AMERICAN SLAVERY
DISTINGUISHED FROM
THE SLAVERY OF ENGLISH THEORISTS,
AND
JUSTIFIED BY THE LAW OF NATURE,
B Y
REV. SAMUEL SEABURY, D.D.,
AUTHOR OF "DISCOIURSES ON TIIE SUPREMACY AND OBLIGATION OF CONSCIENCE."
"Atqui nos legem bonam a ma]a nlulla ali nisi NATUiE NORMX dividere
possuImus."-Cice'ro De Leg., lib. i., sect. 16.'; CIVIL GOVERNMENT has been, in all ages, a standing publication of the Law
OF NATUR-E."-Bislop Butl6s, Ser., 1 Tim. ii. 1-2.
NEW YORK:
ICASOON        BRE O TIH E I S,
5 & 7 MERCER STREET.
1 861.




Entered, according to Act of Congress, in the year 1861, by
MASON       BROTHE RS,
In the Clerk's Office of the District Court for the Southern District of
New York.
STEREOTYPED BY                                   PRINTED BY
SMITH &    MoDoOGAL,                             C. A. ALVORID,
82 & 84 Beekman-st.                             15 Vandewater-st.




el f sePREFACE.howed by t
THn evil of sectional agitation, foreshadowed by the
Father of his country, is upon us; and the North and
the South are arrayed the one against the other.
One of the sources of our dissensions (in my judgment
the original and chief source) is the opinion that has
been extensively propagated, that slavery is a moral
and social evil; that is (though the words are not
generally used in their full significance), that it is wrong
in morals and disgraceful in Christian and civilized
society.
The fact that the Constitution of the United States
covers Slave States as well as Free, is reason enough, in
my opinion, why every man that lives under it should
assume slavery to be neither morally wrong nor socially
disreputable. Slavery is no more forbidden by Scripture than by the Constitution, but is permitted by both;
and I can not but think that modesty and good sense
should have taught all citizens and all Christians who
could not see the reason, of the permission, to take it
on the authtority of the Constitution of their country
and the Rule of their Faith, without an appeal to a
higher law.
It is clearly repugnant to the genius of our government to mix up questions of morality, religion, and social life, with our national politics; and, as slavery, in
some of its bearings, is a legitimate and often necessary object of municipal legislation, it is the mlore to be




iv                  PRE FA CE.
regretted that it should be complicated with questions
of morality, religion, and social reputation. Nevertheless, this has been done; and the natural consequences
have followed;-rancor, and hatred, and deeply rooted
alienations, such as no merely political discussions could
engender.
My aim is to help to withdraw from this vexed controversy, if it be possible, its moral, religious, and social
element; that thus slavery, when it is malde an object
of national legislation, may be discussed and disposed
of on merely economical and political grounds.
But to do any thing effectively in this way, it is
necessary to take decided ground. The political differences on this subject may be accommodated by mutual
concession and compromise, consistently with self-respect.
But it is not so with the moral and social question.
No bridge of compromise can be thrown over the chasm
that separates truth, justice, and honor, fiom falsehood,
injustice, and shame. The relation of master and slave,
and -the claim  of property involved in it, are either
iust and honorable, or unjust and base; and hence I
see no other way to adjust the differences that exist in
reference to this phase of the subject than to induce
men to examine and decide, on rational grounds, the
right or wrong of the question, before they attempt
to heal the exacerbations that grow out of it.
The decision to which I am brought on this point,
by an investigation as careful as I am capable of making, is adverse to the general sentiment in the Northern
States. I hope, however, this will be no bar to an impartial consideration of the reasons on which I shall
endeavor to sustain it. -With candid and ingenuous
minds I am sure it will not be.
And if ever candor and ingenuousness were needful for
any persn ons o  any subject, they are needful for us at




PREFACE.                       V
the North on this subject at the present time. Slavery
at the South is an immovable fact, accepted at first from
necessity, and cherished now (as its patrons tell us, and
I readily believe them), from  conviction.  With the
views which at present prevail on this subject at the
North, it is neither desirable nor possible that our Union
should much longer continue; not desirable, for antagonistic opinions on a subject of morality, religion, and
daily life, must breed constant and rancorous irritation;
not possible, for no government, however well-intentioned or however strong, can give permanent effect to
laws designed for the protection of slavery, among a
free and intelligent people who believe slavery to be
morally unjust and socially degrading.  The love of
country, therefore, the love of peace, the love of liberty
for ourselves, our posterity, and for all nations, no -less
than the love of truth, should persuade us to lay aside
the bias of party, our prepossessions in favor of great
names, and all our prejudices, that we may calmly and
candidly review a subject, which, in the present crisis
of affairs, involves more momentous interests than any
other of a worldly nature which can occupy our attention.
It has been the singular happiness of the American
people to have the greatest facilities and the best opportunities for acquainting themselves with the grounds
and real merits of every great national question which
has heretofore been submitted to their judgment. Men
of unrivaled eloquence and of consummate ability and
learning in their respective departments, have thoroughly
ventilated each subject of national concern, before the
people have been called upon for their ultimate decision.  This has been our great security for the principle of self-government, and the chief cause of its
success among us.   But in the opinions which they




Vi.               PREFACE.
have formed, or may form, on the point now presented
to them, they have not and can not have advantages
of the same kind. Congress may discuss slavery in its
economical and political bearings, and the Supreme
Court may determine the rights of property involved
in it, on grounds of legal justice; but they can go no
further without transcending their proper functions; and
hence the moral and religious question, which is really
in issue before the people, is one which the people are
obliged to determine without the facilities which they
have had for coming to a right judgment on other subjects of national interest. I mention this as a reason
why we at the North should be more ready to suspect
the soundness of our past opinions, and why our brethren at the South should have patience, and not mistake
the somewhat demonstrative opinions at the North for
our deliberate and immutable judgment.   True, the
anti-slavery storm has raged for thirty years; but what
is thirty years in the life of a nation?
With this brief premonition I commend the following work to the public, for whose sake, and not for
any private ends, it has been written.  By their judgment I shall cheerfully abide. If I am so happy as to
carry conviction to my reader's mind, I shall be thankful. If I fail in this end, I shall still have the satisfaction to reflect, not only that I have been actuated
by a good intention, but that I have promulgated no
sentiments which can array brother against brother,
and make a 1man's foes those of his own household;
nor indeed uttered a word which can give just occasion of offense either to piety or to charity.
S. S.
NEW YORK, Jan., 185i.




CONTENTS.
CHAPTER I.
PAGE
INTRODUCTION.-THE CONSTITUTION.-IN WHAT SENSE IT FORBIDS THE ESTABLISIIMENT OF RELIGION.-ITSELF FOUNDED ON THE LAW OF NATURE. —THE
PEOPLE AT THE TIME OF ITS ADOPTION UNITED IN THE SAME RELIGION.-NEW
DEVELOPMENTS.-HARMONY OF THE CONSTITUTION WITH NATURE AND REVELATION,...                                                    11
CHAPTER II.
DEFINITION OF LAW.-DIVINE LAWS BENEFICENT, BUT DIVERSIFIED IN THEIR
OPERATION.-DEFINITION OF JUSTICE, AND ITS RELATION TO LAW.-RIGHTS,
THEIR NATURE AND DEFINITION.-VARIOUS SORTS OF LIBERTY.-SLAVERY.AMBIGUITY OF THE WORPD.-DEFINITION OF THE WORD SLAVE,..     26
CHAPTER III.
THE LAW OF NATURE.-AN EQUIVOCAL EXPRESSION.-EXPLAINED TO BE A
LAW FOUNDED IN NATURE.-ACKNOWLEDGED BY ALL MANKIND.-DECLARED
BY REVELATION.-RIGHTS OF NATURE RESTRAINED BY ITS LAW.-EXTRACTS
FROM STANDARD AUTHORS,......46
CHAPTER IV.
GENERAL DIVISIONS OF SOCIETY.-TWO MAIN CLASSES.-THOSE WHO ARE IN
AN IMMEDIATE, AND TIIOSE WHO ARE IN A MEDIATE RELATION TO THE STATE.
-TIE RELATIONS EXPLAINED ANW ILLUSTRATED.-ORIGIN OF GOVERNMENT.
-RIGHTS OF WOMEN AND CHILDREN.-HOW PROTECTED,...     65




viii                        CONTENTS.
CH-AP TER V.
PAGE
THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED.-THE AUTHORITY OF THE STATE.-HOW LIMITED.-ITS RELATION TO MINORS. —TO MARRIED PERSONS.-ITS POWER OVER
SLAVERY,..                                                     76
CHAPTER VI.
SERVITUDE ORIGINALLY CONSISTENT WITH A STATE OF INNOCENCE.-ITS SUBSEQUENT DEBASEMENT.-REMARKABLE PASSAGE OF ST. AUGUSTINE,. 84
CHAPTER VII.
TIIE ORIGIN OF SLAVERY.-AT FIRST IN THE WANTS OF SOCIETY.-EXTENDED
BY OTIER CAUSES.-HOW AFFECTED BY WAR.-GROTIUS'S DISTINCTION OF
SERVITUDE INTO PERFECT AND IMPERFECT. —RIGHTS OF FATIERS, UNDER
THE LEVITICAL AND OTHER LAWS, TO DISPOSE OF THEMSELVES AND THEIR
CIIILDREN,............. 93
CHAPTER VIII.
ANTIQUITY AND EXTENT OF SLAVERY.-OPINIONS OF THE ANCIENTS.-TIE
DUTY OF MASTERS INCULCATED BY CICERO.-OBJECTIONS TO THE JUSTICE OF
SLAVERY DERIVED FROM ITS DEFINITION IN THE JUSTINIAN CODE.-TIE
DEFINITION EXPLAINED, AND THE OBJECTION SHOWN TO REST ON A VERBAL
AMBIGUITY,............ 108
CHAPTER IX
SLAVERY REGARDED AS A PROVIDENTIAL INSTITUTION.-CHILDREN FOLLOW
THE CONDITION OF TIEIR PARENTS.-INEQUALITIES OF FORTUNE.-MAN'S
NATURAL HELPLESSNESS.-REMARKABLE PASSAGE FROM PLINY,. 126
CHAPTER X.
SLAVERYAS A SOCIAL INSTITUTION.-GROUND OF IT.-QUOTATIONS FROiM GROTIUS AND PUFFENDORF.-SLAVERY AT FIRST INTRODUCED BY VIOLENCE.TRANSITION.-OBJECTIONS TO THE THEORY OF CONTRACT.-A REMINISCENCs,............ 139




CONTENTS.                           iX
CHAPTER XI.
PAGE
ANGLICAN THEORY OF SLAVERY.-SLAVERY AS FOUNDED ON CONQUEST, AND
UNDER TIIE LAW OF NATIONS.-QUOTATIONS FROM GRPOTIUS, LOCK, HOBBES.
-DEDUCTIONS FROM HIOBBES.-POSITION OF MR. WEBSTER.-LOCAL LAW.OPINION OF THE ENGLISH CLERGY,.... 161
C    APTER XII.
LIMITATIONlS OF AUTHORITY.-THE DIVINE RIGHT TO DOMINION FOUNDED, NOT
ON CREATION, BUT ON TIIE WISDOM AND GOODNESS OF TIE CREATOR.-ALL
HiUMAN AUTfrORITY LIMITED BY THE LAW OF NATURE.-AUTIIORITY OF HUSBANDS AND FATIHERS.-ERRORS RESPECTING THE LOVE OF OUR NEIGHBOR.TIE DUTY FOUNDED IN NATURE.-CONSISTENT WITH SERVITUDE.-COMPARATIVE INFLUENCE OF MUNICIPAL LAW AND PUBLIC OPINION IN RESTRAINING TIE ABUSES OF AUTHORITY,.......    182
CHAPTER XIII.
OBJECTIONS, THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL.-PROPERTY IN MAN.-OF NECESSITY LIMITED AND CONDITIONAL.-TIE WORDS OF TIIE CONSTITUTIONQUOTATION FROMi JUDGE O'NEALL.-BREAKING UP OF FAMILIES.-MARRIAGE.
-IN WHAT SENSE FORBIDDEN AND IN WHAT PERMITTED,....   197
CHAPTER XIV.
TIHE PERPETUITY OF SLAVERY.-NOT PECULIAR TO SOUTIIERN SLAVERY.-NOR
CHIARGEABLE UPON SLAVERY AS SUCII.-TWOFOLD SLAVERY AMONG THE
HEIBREWS.-RELATIONS OF TIIE DESCENDANTS OF AFRICANS TO TIIE PEOPLE
OF THIE UNITED STATES.-CIIIEF JUSTICE TANEY'S OPINION.-TIHE NORTII
AND WEST COMPARED WITH TIE SOUTII IN THEIR TREATMENT OF THE
AFRICAN RACE.-PROPHECY,.....                     215
CHAPTER XV.
THE RENDITION OF FUGITIVE SLAVES.-PROVISION OF THE CONSTITUTION.IN WIIAT SENSE TIIE UNITED STATES ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR TIIE LAWS OF
THE SEVERAL STATES.-DISTINCTION BETWEEN UNIVERSAL AND LEGAL JUSTICE.-THE LOCAL LAW IN RESPECT TO SERVITUDE DECLARATIVE OF THE
LAW OF NATURE.-FUGITIVE SLAVE LAW.-RECLAMATION OF FUGITIVES
AS A GENERAL RULE NOT ONLY LEGALLY BUT MORALLY JUST.-EXCEPTIONAL
CASES,........                    2. 226




X                          CONTENTS.
CHAPTER XVI.
PAGE
AFRICAN SLAVE-TRADE.-ALLEGORY OF ICARUS AND ITS APPLICATION.-CONSISTENCY OF GOVERNMENT IN RECOGNIZING SLAVERY AND REPROBATING THE
SLAVE-TRADE.-SEIZURE AND ENSLAVEMENT OF AFRICANS.-WHY DECLARED
PIRACY BY LAW.-THRE LAWS DEFENDED AGAINST OBJECTIONS DRAWN FROM
THE INFERIORITY OF THE AFRICAN RACE.-FROM AGGRAVATING THE HOpRRORS OF TIE SLAVE-TRADE.-AND FROM ITS ALLEGED DISCRIIMINATION
AGAINST SLAVE LABOR.-THE PROHIBITION OF THE SLAVE-TRADE ESSENTIAL TO THE SOUTH,...... 256
CHAPTER XVII.
ARGUMENT PROM SCRIPTURE.-STATE OF THE QUESTION.-INDIRECT INFLUENCE
OF CHRISTIANITY ON SLAVERY.-POLYGAMY AND WAR.-IOW FAR PARALLEL TO SLAVEIRY.-DIFFUSION OF KNOWLEDGE IN WHAT SENSE ADVERSE TO
IT.-CAUSES OF THE DECAY OF SLAVERY IN THE ROMAN EMPIRE.-CASE OF
ST. CYPRIAN AND TIlE NUMIDIAN BISIOPS,.....        280
CHAPTER XVIII.
CONCLUSION.-PRESENT STATE OF THE COUNTRY.-FREEDOM OF OPINION.EFFECTS OF ANTI-SLAVERY AGITATION.-CIIANGE OF OPINION IN THE SOUTH
THE RESULT OF A CIIANGE IN SOCIAL CONDITION.-THE EXAMPLE OF OUR
FATEIIRS-IN WHAT WAY TO BE FOLLOWED.-PROVISION FOR FREE COLORED
PEOPLE.-MODERN CIVILIZATION.-ITS POINT OF ANTAGONISM TO CHRISTIANITY.-TENDENCY OF THE VIEWS ADVOOATED IN THE PRESENT WORK,. 304




CHAPTER I.
I N T R O D U CT ION.
THE first article of the amended Constitution of the
United States declares that " Congress shall make no
law respecting the establishment of religion or prohibiting the exercise thereof."  This declaration is justly
dear to the hearts of the American people. It secures to
every citizen the enjoyment of liberty of conscience, or
the sacred right to worship God according to the dictates
of his own jhdgment, " with none" on earth " to make
him afraid." It puts the various denominations of religion on an equal footing, protecting all but showing
preference to none; and thus saves the people from a
prolific source of jealousy and discord. The dictate of
practical wisdom, it is at once the charter of religious liberty and a preventive of religious dissension.
It would be a great mistake, however, to imagine that
this wise provision of the Constitution was intended to
effect an absolute severance between government and religioon  The law of Nature, or the law founded in the
relation of creatures to one another.and to their Maker,
is the foundation of all just human laws; and the belief




12                 INTRODUCTION.
of its divine authority and sanction is the most efficacious
motive to the observance of these laws, and the most
enduring bond of human society.  This divine law, the
obligation of which has been confessed in all ages and all
countries, in opposition to which all human laws are
nugatory, and the belief of which underlies every variety
of religion, is undoubtedly assumed by the Constitution
as the basis of the government which it creates, and the
limit of its powers. To this extent the Constitution
itself is in alliance with religion, establishing its most
fundamental principles, and depending on its power over
the minds of the people for support.  Hence, the very
clause which forbids Congress to establish religion, restrains it also from  prohibiting  such  establishment.
" Congress shall make no law respectirg the establishment of religion," either for or against it.  It shall not
decree its establishment; for a law of Congress to this
effect, would, of necessity, involve the adoption of some
religious tenets in preference to others, or an alliance
with some denomination to the exclusion of others.
Neither shall it forbid its. establishment; for this would
be to abjure the fundamental principles of all religion
and of all just government, and consequently to destroy
its own function and to die by its own hand. Congress
shall make no law on the subject one way or the other,
but shall leave the government to that natural alliance
with religion which God himself has made necessary to
its health and perpetuity.




INTRODUCTION.                 13
If further proof be needed to show that this was the
design of the framers of the Federal Constitution, we
may appeal, among other evidences to the same effect,
to the Farewell Address of Washington, which, fiom the
unanimous approval it has received, is entitled to be regarded as an authorized exposition of their sentiments.
For having distinguished a unity of government from a
mere league or confederation which would be liable at
any moment to be dissolved by accident or passion or
other inconsiderable cause; and having insisted on a
unity of government as necessary to the welfare and
prosperity of the States, the address proceeds to impress
on the people the belief that religion and morality are
the main pillars of government, and to incite them to
the maintenance of a common government from the
fact of their agreement in a common religionQ  "It is
of infinite moment," are the words of the Address,
" that you should properly estimate the immense value
of your NATIONAL UNION to your collective and individual happiness;" and it then adds, as an inducement
to the preservation of the Union, " With slight shades
of difference you have the SAME RELIGION, manners,
habits, and political principles."  Religion and morality," it further declares, "are indispensable supports
of all the dispositions and habits which lead to political
prosperity."  It denies the tribute of patriotism to the
man who labors to subvert " these great pillars of human happiness, these firmest props of the duties of men




14                  INTRODUCTION.
and citizens.". It warns the people against the popular
fallacy "that morality can be maintained without religion;" and declares " that reason and experience both
forbid us to expect that national morality can prevail, to
the exclusion of religious principle."
Religion and morality both teach us to abstain from
injury, to keep our engagements, and to fulfill the relative duties of life.  So far they are agreed and work
together in harmony.   Considered separately and apart,
however, they are essentially different. Mere morality,
or morality not founded on religion, permits us to regard
the distinction between right and wrong, virtue and vice,
as arbitrary and conventional; as having no higher
standard than human prescription, no higher aim than
the temporal welfare and convenience of society.    Religion, on the other hand, teaches that the distinction
between right and wrong, virtue and vice is founded in
the will of God; that the obligation of men to do
what is right and virtuous, and to shun what is wrong
and vicious, exists antecedently to, and independently of,
all human pacts and covenants, and is in fact necessary
and eternal. Thus, what morality recognizes as rules
of convenience, religion: enjoins as the laws of God,
* "Religion and morality differ not only in the extent of the duty
they prescribe, but in the part in which they are the same in the external work. They differ in the motive; they are just as far asunder as heaven is from the earth. Morality finds all her motives here
below; religion fetches all her motives from above. The highest
principle in morals is a just regard to the rights of each other in civil




INTRODUCTION.                   lo
fixed and immutable, and binds on the consciences of
men by the fear of God and of judgment to come.
Very justly, therefore, are we cautioned (in the Farewell Address) against the delusive fancy that morality
can be maintained without religion.
I make no doubt that God has bestowed on every
creature its proper nature, and placed it in certain
relations from which a rule of action flows, and that
this rule is the will and law of the Creator.  But the
facts of history do not suffer me to believe that human
reason is competent to declare this rule with that clearness and authority which are necessary to command the
assent and to bind the consciences of the generality of
men. This blessing we owe to Divine Revelation; which
has not left us to discover our Maker's will either by
intuition (which is the proper guide of angels and not
of men), nor by the slow and uncertain deductions of
reason, but has delivered it to us in plain and authoritative precepts.  Hence when I speak of religion, I
must be understood to mean revealed relion; and I
suppose that the word religion is used in the same
sense in the Farewell Address.
In this sense it will hardly be denied that religion
society; the first principle in religion is the love of God-or, in other
words, a regard to the relation which we bear to Him, as it is made
known to us by revelation; and no action is religious, otherwise than
as it respects GoD, and proceeds from a sense of our duty to Him,
or at least is regulated by a sense of that duty."-Bishop Horsley's
Charge to his Clergy, 1790.




16                 INTRODUCTION.
is the foundation of human society; the ground on
which morality rests for its support and permanence,
the source from which it derives its purity and efficiency.
As readily will it be allowed that the American people,
at the time of the adoption of the Federal Constitution,
had one and the same religion.  The theory which resolves virtue and vice into social conventionalities, a
theory essentially atheistic and subversive of human
integrity, was abhorrent to the minds of the people,
and has left no trace of its existence in the Constitution
and fundamental laws of the Union.    The law of Nature, which is only another name for the religion of
Nature, has been assumed as the rule of conscience and
the basis of legislation; not the law of Nature as
dimly apprehended by Pagans and Mohammedans,' or
as perverted by wild and infidel theorists, but the law
of Nature as declared by Divine Revelation and embodied in the institutions of the Christian religion.  Hence
the sanction of an oath in order to the discharge of all
the functions of government, executive, legislative, and
judicial; and that oath administered in the Name of
the One God and on the Holy Evangelists.    Hence the
recognition of Christian marriage as the foundation of
the family relation, and consequently of the Christian
* I make no allusion to the Jewish religion, because I regard it as
essentially the same as the Christian; Judaism being Christianity in
the letter, and Christianity being mystical Judaism; that is to say,
the Jewish religion in spirit and in truth,




INTRODUCTION.                     17
family as an integral element of society.     Hence also
the absence of all constitutional provisions and fundamental laws which, in the remotest degree, contravene
the Christian religion or any of its undoubted requirements.@
Few   things, indeed, are more remarkable than the
unanimity which Christianity has produced, wherever it
has prevailed, in regard to the fundamentals of religion.
Differences of opinion, it is true, have always subsisted
among men, and probably always will subsist.        They
arise in part from the constitution of the human mind,
which is such that every truth that is lodged in it
generates new inquiries, and leads to speculation and
conjecture in regard to regions of knowledge yet unexplored and undiscovered.      Christians differ among
themselves, no less than the ancient Heathen differed.
But how unlike, the subject-matter of their differences!
The Pagan philosophers -differed from one another as to
the foundations of all religion, the Being of GoD, the
* The State of Delaware has expressly acknouwledged the HOLY
TIINITY and the Divine inspiration of the Scriptures, The 22d Art.
of its Constitution required every person who shall be chosen a member of either house, or appointed to any office or place of trust, before taking his seat, or entering on the execution of his office, in addition to the usual oath of office, to make and subscribe the following
declaration, to wit:
" I, A. B., do profess faith in GOD the FATHER, and in JESUS CHRIST,
his only SON, and the HOLY GHosT, one GOD blessed for evermore;
and I do acknowledge the Holy Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments to be given by Divine inspiration."




18                 INTRODUCTION.
origin of the Universe, the government of the world by
Divine Providence, and the reality of the distinction
between  good and evil, virtue and vice.     Opinions
which were then the badges of conflicting sects, and
divided the minds of the people, are now for the most
part broached only by the few who delight in paradoxes,
or who, having dug up some old error, hope to gain a
name by proclaiming it to the world as a new truth. In
effect Christianity has shifted our differences from the
foundation to the superstructure; or to speak more
accurately it has brought us to an agreement respecting
the system of Nature, and left us to make for ourselves
new differences in regard to that system of Redemption
which it has pleased God to superinduce upon Nature.
In respect to this latter system which revealed religion
represents as moving forward to its consummation concurrently with the system of Nature, the differences of
Christians are unhappily great and irreconcilable; but
in regard to natural religion, i. e., in regard to religion
considered as abstracted from the scheme of Redemption,
and as limited to the acts and agents of this world,
there can be no doubt, I suppose, that the various denominations of Christians, comprising at the time of the
adoption of our Federal Constitution the great body of
the American people, were substantially agreed.-,
* Bishop Gibson, in his second Pastoral Letter to the Diocese of
London, A. D. 1760, satisfactorily shows that the people of Great
Britain at that time, notwithstanding their multiplicity of sects, were




INTRODUCTION.                      19
The time that has elapsed since the adoption of the
Federal Constitution, has witnessed some extraordinary
and conflicting developments of opinion.      The mind of
the Northern and Eastern States-surpassed by that of
no  other age or country      in acuteness, activity, and
depth, excited by keener stimulants and vaster prospects, and yet thrown upon its own energies with no
hereditary institutions to steady it, with no learned
order to guide it, except in dependence on popular support (which means subserviency in the end to the
popular will), has germinated, as it were, with wild
luxuriance, and put forth, among many good fruits, not
united in a rule of faith and practice, embracing the most necessary
points of religion. The same statement was probably applicable to
their American descendants at the time of their separation from the
mother country. The summary is: " That the world and all things
in it were created by G.OD, and are under the direction and government of His all-powerful hand and all-seeing eye; that there is an essential difference between good and evil, virtue and vice; that there will
be a state of future rewards and punishments, according to our behavior in this life; that CHRIST was a teacher sent from GOD, and
that His apostles were divinely inspired; that all Christians are bound
to declare and profess themselves to be His disciples; that not only
the exercise of the several virtues, but also a belief in CuHaST is
necessary in order to their obtaining the pardon of sin, the favor of
GoD, and eternal life; that the worship of GOD is to be performed
chiefly by the heart in prayers, praises, and thanksgivings; and as to
all other points, that they are bound to live by the rules which
CHRIST and His apostles have left them  in the IHoly Scriptures.
Here then," he adds, "is a fixed and certain rule of faith and practice, concerning all the most necessary points of religion, established
by a divine sanction, embraced as such by all denominations of Cliiistians, and in itself abundantly sufficient to preserve the knowledge
ald practice of religion in the world."




20                INTRODUCTION.
a few crude theories of morals and religion. In the
prosecution of Moral Reform, Temperance, Anti-Slavery,
Woman's Rights, and other fancied schemes of philanthropy, it has contrived to divest some gross sins of
their deformity, and to convert, by means of penal enactments, some innocent actions into crimes. In a word,
it has proposed for our consideration, and made some
progress in forcing on our acceptance, a new church, a
new creed, and a new decalogue.   In the Southern
States, where the distinctions of society are permanent
and sharply defined, where the fountains of learning and
science are open to the few, and the many are confined
to bodily toil and labor, the tone of thought has been
naturally more conservative.  Slavery, whatever be its
real or imaginary evils, like all fixed institutions, unchanged in the midst of changes, has given stability to
society; it has been, and still is a standing protest
against the mental extravagancies of the New England
States; and it will probably continue to beat back the
waves of Northern fanaticism, unless the deeper and
hoarser torrent of Northern cupidity, following the precedents of history, roll down on the South to complete
the devastation which Northern fanaticism has begun.
Slavery is at present the great point of antagonism,
not so much, I think, between the North and the South,
as between order, conservatism, and Christianity on the
one hand, and misrule, anarchy, and infidelity on the
other. Had the institution been assailed merely on




INTRODUCTION.                 21
economical and political grounds, there would be nothing
to justify this remark.  Men mlay discuss the compa.rative advantages of free and servile labor, arl their
respective influences on morals and public virtue, just
as they discuss questions of tariff and revenue, and push
their discussions, as men are wont, with heat and passion, without endangering the structure of society, or
the stability of government. If the opposition to slavery
had been rested on these grounds only, it could have
done no harm, and might have been productive of good.
Had nothing more been done than to stigmatize slavery
as'a relic of barbarism,"' there had been no cause of
alarm; for as nations, like men, sometimes die of repletion, and an excess of liberty betokens decay, so time
alone can determine whether the South be really retrograding in civilization, or whether its Northern opponents, in vaunting their superiority, be not rather enacting the vanity of the ancient Greeks, or the impudence of the modern celestials.  But slavery is not
assailed merely on these grounds. It is assailed also
on grounds of morality and religion.  It is held up, for
the first time in the world's history, to the scorn and
execration of mankind; not merely for its abuses, but as
being in itself a violation of the law of Nature; the law
which is the fountain of justice, and in opposition to
which no government ought to subsist. It is true, that
this opinion is held with various degrees of consistency,
and with cunning adaptations to the demands of public




22                INTRODUCTION.
expediency, and the whispers of private interest.  Some
would have the "higher law" (as it is called), or what
they fancy to be its dictates, carried out at all hazards,
to the extent even of insurrection and treason. Others
aim to conform to it by some scheme of gradual emancipation, and by certain yet undefined changes of government.  Others, again, distinguish between slaveholding
simply considered, and holding slaves with the purpose
of emancipating them when Providence shall have opened
the way; denouncing the former practice as a sin, and
regarding the latter, if I understand them right, as a sin
divested of its guilt by the good intention of the sinner.
Some are violent, others crafty, and others both violent
and crafty; but they are all united in a detestation of
slavery as oppressive, unjust, and altogether repugnant
to the law of Nature; and, consequently, in either condemning, or justifying only on the ground of a stringent necessity or temporary expediency, all human compacts and enactments which are designed to uphold it.
And it is very observable that while the opponents of
slavery assail it as a violation of natural right, they are
not met by their antagonists on their own ground. The
defenders of slavery entrench themselves behind tle law
of the land and the Scriptures; but they do not, so far
as their arguments have fallen under my notice, defend
slavery on the ground of natural right. For the argument founded on the inferiority of the African race does
not come up to the point. It rests the relation now sub



INTRODUCTION.                 23
sisting between the races at the South on the ground of
an assumed expediency, without affirming its immutable
justice; and dominion founded on expediency without, or
against justice, is no better than oppression and tyranny.
If the existing relation is first proved and confessed to
be just and right, then indeed the fitness of the white
race for dominion, and of the black for servitude, is a
sound argument for continuing the relation, or for not
interfering with it where it exists.  But the mere fitness
can not create the relation; can not give the white a just
title to dominion, nor make servitude the duty of the
black.  For the doctrine attributed to the Stagyrite that
the Athenians might lawfully invade and enslave any
people who, in their opinion, were fit to be made slaves,
is, and I hope always will be, abhorrent to the religion
of the American people; and if slavery has no better
foundation than this to rest on, it deserves to fall; and
it is but natural that the energies of a Christian people
should be directed, if the way is open, to effect its extirpation.
Moreover, to rest the defense of slavery exclusively on
the l1w of the land and on Scripture, begets the impression that they are not on this subject in harmony with
the law of Nature; and the consequence is that the people are led, not only to speak contemptuously of the
Constitution for the protection which it extends to
slavery, but to disparage the Holy Scriptures also, and
to resort to forced interpretations to get rid of their tes



24                INTRODUCTION.
timony in its favor. The people, indeed, on the whole,
are as yet loyal to the Union, and attached to the
Christian religion; but they believe, for the most part,
that slavery is contrary to natural right (that is, that it
is a moral wrong or sin, though they may disclaim the
word); and starting with this premise, one oft two things
will probably follow; either they will pursue successfully one scheme after another, looking to ultimate
abolition; or, failing of success, they will become more
and more disaffected and averse to all union, political
and religious, of which slavery is an element. For the
public, in the long run, is a severe logician; and will
either abandon its premises, or carry them out to a rigid
conclusion.
It seems, therefore, in a manner necessary to bring
the question of slavery to the test of the law of Nature;
if for no other purpose, at least to remove, if possible,
even the semblance of disagreement or collision among
laws that are meant to conspire, with a divine harmony,
for the good of human society.  For no greater calamity
can befall a patriotic and Christian people, than a persuasion, even though it be a mistaken persuasion, that either
the law of their country or the revealed law contradicts,
in any point, the law of Nature, the eternal and immutable rule of the human conscience, which no man can
be expected to relinquish, and which the ministries of
God in church and state are really designed to develop
and confirm. For the law of the land in its legitimate




INTRODUCTION.                 25
design, and the law of Christianity from an intrinsic
necessity, pre-suppose the law of Nature, are declarative
of it, and reenforce it with new motives to obedience.
They form  together, in a normal state of Christian
society, a triple cord, binding us together as men, as
citizens, and as Christians in the united discharge of all
relative duties. To untwist this cord, and to remove
one of its strands, is to lay a tension on the others which
they were not intended to bear. Is it necessary to do
this in reference to slavery? Is not the institution
agreeable to the law of Nature, as well as to the law of
the land and to the Scriptures? This is the question
which I propose to examine.
2




CHAPTER II.
LAW, JUSTICE, RIGHTS, LIBERTY, SLAVERY: MEANING
OF THE WORDS.
As words are the medium of human thought, so it is
impossible for men to think clearly on any subject without first distinguishing their meaning, and using them
as far as possible in a uniform  sense.  Great confusion
has been caused in the minds of many, on the subject
we are about to consider, by a neglect of this precaution; and I shall, therefore, hope for the reader's attention while I endeavor to remove this obstacle by a
definition of some of the chief words involved in the
discussion.  And first for the word law.
By law (from the Saxon licgan, to lie down, or more
directly from its passive participle lagu,* what is laid
* Pronounced lauyu. Not only in the Saxon, but in the old English, the g had a liquid sound like our y or w. In an old copy which
I have of Erasmus on the Creed, A. D. 1533, given is spelled yeven,
and equal, egal; and the same power of the letter is still seen in the
words, anywise, otherwise, etc., which were written even so lately as
the last century, any guise, other guise: the wise in these compounds,
not being, as is commonly supposed, a corrupt form of ways, but the
same as guise (which means mode or method), and preservative of the
original pronunciation.




LAW, JUSTICE, ETC.              27
or fixed) we understand a fixed rule directive and
operative of good. In its highest form it is a rule
which the Divine wisdom lays on itself for its outward
manifestation; and in this sense the laws of God are
those rules which God has fixed in His own mind for
the government of His creatures.  In a somewhat lower
sense, it is a rule which God has laid on His creatures,
directive and operative of the end for which they were
created. The end for which all things are created is
good; He who created all things infallibly knows the
end and the best means of obtaining it; and therefore
His laws are necessarily directive and operative of good.
Human laws, indeed, so far as they are merely human,
and not a transcript of the divine, have necessarily the
alloy of human imperfection; yet still they aim at a
good end, and what we mean by a bad law is one that
fails to accomplish the good for which it was intended.
So that divine laws absolutely and in fact, and human
laws, in their design and in a certain approximate sense,
are not merely rules of action, but rules of action directive and operative of good.
It is well, however, to observe that the laws of God
operate in different ways according to the different natures of those creatures on which they are laid. The
laws of matter operate on matter according to the nature
of matter which has neither sense nor power of selfmotion.  The laws of the brute creation operate on
brutes according to the nature of brutes, which have




28               LAW, JUSTICE, ETC.
sense and the power of self-motion, but have neither
will nor reason. The laws of human nature operate on
man according to his reasonable nature, and in a manner suited to that will which is a part of his reasonable
nature: they oblige, but they do not compel; and hence
it happens that, while the laws of God effect necessarily
the ends for which they are intended on other creatures,
and on man also, as respects his bodily and sensitive
nature, they do not work these ends on our reasonable
nature without our own concurrence; God himself can
not compel an unwilling mind to goodness.
To avoid confusion, it is necessary also to distinguish
between Law and Justice, and to define their relations.
The word justice is sometimes used to denote an attribute of the Deity; or, to speak more correctly, it is
used to denote that absolute and inconceivable perfection
in the Divine mind to which the virtue of human justice bears a certain analogy or proportion.  In this
sense of the word justice, the law of Nature is an effect
of justice, and is established by justice; because it is an
effect of God, and is established by God, whose justice
is infinite.  In no other way, then, can we determine
whether a thing is agreeable or repugnant to the justice
of God, than by comparing it with the law of God.
This consideration, if attended to, would cut off much
idle declamation; for men are apt to conceive of the
justice and holiness of GOD after a picture of their own
imagining, and then to denounce things as contrary to




MEANING OF THE WORDS.              29
those Divine attributes, when in truth they are only
contrary to the standard which they have set up in their
own minds.
But this Divine law which is the effect of Divine justice is itself directive and operative of justice in the
minds of men. For justice considered as a human
virtue is the constant and perpetual desire of giving to
every man his due; a certain habitual rectitude of will,
which disposes us to render to others whatsoever we owe
them. Sometimes, indeed, the word is used by a metonymy of the effect for the cause, to denote the duty
done, as well as the temper which moves us to do it.
Thus we say that the justice of the magistrate leads
him to hear both sides, and that the justice of men leads
them  to pay their debts; and we say also that the
magistrates dispense justice, and that men in their dealings render justice to one another. In both senses,
however, justice is primarily the effect of law; for in
the former senses it presupposes law as its rule and
guide, and in the latter sense it is that which the law
enjoins: Jus est quod lex prcecipit.  For although we
may conceive of human justice as existing independently
of, and anterior to, human prescriptions and enactments,
and as even imitating the Divine justice by framing
subordinate rules for its manifestation, yet we can not
conceive of it otherwise than as dependent on some law
superior to itself: for if we consider it as a temper or
habit of mind, we find that it presupposes law, and is




30               LAW, JUSTICE, ETC.
guided by it to be what it is; or if we consider it as an
act we see that it is that which some law, previously existing, directs to be done.  And therefore we say that
justice, considered as a human virtue, is primarily and
essentially the product of a law superior to itself; of
that law which God has laid on all mankind; and
which, because it is laid -on the human nature, is called
the law of Nature. If we speak, then, with reference
to the first principles of human action, we are bound to
acknowledge that law takes the precedence of justice,
and to test our notions of justice by comparing them
with that which is the standard of justice, law.
We may consider further that justice is a relative
virtue: it has respect not to one's own self and possessions, but to the persons and goods of others. Who,
then, can conceive of justice, either as a habit or an act,
without previous definition of law? As long as men are
fallible and liable to have their judgment warped by
interest, prejudice, or passion, so long will they have
differences and disputes. And when arguments have
failed, and friendly arbitrations can not be had, how are
their differences to be adjusted and their disputes terminated?  In no other way, peaceably, than by an appeal
to law; to the law of the State on questions of municipal justice: to the law of Nature on questions of universal justice. If they refuse to abide by the law, or
can not obtain its decisions, they commonly either accommodate their differences by mutual concession, or appeal




MEANING OF THE WORDS.               81
to the sword as their final arbiter.  Inter arma silent
leges; in war it is not always justice, but often fortune,
or rather Providence, which has further and greater ends
to answer than those that respect the merits of the contest, that determines the issue: but while the laws are
operative, they are the wells and fountains to which men
resort for the distribution of justice.
I do not mean to affirm that this relation is never reversed.  Human justice, as already intimated after the
example of its divine prototype, may enact laws; and
these laws are of course the effect of justice, and not its
cause.  In fact most of the laws under which we live
are of this nature: hence many persons, drawing, as
men are wont, a universal conclusion from a partial
truth, are led to suppose that law, simply considered, is
subordinate to justice, and has no force against justice;
and then having raised justice above law    they are
naturally and necessarily led to resolve justice into an
instinct or feeling, or to make it the product of their
own crude notions and fancies; tempted thereto, perhaps,
by the old and secret prompting, "Ye shall be as gods!"
Whereas, in truth, and this is what I affirm, human justice could not originate laws, could not have an actual
or even a conceptional existence, unless it were itself at
first originated and guided by laws superior to any and
every manifestation of its own.  So that, if we trace
matters to their source, we find that justice is the offspring of law. as is law the offspring of God.




32              LAW, JUSTICE, ETC.
Hence the founders of States have sought to fortify
their constitutions by the sanction of divinity; and indeed (Oeoi voftot) that fundamental laws are of God has
been the common sentiment of mankind.
Another notion which it may be well to consider is
that of Rights-their origin and nature.
The functions of law are to command and to forbid, to
permit and to punish. These are the functions of the
law of Nature as well as of other laws. Some things
it commands; as, to live honestly, and to give to every
one his due. Other things it forbids; as, to do injury to
any creature. Now, when the law commands one person
to render a duty to another, it entitles the latter to demand that duty of the former; that is, it gives him a
right to exact its performance: for example, the law
that commands children to honor their parents, gives
parents the right to exact honor from their children.
Again, when the law forbids us to do some things, it permits us to do other things which are not forbidden; that
is, it gives us the right to do them. For example, the law
which forbids me to walk beyond certain limits, permits
me to walk within those limits; in other words, it gives
me the right to do so. Hence we see the origin and
nature of rights; which are no more than a power,
faculty, or liberty to have or to do. A natural right is
simply a liberty that a man has to exact something of
another which the law of Nature enjoins that other to
render to him; or it is a liberty which a man has to do




MEANING OF THE WORDS.              33
something which the law of Nature does not forbid him
to do. In like manner a civil right is a liberty to exact
of others what the civil law requires them to render to
us; or it is a liberty to do that which the civil law does
not forbid us to do. Rights, therefore, do not oblige.
The law may forbid or not permit me in certain cases
to waive my rights, and it may oblige and compel me in
other cases to assert them.  But rights themselves are
not laws and have not the force of laws; they neither
oblige nor compel us to any course of action, but leave
us at liberty; and if it be sometimes a duty and a mark
of spirit to assert and defend them, it is often, also (I
might say much oftener), a virtue and an evidence of
magnanimity to waive them, and to forbear to insist on
them.
That " all men are created equal " is, as our Declaration of Independence affirms, a self-evident truth;
and therefore not to be understood in any other than a
self-evident sense.  All men  have reasonable souls,
capable of willing and thinking and of moral accountability; and their bodies are made out of the same dust,
and are cast in the same mold.  Compared with creatures below them, they have the same natural advantages;
and compared with creatures above them in the scale of
being, they have the same natural imperfections. Their
natural wants and desires are the same; affecting present
good not (like the brutes) for its own sake, but as an
instrument to some other good beside and beyond it, and
2*




84               LAW, JUSTICE, ETC.
thus indicating a capacity for greater happiness than
this world can furnish.  All, too, stand in a common
relation to God as their Maker, and the Giver and Preserver of their life; all are created in His image; all have
the marvelous faculty of articulate speech; and all
have one and the same law for their rule of action; the
law, namely, of that reasonable nature which God has
given them. Like the variegated grass, no two blades of
which are exactly alike, while all have a general resemblance, so men, while distinguished from one another
by infinite varieties of body and mind, are yet all of one
and the same kind, and consequently equal in all the
essential properties of their kind.  The differences that
exist among them are the results of accident or fortune,
of their own acts or of the government of Divine Providence; but not of their creation. They are created
equal, and in all the essentials of their nature they must
forever remain equal.
In a word, men compared with creatures of other
kinds are equal in the essential properties of their kind;
but when compared with one another, and considered as
male and female, adults andT children, rich and poor,
sound and maimed, ruler and subject, master and servant, etc., etc., they are infinitely unequal; every man
being distinguished from every other by some personal
characteristic of his own. Both truths are patent, both
instructive. Our equality results from the constitution
of our nature; our differences result from accident or




MEANING OF THE WORDS.              85
fortune, from our own virtues or vices, or from the
allotments of Providence: the one suggests mutual benevolence and respect, and, inspiring a fixed sense of
human dignity, serves to allay the discontents and
envies, and to guard against the undue elations and
depressions of mind that are apt to be generated by the
other.
From this equality of nature results an equality of
rights.  The Maker of mankind has given life to them
all; He has granted the earth to all of them in common,
and to each one of them in particular a property in his
own person and labor; and He wills the happiness of
them all.  Hence all men have by nature an equal right.to life, liberty, property, and the pursuit of happiness,
subject only to the limitations of the law of Nature.
The natural rights of man, therefore-those that arise
from the law of Nature before the superinduction of any
other-law-are equal. For the very reason, however,
that men are equal by nature, have the same wants and
desires, affect the same things, and have equal natural
rights, they are liable to jostle and interfere with one
another,;'and to come into perpetual collisions, rendering
their natural rights useless to many, and infinitely precarious to all. In order, therefore, to prevent feuds and
dissensions, to provide for their mutual interests, and to
enable them to exercise their rights in harmony, they
define their relations, and their respective spheres of
possession and action; and, to give permanence to these




36               LAW, JUSTICE, ETC.
friendly and peaceable arrangements, they form  compacts and institute governments. These compacts and
governments, not contradicting the law of Nature (for
in this case they are null and void), but being agreeable
to it, are, when formed, bound upon the parties who
form them by the law of Nature, which requires men to
be faithful to their engagements  and bound also not
only on the contracting parties, ut, in many cases, on
their families also, and their children that come after
them.   Now it is evident that these new laws and compacts restrain the former rights of men, and create new
ones.  Men surrender some of their rights for the sake
of obtaining others, or they transfer their private rights
to a public person, for the sake of promoting their
mutual security and welfare.   These concessions and
transfers the law of Nature (while they conform to it)
does not permit men to revoke, and hence Nature and
Revelation require submission to the magistrate,while
the magistrate enforces the observance of these laws and
contracts. Natural right, therefore, is of no avail to
justify the infraction of laws and contracts to which we
have once consented. A man's natural right to dispose
of his own person in marriage is no justification of
bigamy after the law has tied him to one woman; nor
will his natural right to come and go whithersoever he
pleases and help himself to the fruits of the earth, clear
him from the guilt or penalty of trespass if he enters his
neighbor's field and reaps his corn against his will, and




MEANING OF THE WORDS.              37
in violation of the law which protects him in his property. That cruelty and oppression may justify men, in
extreme cases, in falling back on their natural rights,
few will deny; but for fancied grievances and imaginary
wrongs to disturb the just and peaceful relations and
settled institutions of society is, by the consent of all, a
crime that deserves the severest reprobation.
What has been said opens the way for a just apprehension of liberty, which I take to be a right to freedom as restrained and regulated by law. The natural
liberty of mankind is a freedom limited only by the law
of Nature; the civil or political liberty of a people is a
freedom which is further limited by those human laws
and forms of government to which they are rightfully
and actually subject.  Natural liberty is an immediate
gift of God to men, being bestowed on them in virtue
of that human nature in which they are created. Civil
or political liberty is a mediate gift of God to men,
being bestowed on them through the medium or intervention of those political institutions which He enables
them to form by His wisdom, and to preserve by His
providence.
There are other senses of the word liberty, to which I
shall presently advert, but on which I forbear to dwell,
because I consider them irrelevant to the matter in hand.
But there is an abuse of the word which deserves to be
noted and exposed. For by liberty men often mean a
freedom to do as they list, without regard to what is good




38              LAW, JUSTICE, ETC.
and just; to consult their iown present pleasure, without regard to justice, the good of mankind, and their
real and eternal good.     If I should say that there
was no such liberty, and that they who fancied they had
it, were really slaves to their lusts and passions, and to
the author and instigator of evil, I should affirm, indeed,
that which is true, but which might not carry conviction
to all.  Suffice it, therefore, to say, what none, I hope,
will deny, that there is no such liberty given by God to
any man, in any conceivable relation, or under any possible circumstances.  For suppose a man to be free from
all subjection to civil society and human laws, still he is
not at liberty to think and to act, as his fancy, or humor, or passion, may incline him. Even if all other
laws are removed, he is always and everywhere subject
to the law of Nature, and he is entitled to no other liberty, than a freedom to do that, and only that, which the
law of Nature permits.  Fancy and humor, instinct and
passion, are not laws; they are only the workings and
promptings of that lower and sensitive nature, which we
have in common with the brutes; and they are to be
restrained and regulated by the law of that reasonable
nature, which constitutes our resemblance to our Maker.
If men choose to call this state of lawlessness liberty,
let them  at least not degrade themselves and insult
their Maker by calling it natural liberty; for natural
liberty, or the liberty conferred on us by Nature, i. e.,
by the God of Nature, is a freedom to do what the law




MEANING OF THE WORDS.              39
of Nature enjoins, and only that which the law of Nature permits.
From liberty we naturally pass to the consideration
of slavery, which is a privation of liberty in some sort
and to some degree.  But of what sort? and- in what
degree?
Men are apt to think that slavery is the opposite of
liberty, and a privation of it; much the same as cold is
the opposite of heat, and a privation of heat.  Ask
them what they mean by a slave, and the answer will
probably be, that he is one who is deprived of his liberty; and, perhaps, after a moment's reflection, they
will add, that he is deprived of it for no fault of his
own.
But certainly there are many sorts of liberty with
which slavery has no manner of connection, and which
are common alike to the bond and the free.
Liberty sometimes denotes the power of choice and
self-determination; the opposite of this liberty is not
slavery, but necessity.
Sometimes liberty denotes the power to exercise reason and judgment in the direction of our conduct; the
privation or destitution of this liberty is not slavery,
but insanity or idiocy.
Liberty, again, sometimes denotes the power to think
and act on our responsibility to our Maker.  This is
that sacred liberty of conscience, the attempt to coerce
which, by intimidation and persecution, is accounted base




40               LAW, JUSTICE, ETC.
by all generous minds.  But this liberty is inalienable;
no man, whether bond or free, can be deprived of it
against his will; neither imprisonment nor death can
extinguish it; for the man who is resolved on his integrity can not, as the poet bells us, be turned from his
resolute purpose either by the barbarity of tyrants or
the madness of the people.*
Liberty sometimes denotes the habit of virtue and
rectitude.  Thus we say, that "the service of God is
perfect freedom," or liberty.  The opposite of this liberty is habitual pravity, and is said to be slavery in a
figurative sense, because its subject is under the dominion of his lusts and passions.
Liberty sometimes means the power to do this or that,
and to move in one direction or another, accordingly as
outward objects excite the appetites, or attract the senses
of the body. This liberty belongs to brutes, and to man
in virtue of that animal nature which he possesses in
common with the brute creation. The mere privation
of this liberty is not slavery; for men are deprived of it
when they are imprisoned or manacled, but they are not
therefore slaves. The order of human society deprives
all its members of this liberty in some degree, without
by any means reducing them to servitude.
* Justum et tenacem propositi virum
Non civium ardor prava jubentium,
Non vultus instantis tyranni
Mente quatit solida.




MEANING OF THE WORDS.               41
To liberty, in none of these senses, is slavery opposed.
For slaves and masters are equally free, within their
respective spheres, to choose and determine their own
actions; to exercise the share of reason and judgment
which God has given them; to follow the dictates of
conscience; and to go hither and thither as they are
moved by their senses, and external objects. All these
senses of the word may, as already remarked, be discarded as irrelevant to the subject; nor can I conceive
of any sort of liberty to which it can be reasonably pretended that slavery is opposed, unless it be bodily liberty,
or civil liberty.
And here we come to the point at which the road
divides, and the difference, indicated in our title-page,
begins to appear. For it deserves to be carefully noted
that the word slavery itself is taken in two senses, diametrically opposite: the one of which assigns to the slave
a certain status in civil society, and, consequently, reserves to him his natural rights, and assigns to him only a
limited subjection under the protection of Il-e law; while
the other puts him absolutely, and without reserve under
the arbitrary dominion of his master. No wonder that men
differ so radically on the subject of slavery, some denouncing it as abhorrent to nature, and a curse to humanity,
others extolling it as a divine institution and a blessing,
when they use the same word to represent things as wide
asunder as the poles! Thus I find Mr. Locked denying
Works, Vol. II. p. 165, Fol. Ed.




42               LAW, JUSTICE, ETC.
that men, either among the Jews, or any other nation,
ever sold themselves into slavery, and contending that it
is against the law of Nature for a man to be a slave with
his own consent.  But what does Mr. Locke mean by
slavery?  He understands by a slave one who is subject
to the absolute and arbitrary power of another to take
away his life when he pleases;" and he makes slavery to
be "the state of war continued between a lawful conqueror and a captive." And in this sense all that
Mr. Locke says about slavery is very true; but in this
sense there is no such thing as a slave in the United
States. If I turn to Johnson's Dictionary, I find that
a slave is'" one mancipated to a master; not a freeman 
a dependent."  Is slavery, in this sense of the word,
contrary to the law of Nature, and were none sold to it
among the Jews, or other nations; sold to be dependents
and bondmen?    We know the contrary, nor does Mr.
Locke deny it; only he calls this state of servile dependence not slavery, but " drudgery.' Thus we see that
the same word is defined by standard authorities to mean
things as different as light and darkness; the one making
slavery to be a state of hostile oppression and subjection
to absolute power, the other making it to be a state of
peace and friendship, and of limited subjection in a well
ordered society. How many strains of poetry, and
bursts of oratory, and teachings of philosophy that have
stirred our souls in childhood, and awakened our admiration in manhood, are suggested by the former sense!




MEANING OF THE WORDS.              43
And on the other hand, how many moving instances of
attachment, fidelity, and bravery come to our remembrance, when we use the word in the latter sense I What
man that lives, can regard slavery with any other sentiment than one of scorn and execration, if it mean what
Mr. Locke and his followers understand it to mean?
And, on the other hand, who can considter the ties that
bind the slave (in the latter sense of the word) to his
master, and the interest that he feels in all that concerns
his master's family and estate, and not have kindly and
generous sympathies excited in his bosom?
How far this equivocal meaning of the word slavery
is the cause of the extreme and contradictory opinions
that prevail on the subject, I leave to others to decide.
That some grave conclusions; and of a very practical
kind, are drawn from slavery in one of its aspects, and
inadvertently applied to it in the other, I shall endeavor
to show in another place.  But for the present I am
content to advertise the reader, that I consider the
definition of slavery, as given by writers on the Civil
Law, and adopted by popular writers on both sides of
the Atlantic, to be inapplicable to the state of society in
this country.  For it is a fact, which, I suppose, will
not be denied, that no one of the United States upholds
that form of slavery which makes the slave the absolute
property of the master.  And if I am  asked to state
precisely what I mean by American slavery, I answer,
that a slave is a person who is related to society




44                LAW, JUSTICE, ETC.
through another person, called a master, to whom    he
owes due service, or labor, for life, and from  whom
he is entitled to receive support and protection.
This definition comprises, I believe, either expressly
or by implication, all the essential characteristics of a
slave, in that form of slavery which exists in our
country.
1. It affirms that a slave is a person; and when it is
added, that he is related to society through another
person, it is implied that both are persons of the same
nature, and possessed of the same natural rights, and
owing reciprocally, the one to the other, all those human
regards which are consistent with their relative positions.
2. It affirms that a slave is a person who holds not
an immediate, but only a mediate " relation to the community in which he lives.
3. It affirms that a slave is a person who owes service or labor to another, called his master; in which is
implied, that his labor is not his own, to dispose of as
he pleases, but belongs to his master, to be disposed of
as his master directs.
4. It.affirms that the slave owes his labor to his master, not for a term of time, but for life; which implies,
that the master has a right to, or property in. the slave's
labor for life.
* For an explanation of these terms, see below, Chapter Fourth.




MEANING OF THE WORDS.             45
5. It affirms that the slave owes due labor to his
master; by which I mean, that he owes it only in due
measure, and in proportion to his abilities; and, consequently, that the master has the right to exact it only in
the same measure; not to overwork his slave, but to require of him only such work as is reasonable.
6. When it is affirmed that the master has a right to
the due labor of a slave for life, it is implied that he
has the right, also, to transfer that right to others,
under the same limitations, receiving an equivalent in
return.
7. It is affirmed that the slave has a right to claim
from  his master support-food, clothing, shelter, in
sickness and in health; and protection also from insult
and violence.
These several particulars will be more fully explained
in subsequent chapters.  The form of slavery which
they indicate, is limited, and not absolute; and I call
it American slavery, because it is in fact the form, and
the only form, in which slavery legally exists in any of
the United States. It is this limited form of slavery
which I purpose to defend; not by an appeal to local or
positive law, whether State or Federal, but by an appeal
to the LAW of NATURE, or the principles of universal
justice.




CHAPTER           III.
THE LAW OP NATURE. AND ITS RIGHTS.
HAVING defined slavery, and undertaken to compare
it with the law of Nature, in order to ascertain its conformity or repugnance thereto, a due regard to method
requires me to explain, more distinctly than I have
hitherto done, what I mean by the law of Nature.
First, however, in order to allay the fears of those
who think that all recognition of Natural Religion is
derogatory to Revealed, it may be proper to remark,
that the expression law of Nature is capable of a twofold sense.  It may denote a law founded in nature, in
the relations and fitness of things, and directive of the
common good; or it may denote such discoveries of that
law as have been made by human reason, in the unassisted use of its present faculties. The distinction is
obvious; for the law may be founded in nature, and yet
we, through the weakness of our faculties, or the neglect of our opportunities, may have failed, in a degree
or wholly, to discover it: as we see in geometry, which
contains numerous propositions capable of a rigid demonstration, while yet the generality of men know little




THE LAW OF NATURE, AND ITS RIGHTS.        47
more of it than its axioms.  In the former sense, the
law of Nature comprises all those duties which flow
from  the relations in which we stand to God and our
fellow-creatures; while in the latter sense it denotes no
more than those principles and rules of morality and
religion, which we, in the unassisted use of our faculties,
are able to discover.
To what extent human reason is able, in its present
state, without the aid of Divine Revelation, to discover
the law of Nature, is a question on which there is a
wide diversity of opinion.  Had men retained, and not
abused, that gift of reason which God originally bestowed on them, they would, probably, be able to discover, without doubt or perplexity, all the duties they
owe to God and their neighbor.  But the history of men
makes it pretty evident, that they have abused their
reason, and that, in consequence of this abuse, they are
unable to discover the will of their Maker with that
ease and certainty, which were originally in their power.
They can but spell out, as it were, with pains and labor,
those immutable truths which reason, in its pure and
unclouded state, could read plainly and without an
effort. They confess, indeed, universally their subjection to a law of higher authority than human edicts, but
they are perpetually liable to mistake, and misapply its
requirements.  Antigone spoke the voice of Nature
when, scorning the prohibition of Creon, she refused to
violate that divine law unwritten infallible, which is




48              THE LAW OF NATURE,
always living, and of which no man can say when it
began to dawn:'Ov8E, GOVEVeLV TOGOVT7rV 6CtO97V Ta C G
K17pvy/ya&S'a'rT' aypatrra K (a a  a a  e6v
v61uta GCvvacoat OvTrpov OvI' Vitep6palteiv.
oV yap rt vVV ye KUaT, (da2' d e r TOTr, rtr a,  o  e v e' a KOVr ovv v'  bo  d v I:
albeit, guided rather by her feelings than by her reason,
she was mistaken in thinking that this eternal law made
the rites of sepulture necessary to the repose of the
soul. All mankind acknowledge the first and elementary principles of this divine law, which, indeed, are so
easily apprehended and universally promulged, that they
are said to be written in the hearts of men.  Some
few of the ancient Heathen, assisted, doubtless, to some
extent, by traditionary revelation, have given us very
admirable discoveries of the same eternal law, in the
shape of elaborate deductions from its principles; while
to the Holy Scriptures we are indebted for its most
luminous, most concise, and only authoritative exposition. So that I may safely unite in an appeal to the
law of Nature, understanding thereby a law founded in
Nature, stable, eternal, and sufficiently known, especially
by Christians, to answer the ends of a law, without concerning myself in the inquiry whether men owe their
knowledge of it exclusively to Divine Revelation, or,
in part, to the independent discoveries of their own
reason.




AND ITS RIGHTS.               49
With the same propriety, indeed, that we deny the
objective reality of the law of Nature, we may deny the
objective reality of all other things, and so involve ourselves in universal skepticism. True and false, sweet
and bitter, order and disorder, proportion and disproportion, beauty and deformity, light and darkness, are differences founded in nature, and not merely ideas existing in our minds. That the whole is greater than a
part, that 2 is to 4 as 4 to 8, that a parallelogram is double
a triangle on the same base and between the same parallels,
are immutable truths, founded in the nature of things,
independently of our perception of them. Light and
darkness do not depend for existence on a man's eye, nor
beauty and deformity on his taste, nor sweet and bitter
on his palate; but they are real differences, founded in
nature, and upheld by its immutable laws. It is the
same in morals and religion. The nature of things, and
the relations which they hold to one another, are such,
that some habits and actions are agreeable to our reasonable nature and conducive to the common good, while
others are repugnant to our reasonable nature, and
detrimental to the common good. It is evidently the
design of Nature and the will of its Author, that we
should choose and practise the one class of habits and
actions, and avoid the other; and this will of the Author
of Nature, so far as it is discoverable by us, is to us a
law; a law laid in Nature, and always binding on men,
unless the Author of Nature see fit, for great and wise
3




50              THE LAW OF NATURE,
ends, to dispense with it, and to prescribe actions (as,
for example, Abraham's sacrifice of his son), which, if
the law were not dispensed with by its supreme Author,
would be an infraction of it.
Those actions which are agreeable to the law of
Nature, which are due to others by the relations in
which we stand to them, and are conducive to the common good (and the common good, be it observed, includes the honor of God, as well as the happiness of
men), are said to be right, virtuous, and dutiful; right,
as being done according to that straight rule which is
the shortest way to happiness; virtuous, as being eminently worthy of (vir.) man, who is made in the image
of his Maker; and dutiful, as being due to our Creator
and our fellow-creatures, in virtue of the relations we
hold to them. Actions opposite to these are wrong or
crooked, vicious, and undutiful. And we might as well
say that proportion and disproportion are created by the
rules of mathematics, the beautiful and deformed by
canons of criticism, light and darkness by the principles of natural philosophy, or true and false by the
ipse dixit of the metaphysician, as to say that right and
wrong, virtue and vice, are the mere creation of human
law. Evidently the distinction in the case last mentioned, as well as in the others, is prior to the decrees
and enactments of human legislators; prior even to the
written revelations of the Almighty; founded in, and
equally immutable with, the very nature of things: and




AND ITS RIGHTS.                51
the immutable rule which distinguishes what is essentially right from what is essentially wrong, is called the
law of Nature; not as if Nature had no other laws, for,
undoubtedly, the investigations of natural science, and
taste, and all the other branches of human philosophy,
presuppose certain laws of Nature to which they respectively refer; but, by way of eminence, and because of all
the laws founded in Nature that which distinguishes
right from wrong, and defines those actions which are
consonant to universal reason, and promotive of universal
happiness, is adapted, on this earth, only to the human
nature, and is incomparably the most worthy of human
consideration and study.
To discover and interpret this divine law, and apply
it to the regulation of human conduct, is the province of
reason. In matters of taste, the final appeal is to our
feelings. We can give no other explanation of beauty
and deformity in nature, than to say that the one excites
within us pleasant, and the other unpleasant emotions.
We consult the feelings of men as they are affected
agreeably or otherwise, by outward objects, and from
the facts thus collected we form canons of. criticism, and
establish, approximately at least, a standard of taste.
But right and wrong are matters of reason, and not matters of taste; and though we speak of the beautiful and
deformed, the lovely and the unlovely, in morals and
religion, yet what we mean is, if we would talk sense,




52             THE LAW OF NATURE,
not what is in the first instance agreeable or disagreeable
to our feelings, but what is agreeable or disagreeable to
the relations in which we stand to God and our fellowcreatures (which is a matter for reason to decide), and
to our feelings accordingly as they are or are not trained
to a just perception and appreciation of these relations.
In inquiries of this sort, therefore, feeling is to be discarded as a final arbiter.  For feeling can not explain
law, nor tell us what it prescribes, or what it forbids;
and no more can it comprehend the relations of man to
the universe, and define the actions which are congruous
or incongruous to these relations. Feeling can not inform us what actions are most productive of good, or
what of evil, to mankind at large, or to any individual
among them. The investigation of human duty, under
any of these formulas, namely, what is right or wrong,
becoming or unbecoming, good or evil, is exclusively the
province of reason. In inquiries of this nature, feeling,
even were men pure and perfect, would be of no avail;
and taking men as they are, corrupt and imperfect, it is
easy to see that it may become a fallacious and ruinous
guide. In ascertaining the law of Nature, therefore, on
any given subject, let us aim in the first place to be
guided by reason; and to consider actions as right or
wrong, just or unjust, good or evil, not by the feelings
which they excite, but by the feelings they ought to excite, and by their agreement or disagreement with those




AND ITS RIGHTS.                   53
principles and rules of moral conduct which approve
themselves to the reason of mankind.":
If it be said that every man must look for this divine
law to the promptings of his own conscience, I answer
that conscience is indeed the vicegerent of God in the soul;
but then I must contend that conscience is neither feeling
nor instinct, but that it is simply the reason or understanding itself applying its light to the government of its own
moral actions. But this light or knowledge by which
the conscience proceeds is capable of being reduced to
distinct propositions; and accordingly as these propositions are true or false, accordingly as they do or do not
declare the immutable law which Nature prescribes, the
conscience which adheres to them   and follows them, directs us either right or wrong, and leads us either to
good or to evil.
As those propositions which determine, or ought to
determine, the conscience, relate to the moral conduct of
men, and are designed to show us the consequences of
our moral actions, they are called practical, to distinguish them from others of a theoretical or speculative
kind. And for the same reason that those precepts,
* The origin and causes of the habit, now so common, of appealing
to the feelings for the arbitration of grave questions in morals and
religion, would form a curious subject of inquiry. The habit is very
flattering to indolence and self-conceit; and has, perhaps, been fostered by the word heart in our English Bibles; which in our language
denotes the feelings or affections, but which in the Hebrew, and also
in the New Testament Greek, comprises the understanding and judgment as well as the affections,




54             THE LAW OF NATURE,
which are designed for the regulation of the conscience,
are called practical dictates, the conscience itself is
commonly called by our older writers the practical reason, or the practical understanding. The terms are,
indeed, scholastic, and have now become obsolete; but it
is much to be feared that the disuse of them has helped
to blind the public mind to the true nature and office of
conscience, and to propagate the delusion which makes
conscience another name for self-will.
The dictates of conscience, therefore, in the proper
sense of the words, are the deductions which reason
makes, or is capable of making, or the discoveries which,
when made, she acknowledges to be true, of the everlasting law of Nature. Those dictates assume different
forms corresponding to the methods in which reason
proceeds. For sometimes we proceed in the analytic
method; and assuming that nature intends the common
good, that is to say, the honor and glory of the Creator
and the welfare of the creature, and seeing that of all
possible actions some one tends more than others to promote this end, we infer that this action is best to be
done. Or, proceeding in the synthetic way, we prove
that some actions are suited to our reasonable and social
nature, and to the relations in which we are placed to
God and our fellow-creatures, and that others are unsuited; and thence argue that the former are fit and
ought to be done, and that the latter are unfit and ought
not to be done. Moreover, regarding the good and evil




AND ITS RIGHTS.                55
consequences of our actions as the sanctions annexed by
Nature to the rule which she prescribes, and as imparting to it the force of a law, reason, in the name of God,
lays on herself the obligation to do those things which
are agreeable to the rule, and to avoid the contrary, and
thus delivers her dictates in the form of commands.
But, whichsoever of these forms be adopted, the result
is the same; for whether my reason judges a thing to
be best, or tells me that I ought to do it, or commands
me to do it, I am equally obliged to do it,:
Proceeding in one or other of these methods, reason
discovers to us, and devolves upon us, our obligation to
practise those primary duties which we owe to God, to
ourselves and our fellow-creatures; such as piety to God
and benevolence to men, sobriety and chastity, prudence and constancy, moderation and equity, fidelity and
gratitude, innocence and rectitude, candor and honesty,
and in general all those virtues which are suited to our
reasonable and sociable nature, and to the relations and
circumstances in which we are placed, and which promote the honor of God and the good of men, and form
us to the habits of self-control. From the obligation of
these virtues are deduced those precepts which enjoin us
to love and reverence our Maker, to be grateful to parents and benefactors, to do no harm to the innocent, to
be faithful in our observance of compacts, and others of
* See Cumberland's Laws of Nature, c. 4.




56              THE LAW   OF NATURE,
a similar nature.   These virtues, indeed, have been
taught, and these precepts delivered in the Holy Scriptures with wonderful plainness and with divine authority.
But they are not original with the Scriptures. The Ten
Commandments, which are a digest of them made by the
finger of God, were no new law at the time they were
delivered, but declarative: of that eternal law which
dawned forth in the creation; a law founded not in the
opinions of men, but in the reason and nature of things;
engraven, as it were, on the heart of every man; confessed by all nations, and contradicted by none; and expressed with great clearness and force by some Heathen
moralists as well as by Christian divines. This is that
LAW oF NATURE which is of higher origin than human
authority, and unalterable by senate or people.  For, as
Cicero admirably argues, if the laws of the people, and
the decrees of princes, are constitutive, and not merely
declarative, of right and justice, then robbery, adultery,
and forgery would be right and virtuous, if once they
were enacted by the decrees and ordinances of the multitude; and if, as with bitter irony he adds, there be
such rare virtue in the suffrages of fools as to change
the nature of things, why do they not ordain by their
votes that poison be accounted healthy food? and if theiv
* The only exception is in relation to a part of the fourth commandment,,which is declarative of the law of Nature, in so far as it
requires us to set apart a portion of our time to the service of religion,
but positive and arbitrary in so far as it specifies that portion, and
makes it to be every seventh day.




AND ITS RIGHTS.                      57
laws can make right out of wrong, why can not they
make those things preserve life, which naturally destroy it? "
From the law of Nature spring the rights of Nature;
which, as already intimated, are of two kinds. The first
kind comprises those rights which consist in a liberty to
exact of others,what the law     of Nature requires them
to render to us; and the second comprises those rights
which authorize us to have, or to do, all that the law of
Nature does not forbid.
Of the former kind there are evidently two sorts
which, for the sake of distinction, we may call direct
and indirect.    The former is created by the direct constitution of Nature, and without the intervention of any
act on the part of the person, from     whom    obedience is
exacted, to authorize this exaction; as, for example, the
* Quod si populorum jussis, si principum decretis, si sententiis
judicum, jura constituerentur; jus esset latrocinari; jus, adulterare;
jus testamenta falsa supponere, si hbec suffragiis, aut scitis multitudinis probarentur.  Qune si tanta potestas est stultorum sententiis
atque jussis, ut eorum suffragiis rerum natura vertatur; cur non sanciuntj'ut quee mala perniciosaque sunt, habeantur pro bonis ac salutaribus? aut cur, cum jus'ex injuria lex facere possit, bonum eadem
facere non possit ex malo? And he adds, that a good law is distinguished from a bad by no other rule than that of nature; and that
the distinction not only of right and wrong, but of all virtues and
vices, is in like manner founded in nature. Atqui nos legem bonam
a mnal null, alia nisi naturwe norma dividere possumus. Nec solun
jus et injuria a naturd dijudicantur, sed omnino omnia honesta ac
turpia, nam et communis intelligentia nobis notas res efficit, easque in
animis nostris inchoavit, ut honesta in virtute ponantur, in vitiis turpia.-De Legibus, lib. 1, sect. 16.
3*




58               THE LAW OF NATURE,
right of parents over their children.  Rights of the
latter sort presuppose the intervention of such an act,
and may therefore be said to be indirectly created. For
example: the law of Nature (and not only the law of
the land) gives the supreme magistrate, in every settled
commonwealth, a right to exact obedience of the subject;
but then it supposes the previous consent of the subject,
either expressed or implied, to the magistrate's authority. In this case, the right of the magistrate may be
called a natural right, inasmuch as it is created by
natural law; but the right is evidently of a different
sort from one which would give the magistrate liberty to
exact obedience without the subject's consent.
Of the former sort of rights, or those which grow out
of the direct constitution of nature, I am not aware
that there is any variety. Nature gives the parent a
right to exact obedience from his child; but besides this,
I know of no instance in which Nature gives one man
a direct right to exercise dominion over another. Even the
right of the husband over the wife is not directly bestowed on him by Nature, but is obtained in the first
instance by the consent of the woman or of her parents.
And so, in all cases, that of parents alone excepted, the
right of dominion, when bestowed by the law of Nature,
is bestowed only in virtue of some act, expressed or implied, on the part of the subject to justify it; whence it
is, I suppose, that we have in the Decalogue, which is
declarative of the law of Nature, an express command to




AND ITS RIGHTS.                59
honor father and mother, but no express command to
defer to any other human authority; the obligation to obey
the magistrate, and others invested with lawful authority
over us, being enjoined only by implication, and in
consequence of that analogy which other lawful authority bears to the parental.
Natural rights of the other kind, or such as consist in
a liberty to have, or to do, what the law of Nature does
not forbid, are numerous.  The chief of them are, a
right to self-preservation; Aa right to life and limb and
the products of our labor; a right to personal liberty,
and a right to the pursuit of happiness.
It should be well observed, however, that the rights
of Nature are necessarily limited by the law of Nature.
For right, being a liberty to have or to do what the law
permits, perishes and becomes extinct directly it leads us
to do what the law forbids. The rights of Nature,
therefore, are a nullity, the moment they are exercised
in violation of the law of Nature; inasmuch as their
very essence consists in a liberty to do that, and only
that, which is consistent with the law of Nature.
Of the limitation of rights of the former kind, or
those which entitle us to exact what is due to us from
others, I shall have occasion to speak in a future chapter; and shall conclude the present chapter with a brief
review of rights of the latter kind. And, first, of the
right of self-preservation.
Hobbes, who has been more successful in poisoning




60             THE LAW OF NATURE,
the mind of Great Britain (and, consequently, of this
country) with infidel error than have all her clergy in
imbuing it with Christian doctrine (for a fool or a madman may destroy in a day more than a hundred skillful
architects can build up in a year); Hobbes, I say, opens
the fourteenth chapter of his Leviathan, by telling us
that " The right of nature, which writers commonly call
Jus Naturale, is the liberty each man hath to use his
own power for the preservation of his own nature; that
is to say, of his own life; and, consequently, of doing
any thing which, in his own judgment and reason, he
shall conceive to be the aptest means thereunto." Hence,
I suppose, the maxim, which is now-a-days in every
body's mouth, that " Self-preservation (meaning thereby
the preservation of one's bodily life) is the first law of
nature."  One is ashamed to think that such a maxim
can have currency in a Christian country, when the
very heathen have taught us, both by doctrine and illustrious examples, that it is better to die virtuously than
to live dishonorably. I shall not stop to refute the fallacies of Hobbes, but shall merely affirm, what I am sure
none but an atheist will deny, that no man has an absolute right to preserve his own life, but that every man
holds the right under these two limitations; first, that if
religion or the public welfare demand it, he is ready to
part with it: and, second, that in preserving his own life,
he will do wrong to no innocent person. For, as Bishop
Lucy eloquently says (Obser. on Lev., p. 167; London,




AND ITS RIGHTS.                61
A. D. 1663): "To live only, is to be a beast, a plant
only; but to live virtuously and reasonably, to glorify
that God who gave him those abilities by which his life
is happy, that is the end of man, and of man's life;
which he is to leave then, when he can not enjoy it upon
these conditions; and to a Christian man, as to the best
of philosophers who had thoughts and assurance of eternity, this lfe hath been reputed of little value, and to
die, no misery; because it is but the passage to a better
and more spiritual life, although perhaps there may be
some difficulties in opening the gate."
The same, mutatis mutandis, may be said of the
other rights of Nature. They are none of them absolute,
but are all limited by that law of Nature which creates
them. They, therefore, vanish and expire the instant
they are exerted in violation of the obligation which is
imposed on every man to promote the common good; in
other words, to live for God, and for his fellow-creatures,
and for life eternal. It is the foulest of moral leprosy to
assert these rights in defiance of the law which creates
them.  Men have the right to life and limb, and the
products of their own labor, the right to preserve their
liberty, the right to pursue their happiness, not as they
please, but only under the restraints of that Eternal Law
which commands them to keep compacts inviolate, to do
no harm to the innocent, and, in a word, to fulfill the
dictates of universal justice. To vindicate natural rights,
therefore (supposing them to be infringed), or to encour



62             TIE LAW OF NATURE,
age others to vindicate them, by means of theft, robbery, and murder; is, indeed, in all righteous judgment,
"to sow the wind, and reap the whirlwind;"' for rights,
so vindicated, vanish, and only the guilt remains of
having violated the Eternal Law which created them.
P. S. The following descriptions or definitions of the
law of Nature are principally taken from authors who
have treated professedly on the subject. These authors,
though two of them were civilians, were all eminent in
Christian theology; and hence they must have thought
that not only the Decalogue, but also the precepts of our
Blessed Lord and His Apostles, except so far as they relate to external religion, are declarative of a prior law
inlaid in Nature by its divine Author.' The law of Nature," says Dr. Jortin, "' is the primary and original law of God, the eternal and unchangeable law of morality, which necessarily arises
from the nature of rational creatures, and from their relation to God and to each other. And so the wisdom
of this law is the very same as the wisdom of God's
creation itself. For God hath so made us, that, if we
would behave ourselves towards one another, according
to our power and abilities, according to the best of our
judgment, to the dictates of sober reason, and the suggestions of conscience, universal harmony and all its
blessed effects would ensue." 
* Sermons, vol. v., p. 421.




AND ITS RIGHTS.                63
" Since it is inconsistent with the nature and condition of man," says Puffendorf, "that he should live
entirely loose from all law, and perform his actions by a
wild and wandering impulse, without regard to any
standard or measure; it follows that we make inquiry
into that most general and universal rule of human
action, to which every man is obliged to conform, as he
is a reasonable creature.  To this rule custom  hath
given the name of Natural Law, and we may call it
likewise the law universal and perpetual; the former
in regard that it binds the whole body of human race,
the latter, because it is not subject to change, which is
the disadvantage of positive laws."'
Grotius comes nearer to a definition: " Natural law,"
he says, " is the rule and dictate of right reason, showing the moral deformity, or moral necessity, there is in
any act, according to its suitableness or unsuitableness
to our reasonable and social nature; and, consequently,
that such act is either forbidden or commanded by God,
the Author of Nature." t
Bishop Cumberland's definition is more profound and
rigid: it includes in it not only precept, but pronmulgation and sanction, and thus comes fully up to the requisitions of a law.  " The law of Nature," he says,' is
a proposition, proposed to the observation of, or impressed upon, the mind, with sufficient clearness, by the
* Law of Nature and Nations, book ii., c. 3, sect. 1., Gro. De Jur. Bel. et Pacis, lib. i., cap, 1, s. 10.




64     THE LAW OF NATURE, AND ITS RIGHTS.
nature of things, from the will of the First Cause,
which points out that possible action of a rational agent,
which will chiefly promote the common good, and by
which only the entire happiness of particular persons
can be obtained."
To which I may add, as expressive of the matter of
the law, the following quotation from Bishop Butler's
dissertation " Of the Nature of Virtue ":
"As much as it has been disputed wherein virtue
consists, or whatever ground of doubt there may be
about particulars, yet in general there is in reality an
universally acknowledged STANDARD of it. It is that
which all ages and all countries have made profession of
in public; it is that which every man you meet puts on
the show of; it is that which the primary and fundamental laws of all civil constitutions, over the face of
the earth, make it their business and endeavor to enforce
the practice of upon mankind; viz., justice, veracity
and regard to the common good."




CHAPTER IV.
GENERAL DIVISIONS OF SOCIETY.
IN all human society, and under every form of government, we find two general divisions of persons; the
one holding an immzediate, the other a mediate relation
to the community in which they live. It is competent
to persons of the former description to dispose of themselves and their affairs as they please, with no other limitation than that which is laid on them by the laws of
the community to which they belong. They may follow
what trade soever or profession they choose; they may
hold property and form engagements in their own name
and right; they may squander their estate, and reduce
themselves to poverty and vagrancy; or they may deprive themselves for a time of their bodily liberty, and
for the sake of avoiding the evils of penury and vagrancy, and of getting an honest livelihood, they may
subject themselves to the dominion of another, by binding themselves out to service, or enlisting in the army
or navy, if they happen to live in countries in which
armies and navies are maintained.  This division of
persons comprehends, in most countries, the great bulk




66        GENERAL DIVISIONS OF SOCIETY.
of the inhabitants, artisans, lawyers, soldiers, physicians,
merchants, tradesmen, laborers, etc., etc., who have attafined to what is called their majority; or who, in other
words, have reached a certain age (which in our country
and Great Britain is twenty-one, in France twenty-five,
in Holland thirty), which is prescribed by the State in
order to their admission to the rights of citizens.
But, besides these persons, there have always been,
under every form of government, from the most stringent despotism to the purest democracy, a large number
of persons who stand only in a mediate relation to society, or to its governing power; or who, in other words,
are related to it through the medium of others. In every civilized country all persons, who have not attained
their majority, are of this description; to a certain extent, also, all married women, without regard to age, are
of this description; and in many ages and countries, the
relations of master and servant have been such, that servants have been all their life long persons of the same
description.  Minors, for instance, however well qualified
to transact business for themselves, are related to society
only through their fathers or guardians; wives through
their husbands; and servants (except those who are
citizens) through their masters. The relation of this
whole description of persons to the society in which, or
to the government under which, they live, is such that
they are incapable of direct communication with it, and
enjoy its benefits, and receive its protection only through




GENERAL DIVISIONS OF SOCIETY.          67
the medium of others. This distinction of persons into
those who act in their own right, and those who act only
in the right of another, is fundamental; and having obtained under all governments, must be confessed to be
founded in Nature, and a necessary element of social
order.
The foundation of this distinction I take to be this,
viz., that Sta-tes, or communities of men, were originally
formed by fathers of families; and that the theory on
which they were founded, and are still administered and
conducted, supposes their power to be lodged in the men
of which they are composed, not simply as they are persons,
but as they are, or are capable of becoming, fathers of
families. The family was in order of time before the State,
and the State is a combination of fathers and masters for
the better protection of themselves and their families.
Reason points to this as the probable origin of political
communities, and history attests the fact of such origin.
Men's reverence for the law of Nature is not, as a general rule, strong enough to enable families to live together in safety and peaceable communion under that
law alone, and without the intervention of civil government
to coerce the unruly to its observance.  Lust, avarice,
and ambition, with their abominable progeny of violence,
fraud and rapine, bring dismay and desolation on families; and the state or political community is simply a
contrivance, by which the heads and natural protectors
of families shall be able to concentrate their will and




68        GENERAL DIVISIONS OF SOCIETY.
strength in laws and forms of judicature to ward off
from them disgrace and ruin. Hence the reasonableness
and necessity of the provision, not otherwise to be explained or justified, which excludes the larger numerical
portion of every political community from a direct participation in its control.  The right of suffrage is then
truly universal when it is extended to all the adult
males of the State, without regard to distinctions of
property; it can not go beyond this limit, and be extended to women, without violating the main principle
on which the very being of the State rests for support,
which is the subordination of wives to their husbands,
of children to their fathers, and of slaves (in every
community which has them) to their masters.  Women
are cared for and protected in their natural rights by
the State, and so are children, and so are slaves in those
countries in which they chance to form one of the classes
of society; but women, children, and slaves are not the
State, are not the protectors of society.  Their position
is one of subordination and dependence; and men-freemen-whether they be " the lords of creation" or not,
are in fact the lords and rulers of the political community to which they belong.
And not only in fact, but of right; for a little reflection will convince us that Nature and right reason
point to men as the proper depositories of political
power, and restrain two, at least, of the classes above




GENERAL DIVISIONS OF SOCIETY.         69
indicated to that mediate relation to the State which, in
fact, they hold.
In the case of children, the wisdom and justice of the
rule are apparent.  Nature itself, while they are too
weak to take care of themselves, has evidently entrusted
them to the care of their parents; and to this end has
implanted in the bosom of parents a strong affection for
their offspring. But, in order to exercise this care over
their children, to feed, clothe, and educate them, it is
essentially necessary that their parents have the government of them. Nature, therefore, requires the subordination of children to their parents, and to the father
rather than the mother (if the children are born in wedlock), as being the head of the wife, and consequently
of the family. The State presumes this subordination;
regards children as under the care of their parents, deals
with them through their parents, and, in the case of the
death of the parents, continues to govern them in the
same indirect way through the medium    of tutors or
guardians.
The beneficence of this provision, and the true position of the State in relation to it, appear in another
respect.  Children, through weakness and inexperience,
are not qualified to make engagements for their own
benefit; their simplicity and ignorance would render
them an easy prey to fraudulent and designing persons 
and if they had the power to b'ad themselves by their
own acts they would be soon invclved in confusion and




70        GENERAL DIVISIONS OF SOCIETY.
ruin.  The law of Nature accounts them incapable of
forming engagements to their own damage. They gain
the necessary understanding and experience, which
qualify them to form engagements and contracts, at different times of life, some at an earlier age, some at a
later. It is impossible to make a particular rule for
every one; and hence the State steps in and determines
a particular moment when they shall all be accounted
capable of acting in their own name and right.  Thus
the State is the minister of Nature, and gives force and
effect to her intention.  It acknowledges the paternal
relation to be prior to its own relation; and its admission
of the son to immediate relation with itself is simply the
collective consent and concurrence of fathers to the point
of time when their paternal authority shall be surrendered, and their sons admitted to a direct participation
in the government, which they originally founded, and
which they continue to direct.
Nor is this subjection of men to the authority of the
State, during their minority, without any voice in its
affairs, founded exclusively on the paternal right of government, but also on their own consent.' For it may
fairly be presumed that if an infant, at the time of its
birth, had the use of reason, and saw that its life could
not be preserved without the care of the parents, to
which must be joined a power over itself, it would
readily consent to the same, and desire for itself a com



GENERAL DIVISIONS OF SOCIETY.          71
fortable education from them."'  Men, therefore, during their minority, are not deprived of their natural
rights, but are, with their presumed consent, protected
by their fathers.in the enjoyment of those rights.
The fact that the State owes its origin to a union of
families, explains and justifies also the relation in which
women stand to it.  For they were subordinate to their
husbands before the State or political community existed;
they became at first related to the state through their
husbands; and the same reasons which led to the origin
of this mediate relation serve to perpetuate it.  They
were not the framers of the body politic, and are not its
administrators; because they were not, and are not,
heads of families, but occupy in the family a subordinate
position.
But what, it may be asked, is the ground and origin
of the family relation?  By what right does the husband exercise authority over his wife?  On what ground
is the father's authority over the children made superior
to that of the mother?   The life of the offspring is
equally due to both parents; and Nature, by infusing
into the bosom of the mother a stronger parental attachment, and annexing to her relation greater pains and
sorrows, seems, on a superficial view, to give her a
higher claim to their obedience. Why, then, is not the
woman invested with the chief power over her children,
* Puffendorff's Whole Duty of Main, book ii.,. iii.




72        GENERAL DIVISIONS OF SOCIETY.
and made, instead of the man, the medium of deriving
to them the protection and benefits conferred on them by
the State?
The proximate solution of these questions is found,
no doubt, in the institution of marriage. For if children are born out of wedlock, either actually, as sometimes happens in civil society, or hypothetically, as when
we fancy men living in a state of nature; then the case
would be otherwise: for children would then know no
higher authority than that of the mother, and would
owe subjection to her in preference to others.
But there is an answer to the question back of this:
for marriage is not an expedient on which men have
stumbled at random, nor a custom fastened on them by
a senseless tradition; but it is the way indicated by Nature, and prescribed by Revelation, for the propagation
of the human species. And marriage to every person
who well considers it will appear to be not precisely a
contract between equal parties, but a contract which
takes its origin from the man, and in which mutual
stipulations are exchanged, of comfort and protection
on the one side, and of obedience and service on the
other.
It is impossible for a sane man to believe that the
mutual attraction of the sexes is mainly designed in the
human kind, as among brutes, for the continuance of the
species. No more revolting spectacle of brutality and
misery can be imagined, than would be presented by the




GENERAL DIVISIONS OF SOCIETY.         73
human kind, if it were propagated by casual and promiscuous intercourse. To suppose that God intended any
such degradation of a higher species of His creatures to
the level of a lower, is a virtual denial of His goodness
and providence. Nature evidently teaches that the intercourse of the sexes among mankind is designed for
higher ends than the propagation of the species, and
that it ought to be regulated with a view to the care and
education of children, and the orderly government of
society.  By infusing in the man a desire of offspring,
and of filial affection and support, she points him to
marriage as an indispensable means of fixing and ascertaining the paternal relation, which could not otherwise
be known, and without the certainty of which, no man
could know and love his children, and make their welfare
the object of his study and labor.  In this way Nature
indicates the man as the proper party to propose and
originate marriage. By endowing him also with the
greater strength of body and mind (for though particular women may, and, doubtless, do excel particular
men in both these respects, yet a comparison of the
sexes on the whole leaves no reasonable doubt that the
superiority belongs to the man), she unequivocally
points him out as the head of the woman; and in so
doing, she plainly designates the father as superior to
the mother, in the rule and government of the family.
Thus, if marriage requires the subordination of the wife
to the husband, and gives the father a higher claim than
4




74        GENERAL DIVISIONS OF SOCIETY.
the mother on the obedience of the children, it is no less
evident that marriage itself, which involves these distinctions, is founded in nature; and that the preeminence
of the man in the family was potentially wrought in
human nature, before it was actually developed in the
custom of nations, and prescribed by the Revealed Law.
Man was created for society; society can not exist without government, nor government, unless there be one to
rule, and others to obey; and He who created man, created in him, and with him, the rudiments of that government which is necessary for the simplest form of society.
In the extension and enlargement of society, men are
thrown more upon their own resources for the expedients
of government; and in, respect to these, God no otherwise ordains than as His overruling Provilence directs.
Families and tribes combine themselves into the nation
under a single head, or they vest the supreme power in
the hands of the few or the many; and hence the monarchy, hereditary or elective, the oligarchy, the democracy, etc., all which are the effects of human contrivance. But government, in its original or elementary
form (which is patriarchal), is the more immediate
operation of the Divine wisdom, and is stamped on
Nature by the Divine decree.   The man, from   the
necessity of Nature, and in obedience to her voice, becomes the founder of the family, and he chooses the
woman to cooperate with him in the procreation and
education of his children. HIe seeks, and receives her




GENERAL DIVISIONS OF SOCIETY.          75
at her father's hands; and when he obtains her, he becomes to her what her father was before; her protector
and guardian, her representative in society, and the person through whom she is related to the political body.
To reverse this order, is to upheave the foundation of
human society; and to approximate this reversal, and,
under the specious pretext of bettering woman's condition, to work one change after another in her established relations with society, and to confer upon her one
right after another inconsistent with these relations, is,
by little and little, to disintegrate society, and to open
the way for the ultimate reign of confusion and brutality.
Women's rights are, with their own consent, secured to
them through their husbands and fathers.




CHAPTER V.
RELATIONS TO          THE    STATE.
THE power of the State, like all human power, is
limited in its legitimate exercise by the law of Nature; and, if it contravene this law by acts that are
unjust or oppressive, or rash and capricious, it imperils
its own existence.  Of flagrant violations of the law of
Nature, there is little danger; an attempt to decree impiety to God, the contempt of parents, the perpetration
of fraud, or any confessed immorality, would be rejected
at once as suicidal and monstrous. It is only in the last
stage of decay or the fullness of corruption that a political body can rush upon such manifest ruin. It is the
hidden danger that is most to be dreaded.  Rocks that
tower in the air the ship of State easily avoids; but woe
betide her when rocks that lie just beneath the surface
of the waters are not laid down in the pilot's chart!
And if the principles on which we have insisted, as developed in the formation and government of families, are
really dictated by Nature; if they were in force antecedently to the constitution of the State, and underlie its
existence, then every measure of legislation which tends




RELATIONS TO THE STATE.            77
to obliterate these principles, is as really, though less
obviously, hostile to the true genius and welfare of the
State as a statute would be which imposed virtue for
vice, or vice for virtue. The State, no doubt, has the
power to reduce the nonage of men below the limit which
law and custom have prescribed, and to confer on women
the civil rights and franchises which have been hitherto
appropriated to men; but unless the power of the State
in these particulars be exercised with discretion and with
due regard to those principles which are the foundation
of its own existence, there is manifest danger that it
may counteract the design and law of Nature, and thus
retrograde towards anarchy by means, perhaps, of those
very measures which, as it fondly dreams, are to advance it in civilization and refinement.
A law of the State authorizing children to act in their
own right at twelve or fourteen years of age, would be
manifestly repugnant to Nature.  It would be unjust,
by depriving the parent of the right which Nature gives
him to the child's subjection and service, and, by depriving the children of the correlative right to the parent's
protection and care. It would be inexpedient, because it
would confer the right of self-government on a large
class of persons who are unfit for its exercise, and whose
reckless improvidence would probably involve them in
ruin.  A law of the State declaring marriage to be merely
a partnership or joint contract between two equnl parties, would be also repugnant to Nature. It would sever




78            RELATIONS TO THE STATE.
in twain what Nature intends to be one; for man and
woman, separately considered, are parts of one whole, -
and it is only in their union that the human nature is
entire.  It would be unjust, by depriving the man of the
subjection and service naturally due to him from the
woman, and by depriving the woman of the comfort and
protection which Nature gives her the right to claim from
the man. It would be inexpedient, because it would subvert the foundation of that order which is essential to the
peace and happiness of human society, and which Nature
has laid in the physical and mental superiority of the
man; and because by throwing uncertainty over the paternal relation, it would render men incapable of mutual
confidence and alliance, of great and enduring works, of
steady aim and purpose, and deprive them of their
strongest motives to sober thought and persevering
labor.
These principles, though questioned by some, are, on
the whole, pretty firmly rooted in the human mind.  It
is almost universally admitted that the State is right in
holding women and children to the full extent to which
they are so held, in a mediate relation to itself; that
the laws of the State which uphold this relation are de* "They twain," said GOD, at the beginning, "shall be ONE flesh."
(Gen. ii. 24, comp. Mat. xix. 5.) The notion of Plato, that the humanity was originally one mass, and became male and female by separation, was probably not so much a sally of fancy, as a perversion of
tradition.




RELATIONS TO THE STATE.            79
clarative of the law of Nature as exhibited in the constitution of mankind; and that laws of an opposite design
and tendency, by doing violence to Nature, would be productive of confusion and misery in human society.
But there is another class of persons among us, holding a mediate relation to the State, and that is persons
who are bound to service for life, and who are related to
the State only through those persons to whom they are
bound. I say that there are such persons among uts;
for, believing that the States of the American confederaracy are united in fact as well as in name, and that the
Constitution which unites them is something more than a
compact, I hope to be pardoned for regarding the people
of the Southern States as in some real sense one with
ourselves, and for looking upon their prosperity as our
prosperity, and their institutions as our institutions.  In
this view, an inquiry into the moral quality and effect of
a law, the aim of which would be to separate master and
slave, and to bring slaves into immediate relation with
the State, is so far from being a barren speculation that
it is one in the solution of which all citizens of the
United States may be expected to feel a deep and responsible interest.
But here we are in danger of being embarrassed by a
verbal ambiguity.  Men affix the same idea to the word
child; but they affix, as already stated, various and discordant ideas to the word slave. And, by the way, it is
worthy of remark, that a word which is used with so




80           RELATIONS TO THE STATE.
much latitude, and serves to cover such a variety of conditions, is utterly unfit to be used in an instrument that
requires extraordinary precision of language; a fact that
seems to have escaped the attention of those who deny
that the Constitution of the United States recognizes
slavery in any form, because it does not contain the
word.  Bound to service, which are the words of the
Constitution, expresses one form of slavery, the recognition of which is entirely consistent with the rejection
of slavery as the word is understood by Mr. Locke,
Adam Smith, and other eminent authors.  But of this
more anon.
If slavery be a forced condition, upheld by the mere
power of the strong over the weak; if it be an arbitrary
deprivation of natural rights, tyrannical and cruel, unjust and oppressive; then, undoubtedly, a law of the
State that should abolish it, would be so far from being
repugnant to the law of Nature, that it would be imperatively demanded by it. For who doubts, or ever did
doubt, that the law of Nature forbids injustice?  He
who contends that the State is bound to guard the
natural rights of man, and to restrain, by the wisest and
most effective measures in its power, tyranny and cruelty,
oppression and injustice, may rely upon it that he shall
not have me for an opponent. If slavery be, as its
adversaries generally suppose, essentially unjust, it certainly needs no argument to show that justice requires
its extinction, and it would only remain to devise those




RELATIONS TO THE STATE.             81
means for its extinction which prudence and wisdom
would pre.;crib.
But what I hold and shall endeavor to show is, that
slavery, considered as a settled institution of society, is
not contrary to justice; nor an infraction of the natural
rights of man. On the contrary, I suppose that the
relation of master and slave, wherever it is duly established, is consonant to the law of Nature, binds both
parties to reciprocal duties, and clearly conduces to their
mutual welfare, and conduces also (though not always
in the greatest degree), to the prosperity of the community.
Between the natural relations of the family, however,
and those which are merely providential, there is this
broad and ineffaceable difference, viz., that the former are
not, and the latter are, dependent for their continuance
on the will of the parties. While parent and child live,
no power can annul the relation which Nature has created
between them. The law of Nature, if Divine revelation be accepted as its interpreter, does not permit either
husband or wife, separately or both together, under any
circumstances or for whatever cause, to dissolve the bond
that unites them; the parties may separate, but they
can not free themselves from the bond; only the State,
in virtue of the limited power which God has entrusted
to it for the purpose, can release one of the parties from
its obligations to the other. These natural relations,
therefore, may be said to be ordinarily indissoluble. Not
4*




82            RELATIONS TO THE STATE.
so, however, with that providential relation which subsists
between master and slave, for the bond which unites them
may be at any time dissolved by their mutual consent.
Hence it follows that the State has a much larger
power over master and servant than it has over the other
and more sacred relations of the family. It may annul
the relation, with the express consent of the parties; it
may presume on their consent, and extinguish the relation, when its extinction is manifestly conducive to the
welfare of the parties immediately concerned, and demanded by high grounds of public expediency.     It
appears to me, however, that the authority of the State
in this matter is by no means absolute.  For when the
relation is settled and the parties to it are, on the whole
and in a reasonable degree, content with their respective
stations, it is evident, I think, that a law of the State
abolishing it would do violence to the law of Nature,
and work manifold injustice and misery. For both masters and slaves have rights which the State is bound to
respect: it has no right to deprive the master of that
debt of service which the slave owes, without making him
compensation: it has no right to deprive the slave of his
master's care and protection, without putting him in a
position in which he may earn his livelihood in health,
and have a reasonable prospect (equivalent to what he
had before) of support in sickness, decrepitude, and old
age. Thus to deprive men of their social rights, and by
a mere act of arbitrary power cancel obligations that are




RELATIONS TO THE STATE.            83
founded on eternal justice, is tyranny; and to do the
s9nme under the pretext of philanthropy and religion, is
tyranny and hypocrisy combined. And if anything can
cadd to the iniquity of such legislation, it is the fact that
the rights and obligations thus trifled with are in order
of Nature anterior to, and more sacred than, any which
the State can create; for the relation of master and servant grows up in order of Nature next to that of parent:nd child, and the rights and obligations involved in it
were of force before men formed themselves into political organizations. True, the State is supreme; it can
not be called to account (though the men who govern it
may be) for any of its acts; but as every violation of
justice is followed by a righteous retribution of Providence, so the deprivation of slaves of the care and protection to which their servitude entitles them, has been
found not only to involve them in ruin, but to inundate
society with the evils of pauperism and vagrancy and an
increase of crime.
But I find myself unconsciously anticipating the
course of my argument, and assuming that the relation
of master and slave is essentially just, and does no violence to natural rights. Let us look, then, to the origin
and grounds of the relation; when we shall find, if I
mistake not, that the position of the slave, though humble, is not dishonorable; unless, indeed, lowliness be
accounted synonymous with meanness, and all servitude
be branded as vile and reproachful.




CHAPTER VI.
THEORY OF SLAVERY.
"IN the sweat of thy face shalt thou eat bread till
thou return unto the ground," was part of the penalty
which man incurred for his failure in that OBEDIENCE to
the law of GOD, which had been made the condition of
his continuance in the perfect knowledge and love of
his Ma.ker. It was not labor that constituted the penalty
of his transgression, but the discomfitures and hardships
that were thenceforward to be the accompaniments of
labor.  For, before the fall, " the Lord God took the
man, and put him into the garden of Eden, to dress it
and to keep it;?' a plain proof, that as labor is one of
the ends for which man's body was created, so was it
also the condition on which he was to enjoy the products
of the earth.  Even in/his state of innocence he was to
till the ground; and/if men had continued.innocent,
there seems no reasonl to doubt that, in process of time,
the products of one country would have been exchanged
for another, and that the auxiliary arts and sciences
would have flourished in connection with agriculture and
commerce.  Labor which, under the blight of the fall,




THEORY OF SLAVERY.               85
is irksome and oppressive, would have been, in a state of
innocence, a delightful occupation; and the various connections and relations to which its manifold divisions
and subdivisions naturally lead, would probably have
been much the same as at present, only without that
loathing and disgust, which grow out of a disordered
body, and those turbulent outbreaks of oppression and
cruelty, hatred and revenge, which are the bitter fruits
of a disordered mind. The diversity of men's genius
and talents, their various aptitude for all innocent pursuits and. departments of industry, would have been as
great as at present; for it is impossible to believe that
integrity would have impaired their faculties, or restrained their development. In fact, we have only to
see men as they are, and then, by an effort of imagination, to take away sin (and death, which is that method
of departure from this worldl which sin has introduced),
in order to see what they would have been had they preserved their innocence.
But what (methinks, I hear the reader exclaim), do
you think there could have been bondage in Paradise?
Pray, why not? There are bonds of love and reverence,
as well as bonds of fear and hatred  and as it is the substitution of the love of self for the love of God and man,
which makes bondage hateful, so we have only to drive
out self-love, and to bring back the love of God and
man in its place, in order to render bondage lovely and
beautiful. In truth, dear reader, there has been no real




86              THEORY OF SLAVERY.
bondage on this earth, unless it existed in Paradise;
that wretched state, which the world calls bondage, being
no more than a miserable and abortive experiment to
effect, by power, a union, which is then only perfect
when created by love.
I see no reason, then, why the relation of master and
servant should not have existed in a state of innocence
as well as that of husband and wife, parent and child.
Certainly, the Christian religion, which assumes the fall
of man as a fact, and aims to restore him to the state
from which he has fallen, does not abrogate the relation
of master and servant, but seeks to purge it of selfishness, and to reclaim it, as far as human infirmity allows,
to a state of ideal perfection.
The state of servitude, as God designed it, and as it
would have existed in Nature, had not Nature been
vitiated by sin, and as it may still exist on earth, in
proportion as men are redeemed from the curse by the
grace of Christ, and realize the pattern which He prescribes, is eloquently described in one of the noblest
chapters of that remarkable work of St. Augustine,' The City of God."  The reader will find the passage
suggestive of wholesome thoughts; and the old English
version, made from that of Luclovicus Vives, is so redolent of antiquity, that I shall use it in preference to any
modern and more polished translation.  It is impossible
to read it, and not feel that we are holding communion
with the good father himself:




THEORY OF SLAVERY.              87' Now God, our good Master, teaching us in the two
chiefest precepts the love of Him and the love of our
neighbor, to love three things, God, our neighbor, and
ourselves, and seeing he that loveth God, offendeth not
in loving himself; it followeth that he ought to counsel
his neighbor to love God; and to provide for him in the
love of God; since he is commanded to love him as his
own self. So must he do for his wife, children, family,
and all men besides: and wish likewise that his neighbor
would do as much for him in his need: thus shall he be
settled in peace and orderly concord with all the world.
The order whereof is, first, to do no man hurt, and, secondly, to help all that he can. So that his own have the
first place in his care; and those, his place and order in
human society affordeth him more conveniency to benefit.
Whereupon St. Paul saith,' Ie that provideth not for
his own, and, namely, for them that be of his household,
denieth the faith and.is worse than an infidel.' For this
is the foundation of domestical peace, which is an orderly rule, and subjection on the part of the family,
wherein the provisors are the commanders, as the husband over his wife, parents over their children, and masters over their servants: and they that are provided for,
obey, as the wives do their husbands, children their parents, and servants their masters. But in the family of
the faithful man, the heavenly pilgrim, there the commanders are, indeed, the servants of those they seem to
command; ruling not in ambition, but being bound by




88             THEORY OF SLAVERY.
careful duty; not in proud sovereignty, but in nourishing pity."
Beautiful ideal of human society when cemented by
the love of God, " whose service," in whatever relation
of life, "is perfect freedom.'" That servitude should be
upheld by force, that the lords and tyrants of the people
should affect to be their benefactors, is at once the offspring and penalty of the corruption of human society.' Ye shall not be so," said the divine Restorer; " but
he that is greatest among you let him be as the younger;
and he that is chief, as he that doth serve; *  *  I am
among you as he that doth serve!'  To reclaim man
to his original state, not to increase the disintegration of
society, by leavening it with the spirit of pride and rebellion, but to bind together husbandnd ad wife, parents
and children, masters and servants, rulers and subjects,
in the love of God, and in mutual and helpful dependence on one another for God's sake, is the design of
"THE CITY OF GoD," the Church of the Redeemed;
whose origin, history, and polity St. Augustine describes
in the work I am quoting. The above extract was the
conclusion of the chapter entitled, i" Of the law of
heaven and earth, which swayeth human society by
counsel, and unto which counsel human society obeyeth." The next extract is the whole of the succeeding
chapter, title and all:
" Nature's freedom and bondage, caused by sin, in




THEORY OF SLAVERY.                89
which man is a slave to his own affects (affectons)
though he be not bondman to any one besides.
" Thus hath Nature's order prescribed, and man by
God was thus created.' Let them rule, saith He,' over
the fishes of the sea and the fowls of the air, and over
everything that creepeth upon the earth.' HTe made him
reasonable, and LORD only over the unreasonable; not
over man, but over beasts. Whereupon the first holy
men were rather shepherds than kings, God showing
herein what both the order of creation desired and what
the merit of sin exacted.  For justly was the burden of
servitude laid upon the back of transgression.  And,
therefore in all the scriptures we never read servant
until such time as that just man Noah laid it as a curse
upon his offending son.  So that it was guilt and not
Nature that gave original unto that name.  The Latin
word servus had the first derivation from hence; that
those that were taken in the wars, being in the hands of
the conquerors to massacre or to preserve, if they saved
them, then they were called servi, of servo, to serve.
Nor was this effected beyond the desert of sin.  For in
the justest war, the sin upon one side causeth it, and if
the victory fall to the wicked (as sometimes it may) it is
God's decree to humble the conquered, either reforming
their sins herein or punishing them.  Witness that holy
man of God, Daniel, who, being in captivity, confessed
unto his Creator that his sins and the sins of the people
were the real causes of that captivity.




90               THEORY OF SLAVERY.'1 Sin, therefore, is the mother of servitude and first
cause of man's subjection to man, which, notwithstanding, cometh not to pass but by the direction of the
Highest, in whom is no injustice, and who alone knoweth
best how to proportionate His punishment unto man's
offences; and He himself saith,' Whosoever committeth sin is the servant of sin;' and therefore many religious Christians are servants unto wicked masters, yet
not unto freemen,5 for that which a man is addicted
unto, the same is hq a slave unto.  And it is a happier
servitude to serve man than lust: for lust (to omit all
the other affects) practiseth extreme tyranny upon the
hearts of those that serve it; be it lust after sovereignty
or fleshly lust.  But in the - peaceful orders of States,
wherein one man is under another, as humility doth
benefit the servant, so doth pride endamage the superior.
But take a man as God created him at first, and so he is
neither slave to man nor to sin. But penal servitude
had the institution from that law which cominandeth the
conservation and forbiddeth the disturbance of Nature's
order; for if that law had not been transgressed, penal
servitude had never been enjoined.
" Therefore the apostle warneth servants to obey their
masters and to serve them with cheerfulness and goodwill; to the end, that if they can not be made free by
their masters, they (may) make their servitude a free* "Their masters being slaves to their own passions, which are
worse masters than men can be."-L. VIVES.




THEORY OF SLAVERY.               91
dom to themselves by serving them, not in deceitful fear
but in faithful love, until iniquity be overpassed and all
man's power and principality disannulled, and God only
be all in all."'
In this admirable passage the theory of servitude is
luminously developed. The relation of master and servant grows out of the wants of man, and is part of Nature's order; it is productive of no hardship, and is
accompanied with no disgrace, but is alike beneficial and
honorable.  But the abuse of man's free will, which has
disturbed the order of Nature, and brought degradation
and misery in various degrees, on all the natural and
instituted relations of human society, has blighted the
relation of master and servant, rendering masters imperious and servants turbulent, and has thus caused the
relation to be upheld by force, even in cases in which it
ought to be upheld by charity.   Christianity, which
proceeds from the Author of Nature, can not violate the
order of Nature.  She takes Nature as her foundation,
and builds on it a new superstructure, or repairs the
ruins of the old. She does not destroy the man, but
renews him; she does not annihilate the powers and faculties of the human mind, but gives them a new bent
and superinduces on them the new habits of faith and
charity. She does not abolish the natural relations of
mankind, but breathes into them  a new SPIRIT —the
* ST. AUGUSTINE'S " CITY OF GOD," with the learned comments of Jo.
Lod. Vives. Englished by J. A. A. D. 1610. Bk. xix., c, 15.




92              THEORY OF SLAVERY.
love of God and man-and aims, by the energy of this
HOLY SPIRIT, to restore them, as far as human infirmity allows, to what Christians, instructed in the oracles
of God, believe to be their original, and what all others
may perceive to be their ideal, perfection. And it is by
the consistent application of the same principle —the
reformation and conservation of human society, and not
its destruction and disintegration, that Christianity is
led, not to abrogate the relation of master and servant,
but to restore it to its primitive innocence by an infusion
of charity for the performance of its reciprocal duties,
and of patience for the endurance of those evils which
are at first the fruits, and are then made by God's just
ordinance, the punishment of man's disturbance of the
order of Nature.
All this, I confess, proceeds on the assumption that
slavery, or servitude for life, does no violence to Nature,
but is good and agreeable to Nature. For it is only
that which is good that can be abused by man's perversity, and reformed from abuse by his renovation; since
evil can neither be abused nor reformed, but is only fit
to be restrained and abolished. This, then, is the next
point we are to consider, and it will lead us to investigate the origin and essence of slavery, and the grounds
on which it rests.  Whence came it? what is it? and
what are the reasons for its continuance?  The investigation of these matters will form the subject of the following chapter.




CHAPTER             VII.
ORIGIN AND       NATURE OF SLAVERY.
THE father, not less by the voice of Nature, than by
the appointment of God, is the head of his family. He
was born, not for himself alone, but for his wife, his
children, and all others whom he loves and is bound to
protect. Forthe purpose of discharging these functions,
he calls in the aid, and avails himself of the strength,
the speed, or any other perfection of those animals that
Nature has strewed around him, and intended for his
assistance. In process of time arts are cultivated, and
property is more unequably distributed.  The wants of
the rich are multiplied, and the poor are reduced to the
necessity of bartering their labor for their sustenance.
Hence the relation of master and servant; the one engaging to administer food and raiment, shelter and protection, and the other to undertake all proper labors and
reasonable employments, as their own functions and
abilities, and their master's wants and services should
require.*
The relation, at first probably temporary, and as occa* See Dr. John Taylor's Elements of Civil Law, p. 410.




94        ORIGIN AND NATURE OF SLAVERY.
sion required, soon became permanent.  "In the early
ages of the world," says Puffendorff, " when men began
to quit their primitive plainness and simplicity, to cultivate the method of living, and to enlarge their fortunes
and possessions, it is very likely the wiser and richer
sort invited those of less parts and less wealth to assist
them in their business, for hire. Afterwards, when both
parties found their benefit in this way of proceeding, the
meaner tribe were by degrees persuaded to join themselves perpetual members to the families of the greater;
under these conditions, that the latter should engage to
supply food and all conveniences of living, and the
former should bind themselves to undertake all proper
labors and employments as their masters should direct.
So that the first rise of servitude is owing to the voluntary consent of the poorer and more helpless persons,
anc is; In promise to give you constant sustenance,
facias; I promise to give you constant sustenance,
upon condition that you assist me with your constant
work."'*
Besides this honest and natural desire of obtaining a
livelihood, the passions and vices of men, and sometimes
higher and more generous motives, have led them voluntarily to reduce themselves to servitude. The Hebrews
(and I suppose Moses understood human rights) not only
made slaves of foreign nations by conquest, but permitted
slavery among themselves, and over their own people> for
* Law of Nature and Nations, Bk. VI., h. iii., see. 4.




ORIGIN AND NATURE OF SLAVERY.          95
the relief of extreme poverty, and for the payment of
debts, as well as for the punishment of crime.  The
statement of Tacitus in regard to the Germans, is
well known. In their passion for gambling, they used;
when they had lost all else, to stake their liberty on the
cast of a die; and he that lost voluntarily became a slave
to the winner. An ancient Greek author, quoted by
Grotius, speaks of thousands who are free, and who yet
oblige themselves by contract to become slaves.  So
strongly, indeed, has this inclination at times prevailed
among men, that in several countries it has been found
necessary to restrain it by law. The practice was forbidden by the Egyptians, and consequently must have
prevailed among them before it was forbidden. It was
permitted in Athens, until the time of Solon; one of
whose laws, as we learn from Plutarch, enacted a5tiaacL
f   6davetea0Oat, that men should not borrow money on
their bodies.  "Among the Romans, it was a known
trick with sharpers, to suffer themselves to be sold for
the sake of going shares in the price: and for their punishment, they were condemned to real servitude."  The
practice was forbidden by the Petilian law.*  In view
of these facts, it may be questioned whether slavery be
indeed (as is commonly supposed) the creature of local
law, or whether men have not the right universally to
* See Grotius, Bk. II., ch. xxv. sec. 27, and the notes; and Puff.
Bk. VI., ch. iii, see. 7.




96       ORIGIN AND NATURE OF SLAVERY.
dispose of themselves and their services for life, except
so far as they' are restrained from doing so by the law of
the place or country in which they reside.
However this be, it is by no means certain that servitude had its origin exclusively in war. In the judgment
of the eminent authors whom we have quoted, it was
originally founded on contract; and the relation of master and servant is probably more ancient than any other
relation (that of husband and wife excepted) which is
founded on contract. It dates back to a period anterior
to the records of profane history, and may be shown to
have existed in the family, before families were grouped
into nations, and to have involved rights which were not
forfeited, but were recognized and respected under the
more extended governments to which, in course of time,
families were subjected.
The lawyers, indeed, would have us believe that servants owe their name, as well as their origin, to the fortunes of war: " ServorZun appellatio ex eofluxit," say
the digests,' quod imperatores nostri captivos vendere, ac per hoc servare, nee occidere solent;" but the
lawyers are no authority in a question of etymology;
not to add that servants were held as property before
Roman generals made captives, or Rome herself had a
being. The grammarians speak more to the point when
they derive servus from the obsolete spoc a servant the
aspirate being expressed by the letter s and the digamma
of the Eolics by the letter v; which gives us servos from




ORIGIN AND NATURE OF SLAVERY.          97
aPog just as sylva is derived from Nkv7, not to mention
many other instances of the same kind.  No doubt the
condition of servitude was modified by war; of that presently; but first having traced it to its origin, let us
observe its agreement with justice and equity.
Grotius distinguishes servitude into perfect and imperfect, meaning by the latter that kind of servitude
which is for a term of time, or on certain conditions, the
result of agreement or of positive law.  Of the former
he says:
" Perfect servitude is that which obliges a man to
work all his life long for diet and other common necessaries, which, if it be concluded on natural terms, has
nothing too hard and severe in it, for the perpetual obligation to service on the one hand is compensated by the
perpetual certainty of being provided for on the other.
They who let themselves out for daily labor often have
not this assurance of being provided for, whence that
which Eubulus has mentioned frequently happens
E9i2Eit 6'avsv -#ticov. etc.' He was willing to stay with them for his victuals without wages.' The same comedian, in another place,
I0oot 6V Ov7O,reC, etc.'Many who have run away from their masters, when
free again seek the same crib at which they used to feed.'
Thus Posidonius, the Stoic, was wont to note in history
5




98       ORIGIN AND NATURE OF SLAVERY.
that there were formerly many who, conscious of their
own weakness, gave themselves, of their own accord, to
be' slaves to others (6Tnor nap ebetvuov, etc.),' that they
might receive from them the care and provision which
they needed, and do them    in return all the service
they were able.'  Others add an instance of this in the
Mariandyni, who, for the same reason, made themselves
slaves to the Heracleotse."'Hence it appears that slavery may be, and in fact, to
a great extent, has been founded on the consent of the
slaves; and a right to the service of persons founded on
their own consent, is evidently agreeable to the law of
Nature, being confirmed by that fundamental and immutable principle which requires men to be faithful to
their engagements. They who maintain that government
is founded on the consent of the people, maintain also
that this consent is presumed when the contrary is not
manifest, and that it is held to be tacit and implied in
many cases in which it is not expressed; and is not to be
set aside and overruled by individuals because of their
particular complaints and grievances.  In countries,
therefore, where slavery exists, if the slaves are content
with their lot and do not evidence the contrary by any
overt act, it is not easy to see, on these principles, why
their consent should not be presumed and regarded as
the foundation of the masters' right`pr why a right
founded on tacit and general consent and exercised for
* Lib. ii., c, v., sect. 27.




ORIGIN AND NATURE OF SLAVERY.             99
the good of the whole, should fail or be voided because
it happens to operate severely in particular cases. The
fact that thousands of persons, and even whole tribes,
have, of their own accord, subjected themselves to masters for the certainty of protection and maintenance, and
surrendered their liberty for what they considered an
equivalent in return, shows very plainly that all servi.
tude is not involuntary and contrary to natural rights.
There are other ways in which slavery may originate
without violation of justice.  For, as men have a natural
right to sell themselves, when they think it for their
benefit to do so (i. e., to make over to another their own
labors for life, and the disposal of their persons, so far as
necessary to secure their labors); and, as this practice
has prevailed to a great extent, where it has not been
prohibited by municipal law, so have fathers a natural
right, in cases of necessity, to sell their own children.
These are the words of Grotius, who has never been accused of being unfriendly to liberty.  " Although," he
says, " the paternal authority is so fixed and inherent in
the father's person and character, that it can never be
taken from him, and transferred to another; yet may a
father naturally, and where the civil law does not obstruct it, pawn his child, and sell him too, if there be a
necessity for it, and no other way of maintaining him.":
* And, in a note, he subjoins from Jornandes, in his Gothic history:
"This is even what parents do here, who, consulting the preservation
of their children, had much rather they should lose their freedom than




100       ORIGIN AND NATURE OF SLAVERY.
" And this right," he continues, " other nations seem to
have borrowed from that Theban law, mentioned by 2Elian
in his second book, as the Thebans from the Phoenicians,
and they, in turn, from the Hebrews; and Apollonius
tells us, in his epistle to Domitian, that this very law
obtained also among the Phrygians."  Thus far Grotius;
and the reason which he gives for his opinion, is worthy
of note: " Nature itself is supposed to grant a right to
every thing, without which that which she commands
can not be accomplished."
But, although slavery was originally founded in contract, yet there can be no doubt that the number of
slaves has been greatly enlarged, and their condition aggravated, by the fortunes of war. For, on the principles
on which wars were anciently, and are still, in some
countries, conducted, the lives of the conquered are at
the mercy of the conqueror.  The captive was believed,
by the right of war, to have forfeited his life, and it was
accounted an act of clemency to spare his life, on condition that it should be spent in the service of the captor.
Hence mancipia (manu capti, taken by hand, or taken
in battle) became a common appellation of slaves, and
emancipation came to mean delivery from     servitude.
But the clemency, it should be observed, was extended
their lives; and, therefore, out of mere kindness, sell them for a maintenance, rather than keep them to starve and perish at home." To
which he adds, "I find there has been the same custom among the
people of Mexico." (See 1. ii., c. 5, sect. 5.)




ORIGIN AND NATURE OF SLAVERY.         101
by the one party, and accepted by the other, on a given
CONDITION; perpetual service being promised by the
one, in return for his life being spared by the other. So
that in this case, also, if we consider it carefully, we find
that slavery was in reality founded on contract, and that
the fortune of war merely furnished the occasion of the
contract. If it be said, that the contract was morally
void, because it was made on an erroneous principle, and
under compulsion, I answer, that I am not concerned to
defend it; for I by no means justify slavery on the
ground of conquest. Only I would hlave it observed,
how naturally the relation of the captor and the captured may be changed even during their lives (of the
relations of their children I shall speak by-and-by), and
the contract, which was at first the result of necessity,
and extorted by fear, come, after a while, to be the offspring of choice, and cemented by good-will.   For,
when the contract was formed, both parties would find
their mutual advantage in keeping it in good faith.
For if the slave adhered to his natural right of liberty,
and, in consequence of it, should seek opportunity to
escape from service, and take the life of his master; in
a word, if he persisted in regarding his master as his
enemy, and acting towards him by the laws of war, why,
then the master would assert his right by the same laws,
to imprison the slave, to force him to hard labor, and
even to take his life.  It would, therefore, be for the
interest of both parties to divest themselves of the




102      ORIGIN AND NATURE OF SLAVERY.
animnus of war, to lay aside their hostility, and to bind
themselves, in good faith and by moral ties, to observe
the compact by which master and slave are bound together in peaceable and friendly society; the same compact, in fact, which is the original and natural foundation
of the relation. And, however some may deride, I can
not but regard it as an illustration of the beneficence of
God's providence (ever educing good out of evil), and
of His wise adaptation of mankind to their condition in
this world, that even that servitude, which, at first, springs
from war, and is a violence to Nature, is suffered thus
easily and naturally to pass into servitude in its peaceful
and normal state; and men silently turned from enemies
and destroyers into mutual helpers and friends.




CHAPTER VIII.
THE NATURAL JUSTICE OF SLAVERY INFERRED FROM
THE CONSENT OF MANKIND: THE JUSTINIAN CODE.
IN referring to the customs of former ages, I have no
intention to hold them up as models for the imitation of
the nineteenth century. We of this age possess, no
doubt, many and -great advantages over those that have
preceded us; nor do I at all suppose that the antiquity
of slavery is any proof of its excellence, or that the precedents of ancienit Greece and Rome ought to bias a
Christian people in its favor. Indeed, if the question
were as to the eligibility of free or slave institutions,
under circumstances equally favorable to both, and involving no noral obligation in behalf of either, I should
feel no hesitation in avowing my preference for freedom,
and my, aversion to slavery. But I beg to remind the
reader, again and again, that this is not the question
which I have undertaken to discuss. It is not the inexpediency, but the pretended injustice of slavery, the
deeply rooted, and wide-spread conviction among us, that
slavery is upheld merely by local law in opposition to
the law of Nature, or the dictates of universal justice;




104      THE NATURAL JUSTICE OF SLAVERY.
it is this which has so exasperated one section of our
country against the other, as to render it impossible for
the two sections, while the baneful influence of this sentiment continues, to be united harmoniously under one
government. It is to this conviction that I address myself. It is the moral right or justice of slavery, and not
its advantages or disadvantages as compared with other
forms of society, which I aim to establish. It is the fact
(for such I believe it to be) that the positive and local
laws which uphold slavery are not necessarily repugnant
to, but may be declarative of, the law of Nature, which
I have undertaken to prove.  On a question of justice
or injustice, on a question that involves the true meaning and intent of Natural law, the consent of nations
ought to be decisive; and I hope, therefore, that the
reader will permit me, before I come to the distinct consideration of that form of slavery which exists in our
Southern States, to enlarge a little on the argument of
our last chapter, which was designed to show that slavery
may be founded in justice; and to remove, as I hope
to do, an objection which has been of great force to
strengthen the opposite conviction.
The Sacred History informs us, and I now appeal to
it only for its testimony to facts, that slavery existed
under the patriarchs for centuries before the conquest of
Canaan, and that after the settlement of Canaan, it continued to exist among the Hebrews and the contiguous
nations in times anterior to the records of profane his



THE JUSTINIAN CODE.             i05
tory. From profane history, also, we learn that slavery
existed among the Assyrians, Medes, and Persians, before the origin of the Grecian republics. The monuments
of Greece and Rome leave no doubt that slavery existed
in these republics from their infancy, and that it grew
and flourished, so to speak, under the shadow of the tree
of civil liberty.  Nor was slavery extirpated from the
empire when Rome became Christian, under Constantine.
On the contrary, it was recognized by the Christian
Church, and the mutual rights and duties involved in it
were guarded by canons, which forbade slaves to be ordained, married, or baptized, without the consent of their
owners, lest these acts should be made a pretext for defrauding the master of his right of property in the slave.
In the changes of society that brought about the dissolution of the Roman empire, slavery was stripped of its
more repulsive features, and gradually, to a great extent,
decayed. But it was not wholly abolished.  Since the
Reformation, it has existed not only in the East, where
it has always prevailed, but also in some parts of
Europe; and although the nations of western Europe
rejected it for themselves, they yet made no scruple to
establish it in their American dependencies; and the
abominable and infamous expedients to which they most
unjustifiably resorted to introduce slave labor in places
where it was demanded, and then not otherwise to be
had, ought to suggest to us the folly and danger of
attempting to subvert and expel it fiom places where it
5*




106      THE NATURAL JUSTICE OF SLAVERY.
is equally needed, and has come to be naturally and
peaceably established.  These are facts which lie on the
surface of history, and which, as I have rather understated them, it is the less necessary to prove by a citation of authorities.
And not only has slavery existed among these nations
as a fact, but it has been intimately interwoven with the
whole texture of their society.  It was regulated by law
among the Hebrews, Greeks, and Romans; Homer represents his heroes as exchanging slaves, as well as copper
and iron; hides and cattle, for wine and provisions;
and all the poets, tragic, comic, and satirical, have not
only borne testimony to the existence of slavery as a fact,
but have derived from    it occasions and incidents for
pathetic description, for the keenest sallies of wit and
shrewdness, and the most amusing illustrations of life
and manners.
The wise men of Greece and Rome were thrown, for
want of Divine Revelation, exclusively on the law of
Nature. They investigated its principles with profound
penetration, and deduced from   them the duties of life
by rigorous application of reason; and    though their
instructions failed of their due effect for want of being
bound on the conscience by those awful sanctions which
~ EviEv cai olvt'ovTro KapirlcotPovre7f'Axatot,
(i2Loi itev Xa2lc4  at1toi 6' at'& vt atc67p(,
aXot 6E' pvopC, (aEot da' avirfiat oseasctv,
akolt 6' avdpa7rodeaot-Iliad vii., vss., 472, etc.




THE JUSTINIAN CODE.             107
only Divine Revelation can furnish, yet undoubtedly
they did much to prepare the world for the candid consideration and cordial reception of Christian doctrine.
I am. well aware that slavery in the ancient republics,
particularly in Sparta and Rome, was accompanied with
excessive violence and cruelty. This was the natural
consequence of that absolute power, vested in the master,
which Christianity, in later times, effectually limited by
those divine precepts (transcending all the power of
human suasion) which accustomed men to act more on
the principles of justice and benevolence, and from a
sense of responsibility to their MASTER in HEAVEN. But
I am not aware that the ancient moralists, though they
reproved the oppression and cruelty of masters in the
treatment of their slaves, ever impugned the justice of
the relation. On the contrary they assumed it, so far
as my knowledge extends, to be just, and gave directions
for its humane fulfillment.  Under the modest title
of " Offices," the wise men of antiquity set forth
pithy treatises on the relative duties of life (or offices,
as they were then called), which would better repay our
study than some of the verbose elaborations which, under
the sonorous titles of Systems of Moral Philosophy, and
Elements of Moral Science, have enlarged only to impoverish the literature of our age. One of these treatises speaks the sentiments of all on the subject under
consideration.  "We ought to remember," says Cicero,
"that we are bound to practise JUSTICE towards the




108      THE NATURAL JUSTICE OF SLAVERY.
lowest of mankind; the lowest, both in condition and
fortune, are slaves; and they give us wholesome precepts who bid us treat our slaves as hired laborers, and
make it our duty to exact of them  labor, and to afford
them in return the food, clothing, shelter, and protection
which are due to them.":
Now I do not appeal to these facts as proofs that human society is in a healthier state with slavery than
without it.  It may be- that slavery, as it has worn out
in Great Britain, is destined also, in the progress of
events, to expire universally, and to make room     for
something better in its place.  It is not against measures designed to promote its natural decay (in places
where it is in process of decay) that I contend, but against
the manifold attempts that are now making to arrest
and extirpate it, on the ground of its being an unjust
institution, and at war with human rights.  Will they
who reject Revelation. because it allows slavery, go
farther and proclaim  war upon the common sense of
mankind?    But for particular men, or even for a single
age, to set up their own reason as the measure of all
human reason, what is this better than insanity?  Universal consent has ever been thought the most infallible
criterion of truth; it is the strongest argument that can
* Meminerimus autem, etiam adversus infimos justitiam esse servandam. Est autem infima conditio et fortuna servorum, quibus non
male prsecipiunt qui ita jubent uti ut mercenariis; OPERtAM EXIGENDAM,
JUSTA PRAEBENDA.-De O fciis, Lib. i. c. xiii.




THE JUSTINIAN CODE.               109
be brought, independently of Revelation, for the being
of God, and the natural immortality of the human soul;
the concurrence of all nations in these sentiments being
evidently owing either to the traditions of an original
Revelation, prior to all written revelations, or to the
suggestions of Nature and the inborn rudiments of reason.  There is no nation, ancient or modern, barbarous
or civilized, heathen or Christian, which has not, by its
laws, condemned the violation of compacts, the cruel oppression of the innocent, and the fraudulent withholding
of his wages from the honest laborer.  But where is the
nation that has pronounced a state of servitude for life
contrary to natural justice?  What age, before our own,
could point to moralists that proclaim  it an offense
against nature to hold slaves in the condition in which
Providence has placed them? operarn exigere, justa
prhebere, to exact of them  labor, and to give them
board, lodging, and raiment in compensation for their
labor?  And if slavery has, in fact, existed among most
nations; if no nation has proclaimed it a violation of
natural justice; and if the most eminent men of all
time, legislators, sages, and moralists, have confessed a
state of servitude for life, no matter what name they have
given it, to be consistent with justice, then we have, to
this extent, the consent of mankind in its favor; and
from this consent we are entitled to infer, not indeed its
expediency in every country and every state of society,




110      THE NATURAL JUSTICE OF SLAVERY.
but its agreement with, or non-repugnance to, the LAW OF
NATURE.
But if this conclusion be correct, how comes the Justinian Code to define slavery as an institution of the law
of nations iz opposition to natural justice?   This
definition finds much favor with the lawyers who have
lost in our day none of that laudable bias in favor of
freedom, which Bodin, as I remember, in his synopsis
of the arguments for and against slavery, ascribes to
them in his time.  From the lawyers the definition has
passed into our horn-books and periodical journals, so
that now every educated man is supposed to be aware of
the fact that the Justinian Code-a great authority on a
subject of this sort-declares slavery to be an abnormal
state of society, upheld by force and in violation of
justice.
Is it probable that a code, which it took centuries to
mature, which is founded on the law of Nature, and is
one of the ablest developments of its principles ever
made by unassisted reason, has stultified itself by defending and protecting an institution which it proclaims
in the outset to be contrary to.that law?  Is it not just
possible that, in imputing to the code so flagrant an inconsistency, we may stultify ourselves?
Let us examine the authority. The passage occurs in
the first book of the Institutes, near the beginning, and
reads thus:
" Summa itaque divisio de jure personarum haec est:




THE JUSTINIAN CODE.              111
quod omnes homines aut liberi sunt, aut servi.   Et
libertas quidem (ex qua etiam liberi vocantur) est naturalis facultas ejus, quod cuique facere libet, nisi si quid
vi aut jure prohibetur.  Servitus autem  est constitutio juris gentiun  qua quis domninio alieno contra naturam, subjicitur."
Which is translated as follows by Dr. Harris, in his
edition of Justinian, with English notes, London, A. D.
1756:
" The first division of persons, with respect to their
rights, is into freemen and slaves.
" Liberty, or freedom, from which we are denominated
free, is that natural power which we have of acting as
we please, if not hindered by force, or restrained by
the law.
" Slavery is that, by which one man is made subject
to another; according to the law of nations, though contrary to natural right."
It may be suggested by some, who read the original,
that slavery is said to be against Nature, and not
against the right or law of Nature.  The word Nature,
however, is commonly used for the right or law of Nature; and therefore I dismiss this criticism as unworthy
of consideration, and accept Dr. Harris's translation.
It is to be observed, however, that the Code affixes to
the phrase law of Nature a meaning different from that
in which the phrase is commonly taken.
By the law of Nature, according to the best usage




112       THE NATURAL JUSTICE OF SLAVERY.
among the ancients, and universally among the moderns,
is meant, as we have said, that rule of fitness which the
Deity has established for the government of men, considered as reasonable creatures, and intended for mutual
society.  But the code itself, in the chapter next before
that which contains the definition of slavery, gives us its
own definition of the law of Nature.      Adopting   the
language of Ulpian it says expressly, under the title,
" De Jure Naturali,' etc.:
" The law of Nature is not a law to man only, but
likewise to all other animals, whether they are produced
on the earth, in the air, or in the waters.  From hence
proceeds the conjunction of male and female, which we,
among our own species, style matrimony; from      hence
arises the procreation of children, and our care in bringing them  up.   We perceive also that the rest of the
animal creation are regarded as having a knowledge of
this law by which they are actuated." *
Now by the law of Nature, in this large sense of the
phrase, man is as free as the beasts of the field; and to
say that slavery is against Nature, or the law of Nature, in this sense, is merely to say that no precedent or
* In the text I have used Dr. Harris' version; the Latin is as follows: " Jus naturale est quod natura omnia animalia docuit; nam jus
istud non humani generis proprium est, sed omniurn animalium, quse
in eelo, quse in terra, que in mari naseuntur. Hine descendit maris
atque fceminm conjunctio, quam nos matrimonium appellamus. Hine
liberorum procreatio, hine educatio: videmus enim, ccetera quoque
animalia istius juris peritia censeri."




THE JUSTINIAN      CODE.                113
analogy could then be drawn in favor of slavery from        the
brute creation.    I say, could then be drawn in favor of
slavery; for the     ancients were     undoubtedly    ignorant
of the astonishing facts which modern naturalists have
brought to light in respect to a certain species of ants;
and which, if then known, would have restrained them
from saying that slavery was contrary to Nature, even
in Ulpian's sense of the word.      But they were ignorant
of these curious facts, and they pronounced slavery contrary to Nature, on the supposition that no precedent or
analogy   in  its favor could be drawn       from   the brute
creation. 
* I annex from Harper's Family Library (No. VIII., p. 127), a passage, which contains a synopsis of these extraordinary discoveries —
referring the reader to tle note at the end of this chapter, for malny
interesting details. Among facts, all of which are wonderful, not the
least remarkable and instructive is the mutual good-will and affection, which prevails between the negro ants and their masters, and
that, too, mauger the fact that the relation had its origin in hostility and violence. Read the whole description at the end of this
chapter.
"' Connected with the subject of the warfare of ants is the history
of a species of this insect, not existing in these islands, called, by
lHber, the Amazon, or Legionary Ant, the Formica rzifescens of
Latreille. It is both warlike and powerful, and, unlike the rest of
the tribe, its habits are far from being industrious. Enough has been
said to show that the proceedings of some insects so nearly resemble
human actions, as to excite our greatest wonder: but the habits of
the legionary ant are still more surprising than the proceeding of the
chiefs which we have just described; it is actually found to be a
slave-dealer, attacking the nests of other species, stealing their young,
rearing them, and thus, by shifting all the domestic duties of their
republic on strangers, escaping from labor themselves.  This curious
fact, first discovered by Huber, has been confirmed by Latreille, and




114       THE NATURAL JUSTICE OF SLAVERY.
But man is to be considered not only as an animal,
but as a creature endowed with reason, as intended for
society, as accountable for his actions; and as obliged to
coteain duties, which are devolved on him by the various
relations in which he stands to his fellow-men, who are
by nature his equals, to all his fellow-creatures on earth,
and to God, the Maker of all.    Hence, inasmuch as the
Justinian Code applies the phrase, law     of Nature, to
those principles of action which are common to men and
inferior creatures, we are     naturally  led  to inquire,
whether it had no distinctive name for that rule of
action which is proper to man, considered as a reasonable and sociable creature? Certainly it had; and that
name is the Law of Nations.      Let the code speak for
itself; the very next section to that last quoted is as
follows:
" Civil law is distinguished from  the law of nations,
because every community uses partly its own particular
laws, and partly the general laws, which are common
to all mankind.'hat law which a people enacts for the
is admitted by all naturalists. The slave is distinguished from its
master by being of a dark ash-color, so as to be entitled to the name
of Negro-an epithet now appropriated to the Formica fusca, or ashcolored ants. Their masters are light in color. The negro is an industrious, peaceable, stingless insect; the legionary, a courageous,
armed, and lazy one. The relation between them is not, however,
that which exists between a task-master and his bondsman, but a
strong attachment is mutually felt-another instance of the modification of instinct, education obliterating in the ash-colored ant all its
natural antipathy to another species."




THE JUSTINIAN CODE.             115
government of itself, is called the civil law of that people. But that law which natural reason appoints for all
manrkind, is called the law of Nations, because all nations
make use of it."
Hence it appears that what the Justinian Code means
by the law of Nations, is the same that we now mean by
the law of Nature; viz., the rule which natural reason
appoints for all mankind.  In modern times,'indeed,
especially since the time of Grotius, the phrase la'wt of
Nations has been used to denote those rules and regulations by which the civilized nations govern their intercourse with one another.  Among the ancients, however,
the rules of international intercourse were too few in
number, and too limited in application, to be wrought
into a distinct science. Hence it very naturally happened that Tribonian, who digested the Justinian code,
used the phrase law of Nations to distinguish the rule
which natural reason prescribes to man from the law of
Nature in the sense in which he found it used by Ulpian
and other ancient lawyers. It is obvious to remark,
however, that this use of the latter phrase, which had
probably been borrowed from the poets and philosophers,
is improper; in other words, that the wholesome lessons
and examples which men may learn from their observation of inferior creatures, are not, in a proper sense, a
law which they are obliged to obey.  So sensible of this
were the ancients, that many of them used the phrase
lawv of Nature in its limited and proper sense; and




116        NATURAL JUSTICE OF SLAVERY.
what is remarkable is, that even the Code itself which is
a collection from various sources, uses the phrase in one
place at least, in the same sense. For (Tit. I Sec. 11),
it refers the origin of dominion and property to the law
of Nature; and adds, to leave no doubt of its meaning,
"which, as we have already observed, is also called the
law of Nations."   No wonder, then, that the phrase
law of Nature has come to be used universally by the
moderns, as it was used to some extent by the ancients
in its limited sense, to denote the rule of action proper to
hunma   nature; while the phrase law of Nations has
been turned from the sense affixed to it in the Justinian
Code, and appropriated to a branch of study which was
unknowyn to the ancients.
" itr velborumn vekus inteit ctas,"
Mr. Maxwell, in his learned annotations on Bishop
Cumberland (London, A. D. 1727), has placed this matter in a clear light.  "The civilians," he remarks, "universally acknowledge,'that the division into the law
of Nature and that of Nations, according to Justinian's
explication, is only the explaining two different senses
of the same word; the formr er ia.roper ld metcaphor
ical, as Naturalists use the word law, to denote those
uniform efects which are observed in the notions of
bodies.  The latter is proper. By the law of Nature,
the Emperor understands only uniform    instincts observed in all animals; by the law of Nations he




THE JUSTINIAN CODE.             117
denotes what our author, with most moderns and ancients, calls the law of Nature. Some later writers,
by the law of Nations, understand that branch of the
law of Nature which relates to sovereiyn States, or
princes, or those conventions about certain privileges of
ambassadors, about goods taken in open war, and certain
limitations of the methods of hostility, to which, perhaps,
antecedently to conventions express or tacit, there would
have been no obligation."
The Justinian Code, therefore, is so far from affirming slavery to be repugnant to the law of Nature, in
our sense of the expression, that it affirms the direct
contrary.  It declares slavery to be a constitution of the
law of Nations, having previously defined this law to be
that which Natural Reason appoints for all neankind;
which is just what we now mean by the law of Nature.
It denominates slavery a constitution or appointment,
and thus distinguishes the relation of master and slave
from those relations which exist naturally and without
the intervention of any human act; and, to make this
distinction more apparent, it adds that slavery is against
Nature, or the law of Nature, inasmuch as it does not
exist by nature, but is always brought about by some act
or constitution of human reason.  To illustrate: the relation of parent and child is natural; that is, it is not effected
by any constitution or appointment of human reason or
human law, but results from the very nature of the parties who, while they both live, are, and can not cease to be,




118        NATURAL JUSTICE OF SLAVERY.
parent and child. Not so, says the Code, with the relation of master and slave; for this relation does not
exist by nature, nor result from the law of creationi
but takes its beginning from some human act, and rests
for support, not on the original law of creation, but on
the constitution or appointment of that law which natural reason prescribes for the government of all mankind.
In this construction of the Code which makes slavery
to be upheld by positive law considered as declarative
of the law of Nature, I am confirmed by two passages
of Grotius, with the quotation of which, and of a note
by one of his commentators, I shall conclude this chapter. In the second book of his great work (De Jure
Belli, etc.) chap. 22, ~ 11, Grotius observes that, " To take
up arms on account of liberty is not justifiable either in
particular persons or in a whole community, as if to be
in such a state-a state, that is, of aut0ono0my, or independence-were naturally and at al l times every one's
prerogative.  For when men are said to be by nature
in a state of freedom, by nature must be understood to
mean the right of Nature as it is antecedent to all human acts to the contrary; and the freedom there meant
is a freedom in a privative not in a contradictory sense;
that is to say, though a man be not by nature a slave,
or subject to any, yet he can not thence derive a right
of being always exempted from slavery and subjection;
for in this sense nobody living is free.  And this is what
Albutius intends when he says that no man is born either




THE JUSTINIAN CODE.                   119
a freeman or a slave, but these names fortune gives
them   afterwards.   Thus Aristotle N6,1o rTo tv 66v2ov
tvato 0 6e e0,'vOepoz7,  I To the law  it is owing that one
man is in a free, another in a servile condition. ":
And again, in the third book of the same work, at the
beginning of the seventh chapter, the same author says:
"No man is a slave by nature, that is, without any
human deed, and considered in the primitive state of
nature; as we have elsewhere said: in which sense we
may take the lawyers when they say that slavery           is
against Nature.    That slavery, however, should take its
origin from   some human act, is not, as we have elsewhere shown, repugnant to natural justice." t
On which passage, in reference to the words against
Nature, Gronovius observes: That slavery is opposed to
" "Sed nec libertas, sive singulorum sive civitatum, id est ctavrolo,ua,
quasi naturaliter, et semper quibusvis competat, jus bello praestare
potest. Nam libertas cum natura competere hominibus aut populis
dicitur, id intelligendum est de jure naturoe prececente; factum omne
humanum, et de libertate ltara aurpptov, non de ea qume est ct-rT' evavrto6rra, hoc est. ut natura quis servus non sit, non ut jus habeat ne
unquam serviat; nam hoc sensu nemo liber est: quo pertinet illud
Albutii;'neminem natura liberum esse, neminem servum; hec postea
nomina singulis imposuisse fortunam.'  Et Aristotelis illud: N6o/[
7o Pre 866vXov evat, TO 6e ex2vOepov0; e lege venisse ut alius esset liber,
alius servus."
t Servi natura quicler, id est, citra factum humanum aut primsevo
naturs statu, honinum nulli sunt, ut et alibi diximus; quo sensu recte
accipi potest quod a juris-consultis dictum est, contra naturam esse hane
servitutem: ut tamen facto hominis, id est, pactione aut delicto, servitus originem acciperet, justitise naturali non repug'nat, ut alibi quoque
ostendimus.




120          NATURAL JUSTICE OF SLAVERY.
liberty, and that liberty is an endowment of Nature; it
being understoocl, however, that Nature has not bestowed
this endowment on men in such sense as to prevent some
from being for jlst causes deprived of it; for the endowment is not inalienable, but may be lost by fault or fortune. 
N. B.-The author quoted in the note, pp. 1i3, 114, remarks that
all we know concerning the negro ant is derived from Mr. P. Huber,
and he adds the following short summary of Huber's account;
"While walking near Geneva, between four and five in the evening
of the l7th of June, 1804, this distinguished naturalist observed an
army of the ruifescent or legionary ants traversing the road. The
column occupied a space of ten inches in length, by four in breadth;
they rapidly quitted the road, passed a thick hedge, entered a pasture-ground, wound throug  ththe grass without breaking the line of
march, and approached a nest inhabited by the negro or ash-colored
ant. Some of its inhabitants were guarding the entrance, but on the
discovery of an approaching army, they darted forth on the advancing
party. The alarm was communicated to the interior, whence their
companions rushed in numbers to join in the defense of their underground residence. The bulk of the army of the legionaries being
about two paces off, now quickened their march, and in an instant the
whole battalion fell upon and overthrew the negroes, who, after a
short and obstinate conflict, retired and took refuge in the lowest
parts of their nest. The legionaries now mounted the hillock; some
took possession of the principal avenues, while others effected a new
breach with their teeth, so as to admit the remainder of the army,
Having thus taken the city by assault, they remained in it only a few
minutes: returning by the apertures through which they had entered,
each carried in its mouth either a larva or a pupa, and scampered
away without order or regularity. I.Huber followed them for some
~ Servitutem esse contrariam illi bono, quod contigit homini beneficio nature et per naturam, id est libertati; quamvis id ita ei natura
dederit, ut ob justas causas eripi non vetet; ut sit bonum separabile,
quod peccato aut fortuna possit amitti.




THE JUSTINIAN      CODE.                121
time, but lost sight of them in a cornfield. Wishing to observe the
assaulted city again, he retraced his steps, and saw a small number
of ash-colored laborers perched on the stalks of plants, holding in
their mouths the few larvae which they had succeeded in rescuing
from pillage.
The next morning, Huber, taking the same road, with the hope of
once more seeing a similar scene, discovered a large ant-hill tenanted
by legionaries. At five in the evening, provided the weather be fine,
and the temperature 6g~ Fahrenheit in the shade, these sally out.
During the other part of the day they appear to do little; but at this
hour they become restless, assemble on the outside of the city, move
round it in circles: a signal is then given, which they pass from one
to the other, striking, as they proceed, with their antennae and forehead, the breasts of their companions; these, in their turn, approach
those advancing, and communicate the same signal-it is that of departure-as the result satisfactorily proves. Those which receive
the intimation are instantly seen to put themselves on the march; the
column becomes organized; and not a single amazon remains near
the garrison. There is no commander-in-chief; every ant is in turn
first, each seeking to be foremost. A small number may, however,
be observed constantly returning to the rear: this is probably the
means by which the whole army is governed.
With such dispositions, maneuvers, and discipline, Huber saw an
army of legionaries set out for a negro city. With their usual impetuosity of attacl, one party soon entered, and returned laden with
the young of the assailed ant-hill; a second detachment, not meeting
with equal success, separated from their companions, and fell on another negro colony, where they met wvith ample booty; after which
the whole number of legionaries marched to their nest in two divisions. As they approached, Huber saw, to his astonishment, a great
number of the very same species which had been pillaged, all around
the nest of the legionaries. Was this a diversion made by carrying
the war into the enemy's territory? NTo: the return of the legionaries excited no alarm; on the contrary, the negro ants were seen to
approach these warriors, caress them with their antenne, offer them
nourishment, as is the custom among their own species, while the
legionaries consigned their prisoners to them to be carried to the interior of the nest.
In this way the same negro colony was observed to be attacked
three several times, and each time with complete success; the last
6




122       THE NATURAL JUSTICE OF SLAVERY.
attack, however, was made under different circumstances from the
first two: the negroes, as if conscious of their exposed situation, had
lost no time in throwing up trenches, barricading the several entrances,
and reinforcing the guard of the interior; "they had, moreover,
brought together all the little pieces of wood and earth within their
reach; with these they had blocked up the passage to their habitation, in which they had posted themselves in full force."
"The legionaries at first hesitating to approach; rambled about or
returned to the rear; they then on a given signal rushed forward en
masse, with great impetuosity, removing with their teeth and feet the
many obstacles which impeded their progress; having succeeded,
they entered the ant-hill by hundreds, notwithstanding the resistance
of its inhabitants, and carried off their prize to the garrison."
In these attacks the legionaries never take the old negroes prisoners, knowing, perhaps, that at an adult age the love 6f home, with all
its associations, would be sad obstacles to transplantation; nor is their
contest attended with loss of blood; they seek the young, and these
being obtained, they speedily decamp with their booty. Nor do they
ever begin their predatory warfare before the end of May, or beginning of June; if they commenced at an earlier period to purloin the
young negroes, they might secure a large supply of captives, but then
it would principally consist of males and females, and these, it seems,
Nature does not permit them to seize: for she has ordained that, in
the ant-hills destined to pillage, the males and females shall be produced earlier than the males and' females of the legionaries; and it is
only after their own males and females have undergone the last
change, tha         t the instinct which prompts them to steal the young of
others begins to operate. Hence, Huber has distinctly ascertained,
and Latreille has confirmed the discovery, that the legionary ant-hill
contains male, female, and neuter amazons, together with negro-neuters, but never negro males or females. The amazon female, after
having cast off her wings, lays the foundation of her own nest, and
performs all the duties of a laborer.' There is no doubt that these
creatures have the ability to work, and do so; but as soon as they
obtain slaves to do that for them which they ought to do themselves,
they relinquish every domestic duty, and during the day " tranquilly
wait, at the bottom of their subterranean abode, the hour of departure, reserving their strength, courage, and the address which they so
well know how to display, for the purposes of war."
On the negroes reared among them they depend not only for house




THE JUSTINIAN     CODE.                123
and home, but even for food; and these faithful and affectionate servants begrudge neither labor nor pains, in providing for their masters.
iuber enclosed thirty amazons with several pupe and larvae of their
own species, and twenty negro pupae, in a glass box, the bottom of
which was covered with a thick layer of earth; honey was given to
them, so that, although cut off from their auxiliaries, the amazons
had both shelter and food: at first they appeared to pay some little
attention to the young; this soon ceased, and they neither traced out
a dwelling, nor took any food; in two days one-half died of hunger,
and the other remained weak and languid: commiserating their condition, he gave them one of their black companions: this little creature, unassisted, formed a chamber in the earth, gathered together the
larvae, put everything into complete order, and preserved the lives of
those which were about to perish.
In order to obtain a more intimate knowledge of the facts, the
same observer of nature opened and deranged an ant-hill in which
the negroes and amazons dwelt together; in doing so, the aspect of
their city was so altered as not to be recognized by the amazons, and
they were seen wandering at random over its surface. The negroes,
however, appeared to be well acquainted with the new localities of
the ant-hill, and relieved them from their embarrassment by taking
them up gently in their mandibles, and conducting them to the galleries already pierced. " An amazon was frequently seen to approach
a negro, and play upon its head with its antennae, when the latter immediately seized the former in its pincers, and deposited it at one of
the entrances; the amazon ant then unrolled itself, caressed once
more its kind friend, and passed into the interior of the nest; now
and then the negro lost its way too, and wandered about carrying the
amazon.
" I observed one," continues Iuber, " after ineffectual windings, take
the precaution of laying its burden on the ground: the amazon remained on the same spot until the negro returned to its assistance,
which, having well ascertained and examined one of the entrances,
resumed its load, and bore it into the interior."
If the entrance to any gallery happened to be obstructed, the
negro, depositing its burden, went to remove the obstruction, and
again taking up the amazon, introduced it into the nest. It often happens that the ant-hill is not suficiently commodious; in this case the
negroes alone decide upon the expediency of a removal, and choose a
spot for the new dwelling; they set about building, and as soon as




124           NATURAL JUSTICE OF SLAVERY.
the works are sufficiently advanced, appear eager to conduct the
legionaries to the new city: for this purpose, each negro takes up an
amazon, which it carries to the chosen spot, so that a long line of these
faithful creatures may be seen extending all the way from the old to
the new town; their charges are then deposited at the various ent.rances, when other negroes come out, welcome their arrival, and
usher them into the interior of their new abode.
The negro is not the only species of ant subjugated by the legionaries. The mining ants are attacked for a similar purpose; but as
t-iese are a much more resolute race than the pacific ash-colored
tribe, the legionaries are obliged to vary their tactics.
"In one of these forays, the amazons," says Iuber, "proceeded
like a torrent along a deep dike, and marched in a more compact
body than ordinary, and in a short time reached the nest they proposed to attack. As soon as the legionaries began entering the subterranean city, the miners rushed out in crowds, and while some fell
upon the invaders with great spirit, others passed through the scene
of contest, solely occupied in bearing off to a place of safety their
larve and pupae."
The amazon army was often despoiled of its booty, but their superior address and agility at length gave them the advantage, and in a
quarter of an hour they were seen returning homewards loaded with
prey-not, however, straggling, and in a file, as after an assault upon
the negroes, but in a compact mass; a precaution so much the more
necessary, as the courageous miners disputed every inch of ground,
following and attacking them until they arrived within ten paces of
the amazonian citadel.
Besides the amazons, there is another slave-making species, called
the formica sanguinea; a species which has not as yet been discovered in this island. They are larger than the legionaries; unlike
them, however, they share the labor with their slaves. Their mode
of attack is very different from that of the legionaries; the latter
carry every thing by sheer impetuosity; the former never pour in
immense masses, but attack in small divisions; they sometimes go
one hundred and fifty paces, to attack a negro habitation, and the
various divisions succeed each other by means of couriers, which are
evidently sent off to fetch assistance from the garrison.
"On the 15th of July, at 10 A. M.," says Huber, "a small division of
sanguine ants was despatched from the garrison, and arrived in quick
march near a nest of neg'ro ants, situated twenty paces distant, around
which they took their station. The inhabitants, perceiving the strangers, rushed forth, and made several prisoners; the sanguine ants ad



THE JUSTINIAN     CODE.               125
vanced no further: they appeared to be waiting for reinforcements;
from time to time, little companies arrived from the garrison to
strengthen the brigade: thus reunited they advanced a little nearer
and seemed more willing to run the risk of a general engagement;
but in proportion as they approached the negro dwelling, the more
solicitous did they seem to despatch couriers to the garrison, who, arriving in great haste, produced considerable alarm, when another
division was immediately despatched to join the army. The negroes
took up a position of about two feet square, in front of their nest,
where nearly their whole force was assembled, awaiting the enemy."
In the interim, the pupae were removed to the side of the nest facing
the field of battle, so that they might be conveyed away at a moment's warning, affording a trait of what Huber calls prudence, and
certainly a marvelously singular one it is. When fighting with the
amazons, the impetuosity of the attack leaves the negro ant no time
for thought, but in their contests with the sanguine ants, they vary
their tactics so as to meet the new circumstances. The latter insects,
being sufficiently reenforced, make the attack, and band after band
pillage, and carry away their booty, not in a few minutes, as is done
by the amazons, but during the whole day; and if the pillaged city
should suit them better than their own, they remove to it on the following morning; at least so it appears in an instance observed by
Huber. It is rare, according to that author, that they do not change
at least once during the year. They certainly inspire the negroes
with great terror, for these, once attacked by them, generally forsake
their nest for ever.
" To their own slaves they are much attached; the sanguine ants
are often besieged by the fallow ants: on these occasions they carry
their servants to the lowest chambers, and these, as if aware of the
intention of their removal, immediately begin barricading the different entrances, with every species of material lying within their reach.
The sanguine ants evince extraordinary foresight in these engagements; for, while one party is fighting, another is engaged in bearing
away the negroes, who immediately begin by constructing a new
dwelling at a considerable distance from the scene of combat."
Such is the extraordinary recital contained in that delightful work
of Huber's, every fact of which has been confirmed by the subsequent observations of the accurate and learned Latreille. It would
seem that the negro and miner ants are both occasionally enslaved,
and dwell together in the sanguine ant-hills. And Huber has brought
up legionaries and sanguine ants, which are both slave-makers, with
negroes, in one common dwelling.




CHAPTER IX.
SLAVERY REGARDED AS A PROVIDENTIAL INSTITUTION.
HAVING shown that slavery may be introduced into
human society without violence to justice, and that even
when it originates in war, it passes by a tendency of
human nature, amounting almost to a law, into a peaceful and orderly form of society, I come now to show
that, having been once introduced, it extends itself consistently with justice, and by the ordinary laws of Nature
and Providence, unless its extension is violently arrested
by some exterior agency. I do not mean that slavery is
destined to be perpetual in every country in which it is
planted: it partakes, we know, of the mutability of all
things human; it rises and grows to maturity, remains
stationary for a time, and then decays and dies out in
conformity with certain laws which history, by its large
induction of facts, enables us to perceive and unfold.
But I mean that slavery once introduced becomes a just
and settled institution of society; liable, indeed, to the
changes effected by violent revolutions, or by other causes
slower in their operation, and of a more insidious nature;
but still a fixed social institution, entitled, while it lasts,




A PROVIDENTIAL INSTITUTION.          127
in a degree proportioned to its importance, to the same
religious regalrd which is paid by all good men, with
common consent, to the orderly institutions of society,
not only in their own country, but in every country on
earth.
In the first place, as a presumptive, though not, I
confess, a conclusive argument in favor of a derivative
servitude from parent to child, I desire it may be considered that children, as a general rule, follow the concition of their parents; as, for example, that the children
of the'Arabs are Arabians, and that the natives of New
England are not savages, like the aboriginal Indians,
but are an enlightened, civilized, and Christian-people,
after the fashion of their Puritan forefathers.  No man
can deny the fact, and all my readers, I trust, will agree
with me in ascribing it to the wise order of that Divine
Providence which governs the world.  The posterity of
Abraham inherited, by this Divine Providence, the privileges which their father's faith had earned for them, as
well as for himself; the descendants of Ham have been
born to the curse pronounced on their progenitor; and,
universally, from Pekin to Boston, from Cape Horn to
Labrador, and from the time of Adam to the present day,
children have, as a general rule, followed the condition
of their parents; reaping in some instances the happy
fruits of their piety and virtue, and exemplifying in
other instances, the misery entailed on them by the follies and iniquities of the generation that preceded them.




128           SLAVERY REGARDED AS
What would be thought of the man who should wail over
the hard lot of the children of the Esquimaux, because
they were not born in France and Germany, or shed
tears of compassion over the Musquito Indians, because
they could enjoy only the " protection" of England, and
were debarred, by the misfortune of their birth, from all
participation in the liberties bestowed on her, by " our
Great Deliverer," as Lord John Russell calls the Dutch
William?  Why, then, should it be esteemed either a
wrong or a grievance that the children of slaves are not
born to civil freedom?  I say, civil freedom, since the
only freedom to which they are not born is a certain civil
state or condition; for; as to natural freedom, all men
are born alike; and we do not need. the Declaration of
Independence to tell us that new-born infants, whether
they first see the light in London or in Timbuctoo, in a
king's palace or a slave's cabin, are all equal by nature.
The parents of slaves are not more in a state of nature
than their masters; they are equally with them members
of civil society, only standing in a different relation to
society.
The difference, then, between the children of slaves
and the children of their masters being not a difference
of Nature (for in this respect both are equal), but a difference of condition in human society, what reason, I
ask again, has any man to wail and mourn over the sad
condition of the children of slaves because they are not
born to civil freedom?  It is no more an impeachment




A PROVIDENTIAL INSTITUTION.         129
of God's justice (for really it is God's Providence, and
not man's agency, against which this objection is leveled)
-it is, I say, no more an impeachment of God's justice
and goodness that men should be born unequal in fortune, than that divers orders of creatures should be
made unequal in nature.   Whatever any creature has
that is positive, either by its nature or condition, is to
be ascribed to the bounty of the All Glorious Giver;
whatever any creature is not or has not, is a mere negation, and to be ascribed, not to any defect of God's goodness, but to the original nonentity out of which the
creature was produced.  And, if it be an illustration of
the wisdom and benevolence of the Deity, that He has
made an infinite variety of creatures of divers kinds, how
is it an impeachment of His Providence that He permits
the greatest possible diversity of fortune or condition
among creatures of the same kind?  Why the condition
of horses should be diversified; why some of the noble
animals should be trained to the turf or pampered for
a nabob's chariot, while others, their equals in all the
essentials of the equine nature, should be degraded to
the dray, and doomed to be starved and beaten by some
brute of an owner, it might puzzle a philosopher to explain. But man, who is placed in this world on probation for the future, whose character is capable of an
infinite variety of development, and needs a correspond 
ing variety of circumstances in order to its development —
why should it be thought strange that his natural equal6*




130             SLAVERY REGARDED AS
ity should be checkered with an infinite diversity of
fortune?    iMust we raise the heathen from the dead to
teach the nineteenth century Christians that the choice
of our lot is not in ourselves but in God, and that it
becomes us to act well our own part in life because it
is that which the Master of the drama has assigned
to us?*
Do bur philanthropists really think that every human
being has not scope enough for virtue in the rank and
station in which God has placed him, that they are thus
forever moving Acheron to make men as equal in fortune and condition as they are in nature?    Is it not
enough for woman to cultivate the grace and gentleness
proper to her sex? Is the English collier incapable of
all virtue, because he is not born a peer of the realm?
Are all the civilities and charities and amenities of life
of necessity bound up with that structure of society
which exalts the individual-man, woman, or child-above
the State, and can they only grace the car of that
heaven-defying liberty which this sort of republicans
have chosen for their tutelary goddess? Are there no
virtues; nay, rather, are there not many of the noblest
virtues and charities, and among them that divine and
* MEUivrOo, 0rt Vn7ro/cpT7r d dpduaCroC, oZ'ov v20  6 6, tidci/caCog'
dv fpaxv, ppaxEog' uv taKcpbv, p/aKpov, (lv 7rrToXO v7roKptva6aa  aec
OeZy., iva lca 2 OTOO )o EiV0J V7rtOICpIvy' uii X)OV, aV (pXovra, iav lbS6rTv, obv yap roTVr' EAGT, rb 5oO0v EirotcpivacaOat 7roOucowrov IcaSf' E/c2E$aaOat 6' avrb, "uc;ov.-Epict. EyXetp. c. 17.




A PROVIDENTIAL INSTITUTION.          131
chastened liberty which God most approves, which either
grow exclusively out of the relation of master and servant, or are indebted to it for their fuller expansion?
It is a narrow view which limits all the virtues to one
form of society; some flourish best on one soil, some on
another; and all of them, in all their successive stages
and manifold forms of development, are necessary to a
complete humanity. Faith in God's providence should
teach us, that He has so ordered the birth of every human being as to place him in that condition and those
circumstances which he sees to be best for him, both as
to this world and the world to come; and that he who is
lowest (to the eye of man) in the scale of fortune, has
infinitely more reason to be thankful for his humanity
than to be discontented with his lot in life. And so men
would think, if they were permitted to receive the gospel
of Christ without the fumes of Exeter Hall and the
everlasting din and clatter of fanatical busy-bodies.
But, it may be said, all other children have, indeed,
no cause to complain that they follow the condition of
their parents, because, whatever be its hardships, they
are at least allowed their natural rights: but the children of slaves differ herein from all others, that they are
at once, and as soon as born, deprived of their natural
rights. This is a mistake; they are not deprived of
their natural rights, but are protected in them by the
masters, in whose service they are born, just as children,
born free, are protected in their natural rights by their




132            SLAVERY REGARDED AS
parents. But let us look at the matter, for a moment,
on the popular supposition, and see what it will come to.' 0 that the children of slaves," you exclaim,  had but
their natural rights, I would ask no more!"  Nay, my
dear reader, you shall have more.  I will be as liberal
to you as was the good fairy to the honest couple in the
nursery tale. I will give you three wishes, and, my
word for it, your third wish, like that of the said honest
couple, will be prompted by the vanity of the two others.
You wish that the children of the slaves might have
their natural rights.  Done! And now let me ask
what have you gained for them?  What provision does
Nature make for them?   She gives them the light of
the sun by day, and the light of the moon and stars by
night, and the air of heaven to breathe.  This is their
freedom by nature, and to these rights they are born.
But how long will they live to enjoy this natural freedom without food, and shelter, and clothing? The young
of brutes may soon take care of themselves, but the offspring of human parents are utterly helpless; they
must be indebted for years to the care of others for
maintenance, before they can provide for themselves.
The result, then, of your first wish is, that you leave
the children to perish! Your second wish is, I suppose,
that their parents also may have the rights of nature,
so as to be at liberty to take care of their offspring.
Agreed    Take away, then, from the parents the advantages they have received from their masters and from




A PROVIDENTIAL INSTITUTION.         133
that intercourse with human society which they have
enjoyed through their masters, and restore them to their
pure and inalienable natural rights. Can more miserable
creatures be imagined? Naked, and without the use of
language, they pluck herbs and roots, and gather wild
fruits; quench their thirst at the next spring, river, or
ditch; and shelter themselves from the injuries of the
weather by creeping into some cave, or covering themselves after any sort with moss, or grass; pass away
their tedious life in idleness; start at every noise, and
are afraid at the sight of any other animal; and perish
at last, either by hunger or cold, or some wild beast.
Oh, the blessed rights of Nature! And now, reader,
tell me honestly whether your third wish will not be to
revoke the two former wishes, and to restore these poor
infants to the masters to whose care the good providence
of God has committed them?  For, believe me, God has
never dealt so harshly with the descendants of Adam
since the fall, as to leave them  to their natural rights
alone. Look the world through, and you will find that
Nature, to use the words of the elder Pliny, has acted
the part, rather of a cruel step-dame, than of a kind
mother to the young of human parents; and that the
providence of Almighty God has been far more bountiful than Nature to the children of our American slaves,
by giving them  Christian masters, who, from  motives
both of duty and interest, provide for their helpless




134           SLAVERY REGARDED AS
infancy, and thus justly bind them to their service in
their maturer years.
But before we proceed with the argument, the mention of the elder Pliny leads me to pause for a moment
and invite the reader to refresh himself with one of the
most remarkable passages of heathen antiquity.  This
great naturalist, having surveyed all inanimate creation,
enters, in the seventh book of his Natural History, on
the description of living creatures. And here, in the
first place, his attention is arrested by the fact just referred to-the singular helplessness and wretchedness of
human infancy.  To us Christians, who have been instructed in the fall and redemption of man, the fact is
not inexplicable; but to this inquisitive and intelligent
heathen it was a mystery and a marvel; and the perplexity which it gave him probably excited him to study
and exhibit the fact with a force and fullness which no
Christian divine, to my knowledge, has ever equaled.
I give the passage in the telling old English of a Church
of England divine of the seventeenth century; and although it be not exactly the material for a fourth of July
oration, it will yet prove, I trust, at least equally suggestive of salutary thoughts:
"Thus, as you see, we have in the former books sufficiently treated of the universal world, of the lands,
regions, nations, seas, islands, and renowned cities therein contained. It remaineth now to discourse of the living
creatures comprised within the same, and their natures:




A PROVIDENTIAL INSTITUTION.         135
a point, doubtless, that would require as deep a speculation as any part else thereof whatsoever, if so be the
spirit and mind of man were able to comprehend and
compass all things in the world. And to make a good
entrance into this treatise and history, methinks of right
we ought to begin at Man, for whose sake it would seem
that Nature produced all other creatures besides: though
this great favor of hers, so bountiful and beneficial in
that respect, hath cost full dear.  Insomuch as it is hard
to judge, whether in so doing, she hath done the part of
a kind mother, or an hard and cruel step-dame.  For,
first and foremost of all other living creatures, man she
hath brought forth all naked, and clothed him with the
good and riches of others. To all the rest given she
hath sufficient to clad (clothe) them every one, according to their kind: as, namely, shells, cods, hard hides,
pricks, shags, bristles, hair, down, feathers, quills, scales,
and fleeces of wool.  The very trunks and stems of trees
and plants she hath defended with bark and rind, yea,
and the same sometimes double, against the injuries both
of heat and cold. Man alone, poor wretch, she hath
laid all naked upon the bare earth, even on his birth-day,
to cry and wrawl presently from the very first hour that
he is born into this world: in such sort as, among so
many living creatures, there is none subject to shed
tears and weep like him. And, verily, to no babe or
infant is given once to laugh before he be forty days old,
and that is counted very early, and with the soonest.




136            SLAVERY REGARDED AS
Moreover, so soon as he is entered in this manner to enjoy the light of the sun, see how he is immediately tied
and bound fast, and hath no member at liberty; a thing
that is not practised upon the young whelps of any beast
among us, be he never so wild. The child of man, so
untowardly born, and who another day is to rule and
command all other, lo how he lieth bound hand and foot,
weeping and crying, and beginning his life with misery,
as if he were to make amends and justification by his
punishment unto Nature, for his only fault and trespass,
that he is born and brought into the world.  0 folly of
all follies, ever to think (considering this simple beginning
of ours) that we were sent into this world to live in pride,
and carry our head aloft! The first hope that we conceive of our strength, the first gift that time affordeth us,
maketh us no better than four-footed beasts; how long is
it ere we can go alone! How long before we can prattle
and speak, feed ourselves and chew our meat strongly!
What a while continueth the mold and crown of our
heads to beat and pant, before our brain is well settled;
the undoubted mark and token that bewrayeth our exceeding great weakness above all other creatures. What
should I say of the infirmities and sickness that soon
seize upon our feeble bodies? What need I speak of so
many medicines and remedies devised against these maladies? besides the new diseases that come every day, to
check and frustrate all our provision of physic whatsoever. As for all other living creatures there is not




A PROVIDENTIAL INSTITUTION.         137
one, but by a secret instinct of nature knoweth his own
good, and whereto he is made able: some make use of
their swift feet, others of their flight wings; some are
strong of limbs, others are apt to swim, and practice the
same: man only knoweth nothing, except he be taught;
he can neither speak, nor go, nor eat, otherwise than he
is trained to it; anud. to be short, apt and good at nothing
he is naturally, but to pule and cry.
" And hereupon it is, that some have been of this opinion, That better it had been, and simply best for man,
never to have been born, or else speedily to die. None
but we do sorrow and wail, none but we are given to
excess and superfluity, infinitely in everything, and
show the same in every member that we have. Who
but we, again, are ambitious and vainglorious?  Who
but we are covetous and greedy of gathering good?
We, and none but we, desire to live long, and never to
die, are superstitious. careful of our sepulture and burial,
yea, and what shall betide us when we are gone. Man's
life is most frail of all others, and in least security he
liveth: no creature lusteth more after everything than
he; none feareth like unto him, and is more troubled
and amazed in his fright; and if he be set once upon
anger, none more raging and wood (mad) than he.  To
conclude, all other living creatures live orderly and
well, after their own kind; we see them flock and gather
together, and ready to make head and stand against all
others of a conitrary kind; the lions, as fell and savage




138     SLAVERY A PROVIDENTIAL INSTITUTION.
as they be, fight not with one another; serpents sting
not serpents, nor bite one another with their venomous
teeth; nay, the very monsters and huge fishes of the
sea, war not amongst themselves in their own kind; but,
believe me, man, at man's hand, receiveth most harm
and mischief."'
* JaQkson's Works, fol. ed., vol. iii., b. 10, c. 8. For the original,
see Appendix.




CHAPTER X.
AMERICAN SLAVERY CONSIDERED AS A SOCIAL
INSTITUTION.
BUT to return to our argument.  We have seen that
the contract which tacitly subsists between the master
and his slaves devolves on the one party the duty of
care and protection, and on the other party the duty of
service. Now the children of slaves are naturally part
of their parents-bone of their bone, and flesh of their
flesh.  Naturally, therefore, as well as justly, and by a
moral necessity, they become parties to the contract that
subsists between their parents and the master.  That infants, as soon as born are incapable of becoming parties
to a contract, will be affirmed by no person who is even
moderately conversant with moral science. The consent
and custom of all nations; the theories of the profoundest authors on the constitution of human society; the
divinely prescribed usage of the Jewish Church; the
entire consent of the Christian Church; and, with few
exceptions, of all professing Christians, from the time
of the Apostles to the present, concurring with the Jewish Church in not only recognizing infants as capable of




140        AMERICAN SLAVERY CONSIDERED
a covenant relation, but in formally sealing and ratifying
that relation, put it out of all doubt that infants may be
justly held to be parties to a contract for their own benefit. As respects the children of slaves, it is so obviously beneficent, so clearly just, so imperatively obligatory to admit them   to the same contract with their
parents, that the master who should refuse them this
boon, who should turn them   off his hands, where the
providence of God has placed them, and throw them
back on the mere rights of Nature, instead of according
to them the more sacred and important rights that justly
accrue to them by their birth of parents in his service;
who, in a word, should le ave them to perish, instead of
providing for their wants, would be branded, and justly,
as a monster of impiety, injustice, and cruelty.  He can
not escape from his responsibility without bringing on
himself the displeasure of God and the scorn and execration of men  he is morally and religiously bound by ties
of the most sacred nature, to provide for the wants of
these infants, to feed and to lodge them, and to train
them for the duties of their hluble station.
You say that it is his interest to rear them, and that
he does it from  sordid motives, and in order to enrich
himself by their fiture labor.  I answer that his motives
concern nobody but himself and his IMaker; and as to
his profiting by their labors, how unreasonable to carp at
a man for not declining a duty because the Providence
of God has made it his interest to discharge it! Hard,




AS A SOCIAL INSTITUTION.            141
indeed, would be our lot if we were compelled to work,
either for this world or the next, without the hope of reward!
Now if it be granted, and I see not how it can be
fairly denied, that the master is bound to extend support
and maintenance to the children of his slaves during
their infancy, then it inevitably follows that these children are indebted to him for this support and maintenance; and since he gives them support on condition of
their future service, and they can not otherwise repay
the debt, it follows that they owe him service as soon as
they are capable of rendering it; nor is it just or equitable that they should quit his service unless they pay
him an equivalent for his care and nurture.  Thus the
bond of servitude is formed by Providence; it is the offspring not of a physical but of a moral necessity, that is
to say, not of arbitrary power but of benevolence and
justice; it is formed under circumstances under which
it can not but be formed without impiety to God and
injustice to man; it is formed on the one part in infancy
and helplessness, and is, therefore, next in sacredness to
the ties of blood; and for the State to step in and annul
the relation and cancel the real though implied contract,
without the mutual consent of the parties, would be, as
it seems to me, a stretch of arbitrary power that could
only be justified by the same law of expediency and physical force on which slavery itself is thought, by many)
to Iest for its support.




142       AMERICAN SLAVERY CONSIDERED
That I may not be thought to be broaching any private
fancies of my own, I beg to fortify my positions with the
names of men, whose authority alone, I am not ashamed
to confess, would silence my objections, even if their
arguments failed to carry conviction to my reason.
The illustrious Grotius, after having mooted the question, not essential to our present argument, whether children are required by the law of Nature to follow the
condition of the father or the mother on the supposition
that the one was free and the other a slave; the Civil
law, as is well known, making the child take its condition from the mother, the old English law from the
father, the Saxons and some other nations from the slave
parent, whether father or mother, and the West Gothic
law, in case the parents belonged to different masters,
requiring the value of the issue to be divided in two
equal parts between the respective masters; Grotius, I
say, having adverted to the difficulties involved in this
question, with which we have no occasion to encumber
our present inquiry, proceeds as follows:'" Let us suppose, then, for the ease of the inquiry,
that both parents are slaves, and let us see whether so
their children would be naturally slaves too.  If there
were, indeed, no other way of maintaining their children,
parents might, with themselves, bring their future progeny into slavery; because, upon the very same account,
parents may even sell their free-born children.  But
since this right does naturally arise from mere necessity,




AS A SOCIAL INSTITUTION.           143
it is in no other circumstances allowed that parents
should enslave their children; nor have masters any
other right over the children of their slaves, than as
they are to find them victuals and other necessaries of
life; and, therefore, when the children of slaves have
been for a long time maintained before they are capable of
being serviceable to their master, and their work then can
only answer the expense of their present maintenance,
such children can never quit their service, unless they
pay what is reasonable for all their former entertainment.':Puffendorf, a name of equal weight with Grotius, and
who wrote after him is still more explicit and cogent:
" It is easy to show that the master doth no injury to
his slave's offspring, by dooming it to the same subjection. For, since the mother hath nothing of her own, it
is impossible she should maintain the child but with the
master's goods.   And, inasmuch   as the master is
obliged to furnish such an infant with food, and other
necessaries, long before he is capable of making any
requital for his labor; and since, when he first begins
to work, his pains are scarce equivalent to his daily
maintenance, he can not escape servitude, unless by the
master's particular dispensation.  And this reason will
hold, not only while he is supposed to continue, as it
were, in the master's debt, but ever after; because the
* Right of War and Peace, Book II., c. v., sect. xsix., pa.:agraphs
1 and 2.




144       AMERICAN SLAVERY CONSIDERED
condition, on which the master frst undertook to keep
him, was, that lie should perform perpetual service, and
to this condition he is presumed to have yielded his tacit
consent; especially, if it be considered that his very
birth is owing to his master's favor, who, by the right
of war, might have put his parents to death.  And as
for that natural freedom, with which all men are in
common invested, it then only takes place, when no act
or agreement of ourselves or others, hath rendered us
obnoxious to a state of inferiority." 
From all which it appears that, wherever slavery exists as a settled condition or institution of society, the
bond which unites master and servant is of a moral nature; founded in right, not in might; and obligatory
on the conscience, as really so as the bond that unites
men in the higher and more sacred relations of life. Let
the origin of the relation have been what it may, yet
when once it can plead such prescription of time as to
have received a fixed and determinate character, it must
be assumed to be founded in the consent of the parties,
a(nd to be, to all intents and purposes, a compact or covenant, of the same kind with that which lies at the foundation of all human society.  The parties are knit together by numerous ties; care and protection are due to
the slave, who is bound, in his turn, to render the duty
of gratitude and service to the master. The relation can
* Law of Nature and Nations, Book VI., chap. iii., sect. 9.




AS A SOCIAL INSTITUTION.          145
not be severed at the will of the parties; it has passed
beyond their control, and is established by the decree
and order of divine Providence.  The slave can not in
equity fall back on his natural right of freedom; for he
must be presumed, by his own consent, to have waived
that right for the sake of the life and nurture which he
owes under God to his master.  He can not justly claim
exemption on the ground that a definite portion of his
time and labor is an adequate compensation for his early
nurture; since the very conditions on which the contract
was undertaken, and to which he is presumed to have consented, are perpetual service on the one hand, and perpetual maintenance on the other; and he has the less
inducement to make this claim, when it is considered
that the contract includes his support in sickness and in
old age.  Hence the law of Nature, a prime principle
of which is fidelity to contracts, enjoins servants to obey
their masters in all lawful commands; and Revelation
does but expand with greater clearness, and enforce under higher sanctions, the law which Nature imposes,
when it commands servants to be subject to their masters.  It is the same here as in other compacts: nothing
can justify failure of duty on the part of the slave but
the abuse of his right on the part of the master. Oppression and cruelty on the part of the master may justify,
as they are pretty sure to cause, desertion or revolt on
the part of the slave. But the case is exceptional; and
hence the scriptures enjoin submission in this as well as
7




146       AMERICAN SLAVERY CONSIDERED
in the case of children and other subjects of legitimate
authority, without limitation or reserve: " Servants,
obey your masters;" " Children, obey your parents;"
and, " Let every soul be subject to the higher powers;
for there is no power but of God."
It may be said that American slavery originated neither in the wants of society, nor in legitimate warfare,
but that it began in piracy and robbery, and was introduced under circumstances of aggravated cruelty.  Be
it so. I see no occasion to investigate its origin, and
have certainly no disposition to defend it.  For, in spite
of the ingenious pleas of Mr. Dunning * and all its apologists, I believe the way in which African slavery was
introduced into this country to be the foulest of all blots
on human nature; the most baneful fruit of that accursed greed of gold t which sucks its poisonous nutriment from baseness and cruelty, and from all the meanest and boldest vices under heaven.
Be the guilt on the heads of its authors! It does not
affect the American people who have declared the slavetrade to be piracy: it does not stain the slavery that
now exists under the laws of our Southern States:
it does not touch, in the slightest degree, the relation of
master and slave as it now exists on the American soil.
For the relation which now ties the Southern master to
* See his argument in the Somerset case, as given in Loft's Reports.
t Sacra auri fames.




AS & SOCIAL INSTITUTION.          147
his slaves is formed with those who are born under his
own roof, or on his own domain, and not with their African progenitors. It is a personal relation; and like all
other personal relations, derives its moral quality from
the parties that directly form and sustain it, and from no
others; and is either right or wrong in virtue of acts
that have passed between the persons directly united in
it, and not in virtue of acts that transpired before they
were born; and for which, therefore, they can not, in
the nature of things, be in the least degree responsible.
The rape of the Sabines was no derogation to the peaceful and honorable marriages that followed it in the settled times of the Roman republic; and as little can the
violence in which slavery originated in any wise taint or
corrupt the relation that naturally grows up between a
master and the slaves born in his house and nurtured by
his care. And England, for it is servility to English
opinion which has generated this Northern hatred of
Southern institutions; England, I say, should learn to
discriminate between the slavery which was introduced
by violence and piracy into our colonies under her patronage, and the peaceful and orderly institution which
has grown up under the shadow of our laws since our
own self-respect moved us to withdraw from her jurisdiction.
For the relation, however it may have originated, involving, as it now does in our Southern States, mutual
obligations, and knitting together innocent parties in




148       AMERICAN SLAVERY CONSIDERED
sacred ties, manifestly rests less on the will of men, than
on the appointment of God, " in whom is no injustice,
and who alone knoweth best how to proportion His punishment unto men's offenses; and we might as reasonably call on the New Englanders to restore their country
to the ghosts of the aboriginal Indians, whom their
fathers drove out of it, or on the United States to return
to their subjection to Great Britain, as to deny the right
of the Southern planter to the labor of his slaves because
their progenitors some two hundred years ago were abducted from Africa. Why can not men understand that
there is a Providence which governs the world, as well
as a God that created it, and that, while they reject the
appointments of God, they are on the high-road to the
denial of His being?  It is the fact of slavery, the now
established relation of master and servant, and not the
origin of that relation, with which we of this generation
are concerned.  If the relation be innocent in itself, we
are under no moral obligation to abrogate it; if it be
productive of mutual benefits which could not be so well
obtained without it, it would be folly to abolish it; if it
involve, as it clearly does, a sacred, though tacit compact, it would be criminal to neglect the obligations of
that contract; and if it be maintained in good faith, and
cemented in the bonds of peace and friendship and social
order, it is purely diabolical to sow the seeds of alienation and hatred among its subjects, and to seek to overthrow it by violence and bloodshed.




AS A SOCIAL INSTITUTION.            149
To the theory that slavery rests on the basis of contract, it has been objected; 1, that the slave had no
power to transfer to another his natural rights; and, 2,
that he receives from his master no competent consideration for his labor; both objections being founded on the
nature of contracts, to the existence of which it is necessary that there should be a power to give, a power to
receive, and a sufficient consideration.
As to the former: Pray, what natural rights does
the slave transfer to his master?  Right to life?  The
slave has neither given it, nor does the master pretend
to have received it. Right to liberty? The slave, indeed, is presumed to have transferred to the master the
use of his bodily liberty, so far as it is necessary in order
to-that service for life, which he is presumed to have
promised and bound himself to render. But has he not
the right to do this?  Say no, and who, then, deprives
him of his natural right?  You who deny him the right
to dispose of his labor for life, because the municipal law
would forbid him if he lived at the North, or I who contend
that the slave, in virtue of his humanity and in common
with all mankind, has this right until the State, for the
real or fancied good of the individual, steps in to restrain
him in this right and to forbid its exercise? Or is it the
right to the pursuit of happiness, the transfer of which
is to annul the contract?  But neither has the slave
transferred this right; he has merely exchanged, or is
justly presumed to have exchanged the pursuit of happi



150       AMERICAN SLAVERY CONSIDERED
ness in the wilds of uncultivated nature for the pursuit
of happiness in an humble vocation in civilized and
Christian society.
The truth is, that this whole class of objections applies
only to the English theory, which supposes slavery to be
founded on force, and to vest the master with an absolute
power over his servants. It does not apply to slavery,
considered as a peaceable and settled relation of orderly
society, and therefore not to American slavery.
The other objection represents the theory of contract
as untenable for want of a competent consideration;
meaning that the provision made for the slave by the
master is not a consideration of sufficient value to constitute a contract.  But is this so?  What is a competent
consideration for the labor of the poor if it be not nur.ture in infancy, maintenance in health, support in sickness and old age, and a relief from the uncertainty and
mental anxieties inseparable from the lot of those who
are compelled to provide for themselves? Are our AmerL
ican slaves deprived of this provision? On thle contrary,
their rights in this respect are secured by the laws of the
States in which they live; and it is, I believe, the common testimony of those who have either visited or resided
in those States, that the slaves are a happy and contented
people. Dr. Lieber himself, certainly no friend to the
institution, tells us that "it is generally admitted that
the slave is nowhere better treated than in the slave



AS A SOCIAL INSTITUTION.           151
holding States of this Union;", and I believe he might
have added with truth that slaves are better cared for in
our Southern States than the laboring classes of any
other country on earth. And the England and New
England assailants of the institution, instead of denying
the fact when pressed with it, do but ascribe it to the
mercenary motives of the master (who provides for his
slaves, it is said, on the same principle as for his horses
and cattle), and redouble their dismal ululations over the
besotted ignorance of the negro, who is content to remain
a slave!-themselves slaves to a word!
The statistical tables tell us that the blacks of New
England increased six per cent. in ten years, while those
of the Slave States increased twenty-six per cent. in
the same time; which, allowing a, large margin for the
influence of climate, and for the number of free blacks
in the South, still leaves us pretty fair ground to conclude that the slaves, on the whole, have no reason to
complain of insufficient compensation. Besides, if they
are not well paid for their labor, how shall we explain
the fact, insisted on by our political economists, that
slave labor is more unproductive than free labor?  For
what does this mean, if it be not that the negroes, while
slaves, get more comforts in proportion to the amount of
work they perform, than they would get if they were
free? And, once more, if our American slaves are not
* Encyclopedia Americana. Art., Slavery.




152       AMERICAN SLAVERY CONSIDERED
contented with their condition, how shall we explain the
fact, attested by a hundred witnesses, of their fidelity
and attachment to their masters? How account for the
notorious failure of the abolitionists, after thirty years of
diabolical agitation, to excite them to an insurrection?
A number of fugitives, not more in proportion to the
millions of slaves than are the women who claim men's
rights in the North, in proportion to the myriads who
are content to shine in the proper virtues of their sex,
are about all they have accomplished in the way of liberation.
Do you say that the slave works on compulsion and
from fear of the lash, and that, therefore, slavery can
not rest on moral grounds, but is upheld by violence? I
repeat, that facts are, as a general rule, against this view
of the case. Southern men, men who are on the spot,
who know whereof they affirm, and are incapable of misrepresentation, tell us, almost with one voice, that their
slaves, as a general rule, love their masters and are beloved by them; and that they are contented and happy,
except so far as they are inspired with hatred, made discontented with their lot, and turned into fiends by antislavery agitators. Citizens of our Northern States, who
have visited and resided at the South, bear testimony by
hundreds to the same facts. Nay, the abolitionists themselves confirm the facts; for, instead of disproving them,
they twist them into a proof of the degradation of the




AS A SOCIAL INSTITUTION.          153
slave, who must be free according to their notions of freedom, or else his contentment in servitude is a proof of
his abject and miserable condition! So they dispose of
general statements on the one side of the question. But
particular and exceptional cases on the other side, how
eagerly do they press them into proofs of wholesale
oppression and violence    " Contract!" methinks I
hear them exclaim; "look at the poor fugitive from
his master's service!  He bound by contract!   A
good joke, truly."  But ask these same men what
binds them  to society?  Are they slaves to their
rulers?  0  no!   They are bound together by the
COMPACT on which society is founded.   Very good;
but did you ever sign this compact? Did your fathers
ever sign it? "No; it is a tacit and implied compact."
Good again I   But some there are who break this
compact; who turn vagrants, robbers, murderers; and
you take them and shut them up in your poor-houses,
jails, and state-prisons or you hang them on a gallows. Does this prove the social compact a nullity? or
that the people are not obliged by such compact to be
subject to civil government?  Not at all; it only proves
that a few unprincipled and ungovernable men, who have
violated the compact, have received their deserts. And
yet, though the great body of masters and slaves are, in
fact, tied to each other by the like tacit and implied
compact, you cite the case of a runaway slave as a proof
7*




154       AMERICAN SLAVERY CONSIDERED
that there is no such compact, and that slavery is upheld
only by violence.
It is the same compact, with the addition of certain
formalities that make it express, instead of leaving it to
be tacit and implied, which supplies our army and navy
with labor, our commercial marine, and mechanical factories. Insubordinates in the army and navy are flogged;
insurgents and deserters are shot; the master mechanic
may seize his fugitive apprentice and throw him into the
nearest jail; and the merchant, though he can not seize
the sailors that abscond from their captain in a foreign
port, will yet denounce, in no measured terms, their rascality in breaking their engagements, deserting their vessel, and depriving the owners of the profits of the voyage.
Not a word of complaint have we in these cases of the
want of justice and equity in holding men to their contracts (made perhaps in an unguarded moment), at the
expense of their comfort and lives; not a thought of sympathy for the deserter that is shot, or the apprentice that
is imprisoned, or the sailor that is denounced and not
punished only because he can not be caught; but show us
a fugitive slave, and forthwith the community is in a
blaze; his obligations to his master, or his possible delinquencies are not thought of; but, in the name of liberty,
humanity, and justice, men are summoned to his rescue!
Neither the soldier, nor the seaman, nor the apprentice, but
only the colored gentleman from the South, may honor



AS A SOCIAL INSTITUTION.           155
ably repudiate his obligation to labor. Verily, we live in' an age of progress."
With these evidences before me thabt the slaves do receive a competent consideration for their labor, I hope I
may be allowed, under the lead of publicists of the
greatest name, to regard slavery as resting on contract;
and to believe, moreover, that under this contract for
life, which neither master nor slave can, as a general
rule, escape, but which is bound on them both, by the
providence of Almighty God, the slave does infinitely
better for himself than he would do if he were left to
make contracts for himself, without a master, and, from
time to time, as his humor might move him, or his
natural indolence allow. Nay, more; I believe that the
slaves themselves are sensible that the contract now
tacitly subsisting between them and their masters is to
their own advantage; for it is inconceivable to my mind
that four millions of human creatures would, in spite of
the incessant efforts of abolition emissaries, for the last
thirty years, to excite them to rebellion, remain in servitude, unless they were content to remain in it; and
this feeling of child-like contentment (for these slaves
are but children in mind), could it assume- the shape of
intellectual expression, and be translated into the language of educated minds, would be a plain confession
that God, by raising up for them humane and considerate
masters, had made a better provision for them than they
could have made for themselves.




156       AMERICAN SLAVERY CONSIDERED
Since the abolition of slavery in our Northern States
a new generation has arisen, who know nothing of its
actual working, and are apt to take their notions of it
from works of fiction. We who are old enough to remember this sort of servitude, however thankfully we
may acquiesce in the wisdom which, by abolishing it, has
added to the comfort of the rich, in proportion as it lessened their responsibility for the poor, know that slaves
were not all either oppressed, or despised, or discontented
with their lot. I myself have known slaves (at the
North, I mean; for, with the exception of one very
brief and melancholy visit in Virginia, I have never been
south of the dividing line) who were an honor to human
nature; who justly appreciated their condition, and were
content and happy in the discharge of its duties; and
it may, perchance, be a relief to the reader, after the
perusal of a tedious chapter, if I give him the history of
one such.  It is the case of Cane, who was a slave in
the possession of Major H., of Long Island-a man,
much respected in his day, but for many years deceased.
Cane was a man; intelligent, honest, and trustworthy; with a certain dignity of demeanor, relieved by
a vein of comic humor. He well knew, though he had
never learned it from Plautus:
Simul flare sorbereque baud facile
Est; ego hic esse et illic simul baud posse;
that he could not suck and whistle in the same breath;




AS A SOCIAL INSTITUTION.          157
could not at the same time enjoy his freedom and his
claim on his master for support; and of the two he had
sense enough to see that the latter was more suited to
his capacity and condition. When the time which the
law had prescribed for the limit of slaveiy had expired.
and the hour of emancipation had come, the Major took
Cane aside, and a dialogue to the following effect took
place between them. I give it from memory, and substantially as it was told me by a grandson of Major H.,
who, then a boy, was present, and heard it:
Mcajor H.-" Well, Cane, the day has arrived, which
the law has set for the termination of your slavery; and
I have called you to tell you that you are now a free
maln. "
C.-" Sorry for it, master."
Major H.-" What, Cane! sorry to be free?"
C. —"Well, master, Cane has always been free enough
to look after master's business, and to mind his own;
and that is all the freedom Cane wants.'
Major H.-" Well, but, Cane, you will have that
freedom now. You are an industrious man, and can
work, and be paid for your labor. There are many persons that will be glad to employ you."
C.-" Sorry to leave old master."
Major H.     " Why, for that matter, Cane, you need
not leave me. You may continue to work for me as you
have done, and I will pay you your wages at the end
of every month."




158       AMERICAN SLAVERY CONSIDERED
C.-" That will not suit Cane, master."
L.Major HI. —"  Why not, Cane?".- -"Well, master, suppose Cane takes sick, or
grows old, what is to become of him?'
Major IT. —'" That's right, Cane; look out for a rainy
day; but the way to provide for that is to save your
money."
C.-" What does Cane know about money? He has
no place to keep it. Suppose, he saves it, and takes it
to Master S. or Master J. to keep for him; and, before
the rainy day comes, Master S. or Master J. blows up,
and goes to smash; how will Cane get his money then?
Tell me that, master."
Major H.-" True, Cane, such a thing might happen, but —-'
C.-" But I tell you, master, what might not happen,
and that is that while I work for old master, I should not
always find a good home in old master's house. That is
the best bank for Cane's money."
Major H. —' Well, then, Cane, you wish to stay and
work on the farm, and live with me all the same as if the
law had never given you your freedom?'
C.-" That's what I should like, if it had not been
for this law. But now, suppose master dies first?  If
master will promise that Cain shall always live in his
family, then Cain will promise always to work in his
family."




AS A SOCIAL INSTITUTION.          159
" So be it, Cane," was his master's response; and so
it was.  Cain continued to live in his master's family for
the remainder of his days, ashamed neither of the condition nor of the name of slave.  On the contrary, he had
little respect for the free blacks, and several amusing
colloquies which he had with them are still remembered.
It was Cane's fixed opinion that the negroes needed the
protection of the whites, and were not competent to take
care of themselves.  "I am sure I am not," he would
say,' and I think myself equal to the best of them."
And before the days of emancipation dawned, if Cane
caught a straggler whom he suspected of being a runaway slave, he was pretty sure to lock him up in the
barn till his master came to claim him, and never suffered
him to depart without some wholesome advice on the
duties of his station, and the misery of being, to use his
own words, "a poor, shivering, starving free negro."
Though a faithful and industrious creature, Cain was
sadly profane, and as neglectful of religious duties as
any man of fashion.  But time brought its changes. He
lived to be old and infirm, and under the sadness of old
age, became serious and thoughtful of the future world.
The same kindness which supplied his temporal wants in
health, ministered to his spiritual wants in sickness and
old age. Some member of the family daily read to him,
at his own request, a portion of the Holy Scriptures.
Ie died beloved by them all, and was buried in the fam



160    AMERICAN SLAVERY AS A SOCIAL INSTITUTION.
ily ground, where a monument is still to be seen with
the following inscription to his memory:
"Beneath this stone was put
The mortal part of CANE, a colored person:
He was born 27th of December, 1738,
And died the 12th of January, 1814;
In the 77th year of his age.
Cane was an honest man.
Tho' nature tinged his skin, and custom marked him slave,
His mind was free and independent.
His life all through was such as did command
Esteem from those who loved him;
And in death he showed examples of Religion
Full (of proofs) convincing of his Christian faith
THAT HIS REDEEMER LIVED AND HE SHOULD SEE HIS FACE.
"Act well thy part; there all the honor lies."'




CHAPTER        XI.
ANGLICAN      THEORY      OF   SLAVERY.
FROM   what has been said, it evidently appears that
slavery, when founded on mutual consent and productive
of mutual benefit, is agreeable to the law of Nature.
Not that the law of Nature creates the relation of master and slave any more than it creates other social relations, but that when the relation is once formed, the law
of Nature requires its faithful observance and forbids its
violent dissolution. Just as the law of Nature does not
oblige a man to marry and to have children, but on the
supposition that he is a father, obliges him and his chilren to the reciprdcal duties growing out of their mutual
relation; or as it does not oblige men to form contracts
and to hold real estate, yet when contracts are formed
and the distinctions of property are defined, it does oblige
them to keep their engagements and to refrain from trespassing on their neighbors' premises; so, though the law
of Nature does not oblige some men to be masters and
others to be slaves, yet when once the compact is formed
and the relation fairly established, the law of Nature
clearly ratifies the compact and regulates the relation




162        ANGLICAN THEORY OF SLAVERY.
that grows out of it. It binds the parties together with
the ties of a moral union; it enjoins on both reciprocal
duties; it forbids the master to withhold care and protection from the slave, and the slave to withhold fealty
and service from the master. The law itself is immutable and becomes operative as soon as occasion arises for
its use and application.
But there is another condition of life which is also
called slavery, but which is very unlike the former, and
indeed has nothing in common with it except the name,
and which, yet, chiefly from the force of language, is
often confounded with it.  This condition of life, for I
can not call it a condition of human society, is upheld
by force; and supposes master and slave to be joined
together by none of the common ties and offices of humanity, but to live in a constant state of war and enmity.
The consideration of this unhappy relation is proper to
the law of Nations, in the treatises on which it occupies
a large space, and is not otherwise connected with the
law of Nature than as this law is appealed to in support of the principles on which the law of Nations is
founded.
For the better satisfaction of the reader I shall describe
this sort of slavery in the words of others.
Having remarked that " it is not repugnant to natural
law, that slavery may be derived from somepersonal act,"
i. e., from some voluntary agreement or for some crime,
and having treated of both these species of slavery, in




ANGLICAN THEORY OF SLAVERY.          163
his first and second book, in connection with the law of
Nature, Grotius, in the third book of his treatise (De
Jure Belli et Pacis), and in the seventh chapter (entitled "Of the Right over Prisoners"), proceeds as follows:
" But by the law of Nations (which I am now treating of) slavery is of a more large extent, both as to
persons and effects. For if we consider the persons, not
only they who surrender themselves, or engage by promise to do it, are reputed slaves, but all persons whatsoever,
taken in a solemn war, as soon as they shall be brought
within our garrisons, as Pomponius tells us,"
Grotius next quotes several authorities to show that
captives in solemn wars, whatever may have been their
previous standing, were anciently regarded as the slaves
of the conqueror; that both they and their children
(after their captivity) were accounted his absolute property-to be put to death, sold into bondage, or otherwise
disposed of at his will. IHe then adds:
" But the effects of this right are infinite, so that
there is nothing that the lord (or master) may not do to
his slave; as Seneca the father said, no torment but what
may be inflicted on him with impunity, nothing commanded him, but what may be exacted with the utmost
rigor and severity; so that all manner of cruelty may be
exercised by the lords (masters) on their slaves; but
that this license is somewhat restrained by the civil law.' It is generally allowed by all nations to the lord (mas



164        ANGLICAN THEORY OF SLAVERY.
ter) to have power of life and death over his slave,' we
are told by Caius the lawyer.  He also adds that this
large power had been limited by the Roman laws in their
own territories. Hither we may refer that of Donatus
to Terentius,'What may not a lord (master) lawfully
do to his slave?? 
Here follow two short paragraphs, not relevant to my
present purpose;. after which, Grotius adds:
" Now this large power is granted by the law of
Nations for no other reason than that the captors, being
tempted by so many advantages, might be inclined to
forbear that utmost rigor allowed them by the law of
killing their prisoners, either in the fight, or in cold
blood. As I said before, the name of servants (Pomponius tells us) arose from this, that generals sold their
prisoners, thereby preserving them from death. I said
that they might be inclined to forbear; for there is no
argument to engage them to it, if we respect this law of
Nations, but a motive drawn from interest."
We have reason to be thankful that the law of Nations, as understood and acknowledged among modern
and civilized peoples, forbids the putting of prisoners to
death, except they have committed some crime worthy
of death, and that the humane and salutary customs
which have been introduced for the alleviation of the
evils of war (such as exchange of prisoners, releasing
them on parole, etc.), have cut off all pretexts for the
barbarous practice.  But this does not affect the point in




ANGLICAN THEORY OF SLAVERY.           165
hand, which is to show that the right of the master over
the slave was anciently derived from the law of Nations,
and was made by that law to include an absolute power
over the slave; and that this right of dominion was
acknowledged at Rome, and among all nations (see the
above quotation from Caius the lawyer), except in so far
as it was restrained and limited by the civil law.
Here, then, we have two conditions of life, essentially
distinct from  each other, and yet both denominated
slavery.  The one confers a right of dominion derived
from the law of Nature, which is immutable and everywhere the same, and of necessity subject to the limitations of this law, which allows nothing contrary to justice; while the other confers a right of dominion, derived
from the law of Nations, which is mutalble, and in fact
now revokes the right which it once conferred; and a
right, moreover, which is absolute, and authorizes the
master to inflict on his slave all sorts of cruelties which
the law of the State does not specifically forbid.
This sort of slavery, founded on the right of conquest,
and upheld merely by force, formerly existed, as in all
the nations of Europe, so also in Great Britain. It has
long since died out in fact, but it is still this, and nothing else than this, which the English people mean by
the word slavery.  I have before alluded to the following passage of Mr. Locke, and now beg the reader's perusal of it entire:
"Freedom from absolute, arbitrary power is so neces



166        ANGLICAN THEORY OF SLAVERY.
sary and closely joined with a man's preservation, that
he can not part with it, but by what forfeits his life and
preservation together. For a man not having the power
of his own life, can not, by compact, or his own consent,
enslave himself to any one, nor put himself under the
absolute, arbitrary power of another, to take away his
life when he pleases.  Nobody can give more power
than he has himself; and he that can not take away his
own life, can not give another power over it. Indeed,
having by his fault forfeited his own life, by some act
that deserves death, he to whom he has forfeited it, may
(when he has him in his power) delay to take it. For,
whenever he finds the hardship outweighs the value of
his life,'tis in his power, by resisting the will of his
master, to draw on himself the death he desires.
"This is the perfect condition of slavery, which is
nothing else but the state of war continued between the
lawful conqueror and a captive. For if once compact
enter between them, and make an agreement for a limited
power on the one side, and obedience on the other, the
state of war and slavery ceases, as long as the compact
endures.  For, as has been said, no man can, by agreement pass over to another that which he hath not in
himself, a power over his own life.
"I confess, we find among the Jews as well as other
nations, that men did sell themselves; but it is plain this
was only to drudgery, not to slavery.  For it is evident
the person sold was not under an absolute, arbitrary, des



ANGLICAN THEORY OF SLAVERY.           167
potical power. For the master could not have power
to kill him at any time, whom, at a certain time he was
obliged to let go free out of his service; and the master
of such a servant was so far from having an arbitrary
power over his life that he could not at pleasure so much
as maim him, but the loss of an eye or a tooth set him
free."  Ex. xxi.*
I have somewhere seen this eminent man charged with
inconsistency and a departure from his own principles,
because the constitution of the Carolinas, which he
drafted, contains provisions in favor of slavery. Probably the inconsistency is merely verbal.
I now ask particular attention to a passage which I
shall transcribe from the Leviathan of Hobbes; a man
whose principles I detest, but who for clearness and
vigor of thought and expression is unsurpassed, I believe,
by any author in the English language.
"' Dominion acquired by conquest, or victory in war,
is that which some writers call DESPOTICAL, from Ae,7r6Trg, which signifieth a lord, or master; and is the
dominion of the master over his servant.  And this dominion is then acquired to the victor, when the vanquished, to avoid the present stroke of death, covenanteth,
either in express words, or by other sufficient signs of
the will, that so long as his life and the liberty of his
body is allowed him, the victor shall have the use thereof
* Locke's Works, vol. ii. p. 165.




168       ANGLICAN THEORY OF SLAVERY.
at his pleasure.  And after such covenant made, the
vanquished is a SERVANT; and not before; for by the
word servant (whether it be derived from servire, to
serve, or from servare, to save, which I leave the grammarians to dispute), is not meant a captive which is kept
in prison, or bonds, till the owner of him that took, or
bought him of him that did, shall consider what to do
with him; for such men, commonly called slaves, have
no obligation at all, but may break their bonds, or the
prison, and kill, or carry away captive their master,
justly; but one that being taken, hath corporal liberty
allowed him, and upon promise not to run away, nor to
do violence to his master, is trusted by him.
" It is not, therefore, the victory that giveth the right
of dominion over the vanquished, but his own covenant.
Nor is he obliged because he is conquered, that is to say
beaten and taken, or put to flight, but because lie cometh
in and submitteth to the victor.  Nor is the victor
obliged by an enemy rendering himself (without promise
of life), to spare him for this his yielding to discretion,
which obliges not the victor longer than in his own discretion he shall think fit.
"And that which men do when they demand (as it is
now called) quarter, (which the Greeks called Zwoyia,
taking alive) is to evade the present fury of the victor
by submission, and to compact for their life with ransom, or service; and, therefore, he that hath quarter,
hath not his life given, but deferred till further delibera



ANGLICAN THEORY OF SLAVERY.           169
tion; for it is not a yielding on condition of life, but to
discretion.  And then only is his life in security, and
his service due, when the victor hath trusted him with
his corporal liberty.  For slaves that work in prisons,
or fetters; do it not of duty, but to avoid the cruelty of
their task-masters."7:
There are two remarkable positions in this passage
which I can not help, in passing, commending to the attention of our modern radicals, (who, or whose progenitors, have drawn from Hobbes many of their detestable
maxims) and especially to those of them who have given
him the sonorous appellation of "The philosopher of
Malinesbury." 
The first is that Hobbes concedes to slaves (or servants, as he more accurately calls them) the possession
of LIBERTY.   The slave (servant), according to himt,
has, like other men, liberty as well as life; and the precise difference between the slave and the freeman, in this
respect, is that the slave, or servant, has, while the freeman has not, transferred the use of his liberty to another.
The other is that servitude, or slavery, as we now call
it, in its ordinary form, is, according to Hobbes, founded
on compact or covenant.   The relation of master and
servant, even though it originate in conquest, yet, as
Hobbes clearly shows, is capable of exchanging, and for
s Hobbes's Leviathan, folio, London, A. D. 1651, pp. 103, 104.
8




170        ANGLICAN THEORY OF SLAVERY.
the most part actually exchanges, its hostile character for
one that is peaceable and friendly.  It passes, he says
(as indeed it is very apt to pass), from the law of might
to the law of right; so that the slave is morally and religiously bound to serve his master, and defrauds him by
becoming a fugitive from  his service.  Strange that
Hobbes, the author of the Leviathan, to whose poison
Bramhall, Cumberland, and Clarendon, his contemporaries, and the brightest intellects of their age, taxed their
energies to furnish an antidote; that Hobbes, a name
which has been handed down to execration in Church
and State, and which will be execrated as long as the
interests of government and religion are unitedl; that
Hobbes, I say, should be needed in this age to give lessons in government and religion to Christian statesmen
and ministers of the gospel! But so it is; and as I
would cheerfully give the father of mischief and all his
progeny their due, so I take particular pleasure in addl
ing' the philosopher of Malmesbury!" to the names of
Grotius and Puffendorff, and other eminent civilians,
who, by resting slavery on the ground of CONTRACT,
have helped us to clear the precepts of the gospel, which
require slaves to obey their masters, from the imputation
of favoring arbitrary power, and to resolve them into the
prime principles of reason and nature.
But to return from this digression.  The reader will
have observed that, as Mr. Locke distinguishes slavery
from drudgery, so Hobbes distinguishes slavery from




ANGLICAN THEORY OF SLAVERY.         171
servitude; and that both these authors agree in making
slavery consist in an unlimited subjection to absolute dominion. The slave, in their sense of the word, is one
who holds his life and liberty subject, not to the conditional use, but to the absolute disposal of the master;
who, by the right of conquest, and under the law of
nations, may at any time, and of his own mere will,
deprive him of both; may maim his limbs, or take
his life, without being liable to be called to account by
any human authority. This sort of slavery, as Hobbes
intimates, was common among the Romans; who either
could not or would not admit all their captives into a
covenant relation, or work them onf parole, but confined
many of them in their ergastula, in prisons and in galleys, and made them work in chains and fetters; not
trusting them with any degree of bodily liberty, nor
seeking to influence them by higher motives, but governing them solely by fear and cruelty.
It would be easy to fill a volume with extracts from
the writings of philosophers and historians, orators and
poets, and authors of every class, who use the word
slavery in the sense so clearly defined by H-Iobbes and
Mr. Locke. But to what end?     Who does not know
that this notion of slavery, derived from its most aggravated form among the ancient Romans, has been incorporated in the philosophy, the divinity, the science, the
literature, the poetry, and, of late years, in the statesmanship ol the British nation? I do not mean that this




172        ANGLICAN THEORY OF SLAVERY.
notion of slavery is peculiar to Great Britain: it prevails to a considerable extent in Europe, and shows
itself in European writers. Vattel, for instance, has no
other idea of slavery than as' a state contrary to the
nature of man,"'a continued state of war;" and he
rejoices (and every defender of American slavery will
cordially and consistently rejoice with him) that "this
disgrace of mankind is happily extinct in Europe." But
I mean that this notion of slavery prevails in. Great
Britain to the exclusion almost of every other. Villeinage itself, which formerly existed in England, was an
aggravated form of slavery.  The villeins (in gross)
were originally captives at the Conquest; they were
compelled to perform the most servile offices; and " both
they and their children," says Dr. Harris' Notes on
Justinian, " were the absolute property of their lords,
who might lease them out to others for years, or for life,
or make an absolute sale of them."  And slavery in the
British West Indies, left to the management of overseers,
while the proprietors were absent from their plantations,
was, very probably, upheld by terror and cruelty, and
had no opportunity of transition into that peaceable and
friendly relation, which subsists in our Southern States.
In fact, we shall look in vain, if I mistake not, to the
jurists of Great Britain, in modern times, for those just
and profound views of slavery, considered as a social
institution, which have been developed by Grotius, Puffendorf, and other European authors.    Our English




ANGLICA1'N THEORY OF SLAVERY.        173
friends and cousins have no idea of a slavery, which is
founded in contract, and which, because it is founded in
contract, secures the natural riygts of the slave. Their
traditionary and sole notion of slavery is that of servitude founded on conquest, and upheld only by terror and
cruelty.
And this tradition of the English mind has been transmitted to New England, and made the generative cause
of all its abolition proclivities.  Differing essentially'and
by unmistakeable features from that form of slavery which
exists in our Southern States, and agreeing with it only
in name, it is yet put forward persistently and in every
variety of form as essentially the same thing; and that
just and laudable hatred which every ingenuous mind
feels against the one form of servitude is cunningly or
ignorantly excited by argument and declamation, and
brought to bear upon the other; and the southern planter, surrounded by his attached and affectionate domestics, and resorting to coercion only as an ultimatum for
the necessary support of authority (as is done in the
army and navy, and indeed in schools and families, and in
almost every form of secular government) is held up to
the execration of mankind for no better reason, that I
can see, than because his servants are called slaves, and
the poets and philosophers, the Cowpers and Lockes of
England have chosen to affix a very horrid meaning to
the name.
But I have another reason for calling these two des



174        ANGLICAN THEORY OF SLAVERY.
criptions of slavery, the one limited and sanctioned by
the law of Nature, the other unlimited and supported
only by an exploded dictum  of the law of Nations; I
say, I have another reason for calling the one American
and the other British; and that is, that the government
of the United States, by its highest public functionaries,
has solemnly, and in the face of the world, recognized
and declared the slavery of our Southern States to be of
the former description, and has disallowed and repelled
the assumption of the British government referring it to
the latter description.  To explain my meaning:
It has often happened that coasting vessels, under the
jurisdiction of the United States, having slaves on
board, either as hands or as servants, attending their
owners, or for the purpose of being carried from port to
port, have been driven by stress of weather or other
necessity, to take'refuge in harbors belonging to some of
the British dependencies of America; and that in some
such cases, the slaves, owned by citizens of the United
States, have been set free by the authorities of the place.
The Creole was an example of this kind.  This vessel,
having slaves on board, was taken, in consequence of a
mutiny, into a port of the British dominions, and the
slaves, as was alleged, were liberated by the interference
of the local authorities.
In a letter, dated August 1, 1842, Mr. Webster, at
that time Secretary of State for the United States,
brought the case of the Creole to the attention of Lord




ANGLICAN THEORY OF SLAVERY.           175
Ashburton, then residing at Washington, and clothed
with general powers by the British government to act in
its behalf in the adjustment of the disputes that were
pending between the two governments.  In this documnent Mr. Webster does not confine himself to the particular case of the Creole, but goes at length into the subject, and a-firms generally the right of the United States
to exact compensation of the British government in behalf of American proprietors, whose slaves have been set
at liberty in the manner above indicated.  In the course
of his argument, Mr. Webster remarks:' If a vessel be driven by weather into the ports of
another nation, it would hardly be alleged by any one
that, by the mere force of such arrival within the waters
of the State, the law of that State would so attach to the
vessel as to affect existing rights of property between
persons on board, whether arising from  contract or
otherwise.  The local law would not operate to mnake
the goods of one man to become the goods of another
man.   Nor ought it to affect their personal obligations
or existing relations between themselves; nor was it
ever supposed to have such effect until the delicate and
exciting question which has caused these interferences in
the British islands arose.  The local law in these cases
dissolves no obligations or relations lawfully entered
into or lawfilly existing according to the laws of the
ship's country.  If it did, intercourse of civilized men
between nation and nation must cease. Marri;gcs are




176        ANGLICAN THEORY OF SLAVERY,
frequently celebrated in one country in a manner not
lawful or valid in another; but did anybody ever doubt
that marriages are valid all over the civilized world, if
valid in the country iln which they took place?  Did any
one ever imagine that local law acted upon such marriages to annihilate their obligation, if the party should
visit a country in which marriages must be celebrated in
another form?
4 It may be said that, in such instances, personal relations are founded in contract, and therefore to be
respected; but that the relation of master and slave is
not founded in contract, and therefore is to be respected
only by the law of the place which recognizes it. Whoever so reasons, encounters the authority of the whole
body of public law, from Grotius down; because there
are numerous instances in which the law itself presumes
or implies contracts; and prominent among those instances is the very relation which we are now considering, and which relation is holden by law to draw after it
mutuality of obligation." 
Personal relations -that are founded in universal justice, are worthy of universal respect; but personal relations which are founded in injustice, and are upheld in
opposition to natural justice, by the laws of a particular
country, have no claim to respect outside of that country.  In demanding, therefore, that the relation of
* See Correspondence with Lord Ashburton, Welbster's WTorks, vol.
vi., pp. 303-218.




ANGLICAN THEORY OF SLAVERY.           177
master and slave, both belonging to the United States,
and continuing within the jurisdiction of the same,
should be respected, in British ports, Mr. Webster was
sure to be met with the objection, that this relation is not
a just and social relation, like that of husband and wife,
parent and child, but one which exists in opposition to
universal justice, and only in virtue of local laws; which,
in the case under consideration, are the laws of some
one of the United States, and the guaranty of the Federal Government; and that the relation consequently
expires when its subjects pass beyond the limits within
which those laws are operative, and to which that guarantee extends.  For example, if a citizen of New York
is traveling with his minor child, or if a master with his
apprentice is traveling in a foreign country, and in corpany with him is a citizen of South Carolina, with his
slave; it would be accounted barbarous in the authorities of that country to interfere with the father in the
government of his child, or with the master in the government of his apprentice, because these relations are
consistent with natural justice, and entitled to universal
respect.  On the other hand, it would be no violation of
the comity of nations, but an evidence of high civilization, if the authorities of the same country interfered in
order to effect the enfranchisement of the slave, because
the relation of master and slave is repugnant to natural
justice, and ceases to exist when it passes beyond the
protection of positive law. This I understand to be
8*




178        ANGLICAN THEORY OF SLAVERY.
the objection; and I wish to fix the reader's attention
on Mr. Webster's answer to the objection. - Mr. Webster, as the reader will have observed, takes the ground
that the relation of master and slave is not repugnant to natural justice, but that it is founded in contract, and involves mutual obligations; and he declares
distinctly and boldly, and under the high responsibility of his exalted station, that whoever takes the
opposite ground-whoever denies that slavery is founded
in contract, and is consonant to natural justice —" ENCOUNTERS THE WHOLE BODY OF PUBLIC LAW            FROM
GROTIUS DOWN!"     Of course this declaration of Mr.
Webster, or rather of the President of the United States
through him, does not apply to slavery universally: it
does not apply to slavery as it may exist by the law of
Nations; nor to the slavery of barbarous countries,
where captives are, for no personal crimes, totally deprived of bodily liberty, and subjected to unmerciful
treatment: but it is limited, by the occasion on which it
was made, to that form of slavery which exists in our
Southern States, under the guaranty of the Constitution of the United States; and so understood and limited, the declaration, I believe, can never be successfully
impugned.>"
~ A legal friend, who first directed my attention to the above
quoted letter of Mr. W., adds the following:
"In the speech delivered by Mr. Webster, in defense of the treaty
of Washington, in the United States Senate, 6th and Ith April, 1846,
he says,' I refer to the letter to Lord Ashburton on this subject (ths




ANGLICAN THEORY OF SLAVERY.           179
Now, mark the consequence.    It is impossible to regard a man as a party to a contract, without regarding
him at the same time as possessed of his natural rights as
a member of human society, and as having a definite
status under the government which protects that contract.  The United States, therefore, until they repudiate the doctrine which Mr. Webster promulgated in their
name, are committed to the recognition of slavery (in
those States in which it exists) as a SOCIAL INSTITUTION,
and not as a monster that is at war with human society,
and refuses to coalesce with the elements of good order;
they are committed to the recognition of slaves (in the
several States in which they exist) as persons capable of
contract, and actually, or at least, impliedly bound by
contract, and therefore possessed of those natural rights
and faculties without which, no creature can be, either
expressly or by implication, a party to a contract; and
they are committed, moreover, to the recognition of the
relation of master and slave as legitimate by the law of
Nature, and entitled, as well (I say not in the same degree) as that of husband and wife, or of father and child,
to universal respect. This is American slavery.
Lord Ashburton, in his reply to Mr. Webster, confesses that the American secretary has " advanced some
propositions which rather surprise and startle" him: his
lordship, however, does "not pretend to judge them,"
Creole case)'as containing what the Amnerican government regarded
as the true principle of the maritime law.'"




180        ANGLICAN THEORY OF SLAVERY.
but refers Mr. Webster to London for their discussion.
What ground the British government ultimately took in
this particular I do not know, and it is needless to inquire; for the temper and opinions of the British public
(to follow which has become the genius of the English
government, and the hard necessity of the English
Church), point to the conclusion, in opposition to Mr.
Webster and "the whole body of public law," that the
slavery existing in our Southern States is not founded
in contract; that it is repugnant to natural justice; that
the bond which unites master and slave derives its whole
strength from local laws, and dissolves of its own accord
when it passes beyond the reach of those laws; and that
the slave, under the laws of a country that tolerates
slavery, has no natural rights, but is a m.ere chattel of
his master, distinguished from his inanimate chattels by
a principle of vitality, and from his cows and horses by
the possession of a human form and figure.  This view
of slavery seems to be indigenous to the British soil,
and therefore I call it the British view, and am willing
to accord to the British people whatever glory it may
reflect on them.  How the clergy of the English Establishment, consistently with such a theory, would reconcile the precepts of the gospel, inculcating obedience to
masters, with the dictates of universal reason; or how
they would refute the principles of the abolitionists,
while resisting (as I believe they would resist) the application of those principles to practice, I am unable to




ANGLICAN THEORY OF SLAVERY.           181
say.  If they were compelled to attempt a practical solution of the problem, they would be driven, I apprehend,
either to surrender their theory, or to inculcate principles of duty too ethereal for the grasp of English sense,
and too sublimated for English practice. However this
be, though no man rates, or can rate, more highly than
do, the cbligations of our people to their mother country, I have yet felt at liberty to investigate this subject
without the bias of English authority; and I am happy
that the result of the investigation enables me to take,
with a deep conviction of its truth, the ground which my
country has in a manner prescribed; to regard the slavery existing in our Southern States as resting on contract, and to regard the relation of master and slave as
no cause of shame or reproach, but as entitledc to respect,
both at home and abroad; as entitled to respect, because
legitimate, not only by the laws of the particular States
which uphold it, and by the Constitution of the United
States, which guaranties its protection, but also by the
principles of universal justice; that is, by the LAW OF
GoD. And I can not but indulge the hope that the
avowal of this sentiment, however it may at first " startle
and surprise," will in the end approve itself to the more
sober and judicious members of the Anglican Church.




CHAPTER XII.
LIMITATIONS OF AUTHORITY.
BISHOP CUMBERLAND, than whom, in his " De Legibus
Nature,'*" no author has searched more deeply into the
foundations of society, virtue, and religion, in the course
of his chapter " On the original of Dominion and the
Moral Virtues," makes the following observation:' Before I had universally and distinctly considered
the original of all dominion and right whatsoever, I used,
indeed, as most others do, to deduce the Divine dominion
entirely from His (God's) being the Creator; for I thought
it self-evident that every one was lord of his own powers,
which are little different from  the essence of anything,
and that therefore any effect must be subject to him,
from whose powers it received its whole essence, as is the
case in creation, by which the whole substance of the
thing is produced into being.
"But because all dominion supposes some right, and
* The work, published in the seventeenth century, wavs translated
by Mr. Maxwell, a Prebendary of the Church of Ireland, and printed
(with several dissertations of his own) at London, A. D. 1727. The
above quotation is from Mr. Maxwell's translation.




LIMITATIONS OF AUTHORITY.          183
all right is a power granted or permitted by some.law,
at least analogically such; therefore, the law granting
or permitting dominion, ought first to be acknowledged.
But law there is none prior to the natural law, or that
dictate of the Divine wisdom, concerning the best end
and the means thereto necessary, which is perfectly'
agreeable to the law of Nature, and may analogically be
called the LAW OF THE DIVINE ACTIONS; I therefore
came to this conclusion: That the dominion of God is a
right or power given Him by His own wisdom or goodness, as by a law, for the government of all those things
which ever have been, or shall be created by Him.  In
the Divine wisdom is necessarily contained a dictate to
pursue the best end by the necessary means; and in the
goodness or perfection of the Divine will is, by a like
necessity, included a ready consent to promote the same;
and these, by a natural analogy, answer to a ratification
of this eternal law, whence the divine dominion may take
its original."
If, then, God's right to dominion is derived, not from
His irresistible power, but from His infinite wisdom and
goodness, which serve after the manner of a law to direct
the operation of His infinite power; evident it is, that
mere power confers on no. human creature the right of
dominion, and that no one man has the right to govern
another otherwise than agreeably to those laws which
our Creator has given for the government of all men.
Absolute dominion, or the power to direct and dispose of




184          LIMITATIONS OF AUTHORITY.
persons and things without regard to justice and equity,
which are for us men the surest expressions of the Divine
wisdom and goodness, is an attribute neither of God nor
of good men, and is coveted only by that pride and selfishness which are the origin of evil and the eternal tor<
ment of the wicked.
Whatever rights, then, accrue to us under the law of
Nature, are limited by the law of Nature, which commands us to render to all their dues, and restrains us in
every relation of life, and in all our actions, from injustice, cruelty, and oppression.  The law of Nature, obr
example, gives the husband authority to govern his wife,
but it does not permit him to treat her harshly or
cruelly; it gives the father authority over his children,
but not to maltreat and abuse themn; in neither case is
the authority absolute, but in both cases it is limited and
restrained to the ends for which it is given by the very
law which creates it.  So with the relation of master
and slave: the law of Nature gives the master authority
to govern his slave, but not to abuse him: it limits the
exercise of his authority by a just regard to the end for
which it is conferred; that is, to render the slave obedient
to his just demands, and to obtain from him that service
which is the master's due.  All beyond this is usurpation and cruelty-abhorrent to the law of Nature.
In truth the law of Nature; in requiring us to love
God su9premely/ and      o'zr neighbor as ozirselves (and
this is seen to be the sum and substance of the law of




LIMITATIONS OF AUTHORITY.           185
Nature when revealed to us in its full dimensions), imposes an immutable limitation to all the authority it confers; and a limitation which would be as effectual as
immutlable, if the precept imposing it were duly consulted.  Unhappily, however, the very precept v-ich is
designed by God to limit authority is used by thle perversity of man to subvert and destroy it; being made a
pretext for annihilating the distinctions of radnk and
property in society; and consequently of obliterating the
moral virtues of. temperance and frugality, benevolence
and modesty, which, without these distinctions, would
have no scope for exercise, and, indeed, no possibility of
existence.  But the love or benevolence enjoined by the
divine law is no such leveling principle.  It requires us
to do good offices to all men in their various relations,
and in such manner and degree as is best fitted to fulfill
the ends of those relations. Hence it can not, in its due
exercise, subvert the authority which God has entrusted
to any man; but it serves to temper authority, to whomsoever entrusted, and to direct it to the fulfillment of its
legitimate end. We admit this in other relations; why
not also in that which is under consideration?  A man's
love for his wife does not require him to abjure his authority over her, but so to exercise it as to attach her to
himself, and to make her the trusting and trusted partner of his life.  A father's love to his children does not
require him to renounce his authority over theml, but so
to exercise his authority as to fit them for their destined




186          LIMITATIONS OF AUTHORITY.
stations in life.  A ruler's love for his subjects does not
require him to change places with them, but so to govern
them  as he, if a subject and an honest and upright
man, would desire to be governed himself. The love of
a judge for a criminal at the bar does not require him
to divest himself of his office, or to violate its duties, but
it requires him so to exercise his authority as to show all
possible kindness and clemency to the accused, consistent
with the paramount purpose of giving effect to the just
and humane intention of the law. A rich man's love for
his poor neighbors does not require him to beggar himself, but so to use his riches as to relieve their necessities. All these things are so nearly self-evident that
they scarcely admit of proof, and are commonly received
without it.  Why, then, should the relation we are considering be counted an exception?  Why imagine that
love, which is the principle of universal attraction in the
moral world, and binds men together in every other just
relation of life, should in this relation alone become
a principle of repulsion which must of necessity rend
them  asunder?  Surely, unless we are determined to
violate all principle and all analogy, we must acknowledge that the love of the master for his slaves does not
require him to raise them to the same state of freedon
with himself, but that it serves to temper his authority
over them, and to direct the exercise of it to the end for
which it is given; i. e., to make them faithful and affectionate servants.




LIMITATIONS OF AUTHORITY.          187
It is in this law of universal benevolence, which, as
imperfectly and in its rude outlines apprehended by
reason, requires us to abstain from injury and to do justice to all men, and which, when revealed to us in its
full proportions by its divine Author, becomes the charity
of the gospel, requiring us not only to be just, but full
of mercy and compassion; it is, I say, in this law that
we find the limitation of all human authority. It is by
this law that the master (as well as the father and all
others invested with authority) is taught and directed,
not only to do justice to those under him, but to render
them, as -fir as he can, comfortable and happy in the
relations which they hold to him.  He is bound to regard
them as his fellow-creatures, remembering that the difference between himself and them is not a difference of
nature, but of fortune; that he is made of the same clay
with them, and that they are made in the same image of
God with him; that his authority is but a brief trust for the
just and equitable use of which he must account to his
Master in heaven.   They are his servants, and he has
the right to exact of them the service which is his due; but
he has no right to overtask them, nor, indeed, to require
of them any greater labor than is conducive to his and
their mutual benefit, regard being had to their different
stations in life.  They are part of his family, and he has
therefore the right to govern them without accounting to
the State, except for such inordinate abuses as its laws
prohibit; but he has no right (by the law of Nature, I




188          LIMITATIONS OF AUTHORITY.
mean, which restrains us all within much narrower limits than the law of the land) to punish them except for
just cause, for their indolence and other faults and vices,
and in no other kind or greater degree than is necessary
to their amendment. Hle has a right to the use of their
bodily liberty (for how else could he command their service?), but he has no right to require of them anything
impossible in Nature or unlawful in morals.  The relation in which he stands to them is not inalienable by
Nature, like that of parent and child, nor indissoluble
by the law of God, natural or positive, like that of husband and wife, but is/superinduced on him by Providence, with their implied consent, and may be alienated
and dissolved, but not capriciously or wantonly. Strictly
speaking, the master has a right only to the service of
the slave; and there is evidently nothing in the nature
of this right to prevent its transfer to another with the
slave's consent, either expressed or gathered, in cases of
incapacity, by reasonable implication.  Reason, too, allows the transfer, in cases of necessity, arising either
from the master's misfortunes or from the incurable vice
and obstinacy of the slave, which requires his dismissal
from his master's service.  All beyond this, if justifiable at all, must be justified, I apprehend, not by the
law of Nature, but only by the laws of the land.
To say that this authority is always exercised within
the limits which the law of Nature prescribes, would be
to affirm of the master more tharn can be affirmed of any




LIMITATIONS OF AUTHORITY.           189
class of men invested with authority in the body politic,
in the family, or in other associations involving the governmental relation. Magistrates, husbands, and fathers,
clergymen, teachers, masters, or employers, as we now
call them, are all liable to the charge of cruel and capricious conduct toward their subordinates.'1What good
reason have we to believe that the proprietor of slaves
abuses his trust more than others?  His authority is in
some respects analogous to that of the father over his
children; and although it is not restrained by the sentiment of paternal affection, yet it is restrained by that
sentiment of kindliness which is implanted in every human bosom, and by that dictate of our common humanity
which excites every man's solicitude in behalf of all those
who are dependent on him, and look to him for protection.  What reason have we to believe that our Southern
brethren are the only men on earth on whom these sentiments are inoperative?  And if these motives are less
efficacious than the sympathies created by closer ties,
may not their defects be compensated by that principle
of self-interest which, in the present state of our nature,
is more stringent and steady in its operation than any
other motive of human action, and which does not, a
general rule, suffer the master to neglect the welfare of
his slaves?  In this respect, it will be found, I apprehend, that the good providence of God, by infusing seeds
of attachment, and by an interweaving of interests among
those who, however different in station, are under his




190         LIMITATIONS OF AUTHORITY.
common charge, and the objects of his common bounty,
but has acted the part of a kind philanthropist, and a
wise economist.
In another respect, the authority of the master is
analogous to that of the magistrate: he is obliged to
punish his slaves for numerous offenses, which in free
States can be taken cognizance of only by the magistrate.
I would not underrate the advantages that are derived
from  the formalities of law, and the safeguards with
which they surround the liberty, reputation, and property of the humblest citizen. But are the advantages
all one side?  Is nothing to be said in favor of that state
of society, in which the great body of the laboring class
stands only in a mediate relation to the State?  Is the
maxster less interested than the magistrate in the prevention of crime?  Is he less likely to be lenient and
discriminating in his judgments?  Has he fewer inducements to make the punishments which he awards answer
the true end of punishment, the reformation and improvement of the offender?  For my part I shall be
more ready to quarrel with arbitrary power at the
South when we get rid of jails and state-prisons at the
North.
I am not depreciating freedom, nor am I insensible to
the advantages which have been conferred on the white
population of the North (at the expense of the blacks) by
the abolition of slavery.  But if there be any redeeming
points in that state of society which exists at the South,




LIMITATIONS OF AUTHORITY.         191
I think we can well afford to take them into account and
pass them to the credit of our Southern brethren, in the
comparisons which we draw between our own condition
and theirs.
Besides the motives already mentioned, there are
others of a more general nature, which may be presumed
to operate beneficially upon the master. He is responsible to his Ma-ker equally with other men: he has a
reputation to maintain among his neighbors and acquaintances, and throughout the world; he has a large stake
in society, and is proportionately prompted by public
spirit to redress abuses, and to introduce salutary reforms; his slaves, moreover, are part of his family, and
his agency for their temporal and spiritual welfare, if he
be a Christian man, is quickened by the apostolic precept, "If any man provide not for his own, and especially for those of his own house, he hath denied the
faith, and is worse than an infidel.'  If the slaveholder
has strong temptations to oppression and cruelty, let us
remember that he has strong motives also to resist these
temptations. That he, like other men, is often betrayed into excess, is probable; in which case, it may be
hoped, he will be honest enough to confess his fault, and
not seek to justify himself by an equivocation like that;
of Browne, the reputed father of the Independents, who
(I have the story from one of his contemporaries) when
accused of unmercifully beating his wife, defended him



192           LIMITATIONS OF AUTHORITY.
self by saying, that he did not beat her as his wife, but
as a termagoant.'
Tt is hardly fair to visit the faults of individuals on
the class to whichl they belong, and on the institutions
under which they live. I am sure that we at the North
would think we 1had great reason for complaint, if our
magistrates, husbands, fathers, and free institutions to
boot, were all brought into disgrace because individuals
among us abuse their authority.   As to punishmnents for
laziness and lighter offenses, I believe, from  whalt I can
learn, that there is more flogging done in an old-faishioned English school, than on a well ordered Southern
plantation.  And I should be glad to know if the lot of
the slave would be less degraded and miserable, if he
were compelled to labor from   fear of starvation, which,
if left to himself, he could not avoid, than it is when he
is compelled to labor from  fear of the lash, which, as a
general rule: he can escape if he will?  And as to punishments for more serious offenses, are they less severe
in kind and degree, less wholesome in their effects, and
more expensive to the State, than those which it would
be necessary to inflict on the same class of people, if
they were emancipated from their masters, brought into
* Ephraim Pagitt, in his account of the Brownists, Chapter 13th,
" Of their equimocating/," gives this, among other instances: "And old
father Browne, being reproved for beating his old wife, distinguished,
that he did not beat her as his wife, but as a curst old woman."
HIERESIOGRAPHY, or a description of the Heretics and Sectaries sprung
up in these latter times. London, A. D. 1648.




LIMITATIONS OF AUTHORITY.          193
immediate relation with society, tried by judge and jury,
sent for a while to jails and state-prisons, to be thrown
back upon the community, greater vagabonds than before?  These, as it seems to me, are the true points of
comparison, though they are such as novelists and declaimers against slavery find it convenient to overlook.
We are very apt, at the North, to estimate the character of Southern masters from the laws of their respective States, and to impute to them, as a class, those abuses of authority which the laws do not forbid. Nothing
can be more manifestly or flagrantly unjust. What
would the father of a family, in a free State, think of
those who should impute to him  every act of tyranny
and cruelty which the laws of his State do not forbid
him to exercise? And so with persons in other relations.
The truth is that persons possessed of authority are restrained from its abuse by a sense of humanity, of justice and reputation, and the thousand other benign motives with which Providence has surrounded them in a
Christian community, infinitely more than by the laws
of the land; which are designed to guard against the
most scandalous abuses, and to operate chiefly on ignoble
minds. But allowing the objection its due weight, it
deserves to be remarked that Southern legislatures have
not been so unmindful of their slaves as we of the North
are apt to suppose. They acknowledge the rights of
slaves, and have already done much, and, if left to
themselves, and not hampered by the officiousness of
9




194          LIMITATIONS OF AUTTHORITY.
others, will, in the natural course of things, do more to
protect them in these rights.  On this subject I beg the
attention of the reader to the following extract from an
essay on the " Slave Laws of the South," by the Hon.
J. B. O'Neall, of South Carolina. I quote from the
essay as given by De Bow, in his " Industrial Resources," who remarks that the essay, " though based
upon the slave system of that State (S. C.), gives a
fair idea of the system throughout the entire South":
"Although slaves," says Judge O'Neall, "by the
act of 1740, are declared to be chattels personal, yet
they are also in our law considered as persons with
many rights and liabilities, civil and criminal.
"The right of protection which would belong to a
slave, as a human being, is, by the law of slavery, transferred to the master.
" A master may protect the person of his slave from
injury, by repelling force with force, or by action, and
in some cases by indictment.
" Any injury done to the person of his slave, he may
redress by action of trespass vi et armis, without laying
the injury done, with a per quod servitium amisit, and
this, even though he may have hired the slave to another.
" By the act of 1821, the murder of a slave is declared to be a felony, without the benefit of clergy; and
by the same act, to kill any slave on sudden heat and
passion, subjects the offender, on conviction, to a fine not




LIMITATIONS OF AUTHORITY.          195
exceeding five hundred dollars, and imprisonment, not
exceeding six months.
"To constitute the murder of a slave, no other ingredients are necessary than such as enter into the offense
of murder at common law. So the killing on sudden
heat and passion is the same as manslaughter, and a
finding by the jury, on an indictment for the murder of
a slave, of a killing on sudden heat and passion, is good,
and subjects the offender to the punishment of the act;
or, on an indictment for the murder of a slave, if the
verdict be guilty of manslaughter, it is good, and the
offender is to receive judgment under the act.
"An attempt to kill and murder a slave by shooting
at him, was held to be a misdemeanor, and indictable as
an assault with an intent to kill and murder. This was
a consequence of making it murder to kill a slave.
"The act of 1841 makes the unlawzful whipping or
beating of any slave, without sufficient provocation by
word or act, a misdemeanor; and subjects the offender,
on conviction, to imprisonment not exceeding six months,
and a fine not exceeding five hundred dollars.
" This act has received no judicial construction by the
Court of Appeals. It has been several times presented
to me on circuit, and I have given it construction. The
terms'shall unlawfully whip or beat any slave not
under his charge, without reasonable provocation,' seem
to me convertible. For, if the beating be excusable from
reasonable provocation, it can not be unlawful. So, if




196         LIMITATIONS OF AUTHORITY.
the beating be either without provocation, or is so enormous that the provocation can be no excuse, then it is
unlawful. What is sufficient provocation by word or
deed, is a question for the jury. The question is whether,
as slave-owners and reasonable men, if they had been in
the place of the defendant, they would have inflicted the
whipping or beating which the defendant did?  If they
answer this question in the affirmative, then the defendant must be acquitted-otherwise, convicted.
" The acts of 1821 and 1841 are eminently wise, just,
and humane.   They protect slaves, who dare not raise
their own hands in defense against brutal violence. They
teach men who are wholly irresponsible in property, to
keep their hands off the property of other people. They
have wiped away a shameful reproach upon us, that we
were indifferent to the lives or persons of our slaves.
They have had, too, a most happy effect on slaves themselves. They knownow, that the shield of the law is
over them; and, thus protected, they yield a more hearty
obedience and effective service to their masters."




CHAPTER             XIII.
OBJECTIONS THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL.
IN resting slavery on contract, we remove the ground
of those theoretical objections which impugn it as a system necessarily subversive of natural rights and upheld
only by violence. Some of these objections have been
sufficiently considered, but there is one which it may
be well to subject to a fuller and more distinct examination.
The objection to which I refer, when simply enunciated, denies the right to buy and sell human beings.
Sometimes the objection is rhetorically amplified, as when
we are told that men have no right to traffic in human
souls or make merchandise of human flesh; and at other
times it is stated with an appearance of philosophic precision, as when it is said that man can not rightfully
hold property in man. But, however varied the expression, the exact point of the objection seems to be that no
one human being can really own another, and consequently that men are not marketable commodities to be
bought and sold.
The really remarkable thing in regard to this objec



198   OBJECTIONS THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL.
tion is, that the objector himself should believe that he
has an antagonist.  How comes he to think that when a
man is said to buy or sell a slave he is understood to
acquire or give an absolute right to the ownership of his
person, body and soul? The idea is so extravagant, so
contrary to all just conceptions of human nature, that
one feels curious to learn something of its origin; and
how it has come to pass that any man should entertain it
himself or impute it to another. Who needs to be told
that no man but himself can sell his own soul, and that
only in a figurative sense, and with Satan for a purchaser? Who needs to be told that it is impossible for
one man to make the body, limbs, and muscles of another his own? What man in this age and country will
affirm that any man has a right to his own life, much
less to the life of another? Few propositions, I think,
can be more indisputable than that one man can not
really own another, and consequently can not be said, in
a proper sense, to buy or sell another. If I ask a bookseller the price of " Virgil" or " Juvenal,7 "H lume," or
" Macaulay," does it ever enter his head that I wish to
buy these worthies themselves, and become the owner of
their muscles, as well as of the products of their minds?
Was ever slave so stupid as to believe, when told to boil
the kettle, that he must reduce the veritable iron to a
fluid state and make it bubble with heat? How comes
it, then, that when servants are said to be bought and
sold, we do not see that the word servants is used by one




OBJECTIONS THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL.     199
of the most common figures of speech for the service
which they owe?   What else can be bought and sold
among civilized and Christian people but the man's service or labor?  When I read in the Scriptures, without
a word of censure on the practice, that the patriarchs
bought and sold slaves, and that the Levitical law enjoined on the Hebrews to buy servants of the heathen
round about them and of the strangers that sojourned
among them, and to make them their " possession," and
to transmit them as an inheritance to their children after
them "to inherit them  for a possession;" it certainly
never enters into my mind that the Hebrews thereby
acquired an absolute right over the persons of their
slaves, so as, if they pleased, to eat their bodies and destroy their souls; or, indeed, any other right to them
than a right to their service and labor, and to the government of their persons in order to their service and
labor. Nor do I suppose that any reader, left to the
working of his own mind, would put any other construction on the language, or suppose that the heathen slaves
are called the" possession" or property of the Hebrews
in any other than a limited and figurative sense; the
limitation so obvious that it needs not be expressed, the
figure so natural that to avoid it would be a miserable
affectation of philosophic precision. The servants were
the possession or property of the Hebrews only for certain purposes, and even for these purposes they were
not literally their possession, but merely called so by




200   OBJECTIONS THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL.
one of those common figures of speech, by which the
cause is put for the effect, or the whole for a part.
All this seems to me to be so obvious that I doubt
whether men in modern times would have put any other
construction on the words were it not for the influence
of a preconceived theory.  They would read in the Old
Testament that servants were a possession, and think (if
they thought about the matter at all) that servants was
put for service as naturally as when they read in the
New Testament: "Lord, let me go first and bury my
father," they think (if they chance to think of the matter at all) that only the corpse was to be buried; or, at
all events, they would never dream of the " possession"
involving an absolute right to the servant's body and
soul, were not their minds prepossessed with certain
notions of slavery that were as foreign to the Hebrew
mind as they are, happily, to American practice.
Under the Roman law, in the palmy days of the Republic, there was nothing in the theory of slavery to
restrain or limit the right of sale.  Men were made
slaves by captivity, and the slave was the property of
his master to dispose of as he pleased. In the time of
the Emperors the law restrained some of the abuses of
the master's authority, but it never regarded the slave
as under its protection.  The theory was that the master
had an absolute right to the life of the slave, a right
which he held in abeyance on certain conditions, but
which he resumed the moment that the slave refused his




OBJECTIONS THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL.       201
consent to those conditions; and, as the greater included
the less, he had consequently the right to subject the
slave to any treatment, however barbarous, which was
short of death.  On this theory the sale of a slave was
the transfer of that absolute right to life and limb which
the owner was supposed to possess.  This theory of slavery, as we have shown, has been adopted by modern
writers on civil liberty, and depicted'in all its native
horrors, in order to render the civil liberty which they
have justly commended, more lovely and noble by
contrast.
Slavery in the United States rests on a different foundation. The master has no right to the life of the slave,
no absolute right to his person, no absolute right even
to his service and labor.  In no proper sense, therefore,
can he be said to be the owner of the slave, and what he
does not own himself he can not be said, in a proper
sense, to give or transfer to another.  IHe has a conditional right to the service of the slave; this service he
may give or transfer to another, on the same condition
on which he holds it himself; and the transfer of it for
a valuable consideration is said, in legal and popular
language, to be the sale of the slave.  The law of the
land, indeed, declares the slave to be his master's property: his "chattel personal," as the phrase is; and as the
service is inseparable from the servant, I see not in what
other way the law can secure the master's right.  But
to take such legal phrase in a philosophical sense, and to
9*




202   OBJECTIONS THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL.
infer from it that the slave is neither a human person,
nor a member of civil society, nor possessed of the
rights (unless he had forfeited them by crime) of life
and liberty (the liberty proper to his station), is to do
injustice, I apprehend, both to the letter and spirit of
the law.
The truth is, so far as I can see, that the obligation
to servicefor life, on condition of protection and support, is the essefce of American slavery.  Servitus in
totlrn  honinzem  non descendit, says Seneca.    The
heathens saw, plainly enough, that slavery does not pass
upon the soul; and we Christians know and proclaim
by our laws that it does pass on the body, except so far
as to secure from the slave that labor for life, the obligation to which is the essence of servitude.
The framers of our Federal Constitution touched the
precise point of the relation, when, rejecting a word
which has one meaning     at Boston and another at
Charleston, they referred to slaves as PERSONS BOUND
TO SERVICE. The transfer of this right to service, or
the sale of slaves, however common, is no essential or
necessary part of the relation, but merely made a part
of it by custom.  The facility and frequency with which
it is effected is, no doubt, one of the most revolting abuses
of slavery, but it is one which may be greatly restrained,
if not wholly removed, without impairing any essential
feature of the institution.
"This continual change," says Judge O'Neall, in the




OBJECTIONS THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL.      203
essay above referred to, "of the relation of master and
slave, with the consequent rending of family ties among
them, has induced me to think that, if by law they were
annexed to the freeholds of their owners, and when sold
for partition among distributers, tenants in common,
joint tenants, and coparceners, they should be sold with
the freehold, and not otherwise, it might be a wise and
wholesome change of the law.    Some provision, too,
might be made, which would prevent, in a great degree,
sales for debts. A debtor's lands and slaves, instead of
being sold, might be sequestered, until, like vivumi vaditin, they would pay all his debts in execution by the
annual profits. If this should be impossible, on account
of the amount of the indebtedness, then either court, law,
or equity, might be empowered to order the sale of the
plantation and slaves, together or separately-the slaves
to be sold in families."
It is certainly matter of the very deepest regret, that the
reciprocal rights involved in the relation should be overshadowed in the public mind by the master's right of
property in the slave.  Perhaps this prominence of the
legal question has been unavoidable; but, however this
be, its effect has been most disastrous, by turning away
public attention from the relation itself to one of its subordinate and most repulsive features.
Another objection, closely allied to the former, is, that
slavery involves the breaking up of families, the separation of husband and wife, parents and children.




204   OBJECTIONS THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL.
It is doubtless true, that the laws of the Southern
States allow to the master a greater latitude in the transfer of his slaves than is consistent with the dictates either
of humanity or of a sound and enlightened policy.  Put
yourself, then, in the place of your Southern brethren,
and tell me frankly, Would you make the law of the
State in all things the measure of your duty and the rule
of your practice?  Would you, in the spirit of greed
and without mercy, grasp at every right which the law
of the land concedes to you?  Would not you govern
your conduct by higher motives?  Would not you act
towards your dependents with that forbearance and clemency, with that kindness and charity which have their
origin in a far higher source than legal prescriptions and
statutes?  What right have you, then, to charge upon
your brethren a conduct which you would yourself despise?  What right have you to think that they, in the
transfer of their slaves, avail themselves, with reckless
and avaricious temper, of the liberty which their laws concede?  Or that they do not, in obedience to the dictates
of humanity and religion, do all in their power to mitigate those rigors of slavery which the law of the land
can not or does not reach?
But perhaps on this point you do justice to your
Southern brethren; you admit that they do endeavor,
and for the most part with success, to prevent the separation of families. But such, you argue, is their misfortune, such the withering curse of slavery, that they




OBJECTIONS THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL.     205
can not wholly remove this evil. Masters are sometimes
cruel, creditors always merciless; and hence, from the
inherent nature of slavery, these cruel separations will
occur: southern planters can not prevent the evil, if they
would.
Can you prevent it?   Try the experiment first at
home, and on freemen. Can you so adjust the mechanism
of human society as to enable its members to earn their
livelihood without the rupture of domestic ties?  Can
you prosecute commerce on this basis, or raise an army,
or support a navy? Look round among your neighbors.
Is there a family that has not been separated? and do
you not find many whose members are scattered to the
four quarters of the earth, driven to this separation by
their wants, or by that sense of duty which is the sternest of all necessity?  Have these separations caused no
anxious thoughts, no sleepless nights, no bleeding hearts?
Look at your jails and prisons, to which you send those
incorrigible offenders who, in a different form of society,
would be sold to some distant and rigid master; have
the inmates of these dismal abodes left no relatives outside the walls that confine them to mourn over their disgrace, their incarceration and sufferings?  What do we
learn from this?  That freedom has no advantage over
slavery?  God forbid   That slaves are not the lowest
class of human society?  We know that they are. But
this we learn-that the evil under consideration is not
peculiar to slavery; that it is incident to man in every




206   OBJECTIONS THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL.
age and country, every frmn and condition of society;
that it falls equally, though in different ways and from
the operation of different causes, both on bond and free;
that if it produce greater sufferings among slaves than
others (which I am apt to doubt) it has also, though we
may not see it, a proportionate compensation; that we
are bound to use our best efforts (in the way of duty and
consistently with the order of human society) to avert
this as well as other evils from those over whom it impends; and when these efforts have failed, then to acquiesce in the calamity as God's appointment; to receive
it at His hands without peevish complaints and murmurs.
Another common objection to slavery is, that it proscribes marriage; slaves, it is said, being degraded by
the necessity of their condition to the level of brutes,
and compelled to live in a state of universal concubina,ge.
It was some time before I could discover the grounds
of this objection.  My inquiries of clergymen and others
who had resided at the South satisfied me that marriage
was recognized and respected by the bond in the church
to which I belong, as well as by the free; that persons
of both classes were married after the same form, and
that no distinction was made in the performance of the
rite, except that in the case of slaves the written consent
of the master, or masters, to the marriage was required.
My informants also assured me, that to the best of their




OBJECTIONS THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL.    207
knowledge, the same custom prevailed among other religious denominations. One clergyman, who has spent most
of his professional life at the North, told me, that while
residing at the South, he had himself solemnized more
than fifty marriages among slaves; and he added, that
the Roman Catholics (and I record the fact to their
honor) make a point of the matter and insist on marriage among the slaves under their charge as a condition
of cohabitation.  With these facts before me, I was much
at a loss to understand the grounds of this common statement in regard to the concubinage of slaves; a statement
not confined to the slaves of remote plantations, but applied in the broadest terms to slaves of every description;
and it is only since I have been engaged in the preparation of the present essay, that I have been enlightened
on the subject. For this light I am indebted to a work
entitled " The Higher Law in its Relations to Civil Government; with particular Reference to Slavery and the
Fugitive Slave Law," written by WILLIAM HOSMER,
published at Auburn, N. Y., 1852. In this work, page
90, as one of several illustrations of what he calls the
" Natural Injustice" of Slavery, Mr. Hosmer gives us
the following:
" 5. It (slavery) destroys the marriage relation.
So far as we have any knowledge, slaves are incapable
of contracting marriage. They are, in this respect, exactly on a level with brutes. Indeed, it is not possible
that marriage should exist, for marriage is a legal rela



208   OBJECTIONS THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL.
tion, and implies contracting power; but the slave can
make no contract. -le is unknown in law, except as
belonging exclusively and entirely to another.  He may
live as if married, but it would be a desecration of law
to repeat its forms over those who have not power to
keep the slightest of its requirements. The slave, if he
could be married, could not protect his wife from  insult
and defilement, for she would not belong to him, but to
his owner-all that the slave has being his master's.
Moreover, she might be sold or separated from him at
any moment.
" 6. It destroys the parental relation.  This follows
inevitably from the foregoing. When marriage is not
allowed to exist, the duty of parents to instruct and provide for their children must cease.  Amid universal
concubinage, parentage can scarcely be traced beyond
the mother," etc., etc.
From this passage it would seem that the astounding
statements to which the public are treated on this subject, on both sides of the Atlantic, are gathered, not
from an observation of facts, but from a process of argument. Marriage is a legal relation, and implies contracting power; slaves are by law incapable of contract, and
consequently of marriage; therefore they live in a state
of concubinage, and are degraded    to the level of
brutes!
Now, it is undoubtedly true tihat the State does
not legalize the marriage of slaves; and for the same




OBJECTIONS THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL.     209
reason that it does not legalize the contracts of minors.
Slaves are related to the State only through their masters, and it is not the province of the State, but of the
master, to protect them, and to regulate their conduct.
It is obvious, however, that contracts do not depend for
their existence on the law of the State, for they exist
before the law can recognize them, and give them validity.  The slaxve who has a will and reason to understand
the meaning of words has the essential cualifications for
a contract, and is as capable of forming one as his master; and his contract, though destitute of legal force,
will have the same moral force as his master's.  He is,
therefore, equally capable of marriage with his master;
and his marriage, with his master's consent, though it
have no legal validity, will be equally binding on his
conscience.  The difference is simply this: the marriage
of the master is both a civil and religious contract; the
marriage of the slave, with his master's consent, is a religious, but not a civil, contract.  Is his marriage,
therefore, null and void, because it has no legal force?
When was it ever heard in the Christian Church, that
marriage is only a civil contract?  Is it not also, by the
common consent of Christendom, a religious contract?
Nay, is it not primarily and essentially a religious contract, prescribed by God himself? Have Christian States
done more, or can they do more, than guard the contract,
when made and ratified agreeably to Christ's institution,
by annexing temporal advantages to its due observance,




210 OBJECTIONS THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL.
and temporal penalties to its infraction? What are we to
think of men, claiming to be ministers of the gospel, who
publicly declare that marriage, when solemnized according
to Christ's institution, is not valid, merely because it is
not legal? nay, is null and void, merely because the law
of the State does not recognize and legitimate it? These
men discover ANTICHRIST in the Church of Rome because, while she upholds the sanctity of marriage, she
yet " forbids " it, from prudential reasons, to her priesthood; and yet, at the same time, without a suspicion of
Antichrist in their own creed and practice, they proclaim it a "desecration  "to repeat its forms over"
slaves, and thus discountenance, and virtually forbid,
marriage among millions of their fellow-countrymen,
under the impious pretense that it is not Christ but
Cmsar, not the law of God but the law of the land,
which can hallow their union, and restrain them from' universal concubinage"?  "Thou hypocrite! First
pull out the beam that is in thine own eye, and then
shalt thou see clearly to take out the mote out of thy
brother's eye!"
But the answer to this objection admits of illustrations
which will possess an interest for many of the objectors,
evei if they fail to carry conviction. Time was, when
the marriages of Quakers in Great Britain were void in
law; were they then not valid and binding on the conscience, and were this estimable people justly liable to
the charges which are now brought against slaves, be



OBJECTIONS THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL.    211
cause their marriages were not legalized? Take another
case. The IndepEndents, under Cromwell, took a fancy
to dispense with the services of the ministers of religion,
and contract marriages before justices of the peace. By
the laws of Great Britain, which ignored the Commonwealth, those marriages were deemed illegal and void in
law; and accordingly, after the Restoration, a statute
was passed to legalize them. Did the Independents, after
the Restoration, imagine that their marriages were not
valid and binding on the conscience until they were
legitimated by statute? Did the Church, or Parliament,
while denying their legality, question their validity?  I
have read a good many high-flying sermons commemorative of" King Charles the Martyr," and denunciatory
of the " Rebellion," but I do not remember ever to have
seen this charge of concubinage brought against the Puritans, because their marriages during the "troublous
times" wanted, as their opponents believed, the sanctions
of the law of the realm, and, as they themselves vaunted,
the solemnities of religion.
Whether the marriage contract would be better understood and observed among slaves if it could be legalized,
is one of those speculative questions which it were useless
to discuss. We are bound to take slaves as they are,
namely, as persons standing in a mediate relation to
society, and known to us only through their masters, by
and through whom alone they are connected with society.
In this respect they stand, as regards marriage, very




,212   OBJECTIONS THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL.
nearly in the condition which minors held, until modern
legislation made them capable of marriage without the
consent of their parents; with what consistency or justice, while it still holds them incapable of other contracts
which may prove infinitely less injurious to them than
marriage, I stop not to inquire. The treatment of such
cases is no new thing in the Christian Church.  It was
decided in her infancy: and the decision is attested by
her ancient canons, and by the exposition which her
Basils and Augustines have left of the grounds on which
those canons were established.  "If slaves," says St.
Basil, as quoted by Bingham, "marry without the consent of their masters, or children without the consent of
their parents, it is not matrimony, but fornication, till
they ratify it by their consent;' for which he assigns
this reason, "that contracts made without the consent of
those under whose power they are, have no validity, but
are null."  With the consent of their masters, however,
slaves are as competent to contract marriages, as free
persons; and the marriages which they so -contract are,
when duly solemnized, as valid before God and His
Church, and as binding on the conscience as they possibly can be; nor is it in the power of the civil state, by
any law which it has enacted, or may hereafter enact,
either to diminish or increase, by one iota, their validity,
or the strength of their moral obligation.
If the ancient Romans, who had no higher conception
of marriage than as being a civil contract, sought to ex



OBJECTIONS THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL.     213
cite the semblance of virtue in their heathen slaves, by
calling their contubernity figura et imago nratrimonii,
we might surely expect better things of professed ministers of the Gospel, than to cast contempt on the marriage
of Christian slaves, and to brand it as concubinage, for
want of its civil sanction.  Far more seemly would it be,
as well as more consonant to God's ordinance, to cheer
and encourage masters in the laudable efforts which many
of them make to teach their slaves the nature and obligations of the conjugal and parental relations; to impress
on masters also, kindly, but firmly, the awful responsibility and, possible guilt, of being instrumental in severing a union to which they have themselves consented;
and to inculcate on the slave, as opportunity offers (and
there can be no lawful opportunity without the master's
permission), the duties which the Gospel of Christ enjoins both on the married and the unmarried.
There are other objections, some of which will come
under review in a future chapter,- and others of which
I do not feel called upon to consider.  Indeed, I shall
leave reason to be satisfied, if the interest which an
author naturally feels in his subject has not already
tempted me to transcend the object which I have proposed for myself; which is, not to recommend slavery,
or to express a preference for the state of society which
it involves, but merely to show that the form of slavery
* See chap. xvii.




214   OBJECTIONS THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL.
which is protected by the laws in our Southern States,
considered distinctly, in its essence, and as recognized
by the Constitution of the United States, whatever be its
incidental and concomitant evils, is not repugnant to the
Divine law; and thus help to restore (if it please God
to bless the effort), in some measure, the harmony which
once bound together the North and the South; or at
least to dissuade their sons from accustoming their
hearts to war, and turning their mighty energies on the
bowels of their common country!
Ne pueri, ne tanta animis assuescite bella,
Neu patrise validas in viscera vertite vires 




CHAPTER XIV.
THE PERPETUITY          OF SLAVERY.
THERE is, however, one objection which is thought to
bear, with peculiar force, against the form of slavery that
exists in our country, and which, from its collateral belrings, as well as its intrinsic importance, may properly
form the theme of a separate chapter and that is, that
slavery in our Southern States is perpetuated from one
generation to another.  Slaves among the Hebrews, we
are told, were capable of release on the Sabbatical year,
and the year of Jubilee; and slaves among the Mohammedans have a similar privilege. Among the Greeks
and Romans, slaves could be liberated from their servile
condition, and when liberated could rise to such positions
in society as their virtues merited, and lay the foundation of freedom and happiness for their descendants.
But American slaves are cut off from all advantages of
this sort; they are subjected to the evils of caste, from
which they have no hope of escape for themselves, their
children, or their latest posterity; they are doomed to
slavery forever.




216         THE PERPETUITY OF SLAVERY.
This, I confess, has always been, to my mind, one of
the most painful features of slavery in our Southern
States.  In his struggle with poverty, and the troubles
and sorrows that attend it, a man is naturally animated
by the hope of some favorable turn in the wheel of fortune, which may lift him  or his children, as it were,
from the dust, and raise them to comfort and affluence.
This hope is the light and solace of his soul, and the
spring of its energies, and nothing can more effectually
extinguish it than the certainty that both himself and
his posterity are consigned to one hard lot forever.
But let us look at the matter calmly, and we shall
see, I think, that this sad feature is neither peculiar to
Southern slavery, nor consequent upon slavery at all.
It is not peculiar to our Southern States, but was
found as well among God's own people, the ancient
Israelites.
To reconcile this statement with the acknowledged
fact of a periodical release from servitude, it should be
noted that there were two kinds of slaves among the
ancient Hebrews, the native, and the foreign, or Gentile
slaves.
In the first place, the Israelites had slaves taken from
among their own people. For, under the law of Moses,
a man reduced to extreme poverty might sell himself,
Lev. xxv. 39.   A  father might sell his children for
slaves, Ex. xxi. 7. By an order of their courts, thieves,
who were unable to restore what they had stolen, or the




THE PERPETUITY OF SLAVERY.          217
value of it, to the proper owner, might be sold in order
to compensate the owner for his loss, Ex. xxii. 2, 3.
And a creditor, also, might sell an insolvent debtor for
the payment of his debt.  There were other ways in
which native Israelites could be reduced to servitude,
but their bondage, however induced, was not perpetual;
for, by a humane provision of the Mosaic law, these
slaves had the option of liberty on every seventh or sabbatical year, and on every fiftieth year, or the year of
jubilee, the liberation was peremptory and absolute, includino those who had refused the liberty tendered to
them on the Sabbatical year, and had voluntarily bound
themselves to become slaves "' forever."
The other kind of slaves, among the Hebrews, were
those which they made from the surrounding nations.
For they were permitted to buy the natives and subjects
of these nations, and also such persons as had emigrated
froml these nations, and had settled in Judea.  But the
condition of these foreign, or Gentile slaves, was very
different from that of the native, or Hebrew slaves. The
latter were not to be ruled with rigor, and they were to
be set free on the year of Jubilee; "For," saith God,
"they be my servants, which I brought forth out of the
land of Egypt."  But slaves of the former kind had not
this prerogative; for they might be treated with rigor.:Over them," says Calmet, "masters had an entire
authority; they might sell them, exchange them, punish
them, judge them, and even put them to death, without
10




21.8       THE PERPETUITY OF SLAVERY.
public process."  Some of them were perfect proselytes
to the Hebrew faith; others partially so, being called
proselytes of the gate; both these might purchase their
freedom, or be manumitted by their master, but neither
the one nor the other had any claim to that periodical
release which was the boon of the Hebrew slave.  " The
year of Jubilee," says Bishop Patrick (Lev. xxv. 45),
"gave no servants of either sort their liberty."
Perpetuity of bondage; therefore, is not peculiar to
the slavery in our Southern States, but finds its parallel
in one form of that slavery which God permitted to exist
among His ancient people.
But there is a, further aggravation of our American
slavery, to which it would be difficult to find a parallel.
The Gentile slave owned by the Hebrew, if he bought
his liberty, or was manumitted, and conformed entirely
to the Mosaic religion, found himself, as respected his
civil and religious rights and privileges, on a level with
the Hebrews.   The Greek or Roman slave, when enfranchised, was eligible to the honors of the State, and
on a footing of social and political equality with its citizens; and the once despised slave, with no name of his
own, might win for his master's name, which but for him
would have been consigned to oblivion, present and future renown; as happened, we know, in the case of
Terence.  Not so with the American slave, who, though
restored to liberty, is still his master's inferior, socially
and politically. But is this the fault of slavery? Man



THE PERPETUITY OF SLAVERY.         219
ifestly not. It is owing, in the first place, to the fact
that the descendants of Africans in any of the United
States, even when they become free, are not, and can not
be, a portion of " the people" of the United States, in
such sense as to be eligible to political honors, or even to
the rights of citizenship. On this point, Chief Justice
Taney is, I suppose, authority; and if he were not, the
reasons which he gives for his opinion, and prescriptive
usage under the Constitution, put the matter out of
doubt.  For, having stated the question, " Can a negro,
whose ancestors were imported into this country, and
sold as slaves, become a member of the political conmmunity, formed and brought into existence by the Constitution of the United States, and as such, be entitled to all
the rights, and privileges, and immunities guarantied by
that instrument to the citizen?" the Chief Justice remarks: "The words'people of the United States,' and'citizens,' are synonymous terms, and mean the same
thing. They both describe the political body, who, according to our republican institutions, form the sovereignty, and who hold the power, and conduct the government, through their representatives. They are what
are familiarly called' the sovereign people,' and every
citizen is one of this people, and a constituent member
of this sovereignty. The question before us is, whether
the class of persons described in the plea of abatement
[the same as in the question above quoted] compose a
portion of this people, and are constituent members of




220        THE PERPETUITY OF SLAVERY.
this sovereignty?  We think they are not, and that they
are not included, and were not intended to be included,
under the word'citizen,' in the Constitution, and can
therefore claim none of the rights and privileges which
that instrument provides for, and secures to, citizens of
the United States.  On the contrary, they were at that
time considered as a subordinate and inferior class of
beings, who had been subjugated by the dominant race,
and, whether emancipated or not, yet remained subject
to their authority, and had no rights or privileges, but
such as those who held the power and the government
might choose to grant them."
It is, therefore, no fault of Southern slavery, that its
subjects, when emancipated, can not rise to political distinction, nor to social distinction, so far as it depends on
political. The immediate bar to their social and political
elevation, and which necessarily, though indirectly, operates to repress their hope of emancipation, and to keep
them in slavery, is the fact, that the people who are held
in slavery are not a portion of the people of the United
States, or of the people for whom the government of the
United States was intended. For this fact, slaveholders are not responsible.
But there is, moreover (as the Chief Justice intimates), another cause lying back of this; and that is
the fact that, though of the same human kind with his
master and his equal in all the essentials of that kind,
in speech, reason, and will, the slave is yet of a different




THE PERPETUITY OF SLAVERY.         221
race from his master by characteristics which forbid the
two to coalesce. You say, perhaps, that the refusal to
amalgamate is unreasonable, and the consequence of
cruel and shameful prejudices on-the part of the whites.
It may be so; on this point I would leave every man to
his own opinion.  Only I would have it observed that it
is color and other physical differences between the two
races that create the. chasm that separates them  and
that the sad feature of caste, which we all agree in deploring, is neither peculiar to Southern slavery, nor in
fact chargeable upon slavery at all.
And, in view of the relation which the colored people
of this country hold to the white, it does appear to me
that a strong argument, on grounds of humanity and expediency, may be made in favor of a limited and regulated slavery, supposing such slavery to be, as I have
endeavored to prove, permissible on the principles of universal justice and to involve no infraction of human
rights. For, what are we to do with these people? I
mean what are we to do for them with a view not to our
own benefit but to theirs? In the Northern and Middle
States we have abolished slavery, and I have no wish to
deny that the measure was prompted in part by humane
motives and the wish to benefit the colored population.
But has it benefitted them? Are the colored people now
more numerous, more loved, and respected than they
would have been had no such measures been adopted?
We risk nothing in affirming the contrary. We know




222        THE PERPETUITY OF SLAVERY.
that since they have been emancipated they have dwindled
away; that they are debarred from social and political
equality with their white brethren; that they are isolated
and ostracized; and that in relieving them from legal
slavery, we have reduced them to a social slavery, more
cruel and capricious than that which was regulated by
law. We have raised ourselves only to depress them. I
should say that some of the Western States in excluding
the colored population from their limits, had pursued,
towards them, a course more intensely selfish, were it not
that they have merely dealt out to them summarily and
under the form of law the same treatment which we in the
Northern and Eastern States have dealt out to them slowly
and by force of opinion. I can not see that the Western
States are much more to blame for their laws than are
the Northern and Eastern States for their opinions. But
the question recurs, and it is one in the answer to which
we have all, North and South, East and West, a common
interest. What are we to do with these people? Will
you reenslave them in the Free States?  This, even if
you desired it, you can not do justly (as justice is distinguished from expediency), against their will; and with the
opinions which they have imbibed from us, they account
servitude a degradation to which they will never consent.
Will you transport them to Africa? This again you
have no right to do against their will; and if you consult them, they will tell you, almost to a man, that they
love the country in which they were born, and prefer to




THE PERPETUITY OF SLAVERY.         223
stay at home. Will you remove the prejudices, if you
please to call them so, of the whites, and induce them to
raise their colored brethren to their own social and political level? Try first the force of your breath to blow
back the torrent of Niagara! Every man who is not a
very Quixote knows that such efforts, however laudable
the motives that prompt them, are supremely visionary.
If, then, the East can do no better for these colored
people than doom them to social degradation, and if the
West can give them no more than an inhospitable repulsion, why should either seek to disturb-why should not
both unite to commend-the limited and regulated slavery
under which they live and are happy at the South?
This state of fixed and clearly defined subordination,
which precludes all jealousy and rivalry between the two
races and enables them to work together for their mutual
good, seems to be that which the providence of God designs. It is, if I may dare to say it, God's own determination of the great problem which the statesmen and
philanthropists of our country have vainly endeavored to
solve by their empirical schemes. I make no doubt that
the Africans are the descendants of Ham and the Europeans of Japhet; and that both are, as descendants of
Noah, partakers of the same humanity and concluded in
the same redemption; while, at the same time, I think
it undeniable that, wherever the two races are brought
in contact, the peculiar physical and mental peculiarities
of the one, whether brought about by the slow operation




224         THE PERPETUITY OF SLAVERY.
of natural causes, or by some supernatural interposition
(like the confusion of tongues at Babel), the record of
which has not been preserved, fit and dispose it to receive
the care and protection of the other.  It is not for man,
indeed, to interpret the purposes of Divine Providence
and to shape his conduct with a view to their fulfillment.
It is a good distinction which the theologians make between the Revealed Will of God and the will of His
good pleasure;   the former designed to train us to obedience, the latter to form us to habits of submission and
adoration.  I can not, therefore agree with those who
rest the right to hold Africans in bondage on the ground
of the prophecy that Canaan should be the servant of
Shem   and Japhet; any more than those who rest the
right of dominion on the superiority of the white race,
The dictates of natural justice, the precepts of Revelation, are the rule of human conduct; if we follow
this rule, we work with our Maker, if we deviate from
it, we work against Him; and it is His prerogative to
direct all human actions, whether just or unjust, whether
peaceful or violent to the accomplishment of His own
designs.  But when le has been graciously pleased to
unfold, in some measure, His design, in order that we
* Recte distinguunt Theologi voluntatem Dei, in voluntatem signi,
et voluntatem beneplaciti; ac voluntatem signi appellant priscepta
et prohibitiones, quibus Deus signifieat quid a nobis agi, vel non agi
velit. Volultatem beneplaciti nominant earn, qua Deus vult absolute aliquid fieri, quse semper impletur, et quam nulla vis externa
impedire potest.-Bellar. Contro. Chris., vol. iii., p. 987.




THE PERPETUITY OF SLAVERY.          225
may see its fulfillment, and be the more convinced that
the world and all its affairs are under His government;
when we see that in fact He has overruled the violence
of the wicked, and is using the willing cooperation of
the righteous, for the fulfillment of His own prediction
that Ham should be the servant of Japhet; we may assume, I think, when justly devolved on us, the charge
and custody of the African, and exact from him that
reasonable service with which he is justly bound to requite our care, in the humble, reverent, and grateful
conviction-forced upon us by irresistible facts-that in
so doing we are working together with God for the accomplishment of His wise purposes.
10*




CHAPTER XV.
RENDITION OF FU GITIVE SLAVES.
THE Constitution of the United States provides, that
persons held to service in one State, and escaping into
another, shall not be liberated in virtue of any laws or
regulations in the State to which they have fled, but
shall be restored to the person from whose service they
have escaped; and the Congress of the United States
have enacted two laws declarative of this requirement of
the Constitution, and designed to give it effect. These
laws are commonly known as the Fugitive Slave Laws.
Now, the constitutional provision, as compared with
the "higher law," or the law of Nature, must be either
just or unjust. If just, the laws founded on it may be
nevertheless unjust, through a failure to carry out its
intent; but if unjust, the laws which declare and give
effect to it must of necessity be unjust laws.  Before
we consider, therefore, the moral quality of these laws,
it is obviously proper to examine the constitutional provision on which they are founded, and compare it with
the law of Nature, in order to ascertain its justice or
injustice, according to the standard of this law.




RENDITION OF FUGITIVE SLAVES.        227
The dictates of natural law, by which I propose to
test the constitutional provision, are those principles of
utliversal justice which are assumed as the basis of the
Justinian Code, and indeed of all legal and distributive
justice. They are these three: honeste vivere, alterum
non icedere, suumn cuique tribuere; to live honestly,
not to hurt any man, and to give every one that which is
his due.  If the constitutional provision is agreeable to
these principles of eternal and immutable law, it is just;
if contrary to them, it is unjust.
The words of the Constitution are:  No person held
to service or labor in one State, under the laws thereof,
escaping into another, shall, in consequence of any law
or regulation therein, be discharged from such service or
labor, but shall be delivered up on claim of the party to
whom such service or labor may be due."
Now, it is not to be denied that a person may be held
to service or labor unjustly. He may have done nothing,
either expressly or by implication, to forfeit his natural
liberty, have been seized by violence, and be held to service without color of law, and by the mere arbitrary and
tyrannical will of the individuals who seized him.  The
man who kidnaps another, and holds him to labor by
force and against his natural right, violates all three of
the principles of universal justice; and had the Constitution sustained a claim which had no other foundation
than lawless might, it had been flagrantly unjust.  But
the Constitution gives no countenance to acts of private




228       RENDITION OF FUGITIVE SLAVES.
and lawless violence. Its words are not, " No person
held to service or labor,' but, " No person held to service or labor in one State under THE LAWS thereof."
The case provided for, therefore, is that of a person
held to service or labor UNDER THE LAWS of one State,
and escaping into another; and the provision is that the
fugitive shall not, in consequence of any law or regulation in the latter State, be discharged from such service
or labor, but shall be delivered up on the claim of the
party to which such service is.due.  Is this provision
unjust in such sense as to contradict the principles of
universal justice above defined?  Undoubtedly it is, if
the laws of the State, under which the fugitive is held
to service, are themselves unjust. Does the Constitution,
then, in providing for the satisfaction of claims to service
in any one of the United States, assume that the laws
under which the service is held are just and agreeable to
the law of Nature, or unjust and contrary to this law?
Or does it observe a profound silence and a strict neutrality on the question?
It is, indeed, an acknowledged and well understood
principle, that each one of the United States is responsible for its own laws, and that the Constitution does not
transfer this responsibility to the Federal Government,
but leaves it as it found it, in the several States to which
it properly belongs. And hence, it is argued in general,
that the United States are in no degree responsible for
the laws of the several States; and in particular that




RENDITION OF FUGITIVE SLAVES.        229
the laws under which persons are held to service in any
one State, belong to that State exclusively, and in such
sense, as that neither the Federal Government nor any
other State is at all responsible for them.
But this principle, sound and highly important as it
is in its legitimate application, can not2 I think, be admitted without one limitation; a limitation which is assumed in the fundamental laws of every nation under
heaven, and which the Preamble of the Constitution of
the United States expresses in words:' We, the People
of the-United States, in order to form a more perfect
union, establish justice, insure domestic tranquillity, provide for the common defense, promote the general welfare; and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and
our posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution
for the United States of America."  One end of the
Constitution, therefore, is to ESTABLISH JUSTICE; not
justice according to the laws of ancient Rome, or modern
England; not justice according to any human code, but
universal justice; or justice according to that eternal
and immutable LAW OF NATURE, which requires us to
live honestly, to hurt no man, and to render to every one
his due. This universal justice, the breath and inspiration of the Almighty, when it lives in the habits and
acts of a people, is the life and soul of which domestic
tranquillity, the general welfare, and the blessings of
liberty are but various forms and manifestations. And
the very end and design of the Constitution is, not




230       RENDITION OF FUGITIVE SLAVES.
merely' to form a more perfect union," but to form a
union and to establish justice; or to form a union which
would be cemented by the bonds of universal justice;
and the end proposed of necessity limits the means for its
attainment, and must be kept in view in order to a just
appreciation of those means.
When, therefore, the Constitution recognizes the laws
of any one State, and provides that claims to service or
labor under those laws shall not be reversed in any
other State, it manifestly supposes that the laws so recognized and provided for are not repugnant to the dictates of universal justice.  For the supposition is not to
be endured that men designing to establish justice, insure
domestic tranquillity, promote public good, and secure
the blessings of liberty, should seek to accomplish this
end by providing for the operation and guarding against
the obstruction of laws or of rights and claims accruing
under them, which are repugnant to natural justice, and
consequently to the other above enumerated blessings
which are inseparable from it.
It seems, therefore, necessary to believe that the case
provided for in the Constitution is not that of persons held
to service by arbitrary will, in opposition to law, nor of
persons held to service under laws which are themselves
contrary to universal justice; but it is the case of persons held to service under laws which are not contrary
to universal justice.  In effect, the case provided for is
that of persons held to service JUSTLY; that is to say,




RENDITION OF FUGITIVE SLAVES.         231
in virtue of some relation which the law of Nature has
established, or of some contract, express or implied, which
the law of Nature binds them to fulfill.
Let us look, now, at the provision itself, which consists of two parts-the one negative, the other affirmative.
The negative part of the provision is, that the person
held to service or labor in one State, under the laws
thereof, and escaping into another, " shall not, in consequence of any law or regulation therein, be discharged
from such service or labor."
In this clause, it is supposed that laws and regulations
may exist in the State into which the fugitive has fled,
which are in conflict with the laws of the State from
which he has escaped; and it may be objected that if the
laws under which a person is held to service in one
State are just, then the laws which would work his discharge from service in another State must be unjust;
and that consequently the Constitution, by recognizing
the laws of both States, does not in truth concern itself
with the justice of either, but merely aims to harmonize
the operations of both, for the sole purpose of a union of
the States, without regard to the justice or injustice of
their respective laws.
The objection is specious; and I am the more desirous
to fix attention on it, because the answer to it will put
in a clearer light the point which I am endeavoring to
establish.




232       RENDITION OF FUGITIVE SLAVES.
I remark, then, that the objection rests on a confusion
between universal justice, and legal justice; and vanishes the moment that this distinction is apprehended.
Actions which are enjoined on us by the law of Nature, or by those principles of this law which I have
assumed as sufficient for the present inquiry, are intrinsically and universally just; and the rectitude which
consists in an exact conformity to this law or to these
principles, is called universal justice.  On the other
hand, actions which are defective in this kind of justice,
or contrary to that law which requires it, are in such
sense unjust as to be base and dishonest, immoral and
impious.
Now, it is evident that between the rectitude which
the law of Nature enjoins, and the wickedness which it
forbids, are a great number of things which are neither
commanded nor forbidden; and which for this reason are
said to be adtafopa, or indifferent.  And these indifferent things are the proper matter of human laws, because
they are things in which the Divine law leaves us at
liberty; which, if commanded or forbidden at all, are
commanded or forbidden only by human laws; and
which, when commanded or forbidden, we are directly
obliged to do, or refrain from doing, in virtue of human
laws. Every State or Commonwealth commands some
things of this indifferent nature to be done, and forbids
others, with a view only to present expediency, and on its
own mere autlority. And the justice that is agreeable to




RENDITION OF FUGITIVE SLAVES.          233
these human laws, which command or forbid things that
are neither good nor evil, but are simply indifferent, and
are commanded or forbidden by the State alone, and that
not for their intrinsic rectitude or turpitude, but merely
with a view to present expediency: I say, the justice which
consists in conformity to these human laws, is that which
is denominated legal justice.
These things premised, the answer to the objection is
obvious. For the laws of the several States may be, and
sometimes are, in conflict with one another in respect to
matters of legal justice.  Of these conflicts the Constitution is tolerant, and leaves them to be adjusted by the
tribunals which it has created for the purpose.  A position manifestly consistent with the point I am endeavoring to establish; which is, that the Constitution neither
recognizes nor tolerates, but utterly abhors, all laws that
are repugnant to universal justice; or, in other words,
which decree things that are base and dishonest, or in
any way contrary to the eternal and immutable law of
Nature.
To apply the general proposition to the case under
consideration. A person is held to service, for example,
under the laws of South Carolina.  Now what I affirmn
is, that the laws of South Carolina, under which this
person is held to service, are not, in the eye of the Constitution, repugnant to the law of Nature or the principles of universal justice, because the Constitution itself
is founded upon this law or upon these principles.  The




234       RENDITION OF FUGITIVE SLAVES.
person so held to service in South Carolina, escaping
into Massachusetts, might, we will suppose, unless the
Constitution had interfered to prevent it, by the laws and
regulations of this latter State, be discharged from such
service.  Why?  Because the laws and regulations of
Massachusetts contradict the laws of South Carolina in
a matter of universal justice?  No; but because they
are at variance with them in a matter of legal justice;
in other words, because Massachusetts, acting within the
limits allowed by the law of Nature, has enacted sundry
laws and regulations for the good of her Commonwealth,
which laws and regulations South Carolina, keeping
equally within the same limits, and availing herself of
the same liberty which the law of Nature allows, has
not seen fit to adopt, as not deeming them conducive to
the welfare of her State.  The Constitution tolerates
both laws, because both are consistent with universal
justice, and differ only in respect to matters of legal
justice; or such matters as are undetermined by the law
of Nature, and may be ruled, one way or the other, by
every State, with a view to its own notions of the public
good.
Let us turn now to the affirmative part of the proposition, which is, that said fugitives from service " shall
be delivered up on claim of the party to whom such service or labor may be DUE."   Due by what law?  By
the laws of the State, from which the person held to
service has escaped?  Certainly; this is the natural




RENDITION OF FUGITIVE SLAVES.         235
implication of the word, taken in connection with the rest
of the sentence.  Due by these laws only?  Yes, if by
the word only you mean to exclude the laws of the State
or States into which the person held to service may have
fled; but, No, if by the word only you mean to exclude
the law of Nature or the principles of universal justice.
Such a construction is abhorrent to reason, abhorrent to the
spirit of the Constitution and to the circumstances under
which it was created.. For, suppose words to this effect
had been inserted, and that instead of' To whom such service or labor may be due," the clause were to read thus:
" To whom such service or labor, though not morally
due, may be legally due, under the laws, namely, of the
State to which the claimant belongs."  Who can fail to
see that such an avowal would have been an insult to the
State in behalf of whose laws the provision was made,
by imputing to them injustice, and also a virtual confession, on the part of the framers of the Constitution, that
they themselves were willing to connive at injustice, to
be accessories to it and copartners in it, in derogation of
their own character, and in direct contradiction to their
own solemn declaration, that they ordained the Constitution in order to " ESTABLISH JUSTICE."   And if the
clause can not bear the expression of such an intent,
but repels it as an abomination, it is no less intolerant
of the inyplication. Whence I argue that the service or
labor, which is said in the affirmative clause of the provision to be  due" to the claimant, is assumed by the




286       RENDITION OF FUGITIVE SLAVES.
Constitution to be due to him, not only under the laws
of his own State, but also under the law of Nature;
that is to say, in virtue of those principles of universal
justice which bind men to live honestly, to do no wrong
to others, to be faithful to their compacts, and to fulfill
all their moral obligations.
I shall be told, probably, that there are other ways to
get at the meaning of the Constitution, besides an examination of its language; that the opinions of the framers
were adverse to slavery on moral Ngrounds; that the Supreme Court has ruled slavery to be the creature of
local law; and that these facts show that the provision
of the Constitution for restoring to the claimant, outside
of his own State, the service which is due to him under
its laws, was made merely for the union of the States, and
without regard to the essential justice or injustice of his
claim.
Now, if this were indeed the case; if the framers of
the Constitution made the provision under consideration
merely with a view to the prosperity of the United
States, and without regard to the principles of universal
justice, how came they to be so fastidious in their language?  Why so careful to eschew the words slave and
slavery?  If they had regard only to the public convenience, and not also to justice and moral rectitude, they might
have provided, in plain words, for the recovery of slaves
owned in one State, and escaping into another.  Their
studied avoidance of these words, and their guarded ex



RENDITION OF FUGITIVE SLAVES.         237
pression, held to service under the laws, are proofs, to
my mind, that they had a sacred regard for justice, and
were resolved not to promote the public good in opposition to its dictates.
But to come closer to the objection, I submit: 1.
That the opinions of the framers, as gathered outside of
the Constitution, are of no weight in determining its
meaning, unless they meet the precise point for which
they are adduced; and, 2. That even if they meet the
precise point, they ought not to conclude, in opposition
to the expressed design of the Constitution itself.
1. That the framers of the Constitution regarded
slavery as morally wrong, if admitted, proves nothing to
the purpose. For there are manifold forms of slavery,
some confessedly unjust, and others indisputably just;
and therefore the opinions referred to are not to the
point, unless it can be shown that they were adverse to
that particular form of slavery which consists in being
held to service under the laws of one of the United
States. That the framers of the Constitution condemned
as unjust the slavery of ancient Rome, or of the West
Indies, or even of the British Colonies before their independence, is no proof that they regarded, as unjust, a
service regulated by the laws of any State that was embraced in the Federal Union.
2. But next let us suppose, for argument's sake, that
the framers of the Constitution did hold this opinion;
in other words, did regard as morally unjust that legal




238       RENDITION OF FUGITIVE SLAVES.
servitude which was then existing, and which still exists
in some of the United States; still I should say that we
are not to be guided by this opinion in construing the
provision under consideration, but that we are to gather
the meaning of the provision from its own words, as compared with the declared intent of the Constitution itself.
For as the result of the deliberative body can not be at
all inferred from the opinions of some few of its members, seeing these may have been overruled by the rest;
so neither can it be inferred with certainty, from the
opinions of all expressed individually on othl;er occasions,
and in other ways.  For the magnitude of the occasion,
iand the profound consciousness of the unspeakable responsibility devolved on them, may have raised them
above themselves, above the age in which they lived, and
restrained them from doing collectively, what they may
have been willing to do severally; and the providence
of Almighty God, watching over the foundations of a
mighty empire, may have guarded them from the fatal
consequences of their own errors, and guided them, by
a Divine but sacred influence, to other decisions than
those which were the mere fruit of human wisdom.  It
is the result by which we are bound, and not the process
by which it was attained. Be it supposed, then (though
I believe the supposition to be false), that the framers
of the Constitution considered legal servitude, in all its
forms, to be morally?unjust; be it admitted, also, though
I do not believe it to be true, th  ththey were willing to




RENDITION OF FUGITIVE SLAVES.          239
connive at a gigantic injustice for the sake of profit or
lucre, still the Constitution itself is paramount, and its
distinct recognition of legal servitude in the several
States in which it exists, its express provision for satisfying the claims of those who, under the laws of these
States, had a right to the service or labor of others, when
viewed in the light of its own avowed declaration, that
it was ordained to ESTABLISH JUSTICE, oblige me to believe that this same legal servitude, the rights of which
are thus scrupulously guarded, is, in the eye of the Constitution itself, morally right and just.
The further objection, namely, that judicial decisions,
interpretative of the Constitution, represent slavery as
existing in virtue of local and positive law, does not, as
already intimated, touch the point for which I am contending. For I suppose, and have endeavored to prove
in the previous chapters of this work, that the right to
service or labor in the slaveholding States, is a right
founded on the principles of universal justice, and one
which the laws of those States are designed to-declare
and protect; just as the right to the service or labor of
apprentices in the non-slaveholding States is a right
founded on the principles of universal justice, and one
which the laws of these States are designed to declare
and protect.  To meet the point, therefore, it must be
shown, not only that the Constitution regards the right
to service in the slaveholding States as upheld by local
and positive law, but also that it regards this right to




240       RENDITION OF FUGITIVE SLAVES.
service as upheld by local and positive law in opposition
to universal and natural law; and this is what the people understand, when they hear statesmen and judges
proclaim that slavery is the creature of local and positive
law.
Now, I am bold to affirm that the Supreme Court of
the United States has never adjudged or declared that
the right to service or labor under the Constitution is
subject to this limitation. It could not do so, without
proclaiming to the world that the right to the service of
apprentices, and of all other persons bound to labor, is
upheld in the United States by might and violence, in
opposition to right and justice.  The Supreme Court
may not have declared that the right to service is founded in natural and universal justice; nor is it called upon
to make this declaration, because its proper function is,
not to expound and administer the law of Nature universally, but to dispense justice under the Constitution and
laws of the United Sates.   But, on the other hand,
to declare that the right to service under the laws of any
one of the United States, is contrary to universal justice,
would be not only to transcend its proper functions as a
minister of the Constitution, but it would be also to open
the way for revolution and anarchy; because it would be
an admission, or rather, a proclamation to the people of
the United States, that the fundamental laws of their
nation are repugnant to the laws of God and Nature.
What the Supreme Court maty do in future, the future




RENDITION OF FUGITIVE SLAVES.       241
only can reveal; but thus far it has been conservative,
and not destructive of the government from which it
imnmediately derives its powers; and has never even
insinuated (would to God the same could be said of all
the senators of the United States, as well as the judges
of the Supreme Court!) the existence of a conflict, or of
the least disagreement between the Constitution and laws
which they are appointed and sworn to administer, and
the " higher law" of Him'i through whom kings reign,
and princes decree justice."
So far has the Supreme Court been from evincing any
such want of fealty to its sacred trust, that it has said all
that it. well could say within its appropriate sphere, to
show that the right of service guarantied by the Constitution to the several States is a natural and universal
right, a right created by the law of Nature: in the same
sense as are all rights growing out of just and honest
contracts, the fulfillment of which is a prime dictate of
Nature.  "The owner of the fugitive," says Chief-Justice Story, " has the same right to seize and take him in
a State to which he has fled, that he had in the State
from which he escaped; and this right to seize and recapture is universally acknowledged in the slaveholding
States. It is no more than an affirmance of the principles of the Common Law applicable to the subject. The
Court have no hesitation in holding that, under and in
virtue of the Constitution, the owner of the slave is
clothed with authority in every State of the Union to re1l




242       RENDITION OF FUGITIVE SLAVES.
c-pture his slave wherever he can do it without breach
of the peace or illegal violence." x  -t; The Constitution declares that the fugitive shall be delivered up'on claim of the party to whom service or labor may be due.'
A claim, in a just juridicial sense, is a demand of some
matter as of right made by one person on another to do,
or forbear to do some act or thing as a matter of duty.'7
Again:' The clause in the Constitution of the United
States relating to fugitives, manifestly contemplates the
existence of a positive unqualified right on the part of
the owner of the slave, which no State law or regulation
can in any way qualify, regulate, control, or restrain.
Any State law, or regulation, which interrupts, limits,
delays, or postpones the rights of the owner to the immediate command of his service, or labor, operates pro talto
a discharge of the slave therefrom.  The question can
never be how much he is discharged therefrom, but
whether he is discharged from any by the natural or
necessary operation of the State laws or regulations.
The question is one, not of quantity or degree, but of
withholding or controlling the incidents of a positive
right."  And once more: -The right to seize and
retake fugitive slaves, and the duty to deliver them up,
in whatever State of the Union they may be found, is
under the Constitution recognized as an absolute, positive
right and duty, pervading the whole Union with an equal
and supreme force, uncontrolled and uncontrollable by
State sovereignty or legislation.  The right and duty
C                1 )




RENDITION OF FUGITIVE SLAVES.        243
are coextensive and uniform in remedy and operation
throughout the whole Union. The owner has the same
security, and the same remedial justice, and the same
exemption from State regulations and control, through
however many States he may pass, with the fugitive slaves
in his possession, in transitu to his domicil."  What
more the Court could have said, without overstepping its
proper bounds, to show that the right to service or labor,
recognized by the Constitution, is morally as well as
leyally just, I am at a loss to conceive.
In the opinion that local law, when said to be the
foundation of slavery, means the law of one place or
country, as distinguished from other places or countries,
and not as distinguished from the law of Nature, I am
confirmed by the fact, that the same doctrine, viz., that
slavery is the creature of local law, is held by the courts
of those States in which slavery is regarded, not as a
foreign, but as a domestic institution.  Many cases
have occurred in the courts of our Southern States, in
which this doctrine has been avowed. In one, a case of
more than usual interest, a suit was brought for the freedom of a mulatto girl, who had been bequeathed to a
certain person, on condition that she should be freed on
attaining her thirtieth year. The case turned on the
construction of the will; and in the lower court it was
decided against the slave, but on appeal to a higher
court, the case was sent back for a new trial; not on the
ground of an erroneous construction of the will, but on




244       RENDITION OF FUGITIVE SLAVES.
account of certain facts which had been incidentally
proved. These facts were, that the slave had resided with
the person to whom she was bequeathed for a number
of years in France, by the laws of which country slavery
can not be supported.  The Court put their ruling upon
the ground, that the relation of master and slave could
only subsist by virtue of local law, and that as soon as
slaves were voluntarily taken by their masters to a
country whose laws did not support slavery, they were
free; that there was always a presumption in favor of
freedom; and that this was so strong, that the Court
even went beyond the facts forming the essential part of
the record. Now, is it to be supposed that the Southern
Courts, in decisions like these, meant to convict the laws
of their own States of injustice and hostility to the law
of Nature?   This were indeed a violent inference.  The
natural, if not necessary, inference is, that by local law,
they meant the law of their own State, as distinguished from
the law of other countries; and by presuming in favor of
freedom, they meant to affirm the superior advantage and
blessing of freedom, as compared with that limited and
regulated slavery which their laws allow; both, however,
being assumed to be consonant to Natural law or justice.
If, indeed, the Constitution mean less than this; if it
guaranties to the Southern claimant the recovery of a
debt of service which is only legally, and not morally,
due, then, though I would not sanction the violent language of the abolitionists, yet I should be constrained to




RENDITION OF FUGITIVE SLAVES.         245
confess that the constitution has falsified its own profession
of justice; and that George Washington, Hamilton, and
Madison, Rufus King, Roger Sherman, and Benjamin
Franklin, in their laudable effort to found a union of the
States in justice, and to secure for themselves and their
posterity the blessings of that liberty which is inseparable
friom justice, had signally and disastrously failed.
Assuming, however, what I have endeavored to prove,
that slavery in our Southern States is founded in an implied contract; that, in virtue of this contract, the service or labor of the slave is a debt honestly due to the
master; and that the Constitution provides for the
recovery of this debt in States other than that to which
the claimant belongs, I now proceed to consider the
moral force of those laws which have been passed by
Congress to give effect to this constitutional provision.
The Act of 1793 declares that, when a person held to
labor or service in any of the United States, t * under
the laws thereof, shall escape into any other of the said
States, the person to whom such labor or service may be
due, - t is hereby empowered to seize or arrest such
fugitive, and take him  before any judge of Circuit or
District Court of the United States, residing or being in
the State, t; and on proof to satisfaction of such
judge   - t t that the person so seized doth, under the
laws of the State from which he or she fled, owe service
or labor to the person claiming him, it shall be the dui-y
of such judge to give a certificate thereof to such claim



246        RENDITION OF FUGITIVE SLAVES.
ant, which shall be sufficient warrant for removing the
said fugitive from labor to the State from which he or
she fled.
It further enacts that any person who shall knowingly
or willingly obstruct or hinder such claimant in so seizing or arresting such fugitive from labor, or shall rescue
him  such fugitive from  such claimant, - * shall for
either of said offenses be subject to a fine of five hundred dollars.
The Act of 1850, which supersedes the former and is
substantially the same, differing from it in several provisions designed to make the recovery more prompt and
certain, fixes the penalty at one thousand dollars, and
imprisonment not exceeding six months.
It appears, then, that these laws, carrying out the
letter and spirit of the Constitution, assume that the
service or labor of the fugitive is due to the lawful
claimant, and that the fugitive has escaped in order to
avoid the payment of a lawful debt; that they empower
the claimant, in order to the recovery of the debt, to seize
or arrest the fugitive; that they forbid all persons to hinder or obstruct the claimant in making the seizure or arrest, to rescue the fugitive after his arrest, or to harbor or
conceal him knowing him to be a, fugitive from labor;
and that they subject to fine and imprisonment every
person who shall be convicted of obstructing the claimant,
in any of the above ways, in the recovery of his claim.
It is next to impossible for any law to be so framed as




RENDITION OF FUGITIVE SLAVES.         247
to work exact and impartial justice in every case to
which it may be applied. Be the laws ever so good, we
shall sometimes need the rules of equity to remedy the
defects and inconveniencies of legal justice.  The laws
under consideralion are, from their very nature, peculiarly liable to this imperfection; and I doubt not that
cases may arise under them, in which the fugitive is
equitably entitled to that succor and sympathy which the
law awards to the claimant. But the Constitution, I believe, and the laws founded on it, abhor injustice, and
are conceived in the spirit of comprehensive benevolence;
and before we consider the exceptional cases referred to,
it may be well to look at the laws in their general
bearing.
It must, I think, be admitted as a general rule, that
the claimant has done nothing, and intends to do nothing
to vitiate the virtual contract which gives him a just
claim to the service or labor of the fugitive; that he has
not treated him with merciless rigor or in any way abused
his person, and that he does not intend to do so. This
is evidently the supposition of the law which was not intended to work cruelty and abuse, but simply to compel
the fugitive to render to his master the service or labor
which he owes him; and we must surrender all faith in
human nature unless we admit the supposition, as a general rule, to be reasonable and just.
Now, on this supposition it is to be observed that the
law obliges us to no duty to which we were not obliged




248       RENDITION OF FUGITIVE SLAVES.
before its enactment.  It is not the tyrant that the law
sets before us, seeking to wreak his cruelty on the victim of his absolute power, but it is simply one man seeking to recover, in a lawful way, a debt of reasonable
service from another.  For the claimant, by the supposition, has fed and clothed his servant in infancy when the
servant was unable to work, and the service which he
claims is justly his due.  We are, therefore, obliged by
the principles of universal justice, to put no obstruction
in the way of the claimant in any suitable and reasonable efforts which he may make to recover his debt; not
to rescue the fugitive in case he is taken by the claimant, nor to harbor or conceal him.  This is simple justice, and the law does but induce a new obligation on us
to refrain from doing that which we were obliged to refrain from  doing before its enactment.  As a general
rule, therefore, it seems clear that the requirements of
natural justice, enhanced in their obligation by the laws
of our country, forbid us to interfere between the lawful
claimant and the person whose service he claims. In all
ordinary cases, even if our sympathies are with the
fugitive (who, for ought we know to the contrary, may
be les deserving of them than the claimant), it does not
appear that we can justly do more in his favor than see
that the checks which the laws have interposed against
an unjust claim be faithfully observed.
But suppose the fugitive, whether man or woman, to
be flying from the claimant in fear of cruel treatment or




RENDITION OF FUGITIVE SLAVES.         249
abuse, and that the claimant aims to recover in order to
inflict on him  or her such cruel treatment or abuse.
This I regard as an exceptional case; but on the supposition that it occurs, I admit that the fugitive has, on
the principles of natural justice, the right to run away;
and that, if we know or believe, on reasonable grounds,
the facts that make it exceptional, we have the same
natural right to further his escape. Nor does Divine
Revelation, the best exponent of natural justice, contradict this opinion; for the precepts of the apostles and
the canons of the Ancient Church, which command servants to obey their masters, and forbid them to decline
their service, are geieral rules, and not framed with a
view to such extreme and exceptional cases as may possibly arise.
But that we have the same liberty in view of the new
and additional obligation induced on us by the laws of
our country, is not so clear. For the law of the land
has made specific provision against the injustice and
cruelty which we apprehend; it has recognized the tribunals of the State to which the claimant belongs as
vested with legitimate authority to restrain his power
and to guard the rights of the fugitive; and though we
may think this provision insufficient for the exigencies of
the case, yet the law is paramount, and our judgment
ought to yield to its direction.  The case, indeed, must
be extremely aggravated, and the proofs of its aggravation indubitably certain, before we should be justified, in,
11 




250       RENDITION OF FUGITIVE SLAVES.
foro conscientie, in deviating from the course which
the law prescribes; and even then our justification would
be found in the fact that we had neither defied the authority of the law nor rashly braved its penalties; but
that,. in the exercise of a sound discretion, we had acted
in the spirit of the law, though in disregard of its letter,
in a case for which it had failed to provide; and were,
therefore, entitled, in reason and equity, to be regarded
as exempt from its operation.
From what has been said, may easily be inferred the
sentiments I entertain of the conduct of those persons
at the North who encourage the slaves at the South to
run away from their masters;. who secretly harbor them,
and furnish them with money to facilitate their escape,
and who, from these and the like stealthy arts, are commonly known as " agents of the underground railroad."
That these persons violate the law of the land, is, in my
judgment, the least part of their guilt. I believe them
to be not only legally but morally delinquent, instigators and abettors, directly, of fraud, and theft, and indirectly, and by consequence, of rapine and murder; fomenters of discontent and sedition; and I consider the
credit accorded to them for philanthropy and manhood,
to be the evidence of a perverted moral sentiment, and
diseased state of the public mind.  However, I am
willing to look at the subject from their own point of
view; and to inquire, inasmuch as they profess to be
reasonable men and Christians, what conduct reason and




RENDITION OF FUGITIVE SLAVES.          251
religion demand of them in reference to the execution of
the Fugitive Slave Law, on the supposition that their
theory of slavery is correct.
Now, in the first place, it does seem to me that reason and common sense should teach them not to make
for themselves a case which the law does not make.
They have read, perhaps, in Rees' Cyclopedia. or in
some other book of less repute, that a slave is " a person
in the absolute power of a master with regard to his life,
liberty, and fortune;":  or they have learned, perhaps,
at third or fourth hand, from the worthy Dr. Paley,
that " slavery is an obligation to labor for the benefit of
the master, without the contract or consent of the servant;" and, under the influence of this foreign notion,
they denounce the laws of their country, and seek to
obstruct their execution, as if, forsooth, these laws were
designed to uphold absolute power, and to wring labor
from an oppressed and innocent people, without allowing
them an equivalent in return! But this is a case of
their own making; the laws of their country do not
touch it in name or thing.    They do not contain the
words slave or slavery, and they do not relate to the
thing which Rees and Paley, and other English authors,
with their American imitators, express by these words.
* See the article "Slavery," in Rees, which appears to have been
contributed by Clarkson, and is one of a hundred instances of the way
in which the emissaries of new sects zealously avail themselves of the
facility, or perhaps the venality of the editors of popular works to influence the public mind.




252       RENDITION OF FUG[TIVE SLAVES.
Dr. Paley's " slavery," as he himself explains, is limited
to those who become " slaves," 1, from crime, 2, from
captivity, and 3, from debt.
Slaves from debt are unknown in this country; and
the others iwe do not call slaves, but crimintls and prisoners; and their rendition, in case they escape from
their appointed guardians, is provided for in other parts
of the United States Constitution and laws than those
now under consideration. And it is enough to move an
honest man's indignation to see Dr. Wayland and others
far less respectable than Dr. Wayland, apply Paley's
definition to Southern laborers, who, as they know, are
neither criminals, nor captives, nor prisoners; and then,
talking advantage of their own deception, stir up the passions of the Northern people against the laws of the
Union, as if they were designed to rivet the chains of
the miserable, and not, as is the simple truth, to compel
delinquent servants to pay an honest debt of labor.
Let men refuse to be duped any longer by the jugglery of words, and see for themselves the just and humane
intent of the law; and if they do not mildly and firmly
cooperate with it, they will at least abstain from officiously putting obstacles in the way of its legitimate
execution.
But to come nearer to the point. These men, we will
suppose, honestly believe that the claimant has only a
legal, and no moral, right to the service of the fugitive;
that the fugitive has never, by any act of his own,




RENDITION OF FUGITIVE SLAVES.         253
express or implied, parted with his natural right to the
use of his liberty, but still retains this right; and that
the law which commands the fugitive to be restored to
the claimant is tnjust, as compared with the principles of
universal justice or the law of Nature. This, our opponents may say, whether it be right or wrong, is our
honest conviction; and, as you promised to look at the
matter from our point of view, we should like to know
what course, in reference to this law, you think that
we, as reasonable men and Christians, are bound to
pursue?
To these persons I answer that, if the law required
them to assist, or be in any wise actively instrumental,
in the recovery and restoration of the fugitive, they
would not, in my opinion, with their present views of
the subject, be bound to comply with it in these particulars and to this extent.  In a case like this they are
not, in my opinion, obliged by their Christian profession
to render an active obedience to the laws of their country; but they are to refuse, firmly and respectfully, to
have any agency in carrying them out, submitting themselves, at the same time, cheerfully and patiently to their
penalties.  This is the course which the Apostles themselves, and all good Christians after their example, have
pursued when the law of the land has commanded that
which the law of God has forbidden; they have resolutely obeyed the Divine law, and endured the penalty of
the human.   Nor is this merely the command of Rev



254        RENDITION OF FUGITIVE SLAVES.
elation, but the dictate also of Nature and right reason;
as we learn from  the heathen Socrates, who refused to
accede to the entreaties of his friends, that he would
escape out of prison, and resolutely preferred to suffer
the death which his judges had decreed.
This view of the case applies, indeed, to those who
hold office under the Federal Government, and who are
required by their official duty to side with the claimant,
and assist him in the recovery of the fugitive.   Such
persons, if they can not with a good conscience enforce
the law, and deliver up the fugitive to the claimant, are
obliged, I think, to refuse to do so; and either to abide
the consequences of their refusal, or avoid them by the
resignation of their office.  But the law   under consideration gives no private citizen the opportunity to
become a martyr if he would. For it requires of him
no active obedience whatever for the recovery of the
fugitive;' its requirements for this purpose are negative;
it requires him to put no obstruction in the way of the
claimant, not to harbor or conceal the fugitive, but simply to let both parties alone. I confess myself utterly
at a loss to conceive on what grounds of reason or religion any man, who acknowledges himself bound to obey
the laws of his country, in all cases in which they do not
contradict the law of God, should refuse to obey his
~ True, in case attempts are made to thwart the law, its agents
may call in the aid of the posse conitatus; not, however, to recover the
fugitive, but to restrain those who factiously aim to defeat the law.




RENDITION OF FUGITIVE SLAVES.        255
country, when she merely commands him to do nothing;
when she requires him only not to interfere between two
disputants, and asserts her own right to settle the dispute
in her own way.
On the whole, then, it seems to me that, as reason and
common sense should teach men not to conjure up to
their fancy a grievance which the law does not impose;
so reason and religion should teach those who are conscientiously opposed to this law to remember, that their
country has a conscience as well as they; and that, however they may think themselves right, and their country
wrong, yet since she requires them to do nothing contrary to their conscience, they should at least forbear to
do anything contrary to her conscience.




CHAPTER XVI.
THE AFRICAN       SLAVE-TRADE.
THAT was a sage piece of advice which Phaeton gave
to the youthful Icarus when, having adjusted to his body
his wings cemented with wax, he essayed to fly over the
IZEgean Sea-Medio tutissimus ibis. The middle course
is your safest. If you soar too high, the sun will melt
the wax, and, losing your wings, you will fall headlong
into the sea; if you keep too near the earth, the cold
will stiffen the wax, and, unable to use your wings, you
will be tossed about, the sport of the winds. If you
would fly with safety, use your wings in the element
that Nature provided for them, and take care neither to
rise above nor to sink below it.
To apply the vailed wisdom of the fable to the subject
before us. They who own no law but force, who proclaim with the ancient Athenians their purpose to invade
and enslave any people that in their opinion are fit to be
made slaves, who, in scorn of justice, take advantage of
the weakness of their fellow-men to use them for their
own base and selfish ends, sink beneatth the just level of
humanity, deprive themselves of the light and warmth




THE AFRICAN SLAVE-TRADE.            257
which Revelation and right reason afford, and are tossed
about in the cold regions of selfishness, the sport of
avarice and of their other turbulent appetites and passions.  They, on the other hand, who soar on high, after
the fashion of the French philosophers and the German
transcendentalists, and attempt to adjust society on their
airy abstractions of liberty and equality, are predestined
to a miserable failure: no sooner do they reach their
pure ether of bliss than suddenly the wax melts, and
they fall headlong to the earth. Witness Fourier and
Owen; witness also the Genius of Alb:on, poising herself
on high on the waxen wings of French fieedom and
Scotch philanthropy-over the island of Jamaica!
The middle course is the safest; but by a middle
course let me not be understood to mean a compromise,
or an expedient in which truth and error are mutually
conceded and accepted, in order to oppose a temporary
stay to evils, which can only be permanently abated by
removing their cause. No; if with the Roman poet I
condemn extremes, it is for the reason which he assigns;
viz., that Truth and Rectitude are only to be found between them, and can not exist in either direction beyond
them.'   For I can not agree with those who represent
madness and mischief as the excesses of truth and justice, or who, to speak in the concrete, would have us
believe that the insane schemes of the abolitionists are
* Est modus in rebus, sunt certi denique fines
Quos ultraque citlaque NEQUIT CONSISTER.E RECTUM.




258         THE AFRICAN SLAVE-TRADE.
the result of sound premises rigorously carried out to
their logical consequences. I would have men persistently
and fearlessly follow truth whithersoever it may lead
them; and when they counsel madness and mischief, I
am more apt to suspect the fallacy of their premises than
of the argument that is raised on them. Moderation is
the path of wisdom, and though men may be moderate
from indolence or habit and without the ability to develop
logically the grounds of their action or inaction, yet they
can not be extravagant without folly. All truth lies between opposite errors, all virtue between opposite vices;
but is that a reason why men can not be truthful and
virtuous, aye and follow out every principle of truth
and virtue to its farthest legitimate consequences, without becoming contaminated with error and vice? Religion, the doctrine of right reason and revelation, lies
midway between superstition and atheism; can not a
man, then, be religious, so as to think and do all that
Reason and Revelation demand, without being either
superstitious or an atheist?  Temperance lies midway
between gluttony and asceticism; can not a man be temperate without being either a glutton or an ascetic?
Prudence in our affairs is a mean between prodigality
and covetousness; does prudence then really consist in a
mixture of these vices, and is it not rather an avoidance
of both?  And so with all truth and all virtue; nor
should I have any fault to find with any class of fanatics
for carrying out their " one idea" to its legitimate con



THE AFRICAN SLAVE-TRADE.           259
sequences, provided their " one idea"7 were founded on
truth and justice.  For by no possible application of
right reason can any principle of truth and justice be
made to exceed the limits of truth and justice.
But men are governed more by passion than by reason; and hence it happens in morals, as in physics, that
one extreme leads to another.  Excessive heat prepares
the atmosphere for a storm; and when the storm has
exhausted its fury, it is succeeded by a calm proportioned to its violence.  Superstition begets Atheism, and
Atheism in its turn drives us back to superstition.  And
the passions which impel some beyond the limits of right
reason in one direction, disgust others, and impel them
beyond the same limits in the opposite direction. Hence
the licentiousness and free-thinking of one age, are a
reaction from the sanctimony and hypocrisy of the age
preceding; the intemperance of one generation drives
the next into a sort of savage austerity; and hence, to
bring this tedious proem to a close, men recoil from the
horrors of the African slave-trade to the ruthless abolition which proscribes all servitude; and again, disgusted
with the folly and insane violence of abolition, they learn
to revert with complacency and a stupefied conscience to
the meanest and most atrocious form of human iniquity.
The best way to arrest the passionate excitement
which impels men to opposite extremes, is to define distinctly, and to impress on their minds, that middle course
of truth and rectitude which reason prescribes.  For, to




260         THE AFRICAN SLAVE-TRADE.
obliterate the lines which separate any virtue from the
vices that bound it on either side, is, in effect, to blot
that virtue out of existence, and to leave the opposite
vices to struggle for alternate dominion.
And the middle course, the course of rectitude and
safety, on the subject under consideration, is one, happily, which we are not to seek.   It is made to our
hands; not proposed for our consideration and future
adoption under the sanction of great names, but already
clearly defined, and bound upon us by the highest human
and divine authority.  For, to guard effectually against
the seditious schemes of abolition on the one side, and
the reopening of the African slave-trade on the other, we
have only to adhere faithfully and resolutely to THE
CONSTITUTION AND LAWS OF OUR COUNTRY. And the
Constitution, as far as relates to the present subject, is
no compromise. From whatever extreme opinions they
who framed it may or may not have receded, there is no
mixture of truth and error in the result at which they
arrived.  There, at least, they have spoken with no
"stammering lips," no strange tongue.  The provision
of the Constitution, in regard to servitude, compromits
no principle of truth, and contains no ingredient of error.
It is a pure and unequivocal enunciation of justice and
wisdom. It meets the fact, the existing, undeniable fact,
that a numerous class of persons in our country are
bound to service; and it provides, in certain emergencies,
for coercing them into a fulfillment of their obligations




THE AFRICAN SLAVE-TRADE.          261
for delivering them up, in case they escape from one
State into another, to the parties to whom the service
may be due.  On the other hand, it gives no sanction to
lawless violence, and justifies no infraction of human
rights; but prepares the way for the National Legislature to denounce and forbid, as it has in fact denounced
and forbidden, the seizure and enslavement of men in
foreign lands, and their importation into our country.
Thus the Constitution has done for us, what, in our present state of excitement and bewilderment, we could not
do for ourselves; it has marked out for us the course of
safety and rectitude, and has guarded us from injustice
and lawless violence on the right hand and on the left.
And the Constitution, and the laws founded on it, are
the rule of the national conscience a rule so consonant
to right reason and Revelation, that they who deviate
from it, either to the right hand or to the left, are
recreant, not only to their country, but to the law of
Nature and to the law of Christ.
If the Constitution and laws of the United States
regard the limited and lawful slavery that exists in our
Southern States as a stupendous sin, upheld by absolute
power against right, and tolerated only from necessity, it
would be impossible to vindicate their consistency in protecting slavery and denouncing the slave-trade, without
denying to them that which is worth much more than consistency, the profound reverence which they profess to entertain for JUSTICE, LIBERTY, and THE RIGHTS OF MAN. For




262          THE AFRICAN SLAVE-TRADE.
slavery, on this theory of it, is as really, though not so
flagrantly, opposed to justice, liberty, and human rights,
as the slave-trade; and, on the other hand, it is quite
probable that that fancied regard for the public good
which statesmen are apt to mistake for necessity, as it has
been invoked both in Great Britain and in this country,
may at any time be invoked again in justification of the
slave-trade, as well as of domestic slavery. If the Constitution and the laws of the United States protecting
slavery in those States in which it has been established,
and at the same time prohibiting the slave-tnade, have no
deeper foundation than a baseless and temporising expediency, then they can not be sustained among a free and
high-minded people who have a paramount regard for
truth, honor, and justice: they will perish, as they deserve to perish, loathed of all good men, and disowned of
God.  For if slavery, as domesticated aimong us, be regarded as a sin tolerated and protected by the Constitution merely for the sake of the material advantages that
flow from it, what adequate security has the South that
this protection will not be withdrawn? And, on the
other hand, if the slave-trade be regarded as an evil of
the same kind, and be interdicted for no higher reasons,
what security has the North that the laws interdicting it
will not be repealed, and that they themselves will not
join in their repeal, if, by some turn of affairs, it should
seem to be for their interest to repeal them?  For it is
a law of nature that action and reaction are equal; and




THE AFRICAN SLAVE-TRADE.           263
when the furious blast of the abolition agitation shall have
spent its force, it will be but natural that it should be
followed first by the secret agitation, and next by the
open advocacy of the slave-trade. In this view of the
subject, the Constitution and laws of our common country are baseless and mutable, having no ground of permanence, no claim to reverence.  Or rather, we have no
fundamental laws, but are, as we are sometimes reproached with being, a nation void of principle, and
ready to legislate in any direction from cupidity and the
lust of dominion.  But if the Constitution and laws of
our country are really founded, as I believe them to be,
on the enduring principles of justice, liberty, and human
rights; if they protect the limited slavery that is already
established among us because it is consistent with these
principles; and if they denounce the African slave-trade
because it is a gross and wanton infraction of these principles, then indeed we may have faith in their permanence; for then the Constitution and laws of our Union
are settled on foundations more durable than the everlasting hills; and all who live under them, North and
South, East and West, may, as men, citizens, and Christians, unite as one man in their triumphant vindication
and support.
In all that I have advanced in defense of slavery, as it
is established under the laws of our Southern States, I
have regarded the slaves as men, made in the image of
their Maker; and I have insisted on man's natural right




264          THE AFRICAN SLAVE-TRADE.
to the use of his liberty, and on the injustice of depriving
him of it by violence, and without someact or acts of his
own that involve a surrender of it. From this theory of
slavery, it is manifestly impossible to draw any valid
argument in favor of the violent seizure or purchase of
native Africans with a view to their transportation, sale,
and enslavement in other countries.  The two things are
utterly unlike; the one being, as I have endeavored to
to show, a fulfillment of the laws of Nature, and the
other being, as is plainly manifest, an unmitigated violation of these laws.  And it is because of their utter dissimilarity, that the Constitution and laws of our Union
have extended the shield of protection over the one, and
fixed the ban of reprobation on the other: and for the same
reason, our Southern brethren, while approving and upholding their own social institutions, are as free, in point
of consistency, as are we at the North, to condemn the
African slave-trade; and. as much bound to do so by a
consistent regard to the sacred rights of humanity and
justice.
The wisdom  and justice of the Constitution are as
manifest, in my opinion, in regard to the slave-trade,
as in regard to the slavery which it found already established. It discriminates the two by the broadest line of
demarcation  With the origin of slavery in the several
States that had legalized it, it did not meddle; but,
accepting slavery as a fact, in the providence of God,
already established, and acknowledging the sacred obli



THE AFRICAN SLAVE-TRADE.           265
gations of mutual protection and service which it involved, it wisely and justly provided for the fulfillment
of those obligations.  But the seizure, purchase, and
importation of free persons from abroad, to be reduced
to slavery within the limits of its jurisdiction, was a
very different matter. This was confessedly an evil, a
wrong, a violation of justice.  The Constitution, consistently with its design, could not approve this injustice;
nor, in fact, does it say one word which can, by any possibility, be tortured into an approval. It recognized the
slave-trade as an existing evil, but as an evil which it
was not in the power of human government immediately
to abolish.  Justice demanded its extirpation, and wisdom counseled that, like all deeply-rooted evils, which
are only aggravated by the application of rash and ineffectual remedies, the extirpation should be gradual, in
order to be certain; and hence; with united wisdom and
justice, the Constitution makes the following provision:
"The migration or importation of such persons as any
of the States now existing shall think proper to admit,
ill not be prohibited by the Congress prior to the year
o e thousand eight hundred and eight; but a tax or duty.ay be imposed on such importation, not exceeding ten
dollars for each person."  The permission to import
slaves under the laws of any State, up to a certain time,
is an implied, indeed, but an imperative prohibition, of
such importation after that time; and on this prohibition,
12




266          THE AFRICAN SLAVE-TRADE.
contained in the Constitution, Congress has grounded its
stringent laws in respect to the slave-trade.
Thus the Constitution and the laws declarative of it,
are like a two-edged sword, which deals death to injustice and impiety on the right hand and on the left. Servitude, and the rights involved in it, when it has passed
beyond human control, and become, in the providence
of God, interwoven with the fabric of human society, are
protected from the invasion of ruthless fanatics, and the
intermeddling of pragmatical busy-bodies; while the
slave-trade, which involves no social ties, which has not a
shadow of foundation in justice, which is, in its inception,
its career and its consummation, pure and unmitigated
villainy, is proscribed, that it may be, as far as possible,
abolished and eradicated from the face of the earth.
But let us look more particularly at the laws respecting the slave-trade, and the reasons for them.
The native inhabitants of Africa are in a wild and
uncultivated state; uncivilized, unchristianized.  The
thought of waging a solemn war against any of these
ignorant tribes is preposterous. The nations of Europe
and the United States may sometimes find it necessary
to resort to severe measures, in order to compel their
observance of contracts, or to restrain them from wreaking their savage cruelty on the colonists and emigrants
who have settled on their coasts: but in this warfare. if
such it may be called, it is no part of the policy of civilized nations to make or retain prisoners, much less to




THE AFRICAN SLAVE-TRADE.           267
reduce prisoners to a state of servitude.  Their object
is to protect the colonists, or to punish  perfidious
tribes.  In the prosecution of this object, it may occasionally be necessary to capture prisoners for some temporary purpose, possibly to put them to death, in order
to strike terror into the native tribes.  Such cases, however, are comparatively rare. The capture of prisoners,
under national authority, is not the way, in fact, in which
African slavery has been originated and introduced into
Christian countries; nor is it to be supposed that any
enlightened nation of the present age would capture prisoners for the purpose of making them slaves, much less
proclaim a foreign people. however weak and ignorant,
enemies, for the sake of making them slaves.  Such a
course would be in violation of the law of Nations; that
is to say, of those principles of the law of Nature by
which Christian and civilized nations have consented to
be governed.
If the seizure of native Africans for slaves is to be
effected at all, it must be effected hereafter, as it has
been heretofore, by individuals, or associations of individuals, acting on their own responsibility, independently
of the nation or nations to which they belong, and, in
most cases, in violation of their laws.
By what possible motives can such seizure be justified? The Africans, in their own country, however
untutored and barbarous, have that right to freedom
which belongs, by nature, to all mankind. On what




268          THE AFRICAN SLAVE-TRADE.
ground of justice can an invader, whatever pretensions
he may make to Christianity and civilization, or whatever desires he may affect to have for the diffusion of
these blessings, deprive them of this right by violence?
In vain will he allege, in his justification, that the
descendants of Africans are held in slavery in Christian
countries, and under Christian laws.  This fact is in no
respect a precedent, and furnishes no shadow of excuse
for his seizure and transportation of free and native
Africans.  For, have they or their parents lived on his
bounty? Has he fed, and clothed, and sheltered them,
and reared them to man's estate? Is he bound to guard
their natural rights to life and liberty, to maintain them
in sickness and decrepitude, and to provide for.their
offspring?  Does he stand in any relation to them  on
which he can found a just claim to their service? If not,
on what fact can he rest to justify himself in seizing
them and treating them as slaves? Or, having seized
and appropriated them, on what fact can he rest to justify
himself in regarding them as his property, and selling
them to others?  Certainly none; the relation in which
these free natives stand to him, and the relation of lawful servants to their master, are as far asunder as the
poles; they owe him no labor or service, no gratitude,
no affection, no debt of any kind.  His seizure of them
is an act of sheer diabolical violence, without the faintest
shadow or semblance of justice to mitigate its atrocity.




THE AFRICAN SLAVE-TRADE.           269
It is an act all through and all over abominable, and fbrever to be detested of God and man.
An act of singular and acknowledged impiety and
infamy, but without an appropriate name.  For by what
name shall -we designate it?  It is not precisely theft,
or robbery, or kidnapping, or any other crime; for these
klcts, and indeed all crimes, in the technical sense, are
offenses against municipal law.  But these Africans are
under the jurisdiction of no civilized or Christian people;
he who seizes them, therefore, breaks none of those laws
by which his own nation protects its citizens and inhabitants in the enjoyment of their rights and liberties.
Nay, he is himself an outlaw, and rests his bodily safety
on the fact that he is out of the reach of the laws of his
own and of all civilized nations.  He makes himself
AN ENEMY OF THE HUMAN KIND, and sets at open
defiance that law which is the basis of all municipal law,
the law of Nature itself. In these respects he resembles
the PIRATE, and differs from him only in making the
the land, instead of the water, the scene of his depredation. Hence, although his offenses are not really piracy,
yet they are justly declared and accounted piracy, by
the laws of Christian and civilized nations; and he himself, and all who are accessory to his offense before it is
committed, are justly treated as pirates, and exposed to
the scorn and hatred, not of one nation only, but of all
mankind.
But some, perhaps, disclaiming and denouncing the




270          THE AFRICAN SLAVE-TRADE.
wanton seizure of Africans on their native soil, may yet
assert the right, and even make a virtue of buying them,
in order to save them from death. It is possible, indeed,
that a case may happen in which the negro, to escape
from torture and death, may consent to go into servitude,
under promise of protection and humane treatment. But
such cases, if not wholly imaginary, are at least so rare
as not to be worth taking into account.  The purchases
effected by the slave-trader, and by which alone his
traffic can be made to gratify his cupidity, are of a
widely different kind. He sets up a market for negroes,
and buys them of any one that will decoy them to the
coast, and deliver them into his possession.  Instead of
seizing them himself, he stimulates others to seize them,
and, for rum, or money. or a few paltry trinkets, he
avails himself of the rapacity and violence of his agents.
Or he whets the avarice and cruelty of one tribe to make
a prey of others, and buys captives of the conqueror;
thus instigating the native tribes to mutual and fiendish
wars, for the mere purpose of making prisoners, and
selling them to the traders.
The plea that the captured are prisoners of war, and
sold and bought according to the right of war, is one of
those infamous pretexts with which hypocrisy seeks to
varnish deeds of villainy with a show of decency.  In
no just war, much less in an unjust, has the captor a
right to the life of the captive.  The law of Nature
gives no man a right oveir his own life, much less over




THE AFRICAN SLAVE-TRADE.           271
the life of another man; it permits us, indeed, to take
the life of an enemy when the doing so becomes necessary to defeat injustice and violence; but when an enemy becomes a prisoner, this necessity ceases to exist;
and to deprive him of his life without necessity is murder. The sale of a prisoner, therefore, founded on this
pretended right of war, is essentially unjust; not only
null and void, but vile and abominable, as being an
offense not necessarily against municipal law, but necessarily and always against that law of Nature which all
mankind are bound to observe and to vindicate.  The
man, therefore, who buys a negro on this pretext, is a
partner in guilt with him who seizes and sells him. Less
bold, perhaps, but more base and sneaking than the kidnapper, he is deservedly placed in the same category
with him, and branded as an enemy of the human kind;
and if he does not know the atrocity of his nefarious
traffic, it is well that the municipal law should teach it
to him, by declaring, as the laws of the United States
do declare, the purchase of negroes unlawfully seized to
be equally PIRACY with the seizure itself.
To evade the force of these arguments it is sometimes
contended that the African negroes belong to an inferior
race, and that the white, or superior race, has, on the
ground of its superiority, the right to seize and transport them into distant countries, and reduce them into
slavery.
I am not sure that I understand this argument.  Di



272          THE AFRICAN SLAVE-TRADE.
vine Revelation, in this, as in other matters, giving distinct utterance to the voice of Nature, informs us that
God, having created man, blessed him, and gave him
DOMINION over the beasts of the fields, over the fishes
of the sea, over the fowls of the air, and over every living thing that moveth upon the earth.  It is on this
grant of our Maker, inferred by reason, expressed by
Revelation, that we rest the right of man to dominion
over the brute creation.  The subject of the grant is
man, mankind, all men; and the matter of the grant is
an absolute and universal dominion over all other creatures on earth.  Man can not be at once the subject and
the object of thegrant; no man, therefore, has an absolute right to use other men, but every man and all men
have the right to use inferior creatures for their benefit.
They, therefore, who would justify the seizure and
enslavement of African negroes on the ground of their
inferiority, are bound to explain their meaning.  Do
they mean that the blacks are inferior to the whites in
kind? that the whites constitute the entire human kind,
and that the blacks are not included in this kind?
If this be their meaning, then, the consequence is
good.   For man is lord of the earth, and has a just
title to dominion over creatures inferior to himself in
kind; and by the same right that he subjugates other
inferior creatures to his use, some for food, others for
clothing, others for labor, he may seize the negro 1and
doom him to servitude, or make any other use of him he




THE AFRICAN SLAVE-TRADE.           273
sees to be for his own advantage. But, though the consequence be good, the premise is utterly false.  For, let
men magnify the differences as they will, between the
two races, they are, after all, accidental, and not essential.  The color of the skin, the quality of the hair, and
the peculiar anatomical structure which is supposed to
give acuteness to the senses of the negro at the expense
of his intellectual vigor, do not enter into the definition
of man.  The erect figure, the power of articulate speech,
the reasonable soul, with its marvelous endowments of
conscience and will, are attributes of the black as well
as the white;;-ln these constitute thle man.  If they mean
that the inferioiity is lJot in kind, but in degree, then,
though the premise is good, the consequence fails; for both
being of the same kind, have the same natural rights to
life and liberty; and the superiority of bodily or mental
conformation gives the one race no more right to lord it
over the other, than one man's strong habit of mind or
body gives him a right of dominion over his feeble neighbor.
Again, it is argued by some who admit the iniquity
of the slave-trade, that it is impossible to repress it;
that its cruelties are greatly increased by its secret and
contraband character; and that, therefore, a humane
policy demands that government should permit it.
There are three ways in which an evil may be permitted by the municipal law.+ The law may wholly
* See Bp. Sanderson's Sixth Prelection, De Leg. Human. Materia,
Sect. 18.




274         THE AFRICAN SLAVE-TRADE.
pretermit and pass it by, and in this way it must permit
many evils, it being the singular prerogative of the
Divine law to prohibit all evil. But the slave-trade is
too public and audacious to be passed by in silence; a
permission of this sort would, under the circumstances,
be tantamount to an approval. Again, the State may
define certain limits, beyond which an evil shall be
guilty and punishable, and within which it shall be innocent and safe. But this sort of permission can only be
extended to evils which are not essentially such; by
which I mean such as are not forbidden by the Divine
law, either natural or positive, but are entirely within
the power of the State, and are the proper matter of
human laws. But piracy, or evils equivalent to it, are
not of this sort; the State can not make them innocent
in any form or degree, nor extend protection to their perpetrators and abettors. Again, an evil, essentially such,
may be so deeply rooted that it is impossible to eradicate
it by prohibitions; and then the State, with a view to
regulate an evil which it can not abolish, may tolerate it
by imposing a tax or fine, and making it a source of
revenue. This is a desperate and perilous sort of legislation, one which is common under the worst governments of the old country, but which has never, to my
knowledge, been adopted in this country, either by our
State or Federal Governments, unless the action of the
Federal Government, in respect to the slave-trade, be an
exception. For Congress did, in the beginning of our




THE AFRICAN SLAVE-TRADE.           275
national existence, in this way permit the slave-trade for
a limited time, laying a tax on every slave imported. It
mnay, I suppose, without transcending its function as a
minister of the law of Nature, do the same thing again,
if demanded by a manifest expediency.   But as the
effect of the prohibition of the slave-trade has been to
guard the slavery established among us before our independence, from accessions by violence, and thus to allow
its growth and expansion as a just, peaceful, and orderly
institution; so the repeal of the prohibition and the
renewal of the former permission; in a word, the reopening of the slave trade under the sanction of Congress,
would in no long time change the character of domestic
slavery, and deprive it of all color of just support.
Africans openly seized and enslaved by violence would
be worked with cruelty; humane masters would be
driven in self-defense to practice the rigors of the mercenary and unscrupulous; the horrors of the old West
Indian system would be reenacted; and the slavery in
our Southern States to which its patrons now point with
honest pride, would become all that its worst enemies
declare it to be; the creature of inhuman fraud and violence, and a monstrous excrescence on Christian and
civilized society. In this view of the case, it is plain
that the evils which would enure to the Southern States
on the reopening of the slave trade would be infinitely
greater than those which are consequent on its secret and
contraband character.




276          THE AFRICAN SLAVE-TRADE.
I have never yet seen an objection to the laws of the
United States respecting the slave-trade, which was
entitled, in my humble opinion, to a moment's consideration.
I have, indeed, seen it alleged that these laws make
an unjust discrimination against slave-labor, inasmuch
as they do not leave it, like other vendibles, to the law
of demand and supply alone.     But this objection is
grounded, as it seems to me, on a total misapprehension;
for the laws of the United States, I believe, make no
such discrimination, but, on the contrary, leave slave
labor to be bought and sold, to be let and hired, according
to the law of supply and demand alone. The few restrictions (would to God they were greater and more numerous!) which exist, are merely designed to secure such
humane treatment for slaves as is accorded to infants, or
minors, who are put out to work by their guardians; and
these proceed from the laws and enlightened public opinion of the States in which slavery is established.  The
Federal Government has nothing to do with slave labor, as
an article of trade; and Congress has not passed, and can
not pass, a discriminative law, either for or against it;
has not attempted to regulate or touch it, in any way
whatsoever, as an article of trade or commerce. The
simple design of the laws of the United States respecting the slave-trade, is to prohibit piracy, and the importation into the ports under the jurisdiction of the United
States, of persons piratically seized.  The laws presume




THE AFRICAN SLAVE-TRADE.           277
that the persons whose importation it forbids are not the
property of those who hold and seek to import them, are
not persons to whose labor any other man than themselves has a right; but that they are persons who have
been stolen, or kidnapped, and forcibly, illegally, and
unjustly, dragged from their homes; oCr who have been
bought and kept for sale by those who have no shadow
of right or title to hold them. And the laws justly presume this; for such is in fact the case with respect to
those persons whom it is sought to impor-t from a foreign
country into any of the United States, to be sold as
slaves.  Prove that you have a just claim to the service
of these persons, either by their own express consent, or
by your having nurtured them on the condition that they
should requite your nurture by, their subsequent labor,
or by your having bought them of others who had such
just claim; prove this, I say, and then you mray affirm,
with at least a color of truth, and without audacity, that
the laws of the United States are unjust to the South,
by discriminating against slave-labor.
It would be easy to extend this argument, should an
attempt be ever made to repeal the laws of the United
States, which declare the slave-trade to be piracy.  But
I anticipate no such attempt. Slavery, considered as a
domestic institution, is defensible on grounds of right an4d
justice; and I see no reason to believe that the Southern States, while they continue in the Union, will




278         THE AFRICAN SLAVE-TRADE.
surrender this ground of defense; as they clearly
would do, were they to commit themselves to a measure
which has no color of justice, and nothing to recommend it but a base cupidity, clothing itself in the garb
of a hypocritical philanthropy.  There may be men at
the South who adopt, with an application of their own,
the logic common at the North; who admit that the
slave-trade is an evil, but think that it may be justified
by what they fancy to be the necessity of their position,
and who persuade themselves that they may, by this
means, become instruments in the hands of Providence
for civilizing and christianizing the benighted Africans:
forgetting that Providence uses the vile as well as the
good for the accomplishment of His purposes, and that
they are but vile instruments in His hands whensoever,
and under what pretext soever, they give their sanction
to acts of injustice and oppression.  These men, indeed,
may agitate the repeal of the laws which declare the
slave-trade to be piracy, but I can not believe that they
express the settled sense and determination of the South,
nor that the considerate men of the South will thus pronounce their own condemnation in the face of Christendom and at the bar of Eternal Justice.  On the contrary, I believe that the South will unite with the North,
and with nearly the same unanimity, in the belief that
the laws of the United States making the slave-trade
piracy are, equally with the laws which require fugitives




THE AFRICAN SLAVE-TRADE.            279
from service to be delivered up to the parties to whom
the service is due, declarative of the law of Nature, and
consequently, for the matter of them, bound on the consciences of citizens by more awful sanctions than any
which the municipal authority can impose.




CHAPTER XVII.
THE ARGUMENT FROM           SCRIPTURE.
SLAVERY is a word of large extent. Prisoners and
captives of war, criminals deprived of their liberty by
process of law, persons piratically seized and reduced to
bondage by violence, the serfs and villeins of other times
and places, and servants for life in our own countryall come under the general denomination of slaves.
In this country we have come very naturally to appropriate the word slavery to that form of servitude which
exists among ourselves.  To know what the word slavery
means in our use of it, we must first inquire what this
form of servitude is; not what it is vaguely and in its
accidents and abuses, but what it is precisely and in its
essence.  And the definition must be in accordance with
facts; that is, it must express, not what slavery has been
in other times and places, nor what it may be or might
have been, but what it actually is in our own country
and at the present time.
I have (lefined a slave to be a person twho is related
to society throuygh another person, called a master, to




THE ARGUMENT FROM SCRIPTURE.           281
whom he owes reasonable service for life, ancd from
whom he is entitled to receive support and protection.
This definition I believe to be in accordance with facts;
in other words, I believe that those persons called slaves
in our Southern States, are persons born on the soil and
under such circumstances (circumstances not of our
choosing but of God's ordering) that a debt of service is
the very condition of their life. For we are not a nation of
pirates and freebooters; we do not fit out vessels against
an ignorant and unoffending people, to seize them and
import them into our country, and reduce them to bondage.  We have never done this; our mother country has
never done it; no nation in modern Europe has done it.
The work has been done by combinations of lawless men.
And although Great Britain may have been remiss and
tardy in restraining such violence, yet we, in this respect,
have no ground of self-reproach.  For, from the very
beginning of our Confederacy, we took means to arrest
this evil, and, as soon as practicable, enacted stringent
laws, with a view to its suppression.  More than fifty
years-nearly two generations-have passed since these
laws were in force.  However much, therefore, we may
lament and condemn the way in which slavery originated in our country, or the accessions (comparatively
very small) which have since been made to it in tha
same way, yet we are not responsible for either; we
gave no sanction to the former, and have done all that
we could do to prevent the latter.  We are, therefore,




282       THE ARGUMENT FROM SCRIPTURE.
entitled to throw out of the account both the origin of
slavery, and the few and accidental accessions it may
receive from acts of violence which our laws prohibit;
and to declare the slaves of our country to be, what in
truth and fact they are, a class of persons born and
grown on our soil, under an obligation of service which
the laws of God and man require them to fulfill.
And, as we are not a nation of freebooters and pirates,
so neither are we a barbarous and unchristian nation,
permitting our people to exercise an absolute dominion
over their subordinates and dependents. The laws of
ancient Rome, which permitted a master to mutilate his
slaves or put them to death by scores and hundreds at a
time, for venial or, perhaps, only suspected offenses, are
no criterion by which to judge of slavery in our Southern States. The power of masters is restrained among
us both by law and by public opinion, within narrower,
and but for the scandalous abuse of the right of transfer I would say, within reasonable limits; and hence we
are entitled to regard the slaves that exist in our country, not as persons who are under the absolute power of
their master, but as persons who are subject to such
coercion as is necessary to exact from them the service
or labor they owe in return for their food and shelter.
In bringing the question to the arbitrament of Scipture, it is proper to distinguish that form of slavery for
which we hold ourselves responsible, as, from all other




THE ARGUMENT FROM SCRIPTURE.           283
forms, so, particularly, from that unjust deprivation of
liberty which is effected by lawless violence.
When St. Paul enjoins servants to obey their masters in all things, he uses a word for servants (dovXot),
which comprises several sorts of persons restrained of
liberty, and his precept is, consequently, to be taken in
a sense suited to the condition of that class of servants
to which it may be applied.  On prisoners and captives
held by lawless violence, or subject to absolute power,
he enjoins obedience as an alleviation of their unhappy
lot, which would be aggravated by resistance, and rendered more tolerable by patience and submission. On
those who are bound to service, either for a term of time
or for life, the precept must be understood to enjoin obedience according to the nature and condition of the service to which they are bound. To slaves of the former
class, i. e., to prisoners or captives who have been forcibly and unjustly seized and compelled to labor, at the oar
for example, or in the mines, he would say, Obey your
masters in all things, as becomes your sad condition, and
make your chains as easy as you can, by your compliance and submission. To slaves of the latter class, i. e.,
to persons who are justly bound to service, either for a
term of time or for life, he would be understood to say:
Obey your masters in all things according to the contract,
express or implied, by which you are bound; or to use
Bishop Fleetwood's paraphrase: " Behave yourselves to
your masters as diligently and faithfully as you have




284       THE ARGUMENT FROM SCRIPTURE.
promised them to do; or by the custom of the place (in
which you live) are presumed to have promised them."'.
Now, if the slavery which exists in our countrymere
upheld in violation of right and justice, although we
might, after the example of the Apostles, inculcate on
the slave the duty of patience and submission, yet we
should be constrained to confess that the relation in which
he stood was unnatural, and that the authority to which
he was subjected was a usurpation.  But, as I offer no
apology for this kind of slavery, and have no need to press
into my support those precepts which require of the
slave what, indeed, is required of every man, patience
and submission to the hardships of his lot, so I am not
solicitous to repel the inferences which may be drawn
from these precepts, in this sense of them, to show the
injustice and impiety of slavery and slaveholders.
In appealing to the Scriptures, therefore, the question
on which I would insist is, whether-that form of slavery
which I have defined, and which is known to exist in our
country, be, or be not forbidden in the Scriptures? If
it be, then all our reasonings in its defense are delusive,
and must go for nothing; if it be not, then we are at
liberty to uphold it; to regard the relation of master and
slave, as it exists among us, as a lawful relation; and to
consider it as fairly coming under those apostolical precepts which enjoin masters to be gentle and forbearing,
and which enjoin servants to "obey their masters in all
* Works: Fol. Ed., p. 314.




THE ARGUMENT FROM SCRIPTURE.           285
things;" not in that sense which requires of them
patience and submission under usurped authority, but in
the other sense, which requires them to be diligent and
faithful in a service which they are bound to perform.
Now, it is readily admitted that the form of slavery
for which the American people are (a large portion of
them directly) responsible, contains some features that
are exceedingly repulsive to those who are accustomed to
no other restraints of personal liberty than such as are
imposed by the municipal law of the country in which
they live. It gives the master, not indeed an absolute,
but a large discretionary power over his servants; vests
him with a right to their labor for life, and allows him to
transfer this right to others; to invest any purchaser he
may please with the same power over the bodies of his
servants which he possesses himself.  This certainly is a
power liable to fearful abuses.  It may seem to us antecedently probable that our blessed Lord, who came to
reform the world, would never allow His followers to be
clothed with such power; would forbid them, under all
circumstances, to hold, or claim to hold a right to the
service or labor of other men for life, and to the use of
their natural liberty; or at least, if He suffered them to
claim and hold this right, that He would not permit them
to transfer it to a stranger for money. But we are in no
sort judges beforehand of what it was fit for our Lord to
do. It may, for aught we know, have seemed good to
Him that some of His followers should be entrusted with




286       THE ARGUMENT FROM SCRIPTURE.
this large power for their more effectual probation; for
the development, possibly, of virtues which could not
otherwise be manifested, and for a demonstration to the
world of the efficacy of His gospel in restraining and
regulating an authority which, before His time, had been
abused beyond measure, and almost beyond belief. We
are totally incompetent to judge beforehand what regulations it was proper for Him to make on this subject.
Our inquiry is, or ought to be, simply into the facts of
the case. Has our Lord in fact interdicted this sort of
power and authority to His followers?  Have His apostles done so?  Did His Church do so in the age succeeding the apostles, when their instructions were remembered, and best understood?
Now, the fact is, that we have no prohibition of this
sort, either from our Lord, or from  His apostles, or
from the ancient Church.  Certainly there was no want
of occasion or opportunity for such prohibition. The
purchase and sale of the right to the use of men's labor
and liberty, or property in men, as it is commonly,
though vaguely called, had been permitted among the
Hebrews, and was a matter cf every day practice among
the Greeks and Romans; it could not possibly have escaped the observation of our Lord and His apostles, nor
could its fearful abuses have been unknown to them.
And yet the fact is, that there is nothing in the Scriptures of the New Testament which either expressly, or
by implication, forbids it.




THE ARGUMENT FROM SCRIPTURE.          287
But the prohibition, though neither expressed or implied in the letter of the New Testament, is found by
some in its spirit. There were evils, it is said, which
Christ, for wise reasons, did not specifically and directly
forbid; but left to be gradually restrained, and finally
abolished by the silent and iiclirect influence of His gospel, or of those general principles which He has enunciated in His gospel. Such evils were polygamy, war, and
slavery.
I shall not stop to question the legitimacy of the
theory here implied. I shall admit, for argument's sake,
that our Blessed Lord, while proclaiming all needful
truth of a general nature, reserved some doctrine, of a
more specific kind, which the world was not then in a
temper to receive, and entrusted it to His apostles and
their successors, to be afterwards unfolded and applied, in
the shape of positive or negative precept, as men would
be able to bear it. To be sure, this is commonly thought
to be a very Papistical tenet; but the odium attached to
the avowal of it will be considerably lightened when it is
shared in common with Protestants of the Independent
persuasion. But I must be permitted to question the
applicability of the theory to the case in hand. I do
not believe that our Lord reserved any doctrine to be
authoritatively developed by Protestants in Women's
Rights, Moral Reform, Temperance, or Anti-Slavery
Societies. Whatever I may think of the developments
of Rome and Trent (and they are not here in question),




288       THE ARGUMENT FROM SCRIPTURE.
I must be allowed to distrust those that come from Providence, Rhode Island, or from Oberlin, in whatever State
or Territory Oberlin may be.
Let us look at the pretended parallels.
1. And first, it has become common to class polygamy
and slavery together; and to argue that, as polygamy
was anciently permitted by God, and afterwards abrogated, so slavery, though permitted under previous dispensations, was meant to expire under the Christian
dispensation.
But where is the parallel? The marriage of one man
to one woman, so that "they twain" should be "one
flesh," was instituted at the beginning by God's positive
law.  Under the patriarchal and Jewish dispensations,
the author of the law saw fit to dispense with its rigid
observance.  When Christ came into the world, He, in
the name of His Father, annulled the temporary relaxation, and reaffirmed the original law.. By the original
law, thus reaffirmed, divorce (save for the one cause)
and polygamy are forbidden.    The apostles provided
for giving effect to this law, as promptly and stringently
as could be, consistently with ties and obligations formed
previously to the reenactment of the law.  The extinction of polygamy, therefore, which rapidly followed, was
not at all consequent on the indirect influence of the
gospel, but was diretly consequent on the repeal of the
relaxation and the reaffirmation of the original law.
But where is the original law which was dispensed in




THE ARGUMENT FROM SCRIPTURE.          289
order to the introduction of slavery?  Where is the
record of the dispensation?  Where is the enactment or
reenactment of any divine law prohibiting slavery?
There is only one point of resemblance between the two
cases; and that is, that polygamy and slavery were both
permitted under the patriarchal and Mosaic dispensations.  In all other respects the parallel fails; and the
discontinuance of polygamy, in virtue of its express
abrogation by the divine law, presents not a shadow of
reason for expecting a discontinuance of slavery, as more
agreeable to the gospel, without such abrogation.
2.-The case of war is more in point. Christianity,
by its indirect influence, i. e., by quickening the principles of justice and benevolence, and binding men more
closely in the bonds of a common humanity, has done
much towards the prevention of unjust wars, and to
mitigate the horrors of all wars.  Admit the parallel,
and what does it prove? Why, only this: that Christianity has done much to abrogate unjust slavery, anchto
lessen the evils of all slavery.  But if the spirit of the
gospel were to prevail universally; there would be no
war; and hence, it is argued, there would be no slavery.
But this by no means follows, for it is just here that the
parallel fails. For, why would wars cease?  Because
there would be no injuries, and therefore no need even
of a just war to redress them.  But slavery, or that
form of it which we are defending, is founded in the
wants of human nature, or at least of human society; it
13




290       THE ARGUMENT FROM SCRIPTURE.
is not designed to defend us from violence, or to repel
wrongs, but to diversify labor in ways consistent with
innocence and justice, to coerce the vagrant and indolent
to needful industry, to subsist the poor, to enable those who
are unfit for bodily labor to devote their time and talents
to the development of other sources of social wealth, and
thus to bind together the head, and feet, and all the
members of the political body in mutual concord. So
that the spirit of the gospel, if it universally prevailed,
though it should exterminate war, would but purify
servitude.
3. Dismissing the alleged parallels, let us glance at
the application of the argument to the case, for the illustration of which the parallels are adduced. The argument is that though the gospel does not directly forbid
slavery, yet it provides for its extirpation by indirect influence; and the reasons assigned for this conclusion are
such as follow.
In the first place it is contended that the Gospel proclaims genereal principles, the strict and faithful observance of which would be incompatible with the existence
of slavery; as, for example, the gospel requires every
man to love his neighbor as himself, and to do to others
as he would have others to do to him.
Now, observe, we start with the admission that the
gospel does not forbid the relation of master and slave,
but, as respects the letter, permits it. Here, then, we
are precipitated upon this extraordinary conclusion, viz.,




THE ARGUMENT FROM SCRIPTURE.         291
that a man can not obey, in the fullness of their spirit,
the precepts of the Divine Lawgiver, without renouncing
and subverting the very relation which those precepts
are intended to regulate. That the precepts of love and
equity enjoined on us by our Blessed Lord, have no such
tendency as is supposed to impair and ultimately subvert
the relation of master and slave, will be apparent if we
take the precepts with those limitations which common
sense requires, and which we give them when we apply
them to every other relation of life. I am to love my
neighbor, not in the same measure (which is impossible)
but with the same sincerity that I love myself; and I
am to do to others, not all that I might selfishly and
lawlessly wish, but all that I could reasonably desire
them, consistently with duty, to do to me, were I in
their place and they in mine. I can see that the master,
guided by these precepts, would have strong motives to
the humane and generous treatment of his slaves; but I
can not see that the spirit of the precepts, in any reasonable construction of them, is inconsistent with the perpetuity of the relation.
Another reason for the opinion that the gospel is indirectly adverse to slavery is, that, as the gospel diffuses
light and knowledge, and slavery requires the soul to be
kept in darkness, the two can not permanently coexist;
and as the gospel is to triumph, slavery must succumb
and perish.
Pray, of what gospel is this said?  The gospel of




292        THE ARGUMENT FROM SCRIPTURE.
Christ and His apostles, or the gospel of my Lord
Brougham and his schoolmasters?    That the dissemination of "Useful Knowledge," as it is called, which supposes the art of reading to be the first step of human
advancement, which multiplies books and tracts to save
men from thinking and to nurse them in learned idleness,@
or to fill their heads with false notions of human rights
and fallacious theories of human society; filling their
hearts, also, with discontent, envy, and hatred, and unfitting them, head and heart, for any humble and subordinate station, in which God's providence may have
placed them; that this sort of light may lead to the
extinction of slavery if permitted to penetrate it is like
enough.   But this sort of light is so far from being an
indirect influence of Christianity, that it does not proceed from it at all, and, indeed, is as unlike it as is night
to day. The light which Christ imparts is the knowledge
of salvation; and for the propagation of this knowledge
He has appointed His own means and His own agents;
and the art of reading (however useful in its place) is
not the means which He has appointed, nor is the school* " By this means," viz., "the great number of books and papers
of amusement, which, of one kind or another, daily come in one's
way," " time even in solitude is happily got rid of, without the pain
of attention: neither is any part of it more put to the account of
idleness, one can scarce forbear saying, is spent zUith less thought than
a great part of that which is spent in reading." So wrote the author of the Analogy (Preface to Sermons at the Rolls) more than
a hundred years ago, and before the age of light literature had
commenced.




THE ARGUMENT FROM SCRIPTURE.          293
master, although an important functionary in his way,
the agent whom He has commissioned.
The knowledge which He requires in order to salvation. is not abstruse or hard to be learned; it is diffused,
indeed. inl the Holy Scriptures, but may be thence col1 cted, and summed up in brief rules of Faith, Devotion,
Iand Charity, easy to be apprehended by the feeblest
capacity. This knowledge, or the knowledge of these
rules and rudiments, has from the beginning been taught
orally to multitudes who were never able to learn it in
any other way; and it is to this day imparted orally to
all of us before we learn our letters, or are able to read
the Bible.  Bene arguit, qui bene distinguit; and I
should suppose that the mere distinction between the
knowledge of the kingdom of heaven and the knowledge
of this world would be sufficient answer to the objection.
For it can not, without absurdity, be believed that the
light of the gospel, which teaches masters to be mild
and gentle, and servants to be diligent and faithful, can
indirectly, and in process of time, abolish a relation
which it directly, now and always, cements.
Another reason for the opinion I am combating is,
that the gospel forbids cruelty, oppression,' and impurity,
and all the other evils which are the concomitants of
slavery, and make it the " sum of human villainies," and
that, therefore, it must tend indirectly to its extirpation.
I answer that, if these evils are inseparable from
slavery, then we have a right to expect that slavery




294       THE ARGUMENT FROM SCRIPTURE.
would have been directly forbidden in the gospel; and
since it is not so forbidden, we have the right to infer
that these evils are separable from it; and if separable,
then their restraint and inhibition can only tend to strip
slavery of its abuses, and thus to reform the institution,
and not to subvert it.
But the crowning argument remains; viz., that, after
the establishment of Christianity, and under its benign
influence, slavery became gradually extinct.
This reasoning, I apprehend, is no better than the
post hoc, propter hoc logic, which is sometimes maliciously charged on the medical profession. The drug
is administered, and the patient recovers; ergo the drug
has cured him!   The truth is, in my opinion, that
Christianity had noo more to do with the decay of slavery
in the Roman empire, than it had with its extirpation in
our Northern States. In both cases slavery was abandoned because it did not pay. In the New England and
Middle States, where the produce of the earth is slowly
yielded and hardly obtained, and where the cold climate
braces and disposes the white for work, while it enervates
and incapacitates the negro, it cost the master more to
feed and rear his slaves than their labor was worth; and
hence they who owned negro slaves at the North sold
them to the South, where their labor would be worth
more than their keeping; not refusing to accept (why
should they?) whatever credit they could get for philanthropy, and not grudging to send with or after each




THE ARGUMENT FROM SCRIPTURE.          295
bill of sale, a lecture or short tract on the sin of holding property in man.  So in the Roman empire. While
the rage for conquest prevailed, the bulk of the people
were employed in wars abroad, and left their work
at home to be done by slaves; and as their habits were
frugal, and their slaves were valued only for their labor,
they could much better afford to keep them than to
relinquish their plunder in foreign countries. But when
the rage for conquest had ceased, the bulk of the people,
deprived of warlike employment, were compelled to turn
their attention to agriculture and mechanical pursuits;
and as luxury had now increased, and the rich and opulent affected more than ever the elegancies and refinements of life, they put their slaves to such sorts of work
as required not merely muscle but skill and training;
hence slave-labor became more expensive, and free labor
cheaper; and when matters came to that pass, that it
cost more to rear and train the slave for his work than
his work was worth, then slavery did not pay: and when
slavery ceased to pay, it died out, the gospel contributing nothing, directly or indirectly, to its decadence.
The upshot of the matter is, as it seems to me, that
Christianity neither enjoins nor forbids slavery, but leaves
men entirely free, so that they restrain themselves within
the bounds of justice and rectitude, either to discourage
and abolish it, or to establish and uphold it, as the
public good may require.
The plan of my work does not require me to do more




296      THE ARGUMENT FROM SCRIPTURE.
than establish this negative conclusion. A strong affirmative argument, indeed, might easily be made to show
that the Scriptures, both of the Old and New Testament, expressly recognize and sanction slavery; but this
argument has been so often and so luminously stated, and,
indeed, the fact is so apparent on the very face of the
Scriptures, that I deem it quite superfluous to swell my
pages with references and quotations designed to establish it.@  Besides, the aim of my argument has been to
show that that form of servitude which exists under the
laws of some of our States, and under the Constitution
of the United States, is consistent with natural justice;
and if the argument is sound, slavery must stand unless
the Scriptures forbid it.  That " the New Testament
contains no precept prohibitory of slavery' is expressly
affirmed by the ablest of the New England abolitionists;
and what they insist on is that the prohibition, though
not given in any precept, is yet contained in the principles of the New Testament, of course as developed and
applied by themselves.  Their arguments are misty and
confused, and it is about as hard to seize and explain
them, as it would be to bottle and analyze the dense fog
that sometimes hangs over their coast. But, as far as T
could catch their meaning, I have given and answered it;
* For a synopsis of the scriptural argument the reader is referred
to "Slaveholding not Sinful," by Samuel S. How, D.D., of INew
Brunswick, and for sale by R. & R. Brinkerhoof, 103 Fulton Street,
New York.




THE ARGUMENT FROM SCRIPTURE.          297
and the result is, I think, that the gospel, neither directly
nor indirectly, neither by its precepts nor principles,
makes slavery a sin; in short, that it contains not a seed
or germ to serve them for their new Protestant "development of Christian doctrine."
Before I leave this topic, I wish to guard the reader
against a mistake into which he may be led by an equivocation of words.  The apostles admitted into the communion of the Christian Church, the "bond," as well as
the free. From the apostles' time, to the accession of
Constantine in the fourth century, not to go later, it is
matter of undoubted history, that slaves, by which word
I mean persons that were owned by others under the
laws of the Empire, that were kept for labor and were
liable to be bought and sold, formed a numerous class in
the Christian Church; they were "called," in common
with others, from among the Gentiles, and remained,
according to the apostolic precedent, "in the vocation
wherein they were called."  One of the Apostolic Canons (the eighty-second in Beveridge's collection, and
seventy-third in Johnson's) declares: "'  e do not permit slaves to be ordained to the clergy, without consent
of their masters, and to the provocation of their owners;
for this would be to the subversion of families; but if a
slave do appear worthy of being ordained even priest or
bishop, and their owners give way to it, by making them
free, and dismissing them from their houses, let it be
13*




298       THE ARGUMENT FROM SCRIPTURE.
done."    Bingham, in adverting to this canon, remarks
that "the servants referred to were originally tied by
birth or purchase to their patrons' or masters' service;
and assigns as a reason for the canon that " no man was
to be defrauded of his right under pretense of ordination."t  The same author, as above quoted, tells us:
"The same power and right which parents had over
their children, masters had over their slaves: and for
this reason no slave could marry without the consent of
his master."  In the eleventh book of his Antiquities,
which treats of the rites and customs observed in the
administration of baptism, he relates, "that in the examination of the several qualifications of those that offered
themselves to baptism, one part of the inquiry was,'whether they were slaves, or freemen?'   If they were
slaves to a heathen, they were only taught their obligations to please their master, that the word of God might
not be blasphemed; and the master had no further concern in their baptism, as being himself an infidel; but if
the master were a Christian, then the testimony of the
master was first to be required concerning the life and
conversation of his slave, before he could be admitted to
the privilege of baptism. If he gave a laudable account
of him, he was received; if otherwise, he was rejected,
till he approved himself to his master."~    From   all
* Johnson's translation, Vade Mecscm, vol. ii., p. 36.
f Vol. i. p. 487, Pitman's Edition. $ Vide Supra, chap. xiii., p. 212.
~ Vol. iii,, p. 488,




THE ARGUMENT FROM SCRIPTURE.         299
which it appears incontrovertibly that slavery, in the
best days of the Christian Church, was not accounted to
be a sin or disgrace. Neither was the slave, as such,
regarded as an object of commiseration. The horrible
phantasm of "property in man"' did not scare the plain
piety of these early Christians, any more than it perplexed the plain sense of their heathen neighbors. Slaves
were respected according to their condition in life, and
their behaviour in that condition.  Some of them were
very ignorant, and had a hard lot; and others of them
were intelligent and prosperous. Onesimus, the absconding slave whom St. Paul sent back to his master, is said,
by some of the ancients, to have earned his freedom by
his good conduct, and to have been made Bishop of
Colosse. St. Luke, the Evangelist, is believed by Grotius, and others, to have been a slave in the family of
the Lucilli, and to have taken from them his diminutive
name of Luke. However this be, I believe I am right
in saying that slaves, as szch, i. e., persons who were
owned, and liable to be sold under the laws of the Empire, were not regarded as objects of ignominy or compassion.
And yet we are sometimes told that the sympathies
and charities of the Primitive Church were often excited
in behalf of persons in slavery, and that large contributions were made by the benevolent to purchase their
freedom. In particular, the thrilling letter of St. Cyprian, Bishop of Carthage, to the Numidian bishops,




300       THE ARGUMENT FROM SCRIPTURE.
deploring the miseries of slavery, and sending a hundred
thousand sesterces (equal to between three and four
thousand dollars), contributed by the churches under his
charge, to ransom some unhappy slaves in Numidia out
of the house of bondage, is quoted, with marvelous
effect, to show the horrors of slavery, and the sentiments
of compassion with which it was regarded in the Primitive Church.   Hlow reconcile this with our previous
statement, that slavery, as such, was not an object of
commiseration, and with the natural inference from the
statement, that the Christians of that day were not commonly called upon to contribute money to enable slaves
to change their state or condition in life?
" We, Christians," says St. Cyprian, " are all incorporated together as one body; and not only the motives
of humanity, but those of our holy religion ought to excite and quicken our endeavors for redeeming our brethren from their slavery."  He observes, moreover, that
"as many as have been baptized into Christ, have put
on Christ;" and that for this reason we ought to behold
Christ in the persons of slaves, who are our brethren,
and redeem Him [in their persons] from His slavery,
who redeemeth us from the death to which we were obnoxious; *  t' that he who redeemed us by His cross
and passion, may Himself be redeemed with our money."
What, then, would the venerable Bishop of Carthage
say, were he now alive, to the pious abolitionist who
should quote his language to excite the commiseration of




THE ARGUMENT FROM SCRIPTURE.         301
Christians, for the hard lot of our Southern slaves?
Why, he would rebuke him, and hold him up to the
scorn of men as an impudent falsifier! The letter to the
Numidian bishops has no relation to slaves, in the common sense of the word. Under the negligent administration of Gallus, says Dr. Marshall, the barbarous
nations bordering on the confines of the Roman dominions in Africa, made frequent incursions upon their
neighbors in the Roman territory, and carried off many
captives; on whose behalf the bishops, in those parts,
had written to our author [St. Cyprian] for contributions
to assist in redeeming them; and received from him this
letter in answer."
That the reader may see how easy it is to cheat with
ambiguous words, and with quotations wrested from their
context, I annex the first paragraph of this noble letter
from Marshall's Cyprian, Vol. II. p. 176.
" Cyprian to his brethren Januarius, Maximus, Proculus, Victor, Modianus, Nemesianus, Nampulus, and
Honoratus, sendeth greeting.
"I read over, my dearest brethren, the letter which
you sent me, concerning the captivity of our brothers
and sisters, with a compassion and concern equal to what
you wrote it with; for who can withhold his tears from
flowing out upon such dreadful calamities?  Or who
would not consider the misfortune of his brethren as, in
some measure, his own? Especially, when he shall reflect upon what the apostle St. Paul hath said upon this




302       THE ARGUMENT FROM SCRIPTURE.
subject;' Whether one member suffer, all the members
suffer with it; or one member rejoice, all the members
rejoice with it.' And again;'Who is weak, and I am
not weak?' We, therefore, should look upon the captivity of our brethren as a state of bondage to ourselves;
since we are all incorporated together as one body; and
not only the motives of humnanity, but those of our holy
religion, ought to excite and quicken our endeavors for
redeeming our brethren from slavery: for the apostle St.
Paul, having in another place put the question;'know ye
not that ye are the temple of God, and that the Spirit of
God dwelleth in you?' if the rules of charity did not oblige
us to assist our brethren in such extremity, yet we ought to
consider here, that they are the temples of God, which thus
are taken captive; that therefore we should not, by our
neglect and indolence, suffer them to continue long under
their confinement; but should rather labor with all our
industry and application to gain the favor of Christ our
Judge, Lord, and God, by our good offices towards them.
The same apostle St. Paul hath told us that,'as many of
us as have been baptized into Christ, have put on Christ.'
Wherefore we should behold Christ in the persons of our
captive brethren, and redeem Him from His slavery, who
redeemeth us from the death to which we were obnoxious;
that He who hath taken us out of the jaws of the devil,
and dwelleth and abideth in us, may (Himself) be taken
out of the hands of the barbarians; and that He who
redeemed us by His cross and passion, may Himself be




THE ARGUMENT FROM SCRIPTURE.          303
redeemed with our money; who, perhaps, hath permitted
this misfortune to befall our brethren, that He thence
might try the power of our faith, and whether we will do
in the case of others, what we should desire to have done
for ourselves, if we were captives in the hands of these
barbarians. For who, with any sense about him of humanity and mutual benevolence, would not, if he be a
father, imagine those his children, who are there in
slavery? Or if he be a husband, would not entertain
those sentiments of tenderness and concern for the honor
of his marriage-bed, which he could not but entertain, if
his own wife were there?"




CHAPTER XVIII.
CONCLUSION.
HAVING now brought my argument to a close, I beg
to direct the reader's attention to a brief review of the
positions which I have endeavored to establish, and to
the course of action which they naturally suggest in
reference to the present state of our country.
Reverting to the point from which we started, the era
of the great men who inaugurated our independence, we
find our people united in the same religion.  Our social
relations were not derived from heathen prescription,
nor modeled on Utopian theories, but were those which
we had inherited from Christian ancestors. Our government made no provision for the uniform inculcation of
the fundamental principles of religion on which it was
founded, but threw itself entirely on the good sense of
the people; and while undertaking to administer their
political affairs, left to them the whole responsibility of
maintaining the principles on which its whole machinery,
the civilization which it had adopted, the social order and
relations which it protected-in a word, its very life and
being depended for support.




CONCLUSION.                 305
Thus we set out on our career as a civilized and Christian people, according to the highest standard of civilization to which mankind had then arrived, and with such
principles of religion as afforded a broad and ample
foundation for a healthy Christian society.  After the
lapse of more than half a century one of the social relations, protected by government, was assailed as barbarous
and anti-Christian; and the Constitution, for the protection which it afforded to this relation was also denounced
as barbarous and anti-Christian, and as needing to be
reformed to a higher civilization and a purer religion.
Government had provided no means for its own security,
either moral or physical, either preventive or remedial,
against assaults of this nature: it permitted an unlimited
freedom of speech and of the press, and authorized no
means of instruction for their guidance; it made it the
duty of no man or of any order of men, to define and
inculcate those fundamental principles of morality and
religion on which all human society rests for support; it
gave full swing to assailants and agitators, and men who
in any previous age and under almost any other government on earth would have been compelled to choose between a bridle for their lips and a halter for their necks,
were suffered to go on from month to month, and from
year to year, and denounce the Constitution under which
they lived as " a covenant with death and an agreement
with hell." By their eloquent but superficial harangues
the agitators captivated the people; the politicians were




306                 CONCLUSION.
not slow to use the public opinion which the agitators
created; they joined and outstripped them in sophistical
appeals to the people in behalf of that universal equality
and those natural rights which the Declaration of Independence proclaimed, and of which they thought, or
affected to think, that the slavery in our Southern States
was a violation. Nay, they went farther, and raised
their voice in the halls of legislation to arraign the
Constitution itself for inconsistency with that " Higher
Law," of which they knew, or ought to have known,
that it is, on the very point on which they have arraigned
it, a true and infallible exponent. To protect itself
against assaults of this nature, government confided
wholly to the intelligence of the people and their ability
to comprehend and apply the fundamental principles on
which the relation that was assailed, in common with the
other relations of human society, rest for support.  And
the question was and is, for it is still undecided, whether
the confidence is misplaced: whether the people will continue to chase the phantoms held up to them by stationary pulpiteers and itinerant demagogues, or whether
they will justify the wisdom of their fathers and reject
the fallacies and sophistries by which they are taught to
use the Declaration of Independence for the subversion
of their government, and the Gospel of Christ for the
division of His Church.
The effect of these repeated and long-continued onslaughts on slavery has been to excite the passions of




CONCLUSION.                 307
the South, and to extort from them more of denunciation
than argument; although the latter has not been wanting.
And this is perfectly natural.  By the very constitution
of our nature we are led to believe in the truth and justice of the religious and social institutions which are the
foundation of our dearest hopes and interests, before we
are able to develop the logical grounds of our belief.
Hard, indeed, would be the lot of Christians, if they had
no firm and solid ground for their faith until they had
learned from the schools to refute the sophistries of
HXume, and to estimate, at their true value, the sneers
of Gibbon or the sarcasm of Voltaire.  The rich never
think of looking beyond their title-deeds to justify the
tenure of houses and lands which they have bought with
their money, or inherited from their fathers; and not
one in ten thousand of them is able to explain the origin
of property, nor to give a logical answer to those who
from the right of the people to make their own laws
would infer their right to adjust property on a new basis.
An agrarian party at the North, if numerous and successful, would provoke from the rich among us more
imprecations than syllogisms.  So at the South.  Men
who have been born in a society of which slavery is an
element; who have come peaceably and honorably into
the possession of slaves, and are assured of their attachment; who are accustomed to the idea of property in
servile labor, and esteem  it no degradation, but build
upon it their hopes of worldly prosperity; these men, I




308                 CONCLUSION.
say, believe in the essential justice of their system of
society, and of their title to property under the laws of
the States in which they live, before they learn logically
to explain and develop the grounds of their belief.  It
is idle to say that Mr. Calhoun has revolutionized their
sentiments and taught them a doctrine which they never
entertained before. The change of opinion which has
undoubtedly taken place in the South on this subject,
has been the consequence of the transition of slavery
from its violent original to its settled condition in society.
Nature itself has made the change, and neither Mr. Calhoun nor any other man could do more than direct
attention to the facts consequent on the change, and give
logical form and expression to the conviction which those
facts had'before implicitly wrought in the mind of
Southern society.  It ought, therefore, to be no matter
of surprise that our Southern brethren, when the very
foundations of their social structure were attacked on
grounds of morality and religion, were more prompt to
resent the attacks than to refute them.
As long as the anti-slavery element depended for its
practical development on the Abolitionists, it could do
no harm -to the government.    For the Abolitionists
were honest and straightforward; they believed slavery
to be a sin and disgrace, and turned their batteries at
once on the Constitution which protected it.  By this
extravagance they disgusted the more sedate opponents
of slavery, who joined in sneering at them as men of




CONCLUSION.                 309
"one idea," and thus (for the apostles themselves were
men of " one idea") strengthened their moral influence,
while they discountenanced their political measures. But
when the politician thrust his sickle into the Abolition
harvest, and a party was organized which had for one of
its objects to oppose and restrain slavery only by.constitutional and conservative methods, a fair opportunity
was presented for testing the sense of the people.  The
contest was waged with' polygamy and slavery, twin
relics of barbarism," for a motto; and the result showed
that the anti-slavery feeling, far from being limited to
the Abolitionists, was predominant in the Northern mind.
What ends anti-slavery sentiment, working only in a constitutional way, could have accomplished, it is needless
to inquire; since the South, rather than await the experiment, have resorted to secession and revolution.  And
the question now is, how to reinstate ourselves in the
condition in which we were before the moral and social
character of slavery was introduced into our party politics.
I concur, in general, with those who think that the
best way to recover our former harmony (if, indeed, the
recovery be possible), is to copy the example of our
fathers; to guard the government which they established
from all influences which tend to warp it from its original design, and to seek to transmit to our children the
same heritage, pure and undefiled, which we have received from them.




310                 CONCLUSION.
There are two ways, however, in which this laudable
aim may be pursued.  The one is, to plant ourselves on
the principles on which our fathers stood, and to apply
them, in the exercise of a sound discretion, to the solution of new problems; and the other is, to take some
opinion which they entertained on some measure which
they adopted, and to carry out the opinion and to
imitate the measure without due regard to the principles
by which they were governed, or the new circumstances
by which we are surrounded.
There can be no doubt that the founders of our government were, on political and economical grounds,
opposed to slavery, and that they wished to get rid of it.
But their opinions and wishes were controlled by principles from which they never swerved.  Their love of
justice was stronger than their aversion to slavery; and
it taught them to do no violence to the bond which tied
the slave to his master, nor to seek to deprive the master of his right to the slave's labor.  Their love of
union was stronger than their aversion to slavery; for
it led them  to adopt a Constitution which protected
slavery in States which had no intention to abolish it.
They indeed prohibited slavery in the Northwestern
territory; but no one State opposed the prohibition; the
South concurred in the measure with the North; and
the only dissenting vote was from a representative of
New York. In carrying out their very laudable opinions and wishes in this respect, they did no violence to




CONCLUSION.                  311
the great principles which governed them-the love of
justice, and the love of union.
After the lapse of seventy years, the settlement of
another territory is brought in question. We at the North
desire, very naturally, that this territory also should be
dedicated to freedom.    And in favor of this measure
we have the example of our fathers in a similar case, and
their opinions of the deleterious influence of slavery.
Let us revere their example, and cherish their opinions.
But let us remember also that our circumstances are different from those in which they were placed. The territory is farther South.  The Slave States, instead of
concurring with us, oppose the measure which we desire
to carry. And the Slave States are more populous now
than they were then; the population of some of them
having nearly reached that point of density,* where the
maintenance of the slave is of more value than his labor,
and where, consequently, slavery dies a natural death;
the owner himself being glad to be relieved of his burthen.  In proportion as this point is approached, the
value of slave labor depreciates; and the density of population is increased in proportion as its expansion is prevented.  In view, then, of our altered circumstances, let
us be governed by the great principles on which our
* The result of Professor Tucker's careful and elaborate investigation is, that the depreciation in the value of slave labor begins when
the population reaches the number of fifty persons to the square
mile. See Progress of the United States in Population and Wealth,
chapter xiii. By GEOPaGE TUCKER.




312                 CONCLUSION.
fathers acted-love of Justice, love of Union. Let us
love free territory much, justice and union more.
Our fathers foresaw the evils which threatened the
Union, and they have marked out the course by which
they hoped to avoid them. That course contemplates
two fixed and uncompromising principles of action: 1,
the toleration of domestic slavery on grounds both of
justice and expediency: and 2, the resolute prohibition
and, as far as possible, annihilation of the slave-trade.
Can we do better than adhere to the policy which their
wisdom prescribed?  If the Union is dissolved and a
Southern confederacy formed, the slave-trade will probably be reopened.  Will that be any comfort to the
North?   If we can maintain the Union, and uphold
its laws against the slave-trade, at the expense of letting
domestic slavery alone, and suffering it to be governed
by the laws of population and labor, is it not better for
us to do so?  Do not the wisdom and example of our
fathers compel us to tolerate the less evil, for the sake
of avoiding the greater?
Before we adopt measures to circumscribe slavery, and
thus to accelerate its extinction, and bring it about at an
earlier period than is prescribed to it by the natural laws
of population and labor, ought we not to be prepared
with some feasible and effective plan for extending to free
colored people that moral, religious, and physical protection to which, while we exclude them  from  citizenship
and from social and political equality, they are by the




CONCLUSION.                 318
LAW OF NATURE entitled at our hands? Even under
our present system of servitude, with all its abuses., the
colored people that live in it are, as a general rule, cared
for in respect both to their spiritual and temporal necessities.  If we take measures which tend, even remotely,
to deprive them of this protection, and accompany them
with no provision for admitting them to social and political equality with ourselves, we expose them to temptations to vagrancy, intemperance and vice, which experience shows that they will not resist. We shall leave
them, as we have left the original inhabitants of our
land, to dwindle away and die out for want of the
stimulants and motives which human nature demands to
excite it to the pursuit of industry, intelligence, and
virtue. A truly philanthropic heart, really concerned
for the welfare of this unhappy portion of mankind, can
derive no comfort from this prospect.
In the pursuit of a higher civilization and a purer
religion than our fathers have bequeathed to us, a relentless war has been raged against one relation of society.
Suppose the assailants succeed, and either abolish slavery,
or, by breaking up the Union, relieve themselves of the
obligation which now presses on them to enlighten the
consciences, and reform the lives of the benighted South.
What next?   Their mission is to raise the individual
above the State, and to convince him that government is
instituted, not for the common good of society, and the
harmonious development of its manifold and diversified
14




314                 CONCLUSION.
interests, but for his elevation and improvement; and
their mission will be unfulfilled unless every individual
man and woman is made the equal of every other in all
the advantages which government, on their theory of it,
is designed to confer. Not only must slaves have equal
civil rights with their masters, but women must have an
equal share in government with men, and the poor an
equal share of property with the rich. Here is the
point of antagonism between the genius of modern civilization and the law of Nature and of CHRIST. Nature
teaches that government is instituted for the common
good, and for the individual in subordination to the common good, and the history of all orderly society, from
the beginning of the world, illustrates and confirms her
teaching; and Christianity, both in fact and by precept,
binds each member of society to every other, and makes
all subject to the head; while the genius of modern
civilization builds the State on the idea of the individual
and tends to exalt and to benefit him at the expense of
the State. Revolutionary France is a type of its extreme development where it is not tempered and restrained by the prescriptions of reason and the authority
of revelation; and without these divine restraints, all
the measures of pretended reform and progress, which
it inaugurates, are essentially anti-Christian; none the
less so because Satan, in order to accomplish them, transforms himself into an angel of light. To what extent
they foreshadow the great ANTI-CHRIST, which is to




CONCLUSION.                 315
concentrate all the elements of infidelity in one terrific
power of destruction, might be worth considering, if men
were in a temper to consider so serious a subject.
The views which I have advocated, in respect to
slavery, can only affect our intercourse with our brethren at the South, and our estimate of their condition.
They can not, by any possibility, even if they were generally adopted, lead to the reinstatement of slavery at the
North; but they will dispose us to feel and to act more
kindly towards those to whose care Providence has
intrusted the large portion of our fellow-countrymen and
fellow-christians, who now live in that state of servitude
which nothing but our own pride and folly makes disreputable in our sight. They will not only regain for
us the now alienated affections of our Southern brethren,
but they will restore to the bosoms of their families that
"domestic tranquillity," that mutual good-will and confidence, of which the present opinions at the North have,
in a measure, deprived them.  By allaying the jealousy,
and healing the wounded pride of the master, they will
promote the comfort, and secure the mild treatment of the
slave, and remove the impediments which, in some places
and to some extent, have impeded his liberation. They
furnish, moreover, a solid ground for the inculcation of
the mutual obligations and duties, which grow out of one
of the most important relations in human society.  I do
not urge these considerations as proofs of the theory of
slavery, which I have advocated, but as reasons which




316                  CONCLUSION.
should secure for it, if it be not erroneous, a hold upon
our affections.  If others take delight in maintaining the
opposite theory, and spreading before the public distorted facts and exaggerated statements to sustain it, I
must leave them to pursue the bent of their own minds.
But, for my own part, to accommodate to my use the
familiar words of an ancient philosopher on another subject,: if I err in this opinion, viz., that the slavery,
which exists under our laws, is founded in justice, and
not in violence-I gladly err; nor do I wish, while our
Union lasts, to be robbed of an error, which fills me with
kindly and benevolent regard toward all its members;
and if —which God in His mercy forbid!-our Union
should perish, I would still rejoice in an error, which
has saved me from the guilt of having promoted its dissolution, and which will continue to make all who accept
it at the North of one heart, even after they shall have
ceased to be of one country, with the South.
Adieu, dear reader, and may you ever be as fit and
prepared to receive, as the writer is disposed and desirous
to invoke on you and yours, the peace and benediction of
ALMIGHTY GOD!
* Quod si in hoc erro, quod animos hominum immortales esse eredam, libenter erro; nee mihi hunc errorem, quo delector, dum vivo,
extorqueri volo: sin mortuus, ut quidam minuti philosophi censent,
nihil sentiam, non vereor, ne hunt errorem meum mortui philosophi
irrideant.-De Senectute.




APPEND I X.
A.
APPENDED is the original of the passage from Pliny, quoted m
the ninth chapter, and accidentally omitted in its proper place:
it forms the proem to his seventh book.
Mundus, et in eo terrse, gentes, maria, insignes insulse, urbes ad
hunc modum se habent. Animantium in eodem natura nullius
prope partis contemplatione minor est, siquidem omnia exequi humanus animus queat. Principiumjure tribuetur homini, cujus causa
videtur cuncta alia genuisse natura, magna et smva mercede contra
tanta sua munera; ut non sit satis estimare, parens melior homini, an tristior noverca fuerit. Ante omnia unum animantium
cunctorum alienis velat opibus: cseteris varie tegumenta tribuit,
testas, cortices, coria, spinas, villos, setas, pilos, plumam, pennas,
squamas, vellera.  Truncos etiam  arboresque cortice, interdum
gemino, a frigoribus et calore tutata est.  Hominem tantum
nudum et in nuda humo, natali die abjicit ad vagitus statim et
ploratum, nullumque tot animalium aliud ad lacrymas, et has protinus vitse principio. At, Hercule, risus preecox ille et celerrimus
ante quadrigesimum diem nulli datur. Ab hoc lucis rudimento,.
quoe ne feras quidem inter nos genitas, vincula exoipiunt, et omnium membrorum nexus: itaque infeliciter natus jacet manibus
pedibusque devinctis, flens, animal cseteris imperaturum; et a
suppliciis vitam auspicatur, unam tantum ob culpam, qua natum
est. Heu dementiam ab iis initiis existimantium ad superbiam
se genitos! Prima roboris spes, primumque temporis munus
quadrupedi similem facit. Quando homini incessus? quando vox?
quando firmum cibis os? quandiu palpitans vertex, summse inter
cuncta animalia imbecillitatis indicium? Jam morbi, totque medicinse contra mala excogitate, et hse quoque subinde novitati



318                      APPENDIX.
bus victse. COetera sentire naturam suam, alia pernicitatem usurpare, alia prepetes volatus, alia nare: hominem nihil scire, nihil,
sine doctrina, non fari, non ingredi, non vesci: breviterque non
aliud naturse sponte, quam flere.  Itaque multi extitere, qui
non nasci optimum censerent, aut quam ocyssime aboleri. Uni
animantium luctus est datus, uni luxuria, et quidem innumerabi
libus modis, ac per singula membra: uni ambitio, uni avaritia, uni
immensa vivendi cupido, uni superstitio, uni sepulturse cura, atque
etiam post se de futuro. Nulli vita fragilior, nulli rerum omnium
libido major, nulli pavor confusior, nulli rabies acrior. Denique
coetera animantia in suo genere probe degunt: congregari videmus, et stare contra dissimilia: leonum feritas inter se non
dimicat; serpentium morsus non petit serpentes; ne maris quidem bellum ac pisces, nisi in diversa genera, sseviunt. At, Hercule,
homini plurima ex homine sunt mala.
B.
In the Chapter on the " Rendition of Fugitives from Labor," I
have expressed the opinion that the people are not required, by
the law of 1850, to assist in the recovery of the fugitive, but
merely to assist the officers of justice to defeat any factions opposition which may be made to the recovery, the officer himself
being supposed to be able to execute the law in case of the fugitive being the only person to resist it. Such is my construction
of the law; but, that the reader may judge of the matter for himself, I annex the clause referred to. The point is of no importance to the main argument, which is designed to establish the
principle of the law rather than to defend its particular provisions:
An Act to amend the Act respecting Fugitives, etc., passed Sept.
18, 1850.
"~ 5. *   * * * * And the better to enable the said Commissioners, when thus appointed, to execute their duties faithfully and efficiently, in conformity with the requirements of the




APPENDIX.                     819
Constitution of the United States and of this Act, they are hereby authorized and empowered, within their counties respectively,
to appoint, in writing, under their hands, any one or more suitable persons, from time to time, to execute all such warrants and
other process as may be issued by them in the lawful performance
of their respective duties; with authority to such Commissioners,
or the persons to be appointed by them, to execute process as
aforesaid, to summon and call to their aid the bystanders, or posse
comitatus of the proper county, when necessary to ensure a faithful observance of the clause of the Constitution referred to, in
conformity with the provisions of this Act; and all good citizens
are hereby commanded to aid and assist in the prompt and efficient execution of this law, whenever their services may be
required, as aforesaid, for that purpose; and said warrants shall
run, and be executed by said officers, anywhere in the State
within which they are issued." * * *
THE   END.