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I




To-Morrow in Cuba


I' 4 
BY    I.. *'MI PEPPER


CHARLES


NEW YORK'
YOUNG PEOPLE'S MISSIONARY MOVEMENT
OF THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA
I9Io




Copyright, 1899, by HARPER & BROTHERS.
A411rights reserved.




2bebfcation.
TO THE MEMORY OF MY FATHER,
THE REVEREND GEORGE W. PEPPER.




,,,   1!




PREFACE


MY profession as a newspaper correspondent took me
to Cuba in the spring of 1897. With the exception of
a short intermission passed with the American army
and navy outside the island, it kept me there in the
midst of the events shaping the destiny of the Antilles.
Impressions of these events as they appeared to me
were published in various journals. They were recorded from time to time as they were caught up at the
moment.
In the new responsibilities that have come to the
American people in the border tropics, exact information is above all things desirable. At the end of more
than two years it has seemed to me possible to give
information with perhaps more confidence than in the
beginning. What is set forth in these pages is not for
the purpose of supporting preconceived opinions or of
defending any special policy. While the author's views
are stated, it has been his aim to set forth the facts on
which these views are based. Some persons, doubtless,
will reach different conclusions. Whatever opinions
may be developed, it is important to know that the
problems of Cuba cannot be settled from without. On
the surface are the political questions; but deeper than
these lie the social and economic problems. It has


6 "-D0.r75
~-ia^907bp~~d~1Ec




PREFACE


seemed to me that if the American people could feel
themselves more at home in the surroundings in which
all these problems must be worked out, they would be
better equipped for the task. As the majority of them
cannot see for themselves, I have sought to make them
see through other eyes, with the belief that they will be
the better able to discriminate between the fretting circumstances which are transitory and the underlying
conditions which are permanent. To do this it is necessary to know something of the past, and it has been
my aim to exhibit the revolutionary movements of the
island in their true perspective.
In conclusion, the utterance of an Italian statesman
may be paraphrased, "Cuba is made, but who shall
make the Cubans?" and the answer be given, "Themselves." But under what conditions? Perhaps these
pages may aid those who seek an answer for the good of
Cuba and for the proper discharge of the responsibilities
of the United States.                 C. M. P.


WASHINGTON, D. C.




CONTENTS.
PAGE
CHAPTER I.
PROLOGUE To AUTONOMY,.3
CHAPTER IL
THE WESTERN INVASION,.23
CHAPTER III.
CAMPOS AND WEYLEE,... 47
CHAPTER IV.
WOOING THE LOST COLONY,..65
CHAPTER V.
EPILOGUE To AUTONOMY..84
CHAPTER VI.
TRANSITION To LOCAL HOME RULE,.... 107
CHAPTER VII.
PROVINCES AS A FEDERAL FRAMEWORK..124
CHAPTER VIII.
THE RACE OF COLOR,........141
CHAPTER IX.
THE, SPANISH COLONY,... 159
CHAPTER X.
IMMIGRATION AND COLONIZATION,..175
CHAPTER XI.
SUGAR AND TfOBACCO-OTHER PRODUCTS,... 192
vii




TO-MORROW IN CUBA.
PAGE
CHAPTER XII.
TRADR AND TAXATION-RAILWAYS AND INTERNAL DEVELOPMENT,.214
CHAPTER X1II.
RELIGION AS A WITHERED BRANCH,...   235
C HAPTE R XIV.
CUBAN PRIESTS THE LIVING BRANCH).253
CHAPTER XV.
MANNERS AND MORALS,.273
CHAPTER XVI.
AmERICAN MILITARY CONTROL.               291
CHAPTER XVII.
POLITICAL APTITUDES,.309
CHAPTER XVIII.
To-DAY.                                  328
APPENDIX A-BIBLIOGRAPHY...350
APPENDIX IB-TRADE PROSPECTS,....356




PART I
CHAPTERS FROM YESTERDAY




I




CO)...................




I




TO-MORROW IN CUBA
CHAPTER I
PROLOGUE TO AUTONOMY
Record of an Experiment-The Pact of El Zanj6n-Concessions
Which Were Not Autonomy-Grouping into Political PartiesProgramme of the Liberals-Loyalists the Union Constitutionals
-Echo of European Democratic Movement-Points of Agreement-Disappointment of Autonomists-Promulgation of Constitution-Growth of Autonomist Movement-Alarm of the
Privileged Classes-Farce of Cuban Representation in the
Cortes-Birth of Reformist Party-Its Members OpportunistsParties Engulfed in the Waves of Revolution-Influence of
Reciprocity Repeal and the Sugar Market.
AUTONOMY was instituted in Cuba on New Year's
Day, 1898. Twelve months later to a day Spanish
sovereignty was yielded in trust to the United States.
The developments of the intervening year were swift.
So rapidly had they moved that the chapter with which
they began was forgotten. In the broader field of world
domain that has opened to the United States as a consequence of the war with Spain, the brief existence of this
colonial experiment has almost passed from mind. Yet it
was the first attempt of Spain in four centuries to give her
colonies a system of self-government. Short as was the
period, the story of the experiment is worthy of record.
3




TO-MORROW IN CUBA


When the system was decreed in Cuba, the fondness
of the Latin intellect for historical sequences caused
much philosophical and reflective writing, which traced
the series of events precedent as the prologue to a
national drama. The real prologue to autonomy in the
Spanish Antilles was the Ten-Years' War, which raged
from 1868 to 1878. The machete and the torch then
gained what peaceful agitation had not been able to
achieve. The pact of El Zanjon which brought that
insurrection to an end was arranged by Martinez Campos and Maximo Gomez. It affirmed forgetfulness of
the past and gave pledges for the future. It was based
on promises to Cuba which were to insure to the rebellious island, once more become faithful, distinct political rights. Radical changes were to be made in the
organic laws and in the administrative system. Cubans
were to be recognized and to share in the government
of Cuba. They were to have representation in the
Cortes of Spain the same as Puerto Rico.
Spain carried out the letter of the pact of El Zanj6n.
The organic laws were changed. The restrictive statutes of printing, of public meetings, and of associations
or societies were modified and liberalized. A supposedly popular basis of Cuban representation in the
Cortes was provided, and the electoral law was passed
in conformity with that provision. In the administrative system the statute changes were many. They were
carried into effect to the extent of a nominal compliance
with the new laws. Mediaeval absolutism yielded some
of its cherished and hereditary privileges.
Yet neither the spirit nor the letter of the legislation
enacted in 1878, and in subsequent years, was autono4




TO-MORROW IN CUBA


mous. It was as if one of the provinces of the peninsula which had been under a discriminating system of
laws and administration had succeeded in getting itself
placed on the same plane as the other provinces. For
a colony beyond seas requiring a definite measure of
independence there was no recognition. A critical study
of the statutes and the administrative reforms enacted
by the Spanish Government after the peace of El Zanjon produces a plain deduction. A Cuban citizen as
a Spanish subject could engage in political agitation
with less danger of coming under the charge of conspiracy than formerly. Theoretically, also, his right to a
share in the local administration was conceded. With
a sincere and honest purpose on the part of the superior authorities a reasonable degree of local and insular
government might have been put in force. But the
analysis of the legislation and of the decrees of 1878 and
subsequent years shows that in essence there was little
dilution of what had always been the cardinal principle
of Spanish colonial government. This was military
rule. The paths were sometimes crooked, the passages
wound into labyrinths of cedulas, decrees, orders,
edicts, circulars, and bandos. They brought up at the
same barrier. The beginning and the end was the Governor-General exercising his military functions as Captain-General. After 1878, Cuba had good, bad, and
indifferent Captain-Generals. Their character was reflected in the administration of the island.
It would be an unnecessary task to set forth more in
detail wherein the legislation and the administrative acts
following the compact of El Zanjon were not autonomous.
A comparison with the actual regime of autonomy
5




TO-MORROW IN CUBA


when  established twenty years later is sufficient
to demonstrate it. Though the conception of colonial
home rule for Cuba was non-existent among the Spanish
statesmen of that day, the perception of it was clear on
the part of the thinking people of the island. They had
felt it when, three years before raising the cry of Yara in
1868, they signed a petition thanking the Duke de la
Torre for his motion in the Senate that political rights
be granted Cuba. All those things and many more,
they said in this document, foreshadowed that within
a few years there would be a change in policy, and
Cubans would be allowed some voice in the government
of their own island. The educated and wealthy Cubans
who in 1865 formed themselves into a national party
and urged administrative and economic changes upon
Madrid felt the lack of understanding among Spanish
statesmen. The concessions asked were not a broad application of civil liberties. When their programme was
rejected in its entirety they ceased to ask favors. They
inaugurated the Ten-Years' war.
Political organization of a mechanical and artificial
kind followed the restoration of peace. The grouping
was into Liberal and Union Constitutional parties.
This formal resolution of the political elements into
distinct and opposing groups took place in August,
1878. The first platform or declaration of Liberal principles was a conservative one. It accepted candidly the
peace established by the treaty of El Zanj6n, and proclaimed the principles which were the bases of that
compact. It was an organized, though timid, movement to hold the Spanish Government to the pledges
of reforms and enlarged liberties for Cuba. Its pro6




TO-MORROW IN CUBA


gramme was comprised under the respective heads of
social, political, and economic questions. Its foundation was the liberty of print, freedom of political meeting and association, religious liberty, and the right of
petition. Immunity of domicile, of person, of correspondence, and of property was claimed. It demanded
the application to Cuba in their integrity of the organic
laws of the peninsula, including municipal, provincial,
and electoral statutes. Reforms in criminal law were
included. It called for a colonial constitutional regimen as a vivification of the lifeless constitution of the
monarchy not then promulgated in Cuba. The admission of Cubans to the public offices on equality with
Spaniards was also affirmed. Laws which would insure
decentralization within the limits of the national unity
were indicated. The root trouble was recognized in the
demand for a separation and independence of the civil
and military powers. An Antillian constitution was declared to be necessary in order that the inhabitants of
Cuba might consecrate and organize with respect to its
government the principle of responsibility. This was
also asserted to be essential in order to reintegrate the
possession of the individual rights and the enjoyment of
the liberties which were proclaimed in the first article of
the constitution of the monarchy as inherent in the condition of the Spanish citizen. The economic difficulty
was met with boldness. Suppression of the export
duties was demanded. Reforms in the customs were
formulated which would prevent the excessive discrimination of the Spanish tariff-a discrimination practised
not for the benefit of Cuba, but for the enrichment of
Spain. The basis was that the tariff system should be
7




TO-MORROW IN CUBA


a fiscal and not a differential one. Reciprocity"with the
United States was particularly specified as desirable.
Exclusive white immigration and further emancipation
laws for the blacks were favored.
The Union Constitutional party formulated a programme which, in some of its declarations, was the
reverse of reactionary. It called for the liberty of the
press, the right of petition, of peaceful public meeting,
of assimilation in political rights to the other provinces
of Spain, of special laws with relation to the particular
interests of Cuba, for improved morality in public
administration, and for new laws which would be efficacious in securing judicial responsibility. On the
economic question it pronounced for customs reforms,
special protection for the agricultural production of the
island and for the tobacco industry, suppression of
export duties, a rational reduction of the imposts, especially on the necessaries of life, and a liberal commercial
treaty with the United States on the basis of reciprocity.
It favored the abolition of slavery on the terms of the
law of Moret, but with modifications suitable to the condition of the country. It also favored immigration under the direction of the government on the basis of free
contract.
An echo of the democratic movement in Europe was
found in a third platform, but there was no political
organization standing upon it. This democratic programme called for free trade, free shipping, free banks,
free labor, free teaching, provincial militias, municipal
taxes solely, complete abolition of slavery, abolition of
the death penalty, and universal suffrage. These planks
were in addition to the principles which it indorsed in
8




TO-MORROW IN CUBA


common with the Liberals and the Union Constitutionals. Spanish laws had not been liberalized to the degree
of allowing the propaganda of this theoretical universal
democracy.  A few Cubans of intellectual strength
gave it their approval in the abstract, but it never
became an organized political movement. Some of its
tenets were subsequently modified and adopted by
the Autonomists, and the definite programme was
forgotten.
Comparison of the declarations of Liberals and Union
Constitutionals does not show a marked divergence. It
may be said there were no conflicting principles which
afforded a basis for political parties. This is true. In
the beginning the difference was simply one of tendencies and of men. The economic ideas were similar, and
there was not an essential point of distinction on the
social and political articles. Both parties accepted the
understanding back of the compact of El Zanjon and
the promise of measures to make it effective. The
similarity of their creed is the proof that Spain was
pledged to grant Cuba political rights which would insure a certain degree of economic independence. The
assertion of this understanding was broader and more
definite on the part of the Liberals. The programme
of the Union Constitutionals reflected more accurately
the vice of Spanish politics. There were reservations,
checks, and limitations which could be used to defeat
the principles that were affirmed. Yet there was recognition of a new regimen under which would be political
organizations.  The tendency of the Union Constitutionals to become the party of the opposition-not to
the authorities in power, but to innovations-was just
9




TO-MORROW IN CUBA


discernible in the provisos and the checks left in the
hands of the peninsula.
With so little cardinal difference in the announced
principles of the two groups, the tendencies could be
understood only from a knowledege of the men who interpreted and gave them direction. The Liberal party
was a Cuban organization, and it so remained. Then
and afterwards no leading Spaniards in the island took
their stand for autonomy as an avowed creed. The
Union Constitutional party might fairly claim the title
of conservative from the character of its members. The
reactionaries, the Spanish classes who did not accept the
concessions to the insurgent elements and who wanted
Cuba to continue a dependency of the peninsula without political rights, antagonized it. They were the intransigentes. This term should be understood. For
many years the temporary nature of the stay of the
Spaniards in Cuba was shown by designating them as
transeuntes-transients or sojourners. As it was the
Spaniards who always stood out against granting whatever Cuba wanted, and as they were the transients, by a
Gallic adaptation in political discussion they became
known as intransigentes. The etymology is that of
Cuban politics. The term is no longer applied solely to
the Spanish classes. The instransigente is the irreconcilable, the reactionary, the hopeless Bourbon; the political ostrich who has only one way of avoiding the storm
of the desert or the deluge.
The antagonism of the blindly loyal Spanish classes
to the enunciated programme of the Union Constitutionals is evidence of its agreement in essentials with
the principles of the Liberals. But the inherent ten10




TO-MORROW IN CUBA


dencies of the two parties developed the difference when
interpreted by men of divergent convictions and purposes.
The artifical nature of the two organizations formed
mechanically as part of a new political regimen was
soon lost. Their growth was along natural lines. The
Union Constitutionals modified or ignored their original
economic precepts. Then they became jealous of the
integrity of Spanish institutions in the Antilles. The
control passed away from the original supporters. The
intransigentes at first had looked with contempt on the
group of Union Constitutionals. They began by criticizing its assumptions and combating its principles.
They ended by dominating the organization. Whatever
party was in power in Spain they were the government
party in Cuba. The Union Constitutionals were ministerial under all ministries. Being thus the props of authority, they gradually secured for themselves the official employments, and no Captain-General was strong
enough to dislodge them.
The Liberal party celebrated the second anniversary
of its foundation in August, 1880, by a reunion of its
chief members. The original programme was reaffirmed
and broadened. The addresses reflected the disappointment which already had come upon those who had
trusted that the understanding back of the pact of El
Zanjon would be vitalized and given force. Distrust
and suspicion had given way to the conviction that they
had been deceived by Madrid. They were discovering
that the ruling influence in the peninsula did not mean
to concede to Cuba real liberty of political action within
even a limited sphere. The ministry of Martinez Campos had fallen in the midst of doubts, perplexities,
11




TO-MORROW IN CUBA


and hesitation. The ministry of Cainovas del Castillo,
always resolute in his opposition to colonial liberties,
had taken its place. The Cuban Liberal Autonomists
could only deliver addresses voicing their disappointment and their fears.  Nor were their voices heard from
the housetops. They spoke to one another and among
themselves.
The Constitution which had been in force in the
peninsula since 1876 was promulgated in Cuba in the
spring of 1881. Previous to that there had been prosecution of individuals, usually journalists, who interpreted too literally and too liberally the royal cedulas
and the laws enacted by the Cortes following the peace
of El Zanjon.  Some ayuntamientos, or municipal
councils, which sought to apply the new regime to
local government too broadly, found themselves stripped
of their authority. It was a discouraging experience,
which served as a warning and an example to other
municipalities. The power of construing the law and
the facts rested with the Governor-General,'and the construction was commonly on the side of arbitrary power.
The promulgation of the Spanish Constitution did
not lessen the prosecution of the journals advocating
Liberal principles, though convictions did not always
follow. The most notable instance was that of the organ
El Triunfo, which had not long previously declared
that it was not autonomist.  The newspaper was
charged with attacking the national unity in propagating the autonomist creed or doctrine. Ultimately the
judicial tribunal absolved it. Yet the victory for a free
press was not a signal one. These prosecutions were
effective reminders that the law of imprint had not abol12




TO-MORROW IN CUBA


ished the censorship of the press. They were meant as
warnings against too great freedom of political discussion, and were so accepted. Nor were instances wanting of the arbitrary suppression of journals.
In 1882 the Junta Magna, or central committee, of
the Liberal party ceased to apologize and deny that it
was autonomist. In April it issued declarations that it
favored colonial autonomy under the sovereignty and
the authority of the Cortes and the head of the nation.
It further demanded identity of civil and political rights
for the Spaniards of both hemispheres. This was an
effort to propitiate the Spaniards in Cuba, and to obliterate the line which divided insulars and peninsulars.
The movement had been growing in strength. With the
more open definition of autonomy as a political creed,
its vigor spread. The shadow of military government
and the press censorship rested over it, yet the organization grew within the shadow. The intransigentes took
alarm. They sought to make the political division appear as one between integristas and separatistas. They
were the integristas, the defenders of Spanish unity and
sovereignty. The Liberals were the separatistas, the
traitors who would betray their birthright and encourage the colony to set up an independent government.
Autonomy was the viper which, if warmed in the bosom
of Spain, would instil the poison that would destroy the
national unity. Though the thought was not put in
these words, to the intransigentes it was also the monster that would devour the special privileges which
made Cuba valuable to Spaniards, if not to Spain.
Students of this period of Cuban political history will
find its phases reflected in the newspapers, in mani13




TO-MORROW IN CUBA


festoes, allocutions, addresses, and in pamphlets. The
addresses, manifestoes, pamphlets, and controversial
articles of the journals show a deep knowledge of historical precedents. They go to the root of the causes
that destroy empires. They contain all that is true of
political and civil liberty in the abstract. In the presentation of these subjects there is more of speculative
political philosophy than of practical understanding
of the principles of applied government. Beyond this
the literature of the day is the ordinary polemics of
parties. It is not of the campaign or of the stump as
manifested in the United States, for there were no elections of a kind which could give the opportunity for
campaign discussion. Pamphleteering was never superseded by newspaper discussion. For the leading Autonomists it is to be said that one true and consistent
note is sounded.through all the agitation which they
carried on for twenty years. This is the warning of the
fate which overtakes empires and absolutist governments that refuse to recognize the element of popular
representation.
It has been truly said by a Cuban writer,* that "the
virile advance of civism among the Cubans through the
energetic and spontaneous organization of the Liberal
Autonomist party resulted in the awakening of the
old intransigente and reactionary party, fearful that the
new order of things would undermine the edifice of its
interests."  The Union Constitutionals rallied against
the movement with the passion of tigers whose prey is
about to be taken away from them. Yield the first de

* Cabrera, " Cuba y sus Jueces.'
14




TO-MORROW IN CUBA


mand of these Autonomists and Spanish sovereignty
decrees its own death, was their angry cry. National
unity and colonial liberty were analyzed to their ultimate results logically and with ability. The speeches
and pronunciamentos of the Autonomist leaders-sometimes radical in talk, as when Antonio Govin, who was
in time to become a member of the Autonomist cabinet,
called the Spaniards birds of passage-were quoted to
show the real purpose of the movement. This was declared to be separation from the mother country.
The Autonomists in their turn would protest, the
radical sentiments of individuals would be disclaimed,
and the personal controversies would go on. Occasionally these were settled by duels after the French fashion.
Throughout the agitation the  intransigentes kept
steadily before the Spanish classes that whatever threatened or lessened Spanish absolutism threatened their
special privileges. It was the argumentum ad hominem
applied with a tremendous effect. Intellectually, the
discussion on the part of the Union Constitutionals was
a morass, as discussion usually is in championing vested
political wrongs. In this day the historian will not be
repaid for losing himself in the bog. The intransigentes were the defenders of the theory of the divine right
of Spain to govern the Antilles as possessions rather
than as either provinces or colonies. Often, too, they
were the inflexible champions of the Church, and
charged their opponents with plotting to undermine that
support of lawful government.
During this period of political movement, Cuba had
representation, of a kind, in the Cortes of Spain. It
was of the kind that could be possible only under the
15




TO-MORROW IN CUBA


system of government which made elections the registering of the will of the governing power. Among the
Cuban Deputies and Senators, sometimes as many as
half a dozen would be known as Autonomists. Ordinarily one-fourth would be Cuban born, and the remainder
peninsulars. Rafael de Labra, the most eminent of the
publicists in Spain who advocated colonial government,
represented the district of Habana as an Autonomist.
Martinez Campos sat as the Conservative Deputy for
Matanzas.
How far the Spanish statesmen comprehended the
Cuban movement for autonomy must remain undetermined. Emilio Castelar wanted no transatlantic Poland, yet his republican principles did not carry him
to the length of advocating complete home rule for Cuba.
Moret, who was to formulate the system when it came to
be proposed, at that time was giving it little support.
Praxades Sagasta, in the regular changes of power which
made him the ruler of Spain alternately with Canovas
del Castillo, never suggested home rule for Cuba. The
pendulum swung between these two prime ministers;
sometimes vibrated with hope of broader and truer
parliamentary government for Spain itself, sometimes
remained in equilibrium, but never swung loose from
the orbit of colonial subjection. Sagasta was up and C4 -novas was down: the Liberal party had its vague and
hesitating schemes for the Antilles. CAnovas was up
and Sagasta was down: the Conservative party had
liberal legislation in view, and nothing came of it. If,
in the farcical election of Deputies from Cuba to the
Cortes, the government in power occasionally permitted
an Autonomist to be chosen, it was merely good-natured
16




TO-MORROW IN CUBA


tolerance. If the Autonomists at times sent delegations
to Madrid and were represented by resident committees,
this was treated as a colonial chimera not worthy of serious attention. Canovas had his policy of assimilation
by which Spaniards and Cubans were to approach one
another in their political rights. But he never yielded
his ground that autonomy meant separation of Cuba
from the peninsula. And what he called the national
actualities, the need of supporting the bureaucratic
classes, was always a bar to the real insular government
of Cuba by its own people.
In Cuba in time the stubbornness and the aggressiveness of the autonomist propaganda, the steady growth
of both industrial and political discontent, produced an
effect on what had seemed to be stone. A score and a
half of newspapers were advocating the doctrine. The
mass of conservatism quavered a little. Then came an
era of inquiry. Was it not better to do something to
still this perennial discontent? Could not the Cubans
be taken into limited partnership in the administration
of insular affairs? Could not some of the abuses, the
existence of which everybody admitted, be corrected
and the system be modified without endangering the
national unity? To these questions the majority of the
intransigentes returned a passionate No. Yet the agitation, the need of doing something, continued. It came
about that the conservatives divided among themselves.
The Union Constitutional party had liberal tendencies
within its being. It split into right and left wings.
The left favored doing something. Its members were
known as dissidents. The right favored doing nothing
beyond castigating the sowers of sedition. After these
2                17




TO-MORROW IN CUBA


divisions came the rapprochements, the reunion of the
elements naturally cohesive which had drifted apart.
Customarily the basis of reunion was simple. When the
irreconcilables found that the reforms proposed in the
Cortes were paper reforms, when they learned that the
system which to them represented the unity of national
sentiment and the preservation of special principles was
in no real danger, the dissensions were healed. The
Union Constitutional party took back to its bosom the
repentant wanderers.
Yet the movement grew. The Autonomist group became as much a political party as it could become under
Spanish institutions. Perception of a great truth in
human government ultimately dawned upon the more
enlightened of the Spanish classes in Cuba. If the
agitation would not down, and if the intransigente opposition would make no concessions to this alarming
continuance of sentiment, the movement which was going
steadily forward might be controlled and diverted into
other channels. It was not possible to gain control of the
Autonomist party. Had this been feasible, the connection with supposedly separatist principles would have
been too marked to permit the Spanish element so to
identify itself. The diversion might be made if a new
group were formed.
Out of these conditions was born the Reformist party.
It had a practical aim. Spaniards who sincerely wanted
a more liberal government for Cuba, but who could not
afford to join themselves with the Autonomist organization because it was too radical and too Cuban, could
shelter themselves under this tenting. The Reformist
party embraced many worthy Spaniards and Cubans.
I*s




TO-MORROW IN CUBA


In one respect its aim was definite: it did not contemplate colonial self-government at the expense of Spanish
sovereignty. It welcomed the electoral reforms which
Maura, the Liberal Minister of the Colonies, proposed in
the Cortes in 1890, and in subsequent years. Its members joined the Autonomists in mocking the Union Constitutionals when that party accepted the reforms of
Abrazurza offered by the Conservative ministry in the
Cortes in 1895.
The Reformist party was formally organized in 1893.
It did not advance materially in numbers, but it was a
distinct influence, and maintained the shell of an organization till the last. It professed not to favor compromise with the radical tendencies of autonomy, but merely
concessions to better government. Towards the end its
propaganda was bold and clear. In the despair which
was coming over Spanish rule in Cuba with the rising
of the insurrection, its efforts partook of the activity of
desperation. But there was a fundamental weakness.
The poles were positive and negative. The Autonomists
affirmed and demanded full colonial liberty. The Union
Constitutionals denied and rejected the basis. No magnet midway between them could draw. The Reformists
were not a compromise party as compromise had been
applied successfully in the United States. They simply
favored concessions. At first the name of the Autonomists, the thing to the Conservatives. Later it was a
reversal of position with some substance for colonial
home rule.
Spanish conservatives who were of liberal tendencies
and who foresaw destruction if something were not done
joined the Reformists in moments of disgust and reac19




TO-MORROW     IN CUBA
tion from the hopeless Bourbonism of their own party.
Timid Autonomists, with the ultimate outcome of separation before them, and face to face with the early probabilities, hesitated, faltered, and turned back. The
Reformist standard was their refuge. They, too, became
opportunists.  The Reformist party pitched its tent
on the beach. The waves of revolution were rolling
inward. The Reformists raised their brooms to sweep
the billows back. The waves broke over the shore, and
Conservatives, Reformists, and Autonomists were swallowed in the waters. Their emergence, drowsled and
dripping, is the subject for a later chapter of autonomy.
Armed revolt, begun in 1868, had brought the first
change in the outward form of Spanish absolutism during four centuries of despotic government. Peaceful
agitation following the concessions wrung by the revolutionists of that day had been able to show little further
progress in liberalizing the spirit of Spanish political
institutions. The energies of the Liberal party in Cuba
were absorbed and distraught in seeking to check the
reactionary tendencies of parties in Spain which were
reverting to the system that had obtained previous to
the compact of El Zanjon. When it was apparently
going forward the Autonomist party was in reality sim.
ply checking the movement backward. There were
periods of self-deception and of unconscious deception
to the people of the island. Quiescence of the revolutionary elements was mistaken for acquiescence. When the
whole world was prospering, industrial prosperity could
not be wholly destroyed by official corruption and misgovernment. Sugar production with an abnormally
profitable market aided in the temporary quietude. In
20




TO-MORROW IN CUBA


1890 it was complacently remarked that the spirit of
armed revolution had passed away in the embrace of
agitation within constitutional lines by the great Autonomist party. The Cortes was busy with reforms for
Cuba. The plans were not for home rule, but they were
pledges of improvement which, if carried out, would
enable the Autonomists to show that the evolution of
colonial self-government in the logical order which they
advocated had begun. They were very fond of that
phrase, "evolutionary colonial government."  Then
came the exigencies of Madrid politics, the shifting of
ministries and the mockery of the Antillian aspirations
for wider liberties. And then, too, came the tariff legislation in the United States, which repealed the Blaine
reciprocity legislation and lowered at a stroke the profit
of raising sugar-cane in Cuba. The quiescent elements
began to move. They were no longer acquiescent. In
this inchoate activity was disclosed the abyss which the
Autonomists had not been able to bridge. This was the
knowledge that the mass of revolutionists of the TenYears' war never had been reconciled to Spanish domination.
Antonio Maceo had been a young chief in that war.
He had not accepted the regimen of peace, but had consented to depart from the island under a safe-conduct
from Martinez Campos. His subsequent life in Central
America and the watch which the Spanish authorities
kept on his movements are matters of common history.
They do not need recounting. MAximo G6mez had
retired to his farm in Santo Domingo, and withdrawn
himself from participation in the affairs of Cuba. Calixto Garcia, after joining a second abortive rebellion
21




TO-MORROW IN CUBA


known as the Little War, which raged in Santiago
province within a twelvemonth after the peace of El
Zanjon, had accepted the friendship of Campos and
taken a civil position as a bank officer in Madrid,
where he was under espionage. Other leaders of the
Ten-Years' war had voluntarily exiled themselves to the
United States, to Mexico, and to the countries of Central America. That they did not trust the Spanish
promises was evidenced by their actions. Their lack
of faith in the success of the Autonomist party was
equally clear. Some conspired and plotted. Others
merely waited.
The culmination came with the simultaneous failure
of Cuban reform legislation in the Cortes and the
decrease in the profits of the American sugar market.
Economic causes combined with political discontent in
keeping the embers of insurrection glowing under the
ashes of apparent indifference. The period of freedom
from internecine war has been called a parenthesis
within a fact. The insurrection of 1895 was the last
act in the revolution which began in 1868. There had
been an interregnum, nothing more. Armed revolt was
coming again.




CHAPTER II


THE WESTERN INVASION
Alarm Bell of Insurrection Sounded-Old Leaders in Arms-Manifesto of Autonomists Reprobates the Insurrection-Subsequent
History of the Signers-Activity of G6mez and Macdo-Martinez Campos Takes Command-Battle of Bayamo-Arrival of
Spanish Reinforcements —Autonomists Deported-Formation of
Revolutionary Government-G6mez' Address to the Cuban People-His Plan for Nationalizing the Insurrection-March to the
Occident Begun-Machete as a Weapon-Progress of Insurgents
-Campos Quiets Censure of Spanish Classes-Promise of Vigorous Military Operations-Blazing Cane-Fields the Mark of the
Insurgent Campaign-Tremor and Turmoil in Habana-Official
Orders for Defence-G6mez in the Outskirts-Maceo in the Tobacco Country-The Invasion G6mez' Conception and Macdo's
Execution-Spain's Military Power Broken.
TORCH and machete make short work of constitutional
agitation. They are not the weapons of political parties. When they were resorted to it was a question
whether they would convert the Autonomists into recruits or into enemies of the faith that proclaimed its
doctrines by war. A little time had to be allowed before the answer could be given.
It was known in the United States, in the winter
months of 1894-95, that something was expected to
happen in Cuba. The Spanish authorities in the island
were both blind and impotent. They, too, knew that
23




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something was going on, yet they did not know where
to look for the uprising. One day a small party of
insurgents raised the banner of revolt at the hamlet of
Ybarra in Matanzas province. Four hundred miles
away in the villages of Baire and Juguani, in the province of Santiago de Cuba,* small uprisings also were
noted. At Baire the peaceable demand was made for
the implantation of the reforms of Maura. At Juguani
the demand was for the removal of the local ayuntaimento, or municipal council, because of some alleged
malfeasance. At GuantAnamo there was an open revolt
without a stated grievance.
The movement at Ybarra was premature. The little
band of insurgents was quickly dispersed. Some of the
leaders were arrested and deported in chains to the penal
settlements of Africa, among them the mulatto publicist
Juan Gualberto Gomez. Small risings in the province
of Santa Clara were also dispersed. But the alarm bell
had been sounded. It was to ring through months and
years. The night of February 23d, 1895, the printing-presses in Habana were kept whirling with the
proclamation of the Governor-General, Emilio Calleja,
suspending the constitutional guarantees. This was followed by the official announcement that the provinces of
Matanzas and Santiago de Cuba were in a state of war.
Then was disclosed the existence of the Cuban revolutionary party with headquarters and branches in the
United States, and with a net extended throughout the
island the completeness of which was not suspected.
All the agencies of secret police and of similar means
* Santiago means St. James. Cubans and Spaniards call the city
and the province simply C Cuba."
24            '      f




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which were a part of the Spanish system had not uncovered this universal political conspiracy.
Jose Marti, dreamer, poet, and idealist, had visited
MSximo G6mez in his retirement in Santo Domingo,
and on behalf of the Cuban revolutionary societies had
offered him the command of an insurgent army that was
to come up from the earth. Gomez had accepted the
command. Antonio Maceo had been communicated
with and was ready to aid. The sympathizers in Cuba
had been secreting arms, and were awaiting the call.
Bartolome Maso, a sugar-planter at Manzanillo, who
had been an insurgent colonel in the Ten-Years' war,
was quickly in the field with armed followers. He had
the respect of the Spanish classes. Though he had been
friendly to the Autonomist propaganda, he had refused
to accept the presidency of the party. Maso was said to
have taken up arms in order to compel Spain to yield
autonomy without granting absolute independence. Minor engagements took place in the Oriente, as Eastern
Cuba was called, and within a month the insurrection
was in full movement. Spain was sending troops
across the ocean, and the leading Spaniards in Habana
were calling for more vigorous action by the Government. They were also seeking to place the responsibility for the insurrection. The Union Constitutionals
shrieked that the Autonomists had done it all. Insurrection, which meant separation, they cried, was the
fruit, as they had warned the loyal classes, of the pernicious doctrines of autonomy.
Thus attacked, the Autonomist leaders through the
Magna Junta, or central committee, of the party made
vigorous reply. They vindicated their loyalty by offer25




TO-MORROW IN CUBA


ing their unconditional support to the Government.
They issued an appeal to the country in which they
eulogized themselves and reprobated the insurgents.
The insurrection, they said, had sounded the cry of
revolt at the moment when a new regimen was on the
eve of being inaugurated. They condemned all overturning of order because the Liberal-Autonomist party
was a party of legality which had faith in constitutional
methods. Besides, it was fundamentally Spanish because it was essentially and exclusively autonomist.
And colonial autonomy presupposed the reality of the
Metropolis-Spain-in the plenitude of its sovereignty
and of its historic rights. For that reality from its
birth, their party had inscribed on its banner as its
motto, "Liberty, Peace, and National Unity." It also
resented the injurious imputations of its adversaries,
meaning the Union Constitutionals. Recurring to the
rebellion again, the manifesto declared that the insurrection made impossible at that time the liberties which
the Autonomists had conquered. But by good fortune
it would not succeed. All the signs showed that the
rebellion, limited to a part of the eastern provinces, had
with a few exceptions only succeeded in dragging into
it the classes proceeding from the most ignorant and
destitute of the population, who from lack of cohesion
and discipline would soon disperse or give themselves
up. The Liberal party of 1868 had folded its standard
and abandoned its post to the revolutionists of Yara.
The Liberal party of 1878 would not lower its flag nor
cede the field to those who came to undo their laborious
harvest and cloud the perspective of their destinies with
the horrible spectre of misery, anarchy, and barbarism.
26




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By their characterization of the ignorant classes it
will be observed that the Autonomist leaders did not
consider the insurrection respectable. They themselves
were eminently respectable. Their natural opponents,
the Union Constitutionals, while denouncing them and
their policies, always conceded their respectability.
They proved poor prophets, because instead of the insurrection failing from lack of cohesion and discipline,
it grew more coherent and put disciplined ranks in the
field. But truly the classes who formed its base were
not respectable. They were farm laborers, workers in
the cane-fields who had never risen to a high condition
of education. Nor had they ever given support to the
movement for autonomy, because the leaders of that
movement, while championing the system of popular
government, had no knowledge from experience of the
function of the masses in popular government. The
manifesto in its reference to the liberties the Autonomists had conquered meant the reforms of Abarzurza.
Having been unable to obtain the reforms of Maura,
they accepted the diluted substitute as a step in their
programme of evolutionary autonomy.
It is instructive to follow the history of the signers
of this manifesto, and of other Autonomists not members of the central committee who indorsed it. The
majority of them had been for fifteen years and more
advocating the principles of the party. They could say
with truth that they had cradled the organization. In
the years that were to come, some remained unwavering
in the support which they had pledged to the Government of Spain. Among them were found apologists and
eulogists of Weyler. But others went into voluntary
27




TO-MORROW IN CUBA


exile, unable to stand between the two firing-lines.
Many joined the insurgents in the manigua or brush.
Some became involuntary exiles or political prisoners,
because they either fell away from the policy announced
in the manifesto, or because their support was not zealous enough to satisfy the military authorities.
This manifesto of the Liberal-Autonomist party was
published on the 4th of April. The insurrection had
been in movement for six weeks. Martinez Campos,
the pacificator of the former revolution, had been named
Governor-General of the island, and had sailed for his
post. Antonio Maceo, his brother Jose, and a score
of companions who formed the expedition from Costa
Rica had disembarked near Baracoa on the north
coast. A troop of Spanish volunteers lay in waiting
for them. There was fighting in the hills, and some
members of the expedition were taken prisoners. The
brothers Maceo escaped, and Antonio placed himself in
command of the increasing bands of insurgents in the
eastern regions. Within a fortnight Jose Marti and
MAximo G6mez landed near Guantanamo. Marti was
the president of the revolutionary party. He had
been a student in Seville and Madrid, and was old
enough to be imprisoned during the Ten-Years' war for
complicity in that uprising. He was not a military
chief. Marti lost his life in combat with the Spanish
troops on the banks of the Contraestre River, in the
western part of the province, within five weeks after his
arrival. Gomez at once took command of the insurgent forces which began coming up from the earth to
receive him.
Two days after the secret landing of Marti and
28




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G6mez, General Campos disembarked in the port of
GuantAnamo. He immediately assumed his office as
Governor-General and Captain-General of the island,
without waiting to take the formal oath and undergo the
ceremonies customary at Habana. At that time the
Spanish authorities estimated that the insurgents under
arms in the province numbered 5,000. General Campos issued an address to the people, and organized
energetic military operations. In proclaiming martial
law he enjoined on his own soldiers the recognized principles of humane warfare. His policy was to win back
the insurgents by kindness, and to show them that they
could trust the indulgence of Spain. At this time he
had 27,000 troops under his command. After remaining in Santiago a week he proceeded to Habana.
While Campos was combating the insurrection with
the sword in one hand and the promise of pardon in the
other, G6mez and Maceo were pushing it westward
through Santiago to the thinly populated province of
Puerto Principe. These Camagiieyans, as the natives
of the central part of the island are called, were, like
the inhabitants of Santiago de Cuba, perennial foes of
Spanish power. The Autonomist party had an organization in Puerto Principe which reaffirmed its condemnation of the insurrection and its earnest desire to
uphold the military authorities. After drawing to the
ranks of the insurrection the leading Cubans of Camagiiey, Gomez retired to the southern part of Santiago
province. In the mean time General Campos had taken
command in person of the Spanish troops in the field,
and was directing the movements in that region. The
volunteers in many places had been called into action
29




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and were supporting the regular troops. The guerillas,
or native Spanish forces, organized in the different
communities, and the movilazados, or irregular native
forces, were also being utilized.
On July 13th was fought the first real battle of this
war. It was at Peralojo, near Bayamo. Maceo and
Jesus Rabi were known to be contemplating a descent
on the Spanish garrison which held Bayamo. The
columns under Campos were advancing from Manzanillo. The Spanish troops, according to the statement
of the officers, numbered 1,600. The insurgents under
Maceo, the Spaniards afterwards said, numbered between 5,000 and 6,000. There may have been 3,000
of them who fell upon the advancing Spanish columns
of equal number,-certainly more than 1,600,-attacking
them in front and in the rear. General Juan Fidel
Santocildes, a distinguished officer and the devoted
friend of Campos, was killed at the head of his column.
Other officers were killed and wounded. General Campos himself narrowly escaped death. By a strategic
movement, turning his rear-guard into the van-guard
and changing the course, he succeeded in leading his
troops into Bayamo. The laurels of the engagement
were with Maceo, and the insurgent cause gained prestige. General Campos, after strengthening the fortifications of Bayamo and increasing the garrison, succeeded
in clearing the country in the immediate neighborhood
of the insurgents, who confined their activity to the
northern part of the province. He then returned to
Manzanillo.
Through the remaining months of the summer the
insurgent activity was greatest in las Villas, which is
30




TO-MORROW     IN CUBA
the province of Santa Clara, or, as the Cubans call it,
Villa Clara. One uprising followed another, and one
band after another took to the manigua. The successful disembarkment of filibustering expeditions on the
south coast with arms and recruits for the insurgents
kept the fires of revolution flaming. The military authorities were energetic, but the bands of insurgents
in the province managed to avoid many encounters with
the troops. They attacked isolated Spanish garrisons
successfully, though in some of the combats they were
worsted. In Santiago de Cuba Maceo was active, and
his followers had several sharp engagements with the
enemy. At Sao del Indio a column of 1,000 Spanish
soldiers attacked a force of insurgents under Maceo
alleged to number 3,000, and probably numbering half
as many, and dispersed them. All this time reinforcements were coming from the peninsula. By the end of
summer a total of 80,000 Spanish regulars were in the
field. A thousand loyal Spaniards had come from the
Argentine Republic and Brazil to the city of Santiago
de Cuba, and enrolled themselves as volunteers. Subsequently more Spaniards arrived from South America,
and also from Mexico. In Habana the disembarking
of the battalions was a weekly occurrence. The Leon
battalion, that of the Asturias, of Barcelona, of Valencia, and of other provinces in Spain showed that the
army was recruited from all parts of the peninsula.
The insurgents may have had 20,000 men in arms and
without arms, though this is a liberal estimate.
During this period happened an untoward circumstance. It was a rude shock to the credulous and loyal
Autonomists. General Campos began deporting Auton31




TO-MORROW IN CUBA


omists to the penal settlements of Africa without civil
or military trial and without explanation. In the latter
part of September, four leading citizens of Santiago
de Cuba were deported to Ceuta by his orders. They
were Don Eutaldo Tamayo, president of the provincial
deputation and also president of the local autonomist
central committee; Antonio Brava, an educator; Alfredo Betancourt, a lawyer; and Desiderio Ortiz, a journalist. Clearly these men did not belong to the ignorant and destitute classes of whom the central committee
of the Autonomist party had written in the celebrated
manifesto reprobating the insurrection. Their political
associates in Habana sought their releases, but the Captain-General denied the request for reasons which were
thought to indicate knowledge of complicity in the
insurrection.  Later, by his direction, other Autonomists were deported. Military executions of insurgent
cabecillas, or chiefs, who were captured in arms also
began. These chiefs received more consideration than
the Autonomist suspects exiled without trial, for they
had the benefit of summary court-martial.
The revolutionists, on their part, were beginning to
destroy sugar plantations and blow up railroads and
trains with dynamite. They also formed their provisional Cuban republic in the woods with Salvador Cisneros Betancourt, better known as the Marquis de
Santa Lucia, as President. The possessor of a Cuban
patent of nobility and answering all the requirements
of breeding and education, a revolutionist of 1868, he
had taken into the field with him many young men of
the older families of Villa Clara. The insurgent chiefs
met and organized an assembly at Jimaguayu, a corner
32




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of Puerto Principe. They decided that the revolutionary civil government should be kept separate from the
military administration.  They confirmed Gomez as
general-in-chief and Maceo as next in command. Bartolome Mas6 yielded his commission in the field to
become Vice-President of the provisional government,
and he subsequently succeeded the Marquis de Santa
Lucia as President. A civil cabinet was also formed.
This assembly adopted the first constitution of the
Cuban republic. Its creator, the provisional government, sought recognition from the United States.
Nominally the provisional government in the woods
was the supreme power. It issued commissions and
directed the movements of the insurgent army. Nominally, too, Gomez and Maceo and the other insurgent
commanders respected and obeyed it. Actually the
provisional government registered their plans, or if it
did not it was ignored by them. At all times the Junta
in New York, of which Estrada Palma was the head
and Gonzalo de Quesada the representative in Washington, was the more potent body, for it raised and
disbursed the funds and managed the filibustering expeditions. The tribute or tax levied by Gomez on the
sugar planters and railroad managers was frequently
paid directly to the representatives of the Junta.
Six months of revolt passed before the Spanish Government in Cuba knew that the insurrection had a regularly organized plan of compaign. Insurgent maurading bands, though acknowledging the orders of Gomez
or Maceo while engaging in guerilla warfare, did not
themselves fully realize that they were working as part
of a whole. Maceo knew it, and the veteran chief of
8                33




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the revolution knew it. In the autumn of 1895 his
plans began to take form. On assuming command of
the insurgent forces, G6mez had issued an address to
the Cuban people. It is worth reading in the light of
the history that has since been made. Its language
may appear verbose and extravagant to the unsentimental American mind. To the emotional people of
the Latin and the African races, for whom the address
was meant, it was neither verbose nor extravagant. In
this manifesto G6mez promised to lead them in the
struggle for their liberties. Though the words were
glowing, the difficulties and the supreme nature of the
task before them was set out with mathematical precision. Spain, he warned them, would never yield
Cuba to its people while the land was worth possessing.
She would only yield when there was nothing to keep.
And the inhabitants of Cuba must be prepared for the
sacrifice. Every household, he declared, would have
its martyr before the island became free.
In this address Gomez put forth other ideas, though
not with the distinctness with which they existed in
his own mind. If not local, the Ten-Years' war had
been at least provincial. It was confined to the central and eastern part of the island. Barely an emeute
had taken place in the west. If Cuba were to be freed
from Spain, G6mez knew that the revolution must be
made universal. He proposed to nationalize the insurrection. Many young Cubans and some older ones had
joined it believing that they could engage in a guerilla warfare in the neighborhood of their own homes.
Gomez did not understimate the value of this support.
He used this local aid, but did not depend upon it.
34




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Instead, he took the most capable of the recruits and
sent them  to commands in other localities. From
Habana he chose officers for Puerto Principe. From
Pinar del Rio he selected officers for the bands in Santa
Clara. The development of this plan was coincident
with the broader purpose of nationalizing the insurrection by making war throughout the island. The western invasion began late in the fall, at the end of the
rainy season. The insurgents were leaving parts of
Santiago de Cuba in a state of comparative calm while
their bands were spreading west and attacking the
Spanish garrisons. One of these assaults was on the
fort of Cascarro, in Puerto Principe, which was made
notable by the heroic defence of the Spanish soldiers.
As the insurrection developed in intensity, the peninsular classes in the island were alarmed and disgusted
by rumors that a peace had been agreed upon with
autonomy as a basis. The rumors were without foundation, The Autonomists were in eclipse with both
insurgents and the Madrid Cabinet. Gomez crossed
the Jucaro-Mor6n trocha with a force of 1,200 or 1,500
mounted Camagiieyans on the 30th of October. This
trocha or trench runs from coast to coast a few miles
east of the Santa Clara line, and is known as the railroad trocha. It was established and maintained during
the Ten-Years' war, and was again garrisoned as soon
as the insurrection broke out.  G6mez circled from
Sancti Spiritus, in the southeastern part of Santa Clara,
to the northwest, in the direction of Remedios, like a
hawk. He reduced several small forts and released the
Spanish soldiers who were taken prisoners. During
November his forces fought with the Spanish troops at
35




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Manacas, Rio Grande, Covadanga, and other villages or
sugar plantations. Later he moved eastward again
and formed a junction with Maceo, who had advanced
from Santiago province through Puerto Principe, meeting little resistance. They attacked a Spanish convoy
under General Segura at Iguara, and, though having
a superior force, were repulsed. Maceo crossed the
Moron trocha on December 10th at Ciego de Avila, its
central point.
The march to the Occident, the western invasion,
was begun.  Las Villas-Santa Clara province-was
the basis of military operations for this irregular insurgent army which had mysterially mobilized itself.
General Campos and his military advisers had foreseen
the danger in that region, which was tremulous with
the enthusiasm of revolution. They had also seen the
signs in Matanzas and even in the provinces of Habana
and Pinar del Rio. If the insurrection made headway
in las Villas they knew they would have to combat more
than spasmodic outbreaks in the west. General Campos took command in person in Santa Clara, with his
headquarters at Cienfuegos. In that central section of
the island he had not fewer than 20,000 troops. G6 -mez and Maceo divided their bands, and the Santiago
negro farmer Quintin Banderas, who had developed
capacity for getting small parties over the country with
marvellous rapidity, baited the Spanish columns. On
the 15th of December was fought the battle of Mal
Tiempo.   It was one of the genuine combats of the
insurrection, though the number of men engaged in it
was not large. Mal Tiempo was a village thirty miles
northwest of Cienfuegos. Gomez and Maceo watched




TO-MORROW IN CUBA


the engagement and directed it. Part of their forces
harassed the Canaries and the Bailen battalions when
the Spanish columns were marching through the brush,
and galled them with a musketry fire. In the open
road a party of insurgents, armed with machetes, fell
upon a company of the Bailen battalion and annihilated
it. This assault gave the machete a terror to the Spanish troops. In the previous brushes with the insurgents they had learned something of its effectiveness at
close quarters, but the annihilation of the entire company was to them a frightful revelation of its possibilities. The machete was more dangerous than the Spanish shortsword, possibly because the insurgents who
wielded it had trained their right arms to its use in
cutting cane on the sugar plantations. Many of them
served through the insurrection without possessing firearms. The weapon was used in other engagements,
yet the machete charges by battalions of insurgents
of which vivid accounts were related were rare in the
actual warfare.
Gomez and Maceo advanced northwest through Santa
Clara to Matanzas province.  Their movements were
aided by a troop of insurgents under General Lacret
Morlot, who constantly diverted the attention of the
enemy. General Campos sought to throw his columns
in a living trocha along the line to intercept them. He
could not. overtake them with his troops that were scattered through las Villas. Those in Habana and Matanzas provinces were his trust, and they were moved
quickly  eastward.  Experienced  generals - Prats,
Luque, and Suarez Valdes-were at their head. The
insurgent leaders misled and evaded the Spanish genS7




TO-MORROW     IN CUBA
erals. Their forces, partly mounted, appeared unexpectedly in the neighborhood of Col6n on the railroad
in the eastern part of Matanzas province. Blazing canefields announced their presence. The Spanish troops,
including the battalion of the Asturias, were saved from
rout in the encounters on the sugar plantations only by
bringing up their artillery, which consisted of several
field-pieces. The insurgents retired along the road
eastward towards the town of Santo Domingo. General
Campos himself was at the head of the column on the
road between Cimarrones and Jovellanos which it was
supposed the insurgents were following; but Gomez appeared in the hamlet of Roque, closer to Colon. The
insurgents had outwitted the Captain-General. Three
groups or parties were moving for a junction in the
hamlet of Coliseo. One was under General Emilio
Nuriez, one to the north under Maceo, and the forces
of GSmez to the south and east. They entered Coliseo and destroyed it.  Campos encountered them in
the adjacent sugar plantation of Audaz. The insurgents had their lines resting along the base of the hills
in front and in the manigua, or chapparal, flanking the
Spanish troops. They barred the advance of the columns and harassed the rear-guard. General Campos
himself, for the second time-the first had been at
Peralejo-was in danger of losing his life. His adjutant by his side was wounded. Night came on and
stopped the engagement. Before morning the insurgents had disappeared. They retired eastward towards
the village of Jaguey Grande, as if retreating to Villa
Clara.
At Jaguey, G6mez and Maaceo reviewed their forces.
38




TO-MORROW     IN CUBA
The Spanish officers at the time said that they had in
all 10,000 men. Later the insurgents declared that
their force was larger, but the statement was made for
effect. The Spanish troops in active service in Cuba
at this time were in excess of 100,000. From March
to December 79,500 had been embarked from the peninsula; the regulars previously on the island had been
sent to the field, and their numbers had been augmented by the volunteers and the local guerillas.
Figures published in the Habana newspapers in the
last days of December, 1895, placed the full number of
the Spanish forces, active and in reserve, at 189,000.
This included the whole body of volunteers, 63,000; but
they were largely a reserve force, and did not go out of
the cities and towns. While the insurgents had been
marching across the country the harbor of Habana had
been filled with transports disembarking the soldiers
from the peninsula.  General Luis Pando, next in
rank to Campos, had arrived and had taken command
in Santiago de Cuba. General Pando was supposed
to have talents as a politician which would be serviceable in dealing with the insurgent leaders in the Oriente. The sugar plantations there were also aflame, and
sharp combats between the troops and small bands of
elusive rebels were of common occurrence.
The Captain-General returned to Habana, where it
was felt that he had suffered defeat. He found it necessary to meet the movement that was arising against
him for his ill success in checking the spread of the
insurrection. The Autonomists proposed a political
manifestation to show that bad fortune had not caused
Campos to lose the confidence of the country. The
39




TO-MORROW IN CUBA


Reformists joined it, hesitating and doubtful. The
Union Constitutionals held back. They were full of
resentment towards the Captain-General, yet were not
quite ready for a public rupture. Out of the divided
opinions among themselves it was finally agreed that
they should take part in the demonstration. Their
spokesman was Santos Guzman, a violent intransigente.
He referred dubiously to the circumstances, difficult,
as it seemed, in which the country was laboring, but
promised the loyal co-operation of the Union Constitutionals. Rafael Montoro spoke for the Autonomists,
pledging their continued support. A word was also
said for the Reformists. General Campos, in responding, felicitated himself on the consoling union of the
three parties. He had thought of resigning, he said,
because of the apparent lack of unanimity in public
sentiment in supporting him; but with these evidences
of approval he would reorganize the military operations,
and so long as all parties continued to honor him with
their confidence he would not separate himself from the
island. The clouds were lowering over the head of the
pacificator, yet his feet were still on firm earth. The
demonstration for the moment quieted the distrust and
the growing movement, which was in reality a political
conspiracy, to demand his recall.
The insurgents burned their way southwest through
the province of Matanzas. They entered Habana province with a pillar of fire by night and black clouds by
day. G6mez had said in his address to the Cuban
people that Spain would never yield the island while it
was worth possessing. He was showing how it might
be rendered not worth possessing. Various military
40




TO-MORROW IN CUBA


proclamations by him had signalized the destruction of
the sugar crop as the surest means of crippling Spain's
resources. Nightly the skies were lit up by the blazing
cane-fields.  Tall chimneys in the centre of gaping,
scorched plains were all that was left of the great centrales or sugar mills. Blackened walls were all that
told of country villas. In the villages and towns the
ruins were all that remained of fine residences and substantial buildings. The destruction was not wanton.
The insurgents did not riot in it. It was in pursuance
of G6mez' campaign against property. They did not
seek to take human lives. They released Spanish prisoners when captured, and in their successful march were
always merciful to the small garrisons that were reduced. In regular fighting they would have been overmatched and in time their small numbers would have
been exterminated. So they applied the most advanced
principles of modern warfare by systematic and remorseless destruction of property. It was also said that one
purpose of G6mez was to force the plantation workers
to join the insurrection by taking away their means of
livelihood. Such a course was not necessary. The
plantation hands flocked to the insurrection voluntarily,
almost spontaneously.  Later General Weyler was also
to inaugurate a campaign of property destruction and to
dispute the mastery of the scorched and barren wastes
with Gomez. But in the beginning it was the insurgents under G6mez and Maceo who made the trail of
fire from Villa Clara to Pinar del Rio.
Martial law was proclaimed in the provinces of Habana and Pinar del Rio as a tardy New Year's greeting
on January 2d, 1896. The whole island was therefore
41




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officially recognized as in a state of siege. The mili.
tary operations of the Spanish troops in the western
regions were paralyzed. The vanguard of Gomez advanced to Marianao, within ten miles of Habana. The
insurgents occupied Punta Brava, Hoyo Colorado, and
other towns in the vicinity. Cane-fields were burned,
railroad stations destroyed, trains given to the flames,
tracks torn up, and bridges dynamited. The railroads
running out of the city ceased to operate their trains.
Habana was in tremor and turmoil. Though troops
had been disembarking by tens of thousands, it felt
itself defenceless. Though its fortifications and defences, properly garrisoned, could hold out, as was later
boasted, against an invading army of 100,000 American
soldiers, the community recoiled before a few thousand
half-armed insurgents. Panic stalked its streets. The
military authorities were overwhelmed with the pleas
to protect the city and its people. To calm the perturbed public mind, show that the defences were sufficient and the army authorities alert, General Arderius,
chief of the general staff, issued an order.*  This was
one of the most remarkable documents of the insurrection. It reprobated the cowardly insurgents for flying
from every encounter with the valiant troops, but in
order to guarantee absolute tranquillity gave an account
of the measures of protection. The signal of alarm,
this military manifesto said, would be five consecutive
cannon discharges from the Castillo del Principe and
the raising of the flag on that fort by day, or a streamer
under the flag on holidays. By night the signal would
be a red light on the flag-pole. This red light would
* The full text may be found ini "Cronicas de la Guerra " for 1896.
42




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be displayed also by the other forts when they saw the
signal from Castillo del Principe. Minute directions
were given to avoid false signals. The true signal once
given-that is, the cannon discharges and the floating
flag or the red light-the various bodies of troops would
form in designated places. A caution was enjoined
against allowing the cornets to be played while the
troops were concentrating. Full instructions for the
army formations followed. They filled several pages.
The public alarm was increased instead of being
calmed by this official proclamation. Castillo del
Principe commands the highest hill in the environs
of Habana. It did not come about that the flag was
raised on its standard and the five consecutive cannon
discharges made, yet the inhabitants of the city shivered for days and nights awaiting that signal. Habana
had passed through the Ten-Years' war without hearing
the echo of a musket discharge from the insurgents in
the Oriente. The difference between the two insurrections in their ultimate probabilities is shown by the
necessity of giving publicity to the cannon signal. It
recalled the measures against English attack one hundred and thirty-four years earlier. Gomez knew where
to let the demonstration stop. He never had the purpose of entering within the garrisoned outposts of the
city.  Yet he did enter the town of Bejucal, only fifteen miles south, burned many of its buildings, and
spread terror to the great city northward. Two or
three days later in Bejucal again he successfully combated and evaded the Spanish troops under Generals
Linares and Suarez Valdes. For a time thereafter he
operated on the south coast.
43




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Maceo and G6mez had divided their followers in
pursuance of a specific plan. Maceo was pushing on to
the west, not seeking to avoid the Spanish troops at
some places, and at others carefully evading them.
While Gomez was terrorizing Habana, Maceo entered
the province of Pinar del Rio. He had a sharp skirmish at the town of Guanajay, near the north coast,
with the Spanish troops under General Prats. He
ranged through the rich tobacco regions of the Vuelta
Abajo as he had done in the sugar lands of Santa Clara
and Matanzas. Constantly the insurgent forces were
augmented by small parties of recruits. Never before
had Pinar del Rio been in either secret or open rebellion.  Now it blazed with revolt. Maceo carried his
standard to the extreme western end of the island.
During the last week of January he entered the town
of Pinar del Rio and held it for a few hours. The following day he fought a pitched battle on the adjacent
hills of Taironas, in which, notwithstanding the Spanish accounts, he could claim a victory, for it crowned
his purpose. Maceo then turned and led his forces
towards the eastern end of the province. On the 6th of
February he attacked the railroad town of Candaleria
and besieged it for twenty-six hours.  The Spanish
troops, the Volunteers, made a brave defence and MVaceo
retired. He next occupied the village of Paso Real.
Another genuine battle was fought on the calzada, or
highway, leading from this town. The Spanish troops
under General Luque had both artillery and cavalry.
The artillery was employed with some effect. The
insurgents also had cavalry, and it was here as at Mal
Tiempo that a genuine machete charge was made. The
44




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insurgent horsemen, according to the story of the Spanish soldiers, bore down upon their columns in a crescent with such impetuosity that they were forced back.
Finally the Spanish troops were rallied and made a
successful stand. The fighting lasted several hours.
Maceo led his followers in many charges. The losses
on each side were nearly equal-possibly 100 killed and
200 or 300 wounded.
Thereafter Maceo ranged through the southern part
of Habana province. He encountered the Spaniards at
Artemisa. A week later General Linares attacked him
unsuccessfully near Giiines. For a fortnight he moved
back and forth through the southern part of Matanzas. Later he returned to Pinar del Rio. For eight
months he combated, in the western part of the island,
the heavy reinforcements which General Weyler threw
into that section. The trocha running across the narrowest neck from Mariel on the north to the south coast
had been constructed in the mean time. Maceo crossed
it in December with a small band, and with the supposed purpose of moving eastward to las Villas. He
was killed in an encounter with the Spanish troops on
the morning of December 7th, 1896, at a point in the
woods four miles from Punta Brava, within fifteen
miles of Habana. The weight of evidence is that it was
a chance encounter, and not a betrayal or an ambush.
Maceo's real work was completed ten months before
his death, when he massed his troops for the struggle
on the hills of Taironas. He had brought most of them
six hundred miles across the country. Some of his officers declare that he had 11,000 men with him when he
swept around Habana and into the province of Pinar
45




TO-MORROW     IN CUBA
del Rio. This march sometimes has been described as
a mere raid. Students of military campaigning who follow its course and who examine the number and the
disposition of the Spanish troops will give it a higher
rank. It was in verity an invasion. Spanish officers
in the later times showed with pride the decorations
which were conferred upon them for engagements with
the insurgents under Maceo's command. To have engaged the mulatto chieftain in combat was a title to
distinction. The glory of the full execution of the
western invasion is to Maceo, yet its conception is to
the grizzled chief of two revolutions. Gomez planned
it. The success of his plans nationalized the insurrection and broke the military power of Spain in Cuba.




CHAPTER III


CAMPOS AND WEYLER
Climax of Conspiracy Against Campos-Madrid Accepts Resignation-Campos' Prophecy of Spain Losing Dominion-G6mez in
Sight at the Departure-Two Men Who Understood Each OtherArrival of Weyler-Welcome by Spanish Classes-End of Policy
of Moral Agencies-Culmination of Fighting Period of the Insurrection-Issue of First Concentration Decree-Prison Camps
for Pacificos-Failure of Weyler's Military Operations-Attitude of American People-Policy of the Cleveland Administration-Abuse of Naturalization Laws-Consul-General Fitzhugh
Lee's Reports-Inauguration of McKinley-Changed Attitude of
Spain-Visit of Special Commissioner Calhoun to Cuba-Assassination of C&novas-Sagasta Ministry Proposes Autonomy.
COLUMBUS piloted the standard of Spain to Cuba.
Martinez Campos bore it back.    He was not the last of
the Captain-Generals, but when he yielded his charge
and withdrew from    the island Spain's sovereignty in
the Antilles was ended.    Thereafter what was maintained was the figment of power.       The fate of her
dominion was sealed.
It was during Christmas week that the movement of
the Spanish politicians in Habana against Campos was
temporarily checked.   Within a fortnight it was blazing
forth. It had a degree of popular discontent among the
Spanish classes to strengthen it.   Yet the discontent
was not universal. The Habana Volunteers, who dur47




TO-MOlEOW IN CUBA


ing the Ten-Years' war had dominated Captain-Generals
and had speeded their departure from the island, were
not antagonistic to Campos. They were not the same
aggressive organization that they had been during the
previous period of insurrection, though they retained
the strength of armed organization and of unwavering
loyalty to Spain. The Spanish Casino, which was controlled by the higher classes of Spaniards and which
was still a potent influence, was not more hostile to
Campos than it had been to other Captain-Generals.
The first move did not come from them. The Reformists were the opportunists of Cuban politics. They had
advocated reforms and had upheld Campos. But they
were weathercocks as well as opportunists. When the opposition began to develop strength the Reformists turned
against the Captain-General. Their newspapers were
filled with articles inculcating distrust and calling the
situation an insupportable one. The Union Constitutionals also became open in their demands for a change
in policy and in men to carry out policies. Madrid
was deluged with telegrams of a disquieting nature.
General Campos met the emergency like a soldier.
He convoked the chiefs or leaders of the three parties in
the palace of the Governor-General. Then he demanded
to know the meaning of recent affairs. Santos Guzman,
the Andalusian who three weeks before had promised
hearty and loyal support, was again the spokesman of
the Union Constitutionals. He declared that the party
was not in conformity with the policy of Campos. The
Reformist spokesman echoed the same sentiment. The
Autonomists, faithful among the faithless, renewed their
adhesion. General Campos said that he was only a sol48




TO-MORROW IN CUBA


dier, and that if he had lost the confidence of the elements whose union was necessary he would not remain.
He sent a message to CAnovas in Madrid, giving the
result of the conference, and adding that the Autonomists believed the policy he had followed should be continued.
The night of January 17th, 1896, it was known in
Habana that Madrid had yielded and that the resignation of Campos had been presented and accepted. General Sabas Marin was named his successor temporarily.
General Campos, in turning over his office to General
Marin, made an address in which he said that the public opinion against concessions to the enemy, such as he
had made, existed, but was unfounded. In the TenYears' war he had caused the rebels to be executed and
they had retaliated in like manner. Now they were
following a different course. They wished to raise the
structure of independence on the ruins of the country.
They burned and destroyed, but they did not harm the
Spanish soldiers. They released prisoners and cared
for the wounded.  Therefore a different means was
necessary to combat the present war. He had caused
chiefs of the insurrection to be shot, and others to be
condemned to perpetual chains, but it was because they
had been taken in the acts of incendiarism.
General Campos also spoke of the demands on Madrid
for his recall as though they had not been spontaneous.
He issued a brief and dignified farewell to the army.
After he ceased to be Governor-General he talked to the
Habana journalists of the political conspiracy which
had made it necessary for him to retire. The traitorship of the Union Constitutionals and Reformists, he
I                 -n


4


4y




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declared, was the cause, and he spoke with bitterness
of the domineering caprice of certain classes. Of Cuba
he declared that which had happened would not have
happened if it had been treated as a province of the
peninsula. He uttered the warning that if the system
were not changed it would confirm once more the historic apothegm, that Spain had lost dominion of America through the fault of the Spaniards. Prophetic
words were these. General Campos sailed on January
20th. As he was about to embark he said to those who
bade him farewell: "My successor will fail as I have
failed." He dictated a message to the Madrid Cabinet,
in which he said he had not known how to content all
parties, although they had not been just. This was
another way of saying that the Spanish classes in Cuba
had driven him from power and must accept the responsibility of subduing the insurrection after their own
manner. On his arrival in Corufia, General Campos
maintained silence in response to popular demonstrations. General Lanchez Bregua, his military friend and
voyage companion, said if he would speak his thoughts
they would be that on par with vigorous military action
must be guarantees of administrative and political reforms, even to autonomy.
The day on which General Campos embarked from
Habana, Miximo G6mez with his insurgent followers
was encamped on the hills of Lajas on the road to the
plain of Giiines, almost within sight of the city. It is
said that persons in Habana scanning the surrounding
country from their housetops with strong glasses were
able to see the camp of Gomez. The insurgents knew
that Campos was leaving. If ever two men understood
50




TO-MORROW IN CUBA


each other, they were Miximo Gomez and Martinez
Campos; and if ever two men knew Cuba and the Cubans, they were the ones. They had arranged the pact
of El Zanjon. Gomez had retired to Santo Domingo;
and Campos had returned to Spain, vainly to strive to
implant the reforms and even the principles of political
liberty which were the basis of that pledge. None
knew better than he how shameful had been the betrayal
and how complete the failure of the reforms. Knowing
that, he could appreciate the intensity of the feeling
which animated the Cubans. He also grasped the new
plan of campaign which Gomez inaugurated in this insurrection. He knew that the Spanish intransigentes
had no conception of its scope and possibilities, and
that they would beat against it hopelessly. G6mez, on
his part, knew that the recall of Campos ended the possibility that the Cubans would be seduced from the insurrection by conciliatory methods. He knew that the
first acts of the intransigente authority, when it should
be free to act, would be in the line of greater rigor and
blinder folly. The Union Constitutionals thought the
recall of Campos was their triumph. They could not
perceive that it was a victory for Miximo G6mez and
Antonio Maceo.
General Yaleriano Weyler, marquis of Tenerife, was
appointed the successor to Campos. After an interval
of a few weeks he arrived and relieved General Marin.
The Spanish classes welcomed him with real enthusiasm. They had an inspiration of what his coming
meant. Madrid had heeded their demands. The dependence on moral agencies to combat the insurrection,
the policy of conciliation and attraction which Campos
51




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had sought to employ, would cease. In its place would
come rigorous and relentless action against the Cubans.
A score of years had not blotted out the memory of the
new Captain-General's record in Cuba when he was first
the Colonel and then the Brigadier Weyler, and always
the Butcher. The veterans of the Ten-Years' war remembered engagements between him and G6mez. The
insurgents' welcome was an attack on the town of Managua, fifteen miles from Habana, and a raid to the gates
of the city.
It might almost be said that armed revolution ceased
with the departure of Campos, though actually there
was some vigorous fighting after Weyler took command.
But the Cubans had put forth their supreme fighting
ability in the first fifteen months. They could not surpass those efforts, nor could they expect to continue
them on the same scale. They had spread revolution
in every province and in every hamlet of the island.
Now their aim was to keep the insurrection alive until
Spain yielded, because Cuba was not worth the sacrifice
of blood and money which it was costing the peninsula,
or until the United States intervened. The recognition
of belligerency would have been grateful to them, but it
was of small consequence how the United States came
into the struggle, provided it could be actually drawn in.
After the recall of Campos, the insurrection gained
absolutely the support of the middle-class Cubans.
Though sharing the aspirations of their people for political liberty, they were not certain it could be achieved
by fire and musket against the superior forces of Spain,
and they were doubtful of the ability of their people to
maintain an independent government. Autonomy under
52




TO-MORROW IN CUBA


Campos would have held a portion of them to Spanish
authority. Under Weyler they all became revolutionists, and the insurgent juntas in the towns and cities
were strengthened by their accession.
General Weyler began by publishing the usual bandos, offering amnesty to the insurgents who presented
themselves and sought pardon. The first concentration
decree was issued within a week after his coming. The
story of the reconcentration fits into the last chapter of
Spain's efforts to subdue the insurrection. It was the
belief in Cuba that the plan was conceived by Canovas
del Castillo, and that Weyler was merely the instrument. Many circumstances supported this view; but
the instrument was a willing one, and Philip II. had
no more faithful servant in the Duke of Alva than the
relentless Premier of Spain had in General Valeriano
Weyler.
Of the concentration itself, a paragraph will suffice
to tell the story. It was a thorough military measure,
but it failed to accomplish military results. And it did
not recognize the principles of civilized warfare which
require that prisoners shall be fed. The country people-the pacificos-were shut up in prison camps. Often
they were herded in settlements enclosed within stockades or trenches, with forts commanding every approach
and troops on guard. When they were permitted to
wander in the larger towns the bounds were still set by
military lines which kept them within the prison camp.
No system of issuing rations to them was ever carried
out. They were left to live on the charity of the beggared communities in which they were herded. Spain
did not recognize the principle of humanity in its treat53




TO-MORROW IN CUBA


ment of the pacificos-the women and children, the noncombatants who were made prisoners by Weyler's decrees. That was the essence of it all. No apologists
could ever alter this fact, and the defenders of military
measures could not defend this enforced starvation.
But famine did not conquer and could not conquer
insurrection, though in time it would have exterminated
the non-combatant portion of the rural population. Concentration was the confession of Spain that it could only
keep the island without the people.
When General Weyler arrived, Spain had poured
117,000 troops into Cuba. The CAnovas ministry continued to send him recruits. His military operations
were active. Since the insurgents had carried the rebellion to the western end of the island, he sought to
isolate it and partition it. The building of the trocha
from Mariel to Artemisa was one measure. It was not
a difficult feat of military engineering to dig ditches
along either side of the highway, garrison them with
forts and barracks at short intervals, and to unroll
barbed-wire fencing on either side. That was the
trocha.
General Weyler, in tho beginning, threw most of his
reinforcements into the province of Pinar del Rio.
After the death of Maceo he moved heavy battalions
into the interior, into Santa Clara. That section had
now become the centre of Gomez' operations. After
various encounters with the Spanish troops, G6mez
retired to the heart of Villa Clara, and from there he
directed the scattered forces of the insurgents. The
time for opposing the Spanish troops by open encounters was past, and Gomez himself never intended
54




TO-MORROW     IN CUBA
that they should meet in battle. He rarely had with
him 500 men, but he kept the insurgent troops moving
in small bands in pursuance of a general plan. In Santiago province it might be said that the war was waged
on an independent basis, and there was occasional fighting even to the time of the invasion of the province by
the American army. General Calixto Garcia, after being
wrecked on the Hawkins filibustering expedition, had
reached the island, and after Maceo's death he became
next in command to G6mez. He conducted all the
operations of the insurgents in the Oriente.
The arrival of General Weyler in Cuba was almost
simultaneous with the knowledge in the United States
that a real war was waging. Lack of geographical
knowledge and lack of consecutive news had caused the
insurrection as an armed movement to be minimized.
Practically nothing was known of what the Western
Invasion had been, and in truth not much is known to
this day. When the American people came to interest
themselves in the fighting there was simply bushwhacking, guerilla warfare, and it never changed its character.
The Spaniards continued to complain of the insurgents
because they would not come out of the manigua into
the open as though the affair were a knightly tournament of the olden times. The insurgents were neither
Don Quixotes nor crusaders. They'were perhaps a half
rabble, and most of them were barefooted and shirtless.
But they knew how to prevent the pacification of Cuba,
and Weyler never pacified it. He destroyed property
as the insurgents had done, and he made desolate what
they, by chance or by policy, had left green. He
cleared the country by fire, left staring walls as monu55




TO-MORROW IN CUBA


ments to his military thoroughness, left standing the
bare bamboo-poles which, when thatched, had been the
bohios or dwelling-huts of the pacificos, and crowned
every hilltop with a fortina. But neither by his military operations nor by his reconcentration as a military
measure did he end the insurrection. After eighteen
months his failure was more conspicuous than had been
that of Campos.
In the States the insurrection had received popular
sympathy from the outset. It was little understood in
its details. Enough was known of Spanish rule and
Spanish character and of the history of Cuba to satisfy
the public mind that the revolt was a just one. This
popular sentiment was at first apathetic. Genuine reforms, honestly applied, might have restrained it within bounds. No genuine reforms were honestly applied, and the sentiment of sympathy grew. President
Cleveland, in his message of December, 1896, without
asserting specifically the Monroe Doctrine, asserted
the right of the United States to intervene in stated
circumstances.  Previous to that the proffer of the
good offices of his administration to Spain in bringing peace to Cuba by helping to establish a system of
autonomy had been rejected proudly and scornfully.
Spain would subdue her rebellious subjects without the
good offices of a friendly nation and without conceding
a form of local self-government that would remove the
basic grievances. Mr. Cleveland's message was a restatement of the historic position of the United States
with regard to Cuba. It was John Quincy Adams
speaking again. The message was a declaration of
ultimate war between the two countries, and this was
56




TO-MORROW IN CUBA


recognized more clearly in Madrid than in Washington.
Mr. Cleveland, while ignoring the resolutions of Congress recognizing the belligerency of the insurgents,
asserted the right of interference, but apparently he did
not contemplate its exercise.
But policy must sometimes give way to event. Mr.
Olney, as Secretary of State, defiantly fought the Foreign Relations committee of the Senate when that committee reported the Cameron resolution recognizing
the independence of Cuba. The eclat of this antagonism may have afforded personal gratification to the
Secretary of State, yet its purpose was a public one.
This was to assure Spain and the world that the United
States had no intention of involving itself in war over
Cuba. The contemptuous term of Senatorial jingoism
was thought to be sufficient to quiet all apprehension.
It might have been sufficient had not other causes been
working. Spain felt that she had a righteous grievance
against American citizens who were either engaged in
aiding the insurrection or who were suspected of aiding it.
The impartial historian must admit that in the international sense the naturalization laws of the United
States were grossly abused. American citizenship in
Cuba, as a lump or as a mass, was something to cause
the republic to blush. But the United States having
thrown the mantle of its citizenship over this mass,
could not shame itself before the world by denying protection to those who could lawfully claim the shelter of
its flag. The State Department, under the direction of
Secretary Olney, did the best it could to discourage
recognition of this class of citizens. In doing so it
57




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clouded the rights of all American citizens in Cuba.
The Spanish authorities under Weyler became as intolerant as they had been during the Ten-Years' war,
which had culminated in the butchery of the Virginius
prisoners.  The forbearance and indifference of the
State Department led them to the presumption that
American citizens could be treated as Spanish subjects
were treated. Suspicion was allowed to take the place
of evidence. Treaty rights were ignored. President
Cleveland and Secretary Olney were not willing to go to
war in order to enforce the American construction of
the Cushing protocol to the treaty of 1795.
The treatment of American citizens by the Spanish
officials continued with a high hand until an untoward
event brought the climax. General Fitzhugh Lee, of
Virginia, had been selected by President Cleveland for
the delicate position of consul-general to Cuba. One
avowed purpose in his selection was to enable the
administration to have the benefit of the presence of
an experienced military observer. It was not publicly
stated that he was to report on the military situation,
but in time it became known that he credited the insurgents with a strength in the field and in reserve of
50,000 men.
The correctness or incorrectness of this numerical
estimate was not a vital question.  The significant
feature of the consul-general's reports was the reiterated statement that Spain was making no real progress in subduing insurrection. The purport of these
communications may have been known to Madrid and
to the Spanish authorities in Habana. The actions of
the latter showed resentment towards the consul-gen58




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eral. His own Government was not upholding him with
the vigor which he thought was due to his official position. The culmination in his relations with the Spanish
officials came in the death in the jail at Guanabacoa,
across the bay from Habana, of Dr. Ricardo Ruiz. Dr.
Ruiz was a dentist who had been educated in Philadelphia, had been naturalized as an American citizen, and
had returned to Cuba to practise his profession. There
was less ground to distrust his good faith in becoming
a citizen of the United States than existed in the majority of cases. His character was excellent. In January,
1897, some insurgents under Nestor Aranguren stopped
a train on which Spanish officials were returning to Habana, made a prisoner of the paymaster, but released
the officers. It was one of the demonstrations which
the insurgents were in the habit of making in order to
show their contempt for the pacification of the province
by the Spanish troops. Dr. Ruiz was arrested for
alleged complicity in this affair. He was thrown into
jail and kept incomunicado as prescribed by Spanish
practice. The first information the consul-general had
of the military arrest and imprisonment of this American citizen was when the news came that he had been
murdered by his jailers. Whether Dr. Ruiz was actually
murdered or whether he was driven to madness and beat
his brains out against the walls of his cell has never
been satisfactorily determined.
In its bearing on the relations of Spain and the United
States the incident was reduced to the fact that Dr. Ruiz
was dead in circumstances which created great popular
indignation in the United States and fixed public attention afresh on what was happening in Cuba. The
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Cuban question was in suspension during the brief
remainder of Mr. Cleveland's term. The reasons which
actuated Mr. Cleveland's policy were unquestionably
patriotic, but in its historic aspect only one conclusion
can be reached. By his administration Spain was given
every opportunity and every aid towards putting down
the insurrection. Her sensibilities were respected to
the point of withdrawing American war-vessels from
West Indian waters and keeping them withdrawn. The
consuls of the United States in Cuba who began making reports on the actual conditions, including the first
death-fruits of the reconcentration, were ignored and
discredited by their own Government. That weakened
them with the Government to which they were accredited. The State Department forbore to press the treaty
rights of American citizens. That forbearance was misunderstood. Passed into review, it may be said that
during the Cleveland administration the attitude of the
United States towards Spain, with reference to Cuba,
was one of indulgence which was barren of results.
The assertions of the right of intervention made in Mr.
Cleveland's messages were barren because of the indulgent attitude that preceded and followed them. His
administration had done its best for Spain. It had
done nothing for the United States in so far as would
place the army and navy on a footing to carry out the
right of intervention which Mr. Cleveland affirmed, and
it had done nothing for Cuba.
When Mr. McKinley was inaugurated, with his customary acute penetration of the popular sentiment he
outlined a policy for his administration which served a
twofold purpose; it freed him from the embarrassment
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of specific declaration of intentions, and satisfied the
unquiet public mind to await future developments. The
protection to American citizens which he announced was
a broad statement. Its application was narrow.  It
meant American citizens in Cuba. From the 4th of
March, 1897, no consular representative of the United
States in the Antilles lacked support in maintaining the
rights of American citizenship. Nor were their reports
of the conditions of the country discredited.
The astute minister of Spain in the United States,
Mr. Dupuy de Lome, was quick to grasp the situation.
He saw that American popular sentiment might not
become dangerous if it could be kept in certain channels. Sympathy for the Cubans would not cause an
American administration to be driven into war. When
their own citizens were touched the prospect was
changed. The irritation over these instances would
cause a clamor which could not be brooked. Mr. Dupuy de Lome was able to present this fact so forcibly
that Premier Canovas modified the arrogant stand his
ministry had taken. General Weyler, who was plunging violently to a collision with the United States by
his arbitrary actions, was checked. Thenceforth American citizens in Cuba were given the fullest protection
due them. This protection extended to some individuals of whose unworthiness as American citizens there
could be no dispute; but they had the shield of citizenship, and that could not be tarnished.
Mr. McKinley followed this definite evidence of the
administration policy with another step. The death of
Dr. Ruiz called for investigation. Spain professed its
willingness to co-operate with the United States in ascer61




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taining the truth. Judge William R. Day, the friend
and neighbor of the President, was selected to go to
Cuba, in a legal capacity, to aid Consul-General Lee in
the investigation. Actually it was known that he would
be also a special commissioner to gather information
about the real conditions. Before the time set for his
departure, Judge Day became Assistant Secretary of
State, and Mr. William J. Calhoun, of Illinois, who
also possessed the friendship and confidence of the
President, was chosen for the Cuban inquiry. Mr. Calhoun reached Habana in May. The Ruiz investigation
followed the usual lines. One report was made to the
Spanish Government exculpatory of the Spanish authorities, one to the American Government, incriminatory.
Mr. Calhoun did little travelling. It was said at the
time that one trip to Matanzas, sixty miles distant from
Habana, and a visit to the reconcentrado settlements
there, Sufficed him. Iis temperament was judicial and
his actions judicious. He sifted all he saw and heard.
Mr. Calhoun returned to Washington in June. His
report to the President was a private and unofficial
document. In a general way it was known that he
indorsed the consuls as worthy of credence. He, too,
saw the first death-fruits of reconcentration. He also
gained information which negatived the claim that the
insurrection was maintained by bandits and the lower
classes of negroes. He got a passing glimpse of the
degree to which it had spread among all classes of
Cubans. Mr. Calhoun noted that General Weyler was
not pacifying the island so that peace could be assured
at any definite time in the future. His own conclusions
were understood to be that Spain could not subdue the
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insurrection and that the insurgents of themselves could
not end the power of the peninsula. At the period of
Mr. Calhoun's visit another chapter in legislation for
Cuba had been taken in Madrid. New reforms had
been proposed by Clnovas. They had not secured confidence in Cuba and General Weyler had not promulgated them. They were never promulgated, and their
analysis is not worth the while. While hints of Mr.
Calhoun's confidential report appeared, they were only
hints and could have no official standing. The answer
from Madrid to these hints was an official statement to
the Spanish minister in Washington that the Queen
Regent would retain the Canovas ministry and that
General Weyler would not be recalled.
General Stewart L. Woodford, of New York, had been
appointed minister to Spain. It was known that his
instructions contained urgent representations on the
imperative need of Spain adopting a policy which
would bring prompt amelioration in Cuba. Diplomacy
covered the ultimatum with feathered phrases. Provoking delays in the arrival and the reception of the
American minister followed his appointment. It was
August when his credentials were presented. For a
month Premier Canovas made no sign. Then the assassin ended his career. The most resolute enemy to colonial liberties that Spain had produced was no more. A
temporary ministry was formed with General Azcarraga
as Premier. It was a weak attempt to continue the
conservative policies and traditions. With the further
months allowed him General Weyler had made no visible progress in pacifying the island. The irritation
over the treatment of American citizens in Cuba was
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stilled, but the public feeling against Spain. had not
lessened. During this time the horrors of the reconcentration in Cuba were continued. The American
people were slowly learning what it all meant. They
had disbelieved at first, because it was incredible.
When they believed and knew, their wrath was menacing to the peace of two friendly nations. Moreover,
timid commerce was beginning to demand that something be done to end the situation which destroyed substantially all trade between Cuba and the United States.
The Queen Regent of Spain formed a new ministry
with Praxades Sagasta at its head. As Liberal Premier
during the previous terms of power he had never proposed self- government for Cuba. In the month of
October, the year 1898, he proposed the experiment.
Weyler was recalled and Ram6n Blanco was appointed
to succeed him. A complete system of autonomy for
Cuba was outlined with the promise of its early enactment. All this came to Cuba not from a conviction
which had caused the rulers of Spain, and of such fraction of the nation as hai a voice in the Government,
to change their policy into one of enlightened justice.
Autonomy came from without, from the pressure exerted by the United States with diplomatic inflexibility
on the Madrid Cabinet and the monarchy. The insurgents of 1895 had not been able of their own strength to
compel either autonomy or independence. They were
strong enough to create and to continue a condition
which was bound to cause the intervention of the United
States.




CHAPTER IV


WOOING THE LOST COLONY
Olive Branch Brought by Blanco-A Cold Reception-Measures of
Amnesty-Concentration Decrees Revoked-Interest in McKinley's Message-Analysis of Autonomous Decrees-Insular Parliament and Its Powers-The Cabinet and the Council-Veto of
Governor-General-Comparisons with Canada-Defects in the
Light of Experience-System Accepted by a Remnant of Autonomist Party-Allocutions and Addresses-Adhesion of Reformists-Opposition of Union Constitutionals-They Adopt
the Retraimiento-Rejection of Policy by Cubans-Formation
of Autonomist Cabinet-Its Personnel-Historic Oath-Taking
Scene-Aspirations of the Past.
CUBA was lost to Spain.     It was lost when General
Ram6n Blanco came to the island with autonomy as
a peace-offering to the armed revolutionists and their
unarmed supporters. The task before him was to win
the island back to its allegiance. Conciliation was to
supersede concentration.   Recourse was to be had once
more to the moral agencies.
The instrument of the new policy was a good representative of the better type of the soldier of Spain.
Ramon    Blanco had been Governor-General of Cuba
from the beginning of 1879 until the end of 1881, succeeding Martinez Campos.     He had served in the TenYears' war as a colonel and had reached the rank of
general. The period of his authority in the island was
5                   65




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the era of mild agitation for autonomy. As GovernorGeneral he had tolerated the movement, but had never
shown a leaning towards its principles. The first year
of his administration had been marked by the guerra
chiquita-the little war-in the province of Santiago de
Cuba. He had stamped it out. Though he had shown
the military spirit in dealing with political movements
during his term of office, he had left no harsh and bitter
memories. What was remembered of his rule awakened
no feeling of resentment deeper than would have been
felt for any former Captain-General. He was not
odious to the Cuban people for any conspicuous act of
tyranny.
General Blanco arrived from Madrid in the early days
of November. His welcome was not a generous one.
The partisans of Weyler, the Spanish classes, were
sullen. The Autonomists were waiting further information before committing themselves to the new administration. They were now a very small body, but were
still respectable. The mass of the Cuban people were
distrustful or indifferent. The community was benumbed. It had no faith. When not critical it was
cynical. The public was apathetic. The presence in
Habana of the celebrated bull-fighter, Mazzantini,
excited greater popular interest than the promise of
autonomy.
The acts of Captain-General Blanco were an earnest
of the intentions of the Sagasta ministry. The Official
Gazette was filled with decrees modifying, suspending,
or annulling previous decrees. On paper the reversal
of the policy of CAnovas and Weyler was complete.
The reconcentration bandos were modified so as to per66




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mit the reconcentrados to leave their prison camps
within an extended zone of cultivation under the approval of the local military authorities. At the time it
was erroneously supposed that the decrees were absolutely revoked. The difference is not of historical
moment. If there had been power enough in Spanish
authority as personified in the Captain-General to
enforce the modification of the reconcentration bandos,
the world would not have known that they were not
revoked in their entirety.
Proclamations of amnesty to those in arms against
Spanish sovereignty followed one another. The fullest
pardon of past offences was offered on the sole condition of those in arms laying down their arms and
accepting the new regimen. Political prisoners who
for real or suspected complicity in the crime of rebellion had been deported to the penal settlements of
Ceuta, Chafarinas, and Fernando Po, or shut up in the
prisons, were freed and returned to their homes. This
release was not universal, for after the peace between
the United States and Spain hundreds more of Cuban
political prisoners in the penal settlements or in the
prisons were released. Yet the amnesty was general
enough to give proof that it was genuine. The military
executions in the Laurel ditches at Cabania fortress
ceased. After Blanco took command no Cuban patriot
puffed his last cigarette, nodded to the spectators
gathered on the hill above the fortress, and cried, "Viva
Cuba libre!" while awaiting the volley of the firing
squad.
The royal decree implanting autonomy in Cuba and
Puerto Rico was affirmed by the Queen Regent in
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Madrid on November 25th, 1897. The same day were
affirmed the decrees establishing universal suffrage, the
laws of political equality, and the adaptation of the
electoral laws of Spain for the Antilles. The promulgation of the decrees in Cuba was made by CaptainGeneral Blanco when the official text was received in
the early part of December. As the new system was
enacted through the pressure of the United States, it
was of momentous consequence to Spain and to Cuba
to know what would be the position of the national
administration. This position was shown in the message of President McKinley. Spain could not complain. Having tacitly acknowledged the right of the
United States to dictate colonial reforms in the interest
of humanity and of peaceful commerce, she could not
object to the temperate language in which the executive
statement outlined the American policy. The best construction was put by the President on the system as
meeting the demands of the hour, and credit for good
faith and sincere intentions was given in outlining or
sketching the decrees. An argument meant for Congress and the country was made against the recognition
of either the belligerency of the insurgents or the independence of the provisional government for which they
claimed an existence. The balm for Spain was soft,
and the ointment was sweet. Yet there was vinegar,
too. The message in its strongest terms reaffirmed the
paramount right of intervention by the United States.
The administration of Mr. McKinley having given
Spain the benefit of the assumption that the system was
genuine colonial self-government and would end the conditions of chronic insurrection in Cuba, the examination
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of the system itself remains, as also its reception by the
Cubans and the Spaniards in the island. The decree of
November 25th provided that for the government and administration of Cuba and Puerto Rico respectively there
should be an insular parliament divided into two chambers and a Governor-General, representative of the Metropolis, who should exercise in the name of Spain the
supreme authority. The legislation of colonial affairs
should be the function of the chambers concurrently
with the Governor-General. The parliament should be
composed of two bodies possessing equal powers-the
Chamber or House of Representatives and the Council
of Administration. The Council should consist of thirtyfive members, of whom eighteen should be chosen after
the manner prescribed by the electoral law, and seventeen should be designated by the Crown through the
nomination of the Governor-General. The Crown representatives should serve for life; the elective ones for
five years, unless the Council should be dissolved. The
members of the House or Chamber of Representatives
should be chosen in the proportion of one to each twentyfive thousand inhabitants, and their term should be for
five years.
The legislative powers defined were substantially
those of an insular assembly with reference to local
affairs. The colonial parliament was to control the
colonial budget. To the Cortes of Spain it was reserved
to determine what were the obligatory expenses inherent in sovereignty and to fix the revenues necessary to
cover them. Regarding foreign commerce-a root subject, a fundamental necessity for genuine colonial home
rule-whether the initiative negotiations came from the
69




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delegates especially authorized by the colonial government were to participate in the negotiations. The
treaties of commerce in which the insular government
had not intervened were to be communicated to it in
order that it might declare whether or not it adhered
to the stipulations. The framing of the tariff of both
import and export duties was conceded to the insular
parliament. These were the cardinal provisions of the
legislative powers. There were reservations. After
the definition of the powers and functions of the parliament, note the definition of the Governor-General's
authority: "The supreme government of the colony
shall be exercised by a Governor-General." He could
suspend the constitutional guarantees and apply the
Law of Public Order, which was martial law. He was
to be the viceroy patronate, exercising the faculties
inherent in the patronate of the Indies. He was to be
commander of the army and the navy, the delegated
representative of the ministries of state, war, navy, and
colonies in Spain. All the authorities of the island
were subordinated to him. He was responsible for the
order and security of the colony. His veto power
allowed him to suspend parliamentary legislation, referring the veto to Madrid for confirmation or rejection.
The cabinet was to consist of five members or secretaries with portfolios and a president without portfolio.
The secretaries could be members of either the Camara
or the Council, could take part in the discussions of
both bodies, and could vote in whichever body they
held membership. They were responsible to the parliament. The debt incurred in the Ten-Years' war and
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in the then existing insurrection was left subject to
future adjustment.
This system of colonial government proposed by
Sagasta and drafted by Moret was a laborious effort to
apply to the Spanish Antilles the autonomy of Canada
as it could be learned from the books. In his exposition of the subject to the Queen Regent, Sagasta
declared that the Autonomist constitution was not
exotic, was neither copied nor imitated, yet the student
will search in vain through the pages of Spanish
national or colonial history for evidence that it was indigenous. The system could no~ be analyzed merely
from the written text. Its nature was to be gathered
from the circumstances in which it was proposed. Its
application and interpretation had to be in the light of
past events. Experience with Spanish administration
of previous reforms could not be overlooked. When
the critical examination was finished, the conclusion
was strong that Spanish statesmen did not know the
meaning of colonial self-government. In the ultimate
analysis all powers centred in the Governor-General
as the viceroy of the Crown and the representative of
Spanish sovereignty; and notwithstanding Sagasta's
declaration that the Autonomist constitution was not
exotic, the chief recommendation of its sponsors was
its resemblance to the Constitution of Canada.
A literature of annotation followed the publication of
the decrees. This literature went into laborious comparisons to show the points of resemblance and also the
improvements. The difference was fundamental. The
constitution of Canada is interpreted and applied in
the spirit of free institutions. All parties to the com71




TO-MORROW IN CUBA


pact understand parliamentary government. The foreign office, the British Parliament, and the English
people know the weakness of the reserve powers if their
exercise should ever be attempted. A comparison on
paper of the respective functions of the Governor-General of Canada and the Governor-General of Cuba was
an absurdity. Spanish statesmen had no conception of
executive power falling into forgetfulness through disuse. To their minds power was conferred only to be
exercised.
The people of Cuba were of a similar mind. They
had no conception of authority reserved to a supreme
power and not being exerted. Their knowledge was the
knowledge drawn from experience. Their experience
had been with one Captain-General after another who
construed the laws to suit his own notions and executed
them with military rigor. The composition of the
Council was the broadest evidence of the lack of faith in
colonial home rule. With the Crown creating seventeen
life members, a condition could not arise in which it
would be unable to secure the additional member, and
thus having a majority, block absolutely all popular
government. Taken in addition to the veto powers of
the Governor-General, this Council was an exhibition
of how easily Madrid could continue to control Cuba
against the interests of the island. Leaving the debt
unsettled was to leave an irritant which in the future
was certain to cause dissensions between the peninsula
and the island, and possibly foment another revolution.
But it was the system itself which was submitted to discussion rather than the debt, which properly lay outside
of autonomy. And the discussion had hardly begun
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before the end was seen. Moret had joined his name
imperishably with the emancipation law of 1871, which
was crowned in 1886 by the complete freedom of the
slave race. His fame was not to be joined imperishably with the constitutional autonomy which would save
the Antilles to Spain.
The adhesion of the Autonomists who had not joined
the insurgents in the field, been thrown into prison,
deported to the penal settlements, or gone into voluntary exile was made clear after the promulgation of the
decrees of autonomy. Madrid was waiting to know
how the system would be received by the different
political groups. Naturally the Autonomists were the
first ones to be considered. Individually they published manifestoes, allocutions, and addresses pledging
their support. They exchanged felicitations among
themselves and sent congratulatory telegrams to Madrid. The Autonomists in Paris were also satisfied.
Those in the United States, with a very few exceptions,
were silent. Speaking collectively, the central Junta
of Autonomists issued an address telling the people
of Cuba to prepare for the elections without fear that
the verdict of suffrage would be falsified. This was
an indirect way of characterizing the former elections
as fraudulently controlled by the Spanish authorities, which was simply history. The local juntas were
requested to begin the preparation of the regimen of
autonomy. The central Junta adopted as its sentiments
an article in its newspaper organ * which declared that
the new system was the realization of their doctrine of
1881. Former reforms were slighted in the statement
*El Pais.
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that the system proposed by Sagasta was not the administrative and economic decentralization previously
offered by Liberal governments. This which was now
presented was the genuine autonomy-representative
autonomy with responsible parliamentary government,
the ultimate evolution of the process which the Autonomist programme had formulated.
What was lacking in minor details, the Autonomists
said, was unimportant. The system in its entirety conceded all that they had sought. It gave Cuba home
rule without impairing the national unity. It was a tie
that would forever bind the island to the peninsula not
in chains, but in free will. Under it the mother country and the erring child would walk again hand in hand.
Peace and prosperity would come again. Cuba had been
rebellious; her aspirations for political liberties had been
discouraged, and some of her children had unfortunately taken up arms. But now that autonomy was to be
implanted the past would be forgotten, and they would
return to the ways of peace and cultivate its growth.
The annexationists in the United States would redouble
their efforts, would again talk of manifest destiny, but
the Cubans would not be deceived. At the bier of the
decrepit ancestor-absolutist government-they would
imitate the heralds who preceded the funeral car of the
French kings, and would cry, "Long live autonomy!"
Dead the fault which had caused discontent, would die
also the spirit of rebellion. Autonomy meant the definite failure of the insurrection, already broken by arms.
The central Junta appealed to the patriotism of the
insurgents. It knew that the eternal revolutionists,
the anarchists, would not be satisfied. No matter.
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Autonomy would satisfy by its fruits. The arch of the
new alliance between Cuba and Spain, it affirmed the
indestructible sovereignty of the mother country in the
love, the gratitude, and the liberty of the colony. The
shades of the Autonomists who had died-most of them
in exile, it was parenthetically observed-were saluted.
"Long live Cuba-long live Spain!"
But Spain in Cuba had not long to live, and a new
life was unfolding for Cuba.
The Reformists also proclaimed their adhesion.
Nothing had been heard of them during a twelvemonth
and its half. In the elections for deputies to the Cortes,
which were held two months after General Weyler took
command of the island, they had been retired along with
the Autonomists. Their treachery to Campos was fruitless. The Weylerites kept them under the ban of suspicion. Now the weather-vane had shifted. The wind
was north by northeast. Being opportunists, the Reformists turned with the weather-vane. Autonomy was
more than they had ever asked or wanted. It was
something they had not believed in. But it was the programme of the day, and they would accept it. They
sent effusive telegrams to Madrid, exchanged felicitations among themselves and congratulations with the
Autonomists. They would co-operate with the latter in
making the new system effective. Liberal leaders in
Spain and the organs of their opinions were deceived
by this effusiveness. They discussed it as a fusion, as
though two great and powerful political organizations
differing in principle had coalesced and would form a
cohesive unit.
It was left to the intransigentes dominating the Union
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Constitutionals to demonstrate once more that they
were the unchanging element in Spanish power in Cuba.
When autonomy was proposed in October, 1897, the
intransigentes were what they had been in 1879, when
the proposition had been made to carry out in spirit
and in letter the compact of El Zanjon. Their importance and their influence could not be decried. They
ostracized General Blanco. He dwelt in isolation
among his own race and his own people. They received the first suggestion of autonomy with distrust.
This gradually grew into violent opposition. The sentiment was unified and consolidated when the Union
Constitutional party called a convention for the third
week in December. These Spanish Tories in Cuba had
claims to be called representatives of public sentiment.
They showed the vigor of party organization in delegated assembly. The Autonomists had been content
with the declarations of adhesions from the local juntas.
Three men might constitute a junta. The Reformists
had been satisfied with the approval of small groups.
The Union Constitutionals were numerous enough to
hold a convention to which delegates were chosen by
the various local juntas. Some of these delegates were
from sections of the island in control of the insurgents.
It was the only political assembly held in Cuba in five
years.
The symptoms were stormy, Captain-General Blanco
was making a shrewd and persistent effort to gain control of the organization. The president of the Union
Constitutional party was the Cuban-born Marquis de
Apezteguia, who possessed more liberal instincts than
the Spanish classes of whom he was the representative.
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Blanco sought to make the conservatives more autonomist than the Autodomists themselves. The Marquis
Apezteguia was in sympathy with the plan. It was a
conception of high politics. But the majority of the
Union Constitutionals were not fitted for high politics.
They thought the mission of their party was to preserve
Spanish sovereignty, and they believed colonial selfgovernment would destroy this sovereignty. " Authority, not autonomy," was their watchword. The determination of their leaders was to make a demonstration
of the rejection of the new colonial policy which would
be echoed in Spain and would overthrow the Sagasta
ministry. They were not satisfied with their experience in forcing the withdrawal of General Campos. In
the preliminary private meetings of the Habana delegates these cried out anathema to autonomy.
The convention was as intolerant as conventions usually are when conservatives become radicals in the
violence of their opposition to a stated course. The
central Junta, which had shown receptiveness for Captain-General Blanco's schemes, was repudiated. Marquis Apezteguia was rebuked, shorn of his power as
president of the party, and then left in that position.
The Queen Regent was congratulated in entire sincerity
on the restoration of peace in the Philippines. Violent
speeches were made against the United States, President McKinley, and Congress. A telegram was sent to
General Weyler which was meant to show that the convention was in sympathy with him and with his policy.
The official attitude of the party was expressed by formal
resolution which made opposition to autonomy a party
creed. Sedition was condemned, and as loyal Spaniards
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the Union Constitutionals would not hint at armed resistance to the programme of the Government. They would
not themselves become rebels by talking sedition, but
they would have none of the responsibility for the new
system. Instead, they adopted the Retraimiento. This
meant the drawing within the shell. It pledged the
party to retire from participation in public affairs and to
take no part in the elections. The Autonomists spread
the table, the Reformists ate the feast, and the Union
Constitutionals were asked to pay the bill. Never.
This action was taken in order that the non-participation should not be interpreted as lending moral
support. It was passive resistance in the most sullen
and embarrassing form. The Government was drawing
nearer the precipice. They would not be the ones to
push it over.
After these declarations had been made specific and
the attitude of the party defined, some leniency was shown
the central Junta, whose membership had been altered.
This directory was given power to act if developments
later called for drawing out of the shell and participating in public affairs. But the great end of the intransigentes was accomplished. The powerful Union
Constitutional party was placed on record as inflexibly
opposed to autonomy. The intransigentes did not believe that autonomy would conciliate the insurrection
out of existence; they did not believe it would succeed,
and they meant that it should not succeed.
There was no insurgent political party to which the
Madrid authorities could turn in seeking support for
autonomy, yet there was something which in a degree
represented the insurgents. This was the Junta in New
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York and the secret revolutionary committees in the
Cuban towns and cities. Weyler had not succeeded in
breaking up the latter. Blanco did not succeed; but it
was thought that they might be persuaded out of existence by securing the support of leading Cubans who
were suspected of being in sympathy with them. A
very small number of Cubans did join themselves to the
Autonomists, but the majority of the Cuban people not
in the field remained as determined in not accepting the
new policy as were the actual insurgents. They had become revolutionists to the core. The American Junta
also repudiated the system. Its effort was given to
showing that the autonomy proposed was not genuine.
It made comparisons with the colonial government cf
Canada; pointed out the defects in the regimen prepared
for Cuba, and showed especially the danger of the reserve
powers. All this was meant for American public opinion. The time had gone by when the actual provisions
of autonomy-parchment autonomy, they called it-were
of consequence to the Cuban revolutionists, whether in
the United States or in Cuba. They were waiting for
events to determine the limit of the near future foreshadowed by President McKinley as determining American intervention.
Immediately after his arrival, General Blanco began
putting the new policy into effect. The Weyler officials
throughout the island were removed. Influential Cubans
were invited to take office. Here was met the first difficulty. It was a responsibility which most of them
sought to decline. In some instances what was called
gentle compulsion was used. Jose Bruzon, a leading
lawyer of Habana, was persuaded to accept the office of




TO-MORROW IN CUBA


civil governor of the province. His position was defined as waiting while Cuba drifted to its destiny. The
insurgents showed no resentment towards him. It was
commonly believed that compromising documents in the
hands of the Spanish authorities induced him to take
the post of governor in preference to involuntary exile
to Chafarinas. In Santa Clara province Marcos Garcia
was prevailed on to accept the office of governor. Marcos Garcia was an insurgent colonel in the Ten-Years'
war, in which he was associated with G6mez. He had
not been suspected of active sympathy with the last insurrection. For the other provinces fairly good men
were secured, and in the municipalities changes were
made in the alcaldes, or mayors, by selecting either
Cubans or Spaniards who had not been too closely identified with the Weyler administration.
The royal decrees provided for an insular cabinet.
Until elections could be held and the full system of
autonomy be got in working order, the cabinet necessarily would be a provisional one. Captain-General Blanco
and the officials in Madrid gave the composition of this
body careful thought. It was developed that though
the Autonomists were not numerous, they were broken
up into factions. One faction was known as the historic
Autonomists. The other faction was less historic and
more radical. The Reformists also had to be taken
into consideration. The comment at the time was that
they showed a greedy eagerness to get office. Ultimately the cabinet was arranged. Madrid approved
and Habana smiled.
The cabinet was inaugurated on the 1st of January,
1898. It was an historic scene in the throne-room of
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the Palace-the same room which exactly a year later
was to be the scene of the yielding of Spanish authority to the United States. All the foreign consuls, the
official representation of Spanish authority, and the dignitaries of the Church were present. Captain-General
Blanco, after the members had taken the oath of fidelity to Spain, the Queen, and Spanish institutions, addressed them. Peace and the welfare of Cuba, he told
them, formed the best propaganda they could make
in behalf of autonomy and against the revolution, which,
although it was never justified, would thereafter have no
pretense whatever to exist. IHe closed his address with
the exhortation, "Long live Cuba, forever Spanish."
At the conclusion of the ceremony, mass was celebrated
in the chapel of the Palace by the bishop of Habana.
A few hundred of the populace were gathered outside.
They made a feeble demonstration when the new cabinet appeared. The community as a whole showed little
concern in the ceremonies. Military precautions had
been taken against an outbreak or an unfriendly demonstration.
The new cabinet might justly be called representative
of the aspirations and agitation of the Autonomists of
the past. The president, without portfolio, was Jose
Maria Galvez, a lawyer and political orator. His name
was attached to the first manifestoes issued by the Autonomists, in 1879. It was attached to the manifesto issued
in 1895, reprobating the insurrection, deploring its effect
in postponing Autonomist reforms, and predicting its
failure. The leading figure in this Autonomist cabinet
was the secretary of the treasury, Rafael Montoro.
His had been the consistent career of a constitutional
6              81




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agitator. A student in Madrid, he had been educated
as a lawyer and had shown force as an advocate. He
was the most accomplished orator in the island. His
admirers called him the Cuban Castelar; and he was
such, if allowance be made for the difference between
the man of talent and the man of genius. Montoro's
public addresses and writings are voluminous. His
name appears to the introduction and prologues to many
books by Cuban authors on politics and on literature.
He was one of the founders of the Liberal-Autonomist
party. HIe signed the manifesto of 1879, and afterwards
was an Autonomist Deputy to the Cortes, where he sat
in obscurity. Montoro's name appeared at the head of
those who, in the name of the Liberal-Autonomist
party, repudiated the uprising of 1895. He indorsed
the reforms proposed by Canovas, and was rewarded by
the bestowal of the title of marquis. From that time
his influence with the Cuban people ceased utterly.
They forgot his past services, and characterized him as
Weyler's partisan and parasite.
Antonio Govin was named as secretary of justice and
administration. He was a forcible personality. He
was both an historic and a radical Autonomist. He
was the secretary of the party in its early days, one of
the signers of the first platform, and the author of documents which were put forth in its name in explanation
of the principles of autonomy. Govin was capable of
making enemies, and during the period of the active
agitation for autonomy his boldness arrayed the Spanish classes against him. He signed the manifesto of
April, 1895, but he never permitted himself to be identified with Weyler's acts. Ultimately he sought volun.




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tary exile, and settled with his family in the United
States. He did not reach Habana in time to take the
oath of office with his colleagues. Govin was a prominent freemason, and it was thought that his influence
might be potential with the masonic organizations,
which were filled with the revolutionary spirit.
The Reformists were given a member of the cabinet.
He was Eduardo Dolz, a lawyer, who had shown some
talent for arranging compromises. He was a Deputy in
the Cortes. He came direct from Madrid, and it was
said that he would represent Spanish sovereignty in the
bosom of autonomy. Autonomy never warmed to this
representative of the monarchy. Francisco Zayas, an
educator who had the public respect, was made secretary of public instruction. Laureano Rodriguez, a
peninsular from the province of Santiago de Cuba, became secretary of agriculture, industry, and commerce.
The irony of these latter departments caused only a
passing sneer. The actual functions of the Autonomist
cabinet were never clearly discernible. The cabinet was
chiefly useful as a shield for the unpopular acts of the
Spanish Government.




CHAPTER V


EPILOGUE TO AUTONOMY
Colonial Home Rule in Function-Persuasion for the InsurgentsEmissaries Who Were Not Envoys-A Major Andre Without a
Benedict Arnold-Spanish Army Opposition to AutonomyConspiracy of Officers Starts Riots-Habana's Four-Days' Siege
from Within-Its Incidents-The Riots a Political Demonstration-The Press Disciplined-Influence on American Sentiment
-Demand for Official Reports-Review of Relief MovementMisgivings in Spain-Lack of Military Successes-Blanco's
Journey-The Maine Explosion-Hysterical Feeling Preceding
and Succeeding That Event-Rejection of Amplified Autonomy
by the Insurgents-Elections for the Cortes-End of the Experiment.
COLONIAL home rule was finally in function, as the
Castilian idiom has it. The insurgents in the field had
shown little disposition to assist in the functions. A
glance backward is necessary to understand their attitude.  When the system    was first proposed, G6mez,
Calixto Garcia, and the other insurgent commanders
made known positively that their demand was for independence, and they would not consider autonomy.      It
was abundantly and conclusively proven that they represented the feelings of the ragged soldiers who acknowledged   military  allegiance to them.   The insurgent
army, as an army, would not permit autonomy to be
talked. It was held that to propose it was a violation
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of the Cuban constitution and required the proponent
to be passed through arms-that is, executed.
Coincident with the promulgation of the decrees of
autonomy the Spanish authorities began what they
called their moral campaign. This was a campaign of
bribery and persuasion. They were very persistent in
seeking to disintegrate the insurrection individual by
individual. Every inducement was offered to the Cubans in arms to present themselves. The list of presentados began to be followed with interest. But those
in arms who presented themselves were discouragingly
few. The insurgents in the field, by an understanding
among themselves, permitted the presentations of their
sick. This enabled some of their numbers to die among
friends and relatives rather than in the camp. A few
chiefs did present themselves, some of whom held the
rank of colonel. The invariable explanation of these
presentations by the Cubans was that the officer had
been deprived of his command or degraded by G6mez,
and that his presentation was in revenge. While this
was not true in every instance, it was the fact in a surprising number of cases. A few of the minor chiefs
who were among the presentados undoubtedly did so in
good faith. They were weary of the long struggle and
were willing to accept the promises of the Spanish
Government; but these were the exceptions rather than
the rule.
All of Spain's efforts to secure the adhesion of the
insurgents in the field were made by private messengers
and emissaries. They were not envoys. Frequently
these were relatives who were forced to undertake the
doubtful mission. Towards winning the moral support
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of public opinion of the world, which might have been
had by an honest effort to present the policy of autonomy to the insurgents, Castilian pride was an insuperable obstacle. The last shred of territory gained in
centuries of conquest was at stake, yet Spain could not
bring herself to recognize that the revolutionary force
which had brought 200,000 of her soldiers to Cuba to
combat it was a force in arms. No conference was
asked, no truce proposed to discuss the proposition of
autonomy, and no white flag shown. Instead, dependence was placed on secret messengers. That some of
these emissaries were executed by the insurgents is beyond question.
The Ruiz case was the best known. Joaquin Ruiz
was a colonel of the Spanish engineers in Habana, and
was of a winning personality. The military authorities
sought to disintegrate the band of Nestor Aranguren
through him. Aranguren was a young man who had
made reputation by his daring in attacking and annoying the Spanish forces close to the city. He had been
employed in the office of a firm of contractors which
constructed the water works, and this had brought him
in relation to Colonel Ruiz, who was the engineer in
charge. If Aranguren could be reached it would have
a great effect in Habana and among the insurgents in
that province. Colonel Ruiz undertook the task. He
opened a correspondence with Aranguren-a less difficult matter than might be supposed. Former personal
ties and family relationship kept up communication
between many Spaniards and insurgents in the field so
long as no efforts were made to treat of the insurrection.
Ruiz sought a personal interview with Aranguren. The




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latter agreed to it if he did not come on a political mission, and warned him that if he came proposing autonomy it would be at his peril. Ruiz' first attempt was
unsuccessful. Subsequently he succeeded in reaching
the camp of Aranguren, in defiance of the latter's warning, with his propositions from the Spanish authorities.
The story of the insurgents who were in the camp was
that on Ruiz' appearance Aranguren burst into tears,
and asked him why he had come to certain death.
Then an insurgent summary court-martial was held and
Ruiz was executed. The full story was never told, but
the common belief was that he was macheted.
Rumors of Colonel Ruiz' disappearance reached Habana. The authorities feared for his fate, but did not
dare let the truth be known. Finally it was arranged
that a foreign consular representative in Habana who
was a personal friend of the reckless colonel of engineers should ask General Lee's aid. The United States
consul-general, in his unofficial capacity and with the
consent of the Spanish authorities, despatched a messenger to the camp of the insurgents. When the messenger reached the camp Aranguren was absent, but the
officer next in command sent a message that Ruiz had
been tried and executed. Intense excitement was caused
by the news, and the officials sought to make capital of
it in the United States, where some weak sentiment was
shown, and the execution of Ruiz was denounced as an
act of savagery.
A dispassionate study of the circumstances of the case
does not uphold this contention. Colonel Ruiz bore
no white flag and no safe-conduct to the insurgent camp.
He went against warning. He sought to serve his Gov87




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ermnent, and that service would have been rewarded by
military promotion. The service could only be performed by securing the treachery of Aranguren to his
comrades in arms. Back of the attempted interview
with the young insurgent was the purpose of creating
distrust and suspicion among the revolutionists of one
another. The mere fact that a Spanish emissary had
sought to visit Aranguren in his camp was relied upon
to arouse distrust among the other insurgents. The
military authorities professed that they had letters
which would show that Aranguren's course was barbarous and treacherous. They never disclosed such letters.
Instead, Aranguren himself made public the documents.
These were a conclusive showing of the plot to discredit
him and to spread dissensions among the insurgents.
The plot recoiled, and the death of its agent was the
sequel. Colonel Ruiz was called the Cuban Major Andre. The difference was that young Aranguren was not
a Cuban Benedict Arnold. Weeks afterwards Aranguren was surprised in the hills of Tapaste by the Spanish troops and killed. His whereabouts were betrayed
by a camp follower. His body was brought to the
morgue in Habana. He was buried in the cemetery of
Columbus. His grave is a few yards away from that of
Colonel Ruiz.
The execution of Ruiz took place in the latter part of
December, 1897. A month later Augusta Morales, the
alcalde of a village in Pinar del Rio, penetrated the camp
of the insurgent general Pedro Diaz, near San Cristobal.
He brought propositions for autonomy. Morales was
tried by a court-martial. Dr. Hugo Roberts, a young
insurgent officer, defended him. He was condemned as
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an emissary of the enemy and was executed. This
ended the visits of secret messengers to the insurgent
camps.
The army of Spain in Cuba was the last to be heard
from regarding the new system. By the army was always meant the officers. The privates, dumb beasts
of burden and abuse, were not taken into account. The
army never had been for autonomy. That was perfectly
well understood. But its opposition heretofore had been
passive. Military discipline was lax and the military
commanders in the different districts were supreme.
Where they happened to be in sympathy with General
Blanco, a little support was given the new policy by not
throwing insurmountable hindrances in the way of extending the zones of cultivation and aiding the reconcentrados. These cases were not numerous. Usually the
military commander nullified every effort to relieve the
starving population. The army was not in its own understanding disloyal to Spain, but it did not want the
insurrection to end just then. That would end also the
double pay, the pensions and promotions, the decorations, and the monstrous system of corruption which
prevailed. The army had not been fearful of autonomy
succeeding, and therefore did not fear the early end of
the insurrection. All it wanted was to be let alone.
But it was not let alone, and this precipitated the demonstration which showed that the army was not for
autonomy.
The restrictions of the Weyler rule had been relaxed
in so far as affected the freedom of the press. The censorship was not abrogated under Blanco, yet a certain
latitude of comment was permitted the newspapers.
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Some of them, professing faith in the sincerity of the
more liberal policy, ventured criticisms of admitted
abuses. A newspaper called La Discusion had been
suppressed by Weyler because of its insurgent leanings.
It had been an organ of radical autonomist tendencies.
The paper reappeared under Blanco. It began to call
attention to gross abuses of the army, and to demand
their reform. Another paper of less character than La
Discusion, which had adopted the title of The Reconcentrado, was also sensational and personal in its criticisms.
The army officers took alarm. One night groups of them
dropped into a cafe and did not leave till after midnight.
The next morning a score or more of these officers in
uniform went in a body to the office of The Reconcentrado and wrecked it. Then they proceeded to the office
of La Discusion and began to demolish it. The office of
this journal was on the Prado, opposite Central Park, in
the very heart of the city. Soon the officers had a mob
back of them which completed the wreck. Many members of the Volunteers were seen among the mob. The
officers, having started the demonstration, retired and
left the rioters to finish their work. The Orden Publico, the military police of the city and the finest body
of regulars in the service of Spain, sought to drive them
back by gentle means. They were not allowed to use
their swords or firearms. The rioters flouted them, and
mob orators addressed the populace, inciting them to
greater activity. The authorities were powerless.
It was a Wednesday morning, the morning of January
12th, when the rioting began. There was a lull during
the midday, but in the afternoon the mob rallied. It
made little demonstration, however, and was content
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Asth throwing stones and breaking windows. But the
ity feared something more. It was known that the
authorities had been unravelling several supposed conspiracies, and that at all the recent bull-fights extraordinary precautions had been taken to prevent an outbreak.
In Spain the popular uprisings usually begin at the bullring. That afternoon the feeling was as if a black cloud
had settled over the city. It was like waiting for the
thunder-storm on an oppressive summer day. General
Parrado, who was next in command to Blanco, personally took command of the police forces. Orders were
given that all shops should be closed, and within half
an hour the doors were locked and the iron shutters
fastened. People were warned off the streets. The
Guardia Civiles, or military rural police, were brought
in to reinforce the Orden Publico. Then some of the
regulars began to arrive and make their evolutions in a
public square. After them came the Fifth Battalion of
Volunteers, suspected of disloyalty, who were stationed
in the palace of the Governor-General half a mile away
from Central Park, where the rioting had begun.
In the evening the mob rallied. The narrow streets
leading to the Palace were choked with rioters. The
plaza in front of it was filled with them. They cried
"Long   live Weyler!" "Down with     autonomy!"
"Death to Blanco!" Captain-General Blanco and the
members of the Autonomist cabinet who were with him
in the palace could hear these cries. After a while the
troops succeeded in clearing the plaza and the streets
leading to the palace, and holding them against approach. Their instructions were to be gentle. The
disorderly crowds were permitted to roam almost at will
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through the streets, crying long life to Weyler, to the
Volunteers, to Spain, to the army; death to Blanco and
death to autonomy. Sometimes they had sharp colloquies with the troops. One group cried, "War to
autonomy!" and the captain of the guard which had
been brought in from the country afterwards told how
he had heard that cry before. It was when a band of
insurgents had laid an ambush for his men and had
borne down on them crying, "Death to autonomy!"
The night was passed without bloodshed.
The following day General Juan Arolas, recently
named as military governor, took commmand of the
forces. He had just arrived from Santiago province.
Artillery was brought in from the country, and the garrisons were reinforced by the addition of 8,000 regulars.
In spite of this heavy force the mob made several
demonstrations during the day, but without any set
purpose beyond baiting the troops. At night there
seemed to be actual danger. The rioters gathered in
numbers on the Prado on each side of Central Park.
The troops frequently charged them, sometimes with
the cavalry in the lead, sometimes with the infantry on
the double quick. The soldiers were not allowed to use
their firearms unless a shot should be directed against
them. Happily this did not happen. The hospitals
were filled with people suffering from bruises and sabre
cuts, but they had not drawn the fire of the troops.
The belief at the time was that if the order had been
given to fire it would not have been obeyed. The word
ran around that Spaniards would not fire on Spaniards.
It took four days for Habana to resume the semblance
of order, and this semblance was not reached until the
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artillery was placed in position to command every
point.
The events of that week constituted a real siege, and
jabana was garrisoned against the rioters by thousands
of regular troops. But they were not a bloody mob, and
this caused a misapprehension of the serious nature of
the uprising. During the days of rioting it was observed that the rioters seemed to be incited by persons
not taking part, and the presence of the fraternal spirit
between them and the military forces was also manifest.
Yet Habana was on the brink of bloodshed all the time,
and 8,000 troops could not have prevented it if there
had been one musket discharge on the mob.
When the tension was relieved the Spanish authorities
gave themselves up to explaining that the rioting had
been trifling and had no meaning. But it had a deep
meaning. It was a political demonstration of the army
against autonomy, and it served its purpose. Three or
four score of the officers who precipitated the rioting
were placed under military arrest, but they were never
punished. Not one was court-martialled. Pretexts were
found for releasing most of them within a few days after
their arrest, and they were returned to their commands.
This was the significant confession of the weakness of
Spanish authority in Cuba. Captain-General Blanco
did not dare to discipline the insubordinate and rebellious army officers. Instead, the Spanish authorities
disciplined the press, which was held responsible for
the trouble because it had attacked the honor of the
army. The Captain-General issued a decree which,
without superseding the already rigorous laws against
the freedom of the press, placed the censorship abso93




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lutely in the hands of the general staff of the army.
Persons who transgressed the censorship, in addition to
their liability for the penalties of the law were held
guilty of the crime of rebellion; and the crime of rebellion was punishable by either death or exile in chains
to the penal settlements. And this was done with an
Autonomist cabinet in nominal power and under a regimen whose first principle had been the liberty of the
press. The army ended autonomy.
The influence of the outbreak on American public
opinion was pronounced. The people of the United
States were not deceived when the news was published
as to what had happened. The censorship of cable
messages prevented the history of the days of siege
from reaching the north until the vessels could carry
the true story. Then it was felt that the army officers
and the rioters had uttered a true cry in their " Death
to autonomy." The rioting had been at no time directed against Americans, but there was inquietude and
a natural fear of further trouble. It might be said that
the American public was convinced of the failure of
autonomy. There was at once a demand for the reports
of the consuls and for full information regarding the
actual state of affairs in Cuba. The condition of the
reconcentrados was one of the subjects on which information was wanted. Their relief had been part of the
promise of Spain that went with autonomy. In the
generous impulses following the promise of that system
a proposition had been advanced that the American
people aid the starving population. Captain-General
Blanco proudly rejected it, declaring in an official telegram to the Madrid Cabinet and to the Spanish minis94




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ter in Washington, that Spain could care for her own.
Within a fortnight he was compelled to admit that
Spain could not care for her own.
President McKinley issued a Christmas appeal to
the American people for help. At first the responses
were slow. The American people wanted the aid, if
given, to reach the starving Cubans, and they were not
willing to trust it to Spanish officials. But back of this
was their perception that this kind of relief could only
be temporary, and that no permanent alleviation could
come until the circumstances were changed. They saw
that until the cause was removed the distressing conditions would continue; and the cause, they were convinced, was the inability of the Spanish Government
to govern the island satisfactorily. Nevertheless their
hearts and their purses gradually opened, and within a
few weeks American aid was pouring into Cuba, and
continued to pour in until war between Spain and the
United States was declared.
Captain-General Blanco's Government was able to
make appropriations which ultimately reached $250,000
in silver for the relief of a suffering population of half
a million. All the functions of Spanish sovereignty
were paralyzed and it could do no more. This was one
cause of the continued refusal of the Cuban people to
believe in autonomy. Material relief was promised
with it, and this relief did not come. The consuls of
the United States could not have reported honestly that
progress was being made in relieving the distress. Nor
could they report that autonomy was making progress.
It was not even standing still. It was going backward.
The consuls could see what was going on in the vain
o   95




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effort to implant the new system. They could see the
exploradores, or pilot engines, preceding the trains with
armored cars and troops for guards. This was railroad
travel in a pacified country.
They knew other things that could not be treated
of publicly. With one exception, every consul had
lists presented to him of Spaniards, generally of the
commercial classes, who wanted Cuba annexed to
the United States. They had private and confidential
statements made of the movement which had begun
in October among the sugar planters of Habana and
Matanzas provinces for the intervention of the United
States. These classes had absolutely lost faith in the
ability of Spain to maintain her sovereignty. As the
failure of autonomy became more apparent, they became
more pronounced in their desire for American intervention. They could not take overt action because they
were Spanish subjects. Such action would have made
them amenable to the statutes. against sedition, and
placed them in the category of the insurgents who were
charged with the crime of rebellion. But they managed
to let their attitude be known. The United States consuls in giving their judgment had to take account of
these indications. They could also note the full effect
of the sullen and passive opposition of the Spanish
classes to autonomy as manifested in the attitude of
the Union Constitutional party. The intensity and the
influence of that opposition could not be fully understood in the United States. It had to be measured in
the atmosphere and in the midst of the events which
were in process of development.
It was a question how fully Spain understood the
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desperate conditions at the time of the army riots. She
had been watching the experiment of autonomy in ignorant hope. The capacity for national self-deceit was
apparently illimitable. Yet the reassuring accounts,
without practical results, were beginning to cause distrust. The query in the peninsula was why greater
progress was not made in securing the support of the
Cubans. Her statesmen were afraid to tell the people the truth. Blanco was not winning Cuba back to
Spain.  Conciliation had failed, and autonomy must
be implanted by the sword. The Captain-General was
unable to make a vigorous military campaign. Weyler
had left the army in a state of suffering and demoralization second only to that of the pacificos. General
Blanco began its improvement at once like the trained
commander that he was, but it was certain that the
troops could not be got in condition for service in the
field till the rainy season came on. Then there could
be no real campaigning, and the insurgents would ask
the United States if the reasonable time given Spain in
which to implant autonomy had not expired. Blanco
did one thing which showed that he intended to employ
the army. He called for more recruits. The Madrid
press spoke of it as the last sacrifice; but the 15,000
fresh troops were started, and the last detachment of
them reached Cuba just in time to form part of the
defensive force against invasion from the United States.
The exact position of Spain was exposed in February
by the letter of Dupuy de Lome, with its coarse abuse
of the American executive. Military successes were
imperative. The best possible efforts were made to
manufacture these successes. General Jiminez Castel7                 97




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lanios started out from the town of Puerto Principe with
2,500 troops. They reached the mountain hamlet of
Cubitas, where the Cuban provisional government had
had its wandering existence. The government was gone,
and the place in the woods was not worth taking.
Eight hundred of the insurgents harassed the troops,
and a few were killed and wounded on either side.
Then the columns returned to the garrison at Puerto
Principe. That was the nature of the military successes which the Spanish troops were achieving at this
critical period.
General Blanco left Habana in the latter part of January and made a trip through the island. He went by
the south coast to Santiago de Cuba, and returned by
the north coast. His journey could not be called taking the field. It afforded him a full insight into the
despairing state into which Spanish sovereignty had
fallen. When he returned to Habana the Maine had
been in the harbor for ten days. The condition of the
Spanish mind was one of irritation and disappointment. It was seeking to hold the United States responsible for the failure of autonomy because the Junta was
not expelled from New York and because occasional
filbustering expeditions were successful. The Spanish
authorities in Madrid and in Cuba were willing to
forego their irritation and to forgive the United States
if it would undertake the task of forcing autonomy on
the insurgents. The proposition offered by Mr. Cleveland, which would have placed the United States in a
position of guaranteeing the Spanish flag in the Antilles, would now have been accepted with eagerness.
But with the knowledge that the American Government
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would not coerce the people of the island into keeping
allegiance to that flag the resentment was fierce.
The Spanish warships were ordered to Habana harbor to keep the Maine company. When that vessel was
blown up the feeling in Cuba was hysterical and Spanish authority bordered on anarchy. To one living in
the midst of those events as was the writer a plain conclusion was inevitable. With the passions born of that
hour of national sorrow stilled, and with every circumstance reviewed in the calmer moments of reflection, I
have not changed that opinion. A very large element
of the Spanish classes in Cuba rejoiced in the destruction of the Maine. It was not alone the ignorant populace. The feeling was manifest among the army officers. Outside of the possible conspirators none might
know whether the explosion was due to accident or
design. But the satisfaction felt was the same. The
higher officials from the Captain-General down deplored
it in itself and in its consequences. Many of the Spanish merchants were sincere in their sympathy. Yet
this did not obscure the more common sentiment of
satisfaction. The violent anti-American circular which
was distributed the day a breakfast was given by Consul-General Lee to Captain Sigsbee and the officers of
the Maine is sometimes cited as evidence of the plotting that was going on. My own belief is that this
circular was like others of the same character, an invention. It was a coincidence. Genuine circulars were
occasionally circulated, but they were of a different
kind. They were short, and usually typewritten or
struck off from a hand-press. The resentment which
was capable of the deliberate destruction of the Maine
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was too deep for utterance in inflammatory circulars.
Regarding the higher officials, while they sought to
exculpate Spain, my impression was that they did not
feel sure of their own ground. They hoped the explosion was due to an accident, and they advanced the
grounds for the theory of an accident, yet with the
apparent fear that there were Spaniards capable of
causing the destruction of the American warship.
The violent intransigente classes were in earnest in
wanting war with the United States after the report of
the naval board of inquiry was made. A part of the
military and naval element, as well as of the official
class, believed in war in order that Spain might lose
Cuba with honor. Her honor would not permit her to
accept a guarantee of $200,000,000 from the United
States and concede independence. But she would go to
war and take the consequences rather than make a
trade bargain for the most precious of her colonial possessions.
It was impossible for the people of the United States
to understand that the Spaniards in Cuba believed that
in the event of hostilities there would be another war of
secession and the Southern States would revolt. Yet
that delusion existed. It found utterance in the newspapers and in numerous pamphlets. These pamphlets
described supposed invasions of the North American
nation, and their repulse. Some of them were filled
with contempt for the bargaining Yankee. They are
interesting reading now as showing that the delusion
did exist. One pamphlet told how the North Americans achieved success after success over the Spanish
in arms, but were finally compelled to withdraw, be100




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cause the spirit of Spanish resistance was impregnable.
Other pamphlets were filled with Don Quixotism. The
knight of La Mancha really seemed to walk abroad.
More important than this supposed secession sentiment
in the United States was the belief in European intervention. That was found in the pamphlets, in the
newspapers, and among the army and navy officers, and
the representatives of the Spanish Government. Spain
would yield Cuba with honor; but perhaps it would not
be to the United States, and perhaps it would be after a
general war had been precipitated. This was both the
spoken and the unspoken sentiment.
All this time the overtures to the insurgents were
redoubled. Autonomy could be cast aside and Cubans
could have the island if they would keep the flag and
leave the forts and the garrisons to Spain. Govin and
Dolz of the Autonomist cabinet were encouraged to
press these overtures on the insurgents. Radical Autonomists were aided and indorsed in formulating a
new set of propositions for Gomez. These were a
dozen or more in number. They failed. G6mez and
the insurgent chiefs who were invited to share in
the government treated the overtures with contempt.
Whenever Spain would concede independence as the
basis they would open negotiations. And with independence as the basis they would welcome the intervention of the United States, and whatever terms it
made would be accepted.
It might be said that the last chapter of autonomy
was written when the Maine was blown up. But there
was an epilogue. Elections were held. The preparations which were commenced in November proceeded
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slowly. An electoral census had to be taken. It was
completed in March. It was a remarkable census.
Though the official reports showed that people had
been dying by the hundreds of thousands, this demonstrated that there had been no diminution in the number of inhabitants. The island was divided into districts. This first election under autonomy took place
the last Sunday in March. The Union Constitutionals
had been satisfied to let affairs drift. An arrangement
had been made by which they were to have one-third of
the d 3uties to the Cortes to be known as the opposition, and the Autonomists, or Government, two-thirds.
The arrangement was not carried out to the letter, for
two or three of the conservatives were rejected, and the
Government was charged with treachery. It was the
old story. No one cared to deposit a ballot, and the
authorities arranged the election.
In April there were also elections for members of the
insular chambers, that is, the House of Representatives
and the Council. Previous to that time Galvez, as
president of the Autonomist cabinet, issued a public
appeal to President McKinley in the name of autonomy,
urging the American executive not to let the system,
which was on the eve of success, be made a failure
through American encouragement of the insurrection.
The chambers were inaugurated in May, and the
provisional Autonomist cabinet also became a permanent
cabinet. President Galvez declared that the programme
of the colonial government should be to defend the
Autonomist constitution. Of this Autonomist congress,
few names are known unless they are gathered from the
official list. In the flowing Castilian idiom it is said
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of them that they celebrated sessions, pronounced discourses, and adjourned. But they also passed laws.
After the signing of the protocol between the United
States and Spain they held no sessions.  In October
Captain-General Blanco declared the chambers dissolved. The Autonomist cabinet was dissolved a fortnight before the end of Spanish sovereignty. Autonomy would have been better thought of by the Cuban
people if it had never been formed into an insular government.




a



PDART II
THE COMING COMMONWEALTH




,, 1, "2", '6:,
I',' 0
1




CHAPTER VI


TRANSITION TO LOCAL HOME PULE
Groundwork in Autonomous Constitution-Spirit of Spanish Local
Institutions- Paternal Edicts of Governor-Generals- Cuban
Municipality Similar to Township and County Government of
American States-Details of Organization-Illustrations of
the Geographical Basis-Minority Representation-Alcalde the
Chief Functionary-His Position and Power-Attributes of the
Ayuntamientos-Creatures of the Central Authority-Former
Military System-Lack of Knowledge by Citizens-Autonomist
Modifications-Changes Under American Military AuthoritySources of Income.
ARMED revolt of Cubans brought autonomy when too
late for Spain.   Armed intervention of the United
States ended the experiment which had failed. As a
system, the breath was out of the body before vitality
could be discerned. From    the beginning autonomy
was pulseless. Has it then left no trace?
The question cannot be answered in the negative.
Most of the Autonomists who consistently opposed the
insurrection and who took office under the Spanish
Government were old men. The unpopularity which
was visited upon them  by the masses of Cubans may
die out, but none of the leaders among them will be
called on to direct the destinies of the new government.
Their day is gone. Yet it cannot be said that their
work was in vain. They gave Cuba the only political
education in its history. The propaganda which they
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maintained for twenty years was a preparation. Under
centralized Spanish authority, with the traditions and
inheritance of absolute power, the failure of autonomy
was certain. With free institutions under the guidance
of the American republic it may not be said that the
principle is worthless. It is already the hope of Cubans and Spaniards who fear either annexation or independence.  The foundation of the Cuban commonwealth was laid in insurrection, but it may properly be
said that autonomy furnished the scaffolding for the
new structure. The Cuba which came to the United
States in trust was under an autonomous constitution,
legitimately proclaimed by recognized Spanish sovereignty though never put into complete operation. It is
therefore as much an inheritance as the Spanish code
of civil and criminal laws.
In the administrative sense autonomy may be called
the basis of the future Antillian state. It recognized
the political and geographical division of the island
into six provinces, it affirmed the principle of decentralization under provincial government, and it provided
for a new basis of municipalities. It also provided
that in pursuance of the autonomous constitution, laws
should be enacted for local self-government. The stage
was never reached at which these laws could be enacted,
or the pledge of enacting them be neutralized by the
Spanish authorities as with the compact of El Zanj6n;
but their formulation should not be difficult. The system of geographical divisions gives an excellent groundwork for home rule. The groundwork exists to-day,
and on it may be built a popular system of home-rule
administration.  This possibility is the first inquiry
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made by American statesmen who have practical notions about the building of commonwealths in the tropics. For that reason I analyze it first, though this is
not the process of the Cuban political philosophers.
They would build a republic in the clouds and set up a
complete structure at the very beginning of independence. Its present discussion is also contrary to the
natural order of the Spanish system, for that began
with centralized authority, and what there was of local
government came from above.
But before the municipal statutes are the municipal
institutions. The spirit of Spanish local administration as it existed for a hundred years is breathed in
hundreds of orders, edicts, and circulars of the CaptainGenerals. It must be sought there, instead of in town
records and in the histories of village communities.
The Spanish regime in its relation to the individualthe individual was a subject rather than a citizen-for
three-quarters of a century is embodied in the Bando
of Good Government of Governor-General Ger6nimo
Valdes. In a degree it is the regimen up to the present
day. The compilation is both curious and instructive.
This bando or edict was published in 1842. It was
republished at intervals up to the end of the Ten-Years'
war. It is something more than a codification of
laws, regulations, and customs. It is a living exposition
of a system of government without the popular element.
It reflects the political existence of the Cuban people
under absolutism-sometimes administered by a benevolent and progressive despot such as General Valdes,
oftener by a miltary tyrant such as Valeriano Weyler.
Though a score of years have passed since the Span109




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ish Constitution was extended to the Antilles and municipal legislation enacted, to a large proportion of
Cubans and Spaniards the old system is better known
than the new one. Their transition will be as much
affected by the old traditions as by the present municipal statute system. Furthermore, while the new system was embodied into statutes the former practices
continued. So the gap is not so wide as a reading of
the written local laws would lead one to think. The
spirit of Don Ger6nimo Valdes walked abroad through
this old body of laws, customs, regulations, edicts, bandos, decrees, circulars, orders, and injunctions which
he gathered together and vitalized. The regulations
relating to slavery are the only ones that entirely disappeared.
The titles of the bando relate to Religion and Public
Morality, Order, Health, Security, Theatres, Cleanliness,
and Decoration. It required two hundred and sixty-one
articles to define the relation of the citizen to the government or the municipality with respect to these headings.
A special chapter is devoted to the pedaneos, or petty
law officers. The instructions give an insight into the
entire lack of personal or civil liberty reserved to the individual. The p6daneos and their assistants, the cabos
de rondas or roundsmen, were real Paul Prys of the
State. The list of cases in which they could acquire
fees is a long one, and they could impose fines in compliance with specific articles of the bando. They were
practically charged with the regulation of both the public and the private morals of the community.
The regulations are wearisome in their minuteness,
from their prohibition of the picador at the bull-fight
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pricking the animal when in the centre of the ring, to
the requirement that the bodega keepers should have a
basin of water standing in front of their shops so that
the dogs which ran through the streets might drink as
they listed, and thus avoid the danger of hydrophobia.
But through them all runs the authority from above,
and it is the very highest authority. Long after Don
Geronimo Valdes had gone to his reward, the CaptainGeneral and his Council of Administration continued to
fix in detail the regulations for the cock-fight. The
existence of this supreme authority and the extent to
which it was exercised in the most trivial subjects
should be kept in mind in reaching an understanding
of local government under the general municipal legislation, the basis of which was the provisional law
of 1878.
In the Spanish meaning the term municipality has a
territorial significance broader than that which is given
it in the United States. The county in one of the States
of the Union corresponds to the municipality in Cuba.
There is little distinction between city and country government. The city and county of New York answers to
the municipality of Habana. The present system, in
its administrative features, dates from the municipal
law of 1878. After the enactment of that law the municipal life of a Cuban community, whether village or
urban, underwent little change, because Spanish administration did not change materially with the modification of the statute. But the system had a recognized
legal existence which is the existing basis. It is a
good working basis, too, for the development of local
self-government. The island was divided into 132 ayun1TT




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tamientos or municipalities. In the United States it
would be said that there were 132 counties. By provinces, there were 25 municipalities in Pinar del Rio, 37
in Habana, 23 in Matanzas, 28 in Santa Clara, 5 in
Puerto Principe, and 14 in Santiago de Cuba. The
municipal termino, or district, is the extent of geographical territory over which the administrative action
of the municipality extends.
For the creation of a termino municipal these were
the exact conditions: first, not less than two thousand
resident inhabitants; second, territory proportionate to
the population; third, ability to sustain the obligatory
municipal expenses out of the resources which the law
authorized to municipalities. Every termino municipal forms part of a judicial district of a province. The
census of population determines the number of concejales-aldermen or county commissioners-and their
division is into the two classes of lieutenant alcaldes, or
assistant mayors, and regidores, or ordinary councilmen. There are grades of municipalities based on
population. Cities possessing a population of forty
thousand and upward have an ayuntamiento or council
composed of thirty members, and this is the maximum
number. Habana, Matanzas, and Santiago de Cuba
are the cities of this class. Under the statute definition, a municipality is the legal association of all people who reside in a termino municipal or district.
The original law of 1878 also provided for a body
known as the junta municipal. This was composed
jointly of all the members of the ayuntamiento and of
vocales or special delegates in equal number chosen by
the electors. This junta municipal was in effect an
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auditing committee, as it was charged with the revision
and censoring of the ayuntamiento accounts.  This
form of organization underwent various changes; but
the junta municipal was never a real factor in local administration.  The members of the ayuntamiento were
elected theoretically by the residents who possessed the
electoral right, which was based on both property and
personal taxes. The concejales selected three of their
number, from among whom the civil governor of the
province, subject to the Governor-General, could choose
the alcalde or mayor if it so pleased him. If not, he
designated some one else. Generally it was some one
else.
The grades of communities still recognized are ciuades or cities, villas or towns, pueblos or villages, and
caserios or hamlets, and urban districts and rural
districts. Aldea, which is the name in Spain for a
small village, is seldom used in Cuba.  Lugar, the
Spanish designation of a town or place, is rarely heard.
Bayamo, with a population of 17,000, is a ciudad, as
are Habana, Cienfuegos, Matanzas, and other places.
Bejucal, with 8,000 inhabitants, is also a city. El Caney, where the first attack was made by the American
troops in seeking entrance to Santiago, is a villa or
town. Dos Caminos, with 500 inhabitants, is a pueblo. Guani, in the tobacco country around Remedios,
in Santa Clara province, has 200 inhabitants, and is a
caserio. El Cerro, one of the suburbs of Habana, is a
barrio urbane. Guamo, near Bayamo, has 700 or 800
inhabitants, and is a barrio rural or country district.
Barrios, rural or urban, consist of territory which for
any reason is not organized into a municipality. Agua8               113




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cate is a municipality of the province of Habana and
belongs to the judicial district of Jaruco. Its area is
121 square kilometres, or 75 square miles. The municipality is divided into four barrios or districts, which are
the pueblos of Aguacate, Campastizo, Reoj, and Zabaleta.
The pueblo of Aguacate is the headquarters of the
municipal district of the same name. It has 600 or 700
inhabitants, and is a barrio urban or town ward as distinguished from a barrio rural or country township.
The pueblo has a municipal judge. Jaruco, with an
area of 253 square kilometres-157 square miles-is a
partido judicial or judicial district belonging to the
province of Habana and to the audiencia or general
court. Jaruco has eight municipal districts or terminos, including that of the same name, which is a ciudad or city. The officials are the alcalde and members
of the ayuntamiento, a primary judge or judge of the
first instance, a municipal judge, and a register of property. Bataban6, with a population of 8,000 and an
area of 147 square kilometres, is a municipality of the
province of Habana, belonging to the judicial district
of Bejucal. It has six barrios, of which the pueblo of
Bataban6, with a population of 1,700, is one. It has a
municipal judge. Bejucal is a judicial district in the
province of Habana, and depending from it are eight
municipalities, the largest of which is the municipal
district of the same name, which has a population of
7,900 and an area of 400 square kilometres. The municipality is divided into four urban barrios and seven
rural barrios. It has a judge of the first instance, and
also a municipal judge and a register of property.
Other illustrations might be given, but these may
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suffice to show the geographical basis of local government in Cuba. The municipalities, as stated, correspond as closely as can be under different political
systems to the counties in the American States. The
barrios rural are the townships. Before the insurrection and the reconcentration wiped out whole communities, there were a dozen more than 700 barrios rural or
townships in Cuba. By geographical divisions there
are still that number, but scores and scores of them
are without a living inhabitant. The official statistics
formerly gave 600 caserios or hamlets, but these have
no political meaning. Usually the caserio is administratively part of the barrio rural. In perhaps thirty
instances the caserios and the rural barrios or townships
are identical in boundaries, but in the general sense the
caserio may be ignored in seeking to determine the basis
of home-rule government. The whole question of future
local administration lies in these 700 townships and the
100 or more city districts which combined form the 132
ayuntamientos or municipalities.
Under the law a census of the inhabitants of each
municipal district was directed to be taken every five
years. This provision was rarely observed. The concejales-aldermen, or members of the county board, as
they would be called in some parts of the United States
-were chosen by the citizens of the municipality in accordance with the electoral law. As before explained,
the grouping of the rural population was into barrios or
country districts, each of which had an alcalde or township governor named by the superior authority. It was
the same with the urban barrios, except that they had
celadors or police magistrates.
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Minority representation was recognized in the provision that when three concejales were chosen, each elector should vote for two out of the three, for three out of
the four, four out of six, five out of seven, and in that
proportion up to the limit. Half the membership of
the ayuntamiento ceased every two years. The members were subject to fines for absence from the sessions. In actual administration it was not common for
the alcalde named by the aldermen to be approved by
the civil governor or the Governor-General unless the
wishes of these officials had been ascertained in advance. The Governor-General having the power "when
he believed it convenient to the interests of the locality," often rejected the entire list of nominations and
named an alcalde who did not belong to the municipality. In the larger cities the teniente alcaldes, or
assistant mayors, who had jurisdiction as municipal
sub-rulers over different districts, were named from
among the aldermen. The alcaldes de barrios, or township rulers, were named by the alcaldes of the municipalities from the territory in which they exercised their
functions.
Sometimes difficulty was encountered.  A notable
case was that of the municipal alcalde of Mangas, in the
province of Pinar del Rio. He refrained from naming
alcaldes in the rural districts of Pueblo Nuevo and
Guamanor because in them there was no elector who
knew how to read and write. The case was taken up to
the Governor-General's Council of Administration, being too knotty for the intermediate authorities tb settle.
The Council of Administration found no precedent and
no analogy. After mature discussion it resolved that
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there being no electors within those two country districts who could read and write, the alcaldes could be
selected from electors who could not read and write.
The decision stood, and the selections were made. On
the part of the central authority there seems to have
been some idea that the office of alcalde should be
considered a non-partisan one. The Madrid decree of
1880 directed the governors of provinces to prohibit
alcaldes from assisting at reunions of a political character, and also from acting as editors or directors of
newspapers. The primary application of this order
was to the provinces of the peninsula rather than to
those of the island.
A visitor to any rural community of Cuba is impressed with the evidence that the alcalde is the local
authority and the only authority. He is so clearly the
functionary that inquiry is seldom made for other functionaries. It is he who receives the higher officials,
who meets the stranger, and who dispenses the honors
of the town. In American towns due regard is paid the
official position of mayor, but he is not allowed to monopolize the honors. In a Cuban village these privileges are conceded unhesitatingly to the alcalde because he represents political power commensurate with
them. A beneficent instance of this power may be seen
in the proclamations reducing the price of bread when
it becomes too high.  His proclamations enforcing
public order contain frequent references to the culture
and good name of the people. In the plays at the theatre which represent Spanish customs the alcalde is
always a leading character. It is the same in Cuba.
The governors of the provinces could suspend the
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alcaldes, this act being subject to the approval or
disapproval of the Governor-General.  Similarly they
could suspend the assistant alcaldes and the regidores,
or ordinary councilmen. Regarding the superior authority, it was specifically declared that the alcalde
was the representative of the state. Being so, he could
not be the representative of the people of the community.  In everything relating to the political government of the municipality, the authority, duties, and
responsibilities of the alcalde were independent of the
ayuntamiento. Likewise the assistant alcaldes and the
alcaldes of the country districts were under the direction of the municipal alcalde as the representative of the
government. They did not represent the people.
Under the system in force until the legislation following the peace of El Zanjon, there were thirty-one
gobiernos, or political districts, in the island, each of
which had an ayuntamiento; while the villages which
were the heads of jurisdictions had local councils whose
members were named by the civil governor of the province and were nominally responsible to him. Actually,
they were responsible to the military authority. The
elective officials in the larger municipalities were justices of the peace and collectors of fines who were known
as syndics. Besides their responsibility to the military
authority, the civil governor, and the Governor-General,
the auyuntamientos had also a central administration
with a jefe or chief residing in Habana. The main
functions of this central administration were the control of the rural police.
In spite of its defects, the law of 1878 was in one
sense  concession to popular government, Before that
1.                     ';




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time many municipalities had consisted simply of military districts whose absolute rulers were the military
commanders. And the commander, though described
as the captain of the district, was always a lieutenant
ruler of some military official higher in power. When
he was a benevolent and energetic despot he gave a
good local administration; but it was a military, and not
a representative one. Where the military commander
was a bad or an indifferent despot, the municipality
reflected his character. This law also did away with
the regidores perpetuates, or aldermen who held their
offices for life. It may be said to have made a clearing in the jungle of centralized municipal government.
But its application was limited, and the majority of the
people had little conception of the system. To-day a
question put to intelligent Cubans or Spaniards regarding the details of municipal government in past years
is usually met with an apology for ignorance. They
never knew much about it.
The attributes and functions of ayuntamientos included the usual municipal services: opening of streets
and parks, enrolment of residents, draining and sewerage, bridges, water supply, baths, slaughter-houses,
markets, sanitation, public construction, policing, and
local public works generally, including the roads. Also
charitable institutions and hospitals of their own or administered through benevolent societies. Penalties were
provided for the infraction of municipal ordinances by
fines. The ayuntamiento had power to require from all
males between the ages of sixteen and fifty not to
exceed twenty days' labor on public works. This is in
another form the road tax of many of the States in the
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American Union. The teniente alcaldes in the larger
towns and cities were acting mayors in the absence of
the alcaldes. Each also had a district in which he
exercised the administrative municipal functions under
the direction of the alcalde. The ayuntamientos selected from their own numbers one or two members
who as procuradores sindicos, or attorneys, represented
the corporation in all legal proceedings, and also revised the local bills and estimates. The ayuntamientos
named their employes. The income of the municipalities came from goods owned by them, taxes on personality and realty, taxes laid for maintaining the police,
fines for violations of ordinances, assessments upon
the citizens or landowners, and imposts upon articles
to eat, drink, and burn. Where the town was large
enough to maintain a market, that was owned or controlled by the municipality. Generally it may be said
that the chief source of income was the slaughter-house
tax, which was from two or three cents a pound on
beef. Habana had power to lay other imposts.
A brief critical examination of the municipal law of
1878, independent of its administration, is sufficient to
show that under it there could be little growth in local
self-government. The clear statement of the centralized conception appears in the declaration that the alcalde is the representative of the central government;
that in everything relating to the political government
of a municipality his authority, powers, and responsibility are independent of the ayuntamiento. The appointment of the alcaldes by the Governor-General,
frequently not residents of the community, was the
affirmation of this fact. A further check on the inde120




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pendence of the ayuntamientos was devised in their
subjection to the provincial deputations and again to
the civil governors. The law underwent no organic
statutory modification. It was interpreted and construed in the first place by royal orders and decrees
from Madrid applicable to the municipalities of the
peninsula. Then there were the circulars and decrees
of the Governor-General construing and interpreting it,
often in contradictory instructions. The saying that
Spanish government in Cuba was government by decree
found its aptest illustration in the municipal administration.
Under the Spanish system everything came from
above and from without. Spain began its administration of the colonies on the principle that they should
be treated as directly subject to the throne, commercially and politically. One was the corollary of the
other. Columbus memorialized their Catholic Majesties for permission to appoint an alcalde in each grouping of population. The Council of the Indies and the
House of Trade were created within a few years after
Columbus' discovery to secure and insure commercial
monopoly. They exercised all the functions of civil
administration, legislative, executive, and judicial. In
that age was constructed the framework of the Spanish colonial administrative system, which endured with
little fundamental change until no colonies remained.
This power began with the viceroys and Captain-Generals.  It ended with the municipalities.  CaptainGenerals ruled in Cuba for four hundred years. In
the beginning they nominated governors and mayors.
They were doing the same thing when the last Captain1'21




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General but one took the office in order to implant
autonomy. Obedience to the superior authorities was
exacted as rigorously in 1897 as in 1527, and with less
power of local rule to the municipalities.
All that the people of Cuba knew of municipal or of
rural government is embodied in the statute. Less of
actual knowledge was gathered by them from the system in operation than from reading the law, because the
application was at the will of the Spanish authorities.
These officials contrived to bring it into harmony with
their own ideas of administration. Few abuses were
corrected. Elections were made farces, so that good
citizenship found no encouragement. In a municipal
election of Guanabacoa the registry list was posted
up as required. Three electors voted. The officials
returned the whole list as voted, though some of those
whose names were on it had been tenants of the graveyards for months. The same thing was done elsewhere.
The Autonomist constitution made important changes.
Instead of the alcaldes being nominated by the Governor-General or the civil governor, it provided that
the election by the ayuntamientos should be final, and
that the alcaldes should exercise the active functions
of the municipal administration as executors of the
ordinances of the ayuntamientos and as their representatives. Instead of two thousand inhabitants for a
termino municipal, the municipal organization was
made obligatory on every group of population of more
than one thousand. This provision was never carried
into effect. The Autonomist legislation is useful as
suggesting changes which may be made on a basis of
the old laws for genuine local self-government.
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The American military authority through decrees
of Governor-General Brooke modified and enlarged
the sources of municipal income.    They abolished
the imposts on killing cattle which were known as the
slaughter-house tax, along with those on food for articles of consumption, and on wood and charcoal for
burning. That is, the power of making the necessities
of daily life dearer by local taxation was taken away.
In recompense the municipalities were allowed to utilize the state share of direct taxes upon town and country real estate, and also the industrial tax. Some
minor sources of income were further transferred from
the central authority of the state to the muncipalities.
The local imposts on alcoholic or spirituous beverages
were not disturbed. These changes were necessarily
provisional, and subject to the readjustment of the internal fiscal system of the entire island.
Under the American military authority a reapportionment of the municipalities in their boundaries and
classifications was also outlined. Its provisional and
temporary character renders valueless a detailed examination of its effect on the local political organisms of
the island. To a proper understanding of the future
system of municipal self-government a knowledge of
their relation to the provinces is necessary.




CHAPTER VII


PROVINCES AS A FEDERAL FRAMEWORK
No Identity with Municipalities-Municipal Measures of Self-Defence in Past-Provinces Not Similar to American States-Forms
of Civil Authority-Governor and Deputation-Not Genuine
Local Parliaments-Instruments of Central Authority-Provincial Commissions the Real Power-Deputations Abolished Under
American Administration-Judicial Districts as Political Units
-Establishment of Supreme Court-Registries of PropertyCreation of Advisory Cabinet-Changes in Boundaries of Provinces Not Probable-What Regionalism Means-Remedy for It
-Plans for Decentralization.
MIDWAY between local administration and the central
authority was the provincial government.   It will be of
more importance in the future of Cuba than it was in
the past of Spain.    Its former relation was hardly
definable. The provinces were facts of geography and
fictions of administration.
They did not grow out of any system of town and
country government. With the insight afforded into
the municipal administration of Cuba, and even with
the modifications proposed by autonomy, the investigator will not find much of local self-rule. He will search
in vain for the genesis of the New England town meeting.  His quest for something resembling the newly
formed community of the West in the pioneer days,
coming together by natural movement, calling itself
into being, and providing for the management of its own
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affairs, would be barren. One reason would be that
Spanish colonial government is old and there was a
precedent for every condition that might arise. And as
the precedents were not favorable to the self-ruling
instinct, the ideas which would be encountered on this
subject would be primary, hardly rudimentary.
Jaruco, in the province of Habana, has a connected
municipal history of one hundred and forty years, but
there is no record of a town gathering to consider
public improvements or of an indignation meeting to
protest against acts of public officials. Trinidad, in
Santa Clara province, has an historic banner going
back almost to the foundation of the town in the early
part of the sixteenth century, but it has no memorials
of local government. The town of Villa Clara has a
history filled with incident, but the incidents are not
of the community's management of its own local affairs
by elections and by free discussion. Matanzas has a
municipal organization recorded stage by stage from
the opening of the seventeenth century to the present
day. Its leading chapters in local administration are
the measures it organized at various periods for defence against the pirates and the filibusters. Puerto
Principe tells the same story, and its most luminous
chapter is the heroic defence of the alcalde and the citizens against the land incursion of Morgan and his buccaneers in 1668.
Habana's early history is filled with similar incidents. When the English assaulted the city the regidores, or aldermen, were in charge of the garrisons.
Habana at that time was a larger city than the Boston
which held the tea party or the New York which a
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dozen and more years later expelled Lord Howe. It
was almost as large as the Philadelphia in which the
Continental Congress met. It complained righteously
that its municipal basis had continued since its primitive creation that of the smallest councils in the peninsula.  In the first quarter of this century it remonstrated that it had no power to control municipal
government, that its council was in shackled hands.
There was, nevertheless, more local or municipal liberty, though not of free discussion, during the first three
centuries of Spanish government of Cuba than during
this last century. The need of measures of self-defence
was one. The Council of the Indies was also concerned
with the commercial benefits arising from liberal treatment of the municipalities, and the dangers of political
revolution were not great. But in those times the provinces of Cuba did not exist as geographical or political
divisions.
Rising from the subject of local and municipal government to that of provincial or territorial government,
it may be said that there was none in the American
sense. The provinces did not have that degree of independence which is conceded to territories in the United
States. There was nothing that approached the idea
of a provincial legislature. No conception of such a
function could exist in a country where there was no
national legislature; where the Cortes across the sea
legislated, and the agents of the crown administered
according to their own will. For a series of years Cuba
was divided politically into territorial provinces each
with a lieutenant-governor appointed by the CaptainGeneral. There were also military, judicial, regional,
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maritime, ecclesastical, and economic divisions. Their
spheres and functions are indicated by their names,
except possibly the economic division, which is better
described as the real hacienda, or royal treasury. It
was the fiscal department of the island. These departments interlaced as it were in a network, without clear
distinction between administrative and other branches;
but since the Spanish system was essentially military,
they all converged in the Captain-General, called in his
civil capacity the Governor-General.
By the royal decree of 1878 the provinces of the
island were fixed as they exist to-day, the division being into six civil jurisdictions, which took their names
from their respective capitals. With these,provinces
in mind, the other divisions into maritime, regional,
ecclesiastical, and so on may be ignored. The administrative authorities of each province were the governor,
the provincial deputation, and the provincial commission
or junta. The governor was named by the supreme authority. He had a substantial veto on the acts of the
ayuntamientos and of the deputations. He supervised
elections. To him was especially intrusted the administration of public order in the province. Genuine
provincial government was lost somewhere in these
centralized functions of government and administration.
To find it again and restore it to its proper place and
rightful function is one of the tasks of the future.
The political entity of the province was recognized
in the provincial deputations.  Their similarity to the
same bodies in the peninsula was often quoted as evidence that Cuba enjoyed as much civil liberty as did
the mother country herself. Cuba, it was declared,
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had local parliaments, and could ask nothing more without placing herself on a higher plane than the provinces
of the peninsula. But the parliamentary character of
these provincial deputations does not disclose itself on
inquiry. They were anachronisms. They were merely
another check on local self-government. They were
neither provincial legislatures nor provincial councils.
The deputation was composed of deputies selected by
the electors who voted for concejales. Three were
chosen from each judicial district of the province.
Their term was four years. The deputation was especially charged, first, with the improvement of the
roads, irrigation canals, provincial public works, hospitals, and instruction; secondly, with the administration
of provincial funds and the general management of the
fiscal affairs. Educational establishments might be
created or sustained by the deputations, subject to the
general law regarding public instruction. With relation to the municipalities the deputation enjoyed the
faculties conferred upon it by the municipal law, which
were of a general supervisory character.
Then there was the provincial commission, which
was named by the Governor-General from the members
of the deputation. Its membership was five. The commission was assumed to hold regular sittings at the
capital of the province. It answered to the GovernorGeneral's Council of Administration. Its members
were lawyers, and they gave opinions upon the laws
and regulations submitted to them by the governor of
the province or by the Governor-General. It decided
disputed elections, and the eligibility of deputies when
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tion in emergencies when the full deputation could not
be got together. In practice the commission, created
out of the body of the deputation, served a useful
purpose as instrument of the central authority. By
chance or by neglect it would sometimes happen that
the majority in a provincial deputation would be Autonomists. The superior power would feel obliged to
check their too dangerous gropings after liberal government, and their tendency to exercise to the limit
the narrow prerogatives which the statutes gave them.
This was done by the Governor-General in naming the
permanent commission. There could always be found
five or six members who would be subservient to the
powers above. And thus what little good was in the
provincial deputations was destroyed.
The provincial commissions underwent an organic
change in the law of 1890, but the change is not important now. Under the autonomous constitution of 1897
they were declared to be of a permanent character.
They were given essentially judicial functions. The
provincial magistrates of the audiencia, or general court,
were to preside over the commissions, which were to be
known as provincial juntas. These juntas were to be
composed of fifteen vocales, or delegates. By virtue of
their being provincial deputies, the president and vicepresident of the deputation and the oldest ex-president were to be vocales. There were also to be four
tax-payers chosen by lot from among those who paid
the first quota of the industrial tax, four from among
those who paid the first quota of the land tax, and four
citizens who had official titles showing their professional or academic standing.


9


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The autonomist decrees made the deputations autonomous in everything relating to the creation and dotation of establishments of public instruction, charitable
institutions, provincial rights of way, maritime or
fluvial, and the budget. The decrees also authorized
both the municipalities and the provinces to establish
freely the taxes to cover their expenses without other
limitation than that these should be compatible with
the general taxing system of the island. The resources
for taxation of a province were declared to be independent of the municipal resources. In the election of
members of the ayuntamientos and the deputations,
provision was to be made for minority representation.
From these provisions some hints may be had for
the future, but that is all. The provincial deputations
were so utterly useless that they were abolished by
the American military administration. They are not
likely to be re-established under any system of government that may be adopted.
In describing the municipalities, reference has been
made to the judicial districts. In Spain's colonial
administration the judicial district seems to have been
the political unit. At one period it was almost synonymous with or meant the same as the military partido,
or district. The laws following the compact of El Zanj6n made no important change in the judicial system of
the island. There were 33 judicial districts then, and
the number has been increased or decreased by one or
two at different times. The judicial districts in the
island number at present 34. They are divided among
the provinces as follows: Pinar del Rio, 5; Habana, 7;
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tiago de Cuba, 7. Each judicial district is the cabecera, or head, of a number of municipalities. Sometimes, as in the case of the city of Habana, there is
only one municipality, but most of the districts have
included in their jurisdiction half a dozen municipalities. Each district has a judge of the first instance,
except that of lHabana, which necessarily has more
than one. This judge of the first instance, or primary
judge, might be designated variously as a county, district, or circuit judge. The judicial partido would be
known in the United States as a crcuit rather than as
a district. What are known as the municipal judges
come closer to the definition of county judges and justices of the peace. They are more numerous than the
judges of the first instance, numbering two hundred.
The municipal judges have the ordinary functions of
local magistrates and possess police powers.  The
judges of all classes were appointed by the higher
authorities.
The audiencias, or general courts, as commonly understood, would be called appellate courts in most of
the States of the Union. Under Spanish sovereignty
the final appeal was to the courts in Madrid. Originally in Cuba justice was administered from the ancient
audiencia established in Santo Domingo. When that
island was ceded to France in 1795, the judicial tribunal was translated to the city of Puerto Principe as
the most midland one of Cuba. It began its functions
in 1802. In 1838 a second audiencia was established in
Habana, and with a pretorial character which was lacking in the Puerto Principe tribunal. For the administration of justice the aim was to adapt the judicial
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districts to the political and military boundaries. Till
recently Habana constituted the superior audiencia; but
Puerto Principe was a royal audiencia to which pertained civil jurisdiction over Santiago de Cuba. Formerly the division was into twenty-six judicial districts,
known as the territory of the royal pretorial audiencia,
or general courts. Each of these judicial districts had
an alcalde mayor or ordinary judge who had auxiliary
alcaldes or local judges. The appeal lay direct from
these courts of conciliation and counsel to the audiencia
sitting in Habana.
Each province of the island is a criminal audiencia
in itself. The judgments of this criminal court may be
appealed to the criminal section of the Habana audiencia. The audiencia of Habana includes the province
of that name and the provinces of Pinar del Rio, Matanzas, and Santa Clara. While each municipality is
supposed to have its municipal court, there are some
places not municipalities which have their municipal
judge. Habana is divided into districts with different
branches of the audiencia having jurisdiction. Under
the American military authority, a supreme court was
established to take the place of the Madrid tribunals,
which were the courts of last resort. The Supreme
Court of Cuba consists of a chief-justice and six associate justices. An independent court had previously
been organized in the province of Santiago without reference to the former pretorial audiencia of Puerto Principe, of which jurisdiction it was part. A question was
raised whether this Santiago court was final in its decisions or whether they could be appealed to the Supreme
Court of the island. The only logical answer which
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could be given to this question was given, and the Santiago tribunal was declared a subordinate one. This
sketch of the administrative organism of the judicial
system is presented here without reference to the laws
themselves, because the courts are a part of the local
and the provincial regimes as of the general government.
Another organism is that of the registry of property.
These do not follow the lines of the municipalities or
county divisions, as is customary in the United States,
but in a general way follow the boundaries of the judicial districts. Actually they are not so numerous. By
royal decree of July 4th, 1879, twenty-five registries
were established for the whole island. In most instances the boundaries are coincident and coequal with
the boundaries of the judicial districts; but Habana
City has one register for its three districts and for its
suburb of Marianao; and in the eastern provinces there
are also consolidated registries. This accounts for the
number of registries not being equal to that of the
judcial districts. It may be said that the registries of
landownership and the records of property transfers
are well kept. Contrary to the common belief, titles in
Cuba are easily traced, and are, if anything, more secure
than in the United States.
From what is and what has been, an idea may be
gained of what the internal political and administrative
framework of the Cuba of the future may be. For the
present it is not of moment to discuss the external
aspects of the prospective state, or whether it shall have
departments of foreign relations, of the army, and of
the navy. Cuba may be considered as a federal body
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with central authority and central administration. The
difference in the future will be that the central authority will rest on a foundation of local and provincial
government, instead of the provinces and municipalities
depending on it and from it. The old conception of
centralized authority will disappear. Though the Captain-General was the supreme power, even before the
implantation of autonomy he had his Council of Administration which advised him in regard to the interpretation of the colonial statutes and their application
to the island, or to its provinces and municipalities.
The only point was that he could enforce his own arbitrary construction whenever he chose. This freedom of
the executive from responsibility is one of the defects of
the past system which is certain to be remedied. Whatever form the future government of the island may
take, Cuba will have a judiciary department coequal
with the executive branch. It has seen too much of
the subordination and the prostitution of the courts ever
to consent to placing them on a lower plane than the
executive power.
For what might be called the internal federal administration, autonomy made little change in the outward
system. The Autonomist cabinet in practice was little
more than raising the departments of the treasury,
public works, and education to cabinet positions, with
separate functions which also embraced the administrative features of the courts and of agriculture. The American military authority created a provisional advisory
cabinet for the four departments respectively of the
treasury, of state and government, of public works,
and of justice and education. These departments are
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the central power in what might be called internal
administration, for the control of the customs was kept
so largely within the American military authority that
it could hardly be called a part of the actual jurisdiction of the provisional treasury department. The
department of state is a misnomer. In the provisional
arrangement it is the department which regulates the
relations of the municipalities and provinces to the general government.  In the evolution of the commonwealth of Cuba its functions are decidedly the most
important of all the departments.
The six provinces will probably exist in the future as
they exist to-day geographically and politically. Various suggestions have been made of rearranging their
boundaries and consolidating them. The natural division would be into the eastern, central, and western
provinces. The Spanish authorities in their military
and judicial divisions split the island into two districts.
Pinar del Rio was also at one time joined with the
province of Habana. But the inhabitants have become
accustomed to the present boundaries, and they are a
people who cling strongly to that to which they are
accustomed. Each province has its history, its local
usages, and its traditions. Each province has a capital of the same name. When General J. C. Bates fixed
the military headquarters of his department at Cienfuegos, a mere military conveniencey strong feeling was
aroused in the little city of Santa Clara, which under
Spanish sway was the centre of both political and military administration. The people protested against the
removal of the ancient capital of the province. Trifling as was the incident, the intensity of the protests
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showed how difficult it would be to enter upon a series
of changes which upset old boundaries and did violence
to ancient memories.
Some of the Cuban revolutionary leaders have
worked out a plan of five provinces to replace the existing division. The first Cuban revolutionary assembly
divided the island into four jurisdictions, with prefecturas and sub-prefecturas as the subordinate administrative districts. But this was for the military operations of the insurgent troops, and never came to the
knowledge of the masses of the people. They are attached to the present divisions and may be depended
on to oppose a change.
These six provinces are also to be considered as six
states or territories within a nation, rather than as six
great counties within a state. But this is within definite limitations. The wisest among the Cuban leaders already appreciate the importance of nationalizing
the sentiment while decentralizing the administration.
The provinces will have elective civil governors-that
can be readily foreseen. The uncertain question is
how much further they will go. The uselessness of the
provincial deputations has been disclosed, and at this
day there is little disposition to revive them. A provincial parliament in the sense of a twofold legislative
body corresponding to the American State legislatures
is not an apparent necessity even as a part of the education in popular government. With the laws uniform
for the whole island, as they will be, there does not
appear to be a wide sphere for provincial lawmaking.
The administrative functions are the important ones.
It may be that the doubt will ultimately resolve itself
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into the creation of councils something like the territorial councils in the early history of the Western territories of the Union. These councils may possess mixed
executive and legislative functions. They may become
the general board with reference to the municipalities,
but not in the sense of the veto power possessed by the
old provincial deputations. An understanding of the
sentiment as it exists to-day will make this clear. The
people of the various communities have a real longing
for home rule. They may not know much about the
system in operation, they may not do it so well as
higher authority would do it for them, but they have a
full determination to do it themselves without the veto
of provincial assembly, provincial governor, or Governor-General. Some general legislation will undoubtedly be enacted which will simplify their work. Probably the line between town and country government will
be drawn more distinctly, so that the confusing term
municipality-confusing to Americans-will not have
its present wide application. But the organization of
either country grouping or of town inhabitants will be
on the basis of self-government within the administrative organism of the province. The municipalities,
whether city or rural, are units of the future provincial
administration.  The provinces are the units of the
decentralized federal authority that is to be evolved
into a commonwealth.
The physical features of the various provinces may
be said to have a bearing on the political characteristics
of their inhabitants; yet these are not marked enough
to develop strong differences.  Most of the mineral
wealth is in the eastern section of the island, and the
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tobacco districts are the central and western regions.
Beyond this there is a general similarity of products.
No dangerous diversity is likely to spring up among
people who follow similar pursuits. Like the Spaniards in the island, the Cubans have their distinctions
of localities. With the blacks of Santiago there is a
slight mixture of Jamaica negroes, while Haiti and
Santo Domingo also have representation. The mulatto
element there is the result of the crossing of French
blood. Around Baracoa and the towns on the north
coast are yet traces of the habits and customs of the
French refugees of Santo Domingo. These French refugees were the most progressive industrial element that
ever entered into the life of Cuba. The Camagiieyans,
the inhabitants of the central province of Puerto Principe, are fond of calling themselves the genuine Cubans; and in this part of the island it must be confessed there is little of Spain, though sometimes a trace
of Africa appears in the blood. Santa Clara, more particularly the eastern part of the province, also claims
the distinction of being purely Cuban. As with the
Camagiieyans, its men are superior physically to those
in the western part of the island. From Matanzas west
through Habana and Pinar del Rio there is more
mezcla or reunion of Spanish and Cuban blood.
The Spanish writers called this provincial sentiment,
when applied to the people of the various provinces
of the peninsula, regionalism. It might be translated
into English by the word sectionalism. Whatever danger of sectionalism exists is in the two eastern provinces of Santiago de Cuba and Puerto Principe. They
were in constant rebellion against Spanish authority,
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and the query is whether they will not insist on having
independent governments of their own rather than be
parts of a central political organism. Santiago province especially is credited with this possible ambition.
The city of that name in a small way is a rival of Habana. The province is geographically almost disconnected from the rest of the island. Symptoms of opposition to the general government were shown under the
American control. At regular periods protests would
be made against the customs receipts being distributed
throughout the island, instead of the dues received at
the, Santiago ports being disbursed exclusively in that
province. This attitude was indirectly encouraged by
the American officials who were administering the affairs of the province as an independent department.
Santiago, as it happened, came under the American
control several months before the remaining provinces.
So much was accomplished there under the wise direction of General Leonard Wood, that it was perhaps
naturally his part to seek the fullest freedom of administration, as though the eastern end of the island were
a separate country.
Should the popular currents run for annexation when
the time comes to determine the form of stable government which is to prevail, a revival of this feeling may
be looked for in the request of Santiago to be joined
with Puerto Principe and be erected into a separate
state. But in the presumption of an independent island government too much stress should not be given
temporary outcroppings of regionalism on the part of
Santiago or Puerto Principe. The building of the central or backbone railroad will draw these provinces into
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closer industrial and commercial relation with the western provinces, and their political interests are in any
circumstance identical with the rest of the island. The
free institutions for which all aspire are the same. To
check the spread of regionalism or sectionalism all the
provinces should share equitably in the central administration. With uniform  general laws, and with the
municipalities acting as independent local organisms
within the provinces, the latter will have a distinct
function in the commonwealth. They should form the
administrative federal framework on a decentralized
basis.




CHAPTER VIII


THE RACE OF COLOR
Seior Don a Gentleman-Official Definition of Civil Status-Spanish
Law Affirmed by American Authority-Nightmare of Black West
India League-Analysis of Statistics of Population-Comparison
with Jamaica-Relative Decrease of Blacks-Temporary Relative
Increase as the Result of Reconcentration-Colonization Improbable-Value of Negro Labor on Plantations-Higher Industrial
Plane than in the United States-No Color-Line-Disproportionate Number of Criminals —afiigoism a Misleading Term
for Crime-Advance of Blacks Under the Spanish Civilization
-Future Standing that of Political and Industrial Equality.
A STARING interrogation is better answered when first
met. What of the black race? The question cannot
be evaded.   The existence of the blacks must be reckoned with in every phase of the reconstruction of the
island. Consequently their standing and their prospects are now discussed with the simple reminder that
Cuba has social and economic problems to solve as
well as political ones. The African population has a defined status socially, industrially, and politically.  The
black race has no future separate from that of the other
inhabitants of Cuba. It is essentially and integrally a
part of that future.
The negro or the mulatto may call himself "Don,"
and ask that others use the prefix in addressing him.
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miliarity. "Sefior " answers to that meaning. "Don"
is the "Esquire," the old English designation for gentleman, the title of courtesy, and it is translated by
the dictionaries as the Spanish name for gentleman.
The colored man is not simply Senior So-and-So: he
is Sefior Don So-and-So. The prefix was the possession of the proudest grandees of Spain, and it is still
supposed to carry with it a certain dignity. The Captain-General of Spain, whose titles filled half a page,
was always "Don" in the beginning of his official dignities and honors. And under Spanish law, by formal
resolution of a Captain-General, the humblest negro in
Cuba was decreed as rightfully using the same prefix.
The distinct recognition of the civil status of the
African race under the Spanish law was formally proclaimed by Captain-General Calleja in 1893. It was,
in effect, the interpretation and indorsement given by
the Council of Administration in affirming previous decrees. This action is sometimes described as a mere
authorization of the blacks to use the title of "Don."
In reality it was far more. The story of this definition
of the civil rights of the race of color under Spanish
law is instructive. Various societies of blacks petitioned the superior authorities that they direct the
governors of the provinces and the presiding judges and
fiscals, or prosecuting attorneys, of the courts to communicate to their subordinates the decrees and official
dispositions previously made affirming the right of the
colored classes to enjoy equal rights with the white
classes, and prohibiting the establishment of distinctions by reason of color. The official dispositions previously made forbade the proprietors of cafes or simi142




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lar public places to discriminate against persons of
color, and affirmed the privilege of the blacks to travel
on the railways on the same terms as the whites.
The Council of Administration under Captain-General
Calleja did not consider instructions to the courts necessary, but it granted the other requests of the colored
societies.*  The basis which it affirmed was an official
disposition made by the governor of the province of
Pinar del Rio in 1885. A negro complained that the
proprietor of a cafe refused to serve him because of his
color.  The government thereupon issued an order
directing that the penalties be enforced and that the
discrimination cease. This order recited that "if customs were the fruits of the ideas which inspired the
laws, it was the duty of the supreme authority, mindful
of its own, to combat the prejudices in the minds of the
people from usages and opinions born of times which
had disappeared, never to return. For the success of
such important ends it was competent for the superior
authority to consecrate itself to the maintenance and
the respect of the rights which the Spanish constitution
guaranteed to every Spanish citizen, and which reposed
in the principle of equality." This declaration stands
unchanged.   Under the Spanish rule few instances 9
arose in which this enforcement was necessary.
After the American occupation a mulatto chief of the
insurrection was refused entertainment in a cafe kept
by Americans. The Spanish code of civil rights, cited
above, was invoked and was enforced. However distasteful it may be to American prejudices, the code will
be enforced. Nor will there ever be discrimination
- Gaceta de la IHabana, December 19th, 1893.
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on account of color in the privileges of railroad travel.
The American military authorities from the outset
showed a scrupulous regard for the civil rights of the
blacks. So far as their official acts went, they studiously ignored the color-line and discouraged race prejudice. The social toleration which was so natural for
Spaniards and white Cubans did not prove difficult for
the military commanders. But their example was not
always followed by their own countrymen.
The idea of a black West India republic has been
both a dream and a nightmare. It haunted the English historian, James Anthony Froude, like a spectre,
and conjured up for him visions of a mongrel nation of
negroids.   In moments of despair American statesmen have dreamed it as the solution to the problem
of the African race in the United States. To more of
them it has been a nightmare, a fear that the Antilles
would become, if not a menace, at least a bar to the
civilization of the continent. Haiti, on the map hardly
bigger than a man's hand, in the Antillian sky became
a portentous cloud. The cloud is a psychic, not a physical phenomenon. It disappears on analysis. In the
early part of the century, when Humboldt * began to
differentiate the population of the West Indies, the
blacks in Cuba were in excess of the whites. The figures as then collated were as follows:
* After Humboldt, the most complete analyses were given by Arboleya in his "Manual de la Isla de Cuba," published in 1859, and
by Pezuela in the "Diccionario de la Isla Cuba," published in
1863. The fullest analysis of the subsequent censuses may be found
in "La Revista Cubana" in a series of articles by Sefnor Coppinger.
While perplexed by confusing figures and unreliable official statistics, all the authorities substantially agree in their conclusions.
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1811.    1817.     1825.
Whites.................. 274,000  290,000  325,000
Blacks................... 336,000  340,268  390,000
Total.............. 610,000   630,268  715,000
A discrepancy between the statistics of 1811 and
1817 is chargeable to imperfect census-taking. It is
also noted that from 1811 to 1825 the jurisdiction of
Habana received 185,000 negroes brought by the slave
traders from Africa. With respect to other countries in
1825, the population of Cuba was almost double that of
Jamaica. By color, thus:
White.         Black.
Cuba.................... 46 per cent.  54 per cent.
Jamaica................. 6  "         94   "
Taking the greater Antilles as a group, Humboldt
found that, excluding fractional percentages, the pure
blacks were 68 per cent, the mixed blacks 15 per cent,
the whites 17 per cent. These estimates are simply
relative, the exact proportion not being determined. A
generation may be passed over without special observation, and the statistics gathered in 1855 be analyzed.
During those thirty years the slave trade had not been
seriously restricted, though Spain was party to the
treaty with Great Britain for its abolition. Here is the
relation of the two races in Cuba in 1855:
Whites.................... 498,752  47.65 per cent.
Blacks....................  545,433  52.35  "
Total..................  1,044,185  100.00 per cent.
A fractional reduction of the black percentage and a
corresponding increase of the white percentage appear,
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yet so slight as to indicate no real change in the relative position of the two races. Arboleya, taking the
years 1827 and 1854, analyzed the statistics which he
considered trustworthy a little differently. He placed
the percentage of whites in 1827 at 44, and of blacks at
56. In 1854 he made it, whites 47 per cent, and blacks
53. Another ten or twelve years, and the change had
begun which has since continued. The census of 1867,
taken a twelvemonth before the outbreak of the TenYears' war, and before the gradual emancipation of the
slaves commenced, shows:
Whites.................. 764,750  55.09 per cent.
Blacks.....6............. 605,461  44.91  "
Total.................. 1,370,211  100.00 per cent.
Here is an apparent increase in the number of whites
of 326,000, while the increase of the blacks is only
60,000.  Actually it was less, because the Chinese,
vaguely enumerated, were included. In 1877 the total
population had grown to 1,509,291. Leaving out 40,000
Asiatics and 8,400 foreigners, and making the correction
of the Madrid statistics for transients and absent residents, we have a difference of 7,000.
Whites......................  973,725  67 per cent.
Blacks.................. 480,166   33  "
Total whites and blacks.... 1,453,891  100 per cent.
These figures show an actual, as well as a relative
decrease in the number of blacks. It is so large as to
be puzzling. The Spanish statisticians explain it on
the ground of imperfect census-taking. This is always
a justifiable explanation in dealing with Spanish statis146




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tics. It does not alter the known fact that the relative
decrease of the blacks had begun, and that a large increase of the whites was taking place, partly from
immigration and partly from natural development.
Coming to 1887, the last regular census that was taken,
the results show:
Whites..................... 1,102,889  69.46 per cent.
Blacks......................  484,987  30.54  'C
Total.................. 1,587,876  100.00 per cent.
Asiatics.....................  43,811
Grand total.............. 1,631,687
Foreigners, who had grown to exceed 32,000, are ineluded among the whites. They were relatively so
large an element that they may properly be considered
in balancing the races.
Here is an actual decrease in the percentage of the
blacks during the ten years.    If the figures are in
error, it is possible to accept the conclusion that the
blacks were stationary while the whites were progressing.  There was a large increase by white immigration
from Spain during this period.    This steady decrease
of the negroes under the most favored conditions seems
to be conclusive as to the natural ascendency of the
whites by force of numbers. It is true that the censuses taken were all based on slave conditions; but the
emancipation of the negroes had been going on, and
there is nothing to show that the increase of population
has been larger during the years of freedom. In the
first quarter of the nineteenth century, 54 per cent of
Cuba was black blood, 46 per cent white blood. In the
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middle of the century practically the same conditions
obtained. At the beginning of the twentieth century
relatively 30 per cent black and 70 per cent white blood
is the proportion.
The census of to-day may show a larger percentage of negroes and mulattoes, due to artificial causes.
Every observer noted during the period of reconcentration that the black victims of Weyler's policy stood it
better than the whites. The blacks formed the larger
element of the surviving country population. But this
is a temporary condition only. The broad fact can be
stated that at the beginning of the nineteenth century
the black population of Cuba was 54 per cent and of
Jamaica 94 per cent. At the end of that century normally it would not be greatly in excess of 30 per cent.
Actually, as a result of the reconcentration, it may
prove to be 40 per cent. In Jamaica it is 99 per cent.
In Cuba, two whites for one black; in Jamaica, 99 blacks
for every white. Some writers classify the blacks in
Cuba into various divisions of natives, Africans, and
mulattoes or mixed blood. Spaniards and Cubans do
not talk of the black race. With them it is the race of
color. In some of the censuses taken, distinction of
mulattoes and blacks is drawn; but it is not necessary
in determining the number of whites. Whether of the
Latin race born in Spain or born in Cuba, the proportion of white to colored blood is as two to one.
The mixture may be traced through all grades and
through a wilderness of statistics in slavery and since
slavery, but for half a century there is the steady decrease of the African race relatively to the white race.
Superficial observation is so often relied on to settle
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this question, and the conclusions drawn from this
observation are put forth with such positiveness, that it
is fair to measure these conclusions by the history of
a century as shown in the census statistics. Before
them, assumption falls to the ground. Unless artificial
conditions arise, the history of the last fifty years
seems to show that Cuba is in no danger of becoming a
negroid nation, which means a preponderance of black
and yellow blood.
The possibility of an artificial movement can be
judged in the light of what has happened. For a
quarter of a century there has been a free movement of
the blacks throughout the West Indies. They could
come to Cuba from Jamaica, from Haiti, from Santo
Domingo, and from the Bahamas. A sprinkling of all
these classes of blacks was found among the insurgents-the Bahamas and Santo Domingo furnishing
the greater number of them. This free movement will
doubtless continue, though after the American occupation it was temporarily checked by the application of
the immigration laws of the United States. This was
due to exceptional circumstances in the eastern end of
the island. It prevented the influx of idle blacks from
Jamaica.
No reason exists for thinking that the free movement
of the West Indian population will have a greater influence in the future than in the past. The industrial
conditions may call for harder work, and that assuredly will not invite a heavy immigration from the other
islands. It is evident that the black population of
Cuba can only be swelled by colonization or immigration on a colossal scale. Both whites and blacks are
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opposed to negro colonization. If a heavy black immigration is to be sought, it can only come from the
United States. Such a thing might happen as a million or more American negroes, wearied over the continued denial of their political rights, taking their
flight across the Florida straits, but it is not an hypothesis based on probability. The American negroes,
as a class, have not given up their destiny in the
United States. Small projects of colonization may be
attempted; some negroes in the Southern States will
inevitably drift to Cuba; but the physical surroundings
will not be substantially different from the cane-fields
and the cotton-fields of the South. Moreover, while
they will find themselves among people of their own
color, the tongue will be a strange one to them. Nobody who knows the habits of the Southern negro and
his sociable nature believes he will long endure this
isolation. The scheme of negro colonization has been
broached in the United States, but the American negroes have shown little disposition to encourage it, and
it finds no support among their race in Cuba.
In the industrial sense the value of negro labor in
Cuba has not had full justice done to it. Agriculturally, it is essentially of the sugar plantation. Admittedly the black does not do well at fruit-raising, and
the intricacy of tobacco cultivation is too great for him
to become a successful veguero, or tobacco farmer. In
the cane-field he is at his best as a laborer. The right
arm that wielded the machete in cutting cane was more
feared by the Spanish troops than the arm which
sighted the Remington rifle. The estimates of the
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mates it is possible to form the conclusion that fully
one-half of the plantation laborers are black. On some
estates they have remained with little change since slavery times. They do not work hard enough and long
enough in the sun to suit the plantation owner, especially Lif he be an American or Englishman. Labor,
whether white or black, in the tropics will never sweat
quite enough to please capital. Knowing the wealth
of the soil, the capitalist frets at his inability to gather
the fullest fruits of its fertility.
The negro field-hand is not always willing to work
six days out of the seven, though the oxen which may
be his own and the cart which is his would lend their
aid to continuous productiveness. His traits in this
respect are not dissimilar to those of the negro in the
South and of the white laborer everywhere under the
burning sun of the tropics. But under sympathetic
management the race is fairly industrious. The Cuban
negro has a marked trait in the instinct of landownership. It is one of the standard complaints of the sugar
planters that he clings to his cabin and his patch of
ground to the detriment of successful cane-raising. He
does not care to be swallowed up in the big plantation,
and usually his wish for a bohio or palm-hut of his
own in preference to quarters in the plantation barracks has to be gratified. Under encouraging circumstances this drawback may be surmounted. The way
lies open. It is to increase the negro's wants by educating him up to a higher standard of consumption.
Then he will exert his strength more in order to meet
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gro supports his family. The negro women do not
work on the roads and in the fields as in Jamaica.
The men perform that labor. The women care for the
children-always a numerous brood.
In the industrial life of the towns and cities the
Cuban negro is on a higher plane than is his brother
in the United States. It may be that the African has
no aptitude for the mechanical arts. Cuba is hardly
the field for determining that question, because it is not
a manufacturing country; but in such light manufactures as it has, the negro works on an even plane with
the white man of the border tropics. The cigar factories of Habana attest this fact. Between twenty and
twenty-five per cent of the cigar-makers are blacks.
They work at the same bench with the whites. They
receive the same pay. They have the same voice and
the same influence in the labor unions. In the shoe
shops there is the same equality in labor. The white
lad and the black lad work side by side. The negroes
are found in the tanneries and in the shops where saddles are made. They are in the building trades, many
of them as masons and painters. No complaint is heard
that the black artisans do less work than the whites.
They hold their own in the less skilful grades of labor.
A fair proportion are also clerks. The broad generalization can be made and confirmed by observation that
in the industrial life of Cuba, whether agricultural or
mechanical, the negro shows an equal aptitude with the
white man.
The outline which has been given of the industrial
condition of the blacks and the mulattoes has inferentially carried with it a statement of their position in the
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social organization. That there is no color-line is remarked by every traveller. Caste feeling is not absent,
social equality does not exist, but there is social toleration. The presence of the negro is not an offence to
the whites. Race prejudice is not rabid. It is further
noted that the African race in Cuba is homogeneous.
The mulattoes are not antagonized by the blacks. The
military leaders who gave the race its share in the
honors of the insurrection were, with few exceptions,
mulattoes. The pure black knows that he shares their
honors, and is content.
This sketch of the position of the negro in Cuba
would be incomplete and misleading if it failed to note
the blemishes.  A controversial literature exists in
which Spanish and Cuban authors discuss the relative
statistics of crime with reference to peninsulars and
insulars. With the African race such a discussion is
not necessary. A disproportionate number of criminals are black. The chain-gang which may be seen
daily going through the streets of the cities under
armed guard is made up of blacks. The Nanigoes,
frequently cited as a society of banded criminals, are
chiefly of blacks. Nevertheless it is doubtful if these
Naiiigoes are as entirely criminal as is generally assumed. The Spanish authorities made it out so for
their own convenience. The American police officials
who organized the Habana police force did not describe
the organization as a distinctly criminal one. What
they found was that criminals of all classes and of all
colors took refuge under the shadows of the Naniigoes.
Whenever a crime was committed, it was said to be by
the Naiigoes. Originally the society had no criminal
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element in it. It was formed by the Africans brought
as slaves from the regions tributary to the Gulf of
Guinea. Bryan Edwards, in his volume on the British
West Indies, published a century ago, notes a similar
society in Jamaica. The classes who were most prominent in its formation were from the districts of Africa
known as Carabali. They brought the superstitions
of their tribes with them.
The first organization of the slaves, in 1836, as Naiiigoes was permitted by the masters as something entirely harmless. The rites of Voodooism were practised, and natives not born in Africa were not admitted.
Subsequently separate societies of Cuban-born negroes were formed, but not on the same plane as the
ones born in Africa. These various societies were
known as Juegos. They had their ceremonies of initiation and of burial-grotesque and superstitious. In
time these Juegos became imbued with the criminal
element, and personal vengeances were executed. Ultimately Juegos of white Naiiigoes were also formed.
As it existed in its greatest vigor, the society had no
central organization. LEach Juego was independent.
These Juegoes were sometimes at war with one another. The Spanish police claimed that the Naniigoes
had a ritual of crime and assassination, that the ceremonies provided for the commission of crime as a
condition of initiation. The Naiigoes had seals or
signs for each Juego or society. This was tattooed
on the wrist, while the Naijigo mark was tattooed on
the shoulder.  A society of professed criminals would
hardly take this means of identifying its members.
At a period when crime was prevalent in Habana,
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assassinations and robberies of daily and nightly occurrence were attributed to the Naiigoes.  Punishment was difficult, because it was said that many of
the officials charged with administering the laws had
been in their youth Naijigoes and were fearful of the
vengeance of the society to which they belonged. The
more probable explanation was that the criminals, understanding the process of the Spanish justice, bought
immunity from the magistrates. During his rule, Captain-General Weyler gathered up all the criminal classes
of Habana, and deported them as Naiiigoes. By this
means he was enabled to exile hundreds of non-criminal
Cubans suspected of complicity in the insurrection.
After the signing of the protocol, the Spanish Government returned the criminal classes of Cuba from
the penal settlements of Africa. Some of these were
undoubtedly Naiiigoes, but the majority were ordinary
criminals, without membership in any criminal society.
A few of the Juegos were formed again after the return
of the deported criminals. It is doubtful whether
these societies are as criminal as represented. They
are as likely to be groupings of the superstitious negroes in whom the rites and practices of their ancestors have not been effaced. Cabildos, or processions of
Africans, were forbidden in the days immediately following the American occupation. In olden times these
cabildos often carried a snake as a symbol. They are
never without their drums. The African dance is
also a feature of Cuban life. All these things go to
show that inherited superstitions, and practices, and
ignorant customs, and usages have not been completely
uprooted. But it gives an unfair idea of the Cuban
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negroes to identify Naiigoes solely with them, and to
assume that all crime is committed by organized and
banded negro criminals.  Naniigoism has come to be
the general term for crime. This should be borne in
mind whenever the doings of the Nafiigoes are reported
from Cuba.
It is not my purpose to enter into a full discussion
of the future political standing of the race of color in
Cuba. Their place in the industrial element is of infinitely greater consequence, but it is worthy of recording
that the industrial progress has been coincident with
social toleration and civil recognition. The blood of
the Latin races does not repel the African blood so violently as that which runs in the veins of their fellowCaucasians of the Saxon stock. Amid the ruins of
Castilian empire, Spanish civilization has left one enduring monument in the Antilles. It has not denied
opportunity to the black man, and the black man has
risen to his opportunity. He has assimilated to the
toleration of the Latin civilization, and his position today is a refutation of the theories of the pessimists.
It is probable that after a few years, when the currents of immigration flow in natural channels, the relative importance of the race of color, black or blended,
will decrease, because relatively the proportion of the
colored population will decrease. The culmination of
their influence may be marked in the calendar of today. But this is not the end of opportunity. Unless
an overwhelming wave of Americanism with race prejudice on the crest sets in, the future opportunities will
continue as in the present and as in the past. That
there is distrust at this period is undeniable. It has
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been created by Americans urging their own ideas of
inferiority, and telling the white Cubans that the only
hope for them is in ignoring the African race. Towards
this aggresive movement the blacks and the mulattoes
have shown a natural resentment.
On the resumption of peaceful relations between the
United States and Spain, the Cuban blacks manifested
no antagonism to the American authority. Their leaders complained that they showed too great an indifference to their own future in the island whose freedom
they had helped to win. The mulatto insurgent General
Eligio Ducasse, issued an address in which he regretted
the indifference of the race of color, which was due, he
said, to the lack of civic valor. It was necessary for
them to turn their faces to the light. He urged upon
them the indefatigable propaganda of democratic theories, and proposed that they form a group and unite in
order to work in accord with the white Cuban element.
This appeal and similar ones met with little response
until the American newcomers, most of them of the
kind without influence at home, raised the color-line.
Then the solidarity of the race of color began to show
itself. It might be converted into a harmful influence,
for while not dominating the whole island, there are
sections in which the blacks are numerically preponderant. In Santiago province, in the period from 1877
to 1887, the blacks increased four per cent, and in
Puerto Principe two per cent, though they decreased in
the other parts of the island. This is one reason why
the white element in Santiago is to-day fearful of the
experiment of independence. But with the understanding of the purposes of the United States Government
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and the knowledge that individuals who seek to raise
the color-line do not reflect the views of the American
people, this solidarity of the race of color will not continue. It is defensive rather than antagonistic.
The figment of a black republic, of a West Indian
league, vanished in the air when Antonio Maceo fell at
Punta Brava. When the news of his death was confirmed, the Spanish authorities in Habana sent up
rockets as signals of rejoicing. Every rocket was a
dart which pierced the hearts of the Cuban patriots in
the city. Yet in their anguish the wisest of them felt
that it was an agony not in vain. Maceo brought to
the revolution the support of his race. Under him
the Santiago blacks fought their way across the island.
They were enlisted to extermination against Spanish
rule. In their leader were the military potencies of the
i African race.  Had he lived, the notion of a black
league might have grown and spread.   Maceo died
sword in hand, and the blacks fought on as part of the
insurgent forces, looking for their share in the future
government of Cuba that was to come out of the chaos
of revolution.  Those who feared and doubted lest
negro supremacy might succeed were encouraged to
fight by the side of the blacks. There was no colorline in the revolution, there need be none in peace. A
monument will be raised to Maceo. His deeds will be
celebrated by the Cubans not as whites or blacks, but
as Cubans. His memory will be cherished by the
blacks as one of their own heroes. He raised them to
his own level. Their political and their industrial
standing in Cuba for all time to come is that of equality.
158




CHAPTER IX


THE SPANISH COLONY
Strangers in the Country of Yesterday-Description of Themselves
by Spanish Classes-Composition of Colony-Madridlefios and
Andalusians-Catalans the Masterful Latin Element-Asturians
the Town Population-Castilian Yankees-Gallegos Widely Distributed-Other Provincials-Benevolent Societies-Instinct of
Nationality-Change in Feeling Towards United States-Reciprocal Relations of Cubans and Spaniards-Present Political
Attitude, the Retraimiento-Temporary Isolation-Status Under
Treaty of Paris-Strangers in the Cuba of To-morrow.
STIANGERS in the country of yesterday. Thus in bitterness and in anguish the intense Spaniards described
themselves when the flag which for four centuries had
floated over Cuba was lowered forever.
Though they called themselves strangers, the Spanish classes did not care to be known as aliens. That
would be too great humiliation. It would convey a
false impression of their affection for this Antillian
land and of their concern in its future.   They meant
that they were strangers to the new surroundings and
the new institutions. They chose to treat themselves
as guests of the United States accepting its protection.
No longer masters, they would not be the servants of
the natives of the island. By a natural impulse they
formed into the Spanish colony. In places they
grouped themselves into an organization under this
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name. In other sections they kept the old name of
the Casino Espafiol, or Spanish club or circle; but
whether they formed into societies or not, they took
the designation of foreign subjects. Cuba was no
longer a territorial possession of Spain, and they assumed the attitude of a colony in a foreign territory.
The Spanish colony was a spontaneous development.
It was the outgrowth of the instinct of nationality. It
reflects the sentiment and the aspirations of a people rather than of a class. Its members have the common basis of language, usages, tradition, and religion.
They all have kin across the sea. Since this Spanish
element is to be for a time a separate unit, its composition is worthy of analysis. First are the natives of
Catalonia, then Galicia, and Asturias. After them the
people from the adjoining districts of the Cantabrian
Mountains, as also fronr the Basque provinces on the
slopes of the Pyrenees, the Montafieses from Santander,
the Aragonese from Aragon. Spanish officers and soldiers who settled in the island gave all of the provinces
of the peninsula representation; but these did not affect
the main tide from the northern provinces.
The provincial customs of the peninsula are still seen
in all their literalness, and the proverbs which describe
the usages and peculiarities are heard as in Spain.
The Madridlefios were the most cultured class. They
were the office-holders, the bureaucrats, the leeches
and the locusts. They were strong because of their
intrigues and their influence with the government in
Madrid. Almost the same may be said of the Andalusians. They, too, lived on the offices and were leeches
and locusts. At one time they had a society of natives
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of the province. It was not strong in numbers, but its
members included the violent and irreconcilable Spaniards who opposed every concession to popular government in Cuba because popular government threatened
their privileges. Until an immigration movement sets
in, the Andalusian element in the Spanish colony in
Cuba is not likely to be of moment. The natives of
Andalusia are the scorn of the other provincials.  As
lazy as an Andalusian;" " an Andalusian said it" (meaning a doubtful statement); "the women for beauty,
the men for wit, and all Andalusians for lying;"these are the proverbs most commonly heard. They
show the estimation of the Andalusians by their fellowpeninsulars.
The Aragonese are numerically not a large element,
but they are a good one industrially. They carried
their hard heads and their stubbornness from Spain to
Cuba. Runs the saying in the island, "when an Aragonese says two and two make five, don't dispute it;
for in Aragon two and two make five." The natives of
Vasco-Navarre are also a small numerical element who
brought their customs unchanged to the island. They
are seen on holidays in the red-and-blue caps of their
province. Formerly they possessed political influence
which came from their clannishness. The natives of
Castile and Leon have sought to preserve their identity under the designation of Castilians. At one time
they had a society, but it was not influential. They
were mostly poor people, neither strong in numbers nor
aggressive in public affairs.
Following the natives of the provinces back to their
birthplaces, it will be seen that Catalans, Asturians, and
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Gallegos have lost little of their individuality. Their
charitable societies in all parts of the island are monuments to their spirit of union and to their thoughtfulness for their own.  The memorial chapels to their
patroness are evidences of their religious fervor and
their devotion to Catholicism. The Catalans are the
masterful Latin element in trade and in politics. They
are synonymous with commercial enterprise. Of all
the provinces of the peninsula they have left the deepest impress on the island of Cuba. In many places the
Catalan is still spoken of when a Spaniard is meant.
Some of the colloquialisms of the Provengal tongue are
preserved among them. They have always been the
most independent politically, and their demands on the
peninsula for legislation in the interest of Barcelona
have always been heeded. In government administration they have been prominent more for their influence
in shaping economic policies than for holding office.
In that respect the difference between themn and the
Madridlefios and Andalusians has been a radical one.
They have been the intellectual life of the Spanish element in the island, and have dominated in journalism
and in the Church. From them have also come suggestions of political anarchy and of labor proletariatism.
The Catalan peasant is as sturdy in the labor of the
fields and towns as his fellow-Catalans of higher grade
are in commerce and in public affairs. He has the
same traits of dogged perseverence and of unyielding
opinions. In spite of these strong traits, the Catalans
have been numerically a decreasing class in Habana
and the western part of the island for the last score of
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years. The opportunities in trade and in commerce
have not been wide enough for them. Their influence
and their numbers have not been impaired in the eastern provinces. In Santiago de Cuba they are still the
dominating force, and their enterprising and adventurous character has found full play there. The Santiago
Catalans gave some recruits to the insurrection.
Aside from the commercial privileges which made the
Catalans aggressive Spaniards, they have shown themselves possessed of progressive and liberal ideas. They
yet dominate the Spanish press of the island. The Central Union and various other societies in Habana had at
one time ten thousand members, with branches in other
cities.  In Matanzas the votive chapel to the Virgin
of Monserrate is a testimonial of their devotion.  In
Habana an hermitage or memorial to the patroness of
the province was projected, but never finished. In
whatever concerns the Spanish colony of Cuba the Catalan influence will be strong, but its independent character will be preserved. It has shown no disposition
to yield the field of commerce and industry which it
has held. Instead of bowing to American competition,
the Barcelona merchants prepared to meet it on the
even ground of Cuba instead of in the unequal territory
of Spain. They will not give up what is theirs without a struggle.
The Asturians are the most numerous element of
peninsulars in Cuba. It was they who crowded the
Catalans in Habana and the western provinces. They
are estimated to form forty per cent of the Spanishborn population. They were the most loyal of loyalist
Spaniards, and their sentiments have undergone little
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change.  When the insurrection broke out, of 63,000
enrolled volunteers in Cuba, 26,000 were born in Asturias. The Asturians have the largest and most powerful provincial society in the island. It is known as the
Centro-Asturiano of Habana, and has branches in Cardenas, Cienfuegos, Matanzas, Sancti Spiritus, Camajunani, Pinar del Rio, and other places. The society of
clerks known as La Sociedad de los Dependientes de
Comercio is also made up largely of Asturians. It is
within the last twenty years that they have gained such
power. Originally they were engaged chiefly in the
retail business; but they soon mounted to wholesale
trade, and gained a strong foothold in the tobacco industry and in financial enterprises. In recent years they
have had many influential men who have divided political
and commercial influence with the Catalans.
The Asturians are essentially a town population.
Barely a fraction of them are engaged in agricultural
pursuits.  They are the most potent and the most
representative Spanish class. Their patriotism is the
patriotism of ignorance. The majority are also zealous
churchmen. Our Lady of Covodanga, the patroness of
the province, has a splendid memorial chapel in Habana, and in the smaller towns there are also memorials.
The Asturians have transplanted all their Spanish traditions. Gil Bias would be as much at home among
them as among his kinsfolk in Oviedo. Their characteristics are thrift and trustworthiness. For this reason they make good clerks and tradesmen. They also
furnish the largest criminal element among the peninsulars in the island. This may be due to the fact that
they are inhabitants of the towns. Several years ago
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when a Scotch sociologist made systematic inquiries
regarding the inmates of the jails, the number of Asturians was reported as exceeding all the other natives of
the peninsula.
The Asturians are also more given to drink than their
brother Spaniards. Drunkenness is so rare that it
seems invidious to single out any class; but the Spaniard of whatever province will say that the Asturians
are the drunkards of their race. In trade they have
sometimes been called the Yankees among the Spaniards. A nasal twang in their speech has been cited as
further evidence of their kinship with New England.
The major portion of the shops and stores in Habana
are owned by Asturians. This ownership is advertised,
and the patronage of the natives of the province is solicited and secured on these grounds. The Asturians are
gorged with Spanish pride. They are at present the
most compact element; but being townspeople, they are
not likely to increase in numbers by immigration until
conditions change. They are tenacious of their trade
and will not readily be driven out by American competition. Their thrift and industry make them a most
useful factor in the industrial ranks of the island.
The Gallegos are next to the Asturians in numbers.
They are widely distributed in both town and country.
Commercially they have little foothold, and are not
to be considered on the same plane as the Catalans
and the Asturians. Their acquisitive instincts are not
marked, and they have not exercised a controlling influence in either trade, politics, or in the army. Apparently they have fewer material interests in Cuba than
the Catalans and the Asturians. In the towns their
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labor is what would be called unskilled. In the country they work in the fields. They are employed in all
the shipping ports. Most of the boatmen in the Habana harbor are Gallegos. Many of the inhabitants of
this northwest corner of Spain drifted from the merchant marine of the peninsula to the shipping trade of
the island. The Gallegos are also employed in the
mines of Eastern Cuba. They have been called dull intellectually, but this may be because of their indifference to material comforts, for to a stranger they seem
quick-witted. The Gallegos have shown the same tendency towards organization as their brothers from other
provinces.  The central society in Habana is an unusually good one, and has been noted for its efforts
to popularize education. The probability is that the
Gallegos will continue to increase in numbers, though
they suffered greatly during the insurrection and the
war, and lost some of their unity. They show less regard for the past and greater adaptability to new conditions than the other natives of the peninsula.
The Canary Islanders, the Islefios, are called Spaniards, for their speech is that of Spain and many of
them were born in the peninsula. Nevertheless they
have been less Spanish than the other Castilians. It
might be said that their feelings were neutral as between the peninsulars and insulars. The similarity of
the climate of the Canaries to that of Cuba induced
an immigration which was assisted for selfish reasons.
During the slave times, when England was in the habit
of reminding Spain of its obligations to suppress the
traffic, Spaniards in Cuba were wont to retort that British shipmasters were engaged in a system of white slave
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traffic from the Canary Islands. The Isleinos had a society in Habana which was charitable and useful. Most
of the haughty Spaniards looked down with contempt
on the Canary Islanders, who were engaged in minor
employments, such as peddling and raising vegetables.
In the tobacco country of the Vuelta Abajo, the Canarians are admittedly the best industrial element. They
have never been a compact political force. They make
good laborers in the fields, and many of them have
small tobacco farms of their own. Every year the large
tobacco plantations bring laborers from the Canaries,
who return when the crop is over. In the future the
effort will be to keep these islanders in Cuba. There is
work for them on the sugar plantations as well as on the
tobacco farms.
It should be observed that the various societies of the
provinces have their newspapers. These are not political journals, yet while maintaining the traditions of the
province they contribute powerfully to preserve the idea
of Spanish nationality. They are given up chiefly to
news from Spain. They tell what is going on in Corufia, in Barcelona, in Oviedo, or in Santander, as the case
may be. That is to say, they keep the people informed
of what is happening in their old homes. Some of them
also give space to the literature of the provinces. This
is especially true of the Galician newspapers. After the
conclusion of war with the United States some of these
journals voiced very accurately the conditions in Spain.
They contained articles which the censorship would not
have permitted in the journals published at home, but
which showed the real feelings in the provinces.
The reciprocal relations of Cubans and Spaniards
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cannot be fully determined in a single year. In the
past, the animosity and the antagonism have been undeniable. It was a psychological problem to determine just
when this antagonism of two classes of the same race
began to develop. In Cuba all persons born on the
island, whether white or black, of native or of foreign
parentage, are Criollos or Creoles.  The child of a
Spanish father born of a Cuban mother was a Cuban
from the cradle. The child of Spanish parents born
in the island sometimes became a Cuban in the first
generation. General Calixto Garcia was born of Spanish parents.
Commonly two generations would pass before the
Spanish offspring ceased to be a Spaniard. Invariably
in the third generation the offspring would be Cuban in
sentiments and aspirations. The Spaniard was wont to
say: "What is best in Cuba is our work. See us. We
are hard-working, frugal, thrifty, peaceable, developing
the riches of the soil, conserving its productiveness for
other generations, sowing that which the spendthrift
Cubans may cast to the winds. And we pay our debts."
Retorted the Cuban: " See yourselves. You labor but it
is not in the fields. The Spaniard works in the shade.
You grow rich on the labor of others. Your government,
which is not our government, gives you the advantages.
You save that you may spend away from the island
that which you have drawn from it. You do not bring
your families. You demoralize our morals. You are
birds of passage who would carry away the seeds of
prosperity. We are the true economists, for we both
produce and consume."
As in most disputes, the truth was midway. The
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Spaniard unquestionably was the middleman.   He
monopolized the shipping trade partly by reason of his
inclination for commerce and partly by official favoritism. The trade conditions in Cuba had their beginnings in the old monopolies granted by the Council of
the Indies to Cadiz and Seville. Barcelona's heritage of
these monopolies was a natural one; but in the retail
trade it cannot be said that a Spaniard became the merchant through special privileges. His superior ability
as a trader placed him in that position. With the
end of Spanish sovereignty the commercial conditions
changed along with the political system. The Cuban
is on an equal plane with the Spaniard in everything
that belongs to industrial enterprise, and politically he
is a little higher up. Cubans and Catalans in the new
circumstances may be left to assimilate the industrial
virtues which they have in common. I shall have occasion to write of the industrial phases with reference
to the Spanish element in discussing prospects and
sources of immigration. The position of the Spanish
colony as an influence apart and by itself is of present
concern.
When the Spaniards in Cuba declared themselves
strangers in the country of yesterday, they had been
for six months aware of their condition. In the first
burst of passion following the conclusion of peace they
turned to the conquering nation. They would owe allegiance to the United States rather than to a government of Cubans. If opportunity had been given to
declare themselves they would have been unanimously
American because that was the only means of being
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pation and a change of feeling. The Spanish classes
liked the Americans less among them than at a distance.
They began to doubt whether they could get along better
with them than with their own Latin blood.
At this period the feeling of resentment and revenge
was very strong among the Cubans. A voice came
from the woods which stilled it temporarily. MAximo
Gomez risked his popularity and challenged the radical elements by preaching peace and concord.  He accepted invitations from the Spanish casinos, declared
that the insurgents had fought against the Spanish
Government and not against the Spanish people, and
that all classes must join together in the industrial
reconstruction of the country. This was not new doctrine with him. He had preached it in the height of the
insurrection.  His words were received gratefully by
the Spaniards and respectfully by the Cubans.
Afterwards there were periods of proscriptive agitation against the Spanish classes and of demands for
them to leave. Some left; but it must be taken into
account that the parasites of Spanish bureaucracy and
militarism were numerous. They could not all get away
when the troops left. Others went because they felt
there was no opportunity remaining for them in Cuba;
yet in estimating the departures for Spanish ports
regard must be had for the arrivals in Cuba from Spanish ports. The mass of the Spanish population in the
island-the Asturians, the Catalans, and the Gallegos
-have not made up their minds to leave for good, and
the streams of immigration have already begun to flow
back. It is a simple explanation. The opportunities
are better in Cuba.
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In present conditions a numerical estimate of the
number of Spaniards who remain in Cuba could only
be a guess. Without making that guess, it is enough
to know that the number is considerable.  Spanish
newspapers all over the island reflect the existence
of the Spanish colony. The financial and commercial
classes, the merchants and the planters who secretly
sought American intervention when Spain was trying
to implant autonomy, want annexation or indefinite
military occupation, which they look upon as the same
thing. Nothing is likely to change their views. Some
of them have been encouraged in the belief that though
Spain has ceased to govern Cuba, the island will continue to be governed for the benefit of Spaniards. Others simply fear, and fear sincerely, that a Cuban government would be a failure, and they are not willing
that the experiment shall be tried within their own
lifetime.
While this is the feeling of the distinctively commercial element, I have never been able to discover by what
process of reasoning the conclusion was reached that
it was anything like the unanimous sentiment of the
Spanish classes as a whole. It is encouraged politically
by some of the old-time Reformists, weathercocks as
ever, who have tried to create a Spanish party. But as
in the days of the Autonomist agitation, followers are
needed to build up a political organization, and the
former Reformists are lacking in that respect. The
Spanish element is not to be judged by a few men.
The bodegueros-the grocery keepers and retail merchants-and their clerks are a distinct power. They
have had violent spasms against even the temporary
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presence of the American troops. They have been the
most passionate in their opposition to the change in
forms of government and in laws. They stand for old
customs and usages, whether good or bad. The appeal
to preserve the Latin civilization from the brutal aggression of Anglo-Saxonism is addressed to them, and
they are responsive to it. Their Spanish nationalism is sincere and intense.
The present attitude of the majority of the Spanish
classes is their favorite one, that of the "Retraimiento," the drawing within the shell and disclaiming
responsibility for whatever may happen.  They acknowledge their debt to that portion of the Cuban press
which combats the intolerant tendencies of the rabid
Cubans.  They declare their faith that the policy of
peace and concord and union of all the Latin elements
will ultimately prevail. But they are not willing to
trust themselves to it just yet. And from their "Retraimiento," despite the representations of individuals,
the majority of the Spanish classes still look with distrust on American influence. They want to be withdrawn from it as much as from Cuban politics.
Out of this retreat there is only one path. It may be
regretted, but that does not affect the controlling forces.
It leads to the temporary isolation of the majority of
Spaniards in Cuba in so far as relates to the policies
which are to be determined. Some of the newspapers
hint at political action as a means of annexation, but
these hints are received coldly. For a while the idea
prevailed that they could elect to remain Spanish subjects and yet have a voice in establishing the government which is to obtain in Cuba. It grew until the
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belief became a delusion that, though Spanish sovereignty was gone, the Spanish classes would continue
to rule Cuba through the United States.  But with
the understanding of the terms of the treaty of Paris
this vanished.
All peninsular-born inhabitants of the island now
know that by April, 1900, they must decide whether
they shall renounce their nationality, because that will
end the year from the time of interchanging the
treaties. The certainty is the creation of a Spanish
colony in Cuba similar to that which exists in Mexico and in the countries of South America. The registry of Spaniards as subjects of Spain will not be
universal.  Some prominent ones among them will
elect to take the uncertainties of the immediate future
in the belief that the authority of the United States will
ultimately prevail. Others of the bodeguero class and
of small landowners in the country will cast their
lot with the Cubans. But the majority of the Spanish residents will elect to continue their allegiance to
the peninsula. On the part of the commercial and
professional classes of Spaniards this will be simply
the affirmation of the position they have always held.
They came to the island to better their fortunes and
then returnto Spain. Permanent residence has never
been their intention. The paucity of registrations after
the Spanish consul-general opened the registry for
Spanish subjects should not mislead.  The majority
of them will wait until the last month.
What the course of the Spaniards may be in the
years to come, when the political incertitude is ended
and possibly immigration is flowing from the penin173




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sula, is conjecture not worth wasting time on now. In
the formative period of the future government of Cuba
their attitude is that of the Betraimiento. The beginning of American sovereignty in trust found them, by
their own characterization, strangers in the country of
yesterday. By their own choice the members of the
Spanish colony remain strangers in the Cuba of Tomorrow.




CHAPTER X


IMIGRATION AND COLONIZATION
Prospective Greatness of Habana-Agricultural Population the Basis
-Economic Epitome of the Reconcentration-Acclimatization
of White Men in Border Tropics-Spanish Immigrants Not from
Southern Provinces-Comparison of Latitudes-Madrid Government's Policy of Encouragement-Drawback in Political Institutions-Failure of Plans to Keep Spanish Soldiers in CubaLittle Prospect of Farm-Hands from the United States-Evils of
Proposed Systems of Colonization-Former Experiments-History of Chinese Coolies-Probability of Exclusion MeasuresTreaty Between Spain and China-Family Immigration for the
Future.
OF the people who once were in Cuba it is not difficult to write.  Of those who remain it is even less
difficult, for they are fewer. Of the race that will be, it
is too early to write comprehensively. But an exploration must be made in search of those who shall till
the fields.
Whatever race and national characteristics are developed, the leading traits must always be those of an
agricultural people.  Habana will become a greater and
a more magnificent commercial mart.        It will show
the possibilities of the civilization of commerce in the
tropics.  Seventy-five years ago Humboldt placed it
with Rio Janiero as one of the five great tropical cities
of the world. The Cuban metropolis then had 100,000
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inhabitants; Rio Janiero, 135,000.  Habana lies in
north latitude 22~. The parallel of south latitude
220 passes close to Rio Janiero. The latter city has
in this day a population in excess of 600,000. Habana
rises a little above 200,000. Yet with the establishment of a stable government it is possible to look forward to a day not so far distant when the commercial
capital of the Antilles will equal in size and importance the metropolis of Brazil.   With its progress
other ports will grow and spread, and Cuba's coasts
will be lined with as many flourishing ports as once
lined the coasts of the Mediterranean.
The basis of these entrepots of trade will be the
land, because Cuba is so essentially an agricultural
country. Its development will be such as comes from
the harvests of the soil. The mines will give up their
wealth. The forests will be cleared. And when it is all
done the island will be more than ever before the land
of the farmer. Light manufactures will spring up, and
they, too, will lean on the soil, not as a crutch, but as
a prop. It is, then, of an agricultural people, and of
the commerce and trade which develop from agriculture, that the future must be written. Hence the initial
question is of field-labor immigration.
There is in the first place an artificially created gulf
to be closed. It is the void that exists in the productive agencies of the island-the void that will be years
in filling. I wish to write here of the reconcentration
only in its economic effects. It was meant to extirpate
the people from the soil in which they had taken root.
The rooting out was partially successful. The victims
iacluded the heads of families, the children whose arms
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would have been bent within a few years to the tilling
of the land, and the women who would have borne
other children. The strongest, if not the fittest, survived. Probably in the eye of political economy they
were the fittest. More women than men also survivednot exactly the reconcentration, but the events leading
up to reconcentration, because many of the husbands,
fathers, and brothers were killed by the Spanish guerillas. Two illustrations from widely separated points
may suffice. In the six months from July 1st to December 31st, 1897, in the community of Sancti Spiritus, in Santa Clara province, the births were 202 and
the deaths 1,944. In the rich agricultural district of
Giiines, in the province of Habana, within defined limits
the population was 15,000. In the two years from January 1st, 1897, to January 1st, 1899, the deaths were
9,802, the births 319; the excess of deaths over births,
9,483. This page from the story of Giines is the economic epitome of the reconcentration.
Recent discussion has reopened the whole question
of the acclimatization of the white man in the equatorial regions and in the border tropics. Assumption
has given way to investigation.  Distinguished naturalists, among them Alfred Russell Wallace, have challenged assumption in the light of experience. Specialists in medical science have also challenged it. Its
latest exponent* may find it necessary to go beyond
generalizations in upholding his theory. The effect
of Cuba's climate cannot be fairly demonstrated until
modern sanitation has cleared away the artificial
hindrances. When the yellow fever becomes in Cuba
Benjamin Kidd, "The Control of the Tropics."


12


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no more an epidemic than pneumonia in the United
States, the experiment of acclimating the white man in
the border tropics will be fairly entered upon. Malaria will always exist there, just as it exists in immense
regions of the United States. Calentura or breakbone
fever will not be destroyed any more than ague can be
destroyed in the United States. But medical science
may continue to check it and mitigate it in Cuba as in
the United States.
Applied to Cuba, two criterions may be set up without intricate analysis. They are experience and common sense. The natives of the Iberian peninsula are
of the white race. They have shown that they can
work in the fields with equal endurance with the blacks.
The Spanish soldiers who have settled on the island
have always proved good laborers. The peasants from
Catalonia and Galicia are admittedly of the best class
of laborers. And in spite of all the talk the descendants of the Spanish peasants, the Cuban peasantry, are
hard workers in the field.
In describing the Spanish colony in Cuba I have
stated that it was composed substantially of the natives of the three provinces of Catalonia, Asturias, and
Galicia. Those who have not studied the subject will
be surprised when they take their geographies and follow the streams of immigration to the source. Though
the Council of the Indies sat in Seville and in Cadiz,
giving those towns the monopoly of the trade, Andalusia did not people Cuba. Nor has the immigration
tide, whether at ebb or at flood, been from that province of olives and oranges to the land of palms and
oranges. The fertile regions of Southern Spain were
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not deserted for the more fertile lands of Cuba. The
industrial immigration came from the northern provinces. Allowing for the moderating influences of the
Mediterranean and the Bay of Biscay, the inhabitants
of the peninsula who settled in Cuba came from regions
which, nevertheless, cannot be called tropical.  The
damp and cold mountain-lands of Northern Spain, the
high plains which are swept by the cold winds, have
contributed the bulk of the Spanish inhabitants in Cuba.
First they came from the commercial mart of Barcelona
and from the surrounding districts of Catalonia. Later
they came from Asturias, Galicia, and the mountainous
provinces of the north.
The beginning of immigration from Galicia in a systematic manner was half a century back, when the
great poverty prevailing among the inhabitants of the
province caused measures to be taken to assist some of
them to emigrate. Now it is to be observed that Catalonia lies, roughly speaking, between north latitude
40.5~ and 42.5~, that Aragon extends from the parallels
of 40~ and 43~, and that Asturias and Galicia are north
of 43~. They are in the latitude of Middle New England, New York, Northern Pennsylvania, Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, and Iowa. Allowing for the softening
influence of the Mediterranean on the bordering provinces, the broad deduction remains unchanged. A line
drawn laterally from continent to continent shows that
the bulk of the white immigration to Cuba has come
from north of latitude 41~, and latitude 41~ takes in the
great wheat-growing regions of the American continent.
There is no wheat to be grown in Cuba, and the question becomes one of how far people from the wheat179




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growing latitudes can raise products in the tropics.
The answer is given in the agricultural development of
the island. The laborers who have been a leading element in it have come from the wind-swept plains and
the barren mountain regions of the north of Spain.
In a blind way the Madrid Government encouraged
Spanish immigration to the Antilles. It was the one
instinct of national polity which it showed..The voyager in the waters of the West Indies sometimes puts
into Man-o'-War Bay at Great Inagua Island, midway
between Eastern Cuba and Haiti. The English customs
officer, who receives him courteously, tells him that
there are four white families on the island who administer the affairs of the fifteen hundred black inhabitants.
The same is true of the Bahamas and the other British
West Indies. England has never sought to people these
islands with her own colonists; or when she has done it,
has given up in dismay. Jamaica is the most striking
instance. The development of the future will show the
defect of this policy, strong in its administrative features and weak in its economic basis. Spain, in the
midst of unutterable errors and deficiencies of political
administration, did manage to avoid the economic error.
A progressive government would have given the island
5,000,000 inhabitants at the beginning of the twentieth
century, four-fifths of them of Spanish blood. An unprogressive government managed to insure a population of
1,600,000, two-thirds of Spanish blood. The instinct was
correct. The drawback was bad political institutions.
When, during the decade from 1880 to 1890 the tide
of immigration from the peninsula to the Argentine
Republic and other South American countries alarmed
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the Madrid ministry, various explanations were sought
for it. One Spanish writer said the potent reason was
that the emigrants from the peninsula were seeking new
institutions rather than a new country. He declared
they would have gone to Cuba in preference if it were
not that they would encounter their own bad government in even worse form than at home. At this time
there was an actual halt in the immigration to the
Antilles, and for a while more people were returning to
Spain from Cuba and Puerto Rico than were coming to
those islands. This was in one sense the climax of the
system which did not settle Spaniards in the island
permanently, but only to draw from it wealth enough
to return in comfort and ease to Spain. While the
bureaucratic policy of the Government upheld this system, it nevertheless groped about for a means of feeding the industrial deficiencies by immigration.  The
various provincial societies also aided immigration.
The Cuban and Spanish authors who in multitudinous
array have written of the island have differed radically
regarding political liberty and administrative government, but they have always agreed that the number of
inhabitants was never sufficient to utilize the natural
richness of the soil. This phrase, "the natural richness," is found in all their writings.
When the movement of population to the South
American countries was at its height, the Government
issued various decrees relating to immigration which
had for their object the encouragement of immigrant
families settling in Cuba. State aid was advanced, and
privileges were given families similar to those which
were granted to soldiers whose time expired and who
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settled on the island. Immigration was stimulated
somewhat, yet not in great degree, because of the fatal defect in Spanish administration, which is its lack
not of formulating, but of executing national policies.
With it, "la inertia" is what "la guillotine" was to
the French people at a period of their history
The future coming of Spanish immigrants to Cuba in
the first instance will be dependent on the government
which is set up in the island. The hypothesis of political stability is necessary to all discussion of economic
and industrial prospects. If the policy of peace and
concord succeeds, and the Spanish who remain in Cuba
are well treated, there is encouraging probability that
the Spanish peasants will come in numbers. They will
gain advantages which cannot be secured to them at
home. If the Cuban government proves stable and
liberal, they will find both new institutions and a new
country in which they will not be strangers, because
they will be among people of their own tongue and
their own race.  Galicia has 100 inhabitants to the
square kilometre.  The land is poor and thin.  In
years past its inhabitants have spread into Portugal,
and even to Andalusia and the southern provinces,
competing with the laborers there, and under this competition doing better than they could do at home.
And in Andalusia the laborer's wages are rarely more
than 20 cents a day. The Gallegos have also gone
by the tens of thousands to South America. Cuba
offers them far greater inducements in soil and opportunities. They have shown their capacity for every
kind of labor-in the fields, the mines, and in the merchant marine.




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Asturias, from the fact that it contributes a town population instead of farmers and field laborers, is not apt
to be a source of immigration for many years to come.
But Catalonia is a fountain of agricultural and commercial industry, and the prospect is for an increased
immigration from that province. The island can receive no more valuable contributions than these sturdy
and independent Catalans.   Probably the earliest
source will be the Canary Islands, because the movement of immigration and settlement from them is already under way. But the Canaries have a total population of only 250,000 inhabtants, and from that cannot
be drawn a heavy increase for Cuba. When the insurrection broke out immigration had been started from the
Basque provinces to renew the labor of the sugar plantations. The men were strong and excellent laborers.
This experiment was promising. It may be renewed
under more favorable conditions. It is also possible to
look for a permanent and steady immigration from
Andalusia in place of the scattering settlement that has
heretofore taken place. The similarity of climate and
products affords a natural economic basis. It may be.
that within a few years the olive, which heretofore has
not been cultivated for commercial purposes, will be
under cultivation by thousands of Andalusian peasants
and farmers in Cuba.
When the Spanish troops were evacuating the island
a prospect was held out that a definite number of the
soldiers, sometimes placed as high as 20,000, would
secure their discharges and remain. They were of the
classes whose terms of military service expired during
that period. These soldiers would have been an im183




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mense addition to the depleted labor population of the
island. They were from all the provinces of the peninsula, and belonged to the soil. But it was found that
the promises made them of their pay would prove
worthless if they stayed in Cuba. The Spanish Government, which at first had been well disposed to the
plan, became indifferent, and various causes contributed
to its failure. A few hundred Gallegos went to the
mines in Santiago, but it is doubtful if 2,000 Spanish
soldiers remained on the island. So the problem of
immigration from the peninsula has to be taken up as
a new question.
It may be asked where the encouragement for immigration from the United States is to come from if the
labor is to be drawn from the provinces of Spain. I
am not one of those who look to see Cuba Americanized
in that sense. It is my belief that climate will not be a
bar to the men of the temperate zone seeking homes in
the island. The wiser ones will push aside all fancy,
schemes and seek a stake in the land. A fair number
of American farmers will undoubtedly engage in fruitraising successfully. They are certain to work into
tobacco cultivation as into coffee plantations. In time
the readjustment of the sugar industry will be likely to
find many Americans raising sugar-cane extensively on
their own capital for the central mills to grind.
This may happen without changing the prospects
as a whole. It is not probable that the farm-hand
from an American wheat-field or corn-field will seek employment in cutting cane in Cuba. That labor can be
drawn from the blacks and from the Spanish peasantry.
Agricultural labor will be leavened by what it receives
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from the United States, as will other industrial elements; but this does not alter the probability that the
labor supply of the fields as a mass and in a mass will
be drawn from other sources. It is the fashion to talk
otherwise, to assume that in a few years American farm
laborers and unskilled town laborers will be spread
over the island like the industrious ants; but there is
little ground for this talk. Of the 35,000 American
soldiers who were stationed in Cuba during the winter months, and who therefore saw it under the most
favorable conditions, a percentage which cannot yet be
guessed will gather together what resources they have
and return to settle there. Others will follow, but not
as hired hands, and the bulk of immigration to Cuba
for a long series of years must be that of farm-hands.
Colonization differs from immigration. As applied
to the present and future needs of Cuba, it is undesirable, for it contemplates a continuance of the old evils in
disguise. These were the treatment of Cuba as a temporary settlement incapable of maintaining a permanent population on a high, civilized plane. Some prospective employers of labor have looked longingly to
Chinese colonization.  They have imagined the employment of coolies to be the solution of the industrial
problem. If the island could be treated as an immense
farm or plantation to be farmed by aggregation of capital from the outside, this might be possible. But such
a plan will never succeed. It finds lodgment with
many unthinking Americans who have only this notion
of labor in its impersonal sense, and who do not know
the real conditions. They have the idea that labor
might be imported and exported like any commodity.
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This idea was held by some Spanish publicists.
Half a century ago Don Urbano Sotomayor,* a great
landowner and capitalist, planned an extensive scheme
of the kind.  It was at the time that the Gallegos
at home were suffering the keenest industrial distress,
and in a small way were being aided to emigrate to
Cuba. Don Urbano Sotomayor looked on Cuba as an
immense plantation with only a transient population
convenient to Spain and the island. He was a very
patriotic and loyal Spaniard, and he rejected with
horror the idea of a permanent settlement because,
though it might be of Spanish origin, he saw that ultimately it would breed rebellions subjects. So he proposed that the island should be forever an enormous
farm with gangs of men brought from the peninsula to
work it, and then returned at intervals of five years,
while their places should be taken by fresh gangs. He
rejected absolutely the idea of bringing men to stay or
women to raise families. His plan was the formation
of a patriotic mercantile society which should bring the
Gallegos and natives of the other provinces under contract, and should return them in as good condition as
they were brought. Don Sotomayor believed in whiterace colonization because of the slave traffic then being
interdicted and labor importation being necessary to
satisfy the requirements of agriculture. His delusion
as to the probability of enforcing this scheme of
transient labor population was no greater than that
of some Americans of to-day. Don Sotomayor also
declared that Chinese immigration was not a success.
He had tried it, and had reached the conclusion that
*" Inmigracion de Trabajadores Espafioles," Habana, 1853.
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the social, hygienic, and economic objections were
fatal.
This Chinese immigration was begun in 1847. It
was part of a corrupt and money-making scheme by
Spanish officials in Madrid and in Habana. The Chinese coolies were brought under contract, but it was
virtual slavery. In the beginning many came from
the Philippines, and all the immigration was from the
ports of Southern China. Many of the coolies were
kidnapped. China and Spain still have an unsettled
diplomatic controversy growing out of the claims of
Chinese subjects who were thus abducted. In 1860
there were 16,000 Chinese in Cuba. The Madrid Government at that time took measures for facilitating the
importation of the coolies, and in 1877 the Chinese
on the island numbered 40,000. Ten years later their
numbers were 43,000.  Their introduction was continued through government corruption in the face of warnings of the bad effect of this element.
It cannot be said that the Chinese immigrants were
worthless. They were a fair agricultural population,
and contributed their share of employment in other
occupations. They also made a little headway in
trade, and the Chinese genius for conquering the civilization of the conqueror began to manifest itself.
They did not spread over the whole island, but were
massed in Habana, in CArdenas, and other sugargrowing regions on the north and south coasts. In
some places they became numerous enough to form
a social element of their own. They erected casinos
or clubs. In Habana they still have a fine casino and
theatre.
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The Chinese suffered greatly by the insurrection.
They were a neutral class, with the friendship of neither
the Spaniards nor the insurgents. They lost heavily
by deaths, and those who were able to do so got away
from the island. A population of 43,000 dwindled, according to the estimate of the consulate, to less than
20,000. While the Chinese as an industrial element
were fair, the moral results were inevitably bad, because the immigration from the beginning was one of
males. The criminal population among them was also
unusually heavy, and in the present day they have a
very large proportion of beggars. This, however, is
declared to be solely the outgrowth of the war, because
formerly a Chinese beggar was rare. The Chinese
quarter in Habana was not as bad as Chinatown in San
Francisco, even in these enlightened days. Before the
thoroughfare was purified by the American authorities,
the stranger might stroll along Zanja Street and sometimes catch the fumes of opium or peer into rooms and
see shocking sights. But with the exception of the
opium-smoking he could see equally shocking sights in
other quarters of the city.
Spanish civilization made no impress, one way or
another, on the Chinese in Cuba. In few instances the
Chinese contracted regular matrimonial alliances, and
the offspring of these alliances have not proved a
vicious class. But naturally the bulk of the alliances
were illicit. Many of the Chinese who left Habana
managed to find shelter in the United States in spite
of the exclusion law. The tendency among those who
remained is yet to seek this stealthy shelter; but an
effort has been made to revive the immigration into
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Cuba of contract laborers. Inevitably whatever Cuban
government is established will antagonize these attempts.
The agitation in the United States which resulted in
the Chinese exclusion laws of 1889 and 1890 found a
reflex in Cuba among Spaniards and Cubans alike, but
no legislation was enacted. The rights of the Chinese
in Cuba under Spanish sovereignty were protected
by the treaty of 1864, which was fairly liberal in its
provisions. Though Cuba was regarded as foreign territory under American military control, the exclusion
laws of the United States were not enforced against
the coming of small groups of Chinese. The immigration rules of the Treasury Department, which are of a
general character, were applied without reference to the
nationality of the objectionable immigrants.
The possibility of an influx of coolies excited the
cupidity of the speculators. Some steps were taken to
replace the depleted Chinese population. Immigration
of this kind, for a year or so, will do no lasting harm.
It will bring back to the wasted industrial fabric of
the island good working blood. But when a permanent
and unrestricted movement is indicated, the question
becomes a momentous one. In the temporary status
of Cuba some delicate international questions are involved. The consul-general of China sought to have
the treaty of 1864 recognized by the American authorities. That treaty was a reciprocal engagement between
Spain and China. While the United States inherited
the obligation to protect the rights of the Chinese in
Cuba, it did not inherit the commercial privileges and
advantages granted to Spain. The ground on which
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it can be asked to continue this treaty in force is not
clear. The clause relative to emigration permitted
Chinese subjects to make contracts with Spanish subjects for labor in the Spanish colonial possessions and
to embark from designated ports of China. Many of
the Chinese having come direct from the Philippines,
this provision was not necessary to them.
Whatever form of Cuban government is established,
a restrictive treaty or an exclusion law undoubtedly
will be enacted.  This will not grow out of racial
hostility, for there is little of that among either the
Cubans or the Spaniards. It will grow out of the
instinct of self-preservation and of national advancement. Chinese immigration to Cuba must always be
an immigration of males. Its nature was disclosed in
the census of 1877, which gave 77 females among a total
of 40,000 Asiatics. That is why Chinese colonization in
Cuba on a grand scale will be discouraged. If the civilization of the millions of Caucasians on the Pacific coast
was threatened by Asiatic irruption, the probable effect
on the mixed races of Cuba can be judged. The reason
for restriction is a thousandfold stronger. The industrial gain would be lost in the social demoralization. Because of its social and political bearing, Chinese coolie
colonization cannot be looked upon as a means of supplying workers in a mass. At the most it will be simply
a help, and not a source of labor supply.
With this fully understood, the Sugar Planters' Association, which knows the agricultural needs of the
country, has held steadily to white immigration. The
Autonomist party in its first declaration of principles
was specifically for white immigration. And the few
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enlightened Spanish leaders who gave the subject attention took the same ground. In no case was the
hostility to the race of color the reason. The relation
between whites and blacks was proof of the lack of
hostility as a motive. The governing cause was the
fear that with the incoming of blacks and without white
immigration the whites would be absorbed by the race
of color, and that the common level would sink. With
the white immigration kept preponderant, Latin civilization has brought the African race up to a high standard. In a previous chapter I have indicated the belief that no scheme of negro colonization in Cuba will
lower it.
But whatever the color of the laborers, the people of
the island realize that the hope of the country for tomorrow lies only in the immigration that is based on
the family. They will be true to that instinct, though
it may disappoint projects of venturesome and impatient capital.  They will be exercising the principles
of the broadest statesmanship and the most enlightened patriotism in whatever measures they may enact
to protect themselves from an immigration that does
not bring with it the family of the immigrant.




CHAPTER XI


SUGAR AND TOBACCO-OTHER PRODUCTS
Shadow of Beet-Root Competition Not New-Comparison with Cane
Production-Cost of Labor-Effect of Hawaii's Free MarketLocal Conditions of Cuban Industry-Modern Methods in UseLatest Crop-System of Colonos-Improvement Probable-Large
Capital Requisite for Growing Cane-Sugar-Contrast of Tobacco
Production-Field for Small Capitalists-Family-Group Labor
-Control of Crop Not Likely-Statistics of Exports-Prospective Revival of Coffee Cultivation-Fruit Raising and Its Opportunities-Commercial Productiveness of Soil-Mineral Resources-Value of Forests-Stock Raising a Profitable FieldExtent of Small Landownership.
REVOLUTIONS of government do not revolutionize the
soil.  Industrial ruin was the inevitable consequence
of the Cuban insurrection.   In the distress which followed, the prophets of dismay declared that the stricken
cane-sugar industry never could meet the new conditions of competition and production which were arising.
Nevertheless, Cuba is the greatest natural sugar plantation in the world.
The decadence of the cane-sugar industry is not a
new topic.  In the year 1812 A.D., cane was the subject
of a series of vaticinations, and a dozen years previously it was observed that the introduction of the
beet-root plant in Germany was a menace to the sugargrowing islands of the West Indies.  The industry was
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so profitable that during the first half of the century
the change from coffee raising to sugar planting begana change which continued steadily, and reduced the
coffee production to a comparatively small number of
cafetales, or plantations, in the eastern end of the island. Yet the shadow of the beet root lengthened, for
the stalk was growing. In the 'fifties it was the beet
root, not in Germany, but in France, that was causing
concern. Pezuela, the learned and laborious author of
the "Dictionary of the Island of Cuba," writes of it as
a "prejudicial rivalry." The complaint was that this
"prejudicial rivalry" had begun in 1828, when the
sugar of Cuba was preparing to take greater value. At
that time France had ninety refineries of her own and
supplied the whole French consumption. Pezuela also
remarks that as an offset to losses in the French market, Cuba gained by the decline of the sugar production
in Jamaica which the freeing of the slaves caused.
Little note is taken of the steadily increasing consumption in the United States, and the market which was
then widening for Cuba as an offset to the European
exclusion.
In 1830, when, in spite of the French beet-root competition, the development of the cane-sugar industry in
Cuba really commenced, a negro plantation-hand was
accounted worth $400, a yoke of oxen $135, and a
horse or a mule $60. The negro cotton-hand on a
plantation in the United States had a greater worth.
In 1857 Pezulea estimated the value of the 2,000 sugar
plantations on the island at $239,000,000, of which
the land was figured at $80,000,000 and 150,000 slaves
at $105,000,000.  The balance was made up of the
13              193




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plantation animals and implements. New inventions
were also utilized to increase the production.  The
number of separate ingenios, or plantations, diminished
by absorption into larger ones.
In 1860 the production of cane-sugar in Cuba was
1,127,348,750 pounds.  The   aguardiente, or canebrandy, and other by-products also had to be taken
into account. In that year the production of canesugar in all countries of the world was 2,750,496,950
pounds.  The beet-sugar production was 449,999,943
pounds, divided between France and Germany in the
relative proportion of two-fifths to three-fifths. Coming down to a later period without intermediate analysis, the situation may be seen at a glance, and the
changes that have taken place be understood by the
following comparative figures of cane and beet root:
Cane.     Beet.
1887-88............... 2,541 tons  2,407 tons.
1896-97................ 2,452  "   4,772  "C
Cuba's quota had fallen abnormally on account of
the insurrection, and the percentage of cane production
was therefore not trustworthy. But this deficiency did
not obscure the steady increase of beet production.
Since then some further changes have taken place, due
largely to the tariff legislation of the United States
intended to foster its own beet-sugar industry. Cuba's
future must be examined in the light of all these
changed circumstances.
During the worst years of the insurrection the Cuban
sugar planters were confident that when peace should
be re-established they would be able to meet the beetsugar competition. They never feared that the cane of
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Cuba would lose its market. All their hopes were dependent on the United States. This is so obviously
the correct view that it does not need elaboration. The
United States is fostering beet-root production by a
relatively high protective tariff. The growth of the
industry has not yet reached the proportions which
justify the belief that the Western farmers will go into
its production extensively rather than to continue raising bread-stuffs for the sugar-producing West Indies.
Investigations made by the United States Agricultural Department show that in Puerto Rico cane-sugar
can be raised for two cents a pound of the same standard that it will cost the producer of the United States
three and one-quarter cents a pound to produce beet
root. The limit of production in Puerto Rico is so
small, being not over three per cent of the total consumption of the United States, that it is not an important factor. In Cuba it is different. A careful examination will show that in the new conditions cane-sugar
cannot be produced there much below two cents a
pound. The margin may be one cent a pound between
that and the beet-root production in the United States
when beet-root production cheapens. The cost of labor
is relatively high. This cost will increase rather than
diminish in the future, because the Cuban plantation
laborers are likely to reach a higher standard of living.
Cane-sugar production in Cuba at one and one-half
cents a pound is due to exceptional advantages. It is
not general.  It is probable that in its elementary
stages the beet-root industry of the United States and
the Louisiana interests will prevent the free introduction of Cuban sugar. They will not be able to pre195




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vent that liberal reciprocity which is so essential to
the Cuban cane production, especially since a concession has been made to the British West Indies. The
steady increase in consumption in the United States
will justify broad reciprocity. A spoonful of beet root
for the morning coffee from the home product, a saucerful from Cuba for other household purposes, will be
the relative proportions for many years to come.
Hawaii has the advantage of the free market forever
secured by annexation. Its production is undergoing
an abnormal stimulus. No reason exists for placing
the ultimate Hawaiian production beyond 300,000 tons
annually. Under the free market afforded by reciprocity the greatest annual output was 237,000 tons.
All the economies of production and new methods have
been utilized in Hawaii for years past. The area of
soil suitable for cultivation is limited. Because Hawaii once thought 100,000 tons the limit of her productive capacity does not prove that 300,000 is not the
limit.
Jamaica and the British West Indies, under the present policy of the British Empire, are not apt to see the
revival of their cane-sugar industry. The British imperial policy changes slowly.  Grants-in-aid are farthings tossed to a ragged beggar. Though Jamaica
has secured partial reciprocity with the United States,
her recuperation must be slower than that of Cuba
because the conditions of the recuperation are not so
favorable. Cuba has more to fear from the development of cane-sugar in Mexico and perhaps in the Philippines than from the reconstruction of the industry
in Jamaica and Barbadoes.
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These are what may be called the external conditions affecting sugar production in Cuba. They give
fair basis for the assumption that a profitable market
may be assured for the next few years, possibly until
the former production of 1,000,000 tons annually is
reached. In the mean time the conditions under which
this production must go forward become important.
Sugar planters in debt, with years of non-production
and of wreck and ruin behind them, were not in position to make a vigorous start. Probably many of the
mortgaged plantations will pass into other hands. But
the soil is there, and if the American market can be
assured the redevelopment will come, first to the planations closest to the sea-coast, then of those farther
back in the interior, and finally there will be new plantations. In this development the revolution in methods
of production which has been going on will be continued. Already machinery has effected a saving of
twenty per cent in production. The economic basis of
production may be modified, so that there will be practically no wastage, and these new processes must serve
as the compensation for the relatively high cost of
labor. One fact seems to stand out. This is that
while capital will be cautious, it will not find the beetsugar competition too dangerous to prevent investment
in Cuba. In 1905 the Queen of the Antilles may be
producing as large a quantity of cane as she produced
in 1895, but under different conditions and at a less
relative cost of production.
It is a common mistake that the prodigality of nature
destroyed systematic cultivation of sugar-cane in Cuba.
Pen pictures of the planters spending the riotous earn197




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ings of their cane-lands in Saratoga and Paris while the
plantations produced and reproduced without management were often drawn. These pictures gave a false
idea. Some of the Cuban planters were as extravagant
and as improvident as those of Louisiana in former
days. In time the mortgages ate the substance of the
soil, and the plantation-owners were ruined. It was
also true that they did not act together as one body in
establishing a scientific basis of production as the Hawaiian planters have done. The latter by their organization have brought cane cultivation to an exact science
which assures the fullest return of natural wealth from
every acre of land.
But improvidence was not true of the whole class of
Cuban planters. After visiting the few estates which
were enabled to plant and grind during the worst period of the insurrection, it came to me to visit the
leading plantations in the islands of the Hawaiian
group and to observe the methods of production.
During a subsequent stay in Cuba further opportunity
was given to study the cultivation there when peaceful industry reigned. I did not find a single process
in Hawaii, with the admitted perfection to which the
use of improved machinery has been brought and the
economic devices for preventing waste, that was not
understood and practised in Cuba. The progressive
planters of the Antilles knew how to utilize every product of the sugar-cane. The difference was that while
the rule of scientific production in Hawaii was universal, in Cuba it was followed simply by individual
planters. Needless to say it must become universal in
Cuba also before the sugar industry can recuperate on
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a lasting basis. The day of the prodigal planter is
gone. I might add that he was not always a Cuban.
In the province of Habana the plantation which is
usually cited as an example of modern methods and of
keen business administration is owned and managed
by Cubans. In Santa Clara province a magnificent
estate which may fairly claim to be one of the finest
sugar plantations in the world is the property of a
noted Cuban family. The supposedly prudent Englishman in the role of a planter ruined by his own
extravagance is too often seen in the West Indies to
charge that quality solely to the Latins.
The sugar crop of 1898-99 was a disappointment to
unthinking persons.  They imagined that with the
return of peace the scorched cane-stalks which spread
for hundreds of miles over the island would at once
bear sap. The net production for the year was 304,360 tons of 2,240 pounds against 290,028 tons the previous year. Eighteen months are necessary from the
time the cane is planted until the first crop is ready for
grinding. Then the soil produces seven years without renewal. The planters needed first of all oxen,
then laborers, then money for machinery, and all the
time money for interest on the accumulated mortgages.
Some of them by the closest figuring of which they
were capable declared they could not replant their
ruined estates under $30 an acre. Others in favored
localities thought they could do it for $15 an acre.
The owner of a small estate of 1,700 acres which came
within my notice said he could replant for $23,000, or
a little less than $14 an acre. He had the seed-cane
available, and this was not included in the estimate.
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With a proper understanding of cane-sugar cultivation,
no one will look for a heavy increase in the crop before
the season of 1901. By that time an output of 500,000
tons may be in sight. One general fact must be kept
in mind. A maximum of two cents per pound must be
allowed for production. The profit is in the fraction
below that figure. Ultimately this fraction will be assured in the reciprocity granted by the United States as
a compromise between the pressure of the sugar-refining
interests for free raw product and the opposition of the
beet-sugar producing interests to any lowering of the
duty.
Whether the system of colonos will remain is a problem. In the beginning it seemed an ideal system. A
large plantation, in addition to the land worked by the
owner, would have a dozen or more tenant producers.
The cost of production was largely lessened by having
one great central mill grind for the surrounding country. Machinery which on separate plantations would
cost $2,0000000, on a single plantation at an investment
of $500,000 could do the same work. Production was
unquestionably cheapened. It is certain that the cane
will continue to be ground by the central mill. The
practical difficulty is in the adjustment of the relations
of the plantation-owners and the colonos, or tenants.
Under the old system, on a big plantation in return
for so many tons of sugar-cane brought to the central mill the plantation-owner would return to the
colono a definite quantity of raw sugar. The profit
to the mill lay in the amount or quantity of sugar
taken as compensation for the grinding. Naturally
the colonos claimed that the mill wanted too large a
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proportion. That is a difference of opinion which
will always exist.
The real difficulty lay in the fact that the colonos
leased the lands from the plantation-owners. The latter were always large borrowers, and in return they
made advances of money to the colonos. With a debtor
loaning to another debtor, the unsatisfactory results
were certain to follow. But the system is clearly capable of improvement. It is possible to imagine a time
when the central mills will grind the product of sugarfarms which vary in area from a caballeria to two hundred acres, the land either owned or leased by the farmer, who can raise enough farm products for the support
of his family, and devote the rest of the land to the cultivation of cane to be ground at the central mill. On
the larger scale the colono system will also be developed.
An ambitious American may lease 2,000 acres and upwards for a period of five or six years. If he has his
own capital with which to do that and can secure his
own labor, the central mill will become his servant and
not his master.
Though the great planters are not encouraged with
this prospect, and though the sugar industry in Cuba
must always be dependent on large investments of capital, the failure of the colono system cannot be affirmed.
It demands a new trial under new conditions. The
planters apparently have not considered the probability
of the industry shifting to a new basis. The amount
of capital required to be invested in a central mill
is large, ranging sometimes from $500,000 upwards for
the machinery. There seems to be no inherent obstacle
to the mills representing capital independent from that
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which controls the plantations, just as the great flourmills of the Northwest are independent of the wheatfields. In some form it is an industrial possibility.
In the economic history of the island the old writers
note that cane-sugar became a profitable industry when
negro slaves were introduced in numbers. They remarked the progress made during the short period of
English occupation in 1763, when 5,000 slaves were
added to the stock of human blood which the island
already possessed. The slaves came from Jamaica and
the other adjacent islands. The English went, but the
Africans remained. The slaves whom the English left
gave a marked impetus to the sugar plantations. This
growth continued until the beet root caused inquietude
and until the prophecies were made on the prospective
ruin of the industry. The beet root did not cause the
fears of the planters to be realized. Sugar-cane continued to add to the wealth of the Pearl of the Indies.
The aggregate of slave labor increased, keeping pace
with the increase of sugar production.
When the African slave trade was restricted under
treaty agreement and failed to fill the void, Chinese
coolies were introduced. This experiment was not a
promising success. The influence of the Chinese immigration is discussed elsewhere, but the fallacy of the
slave-labor necessity was shown after the Ten-Years'
war, when the progressive emancipation of the blacks
was in operation and sugar production increased. It
was a demonstration again of the greater productiveness
of free labor over servile labor. The years of greatest
production were those following 1886, when the remnant
of slavery was abolished.
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This, however, may be said to be shifting the labor
issue instead of meeting it. The question to be met is
whether sugar production can continue on a profitable
scale under conditions which are not substantially servile labor. The coming industrial life of Cuba is so
largely one of immigration that the bearing of immigration on sugar production calls for a word. It may
be taken as a maxim that white labor from the United
States is not going to work in the cane-fields. Western
farm-hands who show little willingness to exchange
the freedom of the wheat and corn fields for the more
tedious labor of beet-root cultivation will not transfer
themselves to the cane-fields of the Antilles. The labor
of the cane plantations in the future will be drawn from
the same sources as in the past. It will be made up of
black and white Cubans and Spanish peasants. Capital will find the means of securing labor, and the island
will benefit in the collateral branches which come from
handling the sugar crop. If, however, the future of
Cuba were for it to be simply a huge sugar-cane plantation, that future would be dark politically, socially,
and economically. Happily the promises for development are along other lines which will be parallel with
its sugar production and will offset its drawbacks.
The smoke of the Vuelta Abajo curls upwards from
millions of cigars in Europe and the United States and
in every corner of the known world. The conditions of
the tobacco industry in Cuba are not limited by the
uncertainty of tariff duties. The effect of these must
be weighed, but they do not permanently restrict the
output. It might also be said that the production of
cheaper tobacco, following the laws of natural econ203




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omy, has not reached its limit. Its growth will be
accompanied with greater economic developments and
with fewer drawbacks than the redevelopment of the
sugar-cane production. It benefits, too, the artisans of
the island as well as the agricultural laborers. With
the increase of tobacco production, the number of cigar
factories in Habana is certain to increase. This is the
kind of light manufacturing suitable to the tropics. It
pays to have an Habana brand on the tobacco of the
Vuelta Abajo and Partidos districts. Remedios, in the
central part of the island, may ship its strong products
to the United States, and the poorer grades raised in Santiago may go to Germany without affecting this fact.
Centuries of privilege did not destroy the Government
monopoly of tobacco which Spain enforced. From the
time when the Government factory was established in
Seville by the Council of the Indies to the end of Spanish
sovereignty in the island, both production and distribution were regulated by the authorities. When the royal
decree of 1817 was promulgated, it showed the reluctance
which the Spanish Government yet preserved to making
the cultivation and manufacture of tobacco entirely free.
During the insurrection the export duties were moulded
to suit the Barcelona monopoly. Under an independent
government or an American protectorate they will be
shaped so as to lighten the burden of the producer.
The leading characteristic of tobacco production in
contrast with sugar-cane is that it is emphatically an
industry for the small capitalists and farmers. The
island is in little probability of becoming a vast tobacco
plantation controlled by a trust or syndicate with the
power to regulate production. Capital in this form or
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in other forms is of immense benefit to Cuba, but it
has its limitations. The tobacco industry may become,
in the regions which have tobacco soil, an immense
grouping of small farms. The uncertainty of the crop,
the difference in grades, the necessity of manufacturers
having a variety from which to choose, militate against
a monopoly of production. To control the production
of potatoes in the United States would be as simple as
to control tobacco production in Cuba. While the syndicates or companies which own the factories may also
own large plantations, the conditions of production are
such that it does not pay them to work the plantations
as a single tract.
Experience may be needed to demonstrate this fact.
The vegas or small farms, whether leased to the producers or owned by them, are to the interest of the factories as well as to the producers. Where the veguero
needs money, the amount is small compared with that
which the sugar planter must advance to the colono, and
the risk of losing its return is less. In 1858 there were
8,250 caballerias of tobacco land under cultivation, and
the production was 1,700,000 arrobas of 25 pounds.
In 1894 the number 8,875 was given as plantations,
rather than as caballerias. The number of people employed directly and indirectly by the industry was
80,000. Of these there were in Pinar del Rio-the
Vuelta Abajo district-26,000 men and 10,000 women
and children. Aside from its economic and industrial
value, tobacco raising will be of great worth in the transition of political conditions and in its effect on rural
prosperity. Its labor is of the highest type, which is
that of family-group labor.
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Ordinarily four or five years are needed to learn the
science of tobacco growing. It is also an art. One
man may grow nine bales, or about 1,000 pounds, of
tobacco. The plants are placed in the ground from October to January, and the harvest is from January to
April. The first cutting is for wrappers and the later
cuttings are for fillers. Tobacco is thus a three-months'
crop.   When it is in the drying-house, corn or some
other cereal is planted and a crop had from the same
soil.
The foreign demand for Habana cigars and Cuban leaf
tobacco is not likely to be met for a long while because
the consumption grows steadily. The prohibition of
exports and the lack of leaf for local manufacture during the insurrection make an accurate comparison impracticable, but a general idea may be gained from the
cigars and the leaf tobacco exported for a ten-years'
period. This is afforded by the following table:
Year.               Cigars.         Tobacco.
Pounds.
1889........... 250,000,000      30,000,000
1890...............212,000,000........
1891...............197,000,000   17,000,000
1892...............167,000,000   16,000,000
1893...............147,000,000    18,000,000
1894...............134,000,000   22,000,000
1895.............. 159,000,000   23,000,000
1896...............186,000,000   30,000,000
1897...............123,000,000   Prohibited.
1898.............. 98,000,000     9,000,000
Coffee promises to become what it was in the early
years of the century, a staple for all sections of the
island.  At present its cultivation is limited to the eastern province, and the excellence of the plantations
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around Guantgnamo is well known. The French refugees from Santo Domingo who established the industry
there also carried it to the western end. Until they
were abandoned for cane growing, the cafetales in Habana province were very productive. Their re-establishment is probable. Uplands from 1,000 to 2,500 feet
above sea-level abound in Matanzas, and also around
Alquizar and Artemisa in Habana, and this height insures a good crop. The capital invested in coffee production must wait four and possibly five years for its
full return. The field is not, therefore, one for the pellmell investment which wants one hundred per cent.
within a twelvemonth; but when the fever of this kind
of speculation passes away and normal inducements are
followed, the increase in plantations will be seen. The
coffee industry has a great advantage in that it does not
require large capital, and while a plantation is being
brought to the point of market productiveness the land
affords other means of support for those who cultivate
it. With a coffee-consuming population such as the inhabitants of Cuba will always be, and with a soil capable of producing almost unlimited crops, the importation of coffee from Puerto Rico and the United States
is bound to cease. A better quality can be produced at
a cheaper price than it can be imported. The Santiago
grade commands a premium in the markets of the island. In a few years Habana will probably be supplying its local consumption from the cafetales within forty
or fifty miles of the city.
Fruit raising may be engaged in earlier than coffee
production. American interests are understood to be
supplementing their successful development of fruit
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growing in Jamaica by purchases of land in Eastern
Cuba, where Banes and Baracoa are the ports of export.
There is opportunity for the small fruit farmer also.
Sugar planters are discovering that the raising of bananas, pineapples, cocoanuts, and oranges may be carried
on in connection with sugar production. Those who
are in a position to do so are willing to try the experiment. This does not mean that oranges will cease to
grow in Florida. It means that the productiveness of
the Cuban soil is likely to be further diversified in such
products as find at their door the markets of the United
States.
The fertility of the soil of Cuba is so boundless that
exaggerated estimates of what is worth producing are
sometimes made. The tables of the leading authorities
on industrial subjects are taken in their literal meaning
as though applicable to all the cultivators of the soil.
But this is not the commercial productiveness. Their
figures show the limit of capacity of a caballeria, or
33~ acres, and the number of families which may be
supported from that area of land. Sugar, coffee, tobacco, cocoa, corn, hay, potatoes, rice, yucca, or starchplant-which stayed the hunger of Columbus and his
mariners-even wheat, cotton, bananas, and other
fruits may all be raised on one farm, besides the pigs
and the poultry which can be fed; but the limitation of
this productiveness in practice must be noted. Cotton grows on trees instead of bushes, but it is not going
to be produced in Cuba to compete with that raised in
the Southern States; nor will wheat be coaxed from the
ground when it is cheaper to ship sugar and fruits to
the Mississippi Valley and import flour and cotton goods
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in return. The diversity of products is great, but in the
lifetime of the producers of to-day they will not be producing everything that they want to eat. Corn alternates with tobacco beneficially to the soil, and other
crops rotate with advantage; but they do not reduce cultivation to a minuteness vastly greater than that of the
farm lands in many portions of the United States.
Homely calculations have been made of the increased
area which was brought under cultivation on American
farms when the barbed-wire fences straightened out the
corners lost in the elbows of the rail fences. The estimate of the wheat and corn and vegetables which might
be raised on all the railroad rights of way would be an
interesting one. In the same way the generalization
might be made of the increase in production when every
caballeria of Cuban land is under cultivation of crops diversified scientifically and mathematically; but it would
have no present bearing. The thing to be known about
the soil of Cuba is that its cultivators need never be
dependent on one staple, as the Western farmers are dependent on wheat and corn. The value of this condition
is in the probability that, while sugar-cane will not lose
its supremacy, agricultural industry will be diversified
by the increase of lesser farming.
The mineral wealth of Cuba has been prospected with
passable thoroughness. Imbern6,* one of the best of
recent authorities, says that besides the country immediately adjacent to the city of Santiago de Cuba, there
is iron in the region around Holguin and Baracoa in the
same province, in various parts of Santa Clara, near
Jaruco in the northeastern part of Habana province,
* Guia Geografica y Administrativa.


14


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and in Pinar del Rio, especially near the coast along
Bahia Honda. Copper he locates chiefly in Santiago,
but he refers to the deposits near Minas in Habana.
These deposits are now owned by Americans. Plumbago, he says, is found with iron in Santiago, and antimony with lead in the Holguin district. Coal he locates in the region of Consolaci6n, del Sur in Pinar del
Rio and in Matanzas province; gypsum in Pinar del
Rio, magnetic ore around Guanabacoa, which is across
the bay from Habana, in the hills of Trinidad, around
El Caney near Santiago, and in other districts. The
marble in the Isle of Pines is extensive, but it is of
inferior quality.
The best report on the asphalt and bituminous oil
deposits was made by the Spanish official engineer,
Pedro Saltarian, in 1883. He located bituminous wells
in various sections of Santa Clara province, and the
asphalt beds in the Cardenas district as well as several
in Pinar del Rio were described by him. Some of
these have been partially worked with divergent opinions as to their commercial value.
Americans who prospected in Eastern Cuba thought
they saw the greatest possibilities in the manganese
and copper mines, with some encouragement for lead
deposits. Discoveries of this kind became as common
as the location of silver mines in the Western States.
Some of the prospectors were doubtless mistaken; yet
the authorities who are competent to judge do not differ
in their opinions regarding the value of the copper
deposits and the uncovered wealth of the Sierra Maestre range of mountains in Santiago.
Trustworthy information concerning the iron ore




TO-MORROW IN CUBA
deposits, the Bessemer hematite, is given by the large
amount of duties paid into the United States treasury
by the American companies which work these mines.
Of recent years they have been shipping ore also to
Europe. The following table shows the productiveness
of iron ore in Santiago by tons:
Year.                                 Tons.
1884.............                 23,997
1885..................................  80,095
1886.................................  110,880
1887.........................   94,810
1888................................  204,475
1889..........................    255,406
1890................................  356,060
1891.................................  261,620
1892...................       320,859
1893..................................  346,341
1894.................................  153,650
1895.................................  377,041
1896.................................  405,671
1897.................................  452,559
Total.......................  3,443,464
It is a question whether there are the 10,000,000
acres of virgin forests in Cuba that have been vaguely
estimated. Sometimes the innumerable groves of royal
palms, the most useful tree known to the tropics, are
included in this guess. Experienced Americans who
for a year travelled over the island seeking to determine the most valuable timber locations became doubtful of the extent of the wooded area, though the eastern
province seemed to them a single forest.   But the area
is great enough to take many years to clear it. The
cedar from which the cigar-boxes are made is found in
Pinaer del Rio as well as in Santiago, The mahogany,m1




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close to the coast has been thinned out, but further in
the interior it is untouched. The other hard woods are
of great variety. Their commercial value is uncertain
until systematic lumbering as known in Michigan and
Wisconsin is developed. In the building of railroads
the ties may be taken from the woods which it will be
necessary to clear.
Stock raising in Cuba offers one of tile most profitable fields for a.quick return on invested capital. The
high rolling land which begins in Santa Clara and
extends into Santiago affords the best ranges. Much
of this grazing land is capable of sugar cultivation, but
many years must pass before this can be engaged in to
advantage. The central province of Puerto Principe is
a vast grazing region. Its Cuban name, Camagiiey,
means a cattle-pasture. Hundreds of thousands heads
of cattle disappeared during the insurrection. To-day
the traveller may journey from sunrise to sunset and
see no signs of live stock; but this barrenness will not
last. The grazing ranges are bound to be restocked not
only with cattle, but also with horses. Animals from
the United States may be imported to help restock
them. Heretofore they have been imported simply as
live beef for daily consumption. The supply, however,
will not be solely from the United States. In securing
oxen for the sugar plantations it is found that Mexico,
Venezuela, and Honduras are the main sources. Live
stock from the United States will have to be crossed
with animals from those countries and with the native
stock. It is the common experience that the stock runs
out in three generations unless it is renewed by breeding with imported animals.
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The landownership instinct is very strong with the
mass of the Cuban population. This means that it
was strong with their Spanish progenitors and will
be strong with the Spanish immigrants of the future.
This is shown in the government reports, which were,
for Spanish statistics, fairly trustworthy because on
them  were based the taxes. The last enumeration
which was made before the insurrection broke out
showed that in the whole island there were 1,119 sugar
plantations, 4,214 stock farms, 375 haciendas or large
country estates, 188 coffee plantations, 8,485 vegas or
tobacco farms, and 22,224 sitios or estancias. A sitio
is simply a place, and an estancia is a small farm. The
number of city, town, and village real-estate holdings
was 76,402. These fincas urbanos, as they were called,
shaded off into land-holdings capable of cultivation. It
will be several years until an exact estimate can be had
of the products of small farming in Cuba.




CHAPTER XII


TRADE AND    TAXATION -RAILWAYS AND INTERNAL DEVELOPMENT
Some Primary Principles-Adjustment of Purchasing Power of Products by Reciprocity-Tariff Dues and Their Capabilities-New
Sources of Revenue-Decay of Spanish Shipping-American
Markets for Tropical Products-Unwarranted Expectations of
Merchants-Railway Building and Its Limitations-Systems in
Operation-The Backbone Line-Value of Existing Railroad
Property-English Ownership-Water-Way Competition-Harbor Improvements-Good Roads the Coming Question-Cheap
Labor Not Found-Prospect for Agricultural Banks-Strikes Not
a Recent Development-Artificial Monetary Basis- Ultimate
Supremacy of American Financial System.
TRADE and taxation in Cuba may be reduced to a few
simple formulas. The elaboration of these formulas
into economic treatises is not difficult.  When the elaboration becomes wearisome and confusing the return
to the starting point is easy. There is really little need
of wandering far away from    it into the wilderness of
speculative economics.
The island for all time will have to supply the wants
of its inhabitants by what they can get in exchange for
a bag of sugar, a bale of tobacco, a sack of coffee, and
a cargo of fruits and nuts. The adjustment of this purchasing power of sugar, coffee, tobacco, and fruits so
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as to bring back the largest quantity of flour, lard, and
bacon, the greatest amount of agricultural machinery,
and the most extensive assortment of cotton and other
dress goods is the problem of trade and also of tariff
taxation. The United States consumes everything the
island produces. It produces everything that Cuba
consumes. The doors open one to the other. There is
the whole question of Cuban commerce, and its basis is
reciprocity.
It is shown since the American control of the custom houses that an impoverished people not numbering much more than 1,000,000 can pay $1,000,000
monthly in customs duties. This is done by light
rates on articles of commerce and consumption. With
the restoration of prosperity the rates can be further
shifted to articles of luxury, because the Latin-American's fondness for luxuries when able to gratify itself
pays tariff tribute willingly.
A hitherto untouched source of internal-revenue taxation exists. It is ample enough to supplant most of
the present unsatisfactory internal taxes. This source
of revenue is in the tobacco that is consumed in Cuba
and in the by-product of sugar known as aguardiente or
cane-brandy. Everybody in the Antilles smokes, and
smokes countless cigars and packages of cigarettes.
Under the Spanish system the wax tapers which were
used for lights paid an internal-revenue duty, but the
infinitely greater income from cigars and cigarettes was
neglected. The aguardiente, besides its use as a beverage, is employed in a variety of household ways. It
takes the place of a score of toilet articles which in
the United States pay an internal-revenue tax. Inter215




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nal taxation of this kind would easily replace the income lost by the prohibition of the lottery and would
also replace the vexatious industrial tax, which was
literally an impost on progressive industry and enterprising commerce.
When the Blaine reciprocity provisions were in force,
the harbors of Cuba were filled with vessels flying the
American flag almost to the exclusion of the ships of
other nations. After Spanish sovereignty ceased, ships
continued to enter Cuban ports under its flag, but the
cargoes they carried were small.  With the artificial
restrictions removed the peninsula had little to sell
to the island, but it was not itself independent of the
products of the Antilles. Its exports dropped to a
cipher. That may not be a permanent nothingness.
Cuba will buy some things of Spain, and the traffic from
Barcelona to Buenos Aires by way of Habana may not
entirely cease. The Barcelona merchants are already
making an aggressive struggle to keep their Antillian
trade. But with no discriminating tonnage dues, and
with no preferential tariff forcing Cuba to receive the
products of the peninsula at a low rate while its own products pay a high import duty into the peninsula-that
was the basis of the Spanish system-Spanish shipping,
it might be said European shipping, must remain near
the vanishing point which is represented by the cipher.
There have been years in which 95 per cent of Cuba's
exports were sent to the United States. Those years
are coming again, and under conditions which render it
certain that American vessels will not enter or leave
Cuban ports in ballast.
The great country to the north is so little to the
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north that the vessel twenty-four hours or thirty-six
hours out from a Cuban port may start the distribution
of products over an area of 1,500,000 square miles and
among 50,000,000 consumers-all the region from the
Mississippi valley to the New England coast. Habana
can ship its freight to reach New York, Chicago, St.
Louis, and Cincinnati within four days. The American markets await the tropical products which 5,000,000 inhabitants of Cuba can supply. These border
tropics will not encroach seriously on the products of
the temperate zone. The crevices between the rocks in
New England will be sprouting hand-nurtured blades of
grass when the caballeria of rich Cuban land is yielding
its maximum of sugar, coffee, and fruits, but not of
wheat in competition with those blades of grass or with
the prairies of the West.
On the part of merchants in the United States there
was keen disappointment because they did not find a
market of 5,000,000 consumers awaiting them within
three months after Cuba ceased to be a possession of
Spain. They did not stop to reflect that the inhabitants had been reduced in four years by at least 25 per
cent, and that consumption could not make a quick
stride forward until the surviving population was recuperated. The Mississippi valley was surprised that
the demand for bread-stuffs was not vastly larger than
when the flour had to be shipped by the way of Barcelona, while the Atlantic coast was disappointed that
the $100,000,000 of Cuban commerce which was in
vision when the insurrection broke out did not immediately sweep into its ports.  A little thought
was needed to recall that industrial recuperation
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has its limitations of time, and that increased commerce can only come from increased development and
increased population. And the basis of these is internal development.
The question recurs to the resources of the island
and the means of unfolding them as the prelude to the
growth of commerce. A quaint Spanish author once
wrote of Cuba as an island "whose population and
whose richness were a drop of water in the grand ocean
of Spain's colonial treasure." The grand ocean has
dried up. Shall the water-drop become a stagnant pool
or a fountain fed by steady streams? The answer is
again to be sought in the uncovering of that natural
richness and in the population which uncovers it.
What is of first concern is the lines which the development will follow in the lifetime of the young men of
to-day. The market is assured.* Capital starts with
that certainty. Its next movement is for the quickest
and largest returns where there is the least competition
and not too great adventure.
The clearing of the forest lands and the building
of railways and ordinary roads for a time will go forward evenly with the reconstruction of the sugar plantations. The island to-day has 1,135 miles of railway, exclusive of the narrow-gauge lines on the sugar plantations which serve to bring the cane to the central mills.
When 1,300 or perhaps 1,200 miles more are built,
railway construction will be ended, because there will
be no need of further means of rail communication. In
its industrial aspects the Cuba of the past must be
viewed almost as a stationary body. The building of
* See Appendix B.
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railways was a slow work. A description of the island
in 1900 would vary little from a description in 1845.
The towns in 1850 were what they were in 1895. The
means of travel were the same, the roads were the same,
and few new highways of commerce were opened during half a century. The first railroad was built from
Giines to Habana within a few years after George
Stephenson told the poking Parliamentary committee
which quizzed him, that the locomotive he had invented
would undoubtedly prove an inconvenient thing for the
cows which happened to get in its way.
The 1,200 or 1,300 miles of railway which are yet to
be constructed will join the city of Santa Clara with the
city of Santiago, closing a gap of less than 300 miles.
It will have feeders to the north and south coasts to
Nipe, Gibara, Baracoa, Sancti Spiritus, Santa Cruz del
Sur, and Manzanillo. When this construction is finished the backbone or central railway across the length
of the island will be a fact, because existing lines will
complete the links. The narrowness of Cuba forbids
parallel roads, except for short distances. This backbone railway was for fifty years an inviting project; but
the English and the French capitalists who organized
companies, made surveys, and secured what they supposed were Government concessions were always foiled
in the end by the Spanish shipowners. Only the memory of banquets to the government officials remained to
the capitalists; but that will not be the case in the future.
The railways in actual operation in Cuba to-day, as
given by the American military authorities, are as follows;
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Name.


Miles.


United Railways of Habana..............................  244
Western Railway........................................  109 -Marianao Railroad...............................    9
Habana Terminal Railway (American military line).......       6
Regla and Guanabacoa Railroad..........................      21
Matanzas and Sabanilla Railroad.............*........   172k
Cardenas and Jdcaro Railroad System.....................  248k
Sagua la Grande Railroad................................    88
United Railroads of Caibarin............................    57j
Trinidad Railroad........,.................                 22
San Cayetano and Vifiales Railroad (narrow gauge, 2-E feet)..  15
Zaza and Sancti Spiritus Railroad (narrow gauge, 3 feet)....  22j
Jdcaro-Mor6n Railway (military line)......................  40
Nuevitas and Puerto Principe Railroad....................   45
Guantanamo Railroad...................................      10 -Gibara-Holgufn Railroad.................................     9
Santiago Railroads.......................................  33
Total.......................................... 1,135


Of the systems, the Jucaro-Mor6n Railway belongs
to the future Government of Cuba. It is an inheritance from Spanish sovereignty, being the old military
trocha. It passes through a thinly populated region,
and its commercial value has been doubted because
neither of the terminals has a good harbor. Nevertheless the country which is tributary to it is very fertile
and capable of great development, while branches may
be built from the main stem to good ports on both the
north and the south coast. This line cost the Spanish
Government $1,152,800 in gold. The Habana Terminal
Railway, so called, is a belt-line running from the docks
at Triscornia and intersecting the lines which enter
Habana. It was built to facilitate the movement of the
troops and the handling of the supplies. When the
220




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United States ceases to have use for it, this belt-line
will be valuable to the existing roads, and if sold to
them should bring a good price.
The present ownership of the Cuban railways is
chiefly in London.  English capitalists were heavily
interested before the insurrection broke out.  They
built the Western Railway running from the city of Habana to the town of Pinar del Rio, through the tobacco
country. Surveys have been made to extend this line
30 miles farther westward. English capitalists also
control the United Railways of Habana, which enter
the city from both east and west, though the most of
the lines run eastward. Cubans and Spaniards were
the chief stockholders in the sugar-carrying roads
known as the Cardenas-Juicaro and the Matanzas-Sabanilla systems. After the signing of the protocol, in
order to get money with which to work their plantations
or for other purposes they sold their holdings to the
Englishmen.
At one time American capital seemed likely to control the Cuban railways. It had the opportunity, but
the chances of manipulation, of reorganization committees, and of new issues of stock and bonds apparently
were not great enough to appeal to the daring financiers of New York. So the American capitalists retired
and left the ground to their English rivals. It was
another illustration of American disgust because Cuba
was not a promising field for " quick returns and double
money." Some financial interest is still held by Americans, but the supremacy is in London. The English
owners, after they gained control, sent agents to the
United States to offer a profitable share in the enter221




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prises to public men whose political influence was
thought desirable.
In a general way it may be said that it does not matter whether the capital invested in the Cuban railway
system is from the United States or from Great Britain. The English owners will buy their material in
the States if they can get it there cheaper than in England.  Nevertheless it is to be regretted that enterprising American railway managers will not operate
the Cuban railways. The slow and conservative management of the Englishmen is not suited to the new
industrial life of Cuba. Under the Spanish system
railway charges, both freight and passenger, were exorbitant. Both the theory and the practice were a limited business and high charges. The English capitalists follow the same plan. During the insurrection
both freight and passenger business paid a war tax of
20 per cent in addition to the regular government impost of 10 per cent on passenger business and 3 per cent
on freight traffic. The English management does not
seem likely to get out of the old rut. It looks forward
to continuing to collect 7 cents a mile in American gold
for first-class passengers and 5 cents for second-class
passengers. Freight tariffs are enormous. The burden for the sugar industry is too heavy to be borne. A
fall in rates must come either by the voluntary action
of the railroad companies, which is improbable, or by
the action of government.
There is something of a political side, also, to this
European ownership of Cuban railways. Controlling
the system from Pinar del RPo to Santa Clara, it is
natural that the English capitalists should want to con222




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trol the backbone railway to Santiago when it is constructed and the branch lines to the coasts. No one
supposes that the main stem, or trunk line, between
Santiago and Santa Clara will be in itself a paying one,
or that there will ever be much through freight from
Habana to Santiago unless the Florida straits and
the Caribbean Sea dry up. Nevertheless the extension
will be valuable in a way. At the present time the
projects of the English capitalists are combated by
interests which are said to be American. These interests claim to have acquired certain rights with reference to the Cuba Central Railway, partly by the action
of Generals H. W. Lawton and Leonard Wood during
the early military occupancy of Santiago province, but
chiefly by acquiring the rights of the French company
which organized the project for the backbone railway
in 1881. The surveys made by the French engineers
were the most complete and valuable of any that had
been attempted. As to the precise rights regarding the
projected railway, either Congress or the future Government of Cuba must determine. The most important
point is not to delay the construction of the road too
long.
The telegraph and the telephone systems of Cuba
were owned by the Spanish Government. The telephone privileges were leased to a private company, but
the telegraph system was operated in connection with
the post-office. Under the American military authority,
the lines have been repaired, extended, and improved.
They will be valuable property to the State or the Republic of Cuba, but they are better operated in connection with the railway system than independent of it.
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The existing 1,135 miles of railway are valued at
$43,000,000 Spanish gold, according to the stock and
bond issues. This would not amount to $40,000,000 in
American money. While some of the stock and bonds
were quoted above par and some below par after the
restoration of peace, the general average would bring
the total value up to the capitalization, regardless of
temporary fluctuations due to the efforts of rival interests to obtain control. These lines have been described
by American experts as equal to the worth of any similar length of railroad in the United States; and it is
probable that when the island has a complete system of
2,500 miles, this system will be equal in value to any
2,500-mile system in the States.
As they stand in the present day, the Cuban railroads
must spend large sums of money in betterments and in
repairing the destruction caused by the insurrection.
This work will be completed by the time political conditions reach the stage at which there will be some
authority capable of granting the franchises necessary
to the construction of new lines. Once entered upon,
ten years will be enough for constructing all the railways Cuba will need, for clearing the forest lands of
the eastern provinces, and for opening up the mines of
the Sierra Maestre Mountains which are yet untouched.
The laborers engaged in railway construction may be
drawn from the inhabitants, or they may be of a class of
immigrants who will settle down as a part of the agricultural population. When the construction is completed it is a simple process to estimate the number
of people who will be engaged in the administration
and operation of 2,500 miles of railway.
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The Cuban railroads will always have water-way
competition. They will have no rivalry in hauling
sugar to the sea-board; but in the general commerce of
the island, and especially in the local commerce, geography is against a monopoly. Under the Spanish rule
the Caribbean Sea, the Gulf of Mexico, and the Atlantic
waters were a monopoly because the coasting trade was
a privilege. It was made the more valuable by the
obstacles which were interposed to railway construction. But with the artificial limitations of government
removed there can be no monopoly, and with the coasting trade free a permanent alliance of railway and vessel interests is improbable. Too many American skippers can engage in it for the big steamship lines to
control the coasting trade.* Every fishing-smack is a
competitor. Most of the towns are on the coast or so
short a distance inland that electric lines are also certain to compete with the steam railways for passengers
and even for light freight. A few years will be enough
to demonstrate the opportunities Cuba offers to the
merchant marine of the United States. When the
island has 5,000,000 inhabitants relatively no more
people will be engaged in the midway occupations than
to-day. Light manufactures will increase proportionately, while the shipping at the ports due to increased
commerce will give further employment. When this
is stated there is no disturbance in the balancing of
natural occupations which grow out of the turning over
of the soil, seed-time, and harvest. In its broadest
sense the subject of internal development ends with the
agricultural population, though it does not begin there.
See Appendix B.
15               25




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The domestic commerce of Cuba, as well as its foreign shipping trade, if shipping trade with the United
States can be called foreign, makes the question of
the water-ways one of the earliest of public improvements. The island may never have a river-and-harbor
bill such as regularly floats through the Congress of the
United States, because there is only one navigable
river. This is the Cauto, in the province of Santiago.
But when it comes to improvements, harbors supply
the deficiency of rivers. Their betterment and maintenance will be at once an encouragement to commerce
and a temptation to extravagance on the part of the
State. Private enterprise will be sufficient to supply
every need and to meet every deficiency of the shipping
interests in so far as relates to docks, wharfs, and
piers, but the actual control of the water-ways, and
therefore the improvement of the harbors, will remain
the function of the commonwealth. Bahia Honda, Cabaiia, Matanzas, Cardenas, Sagua, Caibarien, Nuevitas,
Nipe, Baracoa, Gibara on the north coast, Santiago,
Guantanamo, Mazanillo, Santa Cruz, Trinidad, Tunas
de Zaza, Cienfuegos, and Bataban6 on the south coast
are the leading ones, but there are a large number of
smaller havens which the coral reefs do not render
entirely inaccessible.
The most important public improvements in the
future of Cuba are the roads. To insure its success
the work must be that of the central Government rather
than of the provinces or the municipalities. A system
suitable to the development and the permanent interests
of the island can only be carried out under a central
plan and by a central authority. Good roads are the
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industrial and in a degree the political future of Cuba,
and good roads cannot be limited to a province or to
a municipality. National turnpikes are the promise
of the island, and the Cuban statesman who emulates
Henry Clay's championship of the old Cumberland
road will be its true benefactor. Whatever form  of
government is adopted there will be nothing in the
Cuban constitution which the strict constructionists
will be able to invoke against this form of public improvement.
The calzada, as it is called, will be the Cuban turnpike or national highway running in all directions
across the country. The extent to which the building
of roads was neglected and even discouraged by the
Spanish Government has been so often recounted that
it does not bear repetition in detail. The military road
was always a good one. The others were of no importance. There are caminos reales, king's highways, on
the maps of Cuba by the hundreds, but neither king
nor peasant could find them in actual travel. Where
not trails they are wagon-ruts which in the rainy season are entirely lost.  The real highway of internal
commerce and of agricultural intercourse is the calzada,
or macadamized road. When once constructed it resists
the changes of the seasons and is easily kept in repair.
Four of these calzadas lead out of Habana. The
longest one is 40 miles, and extends southeast to the
plains of Giiines, the market-garden of the city. The
shortest one runs south to the village of Managua, 15
miles away. The town of Pinar del Rio has a calzada connecting with its port, Coloma, 15 miles south.
Santiago has a few miles of good roads, and other
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cities have short calzadas, but there is no general
means of continuous communication in any section of
the island. When good roads furnish this system of
continuous communication, not only will an industrial
advance of one hundred years be made, but brigandage,
the commonest form of rural crime, will be destroyed.
Whether it be in railway construction, in road building, or in tilling the soil, the cost of labor is relatively
high in Cuba. The probability that it will continue
relatively high, especially agricultural labor, cannot be
argued away. But what is commonly lost sight of is
that the profits of capital are both relatively and absolutely high. Well-paid labor cannot be considered an
unhealthy industrial condition when well-remunerated
capital goes with it. Nor can it be looked upon as
a discouragement to investment in lands or in commercial and industrial enterprises. Sugar plantations for a
series of years paid 12 per cent on highly secured
loans, and were not depleted. The individual usurers
in the country districts drew their 18 per cent from the
farms of the neighborhood for long periods without the
opportunity of foreclosing on the land. It was too
much. It drew the life-blood from the small farmers,
but their endurance of it showed what the capabilities
of production were. In time agricultural banks will
come, and in displacing the individual usurer will be an
immense gain to the industrial life of the country.
The agricultural banks will not be established until
a stable government is beyond the sphere of experiment
and the old Spanish laws relating to debtor and creditor and mortgages are codified into a general banking
law. That may not be so far off. When it is reached,
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the country banks will be able to exact an annual interest of 8 per cent, while performing their functions of
loans and deposits in the community, without interfering with the prosperity of the people or becoming the
masters instead of the servants. I have made the statement of 8 per cent as a probable rate of interest from
a large number of individual calculations without going into the intricate details on which they are based.
Two crops a year on much of the land is one basis.
Americans hardly conceive of a community of 15,000
people, such as Giiines, engaged in varied and profitable forms of farming without a bank, or of the town of
Pinar del Rio, in the centre of the tobacco-raising country, without one. That is, however, true of these places
as of many others.
It does not seem to be an unwarranted assumption
that a country which can pay 8 per cent on banking
capital conservatively loaned in the rural regions can
pay fairly well for labor. Farm labor in Cuba is
usually accounted at $20 per month throughout the
year where the laborer finds his own "keep." On the
sugar plantations in the season of cutting and grinding
the cane it is accounted higher. The planters are
always willing to pay $1 per day, and hands are in
demand just as they are on American farms during the
harvest season. In talking with many planters, perhaps a majority will give the amount of $1 a day as
what they pay for nine months out of twelve; but the
average $20 per month is commonly accepted as the
basis for farm labor in Cuba.
Unskilled day labor on the streets and roads and on
public works generally may be said to command $1 a
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day also, though sometimes 80 cents is the maximum.
The day's labor begins at six in the morning and ends
at four in the afternoon, with an hour for breakfast,
making a day of nine hours. This, of course, does not
apply to the plantations, where work begins at sunrise.
Formerly the wages were paid in Spanish silver, which
was usually at a discount of 18 per cent from gold; but
the common necessities of life were also measured in
silver. Considering that the laborer in Cuba does not
have to lay up fuel for winter, that less clothing is required, and that all the means of existence are more
easily procured than in the temperate zones, it is clear
that $15 to $20 a month in the country and $25 in the
city is good pay. After the military occupation began,
American contractors who had contracts for public
improvements did not find it possible to secure labor
at cheaper figures. The laborers who were employed
directly by the military authorities received substantially the same. The dollar-a-day basis is not likely
to be materally modified under prospective conditions.
Artisans, railway employes, and skilled labor of whatever kind receive higher pay, the cigar-makers being
the best paid. But the development and the reconstruction of Cuba are in the land and in public improvements, so that unskilled labor in the mass is the real
basis for computing the cost.
In the industrial readjustment following the American occupation, a series of strikes occurred in Habana
and in other cities. These were cited as evidence that
American methods had been introduced, and that labor
disturbances were thenceforth to be expected as though
they were something new. Strikes may be looked for
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in the future of Cuba just as they may be looked for in
the United States; but they will not be a new development nor due to new institutions. They occurred under
Spanish dominion with all its rigor of military repression. The most determined of these strikes were by
the cigar-makers and by the stevedores, or longshoremen. There are numerous gremios, or trades-unions,
but the majority of them are benevolent and social
organizations.  Under the Spanish authority the
cigar-makers' unions were partly political conspiracies
against the Government and partly centres of theoretical socialism where collectivism and the collective labor
life were taught somewhat in the manner of the French
theorists. After the exit of the Spanish rulers the Socialist or Workingmen's political party was organized
in Habana with the avowed purpose of incorporating
socialist principles into the industrial and political government of the island. It gained vitality in Habana,
but did not spread to the other towns. The majority
of its members were from the cigar-makers' unions.
The movement did not give promise of becoming a formidable organization.
Most of the strikes after the American control was
assumed were based on demands for the scale of wages
which obtained before the insurrection, or for payment
in United States money or its equivalent.
It is unsafe to guess when the artificial monetary
conditions in Cuba will work into natural channels.
The only safe course for Americans who are making
investments or engaging in enterprises is to follow the
example of their Government and base their transactions on the money of the United States. A disloca231




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tion must come at some period when the inflated value
given the Spanish and the French gold coinage by decrees of the Spanish Government will cease. It served
the good end of keeping abundant gold in the island;
and though silver was in common use, the white metal
was a subsidiary coinage and always so recognized.
The amount of American money in circulation may
be estimated at the end of the first year with some
degree of accuracy. Then a judgment may be formed
of the time when the bankers who received deposits at
the inflated government value of Spanish and French
gold coinage will pay the deposits back in the equivalent of the American standard, and when the value of
debts incurred on the old basis can be computed in the
money of the United States. The requirement for the
payment of customs duties in American money or its
equivalent at a valuation which ignored the inflation of
the European coins, the disbursement of the expenses
of administration and of public improvements in American money, the distribution of the $3,000,000 to the
insurgent troops, the resumption of commerce with the
United States, the payments for the sugar crops-all
contributed to the one end of establishing a uniform currency of the American standard of value.
In the city and the province of Santiago it did not
take long for the American money to establish its supremacy. In Habana and throughout the island as a
whole the change was not so rapid. By all natural
laws Spanish silver ought to have depreciated, but
instead it appreciated. This was partly due to speculative manipulation and partly to a genuine need of the
silver in commercial transactions. But with the steady
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influx of United States currency in the circumstances
noted above, it is possible to foresee the disappearance
of the Spanish silver. When that happens the period
cannot be a long one until the Spanish and the French
gold pieces will circulate at parity with the money of
the United States on their bullion value.  Cautious
financiers who peer further into the future, and who
also take a glance backward, may see the shadow of an
irredeemable paper currency. They may recall that
the various Cuban constitutions adopted by the assemblies which met in the woods all provided for the issue
of paper money. But the shadow need not take the
outlines of spectre. There were mitigating circumstances for those revolutionary assemblies in devising
means of support for the insurrection.
With what has been said of commerce and internal
development, in conclusion it may be worth recalling
the primary formulas. Cuba will have no expenses of
sovereignty and no budget of a huge debt to maintain
out of her customs collections. The expenses of sovereignty were the burden with which the peninsula
broke the back of the island. The million dollars a
month from customs receipts which the present population seems capable of contributing will be so far in
excess of the expenses of administration that the bulk
of it may be devoted to internal and external improvements. If the ratio of increase in customs collections
does not keep pace with increasing population, it will
at least show a substantial growth. In the utter demoralization and impoverishment of the finances of the
provinces and municipalities the American authorities
applied a portion of the customs revenues to provincial




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and municipal purposes. That was a temporary measure. Ultimately it will be unnecessary.
The question will then be with regard to the applications of the customs revenues to island purposes, public improvements, and the like. They may be large
enough to discourage the laying of an internal impost
upon cigars, cigarrettes, and aguardiente.  Yet this
means of raising revenues is so easy and would be so
little felt by the consumer that it will hardly be overlooked. It is not in any sense a tax on agricultural
production as were the Spanish export duties. Looked
at in any light, the subject of revenue and taxation in
Cuba is a simple one. The matter of the purchasing
power of a bag of sugar and a bale of tobacco is not quite
so simple. In it are involved both the future commercial and the future political relations of the Cuban commonwealth to the United States.




CHAPTER XIII


RELIGION AS A WITHERED BRANCH
Reflections of a Spanish Captain-General-Scarcity of Native Priests
-Statistics of Shepherds and Their Flocks-Historical Review
of the Roman Catholic Church-A Part of the State-Provisions
for Its Support-Ecclesiastics Against Toleration and Civil Liberties-Freemasonry as a Foe-Sketch of the Institution-Conflicts with Authorities-Controversies with Champions of the
Church-A Protest Against Intolerance-State of Religion in
Cuba Summarized-Dregs of Spanish Priesthood-Popular Conception a Low One-Exaction of Birth and Burial Fees-Obstacles to Future Usefulness.
CAN the Roman Catholic Church in Cuba call again
the day that is past?   The dry branch withers.     The
living branch puts forth fresh leaves.
Half a century ago Don Jose Guiterrez de la Concha,
who had been twice Governor-General and        CaptainGeneral of the island, wrote his memoirs.    During his
term of office he studied the maladies which threatened
the life of the Spanish possessions in the Antilles.  In
1846 he found 458 ecclesiastics, cures, and sacristans
to administer to the spiritual needs of nearly 1,000,000
inhabitants.   Many    parishes were without priests.
The clerical households of the archbishop of Santiago
and the bishop of Habana were not included in this list,
as he was estimating the parish priests. Fifty years
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earlier Humboldt had incidentally noted, according to
Concha, that 1,500 ecclesiastics guided the spiritual
paths of 500,000 inhabitants.*
General Concha was impressed by the falling off in
the number of the parish priests. As became a devout
and reflective churchman he deplored it, and he analyzed the sources of the Church's decay. The lack of
interest on the part of the Government in Madrid he
criticised. One cause of the decay, he said, was the
indifference to the education of the clergy. An ignorant priesthood, was his pained comment. He urged
immediate and sweeping reforms which would insure
educated priests. He wanted the Government to look
specially to the welfare of the Church. The memoirwriting Captain-General also noted the paucity of Cuban priests. At that time the right of the native-born
inhabitants, or insulars, to share with the peninsulars
in administering the secular affairs of the island was
not admitted. To trust them with spiritual authority
was suggestive of sedition. Yet General Concha courageously gave this proscription of Cuban priests as one
of the causes of the low state into which the Church
had fallen. He wrote frankly and warningly of the bad
results of excluding the natives. He advocated an educated Cuban priesthood which would vitalize the Church
by keeping it in sympathy with the people. So far from
this course being dangerous to the authority of the
*The Paris edition of Humboldt's work, published in 1827, says
that the number of ecclesiastics did not exceed 1,100 according to
the official census which he had, but gives the number of churches as
224. He speaks of the clergy as neither numerous nor rieh, except
the bishop and the archbishop.
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mother country, he believed it would give the priests
the confidence of the people and would encourage loyalty. This was a plain hint that the Spanish shepherds were not trusted by their flocks.
Preceding and succeeding Captain-Generals might
have written memoirs, and might truly have said what
General Concha said about the state of the Church in
Cuba. Don Jose Garcia de Arboleya, a layman, writing a few years later, drew a more complacent picture.
He noted that in all the island there were 364 temples
or places of worship, of which 173 were hermitages and
oratories.  Ie recited that there were 41 parishes in
the jurisdiction of Santiago de Cuba, with 68 places
of worship and 128 parishes in the Habana diocese.
Each diocese had a conciliario, or theological seminary,
for the education of priests. In all he estimated 700
persons consecrated to the service of religion, including
the monks. As General Concha had not included the
monks in his estimate, it is probable that when Arboleya wrote there had been no increase in the number of
parish priests.
In 1864 the Government budget made provision for
106 cures and sacristans in the eastern diocese and for
244 in the western jurisdiction. At that time in Habana diocese the parish churches numbered 137, with
8 auxiliary chapters, 32 oratories and hermitages, 6
convents for monks, and 8 convents for nuns.  The
appropriation for maintaining the Church in the Santiago diocese was $186,000, and of that in Habana $345,000.  In 1872 the "Guide for Strangers" placed the
parish clergy, cures, coadjutors, and sacristans in the
Habana diocese at 240, and in the eastern diocese at
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75-a stationary condition in Habana and an apparent
decrease in Santiago.
General Francisco de Acosta y Albear, writing from
his estates in Spain during the closing years of the TenYears' war, enumerated the causes of the trouble in
Cuba. He had long been a resident of the island,
and was familiar with its internal affairs. One of the
causes of the trouble, he declared, was the lamentable
results of religious abuses. Religion in Cuba, he said,
was a myth. It was a useful agency to the political
party which secured its influence for national integrity,
but it was grossly abused. The parish priests, he declared, were models least of everything of the virtues
necessary for the good discharge of their sacred mission. The example of their bad conduct was demoralizing to people favorably disposed to religion. He
himself knew their exactions from personal experience,
they sometimes demanding four times the regular fees
for baptisms and burials. A concurrent cause in perverting the moral sense of the Cuban people, he said,
was the lack of religious belief.
In 1898, according to the official figures, there were
110 parish cures and sacristans in the diocese of Santiago and 216 in the diocese of Habana for whose support provision was made out of Government funds.
The amount set aside for the support of the Church
was $352,000. This was not a heavy draft out of peace
revenues which some years reached the total of $26,000,000, though it was more than was appropriated
for public education, that amount being $250,000. The
salaries of the parish priests were good, ranging from
$500 to $1,500. It is more than the majority of coun238




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try clerymen of Protestant denominations in the United
States receive, though they have families to support.
The budget figures three or four years earlier, at the
beginning of the insurrection, were substantially the
same. There were not as many church edifices devoted
to worship because some of them were barricaded and
turned into garrisons for the Spanish troops.
When Spanish sovereignty in the Antilles ceased, the
Pope designated the Very Reverend Archbishop Chapelle, of New Orleans, as apostolic delegate to Cuba
and Puerto Rico. Cuba, which had once formed part of
a diocese with Louisiana and the two Floridas, thus
again came into relationship with Louisiana. The
bull of Pope Leo X. in 1518 erected a bishopric in
hitherto unknown Cuba with the seat at Baracoa. A
Franciscan friar, Juan de Witte, of Flanders, was
named the first bishop, but he was not able to go to
Cuba to take possession of his mitre. By the pontifical bull of 1522 the seat of the diocese was transferred
to Santiago de Cuba. Other bishops were nominated,
but did not administer the diocese, and it was not until
1537 that the island enjoyed the presence of its bishop.
He was Miguel Ramariez de Salamanca, a Dominican
friar. His successor was a Carthusian monk, Friar
Diego Sarmiento, of Seville. Then there were a few
bishops who were not monks; after them the monks
again, mostly from Valladolid; and then prelates who
were natives of Mexico.
Don Jose Hechavarri, the first bishop of Habana,
was translated from Santiago. His diocese included
the Floridas, Louisiana, Cuba, and Jamaica. In 1788,
Cuba, having lost more than one-half of its jurisdic39




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tional territory, was assimilated to the political and
military territory. It was divided into two dioceses.'
In 1804 Santiago was created a metropolitan archiepiscopal diocese, which it remains to this day. Habana was made a suffragan bishopric of Santiago,
but each diocese served as a court of appeal from the
other. The geographical division was by a line running from coast to coast through the western section of
Puerto Principe province; so that Habana, while a
suffragan diocese, had the larger territorial area and
much the greater population and wealth.
The spiritual and temporal regimen of the Roman
Catholic Church in Cuba was embodied in the sinodo
diocesana, the synod celebrated in 1681 by Bishop Juan
Garcia de Palacios. This was approved by Royal
pragmatic, and with some modifications has since remained in force. Under Spanish dominion the ecclesiastical authorities were part of the State. The bishop
of Habana was a member of the Governor-General's
council. The ecclesiastical tribunals were respected,
and the ecclesiastics did not hesitate to oppose the secular authorities in insisting on the rights of the Church.
Both Santiago and Habana have cathedrals, with cathedral clergy and the privileges thereto appertaining.
Each has also a theological seminary for the education
of priests. Under Spanish rule the secular or temporal
head of the Church in Cuba was the Governor-General,
and as his delegate in the archbishopric of Santiago
the general commanding that military department. The
archbishop and the bishop were appointed by the Vatican on the nomination of the Madrid Government.
Arboleya, in the edition of his manual published
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forty years back, observes that the Church was poor,
especially in the archbishopric. The acts of worship
were celebrated with some pomp, although there were
no sumptuous processions. He thought the royal cedulas, issued a few years previously, would contribute
without doubt to the aggrandizement and decorum of
worship.  These royal cedulas fixed definitely the
charges of the Church and its ministers on the royal
treasury, and also fixed the salaries of the priests and
their assistants. A computation of income and efficiency was to be made every five years. If the income were in excess of the salary, the excess was to be
apportioned among the assistants and to the maintenance of the church edifice. If deficient, the deficit
was to be made up by the royal treasury. One-third
part of the canons, prebendaries, and sub-prebendaries
when vacated, were to be filled from parishes whose
cures had at least twenty years' service, reserving to the
dioceses of the peninsula a certain number of prebendaries and dignities in the capitularies of the two dioceses, or in the parishes in which they had options.
Arboleya gives an interesting list of the church fees,
and these were not greatly modified during subsequent
years. He also notes as one of the softening influences
of the Church on slavery that in addition to the 52
Sundays there were 20 church holidays on which the
obligation was to hear mass and not to work, so that
the slaves had actually 72 days of rest. The 20 church
holidays were known as the days of two crosses because
they were thus marked in the calendar. The days of
one cross on which it was obligatory to hear mass and
permissible to work numbered 22.
16              241




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With respect to civil reforms and to liberal political
movements, the Church in Cuba was what it was in
Spain-always reactionary.  Clerical intransigentism
became a phrase as common as political intransigentism. It opposed innovations. The Spanish conservatives in Cuba joined it in complaining that religious
toleration and free study encouraged the separatists and
fomented disaffection towards Spain. They, too, deplored what they called the vacuity of the religious
sense in the island; but they laid this to the concessions
and the tolerations that were granted. The statutes
protected the Roman Catholic Church as the state religion.  The penal code provided that those who in
offence of state religion broke or profaned objects sacred or devoted to worship should incur the penalty of
traision correctional. A similar penalty was applicable
to whomever made ridicule of the Roman Catholic
religion by word or writing, by publicly contemning
its dogmas, rites, and ceremonies. The Church opposed civil marriages. In defending in the Cortes the
toleration which the constitution of 1876 extended,
CAnovas, rigid churchman that he was, declared that
three hundred years of intolerance had so brought it
about that religious indifference was the distinctive
character of the Spanish society of the age. But the
clerical intransigentes would not have it so.
In Cuba as in Spain the Church was against freedom of worship. The religious toleration extended by
the Constitution of 1876 was promulgated in the Antilles several years later. It was confined within the
narrowest limits. The Baptist mission which was
established in Marianao, a suburb of Habana, by ap242




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pealing to the higher authorities secured the reversal
of a ruling by the alcalde who had held that public
religious services were within the restrictions of the law
of public meetings. By statute provisions, dissenting
sects were limited to precincts or places set apart for
them, and within those precincts were protected from
interference or disturbance by ordinary police regulations. The provision was not broad enough to have
covered the Salvation Army.  Under it the Baptist
mission was maintained in Habana, and a Protestant
cemetery under the same denomination was secured.
The Presbyterians had a small mission in Matanzas, and there were missions in two or three other
places of the island, but they never had a vigorous
growth.
The ecclesiastical influence was exerted strenuously
against the more liberal provision of the law which
permitted civil marriages. The Church combated this
in inception and in operation. As late as 1894 there
was a dispute between the bishopric and the civil authority regarding the certificates of baptism required in
order to contract civil marriages, and it was necessary
to issue a legal process against Juan Bautista Casas,
ecclesiastical governor of the diocese.
The Spanish ecclesiastics laid much of the irreligious
condition of Cuba to Freemasonary, ignoring the degree
to which their reactionary tendencies encouraged that
institution. Toleration they declared to be an evil to
the State, and toleration of Freemasonry they held was
an encouragement of a foe to the Church and to the
State. The history of this movement is worthy of a
brief review, and it comes as much within a chapter on
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the Roman Catholic Church as within an analysis of
the political side of Spanish dominion.
Freemasonry * was introduced in Cuba by the French
refugees from Santo Domingo in the first years of the
century. Lodges were formed by the immigrants who
established coffee plantations in Santiago province, and
also in the west in the country around Habana. Hostile public opinion growing out of Murat's attack on
Madrid in 1808, during the war between France and
Spain, caused the French colony to emigrate a second
time. Its members went to Louisiana, and with them
the lodges disappeared from Cuba. It was not until
ten years afterwards that lodges were again formed in
Cuba under charters from the grand lodge of Pennsylvania.  In the same period the grand oriente of
France authorized the founding of lodges in Cuba, and
the conferring of the thirty-two degrees of the Scottish
rite. A few years later the grand oriente Spanish
American Symbolical of the Island of Cuba placed
itself under the jurisdiction of the grand oriente of
Spain, but shortly afterwards declared its independence. A fusion was effected of the various lodges in
Cuba, and in 1822 they numbered 67. It was the
time of.political conspiracies and revolt from Spain by
the South American countries. The Captain-General
of Cuba, Francisco Vives, protected the masons, not
because he was one of them, but because by introducing
the official element into them he was able to check their
tendencies towards political treason. After his recall
Freemasonry came under the ban of the Spanish Government, and a dozen years later, through the vigorous
*' La Masoneria en la Isla de Cuba," Inza. Habana, 1891.
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prosecution of the aggressive Captain-General Tacon,
the masonic lodges disappeared from Cuba. A score
of years passed and they reappeared with the vigor of
a new growth.
When the cry of Yara portended the Ten-Years' war,
it was disclosed that some of the leading insurgents
were prominent masons. The lodges in Santiago de
Cuba were disrupted in consequence, and those of
Habana came within the suspicion of the authorities.
When one lodge was celebrating a memorial session the
police and an armed force of Volunteers surprised the
meeting and took fifty-two members prisoners. Those
who were Spanish subjects were kept in prison nearly
four months. They were finally released by direction
of the Madrid provisional Government, which was then
under the Presidency of General Prim, himself a mason.
The Spanish authorities in Cuba were in constant
dread of the lodges as centres of conspiracy. In the
closing year of the Ten-Years' war there was another
police descent on a lodge meeting in Habana, and two
hundred members were arrested while celebrating a
memorial session. Captain-General Jovellanos was a
mason. By his direction the members were paroled,
instead of being imprisoned; and though they were kept
under surveillance, no further consequences were visited
upon them. At all times the lodges had among them
officers of the army and Spanish civil officials. After
the peace of El Zanjon the lodges reunited and Freemasonry had a fresh growth. There were 60 lodges with
a total membership of 2,800. Three years later, more
than a score of new lodges had arisen, and the membership was 3,800. Ultimately it reached 7,000. What
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was known as the Law of Associations, promulgated in
1888, enabled the grand lodges and the subordinate
lodges to be registered as lawful societies. Nevertheless the Spanish authorities always feared them as
cloaking conspiracy.
At various periods the Cuban lodges had controversies among themselves and with the Spanish grand
oriente for attempted usurpation of authority. They
always resented this usurpation. When the masonic
fraternity of Spain split, the Cuban lodges celebrated
a mutual compact of recognition with the faction of Don
Praxades Sagasta, so often Prime Minister of Spain.
Though Cuba was a political dependency, a possession
of Spain, the Cuban lodges uniformly asserted that the
masonic confines did not run with the political confines.
The Cuban grand lodge regularly reaffirmed that it was
a masonic potency, free, independent, and sovereign.
Previous to the last insurrection, masonic newspapers
were published in Habana, and a school was maintained. The lodges ceased to exist to all public intents
and purposes during this insurrection. The large majority of their members were Cubans. This meant that
they were in sympathy, either actively or passively,
with the revolt. So prudence and the frown of the
authorities kept them from holding sessions. Moreover, most of the members were either in the field with
the insurgents or in exile. Some of the leading chiefs,
incuding Calixto Garcia, were Freemasons.
From this sketch of Freemasonry in Cuba the inference might be drawn that it was considered solely on
its political side. This would be incorrect. Its progress was opposed by the Church on twofold grounds,
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The main one was that it was a secret society, and
in contravention of the doctrines of the Church. The
other objection was that its tendency and even its aim
was to weaken the civil authority of which the Church
was the beneficiary and the bulwark. Clerical intransigentism opposed it as vigorously as did political intransigentism.
Following the revival which Freemasonry had in
Cuba after the peace of El Zanjon, a fierce dispute
raged over its tenets and its tendency. A notable controversy was carried on between the masonic writers
and Don Rafael de Rafael, the ablest Spanish editor of
the leading conservative paper. Rafael de Rafael was
a Catalan who believed that Freemasonry had initiated
and fomented the insurrection of Yara, and that its
object was the destruction of the Church and of Spanish sway. Its character, he sought to prove, was revolutionary alike towards established government and
established religion. Since in the Spanish dominions
the two fundamental institutions which served as a base
of society were religion and monarchy, he reasoned
that masonry was the special enemy of Spanish institutions. Other journals continued the controversy, which
lasted for several years; and the Church authorities
persistently opposed the progress of the society. But
with Premiers of Spain and Captain-Generals of Cuba
themselves Freemasons, it was not always easy to make
out that the fraternity was the enemy of the State and
of the State religion. Some Cubans of intelligence
joined the lodges as much as a protest against ecclesiastical intolerance as from fondness for the principles
of masonry.
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The fruitage of a century of Roman Catholicism in
Cuba bears a simple analysis in so far as it relates to
the spiritual welfare of the masses. It may be studied
without prejudice and without bias. All that is bad
that may be said of it has been said by those whose
faith it is. The state of religion in Cuba, if not retrogressive, was at least stationary, while the movement
of population was progressive. The parish clergy who
ministered to the spiritual needs of 1,600,000 people
were fewer by at least one-fourth than those who administered to 800,000 souls. Cuba, not being in partibus infidelium, was not the object of missionary zeal.
Its inhabitants were Catholics from the time the Conquistadores exterminated the native Indians and immigrants from the peninsula filled the void. The Africans
whom the good Las Casas thought it merciful to import into human servitude in order that the soil might
yield its fruitfulness also were converted, and in time
came within the pale of the faith.
With entire homogeneity of the language and predominant homogeneity of the Spanish race, the conversion of the inhabitants of Cuba was not an incentive
during this century that could be urged on zealots or
missionaries in the peninsula. The stream of faith
was allowed to grow sluggish and become a stagnant
pool. Perhaps the trouble was in the fountain from
which it was fed. The Catholic Church in Spain has
its rancorous critics, its sturdy champions, and its apologetic defenders. They may all bury their differences
in the acknowledgment of a craggy fact, and then dispute the cause. The Church in Cuba was not responsive to the aspirations of the inhabitants. Church and
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Crown were one. By its union with the State, the
Church became identified with the oppression and misgovernment of Spanish dominion Out of this condition came the refuse of the priesthood as ministers of
the spiritual wants. Often they were in ecclesiastical
exile from the peninsula because of offences which
forbade their exercising their sacred offices among the
people who knew their offences. Before the last insurrection, in the popular mind the Spanish priesthood in
Cuba as a class personified ignorance, cupidity, and
indifference to their holy office. This is a harsh judgment. It has been pronounced in calmness and sorrow
by Catholic observers.
The popular conception is shown in the theatres. In
the best of the plays the foibles of the cures or parish
clergy are received by cultivated audiences as suggestive of something grosser. In the low variety theatres
the grossness of the stago representation makes the
suggestion unnecessary. The escapades of the cures
are a stock subject. The nephews and nieces of the
priests are sometimes given in polite company their
rightful relationship. It does not need a moral essay
to show that these ideas would not prevail or would not
be tolerated if they were baseless. The slanders and
insinuations of the scoffer are ignored where holy living enforces the respect due to the holy office. A representation of Catholic priests or of Protestant clergymen such as finds favor in Habana would be flat and
dull to a depraved American audience because of their
consciousness of its falsity. In the Habana variety
theatres the sauce comes from the truthfulness of the
suggestion. It was the same in the vile literature.
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Americans are sometimes momentarily shocked when
they see a priest in his vestments sitting in a cafe; but
this is an exaggerated sentiment. For the priests to
smoke in public or to lounge in a cafe does not offend
the customs of the country or degrade religion. The
degradation comes from a deeper cause. A priest in
one of the suburbs was in the habit of gambling in
public with the Spanish officers. He invariably won.
One night the game broke up in a fight. The officers
accused the priest of cheating. In another village the
parish priest played regularly, and won the money of
the officers. Knowing his habits, the insurgents knew
when the officers were occupied and took advantage of
it. During the blockade of Habana by the American
fleet, public gambling was licensed and the license fees
used for the benefit of the poor. At one of the most
notorious places a priest in vestments nightly tempted
fortune at the roulette wheel. These were individual
instances of which the writer had personal knowledge.
The American military commanders, when they took
control, also had a chance to inform themselves. In
one of the most prominent towns the American general sent to his superiors a peremptory demand for the
bishop to remove the parish priest because he was a
drunken old vagabond.
Here is a portraiture of the Spanish priest in Cuba
painted by what may be called an unfriendly hand,*
yet it cannot be called the hand of an enemy of the
Church, for it is that of a native-born Cuban priest:
"Cuba, like all of Latin America, has been the refuge
of the Spanish clergy expelled from their dioceses, the
* "Veritas" in the newspaper El Grito de Yara, December, 1898.
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filon of ambitious prelates. Here they have come in
totality, least of all to preach the dogma, to make Catholic propaganda, to moralize. They have betrayed the
design of domination; for hope, they have substituted
lucre and usury; for charity, tyranny; the god of the
majority of priests has been the vile metal. In their
time of power they were not seeking to save souls or to
administer the sacraments, but to make money, to dominate, to collect dues. Not to educate, but to prostitute."
It is the general testimony that under Spanish rule
the Church fees for marriage, baptism, and burials were
mercilessly exacted. The people paid tribute from the
cradle to the grave. Some controversy occasionally is
heard in the United States about the abuses of the
priestly office and the exaction of these Church fees.
There could be no controversy in Cuba, where the fact
was one of prominent experience. Whoever wishes to
understand the feeling of the masses of the population
towards the Spanish priests because of these exactions
has only to select a given community and judge for himself. The good priests remitted or moderated the legally
authorized tithes; but the good priests were few. By
the majority of cures the parish was administered for its
commercial gain. The Church thus became the partner
in the abuses of the Spanish political system.
During the insurrection, in some parts of the island it
was the belief-a belief which remains to this day-that
the secrets of the confessional were betrayed to the
Spanish authorities, and that insurgents were sent to
their deaths from the altar. That belief may be baseless, yet its existence cannot be ignored. Of other acts,
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conjecture is not needed. Some Spanish priests, without sympathizing with the revolt, labored nobly to mitigate the horrors of Weyler's reconcentration. Others
were indifferent, and some abetted it and gloried in it.
The memory lingers in certain parishes of priests who
told their flocks that the enforced death of women and
children by starvation was the judgment of God because the husbands and fathers rose up against lawful
authority.  Physicians of Spanish blood honored an
honorable profession by their ministrations to the sick
and dying without thought of political passion. Too
often the spiritual physician was reproachful in his
ministrations. So the obstacles to the future usefulness of the Spanish clergy are clearly discernible.
They are gross ignorance and lack of the sympathy and
confidence of the Cuban people.




CHAPTER XIV


CUBAN PRIESTS THE LIVING BRANCH
Native-Born Clergy in Sympathy with Their People-PersecutionsMovement Against Spanish Bishop and Clergy-Manifesto of
Cuban Priests-Hint to Vatican Against Italian Intrigue-Demand for Ecclesiastical Home Rule-Pastorals of the Bishop of
Habana-Acceptance of the New Conditions-Jesuits' Adaptability-Appointment of Native-Born Archbishop in Santiago
Diocese-Alienation of People Not Permanent-Freemasonry
Not Virile in Opposition-Weakness of Religious Orders-Ungrounded Fears-Conservative Action of American Authorities
-Protestant Evangelization-A Religion of Deeds.
THE morning of promise which came to the island
when its political freedom was assured was not heralded by a sunburst of ecclesiastical rejoicing.  To the
mass of the Cuban people, the Church as it remained to
them was hateful.   It was identified with all that was
bad in the buried Spanish domination. If not hostile,
they were indifferent.   Yet the withered tree of the
Church has a fresh branch.   This is the Cuban clergy.
Through all periods and through all phases of Spanish
authority this small Cuban priesthood interpreted the
feelings of the people and was true to their aspirations.
With it rests the future of the Roman Catholic Church
in Cuba.
The Cuban priests came out from the shadows into
sunlight. Don Manuel Santander y Frutes, the Span253




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ish-born bishop of Habana, is credited with describing
them as mutinous and pugnacious. From the standpoint of superior ecclesiastical authority that may be a
proper designation of their defiant and aggressive stand
in these days. In the former period it would hardly
fit. The opportunity was lacking for them to be pugnacious and mutinous, but they were intensely and consistently patriotic in the Cuban national sense. They
were with their people in all the struggles for freedom.
For their national instincts they suffered contumely,
discrimination, ecclesiastical persecution and exile, poitical deportation to the penal settlements, and even
death by military execution.
The story of Padre Escambre is known to every Cuban priest. In the Ten-Years' war he blessed a flag
for the insurgents, and within twenty-four hours was
shot by the Spanish troops. Padre Luciano Santano
was present at a political meeting in Santa Clara.
Cespedes, its leading spirit, afterwards raised the banner of revolution. Padre Santano was taken to Habana
a prisoner and deported to Santo Domingo.   Padre
Yera, of Esperanza, in the province of Santa Clara,
blessed a Cuban flag. Hle was arrested, fined, and only
through the influence of the colonel of Volunteers who
arrested him was enabled to go into exile of his own
choice instead of to the penal settlements. The colonel of Volunteers had personal reasons for his course.
Eight priests were deported to Fernando Po. One of
them died on the voyage. It was charged that he had
been poisoned.
In the last insurrection no Cuban priest was subjected to military punishment, but some were driven
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into exile, and others were made to feel the superior
ecclesiastical displeasure. The few who had churches
were changed to other parishes. It was known that
some of the flags carried by insurgent troops-the flags
were not numerous-received the blessing of patriotic
priests, though their identity was not disclosed to the
ragged, bushwacking troops who carried them. In the
village of Artemisa, in the province of Habana, when
the church was occupied by Spanish soldiers, the priest
got arms and ammunitions past them in a coffin to the
insurgents. It is possible to suppose that this was
not the only instance of the kind. In known instances
the sacraments were administered to dying insurgents
when to visit them was governmental and ecclesiastical
peril. This encouragement of rebellion was contrary
to the teachings of the Church. It was sedition against
the Spain which sustained the Church. But it is over.
The revolution triumphed, and through it comes lawful
government not under Spain.
After the termination of Spanish rule in Habana and
the ending of the press censorship, articles on the relation of the Church to the new conditions began to appear in the newspapers. Some of the violent sheets,
which were demanding a boycott of everything Spanish,
named individual priests (Malos sotanas-evil robes)
whose removal was demanded because of their crimes
against the Cubans. Most of the articles were of a different character. Though acrid in tone, they were not
attacks on revealed religion nor on the Roman Catholic
Church. A sceptic or a free-thinker could not have
written them. They were in purpose and in substance
an attack on the Spanish priests in Cuba and on the
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bishop of Habana. They were also a notice to the
Vatican that something different was expected. Their
authors were known to be Cuban priests.
The essence of these articles was that religion, the
Roman Catholic religion, in Cuba had fallen into a low
state through the fault of its bad ministers who had corrupted the purity of doctrine and of discipline. The first
obstacle to the revival of Catholicism in Cuba was its
Spanish representatives. In peace the attitude of the
Spanish clerics had been to collect dues, live well, and to
mix iti politics. In war, to encourage the shooting of
Cubans, betray the confidences of the confessionals, and
to deny Christian burial to the reconcentrados and the
insurgents. The religious communities-the Jesuits, the
Dominicans, and the Franciscans-it was charged, had
followed in the rut. The Paulists were especially censured for their violent denunciation of the insurgents.
The persecutions of the Cuban clergy, both by the
civil and the military authorities, were made the basis
of a special indictment. Bishop Santander was bitterly assailed. The pastorals in which he abused the
Cubans for their patriotism were recalled and analyzed.
He had contributed $1,500 to the Spanish navy, had
encouraged converting the churches of God into barracks and garrisons. He should not try to seduce the
Cubans. Rather he should remember the pastorals in
which he calumniated them when he changed the frock
of the shepherd to the sword of war. He had done
nothing to alleviate the miseries of the reconcentration.
It had been stated that he did not approve of the principle of the reconcentration. Where was the evidence?
When he should have protested against it, he was shut
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up in his closet dreaming of Spanish victories. The
conclusion of all these articles was that the Spanish
clergy from the bishop down, having been identified
with the odious Spanish rule, and having made themselves odious champions of it, should go because
Spanish sovereignty had gone. The sons of the country should be called to represent the Church. It was
not possible for the Spanish priesthood to continue
directing the Cuban conscience.
Preceding this series of polemics appeared the manifesto of the Cuban clergy. It, too, furnished the text of
newspaper articles. In some of the journals the document was treated as apocryphal. It was not apocryphal. It was written by Cuban-born priests of the
Habana diocese.  Some authorized their signatures
directly, and some gave their adhesion to a general
statement, not caring in what language the utterances
were clothed. A very few of the Cuban priests disapproved of the doctrine. Several avowed to the author
of this volume that they indorsed it in every line.
From either the ecclesiastical or the political standpoint, this manifesto was a remarkable document. It
declared that divine Providence had made to shine
resplendent the inalienable right of the Cuban people
to liberty. Coincident with the establishment of the
Cuban republic would be necessary the rejection of a
foreign and a hostile clergy. Now was the time, the
manifesto insisted, for the Spanish clergy to renounce
spiritual sovereignty over a people not its people. The
same reasons that the Cuba people had for rising in
arms, the native clergy had for not wishing to be dependent on the Spanish clergy.  We, the most humble
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of the citizens who compose the little nucleus of the
suffering and persecuted clergy," said these things.
They reviewed the history of the struggle for Cuban
independence. The seminaries overflowed with Gallegos, Asturians, and peninsulars from other provinces
of Spain. Was it strange that the Cuban families
should dissuade their sons from the priestly calling
when to the priestly peninsulars were the roses and
violets and to the insulars the thorns?
The manifesto rejected energetically the idea of a
schism from the Roman Pontificate, but it was a bold
hint that Italian intrigue would not be tolerated. Respecting dogma, the Cuban priests feared nothing, because the canonical law permits dissidences with the
divine end that the Catholic clergy be advised. They
would obey faithfully the Pope because they were
persuaded that never a Roman Pontiff such as Leo
XIII. would impose upon a free people other clergy
and prelates than those which the sacred canons and
the sovereignty of that free people held respectivelythat is the duty of granting and the right of having.
In the actual circumstances the Cuban Church must
enter the new orbit of reorganization. The first step
was that the Spanish ecclesiastics should go. They
proposed that the spiritual administration should be
conducted by means of two delegates appointed to
organize and direct the Catholic Church in Habana
and Santiago de Cuba dioceses. These two delegates
should be chosen from priests of the native Cuban
clergy of recognized fitness, and indorsed by the most
conspicuous defenders of the liberty of the island, and
should not be members of the Spanish Catholic clergy,
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which always had been a political organization of the
Spanish Government, and which was greedy for spiritual domination in Cuba to compensate in a measure
for the lost temporal sovereignty, the one being as fatal
as the other.
The purpose of these Cuban priests was to impress
on the American authorities and on the Vatican the
right of the Cuban priesthood to the administration of
the Church in Cuba. Its aim was also to accentuate
the demand that the Spanish priests depart.  The
manifesto and the articles in the daily journals caused
a mild controversy. Some of the moderate Cuban
newspapers in an apologetic strain, while approving the
principle, deprecated the polemical and personal tone
in which it was couched. They eulogized the worthy
attitude of the Cuban clergy who did not subscribe to
the violent language. It appeared, nevertheless, that
the Cuban priests were in full accord on the capital
points of the manifesto. All the native clergy aspired
that the Catholic Church in Cuba should be as free and
as expansive as in the great American nation.
The manifesto was censured by the Spanish press for
its uncharitable and unchristian sentiments, and for
the contempt it showed for ecclesiastical authority even
to the degree of heresy. The Spanish papers also
pointed out that it was directly contrary to the political
doctrines of Mlximo Gomez and other insurgent chiefs
who were urging peace and concord among all classes,
Cubans and Spaniards, forgetfulness of the past and
union for the future. The Spanish priests as a body
made no answer. Silence was their best if not their
only defence.
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The bishop of Habana did not reply directly to
the contumacious Cuban clergy. His displeasure was
shown by mild rebukes in his pastoral letters, and by
his efforts to put them in the wrong before the American authorities. He appeared as a grieved prelate,
deprecating the violence and the uncharitableness of
his enemies.
What the Cuban priests said of the bishop's Spanish partisanship was true.  He had been the most
zealous of loyal Spaniards in combating the insurrection. When war with the United States was portending he made an Easter offering of the goods of the
Church, and during its continuance he exhorted his
flock to the lawfulness of resistance. Notwithstanding
the harsh judgment of the Cuban priests for his failure
to denounce the reconcentration, Bishop Santander was
generally credited with opposing the Weyler policy,
and with exerting himself to relieve the suffering it
caused. But his opposition to the Spanish military
authorities taking possession of church property, such
as hospitals and asylums, was credited with being more
pronounced than his exertions for the victims of enforced starvation. He accepted the American control
without question and counselled full obedience to it.
Although, he said in his pastoral letters, the heroic
flag of Spain had ceased to wave over the country she
civilized and evangalized, and though they would never
cease in their love and feeling for the mother country,
the will of the Lord should be fulfilled. This pastoral
letter was also conciliatory towards the Cubans and the
prospective Cuban Government. Afterwards the bishop
issued other pastorals reciting that the union of Church
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and State no longer existed, that consequently the
Church must be supported entirely by voluntary contributions from the faithful, and exhorting them to this
support.
The bishop's attitude towards the American authority was correct if not cordial. He was aggressive in
defending the property rights of the Church, and his
protests were prompt and vigorous when the first suggestion was made of the municipalities taking control of
the cemeteries. He steadily opposed all changes looking to lessening the privileges and perquisites of the
Church in fees. Naturally he was against broadening
the law of civil marriages. Distrust of American influence was shown in one of his pastorals which guardedly
warned his flocks against educational movements outside the Church.
The bearing of the Spanish priests towards the United States authorities was sullen, but not defiant and
meddlesome, as in Puerto Rico. They realized their
helplessness. A few whose bitterness towards the Cubans had made their positions unbearable took the first
opportunity to leave their parishes, but the majority
preferred to remain and trust to the bishop to make
provision for them. The religious orders, with one or
two exceptions, were distrustful of the American influence and of prospective Cuban control. The Jesuits
showed their traditional acuteness and adaptability.
When General G6mez emerged from the woods and
made his journey to Habana, the Jesuit priests were
among the first to visit him and receive his words of
encouragement that religion was necessary to the State.
When there was hesitation in Habana and its suburbs
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by the Spanish colony to receive the American flag, the
Jesuits promptly raised the stars and stripes in welcome of the new authority.
The Habana diocese forms so important a part ecclesiastically of Cuba and its relation to the United States
is so close that it has been taken as a mirror of the
Roman Catholic Church in the island. This is correct,
for the conditions were not dissimilar in the archbishopric of Santiago de Cuba, and the tendencies and the
influences there were the same. Nevertheless the eastern diocese is worth a word by itself. Notwithstanding that it was a superior diocese ecclesiastically, less
was known of the Santiago jurisdiction because of its
isolation geographically and its feebleness in comparative wealth and population. Though the Spanish predominance was maintained, this was less pronounced
because in the intensely Cuban provinces of Santiago
and Puerto Principe it was impossible for the Church
to be so thoroughly out of sympathy with the people
and retain any hold on them.   When the Spanish
authorities were making their last and desperate attempt to save Spanish sovereignty by proffering the
insurgents further propositions for amplified autonomy,
one of these propositions was that the archbishop of
Santiago de Cuba should always be Cuban-born.
The archbishop of Santiago de Cuba, when the revolution broke out, deplored it as a fratricidal struggle.
If not in direct condemnation of the Weyler policy of
reconcentration, his voice at least was raised frequently
deploring the results and pointing out the unmerited
suffering of the innocent classes. When the American
army lay in the trenches before Santiago, after the
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heights of El Caney and San Juan had been taken, his
message was the first one which went to Madrid invoking the surrender of the city in the name of humanity.
The feeling among the Cuban priests of the Santiago
diocese does not seem to have been friendly, though it
may not have been so intense as among the priests in
the Habana diocese against the bishop. The Santiago
journals began to publish articles calling for a change.
The archbishop was defended mildly by some of the
priests, yet it was apparent they would not be content
with a Spanish ecclesiastic as their superior authority.
Archbishop Saenz himself was too intense a Spaniard
to remain under American administration and in the
face of Cuban opposition. He returned to Spain. On
the suggestion of Archbishop Chapelle as apostolic delegate, the Vatican named the Rev. Francisco de Barnada,
a native-born Cuban priest, for the vacant diocese. This
was the first step of Rome towards putting the Church
in Cuba in harmony with the new conditions. After a
struggle of nearly a year the bishop of Habana also resigned. The Cuban priests charged that in resigning
he sought to perpetuate his influence by persuading the
Vatican to name his own choice for a successor.
The extent to which the Cuban people have fallen
away from the Church is recognized by American Catholics. Whether it is a permanent alienation must be
determined by events. The author's opinion is that
the alienation is not permanent. The Cuban women
were all violent revolutionists. They lost their confidence in the Spanish priesthood even as an impure vessel which might hold the crystal water of the pure faith
without corrupting it. Yet they did not lose the faith.
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It is rare to enter a Cuban household and not find a
crucifix, a print or a picture of the Virgin Mary on the
wall. During the bitterest period of the insurrection,
in the families of Cubans it was not uncommon to hear
from the men the remark, "Our women are not, like
us, free-thinkers. They do not go to church, but they
pray in the morning and they pray at night." The
rosary in their hands would frequently witness the
truth of this saying. The humble colored women, sometimes of the outcast classes, keep the tapers burning in oil to mark their saints' days. On the church
holidays or celebrations, throngs of these black women
may be seen gathered at the sanctuary, awe-struck and
devout. Their devotion is mingled with superstition,
it may be removed only a degree from fetichism, but to
the zealous churchman it is a basis of belief, and it is
infinitely more hopeful than indifferentism.
The lack of faith has sometimes been cited as evidenced by the poor attendance at the churches. Observation does not support this assumption. At the early
morning mass at any of the churches of Habana or of
any of the larger towns, or at the later services, attendants are not lacking. The churches are usually well
filled with worshippers. The absence of men may be
noted, and it may be said that the services are more a
social reunion than a devotional exercise; but the same
thing is said with equal truth of both Protestant and
Catholic congregations in American cities. After the
American military occupation began, in some places the
parish priests blessed the Cuban flags anew. In the
village of Jaruco, Te Deum was chanted in the Church.
At Alquizar mass was said on the anniversary of the
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death of Maceo. In Santiago de Cuba mass was also
said as in other towns. When G6mez entered Habana
on the fourth anniversary of the insurrection, three Cuban priests rode with him.
The intellectual life of the island has been variously
described as agnostic, infidel, and free-thinking. A
majority of the men call themselves free-thinkers to
describe their mental attitude rather towards the Catholic Church than towards religion. They revel in the
philosophy of Herbert Spencer; but speculative political philosophy has more attractions for them than speculative theology. The influence of Freemasonry is not
likely to be a serious bar to the efforts of the Church
to regain the confidence of the people. The institution
has not shown great vitality since the change in political conditions.  Unquestionably its secret character
drew to it many Cuban patriots who saw in it the
means for furthering their aspirations for independence. That inducement no longer exists. Without the
stimulus likewise of prosecution and opposition the
probability is that Freemasonry in Cuba will not be a
potent factor outside of its social features. While it
will remain under the condemnation of the Church, the
antagonism is not likely to be strong. The Cuban
priests in their national aspirations sympathized with
it, and their condemnation of its members was lenient.
This leniency may distress the superior ecclesiastical
authorities, but it will continue during the lifetime of
this generation of Cuban priests.
The religious orders were stronger in Cuba in the
earlier eras than in the later days. The nominations
of the monks as bishops was proof of this fact. Their
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powers waned and rose in the Antilles with the varying fortunes of the religious orders in the peninsula.
Dominicans and Franciscans got the strongest foothold. It was the church of the San Franciscans that
was profaned by English military occupation in 1762,
and thereafter was given over to the secular business of
the customs service. The convent of the Dominicans
became the property of the university of Habana when
that institution was secularized in 1837. Forty years
ago there were sixteen convents for monks, and five for
nuns in the diocese of Habana, with seven or eight in
the jurisdiction of Santiago de Cuba. In Habana there
were the monks of Santo Domingo, San Francisco de
Asis, la Merced, San Augustine, San Felipe, San Juan
de Dios, San Lazaro, Jesuitas, and Escolapias.  The
nunneries were of Santa Clara, Santa Catalina, Santa
Teresa, and two of Santa Ursulina.
At present there are eight religious congregations in
I-abana and vicinity —those of San Felipe, San Francisco, Santo Domingo, San Isidor, Mission of St. Paul,
Escolapians, and Jesuits. The mission of the two latter orders is declared to be especially for the instruction of youth. The Jesuit college of Belen in Habana
has been honored by the astronomical discoveries of
Father Vifiez, who has contributed his share to higher
education. The Jesuits also have a college in Sancti
Spiritus. The Escolapians have schools in Guanabacoa near Habana, and in Puerto Principe. Yet it cannot be said as a whole that the religious orders have
done much for public education in Cuba.
The convents of nuns include the Urbanistas of the
Franciscan order, Santa Clara, Santa Catalina, the
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cloistered Carmelites, and the Ursulines. The Sisters
of Charity have charge of various hospitals and charitable institutions in all parts of the island. At various
times there has been an agitation against the ecclesiastical authorities for keeping the cloistered nuns as prisoners shut up against their will. All the religious
orders have property, but the title to some of it will
have to be settled by legal process. The formal title to
the convent of Belen was conveyed to the Jesuits by
the Spanish authorities after the signing of the protocol.
Scandal was thereby caused, though the procedure was
alleged to be simply recording the title which already
existed. All the religious orders showed antagonism to
the establishment of societies from the United States.
Nevertheless, in Habana, the Augustine Brothers established a chapel where services are conducted in
English.
Roman Catholic prelates in Cuba and elsewhere were
fearful after the war lest there should be hostile legislation and confiscation of church property if an independent Cuban government were established. The dispute
over the title to church property shows a possible
ground for this belief. It may be as well that this
question is to be settled by judicial process during the
American control. The other fears were born of the
temporary resentment of the hour, and took no account
of the restraining influence of the Cuban priests. A
few individuals in what was called the intellectual element of the Cubans talked of a philosophical state
without religion, but their talk was the empty echo of
French reading. One of the assemblies in the woods
which adopted a constitution for the Cuban republic
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included a provision making civil marriages alone valid;
but this came from the freshness of the memory of
the Church's opposition to legalizing civil marriages.
Such a provision could not secure support in a regularly constituted assembly legislating for the island.
Whenever a Cuban congress comes to be chosen and
enacts laws for the commonwealth, it will unquestionably exercise the complete divorcement of Church and
State. There is no danger of it going further than this,
and enacting proscriptive legislation against any creed
or sect.
From the outset the attitude of the American authority was clear. The union of Church and State ended
with the end of Spanish sovereignty. None of the revenues collected by the American Government could be
applied to the support of the Catholic clergy or of any
religious sect. The Church holidays were not recognized as State holidays, though in deference to longestablished custom on some of these days official business was not transacted. Absolute freedom of worship
was guaranteed the same as in the United States. The
assurance was given that the property rights of Roman
Catholics would be protected, and this assurance was
broad enough to quiet all fears.  Disputed titles to
property, such as the Jesuit church of Belen, were left
for future judicial adjudication. No other course was
open. The American authorities on the one hand could
not afford to confiscate church holdings, nor on the
other hand could they confirm a clouded title and
possibly rob the municipality of its vested interests.
The most delicate question was that of the cemeteries.
The popular resentment against the Church for its
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monopoly of the burial of the dead was strong. This
Church ownership of the cemeteries and the resultant
abuses were among the causes which weakened its hold
on the people. The municipalities in various places
declared for the right of free burial, and proposed to
make the cemeteries free regardless of assumed property rights of the Church. The American authorities
could only decree that where the complete ownership of
the municipality was clear, the burial grounds should
be free; where the title was plainly in the Church, it
should so remain, and subject only to Church regulations. Where it was held in joint ownership or was in
dispute the respective rights should be left to judicial
process. Where the municipalities had taken possession of the cemeteries before the American occupation,
that action was allowed to stand subject to judicial
action. In time all the towns and villages of Cuba will
have free burial grounds.
The embarrassment which the Roman Catholic
Church will meet will be in its stand on popular education. Under the American authority what could be
done towards establishing a school system on the basis
of the former Spanish system was done, and in the
teaching religion is ignored. In a country whose inhabitants are at least nominally Roman Catholics this
may be called an unjust course; yet the American
authority in assuring religious freedom could not do
otherwise. The reversal of this policy may be sought
by the Catholic Church when Cuba comes to manage its
own affairs, but nothing is more improbable. A legislative assembly may have a majority of members who
are devout churchmen, but they are not likely to make
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provision for religious instruction in the schools. The
popular mind is firmly, irrevocably fixed on keeping
the schools apart from the Church. The religious instruction of the Cuban youth must be within the portals
of the temples and within the homes.
Protestantism was quick to seize upon free Cuba as a
promising field of evangelization. Under the old control the discouragement and the obstacles were too
great. After the signing of the protocol, even before the
American occupation began, Habana was invaded by
the apostles of rancorous and sensational theology. A
brief experience was enough to show that the little headway which Protestantism had gained would be lost by
this kind of propaganda. It received no encouragement
from those who Lhad sought to inculcate a faith other
than the common one, and it fell from its own weakness.
The people might not hold the Catholic creed in venerated affection. At least they were not ready to accept
a gospel which reviled what religious instincts they did
possess. After this experiment came the more earnest
effort of the various Protestant denominations, several
of which established chapels in Habana and missions in
other towns.
Protestant ministers travelled over the island studying the prospects. They could not fail to see that the
field for evangelization was a vast one. Some acquired
the grotesque misinformation which is common in superficial observation made to carry out preconceived
notions. The majority laid hold of the cardinal fact
that the religion which would make progress in Cuba
must be the religion of deeds. They showed the
strength of Protestant evangelical work in their organi270




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zation for the relief of the suffering population and for
the support of orphan asylums and hospitals. They
also grasped the depth of the popular feeling against
the Roman Catholic Church for its taxes on birth and
death, and their first promise was free burial grounds.
The utterance of a young Cuban, "Protestantism cannot be bad, because they baptize you free and they bury
you free," was the keynote with which they sought to
reach the conscience of the masses.
Both Spanish prelates and American ecclesiastics were
averse to the idea of Protestant evangelization of Cuba.
The bishop of Habana, in his pastoral accepting American authority, said that those who were happy in the
thought that the Church would lose its influence and
be vanquished by the Protestants had no cause to be
happy at such a thought. It is certain that the various
evangelical denominations will not withdraw from the
work upon which they have entered. There is no occasion for a conflict of creeds in Cuba. The majority
of people will be as in other Latin American countries
at least nominally Catholics. If the liberal policy of
the apostolic delegate succeeds in making them genuine
Catholics, the incentive furnished by evangelical Protestantism may be credited with a share in the work.
The Cuban clergy will not be content until the Cuban
parochial priests are the custodians of the Cuban conscience. They will also insist on lessening the Spanish
influence in the religious orders. It is doubtful whether
either Protestant missionaries or Roman Catholic ecclesiastics from the United States appreciate the thoroughness of this movement or the degree to which it may
be invoked in winning the masses back to the Church,
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In the lapse of years, when this national instinct has
worked its mission, immigration from Spain may bring
Spanish shepherds with the flocks from the peninsula,
and the history of the French in Canada in their devotion to the faith may be repeated. But that is not of
the present day.




CHAPTER XV


MANNERS AND MORALS
ingenuous Social Life-Reserve Towards Strangers-Immemorial
Customs and Habits-Grosser Amusements-Bull-Fight and
Lottery Disappearing Institutions-Gambling as a National
Trait-Geography and Climate-Statistics of Illegitimacy Not a
Criterion-Unmorality and Immorality-Habana as an Antillian
Paris-Vice on Exhibition for Visitors-State Regulation of
Prostitution-System Accepted by American Military Officials
-Recruits for Iniquity from Abroad-Causes of Social Demoralization Traced-Disproportionate Number of Males-Change
for Better in Social State —Habana Not a Moral Mirror of the
Whole Island-Healthful Influences.
POLITICAL institutions reflect the character of social
institutions.  No government in the       border   tropics
which seeks to place itself above and beyond the customs and habits of the people can succeed. How far
immemorial usages are to be deemed a reflex of the
moral station is not worth stopping to discuss. The
manners and customs and the amusements are all mirrors of Latin traits. Naturally the climate has something to do with them.
Much of the social life is in the open air. Cubans
and Spaniards are indifferent to the scrutiny of their
neighbors. There is an unconsciousness, even a naivete, about their methods of living. It might be said
that they live in public. The courtyards of their
18                 273




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houses, the rooms opening directly on the street, make
it so. Publicity is not annoying because nobody is curious about that which can be seen so readily. Family groups at the open windows are indifferent to the
passers-by. In the evening, when the heat of the day
is past, it is customary to leave the house for the
plaza or park where the band is playing. A stroll of
an hour or two, a meeting with friends, the interchange
of little gossip among the women make these evening
strolls in reality social reunions. There is also the
theatre to attend, and half an hour in a cafe with all the
members of the family, and then the return home.
Because of this habit of recreation in public and of the
groups in the cafes, impressionist American observers
form their conclusions of the lack of home life among
Cubans and Spaniards. Nothing could be more misleading. The custom is in itself a tribute to the moderation and temperance among all classes which is so
general as to be almost universal. The climate helps
to enforce temperance; but the simplicity of the social
diversions, the innocence of the recreations, could not
exist among a people predisposed to grossness.
Cuban social life has lost some of its reserve, but it
does not yet conform to American notions. The visitor
from tthe United States does not readily understand
why the men whom he meets in business affairs or in
official intercourse do not invite him to their homes.
At the balls or dances which he attends as a guest the
constraint shown by the sexes appears stiff and unnecessary.  Some of the older usages are disappearing.
After the return of the Cuban families which had been
in exile in the States, the women began to appear in the
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streets and in the shops without being accompanied by
the duenna whose presence had always been considered indispensable. They also showed their independence of other customs with which previously they had
been hedged. These innovations may all come without a real change in the social usages. It will be a long
time before the visiting stranger will be received into
the families of his Cuban friends with the same freedom that he meets with in the United States. More
than the crust of reserve has to be broken. Cuban hospitality is a proverb, but it is hospitality after the
manner of a Latin country. Until he is on more familiar terms it is well for the American not to judge too
confidently of the family life of which he is ignorant.
Manners do undergo a change and not always for the
better. American brusqueness has already modified
the politeness which was always met with in public, in
the cafes, the theatres, and the tramways. It was perhaps superficial, and there may have been too much
servility for the independent and self-asserting native
of the North. Yet the habit of being courteous should
not be too readily accepted as a mark of an inferior
civilization.
The amusements of the Latin races do not always
conform to American ideas. It is to be said for the
Cubans that in spite of the sombreness of their political
history they do not take their amusements sadly. The
rural diversions are both simple and joyous. Music is
the soul of these diversions. The serenade is the popular form. The calendar of Church holidays, feast days,
is a full one.  Its length sometimes appalls the employer of labor, The people are always ready to ob275




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serve the calendar not so much in the devotional frame
of mind as in the holiday spirit.
The robust and grosser sports are to be considered.
There is the cocking main. This is not a noble sport,
but it is distinctively a Cuban one. Nor is it the
amusement of the lower classes alone. The neat latticed structure in the form of an amphitheatre which is
seen on the outskirts of many of the villages is the cockpit. A similar structure is found on private estates.
In the country the amusement is a favorite one. Its
final disappearance is not of the immediate future.
The most that can be expected for a time is that the
Cubans who have been decrying the sport as a brutal
and degrading one will find greater encouragement in
their efforts to banish it. A Captain-General of Cuba
once kept a cock-pit in the courtyard of his official residence. Another Captain-General declared that game
roosters made it easy to rule the Cuban people. The
Spanish authorities licensed and encouraged matching
the game roosters because of the revenue it brought the
Government. This knowledge, among the Cubans who
were bitterest in their opposition to Spanish rule, is a
moral argument which has greater weight in banishing
the amusement than its brutality.
It was a question of many observers who judged from
the South American countries whether when Spanish
sovereignty was gone the bull-fight and the lottery
would also go. In Cuba, so far as this generation is
concerned, the answer is clearly foreshadowed. The
bull-fight and the lottery were part of the Spanish institutions against which the fiercest resentment was
shown. Educated Cubans charged that they were
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maintained by the Government for the purpose of debauching the moral sense of the people. By one who
has not lived in the midst of them the intensity of this
feeling would not be understood. It was strong enough
to give assurance that these institutions once gone
would not be revived without determined resistance.
Moreover, the bull-fight was the especial sport of the
Spaniards. The majority of its patrons were always
from their ranks.
The lottery was a more subtle evil. Its existence was
among a people who are declared to be gamblers by
nature. That both Cubans and Spaniards are inordinately addicted to gaming there can be no denial. How
far the Government was responsible for encouraging this
instinct by maintaining the great gambling scheme of
the lottery as a State institution may be a matter of
individual opinion. Outside of this, the Spanish laws
against gambling were very severe-quite as severe as
the statutes and the police regulations in the United
States. When the Spanish lottery fell, the mass of the
people, though they had been in the habit of buying
the tickets regularly, did not seem to miss it. Some
surreptitious schemes of lottery drawing found their
way into the island-just as similar schemes existed
in the United States after the Louisiana lottery was
driven out. But they did not secure patrons in the
overwhelming numbers that would justify the belief that
the people could not get along without the drawings.
The time since the stain of the lottery was on the
escutcheon of the United States, the agitation which
was necessary in order to secure the passage of an act
of Congress outlawing it from the mails, are so recent
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that it hardly lies in the mouth of Americans to be too
critical of the Latin toleration. They will find to-day
a pronounced public sentiment against the lottery which
promises to continue strong enough to prevent it getting a foothold under whatever form of government prevails. And in any given community in Cuba quite as
strong a feeling will be found against gambling and
quite as urgent a demand on the authorities to enforce
the laws as exist in any given community in the
United States. This does not mean that gambling will
be eradicated. It does mean that it may be lessened
among a people who recognize that it is detrimental to
their own welfare and demoralizing to their morals.
These questions of manners, customs, and amusements have a bearing on the relation of the social institutions to the political institutions, yet they are not
the core. That is one of usages and habits in their
effect on the morality of the people and their capacity
for maintaining good government. Public morality is
the closed book of Spanish rule. Though never practised in the past, it is compatible with representative
government in the tropics. But what of private morals? Cuba comes within the geographical zone of supposed contamination. The state of civilization has
been represented as one of gross immorality.
It is proper to inquire how far this impression is
correct, and what is the actual and the prospective state
of morality among this people crossing the threshold
of nationality. After that comes the inquiry into relative morals, into the causes that have produced the present conditions and whether they are ineradicable. That
is to say, whether the morals of the border tropics are
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a temporary condition, or a fact of geography and climate, a natural rampart of vice and incapacity for good
government which can be neither scaled nor beaten
down. These might be considered subjects for the
closet rather than for open discussion, but unfortunately they cannot be settled in the closet. In making
the inquiry I do not propose to take the statistics of illegitimacy as the premises of any conclusion. The reason is that they do not furnish the basis from which
just conclusions can be drawn.
Illegitimacy is not confined to the tropics, and is not
a product of the tropics. Acrid religious controversy
may grow out of the discussions over Protestantism and
Catholicism, or over the relative vice of the Anglo-Saxon
as shown in London or of the Latin as shown in the
rural regions of other countries. But on its theological
side Cuba may cite Jamaica with an annual birth-rate
of 76 per cent of illegitimates, and Habana may be compared with a dozen other cities. And if the religious
instincts of the American people are done violence to
through this apparent indifference to the sanctity of
the marriage rite, they may find sober thought in their
own statistics of divorce. If the statistics of illegitimacy are their basis for measuring the capabilities of
the tropical Antilles for self-goverment, why may not
statistics of divorce be taken as a proper means of determining the standard of American civilization? Who
shall take the measurements? The state of unmorality
in Cuba is deplorable, but this is not immorality nor
the immoral basis of a commonwealth.
Habana is the Paris of the West Indies. Its immorality is worn on the sleeve. The American visitor may
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learn more of its vices in a week than he has known of
the dark shadows of his home city in a lifetime. He
may go without apology or without disguising his
identity to one of the public balls during the carnival
season. When he encounters there acquaintances whom
he has met in other spheres he need not be shamefaced,
and seek to explain that he is observing the customs
of the country. No explanation will be expected. He
may attend social functions of the best society, and
wonder at the insouciance of the refined ladies who
dance what he is told is the Cuban national dance. If
his mind is prurient he may dwell on its possibilities;
but this impression will not continue after his familiarity becomes more extended. The Cuban dance will
fade away as the waltz and schottische fade away.
At the public ball he may see the national dance exaggerated and vulgarized in a manner that the good
women whom he met at the social function do not know
to be possible. The probabilities are very great that
he will see nothing more; and the hours will wear away
into the gray morning to the thrumming of the music
without variation and the monotonous motion of the
dance without other incident. His desire for some
excitement is almost sure to be disappointed. At the
variety theatres of the lower order his experience will
be more varied. The stage indecencies may be more
pronounced than may be seen in the low variety theatres of the large cities in the United States, but this is
doubtful. Much of the performance will be dependent
upon an intimate knowledge of the Spanish language,
its colloquialisms and the double meaning which can be
given to so many of its words.
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The traveller may look twice at the comely, graceful
woman with the chocolate complexion who passes the
hotel or the cafe where he is seated. He may assume
that he is in Savannah or New Orleans. He may wonder if it is the eternal doom of the mulatto to be declass4e, and if she is to know no other fate. If he has
the opportunity to study the social life of the middle
classes fully, he will learn that the struggle against this
fate is going on, and that the mulatto race is not accepting the decree. But he will not know this in the beginning. The visitor will not see the strange women in the
street as he may see them in Chicago or New York.
But they will peer at him from the windows and the
doorways of their habitations, and will resent his refusal of their hospitality. Their trade is the open trade
of Ithe outcast everywhere. It is lawful. The State
recognizes it.
The visitor may read in the newspapers municipal
orders about the location and other regulations for the
houses of tolerancy. He will probably be told that
the indifference to their home surroundings is one of
the characteristics of this branch of the Latin race, and
that their lack of morality is shown in their toleration
of neighborhood surroundings of that kind. It is true
that the Spaniard or the Cuban builds his residence for
himself and not for the outside world. Its exterior
gives little idea of the interior, and this sometimes
causes the fine house to be near a foundry, a shop, or
something not so harmless. Yet the visitor who reads
the newspapers will find constant complaints against
the authorities for permitting the houses of tolerancy to
go beyond their prescribed limits and invade respect281




TO-MORROW IN CUBA


able neighborhoods. This assuredly does not indicate
a lack of moral sensibility. Being recognized by the
State, they have their metes and bounds laid down by
official orders, and the protests against their overlapping
the bounds are usually numerous enough and emphatic
enough to impress upon the authorities the enforcement
of the regulations.
If the curiosity of the visitor develops into legitimate
inquiry, he may glean knowledge that will unsettle
previous opinions. He will find a complete code of
civil regulations for prostitution enforced by special
police and re-enforced by medical inspectors. He will
learn of the system of license fees, and will not fail to
hear of the horrible abuses which grew out of that system under the Spanish administration. In comparison
with these abuses, police blackmail of the unfortunate
classes in American cities becomes a luminous spot in
this dark shadow. The American military authorities
accepted the system as they found it, which was as a
measure of hygiene and not of reformation. Some of
them approved the principle of licensing the social evil,
but they would have preferred a different practice.
Others indorsed it both as a general measure and for
the special protection of the soldiers. Under military
administration the enforcement of the regulations was
rigid, but no effort was made to give them other than a
hygienic character.
Some phases of the subject are better fitted to a chapter on medical sociology than for popular information;
but the system in so far as legalizing immorality is
concerned is not different from that of other countries
which adopt the same principle. Neither this official
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recognition of the social evil nor the abuses in connection with its regulation are chargeable to the morals
of the tropics. Moreover, notwithstanding the toleration of public sentiment, State licensing was at all times
opposed by a part of the community. Vicious practices in the United States might be exhibited in their
deformity because the American military authorities
enforced the license system for the protection of their
troops with the same justice as to set forth its existence
as evidence of a low condition of morals in Cuba.
But the stranger may learn other things. He may
meet many persons who will tell him that it is hopeless
to expect a pure home life; that the mixture of races
forbids; that the climate produces social demoralization,
and that climate cannot be conquered. He may follow
his inquiry into all the haunts of vice, and come to learn
that Habana is a port where vessels from the four
quarters of the world drop anchor. He will learn that
the toleration which is everywhere extended to sailors
ashore is not denied in Habana. With these sailors'
resorts and with its Chinese quarters, this Paris of the
Antilles is also the San Francisco of the West Indies.
Do all these things indicate that the blood of this people is hopelessly corrupt? Or are they the excrescences
which grow luxurious like all growths of the tropics,
but which may yet be rooted out? Not rooted out
entirely. The social vices do not have the germs frozen
in the temperate climates; they are not even chilled in
the border tropics.
The austere moralist may look upon it as a hopeless,
almost incurable, condition of depravity. The cynical
man of the world is a better judge. He will not be apt
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to condemn without knowledge of other cities than Habana, nor will he accept unreservedly the verdict of the
Habana residents regarding themselves. Probably the
man of the world knows that the recruits for iniquity
are not furnished by Cuban homes. He may know
something of imported immorality-that more than 50
per cent of the outcast classes come from Mexico, from
the Canaries, and from the peninsula. If he were in
Cuba during the insurrection, he will know that misery
did not conquer chastity. He may see hope for the
future among a people where wives do not refuse the
office of maternity. He may be cynical over the tolerance which permits the knowledge of male infidelity,
but he will not fail to pay an honest tribute to the domestic life which withdraws the wife and mother from
the social sphere and centres her life in the rearing of
children. It narrows her intellectual horizon, but it
enlarges her usefulness in the domestic circle.
The casual visitor may not understand this state
of tolerant morals for the men. Its existence may
strengthen his conviction that all is bad. His other
experiences may not undeceive him. He goes to the
best theatre which is attended by a refined audience.
Broad references to delicate subjects are made on the
stage. He expects to see the fans which the Cuban and
the Spanish women use with such coquettish dexterity
instantly covering their faces. His surprise is great to
find them utterly unconcerned, no lull in their talk, no
embarrassment on their part or on the part of their
escorts. And in social gatherings he will hear topics
discussed which in polite society in the United States
would cause a panic. Certain domestic subjects are
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treated with the same familiarity as in German households. Is all this an indication of immorality? Was
it so a century ago in the new American commonwealths? Has Anglo-Saxon morality improved so vastly
since Chesterfield's maxims were published, or has conventionality simply been veneered?
Personal immorality does not muffle its face in Habana-does not even veil itself. The American fresh
from his own social environment prefers the hypocrisy
of veiled vice, yet he can hardly sit in judgment among
those who do not draw the curtains. What is good in
Cuban social life is open. What is bad is not hidden.
In time some of the conventionalities to which Americans are accustomed will come. In time conventionality will clothe the naked children; but their nakedness
is that of custom and not of immorality. Modesty will
take the place of indifference. All this may happen
without a real change in the innate morals of the people.  Surface morality, if I may so call it, will improve. Houses of tolerancy may cease to be proteges
of the municipality.  Outward public decency will
undoubtedly spread. Yet these things will not in themselves mean a radical change in the morals of the topics.
The hope of the Cuba of to-morrow for a sound
public morality and for improved private morality lies
deeper than the surface. It lies in the removing of the
causes of past and present demoralization. The relation is an intimate one to the future population of Cuba.
Is it to be of mongrels, negroids, abhorrent to civilization? In discussing future immigration and colonization, something has been said on this subject. It bears
development. The race mixture that grew out of slav.
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ery has not been prolific, although the unmixed illicitness of the colored race is declared not to be so sterile
as that of the white race. A barren or a sterile population would make Cuba forever a stunted growth of a
commonwealth, the stump of a state without branches
and without foliage. The black race is prolific, but the
families of the blacks are not relatively much larger than
those of the whites. The Cuban family, of whatever
color, usually has its half dozen blessings, and sometimes there are a round dozen of them. So we may go
out and beyond that phase of the subject, and ask again
whether the morals of the tropics are indigenous or
whether there is something exotic in them which may
be corrected and improved.
The condition which has prevailed in Cuba for centuries was not indigenous. The men outnumbered the
women.   The Spanish occupation for four hundred
years was a male occupation. This was not alone in
the military garrisons. It was also of the civil classesthe officials, the merchants, and even the laborers.
They were in Cuba to make money and return to Spain,
not to settle and bring up families. Those who did
settle and marry raised Cuban families who became
hostile to Spanish Government. Of those who had families in the peninsula, few thought of bringing them
to Cuba.   They were conveniently forgotten during
the residence on the island. Little distinction was
shown in this regard between the husband and the
bachelor. Inquiry was rarely made. They were single
in Cuba, and custom tolerated their taking a mistress.
The Cuban woman would not become the unlawful companion of the Spaniard. The Cuban home did not
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encourage degradation. The Spaniard had no choice
except as between the mulatto and the black woman.
Usually he chose the black woman because she would
work, and she did not demand the finery that the woman of the chocolate complexion wanted. The latter
occupied more the position of the Louisiana octoroon.
She demanded that the title of a house or a small piece
of property be vested in her. The Spaniard, thrifty in
his personal vices, therefore took the black woman for
mistress.
The statement of this condition is revolting, but it
was recognized. It is stated here because with the end
of Spanish control this condition begins to end. Its
prevalence can be judged from census figures. In 1860
tho population of the island was 1,396,470. Of these,
800,575 were men and 595,895 were women. By Spanish nativity the total was 83,000, of whom 66,000 were
men and 17,000 women. Of the Cuban-born it should
be noted that the women were slightly in excess, the
total standing 513,461, of whom 254,193 were males and
259,268 were females. Further subdivision and analysis show that the black males outnumbered the black
females. Therefore the excess of white Cuban women
over white Cuban men was greater. In 1860 the foreigners, including Europeans and Americans, numbered
7,725, of whom 5,673 were men and 2,052 were women.
Many of these foreigners were married to Cuban women.
Many of the Spaniards also married Cuban women; but
the significant fact is that there was only one Spanishborn female to four Spanish-born males.
The census of other years does not give the Spanish
residents by sexes, but the figures apparently indicate
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that this relative proportion was not changed. In 1877
55.88 per cent of the inhabitants were males, 44.12 females. In 1887 the ratio was 54.70 males and 45.30
females. The variation is too small to be of moment
when the uncertainty of all Spanish censuses is remembered. Early in the nineteenth century Humboldt
observed that between one-fourth and one-fifth of the
population of Cuba was condemned to live in celibacy.
He meant more especially the negroes. He might have
added that such Spaniards as were condemned to celibacy modified it by concubinage, and the irregular female classes by polyandry. Under the new era the
parasitic and bureaucratic class of Spaniards disappears
forever from Cuba.  The demoralization which their
presence and their mode of living caused disappears.
It has been noted that the majority of tradesmen and
their clerks in Habana and the larger towns were Spaniards who expected to return to the peninsula. Few
of the clerks, who were numbered by the thousands,
married till late in life. They helped to swell the disproportion between the sexes of Spanish birth. The
change in political and commercial conditions will
gradually alter this unhealthy social state. Future censuses will show no such great disproportion as formerly
existed between males and females born in the peninsula. For various causes, such as in the first stage of
immigration men coming without their families, the
disproportion will not wholly disappear. The removal
of this cancer may not insure the social regeneration of
Cuba, but it does assure an improvement in morals.
It might be said that for thirty years the social demoralization of the island has been continuous, due to?-5




TO-MOIROW IN CUBA


war. The ten-years' struggle from 1868 to 1878 kept a
large armed force on the island. The entire body of
troops was not moved until long after the peace of El
Zanjon, for the insurrectionary spirit was not quelled
in the eastern provinces. When the last insurrection
broke out, in 1895, the Spanish garrisons numbered
20,000 soldiers, chiefly single men. These 20,000 single men could not be accounted a healthful moral influence. Then came the 200,000 soldiers from the peninsula to crush the revolution.  All this is gone forever.
With an approach to normal industrial, political, and
social conditions, there should be an approach to normal morality. These are the signs to watch, rather
than the surface moralities.
Nor is Habana ever to be taken as a type of the whole
island. Being the chief city, it will always have both
the cream and the dregs of vice, and these will always
be on exhibition. The country is seen to better advantage, and the virtues of the people are not obscured by
the vices of individuals. Glimpses, too, may be obtained of the secluded home life, and the domestic qualities which have their foundation in the family. This
home life is the answer to the supposed lack of morals
in the tropics. Reinforced by family immigration, it is
the hope of the future; and the prospect for bettering the state of unmorality may reasonably be assured
in the circumstances which have taken the monopoly of
marriage away from the grasping Spanish priesthood.
From now forward both Protestantism and Roman Catholicism may be expected to diminish the statistics of
illegitimacy by the encouragement which they give to
lawful marriage.
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These are mere incidents in the moulding of morals
in the border tropics. The beginning of improvement
is in the disappearance of the conditions which maintain an excessive male inhabitancy. The continuance
of improvement lies in family immigration.




CHAPTER XVI


AMERICAN MILITARY CONTROL
Setting Up of New Political Power-Provisions of Executive Proclamation —Exercise of American Sovereignty in CustomsGeneral Wood's Bill of Rights-Extension of Authority to All
the Provinces-Regulation of Taxes-Cabinet Secretaries-Temporary Nature of Military Occupation Affirmed-Its Usefulness
Demonstrated —American Officials in the Temple of Corruption-Example of Integrity and Efficiency-Political Reconstruction-Defects in Military Control-Doubtful Reforms of Latin
Laws-Unwise Interference with Customs and Usages-SundayClosing Regulations-Resemblance to Spanish Captain-General's
Power-Military Trusteeship Creditable in Broad Sense.
AMERICAN authority in Cuba began with the surrender
of Santiago by the Spanish troops in July, 1898.      It
was not complete until the formal yielding of sovereignty in Habana on January 1st, 1899. Its basis was
purely the military power of the United States in foreign territory.  This was set forth after the surrender
of Santiago in the proclamation of President McKinley,
which provided for the military government of that
section of the island which was surrendered.     Former
political relations were severed and the new political
power, that of the United States, was established.
The municipal laws of the conquered territory-conquered so far as related to Spain-such as affected private rights of persons and of property, were considered
as continuing in force. The judges and other officials
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connected with the administration of justice, on accepting the supremacy of the United States continued administering the ordinary law of the land, as between
man and man, under the supervision of the American
commander-in-chief. The commander-in-chief had the
reserve power to replace or expel the native officials, to
substitute new courts of his own constitution, and to
create new or supplementary tribunals. The treatment
of property and the collection and administration of the
revenues was declared to be one of the most important
and practical problems, and the moneys collected were
to be used for the purpose of paying the expenses of
government under military occupation and for the payment of the expenses of:he army. All ports in Cuba
in actual possession of United States land and naval
forces were open to the commerce of neutral nations.
Following the surrender of Santiago and the executive
proclamation came the protocol in which Spain relinquished all claim of sovereignty over and title to Cuba.
The exercise of American authority began first in the
province of Santiago, because the United States was
earliest in possession there. Subsequently jurisdiction
was taken in the provinces of Puerto Principe and Pinar
del Rio, and on the first of January in the provinces of
Habana, Matanzas, and Santa Clara. In Santiago the
fixing of a new customs tariff was the first act of American sovereignty. It was followed by measures of local
government under the direction of General Leonard
Wood as commander-in-chief and military governor of
the province. By virtue of his authority he issued a
bill of rights which was in the nature of a provisional
constitution. It consisted of ten articles,
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The first section guaranteed to the people the right of
assembly for the common good and of applying to the
authorities petition or remonstrance for the redress of
grievances. The second guaranteed freedom of worship
according to individual conscience, provided that there
should be no interference with existing form of worship
and assured protection to all Christian churches. The
third article directed that the courts of justice should be
open to all, and that no private property should be
taken for public use without compensation. The fourth
article, dealing with criminal trials, invested the accused
with the right to be heard himself or by counsel, and
to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of
witnesses in his behalf. The fifth said that no person
accused of crime should be compelled to give evidence
against himself or be deprived of life, liberty, or property, except in accordance with the laws of the country.
The sixth section declared that no person once acquitted
should be tried again for the same offence. The seventh provided that all persons charged with crime
should be entitled to bail, except in cases of capital
offence, and that the writ of habeas corpus should not
be suspended except when the commanding general
deemed it advisable. The eighth section declared that
excessive bail should not be required, and that excessive
fines or cruel or undue punishments should not be inflicted. Article nine provided that every citizen should
be guaranteed in his business, person, papers, house,
and effects against every registry and embargo unjustifiable while the probable motive of culpability had not
been declared under oath. The tenth article declared
the right of writing or printing freely on any matter
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whatever, subject to responsibility for the abuse of the
right. The municipal laws were to be administered in
accordance with these declarations, subject to modifications which in the judgment of the commanding general would be beneficent and would promote the principles of enlightened civilization. Though some of the
principles were new, these declarations found in the
Castilian tongue a sufficient medium of expression.
This promulgation of the bill of rights was followed
by a new constitution of the judicial tribunals, by local
administrative measures, the most efficient of which was
sanitation, and by reconstructing the municipal governments in the various towns of the province. Among
the first municipal orders in Santiago was one prohibiting gambling and lotteries.
The general plan of American military control was set
forth by executive order on December 15th, 1898. This
created the military division of Cuba, and designated
Major-General John R. Brooke as commander-in-chief
and military governor of the island. General Leonard
Wood was commander in Santiago de Cuba, General L.
H. Carpenter in Puerto Principe, General J. C. Bates
in Santa Clara, General J. H. Wilson in Matanzas, General George W. Davis in Pinar del Rio, and General
Fitzhugh Lee in Habana province. The character of
government was indicated in the proclamations and decrees which followed the assumption of office. Thereafter the acts of the American authorities in the different provinces were simply the carrying out of a general
policy applicable to the whole island. Habana city was
erected into a separate military department with General William Ludlow as the military governor, but
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subject to the same supreme authority as the others.
Subsequently, when the American volunteers were withdrawn, the departments were consolidated in the military administration; but for civil administration and
purposes of local government the six provinces and the
city of Habana, which might be called a municipal
province, remained unchanged.
Following the exercise of American authority over
the entire island, by direction from Washington a new
customs tariff and new regulations for the coasting trade
were promulgated. Fiscal adjustment to the new conditions was made by proclamation of the American Executive, fixing the parity of money to be received from
customs duties and paid out in salaries and for other
purposes. Thus was the highest prerogative of sovereignty affirmed.  The basis of value was American
money, and French gold and Spanish gold and silver
coins in circulation were measured with it as the standard by their bullion value, allowance being made for
exchange and for transportation charges.
Under the American control, the actual functions of
internal administration were exercised by the military
commanders of the various departments, while the customs revenues, the telegraph lines, and the postal service were administered directly through the generalin-chief as Governor-General of the island.  With the
exception of the postal administration, all branches of
the government were under the supervision of army officers. The post-offices were administered as a branch of
the department in Washington, with E. G. Rathbone, an
experienced official, as director of posts. The customs
districts were established by executive order from
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Washington, Colonel Tasker H. Bliss becoming collector
at the port of Habana.
All the commanders of the departments on assuming
their offices issued addresses to the people, explaining
the policy of the United States and inviting their co-operation. Governor-General Brooke, on recommendation
of the military commanders, appointed civil governors,
alcaldes of the towns, and other officials from among
the natives. The acts of these officials were subject
to the approval of the military commanders. Between
the supreme power exercised by the Governor-General
and the authority exercised by the military governors,
many oppressive practices of Spanish rule were abolished and some of the laws were modified. One practice which was abrogated was the requirement for passports and the cedula or personal tax certificate for
transit from one part of the island to another.
Police regulations and municipal administrations
were moulded to the new conditions.   The internal
taxes, as distinct from local or municipal taxes, were
regulated by the central adminstration of the GovernorGeneral. After a strong protest had been made against
letting the Spanish Bank of the island of Cuba collect
the taxes, as had been done under Spanish dominion,
the War Department revoked the agreement with the
bank, and on the request of the military authorities,
left them free to establish an independent fiscal system.
This was done, and subsequently an entirely new basis
of internal taxation was promulgated by authority of
the Governor-General.
An advisory cabinet of four natives of the island was
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posed of Pablo Desvernine, secretary of the treasury;
Adolf Saenz Yanez, secretary of public works, agriculture, industry, and commerce; Domingo Mendez Capote, secretary of state and government; and Jose
Gonzales Lanuza, secretary of justice and education.
Geographically the cabinet was open to criticism because all its members were from Habana. Their preliminary work consisted chiefly in reconstructing the
administrative personnel of their departments and in
reducing the number of place-holders that had cumbered the official lists under Spanish rule.  These
cabinet secretaries were also given latitude in the matter of appointing their subordinates. The judicial system, after much care, was entirely reconstructed. A
supreme court was appointed for the entire island,
which took the place of the former court of final appeal
in Madrid.
In every act of the United States Government, scrupulous regard was had to the temporary nature of the
military occupation. The American Executive acted
within the narrow limit of those powers. No public
franchises of any kind were granted. This policy was
determined in the beginning and was adhered to without modification. Mr. Griggs, the Attorney-General, in
giving an opinion against granting permission to land a
cable in Cuba, declared it would be inexpedient under
all circumstances.  The United States, he said, was
exercising administration under the law of belligerent
right, and the matter was under control of the War Department, but the Executive Department had taken the
ground that in view of the circumstances under which
the United States came into control of affairs in Cuba,
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and in view of the declared purpose of the American
Government to retire and leave the government to the
inhabitants, it would be inexpedient to grant applications for concessions except in case of -absolute necessity. The Attorney-General did not concede that what
was known as the Foraker amendment to the army
appropriation bill directing that no property, franchises, or concessions be granted by the United States,
or by any military or other authority whatever in the
island of Cuba, during the occupation thereof by the
United States, was mandatory upon the Executive Department. He intimated that it could only be considered as advisory.
Since there was no difference in intention or policy
between the Executive and Congress, the distinction
between advisory legislation and mandatory legislation
is not important. In demanding that Spain withdraw
from Cuba, Congress by resolution disclaimed any disposition or intention to exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction, or control over Cuba, except for its pacification,
and declared a settled determination when that was
accomplished to leave the government and control of
the island to its people. President McKinley, in his
annual message of 1898, reaffirmed this doctrine, and
indicated that the United States would withdraw when
complete tranquillity should be established.
This is the framework of American occupation and
administration in Cuba. It is an iron framework. It
bridged chaos. Its strength was not so much in its
flexibility as in its completeness. The conditions and
the pledges under which the control of the United States
in Cuba began have been regretted by many persons as
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an interference with the right policy and a hindrance
to it. There need be no regret. The first duty, that
of pacifying the island and maintaining public order,
could have been fulfilled by no other agency so effectively. The foundations of political and industrial reconstruction could have been laid by no other means.
The situation was one in which was needful supreme
power, unquestioned by either judicial or legislative
limitations. Circumstances had to govern. Nor could
the measures of sanitation, which was the greatest of
emergencies, have been carried forward with such success under ordinary conditions. The military authority was best adapted to cope with this emergency. It
was almost as valuable in the establishment of an educational system.
The administration of Cuba was a fresh and untried
field for the American military officials, many of them
new to civil duties and responsibilities. The discipline
of the camp and garrison was not such as to fit them
for the exercise of power that could be questioned.
This authority in the main was exercised with tact and
discretion. There was army politics with ramifications
in Washington, but these personal ambitions did not
interfere with the discharge of official duties, and did
not affect the relations of the army officers towards the
inhabitants with whose government they were charged.
Though the tongue was foreign to most of them, and
though they were among a strange people, they showed
quick adaptability to their surroundings. They were
not alien governors of conquered inhabitants.
It was given to the American officials in Cuba to walk
within the temple of corruption erected by Spanish
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bureaucracy while the ruined walls were yet standing.
They might have misgivings about the capacity and the
ability of the Cubans to maintain an independent republic, and their doubts might sometimes find utterance.
But they were all impressed with the conviction that the
rotten structure of Spanish administration could not
have continued and could not have formed the basis of
a stable edifice of government, whatever changes in the
system might have been made. Like all the world that
saw the temple from within, their wonder was that it
lasted so long. Their own administration has been an
example of American institutions. The shrillest want
of Cuba in the future, the one that cries out in the wilderness of chaos and corruption, is that of official integrity. The American officials have set the example.
Their standard of integrity is the lesson of to-day, but
it will not be learned in a day. It should be continued
to-morrow. The same sense of responsibility and of
a high conception of duty has been shown in other
administrative relations.  It was an experiment. The
experiment has been a success in demonstrating American capacity and adaptability to administer government among other peoples accustomed to other institutions.
In a general sense it may be said that the plan of
American administration in Cuba was reconstruction
both industrially and politically. In the midst of
passing conditions it is not worth while to examine
in detail experiments in fiscal systems. Being experiments, they can be rejected when found unsatisfactory.
And the industrial recuperation is a manifest witness
for itself. If it fails to make known its presence,
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searching for it between the covers of a book would be
fruitless.
The political reconstruction, the operation of the
civil machinery, is apart and of itself. It can be followed in all the intricacies of administration.  The
strength of the American military control was demonstrated in its way of meeting emergencies and in the
impress of official integrity and fidelity which it made.
It stamped its mark so deeply that the impress will not
be lost whatever government obtains. But there are
defects in military control. The very success of the
administration in its initial stages makes these defects
the earlier apparent. To change the laws to which
people have been accustomed for a long series of years
is in all circumstances a doubtful experiment. The best
that the wisest jurists would hope for would be to correct flagrant abuses and trust to finding suitable judges
to construe the laws not oppressively, but beneficently.
The abuses were flagrant enough. They were part of
the Spanish political system.
The substance of the provisional bill of rights first
promulgated in Santiago province was incorporated in
the decree of the supreme American military authority
regulating court practice and inculcating various desirable reforms in procedure. The tyrannical practice
of keeping accused persons incommunicado-without
means of communicating with friends or counsel-was
abolished, and provision was made for giving the accused person an opportunity to know the charges
against him in the preliminary hearing. These changes
were opposed by some of the Habana lawyers; but they
will stand because they are guarantees of personal lib301




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erty which were lacking under the Spanish system of
government.
But a disposition was shown to go far beyond such
simple provisions. The Romai-law and its adaptation
in the Code Napoleon do not suit a people who are used
to the common law. Americans would not put up with
it. Therefore the assumption was that under the new
American relation to Cuba the Latin law must be rooted
out, though a million or more inhabitants were accustomed to it, and what understanding of judicial systems
they had was based upon it. When a purpose to reform
the system of laws was first intimated, the College of
Abogados-the bar association-of Habana was invited
to make suggestions. The association was composed
mainly of Cuban lawyers. Many had suffered exile for
their opposition to Spanish misrule, all knew the oppressiveness of the Spanish laws. But they venerated
the Latin principles of jurisprudence. The issue was
raised that a concealed purpose existed to supplant the
Latin law by American law. Dr. Gener, the president
of the bar association, supported the suggestion that
reforms be outlined by the association. Though the
common courtesy was to re-elect the president, he found
the opposition to his course so strong that he declined
to be a candidate. Domingo Mendez Capote, who afterwards became a member of General Brooke's advisory
cabinet, was chosen president of the bar association on
the issue that radical changes in the laws were to be
opposed.
Months afterwards, when the military authorities decreed some reforms, the Spanish lawyers met and organized an association to uphold the excellence of the
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Latin law over the common law. The American military
power had the advantage, for it could decree not simply
changes in the law, but could enforce the changes, nominally at least. Nevertheless the lasting force of all
the changes cannot be judged in the midst of fleeting
conditions. For a temporary governing authority of a
military character to reform a permanent system of jurisprudence is a huge task. The extent to which the system is reformed cannot be judged until the military
power is withdrawn and the reorganized system is left
to stand on its own support among the people of whose
institutions it is a part. Codifying commissions in the
States which find years of laborious work rejected might
sigh for the military authority to enforce the acceptance
of what they know are beneficent legal reforms; but the
worth of a codification which rested on that basis is
readily estimated.
An illustration which better fits the case of Cuba is
that of Louisiana. If in the reconstruction period following the civil war the military commanders had
undertaken to destroy the Code Napoleon and to bring
Louisiana's system of jurisprudence to the basis of the
common law in other States, the effect could be judged.
And this is another way of affirming the author's belief
that while provisions guaranteeing personal rights will
stand, the bulk of changes in the laws made by direction of the American military authority are too transitory to call for detailed analysis.
After a few months' experience there was less disposition to hasten the introduction of new and strange principles of jurisprudence. Conservatism took the place
of etahusiasm, BlveoB showed the need of going low,
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The criminal laws required amendment, and the changes
in the penal code, as well as in the court procedure,
were salutary. Reforms in prison management were
made with good results, especially in Habana under
the vigorous direction of General Ludlow. Yet even in
the criminal law reforms a halt was necessary. The
most ardent military reformer did not advocate projecting grand juries and trial juries on a people to whom
even the statutory jury of other Latin countries was
unknown.
It was, however, in the domain of civil laws that the
gravest shock to the progressive spirit was felt. The
most troublesome question affecting the industrial reconstruction of Cuba is that of mortgages. By direction from Washington an extension of two years from
May 1st, 1899, for the payment of mortgages on realty
then due or which might become due within that period
was granted. The extension was necessary in order to
save a vast amount of property from becoming prey to
the mortgage sharks.. It was far from being what the
debtors asked. It was more than the creditors conceded. No government can expect to please both debtors and creditors.  In displeasing both classes the
American authorities felt that they did substantial justice. But the discussion of the mortgage law and the
legal rights of debtor and creditor and the changes proposed brought up the whole question of the civil laws.
It showed how one change must lead to another until
the entire system of civil jurisprudence should be reconstructed. Though the American military officials
had Latin jurists for pilots, they wisely hesitated to
enter upon these unknown seas. Perhaps they were
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conscious that a few months' tutelage could not make
army commanders masters of jurisprudence.    The
strength of military administration is in its executive
capacity, and not in its ability to construe abstract laws.
It could and did correct abuses in practice, and endeavored to find the right individuals for the discharge of judicial duties. The wisest way is to stop there. The
Latin laws will shape themselves to the new political institutions. American military authority cannot mould
them too far in advance of the political institutions that
are to prevail.
What is true of the laws is true of customs and
usages. The zealous social reformer might sigh for the
power of the military reformer in Cuba. If the latter
sometimes gave way to his zeal he may be pardoned
his weakness. So much there was to be reformed that
the temptation was great to seek to do it all at once.
Many communities in the United States would perhaps
be better if a power from above such as the military arm
of the general government were to regulate their affairs,
but the communities would not tolerate reforms coming
in this manner. In Cuba there is danger of too many
sumptuary reforms by the American military authorities
overriding long-established local usages.
When the American control began, the clerks in Habana petitioned Governor-General Brooke for the early
closing of the shops and stores, and also for Sunday
closing. Their hours were very long, and they were
required to be on duty till ten o'clock at night. The
first intimation given was that to grant their petition
was beyond the powers of the military government.
The shopkeepers were opposed to the change from mo20               305




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tives of self-interest, but the habit of evening shopping
was not without reason in a country, where the heat
of the midday and of the afternoon causes almost a suspension of trade. Ultimately the shops were ordered
closed nights and Sundays after ten o'clock in the morning, and the closing was enforced by General Ludlow as
military governor of Habana. A few weeks or months
of the enforced experiment will hardly furnish sufficient
basis for complacent congratulation about the observance of an Anglo-Saxon Sunday or a New England Sabbath in a Latin community. Left to itself, the agitation
would probably have resulted in a compromise arrangement. Under military pressure there could be no compromise.  When civil authority becomes supreme it
will be time enough to judge of the experiment. Meantime the Anglo-Saxon Sunday should not be taken in
too liberal a sense.
There are other customs which in the end would be
better regulated by local regulations than by the military power of the United States. In a previous chapter I have given the reason for believing that the bullfight is a dead institution-for this generation at least.
If it were not so its formal prohibition by the American
Governor-General of the island would not be apt to
change the nature of the people who delighted in it.
In the old days the Governor-General laid down ironclad regulations for the cocking-mains. By a decree
promulgated in February, 1882, they were only permitted on Sundays, Church holidays of two crosses, and
the day fixed in each town or village for the celebration
of its patron saint. Subsequent dispositions of the Governor-General prohibited rival cocking-mains on the
806




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same day; required the owners of the game fowls to
alternate the lidias, or exhibitions, and reaffirmed the
prohibition on other than Sundays and the Church holidays which were specified. The idea was not to permit
the sport to be held on regular working days because it
would interfere with the industry of the laboring population.
Probably in its effort to free itself from the past
abuses the Catholic Church will exert its moral influence against Sundays and saints' days as the occasion
for cocking-mains and similar sports. This influence
is also likely to be exerted against the amusement on
any day of the year. With such encouragement, local
public sentiment might be depended on to wean the
people gradually from their liking for these sports, so
that municipal regulations could be enacted and enforced. But the circumstances in Cuba are not so exceptional as to require the supreme military power of
the island to issue edicts regarding this sport and similar amusements grounded in habits and customs because the customs are not in conformity with American
notions. A proclamation against dog-fights by the governor of a great State such as New York or Illinois
would be no more absurd.
There is extant the decree of a Spanish Captain-General prescribing the manner in which the legs of chickens should be tied when they were carried to market.
The purpose was a humane one. If the highest military
authority under American occupation is to be concerned
with regulating the amusements and customs of the people it might with justice be asked to reform the customs
of marketing and revive this humane c ree eAgainst
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this it may be urged that police regulations should be
sufficient. So they should be in innumerable other matters which were taken up by the higher authorities for
regulation and enforcement under military decree. It
is as if Connecticut were to regulate the habits of California, or Montana to prescribe the usages of Massachusetts.
These comments are made almost with apology for
their triviality, but this tendency towards sumptuary
and arbitrary regulation of the customs of a different
people became a feature of the power exerted by the
American authorities. It could not, therefore, be ignored. Errors of this kind may be made, yet they do
not affect the American military control in its broadest
sense. The example of official integrity and of earnest
effort in good administration remains. When the military trusteeship ends it will be a creditable ending, with
results to show which will justify the confidence of the
American people.




CHAPTER XVII


POLITICAL APTITUDES
Training for Constructive Government-Autonomy as an Education
-Growth of Popular Element-Germs of Party OrganizationDevelopment of Clubs-Caucus and Primary-Influence of the
Newspapers-Responsiveness of Country People to Good Leadership-Regionalism Again-Santiago and Puerto PrincipeGrowth of Public Opinion-Factions and Groups- Cuban
Weakness in Administration-Dreamers in the Custom Houses
-Patterning the Institutions of the United States-Query Regarding Respect for Authority-Necessity of a Trial-What
Constitutes a State-Future Commonwealth.
MECHANICAL aptitudes are usually inherited.   Political aptitudes may be either acquired or inherited. Propensity for revolution may exist without a grasp of the
fundamental principles of free government.
Of the Cuban people as a people, it cannot be said
that they have an inheritance of political aptitudes from
their grandfathers, and atavism in political government
is a phenomenon not to be expected, because the right
use of civil liberty is a growth and not a miracle.
When so vast a majority of the human race has not
advanced far enough in civilization to find chairs either
a necessity or a luxury, it should not cause surprise
that a people whose habitation is the border tropics
cannot boast of inherited disposition for constructive
government. What they do have is the acquired aptitude. This is another way of saying that their training
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has begun. The extent to which it has progressed and
the influences affecting it may be studied.
From the knowledge of what has gone we gain the
knowledge of what remains. In brief compass of a few
chapters the autonomist agitation and regime were narrated chronologically as an expisode of Spanish history in the Antilles. From that narration the idea may
be had of the degree to which the movement served
the purpose of political education. The basis of free
institutions is free discussion. Under the limitations
of free print and free speech imposed by the Spanish
dominion, this basis could not be a broad one. But
Spanish Captain-Generals had one quality that was not
bad. While they occasionally deported journalists and
suppressed journals whose outspokenness was uncomfortable to the Government, they were tolerant of abstract discussions of political principles. Liberty in
the abstract, the theoretical bases of civil government,
were beyond their ken or care, and discussion on this
line was treated with contempt. It was only when
abuses and misgovernment were attacked specifically
that the iron hand was shown.
These conditions strengthened a natural disposition
towards speculative discussion, and speculative political
philosophy forms a leading part in the programme of
all the political leaders in Cuba. But in the days of
repression, under its disguise real progress was made
to a greater degree than was known. The terms "meeting," "mass meeting," "self-government," "home rule,"
had no equivalent in the Castilian language. Autonomy was not the translation of either self-government or
hoine rule, That all these terms were incorporated isto
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the idiom and are to-day current is the best evidence
that the meaning of free discussion and free government
is understood. The town meeting is not known because
the town as conceived in New England did not exist.
Besides, the discussion of local measures and of local
officials would necessarily have been too concrete for
the comfort of Spanish authority, and would have been
treated harshly. But the town meeting is coming in
Cuba. The aptitude for it is an acquired one-acquired
from the mass meeting of the days of the Autonomist
movement.
In the revolution of 1868 it was stated that a few
wealthy and influential Cubans took their families,
their dependents, and their slaves into the field, and
thereupon Spain had a Ten-Years' war on her hands.
In the last insurrection the influence of a few leading
Cubans was also very great; but all they could do was
to sustain a revolution that already had the support of
the masses. The autonomist propaganda was the work
of a group of talented and cultured men. They laid
down their principles, and a grouping of personal followers accepted the dictum. When the principles were
shifted the followers waited until the chief formulated
the changed issues. Then they fell in line.
During the later years of the autonomist propaganda,
when it gained its greatest strength as a popular movement, less disposition was shown to heed the formulas
of the leaders; but these men did not know it. They
were going with the crowd, and they thought the crowd
was going with them. When under Blanco the autonomists who did not go into the field issued their allocutions and manifestoes accepting the new regimen, it was
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disclosed that old things had passed away. Neither
whistle nor trumpet could bring back the followers who
had once sat at the feet of the prophets. This was in
part indisputably due to the presence of so many of
them with the insurgents in the field. But it was also
due to an advance in political education.
When peace was affirmed, manifestoes, addresses, and
allocutions fell like autumn leaves. Some were from
old-time Autonomists who had kept out of the insurrection, some from insurgent generals, and some from the
Cubans who had been identified with the revolution on
its civil side. They all had programmes and formulas.
To the disappointment of their authors, little heed was
paid to these allocutions. It was manifest that the people were thinking of their own concern and did not care
for ready-made formulas.  This does not mean that
they had ceased to be responsive to good leadership.
It is questionable if anywhere a people can be found
who are more responsive to good leadership; but that
leadership must interpret the sentiments and aspirations
of the people; and the authors of the allocutions were
not doing it. Their prepared formulas were not the
thing, and the majority of the Cubans had become apt
enough in political intuition to know it.
While the manifesto of the leader to his followers lost
much of its importance in the later years, another outgrowth of the autonomist movement gained fresh vitality. This was the organization of juntas or committees. The Autonomist party rested on local juntas or
clubs.  So did that of their vigilant opponents, the
Union Constitutionals. These local clubs delegated
their functions largely to a central committee, a junta
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magna or junta directiva, as it was named. This body
was in reality a directory of the entire organization, and
it directed in a far greater degree than the central committee of a political party in the United States. At a
period when a few prominent men dominated the Autonomist and Union Constitutional parties respectively,
they were able to have their allocutions and manifestoes
adopted by the directories, and the local juntas accepted
the creed prepared for them without question. Though
the later development of popular sentiment, whether
intransigente or autonomist, made the central committee more the organ than the moulder of opinion, the
idea of a directory for a political party was not entirely
lost. It has survived intervening events and exists today in a modified form.
After the re-establishment of peace, great activity was
shown in the formation of juntas or clubs. Usually
they took the names of the heroes of the insurrection.
They furnish the means for political activity and agitation.  They also furnish the field for exercising the
ambitions of young Cubans. In the period before the
insurrection the lyceum was the institution in which
young Cubans found vent for their literary and dramatic
as well as their social ambitions. The lyceum existed
in every town. It was an offset to the Spanish casino,
the casino being to the Cubans the token of a favored
and intolerant oligarchy. After the ending of hostilities the lyceum reappeared everywhere; but it did not
take on a political character. A common feeling obtained that it should continue what it had been, and that
political effort should take a different form. So the
membership in the political clubs grew.
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In the gradual development of parties the clubs will
be the basis of them all. They are the existing political units. They are the medium of party organization
and promotion. They will not be able to control public
sentiment, but they promise to be its interpreters and
thus preserve their influence. The primaries are yet to
come. The germ of the caucus is already in evidence.
It is likely to take the place of the directory. Cuban
politicians who were identified with revolutionary juntas
in the United States have shown a leaning to the caucus,
though not under that name.
The newspaper, even under the restricted liberty of
the press which was permitted by Spanish institutions,
showed an aptness for political discussion. Though
pamphleteering always prevailed, the journals were the
most sought-for mediums of promulgating opinions.
They conformed to all the traditions. Each journal
represented a party, a group, or an interest. No one
ever picked up a leading paper curious to see what stand
it would take on a given question. The only curiosity
was as to how it would champion or defend its side.
The journals announced themselves as the organs of one
set or another set of opinions. They took a serious
view of their mission. Discussion was to them an intellectual tournament, and they recognized that there could
be no tournament without the knights of the contrary
opinion in the lists. Invariably their leading articles
were well considered.
No great change was worked by the revolution except
that with the end of the press censorship discussion
was free. It is still possible to judge the probable
course of the Spanish colony by reading two or three
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Spanish newspapers. The views of the moderate Cubans are reflected in journals which announce themselves
as organs of moderate opinion, while the feelings and
purposes of the radicals may be easily gleaned from
journals which carry their own designation. It is in
the new and changing conditions that the traditional
organs are confused and lost. The manner in which
the newspapers find their way through this wilderness
will be a valuable guide for those who are watching the
march of circumstances in Cuba. They may be depended on to reflect the aspirations as well as the perplexities of the Cuban people. And their aptitude for
discussing the problems which surround them may be
accepted as an index of the aptitude of the people for
free institutions.
They are keen in retort. Some well-meaning Americans on their arrival in Cuba believed they had a mission among savages of various degrees of gentleness.
They thought to impress the natives that they came
from a land of perfect government. Their mistakes
were corrected by the watchful press. The wretched
bickerings among the insurgent leaders over the payment of the troops, the personal rivalries, were made
much of in the United States as proof of Cuban incapacity for independence.  The Habana newspapers had
their campaign argument in reply. They gave instances
of discord among the American officials which showed
just as much jealousy, factionalism, and selfish ambition. The American officials in the midst of their discords could not fail to admit the fairness of the retort.
To the talk of crime and especially of brigandage as
a reason for continuing military control, the newspapers
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replied with full accounts of the train robberies in the
Western States, the daily crimes of the cities, the scenes
of violence at the strikes, and the lynchings. Nor did
they fail to exploit the occurrences, unfortunately too
frequent, which were discreditable to individual Americans in Cuba. These are passing incidents. They
serve to show that while Americans insist on a searching scrutiny of everything that happens in Cuba, the
inhabitants of the island are not inapt at measuring
them with their own yard-stick. They have progressed
far enough to make comparisons.
In the broader sense the discussion in the journals
showed in a high degree the faculty of critical analysis.
Some of the American officials were sensitive over the
criticism they received; but it was no more personal and
was usually less unjust than that which was visited
upon them by badly informed newspapers at home. A
full understanding was shown of the constructive work
they were doing. The greater value of the newspaper
comments and suggestions lay in the complete knowledge they showed of the close relation between the economic future of the island and the political system.
Discussion of the Cuban tendencies was thoughtful. It
is common to find in the journals a warning that the
reality is coming to the Cuban people, a caution that
they cannot live in the clouds. The enthusiasts are
told that government is something more than writing
poetical manifestos and making poetical addresses. The
Spanish idiom is a flowing one. The sentiments which
find utterance in the United States on the fourth of July,
translated into the Castilian language, would be a stream
of hyperbole. The Cuban patriot voices his feelings with
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more metaphors and more vivid imagery; but the press
moderates his exuberance. It hints at the practical side
of government suggestively, though not in a way to destroy his idealism. That is a rare aptitude.
From what has been written a fair conclusion may be
drawn. Free discussion and political organization are
not simply elementary ideas: they are a working basis
for free government in Cuba. But it may be said that
the discussion, which has been limited to newspapers
and pamphlets and to public meetings which were necessarily select, cannot be looked upon as political education in an island a large proportion of whose population is unable to read or write. The assumption would
be misleading in any circumstances, but especially so
in Cuba. The commonest sight in the rural communities is to see the village oracle reading the newspaper to
a group of listeners, among whom, it is easy to guess,
few can read for themselves. But there has never been
a wide gulf between the classes who could read and write
and the ignorant classes whose aspirations they interpreted.
Rocking in the cradle of the revolution, in the midst
of guerilla warfare, in the manigua, and in the hills,
there was the semblance of a political training. The
stern commander, MAximo Gomez, who understood the
Cubans better than they understood themselves, enforced military discipline and civil obedience, while the
camp-fire discussions were of free government. The
systems of prefecturas in the regions held by the insurgents were lessons in military and civil training. The
juntas or revolutionary committees in the towns had no
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cation as well as a political conspiracy under the shadow of Spanish authority. The army had real elections
of a kind, for it chose the delegates who formed the assemblies, which constituted the provisional government.
The aptitude of the guajiro, the countryman or Cuban
peasant, for public affairs, when he must be led through
tho winding paths of intellectual reasoning, is not great.
Mental processes are too abstruse. But he is an apt
pupil when taught through the physical senses. And
he is a tenacious positivist in his conclusions. Object
lessons reach him. He found himself in the midst of a
false artificial condition. He saw the Spaniards govern
and take everything to themselves. He knew that he
was a victim of oppression, cruelty, and tax-eating rapacity and corruption.. He knew that in a dispute with
his wealthier neighbor he had no rights, because the
justice that sat on the magistrate's bench-justice in the
choice of which he had no word-was open-eyed and
keen of vision for the hand that stretched out the bribe.
Where the guajiro was a negative character he became a
pacifico, sympathizing mildly with the insurrection and
aiding it like a sheep. Where there was sterner stuff
in his make-up he became an insurgent and took to the
brush. Once in arms, nothing could move him. His
was not the sublimated patriotism of the intellectual
classes. It was the simple grit of the peasant. The
revolution, while it had the support of the educated and
the wealthy Cubans, was the supreme work of the Cuban people as a mass. The mass was responsive to
good leadership. It trusted its military leaders. It
will trust leaders in civil life who are true to its instincts
and unelfish in their devotion to its interests.
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Americans who have watched the internal affairs of
the island closely sometimes propound a query, either
mentally or openly, whether the aptness which may be
shown for decentralized government will not become a
propensity for revolution by sections or provinces of the
island. It is in line with the general question whether
the defeated party will accept the verdict of the elections
or will take to the woods. The question cannot be
answered with full satisfaction until the experiment has
been tried. In outlining the provinces as a federal
framework I have given the opinion that sectionalism
or regionalism will be less rampant in Santiago de
Cuba and in Puerto Principe than is feared. This is
a matter of impartial administration, and in giving no
just ground for jealousy of Habana.
Should a forced test of annexation be made, Santiago
might then drop out of line with the other provinces in
the hope of being admitted as a separate State. But the
ambitious chiefs will have little prospect of satisfying
their ambition by taking a defeated faction to the woods
in a single province. It is a pure assumption that this
class of leaders would have followers at all. Moreover,
General MIliximo G6mez checked the possibilities of
regionalism when in the first months of the insurrection
he nationalized the cause of independence. His policy
bore fruit, and one result of the revolution was more
thoroughly to mix up the inhabitants of the different
provinces. Some of the Santiago natives who marched
west with Maceo to Pinar del Rio settled and remained
there. Some of those from Habana and Matanzas who
went to Puerto Principe made it their permanent abiding place. Greater homogeneity among the Cubans as
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a people is the consequence. This has its bearing on
future government. It helps to develop the aptitude of
the whole people for homogeneous political institutions.
The political parties will not be essentially different
from parties everywhere. As they exist to-day the line
is not sharply drawn, because there is little chance to
divide on domestic policies until the basis of division
as a territory, state, or independent commonwealth exists. There is the National League, which is composed
chiefly of the civilian elements; the Cuban National
Party, which wants to absorb all the elements favoring
independence; and the various factions which call themselves military parties. They are all following one line
in sustaining schools for voting which are preparing
the Cubans for the use of the ballot. There will be an
anti-American faction composed of a few military chiefs.
These will be continuously demanding the immediate
grant of absolute independence and the withdrawal of
the intervening power. It is not probable that this
group will ever reach the dignity of a real political
party. Some of its agitators fought successfully in
the insurrection, but it is yet to be shown that they
have followers. They are like the Autonomist leaders
who issued manifestoes without getting responses.
In watching the development of sentiment in Cuba it
is well to remember that the cigar smoke which rises
from the cafes in Hlabana is not always the will of the
Cuban people. Habana as a great city will naturally
influence the politics of the island, but the controlling
influence will not be with it. American officials in the
beginning made the mistake of supposing that the metropolis was the whole island. Other Americans make
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the same mistake. What is best in Cuba is its town
and country life. The influences, whether social or
political, are more healthful there. They should always
be sought before forming a judgment.
The growth of public opinion is something that is
also to be noted, and it has its basis in the country. It
frequently stilled the voices of the agitators who were
demanding the immediate withdrawal of the American
forces.  When the factious Assembly was seeking to
prolong the uncertainty about accepting the payment
for the insurgent troops, public opinion compelled that
body to dissolve itself. There is no reason to think
that it will be less healthful in the future whenever a
group of discontented leaders undertake to interfere
with peaceful progress.
The radical group, as it is called, is composed mostly
of generals who were antagonistic to G6mez during the
insurrection. They were patriotic enough to control their
resentments while the struggle lasted. Now they seek to
find expression for it and to prevent the old commander
dominating in civil affairs. They have among them some
respectable figures such as Salvador Cisneros Betancourt,
who can show a record as president of the provisional
republic during the Ten-Years' war and also during the
last insurrection. Despite their personal ambitions and
resentments, it is not just to class all these men as unpatriotic. They want to see Cuba strong, maintaining
friendly relations with the United States; but they want
to be the ones who shall direct her destiny. Some of
them may rebound so that in time they will become annexationists, for the honor of being American Senators
and Representatives appeals powerfully to them.
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Americans who sympathized with the insurrection
and who are sincerely desirous for the success of the
Cuban commonwealth admit to themselves a certain
distrust in the virility of the character when it comes to
be applied to public administration. Their own robustness is lacking. They also note that duplicity is a
common trait. Often they may turn over in their minds
the question of the strong hand for the Latin races; but
a study of past and present conditions in the island satisfies them that the strong hand will never control the
destiny of Cuba. Not even a progressive and patriotic
Porfirio Diaz could make himself the master of this
people. They have been educated to the point where
they will not stand a dictator. It is also worth noting
that while this lack of virility is manifest, sentiment is
a most pronounced trait in their make-up. An appeal
to sentiment rarely fails to achieve results. When their
confidence is once obtained they are trustful and responsive. But with distrust implanted among them, no
progress can be made.
The aim of intelligent and patriotic Cubans was to
pattern the political institutions of the United States.
They showed a hunger for information regarding local
government as well as the methods of federal administration. The American control set the pattern before
them. In every possible way Cuban administration
was modelled after American methods. It is certain
that with the entire power resting with themselves
the Cubans will not do as well as the officials from the
United States were able to do for them. In the beginning and at the various stages of progress these officials were discouraged and sometimes disheartened.
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They had to meet one condition which was the outgrowth of the war. This was the tendency to regard
all the offices as a Cuban club, with the discharge of the
duties a mere incident. Unquestionably under Cuban
administration more public servants will be required
than under American control. But in time the people
of the island will learn what every people learns-that
the cost of managing public affairs comes from the producers.
It may furthermore be said that much fondness for
office is shown by the Cubans. Whether this trait is
really a racial one may be judged by the scenes at
the White House in Washington in the months following the inauguration of a new President, or the
crowd in the anteroom of the newly elected mayor of
a big city or of the governor of a State. There is
one difference: the Latin office-holder or office-seeker
cares more for the dignity of the position than for its
emoluments. The American office-seeker first wants to
know how much it will pay. Nor are public affairs in
Cuba left to the monopoly of one profession. The doctor, the dentist, the journalist, and the civil engineer
mingle in politics as well as the lawyer.
Another inquiry which Americans make sincerely is
to what degree respect for constituted authority exists
among the people who respected it only when enforced by
military government. They want to know whether the
masses have a clear notion of the difference between liberty and license. They have curiosity to learn whether
the decisions of judicial tribunals will be respected
when there is nothing beyond the confidence in the tribunals themselves to enforce respect. These are ques.
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tions that cannot be answered until the opportunity has
been given to put them to the practical test of experience. The test cannot come under American military
control. The most that can be looked for is some indications of an answer in the choice of a constituent, representative assembly to formulate the future government. That the political aptitudes exist for the choice
of such a body and for its deliberations is affirmed in
what has been said of the progress of free discussion
and political organization. Here seems to be the basis
of institutions that will develop and endure. Probably
the first congress, or convention, will bear witness to
the saying of De Tocqueville that a nation is always
able to establish great political assemblies because it is
sure to contain a certain number of persons whose intellectual cultivation stands them to a certain extent
instead of practical experience. The fashioning of the
rude materials of the local community is, as the French
philosopher says, a more difficult task; but the beginnings of municipal government are already seen.
The originator of the revolution of 1895, Jose Marti,
was a poet. He sealed his aspiration for the liberty of
the land he loved with his death on the battlefield.
Other poets before him perished ignominiously for
their faith in free government. Menocal, an artist of
European reputation, left his easel to join the ragged
forces of Maximo Gomez. Cultured men were marched
through the streets of Habana tied to common criminals. Loaded with chains and herded in the foul holds
of vessels with these criminals, they were sent to the penal settlements of Africa. The clanking of these chains
still echoes through many households. All this was for
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the crime of rebellion.  College professors, learned
men, educators, and writers went into voluntary and
involuntary exile. These classes returned to Cuba,
They are a part of its future. Some of them    are
dreamers. They dream with an apostle of liberty * of
another island:
"The dreamer lives on forever,
The toiler toils for a day."
These men may prefer to dream of idyllic government
in the ideal future rather than to work for the imperfect
structure which must be set up by toiling day by day.
Their fondness for speculative thought, their theorizing on the nature of liberty, may unfit them for the
intensely practical business of government. Their ability to administer the customs houses will never be demonstrated. A poet or dreamer in a Latin custom house
will be a failure. But the sentiments which inspire
them, and which they seek to inculcate, will have a fruitful soil. The dreamers will have their place in the
evolution of the Cuban commonwealth. The problem
is to evolve a successful administration not only of
the custom house, but of all public offices between the
dreamers on one side, and on the other side the men
who think that revolution is merely a change to enable
Cubans to loot their own island instead of letting Spaniards loot it. The poets and the dreamers themselves
would be out of place in the custom house, but they
have their place in keeping alive the sentiment which
demands honest administration.
In Pensacola are the ruins of an old Spanish fort.
* John Boyle O'Reilly.
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At St. Augustine are the ruins of the oldest Spanish fort
on the American continent. Near Kingston, Jamaica,
're the ruins of what must have been an extensive,
almost impregnable, Spanish fort. When the American troops landed at Daiquiri and Siboney the old fortress which was discovered in the jungle compelled their
admiration. They might have thought, too, of the vengeance of history, if they had reflected that near Daiquiri landed the Spanish expedition from Hispaniola
which crushed the native chief Hatuey and established
four hundred years of Spanish dominion over Cuba.
The defences of Santiago de Cuba called forth the praise
of the keenest military engineers. The defences of Habana won admiration for their scientific thoroughness
and for their mathematical exactness. If forts, moats,
walls, castles, cannons, and batteries constituted a
state, Spain never would have lost her American possessions.
Men, says Sir William Jones, constitute a state.
And they would have constituted a colony.  Battlements and walls and moated gates went down not
because Spain lacked men to defend them; it was because she lacked men who knew that in themselves were
the power and the majesty of the state. The lands
from which the Conquistadores sought to draw only the
gold that was yellow to the eyes, while neglecting that
which renews itself with the turning over of the soil,
could not constitute a state. All this has gone. The
mediaeval civilization of fortresses and cannons is buried
when the twentieth century is opening its chrysalis of
potentialities. The future commonwealth of Cuba must
be built with sound principles of government at the
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foundation, and with men-real men of muscle and
mind-for the builders. If they have not the faculties
of government fully developed, they have acquired the
primary aptitudes.




CHAPTER XVIII


TO-DAY
When and How to End Military Control-Position of United States
-Good Government from Without-Ruling by Decree-Transition to Civil Authority-Calling a Constitutional ConventionUniversal Suffrage the Basis for a Plebiscite-No Denial to Race
of Color-Assumptions of Americanization-Some Un-American
Influences-Arguments for Annexation-Mistaken Impressions
-The Latin Doubters-Cuban Understanding Is StatehoodParties During Transition Period-G6mez and His Foes-Protectorate as Actual Independence-Opposing Economic Tendencies-Sugar as a Factor-Choice of Popular Assembly.
TRANSITION of institutions may be during a transit of
flags. The standard of Spain is of yesterday. The
emblem of Cuba may be of to-morrow.     The flag of the
United States is of to-day.  The creation of a commonwealth is under its folds.
This does not mean an indefinite continuance of the
American. military occupation. Like other questions,
the one as to the time of its withdrawal is better met
frankly. No policy of avoidance will be successful in
dealing with these problems. The pacification of the
island may not be complete, but it is far enough advanced to look forward. It is in advance of industrial
progress, though the latter is not lagging. The question
of the near future is both when and how to end the
American military control in Cuba. It is of to-day,
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though by to-day should be understood not a few weeks
or a few months, but a definite period. To-day * is a
year.
Pleas may be offered for indefinite control, but they
fall away in the imperious presence of facts. Incentives
to vagueness may be urged on the ground that the peopfe
are so far from being capable of self-government that
they must be put through a long course of political
training. All the arguments for indeterminate occupation would in a short time force the necessity of a
declaration of such purpose, and such a declaration
would mean ultimate and coercive annexation. Sifted
through all evasions, this is what these pleas mean.
Before going further a restatement may be made of
the position of the United States with reference to Cuba.
That position is both of to-day and of all time to come.
The United States is a continuous intervening power.
In ending the Spanish misgovernment and the strife
which grew out of it, the American nation pledged itself
not to permit internal misgovernment in the future.
Whatever shifting there may be of policies, it is pledged
to prevent anarchy and intolerable internal conditions
just as it ended those conditions under Spanish sovereignty. It is also a continuous protecting power for
Cuba. Should an independent government be set up,
no bullying European nation could seize a pretext of
damages to its subjects and send war-vessels into the
harbors of Cuba to enforce the claim without reckoning
with the United States. Besides, in the obligations for
good government which it incurred the United States
became the protecting power for foreign subjects therein,
* October, 1899.
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whatever their nationality. So in every view the American nation has a moral protectorate over Cuba.
The immediate question is whether good government
shall come from above and without, or from within.
The military authority in its ultimate analysis is similar
to the control exercised under Spanish sovereignty. The
difference is that it assures good administration, freedom from official corruption and from oppressive taxation. But there is no misunderstanding that it comes
from above. In describing the military control, I have
stated its strength and what the American authorities
were able to accomplish through its arbitrary nature.
If it were of indefinite continuance the merging of a government of law, order, justice, and equality into the imposition of American manners and customs would be
hard to avoid, judging from the tendency that already has
been shown.   Don Geronimo Valdes might literally
walk abroad with his paternal bando amplified to the
degree of regulating public smoking and the wearing of
undershirts by the workingmen with reference to the
habits of a few thousand strangers rather than of some
hundreds of thousands of natives. And under American
rule it would be made more than ever manifest that
these regulations were in reality the regulations of the
military power. It would be the army which compelled
the teamster to wear his undershirt, for the local law
officers who enforced that order would rest on the military authority and would carry out its decrees.
The complaints of the multiplicity of government and
of rulers are a passing phase of the occupation. The
number of officials might be reduced and still the civil
authority would rest upon military power. The gradual
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widening of municipal government after the full framework of laws and regulations has been set up by the
superior military commanders may be a progressive
step, but it is not a decisive one nor one which meets
permanent conditions. The test of the capacity and the
willingness to respect authority-that is, lawful government-cannot come under army rule because it is the
army which enforces that respect. The limitations of
education in political self-rule under these conditions
are obvious. In its essence the American military control is as much government by decree as was the Spanish
authority. The difference may be a wide one between
beneficent government by decree and oppressive government by decree, as is shown under the American
administration. But the popular element cannot enter
largely into it, and that is the weakness.
So thorough is my own conviction that this fact will
be recognized, and so scrupulous has been the American
Executive in affirming that the military control is of a
temporary nature, that without further analysis I proceed to the subject of the transition from military control to something else. Undoubtedly before this point
is reached there will be a further relaxation of the military administration, and the high standard of official
integrity and fidelity shown by the American officials
will be given a deeper impress.
In the transition from American military control to
something else the preliminary step is to ascertain the
will of the people. It may be said that instead of a
constituent representative assembly to formulate their
wishes in the shape of constructive government, it
should first be determined whether the people of the
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island want annexation. The power to force a determination of that question before anything else is settled
undoubtedly lies with the United States, and if it were
attempted the verdict would be so overwhelmingly
against annexation that the only thing accomplished
would be to prepare for another election. There must
unquestionably be a plebiscite in ascertaining both the
aspirations and the wishes of the people of the island.
The natural process would be the choosing of a representative constitutional convention.  In that election
the issues would determine themselves so that the
opposing tendencies could be developed in the convention. Then the work would be submitted to the people
for their ratification or rejection.  This would be
another plebiscite. As the United States is at once the
intervening power and the only recognized authority,
whatever elections are held must be under its direction.
This may be done by direct Executive action or by the
sanction of Congress. The only important point is that
it be by civil instead of by military agency.
It is necessary to ascertain the basis of the plebiscite.
The declarations are so clear that a stable government
is to be formed by all classes that no question can arise
on this point. But with the tendency of the Spanish
colony, or the majority of its members, to continue as
Spanish subjects, when the time comes it will be found
that "all classes" who are entitled to participate in
determining the form and the formation of the new
government are largely and overwhelmingly the Cuban
classes. The foreigners, whether Europeans or Ameircans, will doubtless exercise an indirect influence, but
there can be no actual participation by them in the pro332




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ceedings to determine the form of the commonwealth.
It will develop that the only basis for the plebiscite
is universal suffrage. Americans are appalled at this
idea when they think of the illiteracy of the island.
The saddest chapter in the history of Cuba has been
said to be the educational chapter. It is in reality a
blank. With this in their minds, and with the further
thought that the blacks are the bulk of the illiterates,
Americans draw back and ask if the mistakes of reconstruction are to be repeated in Cuba.
The cases are not parallel. In the chapter on the
Race of Color I have sought to show that the blacks in
Cuba have reached a higher plane than the negroes in
the United States. Their situation is not similar to
that of the American negroes after the civil war. The
race of color in Cuba fought for the freedom of the
island. The blacks acquired political standing by their
part in the revolution. It assures the continuance of
their civil rights, but that in itself will not be enough.
They are not aggressive in demanding a share in civil
administration, but with their record in fighting for
freedom they will never be content with a government
in which they have no voice simply because the majority
of them in this generation may not be able to read and
write.
If a qualification for suffrage should be required, there
would be the question as to whether it should be an
educational one or based on property, or both. A large
number of the guajiros, or countrymen, are small property owners, but they cannot read and write. They
have all the conservative instincts of the property
owner. In the towns and cities where the vicious
333




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classes congregate, a fair proportion of these are not
illiterate. An educational test would enable them to
vote at the expense of the small landholders. Under
the Spanish Government the voting was so manipulated
that the influence of the small property owners was
lessened, and the influence of the clerks and similar
classes in the towns was augmented. Any efforts by
the United States to restrict the suffrage would give rise
to the feeling that the old Spanish practices were being
restored. And the Spanish Government itself in the
decrees proclaiming autonomy proclaimed universal
suffrage. That was part of the autonomous constitution. In actual operation it would unquestionably have
been nullified, yet it stands as an offer from Spain.
The United States can do no less.
As to the blacks as a class, neither the white classes
in Cuba nor the all-powerful American nation can deny
them their rights. There was neither color line, property qualifications, nor educational requirement in the
insurrection. There can be none in determining the
future government of the island. An Australian ballot
is. not necessary. The method of voting by word of
mouth, which until recent years prevailed in Kentucky
and other Southern States, will answer every purpose.
Various expedients will be suggested and various plans
discussed for limiting the suffrage in Cuba on the
theory that its exercise by all classes would be harmful
to the people themselves. In the end these plans will
fail, and the determination of the wishes of the Cuban
people will be on the basis of universal suffrage because
that is the simplest and the most natural way. It is
also the just way.
334




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It is an unpopular thing to suggest a doubt about the
early Americanization of Cuba. Nevertheless I venture
to suggest it in the sense which is commonly understood. The veneer of Americanism is one thing, and so
is the varnish. There will be plenty of veneer. The
prophets already see Cuba an English-speaking country.
My vision does not see it. So much has been promised
from teaching English in the schools that it is heresy
to insinuate a doubt. Nevertheless the American who
speaks Spanish will be the successful one in Cuba during the lifetime of this generation. The American who
depends on English-speaking Cubans or Spaniards will
be misled. In spite of the wave of English teaching
that has swept over the island, the mass of people will
not be touched. When country schools come to be
established the wisdom of forcing English upon them
is questionable. They will speak the tongue of their
mothers, they will think in that tongue, and they will
act in accordance with the customs and traditions rooted
in that tongue. These young Latins, whether black or
white, have waxen minds.  They show a facility in
acquiring a foreign idiom; but it will not be their thinking and acting medium of expression. The institutions
of which they become part will be interpreted in their
own language. And if the stream of immigration flows
in from the Mediterranean or from the slopes of the
Pyrenees, Castilian will be the native tongue and English the foreign language.
At one time the German colony in Habana and Western Cuba numbered one thousand members. After the
war there were four hundred of them.  Not half a
dozen purely German families existed. The German
35




TO-MORROW IN CUBA.


merchants married Cuban women. Their children were
gathered up into a school by the German consul-general. It was found that a very small number spoke the
language of their fathers or had any knowledge of German customs. Americans and Englishmen who married
Cuban wives generally had their children taught English; but the family talk was in Spanish, and the American talk was sometimes the broken language of the foreign country. Frenchmen, with more affinity between
their own tongue and that of the Castilian, also had the
same experience. The history of Louisiana for a century affords an example. Upper Canada, after one
hundred and fifty years, is also an example. The
leaven of genuine Americanism will be felt beneficially,
but for a quarter of a century or more it will be only a
leaven among a Latin people and an African population
assimilated to a Latin people. Good schools do not
mean that English will uproot the language which is
native to the great majority of the inhabitants.
Probably before the political future of Cuba is fully
unfolded, ten per cent of the inhabitants will be natives
of the United States. There will be a winter colony
whose numbers will grow year by year. Many wealthy
Americans with the charm of country life ever present
to them will purchase country estates on which they
may enjoy the palm-tree landscape and the azure skies.
Trades and mercantile business and small farming will
afford further openings. Yet with these inducements
the prospect is not increased that the field labor of the
country and the day labor of the towns can be drawn
from the States. This is what bids a pause to the loose
talk of Americanization.




.f       "TO-MORROW IN CUBA.
The Americans who settle in the island will intermarry
among the Cuban women; their vitality will be replenished by fresh immigration, and perhaps by themselves
revisiting the more life-giving climate of the North. Out
of this intermixture will come in time the best product
of the two civilizations. Types of it may be seen in
Cuba to-day where Americans, Englishmen, and Germans have married Cuban women. The rule is general
enough to be accepted as a principle that their offspring
combine the moral fibre and the physical stamina of the
fathers with the domestic traits and virtues of the
mothers. But these are only types. It will take fifty
years or two generations to develop the tropical American. When he is developed all the problems of government in the Antilles will be solved. Meantime it is not
well to assume that the tropical American is already
evolved or that a Latin people need Americanization in
the sense of losing their language, their habits, their
customs, and their own institutions. Many plants that
flower in the temperate climates wither when transplanted
to the tropics. The same may prove true of customs and
laws.
Nor are the un-American influences to be overlooked.
Were the United States to be judged solely by its official representatives, military and civil, the influence
would be without exception a healthy one. But the
nation has to be judged by all classes of its representatives. The buzzards and the vultures trailed their
flight in the van and in the wake of the American occupation. The adventurer from the Southwest who
had failed in everything at home, and drifted into
Mexico long enough to get a smattering of the tongue,
22               837




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appeared and told his contempt of Latin civilization.
He talked of dagoes, gringoes, greasers, and mongrels,
the superiority of the Anglo-Saxon race, the necessity
of "our folks" taking hold of Cuba and running it so
the country would be made to pay "us." Often he declared his preference for the gringoes, because the intermixture of blood in Mexico was Indian, while in
Cuba it was " nigger."
American promoters, with experience in securing franchises and concessions from city councils and State
legislatures, put in a prompt appearance. They knew
what the Spanish system had been. They were ready
to offer "gratifications "-bribes-with more effrontery
than had been customary under the old rule. They
sought out the insurgent leaders and opened negotiations on the theory that these men would have franchises and privileges to sell. Usually they proclaimed
loudly that their investments were contingent upon Cuba
seeking immediate annexation, but sometimes they
became partisans of early independence.
When the custom-house passed under American control
it was brokers from the United States who went about
whispering their ability to keep up the old fraudulent
practices in new ways. It was American agents who
sought out the merchants with promises of bargains based
on the assumption that goods could be imported fraudulently through connivance of the quartermaster's department of the army. Sometimes, too, it was an American
officer who heard of this proceeding and kicked his
countrymen out of doors. American firms were the first
ones caught in actual smuggling. American strumpetry
drove through the streets of Habana in blazoned coaches
838




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and proclaimed its presence. American drunkards also
reeled through the streets of a city in which drunkenness was so rare as to be a genuine novelty. Habana
saw more drunkenness in the six months following
American occupation than it had seen in sixty years.
American gamblers sought to dispute by new devices
the lean pickings of the gaming table with the native
gamblers. Americans first raised the color line and
appealed to race prejudice in the cheapest and most
blatant form. American braggarts swaggered through
the town with their hands in their pockets and their
hats tilted back. They shamed their fellow-countrymen
who were there on legitimate business into silence and
seclusion. They voiced their coarse criticisms of the
domestic customs of a people of whose home life they
could know nothing. The whole class of the buzzards
abused the American officials who refused to recognize
them as coadjutors in the work of uplifting Cuba.
They almost justified the bitter comment of one commander that American military control was necessary
in order to protect the island from American harpies.
Americans understood this phenomenon of the scum
floating across the gulf before the healthier undercurrents reached the shores of the island. They sought to
bear it with patience. Cubans who had lived in the
United States also understood it. Those whose home
always had been on the island, and the Spanish classes
least of all, failed to understand it. This class of
Americans is both of to-day and of to-morrow. They
always will be of the same type, claiming kinship in the
American nation, proclaiming the need of civilizing the
Latin races and offering themselves as missionaries of
389




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the higher civilization. If at times there is in Cuba a
disposition to doubt the superiority of Americanism, the
presence of these adventurers may help to account for it.
Persons who visit Cuba for a week, especially if they
happen to be officials, are impressed with the idea that
the majority of the property holders and educated
people, as well as a considerable number of the masses,
want annexation. The sugar planters and the business
men who want it call on them and tell them so. That
the sugar planters long for the assurance of a market
for their sugar the same that Hawaii has, does not
require much argument. The Spanish financiers and
merchants who want the American authority without the
Americans to compete in business tell them that a stable
government cannot be maintained except under the
direct control of the United States.
The Latin doubters confide their doubts to the inquiring and receptive visitors.  These are educated and
generally property-owning Cubans. They see with the
clearness of intellectual perception the dangers and the
uncertainties of the future. They tell of the quickness
with which the Latin blood mounts to the head, and
they distrust the capacity of their race to maintain free
government. They also saw the hopeless corruption
and oppression of Spanish authority; but while sympathizing with the aspirations of their people, they doubted
whether anything better could come of revolt. While
they were doubting, the blacks and the guajiros and the
educated Cubans who were not given to doubting carried
the insurrection forward.  These Latin doubters tell
American visitors truly that a momentary agitation
against annexation should not be taken as the deliberate
849    ' 




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conviction of the Cuban people. But their own influence is no greater than that of the doubter in other
places and in other circumstances. It is certain that
American officials will hear all the arguments and pleas
for annexation, but it is not always creditable to their
judgment that they go no further. For one thing, they
do not seem to understand that the classes who oppose
annexation do not call upon them.
Another point is thoroughly misunderstood. Of the
Cubans who lean to annexation not one has the idea
other than of immediate Statehood. The Cubans who
have lived in the United States have been residents for a
great part of Florida, Louisiana, and New York. They
know nothing of territories. Those of them who advocate annexation have no notion that if they were to seek
admission into the Union it could be on any other basis
than that of equality. The island could furnish accomplished Senators and Representatives in Congress familiar with the language and the laws of both countries and
ambitious of distinction. The honor of sharing in the
government, of taking part in the elections for President,
and possibly at a not remote period of having a member
of the Cabinet appeals to all the ambitious men. With
$100,000,000 of commerce, there would also be that
element of power. It is so improbable that annexation
sentiment in Cuba could be based on anything short of
Statehood that I have not stopped to discuss the prospect of the island asking territorial form of government.
If such a thing should happen it would not be a twelvemonth before the $100,000,000 of commerce would be
demanding recognition, and the agitation for Statehood
would be intense and ineradicable.
841




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With the greatest faith in the capacity of the mixed
nationalities in Cuba to work out their own destiny as a
people, and with the determination to encourage and
help them, it is very doubtful whether the people of the
United States are ready to-day to share with them the
full glory of American institutions. Manifest destiny
can wait a quarter of a century, but in discussing the
earlier future in Cuba there should be no misunderstanding. People of the United States should not turn
their thoughts to annexation when by it they understand
only limited territorial government, while the people of
Cuba who are turning to annexation understand only full
Statehood and equality in the American nation.
It has been noted frequently that the leaders in the last
insurrection were veterans of the Ten-Years' war-Maceo,
G6mez, Calixto Garcia, Maso, and others. The young
men never guided its fortunes. Many of them, especially those who have lived in the United States, are annexationists. Some of the older leaders want to see the
flag of free Cuba floating for a while and then see a new
Antillian star in the American firmament. The majority
of them still believe that the ultimate destiny of Cuba is
to be a part of the republic, but they say not now. But
if a change of feeling should come upon the people and
the drift should be toward annexation, neither old leaders nor Americanized young Cubans would be found
supporting a policy that was not based on Statehood.
In the immediate future, during the transition from
American military control to something else, the formation of Cuban parties may be on the line of Gomez and
anti-Gomez, though the National League may become
strong enough to retain an independent existence. GQ342




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mez is an old man. He gave his indomitable spirit to
the winning of the freedom of Cuba. That he may live
long enough to see in what form it shall be conserved,
and to have a potent influence in determining that form,
is possible. The Spanish blood in him is that of the
conquistadores devoted to human liberty instead of to
oppression. That he is capricious and dictatorial in his
temperament is true. That his ambition was to be a
dictator never has been justified by his history. He has
experienced both the gratitude and the ingratitude of the
people whom he served. The culmination of his influence was when he entered Habana on the fourth anniversary of the insurrection, and was received with honors
by the American military authorities and with acclaim
by the Cuban people. Their confidence in him was
shown when they overwhelmingly repudiated the action
of the Assembly in removing him from the command of
their dissolving army.
General G6mez has been called a soldier of fortune, a
mercenary adventurer whose sword was at the disposal
of the highest bidder. Yet Spain unavailingly bid millions for it. Agents of sugar planters vainly sought the
privilege of placing to his credit hundreds of thousands
of dollars in the banks of London and Paris if his orders
for the burning of sugar-cane and against the mills grinding were not enforced. No South American dictator
could have levied such a tribute. The son of G6mez
fell by the side of Maceo. His own life was risked
countless times, but'it was fated that the offspring who
was his pride and his hope should be the sacrifice.
There has been no change in the position of General
Gomez regarding the future. He declared that Cuba
843




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was neither free nor independent so long as the United
States administered its government. After coming out
of the woods he threw the weight of his influence in support of the American authority and in deprecating the
agitation for its immediate withdrawal. At all times he
showed his comprehension of the industrial conditions
which underlie the political progress of Cuba. But he
is not for annexation.
The belief that immediate annexation is not likely
to be an issue during the transition from military control to something else, has been indicated throughout
this chapter. While this opinion is put forth with diffidence in the face of confident contrary views, I venture
to follow it up and to indicate the possible lines on which
the division may take place. The mass of Cubans have
not changed their aspirations and their ideals. They
are, as when an American statesman * visited them during the dying days of Spanish sovereignty, united in their
purpose. The prediction of General G6mez came true
to them, and as an outcome of the struggle for independence every household had its martyr. But these aspirations, while clear, are not aggressive and unreasoning.
It is my own conviction that while the overwhelming
majority of Cuban people are not thinking of early annexation, they are not in a hurry to cut themselves
adrift. They recognize that the moral protectorate of
the United States is a fact. They have given more
thought than is commonly credited them to what it
means to create an army and a navy. The fondness for
military show may be part of the Latin character, and
there will always be that desire for military honors.
* Senator Redfield S. Proctor.
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But this desire is not an insatiate one, and it may find
expression in the creation of a rural police. A navy is
not being thought of at all, and yet the navy is a part of
an island nation.
There is another basis. This is the financial one.
Under any conditions when the military control is withdrawn and a different government is set up, the new
commonwealth will need money. The United States
advanced $3,000,000 for the insurgent troops as a loan,
and not as a gift. Further advances may be made for
the internal improvements under similar conditions, with
a lien on the customs receipts. It is an individual opinion, but I put it forth that this moral control and this
lien on the customs and the guarantee of Cuba's protection from European aggression is for years to come all
that is desirable by the United States. And it need not
be surprising if Cuban public opinion takes this channel.
Its opponents may charge that this is disguised annexation, but the disguise is so thorough that annexation
would not recognize itself.
A protectorate would be something more than autonomy. It would be an independent government for Cuba
in her internal affairs and in consonance with her aspirations. Many years would pass before such a government would be administered as well as the United States
could administer it, but that is not the question. The
certainty is that in determining the method of transition
from military control to something else, the Cuban people as they approach the reality will be the less anxious
to withdraw absolutely themselves from the American
influence, though they will justily and properly oppose
indefinite delay in ending the military nature of that
345




TO-MORROW IN CUBA.


influence. In these circumstances the Cuban public
opinion which turns to a Protectorate may be left to controvert the public opinion which demands absolute severance of the relations with the United States. All that
the intervening power can do is to assure the untrammelled utterance of these opinions; and if the ultimate
sentiment should develop for a complete severance from
the United States, it must be respected.
To-day there are two opposing tendencies. On the
surface they seem political and social. In their depths
they are economic. Commercialism  antagonizes the
instinct of nationality. Legitimate capital thinks it
sees quicker industrial recuperation and political stability under immediate annexation by whatever means
brought about. Speculative capital has no chance of
exploitation unless Cuba is made part of the United
States. It sees chiefly that annexed Cuba would mean
free sugar. If free sugar were sure, the present mortgages on the cane lands would be easily lifted. Their
value would increase at a bound. There would be an
unexampled era of investment in plantations. Money
that was seeking outflow in coffee culture, fruit raising,
dairy farming, and in timber lands would change its
course. It would all flow toward sugar-cane production.
Tobacco would be the only agricultural industry not
affected. Then the agitation would begin for more radical tariff legislation by the United States to destroy the
European beet-sugar bounties. With a profitable market gained, the next question would be the cultivation of
the inexhaustible cane lands. The first inquiry would
be for cheap labor in a mass. Efforts to get Chinese
coolies would probably be defeated because of the exclu346




TO-MORROW IN CUBA.


sion policy of the United States. Some negro coionization might be attempted, and the dregs of miscellaneous
labor would be gathered up in all quarters. This would
not be an encouragement to family immigration. It
would be harmful socially and politically. Ultimately
the planters would have to turn to the provinces of
Spain, but not until they had demoralized the whole
island. The end would be a Latin plantation as one of
the States of the Union.
The United States by force of circumstances made an
investment in Cuba. The investment is the promise of
a people who are capable of self-government. Whether
these conditions are met by encouraging a sugar craze
which has no definite source of labor supply back of it
can easily be judged.
Against this tendency of commercialism is the aspiration of the Cuban people. Its impelling force, though
not always clearly discernible, is the hope to have the
country populated by small landowners. The labor
which is looked for is not servile or cheap. The immigration which is sought is the immigration of the family
from sources which give promise of constant freshening.
It is not assured that the Cubans can maintain a government which will invite immigrants and insure the
repeopling of the island. That is part of the experiment which must be tried and which may fail. But it
is no more doubtful than the experiment which inevitably leads to the exploitation of Cuba as a huge
plantation, and which insists on settling the political
status before an approach has been made to securing an
industrial population that will be in harmony with the
political institutions.
347




TO-MOIREOW IN CUBA.


Foreign capitalists, especially the English and Spanish, are not concerned with the difficulties of government
which may perplex the United States. They are transients. They do not expect to be of the island and of
its people. Naturally they lean to the annexation idea,
and do not encourage small landholdings. Viewed as
a billion-dollar plantation, Cuba seems to offer greater
profit to foreign investment than as a country in which
the cane lands are to be diversified by the lesser agricultural occupations.
The Cubans are sometimes vague in their utterances.
They do not put forth clearly the reasons which govern
their motives. They realize the infinite richness of the
sugar lands, but they also realize the importance of diversifying the cane-sugar industry and increasing the
number of small landholders who will not be dependent
on the market for sugar. Their instinct is correct.
The interests of the American people seem to lie with
the interests of the Cuban people. Industry and commerce must be encouraged, but they do not need to be
stimulated artificially in order that great fortunes may
be made by speculation in cane lands or in other projects. The American people want the civilization of the
church, the home, and the school to obtain in Cuba.
They will seek the foundation for these in the economic
conditions which develop the independent life of the
small capitalists and landowners. Their patience will
be tried. They may be sure that in the various stages
of Cuban government human nature will be shown at its
ordinary level, and not at loftiest heights. But the end
will justify their patience. When the mass of Cubans
know that they are not being dispossessed from the
348




TO-MORROW IN CUBA.


country that is theirs, they will turn with intelligent
judgment to determine the ultimate relation of the island to the United States.
These are the natural processes. They are also the
healthier ones. They give time for the closer knowledge
and understanding of popular government in the United
States which should be the indispensable requirement
for sharing in that government. Americans on their
part should not be deceived. They should keep in mind
that the civilization of Cuba is Latin. They should not
blind themselves to the fact that the streams of white
immigration which are to freshen and renew the population of the border tropics must continue to flow from
Latin countries. American contact and example may
modify and mould this civilization, but cannot change
its nature in a single generation. For half a century
Cuba is to be understood as a Latin commonwealth,
whether it be an independent nation, a protected republic, or a State of the American Union.
In conclusion, if the majority of the people in Cuba
reject the idea of a protectorate and want to try the experiment of nationality, separate and distinct, with all
its perils, they must be allowed to try it. That a government of this kind would be more than an experiment
its most earnest champions and its well-wishers would
not assert. The first step toward testing the sentiment
and toward solving the problems and the responsibilities with which the United States is confronted lies in
the election of a constituent representative convention on
the basis of universal suffrage. The island is for its
people. Their welfare must be trusted to an assembly
of their own free choice.
349




APPENDIX A.


BIBLIOGRAPEIY.
SPANISH colonial history begins in the pages of Prescott and Irving. Three centuries of its record are almost
barren. The student who wishes to know its outgrowth
may start with the nineteenth century. He cannot do
better than to begin with Humboldt. He will find there
a survey of the state of Cuba which covers its physical,
political, social, and economic phases. Unfortunately
Humboldt, as presented in English, was the victim of a
zealous editor who imposed on American readers a long
preliminary essay and followed it with copious argumentative notes. This was during the period of the slave
controversy, and the editor was a partisan. It is possible to extract the real Humboldt from a mass of irrelevant matter, but a simpler way is to consult the original
French edition or an excellent translation into Spanish
which was published in Paris. After Humboldt comes
a long list of Cuban and Spanish writers whose works
are both historical and controversial. The official history of Spanish rule in Cuba may be found in the Gazettes of the Captain-Generals and the Bulletins of the
provinces. A summary of these was published two or
three times a year as a collection of decrees, orders, and
dispositions of the general Government.
The insurrectionary period of Cuban history, as well
as the political agitation, is reflected in current news350




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paper literature for the last thirty-five years and in an
avalanche of pamphlets. What may be called the Cuban
special pleading is found in a series of volumes which
were issued in the United States. The genuine insurgent literature, from which the spirit animating the revolution may be gathered, appears in some publications
which came from the printing-press in the woods, and
in a small newspaper Las Villas, which was the medium
of the official orders, appeals, and addresses of the insurgent military chiefs. Necessarily the times of publication were irregular, but the journal had an existence,
and its files are valuable. When peace came the old
book-shops of Habana also gave up insurgent literature,
which is an aid in helping to an understanding of the
struggle that ended Spanish rule.
The intellectual life of Cuba for a hundred years is
found in the archives of La Sociedad Economica de
Amigos del Pais-the Economic Society of Friends of
the Country. These archives contain the history of four
centuries. From them was drawn the material for the
most valuable works that have been published. Learning breeds sedition, and the society, if not under the ban,
was often under the frown of the Government. But it
proved that it was composed of true friends of the country. Its memorials, or reports, are of unusual value. A
modern librarian would be appalled at the confusion in
which the records and archives appear, but the honorable poverty of this learned society does not impair its
usefulness.
On what may be called the American side it is not
necessary to recapitulate the Congressional and Executive documents which define the attitude of the United
351




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States toward Spain.      They are all accessible.    Economic tendencies contemporary with Spanish political
rule are set forth for a series of years in the reports of
Consul-General Ramon O. Williams.          Concerning the
present military government in the island, its acts are
fully recorded in The Official Gazette. The industrial
and commercial conditions, as well as the financial system which are the basis of the tariff and other regulations, are discussed in the reports of Mr. Robert P.
Porter, special commissioner. Information regarding
the customs duties, the laws of mortgages, railroads,
public works, and other matters of interest are given
publicity in pamphlet form     from  time to time by the
insular division of the War Department.
Since the guardianship of the United States over Cuba
was assumed, many American libraries have been adding
to their shelves by books obtained in Madrid and in
Habana.    It is with the belief that most of those which
I have consulted may be available to the student that I
indicate the following list of references:
Antiguos Diputados de Cuba (Los). D. Eusebio Valdes Dominguez,
Prologo de D. Rafael Montoro. Habana, 1879.
Almanaque Bailly-Baillierie, Madrid, 1897-98-99. (Contains special
chapters with reference to Cuba.)
Asturianos (Los) en el Norte y los Asturianos en Cuba. Ram6n
Elices Montes. Habana, 1893.
Bando de Gobernacion y Policla de la Isla de Cuba expedido por el
Excelentisimo Sr. D. Ger6nimo Valdes, Presidente Gobernador y
Captain General. Quinta edicion. Habana, 1875: Imprenta del Gobierno. (The famous code of paternal despotism.)
Cuba with Pen and Pencil. Samuel Hazard. Hartford, 1871. (The
best book in English descriptive of the country and its people. Thirty
years have not lessened its value as a mirror of customs and habits.)
Cuban Sketches. J. W. Steele, former consul at Matanzas. New
York, 1881.
352




TO-MORROW IN CUBA.
Cuba y su Gente: Apuntes para la Historia. Francisco Moreno.
Madrid, 1887.
Cuba y sus Jueces: Rectificaciones Oportunas. (Answer to the
above.) Raimundo Cabrera. Sexta edicio'n. Pr6logo de D. Rafael
Montoro. Habana, 1889.
Cuba por Fuera: Apuntes del Natural. Tesifonte Gallego Garcia.
Habana, 1890.
Cuba en la Cartera. Antonio E. Menendez. Habana, 1895.
Cuba: Monografia Historica. Antonio Bachiller y Morales. Habana, 1883.
Cuba ante la Historia, y el sentido comdn. M. Benitez Veguillas.
Habana, 1897.
Cuba para los Cubanos: Folleto Politico. Alvaro de la Iglesia.
Habana, 1898.
Cuba y la reforma colonial en Espafia. Rafael Delforme Salto.
Madrid, 1895.
Cuba: Physical Features of;- her Past, Present, and Possible Future.
Fidel G. Pierra. New York, 1896.
Centro Gallego-Memorias de la Junta Directiva. Habana, 1898.
Centro Gallego-Memaoria de la Sociedad de Beneficiencia. Habana.
1898.
Cuesti6n de Cuba (La): H1istoria y Soluciones de los Partidos Cuba.
-nos. Juan Gudiberto Golmez. Madrid, 1885.
Cro'nicas de la Guerra de Cuba, Habana, 1895-96-97.
Crimines y Criminales de la Habana. Ignacio D. Ituarte. Habana,
1893.
Control of the Tropics (The). Benjamin Kidd. New York, 1898.
Cuestio'n Social en las Antillas Espafiolas (La). Rafael M. de Labra.
Madrid, 1874.
Collecci6n de Reales Ordenes, Decretos y Disposiciones. Habana.
1898. 3 tomos. (Contains the Decrees of Autonomy.)
Compilaci6n de (los) Articulos con Relaci6n al Ramo, de Loteria.
Habana, 1873.
Chinos fuera de China (los) y el Antagonismo de Razas. Federico
Ordas Avecilla. Habana, 1893.
C6digo penal para las Islas de Cuba y Puerto Rico. Madrid, 1894.
Diccionairo geogrdflco, estadi'stico, hist6rico de la Isla de Cuba. Don
Jacobo de la Pezuela. Madrid, 1863. 4 tomnos. (The fountain of much
valuable information.)
Due South: Cuba, Past and Present. M. M. Ballou. B3oston, 1885.
Ensayo Politico sobre la Isla de Cuba. El Baron A. von Humboldt.
Obra traducida a]. Castellano. Paris, 1827.
Esclavitud en Cuba (De la). F. de Armas y Ce'spedes. Madrid, 1866.
English in the West Indies (The). James Anthony Froude. London,
1888.
2335




TO-M1ORROW IN CUBA.
Froudacity: West India Fables Explained. J. J. Thomas. Phila.
deiphia, 1890.
Folletos escritos contra la Anexi6n de la Isla de Cuba 6 los Estados
Unidos. Antonio Saco. Nueva York, 1856.
Guia Geogrdfica y Administrativa de la Isla de Cuba. Don Pedro
Jose' Imbern6. Habana, 1891. (A valuable summary of the condition
and resources of the, isla-nd.)
Gui a de Forasteros de la Isla de Cuba. Habana, 1872, etc.: Imprenta
del Gobierno.
Gum' de Gobierno y Policia de la Isla de Cuba. Don Francisco Garcia
Morales. Segunda edici6n. Habana, 1899.
Gula de los Ayuntamientos. Habana, 1891.
Habana Antigua y Moderna (La.) D. Jos6 Maria de la Torre. Habana, 1857.
Historia econ6mica, poli'tic,a intelectual y moral de la Isla de Cuba.
Rem6n de la 8agra. Paris, 1861.
Historia contemporanea de la Isla de Cuba desde. 1801 hasta 1896. P.
Giralt. Habana, 1896.
Historia de Matauzas, D. Pedro Antonio Alfonzo. Matanzas, 1854.
History of the British Colonies in the West Indies (The). Bryan
Edwards. London, 1807. 3 vols.
Insurreccio'n de Cuba (La). Vicente Torres y Gonzalez. Madrid,
1896.
Insurrecciones en Cuba (Las.) Apuntes para la historia politica de
esta isla en el presente siglo. J. Zaragoza. Madrid, 1872-73. 2 tomos.
Isla de Cuba: Recuerdo de dos Epocas. Don J. M. de Andueza.
Madrid, 1841.
Ilie de Cuba (L'). J. B. TRosemond de Beauvallon. Paris, 1844.
Isla de Cuba: I-nmigracio'n de Trabajores Espafioles. D. Urbano
Feyjoo Sotomayor. Habana, 1853.
Libro del Ciudadano Eispafiol (El): Derechos Politicos y Administrativos. Jose' Sedano y Agramonte. Segunda edicio'n. Habana, 1889.
Leyes de las Indias. Madrid, 1847. 4 tomos.
Liave del Nuevo Mundo. Arrate. Habana, 1830.
Ley de Enjuiciamento Civil, reformada para las Islas de Cuba y
Puerto Rtico. Madrid, 1894,
Legislacio'n Auton6mica. Jose' Raul Sedano. Habana, 1898.
Manual de la Isla de Cuba. 8u Autor D. Jose' Garcia de Arboleya.
Segunda edici6n. Habana, 1859. (A valuable compendium of information regarding the Cuba of balf a century ago.)
Memorias sobre el Estado Politico, Gobierno y Administracio'n de la
Isla de Cuba. D. Jos6 de la Concha. Madrid, 1853.
354




TO-MORROW IN CUBA.
Memorias de la Sociedad Economica de Amigos del Pals. Habana,
passim.
Muerte del General Mace'o. Jos6 Mir6 y Argenter, Brigadier, jefe de
Estado Mayor. Camnpamaento de Manajanado, Dicierabre 22 de 1896.
(Imprenta insurrecta.)
Masoneria (La) pintada porsf inisma. D. Rafael de Rafael. Pr6logo
de Don A. J. de Vildo'sola. Madrid, 1883.
Masoneria (La) Apuntes Ilist6ricos sobre el origen en ln Isla de Cuba.
Compilados por Manuel iRuiz Inza. Habana, 1891.
Masoneria (La) Procedimientos de ia gran Logia. Habana, 1878.
Negro in Cuba (El). Por un Amante de la Verdad. Habana, 1866.
Pal's de Chocolate (El): La Inmoralidad on Cuba. Francisco Moreno.
Madrid, 1887.
Pasado y Presente de Cuba. El Brigadier D. Francisco de Acosta y
Albear. Madrid, 1875.
Peninsulares y Cubanos. Aurelio C. Silveria, y Cordova. Habana,
1891.
Partido Liberal: Segundo Anniversairo. Habana, 1880.
Partido Liberal Autonomista: Procedimientos pama la Eleccio'n de
Representantes. Habana, 1898.
Presupuestos Generales de Gastos e Ingresos de 1898-99. Habana,
1898. Imprenta del Gobiemno.
Penal Code (The) of the Islands of Cuba and Puerto Rico. Trans.
lated into English. Habana, 1898.
Prostituci6n (La) en la Ciudad do la Habana. Dr. Benj. de Ce'spedes.
Habana, 1888.
Restauraci6n Teocratica (La).- Fernando Garrido, Segunda edicio'n.
Madrid, 1881.
Revista Cubana (La). Habana, passim.
Sistemas Coloniales. Rafael M. de Labra. Madrid, 1874.
Los Yankees eniCuba: Pro Patria. Antonio P. Rioja. Habana, 1897,
La Guerra con los Estados Unidos. Adolfo Llanos. Habana" 1897.
La Invasion Norte Americana. Antonio P. Rioja. Habana, 1898.
(These last three pamphlets give an excellent idea of the feeling of
the ultra-Spanish classes towards the United States when war was
known to be inevitable.)




APPENDIX B.


TRADE PROSPECTS.
EXPORTS and imports are a good means of showing the
resources of the island and the opportunities it offers
for American markets. Joined with these statistics are
the possibilities of commerce as shown in the vessel
clearances, and tie sources of revenue as exhibited in
the customs and similar receipts. Those persons who
are specially interested in knowing what the inhabitants
of Cuba are buying and what they are selling will be
able to keep abreast of the subject by following the
monthly and quarterly statements published in the newspapers. A general survey may be had from a summary
of the first six months of American control. This information, together with that regarding the articles of export and import, is supplied in the following official
statement. I am indebted for it to Colonel Tasker H.
Bliss, collector of customs at Habana, under whose efficient administration the opportunities of Cuban commerce have been demonstrated.
OFFICIAI STATEMENT.
The principal exports of Cuba are sugar, tobacco,
cigars, honey, molasses, aguardiente (cane rum), wax,
sponges, fruits, minerals-principally manganese, iron,
steel, etc., from the province of Santiago; wood from
356




TO-MORROW IN CUBA.


Santiago and Puerto Principe; cocoanuts and bananas,
the latter two articles principally from the ports of Banes
and Baracoa.
The principal imports with their sources are as follows:
Rice, mostly from England and Germany.
Mineral waters, from France and Germany.
Oats, barley, and hay, from the United States and South America.
Olive oil, from Spain and France.
Codfish, from Norway and Canada.
Varnish and turpentine, from the United States.
Beer, from the United States, England, and Germany.
Cement, from the United States, England and France.
Coal, from the United States and England.
Coffee, from Puerto Rico and some from the United States.
Shoes, from the United States and Spain.
Onions, from the United States principally, some from Spain.
Preserves, from the United States, Spain, and France.
Drugs, from France, United States, and Germany.
Beans, principally from Mexico, some from the United States.
Cattle, from  the United States, Mexico, and Central and South
America.
Wheat-flour, from the United States.
Hams, from the United States and Spain.
Condensed milk, from the United States.
Crockery and crystal ware, from the United States, England, Germany, and Spain, principally from England.
Woods, from the United States.
Furniture, from the United States, France, and Germany.
Butter, from the United States, Spain, and England.
Corn, from the United States.
Lard, from the United States.
Machinery, from England principally, some from the United States.
Metals, from England and Germany, some from the United States.
Paper and pasteboard, from the United States, Germany, and France.
Hides, from the United States, France, Germany, and Spain.
Paint, from the United States, England, Germany, and Spain.
Petroleum, from the United States.
Chemical products, from the United States, France, England, and
Germany.
Potatoes, from the United States, England, and Spain.
Cheese, from the United States and Holland,
Silk, from the United States, France, England, and Germany.
357




TO-MORROW IN CUBA.


Canned sardines, from Spain.
Hats, from the United States, England, and Spain.
Jipijapa hats, from South America.
Salt, from England and Spain.
Linen tissues, from England and Spain.
Woollen goods, from the United States, England, and France.
Cotton goods, from the United States, France, and England.
Bacon, from the United States and Spain,
Dried beef (" tasajo "), from Uruguay and the Argentine Republic.
Wines and liquors from Spain, France, and the United States.
Eggs and poultry, from the United States.
[Author's Note.-The importation of these last two articles will prob.
ably disappear with the reconstruction of the country. The possibility
of the Southwestern States securing a share of the trade in tasajo, or
jerked beef, is worth following up. Dried beef, from the nature of the
climate, will always have a market in the tropics. In Cuba it is consumed chiefly by the negroes and laboring classes generally, partly on
account of its cheapness and partly on account of its toughness, which
renders it difficult of digestion, and for this reason especially preferred
by those who perform hard physical labor. Any one who travels in
the interior learns to value its nutritive qualities. The consumption is
chiefly in the tobacco regions of Pinar del Rio and Habana provinces
in Matanzas, and in a section of Santa Clara where live beef is hard to
procure. The price is eleven cents per pound in American money.
During the last year the consumption has been about 12,000 hundredweights per quarter; but this is below the normal amount, and is due
to the poverty of the people. Lately much of the importation has been
by way of New York. Spanish ship captains, both of steamers and
sailing vessels, were in the habit of buying large quantities of tasajo for
sale in Cuba on their return voyages from South America. Minister
W. I. Buchanan, in a recent report to Assistant Secretary of War
Meiklejohn, leans to the belief that some of the trade can be transferred
from Argentine and Uruguary to the United States, though he says
the cheapness of stock raising in South America makes competition
difficult. The process of salting and drying the raw beef in the sun
could be followed as well in the Southwest as in Uruguay.]
The following data furnished by Collector Bliss with
regard to receipts of customs funds are instructive:
Total receipts, sixteen ports from January 1 to July
1, 1899, were $6,983,705. Of this amount there was collected at the port of Habana $5,146,162.
Of the above-mentioned total receipts at all ports, the
358




TO-MORROW IN CUBA.


import duties were $6,229,905, and the export duties
were $388,960, the balance being from tonnage dues,
fines, harbor improvement taxes, capitation taxes, cattle
inspection fees, etc.
At the port of Habana during the six months the import duties amounted to $4,537,348, and the export duties to $386,114.
The order of the ports in the amount of collections
was as follows: Habana, Cienfuegos, Santiago, Matanzas, CArdenas, Nuevitas, Sagua le Grande, Manzanillo,
Caibarien, Gibara, Guantfnamo, Baracoa, Trinidad,
Tunas de Zaza, Bataban6, and Santa Cruz.
During the six months there entered at the sixteen
ports of the island, 2,227 foreign vessels and 4,487 coastwise vessels, making the total number entered 6,714.
During the same period there cleared from all ports
2,125 foreign vessels and 4,524 coastwise vessels, making
the total number of clearances 6,649.
At the port of Habana during the six months, the number of foreign entries was 1,031, coastwise, 889; total
entries, 1,920. The total number of foreign clearances
was 953, coastwise 850; total clearances, 1,803.
The total tonnage entered at all the sixteen ports of
the island was: foreign vessels, 2,477,562 tons; coastwise vessels, 735,696 tons. The total amount of tonnage
cleared was, of foreign vessels 2,351,936 tons, and of
coastwise vessels 707,152 tons; making the total amount
of tonnage entered of 3,213,258 tons, and the total
amount of tonnage cleared of 3,069,080 tons.
At the port of Habana the total amount of tonnage
entered was, of foreign vessels 1,292,960 tons, and of
coastwise vessels 124,420 tons. The total amount of
359




TO-MORROW IN CUBA.'
tonnage cleared was, of foreign vessels 1,227,234 tons,
and   of coastwise vessels 99,291          tons;    making     a total
amount of tonnage entered            during    the   six  months of
1,417,380 tons, and a total amount cleared              of 1,326,525
tons.
The course of commerce, foreign and coastwise, is exhibited at a glance in the following official tables:
STATEMENT OF FOREIGN VESSELS ENTERED AND
CLEARED, PORT OF HABANA, CUBA,
JANUARY IST TO JULY lST, 1899.
ENTERED.
STEAM.                      SAIL.            6
MONTHS.                                                            CA
Unite         Other        United       Other
1899.    Sates. Spain. Coun- Total. States. Spain. Coun- Total.  0
_1899, _         tries.       tate         tries.
January..    61    27     69   157     44      7     9     60     217
February.     58    17     47   122     32      1     5     38     160
March...     64    25     61   150     43      1     6     50     200
April.....    53     0     61   114     27      0    12     39     153
May......     56     0     76   132     28      0     6     34     166
June.....    47    17     47    11     10      7     7     24     135
Totals..  339     86 8  361   786    184     16    45    245    1031
CLEARED.
STEAM.                      SAIL. 
MONTHS. 1 
] Other                     Other            ^
United                     United
Stites. Spain. Coun- Total.  States Spain. Coun- Total.  0 
1899.        tates        tries.        tates       tries. 
January..     56    26     62    1-44   28      1     8     37     181
February.     45    16     47    108    26      1     6     33     141
March...     57    24     54    135    33      1     5     39     174
April.....    49     0     69    118    38      0     4     42     160
May......    52     0     74    126    19      0     7     26     152
June.....    49    17     49    115    20      3     7     30     145
Totals.....  308    83    355    746   164      6    37    207     953
360




TO-MORROW IN CUBA.
STATEMENT OF FOREIGN AND COASTWISE VESSELS ENTERED AND CLEARED, PORT OF HABANA, CUBA,
JANUARY 1ST TO JULY 1sT, 1899.
FOREIGN.
Jan.    Feb.   March. April.     May.   June.    Total.
Entered  Steam.     157     122     150      114     132     111       786
ntere Sail.        60      38      50      39       34      24       245
Total..217                  16 2700         153     166     135      1,031
Jan.    Feb.   March. April.     May.    June.   Total.
Cleared    Steam.     144      108     135     118     126      115      746
eare    ail..     37      33       39      42      2       30       207
Total.........      181     141     174     160     152      145       953
COASTWISE.
Jan.    Feb.   March. April.     May.    June.   Total.
Entered    Steam.      22       25      20      20      24       26      137
Sail..       88     114     130     135     161      124       752
Total.........    110      139     150     155     185      150      889
Jan.    Feb.   March.   April.   May.    June.   Total.
Cleared (Steam.        10       21      14      17      18      27       107
Sail..      110      96     125     147     140      125       743
Total........      120      117     139     164     158     152       850.. — 1-'.                                                           5.


Supplementary to these tables is the following information relative to the arrival and departure of passengers. It should be noted that the departures during the
months from April to October always have been considerably in excess of the arrivals.
361




TO-MORROW IN CUBA.
PASSENGER STATEMENT, 'ARRIVALS AND DEPARTURES,
HABANA, CUBA, JANUARY 1ST.TO JULY 1ST, 1899.


ARRIVED.
Jan.   Feb.  March. April.  May.   June.   Total.
United States....  3,618  3,486  2,634  1,675  1,329   951   13,693
Spain...........   369    446   1,106    342    745    613    4,565
Other Countries.   1,074  1,023    609    689    716    454    3,621
Total.........  5,061  4,955  4,349  2,706  2,790   2,018  2.,879
DEPARTED.
Jan.   Feb. March. April.   May.   June.   Total.
United States...  1,423  2,215  5,243  2,492  2,124    998   14,495
Spain...........   769    577   1,031  1,757  2,084   1,749   7,967
Other Countries.    231    235     256    869    243    122    1,956
Total.........   2,423  3,027  6,530  5,118  4,451   2,869  24,418




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