DEFENCE
OP
COM. CHARLES WILKES, U. S. N.,
LATE ACTING REAR ADMIRAL,
IN COMMAND OF THE
WEST INDIA SQUADRON.
READ BEFORE A
GENERAL COURT MARTIAL,
ON CHARGES PREFERRED BY
THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY.
WASHINGTON, D. C.:
McGILL & WITHEROW, PRINTERS AND STEREOTYPERS.
1864.




HON. 0. H. BROWNING,. 
BRITTselONfr. VHI, Ekes..,
BRITTON A. HILL, ESq., J




DEFENCEt
I am called to answer before you to charges preferred
against me by the HIonorable Secretary of the Navy. He is
my accuser and prosecutor. The time when, and the circumstances under which the prosecution was inaugurated
very clearly indicate that the honorable Secretary conceives
his official reputation to be, to some extent, involved in the
issue.
The events involved in the first and second charges had
their inception more than a year ago, and were fully terminated on the 13th of June, 1863. On the 26th of February,
1863, I hoisted my flag on board the United States steamship Vanderbilt, and on the same day addressed an official
dispatch to the Secretary of the Navy, dated on board that
vessel, informing him fully and franlly of vwhat I had done,
and foreshadowing, as far as I then could, my intended
future movements. This dispatch was received at the Navy
Department on the 10th day of April, 1863. Between the
26th of February and the 13th of June, when I transferred
my flag to the United States steamship Alabama, and placed
the Vanderbilt under the command of Lieutenant Baldwin,
I addressed to the honorable Secretary over thirty other
dispatches, all dated on board the Vanclerbilt, givinog from
time to time the details of my operations with her, and all
which were in due time received at the Navy Department.
During the same period I received communications from the
Secretary of the Navy, written after he was fully apprised
that I had taken the Vanderbilt under my command; of the
service to which I had devoted her; and the cruises I had
made with her; but neither then, nor subsequently-neither
whilst I was in command of her, nor since my retirement
from the active service-did I ever hear one word of complaint, one murmur of dissatisfaction, regardilng my conduct.




4
During all this time the rebel cruisers have been roving
unrestrained upon the seas, terrifying our nlerchant ships,
and committing fearful havoc upon our commerce. The just
expectations of the country have not been met by their capture or destruction.  It seems to be supposed, and perhaps
truly, that for this failure somebody is to blame, and the
honorable Secretary on his part seems to have supposed it
Mwas necessary to give to a disappointed and dissatisfied public some explanation of the failure.  Accordingly, the honorable Secretary in his report, dated December 7th, 1863,
and laid before Congress at its present session, attributed to
mne the grave offense of having " wholly defeated the plans
of the Department for the capture of the Alabama, Florida,
and Georgia."  This report was published, and sent abroad
to the world. I felt that I was most unjustly assailed, nay
conderlmned, without having been called upon by the Secretary for an explanation of my conduct in taking possession
of the Vanderbilt, and using her temporarily, for the protection of our commerce; in breaking up the contraband trade
of the rebels, and rendering  other valuable  and  important services to the Government; and if this report was
permitted to go without contradiction from me, it could not
but be very damaging to my character.  My reputation,
earned by forty-five years of arduous, perilous, and incessant
toil in the service of my country, is as dear to me as the
Secretary's can be to him.  I owed it not only to myself,
but also those who sustain to me the nearest, dearest, and
tenderest relations in life, to protect that reputation from
being unjustly tarnished.  The instinct of self-defense is
universal.
I was not willing to bear the erroneous accusations of the
Secretary in his annual report, and be held up to the country as the cause of the failure of the Navy Department to
capture the rebel pirates, of which I was entirely innocent.
Indignant that I should have been selected and, as I conceived, unjustly assailed in the most public manner, as
soon as the attack upon me was brought to my notice, on the
11th of Decenmber, 1863, I addressed a frank, firm, and entirely respectful. letter to the Secretary of the Navy in vindication of myself.
It was not till after this had occurred that it was discovered that the good of the public service required that I
should be brought before a court-martial to answer for my
action in regard to the Vanderbilt. Every incident connected with my use of her had long been in the possession




of the Department; but I had not been rebuked for my conduct, not even called upon for an explanation. But now an
issue was made directly between the Secretary and myself.
It was of his seeking,  not nmine. Plans had failed, anid
somebody had to bear the responsibility of the failure. If I
made good my defense, that responsibility must fall upon
the Secretary. IHe cannot, therefore, but feel deep solicitude as to the issue of this trial. It can be doing him  no
injustice to suppose him agitated with a sensitive anxiety to
secure my conviction. His reputation, as well as mine, is
put at hazard. But we do not meet on equal ground; he
being my accuser and prosecutor has claimed and exercised
the prerogative of selecting and appointing the judges who
are to try me. I do not allow myself to question the perfect
honor, and inflexible integrity of the Court, or to doubt that
it will accord to me a patient hearing; give to the case that
seriousness of consideration which its importance demands,
and be guided to its conclusions by conscientious convictions of duty. But for public as well as private reasons, it
would have been better had the Court been otherwise noruinated. It was hardly just to the members of the Court that
my accuser should designate them, and enforce upon them
the responsible, and doubtless unpleasant, duty they have to
perform. HIowever pure their purposes, however unbiased
their feelings, however impartial their proceedings, however
just their decision, it will be difficult for that decision to give
the satisfaction, and win the perfect and acquiescent confidence, which it is always desirable to secure to the judgrnents of judicial tribunals. I complain of the organization
of the Court as illegal, and in violation of every principle of
right, and of fair and even-handed justice.  On the threshold of these proceedings I objected to the jurisdiction of the
Court to try me, because it was illegally constituted, having
been as I then contended, and now again contend, appointed
by a person who had no lawful authority to appoint it. My
objection was overruled, and the trial proceeded; but that
does not give the Court jurisdiction, if the objection was well
taken.
If appointed by a person without lawful and competent
authority, no consent or acquiescence can give it jurisdiction,
or validate its judgments. All its proceedings are corunin noi
judice and void, and ought now to be dismissed.
The fact of an objection to the jurisdiction having been
overruled in the earlier stages of the trial, does not preclude




me from renewing it now, and I proceed respectfully to present very briefly the reasons in support of the objection.
I do not anywhere fincd an enactment in relation to the
Navy, which, in express and direct terms, declares that an
accuser or prosecutor shall not appoint the court to try the
charges he brings; but I do find the principle which forbids
it, pervading all laws, rules, and regulations.  The law-makiLg power probably did not imagine that so wide a departure
foiom the plain and universally recognized principles of right
and justice would ever practically occur, and, therefore, did not
expressly provide for it.  The provision of lawv with respect
to the Army, is, " that whenever a general officer commanding an army, or a colonel commanding a separate department, shall be the accuser or prosecutor of any officer of the
Army of the United States under his command, the general
court-martial for the trial of sucl officer shall be appointed
by the President of the United States." —4th Slat. at Laryge,
417.
In respect to the zNavy the provision is, that " General
courts-martial may be convened as often as the Presidlent of
te UniLted States, the Secretary of the Navy, or the ComYnander-in-chief of the fleet, or commander of a squadron,
Xwhile acting out of the United States shall deem it necessary." —2 Stat., 45.
There can be no reason for the application of a different
principle to the organization of a naval court-martial fron
that which governs the orgoanization of a military courtmartial; and the law above cited unquestionably means that
uwhen tlhe Commander-in-chief of the fleet is the accuser the
court shall be appointed by the Secretary, aud that when the
Secretary is the accuserr the court shall be appointed by the
President.  There is no other imaginable contingency in
which it could becomre necessary for the President to act
at all.
In all other cases a court could be properly constituted
witkhout resort to himtI, without his interference. But in such
a case as this, where the Secretary is the accuser, it could
not be.:No officer of inferior authority could order it, and
Congress, tlherefore, provided for the precise conditionr of
thlings  which has now arisen, by enacting  that the President
should lhav-e power to order the court.
If thiis i- not the t rue construc-tion of the act, it has no
defilite aind precise meanlingl at all. It could lliot hlave been
intended thlat the President, Secretary, and Comlma'ander-in~t':ief should have concurrent jurisdiction, and in all cases




7
exercise, or be entitled to exercise the power in common,
and indifferently. This might lead to very embarrassing
conflicts of jurisdiction. Clearly each was to have his appropriate sphere, his separate jurisdiction, not to be encroached upon by the others. In certain contingencies the
Commander-in-chief was to act, in certain other contingencies the Secretary was to act, and in yet another the President. The contingency in which the President was to exercise his power had arisen in this case, but he did not act.
The Secretary invaded hisjurisdiction, usurped his authority,
and appointed a court under circumstances which take from
his act all legal validity, and render the whole proceeding
absolutely null and void.
Will it be contended that if a general in the Army should
appoint a court martial to try an officer of whom he was the
accuser, the proceedings of the court would be of the least
legal efficacy or force? Would it be any better if the Secretary of War should appoint a court for the trial of an officer of whom he was the accuser? Such a proceeding would
not only shock the sense of mankind, but outrage the most
common principles of justice. What would be said of a
proposition, in the ordinary judicial forums of the country, to
allow the prosecutor in an indictment for libel, or other personal grievance, to select the jury to try the party against
whom he had brought the accusation? It would be scouted
from the halls of justice, and would deserve to be; and yet
I can perceive no difference in the principle of that case and
this.
True, there is some slight difference in the verbiage of the
laws above cited, relating to army and navy courts-martial,
but none at all in their spirit and meaning. They mean the
same thing; but, being passed at different times, they are
differently worded. What is expressed in the one is neces.
sarily and plainly implied in the other. Why should safeguards be thrown around the officers of the Army which are
Withheld from the officers of the Navy? Why should these
be left exposed to an injustice from which those are protected? It could not have been intended to make a distinction, and the law makes none. In the one case no more
than in the other, has the prosecutor the right of appointing
the court. In this case having assumed to do so without
authority, and in violation of law, his act is null and void,
and this Court has no jurisdiction, and can pronounce no
judgment.
I further objected to the authority of the Court to proceed




8
with my trial, because there had been no court of inquiry,
and because I had not been called upon for any explanation
of the charges preferred against me. This objection shared
the fate of the other, and was overruled. I now renew it.
If the rules and regulations, orders and instructions for the
direction and government of the naval service are to be regarded by this Court as of any validity, then clearly, before
a general court-martial was ordered for my trial, it was necessary that I should have been called upon for explanation
in relation to the offences with which I was charged, and
that a preliminary inquiry should have been made into my
conduct. This does not admit of doubt. These were COinditions precedent to the ordering of a court-martial, and if
neglected, no court-martial could be legally constituted for
my trial.
I invite the attention of the Court to the 2d, 3d, and 4th
articles of the 35th chapter of the rules put in force February 15th, 1853.
They are as follows:
ARTICLE 2.
"When an officer shall be suspended from duty and reported to a superior officer, the superior officer will call upon
the officer so suspended for such explanation as he may
choose to furnish in relation to the offence with which he
may be charged, and for a list of persons whom he may
wish to have questioned in support of his explanation; and
the superior officer aforesaid may institute general inquiry
into the facts and circumstances, for the purpose of regulating his further proceedings."
ARTICLE 3.
"If, after such investigation, the officer ordering the same
shall not deem the offence of a character sufficiently serious
to require a court-martial, the officer against whom the coinplaint has been made shall be restored to duty within ten
days after the investigation is completed."
ARTICLE 4.
"If, on the contrary, after an investigation has been made,
the officer ordering the same should consider the offence
sufficiently important for investigation by a court-martial,




9
he shall transmit to the Secretary of the Navy, or to the
commander of the squadron, as the case may require, a particular statement of the offences with which the officer is
charged, embracing particularly the dates, places, and all
other facts which may be necessary to enable the proper
offieer to judge of the expediency of ordering a court-martial, and to frame charges and specifications, if a court
should be ordered; and he should also forward with such
statement the explanation of the party accused, with a list
of the witnesses proposed, stating where they are to be
found, and a brief statement of the information given by
the different persons at the previous investigation, &c.
The foregoing rules apply to all cases. There is no exception. They were designed to protect all alike from the
harrassment, vexation, and injustice of merely arbitary proceedings. No one is to be subjected to the anxiety, trouble,
and expense of a court-martial until he has had the opportunity of explanation afforded him, and, if that opportunity
be denied, he is not to be brought before a court-nlartial at
all. it is most reasonable and just that it should be so, and
that subordinates shall not be left altogether helpless in the
hands of those having authority over them. A court-martial is not to be perverted into an instrument for the redress
of personal grievances, nor the gratification of personal
enmities. Its objects and purposes are higher and nobler;
to punish the delinquences of offenders against the State,
and protect the public from the consequences of their misconduct. The safeguard against caprice and tyranny, and
an abuse of the power to order a court-martial is to
be found in the requirement for preliminary investigation
and the opportunity of explanation; and until this requiremnent is observed, and these conditions precedent performed,
no official, whatever his rank or station, can legally constitute a court-martial, and clothe it with the attributes of
trial and judgment. If this be not so, then the articles
cited are without meaning or operation. If they are not to
control the organization of courts-martial, they are without
effect, and had better never been published. There is nothing else for them to operate upon, and if they are not to be
observed, then they are only calculated to delude and mislead. I believe them to be as obligatory upon this court as
any law of Congress. If, in this I am right, then the court
has no legal existence, and can proceed no further than to
pronounce its own dissolution.  I submit the objections I
have taken to the legality of the organization of the Court.




10
They are grave questions.  You cannot escape them.  You
are bound to decide them.  Until you have done so you can
proceed no further.  What that decision will be I cannot
anticipate, and proceed, therefore, to present my defence
to the charges.
The first charige is " disobedience of the lawful orders of
his superior officer while in. the execution of the duties of
his office."
The first specification under this charge, after reciting an
order from tile Secretary of the Navy to Acting Lieutenant
Charles H. Baldwin, to take c)lmmnand of the United States
steamer.Vanderbilt, and to proceed with her on a cruise,
specified in said order, and after further reciting that the
accuse(l "did enter upon and take possession and control of
the United States steamnship Vanderbilt, and did transfer his
Rear Admiral's flag to the said steamship Vanderbilt, and
did thereafter for several months hold and control and use
the said steamship as the flag-ship of the said West India
Squadrons," proceeds to present the gist or gravamen of the
offense in the following words:
"Yet he, the said Commodore Charles Wilkes, by his
acts aforesaidl, in entering upon and controlling and employing the said steamship Vanderbilt, did, during, the tinme
aforesaid,?dIlfdlly prevent the scaid Acting  ieutcnant Charles
1H. Baldclzin friom obeying the aforesaid lawful order of the Seeretary of the Actry, and did iml2ede the exccuttion by that officer of
the instructions therein conrttined, thus breaking up the arrangements Cnd p?(as of the Narty Dep)artmen.Ct, in dis).bedlience and
disregyard _lif  e al,thoritdy and the tenor and mlanifest imeaning and
purpose oJ the aforesaid lavwfi  orders of the Secretary" of the
Navy, acid in v'iolttion of the duty of hMsn, the said Co(mmodore
Chiarles 5'lkes as an ofgicer, to abstain from doing any acts to
prevent or impede the execution by the said Acting Lieutenant Ciharles IT. Baldwin of the aforesaid lawful order of
the Secretary of thle Navy according to its tenor and meanThat I did transfer my Rear Admiral's flag to the Vanderbilt, attaell her temporarily to the W'ecst Ildia Squadron,
and Iceep, her most actively tand vigorously cruising in the
WV est Idlile, un!der my orders from the  5oth day of Februai'-N, 18(S, till th!e 1-3th day of June, 18', are not controverted faicts.  Tll:it these things were all done is fully and
unequivoctally.iadmitted.  But these thin,s stlandi ng alone,
constitute no offence.  In their nature they are acts lawful




11
and proper to be done; and if they take on a wrongful
character it is because of their connection with some other
fact or circumstance which made it a violation of my duty
as an officer to perform them. And so the specification
alleges that I did therm in violation of my duty as an officer.
Without this allegation the specification would have been
insufficient to sustain the charge, and I could not have been
called upon to answer it. If I had lawful authority to do
the acts I did, and they were within the line of my duty,
then clearly the performance of them constitutes no offence.
for which I can be punished.  To determine the questions
both of power and duty, it becomes necessary for me to call
the attention of the court to the orders of the Secretary of
the Navy under which I acted as commander of the West
India Squadron, and also to the orders of the Secretary of
the Navy under whicll Lieut. Baldwin acted as Commander
of the Steailship of War Vanderbilt.
The Secretary of the Navy in his orders to me, dated
September 8th, 1862, after informing me that "' two or more
armed vessels without any recognized national flag, and
which are understood to be owned by rebels, are cruisingin
the West Indlies with a view to depredate on American commerce," and that "the Department has information that
other vessels are destined for similar purposes in the same
quarter, and it is therefore essential that prompt and vigorous measure be adopted for annihilating these lawless depredators by their capture, and, if necessary, destruction,"
proceeds to say: "You have been selected to command a
squadron for this purpose, to be composed of the steamers
Wachusett, Dacotah, Cimmerone, Sonoma, Tioga, Octorora
and Santiago de Cuba."  "With these vessels you will proceed at once to sea, having in. view the objects herein specified, and make your way to the Bahamas, in which vicinity
you will have your first rendezvous.  Your cruising ground
will be the Western Indies and Bahamas, thoughb you will
not be restricted to these limits should it be necessary to
pursue any privateer or enemy's vessel beyond them. Much
must necessarily be left to your judgment and discretion.
Dispatches for you will be sent to Havana."  In the orders
of the Secretary of the Navy to Lieutenant Baldwin, of January 27th, 1863, lie, Baldwin, is directed, "LAs Soonll as the
United States steamer Vanderbilt is ready you will proceed
with lher to sea, and resunme the search fior the steamer Alabama, or "290."  You will first visit HIavana, where you
may obtain information to govern your further imovements.




12
You can then visit any of the islands of the West Indies,
or any part of the Gulf at which you think you would be
most likely to overtake the Alabama, or procure infortnation of her.  When you are perfectly satisfied that the Alabama has left the Gulf or the West Indies and gone to some
other locality, you will proceed along the coast of Brazil, &c."
It will thus be perceived that I and Lieutenant Baldwin
were despatched on the same mission, with orders to cruise
in the same waters, and to perform the same service. My
headquarters were at Havana. Havana is the first place he
is directed to visit. My cruising ground was the Bahamas
and Western Indies. He is ordered to continue there until
he is perfectly satisfied that the rebel steamer Alabama has
left the Gulf or West Indies, and gone to some other locality.
My duty was to search for and capture the lawless depredators the rebels had sent forth to prey upon our commerce.
His was the same. He came to the West Indies in execution of his orders, fell in with one of the vessels of my
squadron, cruised in conjunction with her for some time,
and on the 25th day of February, 1863, reported to me at
St. Thomas.
Under these circumstances, I had the full and complete
legal right to take him and his vessel under my command,
and subject them  to my orders, if, in my opinion, it was
necessary to the public service that I should do so. I did
believe that the exigencies of the public service imperatively
required that I should, for the time being, augment and
strengthen my squadron by the addition of the Vanderbilt,
and I did, therefore, take possession of her, transfer my flag
to her and put her upon the most active service in executing
the orders -under which we were both acting. And now
when the transaction is long past, and I am able to look
back upon, and review it in the strong light which subsequent events have cast upon it, I feel that I should have
been unworthy of the commission Ibore, and the flag under
which I sailed, had a coward fear of the great but just responsibility which rested upon me deterred me from acting
as I did.
I proceed to demonstrate my legal right to take, detain,
and use her.
The 8th article of the first chapter of the rules and regulations adopted and put in force by the Secretary of the
Navy, by order of the President, on the 19th of February,
1841, provides that, " When an officer in command of a fleet,
squadron, or single ship, shall meet with his superior officer




13
in command, he shall, if practicable, wait on him and show
his general instructions; and if he shall have sealed or secret
orders, and his superior officer should determine to take him
under his immediate command, he will then make the fact
of his having sealed or secret orders known to his superior,
who will not, in any case, open any sealed orders, or divert
the inferior officer fiomn his original orders, or interfere in
any way with the vessels, officers, or others under his command, unless he may conceive it absolutely necessary for the public
service; and in case of any such diversion of force, in interference with the commands of an inferior officer by his superior, the inferior is to obey his original instructions afterwards, if still practicable and necessary, as soon as possible,
and will, as early as the nature of the service will permit,
communicate all the facts of the case to the person under
whose orders he may have been previously acting."
The same regulation, in all its essential features, is repeated in the " orders and instructions for the government
of the Naval service," promulgated by order of President
Fillmore, February 15, 1853.
When on the threshold of this trial, I excepted to the
proceedings, and questioned the jurisdiction of the Court to
try me upon charges which had not been submitted to a
court of inquiry, and in regard to which no opportunity of
explanation had been afforded me, and relied upon the rules
and regulations for the government of the Navy to sustain
my objections, I was told that these rules and regulations
were of no force or validity, and that the court could not
recognize them as furnishing rules for its guidance, but that
it must look alone to the laws enacted by Congress, and be
governed in its deliberations and decisions by them only.
It is not strange that I should have been filled with astonishment by this announcement, when I remembered that these
regulations had been promulgated by successive Presidents
and Secretaries of the Navy, and constantly and uniformly
recognized and accepted by the Navy as obligatory upon it,
from the day of their publication to the present time; and
I cannot doubt that the suggestion that the Court would disregard them in its present proceedings was made hastily, and
without due deliberation; and that the Court will, upon
more mature examination and consideration of the subject,
arrive at the conclusion that they are valid and bindingthat they have the force and effect of law, an'd that they do
furnish the rules by which the Court is bound to proceed,
and by which my conduct is to be judged.




14
The Government could do no more flagrant injustice to
the officers of the Navy, than to furnish them regulations
by which to govern themselves in the discharge of their various, arduous, and responsible duties, and deny them the
right, when arraigned upon charges of misconduct, to justify themselves by showing the conformity of their acts to
the regulations.
Argument upon this question, ho;vever, is needless. It
is not an open question, but res acldjudicata. The very point
has been under discussion before the highest judicial tribunal of the land, the Supreme Court of the United States,
and maturely considered and authoritatively put at rest by
its decision. To the authority of that decision I cannot hesitate to believe this Court will deferentially bow.
Iu the case of the United States vs. Eliason, 16 Pet., 301,
302, the question of the power of the President to make
rules and regulations for the government of the Army was
directly and distinctly raised, and as directly and distinctly
decided.
In delivering the opinion of the Court, Mr. Justice Daniel said: " The power of the Executive to establish rules and
regulations for the government of the Army is undoubted."
*         * *    The power to establish implies, necessarily,
the power to modify, or repeal, or create anew.
The Secretary of War is the regular constitutional organ
of the President for the administration of the military establishment of the nation; and rules and orders publicly promulgated through him must be received as the acts of the
Executive, and as such be binding upon all within the sphere
of his legal and constitutional authority. Such regulations
cannot be questioned or defied, because they may be thought
unwise or mistaken. The right of so considering and treating the authority of the Executive, vested as it is with the
command of the military and naval forces, could not be intrusted to officers of any grade inferior to the commanderin-chief; its consequences, if tolerated, would be a complete
disorganization of both the Army and Navy.
The question of the authority of the rules and regulations
again came before the Court in the case of Gratiot vs. the
United States, and in arguing against their authority Mr.
Cox observed: " It was said on the other side that the authority of the President does not rest upon acts of Congress.
I take issue upon this proposition  The Constitution says
Congress shall provide rules for the government of the Army
and Navy. What right has the President to do it?"  But




15
in pronouncing the opinion of the Court, Mr. Justice Wayne
met this argument by saying: "As to the Army regulations, this Court has too repeatedly said that they have the
force of law to make it proper to discuss that point anew;
as such of them as were assailed in the case by counsel, as
not warranted by law, the Coult think are as obligatory as
any of the rest."  4 How., 117.
I will not multiply authorities. These are so direct and
pointed, that I cannot feel myself justified in detaining the
Court to quote from others. And if these are not sufficient
to establish the authority of the President to make rules and
regulations for the government of the Army and Navy, and
the binding force of such rules and regulations when made
and promulgated, it is not probable that other cases would
be better heeded.
It is true, both cases cited arose under the Army Riegulations, but it is equally true that the power of the President
is the same in regard to both Army and Navy, and by a parity of reasoning if he can make binding rules for the government of the one, he can also for the other; and the Court
so views his authority in the opinions referred to.
IHe is equally the Commander-in-Clhief of the Navy as of
the Army. The one is as subject to his orders and control
as the other. IHis jurisdiction is the same over both.
But I do not rest the position for which I contend upon
judicial authority alone, though that is undoubtedly sufficient; for the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United
States are law to this Court, as well as to all other tribunals,
and all citizens of this Government.
But to put the matter beyond the possibility of doubt or
cavil, the attention of the Court is respectfully invited to the
consideration of a law whichl must heretofore have escaped
its notice, to be found on page 284 of the acts of the 2d session of the 37th Congress. It is the 5th section of the act
of which it is a part, and is in these words:
"And be it further enacted, That the orders, regulations,
and instructions, heretofore issued by the Secretary of the
Navy be and they are hereby recognised as the regulations of the Navy Department; subject, however, to such
alterations as the Secretary of the Navy may adopt, with the
approbation of the President of the Unite(l States."
This is definite, unambiguous, and emplhatic.  " The orders, regulations, and instructions, heretofore issued by the
Secretary of the Navy."
Not by any particular person but by a particular officer. It




16
is not the personal but the official character, not the personal
but the official act, that is regarded, and recognized, and
legalized, if indeed it needed any such recognition. No
matler who the man may have been, if he was Secretary of
the Navy. No matter what the regulation was, so that it
was a regulation of the Navy Department. No matter when
it was issued, so that it was before the passage of the law.
The only conditions are that it shall be a regulation of the
Navy Department, theretofore issued by the Secretary of the
Navy.
The 8th article of the 1st chapter of the rules and regulations before referred to fulfills all these conditions, and
is now a law of the land of as high authority, and as binding
upon this Court as any law of Congress. It is not only a law
of the Navy Department, but a law unalterable by the Secretary of the Navy. IIe cannot of his own mere will annul,
or in any manner alter, change, or modify it. It is law to
him, as well as to me. All the rules and regulations issued
by a Secretary of the Navy prior to the 14th of July, 1862,
the date of the passage of the act above quoted, have the
force and effect of laws, if they have not since been annulled
by competent authority.
I proceed now to examine the first specification of the first
charge in the light of the regulation herein before recited,
that regulation having the force and effect of law; being,
indeed, a law of the land, and the law especially applicable
in the present instance, and by which I am to be judged.
Indeed, the very oath administered to each member of the
Court at its organization, and before the commencement of
the trial, requires that I shall be tried accordlig to the rules
for the governmrent of the Navy, of which the rule cited is one.
Now, if, as I have been informed, there are no rules and regulations for the government of the Navy, I respectfully ask
the Court what this oath, which the law requires to be administered, and which was administered to each member of
the Court, means?
See acts 2d session, 37th Congress, 330. All orders from
the Secretary of the Navy to an officer in command of a vessel, or squadron, are subordinate to the laws, and the rules
and regulations applicable to the subject matter of the order,
and which prescribe the manner in which such order shall
be executed. Such law or regulation, in fact, becomes a
part of the order as much as if it were embodied in it, and
the officer executing the order is as much bound to regard




17
the provisions of the law, or regulation applicable to the
subject matter of the order, as he is to obey any command
expressed upon the face of the order.
I therefore stand before the Court in the same legal attitude as if the order of the Secretary of the Navy to Lieut.
Baldwin had said to him upon its face, " If you meet with
Rear Admiral Wilkes, who is in command of the West
India Squadron, you will, if practibable, wait on him, and
show him your orders; but he shall not interfere with you
or your vessel unless he shall consider it absolutely necessary for the public service; in which event you will obey
your instructions afterwards, if still practicable and necessary, as soon as possible." Had the order been so worded,
could there be a doubt as to my complete justification?
Surely not. Lieut. Baldwin did meet with me, did call
upon me and show me his orders, and I did take him and his
vessel under my command because I believed that the public service rendered it absolutely necessary, and imperatively
demanded that it should be done. It is not now a question as
to whether I judged wisely and well. I believe that I did.
I believe that subsequent events have demonstrated that I
did; but this I shall discuss hereafter. The only question
now is, whether I had the right of judging at all; whether
the law, or the regulation, which is the same thing, clothed
mne with authority to exercise a discretion upon the subject.
If it did, and that discretion was used honestly, and in good
faith, then I cannot be held to answer for it before a courtmartial, although it should now be made to appear that
I erred in judgment.
" Who does the best his circumstances allow,
Does well, acts nobly, angels could no more."
That the regulation does vest a discretion in a superior
officer, situated as I was, seems too plain to admit of cavil.
There is not room for two opinions. Its language is,
" unless he," meaning the superior officer to whom an inferior in command of a single vessel under special instructions
shall have exhibited his orders, " unless HE may consider it
absolutely necessary for the public service." It was I who,
under the law, was to take the matter into consideration. It
was I who was to decide it. It was my discretion that was
to be exercised, not that of another. It was my judgment
that was to determine the expediency of the measure, not
that of Lieut. Baldwin. And if that discretion was honestly used, if I was actuated by a single and sincere desire,
2




18
as I asseverate I was, to maintain the honor, vindicate the
rights and advance the interests of the country to whose
service I was devoting whatever of energy and capacity I
possessed, in reaching the conclusion, and adopting the
course that was pursued, then I stand fully justified before
the law, not amenable to any earthly tribunal for differences
of opinion which may then have existed, or may now exist
between myself and others as to the necessity and propriety
of the measure. Any other rule would be fraught with
most disastrous consequences to the efficiency of the Navy.
An officer in command of a fleet on a distant station is, at
all times, in a position of great delicacy and responsibility.
In the present circumstances of our unhappy and distracted
country he is trebly so. He is constrained to deal continually with momentous questions, not only affecting the interests of his own Government, but to a greater or less extent
involving the interests and the friendship or hostility of all
other nations with whom we maintain an intercourse.
He is cut off from counsel and advice. He has no access
to jurists and publicists, whose learning and experience
might guide him in safety through the labyrinths of the difficult and embarrassing questions of domestic and international law, which often bewilder and perplex him. He is
bound to decide for himself, decide promptly. There is no
time for investigation, scarce for reflection. With the orders
from his Government in his hand, and the rules and regulations before him, he must act on the instant. He must
take the responsibility. An officer who, at such a time,
would allow the apparition of a court-martial to fill him
with hesitating timidity and frighten him from the resolute
exercise of a discretion that was clearly and manifestly devolved upon him, would dishonor the flag that floated above
him and the commission that gave him his command.
Yet if it shall be settled that for the use of a purely discretionary power an officer shall be liable months after to be
brought before a court-martial and disgraced if some one
else shall chance to think that his discretion was not exercised in the best possible manner, how many will be appalled, yea, paralyzed by the threatening danger, and let
golden opportunities of noble deeds and valuable services
pass them unheeded.
It was never intended that it should be so, and such is
not the law. The orders under which I sailed informed me
that much was necessarily left to my judgment and discretion.
The rules and regulations which I bore with me, and which




19
had received the sanction of successive Presidents and Secretaries informed me that, in the contingency which had
then arisen, I was to be guided by my own judgment of the
necessities of the public service. The law of the land, as
expounded by the ablest, wisest, purest, and most learned
jurists our country has produced, assured me that for an
honest exercise of a discretionary power there could be no
after accountability.  Thus fortified I acted; and I invoke
the same authorities which were my warrant then as my
protection now.
A law of Congress of 1T95 provided that whenever the
United States should be invaded, or be in imminent danger
of invasion, &c., it should be lawful for the President of the
United States to call forth such number of the militia, &c?.,
as he might judge necessary to repel such invasion, &c.
The President, acting upon his own judgment of the
emergency, exercised the power by calling forth the militia.
It was denied that the exigency contemplated by the law
had arisen so as to authorize him to act.  The question Mwas
brought before the Supreme Court of the United States for
adjudication, and Mr. Justice Story, in delivering the unanimous opinion of the Court, said:
"He is necessarily constituted the judge of the existence
of the exigency in the first instance, and is bound to act
according to his belief of the facts.
*    *    *   "The law does not provide for any appeal
from the judgment of the President, or for any right in
subordinate officers to review his decision, and in effect
defeat it.  VWhenever a statute gives a discretionary pcwer to any
person, to be exercised by him upon his own opinion of certaict,facts, it is a sound rtde of construction, that the statute constitutes
hint the sole and exclusire judge of the existcnce of those facts.
*    *   *$   It is no answer that such a power may be
abused, for there is no power which is not susceptible of
abuse."
HIaving thus shown that the law vested in me the right,
and devolved upon me the p(wer and responsibility of
deciding upon the necessities of the pulnlic service; that I,
being the superior officer in command, was the sole and
exclusive judge of the necessity  of the  circumstances
surrounding me, and that there is no accountability for the
decision at which I arrived, if I exercised that right of judgment honestly and in good faith, which has not been
questioned, I might here rest my defence to the specification
under consideration.  The answier already given, I ecnceive




20
to be full and complete, and unassailable upon any principle
of law or justice; and if I am to be judged by the law; if
its plain provisions are to govern the decisions of the case;
if both its letter and spirit are not to be disregarded, I must
be acquitted of the offeince imputed to me in this specification. But I do not leave it here.
This question is yet to be exhibited in another legal aspect
not less pertinent, striking, and invulnerable than that
already presented. I am not charged with any violation of
orders directed by the Navy Department to me. I believe
it is conceded that I observed with scrupulous fidelity my
own orders; and displayed more than ordinary vigor and
energy in carrying them into effect. The charge, I grant, is
disobedience of the lawful orders of my superior officer.
This, of course, implies the orders of my superior officer to
me, and is susceptible of no othe, construction-disobedience
by me of orders addressed to me by my superior officer. The
specifications must be in harmony with the charge, and only
a more particular and detailed exhibition of the charge; and
if they depart from it, and undertake to present some new
matter not indicated by the charge, they must fail. They
cannot be sustained.
Now, singular as it may seem, the first specification under
the above charge of disobedience of orders makes no reference whatever to any order ever issued by any superior
officer, or by the Secretary of the Navy to me. It does
incidentally state that the squadron known as the West
India squadron had been assigned to my command, but does
not intimate that orders of any kind or character had ever
been issued to me from any quarter; much less does it
impute to me disobedience of any such orders. It departs
entirely from the charge, and presents a totally new issue;
namely, that I did willfully prevent Lieutenant Baldwin from
obeying orders issued by the Secretary of the Navy to him,
and impede his execution of the instructions therein contained.
The question arises whether, under a charge of disobedience of orders issued to me, I can be convicted of
obstructing the execution of orders issued to another. It
would be in violation of all recognized rules of law for the
government of judicial proceedings, and, I most respectfully
submit, in violation of your own oaths. It would be an
anomally without precedent or parallel in the records of
judicial tribunals. As well upon an indictment for murder
might you find a man guilty of arson or robbery.




By the law of the Navy, upon an inferior officer coming
within my jurisdiction, it was both my right and duty, in
the absence of special orders to the contrary, to take him
under my command, and subject him to my control.
In 1805, Rear Admiral Sir Edward Pellew was Naval
Commander-in-chief in India. The Admiralty created that
part of the station which lay to the east of Ceylon into a
separate command, and conferred it upon a junior officer,
Rear Admiral Sir Thomas Trowbridge. Sir Thomas on arriving in India, communicated his appointment to Sir Edward Pellew; but as Sir Edward had received no letters of
recall friom the Admiralty, he declared that in consequence
of this omission he could not resign any portion of his command until such letters should arrive; that he was charged
by the King with the command of the whole station, and
that he was therefore bound by the regulations of the service to retain his post until he should be recalled or superseded by proper authority.  Sir Thomas, on the contrary,
maintained that Sir Edward Pellew's commission was cancelled by the issue of another without a direct recall. Sir Edward,
however, peremptorily told Sir Thomas that if he remained in
India, he must place himself under Sir Edward's orders; for
that as Sir Edward's commission comprehended all the station, it
was impossible for a junior to exercise supreme command in any
portion of it during the presence of his superior officer. The dispute was referred to the Admiralty, where it was determined
that Sir Edward Pellew had taken a correct view of the
subject. Had Sir Edward Pellew acted otherwise, very
grave questions might afterwards have arisen as to the legality of the acts done under the dubious authority of Sir
Thomas Trowbridge's commission, and also as to the distribution of prize money.-(Pendergrast, 64, 65.)
It would be difficult in any case, to find authority more
directly in point than this is.
In respect to Lieutenant Baldwin and the Vanderbilt, I
had no orders to the contrary, and could not therefore have
disobeyed any by attaching him temporarily to my squadron.
The Secretary sent him into the cruising ground where I,
under the law and my instructions, was to exercise supreme
command, and subordinate all of inferior rank, who came
within the prescribed limits, to my orders, and he did not
think fit to give me any special order in contravention of the
general rule; and having no order upon the subject, I
neither did, nor could have violated or disobeyed any. The
first and only order from the Department, modifying the




general rule, addressed to me, and informing me that the
Vanderbilt was not to be attached to my squadron, but was
to go upon special service, was received by me on the 9th
or 10th of June. This I promptly obeyed. I immediately
released the vessel, put her in the best possible condition
for future service that I had the means of doing, by supplyinog her wvith coal, officers, seamen and marines, and sent her
forward upon her cruise, under the command of Lieutenant
Baldwin, as directed. There is iLo pretence that I disobey ed
this order. Neither the specification nor the evidence is
addressed to it. What order then did I disobey? It is not
too strong to characterize it as absurd to impute to me disobedience of orders neither addressed to me, nor intended
for me. I might obstruct them. Disobey them I could not,
for they conveyed no command to me. But I am not on
trial for obstructing, but disobeying, and the Court must
confine itself to the charge.
If it be said that the order to Lieutenant Baldwin was
intended for me, which is the only ground upon which the
charge of disobedience can be insisted upon, then I answer
that I obeyed it. If any part of it was intended for me,
obligatory upon me, and a rule to guide and govern me, the
whole of it was-that which vested discretion, as well as
that which imparted commands.
It cannot, and I am sure will not be insisted, that I was
to take the responsibilities which the orders imposed, without the powers which they gave. In other words, that I am
to be subjected to them so far as they make against me, but
not permitted to intrench myself behind the clauses which
justify me.
If these orders were not, in effect, orders to me, and if I
was not to accept and act upon them as such, then it is preposterous to assert that I disobeyed them.
If, on the contrary, they were to be regarded as orders to
me, then, as I before stated, I obeyed them in letter and in
spirit; cruised with the Vanderbilt in the West Indies until
I was perfectly satisfied that the rebel steamers had left, and
then sent her forward under her instructions.
But if, in disregard of all precedent and all principle, it
shall be urged that upon a charge of disobediehce of orders
to me, I may be convicted of obstructing the execution of
orders to another, to that I answer that the assumption of
obstruction is not sustained by the evidence.
I have already called the attention of the Court to the
material part of the specification, namely, that I did willfully




23
prevent Lieutenant Baldwin from obeying the order of the
Secretary of the Navy, and did impede the execution by
that officer, of the instructions contained in that order.
This is the accusation which the prosecution brings, and
which, by all the principles of law applicable to proceedings
of this character, the prosecution is bound to prove fully,
and completely, and beyond all reasonable doubt, before
asking my conviction.
The same rules of the law of evidence obtain in courtsmartial as in other courts of criminal jurisdiction, and the
Court is, or ought to be equally governed by them. The
same presumptions prevail, and these presumptions should
be allowed to have their just, full, and complete operation.
One of these presumptions is, that the accused is innocent
until his guilt is made to appear by the evidence adduced by
the prosecution. One of these rules is, that, in all criminal
cases whatsoever, it is essential to a verdict of condemnation
that the guilt of the accused shall be fully proved; neither
a mere preponderance of evidence, nor any weight of preponderant evidence, is sufficient for the purpose, unless it
generate full belief of the fact to the exclusion of all reasonable doubt. It is not enough to make a probable or prima
facia case. There must be full proof of guilt. The evidence
must be both con6lusive and exclusive. In the language of
Mr. Starkie, it must exclude, or at least tend to exclude, the
possibility of the truth of any other hypothesis than the one
attempted to be established.
These rules and presumptions are alike applicable to all
the charges and all the specifications of all the charges. Let
the allegation that I willfully prevented Lieutenant Baldwin
from obeying his orders, and impeded his execution of the
instructions contained in his orders, be brought to the touchstone of these rules, and what becomes of it? I may proudly,
even defiantly, ask where are the proofs demanded by the
law (and without which the law will not be satisfied) to justify, or even palliate, my condemnation. I fearlessly and
confidently assert that not one act of mine tended to hinder
or obstruct the execution of the orders and instructions given
by the Secretary of the Navy to Lieutenant Baldwin. On
the contrary, I allege that everything I did whilst the Vanderbilt was under my command was in reasonable conformity to those orders, and in faithful execution of the instructions therein contained. The instructions to Lieutenant
Baldwin, as before stated, were: "You will first visit Havana, where you may obtain information to govern your




24
further movements. You can then visit any of the islands
of the West Indies, or any part of the Gulf at which you
think you would be most likely to overtake the Alabama, or
procure information of her. When you are perfectly satisfied that the Alabama has left the Gulf, or the West Indies,
and gone to some other locality, you will proceed along the
coast of Brazil," &c.
Now, after Lieutenant Baldwin had reported to me, and I
had in the exercise of my discretion, and in my judgment of
the absolute necessities of the public service, taken him under my command, as I had full and ample lawful authority
to do, the right and duty of determining when the rebel
cruiser Alabama had left the Gulf or West Indies and gone
to some other locality, were both transferred to me. I was
to judge of that event, not he. My mind was to be perfectly
satisfied that the contingency had transpired, and I would
have been grossly derelict in duty, and unable to justify nmy
action, had I sent the Vanderbilt forward before I was so
satisfied. It would not even have been a palliation of my
conduct to allege that some one else believed the rebel Alabama had left those seas when I had, myself, no satisfactory
evidence of that fact. But if it be an open question, whether
I exercised the discretion vested in me by law in good faith,
judiciously and wisely, I can appeal with confidence to the
facts, and submit that the evidence elicited upon this trial
establishes, beyond the admission of reasonable doubt, that
all my movements, whilst the Vanderbilt was under my command, were in faithful and efficient execution of the orders,
instead of disobedience and obstruction thereof; and that
as I had such evidence of the departure of the Alabama as
any one in my position would have been excusable for accepting as the basis of important action, I detached the Vanderbilt from my squadron and dispatched her, under command of Lieutenant Baldwin, in execution of such parts of
the instructions under which she sailed as had not already
been fulfilled.
It is especially pertinent here to enter upon a brief review
of my situation in the West Indies, and the forces under my
command, and subject to my control when the Vanderbilt
arrived.
The Secretary of the Navy, in his letter to me of the 15th
December, 1863, says in allusion to my command in the
West Indies:
"You had under your brief command, including the
steamers improperly detained, sixteen vessels."




25
The only natural and logical deduction from this is, that
during my cruising in the West Indies I had at all times at
my command sixteen vessels suitable for the objects and
purposes for which I was sent there, to search for and capture the rebel privateers. This is, to me, an extraordinary
and unaccountable statement. I never had at my disposal,
at any one time, one half that number fit for the performance of the duties I was charged to perform. Some of those
promised me, and enumerated in the orders under which I
sailed, never joined me at all; and others that did join were
capable of duty for only a few days, and others again left
me soon after joining.
By the orders of the honorable Secretary to me, dated
September 8th, 1862, under which I sailed for the West Indies, and which are set out in full in the second specification
of the first charge, I am informed that my fleet is to consist
of seven steamers, namely: the Wachusett, Dacotah, Cimcrone, Sonoma, Tioga, Octorara, and Santiago de Cuba. I
anm directed to proceed at once to sea, and to cruise in the
West Indies and Bahamas, and beyond those limits, if necessary, to pursue any privateer or enemy's vessel. "M Much
must be left to your discretion and judgment," is an emphatic part of my orders; and the capture of the Florida and
Alabama and the protection of our commerce in the West
Indies by every means in my power, were made the main
objects of the operations of my squadron. My headquarters
were fixed at Havana. When I repaired to my promised
squadron of seven ships I found only three; the Wachusett,
Tioga, and Sonoma. All in bad condition for a voyage to
the West Indies to engage in active cruising for an enemy.
I made such repairs as were practicable, and sailed from
Washington for Hampton Roads on the 17th September,
1862, when I was ordered by telegraph of the 20th September to go to Bermuda on nly way to the Bahamas and West
Indies. Proceeding with the Wachusett, Tioga, and Sonoma, to St. George harbor, Bermuda, I found several steamers under the British flag, some of them ready to run the
blockade into southern confederate ports with valuable cargoes. The destination and purposes of these blockade runners, thus protected by the British flag, were well known to
all the inhabitants of that seaport, and I took occasion to
open correspondence with H. B. M's. Governor of Bermuda,
tI. St. George Ord, cautioning him against the consequences
of these acts, which were in direct violation of her Maljesty's
proclamation of amnesty. I left the Tioga and Sonoma to




26
cruise for blockade runners, in the neighborhood of Bermuda, for about two weeks, while I passed down to the Bahamas. I fell in with the Octorara, the fourth vessel of my
squadron, in the Providence channel, on my way to Havana.
The Santiago de Cuba did not join me until about the 4th
of November. The other vessels promised me did not arrive, and neither one of these five ships was fit to accept
battle from an enemy in an ordinary breeze in the open
ocean, on account of improper construction and armament.
Besides this, the Wachusett and Santiago de Cuba were the
only vessels that had a speed exceeding ten knots, and each
of these was imperfect, and ill adapted to a service so severe
and arduous, and covering cruising grounds of such great
extent and intricacy.
On my arrival ill the West Indies, the Wachusett, my flag
ship, was found to be defective in her boilers and broken
down, and was a continual source of trouble and annoyance
from that time forward till she was sent home in May for
repairs and new boiler tubes.
Formidable difficulties presented themselves in Cuba, on
account of the running of the Blanche ashore by the steamer
Montgomery; and, in fact, nearly all the authorities of all
the islands of the West Indies and Bahamas were opposed
to the cause of the United States, and in favor of the confederates.
I found the task imposed upon me by my orders vastly
greater than I could hope to perform with the few ships at
my command, surrounded on all sides by spies and enemies
and their sympathizers. Under these disadvantages I commenced a cruise which lasted about nine months, and resulted
in the total destruction of the enemy's plans in the West
Indies, Bahamas, and Texas, and drove their cruisers entirely
out of those seas, and so broke up the blockade running as
to prevent their attempts to any considerable degree between
the 1st of April and 10th June, inclusive.
During this cruise, with a squadron loftily called the
flying squadron, but which would have been better characterized as the creeping squadron of disabled ships, crippled
by their defective machinery, and perpetually out of order,
rolling at sea so wildly and rapidly as to endanger their
safety, and preclude the possibility of using, in an ordinary
sea, the ponderous guns which had been injudiciously placed
upon such vessels, I was fortunate enough to capture thirteen
steamers and twenty sailing vessels, all blockade runners
which had been actively employed in a contraband trade to




27
Mobile, Charleston, Galveston, and other points on the
southern coast.
Onl the 13th October, 1862, I sent to the Secretary of the
Navy, from Havana, a full account of the purposes of the
confederates to attack our commerce in the West Indies
and to make those islands a rendezvous for their ships of
war during the coming winter, and urged the necessity of
occupying the channels which the confederate ships must
pass or resort to, and repeated my opinion that "it was
utterly useless for us to attempt to cruise successfully at
those points with single steamers, &c.; that none of the
enemy's vessels could escape if we cruised in pairs in sufficient force; and that the slave trade was being carried on
in Cuba to a considerable extent-ten thousand slaves having
been imported there within the last few months."
From that day until the arrival of the Vanderbilt, I did
not cease to represent to the Department the imperative
necessity of furnishing me with more ships for the performance of the difficult and important duties which had been
assigned me.
On the 20th October, I called the attention of the Department to the non-arrival of the Santiago de Cuba, Cimerone, Dacotah, and Vanderbilt, which had been.promised
me, and which I had a right to expect would ere then have
joined my squadron.
In January, 1863, I notified the Department that the rebel
Alabama and Florida were in the West Indies, as I had foretold they would be, and that I was in hot pursuit of them.
From that time forth I used all the force I had at my command for their capture, but my squadron, as I had predicted,
and as every one acquainted with the difficulties of the
passages in the Bahamas and West Indies must have foreseen, who knew the condition of the force at my command,
was insufficient for the purpose.
The U. S. Alabama, Oneida, R. R. Cuyler, and San
Jacinto had joined my squadron in January and February,
but the Cuyler was at Key West coaling and repairing to
return to Admiral Farragut. The San Jacinto had broken
down in six days after she joined me and was sent home.
My flag ship, the Wachusett, was disabled and worthless,
and the Juniata, Cimerone, Dacotah, and Rhode Island,
expected by nie, had not joined my squadron.
The Tioga, Santiago de Cuba, Sonoma, Octorara, U. S.
Alabama, and Oneida, the only serviceable ships I had on
the 25th of February, 1863, were wholly insufficient to cover




28
my cruising ground, extending, as it did, over three thousand miles-from KeyWest thb rough the Bahamas, the greater
and lesser Antilles, the Virgin Islands, and the Islands of
the Spanish Main. Six more steamers of superior speed
were absolutely necessary to give reasonable assurance of
success, and every ship gained added in compound ratio to
the strength and efficiency of my squadron.
Ten valuable ships of war were then cruising independently of each other for the capture of the rebel pirates, and
it must be manifest to every experienced naval officer that if
only five of them had been added to my squadron in December, 1862, as they might have been, not only without detriment, but with great advantage to the public service, the
rebel cruisers would have been destroyed, the contraband
trade effectually destroyed, and all supplies to the confederate army arrested.
It was in this condition of affairs that Lieutenant Baldwin
arrived at St. Thomas, in the Vanderbilt, on the 25th of
February, 1863. He had been ordered to Havana, my headquarters, for information to govern his future movements.
I-e had already cruised for ten days in conjunction with one
of my ships, under his superior in command, and had agreed
to meet him in the Mona Passage. This act alone brought
him under my command.  Under his orders he could not
then leave the West Indies, for the rebel pirates were present
there; and it cannot be supposed that I could permit him to
continue to cruise in the midst of my squadron, independent of my orders. Had I done so, my squadron would have
been demoralized and my authority set at defiance. What
was I to do?  I could not communicate with the Department and obtain direction there to guide me in the emergency. There was no time for delay. I was bound to act
upon the instant, and on my own judgment. I examined
Lieutenant Baldwin's orders, and finding in them authority
in conflict with my own, and no prohibition against my
subjecting him to my command whilst he remained in the
West Indies, as I was fully authorized to do by the regulations of the Navy, I transferred my flag to his ship, went in
chase of the enemy, and drove him from that great thoroughfare of our commerce.
In doing this nothing was more remote from my intentions than to set at defiance the authority of my superiors.
I acted from a high sense of duty alone, and upon a conscientious conviction of what that duty was. I neither dis



29
obeyed my own orders nor hindered and obstructed another
in the observance of his.
I cannot meet and repel the charge of wilfully preventing
Lieutenant Baldwin from obeying the orders of the Secretary of the Navy, and impeding the execution of the instructions therein contained, than by recapitulating the history
of my operations with the Vanderbilt, and derived from the
evidence. In this recapitulation I shall follow the account
given of my cruising by Lieutenant Baldwin, who, I am
sure, will not be exposed to the unjust suspicion of construing me too favorably, or overstating anything to my advantage.
On the 25th February, 1863, I subjected the Vanderbilt to
my command, and ordered her to board and search the
Peterhof, and subsequently to capture and send her in for
adjudication, which he did. On the 26th I transferred my
flag to the Vanderbilt, the Wachusett, on which I then was,
being utterly broken down, and unfit for duty. At 9 o'clock
of the same evening I left St. Thomas, sailing to the westward along the south coast of Porto Rico, and to the Mona
channel, remaining there about twenty-four hours, to meet
the United States steamer Alabama, Commander Nichols,
with whom Lieutenant Baldwin had appointed a meeting
there. Anchored for a few hours at the port of San Carlos;
from there sailed along the north coast of Porto Rico,
through the Virgin channel, conmmunicating with one of the
ships of my squadron off St. Thomas; and front thence to
Point a Pitre. There I purchased a cargo of coal, to be delivered on my return, and continued the cruise to Barbadoes
wvith the double object of bringing the Governor of that
island to an explanation for having permitted the Florida to
coal a second time within ninety days, in violation of the
British proclamation of neutrality, and to intercept a rebel
privateer, which I had previously heard was at Barbadoes
ready to sail. From the 13th to the 15th March we returned
to St. Thornas, having, during the entire cruise, made constant and diligent inquiry and search for the confederate
vessels.
After remaining at St. Thomas one or two days, we again
sailed, passing along the north coast of Porto Rico and San
Domingo, stopping a few hours at Nicola Mole, and thence
through the Bahama channel to IIavana, commutnicating,
with the Lobos lighlt-house keeper in the channel. During
this cruise we boarded several vessels-among others two
steamers belonging to my squadron, making diligent inquiry




30
at all available sources of information, for the confederate
ships Florida and Alabama, and vigilant search for them.
On arriving at Havana, the ship's supply of coal was exhausted, and her tubes leaking badly. I ordered her to Key
West to coal and repair, limiting her to ten days for these
purposes. She went there, coaled, patched her boiler, and
returned on the tenth day.
On the 11th of April we again sailed from Havana to the
northward and eastward, through the Providence channel
to Nassau, remaining there a few hours, communicating
with the United States Consul; thence off the mouth of the
northeast Providence channel for two or three days; thence
through the passages to the southward, touching and remaining for a few hours at Columbus Point, and Fortune Island
to off Cape Maysi, remaining in that neighborhood two or
three days, and then to Santiago de Cuba. There, for two
or three days we were coaling, and then sailed for the windward channel and Nicola Mole; thence along the north coast
of San Domingo and Porto Rico to San Juan de Portd Rico,
where we remained about two days, and thence to St.
Thomas, where we arrived on the 30th of April.
During this cruise, as on the former ones, we spoke all the
vessels we met, communicated with our Consuls at the ports
we visited; sought for information of the Florida and Alabama everywhere that it was at all likely to be obtained,
and continued in active search of them  day and night. It
-was also upon this cruise that we captured and sent in the
steamer Gertrude, a blockade runner, since condemned.
On getting back to St. Thomas from this cruise, information reached me, through the United States Consul at NMartinique, that the confederate ship Alabama was blockaded
there by the TUnited States ships Alabama and Oneida. We
immediately sailed to co-operate with them, leaving St.
Thomas at one o'clock, p. m., of the 30th April, and arrived off the northeast side of the island of Martinique on
the night of the first of May.
The report we had received at St. Thomas was, that the
United States ship Alabama and Oneida were blockading the
privateer Alabama in one of the anchorages on the windward
side of the island. We lay there until daylight, and then ran
along the coast, just outside of the reefs, examining all the
anchorages, and went round to St. Pierre of the same island.
There we found the United States ships Oneida and Alabama
at anchor, and learned that they, also, had thoroughly exarr



31
ined the other side of the island, and that the rumors on
which we had come down were unfounded.
We anchored over night in the port of Fort de France,
and the next day, May 3d, I visited the Governor of the
island, who returned my visit in the afternoon.
The next day we went to St. Pierre, where we anchored,
but in the afternoon of the same day went over to Barbadoes,
where we lay off and on, and communicated with the
TUnited States Consul. In the afternoon of May 5th we
went over to the island of St. Lucia, and at daylight communicated with the town of Castries, in that island, and
then again went on to Martinique, anchoring at St. Pierre
May 6th.
The next day we got under way for Santa Cruz, where
we arrived the succeeding night, and thence went over to
St. Thomas, arriving there on the 11th of May.
During this cruise also, we made the most diligent search
and inquiry for the confederate privateers, with a view to
their capture; and Lieutenant Baldwin swears before the
Court that, had he been in sole command of the Vanderbilt
on the 1st of May, he would have sailed for Martinique on
the report of the American Consul, that the confederate
ship Alabama was there blockaded by two of our ships.
Clearly, down to this time I had not prevented the execution of his orders, for he would, uncontrolled by mle, have
done precisely what he did under my command.
HIe also states that he did not himself get satisfactory information that the rebel cruisers had left the West Indies,
until just before or just after the first of May, and he could
not, therefore, in observance of his orders, have sailed south
prior to that time.
After remaining some days at St. Thomas, on my return
from Martinique, I sailed for Laguayra, communicating with
Blanquilla on my way down, and with Caracoa and Santa
Cruz on my way back, returning to St. Thomas on the 9th
of June.
Is it extravagant to say that the annals of naval service
afford no evidence of more active, vigilant, and persevering
cruising than is here' exhibited? Lieutenant Baldwin himself does me the justice to say that, in his opinion, I was
exceedingly active and energetic in the performance of all
the various duties of the commander of a squadron, and
that in his career he has never known one more so. And
this is fully corroborated by all others of the witnesses who
were on the station, and had knowledge of my operations.




32
In storm and in calm, by night and by day, through intricate channels, and among dangerous reefs, at all times,
under all circumstances, and amid all perils, we were in
eager search for the rebel pirates, at all places where information led us to hope they might be encountered. And
may I not ask whether any one does, or can doubt that my
sole object in all this was to carry out, in good faith, the
orders, objects, and purposes of the Secretary of the Navy;
faithfully to serve my country; to protect her commerce,
and to sweep from the seas the rebel rovers who were preying up-on it? Can any one, with this evidence before him,
believe that I hindered, and obstructed the execution of the
orders that assigned both Lieutenant Baldwin and myself
to the performance of this arduous and important work? It
would be monstrous to say that the evidence is conclusive,
or that it even preponderates against me.
And yet until it assumes a conclusive character, I cannot
rightfully be convicted.
I proceed to the second specification of the first charge:
That without permission to do so, I ordered the steam vessels
of war Oneida and R. R. Cuyler to the West India squadron, and refused obedience to an order to return them to the
West Gulf squadron.
A brief history of my possession and use of these ships,
will be my full defence and justification. They came into
my cruising ground, united with my squadron, and placed
themselves under my jurisdiction, without any participation
or contrivance of mine; and very certainly for this I am not
responsible. Captain Emmons, the commander of the R.
R. Cuyler, states that the rebel Oreto had escaped from Mobile, in the jurisdiction of Admiral Farragut, and the Cuyler
and Oneida were sent by him in chase. The Cuyler, having
followed him down to the West Indies, fell in with the Santiago de Cuba, one of the ships of my squadron, and without
any knowledge, united with her, and cruised to the coast of
Yucatan in search of the rebels. This cruise being ended,
both vessels joined me at Cape Antonio, west end of Cuba,
and, no doubt existing of the presence of the rebels in those
seas, I immediately, on the 21st of January, ordered both
vessels in pursuit; the Cuyler whilst so employed, being in
strict execution of the orders of Admiral Farragut, and the
Santiago de Cuba, belonging to my own squadron, being
subject to any duty I chose to direct.
The Cuyler was short of coal, and had to be supplied by
the Santiago de Cuba, to enable her to make this cruise. I




33
appointed them to rendezvous at Lobos island, where they
arrived about the 2d of February. The Cuyler being in
need of repairs before she could go upon other service, on
the 3d of February I ordered her to Key West for that purpose. Before her repairs were completed, Captain Emmons
reCive(i an order from Admiral Farragut to rejoin his squadron, which he did as soon as his ship was in sailing condition. I saw no more of her. This constitutes the entire
history of my connection with the Cuyler. She came tothe
West Indies by order of Admiral Farragut-was vigorously
employed as he had directed, during her stay there-and
upon his orders returned to rejoin his squadron without any
interference or obstruction from me. I say, therefore, that
I did not, as charged, on or about the 2d of February, 1863,
unite the R. R. Cuyler to the West India squadron, and continue for several months thereafter to control and employ
her as a part of the force under my command.
On the contrary, on or about the 2d of February, I sent
her to Kev West for repairs, and never saw her again. Nor
did I, as charged, impair the efficiency of the West Gulf
squadron, and impede the performance of the duties assigned
to Admiral Farragut. On the contrary, I united one of my
own vessels to the Cuyler, to render her cruising more efficient, and to give her some hope of accomplishing what she
never could achieve alone. She was, in all, but twelve days
under my command.
So, too, in respect to the Oneida, as shown by the evidence, she came into the midst of my squadron, and under
my jurisdiction, without my knowledge or procurement.
On the escape of the Oreto from Mobile, both the Cuyler
and Oneida had been despatched by Admiral Farragut in
pursuit. On entering Havana, about the 23d January, 1863,
I learned that the Oreto or Florida had been in that port,
and had left that morning. The Oneida was then lying off
the entrance of tke harbor, and I instantly despatched a
boat, with a communication to the commanding officer, requiring him to join me. She came into the harbor, and
without anchoring, we both started on the afternoon of the
same day, in chase of the Florida. We continued on the
cruise, and in vigorous pursuit, with hardly any intermission, until the 22d February, when we both entered the
harbor of San Juan, Porto Rico, and, after coaling, proceeded thence to St. Thomas,
As in all the orders from the Secretary of the Navy, a
very marked prominence was given to the capture of the
3




34
rebel privateers, and as Admiral Farragut had sent the
Oneida into mny cruising ground in full chase of the Oreto,
it was impossible for me to doubt that I would be meeting
the wishes and expectations of both the Secretary and Admiral by continuing her, for the time being, n1ider my own
command, in the performance of that importa~nt service.  T
knew I would thus be best discharging my duty to my country, and not transcending the limits of my just and rightful
authority. Not doubting that my course would be sanctioned by my Government, on the 2d February I advised
the Hon. Secretary of the Navy that the Oneida having been
sentin search of the Oreto, I had furnished lher with coal, and
united her to my own force to keep up a hot pursuit.  I
also received from  Admiral Farragut a letter, bearing date
February 6, authorizing me to keel, both the Oneida anld the
Cuyler as long as they were on the track of either of the
enemy's vessels witli a probability of overtaking them.
Having, as before stated, written the Secretary on the 2d of
February, I received from him, about the 2d of April, the
order of the 6th March, set out in. the specification now under consideration, to send back the Oneidfa and Cuyler to
Admiral Farragut.
But I already had the letter of Adniral Farragut, giving
me permission to retain themn  and I was bound to suppose
that the Hon. Secretary would assent to any disposition
wvhich Admiral Farragut might see lit to make of the forces
under his command; and consequently did not hesitate to
retain the Oneida, and keep her oil the most active duty
with a view  to finding and capturing the rebel cruisers.
Moreover, this order was not imperative. It gave me the
discretion to retainithe Cuyler, and send one of' my doubleend vessels instead. But the Cuvler was gone, not only before I received the order, but befotre the order was written.
The Oneida was, at that time, the only vessel of Admiral
FarrIagut's squadron under my comnland, and as I had his
permission to keep her, and as she was then upon the most
urgent and important duty, fromi which she could not be
withdrawn without another vessel to relieve her, and as I
had none suitable for such service, was it criminal, was it
even unreasonable in me to suppose I was at liberty to retain
her, and send one of my double-end vessels instead? Whatever conclusion the Court may reach, I at the time supposed
I was faithfully and acceptably discharging my duty in the
circumstances under which I was placed. All thinigs considered, the Cuyler having already gone back to Admiral




Farragut, and the Oneida being upon duty of the highest
moment, I deemed it my duty to lay the particulars of my
situation before the Secretary and await his further instructions.
I, therefore, replied to the Secretary upon the instant,
informing him  that the Cuyler had already returned to
Admiral Faragut, and the Oneida would be sent after slhe
Bad performed the important service she was then on; and
added in conclusion, " I beg to informi the Department that
it is very desirable to have a vessel to relieve the Oneida.
I have none at my disposal, but what are on equally important duty."  But, anxious to comply with all the orders of
the Secretary, and conform as far as possible to the wishes
of the Department, weak and crippled as my squadron wasinadequate as it was to meet the necessities of the public
service in the West Indies-I prepared an order for the Sonoma, one of my double-end vessels, directing her to report
to Admiral Farragut, but befbore she could depart for that
point, an order reached me from the Hon. Secretary to send
her home.
The Oneida was keeping watch over Martinique.  She
was the only vessel occupied with that important service. I
could not withdraw her without the greatest detriment to
our interests, and I had no vessel with whiclh to replace her.
Still anxious to know the wishes of the Department, and to
be advised as to what was expected of me under the embarrassing circumstances in which I was placed, I again wrote
the Hon. Secretary, explaining my situation, and fully and
frankly presenting, for his consideration, all the facts of the
case. I said to him, " in my letter of the 2d April, I wrote
that I intended to return the Oneida as soon as she had
performed the important service she was then on. The
Department suggested that 1 might send another vessel in
her place.
This I found I should have to do, and designated the Sonoma; but shortly afterwards your orders were received to
send her to New York for repairs.  Tthe Alabama was
cruising with the Onedia.  She broke down, and has been
undergoing repairs for some five weeks; and I was therefore compelled to retain the Oneida until such time as I
could send another vessel from the leeward to relieve her."
To all this I received no reply.  Was it not natural,
reasonable, even inevitable to conclude that my action met
the approbation of the Department, and that I had its sanction fbr all I had done? There was, at least, an acquiescence




86
clearly indicating that at that time, in the presence ot the
circumstances which then existed, the emergencies that I
had to deal with, the Department was not willing to take the
responsibility of ordering otherwise. Shall that acquiescence
now be withdrawn, and conduct which the Department did
not, at the time, condemn or reprimand, be now made the
basis of conviction and punishnment by a court-martial?
Let such a precedent be established, and the condition of a
naval officer, on a distant station, with new and intricate
questions constantly arising, with which he is bound in some
way to deal, is not only enmbarrassingl-it is pitiable.  The
Department, at the time of these occurrences, made its
election to let them pass without remonstrance or rebuke, and
it should be held to its decision.
The second charge is"Insubordinate conduct, and negligenlce or carelessness
in obeying orders."
The first specification under this charge recites the order
from the Navy Department to me, dated September 8, 1862,
placing me in command of the West India squadronl, and a
dispatch from the Depatment to me, dated January 29, 1863,
regarding the indebtedness of the government of Venezuela
to citizens of the United States, to which I slhall make more
special reference hereafter; and then proceeds to say that
"he, the said Commodore Charles Wilkes, did, in disregard of the tenor and manifest meaning of the two lawful orders afioresaid,  and in a manner interfering most
seriously Nwith the urgent special duties assigned to him, and
interrupting their due performance, proceed himself, on or
about the 24th May, 1863, in the said steamship Vanderbilt,
to the Part of Laguayra, in Venezuela, and did there detain
the said steamship about nine days, upon business and for
purposes in nowise warranting such detention of the said
steamship at that place and not connected either with the
important and then very urgent war service to which the
said efficient steamship had been and then was especially
assigned by the Secretary of the Navy; nor with the special
belligerent duty assigned as aforesaid to him, the said Commodore Charles Wilkes, as commander of the said West
India squadron."
There is a somewhat embarrassing vagueness in this
specification.
It is not clear whetlher it is intended to charge the offence
as consisting in uoing to Laguayra in the Vanderbilt, or in
going to Laguayra upon the particular business that called me




37
there, without reference to the ship that bore me; or in going to Laguayra in person instead of sending another.
As, however, by the first specification under the first
charge, my use of the Vanderbilt during the entire time I
had her under my command, is made tile foundation of a
separate and distinct charge to which I am called to answer,
and upon which my conviction is asked, I cannot suppose it
to be the intention of the honorable Secretary to ask a second conviction for a fraction of the time covered by the former charge and specificatioll. So, also, as the honorable Secretary himself directed the service to be performed which
was accomplished by the trip to Laguayra, I cannot do hiim the
injustice of attributing to him the purpose of now making
the performanee of that duty the gravamen of the imputed
offence. The only logical conclusion from the specification,
and its surroundings, is that I am now prosecuted for having gone to Laguayra in person instead of deputing some subordinate officer ill Smy coinmanud upon the important mission
which I executed myself. This I assume as the essence and
true meaning of the charge and specification. If the business which took me to Laguayra was proper to be done, and
if the Vanderbilt was lawfully under my command, then I
had the same right to use her to convey me there that I
would have had to use any other vessel belonging to my
squadron.
That she was rightfully in my possession, and under my
orders, I have already discussed, and I think demonstrated.
That it was proper and necessary for some vessel of my
squadron to go at the time, and upon the mission to which
she was devoted, and that it was imperative upon me to have
the matter which called me to La nuayra attended to, I apprehend will not be controverted. The whole question is therefore resolved into an inquiry as to my right to go instead of
sending  another; and this the Court will determine upon
consideration of all the circumstances which induced me to
go. What were they?
Being conmmander-in-chief of the squadron in the Bahanmas and West Indies, Laguayra was in my cruising ground,
and necessarily one of the places which was to receive my
attentioll; and, wholly independent of any special business,
it was competent for me to sail there with any part or all of
my squadron at any time when in Rmy judgment a necessity
existed for doing so. This cannot be questioned. It was a
matter purely within my own discretion.  Can it be possible that uniting with niy visit there which, even for other




38
reasons, I deemed necessary, a special business with which
I awas specially charged, and which in no way interfered
with the purposes of the voyage, converts into a criminal
offence an act for which, but for such specia} business, I
could not have been held to account?
Whilst in the West Indies, in command of the squadron
on duty there, I received from  the honorable Secretary of
the Navy a dispatch, dated January 29th, 1863, by which I
was informed that the Secretary of State, in a recentt eonimunication to the Navy Department, in regard to the nonpayment by Veneznela of large installments long over due to
our citizens under treaty stipulations, had asked if it would
not be in the power of the Navy Department to order one of
our naval vessels into the port of Lagnayr~a, for a temporary
purpose, in case it should be deemed expedient to adopt
that course for the protection of the rights of our citizens.
The Hon. Secretary then proceeds: "' The Department
stated in reply that it could not give assurances that it would
be able to order a vessel as indicated at any specified future
day, but that it would direct you to let one of the vessels
of your squadron visit Laguayra when and as often as it
could be done without serious interference with the special
duties which have been assigned to you, which you will
accordihgly do, instructing the commanding officer of such
vessel to put himself in communication with our Minister at
Caraccas."
This dispatch conveyed two orders to me. First, to let
one of the vessels of my squadron visit Laguayra when
and as often as it could be done without serious interference
with the special duties which had been assigned to me.  Of
the time when, and the vessel which was to go, I was to
judge.  Neither time nor vessel wras designated. My discretion was to determine both, and if in the exercise of that
discretion I should deem it better to go myself than send
another, I did not doubt my right to do so.  Second, to
instruct the commanding officer of the vessel which slhould
go to p It himself in conmurnication with our  Tinister at Caraccas. This was imperative.  There was no discretion about
it.  Whoever should go, whether myself or another, was to
put himself in communication with our Minister at Caraceas.
Immediately on receipt of this dispatch, April 2, 1863, I
replied to the Hon. Secretary that " the matter therein referred to shall receive my earliest attention."  Owingrto the
condition of the vessels of my squadron, and the important
duties such of them as were fit for service had to perform,




39
no suitable occasion for carrying into effect the wishes of
the Secretary had occ-irred, when, on the 15th of May I
received a dispatch from the American Minister at Brussels
saying he had been advised by the Secretary of State of the
correspondence between him and the Secretary of the Navy
in regard to a visit to Laguayra by one of my squadron,
and adding, "I hope that you or one of your squadron will
be able at an early day to touch at Laguayra, or I fear that
your intervention will come too late for any practical results."
Coincident with the arrival of this letter was the receipt of
intelligence which I believed reliable, that rebel cruisers
were present in the Windward and Leaward islands, and
the occasion was now presented of visiting the port of Laguayra, not only "without serious interference with the
special duties which had been assigned me," but in complete harmony with, and the efficient prosecution of those
duties..
The conditions predicated by the Secretary upon which
Laguayra was to be visited had arisen, and I promptly
addressed him a despatch dated "Flag steamer Vanderbilt,
St. Thomas, May 23, 1863," in which I said to him, "The
repairs of the boilers of the Vanderbilt having been completed,
and the vessel coaled, we are ready, and will proceed to Laguayra from here to meet the wishes of the Secretary of State,
evinced in the letter of the Department of January 29. * *
The duties of the squadron have prevented my action
before this time. I have kept it in view continually, and
will be able now to make my visit there correspond with
other duties."
This thing was not done in a corner. There was no concealments. The Secretary was fully and perfectly'informed
at all times of what I intended to do, and of what I had
done when it was accomplished. If my action did not meet
the approval of the Department if my conduct was regarded
as insubordinate, the plain principles of justice required
that I should then have been informed of it; that it should
not have been concealed from me. I kept in ignorance of
any intended censure for nine months after the occurrence
of the events, till after I had been relieved from active duty
and placed upon the retired list; and then without notice
and without the opportunity  of explanation, brought
before a court-martial to answer criminally for services
which, when they were rendered, I believed were not only
within the strict line of my duty, but which LI had also




40
reason to believe met the hearty and unequivocal apIprobation of my Government.
It is very true, in the dispatch of January 29, from the
Department to me, upon this subject, the language used is
that the Secretary of the Navy informed the Secretary of
State that he would direct me to let one of the vessels of my
squadron visit Laguayra; and the charge now under consideration imputes to me insubordination in going with one
of the vessels of my squadron myself, instead of sendilng her
under the command of another. So literal a construction
of the language and meaning of the order would, under any
circumstances which at any time surrounded me in the West
Indies, be harsh. Ullder the circumstances which actually
existed at the time of this expedition, it would be inexcusably unjust. After the receipt of the order under which I
acted, a chance had occurred in our relations with the Government of Venezuela not anticipated by the Hon. Secretary. He contemplated only sending a vessel into the port
of Laguayra to give aid and countenance to our Minister in
his negotiations, and demand the payment of the installments due.
It was not expected that the officer who should go down
would himself have to become a negotiator, and, for the occasion, the diplomatic representative of our Government.
That duty was expected to be performed by the Minister.
But the Minister had withdrawn his credentials; terminated
all intercourse between the Governments, and left us without a representative at Caraccas-a fact well known to me,
but unknown to the Secretary. An emergency not anticipated had arisen, and it became me to adapt my conduct to
meet it. The question was complicated, and the difficulty
of adjustment increased by the action of our Minister in
dissolving his relations with the Government of Venezuela,
and the necessity for the presence of some one whom the
Government of Venezuela would recognize and treat with
rendered more urgent and imperative. The duty to be
performed was difficult, delicate, and embarrassing. I could
not entrust it to one of my subordinates. There was no
officer of sufficient rank besides rmyself to enter into direct
communication with the Government upon such a subject.
In this condition of affairs I did not hesitate, but proceeded
with the Vanderbilt to Laguayra, the only vessel then in
the port of St. Thomas fit for that duty. Leaving her in the
port of Laguayra with orders to sail without a moment's
delay upon information of the presence of any rebel cruiser




41
in those waters, I proceeded to Caraccas, put myself in cornmunication with the proper authorities, accomplished the
object of my visit by securing the payment of $150,000 due
to our citizens, returned at once to Laguayra, took command of my ship, and resumed my cruise.
It is shown by the evidence, that there was no more
eligible point in my cruising ground than Lagnayra as a
lookout and to obtain information of cruisers on the Spanish
Main. On my way down I visited Blanquilla, a hundred
miles to the east of Laguayra, where a rebel steamer had
coaled some time previously, and where I had reason to
apprehend some of the rebels would attempt to coal again,
and to which island the Secretary had drawn my attention.
On my way back I communicated with Curacoa, a hundred
miles to the westward of Laguayra and with Santa Cruz,
and learned from the vice consul at Frederickstadt tlat the
rebel Florida was expected there in a few days. This information may have been and probably was incorrect; but at
that time it was not known to me, nor to any other one
officially connected with our Government, to be so, and it
was my duty to act upon it.
When I started for Laguayra, the rebel cruisers were
reported to be in the Windward islands, or off the Spanish
Main. These reports were well authenticated. They came
from those whose especial business it was to acquire information and communicate it to me, and I could not, without
a culpable neglect of duty, have disregarded it.
Assuming and believing the information which I thus
received to be reliable, I should have deemed it an imperative duty to go to Laguayra, Blanquilla, and Curacoa, even
if I had had no orders to enforce the payment of the debt
due our citizens by the Government of Venezuela. The
only difference was, that I lay in the port of Laguayra a
little longer than I should have done but for this added duty.
But I tarried not an instant longer than was indispensably
necessary to secure the large interests intrusted to my care,
and which, but for my attention, would in all probability
have been lost beyond the hope of redemption.
But, all the time, my ship lay with her fires banked, with
orders to put to sea whenever demanded by the public interests, and was not detained a single hour by my absence
at Caraccas.  The faithful, conscientious, energetic, and
eminently successful performance of this duty is now urged
against me, as an act of insubordination for which I should
be punished!




42
Can any member of the Court doubt that, if I could, on
the instant, have communicated to the honorable Secretary
the precise situation ot afiairs, and all the circumstances of
the case as they were known to me-can any member of the
Court doubt that he would have ordered me to do precisely
what I did? But I could not communicate with him. The
time for action had come. The emergency was upoI me.
The tide in the affair had come, which had to be taken at
its flood or permitted to ebb to return no more. It would
have been most reprehensible to have paused, and hesitated,
and doubted till the opportunity was gone; and had I done
so, I cannot hesitate to believe that I would have been subjected to trial before a court-martial, for gross neglect of
duty. Naval officers, more than any others, often find themselves in conditions of great perplexity —in circumstances
wheretthey are alike exposed to censure whether they act or
whether they remain passive. They are to "be damned if
they do, and be damned if they don't."  This now appears
to have been my situation; I was between "the devil and
the deep sea," and to be roasted or drowned, act as I would.
But, not pausing to count the cost, and to calculate the
chances of personal censure or commendation, and intent
alone upon executing all the orders of the Department to
the uttermost of my ability, I made the voyage to Laguayra,
with the double object of cruising for the rebel pirates and
securing from total loss the debts due our citizens by the
Government of Venezuela. Immediately on my return to
St. Thomas, I informed the Department fully of my expedition and its results. In my despatch from St. Thomas, under date of June 9, 1863, I laid before the honorable Secretary the reasons that impelled me to go; gave minutely all
the details of my visit and negotiation; announced the result, and then added, " I trust that the Department will be
well pleased that the affair has terminated successfully, and
that we have left a favorable impression on the minds of the
Government and people." In reply to this I received no
word of rebuke, no intimation of disapprobation. I did then
believe that the Department was well pleased, and have since
had no reason to doubt the justness of that conclusion, until
recently astonished by the information that it was to constitute one of the grounds of complaint against me upon this
trial. Till then I had supposed that, so far fiom hlaving incurred the censure, I had secured the warm approbation of
my Governnment in this regard. The Government had, at
all events, after being fully apprised of all the particulars of




43
the transaction, accepted what I had done, and quietly and uncomplainingly acquiesce(d, and by such acquiescence ratified
fled my proceedinlgs. There is no principle of law better settled
than that where a principal, with full knowledge of all the
circumstances of the case, acquiesces in the acts, doings, or
omissions of his agent, such acquiescence amounts to a ratification by which he will be bound as fully, to all intents and
purposes, as if he had originally given him direct authority
in the premises, to the extent which such acts, doings, or
omissions reach.
After such acquiescence for nine months, it is too late,
for the first time to repudiate my conduct, and bring me before a court martial to answer for it.
The second specification of the second charge is, that I
failed to deliver duplicate orders, addressed by the Navy Department to Lieutenant Macomb, commanding the -steamship Genesee, of the James river squadron, under my command, and that I also failed to deliver a similar duplicate
order to Paymaster Hyde, of the said ship, suspending them
from duty on furlough, until they did certain acts required
by the regulations.
In the hurry of sailing from Boston, Lieutenant Macomb
had neglected to sign the invoices for ordnance and ordnance
stores, and left without the signal book; and Paymaster
Hyde had failed to receipt for the stores received in his department.  The reason for this was, that the vessel was hurrie(l from Boston, as was supposed, on a trial trip, before the
final receipts were given.
I disprove the allegation that I failed to deliver the orders.
I did transmit them, and have produced in evidence the
letter of Lieutenant Mlacomb to me, of July 14, 1862, acknowledging the receipt.
The part of the charge  upon which the prosecution relies
is, no doubt, that I failed to carry them into effect.  When
these orders were received by me, the Genesee was fifty
miles distant from where I was, engaged day and night in
the serious and arduous duty of protecting the flank of General McClellan's army from an active, wily, and then emboldened and confident enemy, to whose attacks it was constantly exposed.  I had no officer to put in command of the
vessel in Lieutenant Macomb's place, arid it was impossible
for me to carry the order for his suspension into effect vithout the nlost serious detriment to the service in which I was
then engaged-without, in fact, imperilling the safety of our
Army.




44
In these circumstances, I took the responsibility of suspending the immediate execution of the orders, and thereupon received from the Secretary of the Navy a letter, dated
August 5th, 1862, severely censuring and reprimanding me
for the course I had thought it my imperative duty to
adopt.
The 9th article of the 35th chapter of the "Orders and
Instructions for the Government of the Naval Service" provides that " ally offense for which an offender has been reprimanded shall not be revived, and subsequently investigated, except when it mnay be indispensible to prove a
particular habit charged."
This I urge iln bar to the further prosecution of this charge,
and insist that it constitutes a full and complete defence;
and here I niight leave it; but there are other answers to be
given not less conclusive.
On the 11th of August, in reply to the letter above referred to, I made a full statement of all the facts of the case
to the Department; on consideration of which the honorable
Secretary suspended all further proceedings; forebore to inflict the intended punishment upon Lieutenant Macomb and
Paymaster Hyde; continued them in their positions s; and
on the 20th of August wrote me in response to mine of the
11th.  "As regards the excuses or causes that might justify
the officers, nothing further need be said, for the subject is
disposed of."
Upon a full view of the entire case and its surroundings,
the honorable Secretary seemed to concur with me in opinion that the removal of Lieutenant Macomb front his command, in the presence of a vigilant  enemy, would have been
untimely and hazardous under the pressing necessities of
our Army, just after the six day's fight at Fair Oaks and
Chickahominy, and its retreat to Harrison's Landing, and
the subject was disposed of by dropping all further proceedings.
But even this is not all. The Department, in consideration of my services whilst in command of the Jamnes river
flotilla, shortly afterwards, and within twenty days from the
time that the Secretary had informed me the subject of this
charge was disposed of; conferred on nme the command of
the West India squadron, and sent me to protect the interests and commerce of my country on that important station.
Could I, could any one, suppose that at the very moment
when I zwas honored with so distinguished a mark of the
confidence of the Department in my ability and fidelity, I




45
was still resting under the imputation of insubordinate conduct and negligence in obeying orders, for which I was
hereafter to be brought to answer before a court-martial?
I did suppose, as the Secretary had informed me, that the
whole subject was disposed of. The explanation why, after
slumbering for eighteen months, it is now revived and prosecuted, and my conviction demanded upon it, may possibly
be found in one of the charges which yet remains to be exarini ed.
Third Charge.-" Disrespect, and disrespectful language,
to his superior officer whilst in the execution of his office."
This charge is very manifestly framed under the 4th
clause of the 7th article of the 1st section of the act for the
better government of the Navy of the United States, approved July 17, 1862. That clause is in the following
word (ls:
"' Or shall treat with contempt his superior officer, or be
disrespectful to him  in language or deportment, whilst in
the executionl of his office."
The 2d article of the 5th chapter of General Regulations
provides that: 1 "All personsini the Navy shall conduct themselves with respect to their superiors, and show every proper
attention to tliose under their orders, havirg due regard to
their situation."
I can find nothing else, either in the law or the regulations for the government of the Navy, per'tinent to thle subject-matter of this charge. Both law'and regulations clearly
have reference to officers ill the Navy; persons holdling commissiols and entitled to command in the Navy; and to the
official intercourse between them, and to no others.  The
specification under this charge is, that on the 11th Decemnber, 1863, I addressed a letter to the Secretary of the Navy
"of an insubordinate anld disrespectful character, containing
remarks and statements not wvarranted by the tacts, and disrespectful to the Secretary of the Navy."
If this were conceded to be true, is it subject to punishmerient under the law and regulations above quoted; and, if
not, then under what law or regulation am  I to be held to
answer for it?
The Secretary is, in no sense, al officer of the Navy. He
holds no commissiol, and is entitled to no comlmand, in the
Navy.  Tile Presidenlt is thle Commr-ander-in-Chief of the
Navy, and the admirals, commodores, captains, &c., are the
subordirlate officers unlder him. Disrespect to the conmmander-in-chief is properly made an offence punishable by law,
but disrespect to others than officers of the Navy is not pro



46
vided for.  Orders issued by the Secretary of the Navy to
officers of the Navy are obligatory only because they are
the orders of the President-the commnander-in-chief of the:Navy-and disobedience of these, as such, is undoubtedly punishable. But then the offence must be charged to
consist in disobedience of the orders of the President,
not of the Secretary.  But, in the second place, if it be
conceded that the Secretary is within the purview of the
law, then I answer that the charge is altogether too vague
and indefinite to warrant the Court in proceeding upon it.
It designates no single fact that is untrue, no single word
that is disrepectful; but in the broadest and most general
terms possible, charges " statements not warranted by the
facts, and disrespectful to the Secretary of the Navy." What
those facts are, and in what that disrespect conlsists, the
prosecutor has not deigned to inf(irm me.
I am fully aware that courts-martial are not tied down to
the technical formalities of courts of law, yet where the observance of certain rules is essential to enable a prisoner to
grapple with the charge, they become inseparable with justice, and ought on no account to be disregarded.
Mr. Simmons, in his excellent treaties on courts-martial,
page 135, states the rule thus: " It is well known by everybody, that in the case of charges brought before a courtmartial, they are not bound to tile technical formalities which
prevail in other courts of law; but there is this essential
principle in every charge, before any court that can exist in
the civilized world, that the charge should be sufficiently
specific to enable the person to know what he is to answer,
and to enable the Court to know what they are called to inquire into."
And in illustration of the above principle, at page 218,
after stating that a prisoner may avail himself of' want of
specification in the charge as to matter or time, he adds —
"as for instance, an officer charged with scandalous, infamous conduct, or a soldier with disgraceful conduct, without
any mention of facts to which thle category is meant to refer."  And again, at page 171, he says, "It is not only
within the power of a court-martial, but a duty, the neglect
of which may incur censure, to judge of the propriety of
the charge, not only as regards the nature of it with reference to their jurisdiction, but also, whether the wording be
sufficiently precise, and the crime clearly defined."
The application of these principles and illustrations to the
charge under consideration, ought to satisfy the court of the
impropriety of considering it. If, however, the court shall




47
dissent from my views of the law, and proceed to an investigation of the charge, then I answer that it is not true in
fact.  The Secretary, in his annual report, which was published to the world, imputed to me the crime of defeating the
objects cand pl?urposes of the Detpartrnent to captlure the rebel pirates,
by attachliig the Vanderbilt to my squadron inz the lVest JIdies, in.
deroqation of the orders to Lieuttenant _Baldwin, an;d itnlproperly
retctrilng her utrnlil after the month of Mlay.
In my opinion this treatment was cruelly unjust.  I had
been etngaged upon the most important, perilous, and harassing duty, which I had endeavored honestly and faithfully to
perform  in such manner as to protect the interests, guard
the honor, alud uphold the authority of my Governlment.  I
was proud to believe that my efforts had not been in vain~
To perform my duties with due fidelity to my own Government, I was constrained to deal energetically, and sometimes
rigorously, with the autihorities of other governments. This
exposed nme to their censure, and I became the ol~ject of
bitter and unstinted denunciation by all those in sylmpathy
with treason and rebellion, whose schemes of plunder and
aggraldizemlent were defeated by the b)reaking up of the
contraband trade carried on from  the West Indies and Bahanmas.  May compensation for all this was the approval of
the Government whose commission I bore, under wliose authority I acted, and whose wisihes it was rmy most ardent
desire to eibectuate.  It was a part of mny duty never neglected, to keep thle honorable Secretary fully advised of all
my movements.  IMy dispatchles to him were numerous, and
sometimes voluminous; and I was notified of no discontent
tith my proceedings.  The first intimation I ever had of the
purpose to attribute to me the failure of plans for the capture of the rebel rovers, was conveyed to me in the published report of the honorable Secretary.  I was not only
astonished —-I was amazed; and felt deeply aggrieved at
what I regarded as a flagrant injustice. Knowing the charge
to be altogether unfounded and unjust, and most injurious
to my reputation if permitted to go unnoticed, had I not a
right, in dignified and becoming terms, to repel the charge,
and vindicate my character?  Believing that I had, I addressed the letter under consideration to the honorable Secretary.  It is respectful in language, temperate in tone and
spirit, and in all respects a legitimate explanation and defence of my own conduct, whilst in command of the West
India squadron.  My sole motive was to exonerate myself
firom undeserved censure, and to ask for the publication of




48
my correspondence, whilst serving as Rear Admiral on that
station, as my surest and most complete justification.
Tile prosecution has not thought fit to specify the portions
of the letter deemed disrespectful; nor can I designate them;
nor, I may venture to assert, can the Court, unless it shall be
adjudged a crime for all officer, in firm and manly terms, to
reply to most public and hurtful attacks upon his reputation.
In that event, I can only submit to whatever puishnment the
Court may deem adequate to such an offence.
Charge Fourth.-" Refusal of obedience to a lawful general order or regulation issued by the Secretary of the Navy."
The specification is, in substance, that without the consent
of the Secretary of the Navy so to do, I did procure, or consent to, or acquiesce in, or connive at, or through design, or
carelessness, or inattention, allow, or fail to prevent the conveyance to the office of the New York Times, in Washington,
of a copy of my letter to the Secretary of the Navy, of
December 11th, with a view to its publication.
All that has been said of the vague and indefinite character of the third charge, just discussed. is equally applicable
to this. It would be difficult to frame a charge which would
give to the accused less information, or more effectually
c( nceal from him. the precise offence that he was expected
to meet and defend against.
The regulation under which the charge is exhibited is,
"official instructions and communications must not be published, nor copies furnished to any person, without the permission of the Secretary of the Navy."
It is somewhat singular that under this regulation, promnulgated by the honorable Secretary himself, hie should set
on foot a prosecution for carelessness and inattention, in
keeping watch and ward over the letter I had vritten, and
failing to prevent a copy of it firom being procured.  I-How
long wvas I to keep up that surveillance, and how far was I
to extend it?  The letter, of course, when  written, was to
go out of my possession. I did not write it to put under
lock and key and keep secret. It was written to be sent to
the Secretary of the Navy, and was sent to him.  When it
reached the Navy Department it was open to inspectionmany persons had access to it-and yet under the charge,
as presented, I am just as liable to conviction for carelessness, and inattention for not guarding it there, and not preventing a copy from being conveyed from there, as anywhere
else.  The regulation denounces no such offence as careless



49
ness or inattention. It prohibits two things only, publishing
and furnishing a copy.
I intend no quibble or evasion, but concede that if I connived at, or acquiesced in, or willfully consented to a copy
being furnished, I am equally culpable as if I had furnished
it myself. But what I do mean to say is, that I was not
bound to keep guard over the letter; and that if a copy was
procured and published without my knowledge or consent,
it matters not from what quarter, or by what means, I am
not amenable to punishment for it. And I do mean further
to say that I had no participation in, connection with, or
knowledge of the furnishing a copy, or the publication, until
that knowledge came to me, as it did to others, through the
medium of the public press. The onJy part of the charge
to which I need respond, is that which imputes to me an
agency or participation in the publication, and that I am not
bound to negative. The prosecution makes the accusation,
and it is for the prosecution to establish it affirmatively;
and unless that is done, the accusation must fall.
The failure to connect me in any way with the furnishing
of a copy, or with the publication, is total and complete.
All that is certain about it is, that a copy did come to the
office of the New York Times, and that it was subsequently
published. When it came, how it came, and through what
instrumentality, are questions upon which the evidence has
shed not one ray of light. I am totally indiflierent as to
when it reached the Ilimes office. I do not now, nor did
not during the progress of the evidence, see the significance
of that inquiry. The question is whether it came there
through me or my agency, or in any mannerby my procurement. And upon this point there is a total failure of evidence. So far as the proofs go, they tend strongly to negative the assumption. It is proven that the copy was not
in my handwriting, and that the publication was not
made by my solicitation, nor at the solicitation of any one
on my behalf. The newspaper correspondents themselves
who have been examined as witnesses, have no knowledge
whatever as to how or by whom it was conveyed to their
office. The most that the Court can do will be to indulge
in conjecture, and I can apprehend no danger of such conjecture being made the basis of a judgment of conclemnation in a case of such serious import.
Even as to the time when the copy was received the evidence is so conflicting and contradictory as to make it impossible for any tribunal to decide it. Upon this po;nt the
4




50
prosecution examined three witnesses. One of them swore
to Saturday, another to Sunday, and the third to Tuesday.
I do not question the integrity of any one of the witnesses,
and allude to these various statements only for the purpose
of impressing on the Court the necessity of circumspection
in arriving at grave conclusions through the fiail medium of
human memory.
Many surmises might be indulged as to how the copy for
publication was procured; but it is enough for me that the
evidence fails to connect me with it, and I forbear to discuss
them; also forbear comment upon that sort of censorship
over the press which wields it in assailing reputation, and
forbids it to the injured as the medium of defence and justification.
5th Charge. —" Conduct unbecoming an officer, and constituting offence made punishable by article 8th of articles
adopted and put in force for the government of the Navy
of the United States."
The first specification under this charge is that on two
occations the Secretary of the Navy sent to me printed circulars with blank forms to be filled up with the day, month,
and year of my birth, and to be returned to him, and that
I failed to fill up such blank forms in the proper manner,
and instead of so doing made and persisted in making
evasive, informal, and insufficient answers respecting my
age.
The 8th article above referred to is, that " all offences
committed by persons belonging to the 1Navy which are not
specified in the foregoing articles, shall be punished as a
court-martial shall direct."
The prosecutions seem to suppose that any act whatever
which the Navy Department may choose to regard as an
offence is punishable under this article. But this is manifestly not so. No act is punishable as an offence unless it
be in violation of some law or some regulation. This article
does not clothe the Secretary with authority to treat any
and every act which may be distasteful to him as an offence
punishable at the discretion of a court-martial. The language is offences " not specified in the foregoing articles."
If they are not specified in the foregoing articles, they must
be specified in some other articles or some law, or regulations, or they are not offences at all, and not punishable.
The act with which I am charged, or rather the omission




51
with which I am charged, is not made an offence by any
law or regulation, and I cannot be punished for it.
I, however, meet the case upon the facts, and submit them
for the consideration of the Court.
In December, 1863, the Department transmitted to me a
circular containing the following:
" The law of December 21, 1861, renders it indispensable
that all officers of the Navy should furnish the Department
with their exact age."
It then directed me to fill up the blanks in the circular,
and return it to the Department.
The first remark I have to make upon this is, that the
law of December 21, 1861, did. not contemplate any such
application to the officers of the Navy. It simply provided
"that whenever the name of any naval officers now in the
service, or who may hereafter be in the service, or who may
hereafter be in the service of the United States, shall have
been borne on the Navy Register forty-five years or shall be
of the age of sixty-two years, he shall be relieved from active service, and his name entered on the retired list of officers
of the grade to which he belonged at the time of such retirement," this is the only provision of law there is upon
the subject, and this clearly intended that the action of the
Department should be controlled by the records of the
Department. It neither provides for nor contemplates application to the officers themselves for information.
And so the Hon. Secretary himself understood the law,
and so he acted upon it. Whilst in the West Indies protecting our commerce from pirates, and intercepting and
suppressing the trade of the blockade runners, I received
from the Secretary of the Navy, in reply to one of my urgent
requests for more vessels, a letter dated November 12, 1862,
informing me that I was reduced from  my rank as Acting
Rear Admiral to that of Captain on the retired list from the
21st December, 1861, on account of my age. Disrated, at
a moment in the operations of my squadron when I was
most earnestly and laboriously engaged in the service of my
country, my first impulse was to tender my resignation,
and retire from a service in which my only rewards were
contumely and reproach; but the critical condition of our
naval affairs in those seas induced me to sacrifice my personal feelings to a sense of patriotism, and continued on
duty.
The letter of the Secretary disrating me, informed me that
it had " been ascertained from the records of the Department"




52
that my age exceeded sixty-two years. This fact having
been ascertained from the records of the Department, and
having been acted upon by the Secretary in disratingme
and placing me on the retired list, why apply to me, more
than a year after, to give them information of which he was
already possessed, and which he had made the basis of important official action? What was the object-what the
motive? I had spent my life from my youth, mainly upon
the sea. The fanlily record had been carried by a brother
to Charleston, South Carolina. I had no copy of it or access
to it, and did not then and do not now know the precise day
of my birth.
Still, anxious to comply with all the requirements of the
Department, although they might seem to me unreasonable,
I addressed a respectful letter to the Secretary, saying, " in
a letter of the 12th November, 1862, addressed to me by the
Hon. Secretary of the Navy, now before me, I was informed
that the records of the Department state the fact of my age,
and on which they notified me they had acted. I presume
that the record thus made by my parents is to be relied upon.
Referring to it, I am," &c., &c.
This was not satisfactory to the Department, and on the 2d
January, 1864, the Hon. Secretary addressed me another letter
requiring me to give my exact age. Still anxious to satisfy
the Department, I sent, in reply, the following: " I certify
upon honor, to the best of my knowledge and belief, I was
born in the month of April, and that I am now sixty-two
years of age."
This also failed to satisfy the Department, and on the 6th
January, 1864, the Hon. Secretary, addressed me in another
letter as follows:
" The circular enclosed in the Department's letter of the
2d January inst., has not been filled out as required. You
have omitted the,year of your birth, and the day of the
month. It is presumed that your neglect to obey the order
of the Department arises from no desire to disobey a positive order required by a law of Congress. You are therefore
directed to fill up the enclosed circular, with the month, the
day of the month, and the year in which you were born."
On the same day, I replied to him: "Your presumption is
true.  I have no desire to disobey an order of the Department required by a law of Congress. The Department
has ordered me to do what it is out of my power to do-to
state the year of my birth and the day of the month. In
the certificate I enclosed to the Department, I stated what I




53
knew to the best of my knowledge and belief; I can do no
niore. I had previously referred you to the records of the
Department, which you informed me, on the 12th November, 1862, gave my age when I first entered the service. I
had no knowledge of it; but I stated that it must be correct,
if made by my father. I regret not having it in my power
to meet the wishes of the Department; but such is the fact.
It cannot be the expectation of the Department that I should
now state what is unknown to me, and impossible, as I have
no record to show it."
Ought not this to have been accepted? The Department
was already in possession of all the information it was seeking from me, and which I informed the honorable Secretary
I could not give any more definitely. I was already on the
retired list, and it could not be wanted as the foundation of
any further proceeding in my case. Why continue to harass
me about it? And why, especially, bring me before a courtmartial, after I had given all the explanation possible for me
to give?  Was there a latent motive, and a predetermination to fix a quarrel upon me, despite of all I could do to
escape it? These are questions the Court must answer, and
say whether there was anything in my conduct in this affair
unbecoming an officer.
I have now reached the last specification of the last charge;
the last and most extraordinary of all the accusations connected with this very extroadinary prosecution.
The specification is, in substance, that in December last I
received two letters from the Secretary of the Navy, making
inquiries concerning the publication of my letter to him of
the 11th December, and that I failed to make sufficiently
full and explicit answers thereto, and that in one of my
letters of reply, dated December 21st, I used terms and forms
of expression fitted to cast an unfounded and unjust imputation of breach of trust or culpable neglect of duty upon
some person or persons performing official duties in the -Vavy
Department. It is not without difficulty that I maintain the
equanimity of temper and dignity of demeanor which is
becoming before this Court, in the discussion of such an
accusation as this.
In the first place, those parts of the specification which
assume to designate the offence, are destitute of a single
particle of truth. It is not true that I failed to make full
and explicit answers. To demonstrate this, it is only necessary to submit the correspondence between the Hon. Secretary and myself to the scrutiny of the Court. The first letter




54
from the Secretary to me upon the subject was dated
December 19th. In it the Secretary said,'" The Department desires to be informed by you whether or not any
publication of the letter has been made by your agency or
with your knowledge or consent."
On the following day I replied, " I have to state that the
publication of my letter of the 11th instar.it to you, was not
made or authorized by me, nor with my knowledge or
consent."
I cannot conceive, and would not like to have a mind so
constituted as to enable me to conceive, how a more pointed,
direct, explicit, and unequivocal answer could be given to the
questions propounded by the Hon. Secretary. I am incapable of making it more technically and substantially precise.
But, to my astonishment, it was not deemed satisfactory at
the Department, and on the 21st December I received from
the Hon. Secretary a second letter, containing the following:
" Your reply is not so full and explicit as the Department
desired, and leaves room to suppose that you may have unreflectingly furnished a copy of the letter referred to, or
have been aware that a copy was taken. I am reluctant to
believe that any one in the Department has been guilty of
a breach of trust by furnishing a copy of the letter without
authority; yet a copy must have been furnished, either
from the Department or by yourself, with a view to publicity."  To this, without a moment's delay, I replied: " I
am surprised to be informed by your letter of to-day, just
received, that mine to the Department, of the 19th, was not
considered satisfactory or conclusive. I know not how to
make it more so. I respectfully refer you to the assurance
therein made, that I had no knowledge of or connection
with the publication of my letter of December llth."
I repeat, once again, that I had not then, and have not
now, the capacity to make any answer more explicit; my
denial more emphatic. In my answer I attained the utmost
precision that my command of my vernacular enabled me to
do, and I do not covet that intellectual acuteness which can
detect ambiguity or evasion in it.
But it is charged that I used terms and forms of expression fitted to cast an imputation upon some person or persons performing official duties in the Navy Department. I
say, with all the emphasis that I am capable of giving it,
that there is not the slightest possible foundation in truth,
for this charge. The terms and forms of expression that I




55
used are before the Court, and I challenge any mind notmorbidly captious and hypercritical to point to a single word
which can, by possibility, be tortured into the faintest imputation upon any person on earth, either in or out of the
Navy Department.
But suppose it were otherwise. Suppose I had not only
insinuated, but expressly charged that some clerk in the
Navy Department had surreptitiously furnished a copy of
my letter for publication?  What then? 1Have we come to
this complexion at last? Is every employee about the Navy
Department so immaculate as to make the faintest insinuation of faithlessness or dereliction a criminal offence cognizable before and punishable by a court-martial?
Who is the person whose incorruptible purity was thus
wantonly and monstrously assailed? Some person performing official duty in the Navy Department i All the employees
there, from the honorable Secretary, through the Heads of
Bureaus, and all the gradations of clerks, down to door
keepers and messengers, are, in some sense, performing official duty in the Navy Department. To protect these employees from insinuations, is all the correspondence with the
Navy Department to be subjected to the severest scrutiny?
And when optics so keen as " to see what is not to be seen "
shall imagine they have detected some remote and obscure
allusion to possible infidelity in some subordinate clerk,
door keeper, or messenger in the Department, is the naval
service to be interrupted at this critical and momentous era
in our history, and nine Admirals and Commodores be
brought together to exhaust week after week of their valuable time, which ought to be devoted in sustaining the cause
of constitutional government against the assaults of traitors,
in investigating the grave charge, and vindicating the
offended dignity of such clerk, door keeper or messenger?
" Can such things be and overcome us like a summer cloud,
without a special wonder? "
What law brings the employees in the Navy Department
under such protection? What law defines such an offence,
or provides such a remedy? Employees in the Navy Department stand upon the same platform of equality before
the law with all other citizens. If they are injured in person, property, or character, the ordinary and constitutional
tribunals of the country are open to them, where they may
seek and obtain redress. The law-making power has not
thought fit to confer upon them extraordinary privileges,
and to provide extraordinary tribunals, and summary and




56
harsh proceedings for redress of their grievances, either real
or imaginary.
If, therefore, my correspondence contained all that is imputed to it, it would constitute no offence triable by this
Court. But the charge is as groundless in fact, as unsustainable in law. I dismiss it, and with it I dismiss the case.
I have now examined and answered each charge, and each
specification of each charge. I have done. My defence is
closed. You have heard me, with a calmness and patience
becoming the occasion, and I have calmly and patiently
passed through the ordeal. The decision abides with you.
Be that decision what it may, it cannot obliterate the record
of my past services, which, without any touch of egotism, I
may be allowed to say has passed into history, and which,
with a just and unostentatious pride, I am willing to leave
as a heritage to my family. For more than forty years the
great sea has been my home. I have traversed every ocean
and visited every land in the service of my country, and
have every reason to hope that my humble efforts have contributed something towards enlarging the domain of human
knowledge, extending the blessings of civilization and Christianity, and widening and strengthening the fraternity of the
human family.
If your decision shall vindicate me, I shall be gratified.
If it shall be adverse, I cannot feel dishonored, for I will still
be sustained and cheered by the proud consciousness of
having, at all times and in all emergencies, to the full extent
of my ability, and according to the best dictates of my judgment, faithfully performed my whole duty to my country.
I will still have that perfect consciousness, which cannot be
taken from me, nor even impaired, of having been governed
and guided, in my every act, by an ardent, sincere, and unselfish desire to subserve the interests, maintain the honor,
and exalt the glory of the country I have long served with a
fidelity becoming a soldier, and loved with an ardor of affection worthy a patriot.
CHARLES WILKES.