Williamsburg and encamped in such a manner as to
cover the ford into the island of Jamestown. On the same
evening, the Queen's rangers crossed over into the island; and
the two succeeding days were employed in passing over the
baggage.
The morning after the evacuation of Williamsburg, Lafayette
had burnt my home and laid the plantation in ruins. You ought to have considered
yourself as my representative, and should have reflected on the bad example of communicating with the enemy, and making a voluntary offer of refreshments to them
with a view to prevent a conflagration."

GEORGE WASHINGTON

5 I13

changed his position, and pushed his best troops within nine
miles of the British camp, with the intention of attempting their
rear, when the main body should have passed into Jamestown.
Suspecting his design, Lord Cornwallis encamped the greater
part of his army on the main land as compactly as possible,
and displayed a few troops on the island in such a manner as,
in appearance, to magnify their numbers. All the intelligence
received by Lafayette concurred in the representation that the
greater part of the British army had passed over to the island
in the night. Believing this to be the fact, he de- Ju1 6
tached some riflemen to harass their outposts, while he
advanced at the head of the continental troops in order to cut
off the rear.
Every appearance was calculated to countenance the opinion
he had formed. The British light parties were drawn in, and
the piquets were forced by the riflemen without much resistance,
but an advanced post which covered the encampment from the
view of the Americans, was perseveringly maintained, though
three of the officers commanding it were successively picked off
by the riflemen. Lafayette, who arrived a little before sunset,
suspected from the obstinacy with which this post was maintained, that it covered more than a rear guard, and determined
to reconnoitre the camp, and judge of its strength from his own
observation.' It was in a great measure concealed by woods;
but from a tongue of land stretching into the river, he perceived
the British force to be much more considerable than had been
supposed, and hastened to call off his men.
He found Wayne closely engaged. A piece of artillery had
been left weakly defended, which Wayne determined to seize.
Scarcely was the attempt made, when he discovered the whole
British army, arranged in order for battle, moving out against
him. To retreat was impossible, and the boldest had become the
safest measure. Under this impression he advanced rapidly,
and, with his small detachment, not exceeding eight hundred
men, made a gallant charge on- the British line. A warm action
ensued, which was kept up with great spirit until the arrival
of Lafayette, who, perceiving Wayne to be out-flanked both on
'Correspondence with Lafayette.

M! 0 0 I I a '41
-.1 ---1 -11,, 0! 0!law-11"

51I4

THE LIFE OF

the right and left, ordered him to retreat and form in a line
with the light infantry, who were drawn up about half a mile
in his rear. The whole party then saved itself behind a morass.
Fortunately for Lafayette, Lord Cornwallis did not improve
the advantage he had gained. Suspecting this to be a stratagem
of the American general to draw him into an ambuscade, a
suspicion equally favoured by the hardiness and time of the attack, Lord Cornwallis, who supposed his enemy to be stronger
than he was in reality, would allow no pursuit; and, in the
course of the night, crossed over into the island, whence he,
soon afterwards, proceeded to Portsmouth.
In this action, the Americans lost one hundred and eighteen
men, among whom were ten officers; and two pieces of artillery
were left on the field, the horses attached to them being killed.
The British loss was less considerable.
All active operations were now suspended; and the harassed
army of Lafayette was allowed some repose.
Although no brilliant service was performed by that young
nobleman, the campaign in Virginia enhanced his military reputation, and raised him in the general esteem. That with so decided an inferiority of effective force, and especially of cavalry,
he had been able to keep the field in an open country, and to
preserve a considerable proportion of his military stores, as well
as his army, was believed to furnish unequivocal evidence of the
prudence and vigour of his conduct.

GEORGE WASHINGTON

5I5

CHAPTER XXII
THE deep gloom which had enveloped the prospects of America
in the commencement of the year, which darkened
for a time in the south, had also spread itself over the 78
north. The total incompetency of the political system adopted
by the United States to their own preservation, became every
day more apparent. Each state seemed fearful of doing too
much, and of taking upon itself a larger portion of the common
burden than was borne by its neighbour.
The resolutions of congress had called for an army of thirtyseven thousand men, to be in camp by the first of January.
Had this requisition been made in time, it is not probable that
so large a force could have been brought into the field; but it
was made late, and then the difficulties and delays on the part
of the several states, exceeded every reasonable calculation. The
regular force drawn from Pennsylvania to Georgia inclusive, at
no time, during this active and interesting campaign, amounted
to three thousand effective men; and the states from New
Hampshire to New Jersey inclusive, so late as the month of
April, had furnished only five thousand infantry. Of these,
the returns for that month exhibit, in the northern department,
less than three thousand effectives. The cavalry and artillery,
at no time, amounted to one thousand men. This small army
was gradually and slowly augmented so as, in the month of
May, to exhibit a total of near seven thousand men, of whom
rather more than four thousand might have been relied on for
action.
The prospects for the campaign were rendered still more unpromising by the failure of supplies for the support of the
troops. The long expected clothing from Europe had not arrived; and the want of provisions a furnished a still more serious
cause of alarm.

1 See note, No. XVIII at the end of the volume.

I! i WOW

5 I6

THE LIFE OF

After congress had come to the resolution of emitting no more
bills on the credit of the continent, the duty of supplying the
army with provisions necessarily devolved on the states, who
were required to furnish certain specified articles for the subsistence of the troops, according to a ratio established by the
federal government. These requisitions had been neglected to
such a degree as to excite fears that the soldiers must be disbanded from the want of food.
To increase the general embarrassment, the quartermaster department was destitute of funds, and unable to transport provisions or other stores from place to place, but by means of impressment supported by a military force. This measure had been
repeated, especially in New York, until it excited so much disgust and irritation among the people, that the Commander-inchief was under serious apprehensions of actual resistance to his
authority.
While in this state of deplorable imbecility, intelligence from
every quarter announced increasing dangers.
Information was received that an expedition was preparing
in Canada against Fort Pitt, to be conducted by Sir John Johnston, and Colonel Conelly; and it was understood that many,
in the country threatened with invasion, were ready to join the
British standard. The Indians too had entered into formidable
combinations, endangering the whole extent of the western
frontier.
In addition to these alarming circumstances, some vessels had
arrived at Crown Point from Canada, with information that
three thousand men had been assembled on the lakes, for the
purpose of attempting, once more, an invasion from that
quarter.
This information, though unfounded, was believed to be
true, and was, at that critical moment, the more alarming, because a correspondence of a criminal nature had just been discovered between some persons in Albany and in Canada. A
letter intercepted by Generals Schuyler and Clinton, stated the
disaffection of particular settlements, the provision made in
those settlements for the subsistence of an invading army, and
their readiness to join such army.
This intelligence from the northern frontier derived in

GEORGE WASHINGTON

SiI7

creased interest from the ambiguous conduct observed by the
inhabitants of that tract of country which now constitutes the
state of Vermont. They had settled lands within the chartered
limits of New York, under grants from the governor of New
Hampshire; and had, early in the war, declared themselves independent, and exercised the powers of self-government. The
state of New York, however, still continuing to assert her
claim of sovereignty, the controversy on this delicate subject
had become so violent as to justify the apprehension that, in
the opinion of the people of Vermont, the restoration of British
authority was an evil not of greater magnitude, than the establishment of that of New York. The declaration was openly
made that, if not admitted into the union as an independent
state, they held themselves at liberty to make a separate peace;
and some negotiations had been commenced, which were believed
to manifest a disposition in Vermont, to abandon the common
cause of America.
Accustomed to contemplate all public events which might
grow out of the situation of the United States, and to prepare
for them while at a distance, the American chief was not depressed by this state of American affairs. With a mind happily
tempered by nature, and improved by experience, those fortunate events which had occasionally brightened the prospects of
his country, never relaxed his exertions, or lessened his precautions; nor could the most disastrous state of things drive
him to despair. Although entirely uncertain what operation
he might be enabled to undertake during the approaching campaign, he had adopted such preparatory steps as might enable
him to turn to advantage any fortunate incident which might
occur. In consequence of conferences previously held with the
Count de Rochambeau, for the purpose of digesting a system
adapted to contingent events, orders were transmitted to that
officer, directing him to be in readiness to march as large a body
of the French troops to the North River, as could be spared
from the protection of the fleet.
Early in May, the Count de Barras, who had been appointed
to the command of the French fleet stationed on the American
coast arrived in Boston accompanied by the Viscount de Rochambeau, and brought the long expected information from the

5I8

THE LIFE OF

cabinet of Versailles, respecting the naval armament designed
to act in the American seas. Twenty ships of the line, to be
commanded by the Count de Grasse, were destined for the West
Indies, twelve of which were to proceed to the continent of
America, and might be expected to arrive in the month of July.
An interview between General Washington and the Count
de Rochambeau immediately took place at Weathersfield, in
which it was determined to unite the troops of France to those
of America on the Hudson, and to proceed against New York.
The regular army at that station was estimated at four thousand
five hundred men,' and though it was understood that Sir
Henry Clinton would be able to reinforce it with five or six
thousand militia, it was believed that the post could not be
maintained without recalling a considerable part of the troops
from the south; in which event, the allied army might be employed advantageously in that part of the union.
The prospect of expelling the British from New York roused
the northern states from that apathy into which they appeared
to be sinking and vigorous measures were taken to fill their regiments. Yet those measures were not completely successful. In
the month of June, when the army took the field, and encamped
at Peekskill, its effective numbers did not exceed five thousand
men.
Such was the American force in the north, with which the
campaign of 1781 was opened. It fell so far short of that on
which the calculations had been made at Weathersfield, as to
excite serious doubts respecting the propriety of adhering to the
plan there concerted, although some compensation was made for
this deficiency on the part of the states by the arrival of a reinforcement of fifteen hundred men to the army of Rochambeau
under convoy of a fifty gun frigate.
To supply even this army with provisions, required much
greater exertions than had ever been made since the system of
requisitions had been substituted for that of purchasing. The
hope of terminating the war produced these exertions. The legislatures of the New England states took up the subject in earnest,
and passed resolutions for raising the necessary supplies. But
Sir H. Clinton in a letter to Lord Cornwallis, dated June I, 178, states his effective force at ten thousand nine hundred and thirty-one.

GEORGE WASHINGTON

51I9

until these resolutions could be executed, the embarrassments
of the army continued; and, for some time after the troops
had taken the field, there was reason to apprehend, either
that the great objects of the campaign must be relinquished
for want of provisions, or that coercive means must still be
used.
New England not furnishing flour, this important article
was to be drawn from New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania. The two first states were much exhausted; and the application to Pennsylvania did not promise to be very successful.
On this subject, therefore, serious fears existed.
These were removed, in a great degree, by the activity and
exertions of an individual.
The management of the finances had been lately committed
to Mr. Robert Morris, a delegate to congress from the state of
Pennsylvania. This gentleman united considerable political talents to a degree of mercantile enterprise, information, and credit,
seldom equalled in any country. He had accepted this arduous
appointment on the condition of being allowed the year 178i
to make his arrangements; during which time, the department
was to be conducted by those already employed, with the resources which government could command. But the critical
state of public affairs, and the pressing wants of the army,
furnished irresistible motives for changing his original determination, and entering immediately on the duties of his office. The
occasion required that he should bring his private credit in aid
of the public resources, and pledge himself personally and extensively, for articles of absolute necessity which could not be
otherwise obtained. Condemning the system of violence and
of legal fraud, which had too long been practised, as being calculated to defeat its own object, he sought the gradual restoration of confidence by the only means which could restore it:a punctual and faithful compliance with his engagements.
Herculean as was this task in the existing derangement of
American finances, he entered upon it courageously; and, if
not completely successful, certainly did more than could have
been supposed possible with the means placed in his hands. It
is, in no inconsiderable degree, to be attributed to him, that the
very active and decisive operations of the campaign were not

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impeded, perhaps defeated, by a failure of the means for transporting military stores, and feeding the army.
On determining to enter on the duties of his office, Mr.
Morris laid before congress the plan of a national bank, whose
notes were to be receivable from the respective states as specie,
into the treasury of the United States. Congress gave its full
approbation to this beneficial institution; and passed an ordinance for its incorporation.
Important as was this measure to the future operations of
the army, a contract entered into with the state of Pennsylvania
was of still more immediate utility.
After furnishing flour to relieve the wants of the moment
on his private credit, Mr. Morris proposed to take on himself
the task of complying with all the specific requisitions made on
Pennsylvania, and to rely for reimbursement on the taxes imposed by law, to be collected under his direction. This proposition being accepted, the contract was made; and supplies which
the government found itself unable to furnish, were raised by an
individual.
As the French troops approached the North River, intelligence was received that a large detachment from New York
had made an incursion into Jersey, under appearances indicating
an intention not to return immediately. This being thought a
favourable moment for gaining the posts on the north end of
York island, a plan was formed for seizing them by a coup de
main. General Washington fixed on the night of the second of
July for making the attempt; it being supposed that the Count
de Rochambeau might join the American army at Kingsbridge
by that time. An aid-de-camp was therefore despatched to
meet that officer with letters explaining the enterprise, and requesting him to meet the Commander-in-chief at the time and
place appointed.
With the proposed attack on these works, an attempt to cut
off some light troops stationed on the outside of Kingsbridge at
Morrissania, under the command of Colonel Delaney, was to
be combined. This part of the plan was to be executed by the
Duke de Lauzun, to whose legion Sheldon's dragoons, and a small
body of continental troops dispersed on the lines, under the
command of General Waterbury, were to be added.

GEORGE WASHINGTON

52I

On the part of the Americans, all that could contribute to
the success of this enterprise was done. A strong detachment
commanded by General Lincoln, which fell down the river in
boats with muffled oars, reached its ground undiscovered on the
night of the first of July; and the army, conducted by General
Washington, marched to Valentine's hill. The next day,
Lincoln perceived that the detachment had returned from Jersey,
that the British were encamped in great force on the north
end of the island, and that a ship of war watched the landing
place. These unexpected obstacles having defeated the design
upon the works, he proceeded to execute his eventual orders of
co-operation with the Duke de Lauzun. These were, after landing above Spiken Devil Creek, to march to the high ground in
front of Kingsbridge, and there conceal his detachment, until
the attack on Delaney's corps should commence.
The Duke de Lauzun did not arrive, and the return of day
betrayed Lincoln. A British corps advanced upon him; on
hearing which, General Washington put his troops in motion,
and, on his approach, the British troops retired into the island.
Both parts of the plan having thus failed, the army retreated
to Dobbs' ferry, where it was joined by the Count de Rochambeau on the sixth of July.
The thanks of the Commander-in-chief were given to that
officer in general orders, for the unremitting zeal with which he
had proceeded to form his so long wished for junction with the
American army; and he was requested to convey to the officers
and soldiers under his command, the grateful sense which the
general entertained of the cheerfulness with which they had performed so long and laborious a march at so hot a season.
The utmost exertions were made for the grand enterprise
against New York. But as the execution of any plan that could
be formed, depended on events which were uncertain, the
Commander-in-chief directed his attention to other objects, to
be pursued if that which was most desirable should prove unattainable. Should the siege of New York become unadvisable,
his views were turned to Virginia, the Carolinas, and Georgia.
Early in August, the apprehension that he should be unable
to accomplish his favourite object, began to influence his conduct. Letters from the Marquis de Lafayette announced that

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a large portion of the troops in Virginia were embarked, and that
their destination was believed to be New York. This intelligence
induced him to turn his attention more seriously to the south;
but, to conceal from Sir Henry Clinton this eventual change
of plan, his arrangements were made secretly, and the preparations for acting against New York were continued. A reinforcement from Europe of near three thousand men, induced
Sir Henry Clinton to countermand the orders he had given
to Lord Cornwallis to detach a part of the army in Virginia to
his aid; and also to direct that nobleman to take a strong position on the Chesapeake, from which he might execute the designs meditated against the states lying on that bay, so soon as
the storm which threatened the British power for the moment,
should blow over. In a few days after the arrival of this reinforcement, the Count de Barras gave General Washington the
interesting information, that De Grasse was to have sailed from
Cape Francis for the Chesapeake, on the third of August, with
from twenty-five to twenty-nine ships of the line, having on
board three thousand two hundred soldiers; and that he had
made engagements with the officers commanding the land and
naval forces of Spain in the West Indies, to return to those seas
by the middle of October.
This intelligence manifested the necessity of determining immediately, and positively, on the object against which the combined forces should be directed. The shortness of the time appropriated by De Grasse for his continuance on the American
coast, the apparent unwillingness of the naval officers to attempt to force a passage into the harbour of New York, and
the failure of the states to comply with the requisitions which
had been made on them for men, decided in favour of operations to the south; and Lafayette was requested to make such a
disposition of his army as should be best calculated to prevent
Lord Cornwallis from saving himself by a sudden march to
Charleston.'
Conformably to the intelligence communicated by the Count
1In pursuance of these orders, Wayne was detached to the south side of James
river, under the pretext of reinforcing Greene, but was ordered to maintain a position
which would enable him to intercept and oppose the march of Lord Cornwallis, should
he attempt to force his way to Charleston. Lafayette was on the alert to co-operate
with Wayne in the event of such a movement.-Cor. with Lafayette.

GEORGE WASHINGTON

513

de Barras, the Count de Grasse arrived in the Chesapeake late
in August with twenty-eight ships of the line and several
frigates. At Cape Henry he found an officer despatched by
Lafayette with full intelligence of the situation of the armies
in Virginia. Lord Cornwallis had collected his whole
force at Yorktown and Gloucester Point, which he August.
was fortifying assiduously; and the Marquis had taken a position
on James river.
In consequence of this information, four ships of the line
and several frigates were detached to block up the mouth of
York river, and convey the land forces brought from the West
Indies, under the command of the Marquis de St. Simon, up the
James to join Lafayette, who, on receiving this reinforcement,
took post at Williamsburg. In the meantime, the fleet lay at
anchor just within the capes. On the 25th of August the
Count de Barras ' sailed from Newport for the Chesapeake.
Rodney was apprised of the destination of De Grasse, but
seems not to have suspected that the whole fleet would sail for
the continent of America. Supposing therefore that a part of
his squadron would be sufficient to maintain an equality of
naval force in the American seas, he detached Sir Samuel Hood
to the continent with only fourteen sail of the line. That officer arrived at Sandy Hook on the twenty-eighth of August.
Admiral Greaves, who had succeeded Arbuthnot in the command of the fleet on the American station, lay in the harbour
of New York with seven ships of the line, only five of which
were fit for service. On the day that Hood appeared and gave
information that De Grasse was probably on the coast, intelligence was also received that De Barras had sailed from Newport.
The ships fit for sea were ordered out of the harbour; and
Greaves, with the whole fleet, consisting of nineteen sail of the
line, proceeded in quest of the French.
Not suspecting the strength of De Grasse, he hoped to fall
in with one or the other of their squadrons, and to fight it
separately.
1 This admiral was the senior of De Grasse, to whom the command of the expedition
had been entrusted, and was therefore authorized by the minister of marine, to cruise
on the coast of Newfoundland while his ships should join the grand fleet. He preferred serving under his junior officer.-Cor. of Lafayette.

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Early in the morning of the yth of September, while the
French fleet lay at anchor just within the Chesapeake, the British squadron was descried. Orders were immediately given by
De Grasse to form the line, and put to sea. About four in the
afternoon, the action commenced between the headmost ships,
and continued until sunset. Several ships were much damaged,
but neither admiral could claim the victory. For
Sept. I0 five successive days the hostile fleets continued within view of each other. After which, De Grasse returned to his
former station within the capes. At his anchorage ground
he found De Barras with the squadron from Newport, and fourteen transports laden with heavy artillery, and military stores
proper for carrying on a siege. The British admiral approaching the capes, found the entrance of the Chesapeake defended
by a force with which he was unable to contend, and therefore
bore away for New York.
General Washington had determined to entrust the defence
of the Hudson to General Heath, and to command the southern expedition in person. All the French, and a detachment
amounting to upwards of two thousand men from the continental army, were destined for this service. On the i9th of August, Hazen's regiment and the Jersey line, were directed to pass
the Hudson at Dobbs' ferry, and take a position between
Springfield and Chatham, where they were to cover some bakehouses to be constructed in the neighbourhood, for the purpose
of veiling the real designs of the American chief, and of exciting
fears for Staten Island. On the same day, the whole army was
put in motion; and on the twenty-fifth the passage of the river
was completed.
To conceal as long as possible the real object of this movement, the march of the army was continued until the thirtyfirst, in such a direction as to keep up fears for New York; and
a considerable degree of address was used to countenance the
opinion that the real design was against that place. The letters
which had been intercepted by Sir Henry Clinton favoured
this deception; and so strong was the impression they made
that, even after it became necessary for the combined army to
leave the route leading down the Hudson, he is stated to have
retained his fears for New York, and not to have suspected the

GEORGE WASHINGTON

5 2 5

real object of his adversary until he had approached the Delaware;1 and it had become too late to obstruct the progress of
the allied army towards Virginia. He then resolved to make
every exertion in his power to relieve Lord Cornwallis, and in
the mean time to act offensively in the north. An expedition
was planned against New London, in Connecticut, and a strong
detachment, under the command of General Arnold, was embarked on board a fleet of transports, which landed early in
the morning of the 6th of September on both sides the harbour,
about three miles from the town.
New London is a seaport town on the west side of the Thames.
A fort called fort Trumbull, and a redoubt had been constructed
just below it, on the same side of the river; and opposite to it,
on Groton hill, was fort Griswold, a strong square fortification,
but not fully manned. General Arnold, who commanded in
person the troops that landed on the western side of the harbour, advanced immediately against the posts on that side. These
being untenable were evacuated on his approach; and he took
possession of them with inconsiderable loss. To prevent the
escape of the vessels up the river, Lieutenant Colonel Eyre, who
commanded the division which landed on the Groton side of
the harbour, had been ordered to storm fort Griswold, which
had been represented to Arnold as too incomplete to make any
serious resistance. But the place being of some strength, and
the approach to it difficult, Colonel Ledyard, who commanded
it with a garrison of one hundred and sixty men, determined
to defend it. On his refusing to surrender, the British assaulted
it on three sides, and overcoming the difficulties opposed to them,
made a lodgement on the ditch and fraized work, and entered the embrasures with charged bayonets. Further resistance
being hopeless, the action ceased on the part of the Americans,
and Colonel Ledyard delivered his sword to the commanding
officer of the assailants. Irritated by the obstinacy of the defence, and the loss sustained in the assault, the British officer
on whom the command had devolved, tarnished the glory of
'The first indication given by Sir Henry Clinton of suspecting the southern expedition, is in his letter to Lord Cornwallis of the 2nd of September, in which he says,
"By intelligence I have this day received, it would seem that Washington is moving
southward."

526

THE LIFE OF

victory by the inhuman use he made of it. Instead of respecting, with the generous spirit of a soldier, the gallantry which he
had subdued, he indulged the vindictive feelings which had
been roused by the slaughter of his troops. In the account given
of this affair by Governor Trumbull to General Washington,
he says, "The sword presented by Colonel Ledyard was immediately plunged into his bosom, and the carnage was kept up
until the greater part of the garrison was killed or wounded."
In this fierce assault, Colonel Eyre was killed, and Major
Montgomery, the second in command, also fell, as he entered
the American works. The total loss of the assailants was not
much less than two hundred men.
The town of New London, and the stores contained in it,
were consumed by fire. To escape the odium which invariably
attends the wanton destruction of private property, this fire
was attributed to accident; but all the American accounts unite
in declaring it to have been intentional.
The march of General Washington was not arrested by this
excursion into New England. Having made the arrangements
for the transportation of his army down the Chesapeake, he proceeded in person to Virginia, attended by the Count de Rochambeau, and the Chevalier de Chatelleux; and, on the i4th of
September, reached Williamsburg:' accompanied by Rochambeau, Chatelleux, Knox, and Du Portail, he immediately repaired to the fleet, and a plan of co-operation was adjusted on
board the Ville de Paris, conforming to his wish in every respect, except that the Count de Grasse declined complying with
While the American troops were incamped at Williamsburg and the French fleet
lay in the bay, the Count de Grasse, circumscribed in point of time, and therefore,
unwilling to await the arrival of the army from the north, urged Lafayette to attack
the British in Yorktown; offering to aid him not only with all the marines of the
fleet but with as many seamen as he should require. The Marquis de St. Simon, an
officer of great experience, united himself with the admiral in pressing this measure.
He stated that, the works of Cornwallis being incomplete, Yorktown and Gloucester
might, in all probability, be carried by storm, if attacked by superior numbers. The
temptation was great for a young general scarcely twenty-four years of age. A full
excuse for the attempt was found in the declaration of De Grasse, that he could not
wait for the arrival of the troops from the north. Success would have given unrivalled
brilliancy to the reputation of Lafayette, but would necessarily have cost much blood.
Lafayette refused to sacrifice the soldiers which were confided to him to his personal
glory, and persuaded De Grasse to await the arrival of Washington and Rochambeau,
when the capture of Cornwallis would be certainly made without the waste of human
life.-Cor. with Lafayette.

GEORGE WASHINGTON

527

a proposition to station some of his ships in the river above
Yorktown, thinking it too hazardous.
While the close investment of the British army was delayed,
only until the troops from the north should arrive, serious apprehensions were excited that the brilliant results confidently
anticipated from the superiority of the land and naval forces
of the allies, would be put in imminent hazard.
Information was received that a reinforcement of six ships
of the line under Admiral Digby, had reached New York. Confident that the British fleet, thus augmented, would attempt
every thing for the relief of Lord Cornwallis, De Grasse expected to be attacked by a force not much inferior to his own.
Thinking his station within the Chesapeake unfavourable for a
naval combat, he designed to change it, and communicated to
General Washington his intention to leave a few frigates to
block up the mouths of James and York rivers, and to put to
sea with his fleet in quest of the British. If they should not have
left the harbour of New York, he purposed to block them up
in that place; supposing that his operations in that quarter
would be of more service to the common cause, than his remaining in the bay, an idle spectator of the siege of York.
The Commander-in-chief was much alarmed at this communication. Should the admiral put to sea, the winds and
many accidents might prevent his return to the Chesapeake.
During his absence, a temporary naval superiority might be acquired by the British in those waters, and the army of Lord
Cornwallis might be placed in perfect security. The movement
would expose to the caprice of fortune, an object of vast importance, which was now reduced almost to certainty. The
admiral was therefore entreated to preserve his station.
Fortunately, the wishes of the general prevailed, and the.admiral consented to relinquish those plans of active enterprise
which his thirst for military glory had suggested, and to maintain a station which the American general deemed so conducive
to the interest of the allies.
On the 25th of September, the last division of the allied
troops arrived in James river, and were disembarked at the landing near Williamsburg; soon after which, the preparations for
the siege were completed.

528

THE LIFE OF

York is a small village on the south side of the river which
bears that name, where the long peninsula between the York
and the James, is only eight miles wide. In this broad and bold
river, a ship of the line may ride in safety. Its southern banks
are high, and, on the opposite shore, is Gloucester point, a piece
of land projecting deep into the river, and narrowing it, at that
place, to the space of one mile. Both these posts were occupied
by Lord Cornwallis. The communication between them was
commanded by his batteries, and by some ships of war which
lay under his guns.
The main body of his army was encamped on the open
grounds about Yorktown, within a range of outer redoubts
and field works, calculated to command the peninsula, and impede the approach of the assailants; and Lieutenant Colonel
Dundass, with a small detachment consisting of six or seven
hundred men, held the post at Gloucester point. He was afterwards reinforced by Lieutenant Colonel Tarlton.
The legion of Lauzun, and a brigade of militia under General
Weedon, the whole commanded by the French General de
Choise, were directed to watch the enemy on the side of Gloucester; and, on the twenty-eighth, the grand combined army
-moved down on the south side of the river, by different roads,
towards Yorktown. About noon, the heads of the columns
reached the ground assigned them respectively; and, after driving in the piquets and some cavalry, encamped for the evening.
The next day, the right wing, consisting of Americans, extended
farther to the right, and occupied the ground east of Beverdam
creek; while the left wing, consisting of French, was stationed
on the west side of that stream. In the course of the night,
Lord Cornwallis withdrew from his outer lines; and
Sept. 30 the works he had evacuated were, the next day, occupied by the besieging army, which now invested the town
completely on that side.
Two thousand men were stationed on the Gloucester side for
the purpose of keeping up a rigorous blockade. On approaching the lines, a sharp skirmish took place which terminated unfavourably for the British; after which they remained under
cover of their works, making no attempt to interrupt the
blockade.

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GEORGE WASHINGTON

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On the night of the sixth of October, until which time the
besieging army was incessantly employed in disembarking their
heavy artillery and military stores, and drawing them to camp,
the first parallel was commenced within six hundred yards of
the British lines. This operation was conducted with so much
silence, that it appears not to have been perceived until the
return of daylight disclosed it to the garrison; by which time
the trenches were in such forwardness as to cover the men. By
the evening of the ninth, several batteries and redoubts were
completed, and the effect of their fire was soon perceived. New
batteries were opened the next day, and the fire became so heavy
that the besieged withdrew their cannon from the embrasures,
and scarcely returned a shot. The shells and red hot balls from
the batteries of the allied army reached the ships in Oct.
the harbour, and, in the evening, set fire to the
Charon of forty-four guns, and to three large transports, which
were entirely consumed. Reciprocal esteem, and a spirit of
emulation between the French and Americans, being carefully
cultivated by the Commander-in-chief, the siege was carried
on with great rapidity. The second parallel was opened, on
the night of the eleventh, within three hundred yards of the
British lines. The three succeeding days were devoted to the
completion of this parallel, during which the fire of the garrison, which had opened several new embrasures, became more
destructive than at any previous time. The men in the trenches
were particularly annoyed by two redoubts advanced three
hundred yards in front of the British works, which flanked the
second parallel of the besiegers. Preparations were made, on the
fourteenth, to carry them both by storm. The attack of one
was committed to the Americans, and of the other to the French.
The Marquis de Lafayette commanded the American detachment, and the Baron de Viominel the French. Towards the close
of the day, the two detachments marched with equal firmness
to the assault. Colonel Hamilton, who had commanded a battalion of light infantry throughout this campaign, led the advanced corps of the Americans; and Colonel Laurens turned the
redoubt at the head of eighty men, in order to take the garrison in reverse, and intercept their retreat. The troops rushed
to the charge without firing a gun and without giving the sap

530

THE LIFE OF

pers time to remove the abattis and palisades. Passing over
them, they assaulted the works with irresistible impetuosity on
all sides at the same time, and entered them with such rapidity
that their loss was inconsiderable.' This redoubt was defended
by Major Campbell, with some inferior officers, and forty-five
privates. The major, a captain, a subaltern, and seventeen privates, were made prisoners, and eight privates were killed while
the assailants were entering the works.
The redoubt attacked by the French was defended by a greater
number of men; and the resistance, being greater, was not
overcome so quickly, or with so little loss. One hundred and
twenty men, commanded by a lieutenant colonel, were in this
work, eighteen of whom were killed, and forty-two, including
a captain and two subaltern officers, were made prisoners. The
assailants lost, in killed and wounded, near one hundred men.
The Commander-in-chief was highly gratified with the active
courage displayed in these assaults. Speaking of it in his diary,
he says-"The bravery exhibited by the attacking troops was
emulous and praiseworthy. Few cases have exhibited greater
proofs of intrepidity, coolness, and firmness, than were shown
on this occasion." The orders of the succeeding day, congratuOct.. lating the army on the capture of these important
works, expressed a high sense of the judicious dispositions and gallant conduct of both the Baron de Viominel
and the Marquis de Lafayette, and requested them to convey
to every officer and man engaged in the enterprise, the acknowledgments of the Commander-in-chief for the spirit and rapidity
with which they advanced to the attack, and for the admirable
firmness with which they supported themselves under the fire
1 One serjeant and eight privates were killed; and one lieutenant colonel, four captains, one subaltern, one serjeant, and twenty-five rank and file, were wounded.
The irritation produced by the recent carnage in fort Griswold had not so far subdued the humanity of the American character as to induce retaliation. Not a man
was killed except in action. "Incapable," said Colonel Hamilton in his report, "of
imitating examples of barbarity, and forgetting recent provocation, the soldiery spared
every man that ceased to resist." Mr. Gordon, in his History of the American War,
states the orders given by Lafayette, with the approbation of Washington, to have
directed that every man in the redoubt, after its surrender, should be put to the sword.
These sanguinary orders, so repugnant to the character of the Commander-in-chief
and of Lafayette, were never given. There is no trace of them among the papers of
General Washington; and Colonel Hamilton, who took a part in the enterprise,
which assures his perfect knowledge of every material occurrence, has publicly contradicted the statement. It has been also contradicted by Lafayette.

GEORGE WASHINGTON

531

of the enemy without returning a shot. "The general reflects,"
conclude the orders, "with the highest degree of pleasure, on
the confidence which the troops of the two nations must hereafter have in each other. Assured of mutual support, he is convinced there is no danger which they will not cheerfully encounter, no difficulty which they will not bravely overcome."'
During the same night these redoubts were included in the
second parallel; and, in the course of the next day, some howitzers were placed in them, which, by five in the afternoon,
were opened on the besieged.
The situation of Lord Cornwallis was becoming desperate.
His works were sinking, in every quarter, under the fire of the
besiegers. The batteries already playing on him had silenced
nearly all his guns, and the second parallel was about to open,
which must in a few hours render the town untenable. To suspend a catastrophe which appeared almost inevitable, he resolved
on attempting to retard the completion of the second parallel,
by a vigorous sortie against two batteries which appeared to
be in the greatest forwardness, and were guarded by French
troops. The party making this sortie was led by Lieutenant
Colonel Abercrombie, who attacked the two batteries with great
impetuosity about four in the morning, and carried Oct. 6.
both with inconsiderable loss; but the Guards from
the trenches immediately advancing on the assailants, they retreated without being able to effect any thing of importance.
About four in the afternoon the besiegers opened several batteries in their second parallel; and it was apparent that in the
course of the ensuing day, the whole line of batteries in that
parallel would be ready to play on the town. The works of the
besieged were not in a condition to sustain so tremendous a fire.
In this extremity, Lord Cornwallis formed the bold design of
forcing his way to New York.
X General Lafayette states a fact which proves in an eminent degree the good feelings of the American soldiers towards their allies. While encamped together under
his command at Williamsburg, the Americans, who were bivouacked, saw their allies
under tents without a murmur; and saw them supplied regularly with rations of flour
for three days from the American magazines, while corn meal was measured out very
irregularly to themselves. The superior officers lent their horses to those of France
and walked themselves. Although their general was himself a Frenchman, the Americans saw not only without jealousy, but with pleasure, every preference given to
their allies.

532

THE LIFE OF

He determined to leave his sick and baggage behind, and,
crossing over in the night with his effectives to the Gloucester
shore, to attack De Choise. After cutting to pieces or dispersing the troops under that officer, he intended to mount his infantry on the horses taken from that detachment, and on others
to be seized on the road, and, by a rapid march to gain the fords
of the great rivers, and, forcing his way through Maryland,
Pennsylvania, and Jersey, to form a junction with the army in
New York.'
This desperate attempt would be extremely hazardous; but
the situation of the British general had become so hopeless, that
it could scarcely be changed for the worse.
Boats prepared under other pretexts were held in readiness
to receive the troops at ten in the evening, and convey them
over the river. The arrangements were made with such secrecy
that the first embarkation arrived at the point unperceived,
and part of the troops were landed, when a sudden and violent
storm interrupted the execution of this hazardous plan, and
drove the boats down the river. The storm continued till near
daylight, when the boats returned. But the plan was necessarily
abandoned, and the boats were sent to bring back the soldiers,
who were relanded on the southern shore in the course of the
forenoon without much loss.
In the morning of the seventeenth, several new batteries
were opened in the second parallel, which poured in a weight
of fire not to be resisted. The place being no longer tenable,
Lord Cornwallis, about ten in the forenoon, beat a parley, and
proposed a cessation of hostilities for twenty-four hours, that
commissioners might meet at Moore's house, which was just in
the rear of the first parallel, to settle terms for the surrender
of the posts of York and Gloucester. To this letter General
Washington returned an immediate answer declaring his ""ardent desire to spare the further effusion of blood, and his readiness to listen to such terms as were admissible;" but as in the
present crisis he could not consent to lose a moment in fruitless negotiations, he desired that "previous to the meeting of
the commissioners, the proposals of his lordship might be trans'Stedman, Annual Register, letter of Lord Cornwallis.

GEORGE WASHINGTON

533

mitted in writing, for which purpose a suspension of hostilities
for two hours should be granted. The general propositions"'
stated by Lord Cornwallis as forming the basis of the capitulation, though not all admissible, being such as led to the opinion
that no great difficulty would occur in adjusting the terms, the
suspension of hostilities was prolonged for the night. In the
mean time, to avoid the delay of useless discussion, the Commander-in-chief drew up and proposed such articles2 as he would
be willing to grant. These were transmitted to Lord Cornwallis with the accompanying declaration that, if he approved
them, commissioners might be immediately appointed to digest
them into form. In consequence of this message, Oct. 8
the Viscount De Noailles, and Lieutenant Colonel
Laurens, were met next day by Colonel Dundass and Major
Ross; but, being unable to adjust the terms of capitulation
definitively, only a rough draught of them could be prepared,
which was to be submitted to the consideration of the British
general. Determined not to expose himself to those accidents
which time might produce, General Washington could not permit any suspense on the part of Lord Cornwallis. He therefore immediately directed the rough articles which had been
prepared by the commissioners to be fairly transcribed, and
sent them to his lordship early next morning, with ct
a letter expressing his expectation that they would *
be signed by eleven, and that the garrison would march out by
two in the afternoon. Finding all attempts to obtain better
terms unavailing, Lord Cornwallis submitted to a necessity no
longer to be avoided, and, on the i9th of October, surrendered
the posts of Yorktown and Gloucester Point, with their garrisons, and the ships in the harbour with their seamen, to the
land and naval forces of America and France.
The army, artillery, arms, military chest, and public stores of
every denomination, were surrendered to General Washington;
the ships and seamen, to the Count de Grasse. The total number of prisoners,3 excluding seamen, rather exceeded seven thouSee note, No. XIX at the end of the volume.
2 See note, No. XX at the end of the volume.
8 The return of prisoners contained two generals, thirty-one field officers, three
hundred and twenty-six captains and subalterns, seventy-one regimental staff, six

534

THE LIFE OF

sand men. The loss sustained by the garrison during the siege,
amounted to five hundred and fifty-two men, including six
officers.
Lord Cornwallis endeavoured to introduce an article into the
capitulation, for the security of those Americans who had joined
the British army; but the subject was declared to belong to the
civil department, and the article was rejected. Its object, however, was granted without appearing to concede it. His lordship was permitted to send the Bonetta sloop of war untouched,
with despatches to Sir Henry Clinton; and the Americans whose
conduct had been most offensive to their countrymen were embarked on board this vessel.
The allied army may be estimated, including militia, at sixteen thousand men. In the course of this siege, they lost, in
killed and wounded, about three hundred. The treaty was opened
on the eleventh day after the ground was broken by the besiegers, and the capitulation was signed on the thirteenth. The
whole army merited great approbation; but, from the nature
of the service, the artillerists and engineers were enabled to distinguish themselves particularly. Generals du Portail and Knox
were each promoted to the rank of Major General; and Colonel
Govion, and Captain Rochfontaine, of the corps of engineers,
were each advanced a grade by brevet. In addition to the
officers belonging to those departments, Generals Lincoln, De
Lafayette, and Steuben, were particularly mentioned by the
Commander-in-chief, in his orders issued the day after the
capitulation; and terms of peculiar warmth were applied to
Governor Nelson, who continued in the field during the whole
siege, at the head of the militia of Virginia; and also exerted
himself, in a particular manner, to furnish the army with those
supplies which the country afforded. The highest acknowledgments were made to the Count de Rochambeau; and several
other French officers were named with distinction. So many disasters had attended the former efforts of the United States to
thousand five hundred and twenty-seven non-commissioned officers and privates, and
one hundred and twenty-four persons belonging to the hospital, commissary, and
wagon departments, making in the whole seven thousand and seventy-three prisoners.
To this number are to be added six commissioned, and twenty-eight non-commissioned officers and privates made prisoners in the two redoubts which were stormed,
and in the sortie made by the garrison.

GEORGE WASHINGTON

535.

avail themselves of the succours occasionally afforded by France?
that an opinion not very favourable to the alliance appears to
have gained some ground in the country, and to have insinuated
itself into the army. The Commander-in-chief seized this occasion to discountenance a course of thinking from which he had
always feared pernicious consequences, and displayed the great
value of the aids lately received, in language highly flattering to
the French monarch, as well as to the land and naval forces of
that nation.
Knowing the influence which the loss of the army in Virginia
must have on the war, Sir Henry Clinton determined to hazard
much for its preservation. About seven thousand of his best
troops sailed for the Chesapeake, under convoy of a fleet augmented to twenty-five ships of the line. This armament left the
Hook the day on which the capitulation was signed at Yorktown, and appeared off the capes of Virginia on the 24th of
October. Unquestioffable intelligence being there received that
Lord Cornwallis had surrendered, the British general returned to
New York.
The exultation manifested throughout the United States at
the capture of this formidable army was equal to the terror it
had inspired. In congress, the intelligence was received with
joy proportioned to the magnitude of the event; and the sense
of that body on this brilliant achievement was expressed in
various resolutions, returning the thanks of the United States
to the Commander-in-chief, to the Count de Rochambeau, to
the Count de Grasse, to the officers of the allied army generally,
and to the corps of artillery, and engineers particularly. In addition to these testimonials of gratitude, it was resolved that a
marble column should be erected at Yorktown, in Virginia, with
emblems of the alliance between the United States and his most
Christian Majesty, and inscribed with a succinct narrative of the
surrender of Earl Cornwallis to his Excellency General Washington, the Commander-in-chief of the combined forces of America
and France; to his Excellency the Count de Rochambeau, commanding the auxiliary troops of his most Christian Majesty in
America and to his Excellency Count de Grasse, commanding in
chief the naval army of France in the Chesapeake. Two stand of
colours taken in Yorktown were presented to General Washing

5.36

THE LIFE OF

ton; two pieces of field ordnance to the Count de Rochambeau;
and application was made to his most Christian Majesty, to permit the Admiral to accept a testimonial of their approbation similar to that presented to the Count de Rochambeau. Congress
determined to go in solemn procession to the Dutch Lutheran
church, to return thanks to Almighty God for crowning the
allied arms with success, by the surrender of the whole British
army under Lord Cornwallis; and also issued a proclamation,
appointing the i 3th day of December for general thanksgiving
and prayer, on account of this signal interposition of Divine
Providence.
It was not by congress only that the public joy at this great
event, and the public approbation of the conduct of General
Washington were displayed. The most flattering and affectionate addresses of congratulation were presented from every
part of the union; and state governments, corporate towns, and
learned institutions, vied with each other in the testimonials they
gave of their high sense of his important services, and of their
attachment to his person and character.
The superiority of the allied force opened a prospect of still
farther advantages. The remaining posts of the British in the
southern states were too weak to be defended against the army
which had triumphed over Lord Cornwallis; and the troops
which occupied them could neither escape nor be reinforced, if
the Count de Grasse could be prevailed on to co-operate against
them. Although, in his first conference, he had explicitly declared his inability to engage in any enterprise to be undertaken
subsequent to that against Yorktown,' the siege of that place had
employed so much less time than the admiral had consented to
appropriate to it, that the general resumed his plan of southern
operations. In a letter addressed to De Grasse, he used every
argument which might operate on his love of fame, or his desire
to promote the interests of the allies, to prevail on him to cooperate in an expedition against Charleston. If this object
should be unattainable, his attention was next turned to Wilmington, in North Carolina, which was still occupied by a small
detachment of British troops who kept that state in check. The
x See note, No. XXI at the end of the volume.

GEORGE WASHINGTON

537

capture of this detachment, though not an object of much consequence in itself, was supposed to derive some importance from
the influence which the complete liberation of North Carolina
might have on the future military operations of the United
States, and on their negotiations. General Washington proposed
to send a detachment intended to reinforce General Greene, as
far as Wilmington, under convoy. The reduction of that place,
he supposed, would detain the fleet but a few days, after which
it might proceed to the West Indies.
To enforce the representations contained in his letter, as
well as to pay his respects to the admiral, and to express in person
the high sense entertained of his important services, the Commander-in-chief repaired on board the Ville de Paris. The Count
acknowledged his conviction of the advantages to be expected
from an expedition against Charleston; but said, that ""the orders
of his court, ulterior projects, and his engagements with the
Spaniards, rendered it impossible for him to remain on the coast
during the time which would be required for the operation."
As he also declined taking on board the troops designed to reinforce General Greene, preparations were made for their march
by land; and Major General St. Clair, who commanded the detachment, was ordered to take Wilmington in his route, and to
gain possession of that post.
The Count de Grasse having consented to remain in the bay
a few days for the purpose of covering the transportation of the
eastern troops, and of the ordnance to the Head of Elk, they
were embarked in the beginning of November, under the command of General Lincoln, who was directed to march them into
New Jersey and New York, and to canton them for the winter
in those states.' The French troops remained in Virginia, not
only for the protection of that state, but to be in readiness to
march southward or northward, as the exigencies of the ensuing
campaign might require.
The transportation of the troops and ordnance to the Head
of Elk being effected, the Count de Grasse sailed for the West
Indies, and the Commander-in-chief proceeded to Philadelphia.

'See note, No. XXII at the end of the volume.

NOTES
NOTE-No. I
IT will not be unacceptable to the reader to peruse this first report of a young
gentleman who afterwards performed so distinguished a part in the revolution of his
country, it is therefore inserted at large.
I was commissioned and appointed by the Hon. Robert Dinwiddie, Esq. Governor
&amp;c. of Virginia, to visit and deliver a letter to the commandant of the French forces
on the Ohio,' and set out on the intended journey on the same day: the next, I arrived
at Fredericksburg, and engaged Mr. Jacob Vanbraam to be my French interpreter,
and proceeded with him to Alexandria, where we provided necessaries. From thence
we went to Winchester, and got baggage, horses, &amp;c. and from thence we pursued
the new road to Wills' Creek, where we arrived the 14th November.
Here I engaged Mr. Gist to pilot us out, and also hired four others as servitors,
Barnaby Currin, and John M'Quire, Indian traders, Henry Steward and William
Jenkins; and in company with those persons left the inhabitants the next day.
The excessive rains and vast quantity of snow which had fallen, prevented our
reaching Mr. Frazier's, an Indian trader, at the mouth of Turtle creek, on Monongahela river, until Thursday the 22d. We were informed here, that expresses had
been sent a few days before to the traders down the river, to acquaint them with the
French general's death, and the return of the major part of the French army into
winter quarters.
The waters were quite impassable without swimming our horses, which obliged us
to get the loan of a canoe from Frazier, and to send Barnaby Currin and Henry
Steward down the Monongahela, with our baggage, to meet us at the forks of Ohio,
about ten miles; there, to cross the Alleghany.
As I got down before the canoe, I spent some time in viewing the rivers, and the
land in the fork, which I think extremely well situated for a fort, as it has the absolute
command of both rivers. The land at the point is twenty, or twenty-five feet above
the common surface of the water; and a considerable bottom of flat, well timbered
land all around it very convenient for building. The rivers are each a quarter of a
mile or more across, and run here very nearly at right angles; Alleghany, bearing
northeast; and Monongahela, southeast. The former of these two is a very rapid and
swift running water, the other deep and still, without any perceptible fall.
About two miles from this, on the southeast side of the river, at the place where the
Ohio company intended to erect a fort, lives Shingiss, king of the Delawares. We
called upon him, to invite him to council at the Loggstown.
As I had taken a good deal of notice yesterday of the situation at the fork, my
curiosity led me to examine this more particularly, and I think it greatly inferior,
either for defence or advantages; especially the latter. For a fort at the fork would
be equally well situated on the Ohio, and have the entire command of the Monongahela, which runs up our settlement, and is extremely well designed for water
carriage, as it is of a deep, still nature. Besides, a fort at the fork might be built
at much less expense than at the other places.
Nature has well contrived this lower place for water defence; but the hill whereon
it must stand being about a quarter of a mile in length, and then descending gradually
on the land side, will render it difficult and very expensive to make a sufficient fortifiVOL. I. I

NOTES

cation there. The whole flat upon the hill must be taken in, the side next the descent
made extremely high, or else the hill itself cut away: otherwise, the enemy may raise
batteries within that distance without being exposed to a single shot from the fort.
Shingiss attended us to the Loggstown, where we arrived between sun-setting and
dark, the twenty-fifth day after I left Williamsburg. We travelled over some extremely good and bad land to get to this place.
As soon as I came into town, I went to Monakatoocha (as the half king was out
at his hunting cabin on Little Beaver creek, about fifteen miles off) and informed him
by John Davidson, my Indian interpreter, that I was sent a messenger to the French
general; and was ordered to call upon the sachems of the Six Nations to acquaint
them with it. I gave him a string of wampum and a twist of tobacco, and desired
him to send for the half king, which he promised to do by a runner in the morning,
and for other sachems. I invited him and the other great men present, to my tent,
where they stayed about an hour and returned.
According to the best observations I could make, Mr. Giff's new settlement (which
we passed by) bears about west northwest seventy miles from Wills' creek; Shanapins, or the forks, north by west, or north northwest about fifty miles from that; and
from thence to the Loggstown, the course is nearly west about eighteen or twenty
miles; so that the whole distance, as we went and computed it, is, at least, one hundred and thirty-five or one hundred and forty miles from our back inhabitants.
2 5th. Came to town, four of ten Frenchmen, who had deserted from a company
at the Kuskuskas, which lies at the mouth of this river. I got the following account
from them. They were sent from New Orleans with a hundred men, and eight
canoe loads of provisions, to this place, where they expected to have met the same
number of men, from the forts on this side of lake Erie, to convoy them and the
stores up, who were not arrived when they ran off.
I inquired into the situation of the French on the Mississippi, their numbers, and
what forts they had built. They informed me, that there were four small forts between New Orleans and the Black Islands, garrisoned with about thirty or forty men,
and a few small pieces in each. That at New Orleans, which is near the mouth of
the Mississippi, there are thirty-five companies of forty men each, with a pretty
strong fort mounting eight carriage guns; and at the Black Islands there are several
companies and a fort with six guns. The Black Islands are about a hundred and
thirty leagues above the mouth of the Ohio, which is about three hundred and fifty
above New Orleans. They also acquainted me, that there was a small pallisadoed fort
on the Ohio, at the mouth of the Obaish, about sixty leagues from the Mississippi.
The Obaish heads near the west end of lake Erie, and affords the communication
between the French on the Mississippi and those on the lakes. These deserters
came up from the lower Shannoah town with one Brown, an Indian trader, and were
going to Philadelphia.
About three o'clock this evening the half king came to town. I went up and invited him with Davidson privately, to my tent; and desired him to relate some of the
particulars of his journey to the French commandant, and of his reception there;
also, to give me an account of the ways and distance. He told me, that the nearest
and levelest way was now impassable, by reason of many large miry savannas; that
we must be obliged to go by Venango, and should not get to the near fort in less than
five or six nights sleep, good travelling. When he went to the fort, he said he was
received in a very stern manner by the late commander, who asked him very abruptly,
what he had come about, and to declare his business: which he said he did in the following speech:
"Fathers, I am come to tell you your own speeches; what your own mouths have
declared. Fathers, you, in former days, set a silver basin before us, wherein there
was the leg of a beaver, and desired all the nations to come and eat of it, to eat in
peace and plenty, and not to be churlish to one another: and that if any such person
should be found to be a disturber, I here lay down by the edge of the dish a rod
which you must scourge them with; and if your father should get foolish, in my old
days, I desire you may use it upon me as well as others.

NOTES

"Now, fathers, it is you who are the disturbers in this land, by coming and building your towns; and taking it away unknown to us, and by force.
"Fathers, we kindled a fire a long time ago, at a place called Montreal, where we
desired you to stay, and not to come and intrude upon our land. I now desire you
may despatch to that place; for be it known to you, fathers, that this is our land and
not yours.
"Fathers, I desire you may hear me in civilness; if not, we must handle that rod
which was laid down for the use of the obstreperous. If you had come in a peaceable
manner, like our brothers the English, we would not have been against your trading
with us, as they do; but to come, fathers, and build houses upon our land, and to
take it by force, is what we can not submit to.
"Fathers, both you and the English are white, we live in a country between;
therefore, the land belongs to neither one nor the other. But the great Being above
allowed it to be a place of residence for us; so, fathers, I desire you to withdraw, as I
have done our brothers the English; for I will keep you at arm's length. I lay this
down as a trial for both, to see which will have the greatest regard to it, and that
side we will stand by, and make equal sharers with us. Our brothers, the English,
have heard this, and I come now to tell it to you; for I am not afraid to discharge
you off this land."
This he said was the substance of what he spoke to the general, who made this
reply.
"Now, my child, I have heard your speech; you spoke first, but it is my time to
speak now. Where is my wampum that you took away, with the marks of towns
in it? This wampum I do not know, which you have discharged me off the land
with: but you need not put yourself to the trouble of speaking, for I will not hear
you. I am not afraid of flies or mosquitoes, for Indians are such as those: I tell you
down that river I will go, and build upon it, according to my command. If the river
was blocked up, I have forces sufficient to burst it open, and tread under my feet all
that stand in opposition, together with their alliances; for my force is as the sand upon the sea shore: therefore here is your wampum; I sling it at you. Child, you talk
foolish; you say this land belongs to you, but there is not the black of my nail yours.
I saw that land sooner than you did, before the Shannoahs and you were at war;
Lead was the man who went down and took possession of that river. It is my land,
and I will have it, let who will stand up for, or say against it. I will buy and sell with
the English (mockingly.) If people will be ruled by me, they may expect kindness,
but not else."
The half king told me he had inquired of the general after two Englishmen, who
were made prisoners, and received this answer:
"Child, you think it a very great hardship that I made prisoners of those two people at Venango. Don't you concern yourself with it: we took and carried them to
Canada, to get intelligence of what the English were doing in Virginia!'
He informed me that they had built two forts, one on lake Erie, and another on
French creek, near a small lake, about fifteen miles asunder, and a large wagon road
between. They are both built after the same model, but different in size: that on the
lake the largest. He gave me a plan of them of his own drawing.
The Indians inquired very particularly after their brothers in Carolina gaol.
They also asked what sort of a boy it was who was taken from the south branch;
for they were told by some Indians, that a party of French Indians had carried a
white boy by Kuskuska town, towards the lakes.
26th. We met in council at the long house about nine o'clock, where I spoke to
them as follows:
"Brothers, I have called you together in council, by order of your brother the governor of Virginia, to acquaint you, that I am sent with all possible despatch, to visit
and deliver a letter to the French commandant, of very great importance to your
brothers the English; and I dare say to you, their friends and allies.
"I was desired, brothers, by your brother the governor to call upon you, the sachems of the nations, to inform you of it, and to ask your advice and assistance to

NOTES

proceed the nearest and best road to the French. You see, brothers, I have gotten
thus far on my journey.
"His honour likewise desired me to apply to you for some of your young men to
conduct and provide provisions for us on our way; and be a safeguard against those
French Indians who have taken up the hatchet against us. I have spoken thus particularly to you, brothers, because his honour our governor treats you as good friends
and allies, and holds you in great esteem. To confirm what I have said, I give you
this string of wampum."
After they had considered for some time on the above discourse, the half king got
up and spoke.
"Now, my brother, in regard to what my brother the governor had desired of me,
I return you this answer.
"I rely upon you as a brother ought to do, as you say we are brothers, and one
people. We shall put heart in hand and speak to our fathers, the French, concerning the speech they made to me; and you may depend that we will endeavour to be
your guard.
"Brother, as you have asked my advice, I hope you will be ruled by it, and stay
until I can provide a company to go with you. The French speech belt is not here;
I have it to go for to my hunting cabin. Likewise, the people whom I have ordered
in are not yet come, and can not until the third night from this; until which time,
brother, I must beg you to stay.
"I intend to send the guard of Mingos, Shannoahs, and Delawares, that our brothers may see the love and loyalty we bear them."
As I had orders to make all possible despatch, and waiting here was very contrary
to my inclination, I thanked him in the most suitable manner I could; and told him
that my business required the greatest expedition, and would not admit of that delay.
He was not well pleased that I should offer to go before the time he had appointed,
and told me, that he could not consent to our going without a guard, for fear some accident should befall us, and draw a reflection upon him. Besides, said he, this is a
matter of no small moment, and must not be entered into without due consideration;
for I intend to deliver up the French speech belt, and make the Shannoahs and Delawares do the same. And accordingly he gave orders to king Shingiss, who was present, to attend on Wednesday night with the wampum; and two men of their nation
to be in readiness to set out with us next morning. As I found it was impossible to
get off without affronting them in the most egregious manner, I consented to stay.
I gave them back a string of wampum which I met with at Mr. Frazier's, and
which they sent with a speech to his honour the governor, to inform him, that three
nations of French Indians, viz. Chippoways, Ottoways, and Orundaks, had taken up
the hatchet against the English; and desired them to repeat it over again. But this
they postponed doing until they met in full council with the Shannoah and Delaware
chiefs.
27th. Runners were despatched very early for the Shannoah chiefs. The half
king set out himself to fetch the French speech belt from his hunting cabin.
28th. He returned this evening, and came with Monakatoocha, and two other sachems to my tent; and begged (as they had complied with his honour the governor's
request, in providing men, &amp;c.) to know on what business we were going to the
French? This was a question I had all along expected, and had provided as satisfactory answers to as I could; which allayed their curiosity a little.
Monakatoocha informed me, that an Indian from Venango brought news, a few
days ago, that the French had called all the Mingos, Delawares, &amp;c. together at that
place; and told them that they intended to have been down the river this fall, but the
waters were growing cold, and the winter advancing, which obliged them to go into
quarters; but that they might assuredly expect them in the spring, with a far greater
number; and desired that they might be quite passive, and not intermeddle unless they
had a mind to draw all their force upon them: for that they expected to fight the English three years (as they supposed there would be some attempts made to stop them)
in which time they should conquer. But that if they should prove equally strong,
they and the English would join to cut them all off, and divide the land between

NOTES

them: that though they had lost their general, and some few of their soldiers, yet
there were men enough to reinforce them, and make them masters of the Ohio.
This speech, he said, was delivered to them by one Captain Joncaire, their interpreter in chief, living at Venango, and a man of note in the army.
29th. The half king and Monakatoocha, came very early and begged me. to stay
one day more: for notwithstanding they had used all the diligence in their power, the
Shannoah chiefs had not brought the wampum they ordered, but would certainly be
in to night; if not, they would delay me no longer, but would send it after us as soon
as they arrived. When I found them so pressing in their request, and knew that returning of wampum was the abolishing of agreements; and giving this up was shaking off all dependence upon the French, I consented to stay, as I believed an offence
offered at this crisis, might be attended with greater ill consequence, than another
day's delay. They also informed me, that Shingiss could not get in his men; and
was prevented from coming himself by his wife's sickness; (I believe, by fear of the
French) but that the wampum of that nation was lodged with Kustalogo, one of
their chiefs, at Venango.
In the evening, late, they came again, and acquainted me that the Shannoahs were
not yet arrived, but that it should not retard the prosecution of our journey. He delivered in my hearing the speech that was to be made to the French by Jeskakake, one
of their old chiefs, which was giving up the belt the late commandant had asked for
and repeating nearly the same speech he himself had done before.
He also delivered a string of wampum to this chief, which was sent by king Shingiss, to be given to Kustalogo, with orders to repair to the French, and deliver up the
wampum.
He likewise gave a very large string of black and white wampum, which was to be
sent up immediately to the Six Nations, if the French refused to quit the land at this
warning; which was the third and last time, and was the right of this Jeskakake to
deliver.
3oth.. Last night, the great men assembled at their council house, to consult further
about this journey, and who were to go: the result of which was, that only three of
their chiefs, with one of their best hunters, should be our convoy. The reason they
gave for not sending more, after what had been proposed at council the 26th, was,
that a greater number might give the French suspicions of some bad design, and cause
them to be treated rudely: but I rather think they could not get their hunters in.
We set out about nine o'clock with the half king, Jeskakake, White Thunder, and
the Hunter; and travelled on the road to Venango, where we arrived the fourth of
December, without any thing remarkable happening but a continued series of bad
weather.
This is an old Indian town, situated at the mouth of French creek, on Ohio; and
lies near north about sixty miles from the Loggstown, but more than seventy the way
we were obliged to go.
We found the French colours hoisted at a house from which they had driven Mr.
John Frazier, an English subject. I immediately repaired to it, to know where the
commander resided. There were three officers, one of whom, Captain Joncaire, informed me that he had the command of the Ohio; but that there was a general officer
at the near fort, where he advised me to apply for an answer. He invited us to sup
with them, and treated us with the greatest complaisance.
The wine, as they dosed themselves pretty plentifully with it, soon banished the restraint which at first appeared in their conversation, and gave a license to their tongues
to reveal their sentiments more freely.
They told me, that it was their absolute design to take possession of the Ohio, and
by G**d they would do it: for that, although they were sensible the English could
raise two men for their one, yet they knew their motions were too slow and dilatory
to prevent any undertaking of theirs. They pretend to have an undoubted right to
the river from a discovery made by one La Salle, sixty years ago: and the rise of this
expedition is, to prevent our settling on the river or waters of it, as they heard of
some families moving out in order thereto. From the best intelligence I could get,
there have been fifteen hundred men on this side Ontario lake. But upon the death

NOTES

of the general, all were recalled to about six or seven nundred, who were left to garrison four forts, one hundred and fifty or thereabout in each. The first of them is on
French creek, near a small lake, about sixty miles from Venango, near north northwest: the next lies on lake Erie, where the greater part of their stores are kept, about
fifteen miles from the other: from this it is one hundred and twenty miles to the carrying place, at the falls of lake Erie, where there is a small fort, at which they lodge
their goods in bringing them from Montreal, the place from whence all their stores
are brought. The next fort lies about twenty miles from this, on Ontario lake. Between his fort and Montreal, there are three others, the first of which is nearly opposite to the English fort Oswego. From the fort on lake Erie to Montreal is about six
hundred miles, which, they say, requires no more (if good weather,) than four weeks
voyage if they go in barks or large vessels, so that they may cross the lake: but if
they come in canoes, it will requires five or six weeks, for they are obliged to keep under the shore.
5th. Rained excessively all day, which prevented our travelling. Captain Joncaire
sent for the half king, as he had but just heard that he came with me. He affected
to be much concerned that I did not make free to bring them in before. I excused it
in the best manner of which I was capable, and told him, I did not think their company agreeable, as I had heard him say a good deal in dispraise of Indians in general:
but another motive prevented me from bringing them into his company: I knew that
he was an interpreter, and a person of very great influence among the Indians, and
had lately used all possible means to draw them over to his interest; therefore, I was
desirous of giving him no opportunity that could be avoided.
When they came in, there was great pleasure expressed at seeing them. He wondered how they could be so near without coming to visit him, made several trifling
presents, and applied liquor so fast, that they were soon rendered incapable of the
business they came about, notwithstanding the caution which was given.
6th. The half king came to my tent, quite sober, and insisted very much that I
should stay and hear what he had to say to the French. I fain would have prevented
him from speaking any thing until he came to the commandant, but could not prevail.
He told me, that at this place a council fire was kindled, where all their business with
these people was to be transacted, and that the management of the Indian affairs was
left solely to Monsieur Joncaire. As I was desirous of knowing the issue of this, I
agreed to stay; but sent our horses a little way up French creek, to raft over and encamp; which I knew would make it near night.
About ten o'clock, they met in council. The king spoke much the same as he had
before done to the general; and offered the French speech belt which had before been
demanded, with the marks of four towns on it, which Monsieur Joncaire refused to
receive, but desired him to carry it to the fort to the commander.
7th. Monsieur La Force, Commissary of the French stores, and three other soldiers, came over to accompany us up. We found it extremely difficult to get the Indians off to-day, as every stratagem had been used to prevent their going up with me.
I had last night left John Davidson (the Indian interpreter) whom I brought with me
from town, and strictly charged him not to be out of their company, as I could not
get them over to my tent; for they had some business with Kustologa, chiefly to
know why he did not deliver up the French speech belt which he had in keeping: but
I was obliged to send Mr. Gist over to-day to fetch them, which he did with great
persuasion.
At twelve o'clock, we set out for the fort, and were prevented from arriving there
until the eleventh by excessive rains, snows, and bad travelling through many mires
and swamps; these we were obliged to pass to avoid crossing the creek, which was
impossible, either by fording or rafting, the water was so high and rapid.
We passed over much good land since we left Venango, and through several extensive and very rich meadows, one of which, I believe, was nearly four miles in length,
and considerably wide in some places.
a th. I prepared early to wait upon the commander, and was received, and conducted to him by the second officer in command. I acquainted him with my business, and offered my commission and letter: both of which he desired me to keep

NOTES

until the arrival of Monsieur Reparti, captain at the next fort, who was sent for and
expected every hour.
This commander is a knight of the military order of St. Louis, and named Legardeur de St. Pierre. He is an elderly gentleman, and has much the air of a soldier.
He was sent over to take the command, immediately upon the death of the late general, and arrived here about seven days before me.
At two o'clock, the gentleman who was sent for arrived, when I offered the letter,
&amp;c. again, which they received, and adjourned into a private apartment for the captain
to translate, who understood a little English. After he had done it, the commander
desired I would walk in and bring my interpreter to peruse and correct it: which I did.
13th. The chief officers retired to hold a council of war, which gave me an opportunity of taking the dimensions of the fort, and making what observations I could.
It is situated on the south, or west fork of French creek, near the water; and is
almost surrounded by the creek, and a small branch of it which forms a kind of island.
Four houses compose the sides. The bastions are made of piles driven into the
ground, standing more than twelve feet above it, and sharp at top; with port holes
cut for cannon, and loop holes for the small arms to fire through. There are eight
six pound pieces mounted in each bastion, and one piece of four pound before the gate.
In the bastions are a guard house, chapel, doctor's lodging, and the commander's private store: round which are laid platforms for the cannon and men to stand on. There
are several barracks without the fort, for the soldiers' dwelling, covered, some with
bark, and some with boards, made chiefly of logs. There are also several other houses,
such as stables, smith's shop, &amp;c.
I could get no certain account of the number of men here; but according to the
best judgment I could form, there are an hundred, exclusive of officers, of which there
are many. I also gave orders to the people who were with me, to take an exact account of the canoes which were hauled up to convey their forces down in the spring.
This they did, and told fifty of birch bark, and an hundred and seventy of pine; besides many others which were blocked out, in readiness for being made.
s4th. As the snow increased very fast, and our horses daily became weaker, I sent
them off unloaded, under the care of Barnaby Currin and two others, to make all
convenient despatch to Venango, and there to wait our arrival, if there was a prospect
of the river's freezing: if not, then to continue down to Shanapin's town, at the forks
of Ohio, and there to wait until we came to cross the Alleghany; intending myself to
go down by water, as I had the offer of a canoe or two.
As I found many plots concerted to retard the Indians' business, and prevent their
returning with me, I endeavoured all that lay in my power to frustrate their schemes,
and hurried them on to execute their intended design. They accordingly pressed for
admittance this evening, which at length was granted them, privately, to the commander and one or two other officers. The half king told me that he offered the
wampum to the commander, who evaded taking it, and made many fair promises of
love and friendship; said he wanted to live in peace and trade amicably with them, as
a proof of which, he would send some goods immediately down to the Loggstown for
them. But I rather think the design of that is to bring away all our straggling traders they meet with, as I privately understood they intended to carry an officer, &amp;c.
with them. And what rather confirms this opinion, I was inquiring of the commander
by what authority he had made prisoners of several of our English subjects. He told
me that the country belonged to them; that no Englishman had a right to trade upon
those waters; and that he had orders to make every person prisoner who attempted it
on the Ohio, or the waters of it.
I inquired of Captain Reparti about the boy that was carried by this place, as it
was done while the command devolved on him, between the death of the late general,
and the arrival of the present. He acknowledged that a boy had been carried past: and
that the Indians had two or three white men's scalps, (I was told by some of the Indians at Venango, eight) but pretended to have forgotten the name of the place where
the boy came from, and all the particular facts, though he had questioned him foi
some hours, as they were carrying past. I likewise inquired what they had done with
John Trotter and James M'Clocklan, two Pennsylvania traders, whom they had taken

8 NOTES
with all their goods. They tole me that they had been sent to Canada, but were now
returned home.
This evening, I received an answer to his honour the governor's letter, from the
commandant.
a5th. The commandant ordered a plentiful store of liquor, provision, &amp;c. to be put
on board our canoes, and appeared to be extremely complaisant, though he was exerting every artifice which he could invent to set our Indians at variance with us, to prevent their going until after our departure: presents, rewards, and every thing which
could be suggested by him or his officers. I can not say that ever in my life I suffered
so much anxiety as I did in this affair. I saw that every stratagem, which the most
fruitful brain could invent, was practised to win the half king to their interest; and
that leaving him there was giving them the opportunity they aimed at. I went to the
half king and pressed him in the strongest terms to go; he told me that the commandant would not discharge him until the morning. I then went to the commandant, and
desired him to do their business, and complained of ill treatment; for keeping them,
as they were part of my company, was detaining me. This he promised not to do,
but to forward my journey as much as he could. He protested he did not keep them,
but was ignorant of the cause of their stay; though I soon found it out. He had
promised them a present of guns, &amp;c. if they would wait until the morning. As I
was very much pressed by the Indians to wait this day for them, I consented, on a
promise that nothing should hinder them in the morning.
i6th. The French were not slack in their inventions to keep the Indians this day
also. But as they were obliged, according to promise, to give the present, they then
endeavoured to try the power of liquor, which I doubt not would have prevailed at
any other time than this: but I urged and insisted with the king so closely upon his
word, that he refrained, and set off with us as he had engaged.
We had a tedious and very fatiguing passage down the creek. Several times we
had like to have been staved against rocks; and many times were obliged all hands to
get out and remain in the water half an hour or more, getting over the shoals. At
one place, the ice had lodged, and made it impassable by water; we were, therefore,
obliged to carry our canoe across the neck of land, a quarter of a mile over. We did
not reach Venango until the azd, where we met with our horses.
This creek is extremely crooked. I dare say the distance between the fort and Venango, can not be less than one hundred and thirty miles if it is measured to follow
the meanders.
23d. When I got things ready to set off, I sent for the half king, to know whether
he intended to go with us, or by water. He told me that White Thunder had hurt
himself much, and was sick, and unable to walk; therefore he was obliged to carry
him down in a canoe. As I found he intended to stay here a day or two, and knew
that Monsieur Joncaire would employ every scheme to set him against the English, as
he had before done, I told him, I hoped he would guard against his flattery, and let
no fine speeches influence him in their favour. He desired I might not be concerned,
for he knew the French too well, for any thing to engage him in their favour; and
that though he could not go down with us, he yet would endeavour to meet at the
forks with Joseph Campbell, to deliver a speech for me to carry to his honour the
governor. He told me he would order the Young Hunter to attend us, and get provisions, &amp;c. if wanted.
Our horses were now so weak and feeble, and the baggage so heavy, (as we were
)bliged to provide all the necessaries which the journey would require) that we doubted
much their performing it. Therefore, myself and others, except the drivers, who
were obliged to ride, gave up our horses for packs, to assist along with the baggage. I
put myself in an Indian walking dress, and continued with them three days, until I
found there was no probability of their getting home in any reasonable time. The
horses became less able to travel every day; the cold increased very fast; and the
roads were becoming much worse by a deep snow, continually freezing; therefore, as
I was uneasy to get back, to make report of my proceedings to his honour the governor, I determined to prosecute my journey, the nearest way through the woods, on foot.
Accordingly, I left Mr. Vanbraam in charge of our baggage, with money and di

NOTES

rections to provide necessaries from place to place for themselves and horses, and to
make the most convenient despatch in travelling.
I took my necessary papers, pulled off my clothes, and tied myself up in a watch
coat. Then, with gun in hand, and pack on my back, in which were my papers and
provisions, I set out with Mr. Gist, fitted in the same manner, on Wednesday the
26th. The day following, just after we had passed a place called Murdering town,
(where we intended to quit the path and steer across the country for Shanapin's town)
we fell in with a party of French Indians, who had laid in wait for us. One of them
fired at Mr. Gist or me, not fifteen steps off, but fortunately missed. We took this
fellow into custody, and kept him until about nine o'clock at night, then let him go,
and walked all the remaining part of the night without making any stop, that we
might get the start, so far, as to be out of the reach of their pursuit the next day,
since we were well assured they would follow our track as soon as it was light. The
next day we continued travelling until quite dark, and got to the river about two
miles above Shanapins. We expected to have found the river frozen, but it was not,
only about fifty yards from each shore. The ice, I suppose, had broken up above, for
it was driving in vast quantities.
There was no way for getting over but on a raft, which we set about, with but one
poor hatchet, and finished just after sun setting. This was a whole day's work: we
next got it launched, then went on board of it, and set off; but before we were half
way over, we were jammed in the ice, in such a manner, that we expected every moment our raft to sink, and ourselves to perish. I put out my setting pole to try to stop
the raft, that the ice might pass by, when the rapidity of the stream threw it with
so much violence against the pole, that it jerked me out into ten feet water; but I
fortunately saved myself by catching hold of one of the raft logs. Notwithstanding
all our efforts, we could not get to either shore, but were obliged, as we were near an
island, to quit our raft and make to it.
The cold was so extremely severe, that Mr. Gist had all his fingers, and some of his
toes frozen, and the water was shut up so hard, that we found no difficulty in getting
off the island on the ice in the morning, and went to Mr. Frazier's. We met here
with twenty warriors, who were going to the southward to war; but coming to a
place on the head of the great Kanawa, where they found seven people killed and
scalped, (all but one woman with very light hair) they turned about and ran back,
for fear the inhabitants should rise and take them as the authors of the murder.
They report that the bodies were lying about the house, and some of them much
torn and eaten by the hogs. By the marks which were left, they say they were
French Indians of the Ottoway nation, &amp;c. who did it.
As we intended to take horses here, and it required some time to find them, I went
up about three miles to the mouth of Yohogany, to visit queen Alliquippa, who had
expressed great concern that we passed her in going to the fort. I made her a present
of a watch coat and a bottle of rum, which latter was thought much the best present
of the two.
Tuesday, the first of January, we left Mr. Frazier's house, and arrived at Mr.
Gist's, at Monongahela, the second, where I bought a horse, saddle, &amp;c. The sixth,
we met seventeen horses loaded with materials and stores for a fort at the forks of
Ohio, and the day after, some families going out to settle. This day, we arrived at
Wills' creek, after as fatiguing a journey as it is possible to conceive, rendered so by
excessive bad weather. From the first day of December to the fifteenth, there was
but one day on which it did not rain or snow incessantly; and throughout the whole
journey, we met with nothing but one continued series of cold, wet weather, which
occasioned very uncomfortable lodgings, especially after we had quitted our tent, which
was some screen from the inclemency o'f it.
On the i th, I got to Belvoir, where I stopped one day to take necessary rest; and
then set out and arrived in Williamsburg the x6th, when I waited upon his honour the
governor, with the letter I had brought from the French commandant, and to give an
account of the success of my proceedings. This I beg leave to do by offering the
foregoing narrative, as it contains the most remarkable occurrences which happened
in my journey.

NOTES

I hope what has been said will be sufficient to make your honour satisfied with my
conduct; for that was my aim in undertaking the journey, and chief study throughout the prosecution of it.
NOTE-No. II
The author is indebted, for the letter alluded to, to the Editor of the Lancaster
Journal.
SIR,-I am really sorry that I have it not in my power to answer your request, in
a more satisfactory manner. If you had favoured me with the journal a few days
sooner, I would have examined it carefully, and endeavoured to point out such errors
as might conduce to your use, my advantage, and the public satisfaction; but now it
is out of my power.
I had no time to make any remarks upon that piece which is called my journal.
The enclosed are observations on the French notes. They are of no use to me separated, nor will they, I believe, be of any to you; yet I send them unconnected and incoherent as they were taken, for I have no opportunity to correct them.
In regard to the journal, I can only observe in general, that I kept no regular one
during that expedition: rough minutes of occurrences I certainly took, and find them
as certainly and strangely metamorphosed-some parts left out which I remember
were entered, and many things added that never were thought of; the names of men
and things egregiously miscalled; and the whole of what I saw Englished, is very incorrect and nonsensical:-yet, I will not pretend to say that the little body who
brought it to me, has not made a literal translation, and a good one.
Short as my time is, I can not help remarking on Villiers' account of the battle of,
and transactions at the Meadows, as it is very extraordinary, and not less erroneous
than inconsistent. He says the French received the first fire. It is well known that
we received it at six hundred paces distance. He also says, our fears obliged us to retreat in the most disorderly manner after the capitulation. How is this consistent with
his other account? He acknowledges that we sustained the attack, warmly, from ten
in the morning until dark, and that he called,first to parley, which strongly indicates
that we were not totally absorbed in fear. If the gentleman in his account had adhered to the truth, he must have confessed, that we looked upon his offer to parley as
an artifice to get into and examine our trenches, and refused on this account, until
they desired an officer might be sent to them, and gave their parole for his safe return. He might also, if he had been as great a lover of the truth as he was of vain
glory, have said, that we absolutely refused their first and second proposals, and would
consent to capitulate on no other terms than such as we obtained. That we were
wilfully, or ignorantly deceived by our interpreter in regard to the word assassination,
I do aver, and will to my dying moment; so will every officer that was present. The
interpreter was a Dutchman, little acquainted with the English tongue, therefore
might not advert to the tone and meaning of the word in English; but, whatever his
motives were for so doing, certain it is, he called it the death, or the loss of the Sieur
Jumonville. So we received and so we understood it, until to our great surprise and
mortification, we found it otherwise in a literal translation. That we left our baggage
and horses at the Meadows is certain; that there was not even a possibility to bring
them away is equally certain, as we had every horse belonging to the camp killed or
taken away during the action; so that it was impracticable to bring any thing off that
our shoulders were not able to bear, and to wait there was impossible, for we had
scarce three days provisions, and were seventy miles from a supply; yet, to say we
came off precipitately is absolutely false; notwithstanding they did, contrary to
articles, suffer their Indians to pillage our baggage, and commit all kinds of irregularity, we were with them until ten o'clock the next day; we destroyed our powder and
other stores, nay, even our private baggage, to prevent its falling into their hands, as
we could not bring it off. When we had got about a mile from the place of action,
we missed two or three of the wounded, and sent a party back to bring them up

NOTES

I I

this is the party he speaks of. We brought them all safe off, and encamped within
three miles of the Meadows. These are circumstances, I think, that make it evidently
clear, that we were not very apprehensive of danger. The colours he speaks of to be
left, was a large flag of immense size and weight; our regimental colours were brought
off and are now in my possession. Their gasconades, and boasted clemency, must appear
in the most ludicrous light to every considerate person who reads Villiers' journal;such preparations for an attack, such vigour and intrepidity as he pretends to have
conducted his march with, such revenge, as by his own account, appeared in his attack, considered, it will hardly be thought that compassion was his motive for calling
a parley. But to sum up the whole, Mr. Villiers pays himself no great compliment,
in saying, we were struck with a panic when matters were adjusted. We surely
could not be afraid without cause, and if we had cause after capitulation, it was a reflection upon himself.
I do not doubt, but your good nature will excuse the badness of my paper, and the
incoherence of my writing-think you see me in a public house in a crowd, surrounded with noise, and you hit my case. You do me particular honour in offering
your friendship: I wish I may be so happy as always to merit it, and deserve your
correspondence, which I should be glad to cultivate.
NOTE-No. III
SIR,-We your most obedient and affectionate officers, beg leave to express our
great concern, at the disagreeable news we have received of your determination to
resign the command of that corps, in which we have under you long served.
The happiness we have enjoyed, and the honour we have acquired together, with
the mutual regard that has always subsisted between you and your officers, have implanted so sensible an affection in the minds of us all, that we can not be silent on this
critical occasion.
In our earliest infancy you took us under your tuition, trained us up in the practice of that discipline, which alone can constitute good troops, from the punctual
observance of which you never suffered the least deviation.
Your steady adherence to impartial justice, your quick discernment, and invariable
regard to merit, wisely intended to inculcate those genuine sentiments of true honour
and passion for glory, from which the greatest military achievements have been derived, first heightened our natural emulation and our desire to excel. How much we
improved by those regulations and your own example, with what alacrity we have
hitherto discharged our duty, with what cheerfulness we have encountered the severest toils, especially while under your particular directions, we submit to yourself, and
flatter ourselves that we have in a great measure answered your expectations.
Judge, then, how sensibly we must be affected with the loss of such an excellent
commander, such a sincere friend, and so affable a companion. How rare is it to find
those amiable qualifications blended together in one man! How great the loss of such
a man! Adieu to that superiority, which the enemy have granted us over other
troops, and which even the regulars and provincials have done us the honour publicly
to acknowledge! Adieu to that strict discipline and order, which you have always
maintained! Adieu to that happy union and harmony, which have been our principal
cement!
It gives us additional sorrow, when we reflect, to find our unhappy country will receive a loss no less irreparable than our own. Where will it meet a man so experienced in military affairs-one so renowned for patriotism, conduct, and courage?
Who has so great a knowledge of the enemy we have to deal with?-who so well
acquainted with their situation and strength?-who so much respected by the soldiery?-who, in short, so able to support the military character of Virginia?
Your approved love to your king and country, and your uncommon perseverance
in promoting the honour and true interest of the service,, convince us that the most
cogent reasons only could induce you to quit it; yet we, with the greatest deference

NOTES

presume to intreat you to suspend those thoughts for another year, and to lead us on
to assist in the glorious work of extirpating our enemies, towards which, so considerable advances have been already made. In you, we place the most implicit confidence.
Your presence only will cause a steady firmness and vigour to actuate in every breast
despising the greatest dangers, and thinking light of toils and hardships, while led on
by the man we know and love.
But if we must be so unhappy as to part, if the exigencies of your affairs force you
to abandon us, we beg it as our last request, that you will recommend some person
most capable to command, whose military knowledge, whose honour, whose conduct,
and whose disinterested principles, we may depend on.
Frankness, sincerity, and a certain openness of soul, are the true characteristics of
an officer, and we flatter ourselves that you do not think us capable of saying any
thing contrary to the purest dictates of our minds. Fully persuaded of this, we beg
leave to assure you, that, as you have hitherto been the actuating soul of our whole
corps, we shall at all times pay the most invariable regard to your will and pleasure,
and will always be happy to demonstrate by our actions with how much respect and
esteem we are, &amp;c.
NOTE-No. IV
The delegates of the United Colonies of New Hampshire, Massachusetts Bay,
Rhode Island, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, the counties of
Newcastle, Kent and Sussex on Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina and
South Carolina:
To George Washington, esquire.
We, reposing special trust and confidence in your patriotism, valour, conduct, and
fidelity, do, by these presents constitute and appoint you to be general and commander-in-chief of the army of the United Colonies, and of all the forces now raised, or to
be raised by them, and of all others who shall voluntarily offer their service, and join
the said army for the defence of American liberty, and for repelling every hostile invasion thereof: and you are hereby invested with full power and authority to act as
you shall think for the good and welfare of the service.
And we do hereby strictly charge and require all officers and soldiers under your
command, to be obedient to your orders, and diligent in the exercise of their several
duties.
And we also enjoin and require you to be careful in executing the great trust reposed in you, by causing strict discipline and order to be observed in the army, and
that the soldiers be duly exercised and provided with all convenient necessaries.
And you are to regulate your conduct in every respect by the rules and discipline
of war, (as herewith given you) and punctually to observe and follow such orders and
directions from time to time as you shall receive from this or a future congress of
these United Colonies, or committee of congress.
This commission to continue in force, until revoked by us, or a future congress.
NOTE-No. V
This letter is so truly characteristic of the writer, and treats in a manner so peculiar to himself, the measures of congress on this subject, that, although it may not
be immediately connected with the Life of General Washington, the reader will
not be displeased with its insertion.
Stamford, January 22, s779.
SIR,-As General Washington has informed the congress of his motives for detaching me, it is needless to trouble you upon the subject. I am therefore only to inform
you that I have collected a body of about twelve hundred men from the colony of

NOTES

Connecticut, whose zeal and ardour demonstrated on this occasion can not be sufficiently praised. With this body I am marching directly to New York to execute the
different purposes for which I am detached. I am sensible, sir, that nothing can
carry the air of greater presumption than a servant intruding his opinion unasked
upon his master, but at the same time there are certain seasons when the real danger
of the master may not only excuse, but render laudable, the servant's officiousness.
I therefore flatter myself that the conglss will receive with indulgence and lenity the
opinion I shall offer. The scheme of simply disarming the tories seems to me totally
ineffectual; it will only embitter their minds and add virus to their venom. They
can, and will, always be supplied with fresh arms by the enemy. That of seizing the
most dangerous will, I apprehend, from the vagueness of the instruction, be attended
with some bad consequences, and can answer no good one. It opens so wide a door
for partiality and prejudice to the different congresses and committees on the continent, that much discord and animosity will probably ensue; it being next to impossible to distinguish who are, and who are not the most dangerous. The plan of
explaining to these deluded people the justice and merits of the American cause is
certainly generous and humane, but I am afraid, will be fruitless. They are so rivited in their opinions, that I am persuaded should an angel descend from heaven with
his golden trumpet, and ring in their ears that their conduct was criminal, he would
be disregarded. I had lately myself an instance of their infatuation which, if it is
not impertinent, I will relate. At Newport I took the liberty, without any authority
but the conviction of necessity, to administer a very strong oath to some of the leading tories, for which liberty I humbly ask pardon of the congress. One article of this
oath was to take arms in defence of their country, if called upon by the voice of the
congress. To this Colonel Wanton and others flatly refused their assent; to take arms
against their sovereign, they said, was too monstrous an impiety. I asked them if
they had lived at the time of the revolution whether they would have been revolutionists-their answers were at first evasive, circuitous, and unintelligible, but, by fixing them down precisely to the question, I at length drew from them a positive confession that no violence, no provocation on the part of the court, could prevail upon
them to act with the continent. Such, I am afraid, is the creed and principles of the
whole party great and small.-Sense, reason, argument, and eloquence, have been expended in vain; and in vain you may still argue and reason to the end of time. Even
the common feelings and resentments of humanity have not aroused them, but rather
with a malignant pleasure they have beheld the destruction of their fellow-citizens
and relations. But I am running into declamation, perhaps impertinent and presuming, when I ought'to confine myself to the scheme I submit to your consideration.
It is, sir, in the first place, to disarm all the manifestly disaffected, as well of the
lower as the higher class, not on the principle of putting them in a state of impotence
(for this I observed before will not be the case) but to supply our troops with arms
of which they stand in too great need. Secondly, to appraise their estates and oblige
them to deposite at least the value of one half of their respective property in the
hands of the continental congress as a security for their good behaviour. And lastly,
to administer the strongest oath that can be devised to act offensively and defensively
in support of the common rights. I confess that men so eaten up with bigotry, as
the bulk of them appear to be, will not consider themselves as bound by this oath;
particularly as it is in some measure forced, they will argue that it is by no means
obligatory; but if I mistake not, it will be a sort of criterion by which you will be
able to distinguish the desperate fanatics from those who are reclaimable. The former must of course be secured and carried to some interior parts of the continent where
they can not be dangerous. This mode of proceeding I conceive (if any can) will
be effectual-but whether it meets with the approbation or disapprobation of the
congress, I most humbly conjure them not to attribute the proposal to arrogance, or
self-conceit, or pragmatical officiousness, but, at worst, to an intemperate zeal for
the public service.
Notwithstanding the apparent slimness of the authority, as I am myself convinced
that it is substantial, I think it my duty to communicate a circumstance to congress.
I have with me here, sir, a deserter from Captain Wallace's ship before Newport. It

NOTES

is necessary to inform you that this Captain Wallace has the reputation of being the
most imprudent and rash of all mortals-particularly when he is heated with wine,
which, as reported, is a daily incident: that in these moments he blabs his most secret
instructions even to the common men. This deserter, then, informs us that the captain a few days ago assembled the sailors and marines on the quarter-deck, and assured
them, by way of encouragement, that they were to proceed very soon to New York
where they were to be joined by his majesty's most loyal subjects of White Plains,
Poughkeepsie, and Long Island, and at the same time bestowed abundantly his curses
on the admiral and general for their dilatoriness and scandalous conduct in not availing themselves sooner of the invitation they had received from the worthy gentlemen.
The congress will make what comments they please on this information, which I must
repeat I thought it my duty to communicate. Upon the whole, sir, you may be assured that it is the intention of the ministerialists to take possession, and immediately,
of New York. The intercepted letters, the unguarded expressions of their officers, in
their interviews with ours on the lines, but above all the manifest advantages resulting
to their cause from this measure, put their intention beyond dispute. With submission
therefore to the wisdom of the congress, it behooves them, I should think, not to lose a
moment in securing this important post, which, if in the hands of the enemy, must
cut the continent in twain, and render it almost impossible for the northern and
southern colonies to support each.other. This crisis, when every thing is at stake, is
not a time to be over complacent to the timidity of the inhabitants of any particular
spot. I have now under my command a respectable force adequate to the. purpose of
securing the place, and purging all its environs of traitors, on which subject I shall
expect with impatience the determination of the congress. Their orders I hope to
receive before or immediately on' my arrival.
This instant, the enclosed, express from the provincial congress of New York, was
delivered into my hands, but as these gentlemen probably are not fully apprised of the
danger hanging over their heads, as I have received intelligence from the camp that
the fleet is sailed, and that it is necessary to urge my march, I shall proceed with one
division of the forces under my command to that city. A moment's delay may be fatal. The force I shall carry with me is not strong enough to act offensively, but just
sufficient to secure the city against any immediate designs of the enemy. If this is to
give umbrage, if the governor and captain of the man of war are pleased to construe
this step as an act of positive hostility, if they are to prescribe what number of your
troops are and what number are not to enter the city, all I can say is that New York
must be considered as the minister's place, and not the continent. I must now, sir, beg
pardon for the length of this letter, and more so, for the presumption in offering so
freely my thoughts to the congress, from whom it is my duty simply to receive my
orders, and as a servant and soldier strictly to obey; which none can do with greater
ardour and affection than,
Sir,
Your most obedient humble servant,
CHARLES LEE.
To the honourable John Hancock, esquire, president of the continental congress.
NOTE-No. VI
THE NAMES OF THE MEMBERS WHO SUBSCRIBED THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE
WERE AS FOLLOWS, VIZ:
New Hampshire.
Josiah Bartlett, Matthew Thornton,
William Whipple,
Massachusetts Bay.
Samuel Adams, Robert Treat Paine,
John Adams, Elbridge Gerry,

NOTES

Stephen Hopkins,
Roger Sherman,
Samuel Huntington,
William Floyd,
Philip Livingston,
Richard Stockton,
John Witherspoon,
Francis Hopkinson,
Robert Morris,
Benjamin Rush,
Benjamin Franklin,
John Morton,
George Clymer,
Cesar Rodney,
Thomas M'Kean,
Samuel Chase,
William Paca,
George Wythe,
Richard Henry Lee,
Thomas Jefferson
Benjamin Harrison,
William Hooper,
Joseph Hughes,
Edward Rutledge,
Thomas Heyward, jun.
Button Gwinnett,
George Walton,

Rhode Island, ec.
William Ellery.
Connecticut.
William Williams,
Oliver Wolcott.
New York.
Francis Lewis,
Lewis Morris.
New Jersey.
John Hart,
Abram Clark.
Pennsylvania.
James Smith,
George Taylor,
James Wilson,
George Ross.
Delaware.
George Reed.
Maryland.
Thomas Stone,
Charles Carroll, of Carrollton.
Virginia.
Thomas Nelson, jun.
Francis Lightfoot Lee,
Carter Braxton.
North Carolina.
John Penn.
South Carolina.
Thomas Lynch, jun.
Arthur Middleton.
Georgia.
Lyman Hall.

The people of the United States have taken such universal interest in the composition of this celebrated instrument as to excuse a more minute attention to it than has
been bestowed on the other contemporaneous state papers.
Mr. Jefferson has preserved a copy of the original draft as reported by the committee, with the amendments made to it in congress, which has been published in his
correspondence. The following is extracted from that work.

Mr. Jefferson's draft as reported by the
committee
A declaration by the representatives of
the United States of America in general
congress assembled.
When in the course of human events
it becomes necessary for one people to dissolve the political bonds which have connected them with another, and to assume among the powers of the earth the
separate and equal station to which the

As amended by congress
A declaration by the representatives of
the United States of America in congress
assembled.
Not altered.

NOTES

laws of nature and of nature's God entitle them, a decent respect for the
opinions of mankind requires that they
should declare the causes which impel
them to the separation.
We hold these truths to be self-evident,
that all men are created equal; that
they are endowed by their creator with
inherent and inalienable rights; that
among these are life, liberty, and the
pursuit of happiness; that to secure these
rights, governments are instituted among
men, deriving their just powers from the
consent of the governed; that whenever
any form of government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the right of the
people to alter or to abolish it, and to
institute new government, laying its
foundation on such principles, and organising its powers in such form, as to
them shall seem most likely to effect
their safety and happiness. Prudence indeed will dictate that governments long
established should not be changed for
light and transient causes; and accordingly all experience hath shown that
mankind are more disposed to suffer
while evils are sufferable, than to. right
themselves by abolishing the forms to
which they are accustomed. But when a
long train of abuses and usurpations begun at a distinguished period and pursuing invariably the same object, evinces
a design to reduce them under absolute
despotism, it is their right, it is their
duty to throw off such government, and
to provide new guards for their future
security. Such has been the patient sufferings of these colonies; and such is
now the necessity which constrains them
to expunge their former system of government. The history of the present king
of Great Britain is a history of unremitting injuries and usurpations among
which appears no solitary fact to contradict the uniform tenor of the rest, but
all have in direct object the establishment
of an absolute tyranny over these states.
To prove this let facts be submitted to
a candid world, for the truth of which
we pledge a faith yet unsullied by falsehood.
He has refused his assent to laws the
most wholesome and necessary for the
public good.
He has forbidden his governors to pass
laws of immediate and pressing importance, unless suspended in their operation

We hold these truths to be self-evident,
that all men are created equal; that they
are endowed by their creator with certain
inalienable rights; that among these are
life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness;
that to secure these rights, governments
are instituted among men, deriving their
just powers from the consent of the governed; that whenever any form of government becomes destructive of these
ends, it is the right of the people to alter
or to abolish it, and to institute new government, laying its foundation on such
principles, and organising its powers in
such form, as to them shall seem most
likely to effect their safety and happiness. Prudence indeed will dictate that
governments long established should not
be changed for light and transient causes;
and accordingly all experience hath
shown that mankind are more disposed
to suffer while evils are sufferable, than
to right themselves by abolishing the
forms to which they are accustomed.
But when a long train of abuses and
usurpations pursuing invariably the same
object, evinces a design to reduce them
under absolute despotism, it is their right,
it is their duty to throw off such government, and to provide new guards for
their future security. Such has been the
patient sufferance of these colonies, and
such is now the necessity which constrains them to alter their former systems of government. The history of the
present king of Great Britain is a history
of repeated injuries and usurpations, all
having in direct object the establishment
of an absolute tyranny over these states.
To prove this let facts be submitted to
a candid world.
Not altered.

Not altered.

NOTES

till his assent should be obtained; and
when so suspended he has utterly neglected to attend to them.
He has refused to pass other laws for
the accommodation of large districts of
people, unless those people would relinquish the right of representation in the
legislature, a right inestimable to them,
and formidable to tyrants only.
He has called together legislative bodies at places unusual, uncomfortable, and
distant from the depositary of their public records, for the sole purpose of fatiguing them into compliance with his
measures.
He has dissolved representative houses
repeatedly and continually, for opposing
with manly firmness his invasions on the
rights of the people.
He has refused for a long time after
such dissolutions to cause others to be
elected, whereby the legislative powers,
incapable of annihilation, have returned
to the people at large for their exercise,
the state remaining, in the mean time, exposed to the dangers of invasion from
without and convulsions within.
He has endeavoured to prevent the
population of these states; for that purpose obstructing the laws for the naturalization of foreigners, refusing to pass
others to encourage their migrations hither, and raising the conditions of new appropriations of lands.
He has suffered the administration of
justice totally to cease in some of these
states, refusing his assent to laws for
establishing judiciary powers.
He has made our judges dependent on
his will alone for the tenure of their offices, and the amount and payment of
their salaries.
He has erected a multitude of new offices, by a self-assumed power, and sent
hither swarms of new officers to harass
our people and eat out their substance.
He has kept among us in times of
peace standing armies and ships of war
without the consent of our legislatures.
He has affected to render the military
independent of and superior to the civil
power.
He has combined with others to subject
us to a jurisdiction foreign to our constitutions and unacknowledged by our laws,
giving his assent to their acts of pretended
legislation for quartering large bodies of
armed troops among us; for protecting by

Not altered.
Not altered.
He has dissolved representative houses
repeatedly for opposing with manly firmness his invasions on the rights of the
people.
Not altered.
Not altered.
He has obstructed the administration
of justice by refusing his assent to laws
for establishing judiciary powers.
He has made judges dependent on his
will alone for the tenure of their offices,
and the amount and payment of their salaries.
He has erected a multitude of new offices, and sent hither swarms of new officers to harass our people and eat out their
substance.
He has kept among us in times of peace
standing armies without the consent of
our legislatures.
Not altered.
He has combined with others to subject
us to a jurisdiction foreign to our constitutions and unacknowledged by our laws,
giving his assent to their acts of pretended legislation for quartering large
bodies of armed troops among us; for

NOTES

a mock trial from punishment for any
murders which they should commit on
the inhabitants of these states; for cutting off our trade with all parts of the
world; for imposing taxes on us without
our consent; for depriving us of the benefits of trial by jury; for transporting us
beyond seas to be tried for pretended offences; for abolishing the free system of
English laws in a neighbouring province,
establishing therein an arbitrary government, and enlarging its boundaries, so as
to render it at once an example and fit
instrument for introducing the same absolute rule into these states; for taking
away our charters, abolishing our most
valuable laws, and altering fundamentally the forms of our governments; for
suspending our own legislatures, and declaring themselves invested with power
to legislate for us in all cases whatsoever.
He has abdicated government here,
withdrawing his governors and declaring
us out of his allegiance and protection.
He has plundered our seas, ravaged our
coasts, burnt our towns and destroyed
the lives of our people.
He is at this time transporting large
armies of foreign mercenaries to complete
the works of death, desolation and tyranny already begun with circumstances of
cruelty and perfidy unworthy the head
of a civilized nation.
He has constrained our fellow-citizens
taken captive on the high seas to bear
arms against their country, to become the
executioners of their friends and brethren, or to fall themselves by their hands.
He has endeavoured to bring on the inhabitants of the frontiers the merciless
Indian savages whose known rule of warfare is an undistinguished destruction of
all ages, sexes and conditions of existence.
He has excited treasonable insurrections of our fellow-citizens, with the allurements of forfeiture and confiscation
of our property.
He has waged cruel war against human nature itself, violating its most sacred rights of life and liberty in the persons of a distant people who never offended him, captivating and carrying
them into slavery in another hemisphere,
or to incur miserable death in their

protecting by a mock trial from punishment for any murders which they should
commit on the inhabitants of these states;
for cutting off our trade with all parts
of the world; for imposing taxes on us
without our consent; for depriving us
in many cases of the benefits of trial by
jury; for transporting us beyond seas to
be tried for pretended offences; for
abolishing the free system of English
laws in a neighbouring province, establishing therein an arbitrary government,
and enlarging its boundaries, so as to
render it at once an example and fit instrument for introducing the same absolute rule into these colonies; for taking
away our charters, abolishing our most
valuable laws, and altering fundamentally
the forms of our governments; for suspending our own legislatures, and declaring themselves invested with power to
legislate for us in all cases whatsoever.
He has abdicated government here by
declaring us out of his protection and
waging war against us.
Not altered.
He is at this time transporting large
armies of foreign mercenaries to complete
the works of death, destruction and tyranny already begun with circumstances
of cruelty and perfidy scarcely paralleled
in the most barbarous ages and totally
unworthy the head of a civilized nation.
Not altered.
He has excited domestic insurrections
among us and has endeavoured to bring
on the inhabitants of the frontiers the
merciless Indian savages whose known
rule of warfare is an undistinguished destruction of all ages, sexes, and conditions.
Struck out.

NOTES

transportation thither. This piratical warfare, the opprobrium of INFIDEL powers, is the warfare of the CHRISTIAN
king of Great Britain. Determined to
keep open a market where MEN should
be bought and sold, he has prostituted
his negative for suppressing every legislative attempt to prohibit or to restrain
this execrable commerce. And that this
assemblage of horrors might want no fact
of distinguished die, he is now exciting
those very people to rise in arms among
us, and to purchase that liberty of which
he has deprived them, by murdering the
people on whom he also obtruded them;
thus paying off former crimes committed
against the LIBERTIES of one people
with crimes which he urges them to
commit against the LIVES of another.
In every stage of these oppressions we
have petitioned for redress in the most
humble terms; our repeated petitions
have been answered only by repeated
injuries.
A prince whose character is thus
marked by every act which may define
a tyrant is unfit to be the ruler of a
people who mean to be free. Future ages
will scarcely believe that the hardiness of
one man adventured, within the short
compass of twelve years only, to lay a
foundation so broad and so undisguised
for tyranny over a people fostered and
fixed in principles of freedom.
Nor have we been wanting in attention
to our British brethren. We have warned
them from time to time of attempts by
their legislature to extend a jurisdiction
over these our states. We have reminded
them of the circumstances of our emigration and settlement here; no one of which
could warrant so strange a pretension;
these were effected at the expense of our
own blood and treasure, unassisted by the
wealth or the strength of Great Britain;
that in constituting indeed our several
forms of government, we had adopted
one common king; thereby laying a
foundation for perpetual league and
amity with them; but that submission to
their parliament was no part of our constitution, nor ever in idea if history may
be credited; and we appealed to their
native justice and magnanimity, as well
as to the ties of our common kindred, to
disavow these usurpations which were
likely to interrupt our connexion and correspondence. They too have been deaf

Struck out.
Not altered.
A prince whose character is thus
marked by every act which may define a
tyrant is unfit to be the ruler of a free
people.
Nor have we been wanting in attention, to our British brethren. We have
warned them from time to time of attempts by their legislature to extend an
unwarrantable jurisdiction over us. We
have reminded them of the circumstances
of our emigration and settlement here;
we have appealed to their native justice
and magnanimity, and we have conjured
them by the ties of our common kindred
to disavow these usurpations which would
inevitably interrupt our connexion and
correspondence. They too have been deaf
to the voice of justice and of consanguinity. We must therefore acquiesce in the
necessity which denounces our separation, and hold them as we hold the rest
of mankind, enemies in war, in peace
friends.

NOTES

to the voice of justice and of consanguinity, and when occasions have been given
them by the regular course of their laws,
of removing from their councils the disturbers of our harmony, they have by
their free election re-established them in
power. At this very time too, they are
permitting their chief magistrate to send
over not only soldiers of our common
blood, but Scotch and foreign mercenaries to invade and destroy us. These facts
have given the last stab to agonizing affection, and manly spirit bids us to renounce for ever these unfeeling brethren.
We must endeavour to forget our former
love for them, and hold them as we hold
the rest of mankind, enemies in war, in
peace friends. We might have been a
free and a great people together; but a
communication of grandeur and of freedom, it seems, is below their dignity. Be
it so, since they will have it. The road
to happiness and to glory is open to us
too. We will tread it apart from them,
and acquiesce in the necessity which denounces our eternal separation.
We, therefore, the representatives of
the United States of America in general
congress assembled, do, in the name and
by the authority of the good people of
these states, reject and renounce all allegiance and subjection to the kings of
Great Britain, and all others who may
hereafter claim by, through or under
them; we utterly dissolve all political
connexion which may heretofore have
subsisted between us and the people or
parliament of Great Britain; and finally
we do assert and declare these colonies to
be free and independent states, and that
as free and independent states, they have
full power to levy war, conclude peace,
contract alliances, establish commerce,
and to do all other acts and things which
independent states may of right do.
And for the support of this declaration, we mutually pledge to each other
our lives, our fortunes, and our sacred
honour.
The words expunged from the original
thA.- _U-Arl h.a- wr-rP intrfsri.. â, har -n ---.

We, therefore, the representatives of
the United States of America in general
congress assembled, appealing to the supreme judge of the world for the rectitude of our intentions, do in the name,
and by the good people of these colonies,
solemnly publish and declare that these
united colonies are and of right ought
to be free and independent states; that
they are absolved from all allegiance to
the British crown, and that all political
connexion between them and the state
of Great Britain is, and ought to be,
totally dissolved; and that as free and
independent states they have full power to levy war, conclude peace, contract
alliances, establish commerce, and to do
all other acts and things which independent states may of right do.
And for the support of this declaration, with a firm reliance on the protection of divine providence, we mutually
pledge to each other our lives, our fortunes, and our sacred honour.
draft are distinguished by italics, as are

NOTE-No. VII
"My reasons for this measure," said the Commander-in-chief in his letter to General Lee, ordering him to cross the Hudson, "and which I think must have weight
with you, are, that the enemy are evidently changing the seat of war to this side of

NOTES

the North river; that this country, therefore, will expect the continental army to give
what support they can; and, if disappointed in this, will cease to depend upon, or support a force by which no protection is given to them. It is, therefore, of the utmost
importance that at least an appearance of force should be made, to keep this state in
connexion with the others. If that should not continue, it is much to be feared that
its influence on Pennsylvania would be very considerable; and the public interests
would be more and more endangered. Unless, therefore, some new event should occur, or some more cogent reason present itself, I would have you move over by the
easiest and best passage. I am sensible your numbers will not be large, and that the
movement may not perhaps be agreeable to your troops. As to the first, report will
exaggerate them, and there will be preserved the appearance of an army, which will,
at least, have the effect of encouraging the desponding here; and, as to the other, you
will doubtless represent to them, that in duty and gratitude, their service is due
wherever the enemy may make the greatest impression, or seem to intend to do so."
NOTE-No. VIII
In a postscript, it is stated, that an accurate return could not be obtained, but that
from the best estimate he could form, the whole force in Jersey fit for duty was under
three thousand; all of whom, except nine hundred and eighty-one, were militia, who
stood engaged only until the last of that month. The continental troops under inoculation, including their attendants, amounted to about one thousand.
In a letter of the sixth of March to Governor Trumbull, calling on the state of Connecticut for two thousand militia to be marched to Peekskill, after complaining of the
militia he had called from the southern states, who came and went as their own caprice might direct, he says, "I am persuaded, from the readiness with which you have
ever complied with all my demands, that you will exert yourself in forwarding the
aforementioned number of men, upon my bare request. But I hope you will be convinced of the necessity of the demand, when I tell you, in confidence, that after the
i5th of this month, when the time of General Lincoln's militia expires, I shall be left
with the remains of five Virginia regiments, not amounting to more than as many
hundred men, and parts of two or three other continental battalions, all very weak.
The remainder of the army will be composed of small parties of militia from this state
and Pennsylvania, on whom little dependence can be put, as they come and go when
they please. I have issued peremptory orders to every colonel in the regular service,
to send in what men he has recruited, even if they amount to but one hundred to a
regiment: if they would do this, it would make a considerable force upon the whole.
The enemy must be ignorant of our numbers and situation, or they would never suffer us to remain unmolested; and I almost tax myself with imprudence in committing
the secret to paper; not that I distrust you; of whose inviolable attachment I have had
so many proofs; but for fear the letter should by any accident fall into other hands
than those for which it is intended."
NOTE-No. IX
Justice to the unfortunate demands, that an extract from the correspondence between Generals Burgoyne and Gates on this subject should be inserted.
The British general had complained of the harsh treatment experienced by the provincial prisoners taken at Bennington, and requested that a surgeon from his army
should be permitted to visit the wounded; and that he might be allowed to furnish
them with necessaries and attendants. "Duty and principle," he added, "make me
a public enemy to the Americans, who have taken up arms; but I seek to be a generous one; nor have I the shadow of resentment against any individual, who does not
induce it by acts derogatory to those maxims, upon which all men of honour think
alike." In answer to this letter, General Gates, who had just taken command of the

NOTES

American army, said, "that the savages of America should, in their warfare, mangle
and scalp the unhappy prisoners who fall into their hands is neither new nor extraordinary, but that the famous Lieutenant General Burgoyne, in whom the fine gentleman is united with the soldier and the scholar, should hire the savages of America to
scalp Europeans, and the descendants of Europeans; nay more, that he should pay a
price for each scalp so barbarously taken, is more than will be believed in Europe,
until authenticated facts shall, in every gazette, confirm the truth of the horrid tale.
"Miss M'Crea, a young lady, lovely to the sight, of virtuous character, and amiable
disposition, engaged to an officer of your army, was, with other women and children,
taken out of a house near fort Edward, carried into the woods, and there scalped and
mangled in a most shocking manner. Two parents with their six children, were all
treated with the same inhumanity, while quietly resting in their once happy and peaceful dwelling. The miserable fate of Miss M'Crea was particularly aggravated, by
being dressed to receive her promised husband; but met her murderer employed by
you. Upwards of one hundred men, women and children, have perished by the hands
of the ruffians to whom, it is asserted, you have paid the price of blood."
To this part of his letter, General Burgoyne replied, "I have hesitated, sir, upon
answering the other paragraphs of your letter. I disdain to justify myself against the
rhapsodies of fiction and calumny, which from the first of this contest, it has been an
unvaried American policy to propagate, but which no longer imposes on the world.
I am induced to deviate from this general rule, in the present instance, lest my silence
should be construed an acknowledgment of the truth of your allegations, and a pretence be thence taken for exercising future barbarities by the American troops.
"By this motive and upon this only, I condescend to inform you, that I would not
be conscious of the acts you presume to impute to me, for the whole continent of
America, though the wealth of worlds was in its bowels, and a paradise upon its
surface.
"It has happened, that all my transactions with the Indian nations, last year and
this, have been clearly heard, distinctly understood, accurately minuted, by very numerous, and in many parts, very unprejudiced persons. So immediately opposite to the
truth is your assertion that I have paid a price for scalps, that one of the first regulations established by me at the great council in May, and repeated and enforced, and
invariably adhered to since, was, that the Indians should receive compensation for
prisoners, because it would prevent cruelty; and that not only such compensation
should be withheld, but a strict account demanded for scalps. These pledges of conquest, for such you well know they will ever esteem them, were solemnly and peremptorily prohibited to be taken from the wounded, and even the dying, and the
persons of aged men, women, children, and prisoners, were pronounced sacred, even
in an assault.
"In regard to Miss M'Crea, her fall wanted not the tragic display you have laboured
to give it, to make it as sincerely abhorred and lamented by me, as it can be by the
tenderest of her friends. The fact was no premeditated barbarity. On the contrary,
two chiefs who had brought her off for the purpose of security, not of violence to her
person, disputed which should be her guard, and in a fit of savage passion in one,
from whose hands she was snatched, the unhappy woman became the victim. Upon
the first intelligence of this event, I obliged the Indians to deliver the murderer into
my hands, and though to have punished him by our laws, or principles of justice,
would have been perhaps unprecedented, he certainly should have suffered an ignominious death, had I not been convinced from my circumstances and observation, beyond
the possibility of a doubt, that a pardon under the terms which I presented, and they
accepted, would be more efficacious than an execution, to prevent similar mischiefs.
"The above instance excepted, your intelligence respecting the cruelty of the Indians is false.
"You seem to threaten me with European publications, which affect me as little
as any other threats you could make; but in regard to American publications, whether your charge against me, which I acquit you of believing, was penned from a
gazette, or for a gazette, I desire and demand of you, as a man of honour, that should
it appear in print at all this answer may follow it."

NOTES

NOTE-No. X
Lord Suffolk, secretary of state, contended for the employment of Indians, in the
war. "Besides its policy and necessity," his lordship said, "that the measure was
also allowable on principle, for that it was perfectly justifiable to use all the means
that God and nature had put into our hands."
This moving the indignation of Lord Chatham, he suddenly rose, and gave full
vent to his feelings in one of the most extraordinary bursts of eloquence that the pen
of history has recorded: "I am astonished," exclaimed his lordship, "shocked to hear
such principles confessed; to hear them avowed in this house or even this country.
My lords, I did not intend to have encroached again on your attention, but I can not
repress my indignation. I feel myself impelled to speak. My lords, we are called upon
as members of this house, as men, as christians, to protest against such horrible barbarity. That God and nature had put into our hands! what ideas of God and nature
that noble lord may entertain I know not, but I know that such detestable principles
are equally abhorrent to religion and humanity. What, to attribute the sacred sanction of God and nature to the massacres of the Indian scalping knife! to the cannibal
savage, torturing, murdering, devouring, drinking the blood of his mangled victims!
such notions shock every precept of morality, every feeling of humanity, every sentiment of honour. These abominable principles and this more abominable avowal of
them, demand the most decisive indignation. I call upon that right reverend and this
most learned bench to vindicate the religion of their God, to support the justice of
their country. I call upon the bishops to interpose the unsullied sanctity of their
lawn, upon the judges to interpose the purity of their ermine, to save us from this
pollution. I call upon the honour of your lordships, to reverence the dignity of your
ancestors, and to maintain your own. I call upon the spirit and humanity of my country, to vindicate the national character. I invoke the genius of the constitution. From
the tapestry that adorns these walls, the immortal ancestor of this noble lord, frowns
with indignation at the disgrace of his country. In vain did he defend the liberty,
and establish the religion of Britain against the tyranny of Rome, if these worse than
popish cruelties and inquisitorial practices are endured among us. To send forth the
merciless cannibal thirsting for blood! âagainst whom?-Your protestant brethren-to
lay waste their country, to desolate their dwellings, and extirpate their race and name,
by the aid and instrumentality of these horrible hell-hounds of war! Spain can no
longer boast pre-eminence of barbarity. She armed herself with blood-hounds to extirpate the wretched natives of Mexico, but we more ruthless, loose these dogs of war
against our countrymen in America, endeared to us by every tie that should sanctify
humanity. My lords, I solemnly call upon your lordships, and upon every order of
men in the state, to stamp upon this infamous procedure the indelible stigma of the
public abhorrence. More particularly I call upon the holy prelates of our religion to do
away this iniquity; let them perform a lustration to purify their country from this
deep and deadly sin. My lords, I am old and weak, and at present unable to say more,
but my feelings and indignation were too strong to have said less. I could not have
slept this night in my bed, nor reposed my head upon my pillow, without giving this
vent to my eternal abhorrence of such enormous and preposterous principles."
NOTE-No. XI
The following are the letters which passed between the two generals on this subject
Albany, December IS, I777.
SIR,-I shall not attempt to describe what, as a private gentleman, I can not help
feeling, on representing to my mind the disagreeable situation which confidential letters, when exposed to public inspection, may place an unsuspecting correspondent in;
but, as a public officer, I conjure your excellency, to' give me all the assistance you
can, in tracing out the author of the infidelity, which put extracts from General Con

NOTES

way's letters to me into your hands. Those letters have been stealingly copied; but,
which of them, when, or by whom, is to me, as yet, an unfathomable secret.
There is not one officer in my suite, or amongst those who have a free access to me
upon whom I could, with the least justification to myself, fix the suspicion; and yet,
my uneasiness may deprive me of the usefulness of the worthiest men. It is, I believe
in your excellency's power to do me, and the United States, a very important service,
by detecting a wretch who may betray me, and capitally injure the very operations
under your immediate direction. For this reason, sir, I beg your excellency will favour me with the proofs you can procure to that effect. But, the crime being, eventually so important, that the least loss of time may be attended with the worst consequences; and, it being unknown to me whether the letter came to you from a member
of congress, or from an officer, I shall have the honour of transmitting a copy of this
to the president, that congress may, in concert with your excellency, obtain, as soon as
possible, a discovery which so deeply affects the safety of the states. Crimes of that
magnitude ought not to remain unpunished.
I have the honour to be.
Sir,
With the greatest respect,
Your excellency's most humble
and most obedient servant,
HORATIO GATES.
His excellency General Washington.
Valley Forge, January 4, 1778.
SIR,-Your letter of the r8th ultimo, came to my hands a few days ago, and to my
great surprise informed me, that a copy of it had been sent to congress, for what reason, I find myself unable to account; but, as some end doubtless was intended to be
answered by it, I am laid under the disagreeable necessity of returning my answer
through the same channel, lest any member of that honourable body should harbour
an unfavourable suspicion of my having practised some indiscreet means to come at
the contents of the confidential letters between you and General Conway.
I am to inform you then, that **********, on his way to congress in the month of
October last, fell in with Lord Stirling at Reading; and, not in confidence that I ever
understood, informed his aid-de-camp, Major M'Williams, that General Conway had
written thus to you, "heaven has been determined to save your country, or a weak
general and bad counsellors' would have ruined it." Lord Stirling, from motives of
friendship, transmitted the account with this remark. "The enclosed was communicated by * * * * * * * * * to Major M'Williams; such wicked duplicity of conduct I shall
always think it my duty to detect."
In consequence of this information, and without having any thing more in view,
than merely to show that gentleman that I was not unapprised of his intriguing disposition, I wrote him a letter in these words.
"Sir, a letter which I received last night contained the following paragraph.
"In a letter from General Conway to General Gates, he says, heaven has been determined to save your country, or a weak general and bad counsellors would have
ruined it. I am, sir, &amp;c."
Neither the letter, nor the information which occasioned it, was ever, directly, or
indirectly, communicated by me to a single officer in this army (out of my own
family) excepting the Marquis de Lafayette, who having been spoken to on the subject, by General Conway, applied for, and saw, under injunctions of secrecy, the letter which contained this information; so desirous was I of concealing every matter
that could, in its consequences, give the smallest interruption to the tranquillity of
this army, or afford a gleam of hope to the enemy by dissensions therein.
Thus, sir, with an openness and candour, which I hope will ever characterise and
mark my conduct, have I complied with your request. The only concern I feel upon
the occasion, finding how matters stand, is, that in doing this, I have necessarily been
obliged to name a gentleman, who, I am persuaded, (although I never exchanged a
1 One of whom, by the by, he was.

NOTES

word with him upon the subject) thought he was rather doing an act of justice, than
committing an act of infidelity; and sure I am, that, until Lord Stirling's letter came
to my hands, I never knew that General Conway, (whom I viewed in the light of a
stranger to you) was a correspondent of yours, much less did I suspect that I was the
subject of your confidential letters. Pardon me then for adding, that, so far from conceiving that the safety of the states can be affected, or in the smallest degree injured,
by a discovery of this kind, or that I should be called upon in such solemn terms to
point out the author, that I considered the information as coming from yourself, and
given with a friendly view to forewarn, and consequently forearm me, against a secret
enemy, or in other words, a dangerous incendiary, in which character sooner or later,
this country will know General Conway. But, in this, as well as other matters of late,
I have found myself mistaken. I am, sir,
Your most obedient servant,
GEO. WASHINGTON.
To Major General Gates.
NOTE-No. XII
During the existence of this faction, an attempt appears to have been made to alienate the affections of the leading political personages in the states from the commander-in-chief. The following letters exhibit a very unsuccessful effort of this
sort, which was made on Governor Henry, of Virginia, by a gentleman not supposed to be a member of congress from that state.
Williamsburgh, February 2o, 1778.
DEAR SIR,-You will no doubt be surprised at seeing the enclosed letter, in which
the encomiums bestowed on me are as undeserved, as the censures aimed at you are
unjust. I am sorry there should be one man who counts himself my friend, who is
not yours.
Perhaps I give you needless trouble in handing you this paper. The writer of it
may be too insignificant to deserve any notice. If I knew this to be the case, I should
not have intruded on your time, which is so precious. But there may possibly be
some scheme or party forming to your prejudice. The enclosed leads to such a suspicion. Believe me, sir, I have too high a sense of the obligations America has to
you, to abet or countenance so unworthy a proceeding. The most exalted merit hath
ever been found to attract envy. But I please myself with the hope, that the same
fortitude and greatness of mind which have hitherto braved all the difficulties and dangers inseparable from your station, will rise superior to every attempt of the envious
partisan.
I really can not tell who is the writer of this letter, which not a little perplexes me.
The hand writing is altogether strange to me.
To give you the trouble of this, gives me pain. It would suit my inclination better,
to give you some assistance in the great business of the war. But I will not conceal
any thing from you, by which you may be affected, for I really think your personal
welfare and the happiness of America are intimately connected. I beg you will be
assured of that high regard and esteem with which I ever am,
Dear sir,
Your affectionate friend and very humble servant,
P. ENRY.
His excellency General Washington.
(Letter enclosed in the preceding.)
Yorktown, January I2, 1778.
DEAR SIR,-The common danger of our country first brought you and me together.
I recollect with pleasure the influence of your conversation and eloquence upon the
opinions of this country in the beginning of the present controversy. You first taught
us to shake off our idolatrous attachment to royalty, and to oppose its encroachments
upon our liberties with our very lives. By these means you saved us from ruin. The

NOTES

independence of America is the offspring of that liberal spirit of thinking, and acting,
which followed the destruction of the sceptres of kings and the mighty power of Great
Britain.
But, sir, we have only passed the Red Sea. A dreary wilderness is still before us,
and unless a Moses or a Joshua are raised up in our behalf, we must perish before we
reach the promised land. We have nothing to fear from our enemies on the way.
General Howe, it is true, has taken Philadelphia; but he has only changed his prison.
His dominions are bounded on all sides by his outsentries. America can only be undone by herself. She looks up to her councils and arms for protection; but alas!
what are they? her representation in congress dwindled to only twenty-one members
-her Adams-her Wilson-her Henry, are no more among them. Her councils
weak-and partial remedies applied constantly for universal diseases. Her armywhat is it? a major general belonging to it called it a few days ago in my hearing X
mob. Discipline unknown or wholly neglected. The quartermaster and commissary's
departments filled with idleness, ignorance and peculation-our hospitals crowded with
six thousand sick, but half provided with necessaries or accommodations, and more
dying in them in one month, than perished in the field during the whole of the last
campaign.
The money depreciating without any effectual measures being taken to raise itthe country distracted with the Don Quixote attempts to regulate the prices of provisions, an artificial famine created by it, and a real one dreaded from it. The spirit
of the people failing through a more intimate acquaintance with the causes of our
misfortunes-many submitting daily to General Howe, and more wishing to do it, only
to avoid the calamities which threaten our country. But is our case desperate? by no
means. We have wisdom, virtue, and strength eno' to save us if they could be called
into action. The northern army has shown us what Americans are capable of doing
with A GENERAL at their head. The spirit of the southern army is no ways inferior to
the spirit of the northern. A Gates-a Lee, or a Conway would, in a few weeks,
render them an irresistible body of men. The last of the above officers has accepted
of the new office of inspector general of our army, in order to reform abuses-but the
remedy is only a palliative one. In one of his letters to a friend he says, "a great and
good God hath decreed America to be free-or the *******a* and weak counsellors
would have ruined her long ago"-you may rest assured of each of the facts related in
this letter. The author of it is one of your Philadelphia friends. A hint of his name,
if found out by the hand writing, must not be mentioned to your most intimate friend.
Even the letter must be thrown in the fire. But some of its contents ought to be made
public in order to awaken, enlighten, and alarm our country. I rely upon your prudence, and am, dear sir, with my usual attachment to you, and to our beloved independence. Yours, sincerely.
His excellency P. Henry.
Williamsburgh, March 5, 1778.
DEAR SIR,-By an express which Colonel Finnie sent to camp, I enclosed you an
anonymous letter, which I hope got safe to hand. I am anxious to hear something that
will serve to explain the strange affair, which I am now informed is taken up, respecting you. Mr. Custis has just paid us a visit, and by him I learn sundry particulars
concerning General Mifflin, that much surprise me. It is very hard to trace the
schemes and windings of the enemies to America. I really thought that man its
friend: however, I am too far from him to judge of his present temper.
While you face the armed enemies of our liberty in the field, and, by the favour of
God, have been kept unhurt, I trust your country will never harbour in her bosom
the miscreant who would ruin her best supporter. I wish not to flatter; but when arts
unworthy honest men are used to defame and traduce you, I think it not amiss, but a
duty, to assure you of that estimation in which the public hold you. Not that I think
any testimony I can bear, is necessary for your support, or private satisfaction, for a
bare recollection of what is past must give you sufficient pleasure in every circumstance of life. But I can not help assuring you, on this occasion, of the high sense
of gratitude which all ranks of men, in this your native country, bear to you. It

NOTES

will give me sincere pleasure to manifest my regards, and render my best services to
you or yours. I do not like to make a parade of these things, and I know you are
not fond of it; however, I hope the occasion will plead my excuse.
The assembly have at length empowered the executive here to provide the Virginia
troops serving with you, with clothes, &amp;c. I am making provision accordingly, and
hope to do something towards it. Every possible assistance from government is afforded
the commissary of provisions, whose department has not been attended to. It was
taken up by me too late to do much. Indeed the load of business devolved on me is
too great to be managed well. A French ship, mounting thirty guns, that has been
long chased by the English cruisers, has got into Carolina, as I hear last night.
Wishing you all possible felicity, I am, my dear sir,
Your ever affectionate friend,
and very humble servant, P. HENRY.
His excellency General Washington.
Valley Forge, March 27, 1778.
DEAR SIR,-About eight days past, I was honoured with your favour of the 2oth
ultimo.
Your friendship, sir, in transmitting me the anonymous letter you had received,
lays me under the most grateful obligations; and, if any thing could give a still
further claim to my acknowledgments, it is the very polite and delicate terms in
which you have been pleased to make the communication.
I have ever been happy in supposing that I held a place in your esteem, and the
proof of it you have afforded on this occasion makes me peculiarly so. The favourable light in which you hold me is truly flattering, but I should feel much regret if
I thought the happiness of America so intimately connected with my personal welfare,
as you so obligingly seem to consider it. All I can say, is, that she has ever had, and,
I trust, she ever will have, my honest exertions to promote her interest. I can not
hope that my services have been the best; but my heart tells me that they have been
the best that I could render.
That I may have erred in using the means in my power for accomplishing the objects of the arduous, exalted station with which I am honoured, I can not doubt; nor
do I wish my conduct to be exempted from the reprehension it may deserve. Error is
the portion of humanity, and to censure it, whether committed by this or that public
character, is the prerogative of freemen. * * * * * *
* *F * *F * * * * *F $ * * *F
*F * * * * * * * * * * * *
* * *F F *F * *F * *F * * * *
* * * *F * * * *F * * * * *
* * * * *F * *F * $ * *F * *
* * * * * * * * * *. * * *
This is not the only secret insidious attempt that has been made to wound my reputation. There have been others equally base, cruel, and ungenerous; because conducted
with as little frankness and proceeding from views perhaps as personally interested.
I am, dear sir, &amp;c.
GEO. WASHINGTON.
To his excellency Patrick Henry, esquire, Governor of Virginia.
Camp, March 28, 1778.
DEAR SIR,-Just as I was about to close my letter of yesterday, your favour of the
fifth instant came to hand.
I can only thank you again, in the language of the most undissembled gratitude,
for your friendship: and assure you, the indulgent disposition which Virginia in particular, and the states in general entertain towards me, gives me the most sensible
pleasure. The approbation of my country is what I wish; and, as far as my abilities
and opportunity will permit, I hope I shall endeavour to deserve it. It is the highest
reward to a feeling mind; and happy are they who so conduct themselves as to
merit it.

NOTES

The anonymous letter with which you were pleased to favour me, was written by
**********, so far as I can judge from a similitude of hands. * * *
* * * * * * *:* * * * * *
*. * * * * * * * * *
My caution to avoid any thing that could injure the service, prevented me from
communicating, except to a very few of my friends, the intrigues of a faction which
I know was formed against me, since it might serve to publish our internal dissensions but their own restless zeal to advance their views has too clearly betrayed
them, and made concealment on my part fruitless. I can not precisely mark the
extent of their views, but it appeared in general, that General Gates was to be exalted
on the ruin of my reputation and influence. This I am authorized to say from undeniable facts in my own possession, from publications the evident scope of which
could not be mistaken, and from private detractions industriously circulated. ******,
it is commonly supposed, bore the second part in the cabal; and General Conway, I
know, was a very active and malignant partisan; but I have good reason to believe
that their machinations have recoiled most sensibly upon themselves.
I am, dear sir, &amp;c.
GEO. WASHINGTON.
His excellency Patrick Henry, esquire, Governor of Virginia.
The following extract is taken from a letter written about the same time to a gentleman in New England, who had expressed some anxious apprehensions occasioned by a report that the commander-in-chief had determined to resign his
station in the army:
"I can assure you that no person ever heard me drop an expression that had a
tendency to resignation. The same principles that led me to embark in the opposition
to the arbitrary claims of Great Britain, operate with additional force at this day;
nor is it my desire to withdraw my services while they are considered of importance
in the present contest; but to report a design of this kind, is among the arts, which
those who are endeavouring to effect a change are practising to bring it to pass. I
have said, and I still do say, that there is not an officer in the service of the United
States, that would return to the sweets of domestic life with more heartfelt joy than
I should. But I would have this declaration accompanied by these sentiments, that
while the public are satisfied with my endeavours, I mean not to shrink from the
cause; but the moment her voice, not that of faction, calls upon me to resign, I shall
do it with as much pleasure as ever the wearied traveller retired to rest."
NOTE-No. XIII
The following is an extract of a letter addressed on this occasion by General Washington to congress:
"Though I sincerely commiserate the misfortune of General Lee, and feel much
for his present unhappy situation; yet, with all possible deference to the opinion of
congress, I fear that their resolutions will not have the desired effect, are founded in
impolicy, and will,, if adhered to, produce consequences of an extensive and melancholy nature.
"Retaliation is certainly just, and sometimes necessary, even where attended with
the severest penalties: but when the evils which may, and must result from it, exceed
those intended to be redressed, prudence and policy require that it should be avoided.
"Having premised thus much, I beg leave to examine the justice and expediency
of it in the instance before us. From the best information I have been able to obtain,
General Lee's usage has not been so disgraceful and dishonourable, as to authorize
the treatment decreed to these gentlemen, was it not prohibited by many other important considerations. His confinement, I believe, has been more rigorous than has
been generally experienced by the rest of our officers, or those of the enemy who have

NOTES

been in our possession; but if the reports received on that head be true, he has been
provided with a decent apartment, and with most things necessary to render him comfortable. This is not the case with one of the officers comprehended in the resolves,
if his letter, of which a copy is transmitted, deserves your credit. Here retaliation
seems to have been prematurely begun, or to speak with more propriety, severities have
been, and are exercised towards Colonel Campbell, not justified by any that General
Lee has yet received.
"In point of policy, and under the present situation of our affairs, most surely the
doctrine can not be supported. The balance of prisoners is greatly against us, and a
general regard to the happiness of the whole should mark our conduct. Can we imagine that our enemies will not mete the same punishments, the same indignities, the
same cruelties, to those belonging to us in their possession, that we impose on theirs?
why should we suppose them to have more humanity than we possess ourselves? or
why should an ineffectual attempt to relieve the distresses of one brave man, involve
many more in misery? At this time, however disagreeable the fact may be, the enemy
have in their power, and subject to their call, near three hundred officers belonging to
the army of the United States. In this number there are some of high rank, and the
most of them are men of bravery and of merit. The quota of theirs in our hands
bears no proportion, not being more than fifty. Under these circumstances, we certainly should do no act to draw upon the gentlemen belonging to us, and who have
already suffered a long captivity, greater punishments than they now experience. If
we should, what will be their feelings, and those of their numerous and extensive connexions? Suppose the treatment prescribed for the Hessian officers should be pursued, will it not establish what the enemy have been aiming to effect by every artifice, and the grossest misrepresentations? I mean, an opinion of our enmity towards
them, and of the cruel conduct they experience when they fall into our hands; a prejudice which we, on our part, have heretofore thought it politic to suppress, and to
root out by every act of kindness and of lenity. It certainly will. The Hessians will
hear of the punishments with all the circumstances of heightened exaggeration, and
would feel the injury without investigating the cause, or reasoning upon the justice
of it. The mischiefs which may, and must inevitably flow from the execution pf the
resolves, appear to be endless and innumerable."
NOTE-No. XIV
The following petition addressed to Governor Livingston, will furnish some evidence of the situation to which that part of Jersey was reduced.
To his excellency William Livingston, esquire, governor, captain general, and commander-in-chief in and over the state of New Jersey and the territories thereunto
belonging in America, chancellor and ordinary in the same-the humble petition
of the officers, civil and military, whose names are-hereunto subscribed,
Showeth,-That a large detachment of the British army, a few weeks ago, made
an invasion into the lower counties of this state on Delaware, and plundered a few
of the inhabitants. That at present a large detachment are invading them a second
time. That the enemy in this second incursion, have, as we have been credibly informed, by the express orders of Colornel Mawhood, the commanding officer, bayoneted
and butchered in the most inhuman manner, a number of the militia who have unfortunately fallen into their hands. That Colonel Mawhood immediately after the
massacre, in open letters, sent to both officers and privates by a flag, had the effrontery
to insult us with a demand, that we should lay down our arms, and if not, threatened
to burn, destroy, and lay the whole country waste, and more especially the property
of a number of our most distinguished men, whom he named. That he has since put
his threat into execution, in one instance, by burning one of the finest dwelling houses
in Salem county, and all the other buildings on the same farm, the property of Colonel Benjamin Home. That plunder, rapine, and devastation in the most fertile and

NOTES

populous parts of these counties, widely mark their footsteps wherever they go. That
they are spreading disaffection, they are using every possible means to corrupt the
minds of the people, who, within their lines, have so little virtue as to purchase from
them.
That we are in no state of defence. That we are so exposed by reason of our situation, that some of our officers, civil and military, have moved out of the counties for
safety. That our militia, during the last winter, have been so fatigued out by repeated
calls and continued service, and disaffection is now so widely diffused, that very few
can be called out, in some places, none. That we have no troops of light horse regularly embodied, there is a scarcity of small arms among us, and no field pieces. That
in these two incursions, we have very sensibly felt the want of field pieces and artillery men, that the number of us assembled is so small, that though we should use the
greatest conduct and bravery, we could only provoke, not injure our enemy.
That the extent of our country is so great, that our small number of men fatigued
out, indifferently armed and without field pieces, can not defend it. That, as Delaware
runs all along those counties, we are liable to be attacked in numberless places.
That the acquisition of these counties would be of great advantage to the enemy.
That they could nearly maintain their whole army a campaign by the plunder, forage,
and assistance they could draw from them. That although the United States might
not need them, yet it might perhaps be adviseable to defend them, to prevent the advantage the enemy might receive from them. That our riches, and former virtue,
make us a prey to an enemy, whose tender mercies are cruelties.
That in short, our situation is beyond description deplorable. That the powers
civil and military are daily relaxing, and disaffection prevailing. That we can neither
stay at our houses, go out, nor come in with safety. That we can neither plough,
plant, sew, reap nor gather. That we are fast falling into poverty, distress, and into
the hands of our enemy. That unless there can be sent to our relief and assistance a
13ufficient body of standing troops, we must be under the disagreeable necessity of
leaving the country to the enemy, and removing ourselves and families to distant
places for safety. That although the present detachment may be fled and gone, before the relief reaches us, yet a body of troops are necessary for our protection, as long
as the enemy possess Philadelphia. And these are the sentiments not only of us the
subscribers, but of all the rest of the officers civil and military, and other the good
subjects of this state in these counties.
NOTE-No. XV
The following is the report made by the committee:
"January i, 1779. The committee appointed to confer with the commander-inchief on the operations of the next campaign, report, that the plan proposed by congress for the emancipation of Canada, in co-operation with an army from France, was
the principal subject of the said conference.
That, impressed with a strong sense of the injury and disgrace which must attend
an infraction of the proposed stipulations, on the part of these states, your committee
have taken a general view of our finances, of the circumstances of our army, of the
magazines of clothes, artillery, arms and ammunition, and of the provisions in store,
and which can be collected in season.
Your committee have also attentively considered the intelligence and observations
communicated to them by the Commander-in-chief, respecting the number of troops
and strong holds of the enemy in Canada; their naval force, and entire command of
the water communication with that country-the difficulties, while they possess such
signal advantages, of penetrating it with an army by land-the obstacles which are
to be surmounted in acquiring a naval superiority-the hostile temper of many of the
surrounding Indian tribes towards these states, and above all the uncertainty whether
the enemy will not persevere in their system of harassing and distressing our sea-coast
and frontiers by a predatory war.

NOTES

3'I

That on the most mature deliberation, your committee can not find room for a well
grounded presumption that these states will be able to perform their part of the proposed stipulations. That in a measure of such moment, calculated to call forth, and
direct to a single object a considerable portion of the force of our ally, which may
otherwise be essentially employed, nothing else than the highest probability of success
could justify congress in making the proposition.
Your committee are therefore oftopinion that the negotiation in question, however
desirable, and interesting, should be deferred until circumstances render the co-operation of these states more certain, practicable, and effectual.
That the minister plenipotentiary of these states at the court of Versailles, the minister of France in Pennsylvania, and the minister of France, be respectively informed
that the operations of the next campaign must depend on such a variety of contingencies to arise, as well from our own internal circumstances and resources, as the
progress and movements of our enemy, that time alone can mature and point out the
plan which ought to be pursued. That congress, therefore, can not, with a degree of
confidence answerable to the magnitude of the object, decide on the practicability of
their co-operating the next campaign, in an enterprise for the emancipation of Canada;
that every preparation in our power will nevertheless be made for acting with vigour
against the common enemy, and every favourable incident embraced with alacrity, to
facilitate, and hasten the freedom and independence of Canada, and her union with
these states- events which congress, from motives of policy with respect to the United
States, as well as of affection for their Canadian brethren, have greatly at heart."
Mr. de Sevelinges in his introduction to Botta's History, recites the private instructions given to Mr. Girard on his mission to the United States. One article was, "to
avoid entering into any formal engagement relative to Canada and other English possessions which congress proposed to conquer." Mr. de Sevelinges adds that "the policy of the cabinet of Versailles viewed the possession of those countries, especially of
Canada by England, as a principle of useful inquietude and vigilance to the Americans. The neighbourhood o'f a formidable enemy must make them feel more sensibly
the price which they ought to attach to the friendship and support of the king of
France."
The author has reason to believe that this policy was known to the Marquis de
Lafayette when his devotion to the interests of the United States induced him to add
his influence to their solicitations for aid to this enterprise.
NOTE-No. XVI
A letter to President Reed of Pennsylvania from which the following extracts are
taken, is selected from many others written with the same view.
Morristown, May 28th, 1780.
DEAR SIR,-I am much obliged to you for your favour of the 23d. Nothing could
be more necessary than the aid given by your state towards supplying us with provisions. I assure you, every idea you can form df our distresses, will fall short of the
reality. There is such a combination of circumstances to exhaust the patience of the
soldiery, that it begins at length to be worn out, and we see in every line of the army,
the most serious features of mutiny and sedition: all our departments, all our operations are at a stand; and unless a system very different from that which has for a
long time prevailed, be immediately adopted throughout the states, our affairs must
soon become desperate beyond the possibility of recovery. If you were on the spot,
my dear sir, if you could see what difficulties surround us on every side, how unable
we are to administer to the most ordinary calls of the service, you would be convinced
that these expressions are not too strong: and that we have every thing to dread:
Indeed I have almost ceased to hope. The country in general is in such a state of insensibility and indifference to its interests, that I dare not flatter myself with any
change for the better.
The committee of congress in their late address to the several states, have given a

3 2

NOTES

just picture of our situation. I very much doubt its making the desired impression;
and if it does not, I shall consider our lethargy as incurable. The present juncture
is so interesting, that if it does not produce correspondent exertions, it will be a proof,
that motives of honour, public good, and even self-preservation, have lost their influence upon our minds. This is a decisive moment, one of the most, I will go further
and say, the most important America has seen. The court of France has made a
glorious effort for our deliverance, and if we disappoint its intentions by our supineness, we must become contemptible in the eyes of all mankind; nor can we, after
that, venture to confide that our allies will persist in an attempt to establish what
it will appear we want inclination or ability to assist them in.
Every view of our own circumstances ought to determine us to the most vigorous
efforts; but there are considerations of another kind, that should have equal weight.
The combined fleets of France and Spain last year were greatly superior to those of
the enemy; the enemy nevertheless sustained no material damage, and at the close
of the campaign gave a very important blow to our allies. This campaign, the difference between the fleets, from every account I have been able to collect, will be inconsiderable: indeed it is far from clear that there will be an equality. What are we to
expect will be the case if there should be another campaign? In all probability the
advantage would be on the side of the English, and then what would become of America? We ought not to deceive ourselves. The maritime resources of Great Britain are
more substantial and real than those of France and Spain united. Her commerce is
more extensive than that of both her rivals; and it is an axiom, that the nation which
has the most extensive commerce will always have the most powerful marine. Were
this argument less convincing, the fact speaks for itself: her progress in the course of
the last year is an incontestable proof.
"It is true France in a manner created a fleet in a very short space, and this may
mislead us in the judgment we form of her naval abilities. But if they bore any comparison with those of Great Britain, how comes it to pass, that with all the force of
Spain added, she has lost so much ground in so short a time, as now to have scarcely
a superiority. We should consider what was done by France, as a violent and unnatural effort of the government, which, for want of sufficient foundation, can not
continue to operate proportionable effects.
"In modern wars, the longest purse must chiefly determine the event. I fear that
of the enemy will be found to be so. Though the government is deeply in debt and
df course poor, the nation is rich, and their riches afford a fund which will not be
easily exhausted. Besides, their system of public credit is such, that it is capable of
greater exertions than that of any other nation. Speculatists have been a long time
foretelling its downfall; but we see no symptoms of the catastrophe being very near
I am persuaded it will at least last out the war.
"France is in a very different position. The abilities of the present financier, have
done wonders; by a wise administration of the revenues, aided by advantageous loans,
he has avoided the necessity of additional taxes. But I am well informed if the war
continues another campaign, he will be obliged to have recourse to the taxes usual in
time of war, which are very heavy, and which the people of France are not in a condition to endure for any length of time. When this necessity commences, France
makes war on ruinous terms, and England, from her individual wealth, will find much
greater facilities in supplying her exigencies.
"Spain derives great wealth from.her mines, but it is not so great as is generally
imagined. Of late years the profit to government is essentially diminished. Commerce and industry are the best mines of a nation; both which are wanted by her. I
am told her treasury is far from being so well filled as we have flattered ourselves. She
is also much divided on the propriety of the war. There is a strong party against it.
The temper of the nation is too sluggish to admit of great exertions; and though the
courts of the two kingdoms are closely linked together, there never has been in any of
their wars, a perfect harmony of measures, nor has it been the case in this; which has
already been no small detriment to the common cause.
"I mention these things to show that the circumstances of our allies, as well as our
own, call for peace, to obtain which we must make one great effort this campaign.

NOTES

The present instance of the friendship of the court of France, is attended with every
circumstance that can render it important and agreeable, that can interest our gratitude or fire our emulation. If we do our duty we may even hope to make the campaign decisive of the contest..But we must do our duty in earnest, or disgrace and
ruin will attend us. I am sincere in declaring a full persuasion that the succour will
be fatal to us if our measures are not adequate to the emergency..
"Now, my dear sir, I must observe to you, that much will depend on the state of
Pennsylvania. She has it in her power to contribute, without comparison, more to
our success, than any other state, in the two essential articles of flour and transportation. I speak to you in the language of frankness, and as a friend. I do not mean to
make any insinuations unfavourable to the state. I am aware of the embarrassment
the government labours under from the open opposition of one party and the underhand intrigues of another. I know that with the best dispositions to promote the public service, jou have been obliged to move with circumspection. But this is a time to
hazard, and to take a tone of energy and decision. All parties but the disaffected will
acquiesce in the necessity and give their support.
"The matter is reduced to a point. Either Pennsylvania must give us all we ask,
or we can undertake nothing. We must renounce every idea of co-operation, and
must confess to our allies that we look wholly to them for our safety. This will be a
state of humiliation and bitterness against which the feelings of every good American
ought to revolt. Yours I am convinced will, nor have,I the least doubt, but that you
will employ all your influence to animate the legislature and the people at large. The
fate of these states hangs upon it. God grant we may be properly impressed with the
consequences.
"I wish the legislature could be engaged to vest the executive with plenipotentiary
powers. I should then expect every thing practicable from your abilities and zeal.
This is not a time for formality and ceremony. The crisis in every point of view is
extraordinary, and extraordinary expedients are necessary. I am decided in this
opinion."
NOTE-No. XVII
Andre having been unquestionably a spy, and his sentence consequently just; and
the plot in which he had engaged having threatened consequences the most fatal to
America; his execution, had he been an ordinary person, would certainly have been
viewed with cold indifference. But he was not an ordinary person. In a letter written at the time by Colonel Hamilton, who in genius, in candour, and in romantic
heroism, did not yield to this unfortunate Englishman, the character of Andre is thus
feelingly and elequently drawn. "There was something singularly interesting in the
character and fortunes of Andre. To an excellent understanding, well improved by
education and travel, he united a peculiar elegance of mind and manners, and the advantages of a pleasing person. It is said he possessed a pretty taste.for the fine arts,
and had himself attained some proficiency in poetry, music, and painting. His knowledge appeared without ostentation, and embellished by a diffidence that rarely accompanies so many talents and accomplishments, which left you to suppose more than appeared. His sentiments were elevated and inspired esteem, they had a softness that
conciliated affection. His elocution was handsome, his address easy, polite, and insinuating. By his merit he had acquired the unlimited confidence of his general, and
was making rapid progress in military rank and reputation. But in the height of his
career, flushed with new hopes from the execution of a project the most beneficial to
his party that could be devised, he is at once precipitated from the summit of prosperity, sees all the expectations of his ambition blasted, and himself ruined. The character I have given of him is drawn partly from what I saw of him myself, and partly
from information. I am aware that a man of real merit is never seen in so favourable
a light as through the medium of adversity. The clouds that surround him are so
many shades that set off his good qualities. Misfortune cuts down little vanities, that

34 NOTES
in prosperous times, serve as so many spots in his virtues; and gives a tone to humanity that makes his worth more amiable.
"His spectators, who enjoy a happier lot, are less prone to detract from it through
envy; and are much disposed by compassion to give the credit he deserves, and perhaps even to magnify it."
NOTE-No. XVIII
On the first of May, 1781, General Washington commenced a military journal.
The following is a brief statement of the situation of the army at that time. "I begin
at this epoch, a concise journal of military transactions, &amp;c. I lament not having
attempted it from the commencement of the war in aid of my memory: and wish the
multiplicity of matter which continually surrounds me, and the embarrassed state of
our affairs, which is momentarily calling the attention to perplexities of one kind or
another, may not defeat altogether, or so interrupt my present intention and plan, as
to render it of little avail.
"To have the clearer understanding of the entries which may follow, it would be
proper to recite, in detail, our wants, and our prospects; but this alone would be a
work of much time, and great magnitude. It may suffice to give the sum of them,
which I shall do in a few words, viz:
"Instead of having the magazines filled with provisions, we have a scanty pittance
scattered here and there in the different states.
"Instead of having our arsenals well supplied with military stores, they are poorly
provided, and the workmen all leaving them.-Instead of having the various articles
of field equipage in readiness to deliver, the quartermaster general is but now applying
to the several states (as the dernier resort) to provide these things for their troops respectively. Instead of having a regular system of transportation established upon
credit-or funds in the quartermaster's hands to defray the contingent expenses of it
-we have neither the one or the other; and all that business, or a great part of it, being done by military impressment, we are daily and hourly oppressing the people, souring their tempers, and alienating their affections. Instead of having the regiments
completed to the new establishments (and which ought to have been so by the
of agreeably to the requisitions of congress, scarce any state in the union
has, at this hour, one-eighth part of its quota in the field; and there is little prospect
that I can see of ever getting more than half. In a word, instead of having every
thing in readiness to take the field, we have nothing. And instead of having the prospect of a glorious offensive campaign before us, we have a bewildered and gloomy
prospect of a defensive one; unless we should receive a powerful aid of ships, land
troops and money from our generous allies: and these at present are too contingent to
build upon."
NOTE-No. XIX
York in Virginia, x7th October, 178i, half past four, P.M.
SIR,-I have this moment been honoured with your excellency's letter dated this
day. The time limited for sending my answer will not admit of entering into the details of articles, but the basis of my proposals will be, that the garrisons of York and
Gloucester shall be prisoners of war with the customary honours; and for the convenience of the individuals which I have the honour to command, that the British
shall be sent to Britain, and the Germans to Germany, under engagements not to serve
against France, America, or their allies, until released or regularly exchanged. That
all arms and public stores shall be delivered up to you, but that the usual indulgence
of side arms to officers and of retaining private property shall be granted to officers
and soldiers; and the interests of individuals in civil capacities, and connected with us,

NOTES

shall be attended to. If your excellency thinks that a continuance of the suspension
of hostilities will be necessarysto transmit your answer, I shall have no objection to the
hour that you propose. I have the honour to be,
Sir, your most obedient and most humble servant,
CORNWALLIS
His excellency General Washington, &amp;c. &amp;c. &amp;c.
NOTE-No. XX
Head quarters before York, i8th October, 1781.
My LORD,-To avoid unnecessary discussions and delays, I shall at once, in answer to your lordship's letter of yesterday, declare the general basis upon which a
definitive treaty of capitulation must take place. The garrison of York and Gloucester, including the seamen, as you propose, will be received prisoners of war. The condition annexed of sending the British and German troops to the parts of Europe to
which they respectively belong, is inadmissible. Instead of this, they will be marched
to such parts of the country as can most conveniently provide for their subsistence;
and the benevolent treatment of prisoners, which is invariably observed by the Americans, will be extended to them. The same honours will be granted to the surrendering army, as were granted to the garrison of Charleston.
The shipping and boats in the two harbours, with all their guns, stores, tackling,
furniture, and apparel, shall be delivered in their present state to an officer of the navy
appointed to take possession of them.
The artillery, arms, accoutrements, military chest, and public stores of every denomination, shall be delivered unimpaired, to the heads of departments, to which they
respectively belong.
The officers will be indulged in retaining their side arms, and the officers and soldiers may preserve their baggage and effects with this reserve, that property taken in
the country will be reclaimed.
With regard to the individuals in civil capacities, whose interests your lordship
wishes may be attended to, until they are more particularly described, nothing definitive can be settled.
I have to add, that I expect the sick and wounded will be supplied with their own
hospital stores, and attended by British surgeons particularly charged with the care
of them.
Your lordship will be pleased to signify your determination, either to accept or reject the proposals now offered, in the course of two hours from the delivery of this
letter, that commissioners may be appointed to digest the articles of capitulation, or a
renewal of hostilities may take place.
I have the honour to be, my lord, &amp;c.
GEORGE WASHINGTON.
Lieutenant General Earl Cornwallis.
York, in Virginia, z8th October, 1781.
SIRs,-I agree to open a treaty of capitulation upon the basis of the garrisons of
York and Gloucester, including seamen, being prisoners of war without annexing the
condition of their being sent to Europe; but I expect to receive a compensation in
arranging the articles of capitulation for the surrender of Gloucester in its present
state of defence.
I shall in particular desire that the Bonetta sloop of war, may be left entirely at my
disposal from the hour the capitulation is signed, to receive an aid-de-camp to carry
my despatches to Sir Henry Clinton and such soldiers as I may think proper to send
as passengers in her, to be manned with fifty men of her own crew, and to be permitted to sail without examination when my despatches are ready; engaging on my
part that the ship shall be brought back and delivered to you, if she escapes the dangers of the sea; that the crew and soldiers sent as passengers shall be accounted for in

NOTES

future exchanges as prisoners; that she shall carry off no officer without your consent,
no public property of any kind; and I shall likewise desire that the traders and inhabitants may preserve their property, and that no person may be punished or molested
for having joined the British troops.
If you choose to proceed to negotiation on these grounds, I shall appoint two field
officers of my army to meet two officers from you at any time and place you think
proper, to digest the articles of capitulation.- I have the honour to be, sir,
Your most obedient and most humble servant,
CORNWALLIS.
His excellency General Washington, &amp;c. &amp;c. &amp;c.
NOTE-No. XXI
Head quarters, 20oth October, 1781.
SIR,-The surrender of York,,from which so much glory and advantage are derived to the allies, and the honour of which belongs to your excellency, has greatly
anticipated our most sanguine expectations. Certain of this event under your auspices, though unable to determine the time, I solicited your excellency's attention in the
first conference with which you honoured me, to ulterior objects of decisive importance to the common sense. Although your excellency's answer on that occasion was
unfavourable to my wishes, the unexpected promptness with which our operations
have been conducted to their final success having gained us time, the defect of which
was one of your excellency's principal objections, a perspective of the most extensive
and happy consequences, engages me to renew my represntations.
Charleston, the principal maritime port of the British in the southern parts of the
continent, the grand deposite and point of support for the present theatre of the war,
is open to a combined attack, and might be carried with as much certainty as the
place which has just surrendered.
This capture would destroy the last hope which induces the enemy to continue the
war; for having experienced the impracticability of recovering the populous northern
states, he has determined to confine himself to the defensive in that quarter, and to
prosecute a most vigorous offensive in the south, with a view of conquering states,
whose spare population and natural disadvantages render them infinitely less susceptible of defense; although their productions render them the most valuable in a commercial view. His naval superiority, previous to your excellency's arrival, gave him
decisive advantages in the rapid transport of his troops and supplies: while the immense land marches of our succours, too tardy and expensive in every point of view,
subjected us to be beaten in detail.
It will depend upon your excellency, therefore, to terminate the war, and enable
the allies to dictate the law in a treaty. A campaign so glorious and so fertile in consequences, could be reserved only for the Count de Grasse.
It rarely happens that such a combination of means, as are in our hands at present,
can be seasonably obtained by the most strenuous of human exertions.-A decisively
superior fleet, the fortune and talents of whose commander overawe all the naval force
that the most incredible efforts of the enemy have been able to collect; an army
flushed with success, and demanding only to be conducted to new attacks; and the
very season which is proper for operating against the points in question.
If upon entering into the detail of this expedition, your excellency should still determine it impracticable, there is an object which though subordinate to that above
mentioned, is of capital importance to our southern operations, and may. be effected
at infinitely less expense; I mean the enemy's post at Wilmington in North Carolina. Circumstances require that I should at this period reinforce the southern army
under General Greene. This reinforcement transported by sea under your excellency's
convoy, would enable us to carry the post in question with very little difficulty, and
would wrest from the British a point of support in North Carolina, which is attended
with the most dangerous consequences to us, and would liberate another state. This

NOTES

object would require nothing more than the convoy of your excellency to the point of
operation, and the protection of the debarkation.
I intreat your excellency's attention to the points which I have the honour of lay-,
ing before you, and to be pleased at the same time to inform me what are your dispositions for a maritime force to be left on the American station.
I have the honour to be, &amp;c.
GEORGE WASHINGTON.
NOTE-No. XXII
Late in October an irruption was made into the country on the Mohawk, by Major
Ross, at the head of about five hundred men, composed of regulars, rangers, and Indians. Colonel Willet, with between four and five hundred men, partly of the troops
denominated levies, and partly militia, immediately marched in quest of them, and fell
in with them at Johnstown, where they were slaughtering cattle, apparently unapprehensive of an enemy. Before showing himself, he detached Major Rowley of Massachusetts with the left wing to fall on the rear, while he should engage the front. On
his appearance the British party retired to a neighbouring wood, and the American
advance was just beginning to skirmish with them, when that whole wing, without
any apparent cause, suddenly fled from the field, leaving a field-piece posted on a
height in order to cover a retreat, to fall into the hands of the enemy. Fortunately for
the party, Rowley appeared in the rear at this critical juncture, and regained what the
right wing had lost. Night soon coming on, Major Ross retired further into the
wood, and encamped on the top of a mountain. He seems after this skirmish to have
been only intent on repassing the dreary wilderness in his rear, and securing his party;
an object not to be accomplished without immense fatigue and great suffering, as
Colonel Willet had cut off their return to their boats, and they were to retreat by the
way of Buck island, or Oswegatchie. With a select part of his troops who were furnished with five days provisions, and about sixty Indians who had just joined him, and
who, he said, "are the best cavalry for the service of the wilderness," he commenced a
rapid pursuit, and in the morning of the 3oth, at a ford on Canada creek, fell in with
about forty whites and some Indians who were left in the rear to procure provisions.
These were attacked and the greater number of them killed or taken, upon which the
main body fled with such rapidity that the pursuit proved ineffectual. In the party at
Canada creek was Major Walter Butler, the person who perpetrated the massacre at
Cherry-valley. His entreaties for quarter were disregarded, and he fell the victim
of that vengeance which his own savage temper had directed against himself.

END OF VOLUME I

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