OF THE...
RQ:x  STEPHEN A. DOUGLAS, 
ON THE F
PASSED BY CB NGRESSY
DELIVERED IN  THE  CITY  HALL, CHCAGO,;
OCTOBER 2~r 0:'...' t               A-'N~D ON!,
—'    THE BILL TO REFUND THE FINE IMPOSED ON'
GENERAL JACKSON,
AT NEW-ORLEANS,
DELIVERED IN THE HOUSF, OF REPRESENTATIVES, 
AT W'ASHINGTON, JANUARY 6, 1844. 
NEW-YORK:
PRINTED BY JARED W. BELL, 83 NASSAU STREET.     ]i'
[,'xLl~l ~,     J~851.      








SPEECH
OF
HON, STEPHEN A, DOUGLAS,
ON THE
MEASURES OF ADJUSTMENT,
DELIVERED IN THE CITY HALL, CHICAGO,
OCTOBER 23, 1850.
NEW-YORK:
PRINTED BY JARED W. BELL, 83 NASSAU STREET,
1851.








PREFACE.
THE following speech was made under peculiar circumstances. The two Senators from Illinois had sustained all the Measures of Adjustment. Upon his return
home, Mr. DOUGLAS found that the provisions of the Fugitive Bill had been so
grossly misrepresented, that public opinion was loud and fierce in its condemnation.
The Common Council of the City of Chicago, in their official capacity, passed resolutions denouncing the law as a violation of the Constitution of the United States
and of the Higher Law of GOD, and those Senators and Representatives who voted
for it, and also those who were absent and consequently did not vote against it, as
traitors, Benedict Arnolds, and Judas Iscariots.  The Council also released the
" citizens, officers, and police of the city," from all obligation to assist or participate
in the execution of the law, and declared that " it ought not to be respected by any
intelligent community." On the next night, a mass meeting of citizens was held for
the purpose of approving and sanctioning the action of the Common Council, and
organizing violent and successful resistance to the execution of the law. A committee reported to this meeting, a series of resolutions, more revolutionary in their
character, and going to a greater extent in resisting the authority of the Federal
Government, than even those of the Common Council. Numerous speeches, in support of the resolutions, were received with boisterous and furious applause, pledging
their authors to resist even unto the dungeon and the grave.  At length Mr.
DOUGLAS, being the only member of the Illinois delegation, then in the City, appeared upon the stand, and stated, that in consequence of the action of the Common
Council and the phrenzied excitement which seemed to rage all around him, he
desired tobe heard before the assembled people of the City, in vindication of all
the.Measures of Adjnstment, and especially of the Fugitive Slave Law.  He said
he would not make a speech that night, because the call for the meeting was not
sufficiently broad to authorize a speech in defence of those Measures; but he
would avail himself of that opportunity to give notice, that on the next night he
would address the people of Chicago updn these subjects.  He invited men of
all parties and shades of opinions to attend and participate in the proceedings,
and assured them that he would answer every objection made, and every question
which should be propounded, touching the Measures of Adjustment, and especially
the Fugitive Bill. After further discussion, and much confusion and opposition,
the meeting was induced to adjourn, and hear Mr. DOUGLAS'S defence before they
would condemn him.  In the meantime, the excitement continued to increase, and
the next night, (October 23d,) a tremendous concourse of people assembled-by
far the largest meeting ever held in the City-and Mr. DOUGLAS delivered a speech,
of which the following is a fair and tolerably good report, so far as to embrace the
argument, omitting necessarily numerous incidents, which could not be preserved
by the reporter. The meeting then resolved unanimously to faithfully carry into
effect the provisions of the Fugitive Slave Law, and to perform every other duty
and obligation under the Constitution of the United States.  The meeting also
adopted, with only eight or ten dissenting voices, a resolution repudiating the action of the Common Council, and then adjourned with nine cheers-three for
DOUGLAS, three for the Constitution, and three for our glorious Union.  On the
next night, the Common Council of the City of Chicago again assembled, and repealed their nullifying resolutions by a vote of twelve to one.








SPEECH.
MR. DOUGLAS, said:
The agitation on the subject of Slavery, now raging through the
breadth of the land, presents a most extraordinary spectacle. Congress, after a protracted session of nearly ten months, succeeded in
passing a system of measures, which are believed to be just to all parts
of the Republic, and ought to be satisfactory to the People. The South
has not triumphed over the North, nor has the North achieved a victory over the South. Neither party has made any humiliating concessions to the other. Each has preserved its honor, while neither
has surrendered an important right or sacrificed any substantial interest. The measures composing the scheme of adjustment are believed
to be in harmony with the principles of justice and the Constitution.
And yet we find that the agitation is re-opened in the two extremes
of the Union with renewed vigor and increased violence. In some of
the Southern States, special sessions of the Legislatures are being
called for the purpose of organizing systematic and efficient measures
of resistance to the execution of the laws of the land, and for the
adoption of DISUNION as a remedy. In the Northern States, municipal corporations, and other organized bodies of men, are nullifying
the acts of Congress, and raising the standard of rebellion against the
authority of the Federal Government.
At the South, the measures of adjustment are denounced as a disgraceful surrender of Southern rights to Northern abolitionism.
At the North, the same measures are denounced with equal violence,
as a total abandonment of the rights of freemen to conciliate the slave
power.
The Southern disunionists repudiate the authority of the highest
judicial tribunal on earth, upon the ground that it is a pliant and corrupt instrument in the hands of Northern fanaticism.
The Northern nullifiers refuse to submit the points at issue to the
same exalted tribunal, upon the ground that the Supreme Court of
the United States is a corrupt and supple instrument in the hands of
the Southern slave-ocracy.
For these contradictory reasons, the people in both sections of the
Union are called upon to resist the laws of the land and the authority
of the Federal Government, by violence, even unto death and disunion.
Strange and contradictory positions!
Both cannot be true, and I trust in God neither may prove to be.
We have fallen on evil times, when passion, and prejudice, and am



6
bition, can so blind the judgments and deaden the consciences of men,
that the truth cannot be seen and felt. The people of the Northll, or
the South, or both, are acting under a fatal delusion. Should we
not pause, and reflect, and consider, whether we, as well as they,
have not been egregiously deceived upon the subject?  It is my purpose, this evening, to give a candid and impartial exposition of these
measures, to the end that the truth may be known. It does not become a Free People to rush madly and blindly into violence, and bloodshed, and death, and disunion, without first satisfying our consciences
upon whose souls the guilty consequences must rest.
The measures, known as the Adjustment or Compromise scheme,
are six in number:1.-The admission of California with her Free Constitution.
2.-The creation of a Territorial Government for Utah, leaving the
people to regulate their own domestic institutions.
3.-The creation of a Territorial Government for New Mexico,
wvith like provisions.
4.-The adjustment of the Disputed Boundary with Texas.
5.-The abolition of the Slave Trade in the District of Columbia.
6. —The Fugitive Slave Bill.
The first three of these measures-California, Utah, and New Mexico-I prepared with my own hands, and reported from the Committee
on Territories, as its Chairman, in the precise shape in which they now
stand on the statute book, with one or two unimportant amendments
for which I also voted. I therefore, hold myself responsible to you, as
my constituents for those measures as they passed. If there is any thing
wrong in them hold me accountable; if there is any thing of merit, give
the credit to those who passed the bills. These measures are predicated on the great fundamental principle that,, every people ought to
possess the right of forming and regulating their own internal concerns and domestic institutions in their own way. It was supposed
that those of our fellow-citizens who emigrated to the shores of the,
Pacific and to our other Territories, were as capable of self-government as their neighbors and kindred whom they left behind them;
and there was no reason for believing that they have lost any of their
intelligence or patriotism by the way-side, while crossing the Isthmus
or the Plains. It was also believed, that after their arrival in the
country, when they had become familiar with its topography, climate,
productions, and resources, and had connected their destiny with it,
they were fully as competent to judge for themselves what kind of
laws and institutions were best adapted to their condition and interests, as we were who never saw the country and knew very little
about it. To question their competency to do this, was to deny their
capacity for self-government.  If they have the requisite intelligence and honesty to be entrusted with the enactment of laws for
the government of white men, I know of no reason why they should
not be deemed competent to legislate for the negro. If they are
sufficiently enlightened to make laws for the protection of life, liberty, and property-of morals and education-to determine the relation of husband and wife, of parent and child-I am not aware




that it requires any higher degree of civilization to regulate the
affairs of master and servant. These things are all confided by the
Constitution to each State to decide for itself, and I know of no reason why the same principle should not be extended to the Territories.
My votes and acts have been in accordance with these views in all
cases, except the instances in which I voted under your instructions.
Those were your votes, and not mine. I entered my protest against
them at the time-before and after they were recorded-and shall
never hold myself responsible for them. I believed then, and believe
now, that it was better for the cause of freedom, of humanity, and of
republicanism, to leave the people interested to settle all these questions for themselves. They have intellect and consciences as well as
we, and have more interest in doing that which is best for themselves
and their posterity, than we have as their self-constituted and officious
guardians. I deem it fortunate for the peace and harmony of the
country, that Congress, taking the same view of the subject, rejected
the Proviso, and passed the bills in the shape in which I originally
reported them. So far as slavery is concerned, I am sure that any
man who will take the pains to examine the history of the question,
will come to the conclusion that this is the true policy, as well as the
sound republican doctrine. Mr. DOUGLAS here went into a historical view of the subject, to show that slavery had never been excluded
in fact from one inch of the American Continent by act of Congress.
When the Federal Constitution was formed in'87, twelve of the thirteen States, then composing the Confederation, held slaves and sustained the institution of slavery by their laws. Since that period slavery had been abolished in six of these twelve original slave States.
How was this effected?  Not by an act of Congress.  Not by the
interposition of the Federal Government. Congress had no power
over the subject, and never attempted to interfere with it. Slavery
was abolished in those States by the people of each, acting for themselves and upon their own motion and responsibility. The people
became convinced that it was for their own interests, and the interests
of their posterity, pecuniarily and morally, and they did it of their
own free will, and rigidly enforced their own laws.
So it was in the territory northwest of the Ohio river. By the act
of Congress, known as the Ordinance of'87, slavery was prohibited
by LAW, but not excluded infact. Slavery existed in the Territories
of Illinois and Indiana, in spite of the ordinance, under the authority of
the territorial laws. Illinois was a Slaveholding Territory in defiance
of the act of Congress, but became a Free State by the action of our
own people, when they framed our State Constitution, preparatory to
their admission into the Union. So it was with Indiana. Oregon
prohibited slavery by the action of her people under their provisional
government, several years before Congress established a territorial
government. In short, wherever slavery has been excluded, and free
institutions established, it has been done by the voluntary action of
the people interested. Wherever Congress attempted to interfere in
opposition to the wishes of the people of the territory, its enactments
remained a dead letter upon the statute book, and the people took




8
such legislative action as comported with their inclinations and supposed interests.
Mr. DOUGLAS then referred to the country acquired from Mexico,
and called the attention of the audience to the fact, that the Abolitionists had all predicted that slavery would certainly be introduced
into those territories, unless Congress interfered and prohibited it by
law, and condemned him because he was opposed to such interference.
The problem is now solved. What was then a matter of opinion and
disputation, has become an historical fact. Time has settled the con
troversy, and shown who was right and who was wrong.  The Wilmot Proviso was not adopted. Congress did not prohibit slavery in
those territories, and yet slavery does not exist in them. In California, it was prohibited by the people in the Constitution with which
that State was admitted into the Union. It is well known that the
people of New Mexico, when they formed a Constitution with the
view of asking admission, also prohibited slavery. These facts show
conclusively that all the predictions of the Abolitionists, upon this subject, have been falsified by history, and that my own have been literally fulfilled. I refer to these facts, not in the spirit of self-gratulation, but to show that these men, who have alarmed the friends of
freedom, and for a time partially controlled the popular sentiment,
were themselves mistaken and misled their followers; at the same
time that their doctrine was at war with the whole spirit of our republican institutions.
But let us return to measures immediately under discussion. It
must be conceded that the question of the admission of California was
not free from difficulty, independent of the subject of slavery. There
were many irregularities in the proceedings; in fact, every step in her
application for admission was irregular, when viewed with reference
to a literal compliance with the most approved rules and usages in
the admission of new States. On the other hand, it should be borne
in mind that this resulted from the necessity of the case.  Congress
had failed to perform its duty-had established no territorial government, and made no provision for her admission into the Union.  She
was left without government, and was therefore compelled to provide
one for herself. She could not conform to rules which had not been
established, nor comply with laws which Congress had failed to enact.
The same irregularities had occurred, however, and had been waived,
in the admission of other States under peculiar circumstances. True,
they had not all occurred in the case of any one State; but some had
in one, others in another; so that, by looking into the circumstances
attending the admission of each of the new States, we find that all of
these irregularities, as they are called, had intervened and been waived
in the course of our legislative history. Besides, the territory of
California was too extensive for one State, (if we are to adopt the old
States as a guide in carving out new ones,) being about three times the
size of New-York; and her boundaries were unnatural and unreasonable, disregarding the topography of the country, and embracing the
whole mining region and her coast in the limits. Thus it will be seen
that the slavery questien was not the only real difficulty that the ad



9
mission of California presented to the minds of calm and reflecting
men; although it cannot be denied that it was the exciting cause,
which stimulated a large portion of the people in one section, to demand her instant admission, and in the other, to insist upon her unconditional rejection. Even in this point of view, I humbly conceive
that the ultras in each extreme of the Republic acted under a misconception of their true interests and real policy. The whole of California-from the very nature of the country, her rocks and sands,
elevation above the sea, climate, soil, and productions-was bound to
be free territory by the decision of her own people, no matter when
admitted or how divided. Hence, if considered with reference to the
preponderence of political power between the Free and Slaveholding
States, it was manifestly the true policy of the South to include the
whole country in one State; while the same reasons should have induced the North to subdivide it into as many States as the extent of
the territory would justify, But, in my opinion, it was not proper
for Congress to act upon any such principle. We should know no
North, no South, in our legislation; but look to the interests of the
whole country. By our action in this case, the rights and privileges
of California and the Pacific coast, were principally to be affected.
By erecting the country into one State, instead of three, the people
are ago be represented in the Senate, by two, in the place of six Senaters. If their interests suffer in consequence, they can blame no one
but themselves; for Congress only confirmed what they had previously
done.  The problem in relation to slavery, should have been much
more easily solved. It was a question which concerned the people of
California alone. The other States of the Union had no interest in
it, and no right to interfere with it. South Carolina settled that
question with her own limits to suit herself; Illinois has decided it in
a manner satisfactory to her own people; and upon what principle
are we to deprive the people of the State of California of a right which
which is common to every State in the Union?
The bills establishing territorial governments for Utah and New
Mexico, are silent upon the subject of slavery; except the provision
that, when they should be admitted into the Union as States, each
should decide the question of slavery for itself. This latter provision
was not incorporated in my original bills, for the reason that I conceived it to involve a principle so clearly deducible from the Constitution, that it was unnecessary to embody it in the form of legal enactment. But when it was offered as an amendment to the bills, I cheerfully voted for it, lest its rejection should be deemed a denial of the
principle asserted in it. The abolitionists of the North profess to regard these bills as a total abandonment of the principles of freedom,
because they do not contain an express prohibition of slavery; while
the ultras of the South denounce the same measures as equivalent to
the Wilmot Proviso.
Of the Texas boundary, I have but little to say, for the reason that
I have scarcely heard it alluded to since my return home, although
many complaints are made against it in other portions of the Free
States. It was an unfortunate dispute, which could result in no prac



10to
tical benefit to either party, no matter how decided. The territory
in controversy was of no considerable value. If there was a spot
upon the face of the American Continent more worthless than any
other; if there was a barren waste more desolate-sands more arid,
and rocks more naked than all others-it was the country in dispute
between Texas and the United States. Distant from navigation, and
almost inaccessible for want of means of communication; void of
timber, fuel, water, or soil, with the exception of here and there a
nook in the gorges of the mountains; it was entirely useless, save as
it afforded hiding places for the wild and roaming savages. And yet
the controversy was none the less serious and fierce in consequence of
the barrenness of the country. Texas believed it to be hers, and
deemed it a point of honor to maintain her title at all hazards and
against all odds. Many of the States entertained doubts of the validity of the Texan claim, while others considered it entirely without
foundation. In this state of the case, each party having partial possession, was mustering troops to render its possession complete to the
exclusion of the other. Many of the Slaveholding States, from sympathy with the peculiar institutions of Texas, were preparing to array
themselves on the one side; while most of the Free States, from aversion to those institutions, were expected to array themselves on the
other. Thus were we plunging headlong and madly into a civil war,
involving results which no human wisdom could foresee, and consequences which could be contemplated only with horror.
Fortunately, this unnatural struggle was averted by the timely and
judicious interposition of Congress. The Committee on Territories,
to whom the subject had been referred, found it impossible to ascertain and agree upon the true boundary line of Texas, and accordingly
authorized me, as their Chairman, to report a bill for adjusting the
boundary upon an arbitrary but convenient line, drawn through the
the centre of the Desert, and to pay Texas          dollars for
relinquishing her claim to the waste lands outside of that line. I,
therefore, reported this provision, at the same time that I brought in
the bills for California, Utah, and New Mexico, with the intention of
moving to fill the blank with ten millions of dollars. When the Committee of Thirteen, which was subsequently appointed, united into
one the several bills which had been reported by the Committee on
Territories, and thus formed what has been known as the " Omnibus
Bill," they made a slight change in the line which had been agreed
upon by the Territorial Committee. Upon the defeat of the Omnibus, Mr. PIERCE, of Maryland, brought in a separate bill for adjusting this boundary, predicated upon the principle, also, of an arbitrary
but convenient line through the Desert, changing the courses, however, so as to obviate some objections which have been urged to the
others, and paying Texas ten millions of dollars for relinquishing her
claim. This bill, after having been joined in the House of Representatives to the bill establishing a Territorial Government for New
Mexico, passed both Houses, and became the law of the land. The
people of Texas have since ratified it at the polls by an overwhelming
majority; and thus this dangerous element of agitation has been




11
withdrawn from the controversy by the mutual assent of the parties.
And yet there are organized parties, in both extremes of the Union,
who are striving to re-open the controversy by persuading the people
that the rights and interests of their own particular section have been
basely betrayed in the settlement of this question. At the South, it
is boldly proclaimed, and every where repeated, that sixty thousand
square miles of Slave Territory have been sold and converted into
Free Soil. On the other hand, the Northern Nullifiers and Abolitionists are industriously impressing it upon the people, that more than
fifty thousand square miles of Free Soil have been transferred to
Texas, and converted into Slave Territory, by the act of Congress
adjusting the Texas boundary. Such are the extremities to which
prejudice and ambition can lead desperate men! Neither party has
gained or lost any thing, so far as the question of slavery is concerned.
Texas has gained ten millions of dollars, and the United States
have saved, in blood and treasure, the expenses of a civil war.
The next in the series of measures was the Bill for the Abolition
of the Slave Trade in the District of Columbia. This bill was prepared and reported by the Committee of Thirteen, and I gave it my
cordial support. It has been represented at the South as a concession to the North, to induce us to perform our duties under the
Constitution in the surrrender of fugitives from labor, and much
opposition has beeen raised against the whole scheme of adjustment
on that account.  I did not regard it in that light.   My vote was
given upon no such considerations. I believed each of the measures
substantially right in itself, and, under the extraordinary circumstances by which we were surrounded, eminently wise and expedient. The bill does not abolish slavery in the District-does not
emancipate the few slaves that are there, and interferes with no man's
right of property. It simply provides that slaves shall not be brought
from the surrounding States, or elsewhere, into the District for sale.
In this respect, Congress only followed the example of the legislatures of Maryland, North Carolina, Kentucky, and, in fact, most of
the Slaveholding States. The country embraced within the limits of
the District of Columbia, therefore, stands in precisely the same
relation to the slave trade under this law, that it would have
stood under the laws of Maryland, if it had never been separated
from that State. What justification can there be, then, for the
assertion that this was a concession to the North? It does nothing
more nor less than to apply the general principles of the legislation
of a majority of the Southern States to the District of Columbia.
But, while it was no concession from one section to the other, I had
a right to expect that those modern philanthropists who have
declaimed so eloquently and violently against the disgrace of the
National Capitol, by the slave trade within its precincts, would have
rejoiced with exceeding joy at the passage of this act.   I have listened in vain for one word of approval or commendation from the
advocates of abolition and nullification.   While the whole series
of Compromise measures are denounced in coarse and unmeasured
terms, not one word of congratulation to the friends of freedom-.




12
not a word of approval of the act or of the conduct of those who
voted for it-is allowed to escape their lips.  All the other measures
of the scheme of adjustment are attempted to be kept in the back
ground, and concealed from the public view, in order that more prominence and importance may be given to what they are pleased to
call " THE INFAMOUS FUGITIVE SLAVE BILL.")
Before I proceed to the exposition of that bill, I will read the pre
amble and resolutions passed by the Common Council of this city,
night before last.
Mr. DOUGLAS then read as follows
Whereas, The Constitution of the  presentatives in Congress from the Free
United States provides that the privilege  States, who aided and assisted in the
of the writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be  passage of this infamous law, and those
suspended, unless when, in cases of re-  who basely sneaked away from their
bellion or invasion, the public safety  seats and thereby evaded the question,
may require it; and,                 richly merit the reproach of all lovers of
Whereas, the late act of Congress,  freedom, and are fit only to be ranked
purporting to be for the recovery of  with the traitors, Benedict Arnold and
fugitiveslaves, virtually suspends the  Judas Iscariot, who betrayed his Lord
Habeas Corpus and abolishes the right of  and Master for thirty pieces of silver.
trial by jury, and by its provisions, not.nd Resolved, That the citizens, ofonly fugitive slaves, but white men,  ficers, andpolice of the city be, and they
" owing service" to another in another  are hereby, requested to abstain from
State, viz.: the apprentice, the mecha-  any and all interference in the capture
nic, the farmer, the laborer engaged on  and delivering up of the fugitive from
contract or otherwise, whose terms of  unrighteous oppression, of whatever naservice are unexpired, may be captured  tion, name, or color.
and carried off summarily and without    Resolved, That the Fugitive Slave Law
legal resource of any kind; and,     lately passed by Congress is a cruel and
Whereas, No law can be legally or  unjust law, and ought not be respected
morally binding on us which violates the  by any intelligent community, and that
provisions of the Constitution; and,    this Council will not require the city poWhereas, Above all, in the respon-  lice to render any assistancs for the arsibilities of human life, and the practice  rest of fugitive slaves:
and propagation of Christianity, the    AYEs-Ald. Milliken, Loyd, Sherwood,
laws of God should be held paramount  Foss, Throop, Sherman, Richards, Brato all human compacts and statutes:  dy, and Dodge.
Therefore,                             NAYs-Ald. Page and Williams.
Resolved, That the Senators and ReBut for the passage of these resolutions, said Mr. D., I should
not have addressed you this evening, nor, indeed, at any time before
my return to the Capitol.   I have no desire to conceal or withhold
my opinions, no wish to avoid the responsibility of a full and frank
expression of them, upon this and all other subjects, which were
embraced in the action of the last session of Congress. My reasons
for wishing to avoid public discussion at this time, were to be fountr
in the state of my health and the short time allowed me to remain
among you.
Now to the resolutions.   I make no criticism upon the language
in which they are expressed; that is a matter of taste, and in every
thing of that kind I defer to the superior refinement of the city
fathers. But it cannot be disguised that the polite epithets of
"traitors, Benedict Arnold and Judas Iscariot, who betrayed his
lord and master for thirty pieces of silver," will be understood
abroad as having a direct personal application to my esteemed col



18
league, General SHIELDS, and myself.   Whatever may have been
the intention of those who voted for the resolutions, I will do the
members of the council the justice to say, that I do not believe they
intended to make any such application. But their secret intentions
are of little consequence, when they gave their official sanction to a
charge of infamy, clothed in such language that every man who
reads it must give it a personal application. The whole affair, however, looks strange, and even ludicrous, when contrasted with the
cordial reception and public demonstrations. of kindness and confidence, and even gratitude for supposed services, extended to my
colleague and myself, upon our arrival in this city one week ago.
Then we were welcomed home as public benefactors, and invited
to partake of a public dinner, by an invitation numerously signed
by men of all parties and shades of opinion.  The invitation had
no sooner been declined, for reasons which were supposed to be
entirely satisfactory, and my colleague started for his home, than
the Common Council, who are presumed to speak officially for the
whole population of the city, attempted to brand their honored
guests with infamy, and denounce them  as Benedict Arnolds and
Judas Iscariots! I have read somewhere that it was a polite custom, in other countries and a different age, to invite those whom
they secretly wished to destroy to a feast, in order to secure a more
convenient opportunity of administering the hemlock! I acquit the
Common Council of any design of introducing that custom into our
hospitable city. But I have done with this subject, so far as it has
a personal bearing.
It is a far more important and serious matter, when viewed with
reference to the principles involved, and the consequences which may
result. The Common Council of the city of Chicago have assumed
to themselves the right, and actually exercised the power, of determining the validity of an act of Congress, and have declared it void
upon the ground that it violates the Constitution of the United States
and the Law of God! They have gone further; they declared, by a
solemn official act, that a law passed by Congress " ought not to be
respected by any intelligent community,"  and have called upon
"the citizens, officers, and police of the city" to abstain from repr
dering any aid or assistance in its execution!  What is this, but
naked, unmitigated nullification?   An act of the American Con.,
gress nullified by the Common Council of the city of Chicago!
Whence did the Council derive their authority?  I have. been able
to find no such provision in the city charter, nor am I aware that the
legislature of Illinois is vested with any rightful power to confer
such authority. I have yet to learn that a subordinate municipal
corporation is licensed to raise the standard of rebellion, and throw
off the authority of the Federal Government, at pleasure!  This
is a great improvement upon South Carolinian nullification.   It
dispenses with the trouble, delay, and expense of convening legislatures and assembling conventions-of the people, for the purpose of
resolving themselves back into their original elements, preparatory
to the contemplated revolution. It has the high merit of marching




14
directly to its object, and by a simple resolution, written and
adopted on the same night, relieving the people from their oaths and
allegiance, and of putting the nation and its laws at defiance!  It
has heretofore been supposed, by men -of antiquated notions, who
have not kept up with the progress of the age, that the Supreme
Court of the United States was invested with the power of determining the validity of an act of Congress passed in pursuance of
the forms of the Constitution. This was the doctrine of the entire
North, and of the Nation, when it became necessary to exert the
Whole power of the Government to put down nullification in another
portion of the Union. But the spirit of the age is progressive, and'is by no means confined to advancement in the arts and physical
sciences.  The science of politics and of government is also rapidly
advancing to maturity and perfection.   It is not long since that I
heard an eminent lawyer propose an important reform in the admirable judicial system of our State, which, he thought, would render
it perfect. It was so simple and eminently practicable, that it couldi
not fail to excite the admiration of even the casual inquirer.  His
proposition was, that our judicial system should be so improved as
to allow an appeal, on all constitutional questions, from the Supreme
Court of this State to two Justices of the Peace! WVhen that shall
have been effected, but another reform will be necessary to render
our national system perfect, and that is, to change the Federal
Constitution, so as to authorize an appeal, upon all questions touching the validity of acts of Congress, from the Supreme Court of
the United States to the Common Council of the City of Chicago!
So much for the general principles involved in the acts of the
council.  I will now examine briefly the specific grounds of objection urged by the Council against the Fugitive Slave Bill, as reasons
why it should not be obeyed.
The objections are two in number: first, that it suspends the
writ of habeas corpus in time of peace, in violation of the Constitution; secondly, that it abolishes the right of trial by jury.
How the Council obtained the information that these two odious
provisions were contained in the law, I am unable to divine.   One
thing is certain, that the members of the council, who voted for
these resolutions, had never read the law, or they would have disco-vered their mistake.  There is not one word in it in respect to the'writ of habeas corpus or the right of'trial by jury.   Neither of
-these subjects is mentioned or referred to.   The law is entirely,silent on those points. Is it to be said that an act of Congress,
which is silent on the subject, is to be construed to repeal a great,constitutional right by implication?  Besides, this act is only an.amendment-amendatory of the old law-the act of 1793-but does'not repeal it. There is no difference between the original act and:the amendment, in this respect.   Both are silent in regard to the
-writ of habeas corpus and the right of trial by jury. If to be silent
is to suspend the one and abolish the other, then the mischief was
Zdone by the old Iaw fifty-seven years ago. If this construction be




15
correct, the writ of habeas corpus has been suspended, and trial by
jury abolished, more than half a century, without any body ever discovering the fact, or, if knowing it, without uttering a murmur of
complaint.
Mr. DOUGLAS then read the whole of the act of 1793, and compared its provisions with the amendments of last session, for the
purpose of showing that the writ of habeas corpus and the right of
trial by jury were not alluded to or interfered with by either.
But I maintain, said Mr. D., that the writ of habeas corpus is
applicable to the case of the arrest of a fugitive under this law,
in the same sense in which the Constitution intended to confer it,
and to the fullest extent for which that writ is ever rightfully issued
in any case.  In this I am fully sustained by the opinion of Mr.
Crittenden, the Attorney General of the United States. As soon as
the bill passed the two houses of Congress, an abolition paper raised
the alarm that the habeas corpus had been suspended. The cry was
eagerly caught up, and transmitted, by lightning, upon the wires,
to every part of the Union, by those whose avocation is agitation. The
President of the United States, previous to signing the bill, referred
it to the Attorney General, for his opinion upon the point whether
any portion of it violated any provision of the Constitution of the
United States, and especially whether it could possibly be construed to suspend the writ of habeas corpus.  I have the answer of
the Attorney General before me, in which he gives it as his decided
opinion that every part of the law is entirely consistent with the
Constitution, and that it does not suspend the writ of habeas corpus.
I would commend the argument of the Attorney General to the
careful perusal of those who have doubts upon the subject. Upon
the presentation of this opinion, and with entire confidence in its
correctness, President Fillmore signed the bill.
[Here Mr. DOUGLAS was interrupted by a person present, who
called his attention to the last clause of the 6th section of the bill,
which he read, and asked him what construction he put upon it, if it
did not suspend the writ of habeas corpus.]
Mr. DOUGLAS, in reply, expressed thanks to the gentleman who
propounded the inquiry. His object was to meet every point, and remove every doubt that could possibly be raised; and he expressed the
hope that every gentleman present would exercise the privilege of
asking questions upon all points upon which he was not fully satisfied.
He then proceeded to answer the question which had been propounded.
That section of the bill provides for the arrest of the fugitive and
the trial before the commissioner; and, if the facts of servitude,
ownership, and escape be established by competent evidence, the
commissioner shall grant a certificate to that effect, which certificate
shall be conclusive of the right of the person in whose favor it is
issued, to remove the fugitive to the State from which he fled.
Then comes the clause which is supposed to suspend the habeas corpus: i".nd shall prevent all molestation of said person or persons by
any process issued by any court, judge, magistrate, or other person
whomsoever."




16
The question is asked, whether the writ of habeas corpus is not a
"C process" within the meaning of this act?   I answer, that it undoubtedly is such a " process," and that it may be issued by any
court or judge having competent authority-not for the purpose of
"molesting" a claimant, having a servant in his possession, with
such a certificate from the commissioner or judge, but for the purpose of ascertaining the fact whether he has such a certificate or not;
and if so, whether it be in due form of law; and if not, by what authority he held the servant in custody. Upon the return of the writ of habeas corpus, the claimant will be required to exhibit to the court his authority, for conveying the servant back; and if he produces a " certi
ficate" from the commissioner or judge, in due form of law, the
court will decide that it has no power to "' molest the claimant" in
the exercise of his rights under the law and the Constitution. But
if the claimant is not able to produce such certificate, or other
lawful authority, or produces one which is not in conformity with law,
the court will set the alleged servant at liberty, for the very reason
that the law has not been complied with. The sole object of the writ
of habeas corpus is to ascertain by what authority a person is held
in custody; to release him, if no such authority be shown; and to
refrain from any molestation of the claimants, if legal authority be
produced. The habeas corpus is necessary, therefore, to carry the
fugitive law into effect, and, at the same time, to prevent a violation
of the rights of freemen under it. It is essential to the security
of the claimant, as well as the protection of the right of those liable
to be arrested under it. The reason that the writ of habeas corpus
was not mentioned in the bill must be obvious. The object of the
new law seems to have been, to amend the old one in those particulars wherein experience had proven amendments to be necessary,
and in all other respects to leave it as it had stood from the days of
Washington. The provisions of the old law have been subjected to
the test of long experience-to the scrutiny of the bar and the judgment of the courts.  The writ of habeas corpus had been adjudged
to exist in all cases under it, and had always been resorted to when
a proper case arose. In amending the law there was no necssity for
any new provision upon this subject, because nobody desired to
change it in this respect.
But why this extraordinary effort, on the part of the professed
friends of the fugitive, to force such a construction upon the law, in
the absence of any such obnoxious provision, as to deprive him of
the benefit of the writ of habeas corpus? The law does not do so
in terms; and if it is ever accomplished, it must be done by implication, contrary to the understanding of those who enacted it, and in
opposition to the practice of the courts, acquiesced in by the people,
from the foundation of thegovernment.  One would naturally suppose, that if there was room for doubt as to what is the true construction, those who claim to be the especial and exclusive friends
of the negro would contend for that construction which is most
favorable to liberty, justice, and humanity. But not so. Directly
the reverse is the fact. They exhaust their learning, and exert all




17
their ingenuity and skill, to deprive the negro of all rights under the
law.  What can be the motive?  Certainly not to protect the rights
of the free, or to extend liberty to the oppressed; for they strive to
fasten upon the law such a construction as would defeat both of these
ends. Can it be a political scheme, to render the law odious, and to
excite prejudice against all who voted for it or were unavoidably
absent when it passed?  No matter what the motive, the effect would
be disastrous to those whose rights they profess to cherish, if their
efforts should be successful.
Now, a word or two in regard to the right of trial by jury. The
City Council, in their resolutions, say that this law abolishes that
right. I have already shown you that the Council are mistakenthat the law is silent upon the subject, and stands now precisely
as it has stood for half a century.   If the law is defective on that
point, the error was committed by our fathers in 1793, and the people have acquiesced in it ever since, without knowing of its existence or caring to remedy it.   The new act neither takes away nor
confers the right of trial by jury. It leaves it just where our
fathers and the Constitution left it under the old law.   That the
right of trial by jury exists in this country for all men, black or
white, bond or free, guilty or innocent, no man will be disposed to
question who understands the subject. The right is of universal application, and exists alike in all the States of the Union; it always
has existed, and always will exist, so long as the Constitution of
the United States shall be respected and maintained, in spite of the
efforts of the abolitionists to take it away by a perversion of the
Fugitive Law.  The only question is, where shall this jury trial
take place?  Shall the jury trial be had in the State where the arrest is made, or the State from which the fugitive escaped?  Upon
this point the act of last session says nothing, and, of course, leaves
the matter as it stood under the law of'93.   The old law was
silent on this point, and therefore left the courts to decide it in accordance with the Constitution.   The highest judicial tribunals in
the land have always held that the jury trial must take place in the
State under whose jurisdiction the question arose, and whose laws
were alleged to have been violated.   The same construction has
always been given to the law for surrendering fugitives from justices
It provides also for sending back the fugitive, but says nothing about
the jury trial, or where it shall take place. Who ever supposed that
that act abolished the right of trial by jury?  Every day's practice
and observation teach us otherwise.   The jury trial is always had
in the State from which the fugitive fled.  So it is with a fugitive
from labor. When he returns, or is surrendered under the law, he
is entitled to a trial by jury of his right of freedom, and always has
it when he demands it. There is great uniformity in the mode of
proceeding in the courts of the Southern States in this respect.
When the supposed slave sets up his claim, to the judge or other
officer, that he is free, and claims his freedom, it becomes the duty
of the court to issue its summons to the master to appear in court
with the alleged slave, and there to direct an issue of freedom or




18
servitude to be made and tried by a jury.   The master is, also,
required to enter into bonds for his own appearance and that of the
alleged slave at the trial of the cause, and that he will not remove
the slave from the county or jurisdiction of the court in the meantime.  The court is also required to appoint counsel to conduct the
cause for the slave, while the master employs his own counsel. All
the officers of the court are required by law to render all facilities
to the slave for the prosecution of his suit free of charge, such as
issuing and serving subpoenas for witnesses, &c. If upon the trial
the alleged slave is held to be a free man, the master is required
to pay the costs on both sides. If, on the other hand, he is held to
be a slave, the State pays the costs.  This is the way in which the
trial by jury stood under the old law; and the new one makes no
change in this respect.  If the act of last session be repealed, that
will neither benefit nor injure the fugitive, so far as the right of
trial by jury is concerned.
For these two reasons-the habeas corpus and the trial by jurythe Common Council have pronouned the law unconstitutional, and
declared that it ought not to be respected by an enlightened community. I have shown that neither of the objections are well founded, and
that if they had taken the trouble to read the law before they nullified it, they would have avoided the mistake into which they have
fallen. I have spoken of the acts of the City Council in general
terms, and it may be inferred that the vote was unanimous. I take
pleasure in stating, that I learn from the published proceedings, that
there was barely a quorum present, and that Aldermen Page and
Williams voted in the negative.
Having disposed of the two reasons assigned by the Common
Council for the nullification of the law, I shall be greatly indebted
to any gentleman who will point out any other objection to the new
law, which does not apply with equal force to the old one. My object in drawing the parallel between the new and old law is this:
the law of':93 was passed by the patriots and sages who framed
our glorious Constitution, and approved by the Fatter of his Country. I have always been taught to believe that they were men well
versed in the science of government, devotedly attached to the cause
of freedom, and capable of construing the Constitution in the spirit
in which they made it. That act has been enforced and acquiesced in
for more than half a century, without a murmur or word of complaint
from any quarter.
I repeat-will any gentleman be kind enough to point out a single
objection to the new law, which might not be urged with equal propriety to the act of'93?
[Here a gentleman present rose, and called the attention of Mr.
DOUGLAS to the penalties in the seventh section of the new law, and
desired to know if there were any such obnoxious provisions in the
old one.]
Mr. DOUGLAS then read the section referred to, and also the fourth
section of the act of'93, and proceeded to draw the parallel between
them. Each makes it a criminal offence to resist the due execution




19
of the law; to knowingly and wilfully obstruct or hinder the claimant in the arrest of the fugitive; to rescue such fugitive from the
claimant when arrested; to harbor or conceal such person after notice that he or she was a fugitive from labor. In this respect the
two laws were substantially the same in every important particular.
Indeed the one was almost a literal copy of the other. I can conceive
of no act which would be an offence under the one, that would not be
punishable under the other. In the speeches last night, great importance was given to the clause which makes it an offence to harbor or
conceal a fugitive. You were told that you could not clothe the
naked, nor feed the hungry, nor exercise the ordinary charities towards suffering humanity, without incurring the penalty of the law.
Is this a true construction of that provision?  The act does not so
read. The law says that you shall not " harbor or conceal such fugitive, so as to prevent the discovery and arrest of such persons after
notice or knowledge of the fact that such person was a fugitive from
service or labor as aforesaid." This does not deprive you of the privilege of extending charities to the fugitive. You may feed him,
clothe him, may lodge him, provided you do not harbor or conceal
him, so as to prevent discovery and arrest, after notice or knowledge
that he is a fugitive. The offence consists in preventing the discovory and arrest of the fugitive after knowledge of the fact, and not
in extending kindness and charities to him. This is the construction
put upon a similar provision in the old law by the highest judicial
tribunals in the land. The only difference between the old law and
the new one, in respect to obstructing its execution, is to be found
in the amount of the penalty, and not in the principle involved.
But it is further objected, that the new law provides, in addition to
the penalty for a civil suit for damages, to be recovered by an action
of debt by any court having jurisdiction of the cause. This is true;
but it is also true that a similar provision is to be found in the old
law.   The concluding clause in the last section of the act of'93
is as follows:
" Which penalty may be recovered by and for the benefit of such
claimant, by action of debt, in any proper court to try the same;
saving, moreover, to the person claiming such labor or service, his
right of action for or on account of the said injuries, or either of
them.n."
Thus it will be seen, that upon this point there is no difference
between the new and the old law.
Is there any other provision of this law upon which explanation
is desired?
[A gentleman present referred to the 10th section, and desired an
explanation of the object and effect of the record from another State
therein provided for.]
I am glad, said Mr. D., that my attention has been called to
that provision; for I heard a construction given to it, in the speeches
last night, entirely different to the plain reading and object of that
section. It is said, that this provision authorizes the claimant to go
before a court of record of the County and Stato where he lives,




20
and there establish by ex parte testimony, in the absence of the
fugitive, the fact of servitude, of ownership, and escape; and when
a recod of these facts shall have been made, containing a minute description of the slave, it shall be conclusive evidence against a person
corresponding to that description, arrested in another State, and
shall consign the person so arrested to perpetual servitude. The
law contemplates no such thing, and authorizes no such result. I
have the charity to believe that those who have put this construction
upon it have not carefully examined it.   The record from another
State predicated upon " satisfactory proof to such court or judge"
before whom the testimony may be adduced, and the record made,
is to be conclusive of two facts only:
1st. That the person named in the record does owe service to the
person in whose behalf the record is made.
2d. That such person has escaped from service.
The language of the law is, that " the transcript of the record authenticated," &c., "shall be held and taken to be full and conclusive
evidence of the fact of escape, and that the service or labor of such
person escaping, is due to the party in such record mentioned." The
record is conclusive of these two facts, so far as to authorize the fugitive to be sent back for trial under the laws of the State whence he
fled; but it is no evidence that the person arrested here is the fugitive
named in the record.  The question of identity is to be proven here
to the satisfaction of the commissioner or judge, before whom the trial
is had, by " other andfurther evidence." This is the great point in
the case. The whole question turns upon it. The man arrested may
correspond to the description set forth in the record, and yet not be
the same individual. We often meet persons resembling each other to
such an extent, that the one is frequently mistaken for the other.
The identity of the person becomes a matter of proof-a fact to be
established by the testimony of competent and disinterested witnesses,
and to be decided by the tribunal before whom the trial is had, conscientiously and impartially, according to the evidence in the case.
The description in the record, unsupported by other testimony, is
not evidence of the identity. It is not inserted for the especial benefit of the claimant-much less to the prejudice of the alleged slave.
It is required as a test of truth, a safeguard against fraud, which will
often operate favorably to thie fugitive, but never to his injury. If
the description be accurate and true, no injustice can possibly result
from it. But if it be erroneous or false, the claimant is concluded by
it; and the fugitive, availing himself of the error, defeats the claim
in the same manner as a discrepancy between the allegations and the
proof, in any other case, results to the advantage of the defendant.
I repeat, that when an arrest is made under a record from another
State, the identity of the person must be established by competent
testimony.  The trial in this instance, would be precisely the same
as in the case of a white man arrested on the charge of being a fugitive from justice.  The writ of the Governor, predicated upon an indictment, or even an affidavit, from another State, containing the
charge of crime, would be conclusive evidence of the right to take the




21
fugitive back; but the identity of the person in that case, as well as
a fugitive from labor, must be proven in the State where the arrest is
made, by competent witnesses, before the tribunal provided by law
for that purpose. In this respect, therefore, the negro is placed upon
a perfect equality with the white man who is so unfortunate as to be
charged with an offence in another State, whether the charge be true
or false. In some resj ects, the law guards the rights of the negro,
charged with being a fugitive from labor, more rigidly than it does
those of a white man, who is alleged to be a fugitive from justice.
The record from another State, must be predicated upon " proof satisfactory to the court or judge" before whom it is made, and must set
forth the " matter proved," before it can be evidence against a fugitive from labor, or for any purpose; whereas, an innocent white man,
who is so unfortunate as to be falsely charged with crime in another
State, by the simple affidavit of an unknown person, without indictment, or proof to the satisfaction of any court, is liable to be transported to the most distant portions of this Union for trial.
Here we find the act of last session is a great improvement upon
the law of'93, in reference to fugitives, white or black, whether they
fled from justice or labor. But it is objected that the testimony before the court making the record is ex parte, and therefore in violation
of the principles of justice and the Constitution, because it deprives
the accused of the privilege of meeting the witnesses face to face, and
of cross-examination.  Gentlemen forget that all proceedings for the
arrest of fugitives are necessarily ex parte, from the nature of the
case. They have fled beyond the jurisdiction of the court, and the
object of the proceeding is that they may be brought back, confront
the witnesses, and receive a fair trial according to the Constitution
and Laws.  If they would stay at home in order to attend the trial
and cross-examine the witnesses, the record would be unnecessary,
and the Fugitive Law in-operative.  It is no answer to this proposition to say that slavery is no crime, and therefore the parallel does
not hold good.  I am not speaking of the guilt or innocence of slavery.
I am discussing our obligations under the Constitution of the United
States. That sacred instrument says that a fugitive from labor
" shall be delivered up" on the claim of the owner.  The same clause
of the same instrument, provides that fugitives from justice shall be
delivered up.  We are bound by our oaths to our God, to see that
claim, as well as every other provision of the Constitution, carried
into effect. The moral, religious, and constitutional obligations resting upon us, here and hereafter, are the same in the one case as in
the other. As citizens, owing allegiance to the Government and duties to society, we have no right to interpose our individual opinions
and scruples, as excuses for violating the supreme law of the land as
our fathers made it, and as we are sworn to support it. The obligation is just as sacred, under the Constitution, to surrender fugitives
from labor as fugitives from justice. And the Congress of the United States, according to the decision of the Supreme Court, are as
imperatively commanded to provide the necessary legislation for the
cne as for the other. The act of 1793, to which I have had occasion




22
to refer so frequently, and which has been read to you, provided for
these two cases in the same bill. The first half of that act, relating
to fugitives from justice, applies, from the nature and necessity of the
case, principally to white men; and the other half, for the same reasons, applies exclusively to the negro race. I have shown you, by
reading and comparing the two laws in your presence, that there
is no constitutional guaranty-or common law right-or legal, or judicial privilege-for the protection of the white man against oppression
and injustice, under the law, framed in 1793, and now in force, for
the surrender of fugitives from justice, that does not apply in all its
force in behalf of the negro, when arrested as a fugitive from labor,
under the act of the last session. What more can the friends of the
negro ask than, in all his civil and legal rights under the Constitution) he shall be placed on an equal footing with the white man? But
it is said that the law is susceptible of being abused by perjury and
false testimony. To what human enactment does not.the same objection lie? You, or I, or any other man, who was never in California in his life, are liable, under the Constitution, to be sent there in
chains for trial as a fugitive from justice by means of perjury and
fraud. But does this fact prove that the Constitution, and the laws
for carrying it into effect, are wrong, and should be reseited, as we
were told last night, even unto the dungeon, the gibbet, and the grave?
It only demonstrates to us the necessity of providing all the safeguards, that the wit of man can devise, for the protection of the innocent and the free, at the same time that we religiously enforce, according to its letter and spirit, every provision of the Constitution.
I will not say that the act recently passed for the surrender of fugitives from labor accomplishes all this; but I will thank any gentleman to point out any one barrier against abuse in the old law, or in
the law for the surrender of white men, as fugitives from justice, that
is not secured to the negro under the new law. I pause, in order to
give any gentleman an opportunity to point out the provision. I invite inquiry and examination. My object is.to arrive at the truthto repel error and dissipate prejudice-and to avoid violence and
bloodshed. Will any gentlemen point out the provision in the old
law, for securing and vindicating the rights of the free man, that is
not secured to him in the act of last session?
[A gentleman present, rose and called the attention of Mr. DOUGLAS to the provision for paying out of the Treasury of the United
States, the expenses of carrying the fugitive back in case of anticipated resistance.]
Ah, said Mr. D., that is a question of dollars and cents, involving
no other principle than the costs of the proceeding! I was discussing the question of human rights-the mode of protecting the rights
of freemen from invasion, and the obligation to surrender fugitives
under the Constitution. Is it possible that this momentous question,
which, only forty-eight hours ago, was deemed of sufficient importance
to authorize the City Council to nullify an act of Congress, and raise
the standard of rebellion against the Federal Government, has dwindled down into a mere petty dispute, who shall pay the costs of suit 




23
This is too grave a question. for me to discuss on this occasion.  I
confess my utter inability to do it justice. Yesterday, the Constitution of the ocean-bound Republic had been overthrown; the privileges of the writ of habeas corpus had been suspended; the right of
trial by jury had been abolished; pains and penalties had been imposed upon every humane citizen who should feed the hungry and
cover the naked; the laws of God had been outraged by an infamous
act of a traitorous Congress; and the standard of rebellion, raised by
our city fathers, was floating in the breeze, calling on all good citizens
to rally under its sacred folds, and resist with fire and sword    the
payment of the costs of suit upon the arrest of a fugitive from labor!
I will pass over this point, and inquire whether there is any other
provision of this law upon which an explanation is desired? I hope
no one will be backward in propounding inquiries, for I have but a
few days to remain with you, and desire to make a clean business of
this matter on the present occasion. Is there any other objection?
[A gentleman rose, and desired to know why the bill provides for
paying ten dollars to the commissioner, for his fee, in case he decided
in favor of the claimant, and only five dollars if he decided against
him.]
I presume, said Mr. DOUGLAS, the reason was that he would have
more labor to perform. If, after hearing the testimony, the commissioner decided in favor of the claimant, the law made it his duty to
prepare and authenticate the necessary papers to authorize him to
carry the fugitive home; but if he decided against him, he had no
such labor to perform. The law seems to be based upon the principle that the commissioner should be paid according to the service he
should render-five dollars for presiding at the trial, and five dollars
for making out the papers in case the testimony should require him
to return the fugitive. This provision appears to be exciting considerable attention in the country, and I have been exceedingly gratified at the proceedings of a mass meeting held in a county not far
distant, in which it was resolved unanimously that they could not be
bribed, for the sum of five dollars, to consign a freeman to perpetual
bondage! This shows an exalted state of moral feeling, and highly
creditable to those who participated in the meeting. I doubt not
they will make their influence felt throughout the State, and will instruct their members of the Legislature to reform our criminal code
in this respect. Under our laws, as they have stood for many years,
and probably from the organization of our State Government, in all
criminal cases, on the preliminary examination before the magistrates,
and in all the higher courts, if the prisoner be convicted, the witnesses, jurors, and officers, are entitled to their fees and bills of costs;
but if he be acquitted, none of them receive a cent. In order to diffuse the same high moral sense throughout the whole community,
would it not be well, at their next meeting, to pass another resolution,
that they would not be bribed by the fees and costs of suit in any case,
either as witnesses, jurors, magistrates, or in any other capacity,
to consign an innocent man to a dismal cell in the penitentiary, or
expose him to an ignominious death upon the gallows?  Such a reso



24
lution might do a great deal of good in elevating the character of our
people abroad, at the same time that it might inspire increased confidence in the liberality and conscientiousness of those who adopted it!
Is there any other objection to this law?
[A gentleman rose, and called the attention of Mr. DOUGLAS to the
provision vesting the appointment of the Commissioners under it in
the courts of law, instead of the President and Senate, and asked if
*that was not a violation of that provision of the Constitution which
says, that Judges of the Supreme Courts, and of the inferior Courts,
should be appointed by the President and Senate.]
I thank the gentleman, said Mr. D., for calling my attention to this
point.  It was made in the speech of a distinguished lawyer last night,
and evidently produced great effect upon the minds of the audience.
The gentleman's high professional standing, taken in connexion with
his laborious preparation for the occasion, as was apparent to all,
from his lengthy written brief before him, while speaking, inspired
implicit confidence in the correctness of his position.  My answer to
the objection will be found in the Constitution itself, which I will read,
so far as it bears upon this questicn:
" The President shall nominate, and. by and with the consent of
the Senate, shall apoint ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls, judges of the Supreme Court, and all other officers of the United
States, where appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and
which shall be established by law."
Now it will seen that the words A" inferior courts " are not mentioned in the Constitution. The gentleman, in his zeal against the
law, and his frenzy to resist it, interpolated these words, and then
made a plausible argument upon them. I trust this was all unintentional, or was done with the view of fulfilling the " higher law."  But
there is another sentence in this same clause of the Constitution,
which I have not yet read.  It is as follows:
" But the Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of such inferior officers as they think proper, in the President alone, in the
Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments."
The practice under this clause, has usually been to confer the power of appointing those inferior officers, whose duties were executive or
ministerial, upon the President alone, or upon the head of the appropriate department; and in like manner to give to the courts of law
the privilege of appointing their subordinates, whose duties were in
their nature judicial. What is meant by " inferior officers," whose
appointment may be vested in the " courts of law," will be seen by
reference to the 8th section of the Constitution, where the powers of
Congress are enumerated, and among them is the following:
" To constitute tribunals inferior to the Supreme Court."
Is the tribunal which is to carry the Fugitive Law into effect inferior to the Supreme Court of the UInited States? If it is, the Constitution expressly provides for vesting the appointments in the courts
of law. I will remark, however, that these commissioners are not
appointed under the new law, but in obedience to an act of Congress
which has stood on the statute books for many years. If those who




25
denounce and misrepresent the act of last session, had condescended
to read it before they undertook to enlighten the people upon it, they
would have saved themselves the mortification of exposure, as I will
show by reading the first section.
Here Mr. DOUGLAS read the law, and proceeded to remark: Thus
it will be seen that these commissioners have been in office for years,
with their duties prescribed by law, nearly all of which were of a judicial character, and that the new law only imposes additional duties,
and authorizes the increase of the number.  Why has not this great
constitutional objection been discovered before, and the people informed how their rights have been outraged in violation of the supreme law of the land?  Truly, the passage of the Fugitive Bill has
thrown a flood of light upon constitutional principles!
Is there any other objection to the new law, which does not apply
to the act of'93?
[A gentlemen rose, and said that he would like to ask another
question, which was this: if the new law was so similar to the old
one, what was the necessity of passing any at all, since the old one
was still in force?]
Mr. DOUGLAS, in reply, said, that is the very question I was anxious
some one should propound, because I was desirous of an opportunity
of answering it.  The old law answered all the purposes for which it
was enacted tolerably well, until the decision by the Supreme Court
of the United States, in the case of Priggs vs. the State of Pennsylvania, eight or nine years ago.  That decision rendered the law comparatively in-operative, for the reason that there was scarcely any
officers left to execute it.  It will be recollected that the act of'93
imposed the duty of carrying it into effect, upon the magistrates and
other officers under the State Governments. These officers performed
their duties under that law, with fidelity, for about fifty years, until
the Supreme Court, in the case alluded to, decided that they were under no legal obligation to do so, and that Congress had no constitutional power to impose the duty upon them. From that time, many
of the officers refused to act, and soon afterwards, the Legislature of
Massachusetts, and many other States, passed laws making it criminal for their officers to perform these duties. Hence the old law,
although efficient in its provisions, and similar in most respects, and
especially in those now objected to, almost identical with the new law,
became comparatively a dead letter for want of officers to carry it
into effect. The judges of the United States courts were the only
officers left who were authorized to execute it. In this State, for instance, Judge Drummond, whose residence was in the extreme northwest corner of the State, within six miles of Wisconsin, and three of
Iowa, and in the direction where fugitives were least likely to go, was
the only person authorized to try the case.
If a fugitive was arrested at Shawneetown or Alton, three or four
hundred miles from the residence of the Judge, the master would attempt to take him across the river, to his home in Kentucky or Missouri, without first establishing his right to do so. This was calculated to excite uneasiness and doubts in the minds of our citizens, as to




26
the propriety of permitting the negro to be carried out of the State,
without the fact of his owing service, and having escaped, being first
proved, lest it might turn out that the negro was a free man, and the
claimant a kidnapper. And yet, according to the express terrms of
the old law, the master was authorized to seize his slave wherever lie
found him, and to carry him back without process, or trial, or proof
of any kind whatsoever.  Hence, it was necessary to pass the act of
last session, in order to carry into effect, in a peaceable atid orderly
manner, the provisions of the Law and the Constitution, on the one
hand, and to protect the free colored man from being kidnapped and
sold into slavery by unprincipled men, on the other hand.  The purpose of the new law is to accomplish these two objects —to appoint
officers to carry the law into effect, in the place of the magistrates relieved from that duty by decision of the Supreme Court, and to guard
against harrassing and kidnapping the free blacks, by preventing the
claimant from carrying the negro out of the State, until he establishes
his legal right to do so. The new law, therefore, is a great improvenment in this respect upon the old one, and is more favorable to justice and freedom, and better guarded against abuse.
[A person present asked leave to propound another question to Mr.
DOUGLAS, which was this: " If the new law is more favorable to freedom than the old one, why did the Southern slaveholders vote for it,
and desire its passage?"]
Mr. DOUGLAS said he would answer that question with a great deal
of pleasure. The Southern members voted for it for the reason that it
was a better law thlan the old one-better for them, better for us, and
better for the free blacks. It places the execution of the law in the
hands of responsible officers of the government, instead of leaving
every man to take the laws into his own hands and to execute it for
himself. It affords personal security to the claimant while arresting
his servant and taking him back, by providing him with the opportunity of establishing his legal rights by competent testimony before a
tribunal duly authorized to try the case, and thus allay all apprehensions and suspicions, on the part of our citizens, that he is a villain,
attempting to steal a free man for the purpose of selling him into
slavery. The slaveholder has as strong desire to protect the rights of
the free black man, as we have, and much more interest to do so; for
he well knows, that if outrages should be tolerated under the law, and
free men are seized and carried into slavery, from that moment the
indignant outcry against it would be so strong here, and every where,
that even a fugitive from labor could not be returned, lest he might
also happen to be free. The interest of the slaveholder, therefore,
requires a law which shall protect the rights of all free men, black or
white, from any invasion or violation whatever. I ask the question,
therefore, whether this law is not better than the old one-better for
the North and the South-better for the peace and quiet of the whole
country?  Let it be remembered that this law is but an amendment
of the act of'93, and that the old law still remains in force, except so
far as it is modified by this.  Every man who voted against this
modification, thereby voted to leave the old law in force; for I am




27
not aware that any member of either House of Congress ever had the
hardihood to propose to repeal the law, and make no provisions for
carrying the Constitution into effect.  But the cry of repeal, as to the
new law, has already gone forth.  Well, suppose it succeeds; what
will those have gained who joined in the shout?  Have I not shown
that all the material objections they urge against the new law, apply
with equal force to the old one? What do they gain, therefore, unless they propose to repeal the old law, also, and make no provision
for performing our obligations under the Constitution?  This must
be the object of all men who take that position.  To this it must
conie in the end. The real objection is not to the new law, nor to
the old one, but to the Constitution itself. Those of you who hold
these opinions, do not mean that the fugitive from labor shall be
taken back.  That is the real point of your objection.  You would
not care a farthing about the new law, or the old law, or any other
law, or what provisions it contained, if there was a hole in it big
enough for the fugitive to slip through and escape. Habeas corpuses
-trials by jury —records from other States-pains and penaltiesthe whole catalogue of objections, would be all moonshine, if the negro was not required to go back to his master. Tell me, frankly, is
not this the true character of your objection?
[Here several gentlemen gave an affirmative answer.]
Mr. DOUGLAS said he would answer that objection by reading a
portion of the Constitution of the United States. He then read as
follows:
" No person held to service or labor in one State, under the laws
thereof, escaping into another, shall, in consequence of any law or
regulation therein, be discharged from such service or labor, BUT
SHALL BE DELIVERED UP on the claim of the party to whom such
service or labor may be due."
This, said Mr. D., is the supreme law of the land, speaking to
every citizen of the Republic. The command is imperative. There
is no avoiding-no escaping the obligation, so long as we live under,
and claim the protection of, the Constitution. We must yield implicit obedience, or we must take the necessary steps to release ourselves from the obligation to obey. There is no other alternative.
We must stand by the Constitution of the Union, with all its compromises, or we must abolish it, and resolve each State back into
its original elements. It is, therefore a question of Union or Disunion. We cannot expect our brethern of other States to remain
faithful to the compact, and permit us to be faithless. Are we prepared, therefore, to execute faithfully and honestly, the compact our
fathers have made for us?
[Here a gentleman rose, and inquired of Mr. DOUGLAS, whether
the clause in the Constitution providing for the surrender of fugitive slaves was not in violation of the law of God?]
Mr. DOUGLAS in reply-The divine law is appealed to as authority
for disregarding our most sacred duties to society. The City Council have appealed to it, as their excuse for nullifying an act of Congress; and a committee embodied the same principle in their reso



28
lutions to thie meeting in this hall last night, as applicable both to
the Constitution and laws.  The general proposition that there is a
law paramount to all human enactments-the law of thle Supreme
Ruler of the Universe-I trust that no civilized and Christian people is prepared to question, much less deny.  We should all recognise, respect, and revere the divine law. But we should bear in
mind that the law of God, as revealed to us, is intended to operate
on our consciences, and insure the performance of our duties as individuals and Christians.  The divine law does not prescribe the
form of government under which we shall live, and the character of
our political and civil institutions.  Revelation has not furnished us
with a constitution —a code of international law-and a system of
civil and municipal jurisprudence.  It has not determined the right
of persons and property-much less the peculiar privileges which
shall be awarded to each class of persons under any particular form
of government.  God has created man in his own image, and endowed him with the right of self-government, so soon as lie shall
evince the requisite intelligence, virtue, and capacity, to assert anl
enjoy the privilege.
The history of the world furnishes few examples where any considerable portion of the human race have shown themselves sufficiently enlightened and civilized to exercise the rights and enjoy th.
blessings of freedom.  In Asia and Africa, we find nothing but
ignorance, superstition, and despotism.   Large portions of Europe,
and America, can scarcely lay claim to civilization and Christianity;
and a still smaller portion have demonstrated their capacity for
self-government.  Is all this contrary to the laws of God?   And
if so, who is responsible?
The civilized world have always held, that when any race of men
have shown themselves so degraded, by ignorance, superstition, cruelty, and barbarism, as to be utterly incapable of governing themselves, they must, in the nature of things, be governed by others,
by such laws as are deemed applicable to their condition.   It is
upon this principle alone, that England justifies the form of government she has established in the Indies, and for some of her other
colonies-that Russia justified herself in holding her serfs as slaves,
and selling them as a part of the land on which they live-that our
Pilgrim Fathers justified themselves in reducing the negro and' Indian to servitude, and selling them as property-that we, in Illinois
and most of the Free States, justify ourselves in denying the negro
and the Indian the privilege of voting, and all other political rights
-and that many of the States of the Union justify themselves in
depriving the white man of the right of the elective franchise, unless
he is fortunate enough to own a certain amount of property.
These things certainly violate the principle of absolute equality
among men, when considered as component parts of a political society or government, and so do many provisions of the Constitution of
the United. States, as well as the several States of the Union. In
fact, no government ever existed on earth in which there was a
perfect equality, in all things, among those composing it and gov



29
erned by it. Neither sacred nor profane history furnishes an example. If inequality in the form and principles of government is
therefore to be deemed a violation of the laws of God, and punishable as such, who is to escape? Under this principle all Christendom is doomed, and no Pagan can hope for mercy! Many of these
things are, in my opinion, unwise and unjust, and, of course, subversive of Republican principles; but I am not prepared to say that
they are either sanctioned or condemned by the divine law. Who can
assert that God has prescribed the form and principles of government, and the character of the political, municipal, and domestic
institutions of men on earth? This doctrine would annihilate the
fundamental principle upon which our political system rests. Our
forefathers held that the people had an inherent right to establish
such Constitution and laws for the government of themselves and
their posterity, as they should deem best calculated to insure the
protection of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness; and that
the same might be altered and changed as experience should satisfy
them to be necessary and proper. Upon this principle the Constitution of the United States was formed, and our glorious Union
established. All acts of Congress passed in pursuance of the Constitution, are declared to be the supreme laws of the land, and the
Supreme Court of the United States is charged with expounding the
same. All officers and magistrates, under the Federal and State
Governments-executive, legislative, judicial, and ministerial-are
required to take an oath to support the Constitution, before they
can enter upon the performance of their respective duties. Any
citizen, therefore, who, in his conscience, believes that the Constitution of the United States is in violation of a " higher law," has
no right, as an honest man to take office under it, or exercise any
other function of citizenship conferred by it. Every person born
under the Constitution owes allegiance to it; and every naturalized
citizen takes an oath to support it. Fidelity to the Constitution is
the Qnly passport to the enjoyment of rights under it.   When a
Senator elect presents his credentials, he is not allowed to take his
seat until he places his hand upon the Holy Evangelist and appeals to
his God for the sincerity of his vow to support the Constitution.
He, who does this, with a mental reservation or secret intention to
disregard any provision of the Constitution, commits a double crime
-is morally guilty of perfidy to his God and treason to hisi untry!
If the Constitution of the United States is to be repudiated upou
the ground that it is repugnant to the divine law, where are the
friends of freedom and Christianity to look for another and a better? Who is to be the prophet to reveal the will of God and establish a Theocracy for us?
Is he to be found in the ranks of Northern Abolitionism, or of
Southern Disunion; or is the Common Council of the City of
Chicago to have the distiguised honor of furnishing the chosen one?
I will not venture to inquire what are to be the form and principles
of the new government) or to whom is to be intrusted the execution




30
of its sacred functions; for, when we decide that the wisdom of our
revolutionary fathers was foolishness, and their piety wickedness, and
destroy the only system of self-government that has ever realized the
hopes of the friends of freedom, and commanded the respect of
mankind, it becomes us to wait patiently until the purposes of the
Latter Day Saints shall be revealed unto us.
For my part, I am prepared to maintain and preserve inviolate
the Constitution as it is, with all its compromises, to stand or fall
by the American Union, clinging with the tenacity of life to all its
glorious memories of the past, and precious hopes of the future.
Mr. DOUGLAS then explained the circumstances which rendered
his absence unavoidable when the vote was taken on the Fugitive Bill
in the Senate. He wished to avoid no responsibility on account of
that absence, and therefore desired it to be distinctly understood,
that he should have voted for the bill if he could have been present.
He referred to several of our most prominent and respected citizens,
by name, as personally cognizant of the fact that he was anxious at
that time to give that vote.  He believed the passage of that or
some other efficient law a solemn duty, imperatively demanded by
the Constitution.   In conclusion, Mr. D. made an earnest appeal
to our citizens to rally as one man to the defence of the Constitution
and laws, and above all things, and under all circumstances, to put
down violence and disorder, by maintaining the supremacy of the
laws. He referred to our high character for law and order heretofore,
and also to the favorable position of our city for commanding the
trade between the North and South, through our canals and railroads, to show that our views and principles of action should be
broad, liberal, and national, calculated to encourage union and harmony, instead of disunion and sectional bitterness.  He concluded
by remarking, that he considered this question of fidelity to the
Constitution and supremacy of the laws, as so far paramount to all
other considerations, that he had prepared some resolutions to cover
these points only, which he would submit to the meeting, and take
their judgment upon them. If he had consulted his own feelings
and views only, he should have embraced in the resolutions a specific
approval of all the measures of the compromise; but as the question
of rebellion and resistance to the Federal Government has been distinctly presented, it has been thought advisable to meet that issue
on this occasion, distinct and separate from all others.
Mr. DOUGLAS then offered the following resolutions, which were
adopted without a dissenting voice:
Resolved, That it is the sacred duty of every friend of the Union to maintain.
and preserve inviolate, every provision of our Federal Constitution.
Resolved, That any law enacted by Congress, in pursuance of the Constitution,
should be respected as such by all good and 1 w-abiding citizens; and should be
faithfully carried into effect by the officers charged with its execution.
Resolved, That so long as the Constitution of the United States provides, that
all persons held to service or labor in one State, escaping into another State,
"SHALL BE DELIVERED UP on the claim of the party to whom the service or labor
may be due," and so long as members of Congress are required to take an oath to
Support the Constitution, it is their solemn and religious duty to pass all laws
necessary to carry that provision of the Constitution into effect.




31
Resolved, That if we desire to preserve the Union, and render our great Republic inseparable and perpetual, we must perform all our obligations under the Constitution, at the same time that we call upon our brethren in other States to yield
implicit obedience to it.
Resolved, That as the lives, property, and safety of ourselves and families depend upon the observance and protection of the laws, every effirt to excite any
portion of our population to make resistance to the due execution of the laws of the
land, should be promptly and emphatically condemned by every good citizen.
Resolved, That we will stand or fall by the American Union and its Constitution,
with all its compromises; with its glorious memories of the past, and precious hopes
of the future.
[The following was offered in addition by B. S. MORRIS, and also
adopted: ]
Resolved, That we, the people of Chicago, repudiate the resolutions passed by
the Common Council of Chicago, upon the subject of the Fugitive Slave Law passed
by Congress at its last session.
On the succeeding night, the Common Council of the City, repealed their nullifying resolutions, by a vote of twelve to one.








OF
HON. STEPHEN A. DOUGLAS,
ON THE
BILL TO REFUND THE FINE IMPOSED ON
GENERAL ANDREW JACKSON,
BY JUDGE HALL) OF NEW ORLEANS)
DELIVERED IN THE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTA'TIVES, AT WASHINGTON,
ON THE 6th JANUARY, 1844.
NE W-YORK:
PRINTED BY JARED W. BELL, 83 NASSAU STREET.
1851.








SPEECH
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
JANUARY 6, 1844.-While the Bill, " To refund the Fine imposed on GENERAL JACKSON, by Judge Hall, at JVew Orleans," was under discussion in
Committee of the Whole,
MR. DOUGLAS, of Illinois, observed that when this bill was introduced by the
learned gentleman from Pennsylvania, (Mr. C. J. Ingersoll,) he had hoped that it
would be permitted to pass without debate and without amendment; but the character of the amendment submitted by the gentleman from Georgia, (Mr. Stephens,) and the debate that had taken place on that amendment and the original
bill, had been so extraordinary as to justify and require the friends of the bill to go
into the discussion of the whole subject. For one, he was not prepared to shrink
from any question connected with the subject, nor was he prepared to admit the
correctness of the imputations cast upon the supporters of the measure, by gentlemen who had spoken in opposition to it.  It had been stigmatized as an afterthought or party trick, as a humbug, as an attempt to make political capital for
the next Presidential election.
Mr. DIcKINsoN, of Tenn., here explained, that if the gentleman alluded to
him, he had confined his remarks to the speeches and not to the bill.
Mr. DOUGLAS continued. He thought a fair construction required him to say,
that the gentleman confined his remarks to the speeches made in support of the
bill; but there were other gentlemen who did not, and who attacked the bill itself.
He then hurled back on them any imputations on the sincerity of those who advocate the passage of this bill. We have been told, (continued Mr. D.,) that we
are the pretended friends of General Jackson, and that those who take the opposite ground are his real friends.
Yet, in the very next breath, we find them denouncing him as a violator of the
law and the constitution, and as having trampled on the rights of the judiciary.
He applied these remarks to the gentleman from Tennessee, (Mr. Peyton,) so far
as he imputed to a majority of the House the introduction of a humbug-so far
as he asserted that it was a political design for the purpose of procuring political
capital for the next Presidential election.
Mr. PEYTON, of Tenn., asked leave to explain. If the gentleman would recollect the commencement of his remarks, the other day, he would find that he professed his wish to vote for the bill, and alluded to the speeches and action on it
here as a humbug, and as a design to obtain political capital, &c.
Mr. DOUGLAS said he alluded to the speeches of gentlemen on the
other side, when he characterised them as humbugs and as a political
design; for the gentlemen professed to be the friends of General
Jackson, while they were casting obloquy on his mame. Well might
the old hero say, God deliver me from my friends, if their friendship
is such as this.
Mr. D. insisted that this Bill was brought forward in good faith,
as an act of justice-justice to General Jackson, as well as to the
American people. To refuse to pass it, would be an act of the
grossest injustice to the American people, and would stamp them
with ingratitude to their bravest defender. He was not one to
admit that General Jackson violated the Constitution, or the law,
at New Orleans.  He denied that he violated either.  He insisted
that the General rightfully performed every act that his duty required, and that his right to declare martial law, and enforce it, resulted from the same source, and rested on the same principle, that
that the gentleman from N. Y., (Mr. Barnard,) asserted, from which
Judge Hall derived the authority to punish for contempt, without
trial, without witnesses, without jury, and without any thing but his
own arbitrary will. The gentleman asserted that the power to punish




4
for contempt was not conferred by the statute or by the common
law, but was inherent in every judicial tribunal and legislative body;
and he cited the authority\ of the Supreme Court to support the
assertion. He said that this power was necessary to the courts to
enable them to perform the duties which the laws entrused to them,
and arose from the necessity of the case. Now, it was from the
same source that the power to declare martial law was derived-its
necessity in time of war for the defence of the country. The defence
of the lives and liberties of the people as well as their properties,
being all entrusted to the discretion of the Commanding General, it
became his duty to declare martial law, if the necessity of the case
required it. If it became necessary to blow up a fort, he was authorized to do it; if it became necessary to sink a vessel, he was
authorized to do it; and if it became necessary to burn a city, he
was authorized to do it. The necessity of the case was the law to
govern him; and he, on his responsibility, must judge of the existence of that necessity. It was the first law of nature which authorized a man to defend his own person, and his wife and his children,
at all hazards. It was that law which authorized this body to repel
aggression and insult, and protect itself in the exercise of its legislative functions; and it was that law which authorized courts of justice to defend themselves and punish for contempts.
He acknowledged that this was a high-handed and despotic powerone that was only to be exercised when necessary, and which ceased
when the necessity no longer existed. Such was the power under
which General Jackson declared martial law at New Orleans. On
this part of the subject, he did not intend to go into the history of
all the occurences of that period-they had been detailed in a most
faithful and interesting manner by the gentleman from Louisiana,
(Mr. Slidell.) It was sufficient for him to know that General Jackson, who was the Commanding General, deemed it necessary to
declare martial law, in order to defend the city. It was sufficient for
him to know that the Governor and Legislature of the State deemed
it necessary. It was sufficient for him to know that the Courts and
the whole population of the City deemed it necessary; and it was
sufficient for him to know, that this immaculate Judge Hall, himself,
deemed it necessary. Ay, sir, did not this profound Judge-this
pure patriot-did he not understand the Constitution and laws when
he advised the General to declare martial laws? Did he deem that
his advice to the General was to trample on the laws? Was he perfidous when he gave such advice? Was he laying a trap for General
Jackson, to ensnare him? Was it in good faith, first to advise him
to declare martial law, and then punish him for it?  One of two
things was true: either that he thought it was the General's duty to
declare martial law, or that he was a false, perfidous enemy, seeking
to betray him. The most charitable conclusion was, that Judge
Hall did believe that martial law was necessary; and seeing the
near approach of the enemy-seeing the traitors in the camp, and
seeing the impending danger, did advise the General to declare
martial law. Then what right had he to arrest the execution of
it? If the General had the right to declare martial law, it was his
duty to execute it, and Judge Hall had no right to arrest the exe



cution of it. But let us, (said Mr. D.,) take another veiw of the subject.  Gentlemen, in this discussion, had assumed, with much boldness, that the judgment rendered by Judge Hall, was a legal one,
and in conformity with the strictest rules of justice. Now let us exmine, and see if it be so. In the limited time allowed him, (Mr.D.,)
he would not, on this part of the subject, question the power of the
Judge to punish for contempt. He would not for the sake of argument, question the power of the Judge to punish, at his own arbitrary will and discretion, without trial, without witnesses, &c. He
would concede the position that the Judge had the right to punish
for contempt; and then he would contend that he had no right, in
this case, to render that judgment, and that the judgment was
illegal. Now he took this ground: that the declaration of martial
law, of itself, was no contempt of the court; and if it was illegal,
it was a crime for which the General was responsible to a court
martial, or to the civil courts; but the law of contempts could not
reach him. Then did General Jackson do any act that amounted to a
contempt? Certainly not. We are told that he arrested the Frenchman, Louallier, and confined him in prison; but if he did do any thing
wrong in that act, (which Mr. D. would not admit,) he was only
liable to indictment, or an action for false imprisonment; but there
was no contempt of court in that act. Then as to the arrest and
imprisonment of Judge Hall himself. There was no contempt of
court in that act; for when the arrest was made, Judge Hall was
not sitting in court, but was at his lodgings as a private citizen.
No one can pretend that, if a judge of our courts is assaulted or
maltreated in the streets, he can go and open his court, and then
summon the party before him, and try him for contempt. In such
a case a judge must seek redress like any other private citizen.
General Jackson, therefore, in arresting Judge H1all, subjected
himself, if the act was illegal, to indictment for the false imprisonment of a citizen, but by no means rendered himself liable for contempt of court. But they were told that the real point was the
refusal of the General to obey the writ'of habeas corpus for Louallier. NQw, it must be borne in mind, that the writ was issued on the
5th, and was returnable on the 6th, at 11 o'clock; but it was never
shown to, or seen by General Jackson, till after the hour at which it
was returnable. The writ was therefore a nutility —it was dead,
and it was impossble for the General to obey or answer it, when
it was shown, for it was then no longer of any force whatever. The
General, however, on being brought before the court, submitted his
answer on oath, and in which he purged himself of the contempt
according to law; but the Judge, in a most arbitrary and tyrannical
manner, refused to receive the paper and entered the judgment
against him.   If the refusal to obey the writ of habeas corpus was
a contempt, still the General purged himself by oath, that it had
never come to his knowledge till after it was returnable.
General Jackson did it in this case, and the statement was not
contradicted; and still the fine was illegally imposed. He, (Mr.
D.,) was willing to stake this case on the mere question of law, and
he defied any lawyer, with all the aid of technicalities that could be
resorted to in the case, to show that General Jackson was guilty of




6
a contempt, within such a meaning as would properly subject him
to the fine that was imposed. Some gentlemen had discussed this
question as if the very declaration of martial law itself was a contempt; but he defied them to point out a single distinct fact which
amounted to a contempt. But let that pass.
The gentlemen from New York, (Mr. Barnard,) had pronounced
this bill unprecedented. He had said and others had said so too, that
it was an attempt to set aside a decison of a Court of Justice, and
to repudiate its sanctity and authority in an unprecedented manner.
But was it unprecedented? It might be unprecedented to remit a
fine for declaring martial law; for the imposition of such a fine was
unprecedented. They had been told that martial law had been declared by Gen. Wilkinson, and yet no punishment was inflicted for
that. It had also been done on the shores of the Lakes, by General
Gaines; and he, (Mr. D.,) had no doubt that it had been done by
others, without any fine being imposed, and hence no fine had been
refunded. But were bills, refunded fines, and penalties, and assessments, and damages, imposed on military commanders, unprecedented? If they would take the pains to look through the speech of
the late candid and sincere Dr. Linn, of whom no one could speak
but with respect, they would find many cases, commencing in
the last century and coming down to the present time, in which bills
of this kind had been passed. That had been settled, and is the uniform policy of this government, and the question now was, whether
the Hero of New Orleans should be excepted from the general
course of legislation?  Whoever recorded his vote against this
bill, stigmatized the character, and affixed a stain on the fair fame
of General Jackson, which Congress had uniformly refused to permit to remain on the character of other military and naval officers.
And why the exception? Why this unjust, this ignominious exception? Was there any thing in the conduct of General Jackson, at
New Orleans, that required that he should be made an exception?
Was there a man on this floor who had the hardihood to say there
was, and to impeach the motives, the purity, and the fidelity of
General Jackson in any act he did at New Orleans? Was there a
man there that would pretend to deny the necessity for the exercise
of that high summary authority to which General Jackson was compelled to resort? Was there a man there who would pretend that
General Jackson did not save the city, and the country, and the
laws, and the property of the citizens, by that very exercise of high
authority?
These things would not be questioned; the necessity and the glorious effects resulting from the course which that necessity prompted, were acknowledged by the whole country, and he would even say
by the whole civilized world.  Then, as far as this bill was concerned, he, (Mr. D.,) cared not whether their acts were legal or illegal. He cared not whether General Jackson violated the constitution,
or not. He cared not whether General Jackson suspended all civil
authority, or not. If his acts were necessary to the defence of the
country, that necessity was above all law.  Gen. Jackson hazarded
every thing; he hazarded both life and reputation on that step,
which might render him immortal if it saved the country, or on the




7
contrary, make him ignominous, and a by-word, and a reproach; and
the man that dared to do that, deserved the protection and the plaudits of his country. He did not envy the feelings of that man who
would get up.and talk calmly and cooly, under such circumstances,
about rules of court and technicalities of proceeding, and the danger
of example, when the city might be in flames and the utmost barbarity might be committed. What were rules of court but mere cobwebs, when he found an enemy with his cannon at the doors of their
courts, and when they saw the flames encircling the cupola? Talk
then about rules of court, and the formality of proceedings! The
man that would do this, would fiddle while the Capitol was burning.
[Sensation.] He envied not any man the possession of such stoical
philosophy.   Talk about illegallity!  Talk about formality!
Why, there was but one formality to be observed, and that was
the formality of directing the cannon, and destroying the enemy,
regardless of the means, whether it be by the seizure of cotton
bags, or the seizure of persons, if the necessity of the case required it.  The God of Nature has conferred this right on men and
nations; and, therefore, let him not be told that it was unconstitutional to defend the country.  Let him not be told that it was unconstitutional to use the necessary means.   The constitution was
adopted for the protection of the country; and under that constitution, had the right to exercise all the powers that were necessary for
the protection of the country.
If martial law was necessary to the salvation of the country,
martial law was legal for that purpose. If it was necessary for a
Judge, for the preservation of order, to punish for contempt, he
thought it was necessary for a General to exercise a control over
his cannon, to imprison traitors, and to arrest spies, and to intercept communications with the enemy. If this was necessary, all
this was legal.
But the ground on which he placed the defence-and he denied
that General Jackson did any act which was not justified by rightful and legal authority —was as high and as sacred as that of selfdefence.
General Jackson did not exercise any unnecessary arbitrary authority.  He did not suspend the civil law, nor close the civil
tribunals, any farther than was necessary for the carrying out of the
military defence of the country. To this extent he did do it, and
to this extent it was right that he should do it. In other respects,
the civil law, and the courts were in full force.   True, General
Jackson would not allow them to communicate with the enemy; but
they could not surrender ought to the enemy; he deprived them
of the power to commit treason; but he deprived them of no power
which an honest man would desire to exercise. He imposed no restraint that any man devoted to the country would regret; and the
men who instigated the proceedings against General Jackson, were
the men who skulked in the hour of danger.
But he wished to call the attention of the committee to the conduct of General Jackson after hostilities had ceased.  He wished
the committee to direct their attention to that closing scene, which
showed the true character and purposes of the man.   Whilst the




8
British forces were on our borders-whilst danger continued to exist
— whilst treason remained in his camp-whilst there was no necessity to use exertion-he stood firm and undaunted-erect and ready
to take any responsibility, and to defy any restraint; to face any
authority or enemy; either civil, or foreign, or military.  But the
moment the official news arrived, that Peace was declared-the moment the enemy retreated-the moment that danger ceased, and
the necessity for the rigid exercise of his military authority ceased
-he submitted to civil tribunals-he went into the court, and there
stood erect and calm-preserved that order which the Judge himself
could not preserve, and there submitted to punishment.  Did not
this fact of itself, show that he never intended to violate the Constitution or the law? Did it not demonstrate the sacred reverence
and regard that he felt for the supremacy of law? If he were the
despot he had been represented to be-if he were the arbitrary
desperado he was represented-would he, whilst surrounded
by a victorious army; whilst surrounded by the whole grateful population of the city; yes, whilst cheered on by the smiles and apprbation of the ladies themselves, have submitted quietly to the
exer'~e of that authority of the court? No; the desperado would
not have -lone this; the lawless man, the arbitrary man, would never have done this; nothing but the wise, the discreet, the patriotic
Statesman and General, could so suddenly have changed from the
Military Hero, to the humble citizen, and to have submitted to the
penalties of the law.
Then, in view of these facts, he asked the House what pretext
there was for voting against this bill?  O! it was said it had the
effect of accusation against Judge Hall.  Now, if there was any
objection to that bill, it was, that it did not contain a clause condemning and branding that Judge as he deserved.   Nothing-nothing but General Jackson, and his reverence for justice, protected
that Judge from the decree of Judge Lynch. If Judge Hall had
lived in any other country than this, and under any other Constitution than ours, his life would have paid the forfeit for his deeds.
But he, (Mr. D.,) did not wish to comment on the conduct of that
Judge.
He had a proper regard for the memory of that Judge, and for the
feelings of his friends, (if he had any,) and he could not but believe
that there was great impropriety on the part of a friend of that
Judge, in inserting his name in this bill, and thereby reviving his
memory. The name of Judge Hall had been thrust before them,
and they were driven to look at his conduct and character in all
their horrid deformity; and yet were they to be told as they had
been, that they had, Hyena like, dragged them from the grave.
He, (Mr. D.,) regretted that they had been dragged from the grave,
and that the memory of Judge Hall was destined to such an immortality as was secured to it now.